A Cold War in the Soviet Bloc: Polish-East German Relations, 1945-1962

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I N THE

Polish-East German Relations, 1945-1962

Sheldon Anderson

sqiqy - - A Member of the Pcrseus Rooks Croup

All rights reserved, Printed in tlne United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmined in any form or by any means, electronic or mecl-ranical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from tl-republishec Co)pyxlight O 2001 by Weslrview Press, A Member of tlne Perseus Bcwks Gro~up Publislned in 2001 in the United States of Amex-icaby Westview Press, 5500 Central Avenue, Boulder, Colorado 80301-2877, and in the United Kingdom by Westview Press, 12 Hidrs Coy" Road, Cumnor Hill, Oxford (11X2 9JJ Find us o n the Irilclrfd Wide Web at www.,weeslrviewpress.com Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Anderson, Sheldon R., 1951A Cold War in the Soviet Bloc : Polisln-East German relatio3ns : 1945-1962 / Siheldon Anderson, p. m. Inct~icZesbibliographical referencs and index, ISBN Q-813SF-3783-6(pb) 1, Potand-Foreign relation emany (East), 2. Germany (East)-Foreign relatic~nePotand. 3, Poland-Foreign relat.i0ne194~"i-1989, l. Title.

F88

ON DEMAND

For Woody

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Contents Lisf of I~~ust~ations A c ~ ~ o w l e ~ ~ ~ ~ s List o ~ A ~ b r # ~ t i o n ~ A b ~ Usedefbr Archival ~ ~References ~ ~

xi xiii XV

~

~

Introduction

xvii

1

Notes, 8 1

“There Are No Good Germans”: The Myth of Proletarian Internationalism, 1945-1949

10

The Prospects for German Communism, 12 The German and Polish Communists Before 1945,13 The PPRs Anti-German Propaganda, 15 The SED Promotes Socialist Solidarity with Poland, 17 Gomu€ka’sFall and the Stalinization of Party Relations, 19 Notes, 23

2

The Controversy over the Oder-Neisse Border, 1946-1949

31

Poland’s Claims to the Oder-Neisse Border, 33 The SED Rejects the Oder-Neisse Line, 35 The SED Officially Recognizes the Oder-Neisse Border, 40 Notes, 46 3

The Myth of the Stalinist Brotherhood, 1949-1954

52

Poland and the German Problem, 59 Polish-German ”Friendship,” 61 The New Course and the June Uprising in the GDR, 65 Notes, 68 4

The Problems of German Repatriation, Reparations, and Trade, 19451953 The Problem of the Germans in Poland, 7 7

76

viii

Cunfenfs

Repatriation of the Germans from Poland, 1949-1953,79 Disputes over Reparations and Trade, 1945-1953,82 The Synchronization of the Socialist Economies, 194&1953,84 Notes, 89 5

German Remilitarization and the Polish Thaw, 1954-1955

94

Poland and the East German Peoples’ Army 102 The SED Restricts Cultural Contacts, 103 Notes, 108 6

Khrushchev’s De-Stalinization Speech and Gomdka’s Return to Power, Januaxy-Octaber,1956

114

The Poznah Revolt, 117 The Border Controversy Resurfaces, 120 Gomuh’s Election as First Secretary, 122 The Suppression of the Hungarian Revolt, 127 Notes, 129 7

The Cold Winter of Folish-East German Relations, 1956-1957

134

The SED Limits Cultural Exchanges, 138 UIbricht Rejects Gomutka’s National Road to Communism, 141 The Debate over Collectivization, 144 Poland’s Western Territories, 146 Heymann’s Recall, 148 The Harich Affair, 149 Lasota and the Closing of PO Prostu, 151 Notes, 153 8

Gomugka’s Trade Policies and the Recurring Problem of German Repatriation, 1953-1957

159

Poland’s Trade with the West in 1956,161 Gomulka’s Foreign Economic Policy, 164 The Recurring Problem of the Germans in Poland, 169 The Registration of the Germans in Poland, 172 Notes, 176 9

Gomuika’s Foreign Policy and the First UlbrichtGomuika Summit, 1956-1957 The SED Tightens Controls on Tourism, 189

184

Contents

Gomulka Meets Ulbricht, 190 The Aftermath of the Summit, 195 Relations at the End of 1957,198 Notes, 199 10

The Rapacki Plan and the German Question, 1957-1959

204

Poland’s Relations with West Germany, 207 The Berlin Crisis, 211 The Problem of Trade with West Germany and West Berlin, 213 Notes, 217 11

The Right Road to Socialism and Ulbricht’s Visit to Poland, 1958-1959

222

Cultural Relations Remain Frozen, 224 The SED Criticizes PZPR Church Policy, 226 The December Summit, 228 No Consensus on Germany or the Border, 232 Notes, 235 12

The GDR as a Model €orPolish Socialism, 1959-1961

241

Ongoing Problems in Cultural Affairs, 244 Defending the Oder-Neisse Border, 248 The SED and Gomuka’s Policy Toward the West, 249 Toward Detente in 1961,253 Notes, 254 13

The Berlin Wall and the Dittente in Polish-East German Relations, 1961-1962

259

The Border and Germany, 262 Unresolved Policy Differences, 264 Chronic Economic Disputes, 246 The Third Gomulka-Ulbricht Summit, 272 Notes, 276 Conclusion

283

Notes, 288 B~&~iu~ffpky Unpublished D o c u m t s , 289 Published Documents, 289

289

Cuntmts

X

Memoirs and Collecred Works, 290 Books, 291 Articles, 294 Nmspapms and Periodicals, 298 Index

299

Illustrations

Otto Grotewohl and J6sef Cyrmkiewicr signing the Zgorzelec agreement recognizing the Oder-Neisse border, Zgorzclec, Poland, July6, 1950

53

GDR President Wilhelm Pieck and PEP President Bolesiaw Bierut h Warsaw, December 1950

54

GDR President Wilhelm Pieck reviewhg Polish troops h WarsawI December 1950

55

J6sef Cyrankiewicz, Wiadyslaw Gomuika, and Walter Ulbricht at the East German Peaple's Parliame~~t in Berllk on October 19, 1962

272

Wiadyslaw Gomutka, J6sef Cyrankiewicz, and Walter Ulbricht reviewing East Gemall troops at the Brmdenburg Gate, October 19,1962

273

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Acknowledgments :I am deeply indebted. to many people who contributed to the completion of the book. I would like ta thank the archivists at the Archiwum Akt Nowych and the Archirrrt~mSpraw Zagrmicznych in Warsakv, and the Stiftung Archiv der Partei und Massenorganizationen and the Archiv des Aussmmhisteriurrt der DPZR in Berlin. Thanks to their efficiency and cooperation, 1 was able to complete my research in a timely manner. I would also like to thank the Deutsche Akadernische Austauschdienst (DAAD), the Kernan hstitute of Advmced Russim Studies, and Miami University for trhejr gelrerous grants to kilitate my search in Poland, Germmy, and Washislgton D.C. The book would not have been possible without the gracious hospitality of my good friends in Warsm Marek and Rasia Roszkowski, and 1%ter Meitz in Berlin, all of whom made my European research visits so comfortable and el7ljoyable. I would like to give a special thanks to Professor Tom Taylar, who task his precious time to read and critiyue the manuscript. Last but not least, I am b r e w grateful to my wife, Kristie, for enduring long periods of separation whiie I did rcsearclh in Europe, and for her patience and understandhg as :Iworked on the manuscript.

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Abbreviations 1 have used tfie Germall and Polish abbreviations with the exception of commonly translated cases, such as FRG. ADN CC CDZT C CzCP DBD

DWK ECSG FDGB

mJ

FDP FRG GDR

Allgemeiner Deutscher Nachrichtendienst (General German News Srvice) Cerztral Committee Christlich-Demokratische Union (Christian Democratk Union) Communist Party of the Soviet Union Czechoslovak Carnmmzist Party Demokratische Bauernpartei Deutschlands (German Democratic Peasmt Party) Deutsche Wirtschaftskommission (Germm Economic Commission) European Coat and Steel Community Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (Free German Trade Union) Freie Deutsche Jugend (Free G e m m Youth) Freie Dernokatisehe Partei (Free Democratic Party) Federal Republic of Germany (BundesrepublikDeutschland) German Democratic Republic (Deutsche Demokratische Republik) Komitet Centrahy (Central Committee of the PPR/PZPR) Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (Communist Party of Germmy ) Komunistyczna Partia Potski (Communist Party of Poland) Krajowa Rada Narodowa (National People's Council) Kasernierte Vslks;polizei (Peaple's Pollice in Barracks) Liberale Demokratische Partei (Lfieral Democratic Pasty) Lmdwirtschaftliche Produktionsgenossenschaft (Agricultural Production Co-operative) National-Demoksatische Pastei Deutschlmds (National Democratic Party of Cermmy) New Ecmornic Policy Nationale Votksamee (National Peoyle" A m y )

Polska Pastia Robotnicza (Polish WorkersTasty) Polska Partia Socjalistyczna (Polish Sociatist Party) People's Republic of Poland (Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa) Polskie Stromictwo tudowe (Polish PeasantsTarty) Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robofnicza (Polish United Workers' Party) 5D Str0michn;o Demokratycme O)emocratic Party) SDKPiL Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania SED Sozialistische Einheitspartei Detltschlands (Socialist Unity Pasty of Gemany) Stromictwo Ludowe (PeasantsfParty) Soviet Military Administration in Germa"y Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Gemany) Urzad Rady Ministr6w (Bureau of the Council of Mhisters) Zentralkomitee (Central Committee of the SED) Zwigzek modzieiy So~alistyerny(S~cia1ist Ycruth U ~ ~ i a n ) Zjednoczone Stromictwo Ludowe (United Peasants' Party)

Abbreviations Used for Archival References

GenfzarzArchives BRD U Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Politisches Archiv des Aus1/~13rtigen Amtes (Federal Repuh)ic of Germany Political Archive of the Foreign Office), Emn, BRD BfGRF Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Bundesministerium fiir gesamtdeutsch Fragen (Federal Republic of Germany, Federal. Mhistry for AL1-German @estions)], Koblenz. BRD B U Bundesrczpublik Deutschland, Buntfeskanderamt (Federal Republic of Gemany Federal Chancellor's Office), Koblenz. UUR MAA Deutsche Demokratische Republik, Ministerium fiir Auswgrtige Angelegenheiten, Palitisches Archiv des AuswBrtigen Amtes (German Democratic Republic. Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Political Archive of the Foreig~nOffice), Berlin. t)l>R MfAurH Deutsche Demokratisrhe Republik, Ministerium fiir Aussenhandel und Innerdeutsehen Handel (German Democratic Republic, Mirzistry for Foreign Trade and Imer-German Trade), Potsdam, DDR MR Deutsche Demokratische Republik, Ministerrat (German Demcsatic Republie, Councjl of Ministers), Potsdm. SER ZK Sozialititische Einhei.tspartei DeutschZands, Zentsatkomitee (Socialist Unity Party, Central Committee), Berlh.

KWGK

Komitet Wspbgpracy Kuh;lraln? z Zagranica (Co tee for Culttrrd Cooperation with Foreign Countries), 1Narsaw.

xuiii

MSZ

MZC) PZPR KC

U r n BP

Abbrevia tiorjs Used fir A rcf.iiz?~f RC~~~T~PIC

Ministerstm Spraw Zagranicznych (Ministry of Fore i w AfiFairs), Warsw. Ministerstwo Ziern Odzyskanych (Ministry of Reeovered Territories), Warsaw Palska Zjednoczona Partia Rsbatnicza, Komitet Centrainy (Polish United Workers' Party; Central CO tee), Warsaw tlrzgd I-Cady Ministrriw, Biura Prezidialne (Bureau of the C-au~zclilof Mhisters, Preside~zt'sOffice), Warsaw

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Introduction The ulliarzcr ofthc f u ~ ~zutbtzs o [Ger-mtur~ and PoEistzl is . . . not by atzy means u beatrfiful dreunr, u L-haunrifzgitllask~n;tzo, gentlenten, if is un itterrifahl~nc.@essifyrpsulfifzg front fhc confmoifinferc.sfsof fizc firm ~gfio~)1ts. -Fr&r-Irich Engela 184P

I crossed the Oder-Neisse border for the first time in 1987 on an overnight trajn from Hanover to Warsaw. As the traixr approached Frankfurt/Oder around miefnight, f was aroused from n-ty sleep by a phalanx of gmff East German border guards and customs agents..They took aver three hours to check documents and comb the train from top to bottom for stowways and contraband. I had experienced many close inspections m d lo11g delays on trips between West m d East Germany; but the East Gemans seemed to be even more vigilant along their border with Poland than they were on their western border, across which sat enemy NATO troops. The incident prornpted me to ask my East German and Polish Friends about their impressims of relations between the Germm Demcratic Republic (GDi) and the People's R~epublicof Poland (PRP). On the one hand, the East Germans rerjponded &at interstate relations were cordial and emphasized their govemmcmt%constmctive political, cultural, and economic chats to brjng the two peorfcs together. C h the other hand, they often harhored old, prejudices; that is, the Poles were lazy, disorganized, and untrustworthy Many complained &out Poles who crossed the border to buy up scarce East Germm collsumer goods. The Poles afso had ambjguous opinions about the East Gemans. Although some criticized the East Germans' arrogance, dogmatism, and davish adherczmce to Stalinism, they begrudgingly respected the GDR's economic and technical achievements. But the Polish attitude can be summarized i n the old saying fak Swiat Swinte~~, ~zieb d z i e Nkmirrc Pttkzkowi brategg (As long as the wodd is hvhole, no German will, be a brother to a Pole),"

This filial refermce is an apt metaphor for East German-Polish refations after World W a IT, The East Germans m d Poles were like siblings born into the Soviet fmily: N'R maner how much they quarreled, t h y could not leave it. They curried favor with the paternal cmter while pursuing conflict* naticmal interests..'f'he msult was a ""cold war" of misu~~derstmdh and g distrust. Like the Cold W;;rrbetween the Soviet Union m d the United States, there were times of d6tente and times of crisis, but in the end the East German and Polish commlanist parties had irreconcilable national diMeremces. Furthermore, the illegifimcy of the East Qrman and.Poiish communist governments precluded an honest =conciliation between their peoples. This study seeks to fill severd gaps in the history of East German-Palish relations in. the context of the Cold War. Much has been written about relations between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe after World War H; but scholars have paid relatively little attention to East European c m munist party relations and t ~ a t e dthem as though they were alwa)is dictated by Moscow. Marxist historians of Soviet bloc relatiom told an incomplete and slanted story of closc? cooperation and friendship; Pofish and East German historians such as Eugeniusz Gajda and Werner Hgnisch sirnply imitated vacuous party pm"pagan& promoting hatem1 friel~dshipand mutual sodaljst goals." When the United States adopted a policy of cmtainjng Swiet expansionism after the war, Western policy makers and scholars pmpagated the idea that the Kremlin. was running a monolithic communist movement. The communist takeovers in Eastcrn Europe by 1.948, the victory of the communists in China in 1948, Mao Zedangfs alliance with fosef Stalk, m d the North Korean invasion of the South in 1950 confirmed this perception. Throughout the Cold War, Western Europe and the tlnited States based their security policy and defense spending on a cmfrorrtatio~~ with the Soviet bloc countries, Western policy makers assumed, as perhaps they had to assume, that if war broke out the communist states would constitute a cohesive fighting force. The geopolitical world was sitnplified into a bipolar system that either ignored or downplayed differences within the two opposirrg blocs. fn the mid,-f;960s,Zhiglriew Krzezinski was one ol the first scholars to argue that relations within the communist world we= more complicated than that. He contended that national interests in Eastern Europe still had an important role to play in interparty relations: The Communist camp as a collective entity is guided by purposes which are said to reflect its colledive interest. At the same time, within these dorninant, universal objectives there are also the specific, particular interests of

the component units. Occasionally, and almost inescapably, a clash between the universal and particular takes place, and much of the history of relations beween Communist states has to be written in terms of such conRicts.4

In the 3970s, several scholars took up Brzezinski's call fnr serious studies of Soviet bloc relations. Roger Kmet noted that historians usually focussed m the deviatjon of satelli& foscign policy from Moscw%, while ignoring the foreign policy differences between the satellites thernsel~es.~ In the case of East Germany; Peter Merkl wrote that "East Germm foreign policy for many years has been ignored by Wstern scholars and even journaiists m the assumption that it was unlikely to be much mom than a mere instrwent of Soviet forcign poljcy.""hI"oitical scientist Peter Marsh agrcled: "An hterpretation of East German foreign policy . . . as one consistmt development towards the role of most trusted supporter of the Sobrief Union would be grossly simplistic."7 There is also a dearth of histories on Polish. foreign policy after World War II. In the mid-197tfs, James F. Morrison identified a general need for foreip poIisy sludies of the East European countries, and Poland specifically He also noted that analysts had main):y focused on the means that the Soviet Union used to control its satellites" foreign policic?s." Recent works on Soviet foreign policy toward Eastern Europe have suggested that the commnist parties enjoyed greater latitude thm many Western scholars and policymakers prmiously thought. madislaw Zubok and Constantine Pleshakav confirmed that Soviet control over their East European allies was haphazard; they argued that Stalin had no master plan for the communization of the area or desips fctr a separate socialist German state.Worman Naimark and Inessa fazhborovskaia corroborated this view of Soviet policy in Eastern Europe and Germany as unplanned and reactiwe, although the German Communist Party (KPDISED) was more tightly cmtrolled.10 Despite much new evidence to the contrary, the simplistic view of the Zlig~larworld persists. In his 3999 study cJf the postwar Europe, M m Trachtenberg wrote: People still think of the Cold War as a simple two-sided conflict, a kind sf gigantic arm wrestle on a global scale. But this view, 1 believe, is profoundly mistaken. A purely bipolar system would have been quite stable: Soviet power and American power vvoutct have balanced each other sa csmpletely that the risk of general war would have been minimal. But we know the Cold War was a serious conflict.11

Until 1989, the biggest obstacle to writkg an accz~ratehistory of relatjons between the communj.st parties in Eastern Europe was a lack of

archival evidence. Using previollsly classified Polish and East German communist party and foreip mhistry cltocuments, my research seeks to build an the w o r k of Chose who have argued th& the Polish and East German comunists pursued cmfljcting national htctrests first and foremost. As Rrzezinski pointed out, ""illhe Polish Communist preached and practiced a fanat-icalnational hatred somewhat out of step with the doctrinal concepts of relations between nationalities.W G e m m historim Frmz Sikora, in his study of Polish-East German relations, also concluded that their shared commmist commmity did not, in bis words, "kad to a disappearance of the average :Pole%prejudice and distmst of Germms or to their trust in a long lasting understanding with their neigh:bor to the west""13 Given the cdul-ies of conflict between Pdes and G e r m s (especiauy those Germans of the Rrandenberg-Prussia area that comprised a large past of the Soviet zone), continued enxnity between them was hardly surprising, regardless of their political affiliation. Nazi Germany" long occupation and thorough etevastation of Poland in World W r :IIwas the latest and most a w M chapter in this confmntation. S i b r a argued that the Poles did not really want "reconciliation" [ksiihnung] with the Germans after the war; the Poles' rapid and often harsh expulsion of Gern ? Poland only exacerbated theis mutual hatreds." m e expellees mans b horn Pofand represented over one-fifth of the popuhtion in the Soviet zone in the late 1940s. It was indeed a mighty task for the parties of the Polish and German Left to convince the masses, as well as their own party members, that Poles and Germans shared a common socialist destiny. Many commlanist leaders did not believe their own propaganda on this point. The ebb m d Bow of East German-Polish relations cibviously depended on their patronage from the Soviet Union and the contingencies of the Cold War. The Kremlin ultimately determhed the fate of the satellite partics, and the freedom that Moscow allowed the parties often fluctuated with the Wst. Althougl~the Polish and with the state oE Soviet ~1aticl.m East German communists could not stray too far ken? Moscow's forraignpolicy line, they promoted their lrespective natimd interests whenever possible. 'T"here are notably few rekrences in the Polish and East German communist party and foreign ministry archives to Moscow% directives regarding their relations, Athough much of what was said was undoubtedly kf t u11recorded.1~" Guidance m d patronage from the Soviet Unian did not bring the Polish and East German communi.sts any closer. Un the contrary, they were less trusting of each other because of their competiticm f i x MoscotrY's favor, a situation that the Sovi,ets used to their own advantage. Because Lenh" sotto, "Nationalist in form and socialist in content" " h adnot re-

ally =solved the htense national rivalries h the Soviet Union, the Soviet leadership found the tried and true imperial policy of divide ef il~per*uexpedient inmaintaining their disparate and far-Bumg empisc.. It is nut the purpose of this study to chrmicle d l the ecmomic, cultural, and political ties between Poland and East Germmy from I945 to 1962.1 havc intentionally foclnssed on those issues t-hat hvere persiste~~tly contentious; First was the dispute over Pdand's administration of German territories east of the Oder m d Western (Lttsacian)Neisse border. 111 194fiPthe SED adopted a platform calling for a revision of the border, but finally had. to recognize the Oder-Neisse ljne in 1948. The Polish communists knew that the Soviets had forced the East Germans to adopt this position; repeated nnanifest&ions of revisionism in the SED and the GDR made this all too clear. Second, the two parties could not reach a consmsus on policy toward the West, particularly West Germany. The SED claimed that it was conductjng a socialist fareig policy in tine with the Soviet Union m d supportive of workers everywhere. Poland adapted a more ~alistic,less idealistic pdicy. Walter tllbricht insisted Ihat %saw f"c>l.low :his lead on the German question, and freyuent confrontations occurred over Poland's unilateral attempts to develop p0litic.d and economic ties to the FRG and West Berlin. In 1957, friction developed over a Polish plan to create a nuclear-frtze East Centsat Europe (includk~gthe FRG), in part because it was not m East Germm idea. Third, the East German and Polish communists WE in open conft,ict over Marxist-Leninist ideology and the comct road to socialism..The two parties guarreled over censorship, coliectivization, church policy, tourist traffic, cultural &fairs, and mny other dmestic policies. The East Qrman communists often compounded ideological diilerences by adopting an arrogmt and condescending demeanor toward their Polish comrades, British historian Mary Fwlbrook has characterized German communism as having "a f russian compkxion,"lb whiCh, according to Polish scholar Leslaw Kut-win, feabred "dopatism, intolcrmce, and chauvinism."~~ f have deliberately included nllmerous oMicid reports on cz~1turalexchanges to itlustsate the animosity that existed on party, government, and unofficial levels. The sheer number of such incidents is evidmce of the communists' utter faihre to dcvclop better personal relationships. Many exchanges seemed to do more harm than good in breaking down cJLd stereotypes and promoting gmuine friendships. Much to t-he embarrassment of both c o m u n i s t r&gim,es,many of their own officials, as well as the average citizen, preferred to make contacts with Mlest Germans, The most serious ideological rift came in 1956. After being etipelled from the party in 1,949, Wiadysiahv C;omulka returned to power on a platform that directly challenged the tenets of Stahism. Fearful that the

PZPKs reforms woulld destabilize the GDR, the SEI) cut off m a y cultural exchmges, shortrd up b0rdc.r controls along the Oder-Neisse, and instituted vjsa requirements for Poles. Altkough Gomnlka eventually proved to be a loyal Warsaw Pact partner and even supported the military intervention into Czechoslovakia in 1968, Wlbricht never forgot that Gomulka was the product of a potentiaw dangerous reform movemetnt. Fourth, bitter disputes arose time and time again over trade. In the early postwar years, the SED vhemently opposed paying reparations to Polmd. Although trade grekv significantly in the first few years after the GDR was founded in 1949, it did not reach the levels that the East Germans wanted. I'he SED repeatedly accused the Poles of conducting a foreign economic policy that was hilaical to the interests of the GDR and the socialist camp, especially when Pdmd"s trade with capitalist countries increased irr the mid-1950s. The Polish commrmists wew not persuaded by East German arguments that the GDR had to achieve a standard of living comparable to that of capitalist West Germany. As trade negotiators on both sides =cognized, the muddled trade situation also had negative political ramificationss Finally, friction steadily grew over the status of the Germans in Poland. Many wanted to emfgrate, but the Polish authorities were re1uct;mt to allow the GDR to act as the Germans' sole representative. The Polish government often favored B m % htermts in regard to these Germans, but the East Germans viewd this as an unacceptable deviaticm from socialist solidarity. 1 have employed a loose chronological narrative whenever possible, but some recurring disagreements over the Oder-Neisse bordele, trade, and G e r m n repatriation from Poland are add-ressed in separate chapters. Chapter 1introduces the interwar links between the Polish and German communil;ts, and postwar ~ l a t i o n in s the context of the communfst takeover h Poland and the Germm cmmunist movement in the Soviet zone. Chapter 2 examixres the Oder-Neisse problem horn 1945 to the creation of tbe GDR in 3949. When the SED ~ e d campaiped y for a border change in 1946, it confirmed Polish suspicions that the German c m m u nists were nationalists in Marxist clothes. Although the SED eventually had to recopize the border, mmy party members remained steadfastly opposed to it. Chapter 3 cwers the period from 1949 to the turmoil in the Soviet bbc following Stalin's death in 1953. Disputes had to be hidden to maintain the illusion of mnity in Stalin" et~pire;relations between the SED and the PZPR wem correct, but plagued by persistent ideologicall debates and trade squabbles. Chapter 4 is devoted to a closer examhation of economic relations and the problem oi German refugees from Poland and of Germans who re-

mahed there, Ulsagl-eements over these subjects in the early postwar period contributed to the general feeling cm both sides thilt national interests trumped socialist soXidarity Chapter 5 examines the period after StaXin" death in 1953 to 1956, when the Mremlh" more liberal New Course allowed the Poles to raise many of these outstanding issues in pzlblic. Nttch to lheir cmsternation, however, the SED again broached the suhject of a bosder revisim, I have devoted four chapters to the volatile events surrouneiing Khrushchets secret speech i,n 1956,Gomuika's rclturn to power in October of that year, and the SED" ddenunciation of Gomulka" policies in 1957, when relations reached their lowest point. Chagter 6 deals with the impact of Khrushchev's de-Stalinization on relations between the two parties; the SEDfsrejection and the PZPR" acceptance of de-Stalinization set the tone for East German-Polish relations for several years. Chapter 7 takes a closer took at the SEWS reaction to Gomuitka%return; how Ulbricht tried to build a firewall against the reforms of the Polish October; and Gomulka" ideas about a national road to socialism. Witer Wlfgitng Harich's arrest and i m p r i s o ~ ~ mon e ~ charges ~t of conspiring with Polish intellectuals revealed UZbrichtk determination to avoid an. ""East German O~tober.~' Chapter 8 returns to the problems of trade and the Germans in Poland in the context of th Wlbricht-Gmulka rivalry, Chapter 9 covers the serious lack of foreign policy ccrordination between the two Warsw Pact partnas as well as the fisst face-to-face meting between tl'lbricht and Gomuika in the summer of 1957, Aside from the Oder-Meisse border, the most sensitive issue for Polish-East German relations was GDKs role in the question of G e r m unjfication. Chapter 10 focuses on the disagreements over the Polish foreign minister%plan for denuclearizing East Central Europe, the socralled Rapacki Plan. Chapter f7, examines the many dumestic-policy differences that continued to undermine the relationship in the late 1950s as well as the impact of the Berlin crises and the East German leader Wafter Ubricht's coal reception in Warsaw in 19558.This second meeting hemeen UIbricht and Gomuika did not clear the atmosphere, ?"he pride of the East German communists in their stable politic& situation and relathely successful economy was readjly appme"t in the early 1960s. Chapter 12 describes the ongoing ideological M a t e s between the SED and the PZPR over agricultura'i policy, trade, religious and artistic freedom, and the East Germcranskonstant sermonizing about the virtues of their road to socialism. Chapter 13 recounts Gomult'ka'?ireluctant acceptance of the B e r h Wall in 1961 and the uneasy dti;tente that developed after his third meeting with Ulbricht in the fall of 1962,

4. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Collected Works, vol. 6: 1845-4848 (Mosccjw: Progress Publishers, 3976), p. 389. Quoted from Engels's speech in Londctn on Ncjvernber 29,1847, to mark the seventeenth anniversary cjf the Polish uprising af 1830, 2, Qucjted from Ines Mietkowsh-bisel; "Zur br6derlichen Zusammenarbeit zwischen polnischen und deutschen Kornrnunistm und Antifaschisten nach dern Sieg Gber den deutschen Faschismus (1945-1949)'' (On the fraternal cooperation between the Polish and German Co unists and anti-fascists after the victory ower German fasdsm, 1945-1949), Jnlt&uelifgr Gesciric!tte &r sozialisfisclzen LWtzder Eurapns (Yearbook for the history af the scjcialist countries af Europe) 23, no, 1 (1979), p. 51. 3. Eugeniusz Cajda, Potskn Potifyka Zagm~zif-zna,19462971: Pudstnworoe Problerrzy (Polish foreign policy, 1944-1971: Basic prcsblems) (Wrsaw: Ministerstwa Obrony Narcjdowy, 1972); and Werner P-ignisch, A~rssezzpotitz'kzknd itzterr-zationnk Bezielfungen der DUE, 2949-1955 (The foreign policy and international relatians of the GDR, 1949-1 955) (Berlin: Staatsverlag der DDR, 15272). 4. D i p i e w Brzezinski, The Soukt Bloc: Uztz'Cy and Co1:zPict (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 196l), p. ix; see Gabrief Fisckter, ""Nationalism and Internationalism in Hungary and Rumania," Canadian Slamztic Papers, no. 1(191;8),The Rc3manian det~iationfrom the Warsaw Fact has been documented. Fischer concluded that national intel-ests played, in his words, "a substantial role in shaping and reshaping relations among socialist countriesf'; see also Yamis Valinakis, "Diversity in the Warsaw Pact: Bulgarian and Rumanian Scurity Pel-ceptions," Batkarl Stlidies, na. 1 (1984). Valinakis also revealed the widdy divergent security interests of Bulgaria and Romania and the lack of strategic policy coordination on the Warsaw Pact's southern Rank. 5. Roger Kanet, "Research on East European Foreign Policy: Other Needs, Other Areas, New Directions," in Konald H, Linden, ed., The Foreig~Potieie~of East Ezrropc: New Apprmches (Mew York: Praegex; 1980), p. 313. 6. Peter H, Merkl, Cermalz Foreigi~tPolicirn, West and East: 0 1 2 f k TIzreslzotd of n New Ezz(rol1en~Em (Santa Bahara, Calif,: ABC-CLio, 1974), p. 90. 7.Peter Marsh, "Foreign Policy Making in the German Democratic Republic," in Hannes Adomeit, ed., Forizig~Poliq M ~ k i ~ zifig Conzmunis t Countries (London: Saxon House, 1979), p. 106; see also Wilhelm Bruns, Die Aussenpc?litik der DDR (The foreip policy of the GDR) (Berlin: Colloquium VerXag! 1985), p. 24, Bruns also found that researchers had limited knowledge of relations belrv\reen the 30cialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) and tlze other communist:padies in Eastern Europe. 8. James E Mc~rrison,"The Foreign Prjlicy of Pr>land,"in James KuNmann, ed., Tke firei8.12 Policies c?f East Euroije: Domes tic a~zdIn ternat z'onckl Determinnn ts ( b yden, Netherlands: A. W. Sijthoff, 1978), p, 129, 9. VXadisXaw Zubak and Constantine Pleshakov, X~zsidethe KrillrzlilzS Cold War: Fmm Stalin to KJarushc!tez~(Cambridge: Haward University Press, 39526). 10. Norman Naimark, The Russ-in~si ~ zGerma~y:A Histo~yof tlze Sozliet Zone of Ocezrpation, 1945-1 949 (Cambridge: Harvard Universiq Press, 1995); and Inessa

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"There Are No Good Germansff: The Myth of Proletarian Internationalism, 1945-1949 There are 110good Eerrnanli . . . a Ger?~tnt? con~al-rnislis alwaps a d al~oz?e all a EFYtnnt? zulito places Gerntarz ilzferesfsal~oz?c the inlcrrtafiarznl solihrifj! of fhe prcllefnrial. - T ~ w h N s h West Iflrzslii-Mteiin Poztzafis

:It wodd be a formidable task for any Polish gove ent, let alone a commmist one, to recoacilc Che Polish people with their neighbors to the west and east. World War It was the latest and most tragic chapter in a long history of conflict between Russians and Poles and between Germans and Poles. For centuries, Poles had resisted the German D u a ~ ~Nach g Ostmz and Russian expansionism, Polish national, identity was linked to the early modem commonwealth that stretched from the Baltic Sea to the Blaek Sea and i t s heroic struggles against Che Germans, hssians, and Swedes, Poland stood as a Catholic outpost between Prussian Protestantism a d hssian Orthodoxy, but the weak Polish state finally succllmbed to the late eighteenth-century partition between Prussia, Austria, and Russia, Polmd" resurrection after World War I lasted less than a generation: Germany and the Swiet Union overrm the Polish state in September 19339. Poland endured the longest and harshest occupation of the countries that fought Nazi Germany The Germans d e s t r w d the Polish state, pillaged the economy, and evi,sccrated the htelligentsia and political parties. Poland lost 300,0fX3 men in battle and 6 million civilians, m m g them almost 3 d i m Polish Jews. Tens of thousands of Poles perished in the Soviet W o n ; Poles who s~lrvivedthose brutal six years were left with a country in, ruins, Much of the great city of VVarsaw was oblitcrrated.,

'There Are No Guc7d Germalzs'"

21

With the Soviet Red Army's entry into East Centsal Europe at the end of World War 11, German and Polish communists were &lit;ated tcr put ~lali.onsbetween their two peoples on a nekv footing. As t-his verse from the old communist anthem "The IZed Regiment of Warsaw" pprfessed, the enemy of the working classes wlruld not be any one natim, but the capitalist class as a whole: Our enemy is not a foreign people, whether defeated or victor; our enemy are those, who hold the whip the foreipel; or your own oppressar.2

Accosding to Masxist-Leninist theory of socialist internationalism, the Polish communists would jettison aZ1 vestiges of Polish bourgeois-romantic nationalism, Polish Catholicism, and any sentimntal attacihmenl to Polish territories mnexed by the Soviet Union, The Germm communists, for their part, were bound to reject nationalist calls for fie retunl of German territories occupied by Poland after the war. Communism had shallow roots h Poland. There was much truth to Stalin" analogy likening crrmmunism in Poland to a saddle on a cow. The pantheon of communist founders did not i,nspi,re the patriotic, Catholic, m d often anti-Smitic Poles; Marx was a German m d a few, and Lenin was a Russian. With the exception of Rosa Luxemburg, Poland 11ad not produced promine~~t comanunist leaders. I:,uxemtnurg was a Jew and committed internationalist, even to the point of opposing a Polish state. The forenmner of the Polish Communist Party (:KZfI"), the Social Uemcxlracy of thc Khgdom of Poland and Lithuania (SUKPil:,), was fnu,nded in 1899 and reflected Luxernburg's orthodox Marxist views, The party had few followers.3 The Polish Socialist Party's (PPS) nationalist appeal outflanked the KPP for suppwt arnung the Polish. working and peasant classes, The PPS promoted a patriotic, evolutionary social democracy. Fearhg a rightwing government takeover in 1926, the KBP supporkd the PPS and Jizef Pifsudski's May coup dt4tat, This so-called '"May error" was a m g the reasms Stalin cited for erctermi~~ating virtuaily the entire. KPP leadership m d dissolvkg the party in 1938. Some 5,000 Polish cornmm~istswere executedVostwar Foreip Mlnistry offjcial Marian Naszkowski fater remembered his shock at hearing the news of the KPP's demise: A party that had done so much to awaken the revolutionary spirit of the masxs, a party that had Led mighty working-class brigades to war with capitalism, with fascism, could not be a fraud. . . . Shaken to the depths of our souls, accepting, with pain, with bitterness, the "truth' about our leaders"

12

'There A re No Guc7cl G e r mns '" treachery, not for a moment did we doubt our idea or the rightness of our movement, our party. That gave thousands of Crtmmrmists the skwngth to live through the diEicutt times that had arrived-.That was the basis for the resurrection of the party later on."'"

Under the watchful eye of the Soviet secret police, Polish communism returned in 1942 as the Polish WorkersT~arty(PPR). Mrjthout Stalin's howledge or approval, Miladyslaw Gomujka was elected secretary general in German-occupied Warsaw in November 1,943. Stalin formed the Union of Polish Patriots in Moscow to ensure his control over the PPR. These "Muscovite" Poles, among them Bolesjaw Bientt, Jakub Berman, Hilary Minc, and Stanislaw Radkjccvicz, formed l.he core of l.he party leadership after the war, From its inceptim in 1944, the I"1-f:l.I dominated the Poiish Provisional Government of Nationat Unity Gomugka muted Marxist revolutionary goals in an attempt to form a national front with the PPS, the intelligent"ia, and the peasantry. When this strategy failed to gain broader popular szlpport, the PPR gradtlally coopted the other political parties or drove them undergmund. U-rtder pressure from the Western Af.lies to fulfill the Ualta agreements, the Soviets allowed some members of Stanisiaw Mikdajczyk"s opposition 1301ishPeasant Party (PSI.;)into Ihe gover in the spring of 1.945, but they had nu real power. Aiter the phony elections in January 1947, the PPR was the master of the political scene. Mikd;ljczyk fled the country in N'Rventbecme P1)R had some latitude to decide domestic policy in the early postwar period., but there was newer any doubt that Moscow ultimately determined PoIand's political f uture.7

The Prospects for Geman. Communism The German communists had a stronger base in the German workng

ctass. Germany's defeat in W r l d War I, the failure of capitalism to solve the ills of the interwar economy, the demise of the Weianar Republic in the 1 9 3 0 ~ and ~ the disaster of the Niiltional Socialist period gave the party some ideological ammunition to promote communism in postwar Germany. Monarrhism, democracy, and fascism had failed Germmyf and trhe German communists could. claim to have fought them all. Now the party stood ready to constmct a truly ""$mocraticm "socialist state, one founded on Marxist-Lenhist-Stalhist principles,"" UnIikcl the KP:P, the German Communist Party (KPD) survived its exile in the Soviet tlnilrn before the war, although almost three-quarters of the membership had bee11 jailed. Those who spent the war in the Soviet Union were Stalin" lackeys; the KPD's association with the Soviet occu-

'There Are No Guc7d Germalzs'"

23

patim authorities furthr tarnished its image, Many Red Army soldiers inflicted their revenge on the Germm people, and the Soviets wantonly extracted repnrations from their zone. Atbough the KPD registered numerous protests wish the SovicJt military administration, mast Germans viewed the KPD as a collaboratcrr with the SoV;et ~ccupiers,not as champion of Gcrman interests. The SPD's more moderate socialism. had much broader appeal in postwar Germany. Because the KPD and the SPU were bitter enemies during the Weimar period, the KPD initially spzlrned cooperdion with the WD. The Soviet occupation authorities forced the KPD and SPD to form the Socialist Unity Party (SEU) fn April 1946. The other parties fn the anti-fascist Natiolzal Front, the CDU m d the ZJRP, were also coopted. After the elections of October 1946, in which the SED fared poorly in competi"cion with the SPD in Berlin, the Soviets no longer dlowed h e elections in its zone* The Soviets did not immediately hand. over p w e r to their proteg&s, however. Stalh~did not think that his plans to exploit Germany's ecanomy (including the Ruhr) and to bring about the eventual communization of the entire country would be served by a hasty communist takeover in the Soviet zone.Wven if Stalin did not want a division of Germany initially, his undemocratic tactics to consolidate communist control in the Soviet znne and Poland contributed to the emerging Cold. War-70

The G e m a n and Palish Communists Before 1945 'There was historical precede~ztfor cooperation between the Palish and German Left before 1945, but by the end of the war ties to the past were th~adbarc~.11 Luxemburg and fellow Poles Julian Marchlewski and Leo Jogiches helped found the (PR in 1918, and Jogiches Icd the party for a short tjm.e. When the KPP was outlawed in 1919, the KPD provided indispensable support; the Polish communists reciprocated when hdolf Hitler seized power in Germmy h1933.1Wany German communists escaped the Nazis through their und.erground connections to the KPP, which operated clandestinely in several Polish cities with large German populations, Gda-liskand Zabrze among t k m , A few Polish and German Leftists also developed friendships during their incarceration in :Nazi concentration camps.7" Wilhelm Pieck, the first secretary of the KPR after World War 11, W= one of the few German communists left to conthue this tradition,"" veteran of the communil;t movement fn Germany for nearly half a cmkry, I'ieck had been a close confidant of many ol h e Poiish comul-rists in the SPD before Mdorld War I. Pieck studied under Luxexnburg at the party

l4

'There A re No Guc7cl G e r mns '"

school in Berlin, and stamchXy defended her against revisionists in the party who rejected her ortl.wifox Marxist positions." "wing the war, Pieck helped Marchlewski publish his works in Berlin; in the early 1 x 0 s the two worked together at the communist party school in :Mosco-rv. Pieck narrowly escaped with his own life the day raeticai right-wing in Berlin in January 1919. Jogiches was asnationalists shot Luxemb~~rg sassinated five months later,lWhen Marchlewski died in 11925, the old Polish guard in the KPD was gme. Pieck gave the eulogy at Marchlewslti's funerd; the placemmt of his f u n e ~ aurn i n c x l to the gmvemf Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht at the cemetery in Bcrlin-Friedrichsfelde was one of the few symbols left of Polish-German commlanist solidarity in the early twentieth century.17 The PPR bad reason to be suspicious of collusion between the KPD and the Soviet Union at Pcr1md"s expense. 5hce the partition of Polmd in the late eighteenth century, the Germans and Russians had often set aside their differences to mpress Polish national aspirations. Even the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in 1917had not changed that; in 1922 and 1926, the Weimar Republic and the Solriet Union signed cooperative agreements that were inpart directed agalnst the new Polish state. 'e'he most egregious anti-Polish agreement was the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 1939. The X(PU &dared that "the German people welcome the non-aggression pact between the Soviet Union and Germany because they want peace," The KI-fD went so f a r as to profess that the pact strengthe~~ed ties betwee11 the German and Soviet people.?" Pieck characterized Poland" defeat in 11939 as a victory of German workers over the Polish gentry.lWe said that the vanquished Polish government was a "reactionary strudure" anyway." Ig~~oring the Nazi-Soviet partitio~~ of Poland, the KPD condemned the war as an imperialist cmflict, The party criticized Gmat Britain for allegedly decking war on behalf of the Polish landowning class, and praised the work of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) among the workers in the Soviet-occupied Polish areas of Ukraine and Belarus.21 Wafter Ul.bricht, who led the SED from 1949 to 1971,22 deielzded the Nazi-Soviet Pact in a way that seemed to accept Hitler" aagt~ression agairist Poland. He blamed the war on British hnperialists instead: The German people and all thase nationti that have been incorporated into the German state are faced with a decision: to choc~senot English capitalism, prc)longatlion of the war, and another Versailles, but the Soviet Union, peacq national independence, and friendship among all nations. The workers, farmers, and intelligentsia of Germany, Austria, Czechoslavakia, and Poland wili be the staunchest supporters of the Sc~viet-GermanFact and the sworn enemies of the English plan.23

'There Are No Guc7d Germalzs'"

25

This was heavy historical baggage for the PPR to carry. Until mrushchev" de-Stalhization in the mid-1950~~ the Polish communists could not openly question Stalh's licyuidatior?of the KPP. 'They also bad to deny that Stalin had secretly partitioned Poland with Hitler in 1939, The Nazi-Soviet Pact was, as the Polish communists were forced to declare at the time, ostensibty "an element of peace, the result of the Soviet Uniods consistent peace poXicy.""" The PPR was also saddled with the task of convincing Poles to accept the loss of Palan& eastern territorks to the Soviet W o n . 'The party had to follow the line that the Nazis, not the Soviets, had massacred. thausands of Polish army officers at the Katyn Forest in 1940, and had to ignore Stalin's failure to aid the n"arsaw Uprising against the Grmans in 1944. Among those left to fight the Qrmans hWarsaw had been the PPR's own "People" guards."^^ The PPRrsAnti-German Propaganda ?"he PPR consciously used nationalist propaganda in its struggle for power in Poland in 1445, and stubbornly dekmded Poland's national. interests against Germmy%Havlng lived through the bmtd fjve-year German occupation, GomuZka had tittle sympathy for Grtrman political parties. He did not see an old ally in the KPD; he saw instead a party that had embraced Luxemburg's internationalism, obsequiously sanctioned Stalin's liquidation af the KPP, and approved of the partition of Poland in 1939. After the war, Gomuika declared that "the German horse must have its legs broken regardless of whether that horse is ridden by a Nazi ar a Social Democrat."n As Mir~isterof the Recovered Territories, Gornulka had a hand im the rutbless expulsion of the Germans from Polland.28 The PPR promoted a new pan-Slavism inskad of the unity of working classes across national lines"Gtn March 16,1945, a big headlhe in the PPR organ G405 Lzldu (Voice of the People) proclajnned "' Slav SoXidarity" in Eastern Europe, and strssed Po1md"s pditical and economic cooperation with Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and the Soviet Union.29 Gornulka told. a Warsaw audience in April 1346 that Poland now had friendly relations with the Soviet Union and the other Slavic nations, adding that "without this alliance we would never have been able to defeat Germmy or include Gdafisk withh the borders of the Polish state."30 On July 15, G b s Lzrdzr celebrated the anniversary of the Polish v i c t q over the Te~~tonic Knights at the Battle of Grunwald in 1410 with the headline, "Thmgh the Univ of the Slav Nations-To Victory."""l The I"oZish gove ent mnounced that it would base its foreip relations with any country, c o m u n i s t or not, first on that country's p&y toward Germany. In April 1946, Ed:warb &h&, me of the :Wluscovitt.s,

I6

'There A re No Guc7cl G e r mns '"

called for solidari-tywith France and the Anglo-Saxon powers for the defense of Poland against its biggest threat-"Geman imperialism.'"2 The PPR count.ed on Czechoslovakia as a parhner in &is struggle, even though until Fubruary 1M8 it bad a democratically dected coalition g w ernment and a noncommunist president, Edvard BeneS. Afthough Prague and Warsaw had numerous disagreements after the war,"%i~?s Lzsdtl called for a united front with Czechoslovakia agaisrst German revanchism, warning that "the mortal enemy to the We a l ~ dliberty of both [Poldnd and Czechoslovakia] is still lurking-Germany."~Vf)olmd signed a Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance with CzechosIovakia in 1947, and with all the other East European states by 1949, Poland did not: have a similar treaty with the GDR until 1967.35 The Polish government also promoted the principle of collective German guilt for the crimes of the Nazi rkgime. During the Nuremberg trials in the fall of 1946, Polish officials criticized former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill for arguing that Germany as a whole should not be punit;hed for the war." The PPR barely mcognized the existence of any "progressive" German political elentcws-such as the KPD and Ihe SPD. Polish authorities refected offers of cooperation from, the German Leftists in the former German territoritls." Foreign Minister Z y g m t Modzelewski declared that the Poles did not have confidence in any of the German political parges, hclluding the KPD. The Poli.r;fnWest Institute in Poznari issued this blartket statement: There are no goad Germans . . . a German communist is always and above all a German who piaces German hterests above the international soXibarit)l of the proletariat.38 For the first year after the war, the Polish communist press paid little attention to the German political scene." Reports that did appear were usually critical of the Germans, hcluding the German Left," Gios Ludu barely m n t i m e d the f-tlsion of the KPD and the SFU into the SED in Agril1946," hknowing that the new party was a machination of Soviet occupation policy. 'The Polish M I l i t ~ Mission in Berlin underscorltd this fact: "NO activity [for the creation oC the SED] was to be see13 from Ihe masses, but instead [their] passive and loyal: submission to the orders of the party organs."42 The Polish communists were outraged that the KPD (and later the SED) welcomed former Nazis into its ranks, and alleged that some were assuming important party posts. ULbricht later acknowledged to Gomulka that the ex-Nazis had been recruited because the party W= failing to attract new members. Ufbrirht pointed out that many of the German communists had lost connections to the movement during their years in Nazi prisons; by the end of the war, m y had become m e d e r s of the SPD or the CDU.4"

'There Are No Guc7d Germalzs'"

27

The Pdish communists adroitly used anti-German propaganda to strengthen their popular support. They accused Nfikcrtajczyk" PPSL of befrielldillg the German occupiers during the war and of supporting neoNazi wderground groups in Poland. In the summer of 1946, the PPR tried to undercut the PSI, by holdiz~ga referendurn on three constitutional reforms, Mikolajczyk encouraged his hllowers to vote "no" on the first proposition to abolish the Senate. Gomu&a declared that any Pole who vcrted against any of the three propositions ""helps Germany against Poland." He called, the PSL the party of "drei rrttll ~~eitr" (t%lreet i m s no), purposely using the German phrase to imply that the party was infiltrated by German agents.44 Wi~~centy Rzymowski of the Polish Democratic Party (SD)Jhrged Pdes to vote for thc propositions to show domestic unjty for the new "lnistorical Piast borhr" with Germany. He declartld Germans living in Poland wollld not be allowed to wote.46 One af the SED's primary objectives was ta establish itself as an equal a m g the communist parties in Eastern Europe, but the party was slow to gain acceptance. The SEU was not invited to Szklarska Porqba for the fisst meeting of Cominform, in Septentber 1347, and was not informd until October that the meeting had taken place, .GAccording to West German sources, the Poles and Czechoslovaks e x p ~ s s e dreservations about including the SED in any future Cominform meetkgse4B Gmul-ka had, serious misgivings about the Soviets"%two camp" 'policy announced at this first Cominform meetirrg; the policy would eventually prccltrde cooperation with the West and increase Soviet control over the bloc parties. He did agree that '"when two antagoni.3ti.cblocs-i.mperialist and democratic-have crystallized on the world scale, the problem of tactics to be adopted by communist Parties in particular countries carnot be tl-eated as merely a domestic problem for each Party separately but must be the object of concern and discussion by all The Parties." Comulka had no quahs about using the principle of: socialist so:[idarity to circumscribe the freedam of the SED, however." He again slighkd the Gcrman communists by declaring that ""Stav solidarity'bas one of the foundations af Polish foreign policy.50 When the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR) was formed in December 1948, the new party organ Tqburru Lzldzi (People's Tribune) published congratulatory letters from the French, Czechoslovak, Greek, Soviet, Hungarian, and Italim Communist parties, but nuthing from the SED.51 The SED Promotes Socialist Solidarity with Poland Confronted with so many other serious probtems after the war, the SEU had little time to conduct a cmcerted carrtpaigl~ta improve relatio~~s with the Poles. The SEWS primary incentive for developing ties to Poland af-

l8

'There A re No Guc7cl G e r mns '"

ter the war was economic rather than political or cultural. n e loss of the vital industrial center of Silesia to Poland had direct ecmomic implications for the Soviet zone, and the SED repeatedly asked the Poles to increase exports, primarily much-needed coal. I'he SEU leadership k n w how difficult it would be to & w e anti-Polish sentiments in the Soviet zone, especially amollg the Germm refugees from Poland, Many Germans viewed, th subjugation of Poles as natural and p m p q to them, the typical Pole was ignorant, lazy, a d backward. In March 1,947, a representative of the East German Kzlllzirbulzd conceded to the officers at the Polish Mllit.av Mission that "most Geman people are not aware of the responsibility and guilt that falls on the G e r m people as a result of Che war. Among other things this itgnorancc is the main cause of the continued reluctance of the German people for ~Iatioslswith the Polish people.'We said that Germans lacked m y howiedge of Polish culture, and had no interest in l e a r ~ ~ h about g it, mey adhered to the old adage that ""what is to the east of Germany is low and mcultu~ed.'~ Most Gemans still thou&t that Cllopin was Fmnch a d Copernicus was Gerxnm.32 Two yeamfiter the war, a Polish officer at the Polish Military Mission in Berlin observed that SET>functionariesh e w next to nothing about the political sitlaation in Polmd."WUI:bri.chttold the German press that "Germans still had a lot to learn about democratic Polmd,""' He achowledged that Soviet-zone joumatists needed to pay more attention to Polish political and econontir achievements, but suggested that the Poles reciprocate by publicizing the accomplishments of t k Germans in the Soviet zfme." A year later, SED functicmaries were still telling Polish officers at the mission that it would be a huge undertakhg to eradicate mti-Polish attitudes, even among party members.56 The SED also acknowledged that there were "deep-seeded nationalist prcl?judices [of the German working classes] against the Polish people."s7 The SE;D did m t have enough instructional materials to conduct a serious campaign to overcome East GemansYporance of Poland. In April 1,947, the editor of the leipziger Zeitrrng wrote a letter to the PPR Central ittee mquestsing honest information on the reconstruction of Polmd and life in the corntry in gc3neral.B K a t fall, the SET>leadershjp ordered its press services to devote m m coverage to Poland,sg but: it was not until the end of December 1947that the SED issued its first b u l l e ~ about Polmd."" K e Pofish Mifitav Mission rtrpeatedly u ~ e the d Polish Foreign Mssh-y to provide the SED with more propaganda, but. the Polish govenlment had other priorities.61 Until 1948/ the mail1 SSEZ)newspaper, Neues Dezrfschland (New Germany), virtu* ignomd German-Polish relations and devoted more caverage to developments in Czechoslova&a. The newspaper gellerally portrayed the Czechoslovaks in a more favorabk light.62

'There Are No Guc7d Germalzs'"

29

When Moscow tightened the reixzs on the satellite parties in 1948, the Polish and East G e r m press began to p r a t e the idea that t-he SED m d Polish communists were usherhg in a new era h Polish-Germm relations..Tn the suspicious atmosphere of the times, buwever, there was little clbjectiwe repclrting m either side. Few East Germans or Poles, including party members, beljcved in this propaganda. In March, the Poljsh journal N o w Drogi vigomustp criticized two Polish authors for writing a book emphasizjng t-he cmtinuity of German territorial expansior.lism in the twentieth ccn.t.ufy 'The journal attacked the authors for ignoring the new political developments in the Soviet zone and the d i k e n c e s between Soviet and U.S. policy in Germany. They were accused oE harborh g "hyper-anti-Germmf' attitudes.63 Tn June, the SEZ) resolved to ixrcreae press coverage of all important political, economic, and cultural events in Polmd and to develop mom cdtlaraf exchanges"64Later that sumnet; the party opetned Che F-felmutvm-Gerlach Socieb-in Berlin to provide Germans with readmg materials and exhibits &out Polmd.6 5fos Lzldu =parted in t-he fall that the SED was htensifyling its cmpaign against nationaiism and mti-Polish attitudes in the Soviet zone. Ulbricht achowledged the presence of a strong nationalist element in t-he SET) and the trade unions, a d declared that mtj-Polish anirudes were dangerous and unacceptable.66 Although the Polish press still devoted more coverage to the western zones in B48, Polish officials were quick to point out oversights in East Germanvs repctrting on Poland. For example, \zrhem Nezles Det~tschla~d failed to publish an important parlia.mentary speech by Premier Jtizef Cyrankiwicz in June, Polish diplomats in the Polish Military Mission told h d i Wetzel, the head of the SED's press depart~aent,that the omission was an expression of the SEDs general anti-Polish stance. Accordhg to the Poles, tbr SEC) prtrss spent too much time emphasizing the threat from the West ralher than rcnni,nding ~ a d e r of s the strength of the new people" democracies. Wetzel told Grotewohl and Pieck that the SED prtrss should pay closer attention to such importmt speeches in order to cdtivate what Wetzel termed "the weak seedlistg of Gcrman-Polish relations.f'67 Eomutka"s Fa13 and the Staliinizatiw of Party Relations ?"he fatlout from Stalin's expulsion of Uugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito from Caminform in 1,948 soon rewhed the other commul-rist parties in Eastern Europe. Each party engaged in a witch hunt of alleged "Etoists": ?"hose who supported national roads to socialism, or simpfy opposed Stalhist meirhods, were ousted, imprisoned, or executed. The capriciousness of the purg@s,however$put eveq communist in the cross hairs. The

20

'There A re No Guc7cl G e r mns '"

communist lezlders in Eastern Europe now w r k e d under the strain of

slavishly adhering to Moscow's directives. Tito's ouster and the heightened East-West tensions durhg the Berlin blockade in the summer of 1.948 was a boon to the political fortunes of the SEU, but signalled an end to the PPIC's limited indepedence from Mosco\v. When Stalin delnanded p d e r ideological and political conformity from the communist parties in 1948, the SED easily fell into line. The SED had already ernbarked on an economic transformation of the zone that closely foiilowed the Stalinist nnndel,b%and l.he prospect of a m r c permanent &vision of Germay served the party" short-term, polit.ical gods. l'ieck and Urbricht knew that there was no democratic way for the %D to take power in a united German state.69 The SED underwent purges and rccantations, but the top party leadership mmained largely intact.7" Blind devotion to anything Russian was anathema to the Polish people, and the Polish communjsts never fully adopted Stalinist policies, GonruF-katried steer a course that recopized the Soviet Idnion"s geopolitical interests in Poland while advmcing a Palish-style cornmm~ismthat would ensure the greatest possible independence frm the CPSU. For the first few years after the war, Stalin tolerated C;ornul:kafsattempts to c ~ a t e a suitable socialist path for Polmd;n Pdes maintained many n( their religious, cultural, and economic freedoms.72 C~mujkatold a plenary session sf the Pl'R Central Committee in June 1,948that "both for the ITS and the PPR the independence of Poland is a supreme consideration, to which all ofiers are suhordinated."73 He defended Bto% national road to commrmism, and reected the notion that the Yugosla~rleader was a threat to Soviet leadership of the international communist movement. He opposed TX"itotsexcommunication from Cominform, warning fiat communist unity wodd suffer.74 That was enough for Stalh; in the fall, the Muscovites denounced Gornu2ka and his faction. In contrast to the purges in the Bulgarian, Hungarian, :Romanian, and Czechosiovak parties, however, the Polish communists did not execute their okvn.. Connugka, was arrested but never brought to trial. A few years later, Bicmt told Khmshchev, 'To tell yoll the truth, 1 myself d d t h a w what the charges are and why he" in j jai3,"E Bierut replaced Gomulka as party secretary, and Cyranftiewicz took over leadership of the PPS from Edvard OsBbka-Morawski, in part because Osribka-Morwski was opposed to the unification of the two parties. In December 1948, the PPR and the PPS merged to form the PZPR, The Stalinist die hha been cast for the Polish Left.76 At first the SED took a wait-and-see attibde toward Comulkafs suster; but in an article in the Noventber issue of the party's ideological j o w l , Eilzheit, Karf Peters issued the obligatov c o d e m a t i o n by accusing the

'There Are No Guc7d Germalzs'"

23

deposed Polish leader of deviating from a consistent Marxist-L,eninj.st line and of coddting bourgeois-nationalists.77 Mter the BPR-PPS meqer, SED Politburo member Mermam Matem declared that "never again wiXI Polmd be a reactionary springboard and the base of counterrcvolutionary war provocations against the Soviet Llnion." But in a cmdescending tone he cmcltuded that ""the reactionaries in Polmd tried to develop anti:Rrassim and anti-Bolshevik attitudes and use [them] to come to power. This too created vacillations and deviations among the leading comrades in the PPR, like GornuEka." Matern pt?id the usual tribute to the "great Soviet Union" for ensuring Poland's securiv m d "happy future,'"78 tllbrichtfs visit to Poland in October 1948 was the first face-to-face meeting between a high-ranking SED functionary and the top Pdish leadership. The SED viewed the trip as a turning point in relations with the Polish commmists. tllbricht recalled later &at it was not easy to address a erokvd in Warsaw a city that had been destroyed by thc Germans. He tried. to reassure the Poles that the SED had abandoned any hopes of revis@ the Oder-Neisse border: "For us t-he question of the Polish-German border has been definjthely settled.? U'tbrieht exaggerated the level of trust that he had develsped, with Polish dficials, however, claiming that Cyrmkiewicz wap; fully satisfied that the SEC) had overcome its rclvisionist tendencies-K"UIhricht said, that his delegation had ""succeeded in winning the trust of the Polish comrades for our party and our party leadership." He concluded that it was now up to the SEC) to keep that trust.81 The Poles gave UXbricht a rather lukewarm receptim.82 Cyrmkiewicz declared, "W cannot hnagine the victory of socialism without the victory of t-he SED in Germany,"'N%ut he eautiosled Urbricht that orlly '"the first step has been taken."@ Fearing popuhr demonstrations against Wlbricht" visit, G h s Lzkdu did not cover it until after Ulbricht had returned to ESerlh.85 The Polish Military Mission in Berlh viewed Ubricht's pronouncments as a positive s i w for the direction of the SED" foreign policy a d reported that the SED had made it a top priority to quash its mennklers' ideas about. revisixlg the (Ilder-Neisse bordec But the Polish officers at the mission, mhdful of Stalin" demand. for communist party fealty, warned that "even in the central organs [of the SEU] m t everyone speaks candidy about what they think [about the border].'"b Mo~over, the SEUk iil.legitirnacy gave the Poles pause about the party" aabjlity to elixninatc the German peopte" opposition to the Oder-Neisse border, let alone their negative attitudes toward Poles. The SED leadership h e w that much work had to be done to convince its constituents of the need for lriendly ~ l a t i o n with s Poland." UUlbricbt acknowledged that "unfortunately in the past the G e m a n workers' movemnt was mable to overcome reactionary elements."x" a letter to

22

'There A re No Guc7cl G e r mns '"

the PPR thanking the Poles for inviting Ulbricht to Polmd, Pieck conceded that there was still considerable nationalist sentknent in the rmks of the SED." Tryhulztl Lzsdzr's ccorrespmdent in Berh, Stanisaaw Krodzki, also said that the SEWSmain task was to redress the historical corruption caused by Nazism and social ciemwracy of the Geman workirtg clas~.~O Both parties now pllblicly proclaimed the dawning of a n w era in Polish-German relations. At the PZPR" unification congress in DeceHlber, Cyrankiewicz extended a warm welcome to SED delegate Frmz Dahlem, whom he rclmernbered as ""my comrade from the concentration camp in Mauthausen." Cyrankiwicz praised the efforts of the SED leadership to combat social democratic, reformist, and other un-Marxist ideas h the pasty, and lauded the SEUs campaign to convince the masses of the need for good relations with Poiand. Dahlem =plied &at ""as socialist-internationalists, as German workers, we feel deeply bcmded to tl1e working class and the working msses of Poland, We are most vitally hterested in the strength of the3 People" Republic of Poland."% The Polish delegaticln atm to& home a favorable impression of the SED party cmgress in J a ~ u a r y1949. Edward Ochab observed that there was a new fresh air of trust between the SED and the PZPR: "We wmt to enlighten [the Polish working class] that under the leadership of tbe SED the true democratic, anti-i~nperiafi&forces are assernblix~gto create a united, peaceful, demcratic Germany that we have always wmted for a neighbor*"gz li.ybunn Lzrdrf reported that the audience's reaction was "especialfy warm" when Pieck stressed. the need for cooperation with the other nations of Eastern Europe, especially Poland." The newspaper even commended the SED for changjng the nationalistic, anti-Polish atlitudes in the German working classes94 and lavished praise on the party for eliminating the influence and power of Hitlerites, nationalists, and industrialist~.~-rigadier GeneraX Jakub Prawin, the head of the Polish Military Mlssion, told Nowe D q i in 1949 that the worklng classes in the Soviet zone had developed a new attitude toward the Soviet tlnicm; he said that the SEW had done m c h to improve relations with the peo,lefs repwblies, particularly with Polrnd.96 f'ieck led another SEC) delegation to Potand in September 4949. tlbricht reported that his talks with Cyrankiewicz and the Polish Minister of Industry Hilary Minc were conducted in a friendly tone, He maintained that Cyrartkiewicz was now satisfied that thr SEI) had ~ e l l e opd position to the border wi.lhin the partygT But the relative importmce of Pieck" visit to each side was revealed in the coverage it rcceived in the SED and the I'ZPR press. Netitrs Drzitschlurzd devoted severat extensive fsont-page articles to the visit, interpreting it as a significant breakthrough for the recognition of the SEE? as a legitimate communist party. Tryhzlrza Ltldu made only brief mention of the talks.98

'There Are No Guc7d Germalzs'"

23

Relations between the tcvo communist parties seemed to have done a volte-face by 1949, but it was a thin facade of commmist solidarity rather than a genuhe rapprocherne~~t; in the oppressive and s~~spicious atmosphere of Stalin" empire, the partiesyropaganda had a hollow ring, Before Stalirrfssplit with Tito and the b ~ a k d o w nof allied cooperation in Germany in 1948, neither party had rnade a concerted effort to reconcile their differences. For the first few years after the war, Pdish communists not: only ipored their German counterparts but exploited Poles' hatred of all Germms to attract adlaere11t.s to the party The SED was preoccupied with its relations with the Soviet authorities and with consolidathg its power in the Soviet zone, The Soviets did not actively fnster closer relations between the Polish and Germall communists either, for friction between them increased their dependency on Moscow In Stalh" eempire, a genuine frit.ndship between the communist parties, let alone the peoples, was impassfile. The Poles possessed more diplomatic leverage than the German communil;ts in the early postwar period, but ly'itofsexpulsion from Corninform, and the smb5equem.t.purges in the Sovkt Hoe parties changed the d ynamic of PZPR-SED relations. The comrrritted Stalinj.sts and Soviet satraps in the SED saw their formes on the upswing, culminating in the formation of the German Democratk Republic in October 1949. Until Stalin" death in 1953, UXbricht" cmfidence grew as did his resolve to promote East German interests in his dealings with the Poles. Neither the postwar communist gover ent in Polmd nor the SED in the Soviet zone had any legitimate claim to power. As a result, relations between the Polish and German communists were also artificial, conducted with the howledge that Moscow might purge them at m y time. The East G e r m s had misgivings about Polish and Russian Slavic solidarity and the possibility that MOSCOW woUld support a demilitarized, neutral, and democratic Germany. The SED knew that it bad no chance of winning a h e election, Meanwhile, the Polish communists worried that a closer ~lationshipbetween &e SEU a d the CPSU could result in a revision of the ader-Neisse bordcr, 'The Qrmm communists' unwillingness to recogslize the permanence of f i e border in the early postwar period cast a pall over relations with the Polish communists for years to come*

4. Quoted in Franz Sikora, Sc~zi~lis~i~ctzc Sulidlzrifdt zknd ~lnkiu:orze;tle lntercssetz (Sdalist solidariq and natimal interests) (Colc>gne:Verlag Wissenschaft und Poiitik, 1977), pp. 101-102. 2, Quoted from a letter from Polish communist veterans to the SED Central Committee on the tenth anniversary of the founding of the GDR, Qctclber 1959, SED ZK, Wlter Ulbricht Papers, NL 182/ 1244.

24

'There A re No Goc7cl G e r mns '"

3, Luxemburg" closest confidant in the party was Lean Jogiches, who was bom in Wiitno to a wealtl-tyJewish family. Another founder was the infamous Botshevik inquisitor Feliks Dzier2yfiski. The SBKPiL and the left-wing Socialists formed the Polish Communist WorkersTarty in 1918. It was renamed the Polish Communist Party (KPI)) in 1925. 4. See M. K, Dziewanowski, The Corrztnz-lnisfPnrty cf 1Safnnd:An Ozkfline of History (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 19761, pp. 118-419, 150-151. Stalin a h o alleged that virtually the entire W P was infiltrated with agents of the Polish intelligence seivice. 5. Quoted in Woy A. Medvedev, Let H k t o q fudge: Tke Origirzs and Cc~frseque~ces of Sfalinisnz (New York: Vintage Books, 19;71),p. 220. 6, See M. K, Bziewanowski, Palnrrd ifz the Tz~)enfz'eflz Centzt ry (New York: Columbia Universiv Press, 19"7;7 ppp,162-164. Gomuika's native communist group included Zenon Kliszko, Marian Spychalski, and Wladysjaw fliehkc3wsk.i; and Antta Prazmowska, ""Te Sc~vietLiberation of Poland and the Polish Left, 11i343-1945,"7n Francesca Gori and Silvio Prjns, eds., Tire SoztieC Uniorz alzd Ezzrape i12 the Cold Wal; 1943-53 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), p. 76; and John Cclutou~iidisand Jaime Keynolds, Potlarzd 1939-1947 (New York: Holmes and Meier, Z986), pp. 185-197. 'I". See Coutouvidis and Reynolids, bland 1939-1947 p. 315; see also Nikita Khrushchev, F;lhrrislzcl$evRemembers: The Glnsnasf Epes (Boston: Little, Brown, 1990), p. 116. In these memoirs, Khrushchev maintains that Stalin was not responsible for Gomu3ka%arrst: ""Iew for a fact, I heard it from Stalin, that he did not order Gomujka's arrest; on the contrary he even voiced doubts about the arrest, He trusted Gomutka." 8. Manfred Wilke, "Mommunismus in Beutschland und Rahmenbedingmgen polititischer Handelns nach 1945" (Communism in Germany and the cmtingencies of political exchange), in Manfred Wilke, eed., Anafomie der Partel'ze~frnle: Die KPD/SEL) nuj" &ern Weg zzkr Macill (Anatc~myof the Central Party Office: The KI"D/SED on the road to power) (Berlin: Akadernie VerXag, 119981, pp. 24-25, 9. See R. C. Raack, '"talin Plans His Post-War Germanyf"lournnl of Conlenzpor a y H i s f o ~28 (19931, pp. 55,bG. 10. See WiIfried Loth, Sfnlins ungelkbfes Kind: Warurn Moskazt die DDR niclzt wllfe (Stalin" unloved child: Why Moscotzr did not want the GDR) (Berlin: Rowohlt, 1994); and Wilfried Lath, "Stalin" Plans h r Post-VVar Germany,'Yn Francexa Gori and Silvict Pans, eds., The Soviet U~zioclrzand Europe itz ttie Cold Wa1; 3943-53 (New tlork: St. Martin" Press, Z996), p. 24, Loth argues that Stalin did not intend to birth his "unloved child," the GDR: ""Salin really pursued the democratization of Germany under the auspices of the four powers and that he only ended up with a separate Socialist state as a result of the incompetence of the Communists to play the democratic gameW";see also Alexander Dallin, ""Stalin and the Prospects for Post-War Europe," in inrmcesca Gori and SiXviio Pons, eds., The Suvitpt Unbpt and Ellrope in ttie Gold War, 294>&53(New York: St, Martin's Press, 19536), p. 189. Dallin adds that Stalin" long.-termgoal was a communist Germany, even if he would accept a democratic Germany for the time being: "There is nothing in the record to sustain the argument that, in the long run, Stalin wanted a "bourgeois-democraticf gc>vernmenta n w h e r e anytime-surety not in the %>vr"et

'There Are No Guc7d Germalzs'"

25

Union, surely not in Eastern Europe, and surely not in Germany;" Michail M, Narinskij, "The Sc~vietUnion and the Berlin Crisis," in inrancesca Gori and S-iXvio Pons, eds., The Snviclf U r t i o ~and Europe in the Cold Wa1; 3943-53 (New k r k : St. Martin's Press, 19%6 p. 59. Narinskii concurs with Loth, arguing that Stalin gradually warmed to the idea of a wparate East German state in reaetiic~nto the Tmman Dc>ctrine,the Marshall Plan, and other seemingly threatening moves by the West; see also John Lewis Gaddis, We Klzuw Nozu: Rettzitzkirzg Cold War kll'sforp(Oxford: CXarendon Press, 1W?), p. 119, 41. "Left" refers to the communist and socialist parties, the Communist Party of Germany (KPD), the Socialist Party of Germany fSX3D), the Polish VVarkersf Party (PPR), and the Polish Socialist Party (PPS). The KPD and SPD united in 1946 to form the Sacialist Unity Party (SEB), and the PI% and PPS merged into the Polish United WorkersTrilrty (PZPR) in 1948. Because the KPD and PPR dominated these new padim, the terms Potis!z commzrnr'sfsand Gennat~commzhrtr'sfswill be used to characterize the Left in each country, with the exception of where differentiation with the sc9cialists is necessay. 12. Internal memo, undated, unsigned, SE9 ZK, Hermann Axen Office, I V 2/2.035/459. In 1955, Hermam Axen wrt2te that "&ring the Weimar Republic the German Communist Party always saw its duty to support the struggle of the illegal Polish Communist P a ~ y . " 13, Heinrich Gemkow, "Ce~rwirzsasclmeTraditio11en der rez~nlutio~$ren deutsclzen tjnd polnisclzen Arbeiterbcweguq 1917128 bis 1945" (Common traditions of the revolutionary German and Palish WorkersWoclement 1947148 to 4945), in Beilrige Z Z GcschicF~feder Arbeirierbewcgz-~ng(Contributions t c ~the history of the workersf movement) 16, no, 1 (1"34), pp. 1%27, Far example, postwar PPS leader Jcizef Cyrankiewicz was imprisoned in Mauthausm with German communist Franz Dahlem. Adam Rapacki, Poland's fo3reign minister in the 1 9 5 0 ~ and ~ Jan Izydorczyk, the Polish chief of mission in the GDR in the early 1950s, also shared cells with German communists during the war. This cc>habitatio>ndid not necessarily mean that they befriended each other; German political prisoners were among the mc)st privileged inmates, and were oi'len used to guard other prisoners. 44, During KPD leader 1Erns.t Thalmann's internment in a Nazi prison from 1935 to 1944, Pieck acted as chairman of the Central Committee. Pieck spent most of the Nazi period in Moscow, and after the Nazis executed Thalmann in 1944, P i ~ became k head of the party. 45. Luxemburg's profession of a strict Marxist-Leninist internationalist f o r e i p policy was similar to the one espoused by the SE&)after World VVar 11, Luxemburg opposed a separate Polish state and any so>cialdemocratic notions of a nonviolent, democratic means to socialism. She alienated many Polish and German communists with these views. See Elzbieta Ettinger, Rosn Luksetnburg: Eirz lieben (Rosa Luxemburg: A life), (Bmn: Verlag J.H.W. Dietz, 199Q),pp. 203-204. She writes that "the more Rosa Z,uxemburg stocd up for 'revolutionary Masxism' the more she was iscllateb. The Polish tradition of herclism and martyrdom and the German traditian of conforming and consematism were unreconcilable."" 46, Fleinz Vosske, WiEhetjn Pieck: Biogr~plrischerAbriss (Wifhelm Pieck: Biographical Abstract) (Berlin: Bietz VerXag! 1975), pp. 4 M 7 , Karl Liehknecht was also interrogated at the Eden Hotel and shot the same day*

~

26

'Thew A re No Guc~CI Germns '"

17, On the twenty-fifth anniversary of Marchlewski's death on March 22,1950, Pie& presented a Polish delegation with Marchlew~ki%ashes, which they took back to Poland, 18. Declaration of the KPD Central Committee, September 23, 1939, SET> ZK, Wilhelm Pieck Papers, NL 361496. 19. George L. Flemming, "The Polish Eagle Looks West," "~aslt. Ezlrupe 16, no. 10 (19(77),p. 18. 20. Wilhelm Picsck notes, Oct&er 22, 2939, SED ZK, Wilhelm P i ~ 13agers, k NL 36/496. 21. KPD circular, October 21,1939, SED ZK, Wilhelm Pieck 13apers,NL 361496; see Horst Duhnke, Die KPD von 1933 bis 1945 (The KPD from 1933 to 1945) (Colope: Miepenheuer U, Witsch, 2 9721, pp- 333-351. 22. Caroia Stern, Ulbriclzf: A Pt~la'ticalBit?grnp!ty (New York: Frederjck Praeger, 1965), p, 34. Ulbricht became a member of the KPD Politburo in 1929, and tvas the party" representative to the Communist International in Moscc>w in the late 1920s, and again during World War 11, Ufbricht had the reputation of being a humorXess, efficienl; and dogmatic apparatchik, acquiring the derogatory moniker "Comrade Cell" ktr his work in party organization. h r i n g his years in the Soviet Union, Ulbricht developed closer ties to the Czechoslovak Communist Party (CzCP) and its chief, Klement Gottwald, than to the PctXish communists. Pieck also served with Gottwald on the political secretariat of the Communist Xnternational in the 1930s and 1940s..A s a resuXt, the KPD enjoyed better relations with the CzCP after the war than it did with the PPR. 23. Stern, Ulhridzf, p. 207. Ulbricht" article appeared in Die Well., a Comintern paper published in Sweden. 24. MPP note on the German-Soviet Non-Aggressim 13act, November, 1939, SED ZK, Wilhefm Pieck Papers, NL 36/436. 25, See Norman Davies, God%Playground: A Histoty cl(XsolfindrV o l u l r ~11: 2795 fo flze Pracmlt.(New York: Columbia University Press, 19821, pp. 544-548. 26. See M. K. Dziewanowski, bEa7.zd ~ L Zflzc 20th Century (New tlork: Columbia University Press, 1977), p. 164. Dziewanowski obsewes that the Krernlin accepted a Polish national rc~adtcr communism in 1945: "They apparently calculated that toleration of nationalistic slogans was one means of weakening the Polish popular opposition to Communism during the crucial takeover period." Although the Polish communists began to change this propaganda in 2948, this campaign had a Ic~ng-termnegative impact on the SEUs relatiom with Poland. 27. Quoted in Georg W Strcrbet, Beufscr?tl~nd-Polsn: Wtrnsefi irnd Wir-klz'ehkeif (Germany-Poland: Wish and reality) (Bctnn: Edition Atlantic Forum, 1969), g. 14. Born in the Awtro-Hungarian province of Galicia, Gomuika attended a German school where he acquired a working knowledge of German. When the Sctviets occupied Ltvdw in the fall of 4939, he fled tcr I-tis home town of Krosno, where he took his chances with the German occupiers. 28. This ministry administered the German territories occupied by Poland in 1945. 29, G b s Ludu (Vcjice of the People), March 16, 1945, p, 1, Although the nonSlavic countries in Eastern Europe, Romania and Hungary, would eventually become part of the Sc)viet bloc and the Warsaw Pact, they had supplied Hitler with several divisions far the attack on the Svvicst Union in 1941.

'There Are No Guc7d Germalzs'"

27

30, Wtadys2aw Gomutka, O pmblemie sli~mieckz'rn(On the German problem) (Mrarsaw: Ksigkka i Wiedza, 1"384), p. 39. 31.620s L u d ~July , 15,1946, p. 4. 32. GL?S Lud~,April 30,1946, p. 6. 33. For a thorc~raghdiscussion of Polish-Czechoslovak relations in the immediStoszlnki I;"ofl'fyate gs~stwarperiod, see Marek Karnifiski, 1"~~sko-~zec~lc?st~zvnckie m ~ c1945-1 , 948 (Polish-Czechoslovak political relations, 1945-1 948) (Warsaw: Pahsl-vvwe Wydawnicho Naukowe, 1989); see also Anclrzq Pgczkowski, "'The Polish Contribution to the Victory of the Trague Coup3n February 11i348," "13261lefin: Cold Wnr Internntionnl History Project, no. I1 (winter 2998)' p. 242. The disputed area of Teslin (Czieszen) Silesia was one of the main issues dividing the two countries until 1947, when Stalin brokmed a campromise, 34. CXos Lzadu, June 25,1946, g. 4; and GIos Ludu, August 26 1946, p. 4; see Hans Gectrg Lehmann, Der Oder-Meisse-Kotzflikt (The Oder-Neisse conflict) (Munich: C. H. Beck, 3979), p. 58. Relations between the Pc>Xish and Czechoslovak go?vernrnents were in reality rather ten= after the war, especially in April 1946 when the Czechoslovak govemmnt claim& small barder areas in Polish Silesia, The Pofish govei-nment responded by sending troops to the area, and the Czechclslovak govemmnt relented. 35, AliEons Klatfkowski, Tlw P(?lislz-Gmn.mnFrontier After. World War 11 (Poznah: t"dy8amictwo Poznafiskie, 1972), p. 91. 36. See C b s lizlldcl's reports on the Nuremberg trials in Spternber, 1946. 37. Norman Naimark, Tfze Rzsssia~sin Germatty: R Nisi-ofy of the Suztiet Zorzc of Occzrpation, 1945-1949 (Cambridge: Ffarvard biversity Press, 1995), p. 347. 38. Quoted in Sikora, Sclziall'stiscfzeSolihritGf zirtd r2afio~~aIe I-ttferessetz,pp. 101-102. 39. See G b s ttidu from May 2945 to April 1946, 40. See, for example, G2os Ludu, Bctt3ber 22, 4946, p, 2. The newspaper carried just ; t o small articles on the victory of SPD in Berlin and the SE132 in the rest of the %>vietzone, 41. See C2os tudu, April 23,1946, p. 2. In this issue was a small article from the TASS news agency titled jf"Pc>gressin the Work of German Dernocracyn";ee ~XISCJ Gtos Lzadu, April 25, 46946. 42. Polish Military Mission Repc~l"c,May 2,1946, MSZ, 6/671/42. 43. Erwin Weit, Clstbluck irztenz: 13 jnhre Dotmetsclrcrfiir die polnisctzc Pnrfei- iind StnnfsfiiFznltrg (East bloc intern: 13 Years as interpreter for the Polish Party and State leadership) (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe Vertag, 19";78), pp. 225-226. According i-o Weit, who was Gomuzka" interpreter in 1950s and 19Ms, these farmer Nazis were even more loyal to Utbricht because he could use their past to incriminate them. 44. Jan Gross, ""Mar as Revolution,'' in Norman Naimark and lEJec)nid Gibianski, eds., The EsfabEz'shment of Commzr nisi- Rtgz'me?;in Easter~zEzrrope, 1944-1 949 (Boulider: Weshriew Press, 2997), p. 34; see also GIos Ludzr, May '7,1946, p. 5. 45. The SD, along with the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) and the United Peasant Party (ZSL), collaborated with the PPK in the provisianal government. 46. Glos Ludzl, June 30, 1946, pp. 3-44 8; see atso Strobel, Deutscfrlar~d-Polerz: Wtinsclt ir nd Wirklichkeif,p. 13. 47. Loth, Stnlizzs Mnbeliebfes Kl'lzd, p. 104. Loth argues that the Swiets did not invite the SEU because it was not a communist party; see also Nairnark, The Rus-

28

'Thew A re No Guc~CIGermns'"

s i ~ n sin Gertrrmny, p. 305; and Giuliano 13rocacci,ed,, Tke Comirfor~rr:Minutes of the Thrce Conjerences, 1947/1948/1949 (Milan: Giangiacurno Feltrinelli, 1994), p. 3'7; and Erich W Gnifae, JaJzre MiC Lllbridzt (Years with Ulbricht) (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und PoEitik, 1966), p. 264. 48. Press and Informatic~nService af the Federal Government, June 17,1950, BRD AA, Department 2, vol. 437; see also AiFred Schickel, Deltlscltc t-lnd Pc~len: Ein jnhrlnuse~zdgeltneinsame Geschiclzte (Germans and Poles: A thousand years af carnrnon history) (Bergisch GEadbach, Germany: Gustav LGbbe Verlag, 2 984), p. 245. 49, A m a Di Biagio, ""The Marshall Plan and the Founding of the Caminfarm, June-September 1947," in inrancexa Gori and Siifviv I""ons,eds,, The Sazliet Union and Europe ~ I Zthe Cold War, 3943-53 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), p. 217; and Rajna, Csntziika, p. '70. 50. Procacci, ed., TIZPCumitzfonn,p. 61. 51. Tybzrnn Lzldzt, December 16,1948, g. 1. 52. Lewandowski notes of meeting with Weiner, March 1, 1947, PPR KC, 295/m-70, 53. Przeb6j-Jareckinotes, March 1,lli347, MSZ, 6/714 /46. 54. Repol-t on Ulbricfit's press conference in Berlin, October 23, 2948, PPR KC, 295/VTI-69. 55, Mellter notes of meethg with Ulbricht and Prawin, March 15,1947, PPR KC, 295/XX-170. 56. See the Letter from the SED Press Infc7rmation Department to Meller, April 26,1948, PPR KG, 295/XX-I7Q. 57, Letter from the SED Party School Karl Marx tcr the PPR Central %hc>alin Lddz, Spternher 27,1948,13PR MC, 295/XX-70. 58. Dr. Hermann Ley to the PPR Central Committee, April 18, 4947, PPR KC, 295/XX-71. 59. I""rotocoXNo. 13 of the meeting of the Central Secretariat-,November 10, 1947, SED ZK, TV 2 / 2 1 1144. 60. Ostap muski to ComuEb, December 15, 194'7, PZPR KC, 295/XX-72; see also GZos Liadzr, September 23,lli347, p, 1. 61. H. Metler to Grosz, F e b r u a ~16,1948, PPR KC, 295/XX-72. 62. See Nezhcs Dez-ktschk~fd (New Germany) from April 1946 to December 1947. ~ r q i (New Paths), March 1948, p. 209. The book was Janwz Pajewski 63. N O W U and Wlctdzimierz G%owaeki% A~znlogr'erew2"zjc11~izrnu ~ i s t n i e c k i ~(Analysis g~ of German revisionism) (Poznafi, 1947). 64. Appendix No. 4 to Prtstcxol No. 82 of the meeting of the Central Secretariat, June 7,1948, SED ZK, IV 2/21 1205. 65. In March 1958, its name was changed to the Deutsch-polnjscfie Geselfschaft fiir Frieden und gute Nachbarxhaft (German-Pc>lishSclciety for Peace and Gocd Neighborl iness). 61;. C1os Ludu, Sptember 23,1948, p. 1; and Gtos Lildzc, October IQ, 4948, p. 3. 67, Wtzel to Pieck, Grotewohl, et al., June 26, 1948, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339143487. 68. Wilfried Loth, ""Salin's Plans for Post-War Germany," in Francesca Gori and Sdvio I""c>ns,eds., Tlze Soviet U ~ i o and n Ezll.ape in flze Cold War, 1943-53 (New

'There Are No Guc7d Germalzs'"

29

York: St. Martin" Press, 1996)' p. 33-By the spring of 1948,4Qpercent of all industrial prcjduction in the Soviet zone had been de-privatized. 69. See Nairnark, TIE-IZzassi~il?lls ifi Gerf~mny, p. 299. Even Otto Grotewahl, the former SPD leader who was now in a leadership pc~sitionin the SED, recc~gnizedthat there was na alternative but to kowttjw to Stalin, During his first visit to Mogaw in January 1946, Grotewohl fawn& ower the Swiet leader: ""Comrade Stalin is the g ~ ~ a t esocialist st in the world, Comade Stalin is the father af the t~rorld." 70. See Ann L. 13hiltlips,Smiet Policy fozuard East Gerlrznny Reconsidered: The Bostwar Decade (New York: Greenwwd Press, 19%)' p. 40. Ackermann first elucidated the WIYs idea of a "German Road to Socialism" h December 1945, and it was not untiX 1948 that the SED rejected Ackermann" tt-heoxy. He recanted in Septernber of that year, 13aut Merker was expelled from the SED in 1950, Ackermam and Franz Dahlern in 1953. Ackermann was rehabilitated in 1956. 71. Kkrushchev, f"=h~~ltshc/zcv Remembers: The Glnslzosf Tap=, p. 116. 72. Dziewanow-ski, 'The Commjranist h r f y c f h k n d , p. 207'. 73% Quoted in Dziewanawski, Polnnd itz the Tzuctztieth Cent~lry,p. 1%. 74. Raina, Go~rttiIk,pp. 74-75. 75.See Nikita Khrushchev, Khrustrcl~ttRemembers: The Last Tcsfame.tt (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), p, 197. Gomulka was purged from the PZPR in 1949, and arrested in 1951. Five years later, he returned to lead the party. 76, Marjan Spychal"i, Zenon, Kliszko, and Wiadyslaw Biehkowski were other prominent leaders purged. See Bigniew Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc: Unify ancl Cotzflict (Cambridge: Haward Universiv Press 1967')p. 61. Brzzinski claims that one of the reasc~nsfor Gomulka" fdtl was that he was the only prominent communist Leader in Easte1-n Europe to oppclse the fc3rmation af Cominfc3rm in 1947; see also lazhborovskaia, ""Te Gornulka Alternative," p. 126, She writes that election tcr head the PPR in NovemStalin had not been consulted on Gomu%ka% ber 1943, and was opposed to Gomulka" ccommitment to colective decisionmaking in the party, and to his attempt to make an honest c=mned.ic>n between a national communist party and the masses; see also Leunid Gibianski, "The %>viet-YugoslavGonnict and the Soviet Bloc," p 2217. For several years the Foreign Policy Department af the CPSU had been filing critical repc~rtson Gamulka's attempts to put a Polish, rather than a Sc~viet,cast on the communist system. Now his unwillingness to slavishly fc~llawthe Sclviet model was used agaimt him; see also Gnif&e, falzre ~rzitUlbriclzt,p. 340, 77. Einfwit (Unity) 3, no. 11 (November 19481, p. 10&, 78. Nezges Deutscftland, January l, 1949, p. 6; see also Sikora, Sozialisfisclze Solidarz'lai und nnfionafe Trzteressen, pp. 116-1117.. Sikora calls Matern's lecture to the Poles typical of thct SED" '%'afrojiancef~(iiFe&cbliclzkt.it). 79. Report of Utbricht" press conference in Berlin, October 23,1948, FZPR KC, group PPR KC, 295/VfI-69. 80. Nezk~sDezrfsclzla~zd, October 26,1948, p. 2. 81. Report on Ulbricht's trip to Potand, SED ZK, meetings af the party leadership, Octc>ber20-21,1948, IV 2/1/55, 82. Sikora, SuzkarEisfiscI~cSc7tidarit8i iiturd nntiotzate Interesscn, p. 116. Sikora writes that Dahlem" visit was much more thoroughfy reported in the Polish press than Ulbricht" "somewhat toneless visit."

30

'There A re No Guc7cl G e r mns '"

83, Umigned memo, O c t d e r 20, 1948, SED ZK, Walter Ulbricht Papers, NL, 18211245.. 84. Nezges Deufseizlalzd, November 21,1948, p-3. 85. GL?S Lzldu, October 24,1948, g. 1. 86. Meller to the Polish Foreign Ministry, October 29, 1948, PZPR KC, group PPR KG, 295/XX-i"Q. 8'7".Neues Il)eufs&lland, November 24,4948, p, 3. 88. Repod of Ulbricht's press conference in Berlin, October 23,1948, 132;PRKC, group PPR KC, 2951VZZ-69. 89. Pieck, et al., to the 13PR Politburo, November 20, 1948, 13ZPR KC, group PPR KC, 295/XX-m. 90. Trybunn Lzddu, February 11,1949, p.3. 91.. Tqbunn Lzldzt, December 17,1948, g. 4; and December 18,1948, pp. 8-9. 92. Notes on Ochab" visit, unsigned, undated, ea. Qcto3ber 1948, SED ZK, WaLter Ulbricht Papers, NL 182/2245. 93. Trybum Ludzr, January 27; 4949#p. 1. 94. Trybunn Lzddu, January 26,1949, p-4, 95. TyEizlw Ludir, Bctclber 4,4?24"3p. 3. 96. N O W Drogi, ~ March-April 1949, p. 127. 97. Utbricl-rt speech, October 22, 1949, SED ZK, Wilhelm Pieck Papers, NL, 361441. 98. See Tvbfina Ludzt and Rieues Deztksctzlnnd for the first week of September, 1949.

The Controversy over the Oder-Neisse Border, 1946-1949 I""o!~tnnrdno lorlger wants to be a soccer k EI tt~afis

kicked a r o u f ~ d f i aplace f ~ ~ fo place. ----madystau?Gomrslkn, 19&*

The primary obstacle to better relations between the Polish and German communists after World War 11 was the loss sf German territories to Poland. 'The equivocation of the KPT), the SPD, and the SED on recognizing the permanence oi the Oder-Neisse border undermined Polish confidence in the German Left. That they shared an internationalist ideology that theo~ticallytranscended their natimal differences did not seeln to matter; the border was still relevmt. The conflict between Poland and Germany over Uppefiilesia after World. War I was a prolsgw to the dispute over the ader-Neisse border, :Rosa Luxemburg had. rejected the notion of nation-states, national borders, m d even the resurrection sf a Polish state.2 111 1918, Pieck was also opposed to drawing the Polish-German border on strictly national lines, He promoted Polish and German working-class solidarity in the quest for a gmeral victory of communism in East Central Europe. :ll~the fall of 1,922, shortly beftore the plebjscite that w o d d determine the final border, Pierk wrote an open letter to the Poks calling for cooperation against nationdist agitators: "We wodd like the Polish and German wlrrkers from the border areas to e o m together, fraternize as m e d e r s of the proletariat, and investigate and prevent the criminal plans of reactionary nationalists and their agttlntsmr3 After the p1t.bi~cit.e~ Pieck critirsized the natianalists' appea[s to the workers in both countries, but he blamed German expioitation oi Polish

32

C ( ~ ~ r vover r ythe Oder-Ne-isse Bordcr

workers for the extreme cbaracter of Polish nationdist pmpagmda.4 H e urged German and Polish workers to unjte in a revolutionary cause against the industrial mag~~ates in Upper Silesiai.5 The KPP and the W D finally agreed to a border drawn along ethnic lines on January 29, 1933, the day before Adolf Hitler became chancellor of Gemany*" At the k'alta, conhence in kbruary 1945, British Priitne Minister Wins t m Churchill and U.S. President Frankli.n Roosevelt tentatively agreed to Stalirr" demand for a Polish-German border on the Oder and Wstern Neisse Rivers. At first, the Polish Provisional Government hesitated to make a legal claim to the German territories, The Poles did not want to set a precedent to change Poland's 1937 borders; such a change could mean the permanent loss of the eastern territmies now occupied by the Soviet Union.7 By the time the Aflied leaders met again at h t s d a m in July, however, the Polish governmat had established an administration in the G e r m n territories; the expulsion of G e r m s was undcrway. 'The AIlies confirmed at Potsdam that PoXand would occupy the territories until a final peace twaty with Germany." The Western Allies raised no o e c t i o ~ to~the Soviet Union's amexation of BeXarus and Western Ukraine; the Polish government ceded the territmies to the Sowiet Union on August 16, 1945. Now Warsw stood firmly behhd the Yalta and Potsdam agreeme~~ts as Poland's legal claim to the Wr-Neisse border.Yhe g o v e m m t turned its energies to the administration and develogmmt of the Western 'TtJrritories,Io in part to create a fait accompli before the Allies complekd a German peace treatyell The KPD, like all the German political parties, was adamantly opposed to the new border. At first, the party avoided making public statements in the hope that the establishment of LeEtist governments in Germany and Poland would aid a revision of the Odes-Neisse lhe. The KPD often referred to the Soviet zone as "Central Gemmy'YfMitteldezktscl.~lund), with the implication that an ""East Germany'\was yet to be reclaimed from Polmd. Such references elicited vehernent protests irom the Polish Military Mission in Berlin.7" The KPD was in a compromised positim, of course, because its political patron, the Sovict Union, had drawn the bodes in the first place. The party organ Ilt.l.ltsclze Vt,lkszeitzln,r (German People" N~ewspaper) avoided discussion of the border or co~~ditions in the German territories lost to Poland. Several articles djd appear &out the German refugees who were pouring in from Poland and Czechoslovakia, but: MIithout me~~tianing that most had been expelled.13 The KPD tried to absolve itself m d its workhg-class cmstihlents of respmsibility for the lost territories by a r g u i ~ ~&at g Hitler, with the support of non-communist Germnn elements, had garnblcd them away. Pieck, whose own hometown of Guben'%n the Neisse River was now a divided city, blamed Hitler for the plight of the German rehgees from

Polmd: ""We understand what it means when the German people in the east lose a piece of their lmd. "Illere is no one who does not deeply rttgret that it was possible for Hitler to gamble crimhally with the existence and the fuhurc of the German people,"'"" I'he KPD leaders hoped that a free exchange of goods between the fnrmer German territories and Germany was one way to make the new border irrelevant, but the Polish governmnt was in no mood. to cooperate. ?"he PPR ignored requests from the I(I'D to deliver more g o d s from these territories. Ulbricht rcjecled the idea that Germany codd not prosper withln the new borders: however: '*Thisis the old CLeberzsmt~m) argument with M;hich Hitler prc"pare"Jhe war. But from it came catastrophe for Germany; as a rest& of the war of conqllcst Hitler lost the territories east of the Oder and the Neisse forever."l~ The KPD rejected Polmd" historical claims to the territories; if the Allies decided to sign a final peace treaty with Germany, the party wanted to use this as an argument to call for a retum of the territories to Germany. For the time being, the KPD wanted to leave historical claims out of it. Bzrfsche \/cllhzeitu~zgwrote that "'any reference to [Germany's] historical rQhts is senseless, because historical events have repeatedIy shown that the main cause of the bloody wars of cmquest has been the ' D m ~ t g~ ~ a (fstm' ch policy of German imperial2t.s and militnrists.'"~ The KPU" qualified accqtance of the new border with Poiand did not reflect the opjnion of most of the G e r m n communists and socialists in Germmy; however. Social De~socraticParty leader Otto Grotewohl was unequivocally opposed to the Oder-Neisse line; in August 1945 he told an $231)gathering in Leipzig that the border was provisional. W e n he mgrily attacked the Polish government for its obdurate border m d repanationd.istic d e m n d s of our eastrations policies, he charged that "h em neighhor, Poiand, have increased irnmeasurably."lt*Grotewohl, in rejecting Ulhricht's argument that Germany could live wi.t.hout this Lebensritlzim in the east, mahtahed that the lost territories were vital to the industrial and agricultural well-bejng of the country. He warned Soviet officials that the ader-Neisse border would be the cause of a hture Polish-German conflict, and would jeopardize the Soviet tlniods longterm security.lWoscow saw things differently; as long as the Red Army occupied pmt of Germany, there hvas little possibiEty of mother German war of aggression, At this poin.t, the tension betwem the German and Polish communists made them that more dependmt on the Soviet U ~ ~ i o n .

Poland" Claims to the Oder-Pifeisse Border Mast Poles supported the ader-Neisse border, especially given the slim chance that Poland would recover its eastern territories.") Poles justified the acquisition of German land cm moral, strategic, eccmomic, and his-

34

C ( ~ ~ r vover r ythe Oder-Ne-isse Bordcr

toric grounds. As a victim of German aggression and a victorious ally, the Poles regarded the German territories as just cmpenm"ti"" for the human and m&erial darnage that Poland had suffered durjng the war. Polish officids argued that Germany" economic and military potential would be decisively weakened by ceding Silesia and Pomerania to Poland. These territories would also give Poland a stronger and more balanced agricultural and industrial economyB21 Poiish officials wercl. offended when the Germms, includhg German Leki,sts, suggested that Pulmd could not make efficient economic use of the German territories, The Germans often alleged that the sllow ecanomic devebpment in the territories was typical of thc. "Polish economy," a ppejorative term that Germans had long used to stereotype Polish backwardness, disorganizatiun, and inefficicncyzz Pohnd" historical claim was founded on the presence of medieval Piast ernpire on both sides of i.hc Oder River. Gontulka often referred to the Odcr-NQsse line as the '"new Piast borcier." A popular slogan in Polmd after the war wap; 'Wad Odra-Nysa kaiyc@-----RyliSmy,jrs te$r~y,Bgdzietrryf" (On the Oder-Z,usacian Neiss we were, we are, and we will be).2"1n February 1945, Ckos Lzltlrr proclaimed that ""5lesia was and will be Polish," "adding that it was ""the spirit of all Pdand, the power of Poland.""z" Schoulteacbers taught that towns such as Wroclakv and Szczecin were orQinally Polish,zs and the government alluded to Poland" historicaj rights by creating a new Millistry of Recovered Territrrrit.s.2" The PPR even claimed that areas to the west of the ader-Neisse border we= Mabited by Slavs, not Germans. Mrriting in Glos Ltldzl, Stefania 0sinska pointed out that when the Germans conquered the Oder-Neisse area h the tenth century, it was inhitbited by Sfavs k1o~i.nas Lusatim Sobs. She estimated that there were about 275,U80 Lusatim Sorbs living in the Soviet zone of Germmy, and said that they had cheered the Polish army on its way to Berlh at the elnd of the war, Some had carried plxards that read, "A Slav nation lives here, the Lusatian Sorbs." She exhorted Poles to remember their Slav kinsmen across the border: "Poland has regained its hdependence. Our brothers in the west beyond the Oder m d Neisse remah hcapti~iV."2~ Poles not only supported the new westem borcter, but mmt wanted the Germans out af Poland. At Yaita, Churchill h i t i d y objected to the forced removal of the Germans, but Staljsl argued that most of them were fleeing from the advancing Red Army anyway Churtlhill did not press the isszxe.2Wy removing the Qrmans as quickly as possjble, the majority of them in the first year after the war, the Polish authorit.ies made sure that Poland was not susceptible to G e r m ethnic claims to the Western Territories." The government immediately Polonized the area by resettling Polish refugees from the eastern territories."UAlthough estimates vary, by

1950 approximately 11,600,000 Gemans had left Poland, 4,300,000 gojng to the Soviet zone; 3,800,000 to the Rriitish zone; 3,300,000 to the American zone; and 150,000 to the French ~ o n e . 3 ~ Tn September 1945, 63Tls Ludzl wrote that ""all Poland is of the ophion that there is no glace for tbe Gem-tans in these territories, and that they shodd be expelfed from trhm as soon as possiblc." The newspaper even criticized the g w e ent for nut deporting them faster.32 Gomufka eschewed proletarian internationalismby declari~~g &at "we must expef all the Germcrans because countries are built on national lines and not on multixlational mes,"'"When he promised that no '"enemy or fornip" eXements would be allowed to live in Poland, he memt the Germans.34

The SED KejecZs the Odrtr-Neisse Line After the SED was formed in April 1946, the PPR hoped that Pieck and Ulbricht would psevail upon the party to recogize the Oder-Neisse border. Rut the SED adopted a positicm that more chsely reflected Grotewohlfsm d the SX")Wsblunt revisionism. Although the SED could not promote national interests as openly as the Poles, the party" stubborn opposition to the new Polish-Germm border clmfirmed what the Polish communists fcared the most-that the ghost of Rapallo and the Nazi-Soviet Pact would return h the form of a deal behnieen the Stalin and the SER to revise the border in Germany" ffavor. The SED's first mnifest to the German people did not mention forc3ign policy or the Polish-German boder.3 h August, however, the SED declared that a communist German government that was mtaiz~tedby the Nazi's crimes against Poland and that contrib~~ted to the reconstruction of Europe w d d be able to undo the unfortunate results of Hitler's war, nan-tely, the loss of German territories to Poland." The new organ sf tbr SED, Nc~rcrsDeutschland, made a deliberate refcrtnce to Pieck's birtbpface to show that the SED sympathized with the rcfugees from Poland: "If the wcrrkers of Gubcm, in the spirit of strictest democracy, work with all their might for reconstruction, then they can hope that onc day the part of the city of Guben on the other side of the Neisse will agah be placed under German administraition."""a Former SPD melnber Max Fecher, now deputy chairmm of the SED, openly speculated that the Soviets would revise the Oder-Neisse border because Germany was mcrrc. hnportant to them than Poland..?-e PPl\i was worried about Grotewohl" and Fechner's revisionism, which reAectcd the view of the majority SPD-wing of the SED.3 When Fecher told a meeting sf SET>leaders that a Soviet officer had informed him the border would be revised in Germany's favor, Polish officials wcre increddous that no one present had raised an objection.^^^ The Polish Military

36

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Mlssian in Berlin repeatedly attacked the SED for not mcognizing the permnence of the Oder-Neisse border; the mission kept Warsaw well informed af the situatio11.41 The CDU in the Soviet zone" also went on record as opposislg the OderNeisse line. fn May, CDU Vice President Emst L er told the top officer at the Polish Military Missio~~, Jakub Prawh, that he supported a border that ran from the west of Kdobzeg through the middle of Sjlesia., then to the east of Lepica to the Polish-Czechoslovak border. k m m e r &ought &at the disputed territory to the west oE this line could be resolved inbilateral negotiations, but the Poles rcljected the proposition outright.43 I h e SED i~~directly challmged the Oder-:Neisse tine by objecting to a loss of German territory in the West. Shortly before their merger inApril, the KPD and the Wt) flatly rejected French prclposals to sever tke RheinRuhr-Saar region frclm C;emanyYThey joined the CDU and tbr LUP in isszxing a statement calling for the integriq of Germany's western border as guaranteed in the Patsdam agreements." Uhricht contradicted, his prtrvious ~nunciationof Lehe~zsrutcnzin the east by defending Germanyfs 1937 border in the west: "Gemany cannot five without the Ruhr, the :Rhejnland, and the Saar."4.5 Picck also t d d a Collrzgne audience that Germany should not lose more territory." In August, the SED issued a stateme11t supporting Germmy" western border because Poland already occupied German tcltrritory. The party added that the Potsdam agreements did not sanction Polmd" sanxation of Germm lmds.'f7 Polish officials thought that if the Western Alljes moved Germany's western boundary eastward., justifying PoIand" occupation of German territory wourld be easier. Foreign Minister Idygmunt Modzelewski mgued that the reduction of German territory would cmtribute ta the securiv of Europe by weakening Germany forcver: "'fGcmany's] borders along the Oder and the 1Cheirr."lB M a y French and Soviet officids agreed. Pieck knew &at the SEE)" revisionist stance was contributing to antiSoviet smtirnent in the zone, but he did little to stop it. The millions of refugees from the former G e r m n territories were a constant s m c e of nationalist backXash*After visitiing the British znne in early August, Pieck told Rieuer; Detrtsckland that he saw gmat danger in appeals to nationalist sentiment, but he still left the door open for a revi,sjon of the C)der-Nejsse line.49 Bmno Koehler, the head of the SEE)" Central Press Service, told Prawin that the SET)would do everythiw posible to r e p ~ s mthe t interests clf the G e r m people at a future peace conference. He added that his party mcagnized that Poland was developing sacidism, in wfii.ch case the border question would be lcss significmt.50 Koef7ler was certknly not speaking for the German people or the majori-ty of the SED membership. Tn August, SEE) functionary WaZter Bartel

warned Pieck of tendencies among party mernbers to support ""reationary machinations" inregard to thr Oder-Neisse question, and =cornmelnded t-hat the SED leadership cSariQ the party's p0"tion.x But Pieck continued to hedge, Faced with a barrage of criticism from Kurt Schumacher's SPD that the SED was not doing enough to defend German interests, F"ieckcarefully formulated his call for a border revi,si.on in Marxist tems: Germany must '"gajn the trust of other naticms by diminating aggressive forces and through democratic [socialist] consolidation, Then the Allied powers will have understanding for the vital needs of"ou,r peoplc when it comes to the final determination of the border.''SZ The SED leadership even hoped that the Soviets mig:ht change the ader-Neisse line in comedian with a return of Poland's eastern territories. Pieck and Grotewohf speculated that the Soviets wodd return the oil basin around Lwbw to PoIand m d then revise the Geman-Polish border, bat Sta:lin had no such plans. D ~ ~ r i na gvisit to Moscow inJune, Stalin gave th Polish lcladcrshiy assurances that Poland" borders were permanent, in part because of the ethnic faits accompli~reatedby the expulsion of Germms from the Western Territories, and the resettlement there of Poles from Belarus and Ukraisle. Stalin. told the Poles that the OderNeisse border was ""enl;irely settled." Nonetheless, Polish officials wondered why the Soviet occupation authorities were not censoring the SED" revisionist statement~.~S The Soviets k ~ e wthat if the SED was forced to recognize the border, the pmty's chances at the polls would be hurt. D ~ ~ r i nthe g clecthn c m paign in the Soviet zone in the fall of 194(jlthe SED joined the other German parties in making open appeals for a vision of the Oder-Neisse border." At a gathering of SED functionaries on Septelnber W, Fecher repeated what he and GmtewoEil had said many times before: The eastern border was ''only provisional,'"" Accordkg to the Polish Military Mission, Fechner and other SPD elements in the SED had convinced Pieck to adopt a clearer revisionist stance, Previously, Pieck had been mom cirrumspect in his statements about the border, but now be rr-zjected the ader-Neisse line outright. Me told the SED youth orga,nization, Free German Vnuth (FDJ), 'Xftter the SEU' gains the complete trust [uf the Soviets], the Soviet administration will retract the Oder m d Neisse border m d return to Germmy those areas that are really Germm. . . . The SED has certain information that this wiX1:happen."Sb On September 6, the SEC) receivd indirect support for a border ~ v i sion when U.S. Secretary of State lames Byrnes declaxed in a speech in 5tuttga-t that Germany's borders wwld not be determined until the Allies ha$ signed a peace treaty- with GemanyYChurchill had a l r e a e dec l a d his opposition to Pojand's western border in his "lm Curtain"" speech in May which Gomalka had condemned as '"encouragement for

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German imperialism."'5T Now Bymes' statement found echo throughout the SED's ccampaign, In a stump speech in Scherin, Pierk contended that t-he "final settlemenl" meant a border revision i,n Germany's ffavore"" At rallies in Guben and Cottbus on September 13, be reiterated that once Germany had developed a ""dmocratic" character, in other words a socialist go~rernmentled by the SED, the Allies might revise the border.59 In Berlin two weeks later, GmtewoXll declared that ""recently the position of the SED on the eastern border has been clearly alld definitively laid out. . . . The SED is fighting for a sensible settlement of alX borders and the unity of Germany*"m Grotewohl even spemlated that the differencesbetween fie occupying powers might cause the Soviets to move the border in Germany's favor.6" Pechner continued to rail against the "provisional" border, promising that the SEU would oppose a recfuction in Germm territmy at the peace cmference.62 The PPR organ C b s Lulinl immediately ran a series of angry dmmciations of Bymes and the German parties who supported a =vision of the Oder-Neisse burder, hcluding the SEE), 011Septentbes 7, G b s Lzldac ran a huge front page headline that read, ""RymesClefends Germany: Attack on Poland" Right to the &covered Terrifories""h3 Successive issues cond e m e d the enthusiastic G e r m n rclactim to Byrocs' speech. 'The newspapemappealed to the other Slavic countries to protect Poland" interests, even making the dubious claim that the Oder-Neisse border was essmtial for "al Slavs." And as if to relnind readers of Germany's imperialist past, Clos Ludzl referred to Gemany as the ""Reich"' (Kzesm),No mention was ever made of solidarity with the German communists or the German working class.64 PoIish lcaders squelched the notion that Poland would give up one inch of the Wstcm Territories. President tioleslaw tiierut stated unequivocally trhat the "'recovered territories on the Oder, N'eisse, and Baltic are Polish now and will a h a y s be PoXish."G5 Gomulka mnoul-tced that the "Stavicf"border in the west was final, reitaating that Poland had a historer ical right to the area, He remarked bitterly that 'Tolmd no l o ~ ~ gwmts to be a soccer ball that is kicked around from place to place.'Wespite GomuF-kdsintention to develop socialism in Poland on his own terms, he called for close relations with the Sovict Union as the sole guarantor of the Oder-Neisse border." Wiadyslaw Bierikowski, one of Gomuika's close canfidmts in the PPR, branded Germany as Palmd" 'kortal enemy""; concerning Poland's foreign policy, he warned, "Our friends will be judged by their mlatims to Gemany" The PPS dcclared that if the great powers stood on the side of Germany in t.he border issue, all Pdand would ulnite against them.67 Poles across the political.spectmm joined in censuring Bymes, even the c~ppositionPolish Peasant Party (PSL), which had fie diplomatic support

of the Unikd States. A PSL, member of t h Polish National Council put it this way: 'Whoever is with the Germans is against us, be it Bymes, Churchill, or anyone else."@ Polish officials were haken by Bymesbrcmarks and disappointed by Pieck's frank visioni ism; they were bafRed by the failure of the Soviet occupation authorities90 stop the SED's propaganda. No c o ~ ~ s i s tpole~~t icy was coming from the Soviet Military Administration in Germany (SMAG), although some Soviet officers acknowledged tbat the SEWSnationalist appeals were crsosskg the line. Colonel S. I. T'id'panov reported to Moscow that allowing the SED to lobby for a border change was a risky policy: "We run the danger of ailwing the party to revert to extreme nationalism."69 The Soviets tried to reassure the Poles that the border was final. Soviet Fortrign Minister yacheslaw Molotov said that the Polish administration of the German areas east of the ader-Neisse Rivers had been sanctioned at Potsdm, and that it was a fait accompli, that had little chance of being reversed at a future peace conference. H e repeated that it would be cruel Germans who had moved out of these territories to resettle the 2 miltio~~ m d the 1 million Poles who had moved in. Molotov concluded that "all that remains is to wish the Polish friends success in their huge reconstruction efforts in the Western liC3rritories."m Molotov" statement had no impact on blmting the SED's revisionism, however, hlthough Soviet officials in Germany told the Poles that they djd not: support the SED's positinn, they made no mow to stop it. Aware that the SEf>"schances at the polls would, suffer if the p a r 9 recognized the border, the Sowiets tolerated this propaganda, even t-hough it was cmtributhg to a growhg mimosity between the SET) and the PPR, As long as Soviet troops remained in Germany and the Soviet Union cmtrolled the political fate of both communist parties, this duplicitous policy served Soviet interests in consalidathg political co11tro1 of the zane.71 When the SED receked only 20 percent of the vote in the elections in Berljn, where the party had to compete with the SPI) and the other parties from the Weskrn z011es' Polish officials pojnted out &at the SED's nationalist appeals and revisionism had failed miserably" They wamed that the SED's pmpagada was exaceibating old German nationalist prejudices. GOS Lrrdra criIicized the SED for swcumbing to ""Gemanchauvinist pressure"n m d for its '"Ishameful solidarity with the revisionist cmpaign." ?%renewspaper admonished the SEC)for misleading the German working class, m d cautioned the party not to becme ""a taof of a resurrected German impe~alism."~ The Polish Mgitary Mission even concluded that the WU, bettcr than the SER, undt;rt;tocrd that blatant na.tictnal appeals would dtimatefy hurt Germanvs chances for a border revi,sion.7" The SED" nationalist propaganda also estranged the party from the other cornmunist parties in Eastern Europe. :ill early 3947, the Polish For-

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eign Ministry noted that the SEC>rclmained isolated, and that especially the Czechoslovak and Uugoslw communist parties werr;, critical of the Easl. Germm communjsts.7h Glvs Lzkdu pldbljshed numerous articles about Yugoslavia and Czeckoslovakia and their support for the OderNeisse border, but virtudly ipored political cltevelopmmts in the Soviet zone. In 1,947, the newspaper still excluded the SED f r m the sociaiisl: camp, publishing such headIlnes as "All Slavdam Stands in Defense of Poland" Western Border.""" Caught betwee11 the dictates of the Soviet oecupkrs m d the demmds of the German people, the SED had no way out of its political bind, Schumacher" SPD attacked fie SED ~lentlesslyfor being "too little Germmff ill fighting for Germany's 1937 bord,ers.'qve~~ the KPDI wfi,jchwas slill operating in the Mrcstem zones, mcczuraged the SEU to prcssure the Soviets for a border revisim.m h d the SEWSpartner 13af"tit.sfn the Soviet:zone, positions.80 the LDP m d the CDU, maintained their openv revisio~~ist Polish diplomats understood the %D% dikmma, but nonetheless insisted that the party recopize the existing border. In April 3947, Prawin informed Modzelewski trhat if: the SEB took this posi.tion it would lose union support in Berlin to the SPD." Modzelewski cl-iticized the Polish press for exaggerating the possibitity of losing the Western Territcrries, and for poisonhg rcllations with the G e r m s *At a prrzss confe~ncein Navember 1946, a reporter asked Modzelewski about t:he final delineation of the border around Swinouj~cie.Modzelewski replied that an international committee was studylng small changes in the border, but refused further comment. Another reporter drew parallels between the current status of Swinouj~cieand Szczecin with the precarious geopolitical position of Gdarisk and Westerplatte in thc interwar period, m h d ing Modzelewski that Germm agitation for the return of G d d s k was the prtrtext for attacking Poland k-t 1939, Modzelcwski said that moving the border about five kilometers jn Poland's 'avor was likely, but he refused to elabarate.82

The SED Officially Recognizes the Qder-Meisse Border ?"he Soviet occupation authorities at last began to clamp down on the SED's overt revisionism in 1947, Pieck, Ullbricbt, and Grotewohl visited StaIin and Molotov in Moscow in Januar). to ask far small corrections in the Oder-Neisse line, but: Stalin gave them an unqualified "no.ff83 Vladjntir St.mjorno\j,thc political adviser to the SMAG, told Prawin that the "%D's unclear position on tke Polish-German border matter protracted a crisis in the SED as well as impeded the possibility of developing cSoser relations between the SED and the PPR." SmJono'v and Prawin agreed to wam the SED of the dangers of mother world war if they retained illusions of revising the border.M In Febmary, the Polish

Mllitav Mission reported that Pieck, Ulbncht, and even Grotewohl were now moving toward "the right attitude in the border matter.'"s Glos Lzldzi, which had been notably critical of Grotekvohl, quoted him as saying that the Potsdam agrements delineating Germany% border with Poland "form a good basis for the futurt. peace treatym% The first: face-to-ace meeting between Polish army officers in the Polish Military Mission and SEB leaders took place at the mission on Febmary 28,1947. P r w i n wrote Miarsaw that the Germans expected the Poles to have a "rigid hatrcd" of them, but were surprised by the Poles" invitat h n and the officesskpenness and hospitality. Prawh addcd that the Germans were esgecialfy gratefut for the meeting because up to that point: their only contact MIith forcig~~ ofCicials had been With the Soviet occupation authorities, The East Germans viewed the meeting as an opportunity to end the SED's isolation from the other communist parties.87 Paul Merker tautioncd, hocvevcr, that until the two sides had developed greater personal trust, they should r e f r b from discussing substantive issues. One Polish officer was unconvinced that the C;ermnsfpassive attitude was sincere, but believed it an u~~willingness to discuss the OderNeisse border.8" The Polish officers were most interested in glemfng the Germans' candid ophions about &at very issue. The Pdes knccv l-hat eval if the SED leaders publicly accepted the loss of G e m m territory to Poland as a war reparaticm, in private they still believed the loss was a temporary situatio~~.Kg Prawin. told Ulbricht in no uncertaiin terms that the SEWS revisionism, no matter what the rcasm, had to be abandoned: "The Germm people" cchauvinism finds its refiecticm in the political line of &e party [SED], makhg cooperation between ottr parties impossible. What is worse, trhe SED position dms not airn to cure the Geman people, but exacehates its chauvinist sickness.'Wlbricht conceded that the SER's prt-sent position was tactical, Me pointed out that ihe SPD and olher parties had defcated the SEU in the Berlin elections by rclentlessv criticizing U.le SED for not demanding a borcter change from the Soviet occupiers. He added that if the SED cognized the border now, and then t%le Ailies %reed to elections for an all-Germm government, the party w d d be saddled with an unpopular position. Prawin had no syxnpathy for this line of thklkhg.90 The SED h q e d for a defhitive decision on Germany's politicat, future and the Oder-Neisse border at the conference of Allied foreign ministers in Moscow in April 1947. Sbortly behw the m e e t a , Franz Dahlem declared that "the final delineation of the border, whether the border should run east or west of the Neisse, is still open. . . . The SER is as little respmsible as any othrr G e r m n party for thr eastern border tbat was decided in 1944."91 But by this t h e cooperation between t h Soviet Union and.the Western Alljes in the Atiied Control Commissilln was breaking down. The

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United States and Great Britain responded to the Soviets' reparations p o k y and refusal to send prcrmised foodshffs to the Western zones by creating the Bizone in January 1947. Two months later, U.S. President Harry Tmman dccided to aid the anti-communist governments in Turkey and Greece, laying the groundwork for the e w r g h g W.S. policy of cmtaking Soviet expansio~~ism. The foreign ministersheet;ing in Moscow failed to reach an agreement on Germany; in July the Soviets rc3jected the Marshall Plm, which included the controversial reconstruction of the Western zones of Cermany As the nllied positinns hardened that spring, a h a 1 settlement on Germany seemed remote. Relations between the SEU and the PI'R appeared to be improving. For the first time, Polish officials promoted the idea that there were some '"progressive" Germans, namely, the German communists. In April, Gomuika told Clos Lzidu .that "all of the C e m m parties are continuing the spirit of fascism and intperidism m o n g the Germans, except the SED," Gomulka stopped short of praislng the party for recowizing the Oder-Neisse border, which it had not yet done, but said that the SET) was the only party that was not actively cmpaigning against it.92 On May Day 1947, Gcls Lzldu ran an editorial applauding several SEE?leaders for stating that they reected border changes. The newspaper calied this a sign that the SED now understood that recog~~izhg the Oder-Neisse border was an '"adispensable platform for strengthening the democratic [socialist] forces in Germany."g3 But Pieck was still performing a delicate balancing act between the Polish and Soviet demands on the one hand, and the national kterests of the SEU mehership and the Soviet zone populatim on the other, Most East Germms rejected the ader-Neisse border outright. In May, Prawin told Pieck that his government was disappointed in the SED" persistent and opportunistic use of the border issue, He asked the SEB leader whether there was truth to the rumor that the SED, in meetbgs with the Soviets in Moscon; had proposed a border change. Although Stalin and Molotov had told Piwk in January that there would be no changes im the border, Pieck n w told Prawj;n that thercz might be some very sntall border rectifications in Germany" ffavor, but no major ones, Once again, Prawin left t.he meeting disappointed.94 The debate over the Oder-Neisse h e continued to rage withjn the SEU, In July, the Pofish Mhistry of Public Security report& that both the Sl"D and KPU wings of the party thought it was time the SED took a ""concsrrte,clear, and precise psjtion in rekrencc to the eastern border," The old SPDers still maintahed, according to the ministry, that "the lmd [beyond the Oder-Neisse] was German and that the Germans [there]had been wronged," Pieck and the other formr KPU Leaders were mnre realistic; lacking support from the Soviet Union, Pie& now sollght to smooth relations with Poland by recopizing the border essentially as it was.95

At the SEU congress in September, Gmtewot-il declared that his position in favor of a border ~visicmhad not changed, m d that the prtrsmt border was unjust because it had been drawn, "without the participatio~~ m d consent of any prominent leaders of Geman sodev." To gain support h local and zonal ekctions, Grotewohl called for a '"lough positimf% ffavor of revising the border. For tacticd rclasons, Grotewohl supported the payment of reparations for the war, but then argued. that Germmy could better afford to pay them if the Allies returned the German territories.96 InJa~uary1948, the French l;inked their occupatior~zolle with the British and American zones to h r m the Trizone. The Soviets walked out of the A t lied Control Comxnission in March, and,in response to a currmcy refom in the Western zones in june,they blockaded the land routes from the Western zones to Berlin. The unification of Gemany appeared to be a remote possibility, and the SED became more cmfident that the Soviets would continllc to support the party's grip on power in the zone. Tt.le diate political future no ]longerdepended m popular support. Although it is unclear to what extent the Soviets pressmd Eke SED to accept the Oder-Neisse line, the SED kadership ul-rdoubtedy drew its own concIusions from the breakdown of Allied cooperation in Germany%The SEC)cast its b t with the other East European communfst pastie,, which, aftter the Czechoslovak communist coup in Fcbsuary, controlled alf the governments in the rcgim. The SEE?had to accept the present border as final." At t-he Second PeoplesTmgress in Berlin in Martlh 1948,Pieck declared that "the Polish-Germm border would not undergo any chmges." Now GrotewohI a g ~ e das well. The Polish. Military Mission reported that some of the leaders from the SED"s partner parties, such as Otto Nuschke (CDIP) and Wilhelm KGlz (LDP), made similar statements supporting the Oder-Neisse line, but without Pieck"s "dccisive tone."")") In May 1,948, Georgi Dertinger, who led the CDIP in the Soviet zone, told the Polish Military Mission that the leaders of his party understood that the borcier issue was settled. H e sutjge"t"d, however, that it would. be easier .for the German people to accept the loss of the territnries il the Poles delivered agricultural goods to the German people, and especially to the Sowiet zone. Mission officers informed Uertkger that if t-he CDU publicly declared its support of the ader-Neisse border, the Polish people would not be opposed to trade with Germany.l(Jo &rkg meetings of the Soviet bloc forc_.ipministers in Warsaw in June 1,948, the Pol,ish dclegati.on demanded that the SED xcept the OderNeisse border, and promised that trade with the Soviet zone would then follow.'OI Franz Dahlem assured them that t-he SED was not considering changes in the border agreed upon at Potsdam.loWuch to the Poles' satisfaction, the foreip mjnisters issued a declaration stating that the OderNeisse border was "immovable" and a "frontier of peaee."Jm

44

C ( ~ ~ r vover r ythe Oder-Ne-isse Bordcr

In July, Glos t,udzl reported that the SED had. at last rccopized the border.lm C)n Sptember 30, the newspaper carrkd. a huge front: page headline that r e d , ""Waiter Ulbricht Confirms: There Cannot Be Any Discussion about a Revision of the Oder-Neisse."u" UTJllicht used the Polish formulation that the Odtzr-Neisse line was the '%orcler of peace";'"" he called the lost territories a center of twentieth-cerntury German qgressive wars against Poland: ""As Germans we cannot deny that twice in the last 25 years Cemany attracked Poland from the pincers of East Prussia and Silesia. The cause was the dominance of the reactionary forces in Germmy, whidn had particularly strong support h East Prussia and Silcsia,"l"7 @ert revisionism was still rampant in the SED, however. At a workshop for East German journajists at the Brandcnburg SED Party School, one reporter pointed out that "Comrade Pieck declared in 1945, and again in 1946, that the last word had not been spoken in rr.gard to the Oder-Neisse border. . . . Why do you [the SED leadershjpj suddenly say that the decision is final?" h o t h e r journalist asked why Germms had been stripped of their possessions and summarily expelled from P o l d after the was, C)ne reporter stated out loud wfiat the SEU codd. not say in public; namely, that the %D% recognition of the Oder-Neisse border was temporary and tactical: "Well, of course today we carnot do anything else, today W have to swallokv it., but sometime in the hture, when we become stronger, this border will not be maintained,"l(Js This kind of talk made Polish officids jittery; with East-Wst tensims on the rise, they did not rule out the possjhi(iq that the Soviets wodd. make a deal with the SED to change the border. In 1948, the Polish Foreign Ministry investigated a rumor circulathg in the Westcm zones that the Sovicts intended to force the Poles to give up Silesia behveen the Neisse m d the Oder and thus return Mlsoctaw (Breslau) to Germaslylo" A1:hough the rurnor was groundless, Utbricht fold a Polish diplomat that he disagreed with the Polish argulnent that the former German territories we= ecmomjcally indispensable to Polmd but unimportant for Germany. The diptornat reported that when he suggested that such an economic argwemt could be used to justif?j German claims to the Western Territories, ""Uibricht indignantly re~ectedsuch an interpretatim." 1'Zlricht cited his many statements that the bcrrcier was fh~al.He achowledged that although the SED had succeeded in eliminatkg the most dangerous elements from the party many '%eactionaries in masked forms" remained. As for Grotewohl's persistent: revisionism, Lllbricht assured the Poles trhat Gmtewohl cod$ no lmger count on the szxpport of his old. comrades from the SPD inthe central organs of the SEC>,Ufbricht pointed out, fr-tr instance, that Fechner had been demoted from deputy chairman of the SET>to the lesser position of president of the Central Ahinistration of Justice,ll("

Much to the dismay of Polish officials, however, the East German communists did not rule out a border revision. In November 1948, the SED p r o p o x h peace tstlaty that would unify 13erlin and establish one central, democratic German government.llUlthough the resoiution called for a trcllaty based cm the Yalta and Potsdam agreements, which =c%nized Polish admhistration of the German territories east of the OderNeisse border, the border was not directly mentioned.l'V~n May 1949, Nusrhke, now chairman of the CDli, told a French newtipapm that "Germany and Poland . . . must work together in all areas. The proble~xof their borders must be settled in the same spirit of freedom loving cooperation."ll3 The Polish gove t did not cmsider the Polish-German border a '"problem"; it rrefus resolve other pditical or economic issues with the Soviet zone until the SEU f o m l l y recognized the border. The SED leadershjp no lolnger tc,lera.t.ed open revisionism in the party in 1949, although many meHlbers remained unreconciled to the bord.er.114 At the SED Party Congress in January, Pimk said that recopition of the border was a p~rclquisjtefnr German-Pdish understanding.""' Ch? muary 26, Trybunn Lzldzr, the new organ of the PZPR, covered I'ieck" sstatement and his promise to cooperate with the other countries in Eastern Europe, espeially Poland. The nekvspaper observed that the audience reaction to Pieckfsstatement was ""especially warm" and that "'the SED shows Germany the way to peaceful cooperation with Polanli.'"J"n February, the Polish political journal Nolrre Drugi quoted Pieck as saying that "recognition of the border on the Oder and.Neisse as the border of peace and the fight itgahst all revisionist hfluences am the first conditions for understanding with the Polish nation."ll7 The SED was gradually gajning a modicum of trust from the Polish communists. T r y b ~ ~ nLaz ~ ~ u B ' s e r h correspondent, S t a n i s h Rrodzki, d e d m d that the SEU's recognition of the border inthe face of opposition from the other German parties was ""a courageolls political act."Us In July 1949, the Polish Military Mission praised the SED for its hard work in promoting the Oder-Neisse border as a matter of world peace, incmtrast to the continued, revisionism of the political parties operating in the Western zones.119 The Pdes still had lingering doubts about the SECt's szldclen change of heart, however, because they suspected that the Soviets had ordered an end to the SED"s revisionism. They were fully aware that many SED members did not accept the partvs offic.ial position. To further cmsolidate control over the former German territories and precludc a change in the border, the Polish gove ent dissolved the Ministry of Recovered Territories at thc etnd of 1948 and formally integrated the krritories into the Polish state.

46

C ( ~ r t r c r over y the Oder-Ne-isseBordcr

When the Federal Republic of Germany was formed. in September 1949, and preparations for an East G e r m state were underway, cmce again the Palish gover ent feared the Western Allies would renounce the Potsdm agreements. Warsaw sent the Allies a diplomatic note emphasizing that the Potsdam agreewnts provided the basis for t-he security of Europe, and that Poland supported the politied and economic unity of Germany. The demrche brwght no rcsponse.120 The Polish-German border rmained a recufring source of friction between the Poles and East Germans long after the e ~ a t i n nof the GDR in October and its formal mcognj.tion of the Odes-Neisse line in 1950.

Motes 1. Wtadystarnr Gomuika, O probleurfie Nienzieckl'm (On the German prc>blem) (TNarsaw: Ksig;%kai Wiedza, 1971), p- 105, 2. Rosa tuxernburg, Gesantmclte Werke: Band 1: 1893 bis 2905 (Collected Wrks: Volume 4: 1893to 4905) (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1199Q),pp. 50-51. 3. Pieck letter to the Poles, undated, ca. September; 1922, SED ZK, Wilhelm Pieek Papers, NL 36/536; see Peter Wozniak, ""But, Erz, Kohle: A Thematic Examination of German Propaganda on the Silesian Question During the Interwar Uears,"Tast Ezrrapenrz QzinrferIy 28, na. 3 (Sptember 1994), p. 323. One of the I-solish nationalist slogans was, ""Whoever is stupid as a fool, votes yes far the Cl;=mans on Sunday'" 4. Pieck speech to the Prussian State Parliament, October 4,1922, SEU ZK, Wilhelm Pieck Papers, NL 36/3136. 5. Wilhelm Pieck, Gesammeile Redc~ziind Schrqfert. Brarld 11: lnnzlnr 1920 bis April 1925 (Collected speeches and writings. Vc>lurne111: January 1920 to April 1925) (Berlin: Dietz Werlag, 4959). 6. Franz Sikora, Sozl'Lzlisfisclze Solidarz'tiz't tfnd nntl'oualc Interessen (Socialist solidarity and national interests) (Colope: Verlag Wissensehaft und Politik, 1977'), p. 106. 'I". W d a w Baxlcikowski memo from the Legal Commission of the Settlers" Committee in OXsztyn, ca. spring, 1945, PZPR MC, Bolesfaw Bierut Archive, 254 / TV-1. 8. The peace treaty between Germany and the Allies was finally signed in 1990, 9. See Article I X of the Pc~tsdarnAgreement. The Oder-Neiisseborder remained in Legal limbo until a reunited Germany reeagnized the border in 1990. 10. The term Westera Territories will be wed to denote the German territories of lli337 east of the Qder and Neisse Rivers. 12. Legal opinion by Dr. Bolelaw Walewski, September, 1945, PZPR MC, BoEesiaw Bierut Archive, 254/ tV-1. 12. Deutscl2e Volkszez'tung (German 13eopXe%Newspaper), March 21, 2946, p. 2, The headline on this day read 'Central Germany Greets Wiihelm Pieck." 43, See Deutsclzc Volkszeidung, October 17, 4945, p. 2; and August 4, 1945, pp. 1-3.

14. The German half of the city was bter rmamed Wilhetm Pieck Stadt. 15. Henry Krisch, """borstellungen van kGnftiger aussenpoXitischer Orientierung in der SBZ bis 1947 und ihre Auswirkungen auf die spgtere Aussenpolitik der DDR (Concepts of the future foreign policy orientation in the Soviet c>ccupation zone to 1947),"7n Hans Adolf Jacobsen, Gerd Leptin, Ulrich Schemer, and Eberhad SchuXz, eds., Drp.2'Jat~rzehnteAussenpalifik &r DDR (Three decades of the fc3reign palicy of the GDR) (Munich: R. Oldenbourg tieslag, 19";79),p. 48. 16. Walter Ulbricht, Die E?zfzoiclklzrng des deu fsclten volksdemokmt iseIze12 S tma fes, 1945-1958 (The development of the German Peoples' democratic state, 1945-1958) (Berlin: Dietz VerXag! 19142), p. 25, 17. Dezltselre V~Ikszeiftitzg~ August 7, 1945, p. 1. 18. Quoted in Sikora, SozhEistisclze Solidan"t#ftind natiolzale Xrtferesse~,p. 107. 19. Krisch, "VarstelXungen von k6nftiger aussenpolitischer Orientierung in der SEZ bis 1 9 4 h n d ihre Auswirkungen auS die spgtere Aussenpc~litikder DDR," pp. 43-45.. 20, See Sarah Terry, PulnizdS Place in Eurape: Getzeral Sikorski and ttic Origins offhc Oder-Ncisse Line, 1939-2 943 (Princetcsn: Princeton University Press, 1983). Evidence shows that Wjadysjaw Sikorski, head of the Prjlish government-in-exile in London until his death in 1943, understood that if the Germans lost the war the %>viet Union would grc3bably annex the eastern territories of interwar Poland, and therefore he supported the Oder-Nstern Neisse border for Poland. 21. See Hans Georg Z~hmann,Der Oder-Neisse-K~?ylPikt(The Ode~Neisseconflict) (Mrmich: C, H, Beck, 1979), p. 41, The Polish delegation at Prjtsdam pointed out that the area lost in the east was Xarger than the Western Tern"torjes. The area of prewar Poland was 388,000 square kilometers, and pc>s.hitrarPoland was approximately 309,000 square kilometers. 22. Prawin to the Polish Foreign Ministi"yISeptember 24,1946, MSZ, 61668142. 23. Letter from Stefan Krzywicki to Jan Izydorczyk, November 1, 1959, P D R KC, group Izq.cSorczyk 473129. 24. Gius Lirdlt, February 21,1945, p-3. 25. Memorandum from the President" Office of the Council of Ministers to W2adys1-awFerenc, June 5,1946, URLM Pf?r,file 773, 26. Wadyslaw Gomuika headed this ministry 27, G b s Lz-ldu, July 23, 1946, p. 7'. Jlakob Kaiser of the CDIJ asserted that only a few thousand tusatian Sorbs were living in Germany. The true number was about "i",000; see Gerald Stonet Tlze Smallest Stnvunk Nlzl-iu~t:The Sorbs of Lgsaki~ (London: The Athlone Press, 1972), p. 184. 28. See Diane Clernens, "I"~llcl (New Ycfrk: Oxfc~rdUniversiv Press, 1gm), g. 193. 29, BC Boleslatv Walewski to the PPR, Septembeu; 1945, PZPR KC, Bolesgaw Bierut Archive, 2541XV-1Z; Anthony Kruszewski, The Oder-Rieisse Boundary annd PulnizdS Modent izaliun: The Sucioecunumic and Political 1trrp~cC(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), g. 16. Krsrszewski points out that the mcjst of the '7.6 million Germans who had lived in the territories now occupied by Poland left before being expelled; see also Phillip Baler, The Oder-Rleisse Lirze: A Reappraisal tinder IntenzafiorzalLaw (bulder: East European Monagraphs, 14990), p. 104. According to Baleu; approximately 4 million Germans fmm Poland first settfed in the S v i e t zone of Germany.

48

C ( ~ ~ t rover r ythe Oder-Ne-isse Bordcr

30, See Lehmann, Der Oder-Ncisse-Konfiikt, p. 57, According to tehmann, the PoEish gc>vernment%territorial aims went beyond the Ode~Neisseborder to a line 30 miles west of the Oder. 31. Br~Xes%aw Wiewidra, The I;"ofiskt-CcmzanFronlz'crfironz Clip Sfnnd;?ointofl~ztematio:orze;tlLaw (PoznaA: Wydawnicwo Zachodnie, 46359), pp. 13S134; and Norman Naimark, The Russiac;tns in Germany: A History cf the Soviet Z U cf ~Ocezrpafion, 1945-2949 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 414"35), p. 449. 32. Glos Ludz-t,Sytember 16,1945, p. 3. 33. Quoted in Nairnark, TIze Rlissians in Germalzy, p, 146. 34. G b s L~ddl-l, January 2,1946, pp. 12-1 3. 35. SED manifest to the German people, April 22,1946, PZPR KC, group PPR KC, 295/XX-70. 36. " m e $Er> and the Eastern Question," unsigned, August 12,1946, SED ZK, Wilhelm Pieck Papers, NL 36/743. 37. Riezk~sDeuliscllfand, May 7,1946, p. 2. 38. Polish Military Mission report, May 2,46346, MSZ, 61671142. 39. 610s trrdu, September 24, 1947, p. 1. According to SEB figures, about 700,000 (47 percent) of the 1,295,000 party members we= from the KPD, the rest from the SPB. 40. Tnformation on the SEWs position on the eastern border of Germany July 30,1 946, PZBR KC, group 1313RKC, 295/Vf 1-69. 41. Prawin report of meeting with Arthur Pieck, April 23, 1946, MSZ, 6/668/42, 42. The GDU M-asone of the SEVs coalition partners in the Nationat Front, alc~ngwith the Liberal Demarratic Party (LDP), the National Democratic Party of Germany (NDPB), and the Democratic 14easantsTar-tyof Germany (DBD). 43. Prawin report of a meeting with representatives of the German cultural community May 19,1946, MSZ, 6/668/42. 44. Dr~clsekteV~fkssez'tltrzg~ April 9, 2946, p. 2. Pieck signed far the KPD, Grotewohl far the SPD, Jakub Kaiser for the CBU, and WiXhelm KGlz for the LDI? 45. Ulbricht quo>ted in Krisch, "Vc~rsteXlungen?Ton kGnfiiger aussenpolitischer Orientiermg in der SBZ bis 1947 und ihre Auswirkungen auf die spstere Auswnpolitik der DDR," p 448. 46. GZos LuAir, August 27,1946, p,2, 47. "The SED and the Eastern Question," uusiped, August 12,1946, SEB ZK, Wilhelm Pieck Papers, NL 36/743. 48, Gbs Ludz-r,April 30, 1946, p. 4. 49. Riezk~sDeubchkand, August 6, 1946, g. 3; see also PPR memo, unsigned, undated, PZPIT MC, group PX3R KC, 295lVXL7Q. 50. Special report by Prawin, September 24,1946, MSZ, 6/668/42.. 51. Bartel notes for WilheLrn Pieck, August 15, 1946, SET) ZK, Wilhelrn Pieck Papers, NL 36/743. 52, PPR memo, rmdated, unsigned, PZPR KC, group PPR KC, 295/WfiI-"i"0. 53. Chromecki notes of meeting between Fareign Minister Olszewski and Garreau (French Ambassador to Poland), Sptember 5,1946, PZPR KC, group PPR KC, 295/VII-2@,

54. 130fishMilitary Mission report, September 24,1946, MSZ, 6/668/42, 55. Special report by Prawin, September 24,1946, MSZ, 6/668/42. 56. 1301ishMilitary Mission report, September 2,1946, MSZ, 61671 142. 517. Gomulka, O probbtnie Nr'emieckint, p. 99.See Lehmann, Der Oder-Neisse-f(onpikl, pp. 70-109, for a thorc~raghdiscussion of the Western AllesVeliberations on the Polish-German border. 58. Meues l;teufsdzttrnd,September 14,1946, p. 1. 59. Speech b y Wilfhefm Pieck, September 13, 1946, Wifhefm Picsck 13apers,NL 36/ 7'43. 60. Nezges Deufseizlalzd,October 1,1946, p. 1 . 61.. Pctlish Military Mission report, Octc~ber1, 1946, MSZ, 6/6171/42; Krisch, "Varstetlungen von kijrnftiger aussenyofitischer Orientierung in der SBZ bis 1947 und ihre Auswirkungen auf die spgtere Aussenpolitik der DDR," p. 43; see atso Naimark, The Rlassiarls in Gcnnat~y,p. 288. Naimark states that "the Soviets dismissed Grotewohlk resistance to acceptance of the finality of the Qder-Neisse border with Poland as a sign of his petit bourgeois past." 62. Nezges Deufscizlalzd,Sqtember 14,1946, p. 3.. 63, GZos Ludzl, September 7,1946, pp. 1-2. The newspaper devoted its first two pages to attacks on Bymes' speech. 64. GL?~ Ludu, September 8,1946, p. 3; and Ctos Ludzr, September 10,1946, p. 2. 65. Stenographic Records of the National People's Council (mN), September 20,1946, p. 14. 66. Cctmufka, O problemie Niemieckim, pp. 99,112,144. 617. Stenographic Records of the National People's CounciX (KRN), September 22,1946, pp. 2W, 349. 68. Stenographic Records of the National People's Council (KEN), September 22,1946, p. 302. 69, S. Tiuf9p;aov report, September 16, 1946, Btdltetin: Cold War Irzferrznficln~E I-listofyProjrrct, no. 4 (1994), g. 32; see also Gaddis, We Nazv Knozv, g. 119. 70. Nezdes Deufsehland, Scrptember 18,1946, p. 2. 71. Special report by Prawin, September 24,1946, MSZ, 6/668/42.. 7 2 . The Sucial Democrats received 49 percent of the vote in Berlin. In the rest af the zone, where the SPD was not active, the SED won 47 percent of the vote. 7'3%C;lm L I A ~ ZOctober I, 43,1946, p. 4. 74. Glos Ludtr, 0ctcr;ber29,1946, p. 3, 75.Polish Military Mission report, November 9,1946, MSZ, 6/6;71/42. 76. Notes on the SEE) in Berlin, January 3,1947, MSZ, 6/7'12 146, 717. Gas Ludzt, F e b r u a ~9,19417, g. 4. 78. H, Meller report (Polish Military Mission), March 18, 1947, PZPR KC, group PPR KC, 295/XX-72. 7 9 . Article in the W~sfdcz~Csches Voliks-Ectza (West German People's Echo), March 4,19417, in SED ZK, Wilhelm Pieck Papers, NIJ36J743. 80, See J. Marecki notes of meeting with ArZhur Leutenmt, February 28,1947", PZPR KC, group 13PRKC, 295/XX-70, 81, Prawin to Modzelewski, April 1Y81947, MS& 6/"i"11/46. 82. 13ressconference with Modzetewski, November 18,1946, MSZ, 15/230/22.

50

Copltruz~ersyover the Oder-Ne-isseBordcr

83. Naimark, Tht Rzass-in~sirz Germm~y,pp.301. 84. Prawin notes of a meeting with Sernjont>v, February 8, 1947, MSZ, 6/699/45. 85. Prawin to Olszewski, February 18,1947, MSZr 6/711/46. 86. Glos Ludil, February 16, 1947, p. 2. 87. Prawin to Modzelewski, March 4,1947, MSZ, 6/71 1/46. 88. Przebbj-Jareckinotes of a meeting with. German pc~liticians,March I, 1947", MSZ, 6/711/46. 89. tbid, 90. Meller notes of a meeting between Ulbricht and 13rawin, March 25, 1947, PZPR KC, group PPR KC, 2951XX-';"Q;see also Wiesjaw Dc~brzyki,Grnnicrz Zacf~~d~zt'tz -30polityee polskt'ej 2944-2947 (The western border in 130Xish politics, 1944-2 947) (Warsaw: PaAst-wowe VVydawnictwo Naukowe, 1917$), p. 188. Dobrzycki writes that the SET) did not recopize the Qder-Neisse border for domestic political reasc~ns,fearing that the other German parties would label the SEE> the "party of capitulation." 91. Netrcs DeutsclzZtz~d,April 2, 1947, p. 1; see also Sikora, Sozialistische ScllidgritBt und nationale Interessen, p, 108; and Naimark, Tke Rz-fssi~~zs in Ger?rzmt.2yJpp.302. 92. Gk?sLladzt, April 21,1947, p. l . 93, Glos Ludl-l, May 1,1947, p. 6. 94. Melfer notes of meeting beween Pieck and Prawin, May 2,1947 PZPR KC, group PPR KC, 295/=-170. At this meeting Pieck mentioned the island of Uznam near Swinoujjcie for a possible border revision. 95. Ministry of Public Security to Berman, July 16, lli347, PZPR KC, grc~rapPPR KC, 291i/VII-72, 96. Report on GrotewohYs speech to the Sixth Plenum of the SED Central Committee, undated, 132;PRKC, group PPR KC, 295/XX-3. 97. See Ra! f BadstGbner, "Die sowjetische Deutxhlandpc>Iitik irn Lichte neuer Quellm" (The Suvitl: policy toward Germany in Ii&t of new sources), in Wilfried lEJoth,ed., Die Dcatsclzlnnd F rw izz der RincltkriegszAf (The German question in the e 19941, pp. 114-123. post-war period) (Berlin: A k a d e ~ Verlag, 98. '%gricultural Policy in the New Poland," from the SED Press Srrricq May 11,1948, SED ZK, Otto Grotewohl Papers, N L 901483. 99. Prawin to the Polish Foreign Ministry, undated, ca. March, 1948, MSZ, 6/"?"67/54. 100. Meller notes of a meeting with Be&inger, May 14,1948, MSZ, 6/767/54, 101. Neites D~t~kscllllal~d, June 27,1948, p. 3. 102, Motes on the German press, undated, ca. June 1948, PZPR KC, group 13PR KC, 2951XX-3; see also Gottfried Zeiger, Die FIgltung von SED und DDR zur EinItcif Deutschlurzds, 2949-1987 (The attitude of the SED and the GDR toward the unification of Germany, 1949-1989) (CoXctgne: VerXag Wissenschaft u. Politik, 1li388), p. 14. Z ~ Deutscfzl~nd-Frage1939-1949 (Poland and 103. Viktoria Vierhelleu; hEen E ~ P die the German qttestic~n,1939-1949) (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 19701, p. 240, 104.6bs Ludr!, July 36,1948, g. 2.

105, G%ost u d u , September 30,1948, p. 1. 106. MeIler to the Polish Fc3reign Ministry, Bctc>ber29, 1948, PZPR KC, group PPR KC, 295/XX-70, Ulfbricht called it the ""Fiedengrenze." 107. Inialter Utbricht, "The Foundations of German-Polish Friendship," a. TanuarJiS 1949, MSZ, 10/470/43. 108. Georg Kraus notes, Oct-c~ber 26,1948, SED ZK, Walter UIbricht Papers, NIJ 18211245. 109, Wierna to Modzelewski, May 25, 1948, MSZ, 6/767/54; see also Patrick Kenney, ""Plish Workers and the Socialist Transforma tion," in Norman Naimark and teonid Gibiamki, The Estnblislzmenf of Communist Rknender DDR irn Bundesixrchiv, reprinted with germission)

On 'July 6,1950 Gmtewohl and Foreign Minister Georgi Dertinger met their Polish counterparts, Cyrankiewicz and Stefan WierMowski, in the border town of Zgorzelec, where they signed Chc h r m d treaty recognizing the Oder-Neisse as the final ""border of peace" between Poland and Germmy T~!bu~za Ludu claimed that t-he agreement ushered in a new era of ztnderstandi,ng: 'The emthkusjasm with whieh a crowd of people galhered in Zgorzelec, from both sides of the border, w d c m e d the sipjng of the agreement, is an expression of t-he will of both peoples to suppmt mutual relatio~~s on kiendiy prjnciples.'"z An East German poet dedicated these 1hes to the event: "The Neisse follows its old c~)~l.se, t-he Oder flows in its usual bed-but yet it is as if the lazy river had changed its countenance over nighl.". . . There, where for centuries d y anger flourished, through German fault we want to confr?ss,n w one will call we Germans neighbar, friend, and comracie. Clh, \zrhat a beautiful victory.'"s East Germm President Wilhelm It""ieck% official visit to lNarsaw in Decemher 1950 solidified this new relationship. It was his sec& visit in a little over two years, but this time he came as a head of state, Overlooking Pieckfs oupp0rbni.sti.crejection oi the Oder-Neisse bordm a few years earlier, Cyrankiwicz ~ " i s e dhim as "one of the most prominent revolu-

56

Myth of the SfrafirziskBrofherftood

tionaries and anti-fascist fighters," Tryhlmn Lzldzs lavished compliments m this ""devoted friend of Peoplesf Poland," writing that "we welcome him wiCh the depest sincerity seeing i,n him the symbol of a, new dernacratic, peace-1:ovhg Germany,"l"" Pieck ~ s p m d e d in an equdly mapmirnous f a s h h , nothg that this was the first time in almost a t-cousand, years that the head of a German state had made a friendly visit to Poland. Pieck evoked the memory of his former Polish cclmrades in the communist movement: "Heel especially c ~ m e c t e dto the Polish working class md its partypof course such g ~ a political t revolutionaries as Julian Marchlewski, :Row Luxemburg und Lea Jogiches were my friends and comrades in arms. 'Thembre my visit in Warsaw is m expression of proletarian internationalism, which binds the Polish Uni.ted Mlorker" Party with the S:ED."fi"Uponhis departure from the Warsw railway station, Pieck thanked the Poles for their "peat hospitality" and proclaimed, "Long live the great camp of world peace and its ingenious h e h s m m , our common friend, and leader, Generallissmo Stali~~l"" The Polish communists usually avoided &is kind of hyperbole, but alf in all the visit: was a public relations success. Rierut reciprocated Pieck"s visit bp goLng to Berlin in April 1951. Once again, nothing but kind w o d s wew exhanged in public. Bierut thmked the East Germans fnr their "musual hospitaZiQ and M,endshipef""7m Ulbricht went to Warsaw a m t h later, he sotenrnly declared that '"now there are no more difkrences between democratic Germans and the Peoples' Po1:and,."lB This public show of affection masked the f u n d a m t a f lack of trust between the Polish and East G e r m cclmmunists that had developed after the kvar. Relations were not what they appeared. The P7,f"R leadership knew that as long as Stalin stood behixld the SEVs new overtures toward West German Foreign Poland, no honest paranership was possible.1-e Mhistry specdated tkat U'brichl. and C m t e w d had rcceived instructions in Moscow in May to recognize the Oder-Neisse border, m d Polish officials suspected as much." 01e e ~ w i t n e s sto the Zgorzelcc meethg, Polish diplmat Ramuald Spasocvski, called later that the Soviets eventually bad,to mediate the serious differences between the two sides con. wrote that at the time he had cerning the w d i n g of the t ~ a t y He vkwed tke xcord as "a historic victory for peace, fnr both Poles and Cermans. With time, 1 saw with incrclasing clarity that it was Soviet foreign gdicy that was the actual beneficiary them, because the twaty helped their hegemony over Central Elzrope.Tl According to former LDX;" leader Ernst Lemmer, Grotewohl and Dertinger wercl. forced to sign the Zgorzelec agreement inskad of Pieck or Ulbricht so that "an d d c m u n i s t " wwolrld not be eharged with signing away German territory, Lemmer also contended that '"he Poles

Myttr ofthe Stntinisl Brafherlmod

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themselves did not take the theatrically staged siwing ceremony, behixld which stcrcrd the will of the Soviets, very seriously.""Lemmer aileged that m e drunken Polish journaiist told Derti,nger that no sel,&respectingPole trusted a leader who c d d sign away part of his country.22 Most East: Germns were of the same mind. The W s t Cermm press accurately reported that the SED was having serious problelns in justifying the treaty to the East German peopie.23 The SEB leadership still faced the formidable task of reconciling its own party members with the OderNeisse border; the East Gerntan Foreign Minjstry frequently had to admoni.sh its diplomats for using German names for the cities in Polmdfs Westcm Territories.24 The rmk and file of the SED's partner parties in the National Front, the CDU and the LDP, remained, in the words of the Polish Militaw-y Mission, stridently ""cauvhist and revisionist."z5 Polish officials privately thought the SED leadership was not doing enough to stamp out wisionism in the party. For example, during the visit of a Polish delegation to t h Goethe celcbratim in Weimar in November 1949, an SET) functionary was asked when Silesia would return to Germny. His reply echoed Pieck's mguntent ol a few years earlier: '"After the signing oi the peace treaty and when the Germans show proof of [their] democratic cor.lvictions."2Two years later, West German officials speculated that Che GDR was still banking on a return of Silesia, but Dcrtilrger assured the Polish Chief oi Mission, Jan hydorczyk, that '"the Bonn =ports relathg to Silesia do not have any basis in truth'"7 Izydorczyk gave Dertinger the benefit oC the doliht. Nonetkless, he reported that most GDR officials "lacked arguments confirming its [the border 'S] legitirnacy.'"Wther Polish diplomats observed that the East German communists tried to avoid the issue and that they "wcre not always up to [answerir\g]questions on the refugee or the Oder-Nelsse border issues.'"9 In October 1951, Dertinger again had to =assure the Polish governmem.t.that the SED was not maneuvering for sig~~ificant changes in the border,"" The so-called '"border of peace" was far from peaceful; the heavy gtlard that stood watch on the Oder-Ncisse was a powerful syrnbd of discord over the borkr, Frequent disputes over terntorid fishing rights that had begttn shortly after the end of the war continued after the Zgorzelec treat-y was signed. In the fall of 7,947, the Polish coast guard confiscated several East German boats fishing in the bay near Ueckermiinde, south of Swinouj~cie." Two years later, Polish authorities arrclsted four more East German fislnerman from Ahlbeck for fishing in Polish waters. By September 1950, eight East Germm fjshermm and two of their fishing boats were in Polish c u s t d y 'The East German gove demanded l-heir return, and called for a maritime qreernent to prevent future disputes.32 After repeated e n t ~ a t i e sfrom East Berl.in, the Polish

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authorities =leased the fishermen and their boats in 1951.3 Nonetheless, the East Germans continued to fish in Polish waters on the Baltic Sea, and the Polish coast g ~ ~ a stopped rd three more East German fishing boats in August 1951, The Polish Foreign Ministry in.formed the East German gowmment that the Polish coast guard would be increasing patrols a l q the maritim bordec" Polish diplmats complained that East Qrman boats werc still illegally crossing the border near Zgorzelec,3bnd later in the year the Polish gave ent rejected an East German pmposal to ease restric"rons on this traffic.36 If th communistsf assertions about the davvnhg of new epoch in Polish-East Germm relations were true, the tension along the border did not reflect it* In July 1953, the U.S. internathnal newspaper Herald Tribzuzc. went so iar as to call the Oder-Neisse "Europe's worst border problem." Reporter Gaston Cobientz predicted that after the June 17 uprising in the GDR, '"the festering ader-Neisse situation should breed more hatred for the Soviets. :It also stands in the way of complete solidariq between the Polish Reds and German Reds. The Poles still see Germms as enemiesand vice versa." He reported that the border town of Zgorzelec (the site of the Oder-Neisse agreement in 1950) was divided by armed guards and barbed wire, and that East G e r m 6migr4s from the Polish side of the town could see their old homes acsoss the rivec He elaimed that t h y expected to get them back37 Reacting to the Herald Trib article and to similar West German reent assured Warsaw that the border was ports, the East German gove permanent. h response, Bierut wrote Grotewohl that "the border of peace on the Oder and Neisse has estaE7lished a guarantee of friendly relations between our nations."% Frequent anti-Polish dernorrstratio~~s by the East Germans in the Oder-Neisse area, however, belied Bierat" aasscsrtion that the border was a ""garantce." The Polish communists halfhartedly accepted the SEDfs explanathn that such hostik actions against Poles were instigated by Western agents and fascist agitators in. the GDRe39 East Germm and Polish ofiicials h e w that such allegations were untrue, The SEDfsStalinist economic policies and intransigent position on German udication were becoming increasingty unpopular in the GDR. In N o v d e r , Ubrieht told Izydorczyk in confjcience that the SED was havhg difficulty in overcoming people's chauvhistic and. n a t i d i s t i c attitudes. WLhricht said that the party needed to instill mom political indockination, especially in the Guben and Frankfurt areas and eastern S a , , y and Lusatia, where popular opposition to the border was particularly strcmg.3"' At the SEU Party Congress in March 1954, Erich Honecker ack~awledgedthat the FDJ had chauvhistic tendencies, especially concerning the Oder-Nrisse border.41

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East German Ambassador to Paland St.edm Heym filed this report in the s u m e r of 3955: ''The Oder-Neisse border is not only misused in West Germany as a means of chauvinistic agitation, but wide circles of the population of the GDR-not unly the earXier settlers [from Poland]do not have a clear conception of this question, . . . An interpmtation is ofkm spread Ihat a united Germany kviX.1get: back the old territories on the other side of the Oder-Neisse." Heym offered the examgle of one young woman from m East German cdlcctive farm who was asked what she would do in a reunified Germ,any. She answered, "Then I would go home!" She meant, of course, to her home in Polish Silesia. Heymann concluded that whether or not East Germans were SED members, the Poles simply did not trust them.42 Potish officials repeatedly chided the SED for not dslng more to stamp out anti-Polish attitudes. T k Poles complained that the SEWS propaganda was contrib~~ti,ng to the beljef that the Oder-Neisse bordcr was a temporary result oi losing the war." "Polish diplomats criticizd the SED and its publishi~~g houses Eor rejecthg Polish bmks m the subject when they referred to Polmd's historical. presence in the Western Territories"4" The Polish Ennbassy reported that ""in nearly e v e y public speech, talk, discussitm . . . tbr problem of the border on tl-teOder and Neisse has not yet been laid, to rest. Even the statemats of responsible activists in government and society frtzqrrently treat the matter of the Oder-Neisse border as 'unjustly de~ided.~'~45 The Poles vigorously protested implications that the border was temporary. Some East Germans officials stilf referred to the GDR as '"Middle Germanyp"as though western P o h d was German territory.& %e official in the Polish MillisIry of Trade reported that the East Gcrman Embassy in Warsaw often called Lower and Upper Silesia "Poland I" a d "Polmd 11,"as ff they wert? not M y inkgrated into Poland. 'l'he official concludd that "this type of reference does not contribute to the stmgthening of good neigfiiborly relations.

Poland and the German Problem The PZPR did not view the creation of two German states in 1949 as a final resolution to the German problem." The CMer-Neisse border and sta" tus of West Berlin were ultimately dependent m Moscow's adherence to the Potsdam agreements. As long as there was no peace treaty with a u17jted German state, the Oder-Neisse border was sub~ectto change. Furthermore, the East German state was not recognized by other Western countries, but the Federal Republic cJf Germany (FRG) was graeiua1:ty gaining legitimacy in Wrsstern Europe as a vital economic and polit.ical parher.

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Tn the early 1 9 5 0 ~ the ~ Western Allies began to deliberate th rearmament of West Germav. The Polish communists were not as worried about this eventuality as they were &out Soviet diplomatic mancwers to prevent M s t Germany from joining NATa: a deal, for i_nstance,between the Allies and the Germm states to unify the country and revise the C)der-Neisse border: The Poles wanted a h a l peace treav between the Allies and a legit.imate, unified German governnnent that would guarantee the new border. But there were no assurances that the Potsdarn agreements would be the basis for negotidions. 'The SED had more reason to worry; an Allied deal for a united Germany and free elections meant their being rczlegated to a small and inslpificant opposition party In C)ctober 1950, the foreig~~ ministers of Ihe Soviet bloc countries met in Prague to devise a strategy to block the possible integration of West Germany into NATO and the European Coal and Steel Community [ECX]. The East Germans were not invited to the formal talks, but came as &servers, Dertinger held. several meetings with Molotov; tkese Dertinger ~ g a r d e das a c d r m a t i o n of the GDR's legitimacy. He said that the Soviet government was ""in cmplete understmding of our national n e e d ~ ~ " 4 ~ I'he foreip millisters proposed that t-he four Allies create the "conditions for the f o r m i o n of a united peace-lovi,ng dernncratic G e r m state," Gfotewohl was charged with forming a proposal for a German parliwntary council that would determine the procedures for all-Cerman elections and the future of a neutral,, largely demilitarized German state. West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer rejected the idea, although t-he crverbre was probably sincere. Stalin was still not convinced of the lmg-term efficacy of the GDR; %viet fears about West Germany's entry into NATa were very real."" I'he United States and the other Westcm Allies were in no positim to appeaw s a l i n in the early 1950s. The Soviet acquisition of the atomic b o l b , uverestirn.ates oi the Soviet tmop strength in E~urclpe,the communist victory in China, a d thc. Korean War made a compromise with Moscow nearly impossible," The "lesson" of Munich infomed both sides; the West woufd not relinquish any part of Germany if it could fall under Soviet influence, and Stalin interpreted Munich as a capitalist deal to provid,e Hitler with a springboard for a wm against t-he Soviet Union.. There was little hope for serious negotiations on Germany; Grotewohl's proposal went n o h e r e . In March 1952, while discussions continued over the rearmament of West Germany, Stalin made one last proposal for a unified, neutral, and demilitarized German state. Once again, the Polish government f e a ~ d that the border cvitl Germany would go back on the negotiating table."" Ulbricht and Pieck paid iip service to supporting a unified Germany, but

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they knew that a cbange h the status quo threatened the GDR" very eexistmce and the SED's political future. The SEC) was g ~ a t reliewed y that the Soviet de~aarchefailed."" The SEX)took i m e d i a t e steps to confirm. the division of Germany into two states, and to break out of its diplomatic and economic isdaticm from the non-communist world. The GDR leadership enlisted Poland" ssupport in gain.ing djylomatic recognition from the non-communist states, ESiemt agreed-as long as Poland's interests were not compromised.54 111 early April 1952, Pieck went to Moscow to meet Sblin, who agrced to work on buiEding and supporting the socialist German state. Pieck evoked the Rapdo Treaty as a precedmt in Soviet-German cooperation, alt-hough fie h e w full well that a call for a new li'apalfo, which was in part an anti-Polish agreement, was an affront to all Poles, communj.sts included."" When the Western powers recognized the sovereignty sf the FRG h May 1952, serious discussion began m the FRG's role in the defense of by securing its boundary with the Western Europe..The GDR ~ s p o n d e d FRG; in August the Soviet Union liquidated its control commission in East Germany and declared its intention to grant sovercigsrty to the GDR, :In Octcrber, the GUKs djplomatic missims were upgraded from legations to e~abassies.Soviet troops remained in East Germmy; but the sccupation was officially over.% That summer, Ulbricht and the SSED resolved to build socialism in the GDR as quickly as possible, inpart to prevent a capitaljst takeover of East Germany if unification talks convened, The servile SED leaders also wanted to show the Soviets that they were c a p w e of developing a mature socialist state on the Stalhist model. The Soviets cautioned Ulbricht not to push the reforms too fast, however, for fear not only of alienating the East German population but of ending all hope for communism to gain a foot.hod in the FRG. Molotov rcmernbered that "it tufned out that the German comrades began talking at the top of their voices about buitding sociaiism without having laid the proper grolandwork for it." 'The pfan was a disaster, and by thc end of tbe year UI:bricht was pleading for more Soviet aid, The crisis cdminated in the uprisixlg against the SEE? rkgirne in June 1953and almost cost Ulbricht his jcrba57

Polish-German "Friendship" Before the creation of the GDR in 1949, the German and Polish c m m u nists made few honest efforts to further peoyle-to-people contacts. In 1950, Grotewohl conceded that /'the old prejudice and armgance of the Germans toward the Poles still exlistef"8The developnnent of genujne partnerships between t:he connmunists in Stalin's empire was virtudly

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impossible. No one could, be sure who was a Soviet agent or a VVestem spy. Even tbr Polish diplomatic corps, which had previously filed mom h o ~ ~ ereports st than the East Germans, now saw ideological deviations and spies everywhere. Shortly before Stalids death, for example, the Polish Diplomatic Mission in Berlin observed that there were "social-democratic tendcnciesf% the SE:), as welf as dmgerous inhences from foreign agents and bourgeois elements.59 It was not the SED's alleged deviations from Marxist-Leninist-Stalhist thought that made the Poles di,strust the East Germns. As long as Ihe GDR was the devoted satellite of the Soviet Union, Poles had no more trust in the East Germms than they did in the Russians. Shortly after the founding of the C;DR i,n 1949, a porter at the Warsaw train station probably spoke for most Poles when be told Bmdzki that ""fo not believe in the democratic Gemans [in the GDR].. . . G e m m s were, are, and will be our e~~e~=y." hodzki commented that most Poles could not disthgznish between the criminal Nazi concentration camp commandant [Amnun] Goefi from P3rask6w m d the fanous author Coethe from MJeimar.60 Numerous cultural exchmges were developed in the early 1950s to promote East German-Polish friendship, and although some undoubtedly fostered good will and understanding, many had the opposite effect.61 Poles wx generally more inkrested in cultural exchanges than the East Germans, Although many Poles stereotyped Germans as coldly efiicienf, dogmatic, anci condescending, they respected German culture, technology, and economic development. The Polish Committee of C d tural Cooperation With F o A p Countries enthusiastically promoted pmgrams to acyuaint the East Germans with Polish culture;hVrom October 1,950to May 1,951,over 200 Pdes m d e official visits to East Germany, the highest number of Polish visits to another comtry during this time. Because the East Geman authorities perrnftted exchanges only if they were organized and promoted by the SED, only six East Germans went to Poland on oficial gave ent business during this period, in comparison with 181 Soviets m d twelve Gze~hoslovak~.63 Many SEE) members, especially those in the lower ranks of the party, still held. strong prejudices against Poles. These prejudices were evident in various ertchanges; for instance, in May 1950, the head of t.he SEDfs Ecmomic Depart~aent,Willi Stoph, angrily de~~ou~zcled the rude behavior of an East German delegation to the trade fair in Pozna_l"l,and criticized an East Germm newspaper report for calling some of the fair's streets and czlltural park a "carnival,"kwhich Stoph found demeaning* Stopfi said that he was shocked and disappointed by the reporter" 'kstonjshing it;norance.'Vhen Bierut visited tl-te East German factory Lict~naWerkez in 1,9Fit, it was difficult for the East Germixns to organize a welcome because several thousand German immigrants from Pofand wlrrked in the plant." East: German officials worried that the wlrrkers

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would ask Beirut embarrassing questions about when the Germans could return to their homes in Poland.65 Friction between the East Germm m d Polish diplomats and their respective hosts in Warsaw and Berlin was yet mother barrier to better relations. The Polish Diplomatic Missim in Berlin was disappointed in the East German governmnt's lackluster efforts to promole friendship with Poland. East German officials thought that the first "Month of PolishGerman Friend?;hipf% ine GUM in March 1451had achieved positive results, but the SEE) cmplained about the Polish delegati.onfslack of political preparation for the celebration. The SED d s o reported that there were far too many manifestations of East Germans9ostility toward Poles*"" In August 1951, Polish d jplomats complained about the serious shortage of officials in the East German b r e i p Ministry who were responsible for Polish affairs.@That same month, Poljsh diplomats took untbrage when the East Gcrmans breached protocol by sending such middle-ranking SEC) functionaries as Karl Wloch, the secretary gmeral of the Committee for Cnlturd Cooperation with Foreign Count.ries, and Mans Joachirsl Hertwig, the secretary of the FDJ, to greet a Poiish delegation to the Polish Renaissance E;estival in Berlin. The Poles were also disappointed when o171Y two SEX;)rc~r)l"csenfativesat-tended a performance by '"Masowsza," the famolls Polish dance company.68 The discrepancy between the SED's official pmmotion of international working-class soljdarity and Ihe party's policies toward Poland was revealed in the SEE)" restrictions on casual encounters behnieen Poles and East Germns. The ~ s t r i c t i meven s applied to gave ent and party officials. At the height of Statinist repressio11 i,n late 1,952, the East German parliament passed a law requiring the approval of the East German Fore i p Mhistry for atl direct communications between foreipers a d East German officiats, agencies, and institutions.@Dertinger often made persmal decisions on the lists of accepthle contact persons for the various East German departments and agencies.7Us of January 1,1953, all visa qplications for prkate vi,sit.s & r o d had to be approved by the East Ccrmat1 police, the Interior Ministry, and the Foreign Mhistry, Articles that the Poljs2-r press sent to East German newspapers had to pass muster with Ihe East German Foreejgn Mbistry censors. Foreign Mjnistry official Fritz Grosse told Polish dlplornat Stianisiaw Dodin that these measures were necessary ""tocreate cmtrol and order . . . [and] to hinder the work of our common enemies." Grosse said that the Rudolf Slmsky trial was a good lesson for the pasties and a reminder to them to be wary of revisionists and western agt3ntsm71 The Polish diplomats in B a l h soon discove~dthat the SED was scrious about cmiorcing the new statute. East German officials we= careful not: to circumvent the law; when they did, they asked the Pdes to keep

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the meetings confidential, After one meeting at the Polish DipZsmatic Mission, for instmce, Wloch asked the Poles not to mention it to the GDR Fareign Ministry Word nonetheless got back to the ministry; which sent a note to the Polish mission warning against more unauthorized contacts." Because the tight rt~strictionsseriousIy impeded their work, Polish djpornats registered numerous officid prolests, particularly the activities of the mission's cultural attach&," The mission worried that cooperative propaganda effarts with the East Germm press would suffer hnmeasurable damage. Maria Werna, the diredor of the East German Department in the Polish Foreign Ministry, called the East German ban on spontaneous cmtacts '*"crude."T4 In March 1953, Polish envoy Jan Izydorczyk wrote Warsw that East Qrman press coverage of Poland had got.t.cn '"considerably" worse; of the sixty-three articles tlne Polcs had recently sent to tAc East German press agencies, cmly one had appeared in print.75 East G c r m n diplomats often displayed arrogant and aloof attitudes toward Polish officials. Even the SET) recognized the problem. The partyfs choice for chief cJf mission, dramatist fiiedrich Wlf, protested the assignment, but to no avail,.%In 1,950, an SED report on the work of the East German diplomats in Warsaw found that "the relationship between the diylt-tmatic n-tission and the responsible authorities in the Ministry of Foreign Mairs of t-he Repwblic ol Poland leaves mwh to be desired," A~ccordjngto the report, Wolf and his underlings took little interest in meetirrg with Polish offiicials or in fostering persona connections to thcm.77 The head of- the East German F o ~ i g nMinistry's Soviet section, Peter Florin, moved ongoing negotiations on cultural exchanges from Warsaw to East Berlin in order to exclude Wolf from the talks.7"n the spring nl1,95l, Wolf rclsigsled before hjs tour was up. Polish officials were often no more hospitable to the East German diplomats in Poland. Wolf complained that "it isn't easy for a German living in Poland. You are watched with complete suspicion." Another East German diplomat recalled that Poles reacted negatively to anyone speaking German, inchxdk~grepresentatives of the new '"socialist Germany."79 According to the West G c r m n prrzss, Polish offidals rebuffed meetings with the East Germans so m n y t h e s that the Polish government had to order its bureaucrats to treat the East Germans with ""kid gloves,""8 The East German culhral attach&" repeated complaints about the lack of access to Polish Foreign Ministry officials and the P2;PR"s prtrss seetim led to her recall to East Berlin in 1950. Other East German diplornats also grurnbled about the hardships of serving in Poland; the consulate was inadequate and the= was no suitable housing in Warsaw Like Wolf, many diplomats asked to Ieave the post.81 The East German Foreign Ministry begm to question the political reliability oi its own diplomats in Miarsaw and openly criticized their nega-

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tive attitudes toward Poks. Some of the lower-ranking diplomats were unhappy with Wolf's successor, h n e Kundermmn, in part because her husband, Erich, also worked at the embassy Ku~ndermmn,who had survived the purges in the Soviet Union, was a cmvlnced Stalinist. Horst Grmert, tbe p ~ s attachP, s ~ c a k later d that Kundermann was incapable of m k i n g an holnest assessment of Life in the Soviet Unjm under Stalin, even though many of her friends had been vicths of the purges; Grunert complained that her poccupation with embassy secwity subverted attempts by the diplon?a.t.s to mke contacts with the Poles. Stefan Mcymann replaced Kundermann in the faIl of 1953. Heymam had previously served as head of the SEWSDepartment of Cuiture, where, according to Grmmt, he had tolerated too much ""decadent-"and "abstract" art. Heymann helped raise morale at the embassy, but East German djplomats still tried to awoid the assipment.82 The malaise that pemeated the East German b b a s s y in Miarsaw throughout 1953 was just one example of the SEWS failurc to fol-ge a new relationship with Pcrlmd. Most party and government officials remained inctiffercnt to Poles, if not openly hostile. The Mew Course and the June Uprising in the GDR The power struggie that ensued. in the Kremlin after StaXids death in March 3953 d i ~ c 8 affected y Soviet bloc relations. 'fhe Kremtin graduaily loosened its control over the other communist parties in Eastern Europe, and promoted the Pdew Course in political and economic affairs, The CPSU declart~dits intention to treat the other c o m u n i s t parties as equals, and each country s:lowly received more freedom to conduct its own foreip economic policy.83 Stalh" ddeath also brought: hope fctr a laxa at ion in the Cold War. 'The first sign of change came wi& the end of the &rean War in Jdy- There even appeared to be a possibility for German reunifica6on; for a t h e the new Soviet leadership sericrusly debated the future of Germany and Stalin's propsal for a united, nonaligned, and neutral German state-84 The Polish leadership was also keenly interested in a final resolution to the division of Germany*At the Seclmd Party- Congress of the PZPR in March 1954, Bierut declared that ""the Germcran problem is the central question of European security" far France as well as for Poland. Bierut went so far as to pmpose that tt~ehistoric Polish-French alliance be mswrected." These ideas &raptly ended with West Gemany's erntry into NATO m d the formation of the Warsaw Pact ;in May 1955. I'he rrtixcd idecllogical messages that were cornillg out of Moscow in 1953put the commmnist parties in the Soviet bloc on. edge. The Stalinists worried that their past hdiscrctions w d d cost them their jabs, or worse,

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their freedom or their lives, The first serious test to communist rule in East: Germany begm on June 17, 3953, with a workersf strilce in East Berlin. W e n th,e uprising spread to cities thmughout the GDR, the Soviet army deployed troops and tanks to suppress it. 71t.e Polish government officially approved of the action, a d the East German Diplomatic Missim in Warsaw sent a letter to the PZ1)R thanki.ng the party ""for the proof of [your] trust and solidarity that you showed to workers in the GDR in regard to the crushing of t k fascist prov~cation+~~Bb Polish diplomats in Berlh echoed the SEDfspropaganda blamhg the demonstrations on foreign agents and provocateurs, but they were genuinely surprised by fie extent 05 the people's disaffection with fie SED r4girne.m The Polish mission reported that &ere was "a seriotls mood of hostility toward the USSR" h the GDR.WStanislaw Dodin construed the events as proof of the strong fascist elements in East Germany, Other djplonnats attributed the revolt to the fail~~xe of the SEU's economic plan for the first quarter of 1953; they wamed that the economic situation had not: improved much in the secortd.K" Ironically the June uprising saved the Ulbricht rkgirne, m d ended alS serious thoughts that Moscow might bave had about a new demarche on German unif ration.90 nrushchev later co ented fiat ""tmks to the Party [SED] m d its leadership, the uprising never got out of hand. As a result of the postwar circumstances which developed in the GDR, we h e w we would have to find other ways of esthiishing East Germany on a solid Marxist-Leninist footing, We knew Stalinism was contrary to Marxism-LenSrrism*"91 The Kremlin approved of Ulbrichtfs cmpaign to consolidate strict party control over East G e r ~ ~ politics an and so~iety.~Z Ulbricht purged the SED and the East German government of potentially hostile elcments, and rather than elevating the other National Front parZiei., to gmzline govcming part-~zers,the SED subordinated their role even furthes, The SED made a concentrated effort to undermhe the influence of the CUU.gWlbricht told IzydorczyZc that, at most, half the German clergy could be won over to socialjsm anyway and that they were a barrier to closer cooperation between the SEE? and the CDU,94 Before the June uprising, the Polish Exnbassy had specdated that Moscokv's call fnr cdective party leadership would force the SED to give the CDU and the LDP more important positions in the government.'" ?"hat fafl, Poland honored the CZ)U's top government official, Foreign Minister Ccorgi Dertinger, for his efforts to jlnprove relations with Polmd. Dertinger (CDLT) was sacked and arrested on spy charges a few weeks later, an embarrassment for fie Poles.96 7'he Polish Foreig~nrninistry and its diplomats in Berfin were opet.z:ly critical of the SED" unwilljngness to work with the other political, par-

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tks.97 Polish journalists accused Ulbricht of disloyalty to Moscow and disregard for the interests of tbe other people's ~publics.One newsman concluded that "Ulbricht is viewed in Poland as a man who hates Polmd."" The PZPR also deplorcd the SEUk purges of such loyal communists as Franz Dahlem, whom Ulbricht accused of adopting "political blindness" to the intrigues of imperialist agents.* Even some mennbers of the Soviet diplomatic corps in the GDR expressed disappointment in the %R's policies. One diplomat told k y d o ~ z y kthat the East Germans often m d e policy "without thinking beforc?ihand."l"""' But tke PZPR, too, was slow to reform., Polish Cardhal Wyszyriski was arrested in September 1953. &ly after J6zef Swial.0 of the Polish Ministry of Puhlic Security defected in Decentber, and his revelations of"the ministry" brutal persecution of h o c e n t people became widely known in Poland in the fall of 1954, did the party begin the long and arciuaus process of self-examination and reform. The PZPR returned Cyrankiewicz to the position of prime minister in March 1954; Bierut kept the title of first secretary of the PZPR.101 Gomulka was freed in December, m d the party rehed in its see~~rity police. The SED was so s h a h by the June events that the pasty immediately increased surveiliance over the population and took steps to =press liberalizing j,nfluences that rnigbt emanate from Poland. The SEVs central organs remained fimly in, charge of all. Polish visitors, and the party tightened enforcement of the January 1953 law to =strict direct contacts between foreigners and East German officials.lO2 In, a meting at the East German Foreign Ministry, Ezydorczyk complained about the time it took for a Pole to obtain a visa to East Germany- kydorczyk said that the delays were embarrasshg for his government because relations with l.he GUR, a ft.tll.owsocialist state, were supposed to be friendly.HI3 East German Foreip Ministry offitrial Max Keifson was genuinety surprised when the Polish cuih;lral attach4 inEast Berlin, Helena Jakubawska, told him that her gove m t had not issued the s m e kind of restrictions. Jakubowska s a d that she was having trouble doing her job because of te East German law, to which KelJson replied somewhat dishgenuously, "ln no case do we have the intention of impedbg your workem104 The East Gerent intclntionally kept Polish officials in the dark about its intern4 affajrs. I'"n(i& diplomat I, Burgh1 told East Grm,an Sccrcbry of %curity Ernst Wollweber that the Polish, government had not been well informed about the ewmts of June 12, or &out the SEWSrecmt p q e s of Wilhelm Zaisser and Rudolf Hermstadt and thek followers" Wollweber promised to work m easing communications with Polish offjcids,but East German policy did not change.1"' Working condi.tirms for the Polish diplomats beclme so restrictive that Izydorczyk eve~~knally raised the issue with Gsotewohl birnself, who replied. only that the regulations appfied to diplo-

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mats from the othes peoplesbepublies as well. Izydsrczyk responded that in contrast to the GDR, the Polish t;owemmc.nt was doing everything it could to cooperate with tlte East Germm diploma& in Polmd. Grotebvohl suggested that the Poles review the policy with the new foreign ministes, Lothar Bolz, but he, too, iporc?d their appeals.l* Durhg talks that fall on a plm for cultural exchanges, Polish negotiators ag& asked the East Gemans to ease rcstrictions on their personal contacts with GUR officials. 'l'he Poles argued that they expected the m e treatmelnt b m the GUR that the F"olis:h govermnt. afforded the East German djp1omati.c representatives in Warsaw, but again the East Germans flatly fused d. They said that the l w was an intemal affair and expected Polish diplomats to respect itelO7 Polish-East German relations in Stalin" smpim were mircd han atmosphere of distmst and paranoia. Stdin" ccommunists were a camorra of sycophnnts, not an aUiancc by choice. Loyalty to t-he CPSU did not foster fPiend.1~relations between the satellite parties, nor did it cultivate red understmding hetween the natimalities of Eastern Europe. Many f"oli& commnists grrtmbed about the SED's bind obedience to Stalinist orthodoxy; the SED distrusted the PZPR for its alleged social democratic, capitalist, and bourgeois tendencies. The normalcy m d stability that Stalin had brought to cornmmnist party relations in, the early 1950s broke down after his death. In addition to their greater political inutonoq the sateilites soon began to reassert their economic htercsts. As the ptitical and economic fadt lines dividing Eu, rope weakened, the Polish government began to reassess the benefits of its trade with the Soviet bloc. German repatriation from Poland was also a source of lfiction between the East German and Polish communists after the war. In the mid-1950s, B o r n began to lobby Warsaw to allow mow Geman emigration. East Berlk demanded equal treatment in this matter, but never got it.

4. Trybzinn Lildrr, October 26, 494"3 p. 3. 2. See Wilfried Loth, "Stalin" Plans for Post-War Germany;" in inrancesca Gori and Silvio Pons, eds., T!le Sc7;zlieE U t ~ i o ~ l Eurc~pein ttw Ci11d Wal; 2943-53 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2996), pp. 26-29; and Loth, StaEilzs ~fngeliebtesKii"ld: Wnrum Moshzi die DDR rzichl zuotlte (Stalin" unwanted child: Why Moscc~wdid not want the GDR) (Berlin: Rawohlt, *L994),p. 135; and Nikita Khrushchev, Kf~rustzcltezlRetnenfbers: Tfte Last Teslt.antenf (Boston: Littf e, Brown, 1g%), g. 192. 3, Polish Military Mission to Warsaw, November 15, 2949, PZPR MC, 237iV-146. In 1950, Karol Tkocz was named the Polish Chief of Mission. Friedrich Wolf represented the GDR in Warsaw, The diplomatic missions were upgraded to embassies in October 1953.

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4. Trybzinck tudu, October 20,1949, p- 1. 5. Tyhuna LIIGELI,October 12,1949, pp. 2-3. 6. Aside from same contmtiom negotiations on trade and repatriation of Germans in Poland (see Chapter 4), most party and go>vernrnentreports on both sides offer little in the tvay of an honest assmsment of relations. Both parties felt the p ~ s w r of e ever-present Ss~vietagents. The %>vietseven sat in on SED Politburo meetings, and the Polish Minister of Defense was a %viet citizen, Marshal Kmstantin Rokossovsky. It was not until the mid-1950~~ when Nikita mrushchev comolidated his power and the GDR was granted full sc~vereignty and an army in the Warsaw Pact, that East German officials felt no compunction about critridzing their Polish comrades. 7, Neues DezltsclzEa~d,October 13,1949, p. 2. 8. Cited in a speech by Friedrich Wotf, Oct-c~ber7, 1950, PZPR KC, 237/=11-521; see alsc~florst Grunert, Fiir kiorzecker azqgtaltem Parkctt: Eritz~tcrlangen e i ~ c sDDR-DiplomnCen (Fo3r Honecker on the smooth parquet: Memoirs of a GDR diplomat) (Berlin: Edition Qst, 4995), p. 104. 9. Leuschner notes on Ulbricht et al., meeting with Bierut, Minc, Tzydmezyk, Wierblowski, and Dguski, June 1950, SED ZK, Walter Ulbricht Papers, NL 18211247. 10. Riezk~sDeulisctzland, June 8,1950, p. 1. 11. See Eybunn Lud~a,June 6,2950, and subsequent issues. 12. Tybunn Lzldzt, July 7,2950, p. 1. 43, From a poem by Max Zimmering, ""Srom des Friedens" (Current of Freedom) quc~tedin Christa Hijrbner, "Das Abkomrnen .\ran Zgorzelec und die golitisch-ideofogischeArbeit der SED 1950/54" (The Treaty of Zgorzelec and the palitical-ideological work of the SED, 2950-19511, Beitrgge zar Geschicl?te der Arb-beite&ewc"gung (Contributitic~ns to the history of the Workers" movement) 23, no, 1 (19811, p. 39. 14. Bybzrnn Lzidzr, December 19,1958, g. 1. 15. 13ieck speech, December 28, 1950, SED ZK, Mlhelm Pieck Papers, N L 36/449. 46. Pieck speech, December 20, 1950, SED ZK, Wilhelm Pieck Papers, N L 361449. The SED leadership rare1y missed a public oppc~rtunityto praise Stalin, but the Polish communists were careful not to inflame the anti-Russian attitudes; of the 130tishpeople by stressing the PZ;PR"s relationship with Stalin and the Suviet Union. 17, Bierut speech, April 22, 1951, SEC?ZK, Wilhelm Pieck 13apers, NL 361451; and Bierut speech, undated, PZPR KC, Bierut file, 254lt-5. 18, Izydorczyk report on "The Origins of the GDR," May 15, 2 951, PZP1T KC., Izydorczyk file, 4[73/13. 19. See Alexander Fischer, "Aussenpoliitisehe Aktivitat bei ungewisser sowjetischer Deutschland-Pc>titik(bis 1955)'' Foreign policy activity in uncertain SSIviet German policy to 4955), in Hans Adolf Jacobsen, Cerd teptin, Ulrich k h e uner, and Eberhard Schulz, eds., Drei Jalfrzelzszte Ausse~zyolr'tikder DDR, 51-84 (Mtmich: R. Qldenbourg krlag; 19791, p, "17. Fischer obsei-ves that relations between the GDR and Poland did not suddenly improve as a result of the Zgorzetw agreement,

70

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20. Foreip Ministry memo, unsiped, undated, Press and Inhrmation Office of the Federal Government, BRD AA, Department 2, vol. 437. 21. Romuald Spasowski, The Liberatz'ou LZ( One (New York: f-larcuu& Brace Ja?~anovich,1986), p. 293. 22. Ernst ternmer, Marzclzcs wnr doclz arzders: Erinncrzrngert eincs dezitsclzen Demokraten fSc)me things were really othe~wisc;:Memories of a German Democrat) (FranuurtlMain: Verlag Heinrich gheffiel; 1968), pp. 314-315. 23. See the West German nwspaper reports in the Press Service and Information Sel-vice of the West German Foreign Ministry, June 14, 1950, BRD AA, Department 2, vol. 437. 24. Marten to the GDR Diplomatic Mission in Wrsaw, April 26, 1951, DDR M f M , VVarsaw Mission, A3543. 25, b t i s h Military Mission tct the PoEish Foreign Minjst-r)l;November 15,1949, PzPn KC, 231;7/~-146. 26. %id, 27. Izydorezyk notes of meeting with Dertinger, October 10, 4954, MSZ, 10/318/36. 28. Izydorczyk to muski, Ncjvember 5,4951, PZPR KC, 237/V-146. 29. Wierna to Skrzeszewski, May 14,1951, MSZ;, 10/364 140. 30. Tzydorczyk notes of meeting with Dertingel; October 10, 1951, MSZ, 10/318/36. 32. Gebert (Polish Militar)~ Mission) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Septernber 9,1947; URM, MZO, Deparl-ment of Public Administration, file 434, 32. Freund to the GDR Foreign Ministry; January 7,15250, DDR MfAA, AZQ817. 33. Keilwn to the GDR Diplomatic Mission in Warsaw; January 69,1951, DDR M f M , Warsaw Mission, A3542, 34, Ackermann to the State Secretary Eclr Frrt-9d and Consumer Industry, September 15,1951, UDR MfAA, State Scretary, A15627, 35. Tzydorczyk to Warsaw June 11,1951, MSZ, 1Q/364/40. 36. See the article in the Pnssazler Neue Presse, (Passau New Press), December 29,1951, in BRD BfGDE B137/1055. 37. lnterzzatiorzal Herald Tribune, July 12, 4953, in BKD AA, Department 2, vol. 438. 38. Bierut to Grotewohl, July 22,1953, PZPR KC, Bierut Archive, 254/IV-26. 39. $tanistaw Dodin notes of meeting with Emst WllwAer, October 14,1953, PzPn KC, 23;7/~-141;, 40. Izydorczyk to Skrzeszewski, November 24,1953, MSZ, 10/320/36. 41. David Childs, Tfze GDR: Moscow's German Ally (London: ijnwin Hyman, 1988), p. 39. 42. Heymann to the GDR Fcyreign Ministry, July 2, 1955, DDR MMA, Warsaw Embassy, AAS670, 43, J6zef Knapik to the Polish Foreign Ministry, March 31, 1955, MSZ, 10/369/41, 44. h a y i k to the Polish Fareign Ministry, May 5,1955, MSZ, 10/368/41, 45. Izydctrczyk to the Polish Fctreip Ministry, April 45,1954, MSZ, 10/367/41, 46. Wojeiecki r q o r t on Geneva conference of f a r e i p ministers, November 28, 1955, PZPR KC, 237/V-291.

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47. Headquarters of Foreign T r a d e c o a l and Coke in Stalinograd, to the Polish Ministry of Foreign Trade, June 7,1954, MSZ, grc~up10/315)/36. 48. b t h , S1ali;bzsungetiebfes Kind, p 135. Loth argues that Ulbricht played a major role in cmvincing a reluctant Stalin to create the GDR. 4% Dertinger report, Octclber 23, 1950, SET) ZK, Otto Grotewohl Papers, NL 9Qi459;and Izq.cSosczyk notes of meeting with Gro>tewohX,August 23,1951, NSZ, 10/438/47. At this point, East Germany" national interests could not be voiced too loudly Uertinger" repeat& references to them, along with his CBU credentials, made the Soviets and hard-liners in the SET) suspicious af him, Grotewohl told the head of the Polish Diplomatic Mission, Jan Izydorczyk, that Polish officials should avoid discussing any impc~dantmatters with Dertingex: He was accused of spyiing and incarcerated in 2 953. 50. Gerhard Wettig, " m e Soviet Union and Germany in the IdateStalin Period, 11i35&3," in Francesca Guri and Silvio Pons, eds., The Sc7;zliel Uniorz and Ezhrvpe in i.Iw Cold W ~ I1943-53 ; (New York: St. Martin" Press, 1996), pp. 361-363; and Loth, "Stalin's Plans for Post-Wr germ an^" p. 30. Wettig argues that Adenauer rejected the ofkr because he did not want SEB or Swiet interference in West Germany, Wettig, in cmtrast to Loth, tzrrites that "the propclsal submitted by GrotewohX was clearly not serious offer for negotiations,'"t is unlikely that Stalin would have given up on the SED and the GDR without some significant concessions in return, such as Western withdrawal fmm West Berlin and West Germany, but his main goal in the early 1950s was to prevent West Getmany" remilitarination, not to hang an to the GDR, 51. See John tewis Gaddis, We Nozv Know: Rethinking Cold War Hislo~y(i(axfo~sd: Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 123. 52. fiid,, p. 2 28. 53, Historians differ about the sincerity c ~ Stalin's f prc~pasal.See, for example Ann L. 13hillips,S~oiet1;3oEz'eyTotuard East Ger~r~rn~y Reclonsidered: The Postwar GlemCIE" (New York: Greenwood Press, 19861, pp. 125-127; and Vladislaw Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov; futside the Kremli~z'sCold War: From Stalin to Kkruslzclzev (Cambridge: Hamard Universiv Press, 1996), p. 159. Zubok and Pleshakov, like Gerhard Wettig, argue that Stalin was merely trying to prevent West German integratic~ninto a West Eurc~peandefense system, not contemplating a sacrifice of East Germany; see Wilfried Loth, "Die Historiker und die Deutsche Frage: Ein RGckblick nach dem Ende des kalten Mrieges," in Wilfrid Loth, ed., Die Deufsclzland Frnge in der Nnckkriegszeii. (Berlin: Akademie Verlag; 1994), p. 25; Loth, Stnlins unbelirbtes K i d , pp. 174-182. Loth views the proposal as a real offer to remite Germany and claims that the SED was very concerned that Adenauer would accept the Soviet proposals; see also Eberhard Schulz, "New Develvments in Intra-bloc Relations in Historical Perspective," k SmieC-Ensf Elarpenn Dz'lenfnzns:Coerciorz, Competifiorz,and Coplse;ent,eds., b r e n Dawisha and Philip Hanson (bndon: Heinernann Educational Books, 198l), pp. 51-52; see also BZankenhcrm, et al., report on the acceleration of Polish-German friendship, July 31,1950, BRD AA, mepartment 2, vol. 259, There is some question about what the East Germans and Poles knew about the Soviet initiative befc~rehand.In 1950, diplomats in Bonn hinted that perhaps the Sviets were thinking of reunification plans far Germany, and that they wanted to prepare the Poles and other East Europeans for that

72

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eventuality; Gerhard VVettig/ "The Soviet Union and Germany in the Late Stalin Period, 1950-3," p. 366. Wettig contends that the SED was confident that nothing would come of the dernarche, and that after Stalin died and Beria raised the possibility of abandoning the GDR, Molotctov said that Stalin would never have done that. Wettig says that the note was intended to put pressure on the Adenauer government and destabillize it from the Left; see also Andrei Gromyko, Memories (London: Hutchinson, 4989), p. 496, Crornyko later tzrrote that "no other European government in the post-war period made such a gross political miscalcubtion, Without doubt, Actenauer lcjst a historic oppctrtmityf>and Gaddis, We Mozo Krtozu, pp. 124-1 27. Gaddis asserts that Skalin finally realized in 1952 that his policies had prc>mpted the formation of West Germany, the ECSC, and the Pleven Plan to integrate German soldiers into European units, and therefore took a more comprc)mising approach. But Gaddis agrees with Wettig, Zubok, and I)Xeshako>v that Stalin expected the prc~pasalto be rejected. 54. See Izydorczyk notes of a meeting of the SED Central Gommjttee, March 4, 1952, KC PZPR, 237/XXI1-517. h March, 1952, Grotewohl publicly thanked the Poles for their support in the United Nations. 55, Ralf Radstcbner, "Die sowjetische Deutschlandpolitik irn tichte neuer Quel1en'"The Soviet policy toward Germany in light of new sources), in WiXfritzct lEJoth,ed ., Die Dcu tsclzland Frage izz der RincjskriegszAt (The German question in the post-war perid), 11-28 (Berlin: Akademie Vertag, 19941, p. 3.29; Gottfried Zeiger, Die HalIFzlng zlon SED und DDR zznr Eil~lzeitDeutscl~lands,1949-1987 (The attitude of the SED and the GDR toward the unification of Germany, 1949-1989) (Cologne: e r t a g Wiswnschaft und Pofitik, 1988), p. 49; and Phjllips, Soviet Pt>ll'cy Toward East C e r m a ~ yRewrzside~d:The Posk~xrnrDecade, pp. 125-127. 56. See Norman Nairnark, tc,?'i~e Xussia~sin Gertrmny, A History I?ffl~e Soviet Zone of- Qccupni"r'un,1945-1949 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995) p. 286. Naimark remarks that during the occupation "the Suviets did not help the SED develop a sense of independence and confidence, The self-image of the SET>was also poorly served by the need far its leaders to petition repeatedly to the Swiets on a wide variety of material and personnel issues." 57. AIbert Resis, ed., Mc?tukuv Remembers: I-rzside Kwmlitz Pulilics. Curzvers.sal.io:orzs wiflz k l i x Chuev (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1993), g. 334; Loth, Stnlins unbdiebtes K i ~ d , p. 226; and Gaddis, We Now Kpzow, p. 129. 58, Notes on Stoph and Kling visit to the 130znahTrade Fair, May 7,1950, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339/43487; see also Neues Derafschln~td,May 10,1950, p. 5; and Fischer, "Aussenpofitische AktivitZt bei ungewisser sowjetischer BeulschlandPolitik f bis 1955)," p. 72.. 59. Bodin to Wierna, 'January 28, 1953, 132;PR KC, 237/XXXX-517; see also the Educational institute of Scientific Faculty to Bierut, January 5, 1953, PZFR KC, 237/\1-146; and Dodin notes of meeting with VVollweber, October 14,1953, PZPR KC, 2371V-146.. in one case, the Polish Educational Institute of Scientific FacuXly in Warsaw criticized a visiting economics pmfesmr from the Humbold t University in krlin, Jiirgen Kuczynski, for un-Marxist ideas such as the ""pssibiliv of peacefully reforming capitalism." In October 1953, the head of East German security, Ernst ttlollwclber, told Polish diplomat Skanislaw Bodin that Kuczynski was iciec~logicaltyunreliable.

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60. Trybunn Lzddi-l,Oct&er 26,1949, p. 3. 61. See Fisches; "Aussenpolitische Aktivitgt bei ungew-iliser sc>wjetischer Deutschland-PolitiIri (bis 1955)," p, 72; and Sikora, Sozl'nlr'stischeSoLid~rit8tzrnd nnE.io:lannleItgleressesz, p. 130. The Poles were mc~stinterested in technical-scientific agreements as a tvay of obtaining German ""know how"; b r a thorou& discussion of Polish-East German cult-urat reiations, see HaneChristlian Trepte, ""FoXish Literature and Culture in East Germany: A Window to the West? The Polish R e view, no. 1 (1996), pp. 6S72, 62. Committee for Cultural Cooperation with Foreign Countries repart for October 1,1950 to March 31,1953, URM K W k Z , N-505/7, 63. Committee far Cultural Cooperation with Foreign Countries regc~rt;October 1950 to May 1951, URM, MWKzZ, N-505/7. 64. Notes on Stoph and Kling" visit to the P0znai.l Trade Fair, May '7,1950, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339113487; see also Neues Deral.schIn~td,May 10,1450, p. 5; and Fischer, "Aussenpolitische Aktivitzt bei ungewisser sowjetischer DeutschlandPctlil-ik (bis 19551," p, 7'2, 65. Ines Mietkowska-Kaisrtr, ""Zur brGderlichen Zusammenarbeit zwischen p o l n i ~ h e nund deutschm Kommunisten und Antifaschisten nach dem Sieg Gber den deutschen Faschismus (1945-1949)" @n the fraternal coogeratim between the Polish and German Communists and anti-Fascists after the victory over GerLander Euman fascism, 1945-2949), in jl2hrbucIz fiir Cesclziclzte der sctzinlr'sft's~-lzen mpas (Yearbook for the history of the socialist countries of Europe) 23, no. 1 (1979):49-67, p. 65. 66. Karl WEc>chto Ulbricht, April 2, 1951, $Er> ZK, Walter UEbricht Papers, NIJ 18214247; and Wiei-na to Skrzeszewski, May 44,1954, MSZ, 10/364/40. 67. f30tish Diplomatic Mission report, August 10, 1951, MSZ! 10/3M/40. 68. Polish Diplomatic Mission report, August 24,1951, MSZ, 40/364 140. 69. (East German) regulation of communications with foreign officials, January 22,1953, in MSZ, 1013319/36. Because officials from the East German Ministry of Foreign and Domestic Trade were not covered under these regulatians, they enjoyed greater freedom to meet with foreign officials about-economic matters, 70. Note of Polish Mission in Berlin, March 17,1953, MSZ, 10/349/36, 71. Simons notes of meeting beween Grosse and Polish diplomats Dodin and Jakubowska, February 19, 1953, DDR MfAA, State Secretary, A15582. SLansky was the Czechosfovak communist executed in 1952. 72. Wierna to Skrzeszewski, January 46,1953, MSZ, 40/319/36. 73. Simons notes of meeting beween Gsosse and Palish diplomats Bodin and Jakubc>wska,February 19,1953, DDR MfA A, State Secretary A15582. 74. Wierna to Skrzeszewski, January 16,1953, MSZ, 10/319/36, 75. Tzydorczyk tc:, the PoXish Foreign Ministry; March 22, 1953, MSZ, 10/366/40. 76. Grunert, Fiir Honecker nzlfglnftem hrkcltt: Erinn~rungeneines DDR-Diplomate~z,p. 96, 77. GDR Diplomatic Mission in VVarsaw report, July 28, 1951, SEB ZM, microfilm FBS 339113425, 78, hbodycz to Wierblowski an Matecki notes of contrersation with Florin in Berlin, August 26,1950, MSZ, 10/373/42.

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79. W l f to Dertingeu; April 24,1951, BUR MfAA, State Scretary, A15155; and G r u n e ~Fiiu , Honeckt.rnufgtallenl Parhtt, pp, 94-136,109-11 Q. 80. Blankehorn, et ale,report, July 31,1950, BRD AA, Department 2, vol. 259. 81. M. Lobodycz to WierMc>wskx',July 15,1950, MSZ, 10/313/36. 82. GDR Diplcrmatic Mission report, December 17, 4953, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339/13425; and Grunert, Fiir H o ~ ~ e knt&gf~ttenz er Parkff: Erinnerungen e i ~ e s DDR-Diplumah, pp. 99-400. 83. See Khrushchev, Khnlslzclzezt Retrzenzb~rs: The Gtasnast Tizpes, p. 2 16. mrushchev had a blind spot when it came to the way the Polish Left viewed the CPSU. In his memoirs, he says that the Polish communists were united with the Russians in the struggle againl;l:capitalism, even to the point of stating that Fetix Dzieriyxisky the founder of the Soviet secret police, had the respect of the Polish people: "This atl spea ks of the fraternal relationship of the Syviet Union to our atLies and bmthers, the Polish people." 84. See Zubok and Pleshakov, l~rsideflse Krenzlinls Cold War: From Stalin to KlzrzishcI~cv,pp. 159-160. After Stalin" death, the Soviet leadership had same serious discussions about the future of the GDR. Beria questioned Ulbricht" leadership and the Legitimacy of the East German state itself; see also Marc Trachtenberg, A Constrtlcfed Peace: The Illnkitzg of the Euroyea~Setflenzent 3945-2963 (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 1999, p. 138-139. Dutles posited the idea of a neutral Germany as well, but by 1954 that thinking was wer, 85. M. K. Dziewanc>wskl,fitand irz the 20tIt Century (New Ycfrk: Columbia University Press, 1977), p. 238. 86. Letter from GDR Embassy to the PZPR Central Committee, undated, ca. June 1953, KC PZPR, 237/XX11-521. 87, S e the Polish Diplomatic Mission reports of June 1953, in MSZ, 2 0/354/39, 88. Izydorczyk to Wiema, June 30,1953, MSZ, 23/84/9. 89. Izydorczyk to Wierna, June 22,1953, MSZ, 2 0/366/40, 90..See Hermann-Josef Rupieger, "Verpasste Chancen? Ein RGckblick auf die deutschland-politischen VerhandXungen, 1952-1955" "issed chances? A Xook back at the German political negotiations, 1952-1955), in Wilfried Loth, ed., Die l;teufsdzfnnd Frrage in der NacItkriegszeif (The German question in the pc~st-warperiod) (Berlin: Akadernie e r t a g , 19941, pp. 207-210; Resis, ed., Mofatoz?Rentenzbers, p. 334. Kesis quotes Beria when raising the pmspect in 1953 of a reunited Germany without the GDR: "Why should socialism be built in the GDR? Let it just be a peaceful cormtry, That is sufficient for our purposes. . . . The sort of country it p. 131,150, Berials prowill become is unimportantm";nd Gaddis, We Mow KF~QZU, posal war; one of the pretexts for his arrest on June 26. Gaddis writes, "Having done so, it would have been difticult for any of them Ithe Kremlin leaders]-at least as long as the succession struggle was under way-tcxoppo~ UZ1"Ebn"cht,because that would have suggested assaciatic~nwith rebellion and treason. The culture of distrust S.E.alin had left behind now linked his heirs to an East German Leader Stalin I-timsetf had never tmsted." The Pr>lishcommunists shared this distrust. Remembers: The Last Testamrmt, p. 193. 91. Wrushchev, Kh~~ztshctzcv 92, See Phillips, Soviet Policy Toward East Cerrrrnny Reccrnsl'dered: The hstruar Decade, pp. 131-180. Philiips argues that the %>vietseventually decided on the

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policy of two Germanies became of the Western allieshnnMrlllingnessto bargain on German unification. 93, Eobadycz to WddysZaw Ghralski on a meeting beween Uodin and Keilson, F e b r u a ~12,1954, PZPR KG, 237/XXTX-820. 94. Izydorczyk to Skrzszewski, November 24,4953, MSZ, 11Q/320/36. 95. Tzydorczyk to Wierna, June 30,1953, MSZ, 2318419. 96. Cmnert, Fiir Honecker alGgltrktem Parkctf, p. 94. 97, hbodycz to GbraXski, April 21,1954, PZPR KC, 2371XXIX-820. 98, Vrtn Mende notes on information from Polish journalists, November 12, 1954, BRD B U , Office for Expellees, B236/6483, 99. Sikora, SozinlisI.isclze S~IiL;kdl"ifafand nationale Interessen, p. 142; and Childs, Tke GDR, p-26. The SED exonerated Dahlem in July 2956. 108. Izydorczyk to Skrzeszewski, March 29,1954, MSZ, 10/329 /37. in Ntwember 1952. 404, Bierut had assumed both pc~sitic~ns 102. Memo to Efans Lauter (signature unintelligible), March 12,1953, SED ZK, Department of Fine Literature and Arts, 1V 2/406/73. 183. Grosse notes of a meeting with Izydorczyk, June 17, 1953, UDR M f M , State Scretary AA15582. 184. f-lelena Jakubowska notes of a meeting with Keilson, November 5, 1953, MSZ, 10/319/36. 185. Bodin notes of a meeting with Wallweber, October 24, 1953, PZPR KC, 237116-146.. Wolilvveber himself was purged Ercm the party in 1958. 406. Izydorczyk report to Wierna, October 19,1953, MSZ, 10/349/36. In October 1953, the Polish go>vernmentraised its diplomatic mission to embassy status. 407. Wiei-na to Skrzszewski, November 40,1953, MSZ, 40/475 149.

The Problems of German Repatriation, Reparations, and Trade, 1945-1953 We will not give back otlr Pole to tlrr Grmlar~s, . . and zue do naf ztant onc2G~rlnan amntlg files, ---@omrslkn, Nove~~zber 1946.3

Poland" takeover of German territories after the war immediately spawned disputes over the treatment of C e m m refugees from Poland and the status of the Germans who stayed. 16 some of the a r m a n refugees from PolEmd did not harbor mti-Polish attitudes before 1945, the lass of their lmd and the harsh circ tancm of their deportaticm made it tikcly that they developed them," non-cornmm~istGermm press attacked t for the inhumane conditions of the deportations," but Polish officials vehemently denied ~\rrongdoing."f ter the terrible wartinte occupation of Poland, Gc,mu%a, like most Pales, paid nn attention to the German complahts,"i~fos LuBu responded to the charges by accusing the German p o k e of ard af villainy" m d af '%es-tialassaults" from Germany." ill their t r c a m e ~of ~ tf ol,ish prisoncss retur~~ing The expelled Gernans represented, over me-fifth of the population in the Soviet zone by 1946. 'f'he W D and SEC) faced a nearly impossible task of convincing the expelled Germans of the need lor .friendly rcllatiosls with the Polish people and its communist government, The KPD dld not directly addres the real reasons for tbr German exodus westward; it refersed to thern as "settlers'>&her than "~fugees'kor"expellees."7 The party did nut blnme the Poics or the Soviets for the Germans"light; it "

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blamed the German "immpialist monopoly capitalists of industv and agriculture" who had so willingly served Hitler." Instead of complajning about Ehc refugees" rnisfarttlnc and alfeged mistreatment by the Poles, the :KPD urged other Germans to help resettle t h e m e m edirector of the Central Administratrim for Refugees in the Soviet zone, Josef Schlaffer, said, "We wmt to create a new home for these millions, in the political knowledge that we arc no less to blame than they are for the terrible pairr, the cruel misery, and loss of their homeland.""l" argued Chat Germans who complained about 'The Derdtsche 1/116kszeitu~zcy. their present economic situation should, remernber that Gemany had caused millions of French, Russians, Czechs, and Poles to go hungry during the wacll As true as this was, it did not ingratiate the communists with the German people. Durirrg his visit to Warsaw in September 1949, Pieck angrily depicted Western propaganda promising the eventual return of the refugees to their homes in Poland as "illusory."lz fieck added that those who disseminated these notions wanted to use the Oder-Neisse border as a catrslps belli agahst r3oiand.lVn 1952, tllhricht declared that ""the German people and the German settlers [from Poland ds not want war, however, and they view the Oder-Neisse as the border of peace.'"4 That was patently untrue. Few refugees wmted a new war, but they we= by no means reconciled to the loss of the eastern territories, Most wodd settle for nothing less than a retunl of Germany's borders of 1937, if not 1914.~"eir rclcalcitrant oppositim to the SED and its rtflcog~~ikion of the Odes-Neisse line complicated Potish-East German relations,

The Prablem of the Gemans in. Poland ?"ens of thousands of Germans wert? still living fn Poland in 1946. The I'olsh goverment had particular difficulty in expeuing the G e r m s from Silesia because so many had fled from East Prussia and Pomermia to escape the Red A r q at the end of the war. In the fall of 3945, the Allies agreed that the Silesian Germans could be departed into the British and Soviet zonesl but Polish authorities c d d not supply enough trmsports to tl-te British zone. In addition, the Pales wmted to exploit German labar. 'The Poles v a l ~ ~ eGermms d wi& techical stffills, but most were made to do back-breakmg work in the coal, textile, and. cmstruction industries.16 Polish officials tried to =place the Germans with Poles returning from Germany, but many of those Poles either chose not to retwm or did not possess the necessary sklls." The deportation of Germans was also slowed by Polish businesses that prtrferred to employ German workers at lower wages.19 In October 1946, C h s Lzrdu report& that 31)(3,0(30 Germans were still living in the fnJroclaw province alane,zo

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InAugust 1946, Polish officials discovered leaAets circulating in Silesia catiing on the G-mans to petition the AIlied Control Councir for a restoration of the German-Polish border of 19372l After anti-Idolish demonstrations broke out that fall, one Polish official declared that "not one German should be allowed to remair-t in Polandrf22Glos Lzldu predjcted in May 1947 that all Germans would soon be out of the country, but tens of thousmds retmained.23 The Polish p ~ s vehemently s lienied German ailegations that the Germans in Poland were being mistreated. The Poles said that the Qrmans fabricated stories Labout hungry ill-clad, and homeless Geman cbildren in the cities of Silesia. Three years after the end oE the war, one German newspaper in the British zone charged that there werc 20,000 hungry German children in Polanb. The Polish Military Mission pointed out that nowhere near that number of G e m m children lived in Polmd, let alone hungry children. The mission also denied that Polish authorities were try% to Polonize the Gemans."" Gfos Lzcd~aeven said that German children were better fed and clothed than 1-)olishchildren. The newspaper accused the Germans of laziness and clrunlcenness and of sending their children m t o the streets to panhand.le.E Soviet journalists told an offirer at the Polish Military Mission that they too, were d i s p t e d with the Germans' beha~Tioz26 Germans also disputed the P o l i s h e s of sone indigmous groups that lived in the former German territories.27 Several separatist movements sprang up in Poland adtcer the cvar, primarily in Silesia; Gomulka saw these movemnts as a German attempt to reclaim the territories on an e t h i c basis. He said that the Silesians, Kasbubims, and Masurims were Poles too, just like the Craeowims. He likened the differe~~ces to ethnic groups in Great Britain and warned, "We will not tolerate any weakening of the autoch-l-hon-Polesin the Recovered Territories.""" "I November 194fiPGomtka issued assurances to a group of autocht-hons:"We will not give back one Pole to the Germans . . . and we do not want one German among P~les.~'Zg The ot-her German political parties m d ~ l u g e organizations e chastised the SED for not doing enough to represent the interests of the Germans in Poland, but there was little the party could do. 7'he Polish gave rclgarded Ihe stixtus of these Gerrnans as a dornestie affair, and told the Germans, includhg the SED, not to meddle. The Geman communists were also powerless to imtervene on behalf of the approximately 45,000 Germm prisaners-of-war in Paland, many of whom were mad.@to work long hours in Polish coal m-ines,N or h d p reconstruct devastated Polish cities: TvVarsa~r;Cracow, Gdahsk, and Poznaii.3 After visiting a German POW camp in Szczecifi in 1%9, one SED functionary reported that the German prisoners "of' ten revealed an

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undisguised hate for the Poiish people. . . . The [SEU"s] policy of friendship and peace with the Polish nation, [and] =cognition of thc. OderNeisse line as the border of peace is absdutely rejectedeff32 As of August 194g1there were still 10,000 Geman I>OWs in Polmd.33 1i1 early December, the head of the Polish Military Mission, fakub Prawin, proxnised UI:hricht that most of the prisoners would be released ,and sent home by Christmas." The last German POW left Poland in April 1950.3? Repatriation of the Gemitns from Poland, 1949-1953 Accordiz~gto officid Poiish estknates at the end of 1948, approximately 105,7C)I)Germans, or 5,1 p e ~ e n of t the prewar population, stilf lived in the Western Territories; these Germans comprised only 1.8 percent of the papdaticm in the territclries." h e Polish Ministry of the Recovered TerS l num:ber of the remainitlg Germans were ritories fomd that d y a m specialists, technicians, and otfiter workers with unique and ir~placcable sElls.37 In D e c e ~ ~ b 19449, e r Prawh hformed Ulbricht that the Germans who had families in Germany could leave Poland..According to the Polish Military Mission, of the appmxirnately 130,0W Germans still living in all of Poland in 1949,15,000 had relatives in the GDR, and 30,000 had family ties in the FRG.38 Polish Foreign Mhister Stefan Wierbiowski advised his government to repatriate in an orderly and humane manner those Germans who wanted to leave Polmd, "in order to at least ne~~tralize this element and in this way facilitate the political work of our German friends [inthe GDRJ.rf3g The SED received hundreds of letters from Germans h Poland cornplahing of discrimination,"%ut the party was not interested in their fate. Approximately 4 d i o n i igrants horn Potand alreaefy wsic3ed in the GDR, and the SED did not want more. The refugees were bitterly opposed to the SEB" ppoiicy of reconciliation with Poland., and were a s o m e of uncompromising nationalist opposition to communist rule.41 Many repakiates soon lcft the GDR for West Germany, where t h y agitated against &c? GDR and the Oder-Nelsse b0rder.a The German communists could not afford to ignore the Germans in Poland, however. The East Geman government. had to challenge the FRG's aassertion that it was the Germans9qitixnate representative abroad. East German officials alleged that Polish authorities were teiling the Germans not to go to the GDR because the East Qrman standard of living was much lower than Polandk.43 East German Chief of Mission hiedrich W015 also accused Polish authorities of serious abuses against the Germms in western Polmd. Wolf asserted that the Germms were not afforded cultural amenities or opportunities to join trade unions and the

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PZPR Premier Cyrankiewicz toid. Wolf that his government was dolng everything it could to give the Germans the same rights as I'otes. He said that Pojsh officials who had commit-cedwrongdoing would, be punishedl but suggested that the Germans we= also guilty of misdeeds. He rejected Wolf 's =quest fnr official talks on repatriation.44 In early Jmuary 1%5, tlne East German government offered to take all Germans who wanted to leave Polmd; the Polish government Ratly rejected emigration on such a large scale." 'The Poles again agreed to f m d y reunification,4~but the Polish Parliame~~t passed a law h1 1951 declarhg that there were no other Gemans hPolmd who could claim Germm citizenship. The repabia~ontrranspcrrts mded that March." In June, East Gcrman Foreig11Minister Georgi Dertinger infnmed Polish Chief of Mission Jan Xzydorczyk tfiat the tezsmha~onof the repatriation transports was creathg serious problcrms for his gave ent, anli demanded an explmatictn, Izydmczyk ~ s p o ~ ~ &at d e drnnst of the Germms wanted to go to West German)i not East Germmy, and that they agitated against PoIand and the Oder-Neisse border. He said this was causing problems not onty for Poland but for the CUR and t%re Soviet bloc as a cvhole." Izydorczyk characterjzed the tone of this discussion as '*mpieasant."~~ Durirrg a visit to Poland in July, Wbricht again raised the reptriation issue. The Polish government agrc3ed to examine individual cases, but rejected a general plan for mass repatriation.5Un SEE? report on repatriatim concluded that '"it is of particular significance tbat the Polish government is not prepared to negotiate with a GDR delegation over the pxlesskg mpatriation matters, althnugh there are a whole series of camglicated questions to clear up."""" Evidmtly under some pressure from the Soviet Unios~,on Fcbrwary 1, 1952, the PoZish gave ent signed a new agreemmt to remite Germms with their families in the CDR. The operation was sqposed to be completed by the end of the year.52 'The East German. Diplomatic Mission in VVarsaw was d.eligk.ttedwith the deal, and wrote the Polish Foreign Ministry that it not only wlruld =duce anti-Polish agitation by the Germans in Poland m d the rcf.p&ria.t.esin the GDR but would have ""a dtfjnite influence on the solidification of friendly relations between our peopIes."53 The controversy was far f m over. In 1952, the East German governmelnt subntitted lists of 8,592 persons to be rewnited with their fmilies, but by eariy 1953 d y 2,302 had been allowed to leave. When the Poks announced in March that they would not accept more lists, the East German. Diplomatic Mission reported that "in no way can it be seen that the pmblem of rt.unj.ting dividcd families is settled and the protocol of February 1,1952 fulfil led."^ In April 1953, Polish Foreign Ministry official Maria Wierna told the new East German Chief of Mission Anne Kunderm that the last trans-

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port of Germans would leave in June. The East Germans protested that Poland could not stop the transports unilaterally, and blmed the Poles for acting too slowly to aid the repatriation."Vhe West German Foreign Ministry observed that there was still. '"small hope" of emigration to East Germany of Polish Germans who were ""old, sick, or had the very next of kin in the Soviet zone. All others can no longer count on their emigration.fr56 ent sent a formal note to Warsaw on June 5 I'he East German gowe protes.t.ng Poland's failure to meet the provisjons of the rep&riation agreement." Polish Foreign Minister Stanisiaw Skrzeszewski angrily Rspcmded that his governmat was not obligated to repatriate those Vitlksdeutsche and autochthons on the East German lists who held Polish eitizenship before September 1, 1939. Skrzeszewski said that mast of the approximately 6 0 0 people m the lists who had been denied emigration fell into that category In addition, he blamed the East G e r m aut"rrorit.ies for not submitling the lists on time. Skrzeszewski wrote that ""the [East German] note of June 5, 1953, containfng the statement that the PolishGerman protocol d February 1, 1952 has not bee11 fulfilled, is without precedence in our relations with the GDR.""'" A month later, Kundermann confronted President Bierut about Poland's repatriation policy. She characterized Bierut" reception as '"rather cool." Kundermansr said that her government was not interested in mass transports, but wanted only to repatriate the people on the lists. She colnplained that no wason had been given for the exclusions. Bierut informed her that the matter was closed: "The submission of lists must also come to m end and cannot be erctended to an unspecified time." He said that only individual eases of fmiiy reunificdion would be eonsidered in the future. Biemt agreed to exmjne the grounds for denying exit visas, and the whereabouts of two other missing lists."" That fall, the b l i s h government rcluctantXy agreed to more talks, Hermann Matern and Peter Florin tolid Polish Foreign Ministry officials Ostap muski and Maria Wierna that East Germans with relatives still in Poland were causing serious pditical problems for the SED: Tarty Wtivists arc in a difficult situation because they often have no arguments at all against open questicms and attach on this issue. The impossibility of uniting famiiies is incontprehemsi.ibtcreesileto the people." Matern and Florin poislted out that oi the over 12,i"00 names su:bmitted, to the Polish government, only. about 4,000 had been permitted to emigrate to the GDR. They contended that it was in the interest of both governments to complete this process as soon as possible, musk and Werna countered that the mass ~patriationshad to enci so that the ~ m a i n i n gGrmans could cmcemtrate on bujlding their lives in Poland. They said that every new transport contributed. to a '"sujtcase atmosphere,"' and reiterated that

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their government was opposed to repatriating anyone on the East German lists who held Polish citizenship. They noted that c-tf the 12,723 people on these iists, 8,237 h d Polish citizenship, and of those, 1,521 had been allowed to emigrate anyway. The Poles added that many of the children cm the lists were adults, and that irr many cases the Germans' ~ l a thes in the GI3f.l: were distant relatives, not next. of kin. They also said that many of the Germans ultimately wanted to go to West Germany anyway. The Poles pointed out that 4,156) Germans had atready emigrated to the GDR, another 1,900 would leave shortly, m d an addit.ianal 2,500 would probably receive permission to leave, muski and M14erna contmtfed that this total emigration of around 8,500 people '9facifit;ltes a delbite coaclllsion to the major difficulties in the GDR res~titingfrom this issue,"M1The repatriatims continued well into 1954. Accordting to estimates of the Polish F o ~ i g n Ministry, 9,892 Germans were. repatriated to the GDR from February 1952 to September 1954.61 At the end of Octoiber 1953, the Polish government conducted a thorough study of the sibatim of the estimated ZO,O(flf Germans ~ m a i n i n g in Poland.62 Ttle report characterized their socioeconomic situation as '"generally sati.s(actory'hd comparable to the living standards of Poks. The report even found tbat mGermans enjoyed a higher standard of living than Poles; the report said that German children were happy in school, where they got along reasonably well with Polish children." 31n other attempt"^ appease the German population, the Polish gcrvornmelnt gave Germans l-he right to vote in parliarnelntary elections in 1952, and in local elections in 1954. According to Polish sources, a significant number of G e r m s were b e c o m a mow irrvolved in political matters and were generally optimistic about their future in Poland, although many still. held negative ophions of Poles and the Polish government. Polish officials blamed some of the mti-Polish, anti-soviet, and anti-GDR displays on propaganda from the FRG, on fmiiies with relatives in the West, and on letters and packages from VVest GcrmmyM In the mid-1950~~ W a r w tried to fmpmve relations with Bonn by allowing some of the Germans in Poland to go to the FRG (see Chpter 8). The Poles3isregad for the GDR" interesh in this matter contributed to the gmeral decline in mlations &er Gomuika's reto power in 1956. Disputes over Repamalions and Trade, 194S1953 Recurring disagreements over trade illustrated that national interests we= still paramount h the thjnking oi the Polish and East Geman communists..Even after the Soviets formed the Gomcil of Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) in 1949, and Western Europe began to direct its trade a w q from the Soviet bloc, economic cooperation across the OderNeisse fine nevw attained the level that the communist propagandists

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had promised. Each side grumbled that the other was not interclsted in fully developing mutually beneficial ecmomic ties. The German communists, along with the other German parties, rejected. reparation payments to Poland, The KPD and SED regarded Poland's occupation of German territory as enough payment for the war, but the Poljsh governmmt expected to rcceive 15 percrent of the rclparations from the Soviet zone as stipulated in the Potsdam agreements. In August 1945, the Soviet W o n and Poland signed a reparation agreement promising Poland everything fmm maehines to works of art." A Soviet-Polish reparations commission was forrntd in the fall of 1945, but the Soviet occupatim authorities ultimately decided what the Poles Eceived. Shipments to b l a n d usually fell short of Soviet contmitnents."" The rclparatims also held strategic meaning fur Poland. The Poles, like the French and the Soviets, wanted to emaciate Germany's industrial capacity so that it could never fight another aggressive war*Comugka dcciarcd that Germany" hindustrial potential, should be completely eradicated, and that Germany" standard of living should be no higher &an the rest oE Europe's. Me said that Poland could not &ford to have Qrmmy overtake it economically.67 After the economic unity of Germany Zlroke down in 9947, and U.S. Secmtary of State George Marshall proposed a reconstruction plan for Germany and Europe, Polish Foreign Minister Stefan MiierblowslPci again told Allied. foreip ministers in London that Geman ecommic development should not be allcrwed to swpass that of its war victims*h" The German communists had the almost impossii3rXe task of garnering grass roots support MIhile the Sowiet occupation authorities we- stripping the zone of so many of its vital assets. Many SED members opelnly expressed their opposition to the reparation payments, but they were powerless to stop them.69 Few Germans agreed with Paul Merker's expimation that "the reparations which we are ob)igated to pay are certainly a great burdrm for the German people, but they do not hisldcr in any way the normalization of life of the wcrrki~~g population. We must merely prevent the trust-and-monopoly bosses from using the reparations output to profit, like after 1918.""71 In addition to the burden of reparations, many Germans blamed the d n w postwar econoJnic recovery on the loss of G e r m territory to Polmd, which included Silesia, one of Eurclpe" mmost important industrial centers. Under the harsh conditions of the Soviet occupatim, the SED was hard-pressed to raise the stmdard of living i,n the zone without irnports of raw materials and agricultural products h m Poiand. fni-t.ially, the East German co mists were codident that their ideological affinity to the Polish communists would work in their favor.71 Rruno Koehler told Prawh that if the Oder-Neisse region was integrated economically, " t b e ~the ~ question of the border will not have its past irnportme. W

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will have a lively trade in goods from Poland for our factories,"'" At the end of February 1947, the Polish Military Mission predicted that if Poland sigszed an economic agreement with the Soviet zone, the ZJDP w o d d probably rethink its rejection of the Oder-Neisse border'yvhe PPR would not compromise, however, and demmded that all tbr Sovietzone parties comntit to the Oder-Neisse border, with no contingencies. The SED, however, was initially reluctant to make separate economic agreewnts with Poland because the party did m t want to set a precedent for the eventual divisio~~ of Germany. h Mar&, Ubricht hformed Prawh that ""from a strategic point of view it is not possi:ble to concentrate on an allimce with Poland and Czechoslovakia only . . . [or] to conduct a policy of distancing the Soviet zone from the rest of Germany, because that wou%d,put the stmggle for the unity of Germmy on the hack burner." Ulbricht added that the SED had vacillated on recopiz@ the Oder-Neisse border because the party had been slow to dewlap an economic recovery plan. Ulbricht told Prawin that to silence critics of the SEDk ssupport for the Oder-Neisse "order, Germany must expand production three to four times more than was planned at Potsdam, Ullbriclht said that the Soviet zone desperately needed. the coal and steel that it was no longer getting from the British z0ne.T.l-Prawin later infomed Pieck &at he saw no connedion betwee11 an increase in Polish exports and German unification, but agreed that raising the standard af Ilivhg in the Soviet zone would uXthately contribute to the economic mity of the four zanes.7" Prawh's superiors in Warsaw were in no hurry to see that happen. 'The destmction of Poland in the war and the loss of the eastern territories to the Soviet Union made Polish ofkials ~ l u c t a n to t grant tbr SED trade concessions; PoIish economic plans did not provide for trade with the Soviet zone. Instead, the Polish gove ent made it a priority to integrate the Western Territories into the Polish economy, and bstered Silesiafs trade Xbks with CzechoslbovakJa m d Hungary The PPR co~~ducted an intensive propaganda campaign to promote economic development in the regim. In early 1946, Gfos Lladzl wrok that '"he Polish Workersf Party is mobilizing all of its forces . . . on the Recovered Territories' front. . . . There is no Poland without the Ode~LusacianNeisse [border]." The newspaper publisked n m e r o u s articles on the reconstruction of the Western Territories, o k n accompanied by:fiuge headlines trumpeting such proclamations as "The &covered Territories: Guarantee of the Strength and Potential of Polmd!"%

The Synchronization of the Socialist Economies, 1948-1953 'The Polish government was keenly interested in Marshall" reconstructjon plan for Europe in 1947, but Polish officials were skeptical about Germany's partjcipation. After the Soviets forced Warsaw to reject the

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plan, the Polish government declared that Poland did not want to be a party to German reconstruction. 0x1July 10, Glos Lzldzr wrote that "Poland, the victim of numerous German attacks, cannot take part in the conference [onthe Marshall PIan], whose result might contribute to the revival of C e m m aggres~ion.~'TT The collapse of allied coopaation in Gcrmny was unsettling to the Polish government, however. Poland had much to lose if the Potsdm agreementwere no longer regarded as the legal basis f o r the OderNeisse border*Me11 h t e r z o ~ ~trade a l in Germany collapsed in 1948 and the SED lcadcrshiy began to quash popular opposition to the border, the Polish government wnsidered increasi-rrg trade with the Soviet zcme.78 Given the geographical proximity m d existhg communications infrastructure, a renewal of prewar trade connections between the Sovict zone and Poland" Wetern Territories made simple ecclnornic sense. The Polish press began to differentiate betwee11 the Soviet zone and the rest of Germany; it promoted the SED%plans for economic ties to the Soviet ldnion ancl the other socialist countries.7" But =ports on Poland"?;econolnic relationslzips wjth the Soviet Union and Czechoshvakia still overshadowed coverage about trade with the Soviet zone."" When the Soviets blockaded Berlin in June 1948, the SED stepped up eMorts to expand trade with Pdand, placing top priority on innports of cod, coke, irm ore, and steel." Neues Ilteufso'zland reported that "the Polish coal deliveries for Berlin prove that the capitol does m t stand alone in its struggle against the thmttling of its economy."N% Julyf the head of the German Economic Commission (DWK), Heinrich Rau, told the Poles that "economic cc,clpem"tan between Poland and the Soviet zone in Germany is one of the basic prjnciples of DWK policy 'The commission projects Polmd as its main partner in the execution of its economic plans."g" Following a visit tcr Polmd in OctoZner, Bruno Leuschner acknow1edi;ed that the SED had to earn the trust of the Poles before it could expect:a significant expansion of econmic ties: Why haven't W-ereceived enough coal, any Eats, any meat, any steel making equipmen& and any coke up to this point? Of course one does not give a trading partner goods that one needs himself, if one is not sure that the friendship is realty meant sincerely. First the political step must be taken, then the economic questions will be wf\rect. For =ample, we should not forget that [Polish] coke production barely satisfies Poland" own needs, If we get coke a n p a y that is a gesture of friendship that cannot be .\raluedhighly enough."

In a publk show of unity, the SED credited their expmding trade connections with foland for the gradual recovery of the Soviet zone economy. Grcltewohl called for a new pditical and economic relationship

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Problems of German Rlipaliriatiorz, Rc7paraliiorzs, and Eade

with Poland so that East Gemany could share in the production from the former G e m m territories.gVhe SlEU press, which in the past had cmspicuously avoidcd covering Poland" economic development of the Wstern Rrritories, now began to reverse that policy. In late August, Ne~4t.sDlvntscl.rlut?d predicted that Poland would s m become the Soviet zone's second most important trading parher fhehjnd the Sovi,et Union), arguing that "in the close cooperation with the new people% Poland there is also a guarantee for achieving a better life in the eastern zone."""h In private col~versationswi& the Poles, however, the Germm communists often expressed their disappoinment in the vol cially the lack of coal and coke imports from Silesia. The Soviets were partly to blarne for the shortage of avai.able Polish cod because they werc forcing the Polish gove nt to ship so-called "reparation cad" to the Souiet UIlion at we13 below world market prices.H"~~additim, the Poiish gover~nmentpreferred to export caal and coke to Wester11 Europe (hcluding West Genxany and West Berh), whem they commanded a higher price," "'f"heSoviet Llnion and Polmd s i p e d a trade agreement in February 1946, but the Soviet zone received nolle oE the n.4 mi:llio11tons of coal and coke that Poiand exported that year, In 1947, PoIand sent ail its brown coal exports to the Soviet zone, but only 10 percmt of its coke exports-gg The Berlin blockade did more economic d m a g e to the Soviet zone than it did to West Berlh, h December 1948, Ulbricht told the Polish Military Mission that the economic sibation in the Soviet zone was grave, and pleaded for more imports to boost d0rnesl.i~production." h the spring of 1949, Ubricht led a delegation to t k annual trade fair in Pcxzna.li to explore the possibilities of increasing trade with Pcxland.91 I'olmd's trade with the Sovkt zolle rnse sjgnificantly in 1949, but only after a drop in demand for PoIish coal in Western By the time the GDR was formed in October 1949, the Soviet zone of Germmy accotmted for 18 percent of Poland's exports and 7.5 perce~~t of Poland" imports, In 1950, those figures rose to 15 percent and 11.5 percent respectively, but the East Gerr~ansstill wmted more Polish cod. The saturated West European coal market and the West's ecol~omicembargo forced Warsaw to seek a deal to sell coal and coke in return 'for East German machines, appliances, raw materials, half-finfshed goods, and cmsulner items.% When Ulbricht arrived in Warsaw inJune 19550 to sign the Oder-Neisse border agreement, Minister of hdustry Hilary Minc and Foreip Tmde Mhister Tadeusz Gede met the East German delegation at the Warsaw train station, Their presence underscored the importance of a new trade deal to the Poles. Mint told Ulbricht that "there is no doubt that the visit of this delegation to W;;rrsaw will result to a great degree in the resolution of a wide range of economic questions." BBef0t.e Wlbricht left, h initialed a trade pacte94

Pmblems of Germa~zRepatrinkion, Repnmtiotzs, and Trade

87

When the Western Allies amounced m end to the state of war with the FRG in 1950, the Soviets admitted East Germmy into Comecan. The SED sacv political as well as ecoslolnic benefits of the GDKs mrnbership; the party lobbied for more ecmomic cooperation by arguing that the economic health of the GDR was crucial to the security of the entire Soviet East Germany sent four trade delegatio~~s to Polmd in 1952, twice the nurrrber of any other Soviet bloc comt~.YhIn contrast to the problems that the Polish diplomats in B e r h had in making personal cmtacts with other East German officials, Poland's trade representatives reported that they had easy access to East German trade offices.YT Nowtheless, the volume of trade always fell shmt of expectations. Polmd and East Qrmany werc? both g d t y of ddislqllcnt deliveries or outright failures to ship promised goods, Forced by the Western embargo and the logic of their own p l a m d eccmomies to trade primarily witbin the eonhes oE Comecon, they were hard-pressed to find substitute suppliers. Most of the export shortages were caused by production problems; but in s a m cases, simple economics dictated that goods be exported elsewhere for high= prices or kept for dontestic use. NB.ther side trusted that the other was negotiating FR goad faith. The East Germans vestioned Poland% motiwes for trying to irrrrease trade with West Germmy and the other capitalist com~tries.f i e SED did nothing to ease Poland" trade with FRG because it was bound to come at the political and economic expense of the GDR." The? Poles, however, suspected that the East Germans wmted to develop a special economic relationship with the Soviet Ui~ionfor political reasms; trade with Poland made more economic sense. Polish officials h e w that some of the shortages in prornised East German exports to Poland jn 1,950 were the direct result of an hcrease in East German deliveries to the Soviet Union," These shortages resulted in an East Geman trade deficit of $2 million h l950 as well as serious bottlenecks in some Polish hdustries. Polish officials dropped hints about ranforeseen political repercussions shauld the GDR not meet its obligations. The Poles, however, ~ s p o n d e dposiZively to Gmtewohl's =quest for more coal in 195C).1mWolf hvarned his superiors that breakislg trade agreements would bave a dctrirnmta.1impact on relations with Poland in general: "":In my opinion the vestion is not: sirnply a kchnical questio~~ of trade relations, but of course at the s m e time also a question of mutual political trust and understandin.g."m1 Wolf was right. In the fall of 1950, a shortfall in chemicai hnports from the GDR forced the Poles to shut down two large factories in KaiowiCe.102 With their Six-Year Plm in jeopardy, Polish officials insisted that if the GDR could not meet its export r e q u i m m t s on time, the Poles preferred not to incl~~de precise delivery timetables h Iutnxre trade agreements.lo3 Che Polish trade odficiali told the East Germans that Polmd did not have such difkdties with Hungary. He admmished the East Germans to be

88

Problems of German Rlipaliriatiorz, Rc7paraliiorzs, and Eade

sure of their ability to make punctual deliveries bebre entering into more contracts.104 Disagreements also arose over the quality of the goods traded. 'The East Germans complained about receiving coal and coke of poor qualitylm ""ndhe Poles were dissatisfied with the standards of East Cerman consumer items; in 1950, for instance, the Poles returned a shipment of 15,000 watches, m s t of which. were defective, and coffee pots whose cowers we^ so small that they fell into the pot. East Geman diplomats in Wilrsav a h i t t e d that East German cosmetics were ol such poor quality and so poorly packaged that they could not be put on the Polish market, They atso ~ p o r t e dthat East German butchering machfnes left: the meat black, and th& by the time one shjpment o( graphjc maehines reaehed Poland, they were thorough& rusted tlnrough.1" NegclCiations for a new trade agreement began in March 1951, but it took two months ol hard bargaining before an qreement was signed. Izydorczyk blamed the East Germans for refusing to rectify their trade deficit by increasing exports, especially chemicals."'"' Problems resurfaced that summer when the East Germans were unable to deliver promised petroleum prod.ucts.l" The Polish government again attributed the shortages to an increase in East German exports to the Soviet Won,'"" and therefore had no compunction about delaying coal and coke shipments to East Germany. East Gcrman officials, in turn, complained that some of their factories were idle because of the shortfail of Polish coke and the inferior quality nf the coke they did receive. M e n several appeals from lower-level officials brought no results#Grotewohl wrote a personal letter to CyranEciewicz in mvember 1951 requesting more coal. Gcotewohl also asked that f u t u ~ trade agreeme~ztsindude high standards for goods.llQCyrankiewicz reptied that his government was doing everything it could to meet its tbligatiom, but that there was a problem with a new cokery."l Both economies were strugglkg in the early 1950s. The Polish government ended rationing in 1949, but had to reinstate it in September 1951 as a result of increased defense spending and the ovcr-amklitious industrialization of the Six-year Plm, Collectivization took its toll on the amomt of foodskffs going to market, especially in the former German territories. 'The West's econorxtic embargo on the Soviet bloc also hurt the socia,tist economies. The United States ended Poland" most-favored-nation status in 1952.1'2 M e n the SED embarked on a rapid socializatian of the GDR economy in the s u m m r of 1952, energy shortages in East Gemany became so serious that Grotewohl sent yet amther letter to Cyrankiewicz requesting additional shipments of coal m d various heavy i.ndustrial goods."3 No significant incmase in Polish exports was forthcoming, however, and the GDR was unable to m e t its own export plans for 1953.114

Pmblems of Germa~zRepatrinkion, Repnmtiotzs, and Trade

89

There were signs, nonetheless, that trade rclations were i~mving.115 The East Germm gove ent praised the Soviet Union and Pohnd h r their economic cooperati.on, and credjted Sovkt iron ore and Polish coal for enabling the GDR to produce "'steel of peace."l" In the faI1 af 1953, the Soviet Unim and Pdand lifted a heavy h d e n from the East German econonty h l r h c n they agreed to end reparations;"? Gmtewhl and Pieck sent several persmal. letters thankirrg Bierut,lIg The wollrme of trade between the two countries jumped 72 pertlent from 1950 to 1955, but this was largely a rcsuit of the growth in their respective ecmomit.s.l" The proportion of Poland." trade with the GDR remained the same throughout this five-year pt?ric,d. Impmts from the GDR represented 11.5 percent of alX Polish imports in 7950, and 15.1, percent in 1954. Exports to the GDR amolmtd to 14 percent of all Polish exports in 1950, but had dropped tcr 13 percent by 1954.12" The relaxatio~~ af Soviet cmtrol over the satellites in the mid-1950s allowed Poland to rethink its trade relations with. the GDR (see Chapter 8). Poland began to s e l more coal and coke tcr the Wst, and exports to the GDR dropped. The SEQ which no longer considered Poland a reliable trading partner, embarked an a long-term strategy to develop economic ties to the Soviet Union. In ecommic affairs, the ideological ullity of the Polish m d East German Marxists was barely evident.

1. G%osLudu, November 10, 2946, p. 2; and Wta8ysrt.a~Gomdka, O proble~~~ie Niemieckim (On the German prc$iern) (Warsaw: KsigAka i Wiedza), 1972, p. 120. 2, See I'y'c~rmanNaimark, The Rzass-in~sirz Gerr~ta~y: A Histoy c?ffJteSovkf Zone of Occupatiou, 1945-2949 (Cambridge: Haward University Press, 19"35), p. 75. He tvrites, "Orders went out fmm the Polish communists to expel Germans by whatever means necessary to ensure incorpc~rationas well as occupation. As a result, the Polish administration of the new territories made little effort to pmtect local Germans from the depredations of Polish or Russian rapists and thieves. . . . Even the Scrviets expresxd shock at the Poles%ehaic~r,"" 3. G2os Ludl-l, April 25, 2 946, p. 4; see Hans Georg Lehmann, Der Oder-NekseKoujikf, (Munich:C . H. Beck, 1979), p. 36. Lehmann characterizes the expulsions in the summer of 1945 as '%rutalt' and "wild." 4. Clros liudu, January 1,1946, pp. 12-1 3. 5. See G b s Ludu, March 47,1946. 6. Ctos liudu, February 26,1946, g. 1. 7.Maimark, The Rtissirat~sin Germn~ly,p. 149, 8. Deutsclze V;?lkszeitung,July 24,1945, p. 1. 1945, p. 2, 9. Dezlltsclae Vi>lkszeilur$g, October 10. Detrtsclze Volkszeifung, November 20, 1945, p. 1; see also DeafscI~eIralks z i l u q , November 23, '11 945, p. 1. 11. Dcufselze Vokzeitung, November 17,1945, p. 3,

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Problems of German Rlipaliriatiorz, Rc7paraliiorzs, and Trade

12. 13ieck speech to the National Unification Congress of the 1301ishOrganization of Fighters for Independence and Democracy; &ptember 1, 1949, SED ZF;, Wilhelm 13ieckPayers, NL, 361441. 13. Article by Wilhelm Pieck in Neues De~ltsclllnnd,September 6, 1949, in SED ZK, Wilkrelm Pieck Papers, Nt 361441, 14. Tzydorczyk to muski, February 28,1952, PZPR KC, 237/V-14.6. 45. GZos tudu,January 1,1946, pp. 12-43, 16. Glos t u d t l , July 17, 1946, p. 2; and August 27, 1946, pp.7; and H. Kotficki to the Ministry of Recovered Territories, June 44, 1947, PZPR KC, group PPR KC, MZO, file 134; In January 1947, the Palish Military Mission in Berlin sent word to Warsaw of nurnerclus German offers to work on PoXish recmstruct.ic>nprc>jectsor to set up special businesses. At this point, the 1301ishgovernment would not entertain the resettlement of Germans in Poland. 47. Witalis Zielimki notes, rmdated, t"M file 81479. 18. GL?S Lzldu, March 30,1946, g. 5. 49, Unsigned letter to the president af the Cormeil of Ministers, December 20, 1945, URM BP, file 81526. 20, G105 Ludz-l, October 28, 1946, p. 2; an Qctclber 34, 4946, GZos Ludzr reparted that 4,237,040 Poles n w resided in the "IXecovered Territories." 21. Unsigned memorandum t c ~Jakub Berman, August 9, 1946, PZPR KC, group 13131XMC, 295/VII--;?M. 22.ZmicFrc>wskito the Council of Ministers, June 11,1946, UE7M BP, file 81184. 23. GZos L I A ~ ZMay I , 24,19474.1, 24. G o s Lzadzr, May 36,1948, g. 1. 25, Gios Lzidii, March 49,1946, p. 6, 215. Leapold Marschak notes of meetings with toebe, et al., March 1, 1947, PZPR KC, group PPR KC, 295/U-'i"0. 27. U m i g n d mmorandum to Berman, August 9,1946, PZPR KC, group 13PR KC, 295/ VII-2M. 28, Gios t u d u , June 23,1946, pp.3, According to this source, there were between 800,800 and 1 million autochthc3ns in the Recovered Territc>ries,many of whom had been Germanized. 29. GL?S Ludu, November 10,1946, g. 1. 30. Alexander Nasielski notes of a press conference in Berlin for returning Cerman prisoners from Poland, November 15,1948, MSZ, 6/ 764/ 54. 31, Gbs Ludu, September 9, 1945, p. 6; see also Sikora, SoziaIisEiscl~SulidnriMt und natlitnnle Ilzieressen, p. 122. According to the Potsdarn Agreemnl; the Soviets handed over apprc?xirnateIy40,000 German POWs to Polish authorities. Fifty-one of the sixty POW camps were located in Upper Silesia, where the prisoners worked in the coal mines. 32. Artur Vt2gt repart an his trip to the POW camp in Szczecin, April 1, 1949, $Er> ZK, Wiithefm Pieck Papers, NL 36/[7J.5..This camp was under Sovie control. 33. Herbert Wamke report on a meeting with German officers in a Polish prison camp, June 7,1949, SED ZK, Wifhelm Pieck Paper, NL 361745. 34. Cesrgi Dertinger notes of a meeting with UIbricht: and Jakub P)rawin, December 8,1949, SED ZIC, Otto Grotewohl Papers? NNL 9014%.

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35, Alexander Fischeu; "Aussenpolitische Aktivitgt bei ungewissm sawjetischer Deutschland-Politik @is 1955)" "mign policy activity in uncertain Soviet German policy to 1955), in Hans Adolf Jacobsen, Cerd teptin, Ulrich Scheuneu; and Eberhard Schulz, eds., Drei J~t~rzettf'ztt? Au~~mpoll'tik der DDR, 51-84 (Munich: R. Oldenbaurg Verlag, 19791, p. 70. 36. Government report, January 21, 1939, PZPR KC, group PPR KC, MZO, 295/VIlI-159. The population af the Western Territories (including Gdalisk) was approximately 8,810,000 before the war: The populatbn decreased to 5,739,000 by Odober 1948, the majority of them Poles from the eastern territories Last to the Soviet Union. 37. Report on activiw in the Western Territories, January 21, 1949, PZPR KG, group 1313RKC, MZQ, 2951VlI-159, 38. Dertinger notes of a meeting with Ulbricht and Prawin, December 8,1949, SED ZK, Otto Grotewohl Papers, NL 901484; and Dertinger tcr Wierna, January 2, 1950, MSZ, 10/4172/49. Because estimates varied according to how autochthont; and Germans tzrho tzrer-e Polish citizens tzrere counted, it is difficult to verify the number of Germans who remained in 1301and. 39, WierMowski to Berman, December 30,1943, MSZ, 40, 1V/472/49. 40, See the many letters in SED ZK, Wihetm Pieck 13apers,N L 361743, 41. Ackermann to Warnke, November 20, 1951, DDIR MfAA, Poland Sectioyn, A1804; and Sirnoas notes on the GC1R"s suppod for the Germans in Poland, October 25, 1951, DDFt MfAA, Potand Section, A1811. The German Evangelical Church also Lc3bbied for the Germans in Poland, and many turwd to the Swedish and U.S. Embassies in VVarsaw for emigration gapers. 42. See, for example, the documents on West German efforts tcr support the Germans in Poland in BRD BfGBE B137/290. 43. K&n to the GDR Minister of Interior, October 6, 1950, DDR MfAA, Main Office, A10068. 44. Notes of meeting between WlF and Cyrankiewicz, June 5, 1951, MSZ, 10/398/44. 45. Dertinger to Wierna, J a n u a 2,1950, ~ MSZ, 10/472/49. 46. Kuhn to the GDR Ministry af Interior, October 6, 11950, DDR MfAA, Main Office, A1 0068. 47'. Florin tcr Grotewohl, April 24, 1954, SED ZK, Otto Grotewohl Papers, NL r60/484. 48. Izydorczyk to Wierna, June 44,4951, MSZ, 10/398/44, 49. lzydorczyk to the Polish Foreip Ministry, j m e 11,1951, MSZ, 2 0/364/40, 50. Simons notes on the GDRs support for the Germans in b l a n d , October 25, 1951, DDR. MfAA, 1301and Sction, A1811. 51. Unsigned letter to Grc>tewo>hl,Oclit~ber11, 1951, DDR MfAA, State Secret a q A45627. 52- See the documents on the repatriation of Germans, in MSZ, 10/398/44; see also "The Situation af the Germam in the German Eastern Territories under Polish Administration,'kundated, BR%)BfGDF, BB137/290. 53. GDR Diplomatic Mission in Warsatzr to the Polish Foreign Ministry, June 5, 1953, MSZ, 2 013981412,

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Problems of German Rlipaliriatiorz, Rc7paraliiorzs,and Eade

54. GDR Diplomatic Mission in Warsaw to the Polish Foreign MinistryJJ m e 5, 1953, DDR MfAA, Main Office, A1CfO68. 55, GDR Diplomatic 13Rission in Warsaw to the Polish Foreign MinistryJJ m e 5, 1953, MSZ, 10/398/44. 56. Notes on the Germans leaving Poland, July 2, 4952, BRD AA, Department 2, ?70X. 439. 57, GDR Diplomatic Mission in Warsatzr to the Prjlish Foreign Ministry, June 5, 1953, MSZ, 2 0/398/44. 58. Skrzeszewski notes on the GDR Diplomatic Mission's note of June 5,1953, undated, MSZ, 10/398/44, 59. Kundermann notes of meeting with Bierut, July 24,1953, DDR MMA, Main Office, A10068. Kmdermann told Bierut that 5,000 people on the list had been denied emigration. 60. Nc3tes of meeting between ZambmwsEri, muski, Wiema, and Matern and Florin in Warsaw-fNctvernber 2,1953, MSZ, 10/398/44. 61, Report cjn the February 1,1952 repatriation agreement with the GDR, %ptembeu; 1"34 MSZ, 10/398 /44. 62, See the documents in BRD BfGDF, B13137/1277. The West German government estimated that there were approximately 65,000 Germans left in the OderNeisse area, the rest in former East Prussia. 63. Broniatowski notes on the situation of the Germans in Poland, October 29, 1953, MSZ, 10/398/44; see also Sclzlesisclle Rundscltnu (Silesian Review), Octc3ber 15,4953, in BRD BfGDF, B823/2W, The newspaper recommended that West Germans sending packages to Poland leave off the return address; see also the "Report on Assistance for the Territories East of the Qder-Neisx," "February 16,1955, in BRB BfCiDE B137/290. The West German government estimated that West Germans sent about 290,000 packages to Poland every year. The Polish government did not obstruct this traffic because it collected considerable sums of money from custom duties on these packages. 64. Broniatowski notes on the situation of the Germans in Poland, October 29, 1953, MSZ, 10/398/M. 65. Ernil Sommerstein (head of the Bureau of War Reparatiom) to the President of the Polish Council of Ministers, September 14,1945, URM BP, 8/4V. 66. Bul-eau of War Reparations to the President of the Prjlish Council of Ministers, October 15, 2947, URLM ",G?; and ""Report on Reparatirons,'" Bureau of War Reparations, May 1, 1947, URlM BP, 8/47?; see also Vladistaw Zubrtk and Constantine Pleshakov, 11rzsidethe Krenzlt'tz's Cold War: Fm~ttStali~zto Klzndshchev (Cambridge: Haward Universjv Press, 1996), p. 147. According to this source, East Gamany lost 3,500 plants and factories, 2,115,000 pieces of equipment, and 2 million industrial jobs. 67, Franz Sikora,, Sozkarlz"s.lisclzcSotidnriMt iirjd ~zntiorzraleI n f e r ~ s c n(Scrcialist solidarity and nationat interests) (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und dotitik, 19177), p. 113. 68. Georg W. Strobe], Deut-sclzland-Polen:Wtlnsclz tfnd Wz'rklicfikeif(GermanyPoland: Wish and reality) (Born: Editicm Atlantic Forum, 4969), p. 12. 69. See Nairnark, The Rttssiazs 111 Ger?r~mt.zy, p. 296. Nairnark quotes Information Officer Sergej 'Tiul"anc>v in August 1947: "Direct anti-soviet speeches at SET)

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Pmblems of Germa~zRepatrinkion, Repnmtiotzs, and Trade

93

party organization meetings have become almost constant occurrences. At 209 party meetings of production and district grc~upstaking glace in Dreden, there were constant pmvocatianal speeches." 7'0, Report on Paul Merker" speech at the Swond Congress of the FDGB, April 21,1947: PZPR KC, group PPR KC, 2951U-71, 71. Leopoid Marscha k notes of cmversations with lEJoebe,et al., March 1,1947 PzPn KC, group PPR KC, 2951m-70. 72. frrawin to Warsaw, Sptember 24,1946, MSZ, 61668142, 73. Marecki notes of a meeting with Leutenant, Fhruary 28, 4947, PZPR KC, group PPXZ MC, 295/XX-7074. MeIler notes of a meeting beween Ulbricht and Praw-in, March 15, 194'7, PZPR KC, group fZPRKC, 295/XX-70, 75. NeXIer notes of a meeting beween Prawin and Pieck, May 2, 1947, PZPR KC, group PPR KC, 235/XX-"i"0. 76. G ~ QLudzr, S June 4, g. 3; see subsequent: issues in the summer and fall, 1946; SotidnrifSt ulzd nationale Infer~se~z, p. 126. see also Sikora, Sc?z&li~til;che 77. 6 b s Ludz-t, July 10,1947, p. 1. 7%. See Christopl~Royen, ""Osteurc~paischeStaaten" (East European States), in Hans Adolf Jacoben, Gerd Leptin, Ulrich kheunes, and Eberhard Schulz, eds., Drei jnllrzeltnte AussenptliCik der DDR (Munich: R. Bldenbourg Vertag, 1917C3), p. 604, Lladzt, July 1,1948, g. 2. 79. GL?S 80, See EyburPa Lildu from January to June 1948. 81. Appendix Nct. 4 t s Prs~tocolNo. 82 of the SEE> Central Scretariat, June 7, 11i348, SED ZK, 1V 2/2.1/205. 82. Nezges Dcu tscizlalzd, June 29,2948, p. 2 . 83. Broniewicz notes for the Polish Ministry of Industry and Eade, July 45, 1948, PZPZZ KC, group PI% KC, 295/XX-72. On March 15,2948, the DWM signed a trade agreement with Poland, and. then another on September 25. 84. Bruno Letrschner report on his trip to 130fand, undated, ca. October, 1948, SED ZK, Walter tilbricht: Papers, NIJ 18213247. 85. Neues l;teufsdztand, June 2'7,1948, pp.4. 86. Riezk~sDezttscl'zland,August 29,1948, p. 4. 87. See M, K. Dziewanowski, Poftz~zldin the 20tfr. Ccrltury (New York: Columbia University Press, 19771, p. 171. From 1%5-1947 the Soviets paid $1.25 per ton of coal, but Denmark and Sweden were willing to pay $12 a ton. In 1948, the So>viets paid $14 a ton; the market price in Europe was $18-19. See also Nikita Khrushchev; Khrarshctlev Rententbers: The Lnsl Testame1~1(Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), p. 208. During Mhrushchev" visit to Warsaw in October 1956, the Poles raised this issue. Khrushchev later asked Miko>yan,"How did this happen? How could we pay our Polish comrades such an unfair price f o x their coal?" Mikoyan answered, ""lW-asall Sta-ittin" dc3ing." 88. See Sheldon Anderson, ""Pland and the Marshall Plan,"Viptomatic kll'slory 15, no. 4 (fall 1992),pp. 473494. 89. Sikora, Suzi~lz'sfz't;cF~e Sufidnrifdi'f ztnd natit~~nle I-rztercussc~z,pp. 110, 125. After the Swiet zone no longer received coal front the Ruhr, 1301ishcoal became an essential energy source.

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90, Mellter notes of meting with Ulbricht, December 12,1948, MSZ, 6/767/54. 91. internal SED memo, May 10, 1949, SED ZK, Walter Ufbricht Papers, NL 182/334, 92. Report on trade between Poland and the St~vietzone, January 1, 1939, PzPn KC, group PPR KC, 295/=-[;72. 93. Fischer, "'Aussenpolit-ischeAktivitgt bei ungewisser sc>wjet-t-ischer DeutxhLand-Pctlitik (bis 1955),"' p. "9; and Sikora, Soziall"sfi~cI~c Sulidnritgf iirjd nnliorzrale Jtzferessen, p. 125. 94. 3ybul.m Ludir, June 6,495(5, p. 4. 95, Michael Kaser, Comecrm: Irttegmfion Problems of fhe Phlzned Economies (tondon: Bxhrd University Press, 1967, g. 11. 96. 13ZPR report on delegations to Xloland in 1952, March 28, 1953, 132;PRKC, 237/V-76. 97. Izydorczyk to Wierna, October 49,1953, MSZ, 40/319/36. 98. Wierna notes of meeting between Wierbtowski and Wc)lf, May 6, 1950, MSZ, 10/373/44. In 1950, Polish Frrreip Minister Stefan Wierblcjwski said that Poland intended to increag its trade with West Germany one way or the other; and Wolf tc~Dertinger on a meeting with Wiel-lakowski,May 22,1950, DDR MfAA, Poland Sction, A1812, VVoXf reported that Wierbiowski told him that the question of trade with West Germany was still open because Poland would not sign agreements with the Adenauer r$@me. 99. See Sikora, Sazia:nlislisdteSolilzriCat und ntlfiotfaleJnleressen, p. 126. 400. Wolf notes of meeting with Gede, April ti", 1950, DDR M f M , Minister's Office, AZfiZfiS. 404. W l f to Ackermann, March 20,1950, DDR M f M , Warsaw Embassy, Warsaw Mission, A3662. 402. Erben notes of a meeting with Celinska of the Polish Foreign Minisfry, Spternber 14,1950, DUE MfAA, Warsaw Mission, A3662. 103. Letter to Lore Steirner; signature unintelligible, April 20, 1950, DDR M f M , State Secretary, A1 5635. 104. Letter from East German trade delegate (signature unintef ligibEe) to Wlf, December 17,4950, DDR M f M , Warsaw Mission, A3662, 105. N6fier memorandum, December 19,1949, DBR MMulFI, DL-2, file 1948. 406. Erben tcr Ackermann, July 5,495Q DDR MfAA, State Secretary A45635. 107. Tzydorczyk to the Polish Foreip Ministy, J m e 11,1951, MSZ, 10/34/40. 408. Izydorczyk to the Polish Foreign Ministry, August 40, 1951, MSZ, 10/364/40. 1013. 1zydorczyk to the PoXish Foreign Minjst-r)l;May 3,1951, MSZr 10/363/4Q. 110. Gsotewohl to Cyrankiewicz, November 20,1951, BD13 Ministemat, DC-20, file 616. The agreement called far Polish expc~rtsof 79,000 toms of coke in October, but the Poles sent only 57,429 tons. 111. Cyrankiewicz to Grotewoht, December 8, 1951, DDR MMulH, DL-2, file 1948. 112. See R. F, tesfie, et al., The Hisloty of Poland since 2863 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 319-320. 113, Grotewohl to Cyrankiewicz, November 6, 1952, BDR Ministerrat, BC-20, file 616.

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114. Izydorczyk to Wierna, August 12, 1953, MSZ, 3 0/366/40; see also Zubok and Ptes;shakovr Inside the Kwmlir-z's Gold War, pp. 159-160. The East German economy was in g r i a w difficulty in 1953 in part because the SEB was in the process of nationalizing the entire economy on the Stalinist mcjdel. Ulbricht repeatedly asked Moscaw for ecmomic aid. 115. Izydorczyk to the Polish Foreign Ministry September 23, 1953, MSZ, 10/366/40. 116. Izydorczyk to Wierna, May 12,3953, PZPR KC, 237/XXIl-517. 417, See Mcucs DeufsdzEand, May 47,1950, p. I . The newspaper carried a huge headline on Stalin" note to Gsatewohl announcing that the GDR no longer had to pay reparaticyns to USSR or Poland. Tn truth, Stalin reduced the reparations payments by 50 percent to $3,171 million. Although the Poles had also agreed to this deal, the article did not thank them. 438. CrotewahZ to Bierut, September 15,4953, MSZ, 10/35V/39; and Crotewohl to Bierut, December 31,1953, P21711 KC, Biierut Archive, 254/XV-26; see also Pie& to Bierut, 22 January 1954, PZPR KC, Bierut Archive, 254/IV-26. 119, Analysis of trade with Poland, July 22, 1955, UDR MfAuXH, BL-2, 2392; and notes a n trade between Poland and the GDR, July 6, 1961, PZPR KC, 237/V-379. According to the Polish source, the value of trade beween the two countries went up about 50 percent frc>m 1958 to 1955, from 660 million (exchange) zlotys to 9137.6 million zhtys. 120. Fixher, ""AussenpotitischeAktivitgt bei ungewisser sowjet-t-ischerDeutxhStaaten,""p. 60&605; land-Pctlitik (bis 4955)," p. 72; and Royen, ""Ostettrc~paische see also "The Polish Economy Since World War XI," ' i n BRD AA, Repa&ment 2, vol. 242.

German Remilitarization and the Polish Thaw, 1954-1955 I t is ule*Elknoitln flrinl fhrre are g r a t e Hqficutties in rdalions Itctu3ee.el.lGrvmat~sand I%ks (of cutrrse rant in rrlufior?s befwee.el.1ozrr fic~astalest Iftmn in relafiotts betrlvt>n Cemtgrtzs utzd dhr zt~orkersiilz file other people's del-tlocuucies, ---East German Ambassador to fita~zdSI;Efan Heymarzn, 19551

Communist party relatiosts in Stalids empire were frozen in an atmosphere of paranoia and dist;mst. After Stalirr" deafrh, the Kremlin's New Course promised to build stranger cmmunist bonds, but the uprishgs in Czechoslovakia and East Gemany in 1953, as well as the West" plans to rearm West Germany, pprevented significant change in satellite ~ l a tions. m e ""ehaw"in the Soviet Union did allow for domestic experiments, however. The Ulbricht r6gime cmtirrued down a Stallnist path, and the PZRZ began a slow reforming process. Relations between the two parties steadily deteriorated. When no agreement was reached on German mificatian at the fourpower fartrign ministers" conference in Berlh in fanuary-February 1954, the Sovkts m u n c e d in March that the C;DR w o d d be granted fulf snvercignty. With almost a half million Soviet trooys stationed there, this symbolic move had minimal irnpact on the real political indepedence cJf the East Germm state, but it did bolster the SEP>"sstatus with the other satellitrr parties," The Potish gwenlmmt ofificially welcomed the Soviet declaration. Ambmsador JmIzydorczyk told &c Polish Parliment &at in Ihe Likelihood of West G e m m remilitari.zatii,n, East Geman sovereigty was in "comp1ek In reality, F&& officials were ctpagreement. with our national irmterc?~ts.~~3 posed to putting the GDR on an equal basis with the other Soviet bloc comkies. They were concerned about h e future of heir militasy mission

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in Berl4n and the distixlct possibilily that East Germany wodd be amed;" in addition, East Germm officials a p p e a ~ dto be more assertiwe in pro-

mdi~ngEast German inte~sts.East German Ambassador Stefan Hey told. a Polish F m i g Ministry official h confidence that U.le SEU Pol now thflu&t: that it was a mistake to wait for MOSCOW% iniLiative befoe mabng foreign pdicy. East Berlin launched new efforts to gain diplomatic recognjlim h n n such non-aliped states as Lndia, Egypt, and Fisrlmd, and scrught out new trading parbers. I-leym clairned that Yugoslavia was now willing to champiorn East Germm interests in the United Natiorns m d in the Economic Commission for Eurclpe.5 For years, the East German diplomats in MIarsaw had complained about the jnadequacy of"thcir mbassy building. After Masco\vfsdeciaration of East German sovereipty, FXeymann told Polish Fornip Minister Stanisjaw Skrzeszewski that it was time for the GDR to build an embassy that reflected the country'S new political importmce. Heymam said that East Germany valued good relations with Poland, and that ""of course the size and the outside appearance of our embassy dso play a role. Therefore ouc new embassy buildi,ng is m urgernt politicai necessity." Shzeszewski replied that no space was availabk in VVarsaw.6 Polish dipl"mats encountert-d this new East German self--assurance at a banquet at the North Korean Embassy in Berlin in June 1954. Grotewohl promised the North Koreans assistance in rebuil.d.jng their war-ravaged corntry; he then surprised everpne p ~ s mby t suggesting that the rclpresent&ives of Ihe other peoples' rclpuhljcs, which Grotewohf clajrned were better off than the GDR, make the same commitment. Grotewohl embarrassed Potish Ambassador Jan Izydorczyk by asking him point blank, "We11, Jan, will you make such a pledge in the mme of the People's Republic of Poland?" Tzydorczyk mfused to answer, After dinner, :Izydtrrczyl?ci~~formed Crotwohl that Poland was aiready gjving aid to North Korea, m d that he was not authorized to make new cmmitments~ East German security chief Ernst Wollweber later told Izydorezyk that Grotewohl had spoken withoUt Politburo authorizatbn, and that ""the wh& 'scene' had a strong social democratic aftertasteef'7 The East Germans could not trumpet their sovereignty too loudly, however. Without recqnition from m s t of the nm-communist countries, the GDR still needed Poland to represent its interests abmad.8 'The East German Foreip Ministry &served that the rode that the I""a>plefs Republic of Poland plays in Eurc>pe%collective security is sipificant for relations beween our corntries in two ways. Next to the Soviet Union Poland is the strcmgest comti"y belonging to the peace camp [the Sc>vietblc>c]-.Morec~ver[Ifc>land%Jposition beween the GDR and the Sc~viet Union makes rebtions between our countries especially iqoxltant.9

Warsaw" efforts to k p r o v e relations with France pronpted Heymann to ask Skrzeszewski to promote East German interests in Paris." Ulbricht hoped that if France =cognized the W R , the other Western courlkies m i e t folIow.11 fn the Ml of 1954, the East German press gave thorough cowerage (JI Poland" offer to France for a nmggression and mutuai ct-roperation agreement. East German journalists stressed that the agreement was not directed agajnst German5 as Bonn argued. But Po1and"s willingness to r e p s e n t East Germany abroad had definite limits; the Poles wcre careful not to complicate their delicate negotiations with France, and officials at the Polish Embassy in Berlin thought the East German press misunclerstooci the sipificance of the Polish proposal.12 Ulbricht also worried that Polmd and the other Soviet bloc corntries would now develop clloser economic and political ties to West Germany. Heymann publicly praised the Poles for representing the GDR in the United NaEions, but. in private East G e r m officials were disappointed with Mlarsaw" lXukewarm efforts to promote the GDR as the principd German state. The East Germans flinched every time the Poles ignored the GDR's role in resolving the a r m a n problem, m d it was heconning apparent that Poland was more interested in improving relations with the FRG.13 I h e East German leaders publicly supported VV;arsw%ooverturcs to Bonnl but. they worried about being outflanked by the other Qrman state. FXeymann asked to be informed about new deals with West Germany and any phns to irivite West German defegations to Pohnd. He informed Skrzeszcvski, that the GDR, not the FRG, represefied German interests in other comtries,l" In Rsponse to NATO's decisfon in October 1954 to bring West Germany into the alfimce, the Soviet Xlnio~~ m d the satellite cowltries issued the Moscow Ucclaration on October 23, 1954. The Soviets proposed allGerman elections, an Austrian peace treaty, and nuclear liisarmament. 'Three weeks later, the Soviets declared that a palicy is being pursued towards Western Germany which is incompatible bcgh with the prcjmotion of peace in Europe and with the national reunification of Germany. The carrying out of the London and Paris Agreements [to bring West Germany into NATO] tzrill mean that the reunification of Germany through free all-German elections is sacrificed to the present plans of resurrecting German militarism, that mortal enemy of the natians of Europe, including the German nation it~elf.1~

That fall, representatives of the Czechostovak, Polisb, and. East German parliaments met in Prague to discuss West Germanfs entry into NATO and Central Europem security issues in general.16 The East Germans codd not convhce the Poles that the NATO alljance posed an imminmt danger. The head of the SEU" Deparment of F m i p Affairs, Pe-

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ter Florin, complahed that the Poles did, not show interest in strengthening cooperative diplomatic efforts against West Germm revmchism and militarism. Florin concluded that the Poles ought to be better informed abwt the serious threat that the Adenauer government posed to the GDR and to peace in Europe.17 Meymam reported that serious differences had surfaced among the three delegations over a cornmunip4 to the French Chamber of Deputies protesting the fomatilm of a W s t German army, Agah~,the Poles had ~serval.ions&out jeopardizjng their rccent efforts to improve relations with France," Heymann was now convinced that VVarsaw was ignoring East Germm interests in favor of better ties to the TvVest.29 Some Poles were not at all opposed to having the FRG contained withisl the Atlantic dliance, :Most Poles, including a significant number of PZPR members, thought &at a divided Germany was in Polmd's best interest-." A~iccordingto the East G e r m n Foreip Ministry, "the reservations among the Polish people to a strong, unified Germany are a lot strcmger than we usually guessed. . . . The German problem in Poland is not fully viewd corrtlctlyPand the meaning and the strengtt.1of the GDR is somewhat mderestimated. m e n the Soviet Union declared an end to the state of war with East Germany in January f 955, Poland dutifully folowed suit. In the original draft of Pdand"s declaration was a warning that if the Western powers and the West G e m a n gove ent ratified the Paris treaty to = a m Germany, "the People's Republic of Poiiand will further strengthen its rclations with the GDR and take any measures with the other peace-lovhg states which will guarantee the security of Poland and other nations.""No special mention of t-he GDR appeared in the final declaration, however, which left Heymann noticeably disappointed: "This deletion has a significant political meming. I see in tbis incident more proof that right now the Polish government is still. not very e11t-husiastic about concluding a tripartite pact between the GDR, Poland, and CzechosIovakia."~~ Heymann speculated that the PoXish gove ent did not wmt a formal pact with the GDR because the Polish people might think that a war with the West was imminent. Polish authorities were already havlng difficulty convincing people to settle in the Western Territories. In early 1,955, Heymann rclported that s o m Poiish farmrs &ere hvere not planting their fields for fear that war would soon break out.23 He cited several. other exmples of Poland's disinterest in closer cooperation with East Germany; for instance, the failed Prague conference and the recent disagreements that had surfaced at a meting of the Foreign Affairs Departments of the SED, PZPR, and CzGP.Z4 In January 3,955, Tybgnu lzldzr edjturialjzed that "today W have a situation in which no important German political pmblem can be resolved in a peaceful w v without the German Democratic Republk."E Later that

month, however, Heym noted that the newspaper had raised the possibility of a neutral Gemany without mentiming the GDR at all. Articles in the Poljsh provincial press had often ig~~ored the GDR, hut this was the first time that Trybuno L u ~ had z ~ adopted, in his words, such "false interprtrtaticms of the German questicm." He thought that wbzl?za L2rdzl"s editorials indicated that the PZPR was less s~tpportiveof the Moscow Declaration of October 1954 than the other Soviet bloc parties." Althuugh it should have came as no surprise, Heymann exclainled that ""not a few Poles have fears of [German] rcunii"jcation!"27 Exaggerating the W R ' s legitimacy a d hpmtance in resolving the Gtitrman question, the East German Embassy guessed that "the main =ason for this hesitation is that the strenglh of the GDR is underestintated, so a certain fear exists that o~tr state coulld be devoured by the Federal Republic."'"" The East Germans ~ p e a k d f ytold Polish officiafs that they supported better relations between Poland and the FRG, and promised to assist in that effmt, At a meeting between PZPR, SEU, and CzCP leaders in 'January 1955, for instance, the Poles introduced several plans to exchange professionat and student delegations with West Germany; the East Germans offered to help the Poles in dcvelophg specific cmtact5.29 Zlrt reality the East German offers were a pretext for East Bedin to stay abreast of Polish-West German relations, and to prevent agreements that compromised East Germm interests. The East Germans were concerned about rurnors that Poland and West Germny wodd exchange trade missims and later raise them to diplomatic xnjssions. Wlbricht called this West German ploy a 'Trojan horse."'"" Ulbricht" suspicitrns were clmfirmed in February when the W s t German government offered to discuss a trade agreement with Pdand. Cyrmkiewicz suggested that the two countries normafize all relatinns.31 :111 an attempt to prtrempt the trade missims, F o ~ i g n Minister Bolz again offczred to help economic and cdturilil exchmges between Polaxld and the FRG32 In March, he told Rierut that although the GDR supported a trade agreement between Warsw and Born, related questicms needed to be resolved beforehand. Balz achowtedged that he did not want the Poles to compromise East German interests in the negotiations with West Germany.33 The East Germm Fareig~~ Mhistry told its diplomats that "in the future it will be especially important to watch alI appearances of efforts by the Polish authorities to nomalize relations with Wst Cermany.'"Tecause most Pales still made no distinction between the GDR and the FRG, Heymann requested more propaganda to inform Polish officials about the 'progressive Germans'" the GDR. Ileymmn agreed with his superhrs that 'East Berlin should participa.t.e in talks between Warsaw and Bonn on trade and cdtural exchanges so that they would not have a "purely West G m a n charactereff35

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East Geman diplomats repeatedly pressed Polish officials for specific information ~ g a r d i n gthe mgojng trade negotiations with Bonn." "'le East Germans also dichted the terms of Polmd's trade with West Berlin, fearful that this trade would mdermiYre the GDR" efforts to claim that part of thr city. Bolz b ed direct contacts between East German officials and the Polish Military Mission, still, located in West Berlin. M e n the Polish gwernment protested, Bolz suggested that the Hlission coordinate its diplornatic efforts with the Polish Embassy in East Berlin. Skrzeszewski asked the East Germans to expedite the trmsit of Potish goods to West Berlin, but Bolz flatly refused on the grounds that his g w ent would not allow direct trade connections between West Berlin m d Poland.37 He pointed out that West Berlh was a special case: "Here our efforts are htended to make West Berlin as costly as possible for the American and German imperialfsts, Zn our opinion this principle must also be conside~din the decision to develng econolnic ~lali.ons between the PRP m d West Berlin." Bolz said he would weigh the wonomic benefits of each trade agreem e ~ against ~t the political costs. 011this point Skrzeszewski agreed, and Cyrmkiewicz assured Bolz that trade with West Berlin would only be inctueted in trade agreements with the FICC:;. He added that ""s;l1ing [coal] djrectly to West Berlin was out of the question." The issue was settlcd fos the time being, but resurhced after GomulZca" r & m to power in October 1956.38 U11;lble to stop West German rearmament, the So~rietbloc countries fomed the Warsaw Pact on May M. Tbe Soviets signed the Austrian treaty a day later. After the Geneva Conference in July 1955, :Khrushchev st..opped in East Berlin to assure the East Gerntans &at no agreennent. on German unification would be made at the expense of the GDR. mmshchev met Ulbricht again immediately after the Soviets established diplomatic relatio~~s with Born in 9ptember.39 The rapidy changing developments in Central Europe in 1955 unnerwed Ulbricht and Bierut. Bientt was alarmed Zly the Admauer gowernmcnt's increasingly nationalist f o ~ i g npoliCy, and r m o r s that West Germany might produce nuclear weapons.-Il OR m official visit to East Berlin that summer, he pledged Poland" suppmt of Soviet and East Cerman diplomacy regardhg German u~~ification."According to one East German diplomat, however, Ulbricht" constant lecturing eventually got on Bierut"s nerves." Bonn interpreted the visit as an attempt to pmp up the East German government and to ""strengthen the status quo in the German problm,"M The promise of diplomatic relations between proved to be an itlusion. In 1,955, the Adenauer gov the HaUstein Doctrine, which withheld full diplomatic ties from any country that had formal diplomatic relations with the CDR. From the

Polcs-point of view, Miest Germany" refusal to recqnize the OdesNeisse border and entry into NATO prt-cluded any serious ccmsideration of formal djplomtic ~ c o g n i t i manyway. Poland and the East German Peapfes' Army

When Wcst Germany joined NATO in 1955, Moscow went ahead with plans for an East German army as controversial a subject in the Soviet Union as it was in Poimd; as Molotov argued, "Why shottld W fight the West over the GDR?"43 The Polish government feared that an eventual withdrawal of Soviet troops from East Germany would leave Poland as the Red Army's main western outpost, h which case Polmd would be forced to increase Hlilitary spendlng and garrism more Soviet troops.46 Poles had fresh memories of the Geman onslaught in World Miar II, and were vehemently opposed to an East German army47 Foreign Mirzister Bok assured MlBrsaw that Ihe East G e m m people would figlnt along side the Poles to defmd the Oder-Neisse border,48 but few Poles msted m East Germm army whose existence depe~~ded on the Soviet Union. The Polish government was so concerned about people's reaction to East German rearmament that during one special simultaneous radio broadcast from factmies ~ IWarsa\vf I Prague, and East krlk:l in 1955, Polish officials asked the East Gemans not to play any marchhg or martial-sounding rn~sic.4~ speculated that Polis cials had cmceled a tour af East Germ m musicims to Polmd that s r for fear that their concerts would be disrupted by demonstrations agajn.st the crcation of an East G e m m army ?"he Poles d s o denied an East German r t t p e ? j t for a performance of a m r t e r e d Peoplc's Police (KVP) band at- the fig* anniversary cetebration of the Oder-Neisse agreement on July 6,1955.'Weymann told his superiors that if more Polish dekgatkne; could rclviecsi East G e m m police m d militia units, they could see that: &ese forcles had a ""classcharacteref'51 The West German newspaper Die Welt cited SED sources who conceded that the Poles and the Czechoslovaks had serious misgivings about an East German army The newspaper wrote, The Czechs objeded that there were too many former Wehrmacht officers employed in the Quartered People's Police who have thoughts of revenge. The Poles agreed with the CzechasXwakskbjectian. A news conference that is planned for the beginning of February in Warsaw is supposed to arrange the military cooperation between the three countries in such a way that Pragcle and Warsaw maintain the right of veto and cantrof over Pankow [the GDR government quarter in Berlin].s2

Accordislg to the West German Foreign Ministry Bolz" discussions with Polish officials in the spring of 1955 did not produce cclncrete agree-

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ments on the role of an East German army in the defense of Eastern Europe. The Poles rr.jected a unified high commmd with East German army officers; they surprised the East Gernnans with a plan for a joint PolishCzech command of an army gmuy ""north."'" The Polish and Czechoslovak governments had no way to p ~ v e n an t East German army,3%ut they insisted that it be limited to 170,000 men."" Ch January 19, 1956, Tqbnrru Ltddu welcomed the r e m i 1 . i t i t i o of the GDR with this headline: "The National Peoples' Army-the Uefense Arm of the GDR-This Army-Ally of the Polish Nati.on."" m e ne\iv"paper wrote that this was ""not just a German a m y but an army of peace and socialism.""" The East German Embassy in Warsaw encouraged its Foreit;gn Ministry to sand articles 811 German sddjers cvho had sided with the Republ.icans in the Spanish Civil War, German resistance fighters who had foutght with Poles in the World War 11, Germans who had been incarcerated with Pdes in Nazi concentration c q s , and bi,ographies on Dcfense Minister Wlli Stoph and East German army officers.58 To further cooperation and information sharing, the Pofish and East German gouents agreed to exchange mi)itary attach4ss39 The Polish government h e w that if war broke out with 1"6ATa, however, asking Polish soldiers to sacrifice their tives in defense of the GDR would be virtually impossible. m e PZPR functionary told Heymann that m n y p a r 9 mmbers recowized that this was a different East German army but they had red fears that it was no match for NATO forc?es.a

The SED Restricts Cultural Contacts 'The PZPR began a process of sell-criticism in late 1954. Bierut ack~owledged. at the Third Plenum that the security apparatus constituted a "state within a state," and he fired the hated seclrfity chief, Stmisiaw Radki,ewicz. Other Stalinists were also purged from the party, and Gorntlika was set free in December.61 Ulbricht had effctetively e l k h a t e d most of his opposition after thc. uprisillg inJune 11953; he was not about to risk destabilizing his government by sanctioning the PZPfi"s liberalization program, The SEDs tight restrictions on East Germmskontacts with foreipers conthued. The SED leaders we= especialfy wary of exchmgs outside the scier~tificor techmological realm; freer discussions of political m d cuIturaI matters thatened to undermine the p a r v s Stalinist prcrpqanda and reeducation eff0rts.a Cultural relations with Poland rernaltned tied with red tape, just the way Ulbricht wanted it.@The GUR Foreign Ministry was given more respcmsibility for fulfilling cultural a g ~ e m e n t sin 3"35$,,% but the mhistry soon coqlained to the ccr~tralparty orgms that it took far too long for a Pole to get a three-mnth visa to visit the GDR; the mini3tp.y further argued tbat only 7 to 10 percent of East German applicants received visas

to Poland. The ministry proposed openjng more border crossixrgs and allowing border commmities m o freedom ~ to develop exchanges, but the SED Politburo stymied Chese propods as well," At the end of 1955, the SED dictated that all visa applications for GDR citizens had to pass through the party's Department of Foreign Affairs rather than through the less politically reliable Foreig~~ TVfhistry66 The PoIish exile press commented that '"he peopIc in Poland hate the Germans as much today as before, and the Soviets' attempt to cltevelop friendly relations to East Germany has brought no result.'"T East German Ambassador Stefan Heymann agreed: ""l is well known that there are greater difficulties in relations between Germans and Poles (of course not h relations between our two states) than in relatio~~s between Germms and the workers in the other people's dcmocracics," Heymann and other lower-level East Geman offiiciats f ~ p e n t l yexpressed interest in better political and clnlttrral cooperation with Poland. In the summer of 1955, Heymann recommended, direct cooperation between the corrcspunding departments of the SEU a d PZPR Central Cllmmittees and between the Polish and East G e r m Foreit;gn Mkistries. He also proposed more exchanges of hctory, youth, and press delegations." That fall, Heymann again complained that the SET) leadership was placing too mnny obstacles in the way of cztltural cooperati,on with Poland.@H e called the overall state of cultural exchanges ""unsatisfactory," especialiy in the artistic sphrw.7""The SED Politburo ign0rc.d Heymann's recommendations and ordered the Fareign Ministry to devote more attention to cultural relations with Czechoslovakia.71 In contrast to their East German comrades, local PZPR functionaries could issue visas and plan exchanges 'The SED's regional ofiice in Rostock asked to have the same authority; it argued that several visits of smdl Polish delegations to the GDR had changed some East Germans" opposition. to the Oder-Neisse border.72 The SEC>%Department of Foreign Affairs emphatically rejected the proposal: "We are astonished that you have already developed such close connections to the PZPR in Szczcein wjthout first inform,ing the Central Committee.""l-he department remjnded the Rostock office that LalZ exchanges between delegations in the border regimhhad to have Central Committee approv"l.7" Heymam and other East Germm diplomats in Warsaw greatly exaggerated the posithe results of the official cultural exchanges that did take placre. In early 1954, Heymann ~ p o r t e dthat various culturd events in Poland to promte German-Polish friendshjp had been a '"reat success." He noted that the "Week of Progressive German Culture" had been fruitful in acquainting Poles with issues clmfrcmting the GDR, and that "the simple people understand the difference between. the GDR and West Germany much better." H~cymannwas pasticularly pleased that Poles often asked German visitors whether they were a ""Pieck-German" or an

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""Adenauer-C7erman.q At the end of the year, the embassy declared that Polish wwkers were even beg ing to mderstand the importance of the GDR in the questiun of German unification. The embassy was also satisfied with the increase in Polish propaganda against Adenauer and the remilitarization of West Germany.75 The PZPIt leadership doubted that its okvn propaganda had convinced party members, let alone Poles hgenerd, that the East Germans could be trusted. Helena fakubowska observed that "a number of our comrades have still not managed to obrercame their dislike of Germans, whom they view uni.fomly, not distinguishing any significant difierences between fascist and pmgmssive Germans.'"b East German propaganda found relatively little echo in Poland because of its strict adherence to Stalinist ideology Poles thought East German art and literature were devoid of artistic merit; even East German diplomats cro~~ceded this poht.77 One Polish journalist reported that the visit of a Polish delegation to the celebration of the fifth amiversary of the foundillg of the GUR in October 1954 had conf-irmed Polish suspicions that the GDR was merely m obsequious Soviet puppet state: ""Polish Premier Cyrmkiewicz received a very cool welcome there. The German communists opmly demcmstrated their special friendship with the Soviet delegation and paid little &tention to the detegations from the satellite states, which hurt the express sensitivity of the Poles. Cyrankiewicz teft Berth two days earlier than pfarned.lf7" The Polish Embassy in Berfin reported a sig~~ificanl drop in lectures, discussions, and other party psopagmda about Polmd in 1954, The embassy blamed this irr part m the closing of the German-Polislz E'riendship Society.""'The Soviet Efigh Commission in Germany was surprised to find that the society had been dissolved, and told. Polish diplomats that there was still much work to do to improve understand@ betwen East Germans m d Poles"80 The SED" own Deparment of Foreip Affairs knew that too many East Germans, party members among them, rtz.jected the Oder-Neisse border, saw no rcason for friendly rcllations with Poland, and suffered from a general lack of education about the comtry.81Party members confided in Polish diplomats that "if an [East German] mayor is commissiosled to carry out a Polish and a Czech performance, he w o d d ralher orgaslize the Czech, and it is likewise easier far him to mobilize the p&lic to these performances.'%~ccording to the Poles, the SED was also having dificulties overcoming the prej~~dices of the "'kulaks and fascists"" a m g the German refugees from Poland."" The Polish Embassy reported that "raather often irr rural areas [of the GDW it is possible to encounter statements praishg 'the good times' that Hitler ereatedef'g3 Tn 1955, the SED stepped up its propaganda campaign for better relations with Poland, but all exchanges were still kept under tight party cm-

trol, Oxl the tenth anniversary of the end of the war in May, Nezres Uf?~~fschltZnd editor Hermann Axen wrote an article praising cooperation between the GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, He stressed that '"through the border of peace on the Oder and Neisse Poland has for the first t h e 117 its history a reliable, peace-loving neighbcrr and friend m its western border.""" me East Germans were encouraged by the Pales' tmatment of Grotewohi and 23012 for the fifth anniversary celebration of the Zgorzekc border agreement inJuly.8" Even the West German governm e ~ ~recognized i: that the visit had stimulated nebv diplomatic activity between the two countries." The East German Embassy called the warm Polish ~ c e p t i o nfor the delegation a "breakthrough"" in Polish-East German relations, -The embassy praised the work of Che Polish press in chmging the Polish prejudices against Germans, and criticized its own press for "contributing far too little in the fight against n-tisconceptims amnng our people." m e ernbassy noted, however, that too many f"oles pe&tioned the East German deletgation about deve2opments in W s t Germany, and that the FRG still received more coverage in the Polish press than the GDR,K7 Cultural exchanges were still fraught with problems. Polish officials filed numemus =ports &out cdtural and economic exchange"hat went acvry In, mmy cases, cdtural events simply verified existing prejudices; Polish olFficial.5 complained, for instance, that their booth at the Lejpzig Trade Fair in 1954 was far too small-much smaller than fie Czechoslovak stand.KWeymann pointed out that Poland's space at C,eipzig was about the same size as Hungary" or Romnia"s.8' But as one of the GDR's most important tradir~gpahers, the Poles felt slighted. Poland did not s e ~ an ~ dexhibit to the Leipzig fair in 1955. The East German Embassy hterpreted the absence as a sign that the Poles underestimated the importance of the fair," and as usual, saw si~~ister Western intluence behind the Poles' decision. 'The East Gcrman hreign Mjnistry spedated that the Western press was stirring up competition between the two trade fairs as part of an overall strategy to divide the Warsaw Pact countries.91 East Germms also showed little e~~thusiasm for the "Wek of GermanPolish Friendhip" that was held in the GDR in 1955.92Polish diplomats complained to the East Geman authorities that a similar CzechoslovakGerman friendship week had been, much better organized," aand the SED's Depastment of Foreign Affairs achowledged that local SEE) organs had shown little enthusiasm for the German-Polish festival,94 Xn m n y cases, East German visitors to Poland, even party mernbers, left a bad. impression, Attestdance was so poor at one East German economic historian's 1ecturr.s that he regretted not leaving Poland earlier than plmned.95 An East Germm botanist on tour in Poland eagerly photographed Polish art galleries and other cultural exhibitions, but he was indifferent about seeing evicience of the German occupation of Poland in

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World War 21. The Polish Foreign Mhistry reported that ""during his stay in Auschwitz he &owed m i n i 4 interest and did not take one photo. AAerwards he said that the visit to the nrrusetlln [at Auschwitz] was undoubtedly useful, but that it had take.n a considerable part of the day, whicl-rcould have been better utilked far scientific endeavorseff9G Polish officials summed up the visit of a mathematics pdessor from the Polytechnical School in Dresden this way: Polish cufture did not interest him in the least. . . . It is worth emphasizing, that at festivities in Poznafi, Professor tandsbesg did not respond with one word to the rector's special greeting and farewell, The same [thing] repeated itself at the conference of the Polish Mathematics %>ciety,where Profernor Borsuk said a few w ~ d about s the friendly relations between 130fand and the GDR, Professor tandsberg responded to those tzrords with. complete siIence.97

m e n the Director of the Romanistic hstitute at the Humboldt Ul-riversity in Berlin, Rta kholner, refused to take a third-class deeper on a Polish train to Warsaw, the Polish Ministry of Culture commented that "Professor Schober stilt holds a certah chauvinism and revisionist tendency, m d she is not even free from mti-%mitis~n.~~9K Ambassador Heymann recognized that such meetings were counterproducthe. He cited another case of two visiting East Geman musicians who " o f t e ~expressed themselves very condescendingly over the condition of the orchestras hPoland, and they also held the view that one cannot: describe tbr PnP as progressive.' Heymann warned that tbis kind of behavior, espedally by SEX) functionaries, was compromising other efforts to foster better understanding between the two peoplcs.100 East German ofBciats were eyually critical of the actions of their Polish guests. Polish students studyhg in the GDR complained that they were treated poorly by East Geman professors, and that their subsidy f r m the GDR was too small. The East German Mhistry of Education had no sympathy for these grie~rances,respondkg that ""Sudents often forget that they are students, that they are learnhg, not working." At a convention for all the f o w i p students in the GDR, Florin awarded diplomas, book prizes, and s r n d grants to twelve of the best students. Polish officials were angered that n m e of the Polish students was so honored,"l The East German diplomats in Warsw strongly berated the P&s for their interest in making connections to Westerners, especially to West Germans. A veteran East German =porter in Poland told Heym "many Poles still do not distinguish between the hivo parts of Germany. Even progressive Poles often fail to disti.nguish between the GDR and the Federal IZepubll4c."lt" Heymann related what happened when a storm forced six flshing boats from Western comtries, among them West Cer-

many to seek refuge in the Polish harbor of W-I:adistawowo.The owner of a Dmish fishir~gboat was efksive in his gratitude to the Poles: "We have visited numrous harbors, but nowfiercl have we been so cordi,all,y received as by ym." Heymann said that the West Germans were also overly complimentary*He noted that East Germm fishrrmen were never afforded such hospitatjty.""" The SED" vigilance over these ""un-Marxist" elements h Poland extended into such mundane matters as the employment of translators in the East German Embassy in Warsaw- When Heymann expressed his concern that the Polish translators were not members of the PZPR, the Polish Foreign Ministry promised to find at least m e party mernber to transiate confidcwial docu,ments.l'"Jh year later, the East Germans were still complaining about the problem.l(J' Nonetheless, Heym was generally optimistic about the state of relations with Poland in 1955. He reported that the people" trust in the GUR had. grown '~extraordinarily,'~dding that relations between the two states was now ""sgnificmtly closer and better in all areas." He cited the increase in delegation visits, cultural relations, and economic ties, and even commented on the "progressive tendencies" of Polish CathoXics.l'E Heymam wrote that there was a "grow* atrumness among the Polish p e q l e that the GDR is a worker and peasant state, and that Potand does not have to fear m y more attacks from the west, The feelisrg of security on the western border is the decidi~~g factor in the cmsolidation of relations."l"" Heymann often blmed East Germans for poisoning the atmos p h e ~m , d cited their contixlued agitation against the Oder-Neisse border; he also complained to the F o w i Ministry ~ about unfulfilled trade agreements. loR Heymann" superiors did not share his views. He was rcpIaccd in 1957 in part because he was tclcr optinlistic about: Poland's socialist developm e ~ ~At decade . after the e~zdof World War 11, relations between the Polish and East German people had nut improved much at all. Although most Poles now h e w the difference between an ""Adenauer-Germanr' and a "l?ieck-Cerman,'"hercl was no te:lling which they prefersed. After Khrushchev" secret speech to the CPSU in Febmary 1956 and Bierut's death i n March, the PZPR began to acknowledge past policy errors, and also reevaluated relations wi& the SED, 'The mask of socialist solidarity was removed, and. the latent hostilities between the two parties soon came into full view.

1. f-leymann to the Fareign Ministry, June 21, 1955, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339143494.

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2, See Marc Trachtenberg, A Ccsnsfrtkcted Peace: Tke Makirzg I?( the Euroljean Settlemenl. 19453963 (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 1999, p. 139. He argues that by this time the Sc>vietshad abandoned all serious thaughts about German reunification. 3. Izydorczyk speech to the Polish Parliament, April 1954, PZPR KC, group Izydorczyk, 473/6. 4. Izydorczyk to Skrzeszewski, March 29,4954, MSZ, 1Q/329/37; see alw Peter Bendet; East Eurolje in Senrelz of Seezdrify ((London:Chatto and Windus, 197'2), p. 13, 5. Naszkowski notes of meeting with P-ieymann, February 22, 1954, MSZ, 10/361/39. 6. Skrzeszew-ski notes of meeting with Heymann, April 23, 1954, PZPR KC, 237/V-146; and Heymann to Fritz Grosse, April 24,1954, UDR MfAA, VVarsaw Embassy, A35I74f. 7 . Izydorczyk to Naszkowski, June 24, 1954, PZPR KC, Bierut Archive, 254 / TV-30. 8. See Skrzeszewski notes of meeting with Heymann, April 23,1954, PZPR KC, 237/V-146. 9. GDR Frrreign Ministry anaiiysis of relations with Poland, rmdated, unsigned, ca. December 2954, UDR MfAA, Minister's Office, A15156, 10. Heymann to Grosse on a meeting with Skrzeszewski, April 24,1954, DDR M f M , Warsaw Embassy, A3579. 11. Stude to the GDR Embassy in Wrsavlr; Nc~vember15, 1954, DDR MfAA, Warsaw Embassy, A3616. 12. Knapik to the Polish Foreign Ministry, September 20, 1954, MSZ, 10/36"i7141, 13. Heymann notes on Polish activities at the United Nations, October 19,1954, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339143492. 14. Heymann to Crosse on a meeting with Skrzeszewski, April 24,1954, UDR MfAA, Warsaw Embassy A3579. 15, Quoted in Neil Fodor, The Warsaw Treaty Orgn~ization:A Political and Organizational Annlysis (New Ycfrk: St. Martin" Press, 1%0), p. 17. 46. See the documents on this cmfewnce in MSZ, 1Q/466/48. 17. Florin to Ambassador Koenen in Prague, J a n u a 5,1955, ~ DDR MfAA, Warsaw Embassy, A36"7; see also Mrermer Hgnisch, Rzrssenpotitik urzd interr-ze;ttir>~tnIe Bezielgungen der BDR, 1949-1955 (The foreign policy and international relatians of the GDR, 1949-4955) (Berlin: Staatsverlag der DDR, 1972), p. 248. As usual, East German historians such as Wemer HZnisch said that the conference proceeded withcjut acrimony: "Characteristic for this closer cooperation was the fraternal solidariv of the governments, the parliaments, and the people of Potand and Czecl.loslovakia with the GDR." 48. Heymann tcr Handke, January 24, 4955, DDR MfAA, VVarsatzr Embassy, A36178; and Efandke to Heymann, February 3,11355, DD17 MfAA, Wrsaw Embassy, A34;""0. 19. Heymann to Florin, February 1, 2955, BDR MfAA, Warsaw Esnbamy A36";7; and Heymann to the GDR Foreign Ministry, February 7, 1955, DDR MfAA, Warsaw Embassy, A3670; see also Heymann notes on the meetings in Warsaw between Pot ish representatives and an East German government delega-

tion (led by Bolz), March 7,1955, BDR MfAA, Warsaw Embassy, A3579. Bolz told Bierut and Cyrankiewicz that his gc3vernmen-twas also ''very interested" in closer ties with Paris. 20. Heyrnann to Flctriin, February 1, 1955, DDR MfAA, VVairsaw Embassy A3670. 21. Grunert to the GDR Embassy in Warsawr February 4,1955, DDR MfAA, Warsaw Embassy, A3670, 22. Heymann to Florin, February 1, 2955, BDR MfAA, Warsaw Embamy A3670. 23. Heymann to Florin, January 10, 2955, BD13 MfAA, HAiX Secretariat, ,437, 24. Heyrnann to Flctriin, February 1, 1955, DDR MfAA, Warsaw Embassy A3670, 25. Rybzrnn Lzldzt, January 21,1955, p. 3. 26. H e y m n n to the GDR Fowign Ministry, January 28,1955, DDR MfAA, Warsaw- Embassy; A367Q. 27, Heymarm to the GDR Foreign Ministry, Ncjvember 253, 1955, DDR MfAA, Warsaw Embassy, A362 Cr. 28. GDR Embassy in Warsaw repcjrt, December 9,4955, SED ZK, microfilm FES 33911M88, 29. GBrallski notes of a meeting with Czechoslcwak and East German representatives (Hager, Florin, et al.), January 5,1955, PZPR KC, 2371XXII-821. 30. Michaef J. Sodaro, Moseozu, Gernfn;rzyfand thc Wesfff"o7rtKJarli~ItelllevCO 66rbachezt (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 19i(a0), p. 56. 31. Heymann to the GDR Foreign Ministry, June 22,1955, DDR MWA, Warsaw Embassy, A3670; and report a n t l ~ erelationship between Germany [sic] and Poland in 1955, undated, SEB ZK, microfilm FBS 339/ 13492. 32. Heymann notes a n meetings in Warsatzr between the GDR government delegatian and Cyrankiewicz and Bierut, et al., March 7,1955, BDR MfAA, Warsaw Embassy, A3579. 33, Bolz to Grotewohl, March 16, 1955, SEB ZK, Otto Grotewohl Papers, NL 90/483. 34. Grslnert to the GDR Embassy in Warsaw, March 26,1955, DDR M f M , Warsaw- Embassy; A3616. 35. Heymann to Crosse, April 9, 1955, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339/1%92; see also Gsosse to Heymann, June 25,1955, DDE MfAA, Warsaw Embassy, A314"i". 36. Memorandum on a meeting between SkrzeszewsEri and Heymann, November 24,2955, MSZ, 10/31/39. 37. Heymann notes on meetings b e w e n the GDR go>vernmentdelegation and Cyrankiewicz and Bierut, et al., March 7, 1955, UDR MfAA, Warsaw Embassy, A3579.

38, Bcrlz to Grotewohl, March 46, 1955, SED ZK, Otto Grotewohl Papers, NL 90/483; see also Heymann to Grc>sse,May 3,1955, DDR MWA, Warsaw Embassy; A3670. 39. See A m L. Phillips, Sottief I;3oEicy T0zolnl.dEast Genrznuy Reco~s?lder&:The Postwar Decadc (New York: Greenwr>odPress, 49861, pp. 131-180. 40. See Jerzy Hdzer, ""Osteuropa und die neue deutsche Staatenordnungf' (East Europe and the new German State arrangement), in Werner Weidenfeld and

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Hartmut Zirnmerman, eds., Deutsclzland-Handbzld: Eine dopyelte Bilans 1949-1989 (German handbook: A doubte baXancc;3,1949-1989) (Munich: Car1 Hanser Verlag, 1989), pp. 685-697. Holtzer claims that all three states, 1301and, Czechuslovakia, and the GDR were apprehensive about Khrushchev's German policy. 41, Trachtenberg, A Aotzstrlacfed Peacl., pp. 231-233. 42. Bierut speech, undated, ca. July 1955, PZPR KC, Bierut Archive, 254/X-5.. fines LIDR43. Hcjrst Grunert, Fiir Nonecker arggtatfcm Pnrketi: Erintzcrzinge~~ Biylanzaten (For Honecker on the smooth parquet: Memoirs of a GB13 diplomat) (Berlin: Edition Qst, 4995), p, 103. 44. ""Poblem of the Federal Republic in the Polish View," by the Office of Expellees, September 26,1955, BRD BfC;DLX7,813"7"1282. 45, Quoted in Nikita Khru~hchev~ Klzrz~slzchevRevzenzbers: Tlzc CEnsnost 'jfapes (Bcjston: Little, Brc>wn,1990), p. "?Ia. 46. Van Mende notes on information from Polish journalists, November 12, hz1954, BRD BKA, E)136/M83; see also Mary F;uXbrc>ok,Anlrforny ofn Dkfnfnrsl~ip; sidc ftze GDR, 2945-1989 (Oxford: Oxfclrd University Press, 49951, p. 435. Fulbrook maintains that these was considerable opgositian to an East German army in the GDR itself: "Fears of loss of family members tzrere combined with a dislike of the notion of Germans shooting on Germameft 4'7. See Peter Merkl, Gemtan Foreigrz blicies, West and ER&: On Clle Thresltold ofn New Euroijent.2 Em (Santa Barbara, Calif: ABC-Clio, 19741, p, 99, 48. Tzydorczyk to Warsaw December 31,1953, PZPR KC, 237/XXTf-5l8. 4% Heymann to Grussq April 9,111i355, SED ZK, microfilm FEZS 339/1%92; and Grosse to Heymann, June 25, 1%Ci5,DDR MfAA, Warsaw Embass5 A36170, 50, Heymann to the GDR Foreign Ministry, July 2,1955, DDR MfAA, Warsaw Embassy; A3670. 51, E-leymann to the East German Foreign Ministry, Nclvember 17, 4955, DDR M f M , Warsaw Embassy, A3670; and Heymam to the GDR Foreign Ministry, December 30,3955, DDR MfAA, Warsaw Embass5 A3616. 52. Die Welt (The MrXB), January 11,1955, in BRD BfGD1F; B137/427. 53. Berlin Office of the BRD Foreign Ministry to Bonn, March 21, 1955, BRD AA, Department 7, vol. 84, 54. See Fechter notes, March 25,1955, BRD AA, Department 7, vol. 84. 55. Kopa memo, March 23, 1956, MSZ, 10/380/42; see also Mjtech Mastny, "We Are in a Bind? 1301ishand Czechoslovak Attempts at Reforming the VVarsaw Pact, 19564959," Bulletin: Cold Wfir Infenzntz'onnl Hi5:sl"ol.yProject, no, 1 4 (winter 195)8], pp. 236-250. New archival evidence points to the serious conflicts within the Warsaw Pact in the latter half of the 1950s. 56. Tqbuna Lzddi-l,January 19,1956, pp. 1-2. 5'7. Tybunn Lzldzt, January 20,1956, p. 2. 58. Bringmann to Waher, February 44, 4956, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339/ 13494. 59. Handke tcr Crutewc~hl,June 45,1956, DDR MfAA, HA/I Secretariat#A37. 60, Heymann to Florin, April 20, 1956, SED ZK, Walter Ulbricht Papers, Nl, 18214247, 61. M, K. Bziewanowski, The Communist Party I?( Bolnnd: An Oz-lflineI?( Histoty (Cambridge: Haward Universiv Press, 19%), p. 256.

62. Hefena Jakubowska notes of meeting with Schlage, November 6, 1953, MSZ, 10/475/49. 63. SEU report on relations between Germany [sic] and the PRP in 1955, undated, SED ZK, microfilm F13S 339123492. 64. Izydorczyk to the Pcdish Fstreip Ministryf April 45,1954, MSZ, 40/367/41, 65. GDR Foreign Ministry analysis of the current foreign relations, undated, unsigned, ca. December 1954, DDR MfAA, Minister % Office, A15156. 66. SED Regional Office in Rostock to Schirdewan, December 24, 1955, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 939143422. 67. From Dziennik Polski (Polish Daily), December 2 , 1953, in BRD BKA, B136/6$83. 68. Heymann to the GDR Foreign Ministry, June 21, 1955, SEB ZK, microfilm FBS 339/ 13494. 69, Heymann to the GDR Foreign Ministry, October 5, 4955, DDR M f M , Warsaw- Embassy; A3616. 70.Heymarm to the GDR Foreign Ministryf Ncjvember 47, 1955, DDR MfAA, Warsaw Embassy, A3670. 79% Stude notes of meeting between Grunert and East German represntatives of the Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, October 3, 1955, DDR MeAA, HA/I Scretariat, A37. 72, SE13 RegimaX Office in 1;tostock to Schirdewan, December 24, 1955, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339/13422, 7'3. SED Central Committee Department of Foreign Affairs to the SED Regional Office in Rc>stock,February I?/ 1956, SED ;SF;, mjcrclfilm FBS 339/13422. 74. Heymann to the GDR Foreign Ministry, January 21,1954, DBR MfAA, Warsaw Embassy, A3616. 75. P-ieymann to the GDR Foreign Ministry, January 28,1955, DDR MfAA, Warsaw Embassy, A3616. 76. Helena Jakubc)wska notes of a meeting of the PZPR Basic Party Organization (POP), October 29,1954, PZPR KC, 237/XXII-732, 77'. Manfred Schmidt report on cultural, events in Poland in the second quarter of 1955, August 9,1955, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339113911. 78. Vcm Mende notes on infcjrmation from PoXish journalists, November 12, 1954, BRD B U , B136/&83. 79. Izydorczyk to the Polish Foreign Ministry, April 15,2954, MSZ, 1Q/367/41. 80. Pieck answer to a Pybul-zn Ludzd repader, March 7, 1954, SED ZK, Wilhelm P i ~ Papers, k NL 36146LL. 81. Report on relations between the GDR and Poland in 1955, undated, unsigned, SEB ZK, microfilm FBS 339113492, 82. Wierna to Drc)zdowicz on a meeting with Wendet November 9, 1955, KC PZPR, Bierult Archive, 254111"-27, 83. Stanjstaw Albrecht to the Polish Foreign Ministry, December 30,1955, MSZr 10/3110/41, 84. Article by Hermann Axcm, undated, in SE&)ZK, Hermann Axen Office, IV 212,0351159. 85. ZlTeymann notes on the delegation exchange for the five-year anniversary of the Zgorzetec agreement, undated, ca. July, 2955, SED ZK, microfilm FlBS 33911x94,

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86. Von M e d e tu Bachmann, July 14,1955, BKD BKA, B136/6484. 87. GDR Embassy in Warsaw repc~l"c,December 9,1955, SED Z K j microfilm FBS 33911M88. 88. Knapik to the Polish Foreign Ministry, September 20, 1954, MSZ, 10/36"i741, 89. Heymann to Handkc3, September 18, 1954, DDR MfAA, Warsaw Embassy; A3579; see also Florin to Ulbricht, October 42,1954, SED ZK, Walter Ulbricht Papers, NL 2 8211247, 90. GDR Embassy in Warsaw repc~rt,December 9,4955, SED ZK, microfilm FES 33911M88, 91. Stude notes on Warsaw Embassy repc~rtfar the second quader of 1955, %ptember 27,1955, DBR MfAA, Warsaw Errtbassy, A3616. 92. Stanisjaw Albrecht to the Polish Foreign Ministry May 31, 1955, MSZ, 10/369/41. 533.Heymann to the East German Foreign Ministry July 2, 1955, DDR MWA, Warsaw Embassy, A367Q. 94. Report on relations between the GDR and Poland in 1955, undated, unsigned, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 334143492, 95, Ernil Skaut notes on Hans Mottek's visit, May 3,1955, KWKzlZ;, file 152. 96. Stanjslaw Smiarc>wski notes on Emst Reinmuth's visit, May 6, 1955, KWGZ, file 152. 97. Skaut notes on Hans tandsberg" visit, July 27,1955, KWKzZ, file 152. 98. Joanna 01kiewicz notes on Rita Schober" visit, December 16, 1955, KWKzZ, file 152. 99. &port a n the Week of GDR-Pr~lishFriendship from November I"i7o November 22, January 20,1956, SET3 ZK, microfilm FBS 339/ 13494. 400. Eleyrnam to Grosse, April 9,1955, SET>ZK, microfilm FBS 333113432; see also Grosse to f-leymann, June 25,2955, DUB M f i A Warsaw Embassy, A3670, 101. Notes on a convention of fcjreign students in the GDR, unsigned, January 25, 2 956, PZPR KC, 2371XX-11-732, 102. Internal memo, unsigned, January 19, 1956, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339143494. 103. Heymann to the GDR Foreign Ministry; January 28, 1955, DDR MMA, Warsaw Embassy, A367Q. 104. Heyrnann notes of meeting with Murawski, December 13, 1955, UDR M f M , Poland Section, A4844. 105. Lobadycz to Bartef, August 22,1956, MSZ, 20/361/39, 106. Heymann report on ]Poland%foreign policy in the second quarter of 1955, August 9,1955, SE&)ZK, microfilm FBS 33911394, 107. Heymann to the GDR Foreign Minit;try, NcJvember 17; 1955, DDR MWA, Warsaw Embassy, A367Q. 108. Heymann tc:, the East German Foreign Ministry; November 17,1955, DDR M f M , Warsaw Embassy, A367Q;and Heyrnam to the GDR Foreigm Ministry, December 30,2955, DDR ;VfAA, Warsaw Embassy, A362 Cr.

KhrushchevfsDe-Stalinization Speech and Gomulka's Return to Power, anuary-ctober, 1956. Jn the countries fjmf Iznz7e de-ShJiniu-d fJw ~ P Z OFIcf~zgay S ~ , aud &land, ill auill lozmrd Ihc 'GDR' hm hegu~zt~ s p w d hecausa of ifs tnninlerzarzce 4 t h Sfalinist ~ U!bricjtf.cozrrse.

Niki.ta I(hrushchev's visit to Belgradc to see Tito inthe sprjng of 1,955was the first clear signal to the Soviet bloc parties that the new Soviet leadership intended to chart a new foreip policy course. ?'he Polish press began to devote extensive coverage to relatio~~s with Yugoslavia, as though calling for a Polish Eto and a Polish natinna) road to socialism. The damor for a &ornu$ reform of the PZPR and a reevaluaticm of its relations with l.he other communist parties quickly escalated after mmshchev%dmunciation of Stalin in his secret speech to the Twentieth Party Congress of the CPSU inFebruary 1956. Fisst Secrebry Boledaw Rierut never made it back frnm Ihe congress. He died in Moscow an March 11, and was succeeded by Edward Ochab, Oehah, like Bierut, had spent the war years in the Soviet Union, but he was no Stalinist. Ochab all,o.cved party dormers to conduct an honest analysis of past policies, ixrcluding relatEons with the Soviet Union and the GDR. Reformers set the record straight ahouf;what happened to the W P durhg the Staljrzist purges of the late 19305, and exposed the crimes Stalin committed against Poland during the war, fn February 1956, the Soviet, Polish, Italian, Bulgariart, and Finnish Central Committees declared that the dissolutian of the W P in 1938 had been mistake.Wchab later acknowledged to an East German official that ""when we learned

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'the bitter truth about the KPP"in 19561, it was very difficult for the party leadership to fight on against the trends of middle-class ideology."3 Party reformrs began to agitate for the return of Wiadysiaw Gomulka, who bad been expelled from the party seven years earlier. ~~n;tsE.lcbev% speech sent tremors rougho out the SED. As lea$er of a party that had been formed at Stalin's behst, Ulbricht refused to denounce Stalin"s contribution to communim, He g r h l y defended his StaIinist policies and quashed dissident voices in the SED who sympathized with the Polish reformers. As far as Ulbricht was cmcerned, the KPD m d SED had set the right course for Germany. In March, one SED member confided in a Polish diplomat that ""the appropriate climate has not been creat-ed i,n the GDR to cliscuss the materid of the Twentieth Party C m gress of the CPSW, as there is in Poland, so that a whole group of publicists and activists in the GDR are waiting for what the 'Zetka7lthe SEU Ce~~tral Committee] will decide.'%other East Germm official achowledged to PoZish diplomts that it was not possibk in the GDR to have the kind of honest debates tbat Pdish artists and witers we= having.4 Off the record, officiats in the East German Foreign Ministry told Polish diplomat Stanislaw Kopa that the SED leadership was havhg difficulty justifying Stafin's cult of personality to the party faithhl, because U'lhricht had developed one himself. One dficial: said, that if UIbricht allowed criticism of the SED" p a t policies, the leadership would. lose membersqtoyalty and the SED's c~dibilitywith the other parties in the National Front, not to mention the trust of "a broad strata of German society.""" As m m and more SEC) members compbined about the lack of honest debate within the Central Committee, Kopa wrote that "one would thjnk . . . that the CC of the SED has not committed any mistakes, but of course that is not so.'" 1111May, Kopa ~ p o r t e dthat party members still had not been informed of the exact contents of mrushchev"s speech. Mthotlgh the SEX>leadership spoke in theoretical terms about "democratizing party life,"' inpractice power remained firmly in Uf:bricht"shands.'" Mthotrgh the SED leaders tried to ignortl the sccret speeeh, they werc most sepowerless to prevent word of it from leaking to the people,"@ rious breaches of confidentiality were comhg from Poland. The PZPR was the only Soviet bloc party to circu,late the secret speech for its membership. In May a delegation of East German historians to Poland reported that Khrushchevfs speeeh was being sold on the black markt, and that serious mani.fcsta,t.ionsof anti-Sovietism were reszllting from the public discussions of Stalin's crlmes.9 fn .April, Ambassador H e y m m reported that the situation in the PZPR wap; '"specially difficult'" because p a w mmbers were openly discussing Stalin's dissolution of the K I T before World War XI, the Soviet massacre of Polish officers at the Katyn.

Forest in 1940, and the failure of the Soviet Red Army to support the Warsaw Uprising against the Germans in 1944. H e y m a ~ ~admonished n the Poles for resurrecting w:hat he callcd these "old lies";I%e noted, too, that the PZPR" May Day celcbsation was lackluster, and that Edward Ochah's speech that day was barely interrupted by the usual apphuse. He warned that "the workers' demonstrations carried a marked national character."ll Hcryrnann also rcported that many Poies thought that Stalin had m v e d the Polish border to the Oder-NtLtisse to create p e r p e b l animosity between Polmd and Germany-'" Heyrnann maintahed bls optimistic outlstlk on the general state of relations with Poland, however, and portrayed the Poles as much more disposccf to East Germany than they actually were; he prcdicrted Chat "the last manifestations of anhosity toward Germans will soon d.isappeazUl3 He thought that Ochab was consolidating his cmtrol over the PZPR, m d that the party would not undergo major chmges. H e even declared that most party members favorably viewed the GDR as the "island of cab," m d that their mderstmding for the GDKs special sibation in relation to West Germmy had grown.l"n an interview with the West G e r m newspaper Frankfzdrter Allg~rneilzeNnehrichte~,Heyrnann was typicalb upbeat about Poland's political development: "The vast mqority of the Polish people stmd by the Soviet Union m d also support a strong friendship with the GDR, Of course there are still several circles, abwe LalZ intellectuals, in which anti-soviet and anti-German attitudes are prtrsent. But these circles are insigniticmt and have no influence on the poljtical development of t h PREf'ls I'he political reality in P o h d wggmted ~therMlise,and the de-Stalinization process proceeded apace that spring. Formr secwity chief Stanislaw Radkiewicz was dropped from the government; the StaXin.ist Jakob Beman, the emint.nce grise of thk, Bierut gwernn-tent, resigned from the Politburo in May. nousan& of political prisoners wen. freed and many others amnestied and rehabil2ated. The political balance was shifthg away from the old guard in the PZPR, and toward Comulka. Ochab was a pragmatist, always followkg the Kremlin's lead rather than forging his own policies, Although Ochab believed that Gomu#hfs incarceration had been a mistake, he made pohted references to the dangers of Gomn%ka,'snatiaonalist and revisionist positions, Ochah was markedly critical of Gomufka" agricultural pol,cies after the war, which he aIIeged had allowed the return of ""klak." As popular support for Gomulka swelled that sumnet; Ochab contemplated a way to coopt him without granting him real power. Gomulka would, have none of it. FIe wanted a chance to appear before the party membership to clear his record m d his name.16 Heyrnann informed his superiors that some PZPR PoWburo mmhers were csnternplating the return of Gomuika to power and that "reac-

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tionary" student and ixrtellectual grmps were forming to support h; ncmetheless, Heymam thought the Ochab group was in ccrntrol of the political situation.17 Heymann's misreading of the situation in Poland would eventually lead to his recall in 1957'. To maintain the public facade of good relaticms between East Germany and Polatd was one thing, but the higher-ups in East Berlin expected more honest rcportjng from their diplomats in the field. The Poznah Revolt The workersf rebellion in Pomajti on June 28,1956, resulted in the deaths of fifty-three de~~onstrators. The revolt was hard, evidence that the PZPR was facing more serious politiral and clconamic problems than Heym. letting on,Divisione; within t-he PZPR widened as rclfomers in the party demanded leadership that would renounce such brutal Stalkist tactics m d chmpion Poland" national interests, Gornu&a was just that man. I'he Polish press cautiously alluded to the Legitimate grievances of the I'oznafi kvorkers*Even the PZPR organ Tybuna liudzl, suggested that economic problems were partly to blame fnr the unrest.18 In private, the East German Foreign MInistry agreed, and recommended that every effnrt be made to send prontised exports to mland-above aXI, m m consunter goods, Un the politjcal front, the ministry urged that East German workers' delegations be sent to Poland from those factorks that had "f~ught szxccessfully aga.inst: the fascist coup in the GDR on June 17,1953,""" The P m a h incident abruptly stopped the de-Stalinization cmpaign in the Soviet press, whicl-t portrayed the revolt as an hnperialist plot. At first, Qchat? eondemed the stri:kers as well, but on the first day of pienary session of the PZXZR Central Committee on July 18, he backtracked, acknowledgirtg that the wlrrkers were reacting to a real drop in their standard of living. Octnab promoted a limited "'democra.t.jza.t.ion'"of the party, which met with disapproval: from hard-liners in the Kremlin. Speaking to the plenum on July 24, Soviet Premier Nicholai Bulganin alleged that the P o a ~ a hrioters had been inspired by Western imperialists; he urged. the party to be on the watch for "'hostile and opportunist elements.'m As usual, the SED followed Che Soviet line, blaming the u~zreston fascists, imperialists, reactionaries, and Western spies, The East German Embassy concluefed that "the me&ods of the (~tnpmitionin the preparation and staging of the provocations in PoznaA arc the sarnc ones that were used on June l?, 1953, in Berlh.""" Neues Dezrtsehland wrote that "it is no coincidence that the enerny chose Poznaii as a showplace for the provocation because at that time the internat-ional [trade] fair was takng place, It involved besmirchiq the good name of People" P o l a d and disrupting its growing peaceful international relations."22

Heymann warned that the Mstern agents had boped to instigate a similar violent outbreak in East Germany He cited as proof the discovery of inflammatory pamphlets in German i x ~one of the Pdi& ""resistance nests." Heymmn reported that many young priests had sided with the demonstrators, although the Caitholic Church had not taken an active role in the events in Pozzzafi. Nonetheless, Heymann interpreted the quick suppression of the alleged putsch as a sign of the political consciousness m d reliability of the PZPR and Polish workers.2" Thmughout the summer of 1956, Che SET) and its parbler parties suppressed all honest djscussion of the Poznari demonstrations. Berthold Rose, t-he head of the East German DRU, told Polisfi dipiomats that the enemy !in Poland] is exploiting the !loosened] atmosphere. . . . They brought abaut provocations in PoznaA, We had similar provocations in 1953. Therefc>re,in order to avoid new ones, we cannot allow ourselves such open discussions like they had and are having in the other people's democracies after the Twentieth Party Congress.24

East German Interior Ministry Vice Minister Herbert GrGnstein told :Kopa that the Polish g w e m m e n t f ~ w i fsuppression t of the Poznari demonstrators was right and necessary because the unrest could have spread to the GDR."" The East German press gave k w direct fndications that there was any tension in relatinns with Poland, or Chat C)chab was i,n trouble. Throughout the summer and into the fall,Nezies Dczdtschlnnd carried frequent and mostly positive articles on Poland. East German journalists issued glowing rcports of the visit of Polish delegations to the celebration ol the sixth iversary of the Oder-Neisse agreement on July 6,md. to the 'Week of Polish-German Eriertdship'" in Kostock. One wrote that ""the cordiality with which our Polish friends we= g ~ e t e deveryhere in the cities and towns of our republic, bears witness that the Geman-Polish friendship has becclme a matter of the heart for a broad sectim of our population" Neziirs Dcrzrlschla~~d pointed out that Poland was East: Germanfs second most important trading partner in the Soviet bloc, asking rhetorically, "What would our metallurgical factories be-just to name one example-kvithout Polish coke?""" An East German parliament-q delegation to Poland. s t ~ s s e d the Poles%am reception, which the East Germans attributed to ""theconsistent peace policy [conducted] by both govemmez1ts.~~z7 Heymann" report on the twelfth annjversary celebration of the formation of the Luhlin pmvisional government on frtly 22 was also positive: "[After] the events in Poznai7 . . . the masses, to a greater extent than before, recognize the machinations of the memy and therefore are rallying

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around their government." H e y m m agajn exaggerated the friendlly state of relations between the GDR and Polmd; supposedly the East German delega.t.ionto the celebratiol~had made a good impression and h d contributed to "the close bonds between our two peoples,"'"" The congrah;llatory message that Grotewohl and Lllbricht sent on the amiversary also gave the impression t-hat relations we= on track: "The fraternal solidarily between our two peoples is expressed in the heartfelt connections to each other."z" Many people-to-people meetings contradicted this propagmda. Time and again East German visitors to Poland were confrmted with yuestions about Khrushehev" sspeeeh and the crimes co itted by the cornmunists parties during StaWs rule." An official in the Poijsh Mhistry of Culturc chastised one visiting East German SIavic expert, Eugen FXBusler, for his igncrrmce of the Nazi occupation of Poland, the Warsaw Uprising in 1,944, and his unwillingness to visit Ausch\vitz.31 Cultural exchanges were mose dangerous to the SED now. Much to the dismay of the SED leadership, many East German writers and artists were favora:bly impressed bp the ncw inteUechaal freedom in Poland and the political engagement of the Polish people," One East German art historian said that his visit to Poland was much mow pleasmt tban a recmt. trip to the Soviet Uni,olz. Me cmfjded in one Polish officid t-hat t-he SED placed mmy more obstacles in the way of artistic ireedom than the PZPR." h East Germm fieater delegaticm praised fie Poles for reconstructing monument.^ to Polis)t monarchs,nhnd mother group of East German journalists was surprised to learn that the Poles operated a central press censorship office. The! East Cermns said that if an editor in the GDR did not censor his own publkation, he immediately last his job.3" The Pofish diplomats in East Berlin, generally took a less sanguirte view of relations that summer. The em:hassy cornplair~edthat cultural ties bet w e e ~the ~ two countries had s~~ffercd grea.t.1~ in the last k w years. Few East German p e r s m e l were devoted to cultural cooperation, and the East Germans would not: agrt_.eto more unofficial and spontmeous cultwal exhanges. The eJnhassy was generally satisfied with the SED's p ~ s coverage s of Polish afiairs, but it characterized the provincial press as "a lot worse."36 Although the East German news reports failed to mention problems related to the Friendship Week in Rostock inJune, the Polish Embassy in Berlin complained about a number of unsettling hcidents. h Kostock, East Germans had smashed shop whdows displaying Polish symbols and slogans; and Polish theater and music performances were beset with technical difficulties, lack of publicity, and poor attendance. East German Foreit;gn Mnistry offici& t d d the Poles that because Rostock was a port city, fnreigners, most likely West Germans, had probably broken the win-

dows, and asserted that the problems connected with the Poiish performances were "in no way cmnected to any hostile gesture toward Polandef'37 The Polish diplomatic corps in the GDR was skeptical about whether the East Germans really wmted better relations with Poland; at the same time, East: German officials blamd their Polish counterparts for a basic lack of trust in the GDR, Gottfricd Gfiinberg, the head of the Central Political Office in the NVA (National PeopIe"s Army), told Kopa that ""up to now cooperation between Poland and the GDR has still been superfirial and ofkn too official. Above ail there has been too few meetings between simple people, workers and peasants." He said that what lirnited cooperation there was between the GDR and Polish delense ministries was still too formal.38 East German officiats were not doing much to engender that trust, however. To prevel~tPoland's potitical instability from affecting the GDR, the party carefully controfled travel to and horn Poland and increased survei2lance over all Polish visitors; for example. the East Gersent the PZPR a report of the prolsman Mkistry of Higher Educatio~~ lems it was having with twelve Polish students studying in Leipzig. The ministry accused the PoXish studmts of being unprepared, undisciplined, and of hmding in other &udentsf work as their own. The xninistry also said that the Polish students isolated themselves from the other htemationd students and lacked i n t e ~ sin t cultural and propaganda activities. In general, the P&& students were maki.ag a bad impression, and Ihe ministry asked the Poles to rectify the situati.on.39 The East German authorities also complained about two Polish students who had abandoned their studies at the Huntboldt University in Kerljn to defect to the West, The East Germans saw this as a dangerws prclcedent."" Ulbricht u~braidedPolish Ambassador Stanisfaw A l b ~ c h for t allowing Poles traveling;inthe GI>R to criticize the lack of freedom in the GDR, the SED's unwillingness to dlow any debate of its policies, and the dleged "huge differences in the standards of living in our countries."' Ulbricht asked Allbrecht to understand that the GDR needed to have an econmy that matched, if not surpassed, that of the FRG, The East German leader said that the GDR could not afford to have the Poles criticizing his country's relative economic prosperity now. tllbrichl. ailowed that if the present economic situation continued, every dissatisf ed [GDR] citizen would go to the FRG.41

The Border Controversy Resadaces After ten years as the main political party in the Soviet zolle, the SED had made little beadway in convincing East Germans to accept the Oder-

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Neisse border. Griinberg informed Kopa that East Germans often exgrtrssed their dissatisfaction with Poland's occupation of German territories. They doubted hvhether Poland could make efficient use of "che territories as Germany had before the war." East German officials acknowledged that many of their compatriots characterized the Poles' alleged lack of initiative and hard wnrk as typical of thc "Poiiish economy" an old slur that had offended Poles for years." K:~opaurged the Polish government to put more resources into the area, because the bombed-out ruitns oE hoLtses on the Polish side of the border only confirmed the impxlession of laziness.& With millions of iznmigrants from the former Geman territories now living in the G[>R, the SEX:,could not atlord to alienate them by acceptjng Polish historical arguments for the new border. East Geman officials adhered to the line that Pieck and tllbricht had set and recognized the border solely as compensation for Hitler's destruction of Polmd. Because reparations can be paid off,the East Germans implied that the area codd revert back to Germany The head of the LDP in East Germany, Kudolf Agsten, told Polish diplomat JBzef Czechori that his pmty wodd not refer to a Polish historical pl.esence in the Western Territories ""because the G e r m n community ejects these arguments, saying, for example, that Silesia was always German, and not Po1ish. The historical argument is not accepted by the GDR population at Agsten confirmed. that many of his party members still held negative opinions of Poles and vehemently rejected the Oder-Neisse border, They thctught that, inAgsten's words, "it is not possible to speak about fricndshiy with Poland. until. the Germans get back poianli"s] Western Territorie~.~" Agsten told Kopa that the Poles did not realize how difticztlt it was to convhce Germans about the need for friendship with Poland.46 For years, Polish diptomats in the GDR had criticized the SED for Rjecting Poland's historical claim to the O d e ~ N e k s eregion. m e wrote that "bt is] seldom when m e makes use of the argument about our historical right to the Western Territories. . . . it is important to note that we will still have to casrte~~d with the symptoms of aggressive revisio~~ism-'"7 h one case, t h Poles compl&d that the SED did not censure a professor at the University of fena for arglling that Poland's Western Territories were historically Germm, m d had been "unjustly awarded to Polmd."48 Such overt revisionism was obviously unsettling to the Polish population in the territories. The head oE an East German teachers' delegatim to Polmd rclported that Pdes were still not convi,nced that the area wodd remain part of Poland; be &served that many Poles livjng there worked. mly for short-term gain. Ile said that some Poles tbcrught the sihtation would improve il Poland recoverczd the eastern territories lost:to the Soviet Union,"

Gomulka's Election. as First Secretav

WBdyslaw Gornuka's election to the PZPR Central Committee on October 20, 1.956, and his promotion to first secretary a day later surprised. both mmshchev and Ulhricht. The Soviets had approved of Gomu#kafs rcltum to the lendership circle of tbe PZf"R, but. as thc Soviet antbassdos to Polmd told Heym "'one never thought that Gomuika would immediately became first secretary,'"So mrushchev &W to Warsaw on October 19; Soviet troops moved m i nously around Warsaw and the Soviet Baltic fleet made a show of force off Gdhsk. Gomulka refused to be intimidated by his uninvited guest: If you talk with a revolver on the table you don't have an even.-handed discussion. I cannot continue the discussion under these conditions. I am ill and 1 cannot fill such a function in my cmdition. We can listen to the complaints of the Soviet comrads, but if decisions are to be made under the threat of physical force 1 am not up to it.."'

The PZPR Central Committee would not allow mrushchev into their plenary sessions, and Khrushchev eventually accepted the party"s decisinn because Gomuika promised to keep P o h d in the Warsaw Pact" Gomulka alluded to the OCler-Neisse border in assuring mmshchev that Poland needs friendship with the Soviet Union more than the Sc>vietUnion needs friendship with Poland. . . . Wthout the Soviet Union we cannot maintain our borders with the West, We are dealing with our internal prctblerns, but our relations with the Soviet Union will remain unchanged. We will still be friends and allies. . . . The Germans will become a threat to the Prjles if our friendly relations with the Soviet Union are ruined.

Although Gomufka did not ask for a removal of Soviet troops from Polmd, he did demand the recall of Polish Mlnister of Defense, Konstantin Rakossovsky, who was a Soviet citizen.52 Gmul-ka not only posed a chalenge to Swiet influence in Poland but jeopardized Potand"s relations with the C;UR through his return. Gomul.ka's proxnise to promote Polish interests was bomd to weaken the political, economic, and militafy cooperatj.on among the socialist states. The GDR's diplomatic isolation from the West made it the most politically and econon?ically dcpendenl member of Che Warsaw Pact. As Ambassador Ileymann put it, the new PZPR leraderst-tip would make Sovict bloc foreign policy ""sgnificantly more ~omplicated.~"s" Gontugka's elcction set a dangerous precedent for the Stdjnists in the other commnist parties, and Ulbricht was m e of them. Gomulka" na-

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tional brand of socialism was a direct cballenge to the SED's orthodox Stalinist policies. W ~ e n the PZPR purged Comulka in 1949, the SED had ohedien.t.1~ echoed the Kremlin by condemnjng Gornuka's mistakes. UI,bricht had oftm lumped %to and GomuIka together and castigated them for various "criminal activities.'"% hn East German Foreign Mhistry official to1d Polish diplomat Jan Pierzchnla that "the imprisonment and earlier removal from the party permanently compromises c o w & GomuF-ka,and his present election to first secretary reflects badly on our [PZPRJC-C'*''-~5 The succession crisis in the PZPR prompted. the Soviet and East Germm authoritks to act quickly to prctvent the evmts in Poland from destabilizillg t-hc political siknatinn in the GDR. On Ocbber 18, the Polish Em,bassy in Berljn reported that the Soviet army in East Gemmy was mobili* and that the SET) worfunctionary P a d Wandel candidty exprltssed his disappctintment in the East Germixn prcss for its lack of indepenknce and its inability to comprcfnend what was really happening in Poland. He said that the SEU was hesitant to support Gomulka because tbey were not sure about his politicli? future; but he faufted Polish delegations to East Germany for trying to convince SED members of the superiority of the PZPR's "ev01uticmary pafrh.'"T East German Char@ d"affaires GGnter Seyfert told Polish Foreign Ministry official Mieczys3-aw Lobodycz that his embassy had ""a guilty conscience" because the East German press coverage of Polish developments was so deficient, 9yfest said that East German journalists in Poland were embarrassed by their lack of Objectkity: "Pofish colieagues show them literature coming from the GDR md ask why it contains such meager and one-sided information. This is partieu,larly the case with translations of Pmzuda articles abuut th Polish press."@ A few brave East Berlill journalists openly criticized the SED"s censorship of news rcpllrts kern Poland. The editors of the Wochenpost (Weekly Post), a SEU affiliate, complained that the interpretation that a party leadership may choose what the masses may or may not hear about this development in the socialist camp is in our opinion cmtradictory to the teninist standards of party and pubtic life, against

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the Leninist principle that the masses m w t know everything. Above all the nation is mistaken that w e can at all prevent the masses from knowing these things.

The editors said that the pea* were forced to get their news from "enemy""hadcasts, such as RlAS radio from W s t Beriin. They went on to criticize the party leadership for its unwaingness to admit wrong-doing and warned that the SE61 wap; losing tl-te people" trust. 'The editors s q gsted that the only way to avoid some of the P7,PR"s mistakes was to have an honest and open discussion of the recent developments in Poland.69 Heymam also recommended that East German ofiicials stay abreast of developments in Poland by engaging in frank discussions with Poles; he even popx"citit^hgail travel restrictions between the GCZR and Poland. Heymam warned oE the stror~glikelihood that Bonn would so011 establish an official representation in Warsaw, in whirh case East German interests would suffer.70 The SED leadership slonewalfed these recornmcztndations,.medtionsIndead, the Politburo enacted even stiffer regulations an contacts with Poles, and increased sllrveiflance over alleged U.S. and West German agents wwkhg in the GDR.7"n Qctobet; when two East Germam wcre accused of spying for the United States, the SEI) called for public meetings in factories and towns, mcrstly in the border areas with Poland and Czechoslovakia, to publicize these espionage activities.7" h the two weeks between Gomdka" selection on October 20 and the Soviet supprclssion of the Ilungarim revolt, tJle SER leadership was on the ideological defensive. One SED official confided in a Polish djplomat that he supported m e of Gonnulka" rmfoms, hut '?for the time being we cannot allow ourselves such a program.'"" The SEWSpropaganda apparalus of the (jeared up for a ncw defetnse of the party's policies. Condematio~~ '"counterrevolution" in Hungary doxninated the pages of Netces. DeufschEa~zdat the a d of October. The SED Politbum boasted that it taken steps to avoid the upheavals t&hg place in Polmd m d Hungary: in emtrast to the development in several other peoples" democratic cormtries (Poland and Hungary), the damaging results of the personality cult were not as extensive [in the GDR], because from the moment of our party's birth to the present we made allowance for the peculiarities of our development. It is a triumph of the German working class that our unified party of the working dass develved into a Marxist-Leninist party.74

'The SEI) leadership told its members that in light of the West's instigation of the evmts in Poland and Hungary, the party had to work even harder to win the East Germm people over to scrcialism.7"

The Potitbum tried to keep the party rank m d file ignorant of developments in Poland and Hungary. Even Central Committee members were not informed. Alfred Neu ,the head of &e SED 21Berlin, poi~~tedly told East German journal t to ask the party about Gomulktl.76 East Germm authorities confiscated the October 22 editions of the SER's BBZ am Abend (Evenh~gBerliner Zeitung) m d Wocherzposk because they included excerpts h m Gornuikafsspeech to the Eighth Plenum m October 20," Un October 25,N e ~ e Deufschlal~ld s at last reported the news of Gomuika's election as first secretary7Vhuf,tmeously,the Polilhuro iss~teda dircctitre €0 the Central Committee and the district secretaries that Gomulkats speech ly for their persond consumption.'" ?he East Geman Foreign Misristry was still so m~informedabout what was happening in Poland lhat it had to ask the PolisEt Exnbmsy for Polish newspapers."" The text of Comulkafs speech did not appear in Neues Detktsehln~duntil October 28, but even then, parts of it were missing. At the end of the month, the Politburo notified the Centraj Committee that it had restricted access to news from Polmd because of the uncertain sibation withh the PZPR. 'The Politburo cautioned that the Polish communists were ma&ng statements with too many "false formulations.""" l November 2, the PoliZt7um gave the Central Committee the full text of Gumulkafs speech, but with the caveat that Poland had "other conditions."gz The Ubricht rggime bad good reason to cmsor these =ports. Ullctricht knew that there was widespread support a m n g the East Geman pc_lpulation and in the SED for Polish-style reforms. Many party mentbers wanted the GDR to embark on its own national road to sociaIism, h t o n Aekermann told Pierzchala confidentially that some party merrtbers had removed all s i p s connecting &em with the SED for fear of: reprisals from the German people should the party fall irom power.WU~ccordingto Pierzchda, East Germm securiv officials were monitoring a rise h mitiSoviet attitudes in East Germany. Me rcported that "dmost everyone is making comparisons between June l 7 119533 in Berlin and the present events in Polmd.. . . Evwyme has much sympathy for f)oZmd. The general attirikrde [is] against tllbrichl."a Robert Mcntzel, the v i e minister of political, affair.; in the East Geman Ministry of Communications, told one Polish +lomt that there were many peoplc in the GDR who sympa&ized wiPh Polmd m d felt ""solidarity wi& the direct-io~~ represented by Nagy in FXungary."'"" Bmno Baum, who headed the SEZ>district office in Potsdam, told a West Germm journalist that the East G e m m people were wh.isperi,ng, "We need a Gman Gomufka, a Germm Nau.'' h o t h e r East: German official confirmed that party members had a '"lively sympathy" for the Polish reforms. He said that members often complained about the stagnation of &e SEUIS policks; they envjed the dynamic changes taking place in the PZPR and consider& them true to socidism. He aeknowledged that the top SEL)leaders were opposed to reforns.86

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On October 25, the editor of Nezles Detafsehkmd, Hermann Axen, and the editor of Trybuna Ludz-r, Artur Kowalski, met in East Berlin, Their heated exchange refleckd how deep the ideolagicai divide betwee11 the SED and.the PZPR had become. Axm knew Kowalski from the Spanish Civil War, anci the two had been irngrisoned toge&er in the concentration camp at Vertzet, France, during World War X I . Axe11 considered Kowalski an experienced and loyal Marxist, but Axen expressed his disappointment in Kowalski" ""naticrnalist and anti-Soviet conceptions.'" Axen said that "this is even more t r o ~ ~ b l h when g one cmsiders that carnrade Kowalski sincerely loves the Soviet people and the CPSU," Axen was also critical of Kowalski and his comrades for Zllaming Poland" econolnic difficulticts on Soviet economic advisors. He argued that the GDR had experienced successful economic growth by following the Soviet eccmomic model, and that the mistakes in Pofand't; industrialization program were the result of natio~~alistic policies, not bad Soviet advice. Axen was shocked that Kowalski accused. nrushchev of meddling in Polish affairs by flyiw to Warsaw on October 3.9. When Kowafski charged the CPW with anti-Setnitism, hxcn told hinn that more likely the FZT"R was nationalist and. anti-Smitic. Axm concluded, "We think it is very dmgem= that comrades with such-gently put-ambiguous and anti-Sovkt ideas travel around h r e . Me got from us a cup Of c&e and just: ideolsgical fimworks otherwise,"B" Gomuika" attempt to make the PZPR m m reflective of workers%terests also crihalfenged the SET>"sZ,e~~hist view of the party's leading role in building socialism. Gomulrka rejected the notion that all workers" proksts in a people's demcraey were inhermtly anti-socialist including the Polznaii demonstrations that summer. Gornuika declared in his speech to the Eighth Plenum that the workers in Poznah, when they went out on the streets of the city, were nut protesting against People's Poland, [or] against socialism. They were protesting against the ills which had vastly multiplied in our social system, which had also painfully affected them, [and] against the warped fundamental principles of wcialism.88

East G e m a n officials, the &rectos of l.he SEWS party schools, Manna Wolf, ior instance, termed PoznaA "a failed iascist putsch."BY

The Suppression af the Hungarian Revolt M i k e the East German p s s , Polish journalists did not blame either the Foznafi or Ihe Hungarian uprisings on f o ~ i g nage~ntsand bo~trgeoisreactionaries. Tqhzma Ludzl characterized the Hungarian afiair as a tragedy, and on Oct&er 29, the newspaper reported that three Polish transports

of medlcisle were on their wa)i to Budapest, The next day, amther article e x p ~ s s e dPoland's sympathy and declarcd solidariv with the Hungarian people.'" No~~ernber I, l.he PZPR denounced thc use of Sovi,et troops in Hur7garyYland the Pojitburo issued a statement that t h Hungarians should be alictwed to resolve their own problms.92 'The PZPR rejected the SEWScharacterization of Nagy as a counterrevol~~tio~~ary and Western agent, M a y Polish communists viewed him as the '"Hungarian Gomuikaf'-the kgitimate leader of another nationaf communfst movement; however, U'lbricht warned that "Hungary teaehcs Ibat kvhoever gives even his littk finger to reaction will end by losing hls life."% Ulbricht was propktic. On November 4, the Soviet army deposed Nagy and declared martial law. Evidently Kkrushchcv thought that Hungar)i might go the way of Xto in 1948, and even Eto saw the danger of the Hungarim "comterrewlutionnff~~ Ower 2,000 Hungarians died in the fighfing. Gomulka could not phlicly s q p o r t Che Soviet xtjon in Hungary with.out losing some of his popular support; but at the same time he did m t want to jeopardize his compromise with IChrushchev, In a symbolic gesture, the Polish,delegation in the W.N. General Assembly abstahed on the resolution condeming the Soviet Union" i~tervention.~3 Imre Nagy took rttfugc in the Yugoslav Ernbassy in Budapest. tn the su,mmer of 1958, he was kid,napped by Soviet agents; on Jww 16, 11,95RIafter a short trial, he was executed. The Polish government was shocked by Nagyfs death. Gomulka sent a persmal letter to Khrushchev expressing his remorse, and Rapack.i spoke out publicly wainst the execution. The official Pdish press was silent, but Polish iprtellechral and church p u g s held numerous protests. Students at the Catholic University in Luhlin worr. black adorned with the green-kvhite-red colors of the Hungarian flag; graves in Poznari wem decorated with grem-white-red streamers. The PZPR did not stop these protests.46 hccording to East Germm diplomats in Moscow, Rapacki event~~ally had to stifle his opposition. and s~tpport Moscow" foreip policy but the East Germims doubted his shceri"tJrw Durlng a visit to Polmd in early November, 1956, East German President Friedriich Ebert declared that "we will never let the fraternal relations between the German and Polish nations become troubled or ruined, We wish the Polish people further successes in building socialism as well as in the struggle to raise l.he standard of livi,ng fos the kvorki,ng masses,"'"Wt the same time, Pierzchalra reported that some of the younger officiais in the East G e m m Foreign Ministry who had previously judged Gornuika as unfit to lead the PZPIt were now having a change of heart. One top Foreip Mhistry official told Rerzchala that the %R's position toward Poland immediately after Gomuika" election was ""essentiallyfalse," and that "it even brcznght m c h harm,.''qg The SED and the PZPR were beaded in different ideological directions, however. The Ubricht rkgime had t e e t e ~ don the brink in 1953, only to

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be saved by the Soviet suppression of t h June uprishg. Gomulka" seturn to power had threatened Wlbrirht" rkgime again, but the violent end to the Hungarian crisis soiididied U'lbrieht's position. Tbe Hungarian revolt put a brake m de-Stalinization; the & d i n now favomd policies that were closer to Ulbricht" stalhist course. By quick s~~ppression of opposition in the GDR, the Ubriclht r4gime managed to avoid the political turmoil experienced by Poland and Hungary in the fall oE 1956. But the SEUfssharp condemnation oE Gomulkafs allegedy m-Marxist and ndionalist policies and Chc Polish communists' equally vituperative criticism of Ulbricht" srepentant Stalinism soon erased h a t little good will the two parties had lieveloped over the past decade.

4. Maltzan (West German Embassy in Paris) to the FRG Foreign Ministry, Qctober 19,1956, BED AA, Department: 7, vol. 77. 2. Trybzinn Lild~i,February 49,1956, p. 1. 3. Memorandum on East German Min;ister of Culture Alexander Abwch" visit to Poland, rmsigned, January 31,1961, DDR ME, DC-20, file "i"OQ. 4. Jan Mostowik notes of meeting with Br, Hermann, April 19, 2956, MSZ, 10/377/42. 5. Kopa notes of meeting with Nassti, April 27,1956, MSZ, 101377/42, 6. Kopa notes of meeting with Siegewasser;April 27; 1956, MSZ, 101377142. 7.Kcjpa notes of meetings with SEC) members, May 44,4956, MS?, 10/377/42. 8. See M. K. Dziewanowski, The Gomtnz-lnisf&rty of 1Safnnd:An Ozklline of Histurp (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 19761, p, 176. 9. Blubek report on East German historians' trip to 13alandfrom May 7 to May 12, May 42,1956, SED ZK, Walter Ulbricht Papers, NL 182/1247. 10, Heyrnann to Florin, April 20, 1956, SEB ZK, Walter Ulbricht Papers, NL, 18211247, 11. Heymann to the GDR Foreign Ministry, May 2, 1956, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339/13494. 42. Heymann to the GDR Frrreign Ministry, May 28, 4956/ SSED ZK, Walter U1bricht Papers, N L 113211247, 43, Ibid, 14. Heymann to the GDR Foreign Ministry, June 11, 2956, SEB ZK, VValter UIbricht Papers, NL 18214247. 15, Heymann to the GDR Foreign Ministry, May 30, 1956, SEB ZK, microfilm FBS 339/ 13494. 16. Nichoias Bethefli, GomuIh, His bEa7.zd nud His Colrtmunism (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1969), pp. 203,206-207. 4'7. P-ieymann to the GDR Foreip Ministry June 41, 1956, SED ZK, Walter U1bricht Papers, N L 113211247. 48. See Tybzlr2a Lildzc, June 29-30, 4956. 19. B r i n p a m to Mundermann, June 29, 1956, BD13 MfAA, HA/1 Scretariat, A37.

20. 1%.F, Leslie, et al., Tke Hktory I?( PoEa~dSil~ce2863 (Cambridge: Cambridge Universiv Press, 1980), p. 351; and Bethell, Gorrzzctka, His &land and His Cumntzinism, pp. 208-209. 21. Syfert to Handke, June 29,1956, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 3352/13488. 22. Neues Dezdtsclzlu~zd~ June 253,1956, p. 5; September 25,4956, p. 5; and September 27, p. 5 . 23. Heymann notes of meeting with Stasiak (First Secwtary of the PZPR in Pmnafi), July 19,1956, SE%)ZK, VValter Ulbricht Payers, NL 18211247. 24. Jakubc)wski notes of a meeting with Rose, July 24,1956, MRRS 110/3'7"8/42. 25, Kopa notes of a meeting with GrGnstein, August 1,1956, MSZ, 40/378/42. 26. %laps Decltselrland, July 5, 1956, p. 5. The GDR did the most trade with the Soviet Union. 27. Report of an East German parliamentary delegatiron to Poland, Oct&er 8, 1956, SEX) ZK, microfilm FBS 339/ 13492. 28. Heymann to the GDR Foreign Ministry, July 25, 2956, SEB ZK, microfilm FBS 339/ 13494. 29. Dieckmann, Grc~tewohl,and UZbricht to Zawadski and Cyrankiewicz, July 22,2956, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339113492. 30. See S. Liszewsh repc~rtof Humboldt University Professar of History Heinz Lernke's visit to Poland, April 6,1956, K W k Z , file 153. 32. S. Liszewska report of Eugen F-T8uslerfsvisit to Poland from April 19 to May 3, May 45,1956, K W k Z , file 153. 32. See H. Skolik notes of a visit to Poland by University of Leipzig Professor Hans Baeyer and Humboldt University Professrrtr Manfred Nussbaum frcm April 26 to May 27, May 27, 2956, KW&Z, file 153; see also Bigniew Brzezinski, The Sovki: Bloc: Unify ~nndCanJlicl (Cambridge: Ha ward Universiv Press, 19671, p. 98. The SED prided itself on the rapid development of socialism in East Germany and the engagement of the populace in the political process. In 1954, the PZPR had 1,29&",000 members, from a total populatim in Poland of 2725 million. The SE&)had 2.272,%7 members, fram a total population of just w e r 28 million. 33, Ernil Skaut report of art historian Kurt Schifner" visit to Poland from July 26 to August 9,1956, MWMzZ, file 153, 34. Report on an East German theater delegation to Pc>Xand from May 15 to May 18, s i p a ture unintelligible, May 4 8,1956, KWKzZ, file 153. 35. S. Z,iszewska report of visit to I)c>Xand.of East German writers and jsurnalists from April 42 tc:, May 30, June 12,1956, K W h Z , file 453. 36. Polish Embassy in Berlin report from Jmuary 2 to March 25, 1956, MSZ, 10/3'7"0/41. 37. B r i n p a m to VVahner, June 9,1956, SEB ZK, microfilm FBS 339113494; and Pierzchaia notes of a meeting with Wenck and Kinigkeit, July 10, 15256, MSZ, 10/378/42. 38. Mopa notes of a meeting with GrGnberg, September 28, 19514, MSZ, 10/3;""X/42, 39. Ministry of Higher Education memu on Halina Zalewska" visit to the GDR, August 24,1956, PZPR KC, 237/XXII-732.. 40. Pierichala notes of meeting with Kinigkeit, September 6, 1956, KC PZPR, 2371XXII-732.

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41, Edodycz to G6ralski on Ambassador Albrecht's meeting with Ulbricht, july 13,1956, P a n KC, 2371m11-822. 42. Kopa notes of a meeting with GrGnberg, September 2% MSZ, 10/378/42. 43. Repcort on obtaining visas to Poland, unsigned, September 2% 1956, SED Z K , microfit m FBS 33912 3488, 44. Kopa notes of a meeting with an East German border guard in FrankEurt/Oder, April 5,1956, MSZ, 10/37/42. 45, Czechofi notes of meting with Agsten, July 20,1956, MSZ, 10/378/42. 46. Kopa notes of a meeting with Agsten, June 22,1956, M S Z p 10/377/42; see also Fulbrc~ok,Anatomy oflz Dictalarsship, p. 189. 47. Polish Embassy in Berlin report from January 1 to March 15, 1956, MSZ, 10/370142. 48. Mapa notes of a meeting with Namiot (Polish student studying in Leipzig), October 8,1956, MSZ, 101378142, 49. Fritz Baats report of an East German teachersAetegatlion to Poland, October 10, 1956, SEB ZK, Walter UXbricht Papers, N t 18211247; see also Nikita Khrushchec: Khrushcltcv Re-lne-lnbers:The Last Tcsfa~r~ent (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), p. 207, 50. Heymann to the GDR Fcyreign Ministry; January 20, 195'7, SEE) ZK, Waiter Ulbricht Papers, NE, 182/1249. 51, Quoted in Caddis, We Noro Klzuw, p. 211, KIzrusItcbtev Re~.rtenzbcrs:The Glnsnost Tapes (Bostcon: lEJittte, 52. Khru~hchev~ Brcown, 1990), pp. 115,118-120. Rokoss~wskya native Pole, had commanded the %viet Army an the East bank of the Vistula River in VVarsaw during the uprising against the Germans in 1944, Many Poles blamed Stalin and Rokossctvsky for allowing the Germans to destroy the Polish Home Army; thus eliminating the military- wing of the Polish go>vernmentin Idondon.Gomu+ka%sold ally Marian Spychalski, replaced Rokossovsky as commander-in-chief of the Polish armed forces. 53, Heymann to the GDR Fcjreign Ministi"yIOctober 20,1956, DDR MfAA, Warsaw- Embassy; A3579. 54. Dietrich Staritz, Cesefiiclzte der BDR, 2949-1985 !History of the GDR, 1949-1%5] f FrankEurt/ Main: Stxhrkamp VerXag, 1985), p. 24, 55, Pierzchala to the Polish Foreign Ministry, October 26, 1956, PZPR KC, 237/XXII-822. 56. 13ierzchafa to the Polish Foreign Ministry, October 26, 1956, 13ZPR MC, 2371m1I-822; see also joachim Ciirlich, "Kc3mmrmistixhe Freundsehaft an der Oder und Neisse" (Commrmist friendship on the Oder and Neisse) Ostelaropa (East Europe), no. 10 (19641, g. 726. According to Gbrlich, a "wasserpco1,tnisch"" autochthon who left Poland in 1959, a Catholic publication from PoznaA cond e m e d the East German army" actions in October 1956. 57'. Friiz Schenk, llsl Vorzimmer der Ifiktntzrr; 22 jizl~rePankc7w (In the antechamber of the dictatorship: Twelve years Pankow) (Cologne: Kiepenheuer and Witsch, 1962), p. 180; see also Staritz, Cesclzicltte der DDR, 1949-2985, p. 116, 58. Jakubowski notes of a meeting with Wandel, October 26, 1956, M S Z , 10/5;78/42. 59. Tybunn Lzldzt, Octcjber 20,1956, g. 1.

140. Czechoh notes of a meeting with Richard Schmiiing, October 20, 1956, MSZ, 10/378/42. 141. Pierzchafa to the Polish Foreign Ministry, October 26, 1956, 13ZPR MC, 237/XXII-822. 62. Neues DezirsdzEtrnd, October 23, 4956 p. 4. 63. Riezk~sDeuliscIzland, October 21,1956, p. 5. 64. Tybulza Ludlr, October 21,1956, p. 2. 145. Trybunn Lzddu, Oct&er 24,2956, p. 2. 66. Pierzchala to the Polish Fr~reignMinistry, October 26, 1956, PZPR KC, 237/XXIX-822. 67. Jakubowski notes of a meeting with Wandel, October 26, 1956, MSZ, 10/3713/42. 68. Lobodycz notes of a meeting with Seyfert, October 26, 1956, MSZ, 10/361/39. 69. Letter from the chief editors of the Wocflenposlt.to Rudi Wetzel, et al., October 27,1956, in SET> ZK, Politburo Draft Protocol No, 54, October 30, 1956, J 1V 2/2A/528. 70.H e y m n n to the GDR Fctreign Ministi"yIOctober 20,1956, DDR MfAA, Warsaw Embassy, A3579, 71. Briefing on the court proceedings against U.S. secret service agents, OctoV ber 26, 2956, in SED ZK, Politburo Draft Protocol No. 54, October 30, 1956, J X 2/214/528. 7 2 . Propaganda DeparZment plan for public agitation after the trials of Sticker and %hulzef et al., Octc>ber26,1956, SED ZK, Politburo Draft Protocol No. 54, October 30,1956, IV 2/2A/528. 73. Jakubowski notes of a meeting with Wenk, October 26, 1956, MSZ, 10/361/39, 74. "Nothing Can Stop the Progressive Development," in SED ZK, 1301itburo Draft Prc>tc>coXNo. 54, Octc,ber 30, 1956, J TV 2/2A/528. 75. 1301itburoletter to the members and candidate members of the Central Committee, SED ZK, Politburo Draft Protc~colNct. 54, October 30, 1956, J TV 2/2A/528, 76. Kopa notes of meeting of the PZPR POP [Basic Party Organization] on October 24, October 25,1956, MSZ, 40/378/42, 77. Eobodycz notes of a meeting with Seyfert, October 26, 19514, MSZ, 10/361/39. 78. Meties Deu fscizlalzd, October 25,1956, p. 5. 79. SED Politburc:, decree3Octc>ber25, 1956, SED ZK, PcJXitburoPrc~tocolNo. 53, J IV 2/2/507, 80. Jakubowski notes of a meeting with Wenk, Octc~ber26, 1956, MSZ, 10/361/39. 81. SED Politburo letter to the members and candidate members of the Central Committee, SET> ZK, Politburo Draft Protocol No. 54, October 30, 1956, J IV 2/2A/528. 82. SED Politburo memorandum, SED ZK, Pctlitburc~Protocol NCI.55, November 2,1956, J TV/2/2/509,

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83. 13ierzcha2anotes, cited in Kopa to the 1301ishForeip Ministy, November 9, 1956, MSZ, 10/3"7/42. 84. 13ierzchafa to the Polish Foreign Ministry, October 26, 1956, 13ZPR MC, 237/XXII-822. 85. Janusz Rachocki notes of a meeting with Robed Menfie1 on November 16, Nctvember 22,1956, MSZ, 101378/42. 86. Nasielskl notesf cited in C. Urbaniak (Polish Military Mission) to Eobo>dycz, October 26,1956, MSZ, 2 0/378/42, 87, Notes of a meeting between Hermann Axen, Ceorg Hansen and Artur Kowalski on October 25, October 29, 11956, SEB ZK, f-lermann Axen Ogice, TV 2/2.035/43; see also Pierzchala notes, cited in Kopa to the I""olitif7 Foreign Ministry, November 9, 1956, MSZ, 10/378/42, "fe SED had the same problems in owercorning anti-Sc~vietattitudes in the GDR. Pierzchala noted a definite distaste among East German students for studying Russian. 88. Bybzrnn Lzldzt, Octojber 21,1956, g. 3. 89. See "Notes on Current Events and Relatic~nsbetween Poland and the GDIt," unsigned, December 8,1956, MSZ, 10/ 378/42, 90, T y b u w Lzddtk, October 29,1956, p. 1; and October 30,1956, p. 2. 92. Csaba Bekes, "New Findings on the 2956 Hunprian Revolution," Balletirz: Cold Wnr Tnfernntz'onalFJislofy Project, no. 2 (fall 1992), p. 3. The PZPR changed its position aAer the %viet suppression of the Hungarian revolution on November 4, 92. T y b u w Ludir, November 2, 1956 p. 1. 93. Quoted in Carola Stern, Ulbricltt: A hlitz'cnf B e m p h y (New Ycxk: Frederick Praeger, 4965), p. 161 94. Urushchev, EChmsffclzeztReme~rzbers:Tht Glnsnosf Tapes, p. 127. 95. See Norman Davies, God's PInyground: A Hist-u?yi f Poland, blzifne 11: 1795 fu flte Present (New York: Columbia University Press), 2 982, p. 587. 96. tinder (GDR Fc~reignMinistry) to Florin, July 28, 1958, SEC>ZK, Wal ter UIbricht Papers, NL 18211250. 917. Rossmeisl (GDR Embassy in Mt>scow)no>tesof meeting with Krek~tin($XIviet Foreign Ministry), July 23, 1958, SET) ZK, WaLter Ulbricht Papers, N L 18211250. 98. T y b u w Ludir, November 3,4956f p. 2. 99, 13ierzcha2anotes cited in Kopa to the Polish Foreign Ministry, November 9, 1956, MSZ, 10/3";"8/42;see also Franz Sikclra, SoziralisfischeSolidlzrif2E-irnd ~zatiotznte Xntewssen (Socialist solidarity and national interests) (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 197;7), g. 142.

The Cold Winter of Polish-East German Relations, 1956-1957 WPEI,ac~fien nrc you [the SEUl going fa atrsf I ~ Slalitlisfs? P -PZPR member to East German jour~galistSuznnne Lkmclgste-P"Z

h i n o u s portent attended Gomika's trip to Moscow ten days after the Soviet Idnion ended the Hungarian revolt on Novernber 4,19,56. Ncr one h Isolmd was confident that mrushchev would allow Gomutka to remah in power, and many feared tlnat be wouXd never come back from the Swiet Union. Wen Gomulka returned after fnur days of productive talks, his position was no longer in doubt. Me ever1 oklliged Khrushchev to acknowledge that the Soviet Union had underpaid for Polish coal from 1945 to 3953, and had not: adeyuately compensated Poland for the stationing of Sovkt troops. Khrwshchev agreed to cancel all I'olmd's debts. That November, the Kremtin informed a GDR delegat-ionof its support for Gomulka. Ulbricht now h e w that he would have to reconcile bnself with his old rival, but he would not make any compromises with Gomul-kaism. UXbricht stayed m his immutable Stalinist course, By this time, he had f i r d y aliped m s t of the SET)membership behind him. Ulbricht worried, nonetheless, that Khrushchev's criticism of Stalin's cult of personality had dready gone too far, for it threaitened to expose his own, An SEC>Politburo report on the Polish and Hungarian crises insisted that "the clear ideological front between Marxisb-Leninisr and bourgeois ideology must last, and this has to cmtinue despite opportunjstic views, liberal degeneracies, [and1 the renunciation of Leninist standards of party life." The SED leadership boasted that "some People's Republics are surprised by our calm development," but advised party

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members to avoid contacts with Poles if the PZPR went down a different road to socialism.;? East German journalists told Polish diplomat Janusz Rachocki that differences between the two parties should remah on a theoretical rather than a personal level, and maintained that "it is necessary to respect that Stalin's n m e W= dear to all communists as a symbot of social is^^^''^ Most Poles thought differently about Stalin, and an intense dcbate cmsued that fall between reformers in the PZPR m d hard-liners in the SED. Polish and East German officxs made unprecedented p21blic des~ul-rciations of each other: The Poles chided the East German communists for their blind devotion to Stalinist political, social, and eccmomic policies, and the East Germans lectured the PZPR for deviating front orthodox Marxist-Lenjsrist principles, The Polish Embassy in Berlin reported that the SED was c m i n c e d that Gomuika was carrying out his old nationaiist program, m d that Gorntlika m d Eto mderstood each other on this score. Ulbsicht warned the East Germm prtrss that Polish journalists were coming to Berlin only to make contacts in West Berlin and West Germany The SED stopped sending journajists to Poland and stkctly prohibited the publication of Polish n e v a g e r and journal articles.. I"czlil;h diplomats speculated that U'lbricht still thought that counterrclvolutionaries might seize power in Poland." At the erid of November, the Polish newspaper Ex-yrr:'~ Wieczor~zy (Evening Express) repctrted Utbricht's assczrtim that Stalhism had never existed in the GUR, Atfudhg to the developments in Poland since October, Ulhricht argued that "liberalization really [means] the mestablishmelnt of capitalist conditims." The East G e r m n antbassador, Stefm Heymann, told the newspaper" editor that Ulbricht had said only that there had never been one-man leadership in the SEC), but nothitlg about Stalinism or "liberalization."~ The East German kadership maintained that Gornuika" r d o m s had no relevance for the development of socialism in the GDR, and they made it clear to the Poles that the SED wodd not make abrupt policy changes,Wobert Mentzet told one Pofish diplomat that he and his c m rades t.hought the Polish =forms were dangerous deviations from good socialist practices. The SED was particularly critical of the PZPR"s personnel changes and decentralized economic plan.7 During a visit to Poland that fall, SED functionary Conrad Neumam chided Polish officials for exaggerating Polmd" socialist political development in recent months. Neumann reported that he often encountered this arguxnent in Poland, notably among workers: '"The GDR is twenty years a k a d oE us in technoloa-but Poland is tcvcnty years ahead of the GDR in d e m c ra tiza tion," N~eumannalso criticized the Poles for declaring that East

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German journalists ""merclly recapitulated what TA% chewed first."'" He accused the PZPR of making numerous ideological mistakes that deviated from "Lenirzist directives," He concluded that PoXmd was a ""cmplete mess."'" The SEU kept its state security forces on full alert to prevent that ""mess"kom spilling over into the GDR, and sent party members into the factories to spread more propaganda among the workers, The East German cclmmunists we^ most cmcemed that the mfettered Polish press would undermine the SEWS strict control over political Chought in the comphined that the Polish press was doing too little to counterart anti-soviet and anti-Semitic displays in Poland,"" and the East Germm Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, Bemard Koenen, told a Polish diplomat that the economic problems in Polmd were the direct result of the PZPR's lack of press censorship.1l The SEC) restricted the circulation of the Polish press in the GDR, and East German jollrnais ig~~ored the PZP:R"s public statements and c o m m u n i ~ 4 msulting s from the PZPR's talks with the Soviet, French, Italian, and Cl~inesecclmmunist parties.12 N m e m u s SED inklligel~cereports alluded to Che danger of the free Polish press, which was openly reporting on pseviously taboo subjects; for instmce, Pales told East German officials that the thousands of Polish officers fottnd buried i.n the Katyn Forest near Smolemsfchad been shot by the Soviets in 1940, not by the Germans after Hitler attacked the Soviet Union h 1941, One East German official was incredulous: "How can one speak of an ally here when they make such anti-Soviet stateme11ts?"l3 The head of the SED in Leipzig thought that the Polish press was guil.t)i of printing falsehoods &out socialism and the other socialist parties. As he told one visiting Polish prdessor, "our sources of i d m a t i o n are Moscow and Ne~kesDezilselzlnnd, and not Warsaw, RIAS, or the BBC [British Broadcasting Corporation]. We do not eiepend on Poland for anything, and we absolutely disagree with the politics of that party [the PZPR]."l4 Polish officials, however, were disdainful of the East German press for its hcomplete m d biased reporthg on the Polish October.13 The Polish Foreign Ministry criticized the SED for cutting the populace off from "bonest and objecthe informatbn about Poland,'bnd for engaging in ""on-ided connmentary'"about Poiish political developments. The ministry also carped at East German officials for questioning Gonrulka" persomel changes.16 In October 19556, the Polish s t u d e ~political ~t journal PO Prosfzr (Straight Talk) published m article deplorirtg the Stalin.istsrpractice of glorifying all thFngs Russian.l7 11% the N o v e d e r issue of t-he Polish Wfinistry of Cultare and Art wan Przeglgd K a J f g m l ~ ~(Cultural y Revj,ew), Edda, Werfel also calied for the elimixration of the '"yesmen" from the Soviet bloc communist parties.lWestern radio and press also picked up the article.

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This toady behavior was markdly true of the Ulbricht rbgime. Polish diplomat 'J6zef Czeehori reported that Ulbricht was incensed by these articles. East G e r m ofticids were notably disparaging of Werfcl's piecel which they decricd, as interference h mother party's domestic affairs.19 :111 one of the sharp"" polemics against Werfel, Neztes Deutschlund editor Hermmn Axen rejected her contention that the Pdish October was the real evolution for workers, hstead., Axen credited the Soviet a m y %victory in 1 9 4 for the creation of the workersbepublics. In an indirc.ct reference to Utbricht h x c n defended those who had loyaily semed the communist pasties under Stalin" leadership, He assailed Werfel" ccaIl for a new ""hmme socialism," vvhich he equated with the false cmceptions of the nineteenth-century Utopian Socialists and Kurt Schumaclner's Social Dcmacrats. As Axen put it, "the most humane socialism was and is the socialism of the Soviet Union. Axem was most offended by WerfeYs assertion that: wt.toever was agaitnst the 1956 Polish revolution was for "counterrevolution."' He lumped Werfel tclgether with such other "renegades" as autkor Arthur Knestler, and the Hrangarian htellectrrals in the PetGli Club, and RIM. H e criticized Werfel for interfering in East Gcrman affairs, and polnted out that Western propaganda agencies were ush~gher article to attack the GDR. Axen cmcluded that "we [Poles and East Germans] are fraternal people and fraternal parties. Enemies should never and will never separate us, not even such scribes as Edda Werfel.,"Qz'J Polish officials vi,gorously cclrsured Axen's attack. The foreig~npoIisy editor of i\iom Dragz' achowledged that Wrfel had, made several ideological mistakes, but told Heymann that he thought it was wcrng for Axcn to respond with such "'crude attacksf% the SED's maiin newspaper rather than in a cdtural journal on the same level as Przeglqd Kultumlrzy, He added that Axen's venomous tcme was precluding sober debate of the issues," h ecnjtor from T~burzaLudn called Axen's article an "outrage"; he accused h e n of sticking his nose h another p a r v s affairs. He said that if Axen got his news anywhere else but from lVrues DeuCsctzlul.td, he would not have arrived at such "false generalizations." iycie Warswrvy (Warsaw Life) characterized Axen's diatribe as hitting WerfeI with a "stedge hammer.'"'". Later h the year, Hmna Wolf denounced PO Prostu for saykg that the StaIinist era had ended with Khmshchev" secret speech. Wolf wrote in Ne~4t.sDentschlnlzd that she was saddened by Pt, P m s t d s assmtion that the Polish workjng class had Lost its leadng role and that the PZ37R had "'degenerated." Wdf added that "it f i b me with pain that the comrades tdk about their own class and their own party in such a way.'YSh asserted that: the CJelnhistprjnciple of the party's centrd control was necessary to prevent another Hungarian-style uprising. Wolf also criticized the :I'ZP:W%rmoval of the former ambassador to the GDR, Jan Izydorczyk,

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from his post as first secretary of the PZPR h Poznari; she said that Zzydorczyk had proven his loyalty to the communist movement through his ent in a Nazi co~~centration camp. In what was to become a common postscript to these attacks on a partner party, Wolf defended her right to criticize the PZPIC by contending that what happmed in Poland affected the entire smialist carnp.24 The SER Limits Cufturaf Exchanges For years, the SED had tried to regulate alf official and mofficial contacts between Poles and East Gem-tans. With some East Germans calling ktr their okvn "1301ish October," Ul,lnricht took stronger measures to s t m p out revisionjsm," For exampIe, East German professors at the Karl Marx University in Leipzfg told visiting Univen;ity of Warsaw Professor Tadeusz Kupis that the old Stalinists in the SED were promoting their policies as suitable for the East German nationd condition. Some East German prdessors complained that the SEI) wanted to quarantine East German citizems from the unreliable Poles; Kupis reported that the SED had ordered parity members to avoid contact with the Polish professors at the university26 The hard-lhers in the SED were notaibly mgered by Poles in East Germany who criticized the Wlbricht rkgime and urged liberal reform." In early November, when Polish stuetents s h d y i ~ ~atgLeipzig proposed a meeting with East German stlldents to discuss the political developments in Poland, the district SED office would not allow it.2Vhe East German sbdents at Leipzig, indoctrinated by the SED, accused Gomulka of Leavi,ng the Sovi,et camp and allokving the klourgeoisie to dictate political and economic policy." That fall, East Gernan officials refmsed to permit its youth delegation to go to W a r w for the Polish Writersf Union Cor~gressBWnlya few East German wrjters were permitted to attend, on the grounds that the Poles had invited too many Westemers.31 At a meeting of Polish and East German historims in Berlin that November, some of the Poles predicted that the SED also would eventually have to u n d e ~ ao democratizationprocess. One Polish historian thought that the recently rehabilitated Franz Dahlem was a good candidate to be the ""E,ast German Gornu2ka"; the historian noted that Dhlem had recently complitnnmted Poland for gohg through "'a, stormy [butl fortunate development." h o t h e r historian all but demmded that Dahlem replace Ulbricht, and another told Btto Winzer that Dahlem was no answer because ""Dahlem is of course as big an apparakhik as Ulbricht."32 Word of this exchange got back to Ulbricht. Ulbricht had never trusted Dahlem or any other Germm communist who had spent the war years in. Germany. Dal-rlem, like Gomul-ka, had been purged from the party and

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then rehabilitated.3Wt"lbrichtnow suspected Dahlem because he had been in Poland during the October day?;,and had praised the Eighth Plenum for shokving the SED t-hat a nati.onal road to socialism w s possible, In a fit of ange.E;Ulbricht canceled a banquet for the historians and ediately. He told Winzer to ordered them to leave the country i the Pdish Embassy about the incident, and to tell the Polish gove that its ddegations should not meddle in East Germany" internal affairs." %mi&w Kopa apologized to Wnzer for the affair," h t Kopars colXeague Jan Pierzchaia characterized the historians' visit: as an overa:lf success, even though some SED functionaries had behaved coldly toward trhem." As a dirc3ct result oE this incident, the SEC) postpmed the visit of anoCher ten Polish prokssors and suspended other scheduled visits of East Geman scholars, students, and youth delegations to PoIand.37 In October, the PZI'R &axed controls m tourist visas for foreipers and Poles. 'The SED Politburo responded by tigl?tening regulations on travel to and from Poland and Hungary. h a move to shield its populace from poiitically unreliable elements, the Polifburo alerted its security agezzcies to run d~ecrkson the passports of all traveliers between the GDR, Poland, and Hungary" The SED also decreed that visieors from these countries w a to he kept to a mfnimum, and =strict& to "goiitically qraalified persnns." 2 any case, all fo~ignerswe= to be give11 "political escorts." B The GDR Foreign Ministry was given authority to monitor all student and trade delegations to Poland; social organizations that wanted to visit Poland had to get Central Committee approval.40 East G e m m diplomats had difficuly justifytng a policy meant to limit exchanges. When the SED suddmly postpcmed the scheduled visits of sweral Polish ddegat-ions that M, East German atiachi. Giinter 9yferl: told Polish Fornip Ministry official Mieczyslaw Lhodycz that groups from the other peoples9epublks had been schedded to come at the s m e time. kobodycz observed &at Seyfcrt was visibly embitrrassed about having to lie about the cancellations. Lobodycz wrute Poiish Foreign Minister Adarn Rapacki that he h e w the East Germm government did not want Polish reforms with East Germans.41 delegat-ions discussjng the PZPR's rece~~t By myuiring visas for travelers from every country, East German oficials tried to allay suspicions that the Poles and Hungarians were the sole targets of the new meastlses." 2 DxeXYlber, however, Che SED took the unprecedented step of adding visa requirements for d l diplomats and travelers passing through the GDR to and from Polmd. Kopa told Winzer that his govcmment would hiwe a diMicLtlt time accepting the rationde behind these measures. He said that Poles would draw the logical conclusion that the GDR was trying to isdate Polmd.43 In the fall, the Zlbricht r4gime tried to preempt unrest in the GDR by improving working c o d t i o n s and raising the standard of living. The

l40

The Cold Inkitzler ofl-"olkfz-East German Relatiotzs

SED lowered work norms for workers and increased the supply of consumer goads. The Polish diplomats in Berlin ridiculed the notion that these measures were necessary because of"a "specific German situation," and h t e ~ r e t e dthem as a sign that the East German authorities feared their own people. 'lhe embassy concluded fiat the SED was cmtinuir7g down its old Stalinist political and economic path.44 Ulbricht sent Matern, Ebert, and Rau to Warsaw in December to meet with Gomdka, Stefan Jedrychowski, and fiapacki. Outwardly, the two sides maiMained decorunt m d ho.cved no signs of l.he serious differences that had surfaced that winter, Trybzdna Llldtk characterized the meetings as ""sincere, friendly and fruitM,'3ut devoted more coverage to a Yugoslav delegation that was in Wrsaw at the same tinne.4-e director of the SED Central Committee" Deparhnent of Pmpaganda, Karl WIoch, rep"&& that Gomu4ka was miEfed that Ulbricht had not c o w . According to WO&, Gomutka and the PZPR lendership interprekd this sljght as a s i p that Ulbricht was adamantly opposed to the party's new course. Gomulka" suspicion that Ubricht did not want to meet him face-to-face was accurate-At this point., U'brirht was not ready to sanction GomuEka and his reforms by goixlg to Warsaw*Ulbricht still compared the Polish October to the uprising in East Germany three years earlier, anci he blarncd elncmy agents for both. Mc feared those t?geWsn w wanted to export the '"counterrevolution"' to the GDR.46 Dr. Roman Karst, a Pollish professor of German at WBrsaw University confided in an East German diplomat that the meting5 had "'more likely worselned Chan improved the relationship."47 That winter,-the mainstream Polish press tried to foster the impression that relations with the GDR had returned to normal. In late December, Trybzmn Ludz~printed. an article by East G e r m j m a l i s t Hans Mueiler in wkich he predjcted that within a year the PZPR wlruid achieve the aims it had set out in October.4We newspaper also cast Grotewohlfsrecent visit to Moscow in a positive light; it quoted him as saying that "all the efforts of the imperialjst circles to poison the atmosphere between Polmd and the GDR are bound to fail.'Tapacki hjghlighted PoXand's growing international importance, but emphatically reassured th other Warsw Pact countries that Poland was not lewing the sociatist camp.& The East German leadership hoped that the new Polish ambassador, Romm Piotrowski, wodd usher in a new spirit of cooperation in 1957, but the East Germans themselves made tbat virtuafly impossble.iWn Jmuary 11,1957, Ulbricht informed PiatrowsE that the SED intended to tighten controls on contacts between East Germans and Polish diplomats, oMicials, journalists, a d visitors. The Poish Embassy compbined that this practice had already subverted its work and had undermjned cultural programs that called for direct connections between Polish and East

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German institutions. The PoXish Foreign Ministry was annoyed by U1bricht" sstatement that the Polish diplomats in Berlin were i~~volving themselves in affairs in which they had no business. tobodycz hinted that relations were reachixlg an impasse: '"ff the isolation of our embassy Zly the GDR authorities intensifies and persists for a longer time, it will be necessary tt? limit Che size of: Che diplontatic, press and cult-ud apparatus," He advised his diplomats to cultivate the i n f m a l contacts they alsensitive su23jects. He ready had with East Germans, hut to avoid certai~~ also asked them to report their treatmnt if it was different from that of the other diplomatic mpresentatives in the GDR.51 In F e h a r y , Ambassador Piotrowski complained to Florin that the SEWS strict enforcement of the restrictions on direct contacts with foreigners was an obvious attempt to control information coming from Poland. Florin said that the SET) had no reservations about the ac6vities of the Polish Cultural Center in Berlh, but two East German workers in the center told Polish diplomats that East German securiq agents had it under surveil1mce.~~ For years, Polish officials had raised Ihe questim of whether t-hese limits on face-to-face meetirrgs, in tobodycds words, "served the development of relations between Poland and the C;C3R."53 They obviously did not" Ulbrirht Rejects Gomulka's National Road to Communism The controversy over the Polish October shaspened policy debates be-

tween the PZPR and the SED that had lain dormant since the late 1940s. communism and Mast of their differe~~ces were related to Tito's nnatio~~al, his expuXsion from Comjnfom almost a decade earlier. When one East German Foreign Ministry officiai told Polish diplomat Jan Pierzchala that he was concesncd about the nurnerous arti&s in the PoIish prtlss alluding to Poland's national road to socialism, Pierzchala repIied that "it is necessary to take into cmsideration fie existence of national characteristicsl peculiarities, and idiosyncrades.""" An article in thr Jmuary issue d N o w Drogi stressed that "'Poland" path does not mean a national socialism or a national communism in the nationalist sense, as some would like to view it. Sacialis~~ is social is^^, m d we are simply building a model of socialism that specifically suits our country and our people." As for Polartd's foreign p o k y challenges, the journal pointed to the German problem, but \zrithod reference to its Warsaw Pact ally to the kvest.55 tllbrickctt vehemently rejected all national mads to communism. Stalin was Ulbricht" model, not Tito, Although Gumulka's legitimacy was based on mrusbchev's de-Stalinization program, Ulbriclht owed his job to the former Soviet dictator. The Hungariaxl ambassador to the GDR t d d

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The Cold Inkitzler ofl-"olkfz-East German Relatiotzs

Kopa that the SED leadership thought Gomulka's nationalistic policies were a ""dangerous game," and worried that Poland would leave the socialist ci?mp.sWUfbricht told Nenes Deulsc:filaf~dthat "the most important lesson learned from the events hHungary is: there is no tkzini Z I J Q ~ . " ~ ~ &rkg meethgs with Chinese communist leaders in Warsaw in January, G m d h canciidly informed Tschou En-tai that it was impossible to talk about Stalin" ""greatcontribution" to socialism because so many of Stalin" ppolicies had been disastrclus for Poland. Gomulka said that most Poles hated Stalh.58 The Poles rcjected a Chinese proposal fos a joint declaration on the Suviet Union's leading role in the socialist cannp on the grounds that it w o d d complicate the domestic situation in Poland. Gonnulka also refused to back a statement in support of the Soviet suppression of the Hmgarian mformers; he eomtemd with a declaration that the PZPR was puttirrg Marxism-Leninism on an e n t i ~ l ynew foundation, but the Chiaese refused to go dong with this hrmu1ation.'" Ulbricht attributed Poland's economic problems and East Germmy's relative prcrsperity to the PZ2,R"s deviaticm fmm the Soviet model. He said that East Germany dZd,not kvmt or need Poland's economic rclforms: '"Re development of the GDR economy is absolutely corrcct, while in Poland mistakes were made in the process of socializing economic life, and hmee the stmdard of livi.ng of the working people in P d m d is significantly lower than in the GDR."H) The Poies, hweves, thought UZbricht hypocritical far criticizing Poland's national road to socialism while pleading for special Soviet bloc political and economic support on. the basis of the GDR" extraordinary circumstances as the only socia3iist Germm state. The SED received thorough reports on developme~~ts in Poland in 1957 from one of its correspondents in Warsaw, Suzanne UrechsZer, Dreehsler was no friend of the Gomulka r4gime. She decried the P%",l-"Rt1; appeal to Polish nationafism and the unbridled policy dcbates going on within the party.,As she put ii, '"the attempt, to settle everything 'democratically' and in public often gives the demagogic elements in the party the chance to cook their dirty soup to the applause of those outside of the party." D~mchslercontrasted the ideoliogical and org""izational c o n b i o n in the PZPR with the SED"s steady colarse: "'The PZPR bs] in no way as rigidly organized as our party (Democratic Cemtralism). One does not interpret party discipline the same here." Drechsler said that Polish workers wew in fulZ support of the new PZPR leadership, and that before Gomufka had gone to Moscow [hNovenntoer 19561 he had received thousands of letters warning him that he would be killed there. She dleged that many had even suggested that he bring his own cook. She held Comugka personally responsible for the prolif-. eration of these anti-soviet attitudes.6"

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Drechsler took heart that many of her right-wing friends in the PZPR gwatly regretted the rift with the SED and the witch hunt of ""Salhists"' in Poland. She added, however, that "'the wild 'Revoluzza"' were *king her point h h n k when the SED was going to purge its Stalinists." In Mmh, Drechsler reported that the PZPR's attacks on alleged Stalinists had ebbed somewhat, but that many party members still eqzlated Stdistism with the East Geman rkgime: If one argues that the prerequisite far eliminating the difficuXties in the political and economic sphere [in Poland] is the restoration of the leading role of the party and its unity an the basis af Marxism-Leninism, ane is then often categorized as a dogmatic or a 'Stafinisth-ho canno>tsee things any other way, because the situation in the GDR is difkrent and there the 'Stalinists" are still at the helm.63

The SED p ~ d i c t e dthat the Polish pafiamentary elections scheduled for 'January 20 would h;lm out badly- for the PZPLC" and ~commended postponi~rgthem until the political and economic situation had stabilized." Shortly before the elections, a high-level East German delegation to Poland =parted that the PZPIC was in ideological confusion, and that many party candidates held anti-soviet, anti-Se~rritic,and demagogic views: ""All of the party candidates that we h e a d talk a 1st about sovere i p t y . . . it appears as if one has to defend the sovereipty [of Poland] agahst the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. We did not hear scarcely one word against the threat of imperialism and especially of German militarism." One Polish official acicnowledgcd to the East Germans that C;omuika's popularity was based inpart on his rejection of Soviet hegemony. The delegation predicted that Gomuika and the party leadership wcru2fi eventudly have to come out "against nationalism and the [West's] intperiaiist aggression policy if t h y t-hemselves did not want to get r m over."bG in the midst of the election campaign, Neurts Derlfsclzlund attacked Gomufka for condemning the PZPR's past political m d econornic policies: "Gomu#ka said that it was a mistake for Poland to base its constmction of socialism on the main principles of the socialist system that were now buildjng developed by the Soviet Union and by the other cot~~rtries socialism.''67 Connujka was a convinced Lenir~ista d hard-nosed realist, however; he h e w the limits of his natio~ralreform movement. He warned Poles not to cross the PZPR candidates off the election ballot because the Soviets f i g h t intervene in Poland as they had in Hungary: "The appeal to cross P7,PR candidates oft: the balfot paper is tantannount not only to the apped to cross out socialism. Crossing o f f our Party" ccandidates means

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The Cold Inkitzler ofl-"olkfz-East German Relatiotzs

crossing out the ind.epend.ence of our country, crossing Poland. off the map of European stateseff6g The elections wcre h d on time, and the .-"ZT"Jtand the other parties in the National Unity Front claimed 90 percent of the vote. Une PZPR candidate was not elected because his name had been crossed off the :!ballot.@ Nezies Denlschland reported that the efforts of "reactionaries m d imperialists" to uddermine socialism in Poland had failled, But the SED still had no confidence in the PZPR to manage the political and economic crisis. Ulbricht" advisor, Erich GlGckauf, told him that the elections had not settled anything, and might even have strengthened t h forces threatcning the socialist state.70 Meanwhile, the SED was pressuring the PZPR to revert back to Bierut" political md. economic policies, Heyrnann reported that the PZPW and the Polish press werc. not engaging in meaningful ideological djalogtxe; he said that the other socialist countries were dso t a b g issue with the PZPR" 'Vfalse interpretations" of socialism, especially the party's attacks cm Stalinists.7' East German officials lectured the Poles that colnprolnises to private business, private farming, and foreign capitalist investment were incompatjble with any form of socialism.72 When one East German official told Kopa that he was skeptical about whetbrr Polmd was developing a true dictatorship of the proletariat, Kopa caustically replied that it was impossible to build socialism, as Poland was doing, without basing it on working-class rule. Kopa said that the ideological dehate should focus insted on the various nat.iona1 forms of the pmletarian dictatorship.7"

The Rebate over Callectiviziltion

The problem" of sociaiist agricultm had confounded Soviet policymakers since the early days of tbe Rolshevik r4$ime. Stalin's dmconian colfectivization program had not proved any more efficient than Lenin" New Eclmomic Policy (NEI"), and after ir~itialsuccesses, mmshchev's "virgh lands" progrm became m econmic di,saster*There wcre chronic shortages of investment in agricultural equipment, storage facilities, and transport. Contrary to socidist propaganda chmpionirtg the efficiency of collective agrjcdt-ure, the peasantry always prnduced more on their private plots. The E P R never fully adopted Stalinist agriculturai polircies. Its modest coltectivization program was a failure; from 1950 to 1952, agricultural. pmduction hPoland dropped 0.9 percent.%Ufbricht followed the Soviet eccmomic model, embark-irtg on a rapid nationalization of agriculttlrcz in the e d y 19511s. By 1956, East Germany had collectivized 33 percent of its arable land, but Poiand only 24 percent, the lowest percentage in the Soviet bloc. Seven perilent more of East Germany%arable land was coltec-

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tivized by 1957, and collectives in Polmd accounted for 10 percent l e s ~ . 7 ~ Acccrrdillt; to one SED report fn late 1956, in some rczgions of Poiand only 20 percelzt of the collectives remained,7& Although Poland" ccollectkes were obviously not as productive as private farms, the SED took its cues from Prawdn" ssharp attacks on Gomulka" retreat from collectaivization.7~Paul Wandel told a Polish diplomat that he and his government were in total disagreement with GomuF-kdsagriculturai policy and took no lessons from it.7Wlfred Neumann, the head of the SET>in Berlh, told an SED gathering, " h s k myself, are our productive cooperatives bad, do our coflectives work poorly? If farming in Poland is manqed poorly, does that lead us to the conclusion Chat there is bad farmkg in the C-;DR?It7YThe SED majnta,ined that the continuation of small peasant farming in Poland constituted a deviation from socialist principles-a dangerous ccmlpmmise with bowg o i s elements in Polish sodety- In addition, the East German communists thought that the Polish Catholic Church had far too much inAuence in the comtryside.80 In early f 957, one East German diplomat called the situation in the Polish collectives "chaotic" "cause Polish Ifarmers were now free to leave them.8' Urclchsler %reed that the PZPR had lost cmtrcrl of the rural areas, and that the church was rapidfy gaining strelrgth there. She wrote that the s t ~ e t sbuildings, , and houses were in terrible sbage, and that ruins from the war were still evident everywhere. Drechsler was nonetheless szxrprised by the Poles' lack of animosi,ty toward her personally: "As a German one has a damned unpleasant feeling. Sometimes one wonders Mxhy there is no hatred of Germans. &e seldom comes across itafffQ The SEE) feared that its partner party' the DBD (German Democratic Peasant Party), might sympathize with the Polish agriculbral refoms md. expand ties to its Polish counterpart, the Polish Pmsant Party (ZSL1.83 But the DBD XeadersEp did not challenge the SED's agriculh,lral policy; party head Berthold Rose told. Potish diplomat J6zef Czechoh that he disagreed. with the Polish gowmment's concessions to the ZSL as a ""mtreat to the DDKD leadership also attrihted the crisis in Poland's agriculpastfig"" tural sector to the PZPR" hinconsistent collectivization poiicqi which the DBD called a '"huge step backwarcl."" Rose told Kopa and Jakubowski that the ZSL was anempting to g a h complete political m d eco~zorniccontro%of the countrysicfe, and expressed his concern about private land speculation." h April 7957, Polish officials tried to assure. the new East Geman adassador, Josef Megen, that the ZSL was fully cooper&ing with the PZPR, m d that neither the ZSL nor its rural constihzents posed any real dmger to the r4girne.87 Hcgen wm not so sure, and wamed his superiors that the ZSL was still gaking strength inthe villages.% The SED drew a direct connection between the PZPR's agricultural p o k y and the resurgence of the Polish Catholic Church." The members

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The Cold Inkitzler ofl-"olkfz-East German Relatiotzs

of an East Geman delegation to Poland in January had th impression that the CathoLic Church had mcrrc. influence in d e c i d a the fubre of the collectives than the farmers or the PZPR.W After a visit: to the Wrodavv ama h May, one East German diplomat mported that collectives in the regim had been reduced from 1,2(30 before Chrtober 19% to only 96 now. He sajd that the Catrholic Church was gahing influence in rural Poland, that private farmers were growing rich, and.that Poles wese &fanning alleged Stalinists. Class conflict had returned." After the NinCh Plenary Session of the WPR Chat same month, F-legen termed Gomdka's agricultural policy "anti-Marxist, anti-leninist," and saw it as an invitation for mom private farmhg.92 Scxialist Unity Party (SED) lunctionaries poi.nted to their o m colfectivization program as a model for Poland, even though agriculturd production in the GDR had gone down in recent years. 'The East Germans were slnug about the supposed success of their propaganda campaigns arnung famers and workers and frequently scolded. Polish officials for not taking the reeducation of Polish workers more seriously. East German delegations visiting Polish enterprises oAen commented that the Poles were not interested in political djscussims, unly h meetings with East German technicims and economic specialists. Polish workers asked one surprised delegation lender such eharrassing questions as, "Why haven? you radically changed myth;ing h the GDR?" "Didn? you hear anything about the Twentietln Party Congress of the CPSU?" fn May, Polish workers fmm Zielona G r a told an SED delegdion that .they wcre satisfied with their newfound freedom and the reforms of the Gmulka g w ernment; the PZPR ran politics and the workersf councils ran the ecollomy. The delegation conclzzded that the PZPR was losing col~trolof the factory floor and that the workers had no ideological direction. One East: Geman official wrote that "the representatives of the workers" councils talk about their own road to socialism in Poland, but none of them coulld telf us what this road actually looks like."'"" Poland's Mlestem Temitories The open and acrimcmious debaks bettdv.een the two parties after the Polish &fober: touched on the most sel~sitiveand volatile issue in Polish-Cermm relations, the Odes-Neisse border, The Polish gave t scored a mhor virtory in the border conkowersy in late 1956 when the Wiean decided to n m e Poles as bishops in the .former G e r m n areas of western Pofand. Neues Ueadschland had to achowledge that this develnpment further confimed the Polish character of the Westeal Territories.94 The rclative lack of Polish investment and devdopment in the towns along the Oder-Neisse buder gave the East Germans the irnpres"in that

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the Polish g o v m m n t either did not care about the Western Territories or did not have the resources to develop them. &e East German university official from Greifswald told Rachocki that &ere was a marked difference between the Polish and East Germm sides of Guben, Pieck's Zlirthplace. He said that East Germans wondered why Poles had taken the land in the first place if they wcre incapable of: farnting it. Me added that "among the German people the conviction is propagated that Poland is not putting any emphasis on reconstmcting fie territories on the border because it is not sure if they will remain Poljsh."Y" East German officials were genuinely surprised by some PolesVIukewarm interest h keeping the Western Territories; for instmce, one East German delegation to Silesia found Chat many Polish immigrants from the Xands lost to the Soviet Union were willing to leave westem Poland if they codd rebrn to their old homes. Wmdiel said that these sentiments put the East German delegation. in an ""awkward situation'bs the sole defenders of the current border, Jan Jakubowsfr;i. allowed that many Poles from the eastern territories were sentkentally attached to the old homeland, but hc fatly =fused to enter into discussion about changing the Oder-Neisse border.96 In late 1956, some East German officids exploited the politicd instability in Polland to il~sinuatethat the border could be revised. Politburo member Karf Schirdcwan issued a warning to Polish communists who had raised the possibility of regainjng Poland's lost eastern terriiiories: ""Polesaitudir?g to the problem of their easlern border-aught not to forget about the western [border] as well." Schirdewan%statement elicited a storm of protest: from the PZPR, as did his attribution of the Polish and Hungarian revolutions to ""bourgeois ideologues and their colliztoorators." "hird.ewan vehemently rejected. suggestions from some PZPR members that the SED adopt similar reforms." N ~ e BerthoZd n Rose also told Polish diplomats that Poland should retufn to its 1937borders, Rose said that they reacted ""as thollgb hit with cold water."* On January 29, the itJew Vrtrk: Titfies broke the story that during the succession crisis h~Polmd in October 1956, the East Germans had informed the PZPR that Poland's political development could influence their position regarding the border. although Schirdewan had suggested exactly that, Neucs Der.~Zschlandissued an angry refly: "This report of-the h e r i can newspaper the New Vurk Ti~nesis invented and false from A to Z,"1" ~ ~ a ran a scrries The PZ:I'R also publicly denounced the article. T y h ~ i LE~Bu of front-page articles supporti,ng the SED, and blamed U.S. journalists and West Geman. Foreign Minister Hei-nrich von Brentmo, for tryirrg to drive a wedge betwen PoIand and the CDR.Iol Nomtheless, Gontulka was concerned with the New To& Enlrrs' report. He lnad not forgotten that Ubricht and.the rest of the SED had officially

l48

The Cold Inkitzler ofl-"olkfz-East German Relatiotzs

rejected the border in 1946, Repeatilrg prclpaganda that the PPR had used right after the war, the PZPR stressed its partnership with the other Slavic cmmunist parties as the main guarmtee of the mer-Neisse border. n e Polish press even laudcd China as m important contributor to the security of the border, while down playing the role of the GDR.102

Heymann's Recall 'The East German ambassador, Stefan Heymmn, left Pdand i,n February 1957. Polish officials had a good workhg relationship with Heymann, but that may have cmtrihuted to his recall. The SED leadership thought that Heymann was not taking the t h a t of the PZPR's liberal-iza.t.iornseriously enough, and that his reports m Poland were generdy too optimistic; for instmce, Heym had predicted that because E d w d Ochab had long been a supporter of colkctivization, his naxnifig as Minider of Agriculture inJanuary was a positive sign for the restoration oi socialism in the countryside.. The number oE coilectives continued to decline, however.103 After a meeting with Jan Xzydorczyk in early February, FXeyrnann was confident that there had been a significant change in the PZPR's acceptance of Ihe conservat.ives i,n the party, and trhat C m & a now regardcd the revisicmj.sts as his biggest thmat.lM Fleymann's superiors, bowever, remained uncmvinced of Gmu:tca%pdlitical reliability. An East German governmem.t.officiaii told Kopa that most SED party mernbers had reservations abuut the Polish situation and whether the GDR could depend on Poland. He said that some East German diplomats evaluated Polish affairs "too rosily. '*loS Florin wrote Ulbricht that 'Tomade Heymann's =posting and his political stance show that he is not equai to the demands of the preent sibation in Poland.""Florin recolnntendcd State Secretacy and DepuCy Foreign Minister Georg Handke folr the post, but Ulbricht chose Ministry of h~teriorofficial fosef Hegen. Hegents credentials with the Ministry of fnterior were proba;bly the decidjrrg factor in his nminati.on. Ulbricht saw enemy agents behind any =form mvement, including Gomuika", and he was confident that Hegen would keep him abreast of clmnecticms between Polish and East German. ""counterrevolutio~naries.~'~~ UZbricht had reason to worry for Hegm begm sending reports that paj,ted a much bleaker picture of the situation in Polmd than his predecessor had. Elcgen blamed the PZPR leadership for not a d o p t a a dear, consistent, and rational Marxist-Leninist political and economic program. He cited as evidence twenty-five workers' strikes in Poland in March and April, sporadic demonstrations against higher prices, and the increased actiriism of the Polish Catholic Church. Hegen maktaiuled that

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anti-Sovietism was gaining s t ~ n g t hin Poland, and that the PZPR WBS tolerating too many anti-Marxist, bourgeois elemnts. He and other East Germm officials bluntly hformed Gomulka that it would be wise to follow the path laid down by the SED.107 Ubricht was also r e c e h i ~ ~numercrus g intelligence ~port-bout: the dmgers of allowing personal contacts between East Germans and Poles; in early 1957, for instance, Ulbricht gave Florin instructions to hform the Polish government about t-he vestionable behavior of severai Polish athletes at m hternational swim meet in Magdeburg. At a receptio~~ for the ers, one of the Poles had allegedly e x p ~ s s e dregret that the Hung"rian athletes could not participate, and then shouted, "Freedom in Hungary lives. . . . Hopefully we wilS &so succeed in driving the Russians horn our countries." The Poles also wmted to visit West Llerlh, but Ulbricht had already decreed that Polish &legations to the GDR would not be allowed to go to West Berlin or West Germany.'O" The Harich Affair

A far more serious case of alleged Polish meddling in East German affairs was t.he armst of East Geman writer Wolfgang Harich, who was accused of plot.ting to overthrow Ulbricht and the entire socialist system. In early November, Ulbricht met with Harich and asked h h to name others who had similar ideas of "democratizi~~g" the SED. Three weeks later, Harich and his kiencls hvere behind bars.m Tybzmu Lrtdu ig~nore?dthe Marich affair, but Nertes Deutschland rcported the armsts and Harich's alleged connections with the tlungarian writersf "counterrevolutionaryrr Petiifi C-lub.'lO When Harich bad discussed the mgoirzg reforms in Poland with Polish intellecrnls, he had raised the possibility of a similar liberalization in East Germmy. In December, twenty-six members of the Departme~~t of Philosophy and Sociology of Warsaw University, all PZPR mernbers, wrote a letter to the SEU irr Harich's defense. The Poles vehemently rejc)cted the charges that Harich had contacted foreign agents in Poland, or that he was trying to rehstitute capitalism in the GDR. They called for an open and honest trial, a d added that they would never believe that Harich was guilty of anything. The SED accused the Poles of casting doubt m the East German legal system211 Ilt~c! SED used t-he ktter as ewidmce that Harich's group hatl conspired with Polish htellectuals. h fmuary, m SED Central Committee report accused Polish writers Adam Schaff, Leszek Kdokowski, Roman Karst, and h a t o l i Ranitzki of trying to influence =rich's bmd of 'kounterrevdutionarie~~"fl2 The indici-~aentagainst Harich included his meeting with Karst and Rmitzki during the Heirzrich Heine Conference in Micirnar in

150

The Cold Inkitzler ofl-"olkfz-East German Relatiotzs

October 1956. The Poles allegedly had told. Harich that the SED shodd undertake the same struggle against ""Salinist foxesf' as the PZPR. According to the indictment, the Poles had given Harich argwents that he used "in his traitorous conceptions for the liyuidation of socialist ccmditions in the German Democratic. Republic." Marich was also accused of plaming a trip to Polmd to meet with sympahetic Poles m d to propagate his ideas so that the Western press cou%d,publicize them.11" h early Mmh, Maricrh was found g d t y and sentenced to ten years in prison. Polish diplomat Stanisiaw Kopa protested that Harich was mereIy proposing the same kind of changes that Gomu&a had inaugurated h1 the PZPR: "Harich did not agree with cmtinuing the rigid domestic policies of the party and the government, and Chcrcfore t-he leadcrship of the party realized. that it was necessary to isolate him. The accusations againr;t Harich are definitely ullfoullded and biased hterpretations of his views." Kopa concluded that there was no basis to the charge that Polish intdlectuals were responsible for HaricKs actions.11" Other Polish officials =acted angrily to Nezre.; Deutschlernd's allegation that Harich's group was planning to use Poland as a springboard for counterrevolution in the GDR, C)n Masch 13, Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki issued a fo& pmtest to Ambassador Hegen: The way in which these questions were treated by the federal prosecutor,

and the publications about them, gives rise to the thinking that the events surrounding Harich were inspired by- the PRP. The state prc>secutordid not make any distinction between the efforts of the accused and the PRP, . . . In the publicakims things were portrayed as if Harich had been directly inspired to k s actions from hearing news about the October events in Poland.1'"

On Narch 14, Tryhtd~~tl h d z 1 denounced the accusati,on that Harich's group was going launch its revolution from Poland, and chastised Neues Uczrtsdzlatzd for '"improper and regrettable reports."" The paper denicd that Polmd was in any way responsible for attacks on the East German state.llQ In an aide-meimoirt? to the Polish Foreign Ministry on Rcrarch 211, the East German Foreign Ministry pointed to HaricWs admission that he had learned about the PZ:PR"s Eighth Plenary Session through Western broadcasts. The East Germms said that Harich had distorted the PZPR reforms, and had entertained ideas about beginning his propaganda movemnt in Poland. They asserted that Harich had support from "reactionary circles" h West Germany and Poland.117 That spring, Florin upbrajded Polish journalist Stanisiaw Rmdzkji for telling East German a c i d s that t h SED"s censored press was not givlng

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them the truth about Poland. Bmdzki had cbarged. that writer Wolfgang Harich was in prism sjmply because he wanted to bring Polish-style reforms to East Germany'm D ~ c h s l e reported r that Ihe Haricl-c affair was a hot topic of conversation in Polish unjversities. Polish students frequently confronted her with the question, "What did you do with Harich? This really cannot be trzlc.'"he was shocked when the rector at Gdaxisk Universit-y and a professor ( m d part)i member) at Warsaw University made similar irrquiries. Drechsler recommended the recall of East German students studying in Poland as soon as the semester was over: "What they can learn in Polish universities at this time can only hurt them and us."'l" Lasota and the Closing of PO Prostg

Another controversy broke out in early 1957 over an appearance on West German t&visim by the editor of PO Prostzc, Eligitlsz Lasota. f i r i n g a panel discussion on Germm unification, Lasota called on East Germany to canduct a more "elastic" "policy toward West Germany. He also said that Harich" impris ent was proof that Stalinists still ruled the GDR, Lasota defended some of his jcrurnalfs critiques of Marxism as an attempt to provide Poles with less dog~,na.t.ic and more factllal =parting-'2" Lasota said that his invit.ation to West Germany '"showed that things had changed between Poland and Germany," meaning, of course, West Germany. W e n the West G e r m comentator clifferentiated the "national Bolshevist" bsota from the strict Bolshevists of the GDR, Lasota did not protest. 'The East Germans werc. markedly angered when Lascrta completely ig~~ored the GDR in his response to the suggestion that Warsaw could mediate German reunification,'2' 'I'he SEU sent a strongly worded letter to the PZl'R protesting Lasotds behavior, The East German press also went after Lasota and Po X3rosf.u with a vengeance. h Nezdes Dezrfschla-lzd, Harri Czepuck denounced the German newspaper Die WeIf for declaring that fie Gomulka govent had rid itself of the Stdjnists' "fetish" with the danger of West German imperialism and militarim. Czepuck compared the Die Weif. article to Lasota's unwillhpess to defend the GDR ""EL,asotajput up with an unbridfed attack against Ihe GDR and our par% Leaders.'' C~zcpuck censured another Polish journalist who had appeared in Die Welt, Gdeusz Sz&r, for writing that Poland did not consider the GDR a "front line bastion that separates us [Poland] from an eventual aggress~r."Szafar had argued, that a democratic (West) Gemany was a ""hndrcd tirnes better guarantor of peace and the integrity of PoIar1dfsborclersrfhandhad said that it was utopian to .crhinfc the East German ecmomic and political system was a model for all Germany, Czepuck concluded that Lasota, and

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The Cold Inkitzler ofl-"olkfz-East German Relatiotzs

Szafar prObabfp did not have much experience with the dangers of German militarism and fascism.722 Ambassador Piotrowski told Balz that ZJasotafsand Szafar's remarks did nut represent his government" position. We said that he was in complete agreement with Czepu&s denunciation of them. He added that as far as his government was concerned, the Marich affair was closed.D%e Foreign Affairs Cornittee of the PZPR also sent a letter to the SED in April acknowledging that Lasota's participation in the disrussim on West German television had been a mistake, and that he had been. admoni~lhed~l2" The Polish gove ent nonetheless allowed a letter from Lasota to fie editors of Nerres DeutsctzE~ndto appear in the April 24 issue of PO Pmsfzl. Lasota called the attacks on k t h ""smderolxs," He concluded that it was in the interest of both countries to sustain good relations, ""but Harri Czepuck's article, relying on unsut7stmtiated facts, certainly serves this end bad.ly."l~Nezres Derlfschlarzd did not prr:blist-i Lasota" letter. tasota was rt~movedas editor of PO Pmstsz later that spring. Both Khrushehev and tltbrjcht had had e m g h of Po Prosfrl's allegedy antiSoviet and anti-Marxist articles, and told Gmulka to stop publishjng it. The journal was shut down in Oetober. Curnulka had little choice in the matter: Khrushchev ~peatedlyrclnninded him that the ader-N'eisse border and Polmd" independence depended on Soviet supporta12e The Harich and tasota affairs con\i.ir^lcedthe Idlbricht rilgime that it could not allow Polish intellectuals to voice their ophions openly in the GDR. The Polish Embassy confirmed that the SED wanted to prcvent East: German visitors to Poland from hearing the Polish version of Harich's activities; the embassy also reported that the SED had replaced s m e politically unreliable professors, The embassy lamented this poor state of relations with the GDR: Today the [cultural] contacts lie in ruin, people looking for inspiration in Prjland are isctlated now, . . . It I-tas gone sa far in relation to Poland that in speeches for the obser~ationsof the anniversary of the murder of R. Luxemburg and K. LicJbknecht-the activity of Rosa in the SDK13iL [Social Bemocratic Communist Party of Poland and Lithuania] was passed over in silence. . . . In the heart-of the matter the GDR leadership has a distrusting and suspiciom attitude in relatian to the changes taking place in Poland.127

The fallout from the Polish October was also evident in economic affairs. Gomuika was determined to base Poland" ttrade on profit, not on poiitics. Trade with East Germany suffewd when Poland began to ski& some of its exports to Wrsstecn capitalist countries. Warsaw"s attempts to reach political and.economic agreements with Bmn also put the issue of German repatriation back on the agenda. The East Germans tried to

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counteract West German inRuenre among the Germans in Poland by registeriw potential emigrants at the East German Em:bassy in Warsaw. The East Germans nonethekss thought. that the GornuEka r&gimemore often deferred to West German interests h this matter. Gomuika's trade and repatriation policies, the suhjects 01: the next chpter, added to the animosity between Polmd and the GDR.

4. Suzame Drechsler repc~rt,January 9,1957, SED ZK, Walter Ufbrieht Papersf NL 182/1249. 2, Politburo report on relations with the other People's Republics, SET) ZK, Politburo Draft Protocol No. 58, November 10,1956, J TV 2/2A/532. 3. Rachocki notes of a meeting with khroeder and Mentzel December 5,1956, PZPR KC, 23T/XXXT-822. 4. Foreign Ministry memo on current events and relations beween Poland and the GDR, December 8,1956, MSZ, 10/378/42. 5. Heymann tct the GDR Foreign Ministry; No>vernber26,1956, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 3391134%. 6. Kopa nottes of meeting with Heide, November 29,1956, MSZ, 10/378/42. 7 . Rachocki notes of a meeting with Mentzel, November 22, 4956, MSZ, 10/378/42. The SE&)sharply criticized the removal of the Svviet Polish Minister of Defense, Konstantin Kokosst~wski. 8. Conrad Neurnam notes of his visit to Poland, November 12,1956, SED ZK, Walter UIbricht Papers, NL 182/1247. 9. Karkut notes of a meeting with Lungewitz, November 29, 1956, 132;PR KC., 237/XXTI-822. 40. P-ieymann to the GDR Foreign Ministry, November 26, 4956, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339/13494. 41, Foreign Ministry memo on current events and relations between Poland and the GDR, December 8,1956, MSZ, 10/378/42. 42. The SET) ideological journal Eilzhcl't did not publish any articles abc~ut Poland in the last two m o n t h of 1956. 13. Heinz WalM report on a fishing trip to Gdynia, November 30, 1956, SED ZK, Walker Ulbricht Papers, NL 18211247, 14. Tadeusz Kupis noPes of his visit to Kart Marx University Ercm Oct-c~ber 2 3 to Ncjvember 12, Ncjvember 16,11i356, PillPR KC, 237/XXlI-822. 15. Winzer report on the second meeting of the German-Polish Historians Commission in Berlin, November 22, 4956, SET>ZK, Wiilter Ulbricht Papers, NL 18211247. 46. Polish Foreign Ministry report, unsigned, November 30, 4956, MSZ, 10/378/42. 1'7. P(?Proslu, Octojber 2% 1956, p. 2. Historians differ on their transfation far "po yrostu,'hmong them are "quite simply'" or "straight away." 18, Fra nz Sikora, Sozialisltisclze Sl~lidarifl;itund na t ionnk Inlteressen (%;t,cialist solidarity and national interests) (Colope: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1977), p. 144.

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19. Czechofi notes, November 16,1956, MSZ, 10/378/42. 20. Riezk~sDeuliscfzland, November 27,1956, p. 3. 21. Ibid. 22..Ffeymann notes of meeting witEl Menzel (Foreign Editor of Nowe Drogi), Ncjvember 30,11i356, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339/13494, 23. %yfert I s the GDR Foreign Ministry; Nctvember 129,1956, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339113488. 24. N e ~ c sDeutschla~d,December 2, 1956, p. 5; see also "Notes on Current Events and Relations between Poland and the GDR," December 8, 1956, MSZ, 101378142, 25. Kopa to the Polish Foreign Ministry undated, ca. December 1956, MSZ, 101378142. 26. Tadeusz Kupis no>tesof his visit to Kart Marx University Ercm Octt~ber2 3 to Ncjvember 12, Ncjvember 16,11i356, PZPR KC, 237/XXlI-822. 27. SED Poli&uro prc3posal to send a letter to the PZPR, October 29, 1956, in SED ZK, Politburo Draft Protocaf No. 54, October 30,11i356, J IV 2/2A/528. 28. $tanistaw Karkut to the Polish Foreign Ministry, November 2, 1956, PZPR KC, 237/XXII-n32. 29, Karkut notes of meeting with Lungewitz, November 29, 1956, 13ZPITKC, 237/ XXTI-822. 30. 13ierzchafa to the Polish Foreign Ministry, October 26, 1956, 13ZPR MC, 237/XXTI-822. 31, Pierzchala notes cited in Kctpa to the Polish Foreign Ministry, November 9, 1956, MSZ, 101378142; see Trepte, "I'olish Literature and Culture in East Germany: A Window to the West?" pp. 67413, for a discussion of the SEWS quarantine of Polish literature after October 1956. 32. Anne Mundermam notes of a meeting with Winzer and Knpa, Nczvember 24,1956, DDR MK, BC-20, file 619; Winzer report on the second meeting of the German-Polish Historians Commission in Berlin, Nc~vember22, 1956, SEC) ZK, Walter Ulbricht Papers, N L 18211247; and Pierzchata notes of a visit of 130XisI-rhistorians to East Germany, November 29,1956, PZPR KC, 2371XXTI-822. 33, See Peter Grieder, The East G e r m a ~Leadiyrslzip, 194G2973 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), pp, 33-36. 34, Utbricht to Winzer, November 23, 1956, SED ZK, Walter Ulbricht Papers, NL 18211249. 35. Anne Kundermam notes of a meeting with Winzer and Kopa, Nctvember 24,1956, DDR MK, DC-20, file 619. 36. Pierzchala no>tesof a visit of PoXish historians to East Germany Nc~vember 29, 1956, PZPR KC, 237/XXXI-822, 37. SED Depadment of Science and Propaganda to Ulbricht, signature unintelligible, November 23,1956, Wafter Ufbricht Papers, NL 18214247. 38. Politburo Draft Protocof. No. 54 for the Politburo meeting of October 30, 11i356, SED ZK, j IV 2/2A/528. 39. Mundermam notes of a meeting with Rentmeister (Polish M i ~ s t r yof Culture) and Wiew (Scjciety for Cultural Relations), SED ZK, Poli&urcj Protocol No, 54, October 30,1956, J Iti/2/2/508, 40. SET>Politburo prc3posa;al to send a letter to the PZPR, October 29, 1956, in SE&)ZK, 1301itburoDraft Protocol No. 54, October 30,1956, J IV 2/2A/528,

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41. hbodycz to Rapacki on his meeting with Syfert, November 5,1956, MSZ, 10/361/39. 42. Florin to Ulbricht, November 27,1956, in SEB ZM,1301i"cburoDraft 13rotocol Nct. 62,November 27,1956, J XV 2/2A/536. 43. Kmdermann notes of a meting beween Kctpa and Winzer; December 4, 1956, DDR NIAA, HA/X Secretariat, A37; and Kopa to Rapacki, December 1, 1956, K W k Z , file 153. 44. Czyrek notes of a meeting of the SED party organization meeting in Berlin, December 1%1956, PIZIPR KC, 237/XXII-732; and Polish Embassy report from to March 15,1957, MSZ, 10/331/41. October 1,1B&, 45. Tybzrnn Ludzt, December 3% 1956, p. 1. 46. Rachocki notes of a meeting with Wentzet (editor of Sonntag), December 21, 1956, MSZ, 10/378/42. 47, Memo an the situation in the PZPR, unsigned, undated, ca. December 1958, SET>ZK, microfilm FBS 33911324. 48. T y b u w Ludir, December 26,1956, p. 5. 49. 'Tqbunn Lzddu, January 9,1957, pp. 2,4. 50, Pierzehala notes of meeting with Bringmann, January 48, 1957, MSZ, 10/379/42. 51. Lc>bodyczmemorandum, January 18,3957, MSZ, 10/379/42, 52. 13iotrowskinotes of meeting with Florin on February 4, February 8, 1957, MSZ, 10/379/42. 53, bbodycz to Naszkowski, March 2,1957, MSZ, 40/379142. 54. Pierzchala no>tesof a meeting with hringmann (East German Foreign Ministry), January 18,1957, MSZ, 10/379/42, 55. "W oczach zagranicyrr"QXn view of the border), Notoe Drogi 11, no. 1 (January-February l%%"),pp. 4&45. 56, Kapa notes of a meeting with Beck (Hunprian ambassador to the GDR), January 31,1957; MSZ, 10/379/42. 57. Rirenes Beufschlnnd, December 30,1956, p. 1. 58. Heymann to Wjnzer, January 29,395'7, SET>ZK, Otto Grotewc3hl Papers, NIJ

so/4ss.

59. Schwab to Ulbricht, April 35, 1957, SED ZK, Watter Ulbricht Papers, NL 18214249. 60. Pafish Embassy report from October 1, 1956 to March 15, 1957, MSZ, 10/371/41, 63. DrechsXer report, January 9, 1957, SEB ZK, VValter Ulbricht 13apers, N L 18211249. 62. Ibid. 63. Drechsler report, March 14, 1957, SED ZK, W l t e r Ulbriicht Papers, NL, 18211249, 64. Kopa notes of meeting with Nowotny (SED member and head of the "Sorbian Institute") on January 15, January 47,1957; MSZ, 10/379/42. 65. Czechoh notes of meeting with Schwotzer (Director of the Foreign Affairs Department of the SED Central Committee) on January 14, January 18, 1957, MSZ, 10/379/42. 66. Erich GlGckauf to Ulbricht, January 20, 1957, SED ZK, Watter Ulbricht Papers, NL 18211249,

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67. Nezges Deufseizlalzd,January 11,1957, p. 1. 68. Quoted in R. F;.. bstie, et al., The Histo9 c$ Pt~lnndSince 1863 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 365. 69. Pdrues Deutscitland, January 22,1957, g. 1; and Leslie, g. 365. "i"*GZGckauf to Ulbricht, February 4, 1957, SED ZK, Walter Ulbricht Papers, NL 182/1249. 73% P-ieymann n a t s of meeting with Soviet diplomat Karpow and the Romanian, Czechoslovak, and Albanian ambassadors, January 29,1957, SED ZK, Waltm UZbricht Papers, NL 482/1243. 72. See Jakubowski notes of meeting with Wenk on February 19, February 20, 1957, MSZ, 10/379/42. 73. Kapa notes of meeting with Kundermann on February 9, February 14,1957, MSZ, 101379142. 74. M. K. Dziewanawski, The Commzrnist. Party of PoIa~td:An Olrllitze of bll'slorp (Cambridge: Haward University Press, 1976), p. 234. E,Zbigniew Brzzinski, Zze Sovkt Bloc: UtziIy a~zdCotzfEict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 100. 7%. Conrad Neumann report of his visit to Poland, November 12, 4956, SED ZK, VValter ljlbricht Papers, NL 182/1247, 77..See Wfodzimierz Brus, "Economic ReFc3rms as an issue in Soviet-East EUropean Relations,'"n Karen Dawisha and Philip f-lansrrm, eds., Soz7iet-East Ezamp a n Diletnmas: Gocrrcio~z,CuurtpeEil-ion,ancl Cunsefzt (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1981), p. 85, Brus writes, "In 1955, at an East Berlin cmference af economists from socialist countries, a Polish gaper with a number of refc3rm ideas received a great deal of sympathetic attentim, particularly from the hosts; in the course of the subsequent yeas: and a half relations beween East German and Polish ecctnnrnists developed extremely tzrell, and several quite radical reformist articles were published in leading GDR journa1s"";ee also Nicho1as Bethel X, Comzcth, His Poland and His Comntzinism (London: Longmans, Green and Ca., 1969), p. 240, 78. Jakubowski notes of meeting with Wandel, October 26, 1956, MSZ, 10/378/42. 79. Kopa nc>tesof meeting of the SED party ol-ganjzation in Berlin on October 24, October 25,1956, MSZ, 101378142, 80. Hefmer report, undated, ca. July 2955, SEU ZK, microfilm FBS 339113494. 81, Lugenheim repclrt on the agricultural situation in Pr~land,January 44,1957, SE&)ZK, microfilm FBS/ 13489. 82. Drechster report, January 9, 1957, SED ZK, Waliter Ulbricht Papers, NL, 18211249. 83. Czechofi notes of conversation with Rose and Stude on November '7, November r;", 1956, MSZ, 10/378/42. 84. Czechofi notes of meeting with Rose, Hlusziczka (Second Secretary- of the Czechoslovak Embassy), and Sung Chih Kuang (First Secretary af the Republic of China Embassy) on November 29, November 30,1956, MSZ, 10/378/42. 85. Mcspa notes af a meeting with Coldenbaum (DBD) on April 27, May 2,1957 MSZ, 10/379/42. 86. Kopa notes of a meeting with Rose on June 13, June 14, 1957, MSZ, 10/379/42.

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157

87, Hegen notes of a meeting with Czesak, April 1, 1957, SEB ZK, Walter UIbricht Papers, NL 182/1249. 88. Hegen ta the GDR Fareign Ministry April 17, 1957, SED ZK, Otto Gratewcjhl Papers, NL 901485. 89, See Nezics Dl;teufsdzland,December 9, 1956, p. 5; see also) teslie, The Histuq of F"ulnlzd Since 1863, p. 3142. Gomulka had freed Cardinal Wyszinski in Bctc>ber,and in December the government rescinded the 1953 decree barring the church from making ecclesiastical appointments. The government also renewed a 2950 agreement allc~wingfreedcjm of worship, the formation of catholic associations, and religious instruction in state schaols. 90. Gleckauf to Ulbricht, J a n u a 20,1957, ~ SED ZK, Walter Ulbricht Papers, NIJ 18211249. 91. Fritzxhe to the GDR Foreign Ministry, April 16, 1957, DDR MEAA, HA/I Scretariat, A38, 92. Hegen to the GDR Foreign Minjstq May 29,195'7, DDR MEAA, HA11 Secretariat#A38. 93. Blankenhagen report on a ddegatian visit to Ziefana-G6raf May 14, 2957, SED ZK, VValter ULbricht Papers, NL 482112413. 94. Nezges Deufsehkand, December 9,1956, p. 5. 95. Rachocki notes of a meeting with Nichweiss (Prorektor of the University of Greifswafd), December 5,1956, PZPR KC, 2371XXXT-822, 96. Jakubowski, notes of a meeting with Wandel, October 26, 1956, MSZ, 10/378/42. 5317. Kupis notes of his visit to Karf Masx University from October 2 3 to Novernber 12, November 16,1956, PZPR KC, 237/U12-822, 98. 130Xish Foreign Ministry report, unsigned, Nwember 30, 19514, MSZ, 10/3i7tS/42. 99. Czechofi notes of a meethg with Rose, Hlusziczka (Secand Scretary of the Czechoslovak Embassy), and Sung Chih Kuang (First Secretary of the Republic of China Embassy), November 30,1956, MSZ, 20/378/.12; see also Czechofi notes of a meeting with Rose, December 7,1956, PZPR KCl 237/XXIF822.. 400. hiezlcs L)c.utscl.llaizd,February 6,1957, p. 1, 101. Tqblina L I I ~ UFebruary , 6,1957 p. 1; and Fdruary 9,1957, g. 1. IIZIP~GSCIZ,p. 447. 402, See Sikora, Snzialistische Sotidarif-atland ~.ral.io:orzalc 103. Heymann report of a meeting with Tfichau En-iai at the VVarsaw airport, January 11,1957, SED ZK, Qtto CrotewuhJ Papers, NL 901485. 104, Heymann to Winzer, February 6, 1957, SEE ZM,WaXter Ulbricht Payers, NL 182/ 1249. 105, Kopa notes of a meeting with Bitterlich on January 26, January 31, 1957, MSZ, 10/5179/42. 406, Florin to Ulbricht, November 30, 4956, SED ZK, Qtto Cratewohl Papersf NL 9Q/48il. 407. Hegen to the GDR Fctreign Ministry, April 47, 4957, SED ZK, Otto Cratewohl Papers, NL 901485. 408, Utbricht to Florin, January 18, 1957, SED ZK, Walter Ulbricht Papers, NL 18211249. 109. Staritz, Gclscllkltle &r DDR, 1949-1985, p. 113. Tn March 195'7, Harich was sentenced to ten years in prison, and Walter 'Jankewas given five years. in an in-

158

The Cold Inkitzler nfl""olkfz-East German Relatiotzs

terview in the Berliner Zeitzrng in 1991, Janke accused Harich of having worked for the KGB and of planning Ulbricht's coverthrow. Janke also accused Harich of implicating him; for a full account of the Harich case, see Grieder, The East Germnn Leadership, 1946-73, pp. 11Of. 410. Meues Delafsctzlartd,December 1, 1956, p. 1, 111. Encloxd in a letter from the Scretary of the Foreign Policy Commission of the SED Central Committee to the PZPR Central Committee, March 22, 195K PZPR KC, 237/XXTX-823. 412, Report on the "counterrevolutic~narygroup Harich and athers", unsigned, January 26,2957, SE&)ZK, Walter Ulbricht Office, j TV 2/202/7, 113. Enclosed in a letter from the Secretary of the Foreign Policy Commission of the SED Central Committee to the PZPR Central Commitbe, March 22, 1957, PZPR KC, 237/XXTI-823. 414. Kopa to the Polish Foreign Ministry, March 44, 1957, PZPR KC, 237/XXTI-823. 415, Hegen notes af a meeting with Kapacki (m March 43, March 14,11i357, SED ZK, Otto Grotewahl Papers, Nt C3Q/485. 416. Translation af a 3yburze;t Ludtl article on Harich, March 14, 1957, in SED ZK, Otto Grotewahl Papers, NL 981485. 11'7. GDR Foreign Ministry aide-memoire to the Polish Foreign Ministry March 20,1957, UDR MfAA, Minister" Office, A15156. 118. khwanz to the SED Central Committee, March 20, 1957, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 33911389; Wollweber to Hanecker, March 30,1957, SET>ZK, microfilm FBS 339/13489; and Florin to the PZPR Central Committee, April 15, 1957, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339143489. 129. DrechsIler repart, March 14, 1957, SED ZM, Walter Ulbricht 13apers, NL, 18211249. 120. Kurt Turba report on Lasota" press conference on January 18,2957, January 21,1957, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339/13483. 121, Enclosed in a letter from the Scretary of the SE&)Central Committee Foreign Affairs Commission to the PZPR Central Committee, March 22, 1957; PZPX-2 KC, 237/XXII-823. 122. Mezltcs Dezttsci'llnlzd, March 217,1957, g. 2. 423. Kundermann notes of meeting between Bcllz and Piotrowski, March 28, 1957, UDR MfAA, HA11 Secretariat, A38. 424. Czesak to the SET>Central Committee, April 24, 4957 SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339/ 13489. 125. PO pmsdu, April 24,1957; g. 3. 126. Peter Raina, Gomulh: Polit isc7le Biograplzie (Gomutka: Political biography) (Cologne: Verf ag Wissenschaft und PoXitik, 19i"0), g. 120; and Dcouglas Selvage, "Khrushchev% November 1958 Berlin Ultimatum: New Evidence from the Polish Archives,'"uflefiz?: Cold War Ifllernnfional FrEistoly Projeel., no. 1 (winter 1998), p. 200-201, 127. 130Xish Embassy report for October 1, 2956, to March 25, 1957, MSZ, 10/371/41,

Gomul-ka's Trade Policies and the Recurring Problem of German Repatriation, 1953-1957 Today f l ~ FRG c f a k ~one s uf the leading positiorzs anzotrg our mpifafistictrading partrzers. Ofcourse rzat.fro~nnrz ideological pep.spcctiz?erhut hecazrse it is nzufuali!#bcneficklfor flze FRG andfor IlolanQ.

Stalin" pdtical repression and autarkic economic policies, and the West" cantrds on exports to the Soviet bloc forced Poland and East Germany into a closer economfc parhership in the early 1950s. But neither j t Ihe prjnciple of m t u a l advan.t-age side thought their trade was b ~ ~ ion (see Chapter 3).After Stalin" death, the East Germans and Poles began to pursue their own national ecmomic interests with more vigor. It soon became apparelzt that those interests were contradictory. Although the valume of Polish-East German trade actually hcreased from 1953 to 1956, it was largely the result of the grow* of their economies rather than m inm a s e in trade share. Poland" trade with East Germany becorne relatively less important after 1954, amuntirrg to slightly over 14 percent of ail l'lrlish trade in that year, dropping to 13.4 percent in 1955and 32.2 yercent in 1956.2 Both sides opmly accused the other of renegixrg on promised exports; a~t, for instance, ~peatediqlaskcd for more chemfcals In the spring of than the East Germms were willing ta, or c o ~ ~ lsupply.3 d, 1954, a shortage of East German chlurine exports to Poland caused four Polish factories to shut down, and created ather battlenecks in the textile, chemiral, and paper indust.ries.%en the sitmtion had not innproved by the end of the year, the East German Foreig MLnistry began to worry

I60

GomzlPhS Trade Policies and G e r m n ~Rlipaliriatiorz

abwt detrimental pditical ramifications. The Forcign Ministry acknowledged that although the Poles had fulfilled about two-thirds of a supplemelntary trade agreemmt for 1954, " h o s t nothing kvas delivered from our side," As a result, the Poles delayed talks on a new trade agreement." The East Germans complained bitterly, however, about Polish exports that were being diverted from the GDR to the cagitdist countries. The SEU saw this as a betrayal of a fellow socialist country and a direct attack on the unity of the socialist bloc."he East Germans were mak~lyan@red over the drop in Polish coal deiiveries. Many East G e r m industries had been built to make use of Polish coal m d coke; when Polish exports of coal to East Germany kIl from over 4 million tons in 1954 to 3.8 million tons in 1955, the entire East German ecmomic plm was jeapardized.7 Polish trade officials appeared to be more i n t e ~ s t e din tracie with West Germany. The East Germans repeatedly reminded them of the importance of socialist political and ecmomir solidariv on this frunt.8 Ambassador Heymann mcommendied h t , to minirnize its trade with capitalist countries, his government pursue "maxinnal cooperation'hwjth Pdand;"" but when Poland" trade with the West continued to rise in 1955, he blamed Poland for doing ""geat damqe" to the East German ecmomy.lO The East Germans overlooked their own brisk trade with the FRG, which they considered to be a domestic German matter. By 1955, West Germany which now =presented approxinnatdy 11 percent of East Germany's total trade, had repaced Poland as East Germany" ssecond most importmt trading partner.1"ast Germany'S tradc with capitalist countries as a trYhole mse 16 percent in the first half of 1955, and East German exports to the other Soviet bloc countries decreased, with the exception of evort"to Czechoslovakia, East German exports to Poland in the first half of 1955 decreased 16, percent in comparison with the first half of 1954. Hurt by the West" sexpart co~ntrolson certain strategic goods, Polish officials asked the East Gemanr; for mre imports of essential machineryf but to no avail. The Poles accused East Germany of demanding higher prices for tht.ir maebines than other countries charged, and pinted out that East Germany paid less for coal and coke than the capitalist countries. Even Czechoslovakia charged more than Poland. Much to the Poles-rritation, the East Germms pressed for mare Polish coal at even lower priccs.12 At the end of 1955, Heymann reported that trade negotiations with Poland were e~ncountering"extraordhary diEficulties."a 3 e East German Foreign Ministry criticized Warsaw for not recognizing that the West had some purely politicat motives in buying Polish coal: ''In our opinion the orders fsom Che capititlist countries are part of deliberate measurcs to damage the economy of the GDR because Polish coal is still mom expensive than EngIish coal."'l"

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When the East Germans asked the other socialist countries for economic concessions, they never mentioned the GDR% own trade with West Germany." 5 e Poles accused the SED of hypocrisy for attackhg Polish trade policy16 The Pdes had no compunction about reducing coal exports to East Germany in part because the East Germany economy was outperfnrm,j,ng Pulmdfs. The East Germans' rising standard of ljving in the mid-1950s created. especially bard feetlngs among Poles, FIeymann repmted that ""one can often hear the opinion, not only anlong functionaries in the lower m d middle rmks [of the PZPR], but also shard in leadi~gpwmment c i ~ l e sthat , people in the GDR live signi.ficantly better than Polish workers." 011e Polish official claimed that the GDR had ""everythhgin surphs," and another commented that ""sometj.ntes one has the impression that World War X I was won by the Germans and not Zly the Poles."17 The issue was so sensitive that tbr East Germm Foreign MinJstry downsbed the GDR's exhjbition at the Pozna-h fair in 1,955 so that it would not give the innpressjcm that East Germans had a higher standard of livhg.18

Paland's Trade with the West in 1956 mrushchev's determinatio~~ to put Soviet bloc relations on a more equal footing in 1956 allowed the Polish government to develop new economic and pditical connectims to Western Eumpe, particularly to West Germany. Trade with the West was seen as a way to meet the go~rernme~~t's new ambitious economic goals. The government had fulfilled the SixUear Plan for industrial production, but had fallm short in investments, agricu1ttxral productio~~, m d consumer goods.19 At the meeting of Camcon that May Ulbricht expressly b2med Polish steel ercports to capitaiist countries f o f steel shortages in East Germany and the Soviet bloc as a whole. He claimed that the lack of steel, coal, coke, and other h p o r t s from Poland had prevented the GDR from fulf Uing its economic plan fnr t-he first quarter of 1956. Uihricht once s a i n appealed to Poland and the other Soviet bloc countries fos speciat trade concessions; he argued that a strong East German econmy was the only way to win over German workint; classes: ""ln cmtrast to the other people's clemocracies we have open borders with West Germany and stand in open capetition with the strong economic forces of Wctst German monopoly capital." Ulbricht pointed out that the FRG had a higher per capita consumptio~~ and that it was urgent: for the GDR to catch up. The SED had recently promised an end to rationing and a d u c t i o n in working hours to match the 45-hour work week that West German unions had negotiated. UI:bricht calted a Polis:h proposal to further reduce coal shipments "unacceptable" because the GDR could not possibly fulfil1 its economic plans without Polish cod; he pmmised assistance to develop tbr

l62

GomzlPhS Trade Policies and G e r m n ~Rlipaliriatiorz

Polish coal industry, and the Soviets a g r ~ e dto send coal industry experts." The East Germans were w a r e that if Comecon did not furnish investment funds and minng equipment, Polmd would not be able to incrc;.ase its coal productinn," The East Germans also suggested that Polmd use East Geman brawn coal in industries that did not need highqraality coal, and offered he@ to jncrease brocvn coal production.':! The East German exhortations fell on deaf ears, Faced with serious eronomic and political prclblems of its own, the Polish government: could not afford to make economic sacrifices for the GDR. The Poles were acutely aware oi the widening dispariq in livirrg standards between the two countries; Poles and East Germans could easily see the differences, J6zef Winiewicz told H e y m m that a &legation of Poljsh Cathoics returnhg from the CDU party congress that fall ""had made several comparisms with life in t.he GDR [that were] unfavorable for Polmd."zWne delegation of East German educators to Poland concluded that the standard, of living in Poland was '"a lot lower" "than in the GDR.24 The Polish government was in no position to increase coat exports: CJ)chit%, estimated that Poland faced a deficit of 2.5 million tons of coal in 1956. Heymann conlirmed that Poland" ernomy was in trouble, in part because of the shift to d i t a r y pmduction in 1951.zs A prisoner a resulted in a shortage of coal miners, and coal production fell 280,000 tons in May. P d s h authorities had to use 3,080 soldiers in the misres, The Polish economic plan cailed for a 30 percent: rise in the standard of living of workers m d peasants by the l&e Ic)5fls,but to achieve that Ihe Polish ent could not afford to inercase coal exports to the Soviet bloc countries at reduced prices.'" 9lfing coaf. to the West was therefore a logical eco~~arnic choice for the Polish econoolic planners. Trybzlrza Lzldtr reported that East Germany, Czechodovakia, and Hungary paid $20.5 per ton of coal, and the Soviet Union only $19. Capitalist countries paid between $20 to $25." When Cymnkiewicz appealed to the Western countries that were importing Polish coal to invest in the Polish coal industry, he made it clear that his governmem.t.kvolllid xcept ecmomic asshtance from any source.28 Cyrankiewicz informed Grotewohlt in September that Poland would not be abk to meet its comxniments for coal expods to tbe GDR in 1956. Cyrat-tkiewicz said that part of the problem was a reduc.lion in t k coal miners"ork week.B Gmtewohl replied in a personal letter to the PZPR Politbraro that the coal shortqes were causing serious problems fnr the East German ecolIomy; m d requested hmediafe high-level discussions,30 Two weeks later, Gmtewohl wrote another letter to Cyrmjkiewicz expressing his gowemment's deep disagpointment in Warsaw" decision to reduce coal exports to the GDR, Grotewohl complained that the energy shortages wese causing East Geman industries to curb production, and that in some was of the country people had no coal or nah;lral gas to light

Gomzalh's Trndc Policies and German Rlipatriatiorz

l63

m d heat their homes*In contrast to the reduction of the Polish mhers" wlrrk week, he prJinted out, East German rniners were puttirrg in extra hours to m& up fcrr the coat shortage; they hvotr,lif. hiwe only one more holiday that ~ar-Christmas Day, Grotewohl expected Polish miners to work equally as hard. He informed Cyrankiewicz that he would ask mrushchev, Soviet Premier Nicholai Bulganin, and the other Comecon leaders for a special Comecm meting to deal with the energy crisis.31 In itfie letter to A. A. I"awlawI the Soviet secretary of Comecon, Grotewohl wrok that Poland's coal &liveries to the C;DR were falling far short of the pmxnises that the Poles had m d e at the Comecon meeting in Budape" f;December 1955. Grokwohl noted that ""even at the & p i n g of the [Comecod agrcernents it was clear that- the People's RepubIic of Poland was not prepared. to keep the Budapest rczcommndations for tfie agreed level of expmts of metallurgical coke. . . . The missing coal and coke imporl-s are having the most dfficult iimpacts on the GDR econt>my."32 In October, the SEX) sent Matern and Florin to meet with Gierek and Jedrychowski to ask for more Polish coal. The Pales explained tbat they had k e n forced to shorten the mh~ers'hhors because of the uncertain political situation fdlawing mrushchv" secret speech and the demonstraticms in Pozna.li (see Chapter 6). They said that the PZPR had to consider Poland's energy needs first. Gierek and Jgdrychowski rcllnillded the East Germans that prisoners were no longer being used in the mines, They promised to reduce coal exports to capitalist countries, but not by much; they mgued that a coiilqse of Poland's trade agreements with Western countries would. have serious repercussions for the Poiish economy33 I'he Potes were also cfissatisfied with the quality of East German manufachared goods, The Pdi& government colnplained to East G e r m authorities in April ahollt defective East German electric locomotives that had put the rail h e s between Czestclchowa and \iVarsatru out of service. 'The Poles could not even obtairr spare parts to repair the^^^" Heymmn warned Grotewohl that the reputation of both. governments was being damaged and reccmlmcmded ~ctifyingtheir trade differences as soon as possible.35 It was already too late; the GDR gradually lost ground as one of Poland's most important trading partners. Polish exports to the GDR amounted to 10.5 percent of all Pdish exports in 1949,f;3perccnt in 1954, 13.1in 1955, but dsupged to only 10.9 percent in 1956. Polish coal exports to the GDR fell from 15.7 percmt of all Polish coal e x p m t h 13955 to 12.9 percent in 1956. Forty-six percent of Polish coke exports went to the GDR in 1955, but only 25 pescent in 1955," Much to the anger of East Gcrman officials, Poland's monthly coal exports to West Germany from January ta July 1956 averaged 9 percent mare than the year befare.37 h early June 1954, Tqbzina Ludza wrote that ""next to the development of relations to the GDR we will not preclude ffiendly cooperation with West

GomzlPhS Trade Policies and G e r m n ~Rlipaliriatiorz

I64

Germmy on the basis of mutual benefit,""" The newspaper also printed an interview with SPD leader Hc.rhert Weher in which he emouraged an expansion of Polish-West German economic ~lations.39Ch the seve~~th anl niversary of the fomding of the GDR in October, Tqbunn l,udz.il miterated that Poland could have friendly ties with both East and West Gemany.40 The East Germanskoncem grew as Paland began to cultivate ecanomic ties to the FRG in 1956. F r m the inception of the two German states in 1949, the East Germans had publicly encouraged closer = l a t h s between Warsaw and Born, m d had offered to act as intermediaries in trade talks; the East German communists, however, were worried &out being left out oE political or ecmomic deals. :Now Ulbricht insisted on being informd about ncw taXks even if he was not: inclu,ded in &em. In March, Polish Deputy Forcign Minister Marim Naszkowski assured Heymam that his gave ent w u i d keep East Rertin abrrast of rwetings wilh West German oMicials, but. &at did not hwpen." A few months later, Heymann had to ask the Polish Foreign Ministq- for mre information regardiw Poland" relaticms with W s t Germany, and their possible impact on Polmd's agseements with the GDR"42 As usual, Heymann hid the real tmth about his government" position on Polish-West German relations. He told a gmup of W s t German visitors to Polmd that uncferstand-ing between the FRG and P d m d wodd serve to secure the peace and fight the ""chauvinist agitation in West Germany. Although the competition from West German trade was certainly a concern to his government, Heymann said that "an expansion of the present trade rektionship between the PRP and the Federal Republic would in no way lead to a reduction of the eccrnomic ties between the GDR and the PRIF?""" UIbricht was in fact very concerned about competition from West German trade. East German officials ~ p e a t e d l yurged the Poles to engage in anti-West German propaganda and support: Chose polit.ical elements in West Germany who opposed B m % fforeign and Hliiitary policies. But Warsaw was not about to jeopadize relations with Ronn at this tirne.44 Later that fall, the SEWS Departrrrent of Foreign Affairs had to reassure Ulbricht that according to Warsaw Pact bylaws, the Polish government was obligated to consuIt with the GDR before it made ccmcessions to West Germany, or if Warsaw contemplated establishhg diplomatic relations with f f ~ n n . ~ .."

Gomdka" Foreign Economic Policy The political and ideological rift in Polish-East G m a n relations folIowing the Polish October had serious repercussions on trade relations. Grnulka was determined. to develop tradhg partners for economic: rather than for political reasons. Som after =turning to power, he de-

Gomzalh's Trndc Policies and German Rlipatriatiorz

l65

dared that Poland" economic hterests would now take top priority. The East Germans repeatedly evoked political arguments to lobby for mom favorable terms of trade, and Ulbricht afterr accused Gomuika of ulz-sacialist economic practices, H e began to regard. Poland as an unreliable supplier and an unstable market. The Gomufka, r4gime stated that it was no longer wilfing to trade Poland" valuable raw materials lfor hferior East German goods. Polish officials informed the East Germans that thrir "dzficult political situation" was forcing them to cover their own domestic needs first. That fall, the East Germans complahed that coal shortages we= causing serious botttenecb in some East German factcrries, and rt;peated warnings that the scarcity of"coal would create difficulties fos the GDR in fulfilling its trade agreements with Foiand.46 I'he shortages put many East German power plants out of scrrwice. 'The k q u m t ekctrieal out.ages remindcd one East G e r m n official of cm&tions right after the wa~47The situation became so serious by the m d of November that Gmtewohl sent a personal telegram to Cyrankiewicz informing him that Hehriclh Rau was hurrying to Warsaw to request more cod. Raufsmissbion was a faiIure.48 The West German newspaper Die Welt a m Stmlztag (The?WorId on Sunday) predicted that it wlruld be a ""meager Christmas in the [Soviet] z01zee"49 The drop in trade contradicted the %D's pproaganda campaign promoting friendly relations with Poland. A factoy in Stahstadt that had adopted the dogan "We Forge with Polish C a d and Soviet Steel," now lay idle.50 The East German government did not deny that t h brownouts and work stoppages were the direct result oE dehguent Polish coal deliveries. C)n C)ct&er 23, the Polish Milj,tary Mssion reported that the coal shortages we= being openly discussed in factory meetings, where there was a pabable ""anti-Polish atmo~phere.~~ Polish diplomats accused some SED members of i-fltentionallyfosterkg these at-litudes among the work-. ers by criticizing Poland. for not keeping its trade agreementse51 Many East German workers came to the logicd conclusion that their economic problenns WCTC causlSd by the loss oZ' Silesia to Poland. Party merrrbers were also grumbling about Poland" acquisition of German coal mines. 'The East Germans knew that Silesian coal original@plmned for export to the GDR was now gojng to West: Germny, alt-hough it was the East Geman state that had,recogized the Wr-Nejsse border.52 One East German official arcused Poland of send@ more coal to West Germany than caled for in trade agreements. Me criticized the Poles for building fewer ships in Gdarisk and instead makhg mnre turbo generaHe questioned whether these golieies were tors, a specialty of the C;DRI?i cmtributbg at all to the spirit of socialist economic c ~ o p e r a t i o n . ~ ~ The East German diplomats in Warsaw were disappointed by Gomulka's witlinpess to deny the socialist ecmomies essential goods

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GomzlPhS Trade Policies and G e r m n ~Rlipaliriatiorz

for trade with the West.%They were also shocked to find Polish ofiicials openly discussing the Soviet Union's exploitation of the sate2fite economies." h early November, represetntatives from the Polish Trade Comission informed the East Germans that trade agmements with the GDR had been detrimental to Polmd as well. The Poles said that their go~rernmentwould seek trade with complementary economies, not just socialist economies.56 In Noverrther 1954, E y b ~ f L~ Z~ ~a ~proudly EL lieclwed that Poland was West Germmy's most important tradhg partner in the Soviet bloc (excludjng the GDR).57 The newspaper editorialized that Poland( needed to look to the capitalist countries for the best machjnes and the newest technology;-?gand that ideological clonsideratio~nswere now seco~ndaryin economic decisionmaking: "Today the FRG takes one of the Ieading positions among ourr capitalistic trading partners. Of course not from an idedogical perspective, but because it is rnutualfy benclicial for the FRG and for Poland.""" East German officjals were particularly irritated with this and othrr press reports extolling Poland%growing trade with West GermmybO As Poland began to increase trade with the Wcst that fall, East Germany turned to the Soviet Union to fill the v0id.63 At the end of October, the SET) Poli.lburo informed the Central Committee that the political crises in Poland and Hungary had contributed, to the GDR" economic problems, and that the Soviets had been asked for help.hWccorclil^lg to East German trade official Rudi Dernel, the Soviets, in contrast to the Poles, respunded positively to some of the East German myuests for special tracie concessions, even though the GDR economy was already the most developed in the Soviet bloc. Delnel pohted out that the GDR was on the front line against NATO, and proudly cast East Germany as a model for the socialist movement in Western Europe: '"The struggle for the superiority of the socialist world system reflects itself in the German Democratic RepubIic."a Contrary to Demel's claim, hmever, Soviet Prernier Rutganin informd the East Germans that the Soviet tlninln was in no position to increase cod shipments to the GDR. The Poles further cmplicated m expansion in Soviet-East German trade Zly a s h g the East Germans to pay transit fees in convertible currency," By the end of 1956, the GDR was in arrears to Poland for these transit costs.65 In December, the SEU Politburo rc-rsdved to acidress the problem of Polish coal deliveries at the next Comecon meeC-ing, along with the entisc? system of transport between the GDR, Poland, and the Soviet Union. The East Germans plamed to appeal once again for the economic unity of the sodalist camp, and to a& Poland to reduce coal exports to the West.66 Eau dcclarcd in Nezles Deuischland that the GDR" biggest foreign trade

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pmblem was the shortage of Polish coal and coke imports, FIe drew attentim to the kigh cost of transporting Soviet goods through Poiand, and concluded that East Germany could only fulfill its trade agreements through Poland" cooperation,hT An East German analysis of trade with Poland in 1956 found that the GDR had met all its export obligations to Poland, but clai~sedthat Poland had fulfilled only 94 percent of its promised exports to the GDR, The report faulted the Poles for shol-tages in essmtial deliveries of coal, coke, and brown coal. In 1956, Pofand sent only a little over onethird of the coke that the GDR had requested.hs East German econorrrists estimated fiat the GDR lost 138.7 milfion rubles worth of prcrjected imports from Poland and 73.8 million rubles in pmjeced exports to Poland. Coal and coke amounted to over half the shortage in imposts that year.69 The Polish government was unwilling to meet Comecon's recommelnded increase in X,ul.ish coal exports to East Germmy. Fn their export plan for 1957, the Poles reduced. coal deliveries to East Gemany by 50(l,f)(10 tons, which made it virt-uw impossibk for t-he East Germans to fulfill, its own export plans. In January, l-he Polish government gave the East Gcrmans an ultimatum to deliver promised. goods to Poland within a week or it wcrdd order a halt to all expc-lrts to the GDR. The East Germans in turn refused to provide promised hvestment credits to Polmd on the grounds that it was the GDR that needed credits, East German trade officials complained that negotiations with the Poles did not cmform, to ""Phe typical practices between socialist parhcrs."7QFlorin again told Ambassador Piatrowski that the lack of Polish coal deliveries was creating political problems for the SED because many East Germans eqrxated the energy shortages to the loss of Silesia,n Although they were well aware of Poland's ongoing economic problems, the East Germans found it inconceivable that the Polish governmelnt refused to compromise in the hterest of the Soviet hloc c d r i e s . 7 " The head of the DRI), Berthold Rose, upbraided Polish diplomats for Poland's coal exports to capitalist countries because t-hey came at t-he direct expense of the GDR and its industriel;~7~uzanne Drc?chsI,er,the E a ~ f German journalist in Poland, reported that West German companies tried to buy off Polish importers by including in their shipments cheap watches, fountain pens, and other ""lnribes" to keep the Poles buying Western products: "This gets around the [Polkh] company very fast so that all the workrs are for making purchases only in capitalist cowtries."74 Desperate for higher-grad.e Polish. coal and coke, the East Germans persisted in their efforts to help the Poles develop their brown coal industry. The GDR was willi,ng to supply machinery on credit if the Poles would agree to a long-term agreement to export more coal to the GDR75

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:In the sprQ of 1957, the East Germms promised Poland a $25-million credit for equipment and technical assistmce for the brown coal industry. .hlt.hough t h y wodd not achowledge it, the East Germms werc? most interested, in investing in the former German territories that might some? Germany76 day ~ t r mto In March 1957, Polish economic pl ers said that they could increase cod exports to Comecon members by about 1 million tons if P d m d received gold, hard currency, s r goods that could be sold in the W s t for hard currency The move prompted the East Germans to reevaluate their e n t i system ~ of trade with Poland." The Cornuika r4girne had already done that. The East German Foreign Mhistry c i d a t . e d an article in May disectly accusjng m y PZPR members of declaring that Poland" trade with the socialist countries was not beneficial.78 n e r e was much truth to this claim; one sf the reasons that the Polish govemcmt wanted to seil more coal to t-he West was its &Ssatisktion with the quality and qumtiq of imported East German consumer gcrods.7Wne East G e r m official told Kopa that he was aware that Poles were more impressed with U.S. and British brmd names than with goods from socialist enterprises,"" That same month, the head of the folish parliament, Czeslaw W y c d , told his East German cot~~~tecyart Johalmes Diecksann that the only way for Poland to overcome its econurrric problems was to reach out to the West-particularly to the United States. Wycech said the Polish people were hecolning incscasingly &ssati&ed with &is poor standard of living, which was signj.ficantly lower than East Germany". FIe informed Dieckmam that what Poland needs in the first place are the most modern mining machines, which until now the sclcialist countries have not supplied, Poland can get these machines from the USA without having to pay for them irnrnediatefy, which Poland presently is in no position to do. The Soviet Union cannot help either because of its great obligations to China.8"

Dieckmann was sympathetic to Poland" economic predicament, but he was firmly opposed to a socialist country's accepting bans from tbr United States, Despite Wycech's assurmces that there were no political conditions attached to the credits, Dieckm gave Wycech an hdirect warning that the Oder-Neisse border could be jeopardized if Poland traded more with the capitalist countries: "Of course no one h Polmd can have any doubt that only the socialist bloc guarantees Poland" bborder of peace. Takint; a credit from America aiso means, in my opinion, an imperidist attempt at least to m k e the hordes a topic of discussion." When Wycecb polnted out that the GDR had extensive trade ties to capi-

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talist countries, especially to West Gcrm.an)i Oieckmmn dismissed it as a simple exchange of goods witbcrut credit arrangements or political cmcessions.~ PoXand" tradc with East Gcrmay decl4ned significantly in 19561957, fox@ tbe East Germms to make numerous revisions in their new FiveYear Plan. a c e again they turned to the Soviet Union for help, but the Soviets couXd. not replace Polish coal because of the prohibitively high costs of transportation. In 19537, the Soviets began to sbfp sorne coal and coke to the GDR from the Donetz region, but this was a distance of over 2,000 kilometers; in addition, the difference in railroad gauges between Poland and the Soviet Union memt that the coal had to be loaded and u~~loaded at the Polish-Soviet border.83 The East Germans suspected the Poies of hinderirtg that trade, In the fall, the East Germans were making daily appeals to the Pdish government to get trains h n ? the Soviet Union moving through Poland. In desperation, Grotewohl sent a letter to Cyrankiewicz in November informing him that 1,726 loaded railroad cars were standing in Brest m the Polish-tiovi,et border, aXX wait-ing to go to the GDR. Twenty more? trains in Frankfurt / Odes waited for Polish locomotives to take them to the Soviet Idnirrm." Several days hter, the East German Ministry of Co formd Grotewohl that the sihaatim had not ehanged.8" Three weeks passed before Cyrankiewicz responded to Grotewohl"~ letter. Cyrmkiewicz pointed out: that Poland had already s m e d to transport twice as many goods in 7,957as in 7,956, but: that this trade depended upon the regular arrival of goods from th Soviet Wnion m Poland's eastem border and on a steady suppfy of empty railroad cars from thc GDR. He said, that this was not happening. Cyranlkie\Nicznoted that in spite of these problems, 99.6 percent of the planned transports had moved through Poland in October, and 117.1 percent in November. Cyrankiewicz proJnised that the Polish railrod authorities were doing all they couXd to m e t their Obligations.Bh In the fall of 1957, the Poles at last agreed to accept the East German offers to help increase brnwn coal prodwtion and Pdand's manufacture of heavy machineryI machine tools, ships, railroad cars, automobiles, and electmnic goods.87 But the damage to the East German-Polish trade relationship had already been done, The SED begm to synchronize its exports with the needs of the Soviet Uni.m, so that by the end of the 1 9 5 0 ~ ~ East Germmy was the Soviet Union's most important trading parher.

The Recurring Problem of the Gemans in Poland 'The repatriation of the Germans in Poland returned to the agenda of Polish-East German relations after 5taU.n." ddeath (sec Chapter 4). In the

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mid-1950~~ Warsaw improved the economic and political situation for the Germans in Poland." Hlthou* most had access to German schools and newspapers and were affc~rdedlull citizenship rights, many wanted to leave Poland anywaygY I-leymann wrote Ulbricht about several Arming instances of German ""fascist" &morrstrations against Poles in Silesia." After a visit to the German amas in. 1955, East German scholar Giinter Scbmerbach reported that nationalist attitudes we= rampant and that Germans were hophg for a strong, united Germany to free thern from Poljsh rule. khmerbach said that he djned at one restaurant in Opole where Gemans were boisterously sing% along with a band playing ""chauvinistic and fascist German marches and s ~ n g s , " ~ Inl another case, East Germans officials visiting the W o d a w area were greeted with several provocative demonstrations by German nationalists. ' f k East Germans were also shacked by the level of German poverty there.92 These displays of G e r m nationalism WCE a constant source of embarrassmnt for the East German government. A Polish official msponsible for cultural work with the Germans in the Western Territories told an East German dlplomat "that the attitudc of the German population up to that point had not exactly made friends of the Peoples' Republic of Poland and the GDR.'"%e Potish official from Wa1l.lrzysl.l told East German diplomats that older German miners compIained they did not receive the s m e pension as the Poles, and that the Polish authorities would not provide medjcai insurance to cover Chc cost of treathg black lung disease, The mixlers also protested the Polish government" sconfiscation of their houses.94 In 1954, the Polish authorities decided to expel Germans who held anti-Polish and anti-socialist attitudes.'? Some of them were allowed to emigrate to the FRG; the Poles thought that this gesture would fmprove relations with Born and result hmore trade.96 Surprised by this development, the East German government hitially refused to allow the transport of Germans though the GDR to West Germany97 East German officials were also caught off guard in I954 by a new agreement between the West German and Polish Red Cross for the reunification of families."." t" response, Ambassadcrr Heym that his g w e m m t reopen high-level talks with the Poles to address East Germany" interests hthis matter.94 In March 1955, Foreign Mhister Bolz told Biemt and Cyrankiewicz that the GDR would no longer block the transports to West Germany, but that East Berlin wmted to be a party to new repatriation deals betwem Bonn and Warsaw. B012 said that his government also wanted to accept transports. b r propaganda purposes, Bolz suggested making the GDR look as though it was the iniliatnr of repatriation agreements with W s t Germany"0

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When the Polish gwernment =fused to comply with Bolds requests, the SED"s c~dibilityamong the millions of Germms fmm Poland living h the GDR sank even further. The emigr4s constantly lobbied the East Germm government to remember their kinsmen h Poland; this caused some Polish officials ta doubt whether the East German authorities could keep the emigres under control, Heymann adxnitted that "'considering the historical record in a certain sense this mistrust is undoubkdly justified."ml In December 1955, the Polish goverrrmel~tsigned another agreement with the West German Red Crass to reunify an additional 800 to 1,000 Germans with their families in the FRG. East Germm officids were furious about being l e t out of the negotiations, and wou,1d not ailow the East German Red Cross to cooperate in this operation; they even denied warm meals ta thc. passengers passing *rough the GDR by train. Numerous aypeds front Polish officiitls werc ignored.102 It was particularly embarrassing for the SEE? that nearly all the Germans wmted to go to the FRG rather thm to the GDR. Hey Ulbriclht that some of the Germans who did not have Polish looked to the East German Embassy to represent them, but were disappointed by the embassfs Iack of interest.m A vetcrm East Germm correspondent in Poland told Meymmn that "the GDR is rather hated by the Gcmans in the People" Repubiic of Polmd. These people say that the GDR has not stood up for their interests, but fnstead has allowed them to be declared as Polish citizensSffThe reporter said that the Germans in Polmd thought that West German offjcialswodd never behave like this and they hcrped that Born would open a diplomatic mission in Warsaw to represent them.104 East Geman offidals camplahed to th Poles that it was easier for the Germans in Poland to get exit visas to West Germany than to the GDR.Im AAer a visit to Polmd that summer, Berthold Rose told Polish diplomat J6zef Czechoh that he was concerned about the bad blood between the Germans in Poland and the Polish government, especially in regard to repatriation. He said that if most Germans in Poland wanted to go to West Germany; it would reflect badly on both the Polish and East G-ernt ig~~ored East German dernmds that an equal e reunified with families in the FRG and the GDIZ.1"As a result, the Gemans inPolmd thought that the E& German Ennbassy was hdifferent to their plight""8 The FRG received preferential treatment in part because the West Germans paid for the transports of Germans from Poland, but the Polish gove ent had to cover the cost of repatriation to the GDR.'"" 1x1 9 p t e d c . r 1956, the SEE) informed the PZPR that the present situation was unacceptable: "hprinciple the ques-

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tion of family reunification and other similar questions in regard to the relations between Germmy and the Germns living in the People's Republic of Poland must be hmdled by the People's Reptt-blic more gelzerousty for the GDR than for West Gcrman)ru1l"The Polish Foreign Mjnistry ~ s p m d e that d the Germans could not be forced to stay in Poland or to go to the CICZR."I Heymann thought the situation serious enougtn to warrant talks at the Politburo level, and mcommended that the Germans in Polmd be permitted to register with the East German Embassy.112 Grotewohl intesvened, directly by writing to tke PZPR Politburo on September 29. He warned that the Adenauer government was trying to act as the s d e reprclselztative of the German peoplc and complained that it was easier fos the Germans in Poland to emigrate to West CSermany*"s In early rl>ct&er, the Polish government at last agreed to limit the number of Germans going to the FRG and to increase emigration to the GDR.lk"t the end of the year, Poland signed a new protocol with the GDR on family reunffication, Nonetheless, Polish officiats cfid not think there would be a significant increase in repatriation to East Germany Accordkg to the Poks, the East Germans demanded I,OW zbty for eveq German emigrating to the W R , but the West Germans we= still suhsi& k g the transports to the FRG. Polish officials suspected that the SED was not really interested in reunifying families in the GDR, but rather in grtrventing Germans from going to the FRG. AAer one meeting with East German officials, Polish Mhistry of Interior representatives rcported &at '"the [East] German side made eMurts to include in the protocol an obligation that the Polish authorities consult with them on every further step take11in the matter of reuniting families in the FRG.V" A SED report at the ertd of 1956 found that the number of transports of Germans going to West Germany was four times the number going to the GDR. The report said that many Germans who had the necessary documents to emigrate to the GDR were not allowed to leave. The SED charged the Poles with putting obstacles in the way Of family rttunification to the GDR while aiding transports to the FRG, The report concluded that "the behavior of the Polish state is not inclined to strengthen the friedly relationship between the I'eoplefs Republic of Poland and the GDR, The Registration, of the Gemans in Poland :In late 1956, the East Germans warned the Poles that expanding diplomatic refations with West Germany would result in attempts by Bonn to register the Germans in Polmd."7 These Germms already thought that the East Germm Embassy in Warsaw was ignoring them; few had re-

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ceived visas to visit the GUR.1lQe East German Fort;lgn Ministry observed that ""tere is no inclhation from the Polish side to mdertake cooperative measurcs to repress West German influence on the Germnspeaking population and to keep these people in the sociallist camp.""ly Ambassador Hiegen reported that the number of West Geman publications sent to the Germans in Poland dwarfed the number of East German publications,l2" In Nowember 1956, Ruth Wenk recommended that the embassy register these Germans, and s~~ggested opening two new consulates to simplify the process.1" Wmk" colleague alldolf Fritzche wamed his supesiors that if we do not take immediate ffundamentaX and fast action, the remaining Germans residing here tzritl all go over to the Western camp. The ill will [toward East Germany] that already exists suggests such a development. We are therefore of the oginian that our government must make a decision E'Mzmedi~telyabout the registration of the Germans in Paland.122

At a meeting with Ambassador Hegm in the spring of 1957, Poiish M h ister of Interior Wiadydaw Wicha conceded that the Polish gove had made some rnistakes i,n its handling of these Germans, but that the policy was now under careful review. Hegen commented that ""Obviously Minister Wcha wiinted to convince me that the Federal Republic. had no advantage i,n the resett1emem.t.[of Germans from F"oland],"'2" fn May, the East German Emhassy was allowed to begin registering the Germans p e a h g population, but only those who were not Poiish citizens. By the middle of June, 821) people had tried to register, but only 27 East a r m a n passports were issued,"""o step up propaganda with the German communfty in Poland, the East German Foreign Ministry decided to send more periodicals, hold more lectures in the new East German cultural center inWarsaw, and invite Geman children from Pofand to spend their hdidays in the rnR.125 That fall, the East German governnnent sent a note to the Polish Embassy in East Berlin complaining that the registration of Germans in Poland was going slowly because West Germany wap; encouraging them to emigrate to the FRG. The East Germans urged Polish authorities to stop this propagmda,l2h but little was done, Warsaw even encouraged West German tourism to Poland.""e East German Embassy p t e d e d that "throufih the [West German] tourist traffic arguments against l.he GDR and the PRP are best dissemhated."""2" I'tEter of several years of delay, in M a y 1958 the Polish glrve last authorized the GDR to open another consulate in Wrodaw. East German diplomats hoped the consulate would speed the registration process

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and aid their propaganda campaign in the Westem Territories, But the East Germans were constantly h i n d e ~ din their work by the Polesf lack of cooperation. Polish security police kept a close watch on the cmsulate to prevent it from having too much infiuence on the Germans in Poland. The East Germans reported that when they protested the srtrveillance of a friendly state's consdate, the Polish police "laughed ironicalfy"Q2"The Poles also refused offers for East German teachers and would not allow the German teachers already in the Polish schools to form FDJ or SED stude~ztgraups.'" 0 e Polish gover ent authorized the East Germms to circulate a newspaper in the Western Territories in 1958, but ended its run a year later; the Poles said that such a small Germm minority did not need its own daily131 One of the most sensitive issues 'for both the Polish m d East German governments was the legal status of the autochthsns, most sE whom lived in and around @ore, Katowice, and Olsztyn. Although most had been given Polish citizenship in 1.951, many considered &emselves German and complained about discrimination by the Polish authorities.132 'The Polish government- regarded them as Poles who had been Germanized under German rule, and therefore dnubted their political reliability.1" h March 1957, East German reporter Suzannc. Drechsler wrote that mmy Germans and autochlhons i,n Poland "have a Crightening, deep hate for Poles. . . . This hate is directed not only agajnst the Pales, but plah~lyagainst socialism too."M i?nuch to the embarrassment of the East Germans, the autochthons flocked to the embassy to register.'" The Polish authorities refused. to allow their registration, which only increased their distwst in both the Polish and East German govemments~ When the Polish-East German Commission on the Germans in Poland met in Warsw in January 1958, West Germany" wwitlinpess to accept all the Germans in Poland, including the autochthans, was high on the agcnda.1" Otto W z e r warned the Poles about the threat of West Gcrman propaganda ammg these Germans and their potential as a f i f i column.'" Nhzer reported that a group of Germans f r m Poland atte~nding a mcent soccer match in Leipzig had expressed the hope that Ademuer wodd eventually liherate them."Waszkowski told Wnzer that frankly he did not think that the danger from Bonn was that great.l@ Tnitidy, the Polish government was opposed to East German cdtural activity among the autochtl-tons because it would undermine efforts to re-Polonize them, M e n the East Germans complained that this put them at a disadvantage in relation to West Germany, the Polish government relented. The Polish authorities forbade any attempts to Germanize the autocfithms, however, m d rclserved the right to designate those eliglblc to register with the GDR Embassy, They also stipulated that registered Ger-

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mans were not necessarily candidates for repatriation. East Germans ofiicials were dissatishd with this state of affairs, maifily because the West German government did not have to operate under the same restrictions.141 ing of 4958, only 4,0@ Germans had regiskred as East Germm citizens."Wa~ast German officials told the Poles that there were still 39,000 German speakers in Poland who did not bave Polish citizenship, m d 80,000 German speakers with Polish citizenship. The East Germans said that some of the second group had, been forced to hecomc Polish citizens; Polish officiak said that these figures were inhted.1" The Pales denied a =quest from the East Germm Embassy to examizte the approxjmately 14,000 emigration petitions fmm Gemans in the Katowice m d Olsztyn areas. Polish officials did not see any =ason lfor East-German diplomats to discuss emigration with Polish citizens, even if Geman was their first language.'"" h 'January 1959, the East German Embassy rcported that the registration of Germans without Polish citizenship was almost complete. About half the registrants bad left Poland by that tirne.1" According to East German sources, 2,532 more Germans emigrated to the GDR in 19541, and 3,300 went to W s t Germny*:In the first eight mmtJls of 1940,754 went to the GDR, and 3,958 to the PRG.146 n early 19151, the East Gcrman The process did not end there, however. X government estimated that there were another 15,000 Germans whose Polisli cilize~~ship was jn questiotn and who hvnuld be eligible to register as citizns of the Grn.1" The Polish gvvernment d i s s ~ e with d this fig-ure, and by fanuary 1961 only 1,328 more Germans had registered with the East G e r m Embassy.'" It is obvious horn these figures that the Polish government was different to the GDR" sintests in the matter of repatriating the Germans from Poland. The East German governmetnt was not reafly concerned about thc Cermans-fate anyway; in February 1961, the East German Embassy conceded that the rttgistration process was mainly fnteneied to cclmtr~rMiest German hfluence. The East German communists could not admit that they hoped to gain political support in the area shodd it ever revert to Natims Germany."g W e n Gomulka declared in a speech to the U~~iited in Sqtefinber 1,9C,I that there were no more-. Germans in Poland eligible to emigrate, the East German government did not protest. I'he disputes over trade and ~patriationccmtributed to an overall lieterioration in relations in 1957% The Ukl-ieht r&gimebecame incrclasingly nervous about Itsaland" cultural fseedoms, economic reforms, de-Stalinization, and workers"r~tests. Gcrmuika" sirtation with W s t Germany particdarly rankled Wlhrieht- Their first face-to-face meeting in June failed to clear the air,

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4. Trybzina Lildrr, December 9,1956, p. 6. 2. Franz Sikora, Sl~zialistisei'leSolidarildf und nationale Irzkressen (Sctcialist solidarity and nationat interests) (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Pzcllitik, 1977), pp. 137-138. Polish coal shipments to the GDR fell even further, to 1.73 million tons in 1957. 3, Schlage report on political, economic and cultural relations between the GDR and Poland from July 1950 to March 1954, F e b r u a ~19,1954, DDR MfAA, Warsaw EmbassyfA3608. 4. Heymann no>tesof a meeting with PoXish Foreign Trade Minister Dgbrs)wski, April 22, 4954, DDR MfAA, HA/I Secretariat, A37. 5. GDR Foreign Ministry analysis of the present relations with Poland, undated, ca. December 1954, DDR MfAA, Minister's Office, A15154. 6. See VVoXf Oschlies, ""Aktionen der BUI&Reaktianen in Osteuropa" ((Actions of the GDR-readims in Eastern Eumpe), in Die Rofte dpr DDR in OsIerarapn (The role of the GDR in Eastern Europe), ed. Gerd Leptin (Berlin: Dunekm und Humboldt, 19;7$), p. 112. Oschlies says that the SED interpreted economic refc~rmsas a return to capitalism. 7. Sikora, Sozialistiselze Sol2ariCdt und nationale Itzl.etesscm, pp. 137-138. 8. GDR Embassy in h r s a w repc~rt,December 9,1955, SED ZK, microfilm FES 339/ 13488, 9. Heymann to the GDR Foreign Ministry, June 24, 1955, SEL) ZK, microfilm FBS 339/ 13494. 40, P-ieymann to the GDR Foreign Ministry, Ncjvember 47, 1955, DDR MfAA, Warsaw EmbassyfA3670. 11.Repc~E"c on the economic refations of the Sc~vietzone of Germany with the East bloc countries, October 1956, BRU BIGDE B1371427, East Germany's export"~) Poland in 1954 amounted to 10.5 percent of the GDR's ttotal trade. Imports from Poland in 1954 amounted to 40.2 percent. Those figures dropped to 9,7 percent and 9.8 percent in 1955. The figures for East Germany's trade with West Germany, hc3wever, went up from 8.2 percent of all exports and 4.5 percent of all imports in 1954 to 2 0.7 percent and 12.2 percent in 1955. 42. Notes on trade with the GDR, December 16,1955, PZPR KC, Bierut archive, 254lPV-27; see also Sikora, Sazl'nlz'sl-iselzeSolidnritiz't rind zafionckle Intermsen, p. 171, Trade with the GDR amounted to 13.1 percent of all Polish imports in 1955, and 13.6 percent of all exports, 13. Heymann to the GDR Foreign Ministry; December 30, 1955, DDR MfAA, Warsaw Embassy, A3626; see Alexander Fixher, "Aussenpc~litischeAktivit2t bei ungewisser sowjetischer Deut-schland-Ifolit-lk(bis 1955)" Foreign policy activity in uncertain Soviet German policy to 1955), in Hans Adolf Jac&sen, Gerd Leptin, Ulrich Scheuner, and Eberhard klautz, eds., Brei fi-klzl-zel?jzl.lfe Azkssenplitik dcr DDR, 51-84 (Munich: R, Bldenbuurg 'Werlag, 1979),p. 72; and Christoph Royen, "Osteuropaische Staaten'" (East European states), in Hans Adoff Jacobsen, Gerd Leptin, UErich kheuner; and Eberhard SchuXz, eds., Drei Jnhrzehnlc Al?tssenpc?lz'i.ik der DDR, 599-619 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1979), pp. 604-605, From 1954 to 2956 the trade balance favored the GDR, and the East Germans used this profit to cover transportation costs of trade between the GDR and the Soviet Union.

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14. GDR Foreign Ministry analysis of relations with 1301and,undated, ca. Becernber 2 954, DDR MfAA, Minister's Office, A15156. In fact, there war; still a huge demand for coal in Western Eurqe. 15. See Edwina Moreton, East Cern.mny and llze W n r ~ w Alliance: Tke Pt~ll'ticsof Dkterlte (Boulder: Westview Press, 49"78), pp. 35,37'. 16. Report- on the relations betw-een the GDR and Potand in 1955, undated, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339143492. 17, Heymann to Handke, September 18,1954, BDR M f M , Warsaw Embassy, A3579. Florin relayed this message to Ulbricht on October 42. 18, Stude to GDR Embassy in Warsaw November 15,1954, BDR MfAA, Warsaw- Embassy; A3616. 19, See R. F. teslie, et al., TJle History I?( Poln~dSince 21363 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 19801, g. 339. 20, b'lbricht speech to Comecon, May 19,4956f SSD ZK, Walter Ulbricht Office, J TV 2/202-194; and Khrushchev to Ulbricht-, July 2, 1956, SED ZK, Inlalter Uibricht Papers, ML 18211247; and Jakubowski notes of meeting with Wandel, October 26,1956, MSZ, 10/378/42, 13autWandel acknowledged to a Polish diplomat that workers' productivity in the East German manufacturing sector was onty about 70 percent of that in West Germany. 21. Piotr Jaroschewitsch to the Secretary of Comecon, A. A. PawXctw, in Moscow, October 1,1956, SEB ZK, Walter Ulhricht Office, J IV 21202-242. 22. Slbmann to UIbricht, July 14, 1956, SEX3 ZK, Walter Utbricht Papers, NIJ 18214247, 23. Heymann notes of meeting with Winiewicz, undated, SED ZK, microfilm 339143493, 24. H, KIicka report of East German educators' visit to Poland from September 19 to October 2, October 2,1956, KWKzZ, file 152. 25, Heymann notes of meeting with Stasiak, July 19, 1956, SE&)ZK, Walter UIbricht Papers, NL 18211247, 215. Heymann report, June 12, 1956, SED ZK, Waller Ulbricht Papers, NL 18211247. 27. T y b u w Ludir, Sptember 30,1956, pp. 1,s. 28. Excerpt from an October 9, '11 956 report by the Montan Verfag: VWD-Vereinigte Wirtschaftsdienste, Frankurt/Main (Montan Publishing: VWD-United Economic %mice), October 9,1956, UDR MR, BC-20, file 619. 29. Cyrankiewicz tcr Grotewohl, Sptember 24, 1956, SED ZK, Walter UZbricht Office, J XV 2/202-196. 30. Grc>tewofnXto the Potitburo of the PZPR, September 29, 1956, PZPR KC, 237/XXXX-822. 31. Grot-ewohlto Cyrankiewicz, Octt~ber15,1956, SED ZK, Walter Ulbricht Office, IV 21202-496, 32. Grt~t-ewohlto Pawlc>wtOctober 15, 1956, SED ZK, Watter UEbricht- Office, J IV 21202-196. 33. Mat- and Florin report of a meeting with Gierek and J~BrychQwski,October 16,1956, SED ZK, Politburo Protocol Nc). 49, J IV/2/2/503. 34. Polish government aide-memoire to the GDR Ernbassy in Warsaw, April 10, 1956, SED ZK, Otto Grotewc~hfPapers, NL 9Q/4M.

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GomzlPhS Trade Policies and G e r m n ~Rlipaliriatiorz

35, Heymam to Grotewohl, April 26, 1956, SED ZK, Otto Grotewohl Papers, NL 9Q/4E14. 36. From the Statistical Yearbooks of the GDR (195S1956) and Poland (1956) in Sikora, Sozkarlz"s.tis&eSolid~r-itlit. zknd ~zntioior?nlte I~zteressen,p. 137-138. Polish exports of coal to East Germany fell from 3.8 million tons in 1955 to only 2.4'7 million tons in 1956, and 1.73million tons in 1957, 37, German Ecunamic Institute (Deutsches Wirtschaftsinstitut) report on Poland" coal and coal exports, October 16,1956, DDR MR, DC-28, file 619. 38. Eybunn Lzkdu, June 7,1956, p. I. 39. T y b ~ r wLudir, October 5,4956, p, 2. 40. Tqbuna Lzldzr, Octojber 7,1956, p. 1. 41, Vice Director of the East German Department of the Polish Fareign Ministry (signature unintelligible) to Poleszczuk (Director of the Department of Press and information), March 12,1956, MSZf 10J361139. 42. Heymann aide-memuire to the Polish Foreign Ministry, July 28,1956, MSZ, 10/361/39. 43. Heymann to the GDR Foreign Ministry, May 30, 1956, SED ZK, FBS 339/1M%; see also Moreton, East Gertfzcanyalzd the Warsaw Alliance, p. 180. She argues that for most of its history "the prime concern of GDR fc3reign pcllicy was to ensure that West Germany gained no political influence in Moscow or Eastern Europe at the expense of the GD13.f' 44. Pdaszkowski notes of meeting with Heymann, February 22, 1956, MSZ, 10/361/39. 45, SEB Central Committee Department of Fareign Affairs to f-landke, September 14,1956, SEE3 ZK, micrt2film FBS 339143493, 46. SED Politburo repc~rtC I ~refatic~nswitl"the other People" Republics, SED ZK, 130fitburoDraft 13rotocolNo. 58, November 10,1956, J XV 2/2A/532, 47, Ibid. 48. SED Po>litburoDraft Protocol No. 62, November 27, 1956, SED ZK, J IV 2/2A/536. 49. Quoted from Welt am Sc7lzlztlifg (The World on Sunday), Nclvember 8, 1956, aRr, B~GDE~13;7/427, 50, Karkut notes of meeting with Lungewitz, November 29, 1956, 13ZP1TKC, 237/XXII-822; and Pierzchala ncltes af a visit af Polish histclrians tcr East Cerman5 November 29,1956, PZPR KC, 23'7/XXlF822. 51. Nasielski notes, in Urbaniak to Eobodycz, October 26, 1956, MSZ, 10/378/42. 52. Kopa to the Polish Foreign Ministry, undated, MSZ, 10/3'78/42. 53, Karkut notes of meeting with Lungewitz, November 29, 1956, 13ZP1TKC, 237/XXIl-822; and Pierzchala nates af a visit af Polish historians tcr East Cerman5 November 29,1956, PZPR KC, 23'7/XXlI-822. 54. Kirchner (Warsaw Embassy) to Slaimer (GDR Ministry of Foreign Trade and Inner German Trade), November 15,1956, SED ZK, Walter Ulbricht Papers? NL 182/124'7. 55, f-leinz Wolff report on a fishing trip to Gdynia, November 30, 1956, SED ZK, WaIter Ulbricht Papers, NL 482/1247. 56. Heymann to the GDR Foreign Ministry November 8, 1956, SED ZK SED, microfilm FBS 339/ 13488, 5'7. Bybzrnn Lzldla, Nowember 1'7,1956, p. 1.

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58. Trybunn Lzddi-l, November 22,3956, p. 6. 59. Tqbztnn Lzldzt, December 9,1956, p. 6. 60. T y b u w Ludir, February 24,4957, p. 2. 61. State Plaming Commission current estimates of the most important probXerns of economic development in 1957, November 22,1956, Politburo Draft Protocd Nc). 62, November 27,1956, SED ZK, J IV 2/2A/536. 62. 1301itburoletter to the members and candidate members of the Central Committee, SET> ZK, Politburo Draft Protocol No. 54, October 30, 1956, J IV 2/2A/528. 63. Rudi Demel report on Swiet economic assistance for the GDR, October 19, 1956, SED ZK, IV /2/20/32. Original1y Dctmel included military assistance as well, but an unidentified editor struck this from his text. 64, khenk, lm Vorzz'mtner.der Diktafztr, p. 181.. 65. tobodycz to the Polish Foreign Ministry, December 18, 4956, MSZ, 10/385/42. 66. SEP) Politburo I""rc>tc>coX No. 65,December 18-20, 1956, SSED ZK, Polit-buro Protocols, J IV 2/2/519. 67. Nezres Deufsclfland,December 30,1956, p. 5. 68. Analiysis of the trade agreement between the GDR and I""c>landfor 1956, January 11,1957; DDR MfAuIH, DL-2,2392, The East Germans asked for 715,000 tons of coke; see also Jonathan Steele, btside East Ger?rrmt.zy:The Stclle tlzaf Came ifi from the Cold (New York: Llrizen Books, 49n), p, 120. 69, Report on trade between the GDR and Poland, December 29, 1956, SED ZK, Politburo Protocol No. 66, J 1V 2/2/52Q. There was a shortage of 36 million rubles in East German steel imports, and approximately 20 million rubles in foadstuffs, 70. Tnbrmation fc~rUfbricht frc>mthe Department of Domestic and Foreign Trade, January 25,4957 SED ZK, Walter Ulbricht Papers, NL 48211249. 71. Fiotrowski notes of meeting with Florin on February 4, February 8, 1957, MSZ, 10/379/42. 7 2 . Neues l;teztfsc/ztand,February 3, 4957, p. 7.In early 4957, Neues Deratsctzlartd reported that annual coal production in Poland would drop about 2.1 million tons in 1957, and that there would be a 3.5 percent reduction in agrl"culturalproduction. The newspaper blamed the shortage of fcmd prcduction on the breakup of Poland" collective farms. 73% Kopa notes of meeting with Rase on February 23, February 2f3,195"i",MSZ, 10/379/42. 74.Drechsler report, March 14, 1957, SED ZK, W l t e r Ulbriicht Papers, NL, 18214249, 75. Report on the GDR's assistance far the Polish coal industry, undated, ca. January 1957, SET>ZK, Watter Ulbricht Office, J 1V 2/202-242. 7'6. 1nfr)rmation on the Comecc~nmeeting in Warsaw from June 48-22, 1957, J m e 27, 1957, SED ZK, Walter Ulbricht Office, J TV 2/2@/195; Maser, Comecon, pp. 7&;753; and Siikora, Ssziafisfisci'leSolidarifdf t-lnd natiolllznte I~zlteressen,p. 150. The Loan tvas for 17' years at 4.5 percent intel-est. 77. Protocol on the recommendation of the Chairman of the State 131anning Commissisn to the members of the CMEA, March 12-14, 1957, SED ZK, Waiter Ulbricht Office, J JV 2/202-242.

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GomzlPhS Trade Policies and G e r m n ~Rlipaliriatiorz

78, Translatim of an article from the SED Central Committee Department of Foreign Affairs, 'From the International WorkersWc)vement," May 32, 1957, in MSZ, 10/448/47. 79. Hegen notes of a meeting with Polish Foreign Trade Minister Trarnczpski on March 28, April 4,4952: SED ZK, Mralter t"lbric?ht Papers, NL 48211249. 80. Kopa notes of a meeting with Szczepecki (Vice Minister of the German Railroad) an April 4, 195"i"IApril 5,4957, MSZ, 10/37W/42. 81. Bieckmann notes of meeting with Wycech on May 11, 1957, May 26, 1957, SED ZK, Otto Grotewohl Papers, N t 9Q/485. 82. Ibid. 83. Report on East German assistance far the Polish coal industry undated, ca. January 1957, SED ZK, WaXter Ulbrisht Office, J X V 2/202-242, 84. Grc>tewclhlto Cyrankjewicz, November 1, 1957, SED ZK, Otto Grotewc3hl Papers, NL 90/485. 85. GDR Ministry of Commerce to Grotewohji on the transit problems in Poland, signature unintelligible, November 4,1957; SED ZE;, Otto Grotewahl Papers, NL 301485, 86. Cyrankiewicz to Grc~tewohl,November 25, 4957 SED ZK, Qtto Crotewohl Papers, N t 90/485. 87..Report on the political development in the %>viet zone of Germany, Novembeu; '1952, BKD BfGDF, B13711473. 88. Heymann to Florin, J a n u a ~10, 1955, DDR MEAA, HA11 Secretariat, A37; Heymam to Ulbricht, Ncjvember 23, 4955, SED ZK, Walter Ufbricht Papers, NL 18213247; and Heymann to the GDR Fcyreign M i n i s t r ~December 30, 1955, DDR M f M , Warsaw Embassy' A3646. P-ieymann rejected his own ministryfs estimates that there were still hundreds of thomands of Germans living in Poland. Heym a m calculated that there were between 80,000 to 100,000 Germans in the Western Territories without 1301ishcitizenship. 8% Otto Schiin to Florin, December 3,1955, SED ZK, mjcrclfilxn FBS 339/13492. 90, Heymam to Ulbrisht, October 26, 2954, SED ZK, Wafter Ulbricht Papers, NL 182/1247. 91, Heyrnann nstes of meeting with Ciinter khmerbach, December 3, 1955, DDR MfAA, Poland Section, A1 822. 92. Klaus Steiniger and Raoral Cefroi tcr the SED CC on their visit to Poland, August 13,1356, SED ZK, Waltter Ufbrisht Papers, N L 18211247. 93. Cultural Attach6 Manfred Schmidt notes of meeting with Lech (head sf the Cultural Department of the Central Council of X301ish Unions), April 23, 1956, SED ZK, FBS 339113494. 94. Seyfert to the SED Central Committee, August 8, 1957, SE9 ZK, FBS 339113495. 95. P-ieymann to Florin, January 40,1955, DDR MfAA, HA11 Secretariat, A37. 96. Heymann to the GDR Foreign Ministv, J a n u a 28,1955, ~ DDR MEAA, Warsaw Embassy, A3616. 97. Report on relations beween East Germany and 130fand in 1955, undated, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 939143492. 98, f-leymann to the GDR Foreign Ministry, December 30, 2955, BD13 MfAA, Warsaw Embass5 A3636.

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99, Heymann to Florin, January 18, 1955, BD13 MfAA, HPIiX Secretariat, ,437, 100. Bolz to Grc>tewclhl,March 16, 1955, SET>ZK, Otto Grotewohl Papers, NIJ C601483; and f-leymann notes of m e t b g between Bolz, Cyrankiewicz, and Bierut, etal., March 17,1955, T)DR MfAA, VVitrsaw Embass5 A3579. 401, Heymam to Florin, January 10,1955, DDR MfAA, HA11 Secretariat AS?; and Polish Embassy in Berlin report from January 1 to March 15, 1954, MSZ, 10/3;""0/41. 102,Lobodycz notes of a meeting with Helme;?r,December 24,1955, 13ZPXTKC., Bierut archive, 254/1V-30. 183. Heymam to Ulbricht, November 23, 1955' SE&)ZM, WaXter Ulbricht I3apers, NZ, 182112487. 184. SED Central Committee Department of Foreign Affairs memo, unsiped, January 19,1956, SED ZK, micrc~filmFBS 339113494. 405. Anheyer to the Headquarters of the German Fctlk-Policy in Berlin, September 28,1956, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339113488. 406. J6zef Czechoh notes of meeting with Rcxe and Stucle, November 9, 1956, MSZ, 10/378/42. 407. P-iandke notes for the Politburo, September 15, 1956, SED ZK, Politburc~ Protocol No. 45 fram September 153, 1956, J IV 2/2A/519. From January to %ptember 1956, '7,703 Polish Germans went to West Germany, and 5963 to East Cermany. 108. Memo to Grc~tewclhlon a report by Heinrich Goeres on his trip to Poland, unsigned, July 20,1956, SED ZK, Qtto Grotewohl Papers, NL 9014812, 109. Matem and Florin repc~rtof meeting with Gierek and Jed~chc>wski, October 16,1956, SED ZK, Politburo Protocd No. 44, J lV/2/2/503, 110, f-landke notes for the 130fitburo, Sytember 14, 1956, SED ZK, microfilm FES 339113493; and SED Central Committee note to the Pctlitburc~of PZPR, %ptember 1956, SED ZM,microfilm FBS 339/ 13493, 111. Fritzsche notes of a meeting with Zawadski, September 217,1956, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 33911X93, 112. Heymann to Utbricht, November 23, 1955, SED ZK, Walter Ulbricht Papers, NL 182/1247. 113. Grc~tewclhlto the Pc>Xitburc:,of the PZPR, September 29, 1956, PZPR KG, 2371m11-822. 114. f-leymann notes of a meeting with Winiewicz, October 4, 1956, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 33911393. 115, Notes of meetings beween 130fish and GDR Ministry of Interior officials from December 4 to December '7,1956, unsigned, FZPR KC, 237/XXI1-822. 116. SEXU Central Committee report on the unification of families fmm Poland to the GDR and FRG, unsigned, undated, ca. December 1956, SEE?ZKt microfilm FBS 339143493; and SET) Central Committee report an registered German citizens in Poland, unsigned, October 1957, SEE?ZK, microfilm FBS 339113493. From July to September 4957, Germans of Prjlish citizenship emigrated from the Wrodaw, Koszalin, and Szczecin regions to the GDR, In the same period, between 8,000 and 40,1200 Germans from the area went to West Germany 117.13ecommendations for the talks with the Polish government delegation on the question of German citizens in Poland, undated, unsigned, ca. June, 1957,

18.2

GomzlPhS Trade Policies and G e r m n ~Rlipaliriatiorz

SED ZK, Otto Gmtewohl Papers, NL 901483. The 1301ish government estimated that there were approximately 40,000 Germans eligible for registration, mostly in the districts of Wroc-kaw, Koszafin, and Szczecin. 118. Fritzscfie no>tesof a meeting wit11 Germans from WalE.brzych, November 22,1956, DUR MMA, Poland Section, A1811. 119. GDR Foreign Ministry report on the first meeting of the German-Polish Commission, unsigned, June 20,1957, DDR MfAA, M. B. K6nigf A16407, 120. f-legen notes of meeting with Wicha (Polish M i ~ s t r yof Interior), April 4, 11i357, SED ZK, Walter Ufbrickt Papers, NL 18211249. 121. Wenk to Mundermam, November 16,1956, BDR MfAA, HA/P Scretariat, A37. 122. Fritzsche to Bdhm (GDR Foreign Ministry), Nwember 26, 2956, UDR MEAA, Poland Sction, A1811. 423. Hegen notes af meeting with Wicha, April 4, 4957, SSED ZK, Walter U1bricht Papers, N L 18211249. 424. Recommendations for the talks with the Polish govei-nment delegation an the question of German citizens in Poland, undated, unsigned, ca. June, 1957, SED ZK, Otto Grotewohl Papers, N L 9Q1483. 125. GDR Foreign Ministry memo on discussions with the GDR Embassy in Warsaw unsigned, September 25, 1957, SEX) ZK, Walter Ulbricht Papers, N I , 18211249. 126. GDR Fc~reignMinistry to the Polish Embassy in Berlin, unsigned, Sptember 13,1957, DUR MfAA, k;iA/I Scretariat, A14759. 127" Report on the impact of tourist traffic beween Potand and West Germany; unsigned, rmdated, ca. fall 4957, DDR MfAA, M. B. KGnig, A47451. 128. Hegen to Winzer, October 25, 1957, UDR MfAA, HA/X Secretariat, A14759. 129, Joachim G. Gbrlich, ""Mornmunistische Freundschaft an der Oder und Neisse" "o:ommunist friendship on the Bder and Neisse), Oslezrropa 14, no. 10 (19M): 724-728, p. 726. 130. Joachim Giirliich report on the Germans in PoXand, October 1956, BRD 13fGDf=,1313711246. 131. G&rlich,"Kornmunistische Freundschaft an der Bder und Neisx," p 726. 432. Hegen to Winzer, October 25, 1957, DDR MfAA, HA/L Secretariat, A14759, 433. Joachim Giirlich letter in Po prostit, January 27,4957 p. 7. 134. Drechsler report, March 14, 1957, SED ZK, Walter Ulbricht Papers, NL, 18211249. 135. Report on the impact of tourist traffic beween 1301and and West Germany, unsigned, undated, ca. fall, 195'7, DDR MfAA, M. B. Kbnig, A17152. 436. Hegen to Winzer, October 25, 4957, DDR MfAA, HA/L Secretariat, A14759. 437. Kegart on the meeting of the Cerman-Polish Commission on Germans in Poland, January 1Q, 2958, SEU ZM,microfilm FBS 339113493. 438. Stenographic record of the meeting of the Polish-German Commission an Germans in Poland, January 8-10,1958, DD23 MfAA, Wrsaw Embassy, A3755,

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139. Protocol from the meeting of the Polish-German Commission on Germans in Poland, January 9,1958, MSZ, 101327137. 140. Stenographic record of the meeting of the Polish-German Commission on Germans in Poland, January 8-10,1958, DDR MfAA, Warsaw Embassy, A3755. 444, Report on the recommendation of the Polish-German Commission on Germans in Poland, undated, ca. January 1958, DDR MfAA, Warsaw Embassy; A3755; and protocol from the meting of the Pr>lish-GermanCommission on Cermam in Poland, January 9, 2958? MSZ, 10/327/37, The Wrocjaw consulate was closed in 4961, but by the end of 4962, the cmsutates opened in Katowice and Gdahsk. 142. Kolasa (GDR Foreign Ministry) to Winzer; October 10, 1957; DDR MWA, HA/I Scretariat, A14759, 143. Briefing for the January 1958 meeting of the Polish-German Commission, undated, ca. December 1957, DDR MfAA, HA/I Secretariat., A44759; see also "Problems of the FRG from the Polish Perspective" by the Bureau for Expellees, undated, in BKD BfGDF, B43Vi12f32, In 1944 the West German government estimated that 132,000 1301esin Germany had German citizenship. 4 4 , Broniatowski to Eobodycz, May 20,4958, MSZ, 101327137. 145. Fritzsche report on i-he activity of the Cmsular Department of the GDR Embassy in Warsaw January 31,1959, SED ZK, micrc~fitmFBS 339112495. 146, GDR Embassy in Warsaw briefing far the Council on Rqatriation Ques; SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339133493. tions, J a n u a ~1963, 447. Fifth Meeting of the Cormeil on Repatriation Questions, February 1,1964, DDR MfAA, 1EJSA406. 448. GDR Embassy in Warsatzr briefing for the Council on Repatriation Questions, January, 1961, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339113493, 443. GDR Embassy in Warsatzr briefing fr-or the Council on Repatriation Questions, January, 1961, SEB ZK, microfilm FEfS 339113493; see also Bienert (Embassy attachk) notes of meeting with Cerny (Czechoslwak Embassy in VVarsaw) February 2 2,1960, DBR M f M , Warsaw Embassy, A3725,

Gomul-ka's Foreign Policy and the Ulbricht-Gomulka Summit, 1956-1957 The n~aliciouscriticisn~sby tJw [Easti Gerr~zarzconzr~desare rlol decreasing, csyeeiully cunct~rningour ~coizanzicsituation. -Polish Embassy

yclrC,

iltlggst 195F

GomuF-kdsassertion of Poland" economfc imterests abroad was part of a stsateu to balance Poland" relations between the two blocs and the two Germanies. Ulbricht was adamantiy opposed to this "Etoist" 'foreign poky, especially a rapprochement between Born a d Warsatru, The SED could not afford the embarrassrne~~t of having two socialist states, Yugoslavia and Poiand, regarding the GDR as the lesser German state.2 On November 8, 1956, West Germm Chmcellor Konrad Adenauer declasrzd that the FRG would seek to resolve all. questions with the new "free Poland." A week later, the W s t Geman newspaper TaCqessyiegI(Daily Mrmr) hinted. that Poland mi&t have set a new courtie in East-West ~lations: "De-Stalij.1i2;ati.m hias progressed much filr&er in Poland than in the Sok~iet zone of Gcrmany. Nomal retations between the Federal Kcpublic and Poland could possibly contribute to the aceeieration of the s m e process in the The ncbvspaper p~ciictedthat the exchanhge of trade missions with PoIand would be the first step toward. full diplomatk rel.atims.3 The East Germans suspected that Poland" expaneiing trade connections to West Germany had long-range djpbmatic jmpiications, U'Ibricht" confidant, Erich GIUckaufr told him that the Polish government would sacrifice its relations with East Germany for diplomatic relations with West Germany. As he put it, "the thesis of the peopfe in the Polish party that there are also different state interests between the socialist

Gomzalh's Foreigtz Policy and the Ulbp-iclzl-Gumzrth Summit

185

countries could become the basis of a pdicy of understanding betwem Poland and West Gemany at the expense of the GUR.'"Wluckauf suggsted that the East G e r m Embassy i,n Warsaw step up its propaganda campaign in Poland to contrast West Germany's mititarisrn with East Germanfs peace hitiatives. He also rczco ended &creasing exchwes between the towns on Ihe Oder-Nei,sse border, and more delegation exchanges in general; the recommendations contradicted Ulbricht" order to curb direct cor~tactswith Polmd, however, and were shelved." Mtfiotrgh Gomuika sought to expand pditical and economic ties to the F K , diplomatic =cognition was still out of the question as lmg as Bonn refused to recognize the Oder-Neisse border. Furthermore, the only exception that Born would make to the Hallstein Doctrhe was the Soviet Unim (see Chapter S), in part because it was one of the occupying powers. If the FRG recopized Poland as anothcsr occupier, it coutd make another exception; but Warsaw wndd not conternplate jeopardizing the legal status of the Western Territories by acceptink: the status of an occupier. The territ0rit.s were now an htegral part of the Polish state. The PZPR took steps to allcviae East German fears that a deal for diplomatic relations with the FRG was being discussed, In an editorial in Trybzinu Lzidzk, iartur Kowalski expressed optimism about the future of Polish-West German relations, but warned Bonn not to try to weaken Poland" ties to the Warsaw Pact: "There exists in cestaisr circles In the FRG the stubborn tendency to set Poland against the GDR, weakening the katernal alliance tying us to the G e r m Democra.t.ic Rep~tblic.This calculation . . . is comptet@lymistaken and does not have the least chance of rr.alization."Wn Decen-tber 8, 1956, Ne~kesDezktschla~dmpritlted another edjtorial front Fyhuna Lzrdu pledging Ihat Poland would not c m pmmise its relations with the Soviet Union and the GDR for diplomatic recopition from West Germany7 Gontu2ka's cultivation of West Germany and thc United States, however, confin~edUl'bricht" suspicions. h t winter, the Polisb pltess softened its criticism of the capitalist countries and stressed Polmd's independence." m article in Norue Drogi about the Hungarim crisis, Jerzy Watr declared that '"our party stresses the right of every nation to their own decisions about their own destinyf"Wiatr noted that the PZPB's reaction to the initial phase of the Hu~~garian revolutio~~ mirrored that of the Chinese, Yugoslav, Italian, Belgian, and Ameriran communist parties, which had all rejected the notion that it was a ""cunterrevcrlutionary plot." Wiatr acknowledged that- the Hmgarian revolt had becom dangemus, but he reiterated that "above all our party stressed again that it stands unshaken cm the principle of the sovereignty of every nation and nonintervention in their kternal affairs." Wiatr's argument was a direct

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contradiction of the SEn's outright condemnation of the FXungarim rclvolution and support of the Soviet interwention.9 In the walce of the Suez and Cypress crises in 1956, the East German ent speculated that NATO might try to overcome its differences within the Wstern ailiance by acting against the Wasaw Pact. Ambassador Meymann proposed to Jlizef Winiewicz a triiateral comnrtu~~iqui\ with Czeckoslovakia declaring that an attack on one country was an attack on them all. Winiewicz thought that "Hey s intervention c m be j~xdgedlike the series of alarmist GDR comm 011s in the past few weeks" and mcommended that the Poljsh government sit on the proposal.10 In December, T ~ b u LZ.I~ZI ~ a printed the SED and CzCP cornmun i q d wi.lhout mentionhg that the PZPR had declined to sign it.'l When it seemed likely that NATO would station nuclear weapons in West Germany fn 1957, the SED again proposed a formd East GermanPolish-Czechoslovak protest; once more the Poles opposed the idea, Xnstead of preventing the nuclearizatim of tbe FRG, the Poles argued that a protest would only serve to unify NATO a d undermine domestic oppositim to the plan in the U'njtcd States. East Gmman Charge d'affaires GGnter Seyfert assured Winiewicz that his government was merely proposing a separate declaration that would complement the Sowiet resolution in Che Ulrited Nations, but. Winiewicz repeated t b t the foreign policies of the two c ~ ~ n t r i should es "undermine the cot-ierence of the Atlantic ailiance, not result in its cmsolidation," "Seyfert replied that the GDR, mlike Poland, had a significant prohlern in West (;ermany and needed to defend itself against Born% aaggressive foreign policy. But Winiewicz countered that Poland was already doing enough m this fsont. Me resninded Seyfert that Gomnlka and Cyrankiewicz had frciquently warned of the impending danger of West German chauvinism and militarism.72 One East German Foreign Ministry official concluded that the Poles we= worried ahwt complicating their relations with the United Sates. He accused the Poles of underestimting the dmgers of "West German imp er id ism."^^ ARer visiting Pdmd that Ml, another SED functio~nary denounced Gomuika for conducting a blatantly anti-Soviet, pro-Western poky*Several local PZPR leaders told the East Cermm that "it would be best if we [East Germms] would csclate the ullification of Germmy as fast as possible, whether with or without Adenauer, so that together-&rmany and Polmd-we can stand up atgai~~st the Soviet Unioneff14 At the s m e time that the Palish governmetnt was pursuing West German political parties and trade lixlks,l"he SEB was increasixlg the number a d vitriol of its attach on the Adenauer government, accus hahoring militarists, fascists, and former Nazis. Th,e Polish gov

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rejected repeated East German entreaties to join in this campaign, The Polish Embassy criticized t_he tone of the SED attacks on the SPD as "extremely rude and aggressir~e.~~l~ W;arsaw and East B d i n were ullited in, their firm, oppo"ition to M T O % pphn to arm West Germany with atomic weapons, however. In May, the Poles initiated meetings betweern Czesiaw Wycech, Zdenek Fieslinger, and Johannes Dieckmam, the leaders of the Polish, Czechoslovak, and East German parliaments. Although earlier in the year the Polish government had rejected a joint dcclaration denouncing West German reartnameat, now th Poles agreed to a statement protesting the stationing of atomic weapons in West Germany,lTAmbassador Piotrocvski thought Ihe conference had rc.rs&ed some of recent misumderstandings between Wrsaw on the one hand and East Berlin and Prague on the other. :Ele ~ p e a t e dthat Poland wcrdd not risk isolation from the socialist camp for the sake of relations with the West, and ahove all with West Germmy,l" The East Germans interpreted the meeting as support for their stepped-up campaign against West Germm militarism, imperialism, and monopoly capitalism,lgThe Polish press, however, gave little coverage to the creation of the Common Market and Euratom 1957. In the words of one East German diplomat, these institutions were ""a strmg threat to peace and gave the German imperialists and militarists the possibility of producing atomic weapcms." The East German Embassy was thoroughly dissatisfied with Poland's propaganda, campaign and connpared it unfavorably to Czechoslovakia"; the em:bassy recommended raising these issues with the Pdes at the high-level meeting~scheduledfor June.20 Durhg the Ninth Ple~narySssion of the PZPR Central Committee in May 1957, the SED waited, expectantly for cmfismatim that the PZPR was rethinkis its ""anti-Marxist" foreign and domestic poficies. NW East German M a s s a d o r Jnsef Megen filed a typically pessimistic report, however. He said that Gomuih had tried to keep the ideological dtthate with the 'Warxist-Leninist wing" of the party out of public view so that the party wndd appear unified behjnd his program.. Hegen reported, that the party leadership had failcd to stress the leading role of the CPSU, and that Uugoslavia was the model for the PZPKs independent forraign policy-21 Although Ubrichl: had serious d.ouhts about Gomulkds foreign policy he was gaining confidmre that the GDR would play m important role in the fuknre of Gemany. R e East German czconomy was functiorning as well as or better than any in Eastern Europe, and Ihe GDR was m w an irnportant sqplier of machinery for the entke Sovicjt bloc. The CDKs sense of polilical inportance was greatly hcreased by the integration of the W A

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into the Warsaw Pact h 1957; East Berlin thougfnt that th East German anrry wodd enable it to play a cenbal role in Geman remification, The Miarsakv Pact's fighting readi,ness was seriowly mdermined by the bad blood between the Polish and East German amed, forces. Prclpaganda erctolting the unity of the new ""working class'hrmies had little effect on morale; the Polcs were hhigly swpicinus of Qrman militarism, even to the point of complaining that East German army uniforms rcsembled the old Wehrmacht muster.22 A rmcorous confrontation between Polish and East German sailors took place in May while the crew of the Polish ship Baityk was on shore leave in the East Germm pmt of Sassnitz. The head of the East German Navy; Vice Admiral Waldernar krner, was shacked by the Pales' '"negative and hostile attitude" "toward the Soviet Union, and by their attacks on socialism in general. To his surprise, the Poles interpreted the Poznaix st.rikes in June 1956 as a genuine workers' revolt rather than a fascist provocation. The Polish officers mahtained that Polcs bad lived much betkr under capitalism before the war. They said that Soviet cmcentration camps had been much worse than Hitler's, and that Stalin was a criminal who had explsited the Polish economy. The Poles were proud they had mmoved Soviet advisors and political officers from the Polish army. Che Polish sailor concluded that socialiism was ""sit." m e Polish sailors had some particularly unflattering thjngs to say about the GDR: They told Verner that tbe East German government was "too communist" and that it merely aped Moscow"s policies. They called U1bricht a ""Sdinist"' and wmdcred why he and GrotewoXll had not been removed from power.23 The Polisfi sailors disflayed no signs of the politically correct behavior that the East German c o r n m i s t s had corn to expect from their Warsaw Pact parhers. According to the East Germans, the Polish sailors did not address each other as '""cmrade," m d were more concerned &out fhding prostitutes than in "friendship meetings" to discuss Marxism. The Poles made fun of the SED" sstict contrd over Wstern influences, such as the party" bba on ""rock and roll" "dancing; they boasted that they could smoke American-made Lucky Strike and Camel cigarettes whenever they wmted.24 From this confrontatio~~, the East Germm ofticers formed real doubts abwt the loyalty and fightin.g capabiIi9 of the Polish armed forces. One officer concluded that the Poles had no interest in the Warsaw Pact, and that an East German soldier sitting in a foxhole with a Pole had better be prepared '"to get a knjfe in the ribs." Another officer observed that if high-ranking Polish officers behaved in such a way, Poland was not an asset to the Warsaw Pact. m e East German ofticer called the Polish officers " a very reactionary bunch," and. accused them of "spitting on the

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Warsaw Pact," He said that had the East Germans h o w n what a bunch of "heir~is"" thr Polish sailors were, they would have beaten them q . 2 " 'The SED Central Committee was quicMy informed of the kcide11t.26 The SER Tightens Controls on Tousism The Polish sailors3beavior at Sassnitz confirmed the wisdom of SED's strict policy of cmtrolling persmal cmtacts betwen East Gemans and Poles. Polish and East German exchanges dropped dramaticalliy in early 1957. East Germany sent fifty-six delegations of tecMcal. and scientific experts to Poland in 1955 and forty-one in 1954, but none in the first quarter of 1957. Polish delegations to East Germany numbered 123 in 1955,109 in 1956, but only 13 in the first quarter of 1957.27 East Geman officials were concerned about the increashg tourist traffic betwee11 Pdand and Western Europe. Pdes still a p p e a ~ dto be more interested, in developing persona1 connections with West Germans than with East Germans. fn April 1957, Florin registered a complaint with the Poiiish authorities about thirty-four Polish architects hvho had arrived ounced at the Leipzig Tmadc Fair and sought out West German archftects for financial suppod. The Polish a r c h i t ~ t shad atso tried to sell gold, on the black market.28 oyed whenever the Polish East G e m m officials were exceptionally govemmmt afforded West Germms preferential twatment; for example, the SED district office in Magdeburf~reported that W s t Germms had €0 wait only about three weeks to get a visa to Poland, but East Germms had to wait thirteen weeks.29 h one instmce, m East Geman cdled t-he Polkh Embassy about rerciving his visa by majl, but was rudely inlormed that '"you can wait until you are blue in the face, but you will have to pick it up yourself.'" m0thc.r case, m East G e m m woman asked. the P&& Embassy whether she could get her visa in time to attend a wedding in Potmd, She was told that she ""should write Polasrd h a t the w h e should be put in the ceZlar and t-he meat should be frozen for about eight wee&; that is how long it will1 take to process your visa application.'""l"~hen the East Germans lodged a formal protest, Polish diplomats explahed that there was normally m eight-week wait for all visas.33 East German journalist Suzmne Drechsler reported that Wrsaw was actually meouraging Western tourists to come to Poland, especially West Germms. She warned that the "Western tourists not only bring hard currclncy, but act as imperialist recruiters m d agents.'%s lls~tal,Drechsler's answer to the problem was more propaganda: "Can? we and the other socialist countries do our best to send Poland reliable comrades with the most cvide range of expertise so that they can speak with the Polish c m radcs and create ideological clarity [inthe PZPR]?"32

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In the fall of 1957, the East Geman Embassy reported that 36,080 tourists had visited Polmd in 1956, and that 33,000 had already come in the first half of 1957. Of those, 7,000 were West Germans, many of whom the Polish authurities meouraged to visit their old h m e s in Poland. The embassy thought that these visits were hurting both countries: "We determined in all of the discussions b t h the remaining Gemans in Poland] that arguments against the GDR and agajnst the PELF are best spread thrcrugh the tourist traffic. After every transport new rumors reemerged against the GDR and the PRE" Me11 the GDR began to restrict the passqe of tourist busses f r m West Gcrmay and W s t Berfin to the Polish border at Frmuurt/Odele, the Polish gove them through Czechoslovakia. East Ger~nandiplomats recommended holding talks wit21 Prague to stop this traffic and suggested that the g w ent encourage more East German tourism to Folmd to replace the West G~ztrmms.~" But Ulbrickrt had already decided that casual contacts between East Germans and Poles were dangerous, and again he d ot act on the recommendatio~~. Later that f d , the East Qrman govc nt informed the Poles that Americans of PoIish heritage would not be allowed to take busses from West Germany to Poland through the GDR. The contrast between West and East Germany's tourist policies made Pales wonder which country was their Warsaw Pact ally.% Gamulka Meets Ufbricht At the end of hilay 1957, the SED published an article by Heinz Pahl in which he traced the Polish people" growing disappointment in the Gomuika rbgirne to the bureaucmtizatim of state and economic agencies. This was an ironic criticism coming from a party that was aimfng for total control over East German po:[itics and sodety. Pahl blarned Gomulka for developing a "cult of personality, which led to particularly serious mistakes in Poland."" He commented on the great ideological confusion in the party and among Poles in general, and accused t-he party of promoting '"oourgeois-capitdist democracy." h P l claimed that "these forces promote their revisionist pclsition under the banner of the struggie with 'Stalinism-'" He alluded to o~~going problems in Polmd c o ~ ~ c e m hantig Semitism, food productionl and. the growing influence of the C&holic Church, P&l concluded that fie majority of Poland's communfsts were aware that revisionism was contradictory to the interests m d goals of the workbg class, but be was skeptical whether the Gomulka rbgime had the will to stamp it o ~ t . 3 ~ Ulhrieht had a chance to get a better sellse of Gomuflka's intentions during their metings in Berlin that June. It was their first meeting face-

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to-face since Gmuika" election as first secretary of the PZPR the previous October. They had an abidhg dislike for each other, al&ough they had some personal sjmilarities: Both WE loyal folowrs of Lenin, lived relatively modest lives, and spent most of their tirne m official, matters, Neither was charismatic, but both were devoted to the commmist cause and cowheed of the rightlzess of their respective policies. Their main d i s s ~ e m e nwas t over the general applicabiliw of Stalin's model of socialism. Cyrankiewiez and Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki accompanied Gomujka, and Ulbricht, Grotewohl, and 13012; headed the East German delegation. The perfunctory lead l~eadlinein Npl~rsDe~.lt~~IZland proclainned their sociatjst soEdarity: ""Fraternally tl'nited hthe Struggltc for a Permanent Peace and the Victory of Socialism," SSubseyuent issues did not: mention the heated debates that had brought the parties to the breaking point in 1956.36 The a t m o s p h e ~surrounding the meetjngs was, in the words of one East Cermm official, "stiff and reserved.""" That the two sides were still far apart in their conceptions of sociaiisrn was immecdi,dely apparant. The Poles asked the East Germans to declare their agreement with the resohtions of the Eighth and :NinthPlenary Sessions oE the PZPW Central Committee, but the East Germans refused on the grounds that- the resoutions were not based on Marxist-Lesthist principfes.3 The Poles baited ldlbricht and the other East German had-liners by a s k i q them whether there was really a "fulSy free and wonstrained atm,ospf-tereflin the SED, in contrast to the democratization of the PZPR, The East Germans thought that Comufka was naively underestimating the dangers of class conflict in Poland, and that his policies were not promoting MarxistLenhist social, economic, and political development; they severely criticized Gomuikafs agricdturd poiicitls and tolerance cJf the '*reactionary and counterrevolutionaryf'Poiish Calt.lolic Church.s9 A sharl, exchange ensued when Ulbkcht accused the Poles of passing top secret East G e m a n docun-tents to Wstern gcrwrnments. Gomuika called it a ""serionsreproad," and asked for proof of the altcgations. UI.bricht replied that some Poles who had inside hformation on the GDR had fled to tke West; Cyrankiewicz =minded Ubricht that many East Germm officials had defected as well. Grotewohl tried to end the conversation by saying that they should not return to the past. Gornuika agreed and added that if there was no proof of the charges, the Poles would ignore the^^,^ The Poles also raised the contentious issue of the two colxntrieskompeting harbars on the East Sea, Szczecin and Rostock. In 1950, Ulbricht had asked for greater access to the port at- Szczeein," but the East Germans eventually decided to expand the Rostock harhor. Durislg the "East

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Sea Week" celebrations that June, one Pofe ixnplied that the GDR wodd probably not exist after German reunif cation, in which case Kostock would lose its economic importance. He told the East Germms to orient themselves to the unity of Germany by using the port at Harrrburg instead.42 Cumulka and tJlbrichl: agreed to study the use of Szczcch for the transit in and out. of the GDR," but the East Germans went ahead anyway with plans to expand the Rostock harbor. They also discussed trade relations, which appeared to be on the upswing. Recent agreeme~~ts called for a 17 percent il~creasein trade in 3957.45 The East German government projected that Polland" share of East G e m m trade wlruld som return to the 1954 level of 34 percent.& 111 m hterview with T r y b a ~ ~LaU ~ U shortly before the summit, Ambassador Hegen declared that ""the very close economic relations between both countries found their nahtral etipression in the trade agreements."47 Ubricht was in fact deeply dissatisfied with Wrsaw's trade policies, which he blamed for jeopardizil-cg key elements of the GDR" econmjc plan," Polish negotiators insisted that a new trade agreement include a clause slipdating that East G e r m y ' s negative trade balance be paid in gold ar convertible currency. One member of the East German delegation wrote Grotewohl that such a clause was unacceptable, and "contradicts the c m m n n practice between socialist: countries." Me called the Polish negotiators '*obsthate."49 A month before the summit, the PZPR informed an SED delegation from FranklurtlOder that P d m d did not want to export:more cod to the G m . % Ulbricht took his case to Connecon, which was meethg in Warsaw that June. There he Zllamed the shortage of raw material imports for the GDR's failure to meet its Five-Year Plan.51 The Polish representatives to Comecon made no direct concessions to the East Gemans, but the Soviets, Hungarians, Czechclslovaks, and Rulgarians agreed to hold bilateral talks with the Poles to develop joint ventures with the Polish coal hdustry.52 Ulbricht was unable to persuade Gomujka to deliver more coal unless the East Germans paid for it in hard currellcy; The Poles achawledged that they could not export as much coal to the socialist countries because, as Lllbricht suspected, they were trading it for essential imports hcrm capitalist cou~ztries.The Poles said that their ongohg negotiations with British, French, and Swedish firms wodd help Poland build locomntkes and electrify Polish railways; these deals, they asserted, wodd eventually free coal fnr export. 'The Poles also asked the East Qrmms for more investment credits," Dnespesate for Poland's higher quality of coaf, the East G e r m s eventuaily agreed to another 100 million ruble credit for the Pofish brown coal hdustry.34

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On the last day of the conference, Ulktricht, Gomuika, and Cyrmkiewicz exchanged heated w d s w e r Poland's exports to West Redin. The GDR was s~tpplyilngs o m of the same goods to West Berlin, such as cemcnt, The Poles argued that they were not d y contsactualfy obligated to makc the deliveries, but were $40 million i n debt to West Gemany W e n Gomu&a maintahncd that this trade was strictly an economic matter, not a politjcal one, Ulbricht comtered that Polmd's trade with West Berlisr was lrtdeed a major potitical p d l e m for the GDR. Al&ough the East Germans had earlier itlsistcrd that Poland include tradc with W s t k r h in qreements cvith West Germany, they now told the Poks not to consider West Berlin as a part of West Germany, but as a part of a greater Bedin sikated in the heart of East Germany U'lbricht achowledged &at the SED wanted to kcep the '"political and economic pressure on West Berh." He said that his government would not allow Poland to compete for West R e r h cement contracts. Ulbricht pohted out that West Berlk would not be as eco~~omically md politically depmdent on East Gemany if it did not get its cement from the GDR.. Gcrmulka replied that "if [our trade agrc~emmts]are not fuuilled, it will leave the jxnp~ssionthat. discord exists betwee11 Poland and the GDR. Everything t;hould be done to mani.fest rani@" He then mggested that the East Gemans pay hard currency for Polish cement and ship it to West Berlin t-hcmst.l,ves. The East Qrmans said that &ey would study the proposab but they expected the Pdes to acquiesce on matQrs rcgardlng West ISerh.5" Gonnulka and Ulbricht agreed to perjodic meeti~~gs of their forejgn mjllisters to discuss their outstanding problems. The SED promised to foster better personat ties between Poles and East Germans by expanding techical, scientific, educatjnnal, and cultural exchanges, Ubricht also agreed to open an East German cultural and information center in WarW . The t w sides agreed to work on a long-term trade ded, including Polish cod detjveries and East German exports of consumer goods." In spite of all of the hard bargainhg, the East Germans concluded that the talks had confimed the principle of socialist eeoncrmic cacrperation.57 In an effnrt to stabgize the political m d econon?ic situation in Poland before the PZPR Congress scheduled. for December, the East Germans offered to host t w PZPR delegation+one to examine the SEE?%ridustrial and agricztlturaf. policies and another to study Marxist-Leminist principles at an East German unjversity. They also proposed. sending more pu"a1ications and lecturers to Poland to promcrte socialism and alcrt Poles to the dangers of Wrsstern irnperiaiism and mi1itarism. Last, the East Qrmans promised to invite Polifh workrs to Visit East German enterprises. The SED maintained tight control over tbese exchanges, however, and insisted that t h y answer to their respective central, committees or forraign

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mhistries, As a result, exchanges did not significantly increase in the next few years.58 Gomugka and Utbrjcht could not agsee on a inal joint comnunique because the Poles were unwilling to support the SEU's aggressive propad and West Germany One line ganda campaign against the U ~ ~ i t eStates in the Polish proposal for the cornmzlniquit read, "The unity Of the socialist camp based on the principlcr of the intesnationalism oi the proletariat is developing." UWIbcht demmded that fie Poles change ""developing" to "'exists and is stilS develapingefThePoles said no, arguing that they did not want to make grandiose c l a h s that would be rejected. by VVerstem public opinion and solidify the capitalist camp.59 The Poles also ohjected to wording directly aitackhg West German and American imperialism,b" as well a line stating that the imperialist powers were preparing for a nuclear war, The East Germms complained that fie Polish draft of the joint declaratim did not use the word "aggressivef"o charactedze Wcstern policies, and that the draft referrcd to 'TPoladd"9insteadof the "FeopIcs" Replablic of Poland.'"h' The talks cmfrmed the East Germans"erception that the Poles were conducting policies '"on the basis of a certain great power chauvhism." The Poles refused to recognize the leaeting mle of the CPSEJ and ignored U'lhricht's warnil7gs of West Cerman and American miji,tarim and in,perialism, One SEE?report predicted that Poland w d d try to capitalize on Cold War tmsions to bargain for more c ~ d i t from s fie West." The delegations hid their m n y differences from publ.ic view..As usual, the East Germans issued statements exaggerating their friendly relations and the complete unity of the two parties. Grotrewohl declared that "the meetings that we held with YOU, dear Polish friends, brought our agreement on ail questions raised" h his statemmt to the press, however, Gomul-ka substituted "clarification" for "agreennent'? /'The talks contributed to a deepezzhg of" our solidarity, to clarification ol many questions that relate to the building of socialism in our countries, as well as to better mutual understanding.""tilbricht claimed that the SED now had ""completetrust" in the PZPR and Connulka, kvhich was obviclusiy at variance with his personal dsubts about Gomullka" foreign and domestic policies-6s The meetings did d a y East Gcrman fears that Comuika would emulate Tito or Nagy and take Poland out of the Warsaw Pact. East Gcrman officials now seemed more disposed to engage the Poles. At a reception at the Polish Embassy following the talks, Jakubowskicommented on the East Gemans" cordiality and will,ingness to discuss issues more frankly. He =parted that Politburo members Erich Mijrckmberger and Erich Honecker had expressed their "'contplete trust in the domestic- and foreign policjes of the PW." RRudlf Agsten, head of the LDP, told Jakubowski

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that the SEX) had hdeed lost confidence in the PZPR for a time, but that the talks had done much to clear the air.63 The Aftermath of the Summit

The Gomulka-UlbricN summit did not result- in significmt improvment in East Geman-Polish relations, however. At a press coderence in Berlin in July, Hermann Matern told rclpcrrters that the SED was still nervous jbcrut developments in P d m d and had to watch them. clnsely*Matern said that the situation in Poland was "far from stabilized," and warned that ""dgerous trends" still existed.65 Again and again East German officials turned up examples of the PZPR's patently unsocialist policies and reluctance to clamp down on gditical deviants. That summer, the Pdish Embassy distributed some u~~authsrized political pamphlets to the SED's regional and district offices. h a n g the authors were the proxninent Polish economist Oskar Lmge and high-ranking trade offiicial Stefan Jedrychowski. 7%leEast Cerman lodged a formal protest aHegistg the tracts contained revisionist thinking and criticisms of the excessive bureaucratization and centralism in some socialist states, including the GDR. The SET)ordered its offices to rcltum the pamphlets to the Polish Embassy on the grounds that the SED did not want a public dlscussim of these issues. The SED also informed Polish diplomats that thry would have to check with the SEDfsDepartment of Foreign Affairs before Chey could &tribute other materials-66 Polish diplomat J6zef Czesak achawledged. that there were problems with the content of the pamphlets, but he termed the SEUfs reaction "dernonstrati.ve and inappropriate."@ Polish oEficials also reported that there was no dlscernahle change in East German p o k y toward Poland in the last half of 1957. The Polish Foreign Ministry characterized the June talks as acrimonious,6%d Polish officials told the VVest Gemans that the atmosphere had been "'very coot."69 The Polish Embassy in Berlin filed numrous =ports confirming that the East German communists stiff had serious doubts about the future of socialism in Paland. The embassy thought that Gomulka" visit had done nothitlg to chmge the rampant anti-Polish attitudes in East Germmy: "The malicious criticisms by the German cmsades are not decreasing, especially concerning our economic situation."TQ Polish diplomats observed that East German journdists, especialiy Ner~esUez~tschbrnd'sWarsaw correspondents, gencrdy ignored Polish subjects; the Poles even doubkd the sincerity of complimentary stories about Pohd.71 The Polish Foreign Mhistry cclmplained that the East German press was stili publishing articles \zrith a "tone of sharp polemics." The ministry mnstly objected to two articles in Ei~zheit,one in

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which Politburo meHlber Fred Oelsmer had inveighed a Polish professor for attacking "Z,uxernburgism,'hd another by Kurt Lmgendiorf accusing Lange of promotjng "'bowgeois economic policy."7z Ufbricht tried in vain to convince ComuiEra of the pitfalls of close rclations with the West, above all with the FRG, The SED thought that Poland" continued requests for loans and grants from the West was a dangerws policy for Poland and ior the unity of the Warsaw Pact; the East Gemans assumed that the money Polmd received would be linked to poljtical concessions. They tried to persuade tlne Polish govemfnent not to accept $5(fO,Q00from the Ford Founbatim, but Polish officials argued that the grmt was a way for Polish scientists to gain access to the world scientific community. 'The Poles pohted out that Polmd wndd receive the money &rough UNESCO, to which they paid mnual dues of $300,000. East German diplomats even criticized the building of a UNESCO-House in Warsacv because t-hey saw it as a s y d o l i c challenge to the monstrous new Palace of Culture and Science, which had been built with Soviet heip.73 The st~mmitalso left the controversy over tourist traffic unresolved. There was a siwificant increase in cultural exchmges between Poles and West Germms that fall," and the GDR continued to harass the visitors. In one case, the East German authorities refused to grmt transit visas to a group of Polish artists and architects intending to travel by boat through East German waters to W s t Germany, Holiand, Belgi Winzer told Piotmwski Chat over Chirty of the architect VVest Berlin; he said that the East German government had to control travel to and from Western Europe because of the GUKs complicated geographical asld political position. Winzer infnrmd Piotrowski that ents and their agents are spending millions to cormpt our students and intellectuals when they travel to West CennanyYf"~ Piotrocvski later apdogized to Kolz for the arcfiitects' ixnproper travel documents,v but the Polish government did nothing to discourage Poles from travelling to the West. Ambassador Hegen reported that the Polish prcss was d e n t on the d a m a s s that this tourist traffic: was doin& to Che socialist states, m d even encouraged ik78 East Germans visiting Poland were genuinely surprised to find so many Wester~zersthere, One East Germcran university delegation to Polmd that fall c h w e d that the Westerners were treated, better than they were. Tl~ePolish Minister for Higher Education gave the East German delegation a quick thirty-minute reception, but threw a party for the British delegation that lasted late into the night. e e East German in the delegation was astonished that the Polish authorities allowed the Westerners to do and say what they wmted:

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During a visit to the student club at the Technical Academy in Warsaw, where "rock and roll" was being danced in dim Light, w e determined that student delegations from Engf and, France, and other countries were there, moving about without any sugemisian at 2111, and, as 1 could hear because of my own knowledge of English, met with each other for exchanges of information. The band teft the cXub at ten o ' c I c ) ~ ~to play for dollars at the American embassy. The [PZPR] party secretary did not find anything unusual about it.T9

Workers at ;fuyhzrnn Ludu told this s a m East German delegation that the imprisonment of East German writer Wolfgang Haricb tryas a mistake. According to the East Germans, two PZPR m~iversityadministrators said that they hated Ufhricht and Khrushchev, and that UIbrickt "does not have any of his own ideas, but is just a parrot of nmshchev." 'The delegation was shocked to discover that only 30 out. of the 1,2,000 students at the Techical Academy in Warsaw were members of the PZPR's youth orgmization. On their trip of over 800 kdometers t h r o w Poland, the East Germans reported Fhat t h y had not seen onc Soviet sddjer, and had heard the name Berut mentioned once; this was enough evidence for the delegation to conclude that the PZPR was doing little to combat the prevailing re~~isionist, nationalist, and anti-Semitic attitudes in Poland.m Tl-re East Germans also faulted the PZE'R for not basing the development of rural Poland on Marxist principles: Easl. G c r m n delegatinsls criticized Pdish collective managers and workers for their completc lack of pcrliSical awarmess. One delegation concluded that the Poles had "no idea about the systematic constructinl?of socialism in the countrysid,e.""" The East German Exnbassy in Warsaw suggested that the Polish government needed "mmal help'" from the SEU to develop better propat;anda on the merits of colledivi~ation.~~ The embassy appeared not to see that the PZPR was generally satisfied with its accommcrdation of private farming; indeed, agricultural production in Poland was on the rise.KVPoljsh agricdtural experts viewed their policy not as a retreat sirnilar to Lenjn's short-lived NEP in, the early 1920s but as a new direction in socialist agricultural policy.84 Every East German exchange with, Poland had an ullderlying political agenda-namely to promute the East German version of socialism. East German Fornip Ministry officials admftted as much; fn one case they invited the PZPR to send a comrade from Kaszalk to Rostock "in order to influence him pulitically" The PZPR mpeatedly refected East German demands for more central c a r o l over delegation exchanges, and in a thinly veiled admonition to stop criticizkg the PZPR's domestic policies,

198

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Polish offiicials said they could nut and would not try to control the foreign rdations of the other c o m u n i s t parZiei.,." During the election campajgn in the );RC that fall, the East Germans again expressed their deep dissatisfaction with the PZBR" tepid support of their propaganda c m pajgn against W s t Germm imperialism and mititarism. The East Germans suspected that Warsaw did not want to risk its trade rcldions with Barnf or jeopardize its slim chances of establishing formal diplomatic ties. It appeared, too, that Poland wanted to circumwent the GDR in negotiations with the FRG. West German sowces alleged that some highleveX officials in the East German Foreip Mhistry hoped that diplomatic contacts between Bonn and W r s w would benefit the GDR, but only if Poland promoted the East German cause.86 Most East German officials did not trust the Gornujka r6gime to do that. Hegen filed another disrouragiw report in September: PZPR] is still underest-i,ma.t.ingthe role and importance of Phe GDR as the basis for a peaceful democratic German state," Hegen said that the Polish prtrss never presented the problem of G e r m n remifiration from an East German, or working-class, standpoint. He added that Chest was slrong sentiment in Poland for friendly relations with the capitalist countries, and notably with West Germany, Hegen t-hought that many issues had to be resolved between East Berlin and Warsaw before the Poles even thought about opening diplomatic relations with B0nn.W With the exception of East Germany, West Germany had more exchanges wilh Poland than with any other Warsaw Pact cnumtry. 'The West German Foreign Ministry reported that Poland was the only socialist country fiat allowed its student groups tc:,c m e frrr extended visits, and characterized the Poles as ""open-mincfed"and cognizant of the disparity between c a m u n i s t propaganda and what life was reatly like in M s t Germmy88 After a visit of Polish scientists to the FRG in November, one West German scientist said that the Poles did not really care about relations with the GDR, and that Poland" relations with the FRG held the key to PoXmd's indepmdence fmm Moscow.8"

'me

Kegations at the End of 1957 'The Te~zt-hPle~zary9ssion of the PZPR Central Committee met in October 1957, a year after Gomuika" return to power. Fomer East German Ambassador Stefan Heymann, now back in the &reign Ministry, cmfirmed that the PZPR was making some progress agahst revisionis~x,although many p a r 9 members were still attacking the dogmatists and demanding greater freedom of expression."" &r Soviet envoy told an East German diploolat that the PZPR was not committed at all to elinninating anti-Soviet atthdes in the party or in the population as a whole.gl

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Gmul.ka%relations with the Soviet Union gained some traction in the last half of 1957, however. Following mmshchev" ppurge of Molotow and Georgi MMaienkov inJune, the CPSW and the PZPR began a slow rczconciiiation. Gomujka began to rethink many of the reforms he had called for the previous October, Much to Khrushchev" satislnction, Gomulka tried to marginalize the revisionists hthe party rather than the right-wlng Natolir~g r u u ~ . ~ z Gomuika" visit to MOSCOW in November for fie fortieth amiversary of the Bolshevik Revolution solidjied his relationship with F(hrushchev, who again confirmed the PZPR" course, The East German hard-liners still harbored lingering doubts; the East German Foreign Mir~istryissued a port that the Marxist-Lenhist wing of Che PZPR was asserting itself again, but had not yet succeeded in suppressixrg "decadent ideas,"%The head of the SEE?%pgrtrss deparmc-nt Horst Sindermam, told a group of Polish journalists in November that ""despite a general jfnprovemnt in relations between Poland and the GUR, it is djfficult to expect the GDR prtrss to trust in Poland, because they [Polish journalists] charge the SED of 'Stalinism.'""e accused the Poles of avoiding closer ties with the GDR in deference to West Gerrnany.94 The Ulbricht-Gomulka summit in June had failed to normalize relations. The SEU's year-end report on PoXand iterated earlier csit.icisms of the PZPR for ignoring ideological and political propaganda, for underestimating the dangers of German imperidism and militarism, a d for waging a half-hearted campaign against revisionism, Although the GDR had established diplomatir:relatinns with Yugoslavia inOctober 1957, the report criticized Warsatru for favoring cmnections to Belgrade and the West over ties to the Soviet bloc cotmtries, 'The East Germans also faulked the Pales for refusing to declare the Soviet Union the "first and, the mightiestf"socialist state. According to fie report, the Polish communists also mijudged the "'role and character of the CDR." h ccontrast to the cooperative attitude of the Czechoslovak commmists, the East Germans found it impossible to conduct ideological discussions with the Polish of Marxi~nn-2~enirtisncr. The East cmmunists about the basic foundatio~~s Germans accused the Pdes of arrogance, allhough it was usually the East Germans who bragged about their superior economic and political developmemtYVoreitgn Mnister Adarn Rapacki's propoahhat fall to create a nuclear-free zone in East Cmtraf Europe caused yet mother rift.

Motes 1. Polish Embassy repc~rtfor March 15 to August 31,1957, MSZ, 10/371/43. 2. Kopa to the Polish Foreign Ministry, undated, ca. December 1956, MSZ, 10/378/42.

208

GomzlPhS Foreig~2Policy and Eh Ulbn"clrt-Gomzitk Szkfnmit

3. From T~~gesspiegel, November 15,1956, in BRD AA, Bepa&ment 2, vol. 438. 4. Glcckauf to Uibricht, February 1,1957, SED ZK, Walter tilbricht Papers, NIJ 18211249. 5. %id. 6. Trybzlnn Lildrr, Ncjvember 24,1li35& p. 4. 7. Rieues Lleutschlnlzd, December 8,1956, p. 1. 8. Analysis of Polish pc~liticalleadership by Dr. G. mode of the Herder Institute, October 31,1956, BRB BfGDS B137/1282. 9. Jerzy Wiatr, "Kryzys interna jonalizmu7" (Intematimal crisis"), Moii~feDrogi 10, no. 11-22 (November-December 1956)' pp. 114-11 5. 10. Winjewicz no>tesof a meeting with Heymann on December 18, December 19,1956, MSZ, 2315717. 11. Trybztna Lzldzi, December 21, 1956, g. 2; see atso Riezk~sDeztlscillnnd, Decernber 22,1956, p. 1. 12. Winiewjcz notes of a meeting with Seyfert, December 28, 1956, MSZ, 23/5U7. 13, Schwab to Ulbrisht, January 28,1957, SED ZK, VValter Ulbricht Payers, NL 18211249. 14. Heinz VVoXfE report on a fishing trip to Gdynia, November 30, 1956, SED ZK, Walter UEbricht Papers, NIJ 18211247. 15. Piotrwski notes of meeting with Buli: and Kundermann, March 29, 1957, MSZ, 10/309/36. 46, Polish Embassy report for October 1, 1956, to March 15, 4957, MSZ, 10/371/43. 47, Neues l;teutsdztand, May 12, 4957 p. 4. 18. 13iotrwskito the Pufish Foreip Ministry, May 17,1957, MSZ, 101383143. 49, Meues fiutsdzlnnd, May 10,4957, p. 4. 20. tugenheim to the SED Central Committee, June 6,1957, SEE?ZK, microfilm FBS 339/ 13495. 21. Hegen to the GDR Foreign Ministy, May 29,1957, UDR MfAA, HA/P Secretariat, A38. 22. khwanz to the SED Central Committee, March 2 6 4957 SED ZK, microfilm FBS 33912389; Wc~IXweberto Honecker, March 30,1957, SET>ZK, microfilm FES 339113489; and Florin to the PZPR Central Committee, April 15, 1957, SEE) ZK, microfilm FBS 33'3113489, 23. Verner to Stoph, May 9, 1957, SED ZK, Walter Ufbricht Papers, N L 18211249. 24. ibid. 25, Ibid. "Heini" i s is derogatory term for a soldier, or an "ass," 26. Major General Boruaa to the SED Central Committee, Department of Security, May 15,4957, SED ZK, Wlter Ulbricht Papers, N L 48211249. 27. Mernc:, frc>rnthe State Pt anning Commission on Technical and Seientif c Cooperation with Poland, June 8,1957, SED ZK, microfilm F&S339/13492. 28. Schwanz to the SED Central Committee, March 20, 1957, SEB ZM, microfilm FBS 339/1%89; Wt>Ilweberto klonecker, March 30,1957; SEI) ZK, microfilm FBS 339/13489; and Florin to the PZPXT Central Committee, April 15, 1957, SEU ZK, microfilm FflS 339113489.

Gomzalh's Foreigtz Policy and the Ulbp-iclzl-Gumzrth Summit

201

29. A h e y e r to the Headquarters of German Folk-Policy in Berlin (Hauptverwaltung Deutsche Vcnlkspolitik), September 28, 1956, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339113488, 30. SED Central Committee repc~rtc m the unificatic~nof families from Poland to the GDR and FRG, unsigned, rmdated, ca. December 1956, SEL) ZK, micrr~film FBS 339113493. 31, &port on visas to Poland, umigned, Sptember 28, 1956, SED ZK, rnicrofilm FBS 339113488. 32. Dreehsler report, March 14, 1957, SED ZK, Walter Ulbrirht Papers, NL 18211249. 33, Report on the tourist traffic beween Poland and West Germany, unsigned, undated, ca. fall, 1957, DDK MfAA, M, B, Kiinig File, A17151. 34. Beling nc>tesof meeting beh-een Winzer and Czeczyk, Nowember 21,1957, DDR MfAA, HA/I Scretariat, A38. 35. Translation of Pahl articXe from Aus dcr z'nfer?znl.;ionnlcszArbeifcrbezveg1ang (From the International W r k e r s W o v e r n e n t ) , May 31, 4957, in MSZ, 10/448/47. 36. Meues 13eufsdzEand,June 21,1957, p. I. 37. Kopa notes of meeting with Haid on July 2, July 4,2957, MSZ, 10/379/42. 38. Florin to Grotewol-rX, June 20, 1957, SED ZK, Otto Grotewc>hlPapers, NL C60/483, 39. Report of the Polish and GDR government and PZPR and SED party meetings, June 20,1957, SED ZK, microfilm FfaS 339113423. 40. Record of the discussions of party and government delegations in Berlin from June 48 to June 20, June 29,1957; MSZ, 40/309/36. 41. UXbricht to Tzyclorczyk, July 14, 1950, SED ZK, Walter Ufbricht 13apers,NL 18211247, 42. SED District Office in Rostock to Ulbricht, July 25,2958, SED ZK, Walter UIbricht Papers, NL 182/1250. 43. Repod of the Polish and GDR government and PZPXT and SED party meetings, June 20,1957, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339113423. 44. Neu~35'DeufscIztand,October 26,4957, p. 4. 45. ""foint Declaration of the Governments of the GDR and PRP," june 20,1957, SED ZK, Otto Grotewohl Papers, NL 90/485. 46. Repol-l on the trade relations beween the GDR and Pobnd, J m e 7, UDR MfAuIH, DL-2, file 2392, The following is Poland" share af all East German trade: 2 947,3 percent; 1949,9 percent; 1951,13.6 percent; 1953,14.5percent; 1954, 14.1 percent; 1955,133 percent; ?956,11.8percent; and 1957,14 percent. 47. Cited in Nezlres Deutsclzlnrzd, May 10, 1957, p. 5. 48. Kijnig notes on Gomulkak visit to Moscow, May 31, 1957; SED ZK, Otto Grotewohl Papers, N L 90/485. 49. Grc>tewohlto khmidt, June 4, 195'7, SED ZK, Otto Grotewc>hlPapers, NIJ

so/4ss.

50, Blankenhagen report on a Bdegakian visit to Zielana-G6ra, May C;, 2957, SED ZK, Walker ULbricht Papers, NL 482112413. 51. Information on the Comecon meeting in VVarsaw from June 18-22, June 27, 1957, SED ZK, InJatter Ulbricht Office, J IV 2/202/ 195.

202

GomzlPhS Foreig~2Policy and Eh Ulbn"clrt-Gomzitk Szkfnmit

52. Communiqu$ on the Comecon meeting from June 18-20, June 22, 1957, SED ZK, Mlter Ulbricht Officef JV 2J2021195. 53. Information on the Comecon meeting in Wrsaw from June 18-22, June 27, 1957, SED ZK, InJatter Ulbricht Office, J IV 2/202/ 195. 54. Report on the Pc~lishand GDR government and PZPR and SED party meetings in Berlin from June 18-20, June 20,1957, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339113423. 55, Recc~rdof the discussions af party and government delegations in Berlin from June 18-20, June 29,3957, MSZ, 10/309/36. 56. Report on the Polish and GDR government and PZPR and SED party meetings in Berlin from June 18-20, June 20,1957, SEB ZK, microfilm FBS 339/1%23. 57".Neues Deutsei'rfand,Octojber 9, 1957,1; and report on political development in the Soviet zone in Septembeu;0ctcr;ber 8,1957, BRD XSfGUF, B13711473. Atomic power was an alternative source of energy for the GDR, and work began in October 195"i"n a nuclear power plant north af Berlin, Poland and East Germany agreed to cooperate in the development of nuclear energy. 58. Repc3rt of the Polish and GDR government and PZPR and SEL) meetings from June 1S20, June 20,2957, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 33911M23, 59. Record af the party and government dixussiom from June 18-20, June 23, 1957, MSZ, 3 0/304)/36, 60. Florin to Grotewo>bl,June 20, 1957, SET) ZK, Otto Grotewo>blPapers, NL C60/483. 61. Notes on the PoEish draft of the joint declaration, unsigned, undated, ca. June 20,4957, SET) ZK, Otto Grotewohl Papers, N L 901483. 62. Report of the Polish and GDR government and PZPR and SED party meetings, June 20,1957, SED ZM,microfilm FfaS 339113423. 63. See Ncusls &)eulFsclzla~d, J m e 19,1957, pp- 1,3, and June 22,1957, p- 2, 64. lakubowski notes of a reception at the Polish Embassy cm June 20, June 24, 1957, MSZ, 3 0/379/42, 65. Foreign Ministry report on the GDR press, unsigned, undated, MSZ, 10/464/48, 66. Florin to SED Polit-buro members, August 2,1957, SED ZK, Walter UEbricht Papers, N L 18214249, 67. Report on the meeting of the heads of the SED and PZPR Foreign Afkirs Departments, October 2,1957, SED ZK, Walter Ulbricht Papers, NL 18211249. 68. Record of the party and government discussionti from June 18-20, June 29, 11i357, MSZ, 10/309/36. 69. Joachim Giirlich report, "Germans in Poland," "daber, 1957, in BRD BfGDR B137111246. 70. fZofish Embassy report from March 3 5 to August 31,1957, MSZ, 3 0/371. /41, 71. Ibid.. 72.Foreign Ministry report on the GDR press, unsigned, undated, MSZ, 10/464/48. 73.Schmidt to the GDR Foreign Ministryt July 23, 1957, SEL) ZK, VValter Ulbricht Papers, N L 18211249. 74. Foreign Ministry report on Polish-West German student exchanges, November 30, 1958, DBR MfAA, Department of Neighboring Countries, C782 /73, ZR/2892/73.

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203

75, Grosse notes of a meeting beween Winzer and Piotrwski, Syternber 12, 1957, SEX;,ZK, Watter Utbricht Papers, N L 18211249. 76. Grosse notes of a meeting beween Winzer and Piotrwski, Syternber 18, 1957, SEX;,ZK, Watter Utbricht Papers, N L 18211249. 77'.Winzer n a t s on a meeting beween Bolz and Piotr-nwsEri,January 18,1958, SED ZK, Otto Grotewohl Papers, NL 9Q/485. 7%. P-iegen to Winzer; October 25,1957 DDR MfAA, HA/I Secretariat, A44"i"59. 79, Schilde report on a university delegation visit to Poland from September 21-28,1957, SED ZK, Waltes Ufbricht Papers, NL 18214249, 80. Ibid. 81. Report on the cooperation between the SED district oi'Fice in Frankfurt/Oder with the PZPR district office in Zielana G6ra, April 8,1958, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339/13422. 82. GDR Embassy in Warsaw to the GDR Frrreign Ministry, August 4957, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339/ 13489. 83. Ungarn-Sternberg notes on relations between the FRG and the fSc3clietl satellite states, November 6,1957, BRD AA, Department 7, vol. 77. 84, Wolfgang &heider to Hans Glabke on a visit of Prjlish scientists, November 24,2957, BRD BKA, 813616717. 85. Ffsrin report on the meetings of the SED and PZPR Foreign Affairs Departments fram Septmber 25-27,295'7, SEB ZK, microfilm FBS 339/1%22, 86. Report on the political development in the Sc~vietzone of Germany October 8,1957, BRD BfGDF, B137/147J. 87. Hegen to Winzer; September 25, 1957, DDR MfAA, W r s a w Embassy A3755. 88, Notes on relations between the BKB and the [Soviet] satellite states, undated, ca. January 4958, BRD AA, Department 7, vol. 77, 89. Wolfgang Scheider to Hans Globke on a visit of Polish scientists, November 24,1957; ESRD BKA, B136/6717. 90, Heymann to the GDR Foreip Ministry, OOctoher 29,1957, HA/I Scretariat, A38. 91. Syfert notes of a meeting with Stiepancrw (First Secretary af the Soviet Embassy in Mrsaw), November 12, 1957, SED ZK, Walter Ulbricht Papers, NL, 18211249. 92. The Natolin group was named for the building in which they met, 93. Report on cultural relations with Prjland in 1957, unsigned, rmdated, DDR M f M , Minister" OOEfice, A15156. 94. I""oIitiI\. Foreign Ministry report on the GDR press, undated, ca. December 1958, MSZ, 10/464/48, Ulbricht" demotion in early 1958of SEB veteram such as Fred Oelssner, Karl khlrdewan, Emst WoXlwc;ber, and Paul Wandel indeed had a certain Stalinist taste. 95. Report on the results of cooperation beween the regional offices of the SED and counties in Paland, undated, ea. December 4957, SED ZK, Ill 2/20/34.

The Rapacki Plan and the German Question, 1957-1959 We are ~xcIlusivt?Eg arzdJCirzaEtyrcspansibl~forzuluf cotrcrrrls relations with Wrst EFYtnntzy. There every sociairtlisl courztq cnnrlal go ifsOUVE way. -1Mralter Ulbrichtl

:In 1957, NATO began serious deliberations on stationing nuclear weapons in West Qrmany. US. President Dwight Eisenhower hoped to

extl-icate U.S. troops from Europe, and even considevrd putting nuclear idea sent shock waves through forces under West Germn ct,ntrcrl."e the Polish and East German rkgimes. C;rotecvohl duskd off his 11952 proposal for a confederation of the two German states, this time with a provision that neither wodd staticm or produce atornic bombs. The E'BC and GDR would end obligatory military service, leave NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and all foreig troops would leave German soil, The Ademuer g o v e m e n t immediately rejected the plan.3 The former Polish annbassador to the GDR, Jan Izydorczyk, t d d the Polish Parliannent that a confederation was a just and sensihle solution to the German prcrblem,%but the Polish gave ent did not throw its full djpornatie wcight behind C;rotecvohl"s proposal. Most Poles were wary of a united. Geman state, regardless of its composition, and a change in the status quo could jeopardize Poland's claim to the Oder-Neisse bordtr.UIthough Warsaw had limited options in its foreign policy regarding the German question, t:he Gomu-lka rkgime was detemined not to wait for the Soviet Union or the GDR to dictate Poland" foreign policy toward West Germ,any."lnstead of"fully s~tpportingEast Berlin"s pro-

posal, the Polish government developed its own plan to preempt the nuciearization of Central Europe. The idea for a nuclear-free zone appeared in the Polish journal Swiat u h l s h h the spring of 1957. Ul~accustomedto dklomatic initiatjves from its Warsaw Pact par&rs, the Soviet government was slow to respond to the F"oljsh proposaX,7 but in Septentber, the Soviet Chargk d"affaires in Polmd told Polish Oeputy Foreign Mhister Marian Naszkowski that the Soviet government suppo"e"Jt.8 'fche Potish plan eventudy took the name of its fctrcigr~minisfes, former PPS lnetnber Adam Rapacki; it called for a nuclear f?ee zone in Germany, Polmd, and Czechoslovakia. After receiwing formal approval from thc. Warsw Pact, Rapacki and Czechoslovak Foreign Mk~isterVaclav David presented the plan to the United Nations on October 2.9 The bpacki Ran was an important confidence-huftder for fie Polish government, Polish ofiicials Chought it would reduce ternsiosls between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and encourage the other smaller countries of Europe to cortduct more illdependent foreign policies. 'The Poles werr;, proud of their initiative. As the editor of the weekly j o d Potii.!jka, Mieczysiaw Rakowski, later wrote, [the Rapacki Flan was] a good testimonial of her diplomacy. . . . [Potand] had worked out the idea contained in the plan to the minutest detail. Among the many projects put f ~ ~ w aby r d various states in the initial phase of European detente' Poland" initiative far many years occupied the chief place. . . . The discussion of the Rapacki Plan helped make 130fand known thrctughorr the tzrorld.l"

The East German Foreign Ministry immediately infomed Stanistaw Kopa that the Rapacki Plan "'makes an importmt contribuf;icmto solving the German probl,em."~~ C)n C)ctober 6, Nfruics Dezllsclzltznd carried a long article on the proposal, including Bolz's telegram to the U.N. deciarlng the GUWs support." The East Germans, however, werc. mluctant to let Pola,nd play a key role in Qrman affairs. After the October 6 issue, Wezies Deutschland virtually ignored the hpacki Plm, choosing instead to publicize the Soviet Union's disarmament proposals." "1 early 1958, the Polish Fareign Ministry expressed disappoint~nentthat the SED leadership was not showing much intercst in the plan: ""Except for a concise summary of Minister Rapacki's dcrclaration and margin& mention in speeches by Ulbriclht and Grotebvohl, there were few attempts at a sincere cmmmtary on the. initiati:vc."lWne East German diplomat recalled that the Soviet: Unicm and the GUR macted to tl-te plan with "great mistrust m d did everything to let the initiative peter out."^^

206

The hpncki Platz and the Germnn Questiorz

The East German leaders were indifrferent to the Raipacki Phn in part because it did not: include guarantees for the continued existence of thr GDR. East Berlin p r c f e r ~ dbilateral negotiations with Born on issues that aifected the fate of East Gcrman)r Grotewohl demanded that the two German states s i p a nwfear-free agreement; such an agreement woufd mean the FRG recognized the GDR.16 The East Germans were kept in the dark about the details of PoZanb's negotiatiom on the Rapacki Plan. fn December, Rapacki fir~allyinformed Antbassador Megelr &out Poiandfs ongoing talks with Great Britain, France, Austria, and Sweden. Rapacki said that the latter two neutral countries were very suppmtive of the prop.osal.17 Sensing that the Rapacki Plm was cmtributing to telzsions between East Berlin and Warsay Czechoslovak diflomats asked Hcgen about it at a reception at the East German Bmbassy celebrating the eighth anniversary of &he founeiing of the GDR."" Wegen said that he was oMendtd that: neither Cyrankiewicz nos Gonnujka had bothered to attend, and added that he still had serious doubts about Poland" ppcrtitical and economic stability19 Official West German sources alleged that Ulbricht told Soviet A d a s sador Puschkjn that "the Rapacki Plan is e n d a n g e r 4 the 'GDR"' fi@t against West German imperialism' and the stationing of atomic weapons there, and therefore is weakenj,ng the solidarity of the 'socia,List cmg."" Pushkin supposedly respmded that the Rapacki Plan was in line with Soviet. foreign policy.20 Accordk~gto another West German source, the Soviets gave the Poles a free hand to pursue the Rapacki Plan, which '"purposely went around the 'C;DR'."Z1 During the Wrsaw Pact meetings in Moscow in November, the other cornmufist parties mbuked the SED for its harsh criticism of the PZPR in the past year, and for the failure of its own propaganda campaign against the FRG.22 I'he Pdes were incmed that the East Gemans would not give them credit: for the RapacE Plan." m e East Germans characterized it instead as a joint East German-CzechosIavak-Po1ish idea.24 At the end of 1958, the Polish Fortrip Ministry observed that ""for a long time the "Rapacki Plm%as presented as an initiative of the GDR, 'subsequently supported by Czechoslovakia and Poland."The mjnistry noted that the East German press h h not paid much attention to the plan, and when it did, emphasized the ""keyrole""of the GDR. Nenes Deaf.schlat~drefused to call it the ""Rapacki Plan," a stance that Poiish diplomats blamed on its chief editor, Hermann Axen, who had been a vigorous critic of the Gomulka r&girnef"mm the begisming.2' When the chief editor of T~bun/jr Lzrdu, Artur Kowalski, asked. Neues Dezltschland corrcspmdent Karl Krahn point Hank whrther the GDR wati indifferent to the hpacki Plan because it was a Polish proposal, Krahn had no mwer.26

East German officials viewed the Rapacki Plan as an irrtitaticzn of Grotewohl3 proposal for a German confederaticm. In an interview for the Salldczifsche Zeit ung (South German Newspaper), Ulbricht said that he had. already pmposed an atomic-free Germany in May 1956.27 i.11a uniGomuika told The Lo~zdonTi~nesthat I"o1md was not i~~terested fied Germany wheirher or not it was atomic-free: "Any attempt to link the Rapacki Plan with the question of G e m m reunification is completely unreaiistic. . . . It would be no misfortune if Germany were to relnain divi,ded fnr a certain time. In.our view the problem of Gerntan reunification is not the most importmt one."zg In early February 1958, the East German Foreign Ministry tried to seize the d i , p h a t i c injtiative by proposillg a trgateral East (;ermanCzechoslovak-Pdish disarmament plan for Central Europe. Tn an obvious attempt to loosen W s t Germany's ties to N N O , O.tto Winzer s q gested that the four nuclear-free states (Polmd, CzechoslovaEa, and East and West Germany) w ~ u l dpledge not to dcvelop wcapuns in cooperation with other ccnantries. 'The Poks rejected the idea; they argued that a joint proposal with the GDR hvould reduce the Rapacki Plan's chance of gaining acceptance in the Mlest. They said that many NATO countries already opposed the Rapacki Plm on the grounds that it undermined the entirc?concept of the Western atliance. 'The Poles t d d Wnzer that- Poland had to consider the hterests of countries other than Germmy, not Germany alone.2"

Poland's Relations with West Germany 'The success of the Rapacki Plan did not depend on the backizlrg of CzechosIovakia or East Gemany, but on whether the Soviet Union and the Wstern allies signed on. On February 14, 1958, the Polish gowernmeznt issued the RapacE Plan in a formal diplmatic note to the Western powers.= The plm had thme stages: an immediate freeze of nucllcar arms in the four states, discussions on reducing ccmventionai weapons, and talks on the elimination of nuclear weapons. Rapacki suggested a procedure that would spare Bonn from having to deal directly with East Berlin.31 Even if the plan failed to break the impasse over G e r m n rearmament, the PZPR hoped to foster connections to some of the social democratic and lilaerd democratic parties in Western Europe that had shown interest in it. 'The Polish Foreign Ministry djsrnissed rcpeated East German warnings about West German militarism and the threat of irnmiulent war with NATO. The mfnistry saw m m danger irr the Cold Mrar and the arms race itself: ""Not only in the scxjalist: comtries, but in the capita:lisl: countries,

208

The hpncki Platz and the Germnn Questiorz

state policy is not governed by a cmscious pursuit of war-the maln practical danger of war continues to be the arms race.9W~arsawparticularly noted positive reactions to the plan from the WD, the French Radical Part~r,and even some Gaullists. The SPD viewed the Rapacki Plan as a possit7le step toward mifying Germany. The West German Free Democratic Party (FDP) leaned against acceprhg the plan, but agreed with its basic principles for disarmament, and welcomed the possibility of normalizhg relations with Poland.33 East German officids opposed direct talks &out the plan betwell the Polish government and West German political parties, but the Poles ignored them. In March 1958, West German Social Democrat Carlo Schmid met Naszknwskj,to discuss the Rapacki, Plan and relations wi& Poland in general. Schmid hoped the FRG woufd soon normalize relations with Poland?just as West Gwmany had overcame differences with fiance, another old. enemy. Sc:hfitid told Nazkowski that the Rapacki Plan could, be a sipificant breakthrough h the question of German unification: "The conceptim of the Rapacki Plan has created the most favorahle caditions for a solution of the fwdamental pvljtical prolcllelns in Eumpe. It i s ifnportant that the idea came from the Polish side.'"chmid added that he recopized Poland had to play an important role not mly in the socialist countries but also in East m d West Europe by breaEng down the barriers between them. Naszkowki reported that his meeting with Schmid. was cmducted in a "warm atmosphere."% The Rapacki Plan was never seriously considered a basis for addresshg the escaliatislg arms race in Central Europe, however. The Western allimce went ahead with plans to station nuclear rnissiles irr Western Europe, includhg West Germany The United States was unwlllhg to bargahl away its NATO partner for a po1iticaU.y and militarily nmali.gned Geman state; in any case, the Western powers did not tmst the Swiets to allow h e Gcrm m electiam. Furthermore, ESom was opposed to leaving NATO and the recently constituted.European Common Market. Tn an effort to salvage the Rapacki Plan, the Polish gcrvenmcynt w n c d on March 27 that the pmposd did not necessarily mem Chat West Germany had to wikhdraw f r m NATO, or that the GDR, Czechoslovakia, m d Poland had to leave the Warsaw Pact." This idea went nowhere. The Polish, East German, and Czchoslovak foreign ministers met in Prague in April to discuss the Rapacki Plan and other issues related to West Germany*Earlier disagreements fmmediately surfaced d. Rapaclci and Naszkocvski =fused to crilicize West Germany directly for fear of jeopardizing the PZPR" efforts to develop ties to the SPD m d FIX? Tn the final joint communiqu6, Bolz insisted on callhg the FRG m imperialist state. Naszkowski agreed to a general al;llitxsionto the dmgers of Germm militansm, but he rejected refert-cmes to the existence of G e m a n imperial-

ism on the grounds that they did '"not really correspond to reality." Naszkrrwski eventualty agreed to Bolzfs formulation that there was a &=at of "reconstifuting jmperialism" in W s t Germany rathcs than an existing or "recmstibted. imperialism."' The Poles also let the following line stand in refermce to Born's refusal to ~ c o p i z the e Oder-Neisse border: ""TheGrman Rdera) Rep&lic is the only European state h which revanchism is intentionally fostered and open territosiat clai.ms are raised."' Bolz suggested that the find comxnuniquk give direct credit to the Soviet Union for leadkg &e swial,ist parties in the fight for peace, but again the Poles backed off; instead, they p u s h d through a version that rccopized the re& ative hportmce of both Poland and thc.Soviet Union.36 The co~~troversy over the language of the final carnmuniqu4 revealed yet again the ideological differences in the two parties" policies toward. the capitaiist countries. h few days after the cmference, Bolz told Ambassador Piotrowski. that he understood why the Poles had insisted on more cautious language in reference to Wcst Qrmany, but he rekrred to the FRG's ecmomic expansion into Africa, the Faf East, the Middle East, and South America as proof of West German imperialism. Rolz said Chat the GDR's strategy was to vie for the support of the workers and working classes in the West, and criticized Comugka for seeking out the kaders of West German pditical parties, trade unions, m d intellectual drcles. Rolz considered East (;ermany% pdicy a truer reflection of Lenin" tthe0t.y of continuing rewolution, but thought Po1and"s smacked of social democratic revisionism.3T On September 1, 1958, the SED made a perfunctory observance of Hitler's attack on Poland in 1939. fn previous years, the SED had. stressed its friertdship with Poland and the permanence of the C)der-Neisse border, but on this occasion the East German press devoted mom attention to the East German-Czechoslovak Friendship Week that was taking place in Warsaw that the East German at the same time. It: did not go u~~noticed pxless, hcontrast to its scant coverage of Poland, was excessively complimentary of relations with Czecho~l~vakia."K Rapacki made a speech Land011 in September praising Poland's sew political and economic ties to West G e m m y wifiout mentioning the GUR. The speech cmfirmed the SER%suspieions that Warsaw was moro interested in developh~gcloser ties to the FRG &m to the GDR, Hegel1 repeatedly complained that the Potish press was iporing GrotewohYs idea for a G e m a n c m f e d e r a t i n The SED's Frankfurt/Oder office ~ p o r t e dthat Polish officials did not think that a Germm clo~~federation was in Poland's best interest because they did.not tmst the GDR as a guarantor of the OderNeisse border. The office wrote that "reactionary elements [in Poland] ask whether it wouldn't be better to ally with the Americans, English, and West G e m m s inorder to solve these problems with them,"'"""

21 0

The hpncki Platz and the Germnn Questiorz

East Geman officials were highly sensitive to the implication that the GDR was fie lesser of the two German states. They criticized Gomuika's speech to the PZPR's Nhth Party Congress in October 1958 for mentioning East Germany only in the context of Poland's relations with W s t Germany." East German offitrials vigorously protested when the Polish organizers of an international confere~~ce of xientists and engineers in 1958 designated the West German seat the ""l"edral :Republic of Germany," but worded the s i p for the East German contit~gent"'Eastern Zone of Germany,'" 7'%ediscrepancy happemd again at a meeting of the Caal Commission of the U.N, Econonic Commission for Europe.42 Two travet agencies in Warsw issued visas for West Germany &e was called the ""TravelAgency for Cermany,'~intimatingthat it represer~ted both German states. The East German Ernbassy protested. that ""tis sign m a k s allowance for Adenaut3rfsclailn of exclusive representation [of Germany J and djscrimix~atesaga,inst the GDR."Tast Qrmm officials aSso objected to the other travel office, the ""Pass Bureau to the Geman Federal Republic,'" which t h y thought was a diploma~crclpresentative of the FRG. The East Germans aclimonishcd the Poles for this hdirect support of the Adenauer rkghe, but the Poles downplayed the sigificance of the visa b w a u as notl~hgmore than what it wa-a travel agmcy&43 Polmd's persistent ai-i;emptsto foster economic m d cztltural.ties to the West was evidence to the SED of Gomufka" oopportunistic foreim policy :111 April 1958, the East German Embassy wrote a scathing critique of two ""rvisionist" articles by eco~~omist Qskar ZJangein the PZPR's ideological journal Polityh. The ennbassy was particularly annoyed that Lange called fclr more ecclnomic and cultural exchanges with capitaiist countric3s, yet completely ignored exchanges with the socialist camp. The embassy complained that Polish delegations m d tomist groups we= eager to go to West Gemany; it was "W-Marxistf20 pursue exchanges with the capitalist corntries while ignorhg dialogue with the socialist states. 'The embassy thought the policy was contributing to Poland" ppulitical and economic instability.4 The East Germans werc. still convinced fiat U.S. loms to Poland were tied to poljtical concessions.45 In contrast to the many cultural exchanges between Poland. and the GDR fiat went a~v the head of a W s t Geman friendship society with Eastern Europe found the Poles rclmarkably open and hospitable, more so in light of what Germay had done to Poland during the war; he was su~fiisc~d by the Poles' poor treatment of 'East Germns.46 Wwn a West German journalist at the Poznah Trade Fair in 1958 protested that the East Germms were circdating propaganda agahst the Federal Republic, no Polish journalists came to the GDI-C's defense.47 For years, East German officiais had avowed their s~tpportof closer economic and cultrxral.ties behnieen Poland and West Germmy, but their

actions indicated otherwise. The Polish Embassy knew as much; it reported that ""the GDR autborities are nervous about our expanding ccmtacts with the FRG, espedally with W s t Berlh." This was made clear in early 1958 when the East Germans infomed the Poles that they would refuse visas to anycme Mlhose main interest was going to West Berlin.48 Some East German diplomats thought the best way to counteract the Poles-ixrterest in going to West Germany was to open tollrist traffic and increase cultural exchanges across the Oder-Neisse border. But as much as they lobbied their superiofs, the SEE) leadership stjll opposed incrclasing unregulated contacts between Polish and East German citizens. This poiicy also applied to Polish journalists, who complained that they could not adequately cover developments in the GDR if they could not see them for themselves,$g Disregarding official protests from East Berlin, Gomujka persisted in cultivating the SPD as a conduit for better pofiticat and economic relations with the FRG.50 Gomu-Eka" attempts to meet SPD leader Herbert Wehner in 1958 prompted tllbricht to warn the Poles that '"e arc?exclusively and finally responsible for what concerns rcldions with West Qrmany. n e r e every socialist country cannot go its own way,""" The East Germans continued to fault the Poiish press for mde~stimatingthe West German threat and for wri.Ping without a "'dear class standpoint." l-he East Germ.ansbt;erm.onjzing did, not worka52 In October, Piotr OgroeSziriski brushed aside Wiz~zer'swarnings that fie FRG was using tradc deals to pry Poland away .from the Sovkt bloc: "We arc ol Ihe opinion that our tradc relations [and] the economic relations to the capitalist countries do not loosen our relations to the socialist camp.""" Rut Poland's talks with West G e r m poljtical parties failed to nudge the Ademuer government closer to recognizing the Oder-Neisse boder; the impasse remained the major roadblock to formal diplomatic relations,.Jbzef Czesak, Che head ol the 1'7,I'"B"s Department of Foreign Affairs, told Ambassador Hegen that he was disappointed the SPD wodd not recognize the border either. Czesak promised that the Polish press would sharpen its criticism of the SPD, and said that the number of West German student visits to Poland would be reduced because the exchanges bad been mproductive.54

The Berlin Crisis 'The East Germcrans were genuinely angry with Poland's reluctance to X 1 Ocsupport their diplomatic initiatives rcgading German unification, E tober 1958, Ulbricht proposed the withdrwal of the occupying troops from Germany and a one-ycar moratoriuxsl on the deployment of atomic weapons in Central Europe. With the IZapacki Plan shady on the table,

21 2

The hpncki Platz and the Germnn Questiorz

the Gomulh r4gime ignored Ulbricht" pprposal. The Poles thougfnt that the troop withdrawal would create a disatlvantage for the Warsaw Pact, and that NATO would stall negotiations on conventional arms reductions to just* its deploymnt of atomic weapons.'" C h November 4, N58, Rapacki held a press confercsnce to unveil a new wrinkle in his plan. There were indications that Rorln was reconsiderjng its position, but a new Berlin crisis ended prospects for compromise.5h mmshchev"s strategy to prevent the stationing of nuclear weapons in West Germany was to issue m ultimatum on November 27: Wi,t-hinsix months the entire city of Berlin would hrl under the jurisdiction of the G13R.s7 Ulbricht was fully behind aruslnchev's demands; the Right of East Germans through West Berlin not only entbarrassed the GDIZ but depleted its labor force. Gomujka was stunned. The Rapack Plan was the centerpiece of his p d c y to reduce tensicms in East Central Europe, and n w Khrushchev and Wlbrichl. were threatening a shocvdown with NATO to force its The Poles were not alone in fearing &at fie Berlirr ultimabm would plunge the continent into wac Few people in the West wanted to fight with the West Germans for a free West Berlh, As British P r h e Mhister Harold MacMillan put it, why m u l d Britain go to war "for 2 miIIion people we twice fought wars against and who almost destroyed us?'* Eisenhower and U.S. S e c ~ t a r yof State John Foster Dulles did not care Mxhefier the East Germans controlled the access routes to West Berlin as long as they remained open, but the United States took a firm stance about stayhg in West Berlh.59 The B e r h crisis put Gomujkka in a quanliary. Even if the crisis ended peacdully, his support of KhrtrsS.ichw's ultimatun could jeopardize Potand" tenuous ties to the West. Gomulka feared, too, that the GDR wlruld gab legitimacy if the Wstern Allies renegotiated the status of Berlin with the East Germm gover ent," "ally, the Potsdm agreement was still the only legal, iow-power guarantee of Berlin and the Oder-Neisse border; a chmge in the status of Berlin or Germmy could reopen the issue. Emigr6 Poles suspected that U1bncht and Khrushchev were colluding to resolve the Berlin prolnlem m d the question of German unification withwt regad .for Po:tisb interests. h an aticle in Wiladomagci (News), a Polish journal published in the West, W; A. Byszewski LalZeged that the Soviets were ready to embrace Ulbrkht as thefr main ally in Central Europe if the Gomugka, r4gime pushed its national interests too far. Byszewski suggested that "Ubrieht is waiting for a change in the situaticm; he would gladly jettism the "brotl~erlyPeoplesf Poland.' . . . After Moscocv 1consider Ulbricht and his group the worst e~~emies of Poland;

on the other hand I consider it senseless to attack Adenauer as a %@van-

chfst,' 'militarist,' or 'imperialist. Gonugka bad similar apprehezzsions, but. he could only sit by m d wait for the crisis to play itself out. In February 1959, Otto Winzer wrote Ulbricht that the Poles were no longer actively pwsuing the Rapacki Plan because they did not want to divert attentio~zfrom the Soviet proposal for a peace treaty with Germany.62 When the Berlin ultimatum lapsed, however, and there was still no resolution to t-he question of German unification, Gomuika again raised the idea of a nuclear-he Ce~ztralEurope at the U.N. General Assembly in September 1960; and again h March 1962 at a disam-tament conference in Geneva. By then the Rapacirci Plan was dead.6" The Problem of Trade with TnJest Germany and West Berlin

By the late 1 9 5 0 ~ Ulbricht ~ and Gomuika had resolved some of the trade disputes that had been so contentious in 3956. Gomu&a even began to call for more integration of the Comecon eco~zomies.MNoneirheless, the East Gcrmans could not ~conciletl-temselves with Poland's eagerness to trade with West Germany and West Berlin-a trade that o b n came at the GDKs expense.b5 UIbricht knew that for East Germany to compete with West G e r m q and mahtain political stability in t-he GDR, the East G e m m standard of living had to improve dramatically. In April 1958, the SET>set a goal of matchjng the West German economy by 1.965.6 At the Fifth Party Congwss in Jnly Ulbricht went one step lurther and pledged to overtake the West Cermm ecolzomy by 1961.67 But Ulbricht h e w this was an impossible goal without i n c ~ a s e dimports of coal and. oil. The Soviet Uni.m and Czechodovakia coutd meet some of these energy needs, but imports of Sifesian coal were indispensable.68 That spring, the East Germans launched another campaign for ad.ditiond economic aid and trade concessitms from its Warsaw Pact parhers, U'lhricht sent a letter to r(hrushchev arguing trhat as a developing socialist state, the GDR had to out-produce capitalist West Germany. He pointed out that East Gemany lagged behind West Germany in aimost every econolnic category: "lf the GDR is supposed to function as a showcase of the socialist camp to the West, the production targets for 1959 and 1960 must be raised now." UUlbcht said thilt fnr socialism to gain popular support in GermmyI.it was essential that East G e r m workers had a standard of living comparable to that of workers in the PR(;. Ufbricht predicted that in the next two years the GDR would have the slowest grow6 rate of the socialist countries, and that the GDR was the only country in the world

21 4

The hpncki Platz and the Germnn Questiorz

that still had a rationixrg system. Ulbricht presented K h s h c b e v with a long list of goods that the GDR wanted from t-he Soviet Llnian in the next two years.6" At the Comecon meeting in Moscow in May 1958, the East Gcrmans asked the ather socialist countries to consider the CDKs economic and political predicament as the socialist Germm state, But the other Co~xecon countries rehsed even to discuss raisjrng the standad of living in East Germmy, which was a l ~ a d y well above their own. The only commitment mrushchev would make was that, if the situation warranted it, the Soviet Union would grant the GDR credits for raw materials, machfnes, and collsumer items. 'f'he other party leaders did not diwctly respond to East Germany's pleas for rnorc kade and credi,ts, but said, they would do what they cou2d.T" At the end of May, Ulbricht sent a letter to Comulka appealing for addjtional hipments of coal, coke, iron ore, steel, and zinc. Uibriclnt asked for 4021,000 more tons of coal ;in 1958, and a total of 4,000,000 tons amually by 1465.71 Gomu4ka"s positicm had not changed: He was unsympathetic to Ulbricht's appeds for socialist economic solidarity, and was not persuaded. by the argument that the GDR had to match West German ecmomic output. He wrote Ulbricht fiat he understood the fmportance of the ecmomic development of the East Germm state and promised to help "when possible," bbut said that Poland was in no position to provide economic assistmce. Gomulka reminded Ulbricht that Poland had been a theater of war twice in World War 11, and that the G e r m occupation of Polmd had been the longest of the war, Thirty-eight percent of Poland's national wealth had been destroyed, and ~ U ~ I Iwere S still evident in Warsacv and other Polish cities. Gom&a said, that the GDR was outproducing Poland in most economic categories; the GDR%per capita consumption of meat was still hi&er t-hm Poland's, and East Cermms c0nsumc.d almost four times the amount of fruit, Gomuika added that East Germms owned three tirnes the number of cars and twice the number of motorcycles. He mak~tainedthat Paland needed its coal as much as East Germany, but nonetheless p r a i s e d the GDR a credjt to purchase 1, rnillion tons of coal; he also agrced to send m a t , fat, and buttecz According to A d a s s a d o r Piotrowski, whr, personalty delivered Gomu-Eka's letter to tllbriehb the SED leader began moth= one of his long monologues by sayirrg that he fully understood Poland"~economic proloiems; however, LIlbricht then behaved as though he had not read Gmulka's refcrtnces to the dmages that the Germans had inflicted on Poland in the war. Ulbricht insisted that his requests for ecmomir assistance were motivated m t by serious political or economic problems that the GDR was havhg but by the need to make an evezztuaf German confederation pafatable, especially to the workers in Miest Germmy. He

s t ~ s s e daajain that East German workers had to have the same standard. cJE living as West German workers. tJlbricht used the same old arg about East Germany's special needs, admitting that the East German econmy was lagging far behind W s t Germany's. He was inrerested in credits not for food but for coal, coke, and steel.?" Willi Stoph and titefan Jsdrychowski met in J m e 1958 to negotiate a new trade deal. Ulbricht had =quested m additional 5UO,U80 thousand tons of Polish coal in 1959 and 600,000 tons in 1960, but fedrychowski agreed to additional exports of d y 300,000 tons of coal fnr each ol those two years, Poland promised to ship 1,500,000 tons of coal in 1961, and 2,000,000 tons by 1965. The second figure was half the one Ulbricht had proposed. JedrychowsE said that Polmd could not possibly export more iron ore or steel to the GDR.74 Ancrther cmtroversy swfaced that summer when the Pales asked for a three- to four-fold hcrease h the railroad tolls on. Soviet m d East German military transports, Durtng talks with the Poles and Soviets in June, the East Germans contended that the current fees fully covered Polanif"~ costs.7"e East Germans argued that they were the first )ine of defense for Poland and the Warsaw Pact, but their protests went in vain. The Ssviet Union and the other W a r s w Pact countries eventuaily agreed to the tariff hike.76 Before the November elections in the GDR, Wlbrieht made yet another appeal to Gomufia's generosity. Again Ulbricht emphasized the GUKs st..rategic importance for Poland: ''This god [of econornic parity with the :FIG] is of considerabk importance for the issue of peace in Europe, because in 1961 West Germany's atomic armament will be ~omplete.~~TT GornuIfca was still not swayed. Many Polish communists, especially those who remembered the war, were bitter over Poland" standard of living, which was so much lower than East Germany"s.m After a visit to several Polish border twvns that fall, an SED functionary from the Frankfurt/Oder ofijce reported that the Poles a h a y s wanted to know about the standard of living in the GDR, and doubted they would ever achieve the same level.79 Gomul-ka's foreign economic policy was dictated in past by Palmdls need for machines and techncrlogy that it could not get from the other socialist countries. Polmd's trade with the West contkued to rise in 1958, much to the consternation of the East Germans, who expected to receive Polish exports first. iaccordhg to East Germall sources, the share of Poland"s trade with capitalist coul-rtries increased front 37.3 percent in 1956 to about 42 percent in 1958.8(1 Paland" trade with West Berlin conti~~ued to be a divisive issue. In 1957, Ihe new etforts launchcd by West Berlin firms to trade with Polish entevrises resdted in a rapid increase in trade. The East German g w -

21 6

The hpncki Platz and the Germnn Questiorz

ernment responded by instituting new trmsit and passport reg~lations~gl At Warsaw" ii~sistence,the East German gove ent issued one-time permits for Poland to ship cod d i ~ c t l yto W s t Berlin in 1958; but the East Gcrmans prohibited deliveries of other products that Wcst Berlin businesses had contracted to buy from Poland. Those shipments, which ilzcluded pipe, buildi~ngstone, and potatoes, had to be sent through Hannburg. The new reguiations again caused many Polish officials to que"ticm the wisdom of closer ecmomic ties to East Gt?rmmy.Kz Gomulka and U'lbricht had heated arguments oves these restrictions on Poland" trade with West Berlin. According to Gomuika" trmslatort Erwin Wit, ""Gomulka complahed to Ulbricht about this practice, tvha nonetheless did not come around,For years he let thit; area of Polish foreign trade annoy [the Poies], in order to get the Poles to support his aggwssive policies toward West Berlin m d to keep them from any unilateral Airting wilh t k Federal Re~ublic.''~3 While mrushrhev and Ulbricht were seeking a final resolution to the Berlirr pmblem in the fall of 1958, the GDR prohibited skpment of any more goods frnm Poland to West Berlin. Gomulka sent a letter to the SEE) Politburo in Septerrrber asking that Poland be allowed to meet its contrackal obligations. Comuika argued that. Poland wlruld have a serious balmce of payme~ztsproblem if these deliveries were not met.8" October, the East Germm government at last allowed the Poles to make coal deliveries to West Berlin, but only until the end of the year.85 There was no sign of chmge in Poland's foreign econolnic policy at the Twelfth Plenary Session of the PZPR Central Committee in November 1958. Disappointed, East German diplmats criticized the PZPR for its lack of eronolnic cooperation with Czechoslova:ltia, the Sovjet Union, and the GDR, especially in light oi Poland" raw material exports to the West.86 East Germmy had no choice but to redirect its trade toward the Soviet Union. East Germm exports to Polmd fell by almost 18 percent from 19-56 to 1958, and by 1957 East Germany had become the Soviet Idnion's most important trading parher." Differences over thc Rapacki 131an,the future of Germ,any ,and Berlin, and Polmd" trade with West Germmy demonstrated that UZbricht and Gomuika had very different conceptions of sociaiist foreign policy The East Germans =mined steadfat in their Marxist interpretatinn of the imminent threat of capitalist imperialism; the Polish communists followed a realist appmach in their search for economic and politicd modus vivezzdi wi& the West. The two leaders were still engaged in heated debates over domestic policy*UlbricEtt" talks with Gumugka in MTarsaw h December 1458 defmed s m e of the hard feelings of"the past two years, but the leaders' fundamental d i s s r e e m e n t ~ t i lpredud.ed l a closer partnership.

The Rnpmcki Plan and

Germ,,, Qucstiorz

21 7

4. Erwin Weit, Oslblock interr-2:23 jajzre P"IG~)~l?~~et.scher fiir die poJt~isc1~ Partei-und Staatsfilzrung (Inside the East bloc: Thirteen years as interpreter for the Potish Party-and government leadership) (Hamburg: Haffmilnn und Campe Verlag, 19701, pp. 33-34. 2. See Mare Eachtenberg, A Rorjsfrzlcten!I"e~~l(v: T ~Mnking c of thEuropean Settletrzent 1945-1 963 (Princeton: Princeton University 13ress,1999), pp. 185-1 88. 3. Polish Embassy repc~rtfrc~mMarch 15 to August 31,1957; MSZ, 201371 /41; see also Andrei Gromyko, Memor.z'es (London: Hutchinmn, 1989), p. 2%. 4. Izydorczyk speech to the Potish Parliament, undated, ca. No~vernber;1957, PZPR KC, group Izydorczyk, file 473/6. 5. Lc~bod yez to Maszkc~w-ski,September 3,1957; MSZ, 10/350/39. 6. Heymam to the GDR Frrreip Ministry, October 29,1957, DDR MfAA, HA/I Scretariat, A38. 7.See Eberhard Schulz, ""New Devebpments in Intra-bloc Relatiom in Historical Perspedive," h inaren Dawisha and Ph_ilipHanson, eds,, Soviet-East Europea~z Ililmtnss: Goerrion, Contpefiliopl,a d Consenf, 414 0 (London: Heinernann Educational Books, 1981) p. 55; and Hansjakob Stehle, The Itzdqfendent Sntellitc: Society and Politics in Pt~lalzdszlnee 1945 (London: Pall Mall Press, 1965), p. 222. 8. Naszkowski notes of meeting Biermw on September 18, Sptember 19,195"i", MSZ, 23/163/14. Solidarildt 21 ~7dnnthrznte Interessert (Socialist 9. See Franz Sikora, Suzr'a~islisc~ur solidarity and national interests) (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 197;7), pp. 151-152. 10. Mieczysrt-awRakowski, Tke Foreign Policy of the Polish People$ RqzibEic (Warsaw: Interpress Publishers, 1975), g. 164. 11. Kopa notes of a meeting with Beling on October 11,Octcr;ber 16,1957, MSZ, 10/379/42. 42. Mez~fil;)e~f~dbfand, October 6, 1957gp. 1, 13. Riezk~sDeulischland, October 13,1957, p. 1. 44. Polish Foreign Ministry report an the GDR press, undated, ca. February 1958, MSZ, 10/464/48; see %)avidStefancic, "The Rapacki Plan: A Case Study of f Q~cnrterly21, no, 4 Uanuary 1988), p. East European Dipfamacy," E ~ s Eurapmtz 404. Stefancic claims that Ulbricht approved of the Polish proposal at the summit with Gornuika in June 1957. Even if this is true, the Poles were disappointed with the East German reaction thereafter. 15. Horst Grunert, FUU Honecker nzqglntfenz Pnrketi: Erir-znerungen eines DDRDipkomaten (Far Hcmecker an the smooth parquet: Memoirs of a GDR diplc~mat) (Berlin: Edition Ost, 19951, p. 118. 44. Douglas %]\rage, "Intrc~duction"9o"Khrushchev" November 1958 Berlin Ultimatum: New Evidmce from the Pafish Archives," "Bulletin: Cold War Xntematio:orze;tlHisio~yProject, no. 11 (winter 49981, p, 200. 17, Hegen notes of a meeting with Rapacki on December 20, December 11, 1957, SED ZK, Otto Grotewc>hXPapers, NL 9Q/485. 18, Memorandum of a meeting with Koudela, Tomasek, and Cerny (Czechosfovak Embassy diplctmats), unsigned, Bstc~ber10, 1957, DDR M M A, Warsaw Embassy, A3771.

21 8

The hpncki Platz and the Germntl Questiorz

19. h b o d y c z notes of meethg with Kuudeta (Czechoslovak Embassy) on October 9, October 10,1957, MSZ, 10/380/32. 20. Repod on the political devdoprnent in the Suviet zone of Germany in Becember, 1957, BRD BfGDF, B137/ 2473, 21. &pod on the palitical development in the Sclviet zone of Germany from January 1,1958, to F & r u a ~28,1958, BRD BfGIC)FfB13711473; see atso Jarnes G. Richter, Khrushcftev's Double Bitzd: Intenzatiotzat Pressures ~ l z dDomestic Conlitiotz PO!E'tics (Baltimore; j o h s Hopkins 13ress, 19941, p. 224. IGchter writes that Moscow LaEibied hard for the h p a c k i Plan by announcing troop reductic~nsand a moratorium on nuclear testing. 22..Report on the political development in the %>viet zone of Germany, Novembeu; 3.957, BKD BfGDF, B13711473. 23. PoXish Embassy report from November 1,1957 to F e b r u a ~28,1958, MSZ, 10/371/41, 24. Piutrtvvski to Lc>bodzqrez,January 2,1958, MSZ, 10/371/41. 25, Polish Foreign Ministry repc~rton the GDR press, undated, ca. December, 1958, MSZ, 20/464/48. 26. Karl K r a h tcr Hermann Axen, February 17, 4958, SED ZK, microfilm FES 33911M89, 27. Potish Embassy report from Nrwember 1,1957 to F e b r u a ~28,1958, MSZ, 10/371/42. 28. Quoted in Hansja kcsb StehXef Tlte Independeni Snf ellite: Sociefy and 170f ifics in Pulnizd Sitzce 1945 (London: Pall Mall Press, 1965), p. 227. 29. Record of negotiations between Piot r Bgrcsdzihski and Piotrc>wski,et al., and Handke and Wimer, et al., February 7-8, 1958, DDR MfAA, HA/T Secretariat, A14759; and Polish Embassy political report from September 2 , 2957 to February 28,1958, Mmch 11,1958, MSZ, 10/371/4l, 30. Sweden relayed a memorandum on the Ragacki 131anto the FRG. 31 . Peter Bender; Ens t Ezlrupe in Searclz of Scc~lrity(London: Chatto and Windus, 19721, p. 2 4, footnote 5 . 32. Polish Foreign Ministry memorandum to its diplomatic corps, March 5, lli358, MSZ, 231463134. 33, Polish Fc~reignMinistry memorandum to its diplomatic corps, F & r u a ~8, 1li358, MSZ, 23/163/14; and Polish Foreign Ministry memorandum to its diptomatic corps, March 5,1958, MSZ, 23/163/24. 34. Naszkowski notes of meeting with Carlo Schmicl on March 41, March 12, 1958, MSZ, 23/163/14. 35. Ogrodzifiskli memorandum, undated, ca. March, 1958, MSZ, 23/163/24. 36. 13rutocol of the Cuderence of Foreign Ministers of the GDR, Poland, and Czecl.luslovakia, April 12,1958, DDR MEAA, MB Schwab, A I 7275. 37. Piotrclwski tto tobodycz, April 18, 4958, MSZ, 10/333/37. 38. Potish Fc~reignMinistry repoE"Con the GDR press, undated, ca. December, lli358, MSZ, 101464148. 39. GDR Embassy in VVarsaw to the F o r e i p M i ~ s t r ySptembes , 18,1958, UDR M f M , Warsaw Embassy, A3751. 40. SEB district office in FrankfurtiOder to the SEE?, December 22,1958, UDR MEAA, H A /I Secretariat, A3821.

41. IGesner report an the Ninth 13artyCongress of the 132;Pl[t,Oct&er 22,1958, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339113490. 42. Memo on the situation in the PZPR, unsigned, undated, ca. December, 1958, SED ZK, microfilm F-BS 339/ 13424. 43, Notes a n the FRG visa bureaus in Warsaw Ncovember 30, 4958, DDR MfAA, Department of Neighboring Countries, 6781 173,ZR/1892/73, 44. GDR Embassy in Warsaw to the GDR breign Ministry, unsigned, April 2, 1958, DBR M f M , tlfarsaw Embassy, ,43771. 45. Polish Embassy report from Nc3vember 1, 4957 to February 28, 4958, MSZ, 10/371/41. 46. Wlfgang khnelder to Hans Gtc~bke,April 30,3958, BRD BKA, 8136/6717. 47. Gcnther Wirth notes on the Trinitatis dedication, July 1Q, 1958, SED ZM, Department of Church Questions, XV 2/14/89. 48. Polish Embassy report from Ncrvember 1, 4957 to February 28,4958, MSZ, 10/5;71/41.. 49. Kirschey (chief of the VVroc-taw consulate) notes a n visits with Poles in Szczecin, Moszalin, and PoznaA, May 12-16, 1958, SEU ZK, microfilm FBS 339142495. 50, Riesner QWrsaw Embassy) to the 6823 Foreign Ministry, Sptember 25, 1958, DDR TvtfAA, Warsaw Embass5 A3751. 51. Wit, Ostbloek irztem, pp. 33-34, 52. Riiesner to the GDR Foreign Ministry, September 25, 1958, DDR MfAA, Warsaw Embassy, A3754. 53. Record of the negotiations beh-een Ogrcodzihski and Winzer; et al., Octc3ber 15, 1958, DDR MfAA, HA/I Scretariat, A14n59. 54. Hegen notes of meethg with Czesak an September 24, September 25,1958, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339143489. 55, Winzer to Ulbricht, October 25, 2958, SEB ZK, Walker Ulbricht 13apers,NL 182/2250. 56. See Stefancic, "The Rapacki Plan: A Case Study of East European BipXomac&" p 440. 57, See Trachtenberg' A Aeoplslrucled Peace, pp. 247J21. 58. Selvage, ""Khrushchev's Nc~vember1958 Berlin Ultimatum: New Evidence from the Prjlish Archives," p. 200. 59, See Trachtenberg, PZ Constmcted Peace, pp. 261-263; and Henry Kssingeu; Diplomacy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 5"7-579. According to Kssinger, in January 1959, Bulfes hinted at possible unifieatian through confederation, but Adenauer rejeded it as ""totally unacceptabie." 60. See Trachtenberg, A A~o?tstructed Peace, p. 261, 63. Translation of an article by W A. Byszewski in Wiado~rzu$ci(News), NCIvember 23,4958, in 13RB B U , 1313616485, 62. Winzer to Ulbricht, February 12,1959, SED ZK, Walter UIbricFrt Papers, NIJ 18214250, 63. Stehle, The bld~endentSntellz'te, p. 220. Gomutka remarked in 1961 that "if it had been adctpted, many subsequent developments could hatre been avoided." 64. 1301tish Embassy report from September 1, 1'357 to February 28,1958, MSZ, 10/371/41; and Piotrc~wskito Ec~bodycz,March 31, 1958, MSZ, 10/372/41. East

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Germany was suppXy ing approximatel y 40 percent of Poland 'S consumer goods, and at this time Poland was still second only to the Soviet dinion as the GDR's most important trade partner in the Warsaw Pact. 65. fakubc)wski no>tesof meeting with Bringmann (GDR Foreign Ministry) on December 24, December 27; 1957, M$Z# 10/379/42. East Germany had few probXerns trading with Czechoslovakia, as East German officials frequently reminded the Poles. 66. Notes on the development of the GDR econom5 1958-4 960 and 1961-1965, April 22, 4958, SED ZK, Walter Ir'lbricht Office, J 1V 2/202-194. 67. Melvin Croan, "Germany and Eastern Europe," in Joseph Held, ed., Tke Col'ztmb-ila Hisle;tt.ycf Eastern Ezlropc irz Che Truentietrll.Cenlury (New Yc~rk:Gotumbia University Press, 1992), p. 362. 68. teuschner tc:, GrotewohZ, May 17, 1957, SED ZK, Btto Grotewohl Papers, NL 901478. 69. Ulbricht to Khrushchev, May 13,1958, SED ZK, Watter UEbricsht-Office, J IV 2/202-496; see Kehter, Khrzrshchezt's Double Biltld, p. 444, 70. Repol-l on the Comecan meeting in Moscow from May 20-24,2958, PZPR KC, 237/V-284. 71. Ulbricht to Gomujka, May 29,1958, SEB ZK, microfilm FBS 339/13489. 72. Gomulka to dilbricht-,June 13,1958, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339113489. 73. 13iotrwskito Eobodycz, !me 13,1958, MSZ, 10/385/42, 'I"$. Ulbricht to Gornu$ka, May 29,14513, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 3313133489; and Protocol on the meetings of SED and PZPR Central Committee delegations on June 18-20,1958, SET) ZK, microfilm FBS 3313113489. 73,Notes on the pmtocol of the meeting between the GDR, USSR, and Poland, on military transit on Polish railways, June 19,2958, BDR MfAA, t a w and TreaQ Department, A59"i72. 76, Reasons for the SEU 1301itburo's refwal on February 25, 2958 of the treaty with Bulgaria, Hungary I""otand,Czechoslovakia, and Romania (signed in Warsaw on November 7,1957)' by Otto Winzer, DDR M f M , t a w and Treaty Department, A5972. "17. Ulbricht to PZPR Central Cc>mmittee, September 30, 4958, PZPR KC, 2371XXT11824. 78. Heyf (SED Frankfurt /Oder office) notes on exchanges with the PZPR office in Ziefona G61.21, December 1,1958, BDlX MEAA, HA/I Secretariat, A3821. 7 9 . Pueher (SED Frankfurt/Oder office) to Ciinter Schmidt (SED FrankfurtiOder Office), December 1,1958, DDR M f M , HA/P Scretariat, A3821. 80. GDR Embassy Department of Economic Policy annual repc~rtfar 1958 (by Lugenheim), February 19,1959, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339112495; see also Von %chc)w (FRG Embassy in Copenhagen) to the FRG Foreign Ministry September 17,1959, BKD AA, Department 7, vol. 438. Denmark was one of Poland" most reXiable customers; the value of Poland" exports to Denmark jumped almost 35 percent frc3m. 195"7o 1958, while Danish imports incwased over 486 percent. 81. SEB report on the situation in the fZZI"K,unsigned, undated, ca. December 1958, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339113424; and notes on GDR-Polish economic relations, November 30,1958, DBR MfAA, Department of Neighboring Countries, 6783 /73,ZR//892/173.

82. 130fish Foreign Ministry report on relations beween Poland and the GDR, unsigned, undated, ca. December, 19558, MSZ, IO/463/48. Polish coal war; used mainly to fuel electric power plants in West Berlin. In 1957, Poland" trade with West Berlin was worth 6 million rubles. 83. Weit, Ostblorjk infel-E,pp. 33-34. 84. GomuEka to the SED Ilolitburc>,September 18, 1958, SED ZK, V\lalter Ulbricht Papers, N t 48211244. The Poles had agreed tcr ship 300,000 tons of coal to West Berlin, but only ZOQ,OOQ had been sent, 85. Polish Foreign Ministry repc~rtm relations between Poland and the GDR, unsiped, undated, ca. December 1958, MSZ, 1Qi46.t148. 86. GDR Embassy regc~rt: on Poland (by FT. f. MGller), No~vember29,1958, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339112495, 87. Analysis of the I""c>lish-EastGerman negotiations from October 16-24 in Warsaw, October 28,1958, DDR MfAA, Minister" Office, A10089.

The Right Road to Socialism and Ulbricht's Visit to Poland, 1958--1959 kll'clrl't your sorzs, zulw acdl st?mv in tJw arrny solne d ~ y turn , fjzrir ac7eapolrs around atrd ulafrt fa rt2cofqE-lerI/tefamter Gczrr~zantervifaries?

-PoNsh visitor to tlte ''East Sea M k k " in Ihe GDR, fz4ly 79581

:1111958, m atmcrsphere of distrust still permeated Polish-East G e r m relations at atI Icvels.2 Sbce Gomufka's return to power in 1956, the X,Z13R and tine SED had. sparred over the meaning of national commnism, cultural exchanges, tourist traffic, cdectivisation, and church policy. rfhe SED contrasted the GDR's relathely snnooth-.running economy and sta" ble polit.ical system with the Poland's persistent political and economic difficulties; to Ulbricht the soundness of the SEDfsorthodox Leni~~istStahist policies was sclf-evident At a reception at the Polish Ernba~syin January 1958, Ulbricht defended the SEDk tiight control over all aspects of East German society: " W ~ e none has a strong police then it is possible to tdk about-building socia,lisrn." It was a not-so-subtle hint for the X,Z13R to crack d s m on dissidents and Stalinize its economy." At the end of E'ebruary 1958, the Polish Embassy observed that most Easl. German party and (jovernxnent officials still did not trust the Gomul-ka government: One can clearly see a double-track [policy] in relatic~nto PoEand. For domestic purposes the SED has long had a prejudice against Poland. The lower party apparatus frequently expresses the opinion that the Dune 49571 talks laeween Polish and German party and go>vernment[officials] yielded no result, that un-socialistic policies are still practised in 1301and, [and] in regards

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to the Polish countryside, !Pales are] plainly hostile [to socialism). One hears the opinion [in the SED] that the people af Poland have Less and Less trust in the PZPIZ. and W. Gomulka.4

When the editor of Trybgna Lzld'zt asked East German journalist Karl Krahn if the SE13 hadership really believcd in Ihe dass struggle, Krahn concluded that the Polish communists had sixnply given up on the principles of sociaiism, a d were nothing but oppmunists.5 East German diplomats in Moscow eagerly reported any signs that the Kremlin was having secmd thoughts about the Comutka rGgime, In the fall of 1958, a Soviet Foreign Ministry official told the East Germans that Jews held most of l.he leadersh-ip positions in the Polish Foreign Mlnistry and in many other state and party bureaucracies as well. We complained that the PZE'R had dismissed too many "progrt?ssive and loyai officers" from the Polish m y and that they wcre being replaced by officers loyal to the anti-communist Polish government-in-exile in Londsn.6 East German Ambassador Josef Hegen called the PZPR's efforts to purge revisionists a ""corrrpletefailureHTinhis unrelcntirrg criticism oi the party's ideological inconsistency. Wegen dutifully reported statements by Polish ofiicials that hinted of revjsionism, opportunim, or crciticsm of the SED" palicies, During a reception at the Soviet Embassy in Warsaw in March, Zenon Mliszka said that the Polish ""nationalcommunists" Mxho were in Poland during World War 11 (i.e., Gomulkds wing of the FZPR) had a better idea of how to rule Poland than Soviet-backed '"dogmatists."' Hegen took this as a direct attack on the Ubricht regime. He reported that sevecd times Gomufka,had tried to shut Kliszko up, telling the galherirtg not to take Kliszko seriously because he was "completdy drunk." Nonetheless, Hegen clrnclutfed that the conservatiwe wing of the p m y was beirrg margir\alized.R The East Qrmans tried again and again to convince the PZPR leadership to coordinate its political and economic policies along MarxistLeninist Ijnes-lhe SEDfsway. They considered the measures the PZFR adopted to curb revisionism too weak. After the Eleventh Pknary Session of the PZPR Central Committee in March, the East German Embassy reported that hcad of the planning commissic-.,n,Stefan Jedrychowski, had ignored ""clear Marxist-Lenirtist conceptions" in his economic plan.4 East German diplomat Ruth Wenk wmte that the Central Cornittee had briefly mentioned some of the serious deficiencies in socialist development in Poland, but had not prclposed consistent policies to chart a new course.lQe East Germans leveled some of the same criticisms at the PZI'R after the Ninth Party Congress in October," According to West German officials, rcllatims were still. "quite cool."lz

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Cultural. Relations Remain Frozen

Shce the mid-l950s, the Ulbricht r4gime had strictly circumscribed exchanges with Poland to prevent pditical unrest in the GDR. The SET) district ofiEices filed. so many disbrbing reports h 1958about the P o k s y d t i cal unreliability that the policy remaked unhmged. 'The FrmBurtlBder oifice reported that the PZPR was reluctant to push Marxist-Lminist propag"nda on workers because ail they wanted a better standad of living. East German ofiFicials contrasted the poor livislg co~zditionsof Polish workers with the ostentatious receptions the PZPR threw for foreip delcgations.lVarty functionaritls from Cottbus complained that their Polish counterparts avoided political or ideological discussions on the leadhg role of the kvlet M m in the socialist camp, the significance of the GDIZ. for Geman ~unificatim,and the dictatorship of the proletariat; thc.Pdes just wanted to t& about improving their economy. The Cottbus office also found that the Polish comrad.es"excessi:ve hospitality did not reflect the "real living conditions of the Polish pe0gle.~'14 The East German Embassy in Warsaw filed numerous reports criticizing the PZPR" wweak attempts to purge the party of nationalists, clergymen, revisionists, and anti-Soviets. According to the East Germans, the party" lack of a clear and consistent ideoloa m d meirhod of verifyhg members had resulted in a completely unsatisfactory character of the party membership; only 37.8 percent of the PZP1.E members we= workers in 1,958,compared with 47 percent in 1949. East German djponnats were incredulous that the PZPR leaders were unconcerned about this trend.15 The SED viewed the PZlaKs efforts to indoctrhate Polish youth as inadequate.16 'The party reported that Polish schools were notably delinquent in prmotjng "the leading role of the party and the theory of class struggle."l7 East Geman officials warned cJf '"bourgeois-~visionist manifestations" in Polish cztltture and higher education, m example being the continuation of religious instruction in schools; the SEE?even alleged that c h i l d ~ nof atheists faced psychologicat prt-ssure and physical punishme~ztif they chose not to participate h these classes"" According to East German diplomats, Polish studentr; still had no respect for Polish professors holdh~gM a r x i s t - n i t beliefs; the studmts often brmded them as Stalhists and sametimes assaulted them phy sically-1" In the eyes of the East German communists, the PZPR" permissive culturaf policies were a critical loophole in Pdish socialism. The East Germans were genuinely surprised by the PZPrC's lack Clf cmistelnf guidelines for artists, whom the East Germans accused of producixrg too many works reflecting ""burgeois culture.'" Accorcling to c ~ n eEast German source, many I'olifjli writers and intelfectuals had left the PZPR in 1957, but those who remained were still allowed to propatgate un-Mamist

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and bourgeois-capitalist ideas,""n one case, the East German Foreign Ministry criticized a Polish opera company for portraying '"Emilia Galotti'ks "a generd h m a n p r o b l e d rather than "the class struggle of the upwardtly striving bourgeoisie a g a h t feudal domination," The ministry faulted Polish officials for separating art from ecmomic and pditical affairs, and for allowilng artists to gain their inspiration from the Wst; fos exarmple, one Polish theater critic said that the main objective of art was to ""bring the beautiful and the humanef9othe people. Much to the concern of the SED hard-liners, he made no r&rcnce to the accepted norm of Soviet art-ocialist realism-21 I'he Potish authorities ignored the SED's warnings about such ''decadent artefToEshofficials argued that if the press criticbed these artists m d the party suppressed their work, the people w d d tracrsfam them into t the East Gcrheroes and martyrs." m e Poles also showed little i n t e ~ sin mans' dsab,prrzdjcthle, dogmatic art and literahare. The East Germans opened the "House of GDR Culture" in inasaw in August 1957, but, according to a West Gcman source, few Poks visited the cater despite the East @mm Embassy's energetic eMorts to promte it." Although the East Germans made numerous offers, Polish authorities were reluctmt to use East German literaturc. and films, especially propagmda films about the dangers of West German imperiafism. -The Poles djd purchase one East Germm film., but cut all scenes showhg the East G e m a n army24 E'rorn 1955 to 1959, Poland had m l y 12 government-sponsored exchanges with the GDR. Poland conducted 189 exchmges with Frmce, 97 with Great Rritah, and 110 with the Soviet t"nion. Even Bulgaria (27) had more exchanges with Pdand. Ati of Polanc3's exchanges with the GDR were in the technical, agricdtufal, sejentifie, or medjcal fields, but: none in the more politically sensitive areas of language, humanities, and art. In contrast, a h s s t all the French and British exchanges fell into the last three ~ a t e g o r i e s ~ z m Polish e Foreign Ministry paid no attentio~~ to East Berlin" complaints about Poland's budding cultural exchanges with West Germany-26 In late 1958, the SED indicated a willingness to expand cultural ties with Poland., but only if they were strictly regulated. The p a r 9 proposed to resurmct the German-Polish "Frit?ndship Week'kas a way to inculcate the Polish communists with the SEDfsbrand of socialism.2T The PZPR agreed, but the Polish communists stjll thought that spontaneous exchanges of delegations and citizens were a better way to encourage gmzline fricrtdships.2" The Poles were right. The positive effects of the officid cultural exchanges were ephemeral, and many exchanges confirmed old prejudices, D ~ ~ r i nthe g "East Sea Week" in Tiostock in July, for exaxnple, the SEDfs district office reported that whenever party members tried to discuss so-

226

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ciaiist development with the Polish delegation, the Poles "felt insulted. and emphasized that they had very deep national feelhgs."' The delegation rt.jected an East German proposal for a joint declarat.ion stressing class conflict, the roie of the working class in buii.ding socialism, or the struggle against anti-soviet itttitudes. The East Germans said that Titofs YugosXavia served as a rnodel for the Poles, not the Soviet Union.29 One woman in the Polish delegation told the East Germans that she could not speak her mind while in the GDR, but in Poland she would tell them hcr honest opinion of the Soviets, Other Po:lish vi,sitors alleged that the Soviet Union was granting East Germany substantial economic aid, yet exploited Poland as thsugh it were a colony- Severai Polish sbdents characterized the GDR as "a complete diet-atorshjp," and proudly defended the freedoms they eqoyed in Poland. One Polish student commented that there were too many workers in the East German Parliament: ""One cannot govern a country with workers, because in their stupidiw they wodd agree to every decision." R~ostocrkofficials also complained that the Polish athletes at the festival were. trying to make cmnections with West Germans; Polish officials had eve11 allowed their yachtsmn to attend a party aboard. a West German sailboat.= &e East Germm journalist at the East Sea W e k was genuinely surprised by the Pofes' deep mistrust of Soviets and East Germans*Che Pole asked him, '*Won? yyour sons, who will serve in the army some d a turn ~ their weapons around and want to Eccmper the former German territoriesTXnother Pale told him that "the So~rietUnio~zonce had great influence in Poland, but once Stalin was six feet undet it doesn? have any more.'Thbe bstuck office cmsidered it their duty to infom the PZPR leadershjp of these "revisio~zistmanifestations," a l t h g h the Polish authorities took them less seriousXy." &e Polish politicim observed that the festival had created as much e ity as good will.32 Other official exchanges in f 458 yielded sjmilar results. Pofish visitors to the GDR continued to make disparaging remarks about the Soviet Idnion and Ulbricht, and persisted in their efforts to make connections to West Germany. The East Germns repededly ef-rastised Ihe Poles for conductjng cultural.events that catered to Mlcst European artists." Responding to the visit of Polish engineers to a power plant in Leipzig that fall, m e SED fuzzctionnry commezzted that "it is incomprehensjble to me that socialist countries &legate such m-political people to a frimdly socidist state." r-fe added that this delegaticm would not contribute to '%uildir.~g socialism in the worldef'34

The SER Criticizes PZPR Church Policy The SED had no confjdence in GomuMa" resolve to check the power of the Polish Catholic Church. Organized ~ l i g i t t nin the GDR fell under the

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strict control of the East German authorities; they h e w that a rival ideology wodd inevitably undermine socialist beliefs. The rkgime's compromise with the Evmgelical Church in the GDR was a tactical and temporary retreat before the eventual victory of socialism, The East Germans repeatedly alerted Polish officials to the dangers of ~ l i g i o u sfreedom, and to the ""reactionary activity'kf t-he West Qrmm Catholic Church.35 The East German Embassy warned that the Polish Cathohc Front (PAX) in the Polish Parlian-tent was opposed to socialism and rqected the class struggle as a foundation for state policy.36 When Gornutka began to crack down on the independence of the Church in 1958,37 the East Germms took some credit for it, Wifli Barth, the head of the SEVs Departxnent. of Church atestions, reported that he had ""the Fnrpression that the FPol4sX-i)comrades attach great importance to the experiences of our party inthe ideological stmggle against political clericalism." The Poiish authorities agreed to coardjnate their efforks to counteract the agitation of the West Geman chrrrches in Poland," "but a year later the East Germans alleged that West German agents were the inspiratim for a demnstration by Catbo,ic priests inZidma Glira, In their denial, the Poles shrugged off the accusation that these hcidents were the ~ s doft the PZPKs inconsistent church policies.39 After the Twelfth Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee in the fall of 1958, the East German Ernbassy again expressed disappointment with the party" feeble attempts to redwe the power of the Catholic Church. According to East German diplomats, the ZSL, in alliance with Polish '"clerics, kulaks, and reactionaries," had secured its political, influence in the countryside." Blinded by their w n ideologicai zeal, the East Germans ig~norecdthe deep mots of Catholidsm in Poland and advised the PZPR Central Committee to purge the party of all churchgaers.41 East German officials were even more concerned about the links between the small Lutherm Church in Poland and the Germm Lutherm Church. h April 1958, Barth reported that the president oE the Polish Lutheran Church, Reverend Michaelis, had recently visited West Germany without contacting the so-cdled "progressive reprclserntatives of the churches in the GDR.""$ The SEDk Department of Church @estions alerted the SED leadership that Michaelis w n t e d to develop ties between the German and Polish Protestmts as a means ta draw the two countries together. The East Germans were also critical of the financial assistance afforded the Polish Protestant c h u r h s by congregations in Ewrope and the Unjted States." They wcre even suspicious of the relief packages that the Catholic and Lutheran Churches in West Germany were smding Polish cmgregaticms; the East G e m m s saw this as part of a coordbated effort to subvert the socialist states.4" That summer, Michaelis invited church leaders from West Germany, the U ~ ~ i t eStates, d a d other Western countries to ithe dedication of the

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Binitatis Church in Warsaw.. Michaelis also invited two clergymen from West Berlin, but Bar& protested that they intended to agitate among the Germns in Poland to show their solidarity with "Christians fsom the German homelmd.'%e issue appeared to have resolved itself when the Polish Embassy in Berlin refused to grmt visas tcr the W s t Berlirrers on the grou11ds that Michaelis had not followed proper application pmcedures,"Wmetheless, Florirr sent a letter to the PZPR protesting the invitations. He called the West: Berlin clergymen '"representatives of the NATO-wing [sic] in the Evangelical Church hierarchy."46 Leaders from the World Comcil of Churches and Lutheran. World Federation were ammg those invited to the dedication. Barth gave the Potes this kvarni,ng: "The goal of the appearance of these reactionary men of the World Council of Churches is . . . to undemjne the policies of the peoples" democracies and of the GDR in particular. As is h o w n the World Council of Churches takes the position that there is only one German state, namly the German Federal. lRcpublic."g After the dedication ceremonies on June 22, the SED chastised Michaetis and the Bishop of Hanovcr, Hans Lilje, for making statemnts aitical oE the GDR. Lilje had also contrasted the Poles%bospitali@ with the cool receptions be had previously received from East German officials: " " H we v i s i t e l y Z have been received !tere!''48 The December Summit :In the weeks leading up to U1bricht"s trip to W s a w in December, the SER b e e n tcr see some positive poiitical and wonomic etevelopmmts in Polmd. Nthough East Germany had recently dipped from Pol,a~d% ssecand-largest to its thM-largest tradlng partner, the SED predicted that the vollxme of trade between the two countries wollld increase 11 percent from 1957to 1958.'The East Germans were gratified that the Poles had recentb named four entctrlprises and schools after Wilhelm Pieck. The SEE? also noted that the government was removing thc. crucifixes that had reappeared in schools in 1956.49 The East Germans were encouraged by a subtle shift in PoIand" policy t w a r d West Gemany, fn Nowemher 3958, the Polish Foreip Ministry began to restrict Che number of visas for student delegdions going to the FRG; the SEU interpreted this as a significant policy reversal.'The East German press rq0rtc.d that the I'ZPLC: was publishing more complete informtion about the G m , and was silencing revi,sio~~ism in t k party."" The SED district office in Frankhrt/Oder wrote m unusually positive report on relaticms with the PZPR office in Zlelona G6ra, commenting that their Polish comrades now were morc rclceptive to ad\rice on Che right way to build socialism,'2

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Some Polish officials also thought that relations had taken a turn for the better, especially in the economic s p h e ~ Polish . diplomats were pleased with the terms of a nekv trade agreement signed in Pcbruary and with the in.crcased volume of East Geman goods handled by Polish ports and merchant ships.%In a briefing prtrpared for the meetings in December, the Poljsh Poreig~nMinistry applauded the convergence of the two countries9foreign policy objectjves that had taken place since the last high-level meetings in June 1957; it cited its evidence several new economic m d cultural, agreements that the two corntries had signed in the last year and a half.% These =ports noted unresolved issues, however. The Poles viewed the GDR's recent suspension of Pdish expol.ts to West Berlin not only as a political decision but as an attempt to eliHlinate Polish competition for West Bertin markets. The embassy also pointed out that the East Germans had chose11 closer ecmomic relations with Czechoslovakia rather than with what the East Germans referred to as "the unreliable Polish partnrrer.'""e Polish Foreign Ministry filed several reports contrasthg the East German journalists' extenshe coverage of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia with their indifference to Poland" pdtical and economic developments. 'I'he Poles also suspected that the East German prcss seldom mentioned the ader-Neissc?border because the SED, in anticipation of a breakthrough on Germany reunj.fjcatim, was rethhking its recognition of the border. Polish officials werr;, angewd by the East German practice of censorhg all speeches, articles, and other information sent from Poland; they thougfnt the average East German was receiving a "one-sided" m a n d '"arped sense"' of what was going on in the country? Before the December meetings, the Polish Forcigsr Mhistry confirmed its opposition to trilaterat Czechoslovak-East German-Polish initiatives direded against the West. The ministry also reiterated its objections to bilateral agreemnts with East Germany that compromised Pol.and"s national interests. The ministry recommended periodic clmsultaticms with the East Germms about Polmd's relations with W s t Germany; but left no doubts that policy wwld be made in Warsan; not in East Bczrlin.57 Shady before srtmmit, Arnbassador Hegm mote Winzer that Polish officials wanted to avoid taEng the East German delegation to a colfective farm, probably because the SED had attacked the PZPR so oftm for its ""bourgeois""qricultural policies. Hegen added that the Pdes internded to shokv the East Germns a Poish port in hopes that U'lbricht would rethlnk his decision to expand Rostack ha&or,?Vhe Poles had first voiced their opposition to tbr expmsion of tl-te harbor during the Wlbricht-Gomuika s u m i t over a year earlkz In late November, Polish trade officials told the East Germans that Rostocrk was a direct competitor

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to the Polish ports of Szczech, GdaAsk, and Gdynia, harbors the Polish g~vemmenthad just enlarged at great expense, They maintained that only 40 percenf. of these harbors' capacity was being used." Jedrychowski questioned the high cost of expanding Restock" harbor and argued that the East Germans could use the money saved to develop such industries as the East German chemical industry. The head of the PZPR"s GdaAsk office said that the Polish harbors should domisrate the Baltic seaboard, but added this indelicate caveat: "h1 this question the PRP m s t avoid kicking the socialist brother countries in Che behjnd;" The East German Forcip Minisky characteriztzd this official as an "outs p o k n ~visionistwho frequently expressed his antipathy for the Soviet Union. Today he is still a propagandjst of October 1956."60 The East G e r m s planned to confront Gomulka about reducing the cost of transporting goods through Poland to the Soviet Unim. During track tdks in Movernber, East German ncgotiat.ors scolded the Poles fos requesting 350 million rubles annually for this transit. The East Germans wodd have to i n c ~ a s eexports to Pdand to cover these costs, an action they were not prcpared to take. The Poles ignored appeals to expand the capacity of Polish inland waterways; the East German Foreign Ministr)i suspected that the Poles were making m m mmey on rail transit and wanted to keep it that way-61 Ulbricht and Grotewohl [led the East German delegation to VVarsaw As usual, tbr East G e m m s included workers and farmers in an effort present the SED as the true representative of the working classes..'The Polish delegation had none. Gomutka" ttrmslator, Erwin Wit, remembered that ""right from the start Ulbricht, with his wooden vocabulary set himself up as the school master""""." Economic cooperation took center stage. En an exchange that had repeated itself many t i m s before, the Poles rejected Ulbrichtfs argument that: the G n R was, in his words, the "shop window of socialisxn"9o West Germany, and therefore deserved special trade cancessions, Gornutka pointed out that the Polish economy was having difficulty because of a rclcent. fall in coal prices, Wheln the Pdes prcssed U'lhricht to alfocv more Polish exports to W s t Berlin, he replied that the Khmshchev's ultimaon Berlh~would soon resolve that issue.63 a c e agah, the Poles co~~pla&ed about the treat~~ent of Polish visitors to the GDR and the persistent harassment Poles mffered, when traveling tbmugh East Gemmy to Westem Europe. Earlier in the year, East Geman border guards had confiscated some West Gerntan brochures on home building and machhery from an SE3 functionary; the guards admonished, " m a t do you have this for; would you tike to hawe another C)c.ttibl;r in Poland again?'TI"olish oMicials maintained that the brochwes colntained nothing controversial and could easily be obtained, by mail. They said it

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was natural for Poles to comparc M s t German border guards9rimdly treatment wifih this h d of harassment by the East Germms.@ Some Pdes had to wait up to five months for visas to East Germany, if they got them at all, Polish officials poixlted out that it was easier for a Pale to obtain a visa to W s t Gemany than to tbr GDR. Ubricht and Bob tried to conceal the real basis for this policy, which was intended to limit, contacts between East Germans and Poles, and Poles and Westerners, They would admit only that some bureaucratic rnistakes had been made. Cyrat-tkiewicz responded that Poles faced the same travel restrictions as Westerners, He said that Poles could not comprehend why a supposedly friendly socialist country conducted such a policy. Cyrankiewicz also hinted that the East German authorities used visa restrictions on Western travelers through the GDR to limit the success of the Poznari Trade Fair; he pointed out that Westerners l ~ a dno problems obtaining visas for the Leipzig Trade Fair,65 Ulbricht denied it, He said that the strict visa controls on Westerners wew imperative because NATO s e n t 5 wem tryh~gto spy on the CUR; East German security forces wanted Pdes and Wsterners to travel by train so that they could be more caredully watched, A Ifrustrated Cyrmkiewicz concluded that it was a good thing the Poznah fair took place inJune; the two sides still had time to resolve the problem."" When Cyrmkiewicz m d Gornulka complained that the East German authorities were harwsing Polish truck traEfic as well, Ulbricht angrily rclplied that if P d m d would support his policies toward West G e r m y and West Berlin, all these problems would be solved. Wlbricht then warned the Poles against cdtivating ties to the SPD, especially to Weber, cvhnln he called a leadi,ng revisionist. Gomnkka rctorted Ihat '"for us Wehner is no problem at Lall,'bnd that if it was in Po1and"s interest to pursue Weher and other Social Democrats, he would do it.@ Ulbricht's public appearances in Poland that December did not rcsonate with the Pollish people. In a speech to the workers at the "Rosa Luxemburgf"ight bulb factory inWarsaw, Ulbricht boasted of the GDR's enormous economic progrcss h the past few years. Given East German workers%higer standard of living, this was not what Polish llaborers wanted to hear, Ulbricht aiso made a pointed mference to the SED's allegedly sz-lccessful collectivization progrm, implyjng Chat the IJZPKs agricultural policy not only was unsuccessful but was m-Marxist: "The higher growt_hrate of pmductim in tbe collective farms pmves their superiority m d anests to the right-r.3c.s~ of the Socia,list Unity Partvs struggle against opportunistic and mvisionist conc@ptimsabout the development of agricufhrrc-?in the trmsition period from capitalism to socialism.'" U'lhricht praised the P7,PR"s recent efforts to increase production in Che collectives, and encourapd the party to continue the po14cy.6"

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The debate over the final joint communique was as contentious as it had been at the Berliz~summit a year and a half earlier. As always, the East Qrmans wanted to avi& praise on the %viet Union, proclaim the superiority of collectivized,agriculture, criticize the churches, attack West Germm militarism and imperialism, and issue a warning that the FRG ing to attack the GDR. The Poles agreed only to general statements ahwt the development of socialism in East Germany and Poland's support for some sort of Geman confederaticrn, Gomu&a refused to issue a joint statement. w m i n g crf an imminent West German at-tack." Ulbricht was reduced to slipping this line into a toast at the reception following the talks: "The aggressive plans of German militarism show that peace h the Polish peopte and the defense of the Bder-Neisse border is guaranteed only by the struggle with Geman impesial,ism.""~ W i t later gave this frank appraisal of the meetings: "Ulbricht: and Gomuika had serious differe~~ces.'~~~ The Polish, press maintained that, in contrast to the cwerage of other meetings between Polish and East German officials in the past few years, this one was more productive, Tybzkna Ltidza declared that the meetings had ""punched a wide breach in, the wall of distrust." According to an East G e r m n source, Polish press releases on the summit 'kefiect the positive results of the visit. The most important tenor of their cmtent is undoubtedIy tbe pesception that on the essential questions complete agrcement existed between the GDR dekgation and the Polish people.'"z The Polish Embassy in Berlin reported that "the visit m d Ihe atwpt7ere in whirh it unfolded will be treated by the [East German] populace as a manifestation of the coming t o g e ~ e of r the PRP and the GDR and the thawiw of what was essentially an kentbargo' of thc Polish problem that existed rap till now."73 The Polish Forefgn Ministry noted that the East German press was now refraining from "harsh polennics" m a n d ""critical opinions of particw lar aspects of evolutionary process in:Poland."T4 At the beginning of 1959, the East German diplcrmats in Warsaw saw some encouraging signs that the PZPR was adoptkg policies co~~sistent with the East German version of socialism. m e y concluded that their lobbying efforts were at last bearing fruit.7" No Consensus on Germany or the Border Although the Dece~~ber summit appeared to have begun a recmciliation behnieen the two communist leaders, this second meelthg with Gomulka failed to change LI1bricht"s doubts about the rdidbility of the PZm, mom so in regard to the Germm question. Ubricht's agents warned him that Polish diplomats and journalists were still sending VVarsaw "unreliable" about the GUIC.76 and "misleadingf~epcrrts

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With time running out on Khrushchev%six-month Berlin ultimatum, tensions between the West and the Soviet U ~ ~ i oremained n high in early 19559. The SED refused to countenance Pdish hterference h this issue; the party had ample evidence that Warsaw was dis~gardlngEast Gcrman interests in West Germany and West Berlin. Despite repeated protests from the East German government, the Polish Military Mission in West Berlln continued to mfer to that half of the city as part of the FRG.77 Polish diplomat Ludwik Gronowski had the temerity to ask Heymmn whether Ulbricht's unpopularity was causing SO mmy East Germans to leave the GDR through West Berlin. H e y m m r e p k d that the number of West Germans coming to the GDR was about equal to the number of East Germans leaving far the FRG, an assertion that was patently untnle.78 Relations were still so fragile in 1959 that the Polish Foreip Ministry reprimanded Groncrwski for posing the vestion, and advised its djplnmats not to mention the embarrassing exodus of East Gerrrrms,'" The East Germans remained highly sensitive about being treated as the junior German state,Ko That spring, Grotewohl wrote Cyrankiewicz protesting Bybzkna Ludu's designation of the East Gcrman representatives to the G e ~ ~ e vConference a of Foreign Mhisters as a "cansultative (j~oup"rather than a " ~ v e m m e n tdelegat.icm."sl Polish officials were eyuaHy perturbed about the East Germans"ersistent references to the GDR as "Midde Germanyt'' as though Potand's W s t m Territories cmstituted ""East Germany." In May, Piotrocvski, wrote Lohadycz lhat, according to RIeues Dcztfschlat-ni,Ulbricht hivnself had recently used the exprtrssion.82 At first, Heyxi told Polish dipl"m"t Lem Szybek that the newspaper's report was an editorial ersor, and that he was ""surprised and pe"pl"xedf' by the mix-up. But when Szybek later showed. him a copy of the speech, Heymann tried to exp1ai11 that Ulbricht was referTi11g to a workers' revolt near Halle in the 1x20s that had been called the "middle German uprisingem"sThe Poles remained unconvin.ce& The Polish Fortrign Ministry advised Piotmwski to inform the East German Fornip Mhistry that Polish public: opinion was strongly opposed to the term,.M Polish officials suspected, that the SED referrtd to the GDR as "Mid& Germmy'' to pander to the East Geman sclittlers from Poland; tbese 4migr4s still expected to rclcovcr trhejr land. A functionary in the SED's propaganda section, flosst Heinrich, told Pdish diplamat Stdsiaw Kopa that "the view is rather wiciapread of the necessity to revise the border d r w n ill the Potsdarn agreement, . . . Recog~~ition of the right. of G e r m s to return to these areas is justified mainly by the difiicultics Poland has had in administerkg &em."gs The SED felt prclssured by the comtant West German propaganda calling fnr a revision of the ader-Neisse border, The party" oone indirect way of questioning the border was to re~ecthistmical justification for Poland's acyuisi8ion of the territories.%East G e m m jour-

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nalists t d d Polish diplomat Janusz Rachocki fiat they h e w PoImd had controkd the area in the Middle Ages, but that they refrained from tillking about it for fear of e v o h g &i-Soviet se~~timents among the German 4mig&s from Poland. Rachocki reportctd that East German educators sometimes tauti;ht that old Poland irrcluded the Western Territories, but that propaganda intended for the adult popdation did not%gy The press attach6s from the European communist countries met in Berlin in fune. According to Rachocki, the Soviet, Hungarian, and hgoshvim anaehks al~reedthat the ader-Neisse border was the most troubksorne issue for the SED because a majority of East Germans mmained mreconciled to it. The Soviet attach4 said that even the younger generation in the GDR did not accept the Oder-Neisse border, but he declared that Poland had =solved lingering questions about its ability to govern the Western Territories.88 The SED interpreted mrushchev%visit ta East Berlh in March 1959 as a sign that t h Soviets approved of their politkal and economic program, rather than Comuika" reform moven-tent.w 'li> avoid the impression in the West that there was a rift with Gomuika, however, Khrushchev agreed to attend. the fifteenth amiversary celebration of the People's Republic of Poland in July." GGornuika was effusive in his praise of KhrusStchev; he ended one speech with ""long Eve our dear Sovjet guest."= Gomuika even made some wusually generous comments about the GDR, but he avcrided the ritual praise that typified the SEU's propaganda: 'fWeetntertain good retations with it [the GDR]. We m developing mutual cooperation, we are united thruugh a common ideology and cornmm goals, together we belong to the Warsaw A SED report on MI-rrushckevfsvisit to Poland praised new developments in the PZPR-for hstance, the party" rmewed, efforts to eliminate "rttvisionil;tsUand r e t m to central economic planning and collectivisation..The report: concluded trhat mrushchcv's visit would further cemmt this 'Marxist-Leninist development" in the PZPR." Even Ambassador Hegen, who was a verbose critic of the Gomrr&a r&gime,publicly declared that "there are no controversial issues between Poland and the GDR .. . . The fifteen-year existace of the People" Poland shows that the friendship of Paland with the GDR is indissolnble.""q4 By 1959, Gomulka was in greater cosltroii of the political situati.on. Me moved. jerzy Morawski ofi the Politburo and. demoted 'Jerzy Albrecht and Wadysiaw Matwin. Gomrrjka curbed the relatively free ideological debate in the PZPR that had been going on since 1"35&, and began to challenge the power of the Catholic Church." A turning point in Gomufka" increasingly represl;ive policies was the removaZ of the yomg revisioniSt sehOlar I:,,eszek,Kotakowski from the editorship of Slridia filozoficzne (Philisophic Studies) in the spring of 1959. That fall,

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Gomulka sacked his old comrade Wladyslaw BieAkowski as Mhister of Higher Education, and charged farosjaw haszkiewicz with bringing ideologicd confomity to the Polish Wlliters' Union." WWhcn Gomulka called on the old StaXinist Eugcmiusz Szyr to head the central planning commission, Hegen predicted that Szyr wuld employ ccrnsf stent "Marxist-Lerrhisr prhciples of socialist command economyf?o help the stagnmt economy recover.97 The East Germans were obviously relieved that Gomujka had not tried to follokv Rto out of the Soviet bloc, and that he was asserting (jsca.t.er party control over the Polish prcss, economy, and Catholic Church. M i ~ in d self-delusion about the success and poputarity of their own socialist system, however, the East German communists interpreted the Polish people's growing disappointment with GomuMa as a result of his political and economic liberalizaticm, not his increasing political ~ p r t r s sion and ljmited economic successes, After a decade of buildkg a rclatively successful socialist system in the GDR, the East German communists enccluraged Gamulka to adopt the SEWSmodel of communism.

1. Rostock office to Ulbricht, July 25,1958, SEB ZK, Walter Ufbricht Papers, NL 18214250. 2, Duscheck report on the visit of a Polish party delegation in the GDR, February 5,1958, SET)ZM,microfiim FBS 339113489. 3. Piotrowski to Rapacki, January 8,1958, MSZ, 23/77/9. 4. Polish Embassy repc~rtfrom November 1, 195'7 to February 28, 1958, MSZ, 10/371/41, 5. Krahn to Hermann Axen, February 17, 1958, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339113489; and K r a h to Brandt (Ncucs Dt~utschta~ld editor), February 24, 41358, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 33911M89, 6. Rossmeisl notes of meeting with an unidentified Soviet Fctreign Ministi-y official, Sqtember 12,1958, SED ZK, Otto Grotewohl Payers, NL 90/485. 7. Report on the situation in I""otand,unsigned, J a n u a 24, ~ 1958, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339/ 13489. 8. Report on the Eleventh Plenary of the PZPR Central Committee, unsigned, March 5,1958, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339143489, 9. Report on the Eleventh Plenary of the PZPR Central Committee, unsigned, March 12,1(358, DDR M f M , Mrarsaw Embass~r;A3771, 10. Wenk notes on the Eleventh Plenary of the PZPR Central Committee and the Fourth Trade Union Congress, undated, ca. May 1958, DDR MfAA, Mrarsaw Embassy, A3771. ll.ZJugenhelm report on the Ninth Party Congress of the PZPR, October 22, 1958, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339/ 13490. 12. I""otiticaldevelopment in the Sc~vietzone of Germany from May 1-31,1958, June 6,1958, BRD BfGDI-a,B43711473.

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13. SEB report on cooperation between the district office in Frankfurt/Oder and the PZPR in Zielona 66ra, April 8,1958, SED ZK, micrc>fXm FBS 339113422. 14. Leicht fSED office in Cottbus) to the SED Central Committee, April 20, 1958, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339113422. 45. PGschel to the GDR Foreign Ministry, July 45,1958, SED ZK, microfilm FES 339113489. 46. Wenk notes of a meeting with Tdnnies and tipinski, June lli3, 1958, DDR M f M , VVarsaw Embassy, A3T71. 47, SED district office in Frankfurt/Qder report an exchanges with the PZPR office in Zielona G6ra for the second half of 1958, December 19, 1958, SEB ZK, microfilm FBS 339123422. 18. SED report on the situatian in the 132;Pl[t,unsigned, undated, ca. December 1958, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339113424; SED country repc~rtcm Poland, November 30, 4958, SED ZK, Ot to Grotewohl Papers, N L 90/485; and repc~rtfor the delegation to Poland in December; November 30, 1958, DDR MfAA, Depadment of Neighboring Countries, C784 /73,ZR/ 4892/"?"3, 19. GDR Embassy in Warsaw to the SED Depa&ment of Fureip Affairs, August, 1957, SED ZK, microfilm 339143489, 20. SEB Depa&ment of Foreign Affairs report an 1301and, February, 1959, SED ZK, Alfred Kurefla Office, TV 21 2.026126. 21. Report on an SEE3 delegatian visit to Zielnna G6ra, unsigned, November 30,1958, DDR MMA, Warsaw Embassy; A3821. 22. Report by Stropp, P6schel and Wenk of their trip to the Wrodaw area from June 24,1958, DDR IClfAA, Warsaw Embassy, A3'7172. 23, Joaehim GGrlich report an the Germans in Poland, October, 1956, BRD BfGD1F; B23711246, 24. Eesner in Warsaw to the GDR Frrreip Ministry, September 25,1958, DDR MfM,VVarsaw Embassy, A3751. 25. PZPR Department of Science and Education report on educationat, exchanges with fareign countries, 19561959, 13ZPfTKC, 237/V442, 26. Motes on relations beween Potand and the GDR, unsigned, undated, ca. December, 4958, MSZ, 10/4612/48. 27. Wiese notes of a meeting with Ka?Trci;i:ny(Polish Ministry of Culture) on October 30, November 1, 1958, SSED ZK, microfilm FBS 339/124"3* The friendsFtip week had been discontinued in 1956. 28. Propasaf far a German-Polish Friendship Week in 4959, November 30,1958, UDR MfAA, Department of Neighboring Countries, C B 1/73,ZR/1892/73. 29. Rosti~ckoffice to Utbricht, July 25, 1958, SET>ZK, Watter UEbricht Papers, NL 2 8211250. 30. Tbid. 31. Ibid. 32. Michai Grendys to Jbzef Czesak, Octc~ber1,1958, PZPR KC, 2317/XXT1-824. 33. Spielhagen notes on his visit to Warsaw, October 47, 1958, SED ZK, Otto Grotewohl Papers, NL, 901485. 34. Fliegner (GDR Planning Committee) to the SED Central Committee, August 20,2958, SED ZK, VValter Cilbricht Papers, NL 182/1250.

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35, Wenk notes of meeting with Wiese, April 20,1959, UDR MfAA, Poland %ction, A1 7518. 36. XGesner to the GDR Fareign M i n i s t ~August , 5, 1958, SEU ZK, microfilm FBS 339/ 13483. 317. Werner Eggerath report on Polish church/state rela"ticln5, December 8,1957, $Er> ZK, Otto GrotewohX Papers, N L 90/4;78; and no>teson the activities of the Catholic Church in Poland, unsiped, September 10, 11i358, SED ZK, Department h IV 2/14/89; see also M, K. Dziewmowski, Tht Communistof C h u ~ Questions, Party of Pufarzd: An Otillitze of kiistory (Cambridge: I-larvard University Press, 1976), p. 295. In September 1958, the government decreed that no members of religious orders could give school instruction unless they were fully qualified as teachers, There was to be no religious symbols in the schools, Refigiom instruction in wclhools war; abolished in 1961. 38, Politburc~Working Grc~upon Church Questions report on meetings with the Stachelski (Polish Minister of Church Affairs), June I, 19figf$Er> ZK, Department of Church Questions, IV 2/ 14/90, 39, P%chel notes of meethg with k c h , J m e 20,1959, SEE?ZK, Department of Church Question% IV 2/ 14/90. 40. tugenheirn to the GDR Fareign M i n i s t ~November , 8, 1958, SE&)ZK, microfilm F13S 339/ 13490. 41. Xziesner notes of a meethg with Szewczuk (Director of the Foreign Department of the PZPR Central Committee) on August 2, August 6,1958, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339/ 1389. 42. WIli Barth to Utbricht, April 8, 1958, SED ZK, Watter UEbricht Papers, NIJ 182/1250. 43. Notes on Michaelis and the meeting of the VVorXd Council of C h u ~ h e sun, signed, September 22, 1958, SED ZK, Department of Church Questions, IV 2/14/89. 44. l[""olitburoWorking Group on Church Affairs report on meetings with Stachelski, June 1,1959, SED ZK, Department of Church Questians, W 2/14/90, The East German go>vernmentestimated that there were about 3,000 German members of the Evangelical Church in Paland, 45. SED Depadment of Foreign Affairs to the PZPR Central Committee, May 31,1958, ZK SED, microfilm FBS 339143489; 'Wi&ig (GDR Fowign Ministry) notes of a meeting with Weise and Dressler (Department of Church Questions) May 3, 1958, DDR MfAA, Poland Section, A1804; and Hegen notes of meeting with Stachelski (Polish Minister of Church Aflairs), May 19,1958, DDR MfAA, Poland %ctic>n,AI 884. 46, Florin to the PZPR Central Committee, May 31, 1958, PZPR MC, 237/XXTI-824. 47. Wirth notes, June 9, 1958, SED ZK, Department of Church Questians, IV 2/14/89. 48, Wirth notes on the Trinitatis dedications, July 10, 1958, SED ZK, Department of Church Questions, TV 2/14/89. 49. SED country report on Poland, Ncrvember 30, 1958, SED ZK, Otto Crotewohl Papers, NL 90/485; and report for the delegation to Poland in Becembeu;

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November 30, 1958, BDR MfAA, Department of Neighboring Countries, 6781/73, ZR/1832/'73. The East Germans had only W Oschools named for Polish communists, one for Boleslaw Bierut and one for Julian Marchlewski. 50. GDR Foreign M i n i s t ~report on contacts beween West German and Polish students, November 30, 4958, DDR MfAA, Department of Neighboring Countries, 6781 /73,ZR/ l892/73, 54. SED report an the activity of the SED Press Department, unsigned, mdated, ca. December 1958, SEU ZM, microfilm FBS 339112495. 52. Report by the SED FranMurt/Oder office an exehmges with the PZPR office in Zielona Gfjra Ear the second half of 1958, December 19,1958, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339/ 13422. 53. Polish Embassy report on economic relations with the GB23 from 1956-1 958, Nctvember 18,1958, MSZ, 101385/42. 54. Topics for the discussictns with the GDR party and gnvei-nment delegation in December, unsigned, undated, ca. Dwember, 1958, MSZ, 10/464/48, 55, Polish Embassy report on econclrnic relations with the GDR from 195Q-1958, November 28, 2958, MSZ, 10/385/42; and briefing paper for the discussions with GDR party and government delegation in Decembel; unfiiped, mdated, ca. December, 1958, MSZ, 10/4@/48. Polish exports to West Berlin were essential to balance the trade deficit that Poland was running with West Germany, which by 1958 amounted to almost BM 100 million. The 1301ish Foreign Ministry argued that West Berlin" dependence on trade with the entire Soviet bloc made political s n s e . 56. Polish Ft>reignMinistry report on the GDR press, unsigned, undated, ca. December, 1%8, MSZ, 1Q/464/ 48. 57. Topics for the discussions with the GDR party and gavernment detegations, unsigned, undated, ca. December 1958, MSZ, 10/464/48. 58. Hegen to Winzer, November 20,1958, SEB ZK, Ottu Grotewohl Papers, NL 90/483. 59. Notes on GBR-Polish economic relatbns, November 30,1958, BDR MfAA, Department of NeigWoring Countries, 6'781 /'73,ZR/Z892/73. 60. GDR Foreign Ministry repart on the political situation in the PZPR leadership, November 38, 1958, DDR MfAA, Department of Neighboring Countries, C781/73,2R/1892/'73. 61. Ncttes on GBR-Polish economic relatbns, November 30,1958, BDR MfAA, Department of Neighboring Countries, C781/73,ZR/4892/"?"3. 62. Erwin Weik Osl-block irztem: 13 1alzl.e Bollr~etsclzerfiirdie pol~zisclzePartei-zlnd Sfaatsfiillrung (Inside the East bloc: Thirteen years as interpreter E c ) ~ the Polish Party-and government leadership) (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe Vertag, 19;70), g. 39. 63, Record of meetings beween the PZPR and SED, December 9-44, 1958, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339/ 13424. 64. Michal Grendys to Jbzef Czesak, October 1,1958, PZPR KC, 237iXXll-824. 65. Record of meetings beween the PZPR and SET), December 9-14,1958, SEU ZK, microfilm FBS 339/ 13424. 66. %id, 6'7. Tbid-.

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68. Ulbricht speech to Warsaw workers, undated, SE&)ZK, Walker Ulbricht 1%pers, NL 182/577. 69. Weit, Ostblock I'nterrz, pp. 353, 42-45, A few days after the meetings, another summit meeting war; supposed to take place in Warsaw on the fortieth anniversary of the fclrmding of the KPE KI-rrushchev was planning to attend, but when Ulbricht said he would not stay in Poland, Khrushchev sent Mikc~jan.Uibricht sent Honecker, 70. Ulbricht toast at a reception thrown by the 132;PR Central Committee, Becember 9,1958, SEL) ZK, Waltes Ufbricht Papers, NL, 182/577. 71. Weit, Ostblaek itzfer~, p. 39, 72. HackeX report on the Polish press reports of the party and government meetings in Warsaw, December 23,1958, SEB ZK, microfilm FBS 339/13424. 73. Polish Embassy report for February 1, 1958 to February 28, 1959, MSZ, 10/3;""2/41, 74. Polish Foreign Ministry report on the GDR press, unsigned, undated, ca. December, 4958, MSZ, 10/464/48. 75, Wiese report on the activities of the GDR Embassy Department of Culture in 1958, undated, ca. February 1959, SEL)ZK, microfilm FBS 339112495, 76. Winzer to Ulbricht, February 22,1959, SEE? ZK, WaXter Ufbricht Papers, NL 18212250. 77. Stropp (GDR Embassy in Warsaw) to the GDR Foreign Ministry, March 2, 1959, DDR MfAA, Warsaw Embass5 A3750. 7%. Ludwik Grr>nctwskinotes of meeting with P-ieymann on July 2, July S, 1959, MSZ, 10/M6/38. 79,bbctdycz to Piotrowski, July 9,4959, MSZ, 10/346/38. 80, Pcschel (GDR Embassy in Warsaw) report, Sptember 12, 1959, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 33911323. 81. hbodycz notes of meethg with Wiese, April 18,1959, MSZ, 10/383/42. 82. I""ic>trc>wski to Lo>bodycz,May 17,1959, MSZ, 10/383/42. 83. k o n Szybek notes of discussians with Heymann on May 19 and May 27, May 29,1959, MSZ, 10/383/42.. 84. tobodzycz to Pic~trowski,May 18,1959, MSZ, 40/383/42. 85. Kopa notes of meeting with Horst Heinrich, February 11, 1959, MSZ, 10/346/38. 86. tudwik Gronowski notes of meeting with Brinkmam and Wnk, April 25, 11i359, MSZ, 10/381/43. 87, Janusz Rachocki notes of meeting with the editors of BZ nlrz Abefid, May 28, 1959, MSZ, 101381143. 88. hbodycz to A. Gwikd2 (Polish Parliament), July 13,1959, MSZ, 10/310/36. 89. See Franz Sjkora, Sozi~lislisclreSolidarifdf und nnt ionale Tnleressen (Sodalist solidarity and naticlnaf interests) (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1977), pp. 152-1 53. 90. Tacleusz Gede notes of meeting with Khrushchev, March 3, 1959, MSZ, 23/58/7. 91, Quoted in Dziewanawski, The Cummunkl Party ;?lfPolnizdtp, 290. 92. SE&)Department of Foreign Affairs report on Mhrushchevk visit to Poland, July 29,1959, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339122495,

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93, Notes on relations bewem the CPSU and the 132;Pl[t,unsiped, undated, ca. July 1959, SED ZK, Btto GrotewohZ Papers, NL 901485. 94. Hegen quoted in Neues DeutscfzEn~zd,July 22, 1959, in a 130fish Foreign Ministry memorandum, July 12% 1959, MSZ, 101382 /43. 95, See K. E Leslie, et al., Tbc Hisru~yof Polu~zdSil?ce 1863 ( C a d r i d g e : Cambridge University Press, 19t3Q),pp,369-3173. 96. See Dziewanowski, The Cotrzrnlinisf Parfy of- Potrarzd, p. 290, Iwaszkiewicz had served as deputy chairman in the early 1950s. 97. Hegen to Kijnig, Oetclber 30, 1959, SED ZK, Walter Ufbricht Papers, NL 18211250.

The GDR as a Model for Polish Socialism, 1959-1961 The [Easlf Germutzs act. as Ihry ulev-e fhre nzastcr people Izere, [ 5 . 5 2 q / lilrilzk and cut thrirfilf ancl cost llte I%fish si-calf loo nluclf. . . . T/~.rosc East Ger~nu~zs z~fI.to spt?nda year irt fxola~zdatzd still cmz't spe~zkIILllislt art? I Z U ~ ~ O : U a ~Yl Idslzould I ~ / ~ Sbe ~ Sslrot. -i"totisherrgirtrrer on the East Geman workers at a Qotishfact.clry in! 75rrdzal

By the end of the 1 9 5 0 relations ~~ had rebwnded from their nadir in 1956, Political, ideologicai, and trade disputes wem less cmtentious now. Afier a two-year postponement, the Third PZPR Congress cmvezzed h March 1954).There, Gomuika put a brake m the mforms of the past three years when he explained that the Polish October had notJling to do w i t revolution, hut rather with "renewal""and "changing ou,r mcrlhods of work."2 Gomulka" harder line seemed to vhdicate the SED" consistent rejection of liberaiization. East German officials ~ p e a t e d l yheld up the 5EDfs h e s t i c and foreig~npoljcics as a template for the PZPfZ, The tone of their critiques were often patronj.zing and seIf-satisfied, and whenever the PZPW adopted a policy that the SED had been advocating, the East Germms toak credit for it. The East German Embassy" report on the Fourth Plenary Session of the PZPR Central Clomittee hearly f"ebmary 1960 was complementary of the PZPR for reaffirming its commiirzlelrt to the Soviet bloc parties. The embassy was emouraged by the party" desire to expand all types of exchanges with the C;UR. Nonetheless, the embassy identified glaring wealcnesses in the new progran?, including the absence of a definite plan to mobilize the masses for socialism. The embassy criticized the PZPR for exaggerating the role of the inteuigentsia in building socialism rather than stressing the Marxist education of the working elass, Fwthcrmore, the embassy found that the PZPR still allowed too many Western influ-

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ences to creep into the country fur instance, the U.S. puhlic and private funds for U.S. films, books, magazines, and newspapers, Mlhich, according to the East Germans, led to "holcs in the ideolngical fmnt,"%I?\fr the Fifth Plmary Session in June, East German diplomats again faulted the PZPR for failing to hspire the Polish working class to work harder for socialism .4 The SEU hounded the PZPR to adnpt its supposedly superior political and economic stmcbre. The East German communists encouraged the PZPR to adopt stronger measurc3s against the Catholic Church and to reassert party control over agricultum, a l t h u g h the SED's own coficctivizatiltn program was stilt fraught with problems. The party claimed to be cmmitted to a voluntary prograln of socia,list agricu:Iturelhut most East German farmers had been forced to join a collective. By the end of the decade, few private farms were left in the GDR." The SED had long bem criticd of Gomukka's indiffe~rzccto socialist agricultural development. Ulbricht thought there was no socialism without: the cdlectivization of agriculture. In early 3958, Hiegen concluded that the PZPR had ""renotmced in part its leadkg role" in setting agricultural policy6 The Soviets were also troubled by the djsmantling of Polish collectives; of the approxirnatdy 30,Olft)collectives inPoland before October 1956, only 1,800 remained by 1959.7 At first, the SEn was optimistic that the lliew Polish Agriculhrali Minister in 1959, fomer party chief E d w d Ochab, would speed up =-colkctivizatim; but durj,ng a visit to an agricultufal exhibition in I:,eipzig in June-July W a b defended the PZPKs past agriculturd policies. He said. that the Poles did not want to make the same disastrous mistakes with collectivisation that Stalin had made-to force the peasants into coUectives. H e poixlttd out that Poland was a much poorer collntry the GDR, m d that because Poland had suffered greater war damages it had to build its illduskialbase first &hab elnded with a scathing criticism of the East Germansydse propaganda asserting that West German private faming was a failure; he said &at in reality West Germm agriculture was a gmat success, and that West German visitors to l.hc f,eipzig exhibition would be offended by such blatant distortions of the truth."@ East Geman Errrbassy in Warsaw ccmcluded simply that "there is a lack of a Marxist-Lenhist assessment of the sit-uation in the [Polish] com~tryside.~'g Tn any case, Polish. iarmers werc not receptive to the East Germansqectures on socialist agriculbral policy. One Polish famer t d d an East German dekgation that the GDR, whjch was under Soviet occupation, had no choice but to co2lectivize.l" Poles often told the East Germms that eliminating private farming in Poland was impossible becaux the in&pcndent-thinking h l i s h farmer was simply not suited to c o l l ~ t h i z e d agricuZture,l~At m agricultural exhibition in the East German town of

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Markklezeburg in 1960, Polish officials said that they would wait lfor Polish farmers to form collectives voluntariiy. The Poles even praised grivate farmers for producing agricdtural goods that wen. of superior quality and salable hthe West.1" Some East German dicials thought that if Polish officials could see for themselves the smooth-running collective farms in the GDR, they would change their agricuhral policies, With that goal in mirtd, Florin ahised Ulbricht to i n c ~ a s region& e cooperation between the 5ED district offiictls in the f m r along the ader-Neisse border and theit: PZPR cot~~~tecyarts German areas.lTThe SED" Department of Propaganda also urged U1Zlricht to allow more exchmges, especidy to i n c ~ a s ethe Polesf awareness of the dangers of West German rniljtarisrn and revmchism. hs usual, Ulbricht shelved these rcquests.14 When the Comecon countries met in February 1960 to discuss the mounting agriculturd crisis in thc m i r e Soviet blnc, Ulhrieht reeornmended more collectivization."' The PZPR made no move in that direction, however; it caiculated that its cclmpmmises ta private farming and private land ownership would prevent the Catholic Church k m opelnly opposixrg the r4gime.lVrybbuna Lrrdu made no mention of the collectives in its reporting on the Sixth Plenary Sessilm of the PZPR in September 1,960.17 The SED conthued to criticize the PZPR for accepting U.S. aid fur private farn?ing and agricultural research, although that aid was relatively smaXI"l8In January 1,961, Winzer told Ulbricht that a necv $20 million investment credit from the United States was a means lfor the Americans to steer Poiish agriculturt. away from ccrllectjvization,and wlruld make Polish agriculture dependent on the West.'" The SEB argued that the dominant positim of the Catholic Church in rural Pctlmd was yet another =ason to collectivize. The SEU was samewfin.t. encouraged by the PZX"Rrscrackdown on the Catholic Church in 1960; religious instruction was banned horn middle schools, bushess schools, and trade schcrols, athough about:half of the elementary schools still had it.20 But several religious demozzstrations agaiinst the PZPR that year revealed the party still had a serious church problem. h April, an estimated 25,OW to 3(1,(1011 people from Nowa Huta demonstrated against the PZPR for buildhg a school an the site where the party had promised to build a church, Eighteen police oficers were hurt when the protest turned wiolent-some seriously.2' At the end of May, 2,500 peopk in Zielona G6ra massed to protest the slate's confiscatim of a church building for the local symphony. &er 3630 people were arrested m d I56 police we= in~ured.According to East German sources, the demonstrators were h a r d yelfing, "Kill the comanunists, kill the Jews, cut the potice to pieces. . . . You are like the fascists, you arc just like the Gestapo, you are

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just like the Cheka," The bead of the SED district office in Frankfurt/Oder, Edvard Giitzl, concluded that the demonstrations were symptomatic of the PZf+R's lack of control over the CathoEc Church, especially in the rural areas. He promised that his office would "exert with all cirtumspection our political influence on the [Polish] comrades, in order to help them to follow a correct Marxist-Le~~hist poli~y.~'Zz Ongoing Probf ems in Cult-ural:Affairs :Insome ways, the slight thaw in relations betwem the PZPR and the SED in 1959 made it mcrre diEficult for thr Polish communists to swing Polish opinion around to support the German socialist state, As average Poles became more disgruntled with their government, they had even less interest in the officiai, contrived eflforts tcr bring East Germans and Poles to@&ereThe SED rclpeatedly cSaimed that it had the suppo" of the East German people, but the SED's close surveillance over them belied this claim. The East Germans expected the I-'o;lish authorities, who governed m even more recalcitrmt populace, to silence political dissent. At a meeting in Berlin inJune 1959, the p ~ s attach6s s from the East Eurrrpem embassies all complained about the lack of cooperation from the East German Foreig~~ Mhistsy's Press Department. 'They agreed that it was virtually kpossible to persuade the East Germans to prlnt anything about: their comries, except n e w of official events. Polish diplcrmats said Chat the behavior of sorne East: German press officials lackcd ""basic decenc)rU'"WePoles had complained for several years about the GDR's mmthusiastic commemcrraticm of E-fitlerfsattack on Poland on September 1, 1,939. 011the twentielh anniversary of the attack in 1959, Polish diplomats again critirized the East German press for its limited coverage, and reported that the East Germans were reluctant to attend the cemmonies. Polish djflo~natf,udwik Gronowski concluded that "knowledge of Polish issues in the GDR is very limited," and that the SED was not doing much about it.24 Over ten years of communist propaganda extolling Polish-East German friendship had iailcd to change peopleskegative stereotypes, Many culh;lral and economic exchanges still flared into unpleasant confrontations. That fall, the head engisleer of a Polish factory in Turiiw castigated the East Germans working there for their arrogant and chauvinistic attitudes: "The G e r m s act as if they were the master people here, [they] drink m d eat their fill and cost the Polish state taa much. . . . Those East Germans who spend a year in Poland and still can" speak Polish are nationalists m d should be shot." One Polish locksmith complained that whe~~ever he was on a bus full of these East Germm workers, "the German pigs sit and the Pales have to stand." The East Gemans also over-

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h e a d the Poles sayjng that the German workess were taking away their bread. One East German engineer at the plant concluded that working wif-;hthe Poles was brhghng no positive results.25 The SED's files were also rife with reports of polit'tcally dmaging exchange" for instance, in 1959, the SEU sent a protest note to the PZPR about the questionable behavior of Professor Knebel fsoan the PZPR party school in M r s m , who was visiting Weimar University, k e b e l had allegedly criticized the SEDfs economic and social policies, and suggested that the SEDs agricz~lturalpolicies were making farmers so UIIhappy that they were leaving in droves for the FRG, h e b e l also reproached the SED for its ""narrow-minded'"outh policies and for granting privileges to party functionaries. 'The report concluded that b e b e l simply did not understand ""lhe use of Leninism and the experiences of the Cf"5X.J in the GDRSffZb In f;91;0,the SED district office in Qra hosted a group of Polish offidals whom the East Germans found completely Iackillg in socialllst sensibilier, the Poles asked why Soviet nags had to be phced on the table between the Polish and the East German colors. The Poles doubted the sincerity of the East Germans-references to the Russians as their "fririends"";afiter all, the Russians had defeated the Germans in the war, and had treated them harshly ever since. The East Germans were also shocked when the Poles tried to deal for East German currency to buy East German cameras and other goods. n e s e were. harmless business trmsadians to the Poles, but to the East Germans, such corrupt capitalist practices subverted t:he sodalist state and the socialist economy, not to mention socialist minds.zr In lighl. of these m d other si,milar incidants, Chc SED wndd not loosen its tight controls on Polish tourists. The SED denied permission for delegaticms or individuais visiting the GDR to go to W s t B e r h or West Germany m d it became nearly impossible for Poles travelhg to West Berlin or West Germany to obtain a transit visa through the GDR.2Qe PoliSh Foreip Millistry still ~ c e i v e dnlrrnerclus complaints from Poles about the thorough searches and unlawful conliscatim of their property by East German border guard.s.29 For several years, the East Germans had etisparaged the Poles for thefr great interest in cultivating contacts with Western capitalists. Far that reason alone, the top SEC) leaders remained opposed to easillg mstrictions cm personal comectims between Polish and East German citizens. 01 the 57,fK10 visitors to Poland in 1959,42,000c m e fmm capitalist countries; 21,500 Poles visited other countries, 19,000 of them to the Soviet bloc countrirs and 2,5110 to capitalist countries. The majority of Polish tourists went to the Soviet Union, in part because that was all they could afford, The East Germans criticized the Polish gave

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2,500 more Poles to visit Western countries in 1960, most of them to fiance, Denmark, Greece, m d to Italy for the C)lympic Games in Rome. 'The tourist traffic between P d m d and East Gcrmany in I959 was relatively light, but as usual, the Polish government allowed many more Poles to travel to the GDR than the GDR allowed Germans to visit Poland; in 1959,144 East Germans visited Poland, but 2,700 Poles welzt to the GDR, The majority of a13 of the visits were to the Leipzig and Poznal Eaete Fairs." East German authorities also kept a watchful eye m the sharp increase in Polish tourists to Yugodavia and the United States.31 Whzer informed Ulbsicht that the Rockefeller Foundation and the Ford Foundation were funding 650 Poles to study in the Wst, and he warned of t%re "negative ideological effects" of the study-abroad program.32 In May 1960, the East German Foreign Ministry m c e again recommeneied an increase in cooperative efforts with Poland to help familiarize the Polish people with the GDR.3Wlbriclht was still hesitme being particularly concerned abwt the state of Polish art and literature, According to the Polish diplomats in Berlin, ~ l a t i o n between s the East Gwman and Polish Writ.ersf Congresses were still "'stiff: and cool. . . . In the a e a of art the Gcrman comrades have grave reservations about our contemporary creations. The conduct of the Polish Writmsf Congsess in Wrodr-twthat May W= so unsettling to the East Geman leadership that Alfred Kurella, the head. of ithe SEPs Commission for Culbral Affairs, asked two East German writers, San K ~ p l ~ w iand t z Alfred khulz, for a full acczomzt of the proceedings." K~oplowitzand Schulz were dissatisfied with the PZPR"s lack of orgmization and oversight of the congress. They found it inexplicable that the Poles virtually iglzored socialist realisln as the foundation of Marxist writing. They reported that Polish writers lacked ideological consistency and, which was worse, rejected all censorship.36 In his speech to the congress, Koplowitz said that West German writers had told him they were "in ideological coexistence" with Polish writers, The chairman of Potish Writers' Congress, Jarosiaw Iwaszkiewicz, stood up in protest and said, "I'm not taking part in this any more.""J Koplowitz and Iwaszkiewicz later argued bitterly over the latter's suggestion that East German literaue was in decline, in part because of its mechanical adherence to socialist realis~x-38 The head of the PZPR district oKice in 1Nroda~i;Roman Werfel, accused Koplowitz cJf bringing unnecessary confusion into the congress. He defended the PZPIZ's policies because Poland was in a "qecial siluation." Koplowitz countered that the GDR was in an even more precarious position with W s t Gemany on its western border. Wrkl agreed that the GDR had, in fiis words, its "rabid wolf AdenauereffMen Koplowitz repEied that Poland faced the same danger from West Germany, Werfel's

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response stmned him: ""Xhae enough to do to prove to the people here that Walter Ulbricht is not the rabid wolf,"39 Koplowitz and Schdz concluded that the Polish wrikrs wercz not interested in East German literature, but were "well hformed" about West German puhtications. One writer told them that she was learning German to read the West German mgazine Spiegel, and another said that: his good and bad experiences with Germans durbg the war now enabled. him to distinguish between West a d East Germans in the same way-m d he liked the West Germms more.@ The two East G e m n writers Observed that their Polish counterparts were proud of promothg the Polish road to socialism, which afforded them greater freedom than writers in the GDR. The Poles criticized the East Germans for their strict dogmatism and bIhd loydty to the Soviet W o n . Koplowitz reported that "the Polish colleagues reproached us because we simplify everything in the GDR too much and do not come to grips with the various intellectual currents that exist in the world." Egon Nagmowski, one of Poland's most noted literary critics, admonished Koplowjtz and Schulz for the SED's crude propaganda, for instance, the unfounded claim that East German 'farmers had gone into collectives voluntarily: ""You don't believe that yourselves; we h o w , of course, how one effwts such a thing [collectivizationJ, we experienced that already and thank God [we] liquidated [them] agaixr. Furthermore, we read every day in thr West German press how many thousand farmers leave [the GDR], m d that really says everything.'"I When the East Germm delegation asked to check with. their superiors in East & r h before siping a friendship agreement, the Poles speculated that the East German Writers' Congscss was ul-rwilling to put itself on record as recognizing the Oder-Neisse border. Allhough there was truth to this accusalion, the East Germans could not or would not acknowledge it. In typicalfy condcsce~ndingfashion, Kclplowitz and %h& urged Ihe SED to provide ""fraternal help" for the few true Marxist Polish writersea East German officials tried to give Polish fil akers a d actors "fraternal help" as well. 'That summer, East German artist Wrsula Mafsanke denounced a ""bourgeois" Polish, cinema and theater exhibition that was touring East Germany She said that both the form and t.he content of the Polish works wcre influenced by "Weskm decadent dranta," She singled out one Polish film-Rucl Men with the TTunkJ"P"om the Sm-for not sending a political message. Rather than extoHing the bright socialist f u w e of the world, the film depicted man's alienation, which to the East German communists was a decadent bourgeois concept, Hafranke wrote, ''At the end of Zhe fiim the two disappointed men pulled their tmnk back with them into the sea from Wt7ith they c m e (into a better world? Or where to?)." Because some East German artists had reacted positively to the

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fih,she worried about the political ixnpact of such exhibitions. Hafrmke catled for more vigilance in screening the cc,ntent of foreign performances in the GDR "hprimipk I do not t-hink that it is right for a representative of a friendly socialist state to travel aromd our country and to exhibit culturai maxiins that are compfetely inimiral to ours.""? Al*ough Hafmnke's report was sharply critical of the exlnibition, Kttrella characterized it as '"obviously somewhat softened up."44

Defending the Qder-Neisse Border The inability of the SEU and the PZE'R to resolve their ideological differences, or to bring their two peoples together in genuiz~ecultural exchangest represented a serious problem for the Warsaw Pact's cohesiveness on its strategic western fmnt. Given the failure of culkxral programs to engender real friendshjps, the reliability of the East C;erm,an and Polish soldier to the common defense of the two countries was questionable. Polish diplomat Stallism b p a reported that many East German soldiers were opposed to a peace treaty that maintahed the present borders of Germany, especially without input from the German people. In June 1459, East German army ofker Fritz Surkau p~senteclPolish djpornat Janusz Rachocki hvilh a long l s t of critidsms of the PZf+R's fore i p and domestic policies, notably the party" ddir;trust of the working classes and feeble efforts to purge ~actionaries.Surkau said that the SEU and the other Soviet bloc parties had their doubts about the future of socia.2ism in Polmd. under the present PZPR feadershiy. Surkau alleged that the Polish army was pemeated with nationalist and anti-Soviet s m timent, and that the party was doing little to combat it.46 The tmth m n i v e r s a ~of the 1950 Zgorzelec agreement on the W r Neisse border was an oppcntunity to t r m p e t the solidarity of the two peoples, but differences immediately surfaced over the site of the celebration, bpacki proposed a summit and a large demunstration at Zgorzelec ir7 support of the C)&-Neisse border, hut the East Germans told the Poles that they wanted to avoid giving the West the impression that Poland md. the GDR needed to reconfirm their recognition of the border. :111 ~ a l i t y the , East Geman communists wmted no part of a big pubfic shmv of support for a border that was stlill unpopular among the East German people. Furthermore, the SEE? w;xnted to keep celebrations under tight cmtrol. Bolz sugge"ed to Ulbricht that they make an irnmediate cou~~terproposal to preeJude small changes in the original Polish plan; he recommended a smalXcr ceremony in Magdeburg that would be devoted tc, condeming West German rr.vanchism. The East Germans saw symbolic importance i,n holding the commcmor&ion on the Elbe and not on the Oder; they wanted tacit Polish agreement that an attack on the GDKs western border would be considered m attack on Po1md.U Polish

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Ambassador Piotrowski reluctantly agreed. to the Magdeburg demonstration, and said that Cyrankit?wiczwould spe& at the event.48 As usual, the East Germans were m c h more effusive h their praise of the cerc3mon)i as a symbol of cooperation between the two peoples. Neues Dezlfsctzland hailed the event with the headline ""Souuler to Shoulder on the Peace Watch on the Elbe.'"Wrote\vohl declared that "this dernonstration confirms once again that the GDR and PRP are true friends and will dways =main true friends.""Cyrankiewicz criticized. Germm militarism and. imperiahm in general term, but mu& to the &sappointment of the East Germans, did not attack Adenauer or other West German leaders.'Wmetheless, the East German Foreign Ministry was generall,y satisfied with Pnland's propaganda cmpaign, whjch they again credited to East Germany" persistent lobbyjng efforts.s1 The SED and Gomulka's Policy Toward the West Gomdka's retreat from the =form program of October 19% gradually put Pdand's relations wiCh the Soviet bloc back on sotid ground. The Polish Embassy in Berlin speculated that the PZPR" Thirteenth Party Congress in March 1959 and Khrushchev% visit to Warsaw in July were restoring the confidence of the CPSU' and Che SET) in the PZI'Z:R.5zBut Gornu-l-ka%invitation of U.S. Vice President Richard Nixon to visit Poland in early Augu" again aierted the SED to the dangers of a rapprochement \zrith Poland."%e East German Embcrlssy specukted that- by inviting Nixm, Gomulka was trying to enhance Poland's pre&ige in the West and expand trade with the United States. By now t-he East Ceman diplomats were more confident that U.S. schemes to lure Poland away from the Warsaw Pact would fail;'4 but they concluded that the PZPR was practicing "a. ccclrtain form of bourgeois secret diplomacy," which included improving relations with neutral countries, Yugoslavia, and Western social democratic parties. The embassy intevreted Mixon" visit as consistent with a policy that had its roots in the "m-Marxist [PZPIt,]platform of 1956-1957." The East: Germans also speculated Bat the Uni,ted States was using Yugasl.avia to woo Poland away from the Soviet bfoc," While Mixon was in Polartd, the SED dil.ected its press al;ency to Xawnclh a propagmda campaig~nagainst U.S. foreign policy. 'The East Germans denounced Washington" anti-communism, coercive trade and financid policy, use of spie~againstPolmd and the other socialist states, and deployntcrnt of nuclear weapons in West Germany." Ulbricht approved of this measure, and recommended, startilrg a new attack camp a i p against t-he FRG to expose t-he ""sbvversive actiwity of West German rclvan&ists from West Berlin aga,inst the Peoples' Republic of Pojmd."57 Poles on the street gave Nixm an enthusiastic wekome. Arcustomed to c h o r e o r all publir demonsh.atis,ns, East German ofificialscharged

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foreign agents and Pdish dissident g m g s with inciting the crowds.58 The East German diplcrmats in Warsaw warned of anti-socialist and rc-tvisionist forces ill Poland. They &ought &at the PZPR still, had a Inmg way to go to '"establish the moral-politkal uni.ty oi the Polish p e q k . " They concluded that Nixm's visit would encourage the Llnited States to renew its efforts to mdermine Palmdfscomectio~~s to &e Warsaw T3act."" The SEDs cool reactjon to Mixon's visit prompted the Polish Embassy in Berlin to file this report: It seemed as if the GDR leadership had problems with this evmt [Nixon's visit]. [They] tzrithheld infc~rmation about the meetings and official talks with Nixon until the moment came when the Polish Xeaders drew Nixon's attentiron to the dangers coming from the remiltitarizatian of West Germany. From this example it can be seen that our policy toward the West has still not found complete understanding in the SED,"J

The Poles were uneierstating the extent of East Berlin" displeasure with Warsaw's p&cy toward tlne West; Chc SEE3 was cminced that Polish officials were ignorant of the dangerous political, game that West Germany and its allies wew playing. Ulbricht did not doubt that Comulka would sell nut t-he GDR should the opportwl~itypresent itself. mese fears we= conlirmed again that fall when the. Polish government considered accepting a West German pmposal for a ncrnaggmssiftn pact. The West Germans had rebu,ffeda similar East G e r m proposal, and East Berlin was fimly opposed to Born" attempt to differentiate beheen East Germany and its Warsaw Pact partnen;. Gomulka eventually rejected the p r o p o d on the grounds that Bonn would not recognize the Ode~Neisse border, but the whole affair umewed the East Germans.61 By this time, Gomulka recopized that his attempt to balmce political and economic rclatians between Ihe capitaljst and socialist corntries had left Poland dangerously isolated; East German Foreign Ministry oflicials were pleased when he began to strengthen Polartd" ties to the Soviet bloc countries in 1960.62 1x1January, Hegen told Naszkows& that his government had taken note of Gomutkds recent declarations condemning the hfluence of fascism, militarism, and revanchism in W s t Germany, and his emphasis on the progressive role of the GDR inthe German question. The East Gcmans agah took some credit for this shift inthe PZPR"s poky, even though it had more to do with the limited success of Warsaw's overtures toward Bonn.bVhe East German Embassy in Warsaw also reported that the Polish Foreign Minjstry was slowly overcoming reservations about confiding in East German diplomats.M There were still mresoived issues that stood in the w y of a closer coordination of their foreign policies, however. Several minor incidents confirmed East German suspicions that Gomugka had not ended his dal-

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liance with the VVest.65 The East Germans cited one case in which the Dutch gwemment asked the Polish Embassy in the Netherlands to stop issu,ing visas on behalf of the GDR, because France and Great Britain had lodged protests. Rather than offend these mstern countries, the Pales complied. Naszkowski told Hegen fiat an '"pen connict with the &tch wouXd not be in our interest nor in the interest of the GDRefTrenchPresident Charles de Gaulle" support of the Oder-Neisse border was one mom =ason for the Poles not to press the issue.& Rapacki addressed the German problem in an article in the Jmuary 1960 issue of Nozue D q i , but the East German Embassy criticized him fm overlooking the role oE the GDR and the danger West Germany posed to the Warsaw Pact." A m m h l&er, Rapacki declared that ""l"1and stands in the center of the present system of intmatimal relations and actively influences it."' The East German Embassy viewed this as a typical ex%gesation of Poland's importance in European affairs, and accused the Poles of failing to consult with the Soviet tlnion on important diplomatic initiatives. The embassy also faulted Gomulka for not supportiilg East German proposals to bolster the defense of the GDR," The GDR Foreign Ministry m e w e d its efforts to convince the Gomutka rggime of East Germany"~key political a d economic role in the socialist camp, anci even the Gll)Rfspmt in helping to develop socialism in Poland.@The ministry was still unsure about the long-term political stability of the Gomulka rkgke.7" Rapaclti. and Bolz met in Berliln at the end of May. Bolz re~nhdedRapacki that the SED and the GDR, not the West German SPD, wwld guarantee peace in Germany, and &at the devebpmnt of the East German economy was the best way to inhence the working class in West Germany to support sod.alism.71 Accodhg to Bollz's account of the meting, they agreed. to work harder to combat Mlirst Geman mmili.tarizatim m d rclvanchism,, and to coordinate their foreign pdicies toward the Asian and African countries. Rapacki also promised to skengthen Polandts representation of the GDR in intemafional organizations and in kmdinavia." The East Germans were noticeably pleased with the results of this meeting: The Poles, it appeared, were at last recognizing the GDR as the only legitimate Geman state. At the Poznari Trade Fair in fune, for instance, the Polish authorities confiscated West German literature that used the term East Zone for the GDR., and maps that did not show the Oder-Neisse border. Zn contrast to previous years, the Pofes also limited the number of West Germans allowed to travel outside of Poz11afi.7" The Polish government remained opposed to compromises of their important politic& or eccmomic interests in W s t Germany and West erlin, howevw. 1x1its refits& to make direct attacks on the We& Geman g o v m ment, the Polish Foreign Ministry instructed its diplomats around the the gemral danger of ""revanchist elernentsf?in wlrrld to s t ~ s instead s

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West Germany.%The East German Foreign Ministry had. repeatedly asked the Poles not to send reprtrsmtatives to intematicmal confe~ncesin W s t Berlin, but when the Poles did not comply, Bolz raised the issue during meetings with Polish Foreign Ministry oiiicials in August 1960. Once to rc.prc.sent East G e m m political again, the Pales =fused. They a g ~ e d and econontic interests in the Third World., but. d y i f it did, not jeopardize Poland" relations with these countries. Satisfied with the outcome of the conference, Botz declared that "our i n t a s t s are the same." Rapacki's account of the meetings was not so optimistic, but he achowledged that they had contributed. to the better coordjnatim of foreign policy.75 I'he Mlarsw Pact communist parties watched closely as Sino-Swiet relations worsened in 1960. The Gorndka r&gimefeared that this rift, darng with greater East-West tensions after the cancellation of the U,S.-Soviet summit in Paris in May, would pmmpt M:c,scow to clamp down on Poland"~tenuous tics to the West. U'lbrisht, planted fiimsetf firmly behind the CPSU against the Chinese, however, to prove that the GUR was Moscow's most trusted ally. That fall, after the Warsaw Pact meetings in Bucharest and the Skth Plenary Session of the PZPR Central Committee, East German officials wcrrrit.c.1that the PZPR's open discussion of the Sino-Sowiet confrontation would upset the fragile stability that the Polish communists had estixblished in the Iast few months. East German diplomats reported that ""pcvisionist forces" in the PZPR wem taking advantage of the Sino-Soviet split to advance t h i s cause against "dogmatism." 'The ernbassy also criticized the b l i s h pltess for its scant coverage of the Bucharest conference and the Wlrsaw Pact's declarations on disarmament and peaceful coexistencea76 East German diplomats repmarhd the Polish commmists for subordinating the "leadint; mle of the socialist system as a defining element for the course and d i ~ c t i o nof i n t e r n d i d dcve~opment,"and eh,ided the PZPR for nationalist deviations b m Mamist-Lenixrist principles of foreign pcrlicy.77 At a ~ c e p t i o nat the Polish Embassy in Moscw hlate September, an East German djplomat noted that of the guests from Mongolia, North Korea, North Vietnam, the PeoplesX:~epublicof China and Albania, he was the only one to raise a toast to the unity of the socialist carnp under the leadership of the CPSU.78 The East Germans also watched Poland" relations with. Yugoslavia, especially Belgrade" consultations with Warsaw cm Berlin m d Geman unifieation..East German diplosnat Ewald Moldt told tobodycz that: the Yugoslavs djd not fully comprehend the dmger of West Geman maitarism, nor did they realize the seriousness of the Wst: Berlin prcrblem to the GDR Moldt said that it was essentid that Yugoslavia accept East (;erman sovereignty over West Berlin, He pointed out that hgoslavia was prepared to s i p a peace treaty with the GUR only if tbrrc. was nc) possibility

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of an agreement with the FRG on German uni.fication. Moldt suggested that the Poles try to convince the Yugoslavs to =think their policy.7" The Polish government w u l d not cooperate on this front, either"East German officials informed Ulbricht that the Poies w d d not support Soviet and East German diplomacy in Central Europe, m m so ~ g a r d i n g West Germmy. 'The East German Foreign Mk~istsyrepeatedly criticized the Poles for not stressing the kportance?of the GDR h the context of the German ques.ticm, and added that the prcrpagmda the Poles published to this end was insufficient. In December 1960, Moldt reported &at in a recent article on West Germany in Noroe Drogi, Lobodycz had not ment i m d the important work of the KPD in West Germany. Mo1d.t attaclced kobodycz for failhg to emphasize the supposedly posiCive influence on the FRG of East Germany" ['"peacepoiicy." He determined that it was impossible to convince the Polish cclmmunists to coordinate their German policy with the GDR,KO A month later, Winzer informed Ulbricht that the head of the PZPR Press Department, hrtur Starewicz, had advised Pctiish journalists not to repeat Warsaw Pact declarations on "Americm imperialism m d Yugoslavian revisionism." WMrinzer also accused the Polish press of giving the false impression that U.S. policy toward Poland benefited Poles; he viewed U.S. policy as subversive and coercive, but he could not persuade the Poies that good relations with the Uni.ted States was a hindrance, not a help, in building social ism.^^

B s p i k these problems, the SED noted several positive t~11dsin Poland's foreip policy in 1961.. At the Seventh Plenary Session of PZPR Central ittee in January, Gom&a stressed that Poland" rela.tions with the FRG could not: be expanded wit.hout the Menauer government's recopition of the Oder-Neisse border," The East Germm Foreign Mhistry reat h r the first time the P d k h government was takk~g" m open stakable position agahst the miliQrism m d revmchis~xin West 'B8 To the satisfxtion of East-Germm officials, Polish authorities also decided to permit fewer Poles to visit West Germany because they werc being rerruikd as agents there. The PZPR informed Moldt that they would lobby the West Germans harder for a peace?trcaty and recognition of the Oder-Neisse border; however, the Poles hdicated that they would not compromise their economic comeclions to the FRG by putting too much, pressurc on Bonn to resolve these political issues.84 st German industrialist told flyrankiewicz that Later that moat was ready to sign a three-year trade agree~xent the Adenauer gov and another accord on culhral exchanges. He said that Born was also prepared to talk b u t an exchange of trade consdates as a possible bridge to

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diplomatic recognition. Cyrankiewicz stressed that Poland wanted improved econmic and cultural rehtions, hut he stipdated that t-he Adenauer government rec0gnii.e the ader-NQsse border first before his government would taik about diplomatic ties or irtterim trade consulates.85 The Adenauer government refused, however, and in February Cyrankicwicz told East German officials &at his government: would never c o m g m i s e the p ~ s e nborder t for diplomatic relations wi& the FRG.86 In Febmar~!, the SEU issued a =port on Warsaw Pact relations that was unusually complimentary of the PZPR's policy toward West Germany, even acknowledging that :PoXandfstrade with the FRG was not tied to political concessitms. The report found that the PZPR was c u l t i v a t a closer ties to East German go~rernmentand party ofillcials, but that the PZPR still had a long way to go to realize the same close cooperation that the SED had with the C z a especially at the rc.gionalleve1.~ A month later, Gomulka declared that "any attack on the GDR and CzechosIovakia would be an attack on Poland." "c statement came as a surprise to the East Germans. Nloldt called Comu4ka"s recognition oE the importance of the GDR "remarkable.'Woldt also praised Foreign Mhister hpacki for instmcting the Polish press to strcss the role of the GDR in resolving the G e r m w s t i o n . Modt added that tohodjrrcz had counseled the Polish prrzss to c h n g e its nationalistic bias against the GDR.88 Gomul-ka also rejected Adenauer" ooffer of a n m g g ~ s s i o npact on the grounds that Born was trying to isolate the GDR, Gmuika argued that the only benefactor of such a pact would be the FRG: ""That camot happen. The security of the GUR is the security of PoZandeq9 The East German Embassy complimented the E P R for the way it conducted the April electio~~s* The embassy claimed that ""dmocracy" had p ~ v a i l e dh Poland, and that the people had expressed their satisfaction with party m d government policies."Uno~erSED report observed that Western infiuelncc on the elections had been less than in years p a ~ t . Al~l though East German officials were wrong about the PZFR" p~opularity among the Polish people, which was d e c h h g , the Polish communists were slowly rclconivmhg thcis ties to the Warsaw Pact, Warsaw" reaction to a new Berlin crisis in 1961 was indicative of Gomultka%new course. Gomulka had opposed Khrushchevfs first Berlin zlltirnaham in 1958 because of his fears trhat it might lead to war between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. But when the Berlin Wall went up inAugust 1961, Gomulka resigned hilnself to supporting it.

1. Kornisch (chief engineer at VEB M~hXenanXagenLeipzig) to the secretary of the German-Polish Commission, September 23, 1959, SED ZK, Watter Ulbricht Papers, NL 18211250.

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2, Krystyna Mersten, ""155-The Turning 130int,'" in Odd Arne Westad, Svm Holtsmark, and Iver B. Neumann, eds., The Soviet Union irz Enstern Ezlrclpe, 3945-2989 (New b r k : St. Ma&in%Press, 1W4), p. 59. 3. GDR Embassy repc~rt:on the F o u ~ hPlenary of the TfZPR, February 10,1960, SED ZK, microfilm FE5 339143494; see also Hansjakob Stehle, Tke Independent Satellite: Society and I""oliticsin Pt~lnndSince 1945 (London: Pall Mall Press, 1965), p. 209-210. Polish movie houses showed mostly foreign 81ms from the West; in 1960, twenty-nine films from the United States were shown, but only seven made in East Germany. 4. Lugenheirn notes on Fifth Plenary of the 13ZPITCentral Committee, July 30, 1960, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339113491. 5. Hans Rodenberg to Ctlbricht, January 30, 2 960, SED ZM,Walker Ulbricht 1%pers, NL 182/1250; and Crc~an,"Germany and Eastern Eurc~pe,"p. 362. 6. Repart on the situation in Poland, unsiped, January 24,1958, SED ZK, microfilm FiFZS 339113489. 7, Kossmeisl notes of meeting with an unidentified Soviet Fcrreign Ministi-y official, Sqtember 12,1958, SED ZM,Otto Grotewohl Payers, NL 901485. 8. Miickenberger to Ulbrieht, July 15, 4959, SED ZK, Walter Ulbrieht Papers, NL 2 8211250. 9. GDR Embassy report, October, 1959, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339113490. 10. ADM press rep~sentativein Warsaw to the SEB Central Committee, April 26,1960, SED ZK, micrc~filmFBS 339113491 41, Paul Rost repc~rton a visit of Polish tourists to Gera, November 7,4960, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339/ 13492. 42. Fuehs notes on the Polish pavilion at the agricultural exhibitic~nin Markklertburg, J m e 15,Z %Q,SED ZM,microfilm FBS 339112495. 43, Florin to Ulbricht, Ncjvember 11,4959, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339113423. 14. SEC) Department of Agitation and 13ropaganda to Ulbricht, December 23, 1959, SED ZK, Waiter Utbricht Papers, NL 182/1244. 15, Carola Stern, Ulbrictzt: A hlr'tz'cal Bt'ogmyl~y(New York: Frederick Praegeu; 1965), g. 207. 46. Rodenberg tcr Ulbricht, January 30, 1 9 0 , SED ZK, Walter Ulbrieht Papers, NL 182/1250. 47, Lugenheim (GDR Embassy) report an the Sixth Plenary af the PZPR, %ptember 20,1960, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339112495. 48. E. Plachy (Director of the German Academy of Agricultural Science) to MEckenberger, November 9,1959, SED ZK, Walter Ulbrisht Papers, NNt 18211250; see M. K. Dziewanowski, &land irr the 2Otlz Cenlzlry (New Ycfrk: Columbia University 13ress, 2977), p. 288. From 11357 to 1960 Poland received approximately $365 million from the West. 49, Winzer to Ulbricht, January 10, 1961, SED ZK, Walter UZbricht Papers, NL 18211250. 20, PGschel notes of meeting with Lech#September 22,4960, DDR MfAA, Warsaw Embassy, A3725. 21, G ~ t ePGggel r (from Die Arbeit) report on his visit to Poland on April 27-28 April, May 9,1960, SEU ZK, VValter Ulbricht Payers, NL 18211250. 22. Giitzit (FrankfurtlBder district office) to Ulbricht, June 23, 1960, SED ZK, Walter UXbricht 13apers,NNL 2 82/1250. -.

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23. Rachocki notes of a meeting with the press attachks from the s~cialistcountries in Berlin on June 24, June 26, 1959, MSZ, 10/M6138; and Lobodycz to A. Gwiidi (Polish Parliament), Juty 13,1959, MSZ, 10/310/36. 24. tudwik Gronowski memorandum, Spternber 25,1959, MSZ, 10/381/43. 25, K o r n i ~ h(chief engineer at VEB Kohlienanlagen Leipzig) to the secwtary of the German-Polish Commjssion, September 23, 1959, SED ZK, Watter Ulbricht Papers, N L 18211250. 26. SED Central Committee Bepa&ment of Foreip Affairs to the PZPR Central Committee Department of Fowign Affairs, July 8, 1959, SED ZK, micrr~filmFES 339113490, 27. SED district office in Gera to Ulbricht, December 6, 1960, SED ZK, Walter Ulbricht Payers, NL 18212250. 28. Guidet ines for the PZPR-SEDIPRP-GDR delegatioyn exchange, undated, ca. December 1959, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339143423, 29. I""otishForeign Ministitry repc~rt,"UUawfuFul Confixatlions on the Border of the PRP-GDR," undated, MSZ, 10/384/42, 30. Bimert (Embassy attache) notes of meeting with Marczak (Director of the Polish travel agency Orbis), March 4,4960, DDR M f M , Warsatzr Embass~r;A3'?"25, 31. Bienert notes of meetkg with Cerny fCzechosfovakEmbassy) February 12, 1960, DDR MfAA, Warsaw Embass5 A3i725. 32. Winzer to Ulbrisht, January 10, 2 961, SEB ZK, WaXter Ulbricht 13apers,NL 18211250. 33. Propasal for the impmvement of relations with Prjland, May 4,1960, DDR MfAA, Twelfth Foreign Ministry Council Meeting on May 4, tS-A369.. 34. Polish Embassy repart, September 15,1959, MSZ, 101372141. 35, Kuretia (head of the Commission for Cultural Affairs) to Koplowitz, May lli3,1940, SED ZK, Alfred Kurella Office, tV 21 2.026/16. 36. Kirschey (GDR Embassy) report on the flolish WritersTongress, May 11, 1960, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339/ 12495. 37. Ibid. 38. Alfred Schulz and Jan Koplvw-itz report on their visit to the Polish Witers" Congrss in W d a w , undated, ea. May 4960, SET) ZK, Alfred Kurella Office, IV 21 2.02611 6. 39. K i r ~ h e y(GDR Embassy) repart an the Polish WritersT~ongress,May 14, 1960, SEU ZK, FBS 339112495, 40. khulz and Koplowitz repc~rton their visit to the Polish WritersTongress in Wrodaw, undated, ca. May 2960, SED ZK, Alfred Kurella Office, IV 21 2.826126. 41. Ibid. 42. Tbid. 43. Ursula Hafranke repc~rtm an exhibition of Polish film and theater on June 20 in the GDR, June 28,1960, SEU ZK, Alfred Kuretta Office, TV 212.026116. 44. Kurella to Flcxin, August 2, 1960, SET) ZK, Alfred Kurella Office, IV 21 2,026116. 45, Kopa notes of meeting with Ccllanel GrGnberg, April 10, 1959, MSZ, 10/%6/38. 46. Rachscki notes of meeting with Fritz Surkau, June 29, 1959, MSZ, 10/381/43.

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47, Bolz to Ulbricht, June 11, 1960, SE9 E#, WaXter Ulbricht Papers, N L 18211250. 48, Grune& notes of meeting beween Bolz and Piotrwski, J m e 22,1960, SED ZK, Walter UEbricht Papers, NL 18211250. 49. Neues Deufsc/zIa~zd, July 6, 4960, p. 4. 50. Grc>tewohland Cyrankiewicz speeches in Magdeburg on the tenth anniversary of the Ciirlitz agreement, July 7,1960, BRD BKA, IS136/6"i718. 51. Wenk to the GDR Foreign Ministry, September 26,1 %0, UDR MfAA, Warsaw Embassy, A3E4. 52. 1301ishEmbassy report, September 15,1959, MSZ, 10/372/41. 53. Riesner (GDR Embassy in Warsaw) no>tesof meeting with Czyrek (Polish Foreign Ministry), August 8,1959, SED ZK, VValter Ulbricht Papers, NL 18211250. 54. Kiinig to Grotewohl, August '7,1959, SED ZK, Otto Grotewohl Papers, NIJ so14ss. 55. GDR Embassy report, August 14,1959, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339113425. 56. Gunter Kohrt (Department of Foreign Affairs) to Ulbricht, July 27, 1959, SE&)ZK, Witlter Ulbricht Papers, NL 182/1250. 57, Ufbricht to Kohrt, July 28, 4959, SED ZK, Walter Ufbricht Papers, NL 18211250, 58. Kt5njg to GrotewohX, August 4,1959, SED ZK, Otto Grotewohl Papers, NIJ r60/485. 59. GDR Embassy in Warsaw report, August 14, 1959, SEU ZK, microfilm FBS 339143425. 60. Polish Embassy repc~rt,September 15,1959, MSZ, 10/372/41. 61. Czyrek to Winiewicz, August 10,195"3 MSZ, 10/383/42, 62, Foreign Ministry proposal for the improvement of relations with 1301and, May 4, 1960, DDR MfAA, Twelfth Foreip Ministry Council Meeting af May 4, LSA3653. 63. Naszkow-ski notes of meeting with Hegen, January 25,1960, MSZr 123151317; Moldt to the GDR Foreign Ministry, January 26,1960, DDIX MfAA, Warsaw Embassy A3751; see also Chn"stoph Rc>yen,""Oriteuropaische Staaten" @mt European states), in Hans Adolf Jacobwn, Gerd Leptin, Ulrich Scheuner, and Eberhard %huXz, eds., Drei Jn!~rzctlnteAlrssenpc?ll'Cik dcr DDR, 599-639 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg TJerlag, 1979), p. 607. 64. SC3yfert notes of meetings with the Polish Foreign Ministry Bepa&ment of International Organizations, August 24, l"tfC;O,SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339/43404. 65. Brunts Baum to Florin, February 2, 1960, SED EM, VValter Ulbricht Papers, NL 182/1250. 66. Naszkowski notes of meeting with f-legen, January 25,1960, MSZ, 23/58/7, 67. Moldt to the GDR Foreign M i n i s t ~February , 2,1960, UDR MfAA, Warsaw Embassy, AA3751. 68. Moldt report on Pot ish Parliamentary meetings of Februa~y16-1 7,February 23,1li3(;0, SED ZK, micrr~filmFES 339112495, 69, Fareign Ministry proposal for the improvement of relations with 1301and, May 4, 1960, DDR MfAA, Twelfth Foreip Ministry Council Meeting af May 4, LSA3653. 7'0, Prc>tocoXof the Tw-effth Fcyreign Ministry Council Meeting on May 4, May 5, 1960, DBR MfAA, Twelfth C s m c i l Meeting of May 4, LSA369.

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The GDR as a Modelfir PoEis!z Suci~lkrn

71. Rapacki notes of metings with Bolz on May 31-Jme 1, June 15,1960, MSZ, 23/58/7. 72. Bolz notes of meetings with Rapacki from May 31-June 1, 1960, SED ZK, Walter UIbricht Papers, NL 182/1250. 73.Krahn to the SEB, June 21, 1960, SEB ZK, Walker Ulbricht Papers, NL 18211250. 74. Weise notes of meeting with Eobod ycz, June 15,lli3(;CI,DDR M f M , Warsaw Embassy; A3725, E,Stenographic record of the meetings between the Polish and East German 1960, BDR MfAA, Minister's OfForeign Ministries in Berlin from August 4-43, fice, A17670. 76, Hegen to Fischer QSEB Department of Foreip Affairs), November 25,1960, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339113423, 777.GDR Embassy report an the Sixth Plenary of the PZPR on Sptember 43-14, 1960, Octt~ber3,1960, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339112495. 7%. Professor Abraham notes of a reception at the Polish Embassy in Mcwco~r, Spternber 28,1960, SED ZK, Walteu"Ulbricht Papers, NL 28211250. 79.Lobadycz notes of meeting with MoLdt, Ncrvember 25, 1960, MSZ, 23/167/14. 80. Moldt to Seyfert, December 20,1960, DDR MfAA, Warsaw- Embassy A375l. 81. Winzer to Ulbricht, January 10, 1961, SEB ZK, Walter Ulbricht 13agers,NL 18214250. 82. Report af the Session of iMain Cormcil of the Society for the Development of the Western Territc~rieson February 19, 1961, PZPR KC, group Izydorczyk, 473117; and Baum (SED district office in Potsdam) tcr Florin, February 7, 1961, SET) ZK, Walter Ulbricht Papers, NL 18211250. In February, Baum told Cyrankiewicz that after the disputes at the Moscow Conference in 1960, Gornujka had unequivocally taken the Soviet side in the Sinu-Soviet dispute. 83. Annual GDR Embassy report E C I ~ 1960 (by Bechner) t c ~the GDR Foreign Ministry Poland Sction, February 14,1961, DBR M f M , 1301andSectiron, A1780. 84. Msldt notes of meeting with Szewczyk (PZPR Department of Foreign Affairs),January 6,1364, DDR MfAA, Warsatzr Embassy, A3754. 85. Hegen to Kiinlg on a meeting beween Beitz (Krupp Steel Company) and Cyrankiewicz, January 24,1964, SET)ZK, Walter Ulbricht Papers, NL 18211250. 86. Baum to Florin, February 7, 1961, SET2 ZK, WaXter Ulbricht Papers, NL 18214250. 87, Repod on relatbns with the communist and worket-s>partks in the socialist countries, February 17, 1961, SET) ZK, Department of Foreign Affairs, TV 2120131. 88. Moldt to K6nig, March 21, 1961, SED ZK, Walter Ufbricht Papers, NL, 18211250, 89. Quoted in Pest-er Raina, GovrfziItK-n:Pofif~ S C ~ Bi"ngmphie EP (GomuXka: Pot itlcal biography) (Cc?ilogne:'Werlag Wissemchaft und Pcjlitik, 19701, p. 130. 90. tittke memarandurn on the Pr,lish elections of April 1961, April 28, 1961, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 334143424, 92. SED Department of Foreign Affairs information on the Polish 13arfiamentary and National Council elections, June 6, 1962, SED ZM, mierof fm FBS 339/1M91,

The Berlin Wall and the D6tente in Polish-East German Relations, 1961--1962 "To LIS fj~rreis 110 Ldolll~tfJmf great ctlarzges ts~zazyebeeri nzade in the J3eopie's Xe;puiillic of I""oln~zd,fhnf lize Poland of 3 962 d@ers)l~tdalne~tally fr01z1 f h &land ~ c?f 1955. -SED ~epovton Pulna4 December 7962'

Unlike the Berlin ultimatum of 1958, which was mrushchevfs answer to U.S. plans to nuclearize West Germany, UIbricht was Chc driving force behind the new Besllh crisis h 1961. The thousands of East Germms who left the GDR thrrrul;h the open city left behind a depleted lnbcrr force and a cou~~try deprived nl 2s best minds. i\rpproximtely onc-six* of the Soviet zone's popralation had fled to the W s t since 1945; 144,000 left in 1959, and another ZOU,OfZ0 in 1960. About 1,0W a day were leaving in the sulnmer of 1961." Prosperous West Berlin undermined. East German propaganda promoting socialism as Germany's futurt?. East German citizens could go to West Berlin and see the fruits of capitalism, which we= obvjously more bountiful than any.thing the GDR had to offer. It was most embarrassing to the SED that many East Berliners p ~ f e r r e dto work in W s t k r l i n for better wages. The SEIDfsclaims that East Germany equalled and even surpassed W s t Germany" standard of living could not stand th comparison, by East Germany's economic imUlbricht's position was stre~~gtheszed portance to the Soviet Unim and the NVKs integration into the military structure of the Warsaw Pact. After relations with Beijinlj broke down in 1960, mrushchev was determhed to stay on good terms with the satellites in Eastern Europe, more so with the GDR. In January 1961, East

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Berlin tested the limits of its diplomatic freedom by issuing a unilateral warning to the Wstern Allies to stop tbrir aggressive actions in Bedin. Surprised by the move, mrushche~? told Ulbricht not to do it again," With his economy ;in trouble, mrushchev could not risk economic smctions from tbe West by challenging their p r e s m e in West Ber3in.4 Ubricht at last cmvkced mrushchev of the need for a wall to divide the city. The two leaders no longer believed in their grandjose claims that the GDR would soon surpass West: Germany" eccrnomic output. mrushchev later recalled that he did not want the exodus sl:East Germans to cause a labor shortage that the Soviets would have to resolve: "We didn't want our workers to clean their toilets.""" For years the Ulbriclht r4gime had tried to persuade Wrsaw to caordinate its Berlin policy with the GDR. The East German Forcign M i n i s t ~ suspected that the Pales were reluctant to suppcrrt tJrbricht in k r l i n because they still, doubted the long-term viabi.lity of the GD'FC.6 Wben Polish organizers of the Poznah Traadc Fair sent West Berlin firms New Year's gwethgs addressed to "West Berlin, Federal Republic of Gemany,"" the East Germans informed Khrushchcv h t the W s t G e r m press was piaykg up the incident.7 The East Germans were also disappoislted with the lack of Poish press cclverage of the fifteenth anniversary of the founding of the SED in April 1961, more? so because they had stxpplied the Polish authorities with plenty of: propaganda to publicize the event.% A few months later, when the Polish press incorrectly translated a statement that UZbrieht had made in refere~~ce to the German question, Ulbricht appeared to have questioned th GDKs commitment to the OderNeisse border.9 C)n July 21, Gomulka declared that if thc Western powcrs did not: want to make peace with both Geman states, then Poland, the Soviet Union, and the other socialist states wodd sign m e with the GDR. He said that this was not the best option, however: "Of course this will be the worse solution, but it is unavoidable. . . . The Soviet Union and other socialist countries are deterrnfned to ccmctuete a peace trr-?atyand h;lm W s t Berlin into a free city bp the end of the year." Ulbriclrt vehemently objected that a peace treaty with the GDR done was a "worse solution," and to the suggestion that Berlin becow a "free city"2ather than a city fully integrated into the GDR.1" At the Vienna summit between Khrushchev and new US. President John E Kennedy ~ I June, I mrushchev issued a new six-month ultimatum on Berlin.. 'The Kennedy administration, ennklarrassed by the failed invasion of Cuba and the Soviets%suecessful manned space Right, was determined to take a hard stand an West Berlin. Many Polish communists worried that if steps were taken to halt traffic between East and West Berlin, rioting would bmak out in the GDR capitol; if this happened, West

German!., armed with nuclear weapuns, would be compelled to intervene. arushchev assured the MJarsaw Pact cowtries that HATO would not force an armed canfrontation in Berlin. Gornugka believed him, although, until the Warsaw Pact meetings in Moscow that August, he was unawam of thr plans to build a wall,ll 011August 13, 1961, the Soviets and East Germans halted traffic between East and West Beslh, Tybuna Lzsdu commented that the GDR and the Soviet Ednion were. tryb~gto prevent Wstern pmvocatims in €hecity and to regdak the anomalous situation of West Berlin's bejng situded in the middle of the GDR.12 The newspapexdled the decision to put up the wall "correct and necessary*"" According to one SED source, most PZPIt. melnbers recognized that West Berlin was creating too many political and ecmomic problems for the GDR.l"n language that seemed more suited to the crude propaganda of Stalin" sera, Polish diplomats told East German officials that the W& helped the Polish people understmd that East Gemany and the entire Soviet camp had to contain the '"Mlest German war mongers,"15 News of the division of Berlin sent the Polish people into a pmic. Food shops quick@ sold out as nervous Poles laid in supplies; soldiers in the Polish army wew cclnwinced they were going to war,l%e East German journalist in Warsaw rclported that the Poles, includj.ng many party members, thougfnt the Germans were all the same and would do somth.mg to cause a new war, h e t h e r it was Adenauer"s atomic weapons or Ufbricht 'S Berlh Wa11.17 At first, Gomuika reacted cautiousIy to the crisis, The Czechoslovak and tlungarian governments issued official declarations in support of the Berlin Wall, but Gomulka did not elaborate on the Warsaw Pact's joint conmuniguP justifying the move.lWomulka could no longer afford to alienate the other Soviet bloc countries, however. After years of courting the West, Gomlka, had hiled to gain sig~zificantdiptomtic or economic results, His tacit accqtance of the Rerlh Wl1 marked, a turning point in Polish-East Geman relations; in September, Comulka annolmcd that he would not sign a nonaggres&on tstlaty MIith West Germany NIuch to the satisfclctian of East Berljm, Gomukka declared unambiguously that "the security of thcz GDR is the security of Poland.""" Cyrat-tkiewicz said that it was time to sign a peace trcaty with both German states, and.promised his government" support of the G m ' s efiorts to resolve the Berlin problem, includb~gthe problem of tl-te Berlin VValle~~ Polish press coverage of the GDR incseased in the fall of 1,9611and Polish journalists we= generally mnre sympathetic to East Gemany % struggle with West Germany than they had been irr the past.21 One SED report was unusually positive about the chmge in of,llcial Z3001ish policy toward the GDR: "The measures of our government were supported uncondi-

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The Bcrti-i.2 Watl and Bdle~tCe itz Pulisfz-East German Relatiotzs

tiondly and wideXy publicized in the [PoLishJ press."E The East Gcrman Embassy in Warsaw praised Poland" fforeign policy, especially the PZPR's support of East Germany in the Berlin crisis. Even Polanct"s relations with Vugoslavia now appeared to parallel those of the mst of the Warsw Pact countries.23 In contrast to past years, the SEU chamterized recent meetings between SEB and PZPR regional offices in the aderNeisse mgion as "sincere and open."z4 East German officials noticed that Poles were even willing to discuss political and ideological questions, havhg conspicuody avoided them befare, The East Germans credited their own propagmda for this change h attitudc.25 Swiet diptomats in Warsaw were also impressed with C;omdkafs newfound willhgness to cooperate wjth the Warsaw Pact; one described the political situation in Poland as ""absolutely healthy."zb The Border and Gemany The deep distrust that the Ulbricht and GomuLka rcirgimes had developed over the years could not be overcome o~remight,however" The two parties could not find common ground on various ideological issues, although they now kept the debates out of public view. The main problem, as it had been for the entirc~. postwar period, was the SEWS dusd to recognize Poland"s historical claim to G e r m n territory, The SED would not budge from this position, The Poles suspected that the SEI) wanted to keep its options open for a border revision should Qrmany be =unified, The controversy resurfaced in June 1961, when the Poles criticized Ulbricht for ignoring Poland" historical claims and adhering instead to tbr old SED line that Hitler hnd m e ~ l ygarnbled akvay the eastern territories? A p a r later, the East German government issued a document that made a positive reft.rmce to German General Hans von Seekctfssupport of the Treaty of Ixapallo between Wimar Germany and the Soviet Union in 1922. The document cited Rapallo as part of the tradition of fi-imdly Soviet-Geman dations--which the GDR was now perpetuathg-and blamed German mnopoly capitalists m d wenlthy land owners for fighting Hitler" s w a r and Losing Gcrman territory.28 Far years, Polish ofkialr; had expressed their objection to positive references to Rapallo; thcy interpreted the Treaty of Rapdlo as a prtlcedcnt to the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939. They were especially angered by the East German government" document because Seekct was a confirmed enemy of Poland.2' Gomulka cited as proof 9ekct's dcelaratiorl that "the existence of Poland is intolerable, irreconcilablewith the conditions of the Life of Germany Polmd must disappear and will disappea~"'3Usharp critique of the docment by Dr. Wirghia Grhska, the head of the German department oi the Polish Institute for Tnternational Relations, prompted

one East German dlplomat to write that '%er words left the perception that the GDR was going back on its recognition of the Oder-Neisse border." East German diplom&s tried to expain that the publ.cation was for West German consumption, but one Polish official ~ s p o n d c dthat . the price for this kind of propaganda was too high: ""I'dand feeis hit m the head by it. Wont does that help?"31 The docunnent added to Polish perceptions that should a Gcrman confederation become a reality, East Berlin would work with Born to revise the Oder-Neisse border. The PZPR still dot~bted&at the SED was trylng to eradicate rcvmchism in East Gemany The members oi one PZPR delegation to the GDR in the spring of 1962 rczpeatedly etipressed their distrust in the East Germm peopfe m d questio~nedthe SED's ccannmitiset~tto the border." Speaking to a crowd in Gdafisk in July, Gamu&a intentionally cited Polmd's historical presence along the Baltic %a, and notably it.% Gdaiisk, to juslify Po(ish clairns to the former German territories"33 Over five years had passed since the formtim of the Warsaw Pact, but Soviet commanders stifl held serious doubts about whether the East German and Polish arrnies d d fight togethcr to defend the C)der-Ncisse barber. Neither the Polish communists nor the Polish people in genera1 trusted the loyaltp of the East Geman army in a war against West Germany and NATO." Gomulka, was reluctant to allow the East German army to participate in Mrsaw Pact mneuvers in Poland; he knew that Pales would shudder at the sight of a German army marchil~garound the countryside and Gcrrnan military convoys rolling duwn Polish roads. Grnutka asked UI:bricht why East German soldiers had to wear uniforms that were so similar to the old Wehrmacht issue. Ulbricht achowledged that it was a compromiscz to East German feclings of nationalism: '"W give the people their uni.forms, [which is] perhaps a compromise, but in this way we win them over and can more easily raise &em to be good communists.'""l Tryhum Lad24 wrote that it was important fur Poles to know what East German soldiers th:hou&t was their mission a d vvhat they knew about Polmd." P d s h ofticials chjded the East Germms for allowing nationalist and anti-Polish elements to play a significant role h East Gcrman military, political, and ecmomic affairs, m d for cddling former Nazi and neofascist elernetnts i,n the army, party, gover ent, and htellige~ntsia.~~ Polish officials even told the East Germans that they were glad that the Soviet army was stationed in the GDR."K year after the B e r h Wall went up, party fuxnctionaries hvere still tellng t-he East Germans that the Polish people feared the decision to divide Berlin might lead to war.39 No matter which policy the PZPW conducted in regard to the German qraestion, it rarely seemed to satisfy the dogmal.ic East German comntunists. For example, in September 1361, SED I'oEtburo memher Erich

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The Bcrti-i.2 Watl and Bdle~tCe itz Pulisfz-East German Relatiotzs

Miickenberger spoke h Wrsaw for the twenty-second amiversary of Hitler's attack on Poland. For several years tbr Poles had criticized the SED's lackadaisical observances of this event, but now the East German Embassy faulted the Poles for not promoting MGckenberger" speech and for not mentioning that many f o m r Wehmacht officers held high positions in the West German army." The embassy concluded that in general '"East Germany" peace prczposals, the German peace plan, and other special actions and initiatives of the GDR are stil m t propagated enough.'j41 The East Germans allepd that Poles had serious misconceptims about German reunification, and ~peatedfyfaulted the PZPR for not promoting the GDR's sncialist system as G e r m y ' s (uture.42 In F&ruary 1,962, a SED report found that Polish attitudes toward. the two Geman staks had. not. chmged much over the past few years; even mmy PZPR members downplayed the importance of the GDR. T7e SED branch office in Neubrandenburg wrote that '"many [Poles] are of the opinion that the West will not begin a war; or that it [life] is much better in the West than [it is] hereef'43Although East Gcrman officials could not understand the reason their Polish comrades had more trust in the West Germans, the Poles h e w that Bonn conducted a more honest, if hostile, policy toward Poland, and that East Berlh feigned friendship.44 Unresolved Potiey Differences

:In th early 19605, Gomulka began to turn the clock back to 1955, if not to 1953. His rkgime tcrok cm some of the trappings of Stalinism-becomhtg increasingly intolerant of dissent and more rigid in its foreig~mand domestic policies. Gomulka surrounded himself with absequious yes-men, and, according to one biographer, becme ""a rigid, narmw-minded, authoritarian, petty tyrant. . . . Me developed fits of: rage, becme moody, capriciouis, and morhidly p~occupiedwith his prestige. He could stand. no ~riticism.~'45 Although his r4gime began to look m m like Ulbricht's, Gomuilia could abide no criticism from the East Germm communists, The East Germans were highly criticd of the PZPR's constant ~ferencesto October 1956 as the begiming of- Polmd's poli.lrica1and economic renewal.46 The Polish cultural scme remained much more open than any other in the bloc, and the PZPR still tderated private farming and some pri\late elmterprise. The SEI) kept up its relent-less attacks on Paland" pprivate farmistg sector and th in8uencc of the Catholic Church in the colxntryside; for years, Ulbricht had mahtained that socialism in Poland had no futurc without absolute control over rclligous affairs and the reactionary Polish clergy- which the East Germans thought was infiltrated by West-

ern agents. The SED criticized. the PZPR for its half-haked. policy of weakening peoples' reli$ious beliefs to the point of indifference to Cathalicism and socialism.47 In March 1962, a delegation of women horn East German collective farms c o n f i r a d what the SED leadership had been saying for yearsthat there was little PZPR presellce in the rural areas,.'The East German delegation urged Polish ofijcials to collectivize immediate@" Later that spring, East Germm ofkials conlrmted Zenon Kliszko with a long list of the PZPKs failed domestic policies: the paty's inadequate efhrts at propaganda, lack of economic planning, and bankrupt agrarian policies." A few months later, East German officials lectured another delegation of Polish agricultural experts on the superiority of collective agriculture. The Poles were still not listening to these tired old refrains. Aithough the PZPR was interested in the East Germans' agricultural techtlology, the pasty maintained its position that the Polish farmer could not be forced to collectivize, but had to find his own way of socializing agriculture,"" Khrushchev also had his differences with Gomulka over the lack of coHectivized farming in Poland, but, unlike Ulbricht and the SED, mmshchev did not press the matter. He later wrote that "the organization of farmlads was m internal matter for Polmd, m d we never took Comrade GornuEka to task, for it. If we ever raised questions at all, it was only to inform ourselves about how their system of agriculture worked." mmshrhev ackncrwiedged that Polish agriculture was more productive than that of mast of the other Comecon com~tries;slhe ridiculed Ubricht for im.porting Polish potatoes at the same time the SED was bragging about tbe superiority of its collectivized farms-52 East Qrman officids w r e still unhappy with the PZf+R's tolerance of ideologicdly unreliable e l e m t s , more so in literature and art, The East German Foreign Ministry calkd it too much ""modernist" inauence3"e East Germarl comul-ristscould never wholeheartedly embrace t h i s Polish comrades until the PZPR tighter-red censorship. In January 1861, Alexmder Abusch, the East G e m m Minister of Culture, visited Poland for discwsions on expanding official cultural exchanges, In AbuscWs opinion, Polish officials were reluctant to discuss ideological issues for fear of exposing their weakness on this f m t . Edward Ochab said that the Polis-t Writers' Congress was more pditically reljable now but i\rbuseh and Hegm thought that he was overlooking various ideological contradictions Fn cultural life in Polmd.2 The East German Embassy warned that "the cdtural scene rjn Polandf shows that the enexny is still very stmng,""5 adding that ""there is no clear party line in the question of the Marxist aest.J-retic."%'T'he Polish Minister Minof Cdture and Art, Tadezlsz Galinski, told an East Germarl Foreig~~ istry official that it was up to Polish artists to decide how to achieve the

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'"redization of the sorrial function of art." TZh ' e East Gcrmans quickly responded that Polish artists were allowed far too mu& latitude. Without socialist realism as the main criteria for evalu&ir?g art, they argued, Polish artists would conthue to create decadent, bourgeois works,v The SED still belittled the PZPR fnr faifing to inculcate Polish youth with socialist ideas, or to change Polish prejudices against East Germans." Kn contrast to the FUJ's aallegedy cmpsehensive and successful indoctrination af East German youth, the SED blamed the PZPRfs youth orga,nization, the ZMS, for fajling to promote the constructinn of a socialist socit.@," At one 'Vriendsk-ripmeeting" between Polish and East German youth groups in Giiftitz, the Poles jeered FUJ mennbers and asked them such questions as, "Why are? you hiding yourselves behind the [Berlh] Wall?" The meeting ended in a fist fightem Such incidents hardened fie SED leadersAisinclhation for closer relations with Pdand, Until the PZPR and the Polish people proved their Mamist credentials, Ulbricht was reluctant to expand cultural mlations and tourist exchanges, in spite of =peaked entreaties from his diplomats and lower-level party m e ~ ~ b eto r s do so.63 At the Z,eipzig Trade Fair in. March 1962, Cyrmkiewicz proposed a freer exchange of tourists, but the East: Germans did not respond.b"?ccording to SED reports, Polish tourists on vaca.t.ionin East Germany usualJy tried to avoid minders of work, a situation zealous East German officials viewed as more pmof of the I"Zf-'f\t"si n a d e ~ a t propaganda e efforts-6s

Chronic Economic Disputes West European ecmomic recovery in the late 1950s marginalized the importance of imports from Poland, Wclstern Europe was meeting more of its demmd for coal, and oil was replacing it as the main energy source. Poland had few other products that the West wanted to buy By the end of the decade, Gornultka began to shift trade back to the Warsaw Pact countries and tcr suppo& Khrushchev" call for more joint venkrc3s.M A widespread belief in Poland held that East Germany was enjoy'ing too many economic concessions from the Soviet Unicm, and fiat trade with the GDR m d the TVVarsaw Pact in general was to Poli-wdfsdisadvantage. Envious of the East Germans' higher st-mdard of livhg, Pdish officials thought that if any country should be receiving trade concessions, it was Poland." Gomu2kafs frequent requests fur economic aid caused Khrushchev to comment. that "Gomu1:ka had a way of tuming these matters into a national issue." "mshchev accused the Poles of "selfishness," and of trying tcr take advantage of him.6" The difference between the ~ l a t i v prosperity e of the GDR and pctvmty in Poland was an embarrassment for both governments. In the early

1960~ East ~ Germany" ppes capita income and personal consumption was at least 50 percent higher than Poland's." Polish officials from Gdalisk told one East German delegation that the GUR standard of:living was 60 percent higher than Poland's,"" The Poles frtiquently =minded the East Gemans that Potand had been the victim of German aggression less than a gezzeration ago. The Gomulka rdgime knew that the disparity in standards of living wodd c d r m East German stewotypes about the inability of thr Poles to run m efficient e~onouny.6~ For example, mmy Poles blamed a shortage of h r h 1962 on Poland" exports to East Germany m e n one East German visitm to Poland was a k e d about the availability cJf flour in East German stores, he boasted that, if they wanted, East Germans could buy a car-full. Polish officials observed. that suck arrogant behavior conon belief that the East Germans were no different from the Qrmans in Hitler's Reich, and certainly 1x1 better thnn those in the :FRG.m Poiish oificials were also sensitive to implications that Polmd. had only cod and food to sell, but the more technologically advanced East German cconomy produced manutactures for export P d s h officials criticized the East Geman press for contributjng to peoples3mpressim that unprofithle trade with Poland was ~sponsiblefor the GDKs ecclnornic problems.71 Reintegrating the two ecmomis a&er the numerous trade dlsputes of the past several years was difficult. t3y thc time Gomulka tried to rekindle ecmomic comectio~zsto the GDR, the East German government was less interested.; after alf, Poland had not been a reliable supplier.72 The rapid increase in the C",UIC's trade with fie Soviet Llnion in 1959 and 1960 res~~lted in a drop in East German food exports to Poland and forced Poland. to buy foodstuffs from the Uni;ted States and Canada at hi&er prices.73 The GDR was in a much stronger economic position in the 1960s than it had ever been before, East Gcrmany supplied about me-tl-tird of the machines fnr the entire Soviet bloc, and was Cornwon's most important chemicai exparter. Rut: the East German economy was still dependent on the Warsaw Pact for raw materials and steel, The GDR had to import approxhatdy 30 percent of its steel, iron ore, and copper; 50 percent of its coke; 70 pet-cent of its coal; and. all of its oil. Chronic shortages of raw ma" terials, Polish coal especially, pmvented East Germany from exyorting mom manufiactured goods. The. Soviet Ul^lim =placed s w e of the Polish imports, but not enough to satisfy the GDR's needs,74 'The SED estimated that to catch up to the MIest Geman econorrry by 1965, it would have to import an additionai 400,000 tons of coal in 1958, 800,OW tons in 1959, and 800,000 in 1960. Total imports of coal had to reach 8,300,(1011 tons in 1961, and 9,800,000 tons in 1962.7'

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After the Berlin WIl went up in 1961, the East German leaders tried to increase trade with Poland, but on their own terms. The Politburo resolved to end the ""one-sided character of its economic relations with Polmd."z That fall, Bruno Leuschner, the depuv chairman of the GDR Council of Ministers, went to Warsw to make direct requests frtf an increase in coal, steel, and chelnical deliveries. Leuschner argued that the GUR was now in a delicate political and economic situation because of the econmic division of Berlir~artd the FRG's rm.fusal to negotiate a new - requested an additional 500,000 tons of coal for trade a g ~ e ~ " e " "He 19661, and a total of 3 million tons of coal m d 300,000 tons of coke in 1962. Polish negotiaton; agreed to send an additional 100,000 tons of coal h o v e the moul-rt agreed to in the plan for 119611, and an extra 1,511,000 tons of coal in 1962, but no mnre coke. The Poles also a a j ~ e dto handle an extra 11.6 miliion tons of Soviet exports to the GDR on Polish railways in 1,962.-The Poles had to accept a reduction in East German intpllrts in 1,961 m d 1962, among them 64 million convertible zhtys worth of consurncr goods. The Poles also waived a prornised credit for fie purchase of East Germm machines md equipment for a factory in Turosz6.kv,m d grmted the GDR a credit of 100 million convertible ziotys for techology projects, The Poles reected such other East German pmposais as the one askhg for a total of 4.5 million tons of Polish coal in 1'362"This was 1.5 million more tons than Leuschner bad requested One Polish trade official called this =quest ""completely incomprehensibleCff' 'I'he Poles also denied the East Germms a credit to cut trmsit costs inhalf, and refused to enter into negotiations on reducing the coat of the coal, Polish trad.e officials dei East Germany would rwet its obligations to ship manded to ho~when machines and industrial equipment, but f,euschner said that until the GUR was sure of its own imports it could promise anything." I'tEter s o w hard bargaining, Leuscher was able to sign a new trade agreement that fall, But the SED was still not satisfied trhat Polmd was doing all it could. to export steel, coal, coke, and phosphoms to the GDR, c ~ rto provide c ~ d i t to s buy these and other goods. The East Germans were incclrsed that the Poles would not jncrease their "completely insufficient" steel exports to the GDR because of Poland" export obligations to West Germany. They we= also unsympathetic to Polish d e m n d s for maehines and consunter goods to make up the GDR's trade deficit, and more so when the Poles refused to reduce transit costs through Pdand.7" By late October 1961, the two sides were already blamhg each other for not maEng the deliveries called for in the agreement," According to Polish sources, Polmd fulfilled 101.1 pescmt of its export obligations to East Germany in 1961, and the GDR fulfilled 97.2 percent of its &ligations. One Polish official thought that trade wif-;hthe GDR was ""gelzrally disadvantageous for Poland,'hotabb tthe shortfa21 in East Gcrman

machines for the Polish chemical industry, By the sprirrg of 1962, Labout me-third of these deiiveries werc. still delirrqumt.80 At the end of 1961, the East Cerman Ennbassy characterized the progress of trade negotiations with Poiand as "limited.," and. recommended new efforts to convince the Potes of the complex problems fack g the GDR economy For years, the East Germans had tried to persuade the Poles that the bealth of the East German economy was in fie interest of Polmd a d the entire Soviet bloc.81 With the East Germm economy outperfnrming m s t oE the other socialist econosnies in the early 1,960~~ Poland and the other Comecon corntries were still not persuaded by this argument. At the Comecan meeting in Warsaw in Decernber 1961, Polish Deputy Premier Stefan Jedrychowskl angrily criticized some ""undisciplined" countries for not keeping their export proxnises, According to East German diplomat Karl Mewis, the other Comecm represmtatives shouted, "That's right, the GDR!" Mewis concluded, ""Xdo't have any more illusions; what concerns the [economic] plan for 1962 there is only one motto: W must help o u r s e l ~ e s ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ With the exception of a few staunch Marxists, Polish officials were painhlly aware that the socialist economies would. never be a match for the West. They ridiculed the East Germans for predicting that the GDR would equal m d then surpass the West Germans' per capita consumption by 1962.XQ~be Polish government was certainly not goixlg to help the East Gem-tans to achieve that goal, anyway :ill the early 1%l)s, about 60 percent- of Poland"~track was with the Comecon countries (30 percent with the Sovict Union), the smallest pescentage of any Soviet bloc country-wqrade with Poland comprised. only 10 percent of ail East German trade with Che Comecon countries in 1960, and only 7 percent of East German trade as a whole. Five p a r s later, these figures had not changed, m d did not fluctuate much for the rest of ehe decade.85 West Germmy was Poland" most importmt capitalist trizdbg partner, doing $151.1 million in business in 1959. l[n April 1960, Poland and West Germany s i p e d a new trade agrement to raise each country's deliveries by DM 150 million. In a shiCt from years past, the East German government now objected to the inclusion of trade between West Berlin and Poland in the agreement because of the implication that W s t Berlin was a part of the FBC.86 In 1961, Polmd" exports to West Germmy increased 15.2 pescent over 1960, but West German exports to Poland. dropped 6.2 percent, leavirrg the Poles with a pasjtive trade balance of &out DM 70 million.87 By 1,961, Great Britain had replaced the FRG as Polmd's most important tradjng partrner in the West, but that trade represented only 6.5 percent of Palmd's total trade.8" The Ade11aut.r government assmed that tllhricht's push for gsrrater econmic cooperatim with the Soviet Union would cause Poland to ex-

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pand its economic tics to the West, but when the C o m m Market countries s i p e d an agreemat in January 1962 to cut t-he price of their agriculturd pr~dzacts,F"ol.mdtsexports we= squeezed out. /\gricu,ltural goods made up over half of Poland" tradc with West Germany. Talks on a new trade deal stalled,89 and in the first half of 1962, trade between Poland and West Germany dropped 10 percent." In October 1962, the Polish ent predjlcted that trade with West Germany woulcjl fall 20 percent that year.91 East German trade officials h e w that Polmd was in dire need of machines md. consurner goods in 196.2, and they drove a hard baqain for a new trade deal. Polish officials often commented that it was much easier to do business with the Czechoslovaks," 2 e Poles were reluctant to accept a significant East German trade deficit or to provide a credit to cwer it, but they eventually %reed to let the GDR run a 30-million ruble def cit, less than half the origina,l East German proposal.'VI'oSand covered about 45 percent of its imports from the GDR in 1962 with transit charges, but fie East Germans were t r w to reduce those costs by expanding the Rostock harbor, other water routes, and pipelines." rhert! was also an impasse over a new deal on waterway traffic; the East Germans argued that a simple extension of the 1954 agreement was ineqrxjtable now becausc? the Poles could use a new network ol waterways that extended throughuut the GDR, and.Poland"s waterways still connected only the ncrr&em a d western parts of the c ~ u n t r y + ~ s Polish represe~ntativesto the Gto~~ecan meethgs inJuly 1962 called for an intensification of economic cooperation with the Gm," but the Poles and the Romanians wlruld not accept the East German and Czechoslowak rclcome~ndationsfor a divisim of labor in Comeco~nthat would, assign Poland and Romania the job of exporthg raw materials, The Poles and Rumanians rejected arrangements that would compromise tbeir own industrial. devel.~pment%~Y In Septenzher, East German diplomat Moldt concluded. that the Polish g~vernm"nt%stronger pditical suyport of the GDR "is not finding its equivalent expression in the economic sphere." Moldt contrasted the pmblems with Poland. with the GDR" close economic cooperation with Czechodovakia, and even with W s t Germany and West Berlin."" Moldt concluded that Poland's unwillhgness to increase agricultural exports to East Germany was proof that Polish exports to the capitalist countries had priority.* At the behest of the East Germans, Leuscher agaiin went to W;;rrsaw on September 10 to meet Eugmiusz Szyr, teuschner acknowledged that the historical legacy of German exploitation was partly mspcmsible for the difference in Polish and East German economic stmdards and that his government would keep that in mind during the negotiations. The

PZPR blamed the SED" lack of a concrcte economir plan for the stalemate, but Leuscher laid out a series of precise propositions for closer economic cooperation. The Poles denied Leuschner's altegations that Polmd was charghg 110 pescent more for coal and coke than the capitalist countries. A PZE'R report conclulied fiat, given the rc3iatively short distance from Silesia to the GDR, Polish coal was cheaper. Unable to convince the Poles to lower the price, the East Germans began to charge mom for some of its exports to Poland."""" LJeuscher stood his ground durhg the negotiatio~~s* Not o111y was the East German economy wtpmducing Poland's, but Poland was r an overall trade deficit, in part because oE tbc; falling price of cod on the world market.lm The East Grmans hvere aware that t-he Polish government woulld have to cut investment plans by approximate@ 60 billion z2otys in 1962.102 Although the Poles were reluctant to tie thmsetves to long-term agreements that would force them to import East Geman machines after they becan-te o'osolete, they had little choice by now, Frc,m 40 to 50 percent of Pdmdls impllrts from East Germany consisted of machines and industrial equipment; chemiral products made up 35 percent, and.consumer goods comprised from 15 to 20 percent. That Poland could no longer cover the cost of East Gecman goods through exports and East German transit payments made matters worse, and in 1964, Poiand"~ credits from the GDR were to come due.203 Szyr and te~~sehner cottfd not break the impasse, however, although Szyr agreed to increase cooperative efforts in the cod and chemical indush.ies."%e talks were unsuccessful in part because Szyr thought that. Poland was in a stronger negotiating position, The Polish Foreign M h istry doubted that the GDR wodd fu2fll its economic plan for 1962, and was facing shortages of potatoes, corn, and grain. 'The ministry obserwed that the economic d o m t u m was creating considerable dissatisfaction a m g East Germans, who had. assumed that the Beriixr MraII was temporary. 'The rninistry warned that ""a rather strong materialist attitude ~itlgns in GDR society. This affects a si.gnificant part of the [East German] youth as well."^^^ In a briefing paper fnr the meetings between Gomuika and Ulbricht in October, the East German Embassy in Warsaw observed that the Polish ent had not lived up to the p m i s e Cyrmkewicz bad m d e at the Leipzig Trade Fair earlier in the year-namc.1~ to give the GDR "rnaximuln eco~~omic support." The e~nbassyrecmnrtel~dedadoptkg a hard negotiating position to reduce transit costs, increase imports of Polish steel, and e n s m punctual deliveries of coal and coke.1" h report on trade with Poland concluded that the annual incrcase in the volume of trade was still "in.nsufficient,"l~"

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Frc.rn left to right: Jbsef Cyrankiewicz, Waclystaw Gornulka, and Walter U1bricht at the East German People's Parliament in Berlin on October 19,1962. (Photo courtesy Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Nlassenorganisatic~nender UDR im Bundesarchiv, reprinted with permission)

The Third Gomulka-Ulbrichil:Summit 'The surnmit between Ufbricht and Gornufka in October was shaping up to he more productive than their two pr~viousencomters. One SED Zlriehg pager far Ubricht was optimistic about Poiand's recent political development, especially thc P7,f"R's assertion of its leading mle i,n Polish sodety The SEE? observed that Poland" oofficial policy on the German que"ticm was paralleling the GDR's; it praised the Polish press for ""uncovering the militarist and revanchist policy of the Adenauer government." The report even complimented Poland for its economic cooperaticm. The rest of the report was still critical of the Gomugka r&gimefor idedogical inconsistemcies, hawevcr, and for erratic cdtural and agricultural polides. Accordirrg to the SED, t h PZPR was not doixlg enough to promote the accomplislzments of h e GDR, m d was not acting in tandem with the Soviet Union to ostracize China and Albmia.10" The East German Em.bassy in Warsaw suggested that Ulbricht IObby GomuF-kafor more support of the GCZK agairtst W s t Germany, including more f30:l.isrh press coverage on the dangers of Wst: German militarism and imperialism. The embassy reported that "at forums and other discussions we still see the reservations of h e Polish people t w a d the pol-

From left to right: W1adys3aw Gomujka, Jbwf Cyrankiewicz, and Walter Ulbricht reviewing East German troops at the Brandcunbu5.g Gate, October 2 9,19642. (Photo courtesy Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisatic~nender UDR im Bundesarchiv, reprinted with permission)

itics, the orgms, and the actl.011~of the GDR." The East Germms charged that the average Pole could not distinguish between the East and West German flags.lw Karl Krahn, the East German cormspandent in Warsawp warned U'lbricht that dangerous revisionist forces were still lwrking in the PZPR H e blamed these elements for their unfounded allegations that Polish security forces had pushed a Polish journalist out of a wil'Ldow to his death. Krahn considered the journalist politiclally unreliable anyway. :Krahn reported that well aver 300 high-level party and government ofiicials, intellectuals, and journalists, all of whom he characterized as "revisionists,'"ha a t t e ~ ~ d ethe d reporter's funeral- Nonetheless, Krahn thought that Gomukka's position in the party ""S stmng enough to cornbat all rivals,llo A comprehensive briefing report far the Polish delegation raised a nunnbier of outstanding issues, The Poles were still apprehensive about the pclliticai =liability of the East German a m y and the lingering nationalism of the SED ntlm~l~klatziru, who fsequently used the nationalist term flathculnt-rd in reference to Gcrmany. Polish officials thought that E a t German propaganda ennptoyed too many references to the traditbns and

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leaders of the old Prussian-German army. The report also blamed the East German government for the failure of several cooperative effods in the chemical and machirze industries. The Poles noted that the SED was now more interested in exchanges in the scientific field, but that exchanges were still too m-sided; many m m Polish scimtists, professors, and stude~~ts went to the GDR."I The Polish =port cited new problems in tourist traffic with East Germany. More East German emigr&sfrom the former German territrrries were now visitillg Poland, in part because the Berlin Wall had cut them off from Mrest Berljn and West Gcrmmy. R e East Geman authorities, however, ma$e it more dsficult for the emigr6s to go to Poland by ineasing the visa fee. The Poles could not: help but contrast this situation with the growth htourism betvveen East Gemmy and Czechoslovakia.lQ 'I'he briefing also found problems with cdkrral exchanges, such as the East German governmcnt.'~indiffe~nceto popularizing f"oli,sh art and literature, Sixteen Polish books appeared in East Germany in 1961, but 92 East German titles circulated in Poland. The East Germans had not performed a shgle Polish dramatic work in the past few years, but the Poles had performed. six East German plays. PoXish officials criticized the SEE? for reject% theater pieces that did not: promote socialist realism.ll3 Gontuika and Cyrankiewiez led the Polish delegation to East Berlin on October 15, 1962, just as the Cubm missile crisis was unfolding. Highlightiz~gthe visit was Gomuika"s speech to the East German Parliament, which marked the first time in history that a Polih leader had appeared in froslt of a German legislative body, Gomuika thanked the East Germans for the warm reception, and etipressed his satisfaction with the %D's educati,onal. efforts to change East German attitudes toward Polmd. He contrasted the opthistic mood oi this summit with the cool atmospherr;, that had surrounded the meetings in Berlin over five years earlier"Me said that Western attetnpts to clfive a wedge between the SED and the PZPR had failed: "This prclpaganda Labout cold relations between the PZPR and the SED was calculated tr, create the hnpression in GDR society that the SED wi\s fencing itself off from the PZPR-and vice versa-was calculated to isolate the SED from its own peoplc," Even though the SED had conducted such a policy toward the PZPR, Gomulka said that the visit was a turning point. ixl the history of relations between Poland and East Germany because now the two governments were coming together on their own volitionll" The tone of the talks was indeed friendlier than us~~aX, m d largely devoid of the acrimony that had punctuated previous encounters. At the top of tbr agenda was the improvement of trade relations and scientik and tecl-mological cooperation..Gornulka t?dmitted that "econosnic cooperation between our countries is very limited," and pointctd out that the GDR a ~ Czechoslovakia d had much closer economic ties. Ulbricht said

that the GDR was facing serious economic problems because of the division of Berlin, and he seconded Gomu2ka"s call for a wider range of econolnic exchanges, 'The tvcro sides agreed on the construction of an oil and gas p i p e h e from the Soviet &ion through Poland to the GDR, cooperative efforts to expand Polish bmwn coal production, joint industrial venturcs, and a gmeral i n c ~ a s ein trade.ll5 The talks elicited favomble commentary from Pdish journalists; they told one East German =porter that the meetings had exceeded beyond their expectations."b tltbrjcht declared that "&c unbreakable friendship between the German Democratic Republic and the Peuples' Republic of Polmd livesY"'7 Ulbricht had made such grandiose statements before, but his confidmc in Gomuika was grocving. An annual SED port on the state of relations wilh Poland was unusually optimistic about the country" socialist future: "To us thew is no doubt that great changes have been made in the People's Republk of Poland, Chat the Poland d 1962 differs Ifundarnentafiy from the Poland of 1956.""lWven the West Germm government conceded that I-he October summit had been a success and that. the chances of dfawing Poland out of the Sctviet sphere we= now slim, The West German Foreign Mhistry called the talks a signikant step in bringing Poland and East Germany together on several political and economic issues. The ministry also obscrved that the Polish ent was becorning more bvstile toward the FRGflespecially concerning propagmda about the imminent Mrest German threat to the ader-Neisse border.119 The SED m d the PZPR were pleased with the resubs of the talks. In early Jmuary 1963, Tryhti~za1,zkdu messed fie last three mmths of relations with the GDR as ""particdasly frnitful~"~zWast German diplomats in Warsaw blunted their earlier criticism of the PZ:PR and its policies when they =parted an improvement in their personal mlations with Polish officiats. One East German diplomat reported that, contrary to previous metings, exchanges with Polish officials now contributed to a better atmosphere.12' The embassy was pleasantly surprised by the new direction of the West Tnstitute in Poznah, which for years had leaned toward studies of West Germany; the institute was now paying more. attention to East German affairs.'" East German djplomats also praised such Polish jot~mals as Nozrte Drogi and Spmzoy Miedzylznrodow (International Affairs) for their extensive coverage of the GDR in connection with Gornulka" visit, 'The East Germans were particlllarly pfcascd with the slrmger statements that PZPR members were making about the GDR's importance to Pctland's political and ecmomic futurt?.l23 The SED's satisfaction With Gomufka, was directly related to the PZPR"s increasingly repssive policies. Although Gomakka tried to steer a course between the ~visionistsand fie dogmatists in fie party in the

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early 1960s, most of his purges came at the expense of his old supporters, namely former Mir-tister of Education Wadyslaw Biefikowski and Warsacv University philosophy prdessor Leszek KoIakowski, who was expelled from the party in 1966.12-1After testing the lirnits of :Polandfsnational sovereignty for half a decade, Gomufia knew that the fate of communist b l a n d ultimately depelnded on closer pditical and economic cooperation with the Sctviet Union, Khrushchev later claimed that, with each pawhg year, Polish-Soviet relations continued to improve: ' W ~ i l e he [Gornu-fika]and I still differcd in our approach to certain specific issues, our personal relations coulddt have been bettez""5 Gmu"tkafsloyalty to Moscow was liictatcd in part by his long-standing fear of Germany Khrushchev rclmelnbered Gomulka's telling hjm, '"Vou know what our intelligentsia fears most of all? The Germans. And the Germans will become a threat to the Poles if our friendly ~ l a t i o n s wif-;hthe Sobrief Union are raked.'' Gomu-l-kadid not differentiate between East and West Germans.12" Both arushchev and Goznulka had benefited politically from de-Stahization. 'This was not true of Ulbricht, who remained a staunch supporter of Stalin's legacy and practitioner of his political, and economic policies. But Gomulka had to learn to cohabit with the GIIR. As one Polish jaurnalist now wrote, ""Wlfnatevercould threaten [the existence of the GDR]will affect our country. Today a common destiny ties us to the neiglnbor on the other side of the Oder."aT As true as this was, most East Germms m d Poles did not like it. The two cornmmnist parties did not really believe h their common destiny, either, but in the end they had no choice but to accept it.

1. Information on the policies of the ""fraternal parties'" of the socialist countries, December 21,1962, SED ZK, 1V 2/20/31. 2. John Lewis Gaddis, We Nozu ECrzow: Rethinkl'lzg Cold War History (Oxford: Clarenclon Press, 1997), pp. 138,143,147. 3. Ibid., p. 144. 4. Douglas Selvage, "Intrt.>duct.ion""to ""Khrushchev%November 1958 Berlin Ultimatum: New Evidence from the Polish Archives," Bzklletin: Cold War Infel-ptnE.it?nalHistoy Projecf, no. 12 (winter 1998), p. 218. 5. Quoted in Caddis, We Kf~tlozvMoiiu, p, 149. 6. Annual report for 1960 by Bechnes (Department of Cultural Policy) to the Poland Section of the GDR Foreign Ministry, February 14, 1961, DDR MfAA, Poland Section, A1780. 7. Hain and Seyfert notes of meeting with Kartcut (Polish Embassy), January 16,Z 961, UDR MfAA, Warsaw Embassy, A3751. 8. Rdse (GDR Embassy) report cm the celdrations in Poland of the SEWS fifteenth anniversary May 2,1961, SED ZK, mierofiZm FBS 339113496.

9. Riise report, June 19,1961, SEU ZK, microfilm FBS 339113496. 30. Winzer to Ulbricht, July 24, 1962, SET> ZK, Waiter Ulbricht Papers, NL, 18211250. 31. Peter Raina, GsmulK-n:Poll'fiscIt~Biograpllie ((C~)muXka:Pc)litical biography) (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 49701, pp, 438-434: See Selvage, "KKhrushcl~ev% November 1958 Berlin UItirnaturn: New Evidence from the Polish Archives," p. 219, 12. Trybunn Lzddi-l,August 12,1961; and August 14,1961, p. 2, 43, TqEiuw Ludir, August 15,1961, p. 2. 14. Olivier to the SED Central Committee, August 22,1961, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339/13496. 15. Notes of meeting between Seyfert (GDR Foreign Ministry) and llirmala (Polish Embassy) on September 8, September 21,1961, DDR MfAA, Warsaw Embassy, A3751. 36. T6nniet; (GDR Embassy) regc~rton his visit to Poznafi from August 13-15, August 23,1962, SED ZK, microfilm FESS 339113.322; see also Kaina, GomzrEh, pp. 131-13247, OLiuier to the SED Central Committee, August 22,1964, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339/ 13496. 18, Moldt to Kenig, August 29,3961, DDR MMA, Warsaw Embassy; A3";75. p. 130; see also izlicltolas Bethell, ComuiEkn, His Polajzd and His 19. Raina, Gomufk~, Contnzun&m (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1969), g. 1243. 20. Tybuner.Ludir, October 6,4961, p, 1. 21. See, for example, Tqbunn Lzldzt, Octcjber 7,1961, p. 1, Bctcjber 8, 3961, p. 2, and subsequent issues. 22. information on the relations with the ""fraternal parties" of the socialist camp and with the League of Yugcjslav Communist Party in 1964, February 24, 1962, SEU ZK, TV/2/20/31. 23. Nox;bed Kalusche (GDR Embassy) to the GDR Foreign Ministry December 28,1 961, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339113491. 24. SED repc~rton delegation exchanges beween the Pc>Xish-GDRborder areas, April 1,1962, SEL)ZK, micro8lm FB$339/13422. 25. SEE? report on exchanges of delegations with Szczecin, Koszalin, and G d ~ s in k 1964, February "i: 4962, SET)ZK, microfilm FBS 339113422, 26. RGse notes of ;a meeting with Soviet press attach4 Scharykin on November 16, November 17,1961, SET)ZK, microfilm FBS 339113424, 27. X36se to the GDR Foreign Ministry, Spternbes 25,1961, SEB ZK, microfilm FBS 339/ 13496. 28. Mieszhw Tomala notes of a meeting with Helmer, undated, ca. April 1962, PZPR KC, 237/XXII-1103. 29. Stenographic summary of a meeting with East German officials cjn the issue of the GDR and the hture of Germany May 16, 1962, PZPR KC, 2371XXT1-1103. 30. Observations on the document "The History of the GDR and the Futuw of Germany,'hndated, ca. May 1962, PZPR KC, 237iXXXX-1103. 31. Hilmar ghrrmann report, May 22,1962, SED ZK, micrrjfilm FBS 339143496, 32, East German translator (for the Polish delegation to the GDR from May 17-39) to the SET> Central. Committee Depadment of Affairs, unsigned, May 22, 1962, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339/ 13422.

278

The Bcrtin Watl and Bdle~tCe itz Pulkfz-East German Relatiotzs

33. GDR Embassy report on the state holiday in 1301and a n July 22, July 31, 1962, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339113496.. 34. Schumam report on his visit to &5dz, Augutit 27,1962, SEB ZK, microfilm FBS 339113496, 35. Quoted in Franz Sikora, Sc~zialistisctzcSoiidariMt zknd nlirtiorzale Inferessert (Sdalist soXidari9 and national interests) (Colc>gne:Verlag Wis~nschafiund Poiitik, 19771, p. 161, 36. Tryhunn Lzddi-l, February 28,1962, p. 1. 37, PZPR evalua"tian af the situation in the GDR, unsigned, undated, ca. fall 1961, PZPK KC, 2371XXI1-11 02. 38. PGschel notes of meeting beween Reissig and Wichlacz, et al., on January 11,1962, January 16,1962, SEE?ZK, microfilm FBS 339113496. 39. Il6nnies report on his visit to TfoznaA frc~mAugust 13-25, August 23,1962, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339/4342_2, 40. khurnann to the GDR Fcyreign Ministry September 5,1961, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339143496. 41. GDR Embassy report an 1301and for 1961, December 22,1961, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339/ 13446. 42. Information on the relations with the ""fraternal parties of the socialist camp and with the League of Yugoslav Communist: Party in 1961, February 24, 1962, SE&)ZM, rV/2/20/31. 43, SED report: on exchanges of delegations with Szczecin, Koszalin, and G d ~ s in k 1961, February "i: 4962, SET)ZM,microfilm FBS 339113422, 44. Shumann report on his visit to LBdz, August 217, 1962, SED ZK, microfilm FES 339/13496, 45. Quoted in Bethetl, Go~rtuth,His Poland nnd His Communism, p. 254, 46, GDR Embassy report on the Twenty-Seecjnd Congress af the CPSU, November 20,1961, SEC) E%(,microfilm FBS 339113424. 47. Pcschel no>teson the PZPR's relationship with the Catholic Church, January 8,1%1, SE&)ZK, microfilm FBS 339123491. 48. ThiXde khelbe report on the visit of her delegation to Pc>Xand from March 21-27; April 9,1962, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339113492, By this time virtually all, East German farming was coi1wt:ivized. 4% Report on the visit of the PZPR delegation to Berlin from May 17-49, May 23,1962, SEB ZK, microfilm FBS 339113422. 50. Hans Engmann repart an a visit of a Polish agricultural delegation tcr the GDR, September 18,1962, SED ZM, microfilm 333/13492. 52. Khrushchev, F;lzrrishclzev Renlenzbers: The Lnsl Tesl-nnzenf, pp. 211,213. 52, East German Ambassador Biilling note on the discussion between Khrushchev and Utbricht," F e b r u a ~2 6 1962, in Bzillefk: Cold FrVnr Irztemational HisCofy Project., no. 11 (winter 19981, p. 226. 53. GDR Foreign Ministry Department of Culture annual repc~rtfar 1960 (by Beeher), February 14,1961, DDR MfAA, Poland Section, A11;780. 54. Abusch to Ulbricht, Fdruary 1,1962, SED ZK, Walter Ulbricht Papers, NL 18214250; and memorandum an Abusch"s visit to b l a n d , unsigned, January 31, 1961, UDR MR, DC-28, file 700, 55. Weise (GDR Embassy) to the SED Central Committee Depadment of Foreign Affairs, March 14,1961, SEB ZM, microfilm FBS 339112495.

56. GDR Embassy report on 1301and for 1961, December 22,1961, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339/ 13496. 57. b u t %(GDR Foreign M i ~ s t r yCultural Departmrtnt) to VValter (Department of Foreign Affairs), August 20, 1962, SED ZK, Department of Literature and Art, microfilm F135 277 (1V 2/996/"i"7). 58. Sikora, Sosiafistisclle Solidarif~tund nationale Interessen, p. 161. 59. Oliuier to tile GDR Frrreign Ministry November 13, 1961, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339113424, 60. W&lf Oxhlies, "Aktionen der DDR-Reaktionen in Osteuropa" (Actions of the GBIZ-reactions in Eastern Europe), in Gerd teptin, ed., Die Ralle der DC3R ifi Osleuropn (The role of the GDR in Eastern Europe), 103-121 (Berlin: Duneker und Humboldt, 1974), p-108. 61. GDR Embassy report on Pot and for 1961, December 22,1963, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339/13496. 62. Report on the situation in the GDR, unsigned, March 31, 1962, PZPR KC, 237/m11-1103. 63. See, for example, Gunttmann report on the visit of 13ZPR members ta the GDR from June 1-29, July 6, 1962, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339113422. 64. Michael Kaser, Comecon: Ir~tegmfionProblems of the Planned Economies (tondon: Bxfc~rdUniversity Press, 196'7), g. 15. 65. Wiese notes of meeting with Borkowski (Second Secretary of the Wroc3aw Party Committee), Octcrber 6,1960, DDR MfAA, Warsaw Embassy, A3725. 66. Nikita Khrrrshchev, Klzrlaslzchezt Remembers: The Last Teshmenl (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974) g. 211-214. 67. Kaser, Comcwrz, pp. 135-136. 68. 13&chel notes of conversation beween Reissig and WichXacz, et al., on January 44,4962, January 16,4962, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339143496, 69. Report on the situation in the GDR, unsigned, March 31, 1962, 13ZPR KC, 237/XXII-1103. 70. Gunttmam report on the visit of 13ZPR members to the GDR from June 1-29, July 6,1962, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339/13422-. 73% Iteport on the GDR, March 34,1962, PZPR KC, 237/XX11-4403; and Helmer notes of meeting beh-een K6nig mflsaranowski on July 14, July 16, 1962, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 539143424. 72. See Christoph Rayen, "Osteuropaische Slaaten" ((East European states), in Hans Aclolf Jaeobsn, Gerd Leptin, Ziilrich kheuner, and Eberhard Schulz, eds., Dreuahrzehnte Aussenplitik h-er DDR, 599439 {hfunich: R. Oldenbourg Verltag, 1979),p. 607. 73. Sieges report on Swiet-%vi& Zone trade, July 11, 1961, BRD AA, Department 7,vol. 439. 74. Sikora, Suzilzlisfiscf~ SulidariMt u ~ ~1ntio:orze;tle d Intercssetz, p. 475, 75. Obsemations on the cletielopment of the GDR economy 1958-1960, and lli361-1965, April 22,4958, SET)ZK, Walter Ulbricht Office, J 111;"2/202-194. 76, MaserI Comecon, p. 105; and Selvage, ""Khrushchev%Nwember 1958 k r l i n Ultimatum: New Evidence from the Polish Archives," p. 249, 77. E Zeifer (Central Committee Department of Machine Manufacturing and Metallurgy) notes on trade negotiations with Poland, September 1,1961, SED ZK, Walter Ulbricht Papers, N L 18211250; notes of the meeting of Polish and East

280

Tbc Bcrti-i.2Watl and Bdle~tCe itz Pulisfz-East German Relatioizs

German delegations, August 14,1961, PZPR KC, 237/V-379; Poland-GDR trade prcyosal, August, 1962, PZPR KC, 2371V-3779; Piotr Jarctszewicz to GornuEb, August 16,1961, PZPR KC, 237/V-379; Zeiler and Carl Eckltoff (Deputy Minister for Foreign and Tntra-German Trade) report ctn trade negotiations with Potand, August 25,1964, SED ZK, Walter Ulbricht Papers, NL 182/4250; and GDR Embassy repc~rton Poland fc~r1961, December 22,1961, SET>ZK, microfilm FBS 339113496. According to this SED repc~rt,the price of Polish coal was nearly twice the cost of coal from the capitalist countries. "28. Ebersbach report: on Polish economic assistance for the CD$ April 2,1962, SE&)ZK, microfilm FBS 33911M91, 79. SED Central Committee Department of Tradef Supply; and Foreign Trade repart on a meeting with Kopczynski (Polish. trade official), October 30, 1961, SED ZK, Walter trlbricht Papers, NI., 18212258. 80. Record of the completion of the Comecon plan, and protocols on fc3reign trade with the socialist countries for 1961, April 25,1962, PZPR KC, 2371V-313. 81, GDR Embassy report cjn Poland for 4961, December 22,1964, SEC>ZK, microfilm FBS 339113496. 82. Karl Mewis tcr Ulbricht, December 21, 1961, SED ZK, Walter Ulbricht Papers, NL 182/96?. 83. Olivier to the SED Central Committee, August 22,1963, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339/ 13496. 84. Sieger report on the political and economic situation in Poland and German-Polish economic relations, May 18,1962, BED AA, Department 7, wc~l.438, 85. From Sl"ar"istiscftesjnlzubrrck der DDR, 4976, 1978 (Statistical Yeahook of the GDR, 1976, 19B), in Phillip I, Bryson, "Rat fiir gegenseitige Wirtschaftshilfe" (The Council of Mutual Economic Assistance), in Hans Adolf Jacobsen, Gerd Leptin, Ulrich Scheuner, and Eberhard Schrrlz, eds., Drei jnlrrzefrrz tc A zissenpolitik drr BDR (Munich: W, Oldenbaurg VerIag, 1979), p. 578. 86. tugenhelm to the GDR Foreign Ministr~June 20,1960, DDR MMA, Warsaw Embassy A3753, 87. Naszkc>wskibriefing for a delegation visit to the GDR, October 12, 1962, PzPn KC, 2 3 ~ ~ - 3 7 9 . 88. Sieger report on the political and economic situation in Pot and and on German-Polish economic relations, May 18, 4962, BRD AA, Department 7, vol. 438. Trade with the West Germany amounted to about 5 percent of Poland" trade, 89. Sieger report on the political and ecctnnmic situation. in Pcjland and Cerman-Polish economic relations, May 18,1962, BRD AA, Department-7 , vol. 438. 90. MoXdt to the GDR Foreign Ministry September 24,1962, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339/ 13496. 91. Naszkowski report for the delegation t c ~the GDR (including a Centrat Committee briefing report), October 12, 1962, PZPR KC, 237/V-379. West Germany" trade with Pctland represented a relatively insignificant 0.7 percent of the FRG's tcrtal trade, 92. Adam QSED Central Committee Bepa&ment of Foreign Affairs) report on the trade negotiations with Poland in 1962, April 13,1962, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339113491.

93, Notes of meeting with Leucht, undated, unsigned, ca. early 1962, SEB ZK, microfilm FBS 339/13491. 94. Naszkowski report for the delegation to the GDf3 (including a Central Committee briefing repc~rt),October 12,1962, FZPR KC, 237"/V-3179. 95, Kctimar (Neuct; f)c.utschlamd cctrrespondent) to Florin, November 27, 4962, SED Z K , micrc~fitmFBS 339/13496. 96. Sikc~ra,Suzialz'sliscf~Solidarr'Mf u ~ ~1nliu:orze;tle d Intercssetz, p. 455. 97, FRG Foreign Ministry report on developments in Bul@ria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, and Hungary April 1-October 31, 1962, November 20, 4962, BKD AA, Uqartment 7, vol. 438, 98. McrXdt report on PZPR policies, September 5,1962, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 33911M24, 99. Moldt to the GDR Foreign Ministry on the current state of Polish-West German rela"tom, Sptember 24,1962, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339113496. 100. Naszkowskl. report for the detegation to the GDR (including a Central Committee briefing report), October 12,4962, PZPR KC, 237/V-379. 101. Kolmar to Florin, November 27,1962, SEE ZK, microfilm FBS 339/13496, 402, Viebig notes of meeting with Pasko on December 43, December 21,1962, SE&)ZK, microfilm FBS 339/13if96. 103. Sikora, Sazialisl.iselze Srzlidan'ldt und nationale Itzl.etesscm, pp. 173-1 75. 184, Documents of the 116th Meeting of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers, Nctvember 8,1962, DDR MR, DC-2O,i/4 634. 405. Naszkowski report for the delegation to the GDR (including a Central Committee briefing regc~d),October 32,1962, PZPR KC, 23';7/V-379; and notes on the prexnt situation in the GDR, unsigned, rmdateb, ca. Octobel; 4962, PZPR KC, 237/XXII-1103; see also Sikora, Sozialisfisclire Salid'dnr-itlz'fand nationale Irtferessen, p. 157". 106. GDR Embassy recammendations for the 130Xish party and government delegation visit to the GDR, undated, ca. September; 1962, SED ZK, mjcrofllirn FBS 339/ 13424, 107. Information on the policies of the ""fraternal parties" of the socialist countries, December 21,1962, SED Z K , IV 2/20/31. 108. Report on the policies of the Polish communist party unsigned, undated, ca. October 1962, SEE) ZK, Walter Ulbricht Papers, NL 482/1254. 109. GDR Embassy recammendations for the Polish party and government delegation visit to the GDR, rmdated, ca. September; 1962, SET> ZK, microfilm FBS 33"3 13424. 110. V. Guttmann (SED Department of Foreign Affairs) to Ulbricht, Octs~ber10, 1962, SED ZK, Walter Ufbricht 13agers,N L 18211252. 111. Naszkow-ski report for the delegation tc:, the GDR (including a Central. Committee briefing report), October 12, 4962, PZPR KC, 237/V-379, 112. ibid. 413. Ibid. 114. 13rotocol of the discussians between the GDR and 130fishdelegatians, October 48, 1962, PZPR KC, 237/XX-1103; see also Sikora, SozialisfiscF~eSoiidarifaf und nationale Interizssen, p. 158.

282

The Bcrti-i.2 Watl and Bdt-e~t Ce itz Pulisfz-East German Relatiotzs

115, 13rotocol of the discussians between the GDR and I3o1ish delegatians, October 18,1962, PZPR KC, 237/XX-1103. 116. MoXmar report, November 4,1962, SEU ZK, microfilm FBS 339113424. 11'7. SED memorandum, unsigned, October 1'7,1962, SET>ZK, Watter UlbrichtPapers, N L 182/6";7. 118. Jnfc~rmationon the policies of the ""fraternal parties" "of the so>cialistcountries, December 21,1962, SEC)ZK, IV 2/20/31. 119, Foreign Ministry report on develtopments in Bulgaria, Czechaslovakia, Poland, Romania, Hungary April 4-October 31, 4962, November 20, 4962, BRD AA, Dqartment 7, vol. 438. 129. Tryhuna Ludrj, January 22,1963, g. 2. 121. Schurnam notes on relations with the Polish government, undated, ca. December 1962, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339113496. 422. Viebig notes on his visit to the West Institute in PoznaA, November 21, 1962, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339/ 13496. 423. Viebig notes on the Prsllish press' November 22, 1962, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339/ 13496, 424. See R, F. Leslie, et al., The Histufy of Pottrnd Since 1863 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 374; and M. M. Bziewanowski, Pola~zdin i"he20th Genluty (New Ycxk: Columbia University Press, 19771, p. 188Ef. 125. Khrushchev, Klzrt-rshchev Renwnzbers: The Last Test-nment-,p. 210. 126. Nikjta Khrushchev; Khrusltchev Renfenfbers:The Clnsnosl Tapes (Boston: tittle, Brown, 1990), p. 148. 127" From Zng~dnienhi mnfetiaty ((r"rc3blemsand Materials) in Sikora, SozinlisliscItc Sc7tidariW t zlrzd nalioiorznte In tercsse~t,pp. 154155.

Conclusion The silut-ltion in I"lllune2 is zt70rse tlrurz 2968 in Czec/wslovakin. ---SEE) Pofitbrrro, October 29802

The Berlh Wall completed the division of Germany: n e r e would be no more crises over Berlin to t h a t r t n the peace in Europe. Until the late 1,98f)s,neiltner the Kredin nor the Western pocvers floaed my more serious djplomatic proposals to reunite Germany The deployment of vast ars e d s of nuclear weapms in the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries in Europe virtually assured that neither side could risk war to chmge the status yuo in Central: Europe. As long as the borders of Poland remained the same, Gomulka did not oppose a Soviet deal with the West to unify Germany Com&a h a r b o ~ dno j,llusions about the SED's willi,ng~~ess to sacrifice better mlations with Poland if &ere was a breakthrough on German unffication and a change in the Oder-Neisse border. Although the Cuhan Missile crisis ushered in a more real,isti,c approach to East-West relations,"the building of the Berlin Wall resulted in a change in East German-Polish relations. TThe Polish and East German communists rcached a detente in the easfy 7,9hOs, but it was a relationship dictated by Moscow and the contingencies of the Cold W, not a of common interests..rheir t-tm""cold war'konthgenuine pa"er&ip ued. Fundamental ideological differences between the SED and the PZPR e Gerpemisted, especially in agricultural and cultural policy. n ~ East mans, Stalinists to the core, demanded that the PZPI collectivize, eschew capitalist loans, clamp down on the Catholic Church, and expunge all such Wstem cultural influences as the Wester21 newspapers that still circulated in Poland.Vut Pofish officials recognized that the SED's dogmatic: socialism and.exoscism oi all real, or perceived bourgeois-capitalist influences would not work in Poland. Rulirzg a people that was deeply Catholic, anti-soviet, and nationatistic, the PZPR took a more opportunistic, realstic approach. Just how litde m a y Polish communists be-

lieved in Marxism was =flecked in what a Polish official told an East German diplomat in late 1962: "A country can also live without perspectives.""is was heresy to the East German communists; to thcm Marxism-Leninism was an absolute blueprint for the future, not merely a. justification for totalitarian dictatorship. ft was Gomulka, not Ubrieht, who had to adjust hir; thinking to the realities of a divided Europe. In the M of 1956, it had loolied to the East Germms as if Gumulka would follow Tito's path ol independence from the Sovi,et Ullion and the otber sodaEst countries. But C;omuika enjoyed much less latitude than nto. Sandwiched between East Germany m d the Soviet Union on the Warsa~iPact" most strategic front, Moscw was not about to let Poland go its own hvay Gomtka signed himself to Ihe division of Europe into two armed camps and recmfirmed Poland's lrzyalty to the VVarsaw Pact. Comulka's domestic policies gradually became more rep~ssivein the early 2 9 6 0 ~and ~ his foreign poficy began to mimic the Kreml-isr". KLrrushchev's fall from power in 1964 circumscribed Comulka's options eve11 furthec Although Gomufka's rise to pocver had s~trprisedand angered m r ~ s h c h e vboth ~ had dabhled in aborted domestic reforms and risky diplomatic garnbits. In the end, Khrushchev was powerless to change the status quo in Germany, and Gomuika's strategy to open Poland to the West had also largely hiled him, He bad no other choice but to rwive Poland" political and economic parherships with the Soviet bloc. In 2965, the editor of the weekly jottrnal Polifyku, Mkczysiaw Rakowski, correctly observed, "What nonsense it was lfor Western journalists to write hiln [Gomu-tkalup as a national communist to try to pass him off as an opponent of the Soviet Union."5 Much to Ulbricht" ssatifaction, these developments vindicated. the SEWS steady Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist course. W t h the East German econonty otrtperfomting the other Soviet bloc countries, it was the SED, not the PZPIC, that now hefd the diplomatic upper hand. New Soviet leader Leonid Brezhev promised a return to the normalcy of the latter years of Stalin" rule. 'The political situation in Central Europe stabilized, antl Gomulka" ppolicics petrified as well, When West Germmy" 'Grand Coatition" began to explore dktente and dipf omatic relations with Potand in the late 1 9 6 0 ~Gomugka ~ took Ul.bricht%hard-lixle, albeit without the SED" vituperative criticism of the FRG's new Osfpitlifik. In light of Polmd's serious ecmomic prclblems at the time, Gomuika was still interested in an expnnsjon of the trade with the FRG." The Prague Spring in 1968 posed a serious threat to this neo-StaXinist order in fie Soviet bloc. As usual, Tilhicht rejected the Czechsslovak reforms, and wged Brezhnev to take military action to stop the contagion from spreading. The Prague Spring presented a bigger dilemma for

Gomuika. He bad avoided a Suvict armed intervention in 1956 by assuring a m s h c h e v that the party wlruld maintain its monopoly on p o w r and keep Poland in the Warsacv Pact. 'The CzCT-'was now ma:king the same promises. Gomu1ka had quietly disapproved of the Soviet invasion oE Hungary not only out of princir>feand the p ~ c e d e n that t it set, but to gain p21bIjC support for his new rkgime. Now Gomu-lka, with public djscontent growing and party factions shaking the foundations of his power, supported a Warsaw Pact intervention into Czechoslovakia, If the Prague Spring had threatened communist rule in Poland or East Germany undoubtedly Ulbricht and Gomulka would have supported military intervention into each other's country as wel. Rrezhev's presence at the PZPR congress in N o v e d e r 1968 solid,ified Gomuib's position within the PZPR for the t h e being, but worker unrest in Gdaiisk led to his downfall tvvcr years later.7 Edvad Gierek succeeded him. The Krernlh forced Ulbricht out in favor of Erich Honecker a year later, in part because of Ulbricht" stubborn rejection of SPD leader k Wecicer did not bring the personal Willy &randtfs05Qditik.G i e ~ and djstrust of their predecessors to the table, and relations normalized mce again h the seventies. Formal and informal exchanges nuw took place more frequentty Worker revolts in Poland in 1976 and the Solidarity strikes in 1980 again alerted the SEX> to the dangers of close ties to Poland, Honecker dosed the border to keep the Soliciarity Movement from s p a d i n g to the GDR. h October 19630, the SED Politburo observed that "the sit-uatian in Poland is worsts than 1968 in Czechoslovakia," Honecker ordered the East German arn-ty to mobilize in case fie Soviets decided use Warsaw Pact troops against Poland.8 The imposition of martial izlw in Poland in December 1981 temporarily stabilized tke political situation, but Polish-East German relations remained tense, In 1985, for instance, the GDR declared an extension of its territorial waters at Swinouj~ciefrom hvo to ten nautical miles, which the ent did not recognize. h several instmces, fie East German coast gtlard fired w m j n g shots to scare Polish boats acvay.Wnd as the economic crisis paralyzed Poland in the late 1980s, more and more East Germans doubted Poland's ability ever to achieve a stable political m d economic system.,Mmy grumbled about the Poles coming across the border to buy up East Germany's precious consumer goods. Soviet leader Mifiail Gorbachev recopized in the late 1980s that the inherent lack of trust between Poles and East Germans was a serious weahess in the Warsaw Pact, VVarsaw Pact commanders h e w that communist propaganda pmmising the allegiance of the pact's natimai forcles to a comrnnn defe12se of socialism was bankrupt of the truth. Not ml,y we= Poles and.East Germans reluctant alliance parhers, but so too were

East Gcrmans and Czechs, Slovaks and Hungarians, and Bullgarians and Rommians. The unity of Ehe Warsaw Pact was a myth, a dangerclus fantasy of:Marxist theory, a leap of faith that Contmw~istideology had ovcrcome lliational allegiances. Gorbachev =cognized that the satellites were contributing li.ttle to Soviet security and were a drag m the Soviet eccmomy. The rcf.lat.ivecosts of maintahhg Stdin's empirc we= just too gxat. When Gorbachev ilbandoned the Brezhnev Doctrine and left the communist governments in Eastern Europe to fend for themsetves, the r&girnesqwickl.y fell. The forxnatim of the Polish Solidari? governmmt in 1989 masked the first t h e in over forty years that a non-commmist g o v e m e n t ruled m East European country. For decades the SED had been trying to shield the GDR from the political deviat.inns that had periodieally surfaced in Poland. :Now without support from the Soviet W o n , the SED was pwerless to stop the rising tide of popdar opposition to cornmw~istrule. Free now to choose their own friends, the new non-communist governments in Eastern Europe immediately abandoned the Warsaw Pact and lined up to join NATO. Although there was some postxold War cooperation beheen Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary (the so-called Visegrad Four), they eschlJwed a joint application to NATO; each country wanted to be judged on its own merits"It was a sign that SOcialist hternationalism had failed to overcome national differences* The voluntary rapprochement that developed between France and West Germany dzlring the Cold War provides an jnstructive comparison to East Geman-Polish rrrlations within the Soviet empire. The p r w d and patriotic French, like the Poles, had good reason to doubt that Germany would ever become a trusted ally.The Frc3nch had ought three w r s with, Germans within seventy-five yearst losing to the Pmssims in 1870, winning a Pyrl-ric victory in World War I, and then cagitulating again in 1,940. Hitler's eMry into Paris and the four-yeas German occupation was the ulitimate humiliation for France, The Poles endured ;m even more h t a l occupation.lo In contrast: to relations among the communist parties in Eastern Europe, the post-war French and West German partnership was nurtured under the umbrella of what Geir Lundestad and J s hLewis Gaddis have called U.S. hegemony by "invitalion."lVtn the late 1,940~~ the Marshall Plan and :NATO helped usher in a new epoch in Franco-German relations. In the 1950s, the European Coal and Steel Community a d the Comrnon Market further cemented the two countries together im unpxlecedented economic cooperation. The French and Gcrmans were able to overcome their linguistic, cultural, and historic differences and find a common bond in the economic and pcttitical future of Western Europe.

The East Germans and Pdes had. no such opportunity, fnJithout the presence of the Soviet army in Centrd Europe after World War 11, the East German and Polish communist rkgiunes would not have come to power. East Germans and Poks werc su:bjected to illegitimate communi.st dictatorships imposed upon them by the Soviet Unicm, and ~laticmsbetweetn the rkgixnes m d the peoples in the Soviet empire did not develop naturally, Because the communist parties in Poland and East Gerrnany newer trusted the other, it is hardly surprising that there was no reemciliation between the two peoples, either. Marxist educators confronted none of the national conflicts in a meaningl"u1way, and communist propaganda also blurred the many conflicts between the SED and the FZPR, R e East Germm cornmmnists could coerce their people into silent obedience to Marxist ideology, They could inculcate and brainwash, but they could not educate. No signrfcant (jroundswell for Stalin"~style of socialism came from thc people anywhere in Eastern Eurclpe, least of all h Poland. Repressive and authoritarian in their methods, m d rigidly dogmatic and fundamentalist in their idcdogy the zealous East Gerntan communists m d e .few converts to socialist internationalism. Gornu;l.ka%vision that the Polish people could find their way to socialism also proved to be an illusion, but at least for a time the PZPR allowed a more open and honest debate about relations with the SED. After witnessing the recurrent upheavals in Poland in 1956, 1968, 3970, 1976, and 1W8, however, the East German communists viewed the PZPR" mom flexible and liberal socialism as a complete hilure. The ""cold war" "Wen the Ubricrht and Gomugka rkgimes was yet mother division in the communist world that so many Western scholars and policymakers, especially for the first two decades after the war, perceived as a monolithic movement directed by Moscow. Polycentrism happetned k m the inside, regardless of kYhether or not the West encouraged it from the outside, Aggl-essive Western policies to subvert communist solidarity may have made Soviet leaders more reluctant allow the satellites the latitude that r(hrushcl-cev briefly gave them in the mid1"350s, Given the strategic impmtanw of East Germany and Poland to the Soviet Union, however, the Kremlin codd not allow the problems in East German-Polish relations to develop into an open break. It almost carne to that in 1956. There is little doubt that, if left on their own, relations betwcen the East German and Polish c m m u ~ ~ i swould ts have gone the way of the %to-Stalin split in the late 194Qs,or th Sho-Soviet break in the early 1960s. The strained East German-Polish relationship after the World W;;rr 11 pmvides further evidence that the communist pasties oi Eastern Europe

could not supplant national I~yattieswith Marxist internationalism,Even the leadership and the rank and file of the SED and t-he PZPR remained staunchly nationalist. The rapid disintegration of the Warsaw Pact after 1989 and the civil wars in Yugosl.avia, in the 1990s reveal just how dysfunctional this socialist brotherhocrd really was.

1. Michael Kubina and Manfred Wilke, "Pas Mosaiksteinchen Polen 1980/81, Verantwortungsgemeinschaft in Deutschland" (The Mc~saicStone Poland, 1980-81. The Responsible Community in Germany), in Klaus Schroeder, ed., Gcsc7tliclzte t-lnd Transforrnafion~lzdes SED-Sfnntes (History and transformation of the SED State) (Berlin: Ah2dmie Verlag, l994), pp. 151-1 52. 2. See Mare Trachtenberg, A GansfnrcfedPeace: T l ~ M e ~ k i n gcftlle Ezlropean Sefflemertt 1945-1963 (Prineetcm: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 3138. Trachtenberg wrote that "the threat of general nuclear war, which had loomed so large in 1961 and 1962, now faded into the backgrormd, The Cold War had become a different kind of conflict, more subdued, more modulated, more artificial, and above all, less terrifying"; see also John Lewis Gaddist We Now Know: Retlzink-ing Cold War History, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997, p. 261, 3. Viebig notes on the Polish press, November 22,1962, SED ZK, microfilm FBS 339113496;; and Viebig report on the lectures by Bogusz and Kosicki in the GDR from December 4-14, December 27,1962, SED ZK, micrc>filmFBS 339113422. 4. Viebig notes of meeting with Pasko on December 13, December 21, 1962, SED ZK, micrc>filmFBS 339113496. 5. Quoted in Nichalas BetheEl, GumuPkca, His Polartd and His Coitnmzlr~ism(London: Longmans, Green and CO,,1%Q), p. 253. 6. Miehaef J, Sodaro, MUS~"L)'IO~ Ccrmnzzy, nalzd the West from Khrudrclzczt to COTbckclzev (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990) pp. 9498,145. 7. Erwin Weit, Qslblack intern: 13 J~tzl.eDalmctsclzer f i r die polr'~isclt~ hrfei-zrnd Stckatsfiihstdng (Inside the East bloc: Thirteen years as interpreter fur the Polish Par.ty-and gc>vernmentleadership) (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe Vertag, 19"70), p. 187; and Konrad Syrop, 1301azzd in Perspective (Lsndon: Robert Hale, 1982), g. 198. 8. Kubina and Wilke, "Das Mosaiksteinchen Polen 1980/84," pp. 454-452. 9. See Ma&in McCautey, ""Soviet-GDR Relatiom under Gorbachev,'" East Centml Ezlrope, no. 14-45 (1987-4988), p. 4'70. 10. Certainly one cannot overlook the fact that there were signif cant cultural and historical differences beh-een the Germans who ended up in the FRG, such as the Ixhinelanders and Bavarians, and the Germans in the GDR such as the Saxons and the Prussians. But as a result of communist rule, these East Germans tzrere never given the opportunity to foster new friendships with Poles on a free and voluntary basis. 41. See John Lewis Gaddis, "The Cold War, the Long Peace, and the Future," in Geir Lundestad and Odd Arne Westad, eds., Bqond trlte Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 193), p. 42.

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Kersten, Krystyna. "19956-The Turning Point,'" In Odd Arne Westad, Sven Haftsmark, and Tver B. Neumann, eds, The Soviet Union in EasCertz Europe, 3945-4989,4742. New b r k : St. MarZ.in%Press, 1994. Kubina, MichaeS, and Manfred MriXke, "Das Mosajksteinchen Polen 198Qi81.Verantwortungsgemeinschaft in Deutschlanb" (The mosaic stone Poland, 1980-81. The respc~nsiblecommunity in Germany). Tn Klaus khroederf ed., Gescfticlzie ur2d Ea~sfi~rmnfioior?en d~i.sSED-f tnafes (History and transformatim of the SEB Slate), 149-165, Berlin: Akadernie Verlag, 1994. Krisch, Henry. "Vc3rsteLlungen ucln k6nitiger aussenpolitischer Qrientierung in der SBZ bis 1947 und ihre Auswirkungen auE die spgtere Aussenpolitik der DDR" "f~oepts of the future foreign policy orientation in the %>vietoccupation zone to 1947). In Hans Adoff Jacobsen, G a d kptin, Ulrich Scheuneu; and Eberhard SchuXz, eds., Drei JallrzeltrzteArkssenpolitik dcr BDR, 37-49. Munich: R, Oldenbuurg Verlag, 1979. Loth, Wilfried. "Die Historiker und die Deutsche Frage: Ein Rgckblick nach dem Ende des kalten Krieges" (The historians and the German question: A took back after the end of the Cold War). In Wlfried Loth, ed., BB Beutsclzlnnd Frage irz d ~ NacI~kriegszeit, r 11-28, Berlin: Akadernie Verlag, 19%. . ""Salin" Plans for Past-War Germany."Yn Francesca Cori and SiXvio Pons, eds., Tke SouieI. Union and Ezrrope in Clze CoM Wai., 3943-53, 23-36. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996. Marsh, Peter. "Foreign Poticy Making in the German Democratic Repubtic." Tn EZames Adomeit, ed., Fc3reigl.r Potiq Mnki~zgin C~mmzlt2isiCoun$ricsr79-144. Idondon:Saxon House, 1979. Mastny, Vojteck. "We Are in a Bind? Polish and CzechosLovak Attempts at Reforming the Warsaw Pact, 19561959," hBulteCi?z:Cold War 1tzternntim.znlHisto~y Project, no. 11 (winter 1998): 230-250, McCautq, Martin. "Soviet-GDR Relatians under Gorbachev.'" East Centml Europe 1&15 (1987-1 988):$61482. Mietkowska-Kaiser, Ines. ""Zur brGderfichen Zusslmmenarbeit zwischen pofnischen und deutschen Kommunisten und Antifaschiisten nach dem Sieg Eber den deutschen Faschismus (1945-4949)" (On the fraternal cuc~perationbeh-een the h l i s h and German communists and anti-fascists after the victory over German fascism, 1945-1949). lahrbuclr filr Ceschidite der soziatisfisef&i~~z t$~-zder Europns (Yearbook for the history of the socialist countries of Europe) 23, no, 1 (1979):49-67, Moretan, Edwina. ""Foreign Policy 13erspectivesin Eastern Europe." h Karen Dawisba and Philip Hartson, eds., SovieC-East Ezrropean Dz'lcnfwras:Coercion, Compefifion,n ~ Cd o n s et,~ 172-2434. London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1983. Mclrrison, James F. '/The Foreign Policy of Poland," In lames Kuhlmann, ed., The Fal.eig-12 hlicies of East Europe: Dameslic and InCernatiorzlaZ Delerritzirznnfs, 12%165. Leyden, Netherlands: A. WeSijihoff, 497%. Musely, 13hilip E. "Introduction: Power and Xdeoloa in the Communist States." In Adam Bromke, ed ,,The Commzar2is"s;liaiiesat !he Crossroads: Betr~leerzMC~,SC~ZU and Pelting, 3-20. New York: Frederich A, Praeger, 1965.

Nairnark, Norman. ""Te Soviets and the Christian Democrats, 1945-1949,'" In Francesca Gori and S-ilvioPons, eds., 7"ke Soviet Union nlzd Ezlr~pein flze Cold Wnl; 1943-;53,37--56, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996. Narinskij, Michail M. "The Scwiet Union and the Berlin Crisis." h Francesca Gori and Silvio Pons, eds., The Soviet Uniorz and Eurape in the Cold War, 1943-53, 57-75. New Ycfrk: St. Martin" Press, 1996. Oschlies, Wolf. ""Aktimen der DDR-Reaktionen in 0steuropa""Actions of the GDR-reactions in Eastern Europe). In Gerd teptin, ed,, Die Ralte der DDR ifi Osfezirupln (The rc~leof the GDR in Eastern Europe), 103-121, Berlin: Dunekes und Hzxmboldt, 1974. P~czkc)wski,Andrzej. "The Polish Contribution t c ~the Victory of the 'Prague CoupYn February 1948," fillet in: Cold War 11ztemntimznl Hz'stuty Project, no, 11 (W-inter1998), 141-148. Raack, K, C. "Stalin Plans His Past-War Germany." jourrlat of6opttemporny kil'storp 28 (1993):53-73, Royen, Christoph. "Osteuropaisehe StaatenP"(East European states). In Mans AdoXE Jacabsen, Gerd Leytin, Ulrich kheuner, and Eberhard khulz, eds., Drei jnhrzeh~teA~rssertpulitikder DBX, 594-619. Munich: K, Okdenbourg Verlag, 1979, Rupiieget; Hermann-Josef. "Verpasste Chancen? Ein Rgckblick auf die deutschland-politischen Verhandlungen, 1952-1955" (Missed chances? A look back at the German political negotiations, 1952-1955). In Wilfried Loth, ed., Ilk l;teufsdzttrndFrnge in der Nnchkr-icgszeit, 14-28. Berlin: Akademie 'Weslag, 4994. Schulz, Eberhard. "New Developments in Intra-blojc Relations in Historical Perspective." In Karen Dawisha and Philip Manson, eds., Soviet-East Europeaerzz DiEemnzas: Coercio?z,Comyetz't.i"a~z, and Consent, 4140. London: Heinernann Fducational Bcxtks, 4981, %t\rage, Douglas. "Introduction'" to "mrushchev 'S November 2 958 Berlin Ultimaturn: R;"ew Evidence frc>mthe Polish Archives." Bitlrrth: Cold War J~Lternafiotznl Histoty Project-,no, 2 1 (winter 1998), 20&203. Starreis, John M., and Anita M. Malfinckrc~dt.""Eat Germany's Fc~reignPolicy." In James Krrhlmann, ed,, The F"0reigl.rhticies of East Etirap~:Du~nesficarid Internfitpnal Defemtinnnts, 79-107. Leyden, Netherlands: A. W. Sijithoff, 1978. Stefancic, David. "The Kapacki Plan: A C a s Study of East European Diplomacy." East Eurol~ea~z Qzlarferly 21, no, 4 (January 1988): 401412. Trepte, Mans-Christian, ""Polish Literature and CuLture in East Germany: A Window to the West?" Tf1eX"oEislz Review 16, no. 1 (1996): 6%72, Wettig, Gerhard. "The Soviet Union and Germany in the Late Stalin Period, 1950-3." In Francesca Guri and Silvio Puns, eds., The Soviet Idlzion and Ezirok~e izz the Cold W r , 1943-53,357-31711. New Ycfrk: St. MartinPsPress, 1996. Wiatr, Jerzy. "Kryzys intezrnacjonalizmll" (International crisis)? Nuwe Drogi (New Paths) 10, nos. 11-12 fNc)vember-December 1956): 109-1 17. Wilke, Manfred. ""Kommunismus in Deutschland und Kahmenbedingrrngen pafitischer Handefns nach 1945" (Communism in Germany and the contingencies of political exchange), In Manfred Wilke, ed., Rnatamr'~der krt-eizel?t d e : Die KPBISEB ntlfde~rlMreg zur Maclzt (Anatomy of the central

party office: The KPD/SED on the road to power), 13-48. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1998. Wozniak, Peter. "Blut, Erz, Kohle: A Thematic Examination of German Propaganda on the Silesian Question during the Interwar Years." East European Quarterly 28 (September1994):319-334.

Newspapers and Periodicals Einheit Deutsche Volkszeitznng Gtos Ludu Neues Derttschland N m e Drugi Polifyka Trybuna Ludu

Index

Abusch, AIexandex; 265 Ackermam, Anton, 29(n70), 126 Adenauer; Kcmrad, 60,171(nn 50,531, 49,11111,185,123, 1;2' , 174,484, 186,204,219(~59),246,254 Africa, 254 Agriculturfr?,116,144,161,179(n72), 190,191, 197,229,231,232, 242-243,245,264,270,272,283. See also Collectivization; Foodstuffs Agsten, Rudolf, 121,194-1 95 Albania, 272 AXbrecht, Jerzy 234 Albrecht, Stanisjaw, 120 Allied Control Commission, 41,43 Allied foreign ministers ccjnfewnce (19471, 41,42 Anti-Semitism, 1017, 127; 136, 143, 190 "Anti-Saeialist Staternrtnts in the Pal ish Press," 124 Arms raee/reductiong 207-208,242 Art/literatur, 105,119,224, 225,226, 246,247,265-266,274 Asia, 251 Assassins tions, 14 Athtetes, 149,226 Atomic bomb, 60,187. See also Nuclear weapons Auschwitz, 10% 119 Austria, 10,14, 98, 101,206

Axen, Hermann, 25Cn12), 106,127, 137,206 Bnjyk (Polish ship), 188 Bartet, Waller, 36-37 Earth, WilZi, 227,228 Baum, Bruno, 126,25fS(n82) k l a r u q 44,32,37 k n e 9 , Edvard, 16 Beria, Lavrenti, '1"2fn53),N(n84) arrest of, 74(n90) Berlin, 13,41,45, 124 Berlin crises (1958/1961), 244-213, 254,259 Berlin Wall, 254, 264,263,268, 271, 274,283 blockade of, 20,43,52,85,% East Berlin, 66,97, 100,206,263 West Berlin, 59,86, 101, 135, 193, 211,215,223 (nn 82,83), 229,233, 238(n55), 269 Berman, Jakub, 12,116 BiePctkc>wski,Mrtadysjaw, 313,235, 276 Bierut, Boleskavv; 12,20,38,54(photo), 54, 58,62,62,65,67, 81, 89, 403, 123,1 44,2384n49) death of, 108,114 visit to Berlin, 56 Black lung disease, 17'0 Black market 483

Botz, Lothar, 68,100,1Q1, 202,106, 110fn1g), 170, 191,205,208,209, 231,248 and Rapacki, 251-252. Brandt, Witly, 285 Brezhnev, Leonid, 284,285 Brezhnev Doctrine, 286 Brodzki, $tanislaw 22,45,53,62, 150-151 Brownouts, 2 (45 Bruns, Withelm, 8(n7) Brus, Whdzirnierz, 2 56(n77) Brzezinski, Bigniiew, 2-3,4,29(n76) Buhler, Phiflip, 47n29) Bulganln, Nicholai, 117,166 Bulgaria, 8(n4), 15,20,114,192,225, 286 Burgin, I., 67 Bymes, lames, 37,38,39 BZ am Abe~zH,126 Canada, 267 Cath~3licChurch, 40, 41,1Ot3,118, 145-146,14t3, 157(n89), 190,191, 226228,234,235,242,2123-244, 2M-265,283 CDIJ. See Christian Democratic Union Cement, 2193 Censorship, 5,63,139,124,2 26,136, 150,229,246,265 Chemicals, 159,230,267,268,263, 2"7,274 Children, 78,812,173 China, 2/60, 242,148,168,252, 258(n82), 272, 287 Christian Democratic Union (CDU), 13, 16,36,40,43,48(n42), 57; 66, 71Qn49), 162 Churchill, Winston, 16, 32, 33, 37 Cigarettes, 488 Class conflict/strug& 146, 191,223, 224,225,226,227 Coal, 28, 78,234, 85,86, 87, 88,89, 90(n31), 93(n89), 101, 460, 2 61-163,1(45,166,269,176Qn2),

178(n314), 179(n72), 292,193,213, 214,215,236,221(nn 82,84), 266, 267,268 brc3wn cuaX, 162,167-3 68,169,392, 275 coal miners, 162,1(;3,1'1"0 prices of, 9J(n87), 160, 462,230, 268,271 Cctblentz, Gaston, 58 Coke, 85,86,88, 89,94(n110), 218,160, 163,363, 167,169,1214,267,268, 271 Cold War, 2, 3, 65,194,207, 283, 286, 28S(d) Collectivization, 5,88, 144-146, 148, 179(n72), 497 231,232,234, 242-243,247,283 Comecon. See Council of AMutual Economic Assistance Cominfc~rm,17; 19,23,29(n76), 141 Common Market. See European Common Market Communist Party of Germany QKPID), 3, 22-1 3, 14,15, 16,26(n22), 36, 83 and expelled Germans, 76-77 fc3unding of, 13 and Nazi-Sviet pact of 1939,14 and Oder-Neisse border, 31,32, 33, 4Q,42 Communist Party of Poland. (KPf)), 11-12,13,24(nn 3, 4), 32 dissolutic>nof, 214-115 Concentratim camps, 13,188 Consumer items, 86,88,117,140,163, 468,193,214,220(n64), 268, 270, 272,285 Cottbus, 224 Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), 82,817, 162,163,166, 167, 292,213,214, 243,2@, 2170 Coups d%tat, 11,43,117 CPSU. See %>vietUnion, Communist Party Cracow / Cracawian;sj,78

Credit(s), 16?, 168, 169, 192, 194,214, 243,2623,271 Cuba, 260,274,283 Cult of personal it^ 123,125, 134, 190 Cultural issues, 196 253,264,266, 272, 274r 283, See also under East German-Polish relatiom Currency, 192, 193,245 Cyrankiewicz, Jcizef, 19,220,21,22, 25(n13), 54,67,80,88, 100, 101, 10fif162,169,1t3(j,191,193,206, 231,249,254,261,266,271,274 photos, 553,272,273 and Pieck, 55-56 CzCP. Set?Czechoslovakja, Communist Party Czechoslovakia, 14, 18,20,43,%, 96, 98,999, 1Q4,106,111(n40),162, 186,205,2O7,208,213,2f;lf 286 Communist P a r y (CzCX"),26(n22), 99,100,254,285 Prague Spring, 284-285 See also ur2dcr German Demc>cratic Republic; Poland Czechon, Jbsef, 137 Czepuck, Harri, 151-1 52 Czesak, Jhzef, 195,211 Dahlern, Franz, 22,25(n13), 29(nn 70, 82),41,43,67, 138--139 Dalf in, Alexander, 24(nI 0) David, Vaclac: 205 DBD. See German Derno>cratic Peasant Party Defections, 120, 191 de Gaulie, Charles, 251 Demel, Rudi, 166 Denmark, 93(n87), 22Q(nE;O),246 Dertinger, Gwrgii, 43, 55,56,57,6Q, 63,66,71 (n49), 80 l;teul.sc/leVirtkszeifz~ng,32,33,77 Dieckmann, Jc>hannes,168-1 69,187' Die Well, 1Q2,454 Die Welt am Sonlz fag, 165 mu$&, Qstap, 81-82 Dobrzycki, WiesEaw, 50Qn90)

Dadin, $tanislaw, 66 Ilrnp.1~~lacllQsle1.z policy 33 Drechster, Suzamr?, 142-143,145,151, 167,174,189 Dulies, j o b Fsjster, 123,212,219(n59) DWK. See German Economic Commission Dzer2Aski, Feiiks, 24(n3), 74(n83) DziewanctwsEri, M. K,, 26(n26) East German-Polish relations, 16, 22-23,61--65,%, 99,100, 122, 175,194,286 cmfrontation of sailors, 188 cultural issues, 5,62,64,68, 403-108,119, 438-444,152,493, 212,224-226,229,244248 dktente in, 253-254,283 East Germans' ignorance of Poland, 18,19,62, 105,244 East Germanskpinians of Poles, 1, 18, 34,61, 62,122 East German surveillance of Polish visi.tc>rs,120, 141 economic cooperation, 82-83, 84--89,Z 08,159,360,163,165, 214,229,230,267,268,270,271, 272,274,275. See ailso Rade, Prjland and GDR and European security, 97, See also Security issues exchange of professionals and students, 100 and family reunification, 80,84, 170,172 -2 72. See also Repatriation issue and German unification, 7, See also Germany, unification of and ideulo@catissues, 5--6,62,83, 127,142,143, 189,199,209,216, 223,241-242,262,265,272 main issues cmcerning, 5-63 and nuclear energy"fW(n57) and Bder-Neisse border, 5,53,77, 8%84,104,108, 446. See atso Oder-Neisse border

Poleskoginiom of East Germans, 1, 4, 59,62, 78, 105,145, 24-245, 247,267 restrictions on persc>nal encormters, 63-64,67-68, 73(n69>,1Q1,103,125,138,140, 141,149,489,1%3,214,231,245 Soviet influence on, 4-5,23,33,39, 5% 80,86,1104,287 and transit costs, 230. Sce also Tradef transit fees travel restrictions, 125, 139, 149, 1170,172,190,196,236, 231,1245 visits to East Germany /Poland, 62, 10&10'7, 119, 120, 190, 193, 196, 226,230,245-246,274 and "Week of German-Polish Friendship," 106,118,119,225 and "Week of Progressive German Culture," "4 Sce also Polish Military Mission in Berlin; Socialist Univ P a r 5 of Germany, and PZPR Ebert, Fridrich, 128, 140 Ecanamic Commission for Europe, 97 Economic embargo, 86,87,88 Ecanomists, 156(n?i") ECK. See European Coal and Steel Cornrnunlty Education, 224,237(n37), 243. See also Students Egypt, 97 Ei~lzeif~ 20, 195-1 96 Eisenhowel; Dw ight, 204,212 Elections, 13,23,37,39,41,49(n72), 60,82,98,14~144,1%, 208,254 Engels, Friedrich, 1 Euratom, 187 European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), f;0,72(n53),286 Eurc~peanCommon Market, 187,208, 270,2867 Execultic~ng44, 19, 20,25(m 14,16), 73(n71), 128 Ex-N aziuinecy-Nazi, 16, 47,27(n43), 263,264

Exports, 18 Expres WiecsornyJ135

FDJ. See Free German Youth FDR See Federat Republic of Germany, Free T)emo>craticParty Fechner, Max, 35,37,38,44 Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), 5, 57,59, 65,"i", 80,82, S";", 92(n63), 100,116, 120, 150,151, 353,161,167,171,206,232, 251-252,264,272 agriculture in, 1242. East Germans going to, 233,245, 247,253,259,260. See nlso Berlin, Beriin Wall economy, 209,267,269, See nlso Standard of living emigation of Germans in Poland to, 175,381fnn 107,11G), 288(n10) Foreign Ministry 81, 102,198,275 fc3reign policy of, 101,284, 285 formation of, &,52,72(n53) and France, 286 Free Democratic Party (FDP), 208 and Oder-Neisse border, 102,485, 209,211,250,275 Osrpolilik of, 284, 285 packages to Poland by West Germans, 92(n63) and publications sent to Germam in Poland, 173 rearmament of, @2,71 (n5Q),96,983, 99,101, 105,1137,249,250, 261 recogni"Ean of, 61,185 trade. Sce Trade, GDIX and FRG; Trade, Poland and FRG/ Western nations See nlso Poland, and FRG Fierlinger; Zdenek, 187 Films, 225,24F;?48,2255(n3) Finland, 97, 444 Fischer; AIexandel; 8(n4), f;9(n19) Fishing rights, 57-58 Florczak, B i p i e w , 124

Florin, Peter, 64,81,98-99,107, 141, 148,150,163,167,189,228,1243 Flour, 267 Ftxrdstuffs, 267,271. See also Agriculture Ford Foundation, 196,246 Frrreign policy; 3, 422, Sce also zkrtder Federal Republic of Germany; German Demc>cratieRepubtic; 1301and France, 16,36,43,65,110fn1 g), 197, 206,207, 225,286. See nlso under Poland Fr~.anvurferAllgemeine Nnctzrichlen, 116 Free German Youth (FDJ), 58,266 FRG. Sce Federal Republic of Germany Fritzche, Rudolf, 473 Fufbrook, Mary, 5' 11lQn46) Gaddis, John Lewis, 72(n53), 74(n90), 2% Gajda, Eugeniusz, 2 Galinski, Tadeusz, 265-266 Gdansk, 13,15,40,78,122,165,230, 263,285 GDR, Sm C a m a n Demc>cratie Republic Gdynja, 238 Gede, Tadeusz, 86 Geneva Conference (1955), 101 German Demcratic Peasant Party (D-BD), 145 German Democratic Republic (GDR), 1 army, 102-103,111 (n46), 187-188, 225,263,273 collectivization in, 144-1 45, 146, 243,245,247, See nlso Collectivization in Comecon, 87 and Czechosfovakia, 40,104, 109(n1;7), 160,199,2206, 209, 220(n65), 229,274 economic relations with Soviet Union, 87

economy, 66,85,87,95(n114), 120, 142,160,161, 162, 166,169,187, 192,213-214,251,267,269,27t, 284. See also East GermanPrjlish relations, eecjnomic cooperation Evangelical Church in, 227 exodus of East Germans, 233 Frrreign Ministry, 57, 63,64, 99, 100, 103,104, 106,115, 117, 119, 126,139,150,359-1 60,162,172, 197,4%, 199,205,207,225,232, 24,246,252 fc3reign policy of, 3,5,24,97; 1'7Z3fn43),251-252 fc3rmation of, 23 igrants from 130fand in, 79,424,171,1';75,481(nn 107, 116), 233,234,288fn10) 85,86, 87,89, 159, imports/expc~~s, 160, 163,167, 176(nll), 179(n69), 213,1267. See nlso Trade industry in, 29(n&8),84,92(nt46), 162, 165, 177(n20), 230,267 Kutturbztnd in, 18 Ministry af Educatic~n,107; 120 Ministry of Foreign and Domestic Trade, 73(n69) Parliament, 274 Polish students in, 107,120,138 population, 130(n32) Quartered People" Police QKVP), 1Q2 reeagni"Ean of, 52,59, 61,97,98, 206 reeagnition of Oder-Neisse border by, 53 security pc~lice,67 sovereignty of, 69(n6), 914,97 %>vietarmy in, 123 Writes's Congress in, 247 See also East German----Polish relations; Press, East German; Socialist-Unity Pal.t.y of Germany; Soviet Union, and GBR/SED

German Economic Comrnissian (DWK), 85 German Evangelical Church, 91(1141) German-Polish Friendship Society, 105 Germany Bizune/"Trizone in, 42,43 collective German guilt, 16,18 industrial capacity of, 83 Parliament, 98 Poles with German citizenship in, 183(n143) tmop withdratzrals from, 211-242, 2113jn21) rmification of, 7;43,46,58,59,60, 65,66,71(n53), 74(n90), 75(n92), 96, 98,99,100, 101,105, 109(n2), 251,186,188, 292,198, 204, 205, 20'7,208,211,212,219(n59), 229, 253,262,264,283 western border of, 36 See also Federal Republic of Germany; German Democratic Republic; Weimar Republic; VVarid War I11 Gierek, Eduard, 285 Clos Lttdzt, 15, 16, 2 9,21, 27(nn 40, $11, 34, 38,39, 40,41,42,44, 76, '77; 78, 84,85 GtGckauf, Erich, 144,186185 Gold, 189,192 Gornulka, Wiad ys2awf 5-6, 15,17, 20-21,26(n27), 31,35,37-38,76, 78, 82, 83, 138,142,143--144,145, 147,157(n89), 175,486,206,207, 210,241,254,2N arrest of, 20,29(ni"Ci),67,303, 123 and Berlin Wall, 262 foreign economic policy of, 164-169,245 and FRG, 261 and firushchev, 434,152,499,212, 234,254,261,265, 2,66,276,284, 285 native communist g o u p of, 24(n6)

and O d e ~ N e i s s eborder, 34,38,42, 322,253,263,283 photos, 272,273 and Prague Spring, 284285 repressive palicies of, 236235, 275--2%' 215.1, retui-n to pclwer of, 101,145, 116-127,122-127,229,164 and Sclviet Union and Soviet bloc, 199,250,258(n82), 276,284 speech to GDR Part iarnent, 274 speech to PZPR Eighth Plenum, 126 and TTito, 20, 123, 135,284 and Ulbricht, 7,123,140, 448,152, 165,175,190-198,199,213,214, 215,216,217(n14), 228-232,250, 263,272-276 and Warsaw Pact, 262 See also under Stalin, jasef Gorbachev, Mikhail, 285,286 GiirXicE.1, Joachirn, 131(n56) Gotmald, Klement, 26(n22) Gbtzl, Edvard, 244 Grabska, Wirginja, 2Q-263 Great Britain, 14,42,43, 496,197,206, 225,251,269 Greece, 42,246 Gromyko, Andrei, 72(n53) Grcjnowski, t u d w i k, 233,244 Grosse, Fritz, 63 Grcjtewohl, Btto, 29(n6(3),53(phcjto), 55,@2,61,67-68, "i"(n49), 97 106, 319,1'72,391,194,206,238,233, 243 and CUR economic relationtihip and Poland, 85-86,87,88,89, 162-163,265,169 and Bder-Neisse border, 33,35,37; 38,4$0,41,43,44, 53, 56 prcyosaX for German conffideration of, 204,207,209 visit to Moscowt 140 GrGnberg, Gottfried, 420,121 Grune&, Harst, 65 GrGnstein, P-ierbert, 118

Grunwald, Battle of (3 410), 15 Guben, 32,35,147 Hafranke, Ursula, 247-248 Hallstein Doctrine, 101,185 Hamburg, 392,121 6 Handke, Georg, 148 Hgnisch, Wemer, 2, 2 09(n17) Harbars, 191-192,229-230,270 Harich, Wolfgang, 149-151 , 1.52' 157(n109), 197 Hgmler, Eugen, 2 2 9 Hegen, Josef, 145,146,148-1 49,173, 187,192, 496, 198,206,209, 223, 1229,234,235,242,250,265 Heinrich, P-ic~rst,233 Helmut-von-Gertach Society (Berlin), 19 Herald KFzr ne, 58 Herrnstadt, Rudol f, 67 Herwig, Hans Joachim, 63 Heymannl Stefan, 59,65,96,9;7,98, 99,100,104,107,115-116, 11rj--117,11tS---119,122,135j144, Il;cr, 161,4(-;2,1t;3,164,470,171, 2 72,180(n88), 186, 198,233 replacement of, 108,117; 448-449 Hitler, Adof ff 13, 32-33, 77, 105, 2 21, 244 Honeckeu; Erich, 58,294,285 Hungary 20,26(n29), 84,87; 106,123, 125,126,437,139,149t 441;,166, 192,261,286 revolt in, 127-129, 434,147, 2 85-186,285 Iazhboravshia, Inessa, 3,29(n76) Ideolc>gicatissues. See under. East German-Polish relatiom Imprisonments, 25(nn 13,14), 71(n49), 423,149,15%"(n1W) India, 97 Intefleduals, 116, 447, 128, 437,149, 2 50,196,224,241,273 Investments, 161 Iron ore, 85,89,214,215,267 Italy, 314,246

Iwaszkiewicz, Jaroskavv; 235,246 Izydorczyk, Jan, 25(n33), 5 7 , 6 4 , 6 , 6748,80,88,96,97,137-138, 148,204 Jakubc~wska,HeXena, 67,305 Jakubowski, Jan (Polish official), 147, 194 Janke, Walter, 157(n409) Jews, 10,12, 223, 243. See also AntiSernitism Jogiches, Leo, 13,14,24(n3), 56 Joint ventures, 266,275 Kaiser, ja kob, 47(n217), 51(R I 13) Kanet, Roger, 3 Karl Marx University, 138 Karst, Roman, 140,143-450 Kashubians, 78 Katyn Forest massacrer 35,315,136 Keilson, Max, 67 Kennedy, John Er 260 Kemey Patrick, 51(n109) KEtrushchev, Nikjta, 24(n7), 66, 69(n6), 17$(n83), 401,134 (n40), 128, 2 41,161f239(n69), 259,261, 287 purges of, 199 secret speech to CPSU (1956), 408, 115,137,163 and Titc), 114 ultimatum of 2 958,212,230, 233, 254 virgin lands program of, l44 93(n817), 122, visits to PoXand, !B3, 427,234,249 See also under Gomdka, Wjad yslaw; Ulbricht, Walter Missinger, Henry, 219(n59) Kliszkc), Zenun, 223,265 Matwin, Lesla~r;5,9(n13) Koehler; Bruno, 36,83-84 Koenen, Bernard, 136 Koestler, Arthur, 137 K&okowski, Leszek, 149,234,276 Kopa, Stanisgaw, 2 2 5, 2 21,139,144, 450,248

Koplowitz, Jan, 246247 Korean War, 2, SO, C75 Kowaltski, Artuu; 127,185,206 KPD. See C~omrnunistParty of Germany KPP. See Communist Party of Poland k a h n , Karl, 206,223,273 Krutizewski, Anthany, 47fn29) Kuczynski, Jiirgen, 72(n59) Kiifz, MliXhelrn, 43 Kundermann, dnne, 65,81 Kupis, Tadetrsz, 2 38 Kurelfa, Alfred, 246,1248 KVP. See German Demc>csatie Republic, Quartered Pec>plets Police Lange, Oskar, 195,218 Langendorf, Kurt, 196 lEJasota,Eligiusz, 151-1 52 LBP. See Liberal Democratic Party Lebeizsraum, 33, 2% Legi:iZimaeyIillegitimacy2,21,23, 59, 60,74(n84), 141,287 Lehmann, Hans Ceorg, 48(n30), 89fn3) Lcqziger Zcilu~zg,18 Leipzig, 238 Leipzig Trade Fairs, 106, 3 89,231, 246,266,271 l ~ m r n e r Ernst, , 36,51(n113), 56-57' Lenin, V. I,, 4,11, 491,197,209, 270-271 Leuscher, Ifruncl, 54, 8s5,268 Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), 13, 40,43,57,66,811,121 Liehknechl, Karlt, 14,25(n26), 152 LiXje, Hans, 228 Loanslgrants, 296,220,283 Eo'bc>dycz,Miec~ystaw~ 124,139,141 Loth, Wilhied, 24(n40), 27(n47), 71( ~ 5 3 ) Lmdestad, Geir, 286 Lmatian Sorbs, 34,47(n27) Lutheran Churches, 227 2228 Lutheran WrXd Federation, 228

Machinery 160,366,167,168,169, 487 214,215,267,268,269,273, 2174 MacMillan, Harc~ld,242 Magcthurg, 248-249 Malenkoc: Gmrgi, 4499 Mao Zedong, 2 Marchlewski, Julian, 33, 14,26fn17), 5 6 238(n49) Marsh, Peter, 3 Marshail Plan, 25(n40), 42,83,84-85, 286 Marxism-Leninism, 5,499,284 Marx, Kari, 12 Masuriam, 78 Matern, Hermann, 21,81,2 40,1 63f295 MaWin, MsladislawI 234 Medical insurance, 170 Mentzef, Robert, 126, 335 Merkel; Paul, 29(n"1"0),41/83 Merkl, Petetr, 3 Mewis, KKart,263 Mishaelit; (Reverend), 227L28 Mikdajczyk, StaPlisjaw, 12, 47' Mikoyan, Anastas, 93(n87) Minc, E-tilary 42,22,86 Mudzelewski, Zygmunt, 16,36,4Q Moldt, Ewalcl, 252-253,254,2176 Molotov; Vyachestaw, 3353,4Q,42,6Q, 6172(n53), 102,199 Mc~rawsEri,Jerzy 234 Morrison, Jarnes E, 3 Mcwcow Decf aration (1954),98,100 Mfickenbesger, Erish, 194,263-2M Muelfer, P-ians, 140 Munich, lesson of, 60 Naganowski, Egon, 247 Nagy I m r ~ 123,126,128,194 Nairnark, Norman, 3, %12(n56),89Cn2) Nacinskiii, Michail W., 25Cn10) Naszkowski, Marian, 11-12,164,174, 288-209,251

National fronts, 12,13,48(n42), 57,66, 115 National interests, 2,4,8(n4), 35, 71(n49), 82,96,117,159,207,212, 229 Nationalism, 11,19,22,26(n26), 31,36, 39,58,79,116,127,135,142,143, 170,226,248,263,273,283,288 NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization Netherlands, 251 Neues Deutschbnd, 18,19,22,35,54, 85,86,95(nll7), 106,117,118, 123-124,125,126,127,137,143, 144,146,147,149,150,151,152, 166,185,191,195,233,249 and Rapacki Plan, 205,206 Neumann, Alfred, 126,145 Neumann, Conrad, 135-136 New Yark Times, 147 Nixon, Richard, 249-250 Nonaligned states, 97 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 60,65,98,102,103,166, 186,204,207,212,228,261,283, 286 North Korea, 97 Nowa Huta, 243 Nowe Drogi, 19,45,137,141,185,251, 253,275 Nuclear energy, 202(n57) Nuclear weapons, 98,101,184,204, 205,215,218(n21), 249,261,283, 288(n2) nuclear-free zones, 199,205. See also Rapacki Plan See also Atomic bomb Nuremberg trials, 16 Nuschke, Otto, 43,4.5 Ckhab, Edward, 15-16,22,51fn115), 114-115,Il6,117,148,162,242, 265 Oder-Neisse border, 1,6,21,22,23, 31-46,47(n20), 55,%, 59,60,80, 92(n62), 116,152,165, 168,204,

212,229,232,233,234,243, 247, 248-249,252,254,260 anti-Polish demonstrations near, 58 and fishing rights, 57-58 Poland's claims to, 33-35 prologue to dispute concerning, 31 See also sorlnder East German-Polish relations; Federal Republic of Germany; Gomulka, Wadyslaw; Socialist Unity Party of Germany Oelssner, Fred, 196,203(n94) Ogrodzifiski, Piotr, 211 Oil, 213,266,267 Oschlies, Wolf, 176(n6) Qsinska, Stefania, 34 Wbka-Morawski, Edvard, 20 Pahl, Heinz, 190 Parliaments, 80, 97, 187,226, 274 Passports, 139,173,216 Patronage, 4 PAX. See Polish Catholic Front Peasants, 11,12,27(n45), 120,144, 145,162,242 Pensions, 170 People's Republic of Poland (PRP), I, 194. See also East German-Polish relations; Poland Peters, Karl, 20-21 Petofi Club, 137,149 PhiIlips, A m L., 74(n92) Pieck, Wilhelm, 1344,20,22,25(n14), 26(n17), 31-32,35,36,50(n94), 57,89,121, 228 and German unification, 60-61 and Oder-Neisse border, 32-33,37, 38,39,40,41,42,43,44,45,77 visits to Warsaw, 54-55(photos), 55-56,77 Pierzchala, Tan, 127, 128, 133fn87), 139,141 Pilsudski, J k f , 11 Piotrowski, Roman, 140,141,152,187, 196,214,233,249 Pleshakov, Constantine, 3,71(n53)

Pleven Plan, 724n53) Poland, 1 area of, prewarlpostwar, 47fn21) army 223,248,259,261 citizenship in, 474, 175,18l(nll6) coXlect.ivizat-ic>nin, 146145, 146, 242-243,264,265 and Czechosfovakia, 6,15,16,17, 27(n34), 85,102, 403, 187, 498, 192,216,254,270 dernonstratictns in, 148,243-244. See nlso f20znah, workers' rebellion in de-Stalinization in, 116,175, 484, 276 eastern territories, 47(&1), 94 (nSb), 121,147,262 East German diplomats in, 64-45, 66 economy, 34,84,117; 121,127,135, 136,142,146, 161,162, 163,165, 175, 188, 224,230,235, 267.. See also East German-Polish relations, economic cooperation; Eade expulsion of Germans from, 4,15, 18,32,3&35,36,37; 44,4i"(n29), 62-63,76-T, 89(nn 2,3), 105, 1170. See also Repatriation issue; Wstern Territories Foreign Ministry, 44,f;$, 66, 107, lOf3,136,41;4,l"i?2,195,205, 207-208,228,229,232,233, 238(n55), 250,251 f o r e i p policy of, 3, 15, 17, 38,141, 187,204,210,216,25&251, 253-252,262,264,284 and France, 98, W9,251 freedcyms in, 20, 175,226,247 and FRG, 87#994(n98), 98,101 -1 02, 106,107, 425, 135,152, 184, 185, 187,196,2Q7-211,225,228, 251-252,25%254,264,275,284. See nlso Trade, 1201iandand FRG/ Western nations and GDR army, 102-103 German labor in, 77

Germans in, 6,17,47(~29),58, 6M5,66, 7hf 77-79,592 (n31), 92(n62), 153,169-475,180(n88), 182(n117), 274. See also Repatriation issue Home Army, 131(n52) impa&s/exports of, %,87,88,89, 117,152,160,161, 163,178(n36), 220(n8Q),266. See also Trade industry in, 159,242,270, See nlso Poland, Six-Yea r Plan Ministry for f-Xi&er Educatian, 196 Ministry of Public Scurity, 42 Ministry of Reco)vered Territc>ries, 34, 45,m Nazi occupatim of, 4,1 0, 119,214, 244,2% Nixon visit to, 249-250 Parliament, 80,9& 187,227 Polish October, 136, 137, 138, 140, 146,150,152,1di4,230,241,2CS$. Sce also Gornutka, Wbdysiaw, return to power of Polish prisoners returning, 76 population, 130Cn32) recogni"E0n af GDR, 52 registrations of Germans in, 472---475,IFS2(n417) separatist movements in, 78 Six-&ar Plan, 87#88, 161 Slidarity Movtzment in, 285,286 and Soviet bloc, 250,269,276 Soviet trc~spsin, 122,134 trade agreements, 86. See nlso Trade Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance with Czechoslovakia, 46 and United States, 186 and Yugoslavia, 252-253 See also East German-Polish relations; Polish United WorkersTarty; Presa Polish Polish Catholic Front (PAX), 227 Polish Committee af Cultural Cooperation with F o r e i p Countries, 62

Polish Communists W~rkers?~arty, 24(n3) Polish Cultural Center in Berlin, 141 Polish Diplomatic Mission in Berlin, 63 Polish-East German Commission on the Germam in Poland, 474 Polish Educational Institute of Scientific Faculty*72(n59) Polish Military Mission in Berlin, 16, 18, 19, 21, 32, 35-36, 37,39, 4041,43,45,62, 78, 79,84, 90fn I 6),101,165,233 Polish Peasant Party (ZSL), 145,227 Polish I""rc>visionalGovernment of National Unity, 112 Polish Svcialist Party (PPS), 11, 12,20, 27(n45) Polish United '1NorkersTarl.y (PZPR), 6,22,45,59,67,69(n16), tSQ,99, 100,103,1 Q4 as anti-Soviet, 142, 143, 144,149, 198,248 Central Committee, 11'7, 122, 187, 191,198,216,223,227; 253 church problem of, 24S244 and CPSU, 199 demonstratians apinst, 243-244 divisions within, 117 Foreign Affairs Committee, 152 formation of, 1 7 2 0 and Hungarian revolt 128 membership, 130fn32), 224 pc~pularityof, 25.4 reforms of, 67,96,114,125,135, 139,146,447,1150,151,241,249 Second 13arty Congress, 65 secret diplomacy of, 249 youth organizatiun of, 266 Sce also Socialist Unity 1Pal.t.y of Germany, and PZPR Polish West Institute in ]t)oznar"l,10, 46 Polish VVorkersTarty (PI"), 12, 14, 20,2"i7(n4,5), 33/34 anti-German propaganda of, 15-2 7 People" Guards, 15

130fish WritersTongress [Union, 124, 338,235,246,265 130filicalparties, 25Cn11) I""o1iticalprisoners, 116 Potitykn, 205,240,284 I""omerania,34,177 PO Proslu, 136,137,151-152 130tsdamagreements, 32,36,39,41, 45,46,4'i"(n21), 59,60, 83,84,85, 90(n31), 212 PoznaA, 78,86,10[7,12& 360,231,246, 251 West Institute in, 2'75 tvorkers' rebellion in, 147'-118,127, 163,188 PPR, See Polish WarkersTarty 1313S,Sce Polish %cialist Party Pmzoda, 124, 445 Prawin, Jakub, 22,36,40,41,42,79, M Press, 17Ci,106,150,2a2$ East German, 19,22,64,86,98,118, 119,135,336,151,174,195,199, 209,228,229, 232,244,260,267, See also Neucs: DcuEscitfand Polish, 19,222, 63,67,7'8,1Q4, 406, 114,117,119,123,124,127,136, 440,144,187, 496,198, 499,209, 212,232,235,252,253,225,260, 262, 2172, See also Glos Lzldu; Trybzinck Lz4dl-r West German, 57; 247 Prisoners-of-war, 7&79,90(n31) Prc~ductivity, 1'717(n20), 213 Propaganda, 2,4,15-17',48,49,23, 26(n26), 32,39,53,59,64,66,77', 82,%, 100,403,105,119,125, 136,137,146,148,150,164,170, 473,17'4,185,48"i",188,189,194, 197,198,2Qb, 210,225,2234,242, 244,,247,2.49,253,260,263,2~, 273,274,285,287 PRP. See People's Republic of Pc>Xand Pmssia, 4, 44, 77,286 Przeglgd Kzrlf zrralny, 136, 137 PSL, 42,17,38-39 Purges, 11,15, 19,20,23,29(n76),65, 66,67,103,41.12,276

Putrament, Jerzy 2 24 PZPR. See Polish United Workers" 13arty Rachcjcki, janusz, 234 Rad kiewicz, Stanisiavlr; 12, 103, 116 Railroads, 16% 1192, 215,230,234,268 Rakowski, Mieczyslavv; 205,284 Ranitzki, Anatoli, 149-150 Rapacki, Adam, 25(n23), 128,240, 15Q,191,205, 120% 2212,216,1248, 251,254 and Bolz, 252-252 See also Rapaeki Plan Rapacki Plan, 1"3, 205-21 3,221 6, 218(n21) Rapallo Treaty, 35,61,262 Rationing; 88,164,244 Rau, Heinrich, 85, 140, 165,166-16? Raw- materials, 165,192,214,216,267, 270 Red Cross, 170, 171 "Red Regiment of Warsaw, The?" 11 Reforms, 6, 17,61, 126,138,175, 476(nG), 284. Sec also zkndtyr Polish United 1NorkersTarty Refugees. See Poland, expulsion af Germans from Religion, 224,1227-228,232,123';7(n3i7). See nlso Catholic Church Reparations, 6 1 3 , 33,111, 42,43,83, 8gY95(n147), 121 Repatriation issue, 68, 79-82, 153, 169, 170,175 Resis, Alberl; 74(n90) Revisionism, 5,21, 35, 36/37, 39,40, 41,44,45,57,116, 221, 138, 248, 190,195,198,120"3 2210,223,1226, 228,231,234,273 RTAS radio, 125,137 Richter; James G., 218(n21) Rc>kossc>vskyKonstantin, 69fnG), 122, 131(n52), 153(nil7) Romania, 8(n4), 20,26fn29), 106,270, 286 Roosevelt, Frankfin, 32

Rose, krthold, 2 2 8,145, 2 47,167, 171 Rostoek, 118,22 9-120,191-192, 229-230,1270 East Sea Week in, 225-226 Russia, 10. See also Sc3viet Union Rzymawski, Wincenty, 17 Sassnik, 488 kandinavia, 251 Schaff, Adam, 149 khirdewan, Karl, 147,203(n94) Schtaffer, Josef, 77 Schmerbach, GGnter; 170 Schmid, Carlo, 208 SchmGing, Richard, 123 khober, Ri-ta, 107 Schulz, Alfred, 246-247 khumacher, Mu&, 137 SD, 1'7,27(n45) SBKPiL. See Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Pc~fandand Lithuania Security issues, 917,98,254,261 SET). See Socialist Unity Party of Germany Seekct, Mans von, 262 %mjonov, Vladimir, 40 Seyfert, Ciinter (East German Charge d%aEfaires), 124, 139, 186 Shortages, 87, 88,144,159, 161, 162, 163,l 65,167, 179(nn 69,721, 192, 260,267,271 Sikora, Frank, 4,23(n82) Sikc~rski,Wiad ysiav\., 47fn20) Silesia, 18,27(nn 33, X), 34, 32, 34'44, 57, 59,77,78,84, 86,90(n31), 424,165,167, 470,213 Sindermam, Horst, 2 99 Skrzeszewski, Stanisiat~v;81,9?, 98, 101 Slansky, Rudoff?63,73(n71) Slavs, 15,17#23,34,38, 448 Slovakia, 286 SMAC. See Soviet Military Administration in Germany

Social Democracy of the Mingdm of Poland and Lithuania (SDKPiL), 11,24(n3>,152 %>cialDemocratic P a ~ of y Germany (SPD), 13,16,31,37, 4644, 208,212,231,285 Socialist internationalism, 11, 45, 35, 56,193,286,287,288 Socialist Unity Party of Germany QSEB),3,6,13,14, 17, 19,2Ct,21, 22,27(n47), 29(n';"Q),60,62,67, 69Qnn 6, 16),87,92(n69), 99, 100, 103, 125, 164,171, 186, 250 Central Committee, 415,149 Department of Church Questions, 227 Depai-lment of Prvaganda, 243 East Germam hostility toward SE&) rGgirne, 61,66,140 economic policies of, 58,84,85-86, 88,89,05(n114) and expelled Germans, 76. Sec atsu PoXand, expulsion of Germans from as fusion of W U and SPD, 16, 48(n39) and Germans in Poland, 78,79,80, 81,83. See also Poland, Germans in meeting with Polish Military Mission, 41 membership, 130(n32) and Qde~iSTeisseborder, 5, 31, 35-46,50(n90), 52, 57,713,84,85, 105,120-121,146,263 and PoznaA rebellion, 117-418 and PPR, 42 and 172I)R,22-23,68,104,1013,135, 1441,143,14,145,, 151,171-172, 153'7,192,193-1 94,195,206, 222-223,224,226;-228,234,241, 1243,245,248,249,254,261-262, 265,266,27271,272,274, 283,287, 288 and sc~lidaritywith Poland, 17-19

Solidarity, 14, 15,16, 17-19'23, 31,63, 1Ck8,109(n17), 119,125, 126, 160, 194,206,228, 287, See nlso Poland, %>t ibarity Mo3vement in Sclvereignty, 143,185,276. Sec atsu under. German Derno>cratlic Republic Soviet Military Administration in Germany (SMAG), 39 Soviet Unian, 3,15,32,37,38,45, 51fnn 109,11l), 69(n6), 83,85,89, 122, 162, 168, 196, 199,206,215, 272,286 and Alf ieB Control Commission, 41--42,43 army, 66, 402,146, 422, 123,128, 134 and China, 252,258(n82), 287 Communist Pariy QCZ>SZlr), 14,20, 29(n%), 65,68, 108, 114,187,194, 245,2443,252 entry- into East Centrat Europe, 11 and FRG, 101 87; and GDR/SED, 69(nf;), 721~56)~ 92(n69), 96,99,102,105, 423,165, 169,213,214,216,245,259, 262 German attack on, 26(&9) and G a m a n unification, 109(d) Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939,14,15,35, 262 New Course of, 65,96,114 and Poland, 83,86,223,225,226 249,284. See nlso Poland, and Soviet bloc and Xiapackli Plan, 206,207, 218(rr24) two-camp policy of, 17 and Weirnar Republic, 44 See also East German-Polish relations, Soviet influence on Spasowski, Romuald, 56 SPD. See Social Democratic ParQ of Germany Spies, 62,66,71 (n49), 117,125,231, 243,253 Spychalski, Marian, 131Qn52)

Stalin, Josef, 2,3,12, 13,20,29(n69), 32,34,46, 56,69(n16), 74(n90), 93(n87), 134,135,141, 142,242 death of, 6,23,65,68,%(nEd4), 159, 169,226 and GDR, 2 3, %(RIO),60,61, 71(m 50,5J) and Gornulka, 12,24(n7), 29(n76) and KPP, 11,15,24(n4) and Oder-Neisse barder, 37,40,42, 116 and reparatians, 95(n117) Stalinism, 66,96,105, 115,116, 129, 4311,145,444,1%3,199,22f)3(n94), 264,287 and Tito, 19,287 Standard of living, 6,79,82,83,%, 117, 420, 139,142, 164, 142, 168, 213,214,215, 224,231, 259, 266-1267 Starewicz, Artur, 253 Stee1, 84,85, 89, 161, 1751(n69), 214, 215,267,268,271 Stefancic, Davici, 217(n14) Stoph, Willi, 62, 403,215 Strikes, 66,148 Students, 100, 107, 117, 120,123, 428, 133fn87),2 36, 138, 151, 2 96,197, 198,211,224,22li, 228,1274 Studia fifozoFcztze, 234 Summits, 1%'.l-1 98,228-232,239fn69), 260,272-276 Surkau, Fritz, 248 Surveillance, 120,144, 174,244 Sweden, 93(n87), 206 $u)inta Potsktz, 205 Swiaklo, Jbsef, 67 $winouj$cie, 40,285 Szafar, Tadeutiz, 151-152 Szczecin, 34,40,78,104,191-192, 230 Szybek, team, 233 Szyr, Eugeniusz, 235,270,271

Thalmann, Ernst, 25(n14) Tito, Josip Broz, 19,2Q,23, 114,123, 128, 2 35,141, 194,226,235,284, 287' TiuYpanov, S. I., 39,51(n113), 92(n69) Tkscz, Karol, f;R(n3) Tourism, 5,173,189-190,196,211, 245-246,266,274 Trachtenberg, Marc, 3,288(n2) Eade, 6,43,68,152,%, 85-89,94(n98), 95(n119), 97; 10~,l01,1~6,108, 118,153,175 GDR and FRG, 160,161,1 G&--169, Ili"t;(nll),1%,238(n55), 253, 254 GDR and Sclviet Union, 214,268 Poland and Comecon countries, 269 Poland and FKGiWestem nations, 152,159,160,161-1 M,165,166, 170, 284, 192, 193, 2 98,211, 213-21 6,221 (nn 82, M), 229,230, 249,2G9,270,280(nn 88,91), 284 Poland and GDR, 152,159-160, 463,165, 167, 3.68, 176(nn 11, 42), 192,201(n46), 215/216,2201(nIi4), 228,229,230,266,267,268-269, 270,272,275 transit fees, 166,268, 270, 271 Trade unians, I9,79 Translators, 1015 Ravel agencies, 210 Trurnan, Harry, 42 Truman Doctrine, 25(n40) Tybunn Li"~Gtu,17,22,45, 52-53,54,55, 56,99-1U0,103,447,423,124, 127-128, 2 37,140,1117, 2 49,150, 459,11;2,163--.164,166,185,186, 197,232,233,243,261,263,275 Turkey 42

Euo Men witjt fJte Tru~zkfiomfJte Sea (film), 247L.248 Ukraine, 14, 32/37 Ulbricht, Walker, 5 6 , 3.4. 16, 18,20, 23,26(n22), 27(n43), 36,58,66,

67,74(n84), 95(n114), 96,98,100, 101,115,119, 120, 121,123, 126, 128-129,134,135,137,138,149, 161,164,187,190,211,233,249, 269,276 and Berlin crisis of 1961,258 demotions of SED p e r s o ~ e l , 203(n94) and Franz DahIem, 138-139 and German unification, 60-61, 84

and Hungarian revolt, 128 and Khrushehev, 197,213-214,260, 265 and national roads to comunism, 141-142 and Oder-Neisse border, 33,40,41, 44,53-54,56,77 photos, 272,273 and Rapacki Plan, 206,207 visits to Poland, 21,22,56,80,86, 231 See also under Gomuika, Wladyslaw Union of Polish Patriots, 12 United Nations, 97,98,175,186,205 General Assembly 128,213 UNESCO, 196 United States, 39,42,88,168,185,186, 194,210,242,243,246,240,249, 250,253,267 Americans of Polish heritage, 190 containment policy of, 42 and West Berlin, 212 Uprisings, 61,96,129, 140. See also Hungary, revolt in; PomaA, workers' rebellion in Uznam island, 50(n94) Valinakis, Yannis, 8(n4) Vatican, l46 Vemer, Waldemar (Vice Admiral), l88 Visas, 103-104,139,171,189,196,210, 211,228,231,245,251,274 Visegrad Four, 286 von Brentano, Heinrich, 147

Wandel, Paul, 124,145,147,177(n20), 203(n94) Warsaw, 10,12,21,78,210 East German embassy in. 97 Palace of Culture in, 196,225 Warsaw University, 149 Warsaw Uprising (1944), 15,116,119 Warsaw Pact, 8(n4), 65,69(n6), lll(n55), 122,123,164,185,186, 188,189,190,194,196,204,205, 208,212,213,215,248,250,252, 253,254,259,261,262,263,267, 283,285286,288 Waterways, 270,285 Wehner, Herbert, 164,211,231 Weimar Republic, 13,14,25(n12), 262 Weit, Erwin, 27(n43), 216,230,232 Wenk, Ruth, 173,223 Werfel, Edda, 136-137 Werfel, Roman, 246-247 Western Territories of, 32,33, 34,37, 38,39,40, $4,45,47(n29), 79,84, 85,86,99,121,146-148,168,170, 174,18o(n88), 185,234,263 autochthon-Poles in, 78,90(n28), 174 population, 91(n36) See also Oder-Neisse border; Poland, expdsion of Gennans from Westerplatte, 40 Wettig, Gerhard, 71(nn50,53) Wetzel, Rudi, 19 WiadomoSci, 212 Wiatr, Jerzy, 185 Wieha, Wadysiaw, 173 Wierthwski, Stefan, 55, p 8 3 , 94(n98) Wierna, Maria, 64,80,81-82 Winiewicz, J6sef, 162,186 Winzer, Otto, 174, 196,207,213,243, 246,253 Wladhlawowo, 108 Wloch, Karl, 63,64,140 Wochenpost, 124-125,126

Wlf, Friedrkh, M, 68(n3), 79,237, 94(n98) Wlf, Hanna, 127,137-138 Wolilweber, Emst, 67, 72(n59), 97, 203(n94) Work hours, 361, 162 World Council of Churches, 228 WrXd R7arXI, 4, 10, 77, 114, 162,214, 244,286 peace treaty after, 32,37,41,45, 46(n8), 59,60,248,26Q,26;1 Wrwiavv, 34,44,77,17Q GDR consulate in, 1173-1 74, l83(n141) Wycech, Czesiawr 368,187 Wyszyhki (Cardinal), 6?,157(n89)

Valta agreements, 12,32,45 Yugoslavia, 40, 917, 185,199,288 and Potand, 15,114,140,187,226, 246,249,252-253,262 See also Titcl, Josip Broz Zabrze, 43 Zaisser, Wilhelm, 67 Zbyszewski, WeA., 242-243 Zgarzelec, 58 Zgorzelec agreement, 553(photo), 55, 56 Ziefona 66ra, 227, 228,2243 ZSL. Sec Pr>lishPeasant Party Zubok, VIadislaw 3, 71(n53) zycie WnrsznwyI 437