Acre

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ACRE

THE HISTORY AND SOCIETY OF THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST

          Leila Fawaz, General Editor Janet Afary The Iranian Constitution, 1906–1911: Grassroots Democracy, Social Democracy, and the Origins of Feminism Andrea B. Rugh Within the Circle: Parents and Children in an Arab Village Juan Cole Modernity and the Millennium: The Genesis of the Baha’i Faith in the Nineteenth-Century Middle East Selma Botman Engendering Citizenship in Egypt

ACRE THE RISE AND FALL OF A PALESTINIAN CITY, 1730–1831

THOMAS PHILIPP

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS

NEW YORK

Columbia University Press Publishers Since 1893 New York Chichester, West Sussex Copyright 䉷 2001 Columbia University Press All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Thomas, Philipp. Acre : the rise and fall of a Palestinian city, 1730–1831 / Philipp Thomas. p. cm. — (History and society of the modern Middle East series) Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index. ISBN 0-231-12326-4 (cloth ; alk. paper)—ISBN 0-231-12327-2 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Acre (Israel)—History—18th century. 2. Acre (Israel)—History— 19th century. 3. Palestine—History—1799–1917. I. Title. II. Series. DS110.A3 T44 2002 956.94'5—dc21 2001047080

Casebound editions of Columbia University Press books are printed on permanent and durable acid-free paper. Printed in the United States of America c 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 p 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

To the memory of my father, whose conversations I still miss

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CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

ix

Introduction 1 1. Southwest Syria in the Eighteenth Century: Highways, Sea Lanes, and Populations 9 2. The Politics of Acre 29 3. Trade: Local Rulers and the World Economy 94 4. Government: The Military and Administration 136 5. Society and Its Structure in Acre 170 Concluding Observations 187 The Population of Acre 193 Trade: Tables and Figures 197 C . Administrative Positions and Their Occupants 215 D . Maps 223

APPENDIX A . APPENDIX B . APPENDIX APPENDIX NOTES

233

TRANSLATIONS BIBLIOGRAPHY INDEX

283

267 277

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This study has been longer in the making than I care to think of. A grant from the Social Science Research Council supported my research in the archives of the Chamber of Commerce in Marseilles. I am grateful to the Gerda Henkel Stiftung for enabling me to carry out research in Damascus. Many people were at various stages willing to listen to my queries and to give me advice. My special thanks go to Butrus Abu Manneh, Andre´ Raymond, and Eugene Rogan, who all commented on the project or read parts of the work in progress and gave me much encouragement. Thanks also to the anonymous readers whose recommendations and advice helped me to improve the structure of the book. I am indebted to Mary Starkey and Robert Hemenway for their painstaking efforts to put my English into a readable form and to catch my inconsistencies and errors.

ACRE

INTRODUCTION

The city of Acre on the Syrian coast was once a famous Crusader stronghold. In the centuries following the Crusades the city had slipped into oblivion, and by the time of the Ottoman conquest, Acre was a collection of ruins in which only a few Arab fishermen found shelter. But in the eighteenth century Acre witnessed a dramatic rise in its fortunes, making it in 1785 the third largest city in Syria—after Aleppo and Damascus—and the largest port on the Syrian coast. By that time it had become the capital of a major politically integrated area in southwest Syria. Acre was the key to the first region in the eastern Mediterranean that was tied into the modern world economy. The rise of Acre from a fishing village to an important fortified port city of perhaps 25,000 inhabitants was closely connected with the ever-rising demand for cotton in Europe. Although at the end of the eighteenth century the first signs of decline could be seen in Acre and its hinterland, another boom phase followed with highly profitable grain exports to Britain during the Napoleonic Wars. Thereafter the political and economic decline continued despite the persisting European demand for cotton and grain. One aim of this study is to reconstruct the history of a region. This region does not fit easily into the history of any one of the provinces of the Ottoman administration. It is not the history of either the vilayet of Sidon or that of Note: Throughout this volume we have provided English translations to passages in a foreign language. Short translations appear in brackets in the text. Longer passages are identified with an asterisk indicating that the translation appears at the back of the book (pp. 267 ff.).

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INTRODUCTION

Damascus, though both provinces provide the context for this region. Minorities of all sorts play a considerable role in this region, but it is not a history of sects that is to be told here. Most certainly this regional history cannot be described in retrospectively superimposed terms such as “Syria” or “Palestine.”1 Although Acre plays a pivotal role in the story, it is not simply the history of a city that is to be presented here. The region in question consisted of Acre and its realm, whose limits were constantly changing but always included at least the Galilee and some of the coast north and south of the city. It was a region that for a brief time formed a political and economic entity, quite independent from the Ottoman central government, not fitting its administrative borders, and differing widely from such anachronistic categories as “Palestine.” Discussing the rise of Izmir some 150 years earlier, Goffman writes: “The economic transformation of the Ottoman Empire had loosened administrative ties between agricultural regions and Istanbul and created other authorities to whom a foreign state could address grievances, thus enabling natural economic centers, such as Izmir, to develop without the constraints of a highly centralized administration.”2 Doumani discusses Nablus and its hinterland during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in similar terms: “Scores of roughly similar regions filled the interior of the vast and multiethnic Ottoman Empire and surrounded each of its few large international trading cities, like a sea around an island. These discrete regions were located at one and the same time at the material core and the political periphery of the Ottoman world.”3 Perhaps it can help us in our understanding to visualize the internal situation of the Ottoman Empire since the seventeenth century as a loose arrangement of a great number of more or less autonomous cities, each with its hinterland. It certainly would be going too far to speak of “city-states.” This would be to gravely understate the legitimacy and authority, both ideological and physical, that the empire enjoyed even at its weakest moments in the eighteenth century. Acre became one of the “economic centers.” Unlike Nablus, Damascus, and other inland cities, it was not a “discrete region known for centuries.”4 It was rather like Izmir, a frontier city and society. Izmir’s economic rise occurred close to the political center of a still relatively well-integrated empire, and although it enjoyed great economic autonomy there was no talk of political autonomy. Acre, developing 150 years later, did so in the context of a dramatically and visibly weakened empire and very much on what was then the empire’s geographical periphery. Not only for local notables but also for representatives of the Ottoman ruling class, the option of political autonomy—if not independence—became a very real and

INTRODUCTION

3

tempting one, especially since during the last quarter of the eighteenth century Acre also began to play a role in international politics. This is a local history of the first region in the Arab East to be inextricably linked to the modern European world economy. Only the highly profitable export of cash crops—first cotton, then grain—made it possible for Acre to become, for a short century, from 1730 to 1831, the largest center of trade and political power on the Syrian coast and the third largest city in geographic Syria. The rise and fall of Acre in early modern times must be seen against the background of two major processes touching the Ottoman Empire at the time and two further developments emanating largely from the first two. During the eighteenth century the weakness of the empire and the central government became apparent to all. Not only did the European powers witness the disastrous defeats of the Ottoman armies, but the people in the provinces of the empire sensed the growing inability of the central government to project its power. By the middle of the eighteenth century, in Damascus, the end of the Ottoman dynasty was at least imaginable, if not thought of as likely.5 Foreign powers would soon interfere directly in the politics of the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire. During this period of political decline the ever-growing demands of European markets linked the economy of the empire to Europe in new ways. Under political and economic pressure the geographic structure of commerce shifted; the merchandise changed as new agricultural products were exported to new markets; and the social structure of commerce changed as new groups of merchants engaged in trade. This twofold process of political decay at the center and increasing European economic penetration was accompanied by a third process. Local power centers sprang up, and limited regional integration, political and/or economic, took place. In the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire the effects of these changes took two different forms. On the one hand, traditional power centers, long submerged under central imperial rule, resurfaced again during the eighteenth century. Examples include the consolidation of dynastic power of the local al-‘Azm family in Damascus and the rise to power of the Neo-Mamluks in Cairo, ruling over an Egypt independent in all but name. In both cases, the political weakness of the central government was a decisive factor in letting old political structures reemerge. On the other hand, new centers of gravity developed, integrating economically whole regions in new configurations and linking them to European markets. Developments in the Mount

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INTRODUCTION

Lebanon region point in this direction; silk became an important cash crop here during the eighteenth century, and the process of political consolidation and regional integration started in the early nineteenth century. The Mount Nablus region in Palestine was integrated into the world economy in a similar fashion during the nineteenth century.6 After the Crusades Acre had never again been a center of political or administrative, let alone economic, power. Yet it was to become the center of the first region in the Arab provinces touched profoundly by new European demands for raw materials. During the eighteenth century cotton provided the economic base for the importance of Acre and the might of its rulers, while grain played that role in the first two decades of the nineteenth. Here the process of regional integration and political autonomy was fueled exclusively by the new opportunities for wealth that the linkage of the region to the European-dominated world economy offered. The tie to international markets could convert local cash crops into economic and political power for local rulers. The rise of Acre and the integration of its hinterland into an autonomous region must also be seen in the context of the overall shift of the location of economic activity and political power in the Syrian region from inland to the coastal area and in the concomitant change of commercial patterns and networks. As long ago as the end of the fifteenth century a revival of trade and a renewal of the economy had begun in the Syrian region. Aleppo became the most important emporium for merchandise from Central Asia, Iran, the Persian Gulf, and South Asia. Merchants from France, England, Venice, and Holland settled in Aleppo, and the city soon became the third largest in the Ottoman Empire. During the seventeenth century the English were the most important traders in Aleppo, mainly exchanging their wool cloths for silk. Silk, one of the major items of trade in Aleppo, was imported from Persia. Damascus gained its commercial importance as the starting point for the annual pilgrimage caravan to Mecca. On the way back, merchandise from South Arabia, eastern Africa, and India was brought to Damascus. Probably because of the specifically religious character of the pilgrimage, Europeans and minorities played an insignificant role in this trade. This economic structure of the Syrian region, in which long-distance transit trade via Damascus and Aleppo, Alexandretta, and Anatolia was the dominant feature, changed profoundly during the eighteenth century. The silk trade with Aleppo lost its importance, not because England’s demand for silk diminished but because more convenient supply sources were found.7

INTRODUCTION

5

Simultaneously, Aleppo lost its main supplier of silk with the disintegration of Safavid Iran. During the same period we can observe a revival of French trade in the Levant. Originally this was the result of Colbert’s reorganization of the Chamber of Commerce of Marseilles, but soon the rapidly increasing French demand for silk and raw cotton became the driving force behind the revival. By the middle of the eighteenth century the French had replaced the British as the most important European commercial power in Aleppo. Earlier and more important, however, was the development of French trade with the Syrian coastal cities from Jaffa to Tripoli. In the hinterland of these port cities silk and cotton cultivation increased steadily. The crops could be sold directly to the French in the coastal towns, bypassing Aleppo. The economic center of gravity moved slowly from inland Syria to the coastal lands of the southwest. Long-distance trade lost some of its importance, and local cultivation of cash crops became a significant economic factor. The overall framework of these distinct but related processes—the decay of central power in the Ottoman Empire, the concomitant rise of local power centers on the periphery, the early integration of some Arab regions into the European-dominated world economy, and the shift of economic activity and commercial gains from the Syrian inland area to the coastal regions—provides the context for the history of Acre and its hinterland during the period. The history of this particular region gains its meaning from this context, and only within this context can relevant questions be addressed regarding local history. It is easy to understand that the revenue from cotton or grain exports could finance the military expenses of local rulers who thereby could obtain considerable power. But this obvious link aside, how did the new sources of wealth and new patterns of commerce mesh with traditional forms of political power and social organization? Or were these at all “traditional forms of political power and social organization”? When Masters, for instance, discusses the changes from a traditional to a Western-dominated economy in Aleppo,8 he starts out with a tradition of political rule, social formation, and commercial interaction in Aleppo. But Acre is a highly atypical case of urban history in Syria. It was a new foundation, settled by immigrants in the eighteenth century. The city came into being even as the new commercial linkage to Europe developed. Much of the hinterland, too, was settled only during this time by immigrants coming from various directions and for different reasons. In this sense we do not have to do with a traditional society,

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INTRODUCTION

however defined. Might it be more appropriate to speak of a “frontier society”? Was this society subjected to traditional patterns of political rule? If so, which? Was it Mamluk households, tribal power, local alliances of important families? Did new classes develop under the circumstances of an immigrant society and new commercial needs? Why did the cotton trade with France, profitable for all participants, come to an end? How did cotton come to be such an important cash crop in the region? And finally, why did Acre, after such propitious beginnings in the eighteenth century, which made it the center of export trade on the Syrian coast and of political and military power strong enough to defy Napoleon’s army, give way to the dazzling rise of Beirut in the nineteenth century? This last set of questions revolves largely around another salient feature of life in Acre during the period: the policy of economic monopolies. Such monopolistic interference by the government in the economy with regard to the production and/or marketing of certain goods was not entirely unknown in Islamic history, but it would be difficult to find another example where this policy became as all-pervasive and dominant as in Acre. It took another two generations before Muhfi ammad ‘Alı¯ of Egypt would apply monopoly policies in an even more rigorous fashion. Then, too, the export of raw materials to world markets—especially grain and cotton—would become pivotal. In trying to reconstruct the history of this region and to answer some of the questions raised here, we are helped by a great variety of primary sources. At the same time students and researchers are faced with considerable lacunae in our information and a dearth of scholarly work. Fortunately we have at our disposal a host of local histories written in Arabic by eyewitnesses,9 among them two accounts of Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar’s life10 and a most detailed history of the rule of Sulayma¯n Pasha.11 They were, together with Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r, the three important rulers of Acre, controlling its fate from 1740 to 1819. But, curiously, no comparable account exists for Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r.12 These accounts abound with information on the political and administrative history of the region and the men who shaped it. They also provide some systematic reporting on sectarian history and a mass of incidental or anecdotal information on social life, families, worldviews and values, and daily life. I have argued elsewhere13 that the appearance at the turn of the eighteenth century of a group of regional historians—mainly, but not exclusively, Greek Catholics and typically educated sons of prosperous merchant families— was in itself an expression of the profound changes the region underwent

INTRODUCTION

7

during this time. Read with the critical eye of comparative analysis, these reports yield an enormous amount of information. A second set of sources is useful precisely on issues that the local histories gloss over or provide only incidental glimpses into; the economy and, in particular, agriculture and commerce with Europe. Here the French consular correspondence from Acre and Sidon,14 and also from Tripoli, Aleppo, and Rosetta, are of great value. Commerce was the main topic. Here we find detailed reports on the interaction of French merchants with local potentates, powerful administrators, Arab traders, and the peasants of the hinterland. Considerable, but never complete, statistical evidence for the economy and international export commerce can be reconstructed from the consular reports, though there was hardly any direct reporting on the state of agriculture. Depending on the individual consul and the circumstances, we also find detailed memos on political events, which are usefully juxtaposed with the accounts from other sources. The copious travel literature to the Holy Land and Syria must be looked at cautiously. It shares all the weaknesses of general travel literature—exaggerations, search for the exotic, superficial impressions, copying of other travelers’ writings, strictly personal viewpoints, etc. Yet there are the occasional superb reports by travelers, lending an outsider’s keen eye to the observation of local circumstances. Critical analysis of the travelers’ texts can provide insights on a large variety of issues. The Ottoman archives concerning the region have been extensively used in A. Cohen’s work on Palestine in the eighteenth century. They concern mainly fiscal, tax, and administrative affairs and relations to the central government. Sorely missing from the list of archives are any local archives in Acre: the sijilla¯t of the courts, for instance, or private materials. Intensive search for the sijilla¯t of the period has not provided any clue to their possible whereabouts. If they were not destroyed during the Israeli conquest of Acre in 1948, they are likely to have been destroyed during the British bombardment in 1840, or that of the Egyptians in 1831, or the French siege in 1799, or perhaps during an earthquake. Secondary and scholarly literature on the topic yields very uneven results. There has been a considerable outpouring of research on Ottoman Palestine,15 almost all of which is concerned with nineteenth-century history. A recent boom of research on urban history in Syria, from Damascus and Aleppo to Beirut, Jerusalem, and Jaffa,16 has been most helpful in formulating some of the questions raised in the present study, though not yielding any concrete

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INTRODUCTION

materials for the history of Acre and its hinterland. Very little scholarly work exists on the region itself during the eighteenth century. An early attempt was Uriel Heyd’s small study on Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar, and Doumani’s study of the Nablus region has now been added. But Doumani’s period is much more the nineteenth century and his focus Nablus, with Acre appearing at the periphery. Also of recent date is a history of Acre by N. Shu¯r. It is a narrative account of Acre through the ages until the present, relying heavily on European histories and travel accounts. The only extensive work on the topic of the present study is A. Cohen’s Palestine in the Eighteenth Century, by now a classic. As mentioned before, Cohen has made extensive use of the Ottoman archives; administrative and fiscal affairs and relations to the central government were his main concern, and he succeeded in providing a wealth of material and analysis. The conceptual framework “Palestine” sits awkwardly, since it is neither an administrative nor a fiscal entity and Cohen has to move around, treating the two vilayets of Damascus and Sidon in addition to the sancakfi of Jerusalem. I have relied on his very thorough research wherever appropriate. The main focus of the present study is on Acre and its hinterland as a political and economic entity, regardless of Ottoman administrative borders. The development of the regional history during the period is seen in close relation to its economic links with Europe. The goal is to provide a more meaningful framework and one that is more relevant.

chapter 1

SOUTHWEST SYRIA IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY: HIGHWAYS, SEA LANES, AND POPULATIONS

The Arab lands of the eastern Mediterranean region had first been incorporated into the Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the sixteenth century. The Syrian region between the Taurus Mountains and the Sinai Peninsula—known to its inhabitants and neighbors as Bila¯d al-Sha¯m, usually translated as the Geographic Syria or the Land of Syria—fulfilled an essential function in the imperial strategy of Istanbul. The region insured the overland link to the rich province of Egypt for an empire in which the use of maritime connections always remained of secondary importance. With the city of Damascus, Syria also provided the base for the annual pilgrimage to Mecca, the successful management of which added legitimacy to Ottoman rule. Aleppo became the third largest city of the empire as the entrepoˆt of commerce from all points east and, of course, as the conduit of trade from Arabia and Egypt via Damascus to the north. Finally, considerable importance was attached to Jerusalem as the third holiest city of Islam. The spinal cord holding these centers of economic and cultural activity together was the great northsouth axis, the highway coming from the north via Aleppo, connecting to Damascus and eventually to Mecca in the south. A branch-off from Damascus to the southwest provided links to Jerusalem and Egypt. The coastal towns, on the other hand, had lost their importance, and, as far as we can judge, the coastal regions were only very thinly populated. Links between the coast and the hinterland were rare and precarious. Some of these features of infrastructure and demography began to change in the eighteenth century. A short introductory description of the main characteristics of these conditions and an interpretation of the trends and direction of changes in these patterns, especially as they pertained to the situation in southwest Syria, follows.

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SOUTHWEST SYRIA IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

HIGHWAYS AND SEA LANES The changes in the physical web of communications in southwest Syria during the eighteenth century and until the Egyptian invasion of 1831 closely reflected the changes in political conditions and economic circumstances of the area. New technical needs or technological and material improvements, however, hardly played a role. At the beginning of the century there existed a fairly simple set of longdistance highways, which fulfilled two main functions, religious and commercial, as carriers of pilgrimage and trade. Coming from the north, a major road, traveled by merchants as well as pilgrims, connected Aleppo to Damascus. After Damascus the highway bifurcated, one branch going directly south to the Hejaz carrying the same sort of traffic, and the other one turning southwest, crossing the Jordan at the Bridge of Jacob’s Daughters, continuing to Janı¯n and from there to Ramla and Jaffa, and finally overland via Gaza to Egypt or, occasionally, by sea to Damiette. The route from Damascus to Egypt served mainly commercial interests. A minor route branched off at Nablus to Jerusalem and via Hebron to Gaza. No major traffic went through the western Galilee. Along the coast local shipping—not roads—carried the traffic.1 Over the century the infrastructure of the area was to become more complex in pattern, reflecting the growth of new political and commercial centers. The routes of the pilgrimage were perhaps least influenced by such changes, as their functions and destination remained the same.2 The two H fi ajj routes of interest to us here are well established and documented and need no more discussion. As routes with a specialized function, they had such specific features as well-spaced rest stations and fortifications to insure the safety of the pilgrims.3 For our general discussion about the infrastructure and integration of Bila¯d al-Sha¯m it is of interest to note how the sancakfi of Gaza and Ramla were integrated into the Syrian province: although closer to ‘Aqaba, which the Egyptian pilgrimage caravan regularly passed, the sancakfi had to send financial contributions to the pilgrimage caravan starting from Damascus and even provide men to guard it.4 Although the major purpose of the pilgrimage route was religious, it always played an important role for international trade. But only once, with the Wahhabi advances toward Syria at the beginning of the nineteenth century, was the pilgrimage route south of Damascus used as a major military avenue. A certain curiosity value can be attached to the attempt of the Copts to

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establish a regular pilgrimage to Jerusalem in 1753. Since they hired Bedouins, they presumably wanted to cross the Sinai to Gaza. But the pilgrimage that started with much pomp was interdicted by the ‘ulama¯’ for fear that the Copts would want to compete with the H fi ajj.5 A more regular feature was the pilgrimage of European Christians who would usually arrive by ship in Jaffa and continue from there to Jerusalem. From Jerusalem they would venture on short excursions to such sites as Bethlehem or Jericho, security conditions permitting.6 Trade routes7 overlapped to a certain degree with pilgrimage routes or military highways. Merchandise was transported either by beasts of burden or by ship. Sea lanes played a much more important role for trade than they did for military purposes. Throughout the period there existed a very active coastal shipping connecting all the ports from Damiette to Jaffa, Acre, Tyre, Sidon, Beirut, Tripoli, and Cyprus. The shipping business was in the hands of individual entrepreneurs of various religious and ethnic backgrounds.8 As long as Maltese pirates constituted a threat along the coast, French tramps had an edge over others in the business as did shippers of the Greek Catholic Arabic-speaking community, as their certified Catholicism secured a certain measure of protection from Maltese piracy.9 The coastal trade was one of the major north-south trade links in the area. Wood from Mount Lebanon was shipped via Beirut and Jaffa to Jerusalem; silk went via Beirut to Sidon or Acre, from where it was exported to Marseilles. Wood and soap went to Egypt via Jaffa and Damiette, while rice from the latter port was shipped to Acre. Trade with Europe shifted during the eighteenth century. Originally most trade went via Alexandretta or Tripoli to Aleppo and fed directly into longdistance trade routes connecting to Iran, the Hejaz, and beyond. Though the trade with the Hejaz continued to play an important role, by the early eighteenth century Iran had sunk into political chaos, and the important trade in silk and silk textiles from Iran to Aleppo ceased. The French silk industry had to look for new sources of silk supplies. By mid-century Acre became the focal point of European—that is to say, almost exclusively French—trade in the eastern Mediterranean. Increasing trade with raw materials linked Marseilles directly with Acre and the immediate hinterland in the Galilee and Mount Lebanon, from where locally cultivated cotton and silk were brought to Acre for export. With the limited exception of rice shipped from Damiette, no other trade routes fed into this overseas trade. East-west links, albeit rather weak ones, between the inland trade routes

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and the coastal shipping lanes existed at several points: from Damascus a road went via the Biqa¯‘a to Sidon and also to Beirut. Damascus was also linked to the coast via Tiberias, and Nazareth to Acre. Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar, who was to become the founder of Acre as the new center for export trade, had started his career as a trader between Tiberias and Damascus. Further south, Nablus was connected via Nazareth to Acre and via Ramla to Jaffa. There is hardly any evidence that commercial traffic ran directly between Jerusalem and the coast; the link between Hebron and Gaza also seems to have been a tenuous one. Worth mentioning, too, is the fact that all trade from Palestine went—via the Bridge of Jacob’s Daughters, north of Lake Tiberias—to Damascus. No commercial connections existed with other points east of the Jordan, unless we count the occasional plundering of pilgrim caravans by Bedouins and the sale of that merchandise smuggled into the Galilee as “commercial” activities.10 From the middle of the eighteenth century there existed three major trading networks: the traditional one linking long-distance international trade from the Indian Ocean via the Hejaz to Damascus and Aleppo, the latter being also the entrepoˆt for merchandise from Iran; a local trade connecting the Syrian coast with Egypt and trading traditional items such as wood, soap, and tobacco from southwest Syria for rice, skins, and wheat from Egypt, and the newly developed export trade of raw materials from the immediate coastal region via Acre to France. Apart from some items such as alkali from the Balqa¯’, or rice from Damiette, neither the traditional local trade nor the traditional long-distance trade meshed with this new export trade of cotton and silk from the coastal hinterland. Silk and cotton were brought directly from the villages to Acre, Sidon, or Beirut and shipped from there. Thus the above-mentioned east-west trading links from inland were not significantly strengthened. This disconnectedness of the trading networks might also explain, at least partially, why connecting highways between Damascus and Acre, Nablus, Jerusalem, and Jaffa, etc. remained in such bad repair. The flow of trade depended on markets and producers, and also shifted with the political circumstances. When, for instance, Iran sank into chaos with the end of Safavid rule in the eighteenth century, silk exports to Aleppo ceased. This led to the decay of British trade in Aleppo, but also to an expansion of silk production in Lebanon, bought mainly by the French. The coffee trade from Yemen to the Syrian coast had lost its importance and had been replaced by imports from the British or French colonies. When, late in the eighteenth century, the Wahhabis began to attack the pilgrimage caravan, the trade of Damascus suffered. On the other hand, periods of unrest in Aleppo

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13

caused many merchants residing there to relocate to Damascus. In this sense, politics of course played a major role in the economics and the trade of the region. But what is conspicuously absent is any conscious, comprehensive economic policy of the government, not to mention any attempt to introduce government monopolies on all or any goods. Neither did the Ottoman government take any measures to direct the flow of trade or the production of goods by maintaining, let alone developing, the infrastructure of the region— the only exception being the route of the pilgrimage caravan to Mecca. The rise of Acre, its fortification as a seaport, and the systematic attempt of its rulers to impose an all-pervasive economic monopoly policy was a radical break with the existing patterns. As we shall see, this policy had farreaching implications for the geographic stretch of Acre and its realm, for the structure of society in Acre, and for the fate of other port cities such as Jaffa, Sidon and, most important, Beirut. Soldiers, pilgrims, and merchants usually travel along known highways. Their movements follow certain recurring patterns, well defined by the purpose and destination of their journeys. In some ways the movements of individual travelers, be they tourists, government agents, individual pilgrims, or all of the above, are more difficult to summarize in patterns. Individual traveling adapts rapidly to changing circumstances and road conditions. Factors such as safety, expenditure, and road quality are quickly responded to. Fortunately for our period a considerable number of European travelers arrived in what was usually called “Syria and the Holy Land.” Most often they were tourists and pilgrims at the same time and were keen to put down their experiences in writing. Their reports—together with those of traveling scholars from Egypt or Damascus, or of government representatives and messengers from Istanbul—tell us a great deal about the changing conditions of the road network. The first observation we can make is that even for the purpose of tourism travel was not as individual as all that. Most of the European and some of the Ottoman travelers tried to combine a visit to the holy places with their traveling. For the Christians this always meant Jerusalem, often also a visit to Nazareth and its surroundings. Most European travelers would land in Jaffa, arriving either directly from Europe or via Damiette, Acre, or Cyprus. From Jaffa the road would lead via Ramla to Jerusalem. Excursions from there to Jericho, Bethlehem, etc. depended on the existing safety conditions. At very safe times the traveler might continue from Jerusalem via Nablus to Nazareth and Acre. But usually travelers would return the same way and take a boat from Jaffa to Acre, then venture from there to Nazareth and back. The

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Ramla-Jerusalem route mainly served tourists and pilgrims, the poor quality of the road apparently not allowing any other traffic.11 A further reason why travel by individual tourists was not so freely undertaken was the concern with safety. In the early eighteenth century especially, tourists or pilgrims would attach themselves to caravans or form larger groups, seeking safety in numbers. Travelers would wait for groups or caravans to join them.12 They would cancel their journeys if they could not find such groups in time,13 or they would change their routes.14 They would take detours to avoid dangerous areas. Consider, for instance, Ku¯sa¯ Kahfi ya¯, katkhuda¯ of the government. On his way back from the pilgrimage to Mecca he turned from Damascus west to go to Acre, took a boat from there to Jaffa, and continued to Jerusalem. Returning from Jerusalem, he departed by ship from Jaffa for Istanbul. To turn off, for instance, at the pilgrimage station of ‘Ayn Zarqa’ and proceed directly west to Jerusalem was apparently not safe or possible.15 Security seems to have been good in the first century of Ottoman rule. Around 1550 a traveler stated explicitly: “I often moved just by myself in Bethlehem, Gaza, Cairo, Alexandria, but I never was attacked or taken prisoner.”16 Even in the early seventeenth century, traveling to Nazareth, Nablus, and Jerusalem did not provoke any particular safety concerns.17 D’Arvieux, however, felt by 1658 the need always to travel with groups or with a military escort.18 In the following hundred years traveling became increasingly unsafe: fear of kidnapping for ransom, unrest, highway robbery, the extortion of protection money, and other perils weighed heavily on the mind of every traveler. But from the middle of the eighteenth century, travel reports give a differentiated picture. Korten had gone to Jerusalem in 1740, where he had planned to stay a year. In view of the lack of security, however, he left very soon and took a boat from Jaffa to Acre. Traveling in the Galilee, he commented: “It should be known that travel there is much safer than around Jerusalem.” He attributed the greater security in the Galilee to the open landscape and the fact that the region was thinly settled.19 Although his observation was correct, his explanation was not. The better security situation was the result of Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar’s rule in the Galilee; he had by 1737 achieved a considerable pacification of the Galilee, so that “a woman could travel with gold in her hand, without anyone confronting her on the road and without her being afraid in the least.”20 Ten years later Hasselquist had a “horrible” journey to Jerusalem but wrote of his trip from Acre to Nazareth that he had “a pleasant journey in a land where one travels safely and on good roads.”21

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After the death of Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r in 1804, a very high level of internal security in the realm of Acre was achieved under Sulayma¯n Pasha, his successor. Even the coastal highway was now safe. Sulayma¯n’s mutasallim in Jaffa made it a point to move rapidly between Acre and Jaffa. Often he would take a fast camel and a few companions and travel lightly armed in one day or one night directly along the coast.22 In 1813 Sulayma¯n Pasha also took measures to improve the security of the coastal highway to the north of Acre by having watchtowers built and manned with guards. In 1817 Irby and Mangles traveled overland from Cairo to Jaffa and marched from there to Caesarea, Tfi antfiu¯ra, ‘Atlit, Haifa, and Acre. After some traveling in northern Syria they came back to Damascus, from where they proceeded to the Bridge of Jacob’s Daughters: “In some places there were traces of an ancient paved way, probably the Roman road leading from Damascus to Caesarea.”23 They traveled to Tiberias, crossed to the Yarmuk River, crossed back to Baysa¯n, back to Jarrash, al-Salt, and back again to Nablus. From there they traveled to Jerusalem, Hebron, Kerak, and back to al-Salt, Jarrash, Nazareth, and finally Acre. Here they embarked for Istanbul. Not only the coastal highway but even the crossing to the east bank of the Jordan had become safe. That the route from Nazareth to Janı¯n, Nablus, Ra¯malla¯h, and Jerusalem was perfectly safe was confirmed by another traveler during the same year.24 The claim that only Ibra¯hı¯m Pasha and his Egyptian troops brought security and accessibility to the traveler, especially foreigners, in Syria is not correct. Certainly in southwest Syria, and in particular as far as the influence of Acre reached, security on the highways had been established a generation earlier. The less travelers were concerned with their personal safety, the more they complained about the quality of the roads. Roads were “execrable,” “excessively steep and rugged,” “very rugged and bad.”25 Or: “The whole distance between Jerusalem to Jaffa . . . could be traveled normally in 13 hours, but the rugged and pathless rocks, which the traveler has to cross, extend the journey to a day and a half.”26 As late as 1821 the Acre-Damascus road was so bad that no cannons could be dragged over it.27 All heavy equipment, cannons, ammunition, and wood were, if at all possible, shipped along the coast. We hear of a very limited and relatively late attempt by Sulayma¯n Pasha to have the coastal road from Acre to Beirut improved, for example by widening the path in the rock at Ra’s al-Naqu¯ra, building a bridge over the Zahrani River, providing a water fountain.28 But this was clearly exceptional. While considerable efforts were made to construct fortifications and large sums were

16

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invested in the reconstruction of cities and the port of Acre, it seems that not the slightest effort was made to upgrade the communication system by leveling roads, building bridges, or strengthening the roadbed. The first explanation that comes to mind is the one valid for the whole Ottoman Empire: goods were transported by beasts of burden, so roads did not have to be paved and straightened. This certainly holds true for southwest Syria during the period.29 Furthermore, though trade intensified during the eighteenth century, the new trade routes were, as we have seen, juxtaposed but not linked to traditional ones. The commercial wealth of Acre originated from the villages in the immediate hinterland, not from long-distance overland trade routes from Damascus, for instance. Thus the upgrading or new construction of roads was of no interest to the rulers of Acre.

FORTRESSES AND TERRITORY 3 0 The military highway along the Syrian coast via Sinai to Egypt had already fallen into disuse during the late Mamluk period. The Ottoman conquerors marched from the north via Damascus to Laju¯n, Janı¯n, and via Gaza to Egypt. Only with the weakening of central power in the Ottoman Empire and the consolidation of Neo-Mamluk power in Egypt did Egypt’s traditional interest in Syria as a rampart for its own power position reawaken. In the short time-span from 1770 to 1831, four large-scale invasions of Syria were started from Egypt. They all followed the same path along the coast via Gaza to Jaffa and on to Acre. Jaffa was put under siege at least six times, and Acre was besieged or bombed eight times. By the early eighteenth century the Ottoman authorities began to fortify Jaffa. This was aimed, however, not so much against overland attacks as against raids by pirates.31 Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar started fortification works at Acre by mid-century. Control over both cities was decisive for the conquest of the rest of Syria. Difficult sieges of Jaffa and Acre preceded the usually easy surrender of Damascus and the march north toward Aleppo. In Syria, just as in Egypt, local centers of power had consolidated during the eighteenth century. Acre had become the foremost such new base of local power and the most important port on the Syrian coast. No invader could ignore Acre or Jaffa, the latter often serving as an extension of the power base of the former. The coastal cities further north, such as Sidon, Beirut, and Tripoli, were no longer or not yet of economic or strategic importance. Such was also the case with the inland cities in the south— Hebron, Jerusalem, and, to a degree, Nablus. After securing Acre the armies

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17

had to turn inland to Damascus, the “Gate to the Pilgrimage” and the seat of the most powerful representative of Ottoman might, the governor of Damascus and his troops. Damascus was the key to the military highway to the north, to Aleppo, and beyond. Just as Acre was decisive for the conquest of Syria, so control over Jaffa was essential for the rulers of Acre if they wanted to protect themselves against an Egyptian invasion. During those six decades Jaffa was conquered at least nine times. Apart from three more or less peaceful surrenders, sieges lasted from four days to several months, and usually ended in considerable bloodshed. The only marching route from Acre to Jaffa for a long time led ¯ mir, as far as Megiddo, where it from Acre southeast to the Marj ibn ‘A crossed the Muqatfifita‘ River and passed through the mountains, reaching the coast roughly at Caesarea. It seems that Abu¯ ‘l-Dhahab’s army, at least on the second occasion in 1775, marched directly up the coast from Jaffa to Acre, accompanied by one warship.32 The French and then later Ibra¯hı¯m Pasha followed the same route. The coastal plain of Palestine was convenient for the movement of large bodies of troops. Sufficient water could be found, and predatory Bedouins were no threat to troops counted by the thousands. No mountain passes endangered the passage of the troops. But there were no paved or fortified roads. No vehicle could pass, and even light artillery had to be disassembled and carried on camels. “Thousands of beasts” were part of every military campaign. Heavy guns and bulk materials were shipped from Damiette to the Syrian coast. But naval warfare was of secondary importance. To begin with, neither the Mamluks nor the rulers in Acre seem to have had many ships available for this purpose. The port of Jaffa offered no shelter against storms, and even when supplied by the sea, Jaffa could not withstand a siege from the land side. Acre turned out to be a much more formidable obstacle from sea as well as from land. H fi asan Kfi apu¯da¯n Pasha conquered Acre after a bombardment from the sea in 1775, but only because the octogenarian Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar had already lost control over Acre, and his artillery refused to return fire. Even the twenty-two, presumably new, ships of Ibra¯hı¯m Pasha were in 1831 of no use for the conquest of Acre, which at this point was protected by massively improved fortifications and heavy guns. Only the British navy could, in the early nineteenth century, effectively blockade the Egyptian and Syrian coast, intercept the local ships Bonaparte used to supply his troops in Palestine, defend Acre from the sea against conquest from the land in 1799, and conquer it from the sea in 1840. Attempts to conquer Acre from the land side were either unsuccessful or succeeded only after long sieges. In 1789 al-

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Jazza¯r’s rebellious Mamluks briefly besieged him in Acre but were beaten off. So were the French in 1799 after two months of intensive siege and bombardments. In 1821–22 a nine-month siege by Darwı¯sh Pasha could not force ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha to surrender. Conquest came only after a six-month siege by the Egyptian army under Ibra¯hı¯m Pasha in 1832. Conquest also became possible in situations in which the defenders, through fear, treachery, or dissent, had lost the stamina to defend the city and withdrew voluntarily, as occurred (twice) in 1775 and in 1804. Throughout, Acre remained the pivotal point of all military campaigns. With the reestablishment of Ottoman central power in Syria after 1840 Acre sank into oblivion, and the military highway between Egypt and Syria played no further role until British troops set out from Egypt to conquer Syria during World War I. While the long-distance military highways were clearly marked—coming from the north via Aleppo to Damascus and from the south via Gaza and Jaffa to Acre—it is the region between the coast and Damascus where the trails for military expeditions seem to multiply.33 The major military clashes occurred here during the period, with Damascus representing local and imperial interests and Acre representing its own local and/or Egyptian interests. Perhaps the best way to consider the local military staging areas and highways is to look at fortifications and walled cities. The struggle for control over fortified cities also in many ways defined the limits of the realm of the rulers in Acre. Though control over fortresses and fortified towns shifted back and forth according to changing military and political constellations of the moment, the decisive and frequently challenged fortified points that could circumscribe the territory of the Acre region were Jaffa, Sfi a¯nu¯r at the northern approaches to Nablus, Tiberias, Beirut, and Sidon, and, of course, as the last resort, Acre itself. Sieges were as frequent as open-field battles and usually more decisive. Small fortified places dotted the northern Galilee and the Metuali Mountains and served local chieftains as retreats in case of emergency. Their strategic value was rather limited, their importance only local. Such places were used by the sons of Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar to defend themselves against their father. Further north, the Metualis tried to offer resistance in their fortifications to Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r until he had them destroyed. In the early eighteenth century only Damascus and Jerusalem were effectively fortified cities and only the former played any military role. At the very time the Ottomans were putting up fortifications around Jaffa, Zfi a¯hı¯r al‘Umar was repairing the fortifications of Tiberias. In the 1770s Beirut was

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19

fortified by Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r. But the single most important development was the fortification of Acre begun by Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar in mid-century and carried on by Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r and his successors. As long as Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar was based in the eastern Galilee, the governor of Damascus would move along the southwestern highway from Damascus, cross the Jordan at the Bridge of Jacob’s Daughters, and try to break Zfi a¯hı¯r al‘Umar’s power by besieging him in Tiberias. A few more open battles were fought for control of the Bridge of Jacob’s Daughters, but the upper Jordan River was soon established as the permanent borderline between the realm of the rulers of Acre and that of the governors of Damascus. Once Acre became Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar’s base, the dimensions of warfare shifted. In addition to Damascus, now Sidon and Nablus had to pay attention to Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar’s intentions. From Acre, Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar first expanded his area of control to Haifa, Tfi antfiu¯ra, and Nazareth, which was the entrepoˆt for Nablus (bandar alna¯bulusiyya). The whole region had been under the control of Nablus, includ¯ mir, which provided easy access to the bay of Acre. In ing the Marj ibn al-‘A this plain, near Nazareth, the battle against the people from Nablus was fought. Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar pursued the defeated troops as far as Jabal Nablus but could not hope to overcome the fortifications on that mountain. Muhfi ammad ibn Ibra¯hı¯m al-Jarra¯r held the fortress of Sfi a¯nu¯r in Jabal Nablus. This seems to have marked the limit of Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar’s realm.34 Over the next eighty years Sfi a¯nu¯r remained a daunting challenge to the rulers of Acre and defined the limits of their control. When in 1790 Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r was appointed governor of Damascus for the second time, he sent a representative there but stayed in Acre. He also confirmed the leaders of Nablus in their positions. All submitted to him and made an appearance at Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r’s court, with the exception of Yu¯suf al-Jarra¯r, mutasallim of Janı¯n. The latter held out in the fortress of Sfi a¯nu¯r; a fifty-day siege by Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r failed in spite of heavy bombardments. An ill-advised mining of the fortifications literally backfired and destroyed most of the camp of Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r.35 In 1803 al-Jazza¯r tried for a second time to conquer Sfi a¯nu¯r. But, as had been the case the first time, Druze elements supportive of and supported by al-Jazza¯r came under attack by other Druze factions, and al-Jazza¯r had to shift his attention to the north. Where Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar and Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r had failed militarily, Sulayma¯n Pasha gained a certain influence over the affairs of Nablus by diplomacy. In 1830 the sancakfi of Nablus was given by the Ottoman government to the governor of Sidon, ‘Abdalla¯h, the ruler of Acre. Damascus had com-

20

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plained that it could not collect taxes from there because of resistance by the population. Nablus rebelled and ‘Abdalla¯h, provided with new authority, sent troops and besieged the fortress of Sfi a¯nu¯r. After a lengthy siege the fortress was stormed. This was the first time that Acre could assert its military control over Nablus. Ironically, one year later, with the Egyptian conquest of Syria, Acre ceased to exist as an autonomous power and soon slipped into oblivion. Once Acre had become the power base of the local rulers, control over the coast to the north became important. Tyre, and more important, Sidon, not only constituted commercial competition for Acre, but could always serve as a base for attacks on it. Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar tried to establish his control over this coast, and al-Jazza¯r never gave it up. The latter had started his rise to power in Syria when he put himself in control of Beirut and had it fortified. After he had been appointed governor of Sidon, with Acre as the seat of his power, he never again gave up control of Beirut. Sidon and Beirut served as military bases to project his influence into Mount Lebanon. Sulayma¯n Pasha, his successor, was forced to give up full control over Beirut—much to the detriment of the economic fortunes of Acre. On the coast to the south of Acre the fortress of Jaffa became the pivotal point of strategic importance as the first defense of southwest Syria against invasions from Egypt, just as it could be used as the base for any military expeditions from the north into Egypt. At the same time it also served as the port for the commerce of Nablus. In the five years 1770–75 a three-pronged war broke out between ‘Uthma¯n Pasha, the governor of Damascus, backed by Istanbul and in a loose alliance with forces in Nablus, Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar, based in Acre, and, finally, different Mamluk factions from Egypt. During this period Jaffa changed hands six times, suffering at least three devastating sieges. Nor does the story end here. Control over Jaffa seems to have reverted to Nablus, and indirectly to the governor of Damascus after the death of Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar and Abu¯ ‘l-Dhahab in 1775. As late as 1792 Jaffa was a refuge for the French merchants from Acre—beyond the reach of Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r. When the French army under Napoleon, however, moved in 1799 from Egypt to Syria, al-Jazza¯r’s troops defended Jaffa in a bitter siege which ended with the execution of these troops after their surrender. Thereafter, the Ottoman government made repeated attempts to establish its direct control over the fortress of Jaffa, but from early 1807 on Jaffa remained firmly attached to Acre. During this short century of autonomy enjoyed by Acre and its realm, between 1743 and 1831, fortresses and fortified cities played a major role in

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21

defining the political and economic reach of Acre. Since the old international transit routes of commerce and the new system of export of cash crops did not really mesh, no need arose to add to or improve the road system. As beasts of burden were always used, no investment in road maintenance was necessary, but there was also a positive reason to leave the road system in such an abysmal state, and this explains the enormous role fortifications played: the road system could not accommodate armies dragging siege equipment. Bad roads made for good defense.36 The Egyptian invasion radically changed the political and economic landscape, especially that of southwest Syria. In October 1831, 20,000 troops set out from Egypt overland via Gaza to Jaffa, where they were joined on November 8 by an Egyptian fleet carrying 6,000 marines. The 250 Albanian troops constituting the garrison of Jaffa surrendered immediately, only trying, rather pathetically, to negotiate for salaries from Ibra¯hı¯m Pasha, which ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha had not paid them for months. The ruler of Acre no longer had the resources to defend Jaffa. Acre itself, however, resisted the Egyptian onslaught for another six months.37 By the time of the only further conquest of Syria to start from Egypt, Allenby’s invasion in 1917–18, Jaffa had long ceased to be a military obstacle. In conclusion one can observe that the local military highways depended naturally on the geostrategic conditions of the area, but also to a large degree upon the existence of fortified places. Fortifications played a surprisingly large role in the warfare of the period. The sea lanes had a rather limited function in regional or local warfare. Typically, the sea route from Damiette to Jaffa and Acre played at best a supportive role for overland troop movements. The actual number of ships involved was usually very small. The use of sea routes from across the Mediterranean implied great-power interference. The appearance of Russian ships and the Ottoman fleet on the Syrian coast between 1770 and 1776, though, remained rather tentative. After 1798 only the British navy was able to project its power successfully in the region. After the end of the Egyptian occupation in 1840 the newly strengthened central government of the Ottoman Empire never again allowed quasiindependent rulers such as those of the Acre region to emerge in Syria. The increasing integration of the Syrian hinterland into the European economy during the nineteenth century, especially after the arrival of the steamship, made the development of the infrastructure—first roads, then railways—a necessity. Eventually, all these developments ensured the predominant role of Beirut on the Syrian coast and the decline of Acre.

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POPULATIONS AND MIGRATIONS During the eighteenth century Acre was the only city in the Arab Middle East to experience a dramatic boom, one that turned it from a small fishing village into the most important port on the Syrian coast, well fortified by new walls and towers. The population grew from some 400 to about 25,000, and even more at its height. The boom was followed by a bust, which reduced Acre again to little more than a village by 1840. Even the most cursory look at the population curve of the city of Acre shows a dramatic growth and decline within one century. But before commenting on it a word of warning is necessary, as always when dealing with population figures during this time. No censuses were conducted; local historians were supremely uninterested in numbers.38 European travelers, on the other hand, often used numbers to provide their reports with a certain air of scholarship and authenticity. But they, too, did not actually count populations. Most of the numbers, therefore, come from outside observers who made more or less precise estimates, copied estimates from others, or relied on hearsay, but rarely tell us how they reached their statistical conclusions. Therefore it often remains difficult to say anything about the reliability of the data. We can assume that some observers provided sounder estimates than others, such as the French consuls who lived for lengthy periods in Acre itself. But in the end much of the information is impressionistic, and at best we can only establish rough sizes of populations and demographic trends. Even this claim has to be qualified further by limiting it to the city of Acre without its hinterland. For the period we are interested in we have no quantitative data whatsoever for the countryside and are restricted to anecdotal information. When a traveler wrote that plains were “empty of population,” did he mean empty in comparison to the abundant ruins from classical times, empty in comparison to the size of the population that theoretically could make a living from agriculture, empty in comparison to the observations of previous travelers, or empty in comparison to his homeland? Usually, he does not tell us. Other information is more helpful—such as “many peasants died from starvation,” or “people fled their villages for the mountains,” or “peasants from the mountains settled in the plains.” Here we may be able to establish some migratory patterns without, however, being able to discuss quantities. Though unresolved contradictions remain, the general trend and size of population development in Acre can be established. More problematic is reconstructing a reliable picture of the sectarian distribution of the population.

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The major underlying factor shaping the population curve is the tremendous economic boom during the middle of the eighteenth century. The detailed contours of the general trend are formed by such events as plague, famine, war, and earthquakes. Clearly, these factors contributed to the rate of growth and decline but in themselves were not decisive for the direction of the development. The plague in 1760 reduced the population by roughly a third, but the population continued to increase rapidly in the 1760s, while after 1785 every disaster accelerated the general downward trend of the population size. A graph, with annotations, showing the shifts in population between 1700 and 1840 appears in appendix A. Any attempt to determine trends of particular sectarian populations has to take two difficulties into consideration. (a) Numbers are even less reliable than usual. Not only are sources scarce but we must treat them with suspicion: frequently there was a definite interest in overestimating the size of one community at the cost of others. (b) It appears that diseases and especially the plague hit the Muslim population much harder than the Christian. A report on the plague of 1806 claims that while 25–50 percent of the Muslim population perished, not one of the Christians died.39 The Christians were quarantined and took other precautionary measures, believing as they did in the communicability of the disease. Their Muslim neighbors, denying this, took by and large no precautions. Mortality during the epidemics depended not only on religious beliefs and resulting attitudes toward protective measures, but also on wealth (i.e., the means to leave town or to store enough supplies in available living space to lock oneself up for a time). In a general manner we know that during the eighteenth century Christians migrated toward the coast—Greek Catholics from Damascus and Aleppo, especially, but also Greek Orthodox from Nazareth, for instance. In addition, some Greeks came from the Greek islands and were quickly Arabized, as were some families who came from Malta.40 We can also conclude that during the time of Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh many Greek Catholics were attracted to Acre, just as the Jews were later, during the time of H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı. Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar pursued a policy of stimulating immigration to his realm, but with different results for different communities. It seems that throughout the eighteenth century the Christians constituted the majority of the population, with the Greek Catholics and the Greek Orthodox being by far the largest groups.41 With the decay of the city and the disappearance of trade the absolute number and the relative size of the Christian population of Acre dwindled. In Acre we can observe for the eighteenth century the link between a growing Christian population and

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foreign trade that becomes so typical in the nineteenth century for such cities as Alexandria, Beirut, and Izmir. Carmel is wrong when he contrasts Acre to Haifa, saying: “Neighboring Acre persisted in its exclusively Muslim character.”42 Rather, Acre turned slowly into a more Muslim city after having been a predominantly Christian city in the eighteenth century. The waqf deed from 1830 of a Muslim notable by the name of Mas‘u¯d al-Ma¯dfi ¯ı shows that of the five houses he had bought in Acre two had been bought from Jews, two from Christians, and only one from a Muslim. In view of the numerical evidence given before, this appears to confirm a shift in the denominational balance in the early nineteenth century.43 Numbers for the Jewish population are even less precise.44 The Igrot and Sholhei Aretz Israel literature of the time clearly shows Jerusalem and Safed to be the centers of Jewish immigration. Acre is only mentioned as a port of entry. The motivation for Jewish immigration to Palestine during this time had nothing to do with the economic boom generated through cotton exports. The steep increase of Jewish population in Acre coincided exactly with the years during which H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı, the Jewish vezier to Ahfi mad Pasha alJazza¯r and Sulayma¯n Pasha, could serve as a powerful patron.45 The rapid exodus from the city after 1820 is understandable in light of the murder of Farhfi ¯ı and the loss of protection for the Jews. The following observations may summarize the population trends and developments. 1. During the eighteenth century Acre experienced a population increase unparalleled in the Arab lands: from a fishing village of 300–400 people it became a city of 25,000–30,000 inhabitants. Only in the nineteenth century do we find examples of similar rapid growth in other places: Beirut, Izmir, Alexandria. 2. From the end of the eighteenth century we can observe a continued decline in the population of Acre until it was reduced by the middle of the nineteenth century to 2,000. 3. While Acre was predominantly a Christian city in the eighteenth century, it became a mainly Muslim city in the nineteenth century. 4. Throughout the period Jews remained few in number. Only in the early 1800s did the community flourish considerably under the protecting hand of H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı. 5. Plague, famine, war, and earthquakes were important factors shaping the patterns of the demographic trends, but underlying and most decisive

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25

for the direction of these trends was the economic development of the city and its surroundings.

THE PHYSICAL SHAPING OF ACRE Although the results of the reconstruction of Acre during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries are quite visible, information about the history of these reconstructions is scant. There is, for instance, not a word in the records about the construction of private houses and apartments. And while the construction of public buildings is usually mentioned by local historians and travelers, we have little information about the costs, the sources of financing, the labor force, its organization, and so on. We can only indicate in a very crude manner some of the general trends in which construction activities developed. We know that in the early eighteenth century Acre was mainly a pile of rubble and ruins. In spite of the fact that the harbor was useless and that in nearby Haifa a much-better-protected bay was to be found, Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar nevertheless decided to make Acre the center of his realm, precisely because of Acre’s ruins: they provided cheap precut building materials on location. A great number of Crusader structures were destroyed in the process. For convenience’s sake we can group the construction activity other than private housing according to the functions it fulfilled: religious, commercial, military-political, and public services. This shall serve only as a summary overview of the construction in Acre. In the following chapters we shall refer to specific building activities as they become pertinent. For the locations of these buildings the city plan of Acre in the appendix to this volume should be consulted.46

Religious Buildings Around 1700 one mosque, al-Sina¯n mosque, existed in Acre—it was later rebuilt as al-Bahfi r mosque by Sulayma¯n Pasha. Soon another mosque was added, al-Ramal mosque. By mid-century al-Mu‘allaq mosque— built in 1748 by Shaykh Suhayl—and al-Zaytu¯na mosque—built in 1754 by H fi a¯jj Muhfi ammad al-Sfi a¯diq—were erected. As far as we know, in all cases the initiative and the money came from private sources. To these four mosques only one more, but by far the largest and most beautiful, was added in 1778

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SOUTHWEST SYRIA IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

by Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r, built with forced labor and financed by his treasury. All five of the churches in Acre—the Franciscan church, the Greek Orthodox church of St. George, the Maronite church, and the two Greek Catholic churches, St. Andrew and St. John, were built or extensively enlarged and renovated between 1730 and 1770. Naturally, they were not financed by the government. With the exception of the great mosque of al-Jazza¯r, which was clearly built for reasons of representations and political legitimization, all the other religious buildings were built before the al-Jazza¯r period, some of them in fact even before Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar had made Acre the seat of his government. It is reasonable to assume that their construction responded to the rapidly increasing population, both Christian and Muslim, during this period.

Commercial Structures During the first half of the eighteenth century the Kha¯n-al-Faranj remained the only real center of economic activity. But when Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar moved into the city, he was well aware of the importance of cotton exports and other economic activities. Zfi a¯hir decided to build a new port in the southern part of Haifa Bay, while at the old port of Acre he had in 1761 only some wave breakers added to protect boats and light vessels. In Acre he had two new Kha¯ns built—Kha¯n Shu¯na¯ in 1765, the eastern part of Kha¯n alShuwarda, and a large bazaar, where today the Su¯q al-Abyadfi stands. Al-Jazza¯r attributed at least as much importance to the economy as did Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar. He doubled the size of the Kha¯n al-Shuwarda and added Kha¯n al-‘Umda¯n and Su¯q al-Jazza¯r plus some minor structures. During the reign of Sulayma¯n Pasha very few structures were added: a donkey kha¯n for small traders with daily merchandise was erected in 1810. Seven years later Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar’s bazaar burned down and Sulayma¯n Pasha had the Su¯q al-Abyadfi built in its stead. But significantly, where once 110 shops had existed, the reconstruction housed only 64 shops.

Military-Political Structures Almost immediately after entering the town, Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar began a major construction project: the fortification of the city by a wall seven meters high and one meter wide. The wall was to protect against Bedouin

SOUTHWEST SYRIA IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

27

bands, sea pirates, and eventually the French army. Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar rehabilitated the crusader fortress and made it his palace. He added to it a fortified tower. Both Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r and Sulayma¯n Pasha added structures of their own. Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar also built the Busta, or seraglio, where he conducted the daily business of government. The importance of city walls was driven home to al-Jazza¯r during the French siege. After the French retreat, alJazza¯r had the old, thin, vertical wall of Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar repaired, and set out to have a new and enormous additional defense structure added. This included a much larger wall, sloped and covered by earth, much better suited to resist modern artillery, together with a moat and towers. Sulayma¯n Pasha and ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha added to the city walls and raised a few more buildings for their palaces. The latter also had some residences constructed outside the walls.

Public Utilities Here we must mention the bathhouses. Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar and Ahmad Pasha al-Jazza¯r each had a big public bath erected. Al-Jazza¯r undertookfi another major enterprise, bringing fresh water by way of an aqueduct, which was destroyed during the French siege and reconstructed only in 1815 by Sulayma¯n Pasha. From this in no way exhaustive list of constructions a few valid observations can be made: 1. Most of the religious buildings were built during the early period and reflected the increasing population of Acre. 2. Both Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar and Ahfi mad al-Jazza¯r sought to fortify the city and enhance its economic facilities. In fact it seems that al-Jazza¯r’s efforts greatly surpassed those of Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar. This stands in clear contrast to the trends of the growth and decline of the population and the economy, a point to which we shall return. 3. Sulayma¯n Pasha added considerably to the building substance in all categories. 4. The bombardment by Ibra¯hı¯m Pasha in 1831, the subsequent earthquake, and the final bombardment by the British in 1840 reduced the city to what it had been 150 years earlier: a pile of rubble.

We have sketched briefly in this chapter the development and meaning of the infrastructure of southwest Syria, the demographic trends of Acre and its

28

SOUTHWEST SYRIA IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

hinterland, and building activities in Acre. Although all these aspects changed during the period, the phases of their development were not synchronous. What linked and shaped them was an underlying development of rapidly increasing export of cash crops and the changing balance between local and imperial politics.

chapter 2

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

So far we have only looked at the physical layout, the existing infrastructure, and the demographic trends of Acre and its hinterland during the period studied here. The aim of this chapter is to reconstruct a political history for this region with Acre as the focal point. A number of chronicles from the period itself and shortly afterward exist, often written by eyewitnesses. They touch on Acre in various forms, dealing with one ruler or another, with regional or communal affairs of various groups, with the history of the vilayets or with the major urban centers such as Damascus and Aleppo. These chronicles provide a wealth of information, though the specific agendas of the authors are often recognizable and much of the information of interest to us comes in anecdotal or incidental form. French consular reports can often be very helpful here in providing a different perspective and a fairly precise time frame for the sequence of events as they evolved. Modern historians have difficulties in classifying Acre and its hinterland. It was neither the precursor of an independent state nor the center of a later nationalism; as it evolved in the eighteenth century it neither constituted an Ottoman administrative unit nor predetermined later Mandatory entities, as did Mount Lebanon for instance. The region at the beginning of the eighteenth century can be best described as a border region whose contours are not clearly defined: Haifa was under the control of Nablus, i.e. it belonged by extension to the vilayet of Damascus. But it was also called “Little Malta” because no government authority reached to there and pirates used it as a refuge. Nazareth and Tiberias had been under Druze control, i.e., indirectly under the authority of the governor of Sidon, but while Tiberias reverted directly to the latter, Nazareth had moved under the control of Nablus, i.e.,

30

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

the governor of Damascus. On the whole the position of the governor was exceedingly weak. Different elements such as Bedouin tribes in the Galilee, ¯ mil, the Druze, the Metualis in the bordering mountain range of Jabal al-‘A and the ruling elite of Nablus all pursued local rivalries without much direct interference by the Ottoman governors of Sidon and Damascus, not to speak of the Ottoman government itself. In this vaguely defined political borderland Acre and its realm slowly took political and economic shape, and inserted itself like a wedge between the vilayet of Sidon and that of Damascus, eventually taking over the former and reducing the latter. It is this process that I aim to trace in this chapter. Since the political development of Acre and its realm was, as we shall see, heavily influenced by the dominant political presence of its first three rulers, Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar, Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r, and Sulayma¯n Pasha, it seems helpful also to use the political career of each as an organizing principle for this chapter.

fiZ¯A HIR AL-‘UMAR’S RISE TO POWER AND THE FORMATION OF THE REALM OF ACRE Two biographies of Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar (d. 1775) were written by contemporaries or near contemporaries: one was by Mikha¯’ı¯l Niqu¯la¯ alSfi abba¯gh,1 and the other by ‘Abbu¯d al-Sfi abba¯gh. Mikha¯’ı¯l was the grandson of the most important vezier of Zfi a¯hir, Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh. He had a great sense for the anecdotal detail but a complete disregard for chronological sequence and was more concerned with the good image of Zfi a¯hir and his vezier than with precise dates. Mikha¯’ı¯l apparently also wrote a biography of his grandfather Ibra¯hı¯m.2 ‘Abbu¯d was also related to Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh.3 Since Ibra¯hı¯m, as we shall see, was closely associated with Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar, both authors take a rather favorable, if not apologetic, approach to their subject—Mikha¯’ı¯l more so than ‘Abbu¯d. However, all later biographical material relies most heavily on these two biographies. For some important aspects of al-‘Umar’s life in Acre, though, other chronicles, mentioned below, the French consular reports, as well as Mariti’s travel report, provide an independent source. Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar al-Zayda¯nı¯ was a local man, a leader of men, a consummate politician and an astute merchant. He was born around 1690 into a family of some standing in the region between Tiberias and Safed. The Zayda¯nı¯ clan was most likely of Bedouin background, and had settled in the region of Tiberias in the second half of the seventeenth century. Zfi a¯hir’s father,

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

31

al-‘Umar, and grandfather, Zayda¯n, were already multazims of Tiberias, a position they were granted by the amirs of the Druze who, in turn, were the tax-farmers for all of Mount Lebanon by authority of the governor of Sidon. An uncle, ‘Alı¯, obtained the tax-farm for Da¯mu¯n, close to Acre. At the same time the Zayda¯nı¯s carried on a lively trade from the Galilee to Damascus and Aleppo. They established contacts with families in Damascus and relations with tribes in the region. With the death of al-‘Umar at the beginning of the eighteenth century his oldest son Sa‘d became the head of the clan, but nominally his younger brother, Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar al-Zayda¯nı¯, became the most powerful man since the family transferred all tax-farms into his name because “they did not want to have a name with the government.”4 The assumption was that in case of defaulted tax payments the government, i.e., the governor of Sidon, could only hold a young lad answerable but not the actual holders of the tax-farms. Around 1707 Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar, still in his teens, was involved in a brawl, killing a man from Tiberias. His oldest brother, Sa‘d, thought it advisable to remove the Zayda¯nı¯ clan from the region of Tiberias. The opportunity came in the form of an offer from the leaders of the Sfi aqr tribe to reside with them in ‘Arra¯ba, a village remote from major highways but almost equidistant from Safed, Tiberias, and Nazareth and not much further from Acre. Events until the mid-1730s are not firmly dated. Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar obtained some formal schooling from an ‘a¯lim by the name of ‘Abd al-Qa¯dir alH fi ifna¯wı¯. As a young lad he roamed the countryside and learned to hunt and to fight. He played a major role in defending the village of Ba‘na against the rapacious governor of Sidon. This must have occurred some time between 1713 and 1718.5 His heroic defense of the village, his dramatic escape, his justice, and his moderation made him during these years, according to the chroniclers, into a regional folk hero. In the 1720s Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar won for himself a name among the peasants as a fighter and a man of justice but also drew the respect—based on his commercial rather than his martial abilities—of Damascene urbanites. Together with his brother Sa‘d he pursued the trade connections his father had already established. They would often travel with caravans from the Galilee to Damascus, selling and buying merchandise there. His visits to Damascus led to important social and commercial contacts and to a friendship with the ‘a¯lim ‘Abd al-Ghaffa¯r al-Shuwaykı¯, who presumably came from Shuwayk, a village near Nablus. In his house he was introduced to one Sayyid Muhfi ammad of the H fi usaynı¯ Sharı¯fs, the elite of Damascus.6 The latter eventually offered Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar his daughter in marriage. Zfi a¯hir’s Damascene wife

32

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

found ‘Arra¯ba too small a place to live in and insisted on moving to Nazareth. When his wife’s father died he became the sole inheritor of the not inconsiderable fortune.7 The Sfi aqr tribe, roaming between Safed and Nablus, had a bad—but probably well-deserved—reputation as an unruly, dangerous element, making highways insecure, endangering commercial traffic, looting and plundering, and not paying taxes. The governor of Sidon tried to subdue them with the help of the people from Nablus. The Sfi aqr, feeling cornered or simply looking for ways to enhance their position, sought to improve their relations with the government. For the purpose of better representation with the Ottoman administration they looked for a notable or dignitary from the urban population as their official chief, one who could negotiate with the authorities better than they themselves could. Their choice fell on Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar alZayda¯nı¯. This must have occurred around 1730.8 By choosing Zfi a¯hir rather than his older brother Sa‘d, the recognized leader of the clan, the Sfi aqr also made it clear that they had no intention of simply submitting to the will of the Zayda¯nı¯s. They probably hoped to use the Zayda¯nı¯s for their own purposes. They did not anticipate how quickly Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar would use them for his own ambitions and then eventually drop them when they became an obstacle to his plans. The first result of this alliance was that Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar, with the help of the Sfi aqr, took over Tiberias sometime around 1730. Cleverly preparing his move, he persuaded the governor in Sidon to sanction the usurpation and make him multazim of Tiberias and ‘Arra¯ba. The appointment itself was an indication of the receding power of the Druze amirs over the region: thirty years earlier ‘Umar, Zfi a¯hir’s father, had been appointed multazim of Tiberias by the Druze amirs and not directly by the governor of Sidon. Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar proceeded to make Tiberias his first real power base. Members of the Zayda¯nı¯ clan joined him there, and he soon had a troop of some two hundred Zayda¯nı¯ horsemen at his disposal. He appointed his cousin Muhfi ammad al-‘Alı¯ as their commander.9 Efforts were also made to fortify Tiberias. He spent the 1730s working to expand his realm and consolidate his rule. He seems to have been a relatively just and reasonably fair ruler. According to the chronicler, people took refuge in his realm and volunteered to come under his rule.10 But he certainly also took military measures to assert his dominant position in the Galilee. In 1738 he conquered the castle of Jiddı¯n, which controlled the region of Tarshı¯hfi a, Wabar, and Abu¯ Sina¯n. After much negotiation and pressure Safed was surrendered to him by the local strongman and multazim Muhfi ammad Na¯f‘i. A year later he besieged

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

33

the fortified village of Ba‘na unsuccessfully. Eventually, marriage to the daughter of the ruler of Ba‘na achieved the desired result.11 With this the whole northeast of the Galilee had come under Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar’s control.12 In the west his cousin, Muhfi ammad ibn ‘Alı¯ al-Zayda¯nı¯, controlled Da¯mu¯n and eventually Shfa¯ ‘Amr. The same cousin also commanded the Zayda¯nı¯ horsemen who fought for Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar. His brother Sa‘d had moved from ‘Arra¯ba to Dayr H fi ana¯, adding to the presence of the Zayda¯nı¯s in the western Galilee. In the fights for Jiddı¯n Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar had encountered a young Maghrebi mercenary, Ahfi mad al-Dinkizlı¯, whom he hired and charged with building up a unit consisting of over a thousand of his compatriots.13 This troop of mercenaries would be costly, but liberated Zfi a¯hir from dependence on the voluntary Zayda¯nı¯ horsemen and the Sfi aqr tribesmen, who were unruly and usually available for short periods only. While consolidating and expanding his realm, Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar began to come into contact with more powerful opponents. But here, too, it remains difficult to establish the exact sequence of events. The various accounts probably fused different events into one. Nazareth was the residence of his first wife and the hometown of his second. Gaining control over it was most likely a drawn-out process, punctuated by clashes with the people from ¯ mir belonged to the district of Nablus. Nazareth and the plain of Marj ibn ‘A Safed but, in fact, had fallen under the control of Nablus. In the 1730s Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar began to challenge the power of Nablus.14 At stake was control over commerce in Nazareth and over the trade routes between Nablus and Damascus. This challenge mobilized the leaders of Nablus. Most immediately concerned were the al-Jarra¯r clan, originating from Janı¯n and having only recently risen to power when they made Sfi a¯nu¯r, on the northern accesses of Nablus, their fortified base. They were able to draw to their side the Banu¯ Sfi aqr, until then allies of Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar. A battle ensued in the Marj ibn ‘A¯mir. Forewarned that the Banu¯ Sfi aqr would turn against him, Zfi a¯hir was able to win the battle with the help of his Maghrebi troops,15 his Zayda¯nı¯ cavalry, and the active support of the people of Nazareth. He pursued the beaten Nabulusı¯s to the fortress of Sfi a¯nu¯r. There he had to accept that he did not have the means to besiege the town. Thanks to the resistance of the alJarra¯r, he could not force the people of Nablus into submission, but he could maintain his control over his newly incorporated towns and regions, which ¯ mir and Nazareth.16 The successful resistance of now included the Marj ibn ‘A the al-Jarra¯r clan to Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar’s attacks at Sfi a¯nu¯r consolidated their ascendancy over the Tfi u¯qa¯ns in Nablus. Eventually members of the al-Jarra¯r

34

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

clan were appointed mutasallims of Nablus, a position they would hold until 1771.17 The al-Jarra¯rs concluded a peace agreement for Nablus with Zfi a¯hir, but ¯ mir and were they had suffered great losses with the defeat in Marj ibn ‘A forced to surrender control over Nazareth and the surrounding region to him. For the next thirty years they would rally the forces of Nablus against further expansions of Zfi a¯hir to the south. In the 1730s Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar was able to carve out for himself a power base in the eastern Galilee, a region which had previously been a contested border region between the vilayets of Sidon and Damascus, represented locally by the Druze and the Nabulusı¯s respectively.18 Zfi a¯hir succeeded in pushing back both forces. There was no challenge to be anticipated from the governor of Sidon, whose power was waning and for whom Tiberias was of peripheral importance anyway. For the powerful governors of Damascus the situation presented itself differently: Zfi a¯hir’s growing realm between Tiberias and Safed straddled the trade route and communications between Damascus and Nablus, an important part of the province of Damascus. By extension communications with Egypt were also affected. Zfi a¯hir’s unchecked rise to power in the region therefore worried the governors of Damascus greatly.19 The rise of new local power centers in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire in the eighteenth century was not restricted to Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar’s expanding realm in the Galilee. In a sense, the foundation of the Arab Greek Catholic community in Damascus belonged to the same trend.20 More important, however, was the rise of the ‘Azfi m clan in Damascus. With their arrival on the scene the Ottoman policy of appointing outsiders as governors of Damascus, and always for short terms only, was disrupted. During the career of Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar, 1725 to 1775, members of the ‘Azfi m family held the governorship of Damascus for a total of twenty-seven years. The consolidation of the family’s power in Damascus was accompanied by an attempt to expand it to other governorships, especially that of Sidon. Both governorships were repeatedly occupied simultaneously by members of the ‘Azfi m clan. ‘Uthma¯n Pasha al-Kurjı¯, a Mamluk of As‘ad Pasha al-‘Azfi m21 and therefore closely linked to the ‘Azfi ms, pursued the same policy by having his sons appointed as governors of Sidon and Tripoli. Zfi a¯hir’s control over the trade between Damascus and Nablus and the continued expansion of his hold over the province of Sidon was bound to bring him into conflict with the governors of Damascus. Sulayma¯n Pasha al-‘Azfi m had been governor of Sidon in 1733 and ruled Damascus as governor from 1734 to 1738 and from 1741 until his death in 1743. He had ample reason to observe with concern Zfi a¯hir’s fortification of

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

35

Tiberias and his expansion to Safed and its surroundings, and to listen to the complaints from Nablus, which Zfi a¯hir had already successfully challenged. He tried to reduce Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar’s power by conquering the fortress of Tiberias. A first attack was carried out in 1738 but failed.22 In his second tenure as governor Sulayma¯n spent considerable efforts on the conquest of Tiberias. In 1741 he requested support from his nephew Ibra¯hı¯m, governor of Sidon. But Zfi a¯hir defeated the latter’s troops near Acre.23 The following year Sulayma¯n Pasha personally led the campaign against Tiberias and besieged it for some ninety days, supported by his nephew. The Jews in Tiberias had been forewarned by their coreligionists in Damascus about the imminent attack, but had decided to stay in Tiberias and support Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar.24 The latter protested his innocence and his loyal obedience to the authorities of the empire. He tried to negotiate with the pasha of Damascus, but to no avail. Eventually the pasha had to lift the siege because the time had approached for the pilgrimage caravan to Mecca, which he as governor of Damascus was obliged to lead. Zfi a¯hir used the interval to sway opinion in Istanbul to his favor by requesting the French merchants in Acre to send a message to their ambassador in Istanbul to exert pressure. Not sure this channel of communication would work, he tried to open a second one by asking the Jews in Tiberias to establish a conduit through their coreligionists in Damascus and Istanbul to the imperial government.25 These efforts—such as they were— were of no avail. After his return from Mecca the pasha launched, in 1743, a renewed attempt to conquer Tiberias. But the campaign was barely under way when Sulayma¯n Pasha died. His successor, As‘ad Pasha al-‘Azfi m, had no further desire to press the campaign against Tiberias. Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar had survived the challenge against his dominant position in the eastern Galilee, and could now turn westward in earnest, and concentrate in particular on Acre. He had already demonstrated the seriousness of his ambitions for Acre when he had his nephew Muhfi ammad al-‘Ala¯ arrested and killed. Muhfi ammad had once been commander of some of Zfi a¯hir’s troops and multazim of Da¯mu¯n in the western Galilee. But when he appeared to gain influence in Acre, Zfi a¯hir moved against him.26 The taking of Acre was a drawn-out and gradual process. Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar had been aware of the commercial potential of Acre for a long time—by 1731 he had good relations with some French merchants there. Blanc and Treilhier are mentioned.27 A local merchant, the Greek Catholic Yu¯suf al-Qassı¯s, became his agent and representative in Acre.28 Although commerce was probably lucrative for Zfi a¯hir, he understood that only political control over Acre would optimize business conditions for him. With the appointment of As‘ad

36

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

Pasha al-‘Azfi m as governor in October 1743, a peaceful standoff with Damascus began, and lasted for the next fourteen years. Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar could now afford to move on Acre in earnest. Cautious as ever, he tried first to obtain the tax-farm of Acre from the governor in Sidon by agreement. The governor of Sidon refused, despite his repeated requests. Clearly, he observed with great apprehension the rise to power of his multazim in the Galilee. Eventually, Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar marched on Acre with troops, had the local multazim killed, and declared himself multazim. The astute observation of his brother Sa‘d, that the government would be in no position to oppose him, proved to be true.29 In 1746 the French reported that since July Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar was the “gouverneur et douanier d’Acre,”30 which probably means that at that point he was officially invested as multazim of Acre. He himself, though, preferred for the time being to reside in his castle in Dayr H fi ana¯ a few miles outside Acre. In late 1750 Zfi a¯hir—now a man “qui peut tout ce qu’il veut” [able to fulfill his every desire]—made an enormous effort to have a wall built around Acre while the governor of Damascus was away for a few months on the pilgrimage. He fortified the city, had buildings constructed, and tried to populate the city.31 In 1757 he annexed Haifa and Tantura to his realm.32 From this time on, Acre can be said to be Zfi a¯hir’s base and a new center of local power on the coast of southern Syria, challenging the dominance of Damascus in profound ways. Officially though, Zfi a¯hir remained a multazim for the governor of Sidon. Only in 1768 was his preeminent position recognized by the Ottoman government when he was given the title of “Shaykh of Acre, Amir of Nazareth, Tiberias, Safed and Shaykh of all of Galilee.”33 Finally, on March 9, 1774, he was about to be appointed governor of Sidon, an order that was, however, quickly rescinded by Istanbul.34 Interwoven into and concurrent with the events of the conquest of the western Galilee and Acre are the conflicts and various alliances with the Metualis. This Shı¯‘ı¯ Arab community lives in the mountainous region, now ¯ mil, stretching northwest of Safed to the coast at Tyre. Jabal called Jabal ‘A ¯ ‘Amil was part of the province of Sidon and was most often under the direct control of the Shiha¯bı¯ amirs of the Druze. After Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar had established his authority over Safed in the late 1730s he came into direct contact with the Metualis, with whom relations had been good until then. But his territorial ambitions were bound to lead to clashes with them sooner or later. Once more the time frame of the narrative is most difficult to establish. We have two sources for the relations between Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar and the Metualis under Na¯sfi¯ıf Nasfisfia¯r: Mikha¯’ı¯l al-Sfi abba¯gh’s history, written some

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

37

twenty-five years after Zfi a¯hir’s death, and al-Rukaynı¯’s chronicle of Jabal ‘A¯mil. The latter is rather dry and very economical in its information, but in many ways is the more reliable source. Al-Rukaynı¯ was a contemporary of these events and apparently wrote his chronicle in the form of a diary. Hence his dating of events can be trusted more than all later sources.35 All sources agree on the immediate cause for the clash—possession of two villages. They disagree on the outcome of the decisive battle, though they are unanimous that after the battle an alliance between the two sides was struck. Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar provoked the conflict by claiming as his own two villages which traditionally belonged to the Metualis: Balla and Ya¯ru¯n.36 In response the Metualis fought various skirmishes. At some point later a decisive battle ¯ l Sfi afa¯, a nationalist Metuali historian of the early was fought at Tfi arbı¯hfi a. A twentieth century, tried to depict this as a qualified victory for Na¯sfi¯ıf Nasfisfia¯r, while al-Sfi abba¯gh claimed a clear victory by Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar. The earliest source, al-Rukaynı¯, described the battle as a disastrous defeat for Zfi a¯hir, who suffered heavy losses.37 Eventually an alliance between Na¯sfi¯ıf Nasfisfia¯r and Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar was forged and ceremoniously pledged, whereby the latter committed himself to represent the Metualis to the governor of Sidon, regulating all their tax issues with him, and to defend them against incursions by the Druze amirs. In return the Metualis pledged military support for Zfi a¯hir.38 AlSfi abba¯gh places all these events somewhere between the takeover of Safed by Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar and his conquest of Acre, i.e., somewhere in the 1740s.39 From the context of his narration A¯l Sfi afa¯ implies that the events took place some time in the early 1750s.40 Only al-Rukaynı¯ provides us with precise and, most likely, reliable dates. The battle of Tfi arbı¯hfi a took place on Oct. 7, 1766 (8 Jumada II 1180), and he gives the date of the treaty as Nov. 24, 1767, i.e., a whole year later. This would imply that the incorporation of Safed into Zfi a¯hir’s realm did not lead immediately to decisive clashes with the Metualis, but rather was followed by some twenty-five years of low-keyed conflict as well as cooperation.41 It is very likely that the border region and its villages ¯ mil and Zfi a¯hir’s realm remained contested for a long time, between Jabal ‘A while at the same time the Metualis supported Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar—for instance, against the Sfi aqr tribe—or Zfi a¯hir sent troops in defense of the Metualis against the incursion of Amı¯r Mulhfi im Shiha¯b. Only after fortifying Acre and enjoying high revenues from cotton exports did Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar feel secure enough to challenge the Metualis seriously. But it remains doubtful whether it was this challenge that brought the Metualis to the negotiation table in Sidon. The outcome of the battle of Tfi arbı¯hfi a was obviously open to interpretation. Also the fact that Na¯sfi¯ıf

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Nasfisfia¯r negotiated the alliance only a year later indicates that he did not act under the pressure of a defeat in battle. Nevertheless, the alliance enhanced and strengthened Zfi a¯hir’s position as ruler of the region. Apart from a mutual defense pact, the alliance’s most important element was Zfi a¯hir’s new role as the exclusive mediator between the governor in Sidon and the Metualis. This concerned in particular the tax payments of the Metualis, for which Zfi a¯hir took responsibility. In other words, he became de facto the multazim of the ¯ mil region, though not appointed de jure by the governor of Sidon. Jabal ‘A The alliance enlarged Zfi a¯hir’s realm considerably and reinforced his military strength by adding the Metuali forces, who remained faithful allies almost until Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar’s dramatic end. For the Metualis the alliance implied the surrender of, at least, their financial autonomy and the acknowledgment of Zfi a¯hir as their overlord. As we have seen, Zfi a¯hir’s military strength cannot have been the decisive factor for this step by the Metualis. The cause is more likely to be found in the relations between the Metualis and the governor of Sidon. Since the early 1750s the governor of Sidon had started five major campaigns, usually with the help of the Druze, to subdue the Metualis and collect taxes from them perforce. Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar and the Metualis shared the same interests in this point. Both aimed at reducing the authority of the governor of Sidon, and both were wary of the power of the Druze in the north. A political and military alliance made perfect sense, and was to prove its value in the following years in some fifteen joint military campaigns against the people of Nablus, the Druze, the governors of Damascus and Sidon, and in the conquest of Sidon42—especially at a time when the governor of Damascus was again trying to extend his control over the region. The years between 1744 and 1765 were a long, calm period in which Zfi a¯hir al‘Umar consolidated his power. He moved his base from Tiberias to the coast. After fortifying Acre and making it his residence, Zfi a¯hir attached Haifa, Tfi antfiu¯ra and Mount Carmel to his rule. These were probably most prosperous years in the Galilee, and trade flourished. By establishing a monopoly over the cotton exports, Zfi a¯hir was able to obtain maximum prices for cotton from the French. Cotton exports increased in value and quantity. Internal security was established and people from abroad moved to Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar’s realm to settle there and enjoy his benign rule. Zfi a¯hir had the good business sense not to exploit peasants to the point of destruction, but kept his financial demands to a more moderate level. He would even grant tax relief when harvests were bad or when immigrants undertook to put new land under cultivation. The population of Acre increased dramatically. Acre became the capital of the

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new de facto state. Administration and army became somewhat more institutionalized. Internal dissent among the tribes and family squabbles with his sons, who were ruling in his name in different districts, remained on the level of occasional skirmishes, as did border disputes with the Metualis. External threats did not exist. The governor of Sidon was in no position to challenge the discreetly expanding influence and power of Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar, and As‘ad al-‘Azfi m, the governor of Damascus, was for thirteen years preoccupied with the reconstruction of Damascus and apparently in no mood to confront the rising power of his neighbor. Not even the annexation of Haifa caused him to take serious measures against Zfi a¯hir. The first rumblings of change could be heard when in 1761 ‘Uthma¯n Pasha, governor of Damascus, obtained a firma¯n from the Ottoman government to reattach Haifa to his province. He ordered the governor of Sidon, Muhfi ammad Pasha, to send troops to Haifa to occupy it for him. The full extent of the governor’s impotence quickly became evident. All he could send were thirty soldiers, and he had to ask a French captain to transport them from Sidon to Haifa, since he himself had no ship. Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar simply had the ship seized, the troops arrested, and the captain fined.43 He could feel secure, militarily as well as politically, and apparently had contacts in Istanbul who were able to deflect any serious measures against him. He had hosted a certain Ya‘qu¯b Agha, an official of the Ottoman government, who was on his way to Jerusalem. While this official was staying in Acre Zfi a¯hir had ingratiated himself with him, and a permanent relationship was established. In Istanbul Ya‘qu¯b Agha had close contacts with the qizla¯r agha and the fisilihfi da¯r, a certain Sulayma¯n Agha. He wrote to them and had the orders to Muhfi ammad Pasha of Sidon rescinded.44 Eventually Ya‘qu¯b Agha was executed, the qizla¯r agha died, and Sulayma¯n Agha was either exiled to Cyprus or became its governor in 1766.45 These changes encouraged ‘Uthma¯n Pasha of Damascus to try again to obtain backing from Istanbul for his fight against Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar. Zfi a¯hir turned to Sulayma¯n Agha in Cyprus for support. When Sulayma¯n Agha was returned to Istanbul he succeeded in arranging arbitration over Haifa. His own delegate was sent as the representative of Muhfi ammad Pasha to Acre, where the rest of the arbitration committee consisted of Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar, Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh, and the muftı¯ and qa¯dfi¯ı of Acre. Not surprisingly, the issue was decided in Zfi a¯hir’s favor.46 But Zfi a¯hir must have recognized that ‘Uthma¯n Pasha was a tenacious enemy. It may have been this recognition that induced him to conclude the treaty with the Metualis in late 1767. With the death of Sulayma¯n Agha a few years later, Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar lost all support in Istanbul and ‘Uthma¯n Pasha al-Kurjı¯, governor of Damascus, was able—

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after having placed his son Muhfi ammad as governor of Tripoli—to obtain the governorship of Sidon for his twenty-five-year-old second son, Darwı¯sh, in November 1770.47 By July 1770 signs of new tensions could be detected. Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar began new fortification work in Acre, perhaps upon hearing of the death of Sulayma¯n Agha in Istanbul, and had all male inhabitants of Acre, Muslim and Christians, armed with rifle, saber, and two pistols.48 In the following months Zfi a¯hir succeeded in reconciling all his sons and forged thereby a powerful alliance. In a sense, Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar had reached the zenith of his power: he controlled a firm alliance with the Metualis, his sons were—for the time being— united with him, neither the people of his realm nor his troops were in any mood to rebel, and in addition, he must have possessed considerable financial means, since the cotton export trade had been very profitable for two decades. Yet never had his position been as precarious as now: he had lost all contacts and protection in Istanbul—such as they had been. It was his luck that just then Istanbul was preoccupied with the Russian war. His major enemy, ‘Uthma¯n Pasha al-Kurjı¯, the governor of Damascus, was fiercely determined to eliminate him. For this purpose he had struck an alliance with the Druze and found enough support in Istanbul to have his sons invested as governors of Tripoli and Sidon, the province from which Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar had carved out most of his principality. Nablus, to the south, also belonged to the province of Damascus and was controlled by the al-Jarra¯rs, who still bore a grudge against Zfi a¯hir. Strong but surrounded by an alliance of enemies and without backing from Istanbul, Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar must have been in desperate need for an ally to support him. This ally he found in ‘Alı¯ Bey al-Kabı¯r in Egypt. ‘Alı¯ Bey al-Kabı¯r had only recently established himself as sole ruler in Egypt and had conquered the Red Sea coast and the Hejaz. Strategic considerations caused him, like all strong autonomous rulers of Egypt before him, to turn his attention to Syria, which could serve as the base for an attack on Egypt or as the glacis of Egypt’s defense if it was under Egyptian control. In addition, ‘Alı¯ Bey nursed an old animosity against ‘Uthma¯n Pasha al-Kurjı¯. When Istanbul’s attention and energies were absorbed by the war with Russia, the moment seemed to have come for a march on Syria. It is not clear which of the two, ‘Alı¯ Bey al-Kabı¯r or Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar, who obviously shared common interests, initiated the alliance.49 There is no doubt that Ibra¯hı¯m alSfi abba¯gh was the most influential policy maker in the government of Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar and that the network of Syrian immigrants in Egypt had become

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powerful. It provided Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar with the contact he was missing so badly in Istanbul and Damascus. In contrast to the Jews, the Greek Catholics were not an imperial millet with representation in Istanbul but a local minority without legal recognition, well established on the Syrian coast and in Egypt. Their interests were as local as those of Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar and ‘Alı¯ Bey al-Kabir, and they seem to have been instrumental in forging the alliance between the two. In November 1770 ‘Alı¯ Bey al-Kabı¯r sent the first Egyptian troops to Gaza and Jaffa. With that step he set the stage for the last act of Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar’s rule in Acre, five years which in human greed, hubris, and bravery, in dramatic, unforeseen turns of events, and in grandeur and catastrophe lacked nothing of Greek tragedy. The expeditionary corps of some 15,000 to 20,000 men, under the command of Isma¯‘ı¯l Bey, arrived in the region of Jaffa at the end of November.50 He proceeded slowly but without encountering any resistance to Damascus. He arrived there just as ‘Uthma¯n Pasha al-Kurjı¯ was setting out on the pilgrimage. Isma¯‘ı¯l Bey decided not to attack him, apparently because he thought it improper to do battle with the pilgrims.51 He returned with his troops to the coast of Jaffa, where he lingered during the spring without any particular plan. Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar complained angrily to ‘Alı¯ Bey about this inactivity, which gave other pashas the opportunity to collect troops in Damascus. In May 1771 ‘Alı¯ Bey al-Kabı¯r dispatched new troops, some 35,000, under the command of his Mamluk Abu¯ ‘l-Dhahab, who moved quickly on Damascus, defeated the troops of ‘Uthma¯n Pasha, and in June entered the city. Apparently under the moral influence of the abovementioned Isma¯‘ı¯l Bey, Abu¯ ‘l-Dhahab turned in Damascus from a Saul into a Paul and saw the moral impropriety of waging war against the troops of the sultan, the defender of Islam. He left Damascus almost in panic and returned with his troops to Egypt.52 Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar was stunned by this sudden change in the situation, and felt extremely vulnerable to the renewed threat from Damascus. He had just taken Sidon, together with his Metuali allies, from where Darwı¯sh Pasha, the son of ‘Uthma¯n Pasha al-Kurjı¯, had fled. In August he took Jaffa and fortified it with a 2,000-man garrison, and in September he, together with Metuali troops, inflicted a severe defeat upon ‘Uthma¯n Pasha west of the Bridge of Jacob’s Daughters in the Jordan Valley.53 The attempt to take Sfi a¯nu¯r in August failed, as did a later siege on Nablus in April 1772. In the meantime Zfi a¯hir’s son ‘Alı¯ was carrying the war to the H fi awra¯n, the high plain south of Damascus.54 Although worried about his exposure and the force of the enemy, Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar was actually able, after the withdrawal of the Egyptians, to expand his realm as never before. It now

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included Jaffa and Sidon, and a military presence in the H fi awra¯n. Nablus, though cut off from its port, Jaffa, remained unconquerable. May 1772 brought some reverses: ‘Alı¯ Bey al-Kabı¯r arrived in Acre as a refugee, having lost Egypt to Muhfi ammad Abu¯ ‘l-Dhahab. In the same month Muhfi ammad Tfi u¯qa¯n of the Na¯bulusı¯ clan took Jaffa from Zfi a¯hir. ‘Alı¯ Bey and Zfi a¯hir were forced to spend a great deal of energy and resources on the siege of Jaffa for the next nine months before they were able to wrest it from Na¯bulusı¯ control. If they had any hope of bringing Egypt again under the control of ‘Alı¯ Bey, Jaffa had to be in their hands. Indeed, ‘Alı¯ Bey set out to Egypt in March 1773 only a month after Jaffa had been retaken. He was killed by Abu¯ ‘l-Dhahab’s forces soon after his arrival.55 From June 1772 the Russian fleet under Orloff cruised on the Syrian coast, supporting in a haphazard fashion the siege against Jaffa and also against Beirut, where since June Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r, who would before long become ruler of Acre, had entrenched himself, challenging the Druze for possession of the town. This led to a rapprochement between the Druze and Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar, whose help they needed for conquering Beirut. The proZfi a¯hir faction among the Druze gained strength against the Druze Amı¯r Yu¯suf, ally of ‘Uthma¯n Pasha. In June 1773 a formal reconciliation between the Metualis, the Druze, and Zfi a¯hir took place. That step blocked the access of troops from Damascus to the coastal region. Still, it took until early October before the new alliance could dislodge al-Jazza¯r from Beirut.56 Ever since the death of ‘Alı¯ Bey, Zfi a¯hir had made great efforts to strengthen the defenses of Jaffa and to conquer Jerusalem—which, however, he failed to do. At the beginning of 1774 the French consul in Sidon, de Taules, wrote in the report to his government that complete peace was reigning in Syria. The Russian fleet, with its unpredictable actions, had been withdrawn, and ‘Uthma¯n Pasha al-Misfirı¯, who had been appointed as commander-general of all of Syria to reestablish law and order, seemed to accept the fact that he could not defeat Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar, who now appeared to be very conciliatory.57 The pasha negotiated with Istanbul to give Zfi a¯hir the governorship of Sidon, on condition that he pay all outstanding taxes. The official legitimization of Zfi a¯hir’s position seemed to be forthcoming when an edict from ‘Uthma¯n Pasha al-Misfirı¯ was sent on February 17, 1774, to Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar, naming him governor of Sidon and Nablus, Gaza, Ramla, Jaffa, and Jabal ‘Ajlu¯n. ‘Uthma¯n Pasha referred to a decision by the sultan in this matter, although the final ratification of the appointment still needed the sultan’s signature.58 For a moment it appeared as if Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar, now an octogenarian, had reached a new peak in his extraordinary career.59 He was to be the legitimate ruler of

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¯ mil and all of Palestine, the whole Syrian coast from Gaza to Beirut, of Jabal ‘A though he would have no actual control over Nablus and Jerusalem. He had an agreement with the Druze and no powerful enemy threatened his borders. The only clouds on the horizon were his sons, who, getting on in age themselves, finally wanted power for themselves and punctuated the peace with repeated rebellions. ‘Alı¯, based in Safed and probably the most talented of the sons, became a particular problem. He challenged his father for control over villages in the Galilee. Only a precarious alliance with another son, Ahfi mad, who resided in Tiberias and from there controlled Jabal ‘Ajlu¯n, enabled Zfi a¯hir to defeat ‘Alı¯. A third son, Sa‘ı¯d, presented yet another challenge to his father. For the time being Zfi a¯hir could again establish his authority over his sons. But his resources were stretched to the utmost, and desertions became endemic among his Maghrebi troops. For want of pay they went over to ‘Alı¯.60 The peace was precarious at best, and the legitimacy of Zfi a¯hir’s rule was lacking the final signature. By the summer of 1774 ‘Uthma¯n Pasha, who had assured Zfi a¯hir that the governorship of Sidon was his, had been called back and Muhfi ammad Pasha al-‘Azfi m had been appointed governor of Damascus. More important, the Ottoman government had in July 1774 signed the peace treaty of Ku¨cu¨k Kainarce with Russia, terminating thereby the threat to the very existence of the empire. It was now to demonstrate that it was by no means willing to make good on promises to provincial rebels, given under the duress of the war with Russia. The new pasha of Damascus, not able to defeat Zfi a¯hir militarily, promised to negotiate a pardon for him from the government. But there was no more talk of the governorship of Sidon. When the Ottoman government finally did grant Zfi a¯hir a general pardon in April 1775, it occurred almost simultaneously with the renewed invasion of Palestine by Muhfi ammad Abu¯ ‘l-Dhahab, who had been encouraged by the government to do so, in order to destroy Zfi a¯hir’s power.61 Egyptian troops took Jaffa on May 20, 1775. The male population was put to the sword and the city was plundered. Upon the news, panic spread in Acre. All its inhabitants fled, depositing their valuables in the French khan in the hope that the khan would not be touched. Zfi a¯hir himself left on May 24. His son ‘Alı¯ used the opportunity—somewhat pathetically—to enter the deserted city and proclaim himself governor of Acre. His glory lasted only a week, after which, under the threat of the approaching Egyptian troops, his soldiers plundered whatever was left in the city and disappeared.62 On the following day Muhfi ammad Abu¯ ‘l-Dhahab moved into Acre. The rule of Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar had collapsed. He and his vezier were refugees.

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His sons tried to cut personal deals with the invader. The army had disintegrated. Nothing could stop the Mamluk army. But once more Abu¯ ‘l-Dhahab caused—though this time not deliberately—a complete turnaround in the situation. He suddenly fell sick and died on June 10. His Mamluks, well aware that the question of his succession would be settled in Cairo and not in Acre, broke camp almost immediately and left the next day in all haste toward the south. This left the city in anarchy and at the mercy of Maghrebi soldiery. An internecine struggle for the control of the city threatened to break out among the Maghrebi mercenaries, who had served different masters.63 Only the diplomatic skills of al-Dinkizlı¯ and the charismatic personality of Zfi a¯hir, returning to the city on June 12, succeeded in establishing discipline among the troops.64 Once more, it seemed, Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar had saved his rule and realm, though severely battered, in the nick of time. But the death of Muhfi ammad Bey Abu¯ ‘l-Dhahab, inconvenient as it was, did not change the determination of the government in Istanbul to bring this local rebel to heel once and for all. Almost immediately the government decided to send another expeditionfi asan Kfi apu¯da¯n Pasha, newly appointed admiral of ary corps against Zfi a¯hir.65 H the Ottoman navy, arrived in early August in the bay of Haifa with some eight ships. His major task, it seems, was to collect several years’ outstanding taxes from Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar, without necessarily conquering Acre or killing Zfi a¯hir. Yet this is precisely what occurred within a few short weeks. Reports about the events that led to the violent end of Zfi a¯hir and his rule differ in their interpretation of the causes. The various narratives basically offer two versions. It is well worth looking into them more carefully, since they reflect very different and opposing perceptions of the weakness of the imperial center and its relations to its provinces striving for autonomy. The two historians of the al-Sfi abba¯gh family seem to have much inside information, but their story has a particular slant. Both agree that there existed a willingness in principle to pay but that negotiations with H fi asan K fi apu¯da¯n Pasha were sabotaged by the greed and ambitions of various people—the worst among them Ahfi mad al-Dinkizlı¯, who betrayed his master of forty years.66 A French report written immediately after the events seems to confirm parts of this narrative.67 The second version is given by the historian H fi aydar Ahfi mad Shiha¯b— about whom more later—and sheds a very different light on the events. When H fi asan Kfi apu¯da¯n Pasha demanded the outstanding taxes be paid, Zfi a¯hir consulted with his top officials. Opinions were divided. Ahfi mad Agha alDinkizlı¯ advised payment of the debts and submission to the Ottoman au-

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thority. Zfi a¯hir concurred: “This is the right thing to do. I am an old man and I don’t have the nerve anymore for fighting and endless marches in the mountains. For me the most important issue is to die with a calm mind as an obedient [servant] of the Sultan.” But Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh, Zfi a¯hir’s vezier and chief financial administrator, demurred and claimed that the money was not available for these payments. Besides, he argued, “even if we had it and we gave a lot, the government would never be satisfied. . . . Shaykh Zfi a¯hir has no money but he has gunpowder and men, war and battle.” When al-Dinkizlı¯ realized that al-Sfi abba¯gh’s opinion had carried the day, he gave orders to his Maghrebi troops and the artillery not to fight: “We are Muslim people, obedient to the Sultan. For the Muslim, believing in One God, it is not permitted to fight against the Sultan in any form.” Thereupon the soldiers refused to fight, H fi asan Kfi apu¯da¯n Pasha took the city, and Zfi a¯hir was killed by a soldier while fleeing from Acre.68 An anonymous report by an author who was perhaps Egyptian, more likely a Syrian living in Egypt, and probably a Muslim, tells a similar story, putting the blame squarely on al-Sfi abba¯gh’s excessive greed.69 The two men, Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh and Ahfi mad Agha al-Dinkizlı¯, seem to have been personal enemies, and both tried to manipulate the octogenarian Zfi a¯hir. The two sources written by members of the al-Sfi abba¯gh family put the blame for the final catastrophe squarely on al-Dinkizlı¯, although no motive for such an outrageous act of betrayal after forty years of loyalty is given. We can safely assume a deliberate attempt by both authors to exonerate their relative. Shiha¯b’s account seems more trustworthy, not only because it carries no familial prejudice, but also because it makes more sense in its general development. The anonymous account also documents Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh’s absolute refusal to seek a compromise and conciliation. This attitude is actually confirmed, as we shall see, by earlier observations by the French consul. The struggle between the two men shows, too, that there existed, beyond the personal rivalries, profound differences of opinion regarding politics, the role of the empire, and its future. It was, once more, the question of the relations between a weakening center and a provincial periphery teeming with tendencies toward autonomy. In pursuit of his political aims Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar was quite prepared, as we have seen, to disregard the will of the governor of Sidon, to kill his multazim, to arrest his soldiers, and in general to do battle with him. He also challenged the authority of the governor of Damascus when he extended his control to regions belonging to Nablus. Furthermore, at least twice he resisted, in the fortified town of Tiberias, attempts by the governor to subdue him militarily.

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He dealt with the French merchants on his own terms, sometimes with very little respect for treaties the French had signed with the sultan. He raised and maintained his own standing army and signed treaties with his neighbors in Nablus and with the Metualis. In short, he demonstrated a great deal of independence in his actions. Yet at the same time he was eager to maintain contact with Istanbul. During the siege in Tiberias he sent messages via the French and the Jews to present his case and to profess his obedience to the sultan. When his possession of Haifa was challenged by the governor of Damascus, he submitted to arbitration, though most likely he fixed the results. Nevertheless, it provided his expansion with legitimacy from the Ottoman government. He also seems to have paid taxes quite regularly—the ultimate proof of loyalty. The situation was considerably radicalized in 1770, when, having lost support in Istanbul and threatened by a determined governor in Damascus, he forged his alliance with ‘Alı¯ Bey al-Kabı¯r of Egypt. The latter had his own motives for this alliance, and it has been repeatedly but inconclusively debated whether he himself was striving for total independence from the Ottoman Empire. We are, I believe, on firmer ground as far as Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar is concerned. There is no doubt that he was willing to use the alliance to fight the governor of Damascus and to expel the governor of Sidon and that he profited from the occasion to expand his realm to the strategically important towns of Jaffa and Beirut. He was willing to do practically anything in the region to ensure his power, possibly even to defend himself against the admiral of the Ottoman fleet. But at the same time he was also eagerly negotiating to have his power legitimized by the Ottoman government and to be installed as governor of Sidon. When this did not work out, it was important for him to obtain a general pardon from the government. Even in his last struggle, his first direct confrontation with the Ottoman government, his automatic reaction seems to have been to comply with the demands of the government. The sentiment expressed by Ahfi mad Agha al-Dinkizlı¯, that it was unacceptable for a Muslim to fight against his overlord the sultan, must have been a genuine one and was probably shared by Zfi a¯hir. It was the same sentiment that prompted Isma¯‘ı¯l Bey, the Mamluk commander from Egypt, and most likely also Muhfi ammad Abu¯ ‘l-Dhahab, to abstain from attacking the amı¯r al-hfi a¯jj and from following through with their conquest of Syria.70 When Abu¯ ‘l-Dhahab invaded Syria a second time, he immediately sent Isma¯‘ı¯l Bey as an emissary to Istanbul to negotiate the appointment as governor for him. For all participants, the framework of legitimacy for the exercise of political power remained the Ottoman Empire and appointment by the sultan.

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But there are also other tendencies recognizable, which crystallized by the middle of the century and responded to the signs of weakness in the central government. The tendencies toward local autonomy, of which Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar himself was part, reflected this weakness. The disastrous Russo-Turkish War, 1768–1774, introduced a new situation in the eastern Mediterranean. For the first time a European power, a fleet under Russian command, interfered directly along the Syrian coast, looking for possible allies against the Ottoman Empire. With that, local fights between pashas and local strongmen could acquire international dimensions. It was the introduction of modern international politics to the Syrian coast, conceptualized so aptly by Carl L. Brown as the “penetrated system.”71 The signs of weakness at the center were visible enough for prophecies about the end of the Ottoman dynasty and the fall of Istanbul to circulate in the Syrian region by 1758.72 Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh was the most unequivocal advocate of those who concluded that the Ottoman Empire was about to collapse and disintegrate. He belonged to a community, the Greek Catholics, that had itself arisen out of a challenge to the power of the patriarch in Istanbul and indirectly to the authority of the Ottoman government whose representative he was. It is reported, unfortunately without giving a date, that a European approached Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh, suggesting he declare Acre independent from the Ottoman Empire. In return Hapsburgian protection and financial support was to be offered. Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh was not disinclined to listen to the offer, but being a wary politician he suspected the European to be an agent provocateur sent by the Ottomans. When he asked for a written commitment, the emissary refused to give it.73 And there was a curious incident during the siege of Jaffa by ‘Alı¯ Bey and Zfi a¯hir. A ship with supplies for them was sent from Acre. Originally it flew the Russian flag, but then flew the one which Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh had provided.”74 One can only speculate what this flag might have been, but it is not far-fetched to assume here an attempt at establishing symbols of sovereignty. In 1773 al-Sfi abba¯gh had discussed with ‘Alı¯ Bey al-Kabı¯r, living in exile in Acre, the possibility of proposing a pact to the British to help ‘Alı¯ Bey to conquer Arabia in return for naval bases in the Red Sea.75 In the same year the French consul de Taules heard al-Sfi abba¯gh say that “l’Empire Ottoman n’existoit plus, et qu’il n’y avoit dans le monde qu’une seule nation (la Russe) comme un seul Dieu dans le ciel.”76* De Taules warned al-Sfi abba¯gh about these illusions, and with a clairvoyance which would prove to be true for the next 140 years he wrote to alSfi abba¯gh: “L’Empire Ottoman, quoiqu’on en dise, ne sauroit tomber. Il y a des puissances inte´resse´es a` le maintenir dans sa force, et c’est lorsqu’il risquera

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d’eˆtre entie`rement abattu qu’on verra les secours accourir.”77* This argument apparently left no impression on Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh. When in August 1775 the final crisis developed and the question arose whether to pay the outstanding taxes to the Kfi apu¯da¯n Pasha, it may have been al-Sfi abba¯gh’s rivalry with Ahfi mad Agha al-Dinkizlı¯ or his often quoted greed that made him refuse the payments. But he could make this decision only because he had fatally underestimated the new lease of life the Ottoman Empire had obtained with the peace of 1774 and the European strategic concerns that would keep the Eastern Question—and the Ottoman Empire—alive for generations to come.

AHfi MAD PASHA AL-JAZZA¯R: CONSOLIDATION OF POLITICAL POWER, 1775–1804 Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r and His Biographers Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r was born into impoverished circumstances some time in the late 1730s in Bosnia. He died in 1804 in Acre as the undisputed governor of the province of Sidon, a position he had held for almost thirty years. Between these two dates lies a life of adventure, betrayal, cruelty, failure, and grandiose success. His career and personality were judged very differently by various of his contemporaries and later observers: “This lion, let loose against humanity;”78 “Jamais aucun tyran, aucun usurpateur n’a re´pandu, de sangue froid et sans motive, autant de sang humain que Djezar.”79 [No tyrant, no usurper has ever, coldly and without reason, spilt as much human blood as has Djezar.] “The right honorable, the magnificent counselor, the great vezier, the famous ruler Ahmad Pasha, known widely as alJazza¯r . . . in short he was one of the marvels of his age: anecdotes about him are too numerous to be recorded by the pen and memory cannot do justice to them. Collected, they would fill volumes. Had his only achievement been his victory over the French and his steadfastness in resisting [their siege] more than two months without interruption, that would have been enough.”80 Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r was certainly an extraordinary man. He ruled for a generation over Acre and its realm, most often with the support of the Ottoman government, sometimes against its will. He distinguished himself by great courage, sober tactical thinking, and, apparently, by excessive rage and cruelty. His greatest achievement in the minds of his contemporaries, both Muslim and Christian, was his successful defeat of Bonaparte, who

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besieged him for two months in the spring of 1799 in Acre. In Muslim public opinion al-Jazza¯r became the defender of the faith, the fighter of the holy war. Biographies and long panegyric odes were dedicated to him by his contemporaries.81 For European observers al-Jazza¯r remained one of the few who had succeeded in defeating Napoleon. This fascination with al-Jazza¯r’s person led, in the first half of the nineteenth century, to a considerable amount of literary production. It is therefore the more remarkable that since that time nothing more has been written about him, and in particular no scholarly monograph—with the exception of one unpublished M.A. thesis82—has been dedicated to him. I suspect this has to do with some of the general motives for writing history. The early reports on him had drawn such an ambivalent or straight-out negative picture that no national historiography cared to claim him. His field of operation had been too far removed from Bosnia for any Bosnian nationalism to co-opt al-Jazza¯r as its own. Palestinian national historiography has tentatively integrated Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar as a part of its history but did not care to burden its image with the ill repute of al-Jazza¯r.83 The problem is more general and concerns all the late Mamluk establishments, which were ruling elites of decidedly foreign background. Egyptian national historiography has only recently begun to discuss the Mamluks in Egypt in the eighteenth century and is not at all certain how to evaluate their role.84 Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r was a Mamluk and his bad press outweighed by far any positive image. Basically there seem to be two different approaches to the interpretation of his career. For convenience, we shall call them the French and the Arabic school of biographical interpretation. Both counted insightful and reliable observers among their authors. To illustrate the difference in approach we shall take the descriptions of the first period of his life until he arrived in Syria. Two Arab contemporaries of Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r give detailed accounts of this period. ‘Abd alRahfi ma¯n al-Jabartı¯ and H fi aydar Ahfi mad al-Shiha¯b both had excellent access to information about Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r. The first was a conscientious and sober chronicler living in Cairo who made it his business to get the most reliable information. The second, as secretary to Amı¯r Bashı¯r, had direct dealings with Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r. In fact, the two reports are often so similar that one wonders whether the authors worked from the same sources or corresponded with each other. But we have not the slightest indication that this was the case.85 Both authors agree that Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r originated from Bosnia and had probably come to Istanbul around 1755 in his late teens. He worked

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as a barber and his job brought him in touch with the retinue of ‘Alı¯ Bey Agha, who was appointed governor of Egypt in 1756. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r went to Egypt as a member of his household. For a while he served ‘Alı¯ Pasha in the Citadel. It is possible that he then had a quarrel with one of ‘Alı¯ Pasha’s followers—or perhaps he genuinely desired to go on the pilgrimage; whatever the reason, he left the Citadel and joined the service of Sfi a¯lihfi Bey, commander of the pilgrimage in 1758. The two became friends. Upon his return from the pilgrimage Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r entered, in rapid sequence, the service of several Mamluks. He began to wear the dress of the Mamluks and learned to speak Arabic. He acquired the skills of a Mamluk and began to advance in life. When one of his masters, ‘Abdalla¯h Bey, was killed by Bedouins, Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r avenged him by setting a trap and killing some seventy of them. This act of loyalty and revenge for his master gained him respect and acceptance from the Mamluks, who now gave him the sobriquet of al-Jazza¯r— “the Butcher.” From “Ahfi mad, the Bosnian” he had now advanced to “Ahfi mad Bey al-Jazza¯r.” In the monumental chronicle of Egyptian history by al-Jabartı¯, the sobriquet “al-Jazza¯r” appears as an honorary epithet—and not merely a description of profession. A certain Yu¯suf Bey acquired the name “al-Jazza¯r” under circumstances identical to those of Ahfi mad Bey: he slaughtered a great number of Bedouins. It may be that the term was only used with regard to the fight against Bedouins.86 It certainly was meant as a term of respect and did not reflect a perception of general cruelty of character, as later European writers were inclined to believe. ‘Alı¯ Bey al-Kabı¯r was impressed by al-Jazza¯r’s courage and loyalty. He made him his prote´ge´ and promoted him. He also used him as his private strongman and occasionally asked him to liquidate personal enemies. Ahfi mad al-Jazza¯r “had changed the profession of the razor for that of the sword”87 and though he was not, properly speaking, a Mamluk, he was accepted as one of the “numbered Amirs.” His career in Egypt, however, came to an abrupt end in September 1768 following one final intrigue. ‘Alı¯ Bey al-Kabı¯r, who upon his return from exile in Upper Egypt had allied himself with Sfi a¯lihfi Bey, now felt that the latter had become a threatening rival and asked his two henchmen, Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r and Muhfi ammad Abu¯ ’l-Dhahab, to assassinate him. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r balked at the thought of killing his old friend and even went secretly to him to warn him. Sfi a¯lihfi Bey did not believe him and even mentioned the matter to ‘Alı¯ Bey al-Kabı¯r. The latter succeeded in reassuring him that all this had only been a test of the faithfulness of this followers. When Sfi a¯lihfi Bey was finally ambushed and killed, Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r

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was present but did not draw his sword or participate in the assassination. After the deed Abu¯ ‘l-Dhahab commented on Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r’s lack of enthusiasm, and may even have tried to set a trap and kill him. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r realized that ‘Alı¯ Bey would never again trust him because of the loyalty he had displayed for Sfi a¯lihfi Bey. Seeing that his life was in danger, he fled immediately, telling his household to pretend that he was ill and could not be visited. Disguised as a Maghrebi he fled to Alexandria and embarked on a ship to Istanbul only hours before ‘Alı¯ Bey al-Kabı¯r’s men arrived in Alexandria to arrest him. According to his own somewhat apologetic and not entirely true comments on his life in Egypt Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r had gone there as a freeman and a Bosnian and therefore had to move from master to master since the Mamluks would never accept him as one of their own—an opinion which alJabartı¯ shared.88 Our knowledge of Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r’s whereabouts and actions becomes somewhat vague after his departure. He may have drifted through Anatolia to Aleppo. Al-Jabartı¯ claims that he returned secretly to Egypt in an attempt to link up with some Bedouin tribe to fight ‘Alı¯ Bey al-Kabı¯r, but had to flee again.89 It is, however, certain that in 1770 he surfaced in Dayr al-Qamar in Lebanon, so destitute that he was forced to sell the clothes off his back to get food.90 The Druze Amı¯r Yu¯suf took an interest in him and had him fed and provided for. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r stayed for a while, went down to the coast, and, finding no employment, drifted to Damascus. His prospects did not improve and he made a short journey to Egypt, disguised as an Armenian, to collect some valuables and money from his house in Azbakiya.91 Fate finally offered him an opportunity when Amı¯r Yu¯suf asked the governor of Damascus, ‘Uthma¯n Bey, to send him Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r and some troops in order to defend Beirut against the Russian fleet. Beirut became the first stepping-stone of Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r’s career in Syria. He very quickly had its fortifications improved and then used it as a power base against Amı¯r Yu¯suf, claiming that he was defending the interests of the Ottoman government. Only a four-month joint siege by Amı¯r Yu¯suf and Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar could dislodge him from there. His importance was emphasized, if only in a negative way, when in the same year 1772, Muhfi a¯mmad Bey Abu¯ ‘l-Dhahab offered Amı¯r Yu¯suf 200,000 piasters for the head of al-Jazza¯r. The rivalries from the Egyptian years were still strong.92 In summary, we get here a picture of a young adventurer, somewhat of a drifter perhaps, who knew how to ingratiate himself with his masters. He

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seized opportunities when they offered themselves: a man on the make, rising through the ranks and usually not hesitating to fight and kill when it was necessary or demanded from him. Constantly shifting alliances, intrigues, betrayal, and assassinations were surely at the time nothing extraordinary in the daily politics of the Mamluks in Egypt in their chronic power struggles. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r spent formative years in Egypt among the Mamluks. He became an accomplished fighter, courageous and strong-willed, and also a man deeply loyal to friends and masters. He was admired by the Mamluks for his act of vengeance against the tribe who had killed his master. When requested to assassinate his friend and former master, Sfi a¯lihfi Bey, he had refused. Even after Sfi a¯lihfi Bey dismissed his warnings, Ahfi mad Pasha alJazza¯r couldn’t bring himself to participate in his murder, though he must have realized that this would put himself in danger and certainly would end his career in Egypt. It was an outstanding act of loyalty in those times of treachery. How very different is the story told by the French school of interpretation! The first French reports we have about Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r are those of the great travelers Volney and Baron de Tott, the latter being at the time an adviser to the Ottoman government. They saw Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r in Acre in 1783 and 1784, respectively. To them should be added the French viceconsul in Acre, Renaudot, who wrote a lengthy report in July 1783.93 Major later reports come from Olivier, who also met Ahfi mad Pasha alJazza¯r in 1802, from De´nain in his general work on the French expedition to Egypt, and much later the first—and last—attempt at a general history of alJazza¯r Pasha by E. Lockroy.94 Volney provides us with a motive for Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r’s departure from Bosnia: he had to flee after trying, at the age of sixteen, to rape his sister-in-law. In Istanbul he found himself destitute and sold himself into slavery to a merchant who shipped him to Egypt, where he was bought by ‘Alı¯ Bey—presumably Volney means ‘Alı¯ Bey al-Kabı¯r. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r distinguished himself through courage and a willingness to assassinate whomsoever he was ordered to kill. This earned him the title al-Jazza¯r. He hesitated only once to kill “either from humanity or some secret friendship” and even “remonstrated against the order.”95 This forced him to leave Egypt. De Tott has very little to say about the early life of al-Jazza¯r except that he himself had taken the name of al-Jazza¯r “the butcher in which he gloried.”96 Olivier, who met Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r almost twenty years later, has some features to add: al-Jazza¯r had to flee his homeland, at the age of seventeen, after stabbing a woman who did not submit to his wishes. After working as a

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sailor he drifted through Anatolia and sold himself to a Turkish slave trader. Once in Egypt he converted to Islam.97 Sold to ‘Alı¯ Bey, he distinguished himself with cold-blooded atrocities, for which his comrades gave him the title al-Jazza¯r. He had to flee Egypt when he showed scruples “dont il ne paraissait pas capable” [of which he seemed not capable].98 De´nain follows by and large the earlier French reports. Ahfi mad Pasha alJazza¯r’s selling himself into slavery acquires now a more programmatic meaning: “il renonc¸a a` sa liberte´ comme il avait renonc¸´e a` sa patrie” [he renounced his freedom as he had renounced his fatherland]. De´nain emphasizes that Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r named himself “al-Jazza¯r,” a title which he made it a point to justify. Al-Jazza¯r refused to bring ‘Alı¯ Bey al-Kabı¯r the head of Sfi a¯lihfi Bey. But De´nain does not mention any motive for this refusal, and Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r’s behavior seems capricious. Like de Tott, he mentions an incident in which Christians in Beirut were immured alive upon the orders of al-Jazza¯r, but what were “a few” in de Tott’s narrative have become now “all the Greek Orthodox.”99 In Lockroy’s account, at the end of the nineteenth century, the Turkish slave trader to whom al-Jazza¯r sold himself has become a Jewish merchant, probably a reflection of the increased anti-Semitism in Europe. The merchant received 1,200 francs for the boy. The story about the assassination of Sfi a¯lı¯hfi Bey becomes garbled. According to Lockroy, ‘Alı¯ Bey wanted to get at Abu¯ ‘lDhahab by having his friend Sfi a¯lihfi killed. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r refused to carry out the order because he did not want to fall into disfavor with Abu¯ ‘lDhahab. Yet the latter did not hesitate to kill Sfi a¯lihfi Bey himself. We should perhaps add here a further, Arabic, source from a time slightly earlier than Lockroy, but as confused. This source simply states that Ahfi mad Pasha alJazza¯r one day invited eighteen Mamluks to his home, gave them dinner, made them drunk, and killed them all. Thereupon he had to flee Egypt.100 In summary, a picture differing very much from that drawn by the contemporary Arabic sources is presented here. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r tries to rape even members of his family, he sells his freedom just as he renounces his fatherland, he takes pleasure in killing, he boasts of it and calls himself “the Butcher.” His loyalty to Sfi a¯lihfi Bey, when mentioned at all, is dismissed as an erratic move. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r is not just “a bad lot,” he is evil personified, “un Monstre.” Our French authors never tire of adding examples from all periods of his life to illustrate his bloodthirstiness and his capricious, cruel, and unreasonable behavior.

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Why was there an almost systematic effort to paint an even darker picture of a man who certainly had some highly unpleasant traits of character; and why is this tendency only to be found in the French writers? Volney, de Tott, and Renaudot, the French vice-consul in Acre, were not only professional men, educated visitors in a foreign society, they were also profoundly engaged in the political debate in their own country on the eve of the French Revolution. Renaudot, for instance, who set out to write a memo about French trade in the area, treats us to long paragraphs on political thought and despotism: “Dans un des plus beaux pays du monde, les hommes sont me´chants, et Esclaves, et telle est la nature du Gouvernement Despotique que celui qui donne La Loi est plus Esclave que celui qui La rec¸oit. Un Pacha, avec deux milles hommes de troupes, peut-eˆtre les plus me´prisables qu’il y ait au monde, fait trembler douze cent mille habitans: a` Son tour il a les plus grandes frayeurs au milieu des mise´rables qui ´exe´cutent ses volonte´s, toujours prestes a` fle´chir le genoux devant lui, ou prestes a` lui porter le coup mortel.”101* On a more mundane level it should be added that a perusal of the French consular correspondence of the time shows the French merchants calling a tyrant practically any local ruler who was able to force the French to pay higher prices for local goods. Volney writes: “In Turkey, as everywhere else, we must be convinced that arbitrary power in the sovereign is fatal to the state” and, echoing the thoughts of Voltaire in his play Mahomet, Volney tells us that the Koran incites fanaticism, demands total devotion, and thereby prepares the way for total despotism.102 Baron de Tott lectures us that “painting the weakness of the despot and the cowardice of his subordinate officers, who awe him at a distance, gives, at one stroke of the pencil, the picture of the Ottoman empire.”103 “Dans des contre´es ou` rien ne stipule la mesure des droits de ceux qui gouvernent sur ceux qui sont gouverne´s, ou` l’abus de la force semble ˆetre inhe´rent au pouvoir, Djezaar eut l’art de passer tout le monde en injustices gratuites et en cruaute´s monomanes.”104* These comments about despotism were directed at the French reader and were part of the political debate in prerevolutionary France. The Ottoman Empire, two hundred years earlier admired and feared in Europe for its firm organization and effective centralism, served now as an example of the harmful effects of despotism. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r became the incarnation of this political pattern. He was consistently described as tyrant, despot, and usurper. Unfettered by the limits of law, he committed crime upon crime. His picture, as the tyrant par excellence, could not be drawn in colors too dark or bloody. One reason for the choice of al-Jazza¯r for this role had to do simply with

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the accessibility of Acre for Europeans. It was easier to observe at first hand al-Jazza¯r’s rule and its results than the unpleasantnesses inflicted, for instance, by the Shiha¯bis upon each other, or the governors of Damascus upon its population. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r stayed in power much longer than anybody else, almost thirty years, but even after his death his fame lingered on as the first to have defeated Napoleon. There is, of course, a further explanation for the gory descriptions that the French authors provide. Their reports belong to that at the time most popular genre of travel literature. This literature, to be sure, sought to inform and instruct but also to entertain. Dramatization and exaggeration were needed— especially when the journey itself had become rather commonplace, as was the case with the Holy Land in the early nineteenth century. When travelers followed each other in quick succession with their publications, they had to outdo their predecessors in their descriptions. This explains also why the descriptions of Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r’s character and deeds became bloodier, more cruel, and, indeed, pornographic as time went by. Even the approach to Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r’s citadel in Acre lets the reader shudder delightfully: At the sight of these ruined fortifications, sad habitations of misfortune and desperation, my heart contracted with indignation and horror. . . . Having reached an alley we saw on one side the cannons arranged in front of the palace and on the other side well guarded a prison, whose doors, however, remain open so that the people can see those unfortunate ones, loaded with chains, destined for torture or the final martyrdom. Farther away a mosque surrounded by sycamores and finally a fountain decorated with marble and raised by the Ahfi mad Pasha for the poor. Vain monument of a false and sterile piety. We are made to pass the gate of the palace and are conducted through an obscure and sinister corridor to a large hall.105

Most instructive is another incident which has all the ingredients for drama and good horrifying entertainment: intrigue, sex, bloody murder. In 1789, upon his return from the pilgrimage, Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r believed he had evidence of amorous relationships between some of his Mamluks and some of the women in his harem. He chased away all those involved. So far all major sources agree. Al-Jabartı¯ adds that he killed those he suspected in this affair. H fi aydar Shiha¯b reports a highly dramatic battle in the palace between Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r and some faithful followers on the one side and the accused Mamluks on the other. The battle ended in a stalemate and

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the Mamluks were granted free exit from the city. The author reports nothing about later executions. The Englishman E. D. Clarke, who visited Acre in 1801 and seems to have been a rather sober observer, concedes that Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r apparently killed seven of his wives when he had reason to suspect their faithfulness. But he doubts much of what is told about Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r. “Such stories are easily propagated, and as readily believed and it is probable that many of them are without foundation.”106 Olivier, visiting only two years later, told how the older and less beautiful women were packed into boats to be drowned in the sea, others were sewn into leather sacks and thrown in the Gulf of Acre, others again were tortured and thrown alive into a cistern. Olivier then treats us to the last encounter between Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r and his most beloved wife “d’une beaute´ ravissante.” Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r accused her of unfaithfulness. Her denial of any wrongdoing infuriated him only more. Suddenly he cut off both her hands, which were clasped together, then he cut off her breasts. Not satisfied with this “le monstre . . . il lui fend le ventre! . . . Sa main se prome`ne dans ses entrailles palpitants” [the monster . . . slit open her belly . . . His hand moves around in her throbbing intestines].107 Olivier tells us all this, of course, only in order to raise our political consciousness. It might be useful, he explains, to describe such acts of cruelty in all this detail because it shows us how much a man can abuse authority which he inherited from his father or which he usurped.108 De´nain obviously had read Olivier, too, but adds even more details: Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r had all the women of his harem lined up naked and all those who showed signs of pregnancy had their stomachs cut open by him. Generally speaking, De´nain assures us that innumerable young slaves were put into the harem every year: they would come running trembling at the slightest wink of Ahfi mad Pasha; weak women, whom the scimitar readies for pleasure, and “who more than once were transported in his arms from amorous spasms to spasms of death.”109 And so on ad nauseam. I have no intention of trivializing the cruelties Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r no doubt committed throughout his life. The testimony is too general and too consistent to dismiss all accusations against him. Years after his death the visitor to Acre was struck by the great number of mutilated persons—usually missing an eye, or ear, or part of the nose, or all three. Ahfi mad Pasha alJazza¯r was toward the end of his life aware of the image Europeans had of him. In response he remarked: “They say that al-Jazza¯r is cruel and barbaric; he is only just.” About his style of government he commented that contrary

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to the accusations against him he was a just ruler, and “in order to govern the people of this land one cannot be too severe. But if I strike with one hand I recompense with the other. This is how I have maintained for thirty years, in spite of everybody, complete possession of all [the land] between the Orontos and the estuary of the Jordan.”110 This surely was a self-serving statement, but it also reflected an opinion widely shared by contemporary rulers and governors. The grand vezier Yu¯suf, upon entering Syria in 1800, had a great number of rebellious elements executed. Abdalla¯h Pasha al-Azfi m, upon being appointed governor of Damascus in 1799, immediately had several enemies hung—mainly, one feels, in order to establish beyond doubt who could execute whom in the city. Neither, as we have seen, were the Mamluks in Egypt particularly concerned about shedding blood. There can be no doubt that there was a streak of cruelty and perhaps of sadism in Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r. An uncontrollable temper, when provoked, often pushed him to violence; at other occasions he seems to have murdered in cold blood and for no visible reason. In 1789, when the rebellion of his own Mamluks presented the gravest internal challenge to his rule, he reacted violently, spilling the blood of anyone he suspected to be part of the conspiracy. As one chronicler reports: “After that event he became like a wild animal, so that nobody could stand before him and he believed in his imagination that the whole world was against him.”111 In the context of his own times al-Jazza¯r’s cruelty seems not quite so outrageous—at least in the Egyptian context of internecine struggles he was one of the few to show any scruples and loyalty at all. We also might add that Napoleon thought nothing of having 4,000 of Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r’s troops systematically executed in the dunes of Jaffa after they had become prisoners of the French. Napoleon probably had more people killed there in one day than Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r killed in a lifetime. In addition, the image of the cruel tyrant was built up in the French sources. Clearly, al-Jazza¯r served the French authors as an instructive example of the evil excesses of despotism and as a titillating monstrous attraction for the reading public. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r had a far more complex personality, and cruelty was only one of his character traits. De Taules, French consul in Sidon, was probably the first Frenchman to meet Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r personally. This was in 1773, during the time that al-Jazza¯r was attempting to establish a power base in Beirut. De Taules observed him to have a violent temper, which was only made worse through his excessive drinking. De Taules concedes “un certain esprit” [a certain intelligence] but expects nothing but “du bruit et du mal” [noise and evil] from this man.112

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Volney found him “not destitute of talent and especially cunning,” in fact, “too cunning to shed blood while there are any hopes of getting money.”113 Renaudot, the French vice-consul who, living in Acre, must have had daily contact with Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r in the 1780s, drew a far more complex picture: This Pasha is choleric, violent, carried away by his temperament, though he is not inaccessible; with patience and subtlety one can get one’s way with him. He is a mixture of vice and virtue. He has without doubt made the greatest efforts to contain his mad character in the space he had to travel through from his birth to the position which he has now reached. But like a volcano his irruptions were violent when he could enjoy full liberty . . . He guards his authority jealously and to excess. He wants to lord it over all, to judge everything, and his judgments always reflect the state of his soul. He is sometimes just, great, and generous, at other times furious and bloody. He stabs with one hand and gives his own blood with the other. He speaks of himself with great complaisance and is fond of flaunting his talents, his knowledge, his martial qualities, his bravado with which nothing can compare, and his military exploits. He lends his ear to flattery and cherishes the adulators.114

Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r had, indeed, some justification for boasting of his personal courage and physical stamina. At the age of about sixty he still scaled the walls of Acre and fought man-to-man with the French.115 He showed tenacity and the cool head of a superb tactician, as his defense of Beirut or the quelling of the rebellion of his Mamluks proved. The sheer length of his stay in power speaks for his political skills. He succeeded under unusually difficult circumstances which demanded much more from him than simpleminded repression and cruelty. Apart from these qualities Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r had considerable engineering skills, though we do not know where or how he acquired them. “He formed the plans, drew the designs, and supervised the execution” of building the mosque, the bazaar and the fountain.116 He was directly involved in the construction of the fortifications until his last years.117 He took an interest in gardening, and in his later years he showed a talent for making paper cutouts, with which he entertained his guests and his harem. The later French visitors who drew such a negative picture of him reflect the complexity and even the positive characteristics of Ahfi mad Pasha alJazza¯r’s personality almost in spite of themselves when they report direct personal encounters with him. Olivier and Jaubert visited him in 1800 and

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1802 respectively. Their personal impressions are confirmed by Clarke, the Englishman who met him in 1801. At the time al-Jazza¯r was over sixty with a white beard but still of muscular build and very agile.118 “Habile dans tout l’exercice du corps, il conserve encore tous les gouˆts de l’e´ducation qu’il a rec¸ue parmi les Mamluks: il se sert ´egalement bien du sabre et du fusil; il monte un dromadaire et dompte un cheval fougueux avec autant d’adresse que d’agilite´.”119* He apparently had given up drinking in 1791 when he made the H fi ajj.120 Toward the end of his life he gave, in fact, the impression of an ascetic man. He received his visitors sitting on the ground under a palm tree, dressed in coarse cloth and with an old shawl on his head. He could have been mistaken for a beggar.121 At other times his guests would find him in common Arab dress, plain but clean, sitting on a board without any cushions or carpet. But Clarke also suspected that Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r was “betraying as much ostentation in the seeming privations to which he exposed himself, as he might have done by the most stately magnificence.”122 Nevertheless, Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r does not seem to have been a man given to conspicuous consumption. The only exception was his building activity. This was partially done for security reasons—the extensive fortification of Acre; or for public benefit—the drinking fountain, the aqueduct, the bath, the bazaar; or for religious purposes—the famous mosque, which also served as a means of political legitimization. He also lavishly spent money in Istanbul for presents and bribes to maintain support for himself in the Ottoman government. Otherwise, as Clarke informs us, “extravagance of any kind, except in cruelty, [was] inconsistent with Djezzar’s character.”123 Olivier, who depicted him as an extremely cruel and bloody tyrant, had nevertheless this to say after seeing him in Acre: Simple in his manners [Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r] becomes popular and sometimes familiar with the inhabitants of Acre. Charitable and compassionate in appearance, he himself administers to the poor the remedies which he believes to be efficient for their ills. He seats the unhappy next to him and they show complete confidence in him. He consoles them with his talk and nurtures them with his own hand. He has constantly enormous pots of rice in his palace for the destitute and the old. He has money distributed to them every week with the greatest regularity.124

This surprising image of generosity and compassion is confirmed by other testimony. When, for instance, he had to surrender, after a bitter siege, the city of Beirut, he demanded as a condition that the population should not be

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punished by the conqueror.125 Perhaps most touching was the scene when Sulayma¯n, who had been the leader of the rebellion against Ahfi mad Pasha alJazza¯r in 1789, returned humbly to Acre seventeen years later, ready to accept death. Al-Jazza¯r received him like the prodigal son and restored him to his rank and full honor.126 Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r’s European interlocutors were impressed by his intellectual acumen and alertness. He would concentrate in quick sequence on totally different subjects, could change from the most serious topics to the most subtle pleasantries, and could “move from one to the other with alacrity, a precision, a clearness which showed that everything was organized in his head in an admirable order.”127 He would often sidetrack the conversations with stories, parables, and anecdotes while at the same time keeping himself busy with paper cutouts. But from behind this apparent frivolity of behavior he observed the effect of his words on the visitors and listened carefully to what they had to say.128 European visitors to Acre and to Ahfi mad Pasha alJazza¯r—even those who wrote about him first and foremost as an example of despotism or as an exotic human monstrosity—could not but acknowledge the complexity of his personality: a measure of compassion along with his cruelty, vanity along with his courage, astuteness and even sagacity together with a violent temper. It is only in the works of later authors, such as Lockroy and Misha¯qa, that the description of al-Jazza¯r is reduced entirely to the monstrous and sensational. A conscious effort is needed to break through the various cliche´s that have been developed for political or entertainment reasons and to reach a more balanced view of the man. Only then will it be possible to evaluate his role in the development of Acre proper. On the whole, it seems that the two contemporary Arabic reports remain the most useful—they had very limited reasons to praise Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r and none to demonize him. A careful reading of the sources and the reconstruction of the historical context should help us in this task. When we consider in the following pages how he dealt with issues many of which Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar had faced before him, we can establish already two important differences which determined at least some of his political behavior: in contrast to his predecessor he was not a local man and had no local clan or family connections. In addition to SerboCroat he spoke Ottoman Turkish and Arabic with a thick Egyptian accent, and possibly some Italian. His education had been that of a soldier, a Mamluk. At the time he was appointed governor of Sidon he had had no economic or commercial experience worth mentioning. With this background he fitted,

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much more than did Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar, the mold of the traditional ruling elite in the Ottoman provinces at that time.

Acre’s Relation with Its Neighbors During Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r’s Rule THE DRUZE

¯ mil, the region of the North of the Galilee and of Jabal al-‘A Metualis, we reach the southern parts of Mount Lebanon, which at the time were exclusively settled by the Druze. The Arabic-speaking Druze are variously described as a religious community or as an ethnicity with feudalist structures. An off-branch of Isma¯‘ı¯lı¯ Shı¯‘ism and settled since the eleventh century in the region, they remained very much a territorially circumscribed religious community. How important the religious aspect was for the identity of the Druze remains questionable, as the knowledge of the religion and its contents remained the privilege of the few initiated (the ‘uqala¯’), while the majority of the community (the juhala¯’) had only marginal knowledge of their religion. As has been pointed out129 it was the strict rule of endogamy, imposed by the religion, that was instrumental in creating an identity. The society was one in which patrilineal descent determined the individual’s loyalties to the clan, the social ranking of clans, and the options for alliances. The genealogical aspect is so important that often the term “tribe” is used in describing the Druze. Thanks to the dominant role of the aspect of kinship and family relations, neither the Druze nor their neighbors had any difficulty in knowing who belonged to the Druze community and who did not. Politically and administratively they were organized along feudalistic lines in the ima¯ra system. It should be noted, however, that it differed in an important aspect of feudalism as generally defined: genealogical coherence was so strong that there was no clear-cut differentiation between estates. In the case of war the feudal lord would mobilize all peasants as warriors.130 This meant wars could not be fought for very long without tremendous damage to agricultural production, as wars involved the total population. Each village was organized along clan lines. Several villages, or a region, were ruled by one of the distinguished clans, whose heads carried the title amı¯r. To those clans belonged the Ma‘n, Shiha¯b, Arsla¯n, and Abu¯ ‘l-Lam‘a. Slightly lesser but still important clans were those with the rank of shaykh, such as the Junbala¯fit, Abu¯ Nakad, al-H fi a¯zin, and others. From the early eighteenth century the Shiha¯b clan also provided the amı¯r hfi a¯kim, who ruled over the

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whole Druze region and represented it to the outside world. His official recognition in the Ottoman context manifested itself in the confirmation of his position by the governor of Sidon, to whose province the region of the Druze was attached. The amı¯r hfi a¯kim in return committed himself to deliver the annual tax payments to the governor of Sidon. During the period concerning us a Druze identity was firmly established, and the ima¯ra system was officially recognized, internally by a Druze consensus that the Shiha¯b clan always provided the amı¯r hfi a¯kim and externally by the confirmation of his position from Sidon. The question important to us— or, to be more precise, to al-Jazza¯r—was the extent to which these characteristics of the Druze community were basis enough for common political will and action. During Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar’s rule the realm of Acre was isolated from the Druze in the north by an alliance with the Metuali shaykhs and a rather powerless governor in Sidon. Only toward the end of his rule, after linking up with ‘Alı¯ Bey al-Kabı¯r from Egypt, did Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar expand his realm to the north by chasing away the governor of Sidon in a joint effort with his Metuali allies. He appointed one of his senior officers, al-Dinkizlı¯, who was the commander of the Maghrebi troops, as his mutasallim in Sidon. With this step he became a direct neighbor of the Druze, who controlled Beirut. Egyptian support for Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar soon crumbled when Abu¯ ‘l-Dhahab carried out his remarkable retreat from Damascus and the governor of Damascus, ‘Uthma¯n Pasha al-Kurjı¯, could return to his seat of government. At this point Amı¯r Yu¯suf Shiha¯b appeared at his court and had the governor appoint him as ruler of Mount Lebanon instead of his uncle, Amı¯r Mansfiu¯r, who had ruled for twenty-four years. An alliance was forged between the new governor of Damascus, ‘Uthma¯n Pasha al-Misfirı¯, and Amı¯r Yu¯suf in order to push out Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar from Sidon and reinstate the governor of Sidon. The attempt was defeated by Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar’s troops and his Metuali allies in October 1772. The Russian fleet, which had helped to defend Sidon, moved north and threatened Beirut. Amı¯r Yu¯suf asked the governor of Damascus to send him Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r with troops to secure Beirut. Once established in Beirut, al-Jazza¯r saw the opportunity to build his own power base, always acting in the name of the Ottoman government. When it became apparent that he had no intention of leaving Beirut after the Russian fleet disappeared, Amı¯r Yu¯suf tried to rally the Druze to dislodge him from the city. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r could stave off these attempts because, as the chronicler observed, “In appearance the Druze shaykhs supported Amı¯r Yu¯suf but secretly they opposed him.”131 With bribes al-Jazza¯r was able to set

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them against each other. He learned here a lesson that would serve him well in all his future dealings with the Druze: they were deeply divided amongst themselves and therefore easily manipulated. Another pattern of political relations was also now established: fights in the Druze Mountain were always intertwined with interests from the surrounding seats of Ottoman governors, Tripoli, Damascus, and Sidon, and could be easily turned into proxy wars for the various outsiders. Only when Zfi ahir al-‘Umar joined forces with Amı¯r Yu¯suf and defeated the troops of three pashas sent to break the siege against al-Jazza¯r was the latter prepared to accept defeat and leave Beirut. After spending some time in Acre he traveled either to Damascus or, more likely, to Istanbul, biding his time.132 Installed as wa¯lı¯ of Sidon after the death of Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar in 1776, Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r gained a foothold in the politics of the Druze, which Zfi ahir al‘Umar had never possessed. As governor of Sidon he was in a position to grant legitimacy to the ruler of the Mountain. He lost no time laying hands on Beirut, which the admiral of the Ottoman fleet, H fi asan K fi apu¯da¯n Pasha, had assigned to Amı¯r Yu¯suf Shiha¯b. In a second move, to establish his authority as wa¯lı¯ of Sidon over Mount Lebanon, al-Jazza¯r demanded from Amı¯r Yu¯suf the payment of taxes from the Mount Lebanon area, taxes which H fi asan K fi apu¯da¯n Pasha had just collected in the name of the Ottoman government. A first military encounter between troops of al-Jazza¯r and Druze elements occurred in August 1776 near Beirut.133 Bent on gaining control over the Mount Lebanon region, Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r appealed, perhaps somewhat naively, in 1777 to the new governor of Damascus, Muhfi ammad Pasha al-‘Azfi m, and his son Yu¯suf, who ruled over Tripoli, to join him in an attack on Amı¯r Yu¯suf Shiha¯b. But these two declined, claiming that Amı¯r Yu¯suf was a loyal, tax-paying servant of the Ottoman sultan. In fact, they saw in Amı¯r Yu¯suf an ally against the new and ambitious governor of Sidon.134 Musfifitafa¯ ibn Qara¯ Mulla¯, commander of al-Jazza¯r’s Maghrebi troops in Sidon, marched via Beirut into the Mountain with the intention of collecting money and the hope of killing Amı¯r Yu¯suf at the same time. But he was forced to retreat to Sidon. Thereupon he tried another route through the Biqa¯‘a Valley. After he had confiscated the harvest there, and after some bloody but indecisive fighting, here too his assault was stopped.135 Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r’s first opportunity to exercise control over the Mountain came when the rifts between various Druze factions could not be contained by Amı¯r Yu¯suf anymore and turned into open defiance against him. The Druze clans of the Junbala¯fit and the Abu¯ Nakad conspired with two brothers of Amı¯r Yu¯suf, Amı¯r Sayyid Ahfi mad and Amı¯r Afandı¯, to have him

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deposed and his two brothers appointed rulers of the Mountain. For this purpose, they offered al-Jazza¯r 50,000 ghirsh in September 1778. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r accepted the offer and appointed them.136 To support their claim he also moved with troops to Beirut and tried from there to march into the Mountain and besiege Jubayl. Amı¯r Yu¯suf, assisted by another brother, Amı¯r Muhfi ammad, and supported by the governor of Tripoli, could hold his own, but in the ensuing stalemate he finally offered al-Jazza¯r 100,000 ghirsh to be reappointed as ruler of Mount Lebanon. The development of these events during the first two years of al-Jazza¯r’s rule contains all the elements that would define his relations with the Druze over the next quarter of a century: attempts at military subjugation were costly and mostly futile. The internal rifts of the Druze could be used to destabilize the area and at the same time to obtain considerable payments from the various factions. The factionalism of the Druze frequently attracted outside interference not only from Acre but also from the governors of Tripoli and Damascus, who tended to turn the internal strife of the Druze into proxy wars with Acre. For the next dozen years Amı¯r Yu¯suf Shiha¯b remained the dominant figure in Druze politics and the major opponent of al-Jazza¯r. This, however, is not to say that political stability was achieved. On the contrary, several times Amı¯r Yu¯suf lost his position as amı¯r hfi a¯kim of the Mountain, only to be reappointed sooner or later. The challenge against him usually came from a coalition of other members of the Shiha¯b clan in alliance with some other clans. All were aware that to obtain legitimacy for their claim to rulership they needed al-Jazza¯r’s consent and official investiture by him. To obtain such consent they were willing to pay ever more. When in 1778 two brothers of Amı¯r Yu¯suf offered 50,000 ghirsh to be appointed as co-rulers over the Druze region, Amı¯r Yu¯suf made a counter-offer of 100,000 ghirsh. Six years later Amı¯r Yu¯suf as well as his uncle Amı¯r Isma¯‘ı¯l each offered 300,000 ghirsh for the appointment.137 In a final round Amı¯r Yu¯suf, having once more lost the position of amı¯r hfi a¯kim, in 1790 offered al-Jazza¯r 600,000 ghirsh for his reappointment. This offer was countered by Amı¯r Bashı¯r Shiha¯b with a promise of the enormous sum of 1,750,000 ghirsh. Subsequent promises for payments would reach over 2 million ghirsh. It is impossible to determine how many of these promissory commitments were actually paid up, but even if only a part was eventually paid it is easy to see how the financial burden on the population of the Mountain increased. This was also the cause for the permanent political instability. Each time al-Jazza¯r invested another member of the Shiha¯b clan, the new appointee had to try to raise the promised sums.

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This promptly antagonized the population. New coalitions against the new ruler quickly found popular support. At one point, in 1788, Amı¯r Yu¯suf had killed and maimed so many of his own immediate relatives138 that he felt secure enough in his position to defy Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r and refuse to pay the regular taxes. Such rebelliousness triggered swift action by al-Jazza¯r. By August 1779 an expeditionary corps, albeit the third sent from Acre against the Druze for this purpose, was able to effect the disposal of Amı¯r Yu¯suf for the time being. During his intermittent warfare against the Druze al-Jazza¯r used a period of relative calm to turn his attention to the Metualis. In a campaign with some 3,000 troops under the command of his Mamluk Salı¯m Pasha, the Metualis were defeated in a large battle on September 23, 1781. Their most important shaykhs were killed and the others fled into exile. Al-Jazza¯r’s troops conquered and destroyed all the fortifications of the Metualis and collected rich booty. The port of Tyre became permanently part of al-Jazza¯r’s realm.139 When in 1784 Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r’s foray into the Mountain was repelled by Amı¯r Yu¯suf and a united Druze front, this perceived weakness encouraged the Metualis to rise against him after having been crushed by him and driven into exile only three years earlier. Once more they were decimated by alJazza¯r’s troops, and their leadership was—this time for good—driven into exile. The Metualis were numerically much inferior to the Druze, and Jabal ‘A¯mil was more accessible than the Druze region. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r repeatedly tried to force his will upon the Druze during these years by dispatching military expeditions into their region. Eventually he had to accept the fact that, although his troops could usually penetrate the region quite quickly, they could never hold their position or establish permanent political control. All Druze peasants could always be also mobilized as warriors. Familiar with the mountainous terrain, they could use it to their advantage and could resist any intruding regular army. In addition, too much military pressure on the Druze would without fail push opposing elements to seek help from Damascus. This led easily either to dangerous, direct confrontations between al-Jazza¯r’s forces and those of Damascus or to costly, protracted proxy wars between different Druze factions. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r had to learn another lesson about the limitations of his power: even when he was simultaneously governor of Damascus and Sidon140 —and the Druze could therefore not play one governor against the other—he could not impose a military solution on the Druze region. In addition to the disadvantages for regular troops in the difficult terrain of the Mountain, al-Jazza¯r was also obliged as governor of Damascus to command

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the annual pilgrimage caravan, which meant that at least for four months he was absent from Bila¯d al-Sha¯m altogether. Eventually Amı¯r Yu¯suf was killed in one of al-Jazza¯r’s prisons in 1791. His death solved none of the issues in the political relations between al-Jazza¯r and the Druze. It only meant the surfacing of another dominant personality in Druze politics, Amı¯r Bashı¯r Shiha¯b. With his own alliances, especially with Shaykh Bashı¯r Junbala¯fit, he tried to maintain his position as amı¯r hfi a¯kim with varying success. The following five years signified another round of war between Druze factions, military campaigns by al-Jazza¯r’s troops, and a quick sequence of appointments and dismissals for the position of the amı¯r hfi a¯kim accompanied by demands for extortionary sums of money. Even though alJazza¯r was for most of the time governor of Sidon as well as of Damascus, he was unable to force his will upon the Druze. In 1796, having lost the governorship of Damascus to his archrival ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha al-‘Azfi m, al-Jazza¯r realized the advantages of a strong ally (rather than weak enemies) in the Druze Mountain and reappointed Amı¯r Bashı¯r Shiha¯b as amı¯r hfi akim. After some proxy wars between the latter and some sons of Amı¯r Yu¯suf supported by Damascus, Jubayl and the Biqa¯‘a Valley came under the control of Amı¯r Bashı¯r, i.e., under the governorship of Sidon. Together with Shaykh Bashı¯r Junbala¯fit, Amı¯r Bashı¯r began to liquidate other Druze shaykhs, especially those of the Abu¯ Nakad. Some were able to flee to Damascus. Ironically, all these exiles, including the sons of Amı¯r Yu¯suf, ended up in Acre, where they were welcomed at the court of al-Jazza¯r, provided with all necessities, and, presumably, kept under surveillance. Apparently al-Jazza¯r regarded them or some of them as potential alternatives for the leadership in Mount Lebanon— a possibility that did not escape Amı¯r Bashı¯r’s wary eye.141 The French invasion of Egypt in 1798 and, in particular, the French march on Acre a year later changed the political scene radically. For the time being al-Jazza¯r was forced to forgo all attempts to prevent Amı¯r Bashı¯r’s consolidation of power in the Mountain. During the French siege of Acre Amı¯r Bashı¯r observed strict neutrality, neither collaborating with the French nor coming to the support of Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r. He established, however, close contacts with Admiral Smith and won thereby the backing of the British. When the grand vezier Yu¯suf came to Syria in 1800 with an Ottoman army on his way to Egypt, Amı¯r Bashı¯r provided him unstintingly with cash and supplies for his army. In return the grand vezier appointed him ruler over all of Mount Lebanon, including the Biqa¯‘a Valley, Ba‘lbak, Wa¯dı¯ Taym, and the Metuali regions. Tax payments were no longer to go to the governor of Sidon, Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r, but directly to the Ottoman government.142

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Al-Jazza¯r did not hesitate to challenge this new arrangement by once more appointing the sons of Amı¯r Yu¯suf as rulers over the Mountain. He provided them with two expeditionary corps which moved on the Mountain in the familiar pincer movement. With this act al-Jazza¯r put himself into direct opposition to the Ottoman government. Nevertheless, Amı¯r Bashı¯r was forced to flee. With the backing of Smith he went to Egypt to the camp of the grand vezier. The sons of Amı¯r Yu¯suf, however, were not able to pacify the Mountain in spite of the military support of al-Jazza¯r. The familiar round of civil war, oppression, destruction, and extortion began with the sons of Amı¯r Yu¯suf being themselves under pressure to fulfill their financial commitments to al-Jazza¯r. The devastation and impoverishment of the region reached new heights. Opposition grew, and when Amı¯r Bashı¯r returned to Tripoli in May 1801 the majority of the Druze shaykhs offered to accept his rule over the Mountain for his lifetime.143 Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r provided Jirjis Ba¯z and the sons of Amı¯r Yu¯suf with several thousand additional troops, North Africans and Albanians. But the bitter and destructive fights in the following months made it clear that al-Jazza¯r could not provide a military solution to the Druze problem. Eventually he was forced to withdraw his troops in order to save them. At that point Jirjis Ba¯z went over to the camp of Amı¯r Bashı¯r, who made him his adviser and gave the sons of Amı¯r Yu¯suf control over Jubayl.144 Once more, in August and September 1802, al-Jazza¯r thought he saw an opportunity to interfere in the politics of the Mountain by supporting one Druze faction militarily against another. He sent an expeditionary corps under Sulayma¯n Pasha to support the claims of the ‘Ima¯d clan. These troops, too, were beaten. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r, “having experienced many times that he could not take possession of the Mountain without the consent of its people,” withdrew his troops.145 When the ‘Ima¯d clan tried, shortly before alJazza¯r’s death, to draw him back into their intrigues against Amı¯r Bashı¯r, he refused. The Druze had, as we have seen, a strong sense of identity, but were divided among themselves and factionalized to the point that the term “Druze” becomes misleading when analyzing the political events of the time. There was no Druze political entity that behaved as such in any recognizable way. The only political consensus shown by the Druze—which, by the way, al-Jazza¯r shared—was the general belief that legitimate political leadership had to come from the Shiha¯bı¯ clan and that the leader, agreed upon—or, rather, fought over—among the Druze, needed formal confirmation from political authorities beyond the Mountain, i.e., the governor of Sidon. This consensus, however, did not exclude political divisions leading to fratricide

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even within the immediate family, nor did it prevent opposing Druze factions from seeking the support of the governors of Damascus or Tripoli. There was no accepted method to select the ruler, nor was it clear who had ultimate authority in making his formal appointment. This is why we can observe the continued destabilization of the region and protracted periods of civil strife, which seem to have increased in intensity: villages were destroyed, their inhabitants killed or expelled, and the fruit trees uprooted.146 Seemingly the pattern of relations between Acre and Mount Lebanon remained the same during all of Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r’s rule: the Druze were hopelessly divided against themselves, each faction was willing to seek outside support, and more often than not such factional strife was transformed into proxy wars between the governors of Sidon and Damascus, promoting their own strategic interest or, at the very least, trying to extort large sums from the Druze for their support. At the same time, the geography of the Mountain was such that neither of the governors was able to impose permanently his political authority and order. Even when Ahfi mad Pasha alJazza¯r was simultaneously governor of Acre and Damascus, he was not able to subdue the Druze completely, his major constraint being that as governor of Damascus he had to leave Syria every year for four months as commander of the pilgrimage. Al-Jazza¯r demanded, in return for his support, increasingly large sums which, though usually collected only partially, led, together with the continuous civil strife, to increased devastation and pauperization of the region. At the same time, his enormous military efforts to exert direct control over the Mountain came to naught. He repeatedly suffered heavy losses of men and mate´riel. Yet, following the French siege of Acre the political structure of Mount Lebanon, and with that its relations with Acre, began to change. For the first time the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire in the eastern Mediterranean had become part of the “penetrated system.”147 Political events in Syria became of importance, too, and were influenced by European powers. Amı¯r Bashı¯r, until then just one of the many claimants to the rulership, was able to garner British support. He also was able to gain direct legitimization of his rule from Istanbul and establish, albeit not completely successfully, the principle of the region’s autonomy from the governor of Sidon. The fact that in the end most Druze factions rallied behind him and that the shaykhs offered him lifetime rule certainly was a sign of the general exhaustion of society after a generation of incessant war and civil strife. As a result Amı¯r Bashı¯r’s position as ruler of the Mountain was considerably elevated, providing him with the base to become a powerful autocratic ruler in the next decade. The

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¯ dil and ‘Abdalla¯h successors of Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r, Sulayma¯n Pasha al-‘A Pasha, ruling in Acre from 1804 to 1831 as governors of Sidon, would never again try to control Mount Lebanon but preferred to forge alliances. DAMASCUS AND SOUTHERN PALESTINE

While Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r ruled from Acre as governor of Sidon, military actions and political intrigues involving the Druze required incessant attention, energy, and expenditure. But one reason why warfare in the Mountain was so protracted and costly and why politics seemed to be an endless process of shifting alliances was precisely that more was at stake than Druze insubordination and rebelliousness. The Druze might have thought that all that counted were their own internecine quarrels, for which they mobilized support from outside. In fact they were often only the means of determining the larger issue of the balance of power between Damascus and Acre. The latter’s rise as a center of economic and political power coincided with the rise to power in Damascus of a remarkable family, al-‘Azfi m, which for much of the century provided the governors of Damascus and sometimes Tripoli. Since the 1730s a basic political pattern in Damascus had been changing, reflecting the decreasing hold of the central government over the provincial centers, old and new. Traditionally Ottoman governors were sent by Istanbul, and ruled for a very short time so they would not be able to develop a provincial power base, but the general weakness of the Ottoman Empire permitted the rise of local governors and rulers whose tenure as governors lasted much longer, if not for a lifetime—such as those of Ahfi mad Pasha alJazza¯r and Sulayma¯n Pasha. Though they usually professed loyalty to the sultan, they were fairly free to run their own affairs as long as they paid some taxes and—in Damascus—guaranteed the organization and safety of the annual pilgrimage to Mecca. Just when the ‘Azfi m family began to buttress its position of power in Damascus, Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar was busy creating a new power base in Acre. As we have seen, much of al-‘Umar’s political and military energy went into this relation with Damascus. The ‘Azfi ms saw a clear danger to their own interests in Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar’s rise to power. The latter’s ambitions, though, were limited. He created an alliance with the Metualis, did not project his power or ambitions into the Druze area, and recognized Nablus as part of the vilayet of Damascus. His interest was focused on the Galilee and its cotton-growing regions, and it would not have occurred to him to press any claims to Damascus. Only during the very last years of his rule, when he had forged an alliance with ‘Alı¯ Bey al-Kabı¯r from Egypt, did he expand his control—with

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mixed success—to Jaffa and Sidon, but he failed completely to make Nablus part of his realm. Until the very end he remained the unruly mutasallim of the governor of Sidon, albeit a governor whose authority did not reach beyond the city limits. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r started from a different position—he was eventually made governor of Sidon—and had different ambitions. If until the death of Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar Damascus felt challenged because its traditional sphere of influence on the coast was taken away from it, the issue now was how far Damascus would belong to Acre’s sphere of influence; hence the bitter wars in Mount Lebanon, where both sides struggled over territory, influence, and possible tax revenues. It is, indeed, remarkable that during the next thirtyfive years, from 1785 to 1820, the governor of Sidon was also made governor of Damascus six times, for a total of twelve years. Most often the Ottoman government would make such appointments when a governor with political power and economic resources was needed to insure the safety of the pilgrimage, or defend the region against outside enemies such as the French or the Wahhabis; needless to say, massive payments to the right people at the Sublime Porte were helpful, too. The Ottoman government routinely shifted governors from one appointment to another. What was unique in this situation was that the governor of Sidon appointed to Damascus would keep both positions. Repeatedly, these appointed governors would continue to reside in Acre and send subordinates to manage the affairs of Damascus and the pilgrimage. The center of power had shifted from Damascus to the coast. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r understood the importance of the governorship of Damascus as soon as he was made governor of Sidon. In September 1775 he had been made muhfi a¯fiz of Acre. But promotion to governor was not quickly forthcoming. His enemy H fi asan Kfi apu¯da¯n Pasha, commander of the imperial fleet, was busy in Istanbul preventing such a step. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r’s own influence in Istanbul finally resulted in his being granted the third horsetail as pasha in the spring of 1776. But nomination as governor of Sidon still took another year. In May 1777, when he was finally made governor of Sidon,148 he apparently had been close to open rebellion against an imperial government that did not grant him his wishes. When he moved to Acre a year later and began to fortify it, he was still fearing a possible attempt by the government to eliminate him.149 When in April 1783 Muhfi ammad Pasha al-‘Azfi m died, al-Jazza¯r tried to move things in Istanbul in his favor, but his hopes were dashed and another pasha was appointed governor.150 Three pashas were appointed governor of Damascus in quick succession. The first died after only twenty-nine days in office. The next two, Darwı¯sh Pasha and

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Muhfi ammad Batfifita¯l Pasha, were disastrously incompetent.151 In March 1785, after spending an immense fortune to build up support for himself in Istanbul, Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r’s appointment finally came through. It required some extra pressure to have the government appoint his katkhuda¯ Salı¯m Pasha al-Kabı¯r as governor of Sidon during his absence in Damascus,152 while Sulayma¯n Pasha became governor of Tripoli. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r left Acre in the middle of April for Damascus in great pomp and military strength. In June and July he “made the rounds,” aldawra,153 in Palestine. With an army of five thousand he created terror, fought down Nablus, and made its inhabitants for a long time “undesiring to rebel.” He occupied Hebron and Jerusalem, where he appointed one of his Mamluks, Qa¯sim Bey, his mutasallim, taking away this position of power from the Nimr clan in Nablus.154 People fled Palestine in fear, though they probably were also trying to flee the rapidly spreading plague and the famine. The expedition was clearly meant not only to collect revenues but to establish al-Jazza¯r’s authority in the province before his October departure for four months on the pilgrimage. By mid-July, al-Jazza¯r was “master of all of Syria.”155 Yet his tenure in office as governor of Damascus was short and perhaps only meant to carry out a successful, i.e., safe, pilgrimage. It may also have been his attempts to monopolize the grain trade from the H fi awra¯n to Acre, provoking the protests of the Damascenes, that cost him his job. Deposed in 1786 by an imperial order, he returned without resistance to Acre, accepting fully the authority of the Ottoman government over him.156 It was to be the only time that he would move his residence to Damascus when appointed governor. On later occasions he would appoint a mutasallim to rule Damascus in his name, though most often he would personally command the pilgrimage caravan. He never again gave up the governorship of Sidon, which he had some difficulty regaining after being dismissed as governor of Damascus in 1786.157 Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r was again appointed governor of Damascus in October 1790 and stayed in this position for five years. The extraordinary length of stay in office has been explained by the fact that his archenemy, H fi asan K fi apu¯da¯n Pasha, had died and that Sultan Selim III was preoccupied with internal reforms.158 In 1798, after a popular rebellion against Ibra¯hı¯m Pasha, then the governor of Damascus, and with the French danger looming from Egypt, al-Jazza¯r was made not governor but a sort of caretaker of Syria.159 A few months later ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha al-‘Azfi m was again appointed governor of Damascus. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r held the position of governor of Damascus once more, during the last few months before his death in April 1804.

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The decisive period of al-Jazza¯r’s control over Damascus is his second tenure as governor, from 1790 to 1795. Cohen has observed that the rivalry between al-Jazza¯r and the ‘Azfi m family was an underlying theme of all political relations between Acre and Damascus160 —as indeed it had already been during the time of Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar. Schatkowski Schilcher provides a convincing analysis of the internal city politics of the time, whereby the ‘Azfi m clan was allied with the aghas of the northern part of the city against the aghas of the southern part, the Mayda¯n, who controlled the grain trade from the H fi awra¯n.161 It would seem only logical to assume, as Schatkowski Schilcher does, that given these circumstances al-Jazza¯r sided with the Mayda¯nı¯s against the northern aghas and the ‘Azfi m clan. In addition, she sees a common commercial interest between the Mayda¯nı¯ merchants and al-Jazza¯r in diverting the grain trade to Acre. Jewish financial interests in Acre supposedly provided the link with the Mayda¯nı¯ merchants and it is, indeed, during this time that H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı, scion of a powerful Jewish family in Damascus, was brought to Acre by al-Jazza¯r as his top financial adviser—though most likely that was done for other reasons. The relations with the Mayda¯nı¯s remained very complex but scarcely cooperative. Al-Jazza¯r’s attempt in 1785 to monopolize the grain trade of the H fi awra¯n had caused sufficient protest to have him deposed. The protest must have come from the Mayda¯nı¯ merchants who were immediately affected by this step. It was not in the character of al-Jazza¯r to have accommodated a fairly autonomous merchant class. His aim was to take over the grain trade, control it, fix prices, and exclude all middlemen. That the Ottoman government sent, in response to the protests, the order of al-Jazza¯r’s dismissal to the qa¯dfi¯ı of the city, who belonged to the northern faction, insured the unrelenting hostility of al-Jazza¯r against the latter, but does not disprove the opposition of the Mayda¯nı¯ merchants.162 When Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r was appointed governor of Damascus the second time, he only sent a mutasallim to rule in his stead: a certain Muhfi ammad Arfa¯ Amı¯nı¯, or, more likely, Muhfi ammad Agha, his trustee,163 who seems to have been unusually oppressive. Through his mutasallim he had certain economic monopolies reestablished. He also lashed out against the al-‘Azfi m faction by having one of them, ‘Alı¯ ibn Muhfi ammad Pasha al-‘Azfi m, killed and his holdings confiscated. Another important member of the northern faction executed was Ahfi mad Agha Za‘faranjı¯. He had been head of the imperial qabı¯qu¯l (kfi api kfi ul) troops and commander of the citadel. When in 1786 a particularly incompetent pasha was appointed governor, public rioting against him was supported by

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Za‘faranjı¯. After being forced out of the city, the pasha gathered new military support from the government. He besieged Damascus successfully and turned his wrath particularly against Za‘faranjı¯, who had to leave town.164 The latter eventually linked up with al-Jazza¯r. He returned to the city when al-Jazza¯r was appointed its governor. Apparently al-Jazza¯r later saw in Za‘faranjı¯ a danger as one of the northern aghas or as a popular commander linked to the Mayda¯nı¯s. He had him executed before he left for the pilgrimage in 1791. In addition, al-Jazza¯r, or rather his mutasallim Muhfi ammad Agha, had Damascenes executed by the tens and hundreds.165 Clearly, Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r did not rely on coopting certain factions of the city in order to control it, and he established no common commercial interests with the Mayda¯nı¯s. He relied on force and terror. In 1794 Ahfi mad Agha, the trustee of al-Sina¯niyya, one of the major Mayda¯nı¯ mosques, offered al-Jazza¯r sufficient money for the job of mutasallim. Muhfi ammad Agha was deposed166 and the new mutasallim used his time, while al-Jazza¯r was on pilgrimage, for an all-out attack on the Jewish financial interests in Damascus. This action certainly does not point to shared interests of Jewish finances and Mayda¯nı¯ commerce via Acre. Ahfi mad Agha seems to have been aware that he did not act in the interest of al-Jazza¯r, because he fled Damascus shortly before al-Jazza¯r returned from the pilgrimage. During his last appointment as governor of Damascus, al-Jazza¯r’s relations to the Mayda¯n remained as unstable as ever. During the interregnum, while al-Jazza¯r was busy fighting the French, a certain Abu¯ H fi amza, together with the scrap-metal dealer Muhfi ammad ‘Aqı¯l from the Mayda¯n, had more or less run things in Damascus. When ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha al-‘Azfi m was made governor of Damascus for the second time in 1799, he had Abu¯ H fi amza killed, but apparently did not dare to touch Muhfi ammad ‘Aqı¯l. Caught up in his rivalry with the al-‘Azfi ms, al-Jazza¯r soon prepared the next round, having ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha al-‘Azfi m dismissed. Among other things he corresponded with Muhfi ammad ‘Aqı¯l, sent 2,000 troops, and had him take steps in Damascus before al-Jazza¯r was officially declared governor. He asked him to arrest the qa¯dfi¯ı ‘Abd al-Rahfi ma¯n Afandı¯ Mura¯dı¯ and kill him. How delicate such a matter was is evident from the fact that al-Jazza¯r did not sign the order, and Muhfi ammad ‘Aqı¯l only pretended to execute the order and in fact hid the qa¯dfi¯ı in the dungeons of the citadel. It was his bad luck that ‘Abd alRahfi ma¯n died nevertheless. When the Ottoman government reprimanded alJazza¯r for having killed a religious dignitary, al-Jazza¯r pretended to be outraged and hauled Muhfi ammad ‘Aqı¯l to Acre. He had him executed, though not before having found out from Muhfi ammad ‘Aqı¯l, under torture, where

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he hid his money.167 This certainly was not an act to endear him to the Mayda¯nı¯s. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r had no power base in Damascus. He was hostile to the aghas of the north and their allies the ‘Azfi m, but he had never struck an alliance with the Mayda¯nı¯s either, basically because his economic interests contradicted those of the Mayda¯nı¯ merchants. In the end he ruled through oppression, sheer force, and occasional short-lived alliances of convenience. During his last appointment as governor, which lasted only a few months until his death, he entrusted the control of Damascus to units commanded by Tfi aha¯ al-Kurdı¯, whose position would today be called chief of internal security. The latter, together with other fellow Kurds, had distinguished himself in Acre as chief jailer and overseer of tortures. The moment the news reached Damascus that al-Jazza¯r had died, the populace went after the Kurd troops with a vengeance and lynched them.168 Tfi aha¯ himself was killed in Acre. What benefits accrued to al-Jazza¯r from being governor of a city whose populace was rebellious and whose elites were not inclined to collaborate, and where the fiscal burdens, especially the expenditures for the pilgrimage, were considerable—all making a net profit for him unlikely?169 We know that al-Jazza¯r spent great sums in Istanbul to obtain this appointment, just as he had to finance a permanent lobby in Istanbul to have his annual appointment as governor of Sidon renewed. The governorship of Damascus was one of the most prestigious because it included the command of the annual pilgrimage to Mecca. The pilgrimage was politically a double-edged sword. To carry it out successfully promised prestige and influence in Istanbul. After all, the Ottoman government itself drew its legitimacy partially from its ability to provide for the believers the conditions to fulfill their religious duties, among them the pilgrimage to Mecca. At the end of the eighteenth century this ability to safeguard and carry out the annual pilgrimage was put very much into question. In the eastern parts of the Arab peninsula a new puritanic Islamic sect had developed, commonly called, after the name of its founder, the Wahhabiyya. It combined its Islamic puritanism with political ambitions. Preventing the pilgrimage caravan from access to the holy places in Mecca and Medina meant hitting the Ottoman Empire where it hurt most. Having the financial and military capability to command the pilgrimage caravan several times and bring it back safely made al-Jazza¯r, under the circumstances of the period, almost irreplaceable in the eyes of Istanbul. This was precisely his aim. But the annual absence of the governor for four months on the pilgrimage was also the time when all the forces of political opposition could

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plot to have him removed, as al-Jazza¯r found out at the end of his first year as governor of Damascus. Many of the executions he had carried out in Damascus during his second term were related to his attempt to prevent any possible opposition during his absence on the pilgrimage. Another advantage of his governorship of Damascus was that he could deal with his archrivals, the ‘Azfi m clan. But since they also enjoyed the backing of Istanbul, precisely as a counterweight to al-Jazza¯r’s power, he never was able to eliminate them completely. The governorship of Damascus also included legitimate control over the southern parts of Palestine, a right al-Jazza¯r certainly tried to exercise. Here too his success was more than questionable. In 1785, when making “the rounds” in southern Palestine for the collection of taxes, he reduced all resistance by military force and appointed his own Mamluk mutasallim in Jerusalem. But then and later his hold over the region remained tentative. In particular, al-Jazza¯r’s attitude toward Jaffa was curious. Jaffa had been occupied by the forces of H fi asan Kfi apu¯da¯n Pasha during his campaign against Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar. Presumably afterwards a mutasallim, answerable directly to the Ottoman government, was installed, though traditionally Jaffa had been under the control of Nablus, which belonged to Damascus. Ahfi mad Pasha alJazza¯r seems never to have challenged this arrangement. This is curious because al-Jazza¯r himself had experienced in recent warfare the importance of fortifications and he had witnessed the strategic value of Jaffa as the rampart against invasions from Egypt. When he was appointed governor of Damascus for the second time, in the fall of 1790, it so happened that the crisis with the French merchants also came to a head. He expelled them from Acre, and they found refuge in Jaffa and Ramla, which apparently were beyond his reach. Even shortly before the French invasion of Palestine a report in Arabic and French asserts that the government (hfi uku¯ma) of alJazza¯r begins in Caesarea and that the coast from there to the Carmel Mountain was only during al-Jazza¯r’s rule attached to the province of Sidon, having belonged before that to Damascus.170 The importance of Jaffa had apparently dawned upon al-Jazza¯r only on the eve of the French invasion, when he hurriedly had its fortifications repaired and its garrison reinforced. After the defeat of the French and the return of the Ottoman land army from Egypt, the Ottoman grand vezier and commander of the army, Yu¯suf Zfi iya¯ Pasha, installed Abu¯ Maraq171 in Jaffa as governor of the southern Palestinian districts, in an obvious attempt to limit al-Jazza¯r’s power. Ahfi mad Pasha alJazza¯r immediately besieged Jaffa172 in order to dislodge Abu¯ Maraq from there. He was quite prepared to provoke the extreme displeasure of the

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Ottoman government, which at one point declared him a rebel against the sultan. Jaffa’s strategic importance for the realm of Acre had been driven home to al-Jazza¯r, and he was not going to lose control over it again. In addition, Abu¯ Maraq, a local from the Hebron region, had allied himself with the Jarra¯rs in Nablus, thus recreating the traditional Nablus-Jaffa axis, possibly with the backing of Damascus and indirectly with that of Istanbul. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r’s heroic defense of Acre against the French made him most famous. As we have seen, he was praised as the defender of Islam. His personal courage, his skills as a military commander, and his stamina are testified to by many, including French officers.173 Al-Jazza¯r’s status rose in the eyes of the Ottoman government. But that was a dubious distinction, because any local governor gaining too much power was a potential danger to Istanbul. Very soon he was declared a rebel, only to be reinstated and even made once more governor of Damascus. The results of the French siege of Acre were actually minimal: al-Jazza¯r’s power and relationship with Istanbul remained unchanged; the financial pressure on the population and their economic misery became, if possible, even greater; over the next thirty years the governors would spend enormous sums on the fortification of Acre; and Jaffa would be permanently attached to the governorship of Sidon. For the five years of his second term as governor of Damascus al-Jazza¯r had fought a continuous war against Nablus; more precisely, he was able to establish an alliance with the Tfi u¯qa¯n clan and even appoint in 1794 Ahfi mad Bey Tfi u¯qa¯n as mutasallim in Nablus. But the al-Jarra¯r clan, in alliance with the al-Nimr clan, offered resistance. Fortified in Sfi a¯nu¯r at the northern access to Nablus, the al-Jarra¯rs withstood lengthy sieges by al-Jazza¯r’s troops. The losses before Sfi a¯nu¯r were heavy, and al-Jazza¯r repeatedly had to face up to the limits of his military capacities, since troops tied down before Sfi a¯nu¯r were desperately needed elsewhere. In the end he was unable, though governor of Sidon and of Damascus, to subdue Nablus. In late 1803, after being appointed governor of Damascus for the last time, he immediately turned against Sfi a¯nu¯r and besieged it again. But while he had been able to conquer Jaffa, after several months’ siege in early 1803, he could never dislodge the Jarra¯rs from Sfi a¯nu¯r.174 What remains remarkable is that Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r, regardless of his volatile temper, hunger for power, and political ambitions, always played within the rules of the “Ottoman game.” Though unruly, he ultimately accepted the authority of Istanbul and derived his own legitimacy from the Ottoman state and its sultan. Each time he was dismissed from his position as governor of Damascus he left in good order and without any resistance. In

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June 1789 a Russian emissary came to Acre in order to “sonder si l’on pouvait se flatter de de´tacher ce Pacha du joug de la Porte pour causer une diversion. Dge´zzar ne voulut ni le voir ni l’entendre.”175* Even when his own aims were diametrically opposed to the interests of the government in Istanbul he would, at least in appearance, comply with orders, though he may well have been promoting his own interests subversively. He was familiar with the rules of the game, and rather than initiate an open rebellion he preferred to lobby in Istanbul, distribute his money astutely, and bide his time until the next opportunity. His obedience, though, had its limits. When the grand vezier Yu¯suf Pasha, on his way back from Egypt, installed Abu¯ Maraq in Jaffa in an open attempt to limit his power, al-Jazza¯r did not hesitate to go to war against the governor installed by the Ottoman government. A firma¯n by the government declaring him an enemy of the sultan and God and making him an outlaw did not impress him.176 The government lacked the means to enforce its decisions, and al-Jazza¯r certainly had no thought of giving up Acre and his position as governor of Sidon. Rather, he continued his war against Abu¯ Maraq until he had ousted him from Jaffa. At the same time he activated his lobby in Istanbul, provided large sums of money, and, after having created facts on the ground, swayed the government in his favor. He was so successful with this two-pronged policy that once more he was made governor of Sidon and Damascus. To this evidence of his ultimate political goals—holding on to Acre at any price and maintaining good relations with Istanbul as much as possible— other examples could be added: during the whole period of the French invasion of Egypt and Palestine he did not once leave Acre to fight the French in Egypt as the grand vezier had requested. In 1780, when the government in Istanbul equipped a large fleet while the governor of Damascus was simultaneously raising an army, al-Jazza¯r suspected that he was the real target. Quite willing to offer open resistance against the Ottoman government, he began intense preparations to withstand a possible siege of Acre.177 According to the French consul, al-Jazza¯r was prepared to hold on to Acre in open rebellion even before he was appointed governor of Sidon for the first time.178 Likewise, al-Jazza¯r rejected all attempts to lure him out of his lair. When he was asked by the Ottoman government in 1784 to send troops to Egypt, he, according to his own statement, stimulated dissent among the Druze to demonstrate the necessity of keeping his troops in Acre. He used the same stratagem in May 1789.179 Throughout his political career Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r considered Acre his power base, the center of his activities. It was his permanent goal to

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strengthen and secure this base. From here he tried to subdue neighboring areas, whether for economic or strategic reasons or both. This brought him into almost permanent conflict with the Druze region, protracted warfare with Nablus, and—linked to Nablus and the French invasion—efforts to assert control over Jaffa. As attractive as the governorship of Damascus was, it remained a means to these goals. Giving it up was feasible, surrendering Acre was unthinkable. It is this difference that describes fairly precisely the extent of al-Jazza¯r’s loyalty to the Ottoman government.180

SULAYMA¯N PASHA AND HIS SUCCESSOR: BRIEF RESURGENCE AND COMPLETE DECLINE, 1805–1831 At the decisive moment Sulayma¯n Pasha was absent from Acre. In place of the sick al-Jazza¯r, he had been leading the pilgrimage caravan to Mecca. He was on the way back when al-Jazza¯r died. The Ottoman government had tried to preempt any power struggle by appointing, secretly, the governor of Aleppo also governor of Sidon and Damascus a month before alJazza¯r actually died. But a certain Isma¯‘ı¯l Pasha, having only recently joined al-Jazza¯r’s army as a commander but already sacked and jailed in Acre, was the man on the spot. Released from jail by some troops he assumed command in Acre181 and tried to assert his authority. People such as Amı¯r Bashı¯r were far too cautious to recognize such authority. Hearing of the appointment of the governor of Aleppo and that an Ottoman fleet was sailing for Acre, Isma¯‘ı¯l began to prepare the defense of the city. In response, the Ottoman government in June 1804 declared him a rebel to be fought.182 In the meantime Sulayma¯n Pasha had returned to Damascus from the pilgrimage, and, jointly with the governor of Aleppo (and now also Damascus and Sidon), he marched on Acre. A siege of four months yielded no results, and the new governor of Damascus came under time pressure to prepare for the next pilgrimage caravan, which was to leave Damascus in January 1805 and had to be preceded by the governor’s round through the districts, asserting his authority and collecting the taxes that paid for the pilgrimage. Sulayma¯n Pasha continued the siege of Acre, while the government rewarded him with the governorship of Sidon—reason enough to defeat Isma¯‘ı¯l Pasha. The decisive battle was fought near Shfa¯ ‘Amr when Isma¯‘ı¯l’s troops attempted a sortie from Acre. Sulayma¯n Pasha was probably in his late fifties when he took power in Acre.183 Originally from the Caucasus, probably Georgia, he had traveled far

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and experienced more than his share of crises and turns of fate. He had already spent some twenty to twenty-five years in Acre and its realm as military commander, as mutasallim of Sidon, and as commander of the pilgrimage. Though not a local himself, he had acquired an intimate knowledge of local politics. His early policy statements revealed a sense of moderation and deliberation which contrasted strongly with al-Jazza¯r’s policies. Perhaps the new policy reflected only a realistic awareness of the state of the realm. The reduction of export trade at the time of increased building activities by al-Jazza¯r, the devastating period of the French siege of Acre, endless wars with the Druze, and the permanent squeezing of the population for taxes had left an exhausted and depopulated realm. For the establishment of firm political relations with his neighbors Sulayma¯n Pasha would rely much more on diplomacy than on military strength. His army was usually only half the size of that of al-Jazza¯r, if that much. It was this spirit, which contrasted so sharply with al-Jazza¯r’s, that provided Sulayma¯n Pasha with the ¯ dil, “the Just.” sobriquet al-‘A But before he could pursue policies of diplomacy and moderation one further battle had to be won: the battle for Jaffa. After al-Jazza¯r had fought bitterly and against the explicit order of the Ottoman government to dislodge Muhfi ammad Abu¯ Maraq, the latter had used the upheavals after the death of al-Jazza¯r to return and to ingratiate himself with Isma¯‘ı¯l Pasha, who promptly made him commander of Jaffa again. This time, however, the Ottoman government did not back him. The French sources assert that he was financed by the British.184 When Abu¯ Maraq openly defied Ottoman orders to march against the Wahhabis, Sulayma¯n Pasha was ordered to do battle with him. It must have suited Sulayma¯n Pasha’s own interests to extend the influence of the realm of Acre to Jaffa: recent history had demonstrated Jaffa’s strategic importance. Though the siege was long, its successful conclusion in the first half of 1806 raised Sulayma¯n Pasha’s standing in Istanbul as somebody who could get things done in Syria. Subsequently the government invested him with the control over the sancakfi s of Gaza, Jaffa, and Jerusalem, a special waqf of the sultan.185 This extended the realm of Acre legally to all of southwest Palestine. Nablus, though denied access to Jaffa, was noticeably missing from this realm. The chance to assert his influence over Jerusalem came soon, when local unrest could not be handled by the mutasallim appointed by Damascus. Troops sent by Sulayma¯n Pasha established order, and their commander, Muhfi ammad Agha Abu¯ Dharı¯‘a, was appointed temporary mutasallim. Sulayma¯n Pasha was not yet willing to challenge the authority of the governor of Damascus for that appointment.186

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Sulayma¯n Pasha’s policies toward his northern neighbors were diametrically opposed to those of his predecessor. Where Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r had chosen confrontation and military strength to pulverize any Metuali resistance and to assert his direct control over them, Sulayma¯n Pasha relied on negotiations and agreements, and was willing to concede internal autonomy. Where al-Jazza¯r had used any intrigue to play one Druze faction against the other—an easy game since there were willing players—Sulayma¯n Pasha relied from the beginning on a firm alliance with Amı¯r Bashı¯r.187 ¯ mil region, Seeing the destruction and the depopulation of the Jabal ‘A Sulayma¯n Pasha sought to reassure the Metuali population and to attract and pacify the shaykhs who had fled. He offered them villages and tax-exempted lands in the region of Shu¯mar on condition that they would settle there and cultivate the land. He offered guarantees of security and internal autonomy, naming Fa¯ris Nasfi¯ıf as the head of all the shaykhs. In return the legal land tax—and only that—was to be paid, and tribal levies were to be supplied whenever the government needed them. The shaykhs also pledged not to interfere in any form or way in the affairs of the rest of the Metuali region, Bila¯d Bisha¯ra. Sulayma¯n Pasha hoped to co-opt the antagonistic exiled shaykhs of the Metualis by settling them and giving them secure incomes. He was aware that the government in Acre had too often double-crossed the Metualis, and that they would not trust his offer. He therefore asked Amı¯r Bashı¯r to mediate and convince the shaykhs of the seriousness of the offer. Amı¯r Bashı¯r gladly obliged, seeing for himself a chance to ingratiate himself even more with Sulayma¯n Pasha. Finally, a general meeting was called in Acre at which Fa¯ris Nasfi¯ıf, other Metuali shaykhs, Sulayma¯n Pasha, Raghı¯b Efendi (sent by the Ottoman government to make a record of the estate of al-Jazza¯r), H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı, ‘Alı¯ Agha Khazinda¯r, and H fi ana¯’ al-‘Awra, as well as the muftı¯ of Acre, the qa¯dfi¯ı, and a representative of Amı¯r Bashı¯r, took part. In sessions over several days an agreement was worked out and eventually confirmed by the Ottoman government.188 After some initial difficulties this agreement lasted for the length of Sulayma¯n Pasha’s rule. It seems that from the outset Sulayma¯n Pasha had a good working relationship with Amı¯r Bashı¯r. Immediately upon becoming governor of Sidon he confirmed Bashı¯r as amir of Mount Lebanon. Bashı¯r cooperated willingly, trying to enhance his standing with Sulayma¯n Pasha and to make himself the only conduit for all dealings with the Druze and Mount Lebanon. Sulayma¯n Pasha rewarded Bashı¯r’s loyalty by in 1810 appointing him amir of Mount Lebanon for life.189 By far the most important regional relations of Acre were still those with

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Damascus. Since the time of Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar these had been hostile more often than not. Acre’s power challenged Damascus control over southern Palestine, in particular over Nablus, Jerusalem, and the port of Jaffa. In the north influence with the Druze and control over the Biqa¯‘a were the flashpoints of conflict. Control over the export of grain from the H fi awra¯n and cotton from the Galilee and the Nablus region was another bone of contention. In the last two generations the balance of power had definitely shifted in favor of Acre and its rulers. The first official recognition of this change was when al-Jazza¯r was appointed governor of Damascus while maintaining his governorship of Acre. But the struggle for regional predominance had by no means been decided, and Sulayma¯n Pasha was almost destined to enter into conflict with Damascus, once he had secured his southern and northern flanks. Though the structural conditions for further conflict existed, it was apparently the struggle between two powerful families of administrators and bankers, the Greek Catholic Bahfi rı¯s and the Jewish Farhfi ¯ıs, that ignited the fight. The Bahfi rı¯s were originally from Homs. The poet Mikha¯’ı¯l al-Bahfi rı¯ had been educated in Acre under Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar and was employed by the latter’s vezier, the Greek Catholic Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh. Later he worked for Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r but fled to Beirut after having been jailed and mutilated. His sons Jirma¯nu¯s, ‘Abbu¯d, and H fi ana¯’ excelled as administrators and secretaries. Jirma¯nu¯s was initially employed by Sulayma¯n Pasha, while his two brothers began to make their careers in Damascus under ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha al-‘Azfi m, governor from 1805 to 1807. During his rule ‘Abbu¯d became the close confidant of Kanj Yu¯suf Pasha, who succeeded ‘Abdalla¯h in 1807. Under Kanj Yu¯suf Pasha the Bahfi rı¯ brothers rose to the highest positions. H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı, in the meantime, had succeeded in expelling Jirma¯nu¯s from Acre. But the Farhfi ¯ıs in Damascus were seriously worried that the intimate relationship between the Bahfi rı¯ brothers and Kanj Yu¯suf Pasha would cost them their own positions as chief bankers and men of finance. Attempts to discredit ‘Abbu¯d al-Bahfi rı¯ with Kanj Yu¯suf Pasha backfired. The Farhfi ¯ıs and the Bahfi rı¯s began now to draw their respective masters into their fight. The opportunity to raise the mutual animosity of the two governors to the level of open hostility offered itself over the eternal question of the borders between the two provinces of Damascus and Sidon; in this case ownership of a few villages situated between Nablus (Damascus) and Nazareth (Sidon) was at stake. An arbiter was sent from Istanbul to gather evidence from both sides. The Farhfi ¯ıs had insured through bribes that the testimony of the muftı¯ and the qa¯dfi¯ı of Damascus would be in favor of Sulayma¯n Pasha’s claim. The result of this arbitration,

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combined with a timely dispatch from Acre of two shiploads of grain to a starving Istanbul—most likely the idea of H fi aim—strengthened Sulayma¯n Pasha’s position in Istanbul considerably. In the meantime, Kanj Yu¯suf Pasha was as unable to deal with the Wahhabi threat as the preceding governors of Damascus. He tried to compensate for his failure to defeat the Wahhabis by directing Muslim sentiments in Damascus against the Christians and the Jews. The pilgrimage had been suspended for several years, and in 1809 the Wahhabis actually approached Damascus itself. Thereupon the Ottoman government had Kanj Yu¯suf Pasha removed from the governorship and made Sulayma¯n Pasha governor of Damascus in addition to his position in Sidon.190 In close collaboration with Amı¯r Bashı¯r, Sulayma¯n Pasha took Damascus after Kanj Yu¯suf Pasha had fled to Egypt with his Bahfi rı¯ secretaries. Sulayma¯n Pasha proceeded to appoint and confirm local mutasallims. The list expresses well the extent of Sulayma¯n Pasha’s power.191 He made appointments from Homs to Jerusalem and Tripoli.192 The importance of Tripoli had recently declined, and for some time it had not been governed by a governor but only by a mutasallim. The question, however, of whether the governor of Sidon or the governor of Damascus could make that appointment remained open. With both governorships in his hands, Sulayma¯n Pasha ruled virtually all of Bila¯d al-Sha¯m with the exception of Aleppo in the north. Some of the appointments reflected an acknowledgment of local powers such as the amirship of Bashı¯r, or the appointment of a member of the allimportant Tfi u¯qa¯n clan as mutasallim in Nablus and probably also the appointment of Musfifitafa¯ Barbar, who was a local man from the lower classes of Tripoli. But a great number of positions were also filled by Mamluks, most of whom had already served under Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r. Sulayma¯n Pasha’s governorship of Damascus lasted exactly two years.193 But he held on to the region of Tripoli and Latakia, which was officially attached to the province of Sidon.194 Twice more the province of Damascus came under his control, though only in the form of a trusteeship for the appointed governor, who was kept from reaching Damascus for other reasons. In early 1816 Sulayma¯n Pasha was called upon to act as governor when the last one had died suddenly and the newly appointed one, ‘Alı¯ Pasha, had not yet arrived. This temporary appointment lasted not even a year, and the position was given in late 1816 to Sfi a¯lihfi Pasha. Once again, the newly appointed governor could not come immediately, and Sulayma¯n Pasha was made his representative.195 Each time it was the critical phase before the pilgrimage began during which the tax moneys had to be collected from the sancakfi s, especially Nablus, to pay for the expenditures of the pilgrimage

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caravan. On other occasions the governor of Damascus asked him explicitly for armed support. In each case this helped Sulayma¯n Pasha to strengthen his control or influence over the southern regions of Palestine. Mount Nablus remained an especially thorny problem. The factionalization of politics in Nablus pitted clans against each other in continuously changing alliances. The most important clans throughout the period were the Tfi u¯qa¯ns, al-Jarra¯rs, and al-Nimrs. This situation was encouraged and stimulated by outside powers, such as the governors of Damascus and Sidon, and it also gave occasion for outside interference. But even when Sidon and Damascus were united in the hands of one governor, he could only interfere and meddle in the affairs of Nablus. He could create a balance of power within Nablus by supporting one clan or the other, and thus prevent Nablus from becoming a united powerful political entity. But he could never—even militarily—subdue Nablus and exercise direct control. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r had tried this and spent many months besieging Sfi a¯nu¯r, the fortress of the alJarra¯r clan. But he had been no more successful with this than with his attempt to impose his will forcibly on all of Mount Lebanon. As in most instances, Sulayma¯n Pasha took a somewhat different approach to relations with his neighbors. He never attempted to use military force to impose his will on Nablus—even when he was governor of both provinces. But he continued al-Jazza¯r’s policy of support for the Tfi u¯qa¯n clan. The alliance between Sulayma¯n Pasha and the Tfi u¯qa¯ns was confirmed in 1807, when the British began to threaten Sulayma¯n Pasha. The British expeditionary corps in Egypt had already lost its ally Abu¯ Maraq, and was about to be completely defeated by Muhfi ammad ‘Alı¯, yet the British threatened to devastate the coast of Syria “if Sulayma¯n Pasha did not grant free access to English traders.”196 The threat never materialized, but the Ottoman government had perceived the Tfi u¯qa¯ns as the natural allies of Sulayma¯n Pasha. The rise of the Tfi u¯qa¯ns in Nablus led to an alliance between the al-Nimr and the al-Jarra¯r clans. In 1811 wheat prices had risen so high that peasants could not afford their own product and fled to Nablus and/or attacked the granaries of the Tfi u¯qa¯ns in their villages. The Tfi u¯qa¯ns were convinced the unrest was the result of incitement by the al-Nimr clan. They asked Sulayma¯n Pasha, who at that time was also governor of Damascus, for support. He backed the Tfi u¯qa¯ns fully and ordered the removal of all peasants from Nablus. What is not mentioned in the documents of the time or in al-‘Abba¯sı¯’s study is the underlying reason for the high prices of wheat which caused the peasant rebellion. It was the very monopoly policy of Sulayma¯n Pasha and his highly profitable exports to England during the time of the Continental System that

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emptied the whole region of affordable grain. If the peasants attacked the full granaries of the Tfi u¯qa¯ns and merchant caravans it is because the Tfi u¯qa¯ns were business partners of Sulayma¯n Pasha and profited, if indirectly, from the export business in Acre.197 Eventually the Tfi u¯qa¯ns felt strong enough to attempt the physical removal of the al-Nimr clan from Nablus. With this step, however, they had crossed a threshold of tolerance, and all the clans in Nablus united to fight the Tfi u¯qa¯ns. The event is referred to as the Great Rebellion, al-thawra al-kubra, which began in 1817. In fact it was a nasty civil war, each clan having its own fortified residences—comparable to the family towers in Florence—within and without the city of Nablus, controlling different quarters and city gates and stretches of the hinterland. A chaotic stalemate ensued. Al-‘Abba¯sı¯ would have us believe that the alliance with the Tfi u¯qa¯ns remained the dominant strategy of Sulayma¯n Pasha.198 The contemporary observer Ibra¯hı¯m al-‘Awra points out that Sulayma¯n Pasha actually began to lean toward the ‘Abd alHa¯dı¯ and the al-Jarra¯r clans, while his katkhuda¯ ‘Alı¯ Pasha leaned more toward the Tfi u¯qa¯n clan.199 This was most likely a deliberate policy in Acre, since only a balance of power or, more correctly, a balance of impotence in Nablus assured Acre’s influence there. The outbreak of civil war did not move Sulayma¯n Pasha to interfere militarily or exclusively on the side of the Tfi u¯qa¯n; rather, he did what best suited his temperament: he began negotiations. For this purpose he invited representatives of all clans to Acre for a conference. They were received with great hospitality and all signs of respect. They were provided with all creature comforts possible. But it also was made clear to them that they were not going to leave Acre before they had come to an agreement and a conclusion of their strife. After a speech of rebuke and a sumptuous dinner the participants retired to their quarters. For the following ten days they met with each other, with Sulayma¯n Pasha alone, or in groups. He addressed them repeatedly, carefully reducing tension among them and establishing himself as the honest broker. It nevertheless took two weeks of cajoling and discreet threats before all were willing to compromise and accept Sulayma¯n Pasha’s arrangement. The Tfi u¯qa¯ns were forced to pay a considerable amount as blood money to several clans who had lost members in the fights. But Mu¯sa¯ Tfi u¯qa¯n remained mutasallim of Nablus. The agreement’s major shortcoming was that the al-Nimr clan had no part in it. Sulayma¯n Pasha addressed this problem by asking the muftı¯ of Nablus in July 1818 to negotiate between the al-Nimr and the Tfi u¯qa¯n clan.200 For the time being peace was being restored. It reflects Sulayma¯n Pasha’s authority in the region that, though he was

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not governor of Damascus at that time, almost all the parties responded to his invitation201 and he was able to impose terms on them. Ibra¯hı¯m al-‘Awra, a contemporary, himself commented on this phenomenon and indicated some important reasons for this situation: the geographic proximity of Acre to the region; the preoccupation of the governor of Damascus with the preparation of the pilgrimage and his four-month absence from the city while accompanying it; and the frequent replacement of the governor of Damascus, often every year, which made a thorough knowledge of the area and its politics as impossible as any long-term planning. At the same time, Sulayma¯n Pasha ruled Sidon as a permanent malika¯na granted to him for his lifetime, something even al-Jazza¯r had never obtained; Acre was an impregnable fortress and could not be defeated.202 Al-‘Awra leaves out the fact that Sulayma¯n Pasha’s defeat of Abu¯ Maraq had brought the sancakfi s of Jaffa and Gaza under his control and with that the trade of Nablus.203 In fact, he does not mention at all—and that is quite typical for his whole work—the economic policy of Sulayma¯n Pasha that made Acre the only export port along the whole Syrian coast and provided him with considerable income for several years when grain exports to England paid huge profits, not to mention the monopoly policy concerning less important items, such as cotton, olive oil, and tobacco from the north. As we shall see, the most powerful man in Acre would become—with the death of ‘Alı¯ Pasha in 1814, the expulsion of Abu¯ Nabu¯t from Jaffa, and the death of Sulayma¯n Pasha in August 1819—H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı. Brought to Acre initially by al-Jazza¯r as his counselor for financial and administrative affairs, H fi aim rose, under Sulayma¯n Pasha, to control the administration, enjoy influential contacts in Istanbul, and dispose of considerable personal wealth to back up his power. But being a dhimmı¯, a non-Muslim minority member, he was also extremely vulnerable in his position in spite of—or, more correctly, just because of—his wealth and power. His power derived from the fact of his being employed by Sulayma¯n Pasha, but even so it made him enemies. It was quite inconceivable in the tradition of Islamic societies that he should exercise power in his own name. For this reason, he applied all his energies and considerable wealth in Istanbul to have his prote´ge´ ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha appointed as governor of Sidon after the death of Sulayma¯n Pasha. He was convinced that this youth of eighteen years, who already owed him a lot, would be malleable in his hands and provide the legitimacy for H fi aim’s own power. ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha was the son of ‘Alı¯ Pasha, the katkhuda¯ of Sulayma¯n

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Pasha. ‘Alı¯ Pasha died in 1814 of overexertion soon after he had purchased fi aim to take care two Georgian beauties.204 On his deathbed he had begged H of his son ‘Abdalla¯h. H fi aim was delighted to promote the boy against people with a more serious claim to power. Apparently Sulayma¯n Pasha had the same idea. Tired of having a powerful rival with his own claim to power, he quickly appointed the thirteen-year-old ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha as his katkhuda¯. The appointment came as a surprise to all except the mother of ‘Abdalla¯h, who had lobbied heavily with Sulayma¯n Pasha and H fi aim for her son. Lest anybody, including ‘Abdalla¯h himself, should be unaware of the change in the balance of power, Sulayma¯n laid down the rules: in contrast to his father ‘Abdallah was not to have his own ottoman in the Bu¯sta¯, the government building, but was to sit with all the other employees and administrators. He was not to drink his coffee together with Sulayma¯n Pasha, and nobody was fi aim Farhfi ¯ı never perceived ‘Abdalla¯h as a threat to his to kiss his hand.205 H own plans. Rather, he was willing to help him to remove more serious contenders to the successorship of Sulayma¯n Pasha, such as Abu¯ Nabu¯t, the mutasallim of Jaffa, or Musfifitafa¯, the nephew of Sulayma¯n Pasha. The contemporary observer Ibra¯hı¯m al-‘Awra considered H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı as second only to Sulayma¯n Pasha in actual power, if not formal ranking. He called him sharı¯k fi aim Farhfi ¯ı was actually more al-hfi ukm, partner in power,206 suggesting that H powerful than ‘Alı¯ Pasha Khazinda¯r, and describing how H fi aim would speak in the name of Sulayma¯n Pasha without the latter even knowing about it: “H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı held all the reins of government and did as he pleased. Whoever claims that the rule of a Jew over Muslims and Christians, old and young, close and far, in complete liberty is an easy matter and does not weigh heavily on nature—has lost touch with reason.”207 A few words of explanation are needed here concerning Ibra¯hı¯m al-‘Awra’s own position in the matter. That he was a close and good observer of the affairs of government in Acre is beyond doubt. His father, though clearly subordinate to H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı in fact, held formally a comparable position as chief Arabic secretary, and a certain amount of competitiveness can be sensed in Ibra¯hı¯m’s narrative. Ibra¯hı¯m’s family was Greek Catholic and keenly aware of the fight the Jews in Damascus—and especially the Farhfi ¯ı family—were carrying on with the most important Greek Catholic family there, the Bahfi rı¯s, with the Jews apparently winning the fight.208 Ibra¯hı¯m al-‘Awra’s father, H fi ana¯’, had been Arabic secretary during this time, and the sectarian loyalties were understood by all. However, apparently H fi aim and H fi ana¯’ never had a serious open clash, and on the whole H fi aim preferred as employees Greek Catholics to Greek Orthodox, never trusting

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the latter after his encounter with the Sakru¯j brothers.209 Ibra¯hı¯m al-‘Awra was aware of all these ambivalent relations and appears particularly critical of H fi aim. In addition it is worth considering that he wrote his biography of Sulayma¯n Pasha between 1848 and 1853, some years after the famous bloodlibel case of Damascus210 and the arrival of European anti-Semitism in the Middle East. Occasionally one can discover a whiff of it in Ibra¯hı¯m’s comments about H fi aim.211 Though Ibra¯hı¯m al-‘Awra may have been biased, his opinion that H fi aim was the most powerful man in Acre is again and again confirmed by the French consular sources: “Soleiman Pacha ou pour mieux dire, le Juif qui gouverne en son nom. . . . Son Kiaia et ce Juif qui ne pensent qu’a` amasser auront un jour le sort qu’ils me´ritent et le faible Soleiman sera la victime de leur avidite´.”* According to the French a dervish coming from Istanbul publicly blamed the pasha for being governor in name only and letting the Jew manage him.212 Another consular report, this one from Tripoli, put it as follows: “Un Juif qui sous le titre de sarraf du miri est le ve´ritable commandant de toute la coˆte de Syrie.”213* The reason for the French dislike for H fi aim is quite obvious; their commercial interests ran counter to “l’inte´reˆt du Juif du Pacha qui ne veut pas la liberte´ du commerce; il a des compagnons qui savent se joindre a` lui pour de´pouiller l’Europe´en.”214* Sulayma¯n Pasha was said to hold the cow of Syria by its horns while the Jew was milking it. In fact the accusations of the French against H fi aim and his despotism sound very much like those they had issued fifty years earlier against Ibra¯hı¯m alSfi abba¯gh. For the French, despotism meant the economic monopoly policy concerning exports. There is no denying that the Farhfi ¯ıs in Syria and in particular H fi aim in Acre were powerful and wealthy. The wealth of the Farhfi ¯ıs was reflected in the luxurious furnishing of their residence in Damascus. Yet its external appearance betrayed at the same time the precariousness of this wealth and power.215 In Acre H fi aim lived more modestly, residing in an apartment in the Kha¯n alFaranj. But his power was enormous, and Sulayma¯n Pasha’s trust in him was apparently boundless. H fi aim felt so secure in his position that he did not hesitate to deal harshly with Muslim officials. When the multazim of ‘Atlit, Mas‘u¯d al-Ma¯dfi ¯ı, tried to meddle in the financial affairs of the province, H fi aim vilified him publicly: Every single one of you remains a donkey, who does not know anything about this world. When God, the Highest, bestowed his grace upon you, and removed the horseshoes from your feet, you believed you had become something important. You sat in the meetings of veziers and rulers and

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interfered in affairs that were none of your business. You opened your big mouth [baju¯q] without discerning what came out of it. . . . Lest it would be said that H fi aim put his intelligence on the same level as the limited intelligence of so and so I would show you how I would deal with you, impudent blabbermouth and intriguer. . . . Get up, bother your peasants with your insights and join their company.216

Though the patron of Mas‘u¯d al-Ma¯dfi ¯ı was none other than ‘Alı¯ Pasha Khazinda¯r, al-Ma¯dfi ¯ı found it advisable to retire to ‘Atlit and keep a low profile. In another incident, H fi aim insulted a powerful Mamluk in front of Sulayma¯n Pasha’s dı¯wa¯n by reminding him of a large debt he owed the government.217 H fi aim also was instrumental in removing Abu¯ Nabu¯t from Jaffa. Abu¯ Nabu¯t had become the center of the Mamluk party, which hoped to reestablish its rule after the death of Sulayma¯n Pasha and stood in the way of the ambitions of the young ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha and those of H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı.218 But even after the removal of Abu¯ Nabu¯t, H fi aim could not be sure that he had contained the Mamluk party, especially since Abu¯ Nabu¯t had gone to Istanbul, where he could intrigue further against H fi aim. While Sulayma¯n Pasha was on his deathbed in the summer of 1819, H fi aim began to make every effort to have his prote´ge´ ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha, now eighteen, appointed as governor. With the help of Hesekiel al-Baghda¯dı¯, who was a bursar at the Sublime Porte, and with the payment of some 11 million piasters fi aim had his prote´ge´ appointed. It to the influential people in Istanbul,219 H had taken H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı five months of intense negotiation before the Ottoman government conceded the position of governor of Sidon to ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha. On January 27, 1820, the long-expected firma¯n finally came. It was probably the peak of H fi aim’s power. But this success contained the seeds of his destruction. Barely half a year later ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha had H fi aim strangled and his corpse flung into the water: “They tied a heavy stone around his neck and dumped him. The fish ate him.”220 How was such an ignominious end to such an illustrious career possible? European accounts usually speak of the fickleness and the ingratitude of the young ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha. They are correct, in that whatever power H fi aim enjoyed depended upon the protection of his master. Once this protection was withdrawn H fi aim was not even left with the means to insure his own survival. The Arab chroniclers provide us with more specific reasons for the change of heart of ‘Abdalla¯h. During his long stay in power H fi aim had created some mortal enemies with his high-handed manner, such as, for instance, Mas‘u¯d al-Ma¯dfi ¯ı or Abu¯ Nabu¯t. Most of the Mamluks had considered the latter their leader and had therefore become the enemies

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and challengers of ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha and, of course, of his patron H fi aim. But it was not they who brought about the murder of H fi aim. Rather, it was a new group that slowly had taken shape during Sulayma¯n Pasha’s rule and which was able to gain access to ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha. Mas‘u¯d al-Ma¯dfi ¯ı in particular succeeded in influencing the young governor. He appealed to his ego, describing Sulayma¯n Pasha as a simpleton who had been duped by H fi aim—something ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha should avoid. More compelling was the argument that, since H fi aim had been able to obtain ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha’s appointment from Istanbul, he could also, as long as he was alive, obtain his dismissal. Much of the argument was couched in religious terms; that it was against the Islamic law to have a Jew manage the treasury of the Muslims; that God had already pointed out the wickedness of the Jews in the revelation, and so on.221 Shortly after the death of H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı, the French consul in Acre, Ruffin, wrote a lengthy report on the affair. He pointed to the enormous increase in H fi aim’s power as the basic cause for the assassination. He provided, as almost all later reports do in one version or the other, the anecdote of tensions between H fi aim and ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha which always culminates in the same question: who was the pasha, H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı or ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha? No doubt, after the appointment of ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha as governor the struggle for actual authority in Acre began. In this struggle, as Ruffin points out, ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha was backed especially by three men: the newly appointed qa¯dfi¯ı of Acre, Muhfi ammad Efendi Abu¯ ‘l-Huda¯;222 the personal ima¯m of ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha, Shaykh Musfifitafa¯; and Shaykh Mas‘u¯d al-Ma¯dfi ¯ı.223 They seem to have worked rather dexterously on the religious feelings that ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha himself harbored. Ruffin labeled them as Musulmans fanatiques who expressed their disgust at the fact that a Jew ruled Syria, that H fi aim was in fact the pasha of Acre, and that “Les voeux et les prie`res des derviches et des faqhirs, n’avaientils donc contribue´ qu’a` une autorite´ sans bornes accorde´e a` un juif que le commun des musulmans respectaient plus que le gouverneur lui-meˆme?”* A first expression of these sentiments was that the Christians, and soon after the Jews, were ordered to wear specific clothes, in modest and dull colors. H fi aim was offered an exemption from this ruling but insisted on wearing the same outfit as his coreligionists. Then his functions and his authority were progressively reduced. Recognizing the writing on the wall, he requested to be relieved from his functions in order to retire to Damascus. This must have appeared too dangerous to ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha, who insisted that H fi aim stay in Acre. It came down to a final acerbic argument between the two, according to the information of Ruffin, in which H fi aim pointed out that ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha owed him the governorship of the province. This was the final straw.

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On the same night of August 8, 1820, ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha gave orders to have H fi aim strangled.224 The contest between the two men over the actual power in Acre and its realm, rather than the issue of religious propriety, must have been the dominant theme of the whole affair. Surprisingly enough, a few days after the death of H fi aim ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha offered the position to his brother, Mu¯sa¯. Later another dhimmı¯, Yu¯suf Qarda¯hfi ¯ı, scribe of long standing in the administration, was appointed to the position,225 which only confirms that a struggle for power, not a sense of religious impropriety, brought about H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı’s assassination. ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha had been appointed governor of Sidon in all the ways that Sulayma¯n Pasha had been, including jurisdiction over the provinces of Sidon and Tripoli, Arab Latakia, and the liwa¯s Gaza, Ramla, and Jaffa. He also received the rank of wazı¯r. ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha was a young man, rash and inexperienced. He reverted to policies vis-a`-vis Amı¯r Bashı¯r which Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r had applied and with which he believed he could extort much larger sums than had his predecessor. When Amı¯r Bashı¯r proved unwilling or unable to pay these sums, ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha deposed him and appointed somebody else as amı¯r. But the new appointees were even less able to raise money in Mount Lebanon and eventually ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha reconciled with Amı¯r Bashı¯r and reappointed him as amir. The relations remained correct enough throughout the period but less reliable than those between Amı¯r Bashı¯r and Sulayma¯n Pasha had been. At decisive moments, for instance when ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha was besieged in Acre, Amı¯r Bashı¯r excused himself and did not come to his support. In a move that was meant to win the support of the Metualis, ‘Abdalla¯h ¯ mil to them. With the same move he freed Pasha returned control of Jabal ‘A himself of the Mamluks of Sulayma¯n Pasha who had been lording over the region. Relations with Damascus were tense from the beginning. But the first serious, one might say existential, crisis for Acre was precipitated by ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha’s murder of H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı in 1820. It triggered intensive activities within the influential Farhfi ¯ı family in Damascus as well as in Istanbul seeking revenge for this murder. Clashes over territorial claims in the Biqa¯‘a Valley and the Golan became frequent in early 1822. The appointment of the mutasallim of Nablus became another issue. As we have seen, these quarrels were part of the old pattern of hostilities between the two provinces, and they were now instrumentalized by the Farhfi ¯ı brothers for their own purposes. There is no doubt that they actively interfered in politics.226

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At the end of May 1822 the forces of Damascus suffered a major defeat on the Golan Heights thanks to an alliance between ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha and Amı¯r Bashı¯r. At the same time the Farhfi ¯ıs had mobilized support in Istanbul for Darwı¯sh Pasha, the governor of Damascus. In June orders were issued to Musfitafa¯ Pasha, governor of Aleppo, to support Darwı¯sh Pasha militarily. A firma¯nfi announced the deposal of ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha, declaring him a rebel and appointing Darwı¯sh Pasha to the former’s position, in addition to the governorship of Damascus.227 Amı¯r Bashı¯r, faced with a choice of either being disloyal to his immediate superior ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha or defying the Ottoman government, decided to remove himself from the scene and travel to Egypt. Without Druze opposition the united armies of the two governors could march on Acre. By the end of July 1822 the siege of Acre began. It lasted six months, but with no results to show for it. Salumu¯n Farhfi ¯ı participated financially and personally in the campaign of Darwı¯sh Pasha against Acre. But when it appeared that Darwı¯sh was unable to take Acre, and when Muhfi ammad ‘Alı¯ of Egypt, at the same time lending his support to the sultan in the war in the Morea, interfered on behalf of ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha, the Ottoman government shifted its position. Darwı¯sh was dismissed as governor of Damascus and Sidon. After a short transition period during which Musfifitafa¯ Pasha was appointed, ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha was forgiven and reinstated as governor of Sidon, though without control over the southern Palestinian liwa¯s. They were returned to him only a year later. Musfifitafa¯ Pasha, like ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha, put the blame for the whole campaign against Acre squarely on the shoulders of the Farhfi ¯ıs. Apparently under the impact of these accusations—Musfifitafa¯ Pasha produced documents proving his point—Salumu¯n Farhfi ¯ı fell ill and died in the camp before Acre.228 The assassination of H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı had been motivated by the strictly personal fears and ambitions of ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha. The military actions against ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha and the siege of Acre had been instigated by the Farhfi ¯ıs exerting their influence in Istanbul and trying to take their revenge. Calling off the siege, however, involved a quite different set of political measures. The shift of support from the Farhfi ¯ıs to ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha by the Ottoman government reflected a basic shift in policy toward the Jewish financiers, as Okawara has shown.229 In preparation for the weakening and eventual liquidation of the Janissaries, Sultan Malmu¯d II eliminated elements that provided them with support. In Istanbul the contact man of the Farhfi is had been the banker Hesekiel alBaghda¯dı¯, possibly a relative of the Farhfi ¯ıs by marriage. He was a descendant of the famous Jewish banking family Gabbay, the later Sassouns, in Baghdad.

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In Istanbul he became the banker of Halet Efendi, ‘a¯lim and conservative politician in Istanbul. In 1810 he had broken the power of the Mamluk rulers in Baghdad and submitted the province to direct Ottoman control. Perhaps at this time the contact between Hesekiel and Halet had been established. Halet became a fierce opponent of all reform attempts in Istanbul and especially a defender of the Janissaries. Through him Hesekiel had close business ties with the Janissaries. He had engineered the appointment of ‘Abdalla¯h as governor of Sidon on behalf of H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı and also the campaign against him after the death of H fi aim. Eventually, in early 1823, Halet Efendi’s reformist opponents had him dismissed, exiled, and executed.230 His Jewish banker Hesekiel was killed in May 1823 as was his brother Ezra in Baghdad. During the next year the property of twenty-three Jewish banking families was confiscated, including that of the Farhfi ¯ıs. It was part of the policy of Mahfi mu¯d II to destroy the conservative opposition and its financial supporters—as the Jews were perceived—before liquidating the Janissaries themselves.231 With the termination of the siege, the position of Acre had apparently been restored and with it the power of its governor. In reality, however, the whole campaign had ushered in a new balance of power in Syria. For the first time in three generations a governor of Damascus seriously, albeit not successfully, challenged the ruler of Acre and its realm. The governor of Damascus was also appointed governor of Sidon. This had happened heretofore only the other way around. The French consul, who had resided in Cyprus during the siege of Acre, returned as consul of Acre, Sidon, and Beirut but chose to reside in Sidon, and was already eyeing Beirut as the optimal place fi aim and Salumu¯n for the French consul’s residence.232 With the death of H the rapid decline not only of the Farhfi ¯ı family but of the Jewish community in Syria began, while the Christian communities were able to enhance their power and standing. Within the next ten years—culminating in the Damascus blood libel of 1840—the Jews were to lose even the semblance of the power they had held in Syria for almost a century.233 The Druze under Amı¯r Bashı¯r had become a force in their own right. Finally, the role in Syria of the new Egypt under Muhfi ammad ‘Alı¯ announced itself. His support of the sultan gave him a say in the affairs of Syria. Thus he could impose the restoration of ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha to his position—although Muhfi ammad ‘Alı¯ was soon to annex all of Syria to his own realm. It was only the extreme instability of politics in Damascus during the next few years—ten different governors between 1820 and 1831—and the preoccupation of the Ottoman government with internal reforms and the Greek war

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that disguised the weakness of ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha’s regime in Acre, though economically and militarily Acre had already become only a shadow of its former self. In 1826 the French consul reported that “Abd-Allah Pacha gouverne comme si la politique lui conseillait de s’entourer de Ruines, afin que tout le pays sous sa domination pre´sente l’aspect de la solitude et de la pauvrete´.”* As revenues declined, ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha extended monopolistic control even to imports to Acre. The result was that commerce moved away from Acre even faster. Cotton from Nablus, for instance, was traded via Damascus to Beirut for export.234 The economic basis of Acre was vanishing and, while Beirut flourished, ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha was reduced to haggling with his own chief adviser-cum-manager235 over the jewelry of the latter’s wife and daughters.236 Yet once more ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha was called upon by the Ottoman government to exercise authority when he was appointed in October 1830 over the sancakfi s of Jerusalem, Hebron, and Nablus, to collect the taxes for the pilgrimage—the Damascene governor being unable to do so.237 A second consideration of the government was that an Egyptian invasion was imminent and Acre the only formidable obstacle to it in Syria. The appointment led ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha into a direct confrontation with the al-Jarra¯r clan, who were unwilling to recognize his authority. Yet another siege of Sfi a¯nu¯r was organized, which lasted for three months. ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha was convinced that by conquering Sfi a¯nu¯r his name would be placed “a` coˆte´ de ceux des plus grands capitaines du monde.”238* Eventually he succeeded where everybody else had failed: in early March 1831 the defenders of Sfi a¯nu¯r surrendered and the fortress was leveled to the ground.239 The irony of this victory is obvious: within the year ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha was to change roles and become the defender of Acre in the last great siege of that city. For half a year, from November 1831 to May 1832, the Egyptian troops besieged the by now formidable fortifications of Acre and eventually destroyed the city completely with their artillery. During the last months ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha lived underground with his family. When he finally emerged and surrendered, the history of Acre and its realm as a semi-autonomous region within the Ottoman Empire had come to an end.

chapter 3

TRADE: LOCAL RULERS AND THE WORLD ECONOMY

Now that we have considered the analysis of the political history of Acre and its realm during the period, we shall turn to the economic underpinnings of these developments. It is my contention that only the unique economic opportunities and the specific ways in which they were used made the political developments possible. The focus will be on the development of Acre’s export trade during the eighteenth century, which means mainly the new development of the export of raw cotton to France. Several basic questions may be raised here: How was the cotton trade with Europe handled? Who was engaged in it? Who profited from it? Who controlled it? During the eighteenth century the shipping and the marketing in Europe of Acre’s exports was almost exclusively in the hands of French merchants from Marseilles, while the responsibility for cotton cultivation and its delivery to the coast was usually in the hands of village shaykhs, local traders, tax collectors, and, eventually, agents of the ruler in Acre. How did the French merchants deal with the local conditions of economy and politics, and how did the local elites cope with the new—but very rewarding—demands of overseas markets? By concentrating on the relationship between the French merchants and their local counterparts I shall highlight the mechanisms that led to the success of this commercial relationship and that eventually caused its collapse. The trade between Europe and Muslim states had been regulated since the Middle Ages by what came be known as Capitulations, treaties between Muslim rulers and their European counterparts, that granted residence, independent jurisdiction, and trade privileges to European merchants in Mus-

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lim cities. In the Ottoman centuries, these rights and privileges waxed, even as the power of the Ottoman Empire waned. The first comprehensive Capitulations with France were negotiated in the year 1569, when Istanbul was seeking the support of France against Venice. They were renegotiated at the time of Colbert in 1673 and expanded again in 1740, when France sided with the Ottomans in the Peace of Belgrade. The right to protect the Catholics in the empire and the reduction of the tax on trade to 3 percent were among the more important privileges the French gained. When Colbert reorganized French trade at the end of the seventeenth century, Marseilles’ Mediterranean trade monopoly was confirmed. French merchants were organized in each of the various Mediterranean ports as a nation under a consul or vice-consul. A nation’s members consisted of ne´gociants, merchants, and commis, acting as their agents. In addition a physician, a watchmaker, a baker, and other French residents might be members of the nation. The consul, who most of the time was also a ne´gociant, was responsible for the nation. He dealt with the local authorities, protecting the merchants from greedy governors, extortion, and other calamities. He reported to Marseilles and to Paris, sending annual statistics, providing evaluations of the merchants, and giving reports on political affairs. He watched over the behavior of the members of his nation, reprimanding them when necessary and, in severe cases, having them shipped back to France. He also guided the nation, calling assemblies where all important issues were discussed and where the annual issue of fixing prices for buying and selling merchandise was settled.1 It is striking how well this organization of the French merchants as a guild or corporation, as a nation in the commercial centers, fit into the overall organization of the Ottoman Empire. The parallel to the millet system is remarkable. The French lived more or less together and were recognizable by their different dress. The merchants were treated, like the dhimmı¯s, as a group. If the local governor, for instance, wanted to raise—legally or not— money from the merchants, he would always address himself to the whole nation. As a group they were held responsible—rightly or wrongly—for such issues as the Maltese pirates who preyed on the coast of Syria. Negotiations with the local authorities were carried out in the name of the nation by the consul, just as the local leader of a millet would deal with the local authorities. If a serious crisis developed, the consul could always turn to Istanbul, where the French ambassador (like the patriarch of a millet) would try to convince the central government to take measures; usually a tedious, expensive, and time-consuming process.

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Though the millet and the nation shared a similar style of social interaction and sense of themselves, and were seen as similar institutions by others, the parallel should not be carried too far. The essential difference between millet and nation was that the French were not subjects of the Ottoman sultan and had in the last analysis the ever-increasing strength of the French state to protect them and their privileges. But the power of France in the Ottoman Empire was, as yet, still limited. It could be exercised mainly through diplomatic access in Istanbul. Whether pressure applied in the capital would ameliorate the conditions of the French nation in any given locality of the Ottoman Empire depended very much on the ability of the central government to assert its authority and power in its own provinces, a capability which in the eighteenth century, and especially in the regions we are concerned with, could no longer be taken for granted. Though the French occasionally sent navy ships into the region, usually combating corsairs, they were not yet willing—at least until the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt—to interfere militarily in local politics. Active gunboat politics was to make its appearance only in the following century as part of European imperialism. French merchants could, indeed, be harassed considerably by local authorities and even be expelled, as happened with the French in Acre in 1790. At the beginning of the eighteenth century there were three French nations in Syria, each headed by a consul: in Aleppo, Tripoli, and Sidon. In addition, there were individual merchants in Ramla, Jaffa, and Acre. These French merchants, appointed by the chamber of commerce in Marseilles as the only representatives of French trade in the Levant, saw their role as limited to selling imported French merchandise for cash and buying local products for export at prices set by themselves; hoping to avoid at the same time any entanglement in local politics, finances, and business. The reality, alas, was quite different and ever-changing, and therein lies a story. At the end of the seventeenth century Acre had little to offer merchants. Travelers described it as a spacious ruin with a few miserable cottages in its middle. Its three hundred or so inhabitants eked out a living as fishermen. The only structures that stood out from the city’s rubble were a mosque and a large khan. The latter was the center of all business activity, and the French merchants—in 1691 there were thirteen of them—used it as their base.2 Acre lay unprotected on the tip of the bay. Nomads from land and from sea harassed it frequently. In May 1697, Bedouins moved from the interior right up to Acre, where they took all available cattle and exacted monetary contributions.3 Even neighborhood villages were deserted because of Bedouin

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incursions. Further east, in Nablus, peasants and Bedouins fought regularly.4 Travelers from Acre to Jaffa were well advised to go by boat in order to avoid marauding Bedouins. But the sea was not safe either. Maltese corsairs raided the coast. Neither the governor of Acre nor the population could curb the activities of the corsairs, who lay in ambush at the entrance to ports and cruised in the bay of Acre trying to capture small ships.5 Contrary to French-Maltese agreements, the corsairs even raided in the vicinity of ports where French merchants lived. In 1702 they actually plundered a ship that had beached in the bay of Acre to avoid them. Corsairs used the hamlet of Haifa across the bay. It was beyond the reach of the authorities. The corsairs could provision themselves there, shelter their boats from storms, and sell their booty. In fact, Haifa was called “la petite Malte” because most of the inhabitants were refugees from the law.6 In 1725, the danger from pirates was still so grave that the Ottoman government ordered a fortification built in Haifa to protect the bay from raids. A similar plan for Acre was never implemented.7 Acre also had its attractions. The surrounding plain was the city’s wealth: “Il se fait a` la plaine de St. Jean d’Acre deux a` trois milles balles de coton en laine qui sont les plus beaux et les plus estime´s du Levant. Les Anglais et Hollandais qui font la plus grande tenue les ache`tent des marchands franc¸ais qui y resident et qui en font les Amas.”8* When this condition coincided with a rapidly increasing demand for cotton in France, trade in Acre promised to be highly profitable and well worth all difficulties. Evidence of a change in mercantile attitudes concerning the cotton trade can be seen in a letter written from Acre on February 3, 1691, to the chamber of commerce in Marseilles. A certain merchant, one Reucrend, had set out to travel as far as Safed and to negotiate directly with its mutasallim, Ahfi mad Pasha, for cotton. To assure himself a large quantity of cotton, Reucrend had offered Ahfi mad Pasha the exorbitant price of 43 piasters per quintal and promised him additional presents. The outrage of the other French merchants is understandable, especially if one considers that heretofore they had paid only 33 piasters per quintal. The merchants, claiming that such prices were ruinous for them, demanded that Reucrend be punished and warned that the producers would begin to hold back their cotton “in the hope of still higher prices.”9 The letter foreshadows two major themes of the cotton trade in Acre during the eighteenth century: the fight against rising prices and the necessity to deal with the local authorities in order to obtain the cotton crop.

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Throughout the century, the merchants tried to control the price paid for cotton. The major instrument for exercising a price monopoly was the re´partition, by which the merchants agreed among themselves on the quantity of cotton they wanted to buy and the price they were willing to pay. They then would buy the determined amount through one agent and partition it later among themselves. In this way they sought to avoid competitive bidding. But the re´partition could not work unless the cotton trade was a French monopoly and the French merchants were willing to exercise price discipline. According to the official analysis in the consular correspondence, it was personal competition—and cupidite´—that raised prices. The link between an increasing demand for cotton and rising prices was, at least officially, not acknowledged. Individual merchants, though, disregarded the discipline of the re´partition and paid higher prices in order to obtain more cotton, knowing very well that rising demand in France made ever greater profits possible. The high quality of the cotton assured top prices for most of the century. The merchants in Acre could make handsome profits, but their situation remained precarious. Internal fights among the French opened the way for other foreigners to come to Acre and to establish themselves, some even with the help of individual French merchants. Thus a certain Dutchman, Mashook, functioning as British vice-consul, gained considerable control over the trade in 1703–1704. He established good relations with several shaykhs who assured him of a steady supply of cotton. With the help of some of the French, Mashook controlled the villages around Safed. He cultivated good relations with the shaykh of Shfa¯ ‘Amr and induced him at one point to withhold the cotton from the French merchants. Finally, the French consul of Sidon tried to reestablish harmony among the merchants in Acre and forbade the French to deal with Mashook.10 Some twenty years later, the presence of another English vice-consul created similar tensions with the French,11 but most European merchants did not seriously challenge the French in Acre. Only their French compatriots could become truly dangerous rivals. One such challenge came from the French consul in Sidon, who tried to assert control over the merchants in Acre. As early as 1697, the French merchants in Acre had written to the French minister pleading to become independent from the French consul in Sidon. The latter’s response was swift and intense: “L’Eschelle d’Acre a este´ toujours attache´e et sujette a` celle de Seide; si on change cet ordre et qu’on la se´pare nous tomberons dans un de´sordre monstrueux.”12* Such disputes between the French in Sidon and Acre were to consume much energy and ink for the next hundred years. The French nation

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of Acre was trying to obtain an autonomy commensurate with the increasing importance of its trade, while the French consul in Sidon refused to surrender his authority over the merchants in Acre. Re´partition and price monopoly could not eliminate the pressure on cotton prices exerted by the high demand in Marseilles. Ships from Marseilles waited off the coast of Acre before the cotton crop was harvested. In 1699, the merchants in Acre complained that French captains even sent their own agents into the villages to buy the cotton crop directly, and, worse, ships’ captains were willing to buy “a` tout prix.”13 A potentially dangerous practice developed as French merchants responded to external challenges and to internal competition within the French nation. Traditionally, peasants had brought their merchandise to town and sold it there in the market. In Sidon the peasants came to the market twice a week with spun cotton. In peaceful times Bedouins came to Acre to sell charcoal. Likewise, raw cotton was delivered to the city market. But the pressing demand for cotton drove the French captains to the villages. As the case of Reucrend demonstrated, some merchants had begun dealing directly with village officials as early as 1699. They offered peasants the cash they needed to pay their taxes; particularly when taxes were due before the cotton had been harvested. Pressured by tax collectors, the farmers were willing to accept a lower price for their anticipated harvest. It was but a small step for farmers and merchants to move from these practices to a regular forward market in cotton.14 Twenty years later a forward market seemed well established. French merchants made advance purchases from village shaykhs of cotton, olive oil, and grain. The Muslim merchants of Nablus engaged in similar practices. In this fashion merchants guaranteed crop deliveries, but they also risked their money. When the cotton crop was bad the merchants lost money.15 By 1720 the shaykhs of all the villages around Acre were indebted to the French. Their indebtedness made French creditors dependent on them in return.16 A complex pattern of financial relations developed. In 1729, the Ottoman government issued a firma¯n, declaring illegal the French practice of buying directly from the peasants. According to the decree, all cotton had to be sold publicly in the bazaar so the government could collect its taxes.17 Such declarations, however, had little effect. In June 1730, Shaykh Sa‘d al-Zayda¯nı¯—brother of the future ruler of Acre, Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar—was thrown into jail by the pasha of Sidon. A group of French merchants posted his bail of 22,000 piasters. He was released and reinstated as tax-farmer of Safed. In return for the 22,000 piasters advanced

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by the French merchants, Sa‘d al-Zayda¯nı¯ mortgaged the next cotton crop of the villages of Shfa¯ ‘Amr, Thiri, and Abbellin. This deal inspired lengthy discussions in the French consular correspondence. Apparently the merchants involved were from Sidon, and the French merchants in Acre were outraged because they felt their access to the cotton harvest had been cut off. The consul in Sidon denied the existence of the whole deal. But apparently buying “on the cob,” or advancing money against future harvests, was by 1730 a very common practice. The French government was unhappy with the situation. It saw quite clearly the potential dangers if French merchants started interfering in local politics. In principle, the French were not to deal with indigenous intermediaries; they were to buy straight from the primary producer and pay only for cotton actually delivered. The French merchants in Acre, however, pointed out the advantages of local alliances. In times of great unrest in the country, they had to rely on shaykhs and other political figures to insure delivery of the cotton harvest to them.18 All well-intentioned rules,19 attempts at re´partition, and the warning not to get involved in local politics, etc. did nothing to improve the commercial discipline among the French. As long as profits on cotton were 150 percent and on wheat 100 percent,20 the temptation to insure individual access to the largest quantity possible remained high. With such enormous profits one could risk some bad loans to peasants or shaykhs. Securing sufficient supply was the overriding concern.21 Rather than abstaining from local politics, the French merchants became more deeply involved. When it turned out that the cotton harvest of 1730 was poor and Sa‘d al-Zayda¯nı¯ could not deliver enough cotton to pay back the loan of 22,000 piasters, the French merchants of Sidon traveled to Tiberias to collect from him personally. In Tiberias they had to deal for the first time with Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar al-Zayda¯nı¯, his brother. He offered to pay them back the 22,000 piaster in silver at 12 percent interest. However, money was not what the merchants wanted. They insisted on cotton, and if cotton was not forthcoming, they threatened to have Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar held for ransom in Sidon.22 Soon, however, it would be Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar’s turn to threaten them. During this period of prosperity, when cotton prices rose to 60 piasters per quintal,23 the French nation in Acre grew. By 1730 there were fourteen merchants, two commissioners, one painter and paperhanger, one translator from Marseilles, two bakers, one cook, one shoemaker, and eight other foreign merchants under French protection. The nation also included thirty members of religious orders distributed among convents in Acre, Nazareth,

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and the Carmel. There were also at least nine wives and eleven children.24 Many lived in the khan, others had rented houses. Cotton had been cultivated at least since the seventeenth century in the ¯ mir and possibly other areas of the Galilee. The production was Marj ibn ‘A brought to Nablus, from where it was traded to Damascus or via Jaffa to Egypt. The possibility of high profits in the cotton trade began to attract the attention of local authorities. In 1731 the local pasha of Sidon and the customs inspectors of Acre and Sidon tried their hand at the trade. Some local shaykhs even tried to sell on their own directly to Europe—at prices the French consul found exage´re´. This first attempt of local interest groups to export on their own failed.25 Within a few years, however, control over the cotton market on the coast was contested by Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar al-Zayda¯nı¯. He was to contest the control of the French merchants on the coast, on the one hand, and the dominance of the trade route Damascus-Nablus-Jaffa-Egypt, on the other. By linking the Galilee with the coast and establishing his political control over both, he constructed a new and profitable commercial connection. The Zayda¯nı¯ family lived in the eastern Galilee area and made Tiberias their base. Originally the family had commercial contacts with Damascus. Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar, himself a merchant, went frequently with caravans to Damascus. His first marriage was with a girl from a H fi usaynı¯ Sharı¯f family in Damascus.26 But the Zayda¯nı¯ family had also begun to extend its contacts to the west. An uncle of Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar settled in Da¯mu¯n, close to Acre, and became the multazim there.27 Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar systematically expanded his power base in the Galilee. After securing his control over the region of Safed and Tiberias his ambition led him irrevocably to a clash with the people of Nablus, who saw their control over cotton-growing regions in the Galilee and cotton trade diminished. By gaining control over Nazareth he was able to secure his southern flank against Nablus, and to finally move in on Acre. Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar had already established personal contacts in Acre. A certain Yu¯suf al-Qassı¯s, a Greek Catholic merchant, became his agent in all commercial affairs and later, when Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar moved to Acre, his confidant and vezier.28 Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar also found supporters among the French. Whenever he came to Acre Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar stayed in the house of Joseph Blanc, who was considered by the rest of the French community to be Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar’s collaborator. The French consul accused Blanc of having encouraged Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar to impose all sorts of avanias on the French so that he, Blanc, could recoup the loans he had advanced to Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar.29 After having secured his rule over the hinterland of Acre and having

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established his commercial base in the eastern Galilee, Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar attempted to gain control over Acre itself and to integrate his commercial activities, as it were, downstream. Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar asserted his economic and political authority in Acre. In September 1746 he had a French merchant arrested; the man was set free only after a ransom of 1,100 piasters had been paid. But this was not a simple case of kidnapping and extortion, as the French sources would have us believe. Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar was clearly setting forth a new policy: the French merchant was punished for having been in the house of a local merchant. Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar was determined to prevent any direct contact between the French and the local population, and to set himself up as the only agent with whom the French were allowed to deal.30 During the next twenty-five years this policy was again and again enforced.31 Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar’s secretary and general agent, Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh, took similar measures to prevent any direct contact between French merchants and local farmers or brokers.32 Seeing the potential profits in the cotton trade, Zfi a¯hir al‘Umar established an effective monopoly over the delivery and sale of this cash crop. In a new configuration of politics and economics this monopoly was complemented by a monopoly of the French merchants on the buying of cotton and its export to the world market. Economic monopolies established and exploited by the political powers were in themselves not a new phenomenon in Muslim states, although they had not been used in the recent past. About the Fatimid period Goitein observed: “First, both as a producer and a consumer the government was the largest customer in the country. Agricultural products were largely bought from or through government agencies. This applied in particular to flax, the main export staple of Egypt in that period.” For the Mamluk period it is stated that the government enforced the purchase of products owned or produced by the government. Merchants were compelled to buy wheat, rice, meat, textiles, etc. at fixed prices.33 In the seventeenth and eighteenth century the Neo-Mamluks in Egypt were satisfied with profiting from trade by imposing custom fees at certain points without, however, possessing most crops or establishing fixed prices. The policy of establishing a monopoly over a cash crop was to become a permanent feature of successive governments in Acre. The monopoly began with its establishment over the export trade of cotton; later other items were added, most notably grain. But even sesame and olive oils and products such as soap were added. The extent and the permanence of the government monopolies constituted a departure from past patterns of trade and economy. Political power and economic interests were joined in an unprecedented symbiosis. The dominant monopoly policy played, as we will see, a decisive role in the social

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formation of Acre and its realm as well as its political strength, but also in its eventual economic failure and political downfall. In January 1748 the French consul, reporting to Paris in exasperation, described Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar as “Chek Daher, cet homme si redoutable a` tous ceux qui ont le malheur de vivre sous sa domination.”34* Incidents between the French and the inhabitants of Acre increased during that year. Perhaps this was coincidental, but the result was that tensions rose and the French had to rely more and more on Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar for protection and for settling disputes with the local population. A year later the French were very pessimistic: “The trade in this port city of Acre is lost . . . if its form is not changed promptly, in view of the bad faith of the shaykh [Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar] and the people in the countryside who under the disingenuous pretense of bad harvests have refused for about the last four years to pay their debts.” The French turned to their ambassador in Istanbul to demand that the Ottoman government cease tolerating a tyrant who had his own troops and possessed two castles, one in Dayr al-H fi ana¯, and another one in Tiberias.35 Once more the French tried to organize themselves into a united monopoly of buyers. A memoir drafted by the consul stated: (a) that the French merchants should not advance any more money to Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar, to local merchants, or to peasants; (b) that merchandise should be paid for only upon delivery; and (c) that before each cotton harvest, the French nation of Acre should assemble to decide a fair price for cotton and stick to it. This, it was assumed, would keep price hikes at bay.36 But the plan was not implemented, and in the spring of 1750 it was observed “que le commerce de cette ´echelle est totalement de´sole´.”37* Although Acre’s cotton trade was brisk otherwise, the French were not making any money. At the end of the year, the French merchants in Acre reported to the consul of Sidon that they could not possibly buy cotton at the price of 69 piasters decided upon by the French in Sidon. Even the customs official in Acre had begun to buy from the peasants at 75 and 80 piasters. Neither could the merchants exert pressure on rich village shaykhs who had paid their land tax, the mı¯rı¯. They were under no pressure to sell cotton at low prices. In addition, boats arrived daily from Cyprus, and merchants all along the coast were moving to buy cotton at any cost. The French in Acre were in no position to dictate prices.38 The consul in Sidon was outraged that the French merchants in Acre paid up to 80 piasters for cotton “sans une permission expre`s de la nation de Seyde.”39* He demanded their instant “soumission.” But for some time already the true center of commerce of the region had been Acre, and the French

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consul in Sidon fought a losing battle to keep control over the French merchants there. He tried to blame the rising price of cotton on their disobedience and lack of discipline. At the same time he had to admit that profits on cotton during the past two years had been 45 and 50 percent respectively and that the merchant houses of Marseilles had sent considerable sums in cash to Syria to buy cotton, without setting a price limit. The prices of raw cotton had roughly doubled since the beginning of the century, but the value of cotton exports to France had increased by a factor of ten.40 The demands of the French textile industry had risen even faster. In 1751 the issue in Acre was not the price, but the availability of supplies.41 Early in the year prices jumped to 100 and then to 110 piasters for the quintal of raw cotton42 because of the merchants’ “besoins qu’ils avaient d’une prodigieuse quantite´ de balles.”43* But Gautier, the French consul in Sidon, insisted on seeing the situation differently. It was the attitude “peu raisonnable” of Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar, the greed of the French merchants in Acre, and their attempt to destroy the nation in Sidon that had driven prices up. In order to force prices down Gautier ordered the French in Acre at the beginning of the new cotton harvest in the fall of 1751 to offer only between 60 and 70 piasters a quintal and to desist otherwise from buying altogether.44 In response Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar forbade the peasants and the brokers from selling any cotton to the French, whether for cash or old debt receipts. Merchandise carried to Acre was confiscated at the gate, and the bazaar merchants in Acre did not even dare to pay their outstanding debts to the French. Until the fall of 1751 the French merchants in Acre had always been able to buy directly from the peasants, but they now observed with anxiety that Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar was beginning to buy up the cotton harvest himself, and they predicted that soon “il nous fera payer au prix qu’il y mettra luy meˆme.”* Zfi a¯hir had become powerful, and the Acre merchants understood quite well that “il n’e´tait plus ce qu’il ´etait il y a dix ans, il donne des loix aujourd’huy.”45* In the end, Gautier had to give in, as Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar insisted on 100 piasters. Gautier still blamed the “personal greed” of the merchants for the high prices, but a compromise was struck to offer Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar 90 piasters, so that cotton could be bought in time for French ships to return to Marseilles with a cargo.46 Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar agreed to the lower price because that fall he was more than usually pressed for money. He was in the process of rebuilding the walls of Acre, symbol and material means of asserting his increasing independence. He insisted on keeping the French out of the direct cotton trade and even confiscated their merchandise. He himself bought cotton from the peasants and the brokers and tried to do business without the French: he sold 150 bales

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of cotton to an English merchant coming from Livorno, shipped 50 bales to Naples, and sold grain to the merchants in Naples who sold it to Venetians. In the eyes of the French he was “un homme qui peut tout ce qu’il veut, qui ne met point de bornes a` sa cupidite´.”47* The arrival in 1752 of M. Verrayon, the new French consul in Sidon, added a new dimension to the ongoing struggle between the French and Zfi a¯hı¯r al‘Umar. Verrayon brought the long-simmering competition between the nation in Acre and the nation in Sidon to boiling point. The French merchants in Acre had already, ten years earlier, protested to the French government that the consul in Sidon was attempting to undermine and even destroy their position in Acre. The nation in Sidon, they said, was trying to reduce the merchants in Acre to agents for itself and was insisting that all cotton was to be bought in its name and shipped via Sidon. The consul sent inspectors, protected by soldiers of the pasha of Sidon, to investigate the merchants in Acre. Verrayon also tried to dictate the price at which the merchants in Acre were to purchase cotton. All this interference was highly detrimental to the French merchants in Acre, who lost business to English and Venetian merchants willing to pay higher prices for cotton.48 Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar’s appearance on the scene had pushed the disputes between the French nations into the background, but Verrayon clearly was bent not only on challenging Zfi a¯hı¯r al‘Umar’s ambitions but also on asserting control over the merchants in Acre. In October 1752 he came to Acre and confronted the French merchants with new regulations obliging them to buy cotton jointly at the fixed rate of 60 piasters per quintal. They could no longer offer cash advances to a seller, and they were obliged to share the cotton they purchased through the mechanism of a re´partition with the merchants in Sidon. To make sure that his orders were obeyed, Verrayon also appointed an inspector from Sidon, charging his expenses to the merchants of Acre. The merchants were outraged, feeling that they had been reduced to mere agents for the merchants in Sidon and that the re´partition was simply a device to let the Sidon merchants gain control over a large part of the raw cotton traded in Acre. Having to pay for the sacks in which the cotton was sent to Sidon added insult to injury. Acre’s merchants were also convinced that at the price of 60 piasters no cotton would be offered to them. Local growers and merchants would go with their merchandise to English, Dutch, or other merchants. Probably informed of these measures by the members of the nation in Acre, Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar reacted violently. He forbade any sales for less than 120 piasters to the French, and swore he would rather burn the whole cotton crop than sell it at 60 piasters a quintal. He objected strenuously to any re´partition,

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i.e., to any price-fixing by the French. Eventually Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar had all the brokers (censaux) who bought the cotton for the French imprisoned. Verrayon threatened that in view of Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar’s lack of cooperation he would have to withdraw all the French merchants from Acre because of insufficient business. He threatened to have the nation expelled by royal order, a threat addressed as much to Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar as to the French merchants. Verrayon argued in his dispatches to Paris that Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar would give in to his demands because only the French had the transport capacities to bring the cotton to the European market and because the pressure of the peasants, brokers, and merchants who could not sell their merchandise would force him to do so. But Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar did not budge. Despite some negotiations the two parties remained in a standoff. Eventually Verrayon was ordered by Zfi a¯hı¯r al‘Umar to leave Acre. Upon Verrayon’s departure Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar released the imprisoned brokers and once again permitted trade with the French in Acre. The French were free to buy at any price and from anybody, as long as they were not arranging a re´partition among themselves. Verrayon tried to fight back from Sidon by forcing all ships with merchandise for the French merchants in Acre to unload in Sidon. If Verrayon succeeded in diverting all shipments to Sidon, Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar would be robbed of his customs revenues from imports, and the nation in Acre would still be dependent on Sidon for its commerce. Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar perceived clearly that this was a fight for power and control and vowed that in his realm the French consul would never be permitted to establish the law. As the merchants in Acre correctly observed, even the pasha of Sidon preferred accommodating Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar to challenging him. “Le Chek est aujourd’huy sur un tel pied qu’Il se persuade que rien ne peut lui nuire. Il gouverne ce pays en souverain quoy qu’il ne soit que fermier du Pacha de Seyde. Nous avons vu ces anne´es dernie`res pour Gouverneurs de Seyde les Vizirs les plus fameux de l’Empire Ottoman auxquels il a fait la loy.”49* The standoff between Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar and the French merchants in Acre, on the one side, and the French consul and the nation in Sidon, on the other, continued throughout 1753. Verrayon tried to be upbeat about it, claiming that raw cotton could be bought in Jaffa and Sidon. In times of warfare between Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar and his sons, producers were particularly loath to bring their product to Acre.50 A British agent bought cotton directly in Acre but had to absorb a loss because cotton from Izmir was selling for less.51 The French cotton exports from the Syrian coast dropped dramatically in 1753.52

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In the following years exports picked up again and prices rose, though neither price nor quantity reached the feverish levels of 1751/52. Quarrels between Acre and Sidon persisted for the next decade. Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar tried to impose an import tax on French merchandise that came from Cyprus. Having already paid the import tax to the Ottoman Empire in Cyprus, French merchants thus would be forced to pay twice. Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar’s intention was, of course, to attract more French maritime traffic directly to Acre and to benefit personally from the import dues.53 At the same time, the French merchants in Acre became increasingly independent from Sidon and shipped cotton, on their own accounts, via Cyprus to Marseilles using—illegally— French merchants’ addresses in Cyprus as the origin of their merchandise. All this inflicted considerable harm on the nation in Sidon.54 Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar also tried to impose a fixed price on cotton thread, one of the main commodities of French trade in Sidon. More importantly perhaps, the unrest and the misrule by the pasha of Sidon caused many spinners to retreat to the mountains and to Beirut. In this port merchants from Istanbul, Izmir, and Damascus had access to spun cotton and were willing to pay higher prices, diminishing further the trade of the nation in Sidon.55 The earthquake of 1759, which destroyed Safed and other places in the Galilee, damaged Sidon to such an extent that the French consul did not believe it would ever recuperate. Acre had been affected badly and, although the subsequent outbreak of the plague temporarily reduced the population of Acre by perhaps a quarter, neither earthquake nor plague weakened Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar’s control over the area56 or diminished Acre’s population in the long run. By 1761 the power of the Ottoman pasha in Sidon was so much reduced that, when asked to help the pasha of Damascus to take control over Haifa in order to counterbalance Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar’s growing might in Acre, he could offer only a handful of soldiers, but could not supply a ship on which to transport them!57 It was only in 1768 that the Ottoman government recognized Zfi a¯hı¯r al‘Umar as “Shaykh of Acre and Commander of Safed, Nazareth, Tiberias and the whole Galilee”—though he was still subject to the pasha of Sidon. Only in 1776 would Acre become the official residence of the pasha of Sidon, and the French would not transfer their consul from Sidon to Acre until 1786.58 Nevertheless, it had been clear since the early 1760s that Acre under Zfi a¯hı¯r al‘Umar had become the political and commercial center of the whole Syrian coast.59 All trade with Europe went through Acre; at issue was only whether the French merchants or the local ruler could exert more control over the direction and the profit of this trade. Acre was to hold this dominant position until the early nineteenth century. As we shall see, it was in the second decade

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of the new century that Beirut began to challenge Acre’s commercial predominance. Challenges to Acre’s role as an important political power base arose repeatedly and from different quarters. Eventually, the Egyptian occupation of Syria in 1831 and the long siege of Acre put an end to its commercial as well as political role. While he was still living in Tiberias, Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar had established commercial ties with a local merchant in Acre, Yu¯suf al-Qassı¯s, an Arab of the Greek Catholic community that had been formed only recently in Syria. When Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar moved to Acre he made al-Qassı¯s his secretary and chief adviser. This administrative and political position did wonders for alQassı¯s’s commercial fortunes.60 He, in fact, amassed such wealth that he no longer felt secure, and tried to smuggle his possessions from Acre to Europe and to flee in 1761 with his family. He was arrested and all his property was confiscated by Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar.61 The French saw “avec peine encore la ruine d’un principal de´biteur de la nation,”62* a clear allusion to the fact that the French were doing a great deal of business with him. Al-Qassı¯s’s ignominious end only accelerated the rise of another Greek Catholic from a merchant family. Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh had been a physician in Acre when Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar made it his residence. The al-Sfi abba¯gh family had moved from Shuwayr to the coast, to Beirut and Sidon. Around 1700 two brothers, H fi abı¯b and ‘Abbu¯d, moved to Acre, and eventually H fi abı¯b went to Damiette for trading purposes, where his son Ibra¯hı¯m was born around 1715. At the age of seven he was sent to the monastery in Shuwayr, where he was educated and eventually trained as a physician. Presumably in the late 1740s he moved to Acre and began to practice medicine. He very quickly established a reputation that bordered on that of a miracle worker. With a deft measure of insight into the human psyche, a familiarity with the human physis, considerable knowledge of medicine, and a sense for the dramatic he almost appeared to make the blind see and to resurrect the dead.63 With his reputation thus established, Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh’s chance for prosperity and power came in 1757, when the personal physician of Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar, a Greek Orthodox by the name of Sulayma¯n Suwwa¯n, was unable to cure Zfi a¯hir of an illness. Ibra¯hı¯m was summoned to Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar by his coreligionist, Yu¯suf al-Qassı¯s. His successful treatment of Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar guaranteed him the position of court physician.64 A year later, he appeared for the first time in the French correspondence, having bought some belongings of the late Pierre Blanc.65 In 1759, merchants in Acre were already referring to al-Sfi abba¯gh as “physician and secretary of the Shaykh” when he interceded with Zfi a¯hı¯r al‘Umar for the French merchants in an embarrassing affair, for which he was

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handsomely repaid by the French.66 Ibra¯hı¯m also strengthened his position among his Greek Catholic coreligionists by financing the construction of a church, St. Andrew’s, in 1760.67 In the following years, Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh’s power and wealth grew to such a point that it was not quite certain any more whether he was Zfi a¯hı¯r al‘Umar’s man or vice versa. Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh wholeheartedly pursued the attempts of his master to establish a monopoly over trade. The French grew increasingly dependent on him and berated him as despote and tyran. In 1767 al-Sfi abba¯gh was still called the “factotum du Chek Daher,” but in the same letter he was described as powerful enough to initiate the banishment of French merchants from Acre; a man who was well informed about the French and who “after controlling all of the trade in Acre, wants also to control that of the French.” He might be able to do so, the consul speculated, because some of the French in Acre were too weak to refuse collaboration, even though such a monopoly would be “contraire au bien ge´ne´ral” [contrary to the general interest].68 Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh was also beginning to trade for his own account, especially with the free port of Livorno. In 1767, he was still willing to pay the 2 percent duty that French captains had to charge for transporting the merchandise of non-French merchants. Two years later, however, he offered to pay only 1 percent for a shipment of 170 bales of cotton and 200 ardab of rice and in fact did not pay at all. The consul confessed his impotence vis-a`-vis Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh, “ce marchand qui tient le gouvernement d’Acre et qui y est le maıˆtre absolu.”69* In the same year, an official came from Istanbul to buy grain for the army. Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh sold him the necessary grain, stored in a warehouse until delivery. At the same time, he told the French not to let the grain be transported on a French ship. The Ottoman official was unable to find transport for the grain. After several weeks, Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh declared that the grain had started to rot, and he had to throw it all into the sea. In fact, he had sold it elsewhere a second time. The French report does not mention to whom it was sold. The reader may suspect that the French themselves were the second buyers, since only they were able to ship the grain.70 In 1772, de Taules, the consul in Sidon, observed about the French: “Les Ne´gociants d’Acre ne sont aujourd’huy que les facteurs ou les preˆteurs nomme´s d’Ibrahim Sebbag, qui s’e´tant empare´ ge´ne´ralement de toutes les branches utiles du commerce, ne leur laisse que la triste satisfaction de s’agiter et de paraıˆtre faire beaucoup d’Affaires, tandis qu’ils ne travaillent que pour luy.”71* At the same time de Taules knew quite well that any threat by Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh to have the French removed altogether from Acre was not very convincing.

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Al-Sfi abba¯gh was dependent on the French for maritime transport and access to the French market.72 As consul in Sidon, de Taules had lost control over the merchants in Acre, hence his tendency to paint a bleak picture: the nation “forme depuis longtemps un corps d’une constitution mixte et presqu’ inde´pendant de l’officier du Roy. Les ne´gociants, re´publicains par rapport a` la France, sont de vrais esclaves envers Daher.”* He went on to describe how Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh took possession of all products, dictated prices, and dealt highhandedly with the French.73 But how complete was al-Sfi abba¯gh’s control over trade and how much were the French in Acre his victims? An incident that occurred in 1771 sheds some light on these questions. A peasant by the name of H fi anna Kara¯mı¯ came from Shfa¯ ‘Amr to Acre during the wheat harvest and approached the French merchant, Bonnet, in order to do business. Bonnet spontaneously refused— probably thinking of Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh’s interdiction on such direct trade. But when his own censal, Niqu¯la¯ al-Zabu¯r, assured him that the peasant was trustworthy, they reached an agreement. Bonnet and al-Zabu¯r went to the warehouse and provided the peasant with a roll of cloth. Within the following weeks, they twice more did business with Kara¯mı¯. The story appears in the correspondence because Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh claimed that the merchandise Bonnet had sold was stolen, and he tried to confiscate Bonnet’s possessions.74 The story illustrates the fact that even in 1772 peasants thought nothing of trying to do business with French merchants and that French merchants still were willing to risk direct deals and still employed censaux whose very task was to buy directly for the French merchants they represented. Ibra¯hı¯m alSfi abba¯gh’s outrage probably had more to do with his inability to control all business dealings than with the presumed theft. The potential of Acre had been first recognized by Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar. By the middle of the eighteenth century he had created a power base for himself, established law and order in the Galilee, and was attracting immigrants and encouraging cotton cultivation. Thus he was able to supply the French merchants coming to the Syrian coast in their search for ever-increasing amounts of cotton at a time when prices were rising. He was also able to establish himself as the sole middleman and to force the French merchants to deal exclusively with him; in other words he was able to create a monopoly over cotton production in the hinterland of Acre and guarantee delivery to Acre. Recurring attempts by the French to deal directly with the peasants were severely punished. The French, however, monopolized transport to and marketing in Europe. Feeble attempts to enter the transportation business and sell directly in Europe failed under Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar just as under all later

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rulers in Acre. At a time of ever-rising cotton prices increasing profits could be made by the French as well as by Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar. He became not only the biggest local merchant but the only one. With the resources at his disposal he strengthened his political might and very soon the cultivation of cotton, its delivery to Acre, its storage and eventual sale to the French became issues of government administration. Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh became Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar’s chief administrator, scribe, and man of complete confidence. Eventually he controlled most matters of state and trade in the realm of his master. He himself became immensely rich, not as a merchant, but as administrator of the cotton monopoly. It seemed that nothing could go wrong. The demand for cotton kept increasing and prices kept rising. The only condition was that Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar remain able to supply the merchants from Marseilles with cotton; in other words he had to be able to guarantee political stability. This turned out to be his Achilles’ heel. As so often in Islamic history, questions of succession brought him and his sons to their downfall. Internal wars between them, as well as Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar’s alliance with ‘Alı¯ Bey al-Kabı¯r from Egypt, and finally the interference of the Ottoman government led to Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar’s violent death and the expulsion of his sons. Cotton production would suffer from this strife, and French merchants began to find increasing supplies of cotton in Izmir and Salonika. No statistical information can be found on the volume of trade from Acre during the 1760s and early 1770s, but the general impression gleaned from the French correspondence is that trade was good until 1772, when the political events in southwest Syria created havoc and wars left the area a shambles. Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar’s intention to assert his power in the region with the help of his Egyptian ally, ‘Alı¯ Bey al-Kabı¯r, came to a violent end, and both he and Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh perished in 1775. The Ottoman admiral, H fi asan Kfi apu¯da¯n Pasha, confiscated the enormous wealth of Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh. After a short interlude, Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r was made governor of Sidon and took up residence in Acre. In contrast to the tenure of other Ottoman governors, al-Jazza¯r remained governor until his death twenty-eight years later. At various times, he also served simultaneously as the governor of Damascus, an indication of how much the center of politics and economics had gravitated toward the coast and Acre. As we have seen, Ahfi mad Pasha, “the Butcher,” had throughout the nineteenth century an extremely bad press in Europe. Early French travelers used him as the outstanding example of Ottoman despotism, and cited him as personifying all that was wrong with the Ottoman Empire. Later, his life and person served to feed the need for

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erotic-exotic sensationalism in European travel literature, and he acquired increasingly monstrous features. The usual argument is that he was so oppressive and exploitative in his greed and irrational in his exercise of power that he killed the goose that laid the golden egg. In the end, he may indeed have done just that, but his economic activities show considerable reason and insight. During the first half of his rule at least, he invested in agriculture and was keenly interested in trade. When the French called him “tyrannique” and “pas raisonnable,” they were really referring to his determination to obtain maximum profits from the trade with the French. Yet in 1790 he banished the French from Acre, and trade with France was never resumed in any significant fashion. When Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r came to power the prospects for the cotton trade were promising. After devastating war years, exports were up again and prices for cotton were good. In 1782 the demand for cotton was so great that French merchants from Aleppo, Cyprus, and Cairo came to buy directly in Palestine, offering up to 168 piasters per quintal. The merchants in Acre were only willing to offer 153. The nation in Acre complained angrily to Marseilles because the merchants considered Palestine their own turf and felt that other French merchants had driven prices up. When al-Jazza¯r slapped a 6 piasters per quintal export tax on the cotton from Acre, the nation protested loudly against the illegality of the measure. But al-Jazza¯r’s tax did not slow down business because French captains were willing to buy directly, and were more interested in full loads than in French control over trade.75 Ahfi mad Pasha alJazza¯r also seemed cooperative. After some pressure, he let the village shaykhs deal again directly with the French and seemed even willing to accept the principle of re´partition. Local shortages developed, because of the strong French demand.76 When al-Jazza¯r raised the export tax to 10 piasters in early 1784, the French seem not to have protested.77 Export trade was monopolized by the French. Only one non-French trader resided in Acre, and he was not perceived as a threat.78 Shipping was almost exclusively in French hands. Of eighteen ships reaching Palestinian ports in the first five months of 1784, only one did not fly the French flag. At the same time, cotton prices dropped by 30 percent because of the enormous quantities that had reached France the year before.79 Still, the mood was upbeat and Renaudot, the French vice-consul in Acre, was full of plans for renovating and expanding the khan of the French, center of their commercial activities in Acre. The new cotton harvest in the fall of 1784 was abundant, and it seemed the government was not going to challenge the re´partition this year.80 The only jarring note was that while the French in Acre stood by their price

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of 120 livres, the French merchants in Aleppo, showing “visiblement une insatiable avidite´,” were buying up cotton from Safed and Nablus via Damascus at a higher rate.81 Renaudot, who seems to have had rather friendly relations with Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r during these years, saw great potential for commerce in Acre. When al-Jazza¯r was appointed governor of Damascus in early 1785, Renaudot suggested to him that he redirect the Nablus cotton exports from Jaffa to Acre—he must have been particularly concerned with any cotton trade via Damascus reaching the French merchants in Aleppo. Renaudot also suggested to al-Jazza¯r that he rebuild the Bridge of Jacob’s Daughters over the Jordan to draw grain exports to Acre.82 The pasha heeded his advice, began to build granaries and to divert the wheat from the H fi awra¯n. This apparently was also the cause of his dismissal as governor of Damascus one year later. The merchants of Damascus had complained to Istanbul about his attempt to establish a monopoly over the grain trade.83 Renaudot noticed the beneficial results for trade of this “pacification” program. But at the end of 1785, he had also to concede that famine, plague, and a very mediocre harvest had reduced business in Acre.84 And then, in 1786, Acre was devastated by the plague: probably a fifth of the population perished. Two more years of drought caused famine and destroyed the cotton crop. In the summer of 1789, al-Jazza¯r’s own Mamluks rebelled against him. He put down the rebellion with utter cruelty and his personality, always somewhat unstable, now acquired symptoms of paranoia. The French remained optimistic, however. It was true that Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r disregarded the Capitulations completely: “le pays m’appartient, dit-il, et je chasserai ceux qui me de´plairont.”* But the French vice-consul argued that it might not be advantageous to insist too much on the Capitulations. In fact, the French were paying considerably lower customs on the export of cotton than the capitulationary agreement demanded.85 Even when disagreement over cotton prices and personal antagonism between Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r and Renaudot were building up to a final crisis, the vice-consul hesitated to leave Acre and Sidon: “Il est pourtant bien cruel d’abandonner deux grands ´etablissements a` la veille d’une re´colte abondante, la premie`re depuis quatre ans et dans un temps ou l’importation donne des be´ne´fices conside´rables.”86* In 1789 the cotton crop was again “abondante” and the peasants were in dire pecuniary straits after several years of bad harvests, drought, and pestilence. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r tried to establish a monopoly over the sale of cotton as he had already done with grain and olive oil. That is to say, he forbade the peasants to sell to anybody but him and tried then to dictate the price for

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exporters. He even prohibited the sale of cotton to the local population for spinning and offered to sell to the French at 120, later 130, piasters per quintal. The French refused to buy, assuming that the abundant crop and the financial needs would make al-Jazza¯r give in.87 The following year the new cotton crop promised to be huge, as did the grain harvest. The warehouses were still filled with the previous year’s crop. Yet al-Jazza¯r was not willing to lower the price; on the contrary, he forbade all trading with the French and prohibited the loading of French ships. Alas, prices in Marseilles had begun to drop for the first time in the century. The French refused to pay rates for cotton in Acre that were higher than those in Marseilles. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r’s stubbornness was aggravated by a personal pique against Renaudot.88 Matters reached a crisis point, and in October 1790 the French were forced to leave Sidon and Acre. Thus the sometimes unstable trade relation, which had been profitable for both, came to an end. Although Acre’s cotton trade with Europe would continue for some time, it was on a much reduced level and in a haphazard fashion until its final demise in 1831. In order to understand this abrupt and unnecessary end to the cotton trade between Acre and Marseilles, it may help to analyze the position of the French merchants in local commerce. Until the 1740s the French were fairly free to roam the coast and the Galilee and to buy cotton directly from the producers. They would bring it to their khan in Acre and ship it from there to France. When Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar moved from the inland to the coast, he was able to reduce the reach of the French, forcing them to stay and deal in Acre. He sought to prohibit any contact between the French merchants and the local population. In this way, he tried to monopolize the trade and put conditions on French operations. Such measures led repeatedly during his rule as well as under that of Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r later to a boycott of the French and a standstill of trade for considerable periods. How efficient the monopoly was is questionable. Throughout the period, we hear of instances of direct dealings between French merchants and villagers, or more often village shaykhs. It appears that at all times the French merchants had censaux responsible for buying for particular merchants; and even during al-Jazza¯r’s time the French offered loans to producers for future cotton crops. This policy transgressed the rules the French themselves had set up, but it had the great advantage of insuring the supply of cotton to merchants. On the other hand, it also meant a continuous involvement in local affairs which made the French vulnerable. Outstanding debts were difficult to collect and could be used as a means to

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pressure the French. There were, however, limits to the pressure that could be exerted. The political limits were the presence of France, always reaffirming its capitulary rights in the Ottoman Empire and demanding that the government in Istanbul extend protection to the French merchants. This protection was usually only as good as the power of the central government in its own provinces. The economic limits of pressure were perhaps more important. For a variety of reasons the option of dealing with other European merchants was never a realistic one for local shaykhs and merchants. The French had pretty much cornered the trade on the Syrian coast since the 1730s. The French merchants had exclusive access to the growing cotton market in France. All French trade with the Mediterranean went through Marseilles, and only the French were permitted to deal there. In addition, shipping was completely dominated by the French. This was not only true for overseas shipping to Marseilles, but also for coastal shipping from Damiette to Jaffa, to Acre, to Cyprus, and even to Istanbul. The coastal trade was dominated by French tramps (cabotage) which usually wintered in Tyre. French traders’ role in local shipping was so dominant that, as we have seen, the governor of Sidon had his own soldiers shipped by French captains and an Istanbul official could find no cargo space to ship grain from Acre to Istanbul when the French refused to offer him any. The few attempts to use local shipping to export to Trieste, Livorno, or Malta foundered and the ships did not return. In the early 1780s the French merchants were very worried that Arab merchants might set up their own agencies in Europe and even Marseilles and trade on their own. To the great relief of the French all such attempts came to naught.89 In sum, we have here a situation of almost perfect mutual dependence. The French depended on the ruler to provide security in the region to make cotton cultivation possible, and to make sure the crop was delivered to Acre. The local trade depended on the French to export and market the cotton. Each needed the other for successful cotton trade. This mutual dependence also suggests why for over fifty years all tensions, boycotts, and threats to leave Acre for good were settled peacefully, and trade always resumed. If such a balanced mutual dependence actually existed, how then do we explain the breakdown of commerce? It has been surmised that al-Jazza¯r suspected the French of supporting the rebellion of his Mamluks and, hence, had them expelled. But the rebellion had occurred a year and a half earlier and al-Jazza¯r had swiftly punished everybody he suspected of participation.90 What triggered al-Jazza¯r’s rage was a firma¯n coming from Istanbul forcing al-

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Jazza¯r to repay the Catholic order for damages caused by him. As Renaudot pointedly remarked, it was the zeal of the religious not the actions of the merchants which threw al-Jazza¯r into a rage91 and led eventually to the expulsion. The underlying cause, however, was the long and bitter dispute over cotton exports and cotton prices which we have discussed earlier. Should we turn to a more essentialist argument about the cultural differences which led eventually to basic misunderstandings? The correspondance consulaire is filled with bitter complaints about Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar, Ibra¯hı¯m alSfi abba¯gh, Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r, and others with whom business was conducted. They were accused of being “peu raisonnable,” “tyrannique,” and driven by “cupidite´” and “despotisme.” But such accusations should not mislead us. In fact, the French consul in Sidon used very much the same mixture of moral and political terminology when discussing the French merchants of Acre who would not submit to his directives. Though he would describe their “rebelliousness” as being “re´publicain,” to his mind this was not any better than being “tyrannique.” The discussion was always over prices and the ability to determine prices by establishing control over the flow of the merchandise. The key question was how profits were going to be shared; and all participants in the business knew this. This also may be the place to lay to rest the claim held dear by many authors that the Christian minorities rose to economic fortunes in trade since the Europeans, especially the French, preferred to deal with Christians because of cultural compatibility. As I have shown elsewhere,92 the French were willing to trade with anyone who could deliver and considered the ze`le outre´ of the Catholic orders’ missionary activities to be harmful to harmonious business relations in the Ottoman Empire. If, nevertheless, most private merchants in Acre at the time were Christians, this had less to do with compatible cultural traits than with the inner history of the Greek Catholic community originating in Damascus and Aleppo. Doing business with the culturally “other” appears to have presented no difficulties for the French merchants. Considerably greater, it seems to me, were the difficulties dealing with their own cultural tradition. Re´partition and prix raisonnable seem to be key terms, especially in the internal discussion of the French and in the attempts of the consuls in Sidon to assert control over the merchants in Acre. These terms referred to a corporate past, where the merchants acted like a guild, sharing the market and establishing fixed prices. It was with such a corporate vision in mind that Colbert had organized the various nations in the ´echelles of the Mediterranean. The instruments of re´partition and prix fixe were of little commercial relevance at a time when

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need for cotton on the French markets grew by leaps and bounds and prices exploded. The temptation to pay the producer more money, in order to obtain a greater share of total production and to make even greater profits in Marseilles, was too great, and corporate discipline broke down again and again. Even French captains, tempted by enormous profits, jumped into the fray at times and bought for their own account from peasants. Repeatedly the merchants from other French nations in Aleppo, Cairo, and Cyprus circumvented the re´partition and bought cotton in Palestine, a region which the merchants in Acre considered their preserve. Yet the breakdown of the old, regulated system would always be attributed to the moral failing of individual merchants, i.e., it was their greed, not the demands of the market, that was blamed for driving up prices. Problems with trade puzzled the French consuls repeatedly. Periodically other guilty figures appeared in the consular correspondence. During the final crisis between Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r and the French, the Sakru¯j brothers were often labeled “les infaˆmes moteurs de tous les de´sordres,” [the vile originators of all the disorder] i.e., the rupture of trade and the exile of the French merchants from Acre.93 This comment is interesting not only because it seems to exculpate Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r as the author of this rupture, but because it points to another general aspect of the whole issue: the Sakru¯j brothers were in the employ of the local rulers as scribes. They were also merchants from Shfa¯ ‘Amr dealing in cotton and grain.94 Their careers suggest that a local commercial class, beginning to compete with the French commercial establishment, may have hoped to liberate itself from the foreign merchants. The French merchants certainly took this possibility very seriously. They warned in 1786 that some “marchands Arabes d’Acre” may get ideas and try to establish their own commercial connections in Marseilles. Only recently the Arab merchants had sent a ship on their own to Trieste to sell goods there. Fortunately for the French, their agent, having sold the cargo, had absconded with the money, and his theft discouraged any further such attempts.95 But were French fears of local competition justified? What do we know about local merchants in Acre? Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar was, of course, a consummate merchant.96 Starting out as a small merchant in Tiberias and Safed, he finally managed to corner all cotton production, more or less, in the Galilee. He also restricted the French merchants’ activities to Acre. In a sense, all his activities were geared to the cotton trade. Eventually, his commercial success was sustained by his military and political strength, which was, in turn, financed by the profits from trade. He was able to establish law and security in the Galilee—a precondition for any cotton to reach Acre and an incentive

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for peasants from neighboring regions to settle in his realm and thereby increase the amount of cotton acreage under cultivation. His military occupation of Acre assured him a great measure of control over the export trade. Once Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar moved his residence to Acre, he seems to have left commercial affairs increasingly to his entourage. The names of Yu¯suf alQassı¯s and Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh come to mind. Both became enormously wealthy, but their ability to control or to monopolize trade depended on support from the political system. When political rulers withdrew support, or when the system itself crumbled, their commercial fortunes disintegrated as well. The same holds true for the Sakru¯j brothers, for the famous H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı, who, with interruptions, was at the helm of all fiscal and economic affairs of Acre for a quarter century, and finally for Catafago, who played a similar role in the 1820s. All, with the possible exception of Catafago, were government employees, all were able to enhance their wealth and commercial success in these positions, and all came to grief when the ruler withdrew his support from them. Some more names of merchants are mentioned in the consular correspondence, but the French traders had little to do with them. Frequent mention of censaux, however, indicates how dependent the French were on gobetweens and middlemen. Perhaps we are justified in assuming that out of this group of censaux and other local traders a local commercial class began to take shape during the early years of Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r’s rule. The fact that even the qa¯dfi¯ı of Acre took a stand against the French might mean that, indeed, local merchants were beginning to voice their own interests. But alJazza¯r’s increasingly oppressive rule led to the eventual liquidation of the Sakru¯j brothers along with many others of rank and position. Al-Jazza¯r nipped in the bud any attempt to articulate commercial interests not in line with government policies. We should consider a final “misunderstanding” when discussing reasons for the disruption of the cotton trade: the discussion between al-Jazza¯r and the French was about prices.97 As recently as 1783 cotton had fetched 150 piasters per quintal, and more. In 1789, when, after several years of drought, the cotton crop was abundant again, Ahfi mad al-Jazza¯r offered to sell to the French at the rather raisonnable price of 120 piasters. But the French were not buying at this price. Experience had shown that in such situations pressuring the French by withholding the cotton for a few months produced the desired results. The French would cave in, collectively or individually, and pay higher prices. In 1789 Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r must have been convinced that he had

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to do with a particularly extreme case of French stubbornness and greed. Such stubbornness had to be answered by even greater pressure and insistence on the price. He raised it to 130 piasters. But the tactic did not work. Maybe he was not such a skilled merchant, after all. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r had started out as a Mamluk and self-made strongman and not as a trader like his predecessor Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar. But regardless of his commercial skills or the lack thereof, what al-Jazza¯r did not know and could not know was that the world of the cotton trade had profoundly changed since Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar had made his great profits on cotton in the 1750s. The statistics and the graphs show98 that by mid-century raw cotton from Acre constituted roughly half the total cotton exports from the Mediterranean region to France. Imports of cotton from America hardly existed. In this situation, withholding the Acre cotton from the market could indeed have an impact on the price of cotton in France. After the middle of the century Acre’s role in the cotton trade decreased, while Izmir and Salonika entered the market with force. By 1789, the trade of Acre was but a fraction of that of the two other cities. In the meantime French cotton imports from America had grown so rapidly that they had reached double the volume of the imports from the Mediterranean region.99 Acre’s contribution to French cotton imports had become infinitesimal and had no impact whatsoever on world cotton prices. In addition, cotton production finally began to catch up with demand, and prices began to stagnate and even drop in the 1780s. For most of the 1790s prices of raw cotton leveled off.100 When Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r argued for 120 and 130 piasters, prices had dropped to below 100 in France. No amount of threatening and cajoling could persuade the French to buy. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r was not facing a particular case of French greed but the anonymous power of world market prices. When he banished the French from Acre in 1790, he clearly intended the expulsion to be a temporary measure. In fact, he soon tried to renegotiate a modus vivendi with the French under which they might be willing to return.101 At least a few individual French merchants seem to have made the attempt.102 In the meantime, however, conditions in France itself were changing rapidly and, with the dissolving of the chamber of commerce of Marseilles in 1791, trade as usual had become impossible. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r did not have the know-how and the experience to find new markets for cotton and to conduct overseas trade on his own account, nor had Acre’s local merchants been in a position to develop such skills. A dozen years after the ´eclat with the French merchants and after the siege by Napoleon, al-Jazza¯r was still encouraging French mer-

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chants to settle again in Acre, but he qualified this invitation with a strong “as long as they do not meddle in my affairs.” This was not necessarily reflecting obsessive fears that his authority would be undercut. It might have been, so many years later, a very shrewd understanding of the forces of European political and economic expansion arriving in the region with merchants and military. To the European visitor with whom he was discussing these topics, he offered the following rather prescient anecdote: “A black slave found for himself and his family a fertile little corner with water somewhere in the wilderness. A traveler passed by and . . . greeted him with salutations. To which the slave answered ‘may all the damnation of Heaven fall upon you.’ . . . He was right. Had he responded with civility the traveler would have stopped, sat down, taken water and dates. He would have liked them and stayed. He would have eventually expelled the owner.”103 Trade did continue after the departure of the French. Individual merchants came; French merchants from Aleppo and Damiette, for instance, would occasionally send orders for cotton. Very soon, al-Jazza¯r tried to reestablish relations with the French merchants104 and began to use local Europeans and their contacts to maintain his overseas trade. In 1797 a further French emissary came to Acre to renegotiate contacts. The timing was bad, since al-Jazza¯r apparently had just suffered a stroke: his left side was paralyzed and he articulated with great difficulty. This is also the first time we hear of Antoine Catafago, born in Aleppo of Italian extraction, who was to exercise increasing control over the export trade. According to the French emissary, Catafago tried to block the French at every step and to keep them out of the trade of Acre. Two years earlier al-Jazza¯r had the two most important local merchants, Mikha¯‘ı¯l and Butrus Sakru¯j, executed after he had harassed them for some time. The French had considered them, together with Yu¯suf Karda¯hfi a, as the cause of all the disorder and misfortune that had befallen them. They apparently competed with the French for control over trade but were, after the expulsion of the French, unable to establish commercial links to Europe, hence al-Jazza¯r’s displeasure with them.105 The French invasion of Egypt and Palestine, naval warfare between France and England, shifting alliances of the Ottoman Empire with European powers—all this was not conducive to the development of export trade to European markets. At the same time al-Jazza¯r had enormous expenditures. Not only were considerable official payments and massive bribes made in Istanbul, but Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r maintained a costly army and had undertaken a major building program, including an aqueduct to Acre, a major mosque, commercial buildings, and the strengthening of fortifications. The only other solution

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for covering these expenses lay in revamping the financial system, imposing new taxes and collecting all taxes more efficiently if not ruthlessly. For this purpose he brought to Acre in the early 1790s a financial wizard, H fi aim Farhfi i, scion of a powerful Jewish family managing the finances of the province of Damascus. H fi aim’s insight into financial administration, and also his good contacts in Istanbul, were an important help to al-Jazza¯r’s regime during the following ten years. The oppressive burden of various taxes, so well analyzed in great detail by Amnon Cohen,106 the general and personal brutality of al-Jazza¯r’s regime, which increased noticeably after 1789, together with the costs of local wars and the devastation of the French siege of Acre, exerted enormous pressures on the population. Although there are no statistics available for the period, from the estimates and anecdotal observations of travelers we can deduce a considerable drop in the number of inhabitants in Acre, the depopulation of fertile agricultural regions, and a considerable reduction in the export trade. E. D. Clarke, who visited Palestine in 1801, made seemingly contradictory statements about the economy. He repeatedly described the devastation of the countryside, fertile land that was not cultivated. Al-Jazza¯r’s army camped out in tents close to cultivated fields “to seize even the semblance of a harvest which could be collected.” Clarke blamed al-Jazza¯r’s greed for such destruction of agriculture. But he also described Acre as the port from which “a great quantity of cotton is exported. The country abounds in cattle, corn, olives, and linseed. In almost every town of Syria there is a factory for the manufacture of soap; but everything depends upon the will of the Pacha; the produce of the land was exported, or not, as it pleased Djezzar, who cared very little for the consequences. His avarice, it is true, prompted him to increase the income of his custom-houses.” But in Clarke’s opinion it also destroyed the production. The vague description of thriving trade107 in Acre contrasts starkly with that of simultaneous exhaustion of the countryside. Actually both were the result of the economic policy of monopolies which alJazza¯r continued to implement. The incentives for cultivation had disappeared, not only because the cotton market had by and large disappeared, but also because al-Jazza¯r tried to make up for it by higher taxation of the producer. However, whatever merchandise was indeed exported went through the port of Acre. Through politics and military control al-Jazza¯r could maintain Acre’s role as the sole port for exports on the Syrian coast. By the time French trade returned, after the revolutionary upheavals, the cotton cultivation in the hinterland of Acre had largely withered away. Trade between Acre and Marseilles was never again to be of any significance. When Ahfi mad Pasha

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al-Jazza¯r died in 1804 a terrified, exhausted, and impoverished population breathed a sigh of relief. If we are to believe al-‘Awra’s report, the people were justified in expecting a considerable improvement of their conditions. Upon his appointment as ¯ dil gave the following speech in Acre governor of Sidon Sulayma¯n Pasha al-‘A addressing his high officials: In my life I have suffered many hardships and overwhelming situations, shipwreck and exile, horrors, poverty and destitution, starvation, nakedness, coldness and heat; I was forced to reach the land of the Muscovites marching on foot. Now the Most High in His generosity returned me and comforted me and bestowed upon me more than I could wish for and beyond what I had hoped for. I now stipulate that, if you want to serve me, do it in sincere friendship. I do not want oppression or harm for anyone, nor the destruction of anybody’s house, nor am I eyeing anybody’s money. With all sincerity and effort I wish to close and to lock, nay to eliminate the traces of, the gates of iniquity which had been opened previously at the time of al-Jazza¯r. I have no wish nor need but for a good morsel of bread, a handsome stallion, a good smoke, the usual cloth and one woman. I will not allow or permit anyone of you to collect for me the money of the servants of God injustly, forcibly or fraudulently. I only want my legitimate money, allocated by order of the sultan, to be collected. I shall not be grateful to anyone who tries to bring me monies of injustice, rather, I shall be angry with him. From now on may God and his angels and the Prophet be witnesses for me and you in all this. I shall be free of guilt in this world and the next one from all your (mis)deeds.108

Misha¯qa evidently refers to the same speech, but also provides the reply of H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı, whom Sulayma¯n Pasha wanted to make his top administrator. Sulayma¯n Pasha explained: I seek peace for the country and the contentment of the Sublime Empire with the payment of regular taxes yearly along with the amount that was imposed to cover al-Jazza¯r’s legacy. For myself I shall not ask from you more than that a thousand quarter gold funduqlı¯s be put in my pocket on Fridays for me to distribute among the poor when I come out from prayer. My household and personal expenses shall be turned over to you to deal with as I shall put you in charge of all works in the province. I shall issue no order without your sanction.

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Mu ‘allim H fi aim answered with a similar noble-minded statement: The prosperity of the country depends upon having agents who are competent to administer the departments they are put in charge of, who will not covet what the subjects possess and will not be tempted into corruption. The subjects must be secure in their lives and possessions from their rulers, who are bound to maintain and protect them from miscreants.

He went on to demand promotion by merit alone, suggested a peaceful settlement with the Metuali shaykhs, and developed an economic policy to cope with the exceedingly high demands from the Sublime Porte: If we want to impose it (the payments demanded by Istanbul) on the subjects in whatever way, it will be difficult for them to bear, and instead of carrying out our intention of giving them peace, we will bring down upon them numerous hardships. We must then reduce the taxation of our subjects and impose it on the foreigners. That is possible if the sale of grain, oil and cotton to foreigners is limited exclusively to Acre; the people can get what they need directly from the peasants without imposts. Trustworthy agents should be appointed for this purpose, and at the end of every day the surplus of these three commodities taken in, over and above the needs of the local people, should be taken from the owners and they should be paid the price at which it was sold during the day. That which is obtained should be deposited in storehouses and sold by the government to the ships of the foreign merchants at the highest possible price.109

Justice had, of course, always been an integral element of good government in Islamic political thought. The elevation of a state monopoly on (export) trade to a basic principle of just government was new. In the following years the first principle was to be realized in the sense that the willful liquidations, torture, and mutilations that characterized the latter part of Ahfi mad Pasha alJazza¯r’s rule were absent. Beyond that it is, as we shall see, doubtful how far ¯ dil (“the Just”). The second princiSulayma¯n Pasha deserved his epithet al-‘A ple, monopolization of trade—well established by Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar and continued by al-Jazza¯r—was to be developed in the following years to new levels of refinement under the active management of H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı and Antoine Catafago, and it was to lead to considerable suffering among the population. Several factors promised, especially in the early years of Sulayma¯n Pasha’s rule, to make monopolization of trade successful: he early on established his

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control over Tyre, Sidon, Tripoli, and, to a degree, Beirut after having effected a reconciliation with the Metualis and the Druze. At the same time he succeeded with the help of Muhfi ammad Agha Abu¯ Nabu¯t in extending his control over Jaffa and all of southern Palestine. In fact he wielded far greater control over the coast of Syria than Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r had ever been able to. In particular he was able, with control over Jaffa, to force the people of Nablus to sell their cotton, grain, and oil via Acre. In addition, when Sulayma¯n Pasha was also appointed governor of Damascus, from 1809 until December 1811, he was in a position to order the H fi awra¯n grain to be brought 110 directly to Acre. Only after “the needs of Acre” were served was grain to be shipped to Damascus. The “needs of Acre” were, of course, fairly unlimited because the grain was exported to Europe. To these local political conditions was added for Sulayma¯n the fortuitous circumstance of the Napoleonic Wars in Europe and in particular the Continental System, which forced the British to look for new suppliers of grain at practically any place and price. The massive exports of grain via Acre drained the whole region, and by the end of 1811 there were fears that bread riots might break out in Damascus “though Sulayma¯n Pasha’s granaries [in Acre] are full to capacity.”111 At the same time starving peasants in the Nablus region attacked the filled granaries of the Tfi u¯qa¯ns.112 It must be added that all this occurred in the context of a seriously reduced tax basis of an exhausted region, where a process of depopulation was visible in the city and in the countryside. Wisely, Sulayma¯n Pasha did not entertain any great military ambitions, and always preferred diplomacy to war. Where al-Jazza¯r’s troops had been in the thousands, his were in the hundreds. This certainly also helped the financial situation of the government. In 1806 France again sent diplomatic representatives to Sidon and Acre, and, after a hiatus of over fifteen years, we are once more provided with regular French reports from the area. Upon their return the French found vastly changed conditions in the eastern Levant. Hardly any French merchants had remained on the Syrian coast. The one or two in Acre were flunkies of Catafago. Rarely did French ships reach the Syrian coast, and the French cabotage, after having monopolized all trade in the eastern Levant before the Revolution, had been replaced by Greek and Maltese merchant ships. Any illusion of reestablishing a monopoly of transport and marketing of cotton, as had still existed fifteen years earlier, quickly vanished. In fact, the only thing that had not changed was that from the day of their appointment the French representatives in Acre and Sidon fell into interminable bickering over who had precedence over the other. Yet there is a new tone in

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the reports which was by no means justified by the actual local circumstances or the French position there and perhaps reflected rather a new postrevolutionary consciousness and announced the coming age of imperialism. The reports of the French consul in Sidon were full of plans for improving agriculture, proposing the introduction of coffee trees, sugar cane, and new irrigation methods: “Il faut cre´er de nouvelles branches de commerce, qui, enrichissant la France, offrent le double avantage de lui rendre les coeurs et les voeux du peuple.”* Sidon could be a French colony.113 The French invasion of Egypt a few years earlier had demonstrated a whole new potential for projecting European power into the eastern Levant, and the reports of the French scientists who had accompanied Napoleon had provided an example of how to research the conditions of a country scientifically in the self-confident attitude that such conditions could also be systematically changed. Of course, the French consul in Sidon also tried with such suggestions to boost the importance of his own consular position. In fact, the French impact remained minimal while British trade via Malta, mainly on Greek Ottoman vessels, flourished. For as long as the Continental System lasted British demand for grain rose and so did prices. The statistical information114 reflects clearly the rise in volume and prices of exported wheat during the time of the Continental System: 50,000 to 60,000 hl and more went annually to Malta. Additional shipments went to the Greek islands. The Ottoman government had strictly forbidden food exports from the empire to Europe and tried to fix prices in an attempt to keep grain available and affordable for the local population. But the records of shipments from Acre show that it was only rarely and only when it was politically opportune or no other buyers could be found that grain would reach Istanbul. With the end of the Continental System no European takers could be found in 1814. Istanbul was again supplied, at its fixed low prices. Massive sales in the next few years came mainly from earlier harvests stored in granaries, while grain production was reduced in favor of cotton. The table shows a four-tiered price structure. The price at which the government sold grain in Acre (and sometimes Damascus) was determined by the need to prevent bread riots and starvation—a danger that was not always avoided. Export prices were set by what the market would bear. Shipments to Istanbul were priced permanently at 12 piasters per hl but were only rarely forthcoming. The price paid to the producer reflected Sulayma¯n Pasha’s estimate of what the peasant would be willing to tolerate before rioting or, more likely, fleeing the land. The monopoly system, alluded to in H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı’s policy statement when

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joining Sulayma¯n Pasha’s administration, had been implemented with full force and had become much more exploitative than Farhfi ¯ı’s speech may have suggested. Peasants were driven to destitution, and independent merchants— local or foreign—ceased to exist. All profits, and these were not negligible, went to those in power. The French seemingly never quite decided who was the driving force behind this monopoly policy and who profited most from this arrangement. The French would often blame Farhfi ¯ı. The consul, Pillavoine, was adamant in insisting “qu’un Juif est ici, sous le nom de Soliman Pasha, seul proprie´taire, seul vendeur, seul acheteur; qu’il ne fait le moindre cas des capitulations; que Naplouse et les pays qui en de´pendent ne cultivent plus le Coton. Parce que le Juif qui commande ici despotiquement empeˆche qu’il ne vienne aux marche´s, pour vendre le sien plus cher.”115* According to Misha¯qa, it was H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı himself who designed the monopoly policy. On the other hand, Sulayma¯n Pasha was also blamed for his destructive policies or at least his weakness in relying totally on H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı. Frequently, Sulayma¯n Pasha was depicted as being full of goodwill and sincere but also naive and credulous. Thus he genuinely wanted to attract merchants to Acre, but did not realize that the monopoly policies kept them away.116 Finally, a great deal of blame was put on Antoine Catafago, who, at least since 1796, played a role in the trade of Acre and tried to resist any attempt to reintroduce French merchants and French trade to Acre.117 Catafago had survived Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r, and under the reign of Sulayma¯n Pasha “he began to secure his social and economic standing in Acre.”118 He was in the cotton trade, bought European merchandise, and buttressed his position in commerce by obtaining a variety of consular titles representing at one time or the other countries such as France, Russia, Tuscany, Naples, Spain, Denmark, and the Netherlands.119 He also enjoyed the confidence of Sulayma¯n Pasha, who appointed him tax-farmer for land in the Nazareth area. He had apparently come from Aleppo to Acre about the same time as H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı had come from Damascus, and the two must have collaborated closely as far as commercial matters were concerned. According to one comment Catafago was the “ami intime du ministre Juif.”120 Curiously, the main Arab witness for the period, al-‘Awra, has hardly anything to say about Catafago in his extensive history of Sulayma¯n Pasha. The French sources never discuss in any detail the relationship between Catafago and Farhfi ¯ı. Here we are not so much concerned with the allocation of blame as with the results of the monopoly policy. For the French the first result was, of course, that they were excluded from doing business at Acre. Though the French government had filled the consular positions in Acre and Sidon again,

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this did not boost French commercial interests in the area. Only a few adventurous individuals, often with a dubious claim to French citizenship, attempted their luck in trade. Nothing resembling the nation in prerevolutionary times could be established either in Acre or Sidon. The French consuls could only observe how—to their chagrin—the English, with the help of Maltese and Greek shipping and business, could circumvent the Continental System established by Napoleon, while local pashas cheerfully disregarded all regulations emanating from Istanbul intended to prevent grain exports to Europe.121 The same held true for shipping, where the French had played a decisive role even in coastal shipping and certainly held a monopoly on overseas shipping. In the last analysis it was fairly irrelevant for Sulayma¯n Pasha and the well-being of his realm which foreigners did the buying and shipping of the grain. Of greater importance was the question of the exploitation of the peasants. The gap between the price paid to the peasant for the wheat and the price for which it was exported is glaring. At the height of the Continental System the export price was more than seven times that paid the producer. The French consuls were quick to point out this tyrannical and exploitative aspect of the grain monopoly of Sulayma¯n Pasha, though we may suspect that their concern was primarily for the missed opportunities for French trade and not so much the misery of the peasants. Yet their argument about the negative consequences of pauperization of the rural population was well founded. In 1808 the French compared Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r favorably to Sulayma¯n Pasha. While the former mutilated the peasants noses he left them the means to make a living. Under Sulayma¯n Pasha they were left with nothing to eat.122 People became so poor that they could no longer buy any merchandise. The market for French goods in the region disappeared. The producer lacked any incentive to increase cultivation. Estimates suggest that twice as much grain could have been cultivated than actually was. Eventually the destitution became so severe that peasants fled the land. The disastrous effects of depopulation of fertile lands could be observed in 1810: “C’est que les re´coltes ´etaient plus abondantes, le pays avait a` cette ´epoque un exce´dent conside´rable, quoique la population fut plus nombreuse, mais les terres ´etaient alors cultive´es, et la grande partie est aujourd’hui en friche a` cause de de´faut de bras qui se re´duit journellement par les vexations que le paysan ´eprouve, on ne lui laisse pas de quoi vivre, il fuit en Egypte.”123* Later travelers confirm the impression of fertile but deserted plains.124 Monopolizing export trade was not a new policy. Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar, with the help of Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh, had largely succeeded in that. Ahfi mad Pasha al-

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Jazza¯r had reestablished it and H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı had made it government policy in 1806. Shortly thereafter Sulayma¯n Pasha’s neighbor to the south, Muhfi ammad ‘Alı¯, began to establish the same policy.125 For both rulers the initial opportunity was the high demand for grain in England during the second decade of the nineteenth century. But while Muhfi ammad ‘Alı¯ proceeded to use monopoly policies for another twenty-five years to build up the economic strength of Egypt, Acre’s exports and economy fell quickly apart, once grain prices and demand dropped back to normal, though the symptoms of the weakness of Acre’s economic position could already be noticed at the very time of booming grain exports. One may say that Sulayma¯n Pasha, and even more so his successor ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha, overlooked the basic rule of monopoly policy: to make it work total control is required. Muhfi ammad ‘Alı¯ was indeed able until 1840 to maintain his control over all of Egypt and its frontiers. Sulayma¯n Pasha’s control over the Syrian coast was much more precarious, though more complete than Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r’s ever had been. In Jaffa a loyal multazim exercised firm control and was able to prevent the merchants from Nablus from trading on their own, forcing them to deal either with Acre or to attempt to do business via Damascus and Aleppo. Officially Sulayma¯n Pasha’s rule stretched from Gaza to Tripoli in the north. But after the enormous exhaustion of the land and the people during the years of al-Jazza¯r’s rule and the French siege of Acre, Sulayma¯n Pasha had, wisely, reduced his military capability to an affordable level and relied mainly on negotiations to achieve political settlements, as for instance in the case of the Metualis. This meant also that at times there were hardly a thousand troops available to patrol the whole coast of Syria.126 Only in Jaffa and Acre did the garrisons number in the hundreds.127 To the north only the coast up to Sidon was under Sulayma¯n Pasha’s effective control, and though he appointed the multazim of Beirut it appears that from early in his rule Beirut’s merchants were increasingly able to resist attempts to extend his monopoly policy. The lack of control over Beirut turned out to be the weak spot in his monopoly system, and this in combination with effective and complete monopoly control over Acre caused the latter’s downfall. In 1808 we read a first report mentioning Beirut as the port of Damascus replacing Sidon in this function and attracting trade because of monopoly control in Jaffa and Acre.128 In 1811 an English captain refused to buy grain at Acre prices. He turned his ship to Beirut, sold his own merchandise very well there, and proceeded then to Alexandria, where he picked up a load of grain at more reasonable prices.129 Sulayma¯n Pasha and his collaborators were aware of the danger the trade in Beirut constituted for the monopoly in Acre.

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Attempts were made to prevent the merchants of Damascus and Beirut from making a profit. After forcing the merchants of Beirut to buy coffee from him at fixed rates, Sulayma¯n Pasha took a further step in December 1811 when he imposed an avania of 400,000 piasters on the merchants of Beirut. They refused collectively, and successfully, to pay.130 If one looks for turning points in history this act of successful open resistance by the merchants of Beirut could be considered the beginning of Beirut’s rise. British trade in Beirut continued to increase. In the fall of 1812 seven major Damascene merchants had branches in Beirut and were keenly interested in dealing with a certain Yu¯suf Karam who had established himself as a merchant in Malta.131 In the summer of 1813 a British captain could not get a fair price for his cargo of paper and other European merchandise in Acre and turned to Beirut, where he sold everything: “le commerce de cette ville augmente journellement” [the trade in this town is increasing daily].132 It was the British trade in particular that helped this free-dealing port city to its rise. In the fall of 1813 Pillavoine, French consul in Acre, visited Beirut and was very impressed by its vitality. In his report to the French ministry he observed that the wealth of Beirut was caused by its overseas trade, its silk cultivation, and the countless caravans from and to the Syrian hinterland. Pillavoine was quick to add that “le Pacha d’Acre est sans autorite´. Son Douanier, qu’est un de ses esclaves, est chasse´ s’il se permet la moindre vexation. Le Lieutenant du Pacha n’est rien, le Mufti est tout.”133* Discussing the politics of Beirut, Pillavoine observed that the muftı¯, scion of an important old family, was allpowerful and made a point of cultivating good relations with the local Christians, especially the Maronites. His authority was not founded on his religious rank and function alone: he was also “le chef du commerce.” From 1794 until 1824 (perhaps 1827) ‘Abd al-Latfi¯ıf Fathfi Alla¯h was the muftı¯ of Beirut. He came indeed from a renowned family which for 200 years had supplied qa¯dfi¯ıs and muftı¯s for Beirut. His position provided him with public authority and influence. Nevertheless, it is difficult to accept Pillavoine’s description of him as the mover and shaker of Beirut’s economic activities. ‘Abd al-Latfi¯ıf apparently detested his job as muftı¯, which he had inherited from his father. When ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha finally relieved him of his task he left for Damascus in 1827, where he lived until shortly before his death in 1844. His true interest and vocation had always been poetry. He wrote hundreds of lengthy poems in the classical form of the qasfi¯ıda, many of them panegyrics. Some of them bear testimony to his close and friendly relations with the rulers of Acre and its realm.134 All this does not give the impression of a man actively involved in the commerce and politics of Beirut, offering resistance to the governor of

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Sidon. It is more than likely that Pillavoine confused the muftı¯ with Fathfi Alla¯hs from another family that was indeed deeply involved in the commerce of the city.135 But there was more to the position of Beirut than the supposedly strong hand of its muftı¯. Beirut was officially part of Sulayma¯n Pasha’s realm. Some thirty-five years earlier al-Jazza¯r had wrested it from the Druze and claimed it in the name of the Ottoman government. The Druze had never given up hope that one day they might be able to reclaim it. For that reason they seem to have backed any attempt of the Beirutis to preserve their independence from the pasha in Acre—as, for instance, their successful refusal to let troops of the pasha enter the city. Through a series of circumstances Beirut found itself in a vague, illdefined political space which permitted a maximum of independence. Pillavoine was not wrong when he described it as “une Re´publique de ne´gociants qui ont leur force et leur loix”136 [a republic of merchants who have their power and their law]. This observation stands in stark contrast to the remarks made a year later about Acre, where, due to the monopoly control of the pasha, “il n’y a point de ne´gociants arabes”137 [there exist no Arab merchants whatsoever] and, one might add, no foreign merchants either. No wonder, then, that Pillavoine suggested after his visit to Beirut that the French consular office should be transferred from Acre to Beirut. How much the trade had shifted to the north was not necessarily visible in Acre as long as the Continental System worked. Having the primary producers and trade under tight control, the pasha could make enormous profits in the illegal export trade of grain. Even after the Continental System had collapsed Sulayma¯n Pasha was able to turn the vast supplies in his granaries into handsome profit by shipments to Istanbul and then nearby in 1816, when famine struck all of Syria. In contrast to Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r, and reflecting the greater integration of the region into the European world system, Sulayma¯n Pasha was well informed about events and markets in Europe. With the end of the Continental System he realized that grain was no longer going to be profitable. He shifted back to cotton, which had been the major cash crop before the grain boom. In order to catch the season he even, when necessary, sent soldiers to the villages, forcing the peasants to plow the grain under and plant cotton.138 But cotton from the Syrian coast was not in demand any more. Harvests could be good, but often no buyers could be found, partially because the prices demanded by the pasha were often higher than those for American cotton.139 Eventually less cotton was grown and by 1821 the trade in Acre was described as dead, although the monopolies persisted.140 Sulayma¯n Pasha’s

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successor was the prote´ge´ of H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı, ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha. A rash young man with little interest in the economics of his realm, he continued the policy of monopolies, later selling off monopoly rights when he was in financial straits. His appointment had cost huge sums for buying influence in Istanbul. ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha proceeded to have his patron and benefactor liquidated and thus lost his most brilliant administrator and financial wizard. The subsequent lengthy siege of Acre by the pashas of Damascus and Aleppo brought trade to a standstill. The pasha of Acre was able to survive this assault on his power. Catafago became more powerful than ever as the sole manager of the monopoly system. How difficult it is to be more precise about the actual role of Catafago can be shown with the statistical material we have at our disposal concerning exports: the French records show for 1819 total exports of 4,000 quintaux of cotton from Acre.141 Rogan has found in Catafago’s records that in 1819 he exported 85,000 rotes, or 850 quintaux, of raw cotton and in 1821, a year for which no French records exist, 320 quintaux.142 Apart from the extremely complicated question which rotes and which quintaux are meant, connotating what particular and comparable weight,143 we are not certain whether Catafago’s export dealings were included in the French records or whether they were additional transactions. Neither can we actually document what role he played in the other export activities. What the Catafago records seem to confirm is that trade was highly irregular, which is not surprising given the political events and the siege of Acre in 1822. Trade seems to have significantly diminished in the 1820s. Eventually ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha was forced to raise cash by breaking with his collaborator Catafago and demanding all the jewelry of the latter’s wife and daughters plus gold coins.144 ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha, unable to control Beirut, even tried to buy his way into its commerce by pressuring the ten richest merchants in Beirut, five Christians and five Muslims, to form a commercial society with him in which he invested 250,000 francs. The society was soon swindled out of considerable amounts and collapsed.145 After the French consul had already once withdrawn from Acre to Cyprus during the siege in the early 1820s, the consular office was moved from Acre to Beirut following the death of the consul Regnault in 1827, a step which Pillavoine had suggested fourteen years earlier146 and which actually had been imminent for twenty years. A look at the imports to Damascus during the second half of 1824 sheds light from a different angle on the relative positions of Acre and Beirut.147 In that year the value of merchandise imported from Beirut was already more than ten times that from Acre; and while every two months a caravan from Acre reached Damascus, one came every week from Beirut. The statistics

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confirm what anecdotal observations had yielded ten and fifteen years earlier: Beirut had become the major port of imports for the markets of Syria. The statistics also hint at a future development: some 40 percent of all imports to Damascus, consisting almost completely of European merchandise, came overland from Izmir and Istanbul. With the introduction of steamships all this traffic would go by sea to Beirut, by then already established as the predominant port on the Syrian coast. But even before the arrival of steamships some twenty rich merchants from Damascus doing trade with Cairo, Istanbul, and Izmir had, by 1828, established agencies in Beirut to cut down transportation costs.148 Thanks to the work of Fawaz, Abu Manneh, Khairallah, and others we have today a fairly good idea about the process of Beirut’s dramatic rise from a village to the largest port on the Syrian coast.149 The population growth, alone, was unparalleled on the Syrian coast in the nineteenth century. From some 6,000 inhabitants around 1820 the population increased twenty-fivefold to 150,000 in 1905.150 While Haifa grew in approximately the same period from 2,000 to only 20,000,151 Acre, with approximately 10,000 to 15,000 inhabitants in 1820, dipped to about 2,000 in 1849 and regained in 1887 a level of only around 10,000 inhabitants.152 We are familiar with the introduction of the steamship traffic and its effect on the permanent linkage of Beirut to the European economy; we know of the implications of road building between Damascus and Beirut and of their later linkage by railway, of the construction and enlarging of the harbor, of recurring waves of immigrants, of the added role of Beirut as a provincial administrative center in the Ottoman Empire and as a center of education. All these were factors causing or contributing to the growth of Beirut and mutually reinforcing their own development. The various aspects analyzed in these studies answer well to the typical question of the historian. It is the ex post factum question to answer the factum. With hindsight we know that Beirut experienced dramatic development in the nineteenth century, and as historians we will study and analyze all those factors that contributed to this development until we can finally present a chain of events linking cause and consequence logically and providing the result which we already knew beforehand: Beirut’s development. For the observer in the early nineteenth century the question would have posed itself very differently. All experience of the then recent past, all experience of the first two decades of the nineteenth century seemed to promise the continued importance of Acre as the predominant port city on the Syrian coast. For the contemporary observer it would have been unexpected, even illogical,

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that Acre should lose this role. The real question at the time would have been: Why then did Beirut grow in the nineteenth century and not Acre or Haifa? A brief glance at the map tells us that on the whole length of the Syrian coast only the bay of Haifa and the bay of Beirut provided the natural conditions for a safe harbor, protecting ships, especially in the winter, from Mediterranean storms. Both bays were a reasonable distance from the allimportant markets of Damascus. It is true that, as the crow flies, Beirut is closer to Damascus than Haifa, but for beasts of burden to move in caravan through the valleys of Galilee and the plains south of Damascus was arguably swifter and easier than scaling the mountain passes of the Lebanon and AntiLebanon. The geographical argument for the advantages of a link between Damascus and the bay of Haifa is reinforced by political considerations: while the route via Mount Lebanon passed through the region of the indomitable and unpredictable Druze, the route through the Galilee had been secured since the middle of the eighteenth century by Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar. The successive ¯ dil, and ‘Abdalla¯h rulers of Acre, Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r, Sulayma¯n al-‘A Pasha, were certainly more oppressive than Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar, but this did not diminish the safety of travelers and transport of goods in their ever-expanding realm. Apart from short outbursts of warfare the safety of travelers and caravans was maintained in the area until the Egyptian occupation. Moreover, at the turn of the century the pashaliks of Sidon and Damascus were repeatedly held by the same pasha and thus politically united.153 Finally, and perhaps most important, is the fact that throughout the eighteenth century Acre, at the northern tip of the Haifa bay, had already developed into the most important port and commercial center on the Syrian coast and the third largest city of Syria after Damascus and Aleppo. Admittedly, the port of Acre itself was rather small and unprotected but it is easily conceivable that the southern end of the bay where ships sought protection from winter storms could have developed into the major port facility. Given these geographical, political, and commercial conditions, what would have been more likely than the development of Haifa and/or Acre into the main port for Damascus and the Syrian hinterland? But this did not happen and, in fact, Acre withered away, never again to regain the role it had played in the eighteenth century. To conclude, differences in geographic and physical conditions do not adequately answer the question: Why Beirut rather than the Acre/Haifa bay? The causes for the development of Beirut in the nineteenth century, even as Acre had been the dominant port in the eighteenth century, are to be found in the

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politics of economy. They were Acre’s great fortune but also its limitation, and can be summarized in one word: monopoly. As we have observed earlier, government monopolies over certain branches of production or over certain goods were not unknown in Islamic history. But while governments were interested in collecting custom fees on commerce and tax on agrarian production they were rarely willing to control directly and manage themselves any branch of the economy. In the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire no economic monopolies had existed. The policies in Acre constituted an innovation. Not only were government monopolies reintroduced after a very long hiatus, but they also were applied to an extent previously unknown in Islamic history. It would be no exaggeration to claim that in Acre and its realm a political regime developed out of an economic opportunity, which it appropriated to sustain its power. The almost insatiable European demand for cotton in the eighteenth century and British demands for grain during the Continental System constituted the wealth upon which Acre’s position rested. It might have been advantageous for profits when the shrewd merchant Zfi a¯hı¯r al‘Umar tried to monopolize the sale of cotton to the French. It apparently still seemed advantageous when the succeeding or later Mamluk rulers followed the same pattern of doing business. But their very success in establishing monopolistic control over all branches of trade—import as well as export, and with it their successful prevention of the development of any indigenous merchant class—reduced Acre to a one-cash-crop export harbor managed by a government administration. When that particular crop was no longer in high demand in Europe or could not be delivered because of internal turbulence in Acre’s hinterland, commerce in Acre came to a halt and so did the flow of revenues of the rulers. An indigenous merchant class might have looked for new markets and goods. The typical reaction of the Mamluk rulers at that point was, however, to tighten the fiscal screws on the primary producers to the point of counterproductivity and thus to throw the whole economy into a downward spiral. It was precisely the somewhat undefined political situation of Beirut at the beginning of the nineteenth century, a certain vagueness as to political authority, that provided the conditions if not for a “re´publique des ne´gociants” then certainly those for a merchant class to flourish and to do business. The merchants could not, as the rulers of Acre did for a time, dictate prices to the producers or the European merchants. They had to orient themselves to the markets and were therefore much more competitive in the long run. The merchants of Beirut were a loosely cooperating group and the fate of com-

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merce in Beirut did not depend on any single individual or any single decision as it did in Acre. This enhanced not only their competitiveness but also their flexibility to adapt to changing trade patterns, merchandise, and markets. Acre’s apparent political might never had a chance against this “republic of merchants” that emerged during the first two decades of the nineteenth century in Beirut.

chapter 4

GOVERNMENT: THE MILITARY AND ADMINISTRATION

In the preceding two chapters we have seen how a local political power developed on the Syrian coast in an unprecedented shape with Acre as its center. For a while it became the most important center of power in all of Syria. On the one hand this was linked to the then apparent weakness of the Ottoman Empire at its center, on the other hand it had everything to do with the integration of Acre and its realm into the European world economy. The innovative and radical application of state monopolies over the trade and export of raw materials insured the financial base for the growth of this new center of power. In this chapter the questions to be explored are these: In what ways were the military and the bureaucracy, those institutions that were always essential for the defense and the financing of political power, shaped by the new developments? Did these established institutions help or hinder such developments? Did they transform themselves into new institutions?

THE MILITARY The moment Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar staked out claims to political power that went beyond ruling over his own clan his personal prowess and valor were no longer sufficient and the question of military support became essential. What sort of armed forces did he have at his disposal to realize these ambitions? The first fighting force he succeeded in mobilizing for himself was the Banu¯ Sfi aqr, with all the advantages and disadvantages that tribal levies can have. They are cheap and quick to mobilize, but it is extremely difficult to maintain them in disciplined service. Quick to follow the oppor-

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tunities of plunder after battle, they are not necessarily interested in pursuing the enemy. These levies contributed greatly to the conquest of Tiberias around 1730. But we also hear of a troop of some 200 horsemen made up of members of the Zayda¯nı¯ clan. Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar put them under the command of his cousin Muhfi ammad al-‘Alı¯. We do not know whether they were a permanent troop. Zfi a¯hir also mobilized, occasionally, townspeople for doing battle. Thus it seems that the people of Tiberias helped in the defense against the governor of Damascus, Sulayma¯n Pasha, and the people of Nazareth ¯ mir. At a moment of perceived fought on his side in the battle of Marj ibn ‘A danger, in 1770, Zfi a¯hir had the entire male population of Acre, Muslim and Christian, armed1 and later, in January 1774, he raised some 300 foot soldiers from the population of Acre, “servants and craftsmen, but well armed,” to do battle with his son Sa‘ı¯d.2 Such mobilization of civilians, however, was an ad hoc measure and taken only in emergencies. All these options of mobilizing a military force were typical for warfare on the local level. The Nabulusis used them, as did the Metualis and the Druze. Zfi a¯hir took a decisive step when he hired Ahfi mad Agha al-Dinkizlı¯ and ordered him to build up a force of Maghrebi mercenaries. With this he acquired a standing army of around a thousand troops. In the meantime the alliance with the Banu¯ Sfi aqr became a liability for Zfi a¯hir; not only was their military support unreliable and always short-lived, but at a time when one of Zfi a¯hir’s major policies was to establish law and order in the Galilee, and especially security on its roads, his erstwhile allies were unwilling to mend their ways, and continued their highway robbery and marauding. In the larger design of things the Banu¯ Sfi aqr remained what they always had been: a threat to internal security. Again, we are not ¯ mir they very certain about the dates of events, but in the battle of Marj Ibn ‘A had sided with the Jarra¯rs of Nablus. Very likely the relation between Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar and the Banu¯ Sfi aqr went through a variety of stages even after that. As a military force they were replaced by the Maghrebi units, which had won their first victory in that battle. Having a standing army—and being able to afford it—distinguished Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar clearly from other local chieftains, tribal and otherwise. It was a considerably larger force than the governor of Sidon possessed, and put Zfi a¯hir on a par with the governor of Damascus. The next stage in enhancing his military power was the fortification of Acre in the early 1750s. Zfi a¯hir had already applied the fortification program in Tiberias, where he had successfully resisted the assaults of the governor of Damascus. In Acre he had the whole city ringed with a wall, and some fortified towers were constructed. Although the wall was actually very thin, about a meter in width, it remained even for the French army an unsur-

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mountable obstacle. Cannons and artillery troops completed the defense of the city. When Zfi a¯hir appointed his sons as heads of towns such as Shfa¯ ‘Amr, Tiberias, Safed, Dayr H fi ana¯, and Nazareth, they all built or rebuilt fortresses and sometimes walls around the towns.3 They also recruited their own troops, with which they would come to support their father in times of need—or do battle with him, depending on the circumstances and their ambitions. During the last decade of his rule Zfi a¯hir was able to enhance his military power considerably through the alliance with the Metualis, who never failed to support him, except in his intrafamily struggles. The tribal levies provided by the Metualis could consist of several thousand horsemen but, like all other such troops, could not be kept in the field for very long—a shortcoming that was particularly felt in lengthy sieges such as that of Jaffa in 1772 and Beirut in 1773.4 When Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r surrendered Beirut in October 1773 to Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar, the latter employed him and the 800 Maghrebis under his command. Soon, however, al-Jazza¯r changed sides to the governor of Damascus and took his troops with him. This loss of 800 Maghrebis and Zfi a¯hir’s failure to negotiate the integration of 500 Albanians from the Russian fleet into his army severely limited his military options, even against his sons.5 Even in times of war the size of the standing army does not seem to have surpassed 2,000 troops.6 If, on occasion, the governor of Damascus could rally considerably larger contingents, they apparently suffered even more from a lack of discipline and training. Usually they would not withstand even the smaller detachments of Zfi a¯hir’s army. What was strikingly absent in Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar’s strategic thinking and military buildup was any kind of navy. We hear occasionally of a ship being equipped with guns, but this was usually for a single specific action. Just as Zfi a¯hir did not possess a merchant fleet, he had no navy of his own. The fortifications in Acre and later those in Haifa, as well as originally those of Jaffa, were built largely to secure the ports from individual pirates and/or land forces but not from regular navies. To sum up, Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar originally used fighting men from his clan, expanded his force by tribal levies, and finally built a standing mercenary army organized along ethnic lines. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r was a Mamluk. Although his way of joining the Mamluk system was not entirely orthodox, he came to identify himself fully with the Mamluks of Egypt, acquired their habits, and learned to speak Egyptian Arabic. His comrades admired him for his fighting abilities, his

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courage, and, above all, his fierce loyalty to comrades and masters. It is then hardly surprising that he should have made the Mamluk patterns of military rule the principle of his own rule in Acre. He built up his own Mamluk household,7 from which he drew his bodyguard, his personal advisers, and trusted lieutenants who ruled various parts of his realm in his name and commanded most military expeditions. The inner circle of this group was made up of Salı¯m Pasha al-Kabı¯r (the Elder), Salı¯m Pasha al-Sfi aghı¯r (the ¯ dil, and ‘Alı¯ Agha Khazinda¯r. Apparently all Younger), Sulayma¯n Pasha al-‘A were of Georgian origin and had been bought by or given to al-Jazza¯r in Egypt,8 though it is not clear when and how they reached him in Acre. During al-Jazza¯r’s first years in Syria, after 1770 and before becoming governor of Sidon, we do not hear of them; he came as a refugee and was on his own. Yet his emotional attachment to this group of Mamluks must have been very close. When his first Mamluk, Salı¯m Pasha the Elder, died of the plague in 1786, al-Jazza¯r “cried like a child.”9 He was profoundly shaken by the rebellion of his Mamluks in 1789, but when one of the leaders, Sulayma¯n Pasha, returned to him thirteen years later, he treated him like a close friend. AlJazza¯r’s Mamluks were somewhat apart, and above all other units. They served as guards of the palace and the treasury, as commanders of various units or of specific military campaigns, as mutasallims in various cities, and formed a typical Mamluk household with al-Jazza¯r its head; hence their particular loyalty to al-Jazza¯r and his trust in them. In a more general manner Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r subscribed to the principle of using only imported soldiery. In sharp contrast to Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar, he never entered alliances with local tribal forces, nor did he try to mobilize other local forces.10 He hired Maghrebi mercenaries, bought Albanian soldiers (both Christian and Muslim), and relied on Bosnian troops. He also hired some of the former Dala¯t cavalry troops which had been officially disbanded by the Ottoman sultan, and a small group of Kurds under their leader Tfi a¯ha¯ became responsible—in as so far as such distinctions were made at all—for internal security, i.e., they ran the prisons and carried out tortures and executions. How large was this army of al-Jazza¯r? As so often in our attempt to reconstruct the history of the period, we encounter the greatest difficulties when searching for quantitative information. We don’t have any record of the troops themselves, their employment, or their provisions. French consuls and Arab monk chroniclers were not usually eyewitnesses to battles and warfare in general. Chroniclers and later historians supply us with numbers whose roundness alone must make us suspicious. Whether it is the number of participants in a battle, the number killed, or wounded, or taken prisoner—

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they are all guesses, often with the purpose of emphasizing the might or the courage of one side. We have one eyewitness report by the French consul Renaudot describing the caravan-cum-parade of troops when Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r left Acre to assume, for the first time, the position of wa¯lı¯ of Damascus. He was at the peak of his power, and all the political and economic signs promised a great future for him. Leaving Acre for Damascus, he was demonstrating his might. An important moment, and it is worth giving the description in full. The caravan left Acre on April 18, 1785. It included 400 camels and 200 mules with baggage. Seventy-five banners11 of the Maghrebi infantry were followed by fifty-four banners of the Albanians, each group with its own music. Twenty banners of mounted Maghrebis and some 300 Dala¯t marching in twos were next. Four field cannons and baggage carriages drawn by mules followed, together with twenty artillerymen on camels equipped with fuses. “Une bande de santons et prophe`tes burlesquement accoutre´s qui portaient tous les attributs de de´mence, en avaient les masques, et leurs chansons s’en ressentaient, bien qu’elles fussent a` la gloire de Dge´zzar qui suivait imme´diatement avec Selim et les grands officiers de sa maison.”* The litter of the pasha was accompanied by nine hand-led horses. Musical bands followed and “100 Mamlukes cuirasse´s, bardis de fer, ayant les casques en teˆte et la visie`re basse.”* The parade was concluded by 200 slaves mounted and bizarrely dressed, armed with rifles, two pistols, a sword, a dagger, and some even with hatchets. Renaudot commented: “Tout cet appareil avait quelquechose de fort ridicule pour un homme accoutume´ aux ´evolutions d’armes. Mais les gens du pays en ´etaient effraye´s. Dge´zzar lui-meˆme, quoique bon come´dien, paraissait ´etonne´ de la grandeur du spectacle.”12* The total was somewhat more than 2,000 troops plus the baggage train, apparently enough to establish Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r’s authority in Damascus. How many more troops can we assume would have been left to garrison Acre, Sidon, Beirut, and perhaps in the Metuali region and assisting Amı¯r Yu¯suf in the Mountain as well? Even a generous estimate could not more than triple the number at the time, to reach a total of perhaps six thousand troops. We have a variety of estimates by eyewitnesses and other contemporaries but none of them indicates by which methods such numbers were reached. Volney in 1784 estimated all troops to consist of 900 Bosnian horsemen and 1,000 Maghrebi infantry. This would mean that practically the whole army participated in the expedition to Damascus. This seems extremely unlikely, and other sources indicate that in earlier years the army probably was larger. Most estimates, and this constitutes another difficulty, relate to

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specific military actions without telling us how many troops were left elsewhere in al-Jazza¯r’s realm. When al-Jazza¯r, who himself rarely left Acre for military operations, sent troops for one battle or another, the Arab chroniclers most frequently use the terms “he appointed” (‘ayyana), “collected” (jamma‘a), “equipped” (jahhaza) troops (‘askar)—which makes it sound almost as if he raised new troops each time. This is unlikely but perhaps partially true, especially considering the high casualties of his troops in many lost battles. We know he imported troops directly from the Balkans, hired Maghrebi and Dala¯t troops locally, and bought individual Mamluks. In the early years at least he also paid them well, so that they felt a certain amount of gratitude and loyalty to him.13 How many of these were demobilized after a particular military campaign, how many belonged to a standing army, what were the losses? We shall probably never know the precise numbers but the above estimates, coming from different sources, albeit some copied from each other, seem to be fairly consistent.14 An upper limit of 7,000 to 8,000 troops altogether appears to have been the rule. Military expeditions of 1,000–2,000 seem to have been logistically sustainable; corps larger than this were rather the exception. This means in any case a regular army three to four times as large as any Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar had commanded, and al-Jazza¯r’s army saw almost continuous action. These troops were enormously expensive, while their discipline and effectiveness were dubious in the best of cases. The troops were organized somewhat along ethnic lines. Maghrebi mercenaries were a regular feature in the whole region during the period. Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar had already made use of them, and so did others. Maghrebi units were usually infantry. The Albanian troops bought by Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r were usually cavalry. Whether the Albanians (Arna’u¯fit) were different from the Bosnians (Bu¯shna¯q) as a military unit is not clear. Deli or Dala¯t units were the third element in al-Jazza¯r’s army. They were not exactly an ethnic group, but were certainly not of local origin. Originally imperial cavalry troops, they had become private armies of provincial governors by the eighteenth century. They were then also called Levend troops and were usually of a vague Turkmen and Kurdish origin.15 Occasionally hawwa¯rı¯, or voluntary, units are mentioned. Those were tribal and possibly local levies. The vaguely ethnic character of the units had its advantages. It served as an organizing principle of the army and it guaranteed a minimum of loyalty and cooperation within these units. Typically their immediate commanders were of the same origin and could successfully establish some discipline. In

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fact it was they who commanded the loyalty of the troops, rather than the governor of Sidon who paid for them. But this arrangement also had its shortcomings. Troops of similar background and origin confronting each other on opposing sides in a battle were liable to refuse fighting. Dala¯t troops refused to fight when facing other Dala¯t units on the opposing side. In another incident Dala¯t troops of al-Jazza¯r accepted orders from a Dala¯t commander on the Damascus side, because most of the officers of the Dala¯t troops “were his prote´ge´s.”16 Any expeditionary corps containing troops from more than one of the above-mentioned ethnic units risked an outbreak of fighting between them. Joint military expeditions with troops of Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r and the Druze of whichever faction was momentarily allied with him can serve as an example: returning from one such expedition in 1795, the troops under Amı¯r Bashı¯r’s command, Druze and Maghrebis, broke into a fight over the distribution of booty they had collected in the Mountain. In the following meˆle´e 500 people were killed. A few days later the two sides attacked each other again and another 300 lost their lives.17 A year earlier fighting had broken out between Dala¯t troops and Maghrebis, stationed in the Mountain. When the Albanian units decided to side with the former, the Maghrebi troops were defeated and dispersed. The troops were usually well paid and constituted a continuous financial burden. On occasions al-Jazza¯r would delay payments to Istanbul in order to pay his troops; at other times the troops would get restless, when not receiving their pay.18 Once firmly established in Acre, al-Jazza¯r also seems to have had more resources available for paying his troops. They appeared to be “fort attache´s a` lui,”19 badly trained and undisciplined as they were. Frequently the desire to plunder won out over military discipline and fighting spirit. In one of the many campaigns against the Druze an Albanian unit of five to six hundred soldiers disregarded explicit orders and advanced to plunder a Druze village. They were ambushed, and a hundred of them were killed and as many wounded.20 We never read about any particular training. The soldiers’ discipline usually was limited to a certain ethnic identity and loyalty to their own immediate commanders. After each defeat or dispersal of troops Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r spent enormous sums to buy and hire new troops. Yet with all these expenditures al-Jazza¯r’s troops could rarely hold their own against the Druze warriors and never were able to impose their will on the Druze for any length of time. On the other hand the internal political strife, the decentralization, and the lack of political institutions among the Druze made it impossible for them to follow up on their victories and pursue al-Jazza¯r to Acre in order to wrest power from him—or at least keep him

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permanently out of the Mountain. The truly great feats of the army occurred when al-Jazza¯r personally led his troops. In the defense of Beirut against Russian sea bombardments and the troops of Amı¯r Yu¯suf and Zfi a¯hı¯r al‘Umar, in the battle against his own Mamluks under the wall of Acre, and, most famously, in his defense of Acre against the French army, he showed tactical skills, personal bravery, enormous stamina, a cool head under pressure (quite in contrast to his frequent quick-tempered flare-ups), and, apparently, personal charisma in leading his troops. At other occasions, especially when leading his troops in the field, he did not seem particularly successful— as was the case with the siege of Sfi a¯nu¯r. A few comments with regard to naval forces are appropriate: in early 1779 al-Jazza¯r possessed three ships, which traded between Acre and Damiette to the disadvantage of the French tramps. His navy consisted of two che´becs and two galiotes. He used them to fight Maltese corsairs. But his ships lacked the basic technical equipment, which was sometimes seized from French ships. Even compasses were stolen.21 At the end of 1789 al-Jazza¯r “fait sortir des forces navales pour en imposer aux corsaires russes [more likely Greeks under the Russian flag] et les ´eloigner des coˆtes, elles consistent en un che´bec, trois galiotes, un kirlanquisch[?], et deux bateaux dalmatiens. Cette escadre fort mal ´equipe´e a mouille´ successivement a` Sour, Seyde, Baruth, Tripoli et Lattaquie et n’a pas tarde´ de retourner a` Acre ou` elle a ´ete´ aussitoˆt de´sarme´e.22* Generally speaking, however, the naval force suffered from the same neglect as under Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar. The rebellion of the Mamluks in May 1789 was—apart from the French invasion and siege of Acre—Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r’s gravest military and political crisis. In many ways it was more serious since it arose from an internal source. It apparently also affected his personality profoundly. On May 4, 1789, Salı¯m Pasha al-Sfi aghı¯r was dispatched by Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r with two thousand cavalry troops to H fi asfibiyya to convince Amı¯r Yu¯suf to pay his taxes. Sulayma¯n Pasha was sent for the same purpose with some eight hundred infantry troops along the coast to the north. The French consul Renaudot suspected that behind this rather large campaign lay an attempt by al-Jazza¯r to deflect any possible demand from Istanbul to contribute troops to the war against Russia by demonstrating the need to fight against the Druze. From Renaudot’s own account it also could very well be that al-Jazza¯r sent his chief Mamluks off on an expedition so that he could deal with those remaining in Acre.23 Four days after the departure of these troops al Jazza¯r discovered, or

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perhaps exposed, illicit relations between some of his Mamluks and some women of his harem. He had the arms of many of the Mamluks who worked in the seraglio cut off, and in the following night he had some women drowned, “ce qui de´signe le motif du chaˆtiment des premiers.” The next morning al-Jazza¯r continued with his purge. With a unit of thirty Bosnian soldiers he arrested more Mamluks and killed some. At this point, the remaining Mamluks offered resistance and defended themselves in the treasury, which was situated in the Big Tower. The khazı¯nda¯r, brother of Salı¯m Pasha, freed the imprisoned Mamluks and moved with them to the tower, joining the other Mamluks.24 According to the French reports, he was pushed into action after al-Jazza¯r killed his beloved valet. Barricaded in the Big Tower, the Mamluks turned the heavy guns, placed there to defend the city against enemies, on to the seraglio itself and threatened to blast it to pieces. In the ensuing stalemate the muftı¯ of Acre played a mediating role and negotiated free departure with their weapons and horses for the Mamluks, about seventy to eighty altogether; their personal belongings were to be sent after them. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r had no choice but to let them go. Only the prepubescent Mamluks remained. Al-Jazza¯r killed many of them and had others exiled to Egypt.25 Under the command of the khazı¯nda¯r the Mamluks rode to the north and linked up with Salı¯m Pasha and Sulayma¯n Pasha. After an unsuccessful attempt at reconciliation with Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r, they all decided to fight against him. They came to a truce with Amı¯r Yu¯suf and gained the support of the commander of the Maghrebi troops in Beirut, al-Jabu¯rı¯, who had actually been ordered by al-Jazza¯r to deliver him the head of Salı¯m. Sidon, where Sulayma¯n Pasha had been appointed previously as mutasallim, served as the base for the rebels. They then proceeded south to Tyre, which refused to open its gates. The result was the sacking of the town and a subsequent looting in which the commanders lost control over their soldiers. This was the turning point of the whole rebellion: discipline among the troops could not be restored and they remained more concerned with plundering than with fighting. More importantly, the population in Acre, witnessing the events in Tyre, was no longer convinced that Salı¯m’s rule would be a liberation from oppression. Still, for the moment Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r’s position was desperate. All he had left for the defense of Acre were some 200 Albanian soldiers under their commander, Juwa¯q ‘Uthma¯n.26 But al-Jazza¯r’s good fortune was that his opponents displayed a lack of planning and decisiveness of action, which led Renaudot to observe: “Leurs de´marches ne portent point ce caracte`re d’Energie qui annonce les grandes actions, ce sont des Esclaves de´chaıˆne´s plutoˆt occupe´s a` conside´rer leurs chaıˆnes qu’au soin de les

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rompre.”* On June 3 the rebels finally appeared on the plain of Acre, some 1,200 troops altogether, but had no clear idea about how to proceed from there. In the meantime Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r had worked feverishly to strengthen the defense of the city. He collected all the workers and masons from the government workshops and armed them. Upon the advice of Shaykh Muhfi ammad al-Qa¯dfi ¯ı he prepared for a night assault on the camp of the rebels and at the same time had a ship in the harbor ready to sail with him in case of defeat.27 The rebels underestimated the resolve and initiative of al-Jazza¯r and his resourcefulness. The sortie from Acre and the simultaneous bombardment from the cannons on the fortifications took them completely by surprise. In the ensuing five-hour battle Salı¯m Pasha and Sulayma¯n Pasha were defeated and their troops dispersed. The French consul commented that both sides fought without great conviction and were mainly concerned with plundering. But Salı¯m’s troops did not know anything about tactics, defected partially, and “those who fought did so only by fleeing.” Betrayal also seems to have played a role. Supposedly the Kurdish commander Shaykh Tfi a¯hir had contacted one of Salı¯m’s allies, Mulla¯ Isma¯‘ı¯l, commander of the Dala¯t troops, before the battle and had persuaded him to prevent his troops from fighting. A number of Mamluks had been killed, others were already exiled, and the rest fled defeated. Salı¯m and Sulayma¯n reached the Mountain and then Damascus, for a while still hoping to raise new troops against al-Jazza¯r. For the moment the Mamluk household of al-Jazza¯r was destroyed, and ceased to exist as part of the military establishment and as a political institution. Renaudot wondered why, in the end, people such as Sulayma¯n, Salı¯m, and “Abbouheze´” [? “un ancien militaire conside´re´”] rebelled against their master. They had made their careers under him, had been pampered and become rich.28 The question might have been somewhat disingenuous coming from Renaudot, but the story does raise issues about motives, causes, and consequences. It has been asked, for instance, why the leadership of the Mamluks, Salı¯m Pasha, his brother the khazinda¯r, and Sulayma¯n should interfere and provoke a rebellion, when al-Jazza¯r was simply punishing some lowly Mamluks and women of the harem, apparently for having affairs.29 Both Kara¯ma and al-Munayyar flatly state that the Ottoman government encouraged and even ordered Salı¯m to fight against al-Jazza¯r, who was considered rebellious.30 All the reports confirm that Salı¯m entered into an agreement with Amı¯r Yu¯suf Shiha¯b, who also had an urgent interest in seeing al-Jazza¯r defeated. Though it is easily imaginable that the Ottoman government would have encouraged Salı¯m in this direction, it is hard to believe, as has been suggested,

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that the rebellion was initiated by Salı¯m, that, in fact, he “used the occasion” of the expedition against Amı¯r Yu¯suf to rebel.31 Tactically it would have made no sense to leave Acre to rebel, considering how difficult it would have been to conquer Acre. Another possibility is raised by ‘Alı¯ al-Zayn, who claims that the French had instigated Salı¯m’s rebellion against al-Jazza¯r. There is no doubt that a crisis between al-Jazza¯r and the French had been building up, and the French were very much of the opinion that trade would be better for them without him. The French consul also had excellent relations with Salı¯m, and already four years earlier, when Salı¯m was installed in Sidon while alJazza¯r was governor of Damascus, the French consul commented on how much better off they would be with Salı¯m.32 In addition the French in Sidon agreed to keep valuables for Salı¯m and, voluntarily or not, made a major financial contribution to his rebellion.33 The French also conducted a correspondence with Salı¯m from Acre.34 It has been suggested that the French support for the rebellion was the major cause of their expulsion from Acre.35 There is no evidence that they initiated or encouraged such a rebellion. More important, al-Jazza¯r took cruel and swift revenge on all he suspected of participation in the conspiracy against him. There is no reason why he should have waited for a year and a half to expel the French. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r must have asked himself the same question that Renaudot asked: Why would his top lieutenants rebel against him? Given his own identification with the Mamluk system and his keen sense of loyalty, he was deeply traumatized by these events. Latent fears, suspicions, and distrust now jelled into a sense of paranoia: “After this event he became like an untamed animal. Nobody could stand up to him and he imagined that the whole world was against him.”36 Not surprisingly, he began a wave of purges, exiling and liquidating people from all ranks in society. The military activities of al-Jazza¯r certainly continued on an undiminished level, but he must have had difficulties finding qualified commanding officers. He seems to have dealt with the problem by relying increasingly on the sort of military professionals who had flourished in an atmosphere of diminished Ottoman authority. These were military entrepreneurs who gathered volunteers around them: soldiers from dissolved units like the Dala¯t but also tribal people, criminals, and other dubious elements. They fed them, clothed them, and provided them with a salary. The military entrepreneur—unlike the typical warlord—did not seek to control a particular region or province so as to insure his and his soldiers’ livelihood; rather, he tried to hire out his military services to the various governors and amirs. These commanders looked at their military-for-hire services strictly as a business, not bound by

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territorial interests nor impeded by political loyalties. This explains also their frequently changing sides, which should not be understood so much as fickleness but rather as a constant search for greater profits in their business. The name of Qara¯ Muhfi ammad, head of Dala¯t units, appears more frequently.37 He was charged with leading an expeditionary corps of different units during the all-out war against the Druze in 1791. Ten years later he was still performing the same tasks.38 Kanj Yu¯suf, later to become governor of Damascus, started his career, too, as an officer and later an independent military entrepreneur.39 The most famous and typical of them all was probably Mulla¯ Isma¯‘ı¯l, another “commander of Dala¯t.” We have already encountered him above in the battle of the Mamluks against al-Jazza¯r. He had probably predetermined the defeat of the Mamluks once he had been swayed to stay out of the battle. Later he fought on al-Jazza¯r’s side and also supported Sulayma¯n Pasha against Kanj Yu¯suf. Eventually Mulla¯ Isma¯‘ı¯l was appointed by Sulayma¯n Pasha multazim of Hama and Homs.40 The short but steep career of Isma¯‘ı¯l Pasha, an Albanian who had come with the grand vezier Yu¯suf ’s army to dislodge the French from Egypt, is also symptomatic of the shortage of officers in al-Jazza¯r’s army. After the campaign Isma¯‘ı¯l Pasha accepted service with Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r and was immediately given command of a siege around Jaffa, where a prote´ge´ of the vezier Yu¯suf, Abu¯ Maraq, had been appointed governor. Later Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r regretted his choice. He suspected Abu¯ Maraq of conspiring with Isma¯‘ı¯l Pasha and had the latter imprisoned.41 Sulayma¯n Pasha, one of the oldest and most trusted of al-Jazza¯r’s Mamluks but also one of the leaders of the Mamluk rebellion in 1789, returned in 1802 to al-Jazza¯r, who received him with all honors and immediately appointed him mutasallim of Sidon and commander of a campaign against Amı¯r Bashı¯r.42 Eventually, Sulayma¯n Pasha was to succeed al-Jazza¯r as governor of Sidon, and quite a number of Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r’s Mamluks continued to serve under him. This brings up the question of the continued role of the Mamluk establishment under Sulayma¯n Pasha’s rule. When Sulayma¯n Pasha acceded to power the region was exhausted. Not only the French military expedition against Acre, but subsequent campaigns from Acre against Jaffa, Nablus, and the Druze had devastated the economy. Trade stagnated, and the exorbitant tax burden forced the peasants to flee from their villages. By force of circumstance but also, it seems, by the political inclination of Sulayma¯n Pasha, the military was to play a much smaller role. After having dislodged Abu¯ Maraq from Jaffa at the very beginning of his

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rule Sulayma¯n Pasha was to fight only one further major battle, in 1810 against Kanj Yu¯suf Pasha, governor of Damascus. But a major element of his army in that battle was the Druze troops of Amı¯r Bashı¯r. Sulayma¯n Pasha himself was reluctant to spend too much money on the military. The French consul observed with amazement in 1808 that he was dismissing his Albanian troops, the best he had. All this while he had no more than a thousand soldiers stationed from Beirut to Gaza.43 But in 1811 with his treasury flush with money from the grain exports to Europe, Sulayma¯n Pasha began to buy Mamluks left and right after the massacre in Cairo: “Tous les Chre´tiens qui se font Turcs sont amis dans ce corps a` qui tous les emplois sont confie´s.”44* Slave dealers flocked to Acre to sell their merchandise, and by the summer of 1812 Sulayma¯n Pasha’s army had increased to some 2,500 troops.45 Misha¯qa, without specifying the year, speaks of some 1,500 or 2,000.46 In December 1811 Muhfi ammad Abu¯ Nabu¯t, mutasallim in Jaffa, came to visit Sulayma¯n Pasha in Acre. He brought 500 troops, while in Acre itself barely 200 guards were garrisoned. As he too was a Mamluk of al-Jazza¯r, Abu¯ Nabu¯t considered himself very much Sulayma¯n Pasha’s equal.47 The French consul Pillavoine described the regime of Sulayma¯n Pasha thus: “La Syrie depuis Lataquie, jusqu’a` Gaza est une Re´publique dont le Se´nat compose´ d’affranchis qui ont toutes les places est soumis au juif Haim Farhi qui la gouverne Despotiquement sous le nom de Soliman Pacha, Mamlouc qu’en est le Doge.”48*—a sort of republic a` la Ve´nitienne in which the Mamluks held all the important positions. We know of at least a dozen-and-a-half high-ranking Mamluks whose names appear again and again. The chief of the treasury and closest confidant of Sulayma¯n Pasha was ‘Alı¯ Agha [later: Pasha] Khazinda¯r. He was Sulayma¯n Pasha’s lieutenant in Acre while the latter was governor in Damascus. He remained the second in command until his death in 1814. His son ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha was later to succeed Sulayma¯n Pasha. Most other highranking Mamluks served as mutasallims in the various cities. There were occasionally changes but on the whole the permanence of the appointments was remarkable. Only in regions or cities that were beyond the immediate reach of Sulayma¯n Pasha would he make use of local strongmen: the Tfi u¯qa¯ns in Nablus, Musfifitafa¯ Agha Barbir in Tripoli, and, of course, Amı¯r Bashı¯r in Mount Lebanon. The coastal cities and the inland towns of the Galilee and ¯ mil regions and a few of the high administrative positions in Acre the Jabal ‘A were always controlled by the same small group of men who had previously been al-Jazza¯r’s Mamluks. They had belonged to his Mamluk household and were all comrades (khushda¯shs) under the same chief (usta¯dh). This comrade-

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ship cemented their loyalty to each other, and was essential for the functioning of the Mamluk system as a whole. For Sulayma¯n Pasha this personal loyalty was the best means to insure his rule over Acre and its realm. New Mamluks were bought, and they served at the court of Sulayma¯n Pasha. A look at appendix C shows how elaborate the ceremonial was, imitating in titles if not in power the court in Istanbul. In fact, Sulayma¯n Pasha was master of the last functioning Mamluk system in history. Recently it has been seriously questioned49 whether the so-called NeoMamluks in Ottoman Egypt implied indeed a reemergence of the Mamluk system of old or were rather an instance of a much more general phenomenon, the Ottoman household. This is understood as a “patron client and kinship grouping, both for political solidarity and economic activity.”50 It was “neither rigidly defined nor a static entity” and “evolved to serve the needs of a highly competitive society that frequently received new members from far-flung places.”51 Military and administrative elite, freeman and Mamluk, local elements and newcomers were integrated in it. Widening the concept from a strictly Mamluk military household of the Middle Ages to an Ottoman household of the kind described above has its advantages. The concept certainly reflects much better the reality of the household in Acre. As we have seen, it was even doubtful whether al-Jazza¯r himself was a Mamluk properly speaking. In one source he is even quoted as claiming that he always was a freeman and hence disliked by the Mamluk establishment.52 Though he later acquired other Mamluks, he also bought or hired a variety of other troops. Numerically the Mamluks were always a minority in al-Jazza¯r’s household and seemed to have vanished after their rebellion in 1789. Sulayma¯n Pasha, al-Jazza¯r’s successor, rebuilt the system but also hired mercenaries and concluded alliances with the Metualis and Druze and used their tribal forces. Administrators of local origin also belonged to the household in Acre. ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha finally also included local elite elements in his household. But notwithstanding the argument that these were not Mamluk households in the classical sense,53 it is important to point out that their members considered themselves Mamluks and referred to themselves as such. If this was “a calculated, if genuinely felt, nostalgia”54 as Hathaway claims, it was nevertheless a politically relevant sentiment. It generated loyalties which caused al-Jazza¯r to risk his life. It identified political factions such as the party supporting Abu¯ Nabu¯t. Having been comrades (khushda¯sh) under the same chief (usta¯dh) legitimized competing claims to power, as was the case with ‘Alı¯ Agha Khazinda¯r, father of ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha, and Abu¯ Nabu¯t, and between the latter and Sulayma¯n Pasha. The Mamluks under al-Jazza¯r and

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then again under Sulayma¯n Pasha self-consciously styled themselves as Mamluks, and over long periods they were the decisive element in the household in Acre. It seems, therefore, not unreasonable to call this particular “patronclients and kinship grouping” a Mamluk household, even if it did not reproduce the classical form of that model. Understandably, there was great concern in Acre about the fate of the Mamluks in Egypt who had been massacred by Muhfi ammad ‘Alı¯. Two English travelers reported the massacre in May 1811, and soon after a firsthand report was given by Amı¯n Pasha, the famous Mamluk who escaped the massacre in the Citadel by a daring jump over the wall with his horse. He settled for a time in Acre and worked as a cavalry commander for Sulayma¯n Pasha.55 The Mamluks in Acre knew then that they were the last of their kind, and perhaps the massive purchase of Mamluks of which the French wrote in the period immediately afterward was less a question of enlarging the army than an attempt to insure their own existence and way of life. From all the information we have, the Mamluks seem actually not to have played a large role in the military. The seven hundred artillery troops in Acre were almost by definition not Mamluk and probably not Mamluk commanded. But even in the cavalry, the very service of Mamluks, we rarely hear of them. More frequently mentioned are the Kurdish Dala¯t cavalry with their commander Shamlı¯n (or Shamdı¯n) Agha, who seems to have been another military entrepreneur.56 Misha¯qa described the army as follows: “There was no longer any necessity for many soldiers [after settling relations with the Metualis], so only about two hundred infantrymen were put under the command of an Albanian officer named Muhfi ammad Agha al-Nu‘ma¯n who lived in Tyre and about five hundred cavalrymen were put under the command of three Kurdish officers, Shamdı¯n Agha, Ni‘mat Agha and Ayalyaqı¯n Agha; and two officers, ‘Alı¯ Abu¯ Zayd Agha and Mu¯sa¯ al-H fi a¯sı¯ Agha, were put in charge of around four hundred volunteer Arab horsemen, while an officer called the sa¯gba¯n ba¯shı¯ was posted over a few infantry soldiers stationed as guards at the palace gate in Acre. A group of cannoneers [was also stationed] on the city walls, just as there were artillerymen and officers in every city.”57 The Mamluk system had been in decline since ‘Alı¯ Bey al-Kabı¯r in the last third of the eighteenth century. In fact, his rise to exclusive power had been a symptom of the end of the traditional system—just as Amı¯r Bashı¯r’s concentration of power in his hands would bring another traditional order to its end: the feudal system of Druze and Christian lords in Mount Lebanon. The Mamluk system was beginning to suffer internally from lack of good manpower, negligent training, and increasing lack of loyalty.58 Ahfi mad Pasha al-

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Jazza¯r had been an early victim of such disloyalty in Egypt. Later his own Mamluk rebellion caused an almost complete destruction of the system in Acre. Partially rebuilt, it remained only one part of the military establishment. Later, under the rule of Sulayma¯n Pasha, there also existed other branches of the military, as we have seen. Perhaps more worrisome were other signs of decay. As in Egypt before, Mamluks in this last phase were not only inclined to marry and establish kinship relations but to promote their offspring—‘Abdalla¯h Pasha, the son of ‘Alı¯ Pasha Katkhuda¯, being the most glaring example. This added fuel to internal tensions. In April 1818 Sulayma¯n Pasha had been very sick, and people began to anticipate the time after his death. Possibly Abu¯ Nabu¯t had already suggested in Istanbul that he would like to take over the governorship from Sulayma¯n Pasha.59 The Mamluks of Acre were in close contact with Abu¯ Nabu¯t in Jaffa. They wanted to recreate an exclusive Mamluk regime such as they believed had existed in Egypt.60 The son of the late ‘Alı¯ Agha Khazinda¯r had no place in their planning. Perhaps Abu¯ Nabu¯t was acting out of a sense that he was Sulayma¯n Pasha’s equal, and perhaps he was willing to betray him.61 Probably the Mamluks altogether wanted only to safeguard their own existence and system. Natural children of Mamluks had no place in this system. ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha, only seventeen years old, prayed for Sulayma¯n Pasha’s continued health because he could not yet realize his own ambition to succeed him. His alliance with local elements was still on shaky ground. H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı, “de´teste´ de toutes les parties,” [detested by all] also worried that his patron might die. Sulayma¯n Pasha seemed inclined to recognize Abu¯ Nabu¯t as his successor, but Farhfi ¯ı was opposed to this because he feared the latter’s strong position.62 It was probably this fear that motivated H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı in the summer of 1818 to convince Sulayma¯n Pasha to move against Abu¯ Nabu¯t. He was removed from Jaffa through an internal coup. This step initiated the campaign against the Mamluks which ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha began even as he was waiting to be confirmed as governor of Sidon. Ibra¯hı¯m Agha, chief of artillery since the time of Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r, was replaced in September 1819 by Musfifitafa¯ Agha al-Istanbu¯lı¯. Another Mamluk lost his life under obscure circumstances, but probably was killed by ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha, who suspected him of disloyalty.63 Throughout the summer of 1820 mutasallims of various places, all Mamluks of al-Jazza¯r, were removed. Salı¯m Agha Abu¯ Sayf, mutasallim of Beirut, newly appointed to Sidon, was soon exiled, like H fi asan Agha and ‘Alı¯ Agha, a former mutasallim of Beirut. All three were Mamluk comrades of Abu¯ Nabu¯t, and suspected of having contact with him in Istanbul.64 The mutasallim of Naza-

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reth was replaced by a certain seventeen-year-old Salı¯m Agha. It seems that ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha preferred to employ people as young as himself while pensioning off the old Mamluks.65 Some Mamluks survived, and stayed with ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha until the bitter end. But from the list of his commanders who fell during the siege of Acre it is evident that the troops ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha used were not Mamluk anymore: H fi usayn Agha and H fi ama¯dı¯ Agha, both hfi awa¯ra ba¯shı¯s, militia commanders, and ‘Alı¯ Agha Farhfi ¯ıt, maghribı¯ ba¯shı¯, commander of Maghrebi troops. Shamlı¯n, commander of Dala¯t cavalry, survived.66 None of these units, with the exception of Shamlı¯n’s, existed during Sulayma¯n Pasha’s time. The Mamluks were no longer the group they had been under Sulayma¯n Pasha’s rule, with specific exclusive functions, political ambitions, and loyalties. Just as with the assassination of H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı, it was ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha’s aim to eliminate all elements that had been too close to Sulayma¯n Pasha and were perceived as a potential danger to his rule. We know little about the military establishment during ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha’s time. Apparently in each town that had a mutasallim there was also a garrison. At the beginning of his rule smaller towns such as Nazareth, Tiberias, and Tyre would have a garrison of 50 men. Tripoli, Beirut, Sidon, and other larger places would have 200 men, and only Acre had a garrison of 400.67 A rough estimate would indicate a standing army of less than 2,000. In moments of war ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha obviously counted on the tribal levies of the Druze and possibly the Metualis. In 1824 he sent into battle some 3,000 troops, most of them volunteer militias under Abu¯ Zayd Agha, but also consisting of Dala¯t, Albanians, and Maghrebis.68 The organization of the military forces in Acre reflected the whole spectrum of military options in Islamic history: from troops consisting of or controlled by a family clan to tribal alliances; from hired mercenaries, vaguely organized along ethnic lines under military entrepreneurs, to well-defined Mamluk households; and from infantry troops to cavalrymen. All these traditional patterns of military organization, together with their known advantages and disadvantages, were used at one point or another in the short century of Acre’s power. It depended on the political circumstances and also on the personal inclinations of the ruler in power which sort of traditional military organization would be preferred. The emphasis on fortifications and their defense was in particular, at least since the Crusades, well-established military strategy in this region. New tactics, new military technology, and new methods of organization were not sought or needed by the rulers of Acre, since the neighboring rivals and potential military opponents fought with equally traditional means and troop formations. The contribution of the

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unique state monopoly on cotton and grain exports consisted in supplying the means to pay for more troops than the neighbors could usually afford. This was sufficient to establish the predominance of Acre, but it also set limits to the expansion of Acre’s power, as al-Jazza¯r’s futile attempts to win control over the Druze showed.

ADMINISTRATION As Zfi a¯hir’s al-‘Umar’s realm grew in size, and especially after he made Acre his capital, the need for efficient administration grew. The problem is that we have no systematic information about this aspect of his government. About the countryside in particular we know extremely little. Before Zfi a¯hir moved to Acre he made great efforts to control the cotton trade and prevent direct contact between the producer and the French exporter. To establish such a monopoly Zfi a¯hir must have employed at least some overseers in the villages. But only in 1774, when ‘Alı¯ was fighting his father Zfi a¯hir, do we find mention of the cheiks ou administrateurs of villages in the Galilee,69 which does not tell us whether these were officials employed by the government or village shaykhs who were confirmed in their positions and forced to collaborate with the government in Acre. Perhaps they were both; in any case they seem to have been responsible for the delivery of the cotton. As we have seen, Zfi a¯hir and his vezier Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh were relatively successful in establishing a monopoly on cotton, and he could dictate prices to the French. But direct contacts between peasants and the French never ceased completely. To maintain law and order in the realm and insure its defense, Zfi a¯hir appointed most of his eight sons and some other relatives as local governors or prefects over the towns and larger villages:70 Sfi alı¯bı¯ (Celebı¯) was appointed in Tiberias, ‘Uthma¯n in Shfa¯ ‘Amr, which earlier had been controlled by Zfi a¯hir’s nephew Muhfi ammad al-‘Alı¯. Ahfi mad was placed first in Safu¯riyya and later conquered Jabal ‘Ajlu¯n and al-Saltfi, ‘Abba¯s was in Nazareth, and ‘Alı¯’s fi anna¯. After the base became Safed.71 Zfi a¯hir’s brother Sa‘d controlled Dayr al-H conquest of Sidon in 1771 Zfi a¯hir appointed Ahfi mad Agha al-Dinkizlı¯ mutasallim there, and his nephew Karı¯m al-Ayyu¯bi was made commander of Jaffa. Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar applied rather conventional policies here. By appointing members of his clan to positions of power and control, he hoped to guarantee the personal loyalty of the officeholders. He further tried to consolidate his rule by carefully choosing wives for himself and his sons. By marrying the daughters of defeated local chieftains he bound them in loyalty to his clan.72

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It was a political, administrative, and, albeit to a much lesser degree, even military system that relied largely on the bonds of family relations. That this was not necessarily a very reliable and effective system is demonstrated especially in the later years of Zfi a¯hir’s rule by the constant rebellions of one son or the other. In the final analysis the relationship of Zfi a¯hir’s sons to their father was not much different from that between Zfi a¯hir and the Ottoman sultan: while recognizing the sultan as his overlord, Zfi a¯hir most often did not feel bound by the wishes of the Ottoman government—an ambivalent relationship at best. In one important aspect, though, the political relations in the realm of Acre were different: although we are lacking information about the administrative role of the local governors in the cotton production and trade (if, indeed, they had any), it is clear that the export—and with that the profits—were controlled by Acre. Economically, therefore, the sons remained dependent on Zfi a¯hir. We find no evidence of attempts by the sons to build up their own business connections and export cotton for their own account. Fighting the father meant the disruption of the cotton business and suffering economic damage, which the sons, however, were quite willing to risk occasionally. Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar was fairly unique among his contemporaries in recognizing that political power was based not only on military prowess but on a sound economy, which for him meant the production of cotton and its export. He combined ambitions for political power not only with some military skills but also with a keen sense of and experience in the economy, in particular in commerce. In this he is comparable to Muhfi ammad ‘Alı¯ of Egypt two generations later. It was his recognition of the potential and the profitability of the cotton trade from the Galilee via Acre to France that gave his political ambitions content and direction. As a merchant he appreciated the increasing revenues that could be drawn from the cotton trade, as a politician and a man of power he realized that all the profits would be his if he exerted political control over the cultivation and the trade of cotton. This insight motivated his conquest of the western Galilee, the fortification of Acre, and the expansion along the coast. His desire to assert control over the cultivation and trade of cotton from the area led to an unending sequence of alliances, local battles, sieges, etc. But it also introduced prosperity to the region, created a veritable boom in Acre, and provided him with the resources to further enhance his political and military power. By means of combining economic enterprise with his political aspirations, Zfi a¯hir’s personal competition with other merchants turned into a government policy of monopoly as soon as he had the military and political power to implement it.

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Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar also was unusual in that he understood excessive exploitation of the peasant to be detrimental to the increase of revenues in the long run. Greater productivity had to be encouraged through investment rather than extortion. He is said to have observed: “When the fellah is productive, the land will be fertile and all the country with it will be prosperous. How often were the fellahs oppressed before, but my wealth suffices me when I see the peasants prosperous in my country.” For this purpose he ordered his prefects and officials, first, never to take more from the peasant than the legal mı¯rı¯ tax and, second, to advance the peasants money when they were too poor to buy seeds and work their fields.73 He encouraged the extension of cultivation and even seems—in at least one case—to have provided housing in order to settle new immigrants.74 In addition, great emphasis was put on law and order and, in particular, safety on the roads of the realm—an important precondition for the free movement of goods. All this generated immigration from the neighboring regions, the expansion of the cultivated area, and an increase in prosperity. Our information for these developments is anecdotal, and there is no way to provide quantitative data about the demographic and economic development of the countryside. For the city of Acre itself we have at least some indications suggesting that during the rule of Zfi a¯hir it increased from one or two thousand inhabitants to approximately twenty-five thousand or perhaps more. But the dramatic population growth in the city of Acre most certainly does not suggest proportional increases in the hinterland. From the beginning of the rise of Acre the Greek Catholic community had a dominant role in the city. Years before Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar took up residence in Acre he was already involved in its trade and had made Yu¯suf al-Qassı¯s, a Greek Catholic, his agent there. When Zfi a¯hir consolidated his control over Acre, he made him his first vezier. As we have seen, al-Qassı¯s brought Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh to Zfi a¯hir’s attention. As a physician he gained the confidence of his master, and when al-Qassı¯s was caught fleeing with his wealth from Acre in 1761, al-Sfi abba¯gh was made vezier and quickly assumed control over all government administration and the economy. He pursued with vigor Zfi a¯hir’s monopoly policy with regard to cotton—much to the chagrin of the French traders, who described him as greedy and an intriguer but also highly gifted as an administrator.75 Needless to say, he became enormously wealthy in his own right. He controlled the finances of the realm and had full access to Zfi a¯hir, who would take no step without consulting him first. However, Mikha¯’ı¯l al-Sfi abba¯gh’s description of Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar as being so uneducated that he hardly could count and write is certainly wrong when we consider

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that Zfi a¯hir had been a successful merchant and politician long before he met al-Sfi abba¯gh at the age of sixty.76 What might have happened though, and that seems confirmed by the French reports, is that Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh was increasingly able to isolate the old man from his surroundings—especially from his sons—and control access to him.77 Nobody, except perhaps Ahfi mad Agha al-Dinkizlı¯, wielded as much power at the court of al-‘Umar as did Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh. Presumably he had a staff of scribes to help him keep track of customs, finances, and political correspondence. Not surprisingly we find that one of his sons, Yu¯suf, worked for his father in the administration.78 Mikha¯’ı¯l alfi ana¯ Sakru¯j from Bahfi rı¯ worked in the 1770s as a secretary for al-Sfi abba¯gh.79 H Shfa¯ ‘Amr also was an employee of al-Sfi abba¯gh.80 It certainly helped being a member of the family or of the Greek Catholic community to obtain positions of confidence. There surely were more people working for al-Sfi abba¯gh, but we have no clue how the administration was organized. To employ members of Jewish or Christian minorities in high office as scribes, councillors, administrators of finances, and even as veziers had a long tradition in Muslim states. Minority status implied a certain social and legal weakness. When Jews or Christians were employed in the government service, their position and authority depended solely on the will of the Muslim ruler. This insured, understandably, a high degree of personal loyalty to him. He could, or at least he believed he could, be sure that such employees did not represent other, local interests and that he could dismiss Jewish and Christian officials at will. Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh’s membership in a religious community that was localized in Syria and Egypt and was de jure illegal in the empire recommended him all the more to a ruler who himself had strong local interests and was most often at odds with the central government. This pattern of a high-powered official originating from the minorities would be continued in Acre with H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı under al-Jazza¯r and especially Sulayma¯n Pasha and, to a lesser degree, Catafago under ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha. The high concentration of power in their hands—control of finances, economy, and administration, i.e., all branches of government except the military—was closely linked to the largely successful attempt to control exports and impose a variety of economic monopolies. We should also not forget that Acre had started from virtually nothing and, though growing rapidly, remained a relatively small city. Its size and a certain pioneer spirit made no great demands for the evolution of a very structured administration. Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar, quite the patriarch and founder, would himself frequently interfere directly in the affairs of the city and his

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realm: when he observed from the window of his palace what he believed to be a prostitute in action, he personally had her and her husband expelled from town; he had naked dervishes brought before the qa¯dfi¯ı; on observing excessive funeral rituals he had them suppressed.81 These examples should not be understood as implying that he was a very pious person. When incidents of the plague occurred in Acre, he followed European customs and locked himself up in his residence. He laughed off the muftı¯’s criticism and, in fact, fined the muftı¯ for it.82 Some parts of his power he seems to have completely delegated, such as all financial aspects of his government. But he kept a keen interest in military decisions and actions. In his eighties he still commanded troops in the battlefield, participated in the siege of Jaffa, and single-handedly solved a crisis with rebellious troops. Until the very end he remained the dominant figure in the realm of Acre. Firmly in control of political rule, he shared his power only with his vezier and his commander-in-chief. Throughout his rule in Acre, al-Jazza¯r was the appointed governor of Sidon. As such he was an official employee of the Ottoman government—occasional disagreements notwithstanding. In spite of this position he followed the pattern established by his predecessor—predecessor in power, not in title, that is—by residing in Acre. The city remained the center of export trade and political power on the coast. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r expanded the realm. ¯ mil and Mount Lebanon had officially always belonged to the provJabal ‘A ince of Sidon but had enjoyed a large degree of autonomy. Al-Jazza¯r established direct rule over the Metualis by completely crushing their military power; he established direct rule over the coast, including Beirut, and converted the Druze regions to a permanent battleground of proxy wars between him and the governor of Damascus. To the south he extended his direct rule to Caesarea; but only in the last years of his rule did he try to incorporate Jaffa into the realm of Acre. Only when appointed governor of Damascus did al-Jazza¯r try to establish his control over Nablus and Jerusalem—with limited success, as we have seen. Whenever he was also made governor of Damascus or commander-in-chief of all of Syria, Acre still remained the center of power. Damascus would now be ruled from Acre and not vice versa. Despite the climactic end to Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar’s rule and the ensuing struggle by al-Jazza¯r to liquidate the former’s sons and their control over parts of the region, al-Jazza¯r inherited a well-defined realm with its center, and an economic base and commercial infrastructure which were as unique as they were profitable. The strength of the system was enhanced with al-Jazza¯r’s appointment as governor of Sidon, providing a legitimate base for it. He himself

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seems to have had every desire to continue along the road Zfi a¯hir had laid out. From his predecessor al-Jazza¯r inherited not only Acre as the actual capital and residence but also the economic policies of a government monopoly over cash crop exports from its realm. These conditions originally defined the tasks of his government quite well: to secure the realm for cultivation of cotton and other cash crops, and to assure Acre’s position as the sole conduit for export trade. The first he did, as we have seen, through almost continuous warfare and interference at the periphery of his realm. The second he tried to achieve by direct control over the port cities of Sidon and Beirut, though Jaffa remained for most of the time beyond his control and thus guaranteed the economic survival and independence of Nablus. The instruments for achieving these aims were the two branches of government that existed: the military and the administration. Their functions were not always clearly separated. In the smaller towns and harbors in particular, military and administrative functions were often combined in the person of one of his trusted Mamluks appointed as mutasallim. In numbers and cost, the military was by far the larger branch of government. But it was the administration that in the end had to raise the funds to pay for the military. It had to determine and collect taxes and customs, establish and execute monopolies, and carry on correspondence with the French merchants and the central government. In two aspects al-Jazza¯r differed importantly from Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar: he was not a local man and he had no family. Though inclined to continue the policies of his predecessor, these two aspects, together with his more violent temper, induced him to choose means of pursuing these policies that differed substantially from those of his predecessor. Zfi a¯hir had been able to count on the bonds of family to insure loyalty to him, albeit with a certain amount of rebelliousness. He had appointed his sons and other relatives to practically all subregions and towns of his realm to insure security and the collection of taxes. For the actual collection of taxes village shaykhs, appointed or confirmed by the local governors, were responsible, each for his village. The local governors functioned as representatives of Zfi a¯hir’s rule and had total authority over their particular region. Their loyalty to Zfi a¯hir was, of course, enhanced by the fact that he controlled Acre, i.e., the export harbor, key to the flourishing of the economic base of the realm. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r had to substitute for such family loyalties by appointing mutasallims who were under his direct control. Their loyalty derived, at least in the early years, from the fact that they were his Mamluks and thus bound in the very special relationship of trust and loyalty that was characteristic of the Mamluk household. Later the frequent replacement of mutasallims substi-

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tuted for vanishing loyalty. Only where limitation of his military capabilities made it unavoidable would he confirm members of local elites as mutasallims—such as the Tfi u¯qa¯ns in Nablus or various Shiha¯bı¯ amirs in Mount Lebanon, whom he played against each other. Not being of local origin, alJazza¯r lacked Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar’s intimate knowledge of local conditions, personalities, and clan networks. Rather than establishing alliances, as Zfi a¯hir had done so successfully, he preferred to smash local structures with military force and place his military commanders as mutasallims in such regions, and then by sheer force and repression ensure payment of taxes and obedience. The Metualis were the main victims of this policy. In other words, control over the realm became much more centralized and local elements much less involved in it. The consequence of such a shift was a need for more military presence to guarantee control. This in turn created a greater financial burden for the government, i.e., for its subjects. While the regions of the realm were controlled by mutasallims and occasionally recognized local leaders,83 Acre itself, holding the monopoly over export trade, and control over tax collections were under the direct supervision of al-Jazza¯r and his staff. Here we can recognize the rudiments of an administration. Some positions were filled by al-Jazza¯r’s Mamluks. The position of khazı¯nda¯r was apparently first filled by Sulayma¯n Pasha, later by ‘Alı¯ Agha, brother of Salı¯m the Younger. Khazı¯nda¯r is commonly translated as “treasurer.” Unfortunately we do not know precisely what his tasks were. How much was he involved in financial decisions or keeping the books? Judging from ‘A¯lı¯ Agha’s participation in the Mamluk rebellion in 1789, he was certainly responsible, with some Mamluks, for actually guarding the treasury that was deposited in the burj al-khazna, one of the most fortified towers in Acre’s defense works. When al-Jazza¯r was made governor of Damascus in 1785, Salı¯m Pasha the Elder, in fact his deputy, became governor of Sidon, while Sulayma¯n Pasha was made governor of Tripoli and later became mutasallim in Sidon. Administrative, political, and military functions remained closely integrated, at least in the top positions. This multifunctional elite ceased to exist only with the Mamluk rebellion and subsequent purges. Later military commanders appear to have been just this: they had not the same personal access to al-Jazza¯r, were not involved in policy decisions or financial matters. Through much personal interference and frequent changes of officeholders, al-Jazza¯r tried to insure his own safety and his control over the affairs of government. In the more civilian aspects of administration he followed by and large the patterns established by his predecessor in using local minority members as

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scribes, secretaries, bookkeepers, and managers of economy. This certainly was facilitated by the fact that al-Jazza¯r himself “quoique Bosnak se plaıˆt d’avantage a` se servir de la langue et de l’e´criture Arabe, que de la sienne.”84* Just after being established as governor of Sidon, he was approached by H fi abı¯b al-Sfi abba¯gh, son of Ibra¯hı¯m, offering him his services. Al-Jazza¯r was pleased because H fi abı¯b was known to have good accounting skills and to be a responsible man.85 His appointment immediately aroused the envy of Butrus and Mikha¯’ı¯l Sakru¯j, recently hired secretaries from Shfa¯ ‘Amr. The father of the Sakru¯j brothers had already been employed in Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar’s administrafi abı¯b soon resulted in his dismissal and the tion.86 Their intrigues against H advancement of the Sakru¯j brothers. In 1780 the French compared Mikha¯’ı¯l Sakru¯j to Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh. He had become the most important mediator for the French, and al-Jazza¯r had complete confidence in him. In fact, alJazza¯r’s “kitchen [was] in the house of the Sakru¯j” and he ate only what the Sakru¯j women cooked for him.87 In 1784 Mikha¯’ı¯l Sakru¯j was the senior official in al-Jazza¯r’s government.88 The Sakru¯j brothers began to trade on their own with Trieste and Livorno, though we do not know with whose ships.89 In 1787 both Sakru¯j brothers were thrown into jail and tortured, and money was extorted from them.90 Whether their independent commercial dealings were the original motive for their arrest is hard to say. A number of other secretaries—the secretaries of the treasury, of accounts, and of supplies—were purged at the same time. Others were appointed: Ibra¯hı¯m Abu¯ Qalu¯sh and Yu¯suf Ma¯ru¯n took over. Ibra¯hı¯m, too, was briefly arrested. The position of secretary seemed not a very attractive career anymore to subsequent appointees: the newly appointed Ilya¯s Adda fled to Mount Lebanon; his successor, Yu¯suf al-Qarda¯hfi ¯ı, fled to Europe and Ibra¯hı¯m Abu¯ Qalu¯sh was reinstalled. He had come originally from Damascus and served under his coreligionist Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh. From al-Jazza¯r he had received some taxfarms at Nazareth but was called to Acre to serve as a secretary. He was apparently also a military commander and could raise up 400 cavalrymen.91 Having very close relations to Salı¯m Pasha the Elder, he participated in the Mamluk rebellion. He fled to Mount Lebanon but was later killed upon the request of al-Jazza¯r.92 Yu¯suf Ma¯ru¯n, suspected of being associated with alQalu¯sh, was also executed in Acre.93 Another secretary, who was to play later an important role at the court of Sulayma¯n Pasha, was H fi ana¯’ al-‘Awra. He had assumed the position of his father, Mikha¯’ı¯l, as a scribe after the latter had died. Al-Jazza¯r also suspected him of involvement in the rebellion and H fi ana¯’ had to flee.94 After the rebellion the Sakru¯j brothers were set free and

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reinstated in their positions. They quickly regained their influence over alJazza¯r. The French merchants, chased from Acre in October 1790, were convinced that the two brothers, Mikha¯’ı¯l and Butrus, together with the former’s son Yu¯suf, were at the bottom of al-Jazza¯r’s policies against the French, but their powerful position did not protect them against—and perhaps exposed them so much the more to—the wrath of al-Jazza¯r. Their final downfall came five years later, when they were executed, probably as the result of intrigues by the new rising star at the court of al-Jazza¯r, H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı.95 He was the scion of an illustrious Jewish family in Damascus which by the early eighteenth century occupied a preeminent position as bankers, cultivating close relations with power elites there. Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar had already tried to use their services in Istanbul. H fi aim was to become the most powerful of all secretaries and was later justly called vezier. Only Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh had occupied a comparable position. Under al-Jazza¯r, however, he fitted the typical pattern of the dhimmı¯ administrator, his position depending totally upon the goodwill of his master. Considering H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı’s later role and importance and the frequency with which he is mentioned in the travel literature,96 it is remarkable that we can not ascertain the precise date of his arrival in Acre. It must have been sometime after the French left Acre in October 1790, since they never mention him in their reports. We can only presume that he was brought to Acre soon after al-Jazza¯r was appointed governor of Damascus, in addition to his being governor of Acre, in October 1790. Several events occurred which might have been cause for this appointment. After the Mamluk rebellion, purges in the administration had left few qualified secretaries. The departure of the French aggravated al-Jazza¯r’s financial problems. He might have wanted to use the financial skills and reserves of the powerful Damascene bankers. During the same time H fi asan Kfi apu¯da¯n Pasha, sworn enemy of al-Jazza¯r, died in Istanbul; al-Jazza¯r might have hoped to strengthen his contacts there and the representation of his interests via the Jewish network. The sources tell us nothing about H fi aim’s very first years in Acre. In 1794 H fi aim was jailed in Acre for the 97 first time. When he was imprisoned he was blinded in one eye and—most likely on the same occasion—one of his ears and part of his nose were cut off. All travel accounts describe this incident as the result of the erratic and despotic behavior of al-Jazza¯r, who followed every whim of his cruel nature and took delight in personally inflicting mutilations. Yet from a contemporary Arab source we learn that things were not quite as whimsical as they appear in the travel accounts: al-Jazza¯r was actually on pilgrimage during the time of H fi aim’s arrest and mutilation. Simultaneously the whole Farhfi ¯ı family

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was thrown into jail in Damascus, tortured, and forced to pay huge ransoms. In other words we have here a systematic effort to break the power of the Farhfi ¯ı family. What remains unclear from the sources is whether the initiative for the action came from al-Jazza¯r’s mutasallim in Damascus or from alJazza¯r himself. As we saw earlier, the mutasallim, Ahfi mad Agha, fled Damascus shortly before al-Jazza¯r’s return from pilgrimage. This suggests that he acted on his own when attacking the Jews in Damascus. Shortly after his return from Mecca, however, al-Jazza¯r was removed from the governorship of Damascus, and the Farhfi ¯ıs could once more resume their position as sarra¯fs to the local governor. Weakened in his position vis-a`-vis the central government, al-Jazza¯r was in need of H fi aim’s financial talents, and he reappointed him as his secretary. The Farhfi ¯ıs had survived the first serious challenge to their power. H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı continued to serve his master faithfully until he was once more, for reasons we do not know, thrown into prison shortly before the death of al-Jazza¯r in 1804. Upon the latter’s demise H fi aim was immediately released and ordered to bring the estate of al-Jazza¯r and all fi aim went on to a great career as the most the accounts into good order.98 H powerful man in the region, if not in name at least in practice, only to be assassinated fifteen years later. The administration under al-Jazza¯r certainly suffered many disruptions and purges, but we can also recognize some surprising continuity. Many of his scribes and secretaries had previously served under Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar. Others were to stay in the administration after al-Jazza¯r’s death. Typically, sons would follow fathers in their positions. The ‘Awra family provided three generations of secretaries for three rulers: al-Jazza¯r, Sulayma¯n Pasha, and ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha. Three generations of the Sakru¯j family served under Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar and al-Jazza¯r. The al-Sfi abba¯ghs provided at least two generations. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r himself, and after him Sulayma¯n Pasha, followed the policy of having sons succeed fathers.99 Brothers, too, would be hired: Butrus Sakru¯j, Mu¯sa¯ Farhfi ¯ı, and Sulayma¯n Abu¯ Qalu¯sh had all followed their brothers to Acre. Others showed remarkable resilience: Yu¯suf al-Qarda¯hfi ¯ı, who had fled to Europe to escape al-Jazza¯r, later worked for him as well as for Sulayma¯n and ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha.100 With the noticeable exception of the Greek Orthodox Sakru¯j and the Jew H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı, all secretaries were Arabs of the Catholic denomination. There must have been more scribes, but throughout the whole period we find again and again the same names of a few families mentioned who provided the key secretaries and, incidentally, also the first historians of the period.101 Members of the minorities were not only employed as scribes but also, on occasion, as multazims—such as the Misha¯qas,

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al-Qalu¯sh, and Catafago. The latter is mentioned for the first time in 1797. By 1801 he was imperial [Austrian?] consul and impressed European visitors with his wealth.102 He had flourished under al-Jazza¯r and was to continue his career under al-Jazza¯r’s successors.103 Yet under the rule of Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r administrators were never secure in their positions. Some, indeed, were executed, while others were repeatedly thrown into jail and tortured, only to be reinstated some time later. Even H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı, the most prominent and longest lasting, did not escape such treatment. The ostensible reason was al-Jazza¯r’s greed. Every time he heard about one of his secretaries possessing any riches, he had him tortured until he surrendered his wealth, probably assuming not unjustifiedly that the person had accumulated the wealth in his service. More often the real reason for the purging, liquidating, or reinstating of secretaries must have been his personal lack of trust, which after the Mamluk rebellion seems to have occasionally reached pathological levels. One might add that no other institutional checks on the activities of his employees existed and that by temperament al-Jazza¯r was not a man to surrender any aspect of his authority easily. As some travelers put it: “On le voit . . . donner des ordres relatifs a` l’administration de sa province, diriger les travaux des fortifications, des ´edifices publics; suivre la construction d’un navire, tracer des plans de campagne, cultiver des fleurs, ordonner la parure de ses femmes et faire un dessin de broderie,”* and again: “He was his own minister, chancellor, treasurer and secretary; often his own cook and gardener; and not infrequently both judge and executioner in the same instance.”104 Although the composition of his administration remained surprisingly stable we do not observe the phenomenon of the “vezier” as under his predecessor and successor. Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh had under Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar assumed virtually full authority over all fiscal, economic, and civil administrative policies and was actively involved in foreign policy decisions. In a similar way, as we shall see, H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı was to assume power under Sulayma¯n Pasha, leaving only control of the military to others. There is ample evidence that Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r did not reign but rule. Jealously guarding over his power, he would not delegate much responsibility.105 In addition to the civil administration there existed a whole court administration. We occasionally hear about it: the harem is mentioned; palace guards, gatekeepers, etc. play a role; the treasurer and other officials are named. On the whole, though, we have precious little detail about the hierarchies, the positions, and functions of these officials. Since there is much

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more material for this point concerning the rule of Sulayma¯n Pasha, I shall attempt some retrospective extrapolations. Ibra¯hı¯m al-‘Awra, the scribe at the court of Sulayma¯n Pasha and his biographer, has left us a complete listing of all the employees of the administration and the court, their positions, titles, and names.106 Incidental information tells us that much of this had been put into place during the time of Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r. Under Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar before him, however, matters were still much more informal. There were, of course, some scribes, and Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh played a major role as adviser, business manager, and administrator, but, on the whole, the administrative apparatus remained small. Having no claim to an official position as governor, Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar had no ambitions—or perhaps deemed it wise not to show any—to hold court in Acre in a formal and ostentatious way. The realm was, as we have seen, managed by his sons and other relatives. After the death of Sulayma¯n Pasha, ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha seems to have made many personnel changes but continued to use the same organizational forms of court and administration. Only al-‘Awra, however, gives us detailed information about these organizational structures and those who filled them. His description refers, of course, only to the period of Sulayma¯n Pasha, but I believe it is admissible to deduce similar forms for his predecessor and his successor. Ibra¯hı¯m al-‘Awra mentions 34 administrators dealing with affairs in Acre while another 46 were managing the realm.107 At the court some 57 are listed as employees or officials in one position or another. These numbers might have varied somewhat, but the conclusion is that never more than 150 government employees were needed to run Acre and its realm—not counting, of course, the military. We recall our earlier observation about how long individual officials would stay in office, or how, at least, members of the same family would keep between them certain positions in the administration. It meant that the same individual or family would serve two or even three successive rulers. This provided a certain stability and continuity of administrative patterns. During his rule Sulayma¯n Pasha hardly changed anybody in his administration, and he hired the sons when fathers died. Military and civil administration functions overlapped at certain points, especially in the position of the mutasallim in the realm and at court, where ceremonial, guard, and simple servant functions often meshed with each other; usually such functions were filled by Mamluks of different ranks. Yet we can recognize certain institutional and functional differentiations. The military was commanded by some mercenary officers, such as Shamlı¯n, and by the Mamluks who functioned as mutasallims

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in various towns and regions. Ultimate command and authority rested with Sulayma¯n Pasha. There always seem to have existed some distinct units differentiated by their specific tasks and functions—as, for instance, the artillery corps for the fortifications of Acre, garrison troops stationed in various cities and towns, and some cavalry troops. In addition Druze tribal levies could be raised on an ad hoc basis. They would be commanded by their own chieftains, i.e., usually they were led by Amı¯r Bashı¯r. The civil administration in Acre had two major departments, that of the Arabic scribes and the one for finances. The former, headed by H fi ana¯’, the father of Ibra¯hı¯m al-‘Awra, was apparently responsible for general correspondence and administrative tasks, while the latter was headed by H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı. It dealt with the collection and payment of taxes and the economic monopolies and exports. Smaller divisions such as management of warehouses and customs inspections demonstrate a preoccupation with economic matters. But the hierarchical relation in which they stood to the department of finances is not quite clear. Nor is the relation or division of functions between H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı and the financial administration on the one side and ‘Alı¯ Pasha Khazinda¯r, the treasurer, on the other, clear. Even geographically their departments were not separate. Every morning, two hours after sunrise, they convened together with Sulayma¯n Pasha in his dı¯wa¯n in the Bu¯sta¯ building or seraglio and discussed various issues. H fi ana¯’ al-‘Awra, the chief Arabic secretary, was called in to present newly arrived letters and correspondence. More discussion ensued and eventually al-‘Awra would leave to attend to his tasks. At this point various scribes came in to work on their registries, write out letters and orders, and make copies of them.108 This arrangement also explains how our author, Ibra¯hı¯m al-‘Awra, who was after all only a junior scribe, was privy to so many conversations between the high and mighty. Another, potentially important, part of civil administration lay in the hands of H fi asan Agha, the son-in-law of ‘Alı¯ Pasha. He had an office for all peasant complaints and legal cases. But we do not hear much about it. It is important to point out that all scribes in the realm, attached to the various mutasallims, were directly responsible to H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı. He could appoint and depose scribes in Acre and the realm, quite regardless of the wishes of the mutasallims.109 In this way the government offices in Acre could keep a close check on the actions of the provincial administration. In the end we should not expect too much formalization and institutionalization of the administration. The ruling Mamluk elite was small in numbers and changed little, like the administrative staff, which consisted mainly

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of local minority members. It was almost possible to know everyone in these circles personally. The administrative tasks of the premodern government were limited. Even though Acre might here have been somewhat atypical because of the heavy involvement of the government in the economy of its realm, it still remained an administration small in size and limited in its functions. Still, we would have liked to know more about the actual mechanics of government. Perhaps more important than the formal aspects of this government administration is the question of power and authority within it. Ibra¯hı¯m al‘Awra supplies us here, too, with detailed if rather synoptic material in a list ranking the seventeen most important people in Sulayma¯n Pasha’s government.110 The list is problematic because it does not incorporate change over time. It also relates first and foremost to the situation in Acre. Such powerful mutasallims as Abu¯ Nabu¯t of Jaffa and Barbir of Tripoli are mentioned but are not part of the ranking. On the other hand, ‘Alı¯ Pasha Khazinda¯r, designated as the second most powerful after Sulayma¯n Pasha himself, died in 1814. His son, who at this point was thirteen, inherited his position and rank but certainly held no comparable power. Among those on top of the list the only one—after Sulayma¯n Pasha himself—who held power consistently was H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı. ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha was the first ruler who was born and grew up in Acre (still under al-Jazza¯r’s regime). He was neither a self-made businessman nor a Mamluk soldier. He was, in fact, the first who had a thorough education, which is to say a traditional religious education. He apparently knew calligraphy: before he obtained his appointment as governor of Sidon, he made the sultan a present of a copy of the Koran written in his own hand.111 He also was very young, eighteen or nineteen years, when he came to power, and was easily influenced. He is described as rash, irascible, cruel, and dedicatedly anti-Christian.112 The historian Shiha¯b described him as demonstrating “‘adam al-siya¯sa ‘ala khudda¯mihi,” which could be translated as a “lack of political sensibility towards his subjects.”113 ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha had not only an extensive religious education but also religious inclinations. There is evidence that he was a Sufi. His personal ima¯m, Shaykh Musfifitafa¯, and the qa¯dfi¯ı, Muhfi ammad Efendi Abu¯ ‘l-Huda¯, were also influential with him. The names that are mentioned in this context, and we should add the name of Shaykh Mas‘u¯d al-Ma¯dfi ¯ı here, appear first during the rule of Sulayma¯n Pasha, especially in the entourage of ‘Alı¯ Pasha Khazinda¯r. On the periphery of this group is also the poet and muftı¯ of Beirut, ‘Abd al-Latfi¯ıf Fathfi Alla¯h. He had already written eulogies for Ahfi mad Pasha al-

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Jazza¯r. Under Sulayma¯n Pasha he had been repeatedly called to Acre to direct complicated court cases. Judging from the great numbers of odes dedicated to ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha, his relations to the latter seem to have been the closest.114 What is remarkable about the group is the fact that all were members of known local families. It is the first time, with the obvious exception of Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar and his clan, that we can observe a number of influential locals participating in the politics of the government of Acre and its realm. They formed a party at the time of Sulayma¯n Pasha, and they became influential under ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha, once the Mamluk party and, finally, H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı had been removed. The localist character of this group was, of course, not elevated to the level of a program or ideology; rather, its members introduced religious terminology and arguments to legitimize and promote their own interests. Another factor or, more precisely, another person has to be considered in order to complete the picture of power structure, the administration, and economic activities in Acre in the early nineteenth century: Antoine Catafago. He is mentioned by most travelers whom he hosted at his residence, and the French consular correspondence discusses him repeatedly. Oddly enough, Ibra¯hı¯m al-‘Awra mentions him only briefly two or three times in his detailed study of Sulayma¯n Pasha. This probably reflects al-‘Awra’s own preoccupation with formal administration and political hierarchies and his disregard for economic activities and informal structures. Catafago’s family was of Genoese background and had come via Corsica to Aleppo, where Antoine was born. Antoine settled in Acre in 1794, where his brother Philippe joined him a few years later. The French consular correspondence mentions him first in 1797 as a vice-consul of Venice who is bent on preventing the French from reentering the trade of Acre.115 Ten years later, shortly after a regular consular representation was reestablished in Acre, he was described as “antifranc¸ais par intereˆt” because he benefited from the trade monopoly of Sulayma¯n Pasha in Acre. He also acted as Italian subject, agent of Holland, the Republic of the Seven Islands, Spain, and the king of Naples. He changed loyalties all the time and behaved offensively (i.e. toward the French).116 In 1816 Antoine Catafago was also vice-consul of Russia and in 1818 representative of the Hapsburg Empire.117 His brother married the sister-in-law of the French translator in Acre, M. Martin, and his sister was married to Kyu¯rk alFara¯’, an Armenian from Aleppo and scribe for H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı. Antoine Catafago was also the multazim for agricultural land in Nazareth. We are not quite sure when this began. In 1806 he had the tax-farm for three villages, and in 1811 he had already generated so much antagonism among his peasants that one of them took potshots at him; this seems not to have

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prevented him from beating them even years later.118 Catafago seems to have specialized in the cotton trade. He had maintained contacts with Aleppo, especially through the Jewish merchant Piciotto, who ordered cotton from him for Livorno, for instance. But he even conducted direct trade with Marseilles.119 In 1816 and 1817 he made some good profits with grain exports to France when a shortage had developed there.120 The French consul understood Catafago to be an associate of H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı and saw him in 1818 as the cause of the absence of French merchants in Acre: the French merchants in Marseilles sent textiles to “un ´etranger, fermier du Pacha a` qui il doit plaire et les lui vendre.”121* Catafago was an intimate friend of H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı. He socialized with him, and when Europeans—such as Lady Hester Stanhope, for instance—came to visit, Catafago played the role of the translator at the home of H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı.122 Yet he was also a survivor. After the murder of H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı, when most suspected of loyalty to H fi aim were killed or exiled, Catafago succeeded in getting closer to ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha. After the death of Farhfi ¯ı he was made the exclusive contact for European merchants.123 A year later “almost all the trade [was] in the hands of the pasha and the Austrian consul who also functions as the Russian vice-consul. They are the owners of several ships, buy the oil from Samaria and the cotton from the Galilee, export it and market in the country in return for manufactured items”124 A few years later the French consul reported again that Catafago was “associe´ du Pacha pour le monopole” [the pasha’s associate in the monopoly] and that French merchants in Acre were functioning only as his agents.125 The only official position Catafago ever had in the administration of Acre was that of a multazim of Nazareth agricultural lands. In contrast to Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh and H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı, he never was a secretary in the Acre administration and finances. He was not considered a dhimmı¯ but a faranjı¯, a European, though his legal status in this regard is not quite clear.126 He claimed various citizenships and tried to strengthen his status as consul and vice-consul of a considerable number of European states and princes. Nevertheless he seems to have had intimate access to ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha and to have functioned, as did al-Sfi abba¯gh and Farhfi ¯ı, as the chief trader for exports within the system of economic monopolies. The break with Catafago came in the summer of 1828, when ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha, obviously short on cash, accused him of all sorts of wrongdoings and extorted from him all the jewelry of his wife and daughters as well as gold coins. ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha ceased to recognize him as representative of foreign powers. Because of their wealth—they possessed several villages and had done well for themselves in trade—the Catafagos had become vulnerable. They

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became virtual prisoners of the pasha. In the fall of 1828 Antoine Catafago retired to his countryside residence in Nazareth. In this way he was able to protect himself somewhat from ‘Abdalla¯h’s extortions and, eventually, to outlast the regime of the latter. With the arrival of the Egyptians in Syria in 1831, Antoine moved to Sidon, where he lived another ten years as a respected consul and wealthy merchant.127 In sum, administrative structures saw a rudimentary development during the period under investigation. Functions and hierarchies were defined, and a new aspect—the economy—was successfully made the object of government administration. Yet the administration was never institutionalized enough to develop its own rules and regulations and to free itself from direct interference by the ruler.

chapter 5

SOCIETY AND ITS STRUCTURE IN ACRE

It remains for us to have a look at the sort of urban society that evolved in Acre. Because of the dearth of relevant sources more questions will be raised than can be answered. Acre as a city and as a urban society distinguished itself by several unique features, which make it difficult to fit it into the typology of Ottoman provincial cities, though it also shared some features with such cities.1 In terms of time, Acre could look back, of course, on a long and distinguished history from antiquity to the Crusades. But the Acre of the eighteenth century developed quite literally ex nihilo. As one traveler described it in about 1700: “Besides a large Khan in which the French factors have taken up their quarters and a mosque, and a few poor cottages, you see nothing here but a vast and spacious ruin.”2 In terms of space, the new Acre was built on well-preserved urban ruins. This was not accidental, since the ruins functioned as an ideal source for building material: hewn stones in abundance were already on the construction site. The preexisting structures and street plan also prescribed to a large degree the shape and form of the new structures and their location. This had occurred in other cities in Syria, too, but it had been a gradual process over centuries, and ancient structures were much less easily recognized than in Acre. The first building activity by Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar had been the construction of a city wall, more or less along the medieval outline of the city. With that the space for urban development was defined and it remained intra muros at a time when other cities in Syria had gone beyond their original circumference and expanded extra muros. In terms of functions, Acre was, like other cities, the residency of a local

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ruler or governor and was of strategic military importance. But we find no other city oriented so exclusively toward export trade and with only one major cash crop—which, in addition, was made a government monopoly. What was the impact of these features on the development of urban society? Did this society differ from other more slowly developed and traditional urban societies? In what ways was integration into the Europeandominated world economy felt? The attempt to answer such questions is best begun by looking at the physical layout and development of Acre itself. There exists to our knowledge no map of the city drawn during the time we are concerned with, between 1740 and 1831. The French army produced several detailed maps of the immediate geographic surroundings of Acre, indicating artillery positions, trajectories, and outer fortifications. But the area circumscribed by the walls remained a white spot. The French had neither access to nor interest in the layout of the city. We are therefore dependent on contemporary city maps with superimposed indications of building substance left by the Crusaders. The most helpful here is the Kesten report of 1962, an architectural survey of the city and its archaeological remains.3 From the maps of this report we can recognize the phenomenon, described by Wirth for other cities,4 of the way in which the uses and functions of the more recent city slowly changed the underlying yet still recognizable patterns and physical layout of the earlier one. In our case, however, this process was not the result of slowly changing political ideas, social structures, etc.; there was a radical rupture, and the degree to which ancient patterns are still recognizable frequently depends on the height of the rubble heap upon which, in the middle of the eighteenth century, the new city was constructed. Thus the northeastern part of the city lies some seven to eight meters above the level of the Crusader city. Although some major buildings can still be seen that are built on the fundaments of Crusader structures, the layout of thoroughfares and blind alleys has changed radically. A major thoroughfare, for instance, which led from a gate in the northern wall southward during Crusader times, cannot be traced anymore. The new Acre of the eighteenth century had only one gate, at the seashore on the eastern side. A main road forked from there to the commercial parts and to the seat of government. In the southern and western part of the city, more or less on the level of the Crusader city, the new structures frequently incorporated older building substance and followed much more closely the layout of the older city. The Rectangular Quarter and the Pisan and Genoese Quarters of Crusader times are clearly recognizable, with main streets separating the quarters, with entrance gates, and some walls. The Pisan and the

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Venetian khans, huge structures, are still visible today. They were repaired and partially rebuilt during the eighteenth century and used for the export trade. The combination of a few large thoroughfares, connecting major public and commercial areas and the city gate, with a multitude of little branchingoff blind alleys, leading to semipublic space and eventually to entrances of dwellings, dominates the street pattern of Acre as it does in many other premodern Middle Eastern cities.5 A striking feature of the layout of Acre is the strict functional division between different parts of the city. The northern part is dedicated to the government-military complex. The centerpiece was the citadel, fortress-cumresidence of the ruler, built upon the foundations and walls of the Hospitallers’ fortress and integrated into the fortification structures of the northern wall. As in most other cities of the period, such as Aleppo, Damascus, and Cairo, the citadel was meant as a defense for the city but also against the city, in case of urban rebellion. Southeast of it was the Posta or Bu¯sta¯, a Crusader structure used as government building or seraglio. The complex was completed under Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r, who added to it the most beautiful mosque in Palestine from the Ottoman period. Open space to the east of this complex probably served for military exercises; some of it consisted of the gardens of the residence. Along the eastern water edge, facing the bay, spreads the commercial area. It is dominated by four khans. The Kha¯n al-Faranj, also called the French khan, in use by the beginning of the eighteenth century, coincided with the former Venetian khan. Northeast of it Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar had the Kha¯n alShawarda added. To the south he had Kha¯n al-Shu¯na¯ built into the former Pisan khan. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r would later build the Kha¯n al-‘Umda¯n on the site of the Genoese khan, southwest of the French khan. North of the Kha¯n al-Shawarda and close to the city gate Zfi a¯hir had a bazaar erected. A large thoroughfare, passing by the bazaar, connected all three khans with the city gate. In the typical Middle Eastern city economic activities were centered around the bazaar. Artisan production and sales of merchandise were concentrated here. The bazaar was a major thoroughfare with many small adjacent khans, where artisans worked, merchandise was stored, and merchants might stay over. In Acre the sheer size of the khans is striking. The four khans were much larger than the whole bazaar and were not linked to it. The bazaar, so close to the city gate, probably functioned as the major exchange for produce from the rural hinterland, artisan production by the townspeople, and im-

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ported merchandise. The khans had very little to do with all that. They were used principally for the storage of cotton, later grain, and its preparation for export; from the neighboring quay, cargo was loaded onto the ships. The dominant position of the khans and their location symbolized clearly the major business of this city: cotton export. The fact that the Kha¯n al-Faranj was also the permanent living quarters of the French merchants indicated the direction of this commerce. The center, western, and southern parts of the city were residential areas, typically with single-family houses, one or two stories high, turned toward an inner court. Two-story houses with several separate apartments were common too. The typical maze of branching-off blind alleys, accessed by a few larger streets, can be found here. By 1806, Acre also boasted of seven coffeehouses.6 The most important fact about society in Acre is that it consisted almost completely of immigrants. Among the population of about 25,000 in the early 1770s there could have been hardly a grown-up person who had actually been born in the city. Several devastating outbreaks of the bubonic plague took a high toll. In 1760 one-third of the population perished and in 1785/86 an estimated one-half.7 A third severe outbreak of the epidemic in 1812/13 wiped out half of the Muslim population.8 If we add to this several famines and the total exodus of the population in 1775, when Abu¯ ‘l-Dhahab was about to conquer the city, and a dwindling of the population by attrition in the last years of al-Jazza¯r’s regime, the turnover of population and total immigration must have been even heavier than the actual population estimates suggest. Immigrants came from the immediate surroundings of Acre such as Shfa¯ ‘Amr, for instance, but also from the villages and towns of the Galilee and Mount Lebanon, and from as far away as Damascus and Aleppo. Immigrants came from cities as well as from rural backgrounds. In many ways it was a frontier society, at the periphery of the old provincial centers and drawn into a whole new world of European raw-material markets. But it was a frontier society with a twist: the political elite was often itself at the frontiers of transformation and at the fringes of legitimacy. Frequently it would challenge the authority of the central government and go its own way. The rulers were more often than not self-made usurpers. Nevertheless the power of the ruling elite was from the very beginning considerable and its control over the immigrant society formidable: a strong government vis-a`-vis a weak society. In 1783 the French consul in Acre, Renaudot, commented about society in Acre and its realm as follows:

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Le gouvernement Tyrannique auquel [ces peuples] sont soumis augmente ces vices, les fait naıˆtre [?] souvent, et de´truit en eux les sentiments d’honneur et de probite´ que la nature peut semer dans leurs coeurs en leur donnant [illegible]. Dans un des plus beaux pays du monde, les hommes sont me´chants, et Esclaves, et telle est la nature du Gouvernement Despotique que celui qui donne La Loi est plus Esclave que celui qui La rec¸oit. Un Pacha, avec deux milles hommes de troupes, peut-eˆtre les plus me´prisables qu’il y ait au monde, fait trembler douze cent mille habitants: a` Son tour il a les plus grandes frayeurs au milieu des mise´rables qui ´exe´cutent ses volonte´s, toujours prestes a` fle´chir le genou devant lui, ou prestes a` lui porter le coup mortel. Les Esclaves ne connaissent que les extreˆmes de l’inhumain, patients jusqu’a` pussillanimite´, ou en cole`re jusqu’au de´sespoir; et c’est sur ces principales caracte´ristiques que tout est ´etabli ici. Les Peuples Se´dentaires sont si patients, si soumis, si humbles, en meˆme temps si craintifs, si de´fiants qu’ils n’osent, pour la plupart, en de quoi s’enrichir, a` cause des Tyrans qui composent cette chaıˆne de Despote du Troˆne au dernier [illegible] de l’empire, et qui surveillent le mise´rable Raya avec une avidite´ insatiable, pour savoir s’il a plus que ce qui est ne´cessaire a` sa vie et a` l’acquittement des droits dont un monopole actif et cruel surcharge sans cesse sa che´tive et faible industrie.9*

As we have seen, al-Jazza¯r served the contemporary French political discussion as a paradigm for tyranny and its evil consequences. At the eve of the French Revolution, these observations by Renaudot read like the textbook answer to the question “What are the consequences of despotism for society?” Yet, though very much in the style of a theoretical treatise, Renaudot’s conclusions were based on his own experience in Acre. And the French reports recount many incidents, small and large, without couching them in theoretical terms. Indeed, too many of the early Arab historians describe instances of al-Jazza¯r’s cruelty toward the population for one to be able to dismiss them. There can be no doubt that he was in many ways a particularly unpleasant ruler, often terrorizing his subjects. Without knowing the context it is often difficult to guess the motives for such behavior. Not only did he have a violent temper, but he also seems to have gone through drinking bouts, lengthy mood swings, and perhaps some hallucinations. He was violent, and drank heavily in his youth.10 The Mamluk rebellion in 1789 seems to have shaken him to the depths. At that time he imagined the whole world to be against him. He went on a murderous rampage that did not stop before the muftı¯ and the qa¯dfi¯ı,11 craftsmen, servants, and other subjects were liquidated for no particular reason.

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But when al-Jazza¯r returned from the 1791 pilgrimage, his mood had changed. He was cheerful and happy: “He foreswore drink and pederasty and applied himself to praying five times a day.”12 He had good reason to be content. His major enemy in Istanbul, H fi asan Kapu¯da¯n Pasha, had died. The governorship of Damascus had been granted to him in addition to that of Acre, and he had just successfully brought the pilgrimage caravan back from Mecca. His mood, though, soon deteriorated. He had his recently appointed muftı¯ and the director of the port executed. He then had more than two hundred workers, scribes, and chiefs (nawwa¯b) as well as carpenters and other artisans arrested. In a somewhat bizarre procedure he had each brought before him, ordered each to uncover his forehead and then regarded him attentively. Those upon whom he claimed to see a “sign” were imprisoned. On the next day he ordered Maghrebi troops to kill them all outside the city. In the evening the relatives were ordered to bury their dead but were forbidden under penalty of death to wail. Terrorized, the population did as ordered.13 What were the reasons for such a massacre? Apparently there were not even economic motives, since al-Jazza¯r did not try as he did so often to extort a ransom from his prisoners. Were these signs of hallucinations? Al-Jabartı¯ reports that al-Jazza¯r claimed to have esoteric knowledge. According to Shiha¯b the arrests and the massacre were initiated with the smashing of all gates in the city, presumably meaning the gates which led to and closed off blind alleys and quarters and behind which people could easily barricade themselves.14 Perhaps we have here a hint of resistance, or suspected resistance, by the population.15 It was the only such massacre, and if al-Jazza¯r continued to have individuals tortured or killed it was usually, at least to his thinking, for good political or financial reasons. Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar and Sulayma¯n Pasha were comparatively mild-mannered, but they left no doubt about their authority and power. If government monopolies on olive oil, grain, and cotton created hardship and outright famine, it did not sway the rulers to change their policies. Internal political opponents, whether sons or Mamluks, were forced into submission. ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha reverted to outright assassination and banishment to enforce his political control. We don’t know enough about the circumstances that induced al-Jazza¯r to massacre two hundred townspeople to be able to explain or justify his behavior. But perhaps this question is more important: What sort of society is it that buries its dead in silence, not able or willing to rebel? It is precisely the sort of society Renaudot described in his report: “patient, soumis, humble,

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craintif.” For the whole period, from the 1740s to the 1830s, we practically never hear of any rebellion or protest from the townspeople of Acre. The one noteworthy exception occurred in 1816, when famine spread because of a bad harvest and Sulayma¯n Pasha continued to export grain abroad for greater profits. Women staged a demonstration in Acre, demanding flour. Sulayma¯n Pasha threatened to chase everyone out of Acre,16 offering only to sell them biscuits from army supplies that dated from the time of al-Jazza¯r! In moments of crisis, as for instance when Abu¯ ‘l-Dhahab was approaching with his army, all the population left the city. When oppression and actual danger to life in Acre became unbearable under al-Jazza¯r, many people would flee to the mountains, the H fi awra¯n, or elsewhere. But was such faintheartedness the result of despotism, or did despotism just thrive particularly well because of the lack of resistance? We are brought back to the question of the character of this society and its social structure. About the structure of society at the time of Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar—or at any other time for that matter—we know very little. Its most outstanding feature was, as we have seen, its immigrant character. Practically everyone in Acre— commoners and gentlemen, subjects and ruling elite, Christians and Muslims—was an immigrant. Was the population separated in quarters by religion or ethnicity, as it was elsewhere? The distribution of churches and mosques leads to the conclusion that the Christian population was concentrated in the western, the Muslim population in the eastern part of the city. Whether there existed clear-cut border lines distinguishing the quarters and whether the areas were exclusively settled by Muslims and Christians respectively cannot be ascertained. Complete separation of population groups into quarters did not exist in other cities. There seems to have been some structuring along community lines as far as residential distribution patterns were concerned. Probably we can go even further and assume that each Christian community settled close to its church. Most illuminating in this context are the measures the Christians took in 1812/13 to protect themselves against the plague. In contrast to the Muslims,17 the Christians quarantined themselves against the epidemic, with the result that only a few of them died. Those who did were from among the poor who did not have the means either to leave the city or to go into seclusion. At least half the Muslim population perished. The Christians did not lock up the whole Christian quarter, evidently because there was no clear-cut separation of populations. Instead, several families would join in one house and store as much food as they could afford and had space for. The more fortunate groups

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of families also had a priest with them who would read mass for them. Others would lay planks across roofs to be able to approach the church and listen to mass from a distance, while still maintaining the quarantine. All this seems to confirm the pattern of each community gravitating around its church without, however, establishing complete separation from other urban dwellers. After all, the city was small—eight hundred meters wide at its longest extent, and interaction of all the city dwellers with each other was a daily—and well-documented—occurrence in work and business. Indeed, the ruler could not avoid having daily contact with the townspeople. Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar once happened to see, from his residence, a woman in her apartment. Noticing him, she apparently opened her window wide and exhibited herself deliberately. He had the woman and her husband sent packing at once and returned to Damascus from where they had immigrated.18 Encountering naked dervishes in the streets, Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar had them beaten and ordered such behavior to be officially interdicted and announced throughout the city by the town crier. He even had the funeral procession of a shaykh stopped. The dubious claim to fame of the shaykh was that he would fly to heaven and the people in the procession were chanting “fly, fly.”19 Throughout the eighteenth century Christians seem to have been a majority. The largest Christian group were the Greek Catholics, who flourished under the protective hand of Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh, the powerful vezier of Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar. Their first church was that of St. John, initially built in 1737 by the Franciscans and later transferred to the community and enlarged in 1765. The second church, St. Andrews, the largest in Acre, was built in 1764 and financed by al-Sfi abba¯gh. Both churches are located in the southwestern corner of the city. From 1752 on, the community had a bishop. From 1765 to 1768 the Greek Catholic patriarch made Acre his residence.20 For the Greek Orthodox, a church, St. George, existed in the 1730s and was considerably enlarged during Zfi a¯hir’s rule. A church for the Maronites, St. Mary, was built after 1750.21 The rapid expansion of church structures during this time and the fact that no churches were added later are indicators of the growth of the Christian communities and their prosperity during the time of Zfi a¯hir al‘Umar. An Ottoman mosque—the Sina¯n Pasha Mosque, al-Sinniyya—had been built around 1600. Later it was torn down by Sulayma¯n Pasha and replaced with the al-Bahfi r Mosque. Before Zfi a¯hir made Acre his permanent residence he had an old synagogue converted into a mosque, al-Mu‘allaq Mosque. A few years later al-Zaytu¯na mosque was added. The most famous mosque, alJazza¯r’s, was built early in his rule. Its grandeur and location indicate not so

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much the growing needs of the community of believers as the government’s need for legitimization. The city and the realm were, without doubt, under Muslim sovereignty. In all probability the majority of the urban dwellers were Christians, but this was not perceived by anyone as a challenge to Muslim rule. When the Greek Catholic community wanted to repair its church in 1810, it obtained written permission to do so from the muftı¯ of Acre after he had inspected the building; both sides adhered to the practices applying traditionally to the dhimmı¯ communities.22 Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar had appointed a qa¯dfi¯ı and a muftı¯. For the latter post he brought from Damascus the son of an ‘a¯lim and friend of the family, ‘Abd al-H fi alı¯m al-Shuwaykı¯. His father had previously visited the family in Tiberias and been Zfi a¯hir’s host when he was on business in Damascus. In Acre, ‘Abd al-H fi alı¯m was not only made muftı¯ of the city and the realm but also appointed teacher of the children of Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar, at least one of whom, ‘Uthma¯n, developed some poetic skills.23 ‘Abd al-H fi alı¯m also taught Arab grammar and syntax to Mikha¯’ı¯l alSfi abba¯gh, the son of Zfi a¯hir’s vezier.24 Among the upper government functionaries in Acre frequent interaction between members of different communities could be observed, whether it was a question of common education, or collaboration in administration, or business. Some evidence also points toward social intercourse. For a later period we know, at least, of one case in which a Christian shoemaker took on a Muslim apprentice.25 It was perhaps more unusual that Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar was prepared to arm Christian as well as Muslim inhabitants of Acre for a common defense. This step reflected not only Zfi a¯hir’s personal tolerance and broadmindedness but also the localist character of his rule. For the whole period we find no evidence of intercommunal tensions, though identity with one’s religious community certainly existed and was a part of the general social order. When Abu¯ ‘l-Dhahab conquered Acre, however, there seem to have been some who whispered in his ears that the Christians had become too uppity.26 We would like to know more about the social structure of the population, but evidence is meager and our information remains maddeningly sporadic and anecdotal. The French reports cover in great detail aspects of trade and politics insofar as they are relevant for trade, but have very little to say about the internal structure of society. Neither do the accounts of European travelers. Major Arabic sources such as ‘Abbu¯d and Mikha¯‘ı¯l al-Sfi abba¯gh and H fi aydar Ahfi mad Shiha¯b report only incidentally about such aspects. Al-‘Awra, following his own interest and experience, reports in detail about the administration and its organization, but aspects of social organization appear only incidentally in his chronicle.

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Guilds, for instance, play a major role in all comparable cities. Organizing production in particular, they frequently overlapped with Sufi organizations. As they included in many ways the families of their members—through training, providing for widows, guaranteeing price levels, etc.—the guilds were a major institution in the structuring of society. As for Acre, we read, of course, about a variety of artisans and people in service trades: tassel makers and tailors, tobacco sellers and gunpowder merchants, shopkeepers and mule drivers, washers of corpses and prostitutes.27 Perhaps there were too few of each living in Acre to form guilds. In any case there is no evidence that guilds existed. A French report mentions one group with its head, “les emballeurs,” who packed raw cotton into bales for shipping. Unfortunately this report refers to Sidon and not to Acre,28 though such workers must have existed in Acre as well. Whether they were organized in a guild we cannot say. Throughout the whole period under investigation Acre experienced intensive construction activities: private houses, churches, and mosques were built, markets and khans, aqueducts and roads—by far the largest projects again and again concerned the fortifications of Acre and their improvements. Almost half the surface of Acre is taken up by fortifications and the citadelcum-residence of the rulers. Great numbers of masons and carpenters were needed—surely enough to form guilds. Again, there is no hint that such existed. We read, though, of a very different sort of organization for construction work. In connection with the many building activities initiated by Sulayma¯n Pasha, especially between 1810 and 1815, we learn of two wirash (pl. of warsha)—workshops, or artisan ateliers. One consisted of masons, the other of carpenters. Their heads were called alfa¯ (alpha). The head of the carpenter workshop was Boghus al-Armanı¯, the head of the masons was Yu¯suf alH fi akı¯ma. They were in government employ and had scribes attached to them (most likely to keep the accounts of the workshops).29 These workshops were charged with major public construction projects inside Acre but also in the realm of Acre. We have no information as to the number of carpenters, masons, etc. working in these ateliers. But that these were very substantial operations is evidenced by the number of beasts of burden kept in the workshops. At the time of Sulayma¯n Pasha’s death the workshops had 400 mules, 400 donkeys, and 300 camels.30 Just for handling these animals hundreds of drivers would be necessary. If we add to that the actual masons and carpenters, it must have included the major part of the working population of Acre. The important point for our investigation here is that these were outfits, paid and managed by the government, fulfilling tasks that in other

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cities more independent-minded guilds would fulfill. In other words, the Acre government was not only dominant in the export trade but also extended its economic role by being the largest building contractor and employer of labor, and keeping labor under its own management. Apparently these workshops already existed at the time of al-Jazza¯r. When in 1789 he was besieged by his rebellious Mamluks, he “mobilized the workers and the masons in the warsha and furnished them with arms.”31 For even greater projects different populations were mobilized. In 1779, before moving to Acre as his new residence, al-Jazza¯r had the old fortifications and many of its buildings repaired and reconstructed. For this purpose he used forced labor from the surrounding villages on a three-day-rotation basis.32 On occasion, for instance when building the second wall around Acre, he also would use the city people, including the Christians, as labor. For earth movements in particular he used Metualis as forced labor,33 although some people came voluntarily, in search of work.34 Sulayma¯n Pasha used the same methods. When he decided to remove all the earth entrenchments the French had thrown up facing the fortifications of Acre, he ordered the workers of the warshas, all his scribes and administrators (including H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı), and practically every inhabitant of Acre to come out and help level these structures. When the Greek Catholic community refused to return on the second day, Sulayma¯n had them locked out of their churches.35 A few years later, preparing for an imminent assault by the governor of Damascus, ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha took similar measures when he decided to cut a second moat around Acre and have it filled with seawater. The whole population, rich and poor, old and young, had to come out of the city and with the help of wicker baskets remove earth from the ditch. Rations of bread and water were distributed at noontime; only in the evening were people allowed to return to the city, the well-to-do returning before the poor.36 To complete the picture, some other government enterprises should be mentioned here: there was a government slaughterhouse37 and a salt works, managed by a government administrator.38 Private business and government enterprise were inseparably entangled when Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh founded a soap factory in Acre.39 Later ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha made the production of soap an outright government monopoly.40 Families that combined government service with entrepreneurial wealth, such as the Sakru¯j, Abu¯ Qalu¯sh, and al-Sfi abba¯gh, were kept under relentless pressure and control. Although obviously there were retail merchants in the new market built by Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar, many aspects of commerce, in particular cotton but also olive oil and wheat, were government business. An urban

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elite consisting of established families from which came international merchants as well as the top ‘ulama¯, so typical for other cities of the time, was absent in Acre and was, because of the economic monopolies, systematically prevented from developing. The overwhelming dominance of the government establishment in terms not only of political power but also of economic control found no precedent in comparable Syrian cities. This situation had its origin in the monopolistic arrangement Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar established with the French for the export of cotton and the integration of the local economy into the world market. But these patterns of government control of the economy could only develop so successfully because of the peculiar characteristics of the society of Acre. We have observed a certain coherence and continuity of dhimmı¯ families working for the administration in Acre. But what was glaringly absent was an elite of strong, well-established Muslim families filling a variety of functions and defending their interests against governors and military elites—as they did, for instance, in Damascus. They had come from elsewhere and nobody in Acre would take up their case. If the population was frightened, submissive, and patient, this was not caused, as Renaudot suggested, because of despotism or, one might add, economic monopoly policy; rather, these characteristics could thrive thanks to a considerable weakness of social structure and the lack of urban elites—circumstances that in the last analysis could be traced back to the fact that this was a society consisting completely of immigrants. These were not immigrants who had migrated into a city and been absorbed into an already existing society, nor were they constituting a “frontier society” with its characteristic remoteness from political authority. These were immigrants who had come to an empty place, managed from the first day by a strong if not despotic government. Only during the very last phase of the period discussed here can we find some hints of the formation and expression of local interests. This did not happen among the military, which almost by definition was not local; neither were such interests articulated by a merchant class, which, as we have seen, was systematically oppressed and stunted in its growth by monopolistic government policies. Rather, it is among men of religion that we find the first local civilian attempt to participate in power. The beginning of this development lay probably in the circumstance that ‘Alı¯ Pasha liked to surround himself with ‘ulama¯’. Shaykh Muhfi ammad Efendı¯ Abu¯ ‘l-Huda¯, muftı¯ and qa¯dfi¯ı of Acre during Sulayma¯n Pasha’s regime and ‘Abdalla¯h’s, belonged to this circle. The Abu¯ ‘l-Huda¯ family were a Palestinian family of learned men who over several generations held different religious positions in Jerusalem,

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Nablus, Ramle, etc.41 Another ‘a¯lim belonging to this circle was ‘Abd alH fi alı¯m al-‘Adfi wı¯ from the lower Galilee. He was appointed to the administration of Sulayma¯n Pasha. ‘Alı¯ Pasha’s son ‘Abdalla¯h was the first ruler of Acre who actually grew up there. His father appointed ‘Abd al-H fi alı¯m as his tutor.42 Another member of this circle, though not an ‘a¯lim but a local, was Mas‘u¯d al-Ma¯dfi ¯ı. He was of peasant origins, belonging to a family of village shaykhs in Tfi antfiu¯ra, south of Haifa. We have encountered him already as a prote´ge´ of ‘Alı¯ Pasha and enemy of H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı. As his waqf deed shows, he had considerable agricultural holdings and real estate in Acre itself.43 Those three men constituted the nucleus of a group that supported and was protected by ‘Alı¯ Pasha and later would wield decisive influence on his son ‘Abdalla¯h. It was they who succeeded, through ‘Abdalla¯h, in having the powerful H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı liquidated. And it was from this circle that a new political discourse emanated. Promoting their own interests, they couched them in religious terms. During the devastating plague of 1812/13, which the Christians in Acre survived so well thanks to their quarantine measures, ‘Abd al-H fi alı¯m al-‘Adfi wı¯, together with the superintendent of the al-Jazza¯r Mosque, instituted anti-Christian measures. The Christians’ patron, ‘Alı¯ Pasha, had fled Acre during the plague, but upon his return he rescinded the measures and rebuked their initiators. The religious discourse, though, was to have its effect on ‘Alı¯ Pasha’s son ‘Abdalla¯h. From his childhood on ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha received regular religious instruction. As one European traveler reported: “Here I found the young lord, sitting between two venerable shaykhs who were expounding to him the Koran or commenting on some abstruse points of faith.” He also learned calligraphy.44 Later he was not only to heed the counsel of these ‘ulama¯ but would begin to surround himself with Sufi dervishes. Misha¯qa refers to the rabble and the vulgar with whom ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha was inclined to consort, apparently during Sufi dhikrs. According to him, H fi aim opposed this association with the dervishes: “If he must attend dhikrs, then it should be done with suitable people, like the qa¯dfi¯ı and the muftı¯, the dean of the sharı¯fs and the ‘ulama¯.”45 We know that Sufism was then spreading in Acre and that ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha was intimately involved with the Sufis. Shaykh Kha¯lid, founder of the Kha¯lidı¯ branch of the Naqshbandiyya Order, was a spiritual adviser to ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha and corresponded with him from Damascus in the 1820s.46 In 1819 ‘Abdalla¯h “gave up coffee and joined a community of dervishes.”47 He had regular sessions with the dervishes, going through ritual exercises, dancing, and reciting the name of God.48 Being an impressionable and somewhat unstable young man, exposed for years to religious learning,

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‘Abdalla¯h must have appreciated the argument of religious impropriety for a Jew to lord it over the Muslims. Interestingly, in the short period between his official appointment as governor of Sidon and the assassination of H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı, ‘Abdalla¯h reintroduced the traditional—but in Acre never applied— laws of special dress codes for the dhimmı¯s. It was obviously a strategy to undermine the position of H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı and also of most of the government administrators, who were Christians. Probably all this was inspired by the clique of ‘ulama¯ surrounding ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha. When they could not find any serious improprieties in H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı’s conduct, they accused him, after his death, of having brought great numbers of Jews to Syria. Twenty thousand immigrants in Safed and “thousands” in Tiberias are mentioned.49 These numbers, bearing no relation to reality, provided the pretext for harassing the Jewish communities there for higher tax payments. The Christian dhimmı¯s, too, understood the whole affair as a heightening of intersectarian tensions, and some of them began to leave Acre.50 This process was accelerated a year later. After the Greek nationalists had started their uprising in the Morea in March 1821, the sultan sent orders to all provinces to fortify the coastal towns and to disarm the Christians. ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha not only obeyed this order but evicted most Christians from Acre.51 Christians also were paid to convert to Islam. Young ones were trained to become Mamluks.52 These measures were not applied very vigorously, but the mood had changed. Where once the Christians had constituted at least half the population if not the majority, by 1829 they made up perhaps no more than 20 percent.53 The deterioration of intercommunal relations was accompanied not only by the decline in economic conditions—or perhaps was a result of the decline—but also by a curious countercurrent. Even as the dhimmı¯s lost their position of power and influence, the European impact became more visible. The European economy had, of course, been at the basis of Acre’s recent development. But European influence had been indirect and not apparent in the local life-style. During Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar’s rule, all women—“even the catholic and European women”—had to be totally veiled in public.54 As late as 1797 al-Jazza¯r could tell the vice-consul to order the wife of one French merchant to cease wearing dresses “a` la Constantinopolitaine” because this was the exclusive privilege of al-Jazza¯r’s harem.55 In 1806 “Turcs,” i.e., local Muslims, assaulted people wearing European dress. The French exacted a promise from Sulayma¯n Pasha that they could wear the cocarde with his protection.56 ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha, religious-minded as he was, nevertheless was preoccupied with imitating the Europeans: “He sits only on chairs, drinks

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nothing but wine and champagne and uses a European saddle and stirrups.”57 His nephew was mutasallim in Sidon and dressed totally in European style— only his mustache was oriental.58 Catafago gave dinners a` la Franc, where ‘Abdalla¯h would get totally drunk.59 The European presence also found expression in the internal political structure. Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh and H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı had been local dhimmı¯s whose own power was totally derived from the protection their masters granted them. Catafago played in some ways a comparable role under ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha. It was never quite clear, though, whether he was a dhimmı¯ or an Italian. He tried to buttress his position in Acre by becoming vice-consul of as many European nations as possible. Just as profound was another change which suggests a shifting world view: Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar had relied totally on local physicians, trained in traditional concepts, such as Sı¯wa¯n and later Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh. The chief physician of Sulayma¯n Pasha was an Italian from Naples, Francesco. He quickly sent off the traditional physicians still at the court of Sulayma¯n when their incompetence became evident.60 ‘Abdalla¯h also had an Italian physician, Bosio, from Piedmont, though he maintained a profound distrust of him and always, when Bosio prescribed any medicine, made him swallow the same amount.61 There may have existed a correlation between the new religious-mindedness of the Muslims of Acre, the economic decline, and the greater visibility of the European presence. Abdel Nour observes a regroupement confessionel and a crystallisation religieux in all the cities of Syria during the nineteenth century. He implicitly addresses the deterioration of intercommunal relations; he points out the trend in various cities, but does not provide a common explanation.62 In the first decades of the nineteenth century the reasons seemed to differ greatly. Barely a few years before such tendencies appeared in Acre, Kanj Yu¯suf Pasha had established in Damascus stringent rules for Christians and Jews.63 In his case it was an attempt to legitimize his own position in view of his failure to defeat the Wahhabi forces.64 What ties the situation in Damascus to that of Acre is obviously not the visibility of the European impact but the general weakness of the Ottoman Empire, no longer able to defend itself against unbelievers and heretics. In both cases the challenge went to the core of Sunni orthodoxy and the legitimacy of the Ottoman sultan. In the Greek case the question arose whether dhimmı¯s could be prevented from rebellion and in the Wahhabi case Islamic sectarianism could seriously question the orthodoxy of faith of the Ottoman ruling elites. The weakness of the empire’s center had also given space for different

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expressions of localism and the assertion of peripheral vis-a`-vis central power. Acre was the perfect example of this trend. Rulers and minorities had used a variety of means to assert their autonomy. But the religious discourse was first used, as we have seen, by some local elements of Muslim Arabs trying to articulate and assert their own political interests. This group of ‘ulama¯ and landholders, like Mas‘u¯d al-Ma¯dfi ¯ı, from established Palestinian families appeared, however, too late and remained too weak to influence the fate of Acre and its realm in any decisive way. In the final analysis all the population of Acre were immigrants of the first or, at most, the second generation. Hence family ties and social structures were not as firmly developed as they were in Damascus or Nablus, for instance. The fluid social situation in Acre carried the promise of great upward social mobility, but it also exposed individual traders to the whims of political strongmen. The fact, that all the merchants mentioned here and also all the censaux were minority members emphasizes the weakness of this commercial group and its vulnerability. In the final analysis, trade, especially export trade, remained a government affair; and the government demonstrated overwhelming power. Once Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r decided not to pursue export trade through the French link any longer, there existed no local group strong enough to carry it out on its own. Thus we cannot observe in Acre the adaptability to new conditions, changing products and trade connections, etc., which made the Muslim merchant class of Nablus during the same period and after so remarkable65 and were later to characterize the development of Beirut. More generally speaking—once trade was abandoned in Acre and political power was lost—immigrants became emigrants again.

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CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

The set of maps1 of the Syrian region reveals the development of a unique territorial political entity between 1730 and 1831 on the coast of Syria. It had originally expanded from Tiberias, but Acre soon became its ¯ mil permanent center. This entity always included the Galilee, the Jabal ‘A region of the Metualis, and, at times, attached the Druze region to the north through alliances. Control over a coastal strip, extending first from Acre to Haifa and Sidon and stretching at its greatest extension from Gaza to Latakia, was essential to this political entity. At some occasions official appointments from Istanbul would extend the power of Acre even over the provinces of Damascus and Tripoli. I have referred to this entity throughout as “Acre and its realm,” conscious of the fact that it did not coincide with any administrative borders and units of the Ottoman Empire, that its borders and spheres of influence shifted, and that the exercise of political power varied from familial consent and tribal cooperation to military subjugation and formal alliances. Even if the political structure, the borders, and the populations shifted and even if it would be misleading to speak of a “state,” a “kingdom,” or an “emirate,” Acre and its realm constituted during this period a major political force whose rulers came to dominate all its neighbors and to challenge on occasion even the authority of the empire. Acre and its realm constituted a unique territorial and political entity— often independent but never sovereign—that did not exist before and was never to emerge again. Was the development of Acre and its realm the start of a new order or only the end of an old one? Can we trace the beginnings of modernity here, or do we recognize only variations of traditional patterns?

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Or both? The sustained rise and unavoidable fall of Acre and, even more so, the unique shape of its realm point to more than the whim of an individual ruler or the change of a dynasty. Acre’s short century of prominence is testimony of a period of profound transformations. As we have seen, its creation was due to a specific set of circumstances. The weakness of the central government reached a particular nadir in the second half of the eighteenth century, and, concomitantly, various local forces strove for local political, communal, or territorial autonomy. In the case of Acre these tendencies would find support and reinforcement through shifting trade patterns. The raw-material needs of European industrialization and the rising demand of the French market for cotton from the Galilee converted Acre and its realm into the first economy in the eastern Mediterranean based on the export of cash crops. Thus in Acre the rising export trade provided the economic basis for localist ambitions to become more pronounced and develop faster than in Damascus or Egypt. But as always in history, the mere existence of conditions for the development of new political or economic opportunities does not guarantee their realization. Here, Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar played a particular role as a merchant turned political ruler. Acre and its realm came into existence because he realized the economic opportunities that he could exploit by exerting political control over the region. He used political power to enhance his own role in the export business and established in the process a monopoly control over the cotton export which, in turn, increased his political might. In this he was very similar to Muhfi ammad ‘Alı¯, who, two generations later in Egypt, also understood that the relations between state and economy could consist of much more than the traditional taxation or the confiscation of agricultural surplus production. Both had seen that through the interference of the state or the ruler the productive forces of the economy could be enhanced together with the profits from commerce; and that such increased economic activity was a better base for a stronger state than just increased extortions from the primary producers. Both used their growing political power to interfere even more in the economy and manipulate it through the instrument of monopolies. Interestingly, both Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar and Muhfi ammad ‘Alı¯ came from commercial backgrounds and careers before they entered politics and became rulers. Perhaps herein lies the reason for their economic policies, which were so distinctly different from that of their contemporaries wielding political power. Yet the differences between Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar and Muhfi ammad ‘Alı¯ should not be overlooked. Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar limited his efforts to increasing the culti-

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vation of cotton and to attracting peasant immigrants to his realm. This he tried to do by providing law and order, security, and a reasonable tax burden—or even tax abatement for newly cultivated land. We have no evidence that he actually forced peasants to grow cotton, though the financial incentive must have been obvious. Two generations later Muhfi ammad ‘Alı¯ took much more far-reaching steps to enhance production by introducing new crops and better strains, by vastly improving the infrastructure of Egypt, and last but not least by initiating changes in the patterns of ownership and control over land. While Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar had been satisfied to exploit the new opportunities of cash-crop exports to the European markets with quantitative changes in production, well within the range of traditional experience, Muhfi ammad ‘Alı¯ took unprecedented measures in initiating qualitative changes in production. We observed earlier how strong the tendency in the Ottoman Empire toward local autonomy was during the eighteenth century. In itself this was not a new pattern or political formation, since weakness in the center has always provoked centrifugal forces at the periphery. It would certainly be erroneous to speak here of an early national awakening, of a new Arab or Palestinian identity or the rise of new social classes. The assertion of local autonomy almost always sought to obtain legitimacy by acknowledging the suzerainty of the sultan, regardless of the fact that disobedience to orders from Istanbul frequently prevailed. The ambivalent character of this drive to autonomy from Istanbul has been discussed earlier. Its limits were fluid and it only occasionally turned into open rebellion. The active collaboration of the Mamluks of Egypt and Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar with the Russian fleet against the Ottoman government introduced a new element into the eastern Mediterranean, where since the end of the Crusades Europeans had not had any but a commercial presence. This shortlived collaboration announced a new European political and military presence in the region, which would become manifest with the French invasion of Egypt and Palestine. Seemingly the autonomy we talked of was realized in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire in strictly traditional forms of political rule: local strongmen, attempts at establishing a dynasty, tribal alliances, and Mamluk elites. All these were patterns of political power long familiar in Muslim lands. Of course, society as well as the ruling elite subscribed to an Islamic world view. The major mosque of Acre, built by Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r, reflected this order, and the mere fact that Christians constituted, most probably, the majority of the population in Acre did not put this into ques-

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tion. The Christians, too, accepted it. It was an unselfconscious Islam, accepted and unquestioned, which is also why we hear so little about it during this time. Only toward the end of the period, with the encroachment of the Wahhabis on Damascus and the beginning of the Greek uprising, did interreligious tensions arise and the Islamic character of the government and of society become transformed into a conscious issue, antiminority measures being used to legitimize an otherwise weak government. When, just two generations later, Misha¯qa observed sardonically that Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r did not discriminate between Christians and Muslims but oppressed, tortured, and, occasionally, killed all evenhandedly, he spoke as someone who had witnessed intense religious strife and the growth of fanaticism. One feature in particular played into the hands of Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar and his successors as they tried to exert political control over the economy and the exports of ever more cash crops: urban society in Acre consisted almost exclusively of immigrants. Its structural coherence was weak, and it was faced from the beginning by a relatively strong government, enjoying the benefits of control over commerce and parts of the economy. Ruling elites in Acre differed in one important aspect from traditional ones: the ever-increasing European demand for raw cotton, and later wheat, provided an enormous source of income for them. The rigorous application and untraditional extent of economic control increased the flow of revenues to the ruling elite to an extent previously unknown. The imbalance between a strong, economically well-based ruling elite and the population was increased further by the uncommon weakness of societal structure. The urban society of Acre with which the rulers had to deal had come into existence only as a result of Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar’s economic activities. Consisting almost entirely of immigrants, it had not developed any strong social structures. Distinct commercial and religious elites were missing and were prevented from developing; the same was true for the organization of guilds. We can observe a distortion of traditional patterns of political and social structure leading to a most unusual concentration of power in the hands of the elites and the stunted development of social structures and economic forces within society. In a way, the developments of Acre and its realm foreshadowed what was to become typical for the development of the state in the Middle East during the nineteenth century: the strengthening of the ruling powers and an expansion of the functions of the state. But in Acre in the eighteenth century these developments were lacking the new social classes or the institutions that could support them. The integration of the eastern Mediterranean into the European economy and the shift of economic and

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political gravity from inland to the coast, first expressed in the rise of Acre, were to continue during the nineteenth century, but Acre would not be a part of it any longer. The untraditional concentration of political power and economic control which had led to the early rapid success of the attempt to reap the benefits of an integration into the European world markets also turned out to be an obstacle to the development of truly new social and economic patterns able to cope with the new world order. Other places, such as Beirut, were soon to take over from Acre.

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appendix a

THE POPULATION OF ACRE

FIGURE

A.1. Population of Acre, 1690 to 1840.

1. Maundrell, “Journey,” 428, mentions in 1687 “a large Khan, a mosque and a few poor cottages.” In a footnote, 300–400 inhabitants are indicated. 2. Eneman, Resa, 278, gives in 1711 100 Greek families, 10 Jewish, and 200–300 Turkish households. This would imply a total of some 1,200 to 1,600 people and seems high. His count may include incidentally stationed troops. He also writes “Maronita Nagra fa’ Kopter och Armener inga.”

194

THE POPULATION OF ACRE

3. De Saint Maure, Nouveau Voyage, 370, declares in 1721 “S. Jean d’Acre est aujourd’hui assez peuple´ par le grand nombre de Chre´tiens de Nazareth qui sont venus pour fuir la persecution des Arabes” [A good part of the population of Acre today is made up of Christians from Nazareth fleeing Arab persecution.] We do not know what “assez peuple´” means, but it seems that the Christians were a majority. 4. a: AN AE B1, 978, July 20, 1731, and March 16, 1732, describe the occurrence of plague in Acre and coast. b: Thompson, Holy Land, in 1732 remarks that “this [French Khan] is one of the best buildings . . . in town; nay, the only one if we except the mosque.” The population must have been fairly small. 5. a: Mariti, Voyage, I, 295, recorded in 1760 that the population had reached 16,000 but that in the same year some 5,000 died of the plague. b: AN AE B1, 287, March 1760, report from Aleppo describes major plague in coastal cities. c: Ya’ari, Sheluhei, 450, writes that the 1759 earthquake in Safed sent many Jews to Acre, where most perished in the plague of 1760. 6. a: Lusignan, History, 180, estimates in 1770 the population at 40,000. This seems wildly exaggerated. (His estimate of 250 people for Haifa at the same time seems to be reasonable; ibid., 182.) See also Carmel, Geschichte, 34. b: While Lusignan in 1770 estimates a population of 40,000, Browne in 1797 will estimate a population of half that or less. But Lusignan’s estimate does not seem quite that outrageous if we take into account the devastating plague of 1785/86. c: The plague of 1785/86 resulted, according to French sources, in the death of several French people and half the population (AN AE B1 979, July 12, 1785; Feb. 15, 1786; July 10, 1786). Although this is certainly an exaggeration, the death of a third of the population in one epidemic seems, in traditional settings, quite possible (Dols, Black Death, 215–218). The loss of population was compounded in the following winter by starvation. According to the French sources (AN AE B1 979, Dec. 10, 1786) starvation was so severe that people ate the cadavers of the dead. Some 4,557 are said to have perished during the famine. (Charles-Roux, Echelles, 137, quoting a letter from Consul Renaudot, April 18, 1787. Unfortunately, Renaudot does not tell us how he obtained this number.) Extrapolating from Browne’s figure and the heavy losses of population in the ten previous years, even a moderate estimate would suggest 25,000 to 30,000 inhabitants in the late years of Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar’s rule, because for the decade 1775– 1785 we have no hint in the records of an influx of population into the city, nor any reason to assume that there was one. (See Jacoby, “Crusader Acre,” part 1, for estimates on crusader populations. He claims that even at optimal times 40,000 inhabitants were a physical impossibility. Roughly 9,000 people are living in the walled city of today.) 7. Browne, Travels, 366, in 1797 estimates 15,000–20,000 inhabitants.

THE POPULATION OF ACRE

195

8. Seezen, Reisen, 77, in 1806 states that “die Stadtmauer ha¨lt den Ort klein aber stark bevo¨lkert.” 9. al-‘Awra, Ta¯rı¯kh, 186–198, reports a severe plague which killed one-fourth to one-half of all the Muslims, as many as 120 a day—but no Christians. Though the incident is listed in his chronicle for the year 1811, it must refer to the same plague as the French report below. Al-‘Awra’s dating has proved repeatedly to be faulty. 10. The French consul in Acre wrote on March 15, 1813, that out of a population of 5,000 ten died of the plague every day. By April 7, this rate had risen to 14–28 people daily, and on May 20, 1813, he wrote that since January “1,800 or one-third of the population” had died, which would leave a population of approximately 3,500 (AN AE CC Acre, II). 11. Turner, Journal, III, in 1815 indicates a total of 9,000 inhabitants, of which 2,500 were Muslims; 500 Maronite, Jewish, and Latin; 2,000 Greek Catholics; and 2,000 Greek Orthodox. 12. Richter, Wallfahrten, 68, in 1816: “Die Stadt soll 15,000 Einwohner za¨hlen unter welchen viele Armenier und Griechen sich befinden.” He does not seem to be sure. Certainly “viele Armenier” seems surprising. 13. Forbin, Travels, 128, writes that he saw in 1817/18 some 8,000–10,000 inhabitants. 14. Wilson, Travels, II, 48, in 1819: “upward of ten thousand inhabitants,” all in a miserable state. 15. Scholz, Reise, 244, in 1820/21: “Acri hat 12–15,000 Einwohner, davon 800 Griechisch-Orthodoxe, 80 Lateiner, 800 Griechisch-Katholische, 80 Maroniten, 800 Juden.” 16. Berggren, Reisen, II, 225, estimates for 1822 ca. 15,000. Beth Hillel, Unknown Jews, indicates 25,000 “Mahometan” families (i.e., at least 100,000 inhabitants, which is wildly beyond any reasonable figure). 17. Jahn, Reise, 464, estimates for 1826 6,000 inhabitants. 18. Prokesch, Tagebuch, 136, estimates for 1829 10,000 inhabitants, of which 1,500 were Catholic and 500 other Christians. He also mentions 2,000 troops in the citadel but does not indicate whether they are included in the 10,000 or not. 19. Lamartine, Voyage, 328: “Le sie`ge d’Acre par l’arme´e d’Ibrahim Pacha avait re´cemment re´duit la ville a` un morceau de ruines sous lesquelles dix a` douze mille morts s’e´tait ensevelis avec des milliers de chameaux.” Even if many of the dead were soldiers, the number of civilians that perished must have been great. 20. Blondel, Deux Ans, 250, comments in 1839 that the siege by Ibrahim and the recent earthquake had made Acre “un vaste chaos de de´combres . . . la population peu conside´rable” with less than 100 Christians. Narrative of a Mission to the Jews, 314, indicates for the same time 60 Jews in Acre.

196

THE POPULATION OF ACRE

21. Fiske, Memorial, 252, describes in 1842 the total ruin of the city after British bombardment. 22. Journal of a Deputation to the East, part 1, 265, indicates in 1849 2,000 people of whom 1,000 were Christians and 120 were Jews.

appendix b

TRADE: TABLES AND FIGURES

TABLE

YEAR

1700

1705

1710

1715

1720

1. Exports of Raw Cotton from Acre, 1700–1786 LIVRES/

TOTAL VALUE IN

QUINTAL

1,000

45 48 52 45 35 38 35 32 45 42 50 55 56 50 50 60 36 38 50 80 90 80 38 55

LIVRES

255 244 104 9 653 498 321 480 32 2 108 538 609 711 934 322 233 402 912 1,750 608 234 15 12

QUINTAUX

5,600 5,080 2,000 200 18,600 13,100 9,100 15,000 711 47 2,160 9,700 10,800 14,200 18,700 5,300 6,400 10,500 18,240 21,850 6,500 2,900 390 210

198 TABLE

YEAR

1725

1730

1735

1740

1745

1750

1755

1760 1762 1776

TRADE: TABLES AND FIGURES

1. Exports of Raw Cotton from Acre, 1700–1786 (CONT.) LIVRES/

TOTAL VALUE IN

QUINTAL

1,000

45 50 55 50 50 45 46 42 52 50 45 50 45 40 46 46 46 48 52 60 90 85 85 90 85 100 100 100 75 58 43 42 60 60 70 95 — 100 100 100

LIVRES

212 247 466 920 710 824 564 26 609 1,747 338 84 1,904 2,142 1,500 560 1,619 1,547 1,860 1,344 689 1,871 142 306 337 433 790 2,897 2,105 188 662 837 884 708 496 522 — — 664 364

QUINTAUX

4,710 4,900 8,400 18,400 14,200 18,300 12,200 560 11,900 34,900 7,500 16,900 42,300 53,500 32,500 13,500 35,200 32,200 35,700 22,400 7,650 22,000 1,600 3,400 4,000 4,330 7,900 22,970 28,000 3,200 15,500 20,000 14,700 11,800 7,000 5,500 — — 6,640 3,640

TRADE: TABLES AND FIGURES TABLE

YEAR

1783 1786

199

1. Exports of Raw Cotton from Acre, 1700–1786 (CONT.) LIVRES/

TOTAL VALUE IN

QUINTAL

1,000

90 95 — 153 — 110 110 105 90

LIVRES

QUINTAUX

42 139 — 2,250 ca. — 144 35 49 31

460 1,500 — 17,000 ca. — 1,300 300 460 330

: All data are taken from ACCM I, 26, 27, 28, and 29.

TABLE

2. Exports of Cotton Thread from Acre/Sidon, 1700–1789

YEAR

QUINTAUX

1700 1701 1702 1703 1704 1705 1706 1707 1708 1709 1710 1711 1712 1713 1714 1715 1716 1717 1718 1719 1720 1721

8,377 15,570 5,429 990 13,395 6,262 4,966 8,462 2,833 2,973 3,675 7,690 7,680 12,075 12,879 7,328 10,552 19,706 15,792 5,525 8,359 9,019

VALUE

(1,000)

711 1,232 443 74 1,041 413 399 680 329 278 363 769 768 966 1,005 488 736 1,328 1,509 684 1,044 570

200 TABLE

TRADE: TABLES AND FIGURES

2. Exports of Cotton Thread from Acre/Sidon, 1700–1789 (CONT.)

YEAR

QUINTAUX

1722 1723 1724 1725 1726 1727 1728 1729 1730 1731 1732 1733 1734 1735 1736 1737 1738 1739 1740 1741 1742 1743 1744 1745 1746 1747 1748 1749 1750 1751 1752 1753 1754 1755 1756 1757 1758 1759 1776 1777

1,448 6,014 3,678 13,500 11,862 15,925 11,316 12,066 7,255 6,427 12,927 21,063 14,888 14,047 11,500 14,560 11,383 19,635 21,141 17,650 13,657 12,934 4,483 — 2,970 6,746 1,046 3,200 6,823 6,776 7,100 10,033 12,430 13,630 6,716 4,115 4,600 3,950 657 793

VALUE

(1,000)

130 612 319 1,080 949 1,214 1,023 1,086 653 665 1,241 2,061 1,340 1,194 920 1,092 1,000 1,693 1,832 1,436 1,253 1,097 269 — 297 877 136 512 887 881 1,137 903 1,243 1,363 806 535 483 395 95 393

TRADE: TABLES AND FIGURES TABLE

201

2. Exports of Cotton Thread from Acre/Sidon, 1700–1789 (CONT.)

YEAR

1778 1779 1786 1787 1788 1789

QUINTAUX

2,906 829 851 708 271 2,148

: All data are taken from ACCM I, 26, 27, 28, and 29.

FIGURE

B.1. Cotton Exports from Acre, 1700 to 1789.

VALUE

(1,000) 497 136 171 147 76 378

202

TRADE: TABLES AND FIGURES

3. Imports of Raw Cotton to Marseille from the Mediterranean, 1700– 1789 (Ten-Year Averages in 1,000 Livres)

TABLE

YEAR

1700–09 1710–19 1720–29 1730–39 1740–49 1750–59 1776–79 1786–89

SIDON / ACRE

IZMIR

SALONIKI

TOTAL

258 653 425 1,020 1,054 1,009 302 66

129 363 463 893 943 2,699 4,384 6,733

58 213 153 107 115 841 2,383 2,090

445 1,229 1,041 2,024 2,112 4,549 7,069 8,889

: All data are taken from ACCM I, 26, 27, 28, and 29.

FIGURE

B.2. Imports of Raw Cotton to Marseille, 1700 to 1789 (in 10-year

averages).

TRADE: TABLES AND FIGURES TABLE

203

4. Global Cotton Imports to France, 1775 and 1789 (in 1,000 Livres)

YEAR

1775 1789

MEDITERRANEAN

ISLES D ’ AMERIQUE

3,031 8,890

3,417 19,000

: Data taken from Paris, Histoire de la chambre de commerce de Marseille, 512 and George Roux & Victor Hugues, La Colonisation marseillaise en dehors de la Mediterrane´e au XVIIIe sie`cle, in Paul Masson, ed., Marseille et la colonisation franc¸aise (Marseille, 1906), 185.

FIGURE

B.3. Global Cotton Imports to France, 1775 and 1789.

204 TABLE YEAR

1810

TRADE: TABLES AND FIGURES

5. Quarterly Exports of Raw Cotton from Acre, 1810–1826 QUARTER

QUINTAUX

FR / QU

3 no information 4 no exports 1811 1 379 2 2,563 3 1,176 4 — 1812 1 0 2 — 3 0 4 — 1813 1 0 2 — 3 0 4 — 1814 1 0 2 337.5 3 337.5 4 — 1815 1 2,235 2 383 3 1,623 4 1,021 1816 1 — 2 2,111 3 — 4 — 1817 1 287 2 — 3 0 4 — 1818 1 0 2 0 3 0 4 0 1819 1 1,000 2 1,000 3 1,000 4 1,000 1820–1823 No trade records. Trade ceased to exist of the siege of Acre, July 1822 to January 1823.7

TOTAL IN FRANCS

— — 0 0 160 60,640 160 403,400 157 188,053 — —1 0 0 — — 0 0 — — 0 0 — — 0 0 — — 0 0 200 67,5002 200 67,500 — — 210 508,775 230 16,656 228 368,556 227 231,5963 — — 277 574,875 — — — — 370 106,227 — — 0 0 — — 0 0 0 0 0 04 0 0 215 215,500 215 215,500 215 215,5005 215 215,0006 altogether, at least for the time

TRADE: TABLES AND FIGURES TABLE

205

5. Quarterly Exports of Raw Cotton from Acre, 1810–1826 (CONT.)

YEAR

QUARTER

QUINTAUX

FR / QU

TOTAL IN FRANCS

1824

1} 2} 3} 4} — — 1825 1 0 0 2 — — 3 — — 4 — — 1826. No ships arrive in Acre for trans-Mediterranean commerce.

50,000 0 307,001 — —

: All data are from the French consular correspondence, AN AE CC Acre vols. II, III, IV, and V, especially from the quarterly trade reports therein.

 1. The cotton harvest of 1811 was destroyed by locusts. Presumably there were no cotton exports in all of 1812. 2. Identical amounts in two or more quarters are derived from summary statistics in the French reports for the given period. They have consequently been broken down into averaged quarterly amounts. They do not indicate actual shipments in a specific quarter. 3. In 1815 Sulayma¯n Pasha forced Nablus farmers to sell their cotton to him for 100 fr/hl (AN AE CC Acre III, Nov. 28, 1815). 4. Cotton was abundant in 1818 but there were no buyers (AN AE CC Acre III, July 30, 1818). 5. In 1819 cotton sold in Acre for 30 percent more than that from America (AN AE Acre III, Sept. 1, 1819). 6. The amounts for 1819 include an unspecified quantity of sesame oil. 7. In 1821 the French consul Ruffin described the potential production of cotton as 13,000 quintaux, though only 3,000 were actually grown. The trade in Acre was dead (AN AE Acre III, Memoir 1821).

FIGURE

B.4. Quarterly Exports of Raw Cotton from Acre, 1810 to 1826.

206 TABLE YEAR

1810

TRADE: TABLES AND FIGURES

6. Quarterly Exports of Wheat from Acre, 1810–1826* QUARTER

HECTOLITER

AVG . FR / HL

TOTAL IN FRANCS

3 ca. 4,500 66 300,000 4 26,171 32 826,212 1811 1 13,600 40 544,000 2 35,800 36 1,316,7001 3 6,800 47 320,800 4 no information — — 1812 1 50,800 43.5 2,219,600 2 — — — 3 12,880 37 483,6002 4 — — — 1813 1 74,400 44 3,340,8003 2 — — — 3 56,916 26 1,479,1454 4 — — — 1814 1 no exports 0 0 2 22,400 19 425,6005 3 22,400 19 425,600 4 — — — 1815 1 1,600 18 28,800 2 21,200 21.5 453,000 3 13,180 22.5 295,490 4 8,000 22.5 180,0006 1816 1 — — — 2 0 0 0 3 — — — 4 — — — 1817 1 2,800 43 120,400 2 — — — 3 30,240 30 920,560 4 — — — 1818 1 31,760 16 513,760 2 31,760 16 513,760 3 31,760 16 513,760 4 31,760 16 513,7607 1819 1 152 29 4,570 2 152 29 4,570 3 152 29 4,570 4 152 29 4,570 1820–1823 No trade records. Trade ceased to exist altogether, at least for the time of the siege of Acre, July 1822–Jan. 1823.

TRADE: TABLES AND FIGURES TABLE YEAR

207

6. Quarterly Exports of Wheat from Acre, 1810–1826 (CONT.) QUARTER

HECTOLITER

AVG . FR / HL

TOTAL IN FRANCS

1824

1} 2} 3} 4 — — 1825 1 — — 2 — — 3 — — 4 — — 1826 No ships arrive in Acre for trans-Mediterranean commerce.

33,0008 — 62,500 — —

: All data are from the French consular correspondence, AN AE CC Acre vols. II, III, IV, and V, especially from the quarterly trade reports therein. *Value of the franc: In 1815 the French consul calculated 1 piaster ⫽ 1 franc. In 1812 the rate was 1 piaster ⫽ 1.5 francs (AN AE CCC Seyde XXVI, Jan.3, 1812). The devaluation continues later.

 1. The figures for the last two quarters of 1810 and the first two quarters of 1811 also include shipments of 20,000 hl of wheat at 12 fr/hl to Istanbul. 2. The averaged figures break down as follows: 4,600 hl at 60 fr/hl totaling 276,000 to Malta 3,280 hl at 45 fr/hl totaling 147,600 to Malta and Greek Islands 5,000 hl at 12 fr/hl totaling 60,000 to Istanbul 3. The averaged figures break down as follows: 54,400 hl at 57 fr/hl totaling 3,100,800 to Malta 20,000 hl at 12 fr/hl totaling 240,000 to Istanbul 4. The averaged figures break down as follows: 32,916 hl at 36 fr/hl totaling 1,191,145 to various places 24,000 hl at 12 fr/hl totaling 288,000 to Istanbul 5. Identical figures for two or more quarters are derived from summary statistical statements in the French reports pertaining to that period. They have consequently been broken down to quarterly averages. They do not indicate actual shipments in a specific quarter. 6. The French consul estimated that the total amount of wheat sold during 1815 by Sulayma¯n Pasha was closer to 100,000 hl, shipping the difference via Tyre and Jaffa. 7. Each of the quarterly averaged sums breaks down as follows: 12,260 hl at between 18 and 30 fr/hl totaling 279,760 francs and 19,500 hl at 12 fr/hl totaling 234,000 francs to Istanbul 8. Including an unspecified amount for soap

208

TRADE: TABLES AND FIGURES

FIGURE

TABLE YEAR

1810 1811 1812

1813

1814

1815

1816

B.5. Quarterly Exports of Wheat from Acre, 1810 to 1826.

7. Total Exports from Acre, 1810–1826* QUARTER

AMOUNTS IN FRANCS

3 4 1 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4

— — 1,354,788 2,343,600 — 483,600 — 3,340,800 — 1,479,145 — 67,000 493,000 493,100 — 537,575 469,656 664,046 411,565 — 574,875 — —

TRADE: TABLES AND FIGURES TABLE

209

7. Total Exports from Acre, 1810–1826 (CONT.)

YEAR

QUARTER

AMOUNTS IN FRANCS

1817

1 226,627 2 — 3 1,019,560 4 — 1818 1 513,760 2 513,760 3 513,760 4 513,760 1824 1} 2} 3} 4} 98,000 1825 1 — 2 380,521 3 165,500 4 72,000 1826 No ships for trans-Mediterranean commerce arrive in Acre. : All data are from the French consular correspondence, AN AE CC Acre vols. II, III, IV, and V, especially from the quarterly trade reports therein. *In addition to grain and cotton, by far the two largest items, sundry amounts for such items as sesame oil, soap, and olive oil are included in the totals.

FIGURE

B.6. Total Exports from Acre, 1810 to 1826.

210 TABLE

TRADE: TABLES AND FIGURES

8. Individual Grain Prices in Acre, 1810–1820 (Francs/Hectoliter) BOUGHT

DATE

May 1810 Oct. 30, 1810 Feb. 1811 June 18, 1811 Aug, 1811 Feb. 1812 Aug. 1812 Oct. 17, 1812 Sept. 30, 1812 Feb. 1813 July 1813 Oct. 15, 1813 July 20, 18141 Nov. 18, 1814 Dec. 30, 1815 Jan. 25, 18162 May 11, 1816 June 8, 18163 Feb. 6, 1817 April 12, 18174 June 3, 1817 July 2, 1817 Sept. 15, 1817 March 27, 18185 April 14, 1818 July 30, 18186 Sept. 30, 1818 Nov. 18, 18187 Feb. 23, 1819 Jan. 3, 1820 July 10, 1820 Oct.1, 1820

FROM

SOLD

SOLD

SOLD

PRODUCER

IN TOWN

TO ISTANBUL

TO EXPORT

— — — — — — — — 7.5 8 — — — 8 — — 10 — — — — — 10 — — 4–8 5–6 — 4–4.5 — — —

— 23 — 32 — — — — — — — — — — 21 — 50 — 37 40 15 13 15 8 — — — — — — — —

12 — — 12 — — — — — 12 12 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 12 — — — — — —

46 31 40 46 47 44 45.6 45.6 45.55 57 36 35 19 19 40 35 — — 43 — 30 32 20 — 23 — 25 18 — 29 12 20

TRADE: TABLES AND FIGURES TABLE

211

8. Individual Grain Prices in Acre, 1810–1820 (Francs/Hectoliter)

(CONT.) : All data are from the French consular correspondence, AN AE CC Acre vols. II, III, IV, and V, especially from the quarterly trade reports therein.

 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

July 20, 1814. Abundant grain supplies. No export demand. Jan. 25, 1816. Grain shortage—famine. Sold to Druze at 35. June 8, 1916. Food riots in Acre. April 12, 1817. Grain shortages; grain sold from granaries of Sulayma¯n. March 27, 1818. No buyers. July 30, 1818. Sulayma¯n wants 22; offer at 15 not accepted. No deal. Nov. 18, 1818. Few takers.

FIGURE

B.7. Grain Prices in Acre, 1810 to 1820.

212 TABLE

TRADE: TABLES AND FIGURES

9. Acre and Dependencies, Sea Trade, 1825 IMPORTS

Acre Sidon Jaffa Tyre Total

240,474 481,331 162,984 92,725 977,514

EXPORTS

618,021 276,113 116,337 390,406 1,400,877

: All data are from the French consular correspondence, AN AE CC Acre vols. II, III, IV, and V, especially from the quarterly trade reports therein.

TABLE

10. Beirut Sea Trade, Jan.–Dec., 1827

IMPORTS

EXPORTS

5,068,162

3,721,215

: All data are from the French consular correspondence, AN AE CC Acre vols. II, III, IV, and V, especially from the quarterly trade reports therein.

TRADE: TABLES AND FIGURES TABLE

213

11. Damascus Imports, July–Dec. 1824

FROM

Tripoli Beirut Sidon Tyre Acre Mecca Cairo Aleppo Smyrna Istanbul Total

CARAVANS

2 24 9 3 3 1 4 5 3 1 55

TOTAL

6,500 269,000 37,350 4,300 25,000 384,000 1,245,500 487,325 636,450 1,242,050 4,328,475

: All data are from the French consular correspondence, AN AE CC Acre vols. II, III, IV, and V, especially from the quarterly trade reports therein.

This page intentionally left blank

appendix c

ADMINISTRATIVE POSITIONS AND THEIR OCCUPANTS

POSITIONS AND OCCUPANTS IN THE VILAYET OF SIDON AND TRIPOLIS AND LATAKIA AFTER SULAYMA¯N PASHA WAS REMOVED FROM THE POSITION AS GOVERNOR OF DAMASCUS IN 1811* Tripoli and Latakia Musfifitafa¯ Agha Barbar, mutasallim Muhfi ammad Agha Khazı¯na Da¯rza¯deh, his deputy and mutasallim of Latakia H fi usayn Agha, kumrukjı¯ (formerly in Beirut, Mamluk of al-Jazza¯r) ‘Abdalla¯h Ilya¯s, secretary in Latakia with three scribes for general matters, general customs, and tobacco customs. All were under the supervision of Na‘mat Gharı¯b, chief secretary of the province of Tripoli. Wahba Sfi adaqa, Arabic secretary in Tripoli with scribes for the court and the customs attached to him ‘Akka¯ r ‘Alı¯ Bey al-As‘ad, mutasallim Nasfir Alla¯h Nawfal, secretary Mount Lebanon Amı¯r Bashı¯r II Mansfiu¯r al-Dahfi da¯hfi , secretary Jirjis Misha¯qa, banker (sfiarra¯f) Ibra¯hı¯m Na‘mat, Jid‘u¯n al-Bahfi u¯tfi, H fi ana¯ ‘Aza¯m, Bashı¯r’s representatives in Acre

* Summarized from al-‘Awra, Ta¯rı¯kh, 155–167

216

ADMINISTRATIVE POSITIONS AND THEIR OCCUPANTS

Beirut Uzun ‘Alı¯ Agha, mutasallim and kumrukjı¯ (former mutasallim in H fi ama¯) Ayyu¯b Nu¯r Alla¯h, secretary Yu¯suf M-n-s-a [Menase?], father of Ilya¯s, secretary Mı¯kha¯‘ı¯l Sa¯ru¯fı¯m, banker (sfiarra¯f) Sidon ‘Alı¯ Agha al-Sfi u¯rı¯ (Mamluk of al-Jazza¯r) Nakhla Ma¯ru¯n, Shaykh ‘Alı¯, secretaries Jabu¯r al-Qarda¯hfi ¯ı, banker, with a salary of 5 ghirsh a month, operating from his shop Jaba¯ ‘a Khalı¯l Agha Aba¯zfi a (Mamluk of al-Jazza¯r) Yu¯suf Namu¯r, scribe al-Shaqı¯f Mu¯sa¯ Agha Jarkis Nakhla Niqu¯la¯, Andra¯u¯s al-Sha¯mı¯, secretaries Bila¯ d Bisha¯ ra (i.e., Tibnı¯n, Hunayn, Sa¯ hfi il Qana¯ , Sa¯ hfi il Ma‘arka, and Marj‘uyu¯ n) Ibra¯hı¯m Agha al-Kurdı¯ with a detachment of 25 banners (250 troops) paid for from local taxes Yu¯suf Mudawwal, Yu¯suf al-Bawa¯b, secretaries Tyre Sulayma¯n Agha Aba¯zfi a (Mamluk of al-Jazza¯r) ‘Abu¯d Sa¯ru¯fı¯m, secretary of Saray and customs Yu¯suf Ayyu¯b, secretary of warehouses Sa¯ hfi il ‘Akka¯ and Nahr Mafshu¯ kh Ahfi mad ‘Abd al-‘A¯l, wakı¯l, with a salary of 2 ghirsh daily, collected monthly from the area, together with fees for registration services, each registration for 5 ghirsh The two Muqa¯ tfi a‘a al-Shaghu¯ r, al-Jabal and Tarshı¯hfi a¯ H fi a¯jj Mu¯sa¯ Abu¯ Rayya¯, wakı¯l, 4 ghirsh daily salary, two from each muqa¯fita‘a, collected monthly

ADMINISTRATIVE POSITIONS AND THEIR OCCUPANTS

217

Shfa¯ ‘Amr and Surroundings Muhfi ammad Agha (Mamluk of al-Jazza¯r) Nazareth City Salı¯m Agha Abu¯ Sayf (Mamluk of al-Jazza¯r) Nazareth Villages ‘Umar al-‘Adwı¯, brother of Shaykh ‘Abd al-H fi alı¯m, shaykh al-khazı¯na, with a daily salary collected monthly Nazareth Plantation Antfiu¯n Katafa¯ku¯ (Catafago), consul of Austria in Acre, multazim; his brother Philipp was the manager. Sa¯ hfi il ‘Atlı¯t and H fi ayfa¯ Shaykh Mas‘u¯d al-Ma¯dfi ¯ı, multazim Jaffa, Gaza, Ramla, Lud Muhfi ammad Agha Abu¯ Nabu¯t resided in Jaffa and appointed officials for the other three regions independently, without consulting Acre. Ilya¯s Ba¯sı¯la¯, chief secretary, under him: Sama¯‘an al-Sfi a¯lihfi , Ibra¯hı¯m al-Gharra, customs Niqu¯la¯ Gharghu¯r, banker Ishfi aq Juhfisha¯n, secretary in Lud Ibra¯hı¯m Juhfi sha¯n, secretary in Ghaza Qustfiandı¯ Juhfisha¯n, secretary in Ramla ¯ mira and the Awqa¯ f al-Kha¯ sfi akı¯ Sultfi a¯ n in Takiyya al-‘A Jerusalem ‘Alı¯ Efendi al-Qudsı¯, muwakkil Acre ‘Alı¯ Pasha (‘Alı¯ Agha Khazinda¯r), katkhuda¯ Muhfi ammad Efendi Abu¯ al-Huda¯ al-Ta¯jı¯, muftı¯ and qa¯dfi¯ı H fi asan Agha (Mamluk of al-Jazza¯r), son-in-law of ‘Alı¯ Pasha, khazinda¯r. He was appointed by ‘Alı¯ Pasha as inspector of affairs of peasant complainants and plaintiffs. He decided them with the help of ‘Abd al-H fi alı¯m’s knowledge, while the documents were issued by H fi asan Agha. The shaykh al-khazı¯na was like a qapu katkhuda¯ for the peasants.

218

ADMINISTRATIVE POSITIONS AND THEIR OCCUPANTS

H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı, fisarra¯f, partner in political authority of the ruling men, supervisor of the treasury, its management, its accounts, and of all accounts with the Ottoman government and, finally, head of all secretaries in Acre and its realm, whom he could appoint and dismiss without the slightest opposition. The treasury was completely at his disposition. Secretaries in Arabic Administration Under Mu‘allim H fi ana¯ ’ (al-‘Awra) Ibra¯hı¯m Nahfi hfi a¯s, a cousin of H fi ana¯’ al-‘Awra Mikha¯‘ı¯l al-‘Awra, a son of H fi ana¯’ Yu¯suf al-Qarda¯hfi ¯ı Lutfiu¯f al-Sfi a¯bu¯njı¯ Farahfi Zahra, daftar al-quyu¯d Secretaries in Finances and Accounts Under H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı Ilya¯s al-Sfi u¯rı¯ Mikha¯‘ı¯l al-Malak Jirjı¯s Masdiyya (?) Mikha¯‘ı¯l H fi ana¯’ Kyurk al-Fara¯’ al-Armanı¯ al-H fi alabı¯, brother-in-law of Antoine Catafago Shaykh Qays al-Lu¯ba¯nı¯ Shaykh Muhfi ammad al-Khatfi¯ıb al-Du¯ma¯nı¯ Fudfi u¯l al-Sfi a¯bu¯njı¯ Mu¯sa¯ and Hesekiel, brother and nephew of H fi aim, bankers in the treasury Shaykh Jawdy al-Misfirı¯, wakı¯l al-kharaj, collecting legal claims. He had a scribe. Warehouses Ibra¯hı¯m Agha al-Kurdı¯, wakı¯l Ilya¯s al-Yu¯suf, scribe ‘Alı¯ Agha, amı¯n for the distribution of fodder; Mikha¯‘ı¯l was his scribe. Customs Ayyu¯b Sala¯mı¯ al-Aslamı¯, amin Andriya Sa¯ba¯, scribe Jirjı¯s M-n-s-a, scribe Antfiu¯n Sfi a¯lhfiia, scribe Slaughterhouse Jibra¯‘ı¯l ‘I¯d, scribe

ADMINISTRATIVE POSITIONS AND THEIR OCCUPANTS

219

Workshops Boghus al-Armanı¯, head of the carpenters Yu¯suf H fi akı¯ma, head of the masons Farahfi Nahfihfi a¯s, scribe Zaku¯r Agha, amı¯n for buildings (amla¯k) and muhfi tasib of the city Mı¯kha¯‘ı¯l Ka¯tiru¯n, his scribe Court Officials ‘Uthma¯n Agha, silihfi da¯r (arms carrier) H fi asan Agha Qurunba¯soghlu, ¯ıjuqda¯r or jukhda¯r, chamberlain ‘Uthma¯n Agha, bashshokfi ada¯r, head valet Yu¯suf Agha, father of Shukrı¯ Efendi, ikinc¸i, second (valet) Muhfi ammad Agha Ghandu¯r, amı¯r akhu¯r, stable master H fi a¯fizfi Efendi, dı¯wa¯n affandası¯, head of the personal dı¯wa¯n Ibra¯hı¯m Efendi, scribe Musfifitafa¯ Efendı¯ al-Mala¯fit¯ılı¯, scribe Mamluks filled the other positions, such as tutunjı¯ bashı¯, qaftfia¯n aghasi, ‘alamda¯r and bayrakfi da¯r (commanders of the standard), ibrı¯qda¯r (cup bearer), shama‘da¯n aghasi (candle bearer), darbanda¯r (herald), mihrda¯r (seal keeper), mujı¯ bashi (official host for guests), qahwaji bashi (chief coffeemaker), who was ‘Alı¯ Agha, an in-law of ‘Uthma¯n Agha Silihfi da¯r. Bash ja¯wı¯sh (head of the servants) was Adham Agha al-Islambu¯lı¯. Alay bashi ja¯wı¯sh (master of ceremonies) was ‘Alı¯ Agha; kfi awas bashi (head of messengers) was ‘Alı¯ Agha Bu¯shna¯q, with seven messengers attached to him. ‘Abdalla¯h Agha was hfi aram aghasi (head of harem services), with Sa‘ı¯d, Jiba¯‘ı¯l, and ‘Alı¯ Agha attached to him. Sa¯’is agha (stable groom) was H fi a¯jj ‘Alı¯, his assistant H fi a¯jj ‘Alı¯ al-A¯khir; fisufraji bashi (head waiter) was Muhfiammad Agha. Sarayda¯r bashi (head janitor) was H fi a¯jj Muhfiammad al-Misfir. Head of horsemen and messengers of the treasury was H fi a¯jj H fi amza al-Sfi ayda¯wı¯. Tatar aghasi (head of the mail) was ‘A¯l Agha, with twenty-five messengers attached. Gatekeeper was Musfifitafa¯ ‘Afa¯ra, with four employees. Officials for the Travel of the Pasha ‘Umar Sayda¯wı¯, jarbandı¯ bashi (chief of baggage) H fi a¯jj ‘Alı¯, ‘aka¯m bashi (chief of camel loadings) H fi usayn, mash‘aljı¯ bashi (chief of torch bearers) Muhfi ammad ibn al-H fi a¯jj ‘Alı¯, tahfi fitrawa¯njı¯ (responsible for the litters) H fi a¯jj ‘Alı¯ shu¯ba¯fis¯ı bashi (head of police) H fi a¯jj Ibra¯hı¯m, du¯la¯bjı¯ (mechanic?)

220

ADMINISTRATIVE POSITIONS AND THEIR OCCUPANTS

Heads of the Harbor Musfifitafa¯ al-Qa¯tu¯l ‘Alı¯ al-Shamma¯s Army Officers Ju¯la¯q ‘Alı¯ Agha Baylansı¯, in the al-H fi adı¯d Tower Ibra¯hı¯m Agha al-Qilı¯ and al-Qa¯tilı¯ ‘Umar Agha in al-Bawa¯ba al-Jawa¯niyya Tower ‘Umar Agha al-Kamashkha¯nlı¯ in the al-Barra¯nı¯ Tower together with the tu¯bji bashi (artillery commander) ‘Alı¯ Agha, who commanded 700 guns. ‘Umar Agha Bekbashi, in the palace gate, supervisor of the town and the prison Ibra¯hı¯m Agha Bu¯shna¯q, stationed with fifty troops in the gate opposite the Harem Gate Officers with the rank of bulukbashi were stationed in the other towers of the city. Other Officials Muhfi ammad Efendi, superintendent (nazfi¯ır) of the great mosque Rustum Ka¯shif, superintendent of the cotton storehouse, with two scribes, Andra¯u¯s ‘Ası¯lı¯ and Ilya¯s Zahra Abu¯ ‘Umar al-Misfirı¯, superintendent of the flour market, with the scribe Bu¯lus Abu¯ra¯s ‘Ayyu¯b Sala¯mı¯, amı¯n al-kumruk, also superintendent for the unseeded cotton brought from the storehouse [for export?]. The scribe was Jirjı¯s M-n-s-a, scribe of customs.

COMMENTS ON SALARIES * Salaries were paid in coin and goods. Secretaries received 2 ghirsh daily, 1⁄2 ratfil meat, 1⁄2 ratfil rice, 3 uqqa fat and 3 uqqa olive oil, and monthly, 4 kayl wheat. They also had 5 percent on concession places [maalla¯t al-iltiza¯ma¯t in the whole province?], paid out three times a year. From the total sum the Arab secretary would get 8 percent; another 12 percent was distributed among all scribes from the Arab and the finance section. The same procedure held true for 5 percent of provisions for soldiers. The Arab secretary received 1,500 ghirsh, and he gave to the others between 200 and 700 each. The daily salary of the Arab secretary was 5 ghirsh and 1.5 times the goods of the other scribes. H fi aim and H fi ana¯ received various presents in addition. Salaries of provincial officials were usually deducted from the taxes or imposed additionally on the villages and collected quarterly. The scribes in Sidon, Beirut, and Tyre received 11⁄4 ghirsh a day, the mutasallim 5 ghirsh. *According to al-‘Awra, Ta¯rı¯kh, 471 ff.

ADMINISTRATIVE POSITIONS AND THEIR OCCUPANTS

221

‘Abdalla¯h Pasha was paid like the governor: all his expenditures were paid from the treasury.

LIST OF OFFICIALS RANKED BY IMPORTANCE AND AUTHORITY *

1. Sulayma¯n Pasha al-‘A¯dil, the governor 2. ‘Alı¯ Pasha Katkhuda¯ (in fact people were more afraid of him than of Sulayma¯n Pasha) 3. H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı, the Jew. “He held all the reins and did as he pleased. Whoever says that the rule of a Jew over Muslims and Christians is an easy thing is not very reasonable.” 4. ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha ibn Katkhuda¯, the son of number 2 5. H fi asan Agha Khazinda¯r, son-in-law of ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha 6. ‘Abdalla¯h Agha, aram aghasi 7. Sekban bashi, officer of the city, commander of police ¯ dfi a bashi 8. U 9. H fi asan Agha Qurunba¯soghlu, ¯Ijuqda¯r: “He made himself into a second vezier. He stopped all those who came to the court. Those who did not bribe him or did not fear him, he treated miserably.” 10. Tubjı¯ bashi: “He thought of himself as equal to the vezier, telling his people that he could depose the vezier at any time. What impertinence!” 11. The four officers guarding the four towers of Acre: ‘Umar Agha Kamashkha¯nli, ‘Umar Agha Qa¯tilı¯, Ibra¯hı¯m Agha al-Qa¯tilı¯, and ‘Alı¯ Agha al-Ja¯liq. 12. Salı¯m Agha Abu¯ Sayf (Mamluk of al-Jazza¯r): “He was in his prime, haughty and violent, lived in Acre and did as he pleased.” 13. Zaku¯r Agha, muhfi tasib and nazfi ir al-amla¯k 14. Ayyu¯b Sala¯mı¯, kumrukji [chief of customs]. “Incomparable in his shamelessness, transgressions and wickedness.” 15. ‘Abd al-H fi alı¯m, shaykh al-khazı¯na, na¯zfi ir masfialihfi al-falla¯hfi¯ın 16. Mas‘u¯d al-Ma¯dfi ¯ı, prote´ge´ of ‘Alı¯ Pasha 17. al-Qa¯dfi¯ı: “Nobody could say anything against him: he was qa¯dfi¯ı, personal shaykh of ‘Alı¯ Pasha and the teacher of ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha.”

*From al-‘Awra, Ta¯rı¯kh, 477 ff. All comments are those of the original writer.

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Outside Acre there was Abu¯ Nabu¯t and his group in Jaffa, Musfifitafa¯ Agha ¯ zun ‘Alı¯ Agha in Beirut. Barbar in Tripoli, and U “In Sidon many of al-Jazza¯r’s Mamluks lived in houses, with fixed incomes from the government. All were haughty and thought themselves greater than the governor himself. In Tyre was one by the name of Bakr Agha Bu¯shna¯q, prote´ge´ of al-Jazza¯r, doing absolutely as he pleased; an unruly lot. ‘Alı¯ Agha al-Sfi u¯rı¯, another Mamluk of al-Jazza¯r and mutasallim in Jaba¯‘a, was like them. He could not distinguish between tyranny and justice.” Mu¯sa¯ Agha Jarkis, mutasallim of al-Shaqı¯f, was exceedingly crude. Ibra¯hı¯m Agha al-Kurdi, mutasallim in Bisha¯ra, drew all the Kurds of the province there and they exploited the land.

* Summarized from al-‘Awra, Ta¯rı¯kh, 155–167

appendix d

MAPS

224

MAPS

MAP

1. Major trade routes in eighteenth-century Syria and Palestine.

MAPS

2. Major routes of European travelers in eighteenth-century Palestine.

MAP

225

226

MAPS

3. Major military highways, sea routes, and key fortresses in eighteenth-century Palestine.

MAP

MAPS

MAP 4. The Ottoman provinces of Damascus, Sidon, and Tripolis in the early eighteenth century.

227

228

MAPS

MAP

5. Expansion of Zfi a¯hir al ‘Umar’s rule.

MAPS

MAP

229

6. Realms of Acre under Ahmad Pasha al-Jazza¯r, 1775 to 1804.

230

MAPS

MAP

7. Realm of Acre under Sulayma¯n Pasha, 1806 to 1819.

MAPS

MAP

231

8. Acre ca. 1820.

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NOTES

All translations are my own, unless indicated differently. The antiquated and often inconsistent French spelling in citations from the consular correspondence has not been corrected.

INTRODUCTION 1. See, for instance, B. Doumani, Rediscovering Palestine (Los Angeles, 1995), a superb study about Nablus and Jabal Nablus but not about Palestine as we know it, or A. Cohen, Palestine in the 18th Century (Jerusalem, 1973), a penetrating study of most parts of Palestine dealing especially with fiscal aspects, taxes, and Ottoman administration without, however, being able to provide thereby an integrated history of the future Palestine during the eighteenth century. 2. D. Goffman, Izmir and the Levantine World, 1550–1650 (Seattle, 1990), 93. 3. Doumani, Rediscovering Palestine, 2. 4. Ibid. 5. In 1758 a letter circulated in Damascus and Jerusalem predicting the fall of Istanbul and the Ottomans in 1762; see M. Burayk, Ta¯rı¯kh al-Sha¯m, 1720–1782 (H fi arı¯sa, 1930), 54–58. 6. See Doumani, Rediscovering Palestine. 7. For the development of English trade see R. Davis, Aleppo and Devonshire Square (London, 1967). 8. See B. Masters, The Origins of Western Economic Dominance in the Middle East (New York, 1988). 9. See works by Ahfi mad al-Budayrı¯, Mikha¯’ı¯l Burayk, Mikha¯’ı¯l al-Dimishqı¯, Mikha¯’ı¯l Misha¯qa, H fi ana¯naya¯ al-Munayyar, Rufa¯’ı¯l Kara¯ma, and H fi aydar Ridfi a¯ alRukaynı¯ in the bibliography. 10. See works by Mikha¯’ı¯l al-Sfi abba¯gh and ‘Abbu¯d al-Sfi abba¯gh in the bibliography.

234

NOTES

¯ dil (Sidon, 1936). 11. Ibra¯hı¯m al-‘Awra, Ta¯rı¯kh wila¯yat Sulayma¯n Pasha al-‘A 12. H fi aydar Ahfi mad Shiha¯b’s history of al-Jazza¯r, Ta¯rı¯kh Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r (Beirut, 1955) is in a way much more than the title acknowledges and at the same time less than the author intends when he claims that his aim is the presentation of information concerning al-Jazza¯r (p. 122). It is a history of Mount Lebanon, the Druze, and their relationship with al-Jazza¯r. But in contrast to al-‘Awra’s work and that of the al-Sfi abba¯ghs it is not a general account of the ruler and his deeds as seen from Acre. For the problematic question of accounts of the life of Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r, see chapter 2. 13. T. Philipp, “Jews and Arab Christians—Their Changing Position in the Politics and Economics of 18th century Syria and Egypt,” in G. Baer and A. Cohen, Egypt and Palestine (New York, 1984). 14. Of particular value are the J series in the Archive de la Chambre du Commerce de Marseille (ACCM) and the series B1 1037–41 in the Archive Nationale, Affaires Etrange`res (AN AE). 15. See, for example, the works by Gilbar, Kushner, Ma‘oz, and Scho¨lch in the bibliography. 16. See, for example, the works by Kark, Masters, Marcus, Abdel Nour, Carmel, Raymond, and Schatkowski Schilcher in the bibliography.

1. SOUTHWEST SYRIA IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY: SEA LANES, HIGHWAYS, AND POPULATIONS 1. See appendix D, map 1. 2. See appendix D, map 1. 3. C. Barbir, Ottoman Rule in Damascus, 1708–1758 (Princeton, 1980), 12, 133– 67; J. Jomier, Le Mahmal et la caravane ´egyptienne des pe`lerines de la Mecque (Cairo, 1953). 4. Cohen, Palestine, 150–51. 5. ‘Abd al-Rahfi ma¯n al-Jabartı¯, ‘Aja¯’ib al-a¯tha¯r fı¯ ‘l-tara¯jim wa’l-akhba¯r (Cairo, 1884), vol. 1, 188. 6. See appendix D, map 2. 7. See appendix D, map 1. 8. For example, the great-grandfather of Misha¯qa; see M. Misha¯qa, Murder, Mayhem, Pillage and Plunder (Albany, 1988), 9. 9. Philipp, The Syrians in Egypt, 1725–1975 (Stuttgart, 1985), 23–24. 10. See for instance, M. al-Sfi abba¯gh, Ta¯rı¯kh al-shaykh Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar alZayda¯nı¯ (H fi arı¯sa, 1935), 79. 11. See appendix D, map 2. 12. C. d’Arvieux, Merkwu¨rdige Nachrichten, usw. (Leipzig, 1753), vol. 1, 241; F. Troilo, Orientalische Reisebeschreibung (Dresden, 1733), 101; R. Pococke, Beschreibung des Morgenlandes (Erlangen, 1773), vol. 3, 11–20, passim; J. Korten, Reise nach

NOTES

235

¨ gypten (Altona, 1740), 36; al-Jabartı¯, dem weiland Gelobten Land, wie auch nach A ‘Aja¯’ib, vol. 3, 125. 13. See J. Sommer, Wasser-und Landreise (Amsterdam, 1665); C. Niebuhr, Reisebeschreibung nach Arabien und anderen umliegenden La¨ndern (Copenhagen, 1774), 83. 14. Troilo, Reisebeschreibungen, 456; H. Maundrell, “A Journey from Aleppo to Jerusalem, Easter 1697” in: T. Wright, Early Travels in Palestine (London, 1848), 160. 15. al-‘Awra, Ta¯rı¯kh, 266. 16. F. Fabri, Eigentliche Beschreibung der Hin-und Widerfahrt zum Hl. Land (Ulm, 1557), 97. ¨ gypten und Constantinopel 17. H. Ranzow, Reise auff Jerusalem, Cairo in A (Hamburg, 1704). 18. D’Arvieux, Nachrichten, vol. 1, 241; vol. 2, 20, et passim. 19. Korten, Gelobtes Land, 206, 225. 20. M. al-Sfi abba¯gh, Ta¯rı¯kh Zfi a¯hir, 26, 35, 50. 21. F. Hasselquist, Voyages and Travels in the Levant in the Years 1749–1752 (London, 1766), 177. 22. al-‘Awra, Ta¯rı¯kh, 329–30. 23. Ibid., 87. ¨ gypten im Jahre 1817 (Leipzig, 24. T. R. Jollifer, Reise in Pala¨stina, Syrien und A 1821), 253. 25. C. Irby and J. Mangle, Travels in Egypt, Nubia, Syria and the Holy Land (London, 1852), 61–62. 26. Jollifer, Reise, 253. 27. Misha¯qa, Murder, 133. 28. al-‘Awra, Ta¯rı¯kh, 180, 202–11. 29. Although there is some evidence that at least in the seventeenth century carriages were traveling between Jaffa and Ramla; see d’Arvieux, Nachrichten, vol. 2, 83. 30. See appendix D, map 3. 31. Cohen, Palestine, 154–55. 32. A. al-Sfi abba¯gh, Al-Rawd al-zfi a¯hir fı¯ ta¯rı¯kh al-Zfi a¯hir, Bibliothe`que Nationale Paris, MS arabe, no. 4610, 32. H fi . A. Shiha¯b, Ta¯rı¯kh, 66, suggests that he used the route via Caesarea to Nazareth or the one via Ramla to Janı¯n, conquering Safed in the eastern Galilee before approaching Acre. 33. See appendix D, map 3. 34. M. al-sfiabba¯gh, Ta¯rı¯kh Zfi a¯hir, 49. 35. al-Shiha¯b, Ta¯rı¯kh, 102; Misha¯qa, Murder, 26; H fi . al-Munayyar, Ta¯rı¯kh alrahba¯nı¯ya al-shuwayrı¯ya (publ. as an appendix in hfi. A. Shiha¯b, Ta¯rı¯kh, pp. 351– 516), 446, speaks of five years of continuous warfare with al-Jarra¯r and elaborate machinery to storm the fortification. 36. Frederick the Great pursued this strategy at the same time in Prussia:

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NOTES

see H. Schulze, Staat und Nation in der europa¨ischen Geschichte (Mu¨nchen, 1995), 158. 37. Letters from Mimaut to Sebastiani on Oct. 24, 1831, Nov. 14, 1831, and Jan. 16, 1832, published in G. Douin, La Premie`re Guerre de Syrie (Cairo, 1931), 67 ff. 38. See, for instance, al-‘Awra, Ta¯rı¯kh; detailed as it is on other aspects of social history, it does not give us as much as a hint, as to the size of the population at the time. 39. al-‘Awra, Ta¯rı¯kh, 196–98. 40. M. al-Sfi abba¯gh, “Ta¯rı¯kh Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh” (Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, MS cod. Ar. 901), fol. 19. 41. M. Eneman, Resa in Orientan 1711–1712 (Upsala, 1885), 278, indicated that there were some one hundred Christian families for 1711. De Saint Maure, Nouveau Voyage de Palestine 1721 (Paris, 1721) seems to imply a Christian majority of the population for 1721. Judging from the building activities for churches and from the general policy of Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh, Acre must have exerted a great attraction on Christians during the 1760s and 1770s: see Philipp, Syrians, 22, 27, 29. S. Pleschtschjeew, Tagebuch einer Reise nach Syrien und Palestina (Riga, 1774), 24, states that in 1773 the Greek Catholics constituted the largest single community in Acre, which would lead one to believe that Christians altogether constituted the majority in the city. At a time when the city was already in decline (1815), H. Turner, Journal of a Tour in the Levant (London, 1820), vol. 2, 111, counted 2,000 Greek Catholics, 2,000 Greek Orthodox, 500 Jews and only 2,500 Muslims, to which, however, some 2,000 to 2,500 troops have to be added. If one is to believe M. A. Scholz, Reise in die Gegend zwischen Alexandrien und Paraetonium, die ¨ gypten, Pala¨stina und Syrien in den Jahren 1820 und 1821 Lybische Wu¨este, Siwa, A (Leipzig, 1822), 244, a drastic drop occurred in the relative and absolute size of the Christian population within the next five years: 800 Greek Catholics, 800 Greek Orthodox, 80 Maronites, 80 Latins, 800 Jews and 11,000 Muslims. Though a discrepancy remains, his numbers do not seem so totally unbelievable when compared to the next figures we have: R. Prokesch, Tagebuch meiner Reise ins Heilige Land, 1829 (Wien, 1831), 141, gives figures of 2,000 Christians and 8,000 others in 1829. After occupation, siege, earthquake, etc. the Christian population is estimated by E. Blondel, Deux ans en Syrie et en Palestine (1838–1839) (Paris, 1840), 249, at barely a hundred in 1839. A certain amount of remigration seems to have occurred: in 1849 between 1,000 and 2,000 inhabitants were supposedly Christian; in 1853 there were 1,200 Christians; and by 1887 between 2,200 and 2,800 or 30 percent of the population were Christians. 42. A. Carmel, Geschichte Haifa’s in der tu¨rkischen Zeit, 1516–1918 (Wiesbaden, 1975), 73. 43. Marwa¯n al-Ma¯dfi ¯ı, Qaryat ¯Ijzim: qisfifisat al-hfi ama¯ma al-baydfi a (Damascus, 1994). I am grateful to Dr. Y. Frenkel for having pointed out the waqfiyya to me. 44. By 1702 there seem to have been no resident Jews in Acre: see A. Ya’ari, Igroth eretz Israel (Jerusalem, 1951), 234. The Swedish pastor Eneman indicates ten Jewish families for 1711: Resa, 278. In 1741 we hear of more than a hundred Jewish

NOTES

237

households, which seems unreasonably high: Ya’ari, Igroth, 256. The French consular correspondence speaks of a certain “Cacam Mosse Malky, Juif, dragoman barataire de France, re´sident a` Acre,” AN AE B1 84, Aleppo 23/VIII, 1745. After the earthquake in Safed in 1759, a maximum of fifty Jews came to Acre, most of whom died in the following year during the plague: Y. Barnai, Hayeshuv haYehudi b’eretz Israel, 1740–1777 (Jerusalem, 1982), 214: Ya’ari, Sheluhei eretz Israel (Jerusalem, 1977), 450. In 1775 we hear of 36 households, or 120 to 150 Jews, most of whom made a living as jewelers or silk spinners: B. Yashar, Akko haYehudit (Acre, 1953), 26. In the first two decades of the nineteenth century the Jewish population grew rapidly: Turner, Journal, vol. 1, 111, indicates 400 for 1815, and Scholz, Reise, 244, counts 800 Jews for 1820. D. Bet Hillel, Unknown Jews in Unknown Lands, 1824–1832 (New York, 1973), 61, indicates only 100 Jews three years later. This number does not seem to have changed much during the rest of the century. 45. Ya’ari, Igroth, 338: a letter of Haim Bar Tovia from Vilna visiting Acre in 1810 and receiving a promise from H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı to support the Hasidic immigrants in all respects. 46. See appendix D, map 8.

2. THE POLITICS OF ACRE 1. Mikha¯’ı¯l Niqu¯la¯ al-Sfi abba¯gh (1775–1816) studied in Egypt with various ‘ulama¯’, joined General Regnier’s staff as a scribe, and accompanied him back to Paris, where he became an informant for many orientalist philologists. See G. Graf, Geschichte der christlichen arabischen Literatur (Rome, 1949), vol. 3, 249. 2. See his MS, “Ta¯rı¯kh Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh,” which is bound together with what seems to be a first draft of his Ta¯rikh al-shaykh Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar al-Zayda¯nı¯. In style they differ considerably, and a remark in the biography of Ibra¯hı¯m on fol. 8, “those who tell these stories still live in Paris,” leaves the identity of the author unclear. But in the published version of the Ta¯rı¯kh Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar, 73, he refers to his own work, “Ta¯rı¯kh Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh.” 3. The suggestion that he was the brother of Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh is most unlikely. That brother had gone to Egypt, where he was killed in the second Cairo uprising against the French: Niqu¯la¯ Turk, Mudhakkira¯t Niqu¯la¯ Turk (Cairo, 1950), 83. 4. ‘A. al-Sfi abba¯gh, “al-Rawd al-zfi a¯hir.” fol. 2a. 5. Ibid., fol. 3a; see Tawfı¯q Mu‘ammar al-Mahfi a¯mı¯, Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar (Nazareth, 1979), 47–48, who claims the year 1721; but according to his own argument and sources it should be 1717–18. 6. See L. Schatkowski Schilcher, Families in Politics (Stuttgart, 1985), 125, for a discussion of this group. 7. M. al-Sfi abba¯gh, Ta¯rı¯kh Zfi a¯hir, 24, 25. 8. The chronicler contradicts himself when dating the event. According to his first description the Zayda¯nı¯s must have moved to ‘Arra¯ba when Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar

238

NOTES

was still in his teens, i.e. around 1707, but somewhat later in the text it is asserted that the move to ‘Arra¯ba occurred in 1730. It is most unlikely that the Sfi aqr should have chosen a teenager for this task and if the Zayda¯nı¯s indeed moved to ‘Arra¯ba at the beginning of the century the later date is more likely for nominating al‘Umar as chief representative of the Sfi aqr tribe. See ibid., 21, 23. 9. Ibid., 24, 34. 10. Ibid., 35. 11. Ibid., 39. 12. See appendix D, map 5. 13. M. al-Sfi abba¯gh, Ta¯rı¯kh Zfi a¯hir, 37. 14. M. al-Sfi abba¯gh in ibid., 42–50, dates the decisive battle between the forces of Nablus and Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar to 1735, after the conquest of Safed, but also after the conquest of Acre, which he dates erroneously to 1733. According to this chronicle Zfi a¯hir, after conquering and fortifying Acre, took Haifa, Tı¯ra, and Tfi antfiu¯ra, which belonged to Nablus and were controlled by the Ibn Ma¯dfi ¯ı clan. This sequence of events is most certainly wrong. 15. This would mean the battle took place after 1738, since only in this year did Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar begin to build up a Maghrebi unit; see above. 16. Ibid., 41–50; it is remarkable, though, that al-Nimr in his detailed history of Nablus does not mention any such battle at all. ‘A¯bbu¯d al-Sfi abba¯gh, in “alRawd al-zfi a¯hir,” fol. 7a, mentions the battle only briefly. He dates it before 1737 and definitely before the conquest of Acre. ¯ l Tfi u¯qa¯n fı¯ Jabal Na¯bulus (Shfa¯ ‘Amr, 1990), 83. 17. Musfifitafa¯ Al-‘Abba¯sı¯, Tfi a¯rı¯kh A 18. See appendix D, maps 4 and 5. 19. See appendix D, maps 4 and 5. 20. See Philipp, Syrians, 18–19. 21. Burayk, Ta¯rı¯kh al-Sha¯m, 71. 22. Ibid., 9; Y. Birav, Zimrat Ha’aretz (Jerusalem, 1946), 36, mentions two sieges, the second one lasting five days and occurring when Sulayma¯n was still pasha of Sidon. 23. ‘A. al-Sfi abba¯gh, “al-Rawd al-zfi a¯hir,” fol. 7a, 8. 24. Birav, eyewitness to the event, gives a lengthy description of the siege, the negotiations, and the bombardments: Zimrat, 36–60. 25. Ibid., 67. I have found nothing about the request in the French correspondence. 26. ‘A. al-Sabba¯gh, “al Rawd al-zfi a¯hir,” fol. 8a. 27. AN AE B1 978, April 30, 1731, when he actually lodges at Treilhier’s. Blanc appears in ‘A. al-Sfi abba¯gh, “al-Rawd al-zfi a¯hir,” fol. 8, as the Frenchman Bila¯l. 28. M. al-Sabba¯gh, Ta¯rı¯kh Zfi a¯hir, 53. 29. Ibid., 41–44. 30. AN AE B1 978, Nov. 1746. 31. AN AE B1 978, Jan. 4, 1751, Jan. 20, 1751, Acre. 32. Al-Rukaynı¯, 41.

NOTES

239

33. F. Charles-Roux, Les ´echelles de Syrie et de Palestine au XVIIIe`me sie`cle (Paris, 1928), 87. ¯ mil (Beirut, 1981), 116. Shiha¯b, al34. Muhfi ammad A¯l Sfi afa¯, Ta¯rı¯kh jabal ‘A Jazza¯r, 57–59; AN AE B1 1036, Feb. 28, 1774. 35. A¯l Sfi afa¯’s history of Jabal ‘A¯mil was written some 150 years after the event and probably relied to a large degree on the other two sources. The author made a very conscious attempt to interpret the history of the Metualis as an early Arab liberation movement against the Ottomans. For the Metualis, too, the French correspondence is of little help. 36. Some authors mention Ma¯ru¯n, which actually is situated near Ya¯ru¯n. 37. Apparently al-Dinkizlı¯, commander of Zfi a¯hir’s Maghrebi troops, turned the fight in Zfi a¯hir’s favor by a ruse rather than military prowess. He had the two young sons of Na¯sfi¯ıf Nasfisfia¯r kidnapped from Tibnı¯n, the fortified residence of Nasfisfia¯r, and thus forced their father to negotiate. Al-Rukaynı¯ does not mention the anecdote of the two sons nor does he see the subsequent alliance as caused by ¯ mil, 58, mentions a second battle, several the outcome of the battle; his Jabal ‘A months later, in which the “the people from Safed” conquered Tfi arbı¯hfi a. At this point, however, Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar was not participating, since he himself was now at war with his son ‘Alı¯, governor of Safed. ¯ mil, 114–21; M. al-Sfi abba¯gh, Ta¯rı¯kh Zfi a¯hir, 39–41; al38. A¯l Sfi afa¯, Ta¯rı¯kh Jabal ‘A Rukaynı¯; Jabal ‘a¯mil, 54, 55, 58. 39. Mu‘ammar al-Mahfi a¯mı¯, Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar, 60–61, follows al-Sfi abba¯gh with the dates. ¯ mil, 121; most likely the source of this precise date 40. A¯l Sfi afa¯, Ta¯rı¯kh Jabal ‘A ¯ mil, 58. To complicate things further: Mariti, Voyages, vol. is al-Rukaynı¯, Jabal ‘A 2, 89, claimed that already in 1760 the governor of Sidon had to recognize Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar as the “commander of the Metualis,” who declared themselves allies of Zfi a¯hir. 41. For instance: ACCM J 793, Feb. 14, 1755, Sidon, when Na¯sfi¯ıf Nasfisfia¯r is described as the ally of Zfi a¯hir; and J 797, June 6, 1761, Sidon, when Na¯sfi¯ıf is in open conflict with Zfi a¯hir. ¯ mil, Introduction, 15–20. 42. Al-Rukaynı¯, Jabal ‘A 43. ACCM J 797, June 6, 1761, Sidon; ‘A. al-Sfi abba¯gh, “al-Rawd al-Zfi a¯hir,” fol. 10a. 44. ‘A. al-Sfi abba¯gh, “al-Rawd al-Zfi a¯hir,” fol. 10a. 45. Ibid., fol. 11 claims that he was exiled; Uriel Heyd, Za¯hir al-‘Umar: shalı¯t haGalı¯l (Jerusalem, 1942), 43, ascertains that he was sent in 1766 by the government to put down an uprising. 46. ‘A. al-Sfi abba¯gh, “al-Rawd al-zfi a¯hir,” fol. 10a–14. The French reports show nothing on this arbitration. 47. AN AE B1 1034, Nov. 15, 1770, Sidon. 48. Ibid., Aug. 3, 1770. The French consul admits not having a clue why Zfi a¯hir was taking these steps.

240

NOTES

49. Al-Jabartı¯, ‘Aja¯’ib, vol. 1, 351, 364. Perhaps not too familiar with the scene in Acre, he describes the Egyptian expedition in November 1770 as exclusively initiated by ‘Alı¯ Bey al-Kabı¯r. The reports by the two al-Sfi abba¯ghs present a different picture: in their story the Syrian immigrants in Egypt play a decisive role. This community was rising economically, already controlled all trade in Damiette, and began to spread its influence to Cairo. A certain Mikha¯’ı¯l Jamal, Greek Orthodox from Syria, was head scribe of ‘Alı¯ Bey al-Kabı¯r when the latter was exiled to Upper Egypt in 1766, during one stage of the incessant internal struggles between the Egyptian Mamluks. ‘Alı¯ Bey corresponded secretly from Upper Egypt with his prote´ge´ Mikha¯’ı¯l Jamal, asking him to provide him with cash, clothing, and equipment. Fearing the Mamluk Beys in Cairo, Jamal refused to help. Mikha¯’ı¯l Fakhr, Greek Catholic himself, and at that point in control of customs in Damiette, got wind of the matter and supplied ‘Alı¯ Bey generously with all he had requested. It turned out to be a good investment. Upon his return to Cairo in 1767, ‘Alı¯ Bey appointed Mikha¯’ı¯l Fakhr his mu‘allim al-dawa¯wı¯n, while Mikha¯’ı¯l Jamal had to flee for his life to Acre. As head of the dı¯wa¯n Fakhr was now in a position to intrigue against his erstwhile colleagues, the Jewish customs officials, whom he succeeded in having removed from their positions. All of their wealth was confiscated, some were executed. Mikha¯’ı¯l Fakhr was made head of all customs in Egypt. With that the most profitable financial and economic activity in Egypt came firmly under the exclusive control of the Greek Catholic immigrant community: Philipp, Syrians, 30–33; contrary to my earlier impression it seems that Mikha¯’ı¯l Fakhr himself was Greek Catholic, while Mikha¯’ı¯l Jamal was Greek Orthodox; see Shaykhu¯, “Mikha¯’ı¯l al-Sfi abba¯gh wa’sratuhu,” al-Mashriq, 8 (1905), 27; M. al-Sfi abba¯gh, Ta¯rı¯kh Zfi a¯hir, 91. M. alSfi abba¯gh, Ta¯rı¯kh Zfi a¯hir, 94–96, claims that Mikha¯’ı¯l Jamal returned to Egypt, not later than early 1770. Upon the advice of Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh, Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar dispatched him with enormous gifts for ‘Alı¯ Bey al-Kabı¯r, who promptly reinstated Jamal as head of his dı¯wa¯n. ‘A. al-Sfi abba¯gh, “al-Rawd al-Zfi a¯hir,” fol. 15, 15a, has Mikha¯’ı¯l Fakhr initiate the contacts between Cairo and Acre, by writing a letter to Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh asking to buy coats of mail for ‘Alı¯ Bey al-Kabı¯r. The requested armor was sent, but as a present. In both cases the presents were sent with the more or less explicit intention of building an alliance between Cairo and Acre. ‘Alı¯ Bey was fully aware and appreciative of Zfi a¯hir’s gesture and an alliance was quickly forged. Both sources also emphasize the role of the Greek Catholic conduit for establishing the contacts. Both authors belong, of course, to the same community, and a certain bias might be expected. 50. AN AE B1 1034, Nov. 30, 1770, Sidon. 51. Shiha¯b, Lubna¯n, vol. 1, 80. 52. Ibid., vol. 1, 86. Much has been speculated about this sudden change of mind by Abu¯ ‘l-Dhahab, but no more convincing explanation has been offered; see also Heyd, Za¯hir al-‘Umar, 50–53. A decisive role is played here by Isma¯‘ı¯l Bey, who at first hesitated to attack ‘Uthma¯n Pasha while preparing for the pilgrimage, and later advised Abu¯ ‘l-Dhahab that the Ottoman government would

NOTES

241

look askance at such action and punish him for it. Most likely he is to be identified as Isma¯‘ı¯l Bey al-Sfi aghı¯r, whose vita is given by al-Jabartı¯, ‘Aja¯’ib, vol. 2, 20, but see also vol. 1, 206, 251, 258, 308, 334, 366, 371, 413, 414; vol. 2, 10–12, 14, 19, 24, 219. He was a brother of ‘Alı¯ Bey al-Ghazza¯wı¯; he had lived in Istanbul for a long time and is described by al-Jabartı¯ as one of those rare Mamluks who also were pious Muslims and had a high regard for scholarship and scholars. He also was hostile to the dhimmı¯s. It is not unreasonable that with this mindset he was convinced that fighting the troops of the sultan, ruler of the Muslims, was an irreligious thing to do. He later switched sides from ‘Alı¯ Bey al-Kabı¯r to Muhfi ammad Abu¯ ‘l-Dhahab and was sent, during the last campaign by Abu¯ ‘l-Dhahab in Palestine, from there to Istanbul to negotiate the appointment of Abu¯ ‘l-Dhahab as governor of Egypt and Syria, probably counting on his earlier Istanbul contacts. 53. See appendix D, maps 3 and 5. 54. AN AE B1 1035, May 31, 1771; June 13, 1771; June 26, 1771; Aug. 20, 1771; Sept. 21, 1771; May 2, 1772. 55. AN AE B1 1035, May 10 and 15, 1772; Sept. 30, 1772; Oct. 18, 1772. AN AE B1 1036, Feb. 19, 1773; March 27, 1773; April 30, 1773. M. al-Sfi abba¯gh, Ta¯rı¯kh Zfi a¯hir, 124, reports that ‘Alı¯ Bey received letters from Egypt inviting him to come and take over power. In Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh’s opinion this was a ruse to lure ‘Alı¯ Bey into a trap. This anecdote may be true, but the time chosen to return certainly depended foremost on the reconquest of Jaffa. 56. Ibid, March 27, 1773; June 8, 1773; Aug. 17, 1773, Nov. 30, 1773. 57. AN AE B1 1036, Bulletin Jan. 31, 1774, and Bulletin Feb. 28, 1774. 58. AN AE B1 1037, Bulletin Feb. 28, 1774, with an attached translation of the letter of ‘Uthma¯n Pasha. 59. M. al-Sfi abba¯gh, Ta¯rı¯kh Zfi a¯hir, 80, 99, suggests that Zfi a¯hir was appointed governor of Sidon for one month in 1759, but no other evidence for this appointment has appeared. 60. AN AE B1 1036, Bulletin Jan. 31, 1774. The Metualis, Zfi a¯hir’s most loyal allies, had wisely declined to get involved in family quarrels. 61. AN AE B1 1036, April 7, 1775. 62. AN AE B1 1036, June 24, 1775; and 1037, “Pre´cis des Re´volutions d’Acre May Juin 1775.” ‘Alı¯ had, since ‘Alı¯ Bey al-Kabı¯r’s time in Acre, maintained contact with Abu¯ ‘l-Dhahab. But his hope of functioning as an ally of the latter was betrayed. Abu¯ ‘l-Dhahab also conquered and destroyed Safed, his residence. See ‘A. al-Sfi abba¯gh, “al-Rawd al-zfi a¯hir,” fol. 30a, 32a. 63. Some Maghrebi troops had come in the service of the Egyptians and now claimed control over the city in the name of the Ottoman Empire, others had served with ‘Alı¯ the son of Zfi a¯hir and wanted to hand over the city to him. The commander al-Dinkizlı¯ arrived with some three hundred Maghrebis from Sidon, claiming the city for his master Zfi a¯hir. 64. AN AE B1 1037 “Pre´cis . . .”; and 1037, June 25, 1775. ‘A. al-Sfi abba¯gh, “alRawd al-zfi a¯hir,” fol. 33a, 34. 65. AN AE B1 1037, June 27, 1775.

242

NOTES

66. According to M. al-Sfi abba¯gh, Ta¯rı¯kh Zfi a¯hir, 146–48, it was decided by Zfi a¯hir and his advisers that the money could not be found and military resistance was called for. Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh kept up a conciliatory correspondence with H fi asan Kfi apu¯da¯n Pasha. But the latter insisted that he had to enter the city and do the accounts there. Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar was to evacuate the town for the time being. The villain in the story is Zfi a¯hir’s son ‘Uthma¯n, who sabotaged the defense of Acre, forbidding the artillery to shoot at the Ottoman ships. He also kept up contacts with H fi asan Kfi apu¯da¯n Pasha. When he realized that Zfi a¯hir actually was leaving the city he informed al-Dinkizlı¯ and suggested that he kill his father, fearing the latter might return once again. Al-Dinkizlı¯ did this in the hope of ingratiating himself with the K fi apu¯da¯n Pasha. ‘A. al-Sfi abba¯gh, “al-Rawd al-zfi a¯hir,” 35–38, describes Zfi a¯hir as fully willing to “pay every last penny” of his debts to the government. But al-Dinkizlı¯ promised H fi asan Kfi apu¯da¯n Pasha that in addition he could deliver the city to him and he could collect all its wealth, in particular the enormous treasure of Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh. In addition he would deliver Zfi a¯hir’s head. He then engineered an incident which led to the bombardment of the city. Zfi a¯hir fled and was killed by a Maghrebi soldier. The betrayal is enormous, and the worst villain is al-Dinkizlı¯, who killed, or at least caused the death of, Zfi a¯hir, his master of forty years. The motive given, to ingratiate himself with the K fi apu¯da¯n Pasha, is rather weak. The same is true for the sons of Zfi a¯hir: they had often rebelled against him, but were they willing to kill him, as ‘Uthma¯n appeared to be? We don’t know, but it is unlikely. 67. The first version was introduced by a short French report immediately after the events. It states that Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar was willing to pay all his debts immediately, but when he realized that this was not enough and that the government was really after his head he put up a stubborn resistance which led to the bombardment of Acre and eventually his murder while fleeing from the city: AN AE B1 1037, Bulletin Sept. 2, 1775. 68. Shiha¯b, al-Jazza¯r, 67–69. 69. Al-Dinkizlı¯ had negotiated with the K fi apu¯da¯n Pasha and had lowered the latter’s demands to 500 purses. But Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar refused, believing Ibra¯hı¯m alSfi abba¯gh’s claim that there was no money in the treasury. The anonymous author comments that Zfi a¯hir was simple-minded enough to believe everything Ibra¯hı¯m was saying and to protect him. Al-Dinkizlı¯’s threatening demand, “Leave Ibra¯hı¯m to me for a few hours and he will pay even 700 purses from his personal wealth!” was rejected, whereupon he decided to hand the city over to the K fi apu¯da¯n Pasha. Later Ibra¯hı¯m’s treasure of supposedly 36,000 purses of gold coins was discovered, providing an opportunity for the anonymous writer to comment on the excessive greed of Ibra¯hı¯m: See Iskandar Ma‘lu¯f, “Ta¯rı¯kh al-Shaykh Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar alZayda¯nı¯,” al-Mashriq, 24 (1921), 543 ff., and also M. al-Sfi abba¯gh, Ta¯rı¯kh Zfi a¯hir, 6, introduction by Qustfiantfi¯ın Ba¯sha¯. 70. Shiha¯b, Lubna¯n, vol. 3, 86. 71. See Carl L. Brown, International Politics in the Middle East (Princeton, 1984).

NOTES

243

72. Burayk, Ta¯rı¯kh al-Sha¯m, 54–58. 73. M. al-Sfi abba¯gh, “Ta¯rı¯kh Ibra¯hı¯m,” fol. 25–26. 74. AN AE B1 1035, Sept. 2, 1772. 75. AN AE B1 1036, Nov. 30, 1773. 76. AN AE B1 1036, Aug. 16, 1773. 77. AN AE B1 1036, May 27, 1773. 78. De Tott, Memoirs of the Baron de Tott on the Turks and the Tatars (Dublin, 1785), vol. 3, 300. 79. G. A. Olivier, Voyage dans l’Empire Ottoman, L’Egypte et la Perse (Paris, 1804), 256. 80. al-Jabartı¯, ‘Aja¯’ib, vol. 3, 322. 81. See, for instance, the ode by ‘Abd al-Latfi¯ıf Fathfi Alla¯h, Zuhayr ‘A. Fathfi Alla¯h, Al-sha¯‘ir al-muftı¯ ‘Abd al-Latfi¯ıf Fathfi Alla¯h (Beirut, 1994), 293, and that by ‘Alı¯ al-Sfi ayrafı¯ al-Rashı¯dı¯ in al-Jabartı¯, ‘Aja¯’ib, vol. 3, 69; for biographies see below. 82. A. Cohen, Jazza¯r Ahfi mad Pa¯sha¯, hfi ayyaw wepe‘ulotaw (Jerusalem, 1965). 83. There exists one short attempt to rehabilitate him somewhat in an article by Mahfi mu¯d Kana¯‘an, “Ahfimad Pasha al-Jazza¯r wuhfi ukmuhu fı¯ zfi ilal-adab,” alAnba¯, March 1974, where he offers the curious argument that all poetry about alJazza¯r, especially that composed after his death, was so exceedingly negative because in all his life al-Jazza¯r had never shown any appreciation of poetry or hired poets to sing his praise. ¨ gyptens als Aus84. See, for instance, Abir Buschnak, Der historische Roman A druck eines sich wandelnden Selbstversta¨ndnis: Eine literarisch kritische Untersuchung am Beispiel des Mamlukenromans, unpubl. Ph.D. Bamberg, 2000. 85. Al-Jabartı¯, ‘Aja¯’ib, vol. 1, 306, vol. 3, 64 ff., 321–22; Shiha¯b, al-Jazza¯r, 31 ff. A work composed around 1850 by the Ottoman historian Ahmet Cevdet Pasfia, Ta¯rı¯h-i Cevdet (Istanbul 1887–95), follows very closely the two earlier Arab authors, who presumably were the source of his information. 86. Al-Jabartı¯, ‘Aja¯’ib, vol. 1, 113. Muhfiammad Bey al-Jazza¯r, ibid., vol. 1, 136, and Ibra¯hı¯m Bey al-Jazza¯r, ibid., vol. 1, 56–57, 122–24, are the sons of Yu¯suf and inherited their father’s byname. 87. Cevdet, Tarih, vol. 3, 9. 88. Misha¯qa, Murder, 5; al-Jabartı¯, ‘Aja¯’ib, vol. 1, 307. 89. It seems somewhat strange, though, that he should have linked up with the very tribe, al-Hana¯dı¯, whose leaders he had earlier massacred; see al-Jabartı¯, ‘Aja¯’ib, vol. 1, 334–35. 90. According to one source, al-Jazza¯r had at least one slave, a Mamluk, and a stableman with him; Munayyar, Ta¯rı¯kh, 265. 91. Shiha¯b, al-Jazza¯r, 47. 92. Ibid., 50. 93. Tott, Memoirs, vol. 3, 294 ff.; M. Volney, Travels through Syria and Egypt (London, 1787), vol. 2, 53–58, 179–84, 226–27, 268–69, 360–64, 449; Renaudot, “Me´moire sur le commerce des franc¸ais dans le De´partement du Consulat Ge´ne´ral de Syrie et Palestine.” AN AE B1 1039, July 6, 1783.

244

NOTES

94. Olivier, Voyage, 255–70; A. I. De´nain, ed., Histoire scientifique et militaire de l’expe´dition franc¸aise en Egypte (Paris, 1830–36), vol. 5, 226–41, 213–15, 314–17, 364–65; E. Lockroy, Ahmed le Boucher, la Syrie et l’Egypte au XVIII sie`cle (Paris, 1888). 95. Volney, Travels, 55. 96. Tott, Memoirs vol. 3, 295. 97. This is the first time this detail of the stabbing is being offered and only Olivier makes this claim. The Christian origin of Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r is most improbable, since the population of Bosnia was by and large Muslim and since no other source mentions it. 98. Olivier, Voyage, 257. 99. Denain, Histoire, vol. 5, 226–41, esp. 229. 100. Misha¯qa, Murder, 5; the lack of logic in the story is inescapable. 101. Renaudot, “Me´moire,” 2. 102. Volney, Travels, vol. 2, chapter 33. 103. Tott, Memoirs, vol. 3, 300. 104. Denain, Histoire, 233. 105. A. Jaubert, Voyage en Arme´nie et en Perse, 1805–1806 (Paris, 1821), 182. 106. E. D. Clarke, Travels in Various Countries of Europe, Asia and Africa (London, 1812), vol. 2, 364–65. 107. Olivier, Voyage, 266. 108. Ibid., 264. 109. De´nain, Histoire, 231. 110. Jaubert, Voyage, 183, 187. 111. Shiha¯b, al-Jazza¯r, 95. 112. AE AN B11035, de Taules, Seyde, Nov. 30, 1773. 113. Volney, Travels, vol. 2, 268. 114. Renaudot, “Me´moire.” 115. Jaubert, Voyage, 184. 116. Volney, Travels, vol. 2, 227. 117. Clarke, Travels, 368, 389; Olivier, Voyage, 269. Al-Jazza¯r apparently killed the architect of the mosque in Tyre with his own hands—outraged by the bad work the latter had done. 118. Clarke, Travels, 365, 368. 119. Olivier, Voyage, 268. 120. Shiha¯b, al-Jazza¯r, 109. 121. Jaubert, Voyage, 183. 122. Clarke, Travels, 370. 123. Ibid., 364. 124. Olivier, Voyage, 269. 125. Shiha¯b, al-Jazza¯r, 53. 126. Ibid., 156; al-‘Awra, Ta¯rı¯kh, 14, 15. 127. Olivier, Voyage, 269. 128. Clarke, Travels, 369.

NOTES

245

129. B. Schaebler, Aufsta¨nde im Drusenbergland (Gotha, 1996), 29. 130. Ibid. 131. R. Kara¯ma, H fi awa¯dith Lubna¯n wa-Su¯rı¯ya min sana 1745 ila¯ sana 1800 (Beirut 199?), 42. 132. Shiha¯b, al-Jazza¯r, 53; but cf. Munayyar, Ta¯rı¯kh, 370, 374: Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar entrusted him with collecting taxes in the Nablus area, but al-Jazza¯r defected and went to Istanbul, where he reported on the rebellion of Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar against the government troops. Kara¯ma, H fi awa¯dith, 46, also places al-Jazza¯r in Istanbul between 1772 and 1775. 133. H fi . Munayyar, al-Durr al-marsfiu¯f fı¯ ta¯rı¯kh al-Shu¯f, publ. in al-Mashriq, vols. 48–51 (1954–57), 50 (1956), 197. 134. Kara¯ma, H fi awa¯dith, 55. 135. Munayyar, al-Durr, vol. 50 (1956), 198–99. 136. Ibid., 202; Shiha¯b, al-Jazza¯r, 77; Kara¯ma, H fi awa¯dith, 63; only Munayyar, Ta¯rı¯kh, 384, places these events in 1779. 137. The French report mentions a total of 650,000 piasters, of which 100,000 were considered taxes for the current year, 300,000 as covering the expenditures of military actions, and 250,000 as direct contribution to al-Jazza¯r. The report points out the complete impossibility of collecting that sort of money in the Mountain within less than a year: AN AE B1 1040, CC Seyde XXIV, July 21, 1784. A later French consular report speaks of 1,000,000 piastre payments and observes that this would lead to the impoverishment of the population: AN AE B1 1040, CC Seyde, XXIV, Nov. 12, 1784. 138. His main contenders were his brothers Amı¯r Sayyid Ahfi mad and Amı¯r Afandı¯, whom he eventually killed. In 1784 he had his uncle Isma¯‘ı¯l arrested, extorted from him and his followers large sums of money, and finally had his eyes gouged out. He later had him killed. Several of Isma¯‘ı¯l’s followers suffered a similar fate. One, whose hands had been cut off, “died from his aggravation”: Kara¯ma, H fi awa¯dith, 88. Supposedly, Amı¯r Yu¯suf was able to extort 1,600 purses or 800,000 ghirsh from Isma¯‘ı¯l (Kara¯ma, H fi awa¯dith, 87), which made it easy for Yu¯suf to pay off his debts to al-Jazza¯r: Shiha¯b, al-Jazza¯r, 87. 139. AN AE B1 1039, CC Seyde XXIII, Oct. 2, 1781; see also Shiha¯b, al-Jazza¯r, 82, who wrongly places the events in 1783. 140. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r was wa¯lı¯ of Damascus from March 1785 until November 1786 (AN AE B1 981, March 20, 1785, and ibid., Dec. 10, 1786); from Oct. 1790 until 1795; from late 1798 until late 1799 he was named “commander of all troops, Pasha of Tripoli, Syria, Gaza, Ramla, Jaffa and all their dependencies and Commander of the Pilgrimage” (de Testa, Recueil des traite´s de la Porte ottomane [Paris, 1864], vol. 1, 527); see also Mikha¯’ı¯l al-Dimishqı¯, Tarı¯kh hfi awa¯dith al-Sha¯m wa’l-Lubna¯n (Damascus, 1982), 22. The Ottoman government agreed to this enormous concentration of power in the hands of al-Jazza¯r only in view of the imminent attack of Napoleon on Syria. In late 1803 al-Jazza¯r was appointed again as wa¯lı¯ of Damascus, a position he held until his death on April 29, 1804. 141. Kara¯ma, H fi awa¯dith, 153.

246

NOTES

142. Shiha¯b, al-Jazza¯r, 138. 143. Ibid., 150. 144. Munayyar, Ta¯rı¯kh, 481. 145. Shiha¯b, al-Jazza¯r, 158. 146. Ibid., 81; in April 1781 Amı¯r Yu¯suf “confiscated their [the Junbala¯fits’] money, their income [i.e., crops and fruit trees], and destroyed their houses.” Munayyar, al-Durr, 50 (1956), 428–36, talks at length about the devastation of the region and the pauperization of the population. See also Kara¯ma, H fi awa¯dith, 130. 147. Brown, International Politics, Introduction. 148. See appendix D, map 6. 149. AN AE B1 1037, CC Seyde, XXI, Sept. 2, 1775; April 4, 1776; May 31, 1777; AN AE B1 1038, CC Seyde XXII, May 12, 1778. 150. AN AE B1 1040, CC Seyde XXIV, June 17, 1783; AN AE B1 979, CC Acre, May 15, 1783. 151. al-Dimishqı¯, Ta¯rı¯kh, 52. See also Kara¯ma, H fi awa¯dith, 87, though he does not mention Muhfi ammad Batfifita¯l Pasha. 152. March 28, 1785; AN AE B1 979, CC Acre, March 20, 1785; April 7, 1785; April 30, 1785. Shiha¯b, al-Jazza¯r, 87, errs when he claims that Salı¯m Pasha alSfi aghı¯r was appointed, because “Salı¯m Pasha al-Kabı¯r had died in the plague.” His death occurred only in the spring of 1786: AN AE B1 979, May 1, 1786. But the French also seem confused. On May 2, 1785 in AN AE B1 979, Renaudot writes that Salı¯m is twenty-six years old, a good father and husband and for over twenty years in the service of al-Jazza¯r. On August 16, 1786, Renaudot writes in AN AE B1 979 that “Selim de Hama” has become pasha of Sidon and Acre. He is a young man of twenty-five, and al-Jazza¯r has him watched. 153. Annual tour of the southern sancakfi s by the governor of Damascus to collect money for the pilgrimage: Barbir, Ottoman Rule, 122. 154. Ihfi sa¯n al-Nimr, Ta¯rı¯kh jabal Na¯bulus wa’l-Balqa¯’ (Nablus, 1975), part 1, 208. 155. AN AE B1 979, CC Acre, May 16, June 7, and July 12, 1785. 156. The French records state that al-Jazza¯r returned after the pilgrimage, in February 1786, to Acre, lamented the death of Salı¯m Pasha in May, and after appointing Salı¯m Pasha al-Sfi aghı¯r as his representative for Sidon returned in August to Damascus. In early December 1786 he was deposed as governor of Damascus and returned to Acre: AN AE B1 979, CC Acre, Feb. 15, May 1, Aug. 16, Dec. 10, 1786. The only other reliable source for these events, al-Dimishqı¯, Ta¯rı¯kh, 54, states that upon his return from the pilgrimage he was intercepted at Muzayrib, the penultimate station on the pilgrimage route before Damascus, with the order of his deposition, and proceeded from there directly to Acre without setting foot in Damascus. The other sources are completely off the mark: Kara¯ma, H fi awa¯dith, 93, claims he was deposed only in 1787: Shiha¯b, al-Jazza¯r, 90, gives 1788. 157. AN AE B1 979, CC Acre, Dec. 10, 1786. 158. Cohen, Palestine, 68.

NOTES

247

159. The firma¯n of the Ottoman government speaks of “authorization,” tafwı¯dfi : Shiha¯b, al-Jazza¯r, 130; while al-Dimishqı¯, Ta¯rı¯kh, 60, speaks of “an yuna¯zfi ira ‘l-Sha¯m,” to “supervise,” and adds explicitly that Damascus remained without government. 160. Cohen, Palestine, 64 ff. 161. Schatkowski Schilcher, Families, 36 ff. 162. al-Dimishqı¯, Ta¯rı¯kh, 54. ¯ gha¯ 163. Ibid., 56, has “Muhfi ammad Arfa¯ Amı¯nı¯” and on 59 has “Muhfi ammad A ¯ gha¯ amı¯nuhu.” Arfa¯ Amı¯nı¯.” Shiha¯b, al-Jazza¯r, 101, has “Muhfi ammad A 164. al-Dimishqı¯, Ta¯rı¯kh, 55. 165. Ibid., 57. 166. He apparently stayed in Damascus and when ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha al-‘Azfi m, brother of ‘Alı¯ ibn Muhfi ammad Pasha al-‘Azfi m, became governor in 1795 he was killed. 167. al-Dimishqı¯, Ta¯rı¯kh, 103, 104. 168. Ibid., 106. 169. Cohen, Palestine, passim, is not clear about this. 170. The document is anonymous. A date, March 1799, was written on it by another hand. It gives detailed information on the defenses of Acre and was obviously used for the preparation of the invasion of Palestine. Jaffa is not mentioned at all: Archive de l’Arme´e de Terre, B6 19. 171. He was a son of a local family striving for power in Gaza. Al-Jazza¯r had already had Abu¯ Maraq’s brother killed. Abu¯ Maraq himself searched for support in Istanbul and became a confidant of the grand vezier Yu¯suf Zfi iya¯ Pasha; for Abu¯ Maraq see ‘A¯dil Mana¯‘, A‘la¯m Falastfi¯ın (Jerusalem, 1986), 32. 172. See appendix D, map 6. 173. The role of the British admiral, Sidney Smith, and his fleet in the defense of Acre should not be overlooked. Not only did he sink the ships bringing the French heavy cannons from Egypt to Jaffa but he also provided artillery support for al-Jazza¯r. 174. Shiha¯b, al-Jazza¯r, 106, 108, 164; Munayyar, Ta¯rı¯kh, 446, 499, 515. 175. AN AE B1 1041, CC Seyde, XXV, Aug. 13, 1789. 176. Shiha¯b, al-Jazza¯r, 159–61. 177. AN AE B1, CC Seyde, XXII, June 3, 1780. 178. AN AE B1 CC Seyde, XXI, May 31, 1777. 179. AN AE B1 979, Nov. 10, 1784; ibid., 1041, “Extrait de la correspondance entre M. Renaudot et Beaussier au sujet de l’insurrection contre Dgezzar.” 180. For more details see Cohen, Palestine, 56–64. 181. According to al-Jabartı¯, ‘Aja¯’ib, vol. 3, 322, it was al-Jazza¯r himself who appointed Isma¯‘ı¯l as caretaker. 182. See the letter of the grand vezier to Amı¯r Bashı¯r reproduced in Shiha¯b, al-Jazza¯r, 177. 183. AN AE, CC Acre, I, June 13, 1806, declares him to be sixty; another entry, ibid., III, April 27, 1818, gives his age as seventy-five.

248

NOTES

184. AN AE, CC Acre I, June 30, 1806: “Abou Marac ´etait leur (l’Anglais) homme a` Jaffa . . . Mr. Smith lui a obtenue les queues et ce Rebelle a duˆ partir de Jaffa de`s qu’il n’a plus rec¸u les secours pe´cuniaires de l’Angleterre.”* 185. al-‘Awra, Ta¯rı¯kh, 77–87, has his dates wrong when he dates these events to 1808. 186. Ibid., 87, 88. 187. See appendix D, map 7. 188. All the information is from al-‘Awra, Ta¯rı¯kh, 35–50, unfortunately our only source. It does not give a precise date for these negotiations. But since Raghı¯b Efendi was still in Acre they must have taken place by 1805. Other histories such as A¯l Sfi afa¯’s took their information from al-‘Awra. 189. See the firma¯n reproduced in Shiha¯b, Lubna¯n, vol. 3, 552, dated 25 Muhfiarram (1225, March 3, 1810). 190. al-‘Awra, Ta¯rı¯kh, 92, 97; Misha¯qa, Murder, 63–65, 70–72; al-Dimishqı¯, Ta¯rı¯kh, 115, 180–83. Sulayma¯n Pasha was appointed in August 1810: AN AE CC, Acre, II, Aug. 10, 1810. 191. Musfifitafa¯ Barbar was mutasallim of Tripoli, from which he had been recently removed by Kanj Yu¯suf Pasha; H fi ama¯ went to Uzun ‘Alı¯ al-Qasfi¯ır and H fi omsfi to Ja‘far Agha, both Mamluks of al-Jazza¯r; H fi usayn Agha, former commander of customs, kumrukjı¯, in Beirut, became mutasallim of Latakia; ‘Alı¯ Agha Khazinda¯r remained Sulayma¯n Pasha’s replacement in Acre. The appointment of a certain Kanj Ahfi mad Agha as mutasallim of Damascus provoked the protest of the Damascenes. He had previously served in this position under al-Jazza¯r and had a bad reputation. Always willing to avoid confrontation, Sulayma¯n Pasha replaced him with Darwı¯sh Agha, son of Ja‘far Agha, making Kanj Ahfi mad mutasallim of Jerusalem. Mu¯sa¯ Bey Tfi u¯qa¯n became mutasallim of Nablus. Shamlı¯n or Shamdı¯n Agha, a former Kurdish commander of Kanj Yu¯suf Pasha, was appointed commander of the Dala¯t troops in Acre: Shiha¯b, Lubna¯n, vol. 3, 557–60; al-‘Awra, Ta¯rı¯kh, 134–37. Shiha¯b mentions Mulla¯ Isma¯‘ı¯l as mutasallim for H fi ama¯ and Homs. But since the latter had been in this position under Kanj Yu¯suf Pasha, and since al-‘Awra had for such administrative matters the more reliable information, Shiha¯b is probably wrong here. 192. See appendix D, map 7. 193. He was replaced in July 1812: AN AE, CC Acre II, Aug. 11, 1812. 194. al-‘Awra, Ta¯rı¯kh, 157; see appendix D, map 7. 195. al-‘Awra, Ta¯rı¯kh, 224, 284, 341; al-Dimishqı¯, Ta¯rı¯kh, 288. 196. al-‘Abba¯sı¯, Tfi u¯qa¯n, 105–12; the British letter is quoted in a communication by the Ottoman government to Mu¯sa¯ Bey Tfi u¯qa¯n, dated July 1807, and is reproduced in al-‘Abba¯sı¯, Tfi u¯qa¯n, 165, and al-‘Awra, Ta¯rı¯kh, 315. 197. al-‘Abba¯sı¯, Tfi u¯qa¯n, 114; see also appendix B, table 8 and accompanying figure, for grain prices. 198. al-‘Abba¯sı¯, Tfi u¯qa¯n, 105, 110, 123. 199. al-‘Awra, Ta¯rı¯kh, 303, 304. 200. al-Nimr, Ta¯rı¯kh, part 1, 268.

NOTES

249

201. Apparently with the important exception of the al-Nimr, who are not listed in al-‘Awra, Ta¯rı¯kh, 310. 202. Ibid., 308. 203. See appendix D, map 7. 204. Al-‘Awra, Ta¯rı¯kh, 253. 205. Ibid., 256–57. 206. Ibid., 159. 207. Ibid., 477. 208. For a detailed discussion see Philipp, “Jews and Arab Christians.” 209. See next chapter. 210. This was in 1840, the first such case in the Arab world. European-inspired anti-Semitism was used to assert the rise of the Greek-Catholic community in Damascus over the heretofore powerful Jewish community. 211. For instance, when al-‘Awra, Ta¯rı¯kh, 92, writes “since he [H fi aim] was a Jew and having a weak heart” or, (344) “since H fi aim is a Jew his heart is that of a woman” and he is full of “Jewish wickedness,” wasa¯wis yahu¯dı¯. 212. AN AE, CC Acre, II, Nov. 4, 1811. 213. Ismail, Le Liban—documents diplomatiques et consulaires (Beirut, 1945), vol. 4, 414. 214. AN AE, CC Seyde, XXVI, Dec. 22, 1815. 215. “Its exterior, however, was mean in appearance and gave no idea of the magnificence within. . . . Haym’s street door opened and we went down two or three steps into a stone entry about fifteen or twenty feet square, to the left of which was a dirty alcove, with a carpet on the floor and cushions against the wall, and opposite to it a filthy small room. Any stranger and in particular Turk enters this far . . . On entering the aleah . . . the eye was struck with the glitter of the walls and ceiling, resembling the description of fairy palaces. Mock precious stones, mirrors, gilding, and arabesque paintings covered it everywhere, and the floor was of elegant mosaic. The pipes with their amber heads, the coffee cups with a gold stud at the bottom, on which ambergris was stuck to perfume the beverage as it dissolved in it . . .”: C. L. Meryon, Travels of Lady Hester Stanhope (London, 1846), vol. 2, 9–11. Lady Hester Stanhope visited in 1815. Twenty-five years later J. Wilson, The Lands of the Bible (Edinburgh, 1847), vol. 1, 337, gives a very similar description. The house still can be visited in Damascus today. 216. al-‘Awra, Ta¯rı¯kh, 249. 217. Ibid., 251. 218. Ibid., al-‘Awra, 381–88. 219. The 4.5 million piasters that Abu¯ Nabu¯t supposedly offered the government seem a mere pittance in comparison: AN AE, Acre, IV, Jan. 3, 1820. 220. al-Dimishqı¯, Ta¯rı¯kh, 749. 221. Misha¯qa, Murder, 106, 107. 222. Shiha¯b, Lubna¯n, vol. 3, 852; see also Mana¯‘, A‘la¯m, 41. 223. Misha¯qa, Murder, 107, mentions as the two most important intriguers Mas‘u¯d al-Ma¯dfi ¯ı and ‘Umar Efendi al-Baghda¯dı¯, “whose eyes ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha

250

NOTES

[later] put out with red hot irons when his corruption had grown too great to bear.” For Shaykh Musfifitafa¯ see also Shiha¯b, Lubna¯n, vol. 3, 677–78. 224. AN AE, CC Acre, IV, Aug. 25, 1820. 225. Misha¯qa, Murder, 107. 226. See Shiha¯b, Lubna¯n, vol. 3, 721, where they contact Amı¯r Junbala¯fit. 227. Ibid., 717–23. 228. Al-Dimishqı¯, Ta¯rı¯kh, 749–55; Misha¯qa, Murder, 132–33, 136, 140. 229. The following argument relies on Okawara’s analysis. See Tomoki Okawara “Osuman-cho no kaikaku to yudaya-kyoto-kin’yuka-1822-nen shina-jiken saiken,” Isuramu sekai, 48, Feb. 26, 1997. J. Schwarz, Descriptive Geography of Palestine (n. p., 1850), 495, claims that Salumu¯n was poisoned by ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha. He also gives a detailed account of the collusion between the Jews in Istanbul and shaykh al-isla¯m to depose ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha without the knowledge of the sultan. See also N. al-Tfi arabulsı¯, “Kita¯b kashf al-litha¯m ‘an muhfiayyan al-hfiuku¯ma wa’l-ahfi ka¯m fı¯ iqlı¯may Misfir wa-birr al-Sha¯m,” AUB Library MS 217:6 (6077), fol. 453–55. 230. Stanford Shaw, The History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey (New York, 1977), vol. 2, 8–9. 231. Okawara, “Osuman-cho,” 13. 232. AN AE, CC Acre IV, June 30, 1823, and July 28, 1823. 233. Philipp, “The Farhfi ¯ı Family and the Changing Position of the Jews in Syria, 1750–1860,” Middle Eastern Studies, 20 (1984). 234. AN AE, CC Acre, V, March 12, 1826. 235. Catafago: for him, see next chapter. 236. AN AE, CC Acre, V, July 4, 1828. 237. Shiha¯b, Lubna¯n, vol. 3, 800–3. 238. M. Michaud, Correspondance d’Orient, 1830–1831 (Brussels, 1835), vol. 5, 291. The numbers he gives of 12,000 troops and 6,000 perished seem far too high in the general context of things. 239. Shiha¯b, Lubna¯n, vol. 3, 803–18, has long lists of the defenders, their losses, and their village origins, and states that at the time of the surrender there were still 367 of the originally over 1,500 defenders in the fortress.

3. TRADE: LOCAL RULERS AND THE WORLD ECONOMY 1. For an extensive description see R. Paris, Histoire de la chambre de commerce de Marseille de 1660–1789 (Paris, 1951). 2. Maundrell, “Journey,” 428; “Me´moire et Instruction touchant le commerce des Echelles de Seyde, Acre, Barut, et Rame.” AN AE B1 1017, Feb. 20, 1691. 3. AN AE B1 107, May 19, 1697. 4. AN AE B1 107, May 5, 1699. 5. AN AE B1 1017, Aug. 16, 1702, April 14, 1703, Oct. 25, 1703; AN AE B1 978, June 5, 1721. 6. AN AE B1 978, May 2, 1704.

NOTES

251

7. AN AE B1 978, Aug. 26, 1725. 8. “Me´moire Concernant le Commerce qui se fait a` Seyde 1685.” AN AE B1 1017. 9. ACCM J 880, Feb. 3, 1691, Acre. 10. AN AE B1 1017, March 8, 1703, May 2, 1704. There seems to be a question as to whether Mashook was indeed a Dutchman or rather a local Arab merchant who liked to act as the representative of Dutch and English interests. He had extremely good contacts in the villages and, in fact, within the last three years no Dutch or English ship had touched the Syrian coast. See Masters, Origins, 108. “Mashook” could easily be the distortion of an Arab name. 11. AN AE B1 978, April 13, 1724. 12. AN AE B1 1071, Nov. 30, 1697. 13. AN AE B1 1071, April 5, 1699. 14. AN AE B1 1071, April 5, 1699. 15. AN AE B1 978, April 30, 1731. 16. Aug. 1717 consulate of Sidon, quoted from Ismail, Le Liban, I, 185. 17. Ibid., I, 244, May 1729. 18. AN AE B1 978, Letter from the vice-consul in Acre to the consul in Sidon, April 29, 1730. 19. AN AE B1 978, Oct. 22, 1731. 20. AN AE B1 978, Oct. 23, 1730. 21. In 1731 Vice-consul Carbonet in Acre assured the consul in Sidon that in future no cash would be advanced to the shaykhs in return for a future cotton crop. Yet ten years later we hear that the debtors of the French were not willing to pay back their loan, when a rumor declared the French to be bankrupt. AN AE B1 798, Oct. 23, 1730, and June 1, 1741. 22. AN AE B1 978, April 30, 1731. 23. See appendix B, table 1. 24. AN AE B1 978, Aug. 1730, “Estat des Sujets du Roy et des Prote´ge´s de la Majeste´ residens actuellement en la Ville d’Acre” [state of the subjects of the king and the protected persons in the city of Acre]. 25. AN AE B1 978, March 20, 1731, “Me´moire concernant le Commerce de la nation franc¸aise a` Acre.” 26. M. al-Sfi abba¯gh, Ta¯rı¯kh Zfi a¯hir, 23; and Schatkowski Schilcher, Families, 125, for the importance of the H fi usaynı¯ Sharı¯fs. 27. A. al-Sfi abba¯gh, “al-Rawd al-zfi a¯hir,” fol. 2. 28. M. al-Sfi abba¯gh, Ta¯rı¯kh Zfi a¯hir, 53. 29. AN AE B1 978, Oct. 1746; also A. al-Sfi abba¯gh, “al-Rawd al-zfi a¯hir,” fol. 8, where he appears as Yu¯suf Bila¯l. 30. AN AE B1 978, no date 1746. 31. ACCM J 798, Nov. 5, 1767. 32. In 1772 Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh tried to extort a considerable sum from the French in Acre, claiming that a certain merchant Bonnet had stolen merchandise from his warehouse. The accusation was withdrawn later, but what emanates

252

NOTES

from the involved story is that Bonnet had done business directly with a peasant from Shfa¯ ‘Amr, who had come to town. This fact seems to have caused alSfi abba¯gh’s ire. AN AE B1 1035, April 1, 1772. 33. S. D. Goitein, A Mediterranean Society (Los Angeles 1967–85), vol. 1, 267; E. Ashtor, A Social and Economic History of the Middle East in the Middle Ages (Los Angeles, 1976), 320. 34. AN AE B1 978, Jan. 20, 1748. 35. AN AE B1 978, Jan. 30, 1749. 36. Ibid. 37. AN AE B1 978, April 6, 1750. 38. ACCM J 791, Dec. 1, 1750. 39. ACCM J 791, Jan. 28, 1751. 40. Paris, Histoire, 514. 41. ACCM J 791, Jan. 28, 1751. Merchants tried through claims of old debts or through generous cash advances to secure supplies of cotton from shaykhs and villagers. 42. See appendix B, table 1. 43. AN AE B1 978, Jan. 20, 1751. See also appendix B, tables 2 and 3. 44. ACCM J 791, Sept. 30, 1751, Dec. 6, 1751; ACCM J 826, Feb. 10, 1752. “Me´moire Concernant le Commerce des Echelles du De´partement de Seyde.” 45. ACCM J 881, Oct. 8 1751, letter from the merchants in Acre to Gautier, consul in Sidon. 46. ACCM J 791, Dec. 7, 1751. 47. AN AE B1 978, Dec. 14, 1751, Jouvene from Acre. 48. AN AE B1 978, June 1, July 21, 1742; ACCM J 880, April 14, 1742. 49. The preceding account of these events is drawn from two long reports: ACCM J 881, Jan. 19, 1753, an account addressed to the chamber of commerce of Marseilles by the French merchants in Acre; and ACCM J 792, Dec. 6, 1752, a letter by Verrayon, French consul in Sidon, to the chamber of commerce. 50. ACCM J 792, March 2, 1753. 51. ACCM J 792, May 8, 1753; Aug. 23, 1753. 52. See appendix B, table 3. 53. ACCM J 794, March 23, 1756. 54. ACCM J 794, Oct. 30, 1756. 55. Ismail, Le Liban, vol. 2, 83, dated Sidon, April 26, 1751; 99–106, dated Sidon, Feb. 23, 1753. Charles-Roux, Echelles, 68. 56. ACCM J 796, Sidon, Dec. 28, 1759. 57. ACCM J 797, June 6, 1761. 58. Charles-Roux, Echelles, 86–87, 169; AN AE B1 979, Nov. 11, 1786. 59. Charles-Roux, Echelles, 68. 60. ACCM J 879, Jan. 10, 1756, when he shipped, in conjunction with a French merchant, but for his own account, 210 quintaux raw cotton and 20 quintaux unbeaten raw cotton. 61. M. al-Sfi abba¯gh, Ta¯rı¯kh Zfi a¯hir, 62–63.

NOTES

253

62. ACCM J 797, Oct. 16, 1761. 63. M. al-Sfi abba¯gh, “Ta¯rı¯kh Ibra¯hı¯m,” fol., 7–8, 9–14. 64. M. al-Sfi abba¯gh, Ta¯rı¯kh Zfi a¯hir, 73. 65. ACCM J 796, Nov. 5, 1759. 66. ACCM J 796, Dec. 28, 1759. 67. M. al-Sfi abba¯gh, “Ta¯rı¯kh Ibra¯hı¯m,” fol., 15. 68. ACCM J 798, Nov. 22, 1767, Sidon. 69. ACCM J 798, May 1, 1769, Sidon. 70. AN AE B1 1035, July 31, 1772, referring to an event that occurred three years earlier. 71. AE AN B1 1035, June 28, 1772, Sidon. 72. ACCM J 801, April 20, 1772, Sidon. 73. AN AE B1 1035, July 31, 1772, Sidon. 74. AN AE B1 1035, letter from Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh from March 23, 1772, attached to de Taules letter of March 30, 1772. 75. AN AE B1 979, Jan. 18, 1783. 76. The cotton harvest of 1782/83 for the so-called Safed cotton alone, which was of higher quality than the Nablus cotton, was estimated by Renaudot at 2.5 million pounds of which, in his opinion, by far the largest part went to France; AN AE B1 979, July 6, 1783, “Me´moire sur le commerce des Franc¸ais dans le de´partement du consulat ge´ne´ral de Syrie et Palestine.” 77. AN AE B1 979, Jan. 26., 1784. 78. AN AE B1 979, June 2, 1783, Acre. 79. AN AE B1 979, May 30, 1784, Acre. 80. AN AE B1 797, Nov. 16. 1784. 81. ACCM J 879, Oct. 4, 1784, Acre. 82. AN AE B1 979; March 20, 1785. Renaudot speaks of the “grain from Mesopotamia.” I suspect the grain from the nearby H fi awra¯n is meant. Apparently al-Jazza¯r had 200 workers sent to rebuild the bridge. 83. al-Dimishqı¯, Ta¯rı¯kh, 54. 84. AN AE B1 979, “Etat du Consulat Ge´ne´ral de Syrie et Palestine pendant l’anne´e 1786” (sic, but should be 1785). 85. AN AE B1 979, Oct. 24. 1785. 86. AN AE B1 980, Aug. 2, 1789; see also the trade statistics for 1788, 1789; ibid., Jan. 5, 1790. 87. AN AE B1 980, Oct. 20, 1789. 88. AN AE B1 980, Aug. 20, 1790. 89. AN AE B1 979. “Etat du consulat ge´ne´ral de Syrie et Palestine pendant l’anne´e 1786” (sic). 90. See below, pp. 143 ff. 91. AN AE B1 981, 20, Sept. 1790. 92. Philipp, Syrians, p. 32. 93. AN AE B1 981, Oct. 28, 1790, Jaffa. Mentioned are Mikha¯’ı¯l, Butrus, and Yu¯suf ibn Mikha¯’ı¯l. Yu¯suf al-Karda¯hfi a, another scribe in the administration of

254

NOTES

Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r and Wafa¯ ‘Alamı¯, qa¯dfi¯ı of Acre, are also mentioned; ACCM J 835, June 9, 1791, Tripoli. 94. H fi ana¯ Sakru¯j is mentioned in a 1752 listing of hommes d’affaires: ACCM J 881, Dec. 30, 1752. 95. AN AE B1 979, “Etat du Consulat Ge´ne´ral de Syrie et Palestine pendant l’anne´e 1785” (sic, but actually 1786). 96. For comparison with Muhfi ammad ‘Alı¯ see Concluding Observations, p. 188. 97. See appendix B, table 1. 98. See appendix B, table 3 and accompanying figure. 99. See appendix B, table 4 and accompanying figure 100. For Britain see M. N. Edwards, The Growth of British Cotton Trade 1780– 1815 (Manchester, 1967), 253. For France see H. Se´e, Histoire ´economique de la France 1789–1914 (Paris, 1942), 52; P. Mantraux, The Industrial Revolution in the 18th Century (London, 1986), 258. 101. AN AE B1 979; letter from Captain Ligondet, emissary of the French ambassador in Istanbul from Cyprus, May 6, 1791, about his recent contacts with al-Jazza¯r in Acre. 102. ACCM J 836, May 16, 1792, Sidon, Feb. 13, 1793, Jaffa. 103. Jaubert, Voyage, 187. 104. AN AE B1 981, May 6, 1791, Letter from Ligondet. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r had expressed his willingness to resume trade with the French. It was the exiled French who resisted. In the same year an independent French shipper came to Acre and picked up a cargo of cotton while the French merchants in Aleppo tried to buy via a middleman, Qara¯la, in Sidon cotton: ibid., Oct. 16, 1791. 105. AN AE, CCC, Acre, I (1792–1809), 9 Flore´al ans 5 (April 29, 1797); AN AE B1, Oct. 28, 1790, Jaffa. 106. See Cohen, Palestine, 197 ff., 233 ff. 107. Clarke, Travels, 131, 164, 366, 389. Clarke himself (p. 376) describes Acre as having “narrow dirty lanes, with wretched shops, and with wretched inhabitants.” 108. Al-‘Awra, Ta¯rı¯kh, 73. 109. All quotes from Misha¯qa, Murder, 54–57. 110. al-Dimishqı¯, Ta¯rı¯kh, 184. 111. AN AE, CC Acre, II, Sept. 14, 1811. 112. See below, p. 127. 113. AN AE, CC Seyde 1792–1815, Oct. 10, 1810, Nov. 12, 1812. 114. See appendix B, tables 6, 8, and accompanying figures. 115. AN AE, CC Acre, II, June 7, 1812. 116. AN AE, CC Acre, I, June 13, 1808. Somewhat later Taitbout writes: “Soliman Pacha ne sait rien. Je tiens d’une personne sure qu’on a abuse´ de son ignorance pour lui faire signer l’ordre a` son repre´sentant a` Constantinople” (ibid., Aug. 16, 1808).*

NOTES

255

117. “M. Catafago accoutume´ a` exploiter lui seul tout le commerce de l’e´chelle d’Acre . . . voit avec le plus grand peine les Franc¸ais retourner.”* AN AE, CC Seyde, XXVI, June 14, 1806. Two months later the French consul Taitbout claimed that Catafago exploited the goodness of Sulayma¯n Pasha and that if it were not for the intrigues of Catafago, Syria and Palestine could become a “colonie” of the French. 118. E. Rogan, “The Catafago Family and the Commerce of Acre 1816–1825” (unpubl. essay), 5. 119. Ibid., 6. 120. AN AE, CC Seyde XXVI, July 20, 1806. 121. Sulayma¯n Pasha went as far as providing ammunition to Greek ships carrying his grain in order to defend themselves against Ottoman corvettes, sent to interdict this export traffic. 122. AN AE CC St. J. d’Acre, vol. I, Sept. 30, 1808. 123. AN AE CC St. Jean d’Acre, vol. II, Oct. 30, 1810. 124. Scholz, M.A., 240, 243. “Acri ist von einer 3–4 Stunden breiten fruchtbaren aber fast unbebauten Ebene umgeben”*; Turner, 126, observed oppression by 1807 and that “not half the pashalik is cultivated.” Stephens, Incidents of Travel in Egypt, Arabia, Petrae and the Holy Land (New York, 1854), I, 277, comments in 1835: “The plain was very extensive, naturally rich, but almost entirely uncultivated.” 125. H. A. B. Rivlin, The Agricultural Policies of Muhfi ammad ‘Alı¯ in Egypt (Cambridge, MA, 1961), 171, ff. 126. AN AE, Acre, I, May 15, 1808. 127. The total number of troops in Gaza, on the frontier with Egypt, was 300. In Acre a garrison of only 200 men was stationed: AN AE, CC Acre II, Oct. 14, 1811, Dec. 23, 1811. In the summer of 1812 Sulayma¯n Pasha’s troops from Latakia to Gaza were estimated to be 1200: ibid., Aug. 4, 1812. 128. AN AE, CC Acre, I, Sept. 30, 1808. 129. AN AE, CC Acre, II, Aug. 20, 1811. 130. AN AE, CC Acre, II, Nov. 4, 1811, Dec. 23, 1811. 131. AN AE, CC Acre, II, Nov. 13, 1812. 132. AN AE, CC Acre, II, Aug. 7, 1813. 133. AN AE, CC Acre, II, Oct. 15, 1813. 134. Fathfi Alla¯h, al-Sha¯‘ir, 47, 87, 100, 120, 305, 309. 135. Ibid., 54, 55. 136. AN AE, CC Acre, II, Oct. 15, 1813. 137. AN AE, CC Acre, II, Oct. 24, 1814. 138. AN AE, CC Acre, II, Nov. 18, 1814, ibid., III, May 14, 1817. 139. AN AE, CC Acre, III, Sept. 30, 1818, Oct. 10, 1818, ibid., IV Sept. 1, 1819, Aug. 10, 1820. 140. AN AE, CC Acre, IV, Me´moire, 1821 by Ruffin. 141. See appendix B, table 5. 142. Rogan, “Catafago Family,” 8, 9.

256

NOTES

143. See for instance Paris, Histoire, 350–53. 144. AN AE, CC Acre, V, Aug. 11, 1826, July 4, 1828. Catafago had to retire to his landholdings at Nazareth, though ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha cannot have left him destitute: “Diamanten, Perlen und Goldstu¨cke gla¨nzten an der reichen tu¨rkischen Tracht dieser Frauen u. Ma¨dchen ich glaube, dass jede fu¨nfzigtausend Piaster Werth an solchen an sich trug”* (Prokesch von Osten, Tagebuch, 131). The purpose of the latter’s journey to Palestine was precisely to obtain from ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha the reinstatement of Catafago as Austrian consul in Acre: ibid., 144 ff. 145. AN AE, CC Acre, V, June 10, 1827, Nov. 6, 1827. 146. AN AE, CC Acre, V, July 24, 1827. 147. See appendix B, tables 10, 11. 148. AN AE, CC Acre, V, Oct. 5, 1828. 149. See works by Fawaz, Abu Manneh, and Khairallah in the bibliography. 150. L. Fawaz, Merchants and Migrants in Nineteenth Century Beirut (Cambridge, MA, 1983), 73. 151. R. Kark, “The Rise and Decline of Coastal Towns in Palestine,” in G. Gilbar, ed., Ottoman Palestine, 1800–1914 (Leiden, 1990), 73. 152. Scholz, Reise, 244; J. Berggren, Reisen in Europa und im Morgenland (Leipzig, 1826), II, 255; Journal of a Deputation to the East by the Committee of Malta Protestant College in 1849 (London, 1954), 265; Schumacher, “Population List of the Liva of Akka,” Palestine Exploration Fund Quarterly 1887, 171. 153. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r was wa¯lı¯ of Damascus from March 1785 until Nov. 1786 (AN AE B1 981, March 20, 1785, and ibid., Dec. 10, 1786); from Oct. 1790 until 1795; from late 1798 through 1799 he was named “commander of all troops, Pasha of Tripoli, Syria, Gaza, Ramle, Jaffa and all their dependencies and Commander of the Pilgrimage” (de Testa, Recueil, I, 527), see also al-Dimishqı¯, Ta¯rı¯kh, 59. The Ottoman government agreed to this enormous concentration of power in the hands of al-Jazza¯r only in view of Napoleon’s imminent attack on Syria. In late 1803 al-Jazza¯r was appointed again as wa¯lı¯ of Damascus, a position he held until his death on April 29, 1804. Sulayma¯n Pasha was made wa¯lı¯ of Damascus in 1809, when the threat of a Wahhabi incursion loomed large, and he kept this position until Dec. 1811 (al-‘Awra, Ta¯rı¯kh, 106, 155). Late in 1816 he was made representative of the newly appointed but absent wa¯lı¯ of Damascus and prepared the next two pilgrimages, i.e., he raised, most importantly, the necessary money from the various regions (al-‘Awra, Ta¯rı¯kh, 289, 341).

4. GOVERNMENT: THE MILITARY AND ADMINISTRATION 1. AN AE B1 1034, Aug. 3, 1770. . . . 2. AN AE B1 1036, Bulletin, Jan. 31, 1774. 3. Nu‘ma¯n Qasa¯fitlı¯, “Mulahfilahfi ta¯rı¯kh al-Zaya¯dina,” al-Jina¯n 3 (1877), 850; for the importance of fortifications see also above, p. 16, Fortresses.

NOTES

257

4. AN AE B1 1034, Aug. 29, 1772. 5. AN AE B1 1034, Bulletin, Oct. 30, 1773; ibid., Bulletin, Jan. 13, 1774. 6. As G. Mariti, Voyages dans l’isle de Chypre, la Syrie et la Palestine (Paris, 1791), II, 90, observes in 1760 that he had 1,000 Maghrebi infantry troops and 5,000 cavalrymen “in Arab fashion,” it must be assumed that the latter were tribal levies, available in times of need but not part of a permanent army. 7. For this concept see J. Hathaway “ ‘Mamluk Households’ and ‘Mamluk Factions’ in Ottoman Egypt: a Reconsideration” in Philipp and Haarmann, eds, Mamluks. 8. al-‘Awra, Ta¯rı¯kh, 14n, claims that Salı¯m the Elder had come with him from Egypt and that Salı¯m the Younger was a present from Ibra¯hı¯m Bey al-Kabı¯r. But on p. 111 al-‘Awra himself writes that al-Jazza¯r bought all of them only after he had settled in Acre; Shiha¯b, al-Jazza¯r, 87. 9. AN AE B1 979, CC Acre, May 1, 1786. 10. Only once, during the mutiny of his Mamluks, did he arm craftsmen and other people in Acre. See below, p. 145. 11. A banner consisted of ten soldiers. 12. AN AE B1 979, April 30, 1785; Rogan, “The Catafago Family.” 13. AN AE B1 1040, July 21, 1784. 14. When Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r responded to Amı¯r Yu¯suf ’s call to defend Beirut in 1772 against the Russians, he came with 300 Maghrebis. One of them tried to assassinate al-Jazza¯r with a shot in the neck. The latter survived, the former didn’t: Shiha¯b, al-Jazza¯r, 49. When he was appointed governor of Sidon in 1777, he had hired some 600 Levend cavalry troops with their commanders, recently disbanded from the Ottoman army. The Levend were the same as Deli or Dala¯t troops: H. A. R. Gibb & H. Bowen, Islamic Society and the West (London, 1950), part 1, 218. These particular 600 Levend were most certainly the same who during the battle with the forces of the governor of Damascus refused to fight, since they were facing their own comrades on the other side. Shiha¯b, al-Jazza¯r, 72, mentions that at the same time that Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r was hiring 600, the governor of Damascus, Muhfi ammad Pasha al-‘Azfi m, hired 300. These Dala¯t ¯ zu¯n ‘Alı¯, U ¯ zu¯n Ibra¯hı¯m, had come with their commanders Buyu¯q ‘Abdalla¯h, U and Amı¯r Khalı¯l. Dala¯t troops appear again in fighting in the Mountain, but this time under the command of one Qara¯ Muhfi ammad: Shiha¯b, al-Jazza¯r, 116. In March 1781 he sent, according to French sources, an expeditionary corps of 3,000 troops in support of Amı¯r Yu¯suf and in June another corps of 1,500 troops under the command of Salı¯m Pasha: Munayyar, al-Durr, 198–99. Three years later, in June 1784, al-Jazza¯r came to Beirut with an army of 4,000 to start a campaign, this time directed against Amı¯r Yu¯suf: Munayyar, Ta¯rı¯kh, 396. A second campaign in the following year was provided with 4,000 troops: Kara¯ma, H fi awa¯dith, 83. In July 1789 al-Jazza¯r fielded 2,000 cavalrymen to fight against Amı¯r Yu¯suf, who had allied himself with the renegade Sulayma¯n Pasha: Shiha¯b, al-Jazza¯r, 97. A year later, having 1,000 Albanian troops stationed in Dayr al-Qamar, al-Jazza¯r sent

258

NOTES

6,000 to fight Amı¯r Bashı¯r: Munayyar, Ta¯rı¯kh, 481. In 1791 al-Jazza¯r, in support of Amı¯r Bashı¯r and after having suffered sensible losses initially, sent his “entire army” to the Mountain in November: 7,000 men: Munayyar, Ta¯rı¯kh, 327; Kara¯ma, H fi awa¯dith, 122. It, too, was defeated and in December he supplied Amı¯r Bashı¯r with 4,000. By March 1792 al-Jazza¯r had to withdraw his troops after an estimated 3,500 had been killed: Kara¯ma, H fi awa¯dith, 122; but it is not clear whether these are some of the same troops, sent earlier, which had retreated or whether we have to do here with entirely new troops. He estimates 3,450 troops killed: Kara¯ma, H fi awa¯dith, 130. When in November 1800 1,000 Albanian troops were forced to withdraw from Dayr al-Qamar, al-Jazza¯r sent 6,000 troops to Beirut as reinforcements. Even so, the military stalemate with Amı¯r Bashı¯r continued: Munayyar, alDurr, 480. In May 1801 al-Jazza¯r sent 1,000 Dala¯t cavalry into the Biqa¯‘a Valley and replaced them later with 600 irregular cavalrymen: Shiha¯b, al-Jazza¯r, 149. In December of the same year he sent 2,000 Albanian infantrymen in support of his own Druze allies. They were beaten by 500 Druze horsemen: Shiha¯b, al-Jazza¯r, 151. 15. Gibb & Bowen, Islamic Society, part 1, 218. Perhaps because of this background the Arab chronicler refer to them also frequently as “government troops,” ‘askar al-dawla, though the term also may mean all troops of the governor of Sidon and is contrasted with the ‘askar al-bila¯d, the local army, i.e., the Druze military resistance. 16. Shiha¯b, al-Jazza¯r, 139–40. 17. Kara¯ma, Masfia¯dir, 146. 18. AN AE B1 1037, CC Seyde, XXI, March 21, 1777: “Le Pacha est presse´; il lui faut absolument de l’argent. Les troupes re´clament leur solde et murmurent”; ibid., April 2, 1777, “Me´moire”; ibid., 1038, CC Seyde, XXII, March 21, 1781: “Ses troupes s’e´tant de´ja´ re´volte´es deux fois pour le payement de leur solde, et l’ayant menace´ de s’en prendre a` lui personnellement, et de mettre la ville et notre kan au pillage. Les officiers de la Porte le perse´cutant d’un autre cote´ pour le payement des mirhy, et l’irritant sans cesse a` force de le presser tandis qu’il n’avait pas un sol.”* 19. AN AE B1 1040, CC Seyde, XXIV, July 1784: “Il a mis sa confiance en ces soldats, qui, de leur cote´, luy paraissent fort attache´s. Il les pay assez bien, pour leur inspirer des sentiments de reconnaissance a` son endroit.”* 20. AN AE B1 1040, CC Seyde, XXIV, June 2, 1784. 21. AN AE B1 1038, CC Seyde, XXII, Jan. 17, 1779, March 1779, July 18, 1779. 22. AN AE B1 1041, CC Seyde, XXV, Dec. 31, 1789. 23. Misha¯qa, Murder, 39–40, makes this suspicion explicit. The two early Lebanese chroniclers, the monks Kara¯ma and Munayyar, are remarkably uninterested in and uninformed about the internal events in Acre. The whole rebellion is barely treated. As its motive Kara¯ma, H fi awa¯dith, 111, suggests that Salı¯m Pasha received orders from the Ottoman government to kill al-Jazza¯r as a rebel; Munayyar, al-Durr, 415, and Munayyar, Ta¯rı¯kh, 413, follow basically this story. In this case the French reports from Acre seem to be more trustworthy. They—like

NOTES

259

Shiha¯b, al-Jazza¯r and al-Jabartı¯, ‘Aja¯’ib—mention the illicit relationships between Mamluks and women of the harem as the trigger for al-Jazza¯r’s revenge, which led in turn to open rebellion by the Mamluk leaders in the field; see especially AN AE B1 1041, “Extrait de la correspondance entre M. Renaudot et Beaussier au sujet de l’insurrection contre Dgezzar.” 24. Shiha¯b, al-Jazza¯r, 92. 25. Ibid., 93; al-Jabartı¯, ‘Aja¯’b, III, 321. 26. Shiha¯b, al-Jazza¯r, 95; AN AE B1 980, CC Acre, III, May 28, 1789. 27. Munayyar, al-Durr, 416. 28. All the above information, unless indicated otherwise, is drawn from the “Premier Cahier—Extrait de la correspondance entre M. Renaudot et Beaussier au sujet de l’insurrection contre Dgezzar,” AN AE B1 1041, CC Seyde XXV. 29. See al-Zayn’s chapter “Thawrat al-Mama¯lik aw al-mu’a¯mara al-kubra¯ ‘ala ‘l-Jazza¯r,” in his Fusfiu¯l min ta¯rı¯kh al-shı¯‘a fı¯ Lubna¯n (Beirut, 1979). 30. Al-Kara¯ma, H fi awa¯dith, 111; al-Munayyar, Ta¯rı¯kh, 412. 31. Cohen, “Jazza¯r Ahfimad Pa¯sha¯,” 34; Salı¯m seems to have sought to establish contact with the Ottoman government, once he was committed to the rebellion: al-‘Awra, Ta¯rı¯kh, 113. 32. ACCM J804, May 29, 1789, and J834, May 10, 1790; AN AE B1 1041, March 28, 1785. 33. AN AE B1 1041, May 26, 1789. “Extrait de la correspondance entre M. Renaudot et Beaussier au sujet de l’insurrection contre Dgezzar.” 34. AN AE B1 981, July 7, 1791, Jaffa. 35. Cohen, “Jaza`r Ahfi mad Pa¯sha¯,” 35. 36. Shiha¯b, al-Jazza¯r, 95. 37. Misha¯qa, Murder, 41; Munayyar, al-Durr, 416, explains that after the Mamluks were dispersed al-Jazza¯r used in their stead the units of Qara¯ Muhfi ammad and ‘Abd al-Rahfi ma¯n al-Tfi awı¯r (possibly also Kurds). 38. Shiha¯b, al-Jazza¯r, 116, 151; Munayyar, Ta¯rı¯kh, 428, 434. 39. Shiha¯b, Lubna¯n, I, 197; II, 422 f., 523 f. 40. Ibid., I, 182–202. 41. Shiha¯b, al-Jazza¯r, 167. 42. Ibid., 156. 43. AN AE, CC Acre I, April 6, 1808. 44. AN AE, CC Acre, II, Sept. 30, 1811. 45. AN AE, CC Acre, II, Jan. 20, 1812, Aug. 11, 1812. 46. Misha¯qa, Murder, 58: 47. AN AE, CC Acre, II, Dec. 23, 1811. 48. AN AE, CC Acre, II, Jan. 20, 1812. 49. Jane Hathaway, The Politics of Households in Ottoman Egypt, Cambridge 1997; see especially ch. 2 and the conclusion. 50. Ibid., 169. 51. Ibid., 21.

260

NOTES

52. “The serving [low-ranking] Mamluk race did not like anybody to serve their master who was not one of them, lest he would take precedence over them, because he was a free man. He [al-Jazza¯r] was a free man, a Bosnian . . .” This might, however, have been a strictly self-serving statement, to explain why he left Egypt. Misha¯qa, 5. (I am translating here from the Arabic version, as the English translation is totally garbled at this point.) 53. Maybe even then Mamluk households were much more porous and flexible than they appear today in the retrospective view. 54. Hathaway, 170. 55. AN AE, CC Acre, II, May 22, 1811; Shiha¯b, Lubna¯n, III, 785; for the literary dramatization of the incident see Jurjı¯ Zayda¯n, al-Mamlu¯k al-Sha¯rid (Cairo, 1891). 56. Originally he had served in the troops of Kanj Yu¯suf Pasha and had later accepted service under Sulayma¯n Pasha. Eventually he was made “head of the officers of the army.” He was also to serve ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha until the end: al-‘Awra, Ta¯rı¯kh, 221–22, Shiha¯b, Lubna¯n, III, 560. 57. Misha¯qa, Murder, 58. 58. See D. Crecelius, “The Mamluk Beylicate of Egypt in the Last Decades before Its Destruction by Muhfi ammad ‘Alı¯,” and T. Philipp, “Personal Loyalty and Political Power of the Mamluks in the Eighteenth Century,” both in Philipp and Haarmann, eds., Mamluks. 59. Shiha¯b, Lubna¯n, III, 644. 60. AN AE, CC Acre, III, April 27, 1818. 61. In early 1818 a French traveler observed that Abu¯ Nabu¯t might be aiming at independence in southern Palestine: C. de Forbin, Travels in Greece, Turkey and the Holy Land in 1817–18 (London, 1820), 132. 62. AN AE, CC Acre, III, Nov. 12, 1818. 63. AN AE, CC Acre, IV, Sept. 22, 1819, and Sept. 1, 1820. 64. AN AE, CC Seyde, XXVII, July 10, 1820. 65. AN AE, CC Acre IV, Jan. 3, 1820. 66. Shiha¯b, Lubna¯n, III, 852. 67. Scholz, Reisen, 251. 68. Shiha¯b, Lubna¯n, III, 766. 69. AN AE B1 1036, Bulletin, Jan. 31, 1774. 70. M. al-Sfi abba¯gh, Ta¯rı¯kh Zfi a¯hir, 56, calls them wula¯h. 71. Sfi a¯lihfi and Sa‘d al-Dı¯n were still living with him in Acre. Abu¯ Sa‘ı¯d “rejected the sedentary . . . and began to live like a nomad moving with his cattle through [the districts] of his brothers”: al-Qasa¯fitlı¯, “Mulakhkhas,” 851; M. al-Sfi abba¯gh, Ta¯rı¯kh Zfi a¯hir, 51, 156. 72. M. al-Sfi abba¯gh, Ta¯rı¯kh Zfi a¯hir, 38, 53. 73. Ibid., 56. 74. Bı¯rav, Zimrat Ha’aretz, 32. See also Cohen, “Jazza¯r Ahfi mad Pa¯sha¯,” especially p. 151; Mariti, Voyages, II, 88, writes that Zfi a¯hir gave away swamp lands around Acre to anyone who would drain and cultivate them.

NOTES

261

75. AN AE B1 1036, Nov. 30, 1773. 76. M. al-Sfi abba¯gh, Ta¯rı¯kh Zfi a¯hir, 153, 156. 77. AN AE B1 1036, Nov. 30, 1773: “Luttant sans cesse contre les propres enfants de Daher, qui pour arriver jusqu’a` leur pe`re sont oblige´s de passer par lui; occupe´ a` faire naıˆtre des divisions parmi eux ou a` les apaiser; il embrasse tout sans en paraıˆtre jamais embarrasse´.”* 78. Shaykhu¯, “Mikha¯’ı¯l al-Sfi abba¯gh,” 27. 79. S. Bahri, “Hannah el Bahri,” Le Lien, 37 (1972), 14. 80. Shiha¯b, al-Jazza¯r, 76; ACCM J 881, Dec. 30, 1752. 81. M. al-Sfi abba¯gh, Ta¯rı¯kh Zfi a¯hir, 57, 58; Mariti, Voyages, II, 92. 82. Mariti, ibid., I, 288. 83. We also hear of mutasallimı¯n al-qurra¯, mutasallims of villages, which can only imply a tax-collecting function; and we hear of multazims of muqa¯fita‘a lands who were Christians: Shiha¯b, al-Jazza¯r, 89. Without more information it is difficult to ascertain what their precise positions and functions were. 84. AN AE B1 1038, May 21, 1780. 85. Shiha¯b, al-Jazza¯r, 79, dates the return of H fi abı¯b to 1777, while the French report mentions his return as well as that of other members of the al-Sfi abba¯gh family in 1779. By May 1780 they were all again imprisoned; AN AE B1 1038, Jan. 17, 1779, Aug. 22, 1779, May 11, 1780. 86. ACCM J 881, Dec. 30, 1752, “Hanna Sakru¯j, homme d’affaires de Daer.” 87. AN AE B1 1038, Sept. 21, 1780. 88. Shiha¯b, al-Jazza¯r, 76, 85: “al-mutaqaddim . . . fı¯ ba¯b al-Jazza¯r.” 89. AN AE B1 1041, April 6, 1785. 90. AN AE B1 980, April 19, 1787. 91. Misha¯qa, Murder, 39, 40; al-‘Awra, Ta¯rı¯kh, 12n. 92. Shiha¯b, al-Jazza¯r, 88, 89, 95. 93. AN AE B1 1041, “Extrait de la correspondance entre M. Ranaudiot et Beaussier au sujet de l’insurrection contre Dgezzar.” 94. Al-‘Awra, Ta¯rı¯kh, 110–13. 95. Shiha¯b, al-Jazza¯r, 121. 96. See Philipp, “Farhfi ¯ı Family.” 97. Al-Dimishqı¯, Ta¯rı¯kh, 58. 98. Shiha¯b, al-Jazza¯r, 168. 99. Thus H fi ana¯’ al-‘Awra was asked to fill the position of his father: al-‘Awra, Ta¯rı¯kh, 111; Jirjis Misha¯qa was made multazim of Bisha¯ra after his father Ibra¯hı¯m: Misha¯qa, Murder, 32, 33. Al-‘Awra, Ta¯rı¯kh, 470, says of Sulayma¯n Pasha: “If someone of his officials died, be he Muslim or Christian, and he had a son, then he [Sulayma¯n Pasha] would give the son the father’s place and appoint him.” 100. According to Shiha¯b, al-Jazza¯r, 91, al-Qarda¯hfiı¯ left for Europe in 1788. But in the fall of 1790 he was described as secre´taire intime of al-Jazza¯r: AN AE B1 982, Oct. 22, 1790, Jaffa. Shiha¯b, Lubna¯n, 857, claims that he later was also the secretary of ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha.

262

NOTES

101. As Mikha¯’ı¯l Misha¯qa, Mikha¯’ı¯l and ‘Abbu¯d al-Sfi abba¯gh, Ibra¯hı¯m al-‘Awra; see Philipp, “Class, Community and Arab Historiography.” 102. Clarke, Travels, 383–84. 103. AN AE, CC Acre, I, 9 Flore´al ans 5 (April 29, 1797). 104. See appendix C for lists of names. 105. Olivier, Voyages, 268; Clarke, Travels, 362. 106. See appendix C. 107. Misha¯qa, Murder, 58, observes that not many clerks were needed since customs offices and bureaus were leased for fixed amounts. 108. al-‘Awra, Ta¯rı¯kh, 469; curiously, he never mentions the language spoken at such occasions. Presumably it was all in Arabic, though for the Mamluks that was not necessarily true. He also never mentions a Turkish chief secretary, for the correspondence to Istanbul, an official who was usually found in other administrations. Presumably H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı’s Turkish knowledge was sufficient. 109. Ibid., 159. Even the scribe of Jaffa, where Abu¯ Nabu¯t ruled fairly independently, would come regularly to Acre to give H fi aim Farhfii an account of his bookkeeping: ibid., 381. 110. See appendix C. 111. AN AE,CC Acre IV, “Me´moire par M. Ruffin en 1821.” 112. Michaud, Correspondance, IV, 275, who saw ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha when he was already thirty-three and just about at the end of his career, described him as follows: “homme capricieux et fantasque . . . effe´mine´, passant sa vie avec des femmes, et de´ja` vieux a` trente-trois ans. . . . Sa politique va selon son humeur. Il lui prend quelquefois des boutades de civilisation europe´enne: le voila` tout a` coup avec le tarbouch, avec un habit ´ecourte´; le voila` qui boit du vin, qui monte a` cheval a` la franc¸aise; mais au bout de quelques jours, tout est change´ de nouveau; il retourne a` ce qu’il a quitte´, pour le quitter encore lorsqu’il lui viendra d’autres pense´es.” He is not really violent or evil, just an “enfant gaˆte´.”* Sometimes he seeks an alliance with Muhfi ammad ‘Alı¯, sometimes with the sultan. Sometimes he wants to flee from Syria. 113. Shihfi a¯b, Lubna¯n, III, 861. 114. Fathfi Alla¯h, al-Sha¯‘ir, 307, 311, 325, 326. 115. AN AE, CC Acre, I, 9 Flore´al, ans 5 (April 29, 1797). 116. AN AE, CC Acre, I, Aug. 29, 1807; April 6, 1808. ¨ sterreich in der 117. AN AE, CC Acre, III, Oct. 28, 1816; Breycha-Vauthier, O Levante (Vienna, 1972), 14. 118. al-‘Awra, Ta¯rı¯kh, 158; AN AE, CC Acre, II, Jan. 14, 1811;.AN AE, CC Acre, III, Dec. 3, 1815. 119. U. J. Seetzen, Reisen durch Syrien, Pala¨stina, etc. 1806, ed. F. Kruse (Berlin, 1854), 139; AN AE, CC Acre, I, April 5, 1809; AN AE, CC Acre, III, May 31, 1816. 120. AN AE, CC Acre, IV, “Me´moire par M. Ruffin en 1821.” 121. AN AE, CC Acre, III, Dec. 3, 1815, Jan. 2, 1818. 122. Meryon I, 253; AN AE, CC Seyde, XXVII, July 20, 1806. 123. AN AE, CC Acre, IV, Aug. 25, 1820.

NOTES

263

124. Scholz, Reise, 245. 125. AN AE, CC Acre, V, Aug. 5, 1825. 126. Michaud, Correspondance, IV, 268, wrote in 1831 that “Catafago is an Arab merchant” and consular agent for many countries, including France. He also was a banker and lent money even to the pasha. His wife was dressed half-European, half-Turkish. Dinner was taken a` la europe´enne. 127. AN AE, CC Acre, V, July 4, 1828, Oct. 5, 1828.

5. SOCIETY AND ITS STRUCTURE IN ACRE 1. See Abdel Nour, Introduction a` l’histoire urbaine de la Syrie Ottoman (XVIe– XVIIIe sie`cle) (Beirut 1982), and Raymond, Grandes Villes arabes a` l’e´poque ottomane (Paris 1985). 2. Maundrell, “Journey,” 428. 3. For a summary see B. Dichter, The Maps of Acre—A Historical Cartography (Acre 1973), 70–98. 4. E. Wirth, “Die orientalische Stadt” Saeculum 26 (1975), 45–89. 5. See appendix D, map 8. 6. Seetzen, Reisen, 90. 7. Renaudot speaks of almost half the population having vanished, the rest being further threatened by famine: AN AE B1 979, July 10, 1886. 8. Al-‘Awra, Ta¯rı¯kh, 186–88; AN AE, CC Acre, II, March 15, 1813, May 20, 1813. Al-‘Awra dates the plague to the end of 1811, one year earlier than when it actually started. The French consular reports confirm the high toll of the disease: between March and May every day between ten and thirty people died, out of a total population of 5,000. Between January and May some 1,800, or one-third of the population, had perished. If these figures, however, are correct, they leave us with a much lower population estimate than all other contemporary estimates. See appendix A. 9. AN AE B1 1040, July 6, 1783, “Me´moire sur le Commerce de la nation franc¸aise dans le De´partement du Consulat Ge´ne´ral de Syrie et Palestine.” 10. In 1773 de Taules, the French consul in Sidon, reported al-Jazza¯r raising a jug of wine “as big as the club of Hercules” and saying: “On peut bien . . . eˆtre rebel au Grand Seigneur, quand on est rebel a` Mahomet.’ [You can very well be a rebel against the sultan when you are a rebel against Muhfi ammad]. AN AE B1 1036, Nov. 30, 1773. 11. Shiha¯b, al-Jazza¯r, 95. 12. Ibid., 109. 13. Ibid., 111–113. 14. A few years later, during their occupation of Egypt, the French learned very quickly the function of such gates and had them all taken out and burnt after the first uprising in Cairo against them: al-Jabartı¯, III, 29. 15. Ibid., 112, 113; al-Misha¯qa, Murder, 28, 29; al-Jabartı¯, ‘Aja¯’ib, III, 232.

264

NOTES

16. AN AE, CC Acre, III, June 8, 1816. 17. With the exception of ‘Alı¯ Pasha, the katkhu¯da¯ of Sulayma¯n Pasha, who left Acre with his entire household: al-‘Awra, Ta¯rı¯kh, 186–88. 18. M. al-Sfi abba¯gh, Ta¯rı¯kh Zfi a¯hir, 56–57; Mariti, Voyages, II, 92, described Zfi a¯hir’s severe punishment in cases of adultery and homosexuality, though the latter was considered less grave than the former. 19. Ibid., 58. 20. Kara¯ma, H fi awa¯dith, 34–36. 21. See N. Shu¯r, Toldot Akko, (Tel Aviv, 1990), 196, quoting Mariti. 22. al-‘Awra, Ta¯rı¯kh, 177. 23. M. al-Sfi abba¯gh, Ta¯rı¯kh, 50–51; F. A. Busta¯nı¯, “Madfi a¯hir al-adab fı¯ bala¯fit Dha¯hir al-‘Umar,” al-Mashriq, 45 (1951), 235. 24. M. al-Sfi abba¯gh, Ta¯rı¯kh Zfi a¯hir, 51. Mikha¯’ı¯l al-Bahfirı¯ apparently collected the poems of al-‘Umar’s sons and those of ‘Abd al-H fi alı¯m. He arrived around 1770 in Acre from Damascus where his father had moved to from Homs: Lu¯’ı¯s Shaykhu¯, “Mikha¯’ı¯l al-Bahfi rı¯,” al-Mashriq, 3 (1900), 11. 25. al-‘Awra, Ta¯rı¯kh, 397. 26. M. al-Sfi abba¯gh, Ta¯rı¯kh Zfi a¯hir, 135. 27. al-‘Awra, Ta¯rı¯kh, 150, 168, 370. 28. AN AE B1, 1041, March 5, 1785. 29. al-‘Awra, Ta¯rı¯kh, 160, 205, 208. 30. Ibid., 474. 31. Shiha¯b, al-Jazza¯r, 94. 32. Ibid., 79. 33. al-‘Awra, Ta¯rı¯kh, 15, 35. 34. Clarke, Travels, 164, remarked in 1801 about Nazareth: “A wretched poor place from where people are continually leaving, either leaving the country or going to Acre to work on the sites of fortification constructions.” 35. al-‘Awra, Ta¯rı¯kh, 368. 36. Carne, Letters from the East (London 1826), II, 54–56. 37. Shiha¯b, al-Jazza¯r, 89, calls it malhfi ama; al-‘Awra, Ta¯rı¯kh, 160, calls it qa fisfisa¯bkha¯na. 38. al-‘Awra, Ta¯rı¯kh, 160. 39. Shaykhu¯, “Mikha¯’ı¯l al-Sfi abba¯gh.” 40. AN AE, CC Acre, V, April 17, 1830. 41. Mana¯‘, A‘la¯m, 39. 42. Ibid., 274. 43. Al-Ma¯dfi ¯ı, Qaryat ¯Ijzim, appendix. Five houses in Acre, four buildings in the village of ¯Ijzim, two houses in Haifa, and twenty-two lots of land in six different villages and Tfi u¯l Karam. 44. Meryon, Travels, I, 125. 45. Misha¯qa, Murder, 106. 46. See four letters to ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha by Shaykh Kha¯lid Sfi a¯hfi ibzadeh, Bughyat

NOTES

265

al-wa¯jid fı¯ maktu¯ba¯t mawla¯na¯ al-Kha¯lid (Damascus 1915), 85–87, 227–29, 244–45. I am indebted to I. Weissmann for having made them available to me. 47. AN AE, CC Acre, IV, “Me´moire par Ruffin en 1821.” 48. AN AE, CC Acre, IV, “Relation des e´ve´nements e´prouve´s par le consulat de France a Saint Jean d’Acre en 1821.” 49. The numbers are much too high. But by 1812 there was a noticeable immigration of Polish Jews to Safed, which induced a building boom, economic growth of Safed, and more revenues for Sulayma¯n Pasha: AN AE, Acre II, April 16, 1812. 50. Misha¯qa, Murder, 107–08. 51. Shiha¯b, Lubna¯n, III, 668. 52. AN AE CC Acre, IV, Bulletin March–April 1821. 53. See appendix A. Jews never had a strong numerical presence in Acre anyway. 54. Mariti, Voyages, II, 95. 55. AN AE, CC Acre, 19 Flore´al, ans 5 (April 25, 1797). 56. AN AE, CC Seyde XXVI, March 26, 1806. 57. Michaud, Correspondance, vol. 5, 85. 58. Ibid., vol. 6, 212, 305. 59. Ibid., vol. 6, 268. 60. al-‘Awra, Ta¯rı¯kh, 334. 61. Michaud, Correspondance, VI, 276. 62. Abdel Nour, Introduction, 170–80. 63. His closest advisers, however, remained throughout the Greek Catholic Bahfi rı¯ brothers; see Philipp, Syrians, 65. 64. al-Dimishqı¯, Ta¯rı¯kh, 113, 114. 65. See Doumani.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 1. See appendix D, maps 4–7.

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Translations

Pp. 47–48 “[that] the Ottoman Empire didn’t exist anymore and that there is only one nation in the world (Russia), just as there is only one God in heaven.” “whatever one says about the Ottoman Empire, it will not fall. There are powers interested in maintaining its strength and just when it is at risk of being completely beaten one will see help coming to the fore.”

P. 54 “In one of the most beautiful countries of the world the people are mean and are slaves. And such is the nature of despotic government that the one who makes the law is more of a slave than the one who has to accept it. A pasha with two thousand troops, perhaps the most despicable on earth, makes twelve hundred thousand inhabitants tremble. In turn he himself is most afraid in the middle of these miserable people who carry out his wishes, always ready to bend their knee before him or to deal him a deadly blow.” “In regions where nothing stipulates the extent of rights of those who govern over those who are governed and where the abuse of power seems inherent, al-Jazzar has the ability to surpass all in gratuitous injustice and monomaniacal cruelties.”

268

TRANSLATIONS

P. 59 “fit in all physical exercise, he still guards all the predilections of an education he received among the Mamluks. He employs sword and rifle equally well; he mounts a dromedary and tames an impetuous horse with as much dexterity as agility.”

P. 77 “to find out whether one could hope to detach this pasha from the yoke of the Porte and create thus a diversion. Al-Jazzar was not willing to see him or to listen to him.”

P. 87 “Sulayman Pasha, or rather the Jew who rules in his name. . . . His lieutenant and this Jew who think of nothing else but to amass [wealth] will one day meet the fate they deserve and the weak Sulayman will become the victim of their greed.” “A Jew who under the title of director of taxes is truly in charge of the whole Syrian coast.” “the interests of the Pasha’s Jew who does not want the liberty of commerce; he has associates who know how to join him in order to skin the Europeans.”

P. 89 “the vows and the prayers of the dervishes and fakirs, have they not contributed to the unlimited authority granted to this Jew whom the common Muslims respect more than the governor himself?”

P. 93 “Abdallah Pasha governs as if politics advised him to surround himself with ruins, to the point that all the country under his control presents a picture of isolation and poverty.” “next to that of the greatest commanders of the world.”

TRANSLATIONS

269

P. 97 “In the plain of Acre two to three thousand bales of raw cotton are produced which are the best and most appreciated of the whole Levant. The English and the Dutch, who produce the best uniforms, buy it from the French merchants who reside here and collect it.”

P. 98 The port of Acre was always attached and subject to the port of Sidon; if this order is changed and they are separated we will fall into a most monstrous disorder.”

P. 103 “Shaykh Zfi a¯hir, this man who is dangerous to all who have the misfortune to live under his dominion.” “the commerce of this port is completely dried up.” “without the explicit permission for the nation in Sidon.”

P. 104 “need for an extraordinary quantity of of bales [of cotton].” “he will force us to pay the price that he himself determines.” “he isn’t anymore what he was ten years ago; today he makes the law.”

P. 105 “a man who can do anything he wants and who sets no limits to his greed.”

P. 106 “The shaykh has today such standing that he is convinced nothing can hurt him. He governs the land like a sovereign, though he is nothing

270

TRANSLATIONS

more than the tax farmer of the pasha of Sidon. In recent years we have seen as governors of Sidon most famous viziers of the Ottoman Empire to whom he [nevertheless] dictated the law.”

P. 108 “with great pain the ruination of one of the largest debtors of the nation.”

P. 109 “this merchant who controls the government of Acre and is there the absolute master.” “The merchants of Acre are today nothing but the employees of Ibrahim al-Sabbagh, to whom they loan their names. He has seized all useful branches of trade and leaves them nothing but the sad satisfaction to go through the motions and to appear to strike many deals while, in fact, they only work for him. ”

P. 110 “forms since a long time a group of mixed constitution and almost independent of the officer of the king. The merchants, republicans in their relations to France, are veritable slaves to Zahir.”

P. 113 “The country belongs to me and I chase out all who displease me.” “it would be pretty cruel to abandon two great [commercial] establishments on the eve of an abundant harvest, the first in four years, and at a time when imports bring considerable profits.”

TRANSLATIONS

271

P. 125 “New branches of commerce have to be created which, while enriching France, offer the twofold advantage of turning the hearts and wishes of the people toward her.”

P. 126 “that there is a Jew here who in the name of Sulayman Pasha is the only owner, seller, and buyer; that he pays not the least attention to the capitulations; that Nablus and the surrounding lands do not cultivate cotton anymore because the Jew who rules here despotically prevents it from reaching the market, so that he can sell his cotton more expensively.”

P. 127 “Harvests had been more abundant and the country had enjoyed during that period a considerable surplus [production], even though the population had been more numerous. But the lands were then cultivated while today a great part lies fallow because of a lack of hands [to cultivate the fields] which diminish every day due to the vexations to which the peasant is subjected; he is left with nothing to live on and flees to Egypt.”

P. 129 The pasha of Acre has no authority. His customs official, one of his slaves, is chased out if he allows himself the least irritation. The lieutenant of the pasha is nothing, the mufti everything.

P. 140 “A group of santons and prophets ludicrously dressed, showing all the attributes of madness, wearing its masks and reflecting it in their songs, even though the latter were composed to the glory of al-Jazzar, who followed right behind them with Salı¯m and the high officers of his court.”

272

TRANSLATIONS

“100 cuirassed Mamluks, clad in iron, with helmets on their heads and the visors down.” “All this apparatus had something very ridiculous about it for somebody used to the [modern] development of arms. But the locals were terrified by it. Al-Jazzar, though a good comedian himself, seemed genuinely astonished by the grandeur of the spectacle.

P. 143 “put some naval force to sea to instil some respect in the Russian corsairs [more likely Greeks under the Russian flag] and to remove them from the coast; the force consisted of one threemaster, three galiots, one kirlanquisch [?], and two Dalmatian boats. This badly equipped squadron anchored at Tyre, Sidon, Beirut, Tripoli, and Latakia successively and returned without delay to Acre, where it was as quickly disarmed.”

P. 144 “their line of action does not show at all the sort of energy that announces great enterprise. These are unchained slaves preoccupied with contemplating their chains rather than with breaking them.”

P. 148 “All the Christians who turned Turks [i.e., Muslims] are admitted in this corps, which is entrusted with all tasks and functions.” “Syria from Latakia down to Ghaza is a republic with a senate consisting of freed men who hold all the positions. It is under the control of the Jew Haim Farhi, who governs it despotically in the name of Sulayman Pasha, a Mamluk, who is its doge.”

P. 160 “though Bosnian, prefers to use the Arab language and script rather than his own.”

TRANSLATIONS

273

P. 163 “One can see him. . . . giving orders concerning the administration of his province, directing work on fortifications and construction of public buildings, following closely the construction of a ship, outlining plans of a campaign, raising flowers, arranging the necklaces of his wives, and designing embroidery.”

P. 168 “a stranger, tax farmer of the pasha, who has to be pleased and to whom they have to be sold.”

P. 174 “The tyrannical government to which these peoples are subjected increases these vices, makes them frequently [illegible], and destroys in them the sense of honor and probity that nature can sow in their hearts by giving them [illegible]. In one of the most beautiful countries of the world the people are mean and are slaves. And such is the nature of despotic government that the one who makes the law is more of a slave than the one who has to accept it. A pasha with two thousand troops, perhaps the most despicable on earth, makes tremble twelve hundred thousand inhabitants: In turn he himself is most afraid in the middle of these miserable people who carry out his wishes, always ready to bend their knee before him or to deal him a deadly blow. The slaves do not know anything but the inhuman extremes: patience to the point of pusillanimity and rage to the point of despair. It is on these characteristic principles that all is arranged here. The settled people are so patient, so submissive, so humble and at the same time so suspicious and fearful that, for the most part, they don’t dare to enrich themselves with anything. The cause is the tyrants who compose that chain from the despot on the throne to the last [illegible] of the empire, and who survey the raya with an insatiable greed to know whether he has more than is necessary for his life and for servicing the rights with which a cruel and active monopoly overburdens without end his poor and feeble sedulousness.”

274

TRANSLATIONS

P. 248 “Abu Marak was their [the English] man in Jaffa. . . . Mr. Smith had obtained for him[the rank of] horsetails. This rebel had to leave Jaffa when he no longer received the financial support of England.”

P. 254 “Sulayman Pasha doesn’t know anything. I hear from a reliable source that they abused his ignorance in order to have him sign the order for his representative in Constantinople.” “Mr. Catafago, used to exploiting all the trade of Acre for himself, observes with greatest aggravation the return of the French” “Acre is surrounded by a 3- to 4-hour-wide fertile but almost uncultivated plain.”

P. 256 “Diamonds, pearls, and gold pieces shone on the rich Turkish dresses of these women [i.e. the wife, daughters, and daughters-in-law of Catafago]; I believe each carried some fifty thousand piaster worth of jewlry.”

P. 258 “The pasha is under pressure. He absolutely needs money. His troops demand their pay and begin to mutter discontent.” . . . “His troops have already twice revolted for getting their pay, and they have threatened to hold him personally responsible and to plunder the city and our khan. On the other hand, the functionaries of the Port pursue him for payment of the miri and irritate him ceaselessly and press him, even though he does not have a penny.” “He has put his trust in these soldiers, who, from their side, seem to be strongly attached to him. He pays them quite well, in order to inspire their gratitude.”

TRANSLATIONS

275

P. 261 “Fighting constantly against the very children of Zahir, who, in order to contact their father, have to go through him; busy creating divisiveness between them or to reconcile them; he embraces all without being embarrassed by it.”

P. 262 “a capricious and whimsical man, effeminate, passing his life with women, already old at the age of thirty-three. . . . his politics depend on his mood. Sometimes thrusts of European civilization overcome him: there, suddenly with a tarbush with short cloth, there drinking vine, mounting a horse in the French manner. But after a few days everything is changed again: he returns to what he just left, for leaving it yet again when some other thoughts enter his mind.” He is not really violent or evil, just a “spoiled child.”

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Archival Materials Used Archive de l’Arme´e de Terre, St. Vincenne. Archive de la Chambre du Commerce de Marseille (ACCM). Archives Nationales, Affaires e´trange`res, Paris (AN AE). Markaz al-Watha¯’iq, Damascus.

INDEX

A ‘Abd al-H fi alı¯m al-‘Adfi wı¯, 182 ‘Abd al-H fi alı¯m al-Shuwayki, 178 ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha, biographical details (in chronological order): ruled 1819– 1831; (1819): H fi aim Farhfiı¯ as sponsor, 88; (1819): moves against Mamluks, 151–52; (1819): reintroduction of special dress codes for dhimmı¯s, 183; (1820): execution of H fi aim Farhfi i, 88–90, 131; (1820): religious men attempting to participate in power, 181–82, 185; (1820– 31): governor of Sidon, 85–86, 88– 93; (1821): anti-Semitic and anti-Christian moves, 183; (1822): troubled relationship with Damascus and Farhfi ¯ı family, 90–91; (1822): siege of Acre by governors of Damascus, Aleppo, plus Salumu¯n Farhfi ¯ı, 91, 131; (1826): weakness of regime, economic decline due to excessive monopolistic control, 93; (1827): haggling over jewelery of Catafago’s wife and daughters, 93, 168; (1830): successful seige of Sfi a¯nu¯r against al-Jarra¯r clan, 93; (1831): failure to pay defending troops at Jaffa, 21; (1831): six months’ resistance to Egyptian

siege of Acre, living underground, final surrender, 21, 93 ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha, overview: administrative structures, 164; occasional drunkenness, 184; reverting to assassination to ensure political control, 175; traditional religious education with lack of political sensibility, 166–67, 182–83 ‘Abd al-Latfi¯ıf Fathfi Alla¯h, 129–30 ‘Abd al-Rahfi ma¯n Afandı¯ Mura¯dı¯, 73 Abdel Nour, 184 Abu¯ ‘l-Dhahab, 41, 42, 43, 44, 46, 62 Abu¯ ‘l-Huda¯ family, 181–82 Abu¯ Nabu¯t, 88, 151 Acre and its realm: border with Damascus, 19; decline after Crusades, 4; decline, exhaustion and depopulation by 1800, 79; decline under alJazza¯r’s brutal rule, tax burden leading to depopulation, 121–22; decline with continuing depopulation under Sulayma¯n Pasha, 124, 127; decline with monopolistic policies of ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha (1820s), 93; detailed French maps, 171; difficulties in classifying, for modern historians, 29; expansion by al-Jazza¯r, 229map; expansion by Sulayma¯n Pasha, 229map; expansion by Zfi a¯-

284

Acre and its realm (Continued ) hir, 228map; extent of, 2, 187; failure to cope with new world order, 190–91; fortifications and fortified cities, 16–21, 137–38, 180, 226map; harassment by corsairs and Bedouins, 96–97; immigration-based urban history, 5, 24, 190; importance to al-Jazza¯r, 77–78; major military highways and sea lanes, 226map; major routes of European travelers, 225map; major trade routes, 224map; monopolies’ role in eventual economic failure and political downfall, 103; plague, drought, famine in 1786–89, 113; as political and commercial center of entire Syrian coast, 2–3, 107; regional economic shift from inland to coast, 4, 5; return to oblivion after 1840, 18, 20, 24, 27; siege and invasion by Egypt (1831), 10, 15, 18, 21, 27, 93; taking vague political and economic shape, 30; as unique political entity, with role in international politics, links to modern European world economy, 1, 2–3, 4, 187–88 Acre (the city): architectural survey, Kesten report of 1962, 171; artisan production area, 172; beginning 18th Century as spacious ruin, pile of rubble, 25, 96, 170; bombardment by British in 1840, return to rubble, 27; Christian quarter, 176; city walls, 27, 170; coffeehouses, 173; commercial area-foreign quarters, khans, bazaars,, 26, 171–73; docks, 173; failure of government administration, lack of indigenous merchant class, 134; fertility of surrounding plain, 97; as frontier society, 173; as home of local ruler as well as center of (French) export trade, 11, 171; importance to

INDEX

invaders, 16–17; Jews remaining few in number, 24; major buildings and fortifications ca. 1820, 231map; major rebuilding effort, rubble as ideal building blocks for Zfi a¯hir’s new center of realm, 25, 170, 171, 172; military-political structures, 26– 27, 172; Muslim quarter, 176; no evidence of intersectarian tensions, 178; populations and migration trends, 22–25, 193fig., 193–96; as predominantly Christian city in 18th Century, Muslim in 19th Century, 24; public utilities, 27; religious buildings, 25–26, 176; replaced in trade primacy by Beirut, 128–35; as residence and capital of Zfi a¯hir al‘Umar, 25, 38–39; residential areas, 173; as sole port for exports on Syrian coast, 121; temporary success due to demand for cotton and wheat, 134; wealth originating in villages of hinterland, 16; wirash or artisan ateliers, workshops, 179–80 Administrative structures: of ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha, 164; of al-Jazza¯r, 157–64; bookkeepers, 160; civil sector plus court, 163; economy as object of, 169; family connections common, 162, 164; gatekeepers, 163; governors or prefects, 153; khazı¯ndar (treasurer), 159, 165; little formalization or institutionalization, 165– 66; locals becoming influential, 167; military commanders, 159, 160, 164– 65; minorities common in, 156, 163; office for peasant complaints and legal cases, 165; palace guards, 163; positions and officials ranked by importance and authority, for Acre and its realm in 1811 according to al-‘Awra, 221–22; positions and their occupants for Acre and its

INDEX

realm in 1811 according to al‘Awra, 215–20; positions’ salaries, comments on, for Acre and its realm in 1811 according to al‘Awra, 220–21; question of extent of power and authority, 166; scribes, 156, 160, 162, 164, 165; secretaries, 160, 161, 162; of Sulayma¯n Pasha, 164–69; tax collectors, 158; veziers, 163; of Zfi a¯hir, 153–55, 158; see also Rulers Ahfi mad Agha Za‘faranjı¯, 72, 73 Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r (“The Butcher”), biographical details (in chronological order): ruled 1775– 1804; (1730): birth into poverty in Bosnia, 48, 49; (1755): arrival in Istanbul in late teens, possibly after attempted rape and stabbing of sister-in-law, 49, 52; (1756): member of household of governor of Egypt,, 50; (1756): joining service of Sfi a¯lihfi Bey, formative years among Mamluks, 50, 52, 53, 138–39; (1758): pilgrimage, slaughter of Bedouins to avenge death of master, earning sobriquet of al-Jazza¯r (“the Butcher”), 50, 52, 53; (1768): entering service of ‘Alı¯ Bey alKabı¯r, 50; (1768): refusal to assassinate Sfi a¯lihfi Bey on orders, flight, 50– 51, 52, 53; (1770): resurfacing in Lebanon after uncertain wandering, 51; (1771): requested by Amı¯r Yu¯suf for military duty in Beirut, 51; (1771): turns against Amı¯r Yu¯suf, dislodged from newly fortified Beirut, 51, 62–63; (1772): entrenched in Beirut, challenging Druze, 42, 62–63; (1776): annexation of Beirut from Druze, 63; (1776–79): attempts to control Druze, 63–66; (1777): made governor of Sidon, residence in Acre,

285

70, 111; (1781): defeat of Metualis, annexation of Tyre, 65; (1782): ultimate impossibility of military solution for Druze region, 65–69, 229map; (1785): made governor of Damascus after immense bribes to Istanbul, 65–66, 68, 70–71, 74–76, 256n153; (1785): military procession from Acre to Damascus, 140; (1785): as governor, responsible for annual pilgrimage caravan, 65–66, 68, 74–75; (1785): attempted monopoly of wheat trade, 113–14; (1786): deposed by imperial order, 71, 113; (1786): reappointed governor of Damascus, 71; (1789): suspecting dalliance by Mamluks in harem, executions resulting, 55–56, 57, 143–44, 146; (1789): rebellion of Mamluks cruelly suppressed, severe personality affect, paranoia resulting, 113, 143–47, 174; (1790): attempts to subdue Nablus, 19; (1790): H fi aim Farhfiı¯ as top financial advisor, 72, 85, 121, 161; (1790s): execution of Damascenes, 73; (1790s): useless, continuous war against Nablus, 76; (1792): massacre of citizens, 175; (1794 and 1803): failed sieges of Sfi a¯nu¯r, 76; (1795): again deposed, 71; (1797): costly building program requiring new, oppressive taxes, 120–21; (1798 and 1799): French invasion of Egypt and march on Acre, 66; (1799): help from British navy in defeat of Napoleon, 247n173; (1799): successful resistance of siege by Napoleon, hailed as defender of the faith, 48– 49, 76, 121; (1800s): brutal rule, tax burden, leading to depopulation of region, 121–22; (1804): again reappointed governor of Damascus, 71; (1804): forgiveness of former rebel

286

Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r (Continued ) Sulayma¯n Pasha, 60, 139, 144, 147; (1804): death in Acre, 15, 78 Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r (“The Butcher”), overview: administrative structures, 157–64; as adventurer, drifter, man on the make, without family connections, 51–52, 60; as barbarous in a barbarous era, 56– 57; as charismatic, brave, strong and cool under pressure, 143; as courageous, tactically sober, violent, treacherous, bloodthirsty, sadistic, and cruel, 48, 57, 58, 174; curious attitude toward Jaffa, 75–76, 229map; economic pursuits as shrewd, insightful, 112; exhibiting engineering skills, 58; fitting soldiermold of traditional ruling elite of Ottoman provinces, 60–61; fortification of Acre, 16, 19, 27; as generous and compassionate, 59–60; importance of Acre to, 77–78; impressing European interlocutors with intellectual acumen and alertness, 60; as “lion let loose against humanity,” 48; military support as hired, imported soldiery, 38–47; not given to conspicuous consumption, 59; playing within rules of “Ottoman game,” 76–77; reasons for seeking governorship of Damascus, 75–76; ruling through oppression, force, and short-lived alliances of convenience, 74; sources and problems of historiography, 6, 49; sources exhibiting disagreements, bias, ambivalence, 49, 52–56, 60; sources, French, depicting tyrant, despot, usurper, 54, 111–12 Albanian soldiers, 139, 141, 152 Aleppo, 9, 12

INDEX

‘Alı¯ Agha [later: Pasha] Khazinda¯r, 88, 148, 166 ‘Alı¯ Bey Agha, 50 ‘Alı¯ Bey al-Kabı¯r, 40, 41, 42, 46, 50, 111 ‘Alı¯ Pasha, 182 Alkali, 12 American cotton reaching markets, 119, 130, 203graph, 203table Amı¯r Bashı¯r Shiha¯b: ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha’s failed pressure tactics, return to uneasy reconciliation, 90; commanding Druze troops, 165; as dominant figure in Druze politics, 66, 68; failure of several attempts by al-Jazza¯r to eliminate, 67; good relations with Sulayma¯n Pasha, 80; refusal to aid besieged Acre, avoiding trouble, absenting himself from Acre region, 90, 91 Amı¯r (Druze title of rank), 61 Amı¯r hfi a¯kim (Druze title of rank), 61 Amı¯r Yu¯suf Shiha¯b, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66 Anti-Christian measures, sectarianism, 182, 190 Anti-Semitism, sectarian, 87, 89, 92, 183 Aqueduct, 27 Armies. See Military affairs/armies Autonomy from Ottoman Empire: but avoiding open rebellion, 189; commercial centers seeking, 2, 3, 45–48, 69, 184–85, 188, 189; following traditional forms and patterns of political power, 189; rules of “Ottoman game” in acceptance of authority of Istanbul, taking legitimacy from state and sultan, 76–77 al-‘Awra, H fi ana¯,’ 160, 165 al-‘Awra, Ibra¯hı¯m: as ambivalent, competitive, and close observer of affairs of government and of H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı, 86–87; giving reasons for Sulayma¯n Pasha’s power and influ-

INDEX

ence, 85; ignoring social organization, 178; positions and officials ranked by importance and authority, for Acre and its realm in 1811, 221–22; positions and their occupants for Acre and its realm in 1811, 215–20; positions’ salaries, comments on, for Acre and its realm in 1811, 220–21 al-‘Azfi m, ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha, 66, 73 al-‘Azfi m, As‘ad Pasha, 36 al-‘Azfi m clan, 34, 69, 72, 75 al-‘Azfi m, Muhfi ammad Pasha, 63 al-‘Azfi m, Sulayma¯n Pasha, 34–35 Bahfi rı¯ family, 81 Banu¯ Sfi aqr tribe, 33, 136–37 Bathhouses, 27 Bazaars, 26, 172 Bedouins, 12, 30, 50, 96–97 Beirut: ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha’s attempt to buy into commerce, 131; al-Jazza¯r’s fortification of, 20; dazzling rise in 19th Century, flourishing as Acre declined, 6, 21, 93, 128–35, 191; fortified by Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r, 18– 19; French consul’s move to, 131; key to rise in extent of government monopolies, 134; merchants resisting Sulayma¯n Pasha’s extension of monopoly policy, 128–29; rise of competitive, flexible, cooperating merchant class, 134–35; strong trade with Damascus, 131–33; Sulayma¯n Pasha giving up control of, 20, 128–29; transportation advantages, 132; unparalleled population growth, 132 Blanc, Joseph, 101 Bookkeepers, 160 Borders: between Acre and Damascus, 19; contours unclear and shifting, 29, 187

287

Bosnian troops, 139, 141 British Navy, 17, 21, 247n173 British trade: Continental System, 83, 124, 125, 127, 130; and rise of Beirut, 129 Brown, Carl L., 47 Busta or seraglio, 27 Capitulations (trade treaties between Muslim and European rulers), 94– 95, 115 Caravans, 14 Carmel, A., 24 Carpenters, 179 Catafago, Antoine: ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha haggling over jewelry of Catafago’s wife and daughters, 93, 168; concentration of power as sole manager of monopoly system, chief trader for exports, 131, 156, 168; dependence on support from political system and ruler, 118, 168–69; flourishing under al-Jazza¯r, 163; gaining confidence of ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha, 168; holding variety of countries’ vice-consulships, enjoying confidence of Sulayma¯n Pasha, 126, 167–68, 184; intimate friend of H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı, 168; keeping French out of Acre, 120, 126; move to Sidon, 169; as multazim in Nazareth, 167–68; specializing in cotton trade, also dealing in wheat, 168 Christian quarter, 176 Christians: beginning to leave Acre at heightening of intersectarian tensions, 183; convents, 100–101; Copts, 10–11; eviction in 1821 by ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha, 183; in high office, 156; as majority of population of Acre in 18th Century, 23; Maronites, 177, 195n11&15, 196n25, 236n41; quarantine and other protective

288

Christians (Continued ) measures against plague, 23, 176– 77, 182; see also Greek Catholics; Greek Orthodox Churches, 25, 176 Clarke, E. D., 56, 59 Coastal plain, ease of troop movements, 17 Coastal shipping: major routes of, 224map; routes of European travelers, 13–14, 225map Coastal towns of Syrian region: in 16th Century, 9; of lesser importance than Jaffa and Acre, 16 Coffee, 12 Coffeehouses, 173 Cohen, A., 7, 8, 72, 121 Colbert, J. B., 4–5, 95, 116 Commerce: 15th Century revival of trade, 4; Acre’s links to modern European world economy, 2–3, 4; caravans, 14; French replacing British in Levant in 18th Century, 5; importance of political development to, 94; imports to Damascus for 1824, 213table; link between Christian population and foreign trade, 23–24; major trading networks, 12–13; monopoly by French merchants, 94; old international transit routes versus new system of cash crops for export, 21; regulation by Capitulations, 94–95; sea trade for Acre and dependencies, 212table; sea trade for Beirut, 212table; serving raw-materials needs of European industrialization, 4, 188; shifts in, 3; trade routes, 11–13, 224map; transportation by beasts of burden, 16; wealth originating in villages of hinterland, 16; see also Cotton trade; Monopolies; Wheat Continental System, 83, 124, 125, 127, 130

INDEX

Convents, 100–101 Copts, 10–11 Cotton trade: Beirut replacing Acre as center for export, 93; competition between French and other countries’ merchants, 98, 103, 105; cotton brought from villages to Acre to market, 11, 12, 94; creating first economy in eastern Mediterranean based on export of cash crops, 188; cycle of price/supply/demand, 97– 98, 99, 112, 114, 116–17, 118–19; development of regular forward market (pre-harvest advance purchases), 99–100, 114; ever-rising European demand, 1, 2, 4, 5–6; exploitation of peasants in producer price versus export price, 127; exports, comparative, 1700–1786, 201graph; exports from Acre, 1700– 1786, 197–99table; exports of cotton thread, 1700–1786, 199–201table; exports quarterly of raw cotton from Acre, 1810–1826, 204–5table; export value, raw cotton from Acre, 1810– 1826, 205graph; failure of indigenous export efforts of 1730s, 101; French traders in Sidon competing with French in Acre, 98–99, 103–7; imports globally of cotton to France, 1775 and 1789, 203graph, 203table; imports of raw cotton to Marseilles, 1700–1786, 202graph, 202table; mutual dependence of French and locals, 115; near monopoly of French traders, 94; Ottoman Empire’s attempts to control sales in order to collect taxes, 99– 100; profits at 45–50 percent in 1748, demand remaining high, 104; profits at 150 percent in 1730s, 100; repartition as means to avoid competitive bidding by traders, 98; sectarianism of little importance to

INDEX

French, 116; Sulayma¯n Pasha’s failed switch to cotton, 130; Zfi a¯hir’s consolidation, astuteness regarding potential of, 154, 158; see also Monopolies Cotton trade, reasons for breakdown: American cotton reaching markets, 119, 130; French invasion of Egypt and Palestine, 120; local commercial class competing with French, 117–18; naval warfare between France and England, 120; not circumvention of re´partition, 116–17; not cultural differences, 116; not Mamluk rebellion, 116; shifting alliances between Ottoman Empire and European powers, 120; world production finally matching demand, consequent price drop, 118– 19

Dala¯t cavalry troops, 139, 141, 142, 147, 152 Damascus: ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha’s troubled relationship with, 90–91; al-‘Azfi m clan and rivalry with al-Jazza¯r, 34, 69, 72, 75; as destination of Palestine trade, 12; governor’s worry over growing power of Zfi a¯hir, 34; hold of central government decreasing on, 69, 229map; importance as starting point and guarantor of annual pilgrimage to Mecca, 4, 9, 69, 74–75; including control of southern parts of Palestine, 75; instability of politics, 92–93; military routes multiplying, 18; province of, in early 18th Century, 227map; resurgence of power of, 92; road links to points west and south, 12; strong trade with Beirut, 131–33; Sulayma¯n Pasha’s control of, 81–83, 230map; wheat trade as

289

critical, 72; Zfi a¯hir desirous of good relations with, 69–70 D’Arvieux, Ch, 14 Darwı¯sh Pasha, 91 De´nain, A. J., 52, 53, 56 Dervishes, 157, 177, 182 De Taules, 57, 109, 110 De Tott, Baron, 52, 54 Dhimmı¯s (non-Muslim minorities): achieving positions of power, totally dependent on goodwill of masters, 161, 185; commercial group’s vulnerability to whims of political strongmen, 185; common in administrative structures of rulers, 156, 162–63; special dress codes for, 183; see also Catafago, Antoine; H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı; Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh al-Dinkizlı¯, Ahfi mad Agha: advising Zfi a¯hir to pay outstanding taxes to Istanbul, 44–45; appointed mutasallim in Sidon by Zfi a¯hir, 62; betrayal of Zfi a¯hir, 242n66 & 69; as Maghrebi mercenary hired by Zfi a¯hir, 33, 137; unacceptability of Muslim fighting sultan, 46; winning battle by ruse and kidnapping, 239n37 Docks, 173 Doumani, B., 2, 7 dress: codes for Dhimmı¯s (nonMuslim minorities), 183; imitation of European, 183–84 Druze: al-Jazza¯r’s attempts to control, 63–69, 229map; alliance with ‘Uthma¯n Pasha against Zfi a¯hir, 40, 62; all peasants mobilized as warriors, resultant damage to agricultural production, 61, 65, 165; Amı¯r Bashı¯r as dominant political figure, 66; backing Beirutis independence from Acre, 130; centered on Mount Lebanon, 61, 229map; controlling Nazareth and Tiberias, 29; deeply

290

Druze (Continued ) divided amongst themselves, easily manipulated, 63–64, 67–68; distracting al-Jazza¯r from siege of Sfi a¯nu¯r, 19; as endogamous, hierarchical clanship, 61–62; history by H fi aydar Ahfi mad al-Shiha¯b, 49, 234n12; as key to military highway north, 17; local fights readily becoming proxy wars, 63, 64, 68; pursuing local rivalries without interference from Ottoman governors, 30; receding power in Tiberias region, 32; as religious community or ethnicity with feudalist structures, 61; repeated assessments for extortionate bribes, 64–65, 67, 68; Shiha¯b clan, 61–62, 67; success against al-Jazza¯r’s troops, inability to unite, 142–43; Sulayma¯n Pasha relying on alliances, 80; Zfi a¯hir wary of, 38 Exports: alkali, 12; olive oil, 99, 102; rice, 11; sesame oil, 102; silk, 4–5, 11, 12; soap, 11, 12, 102; tobacco, 12; wood, 11, 12; see also Commerce; Cotton; Cotton trade; Wheat Famines: of 1786–89, 113, 194n6; of 1816, 176 Farhfi ¯ı family, 81, 86, 87, 90, 91, 161–62; see also H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı Fa¯ris Nadfi ¯ıf, 80 Fishermen, 96 Fortifications: in 18th Century, 226map; ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha’s moat, 180; of Acre by Zfi a¯hir, 137–38; fortresses in Syrian territory, 16–21; watchtowers, 15 Forward market (pre-harvest advance purchases from village Shaykhs), 99–100, 114

INDEX

French consular correspondence, 7, 29 French siege, 27 French traders/merchants: al-Jaza¯r expels, find refuge in Jaffa and Ramla, 75, 112–14; al-Jazza¯r invites back, 119–20; attempts to form united buyers’ group, 103; attempts to return after expulsion, 124–25, 126–27; competition from Cyprus, English, Dutch, Venetians and coastal merchants, 103, 105; complaints of other French merchants, 112; dependence on Ibra¯hı¯m alSfi abba¯gh, 108–11; enjoying near monopoly, 94, 115; involvement in local politics, 100, 114–15; monopoly on marketing and transport of commodities to Europe, 110–11, 112, 115; in port-based groups called nations, 95; purchasing direct from peasants, 110, 114; reluctant reliance on Zfi a¯hir, 103; replacing British in Levant in 18th Century, 5; sectarianism of little importance to, 116; seeing cotton in Izmir and Salonika after Zfi a¯hir’s death, 111; visions of Levant as French colony, 125; Zfi a¯hir preventing contact between local farmers/brokers and, 102, 114 Gabbay family, 91 Galilee, 14, 187 Gatekeepers, 163 Gautier, 104 Gaza, 10, 12 Goffman, D., 2 Governments. See Administrative structures; Military affairs/armies; Rulers Grain. See Wheat Greek Catholics: Bahfi rı¯ family, 81; churches for, 177, 178; dominant

INDEX

role in Acre, 155, 156; as largest Christian group, 177; migration from Damascus and Aleppo to Acre, 23; Mika¯’ı¯l Fakhr, 240n49; Mika¯’ı¯l Jamal, 240n49; populations, 195n11&15, 196n25, 236n41; refused to work on earth removal, 180; Yu¯suf al-Qassı¯s, 35, 101, 108, 118, 155; see also al-Sfi abba¯gh, Ibra¯hı¯m Greek Orthodox: church for, 177; migration from Nazareth to Acre, 23; populations, 195n11&15, 196n25, 236n41 Guilds, 179, 190 Haifa: annexation by Zfi a¯hir al‘Umar, 36; defense against governor of Damascus, 39–40; under control of Nablus, 29; use by corsairs, 97 H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı: as al-Jazza¯r’s top financial advisor, 72, 85, 121, 161; arrest and mutilation, 161; death on orders of protg ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha, 88– 90; death proposed by religious men in first civilian attempt to participate in power, 181–82; dependence on support from political system and ruler, 118, 161; disliked by French merchants, 87; intimate friend of Catafago, 168; as Jew in high office, 156; migration of Jews to Acre under patronage of, 23, 24; moves against Abu¯ Nabu¯t, 88, 151; on prosperity and need for monopolies for money, 123; residences in Acre and Damascus, 87, 249n215; rise to top power under Sulayma¯n Pasha, 85–90, 162 Hajj. See Pilgrimages Halet Efendi, 91 H fi ana¯,’ al-‘Awra, 160, 165 Harems, 163 H fi asan Agha, 165

291

H fi asan Kapu¯da¯n Pasha, 44, 45, 70, 71, 111, 242n66 Hasselquist, Fr., 14–15 Health issues: famines, 113, 176, 194n6; see also Plague Hebron, 12 Hesekiel al-Baghda¯dı¯, 88, 91–92 Heyd, Uriel, 7 Highways and roads: concern with safety, 14–15; east-west links, 11–12; extent and increasing complexity, 19; major military routes, sea lanes, fortresses, 226map; major trading networks, 11–13, 224map; marauding by Banu¯ Sfi aqr, 137; marauding by Bedouins, 12, 96–97; pilgrimage route as military avenue, 10; pilgrimage routes, 10–11; in poor condition, 12, 13, 15–16; poor quality as hindrance to invading armies’ vehicles, artillery, cannons (“bad roads as good defense”), 15, 17, 21; routes of European travelers, 13–14, 225map; of Syria, 10–16 ‘Ima¯d clan, 67 Immigration: high to account for turnover and attrition, 76, 173; increasing under benign rule of Zfi a¯hir al‘Umar, 38; lack of family ties creating untraditional society with weak structural coherence, 5, 185, 190; Syrian Greek Catholics, 40–41 Imports, wool cloth from British, 4 Irby, C., 15 Isma¯‘ı¯l Bey, 41, 46 Isma¯‘ı¯l Bey al-Sfi aghı¯r, 240–41n52 Isma¯‘ı¯l Pasha, 78, 147 Izmir as economic center, 2 Jabal ‘A¯mil region, 36, 80, 239n35 al-Jabartı¯, ‘Abd al-Rahfi ma¯n, 49 Jaffa, 13, 16, 17, 20, 21, 75–76, 229map

292

Janissaries, 91, 92 al-Jarra¯r clan, 33–34, 76, 93 Jaubert, A., 58 Jerusalem: as center of Jewish immigration, 24; as destination for Christian tourists, 13; fortifications, 18; little commerce with coast, 12; as third holiest city of Islam, 9; typical approach from Jaffa, 14 Jews: anti-Semitism, sectarian, 87, 89, 92, 183; blood libel case of Damascus, 87, 92; few in Acre, 24; in high office, 156; immigration of Polish, to Safed, 265n49; migration to Acre in time of H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı, 23, 24; Ottoman shift to eliminate Jewish financiers, 91–92; populations, 195n11&15, 196n25, 236n41, 236–37n44; of Tiberias, siding with Zfi a¯hir al‘Umar, 35; see also H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı Jirjis Ba¯z, 67 Kanj Yu¯suf Pasha, 81, 82, 147, 184 Kesten report of 1962, 171 Khans, 26, 172, 173 Khazı¯ndar (treasurer), 159, 165 Korten, J., 14 Kurds, 74, 150; Dala¯t cavalry troops, 139, 141, 142, 147, 152 Latakia, 82 Latins, 195n11&15, 196n25 Lockroy, E., 52, 53 Maghrebi mercenaries, 33, 62, 137, 139, 141, 152 Maltese pirates, 95, 97, 143 Mamluks: in Egypt, 49, 52, 138–39, 149, 150; in Syrian region, 82, 88, 90, 113, 147–53 Mangles, J., 15 Marketplaces, 26

INDEX

Maronites, 177, 195n11&15, 196n25, 236n41 Marseilles: chamber of commerce dissolved, trade impossible, 119; monopoly over French Mediterranean trade, 95, 115; as recipient of Acre merchandise, 11 Mashook, 251n10 Masons, 179 Mas‘u¯d al-Ma¯dfi ¯ı, 87–88, 89, 182 Mayda¯nı¯ merchants, 72 Mercenaries. See Military affairs/armies Merchandise. See Commerce Metualis, 30, 36–38, 80, 90, 159, 180, 228map Mikha¯’ı¯l Fakhr, 240n49 Mikha¯’ı¯l Jamal, 240n49 Military affairs/armies: ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha’s, 151–52; Albanian soldiers, 139, 141, 152; al-Jazza¯r’s, 139–41; Bosnian troops, 139, 141; commanders, 159, 160, 164–65; Dala¯t cavalry troops, 139, 141, 142, 147, 152; Druze ad hoc military levies, 61, 65, 165; little innovation in tactics, technology, or organization, 152–53; Maghrebi mercenaries, 33, 62, 137, 139, 141, 152; mercenaries hired by al-Jazza¯r, 38–47; mercenary entrepreneurs gathering volunteers, 146–47; military-political structures, 26–27; troops prone to plunder, 142; of varied ethnicities, expensive, undisciplined, of questionable effectiveness, 141–43; Zfi a¯hir’s arming of male townspeople, 39–40, 137, 178; Zfi a¯hir’s standing army, 136–38; see also Fortifications Military routes: control of Jaffa critical to, 17; highways’ poor quality as hindrance to invading armies’ vehicles, artillery, cannons (“bad

INDEX

roads as good defense”), 15, 17, 21; major routes, sea lanes, fortresses, 226map; multiplying toward Damascus, 18 Millet system, 95–96 Misha¯qa, 122, 126, 190 Monopolies: becoming permanent feature and tool of successive governments, 102–3, 188; creating hardship and famine ignored by rulers, 175; forcing commerce away from Acre, 93; by French of marketing and transport to Europe, 110–11, 112; H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı’s scheme and reasoning for, 123; as key to rise of Beirut, 134; by Marseilles over French Mediterranean trade, 95, 115; other nationalities occasionally challenging French, 98; as radical break with existing patterns, 13; refinements by Sulayma¯n Pasha under H fi aim Farhfiı¯ and Catafago, 123– 28; repartition as means to avoid competitive bidding by traders, 98; role in eventual economic failure and political downfall of Acre, 103; on soap production, 180; by Sulayma¯n Pasha on wheat causing peasant unrest, 83–84; by Sulayma¯n Pasha on wheat, cotton, olive oil, tobacco, 85; various products subject to, 102; by Zfi a¯hı¯r over cotton, but not always total, 102, 110–11; Zfi a¯hir’s astuteness regarding potential of, 154–55 Mosques, 25–26, 176 Mount Lebanon region: Druze centered on, 61, 229map; silk as cash crop, 3 Muhfi ammad Abu¯ Maraq, 77, 79, 147 Muhfi ammad Agha, 72 Muhfi ammad ‘Alı¯ of Egypt: enhancing agricultural production through

293

infrastructure and land ownership improvements, 189; interference in favor of ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha, 91, 92; massacre of Mamluks, 150; sustained, systematic effort toward export-oriented agriculture, 254n96; using economic might and monopolies to build strength of state, 128, 188 Muhfi ammad ‘Aqı¯l, 73 Mulla¯ Isma¯‘ı¯l, 145, 147 Muslim quarter, 176 Muslims: absence of elite of wellestablished families, 181; mosques for, 177–78; plague hitting harder than Christians (1806), 23; population estimates, 195n11&15, 196n25, 236n41; Wahhabis/Wahhabiyya sect, 10, 12, 74, 82, 184 Musfifitafa¯ Barbar, 82 Musfifitafa¯ ibn Qara¯ Mulla¯, 63 Musfifitafa¯ Pasha, 91 Mutasallim, 158–59, 164 Nablus: balance of impotence in civil war, 84; as discrete region at political periphery, 2; highway connection to Acre and Jaffa, 12; Mount Nablus region integrating into world economy, 3; Sulayma¯n Pasha’s alliance with Tfi u¯qa¯ns, 83; Zfi a¯hir’s challenge over Damascene trade route, 33–34, 228map; Zfi a¯hir unable to annex, 19 Na¯bulusı¯ clan, 42 Napoleon, 17, 20, 57, 66 Nations (port-based groups of French traders), 95 Naval warfare: absent from Zfi a¯hir’s strategic thinking, 138; al-Jazza¯r’s battle with Maltese corsairs, 143; of secondary importance due to lack of ships, 17

294

Nazareth: approached from Acre, 14; as destination for Christian tourists, 13; under Druze control, 29; Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar’s challenge over Damascene trade route, 33–34, 228map Negociants, 95 Occupations: bookkeepers, 160; carpenters, 179; fishermen, 96; gatekeepers, 163; masons, 179; mule-, camel-, and donkey-drivers, 179; palace guards, 163; physicians, 184; scribes, 156, 160, 162, 164, 165; secretaries, 160, 161, 162; tax collectors, 158; teachers, 178; see also Administrative structures; Military affairs/armies; Society and its structure Olive oil, 99, 102 Olivier, G. A., 52, 56, 58, 59 Ottoman Empire: al-Jazza¯r playing “Ottoman game,” 76–77; attempts to control cotton sales in order to collect taxes, 99–100; attempts to prevent wheat exports to Europe, 127; Capitulations negotiated with France, 95; defenseless against unbelievers and heretics, 184; facing new European presence in eastern Mediterranean, 189; to French commentators, example of harmful despotism, 54–55; lack of infrastructure, 13, 15–16; as loose arrangement of autonomous cities, 2; massive bribes for appointments to provincial governorships, 70; newly strengthened central government of mid-19th Century, 21, 190; power centers resurfacing in Arab provinces in 18th Century, 3; provinces as part of “penetrated system,” 68; provinces of Damascus, Sidon, and Tripolis in early 18th Century,

INDEX

227map; regions as economic centers yet at political periphery, 2; Russo-Turkish war, 43, 47; shift to eliminate Jewish financiers, 91–92; Syria as essential overland link to Egypt, 9; uncertain authority in provinces, 96; weakness at center leading to pressure for local autonomy, 2, 3, 45–48, 69, 184–85, 188, 189 Palace guards, 163 Palestine: as anachronistic label, 2; see also Acre and its realm Physicians, 184 Pilgrimages: annual to Mecca, under Damascus governor, 65–66, 68, 74– 75; annual to Mecca, with Damascus as starting point for, 4, 9; by Copts to Jerusalem, 10–11; of European Christians to Jerusalem, 11, 13; major routes of, 10–11, 13–14, 224map; plundering of caravans by Bedouins , 12; suspension for several years by 1809, 82 Pillavoine, 126, 129, 130, 148 Piracy, pirates, and corsairs, 11, 95, 96– 97, 143 Plague: of 1760, 23, 173; of 1785/86, 113, 173, 194n6; of 1806, 23; of 1812/13, 173, 182, 194–95n9, 195n10; hitting Muslims harder than Christians (quarantine and seclusion), 23, 176– 77, 182; resulting in anti-Christian measures, 182 Populations and migration trends: Acre (the city), 22–25, 193fig., 193– 96; al-Jazza¯r’s brutal rule, tax burden, leading to depopulation, 121– 22; Beirut’s unparalled population growth, 132; Christians as majority in Acre in 18th Century, 23; continuing depopulation under Sulayma¯n Pasha, 124, 127; Greek Catho-

INDEX

lics, 195n11&15, 196n25, 236n41; Greek Orthodox, 195n11&15, 196n25, 236n41; immigration stimulated by Zfi a¯hir, 23, 110, 155; inaccuracy of estimates, 22, 23; Jewish, 195n11&15, 196n25, 236n41, 236–37n44; Latins, 195n11&15, 196n25, 236n41; Maronites, 177, 195n11&15, 196n25, 236n41; Muslims, 195n11&15, 196n25, 236n41; turnover and total immigration high, 173, 176 Ports: Acre as sole port for exports on Syrian coast, 121; Acre’s harbor as useless, 25; Acre’s harbor fortified, 17; Jaffa, 17 Prix fixe/raisonable, 116–17 Public utilities, 27 Qara¯ Muhfi ammad, 147 Ramla, 10 Religions: from absence of, to development of intersectarian tensions, 87, 89, 92, 116, 178, 182, 183, 184, 190; and local civilian attempt to participate in power, 181–83; Muslim Wahhabis/Wahhabiyya sect, 10, 12, 74, 82, 184; Sufism, 182; see also Christians; Dhimmı¯s (non-Muslim minorities); Jews; Latins; Muslims Renaudot: on al-Jazza¯r’s good fortune in war, 144; al-Jazza¯r’s pique and expulsion of French, 114; description of al-Jazza¯r’s caravan-cumparade to Damascus, 140; plans for renovation and expansion of French khan, 112–13; questioning lack of loyalty in al-Jazza¯r’s subordinates, 145; on society in Acre and its realm, 173–74, 175–76; suggestions to al-Jazza¯r for building trade through Acre, 113; suspicion of alJazza¯r’s motives in fights with

295

Druze, 143; thoughts on despotism, 54; word portrait of al-Jazza¯r, 58 Re´partition as means to avoid competitive bidding by traders, 98, 116 Rice, 11 Roads. See Highways and roads Ruffin, 89 al-Rukaynı¯, 37 Rulers: of Acre as self-made usurpers challenged by powerful political elite, 173; amı¯r (Druze title of rank), 61; amı¯r hfi a¯kim (Druze title of rank), 61; mutasallim, 158–59, 164; as strong vis-a`-vis weak society, 173–76; see also ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha; Administrative structures; Ahmad Pasha al-Jazza¯r; Sulayma¯n fi Pasha; Zfi a¯hir al‘Umar Russian fleet in eastern Mediterranean, 42, 47, 62, 189 Russo-Turkish war, 43, 47 al-Sfi abba¯gh, ‘Abbu¯d, 30 al-Sfi abba¯gh, H fi abı¯b, 160 al-Sfi abba¯gh, Ibra¯hı¯m: convinced of imminent collapse of Ottoman Empire, 47–48; death and confiscation of wealth in 1775, 111; dependence on support from political system and ruler, 118; French dependence on, 108–11; grandfather of contemporary historian, 30; as Greek Catholic, 47, 111; as powerful, wealthy adviser to Zfi a¯hir, 40, 109–11, 155, 157; preventing contact between local farmers/brokers and French, 102; refusal of money to save Zfi a¯hir, 45, 48, 242n69 al-Sfi abba¯gh, Mika¯’ı¯l Niqu¯la¯, 30 Safed: as center of Jewish immigration, 24, 265n49; conquered by Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar, 32 Sakru¯j brothers, 117, 118, 120, 160–61 Sfi a¯lihfi Bey, 50, 52, 53

296

Salı¯m Pasha al-Sfi aghı¯r, 143, 144, 145–46 Salt works, 180 Sfi a¯nu¯r, 19–20, 33, 76, 93 Sfi aqr tribe, 31, 32 Sassouns family, 91 Schatkowski Schilcher, L., 72 Scribes, 156, 160, 162, 164, 165 Sea lanes, 11, 21, 226map Sea trade: for Acre and dependencies, 212table; for Beirut, 212table Secretaries, 160, 161, 162 Seraglio, 27 Sesame oil, 102 Shaykh (Druze title of rank), 61 Shaykh Kha¯lid, 182 al-Shiha¯b, H fi aydar Ahfimad, 49, 234n 12 Shiha¯b clan, 61–62, 67; see also Amı¯r Bashı¯r Shiha¯b Shu¯r, N., 8 Sidon, 20, 41 Silk, 4–5, 11, 12 Slaughterhouse, 180 Smith, Sidney, 247n173 Soap, 11, 12, 102, 180 Society and its structure: absence of distinct commercial and religious elites, 190; absence of guilds, 179, 190; absence of indigenous merchant class, 134, 181, 185; absence of Muslim elite, 180–81; commercial group’s vulnerability to whims of political strongmen, 185; deterioration of intercommunity relations, 182–83; elites enjoying enormous incomes, 190; European impact visible, 183–84; imitation of European dress, 183–84; immigrant basis, lack of family ties, weak structural coherence, 5, 181, 185, 190; informational sources meager, 178; international merchant families as urban elite, 180–81; religious men

INDEX

bringing first civilian attempt to participate in power, liquidation of H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı, 181–82, 185; rulers as strong vis-a`-vis weak society, 173– 76; townspeople as patient, submissive, humble, 175–76; see also Christians; Jews; Military affairs/armies; Occupations Sources: absence of local archives, 7; al-Rukaynı¯, 37; French consular correspondence, 7, 29; inaccuracy of population estimates, 22, 23; local eyewitness, contemporary histories, 6, 29, 30, 36–37; meagerness on society and its structure, 178; Ottoman archives, 7; primary, 6–7; regional historians, 6; secondary and scholarly literature, 7; tourists’ reports, 13; travel literature, 7, 55 Sufism, 182 Sulayma¯n Pasha al-‘A¯dil (“The Just”), biographical details (in chronological order): ruled 1806–1819; (1750?): birth in Caucasus, possibly Georgia, 78; (1785): appointed governor of Tripoli, 71; (1789): role in Mamluk rebellion against al-Jazza¯r, subsequent forgiveness, 60, 139, 144, 147; (1802): sent by al-Jazza¯r against Druze, 67; (1804): successful siege of Acre, 78; (1805): appointed governor of Sidon, speech to officials, earns sobriquet “The Just,” 78, 122, 123; (1806): successful siege of Jaffa, 79; (ca. 1806): establishing order in Jerusalem, 79; (ca. 1806): given control over sanjaks of Gaza, Jaffa, and Jerusalem, 79; (ca. 1806): pacifying and repopulating Jabal ‘A¯mil region, reassuring Metualis, 80; (1807): alliance with Tfi u¯qa¯n clan in Mount Nablus, 83–84; (1807): threat from British, 83;

INDEX

(1809–11): appointed governor of Damascus, ruling virtually all of Syrian region, 81–83, 124, 230map, 256n153; (1810–11): inflation of wheat prices due to monopoly, massive exports to British, peasant unrest, 83–84, 124, 127, 147; (1814): ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha named as successor, 86; (1816): insistence on exporting wheat in face of famine, 176; (1816): twice trustee for governor of Damascus, 82; (1817): balance of impotence in civil war in Nablus, 84; (1819): death Sulayma¯n Pasha al-‘A¯dil (“The Just”), overview: achieving high internal security, 15; administrative structures, 164–69; giving up control of Beirut, 20; improvements to Acre, 27; influencing Mount Lebanon affairs through alliances, 69; influencing Nablus affairs by diplomacy, 19–20; intimate knowledge of local politics, 79; local eyewitness histories of, 6; policies ensuring Acre as sole export port in Syrian coast, 85; refinements of monopolies, 123–28; road improvement attempts, 15; sense of moderation, deliberation, diplomacy, 79; wise reduction in military capacity and tax burden, reliance on negotiations and Mamluks, 128, 147– 53 Synagogue converted to mosque, 177 Syrian region (Bila¯d al-Sha¯m): consolidation of local centers of power, 16; as essential overland link to Egypt in imperial strategy, 9; fortresses and territory, 16–21; French trading groups (nations) in early 1700s, 96; highways and roads, 10– 16; sieges and invasions by Egypt,

297

16; see also Acre and its realm; Beirut; Damascus; Druze Tfi aha¯ al-Kurdı¯, 74 Tfi antfiu¯ra, 36 Tfi arbı¯hfia, 37 Tax collectors, 158 Teachers, 178 Tiberias: under Druze control, 29; Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar’s defense of, 35; Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar’s takeover of, 32 Tobacco, 12 Tourism, 13–14, 225map Trade. See Commerce Transportation issues. See Highways and roads Travel literature as historical source, 7, 55 Tripoli/Tripolis, 71, 82, 227map Troops. See Military affairs/armies Tfi u¯qa¯n clan, 76, 82 Tyre, 20, 65 ‘Ulama, 182, 183 ‘Uthma¯n al-‘Umar, 242n66 ‘Uthma¯n Pasha al-Kurjı¯, 39, 40 Verrayon, M., 105, 106 Veziers, 163 Volney, M, 52, 53, 57–58, 140 Wahhabis/Wahhabiyya sect, 10, 12, 74, 82, 184 Watchtowers, 15 Wazı¯r (title of rank), 90 Wheat: British demand for, 124, 125; exports from Acre, 1810–1826, 208– 9table, 209graph; exports, quarterly, from Acre, 1810–1826, 206–7table; export value, quarterly, from Acre, 1810–1826, 208graph; forward market (pre-harvest advance purchases) from village shaykhs, 99– 100, 114; highly profitable exports

298

Wheat (Continued ) to Britain, 1, 2, 4, 5, 125; local selling price set to avoid bread riots, 125; monopoly by Sulayma¯n Pasha causing shortages and peasant unrest, 83–84; prices in Acre, 1810– 1820, 210–11table, 211graph; production reduced in favor of cotton, 125; profits at 100 percent in 1730s, 100; sale to Malta and Greek islands, 125; subject to monopolies by rulers of Acre, 102, 113; trade as critical to Damascus, 72 Women, veiled in public, 183 Wood, 11, 12 Wool cloth from British, 4 Yu¯suf al-Qarda¯hfi ¯ı, 90, 120, 162 Yu¯suf al-Qassı¯s, 35, 101, 108, 118, 155 Yu¯suf Pasha, 77 Zfi a¯hir, al-‘Umar al-Zayda¯nı¯, biographical details (in chronological order): (1690): birth and family, 30–31, 101; (1707): brawl and killing as a teenager, 31; (1707): move to reside with Sfi aqr tribe, 31; (1713–18): schooling, hunting, fighting, becomes regional folk hero, 31; (1720s): gains respect as merchant, 12, 31, 117; (1722?): marries daughter of elite of Damascus, moves to Nazareth, inherits wife’s father’s fortune, 31–32, 101; (1725?): chosen by Sfi aqr tribe as representative to governor of Sidon, 32; (1730): challenging Nablus for control of Damascene trade routes, 33–34, 101, 228map; (1730): takeover, eventual fortification of Tiberias, 18, 32, 101; (1730s): expansion of realm in northeast and east Galilee, hire of mercenaries, and consolidation of control, 19, 32–33, 34, 101, 102, 117–

INDEX

18, 228map; pacification of Galilee and safety for travelers, 14; (1734): conflict with governors of Damascus, 34–35; (1735?): contesting French control of cotton trade, expanding power base, 101–2; (1738 and 1741): thwarting attacks on Tiberias, 34–35; (1739): decision to use rubble of Acre to build center of realm, 25, 170; (1739): takeover of Ba‘na by marriage to daughter of ruler, 33; (1740): execution of nephew, 35; (1740s): taking of Acre, 35–36, 102; (1743–57): peaceful standoff with Damascus, 36; (1744– 65): consolidation of power, monopolies of cotton exports, benign rule encouraging immigration, 38– 39, 110; (1750): fortification and rebuilding of Acre, 16, 19, 27, 36, 137– 38, 170; (1750s): policy of preventing contact between local farmers/ brokers and French, 102, 104–5; (1751): rebuilding walls of Acre, 104, 170; (1757): annexation of Haifa, Mount Carmel, and Tantura, 36, 228map; (1760s): clashes and alliance with Metualis, 36–38, 228map; (1766): defense of Haifa against governor of Damascus, 39– 40; (1767): de facto multazim of Jabal ‘A¯mil region, 36–38; (1768): given titles in recognition by Ottoman government, 36; (1770): continuing threat from ‘Uthma¯n Pasha, new fortification of Acre, reconciliation with sons, arming of male townspeople, 39–40, 137, 178; (1770s): alliance with ‘Alı¯ Bey alKabı¯r, 41–43; (1770–75): war with Damascus, Nablus, and Mamluk factions from Egypt, 20; (1771): taking of Sidon and Jaffa, 41–42, 228map; (1773): reconciliation be-

INDEX

tween Metualis, Druze, and Zfi a¯hir, 42; (1774): named governor (on decree lacking sultan’s signature), 42– 43; (1774): problems with sons, 18, 39, 43, 111, 154, 242n66; (1775): governorship evaporates, Egyptians take and plunder Jaffa, 43; (1775): Acre plundered by son ‘Alı¯, invaded by Egyptians, 43–44; (1775): Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh’s refusal of money to save Zfi a¯hir, 45, 48; (1775): betrayal and death in flight from Acre, 44–45, 111, 242n66; ruled 1730– 1771 Zfi a¯hir, al‘Umar al-Zayda¯nı¯, overview: clan-based administrative structures, 153–55, 158; contemporary

299

eyewitness sources for, 6, 30, 36–37; desirous of good relations with Damascus, 69–70; eagerness to maintain contact with, and pay taxes to, Istanbul, 46; independence yet readiness to challenge authority of Ottoman governors, 45; investment in peasants’ productivity, safety, as stimulant to immigration, 23, 110, 155; reliance on military support and presence, standing army, 136–38, 159; in special niche as merchant-turnedruler, founder of Acre as new center for export trade, 12, 117, 154, 188 Zayda¯nı¯ clan, 101, 137