Armed Forces, Soldiers and Civil-Military Relations

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Gerhard Kümmel · Giuseppe Caforio Christopher Dandeker (Eds.) Armed Forces, Soldiers and Civil-Military Relations

Schriftenreihe des Sozialwissenschaftlichen Instituts der Bundeswehr Band 7

Gerhard Kümmel · Giuseppe Caforio Christopher Dandeker (Eds.)

Armed Forces, Soldiers and Civil-Military Relations Essays in Honor of Jürgen Kuhlmann

Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de.

1st Edition 2009 All rights reserved © VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften | GWV Fachverlage GmbH, Wiesbaden 2009 Editorial Office: Katrin Emmerich | Tilmann Ziegenhain VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften is part of the specialist publishing group Springer Science+Business Media. www.vs-verlag.de

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Cover design: KünkelLopka Medienentwicklung, Heidelberg Printing and binding: Krips b.v., Meppel Printed on acid-free paper Printed in the Netherlands ISBN 978-3-531-16324-6

Table of Contents Giuseppe Caforio, Christopher Dandeker & Gerhard Kümmel Foreword ...............................................................................................

7

Siegfried Schneider Funeral Oration .....................................................................................

9

I

Soldiers and Armed Forces

Charles Kirke Seeing Through the Stereotype: British Army Culture – An Insider Anthropology ......................................................................

13

Maren Tomforde ‘My Pink Uniform Shows I am One of Them’: Socio-Cultural Dimensions of German Peacekeeping Missions ...........

37

Alejandra Navarro Looking for a New Identity in the Argentinean Army: The Image of the ‘Good Soldier’ ..........................................................

59

Karl Haltiner & Gerhard Kümmel The Hybrid Soldier: Identity Changes in the Military ..........................

75

Dimitrios Smokovitis New Roles for the Military: The Hellenic Armed Forces and the 2004 Olympic Games ...............................................................

83

Giuseppe Caforio Rhetorical Persuasion and Storytelling in the Military .........................

89

Karl Hegner New Methodological Approaches: Aspects of Online Questionnaires ......................................................................................

101

5

II

Civil-Military Relations

Marjan Maleši & Vinko Vegi The Public and the Military in Slovenia ...............................................

119

Henning Sørensen Increasing Military Influence in Danish Civil-Military Relations ........

141

Sabine Collmer To Go with the Flow? Change and Persistence in Patterns of Civil-Military Relations in Germany before and after the End of the Cold War ........................................................................

157

Paul Klein Conscription in Germany Today: A Military Necessity or a Mere Symbol? ................................................................................

179

Morten G. Ender, David E. Rohall & Michael D. Matthews Thinking Globally: U.S. Cadet and Civilian Undergraduate Attitudes toward Social Problems .........................................................

191

Franz Kernic Public Opinion and European Security .................................................

211

Carlos Navajas Zubeldia From the ‘War on Terror’ to the Terror of War: Spanish Defense Policy after 9/11 ........................................................

231

Vladimir Rukavishnikov Disillusionment and Hope: A Brief Reminiscence about Perceptions of the Russian-American Relationship in the Second Term of Putin’s Presidency ......................................................

245

Stephan E. Nikolov Borders: Which in Between Most of Our Lives Has Gone ...................

261

About the Authors .................................................................................

289

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Foreword It is an honor for us to introduce this collection of essays, which is dedicated to an old friend and colleague who is no longer with us. It is an honor, but also a pleasure because we feel like continuing a dialogue with Jürgen; one that has never broken down over the years, revisiting and recalling the different places and occasions where we met, discussed, collaborated and had fun. We, that is, Giuseppe Caforio, Christopher Dandeker and Gerhard Kümmel who have been friends and/or colleagues of and research collaborators with Jürgen and who represent three prominent institutions and organizations with which Jürgen worked, felt that this book is something we owe to Jürgen and we are grateful that many people who at different times and at different places had contact with Jürgen and his work were willing to contribute a chapter to this anthology. Most of Jürgen’s studies, professional work and research activities took place at the Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences (SOWI). Jürgen, born in 1938, had joined the Bundeswehr in 1957 and had already worked at the SOWI’s predecessor institution, the Scientific Institute for Education in the Armed Forces from 1971 onwards after having finished his university? studies. Since this institute was renamed SOWI in 1974, Jürgen belonged to the first generation of researchers that worked at the SOWI. He stayed there until January 1995, when he left the institute, which was in the midst of closing its Munich Headquarters to relocate to Strausberg near Berlin, in order to join the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in GarmischPartenkirchen. His reluctance to move with the SOWI was largely because of a feeling that he could not leave the Bavarian city to which he had become particularly devoted. Within the SOWI, his research interests focused on many things military, but especially on civil-military relations, the topic which reigned over his work. He co-/authored and co-/edited numerous and important international publications, among them some of the most significant cross-national studies of the past 20 years, and deserves the credit for having linked the SOWI to the principal international research institutions in a collaboration that is still enduring. Jürgen’s contribution to the European Research Group on Military and Society (ERGOMAS), for example, can be summed up by saying that he was one of the group’s originators and, along with a few others, its founder in the beautiful setting of the seaside resort of Le Lavandou, where, during two days of discussion and debate, ERGOMAS was created in 1986. Later, Jürgen became coordinator of an ERGOMAS working group. In the last years of his life Jürgen was an avid custodian of the figure and traditions of the group, even writing its history, a work that remained unfinished. 7

Jürgen also maintained strong affiliations with the Research Committee 01: Armed Forces & Conflict Resolution (RC 01) within the International Sociological Association (ISA). Here, he served as Executive Secretary for two consecutive terms (1986–90 and 1990–94). During his first term he organized RC 01’s sessions at the World Congress in New Delhi in 1986 and then took care of the publication of its proceedings in three volumes of SOWI-FORUM International (Vols. 5, 6 and 7). During the same term he organized an interim meeting of RC 01 in Munich (1988) the proceedings of which were later published by Jürgen in three volumes of the SOWI-FORUM International series (Vols. 8, 9 and 10). During his second term, he organized RC 01’s sessions at the 12th World Congress of Sociology in Madrid (1990), edited its proceedings along with Christopher Dandeker (SOWI-FORUM International, Vols. 12, 13 and 14), then organized RC 01’s first interim meeting in Latin America, in Valparaiso, Chile (1992) and, later on, edited the proceedings together with David Segal (SOWI-FORUM International 16). So Jürgen Kuhlmann is present in the history of – especially European – military sociology from every perspective one cares to adopt, and whoever comes to study the subject today cannot fail to come across his name and his work which will stay with us. However, beyond the data and the numbers, what mostly remains in the memories of those of us who knew him and worked with him is his amiable cordiality and humor, his easy-going seriousness, and devotion to completing projects, which allowed us, when working with him, not to feel the weight of the hours we passed around the worktable. More than anything, we have lost a friend and our sympathy is with his wife, Gisela, and his children, Sabine and Michael.

Giuseppe Caforio, Christopher Dandeker & Gerhard Kümmel Pisa – London – Neuenhagen 2007/2008

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Funeral Oration Dear Gisela Kuhlmann, dear Sabine and Michael, dear friends and colleagues, our meeting today is due to a very sad incident, because we have to say Good-bye to Jürgen. We were fundamentally shattered by the news of his death. It was a shock! His image emerged in front of us: energetic, vital, always in for a laugh – and all of this should be in the past? We knew that Jürgen had been seriously ill – he never made a secret of it; but we trusted in the capabilities of the doctors. Yet, this turned out different from what we had hoped for and our grief and sorrow are immense. Each of us has his/her own personal experiences and memories, and I want to share some of my memories with you – and some of you might know these memories. The first time I heard of Jürgen Kuhlmann was in Hamburg, some 50 years ago, sometime in early 1950 when a school kid of the prestigious ‘Christianeum’ High School reported of the school’s sports crack whose name was Jürgen Kuhlmann. The kid also told us that this Jürgen used to borrow the game ‘Monopoly’ from his sister, to play that game in the neighboring apartment for hours. Some 30 years later, Jürgen and me became colleagues in the Bundeswehr Institute for Social Research in Munich. Then, I myself became a witness of his sports qualities that had been praised 50 years ago. Jürgen’s physical actions led to a fracture of my ankle and to a fracture of some other colleague’s lower jaw. Well, we all were somewhat older and much less trained than Jürgen. What about Jürgen’s life? After finishing High School, Jürgen joined the Bundeswehr and became an officer. He spent interesting times in the air force which brought him, inter alia, even to Nigeria. There he physically and mentally survived a full-fledged revolution. Back in Germany, he was ordered to Munich to conduct his studies. He would have liked to study pharmacy, but his employer wanted him to study business management. The period of study had a very lasting effect on Jürgen. Terms like cost effectiveness became central categories in his thinking and acting. At the time of the currency change from the German Mark to the Euro, for example, he once went to a store where an anorak caught his attention. But 700 German Marks seemed much too expensive to him. His family then convinced Jürgen that this anorak was a good buy. Still, he was concerned about the price of 700 German Marks. Back at home, his dismay was huge, because there he realized that the price was 700 Euros instead of 700 German Marks. This definitely ran counter to his cost effectiveness thinking. Already in 1971, following his studies, Jürgen joined the Bundeswehr’s Scientific Institute for Education in the Armed Forces that later, in the mid9

1970s became the Bundeswehr Institute for Social Research. He only left it 24 years later, in January 1995. In the meantime, he had finished his military career as lieutenant colonel. The relocation of the SOWI – meant to be a “symbol of German unification” –, led him join the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen quite close to Munich. Here, Jürgen became the Director of the Research Department which he only left at the end of l997 when he retired. Within the scientific community Jürgen enjoyed a very good reputation. His numerous studies and publications – all more or less focussing on civilmilitary relations – found both national and international recognition. Due to both Jürgen’s understanding of business management as a social science and his in-depth knowledge of the military based on first-hand experience of his own as an once active soldier, his works met a high scientific standard. He was never afraid of scientific disputes, even very controversial ones, because, according to his view, conflict was the driver of social change where necessary. Besides his joy in free discourse, I think, that Jürgen’s strife for changing fossilized structures was another motif to engage in numerous scientific organizations. Whenever Jürgen had decided in favor of something, he did it with all his might. Thus, he was active in the European Research Group on Military and Society (ERGOMAS), in the ISA’s Research Committee 01 and in the Inter-University-Seminar on Armed Forces and Society (IUS) to name but a few. Jürgen also very much liked to teach. Both at the Bundeswehr University in Munich/Neubiberg and at the Munich and Augsburg universities of applied science he found a place to share his broad knowledge with the younger generations. So still today students of his very much praise his lectures on ‘Cost Effectiveness’ or ‘Basics of Business Management’. He was gifted to sketch complicated and difficult issues in such a way that it was easy for his students to follow him. His teaching skills enclosed the teaching of the competence to act. In particular, his seminars on ‘Teaching the Teachers’ were proof of this. The picture of Jürgen’s activities would be incomplete, if it did not entail his hobby. He was an enthusiastic angler, competent both on the East Sea and the lake at Wolfsratshausen. Once, a good catch in the East Sea filled him with such enthusiasm that he had to phone me in Brittany. In such cases, he was full of a joy that electrified those around him. When he could not stand the physical challenges of his fishing tours any longer, he found a new fisherman’s home in the Fishing Association Ammerland. When needed, Jürgen – though already ill – jumped in to bear responsibility. That was typical of him! Equally typical of him was another trait: He was able to laugh about himself and the mistakes he made. Once, for example, he felt asleep at the lake of 10

Wolfratshausen while fishing. When awaking, his fishing rod was missing. He saw it disappearing with a slight bow wave on the lake: A huge carp obviously was taking to his heels and Jürgen tried to catch him by boat, but his aim was the fishing rod, not the fish that had stolen the rod. When looking at Jürgen’s work, his amicable traits, we feel shattered since we know that we can no longer join him and communicate with him. That hurts! We miss him so much! We mourn for Jürgen with all of our hearts. This grief shall help us create room for the memory of Jürgen as he was: on course in his actions and full of humor. The man from Hamburg that he remained would have called that ‘dry’. Jürgen was no man to expressively show his feelings, but he also never denied them. He refrained from using the term ‘morale’, but he acted morally. He was a reliable and responsible man. Whenever he said ‘Yes’ or ‘No’, he meant exactly that – with all the consequences that might have been entailed. Yet, this never prevented him from critically evaluating his own actions. We can and we want to be thankful for what he has done and given to us!! Dear Gisela Kuhlmann, dear Sabine and Michael! The loss of your husband and your father is very hard for all three of you. 38 years – a very, very long time – you have been married to him and you could share your life with him. You, dear Sabine and Michael, have lost a father who very much cared of you and who was very proud of you. We feel with you in your pain and grief about your loss! We very much wish you, that, one day, you may have integrated your grief into your life in order to create room for memories. What will stay with you, as long as you live, dear Kuhlmann family, is the comforting certainty that Jürgen loved all of you. And this love, in your recalling, will leave its imprints in your future life.

Siegfried Schneider Munich, 30 January 2006

11

I

Soldiers and Armed Forces

Seeing Through the Stereotype: British Army Culture – An Insider Anthropology Charles Kirke 1

Introduction

The scene could be at any one of many informal gatherings in recent years. There are people standing and sitting, chatting and drinking, and conversation is flowing happily. When one of those present is asked what ‘he does’ he replies that he is in the Army. “What rank are you?” – “Lieutenant Colonel.” Waggishly, the other speaker (who has never been near the Army in his life) replies, “Oh, I must watch my step then!”, and draws himself up rather awkwardly into what he imagines to be a military pose, grins clownishly and raises a hand in a mock salute. 1 On the same evening a television programme unfolds. It is a story of every-day life in a military unit. A lieutenant and his company sergeant major are conversing in loud voices. Private Smith, one of the chief characters in the drama, is standing on guard duty about fifteen feet away. “Sergeant Major, I can’t do anything to stop Private Smith being courtmartialled. It’s what the Major wants and that’s that.” – “But you know what they’ll do to him Sir? He was only late for parade the once.” – “Yes, but that was the chance that the Major was waiting for. You know how things are between them. And anyway, who knows – two weeks in the glass-house may do him good.” 2 1 2

This sort of incident is remarkably common at informal gatherings, in the experience of the author, who retired from the Army in the rank of lieutenant colonel. This incident from an entirely imaginary TV drama contains a number of serious misunderstandings about life in a military unit, yet the ideas in this scene have appeared in many such dramas; e.g.: It is highly inappropriate to talk in the open about such a disciplinary matter affecting a soldier, and this sort of exchange would be held ‘in confidence’ in private and in nobody’s hearing; it is not up to a major to decide that an individual is to be court martialed: that is a decision for the Commanding Officer (a lieutenant colonel) after due process of summary jurisdiction; officers are not referred to by their rank alone, but by their rank and name or by their role, or by a nickname or circumlocution depending on context. The term ‘Glass House’ refers to the Military Corrective Training Center at Colchester to which only serious military offenders are sent, and never for such a short period as two weeks; a Court Martial would not deal with an offence that only merited two weeks detention – it is for much more serious offences; being late for parade would certainly be dealt with at a very low level in the disciplinary system and no Court Martial could possibly be involved; and so on.

13

Somewhere on another channel, a correspondent is tracking the course of a military operation, extolling the professionalism of the British soldiers involved, noting that fire support is being given by the “big guns of the Royal Artillery Regiment”. 3 And at every event any soldiers watching cringe with embarrassment or irritation. Media portrayals in the United Kingdom of the British Army contain some recurring themes, some of which we have just visited. ‘Discipline’ in its most formal sense is one such theme – spit and polish, shouted orders, the stamping of feet, and an assumption that military training is harsh and oppressive. ‘Professionalism’ is another theme – victory in battle, military skill, and self-control. Another is class-division, with an imbalance of privilege at the top and hard work and graft at the bottom. Yet another is a bias against innovation and change arising from the privileging of history and tradition. As an example of the presence of these recurring themes, in a threemonth sample of broadsheet newspapers taken between 11 January and 12 April 2005 there were 243 separate articles involving the British Army. Of these, 122 dealt with violent misbehavior of soldiers, 58 were about the Army’s professionalism and the courage of individual soldiers, 53 portrayed the Army as institutionally harsh and oppressive (including adverse comments on recruit training, Courts Martial, and the treatment of minorities), six dealt with the importance for the Army of its history and traditions, and four suggested that it is affected by issues of class and privilege. 4 The overall impression given by these reports is of an institution that is impersonal, conservative and repressive, yet somehow manages to fulfill its purpose. It seems that these themes have entered the public consciousness to a remarkable extent, amounting to generally accepted (if sometimes mutually contradictory) stereotypes. It is the opinion of this author who, as a social anthropologist and soldier, has researched the British Army formally for over ten years and informally over the previous twenty years, that these stereotypes are misleading, simplistic, and sometimes a cause of great irritation (and even distress) to the people in the institution. This chapter seeks to see beyond the stereotypes to give insight into the real life that exists in military units. It offers a sociological model with which to describe, analyze and explain the behavior, assumptions and expectations of British soldiers and thus throw light on the real processes and interactions which are part of their daily lives in the organizational culture of the unit. This model offers a path to understanding how life is experienced within the 3 4

14

The artillery is known as either ‘The Royal Artillery’ or, more formally, ‘The Royal Regiment of Artillery’, but never the ‘Royal Artillery Regiment’. The newspapers were The Times, The Independent, The Guardian, The Financial Times, The Sunday Telegraph, The Sunday Times, and The Observer.

Army for those who have never been in the Services. In an outline of the model, and in the case studies which follow, we shall see the face of the British Army that the stereotypes obscure; a robust, flexible, stimulating social system embedded in an organizational culture that is supportive, coherent, and engaging. The author is one of only three individuals so far who have sought to apply the discipline of Social Anthropology to the British Army, the others being Paul Killworth (1997, 1998) and Anthony King (2006, 2007). John Hockey’s Squaddies (1986) and Thomas Thornborrow’s doctoral thesis (2005) provide a complementary small-scale qualitative sociological perspective on the British Military. Only two others, both military sociologists, have attempted to produce a model of life in that Army, Nora Stewart (1991) and Reginald von Zugbach (1988). The first version of the author’s model was generated during a British Army Staff College project in 1981, an edited version of which was subsequently published (Kirke 1988). A more refined version subsequently appeared in his paper in Hew Strachan’s The British Army, Manpower and Society into the Twenty-First Century (2000), and a full version in the author’s doctoral thesis (2002). This chapter will outline the model and demonstrate, by means of a small number of case studies, how it can be used to describe, analyze and explain British soldiers’ behavior. Although the author was a member of the British Army for 36 years, it should be understood that the ideas expressed in this chapter do not necessarily reflect official opinion or thought.

2

Theoretical Background

The author is one of a small but growing number of military anthropologists. Military Anthropology is a sub-area of Social Anthropology 5 which, in essence, is a social science centering on the study of small scale human groups of a few hundred people 6 (as opposed to the larger societies that are the tradi-

5

6

Like all academic disciplines, Social Anthropology as it is today is a child of its history. Useful summaries of the various stages in the development of social anthropological theory up to the early 1960s are given by Beattie 1966 and Mair 1965. Ortner 1984, takes the story up to the mid-1980s and Grimshaw/Hart 1993 provide a more recent complementary, if politically informed review which is a useful counterbalance to the essentially colonially based establishment stance of Mair and Beattie. This interest in ‘small scale’ human groups is fundamental to Social Anthropology. See, for example, Beattie 1966: 40 and Mair 1965: 7.

15

tional area covered by Sociology 7 ). Military units are exactly this size, and are therefore suitable subjects for the application of social anthropological techniques. Depending on their operational role, for example, infantry battalions are between six and seven hundred strong, artillery regiments 8 are between four and six hundred, and armoured regiments are around five hundred. The enabling research for this chapter was carried out in the British Army between 1974 and 2003, but most intensively between 1993 and 2003, involving participant observation, interviews (including 135 one-to-one interviews and a smaller number of group sessions), and a literature research. It was carried out in what has been conventionally called the ‘combat arms’ 9 of the British Army (the Household Cavalry and Royal Armoured Corps, Royal Artillery, Royal Engineers, Royal Signals, Army Air Corps, and Infantry), with a lesser amount of data collected from members of the other corps. Following good social anthropological practice, therefore, it should be said that any application of this research outside the combat arms units of the British Army would be speculative. Nevertheless, it does seem likely from anecdotal evidence and from informal contacts with members of other armies that the basic principles identified during the research may be applicable well beyond British Army combat arms units. This research falls into the growing category of ‘insider anthropology’ (Cerroni-Long 1995; Collins 2002; Forsythe 2001; Labaree 2002; Maina 2003), as the researcher and the subjects of his research were all part of the same institution, the British Army. Such work may violate the tenets of traditional anthropology, in that the researcher may be too close to the target culture and lack any form of ‘stranger value’ (Beattie 1966: 87; Fox 2004: 3), contaminating his/her results with existing cultural bias, but there are balancing advantages in that access to the field is much easier for the insider and (s)he already understands cultural nuances (such as language and jargon) that might pass an outsider by. Suffice it to say that in this insider study the author 7

8

9

16

The nature of Sociology as the social science that focuses particularly on ‘advanced’ or modern societies is defined, inter alia, by Giddens 1984: xvif., 2001: 699. See also Lewis 1999: 74. The use of the word ‘regiment’ in British military parlance can be confusing to outsiders. In some cases it means a formed unit commanded by a lieutenant colonel (equivalent to an infantry battalion), and in others it means the wider entity to which all soldiers wearing the same cap-badge belong (equivalent to the infantry ‘Regiment’ or ‘Royal Corps of Signals’ or ‘Corps of Royal Engineers’). In this chapter, the lower organizational level will start with a lower case ‘r’, while the larger entity will start with an initial capital. Thus, the Royal Anglian Regiment has three regular battalions, the Royal Corps of Signals has a number of regiments, and the Royal Regiment of Artillery has a number of regiments. In this context, the ‘combat arms’ are those elements in the army that train to face the enemy in formed units in the contact zone in conventional war.

found it necessary to be highly disciplined in creating routines for collecting and commenting upon data to remove as much of the cultural bias as possible but, by the same token, he was able to achieve a result that has been embraced by fellow-insiders as an effective portrayal of their lives. The main outcome was the characterization of a social model of unit life, built upon the experience of members of the British Army, which can be used to describe, analyze, explain (and in certain circumstances predict) the behavior of British soldiers in the unit environment. The term ‘soldier’ as used in this chapter refers to any member of a military unit regardless of rank (thus private soldiers, non-commissioned officers [NCOs], warrant officers and commissioned officers are all ‘soldiers’ here). Modelling in Social Anthropology was first addressed as a particular topic in the 1960s in the first of a series of publications of the Association of Social Anthropologists of the (British) Commonwealth (‘The ASA’) (see Banton 1965), and has been an accepted social anthropological practice for some time. The word ‘model’ can be used to cover a spectrum of possible meanings, from a simple analogy such as the now discredited ‘biological’ or ‘organic’ metaphor, which likened a society to an organism with an internal structure and a set of processes that were all in balance – the concept of ‘homeostasis’ in biology (see, for example, Beattie 1966: 40–50) – to complex mathematical devices such as the Integrated Personnel Modelling Environment (IPME) used in UK and Canadian defense research. The precise meaning ascribed to the term ‘model’ is therefore contingent on the use to which it is being put. For example, Giddens/Turner (1987: 164) use the term to mean “theorizing in which concepts and their relations are presented as a visual picture that maps properties of the social universe and their interrelations”. For Loomba a model is “a particular representation of a system, which, in turn, represents specified aspects of reality”, and the purpose of a model is “to describe, explain, and predict the behavior of a system” (Loomba 1978: 39, original emphases). Chapman says that “models are heuristic devices – essential aids in the process of analysis. The fact that subsequent researchers prove them to be faulty doesn’t [sic!] matter. What is important is that they provide us with first approximations which we can test and out of which we can build theories which have more powerful explanatory value.” (Chapman 1967: 32, original emphases) Throughout our consideration of what constitutes a valid and useful model, it is probably best to keep in mind Wilson’s remark that “models (of any kind) are not descriptions of the real world [;] they are descriptions of ways of thinking about the real world” (Wilson 2001: 4, original emphases). For our purposes here, a social ‘model’ will be taken to mean a device that can be used to describe, analyze, explain, and in certain circumstances predict, the behavior of human beings. 17

The basic epistemological construct underlying the model in this chapter is the conventional sociological and social anthropological one of ‘social structure’, but used in a novel way. The concept has traditionally been used to propose that societies make some sort of sense as an entity larger than the sum of its parts (the members of the human group), an approach pioneered by Durkheim (1938) and much used by the British Structural-Functionalist School of Social Anthropology (see Beattie 1966; Kuper 1977; Mair 1965). Instead of that approach, it is used here to represent the shared bodies of ideas, rules and conventions of behavior which inform groups of people or individuals how to organize and conduct themselves vis-á-vis each other. Rather than ‘social structure’ as a reified monolithic entity, the concept used here of ‘social structures’ thus seeks to capture the mental models that are the indispensable background to, and structuring framework for, daily life. Furthermore, the concept of ‘social structures’ is not presented as an exact description of any social or psychological phenomenon, but rather a model of the way that individuals and groups inform their behavior. Far from being a reified entity, ‘social structures’ as used here is an ethnographer’s concept – a tool with which to describe, analyze, explain and predict behavior. Before we approach the particular usage of social structure in this chapter, it is as well to note that ideas about social structure, in any form, have come under sustained attack over the past twenty years. An influential leader in the field has been Giddens (1984: 1–40, 163f.), for whom the legitimate analytical frameworks are the individual agent and the processes of everyday life, rather than a concept of ‘society’. Conceptually, these considerations of agency and process liberate the social scientist from any idea that the members of a human group are pawns compelled by the overarching pressures of ‘society’. They could always “have acted otherwise” (Giddens 1976: 75). Similarly, there are those who point out that ideas of ‘social structure’ imply that a human group’s culture is static and that the concept is incapable of taking account of change (Asad 1979). Those who stress the independence of the individual from ‘society’ seem currently to be in the ascendant, but this is not necessarily the end of the debate (Loyal/Barnes 2001). It is undeniable as far as the present author is concerned that there are frameworks of stated and unstated rules that inform people’s behavior, and that these look very like the pressures depicted by Durkheim in his concept of society. On the other hand, it is also undeniable that nobody is a slave to such frameworks of rules, and thus that individuals can choose how much attention to pay to them. This chapter therefore treats ‘social structure’ as a conceptual framework, not an empirical entity, to be invoked only when there is advantage in doing so. It is treated as a way of modelling the background to, and frame18

work for, daily life, but makes no pretence that the situation that is being modelled is static or permanent. This framework consists of attitudes, assumptions and conventions of behavior that inform individuals how they are expected by fellow-members of their social group to behave under any particular circumstances. Rather than being enslaved or compelled by this background and framework, each individual goes his or her own way through their lives, exercising agency while using social structure as a reference. A useful conceptual illustration of this process is that of a walker using a map. The map (which is a model of real terrain) can be likened to ‘social structure’, capturing as it does the main features of the terrain over which the walker intends to go. Some of the terrain will be shown on the map as open and full of options, whilst other parts may be rugged with only a few navigable paths through them. Some will be highly dangerous. The walker can be likened to the agent, free to make his or her own choice of routes on the map or even to disregard the map entirely. The act of walking can be likened to the agent’s progress through his or her daily life. In making that progress, therefore, the agent navigates as he or she chooses through the social terrain depicted as ‘social structure’. In essence, therefore, any model of ‘social structure’ in this chapter seeks to capture the social terrain over and through the individuals that exercise their agency. ‘Social structure’ is an appropriate model for the British military context because (as in probably most other military environments) frameworks of rules are important for individuals. Most soldiers know what the formal rules are, and have no wish to court trouble by deliberately opposing them, and, living and working together as they do in small groups, they wish to ‘fit in’ with fellow-members by observing the informal ones (following the social conventions). However, it is as well to remember that on occasions soldiers show a sufficiently independent streak to bend or break them from time to time (exercising agency) in the same way as the walker we considered above might decide to take an unmarked or risky route. The initial attempt to capture the ‘social structure’ of a military unit, to help understand and analyze the soldiers’ behavior, was bedevilled by the fact that observed behavior was so varied. Take this simple case, for example: four soldiers (a junior NCO and three private soldiers) are taking a break from working on the routine maintenance of a military vehicle. They are standing not far from the vehicle, smoking and chatting, hunching their shoulders in the chilly March air. There is an air of good-humored equality in their interaction, which revolves around the question of who last shared out his cigarettes. A commissioned officer comes into view, heading towards the group. When he is about 20 yards away, the NCO calls out in a loud voice, “Stand up!”. He and the other three stand to attention, their jollity abandoned, 19

their conversation stopped, and he salutes. The officer returns the salute, calls out in a firm voice “Carry on please!”, and the four men return immediately to their former postures and conversation. The officer goes on his way. A minute or so later the four men stub out their cigarettes at the end of their break and return to their vehicle. The atmosphere between them changes subtly from jovial informality to one of business-like activity with the NCO allocating tasks. There are obvious patterns in behavior like this, but can they be categorized into a single ‘social structure’? In the light of such variance of behavior, the search for a means of modelling a single ‘social structure’ was abandoned. No behavior pattern or system seemed to be stable throughout the day. The solution was to model, not a single ‘social structure’, but a plurality of ‘social structures’, each of them being a separate body of shared ideas, rules, and conventions of behavior. These ‘social structures’ are resources which members of the group, collectively or individually, have as guides to show them how they are expected to organize and conduct themselves vis-à-vis each other. A strong link was observed between the primacy of any particular social structure and the context in which it appeared to operate. The inquiry changed at that stage from trying to observe and catalogue different behaviors to noting and identifying different contexts, and relating observed behavior to the typology of contexts produced. A coherent and straightforward pattern emerged relatively quickly. It then became apparent that behavior which appeared to be highly varied and contingent in isolation could be understood against this pattern of comparatively few separate groupings of contexts, each grouping with its own body of ideas, rules, conventions, and organizing principles: in other words with its own ‘social structure’. 10

3

The Model

Before the model can be presented here, we need briefly to visit the language in which it is framed. As Wilson (Wilson 1990: xv) has pointed out, there is a range of options open to the model-builder which covers a considerable spectrum “from the well defined (hard) problems, in which the modelling language may be mathematically oriented, to soft, ill structured problems in which a modelling language is required which is capable of a richer description of the real world than mathematics can provide”. 10 This approach need not necessarily be confined to the British Army. Preliminary study of other organizations has indicated that an approach via the concept of ‘social structures’ may have wider applications.

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We are clearly dealing here with the softer, ‘ill structured’ end of the range of modelling problems, because of the complexities and rich variety of human social interaction. A textual rather than mathematical presentation is required. The choice of language in the model is therefore no trivial matter, and is a profound element in its shape and utility. The language used in this model is as close to natural English as possible, to avoid neologisms and tortuous non-intuitive phrases. However, if near-natural language is to be used then there has to be some distinction between the specific terms in the model and the use of the same words in normal text. Accordingly all special terms for this model are printed in italics. The top level of the model is a characterization of four ‘social structures’, as described above, each linked to a family of contexts identified during the fieldwork. This set of four fits the case of all the combat arms units researched, and can reasonably be supposed to extend to all combat arms units in the British Army. These four social structures were named the formal command structure, the informal structure, the functional structure, and the loyalty/identity structure, each of which represents a discrete, separable, shared body of ideas, rules and conventions of behavior which affect daily conduct and the organizing principles of daily life. They are summarized in the following paragraphs, with a list of sample keywords for each one. These keywords have resonance for the insider and can act as a resource for the outsider to make some form of empathic contact with the military organizational culture that is being modelled. The formal command structure is the structure through which a soldier at the bottom receives orders from the person at the top. It is embedded in and expressed by the hierarchy of rank and the formal arrangement of the unit into layer upon layer of organizational elements. It contains the mechanisms for the enforcement of discipline, for summary jurisdiction, the downward issue of orders and instructions and for the upward issue of reports, and it provides the framework for official responsibility. It is supported by a substantial corpus of formally published literature with the force of law, which takes its legitimacy from the Army Act and is expressed in the Manual of Military Law (MOD 2001), and it includes further literature on how the body is to be held, moved, and controlled in formal situations (MOD 1990). It also has within it a precise definition of the position and role of each member of the unit in the form of the ‘Unit Establishment’ and the unit nominal rolls. For many outsiders, this social structure seems to be the public face of the Army, containing as it does the raw materials for many of the stereotypical elements and media representations discussed above. It is as if the public’s perception of the Army is of a life spent permanently on parade or in summary jurisdiction. Real life is far from this stereotype, as will become clear 21

from the descriptions of the other three social structures which follow. Keywords for this social structure include: bull, drill, orders, obedience, salute, punishment, shout, stiff, parade. The informal structure consists in unwritten conventions of behavior in the absence of formal constraints, including behavior off-duty and in relaxed duty contexts. In contrast to the formal command structure, there is warmth and friendly cooperation, and the constraints of discipline are in the background. An ethnographic account of this social structure would be long and complex, as there is room for much more contingency and shades of meaning when researching behavior. 11 An important element in this structure is the web of informal relationships within the unit, which we will examine later. Individuals come into personal contact with other people within the unit, of any rank, and establish inter-personal relationships with them. Although it might appear at first sight that the quality and intensity of such relationships are determined by free choice on the part of the individual (because they are informal), the network of a soldier’s informal relationships is for the most part constrained by his rank and position in the unit. Keywords for the informal structure include: friend, mate, mucker, chat, banter, relax, smoke, share, drink, confide, food, time off. The loyalty/identity structure represents the concept of ‘belonging’ to groups and organizations within the overall military structure. Because of the organizational structure of a unit an individual soldier belongs to several groups simultaneously, but (s)he only exercises membership of one at any particular instant. For example, a particular private soldier in an infantry battalion belongs simultaneously to the lowest organizational segment, the ‘fire team’, to the ‘section’ to which that fire team belongs, to the ‘platoon’ to which that section belongs, to the ‘company’ to which that platoon belongs, and to the battalion to which that company belongs. Further segments are brought in at each level (there are two fire teams in a section, three sections in a rifle platoon, three rifle platoons to a company, and between three and five companies to a battalion, depending on role). This social structure thus provides a nesting series of different sized groups which are defined by opposition to and contrast with other groups of equal status delineated in the formal organizational unit structure. Thus an infantry soldier would express his identity as a member of his platoon and feel loyalty to it in competition with other platoons of the same company. However, where his company is in competition with other companies, these attitudes and feelings would be transferred to the company, rather than the platoon, and this process is continued up to levels beyond the unit (and down to those below the platoon).

11 I have attempted such an account in Kirke 2002: 95–141.

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The social structure itself, the ‘body of ideas, rules and conventions of behavior’, consists in the attitudes, feelings and expectations of soldiers towards these groups and their membership. These attitudes and feelings can be effectively captured in the concept that ‘we are the best’, at whatever organizational level the ‘we’ is placed. There are clues to the nature of this social structure in all units, in such things like the labeling of rooms, color coding of accommodation, the flying of flags, and details of uniform. This is a highly flexible and adaptable framework that can adjust very quickly to any organizational level, but there are two levels which deserve special attention. First, in the absence of comparison or competition, most soldiers will identify with the organizational level which is encoded on their cap-badge (the Regimental or Corps level), which is designated in the model the ‘residual focus of loyalty/identity’. Second, for the members of each Regiment or Corps there is a level at which feelings run particularly high, the ‘loyalty/identity hot spot’, which, it is to be noted, varies between Regiments or Corps. For example, in the infantry this level is the battalion, whereas for the Royal Artillery it is the battery (sub unit). Keywords for the loyalty/identity structure include: belonging, ‘the best’, ‘we/us’, our team, battle-honors, badges, cap-badge. The fourth social structure is the functional structure. This consists of attitudes, feelings and expectations connected with being ‘soldierly’ and properly carrying out ‘soldierly’ activity. What soldiers see as ‘soldierly’ ranges from the obvious, such things as weapon handling, fieldcraft, and the driving of military vehicles both on and off roads, to the less obvious but nonetheless ‘soldierly’. Such less obvious soldierly activities include, for example, lighting a cigarette or a cooking fire in high winds and heavy rain, keeping one’s kit dry in the field, cooking military rations with a palatable result, and holding one’s liquor on a night out. Where groups are formed to carry out ‘soldierly’ activity, they might exactly reflect the formal command structure (which provides an easy and quick means of creating any group within a unit) or they might be independent of it. For example, an infantry platoon (a basic element in the infantry command structure) tends to carry out military functions on exercise and operations as a formed body, whereas a ‘fatigue’ party carrying out mundane laboring tasks might well be an ad hoc group which exists only for the duration of the task. Similarly, while the rest of the unit is away (perhaps on leave or on an operational tour of duty) an ad hoc functional group called a ‘rear party’ is formed to maintain and secure the barracks. This group is typically made up of soldiers from all over the unit. Keywords for the functional structure include: ‘doing the business’, ‘getting

23

stuck in’, musketry, military skills, kit, tabbing, guts, ‘go for it’, going without sleep, ‘career courses’. 12 So far we have considered the social structures in isolation. How does a member of a unit manage to assign his/her behavior to the appropriate social structure when there are four of them? In practice, it seems that an individual only operates in a single social structure at any one instant, although he or she may transit from one social structure to another (sometimes very rapidly). Take, for example, the vignette above in which the officer walked past a group of soldiers who were taking a break. At the start of the account, the men were taking a ‘smoke break’ relaxing and chatting (informal structure), then they stood to attention acknowledging the passage of the officer past them (formal command structure), and then they resumed their break (informal structure). When their break was over they resumed their task on the vehicle (functional structure). This need for the model to account for the rapid transition between social structures is answered by the term operating structure, a term to delineate the social structure of the moment. In this case, therefore, the sequence of operating structure for the four men was informal, formal command, informal, functional. In a nutshell, distinct sets of behavior are appropriate to each of the social structures, and an individual or group can only operate in one social structure at any one time (the operating structure), but rapid switching between social structures is possible. This brings us to the question of balance between the social structures. An initial hypothesis was that an even balance of social structures would be the best situation for any unit, but further research showed that each unit has its own particular ‘appropriate’ balance for a particular context and time. For example, in some units at the time of the research there was a feeling that operational function deserved more attention than formal parades, whilst for others the opposite was true. Similarly, some spent more effort on celebrating their identity than on the enforcement of formal discipline and the smart appearance of their dress. The permutations provided by the realization in detail of the conventions modelled in the social structures are sufficiently numerous to provide each unit with a unique assemblage of attitudes and expectations and a unique balance. Although there is scope for any unit to have any particular balance, extreme imbalance is very seldom encountered: the distinctions which are the ingredients of an appropriate balance are fine and subtle. Indeed, it was found during the research that if the members of the unit are encouraged to put a 12 Career courses’ are usually technical employment training without which an individual cannot be promoted. They are normally closely related to the military task that the individual will be undertaking once promoted.

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particular social structure before all else then their military life becomes impoverished in some way. For example, if the functional structure is permanently dominant, the soldiers would be limited in their ability to exercise the identity of the different organizational levels to which they belong or to enjoy informal social interaction. If permanent dominance is given to the informal structure, their ability to function as soldiers would suffer. If the loyalty/ identity structure is supreme, then they would conceive that anything they did, they did ‘better’ than anybody else and that the preservation of the unit was the only thing that mattered, and so on. A further refinement of the model was a characterization of the range of social relationships encountered in the informal structure. At first sight, it might be deduced that informal relationships are a matter of free choice as they are not subject to formal rules. However, it was found that there is an observable and generally accepted set of conventions about the forming of such relationships that is seldom broken, and that different relationships had embedded in them different assumptions of ‘appropriate’ behavior. These can be modelled by breaking down the range of informal relationships into five categories. The first is termed ‘close friendship’. Close friendship consists in a durable relationship that transcends the military environment, can cross all ranges of rank, where there is a large measure of trust and respect between the parties, and there are few barriers to discussion of highly personal matters. In interviews with male soldiers of all ranks it was established that, for virtually every one, a useful test to identify close friendship would be to determine whether the relationship would survive unchanged if one of the parties was prepared to shed tears in the presence of the other. It is a rare and special relationship. In the words of a warrant officer: “I’ve maybe made only two or three close friends in my career, though I’ve had plenty of military friends.” This rarity is an important feature. It is sufficient to recognize the existence of the relationship, but we must also acknowledge that it is so scarce that it is not a regular feature of regimental life for many individuals. The second is ‘friendship’. This term is used specifically in the model to refer to a less intense relationship which is frequently found to exist between soldiers within the informal structure. It can have all the appearances of close friendship, in that individuals constantly seek each other’s company, will help each other if they are in trouble, and will be prepared to share almost anything if the need arises, but it falls short of the depth and intensity of the other relationship. Thus, during an interview one soldier said of his particular circle of mates that he would be more than prepared to help any one of them: if a mate was feeling unhappy, then his friends would naturally take him out drinking to cheer him up. However, if the same mate wanted to discuss 25

deeply personal matters, then he ‘would not want to know!’ Bonds of friendship are usually formed within narrow bands of rank. Although there are no formally stated regulations which proscribe friendships growing up between people of widely diverse rank, such relationships are frowned upon because they are held to be potentially compromising for discipline. There is no intuitive descriptor for the third in this typology of informal relationships, which consists in a close informal relationship across a significant rank gap. It is often found that two soldiers separated by rank distance wide enough to exclude friendship between them will come into regular contact and will form an informal bond of mutual trust and respect that falls short of friendship as defined above, but is nevertheless an important bonding feature. Such a relationship will probably arise, for example, between an engineer troop commander and his troop staff sergeant, a gun commander and his detachment, an adjutant and his or her chief clerk or between an artillery battery sergeant major and his or her battery commander. This relationship was given the name ‘association’ in the study. Next is ‘informal access’. It is recognized, though not officially laid down, that each individual has a right to speak informally and without a formal appointment with certain other people who are at a certain degree of structural distance (superiors in his chain of command for instance), even though a link of association does not exist between them. Thus a junior officer can expect to be able to have informal access to his sub-unit commander from first meeting, as a private soldier can to his platoon or troop commander. Similarly, any member of a Sergeants’ Mess can expect to have opportunities to approach the Regimental Sergeant Major informally. Finally, there is the most distant relationship between fellow-members of the unit. The term ‘nodding acquaintance’ encompasses all the informal relationships which are more distant than those encompassed by the other terms. In essence, it is a relationship where the parties know each other by sight, but not necessarily by name, and they acknowledge each other’s existence and common participation in the same segment of the formal command structure. The relationship may remain as it is, or it may grow into any one of the others listed above. It has no rank component. These five relationships can be depicted in a diagram as follows:

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Figure 1: Typology of Informal Relationships

Senior

Close Friendship

Nodding Acquaintance

Association

Informal Access

Relative Seniority EGO

Friendship

Assocation

Informal Access

Junior

Close

Closeness of Relationship

Distant

Note: EGO is middle-ranking.

In this diagram, ‘EGO’ is an individual of no particular rank, who has superiors and subordinates. He or she might be, for example, a sergeant or a lieutenant. This case was chosen because it illustrates relationships with peers, subordinates, and superiors. For someone at the bottom of the rank structure (a private soldier) the diagram would be redrawn to show only peers and superiors, thus:

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Figure 2: Typology of Informal Relationships

Senior

Nodding Acquaintance

Close Friendship

Association

Relative Seniority

Informal Access

EGO Close

Closeness of Relationship

Distant

Note: EGO is junior.

In reading these diagrams it is important to note that the boxes show the areas (relative rank/closeness) where relationships are expected to fall, but the gaps are voids to separate the boxes for clarity. An important variable is the strength of the relationship. This is captured in the model by the horizontal dimension of each box: on the principle that a line is an infinite number of points, each horizontal line represents the variety of possible degrees of warmth or intensity in the relationship. It should be noted that this model does not seek to capture romantic or sexual relationships. This is a separate area which deserves further study.

4

Case Studies

The model as described so far is clearly an abstraction, and may appear sterile and analytical in isolation. The purpose of the following case studies is to connect the model to samples of real life within the Army. Each case study shows a sequence of events and contains examples of real-life spontaneous behavior and interaction. The events are described first in each instance and 28

then the model is applied to analyze and explain the processes and interactions that are taking place. 4.1

Red Carpet Treatment

In an artillery regiment, there was a general feeling among the soldiers that their regiment was the most proficient in the Royal Artillery, that it was highly cohesive, and had good ‘regimental spirit’. It would brook no rivals. Within the unit, however, there was fierce competition and rivalry between the sub-units (batteries), which was often expressed in terms of their ‘battery color. One much admired Battery Commander of the battery whose color was red, for example, used to go on exercise wearing a red knitted hat, red socks, and red gloves, and had a large red pennant on one of his radio aerials. The soldiers’ nickname for him, ‘King Red’, was entirely appropriate. The battery accommodation and working areas had red paint wherever it was feasible, and red soft furnishings. The rivalry between the batteries was fiercest in the Warrant Officers’ and Sergeants’ Mess and was expressed throughout the regiment in many ways, both in competition for technical excellence at gunnery and in the informal areas of everyday life such as informal gatherings and sports fixtures. The other three batteries had, variously, blue, green and black as their colors. Eventually, one of the junior warrant officers in the red battery was selected to be the Battery Sergeant Major of the blue battery. He had spent his entire adult career in the red battery, and some of the officers were concerned that he might not make the change well. For over fifteen years he had been seen to trumpet the glories of the red battery at the expense, as often as not, of the blue, and people were worried how he would weather the paradigm change from red to blue. Matters came to a head shortly after he had taken up his new position. He appeared at the office of the Battery Sergeant Major of the red battery and asked humbly for a piece of red carpet for his office. It was instantly assumed that he wanted a small piece of ‘home’ for his new surroundings. However, when he was asked why he wanted it, he said, in a loud voice for all to hear that he “wanted a piece of red carpet so he could wipe his boots on it every morning!”. This was greeted as a splendid joke and he went on his way smiling. How come that he had had such a dramatic change of heart? This incident and its antecedents can be explained by using the model, and particularly the behavior modelled in the loyalty/identity structure. For example, the general faith in the excellence of the unit (the regiment) chimes nicely with the ideas of being ‘the best’ captured in the model of the loyalty/ identity structure, as does the rivalry and competition between the sub-units 29

(the batteries). The fact that individuals would find themselves both rivals (in intra-unit contexts) and close allies (in inter-unit contexts) need not surprise us once the loyalty/identity structure is understood. In the same way, the use of the color red by the red battery was a strong expression of, and focus for, identity. The sudden switch of what seemed to be ingrained loyalty and identity in the promoted warrant officer would seem somewhat unexpected on an individual level, but is easily understood with reference to the model: the blue battery was now the right focus for his loyalty and a source of identity for him (as its Sergeant Major) and he embraced it whole-heartedly. It is not that he was fickle, but rather that he was perfectly in tune with the organizational culture. Similarly, the fact that his behavior was seen and understood as a joke indicates that everybody else involved was at home with his behavior as well. 4.2

An Unloved Junior Officer

A certain subaltern was highly proficient and had considerable personal courage. However, he was privately criticized by some of the soldiers under his command for ordering them to follow him into unnecessarily risky situations on operations. His soldiers believed that he was using them to impress his sub-unit commander and his Commanding Officer with his prowess as a brave leader of men and thus to gain advancement. He was also noted by his peers for his assiduousness in talking to the Commanding Officer and visiting senior officers who were in a position to affect his future career. Not only did his fellow subalterns not like him, but his men distrusted him as evidenced by this piece of graffiti in the soldiers’ toilets: “Here we are in Snipers Alley, Then comes [NAME] Dillys and Dallys, Might as well all give it up, As hes [sic!] as much use as a stringless mop.” ‘Sniper’s Alley’ was the name given by the soldiers to a dangerous alleyway in the sub-unit’s area of operations. The accepted practice was to get through it quickly and aggressively. This officer, however, would court trouble by lingering in it. As he was in charge of his patrol, his soldiers were forced to linger with him. This is an example of an individual manipulating the military social structures to his own advantage. He used the principles of the formal command structure by using formal authority to make his soldiers take risks that they judged to be unnecessary. He attempted to establish informal relationships of association upwards with those who could influence his future career. By taking operational risks he was trying to establish a reputation as an operationally competent officer, and thus successful in the functional structure. The price of these activities was paid in the informal structure within the unit. His informal relationships with his soldiers were impoverished by 30

what they saw as his self-centered attitude towards their lives, and he failed to form any strong friendships with his fellow subalterns because they disliked what they saw as selfish behavior. This case therefore highlights the means whereby an ambitious individual can manipulate the norms and conventions represented in the model of social structures to further his/her own ends, and the consequences that flow for his/her reputation among his subordinates and peers. 4.3

‘Best Dress’

A sub-unit commander decided to hold an ‘all ranks’ Christmas party for the members of his sub-unit, to which he invited his Commanding Officer. In order to ensure that there would be a suitable number of people present, he made it a ‘Scale A’ parade (everybody had to come, if they were not formally away). He also insisted in his daily orders on the sub-unit notice board that the men would wear ‘best dress’. The soldiers interpreted the event as an attempt by the sub-unit commander to provide himself with a vehicle with which to impress the Commanding Officer, and they were angry about it. However, they had to attend or get into trouble. A number of them therefore turned up in female clothing, pleading in their defense that what they were wearing was their ‘best dress’. There was no disciplinary follow-up to the occasion, which the sub-unit commander took in good heart to be a comment on his clumsy handling of the situation. The Commanding Officer appeared to treat it as a highly enjoyable event. This incident arises from an inappropriate mixing of the conventions in two social structures. A Christmas celebration draws upon the conventions of the informal structure, and it also evokes the loyalty/identity structure if the majority of people there all belong to a common loyalty/identity segment (such as a sub-unit). What was inappropriate was the sub-unit commander’s attempt to make the occasion compulsory through the formal command structure. Moreover, by turning the event into a joke (informal structure) the soldiers hoped (successfully) both to make their point and avoid punishment. 4.4

The Missing Cannon Balls

In this next example a soldier remembers a tour of duty overseas when he was a junior NCO clerk: “Not many people in our [sub-unit] liked the (...) Commander of the British Forces in the [overseas base]. And outside of his office he had eight cannon balls [in two piles] – three on the base, outside of his door, one on the top. And to get from our accommodation you had to go 31

across the square, past his office to our [sub-unit] bar. (...) I used to do Duty Clerks [a 24 hour duty] in the headquarters building. And one day the Commander’s cannon balls went missing. And he guessed it was [us] that did it. I was on duty the night that they went missing. So he called me in, he said ‘Find my cannon balls’. So he used me to get his cannon balls back, (...) and I did. I didn’t personally find them. Right, I got the word round the [sub unit] that ‘you’d better have the cannon balls back p.d.q. [pretty damned quick] otherwise we’re in deep shit.’ (...) I didn’t know who had taken them. (...) I was the vehicle to say ‘Get those cannon balls back or we’re in deep shit. We’re in deep shit – the OC [sub unit commander] downwards.’ And they came back. So I was the vehicle but I never knew who (...) you see at the time I was also the [sub-unit] barman so I knew a lot of the people. I knew what was going on.” As in the other examples, the model helps to describe and analyze this story and thus to understand the processes contained within it. In taking the cannon balls, the soldiers were informally communicating their dislike of the Commander. The Commander reacted, also using informal means, by exploiting communication channels in the informal structure to get the cannon balls back. Rather than making an official complaint to the sub-unit commander, he got his message round by using his relationship of informal access with one of the clerks who worked in his headquarters. It is likely that the Commander deliberately chose this individual for the task because he knew he was also a barman in the sub-unit bar and therefore had a very good network of informal relationships and thus a quick and usable network of informal communications. In passing on the implied threat of sanctions, the junior NCO was referring to the formal command structure. The soldiers reacted informally by replacing the cannon balls. This case highlights four important aspects of British Army life. First, we see that all the actions took place using the conventions modelled in the informal structure, which indicates the widespread possibilities for individual and collective action provided by these conventions. It also indicates the existence of a many-branched set of informal communications available to all agents. Thirdly, it shows the nodal position of a comparatively junior individual, in this case a junior NCO, who has informal relationships both with figures of authority and with his peers. This individual also had formal and informal links with the Commander British Forces, and loyalty/identity and informal links with the fellow members of his sub-unit. Finally, we see the availability of the formal command structure to a senior person as a potential resource: even though he never raised the stakes to formal disciplinary action the commander was able informally to issue a credible threat to do so.

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4.5

Trouble with Tenting

The last in this short series of case studies was observed by Paul Killworth in his research on hierarchies, boundaries and construction in the British Army. Elements of an infantry platoon were assigned to assist at a fair held to publicize aspects of the Army. They were put in the charge of a female staff sergeant from an Army Careers Information Office. She complained about their work: “You would send them out and say ‘these tents all need putting up’; you’d come back and they’d all be in one big group again. So you’d split them up and in half an hour they’d be back again, the privates and the lancecorporal, with the corporal again. It was like they couldn’t operate on their own.” Killworth assigns this behavior to an attitude on the part of the soldiers that it was not seen as real work and there was little perceived compulsion to carry it out. The speed and efficiency of carrying out the task were essentially irrelevant to the soldiers involved (Killworth 1997: 111). Using the model, we may say that the soldiers were engaged in a task that was not seen as contributing to the individuals’ self-image of ‘soldiers’ as defined by the ‘soldierly’ conventions modelled in the functional structure. It was not, as Killworth says, real work. Furthermore, the senior NCO in charge (the staff sergeant) was not in their chain of command and so had a very weak call on their cooperation through the formal command structure. The fact that she was also female may or may not have affected the situation, but the fact that she was office-bound as a member of the recruiting staff would certainly have done so, as sitting in a high-street office is far removed from the life of a ‘real soldier’ according to the conventions modelled in the functional structure. Killworth notes that the soldiers clustered together to make the work more fun, and this may be assigned to influences in the informal structure.

5

Conclusion: Why Bother with a Model like this?

This last case study raises an interesting point. Most of the elements in my analysis using the model appear in some form or another in Killworth’s account, but although he had access to the model he did not use it. Why do we need a model like the one presented here when individuals who have researched the area can come up with parallel and useful analyses for themselves? There are four principal reasons. First, the model provides an axis of investigation which has been shown to be effective and which is in harmony with the organizational culture of the Army. It is useful in its own right as a tool with which to investigate the Army at unit level. Second, the model 33

shows promise as a tool to be used across military institutions as a common framework for cross-cultural comparison. Initial, unpublished, research with a USAF squadron provides encouragement in this respect. Thirdly, if used consistently, it offers the opportunity for different researchers to produce broadly comparable research. And finally, because the model is clear, simple to understand, and allows for subtleties of British Army life to be described and analyzed, it can, it is hoped, be a vehicle by which the Army can be better understood. It stands in secure opposition to the world conjured up the stereotypes we visited at the start of this chapter. Use of the model can show that, far from being a forum for oppression, violence, one-dimensional discipline and class-privileges, units in the British Army are social groups with a robust, flexible, stimulating social system with multi-threaded internal communications, providing a way of life that is supportive, coherent, and engaging. After all, if it did not have these characteristics, how could an overstretched and all-volunteer Army keep enough of its members to survive? Literature Asad, Talal (1979): Anthropology and the Analysis of Ideology. In: Man, 14: 4, 607– 627. Banton, Michael, P. (1965): The Relevance of Models for Social Anthropology. London: Tavistock Publications. Beattie, John (1966): Other Cultures: Aims, Methods and Achievements in Social Anthropology. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. Cerroni-Long, E. L. (1995): Insider Anthropology. Arlington, VA: National Association for the Practice of Anthropology. Chapman, Brian (1967): The Science of Society: An Introduction to Sociology. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. Collins, Peter (2002): Connecting Anthropology and Quakerism: Transcending the Insider/Outsider Dichotomy. In: Arweck, Elizabeth/Stringer, Martin D. (Eds.): Theorizing Faith: The Insider/Outsider Problem in the Study of Ritual. Birmingham: The University of Birmingham Press, 501–515. Durkheim, Emile (1938): The Rules of Sociological Method. Edited by Catlin, George E. G., translated by Solovay, Sarah A./Mueller, John H. Chicago: Ill.: University of Chicago Press. Forsythe, Diana, E. (2001): Studying Those Who Study Us: An Anthropologist in the World of Artificial Intelligence. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Fox, Kate (2004): Watching the English: The Hidden Rules of English Behaviour. London: Hodder & Stoughton. Giddens, Anthony (1976): New Rules of Sociological Method. London: Hutchinson. Giddens, Anthony (1984): The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration. Cambridge: Polity Press. Giddens, Anthony (2001): Sociology. 4th edition. Cambridge: Polity Press.

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Giddens, Anthony/Turner, Jonathan, H. (1987): Social Theory Today. Cambridge: Polity Press. Grimshaw, Anna/Hart, Keith (1993): Anthropology and the Crisis of Intellectuals. Cambridge: Prickly Pear Press. Hockey, John (1986): Squaddies: Portrait of a Subculture. Exeter: University of Exeter. Killworth, Paul (1997): Culture and Power in the British Army: Hierarchies, Boundaries and Construction. Unpublished PhD Thesis. Cambridge University. Killworth, Paul (1998): The British Army in Northern Ireland: Internal Security Operations, Training, and the Cease-Fire. In: Cambridge Anthropology, 20: 3, 1–20. King, Anthony (2006) The Word of Command: Communication and Cohesion in the Military. In: Armed Forces and Society, 32: 2, 493–512. King, Anthony (2007): The Existence of Group Cohesion in the Armed Forces. In: Armed Forces and Society, 33: 4, 638–645. Kirke, Charles (1988): Social Structures in the Peninsular Army. In: RUSI Journal, Summer, 65–71. Kirke, Charles (2000): A Model for the Analysis of Fighting Spirit in the British Army. In: Strachan, Hew (Ed.): The British Army, Manpower and Society into the Twenty-First Century. London: Frank Cass, 227–241. Kirke, Charles (2002): Social Structures in the Regular Combat Arms Units of the British Army: A Model. Unpublished PhD Thesis. Cranfield University. Kuper, Adam (1977): The Social Anthropology of Radcliffe-Brown. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Labaree, Robert, V. (2002): The Risk of ‘Going Observationalist’: Negotiating the Hidden Dilemmas of Being an Insider Participant Observer. In: Qualitative Research, 2: 1, 97–122. Lewis, David (1999): Revealing, Widening, Deepening? A Review of the Existing and Potential Contribution of Anthropological Approaches to ‘Third Sector’ Research’. In: Human Organization, 58: 1, 73–81. Loomba, N. Paul (1978): Management – A Quantitative Perspective. London: Collier Macmillan. Loyal, Steven/Barnes, Barry (2001): ‘Agency’ as a Red Herring in Social Theory. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 13: 4, 507–524. Maina, Faith (2003): Indigenous ‘Insider’ Academics: Educational Research or Advocacy? In: Canadian Journal of Native Studies, XXIII: 2, 207–226. Mair, Lucy (1965): An Introduction to Social Anthropology. Oxford: Clarendon Press. MOD (1990): The Drill Manual, Army Code Number 70166. London: HMSO. MOD (2001): Manual of Military Law Part I. 12th edition. London: HMSO. Ortner, Sherry (1984): Theory in Anthropology Since the Sixties. In: Comparative Studies in Society and History, 26, 126–166. Stewart, Nora Kinzer (1991): Mates and Muchachos: Unit Cohesion in the Falklands/Malvinas War. New York: Brassey’s (US) Inc. Strachan, Hew (Ed.) (2000): The British Army, Manpower and Society into the Twenty-First Century. London: Frank Cass.

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Thornborrow, Thomas (2005): The Construction of Collective Identity in the British Parachute Regiment: A Storytelling Approach. Unpublished PhD Thesis. Nottingham University. Wilson, Brian (1990): Systems: Concepts, Methodologies, and Applications. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons. Wilson, Brian (2001): Soft Systems Methodology: Conceptual Model Building and its Contribution. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Zugbach, Reginald von (1988): Power and Prestige in the British Army. Aldershot: Avebury.

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‘My Pink Uniform Shows I am One of Them’: Socio-Cultural Dimensions of German Peacekeeping Missions Maren Tomforde 1

Introduction

When I started as a research assistant at the Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences in 2003 my fellow anthropologists jokingly said that I had probably found a new ‘tribe’. And indeed, just as during my preceding ethnological field research among ethnic mountain groups in Northern Thailand, I spent my first months in the Bundeswehr projecting myself into a new culture – as an introduction into my later research work on missions abroad: I was confronted with behavioral patterns and norms (still) unknown to me and had to learn during a four-week military training course for civilian personnel to ‘go differently, to stand differently, to talk differently’ 1 – not to mention of military skills. Thus my daily ethnographical research in the deployment areas of the German Armed Forces did not solely involve the Bundeswehr itself, but equally and foremost the peacekeeping contingents, which are known for their interesting sub-cultures, very different to everyday life in Germany. 2 Since the Bundeswehr has been participating in missions abroad only for a bit more than 15 years it is possible to analyze processes related to the establishment of a collective deployment identity as well as mission-specific behavior patterns: Astonishingly a staff sergeant underlined in Kabul that ‘my pink uniform showed I was one of them’ alluding to his washed-out, slightly pink colored tropical uniform deliberately worn by German ISAF soldiers in differentiation to soldiers not belonging to the contingent, who were on a brief visit to the mission countries. The pink-colored uniform is but one of countless examples for cultural innovation by means of multiple processes of identity development in deployment areas. The paper at hand aims at tracing the main features of the dynamics of socio-cultural practice as well as patterns of institutional consolidation of collective identities connected to peacekeeping missions of the Bundeswehr. In the paper, the term ‘socio-cultural’ relates to all social and cultural aspects of social groups. Culture is an internal orientation system shared by 1 2

The saying ‘We go differently, we stand differently, we talk differently’ was used by the Bundeswehr in the 1980s within the framework of its recruitment campaigns. Apart from a few exceptions the scientific analysis of military culture is largely left aside not only by anthropology, but also by political science and even by (military) sociology. (Euskirchen 2005: 7; Leonhard/Werkner 2005; Apelt 2006: 26; Tomforde 2006).

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people living and acting in the same social environment. It is important to note that a dialectic relationship exists between cultural structures and practice: socio-cultural practice brings about structures which in turn have an impact on human behavioral norms. The ‘producers’ of culture are also the upholders of culture. To stress this, Tim Ingold (2002: 330) introduced the term “culturing” within the framework of a postmodern discourse on culture. The verb underlines that culture is closely connected to practice and the acting agents. Therefore, culture should not be treated as a deliminatable, unchangeable rigid object. This broad definition of culture implies, that within the framework of this paper only an exemplary presentation of mission specific culture(s) and processes of identity building is possible. 3 The investigation of socio-cultural dimensions of German peacekeeping missions is based on the theory that practices typical for mission areas, values, norms, symbols and thought patterns of the soldiers constitute a subculture and “micro-culture” respectively (Hannerz 1992: 73–77) of the Bundeswehr. As other “informal cultures” of the armed forces (e.g., the individual services or rank categories) the missions and their socio-cultural characteristics form an integral subsystem of the Bundeswehr (see Soeters/Winslow/ Weibull 2003: 238; Fujimura 2003: 136, 141–145; Rubinstein 2003: 16; Winslow 1997: 46, 53). Subcultures in organizations develop in case of regular interaction of a group of members, identifying themselves as a specific group. In case of new and complex situations, members of an organization will attempt to reduce this complexity by means of establishing sub-cultural structures. Each sub-culture develops its own identity, may itself split into several sub-cultures and will dissociate itself from other sub-cultures within an organization. Related to the Bundeswehr missions abroad adjustment to new, more complex tasks and structures not only takes place on the formal level, but especially through specific socio-cultural procedures during missions (see Soeters/Winslow/Weibull 2003: 240). Subsequently a missionspecific community develops which disassociates both from the units at home and from the society of the host country through own identity(ies) and specific socio-cultural patterns of action and thought. Since the start of out-ofarea-missions in 1992 these patterns are handed down from contingent to contingent among others through legends, stories, pictures, rituals, plots as well as by the soldiers, who act as cultural subjects. This paper is based on qualitative and quantitative studies carried out in the years from 2003 to 2005 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in Kosovo and in Afghanistan by researchers of the Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences

3

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For a discussion of the term ‘culture’ in opposition to military traditions see Ben-Ari 1998: 3f.; Jandora 1999: 542f.

(SOWI). 4 Within the framework of these inquiries, which each lasted for several weeks, members of the German mission contingents were questioned about various issues (e.g., development of motivation, dealing with foreign culture, military identity, stress) by means of semi – or unstructured qualitative interviews as well as standardized questionnaires. Concurrently, data was collected through participant observation in predeployment training, in Bundeswehr camps in the mission areas as well as in debriefing seminars.

2

Framework Conditions of Missions Abroad

After 50 years of existence and different transformation processes the Bundeswehr no longer primarily serves home defense, but mainly fulfills commitments to allied partners and demands arising from international conflict prevention and crisis management in out-of-area-missions (see Bredow 2006: 318f.). Presently, the Bundeswehr undergoes a transformation process towards an operational army which is deployed worldwide side by side with allied partners within the framework of peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities (see Gareis 2006; Tardy 2004). During the last ten years German forces were among the largest troop providers for international peace missions. About 8,000 Bundeswehr soldiers were on deployment every month in 2007. Many of these were deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina within the framework of SFOR (Stabilization Force), later renamed EUFOR (EU Force), in Kosovo within the framework of KFOR (Kosovo Force) and in Afghanistan within the framework of ISAF (International Security Assistance Force). In 2006 a contingent was deployed in Congo (EUFOR RD CONGO) and in the coastal waters of Lebanon (UNIFIL). These two latter missions are not included in the reflections of this paper as final research results on these missions are not (yet) available. Due to the extended mission spectrum and the increased number of international missions, the Bundeswehr is facing new and varied tasks. Also the actors within the Bundeswehr such as the soldiers themselves have to respond to the new demands. Their behavior and military identity have to adapt to the extended tasks and conditions of service. In the mission areas soldiers also have to adapt to the requirements of multinational forces and have to work in close cooperation with (international) (non-) governmental organizations. Thus the military spectrum of tasks has widened considerably and can even extend from time to time well into the civilian spheres. Increasingly, 4

Jörg Keller, Maren Tomforde, Carola Reinholz from the Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences (SOWI) as well as Heiko Biehl from the Bundeswehr Command and Staff College (FüAk).

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soldiers also take over police functions (Haltiner 2006: 519) or tasks within humanitarian assistance or service functions for the stabilization of conflict regions. Besides their military skills soldiers, especially officers, also need political, diplomatic as well as intercultural abilities in order to meet the various demands during the missions. Step by step missions abroad will turn into an integral part of the Bundeswehr, changing the organization structurally, but also socio-culturally (see also Bredow 2006: 314–319; Moskos 2000). With a few exceptions (e.g., the attack on a bus in Kabul in 2003, the March riots in the Kosovo in 2004) the out-of-area-missions of the Bundeswehr far have proceeded relatively peacefully and, except for air action in Kosovo in 1999, larger-scale combat actions have not been necessary so far. 5 Looking at the mission contingents one has to take into account that during the past years many features common to all of the different contingents and mission countries have taken shape. Personal mission experience, however, can differ and be influenced by various variables: e.g., by fellow soldiers and bonds within the own unit, by first-line and secondary supervisors, by the environment of mission area/mission camp, by the season (summer/winter), by special incidents in the host country as well as by the origin of the units on mission (Northern/Southern/Western/Eastern Germany). In spite of these variables, which shape each contingent and personal experience in a different way, there are many common features between the individual mission contingents and areas related to structure and socio-cultural aspects. As a rule, Bundeswehr personnel is deployed for a period of four months. In general, participation in a contingent is compulsory, if no health or personal reasons preclude service abroad. Service conscripts are not committed to the mission areas, but can volunteer and participate in missions abroad as ‘extended voluntary service conscripts’. As a rule, temporary-career volunteers or regulars do not volunteer for participation in a mission as they know that they will routinely be dispatched several times to the mission areas during their term of service. In general, the motivation of soldiers on the Balkans and in Afghanistan is quite high. Three quarters of the soldiers would volunteer for a second mission. If a unit or large parts of a company or brigade from one garrison form part of a EUFOR, KFOR or ISAF contingent, the members of these military units would feel obliged not only for official but also for moral reasons to join their comrades in the mission. Furthermore, for most of the soldiers participation in an operational contingent abroad represents an important initiation into the transformed Bundeswehr, providing the 5

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According to personal reports by servicemembers returning from North Afghanistan, the German Armed Forces are indeed involved in combat action on a daily scale. This fact, though, is not widely known as the Government as well as the Ministry of Defense are afraid of losing public support for German peacekeeping missions once combat is involved.

opportunity to be part of this newly structured Bundeswehr, to ‘have a say’ among the comrades and to show carrier promoting qualifications (see Tomforde 2006). According to official statements in Bundeswehr circles ‘reliability proven in a mission’ and mission experience increasingly gain importance in career decisions. Soldiers interviewed during our research considered participation in one or more missions abroad also off-the record as an important criterion for further promotions. Contingent members receive a tax-free allowance for their service abroad. This is an important compensation. However, from the point of view of soldiers and relatives it cannot compensate for the burdens of separation from family and home. The strain on the relatives of the soldiers caused by the mission abroad is at least as high for the relatives as for the soldiers (see Tomforde 2006a). According to soldiers, burdens for the relatives at home are even higher because they have to arrange everyday life without the husband, partner and father while the Bundeswehr relieves soldiers on mission of many organizational matters.

3

Camp Life

For most contingent members everyday life in the Bundeswehr camps is relatively monotonous: The camps are entities with limited space. Due to safety reasons only few soldiers (only between 10 and 25 per cent of contingent personnel) are allowed to leave the camp for official reasons (e.g., for reconstruction work, patrol duty, establishment of contact with the local population). The camps are marked by relatively short distances between bunks, offices and recreation facilities. Jogging tracks along the outer fences of the camps are on average not longer than three kilometers. That means that the soldiers move within a relatively confined space during a contingent period of four months, that they can only leave occasionally for official reasons or for rare morale-boosting trips to sights of the host country. Transitions between duty and free time are fluid not only due to little spatial separation between the workplace and the residence, but also due to the fact that uniforms are generally worn within the camp. Private civilian clothing is only allowed for sports activities. In other words, life in the camp is marked by soldiers in uniform (mostly men 6 ). As a rule, between several hundred and up to several thousand men are accommodated in a camp. The soldiers often come from different nations mostly with one nation ‘setting the tone’. For example, camps like the one in Pristina (Kosov) were built by the Bundeswehr according to its needs and ideas; other nations, the Italians, 6

The percentage of women in missions abroad is still not more than eight per cent.

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French, Austrians or Georgians, have to adapt to this. These camps look ‘German’. There are streets with sidewalks, German street names and road signs. German traffic regulations are applied including the possibility of being fined by the MP in the camp for speeding or illegal parking. Besides the bulk of military equipment, building materials, billeting containers, furniture, commodities as well as large parts of the daily field messing come from Germany. Thus, it is possible that a soldier could be on a mission in Afghanistan for four months without leaving the camp at all, without having tasted meals typical for the country, without having seen the local currency or having listened to the language of the host country. Instead, contingent members have to get used to schedules and duty requirements within the camp and get settled far away from their family and home among their comrades for a limited period of time. Due to the fact that most soldiers are accommodated in twinor four-bed rooms privacy in the mission area is a rare good in an environment where, in theory, everybody can observe and potentially control everyone: be it in communal billets, the church, the fitness tent or the recreational facilities where the uniformed soldiers can relax with a glass of beer, listen to music, watch TV and/or play kicker. “The organization (...) enables complete control.” (Apelt 2006: 34) The soldiers find themselves in the camp in structures resembling “total institutions” (Goffman 1973) which determine who they are, when, where and how they have to interact and by whom and in what way they can be controlled. Most of the soldiers who work inside a camp (and not in a company on duty outside the camp) are on duty between 7:30 a.m. and 6:30 p.m. On Sundays, duty mostly starts after 1:00 p.m. hours. During these long duty hours, however, it is often possible to do sports or go to the hairdresser in the camp. Through the ‘short distances’, the typical daily routines of ‘getting up – breakfast – lining up – duty – lunch – duty – supper – calling home – sports/ TV/recreational facilities – bedtime’ and all the familiar faces life in the camp can become very monotonous and dull in the long run. On top of this, as a rule, daily routines in a mission stay within very manageable limits. Mostly stress is ‘only’ caused by a high workload or negative news from home, but not by other usual stress factors such as traffic jams, queues at the checkout counter, nerve-wrecking letters from authorities or faulty washing machines. Peacekeepers have to manage other permanent, but often suppressed strains: latent danger of mines and bombing attacks, extreme climate conditions in summer as well as in winter, high rates of dust pollution, multiperson accommodation, lack of privacy, separation from home and the family, monotonous and highly regulated camp life, contact with the same persons over and over again as well as the necessity, day in, day out, to wear 42

uniform/heavy boots and to carry the P8 pistol/the G36 rifle. Thus, life of soldiers on a mission is, on the one hand, dominated by the potentially existing dangers outside the camp, and on the other hand by routine, boredom, sometimes a too small workload and the feeling of ‘being locked up’ inside the camp. Monotony in the camp in connection with the diametrically opposed hazard situation in the mission areas can easily lead to the so-called ‘camp psychosis’ and unconscious strains which surface only in extreme situations. To cope with these conscious and unconscious strains servicemembers use diverse strategies. If possible, they keep daily contact with their families at home. This is established by telephone (mostly mobile phone), the Internet or the military postal service. For many soldiers and their relatives the regular contact with the partner and the children seems to be a way to bridge the spatial separation. Furthermore, many soldiers send small gifts bought in the camp home to their children and spouses, while the families send German (partly seasonal) specialties and homemade items (cookies or family videos) to the mission country. In order to make mission time more bearable and predictable many soldiers have a ‘contingent calendar’ on which passed mission days are crossed out. Others cut one centimeter from a tape rule for every day which has passed. During a ‘typical’ mission abroad events like the so-called ‘Tapsi 7 Parties’ at the beginning, ‘mid-term parties’ in the middle and ‘fly-off’ parties as well as the handing over of the foreign duty medals during the ceremonial medal parade at the end of each contingent, are both official as well as unofficial rituals during a mission which determine different phases and mark certain dates. ‘Day Counting’ and mission parties make separation from the relatives easier. The period of the mission looks more predictable. Due to the uncertain security situation separation from the usual social environment lasting several months and unusual work the out-of-area-mission will turn into an experience which is related to emotional ups and downs for many soldiers. These lows are to be bridged by intensive contact with home, but also by strong solidarity, good comrade relationships as well as mission specific activities and action patterns.

7

The inofficial term ‘Tapsi’, which stands for ‘totally ingnorant person searching for information’ is one of many acronyms and terms, invented by the soldiers for certain phenomena of the mission abroad which are passed down from contingent to the next, from mission country to mission country. Officially this term is prohibited, because it could have a discriminating effect. Terms like this one are, however, an integral part of an informal ‘mission language’ which can be considered as an important aspect of subcultural structures in missions abroad (see also Ben-Ari 1998: 11–14; Winslow 1997: 54).

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4

The Field Unit as an Expatriate Community

Nearly all people who are placed into a foreign cultural context experience a culture shock in one or more ways. Most of the Bundeswehr soldiers do not have to face this cultural shock in the mission areas because they are not massively confronted with the experience of strangeness, which would normally occur settling into host societies such as Afghanistan. Instead, contingent members have to deculturize and become a part of their own unit/ company and of the (multinational) camp community. Due to security reasons, there are generally only little (private) contacts with the society of the host country so that the soldiers in spatially limited military camps can be compared with so-called expatriate communities (see Sion 2004: Chapter 6). The term expatriate normally relates to migrants mainly from ‘Western’ countries who live abroad for a limited period of time in order to work there, to teach, to do research or to do missionary work. Life of expatriates is characterized by several factors which also apply to peacekeeping soldiers: expatriates only stay for a certain period in the host country, they are a minority limited in numbers and mostly have a privileged position compared with the host society. They learn the local language only rudimentarily, if at all, and integrate themselves only rarely into the host society. Most soldiers’ only have social contacts with their peers. Due to present-day modern communication technologies enabling fast, cheap and close contacts with family and friends at home, the necessity of a social integration into the society of the host country, which was already very low within this group, is reduced even more. These factors play a decisive role in determining the form and bonds of the expatriate communities and their experience abroad. Camps of the Bundeswehr and of other armed forces are comparable with expatriate communities. Also camps can be seen as ‘enclaves’ of the home country, limited in space, where everything is German, or French, British, Italian, Spanish, Canadian, etc. During the mission abroad the German soldiers are much more confronted with a foreign cultural experience due to the multinational composition of the camps, than due to contacts with the host population. For the time of the mission the camp is both a formal organization and a place of residence for the soldiers: Borders between the three areas of sleeping, free time and work merge or are partly no longer existing. At the same time there are clear dividing lines to the civil society both socially and geographically (Winslow 1997: 47). There is a clear differentiation between the spheres ‘inside’ and ‘outside’. In the internal perimeter not only different norms, behavior patterns, rules and legal regulations are applied compared to the surrounding areas, but 44

drastic differences can also exist as to medical care or shopping facilities. As a rule, medical care in a camp corresponds to standards in a German district hospital. In the so-called ‘mom-and-pop stores’ it is possible to buy goods for everyday needs which are, in general, not available at all for the civilian population. Examples are different types of alcoholic beverages, sweets, toiletries or perfumes. Tax-free alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages are so cheap that soldiers can easily invite each other for a drink. This practice does not only serve the fun part of drinking alcoholic beverages, but also promotes the development of social networks based on reciprocity as well as internal bonds (see Winslow 1997: 80f.). The camp is, in the true sense of the word, a world of its own which seems to exist isolated from its environment, a microsociety, which is self-sufficient (see also Lang 1965: 840–845).

5

Second Socialization

Social contacts during a mission are concentrated on the military operating environment. This is an environment soldiers have to adapt to, and into which they are enculturized by means of a so-called ‘second socialization’ (see also Apelt 2006). The completion of this socialization takes place at the medal parade at the end of each contingent during which soldiers are awarded a medal for their service abroad. The term socialization stands for the process of becoming a member of a society. This is a process of the formation and development of personality in interdependence with the social and material environment. In this process the individual is not only a passive recipient of social norms and values, but is processing effects of and inputs from the environment which again in most different ways have an effect on the subjective perception of one’s own identity. Thus the self-image is both a result of external socialization as well as self socialization (Apelt 2006: 27). During their basic training and later on in their service, military personnel is introduced to specific military skills which among others comprise absolute obedience and abilities to injure and kill. They are familiarized with military values like obedience, discipline, loyalty, bravery and willingness to make sacrifices. Furthermore, signs of (hyper-)masculinity, sense of friendly comradeship as well as conduct according to the norms play a central role (see also Rohall/Ender/Matthews 2006: 61; Titunik 2000: 240). Thus, soldiers run through a special kind of socialization which clearly differs from the civilian side regarding values, norms and behavior. During the mission abroad the socialization as a soldier on deployment rather takes place on the informal than on the formal level. In the eyes of the military command the soldier has to do his duty just in the same way as in the home station, only that the circumstances are harder. In order to be able to 45

cope with the heavily changed demands comrades prepare each other for the strains of the missions in addition to official training segments. This is done through passing on mission specific knowledge from contingent to contingent, from buddy to buddy. As a result of this informal process the soldiers develop an identity as ‘multinational, military mission professional’ whose socialization is highlighted by the formal rite of the medal parade at the end of the contingent. Most soldiers go abroad with some experience concerning procedures in camps and mission areas in Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina or Afghanistan. Through stories, mission legends, 8 jokes, songs, pictures, contingent books and personal contacts with comrades people obtain mission knowledge, concrete expectations and ideas. In other words, soldiers condition each other through stories and pictures and thus contribute to the constitution and preservation of sub-cultural structures during deployment: “Storytelling is an important part of military life and in the stories are hidden meanings, underlying messages about correct and incorrect behavior.” (Winslow 1997: 59) The passing on of myths and stories is establishing close relations and solidarity among the soldiers because this underlines that ‘we are all in the same boat’ sharing the same difficulties and strains, be it soldier or officer, be it in the quiet Sarajevo (Bosnia-Herzegovina) or in the troubled and dangerous Masar-e-Sharif (Afghanistan). This lively exchange between soldiers contributes essentially to the propagation of socio-cultural aspects of the missions from contingent to contingent and from mission country to mission country. Peacekeepers who have participated in several missions can be considered as important cultural preservers and so-called ‘culture brokers’ who unconsciously support the survival of mission-specific subcultures.

6

Formation of a Mission-Type Identity: We- and They-Groups

Deployments abroad require complex identity strategies as the troops are part of their national armed forces, and also of deployment contingents, brigades and multinational formations, so that homogenous patterns of identity have become obsolete. The new situation in out-of-area-missions calls for more complex identity strategies. Like the term ‘culture’, the concept of ‘identity’ has become a much-cited keyword to describe different phenomena. Within 8

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Myths are stories passed on which reflect fundamental ideologies of a group. They explain and interpret confessional and behavior patterns, explain the origins of a group/people and pass on information on correct in incorrect behavior. They bring about faith in the overarching whole (Weiner 2002: 387).

the scope of this article, the formation of a group-specific identity, i.e., the formation of a collective identity, is understood to mean the creation of a corporate imagination designed to be used as a delineator from outside images that refers to a repertoire of memories and which needs to be permanently updated by those acting. Thus, identity is disentangled from permanent places and needs to be continuously embedded into current contexts (Rammert 2001: 18). Collective identities constitute the result of commitmentcausing practices, semantics and structures in which a we-feeling towards others is formed and strengthened by ritualized actions and schematized interpretations. They arise from a collective interaction of competing groups in which the image of oneself is brought into interaction with features ascribed by outsiders in a way that is not always intended. Thus, in everyday life, identity as the result of a process of mutual exchange is never static, but always subject to situational rephrasing (Rammert 2001: 11; Barth 1969). However, one cannot draw the reversal conclusion that individuals or groups adjust or even change their identities overflexibly. Identities are neither inherent and static nor can they be changed and exchanged permanently (Reckwitz 2001: 34). Rather, collective identities constitute the result of features ascribed by outsiders and by oneself which refer to affiliations, traditional tales and pictures that over time are turning into self-images and adjust to the respective situation. As far as groups are concerned, the features they ascribe to themselves may vary, they may apply productively imaginary practices that create commitment and are used for negotiating identities and power (see Anderson 1983). Some of the group boundaries have to be reinterpreted or newly defined because differences – depending on the situation – have to be created or negated in order to obtain cohesion in a group. “It is society dressed as community, which produces the emotional cohesion of these we-groups.” (Elwert 2002: 39) Peacekeepers also have to renegotiate when on deployment and/or adjust to the new circumstances. Important institutions with which the troops identify collectively are the German Armed Forces, the nation of Germany, the contingent, the UN Peacekeeping troops and the servicemembers’ own units. The priority given to the individual institutions depends on the location and the situation. In everyday life in a camp, for instance, soldiers will see themselves mainly as members of a particular unit. When they get into contact with Italian or French fellow-soldiers, when on joint duty in a multinational staff unit, they will rather see themselves as Bundeswehr members. When the men and women leave the camp, they have to distance themselves from the local population and act as members of the international peacekeeping forces. Whereas troops hardly say a special hello to international fellow-soldiers 47

within the camp, they wave to any foreign comrade and any motor vehicle with a UN, NATO or EU registration outside the camp, thus demonstrating international mission solidarity. Back home, the troops emphasize their affiliation with a specific contingent, a EUFOR, KFOR or ISAF unit when talking to their fellow-soldiers. As I have shown above, most social contacts during a mission are cultivated among the troops; a good and close comradeship is an important factor during any deployment. The troops must know that they can trust their fellow-soldiers blindly in case of an emergency. Moreover, the fellow-soldiers are important persons to talk to in theater and may offer social support far away from home. The strains put on the troops on deployment, such as the separation from their families, potential dangers, longer duty hours, the lack of free weekends, and the permanent dress code also after duty binds the troops together. Forming a corporate identity helps to overcome difficulties on the ground and the separation from home. An example of the corporate identity that evolves during a deployment abroad are minor changes of the uniform, mostly contrary to the regulations, which would not be allowed in Germany. For instance, many members of the contingent of all rank categories wear name tags during the deployment on camouflage material, onto which the German and the NATO flags or the flag of one of the Allies are embroidered in addition to one’s name. Sometimes, the name tags do not reflect the real name of the soldier, but a nickname or some other inscription. For most troops, the unit/company constitutes something like a ‘substitute family’ during deployment. The members get their (nick-)names and are integrated into the group, they are embedded in the ‘system of relationships’ of the Bundeswehr. “A home away from home” is created in the true sense of the word and symbolized by the changed name tags (Winslow 1997: 70). Moreover, in addition to the ISAF, EUFOR, or KFOR logos on the shirt sleeves, company-specific patches with a logo especially designed for the contingent are worn. Most of these ‘contingent patches’ have been approved by the Federal Ministry of Defense in advance, while others have not. On deployment, the superiors tolerate some changes of the uniform without any additional approval because they promote the cohesion among the troops. Within ISAF it is also customary to consciously wear the light-colored tropical uniform, which is already strongly washed out with a slightly pink coloring. This is an easy way for the soldiers to distinguish themselves as members of the contingent from the numerous military visitor groups. This way they can demonstrate that they belong to the ‘inner circle’ of the deployment that does the real work to be accomplished by the contingent: “My pink uniform shows I am one of them.” Military anthropologist Donna Winslow has 48

also highlighted the particular role that uniforms and badges play for troops’ finding their identity: “Uniforms and badges communicate much about our place in the military. (…) Uniforms describe which service you are in, while badges mark your place in hierarchy.” (Winslow 1997: 55–56) Symbols, i.e. signs whose meanings lie outside the object itself, are omnipresent in all military organizations. They generate and maintain hierarchy and order, create identity and the sense of togetherness as well as pride in the unit, the battalion, the nation or the multinational alliance. The changed uniforms worn on deployment create cohesion and identity among the troops and demonstrate solidarity to the outside. The uniforms are important symbols of the operational identity of the soldiers. Such practices are also known in Germany within the Bundeswehr: By wearing washed out, partly even worn out field uniforms, the ‘old hands’ set off against those soldiers who have only been doing military service for a short time. Clothes, names, hairstyles and other personal adornment have always and all over the world been a kind of identity marker used by individuals to maintain their personal façade (Goffman 1973: 30ff.). The wearing of a special uniform, equipped with ‘identity markers’ such as a particular color or patches, indicates how important it is for the fellowsoldiers to wear clear sings of belonging to the ‘us-group’ thus distinguishing themselves from the ‘them-group’ which, depending on the situation in question, can be composed of visitors or personnel from other units/camps/ nations. Dissociation is important to build coherence within one’s own group. Thus, a new identity forms within the soldiers containing the military, political, socio-cultural and psychological experiences they pick up during (multinational) deployments abroad and which is, furthermore, shaped by internalized norms and values generated in peacetime.

7

Ambivalent Comradeship

In the military community, camaraderie constitutes a duty for any servicemember as defined in the Military Personnel Act (Soldatengesetz) to support one’s comrades under any circumstances, even when risking one’s life. Thus, the employer, by virtue of military law, demands from the individual soldier a “mechanic solidarity”, as Emile Durkheim (1999) put it. Due to this, there is a tense relationship between camaraderie and another military duty, ‘obedience’. A soldier is obliged to express camaraderie also vis-à-vis his superior, while at the same time being hierarchically subordinate to him and having to obey his orders. The superiors regularly write efficiency reports on the soldiers under their command, also following a deployment. The commanders decide whether or not the servicemembers are awarded the service medal 49

at the end of the deployment which is very important to them. Thus, the military attaches great importance to camaraderie, cohesion and team spirit on the one hand, while demanding the strict adherence to hierarchical rules and privileges provided to the respective rank categories on the other (see Winslow 1997: 19f.). In everyday military routine hierarchy and order are generated and permanently confirmed by certain rites such as the formal salutation. As a result, rank and file, noncommissioned officers and commissioned officers mostly interact at duty level only. In the informal area, however, a strict separation is maintained. Everybody knows his position and his concrete roles and tasks within the network of these hierarchical relations of camaraderie, which are marked by an ongoing struggle for power, predominance and subjection. In spite of this ambivalence surrounding camaraderie, it does constitute a motivating factor for numerous soldiers on deployment abroad that cannot be overestimated. As other military sociological studies have shown, the bonds of camaraderie within the unit form the central moment in times of crisis and war that helps people endure the tough pre-deployment training, master precarious situations and permanently bear risking one’s own life (Titunik 2000: 238; McCoy 1995: 695). Bundeswehr members both in the Balkans and in Afghanistan underline that they rediscovered a kind of camaraderie during out-of-area-missions that they thought had disappeared long ago. The sense of unconditional fellowship among soldiers seems to have dwindled away as a result of the transformation of the armed forces from an ‘institutional’ to an ‘occupational’ model (Moskos 1988) and the separation between the spheres of private life and duty work. During missions, sleeping hours, leisure time, and work move closer together again, and potential dangerous situations render comradely cohesion urgently necessary, the ‘old’ ‘we-community’ revives and becomes important as a result of daily interaction. However, also during deployments abroad, reservations exist regarding this camaraderie, as the frequent complaints made by soldiers on deployment about the maddening gossip within the camps clearly underline. Gossip forms an integral part of the social control within the camp community. This social control is marked by reciprocity, since all soldiers can be equally affected by gossip within the limited space available in the camps. The soldiers make negative remarks and spread stories, in particular concerning immediate or indirect superiors, to manage their frustration and animosity without having to spar with their opponent directly. Thus, relations of camaraderie always have ambivalent connotations during deployment. On the one hand, high priority is usually given to camaraderie. On the other hand, the troops avoid establishing deeper-reaching relations with most of their fellow-soldiers. Relations of good fellowship that assume 50

the features of friendship are – if at all – only cultivated with few servicemembers in the closest personal (duty) environment (see Ben-Ari 1997: 25). The relations formed with other people are of a rather casual nature. Camaraderie mostly remains limited to the period of deployment within a contingent and rarely goes beyond the individual rank categories. The fear of revealing personal information within the hierarchical context of the Bundeswehr, the fear of gossip, and the fear of jeopardizing one’s career by possible weaknesses on deployment prevent many soldiers from establishing close ties of friendship during a mission. It is rather regular contacts with their families back home that are important to them. Although friendly relations among fellow soldiers are very important during deployments and many servicemembers enjoy them (again), their fellow-soldiers also constitute an omnipresent controlling body within the camp. Theoretically, anybody can watch anybody else in this contained ‘face-to-face community’ and spread gossip concerning anybody and anything. In order to avoid damage to their reputation, rumor, gossip as well as increased attention towards any inappropriate behavior, the servicemembers generally see to it that they behave in accordance with the normative rules in the ‘public space’ of the camp. To sometimes escape from this public control, the servicemembers create their “social free zone” in different ways, both literally and in the figurative sense (Soeters/Winslow/Weibull 2003: 245).

8

‘Social Free Zones’: Swimming Pools, Jokes and Skulls

The informal, mostly hidden ‘relaxation zones’ 9 which can be found in any Bundeswehr camp are a good example of these ‘social free zones’ which temporarily protect the troops from the onmipresent social control exercised by their fellow-soldiers, in particular by superiors. The troops set up their small, private common areas behind the service and accommodation areas which are often protected from curious eyes ‘from the outside’ by camouflage nets. Thus, for example, the kitchen staff in the camp of Prizren established its small, enclosed ‘beach area’ behind the field kitchen, where some 9

These informal ‘relaxation zones’ are typical of German camps. The German work ethic, which is held in high esteem also within the Bundeswehr, prevents people from relaxing in a way noticeable to everybody in the public space during work – which is particularly true to soldiers on deployment who are usually on duty round the clock. Other nations deal with this in different ways: Thus, for instance, in the camp of Suva Reka (Kosovo), which is Austro-Swiss, there is a large water basin in the center of the camp, used as a swimming pool, surrounded by a sunbathing lawn and showers. Climbing walls and tennis courts are available for further amusement. The Italians have cafes in their camps in which the servicemembers can have their espresso at any time of the day and sit in the sun when they have little to do.

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deckchairs are available for relaxation after duty in a ‘private’ atmosphere. Small swimming pools, whirlpools or viewing platforms on the roofs of the container buildings (which the commanders mostly tacitly consent to) are not uncommon either. In the hidden ‘relaxation zones’, it is also possible to take off the uniform and to bask in the sun, for example wearing swimming trunks. Such unofficial spaces, which exist in addition to the official meeting places, are important hideaways for soldiers. There, they can retreat to smaller groups after duty, spend their time in an atmosphere which is a little more private than in the morale and welfare facilities, and keep themselves out of the sight of seniors or other fellow soldiers whose loyalty they cannot be absolutely sure of. Thus, the soldiers organize their ‘downtimes’ without any military discipline, social control and, to a limited extent, deployment reality. It turned out that informal group norms are of great significance also and in particular among fellows in theater. “It may be assumed (...) that selfsteering by way of informal group norms is an alternative to imposing general military discipline.” (Soeters/Winslow/Weibull 2003: 243) The informal activities in the private relaxation areas establish social cohesion among the fellow-soldiers. Here, stories, anecdotes and jokes are told and spread among the soldiers. The humor typical for groups of soldiers and the storytelling interrupt the monotonous reality and make it more bearable (see also BenAri/Sion 2005: 657). Moreover, the subtle humor helps regulate the relations within the group, constitutes and maintains internal and external groups as well as resolves hostility among kindred spirits (Ben-Ari/Sion 2005: 667; Mulkay 1988: 134). The Israeli anthropologists Eyal Ben-Ari and Liora Sion, who looked at the topic of “Humor among Servicemembers” from every angle, sum up as follows: “Thus humour, and more generally expressive behaviour, allows troops a release from the boredom and tediousness that mark their daily lives.” (Ben-Ari/Sion 2005: 658) Humor forms an integral part of most groups and marks the point from which most social relations start (see Fine 1984; Douglas 1968). It creates cohesion and a friendly atmosphere which facilitates the integration of newcomers and at the same time shows them what values and norms they are expected to adhere to in their social behavior (Coser 1960: 85–87). Jokes and teasing are used to set boundaries and to exclude non-members/outsiders/ strangers from the (constructed, imagined) community. In military contexts, jokes and pranks form an important factor in creating camaraderie, motivation and identity. Moreover, individuals can manage stress and strain by humorous behavior and by laughing off burdens, both in physical and psychological terms. For soldiers on deployment, anecdotes and teasing on other people’s expenses belong to the ‘social free zone’ in the broadest sense in 52

which they can exchange views about delicate topics and jokes far away from any hierarchy and their superiors. Their excuse of ‘we were only joking’ provides them with a ‘safe’ area in which they can criticize superiors and test the limits. Groups which are linked together by the bonds of camaraderie thus create their informal domain within the military sphere. They constitute it themselves (see Ben-Ari/Sion 2005: 659–661). The German public became aware of the most negative aspects of these ‘social free zones’ in November 2006 when photos were published showing Bundeswehr soldiers posing with skulls found in Afghanistan in partly sexistmartial manners. Obviously, this is practiced by members of various ISAFcontingents. The complex reasons for these ‘skull rites’, which appear archaic and which serve, among other things, to debase the enemy and to elevate the soldiers’ selves, are surely of a complex nature and cannot be discussed here. However, it is important to underline within the context of this article that groups which are linked together by the bonds of camaraderie by unofficial patterns of behavior may not only create group identity and build outlets for stress, but also define a framework for practices that violate norms. Even those who do not welcome these practices are covered up by the community in order to prevent them from jeopardizing the group cohesion which is essential for their own (social) survival and for them being left as an outsider. Unofficial patterns of behavior exercised by groups which are linked together by the bonds of camaraderie can develop a momentum of their own which has been noticed already in other military contexts: “Thus, unofficial patterns of behaviour conflicting with official organizational demands seem to coexist with the official patterns. This obviously is an indicator of fragmentation of the military culture, which may lead to problems on the subject of military performance and the retention of personnel.” (Soeters/Winslow/Weibull 2003: 251) Fortunately, the negative sides of unofficial patterns of behavior among German peacekeepers (still) remain limited to rare exceptions. Most troops regard ceremonies, customs, habits and strict rules to be a means that help them to have a permanent place in everyday military routine. The soldier is integrated into the community of fellow-soldiers, who together take responsibility for their nation and/or the respective alliance formed by military partners and find the purpose of their acting in values such as freedom, democracy and a peaceful world order (Euskirchen 2005: 26). The military is an “order within an order” (Euskirchen 2005: 29), which integrates the soldiers not only into the armed forces, but also into the civilian society and, in case of multinational operations abroad, stands for the reinforcement of the superior order and the internal cohesion among the individual nations.

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9

Conclusion

This article has shown that the participation in a mission acts as a second socialization instance to integrate the individual soldier into a transformed Bundeswehr. The participation helps the troops on the ground to begin with the new area of tasks that they have to perform during the mission abroad and to socialize them with the new (multi)national ‘mission camaraderie’. Thus, the participation in a mission is an important passage from the ‘classical’ soldier to the operational soldier in a newly structured and/or transformed Bundeswehr. Furthermore, socio-cultural patterns of acting and thinking as well as mission-specific identities have developed in the German mission areas during the past few years, which in their entirety contribute to the fact that the deployments outside Germany have assumed subcultural structures, which will influence the Bundeswehr not only in terms of its structure, but in an ongoing process in socio-cultural terms as well. Literature Anderson, Benedict (1983): Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso. Apelt, Maya (2006): Militärische Sozialisation. In: Gareis, Sven B./Klein, Paul (Eds.): Handbuch Militär und Sozialwissenschaft. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 26–39. Barth, Fredrik (Ed.) (1969): Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. London: George Allen and Unwin. Barth, Fredrik (1969): Introduction. In: Barth, Fredrik (Ed.): Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. London: George Allen and Unwin, 9–38. Baumann, Zygmunt (1999): Culture as Praxis. London – Thousand Oaks – New Delhi: SAGE. Ben-Ari, Eyal (1998): Mastering Soldiers: Conflict, Emotions, and the Enemy in an Israeli Unit. New York – Oxford: Berghahn Books. Ben-Ari, Eyal/Sion, Liora (2005): ‘Hungry, Weary and Horny’: Joking and Jesting among Israel’s Combat Reserves. In: Israel Affairs, 11: 4, 655–671. Bredow, Wilfried von (2006): Kämpfer und Sozialarbeiter – Soldatische Soldatenbilder im Spannungsfeld herkömmlicher und neuer Einsatzmissionen. In: Gareis, Sven B./Klein, Paul (Eds.): Handbuch Militär und Sozialwissenschaft. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 314–321. Coser, Rose Laub (1960): Laughter among Colleagues: A Study of the Social Function of Humour among the Staff of a Mental Hospital. In: Psychiatry, 2, 81– 95. Douglas, Mary (1968): The Social Control of Cognition: Some Factors in Joke Perception. In: Man, 3: 3, 361–376. Durkheim, Emile (1999): Über soziale Arbeitsteilung: Studie über die Organisation höherer Gesellschaften. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp.

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Moskos, Charles C. (2000): Toward a Postmodern Military: The United States as a Paradigm. In: Moskos, Charles/Williams, John Allen/Segal, David (Eds.): The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War. New York: Oxford University Press, 14–31. Mulkay, Michael (1988): On Humour: Its Nature and its Place in Modern Society. London: Blackwell. Projektgruppe ‘Sozialwissenschaftliche Begleitung von Auslandseinsätzen der Bundeswehr’ (2005): Soldatisches Selbstverständnis im 7. und 8. Einsatzkontingent SFOR. Unpublished Manuscript. Strausberg: SOWI. Rammert, Werner (2001): Kollektive Identitäten und kulturelle Innovation: Thema und Beiträge. In: Rammert, Werner et al. (Eds): Kollektive Identitäten und kulturelle Innovationen: Ethnologische, soziologische und historische Studien. Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 9–19. Reckwitz, Andreas (2001): Der Identitätsdiskurs. In: Rammert, Werner et al. (Eds.), Kollektive Identitäten und kulturelle Innovationen: Ethnologische, soziologische und historische Studien. Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 26–38. Rohall, David/Ender, Morton/Matthews, Michael (2006): The Effects of Military Affiliation, Gender, and Political Ideology on Attitudes toward the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In: Armed Forces & Society, 33: 1, 59–77. Rubinstein, Robert A. (2003): Peacekeepers and Politics: Experience and Political Representation among U.S. Military Officers. In: Frese, Pamela/Harrell, Margaret (Eds.): Anthropology and the United States Military: Coming of Age in the Twenty-first Century. New York – Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 15–27. Schäfer, Alfred/Wimmer, Michael (1998): Einleitung: Zur Aktualität des Ritualbegriffs. In: Schäfer, Alfred/Wimmer, Michael (Eds.): Rituale und Ritualisierungen. Opladen: Leske+Budrich, 9–47. Seiffert, Anja (2004): Veränderungen des soldatischen Selbstverständnisses unter Einsatzbedingungen. In: Kutz, Martin (Ed.): Gesellschaft, Militär, Krieg und Frieden im Denken von Wolf Graf von Baudissin. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 155– 165. Sion, Liora (2004): Changing from Green to Blue: A Tale of Two Dutch Peacekeeping Units. Unpublished PhD thesis. Amsterdam: Free University. Sion, Liora (2006): ‘Too Sweet and Innocent for War’? Dutch Peacekeepers and the Use of Violence. In: Armed Forces & Society, 32: 3, 454–474. Soeters, Joe/Winslow, Donna/Weibull, Alice (2003): Military Culture. In: Caforio, Guiseppe (Ed.): Handbook of the Sociology of the Military. New York et al.: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, 237–254. Tardy, Thierry (Ed.) (2004): Peace Operations after 11 September 2001. London – New York: Frank Cass. Titunik, Regina (2000): The First Wave: Gender Integration and Military Culture. In: Armed Forces & Society, 26: 2, 229–257. Tomforde, Maren (2006): “Einmal muss man schon dabei gewesen sein (...)” – Auslandseinsätze als Initiation in die ‘neue’ Bundeswehr. In: Hagen, Ulrich vom (Ed.): Armee in der Demokratie: Zum Spannungsverhältnis von zivilen und militärischen Prinzipien. Schriftenreihe des Sozialwissenschaftlichen Instituts der Bundeswehr, Vol. 3. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 101–122.

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Tomforde, Maren (2006a): Einsatzbedingte Trennung: Probleme und Bewältigungsstrategien (SOWI-Research Report No. 78). Strausberg: SOWI. Weiner, James (2002): Myth and Mythology. In: Ingold, Tim (Ed.): Companion Encyclopedia of Anthropology: Humanity, Culture and Social Life. London – New York: Routledge, 386–389. Winslow, Donna (1997): The Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia: A SocioCultural Inquiry. Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing.

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Looking for a New Identity in the Argentinean Army: The Image of the ‘Good Soldier’ Alejandra Navarro 1

Introduction

The military institution is a bureaucratic and hierarchical organization made up by officers trained for the defense of the national territory. From the 1930s to the early 1980s, the Argentinean case shows that the Army’s political participation and intervention have been an essential component of political life. It can also be affirmed that far from being a pressure group exercising its power sporadically, the armed forces can be considered as a power group that has intervened on a permanent basis (de Imaz 1977: 59). This participation, however, has not aligned its members under the same vision. Quite the opposite, it has proven the presence of serious internal divisions which supports the idea that the army can be considered as a political society with its tensions, divisions and re-groupings, its gradual ideological development and, of course, its affinities. In April 1987, one group of middle and lower ranking army officials 1 emerged as central actors within the Argentinean political scene. They were called ‘Carapintadas’ (painted faces) by the press because they shoe-polished their faces. They organized four uprisings. Their demands focused on President Alfonsin’s military policy. They argued that this policy was destroying the army and criticized the passive attitude of their superiors. Their objectives were, among others, an army independent from the political power and an army which would defend the nation/homeland rather than the political regime. At that precise historical moment, several army men were being tried in relation to human rights offenses and their performance during the Process of National Reorganization (Proceso de Reorganización Nacional) 2 from 1976–1982. When lower-rank officers were summoned, the Carapintadas started organizing what would later be called the ‘levantamientos Carapintadas’ 3 (Carapintadas’ uprisings). 1 2 3

Second lieutenant, lieutenant, first lieutenant and captain subaltern; major and lieutenant colonel chief; and colonel and generals superiors. ‘Proceso de Reorganización Nacional’ is the official name of the military dictatorship that seized power in 1976. We will not ponder on the unfolding of the four uprisings. We will only mention them: the first two led by Lieutenant Colonel Aldo Rico known as Operativo Dignidad (Operation Dignity) in April 1987 and in January 1988. The other two led by Colonel Mohamed Alí Seineldín, known as Operación Virgen del Valle (Operation Virgin of the Valley) in December 1988 and Operación Virgen de Luján (Operation Virgin of Luján) in December 1990.

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The ‘Carapintadas’ brought the conflicts within the institution to the light, proving that the army has not always acted homogeneously and refuting the hypothesis that lower-rank officers (below Lieutenant Colonel) just obeyed and heeded. Each of the uprisings disclosed deep divisions in the military and in the political way of thinking of the Carapintadas officers as well as their superiors. This conflict lasted three years. As a result of the uprisings, three army chiefs of staff (Gral. Rios Ereñú, Gral. Caridi, and Gral. Cassino) were dismissed and some Carapintadas officers who were considered ‘rebels’ received administrative sanctions. Later, after the last uprising of 3 December 1990 some officers were tried and found responsible for the uprisings, some of whom were still in military prison during the time of my field work. At the beginning of the uprisings, the ‘Carapintadas’ officers demanded a political solution to the so-called war against terrorism; the end of the discredited campaign against the army; the retirement of the Generals who did not support the ‘Carapintadas’ and their replacement by officers who were able to express to the government the real problems within the army. The ‘Carapintadas’ demands were not restricted to the military arena and, mainly during the last two uprisings, they were critical of the government’s foreign and economic policies. Many officers denounced a ‘new world order’ in the international arena that was affecting the national sovereignty and the national identity. ‘From the perspective of some analysts, since the third uprising when the leadership changed from Lieutenant Colonel Rico to Colonel Seineldín, the ‘Carapintadas’ began to shift from institutionally oriented pragmatism towards a more political and ideological direction (Norden 1996: 131f.). We can affirm that with Lieutenant Colonel Rico the conflict remained strictly on a ‘professional’ level, and that with Colonel Seineldín political-ideological levels emerged. Simultaneously, the group consolidated itself and started to create the identity of the ‘Carapintadas’. Unfolding from the narratives and accounts of the ‘Carapintadas’, we can conclude that the army had gone through a crisis of representation which developed into a crisis of institutional identity. The article aims to explain these crises and to portray the model of the ‘good soldier’ that the ‘Carapintadas’ created in order to support their self-image and present themselves to society. This study 4 is based on data gathered from several in-depth interviews with

4

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This article is part of a thesis that aimed at the interpretation of the ‘Carapintadas’ uprisings from the ‘Carapintadas’ point of view, highlighting their evaluations and emotions as well as their ideological speech. The thesis Pensamiento y Accionar Militar. Los ‘Carapintadas’ en la Argentina: 1987–1990 [Thought and Military Drive. The ‘Carapintadas’ in Argentina: 1987–1990] was submitted to the University of Buenos Aires, Department of Social Sciences in June 2002.

some key players within the ‘Carapintadas’ movement. They participated in all the uprisings and are aligned to the line of thought of Colonel Seineldín. We have also analyzed various personal documents written by these officials. The field work was done between 2000 and 2001 and we interviewed officers who were still in jail as a consequence of the uprisings. This article is divided into two main sections. Firstly, I will describe the ‘Carapintadas’ narratives and views about the uprisings to then interpret them as signs of wider crises of institutional representation and professional identity. In particular, I will analyze how the ‘Carapintadas’ feature these crises. Secondly, I will discuss the ‘Carapintadas’ self-image that underpins their narratives. By differentiating themselves from their Generals, the ‘Carapintadas’ produced their professional identities as ‘Good Soldiers’. In this way, the ‘Carapintadas’ offered alternative discourses about the virtues of the ‘Good Soldier’ that, in their view, should contribute to the redefinition of the armed forces.

2

Lack of Representation and the Fragmentation of the Institutional Identity

From the accounts of a group of ‘Carapintadas’ the uprisings can be understood as the result of a series of events and circumstances underlying the armed forces and present during that period. Since the Malvinas/Falklands War (1982), the Argentine army went through a crisis of representation manifested openly in April 1987 which then developed into a crisis of institutional identity. According to Lopez (1994: 62), the crisis of identity questioned not only the professional perspective, but also the moral tone of the military institution. This profound tension promoted the question what it meant to be an army man in Argentina. Therefore, the crisis of identity was made up of military, political and ethical elements. The insurrections questioned the instrumental efficacy of the institution and its new mission began to be debated. However, they also questioned the operational effectiveness by questioning the quality of leadership. Thats why, in order to understand the crisis of institutional identity, it is necessary to start discussing the crisis of representation that emerged in 1987. From a sociological view, ‘representation’ is basically a question of affinities or similarities that transcends a voluntary selection. This outlook differs from the one of private law which belongs to the context of judicial representation covering the idea of “mandate or instruction” (Sills 1977: 307). On the contrary, from the sociological point of view, someone is a ‘representative’ when he embodies certain features of the group, class or profession he belongs to. A representative is someone like ‘oneself’, same way of thinking, same way of behaving, someone who represents our interests. 61

The crisis of representation from the point of view of the ‘Carapintadas’ was expressed in the fragmentation of the operational functions of the institution. This function is achieved through a hierarchical structure whose head imposes security and trust and is characterized by its integrity and courage. This top position entails a greater moral obligation to look after the wellbeing of the subordinates. This collective ethos of the military institution, which includes sharing risks and dangers as well as consequences, crumbled after the experience of the ‘war against terrorism/dirty war’ and the Malvinas/ Falkland war. The lower-rank officers felt both a lack in support and badly represented. To demonstrate this, we could think of the armed forces as a board in which each piece has a certain function and in fulfilling it, everything works correctly. Both events – the Malvinas/Falkland war and the ‘war against terrorism’/dirty war – disclosed that the leader-superior model had changed breaking the entire machinery and the unity and cohesion of the troops. Those generals were no longer perceived as ‘representatives of’ the institution, quite the opposite. They represented the interests of the administration and their own interests, as some of the officers affirmed. By losing all sources of legitimacy they were perceived as strangers ‘defending their own careers’ instead of defending the institution. The objective of the generals drifted to advancing in the institution and their actions were accordingly. This could be seen as a metamorphosis of values. Consequently, the generals stopped being perceived as those embodying features of the group and of ‘oneself’. According to those interviewed, ‘the generals didn’t defend the interests of the group, but those of other groups’. The primary essence of the leadership, which is to represent and defend its organization and its subordinates, 5 was diluted. Due to this lack of representation, the concept of obedience became uncertain. As a result of this, the rules and values of the institution were questioned and discussed to such an extent that it undermined the basic rules of living together in an organization. Another element that can be inferred from the narratives of the uprisings, closely related to the crisis of representation, is the crisis of institutional identity that the Argentine army went through. The social identity that characterized the armed forces had broken down and was in need of recovering. The

5

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We find it important to mention that the officers interviewed, however strong their criticism, could never assert that the army generals were aiming at the destruction of the institution and, in more than one occasion, they pointed at the uneasiness of the generals for the events that had occurred. This fact shows the difficulty in breaking with group bonds. Still we find it correct to talk about a crisis of representation, as the characteristics of the generals were not the appropriate ones for the army the ‘Carapintadas’ wished to have, perceiving themselves with no support, helpless.

reconstruction of this identity was based on the Sanmartinian virtues 6 that had given origin to the old army and that, from the ‘Carapintadas’ point of view, would promote a ‘moral rebirth’ of the armed forces. Social identity is part of the self-concept that derives from group membership. It stems from the sense of belonging to a group. It causes its members to express their preference for the in-group, perceive differences to other groups, and accept and share the rules of the own group. This perception of belonging is achieved by means of institutional and individual mechanisms. We should take into account that military institutions are known for their members’ deeply rooted feelings of internal cohesion which promotes an exclusive and unconditional loyalty to the institutional interests. Simultaneously, the limit between individual and collective identity fades away. The individuals share the main status of being ‘army men’ diluting any other component of their identity. The strong socialization, together with the reduction of external factors, helps carve the profile of the army man and generates strong bonds of identification (Rouquié 1986; Goffman 1988; Coser 1974). Apart from the institutional mechanisms, there are also individual ones that help define social identity. Social identification is associated with social categorization which stresses the similarities within the group. The same categorization is partly responsible for the self-assignment of characteristics of the group to oneself. “When we categorize ourselves, we define, perceive, and evaluate ourselves in terms of our ingroup prototype, and behave in accordance with that prototype.” 7 (Manstead/Hewstone 1996: 559) Self-categorization accentuates stereotypical similarity between self and fellow ingroupers and differences between in- and out-group members. The experience and testimonies of the ‘Carapintadas’ reveal that the values, attitudes and emotions were not seen as being in line with the leadership. Quite the opposite, the consecutive change of generals further deepened the gap between some members of the army. 8 Within each group, the individuals define their own sense of belonging taking into account both their own elements as well as those belonging to another group, resulting in a set of characteristics understood as shared models that give the impression of being ‘part of’ something outside the individual self. The definite fragmentation of those shared models that shape social identity was evidenced through all four uprisings. “The self-categorization 6 7

8

General San Martín is a national hero who led Argentina to its independence. Within the armed forces he is considered a role model. ‘Prototypes’ are defined as a set of features that define each group and describe appropriate behavior for members of each group. They are the way in which we represent social categories. Except for the case of General Cáceres, the rest of the ‘loyal’ officials were more associated with the external group than with the internal group.

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depersonalizes perception and behavior so that people, including ourselves, are perceived and behave not as unique individuals but as a group member.” (Manstead/Hewstone 1996: 559) Arising from this process is the sense of belonging and similarity that helps create bonds as well as uniformity of behavior. During the process of social comparison social identity requires a positive evaluation of the individuals’ own attitudes and behaviors. Hence, it is important to consider the role that the value judgement of others plays in the definition of the self. This is an element that characterizes the interactionist approach (Blumer 1992). The ‘Carapintadas’ events showed how a group of officials in the middle of the hierarchical structure who were socialized in an institution that instilled a series of rules and values came to think that the organization to which they belonged did neither respond to nor defend those rules and values. They also felt excluded leading to a fragmentation of their identity, even with a risk of losing it. As we have previously stated, in this process of categorization, it became difficult for the ‘Carapintadas’ to self-assign group characteristics. More differences were added to the existing ones which led to a definite loss to the feeling of belonging to the army. The need to recover their identity arose as a consequence of their loss in the sense of belonging. The ‘Carapintadas’ believed that the identity would be recovered, first, by rebuilding the Sanmartinian virtues, second, by going back to a more professional army, and finally, by recovering the self-respect and prestige that characterized the armed forces. Due to the lack of representation we have previously mentioned, the ‘Carapintadas’ aspired to a moral rebirth of the higher layer of command. This moral rebirth should be grounded on military honor which is a constitutive and fundamental component of the identity of any officer. Its opposite is the idea of a ‘career’ typical to the bureaucrats/generals. The return to a professional army made up by soldiers/warriors as opposed to bureaucrats/managers required, from the point of view of the interviewees, officers trained in the art of war in order to guarantee the military security of the state serving the nation and national interests. It also required officers who have the capacity to support their corporative character and defend the institutional values. It is also important to outline that when Huntington (1959: 15) defines social responsibility he enhances the military subordination to state policies. “The skill of the officer is the management of violence; his responsibility is the military security of his client: society. His behavior in relation to the society is guided by an awareness that his skill can only be utilized for purposes approved by society through its political agent: the state.” However, in the case of the ‘Carapintadas’ responsibility refers to the nation/homeland as a concept that goes back to the origins of identity. The ‘Carapintadas’ reject the 64

idea of the army reporting to the administration and obeying the Constitution, as they consider it a system of law that could eventually change. They support permanent values; therefore, the idea of the homeland is equivalent to a nation or territory and is not a political domain. This aspect refers to the way some officers see themselves and the military institution. We should bare in mind the definition of the military institution given by an army man as ‘the midwife of the nation’, that is, ‘the woman who assists women in childbirth’. The military institution is perceived by some officers as intimately related to the formation of the modern nationstate in Latin America. Hence, they see themselves as safeguards of the nation and its interests. Finally, we can affirm that the perception of threat and material destruction, as well as the attack on the institutional image have altered the components of prestige and respect that historically distinguished the armed forces. Given that prestige and popular recognition are two main components of the creation of the self-image, the tension generated by the wide gap between what is self-perceived and what others see becomes unbearable (Janowitz 1967: 226). The ‘Carapintadas’ never felt taken into account, quite the opposite, their impression was one of being attacked and expelled. From their point of view, the armed forces were ‘assimilated’ – not integrated – by the democratic government, thus losing their own identity. This idea of assimilation also implied destruction and immobilization. We will again stress the importance of respect and prestige in the creation of self-image that are attributed by the ‘significant others’. The self is organized around a self-concept, which involved the ideas and feelings that we have about ourself. These ideas derive from several sources. They are, e.g., based on how we think other people perceive and evaluate us (which, of course, is not necessarily how they actually see us). The armed forces in general and the army in particular have historically played a central role in Argentina. Prestige and recognition from other members of society were always fundamental values to the officers and important dimensions of their selfimage. The ‘Carapintadas’ wanted to rebuild the self-image that was impaired by the bad behavior of the high command by re-establishing the identity of the real soldier and the army. The trial to the Military Juntas that took place during Alfonsin’s administration put the armed forces on front page disclosing situations that contradicted the image that the officers had of themselves. The ‘Carapintadas’ experienced this situation as though it was their own. They thought that the individual responsibilities were treated as collective and that ‘all’ the institution was being tried. That is why some stress the idea of ‘inherited guilt’ referring to events that they did not feel responsible for. The generals defended their own space and careers not giving their support to 65

those that they were supposed to defend. The ‘Carapintadas’ felt that they were going through an experience comparable to the ‘war against terrorism’ and the Malvinas/Falkland War when nobody cared for the subordinates nor for the consequences that they suffered. We can infer from their accounts the sense of undergoing a third war. Lacking a father – the generals –, the offspring – the ‘Carapintadas’ – has to defend the honor, prestige and identity of the armed forces. The perception of harm done to the image of the military institution altered the components of prestige and respect that, from their perspective, characterized the armed forces. The ‘Carapintadas’ thought of themselves as defenders of the military honor momentarily under attack. The mission changed to that of rebuilding the institution by reconstructing its identity and self-respect. From their point of view, the policies implemented during Alfonsin’s administration were harming the essence and identity of the army. The armed forces were losing their historical mission. Since then, the institution stopped behaving as a corporation and two groups were formed, the ‘Carapintadas’ and the ‘Loyals’. One of the characteristics of group behavior is the fact that when there is a common enemy the behavior of its members is organized according to the established internal rules. The conflicts in the Argentine army from 1987 onwards showed that the common enemy were individuals who had previously been considered members of their own group. According to the accounts, the crisis started during the ‘Proceso de Reorganización Nacional’, was accentuated during the Malvinas/Falkland War, and finally expressed itself during Alfonsin’s administration. Before 1987 there was a common enemy and the differences were hidden. During the Malvinas/Falkland War the feeling of ‘epic war’ dominated and during the so-called ‘war against terrorism’ terrorism became the ‘enemy’ to fight. However, during the consolidation of democracy, ‘Carapintadas’ and ‘Loyals’ officers did not have a common enemy, which, in the past, helped them to conceal their differences. From each of these elements that are part of the crisis of representation and identity, the interviewees had built their own identity in the framework of the ‘Good Soldier’ and presented themselves to the society.

3

The ‘Carapintadas’ Image of the ‘Good Soldier’

As we understand from the interviews with officers who participated in the four uprisings, the crisis of identity gave room to a process of reconstruction in which the ‘Carapintadas’ took the initiative to rescue the past and define the image of the Good Soldier in the way they themselves thought to be. Ac-

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cording to the ‘Carapintadas’, the Sanmartinian 9 model of the soldier and the army was mentioned in several occasions. “The Sanmartinian doctrine was, by excellence, that of moral duty, sacrifice, discipline, low profile and abnegate work, denial of political flattery (…). The spiritual content of the doctrine of San Martín is the legacy of highest meaning and historical importance that the Argentine army has received.” (Gral. Giovanedi 1955: 12) The interpretation of that legacy gives room to two types of ideal soldiers, the one that the ‘Carapintadas’ claimed to be and the one that they presented as the other soldier, who was ‘loyal’ to the constitutional government and who was quite the opposite of them. The following chart is a synthesis of the main elements that, from the point of view of the interviewees, make up the construction of these two ideal types. Table 1: Two Ideal Types of Soldiers COMPONENTS

‘LOYALS’ (the image of the others)

‘CARAPINTADAS’ (self-image)

Image of their behavior

Administrators/Managers

Soldiers/Warriors

Responsibility for their behaviors

From the bottom

From the top

Discipline

Without questioning

The essence and the reason of the institution are above discipline

Social identification

Power group

Their branch of the army

Defense of interests

Personal

Collective of the institution

Value system

Values are changeable

Values are permanent

Orientation

Defense of their own career

Defense of the institution

Those two types of soldiers, curiously enough, belong to the same military institution that for some (the ‘Loyals’) is being internally attacked by acts of indiscipline, and for others (the ‘Carapintadas’) is loosing its essence as a consequence of the inaction of generals. The ‘Carapintadas’ introduce themselves as soldiers trained in ‘making war’, the main function of the military institution. The opposite image corresponds to that of the administrator, the bureaucrat who develops skills in political negotiations and in advancing his career. From a symbolic point of view, the warrior is the one who fights against evil, war is his way of imposing order. The armed forces historically were the institution that defended ‘stability’, “(…) the union between Church

9

We should remember again that San Martín was a national hero.

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and Homeland, symbolized in the altar and the flag, the cross and the sword (…) it is the union between heaven and earth; it is the union of two fundamental institutions” (Carrizo 1966: 88). This ethical commitment of defending order is something the administrators had lost. From the ‘Carapintadas’ point of view, they had become ‘civilian-like’, moving away from the role of an Argentine army officer. They should be capable of blending in with a hero. We should bear in mind that a hero is a “semi-divine man, born from a god and a human being, one idealized for superior qualities or deeds of any kind – the origin of a race, the foundation of a city, victories or incredible deeds” (Pérez/Rioja 1971: 240). As to the officers, it is important to have the qualities associated with sacrifice, abnegation, being a role model to subordinates, all of which the generals of the establishment lacked when acting as government administrator rather than army men. We can then infer another element of the ‘good soldier’: his responsebility for the group. The generals did not only not defend their subordinates against external aggression, but also benefited from their hierarchical position. According to the ‘Carapintadas’, the subordinate is supposed to receive the awards first while the superiors are supposed to sacrifice in turn. The spirit of brotherhood and good-fellowship typical of the military institution is taught as giving an example. Consequently, the ‘Loyals’, from the point of view of the interviewees, felt responsibility to start from the bottom while for the ‘Carapintadas’ it was just the other way round. Facing this image of ‘hierarchy’ discipline becomes a fragile concept. According to the ‘Carapintadas’, the generals defended a discipline without questioning it, forgetting that it should be based on wisdom of command. However, when wisdom was lost obedience and respect for the hierarchical structure were jeopardized. The ‘Carapintadas’ considered discipline a pillar of the institution, to be based on the responsibility of the authority that gives the order, and above this discipline we should find the essence and the reason of the organization. That is why the ‘Carapintadas’ were against the concept of due obedience (Obediencia Debida) because they believed that they should not obey orders that went against institutional objectives. Similarly, this would disclose a superior who avoids responsibility. The image that the ‘Carapintadas’ had of the superior also affected the social identification that the ‘Carapintadas’ envisaged. The generals were identified with power groups forgetting the institution they belong to. The ‘Carapintadas’, however, identified themselves with their branch of the army and expected officers to respond accordingly. They, many times, stressed the loyalty for the institution without losing loyalty and respect for the authority. Based on the interviews, we can infer that the ‘Carapintadas’ understood 68

‘loyalty’ as making their opinions about a situation explicit while accepting the sanctions given by the superior. One of the characteristics of the military institution is that of achieving, by means of socialization, the merging of the individual identity with the collective identity, that the ‘I’ should become ‘we’ and that the feeling of belonging to the group should become stronger. This is another element that stands out from the Sanmartinian military model. On the other hand, from the accounts it is possible to infer that the generals defended personal interests and achievements leaning on their social position and their closeness to power. Therefore, their individual interests opposed the group of interviewees. Similarly, the ‘Carapintadas’ protected permanent values from the religious outlook that guides their lives, while the ‘loyal leaders’ defended values that might change and eventually oppose the institutional essence. Hence, they pointed out and supported the need for an ‘autonomous’ military organization as a fundamental institution that had founded Argentina. This idea is contrary to armed forces participating in actions against the national interest. Finally, it is interesting to include the concept of ‘military honor’ in this model of the ‘good soldier’ that is constitutive of the identity of an officer which, according to the ‘Carapintadas’, was undermined by the generals’ behaviors and attitudes. Honor can be understood “as a means and as an end. The code of honor specifies how the official must behave, but being ‘honorable’ is an objective to reach in itself.” (Janowitz 1967: 217) For those men who based their behavior on rules of honor established by the status group they belonged to (like the armed forces that the ‘Carapintadas’ defended), the behavioral code starts with a personal obligation to honor and loyalty to those belonging to the same status group, and ends with the main institutional value of guarding the unity and prestige of the armed forces as an institution (Miguens 1986: 16). The Argentine army was under attack and those in charge of defending it remained aside taking care of their personal interests only. Honor seen as a traditionally assigned factor falters when career orientations of candidates or officers prevail (Janowitz 1967: 218) – this aspect was stressed by the ‘Carapintadas’ on several occasions as an argument used by some officers in order not to be implicated in the events: individual interests prior to collective interests. Each of these elements that drifted from the two stated crises make up the ideal-type of soldier that the ‘Carapintadas’ created for themselves in opposition to their superiors. This image they represented and wished for the rest of the army allows us to describe the type of armed forces that the ‘Carapintadas’ wished to recover.

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4

The Rebirth of the Military Institution

The institution the ‘Carapintadas’ planned to rebuild was not to be subjected to the civilian power, that is to the political parties of the moment. On the contrary, it was to be based on the support of the nation and other political and social institutions. They rejected the ‘subjective civilian control’ which subordinates army men to civilians therefore losing their capacity of discussion and interference with state affairs. This type of control achieves its end by civilianizing the military, making them the mirror of the state (Huntington 1959: 83). López (1994: 22) mentions that the aspect Huntington is mostly interested in is not related to the way in which army men and civilians associate, but in what happens to politicians. López says that Huntington is not interested in how the decrease of the military power takes place, but he pays attention to “the result of the subjective control: by giving their support to a certain sector, the army men increase the relative power of that sector with detriment to another (group, institution, or interest)”. Consequently, “the military institution becomes ‘civilized’ – in that it assumes certain non-military characteristics and dynamics, but civic/political – and politicizes itself”. This means that the military institution is subjected to some political sector or group and loses its autonomy. Opposite to this, the essence of “objective civilian control” is the recognition of autonomous military professionalism (Huntington 1959: 83). The ‘Carapintadas’ understood that ‘rendering assistance’ to a group and getting close to civilian affairs equals being subdued and therefore losing the equality that typifies the different state powers. They fought for space and direct participation of the armed forces in public affairs. Going back to the two types of civil-military relations, López (1994) remarks that Huntington does not consider the possibility of an autonomous military intervention, taking for granted the military subordination to civilian authorities. In the Argentine case, this is a key issue when we consider the role of the military institution in the history of our country. López (1994: 26) widens the concept of ‘subjective civilian control’ considering the particularities of Argentine reality. He considers this civilian control as “the attempt to elaborate the military subordination based on the support given by the army men to a certain group or political/civilian sector”. On the other hand, the ‘Carapintadas’ expected the institution to become a part of the state and military affairs to be ‘considered’ in state issues. The perception of an institution that founded the nation is understood as the search for accompanying and being part of the state. That is why the idea of military subordination stated by López goes against that of integration and participation, and the idea of supporting a political power group goes against 70

the perception of reporting to the nation/state. We wonder: Who do you report to when you report to the nation? It becomes difficult to understand it from the point of view of a democratic system which works with political parties. According to the ‘Carapintadas’, they reported to a series of precepts and beliefs that created the concept of ‘being Argentine’, that is, the roots of the Ibero-American people, catholic and whose origin stems from Spain. The ‘Carapintadas’ interpreted the cultural globalization as a threat to the national identity and sovereignty of the country. Finally, and considering the world context at that moment, the ‘Carapintadas’ felt that the army had to recover its historical role as ‘savior’ of the nation, but this time through a political party. The failure in the military arena and their separation from the army did not immobilize the group. Quite the opposite, together with the ideological influence of Colonel Seineldín, new strategies were implemented and they were first heard about through a military-civilian movement called ‘Ibero-American Movement for Identity and Integration’ (Movimiento de Identidad e Integración Iberoamericana) and later through a political party, the ‘Popular Party for Reconstruction’ (Partido Popular de la Reconsturcción). From the point of view of the ‘Carapintadas’, the armed forces had lost their identity and they had been unable to restore it, thus feeling excluded from this ‘new’ army. These new armed forces were very different to them and they felt Argentina was losing its roots. The ‘good soldier’ started a different fight based on the national and catholic thought, loyal to its people and considering the collective benefit even at the risk of his own career. The ‘Carapintadas’ saw themselves on this path, and even if some did not support the idea of a political party because to them being an army man was their vocation not their work, they did not find another way of being heard and recognized. Some of these men would have liked to accompany, through the armed forces, a national government that watched the interests for its people in the search for a lost identity.

5

Conclusion

With this article I have tried to present, with accuracy and respect, the point of view of a group of men who strongly questioned their institution as well as the policies implemented by civilian governments. The accounts have revealed that, however strong the criticism against the generals, the main perpetrators of the attack against the armed forces were those who did not belong to the military institution. Thus one looks outside for the guilty ones, assuming in turn the role of victims – an apparently permanent mark in Argentine political history. The economic, social or political crises are always attributed to some external entity and not to oneself. Neither president Alfonsín nor 71

president Menem 10 would have been able to support their decisions had the generals not acted on their side. And General Videla and General Galtieri 11 would not have been able to do their share had it not been for civilian and political groups. It may be necessary for the Argentine people to start reflecting and revising the microcosm of the events in order to point out and identify the responsible ones whose behaviors brought about macro-social consequences. The ‘Carapintadas’ should not be excluded from this reflection, they too should undergo a self examination. Literature Blumer, Herbert (1982): El Interaccionismo Simbólico, perspectiva y método. Barcelona: Hora. Carrizo, Eulogio. (1966): Milicia y Servicio. In: Revista Militar, 678, 45–62. Coser, Lewis, A. (1974): Las instituciones voraces. México City: Fondo de Cultura Económica. De Imaz, Jose Luis (1977): Los que mandan. Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires. Giovanedi, Jorge (Gral de Div) (1955): El contenido espiritual de la doctrina militar. In: Revista Militar, 630, 1–135. Goffman, Erving (1988): Internados. Buenos Aires: Amorrortu Editores. Huntington, Samuel P. (1959): The Soldier and the State. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Janowitz, Morris (1967): El soldado profesional. Retrato político y social. Buenos Aires: Bibliográfica Omeba. Janowitz, Morris (1985): Las pautas cambiantes de la autoridad organizativa: la institución militar. In: Bañón R./Olmeda, A. (Eds.): La institución militar en el Estado Contemp-oráneo. Madrid: Alianza Universidad, 81–100. López, Ernesto (1994): Ni la ceniza ni la gloria. Actores, sistema político y cuestión militar en los años de Alfonsín. Buenos Aires: Universidad Nacional de Quilmes. Manstead, Antony/Hewsrone, Miles (Eds.) (1996): The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social Psychology. Cambridge: Blackwell. Miguens, José E. (1986): Honor Militar, Conciencia Moral y Violencia Terrorista. Buenos Aires: Sudamericana Planeta. Norden, Deborah (1996): Military Rebellion in Argentina. Between Coups and Consolidation. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. Perez-Rioja, José A. (1971): Diccionario de Símbolos y Mitos. Madrid: Tecnos.

10 Alfonsín and Menem were two constitutional presidents after the military dictatorship (1976–1982). 11 General Videla and General Galtieri were the first and the last presidents during the military dictatorship (1976–1982).

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Rouquié, Alain (1986): Poder Militar y Sociedad Política en la Argentina, Tomo I y II. Buenos Aires: Hyspamérica. Sills, David L. (Ed.) (1977): Enciclopedia Internacional de las Ciencias Sociales, Vol. 4. Bilbao: Aguilar.

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The Hybrid Soldier: Identity Changes in the Military Karl Haltiner & Gerhard Kümmel Looking at its nature, military service in itself is a very honorable, very beautiful, very noble thing. The real center of the vocation to be a soldier is nothing but the defense of good, of truth and, in particular, of those who have unjustly been attacked. (Pope John Paul II.; our translation)

1

Introduction

In general, paying attention to the soldier, i.e. to the micro or individual level of the soldierly subject, is something that, compared to an analysis of the military and its usefulness and effectiveness as an instrument of a state’s foreign, security and defense politics, is done rather rarely. There certainly are some objective reasons for this, especially the fact that access to the object of such research, the soldierly individual, is regulated by the military organization. Nevertheless, the described situation comes as quite a surprise as this neglect, even if it is not a complete one, is thoroughly unjustified, because, at the end of the day, as organizational sociology tells us, any institution is made up of human beings. Institutions can only be as good as their members allow for; it is human capital, the human factor, which determines the extent of the gap between pretensions and reality regarding the realization of the tasks and functions commissioned and entrusted to the institution and that matches practice and theory.

2

The Hybridization of the Soldier

However, in the more recent past interest in the micro/individual level of the soldier of Western armed forces has grown somewhat and there are basically two reasons for this: One is that, within the context of developments in society that center around key words like individualization and risk society, both the leeway and the responsibility of the individual to give structure, meaning and direction to his/her life have grown dramatically (Beck 1986; Giddens 1990). In addition to the process of value change identified by Ronald Inglehart (1977, 1990, 1997) entailing the shift from materialistic value orientations to post-materialistic value orientations it seemed logical that costbenefit-calculations would rather prevent people from joining the armed forces, a horrendous scenario for anyone engaged in human resources management and recruiting in the military. As a consequence, there have been various studies which tried to identify the reasons and motivations of young 75

people to join (and remain within) or not to join the armed forces (see, e.g., Bulmahn 2007a, 2007b). The second one relates to the profound changes the armed forces of modern industrialized countries have been subjected to since the beginning of the 1990s due to the fact that we live in an era of globalization and complex interdependence. Because of the depth and the intensity of this process, there are no longer talks about a mere reform of the armed forces. Instead, the terms Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and transformation have been and still are used in Western militaries to describe the scope of change. This automatically entails the question of how the members of these militaries perceive, evaluate and assess these fundamental changes. The same applies to the thorough reorientation of most Western armed forces towards a profile of the military that entails being capable of military engagements on an extraregional, i.e. a more or less global scale, in multinational settings, i.e. in close cooperation with the armed forces of other countries, and in complex missions that are qualitatively different to the missions most of these Western armed forces have been used to in the era of the East-West conflict. Defense, deterrence, and also attack, the three classical or traditional tasks and functions of the military throughout the 20th century are still with us, but they no longer are the exclusive and most important elements of the military’s profile. This profile has been broadened to include international crisis and conflict management, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peace building, nation building, humanitarian interventions and emergency and disaster service and all that comes with it. Having said that, it becomes clear that an analysis of the soldierly subject that does not pay due attention to his/her organizational, societal and global embeddedness runs short. Reflecting on and arguing about seemingly perennial and eternal military and soldierly norms, values, principles and virtues may be very interesting; it may also arouse strong emotions and lead to heated debate. But only focusing and concentrating on such a discussion is somewhat uni-dimensional and remains in a vacuum. A similar verdict of under-complexity applies to a demand that is often heard in Western countries. According to and following this position there is, precisely as a consequence of the changing profile of the military, an utmost need for a remilitarization of the military (see Haltiner 2004). What is often heavily deplored to be missing and thus desperately sought are the fighter or warrior spirit, the willingness to fight and the archaic warrior. Yet, looking for an answer to questions of soldierly identity requires more. It requires to include the organizational level and the tasks that are commissioned to the military into the analysis. It also calls for the consideration of relevant processes and changes that take place within the wider soci76

ety and even within the world at large. All this is needed in order to adequately and fairly tackle the complexity of soldierly identity as a dynamic and thus changeable phenomenon that emerges out of the interrelation of the individual and his/her environment, their co-determination and dialec tics. According to this, soldierly identity may be illustrated by resorting to three ideal-type axis which result in a three-dimensional model and matrix. Figure: Soldierly Identity Nation/Monofunctionality Meaningful Action

Segregated Armed Forces

Integrated Armed Forces

World Society/ Multifunctionality

Parochial Acting

The first axis stems from juxtaposing the personal motifs underlying the actions of soldiers. Here, action with a sense for a broader and larger sense and meaning is differentiated from action that is an end in itself and follows some narrow and parochial interests. The basic difference here is whether a given soldier in his/her actions follows a simple command and order impulse or a set of relatively banal incentives on the one hand or requests a more complex and meaningful context, an ethical or political framework to embed his/her actions into. For example, a soldierly action is defined as driven by simple impulses of narrow or banal incentives when a soldier participates in military missions only because of the financial and economic gains he/she expects, solely because of careerist considerations, simply because he/she has been ordered to do so or just because he/she belongs to the so-called mission junkies who go on military missions to satisfy purely egotistic needs and long77

ings. By contrast, a soldierly action is defined as complex and with an orientation towards deeper sense and meaning when the soldier is convinced that his action is good, justified, morally responsible or widely accepted politically. The second axis reflects one of the classical debates in military sociology and is marked by the opposing positions of two well-known American social scientists, one is the political scientist Samuel P. Huntington (1957), the second the sociologist Morris Janowitz (1960). While Huntington’s name stands for the ideal image of a relative separation, a segregation of the military and its parent society, Janowitz’ name stands for a conception of civil-military relations in which the armed forces are fairly well integrated into society. Within the first concept, the military is seen as an elitist institution that is in need of being protected against unwelcome influences resulting from societal and sociocultural developments in order to ensure the effectiveness of the institution. In contrast to this, the latter vision starts from core values in Western society such as democratization and participation and strives for the military’s acceptance, respect and legitimacy in society and thus favors the military’s integration into society. 1 The third axis represents the mental background of military missions and juxtaposes a national reference frame and a post-national or world society one. Thus, the distinction here is between a military operation scenario primarily along national and patriotic orientations and one that is much broader and includes a global and international outlook following world society or cosmopolitan orientations. While the first position is circumscribed by the traditional military functions of defense, deterrence and attack, the latter one includes non-traditional military tasks such as peacekeeping, peace enforcement, state-/nation building, humanitarian interventions and post-conflict peace building. Related to this are different sets of a soldier’s functions and competences. When the armed forces’ purpose was more narrowly defined as the defense of the national territory, a soldier’s qualification focused on his combatant function. The identity primacy lay in the ‘warrior’ role, the profile of competence was narrowly, almost monofunctionally focused on armed battle. All other functions were clearly of secondary importance compared to this one. The outlined expansion of missions calls for a considerably extended set of competences. The internationally deployed soldier – the miles protector (Däniker 1995) – is deemed to have multifunctional abilities that go beyond monofunctional combatant qualities. Diplomatic or „scholar-statesman“ qualities (Moskos 2000: 15) as well as constabulary and streetworker competences (Bredow 2006) come to mind, without which international sta1

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As can easily be seen, these two positions resemble the German debate between ‘traditionalists’ and ‘reformers’.

bilization operations cannot be adequately and successfully conducted. Hence the warrior function today is at most a necessary, but not a sufficient qualification, and no sufficient soldierly identity basis anymore, either. Today‘s modern soldier thus is multi-, not monofunctional (Haltiner 2003). Indeed, modern militaries are in search of the hybrid soldier. He/she is a warrior and a fighter as well as a constable, a policeman, a diplomat and an armed global street worker. Today’s soldier needs to know how to fight, how to provide local security, how to deescalate conflict situations, how to treat local adversaries, how to cooperate with civilian international relief and humanitarian organizations, how to help rebuild war-torn infrastructures, etc. While being experts in violence, i.e., in the use of force, the soldier needs to be welltrained, well-educated, capable of cultural and social empathy, in possession of intercultural and social skills and competences and knowledgeable in diplomatic behavior and communication (Kümmel 2003). Next to a pillar of soldierly identity that entails patriotism and national commitment, a second pillar is to be developed that rests upon some sort of humanitarian cosmopolitanism and an orientation towards human dignity and human rights that are not in contradiction of national interests, but go beyond them. Team work competences and capabilities, critical loyalty, reflection capacities and power of judgement regarding one’s own actions and one’s responsibility for one’s deeds plus an awareness of the need to link the armed forces to society and to secure democratic legitimacy are critical competences the modern soldier has to have. Equally necessary for today’s soldierly identity is a good knowledge of foreign, security and defense politics in an era of globalization.

3

Conclusion

The reality of military missions of most Western armed forces shows that socialization and learning processes in the direction of such a role set and identity of the soldier are indeed taking place which means that a dynamic change, adaptation and modification of soldierly identity takes place, both at the level of an individual soldier’s identity and at the level of collective soldierly identities. To a quite considerable extent, the transformation of Cold War militaries to armed forces that can, within a world society or cosmopolitan framework, intervene and be deployed on an extra-regional and more or less global scale has been digested mentally and subjectively and has been included into the individual and collective soldierly identity. Yet, this does not mean that this applies to every single soldier. Rather, it is to be acknowledged that, indeed, there are soldiers who do not fall into this type of category, but can be found in other segments of the above matrix on soldierly 79

identity. Their existence is not only to be intuitively inferred, but can be shown empirically. As a consequence, soldierly identity can be conceived as a melange that meanderingly moves around a gravitational center along the lines of the new profile of the military and its soldiers sketched above. Soldierly identity cannot be fixed once and for all, but is subject to dynamic processes of change. Thus, this center of gravity has to be taken care of with a sense and an intuition for the actual as well as the potential factors that may endanger it. Literature Beck, Ulrich (1986): Risikogesellschaft. Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp. Biehl, Heiko (2005): Kampfmoral und Einsatzmotivation. In: Leonhard, Nina/ Werkner, Ines-Jacqueline (Eds.): Militärsoziologie – Eine Einführung. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 168–286. Bredow, Wilfried von (2006): Kämpfer und Sozialarbeiter – Soldatische Selbstbilder im Spanunngsfeld herkömmlicher und neuer Einsatzmissionen. In: Gareis, Sven B./Klein, Paul (Eds.): Handbuch Militär und Sozialwissenschaft. 2nd edition. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 314–324. Bulmahn, Thomas (2007a): Berufswahl Jugendlicher und Interesse an einer Berufstätigkeit bei der Bundeswehr. Ergebnisse der Jugendstudie des Sozialwissenschaftlichen Instituts der Bundeswehr (SOWI-Research Report No. 80). Strausberg: SOWI. Bulmahn, Thomas (2007b): Berufswahl Jugendlicher und Interesse an einer Berufstätigkeit bei der Bundeswehr. Ergebnisse der Jugendstudie 2006 des Sozialwissenschaftlichen Instituts der Bundeswehr (SOWI-Research Report No. 81). Strausberg: SOWI. Caforio, Giuseppe (Ed.) (1998): The Sociology of the Military. Cheltenham, U.K. – Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar. Caforio, Giuseppe (Ed.) (2003): Handbook of the Sociology of the Military. New York et al.: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers. Dandeker, Christopher (1998): New Times for the Military: Some Sociological Remarks on the Changing Role and Structure of the Armed Forces of the Advanced Societies. In: Caforio, Giuseppe (Ed.): The Sociology of the Military. Cheltenham, U.K. – Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar, 573–590. Dandeker, Christopher (1999): Flexible Forces for the Twenty-First Century (“Facing Uncertainty” Report No. 1). Karlstad: Swedish National Defense College, Department of Leadership. Däniker, Gustav (1995): The Guardian Soldier. On the Nature and Use of Future Armed Forces (UNIDIR Research Paper No. 36). New York – Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. De Libero, Loretana (2006): Tradition in Zeiten der Transformation: Zum Traditionsverständnis der Bundeswehr im frühen 21. Jahrhundert. Paderborn et al.: Ferdinand Schöningh.

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Dörfler-Dierken, Angelika (2005): Ethische Fundamente der Inneren Führung. Baudissins Leitgedanken: Gewissensgeleitetes Individuum – Verantwortlicher Gehorsam – Konflikt- und friedensfähige Mitmenschlichkeit (SOWI-Report No. 77). Strausberg: SOWI. Ebeling, Klaus/Seiffert, Anja/Senger, Rainer (2002): Ethische Fundamente der Inneren Führung (SOWI-Working Paper 132). Strausberg: SOWI. Gareis, Sven B./Klein, Paul (Eds.) (2006): Handbuch Militär und Sozialwissenschaft. 2nd edition. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. Giddens, Anthony (1990): The Consequences of Modernity. Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press. Haltiner, Karl W. (2003): Spartaner oder Athener? – Die europäische Offiziersausbildung vor neuen Herausforderungen. In: Kümmel, Gerhard/Collmer, Sabine (Eds.): Soldat – Militär – Politik – Gesellschaft. Facetten militärbezogener sozialwissenschaftlicher Forschung. Liber amicorum für Paul Klein. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 35–48. Haltiner, Karl W. (2004): Die Demilitarisierung der europäischen Gesellschaften und die Remilitarisierung ihrer Streitkräfte. In: Jäger, Thomas/Kümmel, Gerhard/ Lerch, Marika/Noetzel, Thomas (Eds.): Sicherheit und Freiheit. Außenpolitische, innenpolitische und ideengeschichtliche Perspektiven. Festschrift für Wilfried von Bredow. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 226–241. Huntington, Samuel P. (1957): The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations. Cambridge/Mass: Harvard University Press. Inglehart Ronald (1977): The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Inglehart, Ronald (1990): Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Inglehart, Ronald (1997): Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Jäger, Thomas/Kümmel, Gerhard/Lerch, Marika/Noetzel, Thomas (Eds.) (2004): Sicherheit und Freiheit. Außenpolitische, innenpolitische und ideengeschichtliche Perspektiven. Festschrift für Wilfried von Bredow. Baden-Baden: Nomos. Janowitz, Morris (1960): The Professional Soldier. A Social and Political Portrait. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press. Kümmel, Gerhard (2003): A Soldier is a Soldier is a Soldier!? The Military and Its Soldiers in an Era of Globalisation. In: Caforio, Giuseppe (Ed.): Handbook of the Sociology of the Military. New York et al.: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, 417–433. Kümmel, Gerhard/Collmer, Sabine (Eds.) (2003): Soldat – Militär – Politik – Gesellschaft. Facetten militärbezogener sozialwissenschaftlicher Forschung. Liber amicorum für Paul Klein. Baden-Baden: Nomos. Leonhard, Nina/Werkner, Ines-Jacqueline (Eds.) (2005): Militärsoziologie – Eine Einführung. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. Martin, Michel L. (1981): Warriors to Managers: The French Military Establishment Since 1945. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

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Moskos, Charles C. (2000): Toward a Postmodern Military: The United States as a Paradigm. In: Moskos, Charles C./Williams, John A./Segal, David R. (Eds.): The Postmodern Military – Armed Forces After the Cold War. New York – Oxford: Oxford University Press, 14–31. Moskos, Charles C./Williams, John A./Segal, David R. (Eds.) (2000): The Postmodern Military – Armed Forces After the Cold War. New York – Oxford: Oxford University Press. Seiffert, Anja (2005): Soldat der Zukunft. Wirkungen und Folgen von Auslandseinsätzen auf das soldatische Selbstverständnis. Berlin: Verlag Dr. Köster.

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New Roles for the Military: The Hellenic Armed Forces and the 2004 Olympic Games Dimitrios Smokovitis 1

Introduction

After the manifestation of mass terrorism at the 9/11 attack against the United States of America and the following terrorist assaults in Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Spain, the provision of security to the 2004 Olympic Games came to be discussed in a new light. In Greece, in particular, responding to such threats became a matter of national defense. Although there was no specific intelligence indicating a specific terrorist threat to the Athens Olympic Games of 2004, the countering of such an eventuality gained prominence. Since it was widely assumed that this required the decisive engagement of military power, the Hellenic Armed Forces (HAF) planned, in every detail, the application of military countermeasures against any potential terrorist threat from the air, the ground and the sea.

2

The Involvement of the Hellenic Armed Forces

In February 2002, an Olympic Games Branch (OGB) was established, headed by a lieutenant general, directly under the Chief of the Hellenic National Defense General Staff. The specific mission was to help the Hellenic Police to provide the security at the Olympics by assisting and contributing to operational planning and conduct. The Staff of the OGB established a firm cooperation not only with the Hellenic Policy and the HAF, but with all Hellenic security agencies. The OGB instituted a common planning on the strategic, operational and tactical levels. This led to the promulgation of the master plan ‘IFITOS’ which outlined how the HAF should respond to the assigned missions and regulate all the necessary logistic support. According to the plan, the personnel involved in the security of the Olympic Games reached a total of 53,363 persons. The supporting equipment included 513 vehicles, 51 vessels, 182 aircrafts and helicopters as well as 28 Air Defense Batteries S-300, Patriot, Crotale, Hawk and Velos. The main tasks of the HAF were: (a) To support the Hellenic Police in securing the Olympic venues and activities in Athens and the Olympic sites. This involved the deployment of a joint military security force of up to 15,000 personnel. In that context, the main missions of the armed forces were:

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(1)

(b)

(c) (d)

(e)

(f)

(g)

(h)

(i)

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The deployment of personnel for checking pedestrians or vehicles accessing the Olympic venues or events. (2) The deployment of personnel for patrolling athletic or non-athletic areas, venues for the hospitality of foreign VIPs along with other crucial sites for the security of the Olympic Games. (3) The deployment of personnel for escorting members of the Olympic teams and VIPs. (4) The provision of aerial means for the surveillance of the Olympic venues and events. The armed forces provided nearly 1,000 personnel for guarding vital venues, all over the country. These were 236 members of the special forces for guarding venues inside the Attica Basin and 700 soldiers for guarding the full length of the railway line and vital installations in the rest of the country. The HAF assisted the Hellenic Police in policing the land borders by providing five special border battalions and nine infantry battalions. The HAF provided the means and personnel of the Hellenic navy to survey the open seas of national interest and assisted the coast guard in policing the sea borders. Noteworthy in this regard were the Olympic water areas and especially the Olympic port of Piraeus where 110 seals and scuba divers were dispatched to inspect the ground of the sea and ship hulls in the Olympic water areas and the port of Piraeus. The HAF engaged the biggest part of the air defense system of the country (23,500 personnel, radar network, 28 air defense batteries and 110 fighter aircraft) for the surveillance and control of the Greek airspace and ATHENS FIR in cooperation with the Civil Aviation Agency and the countering of ‘Grade 1’ asymmetric threats (from unauthorized aircraft or helicopters). Additionally, the HAF supported the Hellenic Police in countering ‘Grade 2’ threats (from hand gliders, remote-controlled vehicles and similar objects) by providing six T-6 aircraft, two combat search and rescue helicopters and 100 army and air force officers acting as air observers in the Attica Basin. The armed forces provided 33 helicopters and one maritime patrol aircraft for surveillance missions and maintained eight helicopters and 19 A/C in readiness for the transportation of personnel and material. The HAF deployed specialized personnel (plus trained dogs) for ordnance disposal to neutralize possible explosive devices in the Olympic venues, transportation routes and underwater areas. The HAF provided a joint medical NBC unit of 217 soldiers to support the ‘National Plan against NBC threats for the OG 2004’. Their main

task was to be the first rescue response, inside the so-called ‘hot’ and ‘warm’ zones in case of of an incident caused by biological or chemical agents. These medical personnel were intensively trained and qualified in real conditions in a chemically polluted region in the Czech Republic. It should be mentioned that the armed forces provided logistic support for the NATO CBRN Task Force which was called to help the Hellenic state in dealing with CBRN Threats. (j) The armed forces provided intelligence support to the Hellenic Police through the established military intelligence networks. (k) The HAF maintained reserve forces and kept them in readiness status to assist in dealing with natural, technological or other disasters according to the civil protection planning in case of need. But the engagement of the HAF did not stop with the Olympics themselves. During the conduct of the Paralympics (17–28 September) that followed shortly after the Olympic Games the participation of the armed forces in direct police tasks was also required. This time the HAF’s contribution reached half the scale of the Olympic Games. Specifically, the personnel of the joint military security force was decreased to 4,934. In general, the safety posture during the Paralympics remained the same as that of the Olympic Games pertaining to the guarding of vital installations and control and surveillance of land, sea and air space of national interest. After the completion of the Paralympics, the main bulk of the joint military security force returned to their home units. The staff of the military force and the staff of the OGB remained active until 31 January 2005 in order to extract the lessons learned from Greece’s involvement in the security of the games.

3

International Cooperation, Logistics, Finances and Legislative Adjustments

In the fulfillment of their mission the Hellenic security agencies received precious assistance and international cooperation from the Olympic Advisory Group consisting of seven countries (Australia, France, Germany, Great Britain, Israel, Spain and the U.S.). In addition, bilateral cooperations existed with countries that had been involved in other major athletic or non-athletic events (like Australia, France, Italy and the U.S.) and, of course, with NATO. NATO’s contribution was focussed on specific areas such as intelligence, air surveillance (with the deployment of AWACS) and maritime cooperation. Furthermore, NATO provided NBC assistance to the benefit of the cognizant civil authorities.

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Special consideration was given to the process of choosing the personnel of the joint military security force. The selection criteria included personal appearance, knowledge of foreign languages and volunteer participation. Additionally, special attention was paid to uniform issues and lodging that met hotel standards. The amount of 10 mio. € was spent to renovate the camps. At the same time, Greece took the necessary measures to improve the food provided to the personnel, both in the camps and the venues. From all the above we can assume that the total HAF was involved, directly or indirectly. Estimates of the complete costs of the HAF’s involvement are in the range of 130 mio. €. The HAF were called upon to accomplish additional missions. This implied the need for some adjustments in the internal military legislation such as a new special law passed by the Greek Parliament to cover the security needs during the Olympic Games of 2004 in Athens. These adjustments were achieved with the approval of the new laws by joint ministerial decisions and parliament.

4

Conclusion

It became evident that the military presence in executing police tasks did not bother either the local public or the international visitors. The fear of militarizing the Olympic Games did not materialize despite the abundance of military forces. On the contrary, the military presence enhanced a feeling of security. The HAF was extremely flexible in adapting to the new security of the Olympic Games. As the major security entity in the country, one with a high level of training and operational readiness, they fulfilled their novel role with outstanding efficiency. Literature Brekis, Spyros (n.d.): The Greek Armed Forces and Their Contribution to the Revival of Olympic Games of 1896. Athens: Ministry of National Defense, War Museum (in Greek). Caforio, Giuseppe (2001): The Flexible Officer. Gaeta: Artistic & Publishing Company. Caforio, Giusppe/Nuciari, Marina (1994): The Officer Profession: Ideal Type. In: Current Sociology, 42: 3, 33–56. Harai, Denes/Malomsoki, Jozsef/Kiss, Zoltan Laszio (2002): The European Officer and the Challenge of the New Missions. Budapest: Institute of Social Sciences of the Miklos Zrinyi National Defense University. Kuhlmann, Jürgen (Ed.) (1996): The Present and Future of the Military Profession – Views of European Officers (SOWI-FORUM International 18). Strausberg: SOWI.

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Kuhlmann, Jürgen/Dandeker, Christopher (Eds.) (1991): Stress and Change in the Military Profession of Today (SOWI-FORUM International 12). München: SOWI. Moskos, Charles C./Williams, John A./Segal, David R. (Eds.) (2000): The Postmodern Military. Armed Forces after the Cold War. New York – Oxford: Oxford University Press. Myrtsioti, George (2004): Golden Medal to the Armed Forces. In: Kathimerini Daily, 18 November (in Greek). Smokovitis, Dimitrios (1977): A Special Social Group: The Armed Forces. Ph.D. dissertation. Thessaloniki: School of Law and Economic Science of the University of Thessaloniki (in Greek). Smokovitis, Dimitrios (1977): Armed Forces and Society: The Contribution of the Armed Forces to Technological Development. In: Military Review (Athens), 8: 26–35 (in Greek). Smokovitis, Dimitrios (1981): Greek National Defense Policy and Assessment. Research Study, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University. Published in: Hellenic Review of International Relations, The Institute of Public International Law and International Relations, University of Thessaloniki, 3–4, 337–380. Smokovitis, Dimitrios (1984): From Institutional to Occupational Values: Trends in the Greek Military. In: Kuhlmann, Jürgen (Ed.): Military and Society: The European Experience (SOWI-FORUM International 4). München – Toulouse: SOWI, 361–386. Smokovitis, Dimitrios (1988): Greece. In: Moskos, Charles C./Wood, Frank (Eds.): The Military: More than Just a Job? New York: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 249–253. Smokovitis, Dimitrios (1989): Military Sociology in Greece. In: Kuhlmann, Jürgen (Ed.): Military Related Social Research: An International Review (SOWIFORUM International 8). München: SOWI, 187–199. Smokovitis, Dimitrios (1994): The Greek Armed Forces in Somalia. In: IUS Newsletter, Fall, 8–11. Smokovitis, Dimitrios (1995): The Postmodern Military: Comparative Perspectives: Greece. Paper Presented at the Biennial Meeting of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, 18–19 October, Baltimore, USA. Smokovitis, Dimitrios (1998a): The Greek Participation in IFOR/SFOR (Bosnia). Paper Presented at the Biennial Meeting of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, 24–26 October, Baltimore, USA. Smokovitis, Dimitrios (1998b): The Role of the Armed Forces in Maintaining World: Peace. In: Nomos, 8, 1038–1045. Smokovitis, Dimitrios (2001): The Greek Participation in Kosovo. Paper Presented at the Biennial Meeting of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, 19–21 October, Baltimore, USA. Smokovitis, Dimitrios (2002a): Military Education and Training. The Case of the Greek Army. In: Harai, Denes/Malomsoki, Jozsef/Kiss, Zoltan Laszio (2002): The European Officer and the Challenge of the New Missions. Budapest: Institute of Social Sciences of the Miklos Zrinyi National Defense University, 177–180.

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Smokovitis, Dimitrios (2002b): The Greek Army in Afghanistan. Paper Presented at the World Congress of Sociology of the International Sociological Association, 7–13 July, Brisbane, Australia. Smokovitis, Dimitrios (2002): New Trends in the Greek Military. Organization and Training. In: Essays in Honour of Professor Litsa Nicolaou-Smokoviti, Vol. C. Piraeus: Department of Business Administration of the University of Piraeus, 1621– 1629.

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Rhetorical Persuasion and Storytelling in the Military Giuseppe Caforio 1

Introduction

When I joined the platoon of parachutists that had been assigned to me after being commissioned as a lieutenant and completing the necessary specialization courses, I found the non-commissioned officers (sergeants and corporals) of the platoon waiting for me in line in a dormitory on the first floor of the barracks. The sergeant presented the force to me, I asked them for their names and exchanged a couple of words with the group, to then say, “Let’s go down to the canteen and have a drink together” and dismiss them. The NCOs saluted, one after the other, to then, one after the other, jump out of an open window onto the courtyard. I understood that I had to follow them without any hesitation, even if I didn’t know how I would land on the cobbles, otherwise I would lose face. I jumped and luckily there was a big heap of sand left by bricklayers who were working on the outer wall in the courtyard beneath the window. It was a way of putting a newly arrived officer to the test, but also of establishing a kind of complicity, a bluff experienced together and then who knows how it would have been told? We find various definitions of rhetoric and a great number of studies on rhetoric as a discipline. For the purposes of this study it seems sufficient to point out that rhetoric can be defined as “eloquence of speaking and writing” (Devoto 1971: 1918) or, in a way more oriented to our purposes, “the study of effective thinking, writing, and speaking strategies; rhetoricians analyze and evaluate what works and what does not work in a specific context” (Hadley Porter 2004: 2). Storytelling is narration, understood as a “literary activity that aims at the artistic transfiguration of real or imagined events arranged in a chronological way” (Devoto 1971: 1919). Helen Hadley Porter defines it thus (2004: 5): “Narration is storytelling and is frequently paired with specific and concrete description in essays with an expressive purpose. An autobiographical, writer-focused, or personal experience essay will basically be a ‘descriptive narrative’ with event, character, and setting developed with specific sensory details.” I thought it would be interesting to report Porter’s definitions as well because they always appear to be oriented towards a purpose, and this orientation seems consonant with the project of this paper that assumes in its conceptual background: “Rhetoric and narratives are basic instruments for making sense of situations and events, facilitating decisions to happen, for creating opportunities and for committing people to projects. They allow the 89

members of organizations to make sense of their professional or work situation.” (Bonet 2006: 9) It is the same sense that Robert Einarsson (2003: 6, 11) gives when, referring in particular to narratives, he considers it as the “fabric of culture and tradition” and, later on, identifies the instrumentality of narrative with respect to ideology, writing: “Narratives are clearly a primary vehicle of ideologies, both nationally and on the individual level. The ideologies that we inherit and those we fabricate in our conversations with ourselves and others are a powerful force in providing a delimited world where good is good and bad is bad.” Other writers consider organizations themselves as storytelling systems (Boje 1991) and most agree that newcomers are socialized into the organizational culture by way of storytelling (Deal/Kennedy 1982; Schein 1991). In addition, if I am allowed to borrow the concept of imagined communities, used repeatedly in the 1980s by various authors like Anderson (1991) and Hobsbawm/Ranger (1987) in reference to the ideological construction of the national community, the rhetorical persuasion that comes from narratives appears functional to creating communities and communions even where they do not actually exist. This is true not only for nations, but also for the subcultures of smaller organizations. As Anderson (1991: 37) writes with regard to nations, ideologies “do not describe any pre-existing community, if anything, they attempt to evoke it, to create it, and seek to do so in the most convincing way possible for the greatest possible number of interlocutors. It is a question of ideologies that do not rest on true assumptions but on verisimilar assumptions, not on founded descriptions but on possible narrations.” Thus, if rhetorical persuasion and storytelling operate in organizations, especially in the sense of creating cultural communities, where individuals are ideologically bound to achieving a project and draw sense and meaning for their daily actions from it, this is particularly true for the military, where the necessity of making sense of situations and events is undoubtedly a more pressing concern in the face of such special situations as those of combat. The military organization is there to exercise organized violence in potential or actual situations of armed conflict. Always from a teleological standpoint, whatever the prevalent use of military units may be in a given historical period, 1 their technical, cultural and moral preparation is oriented to the most demanding one, combat. Warfighting is a condition where nearly all the individual needs are compressed and deprived of gratification, the threats regard 1

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The last few years have seen a gradual increase in operations whose main focus is not combat. They came to be called ‘Peace Support Operations’ (PSOs) or, with a more general paradigm, ‘Military Operations Other Than War’ (MOOTW). However, the use of military units in such operations is still accompanied by actual warfighting missions (Afghanistan and Iraq, for example), and the face of international conflict remains extremely changeable.

the essential aspects of the person (life, physical integrity), radical value conflicts are created (contrast between moral codes and combat codes), individualism is often stifled, and the individual ego is assailed by anxiety, fear, pain, uncertainty, and a sense of impotence (see, among others, Stouffer 1950). It is therefore a situation where there is an extreme necessity that people are committed to the project and that individuals can make sense of their work situation in face of the harsh reality of death and destruction of the battlefield. But military activity is also a group activity carried out in what usually are emergency situations that requires more than others strong esprit de corps and solid internal cohesion of the units. The sense of community, necessary for any organization, is therefore felt particularly strongly here, and the creation and maintenance of an ideology that supports it is and always has been a constant concern of the military manager. 2 It therefore appears interesting and meaningful to analyze how rhetorical persuasion and storytelling operate and are achieved in the military organization.

2

The Weight of Tradition

History has always seen armies as protagonists. Although we have left the historiographical period that the French called ‘histoire-bataille’, even the most specific forms of social history cannot overlook the fact that the great changes on the international scene have almost always been produced through the exercise of organized violence. The historic centrality of armies and war thus give significance and importance to the military organization, in which warfighting determines the central beliefs, values and complex symbolic formations that define military culture (Burk 1999). 3 It is not surprising, therefore, that all military organizations in various countries have an institute, a center or an office devoted to the military history of their armed forces, even in contexts and in countries where other military studies appear to be below par or neglected. The cultivation of studies of military history in all military organizations thus has, as a by-product, a flourishing of military narratives, centered for the most part on single episodes that are often marginal 2

3

Team spirit occurs increasingly less spontaneous in today’s post-modern society. Winslow observes, with regard to initiation rites of recruits, that “coming from civilian society that elevates the individual, initiates are in a world where the value of the group is supreme” (Winslow 1999: 453). For the definition of the term ‘culture’ I find the one given by Donna Winslow most appropriate: “Culture is a social force that control patterns of organizational behavior. It shapes members’ cognition and perceptions of meaning and realities. It provides affective energy for mobilization and identifies who belongs to the group and who does not.” (Winslow 1999: 435)

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with respect to the larger story and in whose narration reality and fantasy are equally mixed. Their function, however, is no less important for the organization than the dissemination and teaching of actual history. Indeed, for the organization, military-based narratives – often war memoirs, also autobiographical ones – feature two aspects that are not present in history. The first is constituted by the sublimation of facts, events and behaviors that are normally made by the narrator and that are totally precluded to history as a science. The second is that narration, often episodic, enables and encourages an identification of the recipient with the protagonist or the writer, an identification that, by virtue of the sublimation mentioned above, cannot fail to lead to sentiments and behaviors that are positive for the organization. A significant and well-known example is represented by American war films, especially those dealing with episodes of the Second World War. Narration linked to tradition also finds expression in the use of symbolic artifacts (see Piras 2006) aimed at creating and reinforcing a sense of belonging and of continuity. Referring here to a few examples borrowed from my personal experience, I can cite how on the stairways of the command building of the Military Parachutists School in Pisa there was (and still may be) a series of panels tracing the history of the parachute, from the first drawings by Leonardo da Vinci to the experiments of Garnerin, Blanchard and Berry to the photographs of the most recent models. This achieved a clear reference to the historical and proto-scientific roots of the equipment that characterized the specialization, rooted it in time, and simultaneously provided the members of the organization with uncommon knowledge of the history of that equipment. Again, in another barracks’ building, there were copies of photographs of parachutists of the ‘Folgore’ division in combat actions during the Second World War. Here the figurative storytelling appeared to be aimed at reminding the men, even in peacetime, that the parachutist has always been first and foremost an elite fighter. Rhetorical persuasion and storytelling also enter into the strictly institutional activity of individual military units where teaching the regimental history (which often mixes narrative cues and aspects in with the actual history of the unit) plays the dual role of shaping the complex of beliefs, values and symbolic formations that define military culture and of creating a specific esprit de corps of the regiment that puts it in competition and comparison with similar units of the same armed forces. As Winslow writes for a Canadian airborne regiment: “New members learned airborne history during the Airborne Indoctrination Course (AIC, one of the Regiment’s socialization mechanisms). Soldiers were taught a sense of duty and debt to the past, to those that had fought and died in previous war.” (Winslow 1999: 435) But, as

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previously said, training processes of this kind are more or less present in all military organizations.

3

History and Stories

As we have seen, the distinction between history and storytelling is not very clear-cut in the military organization; I therefore included everything which, although it might have narrative aspects, is imparted more or less officially by the organization, normally through written texts or other artefacts, in the preceding section. In this section, instead, I want to deal with actual storytelling, as it occurs by oral tradition (at times also rooted in time) within all military units. It must be said in advance that storytelling in the military takes on important functions of cohesion, of creating or strengthening the esprit de corps, and therefore constitutes an element that must be taken into consideration by the military manager. It is particularly widespread and significant in special units (a confirmation of its function of enhancing the esprit de corps, where it is even more important), of which I will take a few concrete examples. Here, too, I will start with a personal recollection. In the company of Italian parachutists, that I had the honor of commanding, the story was told of an experienced NCO who had adopted, along with his platoon, some rather unorthodox procedures in a military exercise. The story went as follows: the unit has had the task of carrying out, firstly a parachute drop, then a sabotage mission against an enemy installation and finally an exfiltration by means of a long march through the Pisan Hills. After brilliantly executing the jump and the sabotage action, instead of undertaking the long, fatiguing march, the unit had gone to the nearest railway station and taken the train to Pisa, whereupon they made their return to the barracks marching and singing, in perfect formation and with a martial air that had amazed everybody because it was after such a long and supposedly fatiguing march. The story is interesting because it offers significant insights into its effects on personnel. It tells of an initiative characterized by brazenness (lack of respect for rules), imagination in adapting to a contingent situation, an attitude of strong complicity among the men, and a valorization of the formal military aspects (the unit returning in march step and singing), but in the framework of accomplishing the task (sabotaging the objective). If one thinks about it, however, one can easily see how these are the characteristics that a special unit commander would like to have in his men: it is here that storytelling takes on the function of a parable, of a symbolic – and, in this case, also amusing and witty – way of educating and teaching. Other stories, again taken from those collected among Italian parachutists, clearly have the aim of 93

favoring a selection of new recruits on the basis of qualities of character, as in this one told by a parachutist: “When we got to the dormitory the older guys told us: this evening no off duty, combat uniform and a light digging tool. We’re going behind the sports field where each of you will dig a grave of his own size. As you know, given the high mortality in military jumps there’s no time to do it later (...).” Or this one: “Major So-and-So was trying a new parachute but, after exiting the plane, the static line didn’t come unhooked from the parachute pack. So he had to haul himself up the line hand over hand and get back in the plane. Finally back inside he gasps, ‘Damn, this isn’t even going to count in my number of jumps!’” The event actually occurred with an incorrectly used American T-10 parachute, but its transformation into a story and its dissemination are obviously aimed at making the exceptional normal and teaching what character and poise the parachutist must possess. Storytelling also appears to be extremely effective in shaping the sense of the combat situation, of materializing it, making it almost tangible, such as in the lived experience recounted by Tom Squitieri, a soldier during the Gulf War and, later, journalist. “Shattered shrapnel and it started the truck on fire. And all of a sudden you’re totally disoriented, totally disoriented, smoke everywhere and fire and heat. And of course, the feeling of hot metal going into your body, my face, my arm, my leg, I was hit with the shrapnel including my face above it, so, there was blood coming down into my eyes. It’s not like the movies or the TV shows where, you know, everything’s fine and someone runs to help you. The driver, he had been wounded as well. I, we knew we had to get out of the truck. My leg was killing me. My arm was killing me from being wounded, and I couldn’t leave him there. I just couldn’t leave him there. So, I, I had to kick the door open on my side with my one good leg, (…).” (Reported in the ‘Journalists War Home’. Online: http://www. newseum.org/warstories/interviews/mov/wars/war.asp?warID=1) This applies not only to combat, but also to the other deployment situations now typical for the military. The picture given of the situation in Somalia in 1991, described by the journalist Dan Rather upon his arrival in Mogadishu, is a case in point (in Journalists War Home, cited): “I began the drive from the Mogadishu airport into the city itself and it began to sink in that here was, even for experienced correspondents, a unique situation. It’s a country that doesn’t have a government. There’s no police force. There’s no water. There’s no electricity and there’s death everywhere. And the drive from the Mogadishu airport into the city itself is among the more unforgettable things I have ever experienced because death has a peculiar, totally unique stench. It permeated every second.” (Reported in the ‘Journalists War Home’. Online: http://www.newseum.org/warstories/interviews/mov/wars/ 94

war.asp?warID=1) No official account or history can give such a real, palpable picture of lived situations as their narrations do.

4

Rite and Initiation

Rhetorical persuasion within the military also makes use of rite. Rite is very important for the military organization because it sublimates simple rules of aggregation that tend to give a semblance of order to the chaos of combat, to the moral and material disorder of armed conflict. Think of the functions of the sergeant, the ‘serra-gente’ of old battle units, aimed at forming the men into ‘cadres’, enclosing them in an ideal square in order to keep them from dispersing by rushing forward (lone assaults) towards the enemy or recoiling backwards (evasion of the situation) or moving laterally (scattering, uncertainty), thus failing the fundamental objective of the military manoeuvre of focusing the thrust at the desired point and time. These original elementary functions of forming troops in cadres for combat later became formal rules of formation, marching, presentation for review at military ceremonies, and so forth, which strictly observe a ritual that is codified in regulations and handbooks. Like storytelling, rite is also educational, because it teaches the individual to blend into the group, that it is only the group – the platoon, the company – that counts, and that he is a protagonist of the rite itself. Rite also reminds of tradition, giving it greater weight, making the individual feel the ideal bond with those who preceded him in the ranks, 4 with the history of the unit of which he is a member, and the moral obligation to ‘live up to it’. But beyond official rite, the public military ceremonies that everyone is familiar with, there are a number of rites in the military that are much less well-known and have begun to be talked about only in the last few years. These are rites of passage whose importance in military culture and capacity of persuasion on individuals must not be underestimated. Rites of passage, of status, or initiations, as they are also called, have the purpose of screening the individual for a set of qualities that make him an integral, accepted part of the group and his effective determination to be part of it, and tend to represent a crucial milestone in the individual’s professional military history, as earning a university degree (and the accompanying student rites) might be in ordinary professional life. 4

In military ceromonies the reference to the past is always present: one just has to think of the honors to the fallen, included more or less in the military ceremonies of all armies, which can be described, with an efficacious French expression, by the ‘le mort saisit le vif’ (the dead seizes the living).

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Such rites originate from the spontaneous ‘primary group’ (Stouffer 1950) and are themselves spontaneous, completely unofficial, and often even prohibited and combated by the institutional authority. As such they take on different characteristics and forms from country to country, and even from unit to unit (although transversal connections often exist [Winslow 1999]), occasionally degenerating into an outright abuse of the individual. For this last aspect they have often been lumped together with military hazing, from which they must absolutely be distinguished: hazing is based on the bullying of new recruits by more experienced soldiers, has the sole aim of bringing material advantages to the latter (often illicit) and is prolonged over time, whereas rites of passage mark a change of status that is recognized collectively in a precise, unique moment in the soldier’s personal history. All the authors who have studied the phenomenon are in agreement on this point (see, e.g., Winslow 1999; Battistelli 2000). The importance of the study of military initiation rites does not only derive from it being a social phenomenon, but also from its positive role in the creation and reinforcement of the esprit de corps. It is now commonly observed in comparative studies conducted in different units that where these rites exist, the esprit de corps is stronger and more deeply felt. Indeed, according to some, “studies showed that the more severe the rite of initiation was, the greater the bonding to the group is” (Aronson/Mills 1959: 157), a position shared by Winslow (1999), Nuwer (2001) and, much earlier, by Grinker/Spiegel (1945). This assessment is also indirectly confirmed in an Italian study (see Carducci 1999), where it is pointed out that these rites appear to be more widespread in the army’s top operational units. In agreement with these positive assessments are also the opinions of those directly concerned, as can be seen in numerous interviews conducted by various authors. Donna Winslow, for example, reports a statement by a Canadian parachutist: “Zulu Warrior was a smoker or initiation ritual at which we demonstrated to our peers that we new guys were enthusiastic and anxious to be part of the unit (…). We all felt closer-knit and united after it.” (quoted in Winslow 1999: 447) In a research that I myself carried out among the Italian parachutists of the Folgore Brigade, I found out that a strong majority of the interviewees appeared favorable to these initiation rites, and that the relationship with the ‘old hands’ was viewed positively by most. This was underlined by expressions such as “for the unit, the action of the older guy is like a mother’s milk for her child” (quoted in Caforio 2002: 136). An explanation of this phenomenon is given by a commission of experts that carried out an investigation in Italy on this phenomenon. Noting the difficulties that the recruit encounters in fitting into the new social reality of the military unit, the commis96

sion writes: “In this sense the recruit needs a cohesive primary group, a subculture, a role of reference that shows him the possibility and modalities of physical and psychological survival of the present situation. The ‘veteran’/new recruit relationship responds to all of this. It offers the recruit a social microsystem, that is, a set of structures, statuses, norms and values.” (Archivio Disarmo/IDS Barcelona 1999: 15) Naturally, rites of passage do not only have positive aspects for unit cohesion. They can mix in and merge with unacceptable practices of hazing and/or mobbing, at times reaching extremes that require drastic countermeasures which in some cases have led to dissolving the unit. As Winslow again writes, strong group cohesion “is a double-edged sword: what can be functional unit bonding for war can quickly become dysfunctional in an army at peace” (Winslow 1999: 453). To finish up, it should be pointed out that rites of passage are frequent in storytelling, where they are often heavily emphasized, and end up constituting an important part of the cultural background of the individual military unit. In some units they are filmed and distributed as videos, like gadgets and other objects that identify a unit (see Winslow 1999; Piras 2006).

5

The Manager and Storytelling

The necessity for an interdisciplinary approach to a study of the military in general (Caforio 2007), produced by the ever-growing complexity of the use of armed forces and their leadership, also extensively impacts on the aspects of management. For the study of the military many disciplines appear necessary today, moving beyond the strictly positivist approach prevalent in the past. In this framework of greater openness to research, rhetoric and narrative become meaningful tools for a deeper understanding and management of the human and social aspects of the military universe. They make it possible to penetrate and comprehend aspects of the dynamics of social groups, particularly of the so-called small groups (Stouffer 1950), which would otherwise remain unexplored. The three aspects examined here, the weight of tradition, the content of stories, and the rites of passage as an element of storytelling, constitute interpretive elements that are characteristic of, and in part perhaps peculiar to, the military institution 5 . The military manager must be aware of them and be able to discern their contents, also in order to know how to accept the aspects that appear functional to the purposes of the institution and to neutralize and 5

Rites of passage are present, of course, in many other contexts (colleges, sports teams, etc.), but they rarely have the same importance and significance as in the military.

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block the dysfunctional ones. All this needs to be done in a framework of constant relationship between dialogue and clarification with the broader parent society (that is called ‘civil society’), which may have difficulties in understanding and accepting some forms of socialization in the military. A commander who does not know how to valorize and turn to account the activity and the life of the small groups that spontaneously form within units, places a heavy handicap on the efficiency of those units, but on the other hand, one who winds up being passively dominated by this activity loses his leadership over the unit he commands. It is a delicate balance that the military manager achieves most of the time on the basis of his personal qualities and sensibility, but which can be considerably aided by the study and knowledge of the present phenomena. Literature Anderson, Benedict (1991): Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. Revised Edition. London – New York: Verso. Archivio Disarmo Roma/IDS Barcelona (1999): Combattere il ‘nonnismo’ nella prospettiva di un esercito di professionisti (Progress Report). Rome. Aronson, Eliot/Mills, Judson (1959): The Effect of Severity of Initiation on Liking for a Group. In: Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 59, 157–158. Battistelli, Fabrizio (2000): Anatomia del nonnismo: cause e misure di contrasto del mobbing militare. Milan: Franco Angeli. Boje, David (1991): The Storytelling Organization: A Study of Story Performance in an Office-Supply Firm. In: Administrative Science Quarterly, 36: 1, 106–126. Bonet, Guinó et al. (2006): Understanding Expertise: Information and Narratives, First Conference on Rhetoric and Narratives in Management Research, EUDOKMA-ESADE, 11–13 May, Barcelona, Spain. Burk, James (1999): Military Culture. In: Kurtz, Lester (Ed.): Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace and Conflict. San Diego: Academica Press, 447–462. Caforio, Giuseppe (2002): Spirito militare e spirito di corpo nelle caserme italiane. In: Negro, Piero del (Ed.): Lo spirito militare degli italiani. Padova: Università di Padova, 133–143. Caforio, Giuseppe (Ed.) (2007): Social Sciences and the Military: An Interdisciplinary Overview. Abingdon: Routledge. Carducci, Giovanni (1999): L’ Osservatorio permanente sul nonnismo dello Stato Maggiore della Difesa. In: Informazioni della Difesa, 2, 40–48. Commissione per lo studio e la prevenzione del nonnismo (1999): Relazione conclusiva. Rome: Stato Maggiore dell'Esercito. Deal, Terrence E./Kennedy, Allan (1982): Corporate Cultures: The Rites and Rituals of Corporate Life. Reading, Mass.: Addison – Wesley. Devoto, Oli (1971): Dizionario della lingua italiana. Florence: Le Monnier.

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Einarsson, Robert (2003): Narrative Credibility in Rhetoric and Literature: The Case of Jane Austen. Edmonton: Grant MacEwan University. Online: http://www.classiclanguagearts.net/resources/re-paper-austen.htm; retrieved 21 July 2008. Grinker, Roy R./Spiegel, John W. (1945): Men under Stress. Philadelphia: Blakiston. Hobsbawm, Eric J./Ranger, Terence (1987): L’invenzione della tradizione. Turin: Einaudi. McAdams, Dan P. (1993): The Stories We Live By. New York: The Guilford Press. Nuwer, Hank (2001): Hazing: Separating Rites from Wrongs. In: American Legion Magazine, 1, 147. Piras, Enrico M. (2006): The Study of Workgroups in the Military: An Organizational Aesthetics Perspective. In: Caforio, Giuseppe (Ed.): Social Sciences and the Military: An Interdisciplinary Overview. Abingdon: Routledge, 144–160. Porter, Hadley Helen (2004): Rhetorical Strategies of Idea Development and Organization. Bozeman, MT: Montana State University Writing Center. Schein, Edgar H. (1991): Organizational Culture and Leadership. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Stouffer, Samuel (1950): The American Soldier: Adjustment During Army Life. New York: Science Editions. Winslow, Donna (1999): Rites of Passage and Group Bonding in the Canadian Airborne. In: Armed Forces & Society, 25: 3, 429–457.

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New Methodological Approaches: Aspects of Online Questionnaires Karl Hegner 1 1

Introduction

The internet is used by social scientists in a lot of ways to gather data about social phenomena; there are “Web-based questionnaires, Web experiments, observations of virtual worlds, case narrations, content analyses, and analysis of mailing lists and other log data” (Batanic/Reips/Bošnjak 2002: back cover). In order to classify the huge amount of different activities social scientists use the web for into categories, Reips (2002: 229) distinguishes between (1) nonreactive data collection; (2) online surveys; and (3) web experiments. The analysis of server log files or of contributions in news groups are examples for non reactive data collections. These data bases cannot be changed afterwards by the people who contributed to them; and this feature is the defining condition for non-reactiveness. But these tasks as well as the important topic of web experiments will not be dealt with here. The only focus of the present small paper will be on online surveys. Concerning that issue there will be some theoretical remarks (‘theoretical’ is meant here in a naïve sense) and some practical remarks.

2

Theoretical Remarks

These remarks will concern the following topics: (1) Online surveys in the context with other survey methods; (2) the features characterizing online surveys; (3) the errors connected with online surveys; and (4) sampling processes. Two kinds of respondents’ recruitment for online surveys will be described here. (5) The problem of generalizing results of online surveys will be rudimentarily discussed. 2.1

Online Surveys and Other Kinds of Questionnaires

Online surveys and web based questionnaires are a reactive data gathering method in social sciences. ‘Reactive’ means that the objects from and about whom data are collected are aware of the measuring and observing processes. Reactive procedures can be either administered by an interviewer or self1

I did with Jürgen Kuhlmann an extensive study about time budgets of naval commanders. And I have to say that he always was a fine and fair colleague.

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administered. So Bošnjak (2002: 7) came to the following classification of questioning techniques: Table 1: Social Science Methods for Gaining Results through Questionnaires Without Computer Assistance

Computer Assisted

Administered by an interviewer

Paper and Pencil-Interview Computer Assisted Telephone (PAPI) Face to Face Interviews Interview (CATI) Computer Assisted Personal Interview (CAPI)

Self-administered

Hardcopy Surveys Deployed by (ordinary) Mail

Computer Assisted SelfAdministered Interview (CASI) – Disk-by-Mail – E-Mail-Questionnaires – Web-Surveys

In contrast to the other data raising methods it is possible to integrate videos, graphics, short movies, etc. in online surveys; moreover nested filters are definable. So the medium internet considerably enhances the tool-box for social scientists. 2.2

Features Characterizing Online Surveys

Asynchronous application: With mailed hardcopy questionnaires the respondent can choose the time for working through the questionnaire. This is characteristic for self-administration and also valid for online surveys. Not bound to a certain place: The only necessary condition for taking part in an online survey is the availability of an internet connected PC. This is an important feature especially for intercultural studies. Automatic course of administration and registration of the reactions to a web based questionnaire: The respondent scrolls through the questionnaire and clicks the options which indicate his/her answers to the questions. The reactions will be registered by a computer program and are ready for analysis after finishing the questionnaire. So the expensive step of scanning the pages of a hardcopy questionnaire and preparing the data for statistical analysis is no longer necessary. Documentation of data and meta-data: Not only the data will be registered but also the meta-data; e.g. time and date of the application of the questionnaire; the navigation path through the online survey (filters); the duration. Flexibility in the layout of questions and answer options: In web based surveys one is not bound to text only in setting the stimuli. It is possible to integrate graphics, photos, sounds, and short movie sequences. 102

Objectivity in application and analysis: There is no interaction between respondents and the persons who lead the investigation and analysis. The effects of social desirability may be reduced; this feature thus contributes to objectivity. 2.3

Sources of Error in Web Based Questionnaires

There are two perspectives for looking at the quality of results from web based questionnaires. The first one uses classical test theory as the frame of reference. Thus online surveys are seen as psychometric methods for asking questions and gathering the answers. And for evaluating the quality of an online questionnaire analyses are necessary with which to decide upon the reliability, validity and objectivity of the instrument under scrutiny. According to Bošnjak (2002: 17) that view is spread primarily in the Germanspeaking region. A different view is taken by survey analysts. Here the quality of the measuring instrument is given when the influence of different sources of bias is minimized. And in judging different biases, the sampling process – how the actual sample was drawn – has also to be considered. Generalizing the results is tentatively possible if the influence of the following sources for error are minimized: coverage error, sampling error, measurement error and nonresponse error. 2.3.1 Coverage Error Coverage problems occur if the samples of the target population and the general population are not congruent. If sections of the target population are not in the sample population, under-coverage occurs. The other way round is also possible: the sample population contains sections not found in the target population – over-coverage. The literature on online surveys cites just one example with data from 2000 which demonstrates these effects. We know no newer one and due to the fact that the group of internet users is rapidly growing and changing the example is only illustrative; it presumably no longer shows the true relationships. In that study from Bandilla/Bošnjak/Altdorfer (2001: 18) a random sample of respondents from Germany was drawn; these people were asked to work on a hardcopy questionnaire. Some results of that study are gathered in Table 2. In the left column there are the percentages of the demographic variables for that sample. The right column shows the data for a sample of internet users; these users were drawn from a representative online access panel. The results demonstrate that in the group of internet users there are more men (66.1%) than in the sample from the ‘normal’ population (48.2%). There is an under-coverage for the group of women, and an 103

over-coverage for young adults and people with high education. Therefore caution is advisable in generalizing results which concern variables correlating with socio-demographic variables. 2.3.2 Sampling Error Inferential statistics is the theory that tells us under what conditions we can draw serious conclusions from sample statistics about the values of the parameters of the well-defined population under consideration. The rationale is that the sample statistic will always be scattered around the parameter value; the size of that scattering is the sampling error. That size can simply be lowered by expanding the sample; the bigger the sample the lower is the sampling error. But big samples are expensive and therefore pragmatic viewpoints also lead the design of social science studies and not only systematic ones. The sampling error also depends upon the way the sample is drawn. For web based questionnaires a special kind of sampling was invented: the socalled event-sampling (see below); but the new sampling method is not yet sufficiently based on systematic studies which consider the method. Table 2: Comparison of socio-demographic variables of a random sample form the total population and a sample from an Online Access Panel, representative for the internet users (in per cent) Paper and Pencil questionnaire of a random sample (n=1485) from the ‘normal’ population

Web based questionnaire from a representative Online Access Panel of internet users (n=475)

Gender Men

48.2

66.1

Women

51.8

33.9

18–29

16.4

40.4

30–44

31.1

44.8

45–60

27.0

13.6

Above 60

25.5

2.1

Age

Education Low

45.2

8.6

Medium

31.8

21.4

High

23.0

70.0

Source: Bandilla/Bošnjak/Altdorfer 2001: 17.

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2.3.3 Measurement Error In classical test theory measurement error denotes the fact that the true score is sometimes not reached according to circumstances under which the test is applied. For example, in ability testing a person does not score his/her highest level due to fluctuations of attention. These are unsystematic measurement errors and the researchers in the field of public opinion polls purport that these errors can be neglected due to statistical considerations. In the area of web surveys systematic measurement errors appear. These errors come e.g. from a special visual layout or from different resolution rates of computer monitors or from primacy effects by drop-down lists, etc. 2.3.4 Nonresponse Error In every questionnaire – not only online ones – nonresponse error means that persons who were asked to take part in that questionnaire did not answer or did not cooperate; so the social scientist conducting the study receives no data from them. If nonresponse is unsystematic, expanding the sample can repair this negative effect. But it is difficult or even impossible to establish propositions about these people without any information from them. Systematic nonresponse is more serious; because in that case wrong conclusions concerning the population parameters can be drawn. 2.4

Sampling Processes

Sampling problems in the internet can best be illustrated by looking at the research process for getting information about political elections. Municipalities hold lists containing the name of every man/woman in the community who are entitled to vote. So random samples can be drawn from these lists and each and every member of the population has a nonzero chance of being drawn. For the internet users there are no obligatory lists with their e-mail- or IP-addresses. There are commercial stocks with e-mail addresses; but it is often not known in which way these addresses were gathered, so it can be concluded that these stocks are presumably not random samples of internet users. In order to recruit internet users for participation in an online questionnaire there are several methods to be used. (a) Visitors of the homepage of an institution or a single person can be invited or (b) at sites which are often used (e.g., the first site for Google) a banner comes up or an advertisement is placed with a hyper-link to the intended online survey. These recruiting methods all suffer from the same defect of self-selection; the respondent chooses himself for participation. 105

There is another approach; in that approach the entities of the target population are not persons but events. For example the event is the visit of a certain internet site; and sampling occurs in such a way that every tenth or hundredth or thousandth visitor will be invited to participate in an online questionnaire; but that probabilistic moment does hardly circumvent the basic difficulties. Seen as a statistical procedure sampling in the Bundeswehr is quite comfortable since there are lists with all members of the institution. Moreover a lot of features are registered; the socio-demographic variables for example and – important for online surveys – the actual e-mail address. So subpopulations are definable. And as the number of members in subpopulations are known, the sampling process can be quite precise. And it is always easy to minimize sampling bias: the more individuals drawn the better. 2.5

Problems in Generalizing Results from Online Surveys

There are different methodologies for dealing with the generalization of results from single studies. Here generalizability – which is also known as internal validity – is the question: “The results found in the sample, are they also true in the target population?” If results are not generalizable what remains is only a series of case studies, and as Brenner (2002: 93) puts it: “Case studies provide interesting examples of things that happen to some people, but specific cases may or may not have any implications for the rest of the world.” The classical design of inferential statistics works with the following rationale. The central concept here is that of random samples. A sample drawn from a well-defined population is drawn randomly if and only if all members of that population have the same probability of being drawn. And insofar as the sample statistics satisfy certain quality standards (Hays 1963: 196–201) the sample results are transferable to the target population. Now frequencies are the material with which the mathematical algorithms of inferential statistics work – metaphorically speaking. These algorithms do not deal with subject issues. So the general approach for that kind of statistics is this: there is a population with unknown parameters and the only way of gaining some information about these parameters is by drawing samples from that population. But due to the work of empirically oriented scientists important parameters of the populations under scrutiny are not unknown. The distribution of such variables as gender, age, education, marital status, income, etc. for the population of, say, Germany is known; and so a different methodology for the problems of generalizing results from samples came up. The leading idea here is that of sample representativeness. The argumentation is as follows: we trust in the results of a sample if this sample mirrors 106

the proportions of the relevant variables in the population. But there is no theory telling us which variables are relevant in different subject issues. Moreover it is unclear which variables to take in when deciding upon the representativeness of a sample. To construct an extreme example with a medical variable: the real world situation may be that a cognition concerning a social phenomenon may covariate with the blood group of the population members; men and women with blood group 0 score definitely higher on that issue under scrutiny; a sample for that subject issue would be representative if the distribution of blood groups in the sample resembles that of the population. But conventionally always the same standard variables are taken in considering representativeness. Psychological testing theory is just another starting point for looking at the problem of generalizing results from a sample. The basic idea of ability testing can be summarized by a simple formula: X = T + e. The measured test score X is composed by a true score T and an error term e; and in multiple measurements the error term will scatter above and below the true score in such a way that the various error terms will sum up to zero. (The implicit assumption here that the measured score can be higher than the true score according to error influences is hard to digest.) Classical testing theory is further developed to generalizability theory by Cronbach/Gleser/Nanda/ Rajaratnam (1972; see also Brenner 2002: 94). The point here is to disentangle the error term; viz. to disclose the various sources for error influence. And one source of error can be the method of presenting items in a survey; so it has to be clear if there is a difference in results gained by a paper-and-pencil or an online questionnaire. And a further important challenge for online surveys is the problem of unbiased sampling. How (un-)biased sampling and subject issues influence each other is best shown by a table of Brenner (2002: 98); here ‘sources of bias’, ‘generalizability questions’ and ‘hypothetical examples of how this bias could affect results’ are given for eight different examples. We consider that table so illustrative that we show it here (Table 3). Brenner reviews the rare studies concerned with questions of generalizability. One point is that comparing paper-and-pencil with online surveys on the same subject is an expensive task, since the advantages of the online questionnaire (cheapness, quick results, big sample size) are lost in such a study. And as research concerning generalizability is also an empirical task, he stresses the necessity for further endeavors in that area: “[I]t is particularly important to research the medium for its own sake now, defining the limits of generalizability in order to determine the value of internet surveys, before it becomes commonplace to see broad statements of human behavior being 107

made on the basis of sensational results with uncertain generalizability.” (Brenner 2002: 119) Table 3: Potential Sources of Bias in Internet Surveys Source of Bias

Generalizability Questions

Hypothetical Example of How this Bias Could Affect Results

Internet users vs. nonusers

Are users representative of the general population in demographics, attitudes, behaviour, etc.

Internet users may be better educated, highly middle class, and more liberal.

Web surveys vs. e-mail surveys

Do persons who respond to e-mail surveys differ from those who respond to web surveys.

Web survey responders may spend more time surfing, e-mail survey responders may have less negative attitudes towards junk mail.

Volunteers vs. nonvolunteers

Do persons that volunteer to participate differ from those who do not?

Volunteers may be more altruistic or have more free time.

Specific types of users: Web vs. Internet Relay Chat (IRC) vs. e-mail, etc.

Are frequent/primary web users representative of the population of internet users? (for web based surveys)

Web users may be less socially involved and more likely to be compulsive shoppers.

Frequent vs. infrequent users

Since web based research is likely to oversample heavier users, are they representative of all users? Is either more representative of the general population?

Frequent users may be younger and more socially isolated than infrequent users.

Work vs. entertainment users

Are persons who use the web for work undersampled? How might this affect generalizability?

Inclusion of information technology professionals may result in underestimations of the threshold of excessive use.

Talkers vs. lurkers

A special case of volunteer vs. nonvolunteer in online research; do people who participate frequently online differ from those who seldom or never participate.

Lurkers may be more paranoid and less self-disclosing, talkers may be more histrionic.

Website preferences

How do the differences between people who read various web sites – which affects the probability of inclusion – affect generalizability.

MSNBC users may be more informed, vote more, and be higher SES than Ebay users.

Source: Brenner 2002: 98.

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3

Practical Remarks

In the present section we will describe the steps the Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences (Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr – SOWI) has taken in order to build a soft- and hardware configuration for online surveys in the Bundeswehr intranet. The section will deal with three topics: 1. (i) The considerations which led us to choose our specific tools are displayed. (ii) The hard- and software components are described which are now parts of our configuration. And (iii) The improvements planned for an extension of the present arrangement will be shown. 2. In this subsection the main features of the online software will be portrayed. The implicit focus here will be on the differences between the possibilities for Paper-and-Pencil and Online questionnaires. 3. An empirical SOWI study will be reported which partly used the online capabilities. 3.1

Description of the Present Online Configuration in the SOWI, Considerations which Led to it and further Planning

(i) The PCs in the SOWI (and in most offices and departments of the Bundeswehr) are all equipped with an actual Microsoft£ operating system which includes the Microsoft Internet Explorer. Each PC is of one of the following types: (a) stand-alone PC; (b) connected to the Bundeswehr intranet; (c) connected to both intranet and internet. In order to carry out online questionnaires in the intranet of the Bundeswehr (and elsewhere) only three software tools are necessary: a web server, a programming language and (optionally) a data base system. In the newer operating systems the web server tool, is integrated or can be drawn from the freeware market – Apache is the most well-known one. An often used programming language, for example, is PHP, and a freeware data bank is mySQL. We did some experiments with these tools but had to realize that the programming work for small surveys with only a few number of items was very time-consuming. So we abandoned that tinker version and decided to buy professional software. The actual product decision was an easy choice because the SOWI has been using the base system and different modules of the SPSS£ software for 25 years. The (former) meaning of that acronym tells us what it is doing: Statistical Package for the Social Sciences. So our employer bought the SPSS software for online surveys; the whole package for that task is called Data Entry Enterprise Server.

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(ii) The following description of the different modules which constitute the DE Enterprise Server is partly taken from SPSS Data Entry Builder• 3.0 Administrator’s Guide. Citations from that manual are in italics. The full suite of Data Entry Enterprise Server includes the following software components: Builder: Data Entry Builder is a powerful software tool. It offers a lot of options for the layout and the positioning of the items. Network Server: Data Entry Network Server allows survey administrators and network administrators to register surveys. Once a survey is registered and the IP-address of the (hardware) server which hosts the (software) web server is distributed, the Network Server is ready for receiving cases as they are sent from Data Entry Web Server. Web Serve: Data Entry Web Server runs within Orion Application Server to deploy surveys as HTML forms to a Web browser, collect responses from respondents’ Web browsers, and send responses to Network Server. Analysis from SPSS: SPSS for Windows, and other analytic products from SPSS Inc. allow the survey analyst to do further analysis of the survey responses after they are collected. In the manual SPSS Data Entry Builder• 3.0 Administrator’s Guide (SPSS 2006: 16) the different steps taken to deploy an online survey are described. In figure 1 the process for gathering data with a Paper-and-Pencil survey is visualized, too. Typically, the steps from survey creation to storing a survey response with Data Entry Enterprise Server are as follows: x The survey designer uses Builder to create a survey and saves it. (…) he or she exports it to HTML for deployment on the Web. x The survey administrator, working with the system administrator, uses Network Server to register the survey as a master sav file on the server. x (…) the survey administrator, working with the Webmaster, places the exported HTML files in the Data Entry Web Server’s document root directory and publicizes the link for the survey. x The survey is administered to respondents, (…). x For Web surveys, the respondent fills out the survey form and selects the send option. This sends the response to Data Entry Web Server, which in turn sends the case responses to Data Entry Network Server. x Network Server receives the case response data, (…) it saves the case in SPSS format in the master .sav file on the server.

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Figure 1: Flow Diagram, showing the different steps in conducting an online questionnaire as opposed to a Paper-and-Pencil questionnaire

Create a survey with Builder

Deploy survey on Web?

Yes

Export the survey as HTML with Builder

No Register the survey master file (SAV and SER) with Network Server

Paper deployment

Web deployment

Data Entry Web Server Displays HTML form on Web browser for survey responents to fill out

Survey respondents fill out paper form

Scan Hardcopy form

Copy Web files into Web server‘s public HTML folder

Network Server receives cases

Add case to master SAV file

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(iii) The inability of reaching the internet community with our configuration is the main drawback at the moment (June 2008). It is planned to place the Data Entry Web Server in the interface (DMZ) between the internet and the Bundeswehr intranet. Figure 2 schematically displays the future picture: There is the internet ‘world’ and the ‘world’ of the Bundeswehr intranet. That interface is necessary for the communication of Bundeswehr users with the internet; also the public web servers of the Bundeswehr are located in that interface. In the legend the sort of different services which are used for the communication are described. 3.2

Features of the Software which are Important for Online Questioning

There are three outstanding capabilities of the online software; these features are advantages of the online method seen from the viewpoint of survey construction. Filtering: Filters in Paper-and-Pencil surveys are awkward; it is only possible to ask the respondent to go to question number xy and to skip the questions in-between. A second filter near the first one raises confusion; and nesting of filters is nearly impossible. In online questionnaires nesting filters is no problem. Depending on a specific answer the software automatically leads the respondent to the next correct question; skipped questions can be filled with scores indicating the situation. Rules: One can check logical relationships between variables. To give an example: age and income. An income of 100,000 USD a year and an age of 18 years is not plausible; one can ask the respondent to review such an answer. The validation of single variables is also possible. For example a score of 99 in the variable for age produces a query. Types of Questions: An online survey is built up of different forms. The forms are constituted by questions, and each question has a question test and a response control. The forms are of different lengths; so the respondent has to scroll downwards in a form to proceed in reading and answering the questions. According to the possibilities of the HTML-language (the universal language of the internet which is ‘understood’ by web browsers), there are different kinds of question types:

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(a) Opinion Button Question Opinion button questions allow only one answer out of a set of specified answers: If next Sunday were the elections for the Deutschen Bundestag, which party would you vote for with your second vote? CDU/CSU SPD FDP Bündnis 90/Die Grünen PDS/Die Linke Another party

The small circles before the response captions indicate that there is only one answer allowed; a respondent can not mark two (or more) of the responses, if she/he tries to mark a second answer the markation point shifts from the first to the second answer; there is no such control in a Paper-and-Pencil questionnaire. b) Text Box question Text box questions ask a question and offer a text field. This field is confined to a certain length depending on the possible answers for example: Here the default is to allow only four numeric characters. Another kind of text box question would be: What is your year of birth?

(four numerals only)

If 255 characters are not enough, a second text field (again with 255 characters) can be offered. What do you think about subject matter xy. Please, tell us your opinion.

(255 alphanumeric characters only)

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(c) Single-Selection List Box These boxes display a list of responses from which the respondent can choose only one. Single-selection lists require more place than drop-down lists but allow for faster data entry, for instance: (d) Drop-Down List Drop-down lists also allow the user to choose from a list of answers. But the list is displayed only when the user clicks on the control. Drop-down lists save space. They can not be used with questionnaires in printed forms: What is your yearly income (before taxes) ? Less than 20,000 Euros 20,000 to 24,999 25,000 to 34,999 35,000 to 44,999 45,000 to 54,999 55,000 to 64,999 more than 65,000 Euros

(e) Multiple Response Question Multiple response questions allow more than one answer. These questions differ from previous ones (not only) in their statistical treatment; the questions (a) to (d) are each represented as one variable in the statistical system which builds and stands behind the software for online surveys. And the information of multiple response questions is cast into a number of variables; this number equals the number of sub-questions the main question incorporates: What is your higest level of education? Never attended high school Some high school High school Some College Post Graduate Refused

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Here four variables will be built. The first one contains the information: own a fax machine yes/no; (...) own a laser printer yes/no. Which of the following products do you own? … a) … b) … c) … d)

3.3

Fax Machine Copier Computer Laser Printer

An Empirical Example

After extensive testing the SOWI ran the first empirical study with the Data Entry software during December 2005/January 2006. A study which was aimed at the cognitions and opinions of the controllers of the Bundeswehr was conducted. At that time the Bundeswehr had roundabout 750 controllers. 85 per cent of these men and women were invited to work on a Paper-andPencil questionnaire; the remaining 15 per cent got an e-mail with a hyperlink that led them to the online version of the same questionnaire. The online sample covered 96 persons. The results of that study are published in the SOWI media (Richter: 2007). Moreover we used the possibility for a method comparison. The questionnaire had 59 main questions and a lot of subquestions. Number 10 for example was composed of 12 items. So there was a pool of 116 variables/items with standardized answer options. We calculated the chi-square statistic of these 116 variables. In the 2-dimensional tables the row variable was the kind of questionnaire: Paper-and-Pencil or online; whilst the column variables were the answer options: nominal or ordinalscaled. And we can fortunately report that the chi-square values never reached the 5 per cent significance level. This shows that there was no significant variance coming from the kind of questionnaire administered.

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Figure 2:

M Communication: Web server/network server O HTTP and HTTPS service from the Bundeswehr’s intranet Q HTTP and HTTPS service from the internet

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N Data transfer P LAN

Literature Bandilla, Wolfgang/Bošnjak, Michael (2000): Online-Surveys als Herausforderung für die Umfrageforschung – Chancen und Probleme. In: Mohler, Peter/Lüttinger, Paul (Eds.): Querschnitt – Festschrift für Max Kaase. Mannheim: ZUMA, 9–28. Bandilla, Wolfgang/Bošnjak, Michael/Altdorfer, Patrick (2001): Effekte des Erhebungsmodus? Ein Vergleich zwischen einer Web-basierten und einer schriftlichen Befragung zum ISSP-Modul Umwelt. In: ZUMA Nachrichten, 49, 7–28. Bošnjak, Michael (2002): (Non)Response bei Web-Befragungen. Aachen: Shaker. Brenner, Viktor (2002): Generalizability Issues in Internet-Based Survey Research: Implications for the Internet Addiction Controversy. In: Batinic, Bernad/Reips, Ulf-Dietrich/Bošnjak, Michael (Eds.): Online Social Sciences. Göttingen: Hogrefe & Huber, 81–92. Cronbach, L. J./Gleser, G. C./Nanda, H./Rajaratnam, N. (1972): The Dependability of Behavioral Measurements: Theory of Generalizability of Scores and Profiles. New York: Wiley. Hays, William, L. (1963): Statistics. London et al.: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. Reips, Ulf-Dietrich (2002): Theory and Techniques of Conducting Web Experiments. In: Batinic, Bernad/Reips, Ulf-Dietrich/Bošnjak, Michael (Eds.): Online Social Sciences. Göttingen: Hogrefe & Huber, 229–250. Richter, Gregor (2007): Controlling und Führungsprozesse in der Bundeswehr – Ergebnisse einer empirischen Untersuchung. In: Richter, Gregor (Ed.): Die ökonomische Modernisierung der Bundeswehr. Sachstand, Konzeptionen und Perspektiven. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 103–138. SPSS Inc. (2001): SPSS Data Entry BuilderTM 3.0 Administrator’s Guide. Chicago: SPSS Inc.

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II

Civil-Military Relations

The Public and the Military in Slovenia Marjan Maleši & Vinko Vegi 1

Introduction: The Transformation of the Armed Forces and the Public

Public attitudes towards the military are determined by changes of predominant values in contemporary societies as well as by the nature of the military. The end of the Cold War initiated rapid and radical changes in the military organizations of European countries. Downsizing the armed forces, shifting to more flexible and modular formations, increasing force projection capabilities, introducing modular structures and moving from conscription to all-volunteer forces are the keywords in terms of organizational change. As regards functional change, force projection in crises, different kinds of defense diplomacy in peace support operations and international and domestic disaster relief became more visible tasks of the military (see Edmunds/Maleši 2005). In addition, multinationality in performing operations is much more practiced nowadays than in the past. These changes do not pass by without problems. Seeing that far less citizens than in the past join the military service and that military functions are not primarily linked to the defense of the country, the military has lost its function as a ‘school of the nation’. Also, the armed forces are less present in society physically and as a symbol of state security. The new tasks of the armed forces have also raised questions about their legitimacy, especially when these tasks are carried out abroad. From the viewpoint of public support, the decision to participate in peace operations entails some risk. It may be expected that public attitudes towards such missions are more ambivalent and critical than towards the traditional military task of defending the homeland. As Farrell (2004: 296) observed, such ‘non-traditional’ military actions are “freely entered into” by governments and in this sense they are “wars of choice” as opposed to wars of “necessity” that must be fought for the preservation of national security. Dandeker (2000: 32) makes a similar point when he hypothesizes that it may be easier to legitimize the role of armed forces in matters of sovereignty and where clear strategic interests are at stake than in peace support operations, especially when casualties occur and clear political objectives of the operation are not easy to formulate.

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Some also refer to changes within the international system as a factor influencing public attitudes towards the military. Bredow has remarked that a renewed collective security concept is on the political agenda which is sustained by globalization and international institution building: “According to this perspective organized violence and its agents, the armed forces, do play certain roles in the new situation. It is, however, diminished as compared to past eras. And the legitimization of the use of armed forces is about to change. Armed forces are still legitimate instruments of defense, however they are losing their technical and moral justification to promote national interests and to project national power into the international system.” (Bredow 2000: 49) Changing threat perceptions are another factor contributing to the changes in the public’s view of the military. On the one hand, threats other than military ones are gaining in importance and change the understanding of national security. As Dandeker (2000: 28) observed, new conceptions of national security pose “the question, whether armed forces are the most valuable instruments of policy when states consider how best to ensure the security of their citizens in the face of challenges such as economic development, health, and social welfare in an aging population, and threats to the environment”. On the other hand, transnational terrorism and the ‘war on terror’ have led to what may be termed a remilitarization of the military. With regard to Slovenia, since the early 1990s, the Slovenian armed forces (SAF) face similar challenges than the other European armed forces, especially with regard to the post-socialist ones. Yet, they also face a unique situation. This uniqueness lies in the fact that the Yugoslav People’s Army (YPA) completely withdrew from Slovenian territory after a short armed conflict in the summer of 1991. The newly formed independent state of Slovenia had to establish military structures from scratch. The basis for the new armed forces was the former territorial defense structure that mostly consisted of military reserve personnel that came from the former YPA (NCOs and officers of mostly Slovenian origin) or from the police. In 1991, conscription was introduced. From then on, conscripts had to serve seven months compared to twelve to fifteen months in Yugoslav times. Conscientious objection, not allowed before, was also established. The armed forces were put under civilian control and depoliticized and professional military personnel were not allowed to have membership in political parties (for more details see Maleši 2006: 131). The new military enjoyed a strong legitimacy in Slovenian society and strove for modern equipment and organization, but was hindered by a lack of professional expertise, clear (competent) political guidance and modern weapon systems. In the first half of the 1990s, the main efforts were directed towards building basic military capabilities, whereas participation in missions 120

abroad was not conceived as a priority. As was the case with many transition countries, the initial impetus to train and deploy forces for such operations was linked to intentions to join NATO. The last decade brought about the growing need for the SAF to restructure itself and to develop capabilities in line with the new roles of the military, especially with regard to peace operations. Slovenia has participated in such missions since 1997. The number of deployed soldiers expanded from approximately 200 per year in the period before 2002 to 370 in 2003. In the period 2004 to 2006 between 400 and 500 soldiers per year were deployed abroad. Participation in peace operations peaked in 2007 with 750 deployed soldiers and at present, i.e., in the first half of 2008, 500 soldiers serve in peace operations. 1 At the end of the 1990s, the institution of universal conscription in Slovenia underwent a serious crisis. The key indicators of the crisis were a high medical non-fitness of conscripts (often as a consequence of evasion), high rates of conscientious objection, unfavorable demographic trends and the non-operational nature of the SAF. The prevailing manning of armed forces with conscripts was increasingly out of tune with (1) the security situation in Europe and the role of Slovenia in it; (2) value-orientations of a postindustrial (post-modern) society; and (3) the new roles and missions of the military. Thus, in 2003, conscription was abolished and replaced by an allvolunteer force (for more details see Maleši 2003). Our analysis will be based on public opinion surveys (Slovenian Public Opinion – SPO) conducted in the past by the Defense Research Center of the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Ljubljana. We are interested in the public perceptions of the military in Slovenia, and focus on surveys from 1991, the year Slovenia achieved independence, to 2007. Through this period of time some crucial issues were regularly dealt with in the surveys, whereas the data about some of them were collected more sporadically as some new issues became more salient. Surveys which dealt with security issues more thoroughly were carried out in 1991, 1994, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005 and 2007. The sample usually comprised about 1,000 adult citizens of Slovenia. Since attitudes towards the military cannot be explained without recourse to the broader social and political environment, our analysis starts with outlining the threat perceptions of the public. We will continue by presenting public value-orientations and confronting them with public support of Slove1

The current number of officers, NCOs and soldiers employed in SAF is 5,780. According to MoD plans, until 2012 the number of officers will decrease from 1,280 to 1,200; the number of NCOs will increase from 1,800 to 2,000; and the number of soldiers will increase from 2,700 to 4,500. Furthermore, it is planned to enhance force projection capabilities for peace support operations and other tasks in the framework of NATO and the EU.

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nia’s NATO membership because this issue was intensely discussed in public and because (potential) NATO membership was supposed to be one of the main drivers of transformation of the armed forces in the last decade. Next, we will deal with public perceptions of the military as an instrument of national security before we will come up with some conclusions.

2

Threat Perceptions

In theory, we speak about ‘real threats’ (military and political situations in the surroundings of a certain community, frequency and power of natural and technical disasters, ecological conditions, etc.) and about ‘perceived threats’ that are subjectively perceived by the individuals and are reflected in public opinion. This means that the national security system functions in two security ‘surroundings’, in a ‘real’ and in a ‘perceived’ one: the first one is the realm of practice in which the national security system tries to provide effective security, defense and protection of the community against various threats, jeopardizing its cultural and material values and interests; the second one is the realm of perceptions, of attitudes toward the national security system and feelings about (in)security related to its existence. The national security system thus functions in the interaction of these two surroundings: first, the surrounding of internal and external threats to security (the original reasons for the existence, structure and organization of the national security system), and, second, the surrounding of security as a value in which the image of the national security system influences public perceptions of security and trust in different parts of the system. Security, then, is not only a ‘matter of strategic affairs’, but also a ‘matter of spirit’; states, social groups as well as individuals need real security and the feeling of security. If we rephrase this in a more operational way, we could say that this is the relationship between the dangers brought about by different threats and the readiness of the community to deal with them in an organized, systematic and effective manner.

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Table 1: Perception of Threats to Slovenia

traffic accidents

1994

1999

2001

2003

2005

2007

–

3,21

3,24

3,16

3,12

3,34

crime

3,11

3,46

3,28

3,28

3,20

3,20

drugs, narcotics

2,91

3,45

3,41

3,28

3,21

3,17

degradation of environment

3,17

3,35

3,07

2,91

3,06

3,04

sell-out of social property

3,01

3,14

2,87

3,06

2,96

3,03

poverty low birth rate unemployment

–

3,13

3,05

3,08

3,05

2,99

2,25

3,29

3,00

3,09

3,14

2,98

–

3,35

3,14

3,26

3,24

2,97

2,80/ 2,76

3,19

2,76

2,62

2,73

2,85

–

3,08

2,88

2,82

2,77

2,74

economic problems

3,08

3,22

2,99

2,92

2,85

2,69

refugees, illegal immigrants

2,68

2,98

2,74

2,59

2,49

2,52

internal political instability

2,89

2,94

2,53

2,59

2,45

2,51

lagging behind in the field of science and technology

2,66

2,83

2,33

2,47

2,55

2,41

contagious diseases, AIDS, etc.

–

2,77

2,43

2,21

2,28

2,22

conflicts on the territory of former Yugoslavia

2,72

2,74

2,09

2,31

2,22

2,15

natural and technological disasters suicides

extreme nationalism

2,48

2,53

2,20

2,14

2,15

2,07

terrorism

2,45

2,64

2,09

1,87

1,90

1,91

military threats of other countries

2,36

2,21

1,79

1,76

1,68

1,70

Note: The question was: “To what extent do the following factors threaten the security of Slovenia?”; 1 – not at all a threat; 2 – a weak threat; 3 – a medium threat; 4 – a strong threat.

As seen in Table 1, the respondents perceived non-military threats to be crucial for the security of Slovenia: drugs and narcotics; crime; unemployment; traffic accidents; low birth rates; poverty; sell out of social (state) property and other economic problems; and degradation of the environment. We can 123

also see from the table that terrorism 2 and military threats are not perceived as important ones which is a confirmation of a trend experienced in Slovenia in the last decade. It is also a trend that the average figures on threats are lower than in previous years, meaning that the society feels safer every year. Thus, we could say that the perceived threats are more or less in conformity with reality; after the Cold War, military threats retreat and non-military threats take a lead. SIPRI data indicate that the number of armed conflicts in the world is decreasing, while among them intra-state conflicts prevail (SIPRI Yearbook 2006: 3). Non-military threats became more important – although they had already existed before –, perhaps because the lower likelihood of a devastating military conflict enabled us to perceive their importance for the security and stability of the international community. These threats refer to the economic and social field, environmental issues, mass migration, health and epidemiological conditions, terrorism, illegal drug and arms trafficking, the field of information-communication technology, and natural and technical disasters.

3

Slovenia and NATO

The desire to become a NATO member was the most ambiguous national security issue in the recent decade (for a detailed account see Šabi/Jeluši 2003: 83–117). Right after independence, Slovenian politicians eagerly started formal negotiations with NATO; the Slovenian parliament adopted ‘The Resolution on General Principles of National Security of the Republic of Slovenia’ at the end of 1993, and this was the first formal document to announce Slovenia’s ambitions regarding full NATO membership. Yet, at that time, due to its geo-strategic position at the border of the turbulent Balkans, Slovenia was not among the most appropriate states for a meaningful cooperation. When the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was established in December 1991, membership was offered to nine Central and Eastern European countries from the former Warsaw Pact (WP), but Slovenia (as a republic of former Yugoslavia a non-member of WP) was not included in the list and only joined NACC in 1996. In the early 1990s, the Slovenian public did not seriously debate the possibility of NATO membership because the idea simply seemed too utopian. Data on the attitudes of the Slovenian public towards NATO are available from 1994 onwards. In that year Slovenia signed the Partnership for 2

Contrary to this, in 2003, the EU countries citizens perceived international terrorism as the greatest threat to European security. 82 per cent of respondents thought international terrorism was a threat (Solana 2003).

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Peace Program (PfP). The first question on NATO for the respondents of the Slovenian Public Opinion Survey dealt with NATO indirectly. It read as follows: ‘Below is a list of statements. To what extent do you agree or disagree with them?’ One of the statements was related to NATO: ‘We would prefer to ensure Slovenia’s defense on ourselves, even if this costs us more, rather than to become dependent on the West (NATO).’ The level of acceptance of this statement was extremely high, with two thirds of the respondents indicating that they ‘agree completely’ or ‘agree’. Thus, we may indirectly conclude that in the spring of 1994 the public was very skeptical about the idea of Slovenia joining NATO. Roughly a year later (in January 1995) we asked the public once again about Slovenia and NATO. The majority of respondents believed that the Alliance would strengthen its political role in Europe and expand through the inclusion of certain Eastern European countries. Only a small number of respondents thought that NATO would not change (25%) or that it would be disbanded (5%). Table 2: Public Support of Government Efforts to Join NATO (SPO 1995; n=1050) The government is striving for NATO membership of Slovenia. Do you pesonally support such efforts or do you oppose them? I support them

44.2%

I don’t support them but I don’t oppose them

32.7%

I oppose them I don’t know, I am undecided

8.6% 14.6%

The figures in Table 2 show that a relative majority of the public supported the government’s efforts towards NATO membership of Slovenia, but the support was by no means as high as among the political elite and state officials working in the area of national security. 3 Thus, this result did not accord with the political expectations. Even more, it caused shock and disappointment since it became clear that public support for NATO membership was not something automatic and that it would be necessary to justify the idea more systematically and professionally. It is interesting to note that almost half of the respondents were indifferent or undecided despite the fact that this was one of the country’s most important projects since the achievement of independence in 1991. A good quarter of those asked felt that Slovenia’s security position had improved through its PfP participation while more than

3

A content analysis of parliamentary political parties’ programs, of public speeches of statesmen and the results of interviews with high state politicians and officials revealed that the ‘political class’ strongly supported Slovenia’s NATO membership (see Maleši 2000).

125

half of them felt that it had not changed. Approximately a fifth of those asked were unable to judge the effects of PfP on the security situation of Slovenia. Graph 1: Public Opinion Support for NATO membership of Slovenia (SPO 1996–2002)

Yes

No

Don't know

100% 80%

17.9

18.2

20.7

15.7

20.5

21.1

17.6

66.4

61.3

58.3

27.4

22.7

18.4

16.1

24.2

55.4

56.5

53.2

June 1999

Nov 01

26.2

18.3

60% 40%

26.2

64.1

20%

31.5

42.2

0% Oct 1996

Jan 97 Feb 97 March Nov 97 1997

June 2002

More intensive public opinion research was carried out from autumn 1996 to spring 2002. Public support for NATO membership in this period can be derived from Graph 1 which reveals certain trends in public opinion to support the government in its efforts to become a member of NATO: first, from October 1996 to March 1997 public support for the government’s efforts was relatively high and stable, second, the level of opposition to the government’s policy regarding NATO was relatively low (approximately a fifth of the respondents) and stable in this period, third, the group of undecided respondents in this period was relatively high (approximately a fifth of the respondents), fourth, in November 1997, support for NATO membership fell significantly, while opposition did not change and the group of undecided respondents grew larger. This result was almost certainly influenced by the decision of the North Atlantic Council at its meeting in Madrid not to invite Slovenia to be one of the candidates for the first post-Cold War round of NATO enlargement. Afterwards, support for NATO membership remained more or less unchanged until November 2001, but the opposition to NATO membership grew to almost one quarter of the population, whereas the number of undecided respondents decreased. In June 2002, the percentage of NATO mem126

bership supporters dropped considerably while the opposition to membership grew stronger; the percentage of undecided respondents remained at a rather high level. On 23 March 2003 a referendum on NATO membership was held in Slovenia. Out of 1,613,305 voters a total of 974,988 voters cast their votes (60.4%). A total of 965,345 votes were valid. Responding to the referendum wording ‘Do you agree with the membership of the Republic of Slovenia in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)?’ 66.1 per cent voted ‘YES’, whereas 33.9 per cent voted ‘NO’. (see http://www.nato.gov.si.eng) The end of the NATO membership story thus looks very positive, especially for the government and the top officials. The results of the referendum proved that in crucial matters of Slovenian foreign and domestic policy the voice of the silent majority wins. The ‘loud minority’, as NATO skeptics and anti-NATO speakers were labeled in public, lost the case. Nevertheless, the NATO membership campaign in Slovenia showed that the need for transparency increases with the complexity of decision-making. The Slovenian public needs to know the details of major state decisions. These details should be obtained through constructive and empathic debate rather than through technocratic governmental language (Šabi/Jeluši 2003: 100). Furthermore, public support for NATO membership turned out to be consistent. Public opinion data obtained in 2003 and 2005 revealed that the majority of the public (59 per cent and 51 per cent of respondents respectively) thought that the decision for NATO membership was a useful one for Slovenia. In 2003, 28 per cent of respondents thought the decision was not useful, while in 2005 the number of ‘skeptics’ was even lower (20%), meaning that the number of undecided respondents grew significantly in two years (from 13% in 2003 to 29% in 2005).

6

Armed Forces and National Security

During the 1990s the meaning of security changed in modern Western societies. Shaw (2000: 14) pointed out two transformation processes which could presumably influence public attitudes towards the armed forces. First, the transformation of the security agenda to include issues other than purely military ones like environmental, migration and gender issues. Second, the reconstruction of national security as ‘international security’ which concerns the security of the state-system as a whole rather than the security of individual states. Similarly, Boëne et al. (2000: 321) discuss the functional importance of the military and its meaning in the light of hard and soft security. The question was whether the armed forces would be regarded as less important if a higher priority was given to soft security or whether the extension of military tasks to non-traditional areas would increase its functional importance. 127

While we could, with some certainty, expect the connection between the importance that the public attaches to the armed forces and the changes in the understanding of security, we could not presume that these changes led to more critical attitudes of the public towards the armed forces. The main question was how the shift to non-traditional military roles would affect public attitudes towards the military. A brief outline of the value-orientations of the Slovenian public shows its inclination towards understanding security more in soft terms, mostly in economic and social terms rather than in military ones; the perception of military threats as non-important was illustrated above. Some other indicators show that security was understood as some general well-being of the individual and society for which military strength was not of great importance. Surveys between 1994 and 2003 have shown that economic and political factors, more than defense capabilities, were regarded as crucial for security (see Graph 2). Internal political and economic stability were in all measurement points ranked as more important factors of security than defense capabilities. This understanding was present even in the first half of the 1990s when Slovenia faced armed conflicts in its neighborhood, in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina. The importance of defense capabilities further decreased in a ten-year period by approximately 10 per cent. Internal political stability also lost its importance while economic stability preserved its importance through the entire period. Graph 2: Importance of Defense, Political and Economic Factors for National Security (per cent of answers ‘important’ and ‘very important’)

1994

100

2001

2003 80.3

80

67.8

64.4

74.3 77.6

60.9

60 45.0 40

39.5 36.7

20 0 defense capabilities

128

political stability

economic stability

Other data from the mid-1990s mainly confirm these findings. In 1994, more than half of the respondents (56%) indicated a ‘stable economy’ to be the most important goal for Slovenia. This was followed by ‘economic growth’ (50%) and ‘clean (unpolluted) environment’ (19%). Strong defense was the most important goal for merely 9 per cent of respondents. Defense spending, according to public expectations were to remain low. The tendency towards lowering defense expenditures was strongest in 1991 when Slovenia was still part of the former federal state. Mid-1990s’ surveys show a public expecting defense spending to remain the same or to decrease while at the same time support for an increase of defense expenditures grew very slightly. 4 Graph 3: Support for Future Defense Spending

higher

equal

lower

don't know

100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% 1991

4

1994

1999

2001

2003

2005

2007

After 1991, defense expenditures were reduced compared to Slovenian share of the defense budget in former Yugoslavia, and remained at very low levels for almost ten years, but have recently shown a modest upward trend. In the 1990s, defense expenditures were below 1.5 per cent of GDP, reaching 1.52 in 2003, 1.78 in 2006 and should, according to MoD plans, reach 2 per cent of GDP in 2008.

129

7

Public Support for the Transformation of the SAF

In Yugoslav times, public attitudes towards the future of the military were quite ambiguous. Before the proclamation of independence, in June 1991, the Slovenian public was divided between a de-militarization, supported at that time by parts of the political and intellectual elite, and a formation of Slovenian armed forces. 5 A survey in January 1991 showed that the supporters of the first option outnumbered those supporting the formation of a Slovenian military by 38 per cent to 30 per cent. Almost one third of the respondents remained undecided. But demilitarization seemed to be understood mostly as abolishing the Yugoslav People’s Army (YPA) which was favored by 54 per cent of Slovenians. Answers concerning the formation of new Slovenian armed forces showed a more balanced proportion of supporters of each option: 39 per cent were in favor of and 36 per cent were against the formation of Slovenian armed forces. After the armed intervention of the YPA in June 1991, the Slovenian territorial defense units and the police were forced to defend independence. After that experience, the idea of de-militarization was discredited. The new armed forces that were created were of a mixed type consisting of conscripts and a few professionals. As Table 3 shows, before independence the support for all-volunteer forces and for conscription was almost equal. The first survey, in 1994, after the introduction of conscription showed that slightly more than half of the Slovenians supported conscription while support for all-volunteer forces had decreased. In the first years of the SAF’s existence, public support for conscription grew compared to the past, but began to erode in the second half of the 1990s. Although the question wording differed, implying that a comparison of the data may be methodologically disputed, findings from 2001 and 2003 indicate that conscription gradually lost support. A survey conducted in 2003, after the official proclamation of the end of conscription, showed that more than two thirds of the Slovenian citizens supported that decision.

5

The idea of demilitarization was first endorsed within the Liberal Democratic Party. (see Jeluši 1997: 187)

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Table 3: Attitudes about the Manning System of the Slovenian Armed Forces 1991 Public support by types:

1994

2001

2003

Public support by types:

Public support for type of manning in the future:*

Support for introduction of all-volunteer forces:**

All-volunteer 37.1%

All-volunteer 31.2%

All-volunteer 47.9%

Support 67.8%

Conscription 35.6%

Conscription 50.9%

Conscription 34.0%

Oppose 16.0%

* modified question ** after introduction of AVF

Together with the initial support for conscription the public also supported conscientious objection to military service. In the beginning of 1991, when Slovenian young men still served in the YPA, 73 per cent of the respondents agreed that conscientious objection should be allowed. Ten years later this support amounted to 65 per cent. Despite this slightly downward trend conscientious objection remained a standard which was broadly accepted by the public. But very dramatic changes occurred in the attitudes of young males towards compulsory military service. The number of young men that chose conscientious objection began to rise in the mid-1990s. In the period between 1991 and 1995 the annual number of conscientious objectors was between 100 and 260 whereas in 1997 it surpassed 1,000. In 2001, their number reached 3,400 and remained approximately at the same level until 2003 when conscription was abolished. Another important structural change in the Slovenian military during the 1990s was allowing women to join the armed forces. Since then, the number of women has increased constantly and presently their share in SAF is about 17 per cent. Employment opportunities for women in the military were initially seen with some ambiguity in the public. In 1994, when this issue was first discussed, half of the respondents (51%) supported such participation while 46 per cent were against it. This data is not directly comparable with data from surveys between 1999 and 2005 when this issue was analyzed more systematically. As Graph 4 shows, within this period the number of respondents opposing women’s participation in the SAF is lower than in the mid-1990s, while the number of supporters is higher and shows an increasing tendency. Interestingly, the support for women’s participation in combat tasks was also increasing in the period from 1999 to 2005, but slightly decreased in 2007.

131

132

0

20

40

60

80

100

25.5

38.3

1999

63.8

12.9

23.4

34.9 30.6 24.4

2001

65.5

Yes (in combat tasks)

10.3

33.5

38.1

2003

71.6

3.4

25.0

Yes (in non-combat tasks)

No

5.8

19.0

2005

75.2

Yes (total)

40.1 35.1

Graph 4: Support for Women Participation in the Slovenian Armed Forces (in per cent))

35.7

37.7

Don't know

2007

73.4

7.8

18.7

Contrary to increasing public support for women in the military, the Slovenians show more reservations against the integration of some other social groups like homosexuals, persons convicted for crimes, foreigners, etc. into the military. A survey in 2003 revealed that 43 per cent supported the integration of homosexuals into the armed forces while 45 per cent did not. Surveys in 2005 and 2007 show that support remained almost the same, while opposition dropped and the share of undecided respondents increased.6 By contrast, the resistance to include foreigners was high and stable in the period 2003 to 2007 (approximately 75%) and resistance to include persons convicted for crimes was even higher in this period and grew from 83 to 88 per cent. 1

8

Public Attitudes towards the Tasks of the SAF

Values of post-modern societies together with changed threat perception and shifts within the international security environment are commonly regarded as factors that influence the public’s views about the military. Public opinion surveys of the last few years have shown a decreasing believe that Slovenian armed forces will still be needed in the future. While in 2001, 58 per cent of Slovenians agreed with this statement, in 2005 they were more skeptical and only 46 per cent answered affirmatively. A situation in which the general feeling of security is high and military threats are perceived as marginal, obviously contributes to the erosion of beliefs about the need for the military in the future. We try to further explain public expectations by looking at the public support for different military tasks. Table 4 shows military tasks that are supported the most by the Slovenian public and changes in this support during a certain time period.72

6 7

In 2005, 32 per cent opposed such integration and 23 per cent were undecided. In 2007, 36 per cent opposed and 19 per cent were undecided. Support for some tasks has been measured for a longer time while some non-traditional tasks were included in the surveys at the end of the 1990s or even later.

133

Table 4: Most important tasks of contemporary armed forces (support in per cent) Year

1982

1988

1991

1994

1999

Helping in case of a disaster

92.8

97.5

95.8

95.6

95.2

Defending the country

92.1

96.2

95.5

93.7

95.2

Fight against terrorisms

*

*

*

*

*

Contributing to peace operations

*

*

*

*

78.2

*

*

*

*

*

74.7

68.1

62.8

64.9

68.7

Helping police in border control Patriotic education of young people

Year Helping in case of a disaster

2001

2003

2005

2007

92.9

92.5

91.9

94.8

Defending the country

88.2

85.3

86.8

88.7

Fight against terrorism

73.5

71.6

76.4

76.6

Contributing to peace operations

76.6

74.7

72.5

65.5

72

67.2

67.4

64.4

58

56.8

49.8

49.8

Helping police in border control Patriotic education of young people * not available

Since 2001 surveys show that helping in case of disaster is perceived by the public as the most acceptable task of the armed forces. Support for such nonmilitary task is not surprising because the former YPA was called upon first in case of natural disasters (Maleši/Jeluši 2006). This finding is similar to results of the Eurobarometer survey of 2000. Results at the level of all EU countries show that helping in case of a disaster was supported by almost the same percentage of respondents as in Slovenia (91%), but placed second following the defense of the country (94%) (see Manigart 2001: 7). Slovenian surveys since 2001 also show that various typical military roles of the SAF are well supported by the public, with defense of the country ranked first. The so-called ‘new missions’ (‘fight against terrorism’ and ‘peace operations’), which became, especially the second one, very visible tasks of the SAF in recent years, also receive high support. In the past, the YPA was aimed principally at homeland defense and defense of the political system, although it also participated in peacekeeping operations with volunteers, which the popu134

lation was largely unaware of, for example on the Sinai and in certain demilitarized zones between Iraq and Iran (Maleši/Jeluši 2006). When Slovenia started to deploy soldiers to peace operations, large parts of the population accepted these missions as legitimate tasks of the SAF. However, it is worth noting that in this decade support to these missions shows a decreasing trend. More than two thirds of the respondents also want the SAF to help the police in controlling the border.8 And half of the respondents also support a socializing function of the SAF, namely the patriotic education of young people. Table 4 shows changes in support for the different military functions over time. Some data are available for more than two decades, referring to the YPA before 1991 and to the SAF later on. From the beginning of the 1980s to 1999, the defense of the country and disaster relief were almost equally supported. This support remained fairly stable until 1999 when support for the defense of the country slightly decreased. During that period surveys also showed decreasing perceptions of military threats (see Table 1). The patriotic education of young people is a function which changed the most. During the 1980s, the former YPA gradually lost the public’s approval to educate young people, but, in the 1990s, after establishing the SAF, this task became again slightly more acceptable to the public, but began to erode at the beginning of the 21st century. These data draw a picture which is not entirely consistent with the sense of a decreasing need for the military in the future. Indeed, almost three out of four respondents expect the armed forces to perform traditional as well as non-traditional tasks. We could perhaps explain this by the fact that people assess the need for armed forces in the future mostly on the basis of their perception of military threats. Contrary to the fact that the public is not convinced about the need for armed forces in the future and that support for most tasks is slightly decreasing, the military’s performance ratings show an upward trend. Within six years, the belief that the SAF perform their functions well increased. In a 1999 survey, 40 per cent saw a good or a very good performance of the SAF; in 2003 the number was 45 per cent; in 2005 the percentage was 52 and in 2007 it further increased to 56 per cent. The armed forces currently also receive relatively high trust by the public. Graph 5 shows that trust into the SAF has changed drastically within the last decade. At the beginning of the 1990s, trust was high due to the success in the armed conflict against the YPA after the proclamation of independence. Yet, from that time until the mid-1990s, the SAF gradually lost the public’s trust. Since 1998, however, trust has more or less been on the rise. The trust into the mili3

8

This task was not legally authorized before 2004 when, due to mass migration through the Slovenian borders, the Defense Act was amended. In reality, however, the SAF have not performed this function so far.

135

tary since 2000 has been high and stable and almost at the same level as it was at the beginning of the 1990s; yet, there have been ups and downs in between. Graph 5: Trust of the Public into the Slovenian Armed Forces

Percentage of answers ‘rather trust’ and ‘totally trust’

100 80 60 40 20 0 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2003 2005 2007

It is not easy to explain the reasons for these changes in trust into the military. We may speculate that the downward trend in the first half of the 1990s relates to the loss of prestige the SAF achieved as the protector of the country’s independence due to unclear and only partially successful military reforms in the years that followed. Also, the military was involved in several scandals (Depala vas, arms trafficking, misuse of trust in the MoD; see more in Maleši 2006). The political project of NATO membership and the military reforms required could also be cited to explain the shifts in trust in the 1990s. In 1997, Slovenia, contrary to what had been expected, was not invited to join NATO. This quite disappointing event for politicians, was followed by more active reform policies to meet NATO’s membership standards. In 1998, Slovenia adopted the comprehensive ‘National Strategy for the Integration of the Republic of Slovenia into NATO’ which also included activities for the ‘restructuring, reorganization and modernization’ of the armed forces and announced an increase in defense expenditures accelerating the pace of reforms. Apart from this, participation in peace support operations started in 1997 and in the following years the number of deployed soldiers has constantly increased. Through these missions the SAF became more visible in the public. Modernization, together with new tasks performed in sup136

port of international peace and stability could perhaps best explain the newly increased trust into the military.

9

Conclusion

We started from the assumption that public attitudes towards the military are mainly shaped by predominant social values, changes within the international security environment, threat perceptions, and the nature of the military. In our analysis of public opinion surveys, we tried to check this assumption with regard to the case of the newly independent Slovenia. At a general level, the public opinion data show that the great majority of adult citizens in Slovenia feel safe and secure. There is a continued trend in perceiving non-military threats as more relevant than military ones. Although threat perceptions among the Slovenian public have varied during the past decade, the results of the surveys have shown that society attaches significant relevance to drug abuse, crime, social-economic difficulties, traffic accidents, the degradation of the environment, natural and technological disasters, and epidemiological or health problems. Military threats and terrorism are perceived as mainly non-existent or as minor threats only. Slovenia’s NATO membership was not received with great enthusiasm by the public. There was a lot of controversy and skepticism in the process of joining NATO, and the last public opinion surveys prior to the referendum on membership revealed a significant split between supporters and opponents within the Slovenian public. However, those undecided were rather numerous and it seems that ‘a silent majority’ won the case in the end because two thirds of the voters that appeared at the referendum supported Slovenian membership in the Alliance. Military missions have changed significantly after the Cold War. It is more than evident from our data that the public demands the armed forces to play an active role in protection and rescue activities in the case of an emergency. This role of the SAF seems to be of a higher priority than the defense of homeland itself and resonates with the fact that support for the armed forces’ participation in peace support operations outside the country is rather high, although it has slightly decreased in the last years. This peacekeeping and diplomatic role of the military is becoming one of the most important sources of the functional legitimacy of the armed forces. In conjunction with changing perceptions of the main military missions there are also changes in the attitudes concerning the type of army that is appropriate to accomplish the new missions and requirements of NATO membership. The traditional, centuries-long mass army of conscripts gave way to 137

small, professional and highly mobile armed forces and this decision was backed by the public. Although the data which we used to explain public support for the military do not allow a systematic analysis for the period from 1991 to 2007 we can outline some basic characteristics and changes. The surveys revealed a decreasing belief that the armed forces will be needed in the future, but at the same time, according to all other indicators, the armed forces are held in very high esteem. Thus, the public’s expectations that the armed forces will play a smaller role in providing security in the future and the public’s wish for greater attention on soft security do not necessary lead to a growing criticism of the armed forces. Through the process of modernization and adaptation to new functions, the Slovenian armed forces remained well received and respected by the public. Literature Boëne, Bernard/Bredow, Wilfried von/Dandeker, Christopher (2000): The Military and Common-Risk Societies: Elements of Comparison among Nine Countries of West, Central and East Europe. In: Kuhlmann, Jürgen/Callaghan, Jean (Eds.): Military and Society in 21st Century Europe: A Comparative Analysis. Münster – Hamburg – London: LIT Verlag, 305–331. Bredow, Wilfried von (2000): Re-nationalization of Military Strategy? New Challenges for the Armed Forces in a Changing Global Environment. In: Kuhlmann, Jürgen/Callaghan, Jean (Eds.): Military and Society in 21st Century Europe: A Comparative Analysis. Münster – Hamburg – London: LIT Verlag, 45–53. Dandeker, Christopher (2000): The Military in Democratic Societies: The New Times and New Patterns of Civil-Military Relations. In: Kuhlmann, Jürgen/Callaghan, Jean (Eds.): Military and Society in 21st Century Europe: A Comparative Analysis. Münster – Hamburg – London: LIT Verlag, 27–43. Defense Act of Republic of Slovenia 2004 (Ljubljana). Online: http://www.uradnilist.si/1/objava.jsp? urlid=2004103&stevilka=4405; retrieved 17 January 2005. Development Program of the Slovenian Armed Forces 2005–2010 (Ljubljana). Online: http://www.mors.si/ fileadmin/mors/pdf/dokumenti/sop_2005_10.pdf; retrieved 27 July 2007. Edmunds, Timothy/Maleši, Marjan (Eds.) (2005): Defence Transformation in Europe: Evolving Military Roles. Amsterdam et al.: IOS Press. Farrell, Theo (2004): Humanitarian Intervention and Peace Operations. In: Baylis, John, et al. (Eds.): Strategy in the Contemporary World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 286–309. Haltiner, Karl W. (2000): Policemen or Soldiers? Organizational Dilemmas in the Constabularization of Armed Forces. In: Maleši, Marjan (Ed.): International Security, Mass Media, and Public Opinion. Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede, 17–31.

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Increasing Military Influence in Danish Civil-Military Relations Henning Sørensen 1

Introduction

This chapter pursues long-term changes in the Danish armed forces in order to identify military influence in civil-military relations in this country. Four aspects are analyzed: force structure, defense expenditures, defense commissions, and organizational structure. The changes identified evidence an increase of military influence in all these areas. Parallel to this, we witness a lack of political sanctions against growing military ignorance/negligence/ disobedience towards civil supremacy. The consequences of increasing military influence in Danish civil-military relations are discussed for three actors: the politicians, the media, and the armed forces. It is argued that one reason for the Danish military dominance is different perceptions of the concept of democratic control by senior officers and politicians. Top officers define control as ‘exercise control’. It means that they pursue their course until stopped by political initiatives blocking their behavior, i.e., ‘subjective control’ as defined by Samuel P. Huntington. In contrast, politicians define control as ‘have control’, i.e., they rely on the military profession’s self-control or ‘objective control’ for which reason they do not react/sanction towards inproper military behavior.

2

Long-Term Trends in Danish Civil-Military Relations

2.1

Force Structure

Both the size and composition of the Danish armed forces have substantially changed, even if the exact force structure from 1945 to 1949 is somewhat uncertain (Petersen 1980: 2, 41). Several reasons are accountable for this: secrecy, the defense acts of that time were framework laws; 1 conscripts were not drafted centrally, but by several military branches, each pursuing its indi1

Petersen 1980: 52 (my translation) writes: “[T]he 1951 defence arrangement was (...) a framework law that only published the strength of the armed forces in rough numbers” while “the Defence Act of 1960 (...) gave a detailed picture of the strength of the armed forces (…) in rough numbers” while “the Defence Act of 1960 (…) gave a detailed picture of the strength of the armed forces”. A conversation of 26 September 1995 with Major Kaj Hansen, Danish Defense Ministry, Second Office, confirmed that the Ministry has no official data for 1945/1946.

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vidual personnel policy; different statistical categories were used; and official and de facto personnel statistics often differed. Consequently, exact official figures from 1945 and 1950 do not exist. Nevertheless, the probable size and profile of the Danish armed forces from that period up to the year 2007 is presented in Table 1 below. Table 1: Personnel Profile of the Danish Armed Forces 1945–2007

Officers NCO/Const Conscripts All military Civilians Total Population in 1,000 Soldiers per 1 mio. citizens Officers+ NCOs in % of all (off/NCO) military

Officers NCO/Const Conscripts All military Civilians Total Population in 1,000 Soldiers per 1 mio. citizens Officers+ NCOs in % of all (off/NCO) military

1945 n % 1,600 11 2,000 13 10,000 66 13,600 1,600 11 15,100 100

1950 n % 3,533 9 4,667 12 23,000 58 31,200 8,500 21 39,700 99

1965 n % 6,600 11 9,800 16 31,500 53 47,900 12,100 20 60,000 100

1970 n % 7,100 13 11,000 20 24,400 44 42,500 12,600 23 55,100 100

4,050

4,270

4,580

4.930

3,300

8,000

12,000

11,000

24%

21%

27%

33%

1980 n % 7,100 13 11,000 20 24,400 44 42,500 12,600 23 55,100 100

1990 n % 6,000 12 16,200 36 12,200 28 34,400 9,400 24 43,800 100

2002 n % 3,800 13 11,600 40 5,700 20 21,100 8,000 27 29,100 100

2007 n % 3,555 15 11,295 48 2,556 11 17,406 6,231 26 23,637 100

5,110

5,140

5,400

5,500

8,600

7,800

5,400

3,200

41%

48%

53%

63%

Note: Figures for 1945 are calculated from Forslag til lov nr 137 omÆndring i og Tilføjelse til lov nr 301 af 6 Juni 1946 om Statens Tjenestemænd (Act no. 137 on changes in and appendix to Act no. 301 of June 1946 on Public Servants), Bekendtgørelser for Hæren 1945/46 (Announcements for the Army 1945/46), Redegørelse og indstilling nr. 2 vedr. forsvarets personelforhold, (Report and Suggestions no. 2 on the Personnel of the Armed Forces) bilag 4–11, 82–9, and Redegørelse og indstilling nr. 3 vedr. forsvarets personelforhold, bilag 11, 333ff.; for 1950 Lov nr. 278 af 18. juni 1951 (Law no. 278 of 18 June 1951), 910ff., 162ff., Redegørelse og indstilling nr. 1 vedr. forsvarets personnel, bilag 3ff., 84ff., Hærens tekniske Korps’ brev af 12.12.1950 til Forsvarsministeriet, Redegørelse og indstilling nr. 2 vedr. forsvarets personelforhold, bilag 3-4 ‘Over-

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sigt over uddannelse, antal, lønningsklasser’ og bilag 11 (fortroligt, G 67.1950), Redegørelse og indstilling nr. 3 vedr. forsvarets personelforhold, kap. 3, 103–4, bilag 11, 333, Report to Bill 134 of 1950/1951, Forsvarsministerens svar på spørgsmål nr. 3 (Answer from the Defense Minister to Question no. 3); for 1965, 1970, and 1980, Forsvarskommandoen 1987: 74ff., tables 12, 12A, 12B, and 12C; for 1990; Arbo-Bähr et al. 1999: 104, table 27–1, 127. For the year 2002, calculated from Forsvarskommandoen 2002b: 28. For the year 2007, see Forsvarskommandoen 2007: Bilag 1, side 0 (forside), ialt 31 s + bilag.

Table 1 shows changes in the personnel composition of the Danish armed forces. From 1945 to 1965 the size of the Danish military gradually grew from 15,100 to 60,000 soldiers. Hereafter it decreased for all four personnel groups: officers, NCOs/regulars, conscripts, and civilians. However, two groups have remained relatively stable throughout the whole period: the officer corps and the civilian employees. The officers made up around 9 to 15 per cent of all personnel, and civilians amounted to 21 per cent in 1950 and 26 per cent in 2007. In absolute figures, however, the officer corps quadrupled from 1,500 in 1945 to 7,100 in 1970 and then gradually shrank to 4,700 in 1990 and to around 3,600 in 2007. The number of civilians has increased from around 8,000 people in 1950 to around 12,000 in the 1960s to 1980s and has since then dropped by 25 per cent to 6,200 in 2007. The NCOs/regulars have grown from 12 per cent in 1950 to almost 50 per cent in 2007. They are the front-line or battle-field soldiers and the ones most needed for the military activism of Danish foreign policy. For the same reason, the conscripts have undergone the greatest reduction of all four personnel groups both in absolute and in relative numbers: from 10,000 in 1945 via 31,500 in 1965 to its all-time low of less than 2,600 in 2007 or from 66 per cent in 1945 to 11 per cent in 2007. This increase-decrease movement over more than the last half century is reflected in the reduction of Danish soldiers per 1 mio. citizens. It gradually expanded from 3,300 in 1945 to 8,600 in 1980s and then dropped to 3,200 in 2007, while the proportion of professional soldiers has increased from 21 per cent in 1950 to 63 per cent in 2007. This increased military professionalization is mirrored in the decrease of conscripts and civilian employees from 77 per cent in 1945 to 37 per cent in 2007. This change is even more significant for the two smaller services, the navy and the air force, as the army has about 80 per cent of all conscripts and 50 per cent of all civilians. These changes are to be found throughout the armed forces of the Western world. They imply reduced civil-military relations and are a problem for the civil control of the armed forces in particular, if political decisions are not followed by the armed forces. Such is the case with the recruitment of women in the Danish armed forces. Officially, the aim is to achieve “a balanced proportion of women” (Forsvarsministeriet 2002: passim) which may 143

mean a successive expansion of the number of female soldiers, as has been the case in most other NATO countries. And there has been plenty of time and possibility to do so: In 1962, legislation established the legal basis for the employment of women in the armed forces. It was renewed in 1969, but not implemented until 1971. Moreover, since 1994 women were accepted as fighter pilots, in combat units, and in submarines; in 1995 as enlisted soldiers for the Danish Reaction Brigade; and in 1998 as conscripts on a contract equal to the demands of Danish male conscripts (see Table 2).

144

145

28,370

n

4,373

3,717

460

196

15

22

7

4

%

9,782

5,566

4,234

1,067

820

158

89

Total Women

Military Forces

19,582

1991

5

8

3

2

%

20,526

10,186

5,057

4,741

542

4,255

2,945

953

351

6

Total Women

Armed Forces

21

29

19

7

1

%

14,935

6,932

4,447

3,556

345

860

571

191

98

312

Total Women

Military Forces

August 2001

6

8

4

3

1

%

Note: 1991 figures: FOV nyhedsbrev no. 10, 7 March 1991: 2; 2001 figures: Forsvarskommandoens ligestillingsredegørelse 2001: 6. All figures exclude cadets, conscripts, musicians and physicians/dentists. Armed forces personnel figures include civilians, military forces personnel figures exclude civilians. By 15 September 2001, all three services had one female LtCol/LtCom each.

16,692

6,450

Regulars

5,228

Lt – Major

NCOs

LtCol – General

Total Women

Armed Forces

Table 2: Women in the Danish Armed and Military Forces 1991–2001

Table 2 shows a slow increase of female soldiers in the Danish armed forces in spite of the above-mentioned openings. In 1972, women counted for 1.4 per cent of all personnel, in 1981, for 1.9 per cent and in the last 25 years for around 5 per cent (BT, 3 March 1994). It is a disappointingly low figure compared to most other NATO countries, in general, and to the declared Danish political idea of an increased intake of women in the armed forces, in particular. However, one may argue that the stable presentation of women in the armed forces has to be seen vis-à-vis the reduction in overall personnel from 28,370 in 1991 to 20,526 in 2001 (i.e., by 31 per cent) and in military personnel from 19,528 to 15,409 in the same period of time (or by 21 per cent). So, the total number of women employed in the armed forces remained stable at around 4,300. But, the number of female soldiers has dropped from 1,067 in 1991 to 862 in 2001 or by 19 per cent. So even if women have 21 per cent of all jobs (most as civilians) of the Danish armed forces, only 6 per cent of them serve in traditional military functions. In short, relatively seen more (male) professional soldiers have been recruited at the cost of conscripts and civilians. One may thus argue that civil-military relations suffer from the low intake of female soldiers and that the political will is ignored by the Danish armed forces. If the military leadership argues that it has tried in vain to recruite more female soldiers then its administrative efficiency is to be questioned. On the other hand, the present low unemployment rate in Denmark makes it difficult to recruit women in competition with the civil sector. No matter what, the absence of more female soldiers is not met by any political reaction/sanction. 2.2

Defense Expenditures

Throughout the last half-century Danish defense expenditures have fluctuated less than in most Western countries. The growth rate in absolute figures and in current prices in Danish Crowns (DKK) doubled in five years between 1945/46 and 1950/51 from 0,2 bio. to 0,4 bio.; tripled over the next three ecades to respectively 1 bio. in 1960/61, 2,9 bio. in 1970/71 and 8,8 bio. in 1980; then almost doubled to 16,4 bio. in 1990, but increased ‘only’ by 25 per cent in the last decade to 20,1 bio. in 20022 and was 18 bio. in 2007, or 19 bio. if the costs for international military missions of around 1 bio. are factored in. 1

2

The defense budget for 2002 is 18,2 bio. DKK plus 1,8 bio. DKK used for Danish soldiers deployed in international military missions (Forsvarsministeriet 2002b: 58, 60). See also Table 3 at the end of this chapter.

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Table 3: Military Expenditures to Danish Gross Domestic Product and per Capita 1945–2007 1945/46 Defense expenditures (in bio. DKK) Gross Domestic Product (in bio. DKK) Defense expenditures/ GDP Defense expenditures 14 per capita (in USD) Denmark’s rating in NATO

Defense expenditures (in bio. DKK) Gross Domestic Product (bio. DKK) Defense expenditures/GDP Defense expenditures per capita (in USD)14 Denmark’s rating in NATO

1950/51

1960/61

1970/71

0.2

0.4

1.0

2.9

14

22

41

112

1.1%

1.6%

2.4%

2.6%

0.04

0..08

0.22

303 7

1980

1990

2002

2007*

8.8

16.4

20.1

25

317

712

1,175

1,400

2.8%

2.3%

1.5%

1.8

316

515

579

520**

8

6

5

5

Notes: *Estimation based on Samfundsfagsnyt 2007: 72, table 15.5 (defense expenses) and 66, table 14.3 (GDP). ** See the drop in exchange rate DKK/USD. For military expenditures and GDP figures for the years 1945/1946–70, see Johansen 1984: 358 table 9.2i, 362 table 9.2k, 393ff., 403. For the years 1970, 1980, and 1990 see Samfundsfagsnyt: 1994; and for the year 1999 see Samfundsfagsnyt 1999: 78, table 21–13. For the years 1970 and 1980 see North Atlantic Treaty Organization 1990: 459, table V. For the years 1990 and 2002: Forsvarskommandoen 2002a: here 63, table 5. For 2007: Forsvarskommandoen 2007a: here 7, table 1.2.a and 18 table B1.6.

Danish defense expenditures as compared to GDP increased, inter alia, due to U.S. Marshall Plan military assistance in the 1950s (Udenrigsministeriet 1998: 48)3 and the Cold War period tensions – and then dropped over the last quarter of the century from 2.8 per cent of GDP in 1980 to 1.8 per cent today (2007). However, defense expenditures per capita reveal that Denmark has increased its relative military spending compared to other NATO countries so that only the U.S., Norway, France and Greece are ahead of Denmark moving Denmark from eighth position in 1980 to fifth in 2002 and in 2007. Today, the Danish military receives relatively more money compared to most other 2

3

Denmark received 278 mio. USD mostly as a gift.

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European armed forces in NATO, partly because the reduction of military budgets after the end of the Cold War was more moderate in Denmark than in most other NATO countries. One reason for this is the actual public appreciation of Danish soldiers serving abroad and another is the fact that the Danish armed forces did not receive as much money as most other NATO countries during the Cold War period. In this sense, Denmark cashed the peacedividend of the end of the Cold War before it actually ended. The actual positive political attitude behind the military spending is further supported by other economic favors for the Danish armed forces: in 2001, the new government decided to reduce public spending in all other ministries except the DoD. Over the last decade, the Danish army in particular has been granted equipment for international missions on a large scale. Notwithstanding, Danish armed forces’ agencies were criticized several times in the last decade for over-spending and poor economic management, however without any political consequences or sanctions.4 The Danish armed forces are courteously treated and never financially sanctioned in spite of their obvious deficits such as insufficient accounting, reported and criticized in several cases by the Danish Audition Bureau. One example are the ‘forgotten’ salaries for 1,800 soldiers and civilians working in the armed forces in 2003; another is the criticism in May 2008 by the Audition Bureau of the management of the gear investments of the Danish armed forces (Rigsrevisionen 2008: 4).5 In all cases, no political sanctions against the military elite were enforced as it most certainly would have been the case with bad budget behavior within the civil public sector. Again, one reason for the absence of political sanctions may have to do with the above-mentioned popular prestige of Danish soldiers serving in international military missions. 3

4

2.3

Organizational Structure

A major organizational change of the Danish armed forces took place at the beginning of the 1950s. Until that time, the Danish armed forces consisted of the Army, headed by the War Ministry, and the Navy, headed by the Marine Ministry, while each of the two services had its own air force. In 1950, the ‘Lov om Forsvarets ordning’ (‘The Act on the Organization of the Armed 4

5

Some examples for illustration: (1) “The replacement of the F16s will be extremely more expensive than officially announced up till now” (Jyllandsposten 2001: 1); (2) “In conclusion, the greatest weakness of the financial government of the army (…) is that the Ministry of Defense cannot document (…) that sound economic management has been demonstrated.” (Finansministeriet 1994: 25) Some investments are explicitly specifically critiziced in these reports: The Tårnfalken (2006), the Ocean Eye radar System (2007) and the 14 EH 101 rescue and transportation choppers (2008).

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Forces’) combined the two military ministries into a single Department of Defense and established an independent air force. In addition, it was decided that the DoD should have a civilian servant as chief executive illustrating the civil supremacy of the armed forces. But at the same time it was decided (1) to establish an integrated defense command, named Forsvarskommandoen (FKO), and (2) that officers should head each of the three services. In 1952, a new position of Chief of Military Operations in War was established to fit the cooperative structure of NATO and new international military agencies were established such as the Commander Baltic Approaches (COMBALTAP), the Standing Naval Forces Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT), and the NATO Air Defense Ground Environment (NADGE). In 1966, the DoD was further reduced and more functions were delegated to the FKO (Udenrigsministeriet 1968: 144). In the 1990s, more international military organizations have been established such as the Danish Reaction Brigade for use in the UN, OSCE and NATO military operations, in January 1997, a special UN standby force maintained in cooperation with other Nordic countries, in 1999 SHIRBRIG, the multinational UN Stand-by Forces High Readiness Brigade located in Denmark, and, at the beginning of the new millennium, the joint Danish-Polish-German staff of the military NATO command for Northern Europe. This development signals two major organizational changes: (1) the increased delegation in Denmark from the political to the military area, and (2) more new career positions in international agencies for Danish top officers to qualify for. Accordingly, the senior officers are given more political influence in more political career positions abroad than before and at home „the minister of defense (…) and [his] department are weak in contrast to a resourceful defense command (FKO)” (Petersen 1978: 149). On top of that, two more characteristics should be mentioned that are almost without precedence in any other NATO country: The DoD and the defense command are geographically separated and the position as Chief of Defense (JCS) is, in fact, decided by senior officers in the three services and only formally appointed by the Danish minister of defense or by Danish politicians. The tradition is that the position of Chief of Defense circulates between the three services so that an admiral will replace an army officer and an air force officer, in turn, will succeed him. In other words, the defense minister has accepted not to choose the better candidate in his opinion, but to let the senior officers themselves select one of their peers on a regular basis. This implies that the Danish armed forces have obtained increased functional and promotional independence. However, in 2008 a new force structure is implemented allowing the defense minister to select among all top officers for the three

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major positions of the Danish armed forces: JCS, Chief of Military Operations in War, and the Chief of Material of the three services. 2.4

Defense Commissions

Defense Commissions are established to determine the security position of Denmark and accordingly to suggest changes in the Danish armed forces. Over the last half century Denmark has experienced five Defense Commissions in 1946–50, 1969, 1988, 1997 (Bjerg1991; Heurlin 1991:134; Sørensen 1997) and 2007. The first and the fourth had international causes, the end of the Second World War and the Cold War, while the second and third ones were initiated due to a shift in government; in both cases the liberalconservative parties took over from the social-democrats. In all five Commissions, Danish officers became members while civilian and more independent scholars did not participate until the second Commission in 1969. This could be seen as a decreased military and increased civilian influence in the Defense Commissions, but it has to be said that the civilian scholars were security experts. In other words, they could define the security position of Denmark, but were more or less unable to suggest proper changes for the Danish armed forces and therefore less able to debate internal military issues with the military members of the Commission. Another reason for the proposition of an increased and not decreased military influence is that the defense policy ought to be framed by Denmark’s security situation as defined by the Danish Foreign Ministry and therefore outside the realm of the military establishment. Therefore the first, second, and third Commission had representatives from the Foreign Office while the fourth Commission of 1997 the Forsvarets Efterretningstjeneste (FE, the Danish Military Intelligence Service) did it. So here, one agency of the Danish military system defined the foundation for the rest of the military establishment without any protest, complaints, or comments from either experts or politicians. Moreover, when the 1988 Defense Commission ended its work in December 1989, the international security situation obviously had changed dramatically. Therefore in 1991, a new committee (sic!, i.e., no commission) was established to “evaluate the future structure and size of the armed forces, including the extension of conscription, the future defense material acquisitions and the future civil defense force” (Forsvarskommandoen 1992: 5). This Committee consisted of eight people, four public civil servants including the director of the Forsvarets forskningstjeneste (the Research Service of the Armed Forces) and four officers from the DoD and the FKO. No politicians or civilian scholars were included. The military over-influence did not only appear in the composition of the Committee, but also in its report. The Foreign Office was – as expected – 150

asked to define Denmark’s security position and did so in Chapter 2 of the report of the Committee, concluding: “The new security political situation has in other words made saving [author’s italics] on the defense budgets possible.” (Forsvarskommandoen 1992: 5) Nevertheless, the Committee argued in the following chapters for more military expenditures thereby ignoring the security experts of the Foreign Office and again encountering no interventions from politicians, from the Ministry, from scholars or the press. The increased and – from a ‘democratic control’-point of view – incorrect military influence has three faces here, over-representation in Committees, ignoring of the Foreign Office’s evaluation of Denmark’s security situation in 1991, and an internal military evaluation of Denmark’s security situation by the Danish Military Intelligence Service in the 1997 Defense Commission and not by the Foreign Office. The new Defense Commission of 2007 structurally resembles the 1997 Commision with officers, politicians and independent researchers specializing in security policy and terrorism. A further aspect of major military influence in Danish civil-military relations is seen in the way the present political Defense Agreement 2004-2009 did pass Danish Parliament. Actually, it was made up by the military Defense Command as a so-called ‘K-paper’, (actually, it was a PowerPoint-presentation) and it was supported by an overwhelming majority of the Danish Parliament without having more solid, balanced and independent information. All-in-all, from a ‘democratic control’-point of view, it is a problem that the Danish armed forces are over-represented in Commissions, have no military sociologists or civil opponents who could act from the inside and beside the military experts, and that the armed forces have a major influence on the laws concerning the Danish armed forces as such. No other interest group in Denmark, is so much involved in the legislation of its own function.

3

Discussion

The trends in the four aspects pursued here, reveal that the balance of civilmilitary relations has changed in favor of increased military influence. But, even more important, the military has not hesitated to expand its influence even further. So we face more paradoxes underlining the improved influential position of the Danish armed forces. First, even if the Danish military has increased its functional and promotional independence and now probably enjoys the highest degree of sovereignty of all NATO countries, it has ignored superior political and administrative instructions on several occasions. This did not only happen with the political directive for more female soldiers, the increased military influence in Defense Commissions, the political influence abroad and at home of senior officers, their contribution to the legislation on 151

the Danish armed forces, but also and perhaps most decisively with the absence of political sanctions. Secondly, Danish politicians have over the last decade treated the armed forces financially benignly, i.e., supplied them with a relative increase in military expenditures, and continued to do so even if military agencies have repeatedly overspent/mismanaged their resources. Thirdly, even if civil-military relations have been weakened due to an increase in military professionalization, i.e. fewer conscripts and civilian employees, the prestige and positive presence in the Danish media of the Danish armed forces have increased. All these trends may be a problem for the democratic control of the Danish armed forces and this will be further discussed below for each of the main actors: politicians, media, and the armed forces.

4

Actors

4.1

Politicians

From the point of view of the politicians, the problem of civilian control in Denmark is even more severe as “defense is undoubtedly the most controversial and most complicated issue in Denmark’s history after 1864” (Bjerg 1991: 7), and “Danish politicians (in general) lack military insight” (Petersen 1980: 149). However, the problem of democratic control over the armed forces is not perceived that important as “defense policy has a relative marginal position in the public debate and the political specter” (Heurlin 1991: 21). So, even if “defense policy generally seems to create problems for Denmark”, it is based on “a heavy ballast of consensus” among Danish politicians (Heurlin 1991: 22). But this ballast of political and public consensus has not yet been used to sanction the military leadership as it is the case for top civil servants overstepping their competence. One reason is that in cold cases, the responsible top officer has retired in the meantime (all Danish officers retire at the age of 60 years); another is the above-mentioned high esteem of the Danish soldiers for their service abroad; a third is the lack of demand from Danish politicians for valid/sound information and independent research when discussing issues such as the possible abandonment of conscription, investment in ships and airplanes, insight into international military missions, etc. The only type of sanction is that the armed forces have been told from time to time to solve their financial problems in case of overspending on their own.

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4.2

The Media

In the first 40 years after the Second World War, the Danish media wrote little about the military (only about the military treatment of conscripts and the military budget) and they were mostly critical on these military matters. However, since the beginning of the 1990s, the Danish media have become more courteous and less critical towards the military, probably due to the increased prestige stemming from the Danish participation in the UN, NATO, EU and OSCE peacekeeping missions (Berlingske Tidende 1995). Accordingly, the relationship between the media and the military has moved from an ambivalent treatment in the Cold War period to a more accepting and courteous treatment in the 1990s. So, for a decade or more, the Danish media have almost given up their role as a fourth control agency next to the legislative, the executive and the judicial power. This additionally weakens the democratic control of the armed forces. But as it is the case for politicians, the media have lately asked more tricky questions and have written more critically about military affairs than previously, for instance about the mine accident in Afghanistan where three Danish and two German soldiers got killed trying to disarm a Soviet missile. But the problem here is that many (male) journalists do not know the armed forces from within as they have often not served as conscripts. Therefore, they probably lack the needed insight to ask good questions. On the other hand, they may encounter the armed forces less respectful than journalists in the good old days used to. Be it as it may; the bottom line is: The Danish media are normally personally unfamiliar with the subject they are meant to investigate. 4.3

The Danish Armed Forces

The period of passive, uncritical and courteous politicians and media seems to be over now. But this period was not that profitable for the armed forces. Of course, it had its advantages and, on top of that, high-ranking officers expanded their influence even further. But in the long run this was no good for the armed forces because its behavior looked disrespectful to the democratic process, jeopardizing the broad political support and consensus, the military credibility, public prestige and financial support. Another dysfunctional aspect of the increased military influence was the lack of military self-criticism. With their influence on the rise, the armed forces could have focussed on problems of their own such as the consequences of the changed force structure, the lack of female soldiers, the financial mismanagements, etc.; but they did not. At least not publicly. On the contrary, as demonstrated above, they sometimes even abused their increased political influence. But, the armed 153

forces have learned two lessons. One is that increased military influence has now been accompanied by increased public and political interest. Another is the shift in key issues: In the Cold War period, two military subjects were of public interest: the military treatment of conscripts and the military management of money. Today it is the life and work of Danish soldiers deployed abroad (in Afghanistan) and the political aspects of Danish military activism. So, the issues have changed from the institutional level of the Danish armed forces into two opposite directions, one the soldier level, the other the international political level. In short, life has become more complicated, even for the leadership of the Danish armed forces.

5

Explanation

Before leaving the major trends of the Danish armed forces we may owe an explanation for the undisputed increase of military influence in civil-military relations. One explanation is offered here: Top officers and politicians have different perceptions of the concept of ‘democratic control’. Senior officers define the concept as their right to play an independent political role within and sometimes even against the political system of government and parliament. At face value, the rationale might be the high military self-esteem which led them to believe that they were entitled to do so. What they actually misunderstood was the distinction between ‘to have’ and ‘to exercise’ the democratic control of the armed forces. They seemed to believe that democracy is a question of exercising control, meaning that the military system can do what it wants until otherwise instructed and in this way even ignore the democratic rules. But this is not the way officers ought to behave according to Huntington (1964). Democratic control is the self-control of the military profession to adapt to the presumed political will. This applies to Danish civil servants and it must apply to Danish military servants, as well. At stake is the political education of the officers. They need to perceive themselves correctly as servants – and not as actors – of the Danish society. This does not mean that the military system shall be silent when important questions are to be dealt with. On the contrary. Society wants them to express contrasting views on military affairs; but the military leadership dislikes such a debate. If, the Danish military leadership is to be blamed for the increased military influence in civil-military relations, even more so are the Danish politicians. They must recognize their responsibility as well. They have too long played by the ‘objective control’-rules of Huntington, leaving the military elite too much room for maneuvering without reactions/sanctions. As a matter of fact, by playing a more active role Danish politicians will show all four personnel categories (officers, NCOs/constables, conscripts and civilians) 154

their respect, interest and support and thereby improve the function and position of the Danish armed forces. Literature Arbo-Bähr, Henrik et al. (Eds.) (1999): Samfundsstatistik 1992. Copenhagen: Samfundsfagsnyt. Bekendtgørelser for Hæren 1945/46 [Announcements for the Army 1945/46]. Copenhagen: Ministry of Defense. Berlingske Tidende (Newspaper) (1995): August 23. Bjerg, Hans Christian (1991): Forsvarskommissioner i Danmark gennem 125 år. In: Sørensen, Henning (Ed.): Forsvar i forandring. Debat om forsvarskommissionens beretning: Forsvaret i 90-erne. Copenhagen: Samfundslitteratur, 7–17. Finansministeriet (1994): Forsvarsministeriet og økonomiministeriet, Forsvarets økonomi [The Economy of the Armed Forces]. Copenhagen: Forsvarsministeriet. Forslag til lov nr 137 om Ændring i og Tilføjelse til lov nr 301 af 6 Juni 1946 om Statens Tjenestemænd [Act no. 137 on changes in and appendix to Act no. 301 of June 1946 on Public Servants]. Copenhagen: Folketinget. Forsvarskommandoen (1987): Forsvarets rolle. Copenhagen: Forsvarskommandoen. Forsvarskommandoen (1992): Rapport om forsvarets fremtidige struktur og størrelse. Copenhagen: Forsvarskommandoen. Forsvarskommandoen (2002a): Årlig Redegørelse 2001. Copenhagen: Forsvarskommandoen. Forsvarskommandoen (2002b): Fakta om forsvaret. Copenhagen: Forsvarskommandoen. Forsvarskommandoen (2007a): Årlig Redegørelse 2007. Copenhagen: Forsvarskommandoen. Forsvarskommandoen (2007b): Årsrapport 2007 [Annual Report 2007]. Copenhagen: Forsvarskommandoen. Forsvarskommandoens ligestillingsredegørelse 2001. Copenhagen: Forsvarskommandoen. Forsvarsministeriet (2002): Personalestrategi, Copenhagen, Ch. 6 ‘Ligebehandling’, 5, cfr. Online: http://www.fmn.dk/indhold.asp?cat_id=352; retrieved 23 August 2002 (now the link will give you the homepage of the Danish Ministry of Defense.). FOV nyhedsbrev (1991): no. 10, 7 March. Copenhagen: Forsvarskommandoen. Heurlin, Bertel (1991): Seks forsvarskommissioner. En vurdering. In: Sørensen, Henning (Ed.): Forsvar i forandring. Debat om forsvarskommissionens beretning: Forsvaret i 90-erne. Copenhagen. Samfundslitteratur, 18–23. Huntington, Samuel P. (1964): The Soldier and the State. New York: Vintage Books. Johansen, Hans Christian (1984): Dansk Historisk Statistik 1814–1980 [Danish Historical Statistics 1814–1980]. Copenhagen: Gyldendal. Jyllandsposten (2001a): 21 June. Jyllandsposten (2001b): 25 April. Jyllandsposten (2001c): 24 April.

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Krogh, Morten (2002): Værnepligt passé [Conscription Out]. In: Berlingske Tidend, 23 July. Lov no. 278 af 18. juni 1951 [Lov no. 278 of 18 June 1951]. Copenhagen: Ministry of Defense. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (1990): Facts and Figures. Brussels: NATO. Petersen, Nikolaj (1980): Forsvaret i den politiske beslutningsproces [Defense in the Political Decision-Making Process]. Copenhagen: Forsvarsministeriet. Petersen, Nikolaj (1987): Den forsvarspolitiske proces i Danmark [The Political Defense Process in Denmark]. In: Sørensen, Henning (Ed.): Sådan skal Danmark forsvares [In This Way Denmark Should Be Defended]. Copenhagen: Nyt fra samfundsvidenskaberne, 137–155. Petersen, M. H. (2002): Moderniser det danske forsvar [Modernize Danish Defense]. In: Berlingske Tidende, 21 May. Redegørelse og indstilling no. 1 vedr. forsvarets personnel, bilag 3ff, 84ff., Hærens tekniske Korps’ brev af 12.12.1950 til Forsvarsministeriet. Copenhagen: Ministry of Defense. Redegørelse og indstilling no. 2 vedr. forsvarets personelforhold, bilag 3–4 ‘Oversigt over uddannelse, antal, lønningsklasser’ og bilag 11 (fortroligt), (classified), G 67. 1950. Copenhagen: Ministry of Defense. Redegørelse og indstilling no. 2 vedr. forsvarets personelforhold, bilag 4–11, 82–9. Copenhagen: Ministry of Defense. Redegørelse og indstilling nr. 3 vedr. forsvarets personelforhold, bilag 11. Copenhagen: Ministry of Defense. Redegørelse og indstilling nr. 3 vedr. forsvarets personelforhold, kap. 3, 103–104, bilag 11, 333. Copenhagen: Ministry of Defense. Rigsrevisionen (The Audition Bureau) (2008): Notat til Statsrevisorerne om tilrettelæggelsen af en eventuel større undersøgelse af forsvarets materielanskaffelser. Copenhagen: Rigsrevisionen. Samfundsfagsnyt (1994): Samfundsstatistik 1994 [Social Statistics 1994]. Copenhagen: Samfundsfagsnyt, nu: Columbus. Samfundsfagsnyt (1999): Samfundsstatistik 1999 [Social Statistics 1999]. Copenhagen: Samfundsfagsnyt, nu: Columbus. Samfundsfagsnyt (2007): Samfundsstatistik 2007 [Social Statistics 2007]. Copenhagen: Samfundsfagsnyt, nu: Columbus. Sørensen, Henning (1997): Forsvarskommission med særligt formål. In: Udenrigs, 2, 83–89. Udenrigsministeriet (1968): Dansk sikkerhedspolitik. Fremstilling. 1948–1966 [Danish Security Policy. Presentation]. Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Udenrigsministeriet (1998): Marshallplanen 50 år. Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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To Go with the Flow? Change and Persistence in Patterns of Civil-Military Relations in Germany before and after the End of the Cold War Sabine Collmer 1

Introduction

Today, essays on political-military affairs tend to start with overall assertions on the magnitude of changes that came about as a result of the Cold War and again after 9/11. Indeed, it seems to be some kind of conventional wisdom among contemporary military sociologists that the world events during the 1990s, the wars that followed and the threat that international catastrophic terrorism poses to the international community today, can hardly be overestimated in their effect on Western style militaries. This holds particularly true for Germany, a country located in the middle of Western Europe, that had the dubious honor of playing a central role in the strategic war planning during the confrontation with the Soviet Union and then, all of a sudden, was given the historically unique opportunity to unite two countries that had taken distinctly different developmental routes for centuries – including the task of merging the huge East German armed forces into a common military and create the perception among German citizens that these forces are truly common. This essay draws a picture on security policy developments that took place in Germany during these times of political, societal, and economic transformation by analyzing data from a variety of public opinion surveys conducted during the last decade with a special emphasis on those changes in German society that had a significant impact on civil-military relations up to the present.

2

The Transformation of Society and Security: Germany as a Late-Modern Society

Societal change towards modernization accelerated in Western European societies during the last thirty years and became even more salient since the end of the Cold War. The concepts of “late modernity” (Giddens 1990) and “second age of modernity” (Beck 1992) have thereby emerged as synonyms for the global transformations that societies undergo. What makes these developments unique is their tendency towards a radicalization of trends that emanated in modernity, such as rationalization, mobilization, individualization, 157

democratization and globalization. These trends are now so thoroughly intense that they are dissolving key principles, classifications and institutions of modern Western societies. The driving force behind this kind of modernization is not a new social force, but rather one that derives from the modes of Western (capitalist, democratic) industrial societies which are increasingly “becoming global or, simply, reflexive. (...) Reflexive modernization conceives of the motive force of social change in categories of the side effect” (Beck 1994a: 175, 183). As Ulrich Beck (1994b) points out, the transformation from the industrial age to the modern risk society did not occur by intention, but as a kind of secondary result of more or less unguided or selfpropelled modernization processes. German society today can be characterized as being more focused on the global and the local level of political and economic events, instead of the national level, more pluralist due to value change and individualization, more diverse in terms of population, and more mobile in comparison with Cold War Germany, more fragmented in terms of common well-being, and more insecure in terms of the nation-state’s ability to create security (for an overview see Jäger/Meyer 2003). Seeing society in this setting of perpetual change, it seems to be clear that civil-military relations in late modern societies will also be affected by these transformations. At least three factors can be distinguished which intervene in the complex relationship between the civilian and the military sphere and which will be further discussed: first, the phenomenon of globalization and the transformation of the international security environment; second, the emerging patterns of organized violence and the new security regimes; and, third, the re-orientation of armed forces in Western Europe and their changing mission profiles. 2.1

Globalization and the Transformation of the International Security Environment

Globalization, not narrowly defined as a purely economic phenomenon, but seen as a wider phenomenon, signifies the process of intensifying worldwide social relations, through which distant places are connected in such a way that processes at one place are affected by occurrences in far away places and vice versa (Giddens 1995). Though there is a distinct economic drive stemming from intensified trading activities and financial transactions on a global scale, processes of political, ecological and cultural globalization happen just as well and at the same time with economic ones (Waters 1996). That stresses the point that globalization is a multi-faceted phenomenon. Furthermore, globalization also introduces new kinds of unpredictability, new kinds of risk, new kinds of uncertainty (Giddens 1999). However, what is described by so158

ciological theorists for societies also holds true for the international security environment. For researchers on globalization processes there seems to be no doubt that military power has historically served as a key mechanism through which social relations became globalized. Held et al. (1999) refer to this as “military globalization”, signifying “the process which embodies the growing extensity and intensity of military relations among political units of the world system” (Held et al. 1999: 88). This includes an expanding network of military ties and relations, also in the fields of key military technological innovations and armaments’ production. Whereas the East-West conflict constituted a unique system of global power relations, “which, paradoxically, both divided the globe into rival camps and yet unified it within a strategically interconnected world military order” (Held et al. 1999: 99), the post-bipolar world brought a decentralization of the international security system, a regionalization of interests and a fragmentation of power. Held and others refer to this as “disorganized geopolitics”, but argue, that these processes of fragmentation and regionalization are accompanied by very powerful centripetal forces which are reinforcing the unified character of the world military order. They list four factors which contribute to this phenomenon: first, a shift towards more cooperative defense and multilateral security arrangements. In Europe this is reflected in the attempt of the EU member states to homogenize their foreign and security policy in a common European Foreign Policy. Second, the rising density of financial, trade and economic connections between states that expanded the potential vulnerability of most states to crises in distant parts of the globe. Third, threats to national security are becoming more diffuse and no longer simply military in character and may not be resolved either solely through military or national means. And fourth, in the global state system the military security of all nations is significantly influenced by systemic factors. This means that not only the great powers set the standards on the military postures of all other states, but that the tendency of states to depend on military strength can produce a “spiral of international insecurity” (Held et al. 1999: 102). Here Held and others refer to Barry Buzan (1983), who argued in the 1980s that states, by adding or improving their military capability, “can easily threaten the power and security aspirations of other states”. To summarize here, we can say that since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact Organization old patterns of friend and foe have vanished, only to be replaced by more complex, less unequivocal and potentially changing security environments.

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2.2

Emerging Forms of Organized Violence and New Security Regimes

Despite all hopes towards a more peaceful development of the world after the end of the East-West conflict, war and armed conflict returned to Europe in the form of violent ethnic struggles on the Balkans, which eventually led to the disintegration of the former Yugoslav state, last demonstrated by the political separation of Montenegro from Serbia in 2006. Furthermore, in other parts of the world – namely in Africa and Asia –, a variety of conflicts occurred since 1990. The overall pattern of these conflicts leads us to the assertion that we are witnessing a new form of organized violence which does not resemble the traditional model of large-scale war between nation-states. This kind of irregular warfare has at its center asymmetric warfare in which at least one of the opponents is composed of non-regular fighters. This has been described as “low intensity conflict” (Creveld 1991), “small war” (Olson 1995) or simply as “new war” (Kaldor 1999). As Kaldor (2000) observed, the concept of identity (be it ethnic, religious or cultural background) plays a major role in these ‘new wars’, because it regulates the (often violent) exclusion or inclusion of individuals from a local community or polity. Therefore warfare involves ethnic cleansing, heavy civilian casualties and the blurring of traditional boundaries between military personnel and civilian population. These wars take the form of globalized war economies which depend heavily on international financial streams and the political (and economic) support of ethnic diaspora living in other parts of the world. Because of complex background variables, these forms of violent conflicts may persist at low levels without flaring up. All elements taken together constitute a new and typically late modern form of warfare. These wars invoke humanitarian crises that typically result in massive flows of refugees which inevitably call on transnational organizations and NGOs to tackle the situation (see Collmer 2003a). The new patterns of violent conflict also led to a re-conceptualization of security regimes on a global scale. Besides institutionalized alliance arrangements, it is interesting to see that especially in Europe greater emphasis is placed on strengthening and extending regional cooperative security or multilateral defense mechanisms (Held et al. 1999: 125). For the European Union the Common Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) today has gained a central role (besides the establishment of a common currency) in securing regional stability and creating a collective identity among the people living in Europe. As security is no longer defined in terms of the defense of national territorial boundaries, but rather in terms of collective defense and regional security based also on broader notions of security (economic, ecological, cul160

tural, human), it is not to be precluded that the EU may supersede NATO as the most trusted cooperative security provider in the public opinion of European citizens. What lies behind these truly new developments is the emergence of a new era of world politics in which the traditional rule of non-interference in internal affairs of nation-states has gradually been abolished. This originated in a tendency in the beginning of the 1990s not to tolerate grave violations of human rights (Bredow/Kümmel 1999). In the same direction, Ulrich Beck (2002: 24) argues that in the “meta-play of world politics” governments who deny their citizens elementary “world citizen rights” risk a humanitarian intervention. This development is also reflected in a considerable re-definition of the tasks of supranational organizations, such as the UN, and is famously marked by Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda for Peace (1992) which bluntly states “that national sovereignty was no longer absolute for the UN” (Kühne 1999). Since then the UN’s role in peacekeeping and peacemaking operations has been expanded enormously. Accordingly, other defense alliances have been created on a short-term basis in order to man military interventions in several world regions. All these developments can be traced back to the development of new international norms concerning the rights and the obligations of the members of the international community. The events of 9/11 added the latest chapter to the post-Cold War security environment, and one that proves to be of a challenging nature not only for politicians, but also to the concept of traditional state-to-state war. 2.3

New Orientations and New Missions of Armed Forces in Western Europe

After the end of the East-West conflict Western European armed forces not only had to re-arrange their perspective on the potential ‘enemy’ and their mission, but were also confronted with substantial reductions in size. This development is not prone to end soon. As Karl Haltiner (2000) notes, the erosion of the classic mass army in Europe will likely be accelerated through the increasing density of the security institutions network in Europe. Furthermore, as traditional security threats are diminishing and states are suffering from extensive national debts, both factors will likely function as additional drivers to further downsize the military in the near future. As the perceived threat scenario changed from deterrence and prevention of a nuclear war to sub- and transnational violence (e.g., ethnic conflict, terrorism), significant changes of the force structures occurred consisting basically in a shift from large mass armies operating with conscription to smaller, more flexible, more modular, and very well educated and trained all161

volunteer forces. Today’s typical soldier is a specialist in a professional army (Moskos et al. 2000). Most Western European armed forces have already adapted to these new threat scenarios, some of them – including the German armed forces – are still in the midst of a transformation process which includes large-scale restructuring towards the ‘network-centric command’ paradigm (see Collmer 2007). The new missions for the Bundeswehr, in the beginning, consisted mainly of peacekeeping and humanitarian aid missions, but gradually peace building and robust peace enforcement (for example with ISAF in Afghanistan) have been integrated into the official German security policy documents. Accordingly, in principle, both military de-escalation operations and classic fighter missions are part of the German armed forces’ mission profile. The newly published ‘White Paper for German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr’ (2006) states that “international conflict prevention and conflict resolution including the fight against international terrorism” will be the most likely missions in the foreseeable future. To that end the armed forces are currently being restructured in a three-partite way, including the categories response forces, stabilization forces, and support forces. Soldiers in all three categories are trained and equipped according to their respective missions. Response forces and stabilization forces are supposed to be “combat qualified”, thereby achieving “operational interplay” (Voll 2005: 21). Additionally, as another side effect, the roles of women and minorities have changed during this re-configuration process. Interestingly enough, what Moskos (2000: 15f.) predicted as a typical postmodern military structure (he used the United States as a paradigm) did largely become true for the German armed forces. When the European Court of Justice ruled in 2000 that the exclusion of women from most positions within the Bundeswehr constituted labor discrimination based on gender and therefore constituted a violation of EU laws, the German government had to totally re-configure their traditional gender politics and open up the armed forces for women. 1 What can also be observed is that with the outsourcing of peacetime military tasks such as catering and transportation, the formerly strong demarcations between the civilian and the military sphere are diminishing. Furthermore, there is a tendency that with the restructuring of the forces and the reorientation towards ‘three-block-war’ scenarios which simultaneously involve armed conflict, stabilization operations and humanitarian aid, the cultural differences within the armed forces are diminishing (e.g. between the fighter corps in combat units and other military units) as these missions potentially include all three force categories. 1

Small numbers of women had already started serving in the Bundeswehr before this date, but were confined to the medical services and to the military music corps.

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3

The Emergence of New Civil-Military Relations

3.1

From the ‘Bonn Republic’ to 1989

After the disaster of World War II the existence of military forces was not taken for granted by German citizens. The active involvement of the Wehrmacht not only in an unwinnable imperialist war, but its entanglement in the execution of the Holocaust and heavy war crimes made it almost impossible for the average citizen to think of any successor organization in positive terms. Nevertheless, the rearmament of West Germany and the founding of the Bundeswehr in 1956 was arranged by the Adenauer administration due to the unfolding Cold War and led to nation-wide discussions and protests (see Bald 1994). A pacifist undercurrent among German citizens was clearly to be sensed during these times in many segments of the society. In East Germany, however, the parallel process of the installation of the ‘Nationale Volksarmee’ (National Peoples’ Army) was simply ordered (despite possible similar resentment among East German citizens) without societal discourse and substantiated with the corresponding reference to Cold War necessities. This unique historical starting point has to be taken into consideration whenever the development of German civil-military relations comes into research perspective. It stresses the basic assumption that the ‘weight of history’ matters in shaping these relations, as was already suggested in a conceptual framework that set out to measure modernization processes in the military after the Cold War (Callaghan/Dandeker/Kuhlmann 2000: 5). Moreover, traits of these historical constellations are still to be found among the (unified) German population and therefore may serve as explanatory background for certain characteristic features of current German public opinion concerning military politics (see chapters 3.2 and 3.3). When focusing on West Germany, it seems to be clear that three major factors contributed to furthering societal consensus about the necessity of armed forces in the country: First, the inclusion of Germany into a system of collective defense and security provided by the framework of NATO and WEU, second, conscription which enabled structural interchange between the wider society and the armed forces via generations of young men who temporarily followed the call to citizen’s duties. The third factor, however, can be seen in the unique leadership philosophy of the Bundeswehr, the ‘Innere Führung’ and its main element, the ‘citizen in uniform’ that describes the role of the individual soldier within the military organization. These guiding principles were developed by Wolf Graf von Baudissin and his followers and became the ‘corporate identity’ of the German armed forces by providing not only an “authentic delimitation from the Wehrmacht” (Kümmel 2001: 16), but also by explaining the 163

quality of embedding the armed forces into a democratic society. The ideal of Innere Führung regulates the internal conduct among superiors and inferiors within the forces, their respective legal rights, and introduces efficient instruments of checks and balances for the democratic control of the forces, such as the position of the defense commissioner (Wehrbeauftragter), who reports to the German parliament. With the described political pressure of a looming threat scenario and outfitted with seemingly efficient political control mechanisms, the Bundeswehr met quite large-scale approval in the 1960s and 1970s. Despite a few military scandals that surfaced about the mistreatment of inferiors, in the view of the average citizen the Bundeswehr had become an “every-day-life institution of the republic: not particularly liked, comparably expensive, but necessary against the perceived danger from the East” (Kohr/Lippert 1990: 1). This picture first cracked when student protests against the Vietnam War started without, however, leaving any permanent effect on the majority of political constituencies. More crushing was the emergence of a populist movement throughout Europe in the 1980s, which also affected West Germany. People of all societal strata became increasingly critical of the contemporary conduct of security policy and expressed growing skepticism towards the strategic concepts of deterrence and ‘flexible response’ in the nuclear age. The outcome was a widespread peace-movement with powerful protests and demonstrations. The concept of deterrence with its multiple nuclear overkill capacities was perceived as irrational, while people discovered that “vital personal interests may conflict with overarching defense policy rationalities” (Kohr/Lippert 1990: 1). In the cause of the events the formerly accepted system of conscription was challenged more and more by pacifist and antimilitarist sentiments which led to a social value shift from the formerly highly regarded citizen duty towards a cognitive de-evaluation of conscription and to a “de facto, but not de jure, equality of conscientious objection with military service” (Kümmel 2001: 20). With individualist and postmaterialist values on the rise, a continuous pattern of imbalance materialized among young men which quickly became subject of political concern: social science research disclosed that the majority of young men who positioned themselves as politically “centralist” or “left-wing” opted for conscientious objection and an auxiliary civilian service, whereas those with a political selfpositioning as “right-wing” where likely to take part in military service (Kohr 1993). Concerning the quantitative aspects, it turned out that since then the numbers of young men who take part in the auxiliary civilian service regularly outnumber those who take part in military service. The report of the defense commissioner for the year 2006 states an overall number of 63,000 conscripts, whereas 140,756 young men opted for the civilian auxiliary ser164

vice (Deutscher Bundestag 2007: 35). In a reaction to this trend, politicians introduced a new option into military service: the voluntary conscripts (Freiwillig zusätzlich Wehrdienstleistende), who in contrary to conscripts comply with deployment to international missions. In 2006 the number of young men, who belonged to this category amounted to 23,000 (out of the 63,000 conscripts) (Deutscher Bundestag 2007: 35). 3.2

The Peace Dividend: From 1990 to 1994

The end of the block confrontation (co-authored by Mikhail Gorbachev’s Perestroika and Glasnost policy), the sudden opportunity of a unification of East and West Germany and the end of the Warsaw Pact Organization led to rather optimistic world views in the 1990s, encouraged by scholarly assessments about the prospect of a new and peaceful era for mankind as a whole. Besides the observation that the long-time enemy was ‘gone’ and Germany simply found itself ‘surrounded’ by friendly nations, a then popular argument determined that the end of the Cold War should finally enable Germany to substantially reduce its military spending and redirect funds to the ‘Aufbau Ost’, the re-construction of East Germany and other civil society projects, in this way enjoying some kind of ‘peace dividend’. This was also reflected in public opinion polls of the time. An evaluation of public opinion on security and defense policy during the early 1990s reveals a clear trend towards an intensifying loss of significance of the armed forces. German citizens’ attitudes and opinions reflected their hopes for a new start which would bring economic prosperity and political stability to all. The armed forces – even if they were ‘reunified’ – played a fairly secondary role in this context in the eyes of many Germans (see Collmer 2002). Also, the threat perception of German citizens adapted to the new situation: In 1993 the pre-dominant fears of people in Western Europe were no longer connected to traditional military threats, but were connected to (1) proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; (2) loss of jobs; (3) instability in Russia; (4) economic predominance of Japan; and (5) economic pre-dominance of North-America (Hoffmann 1994: 101). Additionally, the perception of living in a “common risk society” (Beck 1987; Shaw 1995) was fostered by the rising awareness towards ecological risks such as the super-disaster in Chernobyl/Ukraine in 1986. As people in most European countries were directly affected by the radioactive fallout, they had to learn by experience that – despite security measures – large-scale technologies are fallible, and thus might pose severe transnational risks that cannot be cured with the instruments of the nationstate alone.

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The beginning of the 1990s was a period in which German government and society were busy focusing on internal unification issues, including the integration of the National People’s Army (NVA) into the Bundeswehr. During that time the armed forces were reduced from approximately 600,000 to 370,000 soldiers, civilian employers were also reduced significantly from 230,000 to 160,000, additionally 200 garrisons in the Western regions of Germany were closed and 2,300 in East Germany were taken charge of, many of them were later closed. (Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 13/65, 1995) Meanwhile new challenges on the international scene such as the 1991 Gulf War emerged and urged the German government, for the first time since the founding of post-World War II Germany, to deal with the request to send German troops to a joint military mission abroad. While the administration rejected the option to militarily participate in the Gulf War, but opted instead for financial support of the mission, the reorientation of the German armed forces gained momentum with a participation in the UN-missions UNTAC to Cambodia in 1992 and UNOSOM-II in 1993 in Somalia. Additionally, the Bundeswehr provided assistance in the air supply for Sarajevo during the Balkan war in Bosnia as well as to operation SHARP GUARD, a maritime embargo mission in the Adriatic Sea. These missions led to a heated debate about the legitimacy of the German engagement in these kind of out-of-areamissions, especially in combat missions. In a legal reply to this comparably intense debate, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled in 1994 that a German participation in peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations was indeed compatible with the German Basic Law and this way satisfied some of the most urgent requests for clarification. Only a short time later, in 1995 the Kohl administration decided to contribute 4,000 German ground troops to the IFOR mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the later SFOR mission, today called EUFOR under EU command). Public opinion towards an international military involvement of Germany mirrors vast differences between East and West German citizens which by then could be found with most political issues. When asked in 1994 how they felt about the new international role of Germany and whether their country should take more international responsibility, 57 per cent of East Germans and 39 per cent of West Germans approved of an extended political and diplomatic role of the unified Germany, whereas military missions abroad were accepted by only 22 per cent of East Germans and 44 per cent of West Germans. 20 per cent of East Germans and 15 per cent of West Germans voted against any kind of international involvement (Hoffmann 1994: 120). An overview on opinion polls during these times points to the conclusion that German “citizens are in search of non-military means to secure peace and 166

stability” (Hoffmann 1994: 120). The reluctance of many German citizens to accept a more responsible role of a unified Germany on the international stage was matched by a corresponding reservation on the political level concerning the strategic outlook of the Bundeswehr. The FRG’s defense concept at the time still retained a strict territorial orientation, and the term “projection of power” did not appear at all in official Bundeswehr literature, to the surprise of foreign observers (Lungu 2004: 266). Despite repeated involvement in various foreign operations, the Bundeswehr’s ‘wake-up call’ only came with the Kosovo crisis and the war against Serbia in 1998–1999. The new global security situation and the acute crisis on Europe’s doorstep led to the conclusion that a concept of purely territorial defense could no longer be maintained. 3.3

Coming of Age for the Bundeswehr: 1995 to the Kosovo Crisis

The reluctance of the populace to see Germany interfere in international politics gradually vanished in the second half the 1990s with a robust peacekeeping operation on the Balkans on its way and additional problems already looming in the Kosovo province. In fact, the unequivocal ruling of the Constitutional Court combined with a thorough evaluation of the political mistakes of the first intervention on the Balkans opened the way to a more innovative approach to German foreign and security policy, which since 1998 was led by a red-green majority under Gerhard Schroeder which had superseded the long-term Kohl administration. During the same time, public opinion towards the new missions turned out to be more supportive. Whereas in 1996 the Bundeswehr mission to SFOR was seen positively by a minority (25%) of the population, two years later, in 1998 it had climbed to a sensational 64 per cent support (SOWI 1999)! Indeed the support for peacekeeping and peace enforcement measures rose even more: In August 1999, directly after the end of NATO’s bombing campaign against Serbia and with the KFOR-mission ahead, 78 per cent of West Germans and 75 per cent of East Germans were in favour of the participation of German ground troops in this peacekeeping effort (AIK 2000: 22). But what also materialized is a pattern of relative reluctance towards combat missions for the Bundeswehr which was even more pronounced in East Germany. When asked about their opinion towards possible future combat missions of the Bundeswehr in cooperation with NATO allies, a clear East-West gap surfaced: While 70 per cent of West Germans said ‘yes’ to a German participation in these missions, only 43 per cent of those asked in East Germany agreed (SOWI 2000).

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With the changed mission definition of the Bundeswehr, a value shift towards military service could be witnessed too: It became obvious that a diminishing number of young men were ready to serve their country by participating in military service as conscripts and especially to participate in out-ofarea-missions. As opinion polls showed, only about 15–16 per cent of the age cohort of 16 to 18-year-old men declared themselves ready to participate on a voluntary basis in an international military mission (SINUS 2000). However, researchers remarked that these refusal patterns are far from indicating any general disapproval of the new missions as such, but rather point towards a value shift towards armed forces in general. The “individualistic, more or less self-centered objector (…) of today is neither pro- nor anti-military, nor is he critical of the state’s authority: He simply views military actions to be public services that should be rendered by professionals as it is in case of fire brigades, postal services, and the like” (Klein/Kuhlmann 2000: 220). This interpretation seems to be confirmed by opinion polls on the public image of the Bundeswehr where a large majority of Germans – including the young generations – reveal positive general attitudes towards the armed forces. Also, since the mid-1990s the armed forces can regularly be found among the three most trusted federal institutions in the country (SOWI 2000). Parallel to the rising approval for international military missions of the Bundeswehr a consensus among German citizens grew in such a manner that a common security policy on the European level was a good thing. While shortly after unification the opinion that Germany should become a neutral state was quite popular, especially among East German citizens (AIK 1997), this opinion faded, giving way to more sober considerations towards NATO and EU integration in the face of gruelling war fighting on the edges of Europe. Since the mid-1990s a move towards stronger EU ties and a common foreign and security policy in Europe became prevalent. By the end of 1999, a majority of Germans (68%) were in favour of a security and defense policy more independent from the U.S. (EMNID 2000) and in 2001 a Eurobarometer poll revealed that 78 per cent of German citizens compared to 71 per cent of all EU citizens did approve of a Common Defense and Security Policy (EB 56). These numbers were still ascending with even higher approval rates later on. 2 The overall impression of this time period is remarkable: It seems that within a comparably short period of time the non-traditional roles of the military, namely international peacekeeping and peace-enforcement missions were not only integrated into the mission spectrum of the armed forces (which were still struggling with a transition to common German forces), but 2

Today, the approval of ESDP among German citizens reaches 84 per cent compared to an average of 75 per cent among all European member states (EB 66, December 2006).

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also gained greater acceptance by German citizens, thereby giving the Bundeswehr a growing significance as an international security provider. This picture is even more surprising when we take into account that the authorizing government of the first combat-oriented foreign mission of the Bundeswehr was in fact a centre-left coalition of Social Democrats and the Greens – with the Green party having traditionally a strong pacifist fraction and the Social Democrats having a similar historical background. Also, the shift of focus from the national level of security policy to a transnational European level can clearly be sensed in opinion polls around the end of the 20th century. 3.4

The New Millennium: 9/11 and Beyond

With an international security environment at the beginning of the new millennium that was all but stable, the news coverage circled around the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the U.S. and as a repercussion the American government not only became involved in a military campaign against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, but also announced a ‘Global War on Terrorism’. While the German citizens’ threat perception became more focused on international terrorism by that time, in 2002 a narrow majority of Germans (52%) were in favour of assisting a NATO partner that had been attacked. But still, tasks like UN blue helmet peace missions (63%) or European blue helmet peace missions (58%) received higher consent (Allensbach 2003). Accordingly, the international missions in which German troops were involved were approved by a majority with KFOR (68%), ENDURING FREEDOM (64%), and ISAF in Afghanistan (61%) respectively (SOWI 2002). The American strategic response to the terrorist threat was received in Europe as an impulse to strengthen regional cooperative security structures and to extend multilateral defense capabilities. Besides intensified AmericanGerman integration of forces on the corps level, the German-French cooperation in the Eurocorps and the founding of the Dutch-German Corps in 1995, the administration worked towards strengthening the European pillar of the Atlantic alliance. Furthermore, the so-called ‘European Headline Goals’, which were agreed upon in 2000 by political executives within the European Union acknowledged the need for a far-reaching restructuring of Western European armed forces and prepared the legal ground for the creation of multilateral decision-making structures including the set up of multilateral European armed forces. The German public was initially (in March 2000) careful in relation to a general vote that would authorize German soldiers to participate in such a multilateral force structure with 47 per cent agreeing without any preconditions and another 47 per cent wanting a decision-making process 169

on a case-by-case basis. On the other hand, only 3 per cent said that they would like to see Germany participate only by providing financial aid and only 1 per cent opted against any German participation what so ever (EMNID 2000). This seems to mirror a general trait in German security policy: there is a tendency to conduct foreign and security policy in close conjunction with multinational partners and never unilaterally. Also, the faith in preventive crisis intervention and ensuring stability via diplomatic measures are central tenets of Germany’s security policy (Thiele 2005: 10). The inclination towards non-military crisis intervention which since long has been lamented by American political observers (see Hönicke Moore 2002: 154), finds indeed its direct counter-part in the underlying belief system of the German population towards war and peace. This issue became never more obvious than in the widening political gap between European and American positions over the Iraq crisis. As the U.S. policy towards Iraq led to a narrowing opportunity for a diplomatic solution, an international opinion poll was conducted in 2003 with the aim to find out more about the nature of the transatlantic divide (Asmus et al. 2003). Possible positions in a foreign and security policy scenario were divided in four categories with distinct belief systems: The ‘Hawks’ believe in a ‘just war’ concept and in the greater importance of military power compared to economic might; they want to circumvent international organizations like the UN if possible. ‘Pragmatics’ also believe in the ‘just war’, but see economic strength as more important than military power. They tend to acknowledge the importance of the UN, prefer multilateral action if possible, but would accept a unilateral approach if necessary. In contrast to these positions, the ‘Doves’ reject the idea of ‘just war’ and believe in the primacy of economic strength over military power. They want to strengthen the UN and are disinclined to accept unilateral military action. The fourth group comprises the so-called ‘Isolationists’ who do not believe in ‘just war’, but also do not believe that economic power is more important than military power (Asmus et al. 2003: 1). A comparison of the quantitative trends revealed significant differences in the distribution of the four groups among German and American citizens: The ‘Hawks’ comprise 22 per cent of all people in the U.S., but only of 4 per cent in Germany. The ‘Pragmatics’ make up the largest group in the U.S. with 65 per cent, but only 35 per cent in Germany. While the ‘Doves’ represent only a minority within the group of U.S. citizens with 10 per cent, they are the largest group with 52 per cent in Germany. 7 per cent of Americans and 9 per cent of Germans (Asmus et al. 2003: 5) judge themselves ‘Isolationists’ when asked. The largest variation is thus witnessed among the category ‘Doves’ which vary by a 40 per cent margin! Similar striking differ170

ences showed up in the comparison of U.S. results with other European countries. Pascal Vennesson has suggested that the diverse views on military power in the U.S. and in Europe form a kind of symmetric system that may be put to good use by complementing one another (Vennesson 2004: 245). Many of the peculiarities of German public opinion can be linked back to these more fundamental differences in the basic belief systems of European and American citizens towards war and peace. A survey conducted in 2003 among German students, which was set out to test a possible civil-military gap in Germany, asked the young generation for their opinion (both a civil and a military sample of students were interviewed) on supranational organizations such as the UN, NATO, and the EU and about the significance of global governance structures. Here, more than four out of five students of both samples voted for a strengthening of the UN, and two out of three interviewees indicated that in their eyes the UN Security Council should be the only institution to legitimize military measures against sovereign states. In the same survey a sound majority (93%) of young Germans objected against a right of the U.S. to intervene unilaterally. Also to be mentioned is the fact that among the survey questions no statistically significant differences were detected between civilian and military student cohorts (Collmer 2006a; 2006b). This way, the solid backing for cooperative security structures, a growing support for common European rapid reaction forces as well as the reluctance to have German troops participate in the U.S. led Iraq campaign can be recognized as stemming from a belief valuing multilateralism as a legitimizing factor as well as a rejection of the ‘just war’ concept – both traits seem to be deeply rooted in the belief system of average German citizens and seem to be underlined by the results of public opinion surveys. While it is true that the interplay of public opinion and political decision-making is a complex process and while it is also true that an imperative political mandate does not exist in Germany, there is ample evidence that politicians are eager to capture public opinion trends and conventional wisdom. Therefore, when the Schroeder administration rejected the request to contribute German troops to the Iraq campaign, it was immediately suggested that this was a witty move to secure a good turn out in the upcoming federal elections. Still, this explanation fails to demonstrate why the government did stick to their ‘no-troops’ policy well after elections (thereby accumulating a good deal of criticism) and why even the current Merkel administration has not changed this policy. Seen in the light of belief systems, however, this may be perceived as a seldom case of correspondence in the beliefs towards peace and war between the political establishment and the public. While the inclination to peaceful conflict resolution in Europe and the preference to resort to military means of conflict 171

resolution in the U.S. has been described at length by Robert Kagan, it may just as well be attributed to the notion that the ‘weight of history’ counts, which in the European case consists of a long history of wars and violent conflict, thereby forming the collective memory of generations of European citizens in a specific way. Hand in hand with the described patterns of public opinion towards civilmilitary relations goes the observation of a shift in the collective identity in Germany and in Europe as a whole. While the traditional concept of collective identity puts the focus on allegiance to the nation-state and is constructed in delimitation to other national identities, more and more empirical evidence surfaced in the last few years that these patterns are superimposed by composed forms of collective identity. Researchers have described this phenomenon in the context of modernization of societies and the creation of postnational identities. Thus, by means of globalization, increased mobility and ethnic diversity, a tendency towards new forms of collective identities in a transnational or ‘post-national’ manner (Albrow 1997; King 2000) have been found, which focus more on a global/local scale and less on the national level. In the Eurobarometer survey, this topic is captured by a question that asks citizens to indicate their agreement to four alternatives: “I feel attached to my home country”; “I feel attached to my home country and to Europe”; “I feel attached to Europe and to my home country”; “I feel attached to Europe”. In 2003, the result for the German population was as follows: 45 per cent felt attached to “Germany and Europe”, 34 per cent feel attached to “Germany”, 12 per cent feel attached to “Europe and Germany” and 6 per cent felt attached to “Europe”. A long-term overview of the survey results reveals a trend among Germans in such a way that growing segments of German citizens feel no longer attached solely to Germany, but at the same time also to larger transnational formations, such as the European Union – which is truly amazing, given the long history of nation to nation rivalries and war fighting among the nations of Europe. Interestingly, these composed forms of collective identities today can be found to different degrees all over Europe (see Collmer 2004), which seems to echo the fact that in posttraditional societies security related issues have, to a large extent, become ‘post-national’ in scope.

4

Conclusion

Accelerated global transformation processes impacted significantly on civilmilitary relations in Germany after 1990. While external (globalization related) and internal (unification related) factors seemed to be mostly balanced in their influence, the particularities of contemporary German history con172

tributed significantly to shaping public opinion. This can be traced as far back as the conceptualization of the Bundeswehr as armed forces in a democracy with the unique leadership concept of ‘Innere Führung’ and conscription as a basic citizens’ duty. The end of the Cold War brought about some kind of ‘peace dividend’ and a search for new roles for the military. However, the more euphoric views lasted only for a brief period of time, only to be transformed into disillusionment and intensified restructuring and reorientation towards the new challenges to world peace. The German public – initially preoccupied with unification issues and revealing mainly non-military threat perceptions – became more attentive towards international security issues when the Bundeswehr was repeatedly requested to take part in international peacekeeping missions. Simultaneously, the parallel impact of a long-term value shift and the new international missions led to dwindling numbers of young men who were willing to take part in military service. The reshaping of the world to a more globalized, more decentralized and more fragmented one, challenges the role of the nation-state as a security provider and led to the public perception that the national level was of shrinking importance for solving security issues – compared to the global or at least the European level. Non-military risks (such as large-scale technology failure or pandemics) as well as the new security threats (such as asymmetric adversaries) turned out to be barely resolvable with the instruments of the nationstate alone. While politicians were eager to form adapted collective security structures on the regional level, the public’s concurrence with the new roles and missions of the Bundeswehr grew accordingly. However, this assertion comes with a caveat: The more ‘humanitarian’ the mission in scope, the more acceptance it receives and likewise the more combat-oriented, the less public approval it gets. This pattern can be found through all strata of German society, but even more pronounced among East German citizens and can be traced back to fundamental belief systems towards peace and war which tend to be significantly ‘dovish’. Together with a shift in perception towards the nation-state, the devaluation of military service as a core citizen’s duty and the increased acceptance of German troops as expeditionary forces, the notion of collective identity began to convert from a more or less monolithic national concept to composed forms of identity. In hindsight, it seems to be ironic that just at the very moment when Germany regained full state sovereignty, the attachment to national symbols began to fade. Given the long history of rancorous feud among the European nations, however, one cannot but feel relieved by that development.

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SINUS (2000): Jugendumfrage SINUS-Classic 2000: Representative Poll on Security and Defense Policy Issues. Online http://www.bundeswehr.de/ministerium/ politik_aktuell/demoskopie/classic.html; retrieved 3 February 2001. SOWI (1999): Frühjahrsgutachen: Repräsentativbefragung zu den Einstellungen und Meinungen in der Bevölkerung zur Sicherheitspolitik. Strausberg: SOWI. SOWI (2000): Frühjahrsgutachen: Repräsentativbefragung zu den Einstellungen und Meinungen in der Bevölkerung zur Sicherheitspolitik. Strausberg: SOWI. SOWI (2002): Ausgewählte Ergebnisse der Bevölkerungsumfrage 2002. Unpublished Paper. Strausberg: SOWI. Thiele, Ralph (2005): Verbesserte Einsatzfähigkeit. Zur Transformation der Bundeswehr. In: IT-Report, 7–10. Vennesson, Pascal (2004): Die Handhabung militärischer Macht – Ein Vergleich zwischen Europa und den USA. In: Gareis, Sven B./Klein, Paul (Eds.): Handbuch Militär und Sozialwissenschaft. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 237–246. Voll, Hans-Jörg (2005): Das Neue Heer. Chancen und Zukunftsfähigkeit im Rahmen des Transformationsprozesses. In: Strategie und Technik, 48: 3, 20–24. Waters, Malcom (1996): Globalization. 2nd edition. London – New York: Routledge.

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Conscription in Germany Today: A Military Necessity or a Mere Symbol? Paul Klein 1

The German Armed Forces – Yesterday, Nowadays and in the Future

Until the end of the East-West conflict, the main task of the German Bundeswehr consisted of countering, side by side with NATO allies, any probable attack that might come from the Warsaw Pact members. Their structure and equipment corresponded exactly to this task, and also the number of soldiers depended on it. This number amounted to about 500,000 personnel since the Bundeswehr’s foundation in the mid-1950s, with around half of them being recruited from conscripts. Early in the 1990s, together with the re-unification of Germany, the political situation completely changed. Both the political and military leadership were suddenly forced to re-think reform measures, which led twice to new structures of the armed forces, once in 1995 and then again in 2000. These measures were aimed at placing the Bundeswehr in a position to fulfill tasks of crisis management and prevention in an international framework besides its mission of national and common defense. The personell strength was first fixed at 370,000 soldiers, later at 330,000, and in the year 2000 at a future prospect of 255,000 soldiers. As for the last figure, however, 22,000 billets have to be added covering those servicemen in vocational advancement measures at the end of their service period as well as servicewomen on parental leave. The number of regulars and temporary-career soldiers was to bei increased from 187,000 to a level of 200,000 whilst the level of conscripts was supposed to decrease from 130,000 down to 77,000 (see Bundesminister der Verteidigung 2000b). From the year 2002 onwards, there are three possibilities for rendering basic military service: either nine months in a row, or six months plus two six-week periods of reserve duty training, or the voluntary prolongation of military service up to 23 months. Initially, 150,000 of the 277,000 active soldiers were intended to belong to the so-called Response Forces replacing the hitherto Crisis Reaction Forces. The remaining personnel was then supposed to constitute the military basic organization with support and training functions and also guarantee the national C2 capability as well as the buildup of the national defense (see Bundesminister der Verteidigung 2000b). This new structure is deemed to enable the Bundeswehr to deploy 50,000 servicemen and servicewomen for one year in out-of-area-missions under the 179

roof of NATO, the UN or the European Union. The first measures were taken in 2001 and were supposed to be concluded in their essentials by 2006. In 2002, however, this reform concept was re-reformed. Now it was decided that the number of soldiers would be further reduced until 2010 to some 252,500 soldiers, among them 195,000–205,000 professional soldiers, 2,500 positions for reservists in reserve duty training and 55,000, or even less, conscripts (see Bundesminister der Verteidigung 2004). 35,000 of those 252,500 soldiers are intended to belong to the so called Intervention Forces and 70,000 to the Stabilization Forces, both to replace the hitherto Response Forces. The remaining personnel will constitute the Support Forces. The Intervention Forces will be used for high intensity missions within the framework of the NATO Response Force or the 13 so called Battle Groups of the EU. It is possible to transfer them quickly to every place of the earth. The Stabilization Forces are firstly designated to operations in the aftermath of conflicts, such as in Bosnia-Herzegovina or in Kosovo. The Support Forces will assume tasks in executive functions, in logistics and in training (see Bundesminister der Verteidigung 2004).

2

Conscription and Its Importance for the Bundeswehr

The increase of the volunteer ratio creates a growing intervention capacity in case of a crisis, and is definitely in compliance with the future objectives of the European Armed Forces. This is probably the main reason why the German reform efforts gain applause at NATO’s headquarters, since Brussels believes that the increase of soldiers for international missions (Blome 2000: 6) and the formation of intervention and stabilization forces up to 105,000 personnel are steps in the right direction. It is not sure though, whether this also applies to the preservation of general conscription and the strategic analysis supporting its continuity. This analysis is not really shared by other NATO countries since most of them either suspended conscription or at least intend to do so. 2.1

Military Arguments for and against a Conscript Army

The supporters of a conscript army in Germany base their opinion first of all on the continuing existence of a threat, or certain military risks. Others suppose that a threat, for the moment invisible, could occur over a medium- or long-term period. For such reasons a double buildup capacity of the armed forces would be required, according to them – which can only be guaranteed by a conscript army. They also like to state that Germany, due to both its geographical position and its political weight in Europe, should bear a par180

ticular responsibility for peace and stability on the continent and thus needs a high number of soldiers which could not be recruited on a voluntary basis only. (Bagger 1997: 8) As for the supporters of an all-volunteer army, they depart from a nearly identical analysis of the situation in Europe, nevertheless they arrive at completely different conclusions. In their opinion, there are still certain military risks in Europe, but due to the disappearance of a direct threat on Europe’s borders and due to NATO enlargement, Germany does not need a mass army any longer. Furthermore, the growing complexity of weapons and equipment as well as the kind of missions, reaching from international peacekeeping and humanitarian activities to the evacuation of German citizens from risk areas, would strictly limit the use of conscripts anyway since it seems impossible to train them to the standards of deploying them in such complicated missions within nine months. Thus, the short period of basic service – and particularly the formula ‘six months plus two periods of reserve duty training’ – meets vehement criticism. General Reinhardt, who was the KFOR commanding general until April 2000, said in an interview in this regard: “Militarily spoken, a military service period being too short does not make any sense. The soldiers are insufficiently educated and trained, then sent back home. Except for efforts, work and costs they do not bring anything to the armed forces.” (Rose 2000: 5) Another argument is, that the short basic service means that conscripts can only be used for simple work such as guard duty, the cleaning of quarters, car driving, serving officers and NCOs in the church, ceremonial and similar functions which has negative consequences on their motivation. “The military value of conscript manpower diminishes. It will turn out to be extremely low when confronted with the emerging tasks of armed forces in the future. Conscripts will increasingly become marginalized in the modern military of tomorrow. They will continue to serve as cheap labor dedicated to do the menial work.” (Kuhlmann 1992: 21) It is also discussed, how much time would be required to reintroduce conscription in order to transform the all-volunteer army back into a mixed system of volunteers plus conscripts. Whilst some start from the presumption that “the introduction of additional weapon systems and the restoration of reserves that once were given up will take ten years and even more” (Wellershoff 2000: 20), thus justifying the maintenance of conscription, others argue that a period of 18 months would be totally sufficient to “re-implement the once suspended conscription and to train and educate the soldiers required in the future. Moreover, an all-volunteer army also would have a pool of reservists.” (Rose 2000b: 7) In this context they willingly remember the examples of the U.S. and Great Britain who successfully and in a very short time have 181

transformed their existing all-volunteer armies into mixed forces in both World Wars. Other military arguments for the maintenance of conscription concern the recruitment of volunteers and the soldiers’ qualification. As for the recruitment of regulars and temporary-career volunteers, the supporters of conscription point out that momentarily about half of the volunteers are being recruited from the pool of draftees. With the end of conscription, this source would dry out (Gertz 2003: 80). On the one hand it seems to be doubtful whether the state is legitimated to use a coercive measure like conscription to solve the problems of recruiting professional soldiers. On the other hand nobody knows whether the number of candidates would really half when conscription were to be abolished or suspended. Intensified and ameliorated recruiting activities, the implementation of large-scale measured probation periods together with the possibility of leaving the armed forces in case of ‘dislike’ – all of this could entice at least those young men to join the Bundeswehr who already come to render their service with the intention to have a look at the military before committing themselves to it for a longer period. Regarding the soldiers’ qualification, the supporters of conscription state again and again that a conscript army would be the ‘more intelligent’ one since being recruited from the whole specter of social strata. On the other hand, an all-volunteer army would have compete on the labor market and would thus be forced to accept less qualified personnel (Gertz 2003: 81). There are attempts to document this argumentation with examples from the U.S., Great Britain, and recently even Spain and Belgium, where the armed forces after the suspension of conscription and the transition to an allvolunteer army have begun to recruit foreigners due to the lack of candidates. Nothing, however, is being said about the fact that conscription in Germany is no longer ‘general’, but selective. For years already, a great deal of young men – among them more than half of the secondary school graduates – object military service and choose to render alternative civilian service. This alone should make it impossible to speak of the Bundeswehr as mirroring all social strata. Secondly, there are no hints supporting the presumption that a great number of highly qualified young men would be stimulated by their basic service to enter a temporary career as a volunteer. Those with a highly qualified – and appropriately paid – vocation would join the Bundeswehr in case of a particular interest in the military, often without any need of obligatory basic service. An argument against conscription in its current form may be derived from the fact that the 55,000 young men rendering basic service in the Bundeswehr today will be in a permanent training situation, since their dura182

tion of assignment is too short for any use in operational billets. A large number of officers and NCOs will be required to realize this training and education, while only some of them can be taken from the Support Forces, as the latter are obliged to fulfill a large scale of other tasks. Thus, for the training and education of draftees one would have to take recourse of regulars and temporary-career volunteers of the Intervention and Stabilization Forces – which should, however, impair the mission performance of the latter. So it is to fear that the draftees, in spite of those which choose a voluntary prolongation later, will weaken the armed forces’ capability of rapid response in case of a crisis. Militarily spoken, short periods of basic service only make sense when they are either leading to a militia system, or when the skills acquired during basic service are being renewed again and again in regular reserve duty training periods in order to make use of them in the (improbable) case of mobilization. Both examples do not apply to Germany. On the contrary: draftees are trained for some months, then sent back home. As a rule, they soon forget the things they have learned as soldiers, because reserve duty trainings are only planned for a little minority of the dismissed soldiers. 2.2

Conscription Equity

Due to the decreasing need for draftees, the Bundeswehr does not need to recruit every citizen liable to military service which puts conscription into question. But according to the Ministry of Defense, there is no danger of lacking equity in the conscription process since the number of young men available nearly represents the appropriate number for the Bundeswehr’s needs. Critics have doubts about these assumptions and refer to demographic data (see Tobiassen 2001). In the planning years 2007 to 2010 the birth cohorts of 1989–1992 will be up for conscription. They enclose between 440,211 (1989) and 388,587 (1992) young men (Bundestagsdrucksache 14/5857 2001: 2). If one starts from the observation that up to now 70 per cent of one cohort are either unfit for military service, choose civilian service or other services or are not available due to their status as professional soldiers or policemen, there are at least 116,500 young men per year left to do their military service. This number is already considerably higher than the number of conscriptions in 2004 and 2005, which amounted to 79, 850 and 68,428 (www.bundeswehr.de) and which will sink further in the coming years according to official estimates. This situation leads one to ask if conscription can still be maintained. Aside from many doubts about the numbers presented by the DoD, with regard to starting out from wrong premises, it also seems doubtful whether 183

the draftee/objector ratio will remain the same in the future. Everybody in Germany is aware of the fact that the decision against military service and for the civilian one is no longer a conscious decision, but, instead, follows costbenefit reflections. Service duration also played an essential role here. But this question moved into the background in recent years as civilian service is no longer more time-consuming than military service. In the future, when it will have spread that by opting for military service one may have a chance of not having to render any service, the number of those willing to opt for military service could rise again. The Bundeswehr would then be even less in a position to call them all. Due to lacking equity in conscription, the pressure of the public opinion or a decision by the Federal Constitutional Court could overthrow conscription. This equally applies to the complaints of young men who see a violation of the equality principle in the fact that women are admitted as volunteers to all assignments in the Bundeswehr whilst only men are liable to render military service. If in the future a German or European court sustains these complaints, in contrast to the judiciary up to now, the Bundeswehr will have no other possibility than to either implement obligatory military service for men and women, or, which is much more likely, to abolish conscription. 2.3

Financial Arguments

There are fierce debates about the question whether a professional army would be more or less expensive than a mixture of both. The supporters of conscription start out from the supposition that armed forces purely made up of volunteers would entail greater expenses than the current mixed form of military service, and quote as a proof that all the neighboring states which have already made the step towards professional armed forces now suffer from higher costs. The supporters of such professional armed forces often state just the contrary, basing their supposition on experts’ opinions. Just in 1992, Jürgen Kuhlmann wrote: “The often heard presumption, that conscript armed forces economically are more advantageous than All-VolunteerForces, rests upon essential assumptions. All of these are questionable. Assumption (1) supposes that a change from conscription to All-VolunteerForces would require the same personal strength, that is the number of volunteers needed would have to be equal to the number of conscripts. But in general we may say that one volunteer replaces more than one conscript. This is valid in terms of training received, of military skills learned, and of experience and motivation. Assumption (2) presumes that conscripts are not paid according to market-place conditions. Actually at present their pay normally is lousy, they earn only small fragments of the salary they would have in a 184

civil job. The erroneous assumption (3) is, that fiscal personnel expenditures for conscripts and the real costs of conscription do coincide. But fiscal costs of conscription form only a small part of all societal costs that conscription causes. Draftees are not only forced to sacrifice a certain period of their life for the state. They personally also give up a substantial civil income. In addition, draftee’s manpower is taken away from civil economy thus causing misallocations of economic resources. Adding all costs, id est: the fiscal personnel expenditures, 2. the opportunity costs of conscripts, 3. the total opportunity costs of civil economy, leads to the conclusion that in economic terms the draft is an expensive alternative to All-Volunteer-Forces. It represents a waste of economic resources.” (Kuhlmann 1992: 21f.) A commission charged by the French National Assembly in 1996 (Balkany 1996) came to the result that, in the long-term, professional armed forces entail smaller expenses than an army which includes a conscript ratio. A study by a working group at the Bundeswehr University Munich, under the direction of former Vice-Chief of Staff of the Bundeswehr and later professor, Mr. Jürgen Schnell, came to similar results. This study summarizes: “The presumption that the Bundeswehr as a conscript army would be less expensive than an all volunteer army of the same efficiency could not be confirmed (...). From the fiscal point of view, an all-volunteer army would be about seven billions DM cheaper, and about 30 per cent more efficient.” (Rose 2000b: 7) When looking only at the figures of the personnel costs in the federal budget, without taking into consideration any opportunity costs, any allvolunteer army will, of course, lead to more expenses than a conscript army of the same personnel strength as the costs to be paid for volunteer rank-andfile are higher than those of a conscript. Due to a higher efficiency of volunteers, however, an all-volunteer army may be kept at a lower personnel strength than armed forces consisting of both, volunteers and conscripts. For the smaller all-volunteer army, lower costs of personal equipment, accommodation and recruiting organization would have to be added, while the latter would not be required any longer in its current form. All the financial funds economized this way could be used for structural amelioration and for an increase in service attractiveness and would finally lead to the effect that an allvolunteer army would not be more expensive than conscript armed forces. The fact that all those European armed forces having suspended conscription over the recent years suffer from cost increases is not contradictory at all to these notions. Any conversion – and it is a conversion phase for those armies – will first need a financial boost. Thus, the commission ‘Gemeinsame Sicherheit und Zukunft der Bundeswehr’ (Common Security and Future of the Bundeswehr) started out from the supposition of needing in185

creased financial requirements for their proposed reform measures (which come close to an all-volunteer army) amounting to about three bio. DM per year over a certain transition period (Kommission Gemeinsame Sicherheit und Zukunft der Bundeswehr 2000: 140f.). 2.4

Political Arguments

In this regard there are two issues that are discussed: On the one hand, one is the relationship of conscription with democracy and society, the other is the fear that an all-volunteer army could become ‘a state within the state’. Since the foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany, general conscription is “the legitimate child of democracy” for many of its supporters. Theodor Heuss, the first president of the Federal Republic of Germany, is said to have uttered these words in 1949 as a Member of Parliament during the debate about the right to conscientious objection. Others say that since the French Revolution and the Liberation Wars against Napoleon, conscription has been the expression of a citizen’s obligation towards the community, a symbol of democratic thinking and a means of strengthening the consciousness of common responsibility. The supporters of an all-volunteer army refuse this as pure rhetoric and even as a myth (see Bald 1999). They rather consider conscription as “a child of the Cold War” (Klein/Kister 1991: 125) that was born in Germany since it seemed to be impossible to reach tne number of soldiers promised to NATO by means of volunteers. Moreover, according to them, there is no relationship between a democratic state and conscription since, on the one hand, democratic states like the U.S. and the UK have would traditionally maintained all-volunteer armies and, on the other hand, dictators such as Hitler, Stalin and Mussolini have started their wars with conscription. The experience of the Weimar Republic in which the Reichswehr lived its own life, separated from the democratic legitimate government, is very often advanced as an argument for the fear that the Bundeswehr could become a state within the state if conscription was abolished or suspended. This historical analogy, however, is wrong. “The Reichswehr served a democracy they hated. The armed forces consisted of the remainders of the Emperor’s army considering themselves undefeated. Their officers had been educated in the class prejudice of the era of William II; together with some from the lower ranks, the latter partly infected with the Brownshirt virus, they strove for the restoration of former splendor.” (Kister/Klein 1991: 127f.) The leadership of the Bundeswehr, however, has grown up in a democratic state, and they profess their loyalty to it. There is no sign at all that the officers and NCOs, holding the same democratic opinions as their civilian co-citizens, 186

would suddenly and radically change their political orientations when an allvolunteer army would be implemented. This is all the more unlikely because all-volunteer armed forces will essentially consist of temporary-career volunteers. In their own interests, they will remain connected to civilian life during their service by manifold links as they intend to return after a certain period (see Heikenroth 2000). This fact, together with the great number of parliamentary and public mechanisms of control which distinguish Germany in an all-European comparison would prevent the creation of a state within the state in case of an all-volunteer Bundeswehr (Klein 2003: 75). Certainly, the argument that a conscript army would somewhat prevent politicians from plunging into military adventures, more than an all-voluntary armed force would do, is to be taken seriously. Whilst the deployment of conscript soldiers certainly would only find support if there is no other possibility at hand, the idea could prevail that in an all-voluntary army, the soldiers had chosen the military profession, thus being aware of all the risks that could arise. When following this notion, conscripts in mixed armed forces, however, could only hold back politicians when the general intention was to deploy volunteers and conscripts together. But, taking the current situation as a base, this would only apply to the Bundeswehr in the (improbable) case of national or collective defense. The current Bundeswehr peacekeeping and peacemaking missions or the fight against terrorism are done by regulars and temporary-career volunteers only. They are accompanied by just a few conscripts who have voluntarily declared their willingness to participate and who have prolonged their time of service up to 23 months. Thus, when imputing the mentioned motives for politicians one has to take into consideration that just now the ‘breaks’ for politicans to plunge into military adventures do not exist. Another argument often and willingly quoted against an all-volunteer army is the statement that such armed forces would constitute a reservoir for those young men and women tending towards violence and showing nationalist or even right-wing radical attitudes. This perhaps plausible presumption at first glance, is however silent about the fact that a conscript army is not at all invulnerable to infiltrations by such elements. As it has been shown by empirical studies, the de facto right of choosing between military and civilian service has led, for a longer period already, to the tendency that those young men classifying themselves among the ‘right-wing’ political specter join the Bundeswehr whilst the ‘left-wings’ rather prefer the alternative civilian service (see Kohr 1993). The extreme right-wing parties and movements in Germany essentially recruit their members among young men. Their image also consists of show187

ing military and belligerent attitudes. Thus, extremely right-wing opinions and civilian service exclude each other. Any rightist will join the Bundeswehr, even though he considers this army as a ‘droopy troop’. Due to appropriate criteria for recruitment, the Bundeswehr has hitherto succeeded to prevent an infiltration by extremists from both sides. An allvolunteer army, of course, would have to maintain these criteria. This could end up preventing young men with rightist radical attitudes from joining the armed forces even to a greater extent than nowadays in a conscript army. As for the latter, we have to presume that, due to the selective effects of the civilian service, the ratio of right-wing oriented young men will always be higher in the army than in the adequate civilian age group. It seems nearly impossible to protect a conscript army against right-wing or left-wing extremists. In case of excluding them, the consequence would probably be that many young men liable to military service would denunciate themselves as right-wing extremists in order to render neither military nor civilian service.

3

Conclusion

When comparing the advantages and disadvantages of the forms of military service under discussion here, it seems rather clear, that conscription in its present form brings only a few advantages for the Bundeswehr. It will be, more and more, a mere symbol or even an obstacle to the transformation process. Many arguments favor the solution that, in the long term, Germany, similarly to most of its neighbors, should follow the international trend and suspend conscription, even though this would result in ending the alternative civilian service which is often wrongly seen by many as indispensable for financial reasons. The often stated reasons for maintaining obligatory military service, such as the integration of the armed forces into society and the simplified recruitment of volunteers will fade away as an attack from outside the borders will be seen as less probable and as the Bundeswehr will come to see its main field of activity in peacekeeping and peacemaking missions everywhere in the world. In a long-term prospect, a renewed reform of the Bundeswehr will become unavoidable. Then, the German armed forces will be orientated towards an all-volunteer army with about 200,000 personnel. Even today, when talking with officers and NCOs you can often hear the sentence: ‘It’s not much but it’s nice.’

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Literature Bagger, Hartmut (1997): Die allgemeine Wehrpflicht steht nicht zur Disposition. In: Europäische Sicherheit, 46: 2, 7–10. Bald, Detlef (1999): Sechs Legenden über Wehrpflicht und Demokratie. In: Information für die Truppe (IFDT), 43: 4, 4–15. Balkany, Patrick (1996): Le coût de la conscription et de l’armée de métier (Rapport d’information No. 2587). Paris: Assemblée Nationale. Blome, Norbert (2000): Nato: Bundeswehr schlecht ausgerüstet. In: Die Welt, 8. Juni. Bundesminister der Verteidigung (2000a): Die Bundeswehr – sicher ins 21. Jahrhundert. Eckpfeiler für eine Erneuerung von Grund auf. Bonn: Bundesminister der Verteidigung. Bundesminister der Verteidigung (2000b): Neuausrichtung der Bundeswehr. Grobausplanung, Ergebnisse und Entscheidungen. Bonn: Bundesminister der Verteidigung. Bundesminister der Verteidigung (2004): Grundzüge der Konzeption der Bundeswehr. Berlin: Bundesminister der Verteidigung. Deutscher Bundestag (2001): Bundestagsdrucksache 14/5857, 3 April. Berlin: Bundestag. Gertz, Bernhard (2003): Zwischen Hindukusch und Hindelang – Die Wehrpflicht in der Diskussion. In: Prüfert, Andreas (Ed.): Hat die allgemeine Wehrpflicht in Deutschland eine Zukunft? Baden-Baden: Nomos, 79–82. Groß, Jürgen/Lutz, Dieter S. (Eds.) (1998): Wehrpflicht ausgedient. Baden-Baden: Nomos. Groß, Jürgen/Rose, Jürgen (2002): Europäische Sicherheit und Zukunft der Bundeswehr. Wehrstrukturen unter neuen Prämissen. Hamburg: IFSH. Haltiner, Karl (2003): Die Wehrpflicht vor dem Aus? Europas Streitkräfte im Umbruch. In: Prüfert, Andreas (Ed.): Hat die allgemeine Wehrpflicht in Deutschland eine Zukunft? Baden-Baden: Nomos, 21–38. Heikenroth, André (2000): Wer will zur Bundeswehr. Eine Potentialanalyse (SOWIWorking Paper 123). Strausberg: SOWI. http://www.bundeswehr.de Kister, Kurt/Klein, Paul (1991): Keine Zukunft für die Wehrpflicht. In: Klein, Paul (Ed.): Wehrpflicht und Wehrpflichtige heute. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 125–128. Klein, Paul (2003): Die Zukunft der Wehrpflicht in Deutschland. In: Prüfert, Andreas (Ed.): Hat die allgemeine Wehrpflicht in Deutschland eine Zukunft? BadenBaden: Nomos, 69–78. Klein, Paul/Kuhlmann, Jürgen (2000): Coping with the Peace Dividend: Germany and its Armed Forces in Transition. In: Kuhlmann, Jürgen/Callaghan, Jean (Eds.): Military and Society in 21st Century. Münster et al.: LIT Verlag, 183–226. Kohr, Heinz-Ulrich (1993): Rechts zur Bundeswehr, links zum Zivildienst? (SOWIWorking Paper 77). München: SOWI. Kommission Gemeinsame Sicherheit und Zukunft der Bundeswehr (2000): Kommissionsbericht. Bonn – Berlin: Bundesminister der Verteidigung.

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Kuhlmann, Jürgen/Lippert, Ekkehard (1991): Wehrpflicht ade? Argumente wider und für die Wehrpflicht in Friedenszeiten. (SOWI-Working Paper 48). München: SOWI. Kuhlmann, Jürgen (1992): National Service Options in Germany. (SOWI-Working Paper 67). München: SOWI. Rose, Jürgen (2000a): Manuscript for the Broadcast ‘Streitkräfte und Strategien’, 7 July. Hamburg: Norddeutscher Rundfunk 4. Rose, Jürgen (2000b): Im Verteidigungsetat ist zu viel Geld eingeplant. In: Frankfurter Rundschau, 22 May. Unterseher, Lutz (2003): Conscription in Germany – Past, Present, Positions, Plans, Prospects. In: Maleši, Marjan (Ed.): Conscription vs. All-Volunteer Forces in Europe. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 63–82. Tobiassen, Peter (2001): Die Neuausrichtung der Bundeswehr und die Frage der Wehrgerechtigkeit. Bremen: Zentralstelle für Schutz und Recht der Kriegsdiensverweigerer e.V. Wellershoff, Dieter (2000): Bewahren und sichern. In: Die politische Meinung, 368, 16–22. Werkner, Ines-Jacqueline (Ed.) (2004): Die Wehrpflicht und ihre Hintergründe. Sozialwissenschaftliche Beiträge zur aktuellen Debatte. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. Werkner, Ines-Jacqueline (2006): Wehrstrukturen im internationalen Vergleich. In: Gareis, Sven B./Klein, Paul (Eds.): Handbuch Militär und Sozialwissenschaft. 2nd edition. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 81–93.

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Thinking Globally: U.S. Cadet and Civilian Undergraduate Attitudes toward Social Problems 1 Morten G. Ender, David E. Rohall & Michael D. Matthews The [world] social issue that concerns me is the hunger in underdeveloped countries while America faces problems with obesity. (ROTC cadet)

1

Introduction

Acknowledging social problems is important to social scientists on numerous levels. According to the website of the Society for the Study of Social Problems 2 members “are an interdisciplinary community of scholars, practitioners, advocates, and students interested in the application of critical, scientific, and humanistic perspectives to the study of vital social problems (…) involved in scholarship or action in pursuit of a just society nationally or internationally, (…) engaged in research to find the causes and consequences of social problems, as well as others seeking to apply existing scholarship to the formulation of social policies. Many members are social scientists by training. Many teach in colleges and universities. Increasing numbers work in applied research and policy settings.” Teachers are concerned about the frames of references students might bring to the classroom. One method for gauging those frames is to periodically query generations of students about social issues they find relevant. Such efforts allow for levels of student-centered approaches to learning and provides for demystifying individual and collective perceptions about the social world students might possess. The present paper aspires to tap the reservoir of perceptions held by three distinct groups of college students in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorists attacks and at the brink of international war. The 1

2

The views of the authors are their own and do not purport to reflect the position of the United States Military Academy, Army Research Institute, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense. Portions of this research are funded by a research grant from the Office of Undersecretary of Defense, Personnel & Readiness, Program Integration. A previous version of this paper was presented at the International Biennial Meetings of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Chicago, Ill., October 24–26, 2003. The authors wish to thank Robert E. Meine for thoughtful suggestions on a previous draft of this manuscript. For correspondence contact the senior author at the Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership, United States Military Academy, West Point, NY, 10996 U.S.A., [email protected] It is noteworthy that war and peace are absent among the nineteen specific special divisions of the SSSP; the teaching social problems however is listed. Retrieved 22 August 2006 at http://www.sssp1.org/ index.cfm?tsmi=1

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paper seeks to identify attitudes about social problems held by military academy cadets, ROTC cadets, and civilian university undergraduate students in the United States in their three social regions – community, nation, and the world.

2

Literature Review

Three sets of literature converge in this chapter: the study of social problems more generally, perceptions of social problems among youth, and knowledge about military matters among military and civilian populations. 2.1

The Nature of Social Problems

Social problems are defined as social situations that are widespread, involving some collective social ill, transcend personal problems, and are viewed as malleable. Social problems can be viewed in terms of their magnitude, severity, and primacy (Ginsberg 1994). From this perspective, in order to be considered a social problem, the issue must be extreme in all three of these categories. These dimensions can vary over time and by location, making them malleable relative to a given community or society, its location, and the historical conditions surrounding it. There are multiple ways of inquiring into social problems. An objectivist approach focuses on the real, the tangible, and the measureable features of social problems (Hastings 1979; Loseke 1999). There are environmental conditions associated with a particular problem that can be identified, objectified, and measured. For example, Berlage/Egelman (1990) focus on issues such as teen pregnancy, drugs, social equality, war, and the environment using statistical changes over time to show the saliency of these problems. The researchers studying the social problem look for objective indicators such as conditions associated with particular problems (e.g., number of people below the poverty line), their causes (e.g., level of education and skills), and their consequences (e.g., increased crime rate). Under this schema, social problems can be quantified and studied using objective measures and tests. The subjectivist approach to the study of social problems complements the objectivist approach by examining the role of time and place in individuals’ perceptions of social problems. Here the focus is on how public perceptions of problems are effected by different historical and cultural factors. Loseke (1999) notes that people live in both the physical world and the world (or worlds) of meaning. The latter perspective indicates that we socially construct what our problems are. The actor subjectively defines for himself what the significant social problems are. Further, these socially constructed defini192

tions, while not necessarily objective, do become real in their consequences as people act upon them via claims making, voting, consideration of others, and through other means. Essentially both approaches offer insight to understanding social problems. The saliency of social problems differs throughout society by time. Social problems, while fairly consistent across a discipline, might be more or less represented in a particular textbook. Salient sociological themes in introductory social problems textbooks in the 1980s include for example, age, crime, drug use, delinquency, education, environment, family, gender, health care, mental disorders, minorities, population, poverty, sexual behavior, violence, welfare, and work. Not salient are war and terrorism (Dolch 1990). Social problems also differ by place. Manis (1984) differentiates the discussion of social problems into three main categories, which include world problems, societal problems, and personal problems. The present chapter adopts these as world, nation, and community problems. Social problems may also differ by groups within a society – further pointing to the social constructivist perspective on social problems. The next section reviews the literature on children, adolescents, youth and social issues and problems. 2.2

Youth Attitudes toward Social Issues

Children are also cognizant of social problems. Elise Boulding (1981) interviewed fourth graders at a New York junior high school and compared their responses to the written responses of students at a junior high school in rural Lyme, New Hampshire, in order to determine how the individuals viewed the world. Concerns for the future, social problems close to home, and international issues are all discussed with the participants, whose responses proved to be quite candid. While the majority of this article centers on the fanciful responses of the young respondents, some of the data presents a clear depiction of some key concerns of young people. Pollution, the depletion of natural resources, and the potential for nuclear war are all discussed as major themes. Social problems for adolescents are likely to be more directly linked to their personal world and perhaps even personal troubles. Erwin (2002) discusses social problems as stressors for adolescents. Based on a series of discussion groups in which the study participants were asked questions related to their perceptions of social problems, Erwin identified five social problem themes deemed most relevant to teenagers in today’s society. The five social problem themes include intergenerational respect, peer pressure, the reality of violence, attitudes toward school, and acceptance by peers. Erwin cautions

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the reader that social problems are likely to shift in response to a changing society. One example of shifts is public opinion – even among youth. The Gallup Youth Survey gathers the opinions and thoughts of people aged 13 to 17 years old about the issues going on in their everyday lives. It engages with a range of issues – and the surveys allege to “provide an unparalleled body of knowledge on habits, hopes, fears, and dreams of American youth” (Gallup 1993: 13). Shifts might be related to how youth learn about problems through interactions of adolescent peers (Fine 2000) and media (Lavalekar 2000). Roscoe (1985) surveyed 446 undergraduate students, asking them to identify social problems and their degree of saliency from a list of 16 social issues. The social issues were derived from 20 years of published social issues. The data yielded five main areas of concern for students including: drug use, pollution, hunger, threat of nuclear war, and poverty. The primary conclusion of the research is “the recognition that late adolescents perceive a variety of issues to be serious social problems in American society today” (Roscoe 1985: 381). While this statement is quite general, it illustrates the wide array of issues which the participants deemed to be serious social problems, but are also specific to their generational cohort. Erica Frydenberg and Ramon Lewis (1986) studied the level of concern of young Australians in dealing with four social problems and examined the youths’ coping strategies for the problems. Given the social problems of pollution, discrimination, global war, and community violence, the participants assigned a level of concern to each problem, giving the researchers insight into the youths’ prioritization of concern. The researchers then analyzed open-ended questions pertaining to how the participants coped with their concerns about the given social problems. Of particular interest was the authors’ discussion of the relation of individual concern to participation in social action dealing with pertinent concerns. Specific findings discussed centered on individual precedence of concerns, sources of social problems in adolescents, and trends which indicate a shift in the level of confidence felt by adolescents in dealing with social problems. Others have studied social problems comparing attitudes of sociologists to their students (Calhoun 2003) and sociologists, students, and the public (Kenkel 1990). Comparatively, there are some shared attitudes, but differences appear more often than similarities. In sum, research shows that two features characterize youth and adolescents and their perceptions of social problems – they change, yet are somewhat stable. War (or the causes) is a problem during times of war. Otherwise, traditional problems for adolescents and youth appear to include the big eight: drugs, the environment, social

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inequality, education, intergenerational respect, peer relations, hunger, and war during times of war. 2.3

Higher Education’s War and Peace Agenda

War and peace might be expected as a topical area of concern in the discipline of sociology. 3 In the Introduction to Social Problems, Lauer (1976) did find “war and peace” to be identified by Americans through Gallup opinion polls taken between 1935–75 as the major social problem “facing the nation.” In slight contrast, he found the topical coverage of war and peace in social problems textbooks for this course among the 14 major topical areas to be the least. Further, his analysis found out that only 29 per cent of the texts covered war as a social problem. Michael R. Nusbaumer and his colleagues (1989) note that sociologists are responsible for identifying and defining social problems for the society and teaching about social problems is essential for the discipline of sociology. However, analyzing several sociology textbooks from 1976 to 1986 they find that war has diminished as a significant social problem. There was some increased coverage in the post-Vietnam era (1976–86), with 33 per cent of social problems texts covering war as a social problem during the period (Nusbaumer/Kelley/DiIorio 1989). However, this same study further reported a disparate treatment of the topic of war both in amount of coverage and substantively. Above and beyond, the topics of peace and the military paled in coverage compared to war (Nusbaumer/Kelley/DiIorio 1989). In a more recent and related study, Ender/Gibson (2005) examine the representation of peace, war, and the military institution in popular introductory sociology textbooks published in the 1990s. They anchor the analysis in both a long tradition of examining the content of introductory sociology textbooks and a recent teaching sociology literature reflecting on commonality of core knowledge at the introductory level. More specifically, they examine the degree to which sociology contributes to the so-called widening civil-military knowledge gap emergent at the time in American society. The analysis deconstructs the content of the textbooks for peace, war, and military concepts, references, and photographs. Four themes are discussed. First, the topics of peace, war, and the military are marginalized in introductory sociology textbooks; second, there is a lack of continuity across textbooks;

3

There is an entire literature focusing on what enlisted soldiers and military officers think about the role and functions of the military in international and domestic affairs (see Kuhlmann 1994; Rohall/Ender forthcoming; Segal/Reed/Rohall 1998). The focus of this article is officer education at the precommissioning level.

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third, photographs of peace, war, and the military are prominent; and finally, the civil-military gap is perpetuated. Finally, Desmond (2005) confirms the saliency of organized violence as a social problem perspective. In a study of his students across time, terrorism was all but absent until after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York, Washington, DC, and Pennsylvania where they then occupied a top position for 35 per cent of the students. In sum, research shows divergences among adults and youth and their views of social problems. More, early research indicates that youth are modestly stable regarding their attitudes toward social problems, but they change from one cohort to the next. Very little research has tried to understand the similarities and differences among students and their perceptions of common social problems across institutional affiliations in the post-9/11 world. This research is important because these students represent future leaders, people who ultimately decide where to extend national resources. The literature reviewed here shows some differences between military and civilian students in their perceptions of social problems. Teaching resources in the social sciences inadequately represent peace and war. The greatest differences are among military issues related to conflict and war in the world.

3

Methodology

We share some qualitative findings from the Biannual Attitude Survey of Students (BASS). The BASS is an on-going examination of attitudes and leadership changes in a specific segment of the U.S. population – college students, ROTC cadets, and military academy cadets. Beginning in January 2003, a biannual attitude survey has been administered to over 2,000 cadets and students from 23 different colleges, universities, and military institutions around the United States (see Rohall/Ender/Matthews 2006). The subjects (n=736) discussed in this chapter were surveyed in the spring of 2003. Students represented nine different institutions including 272 civilians, 375 ROTC cadets, and 89 U.S. Military Academy cadets. 4 The nine schools are located across the United States including Florida, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, and Washington. The principal investigators, or instructors for the classes under the written instructions of the principal investigators, administered the surveys. In the latter situation, faculties were mailed the surveys and returned them via mail. Students were provided with an informed consent form and 4

U.S. Military Academy cadets represent all 50 states and territories in the United States and include some international cadets.

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proceeded to complete the survey. Most students completed the survey in 40 minutes. Our primary goals are to assess students’ perceptions of current social problems and to determine whether military affiliation affected these attitudes. Data were collected while the U.S. was amidst two major armed conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Hence, we believe that responses would be heavily influenced by these events. That said all groups were experiencing these problems at the same time. In addition, we tried to assess these issues using open-ended questions, allowing students to tell us about their sense of problems in the world today. Hence, responses were not shaped by the formatting of the instrument. The open-ended questions solicited participants to respond, “in your own words (…) tell us” the following: x The social issue in your community (your hometown) that most concerns you? x The social issue in the nation that most concerns you? x The social issue in the world that most concerns you? The open-ended surveys were coded by a single coder. Responses by students were coded for key terms associated with social problems from previous studies. The coding strategy was unproblematic as most students identified a very specific problem such as “terrorism” or “homelessness” in their writing. In cases of multiple problems in one response, the most salient or associated “cause” problem was listed. Using the subjectivist logic, problems emerged from the data rather than imposing definitions on the data. Our goal is to review responses to these questions and to compare them among samples of military and civilian students. U.S. students were administered the surveys in sociology classes, ROTC classrooms, or classrooms where students reported for extra-class credit, producing 272 civilian responses. In terms of socio-demographics, males outnumber females with a three to one ratio among all cadets. White representation is roughly equal to societal representations, but African Americans and Hispanics are somewhat underrepresented. The mean age is 19. Two thirds of the total report their political orientation as either Republican or Democrat (66.9%) and a significant number has “other” or “no political affiliation”. Most had completed two semesters of college or university. Most have college educated parents. Most reported neither parent as career military.

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4

Results

The primary goals of this paper are to assess student perceptions of social problems generally and to compare perceptions of social problems among military and civilian students. The results are organized and presented in three different categorical areas – community, nation, and world. Within each region, the more dominate problems are presented. Following the group level results by region, comparison by the three differing groups are presented. 4.1

Perceptions of Social Problems at the Community, Nation, and World Levels

4.1.1 Community Social Problems The majority of all three groups identified a problem in their community (n=419; 56.9%). The remainder wrote nothing (n=193; 26.2%) with eleven per cent (n=79) reporting there are no problems or “none” in their community, and a small group responding either “N/A”, “don’t know”, “no opinion”, “no concerns”, or “don’t care” (n=45; 6.1%). There were 95 differing social problems identified. Eleven categories had 10 or more responses including “Community Development: Growth” (n=20), “Community Economic Stability” (n=13), “Community Joblessness” (n=12), “Crime” (n=17), “General Drug Use” (n=31), “Education: General” (n=21), “Education: School Overcrowding” (n=12), “Education: School Funding” (n=14), “Other” (n=32), “Racism” (n=17), and “Terrorism” (n=32). When problems are combined, singular problems such as “School Dropouts” and “Civil Unions” increase the “Other” category (n=70). Examples of “Other” responses include: x “The social issue that most concerns me [in my community] is the lack of representation of a broad spectrum of the political views in this country. In the name of ‘liberalism’ people are not able to have their conservative voice heard and their problems and complaints are not as well addressed.” (U.S. Military Academy cadet) x “The spread of Islam left unchecked by the liberals that each day eat away at our great nation.” (Western ROTC cadet) x “Any animal mistreatment.” (Southern ROTC cadet)

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Likewise, combining “Drug and Alcohol Use” to include drunk driving and teenage alcohol and drug use, the number rises to 50. Examples of responses include: x “In my hometown there is a rise every year in the number of bars and drunks. These bums commit vandalism and should be dealt with.” (Northeastern ROTC cadet) x “I go to Podunk University, the number one party school. So of course one of the big social issues is drinking. Especially now that PU has earned this name – the students here feel they have to do their part to uphold the reputation. This leads to bigger and better parties, more of them, and more alcohol consumption.” (Midwestern ROTC cadet) x “The social issue I am most concerned with is substance abuse. I come from a fairly wealthy town and it is easy for kids to obtain and afford such drugs. It has moved through the high schools to even middle schools now, and students should not be exposed to that.” (U.S. Military Academy cadet) Similarly, when all of the education categories are combined (minus those appearing only once), the number increases to 61. Education responses include: x “Poor education for lower income families.” (Southern ROTC cadet) x “I am most concerned with failing education systems. It is important to me that teachers not have tenure, so they may be fired. They are unable to perform as effective educators.” (Northeastern civilian college student) x “The school focuses too much on parking tickets and parking problems. That and people are still making too big of a deal with the school mascot name.” (Midwestern civilian college student) Thus, the three largest social problems in communities for the three groups appear to be a range of problems noted as “Other”, education related, and drug and alcohol related. 4.1.2 National Social Problems Like the community problems, the majority of all three groups did identify a specific problem in the nation (n=551; 74.9%). The remainder wrote nothing (n=144; 19.6%) with a small per cent reporting there are no problems or “none” in the nation (n=25; 3.4%) and another group responding either “N/A”, “don’t know”, “no opinion”, “no concerns”, or “don’t care” (n=16; 2.2%). There were 60 differing social issues identified. Eleven categories had 10 or more responses including “Apathy: Lack of Respect for the Mili199

tary/General” (n=13), “Environmental Degradation” (n=11), “Lack of Morals” (n=20), “Military Deployments” (n=11), “Other” (n=22), “Poverty” (n=16), “Prejudice/Discrimination” (n=14), “Racism” (n=14), “Social/ Economic Inequality” (n=14), “Terrorism/Wars/National Security” (n=263), and “General Economy” (n=28). When the above categories are collapsed into larger themes more generally, the “Other” increases slightly by twenty (n=42). Inequality problems including racism, diversity, poverty, homelessness, and other forms of social inequity increases greatly (n=70). Examples of “Other” categories at the national level include: x “The right to a degree of privacy.” (Northeastern ROTC cadet) x “The current airport security.” (Western ROTC cadet) x “I am very concerned with the economic situation of the Airline industry. Thousands of jobs are lost throughout travel seasons. I feel the federal government should include a larger support for the industry. After all, they rely on it too.” (Midwestern ROTC cadet) Examples of inequality include: x “No more offensive action or well fare [sic!] as Bill O’Reilly said, America has a class problem and not a race problem. No more gay rights shit in schools. God Bless Bush and Rush!” (Western ROTC cadet) x “Poor quality of life. It causes other countries to look at those with good living conditions and spite them. People get jealous for stupid reasons.” (U.S. Military Academy cadet) x “Racism.” (Midwestern civilian college student) Problems associated with the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, the war in Afghanistan, and an imminent war with Iraq, are overrepresented (n=263). Typical cadet and student open-ended responses include: x “Whether or not we are going to go to war. It is scary to think about and I don’t like having my life’s fate in someone else’s hands.” (Midwestern civilian college student) x “We should immediately deploy the 18th Airborne Corps, Rangers, and entire 5th Special Forces group to Iraq, with the 2nd ACR, 1st CAV, and Big Red One following as support. Using superior air power and naval gunfire we should pummel all of urban Iraq and invade immediately to remove Saddam from power.” (Northeastern ROTC cadet) x “I am most concerned with the war on terrorism. I think we have spent too many years not looking out for these cells and now we are making up lost ground.” (U.S. Military Academy cadet) 200

4.1.3 World Social Problems Similar to community and national problems, the majority of respondents identified an actual social problem at the world level (n=518; 70.4%). The remainder wrote nothing (n=173; 23.5%) with a small per cent reporting there are no problems or “none” in the world (n=28; 3.8%) and another group responding either “N/A”, “don’t know”, “no opinion”, “no concerns”, or “don’t care” (n=17; 2.3%). There were 35 differing world social issues identified. Seven categories had 10 or more responses including “Environmental Degradation” (n=13), “World Hunger” (n=35), “Other” (n=17), “Poverty” (n=21), “Terrorism/Wars/National Security” (n=257), “Religious Fundamentalism” (n=15), and “Social Conflict/Globalism/U.S. Involvements” (n=89). Clearly, like perceptions of problems at the national-level, issues of war and security dominate concerns at the global level. When the categories are combined around larger themes, “Other” increases some (n=23) as does environmental concerns (n=17). Global stratification increases (n=92). Global peace, war, and social conflict, to include genocide and human rights, remains strikingly high (n=269). Some “Other” category examples given include: x “Long exams.” (Northeastern ROTC cadet) x “International trade development and environment – all are important – raising development will serve to quell violence, heighten education and preserve the environment.” (Northeastern ROTC cadet) x “Hate.” (Midwestern ROTC cadet) Environmental problems at the world level examples include: x “Saving the environment and not losing the quality of it anymore than we have already.” (Midwestern civilian college student) x “Environmental degradation and disease.” (Northeastern civilian college student) x “Again, environmental awareness and responsibility.” (Western ROTC cadet) Examples of both global stratification and peace, war, and social conflict include: x “The social issue that concerns me is the hunger in underdeveloped countries while America faces problems with obesity.” (Western ROTC cadet) x “In the world, the social issue that most concerns me is poor people. There are so many countries where people can’t survive because they don’t have enough food to feed their children. I feel, like we, as a nation and others should be able to help these countries. I see the images of the 201

dying children in Africa on television and it truly concerns me.” (U.S. Military Academy cadet) x “Genocide in the Middle East between Israel and Pakistan. Some sort of peace has to be worked out between the two nations. All the killing has to stop.” (Southeastern ROTC cadet) x “Most of the world falls into a category of ‘surface’. Economically proficient, they provide the world with stability and are a productive part of the world society. However, there are gaps within this surface that try to eliminate the surface. Very poor and underdeveloped countries make up the gap. They harbor terror and war. This gap concerns me. It must be eliminated.” (U.S. Military Academy cadet) 4.2

Perceptions of Problems: Military and Civilian Students by Region Level

A key feature of this chapter is a comparison of the three groups under consideration and the types of social problems they view as salient. Next, we examine those problems at the community, nation, and world levels that are distinctly different among the three groups relative to the overall totals. The data in Table 1 show those topical categories where the three groups are markedly different.

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Table 1: Community, Nation, and World Social Problems Identified by a Sample of United States Military Academy Cadets, U.S. Reserved Officer Training Corps (ROTC) Cadets, and U.S. Civilian College Students (in per cent) USMA Cadets (n=89) Community Problems Nothing Written No Problems Don’t know/Don’t Care/No opinion/N/A/etc. Community Development Diversity Drug Use Other Poverty/Hunger Racism National Problems Nothing written No problems Don’t know/Don’t Care/No opinion/N/A/etc. Abortion Apathy: lack of respect general/military Crime Education: Apathy for Gun Control Lack of Morals Lack of Patriotism Prejudice/Discrimination Racism Teenage Responsibility Terrorism/Wars/National Security World Problems Nothing Written No Problems Don’t know/Don’t Care/No opinion/N/A/etc. AIDS Global Inequality Other Terrorism/Wars/National Security Religious Fundamentalism Social Conflict/Globalism/ U.S. Involvements

ROTC Cadets (n=375)

Civilians (n=272)

Total (n=736)

5.6 2.2

33.6 7.7

22.8 17.6

26.2 10.7

5.6

5.6

7.0

6.1

6.7 5.6 9.0 10.1 4.5 5.6

3.2 1.1 3.7 4.0 0 1.6

.7 0 3.3 2.9 0 2.2

2.7 1.2 4.2 4.3 .5 2.3

0 1.1

26.7 1.9

16.2 6.3

19.6 3.4

0

2.9

1.8

2.2

2.2

1.3

.7

1.2

9.0

1.1

.4

1.8

0 2.2 3.4 4.5 4.5 5.6 5.6 2.2

1.6 1.1 .5 3.5 1.1 .8 1.1 0

.7 1.1 1.1 1.1 .4 2.2 1.8 0

1.1 1.2 1.1 2.7 1.2 1.9 1.9 .3

38.2

28.5

44.9

35.7

2.2 1.1

31.2 2.1

19.9 7.0

23.5 3.8

0

3.5

1.5

2.3

3.4 3.4 1.1

.8 0 3.7

1.1 1.8 .7

1.2 1.1 2.3

39.3

28.3

42.6

34.9

4.5

2.9

0

2.0

28.1

11.5

7.7

12.1

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4.2.1 Community Social Problems First, USMA cadets had a mere 5.6 per cent who wrote nothing compared to the overall total (26.2%). Thus, they were the most likely to write something to the open-ended question soliciting a response for the following statement: the social issue in your community (your hometown) that most concerns you? ROTC cadets are the least likely to respond (33.6%) with a problem. In terms of responding “no problems”, civilians were more likely (17.6%) and USMA cadets the least likely (2.2%). Overall, cadets are fairly similar. They differ noticeably along six issues with only four of the eleven most cited community issues – “Community Development”, “Drug Use”, “Other”, and “Racism”. USMA cadets are twice as likely, and in some cases three times as likely, to note community problems regarding these latter four issues as well as two other areas – “Diversity” and “Poverty or Hunger” at the community level. 4.2.2 National Social Problems Overall, about 20 per cent of the sample wrote nothing when asked about a national social problem. All USMA cadets wrote something. ROTC cadets are less likely to respond (26.7%). In terms of responding “no problems”, civilians are more likely (6.3%) and USMA cadets least likely (1.1%) to say there are “no problems” in the nation compared to the group total (3.4%). All three groups are fairly similar regarding national issues. There are eleven noticeable areas where they differ. Five of the eleven are those listed as the top problems by the overall group. USMA cadets are twice and three times as likely to write that “Lack of Morals”, “Lack of Patriotism”, “Prejudice/ Discrimination”, and “Racism” are a national problem than their ROTC and civilian peers. The one outstanding area is “Apathy: A Lack of Respect in General and for the Military” shows USMA cadets (9.0%) over the overall group (1.8%). Other areas include “Abortion”, “Crime”, “Gun Control”, and “Teenage Responsibility”. Fewer ROTC cadets (28.5%) report and more civilians over report (44.9%) terrorism, wars, and national security at a national problem level compared to the overall group per cent (35.7%). 4.2.3 World Social Problems Finally, USMA cadets continue to be highly responsive to the open-ended questions compared to their ROTC and civilian peers. Almost a third of ROTC cadets (31.2%) and almost a fifth of the civilians (19.9%) did not respond to the question. Though very few civilians were much more likely to note there are no world problems (7.0%). ROTC cadets (3.5%) are more likely to note that they either “don’t know”, “don’t care”, or “have no opin204

ion” on world social issues. The three groups are markedly similar across the majority of identified categories. There are six categories of social issues that are identified where the three groups are noticeably different. Four of the six are also the most identified problems. USMA cadets have fewer (1.1%) “Other” categories than the overall group. ROTC cadets (28.3%) are less likely and civilians (42.6%) are more likely to identify terrorism, wars, and national security as a salient world issue. USMA cadets (4.5%) are twice as likely as the overall group (2.0%) to note “Religious Fundamentalism” as a world problem. Finally, USMA cadets (28.1%) do identify “Social Conflict/Globalism/U.S. Involvements” just over two times more likely as the overall group (12.1%). Two additional differing categories include “AIDS” and “Global Inequality”. USMA cadets (3.4% respectively) report these twice as often as the overall group totals (1.2% and 1.1% respectively).

5

Discussion

The present chapter integrates three literatures: approaches to social problems, perceptions of problems among youth, and the role of military affiliation in the perception of social issues. The unit of analysis compares civilian college students in general, but specifically compares civilian, ROTC cadets, and U.S. Military Academy cadets in the United States with an orientation toward first and second year students and cadets. Social problems research is generally contrasted between objectivist and subjectivist approaches. The subjectivist approach takes a more primary data perspective where respondents are queried about their perspectives. Objectivist approaches focus on secondary data analysis via social indicators such as statistical rates. In the present study, over three-fourths of the respondents could identify a salient problem in their community, in the nation, and on the planet. A serendipitous finding is that U.S. Military Academy cadets appear much more willing to have and share their attitudes toward social problems at all three levels – community, nation, and world. It is notable that all the U.S. Military Academy cadets are in their first year – affectionately called “plebes” or common people/populace. 5 Further, most USMA cadets are stellar performers in high school with exceptionally high grade point averages and SAT scores. Another indicator of identifying, defining, and engaging social problems at multiple levels is that a high proportion of cadets choose the social sciences as their major area of study at West Point despite it tradition5

Some first year plebes may have attended college prior to West Point. They are still required to complete the 47 month developmental experience although they may validate some of their college courses.

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ally being primarily an engineering school (Ender/Kolditz 2004; Parker 2004). Likewise, respondents identified an array of problems in the three regions suggesting social problems differ along a number of dimensions for youth. This finding confirms the fickleness of youth attitudes toward subjective related social issues. For example, in the present study, war, or the target of war – terrorism – is a significant problem during times of war. Research on youth culture has highlighted a number of salient areas that young people consider to be social problems despite their collective waffling when asked about such issues. The traditional problems appear to include the big eight: drugs, the environment, social inequality, education, intergenerational respect, peer relations, hunger, and war. All of these areas are supported in the present study with some exceptions and more additions. Exceptions include very few responses regarding intergenerational respect and peer relations. Additions include lack of morals and religious fundamentalism. Another addition is the global or international nature of inequality. Previous research tends to examine social and economic inequality at the community or national levels. This marked increase of identifying global inequality as a social problem suggests the current generation of college students is more global or international in their outlooks. 6 Comparisons of the three groups show some similarity to work prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the U.S. (Snider/Priest/Lewis 2001). Moreover, the capriciousness of the generation is noteworthy. Yet, differences do exist. For example, U.S. Military Academy cadets did more often report lack of respect, diversity, and poverty and hunger as social problems compared to the other groups. However, these problems are consistent with what we would expect other youth to report. The only other marked difference is higher reporting of terrorism/wars/national security as a problem by civilians and religious fundamentalism as a problem. The only outstanding differences are those that might be expected – dealing with some community level issues and responses to problems that would involve the military. In terms of community level issues, we see regional differences between the groups. The ROTC and civilian samples are drawn from specific areas – the three civilian populations are fairly rural. The ROTC samples are both rural and urban. However, West Point cadets are drawn from every U.S. state, both rural and urban counties, creating less consensus around particular communities and their related issues. Further, West Point cadets are fairly cognizant of their future military occupation requirements as 6

We use global and international interchangeably. Globalism tends to refer to an integration of countries and peoples resulting from global economic and technological advances. Internationalism tends to be thought of as a process of integrating cross-cultural, multicultural, global, and international perspectives into our paradigms (see NASULGC 2004).

206

leaders and are likely to be more attuned to military related social issues that will affect their chosen career trajectory and those they lead. This works at the Frosh level as first year cadets have self-selected themselves into the U.S. Military Academy and some form of anticipatory socialization begins to shape their thinking about national and world related events (Hammill/Segal/Segal 1995). Research on war as a social problem shows that it is merely topical in textbooks during times of war and immediately after war (Dolch 1990; Ender/Gibson 2005; Nusbaumer/Kelley/DiIorio 1989). Yet, the number of U.S. teenagers reporting “international tensions” as the most important problem facing the nation had waned to 6 per cent in 1992 (the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War) after a high of 57 per cent in 1986 (Gallup 1993). In the present study, war, terrorism, national security, U.S. involvement overseas, and international social conflict are reported as the significant problems facing the three groups at all levels – community, nation, and the world. At the time of this survey, early 2003, U.S. forces had already invaded Afghanistan, ousted the Taliban government, and were searching for the international terrorist Osama bin Laden. Further, sitting President George W. Bush had issued an ultimatum to Iraq’s government to surrender their “weapons of mass destruction” or risk being invaded by U.S. forces. Thus, following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, a war and a second pending U.S. led war in Iraq, the topics of war, terrorism, and international social conflict, were foremost in the nation’s consciousness – including youth. Future research should address whether this orientation wanes with new generations of youth. The results show that four patterns emerge when contrasting the three groups – varied responses, similar responses, situational responses, and new responses. Clearly the data show a range of varied social problems identified. There are 95 different community problems identified, 60 different national problems, and 35 different world problems. At the same time, there are a number of similarities between the groups – all three are correspondingly varied in their responses. First, the groups are similar to their previous cohorts of youth in terms of the big eight problems – drugs, the environment, social inequality, education, intergenerational respect, peer relations, hunger, and war. Another similarity is that all differentiate problems by region. Racism and terror are similar at the community level; inequality at the national level, and global stratification and war are reported at the world level. Likewise, the three groups are similar in their focus on the situational response to terrorism and war. At this writing, and at the time of the survey, we are in an environment of war – the so-called Global War on Terror – and American undergraduates across affiliations identify these issues as most important.

207

Finally, a few new problems emerge not anticipated by previous research. First, the preponderances of globalism or internationalism in the present study in all their forms are refreshing. Unfortunately, the focus seems pulled by war and terrorism. However, it does appear to push today’s U.S. students and cadets toward a more international orientation. Second, in addition to globalism, the emergence and recognition of social inequalities at all levels is new. Previous research had students limiting inequality to community and national levels. Again, we found that U.S. cadets and students note racism at the community level, inequality at the national level, and various forms of global or international stratification at the world level. Cadets and students today are recognizing inequality outside the boundaries of the United States. Again, the orientation is global, but students also appear to distinguish social phenomena of differing treatments of groups within communities and nations.

6

Conclusion

The present chapter aspires to tap the reservoir of perception held by three distinct groups of college students in the post-9/11 world. The chapter sought to identify and present attitudes about social problems held by future military and civilian leaders in their three regions – community, nation, and the world. Three literatures converge including subjectivist versus objectivist approaches to social problems, youth attitudes, and military issues. The overall results show that most students perceive of social problems at their community and nation levels as well as the world. Further, they are markedly similar in their identification of social problems and those problems are consistent with their peers of earlier and present generations. At the same time, students diverge greatly on the problems they identify – precisely perhaps because of the sheer number of problems acknowledged. Further, students are fairly situational in their orientations toward social problems – they follow current trends. Moreover, there are no outstanding differences among cadets and civilians with the exception of some focus on military issues for USMA and ROTC cadets. Finally, the new and dominant problems on the minds of students include globalism and global stratification in addition, to war, terrorism, and other forms of international social conflict. Teachers are empowered by knowing what captures the mind of students. We are better prepared to meet students where they are and anchor our disciplinary perspectives, theories, and concepts on areas deemed significant to students of a particular cohort. A significant social good emerges when a generation of ours students’ thinking coalesces with a movement in higher education – globalism and internationalism. An important question remains, 208

to what degree will these results continue with subsequent generations living in an ever changing social world? Moreover, how do American students compare to their international peers on these issues? Literature Berlage, Gai/Egelman, William (1990): Understanding Social Issues: Sociological Fact Finding. Boston, Mass.: Allyn and Bacon. Boulding, Elise (1981): World Security and the Future from the Junior High Perspective. In: Peace and Change, 7: 4, 65–76. Calhoun, Thomas C. (2003): Student and Faculty Perceptions of Social Problems: How Different are They ‘Really’? In: Sociological Focus, 36: 4, 277–290. Desmond, Scott A. (2005): Prioritizing Social Problems: An Exercise for Exploring Students’ Attitudes about Social Problems. In: Teaching Sociology, 33: 1, 59–65. Dolch, Norman A. (1990): A Review of Social Problems Texts. In: Teaching Sociology, 18: 3, 385–398. Elliott, Delbert S. (1994): Youth Violence: An Overview. Paper presented at the Aspen Institute’s Children’s Policy Forum “Children and Violence Conference”, February, Aspen, Col., USA. Ender, Morten G./Gibson, Ariel (2005): Invisible Institution: The Military, War, and Peace in 1990s Introductory Sociology Textbooks. In: Journal of Political and Military Sociology, 33: 2, 249–266. Ender, Morten G./Kolditz, Thomas A. (2004): “Evolution of Sociology at West Point, 1963–2001. In: Betros, Lance (Ed.): West Point: Two Centuries and Beyond. Abiline, TX: McWhiney Foundation Press, 455–477. Erwin, Elizabeth (2002): Adolescent Perceptions of Relevant Social Problems. In: Journal of Child and Adolescent Psychiatric Nursing, 15: 1, 24–34. Fine, Gary Alan (2000): Games and Truths: Learning to Construct Social Problems in High School Debate. In: Sociological Inquiry, 41: 1, 103–123. Frydenberg, Erica/Lewis, Ramon (1986): Social Issues: What Concerns Young People and How They Cope? In: Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 2: 3, 271–283. Gallup [The George H. Gallup International Institute] (1993): America’s Youth in the 1990s. Princeton, N.J: The George H. Gallup International Institute. Ginsberg, Leon. (1994): Understanding Social Problems, Policies, and Programs. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press. Hammill, John/Segal, David R./Segal, Mady Wechsler (1995): Self-Selection and Parental Socioeconomic Status as Determinants of the Values of West Point Cadets. In: Armed Forces & Society, 22: 1, 103–111. Hastings, William M. (1979): How to Think About Social Problems. New York: Oxford University Press.

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Kenkel, William F. (1990): Stranger in a Strange Land: The Divergent Views of Sociologists and the People They Study. In: Sociological Spectrum, 10: 3, 301–320. Kuhlmann, Jürgen (1994): What Do European Officers Think about Future Threats, Security and the Missions of the Armed Forces? In: Current Sociology, 42: 3, 87– 101. Lauer, Robert H. (1976): Defining Social Problems: Public Opinion and Professional Perspectives. In: Social Problems, 24: 122–131. Lavalekar, Anagha (2000): Social Awareness in Relation to Media Among High School Students. In: Psychological Studies, 25: 3, 178–180. Loseke, Donileen. R. (1999): Thinking About Social Problems. New York: Aldine De Gruyter. Manis, Jerome G. (1984): Serious Social Problems. Boston, Mass.: Allyn and Bacon. NASULGC (2004): A Call to Leadership: The Presidential Role in Internationalizing the University. A Report of the National Association of State Universities and Land Grant Colleges Task Force on International Education. Online: http://www. nasulgc.org/CIP/Taskper cent20Force/Call_to_leadership.pdf; retrieved 21 July 2005. Nusbaumer, Michael R./Kelley, Daryl/DiIorio, Judith, A. (1989): The Discovery of War as a Social Problem: Teaching as Sociological Practice. In: Teaching Sociology, 17: 3, 316–322. Parker, Jay M. (2004): National Security Studies at West Point. In: Betros, Lance (Ed.): West Point: Two Centuries and Beyond. Abiline, TX: McWhiney Foundation Press, 533–560. Rohall, David E./Ender, Morten G. (forthcoming): Race, Gender, and Class Differences in Attitudes toward the War in Iraq among Military Personnel. In: Race, Gender & Class. Rohall, David E./Ender, Morten G./Matthews, Michael D. (2006): The Effects of Military Affiliation, Sex, and Political Ideology on Attitudes toward the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In: Armed Forces & Society, 33: 1, 59–77. Roscoe, Bruce (1985): Social Issues as Social Problems: Adolescents’ Perceptions. In: Adolescence, 20: 78, 377–383. Segal, David R./Reed, Brian J./Rohall, David E. (1998): Constabulary Attitudes of National Guard and Regular Soldiers in the U.S. Army. In: Armed Forces & Society, 24: 4, 535–548. Snider, Don M./Priest, Robert F./Lewis, Felisa (2001): The Civilian-Military Gap and Professional Military Education at the Precommissioning Level. In: Armed Forces & Society, 27: 2, 249–272. Thompson, Kenneth (1998): Moral Panics. London – New York: Routledge.

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Public Opinion and European Security Franz Kernic 1

Introduction

35 years ago, French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu published an essay entitled Public Opinion Does not Exist (Bourdieu 1973). In this essay he claims that public opinion polls never refer to ‘the people’ they claim to represent because the kind of ‘cultural capital’ underpinning the opinion of those who are polled has already been conditioned by other societal factors which we would also have to study in detail. Furthermore, Bourdieu leads us to the important question whether entities such as ‘the public’ or ‘the people’ do exist or not. Undoubtedly, ‘public opinion’ itself does not exist in real social life, it is something ‘constructed’ and ‘shaped’ by the interaction and communication of numerous individuals. Bourdieu’s essay encourages us to re-think our theoretical concepts and notions again when making references to statistics and results of public opinion polls. This article does not aim at developing a new theory about ‘public opinion’ or discussing the question how it may by studied through social sciences. However, for the purpose of clarification, at least some relevant aspects need to be addressed in this essay. First of all, public support is crucial for policymaking and for all kinds of political decisions, programs, and reforms. This is also true for the fields of foreign, security, and defense policy. There can be no doubt that the recently introduced changes in Europe’s foreign and security policy require a high level of public support and general acceptance within all EU member states. The political concepts of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) – as agreed upon first in the Treaty of Maastricht and further elaborated ever since – and of a common European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) indicate a tremendous change in Europe’s security and defense policies since the end of the Cold War. Both concepts need sufficient political support among the population of European states in order to be successfully implemented. In addition, the transformation of civil-military relations in Europe and the relationship between public opinion and Europe’s new security and defense policies call for an in-depth sociological examination of the question whether or not this new development finds enough public acceptance and support. Therefore, this essay focuses on the relationship between public opinion and Europe’s new security policy. It aims to explore current perceptions of European integration, security, and defense in EU member states and major trends since the end of the Cold War. Its main focus is on a com211

parison of prevailing attitudes toward security and defense issues (CFSP and ESDP), and perceptions of threat among the population of European states. The challenge of creating a true European Union is now in the area of foreign, security, and defense policy. The creation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy and common European Security and Defense Policy is a challenge largely because, at present , there is still a large extent of uncertainty about what it entails and how it will develop further. But challenges also arise in part from uneven expectations about what should be appropriate aims of CFSP/ESDP, how a common security and defense policy can serve Europeans in maintaining peace and stability in Europe and managing smaller regional conflicts, and what would be the ‘desired future’ of the European integration movement in general. Finally, it has always been very important for policy-makers to focus on public opinion. Data from public opinion polls can be seen as an earlywarning indicator for politicians and decision-makers. In the case of CFSP and ESDP, the lack of general public understanding of the issues and the resulting possible lack of commitment to the goals of ESDP could lead to popular resistance to the EU’s policies in this respect. The fact is that, after the very significant progress of recent years in establishing the single market and the single currency, the EU must now prove itself capable of going further and ensuring that those achievements are linked to other policies such as security and defense. These other areas and policies need to be addressed in order to give greater coherence and consistency to a process whose aim is to respond to the expectations of the people of Europe. Hence, Europe is now going through a decisive phase in defining a new model for its political, economic, security, and defense structures, and asserting its identity on the world stage. Security and defense have turned out to play a crucial role in this transformation process. This fact alone justifies a closer look at European public opinion toward CFSP and ESDP, not mentioning the necessity for political decision-makers to always take public opinion into account and to make sure that key political decisions are backed up by a high degree of public support.

2

Methodology and Key Questions

The purpose of this essay is to provide a survey and first collection of data on public opinion and the common European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). The study’s main focus is on recent developments in the field of Europe’s security and defense policy and how the changes and transformations in this area are perceived by the public. Using data from the published Eurobarometer Surveys and from other public opinion polls, the article tries to identify major trends and tendencies, convergences and divergences 212

in public opinion toward the main contemporary issues of a future common defense policy within the framework of the EU. The article itself concentrates on the available empirical data with respect to the European Union as an entity. This analysis will be based on comparable data from the standardized Eurobarometer Surveys, which meet certain social science standards and which can be – on a general level – considered an expression of general public opinion on CFSP and ESDP in all EU member states. Finally, it must be mentioned that this article is to a very large extent based on the Public Opinion and European Defense Study (1999–2001) conducted by Jean M. Callaghan, Sabine Collmer, Werner W. Ernst, Elisabeth Kernic, Franz Kernic, Philippe Manigart, and Ute Schulz (Callaghan/Kernic/Manigart 2001; Ernst/Kernic 2001) as well as recently published Eurobarometer Surverys. For the purpose of interpretation, the data will be linked to the general policy framework. The analysis on the international level also enables us to get a clearer picture of the differences between EU member states. This study does not go beyond the state-level, i.e., there is no break down by regions, for example. It limits itself to the state level because today the EU’s CFSP and ESDP are still built upon the system of states acting together under certain conditions, based on mutual agreement. This analysis will, finally, also lead to some policy recommendations. Of course, the new security environment gives public opinion an important role in European security and defense policy and in the public debates about key questions on future developments. Despite its potentially unpredictable role and the likeliness of radical changes within a short period of time, public opinion should never be underestimated or ignored by decision-makers. Public opinion is not just the gross result of the latest poll; rather, it is a complex phenomenon of constantly shifting attitudes and perceptions, which, despite their complexity and inconsistency, play a crucial role in everyday life and politics. The term public ‘opinion’, as it is used in this text, does not imply that there is something like a coherent ‘public’ as an entity of its own to which we might refer. Using this term does not necessarily mean that ‘public’ is identified simply with the sum of a certain number of individual opinions. Moreover, public opinion in this text is rather identified with a set of prevailing (volatile) attitudes and perceptions, which are linked, of course, with people’s behavior and their actions but without putting the emphasis on one side or the other, or to say that one side dominates the other. It is not the case that when we observe how people act that we know what they think and how they view certain things. Nor is it that when we know their way of thinking and their personal preferences, we can predict how they will act in certain situations.

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Another term deserves our attention in this context – acceptance. Acceptance can be defined as the factual agreement of individuals and groups of people on certain conditions, decisions, and actions. Such agreement may be based on different motivations and causes and may differ in intensity and underlying modes. The modes, strength, and underlying motivation of acceptance are variables, and therefore acceptance cannot be seen as a quantifiable and static entity. Thus, there is no case in which there is either acceptance or not, but acceptance may vary in intensity and is based on an underlying motivation. Whenever one speaks of a lack or a wish for acceptance (a deficit, so to speak), one refers to a low intensity of acceptance that may further diminish and which characterizes the agreement of a person or a group with a certain condition. In other words, CFSP and ESDP need a minimum of general acceptance among Europeans in order for politicians to support the funding and maintenance of new structures and political commitments, as well as the commitment of troops to the rapid reaction force, and any possible changes in equipment, training, and/or force structure of national armies that would be necessary for the successful deployment of any EU military force. Speaking about CFSP and ESDP, one can say that this EU policy must in fact, as do all other policies, be built on a general acceptance, which serves as the basis of active political support. Without fundamental acceptance of a certain policy, support is only given due to political or social pressure and violence (or threat of violence). This does not provide, of course, a solid ground for a successful and long-lasting EU policy in these fields. The modern understanding of representative democracy is, therefore, closely linked, among other things, to the process of creating and maintaining political support for specific policy goals. Critics of public opinion polls frequently point to the fact that interviews never lead to the truth or to a ‘real’ picture of public opinion. This may be true, but does not discredit studies on public opinions. On the contrary, it encourages us to interpret and reconsider the results of public opinion polls in a general framework of social interaction, i.e., the context of our everyday life. Thus, studying public opinion demands far more than just a look at the figures; it requires a complex analysis of the results of polls in the broader context of the formation and transformation of prevailing attitudes and perceptions among people. At the same time, since public opinion is so floating and flexible, always ready to move in new and unexpected ways – a fact that makes analysis so difficult – it is also open territory for all kinds of influences that constantly help to reshape the whole landscape. Policy-makers are well aware of this possibility and it is frequently exactly this idea that stimulates their interest in studies like this or trends in public opinion in general. Not surprisingly, exactly these points may have also motivated the EU or 214

some of its institutions to support this kind of research, maybe even in order to explore ways of convincing EU citizens that the recently taken decisions on CFSP and ESDP were right and that the way we are heading to is really for the common good. But neither this nor its contrary is the task of this survey; this will be left exclusively to the field of politics itself. As a result, the following key questions will be raised in this paper: (1) What is the general level of acceptance of the current common European Security and Defense policy within the European Union? (2) How much do Europeans support the general goals of a CFSP and EDSP? (3) What are the most important threat perceptions among Europeans and which security concept do they support with respect to maintaining peace and stability on the continent? (4) What are the preferences among Europeans toward their future defense system and how strong is the public support for the EU’s plan to set up its own military forces?

3

Public Opinion and European Security: Major Trends since the End of the Cold War

3.1

The Changing Security Environment

For many decades, security and defense seemed to be more a theoretical than practical addition to the ‘European project’ in general. Since the early 1990s, things have changed dramatically. Meanwhile, the EU’s decision to create a common European Security and Defense Policy has led to a number of larger structural and organizational changes. At the beginning of this process, there was not much more than a common political commitment to the idea of a CFSP among the EU member states. An overall institutional framework for EU military and defense activities was missing and there was, of course, no military expertise in the Union at all. Therefore, the EU had to start this endeavor by identifying the strategic context and analyzing possible scenarios for EU-led crisis management operations and the generic capabilities required for these scenarios. The articulation of key planning assumptions followed, as well as the establishment of new internal military structures. Soon the overall aim became clear: to provide the Union with a force of 50,000 to 60,000 people capable of successfully accomplishing the full range of the Petersberg Tasks (for an overview see Hauser/Kernic 2006). From the outset, it was obvious that the EU had to make a distinction between the role and future of its own Security and Defense Policy and the one of NATO. A definition of the modalities for the relations between the two organizations was indispensable. Some member states viewed the improvement of European military capabilities for crisis management as a reinforcement of the European contribution to 215

NATO; others argued in the opposite direction. There has never been, of course, the need for a duplication of Europe’s security and defense structures and capabilities. From the very beginning, CFSP and ESDP were linked to certain expectations, in some cases even to unrealistic expectations of creating a new ‘European superpower’ on the world stage. Given such definitions, no one could be surprised that political scientists soon detected significant gaps and differences between the expectations and “myriad hopes for and demands of the EU as an international actor, and its relatively limited ability to deliver” (Hill 1996: 23). At certain stages, a “balloon of hopes for the CFSP”, as Hill called it on one occasion (Hill 1996: 29), arose out of the actual policy and served as a new guiding idea, even in public debates. Of course, some of the high expectations soon calmed down, particularly with respect to the hope that CFSP and ESDP could give the whole process of European integration a new drive and even help to stimulate the EMU process. But a few years later, this idea again gained enormous political and public support and expectations seemed rather ambitious that the European Union, due to a new momentum in the fields of security and defense policy and military integration, could provide a new framework for European order as well as a new European identity replacing the old nation-state system. There can be no doubt that the patterns of security policy have changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War (Buzan 1991; Hodge 1999). New challenges have emerged as a result of a multipolar political landscape, combined with an increased influence of non-state (non-governmental) actors and supra-national institutions in world politics. The different effects of globalization have shaped the debates on the post-Cold War security policy requirements in all societies and states. Furthermore, threat perceptions have shifted from military threats to more general civilian or social risks, which seem to need far more attention than ever before. The tremendous changes in European security in the 1990s also had a deep impact on national security policies. Thus far, the end of the Cold War constituted a tremendous challenge to traditional national security and defense policies; perceptions of security based upon only one ‘big enemy’ disappeared almost overnight. The loss of the perceived threat upon which Western Europe’s security and defense policies were based for so many decades left behind a ‘vacuum’. The first years after the fall of the Iron Curtain can be characterized as a time of a general lack of realistic threat assessments and perceptions, which could be used as solid cornerstones for national defense policies.

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3.2

Public Opinion and CFSP/ESDP

Research on public opinion and European security has always focused on threat perceptions. During the Cold War, it was obvious that Western Europeans, to a certain extent, felt personally at risk due to the military threat from the Warsaw Pact states and the Soviet Union. Numerous empirical studies tried to measure and classify those threat perceptions and to analyze the impact of those perceptions on both the European and the national level. There were, of course, certain types of threats and scenarios that Western Europeans expected to have to face (such as, for example, nuclear war). In general, the perception of threat from a major war has decreased slightly among the Europeans. In her study, Maria Carrilho pointed out that, in the early 1980s, this perception was particularly evident, “with a peak, in 1980, of 42% who considered a world war possible within the next ten years; then, a visible decrease began in 1984, to a minimum of 14% in 1989; the beginning of the 1990s show a strong increase” (Carrilho 1997: 14). Since these figures are obviously connected to major political events in world politics (like the Gulf War in the 1990s or the Yugoslavia crisis in the late 1990s), it seems clear that people’s general risk perception has shifted from more military to non-military threats in the past ten years. Today, among the key security priorities are goals like the fight against international organized crime, against drugs and drug trafficking; AIDS and cancer; unemployment, and the protection of the environment. The three things Europeans fear the most are non-military risks, particularly organized crime, an accident in a nuclear power plant, and terrorism. At the same time, people are still afraid of a nuclear conflict in Europe (44%), a conventional war in Europe (45%), and a world war (45%) (Eurobarometer 54). The postCold War era led to a move away from the strong emphasis on external military threats and opened the door to a new understanding of security. In a socalled “common risk society” (Beck 1999), an enlarged or broader security concept could emerge, which is no longer limited only to ‘the absence of military threats’ and to defending the state territory as the most important goal of national security and defense policy. As a result, the term ‘risk’ came into use, which more and more often replaced the old term ‘threat’. Becoming aware of the effects of globalization also made post-Cold War societies more sensitive to the idea that they might have to deal with ‘non-territorial’ threats or risks in the future. Even the military discovered that ‘security’ in a post-Cold War society requires more than just the necessity to respond to a certain threat. What is important is that, as a consequence of these changes, the privileged status of the nation-state is at stake in the global post-Cold War society (Kernic/Hauser 2006). 217

These changes in general threat perceptions and requirements of security were followed by a reevaluation of the traditional means and instruments of security and defense policy. Two developments deserve our special attention in this context. First, the post-Cold War era brought to life a new public debate about what instruments might be most appropriate in the new security environment. The domination of the military approach toward security has, for the most part, come to an end; today, military forces seem to constitute just one foreign policy tool among a variety of other means that are of importance for security policy. Second, the concept of national security as a whole became questionable; i.e., the question whether security (in a broader sense) in a global society can be achieved by just focusing on national interests and the state as the only important actor in the world arena. 3.3

Research Results and Major Trends since the 1990s

Reviewing the available literature on European public opinion and security and defense, one soon discovers that most studies focus on specific key issues related to the area, such as threat perceptions, the public’s perception of traditional and new vulnerabilities, the general acceptance and support for CFSP and defense policies, and the implications of the enlargement processes of NATO and the EU for the future security architecture. This approach heralds back to a long tradition of studying public opinion and European security. Public opinion on national security in Western Europe was studied carefully during the Cold War era (Eichenberg 1989; Munton/Rattinger 1991). Most surveys focused on questions of national security and defense policy, nuclear deterrence, the NATO alliance, and arms control or defense spending. The political transformation of the late 1980s in Europe caused a fundamental change in the scholarly study of security and defense policies. Because of the increasing importance of European integration, the study of public opinion became an important part of the study of European politics. As a result, the specific ‘European’ dimension of a common security and defense policy was discovered as a new field for scholarly research. Since then, inter- or supranational organizations such as NATO, the WEU, the OSCE and the EU have encouraged studies in this field. Philippe Manigart and Eric Marlier were among the first to focus particularly on EC countries (Manigart/Marlier 1993). They presented the results from a preliminary comparative research project on the public perception of security issues in the twelve European Community countries since the early 1970s. Data came from the Eurobarometer public opinion surveys conducted by the Commission of the European Communities each spring and autumn since 1973. These findings showed that Europeans overwhelmingly sup218

ported the creation of a common European security organization, with opinions varying only slightly with regard to political orientation, socio-economic status, and gender. In her research report Defense and Security in Public Opinion: European Trends and a National Case (Portugal), Maria Carrilho focused on general trends in European public opinion toward the security and defense issue and took a closer look at Portuguese public opinion in this respect (Carrilho 1997). Richard Sinnott examined, in his paper on European Public Opinion and Security Policy, European attitudes toward some selected security policy issues playing an important role in the late 1990s, such as the question of institutionalized security cooperation (NATO, enlargement of NATO and EU, CFSP), conflict intervention, and nuclear weapons (Sinnott 1997). Attempting to draw a general picture of the status of public opinion and security and defense, one can observe that public attitudes, of course, shift over time, but, on the other hand, they are also relatively stable. Figures drawn from public opinion polls mostly indicate a general acceptance of the country’s security and defense policy. Changes often seem to be simply the result of short-term influences of most recent events and perhaps still ongoing controversial debates on current political issues. But, in the end, all notable short-term changes seem to be of minor importance over the years and never turn into long-term trends. Furthermore, an evolution from general support to heavy criticism is rarely seen. Attitudes, such as ambivalence and indifference, seem far more important, although the methodology of empirical social research usually avoids focusing too much on such attitudes. It is already the nature and general concept of many public opinion polls to polarize, i.e., to differentiate clearly between approval and opposition, between a yes and no, meaning that nothing is in between. There is logic behind this concept, which must be addressed in the following context: From a practical point of policy-making, indifference does not count. Indifferent people are willing to follow their leaders wherever they go or wherever they order them to go. Indifference does not result in opposition or resistance – it just allows the machinery to keep going, and nothing else. In general, public opinion in most European countries has remained supportive. This is true for both possibilities – national defense as well a common European defense. At the same time, it must be noted that citizens are generally not interested in military service for themselves or their families. If, for example, they are asked whether they are willing to spend at least some money for defense purposes, their personal support for security and defense matters soon reaches a certain limit. The continuing high public opinion is due to the fact that security and defense, even in a post-Cold War world order or in a postmodern global society, seems to be an important and inevitable 219

field of politics. Even military force remains relevant in this new emerging global society in which European countries intend to play an important role. The desire to act on a global level seems to also require certain structures and abilities in the fields of security and defense policy. Since the end of the Cold War, the European public in most countries has been generally supportive of its already established security and defense institutions, such as the national military organizations and alliances like NATO and the WEU. After the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, NATO seemed stronger than ever; when NATO enlargement finally came on the table, one could easily get the impression that NATO has gained additional weight and power, much more than ever before. It should not be forgotten that the European public generally supported this development, including NATO’s peaceenforcement operations in the Balkans. Nevertheless, the idea of CFSP also quickly found a surprisingly huge number of supporters among Europeans. The available data shows a slightly increasing support for this idea during the last decade. Today, an average of 7 out of 10 Europeans state that they are in favor of CFSP. In this context, Maria Carrilho highlighted the fact that this significant support rate must be considered extremely high because it is based on the answers given to an either-or question (“Some people believe that certain areas of policy should be decided by the national government, while other areas of policy should be decided jointly with the European Union. Which of the following areas of policy do you think should be decided jointly within the European Union?”); i.e., the respondent had to choose between the community-based option or decision-making by national governments (Carrilho 1997: 20). A similar positive trend applies to the field of defense and military policy. From the beginning on, two countries were less favorable and less enthusiastic than all other EU member states: the United Kingdom and Portugal. In both countries, support for CFSP increased a little during the first half of the 1990s but the public still remained skeptical. Significant differrences among EU member states were found regarding the issue of defense and military policy. In this context, one of the main problems seems to be a different approach to the idea of a common ESDP in the various EU member states, which may be considered the result of divergences in their history, culture, and geopolitical situation. In early 1996, the European Commission carried out a survey among 65,000 people in 15 member states, in order to identify their expectations and concerns about the future of Europe. 1 The survey revealed that ‘military threats’ were not among the highest fears of the Europeans. The fight against 1

See the EU document Building Europe Together. Online: http://www.europa.eu.int/en/ comm/dg10/build/en/index.htm

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organized crime; against drugs, cancer, and AIDS; concerted action to tackle unemployment; the protection of the environment and the defense of human rights were among the top priorities of more than 80 per cent of people in Europe. The most interesting findings of this 1996 survey with respect to CFSP and ESDP can be summarized as follows: (a) The vast majority of Europeans were in favor of a common European foreign and security policy. Europeans generally endorsed a common military and defense policy, but even more strikingly, 78.9 per cent suggested that the European Union should play a decisive peacekeeping role. (b) Europeans did make a distinction between political commitment and its practical expression, where they had greater confidence in their own governments: some 47 per cent did not think it was necessary for the European Union to have a single army and about 49 per cent believed that defense should remain in the national realm. (c) A majority (59.6%) of persons questioned (compared with 26.4 per cent against) were in favor of a common military and defense policy for the first fifteen member states. The Spanish (58.2%) Belgians (59.4%) Luxembourgers (59.9%), Austrians (60%) and the French (60.3%) subscribed to this general view. Four countries strongly endorsed a common policy: Italy (63.6%), the Netherlands (68%), Greece (70.1%), and Germany (70.5%). Three countries were in favor but not by a clear majority: Portugal (49.3%), the United Kingdom (47.6%), and Ireland (45.1%). Opinions in the three Nordic countries differed significantly from other members of the EU: 54.4 per cent of Swedes, 58.5 per cent of Danes, and 69.3 per cent of Finns were against it. (d) For most Europeans (78.9% compared with 14.5% against), one of the priority objectives of a common military and defense policy should be a firmer peacekeeping commitment than has been demonstrated so far. All 15 Member states show a real determination here, with only 6.6 per cent of the sample failing to respond. (e) 47 per cent of Europeans (compared with 38.5% in favor) did not consider a single European army to be central to the process of European integration. The Fifteen were clearly split on this issue. Another follow-up survey on this issue also brought interesting insights. The results of the Continuous Tracking Survey of European Opinion (February to May 1997) clearly indicated a general acceptance of the project of a common

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foreign and security policy of the EU. 2 Nearly three in four Europeans agreed that “the European Union member countries should have a common foreign policy towards non member states” (72%). Support was particularly high in Greece (88%) and Belgium (85%). Finland (48%) is the only country where support for a common foreign policy was below 50 per cent. In Belgium (+11) and Portugal (+6), the largest increases were noted since January. In all other countries, support remained stable compared to the results from earlier surveys, with the exception of Finland, where it dropped by 4 per cent. The results of the 1997 survey also showed a surprisingly high degree of general acceptance of the idea of a common EU defense policy. More than eight in ten Europeans believed that “the European member countries should have a common defense policy”. The highest levels of support were found in Greece (92%), France (91%), and Belgium (90%). Only in the ‘neutral’ Scandinavian countries there was a sizeable minority of the population against a common defense policy (the percentage disagreeing is 41 in Finland, 36 in Sweden, and 33 in Denmark). Support for a common defense policy increased most in Belgium (+7) since January 1997 and dropped most in Finland (-7). 3.4.

The Eurobarometer 54.1 Survey (2000)

At the turn of the century, the Belgian Minister of Defense, M. André Flahaut, launched an initiative to include a number of defense- and militaryrelated issues in the Eurobarometer opinion poll (Eurobarometer 54). This set of questions was commissioned and funded by the Belgian Ministry of Defense in order to gain a preliminary insight into the attitudes of Europeans toward issues of European defense. Therefore, this exclusively security and defense-related data is sometimes referred to as Eurobarometer 54.1. This Eurobarometer survey 54.1 consisted of eight questions on security and defense issues, most of them with multiple items. The field work was conducted between 14 November and 19 December 2000 by the European Opinion Research Group, a consortium of marketing and public opinion study agencies composed of INRA (Europe) and GfK Worldwide. Regarding the general political development of European integration, the main results can be highlighted in the following way:

2

EUROPINION, no. 11 (June 1997). The EUROPINION no.11 presents the Commission’s survey results for February, March, April and May 1997. The Europinion series can be accessed online at: http://www.europa.eu.int/en/comm/dg10/infcom/epo/eo.html (Technical specification: 800 telephone interviews by country every four weeks; except 2x800 in Germany).

222

(a) The majority of EU citizens support their country’s membership in the European Union: 50 per cent see it as a good thing and a further 27 per cent regard it as neither good nor bad. (a) Support for enlargement is obtained from 44 per cent of EU citizens with 35 per cent against it and 21 per cent lacking an opinion. (b) Support for a common defense and security policy is widespread (73%) and two of three Europeans believe the EU should have a common foreign policy (65%). People in Belgium are most likely to support a common defense and security policy and people in Finland (40%) and Denmark (38%) are most likely to oppose it. The survey also revealed certain differences between the member states in the way people feel attached to Europe. While 82 per cent of people in Luxembourg, 74 per cent in Sweden, and 72 per cent in Spain felt very or fairly attached to Europe, this number dropped tremendously when it came to Greece (43%) and the UK (41%). In these two countries, more than half of the people felt not very or not at all attached to Europe. In comparison to spring 1999 when the question was last asked, attachment levels to Europe improved significantly in Luxembourg, Spain, the Netherlands, the UK (all +4%), Sweden, and France (both +3%). Denmark and Ireland (both -5%) were the only two countries where a significant negative shift was recorded (Eurobarometer 54.1: 12 in comparison with Eurobarometer 51). As was the case with other studies mentioned earlier in this article, the most recent Eurobarometer results clearly show that the three things Europeans fear the most today are non-military risks. Traditional military threats (like a world war or a conventional war in Europe) are at the bottom of current threat perceptions. Furthermore, those who most fear such a war are people of 55 and over. Regarding the role of the military in post-Cold War society in general, the study shows that Europeans still follow the traditional nation-state concept when it comes to security and defense. When asked about the role of the army, “defending the country/the territory” remained the one most often agreed upon by Europeans (94%), followed by the statements “helping our country in case of disaster” (91%), “helping other countries in case of a disaster” (84%), and “keeping or re-establishing peace in the world” (80%). On the other hand, Europeans, at least in some countries, show also a general readiness to replace the old nation state system and to give more power to the EU even in the field of security and defense. More than four Europeans out of ten (43%) consider that the decisions concerning European defense policy should be taken by the European Union.

223

3.5

Recent Eurobarometer Surveys (2005–2006)

Both Eurobarometer Survey 63 (2005) and Survey 64 (2006) indicate that there is still a very strong general support for a common security and defense policy, and that this support has been firm for over a decade. Table 1: Public Opinion toward CFSP/ESDP Key Questions, 2005 Question: The European Union already has a Common Foreign and Security Policy and a European Security and Defense Policy. There is now a debate about how much further these should be developed. Do you tend to agree or disagree with each of these statements? The results were: Statement

% agreement

When an international crisis occurs, European Union member states should agree on a common position.

83

European Union foreign policy should be independent of United States foreign policy.

82

The European Union should work to guarantee Human Rights around the world, even if this is contrary to the wishes of some other countries.

81

The European Union should have a common immigration policy towards people from outside the European Union.

76

The European Union should have a common asylum policy towards asylum seekers.

75

The European Union should have its own seat on the United Nations Security Council.

69

The European Union should have a rapid military reaction force that can be sent quickly to troublespots when an international crisis occurs.

68

The European Union should have its own Foreign Minister who can be the spokesperson for a common European Union position.

67

Source: Eurobarometer 63.

The recently published data from the Eurobarometer Survey 64 clearly show that the vast majority of Europeans are in favor of a common European foreign and security policy: “European public opinion is still very receptive to issues relating to the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). At 77 per cent, support for a common security and defense policy remains at the same high level obtained in spring 2005. (…) The intensity of this support is even stronger in the ten new Member States: there is a difference of 10 points between the average obtained in the fifteen old Member States and that 224

recorded in the ten new Member States (75% and 85% respectively).” (Eurobarometer 64: 34) Table 2: Support to a Common Defense and Security Policy among the European Union Member States (in per cent)

Autumn 1992 (EB 38)

For

Against

76

14

Spring 1993 (EB 39)

77

13

Autumn 1993 (EB 40)

77

14

Spring 1994 (EB 41)

75

15

Autumn 1994 (EB 42)

79

11

Spring 1995 (EB 43)

75

13

Autumn 1995 (EB 44)

73

16

Autumn 1996 (EB 46)

68

20

Spring 1997 (EB 47)

68

19

Autumn 1997 (EB 48)

69

19

Spring 1998 (EB 49)

73

14

Autumn 1998 (EB 50)

75

13

Spring 1999 (EB 51)

70

14

Autumn 1999 (EB 52)

73

14

Spring 2000 (EB 53)

72

14

Autumn 2000 (EB 54)

73

15

Spring 2001 (EB 55)

73

14

Autumn 2001 (EB 56)

73

17

Spring 2002 (EB 57)

71

16

Autumn 2002 (EB 58)

73

17

Spring 2003 (EB 59)

74

15

Autumn 2003 (EB 60)

70

19

Spring 2004 (EB 61)

73

16

Autumn 2004 (EB 62)

78

14

Spring 2005 (EB 63)

77

14

Autmn 2005 (EB 64)

77

15

225

4

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

In sum, public opinion polls – on both European and national level – show positive attitudes of Europeans toward CFSP and ESDP. In general, public support for these policies must be considered high. In many European Union countries, the idea of having a European rapid reaction force finds sufficient public support. In this context, it must be noted that people in general do not care much about security and defense issues, at least as long as they are not personally affected. In addition, there is a lack of knowledge about such issues, and even a general lack of interest. The current security landscape seems too complicated and confusing for most Europeans. Unfortunately, apart from a few exceptions, public opinion research on security and defense in Europe has, thus far, lacked the continuity and consistency necessary to draw a clear picture of the contemporary public opinion landscape in the EU. Upon review of the available polling data on these matters, one is struck, first, by an extremely high degree of continuity and stability of attitudes (e.g., regarding the degree of acceptance of national defense and of general support for defense and the military), and, second, by the high acceptance of CFSP and ESDP in almost all EU member states. In this respect, a remarkable attitudinal shift has taken place since the time of the Cold War. Undoubtedly, this development is closely related to new threat perceptions among Europeans and to a general desire to adapt the military to new missions. The concrete threats and fears of the Cold War, mainly referring to possible direct military attacks or a (nuclear or/and conventional) war between the two superpowers, have disappeared. With the disappearance of these old threat perceptions came a decrease in the importance of the traditional national military (territorial) defense. Hence, military organizations had to seek new roles and functions in order to prove socially necessary and useful in the post-Cold War period. The military soon discovered such new functions in peacekeeping and in a wide range of so-called military actions (or even interventions) for humanitarian purposes (from disaster relief and humanitarian aid to military air strikes and interventions similar to those conducted in traditional wars). During the last decade, popular images and public preferences have strongly been affected by the transformation from Cold War society to postCold War society, which can be characterized as a global society, also leaving behind traditional social and political concepts. Unfortunately, thus far, public opinion research has provided us scant assistance in scientifically exploring this transformation in the security environment in detail. Most polls lack the necessary consistency and continuity to shed more light on the following key question: May we or may we not speak of a general paradigm 226

shift in public opinion with respect to security, defense, and military issues in the post-modern global society? Examining opinion research results in detail, one can even argue that, for the most part, both researchers and respondents still unquestioningly accept and follow the traditional perceptions and concepts of the Cold War period. Most sets of questions posed to the respondents seem to generally adhere to these traditional concepts and stereotypes, to which only a few new questions or answers are added. Neither social science research nor society at large yet seem to have fully digested the changes in all fields of post-modern life, i.e., in the fields of politics, economics, and international affairs. Hence, public opinion results also reflect, at least to a certain extent (and maybe to an unwarranted degree) the realities and calculations of the Cold War period. In other words, in order to study the current situation carefully, one must search for new theoretical concepts, which can guide empirical research. This leads us to an important observation. Most surveys are sponsored either by private groups, particularly the media, which are interested primarily in the topicality and publicity value of particular issues (mostly so-called hot issues), or by governments or governmental institutions, which are more interested in questions of continuity, but often lack the necessary openness for new questions and new approaches and/or (unfortunately more often than one may expect) academic independence and freedom. As a result, polls are frequently either present-day snapshots or rather traditional (and often vague) trend reports. What is most needed is a comprehensive effort to trace the evolution of attitudes and opinions over time and an attempt to link these changes to a general theoretical framework. In general, public opinion research should be more closely linked to policy-planning within the EU. Among the available data, only a few studies exist that can really be used as constructive resources for policy- and decisionmaking. So far, studies on public opinion and European security and defense serve more as background information than as tools for enhancing actual politics (e.g., as early warning indicators). Case or country studies of public opinion on security and defense must be further elaborated in order to identify certain points of tension between the different EU member states. Such case studies could help to shed more light on the differences and similarities in public opinion between EU member states. Therefore, social science research on public opinion and CFSP/ESDP must be improved. This can easily be achieved by (a) linking national and EU public opinion polling on this issue; (b) improving the questionnaires and the quality (and consistency) of the interviews and translations; (c) elaborating a comprehensive theoretical framework for public opinion investigations; and (d) utilizing specialized opinion research tools, such as focus groups, for in-depth analysis of people’s 227

perceptions about key issues. To date, no comprehensive database on public opinion research on the issue of CFSP/ESDP is available. The establishment of such a database would be a boon to both researchers and policymakers in the EU. Next, policy-makers must bear in mind that Europeans see the world, as well as the role of the military, in a considerably different way than they did just ten or fifteen years ago. The public is now acutely aware of the changed nature of likely armed conflict and the emergence of other-than-military threats. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that they now embrace the development of new and improved patterns of conflict management, both within Europe, and, in some cases, even beyond. It is only with public support that the CFSP/ESDP can succeed in the long term. Therefore, this changed public perception, if carefully considered and applied thoughtfully and creatively, could give EU policymakers more room to maneuver on this issue than they perhaps realize. In order to define the parameters in which they can maneuver, however, more and better public opinion research is necessary. Finally, the following two policy recommendations can be highlighted: (a) The EU must pay more attention to public opinion (particularly, with respect to public opinion research as an early warning indicator and instrument for policy planning); (b) The EU must undertake measures to improve the quality of empirical research. This must be done on different levels: link EU and national public opinion polling; link questionnaires to a theoretical framework; improve questions; set up focus groups, etc. Literature Beck, Ulrich (1999): World Risk Society. Malden, Mass.: Polity Press. Belgian Ministry of Defense (Ed.) (2001): Proceedings of Defense Public Opinion and European Defense – Convergence or Divergence? Belgium. Bomberg, Elisabeth/Stubb, Alexander (Eds.) (2003): The European Union: How Does it Work? Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bourdieu, Pierre (1973): L’opinion publique n’existe pas. In: Les Temps Modernes, 318: January, 1292–1309. Buzan, Barry (1991): People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era. 2nd edition. Boulder: Rienner. Carlsnaes, Walter/Smith, Steve (Ed.) (1994): European Foreign Policy: The EC and Changing Perspectives in Europe. London: SAGE. Carrilho, Maria (1997): Defense and Security in Public Opinion: European Trends and a National Case (Portugal). Research report, ed. by the NATO Office of Information and Press, Lisbon, September. Champagne, Patrick (1990): Faire l’opinion – le nouveau jeu politique. Paris: Éditions de Minuit.

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Eichenberg, Richard C. (1989): Public Opinion and National Security in Western Europe. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Eichenberg, Richard C. (2003): The Polls – Trends: Having It Both Ways: European Defense Integration and Commitment to NATO. In: The Public Opinion Quarterly, 67: 4, 627–659. Eliassen, Kjell A. (Ed.) (1998): Foreign and Security Policy in the European Union. London: SAGE. Ernst, Werner/Kernic, Franz (Eds.) (2002): Öffentliche Meinung und europäische Sicherheitspolitik. Baden-Baden: Nomos. Eurobarometer Surveys – For further details, see: http://www.ec.europa.eu/public_ opinion/index_en.htm Gaertner, Heinz et al. (Eds.) (2001): Europe’s New Security Challenges. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. Hannay, David (1996): CFSP. The European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. Menu for Feform. London: Action Centre for Europe. Hauser, Gunther/Kernic, Franz (Eds.) (2006): European Security in Transition. London: Ashgate. Hill, Christopher/Smith, Karen E. (Eds.) (2000): European Foreign Policy: Key Documents. London: Routledge. Hill, Christopher (Ed.) (1996): The Actors in Europe’s Foreign Policy. London: Routledge. Hodge, Carl C. (Ed.) (1999): Redefining European Security. London – New York: Garland. Holland, Martin (1994): The European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. In: Basler Schriften zur eurpäischen Integration, No. 3. Basel: Europainstitut der Universität Basel. Holland, Martin (1995): European Union Common Foreign Policy. From EPC to CFSP Joint Action and South Africa. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Holland, Martin (Ed.) (1997): Common Foreign and Security Policy. The Record and Reforms. London: Pinter. Howorth, Jolyon/Menon, Anand (Eds.) (1997): The European Union and National Defense Policy. London: Routledge. Kernic, Franz et al. (2003): Public Opinion and European Security. Frankfurt a. M.: Peter Lang. Kernic, Franz et al. (Eds.) (2005): The European Armed Forces in Transition. Frankfurt a. M.: Peter Lang. Kernic, Franz/Hauser, Gunther (Eds.) (2006): Handbuch zur europäischen Sicherheit. Frankfurt a. M.: Peter Lang. Knodt, Michele/Princen, Sebastiaan (2003): Understanding the European Union’s External Relations. London: Routledge. Lazar, Judith (1995): L’opinion publique. Paris: Éditions Dalloz. Maleši, Marjan (Ed.) (2000): International Security, Mass Media and Public Opinion. Ljubljana: University of Ljubljana. Manigart, Philippe (Ed.) (1996): Future Roles, Missions, and Structures of Armed Forces in the New World Order: The Public View. New York: Nova Science Publishers.

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Manigart, Philippe/Marlier, Eric (1993): European Public Opinion on the Future of Its Security. In: Armed Forces & Society, 19: 3, 335–352. Meulen, Jan van der (1998): Public Opinion, Mass Media, and the Military. A Programmatic Sketch of Perspectives. In: Vlachová, Marie (Ed.): The European Military in Transition. Armed Forces and Their Social Context. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 148–157. Munton, Don/Rattinger, Hans (Eds.) (1991): Debating National Security: The Public Dimension. Frankfurt a. M.: Peter Lang. Nacos, Brigitte L./Shapiro, Robert Y./Isernia, Pierangelo (Eds.) (2000): Decisionmaking in a Glass House. Mass Media, Public Opinion, and American and European Foreign Policy in the 21st Century. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Niedermayer, Oskar/Sinnott, Richard (Eds.) (1995): Public Opinion and Internationalized Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Oldhaver, Mathias (2000): Öffentliche Meinung in der Sicherheitspolitik. Untersuchungen am Beispiel der Debatte über den Einsatz der Bundeswehr im Golfkrieg. Baden-Baden: Nomos. Peterson, John/Sjursen, Helen (Eds.) (1998): A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? Competing Visions of the CFSP. London – New York: Routledge. Price, Vincent (1992): Communication Concepts 4: Public Opinion. Newbury Park, CA Publishes. Regelsberger, Elfriede/Schoutheete de Tervarent, Philippe de/Wessels, Wolfgang (Eds.) (1997): Foreign Policy of the European Union. From EPC to CFSP and Beyond. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. Sandholtz, Wayne/Stone Sweet, Alec (Eds.) (1998): European Integration and Supranational Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sinnott, Richard (1997): European Public Opinion and Security Policy (Chaillot Paper 28). Paris: WEU Institute. Smith, Karen E. (1999): The Making of EU Foreign Policy. The Case of Eastern Europe. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Wessel, Ramses A. (1999): The European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy. Legal Institutional Perspective. The Hague: Kluwer. Wyllie, James H. (1997): European Security in the New Political Environment. London – New York: Longman.

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From the ‘War on Terror’ to the Terror of War: Spanish Defense Policy after 9/11 Carlos Navajas Zubeldia 1

Introduction

The so-called ‘war on terror’, which started after the 9/11 attacks, has had a decisive effect on Spanish defense policy. This is shown by Spain’s participation in the Afghanistan war and the contents of the so-called Strategic Review of Defense at the end of 2002, agreed by a consensus between the conservative Popular Party (PP) Government and the main opposition party, the social-democratic Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE). Moreover, the 9/11 attacks have served to strengthen the previously existing relationship between the Spanish Government and the Bush Administration, from the moment in which the former tried to draw a parallel between its fight against the Basque terrorist organization (ETA) and the fight against ‘international terrorism’. Furthermore, one of the most noteworthy effects of 9/11 has been the way in which the already unblemished pro-Atlantic attitude of José María Aznar’s Government has been further sharpened. However, the general consensus in Spain with regard to the foreign and security policy to be pursued after the 9/11 attacks crumbled after the invasion of Iraq by mainly U.S. and British forces. This invasion was seen as a form of aggression which was rejected by the immense majority of the Spanish people. Since then, defense policy has become even more a matter of party politics, as shown by what we could refer to as the ‘military legacy’ of President Aznar (who voluntarily stood down at the beginning of 2004 after eight years in power). This was expressed in his the speech to the Center for National Defense Studies (CESEDEN) on 20th October 2003 with the title ‘Spanish Defense Policy in Our World’, in which he defined a new security doctrine to replace the National Defense Directive 1/2000.

2

The Beginning of the Volte-Face

In a book that is not intended to be his personal memoirs, but simply a series of modest ‘emergency notes’, the former president of the Spanish Government, José María Aznar, starts the chapter dedicated to his foreign and defense policy, entitled fairly significantly ‘The Role of Spain in the World’, by talking about 9/11. For Aznar those terrorist attacks marked the beginning of a ‘new history’. (Aznar 2004: 9, 144) However, any historian knows that so231

called ‘monster-events’ must be interpreted as both breaks with and continuations of the past. In fact, the defense policy pursued by Aznar’s government did appear out of nothing after 9/11. Instead, it was a logical consequence of his victory at the 1996 general elections, which marked the end of the ‘long’ government of the Spanish social-democrat Felipe González (1982–1996). 1 During his first term in office (1996–2000), Aznar’s defense policy was mainly based on three pillars: the ‘full’ professionalization of the armed forces; the military’s ‘full’ mo-dernization; and the defensive awareness (or ‘culturalization’) of Spanish society. The first of these processes or, to be more precise, the ‘voluntary enlistment’ of troops in the armed forces prompted a type of second military transition that was superimposed on the first and which commenced after the death of General Franco, who, after rebelling against the legal and legitimate government of the Second Republic – a coup d’état that sparked off the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) –, ruled Spain as a dictator for 36 years (1939–1975). The decision to professionalize the armed forces prompted the first breakdown of consensus in Spain on foreign and defense policy since the centrist government of Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo (1981–1982), who decided on Spain’s unilateral entry into NATO. The breakdown of consensus in Aznar’s government was due to the fact that the decision was agreed upon with a Catalan nationalist group (Convergència i Unió) and not with the main opposition party, the PSOE. However, this did not prevent the consensual agreement of the so-called ‘Professionalization Law’ of 1999, thus revealing the uncertain course of the Spanish defense policy over the last eight years. As regards the second pillar, it is basically worth underlying two facts: firstly, intrinsic verbalism in an expression such as ‘full’ modernization which was never achieved during the two legislatures of the Popular Party; and, secondly, the huge difference between the initial budget of the Ministry of Defense and what Aznar’s second defense minister, Federico Trillo (2000–2004), referred to as ‘real expenditure’. This makes it difficult to determine the true level of modernization of the armed forces over these last two legislatures, except for the fact that, as mentioned previously, it was not ‘complete’. As regards the third pillar, it must be highlighted that, contrary to the opinion maintained by the Popular Party cabinet, the Spanish population does in fact display national and defense awareness, although its defense culture is clearly insufficient. This policy aimed at raising the awareness of Spanish society with respect to defense issues and, in the final instance, at indoctrinating a fairly antiquated form of Spanish nationalism, also suffered from the fluctuations in the political context. This is clearly revealed by its temporary disappearance after the centrist volte-face taken by the gov1

The adjective ‘long’ is applied to what can also be described as the ‘González era’ and is taken from Aróstegui 1999: 311.

232

ernment in the middle of 1998. (Navajas Zubeldia 1999; Navajas Zubeldia 2004: 183–209) Since the end of Spain’s external transition in 1988 (del Arenal 1991: 49–65), it is likely that Spain’s defense and foreign policies have been more inter-related than in the past (1975–1988). Hence, any reference to Aznar’s defense policy prior to 9/11 must be counterbalanced with an explanation, albeit brief, of his foreign policy during the first legislature of the Popular Party. To summarize, we may affirm that the period 1996–2000 was characterized by a relative continuity with respect to the foreign policy advocated by the González administration and based on the existence of a broad political consensus between the conservative Popular Party and the socialdemocratic PSOE. Moreover, during these years it became clear that Spain had acquired a growing political importance, which perhaps contributed to a series of equivocal decisions during the Popular Party’s second legislature (2000–2004). However, that period marked the beginning of a clear revisionism that became even more acute after Aznar’s landslide victory in the 2000 general elections where he won by an absolute majority. This revisionism took shape in the pro-Atlantic approach championed by the Popular Party government which materialized: in Spain’s entrance into the Integrated Military Structure of NATO, despite of what had been stipulated in one of the terms (or conditions) of the 1986 referendum 2 ; in pro-U.S. occidentalism, designed in strategic and not ideological terms, which meant that it remained practically unaltered in the transition from a democratic and multilateralist (Clinton) to another Republican and unilateralist administration (Bush); in the gradual transition from a ‘community’ approach in its relations with the rest of the European Union to one based on pure ‘national interest’; and in ‘sought and unrealized consensus’ with London instead of the FrancoGerman axis (Herrero de Miñón 2000). Moreover, the ‘special relationship’ with the United Kingdom has failed to yield significant results (particularly in the case of Gibraltar) and has also exacerbated Spain’s ‘peripheral’ position in the European Union (García Pérez 2003: 539–550). The year 2000 was decisive for Spain’s defense and foreign policies since three key documents were approved that year: the ‘Libro Blanco de la Defensa’ (White Paper on Defense), the National Defense Directive 1/2000, and the Strategic Foreign Action Plan. The emphasis of the first document was on the establishment of a “special relationship” with the United States

2

„Spain’s participation in the Atlantic Alliance will not include its participation in the integrated military structure.” (quoted in Ruiz 2002: 233)

233

(Department of Defense 2000: 74) 3 ; the second established a true globalization of Spanish defense (and foreign) policy (for a critique see Navajas Zubeldia 2003); and the aim of the third was to enhance Spain’s protagonism on the world stage and its international prestige, make its foreign policy more active and more open to society (in particular with respect to the business world), make Pacific Asia a new strategic priority, to promote and disseminate an image of quality – both commercial and cultural –, and, in short, for Spain to become a great power (García Pérez 2003: 539–550). 4 To summarize, following the Popular Party’s victory in the 2000 general elections, one may acknowledge a strengthening of the changes that had already begun during the first legislature and even a clear reorientation of Spanish foreign and security policy (García Pérez 2003). Nevertheless, this aspiration, which was truly utopian if not dystopian, was endorsed by the Treaty of Nice in December 2000 in which Aznar’s government earned Spain 27 votes in the European Council compared to the 29 of the four big nations, albeit in exchange relinquishing 14 seats in the European Parliament. Hence, the reference to the self-proclaimed ‘special relationship’ between Spain and the United States began to materialize, particularly after Bush’s victory in the 2000 presidential elections. Thus, Aznar’s government backed the deployment of the Missile Defense Shield announced by the new administration and the unilateral rejection of the ABM Treaty, thus augmenting the distance between Spain and its main European partners from the end of 2000 onwards. (García Pérez 2003)

3

Acceleration and Braking

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 offered a new opportunity to Spain’s antiterrorist struggle against the Basque separatist group ETA, since it enabled initiatives to be incorporated into the ‘war against terror’, initiated after the ‘new Pearl Harbor’. This was done despite the fact that the terrorist acts perpetrated by Al Qaeda and ETA were not the same, as the Spaniards in general, and the citizens of Madrid in particular, had to discover for themselves after the attacks of M/11. In any case, the 2002 renewal of the bilateral 3

4

Moreover, the White Paper affirmed that the 1953 pacts between the Franco regime and the United States marked the “beginning of Spain’s opening to the outside world” (Department of Defense 2000: 67) when, in reality, these pacts effectively represented the definitive U.S. backing of the process of consolidation of the Franco dictatorship which undoubtedly helps to explain the so-called anti-American sentiment existing in modern-day Spain. See a more detailed analysis of the White Paper in Navajas Zubeldia 2004. However, “this ambitious programme has not been accompanied by either budgetary resources or the necessary political backing” (García Pérez 2003: 539–550).

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agreement existing between Spain and the United States served to further strengthen the ‘special relationship’ between the two countries (García Pérez 2003). This turn in foreign policy by the Aznar government has been dated back to 2002, although, as we have already seen, this process actually began before that date. What occurred after 9/11 and the start of the ‘war against terror’ was an acceleration, as an inseparable element to any major historical upheaval, of the trends charted previously, in this case since and including 1996. According to Aznar (2004: 157), however, the culprits of the breakdown of consensus that had “always” existed in Spain were actually his opponents (in particular PSOE and other smaller leftist political parties). Regardless of whether this ‘always’ was actually representative of the historical reality, it does not seem logical that the parties that were not in power after 1996 and in particular after the general elections of 2000 can be held responsible for such a huge shift in foreign and, by extension, Spanish defense policy. What were the causes or motivations or reasons for this radical turn in both policy areas? In the opinion of Andrés Ortega (2004: 11), the causes may be grouped into five explanatory blocks: firstly, the anti-terrorist motivations described previously; secondly, personal reasons because of the bad relations between Aznar on the one hand and Chirac and Schröder on the other, and the good relations to Blair and Bush; thirdly, European reasons ranging from the Thatcherism and Euroscepticism of Aznar in his early and final days in power to his desire to use his ‘closer relationship’ with the U.S. to gain more power in the EU of 25; fourthly, American motivations since, according to the world view of Aznar and his government, it was now the United States’ turn to lead the world; and fifthly, other types of causes ranging from the hope that Madrid would host a new Peace Conference on the Near East to the desire to become part of the G-8. However, Aznar’s volte-face suffered a ‘halt’ after the famous Azores summit (Ortega 2004: 11). In fact, this and the infamous photograph in which Bush places his left hand on Aznar’s left shoulder marked the culmination of the ‘special relationship’ between Spain and the United States, which, from that moment onward, transformed into a relationship without any more grandiloquent connotations. Unlike Blair, Aznar was unable to see this relationship with the aforementioned characteristics through to its logical conclusion. One of the consequences of this was that Spain was not awarded control of any occupied areas in Iraq. According to Ortega (2004), Aznar chose the lowest of a total of seven levels of participation in the war, the lowest being the deployment of humanitarian aid missions and the highest being armed combat itself. The cause seems to lie in the internal divisions that had arisen within the Government and, by extension, the Popular Party. However, these must have been affected in some way by 235

the massive demonstrations that took place in Spain against the ‘terror of war’ between 15 February and 20 March 2003 and the fact that between 80 and 90 per cent of the public opposed the invasion of Iraq. For all these reasons, it is not surprising that Aznar wrote in his ‘notes’ that “Spain did not participate in that war” (Aznar 2004: 269) although he contributed politically to its declaration. It was precisely the Spanish government’s backing of the invasion and the subsequent occupation of Iraq that contributed decisively to the debilitation of another document that had been consensually agreed between the Popular Party and the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party at the end of 2002: the inappropriately entitled ‘Strategic Review of Defense’ which stipulated that the intervention of troops abroad would always be performed in accordance with international law (see Navajas Zubeldia 2003). The Iraq war once again broke the zigzag policy of consensus woven by Spain’s two main political parties within the scope of defense policy. However, the doctrinal text which marked the culmination of Aznar’s about-turn on defense was undoubtedly the speech entitled ‘Spanish Defense Policy in Our World’ in October 2003, the very title of which reveals that, despite its dystopic character, the President continued to perceive Spain as a ‘global power’. To briefly summarize, in his declaration on defense Aznar advocated ‘anticipatory actions’ that were undoubtedly reminiscent of the doctrine of preemptive/preventive war advocated in the National Security Strategy of the Bush administration. Moreover, there was an insistence on the cliché that in Spain there was a “weak national awareness of defense” – which is not true –, the hypothetical causes of which would be the “prolonged withdrawal of our nation from international affairs”, “pacifist consciousness” and “widespread anti-American sentiment”, a series of common themes that are neither related to one another nor to the defense awareness of Spaniards, which, and this must be emphasized, is far from being ‘weak’ (see, inter alia, Revista Española de Defensa, No. 88, October 2003: I–VIII). On the other hand, and applying what may be referred to with some irony as the so-called ‘doctrine of Lamo de Espinosa’, who, in an article published after the Iraq war, recommended that “we must not put all our eggs in the same basket, in any of them” (Lamo de Espinosa 2003: 14). 5 During his final years in office the Aznar government supported both the establishment of a Europe committed to defense, the globalization of NATO and the identification of a new non-military enemy: international terrorism (see also Navajas Zubeldia 2003). Since the policy of enhancing the awareness on defense culturalization of the Spaniards suffered a set-back following the about-turn to5

Emilio Lamo de Espinosa was the director of the Elcano Royal Institute for International and Strategic Studies.

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wards the center in 1998, it is difficult to affirm with certainty whether this policy was eventually revived or not; however, regardless of whether or not this was the case, it lacked the impetus that fuelled its development between 1996 and 1998. From another perspective, the end of 2001 marked the end of the transition towards the new military model of all-volunteer forces; a process that, in contrast to what is normally the case, has taken a relatively long time (more than five years). Lastly, attention must be paid to the fact that this second legislature marked the culmination of several rearmament treaties in Spain, although they were insufficient for the country to aspire to becoming a ‘global power’ and to reach a high level of modernization of the armed forces. (see Navajas Zubeldia 2003)

4

The Return to the Status Quo 6

The general elections of 14 March 2004 were surprisingly won by the PSOE, thus ending the first right-wing stage of Spanish democracy (1996–2004), since the governments presided by the first president of democratic government in Spain – Adolfo Suárez – between 1976 and 1982 were more center or center-right than right-wing in the strictest sense of the term. It is important to bear in mind that these elections took place only three days after the terrorist attacks of M/11, perpetrated by a wing of Al Qaeda. Both the attacks and the policy adopted by the government between 11 and 14 March which attempted, at all costs, to attribute the aforementioned terrorist acts to ETA, and the media and social reaction that this provoked, had an undoubtedly complex influence on the results of the elections. 7 The new president of the Government, the Socialist José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, appointed José Bono Minister of Defense; at the time Bono was President of the Autonomous Regional Community of Castilla-La Mancha and had previously rejected the post of Minister of the Interior. Bono had no previous experience in the area of defense, but this was not an obstacle to his appointment. Consequently, this may be interpreted as a party-orientated choice rather than a decision prompted by state interests since this enabled Rodríguez Zapatero to neutralize a hypothetical internal opponent who had also previously challenged him for the leadership of PSOE in 2000. In turn, the new minister appointed two former high-ranking members of his presidency in Castilla-La Mancha as the number two and number three in his 6 7

This section studies defense and foreign policy until 13 June 2004. Regarding these four days in March see the interpretations of the former president of the Government and one of the Spanish neoconservatives in Aznar 2004: 259–277 and Bardají 2004.

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department. As in the case of Bono, neither of them had specific knowledge in matters of security and defense. Naturally, one of the risks that this could entail was a certain weakening of civilian control over the military. Moreover, Bono appointed his former Adviser on Industry and Labor in the Regional Government of Castilla-La Mancha as the new director of the National Intelligence Center (CNI); this allowed him to exercise direct control over the Spanish secret service. Once again, this politician had no prior experience in this field. However, the same was not true of the new Secretary General of Defense. This post was entrusted to a man who had previously been Chief of Staff of the Spanish Navy and who had already occupied this post during the government of Aznar, namely between 1997 and 2000. Faithful to his “peculiar style, brimming with personalism and populist vocation”, as described by one newspaper (El País, 20 April 2004: 10) that is not notorious for being exactly hypercritical of the PSOE, Bono occupied his new post one day after the other ministers. Moreover, during his presentation he was surrounded by all sorts of personalities, from singers to writers, as well as trade union leaders, leaders of the Catholic Church, judges and newspaper directors. This same newspaper also described the event as follows: “His occupation of the post (...) was more like a wedding (...) than a political act.” (El País, 20 April 2004: 20) As promised in his electoral programme presented as presidential candidate at the general elections of 14 March, little more than one month later – on 18 April to be precise – the new President ordered the immediate return of Spanish troops posted in Iraq, before the end of the maximum period established for their presence, which initially was to continue until 30 June that year. Governmental sources claimed that there were three reasons for the withdrawal of the troops two months ahead of the scheduled date: firstly, because the UN would not take over political and, much less so, military control in Iraq, these being the conditions established by Rodríguez Zapatero for the continued presence of Spanish troops in Iraq; secondly, because the deteriorating situation in Iraq prevented the Spanish troops from fulfilling the task for which they had been sent, i.e. to guarantee security; and, thirdly, because any delay in withdrawing the Spanish troops would increase their insecurity on the ground. This was the main reason. However, it is important not to ignore other motivations such as, for example, the fact that European Parliamentary elections were to be held on 13 June and that the return of the troops could be a good electoral card since most of the Spanish population supported this decision, as we will see later. It could also be argued that any delay would increase the risk not only to the troops, but also to the Spanish population in general, due to the risk of other attacks similar to those perpetrated on M/11 and aimed at pressurising the government. Lastly, considera238

tion must be given to the fact that Rodríguez Zapatero also ran the risk that the United Nations Security Council would eventually approve a resolution that would meet some of his demands, albeit not all of them, which would have placed the President in a real dilemma. Internally, the decision taken by Rodríguez Zapatero received the backing of all parliamentary groups in the Spanish Congress of Deputies with the exception of the Popular Party, now lead by Mariano Rajoy, and former president Aznar. Zapatero also had public opinion on his side; according to various surveys, between 75 and 78 per cent of Spaniards supported the withdrawal from Iraq. The last Spanish soldier abandoned Iraq on 21 May, little more than one month after Rodríguez Zapatero had ordered the troops to return to Spain. The cost of this adventure had undoubtedly been very high, from both an economic (around 370 mio. €) and human perspective (13 dead: 11 soldiers: 2 journalists). Moreover, 64 per cent of the Spanish citizens felt that the terrorist attacks of M/11 which killed 190 people would not have occurred if the Aznar government had not supported the invasion of Iraq. (see, inter alia, Ruiz Miguel 2004; Barómetro del RIE, June 2004) In what could be interpreted as compensation for its decision to withdraw its troops from Iraq, Spain announced to increase its military presence in Afghanistan and even send troops to Haiti. In fact, just one week after Rodríguez Zapatero decided to bring the Spanish troops back home from Iraq, NATO asked the Spanish Government to take over the security in one province of Afghanistan and, ten days after this request, Spain notified the Atlantic Alliance that it would increase the number of Spanish troops stationed in Kabul. The pressure exerted by NATO and its Secretary General was subsequently augmented by pressure from the American Ambassador in Spain. As regards Haiti, at the end of May Rodríguez Zapatero agreed to study the request presented by the President of Chile, Ricardo Lagos, for Spain to send troops to that country; however, in the presence of Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Zapatero raised his commitment one notch by informing the former of his pledge to send troops to the Caribbean state (see Malamud 2004). In his first appearance before the Defense Commission of the Congress of Deputies, the Minister of Defense ‘of Spain’, as Bono likes to refer to his post, outlined the general aspects of the future policy of his department (the quotations in the following paragraphs are taken from Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados. Comisiones, Año 2004, VIII Legislatura, Núm. 32, Defensa, 1–36). In this way, the minister initially explained four ‘brief points’, the most noteworthy of which probably was the last: “in terms of defense, my party intends its policy to be a state policy” – a solemn affirmation that is, nevertheless, hardly trivial since during the eight years of Aznar’s 239

government defense policy was often a party-oriented policy. Later, the minister divided his presentation into four parts: firstly, “the important principles of international relations in the field of defense”; secondly, “the priority scopes of foreign defense policy”; thirdly, “the priority objectives of our armies”; and fourthly, “the new model of armed forces”, which is nonetheless hardly new since this term had already been coined by Aznar’s government. As regards what could be referred to as foreign defense policy, Bono offered details on a series of principles such as: “cooperation”, which is “achieved through sovereignty and never submission” (in clear reference to the dependent policy of Aznar’s government with respect to the administration of Bush junior); “loyalty” towards Spain’s North Atlantic and European allies (in this context he affirmed that “Spain’s participation within the scope of European security cannot exclude a strong and balanced trans-Atlantic relationship”, which is not necessarily the case since a greater commitment to Europe must logically entail a lesser commitment to NATO); and “international legality” (“We consider that the role of the United Nations must be strengthened”, he added, and also stated that “we must say no to preventive war”), a principle that is the opposite of the policy advocated by the famous trio of the Azores after 16 March 2003 and the doctrine developed by Aznar in his defense declaration. Continuing with foreign defense, the “priority scopes” of this policy will be Europe (“naturally”), the Mediterranean, Latin America, and, circumstantially speaking, Afghanistan. Of course it is extremely significant that in this block of his intervention Bono did not no mention the U.S., NATO and the West. 8 Moving on from foreign to national defense policy, the “priority objectives” of the Spanish armed forces will be the same as those established in the National Defense Directive 1/2000 and which “we logically share”, albeit with certain variations, as will become apparent immediately: firstly, the objective of “guaranteeing the defense of both Spain and the Spanish people”, on which he introduced certain variations, once again distancing himself from the policy pursued by Aznar and his defense ministers; secondly, the objective of “humanitarian aid missions and peace operations and crisis management”; and thirdly, the objective of “increasing the awareness of the Spanish people with respect to defense issues”. 9 Lastly, there is the ‘bonista’ model (model advocated by Bono) of the armed forces which stems from a prior premise that also bears some similarities with the past: “the Government wants and intends (...) for Spain to play an important role in the world”. In 8 9

For a clearly different view on Spanish foreign policy see Lamo de Espinosa 2004. On the National Defense Directive 1/2000 see Navajas Zubeldia 2003; on the culturaldefense policy developed by the Aznar government during its first legislature see Navajas Zubeldia 2001.

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his opinion, this requires a “respectable and respected” security and defense policy, consisting of twelve points of differing importance: (1)

the modification of the Law governing Basic National Defense Criteria from at least two standpoints: the participation of Parliament in decisions to be taken by the Government with respect to the presence of Spanish armed forces abroad; and the incorporation of “all aspects deriving” from the incorrectly termed – at least in the opinion of this author – ‘Strategic Review of Defense’ which he also did not criticize; 10 (2) the “appropriateness” of a single operative control body; 11 (3) the “strengthening of unarmed missions”; (4) the unification of the intelligence (military?) services in an organic structure supervised, from a functional standpoint, by the National Intelligence Center (CNI); (5) the clarification of “uncertainties” in personnel matters and the establishment of an armed forces based more on “quality” and “specialization” rather than on “quantity”; (6) the consideration that “the current professional career” should not be “the only right acquired” enabling soldiers to achieve “promotion to posts of greater responsibility in the armed forces”; (7) the definition of “a model requiring fewer troops and more experts, i.e., non-commissioned officers” and the establishment of an “adequate and effective operative proportional distribution” in terms of the number of officers and non-commissioned officers; (8) the performance of non-military “duties” by civilians rendering external services; (9) the establishment of a “global plan to promote the quality of life”; (10) the adaptation of the existing legal order in relation to soldiers’ rights and duties; (11) the resolution of the Yak-42 incident and its consequences (see Campo 2004; Rubio Jiménez 2006); and (12) the continuity of the “great armament programs” that were already “underway” and “agreed”, the costs of which amount to 20,4 mio. € which are, in my opinion, hardly compatible with an increase in social expenditures that are an inseparable element of the policy of any socialdemocratic government such as the one clearly advocated by Rodríguez Zapatero.

10 On the need to adapt the Law governing Basic National Defense Criteria to the current scenario see Lagoa 2004. 11 Despite the fact that National Defense Directive 1/2000 envisages the intensification of the joint action of the armed forces, it is clear that until then this has proven to be worthless.

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Regarding these programs, Bono also stated that from a budgetary perspective the Ministry of Defense had gone “from bad to worse” between 1995 and 2004 which is nevertheless tantamount to confusing the initial defense budget with the “real expenditures” on defense which are substantially higher than the former.

5

Conclusion

As indicated above, Spanish defense policy is increasingly entwined in foreign policy, but this clearly reveals its own characteristics to which we will refer to in this last part of our study. In short, the policy initiated by Rodríguez Zapatero represents another about-turn in foreign policy. Hence, in 2004 we had largely returned to a situation similar to that of 1996 at the end of the so-called Socialist period or González era (see Pereira 2000: 517–545; Tusell/Avilés/Pardo 2000: 413–574). In fact, according to the new Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Miguel Ángel Moratinos, the overriding priorities of this policy will be as follows: first, the recovery of the consensus that should exist between at least the two main political parties in connection with Spain’s role in the world in general and in the European Union specifically, although in this case more as a “driving force” rather than as an “obstacle” to the process of European construction; second, the “strengthening” of the United Nations which should not hinder the reform of its “system” and the defense of “effective multi-lateralism” against “preventive action”; and third, the intention” of the Government “not to compromise Spain in international military operations against the wishes of Parliament”. Consequently, the priority “areas” of foreign policy are: Europe which is defined as a “global actor”; the trans-Atlantic relationship and, within this, NATO; the United States, with which the new Spanish government intends to develop a “more balanced” relationship, i.e., “a relationship between friendly partner countries based on equality, loyalty and mutual respect”; Latin America where it was “essential to maintain a political, direct, bilateral and regional policy” and while there was “an urgent need to safeguard the specificity of these privileged relationships by restructuring and extending the mechanisms of political dialogue and cooperation”, to which he significantly added immediately afterwards that it was necessary to “recover the complicities intertwined in the struggle for democracy and human rights”; the Maghreb world (namely Morocco) and the Mediterranean; the Middle East and Iraq, a country Spain will not remain indifferent on; Russia and the western Balkans; subSaharan Africa; and finally Asia, which continues to be “the great pending issue of Spanish foreign policy”. (Quoted in Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados. Comisiones, Año 2004, VIII Legislatura, Núm. 24, Asuntos 242

Exteriores, 1–40; see also Torreblanca 2004; del Arenal 2004). In summary: The return to the European Spain of the democratic transition and the ‘long’ government of González as opposed to the pro-Atlantic Spain of the eight years during Aznar’s government. Literature Aróstegui, Julio (1999): La transición política y la construcción de la democracia (1975–1996). In: Martínez, Jesús A. (Ed.): Historia de España Siglo XX. 1939– 1996. Madrid: Cátedra, 244–362. Aznar, José María (2004): Ocho años de gobierno. Una visión personal de España. Barcelona: Planeta. Bardají, Rafael L. (2004): The Strategic Significance of March 11th. Online: http:// www.newamericancentury.org/europe-20040318.htm; retrieved 9 May 2004. Barómetro del RIE, June 2004. Online: http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/imprimir/ 200406brieimp.asp; retrieved 22 June 2004. Campo, Ramón Javier (2004): Yak-42, honor y verdad. Crónica de una catástrofe. Barcelona: Península. Del Arenal, Celestino (1991): Democracia y política exterior: el largo camino hacia el cambio. In: Vidal-Beneyto, José (Ed.): España a debate. I. La política. Madrid: Tecnos, 49–65. Del Arenal, Celestino (2004): La retirada de las tropas de Irak y la necesidad de una nueva política exterior. In: Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios Internacionales y Estratégicos, Análisis del Real Instituto. Online: http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/analisis/imprimir/ 494imp.asp; retrieved 20 June 2004. Department of Defense (2000): Libro Blanco de la Defensa. Madrid: DoD, General Technical Secretary. García Pérez, Rafael (2003): España en un mundo en cambio: a la búsqueda de la influencia internacional (1986–2002). In: Pereira, Juan Carlos (Ed.): La política exterior de España (1800–2003). Historia, condicionantes y escenarios. Barcelona: Ariel, 539–550. Herrero de Miñón, Miguel (2000): Política exterior. In: Tusell, Javier et al. (Eds.): El gobierno de Aznar. Balance de una gestión, 1996–2000. Barcelona: Crítica, 41– 54. Lagoa, Enrique F. (2004): Una nueva legislación sobre la Defensa Nacional y la Organización Militar. In: Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios Internacionales y Estratégicos, Análisis del Real Instituto. Online: http://www.realinstitutoelcano. org/analisis/imprimir/429imp.asp; retrieved 30 March 2004. Lamo de Espinosa, Emilio (2003): De la vocación atlantista de España. In: El País, 30 May, 14. Lamo de Espinosa, Emilio (2004): ¿Qué piensan los españoles en política exterior? In: El País, 5 May. Malamud, Carlos (2004): Haití: España debe decir sí. In: Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios Internacionales y Estratégicos, Análisis del Real Instituto. Online: http:// www.realinstitutoelcano.org/analisis/imprimir/523imp.asp; retrieved 20 June 2004.

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Navajas Zubeldia, Carlos (1999): Para nuestra mejor defensa. La profesionalización de las Fuerzas Armadas. In: Hispania Nova. Revista de Historia Contemporánea, Online: http://www.hispanianova.rediris.es/HN0307.htm; retrieved 12 August 2000. Navajas Zubeldia, Carlos (2001): La profesionalización de las Fuerzas Armadas durante el primer gobierno Aznar (1996–2000). Paper presented at the VII Spanish Congress of Sociology on ‘Convergencias y Divergencias en la Sociedad Global’, 20–22 September, Salamanca, Spain. Navajas Zubeldia, Carlos (2003): The Trillo Pontificate. Defense Policy during the Second Legislature of the Popular Party (2000–2003). Paper presented at the 2003 International Biennial Conference. Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society. Proceedings, 24–26 October, Chicago, Ill., USA. Navajas Zubeldia, Carlos (2004): La profesionalización de las Fuerzas Armadas durante la primera legislatura popular (1998–2000). In: Historia del Presente, 4: 183–209. Ortega, Andrés (2004): La coherencia del giro de Aznar. In: El País Domingo, 15 February, 11. Pereira, Juan Carlos (Ed.) (2003): La política exterior de España (1800–2003). Historia, condicionantes y escenarios. Barcelona: Ariel. Rubio Jiménez, Mariela (2006): Yak-42. “A sus órdenes, ministro”. Tres Cantos (Madrid): Foca. Ruiz, David (2002): La España democrática (1975–2000). Política y sociedad. Madrid: Síntesis. Ruiz Miguel, Carlos (2004): La retirada española de Irak: significado y consecuencias. In: Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios Internacionales y Estratégicos, Análisis del Real Instituto. Online: http://www.realinstitutoelcano_org/analisis/ imprimir/493imp.asp; retrieved 20 June 2004. Torreblanca, José Ignacio (2004): Las prioridades del nuevo Gobierno socialista en materia de política exterior: gestionar el legado de la guerra de Irak y cortar el nudo gordiano de la Constitución. In: Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios Internacionales y Estratégicos, Análisis del Real Instituto. Online: http://www. realinstitutoelcano.org/analisis/imprimir/449imp.asp; retrieved 20 June 2004. Tusell, Javier/Avilés, Juan/Pardo, Rosa (Eds.) (2000): La política exterior de España en el siglo XX. Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, UNED.

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Disillusionment and Hope: A Brief Reminiscence about Perceptions of the Russian-American Relationship in the Second Term of Putin’s Presidency Vladimir Rukavishnikov 1 1

Introduction

Historians of the future may wonder how much ordinary Russian citizens in the early 21st century actually knew about the Russian-American relationship or if they could reach a conclusion independently. We will bypass such discussions although we could note that a plain person would have had to select from a rich, messy mixture of media reports and ‘lucid’ explanations to find out how the relationship had progressed or regressed. The person could feel that some of his conclusions were wrong, but, as we know, it takes decades to overturn popular views. The author of this chapter is in a similar situation. Our selections include both the ‘canonical episodes’ and the so-called ‘overlooked issues’ or in other words advances beyond the reach of plain individual hands and minds. Time is running fast, but by rolling the memory carpet back we attempt to disclose tendencies hidden behind the surface.

2

A Climb of Discontent and a Feeling of Déjà-vu

Soon after the start of the second term of Vladimir Putin’s presidency the attentive reader of mainstream newspapers could easily detect the growth in doubts whether Russia may ever be an ally to the U.S. in the global struggle against international terrorism and a reliable supplier of oil and natural gas for Europe. This campaign in Western media was unfolding through the nonstop criticism of Russia’s ambitious strategic priorities together with concerns over the democratization process in Russia. The Russian leadership, in turn, replied in an angry tone and mobilized the public as during the Cold War. Here is a sample on key episodes of such polemics: x On 4 May 2006, speaking at the forum of leaders of Baltic and Black Sea region countries, U.S. Vice-President Dick Cheney stressed that the Russian authorities infringed upon human rights and the freedom of the press

1

This article is an update of a paper the author prepared for the sessions of RC 01 at the ISA’s XVI World Congress of Sociology in Durban, South Africa, 23–29 July 2006. The estimates expressed here are those of the author only.

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and used energy resources to press neighboring countries. 2 In fact, there was nothing new in Cheney’s words because U.S. President G. W. Bush, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and other members of administration had often used their visits to Russia’s neighbors to criticize Russia’s politics 3 . Such behavior continued in 2007 and 2008, up to the end of Putin’s presidency. x In his turn, Russian President Vladimir Putin, in the State-of-the-NationAddress on 10 May 2006 (see FT.com, 6 May 2006) harshly rebuked Washington for its criticism although he did not point to Dick Cheney’s speech directly. Putin’s words ignited a wave of criticism of U.S. policies in the Russian media. His strong anti-American rhetoric was repeated by the Russian public with a perception of the U.S. as a “threat to global security”. 4 x The Guardian wrote on 11 May 2006 that “relations between the U.S. and Russia sank to the lowest point in a decade” and that “the war of words is a long way from the optimism with which George Bush said, after his first face-to-face meeting with Mr. Putin in 2001, that he had looked into the Russian president’s soul and liked what he saw”. x We have to note that Dick Cheney said that Russia should be afraid that the U.S., by encouraging democratic development in countries neighbor2

3

4

The Financial Times editorial ‘Cheney’s Cold War’ explained to readers the essence of Cheney’s position in the following words: “The vice-president exaggerated, as one would expect from someone with a richly deserved reputation as the current Bush administration’s Lord Voldemort. But his message contained some plain truths that Moscow should heed. One is the widespread nervousness about Russia abusing its energy supplies for political ends. Moscow may, in general, just be following the current worldwide wave of resource nationalism in adjusting its energy policy to higher world market prices and to rising alternative demand from Asia. But it needs to know that in some western quarters, this is seen, as Mr. Cheney bluntly put it, as using oil and gas as ‘tools of intimidation or blackmail’. Another foreign concern is about Vladimir Putin’s inclination towards a soft dictatorship including the progressive suppression of civil society and its outlets through non-governmental organizations and the independent media. Having awarded Russia membership within the Council of Europe, and this year the presidency as well as membership of the Group of Eight leading industrial nations, the West has grounds for complaint. Finally, there is the worry that Mr. Putin remains un-reconciled to the emergence of democratic movements in Russia’s ‘near abroad’, once part of a Soviet Union whose disappearance he laments” (cited from FT.com, 6 May 2006). Cheney’s speech in Lithuania in 2006 remembered us of George H.W. Bush’s speech of two decades ago when he was in Hungary, as Ronald Reagan’s vice-president, and proclaimed, wrongly, that Russians had never really been part of European civilization. In a January 2006 poll, conducted by the independent Levada Center in Moscow, 57 per cent of Russians regarded the U.S. as a ‘threat to global security’ while just 33 per cent thought it was not. Weir 2006 compared the Russian figure with results of a Harris poll cited in a commentary in The Los Angeles Times of 21 June 2005 stressing the point that at that time Europeans perceived the U.S. as a greater threat to global stability than Iran.

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ing to Russia, acquires influence in these countries. Then he added that Russia “will only win, if it borders with strong democratic countries”. (cited from FT.com, 6 May 2006) The cutting question of the time was why the democratic developments in the form of the so-called ‘colored revolutions’ in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan were sponsored directly or indirectly by the U.S. 5 In Western media Russia’s reaction towards the issue was read like this: “They [the Russians] cannot accept that someone else controls these (neighboring) states which they still view as parts of their great motherland, the former USSR.” Though this version contained some truth, in our view, it was an oversimplification. Many political and business interests clashed in what emerged as the ‘colored revolutions’; in Ukraine, for example, the Russian president’s unskilled intervention was clearly a factor that, at least partially, impacted on the final outcome. And, perhaps, the threat of loosing influence in the CIS was and is a real reason for the Russian leadership to fear a growth of American presence in Russia’s near abroad. Being a pro-Western statesman in the Ukraine, Georgia and alike does not mean neglecting relations with the Russian Federation or the East at large. Russian experts in international affairs at that time shared such a general opinion and actually subscribe to it up to date. For that reason, the cui-bono-explanation of recent ‘colored revolutions’ was dangerously simple as the geo-political orientation of the leaders of almost all post-Soviet states looked rather declared than settled. The climax of Putin’s anger was his speech in Munich on 10 February 2007 at the International Security Forum. 6 The Russian president showed his deep disagreement with the American vision of conflict resolution and world order in the 21st century. The Washington Post columnist summarized his impression of Putin’s speech in the following words: “He does not want to bury us; he only wants to diminish us. (…) Putin does not want us as an enemy. But at Munich he told the world that, vis-à-vis America, his Russia has gone from partner to adversary.” (Krauthammer 2007: A23) After Munich Putin was branded as a ‘disloyal friend’ of U.S. President Bush. Meanwhile, these two leaders held warm personal relations during their long years in office despite disagreements on certain geopolitical issues. But the very idea that a handshake between Putin and Bush could overthrow their commitment

5 6

It is no secret that the Russian administration expresses feelings of outrage at what they view as Western incursions into the post-Soviet republics through ‘pro-democracy revolts’. The full text of Putin’s speech in Russian was retrieved from the Kremlin official site (http://www.kremlin.ru) in February 2007.

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to national interests seems ludicrous. 7 It looked as if Bush listened to Putin, but, in fact, he ignored his objections. One can think of Putin’s foreign policy failures in his first term: Putin’s arguments could not stop the U.S. withdrawal from the 1972 ABM Treaty in 2002; his concessions after 9/11 could not prevent the war in Iraq with the consequent occupation of this country in 2003, etc. This line was continued in Putin’s second term: Putin’s warnings could not prevent deploying U.S. interceptors in Central Europe close to Russia’s Western borders and stop NATO’s eastward enlargement, including Ukraine and Georgia into the Alliance in the future. After the last meeting of the two presidents in Sochi in April 2008 the world once again heard promising words about the strategic framework of the U.S.-Russian partnership. Putin said that Russia was willing to continue the U.S.-European-Russian dialogue on TMD systems, terrorism and other collective security issues. But it was absurd to discuss how to safeguard soldiers against small-range missiles’ attacks while turning a blind eye to the anti-ballistic missiles shields, new launchers, advanced warheads for long-range missiles and other kinds of smart weapons which were modernized under the cover of such ‘successful summits’. We will not speculate here if Russia is perceived as a main threat to the U.S. despite numerous declarations about strategic partnership and collaboration in the fight against international (Islamic) terrorism. Also, we will not discuss the deeply-rooted mutual mistrust towards the truthfulness of the official rhetoric of opponents as a foundation of foreign policy in the U.S. and Russia. Such speculations are fun, but what are they good for? This paper is not about diplomacy, but perceptions. In brief, during the years of 2006–07, the author had a feeling of déjà-vu, when witnessing how a certain way of using pressure in international affairs was considered as ‘legitimate’; how political disputes pertaining to foreign policy and international relations were stirred up, how they were covered by the media, and how they were settled. There was also an impression that the U.S. under Bush and Russia under Putin seemed to be backsliding towards the competition of the arms-race era and familiar postures of belligerent mistrust. And we cannot avoid Putin’s rhetoric connected to this alarming process. Although Mr. Putin insisted that he would not repeat the Soviet Union’s mistakes, the mistakes of the Cold War years, neither in the political sphere nor in defense strategy, he, at the same time, always strongly and repeatedly emphasized the urgent need to increase Russia’s defense expenses and to speed up the modernization of the Russian armed forces. 7

We do not question here whether these two persons really helped drive the U.S.-Russian relationship or not, but according to the press Bush and Putin used their personal relationship to tackle the thorny issues beyond arms control, such as international terrorism, etc.

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‘Fair enough’, the reader may say, but then he or she must realize that Putin, in fact, joined a new arms’ race on a scale not seen since the days of the Cold War. This is a fairly dangerous game with unforeseeable international repercussions. 8 Having noted that U.S. military spending was 25 times higher than Russia’s, the Russian president mentioned in this address to the Federal Assembly that the effect of this was that “Comrade Wolf knows whom to eat, and he swallows without listening to anyone, and he is clearly not going to listen to anyone”. Although he refrained from mentioning the U.S. by name, it was clear for everyone that the word ‘wolf’ referred to Washington. Moreover, he asked the audience in the Kremlin in the same manner all late Soviet leaders did: “Just where does all the rhetoric on the need for human rights and democracy disappear when it comes to the need to realize one’s own interests? It turns out that everything is permitted. There are no restrictions whatsoever.” 9 It is little surprising that since coming to office in 2000 Vladimir Putin admitted that, although there was no natural external enemy for Russia, there were numerous threats to its interests that came from the outside world. And it is not surprising that the Russian military brass agreed with the president. The assertion of no external threats referred to how the outside world was perceived in Russian foreign and security policy in the early 21st century. In the changing global context, Russian relations with China, India, and, of course, Iran were not merely about trading, but basically about Russia’s influence in the international arena. International trading – even arms trade, which Russia does rather well, – was also an important engine for internal economic growth, for sustaining and modernizing Russia’s military-industrial complex. In Russian eyes, the American permanent pressure on Iran – to limit sales to Iran in the year of 2001, to stop Tehran’s nuclear enrichment program in 2005 and so forth – was not just about the loss of Russian revenues linked to Iranian contracts, but about undermining Russia’s re-emerging international status, and, indirectly, about Russia’s efforts to establish a sound market economy by enlarging its international trading and economic co-operation. The bulk of Russians followed the threat perceptions of the ruling elite as well as the media’s interpretation of the U.S. foreign policy. In their opinion, the Bush administration demonstrated, at best, indifference to Russia’s na8

9

There is a long set of essential questions linked to an increase in world military expenditures, including the following ones, primarily important for a Russian audience: Is the result of the previous arms’ race just a part of a history lesson that nobody has learned? And, finally, who benefits from a new arms’ race? Clearly referring to the talk in Washington about a possible military strike on Iran, Putin in the mentioned address to the Federal Assembly had warned that “the use of force (…) could be more disastrous than the initial threat” it supposed to deal with.

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tional interests, or, at worst, a deliberate policy to confront them. Let me be clear here: I do not for a second believe that Putin counter-attacked Washington, because he wished to make an impression that ‘Russia’s bear’ is equal to ‘Comrade Wolf’. Putin’s Russia does not present plausible indicators for such a conclusion, only a collection of innuendoes. Also I have never agreed with the opinion that what “all Russians are asking for, is a little respect from the US leadership” (Brynner 2006). This opinion has a definite arrogant connotation.

3

Two Visions of Cooperation between the U.S. and Russia in Putin’s Second Term

Well after the collapse of the Soviet Union post-Communist Russia and its Western partners seem to understand each other less and less and can hardly find a common language. Academics started to speak about failed illusions. The ideological Cold War is long over, but the habits of the Cold War die hard (Rukavishnikov 2005). Why was the atmosphere on both sides so chilly? Part of the explanation is the path that Russia had chosen in Putin’s second term. Western analysts referred to what could be called the ‘nationalist and anti-democratic backlash’ that ensued in a serious shift in Russian policy, 10 and materialized, in particular, in the Russian efforts to pursue what was termed the Eurasian approach to foreign policy that included building alliances with other states that share Russia’s concerns about the dominant U.S. position in world affairs. 11 This shift had been strongly associated with the declining influence of the pro-Western wing of Russia’s political class on foreign policy. But there is another part of the explanation: Western policy towards Russia and the behavior of Western states – first among them the U.S. – after the end of the Cold War. Concerning U.S. policy towards Russia in Putin’s second term, many analysts used to refer to what may be called the ‘theory of misinterpretation’. The proponents of the above-mentioned theory argued that Washington was stubbornly misreading Russia’s efforts to restore national pride as ‘some kind of reversion’ to the USSR, etc. The entire ‘theory of misinterpretation’, in our 10 There were signs of this ‘backlash’ even before the sky-rocketing rise of oil prices. In 1999, the unwarranted NATO bombardments of Yugoslavia caused a public outcry in Russia and as its indirect aftermath “Mr. Putin was elected on a nationalist platform of ‘restoring’ Russia’s military greatness” (Felgenhauer 2000: 9). This explanation is, of course, far from being complete; it stresses only one of a number of factors that led to Putin’s victory in the presidential elections of 2000. 11 The geographic location of the Russian Federation has a large impact on its foreign policy. However, the Russians always saw themselves as part of European civilization.

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view, was designed to justify the Republican administration in the light of the growing tension in U.S.-Russian relations. Some students of international politics wrongly opposed this theory as a so-called “realpolitik” approach. 12 This point of view partly resembles the interpretation of American policy towards the USSR which was so popular in the Soviet Union in the Cold War period. Frankly speaking, I doubt that since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the U.S. has really consistently misinterpreted Russian objections, intentions and/or actions and that the ‘theory of misinterpretation’ can explain why the U.S. is using so-called ‘double standards’ in her relations with post-Soviet Russia. The Russian public at large believed that in the 21st century, like in the past, national interests – geopolitical, economic, and alike – are the main driving forces of politics, while values are only part of the basis for national strategic policies. There was strong ground for such a view. One could take Russia’s failed attempts to join the World Trade Organization during the eight years of Putin’s rule as an example. Given the link between the economy, national hard and soft power, and security, Russian access to the WTO was not only an economic, but also a security matter. 13 And in Russian eyes all nations slowing this process were acting basically because of their opposition towards Russia’s economic prospects, not a difference of values.

4

The Flood of Oil Money as a Main Source of the Reemergence of Russia’s Self-Esteem

As the reader remembers, the Russian economy was in a deep crisis in the 1990s, at a time when oil prices were low. Then 9/11 came, and after that sad event the U.S. went to war in Afghanistan. Oil prices remained low. In December 2001, they were running between 17 and 20 USD a barrel. A year later they edged up to the 25 USD range. In 2003, the Americans attacked Iraq, and are stuck in that war until today. But it was only in 2004, when the price of oil went up dramatically; oil prices were growing from day to day, and in 2008 the price of 100 USD a barrel was surpassed. Thus it is safe to 12 The Americans used to talk about the difference of values saying that the U.S. were gauging events according to its own ideals and expectations rather than by the values embedded in Russian mentality and culture. An emphasis on a difference of values of these two great nations should not overshadow that the U.S. and Russian national interests are different. 13 Piling on it, President Putin in his spring 2006 State-of-the-Nation address complained that Russia’s bid to join WTO has been used as ‘a bargaining chip’ on unrelated issues: the U.S. is the last big WTO member vetoing Russia’s entry. The reader should remember also that the USSR unsuccessfully applied for membership in the late 1980s under Gorbachev, i.e., long time ago.

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say that Russia’s economic standing has improved tremendously since then. Paradoxically, Moscow greatly benefited from Washington’s military interventionist policy that it itself opposed. And Putin’s rhetoric began to change with the country getting rid of all its loans. The Russian official media began to talk about the reemergence of the nation’s self-esteem, the regaining of world actor’s status, etc. It is worth remembering that the West may not see Russia the way we, the Russians, see ourselves. Some of the Western observers observed a change in Putin’s rhetoric in his second term in pure economic terms. The political use of Russian oil exports and gas supply to Europe was depicted as a means for the realization of Russia’s ambition to recover its great power status. The growth of Russia’s self-esteem was linked to Russia’s transformation into an ‘energy superpower’ or a special sort of a so-called ‘petrostate’. There are certain grounds for such an interpretation. However, the transformation of Russia into a “petrostate” – a country that organizes its political, economic and social relations around energy extraction and which suffers from long-term distortions as a result – is, in our view, a myth (Menon/Motyl 2007; see also Kanet 2007: 224). As with almost any myth, this one is not entirely false. Therefore the principal strategic goal for Russia in the future is to avoid becoming a ‘petrostate’ by increasing global competitiveness, military strength and the diversity of export products (Rukavishnikov 2007). What is not clear enough is how much the Western countries which consume Russian gas and oil and Russia that produces and sells these products are really mutually dependent on each other, and how this situation of dependency will evolve in the years to come. 14 As one wise person said, the Russians would not drink their petrol, if the West did not buy it. Resuming this section, I must emphasize again that a strong feeling of déjà-vu comes back along with all debates about ‘energy as weaponry’, as if the Cold War with its irrational fear of the ‘Russian bear’ has returned.

5

Lessons from the Past

The calendar prompts reappraisals of predicted futures as well as of observed past trends. It may be useful to rethink the similarities that exist between today’s global challenges and those faced or anticipated in the last century. For instance, in retrospect there was an impressive record of Soviet and American cooperation in restraining competition where it seemed likely to lead to war. 14 According to Skidelski 2008: 2, Russia’s share was 12 per cent of a total amount of energy supply to the EU in 2007; Europe imported from Russia 16 per cent of its oil and 20 per cent of its natural gas consumption.

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This pattern could be replicated in the 21st century. The assumptions underlying such an approach are: (1) that the Russian Federation has interests that go beyond simply perpetuating the post-Cold War international system; and (2) that the Russian Federation can therefore best secure its own interests by seeking Western (and, first of all, American) cooperation despite all existing discrepancies rather than looking for confrontation. 15 These assumptions bring us to the center of a century-long dispute between so-called Slavophiles and Westernizers amongst the Russian elite. 16 We will use these old labels, yet they do not match the present-day cleavage of Russian elites exactly. x For the first intellectual tradition, today backed by nationalists, to a certain extent by the communists, and the Russian Orthodox Church with its traditionally strong anti-Western attitudes, the second above-mentioned assumption is unacceptable, or as these people say, ‘otherwise, Russia can no longer be great Russia’. For this tiny group, Russia’s interests must be secured through its own military might and economic power. x According to the Westernizers, the second intellectual tradition, currently backed by liberals, democrats and parts of business entrepreneurs, the Westernization (or the Europeanization) of Russia is not only necessary, it is an imperative. They see no alternative to a Western (primarily American) hand to secure Russia’s future, as their opponents say. The failure of a rapid Westernization of post-Soviet Russia in the 1990s is an empirical fact with plenty of interpretations. 17 It discredited the idea of democratic principles as associated with the Western world. It meant a weakening of all pro-democratic political parties within Russia. Those Westernizers, who determined Russia’s course in the early 1990s, today are political ‘marginals’, and the entirety of politics is determined basically by the antiWestern and nationalist forces, i.e., heirs and assigns of the Slavophiles of the 19th century. Today’s Westernizers emphasize the mistakes made by the Kremlin when recognizing the total incompatibility of Putin’s militaristic anti-Western policy with real liberal reforms. But they are forced to agree 15 Turning back to the starting point, we can say that if the fundamental structures of international realities and American strategic goals remained firmly in place, the analysts would be free to focus their attention on the “how” questions – how best to confront new emerged global threats, to resolve conflicts and sustain peace on the planet within a global framework that looks partly alike that dominated in the past rather than on the “why” and “what” questions which inevitably arise when the very ground for debate looks uncertain. But if the basic hypothesis is wrong, then this focus would not be necessary. 16 There is a mountain of literature on this issue. English speaking readers may find a careful description of these two positions before the 1917 Bolshevik revolution in Flikke 1994. 17 For an interesting view of what is currently going wrong from the perspective of the Westernizers see Grachev 2006; see also Cohen 2000.

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that the energy export revenues are enough to forgive almost any mistake due to non-competent governance, leaving morality and the gradual strangling of democracy and freedom aside. The transformation of Russia into an energyproducing superpower is welcomed by those intellectuals who believe that the Slavophile tradition in foreign policy and the Westernization of Russia in relation to the economy are closely related to one another. In short, the relationship between domestic and external politics in modern Russia is a rather complex matter, which we are not exploring in this chapter. But what may be said for sure is that the decreasing influence of the Westernizers in the Kremlin and in Russia at large has had a considerable effect on Russia’s foreign policy in 2005–2008. The defeat of the Westernizers was among the main causes of Putin’s transformation from ‘Bush’s best friend’ to ‘a burdensome and problematic partner’. The Romanian politician Petre Roman said at the Bucharest NATO summit in 2002: “We believe that we can discern a dual strategy in Russia’s current policies, one that can be illustrated by the analogy with an open pair of scissors. On the one hand, economic modernization, pragmatic cooperation with the West and a determined pursuit of its interests in the global arena; on the other, the gradual emergence of structures of an old extraction, dedicated to rebuilding a status of global superpower for Russia.” (Roman 2002: 150) Because these two options did not make him happy, Roman recommended Russia to adjust its course to Western demands: “In the case of Russia, a realistic strategic foreign policy cannot serve for both opening the Russian society to the world and reserving Russia’s political course. It cannot aim to carry out the economic reform in the interest of acquiring a status of economic superpower, and to reserve obsolete imperial ambitions at the same time.” (Roman 2002: 151) He also warned NATO leaders not to be deluded by Putin’s move towards the West after 9/11: “We should avoid the ‘romantic disposition’ of embracing Russia unconditionally (…) as well as the rather irrational attitude that wants us to see Russia as ‘a lie wrapped in a golden foil’. (…) We cannot ask Russia to abandon its old clichés while preserving our own. We would be caught in a vicious circle of distrust perpetually breeding distrust.” (Roman 2002: 152) Concluding his analysis, he expressed some optimism concerning Russia’s attitude to further NATO enlargement and sounded a warning to Russia: “Russia is and will be a great country. No matter how its future will take shape, Russia will respect its partners’ firm and clear choices. (…) If as we do hope, Russia genuinely follows the path of

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democracy, this is in its own advantage, since a united Europe will not be a greater Europe, but a stronger one as well.” (Roman 2002: 152.) 18 The prospects for European relations with Russia, evolving along two separate lines – Russia-EU and Russia-NATO, looked more promising when Putin came into office. The EU, in turn, was much more interested in constructive relations with Russia than the U.S. at that time. As for RussiaNATO relations, certain steps have been made towards a closer militarypolitical cooperation between the Russian Federation and NATO after 9/11, despite history-driven suspicions on both sides. The partnership that exists today between Russia and NATO is primarily pragmatic. That is, “it is based mainly upon expedient and tactical calculations, and only really becomes operative when important interests are perceived on both sides to coincide” (Smith 2006: 127). There is no convincing and definite answer on the core question about the role of a military-political NATO in the post-September Eleven security environment (Smith 2006: 35). The answer is not clear, even for many independent Western experts, not to speak about the plain Russians. In a Russian view, the prospect of the Russian-NATO partnership depends upon whether the U.S. will keep its central role within the organization because NATO is a vital security instrument in any future engagement of the U.S. and the EU towards Russia. Perhaps, both sides, Russia and the West, must recognize that differences in cultures, choices and interests are something to live with, not to fight against, and that neither side can hope to dominate the other given the rise of China. However, if we recall the failure of Gorbachev’s idea of a ‘Common European House’ that suggested uniting Russia with its Western neighbors, or Western civilization, whose geographical borders would stretch from Vancouver to Vladivostok, then the prospect for an unclouded future looks rather problematic. There are certain reasons for such pessimism: the unilateral U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty and the construction of the U.S. anti-ballistic missile site in Poland and the Czech Republic, the active support for antiRussian forces during the memorial days of the ‘colored revolutions’ by the U.S. and the EU, the deployment of U.S. and NATO troops at military bases near Russia’s borders from the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea to the Caucasus and Central Asia – all these events occurred during the Putin era. Whatever the motivations were for these actions, they are perceived in Russia as a con-

18 Roman advised Putin to promote “the demilitarization of patriotism” in Russia. This use of an expression he had heard in Belgrade after the fall of Milosevic (Roman 2002: 151) sounds cynical. Roman feared a restoration of the former strong influence of Russia on European and global affairs, and therefore equalized Serbia, which was defeated by NATO, and Russia, which he wanted to see in the future as powerless and dependent on the U.S. and the EU as possible.

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tinuation of the Cold War policy of containment, a revamped version of the old theory of ‘rolling back Communism’, i.e., defeating the Russians. The maxim, ‘democracies do not go to war with one another’, is one of the most popular ideas among contemporary political scientists. But, as the Russian military strategists say, – if one starts from the assumption that contemporary Russia is not a democracy, then this formula does not work, meaning that the question about the peaceful future of Russia regains its place and validity. 19 For the military, the decade of benign neglect towards post-Soviet Russian strategic policy did not end in 1999, when the mutual confidence between two states decreased to its lowest level after the Kosovo war, 20 but in 2001 with the U.S. withdrawal from the 1972 ABM Treaty.

6

Conclusion

Contemporary Russia does not resemble the Soviet Union. The main objective the Russian Federation has identified in its relations with the U.S. is the joint task of fighting international terrorism. But despite the absence of conflicting ideologies the old idea of ‘competitive coexistence’ is or might be deeply hidden behind numerous declarations about ‘partnership’ between two former rivals. Despite the swirl and tumult of events, a strong case can be made for the fact that the first eight years of this century have been witnessing remarkably little change in either the fundamental factors that define the post-Cold War international system or the broad policy directions adopted by the U.S. to protect and enhance its own national interests after the collapse of the USSR. The U.S. has severely weakened its standing in the world at large through its unsuccessful military quest for the ‘victory of democracy’ in Iraq, while the Russian government has used the tremendous rise of oil and gas prices to significantly improve Russia’s military and economic position. 19 Here one can refer to international relations as a discipline. According to the school of the ‘democratic peace’ the long peace between democratic states since 1945 has demonstrated that democratic norms and institutions help states in the international system transcend traditional concerns about security, allowing for the possibility of a ‘perpetual peace’ between democratic states. The mentioned ‘theory’ had been used by the Americans to propel their idea that the establishment of democracy in Iraq could be the foundation for an expanding zone of peace in the Middle East. However, there is an alternative view which argues that the long peace between democratic states in the second half of the 20th century was created by such factors as U.S. hegemony, nuclear deterrence, the solidification of borders, globalization and economic growth, and so on. These factors helped liberal democracy to flourish in Western countries. The conclusion is: only states which are relatively secure – politically, militarily, economically, – can afford to have free, pluralistic societies; in the absence of this security, states are much more likely to adopt, maintain, or revert to centralized, coercive, authoritarian structures. We have no room to comment. 20 The hasty expansion of NATO and the EU eastward took place approximately at that time.

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Putin’s ‘victory in the second war in Chechnya, however, has done little to enhance Russia’s external image and even less to widen its influence in its near abroad and the rest of the world. What is of particular concern is whether the familiar traits of ‘competitive coexistence’ are actually re-emerging, and, – in the light of new global challenges, the economic and political changes that occurred in Russia under Putin, the diffusion of economic power formerly centered in the U.S., etc. – whether the incoming presidential administrations in Russia and the U.S. this year (2008) are determined enough to reverse or accommodate themselves to this trend sharing responsibility for peace and security with other global powers. 21 No one in Moscow will explicitly announce the goal of ‘competitive coexistence’ by the time both Putin and Bush leave office, but in the future the geopolitical conditions may change, perhaps not to the advantage of both the U.S. and the Russian Federation. 22 The Russian leadership views American hegemony and unilateralism as obstacles to Russian national interests and Russia’s inclusion into the most influential international political and economic decision-making processes. Thus, Celeste Wallander was right in saying in 2001 that “it is impossible to escape the reality that one of the main features of the international system in all its dimensions – military, political, and economic – is that American unipolarity coexists with a system of multilateral institutions (such as the World Trade Organization or WTO), regimes (such as nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction) and groupings (such as the G-8) that are overwhelmingly influenced, if not quite determined, by American power and preferences” (Wallander 2001). Present-day Russia does not occupy the same place in U.S. global strategy as the former USSR did. Ideology no longer provides the foundation of U.S.-Russian antagonism, but what we see now as a basis for sliding back to the familiar ‘chilly rhetoric’ is Russophobia that seems to be still alive and spreads in the West on the one hand and anti-American sen21 There were too many speculations about the future of U.S.-Russia relations in the Western press during Putin’s second presidency. We are not able to review all of them. Some advised the U.S. to mount pressure on Russia using ‘the democracy card’ and to limit its influence in Europe and the rest of the world by acting together with the EU. Others pointed out that there was no alternative to cooperation between Russia and the West hoping that old stereotypes and power-seeking and security models would be replaced by a more rational vision. 22 The argument that none of the ex-socialist states, some of which have been absorbed by NATO and the EU and some others who have declared their intention to join NATO and the EU, can be considered a geopolitical threat to the Russian Federation in the future to come, is, from the Russian perspective, utterly and dangerously false. During the Ukrainian ‘orange revolution’, Putin said that he had no objections to Ukraine associating itself more closely with the EU. But he was adamantly against any of Russia’s immediate neighbors joining NATO as this is still viewed as an anti-Russian military alliance by the bulk of Russians (leave aside all politically correct statements about Russia-NATO cooperation).

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timents and NATO-phobia in Russia on the other hand. The return of Cold War-style polemics in Putin’s second presidency simply indicated the actual death of the idea of a ‘strategic partnership’ between the U.S. and the Russian Federation which was born after 9/11. Putin’s strategy in his second term was not applauded in the Western media, but we do not think this shift in rhetoric was unexpected. Today’s Russia is very different from that in the recent past. So is the Russian perception of the forces that are driving international relations in the beginning of the 21st century. And the Russians suggest that the West must acknowledge these differences when engaging post-Soviet Russia in a new ‘war of words’ or into a new alliance against Iran to prevent this country from becoming a nuclear power. Russia is against a confrontation between the West and the East and any new ‘saint’ unions either. Well, it seems that the threat of a new Cold War is exaggerated by the media. The dilemma today is not whether Russia and the U.S. are slipping into a new Cold War or whether a new cohesion is feasible; academics do not forget to point to the lack of a fundamentally renewed framework of international relations in the 21st century in which the relationship between great powers ought to be included as a core element of the entire system. At the end, we must stress the following crucial point: upon the closing of his second presidency, contrary to expectations of many media observers, Vladimir Putin neither leaves the political scene nor stays a third term as Russian president. He will rule the country as prime-minister and simultaneously as the chairman of the ruling United Russia Party in the years to come. He still wishes to promote economic liberalism and authoritarian nationalism, all together. His main foreign policy goal is the same as it was in 2000 – to restore Russia’s status as a global power. Putin’s cult of personality is strong and nobody in Russia knows when it will pass away. In truth, the ex-spy character has not changed, Putin simply matured. Now he looks like a typical Eurasian ruler of a Byzantine style. An upgraded version. The newly elected president Dmitri Medvedev was his closest associate. And it is premature to speak about whether the temperature of U.S.-Russian relations will change after the 2008 presidential elections in the U.S. or not. Literature Brynner, Rock (2006): All They’re Asking for is a Little Respect. In: International Herald Tribune, 16 June. Cohen, Stephen (2000): American Journalism and Russia’s Tragedy. In: The Nation, 2 October. Dickey, Christopher (2006): Season of the Wolf. In: Newsweek, 12 May. Felgenhauer, Paul (2000): Reactions to the NMD Deferral. In: The Moscow Time, 7 September.

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Flikke, Geir (1994). Democracy or Theocracy. Frank, Struve, Berdjaev, Bulgakov, and the 1905 Russian Revolution (Meddelelser No. 69). Oslo: University of Oslo Press. Grachev, Andrei (2006): How the West Let Moscow Down. In: International Herald Tribune, 16 June. Kanet, Roger (Ed.) (2007): Re-emerging Russia. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Krauthammer, Charles (2007): The Putin Doctrine. In: The Washington Post, 16 February, A23. Menon, Rajan/Motyl, Alexander J. (2007): The Myth of Russian Resurgence. In: The American Interest, March–April. Online: http://www.the-american-interest.com/ ai2/article.cfm?Id+258&Mid=8; retrieved 11 May 2007. Roman, Petre (2002): On the Influence of the 11 September 2001 Events on the Process of Reconciliation, Stabilization and Integration in the Balkans and Eastern Europe. In: Romanian Journal of International Affairs, 8: 3 March, 138–153. Rukavishnikov, Vladimir (2005): Cold War, Cold Peace. Moscow: Akademicheski proekt (in Russian). Rukavishnikov, Vladimir (2007): Russia’s Power and Competitiveness. In: Medunarodni Problemi/International Problems (Belgrade), 59: 4, 487–512. Skidelski, Robert (2008): Farewell to Arms. In: Vedomosti, 10 April 2008: 2 (in Russian). Smith, Martin A. (2006): Russia and NATO since 1991: From Cold War through Cold Peace to Partnership? Abingdon – Oxford: Routledge. Wallander, Celeste A. (2001): The Multiple Dimensions of the Russian Threat Assessment (Memo No. 199, Program on New Approaches to Russian Security Policy Memo Series, April). Ponars: Council for Foreign Affairs. Weir, Fred (2006): Russia, US Slipping into Familiar ‘Chill’? In: The Christian Science Monitor, 17 April. Online: http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0417/p06s02woeu.html; retrieved 25 February 2007.

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Borders: Which in Between Most of Our Lives Has Gone Stephan E. Nikolov 1 1

Introduction

I became interested in boundaries and borders that divide states both professionally and as a citizen quite naturally. First, I was born and raised in a country from the so-called ‘socialist camp’ where state borders were ‘firmly locked’ following the Soviet pattern. My life experience was that of a Homo balkanicus having some relatives across the border, members of the family whose existence was well-known, but who were usually not known more closely. Thus, border changes and border crossing occupied a special place in family memories and lulling tales of my early childhood. My father’s birth place was beyond the border and thus inaccessible for me although it was located only 50 km (slightly more than 30 miles) from Sofia, the capital of Bulgaria. The times of fierce confrontation between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia were already gone, but, still, these 50 km were far too far when my 104-yearold grandfather died. Indeed, it took my father about 60 years to dare to return to his home town and to show his place of birth to all our family. By doing so, the historical family memory was at least partially restored; otherwise, our family roots would have remained virtual, imaginary. The first time I saw a state border, the one between Bulgaria and Turkey, I was a young pioneer, i.e., a member of the communist children’s organization, an ideologized version of a boy scout. The Turks used to be cruel oppressors of Bulgarians and were perceived as brutal, malicious, insidious and an excuse for our poverty and backwardness. Thus, I expected to see something awful. Instead, when we approached the border line, accompanied by a Bulgarian officer, he stepped over the polosa 2 and greeted two Turkish soldiers on the other side of the fence, both elder men. I was surprised to see their human faces; they looked tired. These two faces did not resemble the nasty image of the Turks in our history textbooks of the time, i.e., the image of the bashibozuk raping Bulgarian women, stabbing babies and burning 1

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I dedicate this article to two men whose lives have been strongly influenced by border issues: My father, Emil Nikolov, and Jürgen Kuhlmann. They both wore the uniforms of colonels, of the Warsaw Pact’s Bulgarian Army and NATO’s Bundeswehr respectively. Polosa = A strip of land with some special purpose; in this case it means parts of the border line components, an area always freshly ploughed in order to preserve the footprints of a trespasser. As many military terms, the expression is derived from Russian language. Following the Bulgarian liberation from Turkish domination in 1878 the Bulgarian military was established and run by Russian officers; after the communist coup d’état the military was entirely reshaped to match the Soviet model.

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down peaceful villages. When we returned from the border post (zastava) the soldiers demonstrated how they used dogs to handle an intruder (diversant). I lagged behind the group and waved good-bye to the two border guardians on the Turkish side. Then I said farewell to many of my biases about the Turks, but I still had a long way to go to leave behind all of them. It took me almost 40 years to cross the Turkish border again, just to find, unexpectedly, a quite deserted land. In fact, two generations of my family had been unable to cross this border. Before myself, only my grandfather had done so. Regrettably, I have never seen him because a border was imposed between us and he died when I was an eight-years-old. He, in his younger years, had walked all the way from Tsaribrod to Tsarigrad 3 , a journey which took him about a week. At that time, there was no border at all; Bulgaria, better known as the Danube region (Tuna vilaya) of the Ottoman Empire, was part of the Sultan’s empire reaching from the Danube to Baghdad. Very soon, however, Bulgaria was to make her first steps toward independence, with Russian support. San Stefano Bulgaria, however, existed three months only. This was some years before the 1876 Istanbul Conference of Ambassadors. The Berlin Conference, then, returned the Southern and South Western territories (Macedonia) back to the Vatican and divided the young country into two: The Principality of Bulgaria, i.e., the present Northern Bulgaria with the capital of Sofia), and the artificially constructed Eastern Rumelia. Both, however, remained more or less dependent on the Sultan. In 1885, the Bulgarians revolted in some soap-opera style and proclaimed the reunification of the country. Prince Alexander Batemberg blessed the undertaking, which cost him the crown; the countermove for restoring the status quo came from Serbia and not from Turkey as could have been expected. The Bulgarians, however, managed to preserve their dear achievement.

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Some Theoretical Premises

One may think that borders are an obsolete, outdated topic in the age of the internet, jets and freedom of travel. A person who is flying from one state or even continent to another, irrespective of the actual distance between the two, will hardly notice the border – or the many borders he or she passes through. It is a quasi border, a transfiguration of the real one, because the sky does not know borders. It is like that ‘Turkish’ border, installed near a village in 3

Tsaribrod is a small town close to the Bulgarian-Serbian border which was ceded, in 1919, to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and renamed to Dimitrovgrad in 1950. Tsarigrad, literally the City of the King, is Bulgarian for Constantinople or Istanbul.

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Northern Bulgaria, probably 300 km away from the real one which I, as a soldier, crossed with my companions from the regiment during military exercises in 1971 in a training for a war that never happened. Probably this is the reason why most sociologists do not consider this a relevant topic. What has mainly been investigated by geographers such as Friedrich Ratzel has remained outside the realm of anthropology and sociology (Giddens 1989: 49). Ratzel argues that the border regions of a given state’s territory are no less important than the more central regions. Introducing the notion of Lebensraum, he examines society/state as a quasi-organism, bound to a certain ‘living space’ (Lebensraum) and fighting for survival through preservation of the homeland and territorial expansion against other states. Borders, according to Ratzel, are “expressions and measures of state power (…) dynamic aspects of a state, since stronger and vibrant ones aspire to expand their spatial range, while declining ones lean to shrinking themselves within smaller area” (Ratzel 1897: 584ff.; see also Ratzel 1882). However, Ratzel’s and other ‘geographical determinists’ fail to develop a sound theory. In distinguishing traditional and modern states, one important aspect to stress is that traditional states had ‘frontiers’, while modern states have borders which are more sophisticated and internationally accepted and thus less contested than frontiers. As Prescott (1978: Chapter 2, esp. 40ff.) precisely points out, ‘frontier’ means a specific type of a division in political geography between two or more states, or a demarcation between settled and uninhabited areas within a single state. Frontiers could be conveniently further subdivided into two categories: (1) ‘primary settlement ones’ (referring to the process of further state expanding into virtually unpopulated areas or into regions with tribal settlements at best); and (2) ‘secondary settlement ones’ (referring to areas which are only sparsely populated because of infertile soil and hostile nature and environment. Thus, frontier means something that is outside the scope of our work here which focuses on modern-day Europe and, instead, relates more to the prairies of 19th century America, the Australian deserts or the high plateaus of Central Asia such as Tibet. After taking over the continent between the two oceans, the Americans looked to the moon and outer space as the ‘New Frontiers’. Such a term can possibly only to be born in a huge country. The Chinese have similar notions when distinguishing borders, boundaries and frontiers with frontier literally meaning territory that is beyond the current reach of China, but is, potentially and actually, part of strategic considerations for future conquests. Past examples include Xinjiang (the Chinese word for ‘frontier’ is part of its name), the predominantly Muslim Uygur populated area and Tibet which are now Autonomous Regions in the People’s Republic of China. A similar geopolitical and geostrategic understanding is found in the Russian designations of 263

‘near’ (and ‘distant’) abroad because the ‘near abroad’ virtually consists of all the former Soviet republics and carries the notion of a recovery of Russian domination in these territories. A ‘border’, on the other hand, is a well established, geographically hauled and diplomatically agreed upon line that separates one or more states; and it is a term that follows from the emergence of the nation-state only (Giddens 1989: 50). The term ‘boundary’ designates every separation, natural or artificial, which marks the confines or the lines of division between some entities. Yet, both ‘border’ and ‘boundary’ have multiple meanings in various spheres of life, and they are not restricted to the physical, the profane world. We thus speak of a moral boundary or the border of moral responsibility which a person is not allowed to cross if he or she does not want to risk loosing his or her face, self-respect or moral authority. In psychology, where the terms border and boundary are easier to catch intuitively than to explicate, a boundary is defined as the edge of appropriate behavior in a given situation (Gutheil/Gabbard 1993). Modern boundary theory, however, goes beyond such behavior to matters of language, time, place and space, money, self-disclosure and reception of input from outside this dyad. In contemporary clinical psychology boundary issues have attained professional awareness, although some early concepts portended the issue. Several decades ago, e.g., the term boundary violations referred almost exclusively to what we now know as sexual misconduct (Gutheil 1999). Within psychoanalysis there exists the notion of parameters (e.g., actions, interventions or responses that lay outside the fundamental analytic terrain of verbal free association), a term that embraces some of the boundary issues that are identified today, though in slightly different conceptual terms. Gabbard/Lester (1998) have pointed out that the developmental notion of ‘ego boundaries’, a term inter alia relevant to the understanding of psychotic thought may have been an early expression of boundary theory. Yet, the sense of where ‘you’ stops and ‘I’ begins has a more intrapersonal focus compared to the dyadic context in which we now think of boundary issues (Simon 1989). Meanwhile, a more systematic vision of boundary theory has emerged, especially during the last decade (see Epstein/Simon 1990; Gutheil 1989; Gutheil/Gabbard 1998, 1993; Simon 1992, 1989). Today, according to therapists infringing boundaries is done in two major ways: boundary crossings and boundary violations (Gutheil/Gabbard 1993). In a boundary crossing, the therapist steps out of the usual framework in some way, but this action neither exploits nor harms the patient; indeed, it may advance the therapeutic relationship or the therapy itself. Examples that clearly fit this description include offering a crying patient a tissue; helping a patient who has fallen down; or disclosing some facts about oneself (e.g., that one is a psychiatrist rather than a psychologist). Far more serious are the 264

boundary violations which involve such serious breaches of professional ethics as initiating or accepting exceptional relations with the patient, including sexual ones, as well as abusive behaviour (Gabbard/Lester 1998). Next, ‘social borders’ are barriers separating social values or strata such as the differences between the life-worlds of the working class and the upper class, or various social groups. Such groups may be separated by many dividing lines, or borders: social/living conditions, opportunities/prospects, legal rights/customs, viewpoints, and so on. Furthermore, ‘psychological borders’ do exist between a person’s judgment and group assessments or between the subjective, personal, internal assessment of the self and that of the ‘milieu,’ of those around, or the society as a whole. Lastly, ‘philosophical borders’ refer to limits of our knowledge, e.g., about the universe or the world, to limits of the capacities of both the individual and humanity as a whole, and to limits regarding fully grasping the divine order above us if it really exists. It seems really strange that border issues are anathema to sociology given that they are so full of philosophical content and so pertinent to the fate of various social groups depending on their position vis-à-vis the border. We think of a boundary whenever we think of an entity demarcated from its surroundings. There is a boundary differentiating a sphere’s interior from its exterior; there is a boundary (a border) separating Greece and Bulgaria, the regions Montana and Vidin and the districts within a city. Sometimes the exact location of a boundary is blurred or otherwise contentious as when one tries to detail the exact line where Mount Everest stops and something different begins. Sometimes the boundary lies slant to any physical discontinuity or qualitative delineation as with the border between the upper and lower halves of a homogeneous sphere. But no matter if it is sharp or fuzzy, natural or artificial, every object persistently has a boundary. It marks it off from the rest of the world. Events, too, have boundaries – temporal ones: their beginning, climax, end. All our lives are bounded by our birth and death. A soccer game begins after the starting whistle of the referee, and finishes with his final blow. A philosopher would imply also that even imaginary, abstract entities, such as concepts or layouts, have boundaries of their own. Euclid was probably the first to define a boundary in his Elements. He concluded, that “[a] point is that which has no part. A line is breathless length. The extremities of a line are points. (…) A surface is that which has length and breadth only. The extremities of a surface are lines. (…) A boundary is that which is an extremity of anything.” (Euclid 1908: definitions 1–3, 5–6, 13). Aristotle put this more precisely by defining the extremity of a thing x as “the first thing outside of which no part [of x] is to be found, and the first thing inside of which every part [of x] is to be found” (Aristotle 1995a: 1022a). This definition is the ut265

most intuitive one and might be regarded as the natural starting point for any exploration of the concept of a boundary. Although, quite apparently, Aristotle’s definition was designed to apply solely to material objects, it is nevertheless spontaneously relevant to intangible or abstract phenomena such as concepts and sets. On the face of it, however, this intuitive characterization is the source of many puzzles that invite philosophical concern, especially with respect to the boundaries of spatio-temporal particulars such as objects and events. The first sort of puzzle relates to the perception that a boundary separates two entities or two parts of the same entity. Imagine ourselves travelling from Sofia to Pernik. What happens as we cross the Vladaya-Dragichevo line? Do we pass through a last point l in Sofia, and a first point m in Pernik? Certainly not, given the density of the continuum. Otherwise, we should admit an infinite number of further points between l and m that would be in neither region. But, equally clear enough, we could barely acknowledge the existence of either l or m, as follows from the standard mathematical handling of the continuum. To do so would be to assign the boundary between the two regions (and districts, areas, states, etc. too) to only one of them, and either choice would be an improper privileging of one over the other. In addition, we cannot identify l with m for we are speaking of two adjacent territories which whatsoever cannot have any parts in common. So, where is the dividing line, and how does it relate to the two bordering entities it separates? The puzzle even goes far beyond this example. It is germane to Aristotle’s (1995b: 234ff.) own motion conundrum: At the moment when an object stops moving, is it in motion or is it at rest? Or let us take the dilemma raised by Leonardo da Vinci (1938: 75f.) in his Notebooks: “What is it (…) that divides the atmosphere from the water? It is necessary that there should be a common boundary which is neither air nor water but is without substance, because a body interposed between two bodies prevents their contact, and this does not happen in water with air. (…) Therefore a surface is the common boundary of two bodies which are not continuous, and does not form part of either one or the other, for if the surface formed part of it, it would have divisible bulk, whereas, however, it is not divisible and nothingness divides these bodies the one from the other.” A 20th century mathematician specifies that: “‘Surface’, it is true, is a substantive in grammar; but it is not the name of a particular existent, but of an attribute.” (Price 1932: 106) Or, consider Charles S. Peirce’s (1893: 98) puzzle: What is the color of the line that demarcates a black spot and its white background? Perhaps figure/ground considerations could be invoked to provide an answer in this last case based on the principle that the boundary is always owned by the figure – the background is topologically open (Jackendoff 1987: Appendix B). But 266

what is figure and what is ground when it comes to the very black spot’s two adjoining halves? What is figure and what is ground when it comes to Sofia and Pernik? What happens when a swimmer dives into the water? In such cases our intuition falls short to suggest any sophisticated explanation. And still, nobody can deny that all these examples involve questions that define important choices to be made by any theory of boundaries – or any border-based theory of the world of spatio-temporally extended entities. This is a concern that already plagued the metaphysics of the Middle Ages: “Real contact occurs in some entity which truly and formally exists in things; for the contact itself is real, and properly and formally exists in reality; therefore it occurs in some real entity which formally exists in the thing; and yet it occurs in an indivisible thing; therefore such an indivisible entity exists formally in the thing itself.” (Suarez 1994: §19, quoted in Zimmerman 1996: 160) The early English philosopher William of Ockham precisely observed that “[t]he spherical body does not touch the flat body primarily with a part that is such that each of its parts touches the flat body. Therefore, it does not touch it primarily with some part that is prior to all the other touching parts. Rather, any given touching part is still such that a half of it does not touch immediately, and a half of that half does not touch immediately, and so on ad infinitum.” (Ockham 1991: 9, 2) A second sort of puzzle relates to the fact that Aristotle’s mereological definition (and the common-sense intuition that it captures) seems only to apply to the realm of continuous entities. Adapting the above-mentioned difficulty, the thought that Sofia and Pernik are bounded by the VladayaDragichevo line, appears fair enough. But ordinary material objects that might easily be observed are not continuous (or dense), strictly speaking. On closer examination, spatial boundaries of physical objects are imaginary entities surrounding a multitude of subatomic particles. Their exact shape and location involve the same degree of arbitrariness as those of a mathematical graph curved out of strewn and inaccurate data (as those of the figures of an impressionist work of art). Similarly, on closer inspection, a body while in motion extends to the fact that the vector sum of the motions of countless particles, averaged over time, is non-zero. Therefore, it makes no sense to speak of the moment at which a body stops moving. Here arises the question whether boundaries are imaginary entities, i.e., projections of the mind or whether they are genuine lodgers of reality? The German mathematician Gottlob Frege is explicit and unambiguous on this issue: “One calls the equator an imaginary line, but it would be wrong to call it a line that has merely been thought up. It was not created by thought as the result of a psychological process, but is only apprehended or grasped by thought. If its being apprehended were a matter of its coming into being, then we could not say any267

thing positive about the equator for any time prior to this supposed coming into being.” (Frege 1884: §26, 35) Even with reference to the Vladaya-Dragichevo line, and, more generally, to those boundaries that demarcate adjacent parts of a continuous manifold, like in the case when an individual agent of cognition conceptualizes that a black spot is being made of two halves, one can raise the question of their ontological status. Such boundaries reflect to various extents our intellect’s organizing activity or that of our social practices. And it might be argued that when we believe in their objectivity, we epitomize a form of metaphysical realism that screams for justification. In this context, we may certainly introduce a conceptual distinction between natural or bona fide boundaries, grounded in certain physical discontinuity or qualitative heterogeneity between an entity and its surroundings, on the one hand, and artificial or fiat boundaries, on the another, those which are not so grounded in the autonomous, mind-free world (Smith 1995). Geo-political boundaries such as the Vladaya-Dragichevo line might be considered as belonging to the fiat sort. It may well be that even the surfaces of ordinary material objects such as tables or tennis balls involve, upon closer inspection, some kind of fiat verbalizations. And the question is, are there any bona fide boundaries? And, if not, is the fiat nature of our border/boundary talk a reason to justify an anti-realist attitude towards boundaries altogether? By the way, let us compare also how the issue arises in the realm of abstract entities: Are there concepts that carve the world ‘at the joints’? Besides, once the fiat/bona fide opposition has been recognized, it is clear that it can also be drawn in relation to whole objects and events (Smith 2001). Insofar as a part of the boundary of a whole is of the fiat sort the whole itself may be viewed as a conceptual construction. Hence the question of the ontological status of boundaries becomes part of the more general issue of the conventional status of ordinary objects and events (Heller 1990). A third puzzle relates to ambiguity and vagueness. Aristotle’s definition mentioned above (together with the standard topology) invariably suggests a sharp demarcation between the interior and the exterior of a thing or an object. In addition, it may be observed that regular objects and events as well as the expansions of various universal concepts may have fuzzy or, in a way, indeterminate boundaries. Such objects as clouds in the sky, wastelands, mountains, swamps, seashores, or impressionist paintings: all seem to prevaricate an invented, highly idealized notion of a sharply bounded object. Equally, the temporal boundaries of many events (let alone their spatial boundaries) seem to be undefined. Can anyone tell us when exactly the Great French revolution began? 14th of July? This is, actually, only an episode of it, though an important one. Moreover: When did it end? Where did it take 268

place? In Paris only? Or also in Marseille, Toulouse? In addition to that, it is more than certain that concepts that correspond to attributes like ‘bald’ or ‘tall’ do not possess sharp dimensions or boundaries. Such concepts seem to correspond to “an area that has not a sharp boundary-line all around, but in places just vaguely fade[s] away into the background” (Frege 1903: § 56). To make things even more complicated: Mark Sainsbury is positive that “a vague concept is boundaryless in that no boundary marks the things which fall under it from the things which do not, and no boundary marks the things which definitely fall under it from the things which do not definitely do so; and so on. Manifestations are the unwillingness of knowing subjects to draw any such boundaries, the cognitive impossibility of identifying such boundaries, and the needlessness and even disutility of such boundaries.” (Sainsbury 1990: 257) Most realist theories about boundaries, construed as lower-dimensional entities, share the view that such entities are something like ontological parasites. First, a boundary cannot exist except as a boundary/border of something; second, this boundary of something cannot exist except as a boundary of that thing (Brentano 1976; Chisholm 1984). How is it then possible to interpret such vagueness? One option is to insist on a purely epistemic depiction: This vagueness, or fuzziness, would rest exclusively in our ignorance about the exact location of the relevant boundaries (Sorensen 1988; Williamson 1994). Alternatively, one may make the distinction, in this case, between a truly ontological account and a de dicto, a linguistic account which corresponds to a purely linguistic (or conceptual) notion of vagueness. In the first case, the fuzziness of Mount Everest’s boundaries would certainly be vague insofar as an objective, determinate distribution of the portion of land which belongs to Mount Everest and that which belongs some other entity is absent. “There is no line which sharply divides the matter composing [Mount] Everest from the matter outside it. Everest’s boundaries are fuzzy. Some molecules are inside Everest and some molecules outside. But some have an indefinite status: there is no objective, determinate fact of the matter about whether they are inside or outside.” (Tye 1990: 535; see also Copeland 1995) Likewise, on this account an attribute such as ‘bald’ would be vague because it stands for a vague set, one with fairly fuzzy boundaries. There is no vague boundary demarcating Mount Everest from the linguistic point of view; rather, there are numerous diverse pieces of land bordering Mount Everest. However, our linguistic practices fail to impose a selection of any one of them as the official referent of ‘Everest’ (Lewis 1986; McGee 1997). According to this view, the set of bald people does not have a fuzzy boundary. Rather, our linguistic stipulations do not fully specify which set of people corresponds to the continuum of ‘bald’. In the same vein, “[t]he reason why 269

it’s vague where the outback begins is not that there’s this thing, the outback, with imprecise borders; rather there are many things, with different borders, and nobody has been foolish enough to try to enforce a choice of one of them as the official referent of the word ‘outback’” (Lewis 1986: 212). For boundaries of the fiat sort a de dicto account naturally evokes itself: As far as the process which leads to the definition of a boundary may not be precise, the question of whether something lies inside or outside the boundary may be semantically undetermined. But this account, however, does not fit well the boundaries of the bona fide sort (if any): While such boundaries are vague, it would be detached from our cognitive and social articulations so that an epistemic account would be surely necessary. This means that a genuinely established limbo would exist. A fourth source of concern relates to the intuition, also inherent in Aristotle’s definition, that boundaries are lower-dimensional entities, i.e., they have at least one dimension less than the entities bound to them. The surface of a continuous sphere, e.g., is two-dimensional: It has no ‘substance’, neither a ‘separable mass’. The Vladaya-Dragichevo line is one-dimensional (it has ‘length’, but not ‘width’); the boundary point at the apex of a pyramid is zero-dimensional because it does not extend to any direction. This perception is germane to much of the borders or boundaries. However, it is challenging as much as it draws a distinction between a number of independent premonitions that are relevant both in common sense and in philosophical envisaging. To take an example: There is a long-lasting tradition in British epistemology, from Moore (1925) to Gibson (1979) according to which boundaries play a crucial role in perception. Following Moore (1925: 217) it is “quite certain that I do not directly perceive my hand; and that when I am said (as I may be correctly said) to ‘perceive’ it, that I ‘perceive’ it means that I perceive (in a different and more fundamental sense) something which is (in a suitable sense) representative of it, namely, a certain part of its surface”. Austin (1962: 100) is even more explicit: “It is (…) wrong to imply that everything has a surface. Where and what exactly is the surface of a cat?” And, finally, Gibson (1979: 23): “The surface is where most of the action is. The surface is where light is reflected or absorbed, not the interior of the substance. The surface is what touches the animal, not the interior. The surface is where chemical reactions mostly take place. The surface is where vaporization or diffusion of substances into the medium occurs. And the surface is where vibrations of the substance are transmitted into the medium.” Thus, we see opaque physical objects indirectly by catching sight of their surfaces. But it is not clear how one can see entities that completely lack any physical immensity. In a similar way, we often speak about surfaces as of things that may be potholed, or moisten, or that can be scratched, polished, 270

rubbed down, and so on. But it is unclear whether such expressions are appropriate for immaterial entities. In such cases it would rather seem that surfaces, and, more generally, borders/boundaries (see Jackendoff 1991) need to be construed as ‘thin layers’, designed as possessing fewer dimensions than the whole to which they apply. Perhaps, this conceptual tension between the notions of boundaries – understood as lower-dimensional entities, on the one hand, and as slim layers, on the other hand – reflects an irreducible ambiguity in ordinary talk (Stroll 1988). Yet, this gives rise to additional dilemmas. For instance, vast boundaries can be treated as regular, appropriate parts of the bulks they border on. It can hardly be doubted that a general theory of boundaries should have something to say about the other conceptions, too – and, even further, about the interaction between the mathematical abstraction associated with the former conception and the physical, cognitive, and philosophical meaning of the latter one. To put it more theoretically: Boundaries are central to our commonsensical picture of the world; yet, at the same time, they are profoundly problematical. Accordingly, we may make a distinction between two main types of theories: First, a realist one which depends on whether one is willing to take the problems at face value, and, second, an eliminationist one that bypasses these problems altogether by treating boundaries as mere theories apart from the conventional, everyday ways of saying it (façons de parler). Most realist theories about boundaries, construed as lower-dimensional entities, share the view that such entities are something like ontological parasites. First, a boundary cannot exist except as a boundary/border of something; second, this boundary of something cannot exist except as a boundary of that thing (Brentano 1976; Chisholm 1984). As already mentioned, most realist theories about boundaries, construed as lower-dimensional entities share the view that such entities are something like ontological parasites. Boundaries cannot exist apart from the entities they are bound to though there may be some discrepancy as to whether this ontological dependence is generic or specific. In the first case, a boundary cannot exist except as a boundary/border of something, in the second case, this boundary of something cannot exist except as a boundary of that thing (Brentano 1976; Chisholm 1984). This view validates the perception that boundaries, even if real, nevertheless are somewhat ‘less real’ than the entities. Realist theories, however, may significantly differ according to the extent to which such dependent, lowerdimensional borders/boundaries relate to the extended entities they are bound to (Varzi 1997). Thus, with reference to the first conundrum above, let A and B be any two extended entities separated by a common boundary (such as Bulgaria and Greece). Then we may distinguish four main theories: 271

1. The boundary may belong neither to A nor to B. This was, ultimately, Leonardo da Vinci’s view. Yet, this does not find much support among recent philosophers, possibly with the exception of Hestevold (1986) and, within certain limits, Sorensen (1986). It implies that contact between A and B may be achieved even in the case when both A and B are topologically open, as long as nothing lies between them except for their common, outer boundary. This, then, is a possible option as long as the closure of A overlaps the closure of B. In this way, according to this view, there is no last point l of Sofia, and no first point m of Pernik: The different regions do not, strictly speaking, overlap. It has been Descartes who first became aware of this: “[B]y superficies we do not here mean any portion of the surrounding body, but merely the extremity which is between the surrounded body and that surrounded, which is but a mode; or (…) we mean the common surface which is a surface that is not a part of one body rather than the other, and that is always considered the same, so long as it retains the same magnitude and figure.” (Descartes 1911: 261) A British geometrist confirms this three centuries later: “If we can give a definition of points which will make them fulfil a certain pair of conditions, it will not matter though points in themselves should turn out to be entities of a very different kind from what we had supposed them to be. The two conditions are (i) that points must have to each other the kind of relations which geometry demands; and (ii) that points must have to finite areas and volumes such a relation that a reasonable sense can be given to the statement that such areas and volumes can be exhaustively analysed into sets of points.” (Broad 1959: 39) 2. The boundary must belong either to A or to B, though it may be undefined to which of A and B it belongs. This theory builds on Bolzano’s (1851) view 4 which, in turn, is reflected by the standard account of pointset topology. It implies that contact between A and B may be achieved only when either A or B is topologically closed while the other is topologically open in the relevant contact area. However, the demand for indeterminacy allows one to leave the matter unsettled. In turn, this indeterminacy may be construed either as semantic or epistemic depending on whether the relevant boundary is of the fiat sort, as with the VladayaDragichevo line, or of the bona fide sort (for a formal treatment of this

4

He wrote: “I define the limit of a body as the aggregate of all the extreme (äußerst) etheratoms which still belong to it. (…) A closer consideration further shows that many bodies are at certain places altogether devoid of limiting atoms; none of their atoms can be described as the extreme ones among those which still belong to it and would accompany it if it started to move. [Two bodies are in contact] when the extreme atoms of the one, (…) together with certain atoms of the other, form a continuous extension.” (Bolzano 1851: 167f.)

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theory see Casati/Varzi 1999: Chapter 5; Varzi 2004). Yet, Pierre Bayle (1697: 370) was very critical about this: “[S]ome School philosophers (…) suppose that nature has mixed some mathematical points in with the infinitely divisible parts to serve as connections between them and to make up the extremities of bodies. They believed by this they could also answer the objection about the penetrative contact of two surfaces, but this subterfuge is so absurd that it does not deserve to be refuted.” 3. The boundary may belong simultaneously to A and to B, but the relevant overlap is sui generis accurately insofar as it involves lower-dimensional parts. Boundaries do not occupy space and thus, according to this theory, it is not implausible to say that, e.g., the Vladaya-Dragichevo line belongs to both Sofia and Pernik. In some cases, however, this theory may require a further sophisticated twist: If the demarcation line, say, between a black spot and its white background belongs to both of them, then it must be equally white as well as black. 5 Likewise, at the very moment when a homogeneous object undergoes the transition from being stationary to moving, it must be both stationary and moving (see, inter alia, Priest 1987). 4. In fact, there might be two boundaries, one belonging to A and the other to B, and these two boundaries would be co-located. This means that they coincide spatially without overlapping mereologically. This view can be traced back to Brentano (1976) 6 and has been elaborated further in detail by Chisholm (1984; 1992/1993). As Roderick Chisholm (1984: 88) emphasizes in his fundamental work Boundaries as Dependent Particulars: “If the continuous object is cut in half, then does the one boundary [that demarcates two adjacent parts] become two boundaries, one thing thus becoming two things? (…) But how can one thing – even if it is only a boundary – become two things? And does this mean that when two things become continuous, then two things that had been diverse become identical with each other, two things thus becoming one thing?” This allows the distinction between closed and open entities – regarded

5 6

Brentano writes: “If a red surface and a blue surface are in contact with each other, then a red and a blue line coincide.” (Brentano 1976: 41) “One of the two lines into which the line would be split upon division would (…) have an end point, but the other no beginning point. This inference has been quite correctly drawn by Bolzano, who was led thereby to his monstruous doctrine that there would exist bodies with and without surfaces, the one class containing just so many as the other, because contact would be possible only between a body with a surface and another without. He ought, rather, to have had his attention drawn by such consequences to the fact that the whole conception of the line and of other continua as sets of points runs counter to the concept of contact and thereby abolishes precisely what makes up the essence of the continuum.” (Brentano 1976: 146)

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by Brentano as “monstrous” – to be rejected, if all extended bodies are treated as closed. In the case of material bodies, spatial coincidence of their boundaries would amount to a violation of Locke’s principle of one object to a place (Locke: Essays, II-xxvii-1), but, again, the violation would be sui generis precisely insofar as the entities in question do not take up any space (see also Smith 1997 for a formal treatment of this theory). These theories are mutually exclusive, but they certainly need not be exhaustive, and they can be further articulated or integrated to address the issues raised by the riddles introduced above. For example, with reference to the second puzzle mentioned above, Smith/Varzi (2000) offer a double-barred theory that is of type 2 with respect to bona fide boundaries, and of type 4 with respect to fiat boundaries. Thus, there will not be any coincidence of real boundaries, but merely of fiat articulations. Similarly, the indeterminacy hypothesis advocated by type-2 theories can be regarded as being a sort of indeterminacy that is involved in the phenomenon of vagueness. For fiat boundaries, for instance, a de dicto or linguistic account may be applied in both cases: statements about such boundaries are true if they are super-true, i.e., true under every admissible way of making the relevant fiat articulations as much precise as possible (see Varzi 2001). As for the other type, the so-called eliminationist theories, they depart from the idea that talk of boundaries involves some sort of abstraction which can already be found in the medieval and modern debate on anti-/ indivisibility (Zimmerman 1996). What sort of abstraction is involved? And how can we account for our ordinary (and mathematical) talk about boundaries if it can be seen as a fictional abstraction? With special reference to the boundaries of spatio-temporal particulars we may distinguish two main approaches. 1. Substantivalists concerning themselves with space-time may see the abstraction as stemming from the relationship between a particular and its spatio-temporal receptacle, relying on the topology of space-time to account for our boundary talk when it comes to other entities. It has been stated, for instance, that bodies are the material content of (regular) open regions of space, where boundary contact between bodies is explained in terms of overlap between the closures of their receptacles. This theory can be traced back to Descartes (1911: xv) and has been explicitly articulated by Cartwright (1975). It does, to be sure, yield a hybrid account, an account that goes away only with the boundaries of material bodies (and, by extension, events); their receptacles are subject to a standard topology in which boundaries are treated in an abstract way. But this account is 274

enough to bypass the puzzles mentioned above insofar as there is no pressing problem in assuming a standard topology for space-time. The main problem for the theory is, rather, to justify the claim that only some regions (open regular regions, for instance) are receptacles (see Hudson 2002 for a challenge to this view.) 2. If one is not a substantivalist about space and/or time, one can describe the abstraction as invoking the idea of ever thinner layers of the bounded entity (Stroll 1979: 279). The best formulation of this idea is Alfred N. Whitehead’s theory of ‘extensive abstraction’ (Whitehead 1916, 1919) roots of which can, in turn, be traced back at least to Lobachevskii (1934; alternative formulations may, inter alia, be found in Tarski 1929; Menger 1940; Clarke 1985). On this account, boundary elements are not included among the primary entities which only comprise extended bodies, but they are nonetheless retrieved as higher-order entities, viz. as equivalence classes of convergent series of nested bodies. For example, the series of all concentric spheres included in a given sphere converges to the point at the center, the series of all concentric right cylinders of equal length included in a given cylinder converge to the axial line, and so on. One may call a convergent series of this sort an abstractive class if it has no bottom, i.e., if no object is part of every member of the class. And call two co-convergent abstractive classes equivalent if every member of the first class has a member in the second, and vice versa. For instance, an abstractive class of spheres is equivalent to the class of all the cubes inscribed in the spheres which converge to the same point at the center. Each boundary element, then, can be viewed as an equivalence class of converging abstractive classes and one can reconstruct ordinary talk about lower-dimensional boundaries as talk about such higher-order entities. This approach has analogues also in the temporal realm where moments are sometimes construed as sets of time intervals which in turn are sometimes construed as sets of overlapping events (the locus classicus is Russell 1914; see also Walker 1947; Kamp 1979; Benthem 1983). One standard objection to type-2 theories is that the abstractness of boundaries seems to run afoul of the abstractness of set-theoretic constructions. One can see and paint the surface of a table and one can even see and paint an infinite series of ever thinner layers of table-parts. But one cannot paint the set of these parts (unless of course this is simply another way of saying that the parts are painted). Indeed, De Laguna (1922), one of the very first promoters of Whitehead’s method, remarked that the identification of points and other boundaries with classes of solids is open to serious misinterpretation: “Although we perceive solids, we perceive no abstractive sets of solids (…). In 275

accepting the abstractive set, we are as veritably going beyond experience as in accepting the solid of zero-length.” (Whitehead 1922: 460) A third option, apart from both type-1 and type-2 theories, would be an ‘operationalist’ account of the sort advocated by Adams (1984; 1996) where the abstractive process by which boundary elements are derived from concrete observables is explained in terms of ‘operational’ tests. Arguably, however, such an account is best regarded as a parallel story, one that offers an explanation of empirical knowledge concerning boundaries while remaining ultimately neutral with regard to their ontological status. But let us return to the genuine topic of our discussion here, the state border or boundary. Concerning the area, the description of land in a deed by specific boundaries is conclusive; otherwise. it would be inoperative. It is always irrelevant whether the quantity contained within the specific boundaries is greater or less than that expressed. The same rule is applicable, although neither the courses and distances nor the estimated contents correspond with such specific boundaries; but these rules do not apply in cases where adherence to them would be plainly absurd. When a boundary, fixed by mutual consent, has been permitted to stay for twenty-one years, it could not be changed afterwards. In accordance with this rule, it has been decided that where town lots have been occupied up to a line between them for more than twenty-one years each party gained an incontrovertible right to the line thus established, and this is irrespective of whether either party knows of the adverse claim or not and whether either party has more or less ground than was originally in the lot he owns. Boundaries are either natural or artificial. A river as well as valleys, ravines, mountain ridges, and various other naturally shaped object are natural boundaries and in these cases through the center of the chosen natural barrier the line of division is drawn. An artificial boundary is one made by man. As one of the famous border-lines’ designers of the first half of the 20th century, Lord Curzon of Kedleston, points out: “We must distinguish between the category of Natural Frontiers and the category of Artificial Frontiers, by which are meant those boundary lines which, not being dependent upon natural features of the earth’s surface for their selection, have been artificially or arbitrarily created by man.” (Lord Curzon 1907: 12) This applies at least to the 20th century wars in Europe and especially on the Balkans where a formation of new states with new borders occurred. For the new borders it was often impossible to find natural landmarks, so they sometimes just divided places, villages, homes from the yards. Very often one could hear stories like this: The officer responsible for establishing the border was drunk, and thus positioned the village’s cemetery or church on the other side of the borderline. 276

Boundaries are frequently marked by partition fences, ditches, hedges, trees, etc. It appears that this has first been introduced by the Poles who invented a new word to indicate artificially designed borders: granica [granitsa], this was the word to indicate a men-made dividing-line or a hedge. The German word Grenze comes from here, widely spread through the Bible in Luther’s translation and leading to the Dutch grenz, the Danish and Norwegian grense, and the Swedish gränz. With the same meaning it has been introduced into the old Russian language ( ) and also into the other Slavic languages and into Romanian (grani a). Moreover, in many documents of the Middle Ages the same word and its derivates can be found in Latinized form such as in granicier, granicierum, graniciebus (Slownik 2000: 474f.). Yet, both the English words border and boundary and the Slavic word granitsa indicate a conditional/imaginary line, dividing adjacent zones, estates, regions, etc., setting the limit of a certain territory and a line of division. Further on, they denote the limits of a location, the whereabouts of something that separates, diverges one from another and demarcates something. In a more specific sense they mean a conditional line which determines the limits of a given state’s territory in relation to the neighboring states (Abramov 1999; Chernov 2001). A border between two countries and regions is the dividing line between them; in some instances the land that is close to this line is also included (borderland); an imaginary line that separates one area from other areas (Collins 2000).

3

Thirty Miles from Sofia

Sour narratives in the region originate from one of the many Balkan boundaries that were subject to frequent changes during the 20th century. After the exhaustion and final collapse of two empires with possessions on the peninsula, the Ottoman Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, new sovereign states were born: Greece, Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania; Macedonia, in 1913, was divided between Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia; after the First World War Serbia annexed Bosnia, Croatia and Slovenia; and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (SCS) was also established to become Yugoslavia about a decade later. After the Second World War, Yugoslavia became a communist state under the legendary guerrilla leader, Marshall Tito, to include six republics: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia (formerly ‘Southern Serbia’, also claimed by Bulgaria and Greece) and was given the status of a republic. After 1991, Yugoslavia crumbled and gave rise to new national entities: the Republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina (a confederation, consisting of the Croat-Muslim Federation and the Republika Srpska, 277

that passed through brutal warfare in 1992–95), Serbia and Montenegro, and the Albanized Kosovo which just recently successfully opted for independence. At the end of the 20th century, the Balkans enriched the vocabulary of international affairs with blood-stained words such as ‘balkanization’ and ‘ethnic cleansing’. Bulgaria was defeated in the First World War and the victorious allies punished it, inter alia, by tearing off 1,545,061 km² of territory (Bulgarite ot Zapadnite 2005: 5) according to the Treaty of Neuilly (1919). Nobody was denying the Bulgarian character of the local population – except for some Serbian chauvinists who hoped for an Eastward extension of the Serbian border, even beyond the Bulgarian capital, Sofia, up to the river Iskar. The territorial loss following Neuilly was perceived as a real cutting-off of flesh from the body of the people. There were two districts, Trun and Tsaribrod, which were separated from Bulgaria and included into the newly established Kingdom of SCS. In addition, the new border was so crudely and recklessly drawn to leave churches, cemeteries, even individual graves on the other side of the border, thus separated from the village. The same happened to fields, gardens and orchards which were separated from their owners as well as to water springs, wells and watering places which were separated from people and cattle (Bulgarite ot Zapadnite 2005: 156, 182, 220, 291, 308, 369, 371f., 410). A ‘good’ example were the villages of Kalotina, Strezimirovtsi and Slavcheto that were torn into two. Virtually and literally, the border went through families, minds, hearts and souls; it separated parents from their offspring and divided brothers, sisters, cousins and the beloved ones of the family. Despite provisions to secure that people regularly meet their relatives, cultivate their patrimonies and have normal access to markets, such activities faced many obstacles, especially from the Serbian side. “The new border condemns the population to hunger. During the bad weather season which may last six months every year this population is not able to supply itself with food from the valley of the Morava river (…) due to the absence of decent roads, on the one hand, and one the other – because mountains are covered with deep snow (…)”, observed a military expert at that time (quoted in Bulgarite ot Zapadnite 2005: 182f., 232). Even the members of the Entente acknowledged that the population in these areas was “bunged like in a bottleneck” between the border, preventing them from accessing their former markets in Bulgaria, and hostile uplands hampering them to reach Serbian marketplaces (Bulgarite ot Zapadnite 2005: 364, 410). Though not as zealous as in Macedonia, assimilation efforts were embroiled. Even the Bible in Bulgarian language was banned (Bulgarite ot Zapadnite 2005: 411). From my father I know that in the school papers names were changed. My father, e.g., was listed as Nikoli, not Nikolov. My grandfather came to be elected Mayor of 278

Tsaribrod as a member of the Serbian Radical party who illegally supported both the Bulgarian Communist Party and the anti-Serbian revolutionary organization Vurtop. In 1932 [sic!] Serbian neighbors warned him of being the next on the list of Belgrade’s secret police, the UDBA, to be murdered; a local Bulgarian priest had already lost his life. So, over night, the whole family, including two young kids, 4 and 9 years old, made a risky escape across the border. Hitler, in 1941, returned both provinces (known as Zapadni pokraynini) to Bulgaria as a price for Sofia joining the Axis. Many people returned to their native places, not only from Bulgaria. The Yalta Agreement changed the map again by returning the provinces back to Yugoslavia; despite the existing ideological differences, the allies were fond of the young Yugoslav guerrilla leader, Josip Broz Tito. The locals, in fact, did not know about this, and soon after the 9 September 1944 communist coup d’etat that came along with the advancing Soviet Army, my grandfather was sent to Sofia to ask about the prospects. He met with Traycho Kostov, then No. 2 in the Communist Party and Deputy PM in a government that congregated communists with some of their earlier enemies. And Kostov himself would soon, in five years time, become a victim of the anti-Yugoslav hysteria, to be shot by his earlier comrades, accused of nationalism, anti-Sovietism, Titoism, and also of surviving ‘fascist’ jail. But this was still to come, such things happen often among the communists. He was still in a strong position, and he by all means shouted at my grandfather that his ‘curiosity’ was not welcome, that this was high politics that he and other ordinary people were not allowed to put their noses into. Not mattering that this impacted upon the future lives and fate of these people (…). We have been told for a long time that on his journey back in a truck my grandfather had fallen asleep, and thus incidentally had fallen down on the road. It has been only very recently that my uncle, himself still a rigid communist, admitted that my grandfather may have been pushed from the inside. My father, then a young volunteer-officer for the front, went by foot most of these 50 km between their town and Sofia to find his father left without papers in a mortuary and to save his life. Then he – my father – went to join the First Bulgarian Army, which, within the Third Ukrainian Front of Marshal Tolbukhin, was to fight Nazi Germany. Less than 22 years old, with only general secondary education and a military sanitary course, my father was given the rank of major (later lieutenant colonel). He became the deputy commander of a divisional military hospital. He saw his duties in comforting the wounded and helping the dying to live their last hours more comfortable; for example, he has been able to prevent the practice of putting newly arrived wounded soldiers in stables where they felt forsaken. Instead, some peasant 279

houses designed to accommodate officers were transferred into hospital wards. His initial acquaintance with the Soviet/Russian ‘brothers’, ‘comrades’, and ‘allies’ made him reassess, even before the communist regime has been completely imposed, its essence as following the quite ugly Soviet pattern. He was, indeed, careful to comment on this, but some occasional words and thoughts revealed his nasty findings about the crude relations between Russians, their drinking habits (all his life he hated sipping even a mouthful of wine or a beer, nothing to say about something stronger), and the intentionally severe conditions when treating wounded Russian soldiers even in the cases when it was possible to ease their torments. He saw and heard how astonished Russians were about the living conditions of most of the people in Bulgaria, Serbia, and Hungary – decent roads, stone or brick-made houses, etc. – when comparing them to the Russian situation. Why did they need communism at all – to destroy this normal way of life. Most of all, however, my father was bewildered by an occurrence at the very end of the war, near Klagenfurt in Austria where Bulgarian troops met their British allies and played soccer with them. Later the Bulgarians witnessed a naughty ceremony: The British handed dozens of POW with a Russian or Soviet background to the Russians, soldiers from the bizarre renegade army of General Vlassov, POW freed from Nazi labor camps and women workers from the Soviet occupied territories. Vlassov’s people, indeed, were doomed and they had no reason to enjoy their transfer to the Soviet Army. But the others? Could it be that a prisoner or an abducted person was not happy to meet his own compatriots? There was no logic in this. After many years, after Stalin died – an event, which made my otherwise pious grandmother cry bitterly and my mother lose her milk to feed me –, N. Khrushchev made his secret speech in which he was able to find an answer to all of this. All these people who had suffered harshly, which was also due to the Great Leader’s miscalculations and the Red Army’s total unpreparedness to meet the aggression, faced another incarceration, tortures, a ban to live in the bigger cities in the European part of the country, a ban to work certain professions, etc. – ruined lives, indeed. After the war both neighboring countries, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, vowed themselves to share the socialist and communist ideology. Both ‘Great Leaders’, Tito and Dimitrov, were calling both people and their relations ‘fraternal’, but the border regime did not soften. For some years things went toward handing down the Bulgarian part of Macedonia to Yugoslavia, despite overall popular resistance, and even a full inclusion of Bulgaria as the seventh republic of Yugoslavia seemed possible. This was about to happen, when Stalin and Tito wrangled heavily in 1948. Then the situation in the border regions deteriorated drastically, and a lessening of the travel regulations 280

between the two countries could not be expected. Teenagers strolling in the direction of the near-by border and on the main street of very small towns might end up with an otherwise bizarre allegation of attempting to violate the border. They even faced deportation to the notorious Goli otok or even assassination. Here in Bulgaria, those born in Yugoslavia, in addition to being deprived of their native places and relatives, were soon labelled ‘Tito’s spies’, and faced removal from office, exile, captivity, if not something more serious. My grandfather, a relatively high-positioned officer, was dismissed a week before I was born, put under surveillance, was arrested and interrogated several times. My granduncle, a former guerrilla commander and for some time the Sofia traffic police chief, was accused of being Tito’s resident; he was sentenced to capital punishment, soon exchanged for a life sentence, and after 1956 released. As a compensation, he has been sent to Afghanistan as a trade representative – with his four classes of elementary education. My grandmother and grandfather died without having seen their home town again. Each year, there has been a sort of ‘fair’ on the border line, closely watched by the secret services of both countries. They hated to go there. Only when me or my brother were boys, they went to buy us a bar of chocolate, absent from the shops in Bulgaria. That is why my father, otherwise a war veteran, feared going back to his home city even after the ghosts of the past, those of the royal regime and Tito or Milosevic were replaced by Zoran Dzindzi who pushed towards democratizing the country. It took him six decades to walk these 50 km (30 miles) between Sofia and his home native city Tsaribrod.

4

A Symbol of the Ferocity of the ‘Most Human Society’

A rigorous borders’ story can not neglect the rise and fall of the Berlin Wall, erected on 13 August 1961 by the communist regime in Eastern Germany (GDR) to prevent the East Germans to go West. A famous photo of the time shows an East German soldier throwing away his machine gun when jumping through the still low barbed wire. Not many were so lucky as he was; many went to their workplaces in the morning not to return home for decades. Within hours and days a real concrete wall was set up, under the incredulous eyes of the Berliners and the entire world, built across streets and open places, 3 m high, and 160 km long. It was continuously built up and enhanced to become a convoluted facility, comprised actually by two concrete walls – one painted white, grim and dull, deserted on the Eastern side, another variegated with jovial paintings and graffiti on the Western side. In between, there were about 200 m of no man’s land, with a stripe of sand cover281

ing landmines, automatically shooting machine guns, and border patrols, wandering around with dogs, odd Trabbi vehicles, or watching from the observation towers similar to those erected for tourists on the Western side. From the towers one could easily see the street life of communist East Berlin, the passers-by looking ahead, or occasionally glancing to the West, and cars forced to turn-around because of the wall that cut through former traffic routes and places like Potsdamer Platz or Bernauer Strasse. There were only a few points that permitted crossing from East to West and vice versa: at Friedrichstraße S- and U-Bahn was a station for pedestrians, at the famous Checkpoint Charlie one for cars, and some others with particular purposes – to haul the urban waste which a utility company from the West was taking care of for Eastern Berlin, to exchange imprisoned spies on the Glienicke Bridge, and so on. Over the weekends, hoards of tourists were coming from the West, including Allied military on leave. No special permission was necessary to cross the Wall in this direction when one returned before midnight. On the reverse route, East Germany was permitting only retired persons to visit their relatives on the other side. The government probably hoped not to see them any more, but these grannies were coming back with handbags full of Western consumer goods. East Berlin was, actually, the ultimate travel end for an ordinary Bulgarian at that time. At the department store Centrum, Bulgarian as well as Russian speech was often heard. Tourists, most often industrial or agricultural workers, winners of the socialist competition, never went to the Pergamon Museum, the Picture Gallery, or the Egyptian Collection; their families expected gifts, clothing, shoes, appliances, or toys of much higher quality than in their countries. And they could even miss the important detail that beyond Unter den Linden and Brandenburger Tor there was a completely different world, one of much more light and splendor, a parallel city, which East Berliners simply used to call ‘Drüben’, i.e., on the other side. On the Western side, many residents used the path alongside the Wall to get from one place to another – often on bicycles – to avoid the busy streets. The Wall, while standing on East German territory, was easy to walk up to, and graffiti – from the trite to the wonderful – was found everywhere, but most abundantly in Kreuzberg, a scruffy neighborhood of artists and immigrants. A wall, though less sophisticated, also covered the internal, GermanGerman border. Along most of it one could see double fences made of steel meshed with sharp edges. But next to cities and built-up areas the fences were giving way to the same concrete wall as used in Berlin, presumably to provide more security. The fence created a weird optical effect – head on, one could see through it relatively easily, but to the side, it appeared nearly

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opaque. The fences and walls were always set to the rear from the actual borderline, marked by guards and signs. The Wall, die Mauer, often used to be topic of the informal talks during our academic meetings. At one of these occasions, Jürgen Kuhlmann told me that while serving in the German Air Force, he had been, as every German, ordered not to go to West Berlin because of concerns of being abducted by East German or Russian military intelligence. 7 Ms. Fleckenstein once admitted a bad dream she often dreamt. Being from a village just next to the German-German border, still on the Western side, she would repeatedly wake up during the night due to the same nightmare – having fallen asleep in the train she missed her station only to wake up on the Eastern side. (…) What she has been only subconsciously deeply afraid of used to be an everyday experience for millions of people from ‘Drüben’, on the other side of the Iron Curtain, that was literally dividing Europe. One can not say that on whichever side of the invented curtain genuine people used to live happily, happy or in full gear. And it was only on the Eastern side that a ruling body regulated lives and often even after-lives of the ordinary people, intruding in their privacy and intimate life. It was hard to believe that one day this nightmare in the middle of Europe would disappear. On 9 November 1989, the awkwardness of Guenter Schabowski, an East German high official who during a press conference failed to find the proper sheet of paper when asked about the vague admission of lifting travel restrictions for the citizens of the GDR, caused a storm. He sneaked hastily that the measure was operable immediately. Literally within minutes the crossing points were assaulted by thousands of people, on foot or by Trabbis, Wartburgs and occasionally by Russian or Czech made cars. These minutes crumbled the most sophisticated and malicious system of border protection in the world. On the next Christmas Day the ringing sound of hammers and chisels filled the air. Hundreds of people were chipping at the wall. Holes had been broken through in places between the slabs of concrete used to form the Wall. The confused Volkspolizei tried, in vain, to put metal

7

Same fears are deeply rooted in the military personnel of both Eastern and Western alliances. My father, who used to write on both international and football issues for the Bulgarian military daily, Bulgarska Armiya, was assigned in the mid-1950s to travel with the Bulgarian football champion, the team of CDNA (now CSKA) sponsored by the MoD, to Stockholm for a European champions’ match with the Swedish counterpart. However, in the last minute the coach decided to take one more spare player, and my father dropped from the group. Then he was offered by his superiors to fly individually, changing planes at Frankfurt am Main airport, one he knew as a U.S. Air Force base. He refused, and his reasons were accepted. After the game someone from the team called my father on the phone at home, and told him the score and some details; then my father wrote the information, and it was published as if wired from Sweden.

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plates over some of the holes, but others were being steadily enlarged by the wall chippers. The crowd was a mélange of Easterners, or Ossis, dressed in cheap stone-washed jeans and shiny jackets, and Westerners. Berlin changed irrevocably within weeks. The streets were more crowded than ever, including East German Trabants mixing in with the BMWs, Opels and Audis. Most tellingly, the border was no longer on the periphery – it was at the very center of things. The once desolated and dreaded area around Potsdamer Platz was now filled with people. Berlin was soon to become the capital of a reunited Germany, despite the apprehensions of major world powers. Checkpoint Charlie was only one site where major construction was soon underway filling the open space that formerly contained customs sheds and containers. The Haus am Checkpoint Charlie, a funky museum dedicated to the history of the Berlin Wall, still remains a major tourist destination. A golden replica of the Statue of Liberty has been erected atop of the remaining guard tower at the checkpoint. But there are claims for this expensive piece of land, too, and it is possible that very soon these last relicts from a sinister past will disappear. Then only historians will keep the memory about the horrendous human creation, the Wall alive.

5

Conclusion

One future day might come where most borders disappear, including the one that separeates Zapadni pokraynini. Will this come about? Europe moves towards such a perspective. And my story above did not aim at all at blaming the Serbs. Instead, I wanted to recall such lurid occurrences from the past in order to make them never happen again. But this may be too premature after September Eleven, the Hamas victory at the Palestinian elections, and the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs. It is now Israel that erects a wall to fence off terrorists; another mouldy internal border, that remains between the two Koreas. Once, at New Year’s in 1972, I crossed the bridge connecting Narva in Estonia and Ivangrad in Russia, and there were no border formalities then. Currently, however, that border is recovered and enforced. Walls and fences thus rather grow than disappear. U.S. homeland security is erecting sophisticated walls alongside the Mexican border to prevent hispanos from further inundating the Promised Land. And even China starts fencing off its communist neighbor North Korea. It is difficult to make borders disappear totally even within the European Union, thus providing some obstacles to the freedom of movement to those left still outside the Schengen agreement. So borders are here to stay – with all the consequences involved.

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About the Authors Dr. Giuseppe Caforio (1935), President of the Research Committee 01: Armed Forces & Conflict Resolution of the International Sociological Association. Dr. Sabine Collmer (1962), Director of Research at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. Christopher Dandeker, PhD (1950), Professor and Co-Director of the King’s Center for Military Health Research of the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, Great Britain. Dr. Morten G. Ender (1960), Professor of Sociology in the Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership at the United States Military Academy in West Point (NY), USA. Dr. Karl Haltiner (1946), Professor emeritus, former Head of Sociology and Military Sociology at the Military Academy at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) in Zurich, Switzerland. Karl Hegner (1944), Senior Researcher at the Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences (SOWI), Strausberg, Germany. Dr. Franz Kernic (1960), Professor of Sociology at the Swedish National Defense College (Försvarshögskolan) in Stockholm, Sweden. Dr. Charles Kirke (1949), Lecturer of Military Anthropology and Human Factors of the Center for Human Systems at Cranfield University, Shrivenham, Swindon, United Kingdom. Dr. Paul Klein (1941), Former Director of Research and Deputy Director of the Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences in Strausberg and Lecturer at the University of the Bundeswehr in Munich, Germany. Dr. Gerhard Kümmel (1964), Senior Researcher at the Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences (SOWI), Strausberg, Germany. Dr. Marjan Maleši (1960), Professor of the Faculty of Social Sciences and Head of the Defense Research Center at the University of Ljubljana, Slovenia.

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Michael D. Matthews, PhD, (1953) Professor of Engineering Psychology and Director of the Engineering Psychology Program in the Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership at the United States Military Academy in West Point (NY), USA. Dr. Carlos Navajas Zubeldia (1960), Professor in the Grupo de Investigación de Historia de Nuestro Tiempo of the Departamento de Ciencias Humanas at the Universidad de La Rioja, Logroño, Spain. Alejandra Navarro (1966), Researcher of the Gino Germani Research Institute and Lecturer of the School of Sociology at the University of Buenos Aires, Argentina. Stephan E. Nikolov, PhD (1952), Senior Research Fellow of the Institute of Sociology at the University of Sofia, Bulgaria. David E. Rohall, PhD (1969), Associate Professor of Sociology at Western Illinois University in Macomb (Ill.), USA. Dr. Vladimir Rukavishnikov (1947), Independent Consultant and formerly Professor of the Faculty of Global Politics and Global Economics at the State-University and Higher School of Economics in Moscow, Russia. Dr. Dimitrios Smokovitis, (1932), Professor emeritus of the Greek Military Academy, the Greek National Defense School and the Technological Educational Institute of Piraeus, Retired General of the Greek Army, Senior Researcher at the Hellenic Institute of Strategic Studies in Athens, Greece. Dr. Henning Sørensen (1944), Assistant Professor at the Institute of Sociological Research (ISF) in Lyngby, Copenhagen, Denmark. Dr. Maren Tomforde (1970), Lecturer in Social and Cultural Anthropology at the German Armed Forces Command and Staff College (Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr) in Hamburg, Germany. Vinko Vegi (1961), Assistant Professor of the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Ljubljana and Research Fellow at the Defense Research Center, Ljubljana, Slowenia.

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