Betrayals and Treason: Violations of Trust and Loyalty

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Betrayal and Treason

CRIME %ries Editor John flagan Norfrhwesten2 U~zivcrsity EDITORIAL,ADVISORY BOARD

John Ilraith~aite~ Rrzbert J. Ilursik, Kathleen Daly, Malcolm M. FeeXey' Jack Katz, Martha A. Myers, Rabrrrl J. Sampson, and Wesfey G, Skogan

Bre~kil.1~ Away from Broketz Windows: Bulfintore Evidence attd the Natiotzwidt~Fight Aguinsf Crime, Grhne, Fear, ~ttzdDecline, Ralpfi B, Taylor Costs uttd Bcvl@fs of Preventing. Crinte, Brar2clorl C. Welsh, David P. Farrington, ax9d Lawrex~ceW Shemar2 Losing Legitimacy: Strcef Ct-;inteatld the Declirze of Social fi.isfilSufio~zs in An?eric~,Gary LaFree

The ContmunifyIxrsticc ideal, Todd Clear and David Karp WhkZkeblowi~tgn f Work: To~lgiTlCh~~ices In Exposir~gFrazrd, Waste, and Abtrse an Clze J L ? ~Terance , L), Miethe C@sunlZiesof Conttfzunity Dkorder: Wor~zen'sCareers in Violerll Crltne, D&c>rah R, Baskh~a ~ lra d B. Sommers Poverty, ElhnicilyI and Violent Crhzc, lames E. Short

Crirrile attd P~iblicPolicg: Puftin8 Tjtcary to Work edited b y Hugh l?. Barlc~w Confro! Balance: Tozo"~rdG Genlrml Thmry c?fDevila?icc,Charles R. Ettle Rape and Society: Xmdings on Ihr Pvublerr~sof Sexual Assault, edited b y Patr-ida Strarles and Ror2ald J. Berger Incqunlity, Crinte, and Socinl Corzfrol,George S. Bridges and Martha A. Myers Forthcoming L a f i ~ Horrzicide: ~o A Fhe-Cify Study, hnniro M a r t h ~ a

and Treason Trust and Loya

- v ' A Member of the 1"erseus Books C;rc?u.lup

C7-i~ze land Society

All rights resellred. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any fc~rmor by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in tzrriting from the publisher, Copyright O 2001 by Weshriew Press, A Member of the Perseus Book Group Westview Press books are availabte at special discounts for bulk purchases in the United States by corporations, institutions, and other organizations. For more information, please contact the Special Markets Department at the Perseus Book Croup, 1 4 Cambridge Center, Cambridge MA 02142 or call (617) 252-5298. Published in 2001 in the United States of America by Westview Press, 5500 Central Avenue, Boulder, Colorado 80301-2877, and in the United Kingdom by Westrriew Press, 12 Hid's Copse b a d , Curnnor Hill, Oxford OX2 9JJ Find us on the World Wide Web at Library of Congress Gatalcjging-in-Publicatic>nData Ben.-Yehuda,Nachman. Betrayal and treaso)~:violat.ic)nsof trust and Icjyaltyl Nachman Ben-Yehuda. p,cm. - (Crime and society) Indudes bibliographical reference and index, ISBN 0-8133-9VB6 1. B&rayal. 2. Treasc~n. I. Title. 11. Crime & sc~cietli;

00-043985 GIP The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials 239.4&--19M.

To Cnvoline and Jean Wittrnbevy and Beatrice and Abralzanz Hez'lbruun whose friendship I have learned to cherislz dear4

"I Did Not Betmy" ---Note written by Uri Zlfan, an Israeli paratrooper who was captured by the Syrians in 1955, while on an intelligence missit)n, and "r&ured. He hid a few notes with the abavc? statement on his body prior to committing suicide in the Syrian prison.



I Introduction: Violating Tmst and Loyalty

2 Violathg Trust m d Loyalty:A Typolow 3 Violathg Trust and Loyalty: Categories and Cases

PART TWO 4 Treason

5 Violating Tmst and Loyalty h r i n g Wosld War II: Part 1 6 Violathg Trust m d Loyalty Durhg World War II: Part 2

7 Radio 7"raitors: Lord. Haw-Haw and Tokyo Rose 8 Intellectual Betrayal: Ezra Pound and &ut Hamsun 9 Edward W11: A Traitor Monarch?

18 The Case of Malkali Tenepal-Malinl=he 1I Treason in Judaism and Israel


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A typology of betrayal

Photos Benedict Amold Statue of Na.thm Hale @isling intlniform. P4tah with his enlarged government Vlasov i~~spects troops Jsyce tlceompmied by two guards Pound gives the fascist salute; The Wlindsars meet Hitler Mantezuma I1 meets H e r n h G'ortks Uri 111m

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ing of this project is clear in my mind. It was during a miversity facz~ltystrike in 1994 when one faculty member last his nerve and decided to break the strike shortly beiore it mded anyway. His own statement that the .rest of the faculty may view him as a "@isli~'"rompted me to start readings on this topic (the incident is recorded in futler detai,l in Chapter 3). n e r e we= a few other incentives. Preceding this incident was my invdvement in politics and deviance (1989) and my prrrject m poliLical assassinations by Jews (1.993) where so many of the cases of: asM a t heled sassixzatim we= in the context of accusations of '"betrayal:' my quest even more was the 1995 assassination of Israeli premier Uitzhak Rabin (discussed in Chapter 11),again in the context of his being accused by so many peoyle from the fsraeri right and. rcl.igi.ous right as being a ""traitor." The instigation against Kabin and his government in the context of betrayal was ominous. My pre~riousinterests in constructionism, power, and politics made studying betrayill a natural extension of my work. As is usualiy the cme, the road from plmging into the prc?ject to its elnd was a long one. It is time to express my gratitude to all those who gave a helping hand along the way. My first patitrude is to Etti, Tzach, and Gu): whose love, devotion, and dedication enabled me to transform, this project from an idea into a book. The Israeli-Canada exchange program enabled my research in the tibrary of the Llniversity of Toronto on Remdict Arnold (Israeli libraries had nofhi~zgon this man). The Z,ondon School of Economics, Department of Sociolrzgy, enabled me to spend two wonderful summrs (1996--1997) in London collect* data about various cases of betrayal and treason. I ant pmticdarly grateful to Eileen Barker; Paul Rock, and Stanley Cohen, whose help and support were crucial. 1especially appxleciate P a d Rock's many praeticaf and essmtial cclmments on an earlier draft. In London, I enjoyed the genemns, conrteous, and very effective assistmce of Ibrarians and staff from the Wiener Library, the British Library, and particularly the Imperial War Museum. As f was spending large m o m t s of time in both libraries, I lenrncd to appreciate th different entrmces to both. At that t h e , entry to the British Library was through the British Museurn. That entry meant passing near the Rosetta Stone. Entry to the Imperial W;;rr MUS~LIIZI memt passhg by two huge sixteen-inch naval guns, Although :I could never decide which



was mow impresshe (a syn-tbolic dilemxna for a person who faced daily dilemmas of deciding what was and what was not treason), I evezztually discovered that I preferred the Rosetta Stone after all. Einat Usant, Vered Vinitzky-Seroussi, Iris Wolf, Dalit Rudner, Avi Shoshana, and Michd h r o n helped at various stages of this l e ~ ~ g t h y project as research assistants. 1am very grateful to them alf for their dcdicated and indispensable help. Barbrara Wehstein was extremely helpful in puttkg me in touch with Ross Hassig. Without his penetrating critical work my understandjng of the Mdinche case would have been less than &sired. I am very grateful to both. Uzi Amit-Kohn, Gershon Ben-Sf-rachar$Stanly Cohen, Martin Gladman, m r i a n n a Bar, A d m Seligman, and John Simpson volunteered m n y insighthl commnts and assistancel which helped to crystallize the appmach presented in this volume. Barry Schwartz, John Simpsm, and Erich Coo& kindly provided usefui and pointed comments as to how to proceed with this project at some crucial: moments in the sttmnrter of 1.997.1am also grateful to Jennifer B. Swearingen, whose editorial sugge"tlc,ns and comments were very helpM in preparhg the mafiuscript for publication. Last, but certainly not least, it is a genuine pleasure to achowlebge my deepest gratitude to an outstantfing crimhok,gist, John Hagan, without whose proiessional support and gujdance this book hvould not have been possible. 1am also very grateful to Ron Gillis, Erich Goode, Simm Singer, and-agah-John Hagan, whose ccmstructive =view prwided productive contments and suggestions. m e i r i,ndispensable assistance most certainly made this book significantly better. It is indeed an honor and a pleasure to have had the privilege of benefiting from the insights of such outstanding colleagues.

Part One

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Introduction: ating Trust and Loya h this book we shall acquaint ourselves with a dazzling spectrum of behaviors that qualify for the dubjous title of '%betrayal." We shall try to develop an understanding of the essence of this fascinating f o m of behaviar and exannine whether behind its m n p varied manifestations the= is a comrmm anafpticd and. empiricd core, Are the= such acts that, when committed, increme significantly t k pmhability of being brmded as "betrayaX"? As we shadX see, betrayal does indeed present a ul-riversal structure. The actual behaviors that fall into the "betrayal" category form a fascinatkg spectrum.,Outlirrhg this spectruln recyuires same vivid and powerful illustrations, Hence, E have tried to invoke as many illustrations as posshle. This is a good place to start. I have deliberately chosen somewhat problelnatic cases to whet the appetite for what follows, The Yehuda Gil Affair. &rkg December 1997 and 'January 1998, the Israeli public was amazed to learn that a Massad (Israeli foreig~~ secret htelligmce service) operathe called Yehuda Gil, who was in charge of collecting and processing information about Syria, was suspected of fahricrating sowces and falsifying his reports. The general implicati.on was that he made Syria appear much more threatening, with belligerent intentions, than it actuaily was. I-lis =ports made it appear as if Syrim President Hafez Ai-Assad was planning anolfner war against Israel. Gil, was probably effective in hhelphg to crcate a false impression in the summer oi 1996 by telling Mossad that Syria was p l a m h g a surprise, but limited, ground atrt-ack in the Golan Heights, which supposediy aimed at seizing some territory Part of his dflception was based on =ports of t h ~ a t m i n g movements by Syrian army units, This falsi.fied information might kave caused great h a m if Israel had acted on it. fJuclkiiythat did not happen, as other checks and bdances were operating.1

:In March 1999, a Tel Aviv district court convicted Gil m charges of providing false infomaticm, iz~tendingto harm the state's security and stealing tens of thousands of doilars from Mossad. Me W= given a five-year prison sentence. The Bus No. 300 At"fair, On April 12,11984, four Palestinjans boarded 1srael's Egged bus no, 300 in %l Aviv. The bus was heading to Ashkelon, a

southern Israeli town on the Mediterrmean coast. Along the way, the Palestinians hijacked it. Later, Israeli soldiers stormed the bus and released the passengers. Two of the Palestinians were killed durislg the action, Two others were taken prisoner, inf;errogatedby SHABAC (Israel's domestic secret security service), m d later killed. :In what was probably the most spectacular (and nasty) cover-up operaticm in the history of the lsraeli secret services, SHABAC initially denied that its people were ordered to, and did indeed, kill the two Palestjnians. Civil servmts in SHABAC lied and manipulated other civil servants (incfuding, among other things, an attempt to falsely implicate Brigadier General Yilzhak Mordechai, later Isracl's minister of deftinse). Evel~tually, this cover-up was exposed (by some SF-IABAC whistle-blowers).Z In both cases, the same violation of values and norms occurred. Although Gif's mtives were coolplex (he held a personal grudge for not being promoted, a political inclination to the right, m d a problematic personality), it can be easity argued that Gil violated in the most fundanental way both the trust invested inhim bp Mossad and his loyalty to be truthful to the organization of which he was a member fur many years. h the case of bus no. 300, there c m hardly be a doubt that the chiefs of SHAESAC and those who participated in the cover-up betrayed the trust and lyalty invested in their positions in the most Fundamental way

The Puzzle Social life, the very essence of sociological inquiries, is a complicated issue. 011the one hand, cultures and societies are ""out there," as if they constitute separate entities that we can talk about, orient ourselves toward, and study. 01the other hand, these entities are "fiere" because we construct t-hem to "'be" there. That is, without us and o w language, they have no existence. For a sociologist this problem is magnified because, clearly the terms we have devised to describe and anaiyze c d t u ~ and s societies m abstractions..m e y form hlrhal C. Wright Mills cai,l,ed "the sociological imaginationH-a sort of consciousness based m a particular pertleption that is shaped by the abstractions we use, not unlike one of those stories in\Polving Bar011 R/lunchhausen, or perhaps Alice's Wonder-

land. People" social life may appear quite chaotic, but with a good coner workir.~gsand order can be made clear. ceptual agparaks, its Taking a long and criticat look at cultures easily yields one basic obscrvation. Most people in any one particular culture would agree about certain aspects of their life, such as facts, which they take for granted. Furthermore, W can get moro =fined agrements regarding these facts if we consult the relevant experts. Wowever, when we demand to know the meaning of these facts-the way they are interpreted m d contextualized-tkn we very quickly etncounter a problem r&rred to as the social construction of reality. That is, different people and experts, as well as their rr-?fclrt?ncegroups, crt?ate a dazlirng, fantastically complicated, and kaleidoscope of varykg ddinitims (and constructions) of reality. If we are not careful, we can easily get lost in a myriad of syntbolic moral ulliverses of meaning with Wonderlmdfs Cheshire catfs partially materialized smiling mouth chuckling at us from different corllers. :I shall examine very closely one partiedar aspect of social life-the puzzle inwolving the violatim of trust and loyalty which is rderred to as "betrayal." 1 sha:tl explore the nature oE trust and loyalty, the differenl. empirical manifestations of their violaths, and their memings. A major hcus of this i n p i r y is on one particular form of violation of trust m d loyalty-tmsm. Thjs form of social behaviar provides us with some interestirtg and impmtmt insights about the ways in which we construct realities m d create meaning. Some oli the more interesting and hstructive aspects of cttlbrcs are to be found in contrasts. Among the more enchanting contrasts are those between truth and that Mthich is not twth, between loyalty and its betrayal, between goad and evil, between right and wrong, and between trust and lack of it, Studyhg these contrasts brings one, first, to the issue of social second, to istiues of power. Momover, by hand moral boundaries-d, cushg on the Hegelirnn concept of mtit;hesis, this book can be thought of as raising the age-oZd Hobbesian question, How is social order passfile? This general plot is occasitmed by directhg attention to how why, where, and when challenges to the status qzto emerge and function as cataiysts for processes of social change or stability. Concepts of deviance and conformity are endemic to such an inquiry, as well as tl-te ccmcept of truth. Trust, Loyalty, and Their Violations

In exploring the nature of t k s e concepts, we shall have an interesting opportunity to examine culturally created contrasts. We shall look at conformity, loyalty, and trust, as well as deviance. When we focus on treason, the relevance of these topirs to processes of sociat change and slability, to mord boundaries and the way they are formed and.changed, and to the

power bchind these processes will becom cleamr. With loyalty#the important ~ e s t i o is n that of "loyalty to who" or ""t what." L~cryaltyis something WC negotiate. Rust is not, Trust, loyalty, and their violation touch some very profound and powerful feehgs we all have about the moral n a t w of our cdtures, what is right anci what not, and how violators should be treated. That is, the nature of the societal reaction to deviants becomes an issue, too, Moreover, the results of examisling violations of tmst and loyalty can be surprihing and are. not atways moralty pleasant. The materialization of a douhlc violation is the malytical k a r t of betrayal. It afso involves sipificant, but different levels of, threat potential. Violations of loyalty and tmst can appear in such varied and different contexts as religion, politics, science, the military, industry commerce, and personal relations. These violations often involve using deceptive techniques such as lying. Thus, discussing violations of twst usually involves examining trutln and its subversion. Hence, in some profound sense, discussions about trust and its violations assume that there are some parameters of reality that we all accept as true, as genuine, as authentic. Constructions of ~ a l i t yarc woven on thit; shared and accepted f omdational framework. Trust involves a particular type of ~lationship,where the participants perceive that a genuine, authei~tic,and truthful interaction exisb. Violating that trust and. subverting that truth typically in\rolves lying, cheating, conceatment, and deception. Loyalty, first and foremost, involves fidelity, Kolating these mord codes invokes strorlg emotional responses because feelings of trust and. loyalty are typicalfy constructed as deep and profound. To achieve a better understancfing of these concepts, I shdl d y on a contextual constsuctionist interpretation (Ben-Yehuda 1995:20-21)' and then continue with looking at the characteristics of trust and loyalty

Carztextzlal Canstvuctz'onz'sn~ and Ctlf ture h recent years a theoretical disthctior~(whose antecedents can be traced to Schutz, Mead, fames, and others) has emerged behnieen the so-called objective and cmstwctionist views. The objective view is a varimt of trhe positivist approach, which is closely related to fu~~ctionalisrn, It assumes that deviance (or more gcrnerally, social issues m d problems) constitutes an ol5jective and measufable reality and, in particuiar, that it consists of objective conditions and harm. 011the other hand, there is the cmstructionist approach (also referred. to as subjective or relativist). This approach maintai.ns that deviance and social issues a d problems do m t present the characteristics of a so-called objective rca:lity and that they are the result of collecthe social defhitions of what some organized members

of a culture view as a problematic, harmful, or dangerous condition(s). That is, the nabre of what is, a d what is not, defhed as reality is not a result of some ob~edivecondition but rather is a social construction. As Goode puts it, ""t the subjectivist, a given condition need not even exist in the objective sense to hc? defined as a social problem" (1989:328). Both Best (1989,1995) and Goode (1989,1997:5841)point out that there are two variants of the constructionist perspective. First, there is strict constmctictnism (for example, see Best 19931, and second, there is contextual co~~structio~~ism, As Gaode (1989:328-329) notes, the first varimt argues that the expert or scientific evatuation of, for example, deviance, social problems, or other issues represents simply one "clai~n-making" activity out of many such activities, This view argtres that scientific claims are socially cmstmcted, as are other claims, and can be studied as such. This view negates the existence of an objective dirnensiftn of reality and argues that there are different versions of rcalit).; each one just as valid as another, inchding this statement itself. Ohviausly, postmodernism" hfluence can be easily detected here. ~ as devimce 'The second Frarimt argues that although S L E C phenomena and social problems are the results of '"him-making"" activi.ties, the socalled ob~ectivedimension can be assessed m d evaluated by relevant experts on the basis of scien.t.ificevi,dence. This view xccpts that jn a given time and place, it is possible to use empirical facts to reach a consensus (wen a temporary one) about the nature of reality. This perspective hnplies that although there may indeed be djfferf-?m.t.versions of reality, they should not be accepted as equal. Contextual constructionism attempts to f h ~ dout and slrbstantiate MIhich version is more empirically valid. Works that utjlize this Cheoretjcal perspective typicalXy contrast the "objective" with the "constructedf' versions of reality and utjlize empirical evidence as a basis for evaluating different ccmstructions. It is important to note that co~~textuaf constructiosris~~ does not claim to know the absolute "tmth"l or to be absolutely "objective." Rather, it bypasses the epistemological problematics irrvolved in deciding m "objectivity" by establishing a consensus clf relevant experts. The goal of cmtextual cmstmctionists is to collect empirical evidence and make informed and ir^ltt.fligentchoices based on the ~Xetiantand important facts for specified narratives for versions). Although this agreed-upon, fact-based consensus is temporary and relative, it prwides a powerful baselitne with which we can evaluate a variety of clairn-making activities. Specific cases of treason and betmyal exist with,in speeific moral and culitural contexts. One observation that must be made immediately is that this is typically not the case in betrayai between individuafs. 'l'he ccrntcxt of such c s e s is such that hmost (if lnot all) of them, interpreting wfio violated whose trust and loyalty is not too difficult to establish. n e context

(and there for^ the interpretation) of betrayal on the collective leveI is much less clear. However, although the specific cclntext and interpretatim of diffemt cases may sometimes be unclear, the social structure of the cases is not. The very structure of betsayal means that it always involves essmtial violaticms of both tmst and loyalty. "Thus, t-he conceptualization that I utilize takes the factual level of each case and examines the way in which these facts arc socially cmstmcted and interpreted vis-&-vis violations of trust and loyalt)i, This is a genuine exercise ill examhing the facts as opposed to the social construction c?f those facts-that is, a cmtextual cmstmctimist approach.

Essence and Constructionism This book attempts to combhe two perspectives. Ch-t the one hand, E assume that the label "betrayaif%wit) be ulliversalf y invoked \zrhenever both trust a d loyalty are violated. This is an essential statement. It implies that these violations can be objec-tively described md measured. On the other hand, the content and meaning of these violatims are always (and necessarily) contextual: and, thus, highly susceptible to social constmcticms. Et is this level that yields the statcment that "betrayal lies in the eyes of the beholder,'" pparaphrase on Becker's (1963) classical work on deviance. To some extent, betrayal does Ijc in the observer's eyes, but not completely The construction of betrayal is lilnited by a universal structure of vioiations. It is pssi&le that such stmctrares underlie and tjn^litthe generalizability of Becker" argument about other forms of deviance as well. Contextual constructionism enables us to bridge these t w perspectives: essential and construdionist. However, there will always be tension between these two levels of analysis,

Culture and Betrayal Wlat arc. the basic characteristics of cdture that make betrayal possible? C h the personal level, it =quires t?l. Icast: two characteristics: the ability to deceive or fie or mmiQulate and the speclific mothation to d.o so. The two criteria can be easily met. We are quite capable of both lying and developing devious motivations. Still, we must remetnber that the overwfielmb~g majority of peopie are not involived. constantly in behavior la:beled. by e as "treacherous.'Wowever, m e these tvvo critetheir ~ s p e d i v cultures ria arc met, we are stilf left with the questim of the "cdturd Ml)nyPuwhich goes beyond specifie personal mothation. The answer for that, f believe, can be found in a major cultural facet: socially constructed moral bomdaries. 'This cultural aspect is composed of both power and mora:lity

Culturc can be conceptualized as being composed of a nunnber of symbolic moral universes,4 each of which competes with the others for symbolic resources (support, recog~~ition, influence) as well as eco~~ounic resources. In fact, this structure is intrinsic to a pluralstic society The problem is that morality in such a society becomes a cclmplicated and negotiated issue. Moreover, the problem becomes immensely more complex once we allow into this conceptualization the existence of different, sometimes antagmistic, societies. Viewing cdtufaf structure from this perspective will ellable us to better undersbnd betrayai at both the collective and the personal level. 117 the past decade the topic of tmst has captured the attention of yuite a few schftlas. S,ince trust is h a s d on both personal acquaintance and the convergence of interests, it is very 1ikeXy that trust is influenced by social structures a d societal institutions. The conditions under which societal trust i,ncrc.ases or decreases, as well the type and distribution of trust in different societies, have increasingly occupied the attention of vasious schslars,s Devimce, as so many have pointed out, is void of meaning without considering what is not deviant-that is, conformity and conventional morality, The conformist conventional morality that lies at the base of this of trust and loyalty. Thus, before we dehe into examining study co~~si.sts different types and cases of violations of trust and loyalty, we need first to exarnine haw trust and loyalty are cmceptualized. Betrayal is dangerous. W e n trust m d loyalty are violated, the threat potential for interpersonal relations or for state integrity (especially during periods of conRict) is pmfound.

Characterizations of Trust and Loyalty

Trust Defining trust is not an easy undertaking, and the literature presents quite a k w approaches. In some cases, the definition of the term blends with the consequences of the prcsence (or lack) of trust. Luhmann (1988)m d Johnson-Ceorge and Swap (1982) define tmst as a behavior, or attitude, that penn,jts ri,sk-taking behavior. Shilarly, G m betta (1988) m d Kee and. Knox (1.970) sugg@stthat trust is inversely related to the willingness to become vuherable to the actions of another person or gr02113. This appr~achis focllsed on expectationsl and G m betta, for example, does not even distinguish between tmst and cooperation (although cooperation can be easily conceptualized as ~ s u l t i n g from (1988) m d Cook and Wall. (191f3Q)center their defhitian

around the concept of confidence; Dasgupta (3988) and Good (1988) focus on prltdictabiliv; and Mver, Davis, and Schcrorman p995) concentrate on the characteristics of the trustor and trustee. C)liver (1992) chose to focus on the mchanisms of trust within the context of organj.zatims, preferring to examine how trust ackally works. Tl~every process through which trust is socially constructed m d maintahed is an interesting topic. (1988) m d Kramer, Brewer, and Hama (1996) chart same of the possibilities (for example, a proces that follows Baysian prhciples). Coleman's influential work (1990) discllsses the issue of trust as a particular fnrm of relations and focuses on syskms of trust rmging from the micro-level between individual trustor and trustee to fie macro-level of society Coleman states that trust involves expressions of codidence within a specified set of relations. Establishing this confidence, partieularly in close and intimate relations, =quires time, and there are sets of behaviors and verbal, expressions that can st.rengthen or weaken this trust. Thus, ""the trust= may engage in actions explicitly designed to lead the potential tmstor to place trustf"(p. 96). At the most basic level, Coleman-like others-poi.nts out. that trust involves behavhr trhat takes into cmsidcration the element of risk, &e interesting issue is what happens when the tmstee breaks the trust. Trust, says Coleman, permeates society. The much earlier works of Durkheim. (1.933) and Simmel (1950) implied that transactions involving trust range from personat, intimate relaticlns to monetary loans, trade, politics, science, the arts, wdicine, law, and so forth. Trustless societies will find that existence is very prclblematic. 5e1ipmFuecentwork (3997) distinguishes between trust and cmfidence. Confidence refers to a situation where roles are clear and one knows what to expect; that is, confidence is based on clear expectations. Trust is what one needs when m e does not have confidence. Seligman makes Ihe insightful poi.nt Eh& the gelneral erosim of trust i,n cantemporary cultures creates some very serious prOblems in the htcgration of those cultms. Sefigman feels fiat fie decline of the integrative p w e r of trust is due to the new perceptio~nof individuals, in which the individraal is reduced to a sum total of group identities and an abstract matrix of ntles. This emsion of trust accompanies the deciine of personal integrity, res~)onsibility,and smse of belonghg. According to Seligman, the modern crisis in identity formation and mairtt-enance trmslates into a crisis in tmst. The problem is not one of extremes, hut of d e g ~ e s "The . general question of wbat is the optirnum level of norms, laws, and sanctions to maintain trustworthiness on the part of tmstees is a c o q I e x one" "(Colem m 1990:134). Aware of the problems involved in definilng trust, Friedrichs (3996:11-12) is right in pointilrg out that although trust is a central. cul-

tural notion, the= is no s h g k meaning for the term. "It has referred both to property of indiwiduals and ~rganizationsand to expectations defh~ing various types of relationshipsf"(p, 11). There can hardly be a doubt that tmst involves relationships based on confidence, prtrdictability and the willingness to take risks (that is, the de'The trust relationship is based, in the 1;iberate suspension of suspicio~~). most fundamental way, on deliberately avoiding lies, deception, and manipulation. Eklnan f1992), whose wnrk focuses on lies and deceptions, does not fail to notice that deception can easily ruin trust: No import-ant relationship survives if trust is totally lost. If you discover your friend has betrayed you, l i d to you repeatedly for his own advantage, that friendship cannot continue. Neither can a marriage be mare than a shambles if one spouse learns that the other, not once but many times, has again and again been a deceiver, I: doubt any form of government can long survive except by using force to oppress its awn people, if the people believe its leaders always lie. f1992:3;?4)

Tlze Importance of Trtlst What is so cdturally important about trust, and why? Seligman (1997) (and earlier, Misztal 1994)has pointed out that trust contributes to the cohesiveness and integration of cultures. 9ligman's work tends to mark a distinctive sociologicaf (as opgosed to psychological) meming of trust. Giddens's sociological approach (4991) sutjgests that in modern societies trust is increashgly shifted from the individual level of friendsfiip to abstract expert systems in the public domain. Thus, the creation and. processing of trust is removed to a detached and anonymous culbral level. Let me continue this by suggesting that-two lines of reasoning can be fob Iowed here, ?"he first is functional. As pcsited by exchange theory, trust enables exchange; without it no social exchange is possible. Trust invokes the concepts of re1iabili.Q faithfulness, and responsibility. Trust is m e of the elements that Durkheim (3933) refen; to in his discussion of the '"recontractual" elelnexrts that are absolutely required for social cohesion and solidarity to exist, As such, trust has acquimd a quality of sacredness. Undoubtedly, trust is an essential integrative i n g ~ d i mof t the cuttlaral "collective conscience,'"hat is, of the central and core vdue system, and it lies at the foundation of consensual social constructions of symbcric moral universes. The argument here can be easily made more complex if we rementber that we expect, indeed even hope, that. s m e cultural roles may involve deliberate violations of trust in the form of

deceivhg and I;ing. For example, diplomats arc expected to lie, and it is difficult to imagine fie survival of pofiticians without their inwolwement in some form of conceaX.mentor manipulatim of the truth. Nevertheless, lower levels of social and personal trust may mean that social disintegraticm is occurring and that holding the ctrtturc. together may require using more force and formal rules"Because trust is considered to be sacred, the violation of trust is interpreted and rcacted to emotionally, This cmceptualization, which is focused on examining cdtures from their moral point of view exemplifies the major issue facing us. In a morally monochromatic society, one that is dmjnated by m e symbolic morai universe, the demarcaticm of moral boundaries is nonproblematic, and moral meanings are simple m d easy to grasp. However, whe11 societies are composed of diverse and competing symbolic moral universes, the meaning of morat codes can become very problematic. As I have shown elseurherc (1985), such societies arc prone, by the very nature of their moral structure, to experience repeated moral crusades aimed at redefinhg their moral boundaries. Living in a multimoraiit,y society is far from simple, and people who search far the elusive comfort that lies in certairrty (deceptive and shallow as it may be) have a tendency to turn uncertah~tyinto certainty.6 T'Iws, alihough the m e a n i ~ ~ofg trust is rather straightfor\vard im a monochromatically m r a l society, it is far from that in a society characterized by a multiplicity of symbcrlic m r a l universes. The meaning of m y forms of betrayal in such societies is contested. 'The majn wason is thatthe base value of trust becomes unclear. Such questions as trust in who? in whathare crucial issues in these multicultural societies. Moreover, if we choose to leave one sodety and look at its moral structure from the outside, making comparisons between different societies, the meanhg of many forms of betrayai (for exan-tple, treason, whistle-blowirrg, ccrllaboraticln) becoms ixnnenscly complex. Indeed, betrayal will aliways involve violation of trust, But the syec$c nzeant~tgof that violation is context dependent. Hence, altt-tough the cmstruction of the specific culturai catew r y of violatit~gtrust, in iEs various forms, is universal, the specific meaning of that category is not. For example. Friedrichs (like a few others) feels that the central characteristic of white-collar crirninality is the violation of trust (1996:11). and he titled his book i r r z ~ s t n lCrirrrinals. In this respect, one may indeed find some comrnon anatyticaf parallels betvveen L\lhite-collar crimiz~alsand traitors. Moreover, Friedrichs pohts out that when levels of societal distrust increase, people tend to become distrustful and c>inical(1936:12). The second line of ~ a s m i n g is more ethnome&odolsgical. W ~ a are t the mderlying assulnptions of the social rel&ionship called trust, whose violation causes such a harsh reaction? Trust assumes such social relation-

ships as loyal"Ey,7fiendship, faith, and belief. It also assums that there is an implicit c~~lality of such social refatimship as primary relationship and, to some degree, perhaps eve11 intimacy- These qualities constitute both necessary and sufficient condit-ionsfor the social construction of reality its&. Without these, no such constructions wodd be possible because it would not be feasibte to maintain consistency pers;istence, and prtldictian of social relationships. Faithfuhess, as implied. by trust and loyalty, is an essential m d vital ingredient of social life, Without it, "society-could sirnply not exist . . . for any length oE time"' (Simmelfin Wolff f,950:379).Violation of trust shatters what actors view as the "natural order of things" because it destroyt; the perception of reality constructions. Moreover, violation of trust tends to involve deception m d lying, wfiich, according to Simme2, are among the most destructive forces in social interactions (Wolff 1950:312-3 16). However, it needs to be stated th& s m e lying may be absolutely necessary for a successfull, ongoing social, relationship, Social interaction cannot survive without some measure of deception. If we wew honest all t-he time, about everylhing and evcryolle, social inkractian-as we h o w it--woujd probably not be possible because societies and cultures would disintegrate into chaos, k r y k w people, if any, can-r wmt t the complete, unaduiterded truth. Lying and deception, therefore, are continuous variables. Deception can range from sinnplp putting on makeup and other cosmetics to deceptive fnfidetity Some lies a d deceptions are socially accepted; others are not. h d , t?$ai.n, we are faced here with a contextual variable. h a way, some lies may be used to affjrmtnlst. ?"hey may be used to show how much we cart. about our interacting partners. We may hide from them unpleasant truths and construct a more comfortable reality This view supports the constructionist apymach taken here, and it does not contradict the statement about the common conceptual core. However, examining deception cont-exwally as a continuous variable implies that the contilluum has ends and extremes, S h mel's observation that clteception has a high potentid to rufn c u l t w s must be interprekd in this context. Violation of trust disrupts the perception, or illusion, of consensual reality constmctjons. However, the tfijng that is denied a d s h a t t e ~ din treason, for example, is not only a social relationship but another fundamental facet of the human existence: the social self, In this sense, L&mann's (1995:127-329) observation that the opposite of trust is not distrust but a sellse of dread or even anomie and a state of anxiey producing normlessness fits well. Hence, t-he vhlation of tmst tends to e k i t a strclng emotional maction in the form of severely hurt feelings. For exanngle, the invocdion of a c h a s e of treason necessitates showing an ifztelztkn to systematirally be-

tray, deceive, and lie to the victirnis. Thus, traitors are typicalv grrnished severely becmse treason always elicits the motivation for revenge or, its Western equivalent, justice.

Loyalty The element that accompanies trust h our analysis is loyalty. This element introduces a tone of mcertahty into violations of trust. Although it is difficult: to circumvent the issue of trust loyalty rewirt.s a directional definition-IyaIty to w h m , or to what, It is not too difficult to see that we can tmst and not be loyal (for example, having a bank account). It is much m r e difficult to be loyal m d distrustful. However, some people defined. as traitors have maintained. that they were loyal to a specific ent, such as loyal Gercountry but mistrusted its specific form of gove mans who distrusted Hitler. Let us examine two illustrative cases.

The Case of Mordechai Va'anunu. Israel's policy regarding its nuclear weaponvmgrm has been crystallized in &e statemat, "Israel shail not be the first one to use nu&= weay-ons." This policy on nuckar w a p m s has been characterized as being ""deliberately opayuer"see Avner Cohm 1998). Va'munu djsagreed and &ou(i;ht &at 1111 dixlnmre was a better poficy Born in 1954 to a Jewir;h orthodox fadly, Va"anunu studied at BenGurion ulliversity in the Israeli Negev. Needing some s o m e of income, he began to work inJmuary 1,977 as a techicim in the Israeli nudcar reactor near Dimma. Vakanuslu was trajxzed in 1976 fur the job and siwed an agreement in which he agreed to keep bis knowledge secret and confidential. After about eight years, he kfir his job (accordirrg to some sources he was laid off). Tn the early 1980s, Vakanunu begm to be polit.icalfy active and demonstrated affinities with the Israeli left. Moreover, he was also disillusioned with the Jewish faith. In January f 984 he left Israel for Australia, where he converted to Christianity. From there he continued his voyage to Londall where he told the Sunday Times (August 1986) that Israel had an arselnal n( ahovlC 200 nllclenr weapons (way above what most experts thought the countv actually had). He was rewaded quite nicely by the newspaper (scrme sourtles state that he was paid US$1C)O,C)Of)).In September 1984, just a few days before the S u t ~ d a y7inzcs published the story, agents of the Israeli s e c ~service t (Mossad)used a ""honey trap" (an agent called ""Cindy") to lure V a h u n u into leaving Londm and traveling to Rome. There he was E d ~ ~ a p p eby d agelzts of the Mossad, brought to Israel, charged with espionage and treason, and in 1988 sentmced to seventeen years in prism.8 For reasons that are not entimly clear, he was kept in solitary coninernew for about twelve years ( s o m say for secur2y reasons, others maintain that this was a measure of revenge aimed to

drive him crazy). He was let out of solitary confinement in 1998. In a selfserving interview that he gave to the Szrnday Tinzls on April 39, 1998, he stated Ihat he would not hesitate to do what he did becarnse he had acted under a deep conviction and belief ill the appropriatmess of his acticms, acting ccnarageously alone against the entire Israeli security establishment. Va'anunu was qwick to point out trhat his revelations were made out of a genuille concern for Israeli sorriety, despite the fact that Israel has come to view him as guhlic enemy number one." 'There is, of course, nothing unique about Va'rtnunu's saccount. Many whistle-blowers, or spies, have given similar accounts exgresshg loyalty to their countr)i (or organization) but distrust toward specific governmmts (or executives), polides, or rcgimes.

The Case of Machum Martbar, A somewhat similar case came to its culmhation on. July 16, 1998, when three Israeli judges cmvicted fiAy-twoyear-dd. Nachum Manbar of betraying Israel by supplyhg Iran (dmQ 1992-1994) with materials required to manufacture agents for chemical warfare for a hefty profit. Specificalfy, Nanbar was fad g d t y of aiding, and attempting to aid, the enemy (Iran) in its conflict with Israel and giving the e n e y hfurmation intended to damage Israel? ndional security. Manbar, an ex-KibbMznjk alld ex-paratrooper in tbc lsraelj army, was sentenced to sixteen years in prison. His act of treason was stated as ""worse &an that of Vakal-runu,'"lMdIsrael's prilne minister-Bhyamir Netanyahu-stated trhat Marlbar "'sold his s o d to the devil."^^ Manbar, of course, denied the chaqes and claimed that the state of Israel allowed other Israelis to trade with Irm and that, therefore, what he did was not so deviant, The prosecution responded by stating, first, that the st..ate authorized many activities that independent indivjduals were not allowed to do and second, that Manbar was never allowed to sell chemicals to Iran that cotdd be used in chemical warfare. Ilvfmbi-tr" accounts were rejeded by the court,

Within a mftitary cmtext, the main association of tmst is with liepend&ilit.y reljabilit.~,but most of all of with loyalty and hcnce wit-h honor, In a boundary defining paper, Captain Omerod (W.S. Marine Corps :Reserve) writes that: loyalty is defined as faithfulness to commitments or obligatians, or an adherence to a saver-eign, a government, a cause, or the like. It ecjnnotes sentiment and the feeling of devotion that one holds for one's country; creed, family; and friends. In the military sense, loyalty is defined by the Marine Corps . . .

as "the quaXiv , which was a telephone service that anyone could call anonymously to report tax violations. Wormers am sometimes idmtified with cdlaborators.. IUustrations for infnrmers can be fomd in many areas. For example, Akerstrom" so& (1.991) is focused on police informers. Many individuals feel that '"squeaiing" is ismorally ambiguous. For example, Knesset (Israeli parliment) rnetnbers in the state of Israel tried to pass laws that would. belp protect whistle-blowers against persecution, but the president of Israel (Ezer Weitzisam) m d the former chief of staff (Refael Eitan) objected because they kljt that "quealers'%hovlld be not rewarded or supported. An interesting case fllustrates s w e the complexities of ""squealing." According to Kdidman and Weston (19981, David Kaczynski. helped the FKt capture his brother, Ted Kaczynski, suspected of being the Una:borrrber. Ted wa~;suspected as the man b&i.nd a seventeen-year letter-bomb spree rc3sult-ingin three deaths and twenty-three ifijured people. Was that squealing inrmoral? &e brother squealed m mother, but did he not prevent future terrible injuries? 'This case had m interesthg twist whezz David felt that he was betrayed. David expected the FBI to keep his role in the arrest of his brother secret and understood that the prosecution would not seek the death penalty. Both expectations WE shattered. Davi,d's rnle in finding the Unabonnbes was revealed, and the prosecution did ask for the death. penalty, h public statements, David made no secret of his claim that the FBI violated his trust and loyalty on these two issues and that he felt betrayed. As things turned out, David" brother did not receive a death sentence. &e other in-depth illustration for this issue is Knox's 1997 study. By focusing on a k w f i g u ~ sKlnox's , (19"37) work eontextrralizes both heroes and hformers h the late-eighteenth-century political struggle for Irish in-


Violating Tr~tsl~ l hyalty: ~ d Categolaies and Cases

dependence. b o x uses these Irish historical figures to understand who the rebels and heroes were, who the villains and collaboraitive informers were, what motivated them, and what canclusions can be drawn about Irish political m d ideolqical, culture. Through this process &m is able to decipher the Irish culturd enigma, with its pwzling contradiictions. His work portrays quite vividly those contradicting charackristics of the idealistic Irishmen: persistence, naivet4, determination, as well as their arrogance, ineptikrde, and mrealistic utopian ideals-m explosive concoction that Led evemtualfy to tragedy, h miserable dcaths of tens of thousands of people, Another interesting case of informing unfolded in 1953Gthe case of Sascha Anderson.. Because of the politics) changes in Germany, t-hc concealment and deception originally involved in the case we= exposed, and. the true facts were established. Sascha Andcrson was one of the most central f i g u ~ isn foriner East Germany" subversive movemmt, He was considered a dissident hero by those supporting =&stance to the totalitarian E& German politicai culture and was deeply immersed in networks of artists and u n d e ~ r o u n d dissidents hformer East Berlin, When the Berllh 1Nall crumbled and East Germany ceased to exist in the early 199Qs,documents from the Stasi (the East German secret service) revealed that, in fact, h d e r s o n was one of their very best and most important informers. While pretending to be , from part of the mcrvement against the East German ~ g i m eAnderson, about the mid-1920s on, gave the totalitarian regime all the hformation he could gather (including s m e very personal impressions and evaluations) on members he met and knew among the resistance, betraying their trust and loyalty. One interesting aspect of this case is that Charm Film Productions made a 1996 documentary about Anderson (for Charnel 4 Television), in which he was canfro~~ted with some of his acts. At the time the docume11tary was made he was hiding out in Rome. h one of the morc tantalizing parts of the docun-tentary,two of his previous Stasi operators wew interviewed. m e of them stated that h d e r s o n was indeed co~~cemed about the freedm of artistic expression and that no arrests were made withjn the dissident group about vvhich Anderson was hforming. C)f course, it was not necessary With such qudi:!, sqclealing provided by Anderson it was better to let those innocent dissidents continue their activities because they posed no real threat to the regime. The seeortd operator stated that it was his impression that Anderson regarded the hforming as a sort of a game inwhich he saw hhself as an actor. That is, he did not see h h self as really involved in the acts, denying the moral meanimg of his infarming. This explains Andcrsm's answer to the yuestion of.his intimate collaboration with the Stasi. He stated that although the Stasi believed he

Violating Tr~tsl~ l h~y a df f y : Categolaies and Cases


was working for them, he mdly was not, Certainly, a person who manages to convhtce himself that h a t e v e r he is doing is just a '"me"" mfght also believe that he realty did not cotlaborate-Aft- all, the "real" Anderhson (whoever that was) was not hvolved in this dangerous ""game." derson is indeed. an interesting case of self-de1usian. 117 this particular context, "informing" aand "collal-7oration" are not djssimilar. In both cases we have two opposjng and clashing symbofic moral universes, where one tries to enlist ""itformers" or "collaborators" h l n the other to obtain an advantageous edge in the conflict, Mereas ""collaborationm"tends to be used more in war-like situations, ""informing'" tends to be used mow in police work. One of the m m fascinating cases, combining two such opposing universes against a third, is the ""Luciano Project," where a legal, military organization formed a coliiaborative alliance with an illegal and criminal organization. 'The klrinter of I942 was a difficult time. Nazi submarines were hitting ships off the east coast of the United Statesl" and rumors of sahotage ning WM. Far example, the S.S. Ni,mrur-rdie, a luxury liner that was being converted to a troop ship (to be christened Lgfiryefte) and fast enough to outrun U-boats, suddenly burst into flames at her Eiludson fiver pier while about 2,500 workers were inwolved in the conversion works (February 9)- Attempts to squelch the fire caused the ship to capsize at the dock. Salvaging efforts failed., and she was sold for scrap h 1946. Although never proven, sabotage was suggested as the explanation for l.he slndderl and unexpected fire." "is context prodwed one of the strangest partnerships between U.S. Naval Intelligence a d the Mafia, moraily two very different organizations. 'The goal of this collaboration was to secure the port of New York from Nazi infiltrators, Such bosses as ""LuckyF'Lwiano, Joe "Socks"' Lmza, and Meyer Lansky were hvolved in this prclject, as well as more than 350 naval personnel, The U.S. Navy estimated €-hat I:.,ucianofscontribution was "useful" but regarded the whole project as an embarrassing episode, better forgcrtten. Campbell, who provides tbr story of this project (1.977), disagrees m d feels Chat the U.S. Navy had nothing to be ashaned of. fndeed, if anything, 'Troject Luciano" 'provides m e of the best illustrations of the d d sayifig that wars create some rather strange bedfellsws. 'These examples illustrate that- &though many people despi,se informers, they sometimes provide information that helps society and saves lives.

Mutiny Murky appears in our typolow twice. Here the term is used to denote military insurrection, When a group of soidiers feel that their command-


Violating Tr~tsl~ l hyalty: ~ d Categolaies and Cases

ing officer no longer desewes their loyalty and trust, they move agajnst that commander. 'The most dramatic muthies, and those that receive the most atte~~tion, have been aboard ships and at sea, The k a g e of a crew revolting agajnst the captain of a warship on the high seas is sornethg that has capthated the i m g h a t i m . Indeed, some classic books and movies have been ereated on this theme, such as Herman Wouk" Pulitzer Prizew I"il2e Gli~zeMziliny (made into a movie in 1954f, the movie The Mzdtiny tllr fhe B O Z I I 0962 Z ~ ~ and 1984, based on an actual mutiny in t,81)6),and Sergei Eisensteh" P925 Russian movie Potemkin, which was based on the P905 revolutionary mutiny cm the battleship fite~kil2.As tbr works of Mlen (1989), Hadfield (1929), and Guttsidge (1992) reveal, naval insurrection has not been rare, and attempts to seize control of ships are part and parcel of the histories of many navies in the world. 'There are several interesting cases of mutiny. One involves Farce X, which was composed of British Royal Navy soldiers who were sent to assist American forces in the South Pacific during World War 11. Their mutiny sternmed fmm "rc?sen.tment.against orders to a remote war zolIe considered principally someone else" province" "uttridge 1992:223). Gfenton (1986) and Bakeless (1998:31%327) liescribe the 1781 mutiny of the Pe~~nsylvania line, which developed aft-er incmpetence and mishandling during the American Revalution, Another example is the 1743 muthy of Lord Sempill's l-fighlmd Regiment (the so-catled Hack Watch Mutiny). The mutiny developed when the anxious soldiers of the rclgjmeat learned that they were to be sent abroad, contrary to their terms of recruitment (MacWilliam 19112). A mutiny (naval or otherwise) basically means crossing the moral boundaries dictated by the m i l i t a ~chain of command, using power to accomplish this crossing. By its very nature, a mutiny is an open, not secret, insurrection, howver, the rnilitary cm-and often does-censor information about such events,

Collaboration, Defection, Dese~iort, Espionage and Spying, International Betrayal, Mutiny, State-Sponsored Terror, and Human Rights Violations The second cell we shall focus on includes acts of betrayal in which an inmember commits a violation of trust and loyalty against the gezzeral collective. The issue of whether the behavior in question was conduct& in secret is of crucial importance. Atthough treason is part of this cell, I shall not djscuss it here; I devote all of Chapter 4 to the topic.

Violating Tr~tsl~ l h~y a df f y : Categolaies and Cases

The term ""collaboration" "motes both positive and negative qualities. Co1la:boration between msicims, scientists, or physicians is typically assumed to be positive. In ~ f e r e n c eto war or cmfiict, the term connotes an agogether diMerent and negative meaning, for examfle, collaborating with the enemy. There is a subtext to this negative meaning, and it is associated with treason. We shall delve into the issue, and cases, of collizboration mare thoroughly in Chapters 5 and 6.

Defectiotz Defection refers to a situation whese two adversarial groups are competing, or are locked in a connict, and one or mom members of one group shift their loyalties to the other and typically move from Che territory of one group to that of the other. Defection cast take place in secret (for exam*, when spies, or the military, are iwolved) or in pubXic (for example, in politics). Moreover, defedion-by definition-involves negotiated and changed loyalties and trust in the most straieforward. w q . The particular form of vidation of trust and loyaity that we discuss here is perpetrated by a member of the in-group who changes his or her loyalty and is not aimed against anyone in particular, but against the group (although individual actors can, m d frequently arc., hurt). Although defection can be observed in a n u ~ ~ b of e rareas (for example, politics, religim, sport, commerce, industry, and even police work [ 1997]), it does not invoke a unified societal reac.tion. Illustrations for defectl.011 are numerous. 'The history of Czarist Russia and the Soviet Union has some fascinating tales about defectors, one of the most famous of which is the case of prince Aneirey Nikhaylavich Kuhsky (1528-1583), Kuhsky was a military commander in Czar Ivan (She Terrible) IV's regime in the middle of the sixteenth century, He was liked by the czar m d became one of his closest, most valued, and twsted associates. However, between 1563 and 1564 Kurbsky lost his special position with the czar, and in 1564 he defected to Poland and joisted the forces of King Sigismund :II: Augustus of Poland-Lithuania, who was fighting against Russia. Kitlg Sigismund was generous bath militarify and fhancially with Kurbsky, After his defection, Kurbsky wrote the czar a few letters, Mlhich serve as useful historical documents for the period. This defection clearly shook Ivan, who c o n t e q l d e d leaving his throne. Instead Ivan began suspecting conspiracies everywhere and ruthlessly moved to cclnsolidate his power, resuiting in a rt;ip of terror tfor example, see Keenan 1971).


Violating Tr~tsl~ l hyalty: ~ d Categolaies and Cases

In recent t h e s , the term ""dfection" h s been used most widely with;in the context of Mthat has become k n m as the intelligence community, where. officers of one country-typicalfy inpossession of some important: informat-im-move to a rival country.24 Clefection was very prominent within the intelligence community during the cold war betwecm the West m d the East. Intelligence jargon differentiates between a ""defector," who fits the above characterization, and a "defector in place,'" which refers to a potential defector who has denounced his or her count-ry but has not left it. Such defectors typically continue their work and become ' h d e s . " Of course, m l e s can become defectors. Some examples include British spies such as Bwgess, Nacfem, and Philby (&sczxssed below), and Arkady Shevchenko, a valuable Soviet mole in the service of the Americms who fh~allydefected to the United States." H a m d e stays too long, he risks being caught, Peshaps the most successful. known American mole the Soviets ever had was Aldrich H. Ames (rtscruited in 1985), who caused sevew damage to U.S. interests.%He was caught i,n 1994 Mlhi:[etrying to Aee and received a sentmce of life in prison, A case of a Soviet mole working for the Americans was Dimitri I'olyakov, who was operative for twenty years. Polyakov was betrayed by Arnes m d executed by the Soviets in 1986.27 Defectors may possess valuable assets (for exampIe, information), and their defection can thus give the side they defect to some obvious intellig e x e and operational advantages. The first hi,gh-rankhg Soviet intelligence officer to defect to the West was probably Schnneka Ginsberg.28 Ginsberg was a former resident of the Soviet Uniorz who joined the Soviet Military Inklligence (GRU) in 1923m d transferred to the NKVD (Sta:lin's secret police) in 1934, rising to the rank of major general there, He became disillusioned with Stalin and defected to the French in 1937. Ginsherg then traveled to Canada and from there to the U~zitedStates, mere he contacted the FBI, whjch hdped to grant him alicn residmt status.2We later visited London and gave crucial intelligence infornation to the British as well..Unfortunately, the British faited to follow some of the important leads Ginsberg provided them and did not use all the information in m effective way*Ginslbert;'~body was hund cm :I;&mary 10,14$1, in a Bellevue Hot4 m m in Washjngton, DC., shot in the temple, wilh three suicide notes. Chances are that he was the victim of a successful assassination,"" Some famous defectors include the fdlowing: Afansy M. Shorokhov (alias Vladimir Petrov), who dekcted to Australia in 1954; Guy Burgess and E>onalJ Madean, two British diplmats who liefected to the Soviet Union in 1951 (KGB moles for twenty years); lgor Gouzenko, a Soviet GRU agent stationed in Ottawa, Canada, who defected to the West in

Violating Tr~tsl~ l h~y a df f y : Categolaies and Cases


September 1945; Polish secret service officer Michal Golienewski, who defected in Oecernber 1960 to the h e r i c a n CIA in W s t Berlin (actually a Soviet male in the Polish secret service) and helped to expose m d arrest. George Blake (a Soviet spy in British MTb) and Harry Houghton (from the Portland spy ring, discussed later in this book); and KGB Major Anatoli Goljtsin, who dtkcted to the West from his Soviet post in Helsinki, Finland, in 1962. Defectors may possess not only valuable information but dso vduable m d tmgible assets, like a fighter plane. In the mornhg hot~rsof August 16, 1966, an Iraqi fighter pilot, Mcxnir Radfa, defected with his Sovietmade h'liG-21 fighter plane to Israel. Illat operation took much effort from the 1sraet.isecret service, but persuading Munir to steal Chat MiG-2t and defect to Israel was m e of the most brilliant, useful, and valuable operaitions of the Israeli Mossad. The ability of the Israeli Air Force to e x m h e , firsthand, \zrhat was ther.~the first-line fighter plane of some of its Arab neighbors certainly gave them an ubvious edge. Despite various efforts, Mmir did not integrak into Israeli culture and experienced difficulties finding a job- Helped by Israeli authorities, Nunir left the country to live elsewhere. He died, in August 1998. Israeli authorities were asked to help in his burial and did so, far away from both Israel and :Iraq (Black m d Morris 1991:20&218; Dan 1998).

Whittaker Chambers and Alga Hiss, 011e particularly notable case wfierfi?facts and constructims are interczstjng to follow is the case of W i t taker Chmbers (1901-1961), an editor for Time magazine. He was a dedicated American C o m u n i s t vvho joined the p m y in 1924 and became a spy for the Soviets in 1933, Disillusioned with communism, he quit bath the party and spyixlg in 1937, that is, he shifted his loyalties to tbe Americans. In 7939, fobwing the nonaggression pact s i p e d by Nazi Gemany and Ihe Soviet Union, he warned the St&e Department about its pemetrat h by Soviet agents. Specifically, he t d d Adolf Rerle, assistant secretary of state, that Alger Hiss was a Communist and a spy. His warnings wew iglwred.31 h 1942 he was in contact with the FBI but was hesitant about giving more names." On August 3,19118, he gave voluntary testimony to the House UII-American Activities Committee, in which he said that Alger Miss was working for Ihe Sovkts. That was a significant picce ol information. It started a case arwnd d g e r Hiss that to some extent is still puzzling even today.33 Alger Hiss was born in 1904 in Baltimore and developed an. impressive career in different departments of the W.S. administration. In 1936 he cmtered the State Deparment w h e he ~ served in some key roles, including advising President Roosevelt during the Valta Conference (February 4-11,1945). Hiss quietly left the Skate Clepartment to become the president


Violating Tr~tsl~ l hyalty: ~ d Categolaies and Cases

of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in 1947, Following Chambers's statement in 1948, Hiss denied the charges and sued Chambers for libel. One men?ber of the comittee, Republican Richard M. :Nixm,accused Hiss of lying and convirrced Chambers to reveal some evidence he supposedly had against Hiss. Hiss continuously claimed that he was not a spy. The accm,sa.t.ionsmade by Chantbers and thc dmials and counteraccusation made by Hiss helped to produce two trials. Under the statute of limitations, :Hiss crruid not be tried for espionage, and he was t h e r e f o ~i-t-tdictedon two counts of perjury. In his first trialt, in July 1,949, the jurnrs could not c m e to a decision, Hiss's second trial began in November 1949. He was convicted on January 21,1950, and sentenced to five years inprison (he actraally semed forty-four months). For many years, the question of whetZler Hiss was really a spy haunted An-terica.3As I'olmar and ALLen (1997) point out, this plazzlix~gcase was solved in the 1,990s.First, in 1992 General Dmitri Volkogunov, a Russian historian in, charge of the KGB and. military archives, re, that vealed that he had searchrjd the relevant files, found n o ~ i n gand tkrefore the accusations against Hiss had been "completely groundle~s."3~ However, Volkogonov admitted that he "couXd not rule out the pclssibility that some rt;cclrds had been overlooked or even destroyed.'qb Second, in 1993 a Hungarian historian doing rclsearch on Ihe Hmgarian secret police-Maria Schmicft-stated. that she had. discovered docu3~ the ments that indicated that Mr. Hiss was a Communist s ~ y i However, most credible evidence was produced in 1929, the same year in which Hiss died.. In that year, decrypted Soviet intelligence messages (code name "Venonam")rom the 1940s were released by the N U (National Security Agency) and tinked Hiss directly to espionage." "eciiically, one document, dated March 30, 1945,identifkd. a Soviet spy in America code-named "Ales." The message identified "Ales" as working in the State Departrrrexrt and as the person who accompanied President Raosevelt to the 1945 Valta Conference and then flew on to Moscow. There, "Ales" met Aneirei VyshinskL; then Soviet Commissar for F o ~ i g nAffairs, and was cited for his aid to the Soviets. We h o w that Hiss worked at the time of the YaIta Cosrference in the State Department and that he accompanied President RocrseveIt to the Yalta Conference as an advi~er.3~ Hiss himself admitted that he spent a nighl im Moscow aficzr the S'atta Conference, but he denied that he was Ales. His version was that he went to Moscow to see the subway system.4Uwilable evidence (Chambers's testimony and evidence, historian Maria Scrhnrridt" statement, and the Venona files) thus seems to suggest that Hiss was indeed a Soviet spy and that throqhout World War 11 be provided to the Soviets inside fnformation that probably helped to mdermine the policies of the United States government, which tmsted him by allowing hixn to work in a sen-

Violating Tr~tst~ l h~y a df f y : Categolaies and Cases


sitive role and to which he swore loyalty The violations of trust and loyalty im this case are very &vious. If bdeed Hiss was a spy, he was very successful at creating a deceptive filcade and managed to conceal his defection for a very long period of time. Not only did he damage U.S. national security but his deception created a bitter and divisive national co~~troversy-quitean achievement for a spy who was also a bma fide traitor. Hiss died on November 15, 1996, in New York City at age ninety-two.43 The Cold War, The cold war saw quite a few spectacular cases of defecition.42 There were some famous defectors from the Soviet Union: Kanstantin Volko~r,Vladimir Petrov, Anatoly Golitsin, and Yuri N'osenko, among others. Three of the most famous defectors from the Soviet Union were Oleg Gordievsky, @or Sergeievitch Gouzenko, and Oleg Penkovsky.

Oleg Gurrlievsky G d i e v s k y was born in 1938 and developed a career in the KGB. Apparently, sometime h the 11970s (probably 1974) he began to work for British htelligenre (M16). His motivation to spy for the Wst, supposedly, was heled by tbr brutal Soviet hvasion to Czechoslovakia in 19658. For more than a decade he W= able to provide his British operators with valuable information, fn 1985 his cover was blown by a double agent in the American CIA, and he defected to Britain. His defection was formally announced by the British Foreign Office in S e p t e d e r 1985. Gordi,evsky paid a very high personal price for defection, as he left his wife and two daqhters in the Soviet Wm. His wife dhoxed him, and althougl~in 1991 his fmily was allowed to leave the Soviet 19nio11, Che fantily did not retunite.43

61eg Penkovsky Penkovsky presents us with an altogether difkrent case, Born in 1919, he took part it1 the Red Army's fight against the Nazi Wehnnncht, and after the war he was trained as an htelligence ofticer. Me eventual:tybecame an officer with Soviet Maitary fntelligencc (GRU). Like Gouzcnko (discussed. below), his first attempts at estail?lishingcontact with Western intelligence were rather f"rust-rating.However, evcn.tua:lfyhe was successful in makhg such a contact with both the British and the A m d c m s , From April 1961. until August 1942, he passed large volumes of vital classified information to the Americans and British,. Some nl this information proved quite irnportant to President Kemedy during the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 because it enabled the Americans to have a better assessment of Soviet inte~~tians. Soviet intelligence was successful h exposkg Penkovsky and arrested him on October 22,1962. In a show trial, in May 3963, he was


Violating Tr~tsl~ l hyalty: ~ d Categolaies and Cases

sentenced to death. On May l?, 1963, it was amomced that he had been executed "by the mefiod =served for the Soviet Union's wwst traitors: fie was dowly fed into a live k n a c e , with some of his crlosest fnrmer colleagues forced to watch" (Volkman 1994:30).Clearly, Penkovsky was one of the best and most producthe pro-West '"defectors in pla~e.~,44

Igcrr Sergeievifch Gozkserzko Gouzenko (1"39-1982) is, perhaps, one of fie mow cdorfuj cases oE defectim. Mavillg been trained in military intefligence in Moscow in 1941, Gouzcnko was sent in June 1943 to the Soviet embassy in Ottawa, Cmada, as a ciplier clerk (officially defined as a "civilian employee"'),111 September 1944 fie received unexpected orders to return to the Soviet Union. Gouzenko and his wife decided that they were not going back. W ~ ahappened t next wodd be a good script for a Hollywood movie. Gouzenko left the Soviet embassy on Sepk"R713er 5,1943, with a pile of classified documents, intending to defect to the Canadians on September 6, with his pregnmt wife and son. Here was a man who possessed invalmble k n o h d g e that was vitd to the West's understanding of Soviet information-gathering methods, Was he received with joy and appreciation? Not at all. At first, Canadian officials refused to give hirn asyfum. It was one of his neighbors, a sergeant in the Canadian Air Force, who actually gave him asylum. OnIy after a while, when the opaque Canadian authorities began to grasp the importance of the information Gouaenko possessed, and the fact that hc was risking his life, did thcy decidc. to grant him official asylum. "The information Gouxnko brought weaied that the Soviets were operating a si,zeable espionage organization in Canada. These revelations led to exposures m d arrests of more then ten spies, all involved in an intcnsive effort to fil~dinformation about atomic weapons and transkr it to the Soviet Union. It is notewort-hy that Gouzenko also provided information (alas, inconclusive) that ALger Hiss was a Soviet spy," A A m d j a n Royal Comxnission that hivestigated. the Gouzenko affair submitted its report on June 1946, stating there that Gauzenko had "revealed the existence in Canada of a widespread conspiracy to &bin secret official information,""" and that the Soviets had tried to create a fifth column organizatim in Canada, whose god i t was to collect miljtary,, and general hforrnation.47 Two famous defectors from the West were Edward Lee Howard a d Harold (Kim) FhiXby

Edzoard L. Howard Howard was born h 1951 in New Mexico. After an. unsteady period of employment and moves within and outside the United States, he applied

Violating Tr~tsl~ l h~y a df f y : Categolaies and Cases


to the CIA and was contacted in 1980 (in Chicago). He was trained by the CIA for a variety of tasks and was eventually statimed in the American embassy in Moscow. Both he m d his wife worked thcrfi?as intelligence officers, Because Moward failed polygraph tests, his employment by the CIA was terminated in 1983 and he rebrned to the U ~ ~ i t eStates. d h t-he mi&1980s Moward traveled a few times to Ewope and was in contact with KGB oficers in Vicnna. fn return for the information he gave them, he was given cash. The CL4 cau@t cm to his betrayal and in September 1985 was ready to arrest him.,Howard was quicker, however, and by that time he was already on his way to Moscow (the last part of the journey in the trunk of a Soviet embassy car).48 Harold (Kiln) Philby I'hilby is an altogether diffewnt, and much more complicated, case. The gel~eralcontext is that of the famous ""C:annbridge spy ring." 'The term refers to a group of British spies who were recruited by Soviet NMVD in the 1930tj, and t-he name relates to the fact that the major figures werl, recruited at Cambridge University49 The core group consisted of Dmald Madean,'Wuy Burgess,'x A n t h y Blunt,SZ Harold (Km) Philby'qJohn Cairncross," Alan Nunn Ma)i," sand Leo Long." These spies were quite effective in carnsing sig~zificantdamage to the West and were probably among the best-knwn spies of all time. In March 1351, as the British ScoCIand Yard was hot cm their trail, Burgess and Maclean defected to t-he Soviet Union. Cairncross, Blunt, May, and Long remained in the West. Blunt and Long were promised i unity from punishment in exchange for information. Blunt evenh;lally cmkessed and became socially isolated; iJongwas less prominent: to begin with. May was caught and sentenced to ten years in prison in 1946 but was actualjy released in 1952. Philby defected and moved to Moscow." Although t-he two most talked about spies from this group are Blunt and Phiby, it is qrxjte possible that- the m r e effective and important spy was actually Maclean, Philhy must he viewed hthe contertt of thr ideological rivalries, World War II, and the sexual exchanges (as well as l.he heavy drinking of Maclean) among that group of spies. Phjlby was born in 1922 and in the 193@ attended Cambridge blniversity, vvhem he was recrUited to Swiet intelligence. He left Carnbridge in 1,933for a fascinating castler as a spy. He managed to become a member of British M15 (British Security Service in charge of domestic security and counterespionage activities in the United Kingdom) during World War I, and after leavhg Carnbridge he covered-as a journalist-the Spanish Civil War. After Spain, British M16 (British security service in charge oE espionqe and foreign intelligence, also h o k m as SE) recrujted him agaiin. Phjby developed quite a career in STS and. was given some of the most sensitive and classified positions


Violating Tr~tsl~ l hyalty: ~ d Categolaies and Cases

there. He had no y u a h s passing all the information he considered valuable to his Soviet operator. As CIA suspicions against Philby were mtlmting in the early 2950s fas w d as those of some of his British colfeagues), he was forced to leave the British .intelligenceservice. His next assignment was as a reportc;r in the Middle East. Even there he was able to continue his espionag work. Philby's personal life was quite turbulent; he had a few affairs (some with wives of his associates), and as a spy, he was able to dodge rather successfully a few Soviet defectors vvho poi,nted their h g e r at him. But t?ll good things come to an emd. In 1963 British ME6 had enough evidence to confront Philby. In that cmfrontaticm, Philby was offert-ld the same deal that Blunt and Long received: immunity from prosecution for infomnati.011. Plnjlhy confessed but defected to the Soviet Uni~n.~B Even after the end of the cold war, defections associated primarily with intelligence were rather common. One such example is the famous easfy August 1995 defection from Iraq to Jordan of Hussejn Kamal Al-Hassan and Generaf Satldam Kamd, both maried to the daughters of Iraqi p s i dent Saddam. Hussejn. 0 x 1 August 12, 1995, Saddam H~~sscin, in a fiery speech, called them "traitors" and threatened to execute them. After spending time in Jordan, and accepthg Saddarn Hussein's tater assertion that Chey would not be harmed if they relzltmed to Iraq, chey chose to believe him and =turned to Iraq. Shortly after =turning they were killed. h o t h e r recent case occurred in Srptember 1997 when fang Sung Gil, Nor* Kttrem ambassador to Egpt, and his wife dcfected in Cajro to CIJZ agents who rushed the couple to safety in the United States, As was the case with p ~ v i o udefections, s tbe North Kortran~;reacted in anger, accusing the CIA of committing a hostile act.. That: ang-er may have bee11 magnified because fang was the axis around which Pymgyang's Middle East pdicy was turning, Obviously, the CIA hoped that ex-ambassador Jang's breadth of knowledge wouXd be helpful in unveiling the mystery surrounding some suspected, shad:y international transactions made by the North Korem s (for example, selling mfssiles to Syria, Libya, Iran, and E g ~ t ) . ~ g Intelligence-orienCed defection is certainly an interclsting furrn of betrayal. It hvolves the violation of trust m d loyalty in betraying secrets to an alien and frequently hostile national adversary. This particular type of defection CharacrteristicaIly a s s m e s a secret form,", Defectors are constructed, differently by those they defect from and those they defect to.

A categcny mlated to defectim is desertion. In its most popular meming, the term refers to the behavior of a soldier MIho leaves a military post wi.thout authorization, intending not to return. Such posts can be in

Violating Tr~tsl~ l h~y a df f y : Categolaies and Cases


trenches, tanks, naval forces, or an administrati:vc position. Whmas defection mems goiw to the otJler/opposite side of the conflict, desertion means walking away from a post wi.lhout changing sides. Much like defectors, deserters most certahly violate both trust invested in them and t punishloyalty to their gmup. Indeed, desertim mceives tbr s e v e ~ sof mmts (espedally if done in the context of combat). Desertion entails a lart;er category oi behaviors associated with military duties that involve both loyatty and trust. Such behaviors include being AWOL (absence without leave), which has been treated frequently as betrayal. During World War 11, both desertion and AWOL infractions took place amlmg the various combatmts. For example, one out of sixtea Soviet prisoners of war (POWs) w e found to be deserters. Much of the Hungarian Army deserted to the Swiet Red Army, Mass desertion took place with the Burma National Army when it left the fapmew to fiit;bt with the Brjtish (March 1945). Despite the mythdogies about them, Japanese soldiers deserted as well (especially as the war prog~ssed),The U.S. A m y had a total of 40,000 deserters. The [email protected] about 35,000 soldiers of desertion m d s e ~ ~ t e ~ to ~ cdeath e d close to 23,000, of whom at least 15,000 were actually executed. Because the U.S. Army tended to charge deserters with the lesser offense of AWOt, only one soldier was executed. More than IQQ,00Q soldiers deserted from the British army61 Many potmtial U,S, soldiers evaded the draft during the Vie mmy by kavir~gthe country. h Israel, it became clear &at du151-1 er ol' 1982) large nun?bers of invasion to liebanon (whjch b q m in the su, soldiers (especiafty h the resemes) fomd.ways to evade joinhg the war, Cmscimticrus objection to mflitary service is not cognized as a legitimate m a t and politicai category in a number o.E countries. In such situations this behavior is constructed as a violation of loyalty and trust. 'Tbus, people who define themselves as such in these countries may face a grim and bittes dispute with clrafting administrations and are ofien branded as traitors, Other countries are able to absorb such behavior without constructing it in such negative terms. Deserters have played a role in quite a few fictional cultural creations, both as heroes and antiheroes. hrhaps one of the most memorable roles of a deserter is played by Marlon B r a d o in Francis Ford Coppola's 1979 violent, yet cryptic, Vietnam War m v i e Apuc@Iyp,st.Now. A category close to desertion and defection, tbougtn in a very different context, is conversion, which is discussed later 117 this chapter.

Espionage and S p y i ~ g Not every spy is a traitor, and not every traitor is a spy A spy that would qualify as a traitor must be a person that is a bona fide member of the in-


Violating Tr~tst~ l hyalty: ~ d Categolaies and Cases

group in a particular collective or organization, whose secrets that person gives ("betry'" to another, sometimes hostile, coflective or orglmization. It is the trust, loydty and faithfuhess that this member of the colkctive violates, which earns that person the label of traitor. Zjrpically such acts are. committed in s e c ~and t hy using deception, 'I'he traitor, in such cases, needs to prrzselrt a f r o ~th& ~ t gives the impression of deccncy, loyalty, honesty and commitment, but the underlyhg reality is th exact opposite of this false and deceptive impression. A person who fakes membership in the group or the collective assume+wiflingly and deliberately-a fake and decepthe identiv That perstrn pretends to be a bona ficie member of a cdlective but really is not. Such is the case with a trmsplanted spy with a fake identity. Sucks a person can badly qualifJrfur the term '"traitor" because he or she does not violate any real trust or loyalty C)bviously, not classifying such a person as a bona fide traitor may becorn problematic if: Chat person generates (deliberately so) feelings of tmst and loyal9 for many years, whereas his or her genuine loyalty is to an altogether d i f f e ~ n collectke. t Hwever, members of the collective whose secrets the spy managed to disclose tend typically to expl.ess their feelings-mce that spy is exposed-in a rhetoric of betrayal, no matter w h t h e r the spy's identity was fake or genuine, There are nurnerous illustrations of people who hid their true identity and interests and pretencfed to be something else, thus gaining access to valuable illlorntation and d a m g i n g the group or eokrtive, whose trust and loyalty they viollated. Let us review a few illustrative cases. The "Esek Bish" in Egypt. In 1951. Israeli military intelligence organized a spy web in Cairo. Recruited members wert?sent for training to Israel and by f 953 all the members of the spy network were back in Cairn ready for action. These spies pretended to be tmstfuf. and loyal Emptims, but they were not. In f"34 the United States demanded that Britah evacuate the Suez Canal region. At that time, Israel was concerned about the growing American alienation toward Israel and felt that a continued British presellce could be used to its advantage. Thus, Israel's military intelligence wanted, to prevent, or at least stall, the British evacuation. They rt.as0nc.d that hitting British targets in Egypt would achieve their desired goal by forcing the British gover~zmentto reevaluate its willingness to comply with the h e r i c a n demand. Despite imer disputes in Israel mgardhg the wisdclm of activatitlg its Cairo spies against British targets, the decision was made, and the Israeli spies were ordered to spring into action.

Violating Tr~tsl~ l h~y a df f y : Categolaies and Cases


The m a h strategy was to plant bombs in various places (on July 2 and M). The aceivity on July 23 was fatal. One of the spies (Philip Matanson) was caught with a smldering bomb when he entercd the Rio cinema, It did not take fong for the Egyptians to figure out what was going on, and and within a matter of days all the mernbers of the spy net were ca-t arreted (with an additimal nine members, plus one innocent Egypti"" Jew-Yoseph Karmona, and Major Meir Binet, a repmsentative of Israeli rnilitary intelligence who was indirectly associated with the net). The capture of the Israeli spy net was made public on July 26,1954, m d their trial began on December 11, 2954. K;trm.ona either committed suicide or died. while being twtured; Binet committed suicicie; Dr. Moshe Marzuk and Shmuel Azar were sentenced to dcath (and hanged on January 31,1955). Two were acquitted, and the rest were sentenced to spend long periods in prison. In Israel, a political.storm arose around the questio~nof who exactly authorized the activation of the net h this amateurish way. The affair was never s o h d satisfactody. Et led, however, to the resipation of both Pinhas Lavm (minister of"d t f e ~ ~ sand e ) David Ben-Curion (prime minister). Clearly, the fag around the authorization and.orders to activate the net reflects the sad fact that those in charge were avoidi?g their respmsibiii.ty to give truthful accounts. 'Thus, both trust and loyalty were compromised in a most significant way. The affair itself, referred to as "the Lavm affair" or moro commonly as the "Esek, Bish" "ranstated, p d a p s , as the "fiasco"") eesoded the foundations of the Isracli regime.62 Further insult accompanied the question of releasing the jailed members of the net. Two members were released after seven years, m d four others were released only after the Six Day War Uune 1967) in an exchange oi prisoners agreement between Israel and Egypt. Thus, not d y did members of the net feel betrayed by those who authorized their mission but refuscd to take full rtlsponsibility, but they also felt they were ignored and left to rot in prison when massive exchanges of prismers took place between Israel md Egypt after the 1956 Sinai Campaip. Betrayal in this case was a multiple issue: First, Egyptian citizelns joined an espionage ring against their countr).; second., intelligence officers in Esraeli military intelligctnce (and perhaps some pditicians too) betrayed their spies by sending them on. a risky and questionable operatio~nand then refmsed full responsibil3y; third, the Israeli gove gres"i""ly pwsue the =lease of the spies, particularly after the 3956 Sinai Campaign.

Tyler G . Kent, Cases of spying arc. abundant. The title of E~ightl@y% illuminating 1,986 book is indeed instructive: TI-re Srrc.o~~d Oldest Professill~s. Une illustrative examplc is the case of v i e r G. Kent.63 Born in 1911 h


Violating Tr~tst~ l hyalty: ~ d Categolaies and Cases

Manchuria to American parents, Kent was an Amencan who worked as a cipher clerk in the U.S. embassy in London from October 5,1939. Affiliating himself, fnr ideologiicat reasons, with a pro-Nazi nctwork, he was able to feak to the Nazis much of the pre-war Churchill-Roosevett cable correspondence..F,wentualt?i,MIli etiposed both him a d his contacts. 'These individuals were charged in court and sentenced to various prison terms. Kent was rcleased f m prison in September 1945 and deporkd to the United Staf;es.T'herc., he continued to exprtrss his racist and fascist views until he died in 1988. In realitypKent was a Nazi sympathizer who pretended to be trustfu.1and loyal, but who in fact caused his countsy much damage. Aside from the instructive tales of spykg in the B;ibleh4and such actual cases as Mata Hari,b5 ""Cicero,"& Harold f K h ) Philby, Whittaker Chambers, Rchard Sorge, Aldrich Ames, Markus Wolf, and a host of others, it is inte~stingto note that some ralher farnous people of words were spies as well. These include Emest Hemingway, G m h m Greene, Somerset Maugham, clergyman Giovami Montini,hT and Daniel Defoe.68 And a recent book clailss that even William Wardsworth, one of the most acclaimed British poets, was spying in 1799 for the British against Germanyt as part of an espimage network.69 'Three rather famous cases in which Israel was involved are also worth exploring.

Janathan. Pollard. Jonathan Pollard was an American citizen who betrayed. his countv's secrets to Israeli intdligencer, Poliard began to work for the U.S. :Navy in September 197'9 as a civilian intelligence analyst. Aromd that time he made contact with a South African military attach4 in Washington, U.C. U.S. comterintetljgence discovered the liaison, and his security clearance was Borngraded. In June 1984 his clearance was upgraded again \zrhen he was reassigned to inteflige~~ce work in the Anti%rrorism Alert Center in the Naval Investigative Service. Pollard again used his pri\lileged position to gain access to classified materials and gave classified informat.ion to an Australjan naval officer and to a szxpporter of the rebel guerrillas in Afghmistm. That, apparently, did not satisfy Pollard. He next made contact with an Israeli intelligence a p n t in NW York. That begm a relationship though which Pollard was paid tens of thiolxsands of dollars by Zsraeh intelligence (for example, at the "oginnir-tg, a monthly salary of $1,500, wliich was raised in 1,985to $2,500, and various gifts valued at $l(l,C)OO-12,(3OQ). Po1lad. grwided Israel with highly classified. and valuabfe intdigencer information. Becoming suspicious of Pollarcl"~requests for huge mounts of data, his commmding officer ordered that he be wtched closety His cover began to crumble, and inNovember 1985 Pollard" betrayal became

Violating Tr~tsl~ l h~y a df f y : Categolaies and Cases


obvious. On Thursday, November 21,1985, the Pollards, followed by FBI agents, drove to the Israeli errtbassy in Miashington, D.C., asking for asylum. The lsraclis refused, and as Che Poljards left the embassy, they were arrested. Pleading guilty to charges of espionage, Jonathm Pollald was sentenced to life in prism, his wife was sentenced to five years in prison. Although Amcl, hjs wife, was =leased in 1990 (they also divorced), F"dlard remained-at the time of writing this book-in prison, despite a strong Israeli lobby to release hhn. T'here is little doubt that Pollard violated both the trust and loyaity vested, in him by his country and did it by way of deception, Pollard clearly fits every criteria of treact-rery and qualifies fully as a traitcrrm Moreover, the literature reveals that Pollard may have been loyal to no one, makirtg him a qualitatively different type of spy than,say, Amold, Hale, or Kent,

Eli Gohen. Born in Egypt in 1924' Cahm was an Arab lhguist who immigrated to Israel in 1957; hcJ. was rt.cruitc;d by the Israeli secret service (vlossad) i,n May 1960. Assuming a false identity, he left Israel, fleaving behind his wife and children) m d arrived in Syria in 1962. He established. hhnself in Damascus as a rich fumfbre and tapestry exporter and made many important friends. Cohm was highly successfd i,n penetsakg irnportant political and military circles in Syria. and provided Israeli. intelligence with crucial information (ammg other things, about the S y r i m fortjfications im the Gotan Heighls), He was so popular that he was cmsidcred for the post of deputy defense mjnister, Ever.ltually, Coheds radio transmissions from Damascus wew detected, and he was caught m d arrested on January 1K,t,965*He was torture& hterrogated, tried for espionage, sentenced to death, and hanged on May 18,3965, in Damascus in Marjeh Square before a clleering crowd of more than 10,000 with full media coverage, Clearly; although Cohen was a spy, he warnot a traitoz71 Israel Beer. According to Israel Beer, fdowing the Nazi takezover of Austria in 1938 (the so-called Anschluss), he fled from Vie~mato Palesthe, There he joined the Hagam (a prestate underground Jewish organizaticm). He prtrsented, hirnself as an experimced guerrilla anti-Nazi fighter and as a person. who took m active part in the fight against the fascists h the Spanish Civil Miar, Beer develuped quite a military career. &ring the 1948 Israeli War of Independence, he was deputy chief of operations of Ehe general staff and,later, head of plmniing and operations. Following that war, he expected to be promted to a m y deputy chief of staff.His expectation was not met, and he resiped from the army to become a military carresponde~~t for a local. newspaper. From 1953 on, he


Violating Tr~tsl~ l hyalty: ~ d Categolaies and Cases

became close to David Ben-Gurion, as well as other defense officials, and Ben-Gurion appointed Beer to write the history of the 1948 war. Despite that: ob\ljons trust, there we= those who di,d not trust him. n o s e who were suspicious (for example, Moshe Dayan, a m y chief of staff, and Isser Harel, chief of the Israeli secret service) were correct. &er was put u ~ ~ dsurveillance, er and on March 30,1961, he was caught passing information to a KGB officer (Victor Soblow) in the Soviet ermbassy in Tel Aviv. Before that, he also tried to establish an unauthorized contact with R e h a r d Gehlen (the11 head of West Germany's intelligence) in May 1960. That attempt may have been a i m d to help him penetrate West German inteuigence for his Soviet masters. Beer was armsted the next day, put on trial for espionnge, and sentenced to fi,ftear years in prison. He died in prison in 1968. At the time of his arrest, he held the chair of military history at Tel Aviv U'niversjty and worked as a ntilitary commentator for the Israeli dajly Ha'laxtz. Beer m a j s l s an enigmatic fgurc, and there is still specdation ahout how much of his cwer story was true. n e r e are feMi answers fnr such basic questions of whetha he was really Jewish, h e t h a he was from Vienna, wkther he fought in Spain or pasticipated in any wadarc., and whether he hrld a legitimate f'h.D. degree. A h r o u g h documentary made about him in February 1990 by Israelj telfvision b a n d that the u n h o w n facts far exceed the known. Black and Morris poiM out that '%eer% impressive curricuiuln vitae turned out to be completely bogug 'The colonel had never been in the Sehutzbund, never foughl in Spain, and had in fact been a lowly clerk in the Austrian Federatim,""Wn one thing there =ems to be no argument: He was a spy fnr the Soviets. Beer was not the only spy planted in Israel during that tirne. Professor Kurt Sitta, from the Israeli Techian, was such a spy too (he was caught in June l960 m d sentenced to a five-year prison se11tence).7WC)fcourse, neither qualifies as a traitor. Beer was probably transplmted Zly the Soviets in Palestine just as Eli Cohen was transplanted by Israel in Barnascus. Both acquired fake idmtities, One needs to be reminded that Soviet intelligmce had a lot of experience in transplanting spies. The best-bornin example is Richard Sorge.3 Sorge began working for Soviet intelljgence in 1920 (hGermany), disguised as a teacher, and visited a number of corntries in the late 4920s. Using a cover of German correspmdent, Sorge worked as a Soviet spy in Japan begjnning in 1933. Me created a valua:ble m d useful spy ring there and was able to pass his Soviet operators extremely valuable hformation about Japan, For example, in 49.21he was able to inform Stalin that Japan did not plan any aggression against the Soviets and that their focus was the south (the h t c h hdies and French hdochina), That iinformation en-

Violating Tr~tsl~ l h~y a df f y : Categolaies and Cases


abled Stalin to divert essential military forces from the Far East to the fight agai~~st the Nazi Wehrnzadf (mom on this case in Chapter 6). Recent Books on Spies and Espionage, Spies engage minds and imqinations. The nurnber of hocrks (fiction and nonfiction) m d movies about them is staggering* Books about spies as traitors are published continuously; some even contain stunning revelations. These tend to capture the headlines, especiatly when they s e m to suggest new discoveries that appear to reveal dark and hidden information. Three examples from 1999 illustrate the point, First is Allen Weinstein and Alexmder Vassiliev'?i work about Soviet espionage in the Stalin era, T!ze hunted Woad: Sovicf A~rrerica-The Sfillin Em (New VnrXr: Random House). In some respects this book may have actually redefined the entire field of iwestigatim in this area, The second book, The Mifrokitrin Archive: Thc KGB in Enro)/e and the West (I-ond m : A k n Lane, Penguin Press) is by Christopher Andrew and. Vasili Mitrokhi~~. The revelations in this thick volume about the involvement of the Soviet KC;K in a number of opera.t.icms(including some interesting '"honey traps") are breathtaking. Should Mitrokhin be considered a traitor for collecting all the damaging m d discrediting information while he was for the KGB? If his actions had been known to KGB, the consequences for Mitrokhin, would certainly have been very dire. Finally, we have h/lark Hollingsworth and Nick Fielding's somher and somewhat sad book, Defeladhg Zi'ztr Reul~ns:M15 and Zhi? Shrayler Aff:air (London: Deutclil). Shayler was recruited by M15 in an attempt to refresh and inject creativeness in the organization. Five years later, Sbayler produced a scathjng critique of M15. Among other aiticisms, he claimed that M15 was incompetcnt and heavily bureaucratic and t h t many of its officers experience prohkms of excessive alcohol consumption. Shlruld S:hayler be considered a traitor for disclosing publicly all the darnaging and discrediting s o m a t i o n he collected about M15? In a strange way, hc. may have actually helped Britain to =vitalize and modernize MI5, which was the original reason for his hiring. The motivations of different. However, both Mltrok;hh and Shayler are-apparently-very violated trust and loyalty, and thus both qualify for the title '"raitor.'" All three books provide drantatic contrasts between factual truth vis-Bvis its construction in the connplex and shady context of espionage and questimable loyaltie. The amount of literature about spies m d espionage is hdeed awesorne.7" The mmy resources spent on espionage reveal the hportance attrj:buted to int" (human-collected intelligewe, as opposed to "Elitlt,"' which is ekctro~zicallycollected intellligencc). Contrary to thclt by indjvidnals, or even companigs, theft of information in the form of espionage occupies the


Violating Tr~tsl~ l hyalty: ~ d Categolaies and Cases

attentjon of nations. They pour money into research, bribing, and bfckmailhg in order to get information, as well as deceive o&ers. 'There i s not a great deal of research on espi,mage from a social science point of view. However, one of the mom interesting studies is by Frank & g m (1989,1997). Hagan views espionage as the secretive theft of informa.t.ion. Mis informative and insightft~lwork focuses on exarniajng espionage as a lorm of political crime, he has developed an empirical classjfication of spies based on their moti\lation, His typology consists of nine main categories and orle miscellaneotls category for the cases that dn not fit the main categories. His typology classifies spies according to the following categories: merilenary (Aldrich Ames); ideolcrgical N a u s Fuchs); alienated/egocent-ric (Edward Lee Howard); buccaneerlsport (Jonathan Pollard); professional (Rudolf Abel); compromised (Richiard Milkr); deceived (Edwin Wilson recruiting technique); quasi agent (I'hilip Agee), m d finallyI those hlrho clefect in order to avoid personal problems. Hagads typology is ovati:vc and manages to surpass older typologies. For example, so-cdfed sex espionage (using sex to gai11 access to information; see, for example, Bower 1,990)can be broken into different: and more generalized categories developed by Hagan. Other possi:ble approaches could focus cm a classificatory scheme based cm the method utilized to gain inteitigense information. This codd include, for example, human data collection, electronic surveillmce, data collection fPom open sources, and even schemes cJf espimage fn [email protected] Espionage has always been a hot: topic fnr popular culture, m d such spies as John Le Carrd's Srniley and Xan Flemjng" Jjames Bond have become culkral heroes. Book md movies have glanzorized the secret agent into mythical proportions.

Double Agents, Dou231e s e n t refers to m agent who works for two intelfige~~ce organizations, sometimes even without the agent's howledge. Double agents push the boundaries between truth and deception to their farthest limits. For example, dtaring W r l d War D, M5 (British intemal counterespionage secret service) managed to capture every German agent sent to Britaisr by the Nazi Germm Abwelzr" m d turn them into double agents working for the British.

International Betrayal hterrrational betrayal is a category of betrayal where both loyalty and trust are violated on the international level.78 At least two salient possibilities exist here. One possibility occurs when a state is being betrayed by another state(s). For example, the crisis created. by Hitler in 1938 over Czechoslo-

Violating Tr~tsl~ l h~y a df f y : Categolaies and Cases


vakia, was "solved" by tthe September 29-m, 1938, signixrg of the Munich Agreement. In this agreement, British premier Neville Chmberlajn and French premier Edouard Dala&r betrayed Czechoslovakia to Hitler for a questionable and &msy hope of peace. "That was not the last time Czechostovakia was betrayed. In 1968 Alexander Dubcek led Czechoslovakia into a f ~ e d o m path that consisted of himportant rclfurms in freedom of speech and the ecmorny The ""spring of 1-"r%uef'did not last tong. The Soviet Union, worried that other Easternbloc corntries would follow this freedom trail, invaded Czechoslovailcia with full military force in August 1968 and crushed the ""spring" with an iron fist. Not one coulltry in Eastern Europe moved to help Czeckodovah a resist or cope with this brubl conquest. Worse yet, some Eastern-bloc countries participated in the militav invasion, For example, thousands of Polish soldiers took part in the first wave d invasim. NOWestern country helped either. The F ~ n c h prime mhiste~;Michel Debre, made a "f remark about the .invasion: "a traffic accident on the road to d6tente 1994:2W). Later, in the 1980s a d early 1990s, the Polish Solidarity movement and the Mazowieckj governmenl. m d e public apologies to the Czech nation. Certainly CzechoslowaEtia was not the only country that was b e t q e d like this- In 1956 the Hungarims revolted agahst the oppressive Soviet rule of the country. The Soviet army invaded Hungary, crushed the revolt, mist dictatorship. In this case, too, no and reirnstated a orthodox co country came to help the Hm~gariirtns. Thusl in Czechoslovakia and Hungar)i feeljngs of being internationally betrayed are not uncommon. However, those feelings, genuine and strong as they are, are based on the ass~tmptionthat some Western or Eastern-bloc country could have intervened and stopped a Sovief-led invasion, a questionable assumption indeed. .A somewhat sirnilar incident concerned the rerationship betwcen Italy and Nazi Gemmy Fascist Italy m d Nazi Germmy signed a pact of cooperatir,n. n i s "Pact of Steel," as Mussolini called it, was s i p e d m May 22, 1939, inBerlin. by the hnlo countries' faseip n?inistcrs, Joachirn v011 Rbbentrop of G e m m y and Count Galeazzo di Cortellazo Ciano of Zta3yYThis pact contirnued the Rome-Berlin Axis treaty signed in 1936. Thus,one could view Nazi Germany and hseist Italy as two nations wh their m t u d interests eye to eye as genuine allies, in war m d in peace. It is important to note that before this dliance was formed-particularly in 19%-the relations between these two countries had been strahed, and points of conflict invollved cultural and political diHerences.79 This ailiance lasted until 1943. Fallwing the major defeat of the Axis in example, in Milan the Mediterranean m d the Ailied strikes in Italy (h and Turin), the Italians faced the prospect of either continuing to fight a


Violating Tr~tsl~ l hyalty: ~ d Categolaies and Cases

hopeless war or surmndering, Supported by the Italian army high command, and slrme of the fascist politicians, King Victor Emmanuel :IIX called Mussolini to a conversation h which the Eng dismissed him from office. On f d y 23, 1943, uyon having the palace, Mussoljni was placed under house arrest. The fascist party and its apparatus were disbanded. Fmm a Nazi German point of view, these events could certajnly be interpreted as betrayaI by Italy, that is, an act of international betrayaI. It is hteresting to note that these events occurred because of an imer stwctural tension within the ltdian fascist movement-a d u d loyatty to both the king and the Duce, Thus, this hternational treason could also be interpreted as treason within Italian fascisrn.80 'This case had m interesting sequel hvolvhg other allegations of treason, Un Hitler" commands, on September 12,1943, Nazi airborne troops (headed by Major Otto Skorzeny) freed thr Duce in a spectilcularly dramatic raid and brought him to Germcrany; Hitler then appointed Mussolhi as the puppet fascist head in control of Geman-occupied northern Italy (thr Salo Republic), Mussoli~liused his positim to put on trial, and execute, five of those who were involved in ousting him out from power, and whom he saw as traitors. One of those five was his son-in-law and foreign minister, signer of the ""Pact of Steel," Comt Ciano (January33, 1944). The second possikliliy for international betrayal occurs when a state betrays the loyally and trust of a collective of sympathizers. Exmples abcrm~d.The Ualta C o ~ ~ f e r e ~ (code-named ~ce "Argonaut'" took place February 4-11,1945, at.Valta in the C r h e a and involved President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Premier Wmstcm S. Churchill, m d Premier foseph Stalin. 01e of the agreements achieved there was the repatriation of al)Soviet citizens. During tbe war, thousands of Soviets had fled their country, After the war ended, large numbers of Russians who were 117 was under Western AlLied control were forced, many at g~~xrpai-nt, to board trains and return ta Soviet-controlled areas, desthed for hcarceratiosr, torture, m d death. Particufarly tragic was the experience of roughly 5.5 million Soviet citizens repatriated after the war, of whom 2.3 miltfiun were handed over on the basis of agreements emeluded at the Yalta ecjnference, often against their will. The core of the repatriated were 2.1 million Qslnrbez'fer(""labor from the eastf'")and about a million prisoners-of-war: The Cksfarbeiterhad mostly not gone to Germany voluntarily. No~netheless,half af all those repatriated w e l c~m d e m e d to hard tabor.81

There is little question that a very hrge numher of those repatriated to Staiin's lethal and ruthless rclgilrrc kit completely betrayed by the Western A12ies.82 After all, most of them were first forced to move from the So-

Violating Tr~tsl~ l h~y a df f y : Categolaies and Cases


vict Union to Nazi-controlled regions, which must bave been a most difficult ercperience. WIany of those who survived trusted and were loyal ta the Western ALlies. Most of them left a totalitarian regime to which they never expected (or wanted) to be forcefully returned. One can easily interpret this nonselective act of repatriation as international betrayal*It is important to note that among the prisoners were White Russians who had never achowllcdged the Soviet Union and who had lived outside the country (more on this in Chapter Q), as well as groups of men who supparted Nazi Germany. A sirnilar incident took place in post-1945 Poland. The instant r e c o e ticm of the Soviet-sponsored gowemxnent by the West was rightly interpreted by the Polish governmmi-h-exile, and the legal opposition w i t h the countsy, as an act of international betrayal.83 There are cases *ere the two possibilities are mingled. An example is the 1,439 Molotov-l?ibbentrop pact. Despite a very basic ideological incmpati:bility between Nazi Germany and the Stalin-led Soviet Union, in Augu" 13939, :Nazi Germany" foreign minister-Joachirn von Ribbentrop-and the Soviet U16on"s forcig~minister-Vyacheslalv Molotovsigned a nonaggression pact that guaranteed the Swiet t r n i d s bordas on its western and Baltic fronts and at the same t h e allowed Nazi Cermany to invade Poland (and to risk war hvilh both Britain and France, a risk HitZer was willing to take), ?'he signfng of this pact can easily be fntr~rpretedas an act of betrayal. The Soviet Union clearly compronnised Polish integrity as a state by emablling Hitler to attack Poland (on Septezmber 1, 1939) without much ixnmediate risk for Nazi Germany. Mowover, the secret part of the pact divided large parts of Eastern Etarope between Sjazi Germany and the Soviet Unjon and thus betrayed East European states and Communist individuals in the West, who found the pact indefensible. It is possible that Sovkt citizelns undcr Stalin's regirne also condemned the pact, but opposition to Stalin tmded to evaporate rather swifily, so that no strmg voices against the agreement were heard L\lithin the country,

Mutiny Muthy in this context refers to a collecthe insurredion not aimed at a pers d or specific t a ~ e tSome . military insurrections (for example, against poor living conditiom or nourishmen-t) can be thought of in this context (for examplc, the mutiny of some 200 veterans of Montgomery's Eighth A m y in Salerno in 15343; see David 1995). However, the major and more =presentative illustrations arc. those involving large-scale insurgencies m d their wars: the American Revolutio~~ (17751783), the French Revolution (1;792-1800), the Russian Revolution (1917-19122); the great 1857


Violating Tr~tsl~ l hyalty: ~ d Categolaies and Cases

mutisly in :India (Mibbert 1978; h p u y m d h p u y 1970:85H6O), the religious revolution in Irm; and the 1968 students revolts. As can be easily seen, some civil wars c o d be nah;lrally classified into this category. In Lal these cases, members from within the group get organized, develop djstinct political cmsciousness, and engage in collective and direct action a i m d at m o w i n g past: or all of a specific political ~gixne.It thus should not surprise us to find that the rhetoric used in such conflicts frey?xently utilizes such terms as "rebet'" and ""traitor." %ch internal conflicts, a h o s t by definitjon, require the =drawing of moral bomdaries and consequently redefjnitims of loyalty and trust. fn these situations, answerhg such questions as "are you with 'us' or against 'us'?"%ecomes a crucial issue, regardless of how that ""us"is defined. n o s e engaged in mutiny tend to be described as "traitorous rebels" by those against whom they rise, and they are treated accordingly. horn the point of view of those against whom the rebellhn is directed, the rebels are iutdeed vierwed as violating both trust and loyaity to the group by going against the stabs y?xo. Social and political revdutions may elkit feelhgs and rhetoric typical of accusations of betrayal, For example, when young Jews in pre-World War 11 Eumpe joined t k Zionist movement, orthodox families, frcrm which many of them c m e , feft betsayed. Some even mourned their children as if they were gone. For some members of these f d i e s , the perception was that their children rebelled ag"i""t tradition and vioiatcd their loyalty and tmst in the "old ways'kf orthodox Judaism..U'n:like the Zionist mvolution, insurgences need not always be successful, For example, Greenbergfs 1987 work documents the successhl counterinsurgency campaign (against the Cu zlnist-led peasant party) in the Phijppines during 1.9461955. Success or faiJure of insurgences will certainly affect the relevant rhetoric of '%etraydef8 m e next category is similar to muthy in that h both trust and loyalty of large numbers of individuals are violated. .And inboth cases, these violations arc. constmcted differclntly by the betrayed and the betrayers.

State-Sponsored Terror and Human Xi@ ts Violat iotls Sometimes a state becmes involved in betrayals agaiinst its own hdividuals. M e n a mgime is involved, inexecuting large numbers of its own cifizms, like Nazi Germany, Pcrl Pot and the m m e r Rouge in Cambodia, Stalin's purges and persecutions, m e is tempted to invoke the term, "betrayal." These regimes emerged from the sarne collective whose individuals it executed. The loyalty and trust of the victims in the state apparatus were thus ~riolatedin the most fuxzdamental way. Cmsequently, one can use the term ""betrayal of the state" h ssuh cases,

Violating Tr~tsl~ l h~y a df f y : Categolaies and Cases


A very close category is the use of paramilitary ""dath squads," such as those that existed in Brazil, South Africa, and Argentina. It can also be argued that states that violate h u m n rights m betraying their citizens by violatixlg their trust and loyalty, Human rights is a continuous, not discrete, variable, so the type and prtrvalence of those vicrlations, as well as the context, are of crucial importance. The freque~~cy of such violations is a genuine and worrisome issue, as various reports about vioiations of human rights indicate. In all of these cases, those committing the violations have developed vocabdaries of motives that help them to justify and.ideologize those violations (or even ignore them; see Cnhm 2fX)O). One example is 5talinfs reign of terror, when milfions of Soviet citizens were accused of ""cottnterrevolutionary" activities, of "betraying" the revolution. The victinns were either deported or executed (sometimes after a mock trial and torture elicikd "'cdessions") as jJtraitors'"ffor example, see Getty and Nanmnv 1999). h o t h e r example is South Africa. Recent reports assert that during the power struggles of the 1980s within SWAPO (South West Africa Peaple's Osganization, formed in 1959 h todq's Namibia to oppose South African rule), hundreds of its members were held against their will in SWAPO's camps, cmelly tortured, and intermgated on charges of betraying the organization, Thus, an organization that had the god of rellcasing South Africa from the yoke of apartkid and freeing Namibia from South Africds cruel xgirnc directed some of its mnst tortwous methods against its own rnembers.84 States frequently justify their wicrlations cJf human rights on the grounds of ""scurity" or "publ.ic safety""They use Che '"ticking bomb" arg m e n t , which refers to a political situation that is extremely volatile, ready to ""explode." %cur@ agencies then make the case that in order to ind, locate, and defuse the ""bmb," they need to resort to methods of investigation that vioiate human rights (for example, torture),

Whistle-Blowing, Political Turncoating, Conversion, Strikebreaking, and Assassination The third ceXl involves mmbers of the in-group who violate the tmst olF,

and loyaity invested fn them by, other members of the in-group. 'T'he difference between this cell and the previous one, in which betrayals are committed against the general collective, lies in the level of sensitivity that these two separate cells prtwide. fn all the cases cited here, members of the relwant group would typicatly r c g d such acts with scorn, and tlne


Violating Tr~tsl~ l hyalty: ~ d Categolaies and Cases

violators of tmst and loyalty would typically fjnd it difficult to gcnerate or ~ c r u isupport t for their actions.

In the early 1,97135, thc casgo doors of two different McDonnell Douglas DC-10%blew open in midair (in one case, causixrg the deaths of 350 passengers and crew mehers). h investigation discovered that a 19@ report that pointed out: that therc? could be problems with that cargo door was not given to the Federal hiation Authority. :In 3971) Ford launched a new subcompact car-the Pinto. Tests indicated that even a low-speed coiilisjon could result in a ruphared fuel tank. Having costs in mind, Ford did not change the fauIty design. &spite warnings, the car went into production. By 1978, seventy-three people died in accidents result-ing from Pinto fires. An engineer who hvamed about the faulty design was ignored and. demoted, and be later resigned.. In 1986 the space shuttie Challenger was launched against warnings by a senior e ~ ~ g h ethat e r the seals h the rocket boosters would not hold because the temperature range was below the safety range for them, The Challenger exploded shcrrtly after liftoff because of this problem. The engheer who reveaied this fact and later testified against the management: became isolated and eventually had to leave his job, and he found it difficult tcr acquire a new job.8" 'These dramatic cases illustrate the problelxs created by organizations when they fail to listen to wamhgs. In each case, the organization misrep~ s e n t e dor concealed important infomtion. 'The literature on wbistleblowing is full of such cases. At the simplest level, whistle-blowers are individuals who report to others within, or outside, an organization about various probtems within the organiz;ation (hcompetence, illegal and/or methical activity, corruption, deceptive practices, etc.) in order to rectify and solve those psoblems. Ob~ljously,&is characterization is tot>broad, because organizations have quality cmtrollers whose job is to do just that. Whistle-blowing is characterized by the fact that key members in the orgmization disappmve of it. This disapproval is related to sweral factors; managers fear that the report may go to the "wrong people" or to the press, or it may be judged. to be too harsh. Organizations tend to rcquil-e full loyalty from their members and full m u b l trust. A whistle-Howr reveals hformat-ion about an organizatiol~that contradicts the in?age thatthe organization tries to construct about itself. Moreover, whistlc-btowers tend to have the tmst of, and share loyalty to, the same oqanization. During their normal course of work they discover and acquire secrets and dmaging informatinn about the workings of that organization, Their

Violating Tr~tsl~ l h~y a df f y : Categolaies and Cases


choice at that point is to either stay loyal to the organization and keep quiet for try to work on fie problem from within the organization), or be loyal to other norms m d '%low the whistle.'"~orne decide that their genuine loyalty is to the truth, and they "blow the whistle." Mmagers and coworkers may view this whistle-blowing as an act of violating trust and loyalty (or as split loyalties), in other words, as m act of betrayal. The organization sees whistle-blowirtg as betrayjng of the h~terestsof the organization, violating tbe rules of hierarchy, bgrpassing authority, squealhg, damaging the reputation of the orgmization, acting in a hostile manner toward the organization, poisming the atmosphere, and supplmting cooperatim with suspicion. VVhistle-blowers, on fie other hand, tend to justify their activities in such terms as doing me's job, being faithful. to the community revealing the truth, and doing something that is in the best interests of the orgmization. .hlt.houghboth sides use the hetoric of trust and loyalty, the hterpretation of these terms, as well as their direction, is very different. Obviously, organizations do not like M;histle-blnwers. Researtlh on *istie-blowing indicates rhat the road t&en by whistle-bowers is di,fficult, with often very heavy social, psychological, and economjc costs to the whistleblower. OfDay (197L2) points out that whistle-blowers risk isolation, inmased criticism, dcfmation of character, being moved to an insignificant job, being firedf and being exposed to other degradation and harassment processes.Kh Glazer and Glazer point out that as in other cases of betrayal, one of the differentiating variables determining whether a whistle-blower will be awarded recognition and respect (and perhaps cast into fie role of a cultural ""hrom")s whefier the whistle-blower recrcives or gelnerates the szxpport of a collecitive of people, that: is, mnbilizes a significant amount of power.87 Because whistle-blowir~gis perileked by many as a "problem,"' many organizations fand states) have established specialized inner mechanisms that are supposed to critkaliy examine organizations in a m r e or less mutine manner. Orgmizations and state bmaucracies have created positions such as controller and ombudsman to deflect whistle-blowing. Although this may reflect a gmuine desirc to improve, it also coopts criticism and els it in such a way that tryrrmgdoing, cormption, mistakes, and the like are either ignored, buried for y m s h "investriga,tiornsIf'or mudclfed in various conflicting and.confusing "versions." The fact remains that despite the= positions, whistle-blowing has not disappeared. Some colrnlries have instituted legal protections for whistle-blowms (for example, U,S, federal protection for whisde-blowers), The state of Tsrael has been trying, for quite some time, to pass lcgishtion that would pmkct whistle-blo.cversbut has encounte~dformid,able opposition. One


Violating Tr~tsl~ l hyalty: ~ d Categolaies and Cases

source of opposition has been the power of burezlucracy; there is a conflict among different authorities ~ g a r d i n gwho wouM be entrusted with enforcing the law. Others have exprtlsscd concern that such a law may encourage bogus coqlaints.WR For exmple, the president of Israel, Mr. Ezer Weitzmann, stated in pubfic that he =fused to lend his support to a law that a i m d to help and protect bona fide whistle-blokvers because these people are "qquealers."RY Eventualb laws werc amended. (in1932,1994, and 1997) in such a way that whistle-Mowers receive protection from their potential persecutors." It remains to be seen how el"fec.livethis legislation actually is, Two anatytical issues are associated with whistle-blowing. 011e is moral, and it concerns trust, loydty, and c o n c e h e n t . The other issue concerns power, Once a potentiat L\rhistle-Mower discovers that the organization for which he or she works is involved in such activities as sexual harassment, bullyCng, threats, cheating, concealment, or discrimination-conducted in a way that deceives the put71ic antS misrepresents the organizatic,n-a choice needs to be made, Either one must violate the trust relationships between the potential whisde-blower and the organization and publicl_v =veal the information or ofie must =main loyal and keep silent and try to solve the problem koan within. This choice is not m d e in a vacuum,, The issue of trust and fuyalty here is much more complex, because mahtaining loyalty to and trust in the organization is cmly one avenue a m g others. Loyalty to m d trust in the truth, in the public interest, or in the law can easily dictate different courses of action. From the organization's point of view, t k r e exists too a problem of who exactly the organization owes loyalty to, and what type of trust relationships exist between the nrganization and its environment. fn addition, fiere are the issues of osganizational misreprt-sentation, deception, and conceaiment. The problem of whistle-bokvhg thus involves primarily a moral dilemma centered around truth and the issues of loyalv: trust, and their violation. However, there is ancrtl~erdimension invoked here tclcr-that of power. facing a lone, Typically, we have a powerful and rescrurceful orgmizatio~~ powerless, and resourceless whistle-blower whose chances of coming out on top are not very promising. Stucfie show that in the end, power often trumps morality; as so many whistle-blowers have sadly found out. Robinson describes five central moral features of whistk-blowing, First, &ere is a question of \/vhose interests s h o d be served (individual interests, o~anizationalinterests, or publk interests). Second, lies and deception are involved in organizatimd cover-ups, often with profound negative consequencedor the wictims of those cover-ups. Third, whistleblowers are exposed to psychological, social, and legd attempts to msassisrate their character and delegitirnize them, These attacks are sometimes

Violating Tr~tst~ l h~y a df t y : Categolaies and Cases


physical, and there is a danger that the whistle-blower ma)i slip into depression and atternpt to commit suicide. Fourth, the organization receives negative exposttre as corrupt or deceptive practices are revealed. Finally, what society does, or does not do, to protect whistle-blowers becomes an It is im,perativc to point out that although whjstle-Howers arc frequently described as "traitors," it as just as likely that those being '"histled" aabout may themsefves be implicated as '"mitors," h ine sense that they may have abused their power and position. and violated the trust and loyalty invested in them. The illustrative cases with which we begart this scrction exemplify this very well.

Political Turncoating Politicians who are elected on the platform of one party and then change their loyalty to another p a r 9 are referred to as "turncoats." Such an act inwolves issues of trust, loyaity, and their violation. 'The term "political turncaating" mrnnotes a negative judg~aent.However, like other cases of violation of trust and loyalty, these very same ""turncoats" may be regarded by others as h o r a b l e , taking high risks by disregarcting party politics. Turncoat-s may thus be viewed as loyalists (to themseIves, to their principles) by one party and as traitors by other parties. Yet, it appears that most people hold loyalty to the party as the more important principle.92 However, much depencts on the context of the event. As Leach points out, the personal experience involved in changing sides in the political, arena is typical1y "~tncomfortableand difficztlt,"B It usually hvohes some sod-searching, new adjustments, confrontations with friends, and sometimes even a new identity and way of Me. Let us exmine a k w illustrative cases from two countries: England and Israel. :In Hebrew, the coil.oquial,term for political turncoatixlg is Calanterism, :In 1955 a man named Rachanlirn Calanta was elected to serve in the city cotrncil of Jerusalem as a representative of the Nationat Religiorls Frornt (idengfied with the MAFDAL Jewish orthodox religious pditical parq). FUAt was ir^lvor\led im a municipal political conflict involving trhe authorization for a new school of archaeology in thc same building where a Jewish Reformed synagogue was supposed. to be built, One resdt of this cmflict was that the h/rAI;DALdecided to quit the municipal coulncil coalition. That move left the municipal roalitio~nwithout a majority vote, fnterestingly, only one vote was required to reestablish the majority vote of the coalition. In rr-?turnfor promises and different favors, Cafanter crossed Che lines and rernained in the coalition as an hdepetn-


Violating Tr~tsl~ l hyalty: ~ d Categolaies and Cases

dent member. Doing that meant that he left the MAFDAL, on whose list he had originalfy been voted.% Although quite a few politicians on the national level (for example, Moshe Uayan), includjng memhers of the Israeli hesset, as well as poiiiicians on the local (mostly mlanicipal) level, have either changed sides permanel~tlyor made s~tcha m w e temporarily for specgic issues without: permanently leaving their original party Calanter was the first to do so, His name has thus beccrme synonymous with negafiwe and stigmatized political turncoating in Israel. Leach providcs a landmark study in this area. FIis 1945 work covered htmcoats in British poiitics horn M86 to the prment. This is how he dwumel~tsand describes some of the most famous British turncoats in his study:

* Joseph Chamberlain, whose move from the Liberal Party to the Conservative Party w m him the unsavory title of '6archtraitor'r and "Judas'" (p. 57). * Winston Churchill is perhaps the most famous turncoat. He "entered the Commons as a Conservative MP, crossed the floor to the Liberals in 19M, and eventually returned to his original party in f 924 (effectivdy),providing an unusual example of a politician successhlly dekcting back to a party he had earlier deserted" ((p. 85). * Oswald Mosley is another famous pditicjans who changed sides: "He spent only ten years in Parliament, yet in that comparativ"iy brief period. sat under four labels-Conservative, Independent, Labour, and New Party. He was also for a time ctmefy associakd wi& the ZJiiberalsU(p. 116). Qswald Mosley also became Britain's most famous Ifitscist leader, h fact, Leach states that Ifassism was the ol-2l-yideology to which Mosley remained committed and loyal. * Ransay MacDona)d, another famous turncoat, had a long politic& career that began in the early 1890s and ended in the mid-1930s. He was a member of Parliament and played a lsey role in the establishment and crystallization of thc British I:.,abourParty pm), and he was appointed its leader more than once. In January 1924 Britain elected its first Labour government, with MacDonald as prime minister. This government lasted only &out njne months. The elections that followed spelled a miqior defeat for Lhour, Folhtwing the hlfay 1929 elections, R/lacUr>naldformed a new Laboursupported government and again became prime mhister. Followh g the econorrtic crlsis, and faced by mjnisters who were not supportive of MacDonald's ideas, he reslgned (August 24, 1931). The next day he formed a national government that was supported primarily by the Conservatkes, the Liberals, and a few members

Violating Tr~tsl~ l h~y a df f y : Categolaies and Cases


of Labour. The October 1931 electiosls awarded a major victov to MacDonaid's coalition, This political structure lasted until 1945. However, &is political "exercjse" was perceived by other members of Labour as betrayal. "MacDonald occupies the prime place in the d e m o t r , g y of Che Labour Party Even now over sixty years after the events of 1932, his treachery has neilher been forgotten nor foqiven, Ramsay MacDonald is only remembered wit.hin the Labour h r t y in so far as he is remembered at all, as the man who betrayed the movement" (p. 148). * Enoch Powetl provides " h e most dramatic and sensational desertion of his party by a modern British politicianf"(p. ZOO), In 3.973, he defected from the Conservative Party to the I,,abour Party in the middle of m elecltim campaiw, calling his followers to follow suit. * Roy Jenkins "was an archturncoat. When he deserted the Labour Party to he@ found the SDP [Social Dennncrati.~ Party], it in\rof,ved a rendition of both his fmily background m d his own long career in Labor politics'"(p. 223) in a publicized controversy between 1979 and 19883. His desertio~~ of Labour was "deliberate and premedilated" ((p. 226) and not the result. of some unexpected crisis. ~ by a British MP. Ac'The summer of 1997 saw mather S L E C turncoatkg cordjng to 7%reErnes, just a few hours before the extremely popular newly elected British prime mhister Tony Blair's visit to Lmdon's Uxbridge ""a longtime Labor activist [announced] that he had decided to back the Tories. Michael Shrimpton, a party member since 1981, switched sides. . . . At a press conference with Lord Parkiwon, the Conservative Party chairm n , Mr, Shrimpton said hc wa,t;'appalled' at the way Labor had behaved sisrce enterhg gave The issues Leach discusses regarding krncoatiing seem to be valid for similar discussions about betrayal: Where is the di;viding line between genuine djsagreement and passhg to the opgosition? When shall we call it 'Vefectionf"? mat are the personal costs to the turncoat? What is t-he impact of the defection? :Is there anything personally different about turncoats? LeacWs very clear answer is negative. The issue of who becomes a turncoat, or a pcrlitical defector, depends on a variety of factors, il~cludi,ngopportunity, amount of identifiration with the original party the political structure, and inducements offered. Leach p o i ~ ~out t s that much of the current debate crvcr Ihe motivation fos changing one's party loyaities is bcused 811 a dichotomy heheen ambition and principle, Political turncoating is most certainly not confhed to Britain. :illAugust 1997, Walter Fekate, one of the most important and influential, leaders of the South African Zulu Inkatha Frtedom Party (IFP), left his party and


Violating Tr~tsl~ l hyalty: ~ d Categolaies and Cases

moved to the African National Congres "K). OX3viously this caused much mguish, anxiety, and anger among IFP mernbers, not to mention surprise among ANC members. Here is what Inkatha" leader, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, had to say about what was referred to as the "defection" of his former right-hmd man, a person with whom he shared eighteen years of political and social activities: "This is m abject betrayal. . . . We, as human beings, had a friendship. For him to turn around and do this, it shakes right to the mots my confidmce in human naturt...You start wondtzri-ng whom to trust."gb

Conversion is a category that msembles defection and desergon, but it differs in context and target. And conversion is not untike politjcal turncoathg. Ideological m d religious cmversions typically invoke the issue of betrayal." A pperson who kaves one ideological or religious gmuy to become cclmmitted to another stands a pretty good chance of being viewed by his or her preconversion symbo:(icmoral u~ziverseas betraying that universe. Much depends, of course, on the manner in which this conversion is made, but the invocation of the term ""btrayal" to describe that pmces always lurks in the background. The main reason is that rne~nbers in the collective that is beirtg left feel that the convert has betrayed thgir tmst and loyall.).. On December 13, 3999, Nezusweck (pp. 3-35) published a report about ultra-0rt.hodox Jews who decide to hecorn secular*The report was titled ""lrrael's New Defectors," The use of the word "defectors" is, tbviously ~vealing. Basicalll;; canversion means changing sides. There are many illustrations lfor conversion, some more famous and dramatic than others. Let us look at a few of them. The Rabela Hussein Affair, On July 6, 1996, The Times, reported on its

front page: A Kuwaiti Islamic court has, in effect, sentenced a businessman to death for cmverting from Islam to Christianity, five years after Westem sc~ldiersre$cued Kuwait from the clutches of Saddam Hussein. Robert f-lwsein, M, has been forced to go into hiding after the court r u f d that he is an apc>stat+a Muslim tzrt-rc> has left the faith . . . Mr. Hussein has been forced to rnotre from safe house to safe house in Kuwait, his wife has been abducted and raped and forced by her family to leave him, he is fohidden tcr see his two children, and his building business is in ruins. . . . Mr. Hussein war; sent-encd on June 9 and given 28 days to appeal. . . . The courthearing lasted less than a minute and Mr. Hussein was declared an official

Violating Tr~tsl~ l h~y a df f y : Categolaies and Cases


apostate from Islam. He is not alhavved to use his passport so he cannot take refuge abroad.%

Although Kuwait is supposedly committed to "freedom of religion," Mr. Hussein was tried by a Shia court for apostasy, a serious crime under Sharia law.

The Jerusalem Mufti and Israeli Citizenship, The Arab Mufti of Jerzlsalem, Sheik Altrarne Sabri, has hvamed, repeatedly the Pirat? dtizens of East Jerusalem not to take Israeli d.tizenship. We has stated clearly that doing so is treasmable. Sheik Sabri said that Islam did not allow Muslims to accept Issaci.licitizensbp because they are asked to declare loyalty to the State of Israel. "Palestinians living in East Jerusalem are allowed, by law, to become Israeli citizens if they so wish. This is a direct result of the annexation of East Jcmsalem to Israel in 1968. Since then and until the eariy 3990s very few East Jerusalem Arabs chose to become Israeli citizens. However, following the Madrid Conferace in 3992, a sharp increase was rclcorded hthe number of Pdeslinians asking Israeli citize~zship."* A similar exampIe is that of the many Orthodox Jews in Europe whose family members converted to secular Zionism between 1925 and 3938. Far many pareills this conversion was a great tragedy and many mourned their farniIy members as if they had died.

Roger Casement. One of the better-howiz, and most tragic, cases of conversion, which ended with charges of treason and execution, was &at of Sir Roger Casement. Born Septmber 1,3864, in County Dublin, Roger Casement develoiped m impressive and distkguished career as a British civil servant. He served as a diplomat, representing Great Britain, in such varied places as Portuguese East Africa (Mozambiyue 1895-1K98), Angola (1898-19WQ), Congo Free State (2901-1"30), and Brazil (190&1911). Casement's work led him to expose the atrocities committed in the exploitation of natives by white traders in Mrica (Congo) and South America (Peru). His 1904 report &out the abuse of natives in the Congo won hiPM international recognition and respect and brought about s m e profound changes in Belgian rule of the -go. Casement was hit;hted following his IN12 report about the abuse of the natives in Peru. Poor health forced Casement to quit. his work, and he r e t i ~ din Irclmd in 1912, Despite a brilhant career and impeccable service to the Crown, Casement sympathized with Roman Catholic Irish nationalism. 'This was unusual, considering the fact that he came from a Protestant family. Pincher points out that Casement had been secretly baptized from Pmtestmtism to Roman Catholicism, meaning that Casement experienced a religious conversion as we1t.l""


Violating Tr~tsl~ l hyalty: ~ d Categolaies and Cases

It did not take long lfor Casement to harness his hcredible abilities to the Irish cause. Zn 1913 he helped orgmize vdmteers and in 1914 traveled to New Uork to solicit American support for an anti-Britisk force. When WorXd. War I began in August 1914, Casement felt that it was a golden opportunity to seek German support for an ineiepmdent Ireland. Specificdy, he wanted to havc tangible G e r m szxpport for anti-British activities. Casement was not a man to waste time; he immediately traveled to Berlin in November 1914,7b his disappointment, German leaders made it clear that they were not gohg to risk m expeditionary force to Ireland.. Moreover, Irish POWs refused Casement" ppsnosal to join a brigade that he tried to organize to fight the British. He even failed to secure German rniniml support for an Irish uprising planned Eor 1,916. Despite their refusal of Casement" ppruposd for a direct and iorceful German intervmticm in Ireland, the Germans were interested in s q p a r t ing the Irish national movement; Irish unrest would distract the British and divest their military resources, Thus, the Germans sent Casement back to Ireland, part& to help subdue the questionable 1916 revolt and partly to continue his agitation there. Casement made his trip to Ireland in a German U-19 submarine as a guest of its commander, Kapitanleutnant Weisbach. He lmded in Tralee Bay on April 20 1916.I"' It did not take and m April 24 he was arrclsted. Casethe British lmg to track Casente~~t, ment was taken to L m d m where he was charged with treasm, found guilty in court, convicted of treason on June 29, and sentenced to death. His glorious past and services to the British Empire did not do him much good, m d appeals on his behallf were rejected. He was hanged on August 3,1916, in Pentoz~villef"rison.102 The contrast between the first half of his career and his end is most striking. It appears that Casement experienced conversion in two significant areas-the religious and the political. Casement was "the only Britcrn tt?be executed far espionage durj,ng World War X," and his "was the first execution h Britah for treason for more than a century"uJ3 The EJli Geva At"fair, h J w ~ 1,982, e Israel began a d i t a r y campaign in Lebanon, which included, a massive invasion of ground forces into the country In fuly, the Israeli military forces were circling Beirut, and politicims were debathg the possibility of e~~terirrg the city m d occzupyhg it. Colonel Elli Geva, a brigade commmder, was outspoken in one of these discussions among the Israeli military commmders. He warned the chief of stae that such an elntry W@ unkvise. Later, in meting5 with his superiors, he asked to be relieved of his command because he did not wmt to be one of the commanders that would order his troops to enter Beimt. Ceva, however, %reed to remain in uniform as a tank driver, This did not h p pen. Folfowing talks with Geva" direct commanders and political superi-

Violating Tr~tsl~ l h~y a df f y : Categolaies and Cases


ors, he was Ordered not to return to Beirut, was fired from the army, and prevented even from having a proper farewell with his soldiers.lw Moreover, he was refused a role, or command, in the lsradi army's serve.^^^ Did Geva betray the trust invested in him. as a commander and violate his loyalty? Many individuals kel he did and that he changed sides. By to take commixnd scsponsi,bility fbut agreeing to participate inan invasion as a tank driver), his behavior could. be interpreted as betraying his loyalty to his command and the trust they invested in him, The Colonel Geva who refused to order his troops to e ~ ~ tBeirut er was not the same man as the one at the start of the war; his values were certainly changed. This is il7deed a difficult case. On one hand, Geva was expected to obey orders g j v m to him. 011 the other hand, he felt that orders to penetrate Beirut would cost numerous lives. He did not see the point to that, and this belief led him to state his objec-tion. But Geva was no conscientious clbjectot R u s , the constructions cd Geva and of his superiors are very different. FXe paid dcarly as his military career was shattered, and he disappeared from Israeii publk life,

Strikebreaking During the acadelnic year 1994-1995, the salior academic staff a.t. Israeli universities declared a full teaching strike due to a conflict over low salaries. It was the longest strike of academic staff in the his to^ cJf the country; lasting seventy-six continuous days. As the strike continued, anger and feelings of frustration were building up, At the time of the strike, 1 was the chair of the department of swiolog and anthropology m d I had to deal MIith all the ad~ninistrativeproblents crcated by the con-. thued strike. n e w reiallq. was not much one could do excerpt wait for this labor dispute to end. Toward the end of the strike, though no one h e w at that- time that the strike was going to end in one or tvvo more weeks, one of the senior hculty members in the deparment-let us call him "Professor K-asked to see me. Wben we met in my office, Profcssor A told me that he had had it with the strike. He was going to the president of Hebrew Uni:versity to tell him that he personally was no longer on strike. He wanted his saiary to be reinstated, and he was going to demand that the department-'Ssecretaries contact e v e q one of his students and inform them that his classes were c o m n c i n g . m e n 1asked him wbrther he believed in the goals oE the strike, he replied that he no longer believed that we-the slrikerscould get what we wanted and that be had plans for the summer, which he did not want to be diskrbed by the strike. Complying with his wish meant quite a hit of work fos the admhist-rat.ivestaff bbclcawse his students


Violating Tr~tst~ l hyalty: ~ d Categolaies and Cases

had to be located (students had left campus during the strike), contacted, and told that his cbsses (and his classes only) were on, I suggested that he spe& to the dean of the facdty about hir; change of heart.l(J6Despite my cmtempt for this despicable behavior at a very diffi. repeated his cult mornent, I felt that his wishes should be ~ s p e c t e dHe request to the dean, went: to the pre?sjdent of Mebrew tlnjversity and told h h that he was a strike violator, and demanded that his salary be reinstated."""7e departmental administrative staff made m effort to locate his students, sent them letters, m d even called them. The result was that very few students came in, One must remember that the rest of Hfrfbrew University was on full strike. Within two weeks or so, the strike ended whesz the Israeli state treas~~ry agreed to respond positively to the overwhelmixlg majority of our dcmands, These develctpmmts, obviously, put the treacherous behavior of Professor A in a rather ridiculous light. Moreover, he never approached anyone with an apology or stated that he was giving uy the strike" economic gains. F r m my point of view, one of the most interesting aspects of this situation occurred at the eszd of the first conversation with Professor A: He asked me to keep his request a secrct. X pointed out to him that it would be utterIy impossible because the dean,the presidmt, a large administrative staff i,n the department, and the faculty, not to mentio~zthe students, wczuld necessarily know about it. It was not possible to keep such an operatrim secret. He ~ s p o n d e dthat once people learned about his behavior they would call him a "Q~islkg." X was puzzled at that. I knew that C;luisljng was a name synonymous with treason aromd the days of World War 11, but not more than &at. Curious, 1 weszt to the 1;ibrary and picked up Hsidalfs 1989 volul~e011 Quisling. As X was readjng i.t, two things occurred to me. First, Profcrssor A was flattering himself, He had very little in commm with Quisling. Althougb Qujsling's treason is an open and difficult questjon, Pmfessnr A"s betrayal of his colleagues, in one of their most difficult moments, was very &vious. Quisling" activities were motivated by a variety cJf motives, most important of which was ideologica). Professor A was motivated by his egoism, his frustration, and his i d i l i t y to forego his salary-two very differcsnt cases altmgether. C)f course, the sdf-aggrandizement of cornparing hinnself to wsfin.g was perhaps typical of the person who breaks a strike, violates his colleagues"rustI and. asks that this shamehl act be d well kept secret. Second, it dawned on me that this issue of " ' t ~ a s was worth a study The resulhf that incident is this boak. A labor strike is m interesting form of connlct. A typical strike has one group "f laborers with a variety of delnands facing a much smaller group of managers with cliMwnt demands. A strike draws clear boundaries between ""us"' and '"hem," and each side is required to take a stand. Thus, a

Violating Tr~tsl~ l h~y a df f y : Categolaies and Cases


strike is not just a power struggle between laborers m d managemnt. The nabre of the conflict is such that once the moral boundaries are d r a m , a strong and emlltional rhetoric emerges. The abjlity of both sides to achieve their goals depends, among other things, on the solidarity that each side presents. The erositm of this solidarity =sulks in the loss of bargainhg power by the collective. Strikebreakers, obviously, are not liked or respected. Moreoves, attitudes toward them differ according to whether fiey initially supported or opposcd the strike. Breaking a strike afier first consenting, Like Professor A, is not viewed lightly. Breaking the solidarity of th g r w p in this manner wiolates a moral code of trust and loyally and can generate a very emotional response. This breach of moral boundaries and changing of sides justifies branding the skikebrezldter as a traitor. Moreover, because a typical strike is a contest of power, a strikebreaker may tilt the balance. One of the m r e memora:ble definitions of this type of betrayal was constructed by the writes Jack London: "A strikebreaker is a traitor to his God, his country, his wife, his family and his class.'"oK Before ending this section, a disclailner is necessary Strikes are meant to hurt. Without tangible threats andior causFRg some damage, strikes are useless. 'I'he question m a i n s , wherr-? is the boundary? In countries where physiciansbaXaries are state controlled (and paid), one must ask when does a physicianshstrike become so lire threatenilrg to the populaticm that it m s t be stopped? Does a teachers' strike fireaten wefl-being and cause damage? It is possible to conceive that a strike could he so damaging that stri.k&reakers would be more than welcome. Xf this situation occurred, Jack London" '""dinition" would be rendered invalid. However, it must also be poiinted out that deciding where the dividing line is between a legitimate strike and a strike thabeverely hurts the population in an intolerable fashion is itself a subject far debate between strikers and employers"'The truck drivers' skike over fuel prices h EUrope m d Englmd in ZOO0 is a good example. Drawing this line cast s m e times be a difficult task.

is a spedfic fnrm of assassinati.on that involves betrayal in an bteresting manner. It is wellf worth examjning.l@ 7'he word '%assasshf%has an Arabic origin and refers to a particutar pattern of killing that was practiced by an easfy Islamic tihiite religious cultcalled. the Ismaili, The goal of the early IsmaiXi was to purify Islam through terrorism and killi~~g corrupt and irnmorat officiafs.1"" The Ismailis, however, had no exclusive rights on this form of killing. There were earlicr movements that used assassination as part of their struggle,


Violating Tr~tsl~ l hyalty: ~ d Categolaies and Cases

Well-known groups are the Thugs (who killed for Kalil'l) and the Sicarii (a group of Jews who practiced assassination in the Great Rewlt of A.D. 6&73).112 The order of Assasshs, however, is probably the most famous of these groups. Descrjbing and analyzi~~g the history of the order of Assassins has been accomplished bp other schdars, and a full account of their hjstory and activit.y is clearly beyond the scope of this work.11" brief account, however, is in order. 'The death in AD. 632 of the Islamic prophet, Mohammed, created a crisis, One result of that crisis was the creation of the caliphate, which instihttionalked the Prophet's charisma. Abu Rakr became the caliph. However, there were those who d i s a g ~ e dand felt that Ali-the cousin and son-in-1a.w of the Prophet-had a better and stronger claim than Abu Bakr. This particular dissenting group became known as the 5hiatu Ali (ALi's party) and later as Shai. That early col~fictgave birth to the most important cleavage h Islam.ll" Around the year AI),760, a particular grwp br& wiiy from Shiism. 'They call4 t%iemselvcsIsmailis, after Ismail, so11 of fafar al-Sadiq, grcatgrmdsm of Ali and Hatirna. At the end of the elevcnth century, a sec.ct society of the Ismailite sect was founded fn Persia by :Hasan ibn al-Sabbah, who was born, at an unk~acvndate, in the city d @t~xmand died in 1124. Hasan apparentjy traveled extensively h the Middle East, North Africa, and Egypt, W ing converts. His goal was to disseminate heterodox doctrinrz and battle the Scljllq Empirts. Hasan needed a base, and by 1090he had enoutgh followers to h d p blrn conguer (40%-3091) the fortress of Alamut in the Elburz mountains (in northern Persia, south of the Caspian %a). h l m u t b e m e the headquarters of Hasan" sect, and Hasan became known as the Old Man of the Momtain, or the Crmd Master. Hasan, however, wanted to gain more converts and have morc3 bases. Me apparently felt that Idarn could, and should, be purified by assassinatirtg in a systematic way all of its major officials, whom he chose to define as corrupt. Hasan clearly aimed to unify Islam into one coherent and integrated commm~ity.Hasall and his sect thus developed the '"art of assassination."" 'They were quite successful fn spreading fear and terror (Rapclport 19%). Hasan's ruthlessness was justified on religj,nus grounds. He chose young, inteujgent, and able people, full of enthusiasm and faith, They were them trained and taught the principles of Hasan's interpretaticm of the faith and then sent on their d e d y missions. The groups of these young men were called Fidais. There are uncorroborated reports (traced to n/larco Polo) that Hasan's young assassins at Alamut were k d into a so-called gardcn of paradise where t h y c o ~ ~ s ~ ~ m e d hahi&, The purpose of this supposed ritual was to persuade the con-

Violating Tr~tsl~ l h~y a df f y : Categolaies and Cases


verts that paradiscr awaited them and that death in the course of carrying plots woutd only hasten their entry to paradise. out their assassi~~ation Hence the name biashishin became synonpous with Hasan's sed. There are a few good reasons to suspect the validity and truthfulness of the story &out the hashish cmsumption,"s hut the fact that it was socially tonslructed, told, and possihly believed created the dynarnic of a self-fulfilting prophecy The Assassir^ls, as they became known to the West by the Crusaders, were quite successful and gained dmnst full cmtrol of Syria. Because, in the Muslim context, the basis of power was personal, when a sultan, or an amir, was assassinated, his base of power disintegrated.1" A~ssassilzations within this cultucal context were thus a powerful pofitical, and social weapon, :111 the twelfth cenbry, the Assassins were led Zly the last Grand Master, Ru&-al-Dh murshah. The end of R u b , and of the Assassins, came ~ I I der the double assault of the Mongols and of the M a d & sultan of Egypt, Baybars. In 1256 the fortress of AIalnut fell. Later, and throughout the 1270s, many other fort~ssesof the Assassins thmugfnout the Middle East Ml. nousands of Assasshs where killed. Tl~atwas the end of the ruthless organization that had thrown an ugly shadow over the regim fos a h s t two centuries. Although the thirteenth century marked the virtual end of the Assassins as a sect, reports about them and their idedcrgy and methods were carried into Europe by the Crusaders""7 The Assassixzs devcfaped a policy of organized, which exhibited one of the m s t important features of political assassination: a sgecific target coupled with a carefully assasshation plot" The pattern of assassination, however, was resting. The Assassins kilfed in a padicdarfy vile m er-after they had befriended their victim,ll" Thus, an "assassin" wwas a persorl who won the trust and loyalty of his victim by deceit and then violated it in the most bmtal way This seems to quatify this form of killing as betrayal. The probtem is that the "friendship" sought by the assassin was never genuine or sincere. IIthis respect, the assassins were like innphnted spies,"lg pretending to be loyal and tmstworthy members of a collective, but in fact the opposite. C)ne of the most f m o u s modern illustrations of this kcRnique is the assassination of Leon Trotsky on August 20, 1940. As Lentz points out, R a m h Mercader, disguising himself under the name of Frartk Jackson, gained Trotsky's trust and loyalty and was able to brcach the securjty of Trotsky" hbvse near Mexico City, Mercader then killed Trotsky with an alpine ax. He was caught, served twenty years fn a Mexican prism, and was released in 1969. Before his death in 1978 in Havana, Cuba, he was pronounced a ""hero of the Soviet Union."


Violating Tr~tsl~ l hyalty: ~ d Categolaies and Cases

As I have shown elsewhere,l21 the pattern oi assassinations, crossculturally, is such that in the m;tjority of cases, the victim and the assassin seem to be from the same coXlective cultural group. However, contrary to the Assassins, in most cases, the assassin and his or her victim were not personatly acquainted. Thus the issues of personal loyalty and trust, in most cases, are irrelevant. There are many cases *ere people in prominent political positions as were assassinated because their views were interpreted by assassi~~s treackrous and dangerous pctl.iticalfyf idedogically, and / or socially The November 4, 1995, assassination of Vitzhak Rabh In Tel h i v is one such case (discussed in detail in Chaptefll). Another example is the Irish politician Robert Erskine Childers, Barn in England. in 1870,Childers developed an interesting career as an author, a professional yachtsman, and an activist for Irish nationalism. His spy novel, T!ze KiLc'dlrc of the liarzds, details a German flan to invade England.12Wmy take the book as a sort of a prophecy m Clnilders" part. Childers, opposed to any-thing other than republic status for Ireland, joined the Republican Army, and in the civil war in Ireland he fought against the forces of the Zrish Free State. He was caught, tried, and executed by a firh~gsyuad of soldiers of the Irish Free State on Ntrvember 24,1922.12" Other prominent victims of political assassination indude Abraham LincoZn (Aprit 14, 1865), Irish activist Michael Coliinsl2"August 22, 1922), Mohandas K. Gandhi (January 30, 1"348),Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.(April 4,1968), and Robect F. Kennerrly (June 5,1968). Finally, there is m e other form of assasinatim worth mentioning hrrc., and that is tyrannieide. If a ruler is perceived to betray his okvn people, by violating their trust and loyalty to the point where the abuse of power becomes intolemble, s+ects may resort to murder as a way of escaping oppression. This particular form of killil~greminds us that betrayal can come from members of a rulisrg elite. Such cases as the assasshations of Julius Caesar (44 Iri.C.) and Caiigula (A.D. 411, and the Juiy 20, 1944, attempt on Hiter's life testify to this possibiiii-y.

Con Artistry Private Investigation, Professional Betrayal, Sumeillance, and Espionage h the previous three parts I have discussed separately three of the cells that appear in our classificatory table. In this part, I shdl discuss the final two cells together. 'The first of these t w cells comprises acts of betrayal comnitted by an outside member in such a way that the vidations of trust and foyale are

Violating Tr~tsl~ l h~y a df f y : Categolaies and Cases


aimed at the personal level, These include con artistry, private investigaticm, and professional betrayal.

Con Autkty Con artists prese~~t m hteresthg combhation of both deception and violation of trust and loyalty. En this mspect, con artists are not dissimilar to hnplanted spies. Both engage in deception about their true identity and intentions. Contmry to implanted spies, who operate on the nat-ional level ( m d smetimes as industrial spies), con artists typically fan within the crimirral jurisdiction. These individuale; present themselves as something other than what they really are. A nonlawyer may built a front nf a lawyer, a nonphysician act as a physician, a nonbroker as an honest broker, a nm-real estate agent as a bona fide real estate agent. Posing as a legitimate bushess person, the con artist tries to trap the unsuspecting vict h . The typical result of a successful (horn the point of view of the con perscm) c m game is the swindling of resources (money, property, land, or rights) from the victim. h lavishly austrated fictional con garne can be seen in the 1973 movie Tfie Stitzg, Maurer" classic work (1.940; see also 1974) provides us with further h~sightsand ilustrations into this behawior of betrayal, Canning a h a y s involves constructing and psesenting a false social reality and deceptive personal identity The aim of doing this is to build the trust of the victim to such a dcgree that thc fie or she develops complete and full confidence in the con artist, Once that is achieved, violatirrg the faked trust and byalty can be accomplished. In other words, the "stingf" takes place, to the miserable djsahantage of the vi,ctirn. The con?bjna.t.ion of deception and the violation of unreal trust and loyalty in a crimhal arena are t-he haurnarks of conning. Moreower, although the target of a con game may typically be a specific persm, it need not be so. BJ-itish tycoon Robert Maxwell showed how a con artist c m fool and swhdle by violathg the tntst and loyalty of a very large number of innocent people (more than once and in more than one corntry). Conning can also be an important aspect of spyjng, It should not c m e as a surprise that Seth (1972), for example, feels that Delilalz was a spy (agent provocateur in his terms) m d actually betrayed Samsan. 'The madern tern for that would probably be '"honey trap" ((or"sex trapm).l"A contemporary example is tbe exposer of Israeli nuclear secrets-Mordechai Va'anunu. Va'anunu was in the process of providk~gthe London Sr.rlzday Times crucial information about IsraeYs nuclear program. In September 1986, only a few days before the story was to be published, Vafmmu disappeared. He was trapped by ei.lrher sex, or the promise of sex, 0ffen.d by an attractbe woman who called herself ""Chdy." Va%arrmustated that on


Violating Tr~tsl~ l hyalty: ~ d Categolaies and Cases

September 24,1986, he met "Cindy" h r the first time in Leicester Square in Lcmdon, and they continued to meet several m m times. ""Cindy'" persuaded Vafanwlu to leave Londo~land come with her to Rome, supposedly to visit her sister. They left London on Sptcmber 30, 1986, aboard a British Airways tligbt to Rome. There they were met by a m m MIho presented himself as the frielnd of "Ci.mdy'sffsister and took t h m to a private apartment just outside R m e . There &hanunu was attacked by two men, dmgged, taken aboard a ship, and brought back to Israel to stand a trial far trcaso~~. h fact, Va'mmu was kidlapped by an Israeli secret service unit. ""Cindy" was a Mossad agmt, who corned V a h u n u by first building his trust inher and then wiolated it. She used Vafanunu%attraction to her to 1 ~ ~him r e into a fateful. ""LEcrrreytrap."=e

Private Investigation Private eyes have the potential fur actirtg like "traitors," That may happen when they present themselves as not what they actually are, trying to gain the trust nnd loydty of tl-teir ""iarget,""only to violate it later and use it against that "target." In this particular rcspect, private eyes c m very close to con artists.

Professional Betrayal This cdegory rcfers to si.tuations where professionals betray the trust and loyalty of other individuals. Exasnpiles aholmd.. One simple examgie involves therapists who take advantage of the vherability af their patients and have sex MIith then. A particdarly problematic subcategory of this case hvolves those professionals who sexually &use children.1" Patients who come to therapists for support in resolving their psychological problems surely put: Cheis full trust and loyalty i,n these theragists. mvionsiy, using that relationship of loyalty and tmst to gaixr access to sexual favors is a severc.betrayai of trust. Other cases involve physicians who fail to tell their patients the true nature of their disease, fearing Che patients' reactions, or physicians who perform. unnecmsary surgeries, or lawyers who cheat and take advantage of thrir clients. These issues are sometims defined as "ethj,cal problems" and involve a varicty of relationships between professionals and their clients. Likewise, a category of interest to acadelnics is the potentid vialation of trust and loyaity between researchers and Chejir sub~ects.The elnphasis here is on the one-to-one, personal interactions beheen the parties. Oste such spectacular case was exposed in the spring of 3998 by British TV Channel 4. In a .fascinating and moving dac~tnnentayabotlC Soviet cosmonauts h r i Gqarin and.his colleagues, it was revealed that Vladimir

Violating Tr~tsl~ l h~y a df f y : Categolaies and Cases


KomarovFone of Gagwin" colleagues, decided to By a spacecraft that he knew had so many design flaws that it was doomed not to return to Earth in one piece. Komarov vdunteered for the mission in order to save Gagarin"~I&. On April 23,1967, he went into space and waited, there for his death. His last words transmitted to Earth were cursing those who sent him to his death. Fdlowing this event, Gagarin organized a campaign for the sakty of pilots, which-by the way-was not wekomed by Soviet officials (see Doran and Bizony 1998:19&21)1). Another illustration hvolves scientists who report on observations that have never been made, falsify and fabrirate dati-t,plagiarize other works, and persecute scientists with whose views they disagree."g Broad and Wade's 1982book on this topic is appropriately titled Betrayers of Tr;cdtfi. More examples involve bankers and brokers who flagrantly violate the trust given to them by their clients to embezzle money cheat, and steal, sometimes on a colossal scale. 'This category is close to con artistry, except that con artists set out deliberately to con their clients and. are typicatly involved in maU-scale operations. Mso, the type and quality of trust: and loyal% between a patient and a pr&ssional are different than those involved h a simple criminal '"on g m e . " The betrayal of the cfient's trust here is obwious, and the damage to those cfients can be quite devastating*

Brand" Mission. A most dramatic and tragic case involves a rather diabolical. Nazi scheme from World War 11.'" h March 1944 the Nazis invaded Hungary, Adolf E i c b a n n was assigned the gruesome task of murdering the 8(2(l,f)1)0 Hungarian Jews.""Ve and his group of Nazis c m to Budapest-and began their yrepara.t.ionsto activate the "final solution" for Hungarian Jews.'"P The Jews in Hungary werc divided into a few main groups. "They were, however, w a m of tvhat the Nazis were doing to European J e w "They tried to orga,nize help and created a "'saving committee." On April 25, E i c h called UoeX band, a Hungarian Jew to his office a d told him that the Nazis were willing to spare about one million Jews iF the Allies would provi,de the Wehnnuchf with 10,0(30trucks (to be used, accordhg to Eichmann, only on the Eastern Front), suhstmtial amounts of tea, coffee, cocoa, soap, and m undisclosed amournt of money;'""" On May 19, Brand left Hungary (accompanied by Andor '*Bandip' Crosz) with this diabolical '%"blood for trucks" offer m d went to Turkey m d from there to Syria. The plm was to prese~~t this "deal" to the British. Contrary to Britist-r promises, when Brand arrived in Syria, he was arrested by the British autkoritics on June 7,1944, and sent to Cairo where fie was jmprismed for three and a h& w n t h s . Sowyer B& states that the order to arrest Brand was issued by Sir Harold MacMichael, the


Violating Tr~tsl~ l hyalty: ~ d Categolaies and Cases

Bri.tish high comrmissimer for Palestine and Transjordan. h doing this, MacMichael violated his promise to Mosbe Shertok, of the Jewish Agenq, that Brand wodd not be arrested. 'The explanation give11 by MacMichael for violating his c o m i t m m t was that "it is war now."133 :111 Cairo, Brand reported that he met with BriPish resident mirrister to the Middle East, Lord Moyne, to discuss Eichmam's offer and Chat. when Moyne heard about the Nazi "offer" to release Labout one million 'Jews, he ~ s p c m d e dby sayhg, "llow do you imagine it, Mr. Brand? What shall I do with those million JewsWWf-rereshall 1 send them?"l34 Wasserstein (1982) argues that the "account" given by Brand was a propagaslda Eatoncation and that Moyne and Brand probably never met. In any event, it is obvious that Brand felt bitterfy betrayed. However, one must &serve that the role Brand played was very complicated. 7'hedebate about whet.her he was a pawn used by Eichmann to expedite the extermination of Mungarfs Jews, or whether there really was a genuirre "Hood for trucks" &al, Etas not been entirely resolved. Wymm (BM) points out that the "deal" ooffertrdby Eichmam to Brand was probnbiy a feeler from S.S. Reichsfuehrer Heinsich H i d e r , \zrhose hidden agenda was to find out whether a separate peace or cease-iire agreement codd be worked out between Nazi Germany and the West. Regardless of how truthful Brand's report. was,l" it is obvious from his behavior and testimonies that Voel Brand felt betrayed, bitter, and extremety mgry.136 Brand" mission failed. The Americans were willhg to enter these negotiations, if only to buy time and save Jewish lives. However, the Soviets (suspicious, as usual, about thc. West's intentions) and thc. British (expressil~gfears that the Nazis might '"flood'' them with Jewish rehngees and thus delay and sabobge the war effort) were not. The resIdll was that the British a r ~ s t e dBrand.D.77 Beginning in May 1 9 4 , the Nazis deported r ythe death camp complex Auschwitzabout 450,080 Jews from H u ~ ~ g ato Birkenau, where they were systematically gassed and cremated. That happened despite appeals h m Jewish leaders tct bomb fby air) the railroads leading to AuscSlwilz, and the camp itself. The appeals were rejected.

Karski" Mission. The case of the Polish emissary Jan Karski is sornewhat similar, Toward the end of 1942, Karski left Polmd canying some alarrning messages to the West about the Nazi systematic eMorts to extermhate European Jews provided by Jebvish leaders hWarsaw As a representative of the Polish underground, Kasski met in July 1943 with President Roosevelt and told him what he had wibessed at Belzec, and in fie fail of 7,944, his information about the extermjnation of European Jews was published in the United States.13Wike Brand's mission, Karski's in-

Violating Tr~tsl~ l h~y a df f y : Categolaies and Cases


formation failed to elicit a response that was effective in altering the externination process. 'These cases are included as illustraticms of professjonal betrayal because ineach case various professionals were presented with alarming information but failed to react in an effective way. The tmst and loyalty that were assumed when both Karski and Brand set on their missions were broken. Surely, a g ~ a t e response r could have followed their discfosures than silence and h a c t i o ~ ~ , 'The next cell we shall focus on is one where an. outside member c m mits violations of trust and loyalty aimed at the collective, Tbere are two typemofbetrayal in this celt: srtrveillance and espionage.

Surveillance Surveillance is practiced by the military, by palice, and by private investigators, m d it usually refers to the close supervision of activi.ties of specific citizens.l.7"" ALthough violatirrg trust and loyalty are not ty~icaliyinvolved in it, s o m forms of this prac.lice may involve issues of trust, for example, when a spouse asks that his or her partner be put under surveillance without that parher's howledge or agreement. Thus, altlnoul;h military surveilla~cedoes not necessarily involve violating trust or loyalty; other forms may."% the abstract Itvcl, one can argue that using surveiXlance (for example, wiretappi"g) violates a generat sense of trust assumed by citizens, However, when undercover cops and sting operations take place, a much more specific and concmtc sense of violation oi trust and loyalty is created. An undercover agent or a sthg operation is based on instilling in an unsuspecting target the false feeling that another persun is from the same cultural group, is loyal, and c m be tnlsted. &ce htyalty and trust are established, they are used to trap the unszxspecti;,ng person. Thus, alhough the undercover agent does not betray the tmst of his masters, he is violating thr tmst and loyalty of the decei\.ed person. Staples" ((1997)provocative s~~ggestisn is that Western societies have experienced a shift Eram focusing surveiBance on specific and suspected targets to a culture where everyone is a suspect. In contemporary life, we are all subjected to mmy types of sllrveiilance on a routinc basis. He refers to this phenomenon as the '"meticulous ritual of power.'? Such surveiliance includes being taped on video cameras in stores, gas stations, banks, s h a d s , cowts, buses, and worblaces; being; recorded on a d o tapes in elevators and on telephones, and being tested by polygraphs, perscmality- tests, dmg tests, genetic screening, and so forth. Staples's observatiun calls attentiun to the fact that in modern, information-processing cultures, much information is gathered about in-


Violnti~tgTrust and Loyalty: Categories and Cases.

nocmt citizens, many times without their knowledge m consmt. This information is gathered in formats that offer easy wtriwal. AlChough some of .this gathering of in.fnrmatim is done for beneficial purposes (for ample, persmal security), it also c m be used against citizens or in ways that are inappropriat-eand u~~~ustified, Metn &is happens, the issue of violating trust and loyalty is invoked in full force.

Espionage: Spies Versus Traitov-Spies Espionage does not altvays involve betrayal. Ilcrwever, it may violate what appears to be trra&, but is not. Spies who are part of Che collective whose secrets they steal and pass on to others easily qualify as traitorsfor example, Jonathm Pdlard. Spies who are implanted by one country in another and who pretend to be genuine members of that other comry, whilc passing its secrcts to the country that sent them (the same logic would apply to industrid espicmage) cmnot be considered traitors. Let us laak at some illustrations from Israel and elsewhere. Israel has long been a traditional target for Soviet intelligence efforts, and many of their fmplmted spies have been caught a d have received w i d e s p ~ a dpuh)icityl" Among the more famous are the following. Zekv h i , one of the most important Soviet spies in Israel, served as an Israeli dipl"mat in a variety of roles but actualfy worked for the :KGB. He was caught in 15356 and sentenced to fo~lrteenpears in prison.1": Two other spies who were caught in the 1950s were Yitzhak Zilberman and Levi Levi. Z i l b e r m , an engineer who worked for the metal industry in Koar Corporation and for the KGB, was caught and sentenced to nine years in prison in 1959.1" k v i Levi was implanted as a mole in the Tssaeli secret service by the Polish secret services. He was cau@t a d sentmced to ten years in prison h 1958. The head of the KGB station in Israel during the 1980s was Alexander Lumov who was assisted in his job by his wife, Anna Alexei (who worked as a cipher clerk in the KGB statictn). In 1,988bolt.1 defected to Israel. 'Thatdefectim helped to expose at least three other spies, One of them was Gwgory Londin, who was drafted to the KGB in 1973 and sent as a spy to Israel. He was caught and sentenced to thirteen years in prison in 1,988, h o t h e r casualty of this defection was Roman Weisfeld., who immigrated to Israel from the Soviet Union in 1980 m d was caught and sentenced in 1988 to fifteerz years for spying.. AIexander Rcdlis, who was the coach of the Israeli natimlal ping-pong tern, was drafted by the KGB in 19% and arrived in Israel in 1979. He collected and sent infarmation. to his Soviet masters until 1988. For his

Violating Tr~tsl~ l h~y a df f y : Categolaies and Cases


services, he received tholxsmds of dollars, h December P996 he was sentcnced tc:,four years in prison, Two other cases illustrate the contrast between a "spy" and a ""eraitorspyf5Shimeon Levkm was an Israeli high-ranking officer in military intclligence who began to pmwide the Soviets valuable information in 4983. He becme a spy out of his okvn free will. Ctearly, Levism qualifies as a bona fide traitor, On the other hand, Anatoly Gcndler, an electric engineer, was drafted by the KGB in the 1 9 7 0 ~ sent ~ to Israel in 1983, and caught: in Novcrnber 1996. Although he was paid for sencfing his masters valuable information for a period of fifteen years, he cannot be considered a traitor. 'There have been other Soviet implanted spies in Israel, none of whom qualifies for the dubious titIe "traitor" because they were not bona fide mernbers oE the Israeli national collective; they just pretertded to be. Two of the m s t famorls Soviet spies in X~rael~Markus Khgberg and Shabtai Kalmanovitch-are well worth mentioning. 1113948 twenty-year-old Markus Klingberg i igrated to Israel. He developed an impressive career, achieving the rmk of w~iversityprofessor, and served as the deputy chief of the biological insti-tute in Nes Tzima (a short distance south of Tel Avh). According to a variety of sources, that institute was the hub of Israeli R&D regarding biological and chemical warfare, In fact, Klhgberg was a Soviet spy (""mnfe"'). K l i n g b e ~was involved in top secret prcrjects, and the damage caused by him to Israeli nat i m d secttrity m s t have been cmsidcrablc. He was caught in 19133 and sentenced to life in prison, &spite his ailing heallh, advmced age, and the fact that the Soviet W o n no Ictnger existed, his ~ p e a t e d=quests in the 1990s to be allowed to live orltside prison for the remaining years of his life were resisted fervently by Israeli officials. However, on September 3,1998, the Israeli district court sf Be'er Sheva fhally decided that the ailing eighty-yeas-dd Klingberg could finish his term ina house-mst: environment in Israel under very severe and limitkg conditions.144 A KGR implanted Soviet spy was Shabtai Kal~-nanovitch.He immigrated to Israel in 1987 m d very quickly established himself as a "flambqant businessman and socialite" and. made successful contacts with various pclwerfd politicians and military officers. He was caught and sentelzced in 1989 to nine years in prison. 145 It was not only the Soviets who operated spies in Israel; there has been at least in in which thc. Llnited States verated an Israeli spy: MaJor Yoseph Amit.""he was arrcsted in March 1968 (about four mm&s after Jonahm Pollard was arrested in the United States), m d the Haifa district court sentenced him to twelve years in prison on charges of espionage. hfter seven years in prison, he was released with variotts resfirictions.ld'


Violating Tr~tsl~ l hyalty: ~ d Categolaies and Cases

Two iflustrations from the United States of traitor-spies, contrasted with an illustration of a nontraitor-spy, will concludt. this section. The most famous case of espionage in recent years in the United States is probably that of the Walkers, or ""family of spies," as they am somtimes referred to. Chief lndarrant Officer 'John A, Mlalker 'Jr., his son Michael Walker, his b r o ~ e Lt, r Commander Arthur J, Walker, and Navy cornmunications specialist ferry A, Whitworth passed the Soviets top secret information probably from the 1960s until 3985, when they were c a w t . The damage to U.S. national security (especially to the t7.S. submarine service) caused by this g r o q of spies must have been enormous. Sontag md. Drew (1998:249-250) comment that ""Sdemm . . . tesl;ified before a fedsayhg that the Walkershing might have had "owerful wareral j~~dge, ing implications for the Soviet side.%.~ndwhen Vitaly Yurckenko, a hi@-ranking KGB officer, kfected in July 1985, he told the CIA that the Walker-Whitworth ring was the most important espionage victory in KGB history." John Walker received a sentence of life in prison, his son was given twenty-five years in prism, and k t h u r Walker wap; sentenced to three life termse14g The second case is that of Aldrich Ames, who as a CIA comterintelligence officer spied for nine years (1486-1994) fctr the Soviets and later for the Russians. His activities cost the Eves of American agents and exposed numerous covert operations. Moreover, his activities corrupted the reports of CIA officers as well. Fur&emore, Ames passed to his Soviet operdors almost all the informtim that passed his desk, including inormation ahout o t h r countries. In this way, he gave tbe Soviets informatiorr ahout Israeli agents and highly classified information about the MIddie East (YehakeLi 1998).Ames was paid an incsrrdiblt sttrn of close to 3 million U.5. dollars for his activities. Afier his capture, he was sentmccd to life in prison,l@ Clearly, such spies as the Walkers, Pollard, and Ames M y quali.fy for the term. "'traitor." They were all Americans who wilXingQ volunteered to pass secret information to another country. 'They all violated the trust invested in them by, and loyalty they owed to, their country. Contrasting with. these cases is the case of a nontraitor-spy who was implanted by the Soviets in the United States under a false identity: Col. Rtlidolf Ivimovich Abel (190S1921) was born in Russia m d served in the Red Army's unit of communication (he was fluent in English, Polish, Cerman, Russian, and Yiddish). &riw World War 11, he served in the Red &my's intelligence and is said to have pelretrated the German Abweit~r. During this period, he disguised himself under several different names and j&s. At the end of the war, he was a major in the NKVD (People's Cornissariat of Internat Affairs, or secret police)- Entering Canada illegally in 1947under the fake name of Andrew Kayotis, he crossed the bar-

Violating Tr~tsl~ l h~y a df f y : Categolaies and Cases


der to the United States h 1948. He established himself there, and in the mid-1950s he was working in New York City as a photographer under the n m e Emil R. Gold&. fn fact, he was in c h a s e of the Soviet spy ring in the Mew York area and in charge of operations in North and Central America. His contacts with Moscow were made by using radio. abel made the n?istake of giving a newsboy a hollocv nickel used to transmit messages, and evmtually the FBI got on his trail. On June 22, 7.957, the FBI arrested him. In the fall of 1957 he was tried, convicted, and sente~~ced to thirty years in prison. On February 10,1962, he was exchanged for Gary Powers, the American U-2 pilot whose plane was shot down over the Soviet Union on May 1, 1960. Abel was trmsferred to train new intellige~~ce operatives in the Soviet Union and was later immortalized on a Soviet stamp.l?(IAbel, one of the most thilented spies known, was cleverIy implmted in the United States. He most certainly was not a trajfor.

Summary Chapters 2 and 3 form a continuurn. In. Chapter 2, X presented the min classificatory scheme for the different forms of betrayal., classified by exclrxsion/inclusic-rn of membership in collectives and t.he n a m e of the target. Using Chese axes yields a table in which one can group diffcrtnt types of violations of tmst and loyalty. Chapter 3 discusses each classification in the tattle and prowides empirical itlustrations. 'The wedth of taws provides empirical substance to the analysis A major goal of this book is to present a comprehensive cmcqtual hamwork in Which the many different mmifestations of betrayal could he made to i t . This strategy requires that we become akvare of their mqiriad manifestations, One immediate conclusion from the presentation thus far is that the experience of betrayal is very common. There is nothixlg snciologically special about betraying or being betrayed. The large number of types of betrayal makes a persuasi\le argument for the high prevalence of betrayal. Betrayal is characteristic of our culture.. The widespread existence of betrayal, together with its s k m g denunciation, indkate that a boundary game is being played here..The behavioral patterns that: are referred to as "betrayals" m utiljzed by variotls cultural agents as boundary markers signifJiing differences between right and wrong. The social ccrnstructims of Judas Iscariot, Benedict Arncrld, &than Hale, m d Mordechai Vafmunu all i1lustra.t.ethis vividly. The social cmstmctim of betrayal is a sociological tale of cultural contrasts and paradoxes. The w i d e s p r ~ dbrhavior of infidelity a d adultery, togthcr with the stmng clenunciation of it, p v i d e s a good illustration for this. Although trust m d loyalty are deeply beld values, their common

violation hdicates that cultuses can absorb q&e a lot of mistrust and dislnyalty and still function. In other words, betrayal is not tcdaated but adds to the calorful mosaic of our cultures, Moreover, mmy ""itraitors" are crucial for continued social life-the whistle-blowers, the strikebreakers, the infomers, the spies, and others. Betrayal helps both to mark and to accelztuate existkg moral botmdaries, but it also helps to change them-anotlter culltural paradox, hdeed, many traitors pay a high personal price for their violation of trust m d loyalty;but sometimes new social organizations m d networks are created a I q the way.

Part Two

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In previous chqtefi, we examined the different: manifestations of betrayal, their constructions, and illustrative cases, Clne category of betrayal, howevel; merits special attention-trcason. The issues of power, moraiity, and boundaries in this particular category arc. critically important and are also very prt>blernatic. Indeed, many researchers note that treason, perhaps like pornqraphy, is a matter of geography This part of the book is thus devoted to examining the nabre of treason and some of its empirical manifestations. There are some questions to consider. Were individuals who have been ~ f e m to d as "guitty of treasonf%ma fide "traitors"? If so, in what sense? Did these particular traitors (or their actions) make a difference? The first thjng we need to do is exmine the very nature of treason. This chaptefis devoted to exactly this pu'1pose. 7'hechapters that foilow in this part focus on cases. If we look at the behavios of the different individuals identified with treason, we find that it disnfays both secret and nonsecret elements. For example, treason that is committed in secret tends to be idel~tifiedwith espionage. The issues of loyalty and trust play a major part in treason. The traitor, and the collective that is betrayed, negotiate and =define the direction of loyalty and the meaning of trust. The very nature of treason inrplies that both loyalty and trust are cast, Fnterprcted, and mderstood in moral terms. Power determines the end product of these negotiations. Consequently, moral issues are involved in the constructinn of the ""taitorr"(or the ""hro"") Even a brief look at such cases as Nalthm Hale, Roger Casement, Benedict Arnold, nounas More, Malinche, and Z,ord Haw-Haw makes this clear. Morcovcr, examining trezlsm enables us to go from the personal level of interpretation to the collective level, which is a more difficdt exercise in other forms of betrayal.


Characterizations of Treason

Definitions W ~ aist our cultural understanding of the term treason? 'The Qxfolii Endish: Dictioni~tydefines treason as "the action of betmying; betrayal of the tmst undertaken by or reposed in anyme; breach of faith." The esteemed dictionary calls our attention to an hnportant historical distkdion by tellhg us that In old English law, treasan tvas either Izigh Ireasurj, an offense against the King" majesty or the safety of the commonwealth, or pcfl't or peEfy tre~son,an offense cornmitt& against a subect. 13etit treasrrrn is now punished as murder, and high treason is usually styled simply Ireas0~2.Many acts of high treatreason prc)per-is inson are now treated as trease~nfelony. I-lr'gll Crc~son-~,~" tel-p~td as the N ~ i ~ l a t iby o na subject of his allegiance to his sovereip or to the state (defined in England in 135&51)."

Petit or petty treason is defined as '"lmason agaixrst a subject; spec. the rnurcier of one to whom the murderer owes allegiance, as of a master by his servanl, a husband by his wilc, etc. Now only history"1 The Encyclopaedia Hebvnica conceptualizes trcason as the violation of trust of the sovereign a d states that this is one of the most severe off e ~ ~ sin e sexiste11ce.2 The fifth edition (1993) of the Columbia E~zeycloyedinstates that treason is an act of disloyalty. It points out that in the twentkth century treasrm was mostly a wartime phe~~omenon.. The Encyclopuedin Brifanrrica offers a 1ittll-l defini.tional twist stating that twason is a general namc. "for the crime of attacking &he safety of a sovereign State or its head." Trust m d loyalty are thus built into this defh~ition~ :It then fcxruses on the different manifestations of '*high t~ason"-SOr example, cmceph;lalizing or planni~~g t-he murder of a ruler; making war against the king; or kilfhg a high official." A later edition of the Etzcyclopaedia Britanuica offers a somewhat mnre problematic definiticm. It states &at treason refers to ""crimes against the State. Treason is the crime of betraying a nation. or a sovereign by acts considered dangerous to security." It also makes a distinction between twason m d sedition, pointing out that '"edition, t h o w it may have the same ultimate effect as treasnn, refers gelrerally to the offel~seoE organizing or encouraging opposition to governtnent in a manner (such as speech or writing) that fails short of the mom dmgemus offenses canstituting treason."Waking a legal distinction betwem sedition. m d treason is sipificant because it allows two versions of tbis particular type of be-

trayal to exist-the harder (treason) and the softcr (sedition)-md thus leaves law enforcement with discretion, that is, with potential negotiatims regardjng the nat-ure of specific behaviors. If the societal definjtion of ttreason is based on defining (extendjng or shrinking) the nature and amount of variance associated with violations of loyalty and trust of particular citians toward the state, then distingtrjshing betkveen sedi,tinn and treason is an expression of this process, Moreover, this definition is interesting because it assclnles that the ""state"(or the n t l c d s ) camot ""btray'7ts citizens. Furthermore, the dcfjnition assumes that it is possiblt to a n d what is, or is not, "dandeternirte the gmuine nature of ""security" m gemus" to it. 'The E n c c e $the Socilrl Scimcrrs states Chat treason is "essentiatly a violation of allegiance to the cornmunib-."$ Treason therefore, first and foremost, consists of a behavior that is presumed to have betmyed trust and breached faith and that presents debated loyalties. The issue, of course, is not as simple as it magi appear because establishing m act of treason rc.quirt.s an a priori act of estdlishing a relationship of trust and loyatty. That: type of relationsip requires in turn some shared consensus regarding the nahrre of that trust and loyalty The issue of a genufne relationship is a crucial one..What if one pwtends tt? be i,n such a rdationship but. really is not? What if swiety is so highly differentiated morally that the very concept of a value consensus becomes a poblernatic issue? What happens when the ruler or the arganfzation vidates trust and loyalty? In a sockty where loyalty is unclear, klrhere trust: is problematic, or where moral polarization is strong, treason cannot be or established. It is reasonable to expect that in such a socieasily defi~~ed ety some melnbers may try to mobilize or generate enough power to socially construct and enforce definitions of t ~ a s o nin order to establish new, more appropriate moral boundaries. illustrative here. 'The case of a rather famous traitor-Socrates-is society put Socrates on trial, found hiHl guilty, and sentenced him to death by poisonfng in 399 B.C. His crime? biting what was interpreted as a crihallenge to the state. Arnn~~g other charges, Socrates was accused of corruptilrg the morals of the younger generation and teaching science in a way that amplified skepticism and disbelief. It was thougbt by Athenians that anyolle involved i,n such activities was emdangering the inkegrib- and the safety of the state. According to Athenian law, Socrates was a criminal. The moral code af Athens did not embrace freedom af expression. Athenian society through the moral agents who defined. its moral boundaries, conde ed and executed Socrates,b who rationalized his activity with a very differat moral justification. Socrates's pseczrtors had more legitimized power, so that when the two oppos* systems of

mordity collided, Socrates lost. In today" Western democrratic societies, freedm of e x p ~ s s i mis hailed as a primary virtue. In regimes fiat are more totalitarim or theocratic, individuals who speak their mind or crihallenge the power structure are liable to find lhernselves imprisoned or colnnlitted to insane asyiums.7

The threat potential of treason is perceived as very great. It is magnified during periods of armed conflict (from local.zed clashes to full-scale war). Conflict, as S h m e l (1955), Levine (1971), and Coser (1956) have noted, is a time for crystatlization of internal conformity in Che face of challenges to the state. Uuring such periods, state definitions of trust and loyalty expand and harden, and what otherwise would be ccmsidered as normal activity may become defh~edas treason. or sedition. In times of conflict, nation-states tend to increase restrictions, which also increases the temptation to violate them.

The Encljclrrpaeda BriiFu~nicupoints out that "the law whieh, punishes treason is a necessary cmsequence of the idea of a State, and is essential to the existence of the State."B PZ"loscoweadds that treason "is the one nabral a i m , prmishable at all times asld in all types of social organization."Y Judging by the socrieta.1reaction to treason, it is ixrdeed one oi the most serious offenses imaginable. Both Nettler and tlurst arc. quick to point out that treason is the only crime defined in. the United States In Israell the death penalty does not exist, except in a few cases, including treason. The EZcycdopaedia Brifal~~lim points out that punishments for treason were ""b&barsus in the extreme." b r example, "the sente~~ce in the case of a man was that the offender be drawn on a hurdle to the place of execution, that there he be hanged by fie neck not until he be dead, and that while yet alive he be disernboweled and that then his body be divided into four quarters, the head and quarters to be at the disposal of the Crownff(women were bumt).ll

Previous Works on Treason Quite a few studies of treason have bee11 conducted in the past, These tend to be divided into three categories. One category (the largest, by far) consists of works that take a particular case-for example, Miil1ian-tJoyce, Kdkun atisljng, Tyler Kent, the Frencln Adlniral Darlan, Aldrich Ames, Benedict Amold-and. discuss it in d.epth.12 The second. category, and

clearly the minority, consists of works that a relativeXy large number of cases, some in an almost encyclopedic manner.13 n e s e wcrrks typitreason or make caIfy attempt to either give readers the "'who's who'" generalizations based on a relatively large pool of cases. The third category consists of works that focus in more detail cm a few chosen cases, typically in specific historical periods or cultures." Unfortunately, no ""theoq" exists in this area (except, perhaps, Boveri" haold-but unsuccessful-at tempt). Many of the authors have used the crsiteria, of motivation in an atternpt to create typologies or expfanations,l%ut overall, this approach has not proven very productive in terms of hinging about generalizable ccmcepn must astualizations regardirrg treason. hdeed, focusing s ~ motivation sume that treachery itself is a nonproblematic act and that there is a consensus regarding the nature, and direction, of loyalty anci trust. Obviously these are prsble~xaticissues"For example, the line dividing legitimate dissent and disloyalty is not always clear.16 111 the rest of this section I present some of the major works on t r w o n m d their historical cmtexts.

John Bullnch Bulloch" 1966 book folbws a typical route. Following quite a few short descriptions of cases of treason, his min conclusions are that "thercl. it; a design, a continuity of trcachev h general, evwy traitor has some defect, some m t a l ixnbalancc which makes him what he is" (p, 178) and that ""in the years to come it will be . . . the men who believe, who will outweigh the weak and the greedy who betray their count-ry fos gain. Those who commit acts akin to treason will do so consciously and wilhgly, not weakly md sbpidly" (p. 183).Bullcrch explains thjs shift trYithin the context of the cold war. Like other authors, Bulloch is puzzled about why certain people become traitors, and he resorts t~ the psychology of personal motivation to n: belief, explain this. Me lhns isolates a few reasms for t r e a ~ ~ideological monetary gain, and social isolation. He even cites a case of t ~ a s o n with a homosc-lxualbackground, where individuats were forced into treacherous acts.'Wis conclusion is very clear: ""Traitors are usually sad men; always there is something wrong with them, some defect in their character or some lack in their personal lives, failure in their jobs or in their social adKu1.Ior=hfsimpression that "traitors are sad peopleu is just~xents"((p. El). shared, very strongly, by West in her 1901 work. Raitors may be sad people (especially those who get caught), but: thrrc. are lots of miserhle and sad people all arottnd us m d very few of them are traitors in Bullocfi's sense of the term*

Moreover, Bulloch" list of motivations raises some doubts about character defects. Is ideologicat belief a consepence of a charactttr defect? How about greed? 7'r, put it: differently there are mny people with similar backgrounds m d traits who do not b e c m traitors. Idndoubtedly several different personal motivations p h y an important part in traitorous behavjor: greed, blacknnail, sex, ideology stupidi,ty, vengeance, fear, and sensation seeking, among others, Secmt intelligent services have dwetoped quite a body of kncrwiedge on this issue. Socaled intelligence officers, whose nnission is to reesuit traitors, collaborators, m d spies, are trahed to locate the weak spots of their potential recruits and utilize them to fie maximum. Tme, recmit~nentof traitors does not always occur in this way, but when it does, bowledge of what motivates individuals to act is important and practical. hdividuals who wel-e themsekes involved in recruiting traitors (for example, spies) tend to view betrayal through the prism of motivati,on, because this is their modus opermdi. :I have selected exmples that ilustrate the dif-ferent types of motivation~,han approach similar to Bullloch'ss..However, 1 am primarily interested in the svcinl uatzrrc oi treason and only secondarily hterested in the d that question of perscmal m o t h t i o n , Some scholars have p o i ~ ~ t eout these two are analytically inexlricabk. My effort to untangle the two aspects, in the hrrn of prioritization of attention, is done for the purposes of focusing the interpret&on. Because persond motivation may reflect cultural preferences, as C. Wright Mllls pointed out, the "sociological Imagination" rrequil-es that we examine the "grrsmal" within the "social.'%ather =ason for tbe above prioritization is that charting the different- mothations provides us with a finite set of rnotivatims that pmvidcs a typology based on motivation. However, it leaves open the vestion of why people with similar weaknesses and motivations do not become traitors. mus, focusing exclusively on motivation is, in my vicw, an inherentXy flawed approach because it is incapable of providing us with a satisl'actcrry explanation about the very nature of thc phel~ontenon..F~~rthermore, beyond the specific motivations that may expIain the conversion of any particular individual into a trajtor, we need to understand the larger cultural and social structures that both produce and en;tble the very existence of these individual motivatia~~s* In other words, we need to expose the social basis of Ireason, If we are to arrive at a better understand% oE treason, W must understand fiat it is a subcatego" of the larger phenomnon o( betrayal and that it is more irnportant for us to understand the meaning of this larger category in its relevant social context. Social life is full of cmflict and cmtradidian. Thus the defmt and the deviant are nut necessarily undersocializd peripheral misfits or rebels.

Greater eznphasis m the structural and. cultural dimensions of dividcd loyalty bighiights the sociological dimension of betrayal, providing a dramatic alternative to the view that traitors have dckctive personalities or are just plain evil. Betrayat, in the perspective presented here, becomes understartdable as an everyday culturai event. Its strucbre is universal, m d its specific co~~tent becomes culturally and contextually meaningful.

(1995), which is dHigel West published the most recent book on t ~ a s m most: encyclopedic in size (aithough his logic in selecting the specific cases is not always entirely clear). AlPhough W s t is inclined tokvard personalized, psychological interpretations, he is keenly awarc that Treachery- and betrayal are otder than the thirty pieces of silver paid to Judas, but at the md of the twentieth century they are cancqts that appear increasingly subjectirie, Are whistle-blowers to be discc~uragedas selfish monomaniacs, or are they to be celebrated as prc3tectors of valuable rights? Are defectors nothing more than selfish careerists, or are they brave martyrs deQing oppression to stand on principles? In an era wKch has seen the political pendulum in Europe swing from totalitarianism, to dernocracli; and then back again to democratic socialism, and during a period when the individual can be seen tcr have triumphed over the state, the choices are less clear cut. 50 what was it that compelled the minority to try to change history? (p.19)

Thus, West does not really offer us a ct,ncegh;lalization of treason, except that it is based on mativation.

Rebeeca West h 1964 Rebecca West drafted one of the classical works in the area of treason, which was republished in 1985. The first edition of her book integrated her previous joumatistic rczports of the trials of Wiltiann Joyce and j o h Arnery for The New Yorkr. These two individuals faced accusations of treason at the end of World I/Var II.lWs West" interest in disloyalty increased, she ai-i;ended other treason trials m d hameled her htellectual pursuit more and m m into espionage. The 1985 Pmguin edition of her work has a chapter on William Jc-tyce(Lord Haw-Haw), but the book also delves into cases of espionage after World War XI, hcluding some aspects of the cold was, West discusses such cases as the so-catled Cambridge spy ring (mentioned in Chapter 3); Emil Klaus Fuchs (a British nuclear physicist who spied for the Soviets); JuIills and Ethel Rosenberg (Americans who passed

information on nuclear weapons to the Swirts; both were executed in 1953); the 1961 Portlmd case involving five cmicted British spies Mtho g w e the Sovjets valuable information &nut underwater weapons; the 1963 John Pmhmo affair, which led to the resignation of British prime minister Macmitfan;'"ohn William Vassal, a British AdmiraIty clerk wbo was arrested in 1962 and charged with passkg state secrets to the S-viets, and a host of others. Clearly, W s t focuses on ""tllhg the stories" of some convicted traitors. Her conclusions are in two areas.20 First, she points out that the te~~sion between public and pl-ivate liberties is such that traitors may fulfill. m important social function of introducing vital change into our cultures-a h d of positive mutation that helps to crihange the moral bou~zdariesof society Howeves, West has a much stronger conclusion regading the dangerous and socially disintegrative nlmidc-ological traitors who c resist the appeal of monetary rewards. She calls far a swift and m m biguous public stand. against traitors. Wheseas West" approach-mphasizb~gthe personal and focusing m the cold war period-has become a sort of standard, my appmach i s c u l t d and thus conceptually different: than hers,

Mnrglaret Boveri The next important work is R/fargaret Boveri's 1956 book, which also surveys a large number of cases of trcason. Without explahing whir, she beg h s k r work by disthguishing among three forms of treason: (2) treason; ( 2 ) propaganda; and (3) coilaboration, resistance, and secret service. This framework serves as the bacbonc structure of her book. Alhottgh Boveri is interested in personal motivations of betrayal, she is one of the few who acbally makes a genuirre atternpt to examine treasm from a sociological and histsrieal perspedive, and th~~s-theoreticaZ1y speakngher work is sounder and more interesting. Boveri asks several interesthg questions: Have we here had to do with random individual phenomena or has there been a common element? What is it which brings Ezra Pound and Count Stauffenberg between the co>versof the same book? Have they anything in common? . . . The startling fact, huwweu; i s that when one examines their aims, their deeds, and their ideas in terms of the sclciety which they faced, there is a remarkable degree of similarity (p. 389)

She asserts that ""teason is a necessary element in the historic development of politically organized societies*All radical poliltical change begins witfi. treasonf"(p. 13).The question is, why? Boveri's historical and

sociologieal view tries to find out what it is about society that brings forth treason. She is quick to note that treachery is, first of all, a betrayal of trust (p, 13). Her point is that althougtn trust is essential for the functionjng of societies, these very same societies become more a d more bureaucratized, depersonaitized, and characterized by diminishing of trust. These societies produce people who have an "atomized modern consciousness" ((p, 391). Clearly this is an argument similar to Max Weber's pessimistic view about the disenchmtment of the world and to Selig~aan"1997 treatise on tmst, Boveri paints this development with a crude historicd brush and states that this ""major metamcrrphosis of European society" is a direct result of a development that began with the Frellch Revolution (pp. 3853-391). This logic implies that treason is expected to rise in modemiw. Boveri concludes that at the root: of treason lies a revolt agair~st""the forms of rule devdoped by the mid& class i,n the njneteent-h and twentieth centuries" (p. 391). She relies on one of Rebecca West" fascinating ideas in her study cJf treason in which West states that in two thousand years of Weskm njvilizatio1~and history we have, in fact, d o ~ ~ e nothing more than completed a theologiral circle. At the time of Christ, the economic and pbysical misery of people were explained in theological terms,.This explanation kvas simple, straightforward, and easily gasped . by the masses. Two thousand years later, theo1ogica.l issues arc t ~ a t e das if they arc. eccmomic or social problems. 'fi,Boverifsmmind, traitors may indjcate that people wan.t. to free themselves from being elnsiiaved by cconomic and pohtieal categories of thought. Two thous& years of histor). have not made individuals more reasonable or rational, What traitors may represel~tis peaple" rediscovery of, m d attelnpt to return to, their souls. Although Boveri does not etiplain treasm in preindustriatized cultures, she claim that if we examine what the diSferclrt traitors surveyed in her book were saying, then m e m s t come to realize that "they did not believe irr 'progress' and the absolute sovereignty of reason""(p,33) interesting that mmy of the spies for the Eastern European countries during the cold war ( h r example, BIunt and Phiby) w d d prohiably use the tern "'pmgrc.ssffto ~ustifytheir betrayals. Boveri, however, is convinced that "'her" traitors "hated the power of money i,n daily life and the suppression of in.ndi.vidua1it.y involved in the average factory or office existence"' [pp.391-392). In other words, these traitors were against revolution and wanted to return to the old conserv&ive moral ideology, She quotes Marshal Pt?;tain,General Back, and others as supporting this idea. These traitors, she claims, presented a similar contmpt toward parliamentary democracy: "Q~isIing wanted to abolish it. Joyce despised it. The Geisau Circle [a group of anti-Hitler German aristocrats, including

von Stauffenberg] was determined to prevent its return, at least in the Weirnar form. Stauffenherg rejected the kegaiitarian fallacyf Laval resigned f r m the Social Democratic Party" ((p. 393). Boveri conctudes her work by statixlg that "eccentrics like Joyce, @isling, and Pound were capable of seeing the wwld only through a bioodshot veil of romanticism" and that the traitor devimts described in her book " m y themselves be the heralds of another p a t historical swing of the pmdulum, that they may be in the vanguarcf of a rmction against the great heresies of the sixteent-h and seventeenth centuries" (p. 398), Boveri's work powerfully illustrates the case fnr the rmanticization of dwiants and their transformation into cultural heroes." ULlnderlying Boveri" argument is one s t r o ~ ~ and g valid pobt-the profound moral nature of violating tmst, As intert~stingand provocative as Boveri's theory is, its credibiliv is weak. Reason did not begin in l.he modem era. Not alf,(or even most) traitors fit her description as counterrevolutionarjes (for example, Ozaki Hotsumi, :Richad Sorge, La Malinche, the m i t e Rose, the C m bridge Ring, f udas Iscariat, to name only a fe*. Whether societal trust has decreased or increased in Europe since the French Revolution is difficdt to =certain, However, the one important idea in Boverifs study is its sociological-historicat perspective. Fortunately we have at our disposal a better and. r n o sensitive ~ conceptual framework than the one focusing on disencl-tantment and bureaucratization. 'There can be little doubt that Boveri's work is Che most serious attentpt to dcvelop a comprehensive theoretical approach to treason. Tn significant ways, my work follows Bavek; I focus on the macra-sociological level, and X expmd the scope of cases beynnd Etllope. Boveci was indeed correct in assessing that there are common elements among different cases of twason. 7'he similarity, however, does not lie in their personal accountings. It lies with the way we conceptu&ze txason as deviance.

Pincher" 1987 work excels with illustrations about spies. .A large part of his work is devoted to the motivational issue-why do some people become traitors and others do not. This particukr focus not o111y merits analytical attention but has s m e strong prartical aspects as welf. Looking at traitorous spies from a mothational poifit of view may give intelligmce oMicers some tools for clealing with and recruiting such spies. Fincher, of course, is not the only author to examhe the motivation of traitors as a pclssiblc explanatory prineipIe, Both Akerstrom and Frmk Hagan pursue this perspective, toa.22 The main concept Pincher proposes is MICE-that is, that traitors are motivated by Money Ideology, Comprmise, or Ego.

He points out that actual motivations arc not discrete and that a complex colnbination of differmt motivatrions may exist. Moreover, other motivatims referstld to by Pincher as "the Rottti,ng of authority and disrespect for the law" may play their part as well. Pinchcr provides a ra&er skaightfmward definition oE beason: ""anattempt to overturn the g o v e m m t @ s t a s h e dby law, including the activities associated with such an attempt, such as tfne assassin.ation of leadersef'23 This is m intereswg but quite problematic approach. the one hand, a political hterpretation given to a c r b h a l activity c m very easily accarding to this defhitim, qualify that activiw as treason. Un the other hand, many cases of traitorclus spies, mentioned by Pinehrr, wodd be dgficuit to dassjQ as such with this def.nilion. Such individuals as Poilard, the Walker family of spies, Ames, and Va'munu would hardly qualify as traitors under his definition. A third probtem is his iz~sistcnceon "gwemxnent by labv;'Wmy dictators, some with horrendous records, wodd qualify u ~ ~ d e r this definition, Cto individuds who go against them qualify as traitors? This leads to another problematic &sue. According to Pincher 'S definition, the activgies of an opposition, any opposition, to any government established by any lawf c m be easily portrayed as being treasm. Piz~cherframes treason wi&in loyalty but adds that a ""traitor" basic role is to betray trust,"% DistStjng~~ishhg between major m d minor violations of loyalty, he concludes that one major criterion of treason is the damage it causes. Uamage he measures by the lmgth of the treason, fie . peace), how m y (or whet-her any) time context (during times of W ~ Jor individuals died as a result of the t~acbery,and the threat to the regime,zs Although not explicit in his analysis, Pincher does point out that secrecy is an important issue.

Cart J. Eriedra'dz Friedrich discusses treason with;in a more general discussion of what he rders tcr as "the pathdcrgy of pditks.'" Examining a variety of such phenomella as violence, corruption, secrecy, propaganda, and betrayal, Friedrich explores the negatke and positive functions of the existence of such phenomena. He p o i ~ ~out t s that the legal etefh~itionsof treason can be easiiy expanded to genccate an understmding that betrayal "consists of supporting a rival organization, giving aid, whether material or other" and that ""teason is basically a violation of trust."% Like others before and after him, Friedrich makes the mativational issue a central one and details various mntkatims to commit betrayal and trcasm: conflict of loyalties; ideological cammitmmt; homelessness a d alienation; and persecution m d ofplaitation o.f mjnorities. Me does mentim that the desire frtr enrichmmt can serve as a cause, too (but he omits sex),

However, he is more interested in political forms of t ~ a s o nand,consequently, distinguil;hes five types of treason: (1)a sihnation where old values clash with new ones; (2) revolutionary treason; (3)involvement with an external enemy; (4)disrcgading orders of a regime; and (5) involuntary treason, when a regime acts in a twasonous way." "Friedrich points out that betrayal and treason are not necessarily bad and m y actually have a posi.tive function. Like Boveri, he states that these acts may lead the way for crucial and important changes. 'rhe July 2(3,1944, plot to kill Hitler is one example, and the resistmce to the Viebarn War is mother. Betrayal, argues Friedrich, like other forms of political pathoiogies such as violence, corruption, secrecy and pmpagmda, facilitates ""theadaptation of a system or regime to changing conditjons occurring either in tl-te system or in the social substructure, or in the outside environment." These phenomena aro "interdependentf"; for example, if violace increases, so will treaso11.2" Friedricb seems to Limit his characterization of betrayaI to cases whesc secrrcy is fnvolved. fnevitablyfthis particular characterization forces him to delve into case of espionage*He thus strates that the ""betrayalof military secrets is the very core of. . . treasonf'29and that "the lure of secrecy consists h r the possessor of a secrtzt partly infie possibility of betraying iterf30

Gwynn Net tler Nettler 'S unusual work ffo6t~seson treason from the perspective of criminology, Like Friedrich, Nettler directly associates t ~ a s o nwith deception and adds that the very idea of treason is based on "the necessity of selfdefense" because "loyatty is a necessity of social lik?.'"l He argues thattreason (and rcllated threats to a state's security) is usually a crime of deceit because ""perpetrators p ~ t e n dto be what they artl not and they conceal from some assioeiates what they are."32 Like Friedrich" work, this iappmach tends to limit Nettler" analysis to cases of secret betrayal, mostly in the areas of espionage, sahotage, and sedition, but there are several cases it c ot explaist, such as @isling, Pi.tah, Malinche, and Clegrctle, among others. It is no wonder that Nettler feels comforbble with the kgal definitions of treason. His discussim takes these clefinilions as a cornemtone.33 Overall, although Nettler is one of the few criminologists (or sociologists) who has paid attention to the topic, his work does not =ally offer us an "explanation" fm beason but rather focnnses on the legal dcfh~ition,on whjch he expands his discussjon.

Treason in the United States: Authors and Histoy n e r e are a few works that focus their attention on treason in the United States. Whereas Rakeless" 11998 work focuses on espionage in the Ameri-

can :Revolution,O'litole" 1991, work targets the history of American intelligence, espionage, and covert action from the days of the Ameriem Revte dution to 1962. The title of C)"Toole's impressive work is N o ~ o r ~ hTreachery. Rich in, historical accounts, 0'Tool.e" work avoids an analytical framework. "rhese two works are representative of most works about treaso~~ in the United States; they rely on. historical description of various cases to "explain" itreason. The meticu%ouswork of W y l (1950) and the outstanding book by Archer (1971) are also devoted to treason in the U'nit-rd States, and both also use a hjstorical perspecti\re. Arckr's wwork focuses on the distixlction beheen dissent and disloyalty as the major criterion daerentiating traitclrs from others, whreas Weyl is more concerned with a very detailed analysis of particdar cmes of treason. They both begin their review of American treason in the colonial period., starting with the case of Natha~lielBacon, who attaeked and burned Jarnestown in 1676.34 111. swveying some of the ixnportant cases of treason in the Uni.ted States, 1 have adopted the historical perspective used by these authors, As the colonies WE b ~ a k i n gaway from the SritiSh yoke and seeking independence, charges of treason were flying in all directions, Such a major conflict required foyalties to be defined and tmst tc:,be estahtished. In fact, the Ueclaxation of Independence on July 4,1776, could be viewed as "the ultimate: act of treason,""" "deed, with& hnio years, Americms had a national definition for treason, and the the Cmstitution fratxfied on September 1%1,788)included the definitio~~ of treason, the only crime defined in the Constitution,As the American War of Independmce continued, the list of traitors grew and a few seem to stmd salient in that dishonorable list: Ethan Men, who aAer being released from a British jail, negotiated a proposal to make Vcrmont a Cmadlan province, which led several congressmen to demand that he be arrested for treason;" Benedict Arnold (caiscussed in Chapter 2) sold valwble military inteuigence to the British; and Aaron Burr, an American vice president, negotiated with the British tc:,split Loufsiana for a hefty amtlmt cJf mmey and conspired to become m emperor of parts of Louisiana and Spanish Mexico (and, pet-haps, later have Mississippi join too), Burr was eventudly caught in Alabama and brought to fichmond, mrl;inia, to face charges of treason. The jury found Burr not guilty (m~dreturned a similar verdict on other charges). Later historical work mvealed that, hdeed, Burr was cmspiring against the United States and that he was ""without doubt, America" most brilliant traitol="s7 The breaiking away of the colonies from England created difficullt questicms of ioyalv and trust, and conspiracy and treason accmpanied the trmsition to independence. Various illdivjduals and grouphad different: national visions for the future, not to mntion their own personal dreams and expectations.

The War of 1812brought, again, the issue of treason to the forefront, For example, the cmections that remained between m o d e Island and England created new issues of loyalty and trust, and s:irnilar questions were raised when Presidmt Pofk went to war with Mexico over the disputed area between the Nueces river and Rio Grande river. There was s s much oppoSition to this wm, that the issue of dissent versus disloyalty was the focus of some rather hot debates.38 That conflict was barely fh~ishedwhen the United States faced a new challenge: the Mormon rebeltjo~zof the f,85I)s, which is viewed by both Archer and Weyl as an act of treason. Against charges of being disloyal to the countr)i and practicing potygarny, g o u p m " f mmmuebelled and resisted cooperation and unity with the United States, which shokved a great deal of intolerance toward this religious group. Eventually$a political settlement was reached, lltcErily a h o s t bloodless. Clearly, this conflict concerned differing ideas about. xceptable lifestfles and values withh the United States.% h o t h e r rebellion was headed by John R r o m from Kansas, an aholiticlnist who wmted to create m indqendent republic of fugitive slaves. In an effort to create a slave uprising, Rrown led twenty-one followers (amcmg them were. four blacks) in an attack on a kderal arsenal on October 16, 1859, at Harper" Ferry Virgixlia- 'The rebels were successful in capturing the arsenal and roundjng up sixty citizens as hostages brlt inadvertently killed the mayor of the town. The rebeilion was suppressed quickly, Brown was brought to trial on criharges of treason and conspiracy; found guilty and executed by hanghg on December 2,1859." Much like the period of ehe American Revolution and the War of 4KE, the period of the Civil War had its share of treason and betrayal. How could it not? The justification for the assassination of President Lhcolut was in exactly such a context. Famous traitors, spies, and dissenters on the edge ol: being considered traitors of the period included Rose Greenhow (who passed secret military idormation about federal. plans to attack the Confecierate Army), B e k Bcryci (who spied fnr the Confederacy), Clelncnt I,. Vallandigan (who opposed the Civil War and tried to involve the French in an attempt to stop it), and Lambdjn P. Mjlligm (who helped the Confederacy military eff ort).43 Ue~xent's1984 historical work provides m hteresting and sardo~zicaccoullt a b u t secret political societies, conspiracies, and treason trials around the pe"1od of the Amerkm Civil War. Hiti thoughtful work recreates the out-of-control atmosphere nourished by the rnilitary clash, accompanied by political intrigues and some bizarre; personalitks, all helping to create imaginary conspiracies and ntmors, which, in turn, solidify into a slxiat reality where treason trials take place. The author shows how

a rurmor can be made into an accusation of treason by some rather sha:bby chararters. Let us look at an example.42 In 1864, rumors were created that Confederate szxpporters in sotlthern Canada we= involved in a plot to create an uprisjng in Camp Douglas (a POW camp where more &an 8,001) Confederate prisoners were detained), free Confederale prisoners, burn Chicago, and incite an uprising in the Midwest, Quite a fmhstic scheme. Nevertheless, some individuals were acbally suspeckd of beillg involved in this irnaghary t~acherousplot. As Klement points out: "It was a rather strange turn of events. . . . The "great conspiracy%was based upon fiimsy and questionable evidcnce that no civit court woutd have found acceptable. . . . It was a fmtasy passed off as fact, a travesty of justice, a political stratagem m d e respectable by historians."43 At the beginnfng of the twentieth century labor disputes were the locus of ins-inuations of treason. Quite a few American inhslrialists and capitalists defined the various exprcssims of risjng consciousness among I.aborers as a potential theat to, and betrayal of, free enterprise. On the other hand, laborers ~lrhoseemed to side with employers, or slrikebreakers, were def ned as violating trust and loyalty.4 This period ended when World War I began (1.914). Like other wars, World War I left its lcgacy in the area of betrayal. Some labor activists were accused of treason. For example, Torn Mooney and \iVarren BiIlings were charged with explodhg bombs in a crowded street corner on July 22,1"36. Although sentenced ta death in a trial that began in 1937, they were not executed; and they continued to insist on their innocmce..They were finally released from prison in January and October 1939, rclspectivcly They had spent twenty-two years in prison for a crirne they did not cornmit," Euugene V. Debs never hid his opposition to the war and made no secret of his sympafrhies for Mooney and Billhgs. He was arrested and sentenced to ten years inprison and deprived of his dtizenshiy. Debs ran as a socialist candidate for the U.S. presidency in 1920, frorn his prison cell, and attracted about 1 million votes. President Woodrow Wilson, in reference to Debs" objection to the U.S. involvement in the war, stated, "This man was a traitor to his countq"46 Other smialist leaders, activists, and pacifists were charged with interfering with the ~ ~effort.. a r Anti-Bri_t.ish acl,vists were t ~ a t e din a shiIar fashion (for example, Jeremiah OfRary who was indicted for a '"conspiracy to it treason")." It is neverfieless true that G e m m agents were active in the tl'nited States in m a t t e ~ ~to p tmobilize support for Germany and were involved in espionage and sabotage, Weyl estimates that German sabotems may have been able to damage as much as $2@ million worth of war materials, ships, manufacknrkg plmts, m d kri* explosives.48

Between the end of World. SiYar 1 and the beginning of World War 11, there was intensi\le pro-Nazi activity in the ldnited States. 'f'he goal, at the xninimm, was to discowage the United States from joinhg the war in Europe. A small minority of Arsrericans, some overtly anti-Semitic, thought that fascism and Nazism were the "in tbing'hnd felt obtigated to support it, even to the point: of creatizlg a Nazi-)ike political and social movement and organizations. One exa-le is German-born Fritz Kuhn, setf-appointeU*rer of the German-American Rund. E-Iis oqanizatbn managed to attract m u n d 8,000 mernbers to its anli,-Smitic and Nazi Wwas cmvicted of embezzlement and forgery in 1940 and sent to prison. Some other Americms were criharged with sedition and with attempts to establish a fascist gwernment in the United States. Sum of the m m famous propagandists far the Nazi ideology included Mrs. Lois de iJalayette Washbum, who believed that "the Jews'\vrere after her and wanted to sell her into white slavery; Mrs. Hizabeth Dilling, the only American woman who was iz~dictedon three successive occasions for seditious conspiracy agaiinst her country and who organized political rallies against the Lend-Lease Act; and Miss Catherine Curtis and. Miss Lama Ingallti, who lobbied for the Nazis (Miss Ingalls was actuaZly paid by the German ernbassy for her services). In her trial, Miss fngaUs, like so many others accused of trcason before and after her, toId the court: "My motives were born of a burniw patriotism and a high idealism. . . . I am a truer patriot than those who convicted me!"@ C)ther f m o u s f i g w s were pro-fascist Father Charles CoughIin, who preached endlessly against the Jews and for fascism both cm the radio and in his newspaper (Socifzl Justice); Gerald L,. K. Smith, an ex-pastor who left the pulpit to preach the hatred of fascism and alignment with the Nazi f i r e r , together with Huey Long, Willlam Dudley Pelky (who felt that it was time for the United Stdes to have a Hiller and a pogrom), Francis E. Tokvnsend, m d Congressman William Lemke. M i l e World War II was dragging on in Eumpe, the Unfted States was getting closc? to etntering the war, h fact, on J d y 2, t,94f, a Washington grand. jury convened and for the following fifteen months inquired into the fascist and Nazi activities in the United States, These activities c u h i nated h charges, accusations, trials, m d sentelnces agaiinst a nutnber of individuals.50 A total of 9,405 Axis agents we= arrested m d brought to trial as a result of these investigatims," It is interesting in this cclntext to point out Henry Ford's sympathies with Germany." The chief, and mast famous, Nazi agcrnt in the United States prior to its entry into World War I1 was undoubtedly George Sylvester Viereck. He was instrumental in distributing Nazi propaganda and in promoting an isolationist ideology Viereck was assisted by another crusader for fascism-Lawrence Dennis

(who worked for the state department for seven years) and by Mrs. Leslie Fry another paid Nazi agent."" One hteresting and dramatic Nazi operation that hvolved violating trust and foyalty and which resu2tt.d in trcasm trials, took place in June 1942. On June 12, Gpitanleutnant Hans-Heinz Linder, crrmmandiz^lg U202, landed four Nazi agents m d four crates of explosives off the eastern clnd of Long Idand near Amagansett usixrg rubber boats, Four days later, on June 16, Kdpitanleutnant Joachim D e d e , crrmrnaneiing U-584, used inflatable rubber boats and landed four Nazi agel~tswith explosives atn all, eight Ponte k d r a Beach, seven miles south of Jacksonviile, Florida. X Abtuehr Nazi saboteurs, with plenty of expiosives, wert? on Americm soil. Fortmately for the Americans, &is mission of destruction failed. Georg Dasch, who Icd the group that landcd in Long Island and who despised Hitler and Nazism, taiked another man into h;lrning himself h, and they betrayed the rest of the p u p (as well as those who sent him). Me contacted the FBI and they surrendered on June 18,Within twenty-four hours his group was in fie hands of the F&f,and on June 23 fie l e a k of fie other group (Edward Kerlhg) was captured and the rest were caught on June 27'. Some of these eight saboteurs had relatives and friends in the U ~ ~ i t eStases, d and fourteen such people wew arrested, too. One of the saboteurs, Herbert Haupt, was raised h Chicago by a pro-Germm family O f the eight saboteurs, six were h a n d guilty of wartirne espionage and were executed cm August 8, and two received long sentences in jail. Ten of the American relatives and friends who were found guilt-)lof helping the sabotews, and thus violating their lqalty to the United States as well as the trust of their cowtry received prison sentm~es~54 However, pro-Nazi individuals m d groups were not the only agitators in the United States; agitators for the Left were t ~ y h g to turn the United States toward co C)ne of the most fascinating cases of treason in that period W= that- of who suggcrsted that if Robert Jordan, a Harlern self-styled '"black f6hrc_.rH black Americans wanted a better futurt;, they had better suppmt, alld fight on, the Japanese side.% After the end of World War 11, issues of treason were raised in the context of the cold war, the :McCar&y persecutiofis," and again, with much power and forcefdness, during the Viehlm War*Unlike previ,ous wars, this very controversial conflict divided Americans and blurred the boundaries of betrayal and treason+sg Archer" s h malytic thrust is to contrast disloyalty wif-;hdissent, He warns that governments h o u l d not equate political opposition with trcason, '"since todays Government policies may be proved to be wrong tomorrow and changed aro completely" (p. f 79). ""National. uaity is hardly hdped when Gove ent spokesmn attack dissenters as unpa-

triotic or traitorous" (p. 183). This issue is indeed an important one, but n specific cases the bouneiary between disdifficult to resdve, because i sent m d disloyalty is often blurred. Appr~lpriatelyenough, Archer ends his book with a quote from Voltairc: "I disapprove of what yczu say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it" (p. 185). Wepl 1950's work raises similar issues" His immense historical review leads him to conclude that major politrical and military crises tend to be accompanied by a variety of forms of bekayal. He points out that those branded trajtors are not always rnornsters but olten true believers. Dissent tends to be, and typically is, regarded aa disloyalty and traitorous in dics tolerance is nonexistmt or very severely limited. tatorial ~ g i r n e whose Struggling against tyranny is often cast by Ihe tyrants into the language of treason. Democracy, states Weyl, must act differently and allow its citizens t e freedom to dissent. However, even democracy must face such issues as aiding its enemies, nationalism, and-Weyl points out-treason agairzst democracy itself, that is, the betrayal of human freedom.

T m s o in ~ E nglnnd: Authors and Histoy Treason and the histmy of Ex~glanda h o s t seem to go hand in hand. fndeed, the topir of treason is very much part of the atmosphere in London. n e r e is the "Traitor" Gate" at the Tower of London, shown to curious wisitors. A visit to London" Dungeons, not too far south across the names, reveals the stories of other larnous traitors, this time in a rather graphic fashion (as does the nearby Clink exhibition). The history of the United Kingdm thus provides us with a 1art;e number of cases of treascm, some of which are bcluded in Wharam's 1995 work. A few English cases involving treason (or suspicion of treason) became h o r n worldwide as a result of very famous movies made about them. An outstanding movie about the conflict betweern King Henry 11 and Becket is the superbly acted 1964 movie Beckt, starring Peter OToonle as King Henry II and &chard Burtm as the doomed archhishp of Canterbury, Thornas Becket. Kecket, who served under Menry 11as archbishop of Canteibury, had a long and bitter dispute with the king, as a result of which he fled England and lived for six years in exile. m e n Becket returned to England, the old c d i c t was renewed, and Kecket was murdered by four knights in Cantcrbur)i Cathedral on December 23, 1170. Becket was cmonized in 1123by Pope Alexander IK The n o m a s More affair was the axis of two very good movies, both nannfd A Nalzfir All Smsons*The first was made in 19% with Paul Scofield playing More. This splendid version won six Oscar awards. A second production was made for televisinn in 11988, starring Charlton Mcston as More. More, in a famous conflict with FXenry VIIX, refused to accept the

k h g as the head of the Church of England. He was charged with treason in what has become one of the most famous treasm kials, found guilty, and beheaded in the Tokver of Lmdo11 on July 6,1535. He was cmmized in 1935. More, no doubt, was one of the best-known and.well-respected statesmen, schotars, and humanists of his time, and perhaps one cJf the peat"" t f all tintes.39 tZnother movie invdving Mjng Henry V111 (and Cardinal Wlsley ) is Atzr-lc ilf: the Tha~lsar-zdDays (1969), starring Genevieve Bue Rolep and Kchard Burton as King Henry Vf1l.a That movie, too, raised issues of loyalty to, and trust inf the monarchy and ciergy. Finally, a more recent movie about t ~ a s o nis Braveheart (1995), starring Mel Gibsm as VViiliam Wallace, the legendary fourteenth-century Scottish agairnst rebel warrior wfio led Scots during the irst pears of their rebellio~~ British d e . He was captured and was executed (actually, publicly torhtred to k a t h ) as a traitor cm August 23, 1305, in London." 3 e movie won five Oscar awards. Several books have been written on people defined as traitors in the United Kingdom." "arm's 1995 work, wbich is quite legalistic, is one of them. It focuses on eleven famous Etnglish treason trials, from the Essex Rebellion (1601) to the trial of Wllhm. J q c e (1945). Like 0Toole" 1991 work, Wharamfs is rich with detail (although not as comprehensive as UToole's), and it offers a tecl-cnjcal unjf-ying framework-the law-aecoding to whirh the different trials were carried out.@ Weale" 1994 work is focused on British traitors h TVVorld War 11, He concludes: Thew is a pervasive air of unrealty surrr~undingthe story of the British renegades of World VVar Two. It is difficuIt to see how even the most intelligent and best educated of them . . . could possibly believe that what they were doing was, as they claimed to believe at the time, in the b e t intersts of Britain. . . . The common denominator i f there is one, which was shared by the renegades and their imrnrtdiate sponsms, was their utterly unrealistic view of the tzrorld, whether out of simple stupidity . . . or for more complex psycholagical reasc)~~. (pp.1527-1 98)

h d yet Weale" work itself reveals the ideological basis behind some of the more famow renegades (for example, Amery, Joyce, Bailly-Stewart) m d a fcw others. :lsr fact, the Nazis searched, for Bri~shsympathizers (not to mention anti-%mites) to help their cause. m a t is so strmge, or wave& in the worldview of m ideologist? Perhaps from a Westem, democratic contemporary perspective ideological commitment seems ""unrealistic,"" even bizarre, but it only accmbates the skeng.t%tof that ideological commitment. However, when this explanation faas short, there arc3 always those ""cmplex pvchological reasons."

Motivation keeps coming up again and again as an organizing prtnciple. It is indeed an interesting cmcept. "T%leorc.tically, if we were to take all h o w cascs of treason and classify Chem according to the motivation of the traitors involved, we would certahly cmate an interesting list, perhaps not much different h m similar dassificatory lists of mothations for espionage."" As important as motivatio~~ is, it alone camot explah treason. To h d a more satisfying interpretation, we have to look at social iinteractions m d institutions. I'secedjrrg Male's 1994 work, Seth's 1973research focused on the eMorts by the Nazis (aided, to a farge degree, by turncoat John Amery) to persuade British and Commonwealth POWs under German cmtroi to join the wm effort on the Nazi side an$ bccome part of the Nazi Wehrmacht. The name given to this potential force was the BriGsh Legion of St. Gease, later known simply as the British Free Corps. Alfiough the Nazis controlled several hw~dredthousand Paws, kwer &an a hmdrcd agreed to participate in the British Free Corps. Thus, this attempt to persuade a mass of individuals to viofate their loyalty to, and the tmst invested in them by, their comtry sirnp)y failed, There were quite a few famous cases of betrayal in Britain during the the cold war, especiatfy espionage. As Britain moved from World War 11 to the cold war, there occurred a sociological shift from public and open dissent (on the baderline of betsayal) to secret and deceptive betrayal. Although English history is full of anecdotes and accounts of betrayal, other countries have their share, too. Klernent's 1984 work, mel~tioned earXier, describes how the American Civil War period was characterized by heightened conscicrusness of conspiracy and treason. During majm conflicts, issues of loyalty and trust become paramount. Tolerance for dissidence, deviance, and complex moral stands is almost impossible to sustain. Charges of distoyalty and treasm can be effecthe symbolic toots in the hands of determined leaders in campaigns to redefine mord bomdaries and bolster their own agenbas. During codict, the boundaries bet w e n patriotism and treason, between loyalty and betrayal, becorne clearly delineated; rhetoric creates a social reality where goad is pitted against evil, with no middle ground. Although KZement focuses on the American Civil War, he cites other cases that support this historical generalization." Shilas situations occzrrred durj,ng the McCarthy witch-bunt: against American Colnmunists in the 13511~~ the Stalinist purges and persecutims of the 1930s,66 and the 1490-1650 European L\litch-hUnts.67 'The generalization we can make here is that intliznes of crisis and social change, various moral entrepreneurs will try to take advantage of the fluid, conhsed, and uncertain situation to redefine the moral boundaries of the cdture. Their success depends on several factors, chief m o n g which is their ability to generate, mnbilize, and use power.

Focusing on Treason Although betrayal on the personal level is an interesthg topic, one about which numerous novels have been written, our m a h hterest lies with betrayal on the nationat, state, collective, or orgmizational level. 'I'he main reason is that the two elelnents so importmt for our understanding of devianc+morali~ and power-are very salimt there, These elements oifer us a way to understand treason. Treason implies violating one" cmmitment, trust, and loyalty to a particular symbolic moral miverse characterizing a collective. This violation is conceptualized as an almost universal "crime" and is severely punished by mast cztlttures.68 Treascl~~ is thus hvoked whe11 m obligation of allegimce (expressed in terms of trust and loyallty) to a particular social (and moral) order exists on the individual level and when an intention to violate that obligation exists, which is duly followed by relevant adioneb9 Committing an act of betrayal requires makQ a moral. decision, Tt means that at least two different behavior options exist and that one of them is defined as immoral and treacherous. 'This is an important p i n t . In, many cases of national or collective t ~ a s m the , mnral choice is not very clear because one may feel loyal to an idea or to a political, social, or moral system different than the one in which that individual lives. Sometimes, these two are mutuafly antagmistic. Violating one's trust and loyalty to a nationaf collective, a state, a state orgmization, or rUIer/s wjll clearly in\Poke a societal reactior~in the form of m accusation in treason. What makes one choice treacherous m d mother not? The cmrial variahle here is power-the power "f those making the cdtural interp~tationof a specific b&avior to mean that it violates trust and loyalty in the form of '"treachery." Thus, the successful defiiyliticm (that is, &:be one that is both accepted a d serves as a basis for action) of any specific person as a traitor is limited to a particular configmtion of power and mrality Change that confjguration and a different interpretation will emerge. Lord Haw-Haw (William Joyce), executed by the British as a traitor, was highly respected and esteemed. by Nazi Germany. Likewise, members of the White Rose, executed by Nazi Gemany as traitors, were fiighly respected bp the nm-Nazi world.. Josephus Flavius, respected by the Romans, has been considered an archetypical triritor by many Jews, It is precisely this qualiy of betrayal that is so interesti~ngand worthy of examining. This qualiw of betrayal raises mother issue that is relevmt to contemporary public discourse. When two or more political or ideollrgical points of view clash, the risk of a particular choice running h t o culturai interpretations that may define that choice as tl-eacherous is significant. In-

deed, when definitims of treason emphasize that it violates ""atlegiance to the communityf9he assumption that the nature cJf this "allegimcef~s nonproblematic needs to be challezzged.

The Stmcture and Cantent of Treason: A Summary It is a common observatio~zthat treason Iies in the eyes of the beholder and that there is no such thisrg as genuine or authentic treason, hdeed, the specific ctnzfmfof treason may not be universal. In this sense, what is defined by some as treaso~zcan be defined by others as heroism. The reason for this is that th sociological sf ndciure of treason is genuine and universal, a l t h o w it is pclssi27le to fill this miversal structure with different cmtents. Treason is based on a social construction of reality, which is what makes this type of social interaction culturally meaninghl. lltis particufar social constmction is based on the violation of two specific .forms of social relat h s h i p , which are typically referred to as trust and loyalty. As pointed. out earlier, trust and loyalty characterize the personal and as well as the callective, natio~zal,and even international levels, Violations of trust and loyalty on the persond level arc commonly Eferred to as ""betrayal" and on the collective or natimal level as ""t~ason.'" Both betrayal and treason often necessitate deceptive behavior and lmguage (for example, concealing, lyixrg) m the part of those hvolved h t k s e relationships. Moreover, the wide variety of behaviors hvolved in treason m y lead us to conclude that the very category of trczason covcrs qualitatively dlffesent behaviors. We shall see that it is not too difficult to deconstruct the differcmt cases of treasm to their basic assumptions and facts. m c e that is done, the co~ztextualmeming of treason becomes inhemtly problematic. 5tr"nge as it may perhaps sound, betrayal on the personal level is much less problematic, easier to estabtish, and clearer to interpret. For exmgle, marriage typically means sexual exclusivity Violating that is interpreted as betrayal, adultery cheating, and so forth. It is not difficult to determine wfio is commi.trtingthe adultery and cvho is hurt by this behavi,~.The violation of trust and lyalty in such cases is obvious, But treason is more difficult to interpret. h n d yet various manifestations oE treason reveal a solid underlying structure. The structure that defines treason is the violation of trust and loyalty between bona fide members of a national collective. Trust and loyalty a d their various violations (includislg treason) constitute gezzuke and universal structures, However, the content of what exactly constitutes tmst,

as well as the direction of loyalty, in specified groups and cdtures may vary considerably,

Approaching the Problem The genuinely important elements of this work are the principles oE organization, that is, examining betrayal as a particular form of devimce structured a b q the viotations of the values and norms of trust and loyalty and classified by the relations of those defined as traitors to the collectjve or dyacl. a c e these principles are established, cases can be interpreted within them. Of course, we cannot discuss treason without context. Some illustrations must be brought in. Good sociology, in my view involves interesting and instructiw puzzles and tales. Although the specific tales of treachery are interesthg, 1 am much more hterested in the possible cmceptualizations and generalizations that can be drawn from such talcs, Rather than focusing on one particular case or building an encyclopedia of treachay, I shall focus in a historical and cross-.cdtu,raf perspective on several cases and will generate m d suppoX"Iexactly those understandings mentioned above. In producjng this work I was faced wiCh the crlassical problem of historical research, that of selection. Which cases to select? I decided to select the more famous cases, from several cdtures, and from speci.fic periods. Clearly, periods ol unrest and cultures profomd social and political changes are good places to look for cases of treason, Hence, in the next few chapters I present Lvhat I hope are quite a few interesting accounts about specjfic cases of treaso~~. :In doing tkis part of t k work, I became acutely aware oi Anthony Glees" rreview (in the Timrs Literary Sztppleme;rzt) of Nigel West's 1995 book on treason. Mavi,ng reviewed West's large encyclopedj,~volumef elees notes, exasperatedly, "By the end of the book we are no wiser about the naturc. of treachery than we were at the bei;iming.'"7@I hope that by the end of this book, the reader will be Wjser m d will achieve some powerful m d practical gmeralizabk insi&ts about the nature oi treason, as well as its structure and various manifestations. Moreover, the study of treason, as m e particular rnmifestatim of betrayal, can hrnish some very h d a r n m t a l insights into the character of sociai order, trust, loyalty, and the assumptions that underpin them all. Failhfui. to contextual constructionism, examining treason bp examining its basic nature, its different empirical manifestations, and the ways in which it is cmstructed and charged with meaning in a variety of cmtexts yields valuable insights into the nature of appearances, mirrors, and masks,71 and how actual behavior contrasts with social constructions.

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ating Trust and ty During Wor d War 11: Part 1

The 1939-1945 period of World War X I provides a fascinatjngly rich time slot within which to examine cases of treason and other forms of betrayal.Wor1d War II is particularly inte~sting,especiaily fie European theater, because at least four different syxnbolic moral universes clashed there. The first was commmism, the second was Ifassism and Nazism, the third was the dder monarchic societies (fctr wample, Vugoslavia), and fie f a ~ ~ rw t hs democmcies..Each of these politically delined sym:bolic moral unkerses represented djfferent cultural worldviews regarding almost every aspect of human life, Moreover, the clash an-tong these symbolic moral universes was fierce, costing the lives of millions ol indi\sjduals. Power, includhg the power to annihilate entire ethnic groups, was very pmmb~en t. 'Thus, this was a period whe11 one master system of governing was SLIPported over another. Such a major cbange on the cultural level necessar.ilp translates tct the individual kvel in terns of such defining persmai characteristics as biographies, worldview, and identities. This historical conflict provides us with a stmcturc within which cases of betrayal unfold. Such structures may be typical of codicts like World War 11. tietmspectivelyr and in most people's minds, that was the last war Where it was clear who hught who and why-what many have mferred to as a ""just war,'hwhere gcrod and evil were clearly delineated. This perception hecomes especiaily sharp when, one examines the conflict b e t w e n Nazi Germany and the Allies. R a t is, tmst and loyalty we= sharply dcfhed. In reality, the picture was sometimes less clear. What better place and time to took for betrayal? In the following pages, we shall examine several different cases of betrayal in World War 11,


Vintalitzg Trrtsl and hyalty Durr'12g WurIcZ War 11: Part l

VVorld War I1 raised the issues of loyalty, tmst, and deceit, on both the personal m d national levels, to a mapitude and intensiv not frequently found ino&r historical periods. We will be examining the issuc of betrayal in different countries, but it must be remembered that personal betrayal was also an issue, for exampk, the bekayal of Jews hiding from the Nazis, Clne m o u s case involves what: may have been the worst traitor of Miorld War 11-Hamld (Pole) Cole. When the war began, Cole deserted the British Army and aligned with the Nazis. Although British intellihe was helpkg to save the lives of Allied pilots who paragence th~r~tght chuted into occupied Europe, he was actually betrayirrg m n y of them to the Germans. He was also effec"cive in betraying other Arlird agents. As the war progressed, he joined the Americans and helped them hunt dokm his previous German masters. Cole was shot and killed on January 9, 1946, in a shoot-out with the French police in Paris. haz,ingly, among the people he betrayed to the Nazis was his lover-Suzanne Warrenwho was also the mother of their child." One general statemat that needs to be made is that clashing armies Esort to deception whenever they cm; that is, they deliberately mislead their oppments and viofate their trust and loyalty. Bp W i n g their enemy through manipulating their trust and loyalty they can score better and cheaper victories. MiliQry history has several such episodes: the Jilpmese attack on Pearl Harbor; the surprise attack of Egypt m d Syria on Israel in 0ctol;ler of 1973; and the surprise Nazi comteraeack in the Adernes (the Rattle of the Bulge) in December 1%4. However, manipulating the trust: and foyalty of oy-pctnents is not restricted to the military field. Hitler certainly manipulated both the Atlkd powers and the Soviets before the beg h i n g of World War IIby signing international agreemel~tshe had no intention of keeping and by violathg them whenever it suited his purposes. Reseaxhers in =cent years have even speculated that Churchill was involved in similar nrrmipulatiol~s* First, Rusbridger and Nave (1991) assert that by not telling Roosevelt about the impending attack on Pearl Harbor, Churchill ensured the entry of the United Statres into World War E. Second, K'tlaer (1994) mintains that by deliberately ignoring Rudolf Mess's (Hitler" deputy) mission of peace to England. (Hess" strange flight to b g 1 m d occurred on May 10,1%1), Churchill guaranteed that the Soviet Union would be dl-agged into World War If. Kilzer even implies that Hess's mission was genuine and that it could have prevented botfn the war and the extermination of Europem Jews. f i r d , Uennistone (9997) states that England used secret s:ignaf intelligence in an attclmpt to get Turkey involved in the war m the side of the Allies and to help open a second front against Nazi Germany in the Balkans. With this ifiroduction and the illustrative cases in mind, let us examine the first category of World War 11cases.

Violating Tr~tsl~ l hyalty ~ d D ~ i r i ~Worlc2 fg War 11: Part l

Fifth CoXumnism One of the more intriguing phenomena to emerge in tbis period is groups of secret sympathizers m d supporters of an enemy who engaged in espionage or sabotage within defense lines or national borcfrrs, also known as ism. The origin of the term is traceable to the Spanish Ciwil War when the Nalj.nnalist general Ennili~Moa at-tacked Madrid i,n 1934 with four m y colums. Gcneral Mola coined the term "fifSh column" tto describe the Nationalist supporters in Rcradrid who assisted his assault. Later, the British used the term to descrfie people w hized wi&, or spied for, the Nazis. British accounts blamed a fif lfor the surprising and umxpected rapid collapse of French military forces confronting the successlul May 1940 Nazi onslaught. There was also British concern &out the possi:ble existence of a fifth column arnung the many ~fugeewho tled to England from the Conthent, Ernest Hemingway"~ play Fqtfi Ccrlurrtrz (about the Spanjsh Civil War) helped to M u s e the term in the United S"ttes*Even President RooseveZt believed in fifth columns; he stated in a fireside chat on May 26, 1940, that there was a "Fifth Coluntn that betrays a nation unprepared b r treaehery"3

Fifth Colum~isnrin World Wuu I1 During the war, leaders took action to suppress, or encourage, fjfthcohmn efforts. Winston Chmbill's order to create the Special Operation Executive, which aimed to b d l e the fires of resistmce and ""st E ~ ~ r o p e ablaze," must have had the idea of a fifth column behind it.Woreover, Churchit1 had ordered a wholesale round-up of people whom he feared might start a Fifth Column that could be infiltrated by the German Inteltligence services. Among these tzrere 150 classed as "pmminent."W~nityMitford's sister and bro>thez=.jn-law, Sir OswalcS and Lady Mosley were among the first to be detained, Others, such as the Duke of Westminster, . . . were tzrarned to keep their mouths shut and nat spread defeatist rumors and to sever all links with Germany?

The threat of growing populaf support for fascism was very real in t-he early 1930s.6 As we shall see in the case of Kng Edward Vlfl (later Duke of W i n d s o sysympathy fur fascism. touched some prominent figures, who f o r m d various networks of sympathizers, In the szxlnrner of 1940, Major Genmal Willjam Donovm, director of the Ofice of Strategic Services (055) during World War f1,7 helped to draft a


Vintalitzg Trrtsl and hyalty Durr'12g WurIcZ War 11: Part l

ent that examined the impIications oi a fifth c o l u m for the Unlted whjch created somefiing of a panic about: the penetralion of Nazi agents hAmerica.-me of the results of that pmic can be seen in m hstruche document from the perjod by Farren (1940). In it, the author calls for workers to assist the war effort: m d provides them with guidelines on how to ide~~tify saboteurs and prevent them from hfiltrating importmt work places.9 Higham" 1985 work attempts to document the collaboraition of some Americms with the Nazis from at least 1933. This collaboration cmsisted of political support and various conspiratmid p&.'"" Fifth columnism was not confhed to only a European context. A mlate$ development took place on Febmary 19,3942, when Prtjsident 1Coosevelt issued an executive directive that culminated in the dete~ztionof about 120,000 peopl ayanese descent on the West Coast. Abwt twothirds of these we ricm citizens with a Japanese culturat heritage (Nisei). It is importmt to note that many Nisei were eventually drafted into the U.S. Army m d Navy and they supported, the U.S. war effiurt in many significant ways. I-lowver, the act of detairra such a large number of people clearly behind it much smspicion, distrust, and a fear of a Japanese fifth colu l That fear, one must hastily add, had some empirical grounds in the behavior of thc. Sudeten Gemms (discussed fater) and some populdior~sin the U'kraine, Yugoslavi,a, and a few other countries, who provided support for Nazi ideolngical and territorial expansionist claims. One of the major mtrospective counterarglaments is that these Nisei wcre U.S. citizens and hence owed their alXegiance to the United States, which they tmsted. However, this argument did not hold much m a y in 1942. As late as 1946, a Canadian royal commission. that had studied Igor Gouzenko" defection (discussed. in Chapter 3) stated in its report that the Soviets had been involved in creating a fifth-cdumn organization in Canada. In reality, the Soviets in Canada were involved in operating a rather mundane intelligence organization whose goal it was to collect hformation about atomic weapons. Basically fifth columr\ism mans Eh& a c o u ~ ~ t (say, r y counky X) cont d s a large number oi people who live in another country (say country U). "T'hesepeople are orgmized secretly and pretend to be loyal and trustworthy dtizens of corntry Y,while hfact their loyalty and trust belong to count^ X. Thus, t h y conceal their true loyalty and engage FR continuously deceitful behavior. Onw hostilities erupt between collntry X and countr>i V, a fifth column bccomes a =source for espionag, subversion, and sabotage, creating mrest and chaos. fifth ccliumnism has been generalized to also include political influence and subversion. Although country X may utilize a fifth column to create chaotic conditions, enabling the invasion of country V, country X may af.-

ternatively use a fifth colu to better control events within comtry V, It zis used political espionage during the war was in this context that th to innuence political decisionmaking processes in their favor, and even created such processes.12 For exampie, up to September 1939, it was a Nazi-stated goal to keep England out of a ccrntimntal war. Until the Japanese attack 811 Pearl Harbor, it kvas a stated Nazi political goal to keep the United States "neutral" and out of the war (Britain, of course, had a diametricaily opposed goal). To help achieve this goal, the Nazis supported sympathizers in these countries. 'Thus, both politic4 and military eiiorts are included in fifth columnism. Metaphorically speaking, it is not c m erode the detoo difficult to imagine that, like termites, a fifth colu termhation, stre~~gth, m d capabilities of country U to such an extent that country X codd conquer it with ease and swifhess, The issues of m r a l boundaries and the betrayal of loyalty, trust, and deception arc. all very neatly focused in fifth colum,nism, In many aspects, a fifth col haps the ultimate example of tseasm.

Ripka focused his 1945 work on the Henleinist pro-Nazi movement in CzeclhoslovaEa. He showed how Herrlehists were hvolved in sabotage, espionage, the accumulation of explosjves and weapons, and deceptive operations. He describes the activities of these pro-Nazis in CzechoslovaEa h terms of a fifth column. h o t h e r docurnmt, titled The Gemran Fqfh Column in Polnl-rd, published by the Polish Ministry of Information in 1940, examines the issue of the German minority in Polmd and in other European com~tries,such as Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, France, and. Norway. It concludes that "subversive activities and conspiracy against the State wert? the p r o g m and political conception. dsminat&~g the G e r ~ ~ mhorities an durkg the period preceding the war" (pp. 11-12). These minorit.ies became one of the standard excuses that the Nazis used to justify their brutal and unprovoked hvasions of these countries.. It is interesting that both this document and :Ripka%(BG)examjne, in detail, the claim that Cermm minorities were ill-treated and severely discrimhated agaiinst by their host countries. Ripka, for example, notes that during 1937-1.938, Germans made up 22.3 percent of the population of Czechoslovakia and they hefd 2.2 percent of the seats in parliament and 23-1 percclrt of tbe civil service posts. I:,ikewise, no crlaims of discrhinat h agaixlst Germans in Poland. (or the existence of a fifth, colurn there) could be empiric* proven. Altrt7ough this attempt to expose the hypocrisy of the Nazisklaims is interesting and instmctke, it would not have made any diflerence to the


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Nazis. The '"German mjnority" 'issue was just an excuse used for public consumption. The real motivation was one of racial Gern-tm hegemcmy m d expansionism, as indeed stated quite blwztly in Mitlds Neirr I ( u ~ l t ? f : Regard.less of this, German minorities were called upon (and expected) by the Nazis to aid them in their political and territorial claims before and after the Nazis seized power, The nature of this help ranged from poEticd support to espionage, conspiracy, smuggling weapons and. explosives, and sabotage.. 7"he most comprehensive work abed fifth co s is that by Louix De fang," De fang examined meticulously the e ce of a possible German fifth cdumn, country by country, in Spain, Austria, CzechoslovaZtia, Poland, Norwy, Balkans, Switzerland, and in more generd terms, in Western and Eastern Europe and the United States. The answer she provides to questicms of the existence and effectiveness of Nazi fifth columns e o m hmd, &ere can hardy be a doubt that elements of sted. That is, there were ;indeed German mhorities (and gmizations) whose goal it was to &stabilize the regirne of their host corntries and cause its downfall. Although the most prevalent activity of these organizations was espionage, they were also FRvolved 117 sbotage and tried to disr?lgt daily life. However, the frevency size, and type of aclvities of these organization different countries. For example, whereas fifth-co strong in Czechodovakia, it was virtuaily nonexistent in Poland. Uc: Jong notes that the activities of these Pllazi sympathizers resdted partially from instructions that came directly from Nazi Germany (for example, preA~zsChlzi~;~ Austria) and partially from these imdividuals' w n interpretatim of their identification with Nazism. Werc they effectbe? Again, the answer is complex and is case specific. 'fhey were quite effective in Czechohvakia. Konrad Henlein had already established a Nazi-like party inOctober 1933. Durhg the 15335elections, this party wan about 60 percent of German-speaking voters. The activities of the pro-Nazi H d e i n i s t movement w e very h d p M to Hitkc Theis continuous provocative agitation in the St~detenland(which increased after the Austrian-&man Anschluss in March 1938) apparenq helped to persuade the British that the Nazi clairn to parts of Czechostovakia had ""smething to it" m d that Czechoslovakian htegrity could no lmger be maintahed. That the Czech government was very effective in quickly and siiviftly squdching the specific September 1938 agitaticm was of no usc? to Czedosfovakian nationd integrity. l-he weak state ol the British a r m d forccs at that tim.e, coupled with what appeared to be a disbelief that Czechoslovakian unity could be maintained, contributed to the sig~zingthe Munich Pact. hdeed, follawhg that 9pternber 1938 agreemmt, the Sudetenland was gi-ven to Nazi Germany, and Monrad Henleh

was =ply rewarded by the Nazis with the appolntrnent as head of the Sudetenland. :ill May 1939 he was promoted to the position of Gauleiter, heading the civilian adminjstrdion, jn Czechoslovakia,l4 However, De Jong points out that in mmost of the cowtries she surveyed, t-he German rninority was not strong or organized as an effective politicd force. M a t most Nazi sympathizers in most c o t ~ ~ ~ t rdid i e swas simpIy to talk loudy about their new belief and used Geman Nazi insig"ia and figures in public as pofnts of identification. It needs to be added that in such countries as Holland, Switzerland, and Britain, the German groups, as such, simply dld not have legitimate grievances. Cansequently, Nazi organizations in these countries never acquked extensive popular support. C)ne examfle is South Mrica, where the government exposed and broke a Nazi organization. Obviously, the Nazis were always interested in increasing tensions and unrest in societies that ob~ectedto them, and so they always encouraged subversive activities ai-nned at promothg such disintegrative processes, The best case of this is Austria. It is quite clear that Kurt von Schusehnigg" Ai?Lurian gover~nme~~t fell because of the systematic activity of a group of Nazis, headed a d supported by Berlin and Munich. ism had a rathctr problematic empirical existence in World War 11. As a conceptual propagmda tool, it was priceless,.At a time of great anxiety and uncertajnw the idea that some sort of widespread pclwerful secret conspiracy existed, wbose purpose was to disintegrate countrks frorn withjn, k d hjdder~fears and was used to expla,in s m e otherwise puzzIing phenomena (for example, the rapid collapse of France). However, a careful examinaticm, country by country, for the existence of a fifih colurnn reveals a complex reality that. is not very supportive of the concept, As couXd be expected, fnllowing World War If, the term slowly vanished frorn use. 'f'he main reason for this was probabty that cptions (for cxamplc, Austria), no genzline widespread actually existed, a realization that became quite clear during the poritwar years. It needs to be added t-hat the abovc conclusiorl is valid on:ly if cve take the term. "fifth column" tto mean a well-organized cmspiratmial body, as the tern originaily memt. If we reintevret the concept to denote a body of sympathizers, then the term could be used to mean the faciljtation of change from one political/cultural form to mother. Haweves, such a reinterpretation of the term, eliminating its origil~aiconspiratorial naturt~, raises other difficutties. For example, what il a large part of the populalion and publicly-befieves that the country slnould folof a country-penly low a path that others object to7 What if others view this part of the population as treacherous or as composh~ga fifth col~x~m? Clearly in a situation where a populatim is so badly split between different worldviews,


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and one part decides to use the rhetoric of trcason to describe its disagreement with dissenters (that is, to &legitimize oppcments as disloyal and untrustworthy), the concept of fifllh columnism becornes completely invalid and useless, .An example that comes to mind is the accusation made by so many in the Jewish Israeii political right (and religious right) that tbr Israeli left is "treacherous" "(same have even used the term "fifth c~lumn"), .As recently as Novmber 1939, accusations were made in Israel by some ultra-Orthodox Jews that hnmigrmts from Russia to Israel constituted a i & h colwm because they werc set on corrupting the country.

Collaboration The delinition of the term ""cllaboration" is context dependent, In the neutral sense of the term, it means cooperation, or harmonictus wmk and effort. Many professional, academic, polj.tical, and economic teams "'collaborate." However, within the non-neutral context of a conflict, or war, the term typically denotes something like "working with the other (cmemy) side" or helping occupyjng hrces.. Thus, the meaning of the term depends on me%ppoit of view that is, on morality and on one" ppower to enforce particdar moral intevretaticms. For example, in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, what Israelis have defined as ""PaI.estinian assistants,""in what map appear as a positively charged jargon (suyfm in M r e w ) , were ~ f e r r e dto as despised ""collaborators'"~ othcr I'alestinians. It is signiS'icant that even in Issaeli E-fcbrew slang, such Palestinian coltaborators have been referred to as sht inkus, meanrr7g '"hose who stinkH-clearly a negative rc-rferenct-1. Overall, arotlnd 5,000 I'alesthian collaborators (mostly undercover) have helped Israel in its occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, of whom around 1,200 have been murdered by other Pale~thims~15 Intelligance (poljce and military) colla,borators have a limit-rd lengCh of operational life. After that, the organization that used them must shelter them, sometimes for very long periods of t h e . The question of betrayal arises at two poiints in the career of such col1;rboratars: the decision to collaborate and l& after the operational period ends. CoIIaboration forces into sharp focus the issues of morality and power, as well as those of trust and loyalty-their direction and violation. 81thou& there are different Qpes of collaboration, I shall continue by facusing on one of those types-dlaboration within the cmtext of a national conflict, which is an integral part of treason.

Background The general back;mund in Europe after World War I was one of major eccmomic crisis and st-radows of both cclmmunism and fascism looming

over the fand. This was a period of unrcst, unrertainv, confusion, and opportunity regarding changes to boundaries of morality. The ascent of Hitler's National %cialism must be viebved wit-;hinthis context..'The Europe that Hitler was facing had quite a few fascist mwements, most of whjch were rather sympathetic to him. Mussoli~~i's Italy and Franco's Spain moved directly into fascist totalitarian social orders, Other cauntries had fascist movements, but not as strong. Thus, for yuite a few people, t.he "choice" appeared to be between communism and fascism (or its Nazi varimt). Let" briefly review some of the key dates and events durirrg the period.. tlitler was appointed chancellor on fanuary 30, 1933. Following the Reichstag fire on March 5, 1933, Germny went to Reiehstag electictns. The Nazis won 288 uut of 647 deputies (44.5 percent). After consolidation of Hitter's power, new elections in November gave the Nazis 93 percent of the votes. In Mar& of 1936, Germany denolmced the Locarno Fact, and German troops were sent to the mineland, In March of 1938, German to September 29-30 witnessed the troops crossed the border i ~ ~Austria. pitiful and wretched appeaserne~~t attempt at Munich by French premier Daladier and British prime minister Chamberlain to Hitler and MussolinfJ6 I'he s p r i ~ ~ and g summer of 1939 witnessed quite a few puhlic calls to Hitler to avoid war, to no avail. Germany attacked Poland m Septesnber 1,1939, and World War 11 began. Within a short period of time, Nazi Germany occupied and cmtrolled much of Europe: Belgium surrendered in May 1940, France yielded in June 1940, and Romania in October 1940, fln 1941 Germm troops marched into Bulgaria (March), launched major offensives in Pllorth Mrica, Yugosl,avia, and Greece (April), and on J w ~ 22, e the victorious Nazi Miehrmachf attacked the Soviet Union. German U-boats experienced ml-tjor victories in the Atlantic, and Britain was heavily bombed from the air, Until the summer of 1941, and following the hitial Nazi victories on the Russian f m t , Europe seemed to yield to Hitler. But FR 1943it began to be clear, as the W-boats werr;, losing the Battle of the Atlantic, Staijngrad was rcltaken bp Sovkt troops, and the Nazi M'mth Afsican campaign was collapsing, that Nazi Germany was probably gohg to lose the war. In June 19.24, follwing the landintgs of Allied forces in Normndy it became obvious that Nazi Germany was loshg the war. 'The question was, how tong before it wauld collapse completely, That happened in May 1945.

The Meaning of Collabovation Millions of peope were undcr Pllazi occmpa.t.ion between 1939 and 1,945, and until 1943 it s e m d that the Nazis had a very strong grip over hrope. The Japanese irritiaf expansion in the Far East created a sometruhat


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similar situation. Both German)i and. Japan controlled large areas and popdations using relatively small military forces. How was that possible? Warmbruun (1943) suggests two major a causes for the swcess of that control: (1)swift and decisive military defeats; m d (2) threats to use violence and actual use of it. What was one supposed to do? HW was one supposed to behave under one of the mast ruthless and racist regimes to have ever existed on this planet? Collaboration and resistance . . . are vague [terms] and defy precise definition; callaboratian could mean anything from volunteering for the Wlfen S.S. to buying a picture pastcard of Marshal Pktain, likewise "resistance"" could be derailing an enemy troop-train or singing an obscene parody of "Lilti Marlene'"! Qtitflejohn 2 972:336)

LittlejQhn's work is focused on those he termed "patriotic traitors" and describes, in detail, collaborators with Nazi Germany in different European countries. However, it is important to note that the very same term can easily be apflied to such individuals as Willy Krandc Malelne Dietrich, or Claus von Stauffenberg (discussed in later chapters). Jt is also important tcr note that :Nazi Cermmy was not thr only occupying force. Imperial Japan occupied large parts of Sout"rreastAsia and China, and Italy controlled other parts in southern Europe and North Africa, Durtng the war, and afterward, countries fell under the occupation of different Allied count.ries, but more prornounced was the occupatian of many coun.t.riesby Soviet troops. Warmbruun points out that collaboration with the Nazi occupation in E w p e assumed one of three forms.l7 First was "'voluntary collaborat h , " which meant embracing Nazi interests, for whatever reason, ranging from such motkation as personal gain to politicaf identification with Nationat Socialjsm. This position typically meant that m y parts of Ihe orig4mal culture of the preoccupied state were washed away in favor oi the Nazi culture as dictated by the Nazi masters. Warmbmun has no doubt that this particular form of collaboratio~nis akin to treason. 9cond was ""sbbmissim to German dcmands on the grounds of "superior force.""" Warmbruun finds this particular behavior to be unavoidable ""accommodation," because not complying could man death. Cda:boration here meant tlne mininlum necessary. Obviously "muperiar force" was not always deadly, and "acccmlmodation" could provide a cover for tbose who were not willing to take even moderate risks. Thjrd was ""reasonabk collaboration," a position typically taken by administrators and justified on the grounds of having ta protect and shield the population, or parts of it, from the horrors of a brutal, occupation..Warmbruun is obviously weary of this "wise guy" agproach. He points out that ""any collaboration with

the absolute evil represented by National Socialist principles, poficies, and fnstitutions, backed up by the pcrice power of the totalitarian state, was bound to corrode the good intentions of all cdaborating jndjviduals or groups" "InJarmbrum1963:274). As he so wisdy p o i ~ ~out, t s the policy of 'keasmable cdaborationf%as taken by the Jewish Goundls under Nazi occupatianflgand it Ied to selfdefeat and self-destruction. The Jews who operated those councils thought they were dcrfng some good, perhaps even deluding themscrlwes that they could save some Jcws..But that hope, given the Nazi Find Solution plan, was a vain one. While perhapmnot always fully aware of it, many of these Jews simply pIayed a role for the Nazis by counseling other Jews to st~bxnit, In each occupied country the great majority of the population came to terms with the reality of the occupation. . . . Most people, against their will, were caught in a social system which of necessity continued to function under the occupation, to some extent to the advantage of the German war economlv,. . . Unw-ifling adjustment was the rule----intentionaI resistance the exception.f"

'The pat-i;c.msof collaboration durjng Worid War II occurred in several areas: political, militar~r,administrative, and economic, tn each of these areas, helping the enemy assumed differcsnt depths and forms.20 CoUaboratim could mean the crossing of morat boundaries by violating precoltaboratjon trust and loyalty. And yet the content m d direction of trust and loyalty are the main issues here. Without lietermhing their naturel the meaning of colla,horatio~z(and it is printarily a m r a l meaning) sirnply dissipates. Indeed, s m e of the most spectacuhr cases of treason date to this period. Let us look at some.

Collaboration in Europe, 1939-1945 Adolf Hitler was appointed ChanceHor on January 30, 1933. From Chat point in time, Nazi expansionism was only a mattcr of time and expediency As the Nazis conquered more territories, more people fell under Nazi political, economic, military, and cultural hegemony and control. The choices these people faced were few. Collaboration and resistance were two general options, divided into numerous subcategories. Questims of resistmsc"' and collaborationf'2 and the way in which these options directly related to issues of trust, l o y a l t ~md. their violation, were an almost daily ~ a t i t yfor people under occupation. Who or what was one s~pposedto trust? To wfiom or to what did m e give loyalty? Let's eexarnine some of the possibilities.


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Austria and Sqss-Inquart The first country into which the Nazi Wehumncht marched was Austria (March 12, 3938) in the process of the Anschltrss ('"ranion"') hetwem Nazi Germany and Austria. That step follcrwed a lcmg history of Nazi aggrrssion. First, on July 25, 1934, Austrim chancellor Engelbert Dolfuss was murdered in the Chancellery h 7Jienna by Austrian Nazis who wanted Austria to become a Nazi state. W e n t h i s did not work, Hitler ~ r e a t e n e d the new chancellor-Kurt von khuschnigg-on March 1938, and demanded his resignation. The reason for this specific threat was that Schuschnigg was p1 img a plebiscite m Austrian independence. Hitler demanded that khusChnigg be replaced by an Atastrim Nazi-Arthur Seyss-Inquart. This took place on March 11. FXowever, the plot became even more interesthg when Nazi Herr~annGoering told Syss-Illquart to send a cable to Germany demandjng the entry of the Nazi a r q into Austria to restore order. Indeed, Seyss-lnquart &eyed Ihe suggested guidelines, a d consequent@ units of the Wettntaadlt marcl-ted into Austria. Seyss-Illquart, an e~nthusiastic-supporter of 'che Ai-lschlzrss and a longtime devoted Nazi, became the Reich gvvernor of Austria. Seyss-Inquart did not hide his Nazi sympathies or his political views. His actions hclped to terminate Austrian independence, which Icd to Ihe integration oi Austria with Nazi Germany. Seyss-Inquart remajned h oifice until April 1939. Seyss-Inquart's career cclntkued, and from May 3940 mtiI 1,945 he was Reich comntissioner in the occupied Netherlands. Among other actions, he was directly responsible for making the Netherlartdskconomy serve Germmy ~ c r u i t e dforced labor on the mapitude of 5 milljon people who were sent to Germny, and was effective in Ihe rounding up of Labout 117,000 Jews wbo were sent to their deaths in Poland. He was a r ~ s t e din May 1945, tried at Nuremberg, found guilty of war crimes, and hanged on October 16,1946.23 Was Seyss-fnquart an AustPian traitor? To answer this question one must answer some other difficult questions. For example, how m y Austrians actually supported the Anschllrss in 1938? If very m n y did, then Seyss-Xnquart did nclt betray the trust and loyalty of many or even possiZlly tbe majority of,Austrians. On the contrary Xlscr, if the aspiraticm to unite Austria with Nazi Germmy was viebved as a positive and necessary process, for the bcnefit of both countries, then the hvocatim of the label "t~ason'" inthis case becomes very problematic. Was he lctyal to Austria? Again, answering this question depends on. whether Austrians viewed the Anschlzlss with Nazi Germany in 1938 as a positive or a negative step and whether the Alzsclzluss can be perceived, ideologicaily, as a positive pro"^^. The main reason Seyss-lnquart was kied (nnd convi,cted) as a traitor was that h i s morality and politics were such that he gave up Aus-

tria" independence as a cultural, political, and social entity. However, it is not too difficult to argue fiat Seyss-Inquart was loyal to the idea of an expanded, htegrated Nazi Reichf m d so his behavior may have presented a consistent patriotic motivation,

Czechoslovakia The f i n i c h Pact (Sptember 29-31),1938), in MIhich Ex~glandand France agreed that: Nazi Germany could acquire the Sudetenland, actually meant the end. of Czechoslovakia as m independent state. It dld not take long. Within a few months Nazi Germany took over the S u d e t e n l d , Poland seized a small border district, Slovakia became a vassal. German state, and the leftovers of Bohemia and Moravia were occupied by the Nazi military in March 1939, If citizens of Czechoslovakia, a d the Czech p~""den,t,Eduard BeneA, viewed Western countries with scorn and suspicion and felt betrayed by both Enghnd and French, who can blame them? In a hopdess policy of appeasement, French and Engfish politicrjans sacrificed the integrity of Czechodovakia, exposed its citizens to Nazi rule, and.certainly did not ach-ieve the. goal they wanted-the psevention of another world war. The Nazi occupation of Czechoslovakia was relatively be11ig11; the Nazis felt that they could maximize economic explojtatim and. squeeze more out of Czechoslovakia by using benign means rather than by using harsh repression. Correspondingly, resistance to Nazi occupat-ion was not very strong, at least not until the 1940% The most notable act of resistance was the assassination of Reinhard Heydrich (May 27, 1942) by Free Czech agents (trained in Ex~glmdand pamachut.ed into Czechoslovakia for the task). His dealh, a week later, resulted in the Nazi massacres and destruction of the villages of Lidire (June 9,1942) and Lezaky. Folfowlng the November 1938 Munich Pact, Eduard BeneB resigned his post as president.24 His successor was Ernil Hacha. Put under bmtat, pressure in Berlin, sixty-seven years old, and in poor health, Ilaeha s i p e d a surrender document in Mar& 1939. i2Ithough he continued to serve as the nomisral head of state of what was left of Czechoslovakia, the state was actually managed by its Nazi rulers." Mastny points out: that Czechoslovakia was Nazi Germany's first conquest m d remained u ~ ~ d e r Nazi rule the longest time, Ui~derpleas from Emil Hacha" government, Czechs were asked to refrain from acts of resistance. However, the assassination of Heydrich (ordered by the C,ondon-based BeneA) unleashed a campaign of terror by the Nazis, Mashy claims that by 1942 the Nazis had sirtlply crushed the Czechs popuiar will to resist, a situation that remained in effect u11ti.l the end of the war, and that ""at no time did the Czechs challenge the Nazis with a significant resistance movement."'""


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It is difficult not to ask whether Hacha was a traitor and thus examhe what some view as his tragic rde. He was sympathetic to Nazi G e r m y before Ihe N'azi occupation of Czechoslovakia, urged his people to support the n i r d Reich, and expressed satisfaction and joy at Germay's victory over Frmce.27 Al-thtrugh he was arrested after the war and died in p"son kvaithg for his trial on charges of col1ahnrati.on and treaso~~ (Jwne 27,19451, it is clear that he tried. his best to keep as much of what was left of his country intact and independent. However, that task was bopeless under Nazi rule. mough not as powerful and strong as Vichy's P&tain, Ilacha was cast into a somewhat similar position." It is noteworthy thctt the collaboration of the Czechs was very useful for the Nazis. In 1941, for example, Czech industry provided about 30 percent of German armor, 40 percent of its automatic weapons, and close to one-third of its trucks, Obwiousiy, there were s w e good reasons for the relatiwely benign treatment of Czechoslovakia by the Nazis. Nevertheless, close to 70,000 Czech Jews were sent to their dcaths,29 and close to 35C),OO Czechs perished as a res d t of Nazi occupation+^^ MacDonald and K a p m provide an illustrative descriptim of life u d e r Nazi occupation in Czechoslovakia. For example, in January 1941 the BBC called people under Nazi occupation to mark the letter "V" m walls as a sign for "vicbory-" Compliance of people in Prague was enthusiastic because this behavios offered a fnrm of resjstance and a marking of moral boundaries in a way that did not pmvoke bloody reprisals. Moreover, the campaign was very sz-lccessful throughout Europe until the Germans themseIves adopted this s i p . In the summer of 1941 Prague was flooded with huge 'V signs-n walls, Locomotives, and bulletin boards. Germans used the sign to proclaim faith in G e r m victory.31 Two possible cases of betrayal may be exmjned. in the Czech context. One was durkg the Sudetenland crisis. a r k g that crisis, which began to heat up durhg April 1938, Konsad He~~leh-headof the German Sudeten party in reality a Nazi party-caffed. for autonomy for his people. tlenlein's politicd agitation was very useful for Nazi Germany and Although by %pplayed directly into Hitler's expansionist inte~~tions. ternher 15, 1938, the Czech government had the agitation under control, and Henlein Red to Germmy, the Munich Pact voided that control. Following the Munich Pact, Henlein was appointed the Gauleiter of the Sudetenlmd in Octuber 1938. The fact is that he exercised little power, and many of his supporters were kilkd by the Nazis. In I945 Henlein committed suicide whj.le in an Allied internmelnt camp. The other case occurrcd follwing the Nazi mcupatioan of Czechoslavakia when a Local Czech political organizaticm was allowed to exist-fie National Cooperation-headed by the Czech fascist General Rudolf Gajda. Cwld Gajda and Henlein be considered traitors? Indeed, they as-

sisted in the disintegration of their corntry and participated in a process that meant the end of Czech independence and srtbjugation to Nazi Germany. Fmrn this pojnt of view, they indeed vi,olated the basic trust and loyal.ty beween citizens and their corntsy. However, both were also camrnitted fascist Nazis and &ought that their ccnantrfs genuine good future was with. Nazi Germany, and their actions were based on that belief. mey trusted, and were loyal to, Nazi Germany and they displayed their preferc.nce in public. 1t is interesting to note that at the ertd of World War 11, Czechnslovakia regained the Sudetenland, and under the terms of the Potsdam Allied Agreements (July-August 1945), the Sudetenland German popdation was expelled.

Hitler invaded Poland on September 1, 1939. Nazi rule of Poland was ruthless, Overall, no major ideological collaboration by Poles is documented (altlnoul;h the invading Nazi Wehn~luchtwas assisted by diffewnt individuals). Indeed, no political or ideological supportkg Polish group existed for the Nazis. Howeves, as the Nazis-brutal occupation devetoped, some forced forms of limited collaboration took place, especially in con cent ratio^^ camps and Jewish ghettos..In return for more controt, even if sometimes for a limited period of t h e , there were those willhg to serve as Kapos (""trustees") or Saaci'rrkmr~1~nd~t (participants in the exterminacamps). The fride~zrafkvas the comcil of tion process inNazi conee~~tration Jews set up as the sellf-governing body of the various gfnettos constructed by tbr Nazis in occupkd Eastern Europe." Jewish mernbers in Judenrats had complex motives to collaborate with Cheir torturers and executioners. Some thought they could save themelves and their families; others thought that they could s-ve the communit,v and he%pit survive, Retrospectively, it is obvious that the Nazis used the Jzrdenraks to achieve better control and exploitation of the local Jewish population; hence, servirrg in a Jude~zrafwas a blocked exit that, in most cases, led nowhere. It is worth noting that many Potes we= mobilized by t-he Sovkts to either fight the Nazis under Soviet command or join cadres of communists in prepation for a Polish communist regime. Many other Poles, defh7ing themselves as patriotic, viewed these steps as collaborative and treasonable because they were putting what they viewed as genuine Polish natimai interests in secmd or third place. One needs to be reminded at this point that Stalin managed to lurc most mmbers of the Polish Communist Party into the Soviet tinion in 1938, where they we= all murdered. Moreover, carried out by direct orders of Stalh and the Soviet Politbura, Soviet NKVO personnel m a s s a e ~ dmore than 4,000 Palish officers in t-he Katyn forest near Smalensk. These vile mass murders took place probably in


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.April and early May of 1940.3"ose Polish dficers were among 180,000 other Polish prisoners of war who fell into the hands of the Red A r y during the Nazi-Soviet partition of P d m d in 1939.3"ese murders, obviously, raise some interesting questions of trust and loyalty between Poland and the Soviet Ul~ionunder Stalin,

Pllazi G e r m y ' s Weftmrachtdewloped a successful d i t a r y attack westward in the spring of 1940, conquering first Denmark and Norway (April), and then continuing going through the Arcjennes invading and conquering B d g i m , the Netherlands, and Luxel-Rbourg ( M a y ) , and France (June).The defeat of France in the summer was followed by a Nazi inwasion and occupation of the Ch el Islands. This swifl military move put several Western E u r o p m conntries under fttll Nazi control. Suddenly, issues of collaboration and resistance became an everyday realit). for millions of Western Europeans. The experiences of the Poles m d the Czechs provide some clues to what was about to transpire.

Denmark Two Nazi German djvisions invaded Denmark on April 9, 19it0, Capenhagm was taken within twelve hours, and Denmark accepted the Nazi cxcupation. Denmark was not the target of the German military move, but controlling Clensnark was crucial for the German military campaign against Norway. The Dmish gover ent was alilowed to mainta,in parts of its powers, and such osganizations as the police, courts, and even the laws were retained. Even a downsized Uanish army was allowed to exist. Clearly, the Danes wanted to keep as much of: the country's administratim as possibfe in Danish hands, and a national coalition was formed fcrr that purpose. b r such a policy to succeed, the Gemans had to be persuaded that a genuine coclperatio~~ existed. It did, for a long time (1940-1943). 011the other hand, it was expected by the Danes that the German interference in Denmark's internal affairs would be m h h a l . It was not. The Germans removal of ministers, and so on. To kept dentmding military equipme~~t, prevent a compulsory conscription to the army, about 100,000 Danish workers were required to go to Gemany. bliowing the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, the Danish Communist Party was banned, and the Danes had to agree to the recruit.m.ent of the so-called Danish Free C o v s to patkipate in the war effort. &tit 1943, most of the Danish population seemed to have supported a po:[icy clf collaboration in =turn for litnited independence.

AIthough a small Nazi party existed in Denmark even beforc the German iwasion and occupation of the country, it must be noted that many Danish diplomats outside Denmark supported the Allies, Such Danish territories as Greenlmd, Iceland, and the Faeroe Islasrds became available to Allied forces, and lrhe Danish merchant fleet sailed to Allied ports and heiped the Allied war effort. The I>anish colla,hmation with Ihe Nazis was strained. As the German demancis on the Danish eccmamy grew and military losses for the Nazis increased, Danes became mare defiant. h 1943strikes occurred, m under;gmund Freedom C o r n 3 was created, and when antiSemitic laws were introduced (October 19$3), most of the country's 8,1100 In response, the Nazis Jews had already been moved to n e ~ ~ t rSweden. al tightened their totalitarian grip on Denmark. By 1944 the Nazi occupation of Denmark resembled the occupation in other areas, and much of the Danish independence was withdrawn. Danish resistance grew day by day, thrking on the lack of inner factions, m d was ready fnr a full-scale rebellion. That became umecessary when the German military surrendered an May 5,1945,35 The nature of the Dcanish collaboration with the Nazis is interesting, The thecrrtrltical trade-off was ""cllaboration" for "limikd independence." For a \zrhile, this poiicy worked as cxpected and apparently mjoycd popular support. Thus, the use of the term "ttreason" in this particular context may be inappropriate because violation of the trust and loyalv of most of the Danish pop~~1atio11 cannot be established. After the war, 14,(MO prison sentences were given to Danes accused of collaborating with the Nazis (that is, &out 374 Danes out of every 100,000 WC"= jailed for this offease). Demark also carried out twenty-three out of forty-six death sentmccs it passed against collaborators.36

Norway and Quisling Imediately following the Nazi incursion into Denmark, Germany attacked Norway (on the same date, April 9,194Q),which was the principal goal, of their mititar). move (operation "lnJeser Exescise"). The major =asans were the need for Swedish iron ore, raw materials from Scandinavia, and strategically located bases for both Nazi submarines and aircraft, which were used against Allied convoys and naval shipping, Moreover, Nazi idedogy viewed Norwegians as a ~ l a t e but d wayward Nordic tribe that needed Nazi-guided persunsicm to return to its proper place-the Nazi Third Reich. Following a military effort that tcrok the Germans two months to c m plete, they occupied thc whole corntry. The Norwegians, Gded by British and other forces, fought valiantly, causing the VVehr~ac/ft very serious ca-


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sualties and losses (especially to the German Kriegsmari~ze).King Haakm VII and the Norwegian royal family, the cabinet, and many members of parliament were able to escape to the United Kingdom Uune 7). There they established a govcmmnt in exile, but not before rejecting the Nazi demand for the establishment of a Norwegim Nazi gave by Norway's Nazi-Vidkul-r Quisling. Norwegians did, not follow the Danish case, and Nazi rule was never accepted. Resistance to the Nazis began to be organized after the invasion. However, the realization that freedom from the Nazi yoke could only be achieved once the Germans lost the war and surrendered dictated. a restrained stnrggle. That struggle was difficult because, among other thirrgs, Nazi agents had penetrated underground groups. Che of the more spectacular series of sabotage acts of the Norwegiian resistance was the contirruous action against a beavy water plant.37 First actim was s~~pposed to be carried out by pmachuted British enginews and aided by Noswegian Special Operations Executive (S.O.E.) agents in October-Novembele 1942 (the failed "Vemork raidU).38Second was the February 28, 1,943, sabotage of the plant by Mrwegian S.Q.E. agents, which was successful only in slowing production, not stopping it completely An unsuccessful air raid on the plant took place m November 16, 1,943, by 140 bontbers of the Bonnber Command (UStAir Force 8th Division in Britain). This raid prompted the Germans to transfer the large stoclipile of about folarteen tons of heavy water manufactured by the Norsk Hydro Hydrogen Electrolysis plant at Vemork to Germany. On Sundaqr.Fehruar). 11?0,1944,the Noswegian ferry Hyduu, carrying the entire heavy water stockpile, was sabotaged (with explosive charges) by S.0.E. agelrts and sunk to the bottom of L& Tnnsjoc, one ol Europe's deepest lakes.3" N o w a y was liberated on May 8,1945. Its p ~ w gowe a on May 31, and King Haakon returned on June 7.40 The Nazi occupation of Norway was the context fnr one of the most notorious of traitors: Vidkun Quisling. Quisfirtg was born in B87 in Fyresdal (located in the west-central part of the province of TeXernark), Norway. His father, Jon Laurits, served as both a pastor and a state bureaucrat. His mothrr, Anna Carolhe, was fifteen years younger than his father. The couple had four chjldre~zand placed a strong emphasis on educaticm. Consevently, all four children received the equivalent of a university education. atisling showed m early hterest i,n history, abstract ideas, and some mystjcism, as well as a national zeal. He entered. the War College in September 1905 and graduatd from that c d e g e in 1908 as a lieutenant in field artiuery, first in his class, Following a short break i,n his mililary career to earn some money as a teacher, he returned to it in 1909 and en-

rolled in the Miiitar). Academy He gracluated from that academy in 1911, again first in his class fin fact, he eanwd the highest grade ever granted by the academy). X'olfokving this spletndjd carczer, @is)i,ng became a junior member withh the Norwegian General Staff. He not only served in headquartcrs but experienced some field co ands as well. &ring a tour of du,ty as an artitkry off-icer, he was p r m ~ t e dto captain, and in 1918 he was p m o t e d to adjutant, @isling% path up to this point indicated &at he was settling into the b q and monotonous cart_.= of a military officer. Indications are that- his style of comrnand was kind, and he was highly respected. The Norwegian m i l i t v assigned Quisling to study Emperid Russia m d to determir.~its military capabaities. Me was able to fulfll this task, with a deep irnmrsim into Russian culltare, and so vast was his knowledge t-hat when t-he post of military attach4 became availa:ble in Russia in 1918, he was appointed to it, However, the political instability in Russia was such that he served there from mly April to December 1918; when he =turned to Norway he wap; appointed to a two-year tour of duty in Finland. Having completed this mission, he returned to Norway and then went agah to Russia, this time as part of Fridt-jof Nanseds mission of relief @ringingfood) to Russia. Zn Russia he met and married his first wife (Alexmdra, irn August 1922). Because he overstayed in Russia, his military career was interrupted, and he was dismissed from the Gcneral Staff in August 1923. Then he met and secretly married his secmd wife (Maria, September 10, 1923) before-. divorcing his fist wife (no record of the divorce exists). After a period of travel, Quishg =turned to hssia, where he apparently learned to despise communism. In 1929 he returned to Norway. Havir-tgbeen m a y for so many years, hc had to carve hjmself a new niche in Norway. Quislirtg chose to begin a politicai career within the sphere of radical conservatism of the early 1930s-That- ailiance kvolllid gradztalXy take hi+n into political networks that would p ~ s e n and t prmotc the Norwegian version of fascism and, later, Nazism. He started by assuming some central positims in the N'orwegim Nordic Folk-Rising Party. :In 1931, a political crisis engdfed Paorway, the g a v e m e a t resigned, ent was created, headed by Pedar Kolstad. and a new mir~oritygove h l s t a d , who was leading the Agrarian Party into assuming power, lacked good candidates for varinus positions FR the new government, It was suggested that Vidkun Quisling was a dependable and wlrrthy candidate for the position of minister of defense. Kolstad accepted the recnmmendation. Thus, on May 12, 1931, Quislixrg became Norway" mminister of defense. Wth this appointment, he left his previous party and joined the conservative Agrarim Party Although Quislhg" te~nureas the mhister of defense showed his competency as a capabfe day-to-day adminis-


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trator, it was also dotted with various political controversies and codicts. Quisling did not hide his moral, political, or ideological views, and he tried to expand the power of his position. Evezztually, an March 3, 1933, @isling was forced to resign. His main achievements were the crctation of a state militia ( k i d e ~ g r zand ) his rise from rczlativr anonymiy to one of Norway" recognized (md controversial) figures, After resigning as minister of defense, Quisling formed in 1933 the Nasjonai Sading (N.5.-National Unilrn Party), over which he had complete control. The N.S. emphasis on nationalism was attractive to some young people, and its antilabor stands attracted some support from business people. Morwer, Quislhg and the N.S. never hid their affhity and adnniration for Nazi Germany (and fascist Italy). Mast N.S. supporters were young and joined for ideological reasons; others simply believed and admired Quisling perscrnatly. Hwever, the party did not attract many supporters and did, wry poorly in the 1933election. Nationally, Ihe Nasjonal Smling gained 27,850 -\rotesout of a total of 1,248,686 cast, amounting to 2.23 percent: of the electorate. Of the N.S. votes, 14,942 came from the rural districts and 12,908 from the towns, which respectiriely was 1.76 pel-cent and 3.21 percent

of the total in the rural and urban divisions of the electorate.4'

Following the 1933 election, the N.S. made some changes to its plat.form, the most siwiffcant of which was a gradual transition between 1934 and 1936 to fascism, both in ideology and in adoptLng @pica1&zi-i-like external s i p s (wjl7gthe Nazi salutre from 1934, and ~ f e r r i n gto Quislinl; as the [email protected],or simply as the Fgrer, meaning the leader)>" The 1936 election put the N.S. to a real test of power, the test of a basic d y nondemocratic party ccrmpethg for power within a democratic framework. Quisling gradlaally fmused his antagonism on the demcxratic system itself, and by doing that d o m e d the N.S. and himself to a marong other things, ginal role in a poputatim that embraced demwraey. s o m N-S. meetings were the scelles of violent: clashes.43 The general election took place on October 1936, and the N.S. won only X,S77 votes ( t h t is, less than in fie 1933Action in absolute terms). The N.S. vote declined .from 2.23 p e ~ e nof t the total vote in the 1933election to 1.83 percent in 1936. The derlis\e in rural areas was from 1.76 percent in 1933 to 1.4 percent in 1936 (a dmp from 14,942 to 14,Ef votes) and in urban arws kom 3.21 percent to 2.74 perce~ztfa, drop from 12,908 to 12,426 votes). The N.S. was clearly losjng supgost.4 The drop FR support and populaity had its impact m the N.S., and in 1936-1937 it exgerienced cfisintegration and gradually turned into kvhat Hoidal refers to as a margirral sect." Consequently, during 1937-1W3, &is&% begm to turn more of his attenticm to Nazi Germany.

Quisling's first contacts with the German Nazi Party had been made in the early 1930s. In 1934 the head of the Scmdinavim desk of the Nazi Partvs office for foreign affairs (headed by Mrcrd Roscnbergl-Thilo vctn Trotha-visited Norwa)i and attended the annual meeting of the N.S. in Stiklested." h e Nazis, however, wew fuliy knowledgeable about the disintegratim and insigrlificance of the MS., and they were not too enthusiastic about either Quisling or the N.S. tn 1933 Quisljtng sent congratulatory cables to both Franco in Spain (February 28, 1939) and Hitler (April 20,1939). Hitler was referred to as a ""hro." A lower clerk for Frmco acknowledged receipt of the message, but Hitler never responded." The Nazi attitude toward Quisling and the N.S. was clearly illformed and ambivalent. Mowever, this amt?ivalence did not prevent the Nazis from supporting @isling, or Hitler from meeting hixn.4" The main reasan for these contradictions and zigzags was that although the Nazi foreip office had a realistic evaluatim of Q~zisli~~g's m r g k a l position, Hitler either lii.Ked him or thought that something could be gained from Quishg. In fact, during their first meetings, one of the topics they discussed was Germmy-Norway cooperation. It is clear that h that meeting Quisling presented to FXitkr his plans fclr a pro-Nazi coup in Norway Quisling was interested in politjcal cotzperatiltn and in Ncrrway becoming an indegerrdel~tpro-Nazi state within a Nazi German federation. AIfiough E-fjAlcr delayed his response to W s l h g " hitiatke, the Nazis we= v i c k to trandate Quishg" ?;&tic& aspirations into practical mititary k g their offensive to hvade and terns. 'They were h the process of pl conquer Norway#and they recognized that Quisling cou%d,be useful. Wen the legitimate Norwegian gwernment left Norway followhg the Pllazi invasi.on of April 9,1940, Quisling announced 811 t%le radjo that he had become both the prime minister and foreip minister and was heading a national government. That government was headed by a man who had failed in two elections and was certainly pro-Nazi However, the Nazis remined ambivalent, On April 15,1940, wit-hin a week of the invasion, they dismissed him because-among other things-he could not maiintain a stable governmelrt and he attracted too much hostility. Instead of QQuisling's national government, an Administrative Council was crcated, and Nazi Germany appointed a Reichkrtmrszissnu to rule the conquered country-Josef Terboven. nrboven, a bank clerk by profession and a party official in the Rhine prowince, was summoned to Hitler's office cm April 19 and told &at he was to becom t-he chief Nazi admiaistrator in Nmway, effective April 24, 1940, Terboven was to administer Norway brutally, cruell~u;and ruthlessly, as ordered by Hitler, until the end of WorId War ZX, On May 8,1945, Terboven committed suicide in Norway.49 Of course, @isling was su& a true believer that he never gave up. His politicai aspirations created a cl-zrcmictension between him and 'lefboven.


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Quisfirzg ir-z unqorm nC Fsis desk, Movetnbet 1940. 50U136E: Reprinfedfrom Oddvor K. S-loidaI,Quisling: A Study in Treasrrm (Oslo:Norwegian U~ziz?ersi'fy Press, 1989). Phofogmplz by tlze Marzuegl;nn News Agency.

Moreover, Quisling wanted. to expand the membership of the N.S., negotiate more &dependence fnr Norway, and shape Norcvegian society to fil: his fascist, radst, and anti-Semitic ideas. Followjng the Nazi conquest of Norway and.the banning of all other political parties, the N.S. enjoyed eccmomic prosperity (due largely to the confiscation of the property of other parties). The nckv h d s it acqrxired were used to rebuild the party. Numhers were important for @isling because the Nazis responded to his eteman& for more power by poifiting out that suppod for him was meager. Mowever, rnernbershir in the N.S. grekv steadily and the party membership reached its peak in the fall. of 1943 with morc than 43,000 members. Hoidal estimates that membershig in the N.S., including its youth movemetnt, approximated bF),Ol)(f.= However, in 1941 it was obvious that despite all efforts, the gap between the N.S. and the majorit). of Norwegians was too great tc:,bridge. Hoidal, puzzled by the poor support Quislhg won, suggests that Quisling's failure to attract a mass membership was largely due, in the final analysis, to the ~ ~ b v i fact ~ u that s he was perceived as a collaborator. He was directly associated with the power that had deprived N o w a y of its saver-

eipty. His insistence that he was carrying out a carnpaip to win back independence tzrithin a greater Germanic federation was disregarded as inronsequential prcypaganda by the ovem-helming majsriq. The public" svew of him as a traitorous canspiratc>rbecame even stmnger as the arcupation progressed because af his ads. To prove to the Germans that he deserved to be trusted as the head of government, he assisted their war efhrt by taking part in the formatian of NoweGan military units, recruited to fight on Germany" bbehalf.51 . . . The o>vem-helmingmajority of the pclopte regarded their opposition to N.S. as a fight against evil, . . . N.S. was further weakened by its inability to a"tract influential people into its ranks.'"

:In February 1942, Quisllng was appointed minister president of Norway*This move gave the false impreskn that Noway had gained some independence, with Quisling heading a new government- However, @isling and his government were totally under the command of Terboven. Quisling's attempts to expand his sphere of influence over Norway werc unsuccessM.,Co~zsquentiy,durhg late 1,942 and throtlghont: 1343, he tried to achieve g ~ a t e control, r through tighter collaboration with Nazi Gemany, helping its war effort." Hwever, his mobilization efforts fajled. C o q l e t e failure and collapse developed h 1,945. Quisling surrendered himself to the police on May 9, 1945, He was charged with treason because of his activities, which included the usurpation of governme~ztalpower, attempts to mobilize Norwegians, orders to cease rclsistance to the Mazis, and attempts to bring Nomay under fowign rule. Negotiations tcrok place, and a trial followed. Quisling responded to the charges by that he was not gujlty, and he denied some of the obvious cbarges. Those denials were cmtrary to the facts that w r e presented to the court (for example, conspirhg with Hitler and Raeder to place Norway under Nazi rule; getting fu~zdsfrom the Nazis; helping the Nazis during the occupation). The court decided that Quisling was guilty on charges of betraying his country (September 10, 1,945), and hc was sentenced to death. Art appeal to l.hc Supreme Colnrt was rejected, and. a mercy plea (by his wife, Maria) was rejected. tle was executed m Octcrber 24,1945,2:40 AM., in Akershus Castle by a firing squad of ten men. Quisling maintained, even minutes before his execution, that he was innocent.54 In fact, in his defense testimony he stated, "lf my activity has been trc-rason . . . then :l wish to God for Norway" sake that a goad many of Norway's sons would became traitors like me, only that they be not thrown into jail."55 Clearly, although the large majority of Norvvegians wiewed him as a traittlr, he most certair11.y viewed hirnsPf as a genuine patriot Mlith an inspired vision for the future of Norway,


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C:harges of collabomtion and treason did not end, with the execution of Quislirrg. Almost 93r00C)individuals suspected of being comected to the NS.were illvcstigatd. They jncludcd nnt just N-S. mclntbers but non-N.5, collaborators as well, Abrsut half were either found not guilw or not brought to bid. AIt;hou& 46,085 Norwegians were fomd H l t y most wert, passive NS.members who received penalties ranging from Hnes to deprivation of: civil rights for limited periods. &out 18,000 people were hprisoned., By 1948 onb 3,2W remahed in prison," Of every 100,WQNorwegims, 633 werc in pis011 for charges of coliaboratiol1,~7and of the thirty Norwegians who werc sentenced to death,hiventyfive werc actually executed." A1:hough Quisling is constructed as a genuine traitor, his treason has problelxatic aspeds..He ide~~tified with Nazi Germany m d believed that :Norway should. be an independent state within a German-dominated federaticm. He did everything in his power to realize this end by collaborating with, the Natzis- Uflfortmately fol. him, very few Norwegims were wilahg to embrace his '"vision," which, so m n y of them, apparently, consietered a frightfut nightmare. It was that; inconsistmt and deceptive for Qlljsling to deny at hjs trial the obvious facts djsclosing his inti,mal.e relations, conspiracies, and collaboration with the Nazis.59

Nazi G e m m y began its offensive in Wstern Europe (code-named /'Fall C;elbm")0011 May 10,1940. Dri-vhg an awesome military war machine consisting of 119 divisions (plus another Went).-three later in the operation) through the Ardennes, it managed to bring about the collapse of the French military withh a month. hlong the way, Chc Nazi Wehmcrcht invaded, three neutral countries: Luxembourg, Belgium, and the Netherlartds. Issues of cupa at ion, collaboration, and ~sistancebecame an irnmediate m d day-to-day reality in these coulztnies.

Luxembourg The tiny country of Luxembourg, with a population of close to 300,000 people, was occupied by the:Nazis on h'lay 10. The ruling family a d g w ernment escaped to England where they formd a government in exile, Although most Luxembourgians did. not welcome the Nazis, about 2,000 joi~~ed the German military. After the war, about 10,001) Luxembourgians faced charges of colla,boration wjth the Nazis.61

In terms of collaboration, the picture in Belgium was different, Despite initial military ~sistance,Belgium surrendered on M a y 28. King Lkopold

negotjated the surrender, after which he retired to his palace until 'June 1944. It is clear that the Belgian king negotiated with the Nazis (including a N o v d e r 19 meethg with Hitler) inthe hope of gaining some sort of a political settlement for his country. Mopold viewed the Belgian government in exile (in Londcm) with scorn and regarded them as "traiton;." Germany mnexed twn Belgian cantons, and the rest of Relgim was controlled by the Nazi militar). machine, headed by General Alexander von FalkeAausen, until June 15644. 11%fact, von Falkenhausen left the actual dedsionmaking and rule of Belgium to Eggast:Reeder; who was the president of the military admbistration, During the German occupation of Belgium, there emerged proGerman groups that identified with Pllazi goals m d ideolaa and sought integration into Hitler's Third Reich. Two of these groups, and their leaders, are well worth noting. One group developed in Ffanders, the Vlaams Nationaal Verband, or National Flemish Front (V.N.V.), headed by Staf de Clercq, and later by Hendrik Elias. By 1940 this group was already a close ally of the Nazis. Consequently quite a few members of the V.N.V. were given intportmt positions in both local and central government, Moreovet V-I"d.V. members served in the Nazi was machine in Belgium and on the eastern front. A second group, the Nazi-sympathizing Rexist movement headed by L6on Degrelle, developed in Francophone neglected Clegmlle; however, after Belgium. At first the Nazi Wehr~~lacht Oegmlle c ~ a t e dthe Lkgion Waiictnie, and that legion fougl~tcm the eastern kont with some distinction, l.he group quicky becam close to the S.S. withjn Belgium.a D e g ~ l l was e born in 1906 in Bouillon, Belgiurn. At a very early stage in his life, he was influenced by Charles Maurras, a French nationnlist. Degrellc became convinced that lawf order, and monarchy werc the most crucial factors for a nation. Hwever, he did not stop them; his beliefs werc also atigned with Nazi ideas of racial "purity" and anti-Semitism. In 1930 he established the Rexist movement, which was a Belgian fascist group modeled after MussolinYs Italian movement and which irnitated is quoted as having said, "If Pllazi tactics, Hitler, flattered by the imitatio~~, I had a son, I woutd want hirn to be like ClegreIle."'" Much like the Norwegian case of Quisling, Belgims were not very impressed with Degrelle or Wjlh the Nazi f i r e r ' s compliments on his behalf. Degrelle lost Che cmcial election of February 1937. The Nazi occupation of Bclgiurn in 1940 b~atl-rednew life into Degwlle. He was revived politically and culturaily. me11 he joi,ned the forces of the M o o n legion to fight on the eastern front, Degrelle gained consjderable respect in the eyes of the Nazis. Out of an original fnrce of about 850 men, only three srtrwived three years of fighting. In 1943 Degrelle negotiated the transfer of Che legion to the Nazi Waffen SS,,and he was awardted several military decorations, induding the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves.@


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In 1945 Degrelle escaped to Spain. A Belgian h i e court sentmced hlrn to death (in absent* on charges of treason. Degrelle went to Argentha in 1946 but later returned to Madrid. A television interview he granted in .April 1973 to a Dutch ch et rcvealed that he regretted nothing. Among other things, he is reputed to have stated, '(1 am only s o r v I diein't succeed, but. if I had the chance, I kvolllid do it all again,but much more forcekLxlIym@ Degrelle died in Spain in 1994. Much like Quisling, Degrelle was attracted to a fascist, pro-Nazi ideolo g early in his life. He never co~~cealed his political m d ideological sympathies, and when the Nazis conquered Belgium he felt that there was a gdden opportunity to actudize some fascist and racist dreams he had been harboring for a long time. Like Quisljng, he failed the free democratic test of elections by the people of his country Whereas @isling served as his country's minfster of dcfense prior to the Nazi conquest, Degrelle nevcr rcf.a&ed such a fiigh positio~~. However, judging by the decorations he received, Degrelle must h v e been a courageous indi:vibuaX, R must be d d e d &at the fascist mwernent bad. contempt for conventional dections. Elections were vkcved as a barricr to the authority of the fascist movernmt itself. Thus, those who were not too enthusiastic about fascist movements in ~ g u l aekctions r were seen as needing correctim or deansing Tram the influelnce of what wati referred to "bad and hosti,le elements." F m the fascht paint of view a lack of support in conventioml elections, while mfortunate, was not taken as a major ideological obstacle. After the war, Belgians arrcsted bctweem 50,000 and 60,000 of their ocvn people on charges of treason; 596 of every I.U0,000 Belgians were inprison on charges of cotlaboratim, and '"Belgium p n o u m e d the death penalty on 4,170 peopfc, of tvvhonn 230 were executed."~~

The Nazi W e h m c h f invaded. the Nethedands on May 10,1940. Follow@ the heavy bombarclment of Amsterdam cm M a y 14, the &tch surrendertld the same day. Wlhelmha fled to EngXmd, and a govemme1"l in exile was formed in London, The Nazis viewed the Dutch as descendmts of an hryan rare, in need of reintegration with the Third Reich. :Elitler appointed Arthur Seyss-lncyuari:in charge of the Netherlands, aided by Germ m SS. m d Police Chief Hams Albh Rauter. Beheen these two Austrians, &ey managed to get out of the Netherlands all that it was possible to take out in terms of food and nnerch,andjse and ship it to Germany These Nazi masters rim a harsh and brutal conquest admixlistration. Although there was a Dutch resistance movement,67 there were also s o m cases of possible betrayal. Before the Nazi invasion, t k r c actuatly was a h t c h Nazi Party In the 1937 general election, that party won about


4 percent of the electorate.&The size of the party grew from around 30,000 members before the Nazi invasion to about 50,000 after the invasion. Although Anton Adriaan Mussert, the leadcr of the D ~ ~ t Nazi c h Party, kept funneliizlg suggestions to Hitler Labout Aryacrizhg the Dutch people, he never received m y serious answer from BerliI7.69 H e was appointed by the Nazis in 1942 as the leader of the Dutch people, but his leadership was on paper only, Un May 7,1945, Mussert was arrested by the Dutch as a tr;7titor and collaborator, and he was executed by hanging at 7'he Hague on May 7,1946.70 Another interesting case is that of General Hendrik Alexander Seyffardt, who was the chief of staff of the Dutch army between 1929 and 1934, when he retired as a lieutenant ge~zeral,Folfawlng the German occupation of the Netherlands, Seyffardt. came out of retirement, changed sides, and became a major collaborator with Nazi Germany. He willingly lent his past reputation to the Nazi cause and formed a volunteer unit in the SocaIled the ""Viijkorps," wwhich fought with the Nazi Wehnl~~lacht viet Union. He was assassinated in m e Hague on February 5, 1943.73 Foot estimates that out of a populahn close to 9 milIion, "over 5,000 Dutchmen johed the TnJaffen-S.S., and.mother 54,000 belonged of their own free will to various other Nazi ~rganizations.~"72 Clearly there were m m y Dutch who were Nazi sympat"hi"ersand who assisted the Nazis in hunting d.own Jews. About 80 percent of the estiand only about 4 pexent mated 150,OW Dutch Jews were erctermi~~ated, of the 1,11),000 who were cleported to camps returned," After the war, the Netherlands had 130,000 of its own people arrcsted on charges of treason, and 40,0(X1served prison smtences (about "419 out of every 1(113,000Dutchmen'". OveraiS, "as many as tiO,O(lC1f)ulch collaborators were deprived of their civil rights, and the Netherlands carried out thirty-six out of 430 death sentenceseff74 'The cases of Quislihg, Uegrelle, and Mussert share similarities. In each case, a preoccupatim :Nazi sympathizer failed politically within his own country. None of them hid their sympathies, and they all seized the first opportunity they had to try and push Chejir pm-Nazi ideas. k t none of them were successful,

France 01June 22, 1940, wi&k &out six weeks of the successful Nazi invasion, msibry war Frmce's mrnilltary nrracK11e was hcapacitated by the s~~perior juggernaut of Nazi Geman5 and France was forced to s i p m amistice that when the French a m y Ragreement with the Nazis. Drnk7-phes treated, French citizens, fearhg German reprisals, prevented the French Army from sabotaging bridges or even f,hting sometimes, French losses


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were astounditsg: about 90,QUO dead and 20Q,000 wounded, plus about 1.9 million prisoners or mil;sing. France was divided into several administra~ve areas,From that point in time, the issue of French collaboratio~~ with the :Nazis became a paistful and,complicated. reality for the French. Of the areas into which Frmce was divided, the sou&em zone is of most interest ta us.

Marshal Philippe Pbtain, The man who replaced. PauI Reynaud as French prime minister on June 16, 1940, was M m h a l Philigpe I"&tain. Born in 1856, Pktairr was the victor of the World War 1 battle of Verdm and had gained the position of a military hero. He was the one who had negotiated the armistice agreement with the Nazis and the one who signed it. h fact, on June 17,1940, at 't2:30, the quavering broken voice of a Marshal of France, the eighty-fclrar-year-c)Id Philiippe Pktain, announced over the radio that France had lost not just a battle but the war as well. . . . "Frranqaiws! At the Request of the President of the Republic, 1 assume as of today the direction of the gc>vernmentof France. . . . I: give to France the gift of my perscrrn to alleviate her misfortunes. . . . It is with a sad heart that I say to you today that the fighting must ~top."7~

:Pi.tain beaded the French colllabosationist regime, whose headquarters were in the resort town of Vichy. Between July l940 and August 1944, :PGtaints regime developed a genuine collaboration with the Nazjs: military, political, ecmomir, culhral, and personal. Some authors even cllaim that the very meaning of World War EI collaboration can, and shodd, be trared to Vichy's France. HirschMd and Marsh's f 989 collection is rcflectivc of the great n u b e r of books written on this subject, revealing the depth and scope of French cclilaboration in ietecrlogy, fine arts, filmmaking, theater, and in po:[itical and economic areas. Ildeed, an orchestrated attesnpt was made to convert Frmce as much as possible to German National Socialism.77 Moreover, the ccollaborationist direction taken by the was presented as a new positive, and bold political orVichy governme~~t der for France, Viewkg itsdf as the rightful govc ent of Frmce, this collaborationist regirne had no difficulty deciding that others were traitors. The events invotving Chasfes de GauUe, who later became president: of France, are instructive, Charles de C d e (l890-1979, a veteran of World War I, was promoted to brigadier gemsal on June 1,1940, .fought the Nazi invasion, and was appointed underserretav for national defense by French prime minister Reynaud on June 6. De Gaulie's tenurr. in his new post lasted only ten days, On J w ~ 16, e Reynaud resigned m d Pktah, who replaced him, negotiated the armistice with Hitlet This meant the end of de Gaulle's short

of-Pkf~in, and Pkftnin zuith his c~ttargedgover~zmetzt,2940. Picrre Lnrfnl is fto ttic Gclneml Wqgalzd is on the riglzf. SOURCE: Rq?rinted*fiomWmpler Ri~qgs,Life with "re Enemy: Gollaboratic~n and Resistawe in Hitler" Europe, 1939-1945, frnnslrrled by I. iClnxz~~c/l Browfzjo/tn {London:WeidenfiM n ~ Pdieolsoa, d 3982). 1"Iaofogr.qla~om Sz~ddEZdlscl~er Verlag! Municif.

career in Repaud's government. On June 17,1940, a Royal Air Force airplane transported de Gaulle to London. From there, on June 18,1940, he made his famous speech on the BBC urging Frenchmen to continue fighting the Nazis because France, in his words, had lost a battle but not the war. The rest is history. De Gaulle eventually became the undisputed leader slthe Free Frmce movementP4tain's regime had no difficulty deciding what to do with the recalcitrant de Gaule. I"6tai11 ordered him to rebrn ta France, but de Caulle refused. Consequently, on July 4,1940, he was sentenced, in absentia, by a court-martial appointed by P4tain, to four years in prison. This obviously was ineffective and was thus perceived as insufficient. The Vichy regime then declared de Gaulle a traitor to France. The? Vichy. minister of war, General Colson, on July 12 ordered him tried for treasc)~and desertion in time of war. This time (August 12) the ver-dict was . . . death in absentia and confiscation of all property.


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Pktain later wrote: "This .\rerdictwas required by the need for discipline, to set an example, in order to stop the exodus of French. officers out of the country, but it is dear that this verdict in absentia can only be in principle- It has never been my t b u g h t that it tzrorald be impc>sed."78

It is important to note that the above me1Bo written by P&tainwas drafted inAugust 1944 when it was clear that de Gaulle w m . After the war, P4tain was put on trial, which began on July 23,1945. Although techically he was chaqed with a few spceific crimes, the gist of the trial was that he betsayed his country by coliahoraiing with the Nazis and working with tbem agairtst the intert-sts of France. &ring P4tairtfs trial, French p ~ m i e Edouard r Daladier w s put: on the sland to testiEy.79 Beforc delving into Daladier's testimony some backgromd farts about Daladier must be mmtioned. Daladier had to r e s i p his third premiership (on Mach 20,1940) because of douhts &out his prewar Icadership (hc. was replaced with his poliitical rival Paul Reynaud). He was arrested by the ent in September 1940 and tried at Kitrm Vichy clrliaborationist gave (1942)011 charges that he had direct responsibility for the French defeat- His trial was only one m o n g many that the colXaborationjst Viichy governmnt initiated. The purpose of the trials was to c~nstmctBe image that prominent French politicians were directly responsihlc for the b e g M , g ol Miorfd. War :I1as well, as for what was referred to as ""poXitical cormption," which was blamed for fiance's military defeat. Because the &faders were allowed to speak freeiy, the trjals becme entbamassing for Petairr, and thus they were suspended," Daladier was handed over to the G e m m s after the trial (in which he defended himself admirably)but was freed in 1945. 'This is what Daladier had to say whezz he was asked by the prosecution whether P4taisr betrayed his countq-: "In all,conscience, 1: will answer that in my opinion Marsh1 f"4tain betrayed the duties of his office." m e n required to elaborate he added: "The word treason has many different memings. n e r e are men who b e t r q their country for money; t h c e are men who betray it sometitnes out of pure incompeknce. . . . As for Marshal Piltain I will state frankly-eve11 though it pains me-that he betrayed. his duties as a f;renchmm.""n R its interesting to note that Daladier seemed to have used the criterion af motivation in decidhg whether P6tain was a traitor, as well as the character of his treason. P4tah denied the charges agai.nst him and stated that he tried to help as much as he could m d was able to maintain Frmce" s i i y for four d3ficult years. On August 15, 1945, P&tainwas found gujlty and sentenced to death. The sentence was never carried out, and he djed inprism in 1951. Was P4tain a traitor or a hero? Lotman (1985) fit~dsit difficult to mswer this question. P4tain hinnself mod certainly did not think he cornmiited. treason, and he was not the m l y one." Tbe way in which, he con-

ducted himself while beading the Vichy government was Obviollsly a h e d at mahtai~~ing, as best as he could, French nationalism under very difficdt cmclitions. However, the price he paid for that- unity was m c h too high in terms of the depth of his collaboration with the Nazis, and it is very doubtful that what I"4tain wmted was achievable at all. Moreover, his goals were not always clear. Pierre Laval. Pierre Laval provides us with another case of a traitorcollaborator"Me was P4tain" vice premier until December 1940, when P4tain dismissed him. Attempts to replace taval with others did not work , was ~ i n s t i k t e d in April 1942. well, and under Nazi p ~ s s u r eLavaf Born in 1883, he later becme a lakvyer, and his initial career kvas affiliated with French socialism, However, be drifted to the right. Un June 25, 1940, he joined P4tainfs collaboratianist gove ent anci was very effective in promoting Fre1zcl-r-German collaboration, in which he was a ge12uine believer. L a d was certa-inly favored by the Germans, After his rehtm to power in April 1942, he broadcast an appeal to the French people to work hand in hand with the Nazis (June 1942) and added that he supported a German victory in order to prevent cornanism from prevailing. Laval tried to get ""m" concessions from the Germms in return for collaboration, but that did not wnrk out very well. Me was effective in providing French workers for Germany and gave the Germans foreign Jews who lived in fiance. 'These steps were rationalized as sacrifiicing t.he "t.w in ordcr to save the many However, Nazi clemands werc growing, and LavaYs policy s h p l y collapsed. Afler the war, Laval tried to find asylum outside France but did not succeed. He was extradited to France where he was sentenced to death (in a rather controversial trial). Although be tried to comrmit suicide by taking poison, his life was saved only so that he could be e x ~ u t e don October 9,3945.83 Although "the collaborationist moveme~ztsreprese~~ted a very small if vocal proportj.on of t:he French population during the German occqation,"" the Vichy government, beaded by Laval and Pktain, cctrtainly marked a djrection of voluntary and willing coltaboration. 'Thus, Laval and PBtain, are probably the most prominent names associated with French collaboration durhg TvVorld War 11.85 'The collaboration of the Frezzch with the Nazis produced many hdividual cases of betrqal.% Aitcr the war, the issue of dealing with collaborators came up. 'The widesprtrad collaboration was such that it was not passible to prosecute every coll;zborator, However, tens of thousands of collaborators werc prosecuted. FaIlowing the liberation of Paris by the Allies, hundreds of French women with shaved heads were forced into the streets carrying big signs stating that they had had ktimate relations wi& Germans." According to official figures, the resistance executed more


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than 10,800persons suspected of colla:borating with the Nazis. This is Selwyn"s description oE one such case: Robert Brassillach, the young editor of the pro-Vichy Je Suis Partout, insbted . . . that he acted in the best interests of his country. He had undoubtedly been consistent. His views as a journalist had been fascist before the war. Brassiltlach had simply not changed them. He died before a firing squad on 6 February 4945 at the fortress oaf Mcmtrr~ragewith a cry of ""Courage! Vive la Fra~tcel'~88

Although after the war many of the collaborators wercl. pmsecuted and pmi&ed, the scope of these prosecutions is djfficult to assess. ""lFrance, more than 6,000 m m and womm were condemned to death for collaboration with the Germms, let alone those who met a summary fate immediatety after the liloeration."g% different set of numbers is provided by Dank who notes that French courts had to deal with 125,000 cases of women m d men who were charged with cdlahoration with the Nazis and betraying France. Of those, 2,853 were sel~tencedto death, and of those, '767 were actually executed. According to Dankf post-VVorld VVar 11 France sent to firing s ~ dmow s people than any other occupied country in Europe.%Archer provides still a diffemt number: "ln f 946, the Frezzch, purgi,g citizens who had turned collaborationist durlng the Nazi occupation, arrested half a miilion men m d women on chargemof trea~on.~'gI Novick's work also tried to assess this issue and is probdly the better one, He maintains that f r m the k n w n cases in, the Cmrs de justice, 45,017 were not prosecuted m d 50,095 were heard; around 39,000 were sent to prison. G v i c k notes that "presidential commutations spared all but 3 of the 8 men sentenced to death by the High Court, and all but 767 of the 2,853 scmtenced to death by the cows lie justice.""- En the Chambrrs civique, 67,965 cases were processed." Novick also tried to assess some summary executions statistics, His research indicates that there are two sets of data. &e set indicates that 5,234 cases occurred before liberation and 4,439 after it (totaling "3,673cases). 'The second set considers cases where the motive could, not be established satisfactorily (1,955 cases) and adds prt?- and post-liberation cases (8,867) for a total of 30,822 cases.94 Havhg painstakingly examisred the issue of the magnitude of sunmary executions of suspected collaborators, Novick comes to the conclusion that the "official numbers" (ranging between 9,200 and 11,100 cases) must be taken as a minimum. The methodological problem in\rolved i,n assessing the numbers, and hence the magnitude of the French reaction to collaboration in this regard, am simply too complex to be solved. Ilowewer, even these mhimal numbers are high, and Novick indeed adds that "94 out of every 100,000 Frenct-rmm were hprisoned for coll.aboration,"'""

Clemency however, began in 1947, and in March 1954 all punishments given in absentia wert? canceled. &y 3 9 a , not even one collaborator remaiined in m y French prison.96 Visiting Vichy. Between June 24 and June 27, ,998, I visited Vichy, a small, quiet, and very pleasant French town about three hours by train from Paris. The amazing thing is that there is absolutdy nothing in Vichy that presents any connection to the World War 11 period. I had to ask a French colleague to show me the buildjng wherc. the Kchy govame"t: was. nere were no markings, no signs, nothjng, The "Vichy Guide" Fphlet distributed to tourists (as well as the interpretaticms given in local orgmized tows) state the f0llokvin.g: THE END OF THE THIRD REPUBLIC, THE WAR, AND THE OCCUPA~ON

After the 1940 French defeat, MarGchal Pktain was in charge of forming a new go>vernment.G4n6ral de GauXle broadcasted his Earnous call from London on J m e 2 8. The French government, unable to stay in Paris, moved to Bordeaux. After the 1940Armistice, the government had to leave Bordeaux, occupied by the German Army, and moved to Vichy, The reasons far this choice were the hotel facilities af the "queen of spa towns" and a modern telephone switchboard. On July 1, the gavernment took possession of the hotels. Six hundred members af parliament voted in favor of the Fourth Republic. The republican regime was abolished-.The French State replaced it, with Philiippe P4talr-i as head of state (only eighty members of parliament out of six hundred opposed the bill). From that date onward, Vichy became the capital of the French State for four years.97

There was not a word about the nabre of the defeat, about a death sentence for de Gaulle, or the nature of the collitborationist "French State" ruled from. Vichy.98 Thus, the question of the necessi.t)i and legitimacy of the Vichy regitne is still not settled in France.. Resistance, Ca)la:bmation r e q u i ~ discussing s French resistance as well. 'T"here were foms of French cultural resistance and contempt for the Germans. However, the most famous French resistance was the Maquis.99 French resistance began with sporadlc individual acts, and m e d acticm was rare at that stage..As the war continued, and Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union, resistance grew as different groups began to organize and act, After much effort and. sacrifice (including that of Jean


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Modin who was captured on June 21, 1943, tortured, and klled), the Maquis was created in 1943. Struggling with objective difficulticrs, the Maqwis eventually mastered armed resistance, The cost was high. nbout 90,000 resisters were killed, tortured, or deported, and thousands of others suffered Nazi reprisais.

Admiral Jean Eiranlais Raslan. We shall end the section on French collaboration with the case of Jean Frmqois Darlm. W ~ e nWorld War I1 began, Fleet Admird Darlan was the colnanander in chief of the Frer~ch Navy. The navy was a modern and powerful force cmcentrated in the Mediterrmean Sea. It had seven battleships (two of which were battle crrwisers), seven heavy cruisers, twelve light cruisers, seven@-onedestroyers, m d seventy-six submarines pius a large number of smaller and auxiliary craft. After the defeat of France (June 1940), Darlan assured British prime rninister Winsto11 Churchill that the French fleet wouM never fall into Geman hmds. FXoweves, fullowhg the surrender of France, Admiral Darlan did not order the French fleet to sail to British or neutral ports. Instead he ordered his fleet to sail to French colonial bases in North Afirica, The British were obviously suspicious of the intentions of the F m c h h e t , anli fearing it rnight act agaifist them, they sent strong BriSish naval forces naval forcm in Mers el, Kkbir (a naval to ellgage and neutralize the Fre~~ch base mar the Algerian port of &an) a d Alexandria (fu2y 3-6,1%0).1" A few days after the defeat of France, Darlan gave his allegime to Marshal Philippc Petain and accepted a position as mhister of the m y and later as vire premier (February 1941) in the Vichy regime.101 As vice premier in the Vichy gowe ent, Admirat Dartan pursued a policy of: limited cooperation with the Axis powers. H@ most certahly presented a slick and evasive frmt. Darlan confided to the U.S. amba* sador, William D. Leahy, that he woulLi dissxiate himself from cotlaboratim and wot~1,dwelcome strong Allied intemel~tionif supported with adequate strength (B0vel.i states that Darlan mentioned a force of 500,000 men),l" Dmlanfs zigzagging created a situation where neither the Germans nor the ALlies really h e w cvhere his loyalties lay or whether Darlan could be tmsted. Early in 1942 Darlan lost his ministerial posts when Lava1 returned to power, but he was gjverl command of all French armed foxes and n a m d high commissicmer of French North Akica. The Anglo-American invasion of French Narth Africa was launched on to secure Fre~~ch nonresistmce, the November 8,1942.10Wespite ai-i;e~xpts invading Allies did. encounter resistance by French forces, especially at the naval base of Oran. 'I'hat port was assaulted on November 8,1942. Uespite its formjdable deknses, opposition was overcome within two days of the Iandings.l@It so happens that at that particular time, Darlan was

visiting his sick son in Algiers (his visit began Noverrzher 6). The French resistance to the Allies and f>arlanfspresmce in Algkrs provoked negotiations between Eisenhower"~deputy, MMark Clark, and Darfan (November 9). The Nazis began applying psessurc on Pktaisl to accept Gcrman "support" hTirnisia. P4tain was trying to gain tkne m d prevent Germm weupation of southern France and thus kept smding hdnniml Darlan contradictory and. vague messages, Darlan was able to delay a cease-fire agreement to November 11, when Geman forces entered Vichy-controUed Frmce. Darlan" success in securing the active support of French officers in 'Titnisia was only partially successful, and the situation remained confused. The remains of the French fieet in Todon delayed sailillg to M r t h Afrka and scuttled more than seventy fleet units on November 27, Since Darian%authority was accepted by at least part of the French forces in North Mrica, Qncral Eisenhower desig~zatedhim colnrnander and political head of French North Afrka. Eisehower" move was severely criticized in Britail1 m d the United States, causing much embarrassment.1~~ h d yet Staiin had a favorable view: "I consider it a rclmarkable feat on your part that you have succeeded in drawing DarXan and the others to the side of the Allies.""fb How does one describe someone who collaborated with the Nazis who then helps the Allies? The solutio~~ was the designation of Darlan as a "temporary expedimt,"loT Vctrrier" 11990 work fmplies that Acfmiral Uarlan was a key player in a pivotal episode of World tRlar II. Behind Darlan" presellce ixt Algiers h 1942, says Verrier, lay a conflict between Roosevelt and Churchill, on which hung the fate of France. He clailns that the "choice"' both Chwhill m d Roosevelt faced was betweell Darlm m d de Gaulle. Verrier is quick to point out that Darbn was P&tainfsforrner deputy and Roosevelt" collaborator in maintaining the Vichy administration of :North Africa as a full and repressive force."Wooscvelt was awarently not a great admim of de Gaulle m d preferred Darlan. According to t7errier"s intevretation, the reason for this preference was I(ot>seveltFsinterest in ~ d u c i n gthe size, influence, and power of the French empire. To accomplish that, a complaisant Frenchman had to be found. Darlan seemed like t:he ideal choice for that purpose. Ch Christinas Eve, 1942, Fernand de Xa Chapelle Boiznier (1922-1942), a twenty-year-old member of the French resistance entered the office of Admiral Darlan and fired at him two deadly shots from a 7.65-caliber pistol. Bonnier was a men7ber of a group of five young anti-Nai Frenchmn who pEotted the assassination because they thought Darlan was a traitor. Although he viewed hknself as a national hero, others did not. A courtmartial ordered by General Henri Giraud (see below) condemned him to death. He was executed on the morning of December 26,1942.1" Clearly,


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Darlan"s assassination removed a possible ubstacle to de Gaullek amch to become the leatler of fiance. Moreover, it allowed a morally nonprcrblematic person to take the helm. It is probable that Darlan" swartime zigzags wou%dhave encurnbed a postwar French political career. :In view of Verrier" 1990 work, it is possible that the assassination of Darlan was a nnajor crossroad in the modern fiistory of France. It eased de GauXlle" rise to leadershiyp, However, one must remember that even if Verrier's work is valid, elevating Darlan could not have been an easy task in view of his public: image and collaboration with the Naziis*Indeed Wheal, Pape, and Taylor note that the assassination of Darlan spared ""the Allies further embarrassment" and eased "the relations with French Colonial, forces-'"m 'Thus, any such plan to ul-rderntine Che infl~lenceof France, as suggested by Vesrier, had to consider the shaky public position sf Darlan. AAer the assasshation, Gelzeral Henri Giraud (1879-1949) assumed the position of high commissioner for F m c h North and West Africa. Giraud, dearly m d pubkly anti-Nazi, had been taken prisoner during the Nazi attack m France in the s u m e r of 1940 but escaped i,n April 1942. In N'Rvember he! was taken to Algiers in a British submarine to help in opesaticm Torch. The Allies (especially the U ~ ~ i t eStates) d considered Giraud a more sujtable person for their purposes than de Gaulle. However, de Gaulle-notorious for his stubborn in.bependenc managed to politically neutralize him, and de Gaulle" mmeuvers cost Giraud his Americ m suppod as well. In April 1943 he quit his position as high commissioner for French Africa, Csnthued confrontations with de Gaulle led to his resignation f m his second position as commander in chief of thc. Free French Army hApril 1944.'11 :In retrospect, it seems obvious that Darim had become a problematic figure. krrier (1990) states that Darlan was Churchill's "odious QuishgPf' George Patton's "little red-faced pig,;,"and Robert Aron's "grc3at enigma of the war." 'deed, Boveri"s WO&m treason in the twentkth, century devotes a wbole chapter to Darlan.~1Wttackedin the press, distnrsted by both countrynte~zand fomigners, how could he have justifkd his actions? According to Boveri (19561, Darlan justified the decision to leave the French fleet in French parts by stating that "if he had odered it to set sail and put in at a British or Cmadim harbor the German reprisals in Metropolitan France wodd have been terrible" @. 126), adding that ""h had obtained a promise from the Germans that the fleet would not be touched, and had h turn promised Churchill at their last meet;irxg that the fleet would never fall into German hands. This engagement was respected by Darlan and his subordinates to t-he last minute detail'" (p. 127). Bovcri (p. 128) states that Darlan's son was ill with polio and that Roo-

sevelt's kind treatment of Darlm should be mderstood in that humme context (Roosevelt himself was crippled by that same disease). Roveci, as well as others, points out that the cooperation of s o m Ailied figures with Darlan was made with much measjness, But the realization that Nor& Africm French troops were committed and loyal to Vichy necrcssit&ed that cooper&ion. Indeed, that is why Robert Murphy, President Roosevelt" special envoy, began negotiating with Darlan. h an apolsgetic letter to Rossevelt, Churchill shows full awareness sf the moral hnplications of using Darian: The more I reflect upcm it, the mow cmvinced I become that it can only be a t e m p o r a ~expedient justified no>tablyby the stress of battle. We must meet the serious political injury which may be done to our cause, not only in France but throughout Europe, by the feeling that we are ready to make terms with the local Quislings. Darlan has an odious record-.It is he who has inculcated in the French Navy its malignant disposition by promuting his creatures tcr cc>mmand'"3

Roosevelt" withdrawal of support from Darlan decreased French readiness to cooperato in :North Africa. S:hortly befure his assassination, Darlan w o t e letters to Chusehill, Eisenhower, and X.Rahy.llVerhaps his best deknse can be found in his letter to Churchill dated December 4,1942, in which he stated: From January, 1941, until April, 1942, by order of my chief, Marshal Petain, I carried out policies tzrithout the implementation of which France and her colonies would have been crushed. These polides were unforttlnatel y diametrically v p o s e d to yours. What else could I have done? You were in no position to offer the slightest help, and any gesture in your direetic~nwould have brought disaster to my country.

His letter to Eisehower also indicates his realization of declirring - American. support m d his bitterness about it, AIthough Churckill. bitterly opposed DarXan"s handling of the fleet, he nevertheless paid cart~fuitrihute to Darlan and noted that, as he had promised, the Frelneh fleet newr fell into German hancts,'"" How are we to view Darlm" actions? Was he a collaborator m d traitor? The Nazi defclat of France placed him in a very compla situation. He was Che commander in chief of a powerful navy What was he tt? do? Collaborate with It""6tahps Vichy government? Order the fleet to sail to British ports? That very s m e navy one must remember, had been an ally of Britain and, in fact, assisted in the evacuation from Dankirk. m a t were his hterests? Arnung other things, be wanted to preserve the French em-


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pire and colonies, m a h t a h the integrity of the French fleet, and minimize the effects of the occupation of Franceall in the face of determined and ruthless Nazi rule. It was an overhelmjng task. Moreover, it was probably not a realistic goal. For example, to what extent was it realistic to expc~ctto maintail1 a peripheral colmid independence while the empire's center was occupied by enemy farcesflhe real test for Darlan, and individualis like him, was whether to grind one's teeth, cotlaborate with the Nazis, and try to mfnimize damage to France, or to face Nazism for wfiat it realty was and defy it in the strongest possible way-that is, join the British. a c e we accept that Darlan saw the reality of the occugatior~,decided to play along, and tried to minhize darnage, rhen his zigzagging actions become understandable. Not morally justified but understandable. Darlan, perhaps well-fntentioned, failed to see the evil of the Nazi regime and preferred to colabarate with it. One needs to be reminded that Darlm could have taken the risk and joined the Allies, However, this is only part of the story. The other part is that Churtlhjll a d Roosevelt we= concerned with the postwm world order, and so was cle Cau,lfe. The potential and actual insrer political conflicts among members of the Allied forces &o played a part. At the very least, Darlan did collaborate with the Nazis, caushg at some points more trouble to the Allies. To mswer the question, was Darlan a French Quisling (in the jargon used in Chwhill" letter), we need to ask, from whose point of view?

The Ghan~elIslands The Channel Xslmds comprise nine islands, the largest of which are the islands of 'Jersey and Guernsey, posil-ioned about forty miles west of Cherb o w and about eighty miles south of England. Fotlowing the German victory over France, Germans began bombardm,etnt of the islands on Jwne 28,1940. tnvasim and occupation began on June 30. This military move cost the lives of forty-four idalders and the evacuatilrn of about 30,1100 crivilians. About 60,0610 rclmained in the islands. The occmpa.t.ionendcd on May 9,1945, when the German garrison there surrendered. The conquest and occupation of this BrifiSh t e r r i t ~ ywas the closest the Germans ever got to the minland of Britain. The issue of cotlaboration with the Nazis in these islands was a compficated one. It appears that previous claims that the occupation was moderate reflected the experience of the islands' colildborative admhistmtors, who were tseated well by the Nazis. Life for the ordinary islander was harsh, as starvation, imprisonment, and harsh fh~eswere cornonplace. In September 1,942, 2,000 British-born citizetns wcx deported to internment camps in Germany, and in January 1943, another 201) were deported.

as rcvenge fur a British c m m n d o raid, Collaboration was also common, not only by local administrators (who helped the Nazis control the islmds and cooperated in the deportation of Jews to concentration camps), but also by black marketeers, informers, and a host of British women, referred to as "'Jerrybags," who dated soldiers from the German garrison."b

Concluding Discussion Chapters 5 and 6 providc us with a broad view of s o m of the ~ S S Z Xof~ S treason during World War 11, fn these chapters, we exasnine the empirical meaning of treason in a situation of extreme conflict h e r e moral bomdaries are continuously challenged and h e m loyalty and trust becorn debatable issues, In a series of cases, we have seen how simple appearances contrast with complex realities m d how, in each case, treason is defined withh a specific context. Fifth coliumism is a conspiracy aimed at dishtegrathg a government from witJlin a country. Clcrse examindim of the reafity behind tbis concept reveals a compex hchaal level, where fifth colmnism may be less prevalent than commonly believed, The term ""fif2.h coliumn" has also come to refer to political inBuence and subversion. Callaboration also provides us MIith a complex reality The popular image of World War XZ collabosatoss is a negative one; it implies that collaborators were willing tcr close their eyes to the evil of Nazism and hclp it to achieve its goal of European dominatio~~. h many cases, this eval~~atiolz is valid.. However, mce we accept that the moral: judgment of ""cllabora" ticm" is not clear-cut, then we c m examilne the cmplex ~ a l i t y 'There are different types and levels of colfaboratian, and one needs to ask, what real choices did people have under Nazi occupation? Could they choose the least damagFr~gone, or even one of the many forms of Esistmce (active or passive)? The reality behind ""cllaboration" was much more connplex than the simple black-and-white dichotomy. There were many forms of collaboration and resistance, each with a somewhat different moral charge. Moreover, some of those referred to as ""clZaborators" "believed in the Nazi ideology and were co itted to it prior to the Nazi wcupatittn (for example, Degrelle, Quisling, and Seyss-Inquart). Although evaluating their activities as treacherous may seem to be a complex issue, the violaition of trust and loyalty c m be established in each of their cases. Obviously, it requ,jres that we define wt.tose loyalty and what trust they bseachect, Doing that may necessitate taking a stand., which brings us back to Chapter I, where it was pointed out that this study requires making judgments. 7he ksues of l o p trust in collaboration are sharp and painful, OveraXl, one can exa ;in detail-the realities h which


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potential traitors were immersed, t k i r possible options in terms of action, as W& as their actual cbttices. And in each of the cases presented in this chapter, choices are assessed jn terms of realities and options. From this perspective, the important poiM is that regardless of the specific di~ c t i o nof the violations of trust a d loyalty, in each of these cases, it is pom"jbl,eto establish that such vidatims in fact took place. The issue of co1la:horation in World War 11 surfaced again during the 1990ti. It is now dear that Swiss banks and Eurvean insurance c m p a nies collaborated wif-;hthe Nazis in their cmfiscatio~~ of economic assets from Holocaust victims, Holocaust survivors demanded, compensation for the prcrflts made by these institutions from their ccmfiscated assets. During 1998 the clajm was expanded to jncludc the collaboration of"various industries with the Nazi war machine and the Naziskse of slave Zabor during the \oiar."T The same issues we faced in examining treason and cotlaboratim during World War 11 in this chapter also surfaced in these recent discussions about collaboration, We shall continue our examination of cases of betryal during W r l d War II: in Charter 6.

ating Trust and Loya During Wor d War 11: Part 2

In the previous chapter we examjned a few cases of betrayd in Western Europe, as weil as cases of collaboration a d fifth colrtmnism. In this chapter we shall conthue this examination by looking at same cases in Eastern Europe, Germany, the Far East, and the Middle East,

Yugoslavia: The Chetniks and General Draia Mihajlovii. Here is another ifiustratim for tfie complicated meaning of tmst, loyalty, and treason. This case ccmcerns the backgromd of the Nazi invasion into the Balkms. The Germm aMack on the Balkms on April 6, 1941, exacerbated the inner tensions in the Royal hgoslavian Army which reflected the deep cleavages characteristic of Yugodav swiety. During the attack, Croat units muthied, m d many wclcamed the Nazi invasion. By April, IQ, the Uugoslav army sixnply disjrttegrated. Once King Peter ZX (1923-1970) anli his govenlment fled. tc:,Ex~gianliin 1941, ~sistancebased on Srbian nationalism began. In late 1941 royalist Serbian Yugoslav commander Generill Dra2a MihajIwii., born 1893, osmized and led the resistance to the Axis army His guerrilIa forces called tl-temselves Chehiks and operated o11ly in Serbia. At the t h e of its formation in 1941, the Chehik resistance was hailed in the West as tbr first guerrilla movement in Europe to fight the Nazis. General DraZa Mihnjlovii." reputation as a nationalist Ieader was both local and international. In fact he was appohted minister of defense by the hent in exile in London. However, it liid not take long for Gt.neml M~ajlovitto find himself in c d i c t with a diffment new farce. That force was the Communist-led guerrilla movement, commanded by


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Cmatian Josip Broz, also known as Marshal Eto (who was the general secretary of the Yugoslav Communist Party prim to W r l d War D). Tito" organized f m e s were called ""Pastisans," after the irregular f m e s who fought agai.nst Napoleon in%sin in 1808 and in Russia in 1842. General Mif-rajlovii:made ~ p e a t e dtmces with the Germans in an attempt to ntinimize casualties. Marshal Tito was much nnore aggressive and ruthless in his tactics and consequently more effective, This difference did not escape Churchill's stkntion. At a conference in Teheran (November 28-Dece~~ber 1, 19431, the first meetbg of W.nstasz S, Churchill, Jaseph Stalin, and Franklin D. Roosevelt (the Big Three), the Allies decided to support 'Tito's foxes. It is worlh noting Lees's (1990) s o m e h a t d j f f e ~ nversion, t Mc suggests that British Commmists fed Churchill misleading information regarding General Mih.ajloviC%activities and that this information led hhn to prefer Tito. Lees implies that Mif-rajlovit was actually betrayed. As clashs contirrued with the Partisans, the Chetniks, lacking real support from the Allies, were drawn into the sphere of Nazi Germany thmugb conthued negotiations, and theis coll,aboration with Axis forces increased. They first collaborated with the Italians, and later with the Nazis, to cornbat the Partisans, whom they viewed as the primary enemy D ~ ~ r i nthis g @me, the Chetniks cdaborated quite openly wlCh Ihe Nazis in hgoslavia, At the very least, it is clear that Lalthough Gcneral M&ajlovit opposed the Nazi occupation, he most definitely collaborated with them on. more than one occasion. The Chetniks were destroyed in May 1945, after their attempts to gain support from the Allies and the local population failed. General Miha~louit went into hiding but was caught on March 12,1946, and take13 to Belgrade the next day, On June 10,194& his trial on charges of cdlahoratlim with the Nazis and for high treason and war c r h e s began. The well-publicized trid lasted until JuXy 15. He w s h u n d guilty and sentmccd to death. C h July 17,1946, a firing squad executed h, Twent).-three other collaboratars were also tried with him. In 1992 Serbia erected a monument memorializing MihajloviC at Rams Gora, rehabiliitating him (and several other World War 11collaborators), Chetniks used mass terror agahst their enemies. Some of the most outrageous acts task place between @fober 1942 and February 1943. Amo~zg other acts, the Chehiks were jnvolved in ""cleming" actions against Muslims and Croatians in countertermr actiwities, It is importmt to m t e that: the Chehiks were not the only collaborators with AXISforces. 'There were other Serbian and Slovenian forces who collaborated,with Nazi Germaniv,' As in other European countries, the Nazi occupation made the issue of the content of betmyal a complex one i,n Yugosfavia. The personal decisions of Mihajlovii- and individual Chetniks werc directly ~ l a t e dto the

exjsting political and military realit).; that is, decisionmaking was related to pm"'; amwell as the complex (and sometimes conflicting) interests m d moralities in which loyalty and trust were contextualized. :It is, perhaps, unfair not to mention in this context the secret fascist organization that was fomded around 1929by extreme Croatim nationalist Ante Pavdit-the Wstachi. Followillg the fall of Yugoslavia in 1941, Pavelii: and.the Ustachi declared (on April 10) the esta.blis:bmnt of an "independmtfTmtia, and under a Nazi umbrella tbry ruled it ruthlessly, violently, and mercilessly until 1945, This r e g h e committed nulnerous barbarous and brutal purges and massacres against those they viewed as their ""opponentsf"-Jews, Muslims, Orthodox Serbs, and others. After the end of World War 12 Pavelit escaped to Argentha. The issue of whether Pavelie and the Ustachi were traitors is an interesting one. They cotlabmated with the Nazis and were invollied in some extremely brutal activities, but from the late 1 E 2 s on, these individuals had never f-iiddcn their desire for an independent filscist Croatia, minus ethnic groups they did not want in their nightmarish "state," Atthough it is possible, and even i~nperative,to accuse the ZTstachi and Pavelif with war crimes and atrocities, betrayd may be a more djfficult charge to support because one needs to establish exac.tly who they betrayed. Although it is possible to acgtle that Chcse terrorists violated the trust: and loyaky of other Uugoslav citizens, it may be equally argued that many cJf their victims never trusted or were loyal to the Ustachi, and thus the term "betrayal" "re is on a higher level. of citizens (with pawer) against citizens (without power), like Stalin's purges, Hitler's genocide-or state-spcmscrred terrorism. Mowover, like the many Germans who welcomed Hitler, many Croatians welcomed the Wstachi. For those, no betrayal was involved."

Romania: The Iron Guard and Anfionescu In March 1939 &mania and Gemany signed an agwement that established the priority of Germany in the Roma12im ecollomy. BasicmZly; Germany heIped, to develop the Romnian economy, and the majoriv of Bomanian products were purchased by Germany. Illis 1939 agreement continued a trend of increased mutual dependence and cooperation between the two countries that had begun after the 1938 Munich agreement, This trend was reinforced May 1940 when the Ramanim gave dedded to atign with Gemany. Following a series of agreements, almost one-third of Romania was gken to other countries, and in return, other parts of it remained under Romanian control. Follcrwing these foxed concrcssions, King Carol II was forced to step down, and his son Michael took over (September 6, 1940). Prior to his abdication, Carol bad appointed


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General fon Antonescu as the powerful preHlier (September 4). In October 1940, the Germans were already in tbe process of creating a Romanian army, and more of the Romanjan economy was shifted to fit the needs of the Germm war machine. At first, the fnfamous Iron Guarcl-a military organization of the Romanian fascist movement-was a partner to Antonescu. A ruthless and violent group that practiced. violence against both its opponents and Jews, the Iron Guard and its terrorist tactics eventuaUy i~~terfered with htonescu's regime. Me thus began to disarm them (and strengthened the army). This caused the Iron Guard. to rebel against Antonescu and Germany (January 21,1.941). That rebelim was crushed, and by January 27, 1941, Antoncscu had formed a new government (composed mostly of military officers). 50 far it was clear that Romania, as a cowtry, was shinking m d that it was being drawn more and morc3 into the clutches of Nazi Germany Did King Carol betray his country's interests, integrity, tmst, and loyalty by givifig up so much territory a d compromising Romania's sovereignty? Did he have any other options? Was Che Iron Gmrd betrayjng Romania? It certainly violated, brutally, the trust and loyalty of other Romanian citizens by using violence against them (Like the Ustachi). 'There is little doubt that Antonescu collaborated with the Nazis. His suppression of the Iron Guard. was made on purely pragmatic grounds (they were interferi~~g with the preparations for the Nazi inwasion of the Sovkt Won).E-fokvever,Hitler's rclspect for Antonescu helped the Latter keep a semblance of an independent Romania. The price for that was Romanian support (economic and military) for the Nazi war effnrt. W e n Germcrany invaded the Soviet U~zionon June 22, 1941 (Operation Barbarosa), Antonescu ordered Romanian army dkisions to join the invasion. He atso managed to secure the support of the Romanian people for that war effnrt. The short-term gains of that military coopadion were such that Romania recaptured some of the territories it had. previously lost.Wowever, as the war with the Soviet U ~ ~ i oconthued, n Rommian troops sutfered increasing casudties.. ConsequentQ, Antonescds popularity decreased. Was Ion htonescu a traitm? Born in 3B6, htcmescu developed a military carc3cr and by 1932 had been appointed minister of war. Following his appointment as preHlier in September of 1940, Antonescu established a pro-German mflitary fascist cltictatorship known as the National Legionary State. Within a mo~zthof his a p p o h t ~ ~ e nAntonescu t, had sig~zed a pact with the Axis powers and won Hitler % trust. ing Antonescu enjoyed papdarit;v, and with the success of the early war effort in the Soviet Union, he promoted himsel,f to the rank of marshall. However, the military losses involved In the continued

Romanian involvement in Nazi Germany" war in the Soviet Union prompted Antonescu to search for ways to p d l Romania out of the German alliance, and he began to explore the possibil2ies for negotiation of a peace settlement. These elfforts ixre~asedafter the Nazi dckat at Stallngrad (Jmuary 1943), but they failed when Antonescu refused the Allies" delnand fsr an unconditional surrender, Eventually, With the Russian invasion of Romania imminent, King Illichael signed an armistice agreement m d had Antonescu arrcllsted on August 23,1944. In 1946Antonescu was charged wi& treason and war crimes. A Romanim cornmm~ist"Peaplc% Ceourtr90und him guilty and sentenced him to death. He was executed on June 1,1946.4 Romania is an interesting case that gives us a d i f f e ~ nperspective t on betrayal. Basically, Rornania acted as an ally of Nazi Germany. And yet when the fascist Iron Guard seemed to pose a threat it was crushed. As the tide of the war turned agaiinst the Nazis, pressttre grew withh Romania to change course. Thus, before 1943, in Nazi-friendly Romania, the Iron Guard was regarded as extreme and traitorous. After 1943, Antt?nescu's search for ways to break away from the Nazi alliance was seen by the suspicious Nazis as an indication that Romania was potentially a traitorous state.

The Soviet Union and Lieutenant General Andrey A. Vlasov Andrey And~yevichVlasov" ((born1900) first significmt military assipmmt in the Soviet Red Army was his appointment as advisor to Chiang Kai-shek from 19% to 1939. In January 1941 he was appointed cornmander of fie 4th A r m m d Corps fn L v o In ~ Febmary he was awarded the C)1:derof IJenj,n.The Pllazjs invaded the Soviet tlnjnn inJune of 1941 (@eration Barhamsa). Vlasov pmved his courage ~andability in the defense of Kiev in August-September 1941.Althou$ the Red Army lost Kiev, the holdup oE the Germm forces &ere dclayed the Battle ol Moscow to Ihe winter. Tn October 1941 the Nazis were about sixty miles west of Moscow During the Battle of Moscow (mostly, October-December) Stalin appointed Vlasov as commander of l.he newly f o r l ~ e d20th A m y . That army pIayed a significant role in resisting and repelling the German attack. His promotion to lieutenant general came in January of 1942. On that occasion he was awarded the @der of the Red Bamec He was &iven a new command, the Second Shock Amy, and assigned to the V0lTcho-c. front. Shce CJ)ct&es 1941, Germm m d Rommim forces, headed by Wellr~~rachtzf Field Marshal1von Manstein, had been engaged in what has becorn known

I 74

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as the Battle of Sevastopol. Although Manstein" 11th Army was not very successfut h its first assault, Manstein etevised a diffaent strategy. He focused on first and then purghg Soviet military presence from the Kerch Penirtsula (at the easternmost tip of the Crirnea). By mid-May 1942 his strategy had yielded some spectacular successes, His fnrces had wiped out two Red Army divisions and captured altnost 1711,UW prisoners. Followhg this success, the fate of Sevastopol was sealed. During June 17-31), Sevastopol fell to the Nazis, who captured an additional 915,OC)O priso~zer S. During these fierce and fateful battles, Vlasov" command was surmmded by German forces in May 1942. Refusing to surrender, he was captured by the Germans.' Whereas official Soviet versions state that Vlasov had been irt contact with the Germans since the Battle of Kiev and thus gave hirnseff up immediately after fie Soviet defeat in Svastopol, Andseyev asserts that foiilowing the colfapse m d dispeaioon of his 2nd Shock Army troops, Vlasov wandered in the forest for more than two weeks before being captured (June2.1: to luly 121, probably reflecting on what had happened.Mncfreyev kets Chat these two weeks are crucial fm understanding Vlasov" later behavia Durtng that time, Vlasov's smjnd changed from "that of a pmmhent Sowiet commander to that of a collaborator with the enemy, and prepared the ground for his subsequent dcdsion to try and form an mti-Stalin Russian Weration ArnyMe7 That transformation was neither simple nor eav. Overall, it is important to understand the context of these evezzts. Thousands of prisoners were taken by the Wehrnzaelrf on its eastern front. Stalids totalitarian rule was very unpopular, and the Red Army itself experie~zcedhtensive Stalhist purges.. Few Soviet POWs, at least initially had the starmjna to fight for the Soviet Union. That changed as the war continued and the brutal nature of the Nazi cmyucst became clear. Foot points out that the Germans captured nearly 5 million members of the :Red Army, noting that the Germans treated captured St~vietpersonnel abominably: about fivesixths of the soldiers of the Red Army who were taken prisoner did not survive the war. . . . These men were hardly given food or shelter at all; their officers were, with few exceptions, shot after interro>gation,and the rest were left prey to lice and typhus. Those who got the chance volunteered to join General Wlasctv" renegade army-any thing to escape from the pit they were in. German policy in this respect was dictated by Nazi racial myth, which held that . . . Slavs were only a superim form of cattle."

Persuaded to side with the Germans, Vlasov first made propaganda broadcasts irt which he voiced the distmst of Stalin felt by the Red Army.

Viasozl inspects the troops of his Rnussialz Liberatiotz Army. WUIXCE: Reprint& ~ Y U I I Inkcrrzer E Rings, Life with the

Enemy: Collaboration and Resistance in Hitler" Europe, 4939-1945, frnnslnt~dby 1.Maxzu~llBrow~tjulzrz(Lorzdt>n: Weidenfeld ~ n Nz'colson, d 11982). Plfotngra.npi"z from UIEsteia Bilderdic~tst.,B~rJin,

hitially; Vlasov (as well as other Soviet Paws) was distrusted by Hi"cller, who viewed them as inierior people. Thus, Wlasov" activities were confh~edto making propaganda, and he was not: giwen the means or authority to form, an asmy, which is what he really w n t e d . But as the war tumed against Nazi Germany, Nazi taboos were sosnewhat relaxed. In November 1944, I-CeichsfGhrer Heinrich Himmler, head s E the Schutzstaffel (the S.S.), allowed Vlasov to form the Anti-Stalinist Committee for the Liberation of the Ptzoples of Russia. VIasov recruited soldiers


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from POW camps and those who bad been brought back from Russian territories as forced labor. Vtasov then set up three divisions of Russian soldiers"This military force became h o w n as the Russkaya Osvoboditelnaya Amiya or Russim Liberation Army (R.O.A.). The idea was to create a free Russian army that was not under the authority of a communist regime. Oa November 14, Vlasov and the R.0.A. published a manifesto in Prague. In it, Stalisl's annexation of foreign territory m d his policy of rc.prtrssior.1oE indigenous Russian nationalities were attacked (Andreyev 1987:124-133). At U?e end of the war, one R.O.A. division was involved in fietine; the Red hrmy at Franuurt-m-fie-mer.9 h o t h e r division was involved in the 1945 Partisans' uprising in Prague (a2ay 1-2.). Requests Eor mpport from Pattods 3rd a m y before the arrjvaf. of the Suviet Ukrairrian Front were ignored. hcking the support cJf other forces and karing that the Nazi forces commanded by Qneral Tonssaint wodd destroy Prague, the rebels appealed to Vlasov. At that point, Vlasw bad about 20,000 troops statinned to the west of Prague. "X'heR.0.A. arrived in P r a p e on May K, 1945 and although they were poorly equipped, they managed to clekat German reinforcements before withdrawing. However, when Konev" Red b y arrived the next d a y in Prague, the city was cleared of Gemms.10 R.O.A. troops surrendered to the U.S. 7th army However, in accordance with one of the agreements reached during the Yalta Confercnre,ll Vhsov, his troops, and six other generals were handed over to the Soviet army. Many of the troops committed suicide. General Vasw was arrested by Soviet authorities on Czech soil in May 1945, m d m August I, 1946, he and the other generals were hanged in Moscow on charges of Ereas011 and espionage.12 Vlasw" defection to the :Nazis needs to be vkwed in context, Sb begin with, Stalirr's rule was very unpopular. Vlasov"s anti-soviet and anti-Stalin feeljngs had deep roots. The hormrs of Stalin's rcgime, his brutd collectivization of farming, and his bloody and ruthless purges of the 1330s were not easily forgotten. Moreover, several historims have noted the enthusiasm with which the Nazi Wt.hrrnacht and S.S, mits were welcomed by local. Sovicts when Operation Barbarosa commenced. M m y believed. that the Germms were comirrg to Iiberate them. Indeed, Andreyv argues that: "dekatism, the doctrjne that wges soldiers to waken their own side so that the regime m i e t be morc easily overthrown, was exhibited on a much larger scale in 1941 than could even be considered normal."13 Burton (1963) refers to Vlasov and his followers as the "Vlasov defeatist movement." He points out that the nurnber of Soviet citizens who participated in the war effort cm the side of the Nazis ""was not of primary importmce" and that these individmls were effective o d y in "German military strength for combat, takhg over . . . such service functions

as mti-pastisan warfare, anti-aircraft duties, and services of suypIy." In terns oE frontline figheing, they rendered service against the "Allied invasion of Italy and of France . . . where [they] gave good accounts of thetnselves in action."M Clearly, Burtm domplays the role of these turncoats, unaware of the contradiction in his w n description. The Soviet forced labor that was sent to Germany helped in the war effc~rtas well, and many of these forced liaborers later jolsled the iR.0.A. Burton interprets the Vlasov movement as a ~flectionof Soviet citizens' aat-titudestoward their own regime. Me notes the many defections in the Red Army, especially in the first six months of the Nazi invasion.'" The events of the sumrner of 1941 clearly indicated the widespread discontent of the Sovi,et ejtizenry Durjng the first phase of the Nazi iwasion into the Soviet mien, Soviet citizens welcomed the Webi?rmaehtas a liberating army*" If Hitler had taken advantage the Soviets' hatred for Stalin, his in\rasion of the Soviet U'nion might have ended differently. Mowever, his racist ideology which led him to view and tmat the Slavs with scorn and contempt, effecthely prltvented such an occurrence. h d r e y e v point oats that many Soviet citizens in Germm hmds, particularly primers of war and forced Iaborers, made clear their opposition to Stalin between 1941and 1945. This r&ses the question of whether these individuals should be viewed as traitors and collaborators. For some, the answer seems clear because they jojned the Nazis in actively figfiiting the Red Army The nature of this violation of trust and loyalty appearwobvious. For ofiers, it is not so clear. Should. resistance to Stalin"s regime, while professing toyally to Russia, be cmsidered treasod Whose tmst and what loyalty were viobted? And what exactly was its nature? Andrcyev prefers to call Chose Soviet citizens who expressed their oppmitim to Slaljn through military, civil, and political means the "Russian Liberation Movement," v The most crystallized form of this oppctsition, in the shape of a military organization, W= the military unit headed by Lieu tenant General Andrey Andreyevich VIasov, This discussion shows how difficult it is ta adhere to technical defh~itims of treason-and how lutile it is. The political, social, and military reality in which the h s s i a n Liberatiun Movemnt operated q u i r e s us to make moral judgments about who betrayed whom. Other Soviet military residance units had been crcated b e f m Vlasov's R.O.A., but VIasov gave these groups the power, respectabiliv, and impetus they had lacked. However, during most of the war, even Vlasov's strongest war effort was in the propaganda, front. M t until January 1945, was he actually allowed. to crc3ate a rnjlitary unit. Thus, in reality, Vlasov's "arn?yMwwas little more than words. In the context of World War 11, resistmce to Stalin. took the form of defeatism. Andrrzyev (1987) examines the debate regarding Sovict defeatlism


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very critically and argues that in mality the situatim was quite complex. For example, the Soviets did not sign the Geneva Ctmventicm, and so it is not clear to what extelzt their Paws were protected. West (2985) argues that treason involves betraying the state" pprotection, but what kind. of protectim did Stalin's ~ g i r n offer? e TOthe extent that it did offer any protedian, what was the nature of this protectionVIrlasov, asserts Andreyev, was basically a propaganda tool until Labout November 194.18 It is also clear fiat by lieciding to o p d y join fie Nazis, Vlaslzv was entering an immemsely complicated politic& a m a for hvlnich he lacked any trainhg or experictnce.l%s Keegan points out, "Vlasov was . . . an idcalistic m n who hated the tyranny of Stalin and made the mistake of seeing the Germans as potential liberators.""2" Unfortunately, many documents relating to the R.0.A. were deliberately destroyed out of fear that they would fall into Soviet hands and be used as evidence. However, as time has passed, the threat has diminished, and more individuals have been willing to provide informatiosl. However, as the context of Vlasov" actions becomes clearer, fie nabre of fiis betrayal hecoms mnre probkmati.~. The Nazi Wetrr~~lacht and the Red Army were locked in a titanic clash. ?"he ddection cJf a resourceful, high-ranking, and decorated officer issimply put-a vio:latim of both the trust and loyalty jnvested in that: officer by his country Thus, many Soviets viewed Vlasov as a traitor and an opportunist. However, unfolding the context of that famous defection creales uncertainties about the natusc of that loyalty and trust The issue of Vtasov's betrayal must be juxtaposed against the ~ a l i t y in which he functioned. His actions were certainly FnRumced by the cataclysmic events in which he took part. Thus, determhing whether Vlasov was a traitor or a hero depends-almost completely n how one views Stalin's rufe cJf the Sowiet URion, TechnicailL; Vlasow betrayed the trust and loyalty hvested in him. However, one must consider what: it was that he betrayed and his aspirat-ions to help create a dif-ferent Russia. Viewed in this way, that is, ccmlparing the reality with the image, the issue of portraying Vlasov as a traitor becomes problematic.

Treason Within the Third Reieh Although th headlng of this particular section may seem a bit strange, Nazi Germany was a state, and it enacted laws and had a judicial sy"t"m.21 What happened to people who were perceived to violate their trust and loyalty to Nazi Germany and the ffihrer? Generallqi speaking, like fiose defiled as traitors elsewhere, they were severely punished. The brutality and rzlt.hless nature of the N'azi rclgilrrc only m d e that more pronounced. As Zentner and Redurftig (f997) point out,

Volksz7errat was a generic term for . . . high treamn, state treasrrm, and tesriturial treason, among other such crimes. Any attack on the authority crf the state or on the "idea of the Vofk Community" that underlay National Socialism constituted treasrrm against the Volk. . . . High treason and state treason were by nature the same crime, . . . Natimal Socialist criminal Law . . . accorded the highest prioriq to the persecution of Vofk treason." (p. 2006)

Of course, in the totditarian nature of Nazi Germany, oppositicln to Hitler; to Nazi ideology, or to the Nazi state was perceived as t ~ a s o nIt. is thus well worth our while to look into some of the cases.

Hitler Charged with and Convicted of T m s m It is, perhap". appropriate to begin this section by noting the fact that Adolf Mirler h i m & was cha,rged with and emvicted o.f the crjrne of high treason. In brief, here is the tale, By 1923 Hitler was convinced that the end of the Germm Wimar Republic w s in sight. He thought this was an opportunity to enlist the support of the a m y and create a new nationalistic order for Germany. He recruited W r l d War I generai Erish Ludendiorff to support this plot, and on November 8,1,923, they launched the now f m o u s Beer-MaXI Pu6ch i,n Munich. When the Nazis marched on November 9 in the Munich streets in the direction of the war ministry, police opened fire on them, caushg the group of marchers to disperse, Thai: was the end of that failed m d arnateurish P~ifcIt. Hitler w s caught and on February 26,3924, only about three mm&s after the fajled Pufc!~,was brottgnt. to trial (before a very sympathetic judge) an a charge of high trcasm. Hitler would not have given up suck m opportunity and used the legal proceedings to launch a personalized propaganda crnmpaig~~. His speeches the court were auno1Ig his very best, and they obvjously left a strong impression. This, however, did not help much, He was found guilty as charged and sentenced to five years in prison. Hitler served d y nine months of the sentence. Eiis impriso Landsberg am Lech was far from difficuilt, and his life in prison was mre like life in a sanatorium.2qt was there that Hitler began to draft (by dictating to Rudolf Mesti) his book Mein I(crmph kvhich surnnarized his politicd and ideological philosophy and his prescribed direction of action. It must be remembered that Ilitler was found guity of treason by the Iegal o ~ a n of s a democratically elected German government. However, when Hitler came to power, he w d d not allow his political rivals to cmjoy a similar toleramt and forgiving crirni11a1 justice system.2" conviction on charges of treason in Hitler's brutal and cruel, Third Reich typically memt the death penalty


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The case of Adolf Hitlcr as a traitor illustrates the main problem involved in treason. It was fie Weimar f\lepuhlic that viewed him as a traitor. Most. certainly, Hitler and his suppctrters did not view it in that way From their point of view#the very establishment of the Weinrar Republic was the result of a betrayal. The trial of Hitler illustrates the clash of two very differer~tsymbolie moral universes, one succeeding the other in a rather quick fashion. Indeed, a mme generalized observation can be made here: Leaders of an incoming regime can be vittwed as ""traitors'~o the old, and vice versa. Some of the statements Hitler made in public during his trial are worth quothg. Having taken full rr-?sponsibilivfor planning the Putch, he said that he was such a natior~alisticGerman that he ""wodd rather be hanged in a Bolshevik Germany than perish under the mle of F-~ench swords," He then added, ""Ewen if you judge us guilty a thousand times, the goddess of the eternal court o.f kistory will laugh and tear up the verdict of this court, but she pronomces us not guilty,"x hrthermore, as stated in Mein I(lam~JHitler did not even accept the democratic rules of the game. His politicai agenda was that for Germany to become powerful m a n d thrive, a people-supported dictatorship was reytlired. He despised t:he constituticm of the Weirnar Republic (August 14,1919). In 11924 the Weimar Repubhe had the authority and power to prosecute and pu" Nlitler. VVithin thirteen years or so, the situation would be completely reversed. Hitler had the opportunity to actualize Mthat he envisinned and preacl-ced as his political dream. It was, in fact-, a genuine nightmare to free people in the rest of the world and-in the final analysis-to Gemms as well. Aside from Hitler 'S past record as a democratic state-cmvicted traitor, it is worth our while to exmisre at least some of the more famous cases e as treason. that his ~ g i m persecuted

Resistance to Hitler No act of m y mti-Hitler persol1 or group within Germmy marked the end of Nazi Germany One can safely state that Hitl@r%r e g h e was never seriously challenged or threatened from withir.1. It was the combined mditary e h t of the Allies that ended the existence of that vilc regime. Howcver, there was opposition to Hithr. That opposition was disorganized., antagonistic, hesitmt, and unable to unite for a meaningful coordinated action aimed to elilninate Nazism. In fact, &though there were quite a few attempts to assasshate Hitler ( k n z and Ptzhlc 1997:12&122), there was only one time when Hitier c m e close to be actuatty killed, and that was the July 1944 faikd attempt to assassjnate fiim with a b o d eAny opposition wiffl.l,in Nazi G e m m y faced a ruthkss and relatively efficient security police,

Looking at the different resistant groups within Nazi Germany, Zimmermam points out: There is no doubt that the contrasts among the different resisting groups, and the tzreaknesses af their political and wcial perceptims, are of secondary importance, The crucial factor was their willingness to defend the hvnor of the human race apinst a total disintegratbn of Christian and human values resulting from the unlimited rule of a political regime which was based an an exaggerated use of force, ruthless brutality personality cult, idwlogicat zealotry, cynicism, loathe for human values, corruption, and arrogance.=

It is important to note the moral and political.aspects of discussing the opposition to Hitler. As Zirmermann points out, exmjning the "resjstance" to Hitler can be used to ease guilty conscimces, incjicating that not everyone was part of one of the darkest regimes in human history." The more resistance one can find, the better. Overall, about 10,000 people we= executed cm charges of disloyalty to Hitler 'S regime. Another relevant question is, wfiat is the nature of resistance? C)n the one hand, we have either individuals or groups who speak agaislst the rc"gj,e or organize actions against it. On the other hand, we may have such pam"ie forms of residance as expressing djsgust, ohectims, evading different tasks, and the like. Discussion of resistance in the Third Reich typically bcuses on the first type and not on passive forms. 'There is a fair m o u n t of search m resistance i,n Nazi Germany" As it is virtuatlq. impossible to review even most of it, 1 will fwus, briefly, on several famous cases: the W ~ i t eRose, the July 20,194, assassination attempt on Hitler's life, Dietrich Ronhoeffer, Casl Friedrich Gwrdela, hdmiral Wikelm Cmaris, and Marlene Dietrich.

The White Rose, =ring the late 1"360s, the West was rocked by a series of student revolts that threatened to destabilize regimes and alter social oders. Those revdts were reseaded quite intensively However, during al)that time, not many (if any one) cared to remeznber that- a small g r o q of students at the University of Munich, supported by one faculty member, chose to express their sense of horror at the Nazi regime. These rebels orgmized a group of resistance wjthin the u~ziversityat the height of the Nazi regirne in 1,942.The scope and magnitude of this "revolt" ((actually,a very moderate expression of dissent) were minuscute compared to the revolts of the late f 960s. However, to do this as early as 1,942, against such a ruthless regime, defistitelly took much integrity m d courage. They all took a tremmdous risk and paid with their lives for their defiance. Their "actims""wcre mostly verbal, criticisms and dispersion of pamphlets, far less than what so many students did FR 1968. Their story can be found in quite


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a few studies,28 as well as in the fact-based 1983 German movie The White Rose. The essmce of that group's story is as follows. "The n m e "the Wbite Rose"' refers to a group of studernts at Munich University that lformed in 1942 and lasted into 1943, The students whose names are most: frequently mentioned am Sophie (born 1921) and her brother Hans (born 1,918) Schd, Wilie Graf, Chrjstoph Probst, Mexmder Schmordi, m d one faculty member-Professor Kurt Huher. Hans was a medical student, and SopPlie specialized in biology. Professor Huber taught philosophy and encouraged the students to take the rebellious stand, Students in the White Rose were in touch with students from other universities. Although in mid-February t-ians and Sophie participated in a demonstration in Munich, quite an occasion in Nazi Germmy, their most overt action was dispersiSlg (anonymously) pmphZets against the Nazi regime in which they called citizens to topple the Nazi regjme of fear and terror: Tfie student-s began dispersing the leaflets in mid-June 1942, and altogether, they produced six of them. Following the surrender of Field Marshall Paulusfs 6th Army in Stalingrad (E;ebrun,ry2, 1913-31, the White Rose puhl,ished its sixth m d firnal pamphlet. In it, it was stated: "Three hundred and thirty thousand German men were senselessly and ir~sponsiblydriven to their deaths by the brilliant strategy of th& world W,r I corporal,. Fiihrer, we t h d you. . . . We grew up in a state where all free expressjon of opinion has been suppressed.'' The b u j l d i ~ ~superintende~nt, g MIho wifnes~edthe Schotls dispersing their latest batch of leaflets irm an upper floor, reported. them to the Gestapo on February 48,4943. Munich tlni:versity headed at that time by an S.S. officer, dmounced their acli\rity. -Together with four &hers, they were armsted and brought before the Nazi People" Court ruled by the infamous and dreaded ""hanging judge" "8land dreisler on February 22, 1943," "Frcisler found the SCholls and Probst gu&y of treason m d sentenced them to death, Supposedly, Rrrichsfijhrer Himmler was not interested in creating martyrs and demanded that the execuf;ictnbe delayed. However, his telegram arrived too late and the condemned were beheaded. Prokssor Huber, Alexander S~hmorell~ and Willie Graf were arrested later. Their trial took place in Munich in Freisler's colartroom m April 19,1943. They w r e found guilty of treason and sentenced to death. OShers were sentenced to prison and fines, Born in 1893 in SLvitzerlartd, Professor Huber taught philosophy and pvychnlogy at Munich Wniversity from 1925, whex he was appointed professor in 1926. Huber opposed. Nazism and was the m e who helped the kholls draft their leaflets. He was beheaded on July 13,1943, Alexmder Sehnnorc311 was also beheaded on that day. W i e Cral: was beheaded on October 12,1943.

:It is interesting to note that on February 3,1945, Freislier was lPcilled during an Allied air attack from a bomb dropped by m Americm plane. This happened in the mid,st of another treason case. The trial was of Frau Solf and her daughter Grafin Ballestrm, who were associated marginaXly with the July 20, 1944, plot to kill Hitler, Mlhich brings me to our next topic.

The July 20, 194.4, Assassination. Attempt Against Hitler, Aside from an atrt-emptto plant a defective bomb inhis airpllane (March 13,7,943), and von Gcrsdorffk ffailed attcsnpt to personallqi bomb him (March 19431, the only time Hitler really came close to being killed was the assassination attempt on July 20, 1944..'The person behind this failed assassination attempt was Colonel Count Claus von Stauffenherg (born 1907). That Stauffenberg was a rnilitary m m was m coincidence; the relationship between Hitler and the Germm military w s complicated." T h e had dways been a group of military officers who were unhappy with Hitier % regime. tlcrwever, for the most part, off-icers were. unable and umilling to coordinate m effective opposition to Hitler. Van StauEenberg fhally managed not o d y to organize such a g r o q but also took upon himseLf the risk of smggling a suitcase with a time bomb into Hitler" headquarters at Raste~~burg, East Pmssia (hewn as the "Wolf" Lair"). 'The bomb exploded, as plmned, m July 20,1944, at 12:42 IW., causing much damage to property and woundhg and killing several officers, but somehow Mitler sustained only minor injuries, although he was only twelve feet away from the explosion. Hitler's rage cuhinated in the identification and capture of all the canspi,rators, even those who wcre o d y remotely associated with it (for exam*, Field Marshal Ewin Rommel), and the execution of mast of them, sometimes in a vicious mmnele, Overall, almost 5,000 individuals were executed, as Hitler utilized the opportunity to eliminate many of his opponents. Clarifying the Nazi mnral and political boundaries in this lethal er bmught the Nazi Party tc:,new peaks of power; the failed assassination plot was used to rcldefine the ReiCXlls moral bomdarics and to reaffirm trust in and toyalty to Ad.ol.f Flitler," This was accomplished by successfuily constructing the conspirators as traitors. Momower, loyalty to the Nazi fGhrer was constraded as Che equivdent of honor. "&r Monor is Loyalty" was the motto of the S.S. and an oath by which they swore. Emm the Nazi Party point of view this failed caup was an effective tool .for generating more social inlegration and cohesion around Hitla at- a very difficult time.32

Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Barn in 1907, Dietrich BoAoeffer was a remarkable German Protestant theologian who opposed Nazi GermmyYHe was


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arrttsted on April 5/ 19113, and sent to Bucbenwald. During this time, he wrote some of the most movilizg documents agah~stNazi G e r m y and detailed his ideas for a new form of rc1igios:ity. Me was later tried by a summar). court-martial and executed, at Flossenburg concentration camp on Agril S,3945. 'There were other Germans who shared Bonhwffer's point of view m e of them was the popular World War I U-boat cornmmder Martin Nimoller, winner of the Iron Cross, who left the navy to be, was come a pastor. Although at first he supported Hitler's ~ g i m ehe later cowinced that Hitier posed a genuine danger to Germany and sided with Bonhoeffer in opposhg the regime. His activities led to charges of treason, and he was sent tc:,a concentration camp, where he spent eight ~ears.3~ Car2 Friedrich Goerdefer, Car1 Friedrich Goerdeler (born 1884) was a jurist, lord mayor of Leipzig, and a rnajor c-ivilian figure in anti-Hitler conspiracy. Althaugh in the early phases of Hitler" regime he was part of the administration, in 1936-3937 he became disillusioned with Nazism and began to distance hhsclf from the Nazis and to opedy oppose t k m , A personally powerful persuaske, and impressive m n , he became one of the main figures in the July 20 assassillation plot, lending it civilian support and moral integrity. Following the failure of the plot, he was idmtit'ied as one of the main conspirators, arrested, and sentenced to death. He was hanged on February 2,1945.M Admiral Wilhelim Canaris. Admiral Wlhelm Canaris was one of the more devious, enigmatic, yet interesting figures of German opposition. Born in 1,887,he began a naval career in 1905 and served in naval intelIigence during Wosld War I and participated in several daring opem"tons, Afkr the war, he remained in the Geman navy. In 3935 Captain Cmaris became h a d of the Ahwehr and was later prmoted to the rank of admiralass "Though small at first, the Abrueltr J ~ R Wto become a large a d important organization by the begjnning o( Wctrld War 11. It seems quite clear that Cmaris was never too thrilled about Hitler, m d both he and the Abwehr were a locus of resistmce to Hitler. Unwilling to openly express opposition to Mitler, Canaris conspired against Mitler under the cover of his j&. He thus exhibited behaviors that involved plots, subplots, ambivalence, uncertainty, m d the like. The "mystery" around him is due-at least in part-to this ambivalence. Thus, Canaris pretended trust in and loyalty to Hialer, but in fact had pr&a:bIy none. The Nazi security service was not ignorant of Gmaris" ambivalence. Evenhaally, the suspicions against:him accumulated to such a degree that in February 1944 Hitler ordered Canaris to stay out of Berlk, and the Ab-

.ioehu was put under the directorship of 5.5. ReichsfGhrer Heinrich Hirnmler, hlthough Canaris wap; not involved in the July 20 attempt to assassinate Mit-ler, he kvas arrested following the conkssion of one of the conspirators. There was plenty of information leading to the conclusion that he was definite not loyal to the Third Reirh. :He was hanged in April 1945 at Flossenburg. Assor" conclusim+Iearly reflecting a moralizing point of view-is that Canaris was a ""gnuine German patriot" who opposed Hitler and tried to both be effective as an intelfigence officer and rcduce the clamage caused by Nazism. Unfortunate@ for Cstnal-is, the journey down this double road could m t last for very Long." hmvell and Fraenkel's analyt;is (1969) asserts trhat the nobility and religious idealism of conspirators like Canaris made them less effective as conspirators because they were inhibited morally as well as physically, &sisting Hitler revired some serious soul-searching, &termination, stubborn resolution, and a strong sense of both purpose and righteousness. However, Canaris-despite his proven as ambivalent. :Ele hated violence; as m intelligence perscm, fie p ~ f e r r e dto o~ttmanezlverhis o p p o n e ~ than ~ t confront hirn, and fie seemed to enjoy intl-igue for its own sake. He must have loved his country from a traditimai, right-wing point of view, in which Hitler was perceived as a destrayez Marlene Dietrich. Marlene Dietrich, one of the world" most famous entertahers, was also involved in some interestkg maral issues"Born on December 27,11901, in Berth, she developed an extraordirrary career as an actress. Her career took off following her unforgettable role as the seductive cabaret sjnger Lola, in the 1930 Cesman movie T!ze Blur Angel (directed by Josef von Sternberg), An anti-fascist, Dietrich left Germany in 1933 and refused to rr.h;lm until 1945 because cJf the Nazi regime. W e n Hitler =quested that she r e k m to Germny (and mke films there for Nazi Germany), she flatly refused. From 1937 an she lived mostly in the United States and acted in a number of movies. Dietrich became an American citizen (in 1,937), and during World. War XX she entertained American soldiers, wearing a U,S, Army uniform. Many Gcrmans never forgave Dietrich fur choosing not to align hersell' with Nazi Germany during World War 11. :In 1960 she appeared in Germany, but her serits of performances were disturbed and t"hreatened by demonritraticms and bomb threats..Some editorials characterized her as a traitor*Dietrieh reacted by rehsing to return to Germany. After her death on May 6, 1992 (in Paris), she was buried, according to her wishes, in Berlin, next to her mothelr, 111 1993, her marble tombstone was ~rmdalized.However, no desecration of her grave has occurred since then.


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:In November 1996 the municipaliv of Berlin cmsidcred naming a city street after her. Reports in the intcmational press test;@ that followhg the annolmcement, representatives of the neighborhood imoived (Shonenberg) received tetters and phone calls from indiviciuals who characterized Dietrich as "non-Cerman'hnd as a ""t;raitor." Dietrich" choice to not trust, to not be loyal. to, and to not align herself with Nazi Germany has been interpreted as treason by those who chose to embrace Nazism. This case illustrates how problematic the characterization of treason can he for those involved in a moral struggle, even in what athewise seems to be a clear-cut case*

The Far East msserstefn (1998) exami~~es some specific forms of callaboration by different individuals, some of them in key political ,and economic positions, especially in Shanghai during the Japanese occupation. Foot points out that the cmtext of collaboration fn the Far East was very differat than in Western Europe.37 To begin with, many Far Eastern cowltries were u~lder colonial occupation prior to the Japanese irtvasjon. Enitially many of these countries welcomed the Japanese because they felt that the Japanese werl, liberators who were about to grant these countries independence. As time passed, that tragic misperception was exposed, forcefully and brutally. Even wben the Japanese did grmt some form of indepcmdence (for example, Burma and the Philippines), it was a charade; in Rumta, some of the leaders collaborated with the pre-Japanese colonial power. It became ubvious that t.he last tbing the Japanese conquerors were i n t e ~ s t e din was the political, economic, or social well-behg of the nebvly co~~quered nat h s . The main goal of the occupation was to enrich the cmquemrs. The conquerors demonstrated their contempt for non-Japanese people through the humiliatim and degradation of- the vanquished. This is the backgrounlt for such p h e n m n a as the "comfort women"';"" the Rape of Nanking, where a ~ a r t ofa a mftlion people were slaughtercd wjr-hin six weeks;"g the Japanese fmperial Forces' special unit, which was involved in a human experimentation program;" aand the Bataan Death March," b r i n g wbich Japanese troops forced about '?tf,(lO starving Allied prisoners of war to march 1115 kitometers from Mariveles to prison camps in San Fernando and a h g that way the POWs were ""beaten, clubbed, and baylmeted.'""zft is estimated that up to 14,0W died along the way.43 Thusl while local people may have hoped that the Japanese conquest rnight free them, the reality was that it =placed one colmid occupation with mothet; whirh was, illmost respedS, much worse and more ruth-

less. This situation was similar to the situation in Eastern Europe during the Nazi occupation that drove w a y Stalin" ddictatoriai regime. Coll,aboratio~~ with the Japanese under these conditions was not very appealing. However, local people seemed to collaborate in one specific area, a d that was in the &liberate campaign by the Japanese to erase all dtural, po:[itical, and econonnic-of the occupatim of the American, Dutch, French, and British colonial, powers in Southeast Asia. Tn the long run, that particular aspect of the otherwise brutal and rulhless Japanese occupation may have been useful in cultivathg local people's striving for independence, by providing them with an opportunity to formulate their own aspirations in the political, cultural, and econmic areas. Clhim provides a good illwtration for both the brutal Japanese occupation and later independence, It is well wlrrth ncrting that some of the Japanese d i t a r y cclmmanders did try to set up colfaborationist puppet Chbese governments, for example, in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia by the Kwantung Army, the North China Area Armypand the Central China Expeditimary A r q Mthough none of these Japmese a t t e ~ ~ pwas t s very successful (they were discredited from the beginning), some of them did control various resources and had coexive powers. Perhaps one of the m m famous of these was the Kwantung Army's conquest of Manchuria m d the creation of the puppet state of Manchukuo headed by the empemr Pu-K, fn fact, the Japanese commander of the Kwantung Army-General Minami Jiro-was "appoi,nled" Japanese antbassador to Manchukuo. Generd Jiro, si.mply put, governed Manchukuo (with very littte-if my-guidance or control from Tokyo). I'u-Ui, t.he p u ~ p e Chinese t ruler of Manchkuo from 1932 (and "the last emperor of China")),was imprisoned in Siberia bp the Sovi,ets after their invasion of China in 1945. He was returned to Chha in 1950, where he was imprisoned again. Havil^lg converted to communism, he was released from prison in 3,959, and until his death in 3,967 be work& as a gardener in Pekhg" bbotanical gadens m d in the Chinese department of historical archives. 'The Japanese were also able to create puppet Chinese armies, the sizes of which are still under debate. However, these were not effective fighting forces and were not trusted by the Japanese themselves. As in other places (for example, Norway and France), they became associated with betrayaX.44 By most Wstem criteria used after World War 11, I'u-Ui was a traitor. He collaborated with the occupykg Japanese forces. Dear and Foot poht out that he accqted the Japanese offer to become the new state" chief administrator with "eagerness."'@Tme, he had been entJRr0nc.d at the age of three as Emperor Hsum Yung, but he was deposed in the IN1 ClChjxlese


Vintalitzg Trrtsl and hyalty Durr'12g WurIcZ War 11: Part 2

revolution. Thus, his personal motivation to rule the Chinese may have overc.ome his pofiticat and culktral sensibilities, and he agreed to become a puppet emperor ""ruling" part of China. He may have atso hoped, like @isling, Pktain, Vlasov, and a host of other European politicians, to gain some independmce for his cowtry. Regadless of h w c ~ n elooks at it, PuYi did colla'Llorate wit-h the Japanese occupation, certainIy to their benefit, It is interestislg to note that despite this fact, he was allowed to live his nabral life (he died in 1967 at the age of sixty-one) and was not etiecuted like European collaborators. Although one should, not make sweeping generaliizations from this single special case, the way Pu-Yi was trezlted might prompt some tl-toughts &out possible diffewnces between European and Chinese forms of justice.46

It is not too easy to find Japmese forms of betrayal, However, hnio rather famous ones, from very different perspectives, involve Ozaki Hotsurni and wfiat has become h w n as Tokyo Rose. X &scu,ss Tokyo Rose in detail in Chapter 7; here E discuss, briefly#the case of Ozaki Hotsumi, To understmd the context, one needs first to review the case of molther famous Wctrld War I1 spy-Rehard Sorge.

Richasd is often descrjbed as one of the most successfuli known spies. He was born in 1895 in Baku, Russia to a Russian mother and a German father (a engineer who worked for the h p e r i d Russim Oil Company). At the age of three he was brought to Germany, where he grew up. Zn Octcrber 1944 he volunteered to serve in the German Army in World War I on the western front, where he was wounded three times. Uurhg the last two years of the war, he studied. at the universities of Berlin, Kie1, and Hamburg. After the war he obtained a Ph.D. in political science from Hamburg University. Disillusioned by the devastation crcated by Wosld Miar I, Sorge gravitated slowly toward communism. His commitment to communism became much firmer after the October IN17 Russim Revolution (he later became an admirer of Stalin), Serge" full conversion to communism o c c u r ~ dprobahly in the early 19205, l-fe joined the C o m u n i s t Party and begm to recruit peaple to communis~~., Sorge worked as a history teacher in Hamburg, Germany, but his at-tempts to ~ecruitmembers to communism durkg school hours caused the schoolmaster to dismiss hhn. His commitme~~t to cmmunism then led him to Moseow.

In 1924 Sorge moved to Moscow and even acquired Soviet citizenship. 'T"here he began to work fnr the International Liajsm Department of the C l o m w ~ i sInterndional. t Following the end of the war, he also operated as an agent for the Comintern." He kveloped the cosmopolitm existcnce of a Comfntr~rnagent on different assipments ir., Europe and Asia. mere he was recruited to become a spy by Dimitry Mmuilsky, head of the foreign intelligence division of the Godntern. His tsainjn.g in Moscow (1924-1923 resulted in missions to Scandinavia (192q, the United States (192cLos Angeles, to cojfect information on the film industry), and Britah (1929-an unclear mission in London). Sometime during 1929-1931) Gmeral Yan Karlovich Berzin, head of the iz~tdigence unit of the Red Army' managed to wcruit Sorge to work for his department. From that time on, Sorge was actually working for the Soviet military intdigmce orgmization-the G.R.U.48 Berzin sent Sorge to Shanghai (1930). His mission was to solidify Soviet espionage actkitics there and provide the Suviets with information Labout the sihlation in China and about Chiang Kai-shek. As Japan was emerging as a cent-rd force inthe Far East, Sorge w s recalled to Mosco\vI \zrhere he was involved in lengthy discussions about the hture direction of Soviet inteligence efforts in the ~ g j o nn. e s e discussims ended with his assignment to Jmpm. However, before going to Japan, Sorge went to Germany. There be became a ccnrespclndent for several newspapers and a member of the Nazi Party; eventually he developed a close relationship with the Nazi leadership. These activities were part of a plan of purposefuI deception. Sorge was playing the role of a dedicated, trusted, and &voted Nazi but was, in fact, using this guise as a cover for spyistg inJapan for Stab* The plan workcd almost perfectly Sorge, a Soviet spy, was perceived by the Nazis as one of them. As a trusted cclrrespondent for the FrankBrier Zeitla~g,he traveled to Tokyo, where hc aXso becme the p ~ s ats tach6 in the German Embassy (October 1933).Hjs position in the German Embassy gave him access to the information available there (including iles, messages, and covert discussions). 'ThusI Stalin had h Tcrkyo a spy who bad access not only to Japanese sources but to German secrets as well. Soqe gassed d l the informatim at his disposal to his c~peratorsin the Red Army intelligence from 7,933 to 1941. Sorge, however, did not work alone. From Tokyo he operated a spy network. ?"he Japanese secret ser\iice-Kempai Tai-very d w l y closed fn on Sorge and his ring of spies. Japanese electronic engineers wcre monitor-. ing the radio transmissions sent by one of Sorge's m n , Max Clausen, but experienced ciiWculties pjnpointing its origin." Both 5eth and Rower note that Sorge" Japanese lover-Kiyomi-ws working for the Kempai Tai,


Vintalitzg Trrtsl and hyalty Durr'12g WurIcZ War 11: Part 2

and so he was very closely watched.%On OctObes 15, 1941, to the cornplete shock of the Germans, he was arrcllsted in his home in Meguro. Eollokving- Sorge's arrest, his ring of spies (about thirty-five members altogether) was exposed m d its members arrested. The Japanese were very successfut in efiminating Serge's spy network completely. .hga,in, Seth and Rower note that S o r g spent the evening and night before his arrest with the w m a n who made his arrest possible-l(iyomiand that she was in the hhase at the time he was arrested.51 From Sorge's paint of view, Kiyomi violated his trust and loyalty and he11ce betrayed him. However, much like Blblical Dclilah, K y m i never had a genuine loyalty to Sorge, and his trust in her was thus mfsplaced and founded on deceit. Sorge's trial took place on. September 29, 1943. He was sentenced to dea&, but his execution was delayed until November 7,1944, when he was hawed in Sugamcr Prism in Tokyo. In 1947Kiyomi was shot tcr death outside a club where she used to perform, "probabiy by agents of Srnersh attempting to avenge the death of their brilliant spy"" The Soviets warded-gcrsthu.mou.sly-Sorge the "Hero of the Soviet Union'hnd honored his melnory by creating a s t m p carrying his pictw.3 Because of the nature of StaliPl" rreghe, it is not entkely clear to what extent Stalh tmsted the infornation passed cm to him by Serge." Hwever, there is little doubt rcgasding the value of the intellige~~ce passed on by Sorge. Two very irnportmt pieces of infornation were passed. on to Stalin. fist, S t a h was given a three-week a$vance noticr about Hitler's plms to invade the %vkt Union. Sorge &armed Stdin in May 1941of the planned German attack on the Soviet Union and specified June 20 as the date of attack. 'I'he actuat attack took @ace on June 21. Staiin, however, discounted the hformatio~~. Second, %rge hformed Stalh that Japan had no intelltions of initiating hostilities against the Soviet Union. Sorge estimated, based on his G e m a n and Japanese sources, that fapan" strategic. interests were in southern Asia and the Pacific and not in Siberia. This enabled Stalin, perhaps not too enthusiastically or tmsthgly, to p d i army units out of eastern Siberia in the fall of 1941and repcwition them tcr defend Mwcoclr. This, most certady was very csudal, in the Kanle of Mosco\v. If Stalixl had more fully tmsted his man in Tokyo, the combination of these two items of i n f o m a ~ o nwould have mabled him to move milibry units from the borders with Jilpan to face the Nazi Maim much earlier and more forcefully. a h e r important pieces of hformation prwided by Serge" espionage ring were the forecaswg of "the Japmese military mutiny of February 1936and the Japmese invasion of China in July 1937."55

Ozaki Hotsunzi .Although Riehard Sorge is a very promhent fjgure in the literature of W r l d \Nar 11 espionage, Sorge"s primary Japanese collaborator, Ozaki

Hotsumi, is often omitted. However, without Ozaki, much of Sorge's valuable intellit;ence work could not have been accompl-ished.Sorge even adxnjtted that when he wrote in 1941 that Ozaki "'was my first and m s t important real confederate. . . . Our relationship, both business and personal, was perfect. The information he coltected was the most accurate and the best that I ever obtained from any Japanese source, and I formed a close personal friendship with him at once."sh For many Japanese, Ozaki is considered the traitor. The letters that Ozaki wrote his wife, Eiko, from prison were published as a book irn 1,946, and it b e m e a best-selkr, sellhg more than 10U,1)(10 copies inf apm between 1946 and 1962.'7 Johnson's 1990 book, An Insfatzce of^ Treasorz: Oznki Hotsuilrzi nrzd fhe Sorgc f(ilqI providcs a very detailed xcount of C)zalti%treachery fnr the English-speaking audience. I shall., therefore, describe the case in brief. Ozaki Hotsumi was born in 1901 in 'l'okyo but raised in Taiwan (t-hcn Formosa), where hjs fatkr worlted as m editor. He attended Tokyo fxnperial Wniversity (1919-1925), from which he graduated in 1925.Fdowing his father" footsteps, he joined the Japanese newspaper Asaki Shinzbla~in May 1926 as a reporter, Me was not very successful at a city desk job, and in Octdber 1922 (at his own request), he was transkrred to the Chinese section of the Osaluz Amhi. m I I e he was sbdying, specializing in the "Chinese problelx," kalso used his time to study Marxism and communism, A month after his move to Osaka, Ozaki married his siste~in-lawAlthou$ such a marriage wollld have received little notice in any Western culture, it was extraordhary in Japm.58 However, cmtrary to a naive assumption, Ozaki did not "steal" his brothefs (Hostami) wife (Eikct). Eiko and Honami's marriage was goirtg nowhere, and they had separated in 1927. 'The Ozaki-Eiko romance developed during the sprjng m d stlmmer of 1927. During tbe summer, Hnnami married another woman, and Eiko was free to remarry*Ozaki's move to Osaka in October 1927 was followed by Eiko moving there in November, m d the two were married.39 HOWever, it seems that Ozaki was not very faithful to his wife. He apparently violated both her trust in him and his loyalty to her, as he had several mistresses.@ :In 1928he was assigned a comspondent post in Shanghai, where h remained until 1932. Ozaki and Eiko"s only daughter, k k o , was born there on Novennber V , f 929, f.In a transmission from April 4940, Lord Haw-MW talks about the occupation of Norway. He slates that the attack against Norwa~."and Denmark is advancing according to plan, that the W i n g and occugation of Denmark wem uneventful, and that the camresistance on the beaeh. C)nly paign against Norway met no sig~~ificant near Oslo were there a few inciderrts, but Oslo was now occupied. He then goes on to quote the appeal of the German minister for Norway to the Norwegian government to avoid resisting Germany because it was "'senseless." "Germany does not intend to infringe on the territorial integrity or political independence of the kingdom of Norway either now or in the future,""""

h d i t ~Traitors: Lord kinur-kinuralzd Tokyo Rose


Joyce ipored the brutal Nazi occupation of Nosway and the hypocrisy of "political independence." Furthermore, the German Nawy sustain& serious darnages in the operation, and its operational ability was significantly reduced. The Norwegians put up a courageous defense, and the Nazi conquest of Noway was certainly not a picnic. Wliam Joyce's personal life was not smooth. His f rst marriage dissolved into nothingness. Now, hBerlh, his second wife was I-ravisrga hot love affair with a younger man. The traitor Joyce was thus betrayed m the personal le~el.~g In August 1941, Willim foyce sued his wife Margaret for a divorce on the grounds of infidelity*Mxgarct responded by stati% that her husband abused her by losing all ~ s p e cfor t her."" It was clear that the marriage came to a dead-end. Divorce was granted. Followhg the divorce in court, the two newly dkorcees displayed an emotional outburst and feu into each other arms outside the court. 'They went to have a meal at the Kaiserhof. Later that day they each went his m d her separate ways,hl The two remarried again in February of 1942.a

Last Radio Recordingsfronz Lord Haw-Haw War hostilities ended May 7,1945, and Joyce" last ~ c o r dfor i ~a radio broadcast was made on April 30,1945." h that broadcast "foyce insisted that the sole cause of war h 1939 was the Germm wish that the city of Danzig-racialty and politically German and part of Germany until 1919-should be turned by Poland."" Had Danzjg, accordi,ng to l-his idiotic and maliciotls, not to mention historicauy wrong, version, been given to Germany, World War I1 would have been prevented.@In that trmsmission, Joyce also talked about Germmy: I'm talkin" to you about Germany That is a concept that many of you have failed to understand. . . . Here we have a united people-.. . . They are not imperialists, they do not want to take what doesn't belong to them. All they want is to live their own simple lives, undisturbed by outside influences. That is the Germany that we know.

Of c o m e , Joyce conveniently forgot to mention that a simple, undistubed life was alil that- millions of Jews, Gypsies, 1301t.sfRussians, Czechs, Danes, Norwegians, French, British, and others also wanted, The recording ends with, "Germany will live . . . :Eleil Hitler! . . .Farewell." "ere is a qualitative difference to this recording. Joyce sounds tired and hjs speech is c1earj-y slurred.6" ?i>nyGemghty reported in 197'4 that this last ""transmissim'kas never actually trmsmitted. Gesaghty notes that Joyce drank too much during


h d i o Traitors: Lord kinur-kinuralzd Tokyo Ruse

the receding, m d his Nazi superiors decided not to trmsmit the recording because it was too obvious from thr voice that somethirrg was very wrong. The recarding itself was found in the archives of Radio Luxernbourg.67

The Capture of Joyce ""Ry the end of R/farch the Joyces were lodged in the little t o m of Apen . . . in the former Grmd Duchy of Oldenburg."@Plms were made to trms-

port the Joyces by U-boat to the Irish Republic, where it was felt they coufd live safely. However, by May 1945, thjs plan was sirtlply not kasible-MAnather plan was to escape though German-occupied Dellmark ta neutral Sweden. The Joyces were put in Hamburg, and Joyce was given a false passport under the namc. of Wiikeh )lansen,TO However, the rapid collapse of the hattered Third Reich left the Joyces wi& very few choices. Joyce decided to go back to Flensburg, near the DmisFt.boder.71 On the evening of 28 May 1945, Jc>ycewas walking through a wood which overlooked the harbar. He was alone, Ahead of him he saw two English officers tzrt-ro were apparently gathering firewoc~d.They belonged to the Reconnaissance Regiment of the Royal Armoured Corps. . . . One of the officers was Captain Lickorish, and the other was Lieutenant Perry Joyce could have passed on his tzray without attracting their attention. Instead, he waved a hand, speaking to them first in French. Then he called out helpfully in English, "There are a few more pieces over here.'" He was walking away again tzrt-ren the two officers overtc~skhim. Lieutenant Perry said, ""Vou wouldn't happen to be Wiltiarn Jcyce, would you'?" The question was almost sugerfiuom, for as Captain Lickorish said later, he had already recognized the voice as ""tat c ~ the f announcer or speaker on the German radio." Joyce stopped, put his hand into his pocket, looking far that faked passport which identified him as "WiLkLm Hansen." (Selwyn 1987:162)

The two British officers were alert, They suspected that the man infront of them may try to puil a gun on them. Thus, as Joyce was rczachi~~g into his pocket, Ijeutenant I+rcy-in a husry-got hold of his revolver and fired bw. At this dose range, the bullet hit Joyce in his right thigh and passed to his left. He fell crying in his confusion "my name is Fritz Hanserr." Captah Z,ickorish went ta the wounded man searching for a weapon, He found none, but did find two passports: one for '"VViXJnelm Hmsenffand the other, a military pawp"tf"r "William Joyce.'"foyce was taken to the nearest Danish fror~tierpost. hterestirg that JOYCC? was nat thirtking of a gun. He thought that the British officers suspected that he

h d i t ~Traitors: Lord kinur-kinuralzd Tokyo Rose


William )t~yce,accompanied by two gziards, or2 gmunds of ftw Lur2eberg Iroyit~tto witere l~zewas kaken after was woztnded dztrz'ttgillis arrest. SQUIPCE: AZnlz Wfzamnt,Treason: Farnous English Treason Trials (Phoenix Mill, Englntzd: Alniz Szkfforz,19951, p. 269, Photo from Times Newspapers Ltd.

was about to use a poison vial. The story of the capturc, and woundjng, of Lord Haw-Haw made its way quickly to the news.n .h historical irony can be foulld in the Wiener Library, Lolldon. In the archives held there, Mr. Simmon, horn the Jewish Chronicle, notes that Lieutenant Geoffrey Perry was Jewish.7Wis original n a m was Pinsche\vcr, and he had lived in Berlin prior to his immigration to England in 1935. Al the tirne of the report, he was described as working for the British Association af Publisherrs"i"4

The Trial The next chapter inJoyce's life was his trmsfer to England, interrogation, and trial. Along the way he was treated for his wounds. foyce was cooperatrive, and despite wamhgs, he "was a ccrmpdsive talker,"n I'he British press easily defined Joyce's acti,vity in h d i o Hamburg as treason and Lord Haw-Haw as a traitor.


h d i o Traitors: Lord kinur-kinuralzd Tokyo Ruse

S e l w p points out that before Joycer was brought back to England, the 'Tieason Act (1945) was amended. 'The law of 3695 required two witnesses to an act of treason ""or else two acts of treason each vouched for by a separate witness. This safeguard. was now abolished, and in Joyce's case the prosecution offered only one clear act of treason vouched for by one witne~s,~'76 Joyce was charged with high treason for his transmissions and for bewas coming a German citizen in 1940.7'he issue of his original ci-t.izctnsl~ip a serirtus one. It was difficdt, if not impossible, for a Britisfn court to convict an American citizen turned German citizen on a charge of treason to Britain. Thus, the case is an empiricd illustratricm of the need to establish that a traitor is a member of the group bejing betrayed. The prosecution claixned that obtahing a British passport (under fahe claims) put Joyce under British jurisdiction and made hirn a British citizen, requiring from fiim t-he dut-y of h i t h f u h e s s , ~ Joyce ptcaded ""not guile*"As far as be was concerned, be did not betray T o n e . He never hid his fascist views, a d when war broke out, he did as his belief required. However, his defense was based on the claim that the British court had no jurisdiction because he was a non-British citizen, That did not work. Joyce was also bothered by the possibility that a "pedominantly Jebvish juryf' would judge him.7" The trial began in Septttmher 17,1945, and lasted three days. ' m e trial of Cord Haw-Haw had caught the ima&ination of the world" pressef'79 Joyce codd answer afirxnatively to the charge that he had never been a British citizen. However, he did feel himself to be British m d had lived in Britah for tl-tirty years. Thus, it was possible that treason codd he invoked between 9ptember f 8,1939, and Septentber 26, 1940 when he became a German citizen). As Slwyn pojnts out, "it was iar from clear that erican suhject in Germany could be guilty of trmsm against E%land, a countr>iwhich he had left and to h i c h he had no intention of retuming,"8(1However, it is equaIly true that "Wi1Iiam Joyce bad broadcast ~ p e a t e d l yand mregentantly m behaif of the Nazi regime, undermhhg British morale by evwy means at his disposal."" Joyce's blatant and repeated radio messages threatening Britain with destruction and &feat, accusing the second-front of being "Jewish inspired,qz and inciting citizells with cdLs of "Lay down your arms! Resistance is uselessl"8"illustsate this charge dramatically. The jury found Joyce guilty on the charge of high treasm in twentythree nrrk3utes of deliberations. His case came before the Court of Crirninal Appeals on October 30, 1945. The hearing lasted for three days, and the problem of Joyce" nationality was a crucial me. On November 7 , 1945, the appeal was rejected. The case was then appealed before the House of Lords on December 10,1945. The discussions ended on Decem-

h d i t ~Traitors: Lord kinur-kinuralzd Tokyo Rose


ber 13, and on Decermber 1%it was announced that the appeal was rejected fiere as well.84 'There were letters and appeals to the British authorities not to execute William Joyce, Documents released in 1995 by the Public Record Office ""disclose a file of letters, telegrams, a d petitions 3 inches thick urging George IV, Clement Attke, the prime minister, and Chute R. Ede, the Home Secretary, to be lenient with a man who earned historical notoriety as the broadcaster Lord Haw-Haw" The Duke of Bedford wrote to Attlee: I gather he has nwer been charged with betraying military secrets. . . . I must say that I feel his execution would be an act of quite unjustifiable vindictive severity involving a not inconsiderable degree of hypocrisy as well. . . . Although in his frequent use of the term "Jewish," he displayed the exaggerated bigotry characteristic of anti-Semites, Joyce, when telling the British people in his broadcasts that their real enemies were the international financiers, spoke no more than the truth.85

Wiltiam Joyee, known as "Lord Haw-HawI was h q e d in the early hours of the morning of Jmuary 3, 11946, at Wmdsworth Prism. As Se%wyn indicates, even on this day, he still had some devotees praying for him. Joyce's last letter to his wife stated: "l salute you, Freja, as your lover forever! Sieg H&l! Sieg Hcil! Sieg t-Xeil," Me added I-he German call of the battaliun to which he was recmitctd to defend Berlin's Wlhelmplatz district agai~~st the advance of the Red ArmygWccorcting to Sfwyn: At 1 P.iVZ.the BBC Home Service reported the executian at Wandsworth and the last public message of the man who had been hanged. ""E death, a s in this lifef T defy the Jews who caused this last war, and 1 defy the power of darkness which they represent. ""Iarn the British people against the crusFting imperialism of the Sclviet Union, "May Britain be great once again and in the hour of the greatest danger in the West may the standard of the Imkenkrezaz [Swastika] be raised from the dust, crc>wnedwith the historic words "hr lab! doelz gmiegf.' [YOUhave conquered neverf heless]. " h a mproud to die for my ideals; and I am sorry ECX the sons of Britain who have died without knowing why." Wlwp 39827-8)

As Selwyn points out, although Joyce was conwicted of t ~ a s o non a grand scale, "he died wit-;hout relBorse, writing his last 'SSieg Heil!hnot twenty minutes before the hangman entered the condemn cell" ((p, 8).


h d i o Traitors: Lord kinur-kinuralzd Tokyo Ruse

Thus, very clearly, until his very last moments foyce regretted nothing and haci learned nothing. He remained loyal to his fallen idol, Adolf Hitler, m d the abomhable National Socialism to the end.

Some Hz'sdorz'cnlIronies History can play some sard.nni.c tricks. Rccall that Joyce was captured and shot in the leg by a Jewish refugee from Germany. Another irony occurred years after his execution. One of Joyce's daughters from his first marriage-Heather Iandol+becanre a regular visitor to the Shiabbat morning service in tbr Ghatham Synagogue. According to the @wish C:hro~z%cle, the last time si,x%-sjx-year-oldHeather saw her fatker was when her parents were divorced (1936)." She was then seven years old, Mrs. farrdola was repclrted as having a ""chc.rishrd and warm regard for Jews," unlike her father: She visited Israel twice, and her daughter spent two years in an Israeli kibbutz,

The Impact of Lord Haw-Haw's Transmissions Were Joyce's transmissitms effecthe? Selwyn quotes a conficfmtial rczport clf the BBC issued on March K, 7,940: [The report] was based on interviews with a random sample of 3,000 people. Of every six interview-ees,one was a regular listener to WilEiam Joyce and four listened to him from time to time, The fipres were mexpededly high and not

made more palatable by the discovery that it was the politicaliy betterinformed and the yc3ung who Xistmed to Hamburg Radio regularly These were also identified as people who did not easily believe in the myth of the Britik Empire d t e d agaimt a CO cm enemy but, said the report, who h e w quite welt that a g o d many of its people had no enthusiasm fox such a war.88

A quarter of the sample surveyed in December 1939 stated. that they had listened to W i a m Joyce the day before; S8 percent stated that they found foyce to be fantastically funny; 50 percent just listened so that they would have something to talk about; 38 percent found Joyce amusing; 29 percmt wmted to hear the German version of events; 26 percent kvanted Efie ncws fiat the BBC did not give t h m ; 15 percent tfiought he was a good broadcaster; 9 perilent found RBC boring; m d R percmt admired Joyce"s broadcasthgs,. Most in the sample did not thkk it was mpatriotic to listen to foyce. However, Selwyn also states that '"inthe BBC surveyF22 percent of those questioned said that they never Listened to Raciic:,Hamburg or any of the other German stations, because their wircless sets were sjmply not powerful enough to pick t h m up,"m These numbers stand in cmtsast to

h d i t ~Traitors: Lord kinur-kinuralzd Tokyo Rose


other relevant figures: 23 million rclgular listeners to the BBC, and 10 dlion occasional listeners (to the news)." C l e a r l at least in the early years of Ihe war, m y people in Britain chose to expose themclves to the propaganda trmsmissims from Germmy.

Other Bmadcasters The impressive works by Edwards (1991) and Bergmeier and Lotz Rainer (1997) document the extent to which the Nazis utilized radio transmissions to non-Germans as a way to spread their version of rcality. Edwasds o r n he refers to as "raeiio discusses at length Arnerican broadcasters w traitorsM")inthe service of the 'Third Reich, such as Jane Anderson, Max Otto Koischwitz, Robert I-I. Best, Douglas Chandler, and DonaId Day (and a few others)." Bergmeier and Lcrtz Rainer's 1997 work surveys the more general radio propaganda trmsmissions of Nazi Germany. Edwards concludes that, much like Joyce, most of the American broadcasters lost their loyalty to the Llnited States yearsbefore World War I1 began. The number of such people, t-hough not: large, was significant.

Some mtes alz This Case Leaving aside the fine legal distinctions cmcernbg citizenship, who and what exactly did foyce betray? He was a significant force in the Nazi propaganda campaign, but hc did it out of his own free will alld out: of a deep conviction in the Nazi cause, which he never hid, Was his execution an act of vengeance? I have no doubt that it was, although in the present polit.ically c o r ~ cterminolow t the more accurate term would be "justice was served." T'hsi raises a more gmeral question rcgading the issue of what should be done with the leaders of defeated enemies after a conflict. Ki1roy's 1,994play about Lord Haw-E(aw deals With this issue. Although I am not entirely convinced that conceptually (not technically or legally) the charge of treason in foyce's case is simply constructed, deception was involved on several levels. Joyce's s b effort was to persuah Allied soldiers and citizens to change sides, In other words, foyce was committed to persuading the opponents of Nazi Germ n y to alter their moral boundaries, to violate their loyalty and cornmitment, to betray trust, Although the charge of treason as applied, to foyee hirnseif is not simple, he was most certaillly callillg on others to betray their country. 'That call puts Joyce in a very questionable moral position. Moreover, Joycek transmissions were based on half-truths, and falsclhoods. Thus, Joyce's fight was based on decepticm while pretending to be an "honest" ideological oppone~~t. In short, he was a liar at the very least,

h d i o Traitors: Lord kinur-kinuralzd Tokyo Ruse

The Case of Iva Toguri-Tokyo Rose During the war in the Pacific, thousands of American soldiers were exposed to a bright, clear, and rather sexy voice transmitting to them daily from Japan. They came to call the female broadcaster "Ti,kyoRose. In at least two World W r 12 submarine movies, Tokyo Rase is featured as submariners listen to her transmissions (in the 19443 Uestinatiorz Tokyo the submarhers ridicule the trmsmissions, and in the 1958 Rzdrz Sileitzf, Rura Deep these transmissions arc used to help make an important operational derision), In these transmissions, contemporary music: was glayc.d, news was m nouncedI and Alnerican soldiers were urged not to fight. The main purpose of these transmissions, Obviously, wwas to erode the morale of American sotdiers. For those Americans fighting the Japanese in the Pacific, Tokyo Rose was a very familiar voice, and according to many sources, they seemed to enjoy the pmgrm. Thus, ixrstead of demralizing the soldiers, her transmissions may have achieved tbr oppot;ite effect. "T'hequestion rclgarding the idenlity of Tokyo Rose is a thorny one. Several JapaneseAmerican women were employed as broadcasters, However, one of them-Iva Ikuku 'lbguri D"Ayuino (born in 1916)-wati put on trial for treaso~~ in 19448. She became ide~~tiiied with the voice of Tokyo Rose. Iva was an American citizen of Japanese parents. Her father, Jun ?i,guri, came to the United States in 1899 when be was scrventeen, intending ta find employment as a farmworker. C k t J w ~ 8,1907, e when 'Jun was twenty-five years old, he returned to Japan to find himself a bride. Althou$ he was travelil7g with a Japmese passport, he was ablc to secure himelf a Canadian passport as well. This passport guaranteed that he codd return to Nor& America whenever he so wished, fn Japan he married nineteen-year-otd Fumi Iirnuro. After the marriage, he returned t~ the Uni,ted States done. It took six years before he could afford to bring his wife to America. fn the meantinne, he visikd fapan, m d F m i gave birth to a son (Fred-born in 1910). h a was born in Los Angeles, cm 'July 4,15316, and mo.trher sister was born later. JWI was determined to Americanize his children. They we= discouraged from learnirtg or usixzg Japanese and were strongly encouraged to adopt American ways of life. Iva was successfz,zlin her schooling, and in 1933began her study of zoology at U C M , Having compIeted her degree in 1936, she plmned to cmter medical school. H w v e r , Iva's aunt, Shizu, was sericrusly ill, and Ivafs parel~tsdecided to send her to Japan to help her aunt- When Iva left America on July 1,1941, for Yokoharna, Japan, she had only a certification of identity and was instmcted by the U.S. Immigration and Namalization Service in Los Angeles to get her pa~sportfrom the US. consulate in Vokohama. Iva arrived in Uokohama on July 24, where her relathes met

h d i t ~Traitors: Lord kinur-kinuralzd Tokyo Rose


her and took her to k k y o , h a , barcly able to speak Japanese and fully Americanized, fomd it difficult to adapt to Japanese life. Moreover, material shortages were an integral part of life in Japan. Iva clearly missed the United States and expressed, h r longixrg in letters and talks with her family On Sptember 8,1941, she applled for an American visa, So unhappy was Iva that in N8vembc.r 1941 she catled her fatha and told him that she wanted to return to the United. States right away. Her father cabled her a few days later, instructing her to board a Japanese-owned passellger ship that was scheduled to leave Yokohama on Dec e d e r 2. Tbe cable arrived one day before the departure oi the ship, but Iva was unable to get: ail the documents necessary before departure. However, it did not make much difference. The Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7,m d the ship that she wouM have taken to the U ~ ~ i t eStates d was imtructed to r e t m to Japan. The declaraticm of war n ? back to the Uni,ted States. meant that Iva was prevented b Like other Japanese Amdcan families, her family in the Urtited States was interned in a camp @er sick mother died in the process). Iva's mmey was running out, but her family in the United States codd nt:,longer help, Despite all this, she did try to find ways to return, thhkixlg that an internment carnp was better than remaining in Japan. Unforbnately, she sirtlply codd not afford a detoured sailing rnute to the Wnikcd States (she had to first go to a third country, for example, Tndja, and f r m tkere to the United States). For d l practicd purposes, Iva, without a U.S. passport and with close family ties in Japan, was stuck in Japan. She had to deal with Chc authorities to get ratianing cards, work, and other essentiafs for survival. Obviously, the attention of the Japanese security service was focused on her (as well as others in similar situations)" :In desperate need of income, she joined in June 1942 the Japanese na~ o n anews l agmry Her jot, was to m a ~ t oand r tr;mscribe hglish-language radio transmissions from such phces as Hawaii, Austraia, India, and China. There she met Felipe dxquino, an English speaking-man, five years younger than Iva, and the son of a Japanese mother and a Fortuguese father. A pacifist, he offered her emotional. support and idel~tification, Eventually the two were married. Despite her attempts to sumive, her inclrme was barely sufficient, and she was deprived of a food raforg her, on a starvation diet, to become tioning card. It did not take l o ~ ~ very sick, and she was consequently hospitalized for six weeks. fmnicalfy, on October 22, 1942, Americm officials notified the Swiss consulate &at Iva was entitled to a passport and that she could return to the United States. No indication exists that the Swiss mission ever contacted Iva with this news. Lookis~gfor a jab, she responded to an advertiselnellt in the Nippon Ti~~fes for employment as a part-tirne typist in English for Tokyo Radio,

21 6

h d i o Traitors: Lord kinur-kinuralzd Tokyo Ruse

and she was accepted for the job, Sometlme during November 1943, she was told that she was being cmsidered for a position as an amouncer for a radio program put together by P m . Although she was reluctanl at: firstt she was pressured, threatened, and eventually coerced into taking the job. She later rnet Australian major Charies Hugh Cousms, Britihborn and a graduate of Smdhurst, who was a radio personality hSydney radio before the war and very well known. Cousens had jofned the Australian a m y and had fou&t as a c of an infantry battalion in Malaya, He became a POW alter the fall of Singapore, Like Iva, he was sick with dysentery, Once the Japanese discovered who he was, they begm a long process of p ~ s s u r i n ghim into broadcastjng for them. He ~ s i s t e d at first but eventualjy a g ~ e d to transmit POW messages. That was only the beginning. Soon he was asked to do more. In June 49-42, Cousens was flown to -li,kyu. b e ' s 1990 work points out: that: Cwsens a p e d to transmit because he was planning to sabotage the transmissions from the inside, He began trmsmitting, at first irnitathg Japanese pronunciation. Eventually in August 3443, he chose Iva to join him as an amamlcer*Howe, agaiin, pohts out that this choice of an inexperienced announcer indicates the subversive intentions Cousens may have had and that h a was party- to. hccoriling to Howe, Cousens's choice of Xva meant that the trmsmissions were much less professional, effective, inffuential, or useful, Under Cousens" gguidmce, Iva begm transmitting on 'lbkyo Radio, and in March 1943, Tokyo Radio beg m its "Zero Hot~r,"in which Iva's voice became even more pronounced as Tokyo Rose, It is important to emphasize that there were other POWs who particjpafed in the transmissions. Howe's 1990 w r k makes it abundantly clear trhat Xva Toguri and Major Cousens (and others) were coerced into their roles. Once the war was over and 'Japansurrendered, U.S. journalists went to Japan searching br interesthg stories. Two of &em found Iva Tagufi and, after talking with her, constructed her as the Tokyo Rose. This exposure eventudly led to her arrest, trial, and impriso Iva was found g d t y of trcason, sents~cedto ten years i,n priso~z,and fhed $10,000. She was released after six years in prison, and onJanuaq 19, 1977, President Gerald Ford girnted her a pardon (on his last day in oflice). Mether Iva Taguri was the one m d only Tokyo Rose is a secmdary issue. Even if she was not the sole female transmitter, she did transmit propagmda fur the Japanese against the United States. However, Iva Toguri" sadions are not equivalent to those of Willim Joyce. Whezl the war began, she was trapped in Japan against her will.. She did nut identify at afl with Japan, was coerced into broadcasting, and-if one is to trust her (and Couf.;ensfs)account-the &erlion was to sabotage such transmissions by makhg them funny and discreditable.

h d i t ~Traitors: Lord kinur-kinuralzd Tokyo Rose


The fact was that Iva, born American and feeling American, transmitted propaganda with the purpose of demoratizitlg American soldiers. Were her transmissions successful? 'This is a difficdt question. From Ihe available anecdstes, it is possible to conclude that the transmissions did not seem to affect soldiers in the battlefields. Did she have a choice? She may have, to some extent, but one needs to remelnber the context in which she operated; one of those choices was starvation. Howe (1.990) asserts that her behavior can be thwght of as ~semblingthe mentality in nt.Bridge on the Rimr Kruai. The answer is not simple. One cannot state that, like Williitm foyce, she willjngiy conspired against the United States. Her actions were motivated Zly coercion, starvation, and fear. Does this make her less of a traitor? That she was coerced into broadcasting certainly makes her offense liglnter. Did she violate trust and loyalty? As an American citizen, a d furthermore, one who loved her life in the United States, the answer is that she indeed violated the trust and loyalty expected of a citizen-tmst and loyalty that, by her own accounts, she felt very strmgly about. es individuals who 'The case involvi-ng Iva Toguri raises i s s ~ ~col~cemhg are forced to collaborate with an opponent of their country. n r o u g h such collaboration, thry may be able to minhnize damage or slrbvert the enemfxfforts. However, as we saw in the cases of cdaboration in Ewrope, choosing this line of behavior is opting to walk a very narrow and slippery tightrope. Some tangible gains may be made in the short run, but such behavior rmains moralfy questionable afterward and is open to contradictory interpretations. The basic reason is that such behavior always involves manipulation, deceit, concealment, and secrecy. Those choosing collaboration must take into cansideration that such courses of action have a very high probabjlily of being interpreted in a very unfavorable light. Cases such as Sacha Anderson (see Chapter 3) and Harold C& (see Chapter 5) illustrate how mmipulation, double meal7ings' steallh, and dishonesty pervade the d.ouble g a m of collaboration and underscore the difficulty of maintaining moral boundaries when such a course is chosen.

Concluding Discussion The two "radio traitors" we focused on in this chapter illustrate some important points. 'lb begin with, they were both ~ g a r d e das traitors. It is not too difficult to show that, structurally, in both cases violations of both trust and loyalty led to that judgment. However, closer examination sf the moral content of the cases reveals that the reality was much more complex. Iva Tuguri and William Joyce are twn very different cases,


h d i o Traitors: Lord kinur-kinuralzd Tokyo Ruse

Jayce developed an early affinitJi for fascist ideologies. He was not i t m a t to Nazism was given freely forced to join Nazi Gemany; his co and he elnbraced it enthusiastically becausc it provided him a compatible political, social, and personal identity. Indeed, he wanted Britain to become anothrr Nazi state. Much like Qlrisling and Degrelle, he did not "collaborate" with the Nazis. He saw himseli as part of Nal.jonal Socialism and dedicated hhself to the Nazi cause. As pointed out earlier, Joyce never hid his sympathies; he wanted to realize his dream of a Nazi Britain. 1111 this respect, the questio~~ of Joyce's citizenship is irrelevant"Joyce's idetllify was that of a Nazi, and. his actions conformed to his identity From a British-hmerican point of view; he wa~;irtdeed a traitor. Joyce even concrcded this in his book. In strwtural terms fm all points of view, k violated the tmst m d loyalty rclquised of him to the Angto-American symbolic moral universe. In terms of content, the Nazis did not see him as a traitor because they thought that his move was morally jtrstified, A nanNazi examination of the way in which bis trcasm was committed (publicly) and its content leads one to cclnclude that Joyce elected to identify hhself with the morally wrong. Thus, we have here an ilfustration for the fieorctical argument prctsented in the first chapters of the book-a structural betrayal, but one that is interpted differently in varied contextti. Iva Toguri presents a difierent case altogethec Clearlyr she was forced into the role of Tokyo Rose and never developed a Japanese identity or identified with Japan" World War 11 moral and political views. But she did violale the trust and loyaify to her country-the United States. Mowever, given the situation that she was trapped in, what real choices did she have? In other W&, Togufi faced m m or less the same choices that many European colla,horators faced. Thus, the structural mirrors reflecting the image of traitor for both 'Tbglari and foyce hide a complex reality and conterct in whjch they both can be llndcrstood as vhlating s o m f o r m of trust and loHty. In that respect, the universal structuse of betrayal exists in both cases, However, when we examine the circumstances of those breaches, their content, and hocv they were constructed, the label ol treason becoms jnterprctively problematic,

Ezra Pound and Knut Hamsun

Intellectual support fur the Nazi cause is an inte~stingissue. Two of the most pmmi~~ent literary men of thr cenbry lent open and public support to the Nazi cause-Ezra Pound and Knut Hamsun. In this chapter, we shall explore the case of Pound and, more briefly, that of Hamsun. It is quite significant that after World War 11 ended, both men wercl. diaposed by professionals as %Mering from some b r m of "mental ilhess-"

Ezra Paund Ezra Pound, m e of the most distinguished Wentieth-century American poets, played a morally questionable role before and during World War E. His anti-Semitism and disenchantment:were an o(d story, long before the war, Indeed Selwyn pojnts out that ""some of his most famous lines from NZLgh Selzuyn Matihcrly had denounced the futility of figbting Germanyf"' Pound was born inMaiZey, Idaho, on C)ctober 30,188,4, and raised inI"lyncote (clme to Philadelphia). He graduated from Hamilton CoUege in 1905 md. f ~ s h e his d M.A. degree at the University of sylvania in 19116. WUInilng a fellowship inthe samcl yerar, he kfP the United Statc-.sto go to Europe to study Romance lanf~uage. Howwer, his feilowrjhip was termhated after only seven months, m d he had to return. l?e next took a teaching positinn at Wabast-r P~sbyterianCo:[lcge in fndima (3903, but it did n d take stornny Pound more than a few months to deride to leave again for a caeer as a poet in Europe. h3 1908 he arrived. again in Europe, this tirng in Gibraltar, and began to tmvd (coverimg large d.istmces by w a h g ) , sczttlh~geventwally inVenice. It did not take Pound long to enter and become part of literary circles in diBerclnt cities across Europe and in London, &rhg 1924, he m d his wife f?(Dsra&y; whom he married in 1914) segled in RapaUo, Italy where he was to stay for quite same t h e .

During these years, Pound" main activit-y was focused on promoting several young titerary figures, but he was also producing bis mwork.2 h Rapallo, Pound focused on. his labyrinthian life-work, the cantos, a kind of a joul-ney thrc~ughthe story of mankind.. . . In cantos XIV-XV, Pc>und directly attacked war prc>fiteers, high finance, politicians and imperialists alike, as well as all liars, orators and preachers. Because many banks were owned and managed by Jews, Pound developed a blind hatred of them."

:111 April 3939, Pound visited the United States, hoping to meet President Roosevelt, He wanted to persuade him not to get the United States involved in mother European war, but the president wouXd not see him. The trip was a part of a significant personal effort by Pound tcr lobby h m y way he could to prevent the United States from entering the war in Europe. X n letters he wrote that the Jews were responsible fnr the war, Pound" version was fiat the war benefited the Jews because it enabled them to take cmtrol of the metals market. Pound decided. to stay in IZapallo when the W t e d States joined the war effort agaiz~stNazi G e r m y . From the start of the war, when Italy still held "non-belligerent" "status, Pound canvassed Italian radio officials to let him go on the air to address the American people. Eventuallyl beginning on 23 January 1941, he was given a ten-minute slot every three days in the ""American Hour." This marked the beginning of an unprecedented one-man peace movement. To r(r?cc>rdhis talks, Pound had to travel from RapalIo to the Italian capital. For each broadcast he was paid the equivalent of fifteen dollars. In his broadcasts, Pound blasted the "money hungry" Americans for sending aid to Britain, warned against the cost of intervention in terms of lives and blood: "For God's sake, don? send your boys over here to die h r the Shell oil company and the Jewish war profiteers," He blamed the Jews for most of the wars in history; and held fc~rthon just about anything that popped into his mind."

Pound did fiis hest to support fascist Italy's war effort, as he felt cornfortable with that fascism.' mough he did not give up his Americsln citizmship, he nevertheless preachrd agair7st his country's policy siding with i t s enemies, in the midst of a war. As Ihe wm progressed, he focused more and more on wbat be saw as the ""communjst m.c.nace,"'h Although Pound's actiwity was problematic before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the declarat.ion of war by the United States, i t s treasonable naturc became obvious after that declaration of war. Had Pound g k m up his U,$,

cit.izenshlp, or kept quiet after Pearl Harbor, his activities might have been overlooked. After all, the U.S. declaration of war (followed by Hitler's declaration of war on the United States) drew very sharp m d clear moral bmndaries between the tvvo sides, Pound made his choice, FXe preferred to bust fascism and to be disloyai to the Idnited Stata and the Allies. Three days after Pearl Harbor, Pound resumed the transmission of anti-U.S. and anti-Semitic propaganda. In his transmissions, he continued to attack his home country in a most vicious way.' For example, here is what he said on Febnaary 14,1942: "That any Jew in the White Housc shodd sezzd American kids to die for the private h ~ t e ~ soft sthe scum of the English earth . . . and the still bwer dregs of the Levanthe . . . '"" Moreover, Pound sought out. and corresponded with another f m o u s ""radio traitoru-Lord Maw-Haw. Although Wliarn Joyce" responses to Poland were s o m e h a t reserved, Pound wrote Joyee long and detailed letters. And although Pound continuously solicited Joyce's responses and wrote to him frequently, Joyce-for all. practical purpose+politely ignored this flood. However, neither forgot to sign their letters with the "Heil Hitler" eerrdhg.9 On July 26, 1943, "'a federal grand jury in Washington FRdieted Ezra Pound . . . on charges of wartime treason.'Tounnd's respmse to these charges is instructive. Mc "received the news with disbelief, and sent a letter to Washington arguing that the simple fact that someone expresses his perstrnal views coutd not possibly be taken as evidence of treason.'""'" Fobwing the Allied invasion of Italy and the surrmder of the Nazi a m y in Italy on May 2, 1945, a few partisans located Pound, captured him, and gave him to the U.S. counterintelligence unit in Genoa-1' Pound was arrested azd held in a military prison near Pisa, He was the11 sixty years old, His health, and perhaps his psychological well-being, was failing. The physical conditions of his imprisonment werc;, difficult. Flrr example, he was kept in isolation; his belt and laces were taken away; there were guards present around the clock; and the lights were never shut off. After being exposed to these cmditims .for three weeks, Pomd began to complai,n &out nightmares and hallucin&ion,seHe lost both hjs appetite and some weight. A local psychiatrist who examined him did not h d any cause to diagnose him as mtlntalv ill but ~commendedtransferring the pro-Nazi poet to the sick bay. There, Pound continued his work m the Canlos.12

h November 1945, Pound was put on an a*lane and sent to the United States. Although he was charged with treason and the chances for a co~~viction wem, a well-publidzed trial was considssed a problematic situation, A wetl-hown poet kvho bad idmtikd publicly with fascism a long time befosc3 the war and who had broadcast propaganda from Itdy seerned like a possibly exploshe mix. The day was saved by same mental heal&

proiessionals who suggested that Pound"s experience in prison may have made him mentally mbalmced and &erefore unlit to stmd trial, Julien Cornell, who was Found's lawyer, wrote a book (1966) &out Ihe "trial." He admits that the charge of t ~ a s o nagainst Pound was made because of Bound's Italian radio tra~~smissisns, which aided m d comforted the enemy at some very critical nrrome~~ts of the war for the Allies" Hawever, he claims that Pound"s own response to the charge of treason was that "the trt?ason was in the White House, not in Rapallo."JVRefore any trial into the nature of the accusations could actually begin, Pound's lawyer chose a drtfense that would rest in showing that Pound was mentally ill and, hence, unfit to stmd trial. If Cornelf could get his client certified as "insane," the embarrassmnt of trying the famous poet w u l d be avoided, as well as the danger of his being declared a traitcrr m d possibly shot as such. Mtbougb the stigma of nrrad~zessis perhaps not m y better thm that of badness, it would absolve Pound of responsibility for his dubious wartime actions; but most irnportant of all, it would get Pound out of the cltanger zme of a potential death sente~~ce. To accomplish this goal, Cornell demnnded that the issue of Poundfs smiw be settled. The court agreed, Thus, four psychiatrists were assiped to examine Pound. "Ilhree were appoifited by the government: Dr. M a i m King (age fifty-six), Dr. Jaseph I,. Gilbert (age fifty-five), and Dr. Winfred Overholster (age fifty-one); one was appointed by the defense: Dr. Wendell Muncie (age forty-eight), Having examined Bound, these four psychiatrists concluded that hc. was "insane and unfit to stand trial." They submitted their report to the court on Clecenber 14,1945. In it they wrote the following: In our opinion, with advancing years his personality, for many years abnormal, has undergone further distortion to the extent that he is now suffering from a paranoid state which renders him mentally unfit, . . . He is. . . insane and mentally udit for trial, and i s in need of care in a mental hurjpital.14

'This unanimorls report left very little choice for the jury and the judge, The ""tia1" eended on February 13, 1946, when the federal jury accepted the psychiatrists' judgment and concluded that Pound was "mentdy msound" and "was mfit to stand trial-''IS One must note that the onXy issue in this pmcedure, which Cornell refers to as a "trial," was whether Ezra Pound was fit to stand trial, that is, m issue of sanity This, amazingly does not prevel~tCome1I from giving the impression that the= actually was a trial and from stating that Pound was not found guilty because his crime was never proven, One needs to read this outrageous statement a k w times to understmd this techical

hocus pocus, In any event, judge Law, who presided over the sanity procedure, sent Pound to St. Elizabeth's Hospital for the mentally ill. As Cole's seviebv (1983)notes, Pownd had frequently participated in Italy" shortwave broadcasts to North America, making speeches that were not only full of praise ECIX" MussoJiinX and Hitler but outspokmly opposed to Axnrtrica" wartime purposes and its political leadership, The Constitution defines treason as ""levying war" on the United States or "ggiing aid and comfort" to its enemies, and Pound certainly did the latter in his broadcasts.

It thus seems fairly reasonable to assulne that had bumd been tried, he would have been convicted of treason. Structurally, there can be little doubt that Pound was a traitor. P o n d , a citizern of the Unitccf St.ates, chose to stay i.n Italy during the war because he sided with Italy against the United States, and he willingly made radio transmissions for Italy sairrst his home country. He violated the trust of his country and was most certabnly dissloyasl. However, from a moral point of view, one must note that Pound" pro-fascist and. antiSemitic views had been established much earlier. He did not side with .fascist Itdy out of convenience or some form of tangjt?le inducement or pressure. Pound seems to have genuinely believed in the fascist and Nazi ideology In this sense, he resembles the ""patriotictraitors" &scribed by Littlejoh (1972). Those interested in how the psychiatric evaluation was made and what Pound did at St. Elizabeth" s i l l find the answers in Torrey's instructive (1984) work. A. psychiatrist at St. Elizabeth's Hospital, Torrey was in. a strategic position to evaluate the situation, He states, very clearly, that Pound was never mentally ill m d that he continued to work durilng all of his stay at the hnsgitaL Torrey documents, in detail, the collaboration between Pound and the psychiatrists and how they created the deception that P o d war; crazy. Having examined Pound's wartime activities, Torrey believes that these activities should be seen as treason.lWhat Cornell refers to as the "trial," Torrey refers to as the "non-trial.""" Torrey states that the psychiatrists who examined Pound felt that thcy saved thc great poet frm sncial degradation and possihly a very harsh sentence. Furthermore, according to Torrey, Pound cooperated fully in this charade and did his best ta give a ""show" that would persuade the psychiatrists that he was insane.18 Torrey confirms that Cornell" skategy was very successful. Pound was not branded as a traitor, he was able to continue his work, and those who knew him did not think for a minute he was crazy. Torrey found Pound to be ecwntric,

Pound gives ti~efnscisfs a l ~ t eOM a v i v ~ in l NtzpEes on ftrly 9, 3958, after being relmsedfrom flze mental Fsospital. SOUEKE: E. Fufkr.Torrey, The Roots of Treaso)n: Ezra Pound and the Sc?cret of St. Elizabeth (Mew York:McGraw-Hill, 49841. Photogmyh nttribtrted to Wide World Photos.

racially bigoted, and rather oblivious to social norms, but he felt that Pound was defhnitely not crazy During Pound" stay at St. Elizabeth", he expressed consistent fascist tendencies, praised Mussolini,lp and continued with his extreme Found was visited daily by his wife, Dorothy- Many literary fsjcnds visited. him as well, and he managed to conduct an extensive correspondence. 7"he lobby for Pound's release was meanwhfte g a h h g momentum. Ernest Herningwmy's ccrommexrt after receiving the 1954 Nobel Prize for literature that indeed it was Ezra Pound who deserved the prize helped, too. The pressure achicved its desired result, and at the age of seventy-two, in April 1958, Pound was released, having never been put on trial for trcason, X n June of the same year, he and his wife left tl-re W t e d States for Brunnertburg in South Tyrol. Pound died on Pllovemher lit 11972, at the age of eighty-severn in Venice, fourteen years after his release f mm. St. Elizabeth" Hospital.21

It is noteworthyf and sjgnificant, that the winner of the Nobel Prize for fiterature in 1920, the Norwegian author Knut Hamsun (described by many as a literary giant), was also a Nazi sympathizer. Mamsun was born on August 4,1859. He had had a harsh childhood and was employed as an occasional worker. He traveled throughout the Wllited States, t a h g on several diBerent jobs. In 1890 his novel Hu~zgtrappeared (translded into German in 1891) and was followed by more stories, H e won the 1920 Nobel Prize fur liLerature for his masterpiece, The Cmztillz q f tlzr Soil (published in 1917and trmslated into German ir7 1918).Between 1927 m d 1933, H m s u n produced the Vagabo~~d Trilogy Hamsm's work displays some unmistakable characteristics: an appreciation of the simple l&, a closeness to nabre, and a strong tone of anti-hericm and mtitechnological civilization. Hmsun's expressed positims were consistently hostile to both Britain and the United States. He didiked parliamntav mefiods of government and what he defhed as "a lack of cult-ure" irr the United States. Also, the process of jndustrializ&ion was not to Hantsw~'s likhg, and he was all hfavor of a rural way of life. These themes made Hamsun's work quite popular among Hitler's youth movement. Hamsun was not indifferent to Ger~nanNational Socialism and did not hide his view that he saw in Nazism an antidote to Angldmerican materialism. 'l-his, naturally and inevitably, led hirn to Qui,sling and his fascist party.22 Me jOined Quisling's politicd cause, gave him a solid endorsement (October 17,1936), and was thus the most distinguished individual to suyport that Ntrrwegian Nazi. In endorsing Quisling, Hamsun exclaimed, "If I had ten votes, he [Quisting] would receive them."'"?.Although Hamsun joined Quisljng rather early, he remained committed to Quisling even during some difficult times artd relused to break away from him, despite requests to do so." bllowing the German invasion and occupation of Norway (l940), Hamsun had. no ksitation in calfhg upon Norwegians to teminate resistance because, like Q~zisling,he believed that Norway had an advantaged position in a Nazi-ruled Europe, Hamsun was accepted for an i~~terview by Hitler (in Vienna in 1943) and expressed open s~tpporf.for him, He urged Hitler to rclmove the Nazi commissioner of Norway-Terboven-but Hitler was not moved by his appeal. Terboven serwed his purposes, ir-t spirit and in practice, much better than either Halns~tnor atisling ever could.2Wespit.e his d,isappoi.ntment in the meeting with the fGhrer, his public suppwt for Hitler did not waver.26 Goebbels-the mird Reich masMareover, Hamsun was hosted by B. ter pmpagandist-in his Berlin home on Map 13, 1943. Hamsun and

Goebbels seemed to adrnire each other and apparently enjoyed each other's company. After Hitler% suicide, Harnsun c ~ a t r t dan emotional eulogy irt his me1~0ry.27 Halmsun, clearly, went hrther in suppwthg Nazism than Pound. Both men, however, felt committed to an ideology that, to them, made sense, descrjbed the kind of world they wanled to live in, and set acceptable moral and political boundaries :It is interesting to note that Hamsun, like E m P a d , was subected to p9Y"biatric examin,at.ions after the war. Professor Gabriel Langfeldt, a leading Norwegian psychiatrist, diagnosed him as not responsibje enough to stand trial on charges of tmascm, Based on this diagnosis, t-he Pllorwegian authorities "concluded that H m s u n was not mentally competent to be prosecuted. Tbe outcome of this case, however, was that the novetist at the age of ninety mustert-d his 'pemanently impaked mental faez~lties'to write his final mast.erpiece, part fiction and part autobiography, in whirh he attacked 131: Langfeldt."= Hamsun, it must be noted, reb e d to be declared mentally ill and was fully p p a r e d to pay for his wartime activities,2i" Nevertheless, Hamsun was denomced and fined after the war for his fi.iendliness toward Germany. He had publiciy suppclrted t-he Nazis, had written articles for them,and had helped recruit Norwegians for their cause. His version of his trial, On O~er~~ucrzrtn Paths, was published in 1949 (and translated h t o Germm in 1950)." This was his last book. It is interestkg to note that durhg his trial, Hamsun tried as best he cot~1dto mhimize bls connections with Nazi Germany and his support for Quisling and denied that he caused any real damage." lamsrtn died m Febntary 19, 1952" :It is worth noting that although Hamsun was the most pmmjnent Norwegian to publicly support t-he Nazi cause and Quisling, he was not the d y one. %c7 individmls as Kirsten Flagstad, hvodd-famous Wag~~erian soprano, and Christim Sindig, an eminent composer, were involved in similar activities-32

Concluding Discussion mere are several issues that require our attention at this point: The first is a puzzle; the second is the naturcl of the betrayal here, and the third is the processing of deviance in the cases of Pound arzd Hamsun. 'There is a puzzle behind the ""inte:Llectualbetrayal""of Ezra Pound and h u t Hamsun, B& Pound and Hamsun were famous and gifted literary men, a d so one wonders how these hcredibly fertile a d creative minds, so smsitive to h u m nuances and with such a powmfral control of language, c d d lend such s k m g support to totalitarian ideologies founded

on the opprclssion of the human spirit and the hatred of large collectives of humans. (r>f course, poets and authors are not i m u n e to overinflated egos or idiosyncratic or eccelztnic behavior. However, one asset they must possess is a sensitivity to the '"urnan condition," a mature perspective of the complexity of hulnan culture. It is difficult to understand how the works of Pomd and Hams~tncould have been created without this semitkity, sympathy, and compassion. ?i, illustrate just a l h i t e d sense of that power, I v o t e one oE Poland's short poems:

1 make a pact with you, Wait WhitmanI have detested you long enough. I come tcr you as a grown child Who has been a gig-headed father; 1 am old enough now to make friends. It was you that broke the new womd, Now is a time for carving. We have one sap and one r o ~ t Let there be commerce between use3"

:In this poem m e can see animosities oi the past, ambivalence, reconciliation, remorse, and hope for a "otter future.. Pound's alignment with fascrisln and Nazisxn does not fit with, the sensitivity rcveded here. Coles's 4983 review csxpressts a similar amazement at this migma. Pound's and Hamsun's affinity f o r fascism and Nazism is part of a larger puzzle. Many intellectraals have aligned themselves with questionable characters and oppressive ideologies. At issue is whether an intellectual% ppoliticd ideology shodd play a part in our attihtk t o w 4 his or her work, and il so, how. The deba.t-e =quires a morall judgment, but it need not detract from the admiration, or criticism, of the works of the person in question. 7'he failure to cletect the evil nat-ure of fascism and Nazisxn by two such gifted individuals is an enigma, but it also reqrrires a moral judlgment of these two intcflech;lals who are viewed by many as I;iants of the human spirit-bound, perhaps, more so than Hamsun.3-e must co~zcedethat these two great men made a choice. No one fnrced their hand. They frtzely elected to side with fascism and Nazism a long time before. the war began. Regardless of the quality of their work, this was-first and foremost-a moral choice. ?'he debate of L\rhe&er Pound's work should be separated from his politicai and moral views was rcignited in t 999. A repctrt by Dinitia SmiCh in the New York Times (October 23) informed readers that the dean of the

Cathedral of St. John the D i v i n e t h e Very Reverend Harry S. Pritchett fr.--overruled a decision by a group of promii~entAmerican writers to honor Ezra Pound wiCh a place h the Poets' Corner of the eathedtd. Me justified. his decision by stating that Pound" destructke anti-Semitic writings and broadcasts from fascist Italy duriw World War II caused too much pain, Reverend Pritchett's decision was clearly a moral judgment. Structmrally, the nature of treason in Pound.'s and Hamsuds acts is clear. They violated the trust invested in them by free democratically elected governments and violated thcir loyalty to these regin?es. In, other wmds, Pound and Hamsun stood up against the sovereigty and interests of their countries, as d e h e d by drrmocratically elected gove However, one must co11cede that their own views were not brery sympathetic to democracyf and they were drawn to the totalitarian and repressive ideolngies represented by Hitler and Mussofini. 11% this sense, they rem i n e d faithful to their views, much Eke other European collaborators mentioned eadier, such as Quisling, Mussert, and Joyce. Once again we see how the stmcture of betrayal materializes, and how its moraf cmtent and context can be interpreted differe~~tly. Finaily! the way in, which social control agencies processed the deviance presented by Pound and Hamsun is similar. Both were discredited as mentally ill- Thus, one codd infer that they w r e not respmsible for their wartime activities, which, through this r a t i d e , become invalidated-a rather ad hominem escape route. ObviousT~the cmstmdion of Pound and Mamsun as irrespmsibly '"il'bmakes one qztestior?the validity of this judgnent. fudging by Fuller Torrey's 1984 work, the validity of Pound's "illness"' is rather questionable. An added note here must be focused on the advantages m d disadvmtages of viewjng both Pound and FXamsun through a medlcaj prism rather than through a moral one. I must confess that, for rt;asons stated in Chapter 1,I believe that the moral prism is mare valid in these cases. The political choices of Pound and Hamsun must be judged for what they were-as moral decisions. 'That choice, during MiiJrld War E, irnplied an aff311ity with fascism andim Nazism. That mord preference needs to be assessed from a moral point of view, C)ne can and should expect such gifted individuals to he more cornpassimate than to identify with worldviews that are extreme, racist, full of hatrd, shplistic, and militaristic. The impjication oi this stand to their works is a different, but related, issue. Would it be easier to evaluate P o n d " s d Hamsun" works if we werc to assume that they were mcntally ill rat,her than morally wrong, or vice versa?

Edward VIII: A Traitor Monarch?

The Riddle The popular image of King Edtvard VIfl is primarily a romantic one.1 :It is of a popular king who p ~ f e r r e dlove to pctkver, MIho leit his role as the king of England in December 11936 in favor of livhg with the woman he fell in love with-Mrs. Walfis Warfield Shpson. Edward VlfX's story is m hstructive historical tale because of the crucial question of whetl-ter he was a traitor. :It has been virtually impossible to find direct and 'bfficial'\evidence of betrayal by Edward VIXf in the writtetn literature, Hourever, some of the most import& aspects of the case have been concealed. Une needs to read the literature very careiully to h d those telltale bits and pieces of information about a possibte treason. Hakvever, a London Channel 4 television program transmitted in 1995 and litled Secret. Lge: Edrvarit Wl-The Traitor Kirfg made it very clear that, in fact, Edward V111 was a traitor.2 'The Channel 4 program indicated that new information supported their view that Edward V111 was a traitor and that his affair with Mrs. Simpson was used by politicians as a face-saving justification for yartking him out of his throne. The progran? impljed that this new i n f m t i o n was concealed by botk the British governmnt and the royal family in order to prevent a ccllossal embarrassment. Winston Churchiff,M;hc, apparently h e w about Edward VflZ's treacherous actions, preferred not to disclose the facts to the public for the same reason, and because he was deepfy cmvinced of the vitality and necessity of the mmarchy. Brown notes that: Churchill was determi,ned to ""clip the tongue and hobble Ihe feet of . . . the Duke of Windsor.""" Thus, we are dealing with two stories here. The first has to do with the factual basis for the claim that Edward V111 was a traitor. The secmd has to do with the possibfe cover-up of m y traces of treason on part of Ed-

ward Wlff. In the following narrative, I have tried to integrate several sources to examine the pcwsible betmyal by Kirng Edward W. It is importanl to note that Ch-44 was not the first to question the behavior of Edward VIII (later Duke of Windsor). Quite a lfew authors and researchers have examined, in more or less direct w a p , the same issue.%at the Channel 4 program did was to clarify and focus many of the questions in such a m er that the viewer was left gasping at the old and new rt?velatic,ns. And yet confirming the informatim provided by Charnel. 4 in other sources is difficult and makes the claim that Edward VXIl was a traitor problematic. fndeed, sources confjrrn that Edward VIE behaved erratically and childishly, was irresponsible, c d d not be tnrsted with classified military information, and leaned rather strongly toward filscism and Hitlcr. These are troublesome qualities, but did that make hhn a traitor?

The Beginning Edward VZTI (Duke of Wir-rdsor, among other titles) was born Jzxlne 23, 1894, the eldest son (out of four) of George, Duke of York (who later became King George V) and Princess Mary of Teck (later Queen Mary). He b e c m e heir to the t h o n e in May 1930. He was tri\ined for the Royal Navy (3907-3911) and was commissioned in the army" G~renadier Guards after the beginning of World War I (August 6,3914). Edtvard had much df-ection and naturd sympa.t.hy fos Germany His molf.ler's family had deep roots h Germany, m d he spent much time there. Germm was also a language he liked and felt comfortable with. 'The outbreak of World War I h 1914 meant that Edward had to make some tau@ decisions. Although he was prevented from being placed in an actual combat role, it seems that whatever duties he was assifled to he performed in an acceptable manner. After the war ended, he to;red extensively the areas controlled by the British Empire, He was a hmdsome and popular king in the making. FatioLving the iline?js of his fatber fn 1928, his interest h national i s s ~ ~ grew. es In the early 1930s' his interest and hvoZvement htrying to find solutions for the memployed increased significantly :His influence was beneficial, and his popularity in the e d y 1930s soared. h 1930 Edcvard was given Fort Belvedere by f i g George V, There he dcveloped, the art of gardenkg m d harbored a social circle of friends. Althoug the American ambassador told Roosevelt that Edward was "surrounded by a pro-German caba1,'"iegler claims that there is scant evidence for this," &ring this time, Edward developed a distaste fnr royal rituais and had several affairs with married women."hese indiscretions were never publicized, but his assistant private secretary-Sir Man Lascdes, ap-

pointed at the end of 1920-was distuhed by what he considered to be his hnmoral behavior (and wrote about it to his wife). Edward" conthued irresponsible behavior caused their relationship to deteriorate, and in 19127 Lascelles asked for an interview with Stanley BaIdwin, then the prime mhister, ~ g a r d h the ~ g issue. )?e told Baldwin about the deteriorating morality of Edward and added that "the Heir Apparent, in his unbridled pursrait of wine and women, and whatever setfish whim occupied hhn at tbe mommt, was rapidly going to the devil, and untess he meneied his ways, would s o m become no fit wearer of the British Crown." Baldwin agreed with hirn.7 In 1930 the futum king met the ambitious and outspoken Mrs. 5impson, an acquaintance that would prove fateful. Wallis TNasfield Simpsm was divorced from a U.S. Navy lieutenant in 1927 and married Ernest Simpson in 1928. The couple were part of the prince's social circle of hierzds. It so happened that by 7,934 the prince was maclify in Love with Mrs. Simpson. However, King Georfye V died. (January 20,1936) beiore the prince could discuss the matter with him. By I933 Wil.ler had risen to power inQrmany Edward felt that Hitler's performance with the German economy was outstanding; it appeared that he had Led Germany out of economic d e p ~ s s i o nand pmvided employment to the German masses. Edward became convinced that England should support Hitler byf among otlner things, g i v h ~ ghim a friendly and congratulatory hand. Also, the memories of the horrors of World War I werc stit very fresh, and the desire to avoid a replay of such a calamity must have played a, strung role h Edward"s conciliatory mood toward Hitler. He chose to ignortr the potential meaning of t-iitler's massive prog r m of rearming Germany and its obvious implications..In fact, hJune 1935, in a speech to the RoyaX British Legion, the prince advocated an alliance betwen Germany and Britain. The speech was very well received in Germany.8 Edward's father, King George V: was furious. He accused his son of behaving in an unconstitutional way because he was involving hhnself in foreign affairs and making pro-German statements. More than one source states that shortly before his death, the ailing king nokd that once he was dead, his successor son would ruin himself with;isl. a year.' Actually, it took Edward much less than a year to fulfil1 his fatherfs prophecy It should. be noted that British appeasement toward Germany in the 1930s had deep roots.10 Moreover, facism did win some genuine converts.. For example, a rdhcr famotls wrnber of the Kritisb aistcxsacyUnity Mitford-was an admirer of Hitler and Nazism.ll Britaisl also had a fascist movement, Mxhicf"lried to win conver-ts.72 Edward's reaction to his father 'S iihess and death Xed to the fhal break with Lascelles. The news of King George W's grave condition reached his

son while he was on a safasi trip in Soutfi. Africa. His reaction was disbelief, and he viewed thc. news as an ""electiondodge of old R a l d ~ i n " ~ (Rradfnrd 1989:167).Accordjng to LascelSes: Then for the first and only time in our association, I last my temper with him. "SSir," "aid, "the king of England is dying; and i f that means no>thing to you, it means a great deal to us." He looked at me;?,went out without a tzrord, and spent the remainder of the evening in the successful seduction af a Mrs. Barnes, wife of the lojcal Commissioner=He told me so himself next morning.

Despite a good start in late 1920, Z,ascelfes became so disillusioned with E d w d that he resigned about eight years later, En 1935 he was asked to rejoin Edward's entourage-which he reluctantly did. Both he and Baldwin felt that the prince was childljke and som&ow did not matlare.l"

Edward VIII as King Followirtg the death of King Gcorge V, Edward. Vn3 became king on January 20,3936. Edward Vlll's hehavior was not that etipectc-rd from a king.15 Moreover, as he began to exercise his new role, he began to try to persuade the royd family to accept Mrs. Simpson. At that time, she was involved in securing a divorce horn her husband and had in fact ~ c e i v e da p ~ h i n a r ydecrcle of djvorce on October 27, 1936. Hokvever, Edward"s attempts in this regard. were met with fierce resistance. The idea of having a foreiper as the king's wife was very problematic. At King George V's funeral, Charles Edward (uncle of Edward VlfI), Duke of Saxe-Coburg and Gotfia, an overt pro-Nazi and a member in the Nazi Party (as well as a smior officer in the S.A.), showed up in a Nazi unifnrm.1Woreover, Coburg wrote a detailed rcport to Hitler and bachim von :Rjbbentrop (German ambassador at large) relating that he had had Imglthy and frank discussicrns with Eciward Wll, in which the kix~gtold him that "an alliance Germmy-Britain is . . . an urgelzt necessity and a guiding prirzciQle fnr British foreign policy"l7 Alt%roughsome cast douht on the accuracy of Coburg's report, he did point out that Edward Vlfl saw a German-British alliance as someirhing important and desirable. The issue of Edward VIIX meeting Hitler also canne up, and the new king certainly expressed his wish to meet the fiihrer, using Ccrburg as a mediator. Edward Vlfl was thus giving clear signals of his ktentio~zto play an active role in British foreign policy. Cohurg, who was an enthusiastic Nazi sympathiza, did not hesitate to pass the new king's preferences on to Berlin.18

The Nazis took these reports very seriously, and Ribbentsop noted that he "was convinced Edward V111 was 'a kind of English National Socialist, with strong concern for the social. problems of his country and w r m sympathy for an tmderstanding with Germany."'lg Although the new king was advised against making pobtical statements, this warning was apparently ignored, Costello states that Edward VllI most certainly wanted to develop directly or infiuence indirectly, foreign policy toward. Nazi Germany20 mamas states that Hitler was cmcerned about a new war wi& Britah and tried repeatedly, through various dipiomatic channels, to initiate contacts with the British royal family in order to forge some sort sf m understanding or alfia~cewith Britah." l e memories of the terrible hulnan lass during World VV;ar I underlay the ieelings of many British citizens that a new war had to be averted, perhaps at any cost. This sentiment explains, at least in part, what has become known as the "appeaselse~~t" policy of the 1930s. mamas poislts out that direct diplomatic channels between Ed\Nard W11 and the Nazis wem kept open through several channels (hcludhg Shpson), It is instructive to look at mother relevmt report: Sir Orme Sargent of the Foreign Office at the end of 1936 recorded a conversatiron in which he was told of Ribbentrap's belief that the real reason far the abdicatic~nwas neither maral nor ccjnstitutional but political: "Mr. Baldwin's real motive was . . . to defeat those Germanophile Ecx-ces which had been working through Mrs, Simpsrrm and the late King with the object of reversing the present British palicy and bringing about an Angla-German dktente."" Hitler also was said to be very distressed by the abdication, ""since he had looked upon the late King as a man after his own heart and one who understood the FGhrer-prinzip and was ready I-0 introduce it into his country."".. . In December 1936 the German Ambassador was personally instructed by Hitler to do all he could to prevent the abdication.2'

Ziegler is quick to pojnt out that the G e r m n Foreign Office was cornpletely misguided about hterpreting Edward VlX3" views and intentions. t?r>wever,even f r m this report it is clear that at the very least Mrs. Simpson was a Nazi sympathizer, as her frequent visits to the German ernbassy indicate. It may be that the Nazis we= misguided about the magnihtete and cltepth of EdLvard Vfll's sympathies, but not about their naturo or direction. Xn fact, Ziegler notes that German mbassadors to Britain in the early 1930s we= instructed to "cultivate him" and that the future lcing (then the Prince of Wales) clearly expressed p r o - G e r m views.23 Moreover, German reactions to the October 1937 visit of King Edward Vllf to

Germany were very positive, and &ss, Goering, and Ribbentrop very much hoped ""t see Edward VXIX remain cm the throne.""24 In March 1936, Hitler took quite a risk when he decided to occupy the dedlitarized mineland.2i This occupation was a blatant violation of pacts Germany signed. What was Edward VI1l"s reaction to Hit:ter%entry into the m h e l m d ? He gwe clear and urnpivocal support for a ""120 reaction" response and to appeasement. AIbert Speer recatls that m March 7, 1936-the day German troops marched into the demilitarized mineland-Hitler rode a special evening train to Munich, anxiously awaiting reports of other countries9eactions to his iwasion, "At one station a message was handed into the car. Hitler sighed with relief: 'At last! The King of England will not intervet~e,He is keeping his promise. That means that it can all go well."Qb One is feft wmderitlg, What promise was Hitler referring to? When was it made? Regardfess of the king's actual ability to hffucnce the governmetnt, there is little doubt that his voice carried. at least sople weight. Speer is quick to poirrt out that any "military intervention would have probably required the King's approval," and howing that the kjng of England was, at the minimal level, an appeaser wantirrg a "peaceful s o l u t i d b o s t certahly lifted Hitler 's mood.27 Brown is much blunter. He quotes Ambassador 1,eapold von Hoesch's telegram to Ribbentrap of March 11,15336, in which the ambassador wrote that he found much understmtjing for the Nazi point of view from the court m d that the cot~rtinstructed the gover ent that "no matter how the details of the affair are dealt with, cmplicatiom of a serious nature are. in no circ.umstances to be allo~vedto develop."% This message obviously hclped to calm the highest Nazi officials. 'Their peace of mind following Hitler" aggression ""was attributable to the influence of the King of E~~gland."'zWradford corroborates this prJint: "There is evidence . . . from captured G e r m docments that the King put presswe m the government against gohg to war over Germanfs take-over of the Rfiinelmd in March 1936."30 nounas asserts that Edward VfXI told German ambassador Leopold von Haesch directly that there would be no war as a result of the German agg~ssion.31'The act of passing ""highly sensitive military information, obtaked by virtue of [the King's] privileged position, to a foreign pokver was nothixlg less than high treason.'"Z However, it must be remembered that the Britisboovernrnent at that time was not eager to go to war. Churchill, who advocated armed opposi,tion to the German move, m d his supporters were iabeled '"warmongers" by Chamberlain and Baldwin." However, even the pro-Edward VIZ1 bisrapher Ziegler pail"tts out of the %ineland, Edward VllE that folf0kvin.g the illegal ren^ritit.arizationtriton called von Hoesch m d told him: "bent for the P r h e Minister and Gave

him a piece of my mind. 1 told the old so-and-so that :I would, abdicate if he made war. There was a frightful scene. E;ut you needn't worry. There wonftbe a waref"4 :It becanne obviws that Edward. VIll wanted to express himself politically and was determined to do so. The king's political activity-in both content and structure-caused much cmcern. He was clearly out of line constitutionallyflintervening in matttlrs he should not bave; and he was sympathetic to Nazi Germany. As Braciford points out, the main issue was not whether the king was pro-German-many people in Britain were pro-German-but that he was acting in m uncmstituSional manner. On August 11,1936, Joachirn von Ribbclmtrop became the Geman ambassador to Great Britah.35 Evidently, Ribbentrap and Mrs. Shpson were close fricnds and spent a great deal of time togcrther." :It seems obvious now that Mrs. 5impmn was tellhg Ebbentmp what she must have heard from Edward Vlll (before and &er hc. became the Iking) about: his briefings from British prirne minister B a l h i n . Thus, Rtlbbentrog must have h o r n the content of the discussions in the British cabhet. As it became e-vide~~t that both Mrs. Simpson m d Edward VllX were leaning strongly toward N a z i Germany, Edward VIE was perceked more and more as a security risk, and the British f ~ r e i office p was withhdding certah dwuments from hh-37 As i w a s reveakd much later, during the spring and mmmer of 1936 a group of powerful and influential British dficials were unithg against Ednaward VliJ, because they felt that he was unfit to rule, The D&ion tions were consulted on whether they would accept Mrs. Sirmpson as queen, and the answer ~ c e i v e dwas a clear "no.'%liaecorclhg to Ch if was becoming obvious that the antipat-hy toward Mrs. Simpson eould be used to get rid of a very problematic king. By September 1936 Neville a m b e r l a i n agreed to the plan. Bradforcl points out that the anti-Bdtvard V111 conspiracy had also gahed some support the United States,3%nd the Whdsors themselves may have begun to lean toward, it, too. The oppmhnity was fast approaching. In October 193%Mrs. Sixnpson began formd divorce proceedings. So desperate were the eonspiraiors against E h & VfEIthat a m m r about a secret file ("the China dossier") was fabricated and circulated." The rumor implied that Mrs. Simpson had enjoyed an exotic sex life in the 19nls in connection with ltlxwious brothels in the East.4" Baldwin told EdLvard W11 that Mrs. Simpsm was unacceptable as queen to him, his governme~~t, the Dornhion nations, m d the British Empire. Edward VfIlseal-ched in vain for ways to bypass this problem.41 Since no solutim could be found to this romantic quagmfre, Edward made a choice: He gave up his position as king in order to remain wi& :Wlrs. Simpson, :Me submitted.his abdication on December 10,1936, Parlia-

mmt endorsed the ;instmment of abdication on December 11, and in a radio broadcast that evening, Edtvard explained that he fomd it fmporisible to act as king wiChout the szlpport of the woman he loved. He thercirfore chose love over power. His brother George V1 was appointed king. Edward VIZ1 reiped as king between January 20 and December 10,1936, a short period of eleven months. Edward left England that night for Austria, where he waited for Mrs. Simpson" divorce to become final. C)n June 3, 1937, Eclward and Mrs. Simpson were married at Cand4, France. No reprtlsentatives of the royal h i l y were present. George ZiI made Edward VIII the Duke of Whdsor and his wife the Duchess of Wiyrdsor, but he refused to allow her to use the title Her Royal Highness. Edward became very mgry and upset about this. :It is interesting to note Thornas% 1995 hypothetical scenario. What might have happened if Edward VIII had been king when Nazi G e m a n y in\Paded Poland in Spten-7ber 1939? It is possibl,e that such an opinionated king would have intervened in Britain" foreign pdicy and rehsed to go akng with the ultimatum given to Nazi Germany following that invasio~~, or refused ta later declare war on Nazi Germany That could have created a major constihntional crisis in Britairz: a cab-3net that was determined to go to war, and a king who refused to sanctim that move. Such a crisis, however, was averted when Edward abdicated the throne, A major tenet in Thornas" wmk is that Athough Edward, left England, he most certainly expected to reto the throne.lWoreover, the Nazis not only were interested in getting a pro-Nai.,i king hack cm the throne but were probably involved in plots to facilitate that event, Although Edward was happy with WaLiis, abdication created three central problems that were to haunt him for years ta c m e . First, his fi~zancial resources after abdkation were-in his own mhd-unsatisfactory. Second, he very desperately wmted Wallis Simgsm to be recognized as Her Royal Highnest;, in other wctsds, to receive the honor that he felt she deserved, but that honor had been rehsed. n i r d , he wmted to be involved in matters of state and may have expected to play an active part irr British diplomacy He was placed, however, in a very minor positim, and he fell that his wishes to be involved were, fur afl practical purposest ignored.43

Post-Abdication The whereabouts of the Duke of Whdsor during the period of World War 12 is an interesthg, importme and thorny issue. Between 1936 and 1938 the couple lived mostly in France and visited several European countries. One of the individuals with whom the Duke of Wh~dsorassociated was Charles Bedaux, a French millionaire with worldwide industrial interests, including some strmg connectiosls in Nazi Genxany, Bczdaux was an ad-

visor to Hitler in the Vichy government and was probably involved in Nazi Germanvs war effort. He was later imprisoned by the Allies in Pllorth Africa m d e r eharges of treason and of trading with Nazi Germany4 Bloch points m t that Bc_.dauxcommitted suicide in an American prison in 1944, but that in 1961 the French government 'Vormally absolved [ h i d ol any treasonable wartime conduct."4"?Kcaux played a crucial role in arrangiq the Duke of Windsor % trip to Nazi Gcrmany and his pcrlrsonal meeting with Adolf Hitler. He was also involved in arranging the duke's visit to Che United States. Although perhaps at the beginning the duke was not awam of Redaux's comections in Nazi Germmyt4b he could not have possibly missed it later. It is clear that Bedaux tried to move the duke further toward the direction of Nazi Germany Bedaux recruited another millionaire into the duke" social circlethe Swedish Axel Wemer-Gren. 'This man was an arms dealer close to Reichsmarschall Hermann Gwring and a Nazi sym,pathizec" Although the official version downplays, and pehaps even yuestions, the fact that the Duke met Wenner-Grm before 1940," the Charnel 4 documentary stated that evidence indicates that Ihe two had already met in 1937 in Paris, Accoding to this version, it was Wenner-Gren who gave, in person, to the Duke of Winstsor a personal invitation from Adolf Hitler to visit him in Germany And Ziegler concedes that the Paris meeting was docume~~ted in Wenner-Gren" diary49 However, in an interestingly dlscrclditing fashicrn, Ziegler characterizes the meeting as "brief" and states that in that "brief" meeting the two "'presmabJy '"iscm,ssed the idea of supporting an international organizatim that would c o d j n a t e "all the various peace movements." It must be said that discussing ""peace"' with Hitler at this point in time could onIy mem s ~ ~ p p ofor r t Hitler's expansionist intentions, Furthermore, when Wenner-Gren later met the duke in Nassau, he noted in his diary that the duke ""rmembers very well our conversation in Paris,"m which tends to co~~tradict the notion that it was a "brief" and supposedly insignificant metirtg, ?"he Duke of Windsor began to plan his trip to Germany. The news about this plmned visit was most unpleasant to the British government. :It crclatcd, questions about the Duke of Windsor" possible ambitions to return to the political and most certainly constikted an intervention in British foreign policy at a very djfficult moment. Indeed, Bloch notes that both Churchill and Beaverbrook tried hpersuade the duke not to visit Germany, but their efforts faited. 0 1 1 Octtder 3,1937, the duke released a press statement, which om~cedthat the Whdsors were going to visit both Germany and the United States ""for the purpose of stu.dyi3ng housing and working conditions."~~ 'The Nazis did not fait to gsasp the meaning of such a trip and presented it as m unoffjcial state visit aimed at promoting an agreement be-

The Windsors mcet Hiftel; 1937. SQUItCE: Ma'ariv, December 5,Ei; 1996. Pf1?.utnfrom Associatlld Press arc/zives.

tween Germany m d Great Britah. It is certah that the duke hated World Miar I, and it is possible that the ex-king felt that he could persuade FIitller to prevmt another war. Also, it was obvious that the Nazis wercJ. goir~gto give him the red carpet treatment, and he m y have misscd that kind of pubfic respect. The Nazis, evibently, had other ideas. They had llmg believed that thr ex-king and Mrs. Simpson were sympathizers m d thougbt that Chey could usc? the d d e in promoting a peace accord to t h i s advmtage, m d not just in Europe.

Visiting Nazi Gemany The Duke and a c h e s s aE Windsor arrived at the Friedrichstrasse Station in Berlh an October 11, 1937, as Hitler" guests, meir visit to Nazi Germany lasted until October 23. Their oificial host was Dr. IZsbert Ley (in

charge of labor). Brown quotes the Ne'iu York T i f ~ ~ report es that on two separate occasions the duke gave what a p p e a ~ dto be thr Nazi salute (on one occasion, to Mitler himself). Aithaugh the tour plan was exhausthg, the Duke apparently enjoyed his visit tremendously." Nazi officials paid. hhn cmsiderabte respect, and tbr Windscrrs also met GoebZlels, Goering, Hess, and Ribbentrop. According to the Channel 4 documentar)i the idea of mounting support fnr Hitler was discussed when the duke visited tke home of b d o l f Hess on October 22, 1937%It turns out that Hess and the duke shared some points of views: They were against communism, and they both wanted peace. The idea was to promote a world peace, dominated by a Nazi army and kvith Britain's ennpire htact, The U'ni.ted Stales was supposed to remain uutside Europe. Edward was supposedly told that when such a peace prevailed, he woutd =turn to the thrcme. The dztke's visil: to Gemmy included listellkg to musk and visitkg the 5.5. t r a ~ n g center md, a concentration camp (al%ough it is quite certain that he was maware of the atroci~esc the=). The bight of the visit, no doubt; was a o~~e-hour persona (md tea) with Adolf Hitler at Berchtesgaden m Octciber 22,The dscummtasy showed a phcrtogmph of a smiling Hitler with the Al&ough Hitler refused to the duke and used m interyrett3.t; he most certainly asduke shared the Nazi worldview.~That an officiat,visit bp uchess at that time could be, m d wm, i n t e q ~ t e das giving szxpport to Nazi Germany is dear. Ziegler, who wmte thc official biography of Edward VIIX, notes that "the worst that can be said about the Germm visit is that the Duke closed his eyes to most of what he did not wish to see, and allowed himself to be paraded as an admi-rer of the economic miracle and,as tacitly condoning the brutal side of the social experiment."ss Bradford m d the Ch et 4 documentav provide a less prehtion and s m e very real concerns rclgarding the potent.ial, poljtical impIicatims of that Urne cannot simply excuse a visit to a dictator like Hitler, not even in 1937, as expressing innocent intewsts in examining what may have looked like some economic "xniracle" (whieh, in rcdity; it was not), Moforeover, h a world. where Hitler" fascism was ideologirally competing with other potitjcat ideologies (communism, liemwracy, even monarchy), lendi,ng Hitler szxpport m d Icgitimacy by visiting him and his nation had some very clear md. loud m o d and poiiticd impliclatims, especially when the visitor was the f o r m r h g of Englmd.

Trusting the Duke Q,jte a few Bdtisfi officia,ls were suspicious of the political aspirations of the duke, both before and after the 1936 abdication. As tension was

mounting in Europe, both the British and the Americans became concerned about the Duke's indiscretion with classified military and political information. One incident took place in 1,937,two years hefore World Mrar II began. An Arnerican low-level diplomt, George Messersmiih, met the duke in Viema in 1937'. Messersmit_htold the duke about a train accident that: had occurred. X n the course of the story it was revealed thatthe Americans had broken a secret military code of the Axis powers. The Duke of Windsor did not keep his mouth shut but told the story at a dinner par% given by an Italhn diplomat, Messersmilh reported the incident. This seemed to confirm. the suspicion that the duke could not be tr~sted.~7 As we shall see, there were several other i~~cidents, too.

The Verdun Radio Transmission Another problelnatic event involving the Duke of Wndsor occurred in the spl-ing of '1939, just a few months before the war began, A few days after :King Ceorgc V1 and his wife emharked on a trip to Canada and the United States (May 5, 1939), the Duke of Whdsor broadcast "an appeal for world peace directed at America from the famous First World War battlefield at Verdun,"m Bloch notes that this was the last time the duke made a speech th& mi11.ions of people listened to and that- mmy rcceivcd with enthusiasm.sY The speech was made on May 8, which is the mnivers a q of the Battle of %dun. I h e rwaning of that broadcast, at that particular point in time, cannot be underestimated. Great Britair.r was on the brink of war with Nazi Germany, and the king was m his way to the United States m a very important mission. l e duke stated in his broadcast that as ""a soldier of the last war" and in "&re presence of the great company of the dead," he was making an appeal for wlrrld peace. It must be acknowledged that regardless of the dukefs political con~rictions,his experience in Mlorld War 1 was such that he felt that preventirrg a replay of that war was worth almost anything. However, the thought that such a mthless tyrant as Hitler could "a sso easily appeased was, at best, terribly naive, Bradford notes the duke" rationale for the transmission: "Became convh-rcedthat E w p e was l-readed dawn the slippery slope to war. &ly the Axnericans had the inRuetnce to arrest Che slide. That was why X decided to aim my appeal at them.""@Ironically there is nut a shred of evidence that the duke was trying to persuade Hitler to stop his aggmssive actio~ns,which were the source of the co~nfiict* h the duke's conversation with his wife after his persond meeting with Hitler, reported. by the duchess in her autobiography there was no mention of any such effort to avert kvar." l u s , alt-houghthc duke was calling for peace, he was in real-

ity asking for appeasement (in that particular historical contextf '*peacefr really meant ""pace under Hitler's terms"'). It is kstrudive to examine how Ziegler, Edward VIII's official biographer, ixrterprets this broadcast." Accordjng to Ziegler, the American radio network NBG ""invited him to broadcast to the United States from &dun after a visit to the bdtlefield. His speech was short, eloquent, uncontroversial and written entirely by himself,"'h"Ziegler ad.ds that "nobody else had offered him t-he chance or was likely to do so-least of all the British. It was hardly the D~tkeof Windsor's fault if the BBC rehsed to let the British people hear his words. He believed, that he had something of real significance to say and that, coming from h, it might be listened to.''M Close reading of this passage reveals the speciousness of the aqument, The facts are that the duke gave up power and influence once he chose Mrs. Sirm,pson, yet he was trying to steer British p o k y h m the backseat when he directly appealed to the American people. The duke was thus undermi~~ing British policy and intervenir-tgin the royal visit to the North h e r i c a n cont.inent. TMhy should anyone be sllrpriscd that the BBC w d d not let the duke cast his defeatist, pro-Nazi Germany position? Rtsides, the duke most certainly had direct charnels of communication to the British government, and he could have tried to persuade them directly n e Verdun broadcast was a blatant attempt to intervene in British policy by a m m wh to a large extent-had given up that right. Clearly Ziegler assttlnes m knocelnt peace-seeking motivation behind the duke's broadcast to the United States, whereas Chmnel 4 and Bradford f h d that it was a treacherous and defeatist speech. Ziegler notes that on Aug~~si: 25,1939, the duke telegraphed Hitler: "Remembering your courtesy and our meeting two years ago, I address to you my entirely personal, simple thougf~very eamest appeal for your utmost infl~tencetocvards a peareflal sdutim of the presetnt problems,"b"" Une must note the humble and apologetic position the duke assumes in begging Hitler, Hitler replied: "You may be sure that my attitude towards England is the same as ever.. . . It depends upon England, howwes, whether my wishes for t:he future developmat of Angle-German relaticms materialize.""" This message is chilling in its hypocrisy. Hitler at this point was about a we& away from brutally violating Poiish sovereig~nty; on September I he unleashed a devastating and ferocious blitzkrieg c m paign against Poland, taking a gamble that tbr Unikd :Kingdom would not honor its lasbminute guarantee of Polish hdepetndence (not to metntjon tke violation of the tm-year nonaggression pact FXjtler s i p d with P o l a ~ din 1934). Britail1 could tolerate no more and declared war on Cermany on. September 1,1939.

The Mirrdsors in France When the war began, the Duke m d Duchess of W d s o r came home to England, but they =turned to France on September 29. The duke was given a military appointment." However, it was made clear to the duke that he could not pssibly "be a fsee-lance in, the ~ ~area,"@ a r 'The Channd 4 documentav statcd that the duke devokd, littie time to his military assigment, prefmhg to s p e d most of his t h e in Paris with the duchess and his friend Bedaux, who paid the hotel bill oE the royal couple. One gets a totaIly different kpression from reading Ziegier % vversim." "ccoding to Ziegler, the duke was active in touring fie units and preparhg repads. However, his insistence on acting independe~~tly became problematic. Count 'Juliusvon Zech-Burkesroda, the German minister to fie Netherlmds, recognized very quickly that the duke was ""disgruntled over the insignificance of his role."7(1 Endeed, on October 16,1939, the duke wrote that there was "no enthusiasm over this waref'T1 When Hitler was preparhg his invasion into the Low Countries and France, he had several options: (1)attacking south through the Maghot Line; (2) attacking through Belgium and norl..hern France; and (3) attack'The Charnel 4 docume~~tary stated that origiing through the Arde~~nes. nally Hitler plamed to use the second, option, through Belgium and nort_hcm France. However, on m u a r y 10,1940, a Lziffzuafe airplane was forced to lmd in Belgium, and on it were documents with alf the details ed German attack.7Ul.thougt-ian attempt was made by a Germ m officer to bum the documents, there was not enough time to do so, and the papers were captured by a local law e ~ ~ f o r c e ~ofticer." ~ e n t Baudat et d.state that although the German invasion plans were communi.cated to the British and French governments, it did not make much difference.7" It was assumed that these papers prese~~tect "a clumsy German attempt at deception." 'Unfortunatelyf these plans were genuine and arathen tic. Weinberg is mow skeptical and is guick to point out fiat the Cermm intention to attack leaked out continuously through various chamels.7" Channel I f s slersion, however, intctgratcs this incident with the duke's disloyal and untrustworthy behawior. Followhg the crash landhg, accordi,ng to the Charnel 4 documntary, Hitlcr needed to find out wfiether his war plans had. been connpromised. Then, Count Zech, the German rninister to the Netherlartds, =parted to Berlin that the duke had discussed in &tail what would happen if Hitler invaded the Netherlancls. According to Count Zech, the duke stated that his information was based on documents found in a German airphne that made a crash landing in Belgium;, Obviously the duke had been briefed by non-German intell-igence sources, Channel 4 stated that this was exactly what Hitler was

waithg for. He altered his war plms and instructed his forces to use the third option instead. That pfm was cmsidered irnpracti"a1 by the Allies because it was felt that if:was not possible to move armor trhrotlgh the Ardcnnes. FXowever, Hitler believed. that it was possible. Enstead of launching an attack t h r o w the Low Countries, the Nazjs penetrated the Ardenncs on May 10, 1940, wi& a force of seven panzer divisions, driving across Belgian and Luxembourgim boders afong the narrow Ardennes roadways. Like a hot knife cutting butter, the Nazi advance was extremely swit, and Mlithin two days they reached the Meuse Rivcc C)n May 12, the Nazi military machine was threatening Park. As Gostello paints out, "it is now possible to develop a convincing case that an intelligence leak leadhg back to the h k e of Wirrdsor may have played a significant part in prompting Hitler to order his generals to change &eir bat(British tle pl;tn,"76 Accorcling to Brown, who wrote the biotgraphy of 'KC"' chief of intelligence jn World War II), "that leakage from Ihe 'Duke to Zech through irttermdiaries was again plain treachery.

The Windsors in Spain and Portugal e14 documentay stated that not only was the duke a hopeless ta1ke.t; but as the Nazi invasion progressed, he left: his post and travcled with the duchess to southern Frmce to rest, and later to Spain and Portugal. Channel 4 pr,inted out that the duke's only real cboices were to remain in his military unit or to return to England. Leaving his post to travel throughout southern Europe was rezlsm enough for a court-martial on a charge of etesertion, a charge that any other officer would have had tt? face. B r o w is more blunt: "The duke abandoned his post without permission, a court-martial offense, and fled to the south of Frmce to ~ j a i s l the duchess at their villa on the Riviera."'Uiegler quotes Metcalfe vvho stated that the duke had to remain with his unit and e x p ~ s s e dhis fear that the duke might ""d o~rzything-anything a c ~ the t right thing. . . . He talks of having done enoug2rl"~Qomas offers a different interpretation far the duke's rather &rangebehavior: Believing that the fall of France was imminent, he h e w if he remained at his post$he would be odered back to Engfand where he ran a very real risk that his involvement with Bdaux had been repode8 and he would be branded a traitor. By making his tvay to the scmth of France, he tvas not fleeing the Cerman advance as has of"l;enbeen suggested, but-putting himself out of reach of the British.80

.hga,in, Zie@r offers a somewfiat difkrent version.81 Me asserts that although the duke went to southern France with the duchess, he returned

to Paris by May 22, Since he was given virtually nothhg to do, he left Paris to rejoin the duckss. In a draft of a message to the duke that Churchill prepared to telegraph on 'July I, 1940, he wrote: "Already there is a great deal of doubt as to the circumstances in which h u r Royal Highness left Paris." However, Churchill decided ta cut out this sentence. Zicgler leaves the rclader with the clear impressjon that the duke had little choice: "The Duke left Paris with the approval, indeed the relief of the Military Mission. . . . 'l'o say that t-he Duke had iieserkd his country when he had no&ing to do in Paris, and had been told to leme by his superior officer, was obviousXy unfair, The Ch el 4 rlocumentasy drmatized this issue by pointing out that while thousands of refugees were forced to leave their horns, the Duke and the BucS-ress of Windsor were battning in the sun, The Germans invaded France, and on June 21,1940, France surrendemd. Most British citizens chose either to escape to Dunkirk or to Britain. The Duke of Windsor chose Spain. The Wndsors arrived in Barcelona late on the night on fum 20, 1940, where they stayed for two days, and then continued to Madrid, arriving there on June 23. They resided at the Rtz FXotd, suite 501. Spain, one must =member, was under the dictatorship of Generalissimo Franco. Although Franco declared Spain to be neutral in the war, the= is Ittle doubt eoncming S p a s s sympathies. Spain was clearly allied with Hitlem: Moreover, Madrid was a city of cmspiracies, M l with spies m d htrigue. The choice of Spain as a rduge looks indeed strange..After all, the Windsors could get to Bunkklk and from there back to England. h any event, the time was not an easy one for Britajn, and the evacuation from a n k i r k , heroic and mapifictmt as it was, did not change the overall bkak picture. :It may be that the duke felt more secure in Madrid, and. he may have hoped to be able to influence some sort of a peace scrttlernent by keeping in touclh with the Germans..Regardless of the duke's feebngs, as England and Germany were entering the war, the Whdsors found themselves welcomed by li"rmco irr neutrd (but sympathetic to Hitler) Spain.The duke was still bitter &out havhg to abdicate the throne, angry that Mrs. S h p son was not given FXRH status, and upset for not being given a position of power and influence. Moreover, it was quite obvious that he was far from antagonistic toward Hitler. Further, he rnighl have genuinely fell that: nothing was worth another world. war and that if appeasixrg Hitler was the way to avoid it, he was willing to go ahtng. That the Windsors had chosen Spain at this particular time mwt have carnsed alarm in the British g o v e r n & and raised suspicions in the court of King Geoqe W. h equafly phusible interprtttaticrn for the d&efs behavior was that he was trying to g a h time, hoping perhaps to be able to press the British g o v e r n & to give hin? m appropriate po"itonF to give official recogsli-

tion to Wallis, ad-possibly-to leave the door open for negotiations with the Nazis. The duke's bbehavior most certainly was not characteristic of a man who decided to give up his throne and s h k into a comfmable life with the womm he loved. h c r m the time of the duke" arrival in Madrid (June 23, an interesting exchange developed betwcen Churchill and the duke regarding the duke" choice of residence, The Charnel 4 documentary stated that the real struggle during tbis time was the battle between Churchill and Hitler far the duke%loydties. The Germans wanted to keep hixn inSpain so thatthey codd lliegotiate with firirm; C1-rurchitl wanted him. back in England. Mowover, the British ambassador to Spain,Sir Samuel Hoare, believed that the war was either lost or unwinnahle and that a negotiated peace should not be ruled out. That view was close to the duke"," m d the duke had no ~servations sharing his pro-German views with others, including Americans,.'The American ambassador to Spain, A. W. Weddell, sent a report to Washingtm, D.C., on July 2,1940, in which he noted: [The duke] dedared that the most important thing now to be done was to end the war before thumands more were killed or maimed to save the faces of a few politicians, . . . These rtbservatiom have their value, if arty, as doubtless reBect-ing the views of an element in England, possibly a growing one, who find in Windsor and his circle a group who are realists in world politics and who hope to came into their own in event of peace,%

Even Ziegler, who is sympathetic to the Windsars, notes that to support appewmmt in June 1940 could be forgiven, but ""t say it openly to a rep~sentativeof a foreign, even if friendly power, was to say the least indiscreet." As Ziegler points out, so damaghg wese these talks between the duke and Ambassacior Hoare, as well as 'I-he duke's public expressions suppo&ing appeasement, that the ambassador telegraphed Z,ondon (on June 30, 1940) and w e d the government "to contradict G e m a n propap n d a saying that Woare anli the Duke were carrying on negotiations for peace.'"qhe results of these activities were obvious. Waller notes that ""6ermal.l Ambassador Eberhard, von Stohrer . . . bad high hopes when he =parted to Hitler: 'Windsm has e x p ~ s s e dhimself in strong terms against aurchill and against the \.varrf'*8h Bradford adds that if indced the documents regarding the duke" eexprcssions against Churchill and the war are true, then the duke was "ca~~templating something very Like treason.""w Ch June 19, 7,940, Churchill stated in the cabinet that "steps must be taken to ensure the Duke" safe return."@Ziegler quotes Alexander Cadog m , permanent undersecretary at the Foreign Office, cwmenting on June 29,1948, on the Windsors in Spain: ''The quicker we get theln out of the country the better. But I'd sooner send them to a penal settlement.

He% be the @isling of England when Gcrmany conquers us and. I'm deadaff8g Indeed, British ambassador Haare contacted the Windsors and ""hastened to irtfom them that the Prime Minister athched grcat wen" to their return to England and wanted them to go on immediatefy to Lisbon, where., on their arri\id, two flying-boats of Coastal Command would be sent to take them home, He told them too, that the Duke of Westmisrster had offered them the use of his house, Eaton Hall, near Chester."W On J m e 24,1940, the duke repfied to Churchill that he was not =turning, and opened a process of negotiation in his lictter about the position be wanted , in addition, that a position outside to be given once he ~ t r t m e dstating, England might be prefesabrc. Churchill replied on June 26 that such negotiations would be better held after the duke had returned to Englan& The duke refixsed, stating that he would ret-urn only after these negotiations had been successfully accomplished (inclndjng giving the duchess an HRH status and,exemption from some taxes). Ambassador Hoare found hhnself in the midst of these negotiations and added in ofie oE his cornmw~icationsthe bizarre idea that giving the duke a "command at seaff might be a solution,Yl These negotiatbns were taking place just after France had coltapsed m d the completion of the May 26June 4 Dunkirk evacuation. Churchill was trying to cope with a very difiicuXt and complex situation. That these s is obvious. negotiations with the duke were taxing his p ~ " f j o utime Moxeover, the trivial demands the duke was on t-he prjme minister in a time of national crisis reveaX the nature and magnitude of the duke's abominate position. Even sympathetic Ziegter must admit that t-he duke was "badgering the f'rirne Minister,""that- hjs position was "'incxcusable," and that his "sense of prap~&ion. . . bad failed him."^^ et 4 docuentary is more blunt. According to the program, the Duke hebv fairly well that he was making dernands that Churchill could not have possibly met, Moseover, the program stated that at that t h e there was a small, but not insipificant, pro-peace (or appeasement) movement in EngSand, which was lobhying for a negotiated settlement with Hitler, Indeed, Bradford notes: "In November Horace Wilson, the most inkential man in W~itehalt,told Moncktm that t-he only real worry as far as the Government was cmcerned was that the Dklkefs return to Englanb might be exptoited by extremist. p u p s , which be undoubtedly meant to include Sir Oswald Moslefs fascist blaekshirts, who had suppmted Edward WII over the .hhdication."~~hurchilLI m s t have been concerned that the duke would speahead. that movement. And the Windsors had alwady proven in Madrid &at they werc. willing to speak out very loudly for appeasement and against Churchill.

Ch 'June 25,1940, Churchill wrote back to the duke: ""Vour Royal Highness has taken active mftitary rmk, m a n d refusal to obey direct orders of competent military authority would create a serious situation. 1 hope it will not be necessary for such orders to be sent. l: most strongly urge coment.'"me threat of a possible courtpliance with wishes of thcJ Cove martid implied in Churchill's Hrm, message is quite clear. And thc threat worked. A few days later the Windsors left for Portugal, They arrived in the Lisbon area on July3,1940, However, before leaving Spain, the duke made some dantaghg statements, Mr. Weddell, the Arnerican ambassador to Spain, wrote to the State Department that he had heard; the duke saying that the only t h i q to do was to achieve ""a peace settlement with Germany."% The anti-British nature of these s t a t e m t s is unquestionable. W i l e negotiaticms were going m between Churchilf and the Duke of WIndsor, the Germans were forming their own plots." hieglcr states that the duke was unaware of these plots, but the Germans were not mistaken in assuming that the duke represented a political force that. was symgathetic to their cause. The Germans were tving to deternine how best to utilize the duke's political sympathies. Several researchers point out that the Germans, headed by Iqbbentrop on this issue, made several co~~thgency plms focusing on moving the duke to their side.97 In ;5iegler%tarns, the Germans wanted "to keep the Duke of Windsor in Europe, and make use of him as a tool of their pctticy."gB At first, atrt-emptswere m d c to persuade the Spania.rd.s to keep the duke in Spain for as long as possible..These efforts failed, but before the duke left Madrid, he made some rather strong statements against Churchill to German ambassador van Stohrere99 The move to Lisbon did not silence tfie Windsors. "An American diplomat in Lisbon, H. CIaiborne Pell, repo&ed to Miashhgton Uuly 20,194C)I Duchess are indiscreet and outspoken against the Brown is mom specific about the nature of the Portugal: "The Dukti was soon repmted to have stated that England 'faced a catastrophic military defeat, kvhich couid only be avoided through a peace settlement with Germ.anym"'""l &coding to the Ch et 4 documentaq King George W was aware of the political threat posed by the Duke af Whdsor, because regular intelligence reports rclceived from Madrjd indicated the duke" disloyal position. 'The Channel 4 program stated that King George W's private secretary, Alexmder Hardinge of Pashot a secret report to the Icing in which he states that the Nazis were pl to overthrow King Gearge W ancl ~ s e a fEdward : VIZ1 as king. That scmario rc_.flectc-.dthe Nazi evaluation of the extent to which they cot~ldexped the duke to side With Chem if and

when they conquered Eng1asrd.U02The secret Nazi plan to d e t h the duke in Europe and their cont%ency plan to =store him as king of England show Chat they viewed the duke as a potential collaborator. As Ziegler points out, the duke's behavior gave them good rcason to think so.103 In Portugal, the Windscrrs resided in the villa of a rich banker, Kicardo Espirito Santo Silva, at: Cascais (a few mifes outside t,istson). Various sources note that Santo was a Nazi informant, sympathize&and supporter.'("%d, s a i n , the duke did m t hide his views. & m e occasion the duke was heard ohis time by an informant to Marcus C k k , a British embassy clerk) predicting that Churchill" ggvvernment would fall and that Labour w U f d f o m a new government that would negotiate peace with the Germans. In this scelzario, King George VI would abdicate the crown and the duke would be restored to the throne: ""Britah would then lead a cclalition of France, Spain, and Portugal, and Germany would be left free to march on Russia.'"Q" Another rather strange event took place while the Windsurs were in Portugal. Aucording to the Channel 4 documentary, t-he a c h e s s of Windsor left some personal ite17ns hher Paris apart~aentwhe~zthe royal couple fled south, She instructed her maid to travel to Paris and retrieve these personal belongings. Paris, however, was then occupied by the Nazis, m d the duke had to obtain special permissio~zand doc~~ments for the trip of the maid. Who did he apply tot The Gestapo. Ail this occurred after Dunkirk, of course. Thus, the Windsors were Ln contact with the enemy, making requests and asking fnr special fa~rors.Sarah Bradford comrnents that this was "extraord.inary."lQGShe also reports that in response to a request from the duke while he was in Madrid, "the Germans agreed to keep watch on the duke" Paris hoLtse,"""'7Donaldson conf r m this rather bizarre incident, adding that a telegram was sent by von Stohrclr (Gernan ambassador to Spain) to Berlin exptailning that the maid's trip to Paris could be used to help postpone Chc Wbdsors' dept?rture,li"BIndeed, dter the war ended, the Windsors returned to Paris and found that "their house in the Boulevard Suchet had been mdisturbed during the war, all their possessions were m h a r m d , m d their caretaker even jnformed them that, when a pair of boots belonging to Major Gray Philljps had been taken, he had complained to the Ksrrzmarrda~tz.irwho had them returned with apol0gies"""2~ Although the Duke of Wjndsar has been portrayed by some as a devout peacenik (even at the price of appeasing Hitler), another incident shattms Chat iltusim. 7'he Nazi air force, the I,~1f'fwalCjCe, took an active and effeclive part inthe Nazi military campaign, which led to the British evacuation at Dmkirk, and Nazi bombers were constantly attacking British (and other) ships engaged in the evacuation and other operiztionse1l0C h 'July 10,1940, Baron Oswald von Hoyningm-Huene, the German amhas-

sador to Portugal, '?old Rjbhentrop that the Duke spoke freely in farvor of compromise and said that the bombing of England would soon make it ready for peace."lll "'The Duke believes with certainty that continual heavy b o d i n g will make hgland ready for peace." In other words, the duke made the fantastically absurd sutjgestion that the aerial heavy bornbardntemt of Brjtain was for Britain's own good. M a s s a d o r Hoynjngem:Fluem%report further states that the duke '"intends to postpme his journey . . . at least until the beg ing of August, in a hope of a change in his favor. He is convinced that had he relnained on the throne, war could have been avoided and describes himself as a firm. supporter of a peaceful compromise with C';ermany.""l' Bradford too does not fail to note that this German docwent implies that the duke was tryhg to &lay his departure from Portugd, hoping that events would turn in his fa\..or,"3 That could only mean, in the relevmt cantext, a radical change in British policy m d the recall of the duke to England to assume a powerful position (presumably h g ) . Thus, the peace-lowinl; M e of Miindsor recommended heavy bombardment of his owl1 country-all, for the sake of peace, of course. C)ne cannot avoid Thornas% acid note: "There is no record that he ever suggested to Churchill that bombing G e r m y would have a similar effect."H4 Such statements make it plahly clear whose side the duke was on. And such violations of tmst m d loyalty are indicatiw of genuine treason. MeanMthile, the Nazis MreR busy m a h g their plans to keep the duke in Eurctpe (and, if necessary, to kidnap hint),"'" Cme of these plans catled for the return of the duke to Spain. The plan was that durirzg a hmting campaip near the Spanish border, the Wndscrrs would cross the borcier secretly and ask for asytum in Spain. There, accorcting to the Channcl.1: documentary, the Windsors would live in, a castle owned by Comt of Montarco. The count was instructed to prepare the castle fm the royal couple. The plan called for the duke to use the castle as the place k m which he would announce his &engagement from the British government and call for peace. In that public announcement, preferably in a radio transmission, the duke was supposed to publicly reject the British war policy and sever tics with his brother the king. Ribbentrop thought that intimidating the duke and making him feel that Bortugd was unsafe would he@ to realize this plan. :Rjbbentrop%m m for the job was the S.S. offjeer Miallter Schellenberg. Schellenberg hired individuals to break the windows of thrt duke's home by thrnwing rock, wh,ieh achieved some eMect of,ation.Moreover, he had a message delivered to the duke" home in which it was stated that the British secret service was planning to assassimte him."%Scheknberg states that he was workhg under Ribbentrop's instructions and that his goal was to bring the Whdsors into the Nazi area of hfltlenre.

Angel dc Wesco, a Spanish agent who was working at the tirne for the Nazis, wap; sent to Portugat to help bring tbr duke back to Spain. Valesco appearcd on the Chnnel4 documentary and stated that when he met the duke at the villa, "the Duke was trembling, the pool. man, There were times when he etiein't know what he vvas saying. H e knew what he wanted to say . . . but could not say it properly So when anyone ash me what 1 thhk about that interview . . . what 1 say is, The man was confused, he was trembling. He did not know what would happen nextafff 'The duke was under the sttrveiUance of British agents in Lisbon, m d Churchill knew the dmgemus and.precarious position the duke was in, Indeed, even Ziegler, who tries his best to prtrsent the Duke of Windsor in the best possible fight, has no choke but to a c k n o h d g e that- "a report from a representative of the British Secret Service in Lisbon said. that the Germans had recently appma&ed Bedaux and asked hirn to establish whether the Duke of Whdsor would be prepared to become King in the event of a German victory. Bedaux declined,"ll"7radf ord summarizes the "@isling activities" of the duke in Spain and Portugal by statin; that ""lrom the momel-rt of his arrival on 23 June, the Germans in collaboration with the Spanish Government contemplated ushg him as a weapon either in the event of a successful invasion of England or, possibly in peace negotiations, detahing him in Spain wi& or without his ~o-operation.~~~18 The problematic nature of the duke" activities did not escape British intelligence. Indeed, Bradford points out that thr duke made statements against. Churchill and the war and that the chief of British intelligel-rce was discussing the " acti:vities"' of t h duke (jn Madrid and Lisbon as well).lw At the very least, the Duke showed practically no support for his cou~ztryat a time when it was most needed. Meanwhile, in Lmdon, various options were cmsibered for the duke"s futurt;, Both Churchill and :King Ceclrge VI felt that bringing the duke back to Englmd was a bad idea. h fact, the king wrote, "My brother has behaved disgracehlly,"120 "Bradford adds that on July 10, 1940, the king was ""amused at Cl% [head. of British :It~telligence]report of thr Quisling activities of my brother.'"= Apparently, the king wanted to project in pu:blic t:he impression that his brother" activities were nont%ireatening. Ewneually, Churchill decidrd to offer the duke &c? positim of governor m d commander in chief of the Rafiarnas. Although some concerns were raised that the duke rnight use this position to plot against Churchill, he brushed these concerns aside. He did warn the duke, in a letter, to be very careful about hvhat he said as a representalive of the British Crown.122 However, even this decision was fraugl-rt with difficulties. London was concerned that the duke rnight change his mind and, instead of going to the B a h m s , might decide to go back to Spain,\zrhere he codd launch a peace initiative. British ambassador Samuel Hoarc, concerned about such

an event, wrote in July 26, 1940, that an effctrt must be made to prevent the duke from comfng back to 5pah.123 As concern about the duke's h t e n t i o ~ was ~ s nrrom~thgh London, Walter Monckton-the duke" good frimd-was asked to go to Lisbon and talk to him. Moncktm arrived in Lisbon on the evening of July 28. Lfke Wesco, he found a demoralized duke who did not really believc that the British secret sewice was planning to assassinate him, but was a little msure about it.He atso suspected that the Germans f i g h t try to assassh~ate h h once he arrived in the Bhamas, and he was not too keen to return to Spairt. Accordhg to the Channel.4 program, Monckton carried with him a letter warning the duke about m a h g contradictory statements about the British governme~~t" policy It may be that Mo~~ckton had some harsher thirtgs to say, too, Monckton" pprcsence in Lisbon had its effect, After his arrival, concern ~ g a r d i n gthe duke's actions diminished. On August 1, 1940, the Windsors boarded Excakibur at 15:00 and sailed to the Bahamas.124 It is interesting to note that on the same day, Hitler issued his Directive 17 on the planned Nazi invasion of Britail7. P~parationsfor the by the army were to be completed by September 15, and the operation was to take place September 19-26.7'he order was to be given about fourteen days &er the main Luftrunfle offawive had begun.DVz.~ffwaffe attacks on British shipping in the English Channel increased, in irttensity betvveen August 1 and 11, and on August 11 Weymouth and Portland were bombed from the air; Ports~xout.Ezwas bombed the next day. 'The Battle of Britain had begun. On August 15, the L21fizuafe f i w a h o s t 1,800 sorties, and the British Royal Air Force (R.A.F.) almost 1,001). The advice given by the Duke of Windsor to bomb England was bejing ruthlessly executed. A revealing communication from the duke to his brotkr, King George VI, dating July 23, 1940 (just prior to his departure from Portugal), testifies to his state of mind then. Xn that telegram, the duke "urged Ihe King to end the war, telling him to dismiss the Cabillet and replace it with one headed by the elderly but still active Uoyd George, which meant dismissing Churchill, the feadcr of a democraticalfy ekcted Government-."l% In the context of events between September 1939 and the summer of 1940 (and the insatiable German qgressim prior to September 1939), this suggestion codd only be interpreted as a strong pm-Nazi stmd, m e t-hat was completely contrary to the stance of ChurchilZ" government. One final note here is that when the Nazis realhed that the duke might leave European soil, they clearly tried to change his xnind even about leaving Portugal, mostly by talks with Santo Silva, the owner of the villa wfiere the Windsors stayed. According to the Charnel 4 documentary, the duke told his landlord Phat he could not djsobey the hstruetions he received from London because it 'kould disclose his intentions pre-

maturelqi." h other words, the duke may have had a plan that he thought he codd opcrlrationaiize from the Bahamas. This intapretation ~ c e i v e s support from reports by Santo and Hoynj,ngen-Hueme that the duke wanted, explicitly, tto keep his German contacts open. The duke may have wanted to keep all his vtions open in case Britain lost the war,'27 Almost all sources seela to agree that while the Windsors were in Spaiin and Portugal, the Nazis were working frantically on plans a h e d at keeping the Whdsors in Europe.12Ut the fmwell party far the Duke of Windsor in Psrtqal, the duke assured the Germans "oE his 'deepest sistcerity and expressed admiration and sympathy for the :FGhrer.Wmoreover, Windsor said 'he could, if necessaryf intervene from the Bahamas."""2"

The Windsars in the Bahamas n o s e thinking that the Duke of Windsor was harmless in the Bharrtas were about to face an unpleasant surprise. The Windsors arrived in the Bahamas in the rniddle of August"eir stay in the Bahamas had some hteresfting problemal-ir asgctcts. Che of the first incidents was the duke's wish to spend a total of about E7000 to renovate the Gove M e n Churckll s w the duke's first demand for an initial E5,(30C) from gublic f u ~ d h s Britaiin, his comme~~t was, 'Tornment is needless." Such a demand in the midst of a costly war was, at the very h a t , insmitive. The Ti-ibune pointed out that with fiat kind of mmey anofier hurricane could be purchased to defend Buchgham 13alaceh-orn bnntbi37g.S' Swedish industrialist Axel Wenner-Gren resided h the Bahamas when the duke arrived there. ?"he duke had already met with Axel WennerGren in Paris. There seelns to be little doubt that the Americans and the British viewed Wemer-Gren as a Nazi synrpathizer or wosse. Even Ziegler concedes that British intelligence i n t e ~ e p t e da letter sent to Wenner-Gren fram a kiend Jn Rio de Janeiro prior to the duke's arrival in Nassau telling WennerGren that he should expect the arrival of "a new and interesting farnity . . . who . . . hold sympathetic understanding for totalitarian ideas."'" H~oever,Ziegler djsmisses the letter as a "cryptic message and asserts that Axel Mienner-Gren was in.terested only in ""peace.'" The duke, however, had been warned by Lord Halifax, then British ambassador to the United States, that We~zner-Gren"was not a suitable companion" for him, The duke ~ s p o n d e dby questioning Lord tlalifax" advice and demanded to know exactly on what grounds the suspicions against Wenner-Gren were based.1" QC course, the suspicions were based, on intelligence evaluations, whirh codd not possibly be revealcd to the duke in full, given his past behavior. Ilowewer, thrrc. can be no doubt about two facts. C)ne, the duke was explicitly warned against as-

s~liatingwith Wemer-Gren, and two, he rejected the advice and kept close ties with Wemer-Gren. In 193.1t-he Americans put Wenner-Gren m a list of persons who wcx to be treated as "'enemy aliens.""Up to thatpoint, the duke could refuse the advice of his own gove tain close ties with Wenner-Grm, but that position was insupportabte after Wemer-Gren was dcfined as an "enemy alien" by the Amerjcans.""" More light about British 'fears of the association between Wenner-Grm and the &ke of Windsor is shed by Brown: On several occasians in 1942 and 1943, Churchill expressed amicsty that a Uboat, acting under the cctntrr~lof the Sou ther~zCross's [Wemer-Cren's yacht] powerful wireless station, would land an armed party in the Bahamas and spirit the duke and duchess away to Germany. Churchill therefore ordered that a platoon of British tmops be statianed arc~randthe Windsors" home in Nassa u.135

Although the duke wanted to visit the United States and meet with President Rassevelt, Britain was-obviously-not too thrilled about this prospect.'" However, the duke did meet with Roosevelt in Miami hoard. the "lirsclzloosu cm December 1.3, 1940. Ziegler notes that Roosevelt was ""dismayedby the g l o m which [the duke] radiated and his obvious belief that the United St.ates would, shelter in isolationism." Ziegler notes that a second meeting with Roosevelt (October 4,1941) was marked Zly a more positive spirit.'" 'The Windsors sailed back on We~~ner-Gren's yacht, the Sozdfher~Cross, to spend Christmas among what was, according to American intelligence, his circle of men like Mooney, an anti-British Irish American traveling with arath~rizationfrom Goering to make piece with. Hitler, and ALked P. Sloan, chairman of General Motors, another Hitier sympathizer. During this periud the Duke is alleged ta have had several conversations on the subject of peace with Nazi Cermany.13"

Une must remember that durirrg this period, Nazi Gcrmany was involved in a vicious battle against Britah~in both air and sea. 'Thus, while h the Bahamas, the duke was maintaining cmtacts with people who were under very strung inteuigence suspicions of being Nazi sympathizers. Among these associates t-he duke could freely ventifate his political and moral views, and thmugh them fie codd selnd the Nazis signals that they should not forget bim.It was a way of keephg his options open. 'I'he verbal context for such discussicrns was that the duke was intercsted in pursuing a ""peaceful"solution to the conflict hEumpe. Mow-

ever, given the n a t u r ~of Hitler" regime, ""pace" could only be interpreted as concession tcr a racist, ruthless, and declzptive tyrant who could not be appeased. Moreover, for a formr British king to have held such vicws in late 1940 was ethically very questionable, One reason that fie British were not too keen about the Duke of Windsor making visits to the United States and meethg with high-rmking U.S. officials m s t have been that they felt he could not be trusted to represent their interests in a forceful, loyal, and meaningful way. Developmentri in the imer political arella of the United States in 1940-1941 heightelzed that mistrust. At issue was the pending legislation for the Lend-Lease Act, whereby the United States would provide aid to nations fighting Germany and Italy (and later lapan). Durhg Decemher 19120, P ~ s i d e nXZoot sevelt was lobbying for passage of the bill., against the prcssure of Americ m isolationists. A lorrt; and bitter debate raged about t k type and degree of U.S. hvolvement in the war. Afier much debate, the hill was submitted to Congress in January 1948, Roosevelt received solid support from the Democrats, and it passed fie House on Xjebruary 8, 3941 (260 votes to 165) m d the Sellate on March 8,19441 (vote was sixty to thirteerz). Thus, the months of February-March 1941 were crucial for decisions made ~garciingthe nature of U.S. involvement in Miorld War E. The duke was not ulzaware of this debate. An hcident much like the duke's Verdun radio I-rmsmission in the spring of 1939 was about to unfold.. 111 either December 1940 or Febmary of 1941,139 fie Duke of Windsor gav" m interview to Fulton azrsler, a jonmalist for the American magazine Liberty and a fricnd of President Roosevelt. The interview was published first hLiberty cm March 32 and later in the Lcmdon Su~rltlyDispatch March 16,1911-1).Rractford's vcrsion is that the duke gave his inksview to Ourslcr on February 6, 1942, only two days before the bill passed the House. The timing of the interview could not have been worse from a British poinl of view. What did the Duke tell Oursler? Bradford states that in the interview the duke appeared to "advocate a negotiated peace and aei\iised America under no circumstances to enter the war.'"m Ziegler expands a bit on the imp~ssionIhat emerged from the interview: The Duke . . . satzr na hope af a British victory. Ncrr was there hope of a change of heart in Germany " k u cannot kill 8Qm Germans and since they want Hitler, haw can you farce them into a revofutian they don't want?"TThe only hope tzras for a Pax Americana: a peace imposed upon a discredited Europe by the New World, which would restore a measure of sanity to international relations. "The Duke of Windsor has given an intesview to a magazine in the U.S,A, in tzrhich he pretty frankly dixlaims all chance af an English ?~ictuq,"Goebbets is supposed to have commented, adding that they would not use it in their propaganda for fear of discrediting the speaker.141

Zkgler adds that the duke ""claimed to have had many words put into his mouth." Churchill was not the type to watch this twacherous interview and keep quiet. Indeecf, he was furious. Ziegler notes, "Whatever was meant, . . . Churchill . . . said the Duke" words would certajnlly be intcrpreted as 'defeatist and pro-Nazi, a d by impiicatim, approving of the isolatinnist aim to keep America out of the war,'"l" Churchill "advised" the duke to seek advice before making pubhc statements m d used the opportunity to demand that thr duke sever his cmtacts with Wenner-Gren as well.143 The duke ;.was a bit belligerent m d exchanged some telegrams about these issues with Churchill. The Nazi attack on Russia on June 22, 1941, but much more so, the December 7, 1941, Japanme surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, shattered completely any hope the duke might have hdled of keephg the United States out of the war. By the time the Ch e14 dcxlumentary program was taped, Oufsler had died. The prodtlcers Chus interviewed his son. H@ told the British television crew that the hterview with the duke had been conducted on December 19, 1940. In that interview, the duke stated that the United States should not enter the war, that it would be a tragic event if "Hitler w d d be overthrown," that "Hitkr was the right and logiral leader of the German people," a d that it was "unfortunate"' that he had never met Hitler (an obvious lie; the duke met Hitler in e t o b e r 19371, who, in his view, was "a great man." Accordjng to Ourslefs son, the duke told his father that if fCoosevclt would make a move t o w 4 peace, the duke would support that move immediately. Such a move, the duke is reputed to have said, would start a revdution in England and would force peace. Oursler's son states that his an-tazed father returned to the hotel, finding it difficzrlt to bclieve Ml)nat he has just heard. He thought that the du,ke wanted his t~acheroussentiments to be passed on to Roosevelt, According to Oursler" son, his father saw Roosevelt and told him about the interview. Oursler9s son states that Roosevelt told his father that nothing was surpris-ing in t h s e days and that some upper-dass people in Britajn wanted to appease Hitler and stop thr war. The hterwiew was wentuaily published i,n March 1941, havirtg been heavily censored. In this respect, the duke's c l a h that the articIe had not quoted him correctly was correct. Brown, author of the biography of the chief of Rritish intelljgence during the war, rcil~forcesOurster's revdations. According to Brown, the duke "made little secret of his sympathies" and told "a pro&ent American visitorfr that it was ""toolate for America to save Democracy in Eur o p e ' b d that it was better for America to ""save it in America for itself"" Moreover, Brown adds: The Duke was said to have written highly c=omprc>misingletters to Hitler personally, ones that escaped the British censorship but were known to have

been delivered. The Dutchess too, was being watched by the FBI, for a s Assistant Secreta ry Ado1f Berte recorded in his diary on September 20,1940, the eve of the day scheduled for the invasion of England: "Tamm, of the FBI, came down, They have uncovered same correspondence which loclks as though the Dutchess of Windsor was in constant communication with Ribbentrup. . . . It looks as thaugh these has been some intriguing. . . . Maybe the Dutchess would Like at Icmg Last to be Queen.144

Folfawlng the end of the war, the Windsors lived mostly in Paris, wi& the duke occasionally visiting BriLain, There are reports that he was involved in some rather questit,na:ble dealings in currency durhg and after the war.

The Covemp Une last episode involves an attempt to cover up the treacherous nature of the Duke of Windsor% activities during the war, Accordix~gto the Channel 4 program, the British royal fmily asked art historian Anthony Blunt (at that t i m , working for British intelligence) to help them hide the duke's pro-Nazi wartime activities. In. 'July 2945, Bli~~nt traveled to Germmy; suppo~"dlyto retrieve some innocent letters. But according to the Chiannel 4 documentary, this was a cover-up. Blunt's mai mission was to mtrieve (and destmy) documents pertainhg to the Duke of Windsor, for example, the transcripts of his conversation with Hitler in October 1937. Bradford refers to the so-called Marburg File, which is the record of Hit:ter%conversations with f a ~ i p statesmen, slating that no record exists of Hitler's conversation with the Duke of Wi.ndsor.1" Moreover, the contents of the file that relates to the duke" activities in Lisbon in July 1940, c l e m a damaging file, were taken and classified as ""serret" by the Allies. Bradford adds that the Americans werc persuaded to keep these documents secret.146 According to the Channel 4 program, Blunt was highly successful in his xnission. The documnts that he bmught back with hixn are locked up in Windsor Castle for 100 years, Mraller confirms that documents relatirrg to the Windsors are sealed in British top secrt-lt files until the twenty-first century.'" M~oreover,the Channel 4 documentmy, relying on John Costello, claims that M16's (external British intelligence) archives have m m information about the duke's treacherous behavior during ttiorld War XI. Zkgler cmcedes that Blm~tand Owen Morshead (fie Windsor librarian) went to Europe and visited both Germany and Holland in a nonsecret mission to retrieve some Letters and rt;lics.""siegler denies categori c d y the existence of a cover.-up.

It is perhaps no cojncidence that Anthony Bhnt himself was a traitor and one of Britain's most famous spies of t-he twentie& century A book about his treachery has becn written by John Coste1lo.l" Other sources tend to support, some very strmgly, the coverup version. Brown, for exam*, is cmvinced that the "lost" documents, which s h w e d "evilience of treasonable commm~ication.between Windsor and Hitler . . . and the ex-kaiser, . . . almost certainly existed."l~(~ The coverup story ubviously, supports the idea that the royal family had somethi~~g very serious to hi& regarding the behavior of the duke dwing World War XI.

Those familiar with the Wndsorsbtory were not surprised at the Channel 4 documentary* mat this program did was tcr assemble, irr a focused short presentation, the facts supporlling the idea that the h k e of Wndsor was a traitor, Clearly, W l e r is grossly understating the tmtt-r when he says that, at the very least, "'the Duke of Wihdsor was frankly an en-tbarrassment to the Brit.ish g o ~ ~ e r n m e ~ ~ t . " ~ ~ l It is obvious that much of the Duke of Windsor" behavior c m be ecasi3-y interpreted as tmachery, There is no doubt fiat he sympathized with t-he Pllazis, associated wilh Nazi sympathizers, m d was quite idisereet inairing his views and in guafding secret intelligence information that rcached him. Prominent resemhers of World War I1 confim this. Wehbeq has no dollbt that the Duke of Whdsor "and even rnorc his wik, had displayed strong pro-German sentiments."l~~ Costeitlo confims thisls and adds that the duke "admired Hitler's Ieadership.'"~Weirrberg adds that "the evidence is clear that he seriously considered working with the Germans and, in fact, remained in cmtact with them for s o m t i m after going to the B&amas."fi3

Concluding Discussion This case is hteresting and instructive in terms of treason. To begh wi&, it involves the well-known sympathy of the Duke of Windsor (and his wife) for t-he Nazis, as well as his public statements (for example, his visit with Hitler, the Verdu~~ radio trmsmission, the cable to his brofier, the intewiew with Uursler), which clearly reBicct his consistent advocating of an ""appeaxmntf' soiution to the conflict. AIthough unpleasant and morally wrong, this se~~timent, h the co~~text of the early to mid-193Qs, could not possibly be considered. t ~ a s o nh . this respect, the duke was no different than many others in the early 1930s who were faced with the choices of fascism, Nazisnt, dennncracy and c o m m i s m , not to mention

monarchy. However, as the outcomes of these choices became clearer, particularly with the evident military expansionist policy of Nazi Germany and its blatmt m d hateful racism, and as it became clear that a second world war was FR the making the moral, meaning of these choices could no longer be ipored. Hitler's invasion of 13nland in Septefinber 1939, and the bllowing ultimatum and dedaration of war by Britain, settled the questions of trust and loyalty fn a swift and liecisive way- Either one was with England or against England. The Windsors' overt behavior prior to August 1, 1940, was certainly not one of solid support for Britain. Even after August 1 (whm t-he Windsors departed for the Bahamas), the duke continued to maintain his contacts with the Nazis and made statemelnts aimed at preventirrg the United States from enter& the war. One can concede that the Duke of Whdsor was interltskd in preventing the war. However, to achieve this goal he was ready to appease Hitler (although he must have known that HitZer"s appetite was insatia:ble). Thus, under the rhetoric of ""pace," he provided support for m e of the most brut.& m d wretchcd regim,es in the history of this planet. Moreover, when one examines those aspects of his behavior that wese nut overt, but apparently quite welt known to Allied ir^ltt.fligmce, the aikgations of distrust and &sloyali,tybecome m c h moro serious. The Duke of Wbdsor" continued unhappiness with the royal family who rehsed to grant HE23 status to the woman he married, and his clear sympathy for Hitler combined to create an explosive concoction. It is clear that ChurchiI1, a firm believer in the mnarchy, spent a great deal of t h e and energy keeping the Duke of Whdsor in check. Zn the midde of a war, he sent letters and friends, conducted surveillmce, and exiled the duke to the Bahamas to contain his questionable loyalty and untmstworthiness. It is, perhaps, appropriate to end this part by reviewing the summary of the Channel 4 documentary. It argued that the W e of Windsor accepted the Nazis"roposal to head Britain under German t-utelage, a kind of a Vichy government, Doing that simply meant klping the Nazis and "workhg with the enemy." "The program implied that he &o helped Gesman eslpionage efforts and that on the diplomatic level he tried to cmvince President Roosevelf to press a "peace" aagreelnelnt between Nazi Germany and England. fn reality, suggestilrg "peace" at that point in time could o d y mean a British capihalatio~~ m d a collapse of Churtlhill"s policy It was also suggested that at one time Roosevelf:proposed assasshating the duke, but the British wodd not allow that. The royal family must have felt that to divulge hfs actkity to the public would hurt the monarchy. Some friends of the Dulte of"Windsor ~ u e that d he was convinced that Britain was close to losing the war and that a worldwide Nazi regime

w d d be established. If such a scenario was about to happen, the duke was convinced that he was going to ""svef?he re ants-a ratianalizarim of several collaborators durhg the war years (for example, X"6tain). Although the Rrit.ish people and the Duke of Windsor denied the t ~ a c h erous nabre of his beplavior, there are some very serious doubts regarding his loydty to and trust in Britain at its most difficult mrnents. The Channel 4 documentary implies that, perhaps, be should have been charged with treason. that the duke violated Clearly; there are compelling reasons to s~~spect loyalv to his government and the trust invested in him by his government (not to m m t i ~ nhis people). His activities certainly bring him very close to the deHniti011 of traitor. The fact that m n y of his activities were t supports the cbarge. conducted in s e c ~further However, an important ingredient in betrayal, -coating, did not take place here. C)f the three elernents necessary to define the duke as a traitor (violatirrg trust, violatjlrg loyalty and turncoating), only two seem to have been present in his behawior, tRus making fie charges made by the Cl~annel4 documentary at least partially substmtive. The duke most certainly violated both trust and loyalty on more than one occasion. FXe is situated. rather well within the boundaries of being a traitor. However, his behav. e major elernmt, Chat is, iar did not illustrate the full cxtent of t ~ a s o nm siding unequivocalfy and openly with the Nazis is missing. The lack of such a move makes labeling the Duke of Windsor a traitor more difficult. This case alerts us to the fact that sometimes the potential traitor walks a very thin line, just on the verge of treason. This case certainly adds to our understanding of treason by illustrating that treason is not a discrete variable but a conthuous one, The depth and intensity of treason varies. Gathering adequate information is crucial, too, especialiy in cases where cmcealment took place. For example, the unItnow implications of the duke's meeting with Hitler and the secreting of the records of that meeting leave too much important information out of the picture. If and when this fnformation becomes available, more light will pour on. this puzzlb~gcase. The Duke of FNindsor died. in 1972, H e never faced djrectly, or provided persuasive accounts for, the nature of his questionable behavior befow, during, or after World War XL mere are many uncertahties in regard to the facts of this case. Because no explicit and open records exist, one must read the ~ l e v a ntexts t very carefully to reach a cmclusion. The important lessm from this is that one can be a ""taitor" and, at the same time, carnouflage it quite effectively n e r e are several contributing factors to this situation: politics, leadership, identity, and loyalty. 'The first is politics. There were powerful actors who bad an hterest in concealing the Duke of Windsor" true support for Nazi Germany. The

German cause was better served by havhg the duke appear to be a loyal and trustful British ciltizen. This mask aided them in gaining access to &:he higher echelons of the British poliEical system, and kept a potential P4tain-like collaborator in stock, without discrediting him. The British political system had no interest in ercposkg the duke's red preferences and sppathies because that- would only have caused divisiveness in their efforts to deal with the conflict, Fimallyras the war progressed and G e m m y was losing, t-he duke himself had no reason to clear the fog surrounding his unethical behavior, What some journalists, inklligence oMicers, and politicians knew was squelched, quite effectively after the war, Blunt's posmar mission to Germany to retrieve the potentially incriminating trmscripts clf the Hitler-Duke conversat-ionsassured secrecy The i n t e ~ s t s of various political actors thus coincided in this case and helped to obhscate the reality of trmsm with a mask of loyalty and trust, seasoned with the duke's resentment that he was not being given the respect he deserved, Such a deceptive political game, particularly FR the context of W r l d War D, was not unique to the case of Edward VIII. This type of g m e is typical of politics, Mlhere interests create a game of masks for public consumption, camnuflaging a reality of immorality and, in this case, of treasonable behavior, .h related topic is the nature of leadership. Clearly leadcrs from all sides faced the dilemma posed by the duke" questionable behavior and participated in this game of masks versus reality. For the reasons stated above, none of the major political or mifitary leaders came out i,n the public arena and. exposed the duke's behavior for what it was. The Nazis ing to coerce the duke into liekction, but when this secret plan collapsed, they did not expose it in public. Sirn,ilarly, Churchill;,who had to allocate pltecious time from his busy schedule to deal with the duke, kept quiet about t-he problem. However, this did not prevent hinl from htervening forcefully and decisively by telling the duke what was appropriate and what was not. mere is no doubt that dcspitc the secl.ecy and potential embarrassment posed by the duke's behavictr, Churchill projected reliablef credible, and solid leadership in this case. n e lesson here is clear, Once Churchill and the Nazis clearly defined their interests, based on a specified moral symboiic universe, appro@atc leadership styles m d decisions followed. The last two topics are those of identiCy and loyajty. The most important issue is t-he way in which &e Duke of Wh~dsorsaw his identity-politicalfy; socially m d culhrally As we saliv, from very early on, the duke felt a kinsltip with Nazi Germany and was probably willing to cooperate and collaborate with the regime. In this respect, he was probably closer to iJavalfi"r P4tain, rather than Quisling, Degretle, or Antmesczl.

Had the Nazis successfully hvaded Britah, the duke would have been useful to the Gemans as the new king. This type of a split identity was characteristic of not only the duke. In Europe, one leader after anotkr whose countries were occupied by the Nazis faced a similar dUemma, tlcrwever, the Duke of Windsor had shown clear signs of his political preferences by the early 11930s. M a t was he to do? His British government was pursuislg a policy that he did not like, and Nazi Germany" victory was not guarmteed. 'f'hus, while expressing dissatisfaction and expounding pro-German sympathies k~private, he mmaged to maiintah a public facade of loyal@ to the Crown, with no small help from ChurchiH and others in fie government. The loyaity issue was a by-product of the conflict that the duke helped into being. Was he contpleteiy loyal to Churchill" Britajnl Not quite. Did he make a full switch of loyal@ to Germany? Not quite. In other words, the duke never crossed, unambiguously moral boumdasies. When such a crossing seems to have occz~rred, its true llaturc was denied, or it was interpreted, in morally mutral terms, or the crossing itself was dfuscated. In several instances, understanding the nat-ure of the duke's violations of trust and loyalty repired that we present the Lalternatives he faced. fn other &stances, the nature of the act was evident in itself. Overall, this case provides a portrait of a m m in a high political pasition who was apparently torn among his desire for peace at almost m y cost, his loyalty to Britain, and his love and appreciation of Germany. Situations of conAict m typical m n a s for antagox-tisticlloyalties, indecisiveness, playing one game in public and another in private, and thus keeping as many options open as posible (for ertample, see Admiral Uarlan's behavhr). This type of behavior may actuafly be nnore pronounced in indkiduals in hi@ positions because there is more at stake. Thus, walking the tightrope of conflicting loyalties, not fulIy comrrtitting oneself to any one side, constructing various masks of behavior in pllhlic a l ~ dconccating others is often typical of such situations. Finally, one must add that this morally dubious behavior involves an intricate play of fabrication, concealment, and ambiguity. Conseque~~tly, separathg fact from. fiction, the real from the Mse, creates prob.X.ems not just for contemporaries, but for later generations a d searchers as well. Because the Duke of Windsor appeared to have honorcd his byalty to the Crown, deconstructing his betrayal requires delving into the details of his actions. Not only was the Duke of Windsor prcrscmting a public ilnage of loydty and tmst in Britain, while engaging jn activities that were cleasfy damaging the British cause, but he was also enrneshed in indecisiveness itself,

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The Case of Ma

This sixteenth-century case of betrayal is complicated alld fascinating, and h o w n very well in Mexico, but much less so elsewhere. This case involves the story of the Conquest of Mexico led by H e r n h Cort4s (1485-1547) in the sixteenth century. Prevailing historical accounts state that in that cmyrrest, Cort4s was helped by a local woman n m e d Malinche. She has became a symbol of treasrm. In i?nexico today "to be cailed a malinchista is to be called . . . a traitor*. . . La Malinche . . . has become a symbol. . . . [She] is for tke most part portrayed as the perpetrator of Mexico's original sin and as a cultural metaphor for all that is wrong with Mexico.'" Even the house where she lived with C-ortksin Mexico City (57 ?"he historkal narrative of the Spanisln Conquest of Mexico is not a sirnp1e account. The story itself is based nnnstly on Spanish sottrces, that is, the victors tding their version of the events. Moreover, the various narrators had their ovvn %endas and interests to p m t and &fend, and thus one should approach the popular and accepted historical narrative with that in mind. 7b complicate matters a bit lurther, there is no consensus about all the details. In the narrative below, I have tried to present the more or less accepted view. Recently, Massig's challemging 1996 work has cast some serious doubts an this accepted history. I will present Hassig's views later.

The Background In f 511 Hernjm, Cort4s and Diego Ve1Bzquez sailed from Spain to conqua Cuba. Following that endeavor, Cort4s was chosen to lead an expedition to the Vucatliin peninsula in early 1519; he was thirty-three years old. After a delay to adequately supply his forces, he left Cuba on February 18, His military strength at the time of departure included. the followirrg: eleven


The Case of Mall'fzat i T e ~ z c p ~ l - M l i ~ z c f ~

Montezunzn X 1 meets Hemrl'n Corkis. lLlalilzclze is standislizzg behiitzd Cortks. Recorded l'fi C l l ~L i e n z ~ de Tlaxcala. WURCE: Nigel Davks,The Aztecs: A History (New E?rk: G. l? PudtzamS Surzs, 1973).

ships (25 according to some sources), about 550 ddiers,z and 150 sailors." He had ten heavy guns, .four lig-hter pieces called fdcmets, a fair an?ount: of mmunition, m d sixten horses. Mt a very impressive force inWstem military terms. In March 1,519, the s~nallsquadso11 arrived at m island off the coast of Yucath called CazumeZ. There, Cartks tried to find and rescue two survivors oE a Sp""ish shipwreck in 3513, who were being held by the local peapk. .hlLL-\oughhis attempts failed, he nevertheless used his stay in Cozu~lelto resupply his ships. ing of March, the ships left Cozumel. They did not travel far. A leak in one of the boats forced them to return to tbe same port. Upon returnjng, they met one of the Spanish captives, Gertjnim de Aguilar, During the time Aguilar had been stranded on Cozumel, he bec m e famiiiar with the M y a n dialects of Ytlcatbn, which m d c him an ideal candidate for interpreter, Another major advantage, perhaps more

The Case of Mall'fzat i Te~zcp~l-Mlitzcf~


important, was that he had not really integrated into the local culture. Fle wanted to rejoin his origi11a1 Spanish culture. CorMs prcrvided Xguilar with exactly the opportwity he wanted. This is an important point, because another Spanish sailor who survived t:he shipwreck, Gonzalo de Guerrero, had become completely naturaiized and a2ssorbed into the local d t - u r e and showed no interest: i,n rejoining C o r t 4 s . a c e the repairs of the ship were completed, Cort4s and his Beet sailed again on Maxh 4, The next goirrt of landing was near a coastal area h w n as Tabasco (on about March 22). The town that was to become the focus of battle was Potonchan, From now on, a clash of It-miocultures was to unfold. The Aztec empire, which domilnated Mexico, was then d e d by Montezuma (sometimes called Moctezuzna) 11. The Aztecs based their rule on a taxatiun system that was highly coercive and on a blood-thirsty religious belief system. Their lust for human sacrifices is well documented. Some reports (probably exaggerated) state that the Aztecs once made 80,000 human sacrifices in four days. The amount of coercion and pressure rczquired to supply the Aztec priclsts with the hurnans needed for the ritual sacrifices must have been e~~ormous. Moreover, at the tjme of the conquest, the Aztec system was characterized by a high degree of connict. Mmtezurna II was both an admirer of power and a firm religious heljever*He also expected the return of a legm d a q gad-Quetzalcaatl, the Plumed Serpent-whose comeback was based. on both prophecies and omens. There arc. irrdicatrions that when the nekvs of Cort4s's landing =ached Mofiezuma H, he believed these white Spaniards to be the gods he was waithg for.5 This belief was a fateful mistake. It was going to cost him his empire and his life. In military terlns, Cort4s had about 550 soldiers, some horses, and some technologically advanced weapons (armor and fireams). This rclatively modest force was about to bring down a migMy empire. Militarily, it is cmceivable that had Mmtezuzna II been mare determhed, assured, and not so hesitant, his vast superiority in manpower, howledge of the terrain, and better intelligence could have translated into a defeat of Cortdis At lea&, he could have m d e the price of conquest so high that it w d d have become impractical for CorMs to continue. But Montezuma was not blessed with these attributes. His opponent, Cartes, was a determined, decisive, cunning, m d ruthless c m a n d e r . He hccv hukv to create opportunities and took advantage of them when they were present. En this clash, the fate of the Aztecs was sealed. Hassig discusses a number of explanations for how and why it was possible for so few Spaniards to defeat so many Aztecs,We also adds that Cort4s did not land into a vacuum. He found himself in the midst of military and political conflicts among the various groups that formed the Aztec empire. Some of these groups m s t certainjy used Cortks and his fosces for a e i r own purposes.7


The Case of Mall'fzat i Te~zcp~l-Mlitzcf~

The first battle began in March 1519 around Potmchan.8 n e r e , defiant Indims were mounting their forces against Cartes. They "consisted of five squadrons of eight t%fousandm n eac:h."g Cortks had "a force of three hundred Spaniards" with horsemen and cannms.lo In the fierce battle that ensued, Cortbs's forcles won. Having conpered Potonchan, Cort4s left on April 97 to continue the Conquest of Mexico.

Enter Marina h o t h e r important event took place in Potonchan. Before the Spaniards left, they acquired twenty (nineteen, acceding to some versions) women slaves. One of these women-Malinche-is the focus of this narrative.11 Cortks next fanded near what we now h o w as Vera Cruz, on April 21, 1519, Cort4s realized that Aguilar could not provide interpretative assistance because he was ignorant of the spoken language.12 Unlike the Maym dialect used in Tabasco, the area where Cost4s lmded was under Aztec inftuence, and the spoken language was Nahuatl. At that point, Cortks was informed that one of the female slaves was a native Mexican and understood the language. The name given to that female slave was Marina. IR Vaillantfs 1962 book on the Conquest of Mexico, figure 28 shows the Spaniards landing at Vera Cruz, and at the right side of the drawing one can see Marina "exercising her diplomacy m a native."l3 Mihen Marina was brought to Cortks she was between fourteen and nineteerz years old." b a s e Marina never left mything h writhg about her life, her persmal history prior to her life with the Spaniards is nut entirely ctear, but what fotlows is based on existing evidence. It is beliczved that her orighal name was Malinali Tenepal. Her first n m e is like the twdfih day of the twenty-day Aztec month. 1Phe second. m m possibly hints at a person who talks a lot, and with animats. MalinaXi was said to have been born in I'ainda in the province of Coatzacualco, on the southeastern borders of the Mexican eznpire.15Malinali was a native speaker trE Nahuatl. Although details about the social status of her family of origin are unclear, it is claimed that she was the daughter of a local chief (cncir;i~lc.)who died while she was stifl young.1" Her mother, Cimatl, soon remarried another mciqz-le.A son was born of this new marriage. Cirnatl feared that Malinali might stmd in the way of her half-brother inheriting the position of chief. Accoding to this version, she sold Maiinali seeretly to some t r a d i n g traders of Xicatlanco, rTi, conceal. this, she pretended that Malinali died. In fact, she used the dead body of a child of one of her slaves to show that Malinali was dead.17 The traders sold Malinali, again, to the cuciqrre of 'TBbasco, who gave her to the Spaniards. Johson suggests that the name the Spmiards gave her-Marina-was a Spanish approximation of MalinaIi. The locals, however,

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might have found the Malinali-Marina names too difficult, and they cafled her Malinche (the suffix "&em hdicated rc.spect).l"mus, when Malinali was givcn to Cortci?~, she was t? "slave in Polonckan in the Chontal Maya-speaking area of Ymucatan."~~ Marina was fluent fn Nahuatl, her mother% tongue, and her stay in Tabasco gabre her a goad h~owledgeof Mayan, too. The use of Marha and Aguilar as intevreters worked this way: Marina talked bhraatl with the Aztecs. She then trrmslated it to Mayan for Aguilar, and be translated it into Spanish. Eventually Maria h e w ellough Spmish so that this cumbersorne translation was no longer necessary. Clearly, the Aguilar-Marina colnbination was a phcrnomenal advantage for Cnrt4s.z" Various sotlrces state that Marina looked differe~~t thm the o ~ efemale r slaves; she was more distinguished and. beautiful," as well as "intellid somethnes humme. Tradigent."zz She is described as ""clever a ~ seemed tion says Chat she w s "beautiful as a goddessef""e';n the female slaves we= given to CorMs, he first gave Marina to one of his good friends, Alonso Hern6ndez de I"uertacarrera.zil However, as Markla settled into her new role as interpreter, Cort4s waked that she was one of his major assets, Marina ""culd not only tell Cort4s what the words meant, but could also explain fndian attitudes, expressions, gesbres, acts, m d reactions, She was sensitive to everything that went on, an acute obser~er.~~Zs Puertacarrero was soon sent to Spain on Cmtesfsflagship, heading a mission to give the Spanish king his share of the accrtmulated treasures.26 Marina "rode behind Cort4s on his horse, stood beside him in the field, shared his bed at night and later bore him a son.""" Marisra, thus, was not just a technical linguist ad\risor to Ccrrtks. She was the cultural expert whose advice to him was tlte tool that made a cnlcial differellee in Cort6sfs ability to conquer Mexico. :lnthis respect, Marjna shifted her trust and loyalty from her local cuitural matrix to the Spanish conquistadors. At Vera Cruz, Cort4s destroyed his ships, so that his men would not consider retreating to Cuba on the masch inland to the Aztec capital. Many sources note how indispensable Malinche's advice and assistmce we= on the march. Along the way, Cort4s learned about the cruelty of the Aztecs, their demands for taxes, and their capture of prisoners to be sacrificed to the Aztec gods inTenochtitlh. Many Indian t r h s were unhappy with Aztec rule and were waiting for an opportunity to h e themselves from the Aztec yoke, Marina stepped way beyond the technical rofe of a translator as she assumed the role of cultural intergreter and advisor. Her cultural h~okvledgeenabled Cort4s to take advantage of opportwnities about which he would not have known without Marina" guidarrce. This ahantage was mapified by the er divisions and conflicts m o n g the different Indian groups and by Nontezumn's apparent ambivalence about how to deal with Cartes,


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Two additional events arc worthy of mention, One was Cort&s%encounter with the naxcaltecs. The naxcaltecs were no great admirers of the Aztecs. Yet they fou$ht Cort4s with determjnation and courage, causing him considerable darnage." hentually, they b e c m e his allies, Indeed, figurc. 32 in Vai1.1ant" book s h w s Cortks meeting Tlaxcaltec high dig~~it-aies with Marina doing the hterpretatiofl The second event is that during Cort4sfs march to the Aztec capital, Tenochtitlkn, he went to see the Cholollans, who were allies af Montezuma and the Aztecs. Cort4s and his soldiers entered Chololfan, while his Tlaxcaltec escort waited outside the city The story goes that while in the city, Malinche found out that the CholotZans were preparhg an ambush for Cort4s and that a big Aztec army was waiting just outsidc Chololian. She told Cort4s about it, and he prepared his own ambush. The next day, under the p ~ t e x of t some fabricated ertcuse, he cmvemd the Cholollm nobiiit-y and soldiers into a centrd cottrt, and there, unprovoked and in a coordinated, act, his soldiers massacred them all. This siging of a larger massacre of fie Choldans in the streets, in whicb the Tlaxcaltecs took an active part. Clearlyr in this tde Majinche is credited with betrayjng a local plan to ambush Cartes m d finish hin? off. Here is how J o h s o n describes the event: [Marina] had been approached by a Chalultan woman who admired her and tzranted her to remain in Chcjlula and marry cjne af her sons. She was urged to life, because the Spaniards were soon to be ataccept in order to save her W-n tacked. The Cholulan woman knew because her hwbmd, a chief, had been given a golden drum by the Aztecs as an inducement to take part in the assault. Marina pretended to agree and begged for time, saying she would have to find someone to carry her personal gmds, her clothes and the jewelry, and she persuaded the cjlder woman to wait in her quarters while she did so. When Cort4s heard Marina" story, he seized a priest and, thrc3ugh Marina's interpretation, forced a canfessiun out of him that confirmed the story,""

Davies questions the validity of the Cholollan conspiracy against Cortes, caliing it unrealistic." From this paint on, Cholollan served as a modcl of obedience and loyaity to Cort&s,JVtmust be emphasized that the question of whether there actually was a Cholollan conapirary agajnst Cartes is not as important as Ma%inchefsrole in exposing such a cmspiracy whether real or innagined. 'The fact is that Malinche emerges as the one who betrayed the Cholollans, The massacre at Gholollan was-as I'rescott points out-to =main a "dark staill on the memory of fie Conquer~rs"~%nand"one of the most eontroversid events in Cnrt&sflifeeff34

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.And Malinche has certainly been portrayed as havjng played a central role in that event. Davies reports on another possible betrayal by Malhche during the expedition to Honduras.. Cuauht4moc [Montezuma's successor] was compelled to accompany his master [Cortks]an this ill-fated adventure. . . . During the long march, on the pretext af an alleged plot, Cartes ordered Cuauht4mac and the cacique af 'Tacuba to be hanged. According to native sources, Cuauhtkmo>cwas the vietint of mere calumy. One wonders why Uaiia Marina, still acting as interpreter, could not, had she wished, have ascertained the real truth. Before the former ruler was hanged, he exclaimed: ''Q Malinche, for many days 1 have understood that you would condemn me to this death, and have known your false wards, far you kill me ~njustly.'~35

The rest of the historical narrative is well known, Cartes continued his conquest of Mexico. He reached Tencrchtitlhn in November 1519. Later, Montezuma was killed, TenochtitlBn destroyed, and the conquest expanded. to Honduras and Guatemala. When Vaillant shows the conquest of Tenochtitlhn, he prociuces a drawing in Mthi& ""Cuauht&moc, who conducted the defense of Tenochtitltiin, is received wi& all the horrors a%war by Cortks and his consort, Mar;ina. . . . With this event, the Mexicans were finishedaU36 Militarily and politically, the Conquest af Mexico is most certainly one of the most fantastic and extraordinary tales inhistosy In it, a rather small rnilitary force, fighthg its way in an u n h o w n territory, c m q u e ~ dand, in fact, elimhated the entire Aztec empire, The role of Marina in t h i s conquest is porh-ayed, repeatedly, as crucial. W ~ e nMontezuma met Cortkr;, Marina (and Aguilar) translated. Critical conversatio~~s between the two were translated by Marina, too.37 Indeed, plate 62 in billant's 1962 book shows the meeting of Mmtezuma and Cortcis with Marina standing right behind Cortcis. Vaillant states that "Marina's value to Corttits camat be underestimated.~ Catalina-ventually arrived in Mexico. Within Cortks" official wi three rnonlths of her arrival, she was dead, officially from astl~ma.However, Catalina's mothcr accused Cort4s of participating in her daugMerfs murdcr by stranglkg her." Although Cortks had several women (including one daughter of Montezuma), Nfarina bore him a son-Martin. hlthough historically and biologically inaccur&e, this s n n is credited as the first mestizo. Thus the Sgmish Conquest of Mexico not only was a militarypolitical conquest, but it ""was fullowed by a biological conquest that would create a mestizo society."@


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During the course of the expedition to FIonduras, Cort4s eventctaly "arranged and supervised a marriage between his faithful interpreter, diplomatic advisor, and mistress, Marina,, and Juan de Jaramirlo. jaramillo was drunk at the time, and many of the Spaniards were secrcltly critical of Cort4s for his treament of the womm who had not only made his conquest possible, but: had also borne him t?l. least one child. Despite her mrriage, Marina conthued to serve Cort4s as m hterpreter."41 Both Collis alld Le6n-Portiila write about Marir~a" ccfllxrage and describe hokv indificult: moments of despair and danger; such as during the Tlaxcaltec attack, Marina showed no fear.42 Their accounts support the position that Malinchefsrole was predclminmtly one of cultulral mediator, not just techical, trmslbatar. Callis adds that ""near Tlaxcala there is a volcano which in Cort&sfstime was called Matlalciuatl (the Dark Green Woman). The divine denizen of this mountain was afterwards identified with Dofia Marina and the momtain is now called Maljnche, her name."43 That Marina &splayed authoritarianism in her dealings with the Aztecs is also clear from ano&er draoving in Vaillant's book. In, the illustration, Marina gives an order to an Aztec to do something, and that Aztec, to use Vaill-ant" own explmation, ""cmplies with ilI grace."% Marha joined Cortks on his last trip to Honduras*Aguilar had died by then," but Marina could now speak Spanish. Johnson describes how during that expedition she was remited with her mcrther: During her bst service to Cortks-an interpreter during the March to Hondura-Marina had a reunion with her mather, who had sald her to slave traders years earlier: The mother, by nc>w Christened Marta, and her son LBzaro were brought to the Spaniardskamp at Coatzacoalcos, The older tzroman and the young man tzrere trembling with fear. But Marina fc3rgave her mother, treated both of them with kindness, and lctaded them with gift5.46

It appears that in her later years Marina enjoyed a high income from the estates given to her by Cort4s. She had. townhouses in Mexico City, a country house in Chapultepac, and a garden in Coyuacen." However, little else is b o w n of her Zife. Beyond the fact that she bore a daughter to Juan de jaramillcl, little more is know-n of Marina, except that her death occurred around 1540. In 1605 Don Fernando Cortks, son of the illegitimate Don Martin Cortbs, addressed a memarial tcr the Spanish court detailing the services his grandmather had performed during the Conquest. With that the record, official and othe~wise, of Malinali, Marina or Malinche ends, The name Malinche, however, unhap-

The Case of Mall'fzat i Te~zcp~l-Mlitzcf~


pily lives on in Mexican slang as a pejorative term far persons who betray their nation and heritage.@

n e r e is little doubt that although Malilrche was a herolne for the conquistadors, she was considered an archetypicai traitor by many Mexicans. The popular narrative of the cmquest leaves very little doubt as to Malinche's cmcial role in that conquest. Even FXassig admits that the Marina is "widely regarded. . . to have played a vital role in the canvest of Mexico land] I.,a Mafhche has become a major motif in Mexican literaturc."l" It is easy to understand why Malinche is considered a traitor, Although she most definitely seems to have had some very good Rasons for violating trust in, and loyalty to, her native c u l t w , that dues not: seem to change the image, Thus, we have a woman who was considered a hero CJwil7g the cotonial period, but following the War of Independence (1821), "she was increasingly regardcd as a trai,mr, a whore?,m d a racial turncoat who collaborated with the Spanish invaders,"'""

Hassig's Challenge In a powerfully argued and persuasive 1996 paper, Hassig attacks the accepted popular narrative about Malhche. Hassig is no amateur. He has published, two major books focusing on the Aztecs and the Conquest of :Mcxico."l In his 1994 short history of the Spmish Clmvest, Hassig, cantrary to otbcr researchers, plays down Malinche's role. For example, fiis description of the events in ChoXollan does not even mention MasinaS5z tlassig does not fail to notice that (a) the history of thr Spanish Conquest is typically knokvn. from Spa"i& sot~rces,and fb) very little factual information is known with any dcgree of certainty about Malinche. He points out, for example, how even infarmaticm &out her background is rwager. Hassig summarizes the ilnpllrtance of Matinche in Mexican history in three areas: (1)she is considered to be the mother of the mestizo race; (2) she acted as a cdtural intevreter for Cortgs and thus facilitated the Conquest of Mexico; and (3) she is " c ~ d i t e dwith saving the Spaniards by learning of the ChoIoltec plans to massacre them, warning Cort4s" (p.2). tlassig then takes these three popular beliefs, one by one, and shatters their ~ralidity. :In brief, the first claim, says Hassig, cannot be hctually true. '*The Spmiards wem givm numerous Indian women before the prtrpancy of blarina.. . . Thus Marha was not the molf.ter of the first recopbed mestizo" "(PP.2-3). As to hes d e as culbal: interpreter, Hassig admits that hdeed she must have acted as a banslator, but the hnpclrtance of her rolehe claims-is greatly exaggerated. Hassig claims that "the pivotal translator in the early days of the Conquest was not she but Aguifar" (p. 4).


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Also, he challenges the accepted version that she quickly learned Spanish m d thus the need for another trmslator was sipificantty diminished (p. 4). Moreover, Hassig pohts out that Malhche" social positio~~ was such that: her abilit)l to act as a cultural interpreter was probably very lowI or none at all (p. 5). In other wods, her knowledge about, and abiliv to comprehend, the geopolitiral intricaciss ol' the culktrr;.was very minimal, to say the least. The Chdollm massacre, according to Hassig, is the most significant intervention by Malinche. Hassig easily discounts her role there. He points out that there is no tangible evidence that the Cholollans were indeed preparing any ambush for CorMs. Hassig points out that once Cort4sfs forces began the conquest, he became entangled in local politics amvarious Indian groups*The massaese at Cholollan can, and should, be understood within this context. Basically, Hassig argues that the Tlaxcdtecs ant( Corth conspircrd together to massacre those Chololtecs who were siding with the Aztecs against the I;taxcalt.ecsand Cortks. Corti.s, in this eontext, is viewed as having been manipulated by the Zaxcaltecs to help them as their ally, against part of the Chdoltecs. "In a single stroke, Cartes killed the b ~ gmu& , OS the political leadership, and the cream of the ct'f7ololtec amy. After the massacre, Cortks appointed a new king m d forced m alliance between t-he Tlaxcaltecs and the Chcrlolte~s.""~3 Hassig also discards Malinche's story about behg asked to rnarry a local as highly improbable. Moreover, klassig argues that althoutgh the Chololtecs posed no threat for Cortes, they did pose a political challmge to t-he Tlaxcaltecs. Thus t-he massacre in Chololl,a,n must be hierprekd as an hner confict within its palitieal cmtext in central America. "hshort, the Tlaxcaltecs had the most to gain by defeakg Choloilan, since they we^ the mmt sipificant military threat. the Chololtecs faced. . . . [AI massacre of thc Chololtec leadership would serve Tlaxcallm's interests, removing those who betrayed them while strengthening those out of power who were sympathetic to the Tla x ~ a l t e c s . ' ~ ~ Hassig is convinced that "the Tlaxcaltecs were almost certainly the masterminds of this event,""" and "Cort6s's o m massacre was both premedjtated and coordinn.t.ed with the Tlaxcaltecs."" He thus completely discards Marina's role as the "discoverer" of the supposed CholoUan ""plot'" s a i n s t Cortcits.'7 However, it is clear that placing Marina in the certtral role of betraying the Choldan plot to ambush Cort4s-thus leaving CorMs little choice but to launch a preemptive strik+removes the responsibility for the massacre from Cnrt4s and casts Marks into the uncomfortable heroine/ traitor role. About Marina, Hassig concludes: "Her role as a translator was real, but she was neither unique nor irreplaceable. But what of her role in warning Cort4s of the plmned ambush in CholoXlan? Except for C0rti.s" sword, these is no evidence of such a plot.""We also pohts out that whereas the

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"eadiest chronicles pay [Marina] the Icast attention, over time her role bec m m r e certain, defined, and ixnportant. . . . From brief references to her in the earliest accounts, she grows and is fler;hed, out (hvented?),both as a persm and as a participant.'J~~ 'The question of betrayal is also addressed by Hassig: The ultimate betrayal in the Conquest does not belong to Marina and what she may or may not have done but, rather; to those who accept the ""facts" "of the Conquest, and Marina" role in it, front a Spanish perspective. . . . The facts af Marina's life are not what is impadant here; it is how her life was used in support of a gart..icularview of history . . . Thus, the post-colonial reassessment that dismissed Marina as a heroine and reconceived her as traitor was not the daring revisionism ioseems. It did nat reassess the role of Marina, but merely shifted her position within the Spanish-authored history that this reinterpretation accepts unquestioningly. Marina as traitor did not break free af the conqueror "s vision; it mere1y shifted its emphasis and continued the coXIaboration.a

Very strmg words in$eed. Furthermore, Hassig poi.nts out that the consensus ""view of the Conquest has grown largely from the h e major first-hand. accounts of the Canquest, plus that of I4pez de 66mara.""" He directs our attention to the fact that thase xlarrati.ves werc? witten by nonob~ectiveobservers.

Concluding Discussion We currently have two very different accounts about Malinche, One, the popular and accepted view, tells her story from the Spanish point of view. h1 it, she is portrayed as a heroine by the Spmiard conquistadors. Following the colonial period, she was rclgarded as a traitor. The essence of tfiis contradictory perileption is a matter of who views her. The acts attributed to her by the Spaniards constructed her as a herohe. The very same acts, vicwed by the Mexicans, made her a racial,and cultural traitor, violator of the trust and lyaity of her people. Malhche is an exceflent example of how the very s m e actims, exarnined Trom different points of view, give rise to the hemineltraitor dichotomy. This is a prime illustration of how the intevretation of the moral content of treason is t o t a y dependent m poliLical context and on the stntcfzkrr. of betrayal. Then along comes Hassig, who chafleng@sall that. :Inhis interpretation, the role of Malinche was ertlremely exaggerated. "rbe real treason, according to hint, is to trust the historical narrative of the conquest, as given by the victors,


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The ixnportant point for our purposes is not whether Hassig is right or wrow. The sociological and historical fact is that Malhche was irrdeed socially constructed as both a heroine and a traitor. Whetha that construction is historicatly accurate does not concern us here. Much like other national myths, such as Israeli myths," the myth of the :!litz,h3 and the Masada myth8&the narra.t.iveof Malkche gained a life of its own as a national symbol. Malilrche is a classic case of the social constmctim of national consciousness. 'The case involvhg Malhche fits our theoretical approach very nicely Cort4s and Malinali were from entirely different symbolic moral universes. VVhen t-hey met, Malinali must have been quick to apprtrciate t-he power 01 Cort&s,as w e l as the opportunities presented bp this f&eful meeting. Cost4s was quick to capitalize on Malinali"s evident lingual talents and prclbably her natural intelligence and quick grasp of the local geopolitical situation. For Cort4s and his Spaniards, there could only be app-rcciation for her. Ixrdetld, from their perspective, she was a heroine. She made a complete move to tbrir si$e-psychologically, politically, and physically. It was a genuine case of turncoalng. For postcolonial Mexico, Malkali was viewed with scorn as a traitor, as the woman who enabled Cort6s to cmyuer and alter Mexic olitically, socially, culturatly, and physically. The power to dccide the n a t m of the symbolic rneanjng of Malinali" actions is obvious here, too, Was the moral constmction of Malhali as a traitor by postcolonial Mexico justific.d? They certainly had the power to constmct her as a traitor, but the moral basis of their judgment is rather shaky The peopte whose trust and loyalty Malinche violated and suppose* betrayed had enslaved h r . The question of whether a slave can "betrw those who enslaved her remains a rather thorny issue when viewed horn a Western spbotic moral unfverse. Mareo~rer,Malinali was not the only one to collaborate with the cmquistadors. Hassig points out that the Totonacs, Tetzcocas, Chalcas, and, of course, the 'Tiaxcaltecs all took the side of the Spaniards." If Ifmt6s and his liznited rnilitary power could overcome Montezurna, it was in no small measure because of the local help he received.. For exarrrple, the Tlaticaitecs werl, mfghty allies. And it is not too difficult to reatize that t-he motivation of a slave to help people who, to a large extent, freed her and offered her a lifestyle sfne could not possibly have had as a slave, was strong and probably even justsed. The social construction of Malhali as first a hero m d later a traitor rclAect changes in the complex skucture and mord content of Mexican society, as well as the change"^ power configurations in that society The acts Malinali supposedly committed were not, in themselves, ~ e r e n t l treacherous. y h decidhg whether she was a

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traitor, one must first answer the questions, who trusted her? Who was expected to trust her and why? Who was she supposed tcr be loyal to and why"?ven if the popular ~Tersion.of the evezzts leadkg to the massacre at Cholollan (contested by Hassig) is valid,to conclude that she '"betrayed"" any Indian in Ch~1oIl;mmust be viewed as a ccmtroversial statement. Cleariy, Matinali cmssed clnlttrrat bolmdaries. She moved from being loyal to her own cultural heritage to a hostile culture whose rclpresentatives came to Mexico on a voyage of conpest and exploitation. Can a slave be defined as a traitor if that slave goes against her captors? Although Mafinali sided with the victors, when she joined them, it was not clear that they would hdeed win. Moreover, it is possible that her joining Cortks provided the Spaniards with an hdispensable assistmce, which increased their chmces of W Politically, Malinali, the onverted from the Aztec-dominated cnnlture to a Merent cdture. Her identity must have been transformed as well, as she adopted and @&raced the ways of life of the conqueriq Spmiards. These transformatims obviously culmhated in a chmged direction of trust and loyalty for her, As we have seen in previous chapters, Malinali" account is not atypical. Vlasov is a comparable example, The generalization from this case is as follows. W had one culture, dominated by a powerful, abusive, and divisive regime rted disunity rivalry, and conflict. Many individuals were quit md wanted to get the oppressive yoke off their backs. Then a foreip power invaded the territory, threatened the powerful hegemony of the 10ct.d regime, and searched for local support. This situation is analogous to many other similar invasions firoughout history. Such evezzts may ellcourage individuals to redefine the boundaries of their symbolic moral universes; trust and lctyalty may shift, and conversion and turncoating from one culture to another may take place.. Very much in C. Wighi: Mills's spirit, the poliitieal, social, and cultural upheaval may trmslate to the personal level with the forming of new idmtities, and those new identities support the upheaval. This case ftlustrates that hdividuals who experience such transfsmtatiorzs of Chejir idmtities risk being socially constructed as "'traitors." Furthermore, as Ducharme and Flne showed in their 3995 study of Renedict Amold, and Hassig in this case, as I-he concepts of loyalty and trust change their meaning, and different groups of people construct different meanings for national conscicrusness, the images of betrayal and heroism also change. We can certainly expect that when similar cmflict sitt~ationsarise, hdividuals like MaIhali m d Vlasov, who straddle the line between hero m d traitor, will emerge. The non-European case of Malinali supports the power of the generalizations of the analytical cmceptualization created here.

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Treason in

daism and Israe

So far we have examjned quite a few cases of betrayal in Europe and North America. It is, perhaps, only fair that I ccmlplement these cases by exmining a few famous cases of traitors k m Israel and the history of Judaism, since I come from that cul'lural context. Although quite a few cases can be f o n d in Black m d Morris" 1991 work, and W s t even devotes a whole chapter to Israeli cases," would )ike to present a somewfiat different selection of cases, based on the andytical iapproach presented in this book. Like other cultures, Judaism had its share of traitors. I describe below a few of the more famous characters, the period in which they acted, and the meanh~gof their actions. This, by no means, is an exhaustive list and is meant for illustrative pwposes only As W shall see, periods of turmoil, of debate about the meaning and nature of moral bomdaries and their enforcement, are periods when the issues of trust and logfatty e ~ ~ e r gM e .e n c~dfuresare experie~zcingprocesses of disintegration, reintegration, and. chmge, the issue of moral boundaries is at the forefront. 'T"hese are periods when hdividual members are required to decide who they arc, MIho or what they identify with, and wfiich side they stand with. Typically, it is durhg periods of such unrest and. hrrmoil that we find uur traitors. Etsewl-iere in this book I have mem.t.ionsome biblical cases of betrayal, The first case I discuss here takes place in the fast perioa of the second Jewish temple.

JosephusFlavius and Yachanan Ben-Zakkai During A.D. 66-73 the Jews rwolted against the Roman conquest of Israel (referrcld to at that time as the R m a n provirtce oE Judeaj.2 The hit-ialivc of a small number of people, the Jewish revolt against the Roman Empirtli

was doomed to fail, What has become h o w n as the Great Revolt was in fact a majestic military, sociai, and political hilure of the Jews. The last effort by Che Roman imperial army against the Jcwish rebels of the GreatRevolt was the destruction of Masada in A.D. 73.Ulthough Jewish resistance agafnst Rome etid not end in this revolt (the Bar Kokhba revolt erupted again about sixty years later), the Roman victory against the rebels was decisive, and the second Jewish tmple was destroyed and.reduced to ashes. However, out of this destmc.tion arose a new form of Judaism, not nationalistic but rather spiritual. In many sig~~ificant aspects, this was the birth of @tlrrodox Judaism. That period gave rise to two very famous figures who defected to fie Romans. Che is a person who became, perhaps, the best-hown traitor h Jewish history-Josephus Flavius; the other was Rabbi Yochanan BenZakkai who is credited with establishing Orthodox Judaism, a form of Ju&ism that prtlvailed until 1948, when a new Jewish state, and hence a renewed Jewish national culture, was esthlished by secular Jews. Joseph Ben-Matityahu, later known as Josephus Flavius, was born in Jerusalem in A.D. 37 to a priestly family. He was not an e~~thusiastic supporter of the Great Revolt. However, when the Great &volt began, at around A.D. 66, he became the gwernor of fie Galilee and was charged with the important responsibility of defendislg it. In AD. 67, the major fortress in the Galileelbdfat (Jotapataj-feu. The last few survivors, including Josephus, decided to commit suicide. Josephus managed to trick the others, and he and anol.her person remained as the last ones dive. At that point, Josephus persuaded the other man that they should both surrt.nder to the Romans. Josephrts was apparently a skillful man, and he struck a relationship with the c o r n a n d e r of the Romm f m e s , &Spasian, Among other thixrgs, Josephus s u p p o s e q t d d him that he would become emperor, Vespasian indeed later became the Roman emperor. Regardiess of how hislorically accwate this story is up to this pobt, it is clear that Josephus then went to Rome where he became a Roman citizen and an officiai historian. He married four times and proloably died smetime around A.D. l(ltf.4 As a resulrt of Joseph Ben-Matityahu's betrayal hYodfat and his defection to the Romans, he has been viewed by many as one of the most prcmounced traitors in Jewish history W ~ aist regarded as his act of betsayal is accentuated even further because of his ineffectfie defense of the GaXilee. However, this man wrote the only book available about the period- Xt is a strange situation indeed &at we have to form an opinion about the behavim of Jews during those fateful years, based on information provided by a Jew who i s viewed by many as a traitor to his ovvn culturt?and people. In 1998 there was m interesting twist related to Jssephus Flavius and treason. The head of Israeli premier Binyarnin Netanyahu's chambers in

1998 was a m m named Uri Elitzur, Elitzur has been identified with the Israeli ~ l i g i o u right, s liv* in and supporting Israeli settlemnts in thr occnnpied West Bank He has k e n politically involved and even edjted the settlers' extreme right weekly magazine Nekuda, In 1998 Netmyahu's g o v e m e n t was involwed with the Palestinian Authority in negotiations that were aimed at giving &em more territory for continuation of the Middle East peace process, For many settlers, t;i\ling any of the territories to the Palestinians is considered a "no-no.'TElzuur seelned to support Netmyahu's position that some territoriat concessions were unavoidable. Consequently some settlers distributed pamphlets in which Elitzur was renamed ""fsephus 1F"lavius"-h other words, stating that he was a traitoz Sure enough, Netanyafnu, as well as other settlers, denounced, these pamphlets. Since the Rabin assassi~~ation, Israel has indeed become very sensitive to namecallhg.3 Josephs FIavius was not the only one p i l t y of betrayal in that era. Another rather farnous man dekcted from the JeLvish camp to the Romans and is generally not v i w e d as a traitor at all. That m m W= Rabbi Yochman Bcn-Zakkai who, like fosephus Flavius, lived and died during this cataclysmic period for the Jewish people. Ben-Zakkai escaped from fcrusdem, prdably in A.D. 69, in the middle of"kspasiads spring offe17sive in the north, and found refuge with the Romms.h Like many other contemporary Jews, bchanan Ben-Zakkai kept a healthy and sober degree of skepticism in the face of" increasing levels of military-political activism, zealot fervor, and Mse messianism. Cfeasiy, he was not a fan of either the Zealots or the Sicarii7 and questioned t-he wisdom of ChaHtnging the might of the Roman Empire. The case of Yochanan Ben-Zakkai not only raises the issue of possible alternatives to the Great Revolt but also provides a comparison to Joseph Ben-Matityahu Uosephus Fla~ius)~ Like Josephus FLavius, Ben-Zakkai disagreed with many of the stated goals of the Jewish Great Revolt.WReing in his sixties when he dekcted, he qpa~t""7ly found common ground with Vespasian (who was morc3 or less his age), chief commander of the Roman militaq- mashhe that was crushing the Jewish rebellion ( a d on his way to becoming emperor of the Roman Empire). kspasian granted Ben-Zakkai his wish to establish a smdl center, with a few Jewish scholars, to study and contjnue develuping spiritual Judaism. The place Ben-Zakkai was sent to was Uavneh. 'There Ynchanan Bcn-Zakkai was slrccessftd in esthtishing a renewed branch of spiritual Judaism. As so many have poixrted out, despite his dcfection, Ben-Zakkai is definitely ~zotconsidered a traitor. His way led to a renekved type of Jewish life, and his challenge of the rebels' decision to confront the Roman Empire is frequently presented as an alternative to

the rebellion. Apparently, both Ben-Zakkai and Josephus Flavius cibjected to the rebellion against the Romans. M~ereasJosephus prohably left ]Udaisrn altogether, went. to Rome, and adopted a Roman lifestfle, RenZakkai did not leave and remained Jewish to his last day Many individuals take Ben-Zakkai as an illustratiox~of what could agaiinst the Romans, that is, inhave been the alternative to the rebellio~~ stead of decimation and destruction on a mass scale, a renewed and meaningfd Jewish life that enabled Jews to fulfifl their religious and culrural aspirations without e~~dangering what was mast cherished to themWg The bsephus-Ben-Zakkai contrast is used continuously in potitical and mord debates in modern Israel. For example, Israel Eichler, editor of the Hart.di1" weekly The Naredi Canrp, kvrote in his magazine that one needs to remember the hoodlums who, during the days of the second temple, brought destmctim to tbe land (despite their good inf;entions). He cmtrasted them with Yachmm Ben-ZaUai, whom he called a Jewish holy scholar and righteow m n who surrendered to the Romans and went to Galut in Yavneh. Eirhler was quick to paint out that Ben-Zakkai was the one to be credited with the survival of the people of Israel since then (A.D. 69-70) '1' ?"here are many interesting paraflels between Ben-Zakkai and Josephus. Both werc front the in-group; both i v e d in the s m e period and UIIder similar circumstances; both left their people in a most difficult time. tlcrwever, Ben-Zakkai is portrayed as continuing to be part oE his people and helping in its revival. Josephus left his people connpletely to become something else. The violation of trust and loyalty by Josephus, as well as his turncoaitimg, thus holds an altogether different meaning than that of Ben-Zakkai. It is thus Josephus who is remembered as a dcfector and traitor. fndetld, Ladoucew notes that Josephus is "usudly r e g d t d as an opportmistie traitor."l2

The Jzldenr~f C)uf

ncxt case took place about 1,870 years after the Great &volt, Jlulen-

rats were the councils of Jews set up as the governing bodies of the various ghettos cms.tructed by the Nazis throughout Germany and occupied Europe during World W r 11. These cotrncils =presented the Jcws in the :Nazi regime, and the Nazi orders concerning Jews were funneled through these councils. 'f'he Nazis certainly used these councifs to help them control the Jewish population. Many Jews view these coulncils with scorn and disgust because, to them, they =presented, a form. of collaboration with the Nazis and in fact the councils helped the Nazis exterminate Jews. ]Udcnrats, for many Jews, have becorn synonpous with betrayal and collaboration with the enemy. Thus, the judenrat suggests the existence of an

~r~qanization that, by nature, is regarded as tseachmus, as opposed to the individual traitor. 'Those Jews who were acfive in the J~rdenrafsfaced an impossible situation. It is inconceivable that t h y zmnted to help the Nazis exterminate the Jews, and many of them prohably thought that by participating in these councils they codd mitigate Che evil wrath of the Nazis and perhaps even save lllfe (including, of course, their own and their famjfics). Uniortunately, the nature of the Nazi occupation and exterminatirrn plan was such that these Jewish councits could not really do much to allevi,ate the situation in a significant way.1"

Pre-Israel Cases of Betrayal Before the state of Israel was established in 1948, secular Zionism developed a determilled drive to establ.ish a nation-state. That effort began ia the last decades of the nineteenth century. The major political struggle was to secure the legitimacy of a new Jewish state by the major wlrrld powers. Another political. and military struggle was with the emerging Arab national movement. Ho~vever,there wew several codicting ideological streams within secular Zionism, MIhich differed on a variety of issues: How shoufd the British Mandate occupation of Palestine (which lasted from 1917 until 1948) be dealt with? What role should the Arabs play? What shodd be the social and politicral shape ol the emerging state? Beginnjng in the 1920s, there emerged three main prestate underground. Jewish groups who practiced direct action: (l) Hagana, (2) Etzel f"":lgun""),m d (3) L&i (also known as the "Stern Gang'"" These groups were unequal in size, with dlfferhg ideological stands on a variety of issues; sometimes they cooperated, and at other times they competed with one another." At times, the hostility of these groups to one another reached lethal proportions; sometimes one group viewed members of the other grouy(s) as ""taitt>rsfkdpersecuted and even killed them. From the large number of such cases, some quite bseinating, X shdl discuss only two.1"

Tlze Case of Israel De Hghn Israel De H a h was born in the small Dutch town of Smilda to an Orthodox Jewish family on December 31,1881. His father was active in the life of the local Jewjsh community but w a not ~ doing v e y well cconomicatly and tumed into a very bitter person. Israel's sister, Carey, was born less than a year before him, on January 21,1881. Carey and Israel were apparv they turned their ently gifted and very talented cfiild,ren. As they g ~ c up backs on Orthodox Judaism.

At the age of nineteen and having finished school, Israel De Hahn decided to move to Amsterclarn a d tcr become completely secular. 'There he studied law and, at the age of twentyone, receitled his doctorate degree. In Amsterdam he also joined the socialist party. Cle H&n% ppditical and academic career in Amstercfam was strtlng and stahle. There were also indicatio~~s that he was developing (or actualizhg) a hornasexual ide~~tity. Despite this, De H a h got into a problematic and stormy marital rclatimship with a Christian physician named Johanna V m Marsphain. De Hahn traveled to Russia several times, m d apparently his experielzces in Russia, and of Jewish life there, persuakd him to return to Orthodox Judaism. Later he decided to i igrate to Palestine. In February 1919, Ue Mahn left his fmily jn A m t e r d m and began hjs long journey to Palestine. C)n his arrival, he settled in Jerusalem. Mthough De Hahn ohwiously moved to Pakstine out of a Zionist idedogy, he wry quickly becamc djsillusioned with the local Zionjst political and social leadership. He drifted slowly into the circles of the most extreme anti-Zionist Jewish Orthoeiox groups in Jerusalem. He later began to write for newspapers in Hollmd very critical essays about the Zionist e11tevrise in Palestine and got involved in lmal anti-Zionist activities. De tlahds icjeology crystallized in 1920, and duri- 1921 he attacked not d y the Zionist elite but the new immigrants as welf, f;or exanple, aft= the 1920 riots in Jerusalem, De Hahn supported the British governor of Jerusalem-Sir Ronald Storrs-when most of the Jewish commlanity demanded his resig~~a.t.ion. There were other anti-Zionist activities in which De H a h was involved and which were regarded by contemporaq and important Zionist figures as being pure treason, or close to it. These activities did not make De Hrshn a very populilr figzsre witbin the Yishuv (prestate [194K]Jewish community in Palestine),le This pm"~"""me to a peak when in 1922 some of these debates received public attentio~~ outside Palesthe. ZJocalnewspapers (secular m d religious) pubfished pieces calling for vengeance against Ue Hahn for his activity I-le began to ~ c e i v threats, e and in M a y of 1923 he receivd a direct death threat de~xandingthat he should leave Palestine. All this did not stop De Hahn, and he continued his activities and published extremety critical essays abroaci. De Hahn continued to receive written threats and warnings urging him to stop his activities, Ch the evening of Monday, June 30,192112, Cle Hahn went to pray in the synagogu" that was located w i ~ the h old structure of the 5hakrei Zedek hospital in Jaffo Street in Jerusalem, Dc M&n left the synagogue at approximately 19:45. As he left the synagogue and was walking down the street;,he was shot three times and died a few mfnutes later in the operating worn of the hospital at the age of forty-three.

Although there were mrnors that De H a h " assassination was related to his alleged hamosexuality, it became evident that the real reason was political. Athough &ere are several opinjons as to exactly who msassinatcrd De Hahn, &ere is little doubt that a member of the Flagasla did. it, on explicit d e r s from the Hagana"~leadership. It was a case of an ultraOrthodox 'Jew who was perceived as threatening the secular Zionist effort to reestablish a Jewish state and who was thus d e h e d by them as a ""traitor," that is, as a person who vidated what was seen by the Hagana as the vaitres of Jewish trust and loyalv. It is quite obvious that De M&n was assassinated because he was perceived as posjng an immediate to a group of dedkated, active, and ~volutionaryZionists who occupied important positions in the leadership of the Jewish community in Palestine.17

The Case of Yehuda Arie Levi Yehuda Arie Levi, tbirty-three years old and single, was a Sfardi Jew w h came to Palesthe from Italy. He was gifted with techllical tdelzts and when he jojned Lehi he became tlne mmager of the techl-rical department. Levi served as a p i d e and teacher in Lehi's courses on explo"ives ,412 iztdustrious and invaztive kllokv, l ~ vdeveloped i mad mines, bullets, and ignithg grenades. He showed an inclination toward. the study of chemistry and was going to be sent to tJle United States as a rep~sentativeof tRhi. On November 29, 1947, the United Nations decided that the Jekvish state would be established, This created a pltoblem for Lehi..They had to decide whether to disband the organization and join the new emerging Jekvisln state or to c o n h u c to exist and operate as an independent organizatbn. Originally Lehi"s headyuarters gave the order to disband, but the order was canceled within a month. That process left many members of Lehi totally co~nfused. Vehuda Arie Levi was one of those who decided to leave Lehi m d join the Hagana. He contacted the Hagana" members and told them of his intelntions. He did not keep his decision a secret m d also told other members of Lehi about it. Lehi's headyuarters sent a woman to t& to Levi to find out exactly what his intentions were and why. Despite the cancellation of the disbanding order, he insisted on joinhg the Wagana. After the woman talked with Levi and reported to her superior, Lehils members were instmcted to avoid contacts with Levi and to exco crate him, Most of bis frie~ndsstayed w a y k m him. k v i did not give up; he continued to voice his opinion and demanded an explanation horn Lehi's command. A clarification was needed. The process of clarification turned very q.ilickly into a "triat.'Wokvever, even the "judges'kcouid not:

find anything wrmg in Levi's actions or words. The whole affair was htmed over to Lehi's headquarters. There it was decided that he should be 3killed.IR At 6:30 on Thursday, January 15, 1948, about fifteen armed yomg males broke into Levifs apartment in Hayarkon Street in Tel Aviv and took Uefiuda Arie by force with them, Alt.lnough the exact debils are not entirely clear, it appears that a few weeks after Levi's kidnapping, his family began to apply pressure m different politicai figur(_."o help h d their son. Even the Tel Aviv Rabbhate demmded to h o w where Levi's body was buried (aft-er a mmor that he was killed was spread). And, indeed, his body was found later, with four handgltn butlet holes in his chest. h inner memo of Lehi told members that Levi was accused of violating the groupf4iscipline, telling lies, demoralizing other members of Lehi, and disclosing secrets. He was brought before a special ""court," found g d t y as chargcrd, and executed. Lehi rnembers were told that this act could not be avoided. C)n Friday, N o v d e r If, 1987, Yedicrt Aharm~otpub1is:hed a long cover story on this case written by Amos Nevo. According to the report, on the day Levi was kidnapped by Lehi, be was put before a Lehi '"court" and shot on the s m e day, after kflin-Mor-one of Let7i's commanders-approved the verdict." The actual: assassin was interviewed, under the pseudonym "Zefev,'" and stated that he shot Lewi because had he not, he would have been shot himself. ""What could I do? Why did those who were the judges not prevent it? I recelved m order, and 1shot, I could not refuse-"m ""Zekv" told Nevo that the order to shoot c m e from ""Adam." The use of pseudonyms t-hirty-fnur years after the assassination and the reluctance to be exposed obviously indicate that those involved certainly do not feel comfortable with their actions. C)n F&ruary 15,1977, Levi's name was added to the list of Lehi's casualties. His family wrote on his tombstone that he was murdered by bad people (""Zedim"") which made some cmtempcrrary Lehi swvivors (for example, Vazernitzki, Rnshe:ll S h p i h a n ) quite angry Shpill,man told Nevo that in 1948 Lehi had no prisons, that Levi could not bave been isolated, and that ""there was no choice . . . the undergromd could not afford such anarchy- . . . 'That: was a loss, a tragedy. But he [Levi] brought the death upon himself ."zl Levi was not a ""traitorfbra "squealerf% the stereotypical smse of the terms..He just wanted to transfer from Lehi to the Hagana on Che reasoning that Lelni was about to become one with the new Jewish state. His execution cannot possibly be understood as anything other than a strong signd from tJehifsleadership to the other mmbers, in a period of greatconfusion and contradictory messqemnd commands, that the coherent

syrmbolic m o d universe of Lehi was still intact and vibrant and that anybody willixlg to violate Lehi's moral boundaries w o d d be puIlished severely, Lsvi refused to hide his opinions. That made his chatlenge to the moral boundaries even harder. His execution needed to be explairned to Lehi's ambers-for exactly the s m e reason-to clarify and reify the moral boundaries in the most explicit mmner.

Israeli Cases of Behayal After 1948 .Al%terthe establishmnt of the state of Israel in 1948, there were quite a few cases illvOLVjl"tg treasm, 'The cases hvolving Wanunu and Mmbar were discussed elsewhere in this book. Here I describe a few more.

Tlze Case of Captain Meiv Tubianski Short amounccmmts in the Jewish daiIy press on JuXy 20,1948, informed the public that on June 30 an unknown spy was executed. 'The man vvho was killed was Captain Mcir Tirbianski-the only Israeli executed on charges of treason,

The Accusations. The British Mandate over Palestine ended in May 1948, and the partition plan did not award Jerusalem to the Jews. A long and fiexe battle over Jerusalem to& place i.111948, and the Jewish portion of fewatcm W= under siege..7'he city was bombed and bonnbc-lrded by the artillery of the Jordanian Legion, as well as exposed to the shooting of Arab snipers. Life in Jewish Prusalem was under much p ~ s s u r emilitarily, economicdly (food W= ratimed), socia,lt4; and politically. The Lehi, EtzeI, and Hagma were active in defending the city During the siege, rumors about spies, collabrators, informers, and traitors; abounded, and the ugly ghosts of war pctisoned the a t ~ ~ o v h e rDurjng e. 1948 Lehi alone assassinated four individuals in Jerusalem on suspicions of 'kcspionage."' &ring the Arab siege of Jemsalem in 1948, the three untfergrtlmd Jewish organizations continually moved their headquarters and weapon shops, TThe Hagana's FRtelIigcrnce service, the Shai, headed at that time by Binyamin Gibly, became suspicious about the accuracy of the Arab artillev in hitting targets that mwed about the city (for example, wapons shops and headquarters). Gradually' suspicions focused on the Jerusatem Electric Company. 'The company had the addresses of all important places in the city, and some of its worlcers wcre in constant contact wifh the Arab side of the cityI using their wireless trmsmitters (for legitimte reasons), 5uspedhg that employees of the Jerusalem E)ectric Company were Espo~~sible for the "accurate artillerytfTtzelarrested five British clerks of the company and.investigated thern. The Hagana arrested Meir Tubianski,

Meir Tabianski held. the rank of major h the British a r y during the Secmd World War. In June 1948, he was appointed the first commander of the newly esta,bIishc.d Ismei D e h s e Forces f1.D.E) camp h Schneler near Mea Shearim.22 Since Tubianski did not succeed in this job, he was transferred to command the airstrips in Jerusalem.2Wwever, in 1948, Tubimski was also an e~~gineer m d a senior official inIhe Jerusalem Electric Company Members of the Iiagma suspected that he gave important military addresses to his British colleagues in the Jemsalem Electric Compmy so that they could connect them to the eiectricd network. It was suspected that this infornation was then transmitQd to the Arab artitlery, which bombarded the new addresses. It must be noted that even if these suspicions were valid, Tubianski was clearly not guilty of deli:berate espionage. Xf these headquarters and. weapons shops, which were moving about the city, wanted electricity, sorner,ne had to get the addrt-sses for the company to cctnnect t-hern to the electrical,grid,. Xbianski was an old member (about twenty-tvvo years) of the Hagma. In the early month of 1948, Isser Bekry, the head of the Shai in Israel," receitled hformation Chat Tubianski was providing hostile British clerks with information (which they sulpposedly passed m to the Arabs). Be"ery consulted with the head of the legal service of the newly formed I.D.F., then rZbfaharn Gorally, and as a result, decided to arrest lilbianski. Re'ery later clahed that he mderstood horn Gorally that he was allowed to establish a military court agairtst Tubfanski. On the very same day, Bekry told the commander of the Palmaclls (originally; Hagana" military unit) about his suspicions. A written reyuest was mad.e to the Pahach" regional commander to assist Be'ery in any way pcwsible. The "Tuialef' On :Monday June 30,1948, Bekery sent one of his oificers to arrest Wianski, vvho was in Tel h i v , Tubianski came wilhgly and tvithout rcsistanee. They left Tel Aviv at around 15:C)O.At around 16:llt)Tubimski ffaced the charge of treason in frmt of a "xnilitary court" h the deserted Arah willage of Beit Giz (on the road from Tel Aviv to Jemsalem). Three judges were appointed to hear the triai.2Tubians:tci was not allowed to prepare a defense or to consult with a lawyer. He was shown a list of the arms m d ammuniticln shops/factaries in fc.rusa1t.m of which he supposedly had given the addresses to his British superiors in the Jemsalem Electric Cmpany. ?i> understand the specific charge we need some &tails. At that time Jerusaiem had two different nctworks of eiectriciq, m e of which servked the military and both of which were serviced by the Jerusalem Electric Company. 7'he B r i t i s h a n a g e r of the Jerusalem Electric CompanyMichael Bryant-may have h o w n about the two electrical networks, It was claimed that during a conversathn on June 16,1948, Tubianski gave

Bryant the information. This conversation was open and was prohably overheard by other Jewish workws. Because it was suspected that Tubianski was givhg vital and secret information to a hostile British citizen, this informatim was passed on to the Hagana's intdigcncer unit. It needs to be noted that despite the insinuaticzns, the information pmvieied by Ebianski could, havc been obtained in other ways. Tubianski was also accused on charges that the information given on June I6 to Bryant was passed m to tbr ford;mian artiltery. When Tubianski heard the charges, he supposedly admitted giving Bryant the hformation, thereby in.directly admitting guilt. Although there is a version that he supposedly may have wen said that he deserved a cleath sentence, a more refiable version is that he probably admitted givjng the list of places that needed dectricity on both networks in fewsalem, but maintained that the infornation was given tltzly so that these places could be connected to the network and receive electricity and not for reasons of sabotage. :Nevertheless, the judges found lirbianski guilty of eripionage and trr-?asonand sentenced hirn to cieath. Ch-t the same day he was arsested, at m u n d t,9:l)ll, a firing squad shot Tubjanski to death. The whole "trial," "conviction, and execution took about three hours. The Aftermath. TubiansE's wife, Chaya (Lena), was not told what had happened, but Mthrn she found out, she wrote to Uavid Ben-Gurion (November 1948), demanding an expanation. Ren-Gurion instructed the army chief of staff to investigate. Consequently, Ben-Gurion wrote Tubianski's wife in December 1948 that "I checked fie p m c e d u ~of his trial and X fomd out that it was not in ordcr, perhaps because the underground laws were still dornhant in the arrny.''Ze On July 1,1949, kn-Gurion wrote agaill to Mrs. Tubianski that It was found that Meir Tubianski was innocent (and his execution) was a tragic mistake. . . . Attempting to reetiQ the tragedyf the chief of staff dedcied: l. to give Meir Tubianski a rank of a captain; 2. to give him a full military burial; 3. to pay you and your son compensation. . . . Your husband made a mistake and perhaps a serious one, giving his British superior a List and did not think it would fall into the wrong hands. He admitted the mistake and regretted it, but he had no bad intentions and without i n t a t there is na treason.27

Tubimski was buried in a full military service on July ;7: 1949.28 July 10,1949, Isser Be'ery then head of military intdigence and directly responsible for Tubianski's execut-ion, was amsted and charged with the unlawful kiliing of Tubianski. Tke trial itself was open to the

public and began in the district c a t of Tel Aviv on Octsiber 16,1949, and lasted until October 30, 1949. 0x1November 22, 1949, the verdict was given, The court stated specifically that no charges of treason agahst Tubimski were substantiated and that his execution was a fatal mistake, The court stated that the use of the list Tubianski supposedly had given to his British superior as evidence lacked any basjs. Furthermore, some questions werc raised during the trial regarding the nature of the accusaticms against Tubianski. For example, between June 11and July 7,a ceasefire was h effect, so the informaim supposedly given by Tubianski could not have served the fordmim artillery. Moreover, them were some que* tions as to Mthether in fact the Jordanian artilrery ruas so accurate.2Vn short, Tubimski was hnocent of the charges of espionage and tstlason. Tubianski" execution was attributed, to Bekry for three reasons: (1) Befery appointed three of his subordinates as judges in a /'field military cou,rt""a.nd told them that if thcy found Tubianski guilty they had permission to sentence bin\ to death; (2) after the judges had found Tubianski guilty and smtenced him to death, Be'ery approved the sentence and verdict; (3)Be'ery ordered that a Aring squad be assembled to carry out the court" decision. Bekry was found guilty as cbarged and was sentenced to one day in prison." Clearty the court was convinced that Tubianski was killed illcgalfy but was equn[ly convinced that Re'ery did not du what he did with a malicious htent, The five British cttrrks kidnapped by Etzef in 194X were given to the Hagma. 'Three were releasccf for lack of evidence, two were charged wilh espionage. Oste (Hawkins) was found ocent, and the other (William Silwester) was found guilty. In an appeal to the Israeli Supreme Court, this individual was fom~dnot guilty and was consequently released.31 The Tubianski case left a scar in the moral fiber of Israeli society. Debates about it still rage.32 Tubimski was the cmly person in the history of Israel cvho was executed on eharges of treaso~~, and the first:person (out of two; the other was Adolf Eichmann) who was sentenced to death iin Israel and ackally executed. 'The Tubianski case is significant and instructive. The "trial" and '"court" represent the type of "justice" that prevailed ammg the three prestate urtdergrourtd fewish organizations until 1948. The justice that emerged, crystallized, and prevailed after 1948 was based on open and formal proceduses grounded on facts and due process and was radically differcmt from thr pre-1948 '*'justice.'"e Tubianski cme was based on insufl"iejent and inconclusive evid,en,ce, corjecturc, pressure, a lack of pmcedums, and improper attention to basic rights of defendants, and there was no right of appeal. What was called a trial was not a trial in the sense that we all b o w and understand. Tubianski really djd not havc much of a reasonable chance to defend hhself once the ""trial" k e n .

Tubianski, a victim of cisrcumstances beyond his control and of human error, fear, and vicicrusness, was certainy considered (wrongly) by his pm=cutors to be a melnber of the collective cvho betrayed the trust invested in him and who was disloyal: to his collective, This combixration led to his definition as a traitor; with a tragic result.

The Case of Dr. Israel Kasztller In March 3,944 the Nazis invaded Hungary. Adolf Eichmann and his aides came to Budapest m d began their preparations to activate the " h a I soluticm'90r Hmgarian Jews. 'The Jews h Hungary were divided into several main groups. M m y of them were, however, awarcl of what the Nazis we= doing to European Jews. They tried to organize help and created a ""saving committee." Clne of the key mennbers of the c o r n i t t e e was Dr. Rudolf (Israel) Kasztner @ern 1906). Kaszher was a local Zionist politician who found himself in the midst of something more dreadful than Dante" shell,He tried to negotiate with E i c h a m and his group of killers and attempted to save as many Jews as he possibly could. under the circumstances. Kasztner was effective i17 s e c u r a the exit of what has becclme known as the ""erain of the prestigious" hJune 1944. 'That was a train with 1,684 Jews aboarb, which the Nazis LalZowed to leave Hungary for Switzerlmd, supposedly as a s i p of ""god will" and an indication of "intent.'" Kasztner was also involved in several other activities aimed at saving Jews33 Ch May 25,1953, the legal advisor to the Issaeli government accused., in c r h h a l file no. 53/124., Malkiel Greenwald with defaming Dr. Kasztner." At that time, &%&er was the spokesmm for the Israeli ministry o.f commerce and industry*G ~ e n w a I di,n mimeographed letters, accused Kasztner of collaborating with the Nazis, helying in the final extermination of Hungarian Jews, helping a Nazi war criminal, and living on funds "confiscated" "from Hungarian Jews. Greenwald called for the death of Kasztner because of his supposedly treacherous behavior. According to Greenwald's accusations, Dr. Kasztrzer actuauy helped the Nazis. Tfne main claims were that the June 1944 traix\ was a price the Nazis paid to buy Kasztmer's silence in order to keep most Hungarian Jews unaware of what was really awaithg &em and that Kasztner gained economically from the money conliscated from the Jews. These were certainly monstrous accusations. In January 1%4, the trial began in Jerusalem, and Greenwald hired Shmuel Tamir as his lawyer." Tamir was very effective in converting the trial from a sirnple crimind case into a potitical trial, and G~envvaidbecame the accuser rather thm the accused. This trial was one of the most dramatic and painful trials in the history of Israel. Et lasted from January

1954 to June 22,1955. In the trial, the role of the Jewish leadership in Nazioccupied Hungary in 1 9 4 and in Palestine was examined with a m a p i Qing glass. Tamir implied that there were many different issues in which Kasztner was ir-tvolved, and in which he basically acted as a collaborator with the Pllazis, and hence hc was a bona M e traitor. I shalS mentio~ztrhm briefly, First, he maintained, contacts with and negotiated with I.he Gestapo and the S.S. Second, he was involved in what later became h ~ o w nas the June 1944 "train of the prestigious."' The ifnplicdion was that the trajn was the price that Eichmann and his Nazi group paid. for Kasztnerfs silence, nird,the Nazis allowed Dr. :Kasztner to hide his Jewish identity in Budapest and his behavior thcrc., accor$ing to Tamir, was di~gracefui.~ He did not wear a yelXow Nagen David, and he played cards with Nazis. Fourth, Kasztner selected Jews from the Klrrj Ghetto over Jews from other places; 388 Jews from that particajar ghetto were on. the June 1944 train, and many of them were relatives of Kasztner. FiAh, Kasztner helped to turn Uoel Brand" mission into a failure. Sixth, Kaszber failed to alert and inform Mmgarian Jews that they werc not just being transported outside of Hungary to a new resettlement but that they we= being transported to an extermination c m p at Auschwitz. He atso failed to warn Jewish leaders outside Httlngary of the horrendous events. Seventh, in 1944 the British A m y sent several British Jewish officer paratroopers to Hungary for ir-ttelligencepurposes. Three of them-Hanna Senesh, kel Nur;bacher (Palgi), and Peretz Goldstein-clearly htended to help organize the Jews into resistJng the Nazis.s"t was claimed that Kaszher was involved in the arrest of all three by the Nazis- Eighth, after the war ended, Kasztner testified in favor of S.S. officer Kurt Bachar*Ninth, Kasztner interfered with operations to save Jews irt Europe. Tenth, Kasztner had personally used the money confiscated from Jews to live luxuriously in Switzerland. Ch June 22, 1955, Judge Halevi, in a lo~zgand debiled verdict, determined that in fact Kasztner had cooperated with the Nazis and. thus had helped indirectly in prt-paring the ground for the extermination of Hungarian Jews, and that he had helped ex-S.S. off-icesKurt Rachar*The judge stated that the above tenth accusation was totally groundless. Judge tlalevi stated in the verdict that when Kasztner had accepted "the gi.ft-'%f the train, "he sold his soul to the devilq"s7 The trial in Jerusdem attracted much attentjon. On the night of March 15, 1955, an anonymous pamphlet was cltistrihuted in which one of the judges-M Peretz-was accused of being biased and of cooperating with the old "leadershipf' so as to help "cover upf' Kasztner" supposed "atrocities.'"" It is obvious that there were many people in Israel in the mid1951)s who were unhappy with &%&er's activities during the period of the Holocaust and saw it as a major betrayal.

Eldad Sheib, who was m e of the triumvirate that had previously cornmandied Lehi, had a newspaper called Sula11~(""Xadder"'in Hebrew), which preaehed a right-wing nat-imal ideology, He also formed an organization called Hazit Hanoar Haleumit fin HebrewI "the front of the national youth"") where smail gmups met and discussed various national topics. Eldad prcaeln,ed d o h 8 '%somethi,ng" about Kasztner"39 The trmsitian of Israel to a state: in the late 1940s and early 1950s was a problematic and pair"1fu1process. Various politic& grourps felt that the emrgjng state was not what they wanted and ehose terrorism ""tn get their way" One of these groups was the r i g h t - w a Malchut Israel ("the Kingdom of krael"), or, as it later became k n o w as, the "Zerih undergrotmd." That group was particularly active during 1952-15353. For example, on Febmary 9,1953, late at night, members from the group planted a bomb at the Soviet embassy, which was then located at 46 Rothschifd ~TS Street in Te1. Aviv. The bomb exploded and wounded some M I Q ~ ~ Eand caused much damage. Consequently Moscow severed. its diplomatic tics with Israel for about six months. The Israeli secret service began an irrtvestigation, exposed the group, and arrested about sixteen members. 'They we= charged in a military court. Some were found guil.ty and sent to prison, Two mernbers of that group were b k c o v Herouti alld Joseph Menkes, who were previousiy men?bers of tehi.4TTh.e lawyer for the defendmts was agah Shmtlel Tamir. For lack of evidence, Menkes was not brought to court. Herouti received a ten-year prison sentence. In 1955 Herouti, and others, received state cfe~xencyand were released. On Saturday night, March 2,19517, Dr. :Kas&er returned to his home in E l Aviv from his work as the night editor of a local Hungarian language newspaper.4Un anonymous male approached, identified him, m d shot him three times with a gun. Dr. Kaszher was taken to a kospital: where he fought death for about two weeks. He died on Maxh 18. The Israeli secret service, headed then by Isser Harel, began an investigation. Very soon four suspects we= arrested: Va%acov HeroutifJoseph Menkes (thirty-eight years old), Zekv Ekstein (twenty-four years old), alld U r n Shemer (fwenty-three years old)." 2 e police told. the press on March 12, 1957, that they had. solved the case.43 Although there were other individuats in the background," only Melzkes, Eksteh, m d Shemer were hdicted on May 28,1957, for the assassixzatim of Dr. Kaszher and for beislg members in a terrorist organizaticm. Herouti was charged with membership im a terrorist mganization. C h January 28,1958, in a different trid, HerotlCi was found guilt-y of"producing the pamphlet mentioned above and was sentenced to eighteen months in prison. An appeal to the Israeli Supreme Court was not accrcpted. Nenkes, Shemcr, and Ekstein were found guilty of Kaszher's assassination. h responding to an appeal, the Israeli Supreme Court stated

that it was Menkes who persuaded Ekstejn to assassinate Kaszher and even gaw him the gun to do it. The court stated that there was an underground o~aninatio~z that was responsible for the assassination. 'The three were cmicrted for their participation in a terrorist organization and received long prison sentences. Memwhile, the Israeli Supreme Court debated the orighal GreerzwaldKaszher trial. The five judges reconfirmed that Gsztner in fact helped S.S. officer Kurt Bachar by givirrg false testimny cm his bcrhalf. Ilowever, most j d g e s rejected all the ofies t?ccmsati.ons made by Greenwald as essentially baseless, On May 23, 4960, Israel's prime Minister-Dwid Ben-Gufion-announced in the Israeli Knesset that: Adolf Eichmam had been caught and w d d be put on trial in Israel. After a long and dramatic trial, Eichmam was executed. The :Kasztner affair did not become a m4or issue in Eichmam" triall,but from the few referelzces to it (and from interviews Eichmann gave to L,@ magazine), it appears that from Eichmam" perspective, Kasztner was ohwiously trying to save as many Jews as he possibly codd. But it w s also c m c d e d that a by-product of that effort: was the fact that Hungarian Jews were kept quiet. Gsztner 's enigma, therefore, was not hlly resolved. Clearly, Ekstein, Shemer, and Menkes acted as a group. Theis cofiesion was partly integrated by their idealogical conviction in what they viewed as Kaszhner's guilt incollaboration with the Nazis. They were. also united by a right-whg and nationalistic worldview that welzt back to Lehi and to Sheib" '%ulam" group In fact, SheWs club was located. at Menkes's house.4WShc.ibfsrewlutionary right-wing propaganda no doubt hebed to h a p c and crystallize the group into taking the lethal path leading to Kaszher 'S assasshation. The Creenwald-Kaszber trial and Kaszber's assassination served as hot platform for mord debates. The Grcenwald-1Casztrner trial examined the nature and scope of the Jewish Ileadershipfsinvolvmnt and collaboration in help% to prevent (or helping to accomplish) the Naziskextermination canpaiws. The assassins' trial was used by Tamir and jottmalist Uri Avneri to claim that the Israeli secret service was behhd Masztner" sassashation because it was too dangerous for the major pol-itieal partythen Mapai-to leave Kasztrner alive. Their version seemed to have been supported by the fact that the Israel secret service bad penetrated the Menkes-Ekstein gmup and that for a short while before the assassinatim, Eksteh had worked for the service. These claims were examhed and dismissed.46 Frarthermore, other works imply that at least in the Brand affair (discussed in Chapter 3), Hi~nmlerprobably inkmded to negotiate a peace agreement with the Allies, tn this context, Eichm % ""offer'2tospa= the

'Jews in the ""blood for trucks" deal was a by-product of that hitiative. Bauer's wlrrk indicated that some essential parts in Brad's 1954 testimonies were not true and points to Tamir's qraestionable role in helping; to aqlifgi lies.47 ?%toKaszber affair continues to haunt Israeli society Dinur asserted in a 1987 perspective on the case that bsit;&er 'S adions during World War II in Hungary were a h e d at saving as many 'Jews as poss&le and were distorted by Tamk's biased and one-dixnmsimal interprc.tation, In 19514, fiistorian Yechiam Weita coll,aborated with Israeli W in the production of a three-hour miniseries about the case, accompanied by three hours of prime-the televised discussions. fn 1995he also published a book cm the topic.48

Tlze Case of LIdi Adiv and Dan Veved Wdi. (Ehud) Adiv was a member oi an Israeli Jewish-Arah rizlg of operators who p v i d e d Syrian intefligence with information. The ring was established by Daoud 'Tuski, a nationalist and Communist Christim-Arab from Haifa. The common denomhator between the Arab and the 'Jewish members of this ring cJf spies was their belief in socialism, with strong Maoist m d Trotskyist tendlencies. The Isracli secret servke exposed the affair in December 1972 when details of the spy ring were leaked to the press. Although during the investigation more than thirty Arabs and about four Jews were arrested, clearly the most prombent left-whg Jew in the espimage net was Udi Adiv, as Black m d Morris (1991:277-279) point out. He was twenty-six years old when he was arrested, an exmelnber of the Gan Shmuel kibbutz, ex-paratrooper in the Israeli army who fought in the Six Day War, and a star basketball player, With him was Dan, a twenty-eight-yc;ar-old mathematics teacher from Tel Aviv. In 1972, the e x p o s u ~of Ikis case of espionage created noisy echoes. Adiw m d V'red secretly visited Damascus and were trahed in the basic skills of coding and the use of weapons and explosives. ?hey also gave their hosts inlormatio~~. Adiw later claimed that the information given was amateurish and not essential. He was indicted incourt on charges of espionage and treason in a trial that begm on February 25,1973. Turki (singing the International) and Adiv wcre found g~liltyof espionage and t ~ a s c mand sentenced in Martll-r 1973 to seventeen years h p"son. Other members of the spy rjng cvho wcre on trial (four, including Dan Vered) were sentenced to variolls punishments. Both Turki m d A d k served about twelve years, until 1985 when they were deased. After his release, Adiv expressed regret frtr his acts, but not for his ideological views,

As Cromer (1.998) points out, the case of Udi Adiv served as a point of clashing betwen two major symbohc moral universes in Israel. The religious one stated that Adiv, the archetype of a sccttfar Jeliv-kibbutznik, paratrooper, secular, Zionist-has also become an archetype of a traitor. Tl~eimplication was that secularism inevitably leads to betrayal, and hellee sticking to orthodox religion was the solution. Ho-cvever, secdarists pointed out that Adiv was an mseprcsentative case (for example, Uri Tllm, mentioned below, came from the same Ebbutz as Adiv, was also secular, and is considered a gel~uinehero) and the orthodox versjo~~ of Judaisrn did not provide m inocu%atimagainst treason or deviance." It is, of course, no cohcidence that treason provided the platform for the two major ideologies to clash. It does, after alll, signify Ihe boundaries of trust and loyalty. The debate between the secular and religious interpretations of Judaism, as focused on the case of Udi Adiv, was thus about the diagnosis of the case, its reasoning, its meirhods of correcthg the deviance, its meming and generalizability On April 10, 1975, whjle in prison, Adiv married 5ylvia mi-ngberg, the da23ghter of a fazsovls Soviet spy-Markus Klingberg (discussed in Chapter 3). Klingberg was kprisoned for penetratjng Israeli high-security instdlations working in the area of chernical and biologic& warfare and providing his Soviet: operators with the information he g a t h a d there, In 1978 the two were divorced and married otLter partners.50 Both Adiv and Vered were members of the majority Jewish collective in Israel. 'Their decision to aid Israel's elIelsy, Syria, by providhg it with information and undergoing training as spies reflect& a decision to violate the trust invested in them by the state and their loyaity to that state. Adiv becam the n m e associated hvilh this spy ring and a synonym for treason.

The Cases of Amos L~vinbevyand Uri Illan On the day that the 1973 ki,m Kippur War began, October Q, the Israeli

stronghold in the Mermon mountains, the Golm Heights, held close to sixty soldiers. At around 15:00, four Syrian he[i.copters carrying commando soldiers landed near the strmghold, attacked it, m d overcame the Israeli sol$iers. Eighteen Israeli soldiers died in that fierce battle; thirtyone were taken prisoner. Among the prisoners was Lieutenant Amos Levinherg. He was m intelligmt p u n g ofiiicer whose appetite for knowledge was voracious. Volunteering h r a variety clf duties, he had learned a )ot about Israeli military. Levinbe~,m obsessive collector of detailed information, was also gifted with a phenomenal memory*fn fact, it was clear that he h e w too much.

Ui-i Illan. Photo by Urifs sister H n ~ n a .

?"he Syrians have a rc-rputation for their brutat treatment of P W s . However, it turned aut that no such ""eeatme~~t" was necessary for Levhberg, He provided the Syrians with all the informatiost they wanted, and mow. The military darnage that Levinberg inflicted on Israel was substantial. That Levinberg had a weak character is obvious. However, Israeli intelligence, which allowed h h access to so much sensitive i~~formation (certainly hvay beyond his "need to how""),must share the Isrtame. When Levinberg returned from Syrjan captkity, the extent of the disaster he h e e d into being became clear. He was ostracized as a traitm Cohen quotes h h as sayhg, "baryears X wmted to die. I had a strong sense of betrayal, of guilt, but the guilt lies with whoever stationed me in the Hermm outpo&."% h oother words, given the bread& and depth of his h o h d g e , he should have been assigned to an outpost where the risk of him becoming a prisoner was not so high. Was Levinberg a traitor? He was certair~lya member of the in-gro"p, m d he vioiated the trust invested in hiln ancl connpmntised his loyalty to the state by givjng so much information so frtzely to the Syrians, Bid he have a choice? Had he been tortured, he could have died without disclssing mything, or he might have broken under torture and give all the information he knew anyway. The issue of what is expected of POWs in terns of disclosing information (and under what conditions) is a difficult m d thorny questio~~.

Uri Illan provides the opposite c a s e t h a t of heroism, He was born in 1935 in the kihbutz of Gan Shmuel,") "joined the Israeii Army in 1953, and was trajned as a paratroopec C-h7 Decennber 8,1954, Illan, three other s& diers, and an officer, were sent across the Syrian border in the Golan Heights to attach listening &vices to Syrian telephone lines. They wew all caught by the Syrims m d placed in a Syrian prison. All the soldiers were subjected to psychological manipulation and torture. .After a mmth, Illan committed suicide. His body was returned to Israel on January 14, 1955. M e n his body was examined, it was found that prior to kis suicide he had placed little notes in his clothes m d between his toes in which he m t e that he had not betrayed his friends. The notes aiso implied that he was under great stress and wanted revenge. The other four soldiers were returned to Israel on March 29, 1956, in return for forty Syrian soldiers, Two of the Israeli soldiers were court-ma~tialed.~" It is appr~priateto examhe these cases because they shed light on a very particular type of behavior. Are POWs, under the credible thrreat of sevexc. torturt-, or ackalty under such torture., still 'kequimd'3to disclose basically nothing? If they do djsclose hformation, s h u l d it be considered a '*betrayalu?From the perspective presented in this book, the answer appears to be yes. However, the themtical perspective we used have assumed that- a decisim to violate trust: and become djsloyal is not forced but a voluntary decision. When one is coerced to betray, smetimes brutally and under a threat of death, should we still consider our moralistic response to it, straight and simple, as noncoerced betrayal" My inclination is to respond in the negative. Perhaps the expectation that civilians, or soldiers, under such conditions, should keep quiet is an unrealistic exd being coerced pectation. The implications of this issue go b e y o ~ ~X>OWs to reveal military secrets, Xt has obvious implicatims for collaborators during World War II (and in other conflicts). The question we must ask ourselves is, what is the threat that the potential collabomtor faces? Although the universal structure of violating trust and loyalty materializes in t-he cases of both collaborators artd POW who disclose miliZary secrets, the circumstances may be such that the social. and moral responses to such behavisrs must- be different than those of iindividuals who commit such violations under little or no threat or danger.

The Case of Derech Hanitzotz I17 1982 a monchly lsraeli magazine, Derech ManI'tzotz (in Hebrcw, "the way of the spark"" began to appear, The magazine reflected the views of a rather s m l l group of Israeli leftists called Hanitzcltz. 11%1985the magazjrre was upgraded to a biweeky and was pzlblished inboth Mebre?\v and Arabic. It focused on reports and news about t h Israeli-occupied, territories

and about the Palestinians. Roni m d Ya'acov Ben-Efiat were paid employees, and Mirhal Schwartz (originally hrielli) wlrrked as a volunteer. Du,ring 1988, about five individuals associated with Ilrrrecl? HaniCsobs were arrested, Rabchi El-Aruri, Arab editor of the Arab language version of the magazine, was arrested first (F&marqt 16,1988); two days later (February 18)Derech Hanz'tzotz was closed by m admhistsative order. When the man in charge of issu% the order was asked to explain it, he responded that the magazine and its people ha$ a comeetion to Nayif Hawam&, head of the Det~ocraticFro~ntfsr the E,i.toerationof Palesthe (DFXI,P), a terrorist organization. Un April 15, 1988, Ua'acov Ben-Effrat was arrested, and. on April 23, his wife, Rani, was arrested, too. Michal Schwartz was arreskd on April 27. Other rnelMbers of the group were Assat Adiv (hmther o.E Udi Adiv, discussed earlier) and Hadas Lahav, who werc arrested inMay 1988. All inall, five Jewish members and one Arab were arrested.% 'The main charges against the hdividuals associated with Derech Hanitm t z were that they werc in contact with a foreip agent and members in an illegal terrorist ortymization. The grosc-lcu.ticm claiMed that some time at the etnd of 7,983 or early 7,984, Michal Schwartz met in iJondon with Sal& Reht-a senior member in Nayif Hawatmeh" organization-and she was persuaded to join the organization. She was follwed shortly by Rmi Ben-Effrat- These individuals, together with h'acov Ben-Effrat, agreed with Hawatnneh"~people that they would establish in Israel a Jewish-hab political organization and wlruld publish a newspaper, all financed by HaovatmeWs organization. Indeed, Schwartz and Ben-Effrat established in Israel a not-for-profit organjzation called Hntzifzulz and Ilawatmeh" terrorist orfjanizaticm,according gublishrd &re& Wu~z%lzotz. to the prosecution, Hnanced it all and provided gujdelines for their activi,ties. The report in Hakaueh quoted anonymous sources in the state" pmsecutian, who noted that "it was decided not to accuse Sclhwartz and BenEffrat with treason because there is no solid evidence for such an accusation, which is difficult to prove in court."'"?The same report stated that although Hadas Lahav, l"afacov Ben-Effrat m d Assaf Adiv were in custody, the specific accusations against them had not yet been established. :111 short, the basic accusation against the Jewish members in I - f a ~ i f Z ~ t z was that they cultivated contacts with Hawatmeh's group. Eventually; Israeli journdists were told that the nature of the evidence was such that individuals associated with Uerech W a ~ i t z o fwere z not going to be charged with treason, but with '"embership in a foreign hostile organization" and with "contacts with a foreip agent,"%Although techni.cally none of these charges was dirc?cttreasm, the subtext was certainly one of treason. 'The implication was, clearly that Jewish indjviduals associated with Derech Hu~itzcltzwere conspiring with an Arab terrorist organization

agairzst the state of Israel. Violating trust and loyalty were certainly the issues here, tncieed, m May 23,19XX, Mchal Shwartz and Roni Ben-Effrat, were formdly accused in court of the the two editors of D m h Hn~~itsttfz, above crixnes. Eventually, each mmber of this group who was in custody was charged in court, was found guilty, and received a prison sentence.57 By 1,991no Jewjsh member of h e grottp remained in prjson. Two related events are wefl worth noting here. First, Michaef Warshawski, who was involved in publishiq a pamphlet of HwatmeWs terrorist organization. (but was not associated with Derech Hanitzofz), was also sentenced to a prism sentence." " c d , m October 3, 1989, a very famous Israeli ""pecenikU-Mi Natan-was sentenced to six months in p"son h r Yasser Ardat, c h a i r m of the Palestine Liberation Organization, which was viewed then as a terrorist organization." Later that m t h , Aibi Natan =fused to express 'kegretf9for meeting Arafat in return for "cleme~~cy."~~ Clearly, Jewish members of Hanz'tzolz were considered to be members cJf t-he in-gmup who violated their loyaity to t-he state and the state's trust in them by cmspiring with a hostile organization.

Tlze Case of Hctou Ostrovsky Victor Ostrovsky was born in. Edmonton, Canada, on November 28,1949, to a Canadian father and an Israeli mother. Victor" parents separated when he was a yomg child. He was raised inboth Canada and Israel as a M e n he was eighteen, he joined the Israeli army where he served. for three years in t-he miljtary poiice as an officer. After his release from the army in N s v e ~ ~ b1971, e r he retur~~ed to Canada, but after five years he returned to fsrael, in Nay 1977, and joined the navy (he served in submarines). In Xprit 1979, while still in the Israeli navy, the Israeli secret service, the Msssad, hitiated an interview with him to determine whether he was inter~stedh joining its ranks. Victor was indeed, interested. The process was long, m d the April 1979 interview was just the beg 1981 he left the navy and tried to start a busin.ess as a graplnic artist, The business was not very successkrl, fn October 1982, the Mossad, contacted him again, and more interviewing folfowed. He passed t-he e n t y examfnation, and in February 1984 he began his c m c r with the Mossad. For two years he was trained for, and eventually participated in, an operation that evcmtually failed. (March 1986).Consequently, he was fired." He left Israel and eventually settled in Canada with his wife, Bella, and two daughters. It is difficult to h o w what exactly drove Victor to his next act-his hurt feelintgs fmm being fired from tbr Mossad, or as he likes to put it, his cancern for Israel- 1x1 any event, he deeded to w 2 e a book spelling out everything he h e w about the Mossad. He did that with the aid of a pro-

fessional journalist, Clair Hoy, and in 1990 the Toronto-based puhlishing house, Stoddart, p&lished their book, By Way of Deeeptian: A Dcmstafing fnsider's Portmif ofthe Mossad, with Hoy as the first author. The book is, indeed, a pl.etity devastating critique of the Mossad from a knowledgeable insi$er. Israel's attempts to prtrvent tbr publication of the book failed. Although there are quite a few books on the Israeli R'lossad (including some by one of its legendary commanders-Isser Harel), Ostrovskcy" book is differcsnt. Unlike other books, it attempts to hide n o ~ i n gIt. exposes the structure of the Mossad, the n m e s of units, commanders, operaflives, modes of recruitment and training, as well as m d e s of operation. It appears to be a very accurate, reliable, and believable book. Indeed, at a price of $26.95 Canadian, it must have been considered an almost free gift by any of Israel" enemies. By publishing this book and spil:ling out his knowledge, Ostrovsky violated his oath and a g r m e n t to the Mossad to keep secret the knowedge he gained from Mossad. That meant that- a member of the group violated the trust in him and his loyalty by providing classified infomtatim in a discreditk~gway to trYhoever could afford the price of the book. Not surprisingly the book sold very w d , thus providing Ostrczvsky a comfortable existence, mere can be little doubt that Ostrcrvsky is cclnsidered a bona fide traitor by many Israelis.

The Assassilzation of Yitzhak Rabin (Novembeu 4,19951 The reason for deivhg into this case is that Rabh was defhed by his assassh (md not only by him) as a traitor.@Israelis and Palesthims have been engaged in a bitter and bloody conajct for mmy years. Israeli Jews who tend to accept at least some of the moral arguments made by the Palestinians (typically found in the so-called Israeli left) run a serious risk of being ~ f e r r e dto as "traitorsf"by other Israeli Jews (typically from the so-called lsracli right, or Israeli rclligious right). The main reason is that in a conflict situation, the issues of tmst and loyalty are seen as polar and contradictory. Such vestions as, "Are you with US or against us?"bnd " C m we trust you?'%ecome crucial. These questio~~s are interpreted to mem whether a persm can be trusted to identify with the interests of a specific e t h i c or religious group in a way that the mjority oE (or powerftd) m e d e r s in lhat group see as legitinnate. Such a conflict raises the possibility for different people to define interests and loyalties in differrent ways and claim loyalty to and trust irr altogether different sets of values, for example, those promoting peace and/or liberal serularisln versus continued conflict and/or cmservatke orhodox religious interpretation of Judaism. This conflict spawned great debate regardhg thr nature of treason, and Ihe assasshtion of Israeli p r i m minister Yilzhak Rabin occurred in p~ciselythis context.

As in other cases of assassination by 'Jews, the killlng of IZabh had a strong politic&-ideological background." Rahin was killed because of his moral pnljticd position, his power, and his acts. This assassination was committed with a carefully pmmeditated intention and not out of any momentary rage. Assassinating Rabin was thus the end product of a long process that Yigael Amir, the murderer, was gohg through. 'This process not only provided the context within which Amir was persuaded that Rabin had to be killed, but it was also the cmtext that provided Amir with the rhetoric of jusliiication Chat Amir was to use. As in other similar cases, this assasshation was committed by an individual belonging to the same ethnic, or cultural, group as that of the assassin, that is, a 'Jew killing another Jew. :Rabin%assassin was a member of a group. h this context, we must make a distinction betwen two grouQs. "The first one is the small and irnmediate group withh which Amir interacted intensely. Mernbers of this immediate and jntimate group were the ones with whom A d r shared his " ermost thoughts, ideas, and intentim. This was a group of yomg, observant Orthodox 'Jews, with extre~nemilitant right-whg ideoloa embed.ded wi.thin a polit y conservathe religious worldview Et was this groupfdee&ack that r heard, and it was these people M;hc, prwieied h i r " s m a l l psychological, political, and practical support (for example, his brother or Margalit Har Shefi). This rather small group was immersed in the subcutture cJf a much larger potitical, religious, and ideologicral rnilieu fmm which this smafl group drew its inspiratiun, ideas, support, and the powerful rhetorical and psychological dwices with Mthich it interpreted and shaped its worldview in a specific wy. This rather large group itself was also part of a broader spectrum of groupm""eimovernents on the right side of the political map of Israd in 1995 that shared a common worldview of Israel. Their ~riebvswere similar on important issues regadjng the interpretatjon of Israel" ppoticaf and ideological past and fubre, and many of them shartrd the same set oE priorities regarding policy and ideology 'The psychological trick that enabled so many members of these groups on the rdigious right-wiX2g side of Israeli polilics to sociatty construct Rabfn, a democratically elected prime xninister, as a "'traitor," a "collaborator," or ever1 a "terrorist" and a ""kilXer" "could be performed only withixl this context. -That is, the political ent took in a courageous and risky atsteps that Kabin and his gove tempt to reach a political. settleme~~t with the Palesthims were not at a111 liked by these members, who preferrttd to define this as '?treason." "e cannot, and shouid not, avoid stating that a very similar social dynarnic was operating in ano&er farnous case of assassination, that of Ur. Israel (Rudolf) Kaszher, discussed earlier.

As in other cases of Jews assassinatirrg other Jews, Yitzhak Rabin, along with the ministers in his gove ent, was exposed-for a very tong period of time-to unrestricted, inffexihle, and constant instigation kom many elements in the Israeli right. This c m p a i p was focused on constructhg Rabin as a genuine traitor. 'f'hese elctments used a campaip of vile propaganda that was m tabielize and delegilimize a freely and democratically elected. g ,and much of their deceitftll propaganda was personally d i ~ c t e dat Rabin. Rabin was p ~ s e n t e das a traitor and a collaborator with the Palestkims, and threats were made that in due t h e he wouldt be judged a criminal, much like other well-known traitors, such as Vidkun Quisling, Lord Haw-Haw, and others Mxho were put on trial m d executed. Rabinfs government was portrayed as the "Judenrat, and he and his ministers were compared to the Vichy govemment. "The rhetoric used was cynical, ernotional, poismous, and sophisticated m d it. created a depressing aimsphere of hired, of verbal (and nonverbal) violence and abuse, h such an atmosphere, and in the eyes of many people, Rabin was seen as stigmatized, deviant, and estranged. In other words, he beclme the "otht.r,'kxternal to the group. .hdanger to the group, tn fact, surveys and polls made before the assassination s h w e d that his popularily had declined very sipificantly Simple, superficial, and deceitful slogans, whose explicit goal W= the delegitimization of Rabin and his government, appeared on houses, on bumper stickers, in newspapers, and at crossrrrads. W ~ e n individuals from the left ( b r e m p l e , from the Peace Now movement) tried to stage counter-demonstrations, they we^ cursed at, spit on,and werc h q u m t l y severely beaten by hooligans from the right." Two illustrations epitomize the situatio~~. A. few weeks before Rabin's assassination, s m e kaders h m the Israeli right staged a demonstration in downtown Jerusakm (Zim square), and the head of the r a t - w i n g oppo&tion, ME Benyamin Netanyahu, made a speech. During that event, some members of the right put up a very big photo-montage (clearly visible in televised =ports of that event) whrre one could easily see &bin in a Nazi d i t a r y uniform (ei&er $5,or GesCapo). The size of this abomination is indeed incredible. That any Jew cwld evm think about, much less so do, something like this is instructive. 'f'he second illustration is a testimony to the media by Leah Rahin after the assasshation. Leah told Rporters that somethe before the assassination she returned home, As happened before, demonstraton; f m the right staged a &anstration in front of her house, cursing her and her huSbmd. Mowwer, the "new'kelement h this particular demonstration was that some demonstrators threatened that after the elections, she and Uitz:hak would be put on trial ""like Mussolb~iand his mistress" "after the end of World War XI. To those of us who need a reminder, let me poixrt out that sixty-two-year-old Benito

Mussolini, :Italy%fascist dictator since 1922, and his young mistress, Clara I'etacci (twmty-five ycars old), were caught by partism forces near Lake Coma on April 27,1945. They were court-martialed and shot the next day, together with sixteen other fascist leaders, On April 29, their bodieshanging by the heds- we^ displayed fn Mih.h"ese two asswiations (as well as those made to Quisling, Lord Maw-Haw and others) were made in the most brutal way possiMe, as if there was anything these at all which made these compariscms viable. Thus, these hate crkes, preceding the actual assassination, turned Rabin-in the rninds of many Israelisinto a traitor to his people, a collaborator, and a strmgcrr. This cmpaign of reated the necessary social instigation and vi2ification-as in other case m d psyhdogical background required for the assasshatim. :It is well worth noting that the word "instigation" need not be interpreted in its narrow or technical sense. The phenomencm of instigation against Rabin was much broader, It involved a very difierent political and ideological worldview than the one held by R;abin. This wrldview provicied the andytical frameworlr within which the trmslation and creation of the concrete expressions of instigation and hatred were made meaningful. Furthermore, Arnir was an observmt Orthodox few, who chose to study at the only religious (Orthodox) u~~iversity in Israel (Bar Illan) m d identified himself with the fsraeli right, His act of assassination brought into focus a possible theocratic justification for tl-te assassination. 'That a religious Jew, identified with the right, assassinated a secular Jew, from the kft, could hardly have escaped attention. Mmover, Amir stated that he recefved ~ l i g i o u sjustification for his act. The works of Shteinberg (1996) and Ekndocvitz flc397) point out Ihe ~ l i g i n u context s of the assassination, with Efenbowitz noting that the major lesson from the assassinaticm was that its maor motive was religious. 'This is the place to note that eleme~~ts in the Jebvish Israeli right have no monopoly, or exchive rights, over campaigns of instigation and hatred like t b s e preceding the assassination of Rabin, In other historicai periods, the direction of hatred and h~stigationW= reversed.& E-Iowwe~, since at least the early 1 9 8 0 ~the ~ ideological cannpaign of instigation, delel;itirnization, and h a t ~ of d elements in the Jewish Israefi right (many of whom arcl C)rRhodox Jews) against the left (many of whom m secula) was a clear background for a number of acts of terror. Let me give just a few illustrations. Ch the evel~ingof Fdruary 10, 1983, during a de~~onstration of the Peace Now movement, a hand grenade was thrown into the crowd and exploded. Ten demonstrators; were wounded and Ernile Greenzweili;, thirty-three years old, was killed. bnat.1 Avrrashmi was accused and found guilty of murdering Greenzweig. Ch October 28#1984, a nineteen-

y e a ~ o l dAWOL soldier, David Ben-Shimol, fired a stolen ""Lau" antitank guided missile into an Arab bus in Jerusalem, near the Cinematheque. m e Arab was killed, and ten others were wounded. Cb April 22,1985, a group of three Jews-Danny Eiseman (twenty-seven years old), Gil Fux (twenty-one years dd), and Michal Ilailel (twenty-five ycars old)-mmdered aa Arab taxicab driver, H m i s Tutanji (thirty-two years old), in revenge for an Arab terrorist act of murdering a Jewish taxicab driverDavid Casgi-a few days earlier, fn Febmary 1994, Dr. Baruck Goldsteirr, a physician, ent-ered the tomb of the fathers (""W'arat Hamachpda," in Hebrew) in HfJbmn, a holy place for Jews and Arabs, with an M-l6 automatic rifle, and opened fire on Moslem worshipers. Twenty-nine I'trabs were killed, and 125 wounded. In May 18,1995, Haniel Koren, a twentytwo-year-old soldier, entered a church in Jerusalem, poured turpentine and tried to set the place on fire. Ch-I M a y 24, he entered a church in Jaffs m d opened fire. Luckily, in both cases no one was injured, Athough Koren stated that the reasons for his acts were "retligous," it was Arvrushmi who stated clearly that the reason for his act was the instigation he was exposed to. men. can hascity be a doubt that those co tthg the above-mentioned acts of terror were affected by the ahnosphere of hatrred created by the propaganda and instigation comhg from ell.me11t.s in the right, which t e ~ ~ d e d to describe anythhrmg with which they disagreed as '%etmyay or "trcasonous." "us, members of Peace Naw were defh~edas ""traitors." This atmosphcre of intolerance m d hatred served as the background for Yigacl h i r 'S sassassi;nationof Rabin. %e assassin's motivation was to stop the peace pace" wwhich Rabin was in\iolved and to avenge Rabin's betrayal, as seen from the assassin's right-wing religious Orthodox worXdview, From the assassin" ppoint of view, his murderous act was politically and ideologicaly justified. This justification was established within the social network in which he lived and functioned, m d which supported h h , n e s e two groups, the general and the specific concrete, form& the social structurt-s that pmwidcd the assassin the psychological and rhetorical devices that not only helped him orient himself to the act but also gave h h the motivation and the will to cclmmit &is act of political murder. In this respect, the similarity betwell the assassination ol "r'ibhak Rabin in 1995 and the m u d e r of Haim Arlosoroff in 1933 is striking.fl In both cases, the murder exposed the deep and hteful cleavages dividing the right and the left i,n Jewish Israeli society. h both cases, the murder became th focal poislt for the political and ideological breaking of different popdatkn groups. Heilbruner (1995) points out the similarities between the assasshatiol~of Rabh and the atmosphere of extrelne instigat h and accusations of betrayal by the extreme right in German& which

led to the assiassixzatim of Waltf-ier Rathenau, the German fnreign minister, on 'June 24,1922. As in other cases of poljtical assassin&ion, m d certainiy from the point of view of the assassin and those who support or identify with him, it can be clairned that what is operatrive here is an alternative system of justice. The assas* feels that he cannot get political for a p r i m minister whom he views as a traitor. He thus resorts to assassination in order to achieve justice. Eurthermore, the violence of the act calls attention to his political, religious, m d ideological viebvs,.In just this mmner, Prime M ~ I iskr Rabjn, not protected as he should have been, was shot and killed by Arnir on Saturday evening, November 4,3995, in Til Aviv.

Concluding Discussion In some respets, the inspiration 'or writing this chapter cane from such previous works as tl-tose by Archer (197f), O'TooXe (NB), and Weyl (19511). The idea of looking at one culture, historicallyf and examining cases of betrayal and treason these is interczsting and suggestive. It allows an in-depth view of the different cases and, perhaps, opens an opportunity for making some cultwal generajizatims. The first observation that needs to be made is that, like other cultures, both f u d a i m and. Israel have their share of traitors. In this respect, Judaism does not prt-sent a differmt case than other culturlts. It is certa;nly not free of traitors. This observation, coupled with the diseussian about infideliq, rchforces the conclusion that betrayal is not a drmatirally rase event. Ch tl-te cmtrary, it is nearly an everyday, almost routine event. Second, h all the cases we examined, the issue of crossing the bom~daries of synnbolic moral universes on issues of trust and loyalty was the core stmchral issue fiat determined the constmction of the relevant individuals as traitors. That was clear, case by case, mird, e x m i n i n g the casa revealed the diereace b e h e m the h a g e of m individual as a traitor and the reality behind it. h each af these cases, the politics of i d e ~ ~ tm i qd the co~~text played a major mle- The cases of Josephus FXavius and Vochanan Ben-Zakkai show how two conteznporanes coped with a shF1ar context, and with similar choices; one kept his Jewish identit)s wheseas the otber chose to transform. OIe has bee11 cmstnlcted m d commemorated as a hero, the other as a traitor. h a shilar way, h o s Levinberg and Uri IUm both faced a difficult tortuous capevity Mereas IXlm chose not to reveal kvhat- be knew, Levinherg revealed eveqthing he knew Again, fllan is construct& as heroicr,kvinberg as a traieor. The murders of De Hahn and Levi p v i d e us with an excellent illustration for the cnnlt-ural antagonism of c d i c t i n ; identities. De Mahn represe~~ted every-.

f i h g the Hagana was against. Levi represented indeyendence and the freedom to embrace a new idmtiv that was supposed to emerge with the c=ation of a new Jewish state. Lehi's leaders cauld not accept it. The Judenrat is remembered. as a treackrous organization, However, examinjng fie context fn which it functioned softens this image. 'l'here we= several cases of asassination that resulted from the co~~struction of the vicths as traitors. Israel De H h ,Yehuda Levi Israel Kasztneq m d Ktzhak b b h were all kifled because individlaals and groupmere convinced that they violated their loyalty and trust insuch a profound mmner &at the only remcdy was to kill fieme&However, in each of these cases, a close examhation reveals that the assassins we= insensitive to complex sit-uations and iporant of the facts, not In mention lacking incompassio~nand m a y . h no case is this as clear as inthe case of the tmnecessaq unjustifid, and hurried execution of CaptL3in Meir 'Tubianski. in this chapter we examined some orgmizations that were deFo~~rth, fined as treacherous-the Jtkl;kTnmdand Dereeh HaniCzolz. One can add to this the small gmups of activists that were behirtd the treachery of Udi Adiv and Dan Vered, as well as the ones behind the assassinations of Kasztner and Rabin. This is an interesting p h e n m n m because it hplies that cultures may have mganizations whose goal is to violate the trust m d loyalty of the mainstream morality of these cultures, by presenting and reinforcing a different morality. There is one major difference between the Judenrat and the other organizations, and it has to do with context and choices. U'aljke memtoersbip in the other organizations, the membership of the Judenrat was under conditions of extreme stress and thrlrat, and joining the organization was not made f m a stand of full free will and choice. Moreover, the choice and conse~~t of many individuals who served in the Judenrats were not fully informed regardhg th real intentions of the Nazis. However, the co on denominator of these orgmizatio~~s is that their actions were defhed as treacherous. m e needs to remember though that in all these cases, the construction of these orgmizations as inseminators of betrayal is not miversally shared. 'The more general cmcllusjio~~ is that it may not be uncommon to f h d an ideological group behind the traitors. T0 counterbalance the possible existence of a fifth colurnn, a cold war, or espionage, nations have created state-sponsored orgmizations that recruit operate, and support traitors. The case of th Israeli-operated spy (traitor to the United States) fonathan Pollard is a good example. Fifth, examhing the personal motivati.011 of trajtors has provided some interestirtg clues. The historical cmkxt played a major part in the traitors' choice of actions and their diwction (for ertample, Levinherg, I)e;trovsky). Traitors d s o used hjstorical context: to jwtify their acts.

Finally, Lalthough application of the universal structure of betrayalthat is,the violation of trust and Ioyalty-enabled us to explain the different cases presented in this chapter, it: was morality that was crucial in constructing the cases as betrayals. Without morality as a criterion, no meaningm interpretation could have been accomplished.

Was Delilah a traitor? Can such figures as Quisling, Vlasov, Benedict Amold, Judas, Malhche, ZJord Haw-HawFEzra Potmd, Stauffenberg, Edward VIXZ, Josephus, Pollard, and Kasztner be Lal lumped together in one category as traitors? If so, in what sense? 'This book was never intended to be a comprehensive encyclopedia of betrayal. Its major purpose was to develop a conceptudizing apparatus that would help us better understmd the naturt. of betrayal. HopefullyI this goal has been achieved. Elowe~rer,writing or reading a dry document, hi&ly abstracted, about betrayal is a punishment undeserved, by anyone. Thus, firoughout the book, we examined numerous cases, some very detded, of betrayai. All these individual red-life stories helped us to weave our more general sociological treatise on betrayal. mrtlughout this book we examined a great number of cases invoking various forms and ~nanifestationsof betrayal. We saw that it is possiblt to classify many of the cases into analytical categories. Examining all these cases, one needs to ask,When is the likelihood of invoking the label "traitor" inineased?Althou$h this label is context and si:uatim depcnde116 it also has a social structure, This structure emeqes when we exmine carereveals fully the type of vicrlations that invoke this term. 'This exami~~ation that the prhdbility of jnvctking this term, is increased sii;lnificantly w k n ever specific boundaries of symbolic moral universes arc crossed. 7'he method we used cmsiskd of examining diverse behaviors, fn different time periods and cultures, trying to crystallize the contmon analytical core behind the different empirical manifestati~nsof betrayal without losing the cdtural mosaic itself. This metl-rod inwlves two interesting and contradictory processes. On the one hand, it decontextualizes the cases by lumping so many cases and contexts togethes. Oxl the other hand, it enhances the importance of context by exami~~ing the specific content that elicits the societal response of "traitar'kr the more specific form referred to as "treason.'f

Our examhation of the behaviors of a considerable number of individ-

uals and groups, in different time pericrds m d c u l t u ~ sreveals , that the varieties of the behaviors that are viewed as betrayal provide a fasdnat-ing, rich, and stimulating mosaic, This variety has a cornmm core that, at the mfnimal l e d , can be characterized as foflows. Betrayal is a behavior that, first of all, involves a social interaction, presurned or directly observed, of individuals who are perceived to share the same cultural heritage m d similar cultural goals. In addition, there are some main elelxents that must be prese~~t to invoke the term '"traitor." Ta begin with, attribution of betrayal occurs when two major violations of expectations occur: violation of tmst and viofation of loyalty- These violations by an in-gmup melxber typically invoke the accusation of the deviant violator as a traitor. The more serious and thrtratening these violations are perceived to be, the higher the liketihood of the label. When no such violations exist, the charge of betrayal is weakened considerably, For example, a spy who pretends to be s o m e w he c ~ she r is not can hardfy be accused of '%etrayingfhcollective he never belmged to, mird, betrayal means that a person from the defaults on his or her moral &Xigations and commit.rnents to the group a d crosses the boundaries of the group or dyad. In other words, some actual turncoating must take place in addition to the aforementioned violations, This added element inwitably increases the probability of finding the person to be a traitor. Finally, when viotations of trust and loyalty occur, accompanied by turnmathg and committed h stealth or secrecy, the label of ""traitor" is practically unavoidable. X n such cases, the tern "traitorf"s used ~ g w d l eof s the power configuration. intert-stingly enough, these cases are nnostly concentra.t.ed in the interpersonal level. Such actions as those commigted by strike violators and police informers also tend to fall in this category* Chzr examhation of the different forms of betrayal makes one conclusion very clear. Betrayal is not a rare occurrence. It takes pIace in numerous awas of our life, alrnmt on a daily basis. Betrayal, in other words, is quite prevalent; most of us have experienced at )east one .form of it, m s t likely mort. than once, Analyticatly speaking, dthough betray& is a mdtidimensiclnal phenomenon, the two most crucial varihlcs that distinguish betrayal from other foms of human behavim are vidations of trust and loyalty. However, these twlr variables are not discrete but continuous. Betrayal hvalves behaviors that are spread on a qualitative spectrum, varying in terns of perceived severity, Che of the important distinctions is whether the betrayat is personal or collective. Withh these two types, we have even fher distinctions. Far example, people seem to differentiate between a "one-ni#t stand" and a

long-lasting affair. Moreover, a further distinction within a "one-night stand" concerns the motivation and cmtext of the art, for exampl", wkther money was used to obtain sex. If we are examhing betrayal on the collective fevel, then questions of motkation, context (for example, industriaf espionage in peacetime versus military espionage in wartime), m d inflicted damage become crucial. For both types of betrayal-personal and collective-the issue of stealth or open belxavior is another sipificant variable. C)ne reason why this distinction is so important is that violating trust and loyalty in secrecy typically hvolves deceit. Thus, issues of dishonesty, pretenser lying, and making other people believe in a Mse reality come into play* h o t h e r dimension invdves threat potential.. When a large organization such as a state is being threatened by a structural violation of trust and loyatty (for example, treason), especially during periods of c d i c t , its reaction will be severc. Betrayal orz the interpersonal level (for example, inf delity) also typically yjclds strong emotional reactions, as identities are being scrricausly chailenged and threatened. To st~mmarize,""eraitor" i s a ggezzeral name referrbg to an. individual who violates trust and loyalty in a variety of circumstances and contexts. Traitors can be found in interpersonal, group, mganizational, or national crntext.~.. The term "traitor" ~ f e r to s a person who is perceived to be a bona fide member of the s a m collective, or group, as those whose trust and loyalty the traitor comprt,mfses. 'fhat is, a strung assrtmpticm about a common and shared czlltural heritage (pasl., present, future, common gods, language, values, norms, worldviews) exists between the traitor and the betrayed. Added to this basic structure of violation are issues that can solidify, or weaken, the appljcation of the term "'traitorf?in specific cases, n e s e issues include the ioilowing: M r e the violations committed in secret? W r e the victims of thr violationti specific indiviciuals, groups, organizations, or countries? Did the violations involve deception? Was the threat potent-ial of the violation large or small? Moreover, the nature and circumstances of betrayals have been used to determine the pmper societal, reactions to such actions. Followkg the tradition of contextual constructionism, we first established the facts and the characterization oE betrayal. Once we exposed the universal structure underlying betrayal, we could move on to the constmction. It became clear that although the universal stmcture of violations could be rather easify identified in each case we discussed, there were several other important related issues. mese issues are relevmt to the constructjon of the tern "traitor" and its application in different contexts. First and foremost is the issue of moraliw. Basic questions of boundaries and power lie at the heart of betrayal. When the term ""betrayal" is invoked, the issue of moral bomdaries is not

far behind. The main reason is that issues of loyalty and trust are fundamental moral issues. Facit~gthese issues =quires making decisions mgarding loyalty and solving similar questions regarding trust. In each case discussed in this book, issues of morality determine the ethical judgment of the case in question. Mora:ljty, however, like deviance, is highly infiuenced by power. Specific moral claims, and the conseqtlent social reactions to those claims, dcpmd on power and its usage. Invoking the possibiljty of betrayal thus always involves examining chalienges to both moraiity and power. Moreover, when secrecy is involved in the betrayal, an element of deceit is added to the mix, and thus an additional mclrai issue clrmpomds an already complex situation. Power relatio~~s are also mag~~ifiecf here, as the issue of who has the power to deceive who and why is at the fnrefront as well. Obviously one result of his is that. invoking and validatiw the existence of betrayd h o s t gmrantees a harsh societaii response, A distinction beheen the universal social stmcturc of betrayal and its specific moral content was made throughout the book. Discusshg morai issues requires paying some attention to those making the moraf, diagnoses, including the author of this book. Mareover, these mord stands gain importance because labeling any specific persun as a traitor is-like it or not-passhg a moral,judgment, Of course, it is irresponsible to make overgeneralizing statemnts, For example, although it is easy to deteritted on the personal level c ~ r rnine t v h e ~ e an r act of betrayat was co on the collective level, punishment- is typically much moro severe for betrayal on the collective, or national, level. I f we confine ourselves just to the issue of treason, and we remind ourselves of such individuals as Qx~isling,Lord Haw-Haw, Ezra Pound, and Malinche, it may become quite difficult to decide who was a bona fide traitor and who or what they betrayed. h gemon with a Nazi worldview would definitely not view m i s l h g or Lord Haw-Haw as traitors. lis my mhd, the issue of morality and power is indeed crucial. Black" theory of srrcial control is appropriate here, at least fmm the point of"view of t h s e la,helcd '"raitors.'" Black;bases his approach on the concept of ""self-help criminal justice," He argues that the main reason that offenders involve fiemselves in devimt a d crimh~albehavior is not that they want to violate norms or iaws. Rathes, these offenders feel that they achieve justlice by b ~ a k i n gsome rules, According to Black, these deviants are involved in a process oE exercising social control either by forcing the culture in which they live to =cognize their claims or by getting justice for what they defne as their own cause. From, this intriguing perspective, traitors can indeed be viewed as being involved in the pursuit of "justjce"; however, it is "'justice" to their own criteria.

There is another major issue hvolved here, and that is the issue of the type of identities that emerge from betryal. C. Wright Mills alerts us to the fact that personal biograghies, and consequently ide~~tities, are linlced intirnatefy to social and historical processes. Nowhere is this process clearer than in the cases of treason. Traiton; facing competing symbolic moral universes have to make a choice. Such a choice can make them heroes for m e universe but despised and detested traibrs for another. Consider intfividuais such as Mdinche, John An&&,Nathan Hale, and a large number of others" Moreover, the very selection of specified cases as traitors reacts a moral choice that accqts the construction of particuiar individuals as traitors as opposed to heroes. We live within cultures, and as Might Mills points out, we cannot escape the cultural context..However, we need to be aware of this, so that we can develop a better understanding of betrayal. The iejentities that various traitors embraced, and those given them after the fact, were all embedded in specific pofitical and, even much more so, moral contexts. This observation necessarily brings me to the next point, which involves masks and reality In an interesthg fashion, this also comects us to contextual constmctiosrism, Once we have ascertaisred the basic facts of the case, we c m unfold the social ( m d moral) constmction of betrayal. Then we can contrast the reality with the construction. In fact, we repeated this exercise numerous tirnes throughout our analysis. Although it is m almost classical exercise in contextual constructionism, it is also an exercise in debm:kjng and tends to color research with a subversive hue, which it should. The identities of traitors are thus a reflection of the political and social contexts in which they live and fu~~ction. In this sense, m e can ask, To what degree are these identities genuine? Are they part of the empirical r they sociatly and moratly cmstruckd? In and factual substratlrm c ~ are the context of World War 11, these questions help us draw a line between genuine colllaborators and true believers (for example, I(auiding, Seyss-. Inquart, Degrelk, VIasov, and Joyce) and opp0rtu"i"ic collaborators, fafcing loyalty and trust. 'The issue of fact versus construction, truth versus falsehood, and empirical versus mythical is thus cutting across not only the macro social and culturat level but also fie l e d of indivibal identities. This conclusion sterns not only fsom C. Wright Mills's formulations but also from syrnbolic inkraction. That, perhaps, should not really surprise us. Contextual constmcticmism is grounded rather strongly in symbolic interaction. Deviance (and crime), as argued elsewhere, needs to be understood within central cultural cmtertCs.2 Indeed, betrayal, as a form of deviance, is intimately connected to both loyalty and trust m d to membership in groups. This means that issues of betrayal always involve central

processes of change and stabilit-y in the moral and social boundaries of collectives of people and hence irr their smse of belonging and identity, It is no wmdcr then that issues involving betmyal are often emotionally explosive and typicallly give rise to moralistic discourses. Treason, perhaps not surprishgly, is the most complex betrayd. When all rhe major elments that define betrayal exist (violat-ions of trust and loyal.t>iby a member of the in-grou~7,secrecy, and turncoating), the likelihood for a consmsrtal etefh~itionof betrayal is rather high. When the elexnmt of: stealt;h disappears, and individuals who are britnded as traitors are simpty those with different political views, the p w e r configurations play a major part, and the nature of "tr.easonffbecomes prciblematic and debataible (for example, Quisling, Lord Haw-Hakv, Pktain, Vlasov, Pound, and Malinche). If and when such ""lraitors" are b r o u e t to trial., one can expect a harsh sentence, but one can also expect that the accused will not accept the verdict as valid. Moreover, the issue of treason will. always elicit a debate mgarding the proper dividing line between legitimate dissent and violation of trust and loyalty or even giving aid and comfort to the enemy. Mr'hat exacerbates this probleln these days is that the bomdaries between "friend'hnd "enemyff may be bfurring, as even "the other" may be difficult to discern. I'crstmodernit;m, by nature, blurs the boundaries between diverse symbolic moral u~~iverses, m d heszce sharp disthctions may become difficult to mahtah. ?he various definitional elements presented here can be used to delineate the moral boundaries between different forms and manifestations of betrayal. The term. "betrayal" rdcrs to a farge nrarnber of types and categories representing a wide spectrum. Although there. is a universal social structure behind these diiferent: manifestations, the specific content of different types of betrayal needs to be assessed in different ways. I hope that we now powes the analytical tools for cmceptualizing this fascinating form of h u m n behavior in a way that is true to its rich and complex nature.


Chapter 1 1. See short report in Newsweek, December 29, 1996, p, 22, and a mview of the case supplement, December 11, 199& pp. 59-62. The by Ronen Bergman in I-I~krefs's charge Cif faced in eau& was espionage related and dealt with individuals who give infornation that is meant to harm and damage the state" scurity. On the verdict, see Mn'cariv; March 25,1999, pp. 12-43; and Yediclt Rluzro~zot,same datef p. 19. 2. See Bbck and Morris 1991:4 09; Cufman 1995; Rachum 19%; and Raviv and Melman 1930:27Zt--38Q. 3. See Ben-Yehuda 1985; and Zerubavel1992. 4. See Ben-Yehuda 3985,1989. 5. Landa 4994; Fukuyarna 4995; Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984; and Seligman 1997 examine these issues. 6. See Goc~deand Ben-Uehuda 4994 on moral panics. In a wa)?r,this interpretatian can also help us understand the modern quest for reltigim and the revival of interest in religionsf new and old, as well as in magical and fantasy scjlutions, The major failure here is the liberals' failure to educate people to cope and Xive with empirical and spiritual uncert.ajnties. 7, See Fletcher's intriguing 1993work, 8. See Poimar and AXlen 199"7357>5;74; Gilfing and McKnjght 2995; and 'Tc>scano 1990. See also Yediot Alrarurzot, March IS, p. 5, A group of British and ather peapfe created a support group for him, demanding, among other things, that he be treated as any atker prisoner; see Hg%retz, April 10,1998, p. 133; and Tel Avilt, September 27, 1996, pp, 53-58, In 1998, this group (the Israeli committee h r Mordechai trapanmuand fcrr a Middle East free from atomic, bicjlogical, and chemical weapons) published a book expressing its views, Vaklanttnu alrd trlte Bomb (in FTc-;brew). 9. See Hra'nretz, April 17,1998, p. A8. Ahnrc;tnol,July 17; 1998, p. 2. See also Maron 1998a. For more details, 10. "I"edi(~t see &diot Rhnro~zol,November 24, 4999, pp. 4-44. 11. Mnklarl'v, July 17, 1998, p. 3. Manbar" aacounts received wide pulaliciq in October 4998, when Illana DayanpsTV Channel 2 program "FACT" pprc~videda forty-eight minute docurnrtntary on this affair. It i s worth noting that another Israeli-Hertzel Kad-bvas found guilty and cmvicted in 1995 on charges of espionage for Iran, too. He was sentenced to six years in prison, half of which were conditional. He was released frc>mprison in Maxh 1997.

12. See Amit 1992:372409. 13. Judges, chapters 13-46. See also Bower 1W0:2-3; and %th, 1972:150-153, 14. Judges, chapters 4-5; see also Heaps 2 969:39-42, 15. See report in Nculsrveclk, vol. 128, no. 12,(Sczptember 16,1996), pp. 36-37. 16. Far example, see Eoenirzg St n ~ d a r dSeptember , 17,2996, front page. 17. For exampte, Cardinat Winning, leader of the Roman Catholic Church in Scotland, , 20,1996, pp. 1,s.. 18. See Eaenizzg S t a n d ~ r dSeptember 19. The newspaper paid the ctluple E15,000 (equivalent, at that time, to about US $23,000). The interview was quoted widely by the BBC, tm. 20, For short summaries we the Sptember 30,1996, issues of Erne, p. 24, and Nczostucek, p. 6. 21. See Ezleni~zgStandard, Octojber 8,1996, and the BBC3 18:00 news on that day, and The Tinzes, October 9, 2 996, p. 90, 22, Ezrenir-zg Shndard, July 2,19917, p. 4. See also Ku 1998.

Chapter 2 1. Granting an illegal pass to a ship-the CFznrming Natzcy. 2. Brandt 3994:188-189. 3. See Pofrnar and ALlen 1W732. 4, Lentz 1988:xvii; and Polmar and Allen 1997:24. 5. There are numerclus tzrrrrks about Benedict Amold. %e Arnold 1979; Bakeless 2 "398; Boy fan 1973; Decker 2 932; Flexner 2 "391; OToole 2 992 :55-59; Polnnar and Alfen 19"3:32; Randafl 1990; Sellers 3930; Seth 1972:28-32; WaIXace 1954,1978; and Weyl 1950:44-59, My favorite two items are Brandt" (1994) excellent and very well-written account and Ducharme and Fine's (1995) critically penetrating analysis of the images of Benedict Amold, 6.Lentz 1988:xvii; B'Tc>c>ol1993:22-24; PoEmar and AIlen 1997:258; and Seth 1972:285-282. Frrr a critical evaluaticrn of Hale's mission, see Bakeless 1998:440-422,

Chapter 3 1. See the Newsweek issue of Spternber 30,1996, which was devoted to the general issue of infidelity. On adultery in China, see Ncrusaueek, August 24,1998, p. 24. Malaysia's punishment consists of six fioggings, three years in prison, or a fine of around $1,190. Malaysia utilizes ""Modesty Guards," whose job is to find pclopte who are involved in illegal sex in hatets and public parks. See Yediot Alznm~of, "24 Hours," "supplement, August 23,1998, p. 6. 2. For example?see tawson 1988. 3. See Norton and Hastings 1997. 4. Newswcek, Sptember 30,1996, p. 40. 5. This case is described in Chapter 1. 6. See Ncwszoeek, spternber 30,1996, p. 38* 7. Ibid., p. 40,

Motes 8. Ibid. 9. Chapter 10, pp. 287-307. 10. See also Ofir-Sl~acham1998. 11. i\a'c>rtc>n and Hastings 1997. 12, Shenhar 1998. See also Muhlbauer and Zernach 1991:438-444; Nardi 1996:42-45; and Sherner 1992:26&267, 13. Hc~rowitzand Ben-Arie 1998:14; and Weitz 4998. See also contemporary newspaper coverage, Ear example, Yedl'ot. Ah~mnot,January 15 and 17, 1993; in both cases coverage begins on front page. 14. See Yedr'otAfiarclnot, "2% Hours," supplemenl; August 23,1998, p. 6. 15. For a short review of an internaticynal list of infidelities and adulteries by celebrities, see Kobi 1998. 16, See The Ernes, October 9,1996, fmnt page. 17, See Nezusaueek, December 8,1997 p. 22. 18. Horow-itz and Ben-Arie 1998:14, pp. 30-31; and Horc~witz 19. See h'arr'z~,October 11, 1996, magazine Weekct:.~zd, and Ben-Arie 1998. 20, See Nezusaueek, August 20,1998, pp. 12-21.25-39, 21.. July 3,2997, p. 8. 22. "0peratic)n Drumbeat-," which began in January 1942; see Blair 1996:50%526; Gannon 19% and Hickam 1989, 23. See Blajr 1996:559. 24, See Villkman 1994:5&80, 25. Dc,bson and Payne 1986:288-289; and Polmar and Alfen 1997:158,3";7$, 508. 26. Atdrich tzrorked in CIA headquar2ers. In mare than a decade of twacheraus activity, he betrayed at least eleven CIA agents to the Soviets, of which at least fcxtr were executed (Richelson 4995:422), 27, 1301marand Alien 1997:22-22,443-4M. 28. Alias Walter G. Krivitsky, born 1898. See Deacon 3982202-203; Dc,bson and Payne 1986:175-176; and Potrnar and Allm 1997:318. B.Vol krnan 19"3:77. 30. Lentz 1988:79; and Polmar and Allen 4992319. 33. Polrnar and AIlen 199"7101;7. 32, Volkman 1994:77. 33. See also Bower 1990:60-67; Friedrich 1972:100-103; and Richelson 1995: 94-96,

34. For example, see Richetson 1995:95; Smith 1976; Weinstein 1978; and Weinstein and Vassiliev 1999, 35, See Polmar and Allen 1997:263; and Scott 1996, 36. Scott 1996:33. 37. Ibid. 38. I""olrnarand AlIen 3992263,575578; and Richetson 1995:224225. For more on Venana, see Haynes and Klehr 4999, 39, 1301marand Allen 1997:263. 40, Scott 1996:31. 41, See also Friedrich 1972:10%104; and Weyl 1950:424441 for shorter rwiews.

42. In its most intense fc>rm,this war lasted from the early 1950s to the late 1980s, a period of about forty years. See Whitcomb 1998, See also Weinstein and Vassiliev 1999; and Friedman 2Q00. 43, See Beacon 1982301-302; and Polmar and Allcsn 1997:239. 44. Pen kojvsky 1965; Polmar and Atlen 199E-429431;Richetson 1995:2'74-282; and Volkman 1994:2%30. 45. I""c>lmarand Allen 199'7:239. 46. The Report u f t h Royal Commission, 4946:ll. 47. See Sawatsky 1984 (who conveys how difficult it was to cope with Gouzenkai); and S t h 19";"2:27&278. 48. See Deacon 1982316-317; 130fmarand Allen 1997:270-272; and Wise 1988, 49. See Bower 1990:141-151; King 1989; liichelson 19(35:91-94; and Sinclair 1986 for the political and academic (as well as sexual) cantextualization of campuwcultures in which this ring developed. See also Winks's 198'7 mc)re general approach, 50. Deacon 1987:334-336; Dobson and I""a~me 1986:205-208; and Polmar and Allen lli3923-47-349. 51. Bobson and Payne 1986:41-44; and Polmar and Allcsn 1997:90-92. 52, Costello 19138; Penrose and Freeman 1986; Polmar and Alien 1997:77-78; and Votkman 1994:17-22. 53. Also knc>wn as the ""tird man," see Page, Leitch, and Knlghtley 1969; Philtby 1969; and Volkrnan 1994:8-16. 54. %metimes referred to as the ""fifth manm";~bson and Payne 1986:46-47; Polrnar and ALlen 1997:97; and Richelson 1*5:95--94,436,485, 55. Dctbson and Payne 2 986:217-228; Polmar and Atlen 1997:358-359; and Seth 19;;'2:388-391. 56. Bobson and Payne 1986:19>194; and Polmar and Allcsn 1997:342. 57. He also had an affair tzrith Maclean's wMrifeMelinda-which began in 1964, 58. Polmar and Allen 1997:433436. 59. Newsweek, September 8,199'7, p. 42. 60. See also Bullocl-r 1%6:158-168; and 13incher 1987:19?-224, 61 . Dear and Ftx~t1995:297. 62. There are several bmks and studies written about this affair. Frrr concise accounts, see Gutman 1995:265-278; Melman and Raviv 1"389:611-.;7Q; and %hiM and H aber 1976:400-402, 63. For example, see Bearse and Read 1991; Pofmar and Allen 1997:309-310; VoLkman 4994:77; and %LW yn 4987:115-449. 64, Palmar and Allen 1997:65-66, as well as Seth 1972:317--319,provide good summaries. There are several spying epix~desin the Bible, One is about J o ~ p h ' s brclthers, who say that they came to Egypt to search for food, but Joseph accuses thern of being spies. A second epimde involves a command by the Almighty to Moses to send spies into Canaan, Moses sends twelve spies and when they return after spending forty days on their mission, their reports are mixed and even contradictory Only two of the spies recommend an invasion; the rest warn of big troubles ahead. The Israelites panic, but the Almighty, who feels that this panic reaction indicates little faith in Him, punishes thern by keeping them from the

13romisedLand far farty years, A third episode involves Joshua sending two spies to Jericho. There, the spies, who practice the world's second-oldest profession, meet Rahab, a practitioner of the world's oldest profession. She manages to save the spies from an infcjrmer working for the king of Jericho. During the Israelites" successful attack and conquest of Jericho, Rahab's househclld is spared. Surely these stories have some interesting lessons for today 65. For example, Bower 4990:282-298; P-ic~we4486; and two Bctional movies about her called Mata Hari, one made in 1932 (starring Greta Carbo in the title rc~le)and one in 1985 (with Sylvia Kristel in the title mle). 66, ""Cicero," was the code name for Elyeza Bazna, who spied for the Nazis in the British embassy in Turkey in World War II; far short descriptions, see Deacon 1982170; 130fmarand Allen 1997:121; and Seth 1972:126-129, 67. For example, see Vijlkman 1994:260---280. 68. See Deacon 198"i79&97; Palmar and Allen 1W7464; and %th 1972:443-449. 69. See Johnston 1998. 70. See Pctlrnar and Allen 199"3":442443,for a short description of the case, and Vinitzky-Serouss 1999 and ZeIizer 1999 for an analysis of the public debate that folioweb and its implications. Hillel Cohen (1998) confronted Pollard's 1lawycl.l; tary Dav, with parts of the events described here. Dav's r e s p o n ~ was that Pollard never contacted the South African embassy and never received large sums of money. Dav's srersim is that Pollard received a Xow salary, which, at its peak, reached no more than $1,500 a month and that his motivation was ideological. Dav also stated that he had heard about a secret Swiss bank account Pollard suppowdly had, but neither he nor Pc~llardhad ever seen it. Qbviousty, Dav's interest is in representing his client in the most pcjsitive light possible. For example, ideological motivatian appears better than hancial geed. h o t h e r spy for Israel, Icebrand6 Smith (renamed Avmr Shamir in Israel), who operated in Holland, tvas also caught, but unlike Pollard, he was allawed to leave the country and chase to move to Israel; see Melrnan 1998. 71. See Black and Morris 1992:22&229; Deacon 1977:79-91; Ei~nberg,Dan, and tandau 19i78:65-133; MeXman and Raviv 1989:165160; Polmar and Allen 1992128; Raviv and Melman 1990:443-146; S g e v 1986; and Steven 1980:199-206. Many activities with those of another Israeli sources couple the description of Eli "Cc>hen% implanted s p the ~ German-born Israeli Wc~lfgangtotz, who operated in E a p t mder an assumed identity, Again, Lotz cannot be referred to as a traitor. 72, Black and Morris 1994:164. For mare on Beer, see Beer 1956-1957, 4966 Qwrittm in prison and brought to press by Amikam Gurevitz); Black and Morris 1991:158-166; Hart31 1987:93-168; Melrnan and Raviv 1989:122-125; Polmar and Allen 1"37:54-55; and Raviv and ;Velman 1990:98-108. On the inRuence of the Beer case on an inner cultural dispute within Israel, see "Crc3rner 1985. 73. See Raviv and Melrnan 4990:102-403. N.Prange 1984; and Whyrnant 1996. 75. For example, see Codevilla 1992; Deacon 1987 Dabson and Payne 4986; Mnightley 1986; Laqueur 1985; Polmar and Alien 1997; Richefson 1995; Sarbin, Camey, and Eoyang 1994; Seth 4972; Volkman 194; and W s t 1993, 76. For example, see Srohl 1989,

1717. Abwellr was the German military intelligence organization headed by Admiral Canaris from 1935; see Zmtner and Bedurftig 2997:2-3. On the double-cross system, see Masterman 1972; and Polmar and Allen 199'7:17%1;7$. 78, X am deeply grateful to Jaama Michlic-Coren, who not only suggested this type of betrayal but read this section very carefully and made some very useful and construdive comments and suggestic~ns, 179..See Noakes and Pridharn 1988, vot. 3:6617-1705.. On the Pact of Steel, see Toxano 1967. 80, See Laqueur 1976:135-139. 81. Heim-Dietrich Lowe in Dear and I-arrot 1995:250. It is estimated that there were about 7,800,000 Soviet IX,OWs,about 2,800,000 of wham died while in Nazi captivity; see Baudot et at. 1989:395-396. 82, Far example, see Bethef 1995; and T'olstoy 1979. 83. See Kersten 1991;and Steinlauf 199'7, ch. 3. 84, See report in Ha%refz, June 3,1998, p. B5, based on a repark in the Gzrardiatz Ercm May 25. 85. Robinson 1996:288-284. 86. For more on whistle-blowing, see Akerstrorn 1991:43-51; Bok 1993; BeMaria 1992; Glazer and Glazer 1989; Greenbere and Baron 1997; Near and Miceli 1985, 2992, 1997; "Nice Guys Finish Last," a 1994,55 minute television documen.tary produced and directed by N-icholas Adter and Gasoline Sherwood, Australian Film Corporation and Titus Films; Miethe 1998; Robimrrm 2 996~273-288. 817. Glazer and Glazer 1989:252-255. 88. Far example, see H~'nre.trtz,January 23,1996, p. At;, 89. Flklrat.elz, November 11,1995. 90. Some examples of the consequences af whistle-blowing in Israel include the follavcring: (1) A tester in the ministry of transportation who warned that road tests af matorcyclists tzrere faulty was fired (Hafare"idfZ, June 30,198); (2)An adviser to fire depa&ments was fired after warning that many hospitals were dangerous firetraps (L)nvnrt %ptember 38,1995); (3)A securiq officer who complained about fiscal mismanagement in the municipality of Loci was transferred to an inferior job (hf;nfareti;,August 22, 1997); (4)A woman who expc~sedin public that vegetables were being falsely marketed as "organic" and that the marketing organization was deceiving the pubtic was isolated and persecuted, along with members af her family (varic~usreports in the press in the summer of 1997). The Qgen Assaciatbn was established in Israel to help whistle-blowers. It was established by a woman who had exposed mismanagement and was then committed, wrc~ngly~ tc) a mental hospital, following a complaint by the organization that her behavior was erratic. Her suffering was so great that it prcrpefted her into public effc~rtson behalf of whistle-blowers, For more on whistle-blowing in Israel, see Bar-Ufpan 1997; and Verner 1992.. 91, Robinsan 1996:274-275. 92. See Leach I W5:I. 93. Ibid.,2. 94. See Rofef 1988:130-131. 95,July 26,4997, p, 4. 5%. From the Canadian The Globe alzd ILlar'l, August 15,1997, p,A13.



97. Nettler (1982:50) is one of the few who include a dixussion of cornersion within the context of an interpretatim of treaso)n. 98, The (London) Tinzes, July S, 1396, pp. 1-2, 99. Abu-Tuema 1995:18. 100. Pincher 4987:427. 101. Gray 1994:147. Gray refers to Casement:as a jftrajtc>r." 102. For short descriptions of the case, see Elzqclopedlr;I Britnnnica, 1980, Micmpnedl'n, vol. 2, p. 608; Pincher 1987:xvi, 4, 108, 127; and 1301mar and Allen 1997:103. For a longer account, see Cwynn 1931. Ingliss 1973 and Wharam 2995:156-165 focus on the trial. Allegations of homosexual behavior were involved in this case, too, and some accounts state that this may have created a grejudiced atmosphere against Casement. 103. Polmar and Alten 1997:103, 104. Ceva" military and pcllitical superic~rsincluded the chief of staEfl, Rafilel "RaEuX" Etan, Minister of Defense Ariel Shamn, and Prime Minister Menachern Begin. 105. khiff and Ua%ri 19%:264-266. 106. The dean of faculty was Professctr Gershon Ben-Shachar (from the department of psychfogy). Departmental chief administrator was Mrs. Osnat (""Ossie"") bn-Shachar: 107. The p ~ s i d e n at t that time was Profesmr Hanoch Gutlreund (from the department: of physics). 108. Quoted in Archer lli3"i7:1;2,See also Rasenbloclm" 4998 work, which examines, among other issues, the effectiveness of strikebreakers. Rosenbloom%study is bcused an the recruitment of strikebreaking labor from outside the striking group. His conclusion is that recruitment and usage of strikebreakers significantly impacted strike effc~rtsin such sectors as the cotton textile industry, mining; iron and steel production, the cigar industry, and in the railroad industry. 109. This part- is based on my 2993 book, hlitical Assrlssinntions by Jemus: A Rhetorical Device for Justice (Albany: State University of New York 13ress), pp. 2639. Used with permission from SUNY Press. 110. See Rapopclrt 1979:%4. 111. See Rapoport 1984; and Hum-oad 3 970:1>1 6. 112. For example, see Ben-Vehuda 4993:102-106; see Ben-Uehuda 4995 for summaries on the Siicarii and Masada. 113. For example, see Hodgsan 1955; and Lewis 1967. 114. Lewis 196220. 115. For example, see t w i s 196212; Rapoport 1984; and Ford 1985:3Q8-1Q4. 116. Rapoport 3.984. 117. For more on the Assassins, see Ford 19&5:9&104; Franzius 1969; Hammer 1835; Hodgsctn 1955; Hu~wood1978:543; Lerner 4930; Lewis 1947; and Wilson 1975:15--301. 118. Rapclpart 1971, 119, Or like fifh column saboteurs (discussed in Chapter 5). 120. Lentz 1988:78--79. 121. Ben.-Uehuda1993, 122. Published originally in 1903and made into a movie in 1984.

123. lE~ntz1988:48; and Polmar and Alfen 199Z110. 124, Callins was mudered because some r&ellious farces thought that he presented a political threat for the Irish Rebetlic~n(Lentcz 1988:4748), An impressive 1996 movie titled Ml'clzael Callins was made on the controversy. 125. See Seth 1972150-1 53 on Delilah. See Bower 1990; and Polmar and AlIen 1997:2%, an ""hney traps" or sex traps. 126. The ca.= is described in fiifuller detail in Chapter 1. For the specifk subplot involving ""Cindy," from Va'anunu's point of viewt see %d-Eot Afznronot, January 24, 1997, Saturday Supplement, pp. 16-22. This story had an interestkg twist in April 1996, Uzi Mahaneimi-a journalist tzrorking for the Sunday Ti~ncs-managed to focate and expose the real 'Yindy." He found out that her real name was Sheryf Ben-Tov, where she lived, and talked with her. Besauw of this exgo>sure,the head of Israel's sailitary intelligence (AMAN), Shlamo Cazit, told journalists that the state of Israel should consider charging Ma haneirnj with treason, or something sirnilar; see 1Vlafariz~, April 44, 4997, p. 6. 127. %e Colton and Vanstone 199'7,alas methodofogicalfy.weak. 128. For example, see Ben-Yehuda 1985,1986; Kohn 19%; and Pallane and Hennessy 1995. 129. The dexriptian is based on my 1993busk, Potiticnf Assassine;ri'iotzs by IIP'ZUS: A Rlzetnrictll Devicefar Justice, pp. 201-202,208,283. 130. Sefer Toldok H @ H ~ p n nvol. , 3, part 1:562-563. 131. See Braham 2981; Hilberg 3.9235, vol. 23796868; and Laqueur 1980. 132. See Bauer 1982348-191; and Wyman 19%:2.44, 133. Bowyer Bell 4987:95; Katz 1966:185; Bauer 1982:14%191; and Hadar 1974. 134. Brand 195'7:355. See also Brand 1960:49-79; N i v 1965-1980, vol. 4:8&81; Ayalan 1980; Rosenfeld 1955; Bauer 1982: 448-494; and P-iadar 49711, 135. Far sample, see Hadar 1972; and Bauer 1982:134-191. 136. Brand 1957,1966,4974, 137. See Wyman 198cZ:24%245, 138. Ibid. 139. See Marx and Fijnaut 1995. 140. For examples, see Mam and Fijnaut 1995; and Staples 1997. 141, See Black and Morris 1994:15&167; Harel1982 MNman 1998; and Melman and Raviv 1989:122-129,236243. 142. See Black and Morris 1991:14%149; and Melman and Raviv 4989:12&128. 143. Black and Morris 1991:149. 144, Ibid., 442-443; and MeIslman and Raviv 1989:243. See alw Yediot Rlmrotzut, Spternher 4,2 W8, p. 4, and Illn'nriv, same date, p. 7, 145. Black and Morris 1991:443; see also Melman and Raviv 198"3:241-2431. Kalmanovifch was later dg>orted to Russia. 146. N;rrkrefs,December 12,1997, g. 1. 147'. See HafaretzZ,June 4, 4993, pp. AI-3; Kol kinir, June 4,1993, pp. 46-51; Yediot Altnmnot, June 4,1996, pp. 2-3; Yedz'at Ahmnot, Supplement, Octcyber 22,1993, pp. 14-45,17. 148. And a hefty fine of $250,000. See Blum 2 987; Earley 1988; and Polmar and Allen 1992585-588. 149. Polmar and All- 199221-22; and Weiner, Johnstm, and Lewis 1995.



150. See Beacon 198E263-265; Bobson and Payne 2986:4-5; 1301marand Allen 1997:H, 447; and Seth 19?2:9-15. On Gar)r Francis Powers and the U-2 incident, see Beschloss 19%; Polmar and All- 1997:448,562-563; Richelson 1995:264-2ti8, 293-294; and Seth 1972:465489.

Chapter 4 1. Oxford E~.zgtz"sh Dictionary, 2nd ed., vol. 8 (OxEord: Ctarendc~nPress), pp. 458--.459. 2. Etzcyel'op~rdr'aHebraica, vol. 7 Uerusaiern: Encyclopedia Publishing), pp. 603407 (Hebrew). 3. Encyclopaedr'n Britnnnica, vol. 22 (London: Encyclvaedia Britannica, 1956), pp. 435-438. 4, Mkrok~aedia,vol. 10 (London: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1974), p. 2 03. 5. Plsscoe 193493. It is interesting that the 1968 edition does not have treason listed in it. 6. And possibly a few ~3thers;see Stc~ne1988. 7. Jiordano Brmo died for chatlmging the Ptolernaic tzrorldview and the morality that s u g p o ~ e dit; Galilm also suffered because of this woridview. Freud's psychoanalytic theories, tzrhich revolutionized psyehobgy and psychiatry and enriched other disciplines, were originally criticized heavily on moral grounds, For mare on these issues, see Ben-Uehuda 1985, 8. Encyelo;~aediaBI-r'ta~lzica,vol. 22, p. 435. 9. Ploscoe 1934:93. 10. Nettler 1982:35; and Hurst 1983:1559. 11. Enqclopaedk Brifasilnl;ca,1701.22, p. 436. 12. For example, Andreyev 1987 Cc3ntzray 1993; Hoidal 1989; Johnson 1990; 1,ottxnan 1985; Randalf 1990; and Selwyn 1987. 13. For example, Pincher 198'7; Weyl1950; and West 1995, 14, For example, Boveri 2956; Bullock 1966; Klement 1984; Littlejohn 1972; DToole 4991; Weale 1994; and West 1964, 15, For example, Archer 1971:3; Hagan 2989,1997; Pincher 2 %7; and West 1995, 16. Archer 1971. 17, The case is that of William John Vassall-a British Admiralv clerk whose espionage caused much da rnage. For details, see Bulloch 1966:152-153; see also West 1995:65-69, 18. See Bergmeier and tcjtz Rainer 199R and Weale 1994. 19. See PoZmar and Allen 1997:451452; Klnightley and Kennedy 1987. 20, West 1985:361-370, 21. See Kooistra" 44989 work on criminals as heroes. On a related case, see Campbell 1977. 22, See A kerstrorn 1991:52; and Hagan 1989,1997. 23, 13incher1 9 8 7 : ~ ~ 24. Ibid., 1-14,22. 25. Ibid., 22-23. 26. Friedrich 1"32:83,93. 27. Ibid., 91-92.

28. ibid., 223. 29, Ibid., 89, 30. Ibid., 188. 31, Nettler 1982:35, 32. ibid., 42, 33. As do Hurst" 11983and Ploscc>e%almost legal-technical 4934 presentations, 34. Archer 1971:10-11; and Weyt 1956:22. 35. Archer 197'4:16. 36. Ibid., 22-23. 37. Weyl4950:464. See alw Archer 1974:34-37; and Weyl 1950: 140-162. 38. Archer 1971~38-47;and Weyl1950:164&231. 39. Archer 1971:48-51; and Weyl 1950:212-237. 40, Archer 1971~51-54;and Weyl1950:23&261. 41. Archer 1971:48-62; and WeyX 1950:262-302. 42. Detailed in Klement 1984, eh, "i"187-247. 43. ibid., 217. 44, Archer 197l:Q-63. 45. Ibid., 6348. 46. Quoted in ibid., 70. 47. Ibid., 72. 48. Weyt 1950:304. See also Archer 1971:69-75; Weyt 1950:303--336; White 1957; and ffvitcover 1989. 49. Archer 1972:116. On Kuhn and the Bund, see Higham 1985; Parrish and Marshall 4978:221,%9; and Weinstein and 'Wassiliev 1999, 50. Archer 1971:'E-118; Higham 1985; and WeyX 1950:317--341. See also the relevant parts in Weinstein and Vassiliev%fascinating 1999 botjk. 52. Archer 1971~12 C;, 52, I bid ., 7&77. 53. See also Wey l 1950~317-341, 54. Archer 1971:115--116; Blair 19"3:6Q3405; Hickarn 1989:238-252; and WeyX 1950:347-356, 55. Archer 19"7:10&118. 56. Ibid., 117, 57. ibid ., 143-154. See also Weinstein and Vassiliev 1999. 58. Archer 197"1:155166. 59, On the historical inaccuracies of the 1966 movie' see Marjus 1995370-73. See also Ackroyd" 19915 superb and vivid biography, 60. On the movie's historical inaccuracies, see Fraser 2 995, 61. See Ash 1990; and Mackay 1995. 62, Far a short review, see Weyl 1950313-20. 63.For more on traitors and their executions in EngXand in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, see Gatref l 4996:298-321. 64.See, for examplef Hagan 1989,1997. 65. For example, the cases of the German White Rose and of Captain Meir Tubianski . 66. Far example, see Besgesen 197'7.



67, See Ben-Yehuda 1985:23-173; Briggs 1996; Klaits 1985; Levack 1987; and Quaife 19817. 68, See Ploscoe 1934; and H-furst 1983, 69. Hurst 1983:156. 70. Ernes Literary Szrpplemenk, February 16,1996, p. 36. 71. This connects this work more explicitly to works by such scholars as Erving Coffman, Anselm Strauss, and Gustav Iclrkzeiser (19m).

Chapter 5 1. For reviews, see Bear and Foot 19995;Parrish and Marshall 1978; Weinberg 1994; Wheal, Pope, and Taylor 4995; and Yormg 1981. Baudot et al." 1989 TIze kirktor.ical Erzcyelapedia of World War I1 even devotes some decent space to treason within the context of World War TT (p. 457). Tt points out that the sharp clash beWeen such extreme ideol%ies as fascism and communism created clear boundaries and made usage of the term "treason" meaningi-ul. 2. For Cole" story see Murphy 1987. Fc~rSuzanne Warren's side, see Young 1959. 3. Pctlrnar and ALlen 4992209. Frrr an interesting discussion of saboteurs in the U ~ t e States d during World War X, see Witcaver 1989. 4, See Baudot et al. 1989:432-434; and Fcmt 1984. 5. Kessler 1991:144, 6. See Pryce-Jones 1976; Shermer 1971; and Weyl1950:317-341. 7. The Office of Strate@c Srvices-a U.S. intelligence and sabotage organization-was created by President Rm)sevelt on June 13,1942,and abolished by President Truman an January 12,1946, In July 194Xrurnan established the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which in many respects continued the work of the QSS. For a short review, see Polmar and ALlen 199?:40&41Q. 8. Polmar and Allten 1992209-210. 9, White" svork (1957) ccjntinues this argument into the 1950s. His work is focused on sabotage by the communists during the cold war, but the cases examined in the book are instructive because they shcm how difficult it is to discern whether certain incidences were actually the result of saboteurs+vvork. Among them he notes the burning of the ReicX-rstagon the night of Februa~y27, 1933, for which the Dutch Van der tubbe was blamed and cmdemned to death. It is adually quite reasonable to assume that the Nazis themsetves were behind that fire, which was used to cmsctlidate Hitler" grip on Germany (for a short descripticrn, see Snyder 1976:28&289), In addition, M i t e mentions the "mysterious" mid-air explosions af the British-designed and manufactured Comet jet, We now know that these accidents were due to a fatal design flaw and metal fatigue and did not result from sabcytage. See also M. R. D. Fcx.t In Baudot et al. 19&9:423-424. 10, See also Archer 1971:81-93; Breuer 1989; and Weyl1950:317-341. 11. See PoXmar and AIlen 3992395-396, and the discussion in Chapter 6. 12. Far example, see Hc>ettl1953. 13. See De Jong 1950,1956. For a general review, see Baudot et al. 1989:16&164.

14. See Snyder 19'76:141-142; and Zentner and Bedurftig 199'7:396. See also Smelser'S 1975study of the Sudeten problem, 15. See H a ' a ~ l z ,July 7, 1997, g. A2, and a penetrating documentary by Gil Sedan from Israeli TV's Channel 1 on this topic on July 6,1997, titled "The Stmy of Three Ex-coXIaborators," produced by h r i n Kirnox: 16, See Citbert 1963; and Zentner and Bedurftig 1497:34-35. 1'7. Warmbruun 1963:272-2"7. 18. Typically called lude~zmts.See Trunk 1972 [49"3"];and Zentner and Bedurftig 199243. 19, From touise De Jnng's intmduction to Warmbrurm%1193bonc~k,p. v. 20, See Baudot et al. 1985):102-109; and Zentnes and Bedurftig 1997:1453-151. 21. See %th 1956, which provides details about resistance in Nctway, Greece, Denmark, Luxembourg, Holland, Yugoslavia, Belgium, France, and Italy. See also M. Baudot" m m general view in Baudot et al. 1989:42&414. 22. See Rings 1979 for cliffewat patterns of cr~llaboration. 23, Parrish and Marshall 19;722:563;Snyder 19'7&32Q;Hans Urnbert in Dear and Foot 1995:90-93, see also p.,998; Young 1981:589-90; Zentner and Bedurftig 1992872-873. 24. BeneB later fled first to the United States and then to England, where he became the voice of Free Czechoslovakia. See Zmtner and Bedurftig 1997:77, 25. Dear and Foot 1995:521; Snyder 19174:234; Wheal, Pope, and. TayXor 1995:204-205; and Zentner and Bedurftig 4 997:175-1 76, 26. Mastny 19"7:2;?3. 27. Weinberg 1994:518. 28. Dear and Foot 1995:521; Parrish and Marshall 19[78:255; Wheat Pope, and Taylor 4995:204-205; and Zentner and Bedurftig 1997:375, 253, Assor 199263-64. 30. See H. Bernard in Bauclot et al. 1989:129-130; and Paul Latawski in Dear and Foot 1995:279-280. 33. MacDonald and Kaplan 1995:60. 32. See Runk 1972, [1977]; and Zentnes and Bedur.Etig1997:43, 33. The discclvery of the bctdies was made on April 12, 1943. For more on this, see Paul 1994; Wittlin 1965; and Zaslavsky 4999. 34. Sword, in Dear and Fcmt 1995:644,646. 35. Claus Bjrcrrn in Dear and Frrot 1995:293-295; tittlejohn 1972:53-82; Wheal, Pope, and Taylor IW5:125-126; and Zentner and Bedurftig 1992192. 36. See Novick 1948:184, on sentcmcing and ratios; and Baudot et al, 1989:401, on the executionti. 37. Heavy water is an important component in the production of atomic energy. 38. SpeciaX Operations Executive was a British secret ser~iceaimed at subversive warfare in enemy-occupied territory; see M, R, D. Foot in Dear and Foot 1995:101&-.1022,and his o>wn1984 book. 39. See Dear and Foot 1995:4244-1245; Callagher 1975; and Kurzman 497. Far a more general context, see also Bermtein 1995, particularly pp. 25-27; Bmoks 1992; Cruickshank 4986; Walker 198%and Weinberg 1994:56&570. The 4965 British mot b n picture The Heroes of TeEemark, filmed on location, depicts these actions.



40. Olav Riste in Bear and Foot 1995:838-823; Wheal, 130pe, and "fylor 1995:339-340; and Zentner and Bedurftig 1997:652454. 41, Hoidal 'i%9:159, 42, Ibid., ch. 5. 43. Far example, the May 21, 1936, ""battle of Gjavik,"hhich invctlved street fighting fo11lo)wing an indting speech by N.S. members. These members were attacked and beaten, and after mare than seven hours of fighting they were able tcr free thernslves only because state police troops were sent to Gjrrrr~ik;ibid., 229, 44. Ibid., 236237. 45. Ibid., ch. 8. 46. Ibid., 334. 47. Ibid., 319-320. 48. Their first meeting was on December 14, 1939, and their last in January 1945. 49. Wistrich 19@:313; and Zentner and Bedurftig 3992946947. 50. Hoidat 1989:4%"3. 51, Ibid., 473-474, 52. Ibid., 499-500. 53. Ibid., ch. 15. 54. Tbid., ch. 18, 55, Quoted by Hoidal 1"389: 717. 56, Hctid at 1989~773-774. 57, Nctvick 196&187. 58. Baudot et al. 1989:401. 59, For more on the Quisling affair, see Dahl 4999; Hewins 1965 (albeit cmtroversial); f-loidal 1989; Parrish and Marshalit 19783512-513; Zentner and Bedurftig 1992744,946-947. On Nomegian cl-rllaboration,see Littlejc3hn 19"il-52. 60, Baudot et al. 1989:153-160; and Dear and Foot 1995:346, 61. Dear and Foot 1995:701; and Zentner and Bedurftig 199"7:563. 62. Martin Conway in Dear and Foot 1995:121; see also Conway" s u c h fuller 1993work; j.Gerard-Liboisin Baudot et al. 1989:5%56,134; Littlejchn 1972131-1M; m d Ent?ler and Bedurftig 199275-76. 63. Quoted in Snyder 1976:62; see also Zentner and Bedurftig 1997:187, 801-802. 64, Snyder 1976:62; Canway, in Dear and Foot 1995:289, 65. Quoted by Snyder 1976:62. 66, See Archer 1971:128 and Novick 1968:187 on the numbers of arrestees, and Novick 1968on the population ratio. The number of executions is given in Baudot et al. 1989:401. 67. From the Allied point of view, the Dutch undergrc~undwas one of the most effective in Eumpe, See Warmbruun 1963:275282, 68,HirschfeXd" 3 988 work states that they won only 0.2 percent of the votes. 69. Foot in Dear and Foot 1995:782-786; Hirschfeld 4988; Rings 49"79:4-99; Weal, Pope, and Taylor 1995:324-326; and Zentner and Bedurftig 1997:633. 70. Snyder 1976:239; and Zentner and Bedurftig 1992643, 71. 13arrish and Marshal1 197835643; Rings 1979:197-198; and Warmbruun 1963:206..

172. In Dear and Foot 1995:783; see also M. R. D. Foot in Baudctt et al. 1989:349-350; Littlejohn 2972:8%129; Hirschfeld 2988; and Wrmbruun 1963. 173. Yediol: Alzamnol, September 26, 1996; Foot in Dear and Fcmt 1995:782; and Warmbruun 1963:165--184. N.See Archer 1971:l28 on the number of arrestees and Nctvick 1968:187 on the sentences given and the pc~pulationratio. Number of executions is given by Baudot et al. 1989:401. 75. Dank 1974:12-43, 76. Quoted from Dank 1974:13. 77. See Roderick Kedward in Dear and I-asrot 1995:407408. See alsc~Littlejohn 1972:185-290. 178. Qtlo~tedin Dank 191;74:2;see also P. M. FT. Bell in Dear and Foot 1995:42@31 (on de Gaufle and Free France); E, Pognon in Baudot et al. 1989:181-183 (on Be Gaulte) and 167-l@ (on Free France). On aspects of the I""4tain-deGauIle cmtrast, see T ~ ~ u r m4964. w 79. Daladier served as premier three times (the latest term being 1938 through March 4940) and as minister of war from 4836 to 4940, 80, 13arrishand Marshal1 2978:148-149,527-528, 81. Quoted in Dank 19;7$:294.For more on P4tain" trial, see Roy 1968. 82, See also Dear and Foot 1995:396--398, 876-877; E, P o p o n in Baudot et al. 1989:38&388; Roy 1967; and Zentner and Bedurftig 19921782-1703. 83, Assvr 1997:84-95; Dear and Foot 1995:673; and Zentner and Bedurftig 19973528-529. 84, Cordon 1980:326, 85. See Dear and Fc>ot1995:396-398; Gordon 1980; Hirschfeld and Marsh 1989; and Kedward and Austin 1985. 86. For example, see an agonizing account of some such cases in Bank 197'4:139-1 58. 87, See f-lirschfeld in Dear and Foot 2 995:24&249, 88. Selwyn 198Z220; see also Baudot et al. 1989:61. 89. Selwyn 2 %7:214. 90. See Dank 1974:322.1[am not sure that the numbers were tower in the %>viet Union,-M.B.Y 91. Archer 1971:128. 92. Novick 1968~487. 93,Ibid., 228-22 9. 94, Ibid., 204, 95, Ibid., 187, 96. See also M. Baudot's lucid surnrnazy in Baudot et al. 1989:4G2403. 97, Quoted from the section ""A Ti>uchof History," p. 17, from Vicfiy Guzi;Je,pubXished and distributed by the TcJurist Office. I used the pamphlet 1 received in the hotel I was staying in-tes Celestirrs-in June 1998. 98. For more on the Vichy go>vernment,see Paxtc~n1972 and the illustrative brtc~kby Az&maand Wievicnrka 1997. 99, See Baudot et al. 1989:173-175; Roderick Kedward in Bear and Foot 1995:405407; Kedward 1993; and Schoenbrm 1990.


32 7

100. On July 3,1940, the French fleet was destrayed by the British in veration Cntnpzcll".at Mers el Kkbir. The "battXesM"began June 24-26 and lasted into Jufy 4. For more, see Bear and Foot 1995:739-740; Parrish and Marshalt 1978:400; Tute 1989; Weinberg 1994:145-146; and Wheal, Pope, and Taylor 1%5:308-301. 101, According to Boveri (lf)56:129),Darlan was mueh closer to Pktain personally than L a d . 102. Boveri 195k423. 103. Operation Torch, commanded by Eisenhower. See Dear and Foot 1995:81&818; Parrish and Marshall 49"i7:468-469; and Wheat, Pope, and Taylor 1995:633. 104. Wheat Pope, and Taytor 1995:11,345. 105. See Parrish and Marshall 1978:150-251,211-212; and Wheal, Pope, and Taylor 1995:122,172-173. 106. From a 1942 letter to Rc>osveltquoted by Boveri 1956:132. 107. Wheat, Popef and Taytor 1995:469. 108. Verrier 1990:49. 109, Parrish and Marshalt 1978:74. 110. Wheal, Pope, and Taylor 4995:122. 111. ]Ibid., 188. 112. Bcj\reri 1956:12&134. 113, Quoted in Boveri 1956:131. 114. Bcj\reri 1956:132--133. 145. Parrish and Marshalt 1978:150-151; see also Assor 19(37:96-10T On Churchill and de Gaulle, see Kersaudy" 1982,work. 116, See Bunting 4995; Cruickshank 1975; Dear and Fcmt 4995:202; Parrish and Marshall 1978:112; Sinel19S9; Tarns 1967; and Wheaf, Pope, and Taylor 1995:90. 117. See, for example, Newswcek, Intei-national Edition, December 14, 1998, pp. 22-28,

Chapter 6 1. Tc>masevich1975:460--363. See also Dedijer 1992; M a ~ i n1978; Milazzc~1975; and Roberts 1973. For a more general background, see 13arrishand Marshall 1978; Zentner and Bedurftig 1997:1Q72-10173; and Cohen 19536. On atrocities, see Tbmasevich 1975:25&261; and Cohen 1996. 2. See Baudot et al. 1989:372, 484; Gojben 19"3:88-91, 100-1 06; Dear and Foot 1995:86(3; Wheal, Pope, and Taylor 1995:116, 490; and Zentner and Bedurftig 1992694,985. 3. See Dennis Deletant in Dear and Foot 19%5:954-959; and Zentner and kdurftig 1997:809-810. 4. Dear and Fcmt 1995:45; Parrish and Marshall 197&22;and Yc~ung1981:523-524. For a more pnerat discussion about Romania in this context, see H, Bemard in Baudot et al. 198%417420;and a n t n e r and. Bdurftit-ig1997:33. 5. Mayer 19773246; Parrish and Marshall 1978:446, 561, 660; Wheal, Pope, and Taylor 1995:496; Ycfung 1981:606407; and Zent-ner and Bedurftig 1997:997. 6. Andreyev 1987:37.

7. Ibid., 37. 8. Dear and Foot 1995:914. 9. Mayer 1972246. 10. Wheal, 130pe,and Taylor 1995:376-377. 11. The h l t a Conference took glace in February 1945 and was the second meeting of Churchill, Rc~ssevelt,and Stalin. 12. Keegan 1978:214; ParrisEt and Marshal1 1978:G60; Wheal, Pope, and Taylor 1995:496; Young 1984:606-60'7; and Zentner and Bedurftig 4997:99T On the more general issue of collaboratiron in the Soviet Union, see Littfejohn 1972:292-334. 13, Andreyev 1987:3. 14. Burton 1963:125, 15. ibid., 126;. 16. Andreyev 2 "387, 1'7. ibid., 2. 18. Ibid., 7. 19. Andreyev in Dear and Foot 1995:224'7-1248. 20, Keegan 49"3":214; see also Young 1981:607. 21. See Mach 2 989; McKafe 1974; Muller 1991; and Zmtner and Bedurftig 199ii7:gW-1WO, 22, Snyder 2976:153; and Zmtner and Bedurftig 1997:42M26,43M32. 23, See Koch 1989. 24, Snyder 2 "3&153. 25. Zimrnerrnann 1986:27. 26. Ibid., 9-11, 27. For example, see Baudot et al. 1989:18&186; Benz and Pcsble 199'7; Dear and Foot 1995:477-478; Fest 1996; Graml, Mr~mmsen,Reirhhardt, and Wolf 1970; Hamerow 1997; f-ledley 2 %6; Hofhann 1977,1988; Mlemperer 1994; teber 1957; Masan 4978; and Zirnmermann 1986 for general reviews. On the JULY 20, 1944, conspiracyf see Baigent and Leigh 19994; Farman 1973; Galante 1981; Kramarz 1967; Manvell 1971; Whalen 1993; and Wiltiarns 19%. 28, Bayfes 1945; Dulles 1947; Ctumbach and Newborn 1986; f-lanser 2979; Neumann 1945; and Zent-ner and Bedurftig 1997:1045--1046.. 29. Quote is from Dumbach and Newborn 19%:179-180, On Freislel; see Kcxh 1989:136--138; and Zentner and Bedurftig 199E295-296. 30. See Wheeler-Bennett 1967. 31, Bear and Foot 1995:478; see also Kershaw 1987, chapter 8. 32, For mare and fuller details, see Baigent and Leiglr 1994; Dear and Foot 1995:478; Fest 1996; Forman 1973; Friedrich 1972:104-108; Galante 1981; Kramarz 1967; Manvell 1973; Mason 19'78; Parrish and Marshal1 1978:6Q1-682; Snyder 1976:332; Whalen 1993; Wheal, Pope, and Taylor 19953252-253; and Zentner and Bedurftig 1997:971-973. On equating ""lr,yaXtyf' with ""knor" in the S.S., see Williamsan 4995; and Zentner and Bedurftig 1%7:682, This was an instrlxctirie exercise in rhetoric because it evaded the direct moral issue, which is ""loyalty to what" "to whom""), 33-On Bohoeffex, see Bear and Foot 1995:152; 13arrishand Marshall 1978374; Snyder lli376:34-35. See also New York Elnes, August 16, 4996, p. A2. On Niemoller, see Hadley 1995:70-71; and Zentner and Bedurftig 1997:647-6448.



34, Baudot et al. 1989:202; 13arrish and Marshall 1978:239-240; Snyder 1976:121-I 2;and. Zentner and Bedurftig 1997:351-352. 35. "fhe A b m h r conducted German military intelligence and counterintelligence; it was created after Wc3rld War i.For short descriptions, see Winfried Heinemann's discussion in Dear and Foot 4945:1-3; and Zentner and Bedurftig 1997:2. 36. Assor 499";7144-487; Colwin 195"i";Dear and Frrot 1W5:489-490; P-iclhe 197'9; 13arrish and Marshal1 1978:202; Snyder 1976:49-50; Zentner and Bedurftig 1997:125-126. 37, Bear and Foot 1995:251-252. 38. See Dear and Fcxt 1995:257; and Hicks 1995. 39, See Brackman 1987; and Chang 1997. 40. See Gold 1996; and WilXiarns and Wallace 1989. 41. The march follc3wed the fall af Bataan, a small area an the western side af the main Philippine island of Luzon, on April. 9,1942. 42. See Dear and Foot 1W5:445; Knctx 4981; and Stewad 1956 (for one soldier's illustrative account). 43. Wheal, Pope, and Taylc~r4995:49-50,228, 44. Lyman 13. Van SXyke in Dear and Foot 1995:215-216, 222-223; see also pp. 660461 on the Kwantung Army and p. 916 on Pu-M. 45. Dear and Fmt 1995:916. 46. See also Pu-Yi 198%and Bernardo Be~olucci" 198'7movie The Lasf Emperw7; tzrhich won nine Academy Awards. 47. Baudot et al. 1"3853:112--115. 48. See Polmar and Allen 1997:24%247, 49, Johnson 1990:IM-168. 50. See Seth 4972:591-594; and Bower 1Wa127. 51, Seth 1972:591-594; and Bower 1990:127. Bcjwer 1990:129. 52. See Seth 1972:595-596; quote fr~wr~ 53. A picture of the stamp can be found in Polmar and AlXen 1997:421, 447, along with similar stamps featuring other spies (for example, Abel, Philbyf and Nathan Hale). 54. See Knightley 1986:192-3; and taqueur 19&5:236. 55. Richelsan 1995:90. For more on Sorge, see Bower 19"3:121-129; Deacon 1987:241-243; Dobson and 13ayne116)86:297-299; Knightley 1986:18%2"33; Parrish and Marshall 1978:580; Polmar and Allen 4997:523; Prange 1984; Richelson 1995:89-91, 113 - 4 3 5, 124-125; Seth 1"62:583-596; Snyder 1976:325; VoXkman 1994:112-120; Whyrnant 1996. 56. Johnson 1990:2, 57. ibid. 58. Ibid., 35. 59. ibid., 35-36. 60.Ibid./ 36. 61. West 1995:277-278; West argues that this ideological Xine was adopted by Agnes as a result af her meeting Laipat Rai, an Indian nationalist, at Columbia University. 62,West 1995:27'7-278; and Polmar and Alfen 19W52'7-528.

63.Jc>bnson1990:198. 64, bid. 6. ibid., 11. 66, Ibid., 12. 6'7".ibid., 200-21 5. 68. See Clayborne Carson in Dear and Foot 1995:63243. This is also the place to calX attention to Shibutani's 1973 fascinating work. 69. See Tanaka lli397, 70, Meegan 1978:77; Parrish and Marshall 2 "37:186; and Weinberg 1994:504, 71. See Weinberg 4994:8913. 72. Ibid., 504, 73, Keegan 1978:77. 74, The Record of Collnbomtimz of Kz'lzg Farozrk of Egypt witFz trlte Nnzis and Thtir A Ily, The Mufti. The official Nazi Record of the King's Alliance and of the Mufti" Plans for Bombing Jerusalem and Te1 Aviv. Memarandurn submitted tcr the United Nat.ic>ns,June 1948, by the Nation Assodates, New Ycfrk.

Chapter "7 1. See Weyl1%&364-373; and Edwards 4991. 2, Weyl 1950:388. 3. Eclwards 1991; and West 1987. 4, Wf;lyl1950:361-373; and Archer 1971:119-128, 5. Edwards 1%1:99-114. 6. On Wodehouse, see the Globe and Mail, Sept. 17, 1999, p. ,416; Edwards 1991:32; and Bergmeier and Imtz Rainer 19"3:112-114. 7. On ""Axis Sally," see Bergmeier and Lotz Rainer 499E126-130; Edwards 1991:8&93,97-98; and Weyl1950:3"17382. 8. Edw ards 1991:41-56; and Weyl1950:37&376. 9. See Cole 1964; Selwyn 1987; and Wharam 2995:166-172. 10, Selwyn 1487:43. 11. Stwyn 1987. 12. Cole 19@:21. 13. Ibid., 23, 14. ibid., 24. 15, Ibid., 26. 16. Bo>tihCole (1964) and Selwyn f198'7:16,22)derive this conctusisn. 17, See Cole 4964:2&29; quote is from p. 23. 18. Ibid., 29, lli3. Ibid., 30. 20, Ibid., 35, 21. See Sherrner 1371. 22. CoXe 29&:41. 23, This passpc~rt-based on falsified infc2rmation-would eventually be used by the British prosecution as an indication of Joyee's ppmfessed Icjyalty and his breach of it. It would mean Joycefsdeath.

Motes 24, Selwyn l"387341. 25. ibid., 43. 26, Charman 1992:vii. 27. ibid. 28. Ibid. 29. Cole 19&:72-81.. 30. Ibid., 66. 31, Charman 1992:vii. 32, Cole 1964:84-85. 3%Ibid., 85. 34. Selwyn 198E76-7";". 35, MacNab visited Berlin in the summer of 1939; see Cote 1964:82-83. U MacNab positive reassurances about their ac36. Bauer was the one W ~ gave ceptance. 37. Cole 19&:93-95. 3"3 Selwyn 1987:93; Selwyn refers tcr Coxbbels and Caering. 39, See Bergmeier and Lotz Rainer 1997; Edwards 1991; and West 11987. 40, Selwyn 198"7:91-92, 41, Ibid., 124. 42, ibid.; see also Cole 1964:110-119. 43, Selwyn 1987:105, "Te book, by the way, was reproduced in English by the British imperial War Museum in 1992. 44, PZ, "i"n the 4992 reprint of his brtc~kpublished by the Imperial War Museum. 45. Selwyn 15382130. 46. Charman 1992rxii. 47. Selwyn 1%7:111, 48. Ibid., 112, 49, The Germam built three such pocket battleships. They were desiped to be more powerful than cruisers and faster than battleships. The Admiml CrafSpec's technical specifications matched the above goal. It was bunched in 1934, with six 11-inch guns as main armament, eight 6-inch guns, eight 19.7-inch torpedo tubes, and an impressive cruising speed of 26 knots. 50. The Exeter. was buiXt in 1931 with six 8-inch guns as main armament, eight 4inch guns, and a top speed of 32 knots. The Achilles was a New Zealand cruiser. Its main armament consisted af eight 6-inch guns, and it had a top speed of 31.25 knots, The Ajnx was a Royal Navy cruiser completed in 1934, It had eight 6-inch and four gater eight) 4-inch guns and eight 21-inch torpedo tubes. 51. See Wheal, Pope, and Taylor 1995; and Pope 1956. 52, Snyder 1"36:126, 53. Tape #l3438 in the Imperiat, V\lar Museum, London. The r's in ""Admiral. Graf" were pronounced as German rc~llingr%. 54. Tke Dmmn of flze CrafSpee, 1964:xxvi; see af SC)Tbnks 1971:20. 55. Tanks 1971:17'. 56. January-February 1942; see Parrish and Marshall 1978:320-321. 57. Tanks 1971; Wheal, Pcjpe, and Taylc-rr1995:541. 58. Tape no. 4859, in the Imperial War Museum, London. 59. Coie 19H:186-38";".

60.ibid., 195. 61. Ibid., 196, 62,ibid., 205. 63. Selwyn 19873152, 64.Ibid., 156. 65. Elitler's territorial expansionist intentions (including world domination) were laid trut In his Mein Krc~ntpJ and his taking of Austria and Czecho>slovakiais proof enough that tzrt-rateverhe could not achieve by pc~litics,he tcmk by military force. It is important to make this point clear became a somewhat similar claim tzras made by Kilzer (1994). 66, Tape no. 522411, Imperial War Museum, London. 67. See also Weale 1994:185, 68, Seiwyn 1%7:150, 69. Cole 19C;$:229. 70. Selwyn 198E454. 171. ibid., 160; see also Charman 1992:xii; and CoXe 1964:244-247. 7'2,Selwyn 198";7:162-463. 73. May 28, 1976, Biblio~aghicalA~hriveG15, reel 27, 74. See also Sefwyn 198E163; Charman 1992:xiii; and Cole 1964:247, 75. Selwyn 1"3873168, 176, Ibid., 1'70. 77, Charman 1992:xiii-xiv. 1725. Selwyn 198Z1179. 79. Ibid., 180. 80. ibid., 190-191. 81. Ibid., 189, 82. Radio trantimissian from April 11,1943. 83. Selwyn 19817:107. 84. Charman 9992:xiv. 85. Tke Times, Frc3bruary 8,1995. 86, Selwyn 1987:4, 87. fewish Cfzronicle, February 17, 1995, g. 10. 88. Selwyn 1987:108-409. 89. ibid., 118-119. 90. See Charman 4992:ix. 91, Bergmeier and Lotz Rainer (1997:45-83) add several more names to the list. 92. Full details are provided in accounts by Duus 4983 and Howe 4990. For shorter accounts, see Archer 1971:122-123; Baudot et al. 1989:456; Dear and Foot 1995:1119; Parrisk and Marshall 1978:432; Weyl 1950:382-388; Wt-teal, Pope, and Taylor 1995:467; and Young 1981:602403.

Chapter S 1. %twyn 198'7:219, 2. Bergmeier and Lotz Rainer 1W773-74,

Motes 3. Ibid., 74. 4, Ibid.,'75. 5. Redman 1991. 6. See Pound 19178. 7. Torrey 1984:161. The anti-Semitic tone in his transmissions in 4941 was very salient. Casillo (1%88) points out that Pound" anti-Semitism emerged from his work and his mind, ALtht->ughit diminished later, it remained a major theme in his transmissians; see Carpenter 1988:594-597. Caryenter points out that Italian officials were puzzled by Parmd" motives and were cmcei-ned that his transmissions might be using a code to pass informatian to the Allies, that is, that Pound may have been a spy (p. 597). 8. Torrey 1984:161. 9. See Carpenter 1988:592-596: and Bergmeier and t o & Rainer 1991i":75-79. 10, Bergmeier and Lotz Rainer 1997:77. 11. Bid-. 12. Ibid., 77-78. 13. Cornell 1966:vii. 14, In Torrey 4984:196. 15, Cornell I"36:M. 16. Torrey 1984:155-Z 7%. 17, Ibid., 177-228. 18. Ibid., 195. 19, Ibid., 225-226. 20. I""c>undtended to deny his anti-Semitism when confronted with it. See Ibid., 22622R See also the excelfenk review in Coles 1983. 22, Bergmeier and Lotz Rainer 1997:78-79; and Sc?lwyn 1987:219-220. Fur short accounts of the case, see Boveri 1964:482-188; and Weyf 1950:400411. See Heym a m 1975 on 130und's personal history; see Morn 1985 on Pound" usage of history 22, Zentner and Bedur.Etiig1997:379, 23, Quc)ted in Hoidat 1989:236,803, n57 and n58. 24, For example, in June 24/ 1937. See ibid., 272 and 8flt3,n179, 25. Zentner and Bedurftig 1997:379. 26. Bclveri 1961:197, 27, Assor 1997:26-28. 28. Hoidal1989:743. 29, Boveri 1961:199. 30. Zentner and Bedurftig 1992379. 31, Boveri 1961:198-199. 32. titt.lej;icthn197231. 33. Pwsorzne: The Catlected Slzorter Poe-lns of Ezrn Pound (New York: New Directions, 1926), p. 89. 1 am very gratehl to Declan Spring, editor; New P>.irectic>ns, New York, who grmted me permission to quote the poem. 34. 130und's affinity far fascism did not fail to attract attentiron. For examplm, see Carpenter 4(388:566-597 Casillu 4988; Chace 1973; and Redman 1991.

Chapter 9 1. This includes a 1980 biographical movie titled Edzuard Mrs. Simpsun, starring Edwad Fux and Cynthia Harris, 2. The British television drlcurnentary prclgram on King Edward VIiI was transmitted on November 16, 1995. The executive producers were Sally ttlovdward and Davit3 Hart. The prc"ram was directed by David Hart and Nick Read-.1shall refer to this program here as Channel 4. 3. Brown 1987:272. 4. For example, see Bloch 4988; Bradford 1989; Costello 1988; Higham 4988; Parker 1988; and 'Thornas 1995. 5. Ziegler 1990:26&269. 6. See Bradford 1989:125127. 7. Bradford 498"3166. 8. Thomas 1995:41* 9. Channel 4,1995. 10. See Gilbert 1%3; and Morris 1991. 11. Pryce-Jones 1976. 12. See Shermer 49Tl for a shart review; see also Chapter 7 on radio traitors and Lewd Haw-Haw. 13. Quoted in Bradford 1989:167. 14. Zieglctr 1990:163. 15, Bradford 1989. 16. Ibid., 164; and Costello 1988:49, 1'7. Brown 1987:181-182,678. 18. Zieglm 1990:267; Bradford 1989:165; and Costello 1988:451. 19. Ziegler 1990:268. 20, Costello lli388:449, 21. Thomas 1995:28-30. 22. Ziegler 4990:268. 23, Ibid., 207-208. 24, Ibid., 391. 25. The agreement was achieved within the framework of the 1925 Locasno Facts. 26, Speer 1971:113, 27. Ibid. 28. Brown 1987:483. 29. ibid., 184. 30. Bradford 1989:465. 31, Thamas 1%5:69-'70, 32, Ibid., 7'0. 33-Ziegler 1990:270, 34. ibid. This telephone conversation was overheard and reported by Fritz Hesse, a press attach4 in the German embassy. 35. Ribbentrop was Xater appcjinted foreip minister of the Third Reich (on February 4,1938).



36. See Higham 1988, Brown (1987:179) notes that "C,,"' chief of the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS),was quite cmcerned about the relationship between Mrs. Sirngson and Ribbentrop. 37. Bradford 1989. 3"3 Ibid., 283-284. 39. See Ziegler 1990:224, 40, For a statement that there was no fabrication and that in fact, Mrs. Simpson Ifad such a past, see Thornas 2 995:3T, and Higham 1988, 41. For example, he suggested that Mrs. Simpson give up scjme significant rights as queen; see Bradford 1989:182-186. 42. Thomas 1995388. 43, See Bloch 1988. 44. Blsch 1988:jQR;Bradford 1989:441; and Channel 4,1995. 45. Block 4988:108. 46. Ziegler 1990:362. 47. See Higham 1985:45, 45, 160, 164170; for a rather strange and dissenting view, see Zic?gler 1990:456. 48. Ziegler 1990:454-459, 49, Ibid., 455. 50. Quoted in ibid., 456457. 51. Bloc11 1988:112. 52. Brown 198E186. For mc~re,see Bloch 1988:113; and ZiegXer 1990:391. 53. More pictures can be seen in Bryan and Murphy 19713 (Morrow edition), eighth picture gage bllowing page 320 (Hitler shaking the hand of the Duchess); Donaldson 1974, Brst picture page following page 324 (Hitler shaking the Duchess" hhad and Mazi officials escorting the Windsors); Thornas 1995, third picture page following page 128 (the Windsors Leaving Berchtesgaden, with Nazis saluting in the back). With the exception of one insipificant picture of the Windsors meeting with Josef Tehuven, the Nazi GauXeiter of Essen (on April 24, 1940, he was appointed Reich Commissioner of Noway, a position he held until the end of the war and that he executed with ruthless brutality), Ziegler (1990) prc~uides no pictures of the October 15337 visit to either Germany or Bel-chtesgaden (picture gage before gage 319). 54, See Ziegler 11390:392. 55, Ibid., 392-393. 56. Bradford 1989:254-257. 57, Channel 4,1995, 58. Bradfc>rd1989:285-. 59, Bloch 1988:136-139; see there the transcript of the speech on pp. 315314. 60. Bradfc~rd1989:286. 61. See her boc~k,The Heart kiss Ifs Rmso~ts(London: Landr;borough, 49562, pp. 268-269. The duchess states that visiting Hitler was a last-minute, unplanned event and that her husband refused to discuss with her the emtents of his meetings with Hitler. Her version is that the duke told her that during the one-hour meeting with ElitZer, it was Hitler who did most cjf the talking, focusing on "W hat he's tying to do for Germany and to combat Bolshevism" ((p, 269).

62,Ziegler 1990:398-400. 63. Ibid., 398. 4%. Ibid., 399. 65, Ibid., 400. This cable was sent about a week before Hitter" invasion of Poland, which marked the beginning of T/Vc)rld War TX, more than three months after the Verdun broadcast.. 66. ibid., 401. 67. The duke was assigned to the command of Major General Sir Richard Howard-Vyse, headqua&ered at Vincennes; ibid., 406407. 68, Ibid., 406. 69, Ibid., 406413. 70. ibid., 414. 71, Ibid., 415. 72. Different sources vary slightly about the exact date. 73. The incident is referred to as the ""Mechlin Incident." Young (1984:46), Baudot et at. (1989:313),and Weinberg (Z994:11) all confirm the story about this forced Landing of a German plane, Breuer (199T14-18) provides more details. He identifies one of the two German officers on the airplane as army officer Major Fqefmuth Reinberge~No name cjf the pilot is given, Keinberger tried to burn the documents in front of the Belgian investigating officer, Captain Emilio Rodrigue. Major Reinberger threw a batch of papers, which he had been carrying under his gray coat, into the burning stove in the room where he was waiting to be interrogated, Captain Rodrigue rushed to the stove and got the papers out ('. 15). Breuer d a t a the incident to January 10,1940. N.Baudot: et al. 1989:313. 75. Weinberg 1994:14. 76. Costeilo 1988:452. 77. Brown 1987:Ciiff). 78, Ibid., 273; see also Kessler 1992:143. 79. Ziegler 1990:416. 80. Tihomas 2995:181. 81. Ziegler 1990:4lf;. 82. Ibid., 417, 83. Ibid., 421. Hoare was a strong supporter of Chamberlain" appeasement polcy; see Baudot 1989:224. 84, Quoted in Donaidson 1974:3M, 85, Ziegler 1990:421. 86, VVailer 2996:168. 87. Bradfc)rd 1989:578. 88, Quoted in Ziegler 1990:421. 89. ibid., 420. 90. Donaldson 1974:359. 91. Ziegler '11 990:422-423. 92. Ibid., 423. 93,Bradford 2 989:341, 94, Quoted in Bradfc~cd1989:5;76. 95, Brown 1%7:273.



5%. Far example, see Blach 19&4,1988:165-169. 97. For example, see Btoch 1984; Bryan and Murphy 19?9:422-436 (Morrow edition); Urnaidson 1974:359-377; KessXer 1991:146; Kilzer 1994:240-247; Schetlenberg 1965:66-80 (including the publisher% skrong disclaimer on pp. 66-67); Thomas 1995; and Ziegler 1990:423-436, 98. Ziegler 1990:423. 99,Ibid., 424, Ziegler attempts to dixredik this report. 100. Watler 1996:168. 101, Brown 1987:273, 102. See Ziegfm 1B0:434, 103. Ibid., 424. 104, Fur =ample, Channel 4,1995; Brown 1987:273; and Ziegler 1990. 105. Ziegler 1990:425. 106. Interview in Charnel 4 pmgram, 1995. 107. Brad fc>rd1989:5;"1(. 108. Donaldson 19"i74:368,376. 109, kid., 391. 11Q.Miller 1995:8(5. 111. ZiegXer 1990:425.Again, Ziegler tries to discredit the report. 112. Qucrted in Thomas 1995:204, and in Channel 4,1995. 113, Bradford 1989:579, 114. Thomas 1995:204. 115. Brown 4982273-276; and Costello 1988:45=54. 116. Zliegler 1990:331; Brown 1982275; KessEer 1991:Z52-159; and kheflenberg 1965:6&tS4, 117, Ziegler 1990:459. 118. Bradfs~rd1989:578. 119, b i d . 120. Bid., 577. 121. kid., 578. 122. See ibid., 576; see atso Ziegler 1990:42&327. The warning letter is reproduced in Brawn 1987:2%. 123. Ziegler 1990:432. 124. Ibid., 432-433, Brown (1987:2"i"2"i"I;) notes that in fact %hellenberg% smission failed and that following the fiasco in Lisbon, %hellenberg fell ill as a result af ""a severe case af liver or gall bladder ps)isoning, an episode from which he nwer recovered and fram which he died young. He always insisted that he had been poisoned by the British secret ser~ice,""hehenberg died at the age of fif"t-ytwo. 125. See Ycjung 1981:69. 126. Tficlmas 1995:205. 127. See Ziegier 1990:433-434. 128. Brown 198i":Z"i"-276; Thomas 1995; and Waller 1996:167-173, 129. Costello 1"388~454. 130. Ziegler 1990:442. 131. kid., 443, 132. Ibici., 455.

133. Ibid., 457. 134. Ibid., 458. 135. Brcjwn 198E681. 136. Bradford 1989:583-584; and Ziegler 1990:464483. 137. Ziegler 1990:461. 138. Bradford 49893584. 139. Bluch (1988:186) states that it was in December. BradiEord (1983:584) states February as the date of the intei-view. 140. Bradford 1989:584. 141, Ziegler 1990:4a. 142. Ibid.; see also Bloch 1988:181;-190. 143. Bradbrd 2989:585. 144, Brown 1987:276. 145. Brad fc-rcl 2 989:425. 146. Ibid., 1%. 147. WalIer 1996:171. 148. Ziegler 1990:550. 149,See John Castella, Mask ofPeaclze?y (New York: William Morrow, 1988); see also Penrc~seand Freeman 1986. Costello (1988:463) even implies that Blunt" iintimate knowledge of the nature of the contacts beween the Duke of Windsor and the Nazis during World War 111, gained through his mission to retrieve the relmant documents in Europe, gave him a powerful insurance policy against being punished by the British for his treachery. The fact is that when the British became awaW of Blunt" treachery, he was not punished accordingly. 150. Brc3wn 1987:6153. See a i m Bradford 1%8:563-564; Costelf o 1988:443-471; and Kusbridger 1989:483. 151. Wafler 1996:168. 152, Weinberg 1994:143. 153, Costello 2988:448. 154. Ibid., 449. 155-Weinbesg 1994:144. 156. The Duke of Wndsor prc3babty met Laval in December 1935. The purpose of that aleged meeting tzras, supposedly, to discuss and solidify support for British nonintervention in the Italian invasion of Abyssinia in 1935. Again, the duke was sympathetic to a fascist regime" expansionist policy. See Ziegler 1990:210-211.

Chapter 10 1. Kraus 1992A4. 2. Hassig (1994:47) states that there were 450; other sources place the entire number of Spaniards at 508. 3- Plus "two hundred Tndiam . . . and a few Indian women for menial offices"'; I""rc3scott1925:124. 4. Jc~hnson197'7. 5. Hassig 1994:54.

Motes 6. Hassig 19%:13, 7. Ibid. 8. Thornas 1993:169-171. 9. See Prescott 1925:136. Please note that he cautions against attributing too much credibility to numbers. 10. Hassig 1994:50. 11,Ibid., 51,163-164; and Thornas 4993:171, 12. 13rescutt1925:140. 13. Waillant F19443 4962:242. 14. Bavies 2 "373:243. 15. Johnsc>n197243. Others give different localities far her glace of birth; see Hassig 1996:1. 16. See Gruzinski 19%:79. 17, Johnson (1977:43) states that, in fact, a slave's daughter tvas actually Erilled for this purpox. 18. See Garnara 1964, chapter 26. There are difkrent versions regarding her enslavement; see Hassig 1996:1. 19. Hassig 1996:l. 20, See Davies 1973. 21. For example, see Hunter 1990:9; and Davies 1973:238, 22. Borner 19r;72:72, 23, Thornas 1993:172. 24, Thomas 1993472, 25. Jc>bnson1977:44. 26. Ibid., 44,64. 27, Ibid., 44. 28. See Hunter 1990:44. 29, Vaitlant [l 9441 1962:246. 30. Jcrhnson 19;7i7:93. 31. Bavies 2973:252. See also Hunter 1990:15; Prescatt 1"65:238-244; and mornas 1993:260-262. 32, Joknson 497:94. 33. Prescott 1925:244. 3.Thomas 191)3262, 35. Davies 1973:288, See also Thomas (1993:594), who does not mention Malinehe in this cmtext. 36. Vaillant 1962, fig. 50, p. 260. 317. Daviet; 1973:263; Hunter 1990; Jc>bnson197E116; Le6n-Pc>rt..iXla1990:65; and Thornas 1993. 38. Valllant 1962:247. 39. Hunter 1990:23. 40. Je>hnson1972179. 41. Ibid., 192; see also Presott 1925:597. 42, Collis [l9541 2994:97; and Le6n-Portilla 1990:69, 43. Collis 1994:233. The volcano La Malinche is Ic~cated120 kilc~meterseast of Mexico City, 225 kilometess northeast of 13uebla;,Its elevation is 4,461 meters. 44. Vajllant1962, fig. 34, p. 247.

45. Golf is 1994:235. 46, Johnson 197221-222. See also 13rescott1925:596--597. 417. Coltis 1994. 48, jahnson 197:222. 49. Hassig 1996:3. 50. Ibid., 1,17, 51. See Hassig" 1988,1992, and 2 994 works. 52, P-iassig 1%4:78-80. 53. Ibid., 80, 54, Hassig 1W6:44. 55, Ibid., 12. 56, Xbld., 16. 57, Hassig (1996:16) indeed offers a few possible explanations as to why Marina was ""credited" k i t h the "discovery" of the CX-toXotitans"plot. 58, P-iassig 1W6:25. 59. Tbid., 16-2 7. 60.Ibid., 18. 61. Bid., 6-7; quote is from p. 6. 62. See &rubave11995, 63. Calder 1992, 64.Ben-Yehuda 1995. 65. Hassig 1996:17.

1. West 2995:352-366; Ostrovsky and Va%nunu star in that chapter. The topic of treason has traditionally attracted much attention in Israel. Crorner has Bone some academic work on both the case of Xsrael Beer (1985) and on Adiv (19%). Tn the daily popular press, Maron (1998b) drafted one the more analytically confused and contradictory but colorful pieces. He surveyed some of the traitors (Udi Adiv, Yoseph Amit, Israel Beer, Markus Klingberg, Shimon Levinsctn, Nachum Manbar, Victor Ostrovsky, and Mordechai Vakanunu), making the factually unsubstantiated claim that they all did what they did because of what he referred to as a problem of "lost honor." That is, all these traitors felt that people did not give them the honur for respect) they deserved. 2. Part of the description of this case is based on Ben-Yehucla 1W5:4M9. 3. See Ben-Yehuda 1995. 4. For short biographical sketches of Jc~sephttsFlavius-the man, his deedq and his writings-see Encyclopedia jzddaica, 1971, vol. 10, pp. 251-2M; and fewr'sh E ~ c y ~ I o p e d i~01.7. ~, For mow m J c ~ ~ p h u swritings, 's see Aberbach 1985; Feldman 1984; FXusser 15385;Hadas-L&et 1994; Rajak 1983; Rapopvrt 1982; Stern 1987; Stone 1984; and Thackeray 1968. There are literally thousands of works about Josephus Flavius, and it is impossible, and counterproductive, far this short review to delve into all of them. Nevertheless, the curious reader is referred to Feldman" summarizing works from 4984 (about 100Ot- pages) and 1984 (about 700 paga), 5. %e HarareCs,June 15,1998, p. A3; and Vcdiot Altnronot, June 22,1998, p. 5.



6. There are several versians concerning his escape. See Ber 1976-1971:2 75-2 90; Karninka 1933-1934; Lewris 1975:28-21; Zerubavel 1980:107-116; and Kedar 2 982:59-60, For more readings on Ben.-Zakkaiand Yavneh, see Alon 2 96R219-252; bn-Dov 1998; Hadas-hbel 1994:112-115; En~-yckopediaHebmicn 1967-1 968, vol. 19, pp. 346-349; Encyclopedia judait-a 1471, vol. 10, pp. 448-154; Goren 4987; and Neusner 19178. 7. The Galats and the Sicarii were Jewish ideolt~giealand pc~liticalgroups that existed during the time of the Great Revolt, 8. See Stern 19%:320-345, 9, Far an interesting discussian about the Masada-(""el;athI destruction"") Yavneh ("life"")mtrast, and its possible implications for Judaism generally and contemporary Jrrdaism particularly, see Weiss-Rosmarin 1966. See also BenYehuda 1995:413,531,n, 39. 10, Haredi is the ultra-Orthodox version of Judaism. 11. Segiiil 1996. 12. Ladoueeur 1487:95, 13. See Snyder 19%:184; and Trunk 1972,29777. 14, Fotr a short description of the historical development of these groups and the historical context, see BeeYehuda 2 993:79-97, 15. For a fuller discussion, see Ben-Y&uda 1993, upon which the description of these cases is based, 16. He alienated mojstly the non-ultra-Orthodm community; but some mernbers of the ultra-Orthodox cl-rmmunity too. Soxially, this put De Hahn in a questio~nabtegc~sitionwithin local contemporary Jewish,networks. 17, Far a fuller summary of the case, see Ben-Uehuda 19%:137-140. 18. 13robablyby the two leaders of Lehi at that time-Yellin-Mor and Shaib. lli3. See Nevc~4987, 20, Ibid., 21.. 21. For a fuller surnrnaT of the case, see Ben-Yehuda 19"3:252-254. 22. Schiff and Haber 197&:E2-223. 23, Shealtielfstestimony, Flln'nl.etz, October 19,1949, p. 2. 24. The S h i was the intelligence service of the Hagana. In June 4948 it was replaced by three different units: military intelligence (headed by Tsser Be'eery and Chaim Herzcrg); imer intelligence sei-vice (headed by Isser Halperin and Uoseph Israeli); and external political intellipnce service (headed by Reuven Shiloach).This strudure was Later changed agah. As is clear, the case of Tabianski occurred during a period of structural uncedainq when Israel as a state was emerging and when its intelligence community was in the prc3ccr.s~of being fc>rmed.See Ben-Yehuda 1993:438, n. 2 15, 25. Be'eery- appointed himself as a prc>secutor:He appc~intedas judges Binyamin Giblyf Avraham Kidron, and David Caron. No Legal (or other) defense was appointed for Tubianski. 26. M'nl-iv, July 5,4949, p. 2. 27, Tubianski"~file in the Hca'nretz archives. 28. Hn'arefz, July 5, p. I; july 7, p. 4; July 8, p. 1,1li349. 29, Ha'czret-z, Octclber 26, 1949, p. 2.

30. See also Bar-Zohar 19?0:39-45; Harel 19&9:113-1317; and Ha'nrefs, Nctvember 23,1949. 31. Katz 196:4217. 32. Far example, Gutman 1995:16&-269;and Teveth 1992. 33, For example, Kasztner was involved in Yoel Brand" misskn to the West, mentioned elsewhere in this bc~ok.This was the famous diabolical "blood far trucks" ""'offer" "c>m the Nazis; Jews were to be traded for trucks from the Ajlies. 34, See Haw1 1985:113-425, 35, Tamir was earlier a member of Etzel, and in the late 1970s he became Israel's minister of law, 36. Sefer Toldat HaHagann (The History of the Hagana), vol. 3, pt. 1, pp. 635-640, 317. See Rosen feld 1955:415. 38. Haref 1985:106. 39. See Ibid., 4748,145-1 47. 40, See ibid., 55-"i"3,for a short accc~rant. 41. At 8 Shderc~tShrnuel Street 42. See bitz%[email protected], March 7 and 11,1957. 43, See Ha'nretz, p. 4. 44, Such as Tamir, Rumak, and Sheib. 45. Hare1 1985:138, 46. See Black and Mcjrris 3 991:153-156; Harel 1985; and Margalit 1982. 47. See Hadar 1971; and Bauer 1982:134-191. 48. See Gutman 1995:1817-196. For a fuller summaT of the case, see Ben-Yehuda 1993:27&2%. 49. For a short description, see khiff and Haber 19?6:495. See Cromer (1986, 1998) cjn the sclcietal reactions to this case. 50. Syfvia married in Paris, Adiv in Israel. See Mnrnriz?,August 4, 1993, p, 2; Y,dit~fAAlraro~tol.,Supplement, August 6,1993, pp. 1-3,23. 51, Cohen 1993:55. 52. This is the same kibbutz that Udi Adiv and Assaf Adiv (discussed next) came from. 53. See Schiff and Haber 19176:38; FJnknretz, January 16, 1955, p. 1; Granot 1984:39-43; and Melman 1999, 54. Flklrat.elz,May 6,1988, g. 82.. 55. Hn"areEz, May 24,1988, p. 4. 56. Hahretz, May 3,1988, p,AI, and May 19,1988, p. ,412. 57. Miehal Schwartz was sentenced to eighteen months in prison; Ben-Effrat tcr thirty months; and Assaf Adiv to Wenty months. 58. Flnkrefz, Nctvember 120,1989, p. 13. 59. In addition, he was handed a twelve-month prison sentence conditional upon abstaining fmm similar activities for the next three years. 60.See bitz%[email protected], October 4,4989, p. 3, and October 253,1983, p. 3. 61. For an interview with the man who fired Ostrovsky-David ArbeX-see Ma 'carizj, May 5, 1998, weekend supplement, pp. 12-80. Arbet cla i m that Ostlmvsky prwided inaccurate accounts and concocted blatant lies. Consequently, "it was necessary to fire him" (p. 12). 62, nhis passage is partially based on Ben-Uehuda 1997 and 1998.

63. Ben-Yehuda 1993. 64.See for example Karpin 1999; and Sprinzak 1999. 65. See Ford 1985:286-287; and Lentz 1988:101-102. 66. An example is the so-called %ason-during the early 1940s. For a short description, see Ben-Uehuda 1993:240, 6'7".Haim ArtosowofE was a major Jew-ish political figure in Palestine at the time. See Ben-Uehuda 4993:440-443. 68. As pointed out in my 19413 book, these are several other cases, far example, Michael SchetZ and Chaya Gidenberg, among others.

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References Hebrew busks are identified as such by (E-lebrew) at the end af the reference. The titles of books written in Hebrew are translated into EngXish by the authul-,except in those eases where an English title is pmvided by the publisher. Aberbach, Moses. 1985, "Josephus and His Critics: A Reassessment." Midstream 34 (nu. 5):2529, Abu-Tuerna, Haled. 1995. "The Mufti of Jerusalem: Accepting Israeli Citizenship Is T'reasrrm." "rusnlem, August 18, p. 28 (Hebrew), Ackroyd, Peter. 1998. The L f c of T/zomnsMt~re,New Ycfrk: Doubleday Aho, lames A, 1994. T!jis Thing of Darktzc-rss: A Sc7ciat17gy of Ilie Encmy. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Akerstram, Malin, 4991. Bctraynl arzd Betr~yers:The Sociology of Treaclzefy. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, Allen, R&ert L. 1989, Port CCricogo Mutitzy, New York: Warner Basks, Amistad Books. AXon, GtsdaXiah. 1967. Stzidies i~zthe Hisfa~y offsrad. Tet Aviv: Hakkibutz Harneuchad (Hebrew). Amit, Mcjshe. 1992. A Histoy of Classical Greece. Jerusalem: Magness Press (Hebrew). Anderson, Benedict. 1991. Tmngi~edCamntuniCirzs.: Rfleelions on the Or@in nrzd Spread of Matiotznlism, London: Verso. Andrew, Christopher, and Vasifi Mitrukhin. 1999. Tke Mitrohin ArcIzive: Tke KGB in Ellrope t k ~ dt;Iz West. London: Alten Lane, Penguin Press. Andreyev, Catherine, 1987. Vlasclv nnd trlte Rzassinn Liberation Illovement: Soviet Redity and Ernigrk Tlzeories..Cambridge: Carnbfidge Zjniversiq Press. Archer, Jutes. 1971. Eeasott E'lz Arrrericn: Dislayarlfy Versus Bissenf. New York: Haw-tl-iomBooks. Amold, Isaac N. [l863011979. The Lqe of Be~zediclAI-P~o~L~', New York: Arno Press. Ash, Marineit. 1990. 'Vi1Xiarn Wallace and Robert the Bruce: The Life and Death of a National Myth."Vn The Myths We Live By, edited by Samuel Rapael and Paul Thompson, pp. 8S93, tondm and New York: Rotatledge. Ash, Timathy Carton. 1994, ln ErarcrpcS Namc: Germtly and the Divl'dt-d Co~ttirzetzt. New York: Vintage Books. Assor, Reuven. 1997. Paifors in flze Second World War. TeI Aviv: h r o n Golan (Hebrew). Ayalon, Amos. 1980. Ticlefabfe.Jerusalem: Edanim Pubtishers, Yediot Aharonot Edition (Hebrew).

Azgma, Jean Pierre, and Olivier Wieviorka. 1997. Vicil~r,1946)--1944.Paris: Perrin (French). Baigent, Michael, and Richard Leigh. 1994. Secret Gerrrrnny: Stnziflelzi7erg alzd fhe Mystical Crusade Agninsf Hitler. Lcjndon: Penguin Books. Bakeless, John Edwin, F195131 1948. nkmcoats, Traitors' and Hewes: Espiotzage in fk Ametimn Reoofzrliun.New York: Da Cap0 Press. Bakel; Robin. 4996. Sperm Wars, England: Fourth Estate, Banai, Ya%acov. 1958. Ano~ymozrsSoldiers, Tel Aviv: Hug Yedidirn (Hebrew), Bar-Ulpan, Dina, 11i397. A Aolzcept lml Fmmewrk to S t tidy Whistleblowing in Israeli Organizations, M.A. Thesis. University of Te1 Aviv (Hebrew). Bar-Zohar, Michael. 1970. Tssnr Haref and Israel5 Security Semices. Jerusalem: Weidenfe1d and Nicolsan (H&rew). Baudot, Marcel, Henrt" Bernard, Hendrik Brugmans, Michaet R. D. Foot, and Mans-AdoEf Jaccjbsen. 1989. The P.ll"slof*icnlEncycXoplYdia of World War 11, New York: RXJF Books. Bauer, Uehuda. 1982, Tke klolocrailsf:Some Historical Aspects. Jerusalem and TeL Aviv: Moreshet; Institute on Contemporary judaism, Hebrew University; Sifriat Poalim (E-l&rew), Baytes, Williarn. 1945. Set~enWere Hanged. tandon: Victor Golbncz, barse, Rsay and Anthony Read. 1991. Corzspimtor: The Untold Stozy c$ Cl.aurc.ehill, Rrroset~elt,and Tyler fint, Spy.London: Macmillan. bcker, Howard S. 1963. Ozrfsiders. New York: Free Press. k e r , Israel. 1956-4957. In the Circle of Sectarity Prublerns. Tie1 Aviv: Sifria ta'am, Am Oved (Hebrew). . 1966. Ismelk Security: Yesterdayf Todayf Tomumw. Tel Aviv: Amikam (Hebrew). kn-Dov, Meir, lli390, "ham Jerusalem tcr Uavneh: A Day After the Destructim."" Ha'aretz, August 3, p. B4 (Hebrew). bn-Yehuda, Nachman. 1985. Ifeviailzrtce and Motnf Boztndaries. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986. "Deviance in kience: Tow-ards the Criminolo>gyof kience," fiitiskt jourrlat of Crirnitzology 26 (no. 4):4-27, . 1989. Tlze IJol'itics and ILliiitmlity of Deviance: Muml hnics, Drzig Abuse, Deviazzt Scic~~ce, a ~ Reversed d Stigmntization. Albany: State University of New York Press. . 1993. Poliliwl Assassitznliorzs by ]ern: A Rhetorical Devicefor j~isfice.Albany: State University of New York Press, . 1995. The M~sadaMyflz: Collective Mentofy and Mytjznzakir-zgin Israel. Madison: University of Wi~icansinPress. . 19917. 'Tolitical Assassination Events as a Cross-cultural Form of Alternative justice." Interrtalional lourfzal of CcrmparaEive Sociology 38 (no. 1-2):25-47. . 4998. ""Pcttiical Violence: Political Assassinations as a Quest for Justice,"" In Critrre nnd CrimilmE f listice i1.2Ismcl: Assessi~zgfhe Krtozuledge Base 7"ozual.d the Twenty-First Centzrfypedited by Roberet K. Friedmann, pp. 439-481. Albany: State University af Mew York Press,

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. Forthcoming. Arclzacology, Politics, and Becey ticrn: The Excn z7a t ions of Mnsadn. Benz, Wolfgang, and VValter H. 13ehle, eds, 1997. Encyclof-1edi~z of C e r ~ m nResista~ce to fhe Nazi Mownzenl.. New Ycfrk: Continuum, k r , Yitzhak, 49%"0-49"i7. ""Jerusalem During the Days of the Great Kevdt." Zion 36:127-1 90 (Hebrew). krgesen, Albert 5,1977" "Political Witch Hunts: The Sacred and the Subversive in Cross-national Perspective." Americau Sociological Reviezu 42:220-233, krgmeier, E-lcrrst J. E?, and E, Lcltz Rainec 4997".Hitler$ Rirrunves: The I~zsideStory ofNazi Radio Brondcnstizzg nud Pryngaudn Swing. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. HitlerS Ur~niz-lrrrChb: The Secret R e m d i ~ g snt Ftzrfrr Hall. Bemstein, J e ~ m y1995, . Wth an introduction by David Cassidy Woc~dburyN. Y.: American Institute of Physics. bschloss, Michael R. l 986. Mnyd~y!The U-2 Afiz'i.: 7"ke Untold Sloly of lltp Greatest U.S.-U,S,S,R, Spy Scandal. New York: Harper & Row, Best, Jaet, 1993, "But %r-iousiy Fatks: The Lirnitationti of the Strict Cunstructionist Interpretation of Social Problems." In Co~tstnicfiorzislCorztroz7.ersies: Issues in Social Prcrblerr~sTlzeory, edited by Gale Miller and James A. Holstein, pp. 109-127. New Ycxk: Aldine de Gruyter: of Issues: Typifii~fgConte~rzpcrra~y Soci~lPmblenzs, New Best, Joel, ea. 1989. X~r~ages York: Aldine de Gruyter. k s t , Joel, ed, 1995, Irrqes oflssues: Typrfii~tgCo~ztempornfy $oc.inl Problems, 2nd ed. New Ycxk: Aldine d e Gruytex: kthell, Nichdas. 1995. TIie Last Secret: Forcible Rcpatriatiotz to Russia, 19461947. London: Penguin Books. Black, Donald. 1983, "Crime as Sclcial Clontrol,"~mericanSociotogical Review

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Abdication, 371,233,235,236,239,244, 246,248 Abel, Col, Rudcllf Ivanavitch, 400 Abu Ba kr, 90 A bwehl; 72,100, 121,184,185,329n35 Accc~rants,44,67,96, 414, 131 Adarn, Hanna, 35 Adiv: Assaf, 297; Udi, 29S294, 297,305 Admz'mf Craf Spce, 205-206,332 n50 Adultery, 38,43-53; dual standard, 44; generalizability, 51; identifying, 51; as illegal, 49-50; and mamiage, 52; new meaning of, 47, 52; in Newsroeek, 52; parallel, 46; prevalence and meaning of, 4&50; rec~atianaf,46; and religion, 44; as theft, 45; traditional, 46 Afghanistan, 68 African National Congress (ANC), 84 Afrika Kc~rps,495 Agent($): double, '72; foreign, 297; German, 119,120,121; rmdel-cctver, 97' Agitator(s), 121,134 Agnes, Ms. Smedley, 192,192,329n61; Sorge's lover, 192 Agujlar; Gerubimc:, def 2H-267, 269-271

Aho, James A., 17 Aibi, Natan, 298 Air Force 2,21 Airplane, crushing with invasion planes, 242 Akerstrclm, Malin, 28,55J, 144 Alabama, 117 Abmut, 9O,91 Al-Assad, Hafez, 3 Alcibiades, 18-19 "AXt)fi," 60 Alexandria, 162 Alexei, Anna, 98 Algiers, 163,164 Al-Hassan, Hussein Karnal, 64 Alice's Wonderland, 4-5 Allan, Ronatd, 47 Allen, Clolc~rteLEthan, 28,147' Allen, Robert L., 56 Allen, Thamas B,, 60 Allies, 129,145,164,166,170,205,221, 256,292; western, 174,75, Al-Sabbah, ibn Hasan, 90 Al-Sadiq, Jafar, 9Q Alsworth, Adrianna, 22 AMAN, 320n126 A h n f o r all Sensorzs, 122 "American Hour," 220 American isolatianists, 254

370 American Revolution, 56,7!5,11 7,118 Amery, John, 411,123,124 Ames, AIdrich H., 36,58,68, 100, 1013, 115 Amir, Uigael, 300,302-304 Amit, Yoseph, 99 Amsterdam, 282 Anderson, Benedict, 27 Anderson, Jane, 199,1213 Aderson, Sacha, 54,217 Andr&#Major J c ~ h34,32,33,34,344 , Andrew, Christopher, 71 Adreyev, Catherine, 176,177,178 Angola, 85 Ann of tltp Tlzousnnd Days, 123 A nselzlzlss, 69,134,140,202 Anti-aircraft, 477 Anti-fascist, 185 Anti-%mitism, 17,123,202; in Belgium, 153; in Denmark, 445; and Lord Haw-Haw; 204; and Pound, 221,224; and Quisling, 450; in U.S.A., 120 Anti-Stalinjst Committee, 175 Antonrncu, General Ion, 172,196,260; arrested, 173; collaboration with Nazis, 1'72; execution of, 173; minister of war, 172; pupubrity of, 172; as premier, 472; as a traitor, 172; trial of, 173 Anusim, 41 A Pact, 227 Apomfypse Moru, 20,65 Apulo@es(y), 73 Appeasement, 141,231,233,234,23f3, 240,241,244,245,246,248,255, 258 Arafat, Uasser, 298 Ax;bel, David, B2n6l Archer, Jules, 117,199,304 Ardennes, 130,144,152,242,243 Argentina, 77,171 ArgyXe, Bishop of, 21

Index ArXosoroff, Hainn, 303,343n67 Armistice, 157 Amold, Bendict, 24,28-34,69,101, 105,108,117,275,307; demcmization of, 34, duel, 32; feeling betrayed, 30; honeymo, 73,74 ""Cicez-o," 68,34 7n66 ""Cindy '"14,93,94,320n126 Cinema, 67

Cinematheque, 303 Cipher clerk, 62,68,98 Claim-making, 7 Clark, Mark, 163 Clausen, Max, 489 Cleansing, 170 Clemency, 161,298 Clercq, Staf de, 153 Clergy, 22,68,123 Clink exhibition, 122 Clinton, Sir Henry, 31,32 Clinton: Bill, 4';1,51,53; Hilfary 51 Cuhm, Eiti, 69,70,317n71 Cohen, Erik, 16 Co>hen,Miriam, 51 Cuhen, S t a d q , 77 Cold War, 61,108,112,113,121,124, 305 Cule, Harold (Pole), 130,217 Coleman, James S,, 40 Coles, Ro>bert,223,227 Collaboration, 38,39,57,132,136-178, 159,11;O, 162; administrative, 1%; and Antonescu, 172; and betrayal, 136; definition of, 136; in the Far East, 186-195; in IsraeliPalestinian cmflict, 136; with Nazi Germany, 138,280; popular image in WMrlf, 467; reality of, 167; and resistance, 138,139; success of, 138; types of, 138 Collaborators, 53,136,285,296; Malinche, 271; operational life of, 136; opportunistic, 311 Colledive conxience, 11 Collective: insurrection, 75; memories, 27; national, 125; patterns of, 139; social defhiltic~ns,6 ColXectivization of farming, 1% Cullins, Michae1,92 Collis, Maurice, 270 Colonies: American, 117 Curnet jet, 323n9

Index Cornfad women, 186 Comintei-n, 189,192 Communism, 129,136,159,1;78,188, 192,220,239,239,257 Commrmists, 75 Conceal, 37; 40,41,54 Conceal(ment), 80,217,261 Con: artistry, 338,42,93-94; game, 93 Confederate army, 1l8 Confederate: prisoners, 119 Confession(s),41,77 Confidence, 10,11 ConBict, 105,261,265 Congo Free State, 885 Congress, 29,30,34,51 Congressional Medal of Honor, 495 Connecticutf 28,32,35,36,47 Conquistadors, 267 C1omciencl.e~~ 4484 Conscientious o>bjection,65,87,2Q2 Consent, 40,M Comeivative orthodox, 239 Conspiraey(tors), 183; Canaris, 184; as traitors, 1283 Comtrudionism, R contextual 7,8, 204,309,311; strict 7; variants 7 Continental Army, 28,35 Conversion, 38,66,84-85,85,188; and Va'aanunu 14; Cook, J,, 9 Crstppc~la,Franeis Ford, 65 Cornell, Julien, 222 Corruptian, 34,79,11 C; Corte's Hernan, 263,265,267', 269,272, 2174; accumulated treasures of, 267; burning his ships, 267; and Catalina" death, 269; cmquest af Mexico, 269,271; encounter with Cholollam, 268; and Tlaxealte~s~ 268,272; entangled in lacal politics, 272; military qualities, 265; military strength, 26S264,

274; power of, 274; wife of, 269; See also Chalollans; Malinche; Marina; Tenepal; Montezuma; "fiaxcaltecs Cosel; 108 Cosmetics, 13 Costella, J o h , 233,243,256,257 Coughlin, Father Charles, 120 Counterfeit Traz'iol; T k , 21 Courageous man, 34 Court-martial, 30,157, 184,247,296, 302 Cowens, Major Charles Hu&, 216; subversive intentiom of, 214 Co>ventry35 Cover-up, and bus 300,4; Cozumel, 264 Crimea, 174 CroatQia): independenl; 171; na"tonalism, 171; and Nazi influence, 171; and massacres, 171; and Pavelic, 171; and purges, 171; as faxist, 471; and terror, 170; units, 369 Cromer, Gerald, 294 CruiserCs): Achilles, 205,331n50; Ajax, 205,333 1150; Exeter, 205,206, 331n50 Crusaders, 91 Cuauhte'mmoc, 269 Cuba, 91,263,267; missile crisis, 61 Cultrtre(s), 4,8,17; belonging to, 37; boundaries of, 275; definition of, 9; fiction, 47; and heroes, 114; hostile, 275; Israeli, 4% and mistrust, 102; moral point of view, 12; pluralistic, 24; political, 54; worldviews, 423 Cultural: cmtext, 311; interpreter, 267, 270,272,272; mosaic, 307 Curtis, Ms. Catherine, 420 Cynical, 12 Czechs, 207



Czechoslovakia, 61,72-73,1 33,1 34, 435,444-443,202

h i l y Exyrms, 203 h i l y Tribzinc, 252 Daladier, Edouard, 73,137 158 Damascus, 69,70,293 Danbury, 30 Danes, 207 Bank, Mitton, 155 Danzig, 207 WAquino: Felipe, 215; Iva, see Toguri, Iva Darlan, Admiral Jean Francois, 108, 162-166; justifications, 164-165; as an (odiow) Quisling, 164,165, 466; son of, 164; as a ternparay expedience, 163,165; zigzagt;, 162, 164,261 Darth Vader, 20 Dasch, Georg, 121 Basgupta, Partha, 10 Davis, J. H., 10 Davies, Nigel, 2653 Bay, Bonald, 213 Dayan: IIlana, 313nll; Moshe, 50,70,882. Bay an, Ruth, 50 DC-40,78 Death: maxlch, 186; penalty 17; 19,62, 108,170,173,193; squads, 77 Debre, Michel, 73 Debs, Eugene V., 119 BeceptionQs), 3,11,17,33,37,3941,54, 69, 1133,1,243,247,242,260; and the Dedaration of Indc;pendence, 117; definition of, 40; as a continuous variable 13; military use of, 130; in Pound" case, 223; and treason, 1l 6 Declaration of Independence: as ultimate treason, 11'7 Defeatism, 176

Defection(ors),38,57--59,260,279;to Israel, 98; in place, 58; Vlasov, l7hf 177 Defendirtg the Realtrzs: W5 a ~ fke d ShnyEer Afail; 71 Defoe, Daniel, 643 de Gautle, Charles, 156, 157,161,163, 164,166; and BBC speech, 15%" Degrelle, teen, 116,153,155,167,218, 2f;Q,311; in Argentina, 153; caurage of, 154; and Iron Cross with Oak Leaves, 153; lost elections, 153,154; in Spain, 153 De Hahn, Israel, 281-283,304,305; and anti-Zionism, 282; assassination aft 282,283; and homosexuality, 282,283; marriage, 282; sister 05, 281; threats on, 282 de Louis, Jclng, 4434 Defegitlmization, 136,302 Detilah, 19-20,93,190,307 Demacracy, 129,148,228,239,25%"; parliamentary 113,225; unstable, 196 Demanization pmcess, 34 Denmark, 144--145,206,208; communist party of, 144; Free Corps, 444; German economic demands from, 145; and evacuation of Jews! 145; Freedom Cormeil aft 445; government of, 144; independence, 144-1 45; internal affairs of, 144; merchant fleet, 145; Nazi party in, 145; resistance in, 145 Dennis, Lawrence, 120 Dennistone, Robin, 130 Dercctz H~lziteois,296-298,305 Desertion, 38,654-145 Destirznlio:orzTokyo, 214 Detente, 73

Index Deviance, 7,9,25,28,52,114,124,310, 311; and betrayal, 311; and cultural cmtext, 311; in science 25 DeWit"c,Lieutenant General John L., 494 DFLP (Democratic Frc.nt for the Liberation of Palestine), 297 Dictators, 115 Dietrich, Marlene, 17; 41,138,181, 185-186; as traitor, 186 Dilling, Mrs. ELizabeth, 120 Dirnbleby, Jonathan, 23 Dimonia, 14 Dinur, Dov, 293 Diplomats, 12. Disenchantment of the world, 2 2 3,114 Disloyalty: c h r g e s of, 124; us. dissent, 12,181 Disobedience, 27 Dissent, 121,122,136,342; vs. disloyalty 121,122,181 DissidentQce), 54, 124 "Divine" Brc~wn,50 Divorce, 49,5Q DNA: on Monica" dress, 51; testing, 48 Dc~lfus,Engelbert 140 Dc)no>van,Major General Wiitliam, 131 Dc~ublethink,40 Dortbte meaning, 217 Douglas, Camp, 119 Draft: evasion, 65 Drew, Christopher, 108 Dubcd, Alexander, 73 Dublin, 85,203 Duce, 174 Ducharme, Lori J., 34,275 Ducruet, Daniel, 50 Duel, 32 Duke of Bdford, 212 Duke of Saxe-Coburg and Gatha, 232 Duke of Westminster, 131,246


Duke of Windsor, 229,131,338n149; abandonhg his military past, 243, 247; and appeal to Hitler, 241; and appeasemenl; 239,244246,248, 255,258; anti-British, 247; badgering ChurclhiX1, 246,258; in the Bahamas, 250-256,258; and battle af Britain, 248-249; and Bedaux, 236,242,243,250; betraying military secrets, 240; and Channel 4,229,241,247, 256258; choices, 243,244; and Churchill, 237,244-246,247, 249-253,255,2r;CI; and the coverup, 256257,259-261 ; disloyalty, 247; defeatism, 241, 255; financial problems, 236; and George VI, King, 240,247,248, 250; gives a Nazi salute, 239; Her Royal Highness ( M M ) status, 236,246,258; and Hitler, 240; as Hitler" guest, 238; and Hoare, 245,246,250; indiscretim(s), 240, 245,2417,125'7; and intef tigence leak, 243; interview to Oursler, 254255,257; invitation to meet Hitler, 237; lending Hitler suppork 239; and Lloyd, George;?, 251; marriage, 236; and meaning of peace, 241,254; meet HitXer, 238,239,255,25Qr257,2a; meeting Nazi elite) 239; meeting RooJsevelt, 253; meet Valexclo, 250, 251; and military appointment, 242; minor position aft 236; and Monckton, 251; in Nassau, 237; and Nazi plots, 247-248,249,252; in Paris, 237; 242,244; and Paris apartment, 248; political aspirations of, 239; in Portugal, 247-252; as Quisling 246,250; proNazi, 241; recommending



bombing England, 249,253; renovating house, 252; return to the throne, 23% Simpsc~n,236, 241; in Spain, 243-247,248,249, 254; and Stohrer, 245,247",48; and threat of a court martial, 247; and treachery 243,245,257,259; and trivial demands, 246; undermining British pc)l,ilicy,241; untrustworthy, 240; Verdun radio transmission, 240,241,254,257; visit to Nazi Germany, 23'7, 238-239; visit S.S. training center, 23% and Wenner-Cren, 237;252-253,255; wish to meet Hitler, 232; and world peace, 239,240, 244; writing Hitler, 255,257 Duke of York, 230 Dune, 20 Dunkirk, 244,246,248 Durkheim, Emile, 10,11 Dutch East Indies, 70,206 Economic: crisis, 136; demands, 145; prosperity, 150 Edward VII, King, 446,131 Edward VIII, King, 25,197,229-263, 307; abdicatian of, 233,235,236, 239,244,246; and appeasement, 232,233,234; and Baldwin, 231, 232,233,235; becoming king, 232; burn, 230; and Chamberlain, 235; and Channel 4,229,238,235; and the ""China dossier,'" 235; choice, 236; and Churchill, 229,234; and conquest of the Rhineland, 234; conspiracy against, 235; cover-up, 229; distaste for Royal rituals, 2230; and the Duke of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha, 232; and f o r e i p policy, 233,235; Ceorge (Duke cjf Uurk, later King George V, hther), 238, 231,232; and George VT, King,

236,247; and German ambassadors, 2233; and Germany, 230,231,234; Grenadier Guards, 2N; and I-jj~esch,234; image of, 229; immoral behavictr, 234,232; and I,ascelles, Sir Man, 230,231, 232; Mary of Teck, 13rincess(later Queen Mary), mother, 230; poputariQ of, 230; in the Royal Navy, 2N; and Mrs. Simpsrrm, 229,230,232,233,235; as a security risk, 235; speech to Royal British Legion, 231; and treason, 234; uncmstitutional behavior, 235; untrust-\lzPorthy,230; and WWI, 230; see alw, Duke of Windsor; Simpstjn Edwards, John Carver, 199,213 Egypt, 64,66,69,9O, 91,130,195, 316n64,317n7'1; nationalism, 195; prc~Axisgo~vernment,195 Eichlitsr, Israel, 280 Eichman, Adolf, !25,96,288,289, 29QQ, 292 Eiko, 191,192,293 Eisenhower, General b i g h t B., 163, 165 303 Eisenman, D a n n ~ EisenstekFSergei, 56 Eitan, Rafael ("Rafut"), 51,53,319n404 Ekman, Paul, 11,40,41 Ekstein, Zekv, 292,292 El-Aruri, Kabchi, 297 El-ias,Hendrik, 153 Elint, 71 Elitzur, Uri, 279 ElIsberg, Daniel, 16 Embezzle, 95: 120 Emrnanuel 111, King Victor, 7'4 Emotional: betrayal, 52; exclusivity, 52; intimacy, 48; involt\rernent, 48; reaction, 13, 309 Emperor Hsuan Thug, 187 E n e m ~17,57,294,299,312

Index England, 32,92,122,118,131,141,154, 466,203 EngXish Channel, 33 EphiaXtes, 2 8 Emser, 21 ""Esek Bish (fiasco)," 66-67 Espionage, 38,66,98-101,111,12 6,119, 491,293,305; in cyberspace, 72; Hagan's definition of, 72 Essentialist perspective, 8 Essex rebellion, 123 Estee Lauder, 50 Etihics: contextual, 24; prc>blemsin, 94 EthnornethoBolog(ical), 12 Etzef, 284,285 Evenir-zg Standard, 51 ExcaEl'b~r,251 Evolutionary intei-pretation, 49 Exchange theory; 11 Exploitation, 85,115,275 Explosive(s), 119, 424, 433, 446,283 Extramarital affairs, 44,118,451,309 Fabrication, 34,95,261,268 Faeroe Islands, 145 Ftzltrenlzeit 452, 20 Faithfulness, 13 Falkenhausen, General Alexander von, 153 Falkland Islands, 206 False presentation, 40 Falsification, 40,95 Far East, 72,137,18&194 Farouk, 1, King of Egypt, 195,196 Farren, Harry Desmond, 132 F a ~ i s m429,436,204,218,224,224, , 231,246,257; contempt to electirons, 154; in Craatia, 171; Hitler "s,239; in Ncjrway; 147; popular support of, 131; and secret organizationti, 171


FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigatians), 53,58,59,69,101,121,256 Federal Aviation A u t h o r i ~77 , Feelings, 13 Felgale, Waiter; 83 Ferry (rf;Tydut;t),146 Fidais, 90 Fielding, Nick, 71 Fifth c=oXurnn(isn),132-336,305; in Britain, 204; meaning of, 2 31,235, 167; empirical existence of, 135; implications of, 132; meaning oft 232; in the U.S.A., 132,194 Fifth man, 3 1 b 5 4 Final solut.ic>n,139,289 Fine Gary Man, 34,275 Finland, 59 Flagstad, Kirsten, 226 Flanders, 2 53 Fleming, lan, 72 Flensburg, 208 Fletcher, George I,., 16 Florida, 121 Flossenburg, 184 Foot, MichaelI3. B., 274 Forblddezz Planet, 20 Forced Iabor, 140,176 Force X, 56 Fctrd, Cerald, 246 Ford, Henrlr, '77,120 Fort Ticonderoga, 2% 334 442nd Regimental Combat Team, 195 France, 50,75,133,141,144,155-156, 2 56,l 87,203,236,243,248; defeat of, 162,166,236; Free, 45"i"; invasion of Nazi Germany into, 242; leader of, 164; surrender of, 137,142,152,155,244,246 Franciscus, James, 47 Franco y Bahamonde, General Francisco, 1317,244 Frankfurt-on-the-OderI 176 Frankfirter Zeitung, 189



Free Czech, 141 Freislel; Roland, 482, 483 French, 34, 361; citizens, 207, cullabaratian, 156; collapsrz, 131; colt~nial,162,166; defeat, 158; empire, 163,165; fleet, 33,162, 163,164,166; Tndochha, 70; navy, 462; North Africa, 162,164,165; pstrts, 364; Quisling, 366; resistance, 161,163; revolution, 33,75, 413,114; submarines, 362; wsjmen, 159; workers, 159 Friedrich, Carl J,, 145-116 Friedrichs, David Q., 10,112 Froetich, Wilhelm, 204 Fry, Mrs. kslie, 121 Fuchs, Ernil Ktaus, 113 Faet tank, 78 Fux, Cil, 303 Gagarin, Vuri, 94-95 Cajda, General Rudolff 142 Galileo, 322x17 Galut, 280 Cambetta, D, C., 9 Game, 55 Gandi, Mohandas K,, 92 Can Shmuel (kibbutz), 293,296 Genoa, 221 Garbo, Greta, 337n65 Cazit, Shlomcl, 320n126 Gehlen, Reinhard, 'I"Q Gendfer, Anat01y, 99 Geneva Convention, 178 George V, King, 230,231; dying, 232; prophecy of, 231 Cesrge Wf, King, 2236,240,244,247, 250; psttential abdication, 248 Georgia 13each,the, 199 Ceraghty, Tom, 207' German(y), 68,773, '74,248; agents of, 119,220,121; aristocracy of, 113;

attacks Poland, 137,141,144,236, 258; East, 54; embassy in Tokyo, 193; and saboteurs, 319,121; hegemony, 134; navy, 207; Nazi rule off 14S144; rearming of, 231; victory over Franc% 166; West, 70 Gersdorfi, Baron Rudolf-Christoph vtm, 183 Gestapo, 182,248,301 Gethsemane, Garden of, 19 Geva, Elij, 8687 Gihly, Bhyarnin, 285 Gibraltar, 219 Gibsctn, Met, 323 Giddens, Anthony, 11 Gil, Jang Sung, 64 Gil, Yehuda, 3-44 Gilbest, Bc Joseph, 222 Gillars, Mildred, 499 Ginsberg, khmeka, 58 Giraud, General Hemi, 163,164 Glass, Shirly, 48 Glazer M. P. and P. M., 179 Glee, Anthony, 127 Glenton, Bill, 56 GoebbeXs, Dr. Jctseph, 225,226,239,254 Goerdeler, Carl Friedrich, 181,184 Goering, Keichsmarschall Hermam, 140,234,237,239,253 Goffman, Erving, 3231171 Go For Broke, 195 Golan Hights, 3,69,294,296 Coldcr~Eye, 20 Goldfus, Emil K,, 101 Goldstein, Dr. Baruch, 303 Goldstein, Peretz, 290 Golienewski, Michal, 59 Golitsin, Anatoli, 59,6Q Gdnrrara, L6pez Be, 273 Good, D., 10 Goode, Erich, '7,124 Gorally; Abraham, 286

Gordievsky, Oleg, 61-61 Cordon, Captain 0.L., 206 Gouzenko, Igor Sergeievitch, 58,61, 62, 132 Graf, Willie, 482 Grant, Hugh, 50,53 Great Revolt, 90,278,279 Greece: ancient 48; attacked by Nazi Germany, 137 Greed, 34,110 Greenherg, Lawrence M,, 76 Greene, Graharn, 68 Greenhow, Rose, 118 Greenland, 145 Greenwald, Malkiet, 289,292 GreemwBg, Emile, 302 Grey, Sir Charles, 333 Grosz, "Bandi" Andor, 95 G.R.U. (Soviet Military Intelligence), 58,61,489,492 Guadaloupe, 33 Guatemala, 269 Guernsey 166 Guerrero, GonzaXo de, 265 Guns ofNtzvamne, Tke, 21 Gutfreund, Hanach, 34 9n107 Guttridge, tec>nard F., 56 Gwynn, Nell ("the king's shore'"), 46 Gypsies, 207 Haakon Wfil, King, 146 Flln'nrefs, 297 Hacha, Emil, 241,242 Hadfield, Robert L., 56 Hagan, Frank, 39,'1"2,114 Hagana, 69,281,283,228,285,286,227, 305; order to Erill De Wahn, 283 Haifa, 293 Hale, Nathan, 28,34-36,39,69, 2 01, 405,311 Halevi, judge, 290 Halifax, b r d , 252

Hallel, Michal, 303 Hamburg' 188; university, 188 Harnsun, Knut, 25,219,225-226; agc2inst his country, 228; born, 225; call to stop resistance, 225; choice, 227 and compassion, 22';: 228; eulogy in Hitler % memory, 226; failing to detect evil, 227 and hatred, 227,228; hosted by Goebbels, 225-226; hostility to Britain and the U.S.A., 225; insanity 228; intewiew with Hitler, 225; nature of work, 225; as Nazi sympathizer, 225; navels, 225; poputariQ with Hitler's youth movement, 225; and psychiatric examination, 226; and sensitivity 227; trial, 226; and Quisling, 225,226; and Te;T;boven, 225 Hanna, B., 10 Hansen, Wihetm, 208 Hardinge, Alexander of Penshot, 247 Harel, Isser, 70,291,299 Hari, Mata, 68; mavies about, 31h65 Har Shefi, Margalit, 308 Hashish, 90,92 Hassig, Ross, 263,265, 272-2723, 275 Hate: atmosphere of, 303; and sociaX cleavages, 303; crime, 302 Haunted m o d : Soviet Espiorznge irz America-77~eStalin Era, 7"ke, 71 Haugt, Herbert, 121 Havana, 94 Hawat-meh,Nayif, 297,298 Haw-Haw Lady, 2 99 Haw -Haw, Lord (William Jnyce), 24, 25,36,105,111,324,397', 399-213, 221,301,302,307,310,312 Heavy water, 146,324n37 Hebrew UniversiqI 87; department of Sociology and Anthropology, 87



Hebron, 303 Hegel, 5 Heilbruner; Bded, 303 Helsinky, 59 Herningwa~Emest, 68,131,224 HenXein, Konrad, 133,134,142 Henry 11, King/ M, 122 Henry VIIl, Kingt 422,423 Herbert, Frank, 20 Hero: cultural, 42; dissidenl; 54; genuine, 294; Hale, 36; vs. informer(s), 53; national, 163; vs. rebels, 54; vs. traitor, 19,28,33,34, 425,426,458,494,271,273,2f35; of the Sc>vietUnion, 91,190 Heroes of Terfema&, The, 324n39 Herouti, Ya%accty 291 Hess, Rudolf, 130,234,239 Hesse, Fritz, 3%n34 Hestcm, Charltan, 122 Hewitt, Jarnes, 50 Heydrich, Reinhard, 141 Higham, Charles, 432 HirnmIer; Reichsfuhrer Heinrich, 96, 175,182,185,292 Hirschfeld, Cerhard, 156 Hiss, AAlgex; 59,62 Hitler, Adolf, 74,75,92,202; appeased, 240; aggression of, 234; and Antonescu, 272; attempts to assassinate, 180,183; chancellou; 437,439; cohesic~nand integration around, 183; convicted as traitor, 1713,180; declaring war on the U.S.A., 221; directive, 17#2551; expansionism, 237,258; interview with Hamsun, 225; and King Edward VIII, 2%; and Degrelle, 153; and geno>cide,171;invasion plans, 242; and Marlene Didrich, 485; and non-aggression pack 241; and Quisling, 149; and reply to the Duke of Windsor; resistance

to, 180; rise to power, 231; trial, 179;as a tyrant, 240; see also, Duke of Windx~r;Edward VXIT; Hamsun Hoare, Sir Samuel, 245,246,250 Hc>bbes,5 Hocus gocus, 223 Hoesch, Leapold van, 234 Holland, 133,135,256,281,282,317n';"Q Hollingsworth, Mark, 71 Holt~caust,168,290 Honami, 191 Honduras, 269,270 Honey trap, 14,71,93,94 Hong Kong, 23 Honor, 15,283,328n32; construction of, 183 183; lost, 340n4; and the S.S., Hunor~bleTreaclzely, 117 Hoofigan(s),301 Hotsumi, Ozaki, 24,414,188, 1W194, 196; commentator on China, 192; executed, 2 93; faithlessness, 494; as hem, 194; letters, 191; marriage, 191; meeting Sorge, 191; mistresses of, 191; and patriotism, 1%; and Sorge, 192; as traitor, 191, 193; trial of, 193; value of, 191; tzraminga492 Houghton, Harry, 59 House of Lords, 32 House of Representativesf51 Hc>ward,Edward Lee, 62-ti3 Howe, Russell VVarren, 226,217 Howe, Sir Williarn, 36 Hc>yGlair, 299 Hoyningen-Huenc3, Baron Oswald van, 248,249,252 Huber, professor Murt, 182 Human: conditian, 227; nuances, 226; rights, 338, %V; spirit, 227 Hurnint, 71 Hungarian: Army, 65; Jews, 290

Index Hungary, 95,290; Nazi invasian into 289 Huntington, 36 Hurl% Elizabeth, 50 P-iurst, Jarnes Willard, 108 Hussein, Robert, 84-85 Hussein, Saddam, 64 Iceland, 145 Ichheiser, Gustav, 3231171 Idaho, 249 Identity(ies): and betrayal, 331,312; conflicting, 304; deceptive, 66; faked, 66,77,3011; false, 69; group, 37; homosexual, 282; Jewish, 41, 290; Malinali's, 275; natbnal, 27; newt 305; personal, 27,275; politics of, 304; true, 93; Windsor %, 2f;Q Ideology, 110,443; isala"tionist, 420,253, 254; and justification for assassination, 303; Maoist, 293; pc~litical,23% repressive, 228; sodalism,293; totalitarian, 228; Trotskyist, 293 I.D.F. (Israel Defenw Fctrce), 286 Ijmuro, Furni, 214 Illan, Uri, vi, 294,304; as a hero, 2914 Illusion, 43 Imagined communities, 27 Imperial War Museum, 195,204 Imprisanment, 166 Indian nationalism, 191-192 Indiana, 219 I-ttdinnnJorzesalzd The Temple ofD(>om,20 Individuals, new perception of, 10 Infidelity, 17,38,42,43-53,309; in China, 4% deceptive, 145;and DNA testing, 48; essence of, 47; international, 48; in Israel, 48-49; natuw of, 44; prevalence and meaning of, 48-50; of Williarn Joyce" wife, 207


Informatian: damaging, 78 Infc~rming(ers),38,53-55,102,167,285; police, 42 Ingalls, Ms. Laura, 3 20 Inkatha Freedom Party (IFB), 83 Instigation, 302,303 Insurrection, 17,75 Integrity personal, 40 Intefligence: British, 250; c o m m u n i ~ , 58; counter, 221; Israeli, 69; Soviet, 70,98,189 Intention, 13,40 Iran, 15,654 Iraq, 59,144 Ireland, 85,92,200; civil war in, 92; republican army of, 92 1l.ish: culture, 54; free state#92,201; independence, 54; RepubXic, 208 Iron Cross, 153,184 Iron Guard, 172,173,1196 Islam, 90; fundamentalist, 45 Ismaili, 89,90 Israel, 59,130; immigrmts from Russia to, 136; income tax, 53; and Joyce's daughter, 212; KGB station in, 98; military intelligence, 66; and Negev, 14; new defectors, 84; and nuclear weapc~ns,114; and nuclear reador 14; October 19'73war, 130,294; and spies, B, 285; and Syria, 294; and tzrhistle-blowers, 80,328n90 Israeli: citlzenship, 85; embassy in VVashingtcm, 69; and fifth column, 136; invasion to Lebanon, 65,86; intelligence, 69; Jews, 29% left, 14, 336,295; navy 298; peacenik, 298; prestate underground groups, 281; right, 299,301,302; secret service, 59,70,291,292,293; submarines, 298; supreme court, 291; Technion, '70; universities on strike, 87



Italy 74,138,170,219,220,283; Allied invasion into, 221; fascist, 73, 137, 220,302; northern, '74 Italian Army, 74 Ivan IV, Czar (the Terrible), 57 Jackson, Frank, 9.1 Jacksc~nville~ 121 Jael (Heber Hakelni" wife), 220 Jaffo, 303 James Bond, 20,"i"2 Jamestc>wn,117 Japan, 7Q,138,188-194,214; material shortages in, 215 Japanese: American, 132,194-1 95; attack on Pearl f-larbor, 194,215, 220; collaboration with, 487; conquerclrs, 186; fifth column, 132; human experimentation, 186; imperial forcesf 186; as Liberators, 186; militar)~mutiny 190; occupation, 186; secret service, 489 Jararnilfo, Juan def 2178 Jeeves, 199 Jericho, 317n64 ""ferry bags," 367 Jersey, 166 Jerusalem, 84,85,2"i"8,282,286,3301; airstrip, 286; cease-fire in, 288; electric company, 285,2286; and Kasztner 'S trial, 289,290; under siege, 285; Mufti, 85; Zion square, 301 Jew($, 207; in Crclatia, 171; as conspirators, 120; councilis of, 12250; deported from f-lmgary;96; ation of, 96,4430,140,443, 280, B9,290; failure of, 278; Gwnrrm, 159; and Haw-Haw 204; Hungafian, 95;hunted in the Netherlands, 155; killing another Jew, m,301; secular, 84,282,294;

o d h d o x , 131?,281,285302; and Pomd, 221; in Ramania, 172; Sfardi, 283; ultra-orthc~do~:,84,136 Jewish: Agency, 96; councils, 139; ghettos, 143; history, 278; leaders, 96, 290; national culture, 278; paratroopers, 2290,293,296; rebellon, 279; refugees, 996; scholars, 279; state, 283,284,305; Temple, 278; traitors, 278 jeutis!l Gfzm~ticlc; 209,212 Jirc), General Minami, 187 Johnmn, Chambers, 191,192 Johwn-George, C., 9 Johnscln, Lady Bird, 46 Johnmn, Lyndc~nB, $6 J o h w n , Wifliam Weber, 266,268 Jordan (Kingdom), 64; a r t i l l e ~of, 285, 287,288; Legion of, 285 Jordan, Robert, 421 Joseph (BibEicaI), 316n64 Josephus, Ffavim, 124,277-280,304, 307; death of, 278; governor of the Galilee, 278; marriagez 278; an official historian, 278; as an opportunistic traitor, 280; in Rome, 278; Roman dtizen, 278 Joyce, Wifliam ("Lord Haw-Hawf'), 108,144, 413,114,123,124, 199-213,228,311; academic life, 201-202; affinity for faxism, 218; American citizen, 200,204,203; appeal, 212; birth, 200; in Berlin, 203,207; betrayed by Margaret, 207; Black and Tans, 200-201; and Britain" future, 21 8; and British morale, 210; braadcasthg, 203; Bmc~ke~ Certrude Ernily ( m t h e r of), 200; capture of, 208; cause of war, 207; choices, 202,208; and Churchill, 204; childhoc~d,200; citizenship, 210; and correspondence with 130und,223;

daughtex; 212; defines himself as traitor, 204; divorce, 207; and Duke of Bedfc>rd,211; enlisting to the army, 201; escape plan, 208; execution of, 214; failure in foreign office, 202; false passport, 208; fifth column, 204; fomd guilty 240; German citizen, 204, 207; jdmtification of, 203; identity of, 21 8; impact of transmissions, 212-213; invasion tcr Norwa)?r, 206-207; and ""jewish jury," "12; and Jews, 204,211; last letter, 221; last recording, 201;; leaving England, 203; lc>yaltyto, 21Q; Michael (father of), 200; Ministry of Propaganda, 203; marriage, 201,202,207; and Nazi propaganda, 204; and pact with Hitler, 202; patriok, 201,202; personal Ii fe, 207; political career, 201-2@; preaching revolt, 204; purged from B.U.F., 202; radic) transmissions, 204; scar, 201; trial of, 209-211; War Merit Cross, 204; judaism: cmservative, 299; liberal, 299; new form of, 278; orthodox, $5,278,281,282,294, 299; religic~ras,294; secular, 294, 299; spiritual, 279 Judas Xscariot, 19'24,353, 401,411,114,30"i" Judas-Jude (Nazi term), 19 Judea, province of, 277 lude~zmf,139,143,280-281, 305,324nZ 8 Judgmental, 24 July 1944 assassination attempt, 180, 182,183 Just war, 1;?f) Justice, 288, 310 Maczynski, Bavid and Ted, 53

Kali, 20,9O blmanovitch, Shabtai, 99 Karnal, General Saddam, 64 Kansas, 1128 b p l a n , Jan, 142 Kapns, 143 Karmona, tloseph, 67 b r s k i , jan: mission, 9&97 Kasztner, Dr. Rudolf (Israel), 289-293, 307,305,342n33; accused of, 289, 2%; activities in Hungary, 289; assassinated, 291; assassins of, 291,25)2,292; and Bachar, 290, 2 E ; and Brand, 29Q and cover up," "1290; frc~ma criminal case to a political trial, 289; and Eichman, 2W, 2 E ; and role of leadership in Hungav, 290; and Mlsj Ghetto, 290; and moral debatesy292; and pamphXets, 290; saving Jews, 289; "sold his soul tcr the devil,"T990;suing Greenwald, 289,292; and Tamir, 289,290,292,293; and Ntrainof the prestigious," 28% 2290; and trial, 289; .\rerdict,290. See also Greenwald b t y n (forest massacre), 443-444 Kayotis, Andrew, 1CfO Kee, H. W., 9 Keegan, John, 178 Kempai Tai, 189 Kennedy:John E, 61; Robert E, 92 Kent, Tyier, G., 67-68,653,108 Keppef, Mrs., 46 Kerch 13eninsub, 174 Kerling, Edward, 121 KGB, 59,60,61,63, '70, 71,98,99,1Q8 m m e r Rouge, 76 murshah, Rukh-al-Din, 91 Kiev, 173 Klroy, 1994 play, 22 3



Milzer, Louis C,, 332n65 King, Dr, Marian, 222 King, Dr. Martin Luther; 92 Miyomi, 189-190; S r g e ' s lover, 2 89 Klement, Frank L,, 418,119,124 Klingberg: Markus, 98,294; Sylvia, 294 h e s s e t , 82 Knightley, Phillip, 67 Knowlton, Colonel, 36 h o x , Oliver, 53 Knox, R, E,, 9 Kc3bal)rasbi, Takiji, 192 Moischwitz, Max, 213 Kolstad, Pedar, 447 Komarcvv; Vladirnir, 94-95 Monev, Marshal I-van, 176 Konyo, Prince Fumimam, 193 Kooistra, Paul, 321~21 Moor corporation, 98 Koren, P-ianiel, 303 Kramer; Joseph (''beast of Belsen"") 204 Mramer, R., 10 Kreisau Circle, 443 Kristel, Syfvia, 317n65 Kriegsn~~n'ne, 146 Krivitsky, Walter G., 315n28 Kuhn, Fritz, 120 Murbsky, prince Andrey Mikhaylovich, 57 Kuwait, 84,85 Mwantung Army, 2287 tabor: disputes, 119; stri ke, 88 tadouceuu; Bavid, 280 Lady Hamifton, 46 La fa yette, 31,55 tahav, Hadas, 297 Lake: Champlain, 29; Tinmjoe, 446 Lambeth Ncjrth, 201 tandsberg prison, 2 79 Langfeldt, Gabriel, 226 tangsdorf, Hans, 205 tansky, Meir, 55

Lama, Joe "%cbIf' 55 Laseelles, Sir Alan 'Tommy" 230t 234, 232 Last S, 18 Last Supper, 19 "Lau" 303 Laval, Pierre, 157,159-161,162,260 Lavon, Pinhas, 67 l,awson, Annette, 44,45,46,48,52 Leach, Robert, 81,82,83 Leahy, William D., 162,165 Lees, Mishael, 1'70 Legion WaXlonie, 2 53 Lehi, 281,283,284,285,291; assassinations of, 285; Xeaders, 305; order to disband, 283; order tcr kill Levi, 284 Zxipzig, 184 Lemke, William, 2 20 Lend-Lease Act, 120,254 lxonidas, King, 18 Leo%-Portilla, Miguelt, 270 Lectpc~ld,(King), 152-153 lxvi, Levi, 98 Levi, Yehuda Arie, 28%285,304,305; accused of, 284; excr~mmunication of, 283; judges of, 284; move from t e h i to Hagana, 283; talk with a Lehi woman, 283; as a traitor, 284; trial of, 283; killed, 284 Levkberg, Amos, 296295,304,305 Levison, Shimeun, 98 lxwinsk~r,Monlca, 51 Ley, Robert, 238 Lezaky, 444 1,iberal secularism, 299 Liberty, 254 Libya, 64 lEJickorish,Captain, 208 Lidice, 2 41 Lie(s), 11,12, 43,284; as a cmtinuc)us variable, 13; necessity of, 13 "Lilti MarXene,'" 238

Lincoln, Abraham, 92,11 8 Linton-Orman, Miss R, L,, 2024 Lisbon, 246,247; 248,258,252,256 Lithuania, 57 Littlejohn, David, 41,438,223 Livingston, Bob, 52 Lloyd, George, 251 Lacarno Pad, 137,334n25 98 Lc~ndin,Gregox~~, tandon, 32,83,93,123,189, 199,209, 250,297'; dungeons, 422 Lc~ndon,Jack, 89 tandon University, 201 Lang, Huey, 120 Long Island, 36,121 tang, Leo, 63 Las Angeles, 1189, 2244 Lotz Rainer, E., 21 3 tatz, Wlfgang, 317n71 Lauisiana, 117 Love: illicit, 22 tayalty, 14-15,24,27; to Americans, 33; and bank account 14; to British, 33; and deception, 37; definition of, 129; and Germans 44; and hanor, 328~32;meaning of, 16; to one's count% 16; violation of, 28,36,37,2%, 308; and whistle-blowers, 78 Lubbe, Van der, 3 3 n 9 Luciano Project, 55 Ludendorf, General Erich, 179 L~~jfwafle~ 242 (see Mechlin Inddence); bombing Britain, 248,251 Luhmann, Niklar;,r;", 10, 43 Lurnc>vrAlexander, 98 Luxembourg, 133, 1M, 152,208,243 Luzon, 329n4I

Macmillan, 112 MacNab, John, 203 MacPhee, Kathleen, 22,46 Madrid: conference, 85; and Begreltle, 153; fifth column in, 131; Windsor's visit in, 244,245,247 MAFDAL, 81,82 Mafia, 55 Magino>tLine, 242 Mahaneimi, Uzi, 32Qn126 Main, 29 Maitland, Jarnes (Earl of Lauderdale), 32 Makeup, 13 Malaysia, 50 Malchut Israel, 291 Malinche, 25, 405, 444, 1116,263,266, 267,269,270,307, 310,311,312; betraying Cholollan;sj,268; and Corte's, 26T 2269; as a collaborator, 272 ;infc~rmationabout, 271 ; importance of, 271; in Mexican literature, 274; and national cmsciousness, 274; popular narrative of, 271; as a racial turncoat, 271; role of, 273; scxial position of, 272; symboX of heroism for the Conquistadors, 271,273,274; symbol of treast~nin Mexico, 263,271,1273,274; two accounts about, 273; volcano's name, 276 33h43; as a wh~?re, 272. See also ChoXollans; Carte"; cultural interpreter; Marina, Mestizo); Tenepal, Malinali Malshinon, 53 Malta, 47 Mamluk, 91 Manbar, Nachurn, 15,285 Manchukuo, puppet state, 187 Mancfiuda, 68,187 Manhattan, 36 Manila, 21



Mansfield, Margaret, 31 Manstein, Field Marshal Erich uon, 173,174 Manailsky, Birnitry 189 Maquis, 464,41;2 Marburg File, 256 Marco Polo, 90 Marina, 266,269,2271; and CorZe'r;, 267 and courage, 2178; daughter of, 270; death, 270; discovering Chctlollan's plot, 272; estates of, 2178; hero vs. traitor, 273; income of, 270; intelligence of, 262,274; as interpreter, 267 looks of, 267; marriage of, 270; and. plot against Carte's, 272; reunited with her mother, 27'0; role in the conquest of Mexico, 269, 27Zf 21711; roXe of, 273,273; shifting trust and loyaltyf 267,274; son of, 269,2"i"; soral-ce of name, 266; speaking Spanish, 270,272; value to Carte", 269; and uolcana, 27'0; See also Cholollans; Malinche, Tenepa l Marranos, 41 Marsh, Patrick, 156 Marsphain, Johanna van, 282 Martyr(s), 35,182 Marzuk, Dr, Moshe, 67 Masada: destruction of, 2178 Mate swapping, 44 mlrisr, 'The,20 Maugfiam, %>merset,68 Maurras, Charles, 153 Maxwell, Robert, 93 May AXan Nunn, 63 May, Uoris, 51 Maya: dialect, 264,266,267 Mayer, R. C.# 10 Mazarine, 50 Mazowiecki, 73 McCarthy persecution, 59,121,124 McDonaghin850

MeDonne11 Douglas, 78 McGann, Eileen, 47 Mechlin incident, 336n73 Mediterranean, 73 Meitz Knmpb 1%,17"3,18t3,332n65 Meix; GoXda, 51 Membership, 28; in dyad, 36; in calledive, 36; faked, 66; in g r ~ ~ u p , 23,317,308; meaning of, 38; in pluralistic cultures, 24 Me~tkes~ J~oseph,294,292 Mercadex; Ramojn, 91 Merchanl; 13iers,50 Mers el Kebir, 162,327nlOO Messersmith, George, 240 Mestizo, 26% 271 Metcalfe, Edward Truity" 223 Meuw River, 243 Mexico, 25,263,265,275; city, 91,263, 270; cmquesl of, 263,265,266, 2@,273,275; liberation of, 33; war with, 118. See also Carte"; Marina Mi5,63,613,71,72 MI6,59,61,63,64,256 MICE, 114 MichaeL (King), 173 Middle East, 64,9Q, 96,100; peace process, 279,303 Mig-24,552 Mihajlovic, General Draza, 169-171, 1%; executed, 170; hiding, 170; betrayed, 170; minister of defense, 169; misleading infcj'cmation about, 171); trial of, 170; truces with Germans, 478 Milan, 73,302 Milligan, Lambdin R, 118 Mills, Cl. Wright, 4,41,140, 275, 344 Mindanau, 21 Mirror, 50 Mississippi, 147 Mistress, 50, 191 Misuari, Nur, 21.

Misztal, Barbara A., 11 Morris, Benny, 70,277,293 Mitfcjrd, Unity, 131,231 Morris, Dick, 47, 50'53 Mr'troktiizzArc.chz've:The KGB ir-z Ezrl.ope Morshead, Owen, 256 Moscow, 60,101,188,189,291; and trlte Wst, Tht, 71 Mitrokhin, Vasili, 71 American embassy in, 63 Mitterrand, Francois, 5Q,53 Moses, 316n64 MosXey, Oswald, 82,131,2@, 246 Mock trial, 77 Mc>hammed,90 Mossad, 4, 44,59,69,94,298,299 Motivation, 34,3i7,4l; and Hagan's Mola, General Emjlio, 131 tyyofogy, 72; personal, 33 Mole(s), 27,58,99 MouIin, jean, 464-462 Mc~lotov,Vyacheslav, 775 Movies, 40 Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, 75 Monarchy, 123,129,239,258 Moyne, Lord, 96 Mc~nckton,Walker, 246,251 Mozambique, 85 Mongolia, 187 Mufti, 85 Muncic?,Dr. Wmdell, 222 Mongols, 91 Mc~ntezuma,265; ambivalence toward Munich, 435; agreement, 73,134,137; Corte's, 267; beliefs, 265; death of, 141,142; Pu tch, 179, 180; university of, 181,182 269; expectations, 265; military Muslim: minority, 21, 171 qualities, 265; s-txccssarof, 269 Montevideo, 205 Mussert, Anton Adriaan, 155,228 Mussolini, Benito ("Duce'"), 73,74137, Montgomery, Bernard, 75 Mc~ntini,Ciovanni, 68 153,301,302; and Clam Petacci, Montreal, 29, 34 302 Mutiny, 17,38,55-56,7L%76; of Croat Mooney, Tom, 119,253 units, 463; in India, 76; in Iran, 76; Moral: boundariest 22,27, 36,39,76, Japanese militar)lf 190; of Lord 1Q2,133,139,167,183,196,213, 217,221,285,308,309,312; claim, Sempiltf's Highland R e ~ m e n t56; , 310; commitments, 308; complex of the Pennsylvania line, 56 stands, 124; content, 228,273; Mutz'r-zyon the Boz-lnly, Vtie,56 Myth, 25,274; of the Blitz, 274; Israeli, contexts, 311; debates, 292; 274; of Masada, 274; national, decisions, 228; entrepreneurs, 424; 274 evaluat.ic>n,24;features of ideafogy, 113; judgment 227,228; and loyaltr; 31Q;meaning; 258; NahuatI, 266,26T non-prc)biematic, 364; o>btigations, Nansen, Fridqctf, 147 Nanking, rape of, 181; 308; panics, 313n6; and power, 310; subversion and morality, 217; Napoleon, 470; Bonaparte, 333 and trust, 310; whistle-blow-ing, Nasjonal Sampling (N.$.), 148,150 Nassau, 237 8&81 Nasser, Carnal Abdel, 495 Mc~rdechai,Uitzhak, 4 More, Thomas, 21,1Q5,122 Natanson, Philip, 67 National Flemish Front (V.N.V), 153 Mormon RAellion, 118



National Scialist League, 202 National: cmsciousness, 224; unit?i; 424 Naval: base in Bran, 162; insurrection, 56; intet ligence, 55; scuttling, 163, 205 Nave, Eric, 130 Nazi: activity in U.S.A., 120; aircraft basesf 445; Austrians, 140; brutality 174; control o f , 144; conquest, 174; defeat, 205; evil of, 466; expansionism, 139,258; extermination plan, 281; fuhrer, 120; Germany, 73,75,76,%, 1E, 429,136, 470,199; goals, 133; ideology 19,120,145,167; insipia, 135; invasion to Yugoslavia, 469; and Jews, 24,41; Jud a ti-jude, 119; moral bound a ries, 183,196; party, 18% 189; party in Denmark, 145; propaganda, 12Q 174,175; racial myth, 174,177; rule, 166; submarines, 55,145; sympathizer(s), 68,134,155,236, 237; taboos, 175; winning elections, 137; war with the USSR, 473,477,490; worldview, 310 Nazi Germany: appreciation of the Duke of Windsor visit, 237; judicial system of, 478; as a state, 178; treason in, 179 Nazism, 129,137,257 NBC, 241 ""Need to know-f"295 Nekzkdn, 279 Nelson, 46 Nes Ziona, 98 Net-, TZ14,21 Netanyahu, Benyamin ("Bibif'), 45,43, 5Q,53,228,229,301 Netherlands, 140,144,152, 454-455,242; a ~ a n i z i n gof, 155; coXIaboration, 155; and Jews, 155; invaded, 242;

Nazi party, 15&155; Nazi sympathizers, 155. See also Mussert.; Seyffardt; Vrijkorps Nettleu; Gwynn, 108,116 Nevo, Amas, 284 New London, 32,35 New Mexico, 62 News of the Worl~Z,22 Newsweek, 47,49,52 New York, 35,101,200; attack of, 31/32 New Vczrkcq The, 111 New "Ical-k Times, 1dif2Q6,22i" New Zealand, 23 Niemoller, Martin, 184 Nippon Ernes, 215 Nisei, 132,194195; Congressional Medal af Honor, 495 Nixon, Richard M., 60 N.K,V,B.,58,63,100,143 Ncjbel Prize: see Hamsrm, h u t and Pound, Ezra NORC, 45 Ncjrmandy, 137 Nctrsk Hydro Hydn>genElectrolysis, 146 North: Africa, 90,137; 162, 195; America, 277; China Area Army; 187; Korea, 64 Ncjmay 133,134,144,145-152,187; Agrarian party. o f , 147; attacked by Germany, 145; government in exile, 146; Nazi invasion to, 206-207; Royal family of, 146; SOE IN, 146; and version of fascism, 147; viewed by Nazis, 145; See also Flagstad, Hamsun, Quisling, Sindig NcjmegiamI 207 Nctsenko, Yuri, 61 Natium, naval battle at, 18 NSA (National Scurity Agency), 60 Nueces, 118 Nuremberg, 140


Obfuscate, 26Q,261 Objective, 7 Occupation, 466,486,284 @day, Rosemary 78 Office of Strategic Semices (OS$),131, 323n"i" Ogen, assodation, 318n90 WLeary, Jeremiah, 119 Oliver, Arnalya L., 10 Ombudsman, 79 " h e night stand," "gQ8,309 Operation: Barbarc~sa,172, 173?176; Catapult, 327n100; Drumbeat, 315d2; Fall Gelb, 152; Nazi, 121; Torch, 164; Weser Exercise, 145 Oran, 162 Oregon, 194 Organiz;ation(s):formal, 3% hostile, 39, See also treacherr~us organizations 0rganiz;ed muder, 91 Ormerod, Captain Gerald j., 15 OwelX, George, $0 Osaka, 494,492 Qsakn A s ~ h i 191 , Oscar awards, 122,123 OSS, see Office of Strategic Services Qslnrbeitel; 74 Ostrovsky Victor, 29&--299,305;and book, 239; born, 298; in Mossad, 298; as trajtc3z; 299; wifet 298 WToofe, J, A., 117,123,304 UToole, Peter, 422 Ottawa, 58,Q Oursler, F-trfton, 254255 Overholster, Dr. Winfred, 222 13aci&c:wuth, 56 ""Pct of Steel,"73?74 Palestine, 69,282,283,290; and Transjordan, 95


Palestine Liberation Organizatian (PLO), 298; negntiatiom with, 300 Palestinian Authority, 279 Palmach, 286 Panzer: divisictns, 243 Paradise, 91 Paris, 130,161, 185,242,243,244,248 Parkinson, Lord, 83 Partisan(s), 1'1"0,176,302, Party: contiernative, 82,83,202; independent, 82; labor, 82; liberal, 82; sc:,ciat demo>cratic,83 Pastor, 2 84 Patblogy of politics, 4115-146 Patient (S), 94 Patriotic traitors, 41,238,223 Patriot(ism), 420, 424, 454, 485, 494,204 Patten, Chris, 23 Pattun, General George, 264,Z 76 Paulust Field Marshal Friedrich, 482 Pavelic, Ante, 171;as a traitor, 171 Peace Now, 301,302 Pearl Harbor, 130,133,194,215,220, 221,255 Peking, 187 Pell, Claiborne H., 247 Pettey, Williarn Dudley 120 Penkovsky, Oleg, 61-62 Perfidy 47 Perry, GeoRrey, Z,ieutenant, 208,209 Persians, 18 Peru, 85 Petacci, CXara, 302 Petain, Marshal Philtlip, 2 2 3,116,138, 142! 156-159, 161, 162! 165, 188, 259,2CZO,312; trial of, 158; betrayal of, 158; traitor or hero, 258 Peter 11 (King), 169 Petrov, Vladlimir; 58,61 Philadelphia, 30,31 Philby, Kim, 36,58,62,6344,68,143 Philistines, 19-20 Philippines, 21,76,2 86,329n41



13incher,Chapman, 16,114-115 Pingectt, Anne, 50 Fing-pong, 98 13into, 78 Pitt (British Prime Minister), 33 Fittman, Dr. Frank, 47 131agiarize,95 Ploscowe, Morris, 108 FIumed Serpent, 265 131urafistic mcic?;ty,9 Plymouth, 2% Foetfs), 68 130etsTorner,228 Pogrom, 120 Poker, 41 130fand,57,7!5,134,202,203; attacked by Germany, 137,207; and fifth column, 133; and non-aggression pact, 241 Poles, 207 Fotice, 53; military 298 130fish:communist party, 143; government-in-exile, 75;integrity, 75; officers, 143-144; secret service, 59,98; soldiers, 773; Sctlidarity mctvement, 73; undergrc~und,96 130fitical:consciousness, 76; influence, 432,467 Fot k, President, 118 130flard,Jonathan, 36,39,42,6M9,%, 99,115,305,307; Ann, 69 Fotmax; Norman, 60 130f 130t, 76 Polyakov, Dimitri, 58 Fond, Charles, 36 130ntr?Vedra Beach, 121 Podland spy ring, 59, 1111 Fort StanXey, 206 130rtugal,243,247,248,248,249,250 Poduguese East Africa, 85 Fostmc>dernism,312 Potemkin, 56

Potanchan, 265,266,267 Potsclam Allied Agreements, 143 Pound, Ezra, 25,36,112,114,219-224, 226,227,307,310,312; A Pact, 227; anti-%mi tism, 220,221,223, 224, 228,333n7n20; agc2inst his country, 228; amested, 221; barn, 219; cantos, 220,224; career as a poet, 219; choicq 221, 227; and Cdes, 223; and communism, 220; and compassion, 227; 228; correspondence with Lord HawHaw, 224; and Cornell, 222; death of, 223; and deception, 223; and Borathy, 224; eccentric, 223; failing to detect evil, 227 and federal,jury 221,222; giving the fascist salute, 224; and hatred, 227,228; and EIemingway, 224; insanity 222,223,228; and Judge taw, 223; marriage, 219; patriotic traitor, 223; and Poets' Corner, 228; pro-faxist-, 223; promoting young authors, 220; radio transmission%220; in Rappalo, 21 9,220,222; sanity 222, 224; in St. Elizabeth" hospital, 223,224; and semitivity, 227; as traitor, 223; and treason, 221, 2 2 ; "trial" of, 221,222; visit to U.S.A., 220; walking, 219; and Washington" indictment, 221; 13QW:Allies, 186, 199, 216; British, 124,204; camp, 449,204; Irish, 81";; Soviet, 174,175,176,17;7,178 Power, 171,310; configurations, 274; cmtest of, 89, 425; of money 113; ritual of, 97; struggle, 89; in time of crisis, 424 PcIwers, Garlr, 101 Powel, Enoch, 83

Index 13rague,142; destruction of, 176; 13.O.A. manifesto, 176; spring of?73; uprising in, 1% 13redictability, 11 Prescott, William H., 268 Prince Charles, 58 13rinceof Wales, 233 Princess Diana, 50 Prisoner(s) of war (POW), 42,295; coercion of, 296; expectations from, 295,296. See also Illan; Levinberg; Cousens 13ritchettthe Very Rwerend Harry S., 228 Private: investigation, 38,42,94; life, 51 13robst,Christoph, 182 Professional Betrayal, 38,94-95 Profurno, John, 112 13ropagc2nda,11(4,120,174,175,177, 491,203,213,304,303 Prostitute, 47,5Q 13rotestantism,85 Public life, 51 Public vs. private, 112 13uertacarrero,Alonso Hern6ndez de, 267 Pu-M (emperc~r),187, 196 Quebec, 34 Queen Alexandra, 46 Queen Mary, 230 Quetzalcaatl, 265 Quisling, Vidkun, 24,36,42,108,113, 114,226,14&152,155,164, 166, 467, 488,218,228,260,304,302, 307,310,313,312; adapting Nazilike insignia, 148; admiratian of Germany and Italy, 148; and antiSemiitism, 150; Germany's attitude towards, 149; conspiring with Hitler and Raeder, 151; contacts with Germany Nazi party, 149; and democracy, 148;


elections, 148; executed, 151; and Hamsun, 225,226; ideological views of, 148,149; marginal position of, 149; marriage, 147; military career, 147; as minister of defense, 147; as minister president, 151; and Na$onal Sampling, 448; as the pnrtqorel; 148; and patrio>tism,151; political career of, 147; political failure, 149-151; and "praf. A," 88; and Terboven, 149; as a traitor; 151. See also Duke of Windsor. Qumm, 90 Rabin: Leah, 301; Yitzhak, 279, 29-305; and ideological differences, 303; in Nazi unifc~rm, 301; similarities to other assassinations, 303; threats on, 303; as traitor, 299-301 Rachel (Israeli poet), 51 Kad, Hertzel, 313~11 Radfa, Munir, 59 Radio: Hi-rmbuq, 203; Luxembourg, 208; traitors, 25,196,213; transmissions, 69,103,120,174, 204,213,220,240; from Verdun, 240,241,254 Rahab, 317n64 Ramos, Fidel, 21 Kappalo, 249,220,222 Rastenburg, 183 Rathenau, Walteu; 304 Kauter, Hanm Albin, 154 Ravna Gora, 170 Reality; 7,304; construction of, 13, 311; false, 309; vs. image, 304; mirrors and masks of, 127,311 Red Army, 100,144,174,176,177,178, 189; intelligence unit, 189 Reichstag: burning of, 137,192, 323n9



Rebel(s), 54,11 8; traitorurn, 76 Rebellion: in Iraq, 195; Iran Guard, 472, 196; in Pragulrl, 1%; Scottish, 123. See also Essex; Jewish; Mormon, Red1is, Alexandex; 98 I3eedel; Eggart, 153 Repatriation, 74,75 Researcherfs),94 Resistance, 138,139,141,145,154,159, 464,4(-;2,477,480 Revolt, 17; against Britain, 204; of students, 181 Rexist movement, 153 Reynaud, Paul, 156,158 Ixhineland, 137,234 Wade Island, 448 Ribbentrop, Joachim von, 73,175,2312, 233,234,239,249,3Xn35; ambassador to Britain, 235; and Mrs. Simpson, 235,256,335n36; plotting against the Windsors, 247 Riddle of ftw Sands, The, 92 Rio Grandet 118 IGyka, Hubert, 133 Ksk(s), 11/75 R.O.A., see Russian Liberation Army Robinsrrm, 13eterW., 80 Roman: Catholic, 22,885; Emperc~r,278; Empire, 27'7,279; province of Judea, 277 Romania, 137; 171-173; army 172; economy, 172; Jews in, 172; Nazi friendly 173; Russian state, invasion to, 473; I-raitorc~us 173; see also Iron Guard Romans, 425 Romantic: friendship, 38; mamiage, 45 Romanticism, 444 Rome, 54,94; irnperiaX 18 RornmeX, Field Marshal Ewin, 183,195

Roosevdt, Franklin B., 46, 59,60, 68, 74,96,131, 132,163,164,165,166, 1170,220,253,254,255,258,33n7 Rosenberg, Alfred, 149 Rosenberg' EEthel and Julius, 111 Rc>wlands,Sherr~p,47 Royal Air Force QR,A.E), 251 Royal UugnsIavian Army, 169 Run Silent, Rtlrl Deep, 214 Rusbridger, Jarnes, 130 Russia, 147,248; Czarist, 57, 470 Russian(s): dtizens, 207; revolution, 75, 188; soldiers, 176; white, 75 Russian Liberation Army (R.O.A,), 174 175,176; fighting duties, 176,177; performance, 177; Pragzle manifesto, 176; suicide, 176; surrender, 176 Sabri, Sheik Akrame, 885 Sabotage,55,96,116, 319,131,132,146, 155,216,323n3 Sadat, Artwar, 495 Saxerno, 75 Salo Republic, 74 Samson, 49-20 Saratoga, Battle of, 30,34 Sargent, Sir Orme, 233 Slay knn, 436 Ijcandinavia, 183 khelleberg, WaXter: mission, 249, 337n124; paisaned, 33"7124; threatening Windsox; 249 kheppele, Mim Lane, 39 ghmidt, Maria, 60 Ijchmorelf, Alexandex; 182 %hull: Ham, 182; Suphie, 182 ghosrman, D. F., 40 Ijchuschnigg, Kurt von, 135,140 Selzutzbund, 70 ghutzstaffel (the $,S.), 175,176,239, 303 Selzuyler, 36

Schuyter, General Philip, 31 khtvartz, Michal, 237,2298 khwart.zenegger, Amold, 21 Science fiction, 25 kofield, Paul, 422 Season, 343n66 Second Oldest Projess-io:~,The, 67 Secrecy, 33,37, 115, 446,247,340; definition of, 39; existence of, 48; sociology of, 39 Secret(s): betrayal, 146; disclosing af, 284,299; intimacy, 47; and whistle-blowers, 78 Sedition, 17,27; 116, 420 Selection: of cases, 127 ""Self help crinninal justice," 320 Seligman, Adam, 10,14,413 Selwyn, Francis, 203,221 0,221 1 Senesh, Hama, 290 Sensation seeking, 140 Serbia: fc~rcel;,370; memorializing General Mihajtovic, 170; natimalism, 469; Orthcjdox, 4 71 Seth, Ronatd, 124,189,190 Settlers, 279 Sex, 22,4ii",440; espionage, 72; exotic, 235; group, 44,126; and money, 309; trap, 93 Sexual: abuse, 94; attraction, 48; chemistry; 48; exchanges, 63; exclusivity, 353,44,47,126; faithlessness, 52, 494; favors, 94; relations, 46 Seyffardt, General f-lendrik Alaander, 155 Seyss-Inquad, A ~ h u r1, 40,154,167, 312 Shabac, 4 Shai, 285,286,341n24 Shamir, Avner, 317n7Q Shanghai, 486,489,494,492 Shamn, Ariet, 339n104 Shaved heads, 2 59

Shayter, 71 Shazar, Zalman, 51 Sheib, EIdad, 291,292 Sherner, Dan, 291 Shepherd, Elizabeth, 47 Shertok, Mcjshe, 96 Shevchenko, Arkady, 58 Shia, 85,90 Shiitcz,83 Shippen, Margaret (Peggy), 30,31,33 Ships: Corte" burning af, 267; cjf fire, 33 Shiva, 20 Shorokhov, Afamy M,, 58 Shpillman, Anshetl, 284 Shrimpton, Michael, 83 Slztinkeq 136 Siberia, 187,190 Sicarii, 90 Sicily, 47 Sijva, Ricardo Espirito Santo, 248,251, 252 SimmeL, Georg, 40,13, 408 Simpson, Mrs. Wallis Warfielid, 229, 23,232,241,244; and the "China dossier" 23235;divorcet 234,232; Duchess of Windsor, 236; Her 130yal f-lighess (HlW) status, 236,244,246; as Hitler "sguest, 238; a Nazi sympathizer, 233; and Paris ayartmrtnl; 248; and Kbbentmp, 335n36; shaking Hitler" bhand, 238,335~53;visit to Nazi Germany, 23&-239; watched by the FBI, 256 Sinai Campaign, 67 Sindig, Christian, 226 Sin-Japanese war, 193 SE, 63,335n36 Sisera, 20 Sisigmund If, King Augustus, 57 Sita, Kurt, 78 Six Bays War; 67



Skorzeny, Major Otto, 74 Slave, 118,177; and betrayal, 275; as inferior people, 175 Sloan, Alfred I?., 253 Slc~vakia,141,170 Smersh, 190 Smiley, 72 Smith, Icebrandt, 317~750 SmoXensk, 143 Snipers, 285 Social: boundaries, 312; cohesictn, 183; control, 310; integration, 183; problems, 7; justice, 120; stmctul-e, 52 Sc~detalreaction, 108 SucietyQies): atomized and bureaucratized 413; monochromatic 12; multimorality 12 Sociolagical imagination, 4, 110 Sc~crates,107-1 08 Sukolow, Victor, 70 Sold his soul to the devil, 45 Sc~ff,Frau Johanna, 183 Suf ilary canfinemnl; 14 Sorzderkommandl~,143 Sc~ntag,Sherry 100 Surge, Richard, 68,7Q, 114,188, 488-490; and P-iotsumiOzaki, 192; conversion to c=ommunism,188; lover, 189; trust of Stalin in, 190 South Africa, 23,68,77; 83,135, 232 Suutheast Asia, 138 Soviet: army, 665; citizens welcoming invasion, 177; defeatism, 176,177; dixontent, 477; embassy in Israel, 70,291; espionage in America, 71; intelligence, 70; military Intelligence, see C.R.U .; operators, 294; I""s>Xitburo, 143; troops, 137; Ukranian Front, 176;

Unian, 36,57,58,6l, 62,64,73, 75, 99,130,137; 144,172,173 Space Shuttle, 78 Spain, 41,134,137,170,243,244,247, 248,251,263 Spaniards, 274,275 Spanish, 267; Civil War; 63,69,131; Conquest, 263,269,2"i7; c=s>nqujstadors, 267,2653; culture, 265; invaders, 2271; Mexico, 117; shipwr-eck,264; sources, 2711 Sparta, 18 Spartans, 18 Special Operations Executive (SOE), 131,3;?4n38; Nowegian, 146 Speer, Albert, 234 Spencel; Earl Charles, 550 Spy(ies), 28, 70, 102; famous pclopte as, 68; industrial, 93; netwrork, 66, 189,190; planted, 28; as traitors, 66,98--101 Spying, 66 Squealing(ers),53,8fl S.S., see khutzstaffel Sl'nIrlg 37,21 Stalin, Jnseph, 58,71,74,77,470,488, 189; brutality 1%; distrust of, 174; purges, 124,171,174,176; resistance to, 177; totalitarian rule, 174,176; tyranny of, 178 Stalingrad, see Battle, oof Stalingrad Stamp(s), 101,190, 329n53 Staples, William J., 97 Starnation, 166,217 Stasi, 54 State Department, 59,643,120,247 State-sponmred terror, 38'76-T, 171; see also Croatia and Utjtachi Status quo, 5 Stauffenberg, Colonel Count Claw ucm, 112,114,138,183,196,307 Stealth, 24,221 7,309,312 St. Elizabeth's hospital, 223,224

Index St. John the Divine Cathedral, 228 Stephanie of Monaco, 50 Sternberg, Josef von, 185 Stern Gang, 2281, See Lehi Stigmatization, 34 SlingI 93 Stohreu; k%erhard van, 245,247, 248 Stc~rrs,Rc>naldSir; 282 Strauss, Anselm, 323n71 Strikebreaking, 38,87-89,404 Students: in Nazi Germany; 181; revolts (1%8), 76 Subversion, 47,132,167,194,216,217; as morally questionable, 217 Sudeten, 134,135,141,142,143; German, 38,432 Suez Canal, 66 Sugarno prison, 2 93 Suicide, 459, 476,278,296 Sztfnnz,291,292 Sunday Dispn tck, 254 S u n d q Tifzes, 14,15,9St320n126 Surgery: unnecessary 94 Surveillance, 38,97-98; military, 97 Survey 212-21 3 Suspicion, 1I Swap, W., 9 SWAPO (South West Africa Pe.oplePs Organization), '77 Sweden, 2 45,208; iron ore from, 145 Swinging, 44 Switzerland, 134,135,182,290; banks, 168 Sydney, 216 Symbolic interaction, 311 Symbolic moral universe, 9,12,22,24, 55,180,260,274,275, 285,294, 304; and betrayal, 217,3017,312; competition beween, 312 Syria, 3,64,69,91,95,130,294; captivity in, 245; intelligence of, 293; and POWs, 295; and prison,

397 296; telephane lines in, 296; and Y m Kippur war, 294

Tabasco, 265,266,267 Taiwan, 191 Takada, Tadashi, 192 Tarnir, Shmuelt, 2854,290,291,292,293 Target, 37 Teheran, 170 Te1 Aviv, 70,99,284,286,288,291,293, 304; university of, 70 Telemark, 146 Tenepal, Malinali, 24,266,267,270, 274; acts of, 274; brc~therof, 270; CirnatX (mother of), 266,270; crossing cultural boundaries, 275; family of origin, 266; lingual talents of, 2%; place of birth, 266; social construction of, 274; and slavery, 2&5,2"i"; and trust and lo>yalty275; and VEasc)v, 275. See also Cltolollam; Co&e%s, Malincfie; Marina Tenochtltla'n, 26F269 Terboven, Josef, 149,225,335n53; see also Norway. Terror: countex; 170; mass, 1170; reign of, 57,77 Theater, 40 Theft: by individuals, 71; of information, 71,72 Theological circle, 113 Therapistfs), 94 Thermopylae, 2 S Third man, 316n53 Thomas, Gwynne, 233,234,236,243, 249 Threat potential, 27,33,45,52,108,115, 196,309 Thugs, 90 "Ticking BombfPT7 Emcs Lz'temq Sznppletnenl, 127 Tito (Marshal), 170



"naxcaltecs, 268,270,274 Taguri, Iva, 214,218; American citizn, 214; choices, 217,218; and Cousens, 216; hospitalization of, 215; Iimuro, Ftrmi, ( m t h e r (;)Q, 214; coerced into broadcasting, 216; compared to Joyce, 216,217; Jun (father of), 214; marriage, 245; and Medical school, 214; pardon to,216; sabotagng trantimissions, 216; Shizu (aunt of), 214; and Swiss mission, 215; as Tokyo Rose, 216; and UCLA, 214; Uokc~kama,214 Tokyo, 187,189,191,192,193,215,216; radia, 215,216 Takyo no%, 25,188,197,199,214-217; see also Tc>guri,Iva Tolerance, 122,124 Tarontcr, 299 Torrey, E. Fuller, 223 T o r t u ~77,162,296 , Taulon, 163 Toussaint, (General), 176 Tower of London, 21,122,123 Tawrmsend, Francis E,, 120 "Train of the prestigious," "9, 290 RaitorCs): conditians for, 308; and conspiracy, 183; Debs, 11% definition of, 309; as deviants, 114; Farouk, 195; vs. heroes, 105,271; and identitis, 341; individual, 281,309; in Jerusalem, 285; motivation of, 114; opportunistic, 288,311; and radio, 196,189; role of, 112; as sad men, 109; vs. spies, 9&--101,295;as true believers, 1122; unrealistic view of the world, 123; viewing of, 36. See also, Hero, .\rs. traitor Traitor" Gate, 21,122 Tralee Bay; 86 Rantilator, 267,269,270

Treacherous organization, 281,305, 309; See also, Dereeb Hanitzaz Treason, 17,25,27,38,39,293; act, 210; vs, betrayal 18,312; boundaries aft 121,196; as a cmtinuous variable, 259; and criminolc>gy, 116; damages of, 115; and deception, 116; definition aft 106-1 07,115,116, 125; depth and intensity of, 259; as deviance, 114; and the Duke crf Windsor, 245; empirical manifestations of, 127'; encyclopedia of, 127; in Engjand, 122-124; and Ezra Pound, 221; high and petit, 106. 170; insinuatians, 119; in Mexico, 271; and morality, 125; motivation for, 110,112,114,115, 124; nature of, 299,312; in Nazi Germany, 17'&1%; vs. opposition, 121;political Ievel 18; and power, 125; punishment for, 108,310; via radio, 199; and Rabin, 300; reason(s) for, 108,111, 112; and social change, 112,416,124; and societies, 127; structure and content of, 126-127; threat of, 115; trials, 423; types aft 112, 446; universal crime 125; in the U.S.A., 116-1 22; and violence, 11C;; within the Third Reich, 17'&1%, 196. See also, Derech Hanltzc>z; Dissent Trickery, 47' Trots, Thilo von, 149 Trotsky, Lean, 91 Truck drivers strike, 89 Trunk, 63 Trust, 9-14,24,27; boundaries of, 294; crisis in, 40; and deception, 37;' definition of, 9-10, 129; diminishing of, 113; faked, 93;

Index importance of, 11--l4; invoking other concepts, 41; meaning of 12; nationat 17,130; and secrecy; 39; and treason, 113; violatiron of 42-13,36,37, 296,308; and whistle-blc>wers,'78 Ruman, Harry, 323n7 Trusted Criminals, 42 Truth, 7; manipulation of, 12; unadulterated, 13 Tubianski, Captain Meir, 285-289,305, 322~65;arrest of, 285,2%; and Ben-Curion, 287; buried, 287; career of, 286; cleansed, 287-288; convicted, 287; executed, 287,288; found innocent, 288; judges of, 287; and justice, 288; member of Hagana, 286; suspected of, 286; and treason, 286,287; trial ofy286-287; wife of, 287 Tmisia, 163 Turin, 74 Turkey 95,130 Turki, Boud, 293 Tumcc>at(ing),32,37; 81-84,259, 308, 312; and persc>naliv,83; political, 38,39; R,C),A., 177 Tutanji, Wamis, 303 Truili'ghl otter Engl~nd,204 2002 - A S p c e Odyssey, 20 Typology 38,72 Tyranny, 122,178 Tyrannicide, 92 U-2,101 U-boatls), 5 5 233,208,253; commander, 1%; pens 47; U-19, 86; U-202,121; U-584,121 Ukraine, 2 32 Unabamber, 53 Unconditional surrender, 173 U ~ t e Kingdom, d 46,63,2 22,246


United Nations, 283 United Statesf 558,64,66,96, 404, 463, 189,2t33,33n3; civil war, 118,124; collaboration with Nazis in, 132; embassy in London, 68; and fifth column, 132,194; German agents in, 119'2 20'2 21; natianal security, 61,9f); navy 68; Nazi activity in, 120; submarines, 99; Supreme Court, 294; and treasrrm, 2 2 6-122; visit of Gesrge Vl, King, 224; war with Nazi Germany, 221; and whistle-blowers, 79. See aalso, Pound, Togttri Universiv of: Califc~rnia,Los Angeles QUCLA), 214; Chicago, 45; Pennsylvania, 219 Uprising, 17 Ustachl 171,172; as traitors, 171 Uxbridge, 83 "V," '142 Va'anunu, Mordechai, 14-45,93,94, 101,115,285,320n 126 Vaillant, George C., 266,267,269,270 Valcaur Island, Battle of, 29,% Valesco, Angel de, 250,251 Vallandigan, Clement L., 118 Value, 28,299; in~l-rmmensurability~ 16; system, 1I Vassal, John Williami, 112,321n27 Vassiliev, Alexander, 71 Vela'zzquez, Diego, 263 Venice, 219,224 Venona, 60,315~138 Vera Cruz, 266,267 Verdun, 240. see atso, Battle, of Verdun; radio transmission from Verdun Vered, Dan, 293-294,305 Vermont: as a Canadian prwince, 117 "hrmork Raid," 146 Verrier, Antchony, 163,164 Vespasian, 278



Vichy, 142,156,157,1 58,159,161,162, 445,258,30It326n97&98; and Bedaux, 237; guide, 161; owerrun by German forces, 163 Victim, 37 Vienna, 63,69,225,1240 Viereck, George Sylvester, 120 Vietnam: war in; 16,65,444,121 Vitification, 302 Vinitzky-Seroussi, Yered, 317n70 Violence, 116,304; vehal, 304 Virginia: Harper's Ferry, 118; Richmond, l27 Vlasov, Lieutenant General Andrey A., 173-1 ;78,188,196,275,307, 31l, 312; amnsted, 176; capture, 174; defeatist mavement, 176; defection, 17%; pr~mC)tic>n of, 173; propaganda broadcasts, 174,175, 477,4713; Order of the Red Barner, 173; as trajtc3z; 178; wandering in the forest, 174 V.N .V. - Vlaam Naticjnaal Verbcjnd, 453 Vc3cabularl"esof mo>tivet;,1717 Volcano, 339n43 Volkhcjv front, 17'3 Vc3Xkogonov; General Dmitri, 60 Volkov, Kc~mtantin,61 Voltaire, 122 Vrij korps, 155 Vyshinsky, Andrei, 60 Wade, N., 95 VVaffen, S.S., 138 Walker: Arthur J,, 100; family of spies, 1CfO,115; John A., 100; Michael, 100 VVall, T*, 9 Wallace, Wilfiarn, 423 Waller, John H., 256,257 VVandsworth prison, 211 War(s): of 1812, 448; American Revt,lutionar)l, 30,34,117; crimes,

171; civil, 118; French Indian, 28; 0ctcr;ber 1973,130 Warfare: ant-Partisan, 177;chemical and biological, 99,294; subversive, 38 Warmbruun, Wemer; 138 Warren, Suzanne, 130 Warshawski, Michael,298 Washbum, Mrs. tois de, 120 Washington, 494 Washington, D.G., 51,58,69,120,221, 245,247 Washiington, General George, 29,30, 31,32,35,36 Wasserstein, Bernard, 96 Weale, Arian, 123,124 Weapons: atomic, 62,132; undem-atex; 112 Weber, Max, 113 Weddel, A. W., 244,247 Wchrrnncf.&t, 61,65,71,95, 124,137,140,143,144,145,152, 153,154,155,173,174,1176,178 Weimar Republic, 114,179,180,196; and betrayal, 180 Weinberg, Gerhard L., 195,242,257 Weinstein, Alfm, 71 Weisfeld, Roman, 98 Weitz, Yechiarn, 293 Weitzman, Ezex; 53,8Q Wemer-Gsen, Axel, 237,252,253,255 Weygand, GmeraX, 157 West: Bank, 279; Indies, 33; Point, 34,32 West, Rebecca, 111-31 2,113 West, Nigel, 111,277 Western civilizatian, 113 Westminster Abbey 32 Weyl, Nathaniel, 117, 493,304 Wharam, Alan, 122,123 fitrhibley: Joanna, 22; Kevin, 22

Index WistXe-blowerO,4,38,53,78-81,201, 411,318n86; legal protection for, 79-80; and powex; 80; risks of, 79 White-collar crime, 38 m i t e House, 51; and treaso)n, 222 m i t e , Margaret Cairns, 202,207 White Rose, 414,125,181,181-183,196, 322~65 W?ziIeRose, The, (movie), 182 m i t e slavery, 120 Whitworth, jerry A,, 99 Wiener Library; 209 Wilhelmina (Queen): Fleehg to England, 454 Wilson, Horaee, 246 Wilson, Woodrclw, 119 Winning, (Cardinal), 344n344 Witch: craft, 25; hunt, 124 VVodehouse, I? G., 2 99 Wolfi Markus, 68 V\lalf% Lair, 183 VVoXsley, Cardinal, 2 23 Women: British, 167 ccctmEc>&,1%; French, 159; slaves, 266 muster, Bertie, 199 VVocrsteu; General Uavid, 30 Wordswclrth, William, 68 W r l d War 1 (WWI), 63,86,119, 120, 156,184,188,230,231 World War 11 (WWII), 63,72, 88, 95, 108,311,120, 137,156, 196, 323n3 Worsthorne, Sir Peregrine, 54 W u k , Herman, 56


Wright, Rev. Roderick, 21,46; as traitou; 22 Wyman, Davici S., 96 Yale University 36 Yalta Conference (""Argonaut"")55, 60, 74,176,328n11 Vavneh, 279,280 Yazernitzky (Shamir), Uitzhak, 284 Yedl'ot Aftamnot,284 Yellin-Mc~r,Natan, 284 Yishuy 282 Vodfat, 278 Yokcj, 1% Yc)kc)harna, 21 4 Vucatan, 264,267; p e ~ n s u l a263 , Yugoslavia, 432, 437 46%474; communist part_)j;170 Vurchenka, Vitaly, 2 00 Zech-Burkesroda, Count Julius von, 242,243 Zelizer, Barbie, 334 7n70 Zerifin rmdergrctrmd, 231 ''Zero hour," 21 6 Ziegler, 13hilip,233,237,239,241,243, 245,247,248,250,254256 Zigzags, 162,164 Zilbemman, Vitzhak, 98 Zimmermann, Mcwhe, 484 Zionist: elite, 282; ideology 21282; leadership, 282; movemenl; 76; secular, 85,281,283,294 Zulu, 83