Britain, Hanover and the Protestant Interest, 1688-1756 (Studies in Early Modern Cultural, Political and Social History)

Citation preview

STUDIES IN EARLY MODERN CULTURAL, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL HISTORY Volume 3

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST, 1688–1756

1 2 3 4 51 6 7 8 9 0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45

Studies in Early Modern Cultural, Political and Social History ISSN: 1476-9107 Series editors David Armitage Tim Harris Stephen Taylor I Women of Quality Accepting and Contesting Ideals of Femininity in England, 1690–1760 Ingrid H. Tague II Restoration Scotland, 1660–1690 Royalist Politics, Religion and Ideas Clare Jackson

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST, 1688–1756

Andrew C. Thompson

THE BOYDELL PRESS

© Andrew C. Thompson 2006 All Rights Reserved. Except as permitted under current legislation no part of this work may be photocopied, stored in a retrieval system, published, performed in public, adapted, broadcast, transmitted, recorded or reproduced in any form or by any means, without the prior permission of the copyright owner The right of Andrew C. Thompson to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 First published 2006 The Boydell Press, Woodbridge The Boydell Press is an imprint of Boydell & Brewer Ltd PO Box 9, Woodbridge, Suffolk IP12 3DF, UK and of Boydell & Brewer Inc. 668 Mt Hope Avenue, Rochester, NY 14620, USA website: www.boydellandbrewer.com ISBN 1 84383 241 0

A catalogue record for this title is available from the British Library

This publication is printed on acid-free paper Typeset by Keystroke, Jacaranda Lodge, Wolverhampton Printed in Great Britain by Cambridge University Press

Contents Preface and acknowledgements Abbreviations Glossary

vii x xi

Introduction 1

1

The balance of power, universal monarchy and the protestant interest

25

Britain, Hanover and the protestant interest prior to the Hanoverian succession

43

3

The Palatinate crisis and its aftermath, 1719–1724

61

4

The Thorn crisis and European diplomacy, 1724–1727

97

5

George II and challenges to the protestant interest

133

6

Walpole, the War of the Polish succession, and ‘national interest’

168

7

The decline of the protestant interest?

188

2

Conclusion

229

Bibliography Index

238 263

v

For my parents

Preface and acknowledgements A first book naturally relies heavily on the help of others and I take great pleasure in recording that now publicly. This work originates in my doctoral dissertation, approved by the university of Cambridge in February 2003. Over the course of researching and writing this book, I have incurred a number of intellectual debts. Yet thanks to a number of equally generous organisations, my bank balance has remained relatively healthy. The bulk of the research was funded by a postgraduate studentship from the Arts and Humanities Research Board. My research trips to Germany were funded by a short-term research scholarship from the DAAD (German Academic Exchange Service). There I was a visiting scholar at the now sadly defunct British Centre for Historical Research in Germany, based at the Max-Planck-Institut für Geschichte in Göttingen. I had learnt of the Centre’s existence at a conference sponsored by the Centre, and funded by the Volkswagen Stiftung, Hanover, for graduate students from Germany, France and the UK in September 1999. I am grateful to Joe Canning and Tony Claydon for their help on that occasion, and to the other participants at the conference for their comments on how I might go about this project. Jürgen Schlumbohm chaired the session at which I spoke and offered advice subsequently. Hartmut Lehmann was helpful on that occasion and was a gracious host when I returned to spend a longer period in Göttingen. My research in Germany was greatly helped by the good advice of Hermann Wellenreuther and he also kindly introduced me to Thomas MüllerBahlke, whose help in the wonderful archives in Halle was invaluable. The staff of the Hauptstaatsarchiv, Hanover fulfilled my frequent requests for large stacks of dusty files with characteristic good humour. My other major trip abroad was to the delightful Lewis Walpole Library in Farmington, CT. There I was fortunate enough to benefit from being elected to the George B. Cooper fellowship. Maggie Powell and her staff make this library an ideal location for the scholar of eighteenth-century Britain to work. September 2001 was not the best of months to spend in the USA but Holger Hoock, Arnold Hunt, David Lemmings, Chad Luddington and Alison Shell, my ‘fellow fellows’, ensured that I remembered the trip for good reasons, as well as terrorist outrages. In Cambridge I have benefited from several sources of income and countless individuals. At various times my research trips to the British Library and Public Record Office have been funded through the munificence of the Newton Trust, the Lightfoot and Members’ funds in the Faculty of History, the Sir John Plumb Charitable Trust, and a Munro Studentship from Queens’ College. Queens’ vii

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

also elected me to a research fellowship, which has allowed me to expand and revise the original thesis for publication. In Queens’, I am grateful to successive directors of studies, Brendan Bradshaw, Peter Spufford and Richard Rex for their support and encouragement over many years. My other historical colleagues, Carl Watkins, Craig Muldrew, Martin Ruehl and Hannah Dawson, together with other members of the SCR, have helped the process of writing with advice, humour and good fellowship. Elsewhere in Cambridge Chris Clark and Jo Whaley offered advice at the early stages of the project. Mark Goldie encouraged me to ‘Europeanise’ myself, after my M.Phil. studies, ably supervised by him, and has shown an interest in my development ever since. Friends and fellow researchers, Rhiannon Thompson, Bridget Heal, Torsten Riotte, Guy Rowlands, Hannah Smith and Grant Tapsell, have also offered support along the way. Christopher and Stephen Thompson have been the most understanding and helpful of siblings, as well as sources of historical advice in their own right. Philip Stickler and his colleagues in the Cartographic Unit of the Cambridge University Geography Department helpfully drew the maps. Outside Cambridge, Graham Gibbs, W.R. Ward and David Wykes have all answered queries patiently and helpfully. Clyve Jones did sterling service in enabling me to look at a London Ph.D. not held by the IHR on an otherwise wet and frustrating day. The German Historical Institute in London allowed me to talk at its postgraduate conference and organised the invaluable course in palaeography which enabled me to read German documents. Fetchers and librarians in the British Library and the Public Record Office helped the process of research, but the work on this book has also reinforced my view that any researcher in Cambridge benefits hugely from the wealth of materials, and the ease with which they can be accessed, in the Cambridge University Library. Travel broadens the mind but it also underscores the value of treasures closer to home. I am also grateful to the Early Modern and Modern British graduate seminars in Cambridge for the opportunity to present versions of chapters one and six. The most important debts have to be left until last. Tim Blanning has been an inspirational teacher since he converted me to the works of the Meister for my third-year special subject. He was a model supervisor throughout and is now a much valued colleague. My examiners, Hamish Scott and Brendan Simms, provided me with valuable insights and advice on the process of turning the dissertation into a book and have been a source of encouragement and support. I am grateful to my editors at Boydell for accepting this work into their series and for comments on earlier drafts. Stephen Taylor, in particular, has been both an incisive reader and a good friend. Peter Sowden has seen the book through the press with consumate professionalism. My parents have supported me spiritually and financially over many years. This work would have been simply impossible without them. Finally, my wife, Victoria, has ensured that I have been constantly reminded that there is much, much more to life than the ‘protestant interest’. Her help with the genealogical viii

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

table was a concrete reminder of her broader interest in this project. Needless to say, what follows is entirely my own work and I am responsible for any remaining errors. Cambridge, July 2005

ix

Abbreviations BL CUL EHR HHStA HJ LWL PRO Parliamentary history PSGB

London, British Library Cambridge, Cambridge University Library English Historical Review Hanover, Hauptstaatsarchiv Historical Journal Farmington CT, Lewis Walpole Library London, Public Record Office Parliamentary history of England ed. William Cobbett (36 vols, London, 1806–20) Political State of Great Britain

Note on the text The vast majority of files in the Hanover archives have now been numbered continuously within each class and I have used the modern system of citation throughout. As the Findbücher still contain both old and new references, it is still possible to compare old and new style references easily. All continental dates are ‘New Style’ and British ‘Old Style’. The start of the year has been standardised to 1 January in all cases. I have translated all quotations in French and German in original sources into English myself. ‘Empire’ and ‘Imperial’ refer to the Holy Roman Empire and its institutions.

x

Glossary casus foederis – an event which, under the terms of an alliance, entitles one of the allies to help from the others. Corpus Catholicorum – the catholics, when gathered together at the Reichstag; not as organised as the protestants in this period. Corpus Evangelicorum – the protestant confessional group at the Reichstag; met regularly and decisions were subsequently collected and published. Saxony retained the directorate of the Corpus, even after Augustus II’s conversion to catholicism in 1697. Diet – a representative assembly; more specifically the Imperial Diet in Regensburg. Deutsche Kanzlei – German chancery, the office in St James’s used by the monarch’s Hanoverian ministers. Emperor – the Holy Roman Emperor. Empire – the Holy Roman Empire. Geheime Räte – ‘privy counsellors’. Greffier – the notary of the States General in the United Provinces, whose position brought with it considerable political influence, particularly over foreign policy. Hofdekrete – decrees proposed to the Reichstag by the Imperial Chancellor (the elector of Mainz). Hoheitsrechte – ‘prerogatives’ of German princes. ius emigrandi – ‘right to emigrate’: right of subjects to emigrate to a territory of their own confession under the Westphalian settlement. Whether it was permitted to take children and/or possessions was disputed. ius eundi in partes – ‘right to go into parties’: the right which could be invoked by either confessional grouping at the Reichstag in Regensburg to ensure that any matters relating to religious issues were settled by direct negotiation between the two groups, rather than by majority decisions in the various colleges of the Reichstag. The definition of what constituted ‘religious issues’ was disputed. ius reformandi – ‘right of reformation’: the right of the territorial prince to establish his own confession in his territory. How this related to the territorial position established in 1648 in the case of princely conversions was disputed. Kanzelist – official working in a chancery. Kirchenrat – ‘church council’, responsible for administering churches in areas such as the Palatinate. xi

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

Kommission – ‘commission’, such as that granted by the Emperor to Hanover to intervene in Mecklenburg. Kommissionsdekrete – decrees proposed to the Reichstag by the Emperor, through the Prinzipalkommissar. Konkommissar – the Prinzipalkommissar’s deputy; responsible for most of the day-to-day running of the chancery in Regensburg. Normaljahr – ‘normal year’: the year (1624) used as the benchmark for regulating possession of churches in the Peace of Westphalia. It was chosen as a compromise between the highpoints of protestant (1618) and catholic (1630) gains. Öffentlichkeit – ‘public sphere/space’. Pensionary – chief magistrate of a city in the United Provinces, specifically the (Grand) Pensionary, chief minister of Holland and Zeeland. Personal union – the union between the British thrones and the Hanoverian electorate from 1714 to 1837. Prinzipalkommissar – the Emperor’s chief representative at the Reichstag. Responsible for introducing Kommissionsdekrete. Rat – counsellor or adviser. Reichsarmee – ‘Imperial army’, formed by contingents from the various states of the Empire. Reichshofrat – ‘Aulic council’: established by Maximilian I; based in Vienna; one of the two most important courts of the Empire. Reichskammergericht – ‘Imperial chamber of justice’: the other important Imperial court, based in Wetzlar. Reichskanzlei – ‘Imperial chancery’ in Vienna. Run by the Imperial vicechancellor; centre of the ‘Imperial’ faction. Ryswick treaty – peace treaty between the Empire and France (1697). Its Fourth Clause allowed those churches which had become catholic during Louis XIV’s occupation of the Palatinate to remain so. Protestants claimed that this went against the Westphalian settlement and sought to have the clause abolished. Sejm – the Polish estates. Simultaneum – the use of a church by both confessions. This could involve either the physical separation of parts of the church or a strict timetable regulating use. Stände – ‘estates’. Vollmacht – ‘full powers’ to conclude treaties etc., frequently sought by Emperor from Reichstag for peace settlements. Votum – ‘vote’: opinion that an ambassador at Regensburg had recorded in the minutes of the Reichstag, in response to a formal proposal. Wahlkapitulation – ‘electoral capitulation’: the promises made by the Emperor on his election.

xii

Europe in the early eighteenth century

Habsburg Territory

FRANCE

AUSTRIAN NETHERLANDS

BRITAIN

Parma

Salzburg Sa

BAVARIA

Piacenza

SWISS CANTONS

Thorn BRANDENBURG -PRUSSIA

HUNGARY

Vienna

SAXONY

Berlin

Re Regensburg

Hanover anover

Heidelberg

HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE

HANOVER UNITED PROVINCES

T

ON

DM

PI E

POLAND

HOLSTEIN (shared between the King of Denmark and the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp)

Lubeck

Glückstadt

Ratzeburg

MECKLENBURG

Hamburg Stade

Lüneburg

OLDENBURG (Denmark)

CELLE

Bremen

(united with Hanover 1705)

8

Osnabrück

BERG LEN CA

e

K 98 UC1661– BR ed rn

G Esia) us L I(N Pr

N

BRANDENBURG

Celle

HOYA (1682 and 1705)

O

H S 17 an.g N 16 o A –2 v

Hanover

LIPPE

Göttingen

SAXONY

Areas added to Hanover during George I’s reign Wolfenbüttel Imperial free cities Boundary of George I’s Hanoverian Dominions Harz mountains and mines

Hanoverian territorial expansion

0

40

80 km

Anne (1709-1759), m. 1734 William of Orange later William IV stadholder of the United Provinces

William Augustus (1721-65), duke of Cumberland

Mary (1723-72) m.1740 Friedrich II, Landgraf of Hessen-Kassel

Friedrich Wilhelm I (1688-1740), king in Prussia (1713)

Friedrich II (1712-86), king in Prussia (1740)

m.

Note: This table only shows the principal individuals mentioned in the text and does not include all children.

Frederick Louis (1707-51), prince of Wales (1728)

Ernst August (1622-98) ruling prince-bishop of Osnabrück, 1661-98, ruling duke of Calenberg (1679), elector of Hanover (1692), m. 1659 Sophia of the Palatinate (1630-1714)

Sophia Charlottte (1668-1705), m. 1684 Friedrich I (1657-1713), elector of Brandenburg, (1688), king in Prussia (1701)

Sophia Dorothea (1687-1757) m. 1706

Johann Friedrich (1625-79) ruling duke of Calenberg, 1648-65, Celle 1665-79, m. 1668 Benedicte Henriette of the Palatinate (1652-1730)

Georg Ludwig (1660-1727) elector of Hanover (1698), as George I, king of England, Scotland and Ireland (1714)

Georg August (1683-1760) elector of Hanover (1727), as George II king of England, Scotland and Ireland (1727), m. 1705 Caroline of Ansbach (1683-1737)

m.

Georg Wilhelm (1624-1705) ruling duke of Calenberg, 1665-79, Celle 1679-1705, m. 1675 Eléonore d’Olbreuse (1679-1722)

Sophia Dorothea (1662-1726) m. 1682 div. 1694

Christian Ludwig (1622-65) ruling duke of Calenberg, 1641-48, Celle 1648-65, m. 1653 [Sophie] Dorothea of Holstein-Glücksberg (1636-89)

Georg (1582-1641) ruling duke of Calenberg 1636, m. 1617 Anna Eléonore of Hessen-Darmstadt (1601-59)

Introduction Charles Whitworth had been busy throughout the summer of 1719. As minister plenipotentiary to Berlin, he had been involved in protracted negotiations with Frederick William I, the Prussian monarch. Whitworth had returned to Hanover several times to consult his master, George I, who was visiting his electoral domains. Early in August, Whitworth informed James Craggs, one of the secretaries of state, of the conclusion of a Prussian alliance, remarking that ‘the King of Prussia by a little good management and complaisance may be secured in measures more suitable to the state of Religion, and the common tranquillity of Europe’.1 Six weeks later, writing to undersecretary Delafaye, Whitworth commented ‘the good dispositions get ground here every day, and I hope the poor Protestants in Germany will soon feel the effects of our Reunion’.2 In September 1719 Abel Boyer, a Huguenot exile and journalist, noted in his periodical The Political State of Great Britain that ‘the Popish Zealots were busy and industrious in several parts of Germany in raising a Persecution against the Reformed Protestants’.3 Boyer’s account was based on two letters. The first described the fate of the reformed of Frankfurt am Main. The second concerned the reformed of the village of Freimersheim in the bishopric of Speyer. These two contrasting perspectives not only show that both diplomats and journalists were concerned about the persecution of protestants in the Holy Roman Empire in 1719. They also aptly illustrate the purpose of this study. Such figures as Charles Whitworth and Abel Boyer have rarely been considered together.4 Indeed, for some, diplomatic history has little to learn from the latter and everything to learn from the former. For historians of periodicals and popular politics, by contrast, the opinions of such an ‘establishment’ figure as Charles Whitworth have little to do with their nonelite narratives. Yet considering religious concerns, common currency in eighteenth-century debate at both an elite and popular level, indicates how 1 Whitworth to Craggs, Berlin, 14/8/1719, London, Public Record Office [hereafter PRO], State Papers [hereafter SP] 90/8. 2 Whitworth to Delafaye, Berlin, 30/9/1719, PRO, SP 90/8. 3 Political State of Great Britain, xviii, Sept. 1719, p. 196. 4 However Heinz Duchhardt, Balance of Power und Pentarchie (Paderborn, 1997), pp. 1–4, has a much broader conception of the materials needed for a history of eighteenth-century international relations.

1

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

the accounts of Whitworth and Boyer interact in ways that have been previously ignored. Much valuable work has appeared on the history of British diplomacy in the eighteenth century. The present work’s aim is different. Instead of concentrating on establishing the course of particular negotiations, it asks a broader question: what motivated policy-makers? Some of the most commonly held and widely disseminated assumptions about how both foreign policy and government were conceptualised and conducted in the early eighteenth century need to be reconsidered. Foreign policy was not simply determined either by the desire for profit or territorial gain. It was part of a complex web of ideas that were intimately related to a broader political culture. Religion has reappeared as central to British political culture in the early modern period in recent work. The history of foreign policy needs to be connected back to these debates and the present work is an attempt to do so. By showing the importance of confession for the whig oligarchy’s foreign policy, this book offers a radical reappraisal of the nature of whiggery from 1688 to 1756. The book’s chronological scope is determined by political events – the Glorious Revolution marked an important caesura in foreign policy and the start of the Seven Years War ushered in a period of further change. In between, it is argued, foreign policy-makers were driven by the need to defend the protestant interest. This need arose from two sources. First, with the exception of Anne’s short reign (1701–1714), British monarchs held territory in continental Europe throughout this period. Britain consequently became more involved in European politics and diplomacy. The language of the protestant interest was an important means of justifying this involvement. Moreover Britain’s position as one part of a ‘multiple monarchy’ meant that a balance had to be struck between the needs and interests of Britain and a continental partner, be it Holland under William III or Hanover under George I and II. Common confession provided a means to bring together seemingly disparate interests and concerns. Secondly, and relatedly, defending the protestant interest had popular resonance. The growth of the public sphere made discussion of foreign policy more common and consequently the presentation of policy more important. Foreign policy lay at the heart of eighteenth-century governmental activity. Demonstrating the centrality of confession for diplomacy is therefore a means of showing confession’s broader importance. Both the beginning and end of the period were characterised by war against France (and this continued well beyond 1756). France represented the catholic ‘other’ but studying the structure of diplomacy in peacetime and efforts to maintain an international system also illustrate the importance of confessional thinking. The book argues for a significant reappraisal of three related areas: the foreign policy of George I and George II and its roots in the legacy of William III and the Glorious Revolution; the role of foreign policy in public discussion in Britain; and the importance of protestantism to Britain and Hanover. Central to the analysis is the idea of the ‘protestant interest’, linking confessional ideas and practical politics. It is appropriate to begin by explaining 2

INTRODUCTION

why the ‘protestant interest’ has been overlooked previously. Three contexts, all involving methodological and historiographical issues, are relevant. The first is the general position of the discipline of international relations and the study of diplomacy. The second considers the eighteenth century and the third looks specifically at the two monarchs central to the study – George I and II. The history of international relations has usually adopted a ‘realist’ view of politics.5 In contrast to ‘idealistic’ disciplines, like peace studies, historians and practitioners of diplomacy have concerned themselves with the realities and limits of power. Notions of an ‘ethical’ or ideologically motivated foreign policy have been treated with a healthy scepticism. The naked ambition of the ‘great powers’ dominates accounts of international relations. Even if it is allowed that historical actors believed what they said, it is more evident to the historian retrospectively than to the individual actor why they acted as they did. Behind such views lie two explanations of motivation. The first might be called, for simplicity’s sake, the ‘Machiavellian’ tradition. Here primacy is given to the supremacy and independence of politics. Often described as raison d’état, and classically expounded by Friedrich Meinecke, it will be necessary to investigate this further. The second strand of explanation is economic and mercantilist.6 International relations can be explained as the interaction of trade, competition and war. The explanatory force of trade will also be explored further below. Neither approach allows space for the causal power of religion. This study places more emphasis on how actors on the diplomatic stage explained and justified their actions to each other and less on imposing a theory of human motivation upon them. It is an attempt to reconstruct the political culture of diplomacy.7 Political culture, I argue, shaped political action. Ideas about, for example, the nature of catholic regimes coloured the ways in which Britain and Hanover responded to them. It has been especially difficult to take belief seriously in the eighteenth century. The century has been portrayed as one of ‘enlightenment’, when prejudice and superstition, particularly of a religious variety, disappeared in the glaring light of rationality. Analogously Ragnhild Hatton argued that the early eighteenth century was a non-ideological period of history when a practical approach to international relations, through the vehicle of collective

5 This is often linked to an emphasis on the ‘primacy of foreign policy’. The theoretical basis of the ‘primacy of foreign policy’ approach is cogently elucidated in Brendan Simms, The struggle for mastery in Germany (Basingstoke, 1998), pp. 1–7. 6 Cicero’s comment in the Orationes Philippicae that ‘the sinews of war are infinite money’, the first quotation on the frontispiece of John Brewer’s The sinews of power (London, 1989), deftly encapsulates this view. 7 Classically defined by Lynn Hunt (Politics, culture, and class in the French revolution (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London, 1984), p. 10) as ‘the values, expectations and implicit rules that expressed and shaped collective intentions and actions’.

3

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

security, first emerged.8 The willingness of monarchs, such as George I, to enter agreements based on equivalent exchange of territory is evidence of this practicality.9 The end of the Thirty Years War in 1648 is often portrayed as marking the birth of ‘modern’ international relations and the end of wars of religion. 10 Thus, in a recent account of Huguenot exiles’ propagandistic efforts during the War of the Spanish succession, the author argues that the Huguenots failed to realise how unimportant their concerns were.11 They had not appreciated that the legitimacy of confessional intervention in the newly rationalised and modernised system of state sovereignty had disappeared. Yet the book’s final sentence acknowledges that this ‘historical watershed was largely imperceptible’.12 Earlier generations of historians were also quick to condemn those poor unfortunates who failed to realise that Europe’s future lay in the sovereignty of the nation-state.13 More particularly, it is often argued that Britain was the first European state to develop such modern politics, ahead of its absolutist continental neighbours.14 Ironically, the whiggish emphasis on progress has distorted accounts of the period when the whig ascendancy was first established. There are particular problems in studying religious ideas in the reigns of George I and II. The Hanoverian monarchs have received an indifferent press amongst British historians, although this is slowly changing.15 Many have emphasised the personal morality and piety of George III. 16 George III’s 8

Ragnhild M. Hatton, War and peace, 1680–1720 (London, 1969), pp. 5–11 and pp. 18–23. 9 Hatton, George I (London, 1978), p. 81, 233, 303. See also Paul W. Schroeder, The transformation of European politics (Oxford, 1994), pp. 1–19. Hatton’s interest in collective security, in the light of her experiences of the turmoils of the twentieth century is highlighted in Andrew Lossky, ‘Ragnhild Marie Hatton: a personal appreciation’, in Robert Oresko, G.C. Gibbs, and H.M. Scott, eds, Royal and republican sovereignty in early modern Europe (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 642–3. 10 This is the view frequently found in textbooks. It finds support in Derek McKay and H.M. Scott, The rise of the great powers (London, 1983), p. 3. 11 Laurence Huey Boles jr, The Huguenots, the protestant interest, and the War of the Spanish succession, 1702–1714 (New York, 1997), p. 209. 12 Ibid., p. 256. 13 See, for example, C. Grant Robertson, England under the Hanoverians (London, 1911), pp. 1–14. 14 Thus Gottfried Niedhart, Handel und Krieg in der britischen Weltpolitik, 1738–1763 (Munich, 1979), p. 47. Whiggish histories, such as G.M. Trevelyan’s History of England (London, 1926), emphasised the superiority of English constitutional development. 15 See R. Hatton, ‘New light on George I of Great Britain’, in Stephen B. Baxter, ed., England’s rise to greatness, 1660–1763 (Berkeley, 1983), pp. 213–55 and J.B. Owen, ‘George II reconsidered’, in A. Whiteman, J.S. Bromley, and P.G.M. Dickson, eds, Statesmen, scholars, and merchants (Oxford, 1973), pp. 113–34. Jeremy Black, The Hanoverians (London, 2004) is a recent reassessment of the dynasty as a whole. 16 Robertson, England under the Hanoverians, p. 217 is typical. 4

INTRODUCTION

morality contrasts sharply with that of his grandfather and great-grandfather. While George III remained faithful to his wife, the gifts showered upon their mistresses by George I and II were notorious. Hence, it is often believed that neither George I nor George II was personally particularly religious.17 By limiting ‘religion’ to personal morality, it has been assumed that, even if a ‘religious foreign policy’ could exist, this period would not be the place to search for it. However, A.W. Ward, in his Ford Lectures,18 noted, very much in passing, that ‘as a rallying cry “the Protestant cause” had a considerable vitality left in it even after the Peace of Utrecht [1713]’. It was a type of ‘final appeal’ even for such cosmopolitan diplomats as Carteret.19 This book explains why the protestant interest was so important for both foreign and domestic audiences and explains its strength and longevity. The frequency with which references to religious matters appear in diplomatic dispatches is assumed to reflect contemporary interest and concern. However, it is important not to overemphasise the ‘sins of commission’ of other historians of the personal union and eighteenth-century diplomacy who had different concerns. Thus, before exploring the protestant interest further, it is necessary to consider the current state of the historiography of the personal union itself.

The personal union The history of the personal union has received relatively little attention in either British or German historiography. There is still no general survey of the importance of the Hanoverian connection.20 For many British historians, the future of these islands lay in the expanding colonies and the first British empire and not in commitments to a ‘small’ German electorate. 21 The existence of the personal union went largely unremarked in both groß or kleindeutsch accounts, with their emphasis on the importance of Austria and Prussia respectively for German historical development. Furthermore, for the

17

Although Black describes George I and George II (more accurately) as ‘strong Lutherans’ (Black, The Hanoverians, p. 52). 18 A.W. Ward, Great Britain and Hanover (Oxford, 1899). Although composed without consulting the Hanoverian archives, these lectures remain valuable. 19 Ibid., p. 42, fn. 3. 20 This gap should be partially filled by Brendan Simms and Torsten Riotte, eds, The Hanoverian Dimension in British History, 1714–1837 (Cambridge, forthcoming). Unless otherwise indicated, references to the ‘personal union’ should be taken to refer to the union between the British crowns and the Hanoverian electorate from 1714 to 1837. 21 Contrast Jeremy Black, Parliament and foreign policy in the eighteenth century (Cambridge, 2004), p. 86: ‘For George [II], Carteret and, to a far lesser extent, Newcastle, the Empire meant the Holy Roman Empire and the Imperial Election to its headship, but, in other circles, the empire was British and spanned the Atlantic, while imperial election was a providential call of Britain to greatness.’ 5

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

nationalist German historians of the nineteenth century, the domination of German territory by a ‘foreign’ royal house until 1837 was highly anachronistic. The decline of nationally orientated German history and the rise of regional studies – the Landesgeschichte approach – has also left little space for exploration of the links between Germany and other countries. Existing work has had to cope with two languages and disparate sources.22 The description of the union as ‘personal’ indicates its salient characteristics. There was no merging of governmental and political structures. 23 The king of England was simultaneously elector, and after 1815 king, of Hanover. The government of Hanover was regulated, in the ruler’s absence, by a Regierungsreglement.24 This Reglement remained essentially unchanged until the beginning of the nineteenth century. The king was able to use the Deutsche Kanzlei (German Chancery) in St James’s to deal with his German affairs. Work has been done on the ‘informal’ relationships between Britain and Hanover, such as the promotion of new agricultural ideas, the economic and trade relations and artistic connections, as embodied by Kapellmeister George Frederick Handel.25 Most work, however, has concentrated on diplomacy because of the important role still played by the monarch. Although royal freedom of action was partially constrained, most notably by the necessity of securing supply for the provision of troops in the House of Commons, foreign policy remained within the sovereign’s prerogatives.

22 Ward, Great Britain and Hanover, T.C.W. Blanning, ‘“That horrid electorate” or “ma patrie germanique”? George III, Hanover, and the Fürstenbund of 1785’, HJ, 20 (1977), pp. 311–44, Adolf M. Birke and Kurt Kluxen, eds, England und Hannover (Munich, 1986), Black, British foreign policy in the age of Walpole (Edinburgh, 1985), Heide N. Rohloff, ed., Großbritannien und Hannover: Die Zeit der Personalunion, 1714–1837 (Frankfurt am Main, 1989), Uriel Dann, Hanover and Great Britain, 1740–1760 (Leicester, 1991), Uta Richter-Uhlig, Hof und Politik unter den Bedingungen der Personalunion zwischen Hannover und England (Hanover, 1992). A renewed interest in the links between Britain and Hanover can be seen in the following examples of recently, or soon to be, published work: Torsten Riotte, Hannover in der britischen Politik (1792–1815): Dynastische Verbindung als Element außenpolitischer Entscheidungsfindung (Münster, 2004), Nicholas B. Harding, Europeanizing the Empire: Britain and Hanover, 1700–1837 (forthcoming) and Brendan Simms, At the heart of Europe: Britain–Hanover and the world, 1714–1783 (forthcoming). 23 See, however, the cautions against overemphasis on a purely personal union in Nicholas B. Harding, ‘North African piracy, the Hanoverian carrying trade, and the British state, 1728–1828’, HJ, 43 (2000), pp. 25–47. Harding’s preferred term is ‘composite state’. 24 For governmental structure, see Dann, Hanover and Great Britain, pp. 1–6. 25 See Ulrike Begemann, ‘Die wirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen der Personalunion für Hannover’, in Rohloff, ed., Großbritannien und Hannover, pp. 367–89, U. Gerold, ‘G.L.F. Laves: der “hannoversche Klassizismus” und seine Anregungen aus der englischen Repräsentations- und Industriearchitektur’, in ibid., pp. 553–70 and Ruth Smith, Handel’s oratorios and eighteenth-century thought (Cambridge, 1995).

6

INTRODUCTION

Diplomatic cost/benefit analyses of the personal union exhibit a distinct historiographical divergence along national lines. For Reinhard Oberschelp, 1714 marked the end of Hanoverian independence and, throughout the eighteenth century, British interests were placed above those of Hanover. The Prussian occupation of Hanover in 1803 was the logical outcome of previous neglect. The king/elector could pursue an ‘absolutist’ foreign policy, at odds with the interests of his subjects.26 Jeremy Black, on the other hand, is convinced that British ministers had to adapt British interests to suit the prejudices of their German sovereign. Tory propagandists’ complaints that British interests were being sacrificed to German projects were therefore justified.27 Brendan Simms suggests that Hanover was both an objective and subjective asset to Britain in the eighteenth century, but his is very much a lone voice.28 The close links between debate about Hanover in eighteenthcentury Britain and partisan politics are often overlooked. Attitudes towards European protestantism also differed within tory and whig argument. Debate has also focused on questions of identity. While George III is usually regarded as being ‘British’ or ‘English’, his two immediate predecessors are usually viewed as ‘German’.29 Far more space is devoted to the reign of the ‘more’ British king in older accounts of the period.30 Given that George III never visited his electorate (again, in contrast to his predecessors, who were frequent visitors to their German lands), it is easy to see how this impression might have arisen. Yet its validity can be questioned. George III’s desire to educate his sons in Göttingen suggests an interest in his German roots. Furthermore, Tim Blanning has demonstrated that George III was deeply interested in the fate of Hanover.31 However, the neglect of George I and II in favour of their more British descendant is also related to the balance of surviving evidence. While George III’s correspondence runs to several volumes in the printed edition, only a handful of letters survive from his predecessors.32 Recent work indicates that national identity was complex in eighteenth-

26

Reinhard Oberschelp, Politische Geschichte Niedersachsens, 1714–1803 (Hildesheim, 1983), pp. 1–7, 123–30. 27 Black, British foreign policy in the age of Walpole, p. 29. 28 Brendan Simms, ‘Hanover in British policy, 1714–1783: interests and aims of the protagonists’, in Rex Rexheuser, ed., Die Personalunionen von Sachsen-Polen und HannoverEngland: ein Vergleich (Wiesbaden, 2005), pp. 311–34. 29 Robertson, England under the Hanoverians, p. 217, and, more recently, Linda Colley, Britons (New Haven and London, 1992), p. 229. 30 W.E.H. Lecky, History of England in the eighteenth century (New edn, 5 vols, London, 1901), Robertson, England under the Hanoverians or J.H. Plumb, The first four Georges (Harmondsworth, 1956). 31 Blanning, ‘That horrid electorate’, passim. 32 See Ragnhild M. Hatton, ‘In search of an elusive ruler: source material for a biography of George I as elector and king’, in F. Engel-Janosi, G. Klingenstein, and H. Lutz, eds, Fürst, Bürger, Mensch (Vienna, 1975), pp. 11–41. 7

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

century Britain.33 This area is explored at greater length in subsequent chapters but the debate has rendered the binary opposition of the early Hanoverians as ‘German’ and the later as ‘British’ as problematic. It was particularly important for whig historians to emphasise the indifference of George I and II to British politics and concerns. Without this, it becomes far more difficult to tell a tale of monarchical neglect leading to the growth of cabinet government and ministerial responsibility. In this story, Sir Robert Walpole, our ‘first prime minister’, has a particularly heroic role. Whig historians believed that in the field of foreign affairs, Walpole was the pacific foil to the continentalist ambitions of his German masters.34 Walpole’s pacific convictions were not as important in the 1730s as was once thought.35 Amongst the Walpole papers is the draft, dated c.1734–5, entitled ‘The interest of Great Britain’s going to war at the present time considered’. In it, the anonymous author pointed to the frail nature of the balance of power and how the death of one prince could upset it. He argued that the only reason for Britain entering an alliance was ‘for the Defence and Protection of some of the Protestant States, that is, for the mutual Defence and Support of the Protestant Cause’. Hence, the conflict between the Habsburgs and the French over the Polish succession was to be welcomed, as it prevented the catholic powers uniting against the protestants. Neutrality made strategic sense.36 Preserving the protestant interest was clearly important. Prior to considering this concept in greater detail, it is necessary to return briefly to trade. For D.B. Horn, trade was the predominant force behind eighteenth-century British foreign policy, related to the drive for markets and empire. However, Horn acknowledged that some sense of a British duty ‘to defend the Protestant interest in Europe’ also survived.37 Horn is far from unique in identifying the growth of the first British empire as the most salient factor in eighteenthcentury British diplomacy, although his field of vision was broader than many.38 A crude economic determinism is evident even in non-Marxisant accounts.

33 Contrast Colley, Britons with the responses in Tony Claydon and Ian McBride, eds, Protestantism and national identity (Cambridge, 1998) and J.C.D. Clark, ‘Protestantism, nationalism, and national identity, 1660–1832’, HJ, 43 (2000), pp. 249–76. See also now Krishan Kumar, The making of English identity (Cambridge, 2003), ch. 6. 34 Lecky, History of England, i, p. 405. Trevelyan, History of England, p. 535 has a similar emphasis. 35 For a critique of Walpole’s centrality to British neutrality in the War of the Polish succession, see ch. 6. 36 Cambridge, Cambridge University Library (hereafter CUL), Cholmondley Houghton Manuscripts (hereafter Ch (H)), 73/30. 37 D.B. Horn, The British diplomatic service, 1689–1789 (Oxford, 1961), p. 14. For a more recent discussion of the British diplomatic service, see Jeremy Black, British diplomats and diplomacy, 1688–1800 (Exeter, 2001). 38 Robertson, England under the Hanoverians, p. 2 and Geoffrey Holmes and Daniel Szechi, The age of oligarchy (London, 1993), p. 63.

8

INTRODUCTION

It might seem that a foreign policy orientated towards imperial goals must necessarily ignore Europe. The ‘imperialist’ or ‘continentalist’ options are often portrayed as mutually exclusive.39 Just as Britain’s political destiny could only be fulfilled by turning away from the ‘crazy’ continental fantasies of ‘foreign’ monarchs, so economic wealth lay in a transoceanic empire, not Europe. Euroscepticism is not new. It was characteristic of eighteenth-century advocates of a ‘blue water’ foreign policy. Protests from the South Sea Company or individual mariners about supposed infringements of their rights, be it in the West Indies or the Baltic, surface in British archives. Instructions from the secretaries of state to diplomats frequently urged them to pursue these matters and seek recompense for the sailors. Yet, it remains unclear how far ‘trade’ was the telos of British policy. In a famous defence of ministerial policy published in 1727, Benjamin Hoadly argued trade was not an end in itself but the means by which Britain had the resources to defend the balance of power. The prosperity provided by trade enabled Britain to preserve protestantism.40 Not all eighteenth-century policy-makers thought in such terms. There were particular reasons why Hoadly used such language in 1727, as chapter four shows. However, it is necessary to offer a ‘joined-up’ analysis of what drove diplomacy. Contemporary whigs frequently referred to the need to defend ‘liberty, property and religion’. Histories of whiggery concentrate almost exclusively on the first two elements of this trinity.41 The history of the defence of the protestant interest indicates the shortcomings of such accounts.

The protestant interest Despite references to the ‘protestant interest’ mentioned already, some historians insinuate the protestant interest was mere rhetoric. One argument often used to dismiss a ‘protestant foreign policy’ highlights the fact that, at various points in the eighteenth century, Britain was in alliance with catholic powers.42 Jeremy Black extends this argument when he claims that there was no ‘natural’ reason why the Anglo-French alliance of 1716 to 1731 should not have continued.43 As Black assumes that all historical relations are contingent,

39 Such as in the suggestively titled Jeremy Black, America or Europe? British foreign policy, 1739–63 (London, 1998). Wolfgang Michael thought there was an inherent tension between British global ambitions and Hanover’s essentially local interests. See Michael, Englische Geschichte im achtzehnten Jahrhundert (5 vols, Hamburg and Leipzig, 1896–1955), i, p. 709 or idem, England under George I (2 vols, London, 1936–9), i, p. 284. 40 Benjamin Hoadly, An enquiry into the reasons of the conduct of Great Britain, with relation to the present state of Affairs in Europe (London, 1727), pp. 78–80. 41 See (the suggestively titled) H.T. Dickinson, Liberty and property (London, 1977). 42 Clark, ‘Protestantism, nationalism, and national identity’, p. 261. 43 Jeremy Black, Natural and necessary enemies: Anglo-French relations in the eighteenth century

9

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

there are no good grounds for arguing that Anglo-French animosity was ‘unnatural’. Indeed, the argument could be inverted. It was the minority caused by Louis XV’s accession at the age of 5 in 1715 which led to a contingent alliance between the two powers. Dynastic marriages were frequently used to cement diplomatic alliances in this period. In 1725 the French proposed a marriage between Louis XV and one of the daughters of the prince of Wales (the future George II). George I was unenthusiastic, as Newcastle reported to Horace Walpole, a British diplomat in Paris. The king ‘who upon all occasions prefers the Religion and Interests of his people to all other Considerations’ had told Broglie, the French ambassador, that ‘the Objection of Religion was such, that he could by no means entertain any Thought’ of agreeing to the marriage.44 The event made a considerable impression on Newcastle. A week later he noted ‘it is wonderful, that any person who knows the King’s Goodness for his people and zeal for the Protestant Religion and Interest, should ever have imagined it possible for His Majesty to have been in any other way of thinking’.45 The proposal attracted considerable comment in European courts. The Prussians had heard rumours that an engagement announcement was imminent. In response to an enquiry by Du Bourgay, the British extraordinary envoy in Berlin, as to whether there was any truth in the rumours, Townshend responded that George was surprised that anyone could believe that he would ‘sacrifice his Religion for any worldly Interest or procure the advancement of his family at the expense of his conscience’.46 Did alliances with non-protestant powers reflect indifference to confessional matters or were they temporary expedients to secure desired aims? Stating that a balance of power was the aim of British policy is insufficient. It is necessary to ask what the European balance of power looked like in practice and how it was thought to function. It is consequently impossible to divorce a narrow study of the mechanics of diplomacy from a broader consideration of Britain’s relationship to Europe and attitudes towards national and confessional identity. The ‘protestant interest’ was naturally opposed to the ‘popish interest’. The use of language is important because, as Reed Browning points out, it was possible for Newcastle to believe in the 1750s that Austria had done more to protect the protestant succession than Prussia.47 At one level, this might indicate indifference to the issue of whether a power was protestant or not.

(Athens, GA, 1986). But contrast H.M. Scott, ‘The second “Hundred Years War”, 1689–1815’, HJ, 35 (1992), pp. 446–7. 44 Newcastle to H. Walpole, Whitehall, 1/3/1725, British Library (hereafter BL), Additional Manuscripts (hereafter Add. MSS) 32742, fol. 308r. 45 Newcastle to H. Walpole, Whitehall, 11/3/1725, ibid., fol. 429r. 46 Townshend to Du Bourgay, 30/3/1725, Whitehall, PRO, SP 90/18. 47 Reed Browning, The duke of Newcastle (New Haven and London, 1975), p. 161. For how Newcastle came to this view, see ch. 7. 10

INTRODUCTION

However, exploring how Newcastle might have understood ‘protestant’ and ‘popish’ powers suggests a different conclusion. ‘Popish’ powers were not necessarily catholic. Indeed, Steve Pincus has shown how flexibly this language could be applied in his study of Anglo-Dutch relations in the mid-seventeenth century. He draws attention to how the Orangist Dutch were described as ‘popish’ by their Cromwellian opponents because of their desire to restore the Stuarts to the British thrones.48 Pincus concludes that by the Restoration, the idea of an international protestant community had been subsumed within the national interest (which seems to mean a national identity).49 Pincus shows that ‘popish’ states had come to embody a certain set of political characteristics, such as their unwillingness to countenance freedom of conscience and arbitrary forms of government. That said, in practice most powers viewed by the British as ‘popish’ were ruled by catholics. Pincus correctly identifies a tension between ‘national’ and ‘international’ versions of protestantism. Too little attention has been paid to issues of diversity.50 If it is acknowledged that both protestantism and popery were diverse, some have assumed that the antithesis between the two is an unhelpful analytical tool.51 This is, however, to throw the baby out with the bath water. The frequency with which the language of protestant interest was invoked indicates that explanation is still necessary. Claiming that such language is ‘meaningless’ avoids the issue. Debate about the ‘foreignness’ of the Hanoverians indicates how pertinent the issue of international protestant solidarity was. In 1721 Charles Owen, a dissenting minister, claimed that all monarchs were ‘foreign’. Yet English liberties had been secured by foreign and protestant monarchs such as William III and George I and not by the Stuarts.52 The basic antipathy of protestant and popish interest still permitted diversity. The two views were at either end of a spectrum of opinion; they were not binary opposites. There were two main versions of the protestant interest. For members of the established church, the protestant interest was virtually synonymous with Anglicanism. Anglicans still sometimes regarded dissenters as crypto-catholics. For dissenters, the protestant interest entailed protestant unity and broadly whig principles. Some low churchmen held similar views. The state of Irish protestantism ensured that there was a ‘domestic’ as well

48 Steven C.A. Pincus, Protestantism and patriotism: ideologies of the making of English foreign policy, 1650–1668 (Cambridge, 1996), p. 100. 49 Ibid., p. 447. 50 Clark, ‘Protestantism, nationalism, and national identity’, p. 262 reproves Colley on these grounds. 51 See Jeremy Black, ‘Confessional state or elect nation? Religion and identity in eighteenth-century England’, in Claydon and McBride, eds, Protestantism and national identity, pp. 62–4. 52 Charles Owen, The Danger of the Church and Kingdom from Foreigners consider’d; in several articles of the highest importance (London, 1721).

11

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

as a ‘foreign’ dimension to the discussion. Dissenters and whigs were more favourably predisposed towards European protestants. Yet even high churchmen were willing to contemplate closer ties with European protestants, provided an acceptable minimum of Anglican standards was adopted. 53 Attitudes changed over time. A sense of protestant solidarity was more common in the period of the wars against Louis XIV. By the 1740s a strong strand of English exceptionalism and superiority had appeared – the modern English, like the ancient Hebrews, enjoyed a special relationship with the Almighty. What did monarchs themselves, crucial to putting ideas of protestant interest into practice, think about such ideas? Were either George I or George II ‘confessional’ monarchs? Confession was crucially important for British monarchs.54 The Act of Settlement (1701) had made it a legal requirement that the monarch must be protestant and married to a protestant. Catholics were excluded from the succession. Whig historians emphasised how the act indicated the power of parliament. The Lords and Commons of England had determined the succession, rather than God through Stuart divine right.55 Yet the act was also the third occasion when the English political nation had placed religion over country of birth when it came to choosing monarchs, following 1603 and 1688. The act provided that the monarch should be a communicant member of the Church of England and George I’s Lutheranism sparked some public discussion in 1714.56 While George’s religious credentials were contested in various ways, many sought his support as a defender of the protestant faith. George used the title ‘defender of the faith’.57 German officials added ‘Schützer des Glaubens’ to his other titles in correspondence. In 1714 George’s Hanoverian advisers were convinced that the accession to the British crown would enable George to

53

See R. Barry Leavis, ‘The failure of the Anglo-Prussian ecumenical effort of 1710–1714’, Church History, 47 (1978), pp. 381–99. High churchmen viewed acceptance of the Book of Common Prayer as the basis for unity. 54 See also Hannah E. Smith, ‘The idea of a protestant monarchy in Britain, 1714–1760’, Past and Present, 185 (2004), pp. 91–118. 55 Trevelyan associated the act with modern ideas: History of England, p. 502. 56 See Thomas Brett, A review of Lutheran Principles (London, 1714), A Letter to the author of the History of the Lutheran Church, from a Country School-Boy (n.p., n.d. [1714]), The Lutheran Liturgy: now us’d by the Protestants in the Reformed Churches of Germany, prov’d to agree with the Rites and Ceremonies in the several Offices of the Book of Common Prayer (2nd edn, London, 1715), Two Letters to the Right Honourable the Lord Viscount Townshend: shewing the seditious Tendency of several late pamphlets; more particularly of, A Review of the Lutheran Principles, by Thomas Brett; and of, A Letter to the Author of the Lutheran Church, from a Country School-Boy. By a Presbyter of the Church of England (London, 1714). The publication of Balthasar Mentzer’s A vindication of the Lutheran Religion, from the charge of popery (London, 1720) suggests debate continued beyond 1714. Mentzer was a Hanoverian cleric. 57 The title was originally granted by the pope to Henry VIII in 1521 for his attack on Lutheran heresy. The faith to be defended was no longer catholicism but protestantism. 12

INTRODUCTION

balance the European state system and protect the protestant religion. 58 Increased gloire brought with it a commensurate increase in responsibility. Hanoverian archives contain many requests from persecuted protestants, addressed to George as ‘defender of the faith’.59 The title was used by British supporters of George’s confessional role too. An edition of the Heidelberg Catechism published in 1720 was dedicated to the king. Protestants could rely upon George as their defender. George was protestantism’s ‘strongest Bulwark’. He was willing to protect those whose only link to him was ‘the Advantage of professing the same Religion’ as him.60 Although not their only persona, ‘protestant hero’ was a role that both George I and II could play on occasion, building on the illustrious example of William III.61

Describing ‘interest’ How far was the language of a religious interest appropriate for describing the conduct of states? The strongest objections to mixing religion and politics are found in the doctrine of ‘reason of state’.62 Friedrich Meinecke’s Die Idee der Staatsräson is one of the most influential works to use ‘reason of state’ as an explanation of historical development. Meinecke argued that ‘raison d’état is the fixed principle of national conduct, the state’s first law of motion’.63 He argued that the workings of the state system made it impossible for the state to act ethically.64 Meinecke wrote in the 1920s, in the aftermath of German

58 See Hermann Wellenreuther, ‘Von der Interressenharmonie zur Dissoziation: Kurhannover und England in der Zeit der Personalunion’, Niedersächsiches Jahrbuch für Landesgeschichte, 67 (1995), pp. 27–8. Wellenreuther quotes a memo from the privy council dated 5/6/1714. The document is reproduced in full in Georg Schnath, Geschichte Hannovers im Zeitalter der neunten Kur und der englischen Sukzession, 1674–1714 (4 vols, Hildesheim, 1938–82), iv, pp. 743–7 [relevant text, pp. 745–6]. 59 One instance of this can be seen in Bothmer to George I, London, 14/3/1712, Hanover, Hauptstaatsarchiv, Calenberg Brief 24, 1696, 259r which describes a plea from de la Mothe, a Huguenot minister, for support at the Utrecht negotiations. 60 The Heidelberg Catechism: containing the Principles of the Christian Religion, for which the Protestants in the Palatinate have long been persecuted by the Jesuits (London, 1720), pp. iii–v. The context for the publication of the catechism is discussed more fully in ch. 3. 61 Monarchical representation is considered in more detail in Hannah E. Smith, ‘Georgian Monarchical Culture in England, 1714–60’ (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Cambridge, 2001), published as Hannah E. Smith, Georgian monarchy: politics and culture in Britain, 1714–1760 (Cambridge, 2006). 62 For an introduction to ‘reason of state’ see Peter Burke, ‘Tacitism, scepticism, and reason of state’, in J.H. Burns and Mark Goldie, eds, The Cambridge history of political thought, 1450–1700 (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 479–98. 63 Friedrich Meinecke, Machiavellism: the doctrine of raison d’état and its place in modern history (trans. D. Scott, London, 1957), p. 1. 64 Ibid., p. 15.

13

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

military defeat. He believed in the historian’s ability to discover timeless patterns of development. For Meinecke the doctrine of historicism and the practice of reason of state represented the triumph of the realistic view of history over natural-law based versions of the ideal state.65 This dichotomy reflects that adopted by other German intellectuals in prioritising (German) Kultur over (French) Zivilisation. Culture and history offered deeper truth than natural law and civilisation which were both superficial and artificial. Meinecke’s story is the evolution of how he thought the modern state ought to act.66 Meinecke traced the development of reason of state from Machiavelli to balance of power theorists in the early enlightenment. The balance of power was shorthand for state interest.67 Ideas of reason of state were widespread by the late seventeenth century. Yet ‘the cloak of religion still continued to be an effective means to be used in statecraft’.68 However, slowly through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the cloak of religion disappeared and ultimately historicism, with its realistic conceptions of state, triumphed.69 For all its insight and erudition Meinecke’s book relies on the widely held assumption that the rise of the nation-state was both desirable and inevitable. The minor figures in Meinecke’s story are forced to adopt this view. Meinecke used the Mecure historique et politique, founded by Huguenot exiles in 1686, as a prime example of the proper representation of state interest in the early eighteenth century. He claimed one of its authors, Rousset de Missy, was particularly important in transmitting such doctrines. 70 Meinecke was not interested in explaining how Huguenot exiles made sense of their own world. The next chapter shows what the language of the balance of power and protestant interest meant to figures like de Missy and his close friend Abel Boyer. Their own views of the world tell a different story from Meinecke’s. The language of interest was ubiquitous but Meinecke’s model does not describe adequately how it related to the language of politics and the state. Indeed it is necessary to unravel and interpret long- and short-term concerns in international relations before an adequate assessment of its importance can be reached. The very usage, the protestant interest, suggests that an exhaustive account of the ways in which interest was deployed cannot be given solely by reference to national and economic paradigms. Describing the protestant interest as a ‘cloak’, to return to Meinecke’s phrase, for other interests may be one strategy to neutralise its importance. Yet why was one form of rhetoric, 65

Ibid., p. 19. There is a consideration of the impact of Meinecke’s work in Michael Stolleis, ‘Friedrich Meinecke’s “Die Idee der Staatsräson” und die neuere Forschung’, in idem, Staat und Staatsräson in der frühen Neuzeit (Frankfurt/Main, 1990), pp. 134–64. 67 Meinecke, Machiavellism, p. 85. 68 Ibid., p. 248. 69 Ibid., pp. 348–61. 70 Ibid., pp. 248–58. 66

14

INTRODUCTION

as opposed to any other, adopted? It is irrelevant how popish (theologically or politically) a power like France ‘really’ was. The British and Hanoverian perception that France was a threat to protestantism is telling. Rhetoric can reveal what people were prepared to believe. From a high political standpoint, presentation might seem irrelevant. Policies, particularly foreign policy, did not need to be legitimated in a hermetically sealed world. However, any policy requiring military action necessitated parliamentary approval to release funds. An Irish incident from 1719 illustrates why presentation mattered. During the summer of 1719 George I visited Hanover. In common with all monarchical visits to the electorate, a regency council was created. One of the secretaries of state remained in London, while the other travelled with the king. Visits to Hanover had to wait for the end of the parliamentary session. The restriction was practical.71 It was easier not to have to deal with parliamentary business from a distance. However, the Irish parliament in Dublin still met in the summer when the king was most often away. In 1719 the Irish parliament passed a bill to defend the protestant interest, including, amongst other draconian measures, the introduction of castration as the penalty for any priest caught within Ireland. George was annoyed by the bill. Hatton believed George’s tolerant nature and desire not to give offence explained his reaction.72 This accorded with her general view of George as a humanitarian, early-enlightened monarch.73 James Stanhope, the secretary of state, explained George’s conduct differently. He admitted George regarded the punishment as ‘ridiculous’ but, more importantly, it was ill-timed because ‘it would be a Handle to the Elector Palatine to continue his persecution of the Protestants in his Dominions against which proceedings His Majesty, together with several Protestant Powers, are now representing’. Any amended version of the bill must remove the castration clause.74 The clause was not removed because of George’s affection for catholic clergy. Rather, he was concerned not to damage his diplomacy. George had sent James Haldane from Hessen-Kassel to the Palatine court at Mannheim. 75 The treatment of catholics in Britain affected diplomacy. Indeed some advocated support for catholics at home, in order not to disoblige catholic allies abroad. 76 Confessional issues were too important to ignore. The manifold ways in which

71

The provisions of the Act of Settlement requiring parliamentary approval for royal travels abroad had been removed in 1716. 72 Hatton, ‘New light on George I’, p. 236. 73 See Hatton, George I, p. 290. The example of the castration clause is used to support the view of George as a rational individual. 74 Stanhope to Delafaye, Göhr[d]e, 28/9/1719, PRO, SP 43/2. 75 For the negotiations themselves, see ch. 3. 76 This is apparent from reports on the Papist Bill (1723) in Edward Knatchbull’s diary. See A.N. Newman, ed., The parliamentary diary of Sir Edward Knatchbull, 1722–1730 (London, 1963), p. 22 (3/5/1723). 15

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

foreign policy was justified because it supported the protestant interest are investigated in this book. The monarchy was frequently praised for its support for the protestant interest. In 1736 Frederick, prince of Wales, married Augusta, a princess of Saxony-Gotha. One sermon in celebration of the match drew attention to the early support of the princess’s ancestor, the elector of Saxony, for the protestant cause.77 This was particularly pertinent, as the Saxon electoral house had reconverted to catholicism in 1697 to gain the Polish crown. The marriage was ‘a good Presage of great Security to the Protestant Interest at Home and Abroad’.78 Parliamentary addresses to the throne, in response to the king’s speech at the opening of the session, usually included similar sentiments about the security provided by the crown to the protestant interest, both at home and abroad.79 Defence of the protestant interest also features prominently in the loyal addresses presented on George II’s accession.80

The protestant interest and international relations How can the importance of the protestant interest for international relations be measured? Contemporaries were keenly concerned to describe conflict in confessional terms. Yet historians have been more reluctant to do so. It is important to separate discussion of the protestant interest and diplomacy from debate about the validity of ‘wars of religion’ as a historical category. It has been a shibboleth, amongst certain diplomatic historians, that sixteenthand seventeenth-century wars of religion were really thinly disguised struggles over dynastic interest and power. There is an element of truth to these claims. Conflicts are about power. Yet since the nature of power changed, it is important to adopt more sophisticated explanations to understand what was happening. The choice of ‘either/or’ is less convincing than ‘both/and’ as a means of describing human complexity.81 Arguing that the protestant interest was important for diplomacy does not mean that power considerations were not. Equally, saying that strategic considerations were involved in a decision does not automatically mean that the protestant interest was not. Simon Adams has suggested that the previous consensus within the English political nation about the need to defend protestants abroad had broken down

77 Benjamin A. Atkinson, Good Princes nursing Fathers and nursing Mothers to the Church. A Sermon on the marriage of his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales (London, 1736), p. iv. 78 Ibid., p. 7. 79 See, inter alia, Journals of the House of Commons, xxi, p. 6 (28/6/1727), xxii, p. 209 (18/1/1734). 80 See PSGB, xxxiv, Jul. 1727, pp. 24–51, Aug. 1727, p. 165, Sept. 1727, pp. 262–4, Nov. 1727, p. 456. 81 This insight draws on Jonathan Bate’s characterisation of William Empson’s critical methods. See Bate, The genius of Shakespeare (London, 1997), pp. 311–16.

16

INTRODUCTION

by 1640.82 Yet Adams also remarks that discussion of foreign policy was discouraged not so much for constitutional as political reasons. The king feared being forced to change policy by popular pressure.83 The history of foreign policy must go beyond the corridors of Whitehall and the closets of St James’s. Indeed Adams concludes that, while Stuart monarchs wanted to ally with Spain, many of their subjects ‘preferred the company of the godly to the adherents of antichrist’.84 Popular feeling was seemingly still very much on the side of the protestant interest. In the eighteenth century, when protestant kings and ministries ruled a predominantly protestant people, the protestant interest was no longer a source of division between monarch and people. Steve Pincus is right to point to the end of biblical and apocalyptic language in the field of foreign policy after 1660 (at least in the official documents).85 Yet what followed was not a straightforward transformation into the language of the national interest. The language of the protestant interest emerged as important in its own right. If early eighteenth-century Britons were too polite and civilised for the pursuit of religious crusades,86 they were not completely deaf to the pleas of their co-religionists. Numerous petitions survive in public and private collections, such as the Walpole papers.87 Black claims that petitions were both declining numerically and rarely resulted in action, although this impression is difficult to prove.88 D.B. Horn is nearer the mark in observing that religious differences were ‘one of the commonest causes of diplomatic incidents in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries’.89 Judgements as to whether petitions were declining, stable, or increasing can only be impressionistic. However, the inability to quantify is not disastrous. Consideration of particular events where the protestant interest was defended is one aspect of my argument, but there is also a broader thesis about the language and presentation of diplomacy. The study of diplomatic personnel illustrates the broader argument well. Charles Whitworth had been posted to Regensburg (and thus encountered the religious politics of the Reich) and Holland, prior to his sojourn in Berlin.

82 Simon Adams, ‘Spain or the Netherlands? The dilemmas of early Stuart foreign policy’, in Howard Tomlinson, ed., Before the English civil war (London, 1983), p. 80. 83 Ibid., p. 82. 84 Ibid., p. 101. 85 Pincus, Protestantism and patriotism, p. 447. 86 The view of eighteenth-century Britons as ‘polite and commercial’ has become paradigmatic. It is reflected, not always uncritically, in the interpretations offered in Paul Langford, A polite and commercial people (Oxford, 1989) and Neil McKendrick, John Brewer, and J.H. Plumb, The birth of a consumer society: the commercialisation of eighteenth-century Britain (London, 1983). 87 CUL, Ch (H) 78/39 is a good representative of the genre. It details the problems of the protestants of Samogitia in Poland. 88 Black, British foreign policy in the age of Walpole, pp. 118–20. 89 Horn, British diplomatic service, p. 216.

17

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

Such a career lent itself to developing some interest in religious politics, if only because of the disputes Whitworth encountered. Newcastle’s biographer described him as ‘a good churchman’.90 Some of Newcastle’s attitudes, discussed in subsequent chapters, suggest that even his foreign policy was affected by his religious beliefs. How do individuals interpret experience? As Hamish Scott shows, many eighteenth-century diplomats continued to view the world through the lens of the age of Louis XIV. They sought to revive the Grand Alliance and were unable to see the changes that had taken place in the international system.91 Scott points to the issue of generational experience. Newcastle himself (1693), Hardwicke (1690), George II (1683), and Pelham (1696) were all born and grew up in the period of the great conflicts against France. The twenty-five years of warfare after 1688 were crucial formative experiences.92 Thus it should come as little surprise that the fear of French absolutist (and by extension popish) ambition was so strong amongst the generation in charge of British policy from the 1720s to the 1750s. Changes in the international system were unclear to those living through the transition. Hence frames of reference may have been ‘outdated’ but it is far easier to explain motivations in relation to past experience than to an uncertain future. It was therefore possible for eighteenth-century statesmen to sympathise with Christian Gottfried Hoffmann’s claim that the papacy was to blame for most international problems.93 The protestant interest was both an aim or ideal to be defended and a means of explaining European politics and making sense of the world.

The Holy Roman Empire The geographical focus for this study is central Europe in general, and the Holy Roman Empire in particular. The reasons for this are readily apparent. First, Hanover was an important state within the Reich. Hanover had achieved electoral status in 1692. After 1714, the British monarch was simultaneously an elector of the Holy Roman Empire. Secondly, the Peace of Westphalia (1648), which brought the Thirty Years War to an end, had made catholicism, Lutheranism and Calvinism official confessions within the Empire. The existence of multiple confessions continued to be a source of political and legal argument after 1648 and consequently the politics of the Reich were important for those concerned about the fate of the protestant interest. Therefore a brief 90

Browning, Newcastle, p. 79. H.M. Scott, ‘“The True Principles of the Revolution”: the duke of Newcastle and the idea of the Old System’, in Jeremy Black, ed., Knights errant and true Englishmen (Edinburgh, 1989), pp. 55–91. 92 Ibid., p. 62. 93 Christian Gottfried Hoffmann, Entwurff einer Einleitung zu dem Erkäntnis des gegenwärtigen Zustandes von Europa (Leipzig, 1720), p. 9. 91

18

INTRODUCTION

survey of the structure and constitution of the Empire is necessary to provide the context for the subsequent analysis. The Holy Roman Empire consisted of a group of territories, partly consistent with modern Germany, under the overlordship of the Holy Roman Emperor. The Imperial title was not hereditary. The Empire’s electors elected the Emperor. Yet since the high medieval period the electors had chosen a Habsburg. All the electors held Imperial offices. The archbishop of Mainz was chancellor of the Empire. It was his deputy, the Imperial vice-chancellor, who represented the interests of the Empire at court in Vienna. He was also head of the Imperial chancery there (the Reichskanzlei). There were two Imperial courts, the Reichshofrat in Vienna and the Reichskammergericht in Wetzlar. Apart from the courts and the chancery, the only other permanent Imperial institution was the Reichstag.94 It had originally been summoned only at the Emperor’s pleasure but it had been in session in Regensburg since 1663. The representatives of the Empire’s various territories met to discuss war, peace and taxation. The Reichstag was divided into three colleges, those of the electors, princes and towns. These met roughly twice weekly when the Reichstag was in session. The formal representative of the Emperor was the Prinzipalkommissar, although most of the work was done by his deputy, the Konkommissar. The Konkommissar ran the chancery at Regensburg and was responsible for ensuring that proposals for debate were dictated correctly to the delegation secretaries. Two sorts of proposals could be introduced by the Emperor – Kommissionsdekrete from the Prinzipalkommissar and Hofdekrete from the Imperial Chancellor. Once a proposal had been made, the directors of the colleges introduced a draft response. The directorship of the electoral college was in the hands of the representative of the elector of Mainz and the directorship of the princely college alternated between the representatives of Austria and Salzburg. Representatives sought instructions on how to respond to proposals from their respective courts. Once these had been received (usually about six weeks was allowed for this), a formal vote was taken, and the responses were recorded in the colleges’ minute books. It was possible to prevaricate by entering a vote of ‘sub spe radii’ (still requiring instructions). If there was no clear decision, a compromise was sought via negotiation. A simple majority sufficed, except in religious matters. In religious disputes, the treaties of 1648 had provided for direct negotiation between the two confessional groups, which were to be treated as equals, even if this was not numerically so. The ius eundi in partes was the procedure invoked 94 See Anton Schindling, ‘The development of the Eternal Diet in Regensburg’, Supplement to Journal of Modern History, 58 (1986), pp. 64–75 and Johannes Burkhardt, ‘Verfassungsprofil und Leistungsbilanz des immerwährenden Reichstags: zur Evaluierung einer frühmodernen Institution’, in Heinz Duchhardt and Matthias Schnettger, eds, Reichständische Libertät und Habsburgisches Kaisertum (Mainz, 1999), pp. 151–83. The Empire was also divided into Kreise (circles), which were responsible for various (mainly military) matters. The Kreise had directors but only met infrequently.

19

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

when either Corpus, as the two confessional groups were known, felt that an issue demanded direct negotiation. Needless to say, the definition of what constituted a ‘religious’ matter was subject to dispute – protestant diplomats tried to portray any dispute as confessional to improve their negotiating position.95 The eighteenth-century Empire was written off by previous generations of historians.96 Typically, nineteenth-century nationalist historians regarded the Reichstag as little more than a talking-shop. The important decisions were not taken there but at the princely courts. Although representatives received instructions on key issues, the Reichstag still provided a forum for debate. It was also a centre for the publication of propaganda. The late twentieth-century crisis of the nation-state has meant other forms of political community have attracted increased scholarly attention. Maiken Umbach has argued forcefully that the study of the Holy Roman Empire in the eighteenth century offers the chance to discover ‘progressive’ and enlightened elements in German political culture.97 Whether the Empire provides a more appropriate model for contemporary society than the nation-state is unclear, but the eighteenth-century Empire is underresearched. Several studies by students of the late Max Braubach used the Cologne archives.98 The Hauptstaatsarchiv in Hanover has been used much less.99 As well as preserving almost all the original copies of the reports of the representatives at Regensburg, there are also copies of the reports sent to the Deutsche Kanzlei in London.

Britain, Hanover and the Empire Two views, widespread in the current historiography on Anglo-Hanoverian attitudes to the Empire, need to be addressed. The first is that the material to write a history of Hanoverian foreign policy in the period simply does not

95

Karl Härter, Reichstag und Revolution, 1789–1806 (Göttingen, 1992), pp. 52–65 provides an exceptionally cogent summary of a set of complex processes. 96 Abigail Green, ‘The federal alternative? A new view of modern German history’, HJ, 46 (2003), p. 190. Härter and Wolfgang Burgdorf, Reichskonstitution und Nation (Mainz, 1998) exemplify the recent more positive assessment of the Empire. 97 Maiken Umbach, Federalism and enlightenment in Germany, 1740–1806 (London, 2000), pp. 4–5. See, more generally, Maiken Umbach, ed., German federalism: past, present and future (Basingstoke, 2002). 98 Theo König, Hannover und das Reich 1740–1745 (Düsseldorf, 1938), Friedrich Meisenburg, Der deutsche Reichstag während des Österreichischen Erbfolgekrieges (1740–1748) (Dillingen a. Donau, 1931), Theo Rohr, Der deutsche Reichstag vom Hubertusburger Frieden bis zum Bayerischen Erbfolgekrieg (1763–1778) (Inaugural Dissertation, Bonn, 1968). 99 Although Härter, Reichstag und Revolution, pp. 27–8 draws attention to the richness of its holdings. 20

INTRODUCTION

exist.100 While the main run of Hanover foreign policy files was destroyed in a bombing raid (1943) and subsequent flood (1946), many of the files relating to Hanover and the Empire survive. The failure to write a history of Hanoverian foreign policy has more to do with the tradition of Landesgeschichte and the mistaken assumption that Hanoverian aims were completely subordinated to the nascent Weltpolitik of Great Britain than an absence of the necessary material. The reports of the Hanoverian officials at Regensburg and Vienna provide the backbone of the Hanoverian archival material deployed in this book.101 The second myth relates to the interest the king took in Imperial politics. Rudolf Grieser’s article on the Deutsche Kanzlei in London102 drew attention to the section of George’s Regierungsreglement of 1714 which stated his representative in Regensburg should send him only a short summary and the full dispatch should go to the Hanoverian privy council in Hanover. All other diplomats were to send full reports to both Hanover and London. 103 Grieser argued that George’s instructions show how unimportant Regensburg was.104 Grieser’s analysis reflected the hostile historiographical assessment of Regensburg still prevalent in the 1950s. George’s Regierungsreglement expressed his intentions prior to his departure from Hanover. Yet the practice was different. To the best of my knowledge, the reports sent by George’s diplomats in Regensburg in the period under consideration were not only sent to Hanover, but a full copy went to London as well. Hence, for most reports, there is a copy in Calenberg Brief 11 (the records kept in Hanover) and Hannover 92 (the records from London of the Deutsche Kanzlei). As subsequent chapters show, when officials in Hanover acted without direct instructions from the monarch in London, they found themselves in trouble. The interplay of relations between Britain, Hanover and the Empire has received insufficient attention. The foremost historian of the eighteenthcentury Empire, Karl Otmar Freiherr von Aretin, argues that two forms of politics had been competing with each other in the Empire since the seventeenth century. On the one hand, the politics of Recht saw the Empire as a legal entity to preserve peace. On the other, there were the politics of Macht,

100

Black, British foreign policy in the age of Walpole, p. 126. More recently see Mitchell D. Allen, The Anglo-Hanoverian connection: 1727–1760 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Boston University, 2000), p. 71. 101 More generally the collections in Calenberg Brief 11 and Calenberg Brief 24 make it possible to reconstruct Hanoverian policy towards the Empire which was, after all, one of the most important spheres of foreign political activity. 102 Rudolf Grieser, ‘Die Deutsche Kanzlei in London, ihre Entstehung und Anfänge’, Blätter für deutsche Landesgeschichte, 89 (1952), pp. 153–68. 103 See Richard Drögereit, ed., Quellen zur Geschichte Kurhannovers im Zeitalter der Personalunion mit England 1714–1803 (Hildesheim, 1949), p. 11, clause 19. 104 Grieser, ‘Deutsche Kanzlei’, p. 155. 21

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

associated with Ranke’s ‘great powers’.105 For Aretin, the struggle between these two concepts was embodied by two powers, Austria and Prussia. There is much to commend this approach. However, there is always a danger of digging too deep for the roots of such conflicts. It is undeniable that AustroPrussian dualism was a major issue after 1740. Whether Austria viewed Prussia as unquestionably the greatest threat prior to this point is less clear. The accession of the elector of Hanover to the British thrones increased Hanover’s claim to be regarded as the premier power of north Germany relatively, if not absolutely. This work offers a new account of power relations in the early eighteenth-century Empire by suggesting the central importance of Hanover. Hanover’s increased status came as a result of the dynastic link with Britain. Aretin believes confessional tensions were becoming less important in the Empire. They were replaced by the struggle between Austria and Prussia as the chief source of conflict. Gabriele Haug-Moritz offers a different picture. 106 Haug-Moritz argues that there was what she terms a ‘reconfessionalisation’ of the Empire in the eighteenth century. She concentrates on religious conflict in the period 1719 to 1725 as the basis for conflicts in Württemberg in the 1750s and 1760s.107 Although subsequent chapters show confessional conflict did not disappear between 1725 and the 1750s, Haug-Moritz rightly argues that religious disputes were important in forming the identity of the Corpus Evangelicorum. Her contention that while the Emperor saw the Empire as catholic and hierarchical, the princes now wanted a more federal power structure is illuminating.108 Haug-Moritz notes in passing that ‘Hanoverian Imperial religious policy has not been researched. It obeyed, however, different rules from British great power policy.’109 The idea of completely separate aims for Hanoverian and British policy recurs frequently in the literature. It relies on a view of British policy as based on the pursuit of extra-European expansion and uninterested in continental Europe for most of the period. It represents a back-dating of how British policy developed after the Seven Years War. This book not only 105

Karl Otmar von Aretin, Das Reich (Stuttgart, 1986), p. 75. More generally, see Karl Otmar von Aretin, Das alte Reich, 1648–1806 (3 vols, Stuttgart, 1993–97). 106 Gabriele Haug-Moritz, Württembergischer Ständekonflikt und deutscher Dualismus: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Reichverbandes in der Mitte des 18. Jahrhunderts (Stuttgart, 1992), idem, ‘Kaisertum und Parität: Reichspolitik und Konfession nach dem Westfälischen Frieden’, Zeitschrift für historische Forschung, 19 (1992), pp. 445–82, and idem, ‘Corpus Evangelicorum und deutscher Dualismus’, in Volker Press, ed., Alternativen zur Reichsverfassung in der Frühen Neuzeit (Munich, 1995), pp. 189–207. 107 See Haug-Moritz, Württembergischer Ständekonflikt, pp. 140–54. In making the leap from the 1720s to the 1750s, Haug-Moritz follows the account in Ulrich Belstler, Die Stellung des Corpus Evangelicorum in der Reichsverfassung (Inaugural-Dissertation, Tübingen, 1968). Belstler makes the leap himself on p. 32. He also used Württemberg sources as the basis for his study. 108 See Haug-Moritz, ‘Kaisertum und Parität’, passim and p. 481. 109 Haug-Moritz, ‘Corpus Evangelicorum’, fn. 33, p. 194. 22

INTRODUCTION

shows the importance of confessional politics for Hanover but also how they related to British concerns. Defending the protestant interest meant that the British had to watch developments in continental Europe closely because it was here that protestantism was most threatened. The balance of power, the protestant interest and universal monarchy are explored in chapter one. The links between these ideas are crucial for understanding the outlook of politicians and people in Britain and Hanover in the first half of the eighteenth century. How the Hanoverians came to the British thrones in the first place and the ways in which they inherited and developed the twin legacies of protestant monarchy and continental involvement is considered in chapter two. The period from 1714 to 1740 witnessed three particular causes célèbres, all of which will be explored in detail. The first occurred in 1719 to 1720 and concerned the restrictions placed on the protestants of the Palatinate, and particularly the seizure of the Heiliggeistkirche in Heidelberg. This is considered in chapter three. The second related to the executions that took place after riots in Thorn, Poland in 1724. At the time, this was commonly described by protestants as a ‘massacre’. Its impact is discussed in chapter four. The third concerns the fate of those protestants expelled by the archbishop of Salzburg in 1731. This is discussed in chapter five. The relationship between Britain–Hanover and the Reich, Austria and Prussia will feature prominently. Confessional concerns remained important in the politics of the Empire. Protestant jurists regarded the Peace of Westphalia as part of the Empire’s fundamental constitution.110 Hence, there were campaigns to remove any treaty clauses perceived to contradict the Westphalian settlement, such as the fourth article of the Treaty of Ryswick. The situation within protestant Germany was made more complicated by conversions, such as those of the electors of Saxony and, later in the century, by the dukes of Württemberg and the heir to the landgrave of Hessen-Kassel, who was married to one of George II’s daughters. While it may seem far-fetched today, fears that protestantism was under siege in the Reich were highly plausible. George I and II were naturally interested in the Reich. It is in this sphere, through their participation in the Corpus Evangelicorum at the Reichstag in Regensburg, that the intersection of Britain, Hanover and the protestant interest can best be explored. The territorial complexity of the Reich made it important to keep abreast of who was friend and who was foe. Walpole’s papers 110

Modern scholars have identified nine laws at the heart of the Imperial constitution: the Golden Bull (1356), the Eternal Peace and its reforms (1495), the Treaty of Passau (1552), the Religious Peace of Augsburg (1555), the Peace of Westphalia (1648), Electoral Capitulations (from 1519 onwards), the Peace of Teschen (1779), and the Final Recess of the Imperial Deputation (1803) (see J.G. Gagliardo, Reich and Nation (Bloomington and London, 1980), p. 16). The confessional nature of public law in the early modern period is discussed in Michael Stolleis, ‘Glaubensspaltung und öffentliches Recht in Deutschland’, in idem, Staat und Staatsräson, pp. 268–97. 23

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

contain a detailed list of German protestant princes and towns.111 Walpole’s role in securing British neutrality in the War of the Polish succession is discussed in chapter six and the final chapter considers the fate of the protestant interest between the arrival of Frederick the Great on the international scene in 1740 and the outbreak of the Seven Years War. The desire to defend the protestant interest, explored throughout this book, throws new light on who the British and Hanoverians thought they were and how they interacted with each other and the wider world.

111

CUL, Ch (H) 76/21. 24

1

The balance of power, universal monarchy and the protestant interest

This chapter explores changes in the international system in the first half of the eighteenth century. It throws new light on the balance of power, one of the models most commonly used to describe international relations in the period. Some critics dispute whether this model actually ‘works’ because the balance of power meant different things to different people. However, this chapter describes a particular understanding of what the balance of power meant to a particular group of people at a particular time. It is assumed here that the perceptions of those involved in debates are as revealing as the strategic reality of a situation. Thus, even if there was no objective balance of power, the series of exchanges which assumed its existence are interesting in themselves. Both British and Hanoverian writers and politicians viewed the preservation of the balance of power as the most powerful means to defend the protestant interest and combat the threat posed by universal monarchs, real or imagined. The focus is on how contemporary writers and thinkers justified their specific understandings of the balance of power, universal monarchy and the protestant interest. Such understandings provide the key to explaining the policies and decisions discussed in later chapters. By addressing a series of objections to the heady mixture of religion and politics, it will become clear why the links between the three concepts contained in the chapter’s title have been overlooked previously. It will be important to consider what impact historical conventions about periodisation might have had on the acceptability or viability of a ‘protestant interest’ after the Peace of Westphalia (1648). This will be linked to a discussion of secularisation. The belief that international politics was quickly secularised after 1648 indicates more about the persistence of whiggish myths than historical reality. The historiography of international relations needs to catch up with recent developments in enlightenment studies. The easy distinction made by liberals in our own time between religion and politics may apply in theory to our present situation but it has no place in the eighteenth century.

25

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

Problems: periodisation, secularisation, international relations and enlightenment Amongst German historians, there is general agreement that the ‘confessional age’ (‘konfessionelle Zeitalter’) came to an end with the Peace of Westphalia. Armed conflict between the confessions inside the Empire ceased. As Michael Maurer notes, ‘overall the systematic placing of confessional differences within a legal context meant a deconfessionalisation of politics. The state created stability for itself above the confessions.’1 Maurer emphasises the progressive nature of the legal toleration granted throughout the Empire in 1648.2 However, his approach makes it difficult to explain confessional conflict after 1648, like the expulsion of protestants from Salzburg in 1731–2. He comments of Salzburg that ‘the era of religious persecutions and confessional disputes was really already over then.’ The Peace of Westphalia was, for religious matters, a ‘decisive break, which also consciously had an importance for the long term’.3 1648 came to be regarded as a turning point, not least by historians writing about it in retrospect.4 Yet to assume that 1648 brought a rapid end to confessional conflict is unhelpful. Modernity and the growth of state power are often linked to religious decline. The primacy of theology has given way to the primacy of politics. Niccolo Machiavelli’s work has frequently been associated with this shift. Machiavelli saw the tension between the world of justifications or theology and the world of affairs or power. He counteracted the ‘scholastic fog’ which had enveloped political thought in the middle ages and instead preached political realism.5 Machiavelli’s work has inspired two conclusions. First, religion ceased to be important when the state, with modernity, becomes the ‘master noun of political argument’.6 While the Peace of Westphalia inaugurated this era in practical political terms, the necessary theoretical insights appeared a

1

Michael Maurer, Kirche, Staat und Gesellschaft im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert (Munich, 1999), p. 17. 2 Ibid., p. 17, pp. 101–5. 3 Ibid., p. 17. For a contrasting perspective on the decline of religious war in Germany, see Johannes Burkhardt, Abschied von Religionskrieg: der Siebenjährige Krieg und die päpstliche Diplomatie (Tübingen, 1985). 4 Konrad Repgen has pointed out that this does not mean that ideas of the ‘balance of power’ shaped the 1648 settlement. See Konrad Repgen, ‘Der Westfälische Friede und die Ursprünge des europäischen Gleichgewichts’, in idem, Von der Reformation zur Gegenwart eds Klaus Gotto and Hans Günter Hockerts (Paderborn, Munich, Vienna, and Zurich, 1988), pp. 53–66. There is a compact and persuasive summary of changes to the international system in the eighteenth century in H.M. Scott, The emergence of the eastern powers, 1756–1775 (Cambridge, 2001), pp. 1–10. 5 Felix Raab, The English face of Machiavelli (London, 1964), pp. 25–6. 6 See Quentin Skinner, ‘The state’, in Terence Ball, James Farr, and Russell L. Hanson, eds, Political innovation and conceptual change (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 90–131 (quotation p. 123). 26

BALANCE OF POWER AND PROTESTANT INTEREST

mere three years later with the publication of Hobbes’s Leviathan in 1651.7 Secondly, after the rise of the state, religion becomes, like Machiavelli’s civic religion, a mere servant of the state. Some modifications have been made to this crude account of modernisation within German scholarship but its influence remains strong.8 Religion’s role in standard interpretations of international relations is aptly summarised by Theodore Rabb’s conclusion that after 1650, ‘one’s church was to all intents and purposes irrelevant to one’s foreign policy’.9 Similarly Evan Luard notes that after 1648, ‘religion ceased to count for much in determining the policy of states, and so ceased to inhibit the pursuit of balance of power policies’.10 Luard further argued that the balance of power was a system in which religion and ideology had ceased to be important. 11 The system had perhaps even advanced or progressed. 12 Religious zeal in foreign policy was associated with the bad old days of a Europe divided upon confessional lines. It was an unfortunate hangover. After 1648 foreign policy became more realistic and rational.13 The viability of a protestant foreign policy had seemingly disappeared by the end of the seventeenth century.14 Indeed Steve Pincus has linked the decline of religion in Britain in the late seventeenth century to the rise of the national interest as a viable political concept.15 Such arguments rely on a particular understanding of ‘interest’. Interest has frequently been associated with Machiavelli and therefore, by extension, with a secularised conception of politics.16 Machiavellian politics, in their

7

Although Bodin’s work on sovereignty was also important and predates this. Part of the point of ‘confessionalisation’ theory, at least as adopted by Heinz Schilling, is to indicate the importance of confessionalisation for modernity. See Heinz Schilling, ‘Nationale Identität und Konfession in der europäischen Neuzeit’, in Bernhard Giesen, ed., Nationale und kulturelle Identität (Frankfurt/Main, 1991), pp. 192–252. 9 Theodore K. Rabb, The struggle for stability in early modern Europe (New York, 1975), p. 81. 10 Evan Luard, The balance of power: the system of international relations, 1648–1815 (London, 1992), p. 7. 11 Ibid., p. 26. 12 Ibid., p. 353, although it is ‘advance only of a kind’. 13 M.S. Anderson, ‘Eighteenth-century theories of the balance of power’, in Ragnhild Hatton and M.S. Anderson, eds, Studies in diplomatic history (London, 1970), p. 183. 14 Even Steve Pincus concludes, despite his attempts to show the logic of a protestant foreign policy in Britain in the second half of the seventeenth century, that this logic had gone by the 1690s. Steven C.A. Pincus, Protestantism and patriotism: ideologies and the making of English foreign policy, 1650–1668 (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 447–8. 15 Steven C.A. Pincus, ‘“To protect English liberties”: the English nationalist revolution of 1688–1689’, in Tony Claydon and Ian McBride, eds, Protestantism and national identity (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 75–104. 16 Raab, English face, p. 235. Raab argues that interest was a key signifier of the independence of politics from theology and that this move was already visible by 1660. 8

27

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

Harringtonian disguise,17 can also be related to economics and therefore to what is now viewed as the primary function of state activity.18 Interest is viewed as Machiavellian, modern and inherently irreligious. Machiavelli undoubtedly used ‘interest’ in his work. Yet to claim that using the term ‘interest’ meant adopting a Machiavellian conception of politics seems a little far-fetched, as the subsequent discussion of the ‘protestant interest’ shows. While certain strands of religious thought had disappeared by the end of the seventeenth century,19 not all religion went into terminal decline with the onset of enlightenment. Religious thought and religious concepts changed. Change is not disappearance. Too often religion is regarded as both monolithic and static: static because change is regarded as corruption or compromise, and monolithic because Christians ‘believed’ in Christendom; Christendom was a supranational idea, destroyed at the reformation; the reformation saw the beginnings of the rise of the nation-state; the state triumphed over the church so Christians had ‘lost’. Put in such schematic terms, this account appears crude and reductionist. Assumptions about what religious people should have believed in (Christendom, peace, etc.) are used to dismiss such people as irrelevant. Anyone who departs from these assumptions is condemned as a hypocrite. Yet Christianity could be used to reinforce ideas about both transnational and national communities. It was used by those who justified war and those who sought to portray war as contrary to God’s will. Neither talking about interest nor being a Christian politician implied a particular concept of politics. Historians of the enlightenment now realise that it did not mark the ‘birth of modern paganism’.20 Despite this, debate about when secularisation became endemic in Britain rumbles on. Some of the more thoughtful contributions to the debate have highlighted the problem of only considering elite perceptions and in assuming a divide between elite rationality and irrational popular

17

For the importance of James Harrington as a source for Machiavellian ideas in Britain see J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian moment (Princeton, 1975), chs 12–14. 18 See Istvan Hont, ‘Free trade and the economic limits to national politics: neoMachiavellian political economy reconsidered’, in John Dunn, ed., The economic limits to modern politics (Cambridge, 1990), pp. 41–120. 19 The decline in millennarian language and fears of the apocalypse is often taken to indicate the general decline of religion. See Steven N. Zwicker, ‘England, Israel and the triumph of Roman virtue’, in Richard H. Popkin, ed., Millennarianism and messianism in English literature and thought, 1650–1800 (Leiden, 1988), pp. 37–64. Blair Worden’s discussion also tends towards linking ‘religion’ simply to ‘puritanism’. See Blair Worden, ‘The question of secularisation’, in Alan Houston and Steve Pincus, eds, A nation transformed (Cambridge, 2001), pp. 20–40. 20 This interpretation can be seen most trenchantly in Peter Gay, The enlightenment: an interpretation (2 vols, London, 1969). For a corrective of this view, see Derek Beales, ‘Religion and culture’, in T.C.W. Blanning, ed., The eighteenth century (Oxford, 2000), p. 133. 28

BALANCE OF POWER AND PROTESTANT INTEREST

religiosity.21 The present work argues that the defence of the ‘protestant interest’ was neither irrational nor restricted to one strata of British society in the early eighteenth century. The rise of rationality and the decline of religion were not necessarily part of a zero-sum game. A religious foreign policy could exist in an enlightened world, although it differed from that of earlier periods. If 1648 marked a watershed in any sense, it was as an end to ‘wars of religion’. The creation of new institutional and legal structures to settle religious disputes within the Empire helped this process. Yet bringing these disputes within a legal framework did not mean that they disappeared. Even the claim that ‘wars of religion’ ended in 1648 can be qualified. Religious conceptions of conflict survived.22 Konrad Repgen has identified a range of justifications offered for war in the early modern period.23 He concludes that the term ‘war of religion’ was necessary for a particular period in European history to identify a new sort of conflict.24 ‘Wars of religion’ ceased to be as important within European thought after 1648. Repgen also remarks that from the thirteenth to the nineteenth century, a Christian could only engage in a just war.25 Studying how wars were justified is therefore interesting in itself. Although talk about wars of religion may have diminished after 1648, this need not imply that people were no longer interested in religious issues. Indeed, as the subsequent discussion shows, protestant aversion to wars of religion reflected confessional thinking.

The balance of power Britain is usually said to have had a particular interest in the balance of power. This was acknowledged both by contemporaries and by historians subsequently. Johann Jacob Schmauß, writing about the War of the Spanish

21 See Kaspar von Greyerz, ‘Secularization in early modern England (1660–c. 1750)’, in Hartmut Lehmann, ed., Säkularisierung, Dechristianisierung, Rechristianisierung im neuzeitlichen Europa (Göttingen, 1997), pp. 86–100 and Hermann Wellenreuther, ‘On the public and private spheres, feelings, passions, beliefs in Christian, secular, and dechristianized worlds’, in Lehmann, ed. Säkularisierung, Dechristianisierung, Rechristianisierung, pp. 101–13. 22 Burkhardt, Abschied von Religionskrieg argues that some catholics used the ‘war of religion’ concept until the end of the Seven Years War. By contrast James Turner Johnson, Ideology, reason, and the limitation of war: religious and secular concepts, 1200–1740 (Princeton, 1975) argues for a slow shift from predominantly religious to predominantly secular justifications of conflict. 23 Konrad Repgen, ‘Kriegslegitimationen in Alteuropa: Entwurf einer historischen Typologie’, Historische Zeitschrift, 241 (1985), pp. 27–49 and idem, ‘What is a “religious war”?’, in E. I. Kouri and Tom Scott, eds, Politics and society in Reformation Europe (London, 1987), pp. 311–28. 24 Repgen, ‘What is a “religious war”?’, p. 323. 25 Ibid., p. 316.

29

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

succession, remarked that ‘England alone, for the common good . . . seemed, according to her old principles, to worry about the Balance of Power.’26 Schmauß was a professor of law at the university of Göttingen. The involvement of Göttingen academics in the spread of notions of the balance of power in Germany was probably more than coincidental.27 The university was founded in the 1730s and named Georgia Augusta in honour of its royal patron, George II, British monarch and Hanoverian elector. Later in the eighteenth century, Frederick von Gentz and the Hanover school argued that Britain, with its maritime power, could never be a threat to the liberties of the continent. It was, therefore, the ideal ‘balancer’ state.28 At one level, the transmission of ideas about the balance of power can be explained by Hanoverian interest in the direction of British policy. Hermann Wellenreuther has suggested that more than mere disinterested observation was at work though. There was an upsurge of tracts on the balance of power in the 1740s, when the Hanoverian connection had come under increased scrutiny in Britain for other reasons. These tracts claimed that the personal union had brought peace to Europe and Hanover. George II was guarding the balance of power.29 Wellenreuther suspects that the interest in the balance of power was an instrumentalised way of dealing with the absence of the elector in London. Talking about the balance of power was one way in which Hanoverian writers could show that they were in touch with British concerns. Unlike Wellenreuther, other historians of Hanover have adopted less sophisticated accounts of the relationship of British and Hanoverian politics in the period. There is a tension between ‘continental’ views of British foreign policy and ‘blue water’ approaches.30 For German historians it has been easy to believe that the British were never truly interested in Hanover and were

26

Johann Jacob Schmauß, Einleitung zu der Staats-Wissenschaft, und Erleuterung des von ihm herausgegebenen Corpus Juri Gentium Academici (2 vols, Leipzig, 1741–60), i, p. 288. The first volume is entitled Die Historie der Balance von Europa. 27 For Göttingen as a conduit for the spread of ideas from Britain to Germany, see Thomas Biskup, ‘Britain and Göttingen’, in Brendan Simms and Torsten Riotte, eds, The Hanoverian dimension in British history, 1714–1837 (Cambridge, forthcoming). 28 Herbert Butterfield, ‘The balance of power’, in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, eds, Diplomatic investigations (London, 1966), p. 143. Gentz helped spread Edmund Burke’s ideas in Germany. 29 Hermann Wellenreuther, ‘Göttingen und England im achtzehnten Jahrhundert’, in Norbert Kamp, Hermann Wellenreuther, and Friedrich Hund, 250 Jahre Vorlesungen an der Georgia Augusta 1734–1984 (Göttingen, 1985), pp. 40–3 (quotation p. 43). 30 For ‘blue water’ policy, see Richard Pares, ‘American versus continental warfare, 1739–1763’, EHR, 51 (1936), pp. 429–65 and Daniel A. Baugh, ‘Great Britain’s “bluewater” policy, 1689–1815’, International History Review, 10 (1988), pp. 33–58. While advocates of a ‘continental’ strategy supported active British intervention in alliances and wars on the European mainland, ‘blue water’ strategists felt that British security could effectively be secured through a large navy, without the need to become too involved in European politics. 30

BALANCE OF POWER AND PROTESTANT INTEREST

always more concerned with their colonies. Such a perception is reinforced from two directions. First, some American historians cannot conceive that the British were ever not interested in empire (and by extension, them, in the eighteenth century). Secondly, ‘new British history’ has tended to emphasise the ‘Atlantic archipelago’ at the expense of European connections.31 Why has the balance of power attracted so much attention? It is not the only way of thinking about evolving ideas of the state in the eighteenth century.32 However, the difficulty of defining what the balance of power was means it has been the subject of considerable debate. Martin Wight has identified nine separate but related meanings for the term ‘balance of power’.33 His first three meanings illustrate the problem. The balance is ‘an even distribution of power’. This can easily slip to ‘the principle that power ought to be evenly distributed’. How is this to be judged? His third meaning is simply the ‘existing distribution of power’.34 How the balance could be maintained was also open to dispute. For some theorists the balance should be selfregulating. Others argue that to function properly a ‘balancer state’ is required. Such a state must intervene on the side of the weaker state or alliance system in any conflict to maintain the balance of the whole system.35 Those who claim to be acting on behalf of the balance of power risk being accused of pursuing self-interest. British concern for the balance of Europe, for example, was seen as a diversion from ‘unbalanced’ imperial expansion.36 Defenders of the balance claim that the balance of power, although an ‘idea’ itself, is more realistic than more ideologically inspired policies.37 Sir Herbert 31 J.G.A. Pocock remarked in his seminal article on ‘new British history’ that ‘within very recent memory, the English have been increasingly willing to declare that neither the empire nor commonwealth ever meant much in their conscience, and that they were at heart Europeans all the time. The obvious absurdity of the second part of the claim is no bar either to the partial truth of the first part, or to the ideological assertion of the claim as a whole’ (J.G.A. Pocock, ‘British history: a plea for a new subject’, Journal of Modern History, 47 (1975), p. 602). Pocock admitted more recently that his views had much to do with his New Zealand heritage, but maintained ‘Europe’ was a fluid concept and advocates of the ‘European project’ refused to accept criticism. See J.G.A. Pocock, ‘The new British history in Atlantic perspective: an Antipodean commentary’, American Historical Review, 104 (1999), pp. 490–500. 32 See Harm Klueting, Die Lehre von der Macht der Staaten (Berlin, 1986), pp. 16–19. 33 Martin Wight, ‘The balance of power’, in Butterfield and Wight, eds, Diplomatic investigations, pp. 149–75. 34 Ibid., pp. 151–6. 35 Michael Sheehan, Balance of power: history and theory (London, 1996), pp. 79–82. 36 This interpretation is argued forcefully in Paul W. Schroeder, The transformation of European politics (Oxford, 1994), although contrast the essays in International History Review, 16 (1994), particularly H.M. Scott, ‘Paul W. Schroeder’s international system: the view from Vienna’, International History Review, 16 (1994), pp. 663–80 and Charles Ingrao, ‘Paul W. Schroeder’s balance of power: stability or anarchy?’, International History Review, 16 (1994), pp. 681–700. 37 Sheehan, Balance of power, p. 53.

31

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

Butterfield argued that, in contrast to previous confessional divisions, ‘the eighteenth century did not set its heart on either a Catholic order in Europe or a Protestant order, but an international system which was to be defended for its own sake’.38 Butterfield’s faith in an ‘unideological’ enlightenment and eighteenth century is no longer so generally accepted but, as Michael Sheehan points out, the balance of power has been favourably contrasted with the religious zeal of the seventeenth century and the nationalism surrounding later struggles against Napoleon.39 Sheehan also believes a sense of international community distinct from ideas of Christendom is a prerequisite for a functioning balance of power. Such sentiment only emerged throughout Europe after 1648.40 Did an international system exist? At one level, as the growth of diplomatic representation and the associated rights and privileges indicates,41 the notion of a new system was accepted. Whether catholic states suddenly realised that the Peace of Westphalia meant that they had to accept religious pluralism in Europe is less clear. The conflict between catholics and protestants became institutionalised. It did not simply disappear. The Treaty of Utrecht (1713) marked the entry into the formal language of diplomacy of the balance of power as a guiding political principle. Ideas of balance gained wider currency thereafter but for contemporaries the balance of power also illustrated a pattern already observed in British history. Although largely ignored by those concerned with strategy, examining how contemporaries conceptualised the balance of power is revealing. Charles Davenant’s 1701 essay on the balance of power aptly illustrates contemporary understandings.42 Davenant noted Henry VIII’s investment in defending the balance of power through his Habsburg and Valois alliances.43 Elizabeth I helped both the French Huguenots and the Dutch and therefore disrupted Spanish attempts to acquire universal monarchy.44 James I, by contrast, had injudiciously and wrongly sought alliance with Spain. Spain posed the greatest threat to the balance of power and therefore it was the role of Britain, as balancer, to ally herself with the weaker side. James’s policy

38

Butterfield, ‘Balance of power’, pp. 141–2. For Butterfield’s scepticism about ‘big ideas’ in international relations, see Alberto R. Coll, The wisdom of statecraft: Sir Herbert Butterfield and the philosophy of international politics (Durham, North Carolina, 1985). 39 Sheehan, Balance of power, pp. 98–100. 40 Ibid., p. 38. 41 See M.S. Anderson, The rise of modern diplomacy, 1450–1919 (London, 1993). 42 [Charles Davenant], Essays upon I. the Ballance of Power. II. The right of making war, peace and alliances. III. Universal Monarchy (London, 1701). Davenant is described by the DNB as a political economist. He wrote extensively on economics, history and politics. An anticlerical passage in his essay on the balance of power caused it to be discussed in Convocation. 43 Ibid., p. 8. 44 Ibid., p. 9. 32

BALANCE OF POWER AND PROTESTANT INTEREST

reflected his desire to increase his authority over his own people and ignore parliament.45 Whilst Britain was involved in civil war, the situation in Europe changed, so when Cromwell sided with the French, this was again a mistake, as France had now become the greater threat to the balance. The policy was also ill-judged because it gave a precedent to Charles II and James II to justify a French alliance.46 Parliament had always been concerned with the balance and after 1688, it was able to guide the monarch back to sensible policies.47 Others noted how after William III’s death, the role of protector of the balance had passed to George I.48 At George’s death in 1727, this role was mentioned specifically in a number of panegyrics.49 George II was also praised by academics in Göttingen for his special role in protecting the balance. British monarchs had a particular duty to protect the balance of power and failure to do so was a sign of broader faults.

The meaning of the balance of power Davenant’s work reflected a broader understanding of what might best be called the ‘protestant balance of power’. Some writers deny such notions were compatible. Eberhard von Vietsch, for example, stated that seventeenthcentury Anglo-Spain rivalry was primarily commercial and only secondarily concerned with religious matters because after 1588 Britain was free from fear of invasion. Cromwell may have tried to pursue a ‘protestant world-policy’ (‘protestantische Weltpolitik’) but alliances formed after 1660 showed how outdated such a view was. William III, von Vietsch argues, pursued a ‘religious’ as opposed to a ‘balance’ policy. The Treaty of Utrecht was not actually about the balance at all but came about through political machination.50 Other German writers were less ready to dismiss entirely the notion of a protestant balance. Ernst Kaeber commented of the War of the Spanish succession that, ‘the idea of a “protestant balance” appeared, which was not

45

Ibid., pp. 10–11. Ibid., pp. 13–15. 47 Ibid., p. 28. 48 Tony Claydon, William III (London, 2002), pp. 134–55 discusses William’s efforts to link his self-portrayal as protestant ruler to involvement with Europe. 49 See, for example, Isaac Watts, The religious improvement of publick events: a sermon preach’d at Berry-Street, June 18. 1727. On occasion of the death of our late gracious sovereign George I (2nd edn, London, 1727), p. 15 (‘A Prince who held the Balance of Europe . . . One that was the Arbiter of Peace and War among the Potentates of the World’). 50 Eberhard von Vietsch, Das europäische Gleichgewicht (Leipzig, 1942), pp. 134–6, 144–6, 152. His argument (p. 341) that it was false ideas of the balance and not German aggression that had sparked World War Two suggests something other than dispassionate scholarship may have prompted publication. 46

33

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

identical to the political balance, but which could be maintained by it.’51 By the time of the dispute over the Ostend Company (1725–7), such a protestant analysis was only a superficial covering, rather than an integral part of British understandings of the balance. Trade was now central.52 The present work contends that Kaeber’s accurate analysis of the situation in the early eighteenth century had a longer term validity. Interpretations advancing the declining importance of religion and the growth of trade rely upon positive assessments of the strength of protestantism in Britain and the relatively small threat to the dynasty and the protestant succession from Jacobitism. Whilst this was clear with the benefit of hindsight, the subsequent chapters show how eighteenth-century ministries felt the protestant succession was in danger. The recent revival in Jacobite historiography also undermines the whiggish view of the Hanoverians as unassailable. Existing critiques of the idea of a protestant balance of power are, therefore, misleading. Protestant understandings of the balance of power may have had propagandistic aspects but they undoubtedly existed. In his History of the affairs of Europe, published in 1725, William Gibson claimed: England has always been accounted, and with very good reason, the main bulwark of the protestant interest, because her situation is of all other nations the most commodious to keep the balance; and as her strength depends chiefly on her power at sea, she is therefore not so much exposed as other nations to insults from her neighbours. The protestant religion is also best suited to the interest of that kingdom, as a trading nation.53

Gibson was not alone in defending the balance of power on protestant lines. Ludwig Martin Kahle’s defence of the balance of power appeared in 1744 during the War of the Austrian succession.54 Kahle was dean of the philosophy faculty at the university of Göttingen.55 Kahle argued both the ancient and

51 Ernst Kaeber, Die Idee des europäischen Gleichgewichts in der publizistischen Literatur vom 16. bis zur Mitte des 18. Jahrhunderts (Berlin, 1907), p. 67. 52 Ibid., pp. 85–6. On the dispute over the Ostend Company, see ch. 4. 53 William Gibson, A history of the affairs of Europe, from the peace of Utrecht to the conclusion of the Quadruple Alliance. With a treatise of the religious and civil interests of Europe (London, 1725), p.11 (of the Treatise, which is paginated separately). Gibson may well have been a son of Edmund Gibson, bishop of London. See Norman Sykes, Edmund Gibson (Oxford, 1926), p. 377 for details of a son named William, who held minor clerical posts and died in 1752. 54 Ludwig Martin Kahle, La balance de l’Europe considerée comme la regle de la paix et de la guerre (Berlin and Göttingen, 1744). This was a French translation of a scholarly disputation originally delivered in Latin. 55 See Christian Ludwig Stollten, Göttingische gelehrte Nachrichten von dem Jahre MDCCXXXXIIII (Göttingen, 1745), p. 140, which records Kahle’s defence of his thesis

34

BALANCE OF POWER AND PROTESTANT INTEREST

modern worlds contained examples of attempts to join states and create universal monarchies. The Ottoman empire was one and the policies of Charles V another.56 The Spanish Habsburgs had inherited Charles V’s desire for universal monarchy, although the British had tried to stop them. However, as Rapin’s History of England showed, the French now desired universal monarchy.57 Kahle claimed that ‘amongst all the other Potentates, the Kings of England, by some act of Providence, strove to maintain this balance in the general affairs of Europe’.58 Kahle’s praise for the British royal family as protectors of the European balance was characteristic of Hanoverian writers. However, his observations on the importance of religion are significant. Kahle explicitly linked the balance of power with attempts to prevent universal monarchy. Britain had traditionally held the balance between the houses of Austria and France.59 In the 1740s, with Habsburgs and Bourbons once more in conflict over the Austrian succession, this was a reminder of British responsibilities. Kahle also considered the relationship between catholic princes, universal monarchy and the papacy. Several catholic princes masked their quest for universal monarchy under the guise of advancing true religion. Such people argued that the true faith could only flourish under a universal monarchy.60 Kahle disagreed. To thrive, faith required the rights of conscience to be respected. Individuals could never abdicate rights over conscience.61 Universal monarchy could never aid religion because it was impossible to determine religious belief by external coercion.62 Instead, religion’s survival depended on protection of a different kind. ‘The true defenders of faith are the defenders of the balance of nations.’63 Kahle concluded that French desire for universal monarchy meant they remained a considerable threat.64 Kahle’s work was attacked by a Prussian professor from Stettin, Christian Friedrich Stisser.65 Stisser disputed Henry VIII’s role in balancing France and

on the balance of power as having taken place on 2 December 1744. From this, it appears that Kahle was born in Magdeburg in 1712. His father was a Domprediger. After studies in Jena and Halle, he travelled to Holland and Britain in 1735 and was appointed to the job in Göttingen on his return to Germany (pp. 146–9). 56 Kahle, Balance de l’Europe, pp. 13–20. 57 Ibid., pp. 22–6. 58 Ibid., p. 72. 59 Ibid., pp. 114–15. 60 Ibid., pp. 119–21. 61 Ibid., pp. 122–3. 62 Ibid., p. 125. 63 Ibid., p. 126. 64 Ibid., p. 165. 65 Christian Friedrich Stisser, Freymütige und bescheidene Erinnerungen wider des berühmten Göttingischen Professors, Herrn Doctor Kahle, Abhandlung von der Balance Europens (Leipzig, 1745) and idem, Fortsetzung der freimütigen und bescheidenen Erinnerungen wider des berühmten 35

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

Austria.66 He further claimed that the British defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588 did not serve the general interest. Rather, it was merely an assertion of particular self-interest.67 However, his main argument was that Kahle’s characterisation of the French was exaggerated and that they posed no real threat to the balance of Europe in the current war.68 Certain aspects of Stisser’s critique were valid. Kahle’s historical account was partial. However, as Kaeber remarked, Stisser was a Prussian, keen to defend his monarch’s reputation. Frederick the Great was the ally of the French, whom Kahle had described as the enemy of all peoples. Kahle was attacking Frederick’s policies.69 Stisser ignored Kahle’s remarks about the role of religion. Stisser’s omission was highlighted in a review of Kahle’s dissertation, which also emphasised that princes had no right to interfere with conscience.70 It is interesting to see arguments for the separation of belief from the sphere of the sovereign’s legitimate interest, often associated with Locke, in a German treatise of the 1740s. Yet Kahle remained convinced that his enlightened attitude towards religious matters would not be adopted by catholic princes. Kahle’s analysis may simply be a rejection of the view that wars could be fought for religious reasons but arguably something more subtle was at work. Returning to Gibson and Davenant and considering the nature of universal monarchy more generally establishes this claim.

Universal monarchy It is necessary to dispose first of some of the historiographical myths about universal monarchy.71 Admittedly, little has been written on the topic in English recently. However, both John Robertson and Steven Pincus contributed chapters dealing with universal monarchy to a volume on the political thought of Anglo-Scottish union (1707). Robertson’s nuanced account of the importance of universal monarchy highlights interest in both imperial and confederative unions within European political thought prior to the union of 1707.72

Göttingischen Professors, Herrn Doctor, Kahle Abhandlung von der Balance Europens (Leipzig, 1746). 66 Stisser, Freymütige und bescheidene Erinnerungen, pp. 22, 56. 67 Ibid., p. 78. 68 Ibid., p. 92 and pp. 101–3. 69 Kaeber, Idee des europäischen Gleichgewichts, pp. 96–7. 70 Stollten, Göttingische gelehrte Nachrichten (1744), p. 143. 71 The use of the concept prior to the eighteenth century is discussed in Franz Bosbach, Monarchia Universalis: ein politischer Leitbegriff der frühen Neuzeit (Göttingen, 1988). Bosbach does not consider the interaction of ideas of universal monarchy and the balance of power at any length. 72 John Robertson, ‘Empire and union: two concepts of the early modern european political 36

BALANCE OF POWER AND PROTESTANT INTEREST

Pincus’s aim is to discredit the view that the seventeenth-century English were interested in Europe because of their desire to defend true religion. 73 He contends that fear of universal monarchy, rather than confession, was crucial. Pincus maintains that ‘universal monarchy’ is a non-religious concept. Fear of Dutch (economic) universal monarchy may help explain Anglo-Dutch conflict in 1672.74 Yet Pincus overlooks the unpopularity of the war with certain sections of the British public. High church Anglicans may well have thought that the Calvinist Dutch, with their republican politics, were virtually atheists (which would tend to suggest that religion was important after all). However, as Pincus acknowledges, nonconformists, like Slingsby Bethel, thought that the main threat was French (and therefore papist). 75 Pincus remains sceptical about the application of ‘popery’, particularly in relation to opposition to Louis XIV, arguing that ‘popery no longer had a predominantly theological meaning. A term so flexible as to embrace the predominantly Calvinist Dutch and the largely Roman Catholic French commented on more than just religious proclivities.’76 ‘Popery’ did have more than a simply theological meaning, but this variety had rendered it ‘meaningless’.77 Rather, it indicates that particular groups used the term for their own purposes and historical analysis should reflect this diversity. Pincus claims there was a struggle ‘to maintain national integrities against aspiring universal monarchy’. This was nothing to do with wars of religion, indeed a ‘balance of power’ policy was incompatible with a ‘religious policy’ because there could be no compromise between the forces of reformation and counter-reformation. The English role was special but not confessional, because they would only protect protestantism where it was established by national law.78 Pincus elides the ‘war of religion’ argument with the importance of religion per se. His view of religion is stuck in the eschatological struggles of Luther and Calvin against the anti-Christ. He maintains that, because Louis XIV was not genuinely acting from religious motives, the struggle against him was not order’, in John Robertson, ed., A union for empire (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 3–36 and Steven C.A. Pincus, ‘The English debate over universal monarchy’, in Robertson, ed., Union for empire, pp. 37–62. 73 Pincus, ‘English debate’, p. 37. This view is attributed to Jonathan Scott, particularly his chapter, ‘England’s troubles: exhuming the Popish Plot’, in Tim Harris, Paul Seaward, and Mark Goldie, eds, The politics of religion in Restoration England (Oxford, 1990), pp. 107–31. This seems to me to be an oversimplification of Scott’s argument. He has now provided a fuller version of his interpretation of the seventeenth century in England’s troubles (Cambridge, 2000). 74 Pincus, ‘English debate’, p. 38. 75 Ibid., p. 45. 76 Ibid., p. 53. 77 On the interrelationship of political and religious conceptions of popery, see my ‘Popery, politics and private judgement in early Hanoverian Britain’, HJ, 45 (2002), pp. 333–56. 78 Pincus, ‘English debate’, p. 54. 37

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

a war of religion but a war for the national interest.79 He denies that which has not been significantly affirmed. Apocalyptic protestant internationalism had probably declined,80 but it seems his argument is part of a more general historiographical trend to show the rise of modernity.81 Pincus associates the attack on universal monarchy with an attack on French political culture.82 However, as discussion of other writers has already suggested, where the threat from universal monarchy was perceived to come from could change. Earlier in the seventeenth century the Spanish were viewed as the greatest threat and, even earlier, Charles V. Like Kahle, Schmauß viewed the Bourbon powers of France and Spain as posing the greatest universal monarchist threat in the 1740s.83 Davenant traced the history of universal monarchy from the Assyrians, Babylonians, Macedonians and Romans to Charles V.84 He also considered whether the Spanish had followed the Machiavellian maxim that a strong population was necessary to increase dominion. Spain had erred, both in wasting its population by encouraging religious orders and in driving the most productive members of Spanish society away through the inquisition.85 He argued universal monarchy tended towards tyranny and tyranny harmed trade.86 Universal monarchs invariably sought to impose religious uniformity and feared religious pluralism. 87 Davenant associated universal monarchy with two things, tyranny and persecution. Both concepts had heavy ‘popish’ overtones in British political discourse. Davenant also explicitly linked popery and universal monarchy, arguing that catholic clerics were ‘Friends to Universal Monarchy, and that they think it their interest to promote it, is apparent enough’.88 The association of clericalism and universal monarchy is important. Thomas Gordon, writing against the Pretender in 1723, argued in such terms.89 He claimed that even if George I were to rule in an absolutist way, which

79

Ibid., pp. 55–7. Ibid., p. 58. 81 See Alan Houston and Steve Pincus, ‘Introduction: modernity and later-seventeenthcentury England’, in Houston and Pincus, eds, A nation transformed, pp. 1–19. The strict division between the religious and the political is also maintained in Pincus, ‘From holy cause to economic interest: the study of population and the invention of the state’, in Houston and Pincus, eds, A nation transformed, pp. 272–98. 82 Pincus, ‘English debate’, p. 62. 83 Schmauß, Einleitung zu der Staats-Wissenschaft, i, pp. 630–2. 84 Davenant, Essays, pp. 238–43. 85 Ibid., pp. 255–60. 86 Ibid., p. 288. 87 Ibid., pp. 293–4. 88 Ibid., p. 285 (sic) – the page in question follows three pages after p. 294, where the pagination goes 281, 280, 285. 89 [Thomas Gordon], A short view of the conspiracy with some reflections on the present state of affairs (London, 1723), p. 45. 80

38

BALANCE OF POWER AND PROTESTANT INTEREST

was unlikely, this was preferable to the rule of clerics and the Pretender.90 Confession was not so separate from understandings of universal monarchy, nor universal monarchy so distinct from religious fears, as Pincus would have us believe. While it was best to combat the universal monarchist threat at a national level, the desire to obtain universal monarchy was not characteristic of one particular nation, such as France. Rather, it was associated with a type of nation, all of which (at least those which were convincingly argued to pose such a threat in the early eighteenth century) were ruled by catholic princes. As the final chapter indicates, the rise of Prussia after 1740 complicated matters. Before that, popery and universal monarchy went hand in hand.

The protestant interest and the balance of power Having indicated how ideas of the balance of power were used to counteract popish universal monarchy, it is important to link these concepts to the notion of a protestant interest and religious foreign policy. The limitations of a purely Machiavellian analysis of interest have been shown already but does the idea of a protestant interest make sense? Samuel Pufendorf’s observation ‘that if a potent Prince of the Roman Catholick Persuasion should attempt to ruin a Protestant state, the other Roman Catholick States would not prevent it, if it was for their interest to see that Protestant State preserv’d’ 91 seemingly undermines a ‘protestant interest’ approach by suggesting power-political considerations were paramount. However, Pufendorf also commented that protestantism was best preserved on a territorial basis.92 The emphasis on the territorial unit suggests how the balance of power and the protestant interest were linked. Much is made in arguments against the idea of a confessional or religious foreign policy of the undeniable fact that for significant periods in the eighteenth century, Britain was allied with catholic powers and sometimes against protestant ones (although this rarely happened prior to 1740).93 Such arguments fail to consider the character of the alliance. Eighteenth-century alliances are often seen as fluid and subject to frequent change, partly because of the workings of the supposedly unideological balance.94 The lines of causality here are not as clear as might be thought at first sight. Did the balance itself

90

Ibid., p. 46. Samuel Pufendorf, An introduction to the history of the principal Kingdoms and States of Europe (6th edn, London, 1706), p. 462. 92 Pufendorf was almost certainly influenced by that famous summary of the Religious Peace of Augsburg (1555) ‘cuius regio, eius religio’. 93 Jeremy Black, ‘The catholic threat and the British press in the 1720s and 1730s’, Journal of Religious History, 12 (1982–83), p. 370, idem, British foreign policy in the age of Walpole (Edinburgh, 1985), p. 120 and Sheehan, Balance of power, p. 100. 94 Luard, Balance of power, p. 269. 91

39

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

mean alliances were short term or was it the lack of ideological agreement which necessitated short-term alliances to support immediate aims? If ideology is excluded a priori as irrelevant, then arguably it becomes difficult to explain the situation. The only British alliance in the early eighteenth century with any permanence was with the protestant Dutch. There were alliances with Austria and France but British and Hanoverian officials, as subsequent chapters show, viewed these arrangements as temporary but necessary. Catholic powers were untrustworthy in the longer term. Britain and Hanover played the role of balancer within the European state system partly to preserve their territorial security but also to ensure that protestantism survived. They ensured that neither France nor Austria could threaten other protestant states by attaining universal monarchy in Europe. Such a policy sometimes necessitated changing sides. Concern for the protestant interest might explain Townshend’s anti-Austrian policy in the 1720s. Louis XIV’s death and the ensuing minority had reduced French power so Austria now posed the greatest threat to the balance. In the 1730s both Austria and France were more evenly matched, hence Britain remained neutral in the War of the Polish succession. Gibson’s claim that Britain was bulwark of the protestant interest and keeper of the balance fits this logic.95 Was the ‘protestant interest’ simply outdated and anachronistic by the beginning of the eighteenth century? The wealth of references to the idea used in subsequent chapters refutes this argument at a factual level. There is a broader interpretative point. ‘Interest’ has often been regarded as a secular concept, associated with Machiavelli. However, J.A.W. Gunn, in his study of the rise of the concept in the seventeenth century, argues the spread of ‘interest’ arguments owed more to clerical preaching and the Duc de Rohan than to Machiavelli, who was widely disliked.96 A leading Huguenot aristocrat, the Duc de Rohan’s tract on interest was translated into English in 1640.97 When appropriated by English clerics and protestant nobles interest arguments could be disseminated widely in ways unthinkable when interest was associated with Machiavelli. The ‘protestant interest’, far from being a contradiction in terms with its unholy mixture of confession and realism, was a vital part of contemporary concerns.98

95

See p. 34. J.A.W. Gunn, Politics and the public interest in the seventeenth century (London, 1969), p. 38. 97 Henri, Duc de Rohan, A Treatise of the interest of the princes and states of Christendome trans. Henry Hunt (London, 1640). Rohan was a Huguenot aristocrat, writing for a catholic monarch. 98 The subtle interaction of ideology and interest was appreciated by Otto Hintze. See Hintze, ‘Calvinism and raison d’état in early seventeenth-century Brandenburg’, in idem, The historical essays of Otto Hintze ed. Felix Gilbert (New York, 1975), p. 95: ‘Man does not live by bread alone; he wants to have a good conscience when he pursues his vital interests; and in pursuing them he develops his powers fully only if he is conscious of simultaneously 96

40

BALANCE OF POWER AND PROTESTANT INTEREST

Jeremy Black contends confessional concerns were increasingly marginalised in the thinking of eighteenth-century European monarchs. The imperatives of the fiscal–military state had made it difficult for states to maintain religious uniformity. Consequently attitudes towards heterodoxy were relaxed. Black’s evidence comes predominantly from the second half of the eighteenth century.99 Chronology is often neglected in studies of both enlightened ideas and the balance of power. Just as catholic rulers did not suddenly decide in 1648 to accept the end of Christendom and the birth of a new community of states, as ahistorical international relations theory implies, neither did persecution by catholic rulers suddenly cease in 1700 because it was now the century of enlightenment. The linkage of balance of power, universal monarchy and the protestant interest is a reminder that arguments for toleration and enlightenment had to be made and won by protestant thinkers and emerged from debate. Some take the attempt to portray wars of religion as a cloak for self-interest as indicating that religion had ceased to be relevant.100 An alternative, and more plausible, interpretation is that, faced with catholic powers still perceived to be interested in spreading their religion by coercion, protestants concentrated on other arguments. First, they tended to forget that they had ever been interested in proselytising with the sword. Secondly, they blamed wars of religion exclusively on catholics. They were caused by scheming priests and papal desire for universal monarchy.101 Protestants could prevent wars of religion by defending the balance of power and thus avoid universal monarchy. The ways in which confessional conflict was conceptualised had been transformed. This form of argument was distinct from both the inter-confessional and apocalyptic strife of the seventeenth century and the arguments advanced by Edmund Burke in the 1790s, which saw an essential struggle between religion and atheism.102

serving purposes higher than purely egotistical ones. Interests without such spiritual elevation are lame; on the other hand, ideas can succeed in history only when and to the extent that they attach themselves to tangible interests.’ 99 Jeremy Black, ‘Confessional state or elect nation? Religion and identity in eighteenthcentury England’, in Claydon and McBride, eds, Protestantism and national identity, p. 70. 100 Luard, Balance of power, p. 26 interprets a remark from William III in this way. Arguably William was suggesting that talk of wars of religion was dangerous because it could potentially unite Austria and France. Johannes Burkhardt discusses the importance of a language of catholic confessional solidarity in, ‘Konfession als Argument in den zwischenstaatlichen Beziehungen: Friedenschancen und Religionskriegsgefahren in der Entspannungspolitik zwischen Ludwig XIV. und dem Kaiserhof’, in Heinz Duchhardt, ed., Rahmenbedingunen und Handlungsspielräume europäischer Außenpolitik im Zeitalter Ludwigs XIV. (Berlin, 1991), pp. 135–54. 101 Gibson, History of the affairs of Europe, p. 71. 102 ‘The Revolution consequently took the form of a war of religion in which for the first time, atheism usurped the place of theology: in this insight, Burke heralded the age of ideology which succeeded’ (Edmund Burke, Reflections on the revolution in France ed. J.C.D. 41

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

Protestant argument also emphasised the futility of religious wars by showing that conscience could not be coerced. The defence of the protestant interest relied more on states than transnational solidarity. Emphasising international law and the provisions of such treaties as Westphalia did not mean the defence of protestantism had been abandoned. Rather, law and the state were now viewed as the best means to ensure protestantism’s survival in a world where many thought that catholic princes ultimately aimed to destroy protestantism. In this analysis, it is unsurprising that attempts to interfere with the legal rights of protestants in the Holy Roman Empire or Poland were perceived as evidence of a real and continued threat. Furthermore, while accounts of Britain’s historic duty to defend the balance may seem fanciful and partial, they are a reminder that history has rarely been used dispassionately. For the eighteenth-century Briton and Hanoverian, the mission to defend the protestant interest against the threat of universal monarchy was ‘real’. It is against this background that it becomes possible to make sense of the reactions to diplomatic incidents described in subsequent chapters.

Clark (Stanford, 2001), p. 82). The textual basis for Clark’s claim can be found in Part IV of Burke’s text, which discusses revolutionary principles. In his An Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs (London, 1791), Burke describes the new toleration edicts issued by the National Assembly as a new form of persecution, aimed against all forms of conscience because of the disregard for all religion (p. 11). 42

2

Britain, Hanover and the protestant interest prior to the Hanoverian succession

The confessional politics of George I and George II were crucial to British and Hanoverian foreign policy in the first half of the eighteenth century. A sense of confessional unity brought Britain and Hanover together and also provided a justification for British involvement in continental politics. Concern with the protestant interest and the desirability of protestant monarchy did not begin in 1714, however. Rather George I and George II were part of the continuing drama of the protestant succession in Britain. This chapter considers both William III, a model protestant hero, and the changes which the Glorious Revolution of 1688–9 brought about. Constraints of space mean that the rich vein of scholarship on William III’s protestant credentials can only be mentioned briefly. Instead the focus is on themes important for the whole work: the shifting patterns of Hanoverian interest in the British thrones, the role played by Huguenots in the promotion of international protestant ideals and the concerns of protestants in the Empire about the fate of protestantism. Older accounts of the Glorious Revolution tended to see it as the triumph of whig constitutionalist politics – another, albeit important, step down the road towards progress and the triumph of reform in the nineteenth century. Recent accounts have been more sensitive to contemporary fears, such as the twin perils that James II’s government was believed to encapsulate – popery and arbitrary government. Worries from sections of the political nation about the likely effects of a catholic monarch, as well as fears about the direction of Charles II’s rule, had prompted attempts to exclude James from the succession in the latter years of his brother’s reign. The parties of the whigs and tories first began to form in this period.1 Whigs believed that both English liberties and the protestant religion would be threatened by a catholic monarch. Tories, on the other hand, argued that the rights of the crown, particularly over the succession, could not be altered by parliament. Succession was based upon indefeasible hereditary right, not human choice. Moreover it was argued that the Church of England had adequate legal protection and so could survive a

1

See Tim Harris, Politics under the later Stuarts (London, 1993), chs 3–4. 43

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

catholic king. These partisan divisions remained important well into the eighteenth century. The nature of partisan division was not simply about domestic policy; there were also international aspects to it. Whig ideas had grown out of the country opposition to Charles II in the 1670s. Country thinkers, such as Anthony Ashley Cooper, first earl of Shaftesbury, argued that the court had become corrupt and was tainted by its associations with Louis XIV’s France. In 1672, when Louis had invaded the United Provinces, Charles’s alliance with Louis meant that the English found themselves fighting against their protestant co-religionists on the side of a catholic power. Charles had withdrawn from the conflict by 1674. Yet the fear remained that a catholic successor would continue a pro-French, pro-catholic, anti-protestant foreign policy. Louis XIV was the bogeyman of protestant Europe. Regardless of his personal attitude towards faith, he was perceived to be a threat to the liberties of Europe, hellbent on attaining universal monarchy. Papists naturally desired universal monarchy. The expulsion of protestants from France after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685 confirmed protestants’ worst fears. 1685 was an annus terribilis for European protestantism with the accession of a catholic monarch in England, the expulsion of protestants from France and the transfer of the Palatine electoral title to a catholic following the last protestant elector’s death. William of Orange’s arrival at Torbay in November 1688 reassured not just English aristocrats, worried about the Church of England, but concerned protestants throughout Europe. As Tony Claydon has shown, William was well aware of the advantages that could accrue to him by stressing his protestant credentials.2 William was happy to accept the mantle of defender of protestantism and hammer of the French. There was a close interaction between the two roles. As a British diplomat at Regensburg commented to Nottingham, the secretary of state, William’s victories in Ireland were a sign of divine favour and ‘all the Empire looks upon it as a good omen of their future deliverance from the French yoke’.3 Just as James’s catholicism was both a domestic and a foreign threat, so William could combat arbitrary government at home and the threat of popery, epitomised by Louis XIV’s France, abroad. William quickly moved to involve England in the Nine Years War on the side of the United Provinces and the Empire. As has been well documented elsewhere, England was transformed in the 1690s.4 William brought with him from the Dutch republic financial

2

See Tony Claydon, William III and the Godly revolution (Cambridge, 1996) and more recently William III (London, 2002), pp. 133–43. 3 Hughes to Nottingham, Regensburg, 15/11/1691, Public Record Office [hereafter PRO], State Papers [hereafter SP] 81/166, fol. 116r. Hughes claimed to have been representing William’s interest in Regensburg prior to 1688. The Repertorium der diplomatischen Vertreter aller Länder (3 vols, Oldenburg, Zurich and Graz, 1936–65), i, p. 186 lists Hughes simply as secretary in Regensburg from 1689 to February 1694. 4 See Geoffrey Holmes, ed., Britain after the Glorious Revolution, 1689–1714 (London, 44

PROTESTANT INTEREST BEFORE 1714

know-how that enabled first the English, and later the British, state to finance war more cheaply than its competitors through such innovations as the Bank of England, founded in 1694, and the national debt. Financial and political changes were closely intertwined. William called parliament more frequently than his Stuart predecessors because he needed parliamentary approval for extraordinary tax expenditure to fund war. Thus it was the necessities of war rather than an ability to foresee a whiggish script of historical progress that turned parliament from an event into an institution. Parliament had a positive effect on the nation’s ability to raise loans because financial markets quickly realised that a system backed by some form of popular consent was less likely to lead to defaults than the absolutist systems of the continent.5 The early modern state was a war machine. The intention, even if not the effect, of changes to the state in the 1690s was to make this machine function more efficiently. William’s enemy was clear – Louis XIV’s France. Thus the Glorious Revolution was accompanied by a revolution in foreign policy.6 William quickly turned his back on the pro-French policies of his Stuart forebears. This was, in some ways, a counter-revolution, a return to the norm, rather than a revolution.7 The rejection of the French alliance could be assimilated into a broader tradition which saw Britain’s historic role as balancing the overmighty states of Europe and defeating aspirant universal monarchs.8 William’s involvement of England in continental warfare had crucial long-term implications. It was through the twenty-five years of war against Louis XIV in the Nine Years War and then the War of the Spanish succession that England and then Britain (after the 1707 Act of Union) emerged as a great power. For most of the seventeenth century England had been a bit player on the European stage. By 1713 Britain could justifiably claim to be not only the arbiter of Europe but to hold the balance of power between the European states. Secondly, the strategy pursued by William and then followed by his political heirs, at least in foreign policy terms, the whigs, was one of continental involvement. For much of the first half of the eighteenth century royal predilections and whig political dominance combined to ensure that continental involvement would remain the cornerstone of British policy. The two were mutually reinforcing. George I favoured the whigs on his accession in 1714 because they, unlike the

1969), John Brewer, The sinews of power (London, 1989), Craig Rose, England in the 1690s (Oxford, 1999). 5 Thomas Ertman, Birth of the Leviathan (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 208–23. Unlike others, Ertman believes that many of the institutional aspects of the financial changes of the 1690s represent the continuation of trends from the period 1660–1688 (p. 208). 6 Paradigmatic: G.C. Gibbs, ‘The revolution in foreign policy’, in Holmes, ed., Britain after the Glorious Revolution, pp. 59–79. For a contrasting perspective see Jeremy Black, Parliament and foreign policy in the eighteenth century (Cambridge, 2004), p. 5. 7 Gibbs, ‘Revolution in foreign policy’, p. 59. 8 See ch. 1. 45

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

tories, had wanted to continue the war against Louis XIV and had opposed the separate peace made at Utrecht. A whig historical tradition of separateness, difference from, and superiority to the continent disguises an early eighteenthcentury whig politics of continental involvement, awareness and participation. The whig politics of involvement contrasted with the tory politics of isolation and blue water. The tensions between these two competing views are explored throughout the present work. To understand George I and George II, it is important to appreciate how they viewed themselves as protestant heroes and defenders of the balance of power. Inheritance and succession were important for all European monarchs but the relationship between William and his Hanoverian successors was forged with a particular sort of succession in mind. Whilst 1688 did not bring to an end ideas of hereditary monarchy – tories could comfort themselves with the fact that Mary, William’s wife, was James II’s eldest daughter – parliament had spoken decisively on one issue. The British thrones were henceforward to be restricted to protestants. The principle was included in the Bill of Rights (1689) and was restated in the Act of Settlement (1701). The Act of Settlement named Sophia, dowager electress of Hanover and the heirs of her body ‘being protestants’ as heirs to the English throne.9 Why had an obscure German princess been named heir to the British thrones? William and Mary had no children when they returned to Britain in 1688 and Mary died childless in 1694. William showed no signs of remarrying. However, Mary’s sister Anne was married to George, prince of Denmark, and it seemed likely that she might produce an heir to continue the protestant line and avoid recourse to the catholic Stuarts. Indeed in 1688 Anne had borne a son, William Henry, duke of Gloucester, and, although all her other children had died in infancy, William survived. However in July 1700, the duke of Gloucester died, leaving the succession wide open again. William III introduced the Act of Settlement to ensure Sophia was named Anne’s heir.

Hanover and the succession Sophia was protestant and so she leapfrogged over fifty or so closer blood relations to claim the throne. She was the daughter of Frederick V, elector Palatine, and Elizabeth, the eldest daughter of James VI and I and Anne of Denmark. Thus her maternal grandfather had been king of England and Scotland and her parents were potent symbols of the protestant cause – expelled from Prague as tragic ‘Winter King and Queen’ of Bohemia at the

9

Technically the Scottish parliament still had the right to name their own successor to the Scottish throne. The need to ensure a unified succession was one of the chief motivations behind the Union negotiations of 1707. 46

PROTESTANT INTEREST BEFORE 1714

start of the Thirty Years War. Sophia had married Ernst August, the youngest son of the cadet branch of the house of Brunswick in 1658. The house of Brunswick was divided into the senior branch of BrunswickWolfenbüttel and the junior branch of Brunswick-Lüneburg. Both branches were members of the Guelph family. The Guelphs had a long and noble heritage. In the twelfth century Henry the Lion had been the most powerful prince in Germany, duke of both Saxony and Bavaria. The Emperor Frederick Barbarossa, jealous of his powerful vassal, deprived Henry of all his lands, except those in north-west Germany. Henry went into exile in England (he was married to Henry II’s daughter, Mathilda) but eventually returned to Germany in 1184. His grandson, Otto, was granted the territories of Brunswick-Lüneburg and it was from him that the Guelphs were descended. By the seventeenth century the original territories had been divided. Moreover, the Guelphs gained little from the territorial carve-up that followed the Peace of Westphalia (1648). Brandenburg-Prussia gained Halberstedt and Minden and Sweden gained Bremen and Verden (all had formerly been bishoprics; now they were secularised). All the Guelphs received was the right to be ‘bishop’ of Osnabrück in alternation with a catholic prince. From this unpromising situation Ernst August, the first Guelph bishop of Osnabrück, tried to improve his family’s position.10 Ernst August had three elder brothers.11 The Brunswick-Lüneburg family held the titles of duke of Celle and duke of Calenberg or Hanover. Celle was regarded by his elder brothers as the more important – each succeeded to the Celle title, having previously been duke of Calenberg. Through a series of complicated alliances, deals and marriages Ernst August improved the family’s power through territorial consolidation. He married his son, Georg Ludwig, to his brother’s (Georg Wilhelm) only daughter to ensure that those two branches of the family’s holdings would ultimately have the same ruler, thus uniting the Celle and Calenberg titles in one person. By 1692, Ernst August had been largely successful. He had shown himself to be a smart political operator and a useful ally. He had been noticed by the Emperor. Ernst August had ensured that Hanover took an active role in the Emperor’s wars against the Turks in the 1680s. The Emperor was worried about French influence on the the electors of Mainz, Cologne and Trier. The elector Palatine, whose territories bordered France, had always been open to French influence. It was rumoured that French influence was also growing at the Wittelsbach court in Munich. The Emperor was also concerned about the growing power of Brandenburg and Saxony. The Emperor wanted a strong ally in north Germany but Ernst August’s allegiance came at a price. He wanted to be raised to electoral status. Ernst August sought to make this a condition of his various

10

For what follows see Ragnhild Hatton, George I (London, 1978), pp. 22–4 and ch. 2. Both the genealogical table and the map illustrating Hanoverian territorial expansion clarify these points (see pp. xv and xiv). 11

47

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

alliances with both the Emperor and France in the 1680s. In 1692 the Emperor finally agreed. Thus when Ernst August died in 1698, his eldest son and heir, Georg Ludwig, became an elector, secure in the knowledge that when his uncle (and father-in-law) Georg Wilhelm, the duke of Celle, died, the process of territorial consolidation would be complete.12 Ernst August’s primary interest, like that of many of his contemporaries, was in state-building. When an attempt to include Sophia’s name amongst the possible protestant successors to William and Mary failed in 1689, Ernst August was unmoved.13 Ernst August displayed little interest in his wife’s prospects in England. Such prospects looked remote while the duke of Gloucester lived. Moreover it was his wife who was the prospective heir and not Ernst August – why should he sacrifice his own interests to become the powerless partner of a ruling sovereign?14 Being strongly identified with the protestant cause was not necessarily in Ernst August’s best interests either. Germany was already a fertile recruiting ground for troops and the soldier trade.15 Like other princes with an eye for the main chance, Ernst August was willing to listen to any offers for his regiments. William tried to entice Ernst August away from France in 1688 with talk of a possible succession for Sophia but Ernst August discovered what Louis XIV was prepared to offer before committing himself.16 Ernst August was not finally separated from France until 1692. Even then he flirted with the idea of conversion to catholicism because he thought it might make the Emperor and the catholic electors more susceptible to his claims to become an elector.17 Guelph interest in the protestant succession was most strongly maintained not by Ernst August but by his elder brother Georg Wilhelm, the duke of Celle. Georg Wilhelm was close to William III.18 He had put Celle’s considerable military resources at William’s disposal. It was during a visit to Celle in 1698 that the possibility of the succession was discussed by William, Georg Wilhelm and representatives of Sophia and her son Georg Ludwig, who had succeeded to the electoral title on his father’s death earlier that year.19 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, who was closer to Sophia than to her son, was also a strong supporter

12 The basis for this summary account of Ernst August’s state-building is Georg Schnath, Geschichte Hannovers im Zeitalter der neunten Kur und der englischen Sukzession, 1674–1714 (4 vols, Hildesheim, 1938–1982), i, book 2, chs 6–12. Schnath’s work is an invaluable source of both analysis and evidence. 13 Schnath, Geschichte Hannovers, iv, p. 4. 14 Ibid., p. 5. 15 See Peter H. Wilson, German armies (London, 1998), chs 1–3. 16 Waltraut Fricke, Leibniz und die englische Sukzession des Hauses Hannover (Hildesheim, 1957), p. 8. 17 Hatton, George I, pp. 45–6, Heinz Duchhardt, Protestantische Kaisertum und altes Reich (Wiesbaden, 1977), pp. 229–30. 18 Hatton, George I, pp. 82–6. 19 Schnath, Geschichte Hannovers, iv, pp. 9–10.

48

PROTESTANT INTEREST BEFORE 1714

of the Hanoverian succession and even claimed to have been instrumental in raising the issue in 1698.20 Sophia may have had some misgivings about a possible succession to the English throne, but she was far from opposed to the idea. One reason for her doubts was that she would be replacing her Stuart cousins. She had been brought up in exile as a religious refugee in The Hague after her parents had lost their Palatine lands. Yet she had also known her Stuart cousins there when they had been forced out of England after the execution of her uncle, Charles I, in 1649. Her brother, Rupert, had been one of the Stuarts’ leading generals in the 1640s. Yet Sophia had no sympathy for the religious difficulties that had forced her cousins into exile again after 1688. Sophia had been brought up in the reformed faith. She, together with Prussia and William III, had ensured that Huguenot exiles in Hanover were able to erect a church. Her faith was not narrowly confessional in the way so often characteristic of early modern Germany. She had a healthy protestant enlightened scepticism about priestcraft in all its forms. Schnath records her comment to Strafford in 1714 that all confessions were equal to her, so long as they were directed against the pope, the antichrétien universal.21 This attitude perhaps also explains her unwillingness after she had been named as Anne’s heir to accede to English requests to appoint an Anglican chaplain. She was pleased to receive a copy of the Book of Common Prayer with her name included in the appropriate state prayers but was irritated that she had twelve copies – there were not nearly enough English speakers at the Hanoverian court to justify its use.22 When pressed on the issue again several years later, she claimed that the German version of the Book of Common Prayer was too boring and she still knew the liturgy by heart from her childhood so there was no need for her to repeat it regularly.23 Sophia was aware of the importance of her protestant credentials for the succession. Two of her letters to Anne show that her interest in confessional concerns was not simply related to her future prospects. In February 1713 Sophia wrote to Anne to ask for her support for the Marquis de Rochegude’s efforts to free protestants condemned to the galleys in France.24 Sophia’s last letter to Anne expressed her dissatisfaction at the contents of the schism bill which attacked religious dissenters. Sophia opposed persecution and also thought the bill ridiculous because it would prevent Britons from

20 Fricke, Leibniz und die englische Sukzession, p. 13. Leibniz had first entered Hanoverian service when Johann Friedrich was duke of Calenberg and did not enjoy a good relationship with either Ernst August or his son (ibid., p. 3). 21 Schnath, Geschichte Hannovers, iii, p. 67. 22 Schnath, Geschichte Hannovers, iv, p. 57. 23 Ibid., p. 205. 24 Sophia to Anne, Hanover, 14/2/1713 in Schnath, Geschichte Hannovers, iv, p. 711. Rochegude’s broader campaign is mentioned in Laurence Huey Boles jr, The Huguenots, the protestant interest, and the War of the Spanish succession, 1702–1714 (New York, 1997), pp. 202–9.

49

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

attending Lutheran services in Hanover.25 Ultimately, Sophia was to predecease Anne by six weeks and so it was her son, and not the dowager electress, who succeeded to the British thrones.

Huguenot influence Sophia’s concern for the fate of French protestants is a reminder of the impact that the expulsion of the Huguenots had on Europe. The Huguenot diaspora after 1685 was an important source of resistance to Louis XIV. From Switzerland, Germany, the Low Countries and Britain, Huguenot exiles reminded their new neighbours of the threat that France and Louis posed to the liberties of Europe. Networks of exiles were important both for commerce and communication. Huguenots appear frequently in the story of the protestant succession in Britain prior to 1714. Wilhelm Beuleke produced the definitive history of Huguenots in Lower Saxony, based primarily on church records, in 1960.26 His statistical analysis showed that the view that, after Prussia, Celle had taken more Huguenots than anywhere else in Germany was wrong.27 However what Beuleke fails to address is why the impression might have arisen in the first place. Some Huguenots were able to exercise an influence disproportionate to their numerical strength. The best example of this from the court of Celle is at its apex. Georg Wilhelm’s wife, Eléonore Desmier d’Olbreuse, was born near Poitou in 1639.28 About a third of the Huguenots at Celle came from this area of France.29 Eléonore had met Georg Wilhelm at Kassel in 1662 and so had left France before the revocation.30 Eléonore’s patronage made Celle attractive for Huguenots after 1685. Like her husband, she was a close friend of William III. Jean de Robethon was a recipient of Georg Wilhelm’s patronage. Robethon’s father was an advocate in the Parlément of Paris. Robethon fled from France to England and was naturalised in 1693. He became Georg Wilhelm’s legation secretary in London in that year. In 1698 he accompanied the earl of Portland on his mission to Paris and he subsequently became William III’s private

25

Schnath, Geschichte Hannovers, iv, p. 398. Wilhelm Beuleke, Die Hugenotten in Niedersachsen (Hildesheim, 1960). 27 Beuleke, Hugenotten, p. 16. 28 Ibid., p. 104. 29 Ibid., p. 195. 30 Her position was also complicated because Georg Wilhelm had agreed to refrain from marriage in an agreement with Ernst August, designed to bring about the consolidation of Brunswick-Lüneburg territories. Georg Wilhelm had originally been engaged to Sophia and Ernst August insisted when stepping in to preserve family honour that Georg Wilhelm agree not to produce legitimate heirs. Ernst August was therefore doubly keen that Georg Ludwig marry Georg Wilhelm and Eléonore’s daughter. The marriage would ensure that Ernst August’s original dynastic intentions would still succeed. 26

50

PROTESTANT INTEREST BEFORE 1714

secretary. When William died, Robethon transferred his service back to Celle and then to Hanover, on Georg Wilhelm’s death in 1705.31 Robethon was closely involved in both the fight against Louis XIV and the quest to secure a protestant succession in Britain. He personified a continuity of personnel to complement that continuity of ideas between William III and George I. Pierre de Falaiseu was another Huguenot in an influential position. Falaiseau had previously been a diplomat in Brandenburg service but he had moved to London and from there, he used his contacts with whig politicians to provide Leibniz and Sophia with information on the succession question.32 The Celle (and subsequently Hanoverian) extraordinary envoy in London from 1693 to 1710 was Ludwig Justus Sinold (called von Schütz). He was the son of the former chancellor of Celle and brother-in-law to the then chancellor, Andreas Gottlieb von Bernstorff. Sinold was married to Anne des Lescours, a Huguenot and one of Eléonore’s ladies-in-waiting.33 Guillaume Beyrie, another Huguenot, was secretary (and after 1706 resident) at the Hanoverian mission in London.34 Bernstorff, although not Huguenot, worked closely with Robethon and also moved from Georg Wilhelm’s to Georg Ludwig’s service in 1705. The Williamite–Celle–Huguenot–Hanover link worked in many ways but there was an effective pro-protestant pressure group at a high level.35

Hanover and confession in the Empire Georg Ludwig was hardly a friend of catholicism. Unlike his father who professed confessional indifference, he was an orthodox Lutheran.36 Schnath

31 Schnath, Geschichte Hannovers, ii, p. 241, D.C.A. Agnew, Protestant exiles from France (3rd edn, 2 vols, London, 1886), ii, pp. 199–207. See also R. Pauli, ‘Jean Robethon und die Thronfolge des braunschweig-lüneburgischen Hauses in England’, Nachrichten von der Königl. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften und der Georg-Augusts-Universität zu Göttingen, 16 (1881), pp. 409–37. 32 Schnath, Geschichte Hannovers, iv, p. 63. 33 Ibid., p. 53. 34 Ibid., p. 54. 35 For the more general importance of the Huguenots, see Robin Gwynn, ‘The Huguenots in Britain, the “Protestant International” and the defeat of Louis XIV’, in Randolph Vigne and Charles Littleton, eds, From strangers to citizens (Brighton, 2001), pp. 412–24. . 36 Schnath, Geschichte Hannovers, iii, p. 61. Georg Ludwig’s correspondence contains very little on religion. However in a letter to his mother from Venice in December 1686 Georg Ludwig reported that several days earlier a number of gondolas full of nobles had overturned. Georg Ludwig commented that this was a sign of divine justice. No one had drowned but God had not wanted to punish those who deserved the fires of Hell with water as well. See Georg Ludwig to Sophia, Venice, 12/7/1686 reproduced in Georg Schnath, ‘Briefe des Prinzen und Kurfürsten Georg Ludwig (Georgs I.) an seine Mutter Sophie 1681–1704’, Niedersächsisches Jahrbuch für Landesgeschichte, 48 (1976), p. 264.

51

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

attributes the delays in building a catholic church in Hanover to Georg Ludwig’s unwillingness to observe the concessions that his father had made to catholics in the electoral treaty. A tough anti-catholic edict of 1713 reflected the elector’s own views and those of Bernstorff, his chief minister.37 Georg Ludwig’s and Bernstorff’s dislike of catholics was not simply a domestic concern. As subsequent chapters show, confession remained an important political issue in the Empire. Schnath makes much of Hanoverian concern about the confession of the Saxon electoral prince. Saxony, as the senior protestant electorate, held the directorate of the Corpus Evangelicorum, the umbrella organisation for protestants at the Reichstag in Regensburg. However, in 1697 Augustus the Strong of Saxony had converted to catholicism to ensure his election to the Polish throne. Protestant concern centred thereafter on the confession of his eldest son. In 1711 Rudolf Johann von Wrisberg, representing Hanover at the Diet to elect a new Emperor, became concerned by reports of conversations between a papal nuncio and the Saxon prince. Georg Ludwig reacted by dispatching one of his courtiers, Kraft von Erffa, to Italy in an effort to prevent the prince’s conversion. Georg Ludwig also sought Anne’s support for this mission. Ultimately Georg Ludwig was unable to prevent the conversion but his involvement is significant.38 Bernstorff argued it was necessary for Hanover to intervene in the neighbouring bishopric of Hildesheim to protect protestant rights.39 St John, the tory secretary of state, was irritated by Hanoverian actions. He was uninterested in the rights and wrongs of the situation in Hildesheim but he wanted the dispute brought to a rapid conclusion because it was delaying the dispatch of Prussian recruits to Italy.40 Before exploring Hanoverian attitudes towards protestantism during the War of the Spanish succession it is necessary to consider a final local example – the relationship with the senior branch of the family in Wolfenbüttel. Georg Ludwig and his uncle, Georg Wilhelm, had invaded Wolfenbüttel in 1702 to prevent Wolfenbüttel from launching a pro-French attack from within the Reich. Wolfenbüttel was persuaded to side with the Emperor against France. The alliance led in 1708 to the marriage of one of Duke Anton Ulrich’s granddaughters to Charles III of Spain, the Emperor’s brother. The Hanoverians were keenly interested in Habsburg marriages – Georg Ludwig’s eldest son had married Caroline of Ansbach after the latter had refused a Habsburg marriage because it would entail renouncing her protestant faith.

37

Schnath, Geschichte Hannovers, iii, pp. 68–9. Ibid., pp. 80–5. For Wrisberg’s later efforts to support protestantism in Regensburg, see chs 3–4. 39 As reported in d’Alais’s letter to an unknown recipient, Hanover, 17/2/1711, PRO, SP 81/164. 40 St John to d’Alais, Whitehall, 10/4/1711, PRO, SP 104/48. St John’s views on the protestant interest are considered further below. 38

52

PROTESTANT INTEREST BEFORE 1714

Elizabeth Christina of Wolfenbüttel did not share Caroline’s confessional scruples and was willing to convert. Concerns arose in England because several German protestant theologians had approved the conversion. In particular Fabricius, a professor at the university of Helmstedt, had given the match his blessing. This created difficulties for Georg Ludwig because Helmstedt was partially funded by Hanover and partially by Wolfenbüttel. Several English pamphleteers, including the tory Andrew Snape,41 thought that this was evidence of Georg Ludwig’s unsuitability as a defender of protestantism and, were he to succeed, the Church of England might be endangered. Georg Ludwig made clear that not all German theologians shared Fabricius’s view in an effort to convince his future subjects of his protestant credentials. 42 Robethon helped to calm Anglican fears about the potential links between Lutheranism and popery by composing a statement denying any connection. The document was shown to leading clerics. Robethon used his uncle, the Huguenot minister Claude Groteste de la Mothe. La Mothe was closely connected to Archbishop Tenison and dined frequently with Hanoverian diplomats in London.43 Huguenots were important supporters of the protestant succession in a period in which religion was a staple of partisan debate in England. Worries about the position and safety of the Church of England were more characteristic of tories, like Snape, than whigs. Whigs were more broadly ‘protestant’ in their outlook. However tories were not entirely uninterested in European protestantism. In 1710 secretary Boyle wrote to Wich, a British diplomat in Hamburg, that Anne was irritated to hear that the duke of Wolfenbüttel had given a Lutheran church to the catholics. She wanted to hear the full details of this, and other plans, so that she could intervene to prevent such evils.44 The church transfer was explained a few months later when d’Alais reported that Duke Anton Ulrich had, like his granddaughter, converted to catholicism. The duke claimed his conversion would not harm the rights of his protestant subjects.45 Georg Ludwig was well aware of the dangers that princely conversion posed for the protestant interest in Germany. Indeed Anton Ulrich’s example and the sense that one family conversion inevitably led to another may even explain the intensity of Georg Ludwig’s efforts in 1711 to prevent the Saxon electoral prince’s conversion. Even Anne realised the dangers. Many refugees had arrived in England from the Palatinate in 1709 and 1710 claiming that

41

Snape was a famous clerical controversialist – he was deeply engaged in the Bangorian controversy of 1717. 42 Schnath, Geschichte Hannovers, iv, pp. 193–4. 43 Phyliss Bultmann and William A. Bultmann, ‘Claude Groteste de la Mothe and the Church of England, 1685 to 1713’, Proceedings of the Huguenot Society of London, 20 (1958–1964), pp. 97–100. 44 Boyle to Wich, Whitehall, 31/1/1710, PRO, SP 104/212. 45 d’Alais to [Boyle?], Hanover, 29/4/1710, PRO, SP 81/163. 53

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

they were fleeing persecution. The elector Palatine had become a catholic in 1685.46 Georg Ludwig was keen to protect protestantism within the Empire and he was also aware of the importance of his protestant credentials for his claims to the British thrones. Further evidence of this twin approach can be seen in the ways in which protestantism surfaced in discussion of the declaration of war against France in 1702 and in attitudes towards the eventual ending of the War of the Spanish succession.

The War of the Spanish succession Protestants within the Empire viewed the outbreak of the War of the Spanish succession as a chance to press their own claims. William III had ordered Charles Whitworth to depart for Regensburg almost immediately after hostilities had broken out between Britain, the United Provinces and France.47 William wanted Whitworth to ensure the Empire declared war against France. By the time Whitworth arrived in Regensburg William was dead and Anne was upon the throne. In one of his first letters from Regensburg Whitworth reported that he had been questioned by a representative of the reformed in the Palatinate about whether William had ever given any orders in response to a letter they had sent him detailing their religious plight. Should another application for aid be made to Anne and how should Whitworth react to similar requests in the future?48 Palatine protestants were particularly concerned by an article in the Treaty of Ryswick (1697). The fourth article allowed churches that had been given to catholics by Louis XIV during his occupation of the Palatinate in the Nine Years War to remain in catholic hands even after the peace and French withdrawal. This suited the catholic elector. The Peace of Westphalia had supposedly frozen the confessional balance in the Reich and further changes were not allowed. Approval by the Reich of the 1697 treaty therefore enabled a shift in the confessional balance that would not otherwise have been licit. Palatine protestants had naturally objected to the agreement and the Reichstag had been disrupted because protestants refused to accept it. The Emperor’s need for the Empire’s support for a further war against France in 1702 provided an excellent opportunity, from the protestants’ point of view, to exert pressure on the Emperor to redress their grievance over

46

On the emigration of the ‘Poor Palatines’ see Walter A. Knittle, The early eighteenthcentury Palatine emigration (Philadelphia, 1936). For a perspective with less emphasis on religious persecution, see William O’Reilly, ‘The Naturalization Act of 1709 and the settlement of Germans in Britain, Ireland and the colonies’, in Vigne and Littleton, eds, From strangers to citizens, pp. 492–502. 47 For Whitworth’s later concern with protestant affairs, see ch. 3. 48 Whitworth to Hedges, Regensburg, 15/6/1702, British Library [hereafter BL], Additional Manuscripts [hereafter Add. MSS] 37348, fol. 44. 54

PROTESTANT INTEREST BEFORE 1714

Ryswick. Whitworth reported in early September that the reformed had met recently to consider their position on the declaration of war.49 Whitworth subsequently reported that some protestants maintained the Ryswick treaty would be annulled by the declaration of war. They also wanted strong assurances from the Emperor that their grievances would be addressed before they would consent to the declaration of war.50 The protestants wanted a statement in the declaration of war that the lands recovered from France would be returned to their confessional status as established in 1648. Catholics simply wanted a reaffirmation of previous peace treaties (including, presumably, Ryswick).51 The protestants at Regensburg had already asked William for support. Anne indicated that she might also help and Whitworth was shown a draft of a letter to her. Whitworth thought it odd that a letter asking for help in religious matters should not make any reference to, or even use, Anne’s title of Fidei Defensor. Christoph Schrader, envoy from Celle, concurred with Whitworth that it would be sensible to use this title so the Saxon minister added it to the draft.52 Anne replied in positive terms to the request for help in protecting protestant liberties,53 describing herself as ‘la Chef de l’Interêt Protestant’.54 Whitworth noted later that some protestants had been as concerned by Anne’s temerity in using the expression ‘Chef de l’Interêt Protestant’ as ‘pleased with her Majesty for the Welfare of their Religion’.55 Whitworth was exasperated by protestant pettiness. He was concerned that protestant failure to agree to the declaration of war was allowing France and Bavaria to claim that the Emperor’s actions were confessionally motivated and designed to harm the catholic religion. Regensburg’s position, surrounded by Bavarian territory, made it unwise to overplay confession.56 Both in Whitehall and Regensburg the malicious influence of a papal anti-Christ was seen in Bavarian and French actions.57 In London the issue of troops was becoming more pressing – the failure of the Empire to dispatch troops meant that

49 Whitworth to Hedges, Regensburg, 10/9/1702, ibid., fol. 210. Whitworth consistently used ‘reformed’ to refer to both Calvinists and Lutherans. It was reasonably common to see ‘reformed’ as synonymous with ‘protestant’. A sense of common interest could be constructed relatively easily. The growth in the use of the term Anglican might be both symptom and cause of a growing sense of difference between mainstream, established English protestantism and its continental equivalents. 50 Whitworth to Hedges, Regensburg, 14/9/1702, PRO, SP 81/167, fol. 113v. 51 Whitworth to Hedges, Regensburg, 25/9/1702, BL, Add. MSS 37348, fol. 247. 52 Whitworth to Hedges, Regensburg, 30/11/1702, BL, Add. MSS 37349, fol. 61. 53 Whitworth to Hedges, Regensburg, 26/3/1703, PRO, SP 81/168, fol. 189. 54 A copy of the Memorial with this expression, dated 15/3/1703 can be found in ibid., fol. 192. 55 Whitworth to Hedges, Regensburg, 2/4/1703, ibid., fol. 206r. 56 Whitworth to Hedges, Regensburg, 16/4/1703, BL, Add. MSS 37350, fols 145–6. 57 Whitworth to Hedges, Regensburg, 23/4/1703, ibid., fols 162–4.

55

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

Imperial contingents had not yet joined British and Dutch troops in the field. Anne wrote to the protestants asking them to send their troops as soon as possible.58 The Corpus responded that they hoped that Whitworth would be instructed to press the catholics to sort out the religious grievances and that, at the very least, no Ryswick-style provisions would be included in any future peace treaty. Whitworth pressed for the troops’ dispatch but nothing happened.59 Bavarian troops encircled Regensburg and the Diet broke up without a decision. The protestants decided not to reconvene elsewhere so Whitworth returned to Vienna. In a private letter from Vienna he expressed his frustrations. He described Prussia as the leader of the protestant interest in Germany but was angry that Prussia had not done more to take advantage of Anne’s offer to help. Prussia had used religion to gain credit with other protestant princes while pursuing an independent agenda. 60 Whitworth himself, and other British and Hanoverian diplomats, would have cause on a number of occasions to question the motivations behind Prussian policy at the Diet. The importance of the abolition of the Ryswick clause will also feature prominently in later chapters. Events, such as a declaration of war or an approval of peace, requiring the Empire’s consent were classic occasions to raise protestant complaints. Concerns about protestant rights in the Empire resurfaced in 1709 when there was talk of a settlement. Anne’s initial peace conditions included French acceptance of the protestant succession, the expulsion of the Pretender from France, demolition of the fortifications at Dunkirk, and all of Spain going to the Habsburg Charles III. A separate barrier treaty was to be agreed with the Dutch, also including guarantees of the protestant succession. In her instructions to Marlborough and Townshend, Anne noted ‘as we think ourselves obliged to exert our Zeal on all proper occasions in behalf of the Protestant Religion’, her diplomats should do all they could to ensure Huguenot civil and religious rights were restored.61 The injunction appeared before anything about commercial matters perhaps indicating the relative importance attached to each by the queen. There were other issues of protestant concern. The Swiss soldier and diplomat François de Pesme, Seigneur de St Saphorin,62 was adamant in a

58 Whitworth to Hedges, Regensburg, 11/6/1703, ibid., fol. 254 confirmed delivery of her letter. 59 Whitworth to Hedges, Regensburg, 9/7/1703, PRO, SP 81/168, fols 350–1. 60 Whitworth to Tucker, Vienna, private, BL, Add. MSS 37351, fols 36–8. 61 Anne’s Instructions for Marlborough and Townshend, St James’s, 2/5/1709, PRO, SP 84/233. 62 On St Saphorin, as he was generally known, see Theo Gehling, Ein europäischer Diplomat am Kaiserhof zu Wien: François Louis de Pesme, Seigneur de Saint-Saphorin als englischer Resident am Wiener Hof, 1718–1727 (Bonn, 1964). There is also an entry for him in the online Oxford DNB.

56

PROTESTANT INTEREST BEFORE 1714

memo sent to Robethon in January 1714 that the Spanish Netherlands must be kept out of French hands to preserve the balance of power and ensure the survival of protestantism.63 Robethon had worried in instructions to Hans Kaspar von Bothmer in November 1711 that French domination of Europe would lead to slavery. Maintaining a barrier in the Low Countries would ensure that the English did not slip back to their former policy of continental neglect.64 Bothmer presented Georg Ludwig’s objections to the preliminary peace articles to Anne’s ministers and, on receiving no response, circulated copies. The memorial found its way into print, caused a minor storm and it was only then that Anne learnt of its existence.65 As the various European powers considered peace proposals, thoughts in Hanover turned to the protection of protestant rights. Georg Ludwig placed the abolition of the Ryswick clause high on a list of priorities for the forthcoming peace negotiations drawn up in 1709.66 When negotiations moved to Utrecht, the priority remained.67 Bothmer was accredited to the negotiations at Utrecht (he had failed in a similar attempt to be included at Ryswick in 1697) and so could push Georg Ludwig’s agenda. His efforts were not well rewarded. He was unable to introduce a more precise acknowledgement from the French that Sophia and the heirs of her body should succeed to the British thrones. Instead the more ambiguous expression ‘heredes’ was left in place.68 Georg Ludwig was bitterly disappointed that the Ryswick clause was not removed and he blamed the English for not supporting protestant demands properly.69 Georg Ludwig distrusted the tory ministry of St John and Harley and was further irritated when Anne concluded a separate peace without her allies. The Hanoverians were unconvinced that Louis XIV would keep his promises to acknowledge a Hanoverian succession. Recent experience suggested Louis could not be trusted. Prior to the Treaty of Ryswick in 1697, Louis had promised to restore the seized churches to protestants. He had reneged on this commitment, just as he had gone back on his partition treaty commitments of 1698 and 1700.70 Lack of good faith was a characteristic that protestants particularly associated with catholic princes.

63

Schnath, Geschichte Hannovers, iv, p. 356. For St Saphorin’s contributions to the defence of the protestant interest in the 1720s, see ch. 3. 64 ‘Memoire instructif pour le Baron de Bothmar’, Göhrde, 7/11/1711 reproduced in Onno Klopp, Der Fall des Hauses Stuart und die Succession des Hauses Hannover (14 vols, Vienna, 1875–88), xiv, pp. 688–92. 65 Edward Gregg, Queen Anne (London, 1980), pp. 346–7. 66 Schnath, Geschichte Hannovers, iii, p. 711. 67 Schnath, Geschichte Hannovers, iv, p. 272. 68 Ibid., pp. 309–10. Bothmer had been sent back to London when news of potential negotiations had first emerged to be on hand if needed (ibid., p. 255). 69 Ibid., pp. 310–11. 70 Ibid., p. 313. 57

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

Anne’s efforts to gain the removal of Ryswick were viewed more sceptically after the conclusion of a separate peace.71 John Robinson, bishop of Bristol, and Strafford, the plenipotentiaries at Utrecht, told St John that one reason for the delay in resolving the Ryswick issue was that the German protestants could not agree amongst themselves.72 St John frequently referred to the fate of Sweden in discussions of protestant concerns throughout the final peace negotiations. He expressed Anne’s willingness to make concessions to save Sweden in a letter to Robinson and Strafford in March 1713.73 Sweden was not involved in the War of the Spanish succession but she was under attack from several of her northern neighbours. Hanover was not yet an active participant in the Great Northern War – that only occurred after Georg Ludwig’s accession in 1714. While he had already begun to think about acquiring Bremen and Verden from Sweden after Charles XII’s defeat at Poltava in 1709, Georg Ludwig had done nothing. It was only after his treaties with Denmark and Prussia in early 1714 that he began to contemplate action. It is, therefore, unlikely that St John knew of any specific Hanoverian designs against Sweden, although he could have foreseen the possibility.74 St John must have ordered d’Alais in Hanover to explain to Bernstorff and the other Hanoverian ministers that Sweden must not be ruined because of the impact this would have on the protestant interest more generally. Anne’s commitment to abolishing the Ryswick clause was restated, although the separate peace had already been made.75 Shortly afterwards d’Alais warned Bernstorff that the Emperor’s refusal to agree to a peace on a point of honour was harming the Empire. Sweden would probably be destroyed and the Ryswick clause would not be abolished. Had the Empire joined with England at Utrecht, the clause would now be history. St John and d’Alais were reprimanding the Hanoverians for continuing the war. Bernstorff responded that Georg Ludwig was obliged to continue to supply troops to the Emperor so long as the Empire was still at war with France and nothing could be done for Sweden until peace was concluded with France. To d’Alais this seemed to be evidence that Georg Ludwig was more concerned to support the Emperor than to deal with protestant problems.76 Concern for European protestants

71 Ragnhild Hatton remarked that the Dutch realised quite quickly that English interest in Ryswick was a means to gain influence with protestant states in the Empire. The indifference to Swiss protestant concerns underlined the tactical nature of the position. See Ragnhild Hatton, Diplomatic relations between Great Britain and the Dutch Republic, 1714–1721 (London, 1950), p. 46. 72 Robinson and Strafford to St John, Utrecht, 4/4/1713, BL, Add. MSS 31138, fol. 143r. 73 St John to Robinson and Strafford, Whitehall, 26/3/1713, ibid., fol. 120v. 74 For the evolution of Hanoverian policy towards Sweden see Schnath, Geschichte Hannovers, iii, chs 6, 12 and 13. The course of George’s Baltic policy is traced succinctly in Hatton, George I, pp. 180–92. 75 d’Alais to St John, Hanover, 14/7/1713, PRO, SP 81/164. 76 d’Alais to St John, Hanover, 18/7/1713, ibid.

58

PROTESTANT INTEREST BEFORE 1714

had become politicised. On the one hand, the Hanoverians felt that Anne had not done enough to achieve the abolition of Ryswick. On the other, St John and his tory colleagues complained that Hanover was prepared to watch the destruction of the ancient protestant power of Sweden. Sweden had caused tensions between London and Hanover before. In 1702 Cresset, the English envoy, reported to Hedges that he had asked the elector about what he thought of recent attempts to make peace between Sweden and Poland. Cresset was not surprised that ‘the priesthood of Vienna’ was anxious to help the king of Poland, whose conversion ‘struck so fairly at the root of the Reformation in this part of the world’. If Sweden were defeated, ‘adieu liberty and protestant religion in Germany’.77 Cresset was tory in his inclinations.78 Cresset argued that while low church whigs and dissenters claimed to be the only true protestants, their support of Poland and opposition to Sweden indicated the real value that they attached to religion.79 Tories tended to regard Sweden as the most important protestant power. In part this was tactical. By defending Sweden it was possible to draw attention away from other obvious protestant allies such as the Dutch, despised because of the connection with William III and foreign influence, and later the Hanoverians, disliked for much the same reason. In 1714 Bolingbroke (as St John now was) informed Strafford that Whitworth was being sent to the Empire again. His presence would show the protestants Anne earnestly wanted to help them, even though it seemed that the Emperor had been allowed to conclude a peace on his own and the protestants had abdicated their civil and religious rights. Bolingbroke was in no doubt that commercial and religious considerations meant Britain should stop the ruin of Sweden but Britain could not act alone.80 Supporting Sweden was a way of showing strong protestant credentials but also implicitly criticising Hanover, one of the causes of Sweden’s weakness. Bolingbroke also complained to Strafford that Hanover’s recent alliance with Denmark and Prussia, which included a guarantee of the protestant succession, was unnecessary. British concern for religion and liberty would be enough to secure the protestant succession without the need to resort to foreign troops.81 Anne had done much to abolish the Ryswick provisions but had been thwarted

77

Cresset to Hedges, Hanover, 26/12/1702, PRO, SP 81/160. Cresset to Hedges, Hanover, 13/10/1702, ibid. includes a complaint about Falaiseau, who was certainly a whig. Cresset remarked acidly that ‘Such heros as these, if credited would make themselves . . . to passe for the only Protestants & Englishmen pretty champions for laws and religion being arm’d with beggary and impiety.’ His subsequent comment that men like Falaiseau had been strangely silent under James II was symtomatic of the high church complaint that dissenters (or Huguenots) had not written enough against popery under James. This strongly suggests Cresset held tory and/or high church views. 79 Cresset to Hedges, Hanover, 26/12/1702, PRO, SP 81/160. 80 Bolingbroke to Strafford, np, 29/4/1714, BL, Add. MSS 49970, fol. 6v. 81 Bolingbroke to Strafford, Whitehall, 23/3/1714, ibid., fol. 34r. 78

59

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

by the Emperor and unsupported by either the Dutch or the German protestant princes.82 Whilst Bolingbroke was complaining about Hanoverian indifference to the plight of Sweden, Bothmer, whose missions to Holland and London placed him at the centre of Hanoverian efforts to secure the succession, remained concerned that when push came to shove (and despite Prince Eugene’s promises), bigotry would prevail and Austria would not back a protestant succession.83 Bothmer’s fears proved unfounded and George succeeded with little initial opposition in August 1714. Perhaps the efforts made by both Sophia and her son to persuade Anglican clergy that there was little essential difference between Lutheranism and the Church of England had succeeded.84 Georg Ludwig or George I as he became had a good claim to be regarded as a viable Fidei Defensor. He had shown confessional concern in local disputes and engaged in protestant politics within the Empire. Moreover George’s court contained such figures as Robethon and Bernstorff. Both had strongly anti-catholic views. Tories, like Bolingbroke, may well have felt that the Hanoverians were not appropriate defenders of protestant interests but it was possible for whigs to argue differently. The legacy of William III and his policy of intervention was of enormous importance for the future. Many whigs remained committed to a policy of continental involvement for much of the next half-century. The whig consensus only started to break down amidst the pressure produced by the War of the Austrian succession. Revealingly this was also a period of party and ideological realignment more generally. The closing comments of Georg Schnath’s monumental work reveal an important truth. It was not the Hanoverian succession that the people of England greeted so tumultuously but the Protestant succession, with its guarantees against the hated, age-old fears: France and Popery. This was what the great gold medal to commemorate George I’s coronation wanted to express: Britannia pays homage to the new ruler, whom the symbolic forms of religion and liberty accompany.85

82 Ibid., fols 33v–35r. Details of the Hanoverian mission to gain Prussian support for the succession can be found in Schnath, Geschichte Hannovers, iv, p. 415. 83 Schnath, Geschichte Hannovers, iv, p. 419. 84 See ibid., p. 292 (George in 1711), p. 327 and p. 726 (Sophia in 1713). 85 Schnath, Geschichte Hannovers, iv, p. 435.

60

3

The Palatinate crisis and its aftermath, 1719–1724

At the beginning of September 1719 the reformed protestants of the Palatinate found themselves in difficulties. Earlier in the year the catholic elector, Karl Philipp, had banned the use and publication of the Heidelberg catechism. The catechism had irritated the elector for two reasons. First, he felt that the description of the catholic mass in the eightieth question and accompanying gloss was deeply offensive and secondly, he was annoyed that editions of the catechism had been printed bearing his coat of arms without his permission. The ecclesiastical authorities, the Kirchenrat, claimed to their supporters outside the Palatinate that the arms had been added by the catechism’s catholic publisher without their permission.1 The content of the catechism was more problematic. A contemporary English translation of the eightieth question (What is the difference between the Lord’s Supper and the Mass of the Papists?) noted that while ‘the Lord’s Supper is a Testimony to us, that we have full Remission of all our Sins by the only Sacrifice of JESUS CHRIST’, the Mass ‘teaches, that neither the Living nor the Dead obtain Remission of Sins by the Death of JESUS CHRIST, unless he be again offer’d up daily to them by the hands of Priests . . . the Mass is at bottom nothing less than blaspheming the only Sacrifice of JESUS CHRIST, and a cursed Idolatry’.2 The gloss was even more forthright claiming that ‘the law is from God but the Mass is from the Devil.’3 The elector was also dissatisfied with the sharing of the Heiliggeistkirche in Heidelberg between the reformed and the catholics. The church, the elector claimed, had been a court church and he was no longer content to use the choir but not the nave; the choir was too small for the catholics. As several of his relatives were buried in the church, it was impertinent not to have

1 Protestant Kirchenräte to George I, 10/6/1719, Heidelberg, Hanover, Hauptstaatsarchiv [hereafter HHStA], Calenberg Brief [hereafter CB] 24, 6385, fol. 3v. 2 The Heidelberg Catechism: containing the Principles of the Christian Religion, for which the Protestants in the Palatinate have long been persecuted by the Jesuits (London, 1720), p. 21. 3 Europäischer Staats-Cantzley, 357(1721), pp. 485–6. Modern editions of the catechism do not include the gloss.

61

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

unlimited access to their tombs, the entrance to which was in the protestant part of the church.4 At the end of August representatives of the Kirchenrat were summoned to see Baron Hillesheim, the president of the privy council. They were given a week to vacate the church. On 4 September 1719 the catholics knocked down the internal dividing wall and took possession of the whole church. News from Heidelberg received extensive coverage in the European press. Manuscript accounts quickly found their way into print. The Europäische Fama argued that the disputed catholic tombs were already easily accessible.5 The Political State of Great Britain linked the situation in the Palatinate to a Europewide attack on protestants.6 The implications of events in the Palatinate were significant. Protestants believed, on the basis of the 1648 religious settlement, that they had a legal right to use the building. Submitting to the elector’s request and voluntarily vacating the church would set a dangerous precedent.7 This chapter shows why the Heidelberg incident has a legitimate place in a study of British and Hanoverian diplomacy. It considers the diplomatic context of these events and shows how the troubles in the Palatinate were perceived to fit a broader pattern. Focusing on the protestant interest shows the complex and multi-faceted nature of diplomacy. Policy was not simply dictated from on high but was subject to the limitations provided by existing political culture. The diplomatic narrative will be set in a broader context of impression and preconception. This will entail both an understanding of the politics of the Holy Roman Empire and a discussion of the relationship between the British and Hanoverian territories of George I. Öffentlichkeit and its links with diplomacy will also need to be addressed explicitly.8 Instead of providing an exhaustive survey of either British or Hanoverian foreign policy, the thematic focus illuminates previously neglected issues. Events in central Europe and the relationships between George I, Frederick William I and Charles VI are central to the account. Politicians considered common religious concerns in the formulation of their domestic and foreign policies and therefore a simple model, which sees either domestic concerns subjugated to foreign policy aims or, indeed, the opposite, provides only a limited account of how eighteenth-century statesmen thought and acted.9

4

Karl Philipp of the Palatinate to privy council and Hillesheim, Heidelberg, no date, HHStA, CB 11, 1626, fols 1–2 (copy). 5 Europäischer Fama, 226 (1719), pp. 519–21. 6 Political State of Great Britain [hereafter PSGB], 18 (September 1719), pp. 196–223. 7 Karl of Hessen-Kassel to George I, Kassel, 14/9/1719, HHStA, CB 24, 2490. 8 For an introduction to Öffentlichkeit or the ‘public sphere’ as it is usually rendered in English see James Van Horn Melton, The rise of the public in enlightenment Europe (Cambridge, 2001). 9 Hence both (realist) ‘primacy of foreign policy’ and (Marxist) ‘primacy of domestic policy’ accounts have their limitations. For a summary of both positions, favouring the former, see Brendan Simms, The impact of Napoleon (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 2–17. 62

PALATINATE CRISIS

Confessions and history in the Holy Roman Empire The Peace of Westphalia (1648) tried to solve the confessional conflicts that had afflicted central Europe for the previous three decades. The reformed faith received formal recognition.10 It was agreed to accept 1624 as the Normaljahr (the normal or normative year). 1624 was half-way between the height of protestant victories in 1618 and prior to the almost total defeat of the protestant forces by 1630. Restoring territories to their 1624 confessional status was deemed a reasonable compromise. The Palatinate returned to protestant rule after 1648. However, the protestant line of Pfalz-Simmern died out in 1685 and was replaced by their catholic cousins from Pfalz-Neuburg. Conditions worsened for Palatine protestants. Not only was their elector catholic but between 1688 and 1697 large parts of the Palatinate were laid waste by Louis XIV’s invading armies. The Peace of Ryswick (1697) allowed those churches given to catholics during the French occupation to remain so – the infamous fourth article.11 Protestant powers tried repeatedly to remove or nullify this clause.12 In 1705 Frederick I of Prussia intervened to help the Palatine protestants and an agreement, clarifying their rights, was signed. The Treaty of Ryswick had also introduced the so-called Simultaneum to various churches in the Palatinate.13 Churches were shared between the confessions. This involved either the physical division of the church, as in Heidelberg, or a strict timetable for who could use what and when. The Heidelberg crisis focused attention on the legality of the Simultaneum under the 1648 treaties. The broader legal issue was how far the 1648 treaties limited the ius reformandi of a territorial prince and, more generally, what were known as the prince’s Hoheitsrechte (basically ‘prerogatives’).14 The protestant princes of Europe received frequent appeals for help

10 On the treaties themselves, see Armin Reese, Pax sit christiana (Düsseldorf, 1988) and Heinz Duchhardt, ed., Der Westfälische Friede (Munich, 1998). 11 The clause in question is ‘and all things shall be brought into the same state they were before such Seizures, Unions or Reunions were made, and are for the future no manner of way to be alter’d or incommoded; but yet so as that the Roman Catholick Religion shall continue in the State tis at present, in the Places so restor’d’. For the Latin text of the treaty and an English translation, see Clive Parry, ed., The consolidated treaty series (231 vols, New York, 1969–81), xxii, pp. 10–11 (Latin) and p. 82 (English). 12 The abolition of the Ryswick clause is also discussed in chs 2, 5 and 6. 13 For a general history of the development of the Simultaneum, from a mainly legal standpoint, see Christoph Schäfer, Das Simultaneum: ein staatskirchenrechtliches, politisches und theologisches Problem des Alten Reiches (Frankfurt/Main, 1995). The Heiliggeistkirche in Heidelberg was shared until 1936. 14 Two older accounts, both protestant, still provide an introduction to the religious situation in the Palatinate, as well as copies of relevant documents and treaties: Burkard Gotthelf Struve, Ausführlicher Bericht von der Pfaltzischen Kirchen-Historie (Frankfurt/Main, 1721) and Ludwig Häusser, Geschichte der Rheinischen Pfalz (2 vols, 2nd edn, Heidelberg, 1856). The 1705 treaty is considered in Hans von Hymmen, Der erste preussischen König

63

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

from their persecuted co-religionists in the Palatinate. Both British and Hanoverian archives contain a number of such appeals.15 The dispute in 1719 in the Palatinate surfaced against a backdrop of historic local tensions between protestants and catholics. Elsewhere in the Empire, relations between protestant and catholic powers were also strained for two reasons. The first was the decision to force Hessen-Kassel to vacate the fortress of Rheinfels and the second was a dispute between the Palatinate and Hanover over which title should be attached to their respective electorates.16 The latter resulted from the restoration of the elector of Bavaria’s titles after the end of the War of the Spanish succession. Hanover, as ninth electorate, had only been officially acknowledged at the Reichstag in Regensburg during the war.17 The Palatinate had gained Bavaria’s titles, when Bavaria had been stripped of them for supporting France. Hanover had, in turn, gained the Palatine title of Erzschatzmeister (Arch-treasurer). The Hanoverians were unwilling to return ‘their’ title to the Palatinate and on the eve of the outbreak of the crisis in Heidelberg, Wrisberg, George’s electoral representative in Regensburg, talked of invoking the ius eundi in partes over the title issue.18

Contexts for the religious conflict Older work on the eighteenth-century Empire saw everything leading one way – to the rise of Prussia and 1866. In states other than Prussia, the writing of Landesgeschichte was used to draw attention away from Borussian myth but the nature of the personal union made this a difficult strategy for Hanoverian historians to adopt. For them the tendency was rather to emphasise the extent to which, despite the personal union, they had retained their independence. Hence much was made of the purely personal nature of the union with Britain.19 Older work on Hanover’s role in the religious conflicts triggered by

und die Gegenreformation in der Pfalz (Inaugural-dissertation, Göttingen, 1904) and Alfred Hans, Die Kurpfälzische Religionsdeklaration von 1705 (Mainz, 1973) where the latter takes a Palatine and the former a Prussian perspective. 15 Unsigned to George I, Carolsburg, 23/6/1716, HHStA, CB 11, 1609 is typical. 16 The background to both these disputes can be followed in HHStA, CB 11, 2973–5. These are the reports of Wrisberg, George I’s representative in Regensburg, for the first part of 1719. 17 The original seven electors had increased to nine by the start of the eighteenth century. The original were the three archbishops of Mainz, Trier and Cologne and the secular rulers of the Palatinate, Saxony, Brandenburg and Bohemia. The ruler of Bohemia was a Habsburg. Bavaria attained electoral status after the Thirty Years War and Hanover in the 1690s. 18 Wrisberg to George I, Regensburg, 28/8/1719, HHStA, CB 11, 2975, fol. 290r. For the ius eundi in partes, see p. 19. 19 See Ernst von Meier, Hannoversche Verfassungs- und Verwaltungsgeschichte, 1680–1866 (2 vols, Leipzig, 1898–99), i, p. 27, pp. 122–3. Borussian or Prussian historians were keen 64

PALATINATE CRISIS

events in Heidelberg in 1719 therefore suffers from two problems. There was a tendency both to exaggerate the importance of Prussian involvement and minimise the value of British intervention.20 Biederbeck, Borgmann and Naumann’s studies all appeared in the 1930s. The sudden revival of interest in religious conflict in 1930s Germany and Austria (Naumann worked in Vienna) may have been related to potential contemporary relevance. Naumann argued the period 1720 to 1740 witnessed a marked decline in the power of Austria. Austrian Imperial policy failed and the Austrians became increasingly uninterested in the Empire. This disengagement lived on and it was the forces of ‘political catholicism’ that were preventing the reunion of Austria with the greater Germany.21 For Naumann, George I and George II were symptomatic of a general challenge to Austrian leadership in the Empire rather than the initiators of change themselves. Biederbeck, Borgmann and Naumann all blamed the troubles in the Palatinate on the catholics.22 The real villain was Friedrich Karl, Graf von Schönborn, the Imperial vice-chancellor and head of the Imperial chancery in Vienna.23 More recent scholars view Schönborn more favourably. Aretin argues Schönborn was following a true Reichspolitik by placing law at the centre of his policies, whereas those who had the Empire less at heart tended to see law as one argument among many in the conduct of international relations.24 If anything, Aretin has moved from one caricature to another. Instead of placing the blame on Schönborn, he has reversed the moral polarities and turned the Hanoverian representative at Regensburg, Wrisberg, and his British counterpart in Vienna, St Saphorin, into the two bigots who prevented an equitable resolution of the problem.25 This chapter tackles two of the problems of previous work. It will avoid the entrenched political and confessional positions in the existing literature and it will also be the first account to provide

to emphasise the centrality of Prussia for German historical development. For a recent reflection on both the Borussian and new federal traditions of German historical writing, see Abigail Green, ‘The federal alternative? A new view of modern German history’, Historical Journal, 46 (2003), pp. 187–202. 20 See Andreas Biederbeck, Der deutsche Reichstag zu Regensburg im Jahrzehnt nach dem spanischen Erbfolgekrieg 1714–1724 (Düsseldorf, 1937), Karl Borgmann, Der deutsche Religionsstreit der Jahre 1719/1720 (Berlin, 1937), and Michael Naumann, Österreich, England und das Reich, 1719–1732 (Berlin, 1936). There is also material in Theo Gehling, Ein europäischer Diplomat am Kaiserhof zu Wien: François Louis de Pesme, Seigneur de SaintSaphorin als englischer Resident am Wiener Hof, 1718–1727 (Bonn, 1964). 21 Naumann, Österreich, England und das Reich, pp. 9–10. 22 Biederbeck, Deutsche Reichstag, pp. 35–6, Borgmann, Deutsche Religionsstreit, p. 25, Naumann, Österreich, England und das Reich, pp. 17–18. 23 For a defence of Schönborn, see Hugo Hantsch, Reichsvizekanzler Friedrich Karl Graf von Schönborn (1674–1746) (Augsburg, 1929). 24 Karl Otmer von Aretin, Das alte Reich, 1648–1806 (3 vols, Stuttgart, 1993–7), ii, p. 269. 25 Ibid., p. 272. 65

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

a genuinely comparative perspective because of its basis in extensive archival work in both Britain and Hanover.26 Wrisberg, St Saphorin and Schönborn were key players in the religious conflict ignited by events in Heidelberg.27 Wrisberg wanted to exploit the situation in the Palatinate for his own advantage at Regensburg.28 However, Wrisberg should not be blamed for what happened, partly because there is a tendency to minimise the importance of the confessional issue by turning it into a mask for the ambition of an individual. He may have exceeded his instructions on occasion (most notably in 1722) but there were a number of others who were closely involved in the decision-making process. Amongst these were the secretary of state, James Stanhope, and two British diplomats, Charles Whitworth, minister plenipotenitary in Berlin, and James Haldane, minister in Kassel, who was dispatched to Heidelberg in September 1719.29 Charles VI, the Holy Roman Emperor, lacks a modern scholarly biography, although Charles Ingrao is unfair to describe him as ‘a hopeless mediocrity’.30 For assessments of Charles’s rule, it is necessary to refer to older work by Adolf Beer. Some of his domestic policy is covered by John Stoye.31 George I has been served well by Ragnhild Hatton’s biography, although Black correctly notes that the period after 1721 and the death of Stanhope receives relatively less treatment.32

26 Given the balance in the existing literature in favour of material in the Hanoverian archives, relatively more space will be given to British material to indicate previous omissions. Borgmann, Biederbeck and Naumann were able to use St Saphorin’s correspondence with Bernstorff which was destroyed in 1943. 27 There is no biography of Wrisberg but for biographies of the other two, see the works by Gehling and Hantsch cited in notes 20 and 23 above. Basic information on most Hanoverian officials can be found in Joachim Lampe, Aristokratie, Hofadel und Staatspatriziat in Kurhannover (2 vols, Göttingen, 1963), volume II. 28 See HHStA, CB 24, 6385, fol. 19r. The draft is undated, although its position in the file and contents suggest that it is from September 1719. The handwriting confirms Wrisberg’s authorship. 29 For Stanhope, see (still) Basil Williams, Stanhope (Oxford, 1932) for details of his life. For Whitworth see now Janet Hartley, Charles Whitworth (Aldershot, 2002). I lay greater stress on Whitworth’s interest in the fate of protestants than Hartley but even she admits Whitworth was keenly interested in the fate of protestantism in 1719. Contrast Hartley, Whitworth, pp. 24–9, 113–18 and 163–70 for the development of Whitworth’s views. 30 Charles Ingrao, The Habsburg monarchy, 1618–1815 (Cambridge, 1994), p. 130. 31 Adolf Beer, ‘Zur Geschichte der Politik Karl’s VI.’, Historische Zeitschrift, 55 (1886), pp. 1–70 and J.W. Stoye, ‘Emperor Charles VI: the early years of the reign’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 5th series 12 (1962), pp. 63–84. See also Volker Press, ‘Die kaiserliche Stellung im Reich zwischen 1648 und 1740: Versuch einer Neubewertung’, in idem, Das alte Reich: ausgewählte Aufsätze ed. Johannes Kunisch (Berlin, 1997), pp. 189–222 and Derek McKay, Prince Eugene of Savoy (London, 1977). 32 Ragnhild Hatton, George I: elector and king (London, 1978), Jeremy Black, ‘British foreign policy in the eighteenth century: a survey’, Journal of British Studies, 26 (1987), p. 32.

66

PALATINATE CRISIS

The elector of the Palatinate, like Schönborn, was frequently portrayed as a scheming catholic villain in older literature. Hans Schmidt’s biography portrays him in a more sympathetic light.33 Schmidt attacked the older work of Naumann, Häusser and Droysen as erroneous and (confessionally) partisan. Rather than being motivated by religious zeal, the elector’s attempts to reduce the secular power of the Kirchenrat were characteristic of an absolutist prince.34 There is a noticeable reluctance to let religion and politics mix in the period after 1648. Historians become trapped by their own notions of periodisation. Yet confession was more than ‘false consciousness’ disguising the real power of politics.

The Diet, the courts and the conduct of diplomacy Much of the action described in this chapter took place at the Diet of the Holy Roman Empire in Regensburg. It has been common to describe the Diet as an impotent talking-shop.35 Although delegates lacked the full range of powers claimed by parliament in Britain, the power of the purse being chief amongst these, there were still various spheres in which they could exercise influence. One of these was the approval of peace treaties. Protestants frequently attempted to attach conditions to their ratification of treaties, with varying degrees of success. However, George I and Frederick William I wanted to avoid the Corpus Evangelicorum acting independently. Attempts were often made to send delegations from the Corpus (or Reichstag) to represent the protestant interest in treaty negotiations. On such occasions, George argued he could best represent the protestant interest through the British or Hanoverian officials at a congress.36 It was not always easy for George to control the Corpus. Although the personal union undoubtedly increased Hanover’s diplomatic bargaining power,37 there was a suspicion that ‘foreign influence’ was detrimental to the Empire. Concern about Hanover’s links to Britain manifested itself in several ways and was open to manipulation by interested parties. One example indicates the problem. Rumours circulating in Regensburg in early 1720 suggested Frederick William and George’s campaign to support protestants was a sham. Anglican protestants were suspect and so the involvement of such people in a campaign to help German protestants cast doubt on the real motives of the monarchs. Hence Wrisberg felt it necessary to solicit an explicit declaration

33

Hans Schmidt, Kürfurst Karl Philipp von der Pfalz als Reichsfürst (Mannheim, 1963). Ibid., pp. 120–5. 35 See p. 20. 36 See George I to Wrisberg, np, 8/9/1720 and 23/9/1720, HHStA, CB 11, 1426: II, fols 297–301. 37 Biederbeck, Deutsche Reichstag, p. 74. 34

67

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

from the Prussian Komitial-Gesandter Metternich that the Church of England was a true protestant church.38 Where these rumours originated is unclear. Austria wanted to portray Hanover as acting in the interests of non-German Britain. Some of the smaller Saxon states with their more orthodox Lutheranism were also keen to upset attempts by either Hanover or Prussia (or worse, a combination of the two) to challenge Saxony for the directorate of the Corpus Evangelicorum. About this time Wrisberg also reported that Consistorial-Rat Cyprian from Saxony-Gotha was trying to cause trouble by suggesting that Wrisberg and George favoured the Calvinists and had not done enough for Lutherans in the Palatinate.39 Saxony as the senior protestant electorate had traditionally led the protestants in the Empire and this continued even after Augustus II’s conversion in 1697. While a (Saxon) historian of the directorate concluded the conversion had no detrimental impact on protestantism, contemporaries in Hanover and Prussia were less confident.40 When George sent James Haldane from Kassel to Heidelberg to help resolve the religious crisis, Wrisberg took great pains to reassure the other members of the Corpus that Haldane would do nothing without their approval.41 George had to be sensitive to tensions between protestants at Regensburg in his efforts to help Palatine protestants. How did the relationship between Wrisberg and Haldane work? The traditional impression, particularly in the literature on the Great Northern War, is of a clear division between (sometimes contradictory) British and Hanoverian aims and interests.42 The British diplomatic service was larger than the Hanoverian but, particularly within Germany, there were courts with both British and Hanoverian representation. In such cases, it was common for instructions to include not only the usual injunctions to correspond frequently with London but also to maintain good relations with the other envoy. On at least one occasion, following the death of a Hanoverian diplomat, the British official took over his duties and began to receive orders from Hanover.43 The receipt of orders from more than one source could be a problem, as Whitworth 38

Wrisberg to George I, Regensburg, 26/2/1720, HHStA, CB 11, 2979, fol. 427r. Frederick William and George’s actions are discussed in greater detail subsequently. 39 Wrisberg to George I, Regensburg, 1/2/1720, HHStA, CB 11, 2978, fol. 256. Cyprian also opposed the union schemes, described on p. 93. For an assessment of Cyprian’s career, see Ernst Koch and Johannes Wallmann, eds, Ernst Saloman Cyprian (1673–1745) (Gotha, 1996). 40 See Adolph Frantz, Das Katholische Directorium des Corpus Evangelicorum (Marburg, 1880), p. 175. The tensions over the leadership of the Corpus will be discussed further when considering the relationship between Britain/Hanover and Prussia. 41 Wrisberg to George I, Regensburg, 19/2/1720, HHStA, CB 11, 2979, fol. 353r. 42 See Hans-Joachim Finke, The ‘Hanoverian Junta’, 1714–1719 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Delaware, 1970), passim and pp. 89–94. More generally, see J.F. Chance, George I and the Northern War (London, 1909) and John J. Murray, George I, the Baltic and the Whig split of 1717 (London, 1969), pp. 89–96. 43 Charles Whitworth took over Hanoverian duties at Berlin on the death of the resident, 68

PALATINATE CRISIS

was to discover,44 but while a demarcation of authority between British and German officials existed in theory, it was not always put into practice. Jean de Robethon corresponded extensively with British and Hanoverian diplomats. Robethon was a Huguenot exile who had acted as secretary for William III, and for George’s uncle, Georg Wilhelm of Celle, before entering George’s service. The extent of his influence is difficult to determine, but he probably had George’s ear.45 Some of the newsletters in French sent from London to the ministry in Hanover bear Robethon’s signature.46 Charles Whitworth’s papers, in particular, indicate the extent of informal cooperation between British and Hanoverian officials.47 As well as his letters to the secretary of state, Whitworth was in regular contact with Hans Kasper von Bothmer, the second Hanoverian minister in London, and Bernstorff, the senior Hanoverian minister in London until his dispute with Stanhope in 1720.48 Although Haldane was not specifically instructed to consult Wrisberg, it is clear from Wrisberg’s reports that they kept in regular contact.49 Early in the crisis Wrisberg urged George to send a British diplomat to Heidelberg because of the impression it gave of British commitment to the cause.50

George I and the crisis in the Palatinate The precise reason for sending Haldane to Heidelberg is obscure. This is hardly surprising as Haldane was dispatched while George was in Hanover. George Heusch, in 1719. For the report of Heusch’s death see Whitworth to Bernstorff, Berlin, 2/9/1719, London, British Library [hereafter BL], Add. MSS 37375, fol. 17. 44 See Whitworth to Tilson, Berlin, 20/1/1720, BL, Add. MSS 37378, fol. 253v: ‘It would be much better to have a German Secretary or Resident to sollicit these Points, whom I could second on occasion, than to make me disagreeable by such commissions.’ 45 Murray, Whig split, p. 96 thinks Robethon’s influence has been overestimated. Hatton, George I (p. 123) is ambivalent on his importance. Robethon’s proximity to the king would seem to make it reasonable to assume that he was not without influence. The importance of Robethon’s Huguenot background was stressed earlier. See p. 50. 46 See, for example, those of 4/1/1715 (HHStA, CB 24, 1713, fol. 41r) and 1/2/1717 (HHStA, CB 24, 1719, fol. 11r). 47 During the crisis in the Palatinate, Whitworth advised Haldane to follow the lead of German ministers when it came to matters of Imperial law and the religious situation in the Empire (Whitworth to Haldane, Berlin, 28/11/1719, BL, Add. MSS 37377, fol. 100r). 48 For Bernstorff, see Hartwig von Bernstorff, Andreas Gottlieb von Bernstorff 1649–1726: Staatsmann, Junker, Patriarch (Bochum, 1999) and for Bothmer, see Georg Schnath and Karl Freiherr von Bothmer, eds, Aus den Erinnerungen des Hans Kaspar von Bothmer (Hildesheim, 1936). Short biographies of both can be found in the online version of the Oxford DNB. 49 For Haldane’s instructions see Hanover, 22/9/1719, Public Record Office [hereafter PRO], State Papers [hereafter SP] 44/269B. Wrisberg to George I, Regensburg, 19/2/1720, HHStA, CB 11, 2979, fol. 353r. 50 Wrisberg to George I, Regensburg, 25/9/1719, HHStA, CB 11, 2975, fol. 456v. 69

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

conducted his diplomacy in person in Hanover, summoning British and German diplomats to report to him orally. Consequently little evidence about the content of these meetings survives. George enjoyed negotiating outside the glare of London, where news travelled fast. Relations between George and the landgrave of Hessen-Kassel had been indifferent immediately prior to the religious crisis of 1719. Charles XII of Sweden’s death and the accession of Charles’s sister, the landgrave’s daughter-in-law, to the Swedish throne had led Haldane to urge the landgrave to press for a swift peace between George and Sweden.51 The landgrave had entered a dispute with the electors of the Palatinate and Trier (who were also brothers) over the Emperor’s decision to return Rheinfels to a catholic cadet branch of the ruling house in Hessen.52 The delicacy of the situation in the north meant George was annoyed by, rather than supportive of, the landgrave’s actions. In June 1719 Stanhope, from the spa where George was taking the waters, told Haldane to discourage the landgrave from sending a minister to George at Hanover until he changed his policies.53 The landgrave’s attempts to act as an independent mediator between Sweden and Russia had also irritated George. Attempts to bring the Great Northern War to an end and to build an anti-Russian coalition from 1719 to 1721 affected George’s conduct within the Empire. However, by the end of August relations had improved.54 Haldane thanked Stanhope for the orders he had received by Luke Schaub, explaining how to react to events in the Palatinate. Haldane had read a memo to the landgrave indicating how concerned George was about Palatine affairs. He was working to find an effective remedy for their difficulties. Moreover, George wanted to create a protestant alliance. He was considering sending a minister to the Palatinate. The landgrave had thought this a good idea, although he had suggested involving Hessen-Darmstadt, because of the influence that court held over the elector Palatine.55 Haldane’s dispatch was dated 31 August, several days before the protestants were evicted from their church in Heidelberg. Consequently, George must have been sufficiently disturbed by the elector’s actions to contemplate diplomatic representations even prior to the eviction. In addition to the banning of the Heidelberg catechism, the complaints of the protestants in the villages of Billigheim, Wolmersheim and Mörzheim about the seizure of their revenues had probably led George to

51 Haldane to Stanhope, Kassel, 5/1/1719, PRO, SP 81/119. This was in the context of the Great Northern War. 52 Haldane to Stanhope, Kassel, 17/4/1719, PRO, SP 81/120. 53 Stanhope to Haldane, Pyrmont, 21/6/1719, PRO, SP 81/120. 54 Subsequently, Haldane linked the improvement in relations with Hessen-Kassel directly to George’s intervention to help Palatine protestants. See Haldane to Whitworth, Kassel, 28/9/1719, BL, Add. MSS 37377, fol. 98r. 55 Haldane to Stanhope, Kassel, 31/8/1719, PRO, SP 81/120. Schaub was another foreign protestant in British service who acted as Stanhope’s secretary, before holding various postings abroad in his own right.

70

PALATINATE CRISIS

contemplate action. The seizures were mentioned before the problems of the catechism and the church in Heidelberg in Haldane’s instructions.56 George’s reaction to events in Heidelberg is often seen as either pragmatic or as a response to the promptings of that pious protestant monarch Frederick William I.57 Behind claims for Prussian leadership lies a powerful myth about the unique mission of the Hohenzollerns to help protestants.58 Yet the Prussians had no monopoly on protestant protection. Whitworth was instructed to seek Frederick William’s cooperation in helping the Palatine protestants and to ensure Frederick William dispatched his envoy at Frankfurt, Hecht, to support Haldane.59 Haldane’s selection for the mission is also noteworthy. Rather than use a Hanoverian, George opted for maximum impact by sending a British diplomat. It was not simply the elector of Hanover but also the king of England who was concerned. Moreover, George sought Frederick William’s help, not the other way round. Haldane claimed to Stanhope that British vigour would both convince doubters of the seriousness of British support for protestants in the Empire and impress the tsar.60 Armed with a letter of support from the landgrave, Haldane travelled first to Darmstadt, where he met the landgrave of Hessen-Darmstadt and secured support for the protestant cause,61 and then to Frankfurt, where he met Hecht. Hecht had been instructed to press strongly for a restitution of the 1705 agreement. If, as was likely, this failed, the Prussians wanted a return to Westphalian conditions. Haldane believed the Prussians were spoiling for a fight. They wanted Haldane and Hecht to present a long list of (old) grievances at their first audience with the elector. Haldane regarded reopening old legal disputes as counterproductive. He suggested that he test the waters first. It was believed that Karl Philipp’s resolve was weak and that his ministers had opposed his strong action in the first place. Consequently Haldane

56 See Haldane’s instructions, Hanover, 22/9/1719, PRO, SP 44/269B. Point three deals with village revenues and points four and five with Heidelberg and the catechism respectively. The villages were all close to the important Imperial fortress of Landau. 57 Robethon to Whitworth, Hanover, 9/9/1719, BL, Add. MSS 37375, fol. 71r suggests that Frederick William did make representations on the matter but this would now appear to be an additional impulse for a plan already contemplated. 58 Ernst Schubert, ‘Die Fürsorge der Hohenzollern für die evangelischen Auslandsdiaspora’, Auslanddeutschtum und Evangelische Kirche, 1935, pp. 115–57 exemplifies such views. 59 Whitworth to Craggs, Berlin, 26/9/1719, PRO, SP 90/9. To Robethon, Whitworth remarked that Frederick William had offered to help George by confiscating catholic assets in his lands if the elector Palatine failed to cooperate. (Whitworth to Robethon, Berlin, 16/9/1719, BL, Add MSS. 37375, fol. 182r.) 60 Haldane to Stanhope, Kassel, 1/10/1719, PRO, ibid. He left Kassel the next day. 61 Haldane claimed that the landgrave of Hessen-Darmstadt’s letter had shocked the elector Palatine as the latter had hoped to pacify the Lutheran princes by offering some of what had been taken from the reformed to the Lutherans in the Palatinate. (Haldane to Whitworth, Neckerhausen, 21/10/1719, BL, Add. MSS 37376, fol. 133.)

71

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

departed for Heidelberg first and Hecht agreed to follow shortly afterwards.62 George’s intervention meant that the Prussians, at least temporarily, agreed to moderate their tone. While Haldane wanted a quick solution, Wrisberg thought the opportunity too good to miss. He wanted to reach agreement on the complete removal of the Simultaneum.63 The elector Palatine, meanwhile, insisted firmly to Haldane that the affair was none of George’s business. Haldane rapidly realised there were tensions between the Kirchenrat in Heidelberg and the Corpus in Regensburg. The Kirchenrat were prepared to make concessions to the elector in order to gain full control over revenues from ecclesiastical lands, which had been given to the protestants at the reformation but were now controlled by the elector’s catholic ministers.64 Wrisberg was concerned to avoid any precedent permitting the renegotiation of the 1648 treaties.65 It was a difference of perspective more than the difference of nationality that caused problems for Wrisberg and Haldane. Haldane was initially very optimistic and thought that he could marginalise the court faction, led by Becker and Hillesheim. He blamed them for perpetuating the conflict. The Palatine ministers expected no quarter from Prussia so Haldane hoped his moderation would be an asset.66 A fortnight later Haldane had changed his mind. He felt that until ‘the Priests feel the effects of their ill timed zeal’ and the Palatine court realised that George’s threats were serious, there would be no resolution.67 Haldane was angered by Hillesheim and Becker’s claim that the elector had not acted contrary to Imperial law. Wrisberg subsequently convened a meeting of the Corpus to urge the preparation of an official legal response.68 George instructed St Saphorin in Vienna at about the same time that although he disliked religious disputes, ‘we cannot abandon our religious relatives in the face of such hard persecution and oppression’. 69 He added that St Saphorin ought to remind Charles that he needed allies in Italy to 62

Haldane to Craggs, Frankfurt/Main, 10/10/1719, PRO, SP 81/120. Wrisberg to George I, Regensburg, 16/10/1719 and 23/10/1719, HHStA, CB 11, 2976, fol. 53r and fols 106–7. 64 Haldane to Craggs, Neckerhausen, 25/10/1719, PRO, SP 81/120. 65 Whitworth urged Haldane to consult Wrisberg to ensure that protestant rights were upheld. See Whitworth to Haldane, Berlin, 28/11/1719, BL, Add. MSS 37377, fols 102v–103r. 66 Haldane to Craggs, Heidelberg, 4/11/1719, PRO, SP 81/120. Haldane asked Whitworth what Frederick William’s motives really were because Hecht’s conduct suggested the king did not want a settlement (Haldane to Whitworth, Heidelberg, 8/11/1719 NS, BL, Add. MSS 37375, fol. 393v). Whitworth responded that Hecht’s aggression was temperament and not his orders (Whitworth to Haldane, Berlin, 28/11/1719, BL, Add. MSS 37377, fol. 104r). 67 Haldane to Craggs, Heidelberg, 18/11/1719, PRO, SP 81/120. 68 Wrisberg to George, Regensburg, 18/12/1719, HHStA, CB 11, 2976, fol. 408v. 69 George to St Saphorin, St James’s, 11/12/1719, HHSt.A, CB 11, 1626, fol. 20r. 63

72

PALATINATE CRISIS

support his claims against the king of Spain.70 This was a thinly veiled threat. British naval power had prevented a Spanish force from invading Sicily in 1718. Admiral Byng had won the decisive victory off Cape Passaro. The implication was clear. The Emperor ought to remember what he owed George. Accommodating Hanoverian claims was the least the Austrians could do after British assistance in Sicily. The Palatinate crisis occurred while George was seeking recognition for Hanoverian claims to the duchies of Bremen and Verden, seized from Sweden in the course of the Great Northern War, and backing for his intervention in Mecklenburg in support of the opposition to the duke.71 The religious crisis provided George with additional leverage over Charles. Wrisberg’s tough talking in Regensburg was to George’s advantage, as was Prussian aggression. George could portray himself as the moderate seeking a solution and Frederick William as the zealot. Settlement was not to be achieved at any price. Stanhope had suggested that it might be necessary to remove the description of the Mass as ‘damnable idolatry’ from the catechism. Whitworth, writing to Haldane, agreed that it would be best if other religions were not described in offensive terms but if we did not believe that the Mass was damnable idolatry we could never justifie our separation in matters of faith from the Church of Rome. Whereever a religion is established by law, the professors of it are at liberty to express their opinions in such terms as are thought most proper and significative . . . Besides if such alteration is to be made, it ought to be by the same authority the expression was introduced viz by a synod of the reformed churches and not by the Elector’s temporal power which he cannot employ without a direct breach of the peace of Westphalia, which were allowed and in publick use in the year 1624. For that is the unalterable rule for the state of religious worship in the Empire.72

Whitworth’s analysis reflects two attitudes about religion and politics. The first could be termed the ‘English’ approach – it was vital to protect those churches established by law, as the Church of England was. The second is more characteristic of the early enlightenment. The state did not have a legitimate interest in determining religious belief. In combination, these attitudes provided a coherent framework through which British diplomats could justify complaints about catholic oppression and persecution. They wanted to defend both liberty and law – two of the traits eighteenth-century Britons felt to be marks of the superiority of their constitution. Seemingly minor diplomatic incidents provide the means to uncover the ways in which religion was a vital part of political culture. 70

Ibid., fol. 21r. For Mecklenburg see Mediger, Mecklenburg, Russland und England–Hannover, passim. Both problems are treated from a legal perspective by Michael Hughes, Law and politics in eighteenth-century Germany (Woodbridge, 1988). 72 Whitworth to Haldane, Berlin, 28/11/1719, BL, Add. MSS 37377, fols 100v–101r. 71

73

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

The British watched the Palatine crisis closely because of the broader diplomatic situation. Stanhope had suggested to Whitworth in October 1719 that the crisis could be used to make Britain guarantor of the Westphalian settlement. A British guarantee would have added weight to intervention on behalf of protestants.73 It would also have justified more active British interest in central European affairs. Haldane welcomed any news of peace in the north because it would eliminate the prospect of Russian aid for the catholics.74 To Carteret, negotiating in Sweden, Whitworth observed that peace would allow the protestants powers to reunite and resolve the Palatine crisis. Their unity would reduce the chances of something similar happening to Saxon protestants in the future.75 Having initially opposed Sweden in the Great Northern War, George had now changed his mind. He now feared Russian domination of the Baltic. To avoid this, alliances were necessary and common confession was seen as one way to achieve such alliances. United, protestants could preserve the balance of power but divided, they would fall. Haldane’s attempts to resolve the crisis were thwarted by opposition to compromise from the elector of Trier, Karl Philipp’s brother.76 Haldane told Whitworth that he now thought there needed to be stronger guarantees for protestants in Europe. Although 1648 should be the basis of all negotiations, the question of the ius reformandi and the status of the compromise of 1685, by which the last protestant elector Palatine had sought to defend his co-religionists from his catholic successor, made the matter more complicated, as did the fact that catholics had not been explicitly excluded from the Palatinate in 1648.77 Having returned to London from Hanover, Stanhope reassured Haldane that George viewed the Palatine situation as an important test case for the position of protestantism in the Empire. It was imperative not to dilute Westphalian principles, creating long-term difficulties, even if seemingly attractive concessions were offered.78 The division of ecclesiastical revenues in the Palatinate caused problems. Haldane was told that Elector Frederick III had apportioned revenues from church land in the Palatinate in the sixteenth century for pious purposes. Any surplus was to be used for the good of the Palatinate. Mieg, a member of the Kirchenrat, claimed that the surplus in 1618 had been larger than the total amount the reformed now received. When it came to the division of monies, the Kirchenrat had an advisory, rather than a controlling, role. While Haldane

73

Stanhope to Whitworth, Göhrde, 27/10/1719, BL, Add. MSS 37376, fol. 164v. Haldane to Craggs, Heidelberg, 18/11/1719, PRO, SP 81/120. 75 Whitworth to Carteret, Berlin, 6/12/1719, BL, Add. MSS 37377, fol. 210r. 76 Haldane to Stanhope, Heidelberg, 25/11/1719, PRO, SP 81/120. 77 Haldane to Whitworth, Heidelberg, 8/12/1719, BL, Add. MSS 37377, fols 213–18. Whitworth replied that he had not read the Treaty of Westphalia recently so only had a general idea of protestant rights (Whitworth to Haldane, Berlin, 23/12/1719 NS, BL, Add. MSS 37377, fol. 390). 78 Copy of Stanhope to Haldane, Whitehall, 1/12/1719, BL, Add. MSS 37377, fols 287–8. 74

74

PALATINATE CRISIS

agreed that the protestants deserved to have back the churches taken from them by the Ryswick clause, given their numbers, he could see no means to achieve this short of war.79 There had been few Lutherans in the Palatinate in 1624 so they had received little in the 1648 settlement. Wrisberg, and George, had seen the events in the Palatinate as a means both to exert pressure on the elector to respect protestant rights and to persuade the reformed Kirchenrat to give up some of their revenues to the Lutherans.80 Haldane feared their strategy would slow negotiations at Regensburg. He was anxious to maintain good relations with Prussia because catholic clerical attitudes made a war of religion a real danger.81 Wrisberg felt, with appropriate Prussian support, Haldane would be able to settle the revenue dispute between the reformed and the Lutherans.82 Others were more concerned with the bigger picture. George Tilson, a longserving undersecretary, was worried by Austrian unwillingness to act against Russia to preserve peace in the north. Haldane’s failure to make progress was explicable because ‘tis hard to do very much, where priests, women, & Bigots govern’. The comment applied as much to Vienna as to Heidelberg. Yet Tilson was keen to avoid the Palatine situation deteriorating into open conflict.83 Whitworth emphasised the benefits of the Prussian alliance to Stanhope. Other protestant states would look to George for protection. Although the Habsburgs would soon receive Sicily, George’s help was needed until they were in complete possession of the island so George still held leverage over them. Austria would probably also try to undermine the alliance with Prussia to reduce George’s bargaining power.84 Stanhope had informed Whitworth of St Saphorin’s opinion that force might be necessary to resolve the crisis. St Saphorin had suggested that moving troops into Jülich and Berg would be another way to exert leverage. 85 Whitworth replied that, through subtle conversation, he had been able to bring the Prussian minister Ilgen to suggest St Saphorin’s plan as if it were his 79

Haldane to Whitworth, Heidelberg, 1/1/1720, BL, Add. MSS 37378, fols 68–74. Wrisberg had reassured the Lutherans at Heidelberg that they should trust Haldane and George to improve their lot. See Wrisberg to George I, Regensburg, 23/10/1719, HHStA, CB 11, 2976, fol. 107v. George clearly wanted to help the Lutherans. See George I to Wrisberg, St James’s, 4/3/1720, HHStA, CB 11, 1626, fol. 69v. 81 Haldane to Stanhope, Heidelberg, 14/1/1720, PRO, SP 81/121. 82 Wrisberg to George I, Regensburg, 22/1/1720, HHStA, CB 11, 2978, fol. 146. George agreed with Wrisberg that Haldane should not to do anything about the revenues without the agreement of the Corpus (George I to Wrisberg, St James’s, 23/2/1720, HHStA, CB 11, 1626, fol. 65). 83 Tilson to Whitworth, Whitehall, 1/1/1720, BL, Add. MSS 37378, fol. 180. 84 Whitworth to Stanhope, public, Berlin, 13/1/1720, BL, Add. MSS 37378, fols 189–90. 85 Stanhope to Whitworth, private, Whitehall, 11/12/1719, BL, Add. MSS 37377, fols 376–80. The succession to the Rhine duchies of Jülich and Berg was disputed. The ultimate decision was the Emperor’s and Frederick William I was keen to ensure his claims were taken seriously. 80

75

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

own.86 This was ideal. St Saphorin and Stanhope had realised that Prussian force could be a useful bargaining tool and the Prussians had obliged without realising that they were being prompted to do so. What had begun as a dispute about a book and a church had become entwined with bigger issues. A deterioration in British relations with Austria meant George was keen to test Viennese resolve. The leaders of the Corpus were also anxious to challenge the Emperor, drawing on the complicated legal situation to feed their complaints. Whitworth and Stanhope were strong advocates of an alliance with Prussia, both on confessional grounds and because they wanted to isolate the tsar, given the situation in the north. Bernstorff, whose disputes with Prussia over three villages near his estates at Gartow soured his relations with Berlin, was less keen on the Prussian alliance.87 In early 1719 Bernstorff and his close ally St Saphorin had negotiated the Treaty of Vienna between Hanover, Austria and Saxony.88 Although ostensibly defensive in nature, Frederick William saw the treaty as anti-Prussian, allying as it did three of his most powerful neighbours. Now St Saphorin seemed to have shifted position and become an advocate of the Prussian alliance; but this was alliance at a price. St Saphorin was keen for Prussia to be seen as the aggressor and George as the moderate. Part of this strategy was to attack Schönborn through the Corpus, but to avoid committing George to anything precise.89 Another part was to contemplate what a Prussian force might do in Jülich and Berg. The Corpus made their religious complaints more general, attacking not only the elector Palatine but also Schönborn’s uncle, the elector of Mainz, and his brother, the bishop of Worms. George distrusted the Kirchenrat. They were likely to settle with the catholics, partly to hide irregularities in the administration of their revenues. Therefore the Corpus should negotiate an agreement.90 Although reports from the Palatinate talked about returning the church and permitting the use of the catechism, the wider issues of revenue and the Ryswick clause remained unresolved.91 Reports suggested a commission would

86

Whitworth to Stanhope, private, Berlin, 13/1/1720, BL, Add. MSS 37378, fols 192–3. This comes across forcefully in Derek McKay, ‘The struggle for control of George I’s northern policy, 1718–19’, Journal of Modern History, 45 (1973), pp. 367–86. The article is of more general importance for understanding the conflict over how best to respond to the pressure on Sweden in the latter stages of the Great Northern War. 88 Michael, Englische Geschichte, ii, p. 466, idem, England under George I, ii, p. 229. See also Wolfgang Michael, ‘Ein schwieriger diplomatischer Fall aus dem Jahre 1719’, Historische Zeitschrift, 88 (1902), pp. 56–68 for a detailed discussion of St Saphorin’s role in the treaty. 89 St Saphorin toWhitworth, Vienna, 10/1/1720, BL, Add. MSS 37378, fol. 170r. See also Whitworth to Tilson, Berlin, 27/1/1720, BL, Add. MSS 37378, fol. 312r. 90 George I to Whitworth, St James’s, 4/3/1720, HHStA, CB 11, 1626, fols 72–3. 91 Haldane thought a deal was imminent on several occasions. See Haldane to Whitworth, Heidelberg, 1/3/1720, BL, Add. MSS 37379, fol. 296. Wrisberg noted talk of a deal at about the same time. See Wrisberg to George I, Regensburg, 4/3/1720, HHStA, CB 11, 2980, 87

76

PALATINATE CRISIS

settle protestant grievances, but Haldane commented that a commission would take too long and might not reach a decision. If things remained the same in the Palatinate for even two more years, ‘half the protestants will be forced to quitt the country’.92 Haldane felt increasingly unwelcome at the Palatine court. His Prussian colleague, Hecht, claimed Haldane backed a return to the 1705 situation, rather than a restoration of Westphalian rights. Protestants at Regensburg lost confidence in Haldane. Wrisberg did his best to defend Haldane. Yet Wrisberg was also concerned that Whitworth had misunderstood the importance of removing the Ryswick clause, even though Whitworth had seen protestant opposition to Ryswick at Regensburg himself.93 Whitworth hoped that the dispute could be settled at Regensburg.94 Tilson was less confident. He saw few options for Haldane ‘but stay to be insulted & as all is gone to Ratisbon, the influence & guaranty of England & Holland is gone quieter’. Papist encroachments would continue. Tilson admitted he was unsure whether the British could have done anything other than insist on the restoration of Westphalian rights (which he did not fully understand). Things might have been different had Stanhope been less busy.95

Protestant leadership and the Prussian myth Who was directing protestant efforts to resolve the crisis? Max Lehmann’s nine volume history of the relationship between Prussia and the catholic church exemplifies traditional views of Prussian political and religious leadership.96 Both its content and its publication from the late 1870s onwards suggest it provided ‘evidence’ in Kulturkampf campaigns. As a reliable guide to eighteenth-century attitudes it is more suspect. Lehmann’s choice of material was probably influenced by his assumption of the Hohenzollerns’ importance for German protestantism – a view which had wide currency well before the second half of the nineteenth century. Lehmann saw 1719 as an example of the Hohenzollerns following their traditional policy of supporting

fol. 524. However, Wrisberg subsequently reported that the proposal was simply a return to the 1705 position and not to 1648 (Wrisberg to George I, Regensburg, 7/3/1720, ibid., fol. 530). 92 Haldane to Stanhope, Heidelberg, 14/4/1720, PRO, SP 81/121. 93 Wrisberg to George I, Regensburg, 28/3/1720, HHStA, CB 11, 2980, fols 706–7. Wrisberg had earlier written to George to express his confidence in Haldane. This was to counter rumours he had heard that it was intended to recall him from Heidelberg (Wrisberg to George I, Regensburg, 11/3/1720, ibid., fol. 580). 94 Whitworth to Haldane, Berlin, 16/4/1720, BL, Add. MSS 37380, fol. 280. 95 Tilson to Whitworth, Whitehall, 15/4/1720, BL, Add. MSS 37380, fol. 356. 96 Max Lehmann, Preussen und die katholische Kirche seit 1640 (9 vols, Leipzig, 1878–1902). 77

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

their co-religionists, although Hanover was supporter-in-chief.97 Lehmann included archival extracts of the orders given by Frederick William for retaliatory measures98 and an exchange with the philosopher Christian Thomasius, president of the university of Halle, on the injustice of the Simultaneum.99 From Wrisberg’s point of view, it was the Prussians who were the allies who had to be cajoled into supporting George’s schemes and not the other way around.100 No doubt counter-examples of Prussian attempts to influence Hanoverian policy could be produced from Prussian archives but exchanges between George and Frederick William provide more compelling evidence of who was calling the shots. Frederick William had circulated a letter to German protestant courts urging solidarity in late 1719. The letter argued that the Corpus in Regensburg should direct events. Early in 1720, George replied that, while Frederick William’s plan was not without merit, controlling everything through the Corpus and Regensburg was ‘risky’. The catholics might discover protestant plans sooner rather than later, given the difficulties of controlling information in Regensburg. Protestant territories surrounded by catholics would be exposed to increased risk of reprisals. More dangerous was the letter’s demand that all protestant estates should pledge to ally, should it come to conflict with the catholics. A similar demand was also to be made of the guarantors of the Westphalia treaties. George thought this conveyed the wrong impression. It would suggest to the smallest and weakest protestant states, who had placed most trust in Prussia and Hanover, that George and Frederick William were losing their nerve. The smaller states would therefore be less likely to help.101 The letter was not couched in the language of a junior partner, timidly suggesting an alternative policy. It was a reprimand. Reactions to reprisals against catholics confirm Hanoverian leadership. Frederick William had responded quickly to catholic intransigence, closing catholic churches in Halberstadt, Minden and Hammersleben, as well as seizing assets from religious houses. George had closed the catholic church in Celle, claiming it was unjust to allow catholics what they did not allow protestants.102 However, he had done little else. Indeed there were not many catholics in the electorate. In Britain, as his treatment of the Irish bill demanding castration for captured priests indicates,103 he was mindful of the negative consequences of harsh action.

97

Lehmann, Preussen und die katholische Kirche, i, p. 417. Ibid., pp. 679–80 (dated 2/12/1719). 99 Ibid., p. 682 (dated 17/2/1720). Wrisberg to George, Regensburg, 25/3/1720, HHStA, CB 11, 2980, fol. 678r reports Thomasius’s conclusion that the Simultaneum was unjust. 100 Wrisberg to George, Regensburg, 1/1/1720, HHStA, CB 11, 2978, fol. 10. 101 George I to Frederick William I, St James’s, 5/1/1720, HHStA, CB 11, 1626, fols 45–7. 102 See George I to Geheime Räte, St James’s, 6/10/1719, ibid., fols 5–6. 103 See p. 15. 98

78

PALATINATE CRISIS

When Dowager Empress Amalia complained to George about his treatment of the catholics in Celle, George instructed his envoy in Vienna, Huldenberg, to respond that he had not closed a church but merely stopped worship in a private house. His ban was temporary and would be revoked, should an accommodation be reached.104 George did enough to appear to be taking strong action but was always ready to negotiate a settlement. He told Charles that he hated all persecution ‘because I know very well that nothing is so contrary to the duties of Christian love as this’.105 In suggesting his main concern was the preservation of the Imperial constitution, George was claiming the moral high ground. While he had granted catholics freedom of worship as a favour, the elector Palatine was legally obliged to tolerate protestantism.106 Frederick William’s approach was less accommodating, although revealingly he sought George’s advice over the timing of removing sanctions against the catholics. George responded, via Whitworth, that the cathedral in Minden could be reopened as soon as the Heidelberg church was returned but it was best to await the catholic response. Given an inch, they would take a mile.107 George was well aware of Austrian annoyance at Frederick William’s behaviour. Huldenberg reported that a recent letter from the Prussian king to Charles had ‘ruined nearly everything’. The letter’s publication before it had been presented to Charles had done little to diminish Austrian irritation. Huldenberg also noted darkly that the recent peace between the Emperor and Spain meant that the Emperor was now free to engage in a war of religion.108 Despite claims of Prussian leadership in 1719 to 1720,109 it was George to whom Frederick William looked for advice and it was George who did most to manage the situation.110

104

George I to Huldenberg, St James’s, 12/1/1720, HHStA, CB 11, 1626, fol. 50. Charles VI had also written to George, pointing out the illegality of reprisals under Imperial law on discovering the closure of the church in Celle (Charles VI to George I, Vienna, 24/2/1720, HHStA, CB 11, 1643). Amalia was a relation of George from the Brunswick-Wolffenbüttel branch of the family. 105 George I to Charles VI, St James’s, 5/4/1720, HHStA, CB 11, 1574, fol. 57v. 106 Ibid., fol. 58. 107 George I to Whitworth, St James’s, 18/3/1720, HHStA, CB 11, 1626, fols 78–9. See also Frederick William I to George I, Berlin, 16/3/1720, HHStA, CB 11, 1649: I, fol. 6. 108 Huldenberg to George I, Vienna, 28/2/1720, HHStA, CB 24, 4916: I, fol. 211. 109 Johann Gustav Droysen, Geschichte der Preußische Politik, IV: ii, Friedrich Wilhelm I (Leipzig, 1869), p. 286. 110 A similarly deferential tone can be found in letters from Karl of Hessen-Kassel to George. See, for example, Karl to George I, Kassel, 28/9/1719, HHStA, CB 24, 2490. Borgmann, Deutsche Religionsstreit, p. 131 also supports this conclusion. 79

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

The place of religion and the conduct of diplomacy For George, religion was a matter of conscience, in which the state had no legitimate right to interfere. Belief could not be changed by persecution and pressure. Consequently, there is merit in Hatton’s characterisation of George as a monarch of the early enlightenment.111 She argued the enlightenment gave rise to ideas of collective security and a shift away from the ‘ideological’ wars of the seventeenth century.112 In this picture, the irrationality of religious conflict has been replaced by the pure calculation of enlightened statecraft.113 Neither George I nor George II engaged in aggressive wars for the defence of religion. However, they both still saw themselves as defenders of the faith. To assume that the threat to protestantism in Europe had evaporated in the early part of the eighteenth century is to take the propaganda of the Aufklärer at face value. The removal of religion from just grounds for an aggressive war was a defensive, rather than an offensive, move. To make conscience sovereign was a response to the strength, not weakness, of catholicism. In 1719 many protestants believed that the catholic powers still sought to spread the one true faith by the sword. A further protestant explanation of the Palatine crisis was the desire for power of the Schönborn family and clerics more generally – the evils of priestcraft. St Saphorin’s reports suggested there were three factions at the court in Vienna.114 There were Charles’s Spanish advisers, who remained attached to Habsburg possessions in the Iberian peninsula. Then there was Schönborn and his group, mainly from the Imperial chancery, interested in Germany and the Empire. Finally, there was the Austrian faction, led by Eugene, Sinzendorf and Starhemberg.115 The image of the scheming cleric is ubiquitous in the early eighteenth century but St Saphorin used it with particular skill against Schönborn.116 Wrisberg was convinced that it was Schönborn’s desire to help his prince-bishop relations that was hindering a settlement. Eugene and his faction wanted a resolution.117 Haldane’s first reports had blamed the church’s seizure not on the Palatine ministers, who had opposed it, but on the elector of Trier (Karl Philipp’s brother) and the

111

Hatton, George I, p. 81. See, particularly, Hatton, War and peace, 1680–1720: an inaugural lecture (London, 1969). 113 Although Hatton thought it important not to underestimate the power of protestantism, ‘even though the period 1714–60 was not one of religious fervour’ (The Anglo-Hanoverian connection, 1714–1760: the Creighton trust lecture 1982 (London, 1982), p. 12). 114 Gehling, Europäischer Diplomat, p. 45. Interestingly, the first report setting out this view was written in September 1719. 115 Ibid., p. 56. 116 St Saphorin even argued Schönborn was influenced directly from Rome. See St Saphorin to Stanhope, Vienna, 10/2/1720, PRO, SP 80/40. 117 Wrisberg to George I, Regensburg, 8/2/1720, HHStA, CB 11, 2979, fols 272v–273r. 112

80

PALATINATE CRISIS

Dowager Empress Amalia.118 Haldane subsequently changed his mind but his initial impression is revealing.119 Whitworth also mentioned Haldane’s struggles with the ‘Jesuitical’ party.120 Beyond the Jesuits, blame was also laid at the gates of Rome. A German periodical published a letter, supposedly from the pope, to German catholic princes and then berated the papacy for its interference in Imperial affairs.121 This was not simply popular prejudice that had little impact on official discourse. George was perfectly prepared to attribute a particular action to friends of papal interests amongst Charles’s advisers, rather than the whole ministry or the Emperor himself.122 Earlier in the troubles George had pondered whether the affair might have been stirred up by the papacy to keep the Emperor distracted from Italy so that Spanish power might be reinforced, thus protecting the papacy from the Emperor.123 Wrisberg responded that he had heard on good authority that the pope had been exerting pressure on Charles.124 Contemporary protestant writers were willing to give credence to rumours of papal interference. Some historians have followed suit, arguing, for example, that Schönborn was happy to encourage the idea that Vienna was ready for a war of religion. While protestant historians admit that claims of papal involvement were exaggerated at the time, they claim there was a factual basis to them.125 Catholic historians, like Hans Schmidt, deny that there was ever a papal plot.126 The elector Palatine simply desired to increase his secular, absolutist power.127 Schmidt’s argument negates neatly accusations of religious bigotry on the elector’s part. The argument turns to a greater or lesser extent on the irrationality of protestant claims. Protestant paranoia is countered with the hard facts. In some ways, it may have been easier to blame scheming clerics than fellow monarchs. However, those who did blame scheming clerics were not necessarily insincere in their beliefs. Nor does an alternative explanation necessarily need to be found for the actions of protestant rulers – sometimes people’s actions cannot be explained in a purely rational way. When considering the age of enlightenment, it is imperative to spot areas of difference from today, the extent of religious belief being one of the more important.

118

Haldane to Craggs, Kassel, 18/9/1719, PRO, SP 81/120. Haldane to Craggs, Heidelberg, 18/11/1719, ibid. 120 See Whitworth to Stanhope, private, Berlin, 13/1/1720, BL, Add. MSS 37378, fol. 192r and Tilson to Whitworth, Whitehall, 22/1/1720, BL, Add. MSS 37379, fol. 28v. 121 Europäische Fama, 239 (1720), p. 942. 122 George I to Wrisberg, St James’s, 19/4/1720, HHStA, CB 11, 1649: I, fol. 61r. 123 George to St Saphorin, St James’s, 11/12/1719, HHStA, CB 11, 1626, fol. 21. 124 Wrisberg to George, Regensburg, 18/1/1720, HHStA, CB 11, 2978, fol. 116r. 125 Naumann, Österreich, England und das Reich, p. 44 and Borgmann, Deutsche Religionsstreit, pp. 33–42. 126 Schmidt, Karl Philipp, p. 120. 127 Ibid., pp. 121–5. 119

81

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

Irrespective of whether the papacy or the Jesuits were plotting the destruction of protestantism, the ‘fact’ that they were perceived to be so doing affected the attitudes and policies of officials in both Britain and Hanover.

Attempts at settlement: Cadogan in Vienna So how did George I seek to resolve the religious conflict? William, Earl Cadogan was sent to Vienna, by way of Berlin, to try to settle both religious grievances and the dispute over the investitures to Bremen and Verden in April 1720.128 Cadogan was confident from the outset that an agreement on the religious issue that would be acceptable to the Corpus and leave European protestants in George’s debt was achievable.129 Early discussions were conducted with Philipp, Count Sinzendorf, the Austrian court chancellor, who claimed that, as the elector had now agreed to leave the church and allow the catechism, there was little else the Emperor could do.130 Stanhope was worried by rumours of negotiations between Russia and Austria. He also wanted to remind the Emperor that all George wanted was security for legitimate protestant rights.131 The Austrians attempted to link the religious issue to the investitures. Prussia’s unwillingness to lift sanctions made things more difficult still.132 St Saphorin claimed to the Emperor that the religious disputes had been stirred up by the pope to start a war of religion in the Empire thus forcing the Emperor to withdraw his troops from Italy.133 Schönborn had emphasised the dangers of Prusso-Hanoverian alliance for peace in the north and to the Emperor’s authority to Charles.134 Sinzendorf, by contrast, seemed willing to compromise.135 However, some of the smaller protestant princes were now faltering in their commitment to the collective cause.136 St Saphorin advised Stanhope that it was important to seek a lasting regulation of the Ryswick issue.137

128 The investiture claims arose from Swedish losses in the Great Northern War. Hanover’s claims (and Prussia’s to Stettin) needed to be officially sanctioned by the Emperor. 129 Cadogan and St Saphorin to Stanhope, Vienna, 1/5/1720, PRO, SP 80/41, fol. 1r. Some have cast doubt on Cadogan’s understanding of the religious issue and his general diplomatic ability. See Borgmann, Deutsche Religionsstreit, pp. 98–9. Hugh Dunthorne describes Cadogan as a bluff soldier and does not rate his diplomatic skills particularly highly. See Hugh Dunthorne, The Maritime powers, 1721–1740: a study of Anglo-Dutch relations in the age of Walpole (New York and London, 1986), p. 49. 130 Cadogan and St Saphorin to Stanhope, Vienna, 4/5/1720, PRO, SP 80/41, fol. 5. 131 Stanhope to Cadogan and St Saphorin, Whitehall, 20/4/1720, PRO, SP 104/42. 132 Cadogan and St Saphorin to Stanhope, Vienna, 9/5/1720, PRO, SP 80/41, fol. 12. 133 Ibid., fol. 12r. 134 Ibid., fol. 12v. 135 Ibid., fols 14–15. 136 Ibid., fol. 16r. 137 Ibid., fol. 22r.

82

PALATINATE CRISIS

Privately Cadogan and St Saphorin were annoyed that Prussia was doing little to help. The Prussians were moreover complaining about George’s lack of vigour. Meanwhile other powers, such as France, were looking for opportunities to exploit the situation in the Empire.138 St Saphorin and Cadogan commended Charles’s offer of a commission to settle the religious disputes to Wrisberg.139 Wrisberg was unconvinced. Rumours of the offer of the commission had caused disquiet at Regensburg. Protestant diplomats were reluctant to do anything further as they thought a deal had been done on both the religious issue and the investitures. Furthermore Wrisberg doubted that the English ministers in Vienna could have grasped the seriousness of the Ryswick issue.140 He reminded Cadogan and St Saphorin not to forget the importance of protestant grievances.141 Wrisberg was also concerned that, despite George’s reassurances of his good intentions, negotiating in Vienna would make it easy for powers like Saxony and Prussia to adopt an ‘affected religious zeal’ and then blame Britain if things went wrong.142 George made clear to St Saphorin that he must resist the linkage of the religious and investiture issues.143 Unity amongst the Corpus, George warned Wrisberg, was essential for achieving a settlement. Wrisberg could suggest a defensive alliance amongst the protestants. Some sanctions must remain until there had been more movement from the catholics.144 George’s next move was to instruct St Saphorin on the religious question.145 The instructions were drafted by the Deutsche Kanzlei (an indication that George did take a personal interest in the conduct of Imperial policy) in London.146 The instructions explained the precise nature of the complaints against the electors of Mainz and the Palatinate. Perhaps it was not just Wrisberg who was worried about St Saphorin’s and, in particular, Cadogan’s background knowledge. The instructions not only justified the sanctions but also maintained that the Emperor must undertake to deal with all protestant grievances within a fixed period, say a year. All settlements must conform to Westphalian provisions.147 A confessionally balanced commission at Regensburg should resolve matters.

138

Cadogan and St Saphorin to Stanhope, secret, Vienna, 9/5/1720, SP 80/41, fol. 39. Cadogan and St Saphorin to Wrisberg, Vienna, 9/5/1720, ibid., fol. 37r. 140 Wrisberg to George I, Regensburg, 13/5/1720, HHStA, CB 11, 2981, fols 251–2. 141 Wrisberg to Cadogan and St Saphorin, Regensburg, 14/5/1720, ibid., fol. 272v. 142 Wrisberg to George I, Regensburg, 16/5/1720, ibid., fol. 262. 143 George I to St Saphorin, St James’s, 6/5/1720, HHStA, CB 11, 1649: I, fol. 94. 144 George I to Wrisberg, St James’s, 3/5/1720, ibid., fols 91–2. 145 Several copies of these are extant, dated 13/5/1720 and signed in St James’s. The original draft can be found in Hann. 92, 2474, fols 86–95. There is a German version in CB 11, 1649: I, fols 101–14 and another copy of the French version in SP 104/42. 146 Stanhope to Cadogan and St Saphorin, Whitehall, 20/5/1720, PRO, SP 104/42 describes the instructions as ‘expedie de la Chancellerie Allemande le 13/24 de ce mois’. 147 George I to St Saphorin, St James’s, 13/5/1720, HHStA, Hann. 92, 2474, fols 86v–87r. 139

83

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

Catholic states accused of committing acts of violence should be excluded.148 No further alterations to the ecclesiastical situation in the Palatinate should be made until a full agreement had been reached.149 Sinzendorf must also realise that George would never abandon the protestant cause to obtain the investitures.150 George disliked religious war but he would not flinch from taking firm action, if forced, to defend legitimate protestant rights. 151 A postscript emphasised the need to replace the treaty of 1705. It had been concluded solely with the elector of Brandenburg and not the whole Corpus and some of it contradicted Westphalian provisions.152 George I was clearly concerned with more than securing the investitures. The importance of a religious settlement was reinforced by Stanhope’s order to Cadogan to work closely with Huldenberg and St Saphorin who knew more about such matters. Cadogan was to hint at what a religious war might do to the Emperor’s authority. Both Stanhope and George wanted to increase British influence within the Empire and so a British guarantee of the Westphalian settlement was again raised as a possibility. Cadogan was told to impress upon Charles that if no redress were forthcoming, then the Corpus would certainly apply to George for protection. George (and Cadogan) would be forced to adopt a different tone. George would unfortunately be obliged to stop being a mediator and take firmer action ‘rather than leaving his brothers in the Empire without redress and at the mercy of their enemies the Roman Catholics’.153 Any solution must include settlement of all complaints in Mainz and the Palatinate, a return to the principles of 1648 and the abolition of the Ryswick clause. Pressure was applied from both Britons and Hanoverians and diplomatic efforts were carefully coordinated. Wrisberg thanked George for a copy of St Saphorin’s instructions. They had convinced the smaller protestant princes that George had not forgotten them.154 The instructions had been sent to St Saphorin by messenger, indicating their importance. St Saphorin was glad that they had been instructed on the religious issue; it brought an end to the embarrassment of having to claim that they were not empowered to negotiate on such matters.155 St Saphorin, along with other protestant ministers, had indicated to the Emperor

148

Ibid., fol. 87v. Ibid., fol. 88v. 150 Ibid., fol. 90r. This should be remembered, as the more usual interpretation of events is that given in an earlier letter from Stanhope, where he emphasised the importance of achieving the investitures. See Stanhope to Cadogan and St Saphorin, Whitehall, 6/5/1720, PRO, SP 80/41. 151 George to St Saphorin, St James’s, 13/5/1720, HHStA, Hann. 92, 2474, fol. 90v. 152 Ibid., fol. 93r. 153 Stanhope to Cadogan and St Saphorin, Whitehall, 20/5/1720, PRO, SP 104/42. 154 Wrisberg to George, Regensburg, 10/6/1720, HHStA, CB 11, 2982, fol. 458v. 155 Cadogan and St Saphorin to Stanhope, Vienna, 15/6/1720, PRO, SP 80/41, fol. 119. 149

84

PALATINATE CRISIS

that neither the elector Palatine nor the elector of Mainz had, in fact, settled protestant complaints properly.156 George had instructed St Saphorin to act with great care and keep the Corpus happy precisely because of the rumours of discontent he had received from Regensburg.157 George ordered the ministry in Hanover to ensure that Hessen-Kassel dispatched an envoy to Regensburg. In the absence of an official representative, the Hessen-Kassel votes had been delegated to Saxony-Gotha. Saxony-Gotha was not well disposed to George’s strategy.158 Prussia remained recalcitrant. Although Frederick William had agreed to lift most of the sanctions, it was rumoured that he was refusing to hand back the confiscated revenues from a monastery in Hammersleben. If asked, St Saphorin was ordered to feign ignorance, while George tried to restore the revenues.159 St Saphorin presented a memo to the Emperor outlining his instructions on the religious issue.160 The Austrian faction was willing to accept most of the conditions, although there was some unhappiness that the proposed commission would meet at Regensburg.161 The negotiations dragged on for much of the summer. The Emperor ultimately set the deadline for a resolution, thus satisfying George’s demand, of four months in September 1720. The question of the investitures, however, remained unsettled.162

The place of the press The role of Öffentlichkeit in these events was significant. It was impossible to keep diplomacy entirely secret. Regensburg, in particular, was a centre of news, rumour and the exchange of information. Wrisberg’s reports frequently made use of information gathered from the various other diplomats resident in the town. However, the flow of news was imperfect. Wrisberg complained in the summer of 1720 about the lack of information from Vienna.163 He was even more annoyed when both protestants and catholics were able to read in the ‘public newspapers’ (‘öffentl. Zeitungen’) from Holland what the Emperor had decided to do about the religious situation, before the Reichstag had been told anything.164 Much has been written about the economic origins of the modern press and how the quest for news arose from a need to have accurate information about

156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164

Ibid., fol. 120r. George I to St Saphorin, St James’s, 17/5/1720, HHStA, CB 11, 1649: I, fol. 114. George I to Geheime Räte, St James’s, 17/5/1720, ibid., fol. 123. George I to St Saphorin, St James’s, 24/5/1720, ibid., fol. 139r. Memo on religious affairs, 20/6/1720, PRO, SP 81/41, fol. 133. Cadogan to Stanhope, Vienna, 13/7/1720, ibid., fol. 158r. Naumann, Österreich, England und das Reich, pp. 56–8. Wrisberg to George I, Regensburg, 12/8/1720, HHStA, CB 11, 2983, fol. 217v. Wrisberg to George I, Regensburg, 19/8/1720, HHStA, CB 11, 2984, fol. 268r. 85

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

trade.165 Yet other forces also contributed to the growth of the public sphere. Demand for purely economic content was limited. Stories of religious persecution, for example, also made good copy. Moreover, the structure of the European press, with much news being taken from British, and particularly Dutch, sources meant that a fair amount of ‘editorial line’, consciously or not, was included in the transfer of information. The process can be illustrated in practice. The ministry in Hanover employed agents throughout Europe to send them reports from the local press. Reports were sent from London in at least three hands. One of them may have been a semi-official newsletter sanctioned by Robethon, but the provenance of the others is unclear.166 There is a chance that the Huguenot journalist Abel Boyer might have provided one. Graham Gibbs has drawn attention on several occasions to the importance of Boyer’s work, as well as showing the likelihood that he was providing a manuscript newsletter for Huguenot journalist friends in the United Provinces with detailed parliamentary information.167 Parliamentary reporting was semi-official in this period. Reports of debates are often incomplete.168 By contrast the speeches from the throne at the beginning and end of parliamentary sessions and the responses of the Lords and Commons to them are readily accessible in official sources. 169 The

165 Paradigmatic: Jürgen Habermas, The structural transformation of the public sphere trans. Thomas Burger (Cambridge, 1989). For a different perspective, emphasising the importance of religion, see Göran Leth, ‘A protestant public sphere: the early European newspaper press’, in Michael Harris, ed., Studies in newspaper and periodical history: 1993 Annual (Westport, Conn., and London, 1994), pp. 67–90. There is a good evaluation of Habermas in Van Horn Melton, The rise of the public in enlightenment Europe, pp. 1–15. 166 See HHStA, CB 24, 1722–33. Further evidence of interest in the English press, in particular, can be found amongst the papers of the Hanoverian minister Johann Philipp von Hattorf. See his collection of cuttings in HHStA, Hann. 91 v Hattorf, 33. 167 See Graham C. Gibbs, ‘The role of the Dutch republic as the intellectual entrepôt of Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries’, Bijdragen en mededelingen betreffende de geschiedenis der Nederlanden, 86 (1971), pp. 323–49 and idem, ‘Some intellectual and political influences of the Huguenot emigrés in the United Provinces, c. 1680–1730’, Bijdragen en mededelingen betreffende de geschiedenis der Nederlanden, 90 (1975), pp. 255–87 for the general argument about Huguenots as sources of news. For the involvement of Boyer in particular, see idem, ‘Huguenot contributions to the intellectual life of England, c. 1680–c. 1720, with some asides on the process of assimilation’, in J.A.H. Bots and G.H.M. Posthumus Meyjes, eds, La Révocation de l’Édit de Nantes et les Provinces-Unies 1685 (Amsterdam and Maarssen, 1986), pp. 181–200. The Hanover archives contain only one reference to Boyer in a printed copy of his translation (into French) of the ‘Addresses des Deux Chambres du Parlement de la Grande Bretagne: Presentées au Roi le 22. Fevrier 1716/7, traduites de l’Anglais, par Mr A. Boyer’, HHStA, CB 24, 1719, fol. 33. 168 For a general discussion of source problems, see Jeremy Black, Parliament and foreign policy in the eighteenth century (Cambridge, 2004), ch. 6. 169 The value and importance of the speech from the throne is discussed in Mark A. Thomson, ‘Parliament and foreign policy, 1689–1714’, in Ragnhild Hatton and J.S. Bromley, eds, William III and Louis XIV: essays by and for Mark A. Thomson (Liverpool,

86

PALATINATE CRISIS

audience for these speeches went beyond the members sitting in the chamber. Parliamentary reporting was a staple of foreign newspapers and the monthly periodicals based upon them, as well as the still important manuscript newsletters. Thus, in the newsletters in Hanover, parliamentary events figured significantly and in November 1719, a reference to an address delivered by the Lords spiritual and temporal in support of the protestants of the Palatinate appeared.170 Copies of speeches at the opening and closing of parliament and on other important occasions were frequently sent to all British diplomats serving abroad so that they could be distributed at their respective courts. Evidence of their impact is difficult to ascertain, although two points must be remembered. The first is that, regardless of whether it was ‘meant’, the fact that such speeches frequently invoked a language of defending liberty, property and the protestant interest at home and abroad was an important signal. Such language set the parameters for debate, even if the exact definition of what constituted the protestant interest was contested. Secondly, there is some evidence that the distribution of speeches made a difference. Whitworth told Tilson that the speeches showed British domestic unity and thus strengthened his negotiating position.171 The intention of speeches from the throne was, therefore, not only to persuade country gentlemen to grant supply but to ensure both foreign courts and the growing European public were aware of Britain’s diplomatic priorities and goals. Dutch reports and newsletters sent to the ministry in Hanover also indicate an interest in the Palatine crisis.172 These reports claimed that the elector of Mainz was irritated by the coverage the gazettes were giving to the crisis.173 Some catholics claimed by contrast that, when push came to shove, George would be as unwilling as his predecessor James I to give aid to the Palatine protestants.174 There was a lively interest in the fate of the Palatine protestants and a willingness to use the press to influence debate. An incident in 1720 adds further weight to this argument. The archbishop of Canterbury

1968), pp. 130–9 and Graham C. Gibbs, ‘Parliament and foreign policy in the age of Stanhope and Walpole’, English Historical Review, 77 (1962), pp. 18–37. Whilst P.D.G. Thomas describes the speech as significant, the emphasis in his discussion is more on the formal character of the speech. See P.D.G. Thomas, The House of Commons in the eighteenth century (Oxford, 1971), pp. 39–42. 170 See letters from London, 24/11/1719, HHStA, CB 24, 1722, fols 551 and 567. See also Parliamentary history, vii, col. 604 for the archbishop of Canterbury’s addition to the address of thanks in favour of the Palatine protestants (23/11/1719). 171 Whitworth to Tilson, Berlin, 16/12/1719, BL, Add. MSS 37377, fol. 306r. For Stanhope’s interest in monitoring reactions to the king’s speech, see Stanhope to Dayrolles, Whitehall, 23/1/1719, BL, Add. MSS 15867, fol. 47r. 172 HHStA, CB 24, 3208, passim. 173 Amsterdam, 1/3/1720, ibid., fol. 52r. 174 Amsterdam, 20/4/1720, ibid., fol. 104r. 87

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

brought another address in the Lords in favour of foreign protestants. The bishop of Gloucester also brought an address against the Jacobite printer and publisher, Nathaniel Mist, who had attacked the Palatine protestants in one of his publications.175 Mist had covered events in Heidelberg throughout March and April 1720. At the beginning of March, he had noted how the ‘the Presbyterians, Dissenters, or, as they call themselves, the Reformed at Heidelberg’ still wanted their church back.176 Mist continually sought to associate the Palatine protestants with English dissenters and their supposedly anti-monarchical principles.177 Mist also blamed the protestant citizens of Heidelberg for driving their prince from their city and, thus, bringing about its ruin.178 As evidence of the partiality of the case being put forward by the Palatines, Mist cited their unwillingness to allow their case to be heard before an Imperial court, which Mist assumed would be impartial.179 Mist’s purpose was partisan. He was linking support for the Palatines with the whigs. He argued Dutch and Prussian reprisals against catholics would only make things worse. Mist feared that Polish protestants were likely to suffer in retaliation and Palatine behaviour would be to blame. He mused as to how whig commentators would justify the persecution of catholics but simultaneously condemn the treatment of protestants in catholic countries.180 Mist’s Jacobite sympathies meant he was used to controversy.181 The incident indicates how religious tensions and party-political concerns were intimately connected. The bishop of Gloucester’s address was picked up in several other periodical publications. The Political State of Great Britain devoted the first forty-two pages of its June issue to bringing its readers up to date on developments in the Palatinate and included mention of the debate initiated by the bishop. 182 A report of the incident was also carried in the Europäische Fama. It claimed Mist’s attack was based on the accusation that the Palatinate protestants were rebelling against their legitimate master.183 Both reports may have drawn upon a common source but, more importantly, they show the flow of information and its uses. One use was to obtain diplomatic advantage. Stanhope felt that it was worth writing to Cadogan and St Saphorin in Vienna about the address. Stanhope enclosed extracts from the minutes of the Lords as well as the

175

London, 3/6/1720 OS, HHStA, CB 24, 1726, fol. 289. The Weekly Journal, or Saturday’s Post, 5 Mar. 1720, 66, p. 392. 177 See also ibid., 7 May 1720, 75, p. 447 and 14 May 1720, 76, p. 453. 178 Ibid., 9 Apr. 1720, 71, p. 423, and 16 Apr. 1720, 72, p. 429. 179 Ibid., 23 Apr. 1720, 73, p. 434. 180 Ibid., 7 May 1720, 75, p. 447. 181 On Mist as Jacobite printer, see Michael Harris, London newspapers in the age of Walpole (London, 1987), pp. 114–15. 182 PSGB, xix, June 1720, pp. 600–42 (Gloucester reference, p. 630). From June 1720, Mist’s comments on the Palatine situation were more subdued. See Weekly Journal, 18 Jun. 1720, 80, p. 482. 183 Die Europäische Fama, 237 (1720), pp. 795–6. 176

88

PALATINATE CRISIS

addresses themselves. Stanhope dismissed Mist’s comments as an example of Jacobite impudence but was sending them the material ‘in order that you would know how much one takes to heart here the interest of religion’.184 Cadogan and St Saphorin should use the information to convince the Emperor’s ministers of the strength of British resolve. The circulation of an account of the Mist incident in the European press reinforced the point that religious matters were important to George. The press also reflected some of the attitudes mentioned earlier about blame for what had happened. The Europäische Fama complained that clerical interference in secular government always had negative effects.185 Cambridge university felt it necessary to send a loyal address to George, thanking him for the protection that had brought about a revival of learning. It was with ‘particular Pleasure’ that the university saw George ‘asserting the cause of Liberty and Supporting the interest of our Protestant Brethren abroad, where deplorable Conditions every Day convince us that the Protestant Religion must stand or fall with the Protestant Succession’.186 The association between protestant rule in Britain and the fate of the protestant religion in Europe is striking. The address exemplifies what Duncan Forbes calls ‘vulgar Whiggery’ in his study of the scientific (and implicitly superior) whiggery of Hume.187 However, the use of this sort of language at the level of the periodical, the statesman and the austere academics of Cambridge suggests that it was not simply the preserve of the uneducated and the unenlightened. To dismiss such views as mere ‘prejudice’ and to then seek explanation for actions in the seemingly more ‘rational’ realms of Machiavellian statecraft is to miss the point. Statesmen may have considered strategy and territorial gain more carefully than those less ‘in the know’. Yet politicians (and the elite more generally) were not immune to wider patterns of thought. There is no straight opposition between religious/ethical and practical/pragmatic concerns. The protestant interest could not be ignored by an early eighteenth-century British or Hanoverian statesman.

The repercussions of the crisis The effects of the crisis lasted well beyond 1720. Several important themes emerge. The first is the importance Whitworth attached to the protestant interest as a means to counter the Russian threat. Secondly, it will be necessary to consider the moves made for church union amongst European protestants in 1722. The union proposals have usually been considered solely in a theological context yet they also illustrate the extent of informal contacts

184 185 186 187

Stanhope to Cadogan and St Saphorin, Whitehall, 3/6/1720, PRO, SP 104/42. Die Europäische Fama, 226 (1719), pp. 541–2. PSGB, xviii, November 1719, pp. 414–15. See Duncan Forbes, Hume’s philosophical politics (Cambridge, 1975), pp. 125–92. 89

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

between British and Hanoverian figures. Thirdly, it will be necessary to discuss Jacobitism briefly. Whitworth had continued to follow the development of the religious crisis from Berlin. Unlike Haldane, he had always been more concerned about the relationship between Palatine affairs and the wider European picture. Rumours he received in November 1720 suggested that the tsar had reached an agreement with Charles, including provisions to provide troops to defend the Emperor, should he be attacked by protestant powers.188 Rumours of a new catholic alliance worried Whitworth so he wrote to Bernstorff to enquire whether Wrisberg had heard anything.189 Wrisberg responded that the catholics had met to organise their votes for the Reichstag resolutions on the Congress of Cambrai, called to resolve all outstanding international disputes, and the religious issue. Perhaps this was the source of Whitworth’s rumour?190 However, most of his dispatch dealt with the Hanoverian official, Reck.191 Reck had been sent by the Corpus to the Palatinate to ensure that the elector was keeping his promise to resolve protestant grievances. He was also supposed to prevent the reformed from striking a deal detrimental to the general protestant interest and improve the position of the Lutherans. Reck had outstayed his welcome.192 Indeed, Reck wrote to the Corpus shortly after his arrival to explain that all Palatine officials had been banned from talking to him on pain of dismissal.193 Stanhope approved of suggesting the formation of a protestant league to the Swedes.194 He doubted that a catholic league had been formed already, simply because Bavaria had not joined. Stanhope therefore suggested caution. Hasty action might cause the catholics to form an alliance. George would consult the Prussians, if necessary.195 How seriously was the threat from a catholic league taken in London? Townshend, who succeeded Stanhope in the Northern department on the

188

Whitworth to Stanhope, secret, Berlin, 26/11/1720, BL, Add. MSS 37382, fol. 151r. By December 1720, Whitworth could write to William Finch, the British extraordinary envoy in Sweden, that the Emperor had rejected the Russian advances (Whitworth to Finch, Berlin, 29/12/1720, ibid., fol. 283r). 189 Whitworth to Bernstorff, Berlin, 18/1/1721, BL, Add. MSS 37383, fol. 37r. 190 Wrisberg to George I, Regensburg, 13/1/1721, HHStA, CB 11, 2988, fol. 68r. 191 Reck had been a Kanzelist in the Hanoverian delegation at Regensburg. In 1720 he had assembled various materials for the complaints published by the Corpus. He had consequently attracted catholic opprobrium, so George had written to express his confidence in Reck. See George I to Wrisberg, St James’s, 12/4/1720, HHStA, CB 11, 1649: I, fol. 47. 192 Wrisberg to George I, Regensburg, 13/1/1721, HHStA, CB 11, 2988, fol. 69r. 193 Reck to Corpus Evangelicorum, Heidelberg, 11/1/1721, ibid., 98r. 194 Stanhope to Whitworth, private, Whitehall, 13/1/1721, BL, Add. MSS 37383, fol. 69r. 195 Stanhope to Whitworth, private, Whitehall, 27/1/1721, ibid., fol. 110r. Whitworth had informed Tilson earlier that month of a new willingness on Frederick William’s part to act with determination in relation to the investiture and religious questions (Whitworth to Tilson, Berlin, 4/2/1721, ibid., fol. 95r.) 90

PALATINATE CRISIS

latter’s death in February 1721, told Whitworth to emphasise to Frederick William that it was best to stick with George, if he wanted to help protestants. This was probably part of a wider strategy to ensure that Frederick William cooperated and was not tempted back by offers from Russia.196 Townshend observed that the protestants would not have been in such a difficult position in the first place if Britain and Prussia had maintained a close alliance,197 but his remarks perhaps reflected his dislike of the perceived Hanoverian influence on British policy under Stanhope.198 Nevertheless, Townshend thought an alliance might force the Imperial court to moderate its demands in Italy. The recent demonstration of the power of the British fleet in the Baltic would indicate to all at the Congress of Cambrai the value of George’s friendship. By this means likewise instead of having the Prots left to be made a Victim as they have (v) been in almost every treaty of late they might not only have it in their power to keep themselves from being used ill but might also become umpires of the peace, both in the North and the South.199

The proposed alliance was to include Denmark and Hessen-Kassel. Whitworth thought that a protestant alliance would always be necessary to protect liberty and religion. The Habsburgs and Bourbons would ‘be obliged on every turn’ to take notice of it.200 Frederick William proved reluctant to enter into the alliance, as he had promised the duke of Holstein help in recovering Holstein from Denmark.201 For Whitworth, one of the benefits of the alliance was that it blocked Russian ambitions. He thought that the two real dangers to the peace of Europe were a war of religion in the Empire and war against the house of Bourbon. In these scenarios, the tsar would probably side with the catholics in the former and the French in the latter since he could only achieve his aim of gaining a footing in the Empire ‘at the expense of the Protestants, who have all the coast of the Baltick in their hands’.202 The Prussians remained unconvinced of the treaty’s necessity to defend the protestant interest, partly because

196

Townshend to Whitworth, private, Whitehall, 17/2/1721, BL, Add. MSS 37383, fols 220–1 and 24/2/1720, ibid., fols 260–1. 197 Townshend to Whitworth, Whitehall, 10/3/1721, BL, Add. MSS 37384, fol. 35v. 198 The standard view of Townshend’s and Walpole’s departure from the ministry in 1716 is that it related to disputes with Bernstorff over the direction of British policy in the Baltic. See Michael, Englische Geschichte, i, pp. 772–6 or idem, England under George I, i, pp. 328–31. 199 Townshend to Whitworth, private, Whitehall, 14/3/1721, BL, Add. MSS 37384, fol. 70. Italics indicate cipher in the original. 200 Whitworth to Townshend, secret, Berlin, 12/4/1721, BL, Add. MSS 37384, fols 178–83 (quotation fol. 183r). 201 Whitworth to Townshend, very private, Berlin, 6/5/1721, ibid., fols 380–1. 202 Whitworth to Townshend, very private, Berlin, 3/5/1721, ibid., 351r. 91

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

they feared Russia’s reaction. In response to Whitworth’s advances, they alleged that it was impossible for the protestant interest to be secured by a treaty which did not mention it directly. They had already made a treaty with Hanover for defending protestantism within the Empire. Whitworth responded that the existing treaty committed George as elector but it did not involve Britain. Moreover, given Charles’s likely reaction to a treaty made with a foreign power involving religious complaints, it had to be understood, rather than stated directly.203 Charles had always insisted that invoking the aid of a foreign power in religious disputes (other than the guarantors of the Westphalia treaties) was contrary to Imperial law. Sweden was engaged in war in the north and unable to help and France was unlikely to act during a regency. British plans to become a guarantor of the settlement reflected a desire to overcome the problem. Whitworth was concerned by how much territory Sweden was having to relinquish to Russia to gain peace.204 He viewed both preserving Sweden and maintaining the alliance with Prussia as means to preserve the protestant interest. More generally, Whitworth wanted to avoid dependence on either Bourbon or Austrian interests and a protestant alliance ‘would have put you in a Condition, to ballance both, with little trouble’. 205 While there were immediate tactical reasons for backing a protestant alliance, there were also broader strategic reasons related to how the states system could best be used to the advantage of Great Britain. Being able to balance the two leading catholic powers was a way to ensure protestantism’s survival. As well as the religious crisis, protestants at Regensburg had to decide what to do about the Congress of Cambrai. The congress was an attempt to resolve a number of issues, particularly the distribution of territory in Italy. The Emperor needed the Reichstag’s permission to make peace on its behalf. Protestants were reluctant to give permission – it had led to the Ryswick clause in 1697 and the Emperor’s failure to remove the clause at the Peace of Baden in 1714. Consequently, there were two views on how the protestants should proceed when it came to the peace treaties. One idea was to send a deputation to the congress to represent protestant interests. The other was for the protestant princes already represented at the congress to act on behalf of the Corpus. Wrisberg reported in September 1720 that he had been approached by the Saxon envoy, baron von Gersdorff, who wanted George to act for the

203

Whitworth to Townshend, private, Berlin, 10/5/1721, BL, Add. MSS 37385, fols 13–14. 204 Whitworth to Townshend, private, Berlin, 27/5/1721, ibid., fols 176–8. 205 Whitworth to Tilson, Berlin, 7/6/1721, ibid., fol. 235r. Tilson explained Prussian reluctance to sign the alliance by the lack of prospect of future gain. The alliance ‘was but an honest allyance for the publick good, which is a phrase not much understood any where, but among us good natur’d English’ (Tilson to Whitworth, Whitehall, 2/5/1721, ibid., fol. 65r). 92

PALATINATE CRISIS

protestants at the congress. As Wrisberg put it, most of the Corpus regarded George as their ‘head and protector’.206 This suited George perfectly. He was determined to represent the protestants himself. Tilson also thought, given the number of zealots amongst the catholics, a specifically protestant deputation would have little impact.207 The Ryswick clause was never discussed at Cambrai, although it had not been forgotten. George assured the ministry in Hanover in 1723 that he was seeking a declaration from the French that the clause should be modified.208 Protestant complaints rumbled on at Regensburg. George remained concerned about the ongoing religious dispute but by 1723 two particular incidents had affected his and Wrisberg’s reputation as credible defenders of protestantism. The first of these had been the decision in February 1722 by the Corpus to sign an agreement to promote greater unity and cooperation between the Lutherans and Calvinists. Wrisberg had always been concerned to maintain good relations between the confessions at Regensburg.209 In early 1720, Wrisberg had sought the advice of several of the leading European irenic theologians and had been informed by the Swiss theologian, Turretini, and the abbot of Loccum that an agreement over matters of doctrine was possible. Wrisberg was pleased, as he had previously believed that a mutual tolerance, encouraged and supported by the great and the good, was all that could be achieved.210 Much of the work on church union in the eighteenth century has focused on a slightly earlier period and, following broader historiographical trends, on Prussia’s role.211 Wrisberg’s efforts to promote union at Regensburg were crucial and have been largely overlooked. A memo of his from 1720 outlined George’s role, as head of the protestant party, in encouraging other

206

Wrisberg to George I, Regensburg, 14/9/1720, HHStA, CB 11, 2985, fol. 644r. Tilson to Whitworth, Whitehall, 2/5/1721, BL, Add. MSS 37385, fol. 76r. 208 George I to Geheime Räte, St James’s, 1/2/1723, HHStA, CB 11, 1680: I, fol. 42. Schaub raised the Ryswick clause with Cardinal Dubois in March (Schaub to Carteret, Paris, 20/3/1723, PRO, SP 78/178, fols 129–30). Dubois maintained that he could do little because of the bishop of Frejus’s scruples. Dubois received a declaration on the matter in July, written to deal with Frejus’s scruples, but Dubois had been non-committal (Schaub to Carteret, Paris, 12/7/1723, secret, ibid., fols 301–2). After Dubois’s death, the bishop, as Cardinal Fleury, eventually took over the direction of French foreign policy. 209 This comes through strongly in an undated memo which he wrote on the situation in the Palatinate. Its content and position in the file suggest a date of composition in either September or October 1719. See HHStA, CB 24, 6385, fols 19–27. More specifically he suggested (fol. 20r) that it was time to revive the proposals for a closer union at Regensburg which he had sent to London two years before. 210 Wrisberg to George I, Regensburg, 1/2/1720, HHStA, CB 11, 2978, fols 242–4. 211 See Hermann Dalton, Daniel Ernst Jablonski (Berlin, 1903), pp. 227–79, and R. Barry Leavis, ‘The failure of the Anglo-Prussian ecumenical effort of 1710–1714’, Church History, 47 (1978), pp. 381–99. There is a broader survey in Walter Delius, ‘Berliner kirchliche Unionsversuche im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert’, Jahrbuch für Berlin-Brandenburgischen Kirchengeschichte, 45 (1970), pp. 7–121. 207

93

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

protestant powers, like the United Provinces and the Swiss Cantons, to advance protestant unity.212 By 1722, despite a certain amount of Saxon foot-dragging,213 an agreement that Lutherans and reformed should work together had been signed. Wrisberg was concerned enough that Prussia and Hessen-Kassel were not fully supportive to suggest that it would be good if George could engage the support of the archbishop of Canterbury and the chancellor of the university of Tübingen for the cause of unity.214 Moves towards greater cooperation had met with a negative reception amongst the more orthodox Lutheran clergy in both Hamburg and parts of Saxony. This had unleashed a considerable pamphlet war.215 George’s concern about negative publicity had been made more acute by the debacle in the summer of 1722 over Schönborn. Schönborn had gained the upper hand over Sinzendorf and the Austrian faction in the first part of 1722.216 He had persuaded Charles that a moderate approach to matters religious in the Empire was not working. Charles had become far more intransigent over the settlement of protestant grievances. He adopted a tough line over the continued Prussian refusal to return the revenues of the Hammersleben monastery and refused to countenance further redress until the Corpus recalled Reck from the Palatinate. Wrisberg had found it increasingly difficult to keep the Corpus together. He had become convinced that all his problems emanated from Schönborn and only Schönborn’s removal would allow further progress. Wrisberg returned to Hanover and, with several ministerial colleagues,217 drew up a strong response to the Emperor’s most recent religious declaration. Their response blamed Schönborn for the Empire’s problems. Charles must get rid of him. The draft was then shown to several envoys and representatives from a select group of leading protestant powers. George was unhappy when he received the draft and wrote back to the ministry in Hanover to vent his displeasure. While he appreciated that the content was truthful and well deserved, as it was also clear that Schönborn would not be removed, he did

212

HHStA, CB 11, 1652. See Wrisberg to George I, Regensburg, 26/2/1722, HHStA, CB 11, 2294: II, fol. 353v and Wrisberg to George I, Regensburg, 30/3/1722, ibid., fol. 578v. 214 Geheime Räte to George I, Hanover, 3/3/1722, HHStA, CB 11, 1658, fol. 79. Wrisberg corresponded with both Wake and Pfaff. 215 The pamphlet war is evaluated in Wolf-Friedrich Schäufele, Christoph Matthäus Pfaff und die Kirchenunionsbestrebungen des Corpus Evangelicorum, 1717–1726 (Mainz, 1998), ch. 10. See also Andrew C. Thompson, The protestant interest and foreign policy in Britain and Hanover, 1719–1736 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Cambridge, 2003), pp. 98–9. 216 Hantsch, Schönborn, pp. 281–2 and Naumann, Österreich, England und das Reich, p. 83. 217 The draft of the project is to be found in HHStA, CB 11, 1658, ff. 108–29 and it contains the work of at least four hands. 213

94

PALATINATE CRISIS

not see ‘what purpose it serves’.218 At best a bishopric might become vacant and Schönborn would be removed that way.219 Although George had forced Wrisberg to moderate his tone substantially, a draft of the original version unfortunately found its way into Austrian hands. The incident did considerable harm to the protestant cause at Regensburg and put George on the defensive diplomatically, although the Treaty of Charlottenburg in September 1723 with Prussia may have helped to reduce its impact.220 A final example illustrates the parameters of debate within Britain and shows more populist concern with the protestant interest. Jacobitism has provoked considerable interest of late, although the debate has tended to create more heat than light. Those seeking to attack a whig account of parliamentary triumph have found in the Jacobites a pleasing alternative narrative. Interest in Jacobites relates to the general tendency of the historical profession to prefer the radical and the troublemaker to the establishment. As such, the Jacobites are quite an implausible group of ‘radicals’, although they were able to create considerable trouble for the administration and were regarded with a watchful eye by both British and Hanoverian diplomats abroad. While the tendency in the historiography of the 1790s is now to stress the importance of loyalism (as opposed to E.P. Thompson’s ‘failed revolution’), the interest in loyalism has not been transferred into the earlier part of the century. The reasons why Britons were loyal to the established monarchy have tended to be overlooked. Protestantism, as the present work shows, was one of them. Matthias Earbery’s Jacobite pamphlets on the supposed ‘advantages’ Britain had derived from the Hanoverian succession appeared in 1722.221 Earbery’s argument boiled down to two related points. The first was that George was foreign and had sought to rule Britain to the advantage of his German domains.222 The second was that he had failed to defend the protestant interest, particularly in relation to the fate of Sweden.223 Argument about the succession was now being conducted within essentially whig parameters. The Pretender’s catholicism and associations with France were left unmentioned, precisely because they were so unpopular. Instead Earbery claimed George had

218

George I to Geheime Räte, Kensington, 11/9/1722, HHStA, CB 11, 1658, fol. 156v. Ibid., fol. 157r. 220 The attempt to undermine Schönborn backfired, in part, because the attack on him was perceived to be an attack on the Emperor. See Hantsch, Schönborn, pp. 281–4 and Naumann, Österreich, England und das Reich, pp. 79–83. 221 Matthias Earbery, An Historical Account of the Advantages that have accru’d to England, by the Succession in the Illustrious House of Hanover (London, 1722), idem, The Second Part of the Advantages that have Accrued to England by the Succession in the Illustrious House of Hanover (London, 1722). Earbery was a nonjuring Anglican clergyman and Jacobite polemicist. He was arrested for seditious libel in 1723. 222 Earbery, Historical Account, p. 24. 223 Earbery, Second Part, p. 14. 219

95

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

not been a strong protestant monarch, although Earbery’s definition of protestantism encompassed little beyond the Church of England. The focus on Sweden is also suggestive. The need to defend Sweden, as opposed to Holland or Hanover, had been a feature of earlier tory arguments invoking the protestant interest.224 The protestant interest was a crucial component of political debate – to win an argument, one had to have a view on it. While the story of the fate of Imperial protestants is interesting in itself, there have been few attempts to fit it into a general pattern of European diplomacy and fewer that have viewed such a context as anything other than detrimental to the fate of the protestants themselves – it is usually alleged that the British were only ever interested in the protestants as a means to their Weltpolitik ends.225 Instead, this chapter has told a more complex story. George I was aware that the Austrians wanted to link the recognition of his rights to Bremen and Verden to a settlement of the religious question. George resisted this pressure. Religion was not subjugated to political concerns; the two were still intimately intertwined. Confessional identity was a vital component of power-political struggles in the Empire. This chapter has indicated the importance of Britain–Hanover in these struggles. Previous assessments of the relative importance of Prussia and Hanover need revision. This argument is reinforced by the discussion in the next chapter of the Thorn incident. There was a lively public interest in the fate of the Palatine protestants in both Britain and Hanover. Both German and British protestants looked to George I to provide leadership in solving the problems of their co-religionists. The legal position of protestants in the Empire remained a vexed issue throughout the period of this study. George I was prepared to use both British and Hanoverian diplomats in a coordinated effort to resolve Palatine problems and to ensure that the Westphalian settlement was not altered in a manner unfavourable to the protestants. While it ultimately failed to come to fruition, Stanhope’s hints at the value of Britain becoming a guarantor of the Westphalian settlement indicate a desire to become more closely involved in the politics of the Empire and to use Britain’s guarantee to help the defence of protestantism. Neither the British nor the Hanoverians wanted to risk a war of religion in the Empire. The use of (Prussian) force was contemplated. Ultimately it was decided to pursue diplomatic solutions. If there had been a shift away from war as the best means to further religious ends, the shift was not from zeal to scepticism but rather a change in the nature of the means through which it was thought that protestantism could best be defended.

224

See pp. 58–9 above. Droysen, Geschichte der preussische Politik: IV, ii, p. 324 emphasises how Saxony, Hanover and Denmark had territories both within and outside the Reich, so had other interests than the ‘truly’ German at heart. The only power which could and did take ‘German’ interests seriously was, unsurprisingly, Prussia. 225

96

4

The Thorn crisis and European diplomacy, 1724–1727

The ‘massacre’ at Thorn, a small town in Royal (Polish) Prussia, occurred after an incident in July 1724. On 16 July, Thorn’s catholics held a procession. Protestants alleged that Lutheran students who refused to bow before the host were forced to do so by students from the Jesuit Gymnasium. The catholics maintained that a Lutheran student had not removed his hat and had mocked the host. A scuffle ensued. Civil order broke down and prisoners were taken by both sides – catholics were dragged to the town hall and protestants to the Jesuit Gymnasium. A protestant mob stormed the Gymnasium to free the Lutheran students. The catholics alleged that statues of the Virgin and other relics had been burned in the street. The mayor eventually called out the militia to calm the situation. Thorn’s Jesuits claimed the city authorities had failed to dispatch the militia quickly enough to quell the riot and had encouraged damage to catholic property. The Sejm, to whom the Jesuits complained, agreed and sentenced several men (including the mayor and his deputy) to death. The catholics were given the last remaining protestant church in Thorn and large fines were imposed upon the town. News of the sentence was treated with incredulity in protestant Europe. Incredulity quickly turned to anger when the executions were carried out on 7 December. The mayor was beheaded privately before dawn and other prisoners were executed publicly shortly afterwards, although the mayor’s deputy was pardoned. The precise number originally condemned and eventually executed is disputed. However, the numbers involved (less than fifteen) suggest that to describe it as a ‘massacre’ (or a Blutbad or Blutgericht in German) is something to be explained, rather than assumed. Within British historiography, Thorn appears as a partial explanation for continuing domestic antipathy to catholics.1 Older German historiography saw the events at Thorn as symbolic of a wider conflict between the civilised Germans and the barbarian Poles.2 Few have considered why Britons were

1

Colin Haydon, Anti-Catholicism in eighteenth-century England (Manchester, 1993), pp. 25, 128. 2 Karin Friedrich has an extensive discussion of both the history and historiography of 97

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

interested in the ‘massacre’ or who was directing the diplomatic campaign against Augustus the Strong, the Polish king. This chapter shows how religious tensions were inextricably bound to political disputes in the Empire prior to George I’s death in 1727. The use made of the ‘massacre’ in the protestant press reveals much about the protestant cultural assumptions and worldview. The Thorn incident exacerbated tensions between George I and Charles VI. Previous discussions of the period’s diplomacy have minimised the importance of religious concerns. Yet contemporaries viewed Thorn as part of a broader attack by catholics on protestants. Once more pamphlets and sermons offer a different and neglected perspective on diplomatic history. The previous chapter indicated how relations between protestants and catholics in the Empire had deteriorated after 1719. Protestant persecution has usually been seen in a largely ‘national’ context. Thus German historians posit a decrease in religious tensions after 1723 or 1724, whilst for Poles, the situation at Thorn seems to have appeared from clear blue sky. Yet, multiple monarchy was crucially important prior to the triumph of nation-states. The king of Poland was simultaneously elector of Saxony. The Thorn incident therefore raised questions about the relationship between politics both inside and outside the Empire. Despite having a catholic ruler, Saxony retained the directorate of the Corpus Evangelicorum. Throughout 1724 the Hanoverian privy council reassured their Prussian counterparts that they remained committed to religious complaints within the Empire, despite Saxon prevarication and obstruction.3 Was it satisfactory for the head of the Corpus to be a persecutor of protestants?4 Both the Hanoverian privy council and George I remained interested in the fate of German protestants and protestantism more generally. The council were worried by Count Metternich’s behaviour. They feared Metternich, Prussian Komitial-Gesandter in Regensburg, wanted to convert to catholicism.5 However, they also noted that they believed Metternich wanted a larger salary so perhaps George could offer him extra cash.6 Privy councillor von dem Bussche expressed two other concerns in a memo on religious affairs.7 First, he thought that the catholics were trying to subvert protestants’ legal rights.

Royal (Polish) Prussia in the early modern period in her The other Prussia (Cambridge, 2000). 3 See, for example, Geheime Räte to Prussian Geheime Räte, Hanover, 23/2/1724, Hanover, Hauptstaatsarchiv [hereafter HHStA], Calenberg Brief [hereafter CB] 24, 736, fols 184–5 or Geheime Räte to Prussian Geheime Räte, Hanover, 27/4/1724, ibid., fols 192–3. 4 Geheime Räte to Wrisberg, Hanover, 5/5/1725, HHStA, CB 11, 1628, fol. 84v. 5 Geheime Räte to George I, Hanover, 11/1/1724, HHStA, CB 11, 1680: II, fol. 240r. 6 Addition to Geheime Räte to George I, Hanover, 11/1/1724, fol. 243r. 7 Heinrich Albert von dem Bussche (1664–1731) had been a member of the ministry since 1713 and became Kammerpräsident in 1728. See Joachim Lampe, Aristokratie, Hofadel und Staatspatriziat in Kurhannover (2 vols, Göttingen, 1963), ii, p. 25. 98

THORN CRISIS

Secondly, he thought Wrisberg’s tendency to act without instructions caused problems.8 Despite reassurances that he still enjoyed royal support, Wrisberg was increasingly under pressure.9 The privy council wanted him removed. In December 1724, Gerlach Adolf von Münchhausen wrote to George asking to replace Wrisberg at Regensburg.10 The privy council also suggested that the current situation required someone experienced in public law and dedicated to George’s interests at Regensburg.11 Wrisberg had lost the confidence of the Hanoverian ministry but he was not finally recalled by George until 1 March 1726, when he was replaced by Münchhausen.

Historiography and the explanation of the tumult To appreciate the novelty of the present approach, it is necessary to discuss briefly the existing literature on Thorn. The historiography of the Thorn tumult has two aspects: pro-Prussian and pro-Polish. Or rather, there are protestants and catholics and the confessional divide reflects national boundaries. Moreover, themes familiar from other parts of the study recur here. Work has frequently focused on the role of Prussia and Frederick William, rather than George and Britain. Droysen, unsurprisingly, argued Prussia led the protestant response to Thorn.12 He also claimed that British prevarication meant that firmer action was not taken.13 Droysen’s position was challenged by Romuald Frydrychowicz,14 who resisted calling what happened either a ‘Blutgericht’ or ‘Blutbad’, claiming that the execution of ten people hardly justified such terminology.15 He sought to deflect blame from the Jesuits. Instead, he proposed that the real culprit was Augustus, because he used events in Thorn to increase his absolute power in Poland.16 Whilst Frydrychowicz

8 Bussche’s thoughts on 13/4/1724 report from Regensburg, nd, np, HHStA, CB 11, 1680: II fol. 273r. 9 George I to Wrisberg, Kensington, 4/8/1724, HHStA, CB 11, 1680: III, fol. 393r. 10 G.A. von Münchhausen to George I, Celle, 13/12/1724, HHStA, CB 11, 1690. Münchhausen was born in Berlin in 1688. He had been educated at Jena, Halle and Utrecht. In 1716, he had become a Oberappellationsrat at the Oberappellationsgericht in Celle. He was to become the effective prime minister of the electorate in the 1730s, when he was also largely responsible for the foundation of the University of Göttingen. See Lampe, Aristokratie, ii, p. 39. 11 Geheime Räte to George, Hanover, 22/12/1724, HHStA, CB 11, 1690. 12 Johann Gustav Droysen, Geschichte der preussischen Politik, IV: ii, Friedrich Wilhelm I (Leipzig, 1869), p. 362. 13 Ibid., p. 363. 14 Romuald Frydrychowicz, ‘Die Vorgänge zu Thorn im Jahre 1724’, Zeitschrift des Westpreussischen Geschichtvereins, 11 (1884), pp. 73–98. 15 Ibid., p. 73, fn 1. Frydrychowicz underestimates the longevity of such emotive descriptions of events. They were characteristic of contemporary protestant accounts. 16 Ibid., p. 75.

99

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

differed from Droysen on a number of issues, he agreed British indifference had prevented decisive action.17 Frydrychowicz’s scholarship was attacked as partial and merely reflecting Polish ultramontane opinion by Franz Jacobi, Thorn’s protestant pastor.18 Jacobi used official (protestant) sources in Thorn, such as magisterial records.19 Whilst admitting that Augustus and his adviser Count Flemming might have used the judgement for their own ends, Jacobi concentrated on the bloody nature of the executions.20 Jacobi also argued that Frederick William had been disappointed by other powers’ responses.21 Martin Naumann viewed what happened at Thorn as far worse than the Heidelberg affair of 1719. Despite Frederick William’s best efforts, little was done about Thorn and selfish state interest prevailed.22 Yet it was not just Frederick William who reacted to protestant persecution. Naumann, like nearly all German historians who assert lack of British interest in religious questions, made no use of British records. The only article discussing the British role in Thorn directly is equally misleading.23 In Gotthold Rhode’s view, Britain had always followed a Prussian lead when helping foreign protestants.24 George felt intimidated by Frederick William, even though British policy was far more concerned with trade and Gibraltar.25 Rhode argued that the Poles had been betrayed by French and British diplomacy. Just as Germans in Poland had found British promises to be meaningless between 1919 and 1939, so the inhabitants of Thorn discovered how uninterested the British were in the fate of the oppressed.26 Rhode’s account undoubtedly reflected his Polish–German background. Distrust of British diplomacy is also unsurprising in a German work published in 1941.27 Rhode maintained that Frederick William, like his Hohenzollern predecessors, had viewed the protection of protestants in the East as a particular

17

Ibid., p. 93. Franz Jacobi, ‘Neuere Forschungen über das Thorner Blutgericht 1724’, Zeitschrift des Westpreussischen Geschichtsvereins, 35 (1896), p. 21. His Das Thorner Blutgericht 1724 (Halle, 1896) expands many of the arguments made in the article. 19 Ibid., p. 24. 20 Ibid., pp. 33–4. 21 Jacobi, Thorner Blutgericht, pp. 148–9. 22 Martin Naumann, Österreich, England und das Reich, 1719–1732 (Berlin, 1936), pp. 97–8. 23 Gotthold Rhode, ‘England und das Thorner Blutgericht 1724’, Historische Zeitschrift, 164 (1941), pp. 496–528. This was part of Rhode’s dissertation published as BrandenburgPreußen und die Protestanten in Polen 1640–1740 (Leipzig, 1941). 24 Rhode, ‘England’, p. 508. 25 Ibid., p. 511. 26 Ibid., p. 528. 27 He was born in 1916 and moved to Posen in 1922 (Rhode, Brandenburg-Preußen, p. 266). The highly political nature of German Ostforschung in the early years of the twentieth century is described in Michael Burleigh, Germany turns eastwards (Cambridge, 1988). 18

100

THORN CRISIS

Prussian responsibility. Stefan Hartmann has recently challenged this view.28 Hartmann sees Frederick William as inherently cautious.29 Frederick William was annoyed that he had not managed to seize the directorate of the Corpus from Saxony and blamed George for this.30 It was this rivalry with Saxony that determined that the Schutzpolitik (‘policy of protection’) would continue. By contrast, British policy was half-hearted.31 There is a confusion of standards. Frederick William blamed the British because they did little.32 Frederick William had good intentions but did little more, although Hartmann correctly observes that Frederick William’s aggressiveness has been exaggerated.33 The accusation of aggressiveness resurfaces in recent pro-Polish literature on the subject. Stanislaw Salmonowicz supports Frydrychowicz’s account of events.34 Salmonowicz is interested in the Thorn ‘massacre’ as myth.35 Yet he cannot understand why the massacre myth has persisted, given that Poland was one of the most tolerant countries in Europe.36 Simplistic confessional divisions help little in understanding events in Thorn and relating them to a broader historical context. The rest of the chapter explains the hitherto neglected role of Britain and Hanover and shows the wide resonance that events in Thorn had within the public sphere.

Diplomatic responses to Thorn Frederick William and George initially responded to events in Thorn by writing letters to Augustus of Saxony–Poland. A number of these were published and printed in newspapers and periodicals in both the Empire and Britain. Indeed, there was practically an officially orchestrated publicity campaign. Initially, however, the chapter discusses the high politics of troop manoeuvres and brinkmanship. The Hanoverian envoy in Vienna, Huldenberg, reported to George in late April 1725 that the Hofkanzler had told him that the king of Poland had 28 Stefan Hartmann, ‘Die Polenpolitik König Friedrich Wilhelms I. von Preussen zur Zeit des “Thorner Blutgerichts” (1724–1725)’, Forschungen zur Brandenburgischen und Preussischen Geschichte, N.F. 5 (1995), pp. 31–58. 29 Hartmann, ‘Polenpolitik’, p. 46. 30 Ibid., p. 51. 31 Ibid., pp. 54–6. 32 In July 1725, George wrote to Frederick William to reassure him that he could be relied upon to back him in relation to the religious question. See George I to Frederick William I, Pyrmont, 12/7/1725, London, Public Record Office [hereafter PRO], State Papers [hereafter SP] 43/6, fols 160–1. 33 Hartmann, ‘Polenpolitik’, p. 57. 34 Stanislaw Salmonowicz, ‘The Torún uproar of 1724’, Acta Poloniae Historica, 47 (1983), p. 58. 35 Ibid., p. 56. 36 Ibid., pp. 75–7.

101

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

mobilised his forces. Frederick William intended to reinforce the border between Prussia and Poland (the Imperial court may have wanted to awaken Hanoverian fears about Prussian mobilisation; the size of the Prussian army and its proximity to Hanover were a perennial source of concern for the Hanoverian ministry). George was also told of the arrival of the Spanish envoy, Ripperda, in Vienna.37 The British extraordinary envoy in Berlin, Colonel Du Bourgay, had mentioned in late November 1724 that the sentence passed against the Thorn protestants had caused ‘a great Indignation’.38 At the start of February 1725, Du Bourgay told undersecretary Tilson that he had hoped to send him the letters that the town of Thorn wanted Townshend, the archbishop of Canterbury and the bishop of London to have about their plight. The delay was caused by the need to remove a passage asking parliament to address the king on their affairs. They had been warned that it was unwise for foreigners to interfere in relations between king and parliament. Du Bourgay included the articles of the Treaty of Oliva regulating relations between protestants and catholics in Royal Prussia and concluded that ‘the famous Mr Joublunsky’ wished to publish a complete history of the Thorn affair.39 Du Bourgay’s account shows that the residents of Thorn were keen to gain British support. Viewing bishops as potential saviours may reflect social relations in Poland but the archbishop of Canterbury did interest himself in their plight. The advice to remove any hint of interfering in relations between king and parliament suggests that they had been advised by someone with a better knowledge of the British constitution than their own. The adviser was probably Du Bourgay’s ‘famous Mr Joublunsky’ or, to give him his correct title, Daniel Ernst Jablonski, the Prussian Hofprediger.40 Jablonski had a reasonable relationship with Frederick William and was also a friend of Archbishop Wake – both had studied at Christ Church in the 1680s. Jablonski’s desire to publish suggests that propaganda efforts on behalf of Thorn protestants were semiofficial in nature. Jablonski promised to send Du Bourgay copies of his history of Thorn straight from the press.41 The Prussian court seemed less willing to risk war with Saxony after Peter the Great’s death removed a potential ally.42 Du Bourgay heard rumours that 37 Huldenberg to George I, Vienna, 28/4/1725, HHStA, CB 24, 4925: I, fols 123–4. The file includes correspondence between Frederick William and Augustus in Latin. Hanoverian concern about Prussia looms large in Walter Mediger, ‘Great Britain, Hanover, and the rise of Prussia’, in Ragnhild Hatton and M.S. Anderson, eds, Studies in diplomatic history (London, 1970), pp. 199–213. John William, Baron Ripperda, was born in the United Provinces and sought his fortune at the court of Philip V of Spain. 38 Du Bourgay to Townshend, Berlin, 28/11/1724, PRO, SP 90/18. 39 Du Bourgay to Tilson, Berlin, 17/2/1725, ibid. 40 See Herman Dalton, Daniel Ernst Jablonski (Berlin, 1903) and Norman Sykes, Daniel Ernst Jablonski and the Church of England (London, 1950). 41 Du Bourgay to Townshend, Berlin, 20/2/1725, PRO, SP 90/18. 42 Du Bourgay to Townshend, Berlin, 3/3/1725, ibid.

102

THORN CRISIS

Saxon troops would be used to crush the Polish protestants. Yet Du Bourgay thought that Prussia seemed set on a religious war, so was unsure whether to trust the rumour.43 Frederick William felt there were benefits to be derived from the religious situation, although Du Bourgay remained sceptical.44 Despite both Saxony and Prussia mobilising troops, the danger of conflict quickly subsided.45 Du Bourgay felt, while pretending to advance the protestant cause, Prussia sought merely to benefit at Saxony’s expense. Moreover, a protestant alliance brought immediate advantages but would probably provoke an opposing catholic alliance and a conflict similar to the Thirty Years War and the Prussians thought the British would foot the bill. The situation was being used to discredit Count Flemming, the Saxon soldier and statesman. Prussia and Russia could, and indeed should, resolve the religious situation but private interests meant that they would not.46 Du Bourgay was reluctant to get involved. Indeed, when petitioned shortly afterwards by Jablonski, Du Bourgay repeated (in cipher) his opinion that Prussia and Russia were best placed to resolve religious grievances in Poland but they should do so without antagonising catholic powers.47 Jablonski wanted Du Bourgay to send Jablonski’s recent work on Thorn to Townshend and Mr Finch, the envoy from Regensburg whom George had dispatched to Dresden. Du Bourgay was not the only British diplomat involved in the affairs of the Thorn protestants and it is to Finch and his mission that it is necessary to turn now.

The Finch mission (1) – Regensburg Edward Finch came from a noble family – his father was earl of Nottingham. Several of his brothers were engaged in government service. In 1724 his brother, William, was extraordinary envoy and plenipotentiary in the United Provinces. Edward’s instructions as minister plenipotentiary to the Diet at Regensburg were signed on 2 May 1724.48 His first report from Regensburg was dated 4 September 1724.49 The English, and then the British, had sent representatives occasionally to the Diet. Charles Whitworth had served there as minister from 1702 to 1704 and then again in 1714.50 The French and the Swedes, as guarantors of the Westphalian settlement, were entitled to send representatives. The Dutch and the Danes had also traditionally been represented. Sending Edward Finch in 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

Du Bourgay to Townshend, Berlin, 13/3/1725, ibid. Du Bourgay to Townshend, Berlin, 24/3/1725, ibid. Du Bourgay to Townshend, Berlin, 11/4/1725, ibid. Du Bourgay to Townshend, Berlin, 18/4/1725, ibid. Du Bourgay to Townshend, Berlin, 1/5/1725, PRO, SP 90/19. Instructions for Edward Finch, St James’s, 2/5/1724, PRO, FO 90/19. Finch to Townshend, Regensburg, 4/9/1724, PRO, SP 81/174. See pp. 54–9. 103

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

1724 marked a departure from recent British practice – after Whitworth’s recall the post had been left vacant. Indeed in 1723 George had received a request via his Hanoverian representative in the United Provinces to send an English minister to Regensburg. George responded that this was unnecessary because ‘the Imperial court knows already . . . how seriously we as king take the religious affairs of the Empire’.51 British diplomats in Vienna were best placed to exert pressure on Charles VI over religious complaints. Had George changed his mind by the following year? His instructions to Finch leave open the possibility. Finch was to consult Wrisberg closely. He should support the protestants consistently and make himself aware of all infringements of their Westphalian rights; observe closely the Emperor’s diplomacy; report on the discussions of the Diet, especially in relation to the ‘interests of religion’.52 These instructions were drawn up before the Thorn tumult on 16 July. When events in Thorn became a protestant cause célèbre, George already had a diplomat on hand. On arrival in Regensburg, Finch quickly realised that confession of itself was not enough to keep the Corpus united. As he told Townshend, he was worried about protestants selling themselves to the other ‘interest’ and not supporting the common cause.53 Finch also sent Townshend a Latin memo he had received about church union. The memo claimed Lutherans had always wanted closer links with the Church of England but not with Calvinists. Finch speculated that he had been given the memo because Saxon officials believed he was in Regensburg to promote union between the Church of England and continental protestant churches. They thought Archbishop Wake, Dr Bray and Dr Calamy had already corresponded with Jablonski, Jean Alphonse Turretini, Christoph Pfaff and August Hermann Francke on the subject. It is unclear whether Finch meant ducal or electoral Saxon officials but he thought the Saxon ministers were his enemies and had, with catholic help, prevented him from ‘commercing with the other ministers’.54 Ernst Saloman Cyprian, a cleric from Saxony-Gotha, had strongly opposed closer union between Lutherans and Calvinists in 1722.55 Saxony, the heartland of Lutheranism, remained unwilling to dilute Lutheran principles through closer ties with Calvinists.56

51

George I to Spörcken, St James’s, 10/5/1723, HHStA, CB 11, 1680: I, fol. 156. Instructions for Edward Finch, St James’s, 2/5/1724, PRO, FO 90/19, fols 137–40. 53 Finch to Townshend, Regensburg, 16/10/1724, PRO, SP 81/174. 54 Ibid. 55 See p. 93. The debate about protestant union in this period is discussed in Wolf-Friedrich Schäufele, Christoph Matthäus Pfaff und die Kirchenunionsbestrebungen des Corpus Evangelicorum, 1717–1726 (Mainz, 1998), pp. 283–9. 56 Wrisberg told George that the Saxons were uninterested in union and only Finch and the representative of Wolfenbüttel had seen material on it. Perhaps it was Wrisberg, not Finch, who was pushing this particular policy. See Wrisberg to George, Regensburg, 16/10/1724, HHStA, CB 11, 3005: I, fol. 67. Finch reported to Townshend that Wrisberg 52

104

THORN CRISIS

The smaller protestant princes were keen not to allow either Prussia or Hanover too much influence within the Corpus. Rumours of protestant union were likely to create distrust. Finch’s instructions give no sense that this might have been an aspect of his mission. However, it was only a few weeks later that George informed Wrisberg that the archbishop of Canterbury had asked him to promote the union of protestant confessions in the Empire. George had told him ‘we were inclined to do this and nothing was lacking on our part or yours.’ Opposition to the union made it necessary to proceed with extreme caution, particularly because of the number of ‘defamatory pamphlets’ (‘Schmähschriften’) circulating on the issue. Wrisberg was to compose a memo (in French to avoid the need to translate it from German) on the subject for George to show to Wake.57 Wrisberg dutifully sent George his Pensées sur l’Etat present, ou se trouve l’affaire de l’union entre les Protestans. Wrisberg remarked in the accompanying letter that he had stopped Pfaff, from Tübingen, from publishing an immediate response to recent Saxon criticisms of union proposals, because he believed this would only inflame matters.58 Wrisberg noted that resistance to the idea of union came mainly from the Saxon states, Hamburg and Swedish Pomerania. He hoped Prussia could alleviate the Palatine Calvinists’ antipathy to the Lutherans and thus remove another barrier to union.59 Finch initially had to persuade the other protestant diplomats that he was not at Regensburg to push an unwanted ecumenical plan. The new Dutch envoy had also been instructed to tackle the Empire’s religious grievances.60 Finch acknowledged the strength of Dutch feeling. He felt however that Hessen-Kassel’s commitment to the protestant cause was questionable and that the Saxons were troublemakers.61 Finch also asked Townshend if a Church Brief could be issued in Britain on behalf of the Palatine protestants.62 Events in Thorn gave him something new to think about.

had written to Wake about the union himself. See Finch to Townshend, Regensburg, 23/10/1724, PRO, SP 81/174. 57 George I to Wrisberg, Kensington, 27/10/1724, HHStA, CB 11, 1684. 58 Wrisberg to George I, Regensburg, 23/11/1724, HHStA, CB 11, 3005: II, fols 265–7. 59 Ibid., fols 269–72. 60 Wrisberg to George I, Regensburg, 12/10/1724, HHStA, CB 11, 3005: I, fol. 53v and Finch to Townshend, Regensburg, 19/10/1724, PRO, SP 81/174. 61 Finch to Townshend, Regensburg, 2/11/1724, PRO, SP 81/174. 62 Finch to Townshend, Regensburg, 18/12/1724, ibid. The request was prompted by Wrisberg. No Brief was issued. On the history of Church Briefs see Sugiko Nishikawa, English attitudes toward continental protestants with particular reference to Church Briefs, c. 1680–1740 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of London, 1998) and Wynham Anstis Bewes, Church Briefs (London, 1896). 105

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

The Finch mission (2) – Dresden and Warsaw Townshend’s orders were the first Finch knew of his mission to Dresden. In early December Finch seemed more concerned with the Emperor’s refusal to allow the ius emigrandi within his lands commenting that ‘the Loss of this priviledge . . . will not be a less fatal Blow to the Protestant Religion in the Empire’ than events in Thorn.63 Protestants argued that the Emperor’s refusal to allow the right of emigration from his hereditary lands was contrary to Imperial law. Yet protestants’ legal rights were also at stake in the Thorn dispute. Townshend instructed Finch to proceed to Dresden to counter the ‘unheard of cruelty’ of Thorn. The protestant inhabitants’ privileges, granted to them by the Treaty of Oliva, should be restored. Finch was to work with the Prussian minister. George hoped to resolve matters diplomatically but was not ruling out reprisals. Augustus should be told that not only was George moved but that ‘the whole Nation is provoked’ because of the unjust punishment imposed on Thorn.64 Augustus claimed to Finch that he could not interfere in the workings of the Polish constitution, aptly encapsulating the problems of dealing with multiple monarchies.65 Other Saxon officials were sympathetic but told Finch the Poles only responded to force.66 Townshend told Finch to ensure that no private deals were reached.67 The Saxons responded to demands to secure protestant rights and avoid the repetition of such a monstrous act by claiming that it was a Polish matter and could only be resolved by a Polish Diet. At the end of March Townshend told Finch that he had done well ‘but as the King sees that words will not do the business, & that we are not prepared in any wise to support them by effects’, George thought it best not to press Augustus too hard. Prussian displays of force would have little impact. Hopes of a military solution now depended on the tsarina’s reaction.68 Finch replied that he would take care not to reveal his new instructions to anyone.69 The change of course did not mean, as some Prussian historians have suggested, that George was never really interested in the Polish protestants. George knew what could, and crucially what could not, be achieved. He was also aware of the need to be seen to act, even if there was little chance of success.

63

Finch to Townshend, Regensburg, 25/12/1724, PRO, SP 81/174. Townshend to Finch, Whitehall, 15/1/1725, PRO, SP 88/29. 65 Finch to Townshend, Dresden, 13/2/1725, ibid. 66 Finch to Townshend, Dresden, 18/2/1725, ibid. The Imperial envoy to Dresden was currently in disgrace because he had failed to deliver a letter from Charles VI advising Augustus against the executions in time. 67 Townshend to Finch, Whitehall, 12/3/1725, ibid. 68 Townshend to Finch, Whitehall, 30/3/1725, ibid. 69 Finch to Townshend, Dresden, 25/4/1725, ibid. 64

106

THORN CRISIS

Finch remained in Dresden and collected the ever-growing number of German and Latin works published on the Thorn issue. 70 He felt that the Saxon ministry was sending material about his mission to the Dutch Gazette in a deliberate attempt to smear him.71 Renard (a Hanoverian agent in Amsterdam) confirmed that a story had been planted in the Amsterdam press by the Saxons. Finch felt that his honour had been questioned by the article. 72 Townshend hoped that Finch could laugh off his media problems. He must ensure that he was not recalled. George could not be seen to have failed to support the protestant cause.73 Townshend sent credentials to Finch to allow him to follow Augustus’s court from Dresden to Warsaw. Finch did not enjoy Warsaw. He felt Count Flemming was plotting against him.74 He commented wryly to Tilson that Polish dispatches were best read after dinner and a quantity of Tokay because this would accurately recreate the conditions of their composition.75 He provided Townshend with details of the various factions at the Polish court and their desire or otherwise for war.76 By the summer of 1725, the centre of the action had moved from Warsaw to Hanover. Before continuing the diplomatic narrative, it is important first to examine other aspects of the Thorn crisis: its impact on Hanoverian politics and diplomacy and on the press.

Hanoverian reactions to Thorn Events in Thorn had repercussions within the Empire. Before the executions, the Saxons had been lukewarm about church union. However, Wrisberg reported in January 1725 that the Saxon envoy appeared concerned about the wider protestant interest, particularly the Waldensians.77 The question of the directorate of the Corpus had resurfaced. Wrisberg had received a number of requests from other protestant powers to raise the matter again. Wrisberg thought Saxon inaction over Thorn was not the best means to challenge the Saxon directorate. Their inability to resolve disputes in Naumberg was more important. Naumberg was within the Empire so it was a concrete case of dereliction of duty.78 Wrisberg also argued that Britain should allow a general

70

Finch to Tilson, Dresden, 16/5/1725, ibid. Finch to Townshend, Dresden, 6/6/1725, ibid. 72 Finch to Townshend, Dresden, 7/7/1725, ibid. 73 Townshend to Finch, Pyrmont, 12/7/1725, ibid. 74 Finch to Townshend, Warsaw, 1/9/1725, PRO, SP 88/30. 75 Finch to Tilson, Warsaw, 8/9/1725, ibid. 76 Finch to Townshend, Warsaw, 3/10/1725, ibid. 77 Wrisberg to George I, Regensburg, 8/1/1725, HHStA, CB 11, 3006: I, fol. 48r. 78 Wrisberg to George I, Regensburg, 5/3/1725, HHStA, CB 11, 3006: II, fols 257–8. The precise nature of the dispute in Naumberg is unclear but the bishopric had been secularised 71

107

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

collection for European protestants. George was ‘Defender of the Faith’. The crown had helped persecuted protestants in Lithuania, Siebenburgen and Piedmont, not to mention Germany, ‘like a mother’.79 Wrisberg linked what had happened in the Palatinate to what was now happening in Poland. Part of this was the praise necessary to grease the cogs of power but it was something at which Wrisberg excelled. He insisted to George later in the month that the mood of the Corpus was changing and old differences could be laid aside. Ansbach, Bayreuth and Darmstadt might now welcome a change in the directorate.80 Wrisberg used ‘local’ issues, such as Naumberg, to engage protestants within the Empire but emphasised the importance of Britain when it came to helping protestantism throughout Europe. The plan to remove Saxony did not succeed. The Saxon envoy discovered that an ambush had been planned over the Naumberg issue. He cornered Wrisberg to insist that the Saxons would not tolerate any impertinence from Finch over Thorn. Wrisberg reverted to multiple monarchy politics and responded that the Saxons needed to remember the difference between their concerns and those of the Poles.81 Ever the optimist, Wrisberg noted a few months later that more and more courts would realise the disadvantages of the Saxon directorate.82 Relations with two other powers were affected by Thorn. The Swedes had become closer to Russia in early 1724. Yet after Thorn, they wanted British support for the protestant cause. George expressed his willingness to help in Poland. However, the Swedes should reciprocate by doing more for protestants in the Empire.83 The tumult, therefore, provided an opportunity to apply pressure in Imperial politics. Dutch concerns over events in Poland also gave George leverage. The Swedes had proposed an alliance to the Dutch. The Dutch did not regard it as their business to interfere in Poland and would only intercede.84 Unlike Sweden, Prussia and Britain, the Dutch were not guarantors of the Treaty of Oliva. It was as guarantors that the three protestant powers justified their intervention. The Dutch did nothing. Suddenly, in late June the States General passed a resolution to petition both the Emperor and the king of Poland about protestant grievances. The Pensionary had, however, suggested that, although the Dutch were not indifferent to religious complaints, they could do little else but make representations.85

and become part of electoral Saxony after 1648. Wrisberg thought that it would be easier to attack Saxony for failures to defend protestantism inside the Reich than outside. 79 Addition to Wrisberg to George I, Regensburg, 5/3/1725, ibid., fol. 266v. 80 Wrisberg to George I, Regensburg, 26/3/1725, ibid., fols 353–4. 81 Wrisberg to George I, Regensburg, 9/4/1725, HHStA, CB 11, 3007: I, fols 34–6. 82 Addition to Wrisberg to George I, Regensburg, 21/5/1725, HHStA, CB 11, 3007: II, fol. 350r. 83 George to Bassewitz, St James’s, 22/1/1725, HHStA, CB 11, 1680: III, fol. 427r. 84 Dayrolles to Townshend, Hague, 26/1/1725, PRO, SP 84/285, fol. 31r. 85 Dayrolles to Townshend, Hague, 23/6/1725, ibid., fol. 209v. 108

THORN CRISIS

Townshend, on his way to Hanover, had urged the Dutch to do more. Indeed Townshend told William Finch that Finch should repeat the arguments to the Pensionary that Townshend had made to him already. The Dutch were impartial because they were not party to the Treaty of Oliva.86 Townshend emphasised how concerned George was about the Polish protestants’ fate.87 The Pensionary wanted to help but returned repeatedly to the difficulties of getting the States General to act.88 George’s dispatches to Edward Finch show he was reluctant to risk a war over the Polish issue. What, then, was the purpose of putting pressure on the Dutch? The most likely explanation is that an attack on protestants provided a means to draw other protestant powers within the orbit of British–Hanoverian interests.89 As such, the defence of the protestant interest offered opportunities, as well as obligations, for the intelligent diplomat. The initial impression from Hanover’s archives is of a passing, but relatively insignificant, interest in events in Thorn. The reason for this is simple. For reasons known only to archivists, the vast majority of the material relating to Thorn was collected together in a single file and tucked away amongst the Nachlass of Andreas Heinrich Jahns, a Kanzelist in Hanover.90 The Jahns material illustrates the variety of responses to events in Thorn. Official letters sent by George to Augustus, printed copies of letters sent by Frederick William to various other monarchs to encourage action against Poland, several of the pamphlets produced, and copies of correspondence between Wrisberg and George about Thorn all survive. Wrisberg was particularly strident in his condemnation of the Jesuits. He remarked that news of the executions had led to various catholic representatives at Regensburg becoming despondent because of the likely negative impact of the executions. Wrisberg also commented that Thorn might acquire a similar reputation to the Donauwörth incident.91 Wrisberg noted subsequently that Thorn had reinforced a sense of confessional conflict ‘especially among the common people’.92 Reaction to

86

Townshend to William Finch, Hanover, 29/6/1725, PRO, SP 84/286, fol. 13. Townshend to W. Finch, Pyrmont, 17/7/1725, ibid., fol. 33. 88 W. Finch to Townshend, Hague, 6/7/1725 NS, ibid., fol. 25v. 89 Townshend told Poyntz, in a dispatch playing the ‘protestant card’ to draw in the Swedes, that the United Provinces had shown a ‘very great indifference’ to European affairs and the fate of protestants recently. See Townshend to Poyntz, Pyrmont, 15/7/1725, PRO, SP 43/6, fol. 116v. 90 The file in question is HHStA, Hannover 91, Jahns 8. Jahns’s position was described by Lampe as ‘Wirkl. Geh. (Kabinetts-) Sekretär’. This was roughly equivalent to undersecretary. Jahns wrote the minutes of the meetings of the privy council and drafted dispatches. See Lampe, Aristokratie, ii, p. 3, pp. 34–5. 91 Addition to Wrisberg to George I, Regensburg, 25/12/1724, HHStA, Hann. 91, Jahns 8, fols 35–6. The attempts of Maximilian I to reintroduce catholicism to Donauwörth had led to the formation of the Protestant Union in 1608. 92 Addition to Wrisberg to George I, Regensburg, 22/1/1725, ibid., fol. 45v. 87

109

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

events in Thorn seemingly resonated widely down the social scale. Information must have spread broadly and quickly. Wrisberg noted a change of mood at Regensburg in early 1725. It appeared the Prussians and the Swedes were willing to act, although Wrisberg commented acidly that the residents of Thorn could expect little from the Swedes.93 He reminded George that Britain as another guarantor of the Treaty of Oliva could also intervene. The Church of England was also affected by Jesuit behaviour. Perhaps now was the time to revive the religious claims.94 When Edward Finch departed for Dresden, Wrisberg reported that the protestants in Regensburg had drawn comfort from his commission. The catholics, on the other hand, feared that they would be put under renewed pressure to resolve Imperial religious disputes. Finch’s speech to protestant diplomats prior to his departure, which rapidly found its way into print, had helped to reinvigorate protestant solidarity.95 An intercepted dispatch from the Palatine envoy to his court in Mannheim, sent by Wrisberg to George, warned of the dangers of combined action by Britain, Prussia and Russia in Poland. It also remarked that Wrisberg had been particularly happy of late because the religious conflicts meant he was likely to remain in Regensburg.96 Some catholics had probably hoped that they could finally exert enough pressure on George I to recall Wrisberg. With the reopening of the religious question, the hopes of achieving this faded swiftly.

Contemporary comment in public and private Wrisberg noted in March that the death of the tsar had been greeted with incredulity by the protestants and joy by the catholics. It was thought that, in relation to Thorn, the tsar was ‘gut Evangelisch’.97 Russia would support attempts to restore protestant rights in Poland. It was not just diplomats in Regensburg who were moved by the events in Thorn. One of the correspondents of the Halle pietist August Hermann Francke expressed his horror at what had happened.98 The Hanoverian ministry’s manuscript newsletters from London also illustrate concern with Thorn. One noted how the king and his ministers had taken the Thorn affair ‘strongly to heart and they appear resolute to push it to the limit’, as Finch’s departure for Dresden proved.99 Another noted that both his subjects’ wishes and his own desire to maintain

93

Wrisberg to George I, Regensburg, 25/1/1725, ibid., fols 52–3. Ibid., fols 54–5. 95 Wrisberg to George I, Regensburg, 8/2/1725, ibid., fols 73–4. 96 Extract from a report from the Palatine envoy, Regensburg, 8/1/1725, ibid., fol. 102. 97 Wrisberg to George I, Regensburg, 1/3/1725, ibid., fol. 118. 98 Reinhold Friedrich Bornmann to August Hermann Francke, Thorn, 23/12/1724, Halle, Archiv der Franckesche Stiftung, Hauptarchiv, C245, fol. 2. 99 MS newsletter from London, 15/1/1725, HHStA, CB 24, 83: II, fol. 270 94

110

THORN CRISIS

his title of Fidei Defensor meant George would act positively over Thorn.100 Public reactions to events in Thorn stressed George’s royal obligation to act in such circumstances. John Perceval, the future earl of Egmont, discussed Thorn in his correspondence. Having remarked that, in Britain, even catholics were shocked by the Thorn incident, he blamed the Jesuits for what had happened. Their actions had provoked the assault on their college. Their subsequent conduct in pursuing the town authorities and seeking punishment reflected ‘not the Action or Principles of Christians, but rather of Turks and Infidels, or saveage beasts’. He hoped that protestant princes would not stand idly by and see their interest attacked in the Empire and elsewhere but would now act decisively.101 Egmont’s view of the incident as a barbarous act of popish violence was typical. However to substantiate this claim, it is necessary to turn to other more public media. Jeremy Black has shown that the events in Thorn received substantial coverage in the British press.102 The Political State of Great Britain reported the riot at Thorn in its October edition.103 The account blamed the riot entirely on the Jesuits. Two months later, there was news of the executions, including a description of the quartering of some of the accused.104 The January edition included A faithful and exact Narrative of the horrid tragedy; lately acted at Thorn.105 The Daily Courant regretted that the executions had been carried out. Troops had watched the mayor’s execution. Some of the condemned had their right hands cut off before being executed. Others were ‘first beheaded, afterwards quartered, and then burnt without the City. The consternation of all the inhabitants is not to be described, the rather since they are not allowed to express their grief but by silent tears.’106 The Saturday issue included an account of the entry of the Jesuits into the reclaimed churches, and the Weekly Journal ran a similar story about the execution.107 The news probably came from a common source, perhaps letters from Amsterdam, but there were interesting variations. The removal of hands was mentioned in most accounts.

100

[A different] MS newsletter from London, 15/1/1725, ibid., fol. 273r. Perceval to Worth, London, 24/12/1724, London, British Library [hereafter BL], Additional Manuscripts [hereafter Add. MSS] 47030, fols 121–2. 102 Jeremy Black, ‘The catholic threat and the British press in the 1720s and 1730s’, Journal of Religious History, 12 (1982–3), p. 368. 103 Political State of Great Britain [hereafter PSGB], October 1724, pp. 375–6. The account is almost certainly an English translation of the ‘official’ version of events provided by the town council. 104 Ibid., December 1724, pp. 573–8. 105 Ibid., January 1725, pp. 1–36. This pamphlet was also published separately and is considered again below. 106 Daily Courant, 7229, Wednesday 16/12/1724. 107 Daily Courant, 7232, Saturday 19/12/1724 and Weekly Journal, 3049, Saturday 19/12/1724. 101

111

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

However, quartering was not reported in German accounts of the execution. The account had probably been ‘anglicised’ to match preconceptions about what such popish crimes entailed. The form and style of reporting recalled protestant martyrology. Protestant concerns loomed large in pamphlets about Thorn. A faithful and exact Narrative of the horrid tragedy included a large plate depicting the execution of Mayor Rosner, the execution of the other accused, and the Jesuits reclaiming the Lutheran church.108 The pamphlet admonished all protestants to lay aside their ‘private trifling disputes’ and unite against an enemy who wanted ‘the utter extirpation of Protestantism’.109 The pamphlet contrasted the printed accounts of what had originally happened provided by both the Jesuits and the town council (both these documents were reprinted frequently in the collections of German documents about the case). Most publications drew ultimately on three German works Das Betrübte Thorn, Thornische Denckwürdigkeiten and the Wahrhaftige Historischen-Nachricht von dem zu Thorn paßierten Tumult.110 The first two were almost certainly by the Jablonski brothers and the last appeared as a periodical. All three were published in Prussia. The impact of events in Thorn was felt throughout protestant Europe and led, as Hartmut Sander has shown, to ‘a flood of publications’.111 The faithful and exact Narrative argued that Finch’s mission to Dresden showed how seriously George took his duties as Defender of the Faith and guardian of the protestant interest.112 However, the concern was not just with Thorn: persecutions in the Palatinate and elsewhere in Germany showed the need for collective protestant action ‘to restrain the Fury of Popery’. 113 Protestants, the tract concluded, should lay aside petty squabbles and imitate

108 Inside front cover of A faithful and exact Narrative of the horrid tragedy; lately acted at Thorn, in Polish Prussia (London, 1725). A French version of this tract appeared as Relation exacte et sincere du Sujet qui a excité le funeste Tumulte de la Ville de Thorn (Amsterdam, 1725). This was ‘par Jean Bion, Ministre de l’Eglise Anglicane’ so Bion probably compiled both. 109 Faithful and exact narrative, p. 1. 110 [Daniel Ernst Jablonski], Das Betrübte Thorn, Oder die Geschichte so sich zu Thorn Von Dem II. Jul. 1724. biß auf gegenwärtige Zeit zugetragen, Aus zuverläßigen Nachrichten Unverfänglich zusammen getragen, und der Recht- und Wahrheit-liebenden Welt zur Beurtheilung migetheilet (Berlin, 1725), [Johann Theodor Jablonski], Thornische Denckwürdigkeiten, Worinnen die im Jahr Christi 1724 und vorhergehenden Zeiten verungluckte Stadt Thorn Im Königl. Pohlnischen Hertzogthum Preußen Von einer unparteyischen Feder gründlich vorgestellet wird (Berlin, 1726), Wahrhafftige Historische Nachrichten von dem am 16. Jul. 1724 zu Thorn in Preussen passirten Tumult des gemeinen Volcks, und erfolgten scharffen Execution einiger Todt verurtheilten Personen, aus sicheren Nachrichten und expresses Verlangen, zu Steuer der Wahrheit dem Publico mitgetheilet von einem Liebhaber der Wahrheit (Jena, nd [1724–5]). 111 Harmut Sander,’Das Thorner Blutgericht von 1724 in zeitgenössischen niederländischen Schriften’, in Bernhard Jähnig and Peter Letkemann, eds, Thorn: Königin der Weischsel (Göttingen, 1981), p. 361. 112 Faithful and exact Narrative, pp. 28–9. 113 Ibid., p. 34.

112

THORN CRISIS

the Church of England which, as the most powerful bulwark against popery, had always shown ‘an Universal Charity towards, and a Motherly Concern for all the different Members of the Protestant Body’.114 Anglican protestants would help but also felt themselves implicitly superior to their European co-religionists. An Authentick Narrative of the late proceedings at Thorn emphasised the need to preserve the protestant interest and the reformed religion. 115 In 1688, the fear of popery had been great but had subsequently subsided.116 Britons should be concerned about Thorn because everyone with a sense of civil and religious liberty was affected by it.117 Moreover, ‘every Advance of the Power of Bigottry abroad, threatens us with a Popish Pretender at home; and together with Him, All the train of his Attendants, Superstition and Cruelty’.118 The domestic lessons to be learnt from events in Thorn were also highlighted in The source of all the sufferings the Protestants in Thorn have undergone published in 1726.119 Opposing the Pretender’s return would prevent something like Thorn happening in Britain.120 The work suggested that though these events were shocking, they fitted a pattern of previous actions by popish princes in Spain, Holland, France and Britain.121 Characteristically for the early enlightenment, it was suggested that it was ludicrous to attempt to spread religion by the sword.122 The Church of England was praised because, although neither Lutheran nor Calvinist, it was prepared to defend both. 123 The executions were described in lurid terms. Three victims had been broken on the wheel and burnt alive under the gallows. ‘To finish the dismal tragedy, one Boy was cut open alive, and his noble parts torn from his entrails and flapp’d in his Face, and the Youth afterwards beheaded and quarter’d.’124 In a style reminiscent of John Foxe, protestants learnt what had happened to their

114

Ibid., pp. 36–7. [Thomas Gordon], An Authentick Narrative of the late proceedings at Thorn (London, 1725), p. 1. The tract is attributed to Gordon in John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, A collection of tracts by the late John Trenchard, esq; and Thomas Gordon, esq (2 vols, London, 1751), ii, pp. 91–126. The tract also included two letters from the London Journal by Britannicus. This was Benjamin Hoadly’s pseudonym. A French translation appeared by Jean Bion, possible author of the Faithful and exact Narrative. See Narré exact et impartial de ce qui concerne la sanglante Tragedie de Thorn, traduit de l’Anglois par Jean Bion (Amsterdam, 1725). 116 Ibid., p. 29. 117 Ibid., p. 38. 118 Ibid., p. 40. 119 The source of all the sufferings the Protestants in Thorn, in Great Britain &c. have undergone from Popish princes (London, 1726). 120 Ibid., p. v. 121 Ibid., p. 2. 122 Ibid., p. 4. 123 Ibid., p. 13. 124 Ibid., p. 23. 115

113

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

brethren in Thorn. The damage done to the catholic images by the protestant rioters was condemned in the pamphlet but the real blame lay with the catholic instigators of the troubles.125 The rest of the pamphlet illustrated the dangers of a catholic succession in Britain. Any catholic prince would forcibly convert his subjects.126 Controversial literature on the Thorn executions developed over time. Initially there was shock at the events themselves. From that emerged an emphasis on the lessons to be learnt from Thorn and the need for vigilance. Events in Thorn provided the opportunity to extol the virtues of the Church of England as a model protestant church. Worries about Thorn also chimed well with contemporary British domestic concerns about Jacobitism and the security of the protestant succession. Sermons occasioned by the executions bear out this analysis. Unlike the tracts, which tended to be by Anglicans, several of the sermons were written by dissenters. One such was Robert Bragge’s discussion of the manifestations of Satan’s power.127 Bragge was concerned by the growth of heresy in London,128 but he also remarked that protestants in both the Palatinate and Thorn had been the ‘Butt of Satan’s Rage’.129 All British protestants should be grateful to William III and George I. They had preserved the balance of power and thus protected all that protestants, especially dissenters, held dear.130 Charles Owen offered a thorough analysis of protestant woes.131 Augustus’s conversion posed problems for the protestant interest, as did the Treaty of Ryswick.132 He claimed that Cardinal Alberoni, the Spanish minister, was unwilling to start a religious war until more protestants had been destroyed in catholic countries.133 Owen rehearsed typical arguments about popery

125

Ibid., pp. 24–5. Ibid., p. 34. 127 Robert Bragge, A brief essay concerning the soul of man shewing what, and how noble a being it is. To which is added, a short answer to that weighty Enquiry, Watchman, what of the night? Occasion’d by the Cruelty of the Jesuits at Thorn (2nd edn, London, 1725). Bragge (c. 1665–1738) was an Independent minister in London. His moderate Calvinism explains his concern with heresy and trinitarian orthodoxy. See Walter Wilson, The history and antiquities of dissenting churches and meeting houses, in London, Westminster, and Southwark (4 vols, London, 1808–14), i, pp. 241–9. 128 Bragge, Brief essay, p. 30. 129 Ibid., p. 35. 130 Ibid., p. 43. 131 Charles Owen, An Alarm to protestant princes and people, who are all struck at in the popish cruelties at Thorn, and other barbarous executions abroad (London, 1725). Charles Owen (d. 1746) ran a dissenting academy and ministered to a congregation in Warrington. See Alexander Gordon, Freedom after ejection (Manchester, 1917), p. 323. 132 Ibid., p. 12. 133 Ibid., p. 17. Alberoni was a native of Parma. His influence had grown after Philip V’s marriage to Elisabeth Farnese. 126

114

THORN CRISIS

representing power without reason.134 He, of course, affirmed that religion could not be spread by force, although force could be used to defend religion.135 Britain had always defended protestantism, from Elizabeth I to Cromwell. United, protestant naval power was superior to the catholics. If German protestants united, they would possess considerable force. By contrast, the effeminate French were all talk and no trousers.136 Owen thought that a protestant alliance with ‘the glorious King George (the great patron of liberty and property) at the head of it’ would effectively secure the protestant interest.137 Richard Cocks’s sermon, on the other hand, promised much but delivered little. Although entitled a True and impartial inquiry made into the late bloody execution at Thorn, it was a general attack on popery and contained nothing specifically on Thorn.138 Both sermons and tracts considered Thorn as an example of what might happen in Britain. They underlined the need for protestant unity. Foreign policy was not simply ‘determined’ by public reaction. However, the ways in which policy was presented closely mirrored public opinion.

The international context for responses to Thorn How did events in Thorn interact with other problems in contemporary international relations? While Peter the Great lived, the possibility of Russian intervention in Poland, and an escalation of disputes over Thorn, was real. Peter’s death meant that the break between France and Spain and the rapprochement between Spain and Austria took on greater importance in shaping the diplomatic context, although religious conflict had far from disappeared.139 Relations between France and Spain had recently deteriorated and the Infanta had been sent back to Spain. She had been betrothed to the young Louis XV. Her return meant that the French needed a new bride. One of the prince of Wales’s daughters was considered.140 British politicians were

134

Ibid., p. 13. Ibid., p. 31. 136 Ibid., pp. 32–6. 137 Ibid., p. 39. 138 Richard Cocks, A true and impartial inquiry made into the late bloody execution at Thorn (London, 1727). 139 Grzegorz Krol, The Northern threat: Anglo-Russian diplomatic relations, 1716–1727 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, London School of Economics, University of London, 1992), p. 235. Dr Janet Hartley kindly drew this dissertation to my attention. Krol provides a helpful discussion of George I’s Baltic policy from both a British and Hanoverian perspective. 140 See p. 10. 135

115

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

unenthusiastic about the match. They feared it might endanger the protestant succession. Amidst worries about Thorn, news that George I might be considering his granddaughter as a bride for Louis XV caused consternation at other protestant courts, including Prussia.141 The Prussians feared that Britain was more interested in allying with France than with Prussia. Alliance negotiations had begun between the three powers before the executions at Thorn. Writing to Horace Walpole, British extraordinary ambassador in Paris, in November 1724, the duke of Newcastle, noted that references to the defence of the protestant religion had disappeared from the preamble to the proposed Anglo-Prussian treaty because it was now thought that France might join.142 The duke of Newcastle’s correspondence reveals the difficulties the inclusion of the French in the alliance system posed for the defence of the protestant interest. However, the latter was not sacrificed to achieve the former. Instead, the British sought to convince the French that the defence of protestantism was compatible with French interests. The French also realised the need for caution. Walpole reported to Newcastle that ‘672’ (the codename for Fleury) had some sympathy for the protestants of Thorn but it was difficult to support them openly. Walpole added that Fleury distinguished between being a good catholic and supporting the French church and being ‘a good Protestant in the alliances to be made by this crown abroad’.143 Whether Fleury was being sincere is debatable but France had traditionally supported protestant princes within the Empire to keep Habsburg power in check. Newcastle told Walpole to explain how French cooperation with Britain over Thorn would prevent a war of religion and turn Polish protestants into French allies. The French must do no more for protestants than the Treaty of Oliva required. The French might also achieve their aim of preventing Augustus’s son from succeeding him in Poland.144 The final point came from George himself. It was possible to defend the protestant interest through nonprotestant powers and the workings of the international system. Defending the protestant interest had become dissociated from wars of religion. Instead, the balance of power was seen as the best defence for the protestant interest. Newcastle’s comment to Walpole that, as the chances of a religious war in Poland increased, the more necessary it became for the French to intervene to ensure that the Austrian interest did not become too strong reflected such a view.145

141

Townshend denied the rumours, and claimed that George was disappointed that Frederick William had given them any credence. Nevertheless, they had clearly had an impact. See Townshend to Du Bourgay, Whitehall, 30/3/1725, PRO, SP 90/18. 142 Newcastle to H. Walpole, Whitehall, 12/11/1724, BL, Add. MSS 32741, fol. 206r. Newcastle was secretary of state for the Southern department and Townshend’s colleague. 143 H. Walpole to Newcastle, Paris, 24/2/1725, Secret, BL, Add. MSS 32742, fol. 206v. 144 Newcastle to H. Walpole, Whitehall, 1/3/1725, ibid., fols 298–9. 145 Newcastle to H. Walpole, Whitehall, 16/3/1725, ibid., fol. 457. 116

THORN CRISIS

A frequent complaint in German writing on Thorn was that British reaction was entirely self-interested. Newcastle’s increasing scepticism about Prussian sincerity provides another perspective. In April 1725 he expressed doubts about Prussian commitment to the common cause.146 Walpole had considerable difficulty in persuading the Prussian representative at Paris of the benefits of the proposed French alliance. In Walpole’s view Frederick William was only interested in personal gain rather than the bigger picture.147 Prussia was not widely regarded as a great power at this point and Prussian horizons were limited to their immediate neighbourhood. News from Vienna of an Austro-Spanish treaty changed things. William Stanhope, the extraordinary ambassador and plenipotentiary to Spain (later Lord Harrington and secretary of state) informed Newcastle that the Emperor had concluded the treaty to ensure the separation of France and Spain. As a result, it was less risky for the Emperor ‘to engage in the affair of Thorn against the Protestant Princes’. Spain had probably agreed to provide financial help in case of war.148 The Treaty of Vienna aroused the suspicion in Britain, even in the highest governmental circles, that the Emperor had sinister designs for the protestants of Europe. For the Hanoverians the Emperor’s continued reluctance to settle religious complaints at Regensburg served only to exacerbate the situation. The conclusion of the Treaty of Vienna gave additional impetus to the negotiations between France, Prussia and Great Britain. In the summer of 1725 Townshend and the king travelled to Hanover, meeting various diplomats en route. Townshend’s efforts to persuade the Pensionary to take firmer action on the religious question have been noted already. Newcastle remained in London but his correspondence provides valuable insights into ministerial thinking. Newcastle commented to Walpole that the proposed treaty was ‘calculated to give the greatest satisfaction to the protestant powers’ but also to appeal to some catholic powers.149 The aim was to secure protestantism through alliances without creating confessional blocs reminiscent of the wars of religion. French reluctance to agree to anything too strident on the religious question made this a difficult task.150 Information Horace Walpole received suggested that the Emperor’s intentions were dangerous: the Emperor wanted

146

Newcastle to H. Walpole, Whitehall, 1/4/1725, BL, Add. MSS 32743, fol. 4r. H. Walpole to Newcastle, Paris, 3/5/1725, ibid., fols 134–5. 148 W. Stanhope to Newcastle, Cienpozuelos, 21/5/1725, ibid., fol. 211r. 149 Newcastle to H. Walpole, Whitehall, 6/8/1725, BL, Add. MSS 32744, fol. 63r. Townshend informed several British diplomats that he believed the new treaty proposals in their fifth and first separate articles adequately dealt with the religious question. See Townshend to Poyntz, Hanover, 4/9/1725, PRO, SP 43/7, fol. 32r. The two previous letters in the file (to William Finch and Horace Walpole) had made a similar point. 150 Townshend also made this clear to the Prussians. See Townshend to Ilgen, Hanover, 21/8/1725, PRO, SP 104/253. 147

117

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

the pope to grant him a croizade so that he could tax the clergy to pay for his war.151 George’s diplomatic efforts were rewarded with the Treaty of Hanover or Herrenhausen, signed on 3 September 1725 by Britain, France and Prussia. Newcastle reported to Walpole that although the articles relating to religious complaints were not quite as one might wish, as the alliance aimed ‘to bring in all the Powers both Protestant & Popish whose Interest it is to oppose the House of Austria, the Alterations may not be improper’.152 Opposition to Austria was not simply about power-politics. British officials believed the Austrians had more sinister purposes. Aspects of the alliance (the first separate article related to Thorn) were designed to protect protestants. Horace Walpole was particularly keen to communicate these parts of the treaty to the Dutch and Swedes.153 Early in 1726 the British sought ways to expand the alliance system. One of the most prized targets was the elector of Bavaria. Thomas Robinson reported the French suggestion that persuading the Bavarians to join would show the non-confessional character of the alliance and indicate how the alliance’s purpose was to maintain the liberties of the Empire.154 It might seem that confession was irrelevant to foreign policy but the reality was more complicated. In the face of popish aggression from Spain and the Emperor, the protestant powers wanted a transconfessional opposition. They thereby avoided the objection that they were stirring up religious conflict. Instead, they portrayed their popish opponents as narrow-minded zealots, while claiming the moral high ground of moderation for themselves. There was a genuine sense of apprehension that, ultimately, confession might prove a solvent of the alliance. William Stanhope had heard that the Spanish had recently sent the French proposals ‘for their entering into a religious war with the Emperor & Spain on account of the Affair of Thorn’. Newcastle ordered Robinson to check with Morville, the French foreign minister, whether this was true.155 Newcastle also asked Robinson to be on his guard against the machinations of the Imperial resident in Paris, who, it was believed, was seeking to drive a wedge between Fleury and Britain on religious grounds.156 In April Robinson reported that both Fonseca, the Austrian chargé d’affaires, and Sinzendorf, a leading Austrian minister, had attacked Fleury for placing French commitments to the Treaty of Oliva above confessional

151

H. Walpole to Newcastle, Paris, 25/8/1725, BL, Add. MSS 32744, fol. 122v. Newcastle to H. Walpole, Whitehall, 27/8/1725, ibid., fol. 157r. 153 Copy of H. Walpole to Townshend, Fontainebleau, 15/9/1725, ibid., fol. 198r. 154 Robinson to Newcastle, Paris, 12/1/1726, BL, Add. MSS 32745, fol. 9v. Thomas Robinson was secretary of the mission and acted as chargé d’affaires whilst Horace Walpole was in London for parliament. 155 Newcastle to Robinson, Whitehall, 13/1/1726, ibid., fol. 50. 156 Newcastle to Robinson, Whitehall, 22/2/1726, ibid., fol. 215r. 152

118

THORN CRISIS

solidarity. Fleury apparently replied that he had always believed keeping one’s word was ‘the first & most valuable principles of Christians’.157 George was worried that the French would be won away from the Hanover treaty not only by confessional arguments but also by the wider repercussions of the Treaty of Vienna. Newcastle told Walpole in May 1726 that the Pretender had left Rome to take advantage of the alliance between Austria and Spain. George feared the alliance might prompt another rebellion.158 The Emperor wanted to win all the princes of the Empire for his new alliance. George intended to dispatch another British diplomat to Regensburg as a preventative measure. Walpole must convince the French to instruct their representative in Regensburg to cooperate with the British diplomat.159 Fears about the security of his British thrones and worries about Hanover’s position in the Empire combined to magnify the perceived threat from the Treaty of Vienna. Walpole reassured Newcastle that Fleury would not desert them for Spain.160 Yet Walpole saw little prospect of separating Spain and Austria. The king of Spain’s religious zeal bound him to Austria and his queen hoped to aggrandise her family. Charles VI could easily please both of them.161 Meanwhile the catholic electors of Bavaria, Cologne, Trier and the Palatinate had acceded to the Treaty of Vienna. Newcastle commented that the accessions confirmed the view that one aim of the treaty was to destroy protestantism. He sent Walpole intercepted letters as evidence, although Walpole was to use them cautiously. Newcastle was now convinced that it was necessary to gain as many allies as possible. Hence Isaac Le Heup would depart for Regensburg soon to counter Austrian diplomatic efforts.162 What had so alarmed Newcastle? A copy of an intercepted letter from Vice-Chancellor Schönborn to Palm, the resident in Paris, survives amongst his correspondence. The letter hinted that Louis XV might be persuaded to change sides.163 The British were again worried about French fidelity. Efforts to persuade the French that it was necessary for Le Heup and Louis’s representative in Regensburg, Chavigny, to cooperate had increased. By the end of July Newcastle thought the immediate danger of French defection had

157

Robinson to Newcastle, Paris, 3/4/1726, ibid., fol. 351r. These fears were prompted and encouraged by Ripperda’s defection in May 1726. See Karl Otmar von Aretin, Das alte Reich, 1648–1806 (3 vols, Stuttgart, 1993–7), ii, p. 305. For ministerial fears about Jacobitism, see Paul S. Fritz, The English ministers and Jacobitism between the rebellions of 1715 and 1745 (Toronto and Buffalo, 1975). 159 Newcastle to H. Walpole, Whitehall, 9/5/1726, BL, Add. MSS 32746, fols 29–32. 160 H. Walpole to Newcastle, Paris, 26/6/1725, ibid., fol. 293v. 161 H. Walpole to Newcastle, Paris, 2/7/1725, private, ibid., fol. 321r. 162 Newcastle to H. Walpole, Whitehall, 27/6/1726, BL, Add. MSS 32746, fols 345–6. 163 Translation of Friedrich Karl Schönborn to Palm, Schloß Schönborn, 23/6/1726, ibid., fol. 376. 158

119

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

passed.164 His fears did not subside entirely, particularly as Fleury told Walpole that Spain was still seeking to win France by playing the confessional card.165 Confession, in various ways, was critical to the arguments used by both sides to win support for their respective causes. According to Newcastle, George still hoped to create a protestant alliance including the Dutch, Prussia, Sweden, Denmark, Hesse and Wolfenbüttel. France had promised to persuade Württemberg to join. The remaining protestant princes were too small to bother with. Other protestants seemed unreliable.166 Relations with Prussia had worsened, having been tense for much of 1726, because Frederick William had signed a treaty with the Emperor on 12 October at Wusterhausen. Du Bourgay had first suspected that George’s unwillingness to finalise the proposed marriage alliance between Britain and Prussia was disrupting relations. Townshend doubted the marriage alliance was the problem but thought Frederick William’s aggression did more harm than good.167 Both George and Townshend had been disconcerted by the news that Tsarina Catherine I, Peter the Great’s wife and successor, had joined the Vienna allies. News that Frederick William was negotiating with both the Russians and the Austrians prompted further concern. Du Bourgay remained convinced almost until the Treaty of Wusterhausen was signed that it would ultimately fail.168 Townshend was clearly disappointed. The Prussians had left their true friends to ally with those whose religion and interest prevented them from being faithful allies.169 Shortly afterwards, he reported the British public reaction to the Prussian defection. The talk of the coffee houses was that Frederick William was likely to convert to catholicism. Both the Emperor’s friends and the Jacobites were elated. Frederick William had deserted a close relation to join with the Emperor, viewed as the Pretender’s chief support. No wonder news of the treaty was all over the newspapers.170 The language of confession, be it as a putative explanation for Prussian action or as a warning about the potential fidelity of new allies, was never far from the surface. Du Bourgay identified four reasons for Prussian behaviour. These were the power of a particular faction, the threat from Russia, the belief that the ties of blood and religion with George would eventually force him to accept all their demands, and Prussian inability to take a longer view when it came to international relations.171

164 Newcastle to H. Walpole, Whitehall, 26/7/1726, private, BL, Add. MSS 32747, fol. 96v. 165 Copy of H. Walpole to Townshend, Paris, 27/8/1726, private, ibid., fol. 202r. 166 Addition to Newcastle to H. Walpole,Whitehall, 26/8/1726, ibid., fols 254–6. 167 Townshend to Du Bourgay, Whitehall, 22/2/1726, private, PRO, SP 90/20. 168 Du Bourgay to Townshend, Berlin, 10/9/1726, PRO, SP 90/21. 169 Townshend to Du Bourgay, Whitehall, 8/11/1726, ibid. 170 Townshend to Du Bourgay, Whitehall, 21/10/1726, ibid. 171 Du Bourgay to Townshend, Berlin, 2/11/1726, ibid.

120

THORN CRISIS

Le Heup in Regensburg Isaac Le Heup’s instructions illustrate the aims of his mission. Just as Finch had been told to consult Wrisberg, Le Heup was told to consult the Hanoverian Komitial-Gesandter Münchhausen (who had finally replaced Wrisberg).172 Le Heup was to convince the Diet that George’s purpose in signing the Hanover treaty was nothing more or less than the preservation of peace within the Empire. George wanted further alliances with protestant princes, but alliances with catholic princes who shared similar interests were also possible.173 The Hanover treaty was defensive and designed to preserve civil and ecclesiastical rights in the Empire. Working with France and gaining multiconfessional support would prove George’s commitment to the common good.174 The remaining points followed the model of Finch’s earlier instructions and included exhortations to defend the protestants of the Empire and ensure that the terms of the Peace of Westphalia were observed.175 On his arrival in Regensburg Le Heup, with Münchhausen’s help, took Finch’s old lodgings.176 Like Finch, Le Heup quickly discovered how close the Saxon envoy was to Imperial officials. In his view, as all the catholics followed the Emperor, only a protestant alliance could curb Austrian plans.177 In November Le Heup observed to Townshend that the catholics had united to thwart their religious opponents. The protestants were divided and therefore unable to resolve their religious grievances. Le Heup commented he had heard only Reck, the Hanoverian official, and Gallieris, the Dutch envoy, talk about the outstanding grievances. He saw little hope of a successful resolution. The Emperor’s authority was increasing and Frederick William had allied with Charles. The other Hanover allies seemed only interested in the suppression of the Ostend Company. Although the Ostend Company was important, Le Heup remarked that suppressing it was not the sole aim of the Hanover treaties. The preservation of the Westphalian settlement had widely been seen as an important part of the treaty.178 The aims of the alliance of Hanover were hotly debated in the contemporary pamphlet literature. Le Heup clearly believed that the resolution of the religious difficulties was a crucial part of the treaty. In early 1727 Le Heup stepped up his efforts. He sent a memo to Townshend detailing the evils of the Austro-Spanish alliance. The likely results of the alliance were ‘the extirpation of the protestant religion, the destruction of

172 Instructions to Isaac Leheup, Kensington, 8/7/1726 OS, PRO, FO 90/19, p. 209. Münchhausen was instructed to work closely with Le Heup but to keep his instructions secret. See George I to Münchhausen, Kensington, 8/6/1726, HHStA, CB 11, 1717, fol. 2. 173 Instructions to Leheup, FO 90/19, pp. 211–12. 174 Ibid., p. 213. 175 Ibid., p. 215. 176 Le Heup to Townshend, Regensburg, 9/9/1726, PRO, SP 81/175. 177 Le Heup to Townshend, Regensburg, 19/9/1726, ibid. 178 Le Heup to Townshend, Regensburg, 14/11/1726, ibid.

121

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

German liberty and the establishment of a universal monarchy’.179 About the same time, Münchhausen informed George that Le Heup and the French minister had been discussing how to resolve the disputes over Ostend and the religious complaints with various diplomats.180 Their conversations yielded little. Indeed they may even have worsened Le Heup’s position because shortly afterwards Münchhausen first mentioned that questions had been asked about Le Heup’s credentials; complaints had also been made about the tone of his letters.181 Townshend sent Le Heup George’s speech at the opening of parliament in 1727. He emphasised the strength of George’s support.182 George wished the Empire to remain neutral in his disputes with Austria. Le Heup should describe the Emperor as simply the archduke of Austria.183 The idea was to persuade the Diet that the dispute over the status of the Ostend Company was primarily an Austrian and not an Imperial matter. By the end of January, Le Heup was less convinced of a positive resolution. Worries about increased Habsburg power had evaporated following the distribution of ample pensions. The prospect of destroying the reformed religion in Germany had strengthened catholic support for the Emperor. Chavigny had been reproached by some of the catholics for abandoning his religion. Although the catholics were governed by ‘fear and religious Zeal’, Le Heup was ashamed that protestants had also deserted their religious principles for financial gain.184 Townshend suggested to Le Heup that a joint declaration with Chavigny might prevent the Emperor from imposing his plans upon the Empire.185 Relations between George I and Charles VI had been poor for much of the 1720s. George had not received compensation for the money he had spent in the occupation of Mecklenburg. The titles to Bremen and Verden had still not been conferred upon him. Some Britons feared trade to the Indies would be threatened by the creation of the Habsburg’s Ostend Company in the Austrian Netherlands. Finally, numerous religious grievances remained unresolved. Münchhausen was aware that the Austrians were intent on isolating both himself and Le Heup.186 Austrian pressure took several forms. An Austrian diplomat, Count Wurmbrand, visited several German courts offering the complete resolution of the religious disputes in exchange for supporting Austria in disputes with the Hanover allies.187 Wurmbrand’s mission was a barely concealed attempt to divide and rule. The Hanoverian privy council warned

179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187

Le Heup to Townshend, Regensburg, 3/1/1727, PRO, SP 81/176. Münchhausen to George I, Regensburg, 2/1/1727, HHStA, CB 11, 3014: I, fol. 1. Addition to Münchhausen to George I, Regensburg, 6/1/1727, ibid., fols 31–2. Townshend to Le Heup, Whitehall, 17/1/1727, PRO, SP 81/176. Townshend to Le Heup, Whitehall, 26/1/1727, ibid. Le Heup to Townshend, Regensburg, 30/1/1727, ibid. Townshend to Le Heup, Whitehall, 21/2/1727, ibid. Münchhausen to George I, Regensburg, 27/2/1727, HHStA, CB 11, 3014: II, fol. 525r. Addition to Münchhausen to George I, Regensburg, 5/3/1727, ibid., fol. 542v. 122

THORN CRISIS

their counterparts in Hessen-Kassel that Wurmbrand’s proposals seemed highly suspect. They questioned the Emperor’s intentions. Convening a commission to settle the religious disputes in Frankfurt would lessen the Diet’s influence and increase the Emperor’s power.188 Le Heup complained to Townshend that he and Münchhausen had become the victims of a smear campaign. It was alleged that they had demanded an immediate resolution of the religious grievances upon threat of the expulsion of all the catholics from Ireland and Scotland. Le Heup had tried to impress upon the Dutch minister the falsehood of this report. The Dutch minister was the correspondent for the Amsterdam Gazette and Le Heup wanted to avoid the story getting any further.189 In a subsequent dispatch Le Heup included a copy of the Imperial Kommissionsdekret which strongly denied the allegations made by George in his speech from the throne that Charles was actively supporting the Pretender.190 The decree raised the diplomatic stakes further. Le Heup spent March preparing his declaration. Münchhausen mentioned that the Prussian minister had suddenly become interested in the resolution of the religious grievances again.191 However, most of his dispatches were less positive. He had heard of the trouble the Imperial resident in London, Palm, had caused over George’s speech. He was also worried about the tone of Le Heup’s declaration.192 Submitting such a declaration could cause difficulties because of the rigid diplomatic protocol in Regensburg.193 Münchhausen advised caution. Many protestant courts thought the Emperor deserved respect. The Corpus would have to be managed if the declaration were to have any positive effect.194 Unfortunately Münchhausen’s fears proved accurate.195 The electoral and princely chambers refused to accept Le Heup’s declaration.196 Münchhausen

188

Geheime Räte to Hessen-Kassel Geheime Räte, Hanover, 26/4/1727, CB 24, 2501. Le Heup to Townshend, Regensburg, 2/3/1727, PRO, SP 81/176. Münchhausen also thought he was the victim of a concerted campaign. See Addition to Münchhausen to George I, Regensburg, 6/3/1727, HHStA, CB 11, 3014: II, fol. 617. 190 For the decree, dated 17/3/1727, see Le Heup to Townshend, Regensburg, 19/3/1727, PRO, SP 81/176. 191 Addition to Münchhausen to George I, Regensburg, 17/3/1727, HHStA, CB 11, 3014: III, fols 699–700. 192 Addition to Münchhausen to George I, Regensburg, 27/3/1727, ibid., fols 830–1. 193 Münchhausen to George I, Regensburg, 24/3/1727, ibid., fols 755–6. 194 Addition to Münchhausen to George I, Regensburg, 31/3/1727, ibid., fols 853–4. 195 In August 1726, Münchhausen had sought the Hanoverian privy council’s advice on how to resolve a dispute in the Corpus about the most appropriate seating arrangements for informal meetings in private houses. Even here, there had been disagreement about whether it was appropriate for officials to sit ‘pele-mele’, rather than in a specific order. The incident indicates the importance attached to diplomatic ceremonial and protocol. See the exchange of letters in HHStA, CB 11, 1716. 196 Münchhausen to George I, Regensburg, 2/4/1727, HHStA, CB 11, 3015: I, fol. 1v. 189

123

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

was informed that the dispute was between Austria and the king of England, not the elector of Hanover.197 Le Heup travelled to Augsburg. In his absence, Münchhausen followed what had now become a flood of propaganda about the Hanover and Vienna allies. He also had to pacify the other protestant ministers. Saxony-Gotha blamed George for the dispute with the Emperor. Hessen-Kassel and Wolfenbüttel, by contrast, complained that George had said little about religious disputes in his recent declaration, to which Münchhausen replied that the reason why the Emperor was irritated with George was because George had so actively pursued religious issues.198 Prussian aid had proved transitory. Münchhausen doubted they would help Le Heup.199 Le Heup’s declaration was returned unopened.200 He was ordered to leave Regensburg. Münchhausen expressed his annoyance at Vienna’s high-handed action and the ‘blind obedience’ of the other ministers but there was nothing he could do.201 Le Heup told Townshend that he had encountered fears of imminent persecution in many Imperial cities on his journey home. 202 Le Heup’s departure, and St Saphorin’s expulsion from Vienna, marked the end of a diplomatic crisis that had begun in 1725 and had boiled over in the early months of 1727. The European public was able to follow the development of the crisis because of the use both sides made of print.

The pamphlet war Many of the pamphlets for and against the Vienna and Hanover treaties were produced with official sanction, although ministers tried hard to disguise the fact. Manuscript versions of such items as the Analyse de la Preface du Traitté d’Hannover survive in the Hanover archives.203 In April 1727 George sent his Hanoverian privy council an essay about how the Ostend Company affair concerned the Emperor only in his Austrian capacity and not the whole Empire. His instructions about how to use the material were specific. The text must be published without indication of authorship or place of publication. The typeface and production should suggest that it was not German in origin.

197

Ibid., fol. 13v. Münchhausen to George I, Regensburg, 10/4/1727, HHStA, CB 11, 3015: I, fols 108–9. 199 Addition to Münchhausen to George I, Regensburg, 10/4/1727, ibid., fol. 114r. 200 Münchhausen to George I, Regensburg, 13/4/1727, ibid., fols 134–6. As Münchhausen had predicted, it was the use of ‘calumny’ to describe some of the Emperor’s actions which had caused most offence. 201 Münchhausen to George I, Regensburg, 14/4/1727, ibid., fols 161–3. George admitted to the privy council that he realised the Emperor had disliked Le Heup and had stirred things up on purpose. See George I to Geheime Räte, St James’s, 11/4/1727, ibid., fol. 30. 202 Le Heup to Townshend, Strassburg, 20/4/1727, PRO, SP 81/176. 203 HHStA, CB 11, 1699, fol. 1. The MSS was dated 3/9/1725. This file contains other tracts on the Treaty of Vienna. 198

124

THORN CRISIS

The finished product was to be sent, using the ordinary post, to all ministers at Regensburg whom the Hanoverians hoped to win to their point of view and to their allies and to all British and Hanoverian officials in the Empire. 204 Earlier in 1727 George had warned the privy council that it was imperative that propaganda could not easily be traced back to him and so, whilst the tract in question, the Schreiben eines Teutschen Patrioten, contained useful material, he did not feel that publishing it or even circulating it more widely in manuscript form was politic.205 Material from the other side is also preserved in the Hanover archives.206 One tract disputed George’s claim to be concerned about the peace of the north by arguing that he willingly claimed his share of the spoils from the Great Northern War.207 The Swedes were excellent defenders of protestantism, unlike George, who used religious pretexts to cloak his self-interest.208 This was a blatant Austrian attempt to portray the British as self-seeking commercial individuals for whom religion masked baser designs. Münchhausen reported the tract’s existence to George in February 1727 and presumably forwarded a copy to Hanover.209 Earlier in the crisis, Wrisberg had also sought to counter Austrian propaganda. His strategy for refuting the Analyse du traité d’Alliance, conclu a Hanover was threefold. He stressed the threat the rise of Austrian power posed to both protestant and catholic estates in the Empire, the specific threat the Imperial court and Aulic council posed to protestants, and the threat posed by the hereditary lands to their protestant neighbours, together with the illegitimate influence they were exercising at the Diet.210 The Analyse, as its title suggests, considered each article of the treaty. Thorn featured in the treaty’s first separate article. The Analyse claimed that Thorn was really a pretext for conflict. The main issue was the Ostend Company. However, to win over the protestant powers, Thorn had been mentioned in the treaty.211 The author also noted that, although the need to maintain the Treaty of Westphalia had been mentioned, other settlements, such as those at Ryswick, Basel and Vienna had not been included. Did this mean that France was

204

George I to Geheime Räte, St James’s, 4/4/1727, HHStA, CB 11, 1717, fols 94–5. George I to Geheime Räte, St James’s, 24/1/1727, ibid., fol. 28. 206 Reflexions d’une Personne des-interessée sur le Memoire, que Monsieur Poyntz, Envoyé Extraordinaire & Ministre Plenipotentiare de Sa Majesté Brittanique à la Cour de Suede, a presenté le 4. Juin 1726 pour porter cette Couronne à l’accession au Traité de la Triple Alliance, conclu à Herrenhausen le 3. Septembre 1725 (np, 1727), HHStA, CB 11, 1733. 207 Ibid., Sig. A3r. 208 Ibid., Sig. B3v. 209 Addition to Münchhausen to George I, Regensburg, 27/2/1727, HHStA, CB 11, 3014: II, fol. 524. 210 Wrisberg to George I, Regensburg, 12/3/1726, HHStA, CB 11, 3010: III. 211 Analyse du traite d’Alliance, conclu à Hanover entre leurs Majestés tres-chretienne, Britannique, et Prussique, le 3. Sept. 1725 (np, nd [c. 1725–6]), p. 16. 205

125

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

making new claims on the Empire, because all these settlements were now part of Imperial law?212 The nature of Imperial law in the first half of the eighteenth century was contested. No protestant jurist would have acknowledged that the other settlements mentioned had the same status as the Westphalia, partly because the Westphalian settlement was the basis for many protestant claims against the catholics. The absence of mention of the other settlements in the Treaty of Hanover was probably intentional. By talking of new French claims, rather than old protestant ones, the author of the Analyse sought to neutralise protestant argument. French interference in the affairs of the Reich was objectionable. Protestant claims were more difficult to dismiss. Another Austrian objection to the treaty was that sovereign princes of the Empire were not allowed to ally against the Emperor. The Analyse commented that, although as king in Prussia and king of England (both extra-Imperial territories), Frederick William and George could make whatever alliances they wanted, within the Empire they were bound to obey the Emperor.213 One of the main responses to the Analyse, the Remarques sur l’Analyse, countered such arguments. The Remarques was produced not by a Hanoverian or British official but by Johann Gottfried Meyer, a counsellor of the Margrave of Brandenburg-Kulmbach.214 The Remarques claimed that Thorn was not a pretext. Rather it was vital to maintain the Treaty of Oliva. The French had become involved to defend Oliva, not because they had new claims against the Empire.215 The alliance of Hanover was purely defensive so not directed against the Emperor and therefore perfectly licit.216 It also listed a number of examples of treaties made between estates of the Empire, including ones involving the Emperor, to show that alliances were actually permitted.217 It reiterated the fundamental nature of the Westphalia settlement.218 All these tracts are collected in one volume in the Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek in Göttingen.219 Other tracts in the volume illustrate the variety of material produced. Untersuchung der Ursachen, welche die Cron Spanien sowohl als Die Cron Engeland zu der jetzige Aufführung bewogen haben appeared in Vienna in 1727. It used correspondence between William Stanhope and Spanish ministers to show that most British complaints were groundless.220 The Reflexions sur l’Ecrit intitule, Recherches des motifs, ou raisons

212

Ibid., p. 12. Ibid., p. 21. 214 The MS version of the tract, addressed to Townshend, was enclosed in Wrisberg to George I, Regensburg, 10/4/1726, HHStA, CB 11, 3011: I. 215 Remarques sur l’Analyse du traité d’Hanover (np, nd [c. 1726]), p. 25. 216 Ibid., p. 6. 217 Ibid., p. 14. 218 Ibid., p. 17. 219 8 H UN V, 583. 220 Untersuchung der Ursachen, welche dir Cron Spanien sowhol als Die Cron Engeland zu der jetzige Aufführung bewogen haben (Vienna, 1727), p. 36. 213

126

THORN CRISIS

de la conduite de la Grande Bretagne par rappel à l’Etat present des affaires de l’Europe; contenues dans une Lettre publiée dans le Journal de Mist. Avec la réponse à ces reflexions (Hague, 1727) was Nathaniel Mist’s anti-ministerial attack on the official defence of the Hanover treaty produced by Benjamin Hoadly.221 Mist remained an inveterate Jacobite and opponent of continental intervention. Taken together these tracts confirm the view advanced by Andreas Gestrich that the public sphere was important to both sides in this conflict, even the ‘absolutist’ Austrians.222 Benjamin Hoadly was a cleric and ministerial polemicist. 223 In his first work defending the Hanover treaties, he explained why war seemed likely.224 He was surprised that the Austrians should have deserted their old allies and joined Spain, given how much aid they had received in the past from British, Danish, Hanoverian, Prussian and Hessian troops.225 Hoadly discussed most of the arguments from the previous two years of polemical debate. The British had wisely not guaranteed the Pragmatic Sanction in 1725 because they had no idea whom the daughters of Charles VI might marry.226 They feared Charles VI intended to marry one of his daughters to a Spanish prince, thus reawakening fears of the universal monarchy of his forebear Charles V. Hoadly also alluded to the possibility that Madrid and Vienna had offered support to the Pretender.227 He was certain that every ‘true Briton’ would always wish to preserve ‘our present Protestant Establishment’.228 He accused the Spanish of perfidy in not keeping the commitments made at Utrecht and under the Quadruple Alliance. They had also hindered a peace settlement at the Congress of Cambrai.229 Hoadly stressed the importance of maintaining good trade relations, supporting the United Provinces and preserving the balance of power. Preserving protestantism and the Church of England at home generated the prosperity to ensure that protestantism could be preserved abroad. It was worth incurring short-term debts to protect Britain against the Pretender.230 The Vienna alliance was a threat to the possessions, commerce, liberty and religion 221

This was entitled An enquiry into the reasons of the conduct of Great Britain, with relation to the present state of affairs in Europe (London, 1727). It appeared in both French and German translations. 222 Andreas Gestrich, Absolutismus und Öffentlichkeit (Göttingen, 1994), pp. 201–38. 223 For Hoadly as ministerial polemicist see Simon Targett, ‘Government and ideology during the whig supremacy: the political argument of Sir Robert Walpole’s newspaper propagandists’, HJ, 37 (1994), pp. 289–317 and Reed Browning, Political and constitutional ideas of the court whigs (Baton Rouge and London, 1982), ch. 3. 224 [Hoadly], An enquiry into the reasons of the conduct of Great Britain, p. 5. 225 Ibid., p. 7. 226 Ibid., p. 22. 227 Ibid., p. 30. 228 Ibid., p. 41. 229 Ibid., p. 45. 230 Ibid., pp. 78–81. 127

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

of Great Britain.231 The Austrians claimed the British were only interested in trade – religious arguments were a spurious diversion from the real motivations of George’s policy. Hoadly offered a different view. While not denying that trade was vital, Hoadly argued that trade was a means to an end, not an end in itself. The prosperity generated by trade ensured that the British way of life could be preserved. The main threat to this way of life was defined primarily in religious terms. Hoadly’s pamphlet provoked considerable debate.232 The British Library holds a tract entitled A Second Enquiry into the Reasons of the conduct of Great Britain.233 The date given for publication is 1726, although this is probably wrong. Whether it is by Hoadly himself is unclear. What is certain is that it contains further arguments in favour of the Hanover alliance. Its tone throughout is didactic and it draws heavily on historical example to reinforce its argument. It claimed that there was a fundamental difference between those peoples who had loved liberty and property and those who coveted dominion through conquest. The former were best represented by the Batavians and the Britons, whilst the Romans were a people inclined to dominion. 234 Great Britain had always been the chief preserver of the balance of power and the liberties of Europe while the Romans had always used the sword and fear of the gods to extend their dominion even in ancient times.235 The Maritime powers had the responsibility of defending Europe against popish aggression. The classical analogy was extended to claim that the only nation ever to oppose Roman religious policy had been the Gauls but they had been defeated by the Spaniards and High Germans.236 Now, as then, the Austrians and the Spanish were acting under Roman direction so it was futile to even ask what the British might have done to provoke them.237 The Second Enquiry mixed history with polemic but, in common with many other contemporary tracts, it saw opposition to the Hanover alliance as part of a popish conspiracy to destroy the liberties of Europe and replace the Hanoverians with the Pretender. The true interest of the Hanover Treaty consider’d contained similar themes, although the author distinguished a war of religion from an alliance formed to defend the church. Thus the Hanover alliance avoided being tainted by

231

Ibid., p. 91. This chapter considers the debate to 1727. However, as the discussions in chs 5 and 6 reveal, the merits of the Hanover alliance were still being discussed well after 1727. See also [Hoadly’s] A Defence of an Enquiry into the Reasons of the Conduct of Great Britain. Occasioned by the paper published in the Country Journal or Craftsman on Saturday, Jan. 4, 1728–9 (London, 1729). 233 A Second Enquiry into the Reasons of the conduct of Great Britain, with relation to the present state of affairs in Europe (London, 1726). 234 Ibid., p. 3. 235 Ibid., pp. 3–4. 236 Ibid., p. 6. 237 Ibid., p. 14. 232

128

THORN CRISIS

popish ‘war of religion’ language. The author carefully associated the defence of the protestant interest with higher aims such as the protection of one’s neighbours, protecting civil rights and commerce and preserving the balance of power.238 The tract combined religious language with a language of interest. While the French were not protestant themselves, their interest would make them firm allies.239 Two pamphlets from 1727 addressed the likely costs and benefits of a conflict for Great Britain. Daniel Defoe mentioned the causes of the present crisis in passing but did not want to say too much about Thorn, the departure of the Infanta or Tuscany to avoid causing offence.240 The popish clergy had wanted to turn the crisis into a war of religion and Austria had made great efforts to drag a powerful protestant prince from the alliance.241 He argued that ‘our interest is our trade; and our trade is, next to our Liberty and Religion, one of our most valuable Liberties’.242 Liberty and religion were as important as trade. Defoe, like many other pamphleteers, emphasised Austrian ingratitude in turning on their former allies. Ultimately, however, matters would be resolved without open conflict.243 The tallies of war and peace also made much of Spanish and Austrian ingratitude.244 Their attempts to stop the West Indian trade would be met with force.245 These tracts were responses to Reasons against a war. It had opposed a war on economic grounds, arguing Britain already had large debts and little to show from recent conflicts.246 It was debatable how much the Ostend Company really would affect British trade. It might have an impact on the East India Company but its wider impact was unclear.247 The final area of public debate to be considered is parliament. Townshend emphasised to British diplomats abroad the extent of domestic support for George’s policies but parliament was not entirely united. Parliament considered the Vienna and Hanover treaties in the 1726 session. William Shippen, a leading tory, commented in a debate on the size of the land forces that George had certainly achieved concessions from catholic princes, but George should not defy the Act of Settlement by involving Britain in foreign disputes when

238

[Benjamin Good?], The true interest of the Hanover Treaty consider’d (London, 1727), pp. 16–18. 239 Ibid., pp. 22–4. 240 [Daniel Defoe], The evident approach of a war; and something of the necessity of it, in order to establish peace and preserve trade (London, 1727), p. 19. 241 Ibid., pp. 25–6. 242 Ibid., p. 32. 243 Ibid., p. 43, 53. 244 The tallies of war and peace: or, what may be expected from the present situation of affairs in Europe (London, 1727), p. 20. 245 Ibid., p. 22. 246 Reasons against a war. In a letter to a member of Parliament. By an Old Whig (London, 1727), pp. 3–4. 247 Ibid., p. 10. 129

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

British interests were not threatened.248 While deploring persecution, Shippen clearly doubted that the disputes were any of ‘our’ business. Horace Walpole opened the debate on the Hanover treaty for the ministry. He argued that the treaty aimed to secure the balance of power and defend the protestant interest, especially in Thorn.249 Shippen retorted that the treaty was contrary to the Act of Settlement.250 William Pulteney claimed that the real aim of the treaties was to secure Bremen and Verden but Robert Walpole denied this.251 The opposition in the Lords also wondered whether the treaties were contrary to the Act of Settlement.252 In 1727 the opposition remained sceptical about the reality of the threat mentioned by George in his speech from the throne. William Wyndham observed that talk of the balance of power seemed to involve Britain in perpetual warfare.253 Hoadly’s pamphlet had been published at the start of the session and this did something to convince waverers. 254 However, Palm’s memo, attacking the claims George had made in his speech about Austrian support for the Pretender, turned opinion firmly towards the ministry. Copies had been distributed to every MP.255 General disgust was displayed in a debate on 13 March at this attempt to divide the people from their sovereign.256 Even Shippen and Wyndham joined the chorus of condemnation.257 Just as pamphlet debate shows how confessional arguments were deployed to defend ministerial policy, parliamentary debate reveals that confession featured prominently in defences of the administration’s approach to foreign affairs. Confessional thinking was deeply embedded and widely utilised.

Conclusion Protestants viewed the alliance of Spain and Austria as deeply threatening to both their interests and survival. Contrary to the impression given in much of German literature, religious disputes had not ceased to be important by 1725.258 Religious grievances within the Empire were no longer as prominent

248

Shippen’s speech, 28/1/1726, Parliamentary history, viii, col. 499. Horace Walpole’s speech, 16/2/1726, ibid., cols 503–5. 250 Shippen, 16/2/1726, ibid., col. 506. 251 Robert Walpole, 16/2/1726, ibid., col. 507. 252 Ibid., cols. 509–10. 253 William Wyndham, 17/1/1727, Parliamentary history, viii, col. 530. 254 A.N. Newman, ed., The parliamentary diary of Sir Edward Knatchbull 1722–1730 (London, 1963), p. 59 (17/1/1727). 255 Ibid., p. 66 (2/3/1727). 256 Ibid., p. 67 (13/3/1727). 257 Parliamentary history, viii, col. 557. 258 See Gabriele Haug-Moritz, Württembergischer Ständekonflikt und deutscher Dualismus (Stuttgart, 1992), p. 143. Aretin, Das alte Reich, ii, pp. 298–312. 249

130

THORN CRISIS

in Regensburg (although even there they rumbled on for a good while after 1725). Yet events in Poland and then the Vienna alliance meant confessional concerns were still on the agenda. Politics within the Empire were intimately linked to international events. The multiple monarchies of Saxony–Poland and Britain–Hanover were tangible examples of such links. Michael Hughes correctly remarked that the Thorn executions were further fuel on the fire of religious conflict in the Empire.259 The Austrian treaty with Spain, including provisions for a marriage treaty and common religious and political action, did little to help matters.260 Theo Gehling, in his biography of St Saphorin, drew attention to the strong sense of panic in St Saphorin’s dispatches of the period.261 Newcastle’s worries will also be recalled.262 The Lord Chancellor, Peter King, noted his fears that the Spanish and Austrians aimed at a universal monarchy, as well as his shock at the revelations made to William Stanhope by Ripperda about the desire to destroy protestantism.263 Analysing Hanoverian and British concerns together shows the need to modify significantly the traditional picture of diplomacy in the period. Much work has focused on the importance of trade for the disputes of 1725 to 1727.264 It would be foolish to deny that certain sections of British society were worried about the Ostend Company. However, it is somewhat misleading to conclude, as Hertz did, that eighteenth-century Britons did little to veil their greed by an idealism they could not feel. The story of the attack upon the Ostend Company has no trace of the self-sacrifice and public spirit which go so far to disarm criticism of more familiar chapters in the history of English expansion.265

Hertz’s early twentieth-century sensibilities were particularly offended by the fact that the attack on the Ostend Company was made on behalf of the monopolistic East India Company, and not presumably more preferable ideas of liberal free trade. Part of the problem, exemplified in Hertz’s work, is that much work on Britain in the eighteenth century assumes that the only

259

Michael Hughes, Law and politics in eighteenth-century Germany (Woodbridge, 1988), p. 192. 260 See Adolf Beer, ‘Zur Geschichte der Politik Karl’s VI.’, Historische Zeitschrift, 55 (1886), p. 33 for details of § 7 of the treaty of 5 November 1725 which expressed these points. 261 Theo Gehling, Ein europäischer Diplomat am Kaiserhof zu Wien (Bonn, 1964), p. 213. 262 See pp. 118–20. 263 Peter King, ‘Notes of Domestic and Foreign Affairs, during the last years of the reign of George I and the early part of the reign of George II’, in Peter King, The Life of John Locke (new edn, 2 vols, London, 1830), ii, pp. 1–132 (paginated separately), p. 26 (9/9/1725) and p. 33 (20/6/1726). 264 The classic articulation of this view remains Gerald B. Hertz, ‘England and the Ostend Company’, EHR, 22 (1907), pp. 255–79. 265 Ibid., p. 279. 131

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

interesting story is of imperial expansion and then skews the narrative in that direction. This move allows German historians to dismiss the English as merely commercial and uninterested in the confessional politics of the Empire.266 Instead, as this chapter suggests, commercial concerns alone cannot explain British and Hanoverian policy in the period. The defence of the balance of power and the concomitant defence of the protestant interest were crucial determinants of policy. Graham Gibbs makes similar arguments in his seminal article on the period.267 Hanoverian (and British) concern about the fate of protestantism in the Empire has not been sufficiently recognised previously. The protestant interest does not provide a ‘total’ explanation of foreign policy in the period. Yet analysing it indicates how debates about foreign policy were conducted. The Austrian claim that religion was a cloak for commerce and the British claim that trade was merely a means to encourage prosperity and defend the protestant interest are irreconcilable. Too often one side appears without the other. Religious disputes continued to be a source of tension in Anglo-Austrian relationships. Hanoverian officials remained suspicious of Charles VI. An atmosphere of mutual mistrust was perpetuated by the pamphlets produced by both sides. It was this legacy that George II inherited on his father’s death.

266 Reinhard Oberschelp, Politische Geschichte Niedersachsens, 1714–1803 (Hildesheim, 1983), p. 21. 267 G.C. Gibbs, ‘Britain and the alliance of Hanover, April 1725–February 1726’, EHR, 73 (1958), pp. 404–30. Gibbs shows how ministerial arguments centred on the ‘present dangers’ of Austro-Spanish alliances, rather than more abstract trade concerns (p. 430).

132

5

George II and challenges to the protestant interest

George I died on 22 June 1727 at Osnabrück. He was returning to Hanover for his customary summer visit. Some hoped that the new reign would bring a change of administration, and even an end to tory proscription. George II, however, retained most of his father’s ministers.1 Townshend and Newcastle remained as secretaries of state and Robert Walpole also retained his influence.2 This chapter explores whether a continuity of personnel resulted in a continuity of policy. There were certainly policy changes in the period but whether they arose from George II’s personal predilections and prejudices remains an open question.3 The chapter considers three pivotal episodes in the diplomatic history of George II’s early years. Each sheds light on the more general themes of the work: Anglo-Hanoverian relations and the importance of the protestant interest. The first is the German protestant princes’ efforts to be represented at the Congress of Soissons, called to settle differences between the Hanover and Vienna allies. Their efforts have been largely ignored but the reports of a Hanoverian diplomat sent by George II to the congress mean that princely and protestant concerns can easily be reconstructed. The second returns to the more ‘public’ themes of the book. The diplomacy of George and his ministers between 1729 and 1731 provoked considerable discussion. An analysis of these tracts shows how debate about the nature of the relationship between Britain and Hanover evolved. Religious rhetoric continued to provide a useful resource for ministerial pamphleteers to justify their actions. The final episode has both diplomatic and public aspects. The importance of the expulsion of the Salzburg protestants for Prussian history is well known. This chapter considers British and Hanoverian reaction to the expulsion. Together these episodes provide a means to assess what difference George II’s accession made to protestant politics. 1

Linda Colley, In defiance of oligarchy (Cambridge, 1982), pp. 26–7. J.H. Plumb, Sir Robert Walpole (2 vols, London, 1956–60), ii, pp. 166–9. 3 See also Jeremy Black, ‘George II reconsidered: a consideration of George’s influence on the control of foreign policy, in the first years of his reign’, Mitteilungen des österreichischen Staatsarchivs, 35 (1982), pp. 35–56. 2

133

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

Relations between the Vienna and Herrenhausen (or Hanover) allies had been hostile since 1725 and had almost erupted into open war early in 1727. Philip V had laid siege to Gibraltar and Charles VI had actively sought allies at the minor German courts.4 Despite this, peace preliminaries were signed at Paris on 31 May 1727. The deaths of Tsarina Catherine I in the middle of May, and of George I shortly after the preliminaries were signed, ensured that neither Britain nor Russia wanted hostilities to erupt. The preliminaries dealt with the future of the Ostend Company and the claims of Don Carlos to territories in northern Italy, but not the religious situation within the Empire. Although Austria had detached Prussia from the alliance with France and Britain–Hanover in 1726, Charles VI’s position within the Empire was still far from unassailable, as his intensive efforts to cultivate the smaller powers at meetings of the Kreise in early 1727 indicate. The Corpus Evangelicorum did not believe that the religious issues that emerged in 1719 had been properly resolved. Furthermore, the Corpus sought to exploit any potentially ‘religious’ issue. In 1727 the Corpus was exercised by a disputed succession in Zwingenberg. The Corpus was most annoyed that the Emperor had raised the matter at Regensburg while the case was still being heard by the Imperial courts. No protestant state had ever been able to introduce a case at Regensburg already under consideration by an Imperial court, so the Emperor’s conduct seemed partisan. The Palatinate had benefited from the Emperor’s efforts, provoking protestant anger. The Corpus wanted to invoke the ius eundi in partes over the issue. Business at Regensburg was temporarily halted. The catholics claimed that this was a misuse of confessional protection for political ends but to little avail.5 The Austrian position was weakened by the Wittelsbachs’ continuing unwillingness to recognise the Pragmatic Sanction. Wittelsbachs held the electorates of Bavaria, the Palatinate, Trier and Cologne, so they were a powerful bloc in the electoral college. Charles VI hoped to secure the succession of his eldest daughter to his hereditary lands after his death, to the exclusion of the claims of his elder brother’s daughters, through the Pragmatic Sanction.6 As these daughters were married to important members of the Wittelsbach and Wettin families, both Bavaria and Saxony had been extremely unwilling to recognise the Pragmatic Sanction.

4

See pp. 122–3. See Martin Naumann, Österreich, England und das Reich, 1719–1732 (Berlin, 1936), pp. 134–5. 6 For the origins of the Pragmatic Sanction, see Karl Otmar von Aretin, Das alte Reich, 1648–1806 (3 vols, Stuttgart, 1993–7), ii, pp. 295–9. 5

134

GEORGE II AND CHALLENGES

The Reich and the Congress of Soissons Shortly after George II became king, Johann von Reck raised the possibility of discussing the Empire’s religious problems at the congress to finalise the peace preliminaries.7 Johann von Reck had represented the Corpus in the Palatinate in the early 1720s. Religious concerns were close to his heart. 8 Other protestant diplomats appeared not to have been instructed about religious issues and the forthcoming congress. Reck had told the Corpus that George was keen to resolve the religious grievances at the congress, although it might be better to use ministers already attending than send a special mission from the Corpus. Various territorial complaints and the infamous Ryswick clause needed to be settled.9 Without a special delegation, George could maintain control over religious policy himself. The Hanoverian privy council also saw the congress as an opportunity to deal with both religious complaints and the Emperor’s ‘despotic’ breaches of the Imperial constitution.10 They identified three approaches: either the protestants could join a delegation from the various colleges of the Reich, as in 1697; or they could delegate Vollmacht to the Emperor to conclude the negotiations, as had happened at Baden and then at Rastatt; or they could ally with powers from outside the Reich and use their ministers at the congress. Of the three, the first was impractical, due to problems of control, and the second unwise, given what had happened at Baden, so only the third remained. The council suggested George should lead the protestant interest within the Empire at the congress, although he should consult Prussia, Hessen-Kassel and Sweden.11 George supported the council’s approach. He wished to receive drafts of Münchhausen’s instructions to approve them and then show them to other friendly courts.12 Both the privy council and George subsequently instructed Münchhausen.13 The surviving material permits a rare glimpse into a difference of opinion inside the privy council about policy over the congress. On 12 September, the majority council opinion, probably written by Alvensleben, was sent

7 Reck to George II, Regensburg, 26/7/1727, Hanover, Hauptstaatsarchiv (hereafter HHStA), Calenberg Brief (hereafter CB) 11, 3016: II, fol. 127. In his first letter to George II, Münchhausen had remarked that with the death of his father, protestants had lost their ‘sole protector’ (Münchhausen to George II, Regensburg, 3/7/1727, HHStA, CB 11, 3016: II, fol. 17v). 8 See p. 90 and the subsequent discussion of his involvement in the Salzburg affair. 9 Reck to George II, Regensburg, 26/7/1727, HHStA, CB 11, 3016: II, fols 128–32. 10 Geheime Räte to George II, Hanover, 5/8/1727, HHStA, CB 11, 1722: I, fol. 3. 11 Ibid., fols 4–11. 12 George II to Geheime Räte, Kensington, 8/8/1727, ibid., fol. 16. 13 See Geheime Räte to Münchhausen, Hanover, 3/9/1727, ibid., fol. 18 and George II to Münchhausen, Richmond, 22/8/1727, ibid., fol. 20.

135

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

to George.14 The congress should remove misunderstandings and assert the rights of the Stände and remind the Emperor of the promises made in his Wahlkapitulation. Religious complaints should be investigated and the Simultaneum abolished.15 Closer cooperation between England, Holland, Prussia, the northern crowns and the protestant Swiss cantons might achieve this.16 A private note for Reiche at the Deutsche Kanzlei in London insinuated that, due to his own private affairs, Kammerpräsident Goertz had thought differently. Bussche and Eltz’s decision to send separate opinions was simply to ensure that George was fully informed.17 Unfortunately, these separate opinions do not seem to have survived, although George’s polite thanks for them do. He promised that he would use them when approaching the Swedes, Danes and Bavarians.18 Eltz and Bussche’s opinions can however be largely reconstructed from subsequent exchanges. The privy council wrote to George in September 1727 to express concern about the alliance between Württemberg and Wolfenbüttel. They feared the alliance might create a third party within the Empire.19 A week later they told George that Münchhausen had suggested that Hanover, Prussia and HessenKassel should protect protestant interests at the congress, just as they had taken the lead over the Heidelberg crisis in 1719, on behalf of the Corpus.20 The council thought either Saxony or Württemberg could be used as well. To ease matters in the Corpus, George must write to his fellow princes to ensure their representatives in Regensburg were properly instructed. To maximise the chances of French aid, it was best to emphasise the importance of the politicolegal aspects of their complaints, rather than the religious. Attention should focus on the 1648 settlement and the rights of the Stände and the Emperor’s broken Wahlkapitulation.21 The council subsequently added that, as British representatives at the congress were unlikely to know much about Imperial affairs, it might be good to have a German minister at the congress too.22

14

Geheime Räte to George II, Hanover, 12/9/1727, ibid., fol. 25. Johann Friedrich von Alvensleben (1657–1728) had been on the privy council since 1718. See Joachim Lampe, Aristokratie, Hofadel und Staatspatriziat in Kurhannover (2 vols, Göttingen, 1963), ii, p. 19. 15 Geheime Räte to George II, Hanover, 12/9/1727, HHStA, CB 11, 1722: I, fols 26–31. 16 Ibid., fol. 32. 17 Ibid., fols 33–4. Goertz had risen to Kammerpräsident after a long career in Hanoverian service. He had accompanied George I to London in 1714 but returned to Hanover. See Lampe, Aristokratie, ii, p. 29. Eltz had also had a long career as a diplomat and Hanoverian official. He died in October 1727 (Lampe, Aristokratie, ii, p. 27). Heinrich Albert von dem Bussche had been a member of the privy council since 1713 and succeeded Goertz as Kammerpräsident in 1728 (Lampe, Aristokratie, ii, p. 25). 18 George II to Bussche and Eltz, Kensington, 12/9/1727, HHStA, CB 11, 1722: I, fol. 41r. 19 Geheime Räte to George II, Hanover, 16/9/1727, HHStA, CB 11, 1736, fol. 24r. 20 Geheime Räte to George II, Hanover, 23/9/1727, HHStA, CB 11, 1722: I, fol. 44v. 21 Ibid., fols 45–6. 22 Geheime Räte to George II, Hanover, 3/10/1727, ibid., fol. 57. 136

GEORGE II AND CHALLENGES

The council now wanted George to deal with religious and Imperial affairs himself.23 While the council were reluctant to prolong tensions with Vienna, some thought it important not to capitulate to the Emperor. Bussche and Eltz argued if too much were conceded to the Emperor, very soon protestantism and the freedoms of all the Stände would be threatened. They advised a reconciliation with Prussia ‘at the very least in religious and Imperial affairs’.24 Perhaps the earlier dispute had been sparked by Eltz and Bussche’s reluctance to be too conciliatory towards Vienna, particularly if they thought Goertz wanted reconciliation for primarily private reasons. Eltz and Bussche advocated alliance with Prussia, a return to the policy of the early 1720s. George responded that it was simply impractical to contact all the protestant princes to ensure their representatives in Regensburg were properly instructed.25 He revealed more of this thinking to Eltz and Bussche. Their desire to have Germans at the congress was sound.26 He had decided not to write to other courts because it would alert the Emperor to his intentions.27 Münchhausen should use his contacts to rally those friendly to their point of view at Regensburg. George mentioned various diplomats who could be especially useful.28 On the value of an alliance with Prussia, George was far more trenchant. Although it would be good to have reasonable relations with Prussia, ‘the inconstancy and the selfish intentions of that court are so well-known . . . that to want to agree something right and constant with them is a futile task’.29 A subsequent letter reiterated the view that the Reich should be represented at the congress but George had made up his mind about Prussia.30 A letter from the Prussian privy council, expressing Frederick William’s concern to maintain the liberties of the Stände but also his opposition to external interference in the affairs of the Empire, was unlikely to have swayed George on the desirability of a Prussian alliance.31 ‘External interference’ was code for France and England, Prussia’s former allies in the Treaty of Herrenhausen/Hanover. The Hanoverian privy council trimmed Münchhausen’s instructions to reflect the king’s wishes. Münchhausen was told to contact other diplomats at Regensburg. He was also to signal that George did not want a delegation from

23

Ibid., fol. 58. Ibid., fols 59–62. 25 George to Geheime Räte, Kensington, 27/9/1727, ibid., fol. 67. 26 George to Eltz and Bussche, St James’s, 3/10/1727, ibid., fol. 71r. 27 Ibid., fol. 71v. 28 Ibid., fol. 72r. 29 Ibid., fols 72v–73r. 30 George to Eltz, Bussche and Hardenburg, Kensington, 8/10/1727, HHStA, CB 11, 1736, fol. 38. 31 Copy of Prussian Geheime Räte to Geheime Räte, Berlin, 18/10/1727, ibid., fol. 51r. 24

137

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

the Corpus at the congress.32 When the council sent George Münchhausen’s instructions for his approval, they repeated their belief that cooperation with Prussia was necessary. They had recently received a request for cooperation (on Prussian terms, of course) from Berlin.33 George approved the instructions.34 Cooperation with Prussia was relegated to a postscript where George simply remarked that he felt it unnecessary.35 In December the council tried again. They feared that the arrival of Frederick von Seckendorff in Berlin might mean that the Emperor received news of how George intended to act at the conference prematurely.36 Seckendorff was a protestant, an Imperial general, and a close associate of Prince Eugene. The council argued that the risk of intercepted correspondence meant the only way to ensure secrecy was to dispatch people and not letters to foreign courts.37 They wanted an alliance with Prussia and the other protestant powers.38 George denied that it would be any easier to keep a diplomatic visit secret than a letter. He was willing to work with Prussia but he was also aware of her untrustworthiness.39 Unfortunately for the council, the first months of 1728 suggested George had been wise to doubt Prussian intentions. The privy council discovered that Seckendorff had made clear that the Emperor was aware of, and unhappy about, protestant plotting over the congress.40 Consequently Prussia would no longer support attempts at Regensburg to create a united protestant front for the congress.41 George felt vindicated and told the privy council that it was pointless to expect the Prussians to reconsider.42 Events in Regensburg had made relations with Berlin more difficult. In late 1727, Münchhausen had reported that the Prussian Komitial-Gesandter, Graf von Metternich, had converted to catholicism.43 The Prussians asked

32 Geheime Räte to Münchhausen, Hanover, 23/10/1727, HHStA, CB 11, 1722: I, fol. 79v. 33 Geheime Räte to George, Hanover, 24/10/1727, ibid., fol. 85r. 34 George to Geheime Räte, Kensington, 27/10/1727, ibid., fol. 90r. 35 Addition to ibid., fol. 91r. 36 Geheime Räte to George, Hanover, 12/12/1727, ibid., fol. 99r. 37 Ibid., fol. 101r. 38 Ibid., fols 101v–102r. The other protestant powers were probably Hessen-Kassel, Denmark and Sweden. 39 George II to Geheime Räte, St James’s, 12/12/1727, ibid., fol. 119. 40 Prussian Geheime Räte to Geheime Räte, Berlin, 3/2/1728, HHStA, CB 11, 1736, fol. 77. 41 Geheime Räte to George II, Hanover, 2/3/1728, HHStA, CB 11, 1722: I, fol. 142v. 42 George II to Geheime Räte, St James’s, 1/3/1728, ibid., fol. 156r. 43 Addition to Münchhausen to George II, Regensburg, 25/12/1727, HHStA, CB 11, 1717: IV, fol. 699. Du Bourgay reported to Townshend that it was unclear whether Metternich had converted some time ago and kept his conversion secret until at death’s door or whether it was more recent. See Du Bourgay to Townshend, Berlin, 6/1/1728, London, Public Record Office (hereafter PRO), State Papers (hereafter SP) 90/23.

138

GEORGE II AND CHALLENGES

Münchhausen to represent their interests until another diplomat could be appointed. Consequently, when the Prussians indicated their withdrawal from combined protestant efforts to be represented at the congress in March 1728, Münchhausen suffered the embarrassment of having to explain Prussian doubts to the Corpus.44 As the privy council noted, the Prussian court was clearly taking advantage of Münchhausen’s difficult position. They wondered whether George should forbid Münchhausen from carrying out his orders from Berlin on this matter.45 George II was unwilling to pursue a purely confessional strategy in Imperial politics. Münchhausen had been working closely with the Württemberg envoy, Schütz-Pflummern, ever since the signing of the alliance between Württemberg and Wolfenbüttel in 1727. The pair had tried to persuade Bavaria that it was worth pursuing questions about Hoheitsrechte and the Stände together. This approach, Münchhausen argued, made it difficult to claim that opposition to the Emperor was simply protestant. A polarisation of the Empire along confessional lines could be avoided.46 Yet Münchhausen remarked subsequently that Vienna was clearly making such strenuous efforts to woo Württemberg, and had already succeeded with Prussia, because she wanted to avoid protestant representation at the congress.47 Both Münchhausen and George believed it was best to keep doors open, rather than closed. The protestant princes provided one source of ready allies to oppose Austrian pretensions and the Wittelsbachs another. Who the preferred allies were varied. George negotiated with both Wittelsbachs and with Württemberg and Wolfenbüttel in 1728. He acceded to the treaty signed by Württemberg and Wolfenbüttel in 1728, as elector. George explained to the Hanoverian privy council the importance of getting Würzburg to join as well ‘so that it does not have the appearance of a protestant league’.48 George did not want Würzburg to join so that it was not a protestant league but so that it did not look like a protestant league. The Hanoverian accession to the treaty had no direct confessional references but, in the context of the 1720s, the commitment (clause three) to protect the religious rights granted by the Peace of Westphalia as well as the other territorial rights and prerogatives of the Imperial princes suggests confessional concerns were lurking beneath the surface.49 The defence of the Peace of Westphalia had become synonymous with an assertion of protestant rights.

44 See Addition to Münchhausen to George II, Regensburg, 4/3/1728, HHStA, CB 11, 1720: II, fols 533–9. Münchhausen enclosed the memo (dated 24/2/1728) refusing further Prussian participation. He attributed the Prussian change of heart to a fear of annoying Charles VI (fol. 534r). 45 Geheime Räte to George II, Hanover, 19/3/1727, HHStA, CB 11, 1742. 46 Münchhausen to George II, Regensburg, 5/1/1728, HHStA, CB 11, 3020: I, fols 31–2. 47 Münchhausen to George II, Regensburg, 11/3/1728, HHStA, CB 11, 3020: III, fol. 610v. 48 George II to Geheime Räte, Richmond, 7/6/1728, HHStA, CB 11, 1722: II, fol. 216. 49 For the accession, HHStA, CB 11, 1746. Clause three is on fol. 2.

139

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

By June 1728 it was clear that there would be no separate protestant representation at the congress. Münchhausen had returned to Hanover to take up a position on the privy council so Reck was once more in charge. He noted the perennial problem of securing appropriate instructions to achieve action from the Corpus.50 At the end of July, Reck and the new Komitial-Gesandter, Diede, reported that the Corpus had formally approved George’s offer to represent their interests at the congress, despite some last minute attempts to send a special mission from the Corpus.51 Ultimately, George, following the privy council’s advice, sent Reck to the congress at Soissons. This was an almost perfect solution. The Corpus knew Reck was cognisant of the religious situation in the Empire but George was able to use one of his own diplomats at the congress. George told Reck that he was the only diplomat at the congress with the necessary knowledge and experience to deal with Reich concerns. 52 Reck should tackle the general complaints regarding the abuse of the Imperial courts and constitution but he was also expected to address the pressing religious issues. George thought that abolition of the Ryswick clause would prove impossible. Instead Reck should seek to limit the scope of the clause to reduce cases of persecution.53 Reck was in Soissons to advise Horace Walpole, William Stanhope and Stephen Poyntz, the British envoys on Imperial affairs.54 Reck explained the disputes between George and Charles VI over Mecklenburg to them.55 Reck had less success with the Ryswick clause. The Danish and Swedish representatives raised the issue with Reck so he talked to Stanhope. Stanhope claimed he had no instructions on Ryswick.56 George’s response to this letter does not appear to have survived. How did the British react to Hanoverian concerns? Newcastle had informed Horace Walpole as early as July 1727 that George was aware of Austrian attempts to prevent German princely concerns being considered at the congress. Newcastle noted George’s idea of sending an electoral minister to several courts both to encourage and to undermine reliance on the Emperor.57 Townshend observed to Walpole shortly afterwards that Vienna was working hard to ensure there were no protestant princes at the congress.

50

Reck to Geheime Räte, Regensburg, 14/6/1728, HHStA, CB 11, 3021: III, fol. 473. Diede and Reck to George, Regensburg, 26/7/1728, HHStA, CB 11, 3022: I, fols 143–6. 52 George II to Reck, Hampton Court, 2/8/1728, HHStA, CB 11, 1722: II, fol. 268. 53 Ibid., fol. 269. 54 Significantly, Reck was not to be told about Fleury’s plans for a treaty with the four catholic electors. See Townshend to Plenipotentiaries, Windsor, 12/9/1728 (draft), PRO, SP 78/189, fols 395–9. 55 Reck to George II, Fontainebleau, 5/10/1728, HHStA, CB 24, 2001, fol. 27. 56 Reck to George II, Paris, 27/10/1728, ibid., fol. 37v. 57 Newcastle to H. Walpole, Whitehall, 31/7/1727, very private, London, British Library (hereafter BL), Additional Manuscripts (hereafter Add. MSS) 32751, fol. 187r. 51

140

GEORGE II AND CHALLENGES

Walpole should urge the French to encourage opposition within the Empire.58 Subsequently Townshend opined that unless the German princes could be induced to fight for their rights and resolution of their grievances at the congress, the negotiations would focus on ‘a v[ery] narrow compass’ of trade issues.59 Newcastle told Walpole that George was willing to support Fleury’s Wittelsbach family alliance proposal if it ensured that princely grievances were discussed at the congress. George thought that the French were better placed to negotiate with the Bavarians but he would endeavour to ensure that the protestants did not allow the Emperor alone to represent their interests at the congress.60 George II’s refusal to contemplate a speedy reconciliation with Prussia dashed the Hanoverian privy council’s hopes of a purely protestant opposition against perceived Austrian encroachments on their rights and privileges. Yet George was still aware of religious concerns. He carefully avoided giving the impression of setting up a purely religious alliance. His defence of the protestant interest mirrored earlier patterns. The balance of power and the workings of international relations were taken seriously. Protestantism could best be defended pragmatically, by avoiding outright confessional conflict but insisting on the preservation of religious and legal rights. Austria was seen as posing the greatest threat to protestants so it made sense to ally with Austria’s other opponents, even when these included such catholic powers as France and Bavaria.

British pamphlet debate on foreign policy Hanoverians hoped to use the link with Britain to their advantage at the Congress of Soissons. The next section considers the personal union in contemporary political debate.61 In the 1740s the personal union came under systematic attack. Concerns about the relationship between Britain and Hanover appeared amidst broader discussions of the direction of British foreign policy in the 1730s. Competition for power in Italy between Spain and the Habsburgs was a continuing source of tension. Don Carlos’s claims to several north Italian territories had consistently been resisted by the Austrians, even after

58

Townshend to H. Walpole, Whitehall, 8/8/1727, private, ibid., fol. 215. Townshend to H. Walpole, Whitehall, 21/8/1727, ibid., fol. 351. 60 Newcastle to H. Walpole, Whitehall, 29/8/1727, ibid., fols 418–19. 61 See also Frauke Geyken, ‘“The German Language is spoken in Saxony with the greatest purity” or English images and perceptions of Germany in the eighteenth century’, in Joseph Canning and Hermann Wellenreuther, eds, Britain and Germany compared (Göttingen, 2001), pp. 37–70, although Geyken concentrates on the 1740s. 59

141

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

an accommodation had been reached over Naples.62 Spanish hopes that their 1725 alliance with Austria had resolved matters proved ill-founded. Consequently after 1727 Spain turned back to France and Britain to secure her Italian claims. The Treaty of Seville (1729) promised British and French support for the introduction of Spanish garrisons into north Italy. The wisdom of allying with Spain, particularly because the Spanish were perceived to have broken promises about the restoration of ships and compensation for trade disruptions, was hotly disputed. Maintaining Hessian regiments in British pay also provoked comment inside and outside parliament.63 Certain sections of the political nation distrusted standing armies per se. Concerns had appeared in debates about the wisdom of maintaining a militia, as opposed to a standing army, in 1697 and had resurfaced periodically ever since. The ministry constantly asserted their latest diplomatic coup had secured the peace and stability of Europe, so their opponents asked why was it necessary to maintain such large land forces. The Treaty of Seville provided ample ammunition for mercantile lobbies, disappointed at their lack of just recompense from Spain, and the opposition.64 Consequently, the ministry defended the treaty in print and parliament. In parliament, Horace Walpole spoke in its defence.65 Walpole probably also helped produce the Observations upon the Treaty between the Crowns of Great-Britain, France, and Spain, one of the contemporary ministerial pamphlets.66 The Observations responded to likely criticisms of the treaty. Some had hoped to profit from a burdensome war and were therefore annoyed at an advantageous peace.67 Fears that the treaty would cause a split with the Dutch were exaggerated.68 Don Carlos’s right to succeed to the Italian duchies had been accepted in the Quadruple Alliance (1718). The garrisons posed no

62

Don Carlos claimed the succession to Farnese possessions (Parma and Piacenza), as well as the Medici inheritance (Tuscany). His claims came from his mother, Elisabeth Farnese, Philip V’s second wife. Most historians agree that Philip V was controlled by his wives. Elisabeth dominated Spain after 1715. Her chief policy was to secure Italian possessions for her sons. See W.N. Hargreaves-Mawdsley, Eighteenth-century Spain (London, 1979), p. 45 and part one, passim. 63 For debate within parliament, see Jeremy Black, ‘Parliament and foreign policy in the age of Walpole: the case of the Hessians’, in idem, ed., Knights errant and true Englishmen (London, 1989), pp. 41–54. 64 Both A short review of the principal transactions in Europe, since the peace of Utrecht (London, 1729) and Reasons for a war, in order to establish the tranquillity and commerce of Europe (London, 1729) had a strong anti-Spanish tone. 65 See Diary of Viscount Percival afterwards first earl of Egmont ed. R.A. Roberts (Historical Manuscripts Commission, 3 vols, London, 1920–3) (hereafter Egmont diary), i, p. 4. 66 Observations upon the Treaty between the Crowns of Great-Britain, France, and Spain, concluded at Seville on the Ninth of November, 1729, N.S. (London, 1729). 67 Ibid., p. 4. The target for this jibe could well have been the author of Reasons for a war. 68 Observations, p. 7. Contrast the worries expressed in Short review of the principal transactions, p. 34. 142

GEORGE II AND CHALLENGES

threat. Gibraltar was also safe, as the Spanish had confirmed their commitment to the Utrecht treaty, where British claims to the rock were enshrined.69 The ministry thought they could prove the king had not placed German interests over British ones. Reconciliation with the Emperor might have brought advantages for George’s German territories, but he had chosen to ally with Spain and against the Emperor.70 Relations with Prussia had been poor for much of 1729.71 Yet the opposition’s attitude to Prussia was symptomatic of the way they stirred up debate for debate’s sake. When Prussia had been an ally, they had regarded her as unprofitable but at the first whiff of an alliance with Spain, Frederick William had suddenly become a hero and an alliance with him the most desirable option.72 Hanover appeared in the pamphlet’s conclusion. It was hardly patriotic for Englishmen to encourage foreign powers to invade George’s German territories. Moreover, Hanover had ‘surely the common Claim of all Protestant Nations to our Favour and good Wishes, if not to our Protection’.73 The ministry seemingly wanted to have it both ways – George had put British interests first in his recent diplomatic moves but Hanover, like other protestant territories, still deserved British protection. In 1730 William Wyndham, a close associate of Bolingbroke and a Jacobite sympathiser, enquired in parliament whether the Commons’ response to the king’s speech bound Britain to defend Hanover, if attacked by either Austria or Prussia. Egmont, whose diary is an invaluable source for parliamentary politics, thought that Prussian fear of British intervention helped secure Hanover’s position, although the ministry was wise not to admit this openly.74 The debate on the king’s speech, where Wyndham had intervened, was a classic occasion to discuss foreign policy. Another was the debate on the size of the land forces and 1730 was no exception. William Pulteney and William Shippen, both strongly opposed to the ministry, hoped that the ‘German constitution of ruling by a standing army was not to be introduced here’.75 Shortly afterwards in the debate on the Hessian forces the opposition claimed the troops were only needed to defend Hanover. Henry Pelham, for the ministry, countered they would keep Austrian designs in check.76 Several MPs thought that Hanover, as a protestant state, deserved protection anyway and

69

Observations, pp. 9–14. Ibid., p. 23. 71 Ibid., p. 24. 72 Ibid., p. 25. 73 Ibid., pp. 26–7. 74 Egmont diary, i, pp. 4–5 (13/1/1730). 75 Ibid., p. 11 (28/1/1730). See also [William Shippen], Four speeches against continuing the Army, &c. As they were spoken on Several Occasions in the House of Commons. As also, a speech for relieving the unhappy sufferers in the charitable corporation; as it was spoken in the House of Commons, May 8. 1732. By W____ S____, Esq (London, 1732), p. 35. 76 Egmont diary, i, p. 25 (4/2/1730). 70

143

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

that, given how protestants abroad were being oppressed, George should do all he could to help.77 Egmont thought the debate was more about the general question of how peace should be secured than the Hessians themselves.78 His comments show debate about Hanover and the Hessian troops had become functionalised. The troops had become shorthand for a set of ideas about the appropriate conduct of government. They were also an easy stick with which to beat the ministry. Debate was not restricted to the Commons. Pulteney published a response to the Observations.79 In it, he argued that the present situation had arisen from a series of ministerial mistakes, dating back to 1724.80 Like the Craftsman, an opposition periodical to which both Pulteney and Bolingbroke contributed, Pulteney blamed the Austro-Spanish alliance of 1725 on the Spanish perception that a British promise to return Gibraltar had been broken, the illtreatment of the Infanta by France, and the British refusal to be sole mediators between Austria and Spain at the Congress of Cambrai.81 Britain’s alliance with France had simply pushed Spain and Austria closer together. The ministry had chosen to disguise their miscalculation by claiming that the Treaty of Vienna had contained secret articles that posed a threat to the Hanover allies.82 These secret articles, whose existence Pulteney doubted, had then been used to continue hostilities from 1725 to 1727, although Pulteney did admit that in the claim and counter-claim this was perhaps too ‘nice’ a question to resolve satisfactorily.83 Since 1727 ministerial negotiations had been handled ineptly. Nothing had come of the Congress of Soissons. Spain had not kept promises on trade reparations and British commerce had suffered. The Observations’s interpretation of the recent treaty was not borne out by the text.84 Turning to British interests, Pulteney admitted that alliance with Spain was probably preferable for commerce, but only while peace lasted. If conflict became inevitable, it would be more difficult for a ‘maritime power’, such as Britain, to fight the Emperor than Spain.85 Pulteney was extremely cautious on Hanover. Englishmen should not encourage foreigners to invade George’s German dominions. Hanover was not a bad place but Britain should take priority in ministerial considerations. Hanover ‘hath certainly the common Claim of all Protestant

77

See the contributions of Bladen and Crofts in ibid., pp. 20–30. Ibid., p. 31. 79 [William Pulteney], A short view of the state of affairs, with relation to Great Britain, for the four years past; with some remarks on the Treaty lately published and Pamphlet intitled, Observations upon it (London, 1730). 80 Ibid., p. 3. 81 Ibid., p. 4. 82 Ibid., p. 5. 83 Ibid., p. 7. 84 Ibid., pp. 9–15. 85 Ibid., p. 26. 78

144

GEORGE II AND CHALLENGES

Nations to our Favour and good wishes’ but whether war on Hanover’s behalf was permitted was a matter for the Act of Settlement.86 Unsurprisingly, the opposition’s view of the Act of Settlement allowed very little to be done for Hanover. The ministry were less convinced. In his Free Briton Extraordinary, the ministerial publicist, William Arnell, adhered firmly to the official line that, despite the Emperor’s claims, there had been secret clauses in the Treaty of Vienna. He reminded his readers of the Gyllenborg plot in 1717 when a conspiracy between Swedish diplomats and the Jacobites had been successfully exposed, despite Swedish protestations of their innocence.87 Plotting was associated with popery. Confessional argument was an important aspect of ministerial propaganda. Concerns about the direction of ministerial foreign policy reappeared in the next parliamentary session. Egmont noted that Walpole and Poyntz had produced a pamphlet called Considerations on the present state of Affairs in Europe.88 In the Considerations, Poyntz and Walpole again argued that the foundations of all current troubles lay with the Treaty of Vienna.89 The French alliance was the best way to balance the Austrian threat. Although an alliance with the United Provinces was desirable, the nature of their constitution made it difficult to keep negotiations secret and therefore reduced the alliance’s value. Prussia had originally been part of the current system but had subsequently forgotten her true interest and joined the Austrians. 90 Given the complicated diplomatic situation, the Hessian forces remained necessary for defending British interests in the East and West Indies, the Baltic, for domestic security (against the Jacobites), and in Gibraltar and Port Mahon. 91 The existence of these forces had arguably helped to secure concessions from Spain in 1728. Their value as a bargaining counter was undiminished. The Hessians could help ensure that the provisions of the Treaty of Seville were met.92 Poyntz and Walpole returned to the supposed links between Hanover and the Hessians. The troops were maintained for their general defensive and diversionary value.93 If war broke out and Britain were allied to Hanover, Britain would be obliged to defend Hanoverian territory. This union was strongly and necessarily implied in the king’s person. Commonplace misrepresentations

86

Ibid., pp. 34–5. Emphasis is as in the original. [William Arnell], The Free Briton Extraordinary: or, a short review of the British Affairs (2nd edn, London, 1730), p. 9. 88 Egmont diary, i, p. 125 (2/2/1731). The full title of the pamphlet was Considerations on the present state of Affairs in Europe and particularly with Regard to the Number of Forces in the Pay of Great-Britain (London, 1731). 89 Considerations on the present state of Affairs, p. 4. 90 Ibid., pp. 6–8. 91 Ibid., p. 15. 92 Ibid., pp. 23–5, 35–6. 93 Ibid., p. 40. 87

145

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

should not detract from the real merits of retaining the Hessians.94 Finally it was odd to blame Britain’s allies for breaking their engagements and then claim that parliament should dissolve its own engagements to Hanover.95 The ministry’s opponents were cunning but pretend patriots.96 The main opposition response to Poyntz and Walpole was The case of the Hessian forces.97 Placing the blame for current problems on the Vienna treaty was dubious.98 As the Hessians would be unlikely to fight against their feudal overlord, the Emperor, their value for preserving the balance of Europe was limited. Yet the Emperor was seemingly the main threat they were intended to combat.99 The argument that the Hessians might help install Don Carlos in Parma and Tuscany was similarly misguided.100 Argument about Hanover had subtly changed. Although the ministry had claimed that there was an implied alliance with Hanover, this was denied. Hanover was arguably a ‘Weight upon the Strength of England’ because the Emperor could use Hanover’s security as a bargaining counter.101 The usual references were made to the Act of Settlement. The potential incompatibility between different forms of government, limited in Britain and absolute in Hanover, was also raised. Similar arguments describing Hanover as a strategic ‘Achilles heel’ were used extensively in later pamphlet literature. Attacks on the personal union shifted from legalistic arguments towards the practical difficulties of securing Hanover. Some useful and occasional remarks on a late seditious Libel, entitl’d Considerations on the Present State of Affairs in Europe adopted a different line.102 Like other opposition pamphlets, it denied that the Vienna allies had ever posed a real threat.103 It chose, however, to concentrate on the stupidity of keeping foreigners in British pay, when British forces had been disbanded. Given Britain’s considerable naval superiority, the size of land forces was much less important.104 The British Patriot also claimed that naval power

94

Ibid., pp. 49–50. Ibid., p. 53. 96 Ibid., p. 54. 97 The case of the Hessian forces, in the pay of Great Britain, impartially and freely Examin’d (London, 1731). The British Library catalogue misattributes this pamphlet to Walpole. The contents are clearly anti-ministerial rendering Walpole an improbable author. 98 Case of the Hessian forces, pp. 4–6. 99 Ibid., pp. 20–3. 100 Ibid., p. 26. 101 Ibid., p. 35. 102 Some useful and occasional remarks on a late seditious Libel, entitl’d Considerations on the Present State of Affairs in Europe (London, 1731). 103 Ibid., pp. 16–19. 104 Ibid., pp. v, 21. James Oglethorpe, who will appear later as an instigator of the Georgia Company, had argued in the Commons in 1730 that it made more sense to use British and Irish, as opposed to Hessian troops. See Egmont diary, i, p. 26 (4/2/1730). 95

146

GEORGE II AND CHALLENGES

was best and that the Hessians were solely useful for maintaining peace in Germany.105 The Considerations was an attempt to remove British liberties by finding plausible arguments for a standing army.106 The author had eschewed ‘Billingsgate rhetoric’ (the abuse characteristic of the London fishmongers) and claimed he wanted to moderate between the D’Anverian and ministerial positions (D’Anvers was the pseudonym used by Bolingbroke for his attacks on the ministry in the Craftsman).107 His protestations of non-partisanship were unconvincing. The ministry still found supporters. Attempts were made to justify the Treaty of Seville because it had separated the potentially fatal combination of Austria and Spain (the premise for this being, of course, the secret articles of the Treaty of Vienna).108 Instead of invoking the insular patriotism of the opposition, with its juxtaposition of limited monarchy at home and the threat of absolutism from abroad, a different relationship was suggested between Britain and continental Europe. Britain should aid the northern powers and protestant German princes, despite the cost, because ‘the suffering any of them to be distres’d or weaken’d, were so far to weaken ourselves, and to take Weight out of the Scale which weights against Popery’. It was not a matter of defending a small German duchy, like Hanover, but of securing the ‘whole Protestant interest Abroad’. Moreover, the British would have been obliged to pursue such a policy regardless of whether the monarch was elector of Hanover or not.109 The current ministry should be praised not blamed because ‘never was the Protestant Cause in general in more Danger, than the Gentlemen now in Power found it, or in greater Safety, than they have brought it to’.110 The use of the language of the protestant interest was not coincidental. Another pamphlet presented similar arguments. Again, the Treaty of Seville was portrayed as a means of breaking up the dangerous Vienna alliance.111 British policy should oppose states desirous of universal monarchy, France previously and now Austria.112 The Hessian troops were to protect any ally, not just Hanover, and, as they were paid for and approved by parliament, this could hardly breach the Act of Settlement.113 More interestingly, it was argued that it was surprising that the ministry was being blamed for doing precisely what James I had failed to do. James was universally condemned for failing to

105

The British Patriot, or a Timely Caveat against giving into the Measures of any Evil and Corrupt Minister (London, 1731), p. 40. 106 Ibid., p. 35. 107 Ibid., pp. 11–13. 108 A Defence of the Measures of the Present Administration (London, 1731), p. 16. 109 Ibid., pp. 23–4. 110 Ibid., p. 27. 111 Some observations of the present state of affairs, in a letter to a member of the House of Commons (London, 1731), p. 14. 112 Ibid., p. 22. 113 Ibid., pp. 29–30. 147

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

support the protestant interest in the Palatinate. Hanover was similar to the Palatinate ‘or rather still more deserving our Protection as the Difficulties they labour under, proceed from our Quarrels and not their own’. 114 The redescription of Hanover as a potential parallel case to the Palatinate was a calculated attempt to place the relationship with Hanover within a category of shared religious identity, rather than resorting to the rhetoric of British patriotism and its potentially narrower definition of what was legitimate interest. For ministerial supporters, British concern for European politics was both a matter of statecraft and a protestant duty. Protection of protestant co-religionists remained a vital task. Ministerial pamphlets linked the protestant interest to a set of obligations about what it meant to be British – predominantly, the need to take a lead within protestant Europe. Two forms of British identity were competing. The ministry sought to link the protestant interest and monarchical obligations on the diplomatic stage. The opposition suggested that a foreigner could never have British interests truly at heart. Jeremy Black has frequently argued that opposition accusations that British interests were sacrificed at the altar of Hanoverian aggrandisement were largely justified.115 Hanoverian historians of the personal union have emphasised the conflicting interests of the two countries.116 Comparatively less attention has been paid to how those faced with the day-to-day reality of the personal union in the area where it counted most, foreign affairs, sought to legitimise their actions. The language of the protestant union was a convenient and effective rhetorical weapon. Hanoverian attempts to be represented at the Congress of Soissons show how the Hanoverians wanted to benefit from their association with Britain. Pamphlet debate after the Treaty of Seville indicates how the opposition used the Hanoverian connection as a rod for the government’s back. The ministry invoked the language of the protestant interest in their defence. The third section of this chapter considers the reaction to a seemingly enormous threat to the protestant interest – the expulsion of protestants from Salzburg in 1731. As Mack Walker has shown,117 the expulsion had a lasting impact on German national culture. Frederick William’s offer to allow many of the exiles to settle in Prussia did much to enhance his reputation as a leader of German protestantism. However, as previous chapters have shown, the assumption that Prussia was the only power to take the fate of German protestantism seriously is misleading. Prussia was probably more prominent over Salzburg than over

114

Ibid., pp. 30–1. See Jeremy Black, ‘Parliament and foreign policy in the age of Walpole: the case of the Hessians’, in idem, ed., Knights errant, p. 48 and idem, British foreign policy in the age of Walpole (Edinburgh, 1985), ch. 2. 116 Paradigmatic: Reinhard Oberschelp, Politische Geschichte Niedersachsens, 1714–1803 (Hildesheim, 1983), pp. 1–7. 117 Mack Walker, The Salzburg transaction (Ithaca and London, 1992). 115

148

GEORGE II AND CHALLENGES

either the Palatinate or Thorn. Nevertheless the less explored aspects of the Salzburg crisis, placed in the broader context of relationships between Britain, Hanover, Prussia and Austria, shed new light on protestant leadership in the Empire.

Anglo-Prussian relations prior to Salzburg The death of George I in 1727 marked a generational shift. George I had been Frederick William’s uncle; George II, by contrast, was merely Frederick William’s brother-in-law. While Frederick William had felt a degree of respect for George I, as a more senior relation, he was more antipathetic towards George II. British diplomats had been suspicious of Frederick William since his defection from the Hanover alliance in 1726. In early 1727 Du Bourgay had hoped that Frederick William might be induced to switch sides again but he was worried by the lack of concern for ‘the Interest of our Religion which might be justly expected from a protestant Prince of the K[ing] of Prussia’s figure and descent’.118 After George I’s death Townshend commented Prussia might be persuaded to return to a more natural alliance with Britain at the forthcoming congress. Townshend could not conceive how the interests of protestantism or the good of the Empire could possibly be served by the AustroPrussian alliance.119 Some sections of the Hanoverian privy council were keen to renew ties with Prussia.120 George II was more reluctant. Anglo-Prussia relations were strained for several reasons. Frederick William’s wife, Sophia Dorothea (George II’s sister), and George I had been keen on a double marriage alliance between the two powers. Frederick, George II’s son, and one of his sisters were respectively intended for Sophia Dorothea’s daughter, Wilhelmine, and son, Frederick. The idea had been discussed as early as 1723 but progress had been slow.121 Townshend ordered Du Bourgay in late 1728 to avoid discussing the marriage proposal, suggesting that George II was reluctant to pursue the alliance idea.122 Additionally, there were three territorial disputes within the Empire where George and Frederick William found themselves on opposite sides. The continuing dispute in Mecklenburg between the duke and his estates was an irritation. On George I’s death, the old commission had lapsed and Charles VI used the opportunity to introduce a new administration, including Frederick William. George II was angered because he felt Mecklenburg fell within his

118 119 120 121 122

Du Bourgay to Townshend, Berlin, 18/1/1727, PRO, SP 90/22. Townshend to Du Bourgay, Whitehall, 15/8/1727, ibid. See pp. 137–9. Ragnhild Hatton, George I: elector and king (London, 1978), pp. 162–3. Townshend to Du Bourgay, Whitehall, 27/12/1728, PRO, SP 90/24. 149

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

sphere of interest, and not Frederick William’s.123 To induce Prussia to defect in 1726 the Emperor also seemed to have backed Frederick William’s claims to the Rhine duchies of Jülich and Berg. While George was not directly affected, it was annoying to see his neighbour expanding his territory. George was prepared to conciliate the Palatine claimant in his efforts to recruit allies opposed to the Emperor. This irritated Frederick William further. The third dispute was over the succession in East Friesland, when the British again found themselves on the opposite side to the Prussians. Hanover had its own claims to the territories but the British also wanted to protect their Dutch allies and their interests.124 These territorial disputes led Prussian officials to claim to Du Bourgay that it was not British but Hanoverian issues that were souring relations. Prussia had no intention of taking Mecklenburg but the rumour had been spread by Hanoverian officials to prevent closer ties between Britain and Prussia. Du Bourgay informed the undersecretary of state, George Tilson, of Prussian views. Tilson should decide whether to bring the matter to Townshend’s attention.125 Relations deteriorated sharply in 1729 when Hanover and Prussia became embroiled in a dispute over the impressment of non-Prussians into the Prussian army.126 Whilst tensions between Hanover and Prussia probably affected AngloPrussian relations, as they had done earlier in the 1720s, the British had other explanations for their difficulties. Even before George I’s death, at least one British diplomat had stated, in a longer discourse on the Mecklenburg question, that the Emperor’s attempt ‘to reverse the entire protestant interest in the Empire and to establish his despotism turns on the division of your Majesty and the king of Prussia’.127 The policy was blamed on the Austrian minister plenipotentiary in Berlin Frederick von Seckendorff and the Prussian minister Grumbkow. Du Bourgay’s remark, following the troubles in 1729, that these two were particularly annoyed by George’s dispatch of Sir Charles Hotham to Berlin shows they were still seen as the source of anti-British sentiment.128 Hotham had been sent to negotiate an Anglo-Prussian marriage treaty and his instructions made clear that he was to work closely with Kniphausen, who was thought more friendly towards George, to achieve this

123

Michael Hughes, Law and politics in eighteenth-century Germany (Woodbridge, 1988), pp. 206–8. Hughes’s book is an excellent introduction to both the Mecklenburg and East Frisian cases. 124 See Hermann Rother, Die Auseinandersetzung zwischen Preussen und Hannover um Ostfriesland von 1690 bis 1744 (Inaugural-dissertation, Göttingen, 1951). 125 Du Bourgay to Tilson, Berlin, 19/3/1729, PRO, SP 90/24. 126 See Heinrich Schilling, Der Zwist Preußens und Hannovers 1729/1730 (Halle, 1912). 127 The document’s author was probably St Saphorin and it probably dates from April or May 1727. See ‘Relation sur les affaires du Mecklenbourg’, PRO, SP 80/61. 128 Du Bourgay to Townshend, Berlin, 2/5/1730, PRO, SP 90/26. 150

GEORGE II AND CHALLENGES

end.129 Kniphausen had also hinted that attempts to detach Frederick William from Austria might now succeed.130 The British thought Austrian confessional antipathy had undermined relations with their protestant brethren in Prussia. By 1731, when the Salzburg crisis arose, Austro-Prussian friendship no longer necessarily undermined Anglo-Prussian relations because Britain and Hanover had signed a new alliance with Austria. During the 1720s, Austrian diplomacy had focused increasingly on persuading foreign powers to guarantee the Pragmatic Sanction, the device by which Charles VI hoped that he would be able to keep all his lands together, despite his lack of male heirs. The Spanish had guaranteed it in the Treaty of Vienna (1725) and the Prussians in the Treaty of Wusterhausen a year later. James, Earl Waldegrave was sent as the new extraordinary ambassador and plenipotentiary to Vienna when diplomatic relations between Britain and Austria improved in the second half of 1727. Townshend advised Waldegrave to note carefully discussions about the Pragmatic Sanction.131 In his private letter, he added that Waldegrave would almost certainly be questioned on George II’s attitude to the Pragmatic Sanction. He should never initiate such conversations and should always claim he had no instructions on the matter but he could hint privately that George was not averse to the territories being kept together. The crucial question was who Charles’s daughters would marry.132 Some potential husbands were more acceptable than others. Townshend resigned in May 1730. Later that year negotiations were begun in Vienna by the British minister, Thomas Robinson, and the Hanoverian envoy, Johann von Diede zum Fürstenstein, with the Austrians. These led to a treaty between Britain and Austria in March 1731 and a treaty with Hanover shortly afterwards.133 Diede and Robinson had used the promise of a British and Hanoverian guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction to extract concessions from Charles VI.134 Diede was happy with the support he had received from

129

Instructions to Hotham, St James’s, 5/3/1730, PRO, SP 90/27. Private Instructions to Hotham, St James’s, 5/3/1730, ibid. 131 Townshend to Waldegrave, Whitehall, 7/8/1727, PRO, SP 80/62, fol. 54r. 132 Townshend to Waldegrave, Whitehall, 7/8/1727, private, ibid., fol. 74v–75r. 133 Townshend has traditionally been blamed for the anti-Austrian course of British policy for much of the 1720s. His resignation and the subsequent shift to a more accommodating view of Austria, by contrast, is usually attributed to Robert Walpole, although Jeremy Black has suggested that Townshend’s fall was not related to a policy dispute at all. See Jeremy Black, ‘Fresh light on the fall of Townshend’, HJ, 29 (1986), pp. 41–64. 134 The guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction was linked to Austrian acceptance of the Spanish garrisons in the Italian duchies. See Harrington to Robinson, Whitehall, 4/12/1730, BL, Add. MSS 23780, fol. 439v. Settling Hanoverian concerns was hampered by Charles’s unwillingness to sign a treaty with the elector of Hanover, as this implied a degree of equality. Instead, he made a declaration of intent and then gave all the assurances he deemed necessary in private. See Naumann, England, p. 172. Hanover agreed to guarantee the Pragmatic Sanction on 4 May 1731, in return for the investitures of Bremen and Hadeln and promises of their views being respected over Mecklenburg and Hildesheim. 130

151

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

Robinson over George’s electoral concerns, like Mecklenburg.135 With Prussian and Hanoverian support secured, Charles felt able to bring the Pragmatic Sanction to Regensburg in July 1731. Problems arose when Reck made some unfortunate remarks in the Fürstenrat (princely college). Why this happened is not clear. Both British and Hanoverian officials claimed that Reck had yet to be instructed and had made an unfortunate error.136 The Austrians were worried but Hugo, in Regensburg, and Diede, in Vienna, were able to calm their fears. Reck was later to play an important role in the emigration of some of the Salzburgers to Georgia but his mistake perhaps reduced George’s confidence in his abilities.

Recent historiography and contemporary reactions to Salzburg The reaction to events in Salzburg was striking.137 The troubles in Salzburg had begun with the election of Leopold Anton, Baron von Firmian, as archbishop in September 1727. Firmian had been a reforming bishop in his previous dioceses. On Firmian’s orders, the Jesuits investigated the upland areas of the diocese and discovered pockets of protestantism. In the summer of 1731, two Salzburgers journeyed to Regensburg to seek the aid of the Corpus Evangelicorum. Soon afterwards the Corpus received a petition, signed by some eighteen thousand Salzburgers demanding the free exercise of their religion. The petition’s authorship was unclear. Catholics claimed that the petition was not just the work of poor protestant peasant farmers; protestant diplomats had been involved in an effort to cause trouble.138 Protestant historians have denied the claim.139 In the autumn of 1731 the archbishop issued his infamous Emigrationspatent (‘patent of emigration’). Protestants were given eight days to leave. They were allowed to take neither children under 12 nor many possessions. The Corpus complained that such treatment was contrary to the Westphalian settlement. Stories began to filter through of Austrian troops harassing emigrants. Protestant periodicals responded quickly to events in Salzburg. The Europäische Fama reported the disputes over the Salzburgers’ rights, as well as their expulsion, in the first issue for 1732. The Fama also argued it was completely against the tenor of Christianity to persecute those who worshipped

135

Diede to George, Vienna, 4/1/1731, HHStA, CB 24, 4933: I, 1, fp. 2v. George to Diede, np, 3/8/1731, HHStA, CB 11, 1804, fol. 54v told him to use this explanation. 137 Artur Ehmer, Das Schrifttum zur Salzburger Emigration 1731/33 (Hamburg, 1975) lists nearly sixty pages of contemporary works dealing with Salzburg. 138 Franz Ortner, Reformation und Gegenreformation in Salzburg (Salzburg, 1981), p. 221. 139 Gerhard Florey, Geschichte der Salzburger Protestanten und ihrer Emigration 1731/32 (Vienna, Cologne, and Graz, 1977), pp. 84–9. Ortner and Florey represent two sides of the heavily confessionalised debate on Salzburg within German-speaking church history. 136

152

GEORGE II AND CHALLENGES

differently.140 The Political State of Great Britain had reported the sufferings of the Salzburgers in the October 1731 issue.141 The same journal attacked Austrian inactivity a few months later. As the British had agreed to guarantee the Pragmatic Sanction, the Austrians should have done more to help the Salzburgers. However, it was not unusual for the Austrians to be ‘oppressing the Protestants in one corner of Europe, when the Protestants of another corner were sacrificing their Blood and Treasure’ to support them.142 Periodical comment reflects, therefore, both contemporary enlightened protestant views on the incompatibility of faith and force and frustration at Charles VI’s unwillingness to act, despite recent British and Hanoverian support for the Pragmatic Sanction. Besides periodical reports, lengthy treatises on the history, rights and piety of the emigrants also appeared.143 Johann Jacob Moser, famous for his collections of Imperial law, documented the legal and diplomatic debates over the expulsion.144 Accounts of the Salzburgers’ travels emphasised their endurance and faith. As exemplary protestants, their bible reading and simple faith had enabled them to survive persecution.145 Similar themes emerged in the pictorial record of the emigrants’ journeys.146 Samuel Urlsperger, who had been forced from Styria for his faith, was sure that he had detected the hand (or, as he put it, finger) of God in efforts to help the Salzburgers.147 By contrast, more recent literature has found it difficult to explain events in Salzburg in the supposedly ‘enlightened’ eighteenth century. George Fenwick Jones notes how ‘long after tolerance was becoming fashionable elsewhere in Europe’, Firmian embarked on a policy of persecution.148 Although protestant publications frequently talked about the necessity of tolerance and the essential incommensurability of persecution and religious belief, this argument had not yet been won. Consequently, to describe what went on in 1731 as somehow ‘anachronistic’ is misleading. Enlightened it certainly was not but it was very much in keeping with the religious situation within the Empire in

140

Europäische Fama, 338 (1732), pp. 95–6. Political State of Great Britain, 42 (Oct. 1731), p. 411. 142 PSGB, 42 (Dec. 1731), p. 618. 143 Such as the Ausführliche Historie derer Emigranten oder vertriebenen Lutheraner aus dem Ertz-Bißthum Saltzburg (2nd edn, Leipzig, 1732). 144 Johann Jakob Moser, Derer Saltzburgischen Emigrations-Acten (Frankfurt/Main, 1732). For Moser’s influence, see Mack Walker, Johann Jacob Moser and the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation (Chapel Hill, 1981). 145 Johann Gottlob Fischer, Reise-Beschreibung Der Saltzburg-Dürnberger Emigranten (Leipzig, 1734). 146 Angelika Marsch, Die Salzburger Emigration in Bildern (Weißenhorn, 1977), pp. 52–224. 147 Samuel Urlsperger, Der Nachrichten von der Kgl. Grossbritannischen Colonie Saltzburgischer Emigranten in America (3 vols, Halle, 1741–56), i, preface, Sig. B1r. 148 George Fenwick Jones, The Georgia Dutch: from the Rhine and Danube to the Savannah, 1733–1783 (Athens, GA, 1992), p. 14. 141

153

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

the 1720s. Contemporaries may have been worried by this turn of events but, given the experience of religious crisis described in previous chapters, they are unlikely to have been taken completely by surprise.149 Other authors have chosen to emphasise different aspects of the events in Salzburg. This chapter complements, rather than supplants, their accounts. Mack Walker’s work richly documents the importance of the events in Salzburg for Prussian self-image. He argues the Emperor’s acceptance of the Prussian proposal to take the Salzburgers was linked to Prussian support for the Pragmatic Sanction at Regensburg.150 Renate Wilson shows how networks of pious individuals on both sides of the Atlantic were involved in helping the Salzburgers.151 Reg Ward links the events of 1731 to his more general thesis about the impact of revivalism on protestantism in the period.152

British diplomacy and Salzburg How did the British and Hanoverians react to the emigration? In October 1731 the Austrians had still to get the guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction through the Reichstag, so the last thing they wanted was another major religious crisis.153 The Hanoverians and the British, on the other hand, were keen to ensure that the promises made in the recent Vienna treaty were fulfilled. Moreover, the British were under pressure because they had agreed to secure Dutch acceptance of the Pragmatic Sanction. In August 1731 Harrington, who had succeeded Townshend as secretary of state for the Northern department, informed Thomas Robinson that the States General had written to George about the security of Hungarian protestants. George was committed to helping such people, so Robinson was to investigate but, Harrington added in cipher, as it was ‘a nice point’ that might offend the Emperor, Robinson must proceed cautiously ‘lest a precipitate, or unseasonable zeal’ was counterproductive and reawakened resentments against the protestants.154 Dutch concern for their co-religionists was probably sincere but the issue was also a means to remind the British about their priorities. Concessions

149

Michael Maurer’s claim (Maurer, Kirche, Staat und Gesellschaft im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert (Munich, 1999), p. 17) that the events in Salzburg in 1731 were an isolated example of confessional conflict in an age already largely immune to such pressures is misleading. 150 Walker, Salzburg transaction, pp. 124–35. 151 Renate Wilson, ‘Continental protestant refugees and their protectors in Germany and London: communal and charitable networks’, Pietismus und Neuzeit, 20 (1994), pp. 107–24. 152 See, most recently, W.R. Ward, Christianity under the Ancien Régime, 1648–1789 (Cambridge, 1999), pp. 105–10. 153 Hans von Zwiedineck-Südenhorst, ‘Die Anerkennung der pragmatischen Sanktion Karl VI. durch das deutsche Reich’, Mitteilungen des Instituts für oesterreichische Geschichtsforschung, 16 (1895), p. 300. 154 Harrington to Robinson, Hampton Court, 10/8/1731, PRO, SP 80/78. 154

GEORGE II AND CHALLENGES

on religious matters ought to be the price Charles VI paid for the cooperation of the Maritime powers. Hanoverian officials were also approached by the Dutch and George ultimately instructed Diede to act with Robinson on the matter.155 Robinson responded that he had always been reluctant to interfere too much in Habsburg religious policy because he felt it did more harm than good and was likely to prompt counter-claims by Charles on behalf of catholics. However, he had told the Austrians that it was politically unwise to annoy the Hungarians. Their support was vital both to secure the Austrian succession and against the Turks.156 The Dutch were not satisfied with the British response and in December 1731 the States General passed a resolution asking their extraordinary envoy in Vienna, Hamel Bruyninx, to work with Robinson to gain relief for the Salzburgers. Chesterfield, the British extraordinary ambassador and plenipotentiary in The Hague, did not send Robinson the resolution because it was ‘so voluminous as not to be worth the Postage’.157 Harrington included the resolution when he instructed Robinson to act with Bruyninx.158 Robinson eventually made representions to the Austrians with Bruyninx. Relations between Robinson and Bruyninx were strained. Bruyninx had unfairly insinuated that Robinson was unwilling to help in the dispute between Frankfurt Calvinists and Lutherans, as well as being tardy in his support for the Salzburgers. Robinson claimed he had never been instructed to waste George’s credit in persuading the Aulic council to intervene in Frankfurt. He had made appropriate noises about Salzburg.159 Shortly afterwards Robinson was instructed to support Dutch claims for the restoration of a ship (again, no doubt, part of the bargaining relating to the guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction). Robinson replied that he had received no support from Bruyninx recently in matters of common interest ‘excepting that of Religion’.160 Robinson informed Harrington shortly afterwards that he had presented a memo to the Austrians about Salzburg. After Harrington’s initial letter in December, Bruyninx had become an advocate of temporising but had now become zealous again. The memo had been presented, despite the efforts of Imperial ministers. They had claimed both that such representations would not be welcome in England and that the Irish catholics had just grounds for complaint. It was also suggested that Count Kinsky, the Austrian envoy in London, would be issued with similar orders to defend George’s catholic

155

George to Diede, St James’s, 3/12/1731, HHStA, CB 24, 5253, fol. 3 contains Diede’s instructions to work with the Dutch in Vienna. The rest of the file contains letters to the Hanoverian resident in the United Provinces, von Spörcke, detailing George’s willingness to assist Dutch claims. 156 Robinson to Harrington, Vienna, 5/9/1731, PRO, SP 80/79 (in cipher). 157 Chesterfield to Robinson, Hague, 14/12/1731, BL, Add. MSS 23783, fol. 490. 158 Harrington to Robinson, Whitehall, 7/12/1731, PRO, SP 80/82. 159 Robinson to Chesterfield, Vienna, 26/1/1732, PRO, SP 80/84. 160 Robinson to Harrington, Vienna, 20/2/1732, PRO, SP 80/85. 155

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

subjects.161 The king supported Robinson’s actions.162 Intervening on behalf of protestants was complicated. The constant risk of the Irish catholics being used as a counter-pawn suggested the need for caution. Yet other protestant powers, such as Holland or Prussia, never failed to highlight perceived deficiencies in the strength of British and Hanoverian interventions, even if their complaints were part of a broader diplomatic strategy to pressurise George II. Concern for Salzburg and Hungarian protestants did not entirely disappear. Robinson’s additional instructions for his mission to the Emperor in Prague in July 1732 warned him to be careful when deciding how to help the persecuted protestants. Private insinuations to ministers might be more effective than open contacts and correspondence. He should act ‘as you shall find you are able to do most service to ye Protestant Cause’.163 Robinson and George shared the view that the best way to help the protestants was through something similar to ‘constructive engagement’. To persuade the Austrians to respond to protestant demands, it was necessary to offer carrots, as well as threaten with sticks.

Hanover and the Salzburg emigration Robinson was well placed to make direct contacts with Austrian officials. However, it was at the Diet in Regensburg that much of the day-to-day diplomatic activity took place. The Prussians renewed calls to remove the Saxons from leadership of the Corpus. When the Saxon envoy left Regensburg in August 1731, Hugo, the senior Hanoverian diplomat at the Diet, reported to George that the Prussians were eager to revive the 1720 agreement that had proposed alternating the directorate of the Corpus between Hanover and Prussia.164 Hugo had persuaded the Prussians that the time was not yet ripe to adopt the plan but he feared that, if the Saxon envoy were away for too long, the Prussians would take further steps to enact their plan.165 There were still tensions between the protestants at Regensburg, as well as between the protestants and catholics. Amidst comments about other religious complaints and the Empire’s guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction, Hugo and Reck’s reports from Regensburg reveal a crisis developing over Salzburg. The Dutch were pushing their

161

Robinson to Harrington, Vienna, 25/2/1732, ibid. Harrington to Robinson, Whitehall, 10/3/1732, ibid. 163 Additional instructions for Robinson, Herrenhausen, 21/7/1732, PRO, SP 80/89. 164 On the original plan, see p. 68. 165 Hugo to George II, Regensburg, 23/8/1731, HHStA, CB 11, 3035, fol. 241. The Saxon envoy had left on 10 August. George replied that Hugo was wise to try to contain this issue. See George II to Hugo, Hampton Court, 27/8/1731, HHStA, CB 11, 1628, fol. 97r. 162

156

GEORGE II AND CHALLENGES

protestant concerns in Regensburg, as well as in Vienna.166 The Hanoverian privy council had commended the Salzburgers to George in November 1731.167 When the size of the emigration became clear, the privy council seemed willing to let Prussia take as many as she wanted, arguing that Hanover had no use for the ‘husbandmen or miners’.168 A proposal circulating at Regensburg had suggested that all the protestant powers should share the emigrants on a proportional basis. Hugo and Reck told George that they had made clear that Hanover was already well populated and lacked space for further immigration.169 There were worries about the protestants within the Austrian hereditary lands as well. Diede, in Vienna, believed that although there was little prospect of achieving much for them, it was still necessary to make representations on their behalf.170 George thought talk of sanctions against Austria was unwise; previous experience showed that closing a few catholic churches irritated the Emperor and achieved nothing. However, if the majority of the Corpus favoured such a move, Hugo and Reck should not oppose it but should still record George’s view that it was pointless.171 Throughout 1732 Hugo and Reck recorded Prussian efforts to accommodate the Salzburg emigrants. In July 1732 they argued that God was using the emigrants to glorify His name.172 As well as the Salzburgers, there were now emigrants from Berchtesgaden and other areas close to Salzburg. In August Hugo and Reck reported that some of the Salzburgers had given them a memo requesting permission to emigrate to the colony of Georgia. 173 They also reported that the Dutch had agreed to take three hundred emigrants.174 Many hoped a meeting between the Emperor and the archbishop of Salzburg in early October 1732 might improve matters. The protestant powers had considered refusing to have any dealings with the archbishop’s representative at Regensburg. This would have effectively halted business, because Salzburg held the chairmanship of the princely college (although this alternated between Austria and Salzburg). In late October 1732, the Hanoverian privy council wrote to George to ask him whether Hanover might take some of the Salzburg

166

See HHStA, CB 11, 3036, covering the period October to December 1731 and the additions to Hugo and Reck to George II, Regensburg, 14/1/1732, HHStA, CB 11, 3037: I, fols 195–214, describing how they had followed their orders and supported Dutch representations. Most of the letter had dealt with the Pragmatic Sanction. 167 Geheime Räte to George II, Hanover, 9/11/1731, HHStA, CB 11, 1791, fol. 13. 168 Geheime Räte to George II, Hanover, 8/1/1732, ibid., fols 39–40. 169 Hugo and Reck to George II, Regensburg, 31/1/1732, HHStA, CB 11, 3037: II, fol. 324v. 170 Diede to George II, Vienna, 26/3/1732, HHStA, CB 24, 4934: I, 2, fol. 317. 171 George II to Hugo and Reck, St James’s, 28/3/1732, HHStA, CB 11, 1791, fol. 91. 172 Hugo and Reck to George II, Regensburg, 3/7/1732, HHStA, CB 11, 3039: I, fol. 4v. 173 Hugo and Reck to George II, Regensburg, 18/8/1732, HHStA, CB 11, 3039: II, fol. 341. 174 Addition to Hugo and Reck to George II, Regensburg, 27/10/1732, HHStA, CB 11, 3040: I, fol 133r. 157

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

emigrants after all.175 The letter also mentioned that collections in Hanover for the Salzburgers had raised 2,000 thaler so the prospect of being able to pay for the emigrants might have encouraged the change of heart. Perhaps the fact that other protestant powers, like Holland and Britain (via Georgia) were also willing to take emigrants had also made the council reconsider. Hugo was instructed to look for about sixty families who would receive land in SachsenLauenburg. He was sent quite specific requirements, including a request to try to find tobacco-planters!176 George approved the council’s request to Hugo to investigate the possibilities.177 Finding a group for Sachsen-Lauenburg proved more difficult than Hugo had anticipated. Some of a suitable group, identified by Gullmann in Augsburg, decided to go to Holland instead.178 The Prussian agent, Göbel, who was responsible for organising columns of emigrants in Swabia and dispatching them to Livonia, was also contacted. Göbel claimed Prussia was intending to build a hospital for the Salzburgers and so wanted to use some of the funds the Corpus had collected for this purpose.179 By December hopes had shifted from the Salzburgers to a group of refugees from Berchtesgaden.180 A group was eventually gathered. Hugo and Reck were clearly unimpressed by Göbel’s claim that the Prussians, as they had aided the Salzburgers initially, should have first refusal on any group of refugees. They felt Göbel’s actions might give credence to the catholic complaint that the protestant powers were only helping the Salzburgers out of self-interest and to gain temporal advantage.181 Despite all these difficulties, by the middle of 1733 a group had departed for Hanover.182

175

Geheime Räte to George II, Hanover, 31/10/1732, HHStA, CB 11, 1791, fol. 109. Geheime Räte to Hugo, Hanover, 8/11/1731, ibid., fols 119–21. 177 George to Geheime Räte, St James’s, 31/10/1732, ibid., fol. 134. 178 Hugo and Reck to Geheime Räte, Regensburg, 27/11/1732, HHStA, CB 11, 3040: II, fol. 296v. Gullmann’s brother was the Hanoverian resident in Frankfurt. 179 Addition to Hugo and Reck to George II, Regensburg, 30/11/1732, ibid., fols 304–6. 180 Hugo to Geheime Räte, Regensburg, 31/12/1732, HHStA, CB 11, 3041: I, fol. 2v. 181 Addition to Hugo and Reck to George, Regensburg, 2/2/1733, ibid., fol. 200. 182 For the fate of the group on its arrival in Hanover, see Fritz Klein, ‘Die Einwanderung der “Berchtolsgadener Exulanten” in Kurhannover 1733’, Hannoversche Geschichtsblätter, 34 (1980), pp. 159–74, Victor Loewe, ‘Die Einwanderung der Berchtesgadener in Kurhannover 1733’, Zeitschrift des historischen Vereins für Niedersachsen, (1902), pp. 64–84, and R. Heinrich Meyer, Vertreibung Salzburger und Berchtesgadener Protestanten und ihre Aufnahme in Kurhannover 1733 (Uslar (Solling), 1933). Lack of broader historical awareness renders these works unreliable guides for explaining the Hanoverian privy council’s actions. 176

158

GEORGE II AND CHALLENGES

Salzburg, Halle, London, Georgia Hugo and Reck had also been enlisted to help the Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge and the trustees of the Georgia Company find settlers for the new colony in Georgia. While not on the same scale as the Prussian enterprise, the origins of the Georgia colony and the routes by which Salzburg protestants found themselves settled there merit attention. This completes the picture of British and Hanoverian involvement in the crisis. It is also possible to highlight the networks of individual protestants concerned to defend the protestant interest and to indicate the informal links between Britain and Germany. Finally, a consideration of British contributions provides a context for the subsequent discussion of the state of leadership of the protestant interest by 1733. The SPCK’s interest in the Salzburg protestants had been aroused by Frederick Michael Ziegenhagen, an influential member of the SPCK and Lutheran court preacher in London.183 At the Society’s meeting on 22 February 1732 Ziegenhagen presented an account of the Salzburg emigrants, some eight hundred of whom had reached Augsburg. Ziegenhagen had written to Samuel Urlsperger in Augsburg to request further information.184 The source for Ziegenhagen’s report to the SPCK was not simply Urlsperger.185 In a letter to Gotthilf August Francke, written a few days before, Ziegenhagen thanked him for his news of the Salzburg emigration and promised to do something about it.186 In his previous letter to Francke, Ziegenhagen had thanked Francke for the ‘erbauliche’ (‘edifying’) news of what the protestants in Augsburg were doing for the Salzburg emigrants.187 The impulse to do something about the Salzburgers came via the pietist stronghold of the Franckesche Stiftung in Halle.188

183

Ziegenhagen ( b. 1694) was educated in Halle. He replaced Anton Wilhelm Böhme as chaplain to the German congregation at court in 1722. Earlier links between pietism and the SPCK are explored in Daniel L. Brunner, Halle Pietists in England (Göttingen, 1993). 184 SPCK minute books, 22/2/1732, Cambridge University Library SPCK archive (hereafter CUL), SPCK.MS A1/14, pp. 135–6. I am grateful to Mr Peter Meadows of the Manuscripts department of the University Library for allowing me access to the SPCK archive before completion of the new catalogue, following the recent move of the archives from London to Cambridge. 185 Urlsperger had joined the SPCK in 1709, whilst ministering in London. See Gordon Huelin, ‘The relationship of Samuel Urlsperger to the “Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge”’, in Reinhard Schwarz, ed., Samuel Urlsperger (1685–1772) (Berlin, 1996), pp. 151–60. 186 Frederick Michael Ziegenhagen to Gotthilf August Francke, London, 11/2/1732, Halle, Archiv der Franckesche Stiftung, Missionsarchiv, I E 2, letter 35. 187 Frederick Michael Ziegenhagen to Gotthilf August Francke, London, 1/2/1732, ibid., letter 36. 188 For both pietism and Halle, see Ward, Christianity under the Ancien Régime, pp. 71–82. 159

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

The SPCK were so impressed by Ziegenhagen’s accounts that they decided to have them printed. The minutes for February and March 1732 detailed the process of translation and publication.189 The Society was keen to gain ministerial support for their work because they also wanted to collect money on the Salzburgers’ behalf. They hoped Bishop Gibson would approach Harrington to secure royal approval for the translation and collection. Gibson claimed he was too ill to go to court, so James Vernon agreed to approach Harrington instead.190 In the meantime Ziegenhagen organised a collection in the German chapel and dispatched £70 from the collection and another £125 from other sources to Urlsperger in Augsburg.191 Shortly afterwards Vernon informed the SPCK that George had approved printing the account.192 The king also agreed that a paragraph expressing his approbation for the Society’s work could be included in the circular letter sent with the account to members of the Society.193 The Society agreed to print three thousand copies of the account, of which Vernon was to distribute a hundred to important people at court.194 The account appeared as An Account of the sufferings of the Persecuted Protestants in the Archbishoprick of Saltzburg. It detailed the emigrants’ journey and included translations of various documents from both sides in the crisis. It also listed various members of the Society, including Ziegenhagen and Vernon, to whom donations for the Salzburgers could be sent.195 Raising money to help Samuel Urlsperger in Augsburg was not the only thing the SPCK felt it could do for the Salzburgers. Several of those involved in the running of the SPCK were also trustees for the new colony of Georgia. Much of the impetus for the foundation of Georgia had come from a parliamentary investigation in 1729 into the state of debtors’ prisons. James Oglethorpe, a soldier and MP, had been influential in this. Debtors could be given land and find useful employment in Georgia. Oglethorpe was also a member of a group which dealt with the bequests left by Dr Thomas Bray. Bray had been one of the founders of the SPCK. Both the interests and personnel of the SPCK and the Georgia company overlapped.196

189

See SPCK minute books, CUL, SPCK.MS A1/14, pp. 140–9. SPCK minute books, 28/3/1732, ibid., p. 149. Henry Newman’s letter to Ziegenhagen from July 1732 suggests that Gibson subsequently changed his mind about supporting the collection for the Salzburgers, partly because other bishops appeared to be supporting the plan. See Henry Newman to Ziegenhagen, London, 31/7/1732, SPCK letter books, CUL, SPCK.MS D4/24, p. 29. 191 SPCK minute books, 25/4/1732, CUL, SPCK.MS A1/14, p. 156. 192 SPCK minute books, 2/5/1732, ibid., p. 159. 193 SPCK minute books, 1/6/1732, ibid., p. 170. 194 Ibid., p. 172. 195 An Account of the sufferings of the Persecuted Protestants in the Archbishoprick of Saltzburg (London, 1732), p. 99. 196 See Leonard W. Cowie, Henry Newman (London, 1956), pp. 223–6. 190

160

GEORGE II AND CHALLENGES

At only their second formal meeting, the Georgia trustees deputed James Vernon to ask the SPCK whether they had thought of sending any of the Salzburgers to the new colony.197 At their next meeting, Vernon was able to report the SPCK’s interest in the proposal.198 Negotiating the terms of a transport took several months. On 12 October the Georgia trustees formally agreed to settle a group of Salzburgers in the colony.199 The SPCK set up an extraordinary committee to deal with the transport, including Ziegenhagen, Vernon and Sir John Philipps, who had maintained close contacts with Halle and Francke for many years.200 The secretary of the SPCK, Henry Newman, informed Samuel Urlsperger of the Society’s intentions.201 Urlsperger was keen to publish terms for taking the refugees to Georgia. He also thought that, to gather a group together, he needed to correspond with George’s ministers in Regensburg.202 Urlsperger seemingly already had sources of information in Regensburg, one of whom was probably Johann von Reck. When the proposal for publishing terms was put to the Georgia trustees, Egmont, another of their number, noted in his diary that the trustees were concerned because, as any potential emigrants were still the archbishop’s subjects, it was improper ‘to tempt them away’. Egmont proposed that a private account be drawn up and sent to Augsburg or Frankfurt. It could then be used by George’s ministers when a new group of emigrants appeared.203 Hugo and Reck were eventually instructed to find a group to journey to Georgia.204 When more emigrants appeared in August, Urlsperger requested that an account of Georgia be published, although he also noted Hugo’s reluctance to be seen to be contravening the Westphalian settlement by drawing subjects away from their legitimate masters.205 When the group had finally

197

Journal of the Georgia trustees, 27/7/1732, PRO, Colonial Office (hereafter CO) 5/686, fol. 3v. 198 Journal of the Georgia trustees, 3/8/1732, ibid., fol. 4v. 199 Journal of the Georgia trustees, 12/10/1732, ibid., fols 11v–12r. 200 SPCK minute books, 28/10/1732, CUL, SPCK.MS A1/15, p. 7. See also W.K. Lowther Clarke, A history of the SPCK (London, 1959), pp. 134–8. 201 Henry Newman to Samuel Urlsperger, London, 13/10/1732, in George Fenwick Jones, ed., Henry Newman’s Salzburger letterbooks (Athens, GA, 1966), p. 29. 202 Samuel Urlsperger to Henry Newman, Augsburg, 11/12/1732, ibid., pp. 279–80. 203 Egmont diary, i, p. 303 (21/12/1732). The SPCK published A further account of the sufferings of the persecuted protestants in the archbishoprick of Saltzburg (London, 1733) in March 1733 to raise further funds (SPCK minute books, 8/3/1733, CUL, SPCK.MS A1/15, p. 59). The SPCK were clearly less reticent than the trustees about the German translations of works on Georgia, as they instructed Ziegenhagen to get a translation made of an account of Georgia (probably Oglethorpe’s A new and accurate account of the provinces of SouthCarolina and Georgia (London, 1732)) in April 1733 (SPCK minute books, 7/4/1733, CUL, SPCK.MS A1/15, p. 69). 204 Hugo and Reck to George II, Regensburg, 17/6/1733, HHStA, CB 11, 3042: II, fols 404–5 acknowledged the order to help. 205 Urlsperger to Newman, Augsburg, 17/8/1732, Salzburger letterbooks, pp. 307–13. 161

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

been assembled, Reck’s nephew accompanied them on their journey to Georgia. The first group of Salzburgers to travel to Georgia left Germany in the autumn of 1733 and arrived in Georgia early in March of the next year. There were thirty-seven refugees and they were joined by two pastors, selected by Francke, and a schoolmaster and his wife. A second group of fifty-four followed in 1734.206 A third group of thirty-six arrived in 1736, although this consisted of Bohemian refugees and some of the Salzburg exiles still living near Augsburg. The Society and the trustees had originally intended to take 300 refugees. Partly due to the shortage of candidates and partly due to cost, this figure was never achieved from Salzburgers alone.207 What assessment should be made of the British efforts to help the Salzburgers? First, large amounts of money were raised on their behalf. An SPCK minute from December 1735 noted that since March 1732 nearly £7,000 had been raised for the Salzburgers.208 Donations had come from a variety of sources, including the Lord Chancellor, Sir Robert Walpole and the duke of Newcastle.209 Oxford and Cambridge colleges had been targeted.210 Other money came from church collections, both established and dissenting.211 The Georgia trustees had also received a parliamentary grant for transporting the Salzburgers and others to Georgia. In the Commons in May 1733, Sir Joseph Jekyll spoke in favour of giving money to the colony to allow the Salzburgers to be transported. He spoke of the Salzburgers’ faith. As other protestant countries had helped them, ‘it would be of great reproach to

206

Robinson had to deal with objections from catholics in Augsburg to the presence of the refugees. He remarked that sorting this out ‘gives me more trouble than twenty others of twice the Weight’, although he knew that it ‘must be a popular affair in England’. See Robinson to Weston, Vienna, 20/1/1734, PRO, SP 80/103, fols 161–2. 207 George Fenwick Jones, The Salzburger Saga (Athens, GA, 1984), pp. 9–36. 208 SPCK minute books, 2/12/1735, CUL, SPCK.MS A1/16, p. 208. 209 SPCK minute books, 27/6/1732 (Lord Chancellor King, £20), 18/7/1732 (duke of Newcastle, 20 guineas), 5/9/1732 (Sir Robert Walpole, £50), CUL, SPCK.MS A1/14, p. 176, 183, 200. 210 See C.L.S. Linnell, ed., The diaries of Thomas Wilson, D.D. (London, 1964), p. 84 for attempts to promote the collection amongst the heads of Oxford colleges in December 1733. 211 One of London’s baptist congregations raised £67 for the Salzburgers (SPCK minute books, 28/11/1732, CUL, SPCK.MS A1/15, p. 16). The sermons preached on the occasion of the collection were subsequently printed. See Joseph Burroughs, Two sermons: the one against the traditions of the church of Rome; the other about the right manner of contending for the Christian faith: preached at Barbican in London, October 15. and 22. M.DCC.XXXII. on occasion of collecting for the relief of the persecuted Protestants of Saltzburg (London, 1732). Urlsperger was surprised that the baptists had given anything. He assumed them to be like German Calvinists and so uninterested in the fate of their Lutheran brethren. Newman had to reassure him of the sincerity of the gift. See Newman to Urlsperger, London, 2/2/1733, Salzburger letterbooks, p. 38. 162

GEORGE II AND CHALLENGES

England, the head of the Protestant interest, not to imitate them’.212 Other MPs wanted to settle the Salzburgers in England or Jamaica or expressed concern about the wisdom of allowing foreigners to settle in the colonies, without at least the JPs and town officers being Englishmen. 213 When the committee of the whole house met to consider the matter on 16 May, no one spoke against the grant, although a few voted against it.214 It might seem, therefore, that there was some official approval for transporting the Salzburgers to Georgia. George Fenwick Jones has consistently attributed official sanction to George II’s Lutheran inclinations, despite his nominal Anglicanism.215 The king may have been keen to help his Lutheran ‘brethren’. However, parliamentary support requires additional explanation. When the initial grant of £10,000 for the colony was raised in 1732, Egmont had worked hard to gain Robert Walpole’s approval for the scheme. Walpole had ensured that the motion creating the colony was worded so as not to give encouragement to foreign protestants to ‘crowd too fast upon us’. He had also asked Egmont if Oglethorpe had been able to secure the support of the ‘angry chiefs of the minority’ for the colony.216 Although Egmont was still a ministerial supporter, some of his colleagues in the Georgia enterprise were not. Oglethorpe, for example, was an inveterate tory, who had spoken against the maintenance of the Hessian forces. Moreover in the debate on the king’s speech in 1732 Oglethorpe had opined, having talked about the impact of Spanish depredations and the need for the correct use of the militia that the ‘last, though not the least thing requiring our attention, [is] some care of the Protestant religion, which will be quite destroyed in Germany soon as the Pragmatic Sanction takes effect’. Oglethorpe argued that, whilst the guarantee hung in the balance, the Emperor had to refrain from persecuting his protestant subjects because he needed their support. The guarantee had removed any incentive for good behaviour.217 Robert Walpole disliked such talk. Walpole and the ministry probably regarded the Georgia colony, and attempts to bring Salzburgers there, with some suspicion because of the personalities involved. Egmont’s falling out with the ministry in 1733 and his increasing involvement in the SPCK’s activities and Georgia did little to alleviate ministerial suspicions. The SPCK were able to make use of the Hanoverian connection through contacts with Reck in Regensburg and Ziegenhagen’s ability to transfer funds.218 Existing networks, supportive of pietism and the Franckes in Halle, 212

Egmont diary, i, p. 373 (10/5/1733). Ibid., p. 374. 214 Ibid., p. 375 (16/5/1733). 215 See Fenwick Jones, Salzburger Saga, p. 9 or idem, ‘Urlsperger und Eben-Ezer’, in Schwarz, ed., Urlsperger, p. 192. 216 Egmont diary, i, p. 273 (11/5/1732). 217 Ibid., p. 215 (13/1/1732). 218 Ziegenhagen told Newman to use J. Meyer, a German merchant in Broad Street, or 213

163

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

were used to help the Salzburgers. These networks already had members in Britain, such as Newman and Sir John Philipps, and it was therefore possible for the SPCK to draw support from like-minded individuals who moved in similar circles in London. Sermons preached on behalf of the Georgia colony argued that the colony provided a means for England, as the head of the protestant interest, to maintain both religious and civil liberty, supported by trade.219 Religious arguments featured in the trustees’ official advertisement for Georgia. The colony’s proposed new industries (the production of silk, wine and potash) were valuable to the British economy.220 However, the decline of the protestant interest in Europe was also mentioned and reference made to persecutions of protestants in the Palatinate and Poland. The power of Sweden had declined. Prussia had taken some refugees but there was an opportunity for British honour to be preserved. Since the reign of Elizabeth I, Britain had been viewed as the head of the protestant interest in Europe and accommodating protestant refugees in Georgia was a way to maintain that title.221 The court frequently sought to legitimate its own position in such terms. In this case, some of those using the language were out of favour with the ministry. In his account of Georgia Oglethorpe had claimed that the new colony would provide real trade for Britain as opposed to the paper credit with which the ministry seemed enamoured.222 Such a blatant use of oppositional, ‘country’ rhetoric, with its mistrust of the financial innovations of the 1690s, was not the way to secure Robert Walpole’s support, particularly in a period when domestic politics were dominated by the Excise crisis.

Mr Schick, ‘Clerk to His Majesty’s Privy Council for His German Dominions’ who used Gullman, George’s resident in Frankfurt, who also wanted to do all he could to help the Salzburgers (Ziegenhagen to Newman, London, 23/5/1732, Salzburger letterbooks, pp. 224–5). 219 See Thomas Rundle, A Sermon preached at St George’s Church Hanover Square, on Sunday February 17, 1734. To recommend the Charity for establishing the New Colony of Georgia (London, 1734), pp. 15–20, Samuel Smith, A Sermon preach’d before the Trustees for establishing the Colony of Georgia in America (London, 1733), pp. 29–33, George Watts, A sermon preached before the Trustees for establishing the Colony of Georgia in America; at their Anniversary Meeting in the Parish-Church of St Bridget, alias St Bride, in Fleetstreet, London: on Thursday, March 18. 1735 (London, 1736), pp. 9–17. 220 [Benjamin Martyn], Reasons for establishing the colony of Georgia, with regard to the trade of Great Britain, the increase of our People, and the Employment and support it will afford to great numbers of our own poor, as well as foreign persecuted Protestants (London, 1733), pp. 7–30. 221 Ibid., pp. 31–8. 222 [James Oglethorpe], A new and accurate account of the provinces of South-Carolina and Georgia (London, 1732), p. ii. 164

GEORGE II AND CHALLENGES

The leadership of the protestant interest Droysen’s assessment of Prussia’s role in the Salzburg crisis was unsurprisingly enthusiastic. Everyone turned to Frederick William to resolve religious complaints in the Empire.223 Droysen conceded that other protestant powers had protested at Vienna,224 but ultimately it was the king of Prussia whom both poor Salzburgers and his own subjects praised. 225 1731 marked not the beginnings of Prussian leadership of the protestant interest in Germany but just another stage in a Hohenzollern defence of German protestantism. Naumann’s analysis is strikingly similar. He admitted that Prussia was still less powerful than Austria and that the personal union with Britain had increased Hanoverian strength.226 In the long run, however, neither the German states, such as Hanover, Saxony and Hessen-Kassel, nor Germany as a whole had benefited from these personal unions. Personal unions had resulted in foreign intervention in German politics and had inhibited the proper defence of Lebensraum. This problem had been worst in Hanover and it had taken time for the (truly German) leadership of Prussia to emerge.227 Mention of Lebensraum is a reminder that Naumann’s work appeared in the 1930s. Yet the underlying assumptions are of an older vintage. One of the reasons why it was important to trace Prussian leadership of the protestant interest was that it was under a Hohenzollern that Germany was eventually united (or divided). Within this nationalist scheme, there was little appreciation of the advantages that Hanover’s connection with the strongest protestant power in Europe, Britain, brought for the protestant interest in Germany. The image of Prussian leadership in 1731 was largely constructed to justify subsequent developments. Tony Claydon remarks that such images can never be entirely constructed.228 Prussia did take the vast majority of the exiled Salzburgers and the numbers who settled in either Georgia or Sachsen-Lauenburg were tiny in comparison. Is this evidence that George II was less keen on political protestantism than his Hohenzollern brother-in-law? Does the fact that it was only the SPCK who were prepared to do something for the Salzburgers suggest, as Sugiko Nishikawa has argued, that British protestantism was becoming more insular in its outlook in this period?229

223 Johann Gustav Droysen, Geschichte der Preußische Politik, IV:iii, Friedrich Wilhelm I (Leipzig, 1869), p. 157. 224 Ibid., p. 159. 225 Ibid., p. 161. 226 Naumann, England, pp. 185–6. 227 Ibid., p. 189. 228 Tony Claydon, ‘Holland, Hanover and the fluidity of facts: further thoughts on national images and national identities in the eighteenth century’, in Canning and Wellenreuther, eds, Britain and Germany compared, p. 96. 229 See Sugiko Nishikawa, English attitudes toward continental protestants with particular

165

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

Unlike his father in both 1719 and 1725, George II did not dispatch a British diplomat to Salzburg to deal with the situation. No overt attempt was made to contest Habsburg power or indicate that the personal union meant that the Emperor needed to treat the elector of Hanover cautiously. Britain had signed an alliance with Austria in March 1731. This may have made both Britons and Hanoverians reluctant to countenance conflict. On the other hand, despite the bluster about Frederick William I and the defence of protestantism, the central thrust of Mack Walker’s argument is that it was a ‘transaction’ – Frederick William was allowed to take the refugees in exchange for his support for the guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction in the Diet. Prussian motives can hardly be characterised as entirely altruistic, as both Hanoverian and British officials never tired of remarking.230 Moreover, as Uta Richter-Uhlig has shown, the anti-Imperial policies of both Prussia and Hanover during the reign of George II at times led to cooperation, but at times also to competition, over the leadership of protestants within the Empire.231 The early years of George II’s reign were characterised more by rivalry and misunderstanding than by friendship and mutual support. As the next chapter shows, George II neither abandoned his attempts to aid the protestants of the Empire after 1731 nor accepted the inevitability of Prussian leadership. If anything, this ‘result’ only became clear later, even if Borussian historians have seen fit to regard 1731 as prophetic. Instead of concentrating on the construction of a new Prussian, great power identity, it is important to remember elements of continuity from earlier periods. Attempts to remove the Ryswick clause at the Congress of Soissons showed how older concerns had not disappeared. The next chapter also illustrates how important the removal of this clause remained in the 1730s. Ryswick, and the associated discussion over leadership of the Corpus, underscore the extent to which Britain–Hanover was an active player in Imperial politics. Much of the characterisation of Frederick William I as protestant hero has been built around his tendency to take offence quickly and to react dramatically, such as in his frequent threats to close catholic churches in his realm. Neither George I nor George II was particularly impressed by this approach. Indeed, in 1732 Robinson’s instructions were quite specific on the need to proceed cautiously when discussing protestant persecution with the Austrians. This caution partly resulted from an awareness that the situation in Ireland made the British vulnerable to accusations of hypocrisy. It was also a product of what might be described as ‘enlightened statecraft’. Monarchs

reference to Church Briefs, c. 1680–1740 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of London, 1998), pp. 260–1. 230 See, for example, Weston to Robinson, Whitehall, 11/4/1732, BL, Add. MSS 23785, fol. 72r. 231 Uta Richter-Uhlig, Hof und Politik unter den Bedingungen der Personalunion zwischen Hannover und England (Hanover, 1992), p. 75. 166

GEORGE II AND CHALLENGES

like George I and II attempted to use pressure and diplomacy, rather than war and crusading, to secure the interests of their co-religionists. Such an approach may not always have yielded results. The diplomatic records show, however, that the fate of German protestants was something that both British and Hanoverian diplomats had to take seriously. While moves towards a more national understanding of identity were readily apparent, a broader sense of cooperation and interdependence across European borders was not entirely lost. The Hanoverian monarchs were constantly reminded that they were the head of the protestant interest in Europe and so ought to behave as such. The use of protestant interest arguments in support of monarchical foreign policy between 1729 and 1732 is clear from the pamphlet literature. However, ‘the protestant interest’ was not the exclusive property of the ministry, as the discussion of Oglethorpe and the anti-ministerial supporters of the Georgia project shows. In essence there were two sets of conflicting pressures at work. The first was the tension between a purely ‘national’ identity, excluding dynastic loyalties to a foreign monarch, as opposed to one which sought to combine both elements. The second was the tension between Britain as an imperial and a European power. Both remain unresolved.

167

6

Walpole, the War of the Polish succession, and ‘national interest’

The 1730s can appear as an interlude between more turbulent and interesting times. Historians focused on conflict move quickly over this decade in eager anticipation of Frederick the Great’s dramatic arrival on the international scene in 1740. Within Britain too, with the exception of the Excise crisis, there seems little of historical note. Sir Robert Walpole was at the height of his power and his support for low taxes, trade and peace meant that the British ship of state sailed smoothly onwards. Or at least, that is the received view.1 Sir Robert has often been regarded as central to saving the country from being plunged into disastrous foreign war by a bellicose king in 1733. George II, it is claimed, was eager to intervene in the War of the Polish succession and only Walpole’s skilful manipulation of Queen Caroline and his acute appreciation of the British national interest prevented British involvement. As a maritime power, Britain could ignore the petty squabbles of the continental powers and it was a sign of Walpole’s brilliance (and the king’s stupidity) that he realised this.2 So far, so good; or, rather, so far, so simplistic. This chapter shows that Walpole’s centrality to British non-intervention has been overstated. Several scholars have suggested recently that George II’s political importance has been underestimated. Reconstructing the European context of the king’s diplomacy indicates why George was a reluctant, rather than an eager, participant in the conflict. It is unsurprising, given the argument of previous chapters, that much of this evidence can be found in Hanoverian sources. The situation at the Reichstag at Regensburg in the 1730s provides vital clues for explaining George’s conduct. This narrative complements previous accounts of why the British failed to intervene, although Hanover ultimately sent troops. The study

1

See, for example, Simon Schama, A history of Britain: the British wars, 1603–1776 (London, 2001), pp. 350–76. 2 See W.E.H. Lecky, History of England in the eighteenth century (New edn, 5 vols, London, 1901), i, p. 415, C. Grant Robertson, England under the Hanoverians (London, 1911), pp. 65–6, and G.M. Trevelyan, History of England (London, 1926), p. 535. 168

WALPOLE AND THE POLISH SUCCESSION

of the Reichstag amplifies the account given in previous chapters of the importance of the public sphere for diplomacy. Finally, the Reichstag in this period provides yet more evidence of concerns about the position and legal status of protestantism within the Empire. However, how Walpole came to be seen as so crucial needs to be explained first.

The Walpole myth Despite provoking the ire of large sections of the literati, Walpole had several prominent contemporary supporters. Queen Caroline’s vice-chamberlain John, Lord Hervey, observed the workings of the court from the inside. His Memoirs are a significant source.3 These Memoirs, and Archdeacon Coxe’s collections,4 have shaped the myth that Walpole was solely responsible for saving Britain from war in 1733. Untangling the Walpole ‘myth’ involves appreciating the diplomatic background to the Polish conflict. Like many others Hervey traced the roots of the disturbances in the European states system to the 1725 treaties between Austria and Spain.5 Hervey was critical of Townshend’s abilities as secretary of state. Yet he praised Walpole for concluding the Treaty of Seville in 1729.6 Hervey’s political preferences were clear. In February 1733, Augustus the Strong, elector of Saxony and king of Poland, died. Augustus’s son wanted to succeed him in Poland, as well as Saxony. However, the Polish throne was elective and Augustus’s son faced competition. The French supported Stanislas Leszczynski. Stanislas had briefly held the throne during the upheavals of the Great Northern War and his daughter had married Louis XV. The Emperor, Charles VI, and the Russians favoured the Saxon Wettin candidate. The Emperor’s price was Saxon recognition of the Pragmatic Sanction – Charles VI’s device to deal with the succession on his death. All sides claimed to want a free election. Stanislas was elected in September and Russian troops promptly entered Poland. The French then declared war on Charles VI and invaded, taking two key Imperial fortresses on the Rhine. The Austrians claimed that under the terms of the Treaty of Vienna (1731) the Maritime powers were obliged to declare war on France. The Austrians also sought to persuade the Empire to declare war on France, and her Spanish and Sardinian allies.

3

The standard printed edition is Romney Sedgwick, ed., Some materials towards memoirs of the reign of King George II by John, Lord Hervey (3 vols, London, 1931), pp. xi–xiii. 4 William Coxe, Memoirs of the life and administration of Sir Robert Walpole (3 vols, London, 1798). 5 Sedgwick, ed., Memoirs, i, p. 53. See also pp. 117–18. 6 Ibid., pp. 80, 111. 169

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

In these circumstances, it was unsurprising, thought Hervey, that George II wanted to side with Austria. All Germans disliked the French but George also wanted to make a fellow elector king and help the Emperor, whom he viewed as his chief. A great mind would not have been swayed by such petty reasons but weak minds and narrow souls, presumbably like George’s, could be persuaded by trifles.7 Hervey suggested to the king that entry into the war would only help the opposition.8 However, ‘Sir Robert Walpole constantly, and with much more weight, talked in the same strain. My reason, therefore, for putting these arguments in Lord Hervey’s mouth . . . is, because I know they were said by him, and only conjecture their being said by any other person.’9 Historians have taken such remarks as evidence of Walpole’s importance, rather than noticing Hervey’s caveat. Elsewhere Hervey repeated his claim – George’s Hanoverian electorate, and consequent attachment to Charles VI, meant he wanted to participate.10 Whilst Hattorf, George’s chief German minister, wanted war, Walpole wished to avoid conflict.11 Hervey’s analysis has been influential.12 The late Sir John Plumb claimed Walpole was indifferent about who was king of Poland but was definitely against war.13 Paul Langford argues Walpole’s was the crucial voice and had anyone else had the decisive say in foreign policy-making, Britain would have been dragged into war.14 Yet Jeremy Black has never been entirely convinced, partly because he has emphasised the importance of the king’s influence on policy. In an early attempt to rehabilitate George II as a diplomatic player in the 1730s, Black claimed that it was misguided to see George as simply losing out to Walpole in 1733. Rather, neutrality was perhaps the safest strategic option.15 Black also remarked that Coxe, Plumb and Sir Richard Lodge had all drawn heavily on Hervey in their accounts of why Britain had remained neutral.16 Black mentioned various reasons why the British were not keen to support Austria, apart from Walpole’s dislike of war. He even suggested that Hanoverian material might explain why certain decisions were taken, 7

Ibid., p. 217. Ibid., p. 224. 9 Ibid., p. 227. 10 Ibid., ii, p. 340. 11 Ibid., pp. 342–4. 12 See, for example, R.L. Arkell, Caroline of Ansbach (London, 1939), pp. 218–19 and Peter Quennell, Caroline of England (London, 1939), p. 140. 13 J.H. Plumb, Sir Robert Walpole (2 vols, 1956–60), ii, p. 284. 14 Paul Langford, The eighteenth century, 1688–1815 (London, 1976), p. 106. 15 Jeremy Black, ‘George II reconsidered: a consideration of George’s influence on the control of foreign policy, in the first years of his reign’, Mitteilungen des österreichischen Staatsarchivs, 35 (1982), p. 52. 16 Jeremy Black, ‘British neutrality in the War of the Polish succession, 1733–1735’, International History Review, 8 (1986), p. 345. Black is alluding to Richard Lodge, ‘English neutrality in the War of the Polish succession’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 4th series 14 (1931), pp. 141–73. 8

170

WALPOLE AND THE POLISH SUCCESSION

although he believed much of the relevant Hanoverian material had been destroyed in World War II.17 Aubrey Newman also expressed scepticism about Walpole’s ability to overrule the king. The British were neutral because both king and minister wanted to be.18 Mitchell Allen, in a recent study of Anglo-Hanoverian relations in George II’s reign, reached a similar conclusion.19 George’s support for Charles VI was conditional and predicated on Austrian promises being kept. Secondly, even though Hanoverian troops eventually joined the Reichsarmee, they were not dispatched with the speed that the warmongering interpretation of George’s conduct suggests that they should have been. Finally, Walpole’s unwillingness to act without the Dutch was serious and not simply an excuse.20 Allen attributes George’s reluctance to act quickly to his concerns about the electorate’s security, particularly his worries about Prussian troops in Mecklenburg.21 There is something in this. However, as the rest of this chapter indicates, it does not tell the whole story.

Initial British reaction to the crisis in Poland Faced with Austrian pressure to support the Saxon candidate, the British remained noncommittal. After Augustus’s death Harrington, the secretary of state for the Northern department, instructed George Woodward, the British extraordinary envoy to Saxony–Poland, to work with the Emperor’s ministers. Yet he was not ‘to enter into a warm and violent opposition to any Candidate upon the foot of a new . . . election’.22 The French must not be offended. George was worried because he feared both an increase in French power in the north and having to join Austria in opposing French pretensions militarily.23 Woodward was also instructed to oppose actively the candidature of the Pretender.24 These are not the instructions of someone spoiling for a fight.

17

Black, ‘British neutrality’, p. 362. Aubrey Newman, The world turned inside out: new views on George II. An inaugural lecture delivered in the University of Leicester, 10 October 1987 (Leicester, 1987), pp. 13–14. 19 Mitchell D. Allen, The Anglo-Hanoverian connection: 1727–1760 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Boston University, 2000). 20 Ibid., p. 74. 21 Ibid., p. 82. 22 Harrington to Woodward, Whitehall, 9/3/1733, most secret, Lewis Walpole Library, Farmington, Connecticut [hereafter LWL], Charles Hanbury Williams papers [hereafter Williams papers], vol. 3, p. 270. Hanbury Williams was a British diplomat in Prussia and Poland in the 1740s and 50s but his papers also contain some of George Woodward’s correspondence. 23 Ibid., pp. 272–3. 24 Ibid., p. 276. 18

171

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

Harrington’s dispatches from March to August 1733 show George’s caution. Woodward was praised for his efforts to protect protestants;25 he was warned to watch the French diplomat, Count Monti, closely; 26 and he was kept informed of the progress of negotiations between the Emperor and Saxony to secure Saxon accession to the Pragmatic Sanction.27 As the election approached, it became increasingly difficult for Woodward to remain disinterested. Harrington urged Woodward to signal George’s desire to maintain the peace.28 After Russian troops entered Poland, Harrington praised Woodward’s reticence. He reiterated that the king had ‘been using his good offices with the respective Partys to induce them to act in such a manner, as might be most consistent with the preservation of the publick Tranquility’.29 Woodward received no new orders after Stanislas’s election.30 George’s exchanges with diplomats in Vienna confirm how circumspect his policy was. Just like Woodward, Thomas Robinson in Vienna was instructed to act cautiously after confirmation of Augustus’s death. If the Austrians complained about George’s lack of vocal support for their candidate, Robinson should respond that George doubted open support would ‘have been of any real service’ because it was ‘entirely unadviseable for him to give such an Offense to France’. He had chosen ‘to confine Mr Woodward to a Secret, & underhand Opposition’ as this would be just as effective as any open declaration in supporting the Emperor.31 The Austrians might have valued this promise of secret aid, but George had ensured that he had not declared prematurely for one side or the other. In June 1733 rumours surfaced that the Austrians would only defend Luxembourg, were the Low Countries to be attacked by France.32 The treaty between Saxony and the Emperor brought hostilities a step closer. Harrington informed Robinson of George’s reaction to the treaty in a secret dispatch. The treaty was rumoured to contain a Saxon/Austrian plan to remove Stanislas if he were elected. George was convinced that the French were willing to oppose this militarily.33 In the king’s view the Emperor ought to consider ‘how far he can depend upon the support of his Allies, and especially in those Parts where

25 See Harrington to Woodward, Whitehall, 30/3/1733, 11/5/1733, 19/6/1733, LWL, Williams papers, vol. 3, pp. 295, 319, 335. 26 Harrington to Woodward, Whitehall, 23/3/1733, ibid., p. 292. 27 Harrington to Woodward, Whitehall, 13/4/1733, 4/5/1733, 11/5/1733, ibid., pp. 299, 303–4, 320. 28 Harrington to Woodward, Whitehall, 22/6/1733, ibid., p. 339. 29 Harrington to Woodward, Hampton Court, 11/9/1733, ibid., pp. 383–4. 30 Harrington to Woodward, Hampton Court, 26/10/1733, ibid., p. 407. 31 Harrington to Robinson, Whitehall, 9/3/1733, secret, London, Public Record Office [hereafter PRO], State Papers [hereafter SP] 80/94. 32 Harrington to Robinson, Whitehall, 19/6/1733, ibid., fol. 248v. 33 Harrington to Robinson, Whitehall, 29/6/1733, ibid., fol. 259.

172

WALPOLE AND THE POLISH SUCCESSION

his Dominions are most exposed’.34 Robinson was to intimate that the Dutch would probably remain neutral, partly because of the unwillingness of the Emperor to defend the Barrier fortresses.35 George doubted the Prussians would help Charles. The Bavarians would back France. George wanted to help but as ‘the foundation of the Dispute is so entirely foreign to all ye national Concern of this Country’, it was clear that ‘unless such a situation of affairs should present itself as would fall directly under the very Letter of our Treaties . . . or unless some imminent Danger should threaten the National self, or the Balance of Power in Europe’, George would be unable to persuade the British to fight.36 Robinson was to confirm the promise made in April that a conflict in Poland would not be regarded as a casus foederis under the 1731 Anglo-Austrian alliance. If the recent Austro-Russian treaty envisaged the use of force, he was to suggest that only Russia should take action in Poland to ensure that France had no excuse for invading the Empire.37 George was seemingly still opposed to conflict. When news of the Russian invasion reached London, Harrington quickly told Robinson that, given Dutch timidity, the backward conduct of the Prussians, and the failure of the alliance with HessenKassel, the king felt that, ‘as a faithful friend of the Emperor’, he had to advise the Emperor to ensure that the Russians gave the French no excuse to initiate a more general war.38 The Austrians were unhappy with this. Robinson informed Weston, Harrington’s undersecretary,39 that the ministerial conference wanted George to act with greater resolution qua king. George’s electoral envoy, Diede, had already told him that the Emperor was demanding six thousand Hanoverian troops for the Reichsarmee and was prepared to pay for another four thousand. The Austrians also hinted that they were unsure they could rely on Prussian aid – could George do something?40 Harrington replied that George was interested to learn that the Prussians had proved unhelpful allies (hardly surprising, given George’s well-known mistrust of his Hohenzollern brother-in-law). Robinson must make clear that George would not support an alliance with Russia that obliged him to defend the tsarina militarily, ‘since this is a method which would engage his Maty as a Principal in those affairs [of Poland], (which has hitherto you know been so carefully avoided)’.41

34

Ibid., fol. 260r. Ibid., fols 260v–261r. 36 Ibid., fols 261v–262r. 37 Ibid., fols 263v–264. 38 Harrington to Robinson, Hampton Court, 17/8/1733, BL, Add. MSS 23789, fol. 78. 39 Weston’s papers are now in the Lewis Walpole Library, Farmington CT, and are referred to as LWL, Weston papers in what follows. See also Karl W. Schweizer, ‘Edward Weston (1703–70): the papers of an eighteenth-century Under-Secretary in the Lewis Walpole Library’, Yale Library Gazette, 71 (1996), pp. 43–8. 40 Robinson to Weston, Vienna, 2/9/1733, PRO, SP 80/99. 41 Harrington to Robinson, Hampton Court, 18/9/1733, ibid. 35

173

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

The British wanted to discover whether specific military agreements had been reached between Austria, Prussia and Russia.42 The Prussians had mobilised some troops, but Dickens, the British secretary in Berlin, thought that this was to exert pressure on the Emperor to recognise Prussian claims to Jülich and Berg, rather than to help the Emperor.43 Eventually Frederick William promised ten thousand Prussians for the Reichsarmee after considerable prevarication.44 The Austrian desire for commitments about troop supply is understandable but it also indicates how much the Austrians needed their allies’ help. Allies, such as Britain, the Dutch and even Hanover, had diplomatic leverage they refused to ignore. Both George and British ministers were initially unwilling to get involved in Poland. This was not simply the result of British ministerial pressure on a weak king, as the subsequent discussion of Hanoverian politics makes clear. Consideration of Horace Walpole’s diplomatic missions to the United Provinces in 1734 also undermines Hervey’s account of Robert Walpole’s centrality.

Proposals for a negotiated peace Hervey did nothing to disguise his prejudices in his Memoirs. Hervey thought that Horace Walpole, unlike his brother, wanted to side with the Austrians.45 Hervey claimed that Horace Walpole was so keen to travel to the United Provinces in 1734 because he was anxious to persuade the Pensionary to join the war, thus increasing his credit with the king. Moreover, as domestic policy was not Horace’s strength, this was his only means to gain favour. Hervey conceded that Horace’s encyclopedic knowledge of foreign affairs was useful in the Commons, describing him as a ‘treaty dictionary’, but added acidly that ‘to hear Horace talk on these subjects unrestrained, and without being turned to any particular point, was listening to a rhapsody that was never coherent, and often totally unintelligible’.46 In some ways Horace did want to persuade the Dutch to do more for the Emperor. Horace reported to Robinson in June 1734 that he had emphasised to the Austrian representative in the United Provinces Britain’s reluctance to act without the Dutch. Horace reminded Robinson that the Dutch were unwilling to fight (the Dutch had signalled in December 1733 that they would remain neutral in the war between France and the Emperor; the French had 42 See Harrington to Dickens, Whitehall, 13/7/1733, PRO, SP 90/35 and the ensuing exchange of dispatches. 43 Dickens to Harrington, Berlin, 25/7/1733, ibid. 44 Dickens to Harrington, Berlin, 6/10/1733, ibid. 45 Harrington, Poyntz and Newcastle were also condemned for wanting to support Austria to ingratiate themselves to the king. See Sedgwick, ed., Memoirs, ii, pp. 345–7. 46 Ibid., i, pp. 284–5.

174

WALPOLE AND THE POLISH SUCCESSION

promised that the Low Countries would not be invaded).47 Encouraging the Dutch to reconsider might suggest George wanted to help the Emperor, but it was also a way of doing nothing, whilst seeming to do something. The Dutch, on the other hand, believed that Walpole was there to promote the Austrian cause. Walpole’s (perhaps jealous) colleague in The Hague, Robert Trevor, suggested that Walpole was doing more harm than good and was driving the Dutch closer to the French. The Dutch suspected that George wanted to change the Dutch government. Their evidence was the proposed match between the prince of Orange and George’s daughter, Anne. Trevor suggested that perhaps the only way for the British to redeem the situation was through support for the Orangists, rather than the weak and irresolute Patriots around the Pensionary.48 Horace Walpole’s correspondence with his brother and Harrington from July and August 1734 detailed schemes for cooperation between the Maritime powers. The British hoped that they might be able to arbitrate by detaching either Spain or Sardinia from their alliance with France and reconciling them with the Emperor, thus reducing the military pressure on the Emperor in Italy. Horace Walpole proposed a plan for reconciling Sardinia and the Emperor, involving the handover of the Milanese to Sardinia. The Pensionary thought that the plan would fail and provoke further conflict rather than a general pacification.49 Greffier Fagel was also unconvinced. He thought that even with Sardinian support it would be impossible for the Emperor to defeat the French without the Maritime powers. Desperate as the Emperor’s situation was, it was still not bad enough to force him to come to terms.50 Horace Walpole told his brother shortly afterwards that the Pensionary opposed a joint approach to France and Spain. Hence Horace thought it best to contact France secretly to initiate negotiations. He argued that recent French victories necessitated devising a peace scheme before the start of the parliamentary session to avoid trouble.51 What might such a scheme look like? The Maritime powers could not simply agree peace terms with the Emperor and then present these to Spain and France as an ultimatum. Horace also rejected a plan to separate Spain from France as impractical. Sardinia could not be bought off by a separate peace. The only option was to test the seriousness of French desires for peace. The Maritime powers would offer to act as arbiters, assuming that they could

47

H. Walpole to Robinson, Hague, 15/5/1734, BL, Add. MSS 23791, fols 29–32. Trevor to Weston, Hague, 27/4/1734, LWL, Weston papers, vol. 2, letter 46. 49 H. Walpole to Harrington, Hague, 30/7/1734, LWL, Weston papers, vol. 1, letter 9. 50 H. Walpole to Harrington, Hague, 17/8/1734, secret, ibid., letter 12. 51 H. Walpole to R. Walpole, Hague, 27/8/1734, Cambridge University Library [hereafter CUL], Cholmondeley Houghton correspondence [hereafter Ch (H) correspond.], 2319. Many historians have used the documents in volume III of Coxe’s Memoirs of Sir Robert Walpole, rather than the original correspondence. Coxe did not include this letter, or several of the others cited here, in his collection. 48

175

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

have some flexibility. They probably could not persuade the Emperor to withdraw from Italy. Rumours of negotiations might persuade the Emperor that his hopes of support from the Maritime powers were illusory. He would therefore reach agreement with Spain. Maintaining the balance of power was central to the negotiation.52 Horace had discussed the plan with the Pensionary. He shared it with his brother but not Harrington.53 Horace subsequently informed his brother that Cardinal Fleury appeared willing to negotiate. Consequently he needed the king’s authorisation to proceed quickly. George might be distrustful both of the French and negotiating in Holland but he hoped that Sir Robert might be able to expedite matters by preparing the queen.54 Horace wrote to the queen himself to suggest that the best way to support the house of Austria now was to persuade them to let their friends negotiate a peace settlement. The Dutch would not enter the war and Britain could not fight without the Dutch.55 How best to achieve a negotiated settlement provoked disagreement in London. The duke of Newcastle informed Sir Robert that he was willing to proceed at Sir Robert’s pace, although Horace wished to go faster and Harrington was attached to his own plan.56 Meanwhile the Emperor had sent the bishop of Namur to London to repeat the threat France posed to the balance of power and the consequent need for Britain to support the Emperor. This may explain why Newcastle told Sir Robert that he had had great difficulty in dissuading the king from allowing Harrington to order Horace to do nothing. George had been annoyed by Horace’s suggestion that he needed room to manoeuvre in the proposed negotiations with the French.57 The diplomatic situation in 1735 remained complicated. Fleury seemed keen to settle but blamed the lack of progress on his tougher colleague, Chauvelin. Fleury was ultimately able to negotiate a separate peace with the Emperor without the mediation of the Maritime powers. Yet British attempts to mediate show how the simple picture of one man saving Britain painted by Hervey belies a more complicated reality. This picture takes on further shades of grey when Hanoverian involvement is considered.

52

H. Walpole to R. Walpole, Hague, 27/8/1734, Ch (H) correspond., 2319. The letter offers circumstantial support for the view that Sir Robert Walpole’s influence over foreign policy had increased, even if it was not decisive. Harrington’s comment to Horace Walpole later in the year (Harrington to H. Walpole, Whitehall, 19/11/1734, private and particular, LWL, Weston papers, vol. 2, letter 52) that he was unable to instruct him because of Sir Robert’s absence from London offers additional evidence of Sir Robert’s importance. However, Harrington also remarked that he and Sir Robert shared everything about the conduct of negotiations. Harrington was probably not as unimportant as Hervey suggests. 54 H. Walpole to R. Walpole, Hague, 8/9/1734, Ch (H) correspond., 2333. 55 H. Walpole to Caroline, Hague, 22/10/1734, copy, Ch (H) correspond., 2348. 56 Newcastle to R. Walpole, Newcastle House, 13/11/1734, Coxe, Memoirs, iii, p. 209. 57 Newcastle to R. Walpole, Newcastle House, 19/11/1734, Coxe, Memoirs, iii, p. 229. 53

176

WALPOLE AND THE POLISH SUCCESSION

Hanover and the Polish crisis The ministry’s foreign policy was typically criticised by its opponents for prioritising Hanoverian over British interests. The War of the Polish succession could easily have been portrayed as a ‘German war’ and outside the interests of a commercial, maritime people like the British, as Hervey did. However, as monarchical and dynastic interests were still at least as important as any emerging concept of the ‘national interest’, British politicians could not afford to ignore their king’s electoral domains completely, even if ‘Hanoverian influence’ troubled them. Sir Robert Walpole’s correspondence includes an intercepted dispatch from the Saxon extraordinary envoy in London, Johann von Loss, to his electoral master. The Saxon envoy had read a declaration concerning religion to Hattorf. He also noted that Kinsky, the Austrian ambassador, had been instructed to reject the offer of arbitration by the Maritime powers.58 Although the contents of this declaration do not survive, they are easy to guess. No doubt the elector was keen to ensure that George would support his claims by reaffirming those promises made by his father about the security of protestants within his electoral domains. Such a declaration was best suited to be presented to an electoral minister but it had come to Walpole’s attention. Regardless of what British ministers thought personally, electoral affairs inevitably meant that it was necessary to be aware of confessional politics in the Empire. Horace Walpole told his brother, during his negotiations at The Hague, that he had received orders from the king to correspond with Hattorf. He did not think that he would be able to hide this from Harrington for long and, once discovered, this was likely to cause resentment.59 Horace thought that involving Hattorf might help resolve the succession problem in the Rhine duchies of Jülich and Berg. A simple division between ‘British’ and ‘Hanoverian’ concerns is historically suspect. Studying the Diet at Regensburg in the 1730s offers a different way of explaining George’s reaction to the Polish crisis. Augustus of Saxony–Poland’s death reignited the question of whether the Saxon directorate of the Corpus Evangelicorum should be replaced with a more obviously protestant power (the discovery of the crown prince of Saxony’s conversion to catholicism had previously sparked discussions in 1717). The Hanoverian privy council informed George that they had told Hugo, the Hanoverian KomitialGesandter at Regensburg, that, unless there was a dramatic change in Saxon policy, now was not the time to change.60 Prussia wanted to replace Saxony and was refusing to cooperate with other protestant powers.61 George consulted

58

Loss to king of Poland, London, 1/7/1734, Ch (H) correspond., 2237. H. Walpole to R. Walpole, Hague, 10/7/1734, ibid., 2259. 60 Geheime Räte to George II, Hanover, addition to 20/2/1733, Hanover, Hauptstaatsarchiv [hereafter HHStA], Calenberg Brief [hereafter CB] 11, 3041: II, fol. 337. 61 Hugo to George II, Regensburg, addition to 30/3/1733, ibid., fols 623–5. 59

177

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

the Hanoverian privy council about a request from the Prussian minister plenipotentiary in London that the agreement reached between Hanover and Prussia in 1720 on the leadership of the Corpus be implemented now.62 The council responded that they did not believe other protestant powers could be persuaded to adopt the Prussian plan.63 Perhaps the Hanoverians were unwilling to countenance any increase in the stature of their north German rival. George agreed with the council’s advice to accept a continued Saxon directorate of the Corpus, but insisted that if conditions worsened for Saxon protestants, a change would be necessary.64 Fortunately, Count Degenfeld, the Prussian minister plenipotentiary, subsequently reported that he had been instructed to cooperate with the Saxons and drop the directorate question.65 George thought it unwise to confirm continued Saxon leadership of the Corpus in writing. It was important that the Corpus preserved its freedom of action to help Saxon protestants as it saw fit, free from particular conditions.66 The directorate of the Corpus was not the only issue facing the Hanoverian representatives at Regensburg. The outbreak of war after Stanislas’s election led to intense Austrian diplomatic activity. In late October 1733 Hugo had been shown a copy of the new alliance between France, Spain and Sardinia by Kirchner, a leading Austrian diplomat. Kirchner had highlighted the specific plans for making gains in Italy at the Emperor’s expense. He had emphasised how privileged Hugo should feel for seeing the document.67 As the Emperor’s particular ally, George should also feel obliged to help. Many recent historians, following Volker Press,68 have assumed too readily that the Hanoverians were more than willing to comply with every Austrian demand. Yet Kirchner, it seems, did not feel that the Hanoverians were doing nearly enough. Hugo was taken aside by Kirchner again in December. Kirchner requested that a fleet (presumably British) be sent to the Mediterranean to help the Emperor in Italy and justified his request on the basis of the Quadruple Alliance and the need to preserve the ‘Balance in Europe’. Hugo responded he had no instructions on such a request and that it required time for reflection. He could only comment on electoral affairs.69 The Austrians were attempting to influence British policy through Hanoverian channels. Hugo’s reaction

62 George II to Geheime Räte, St James’s, 13/2/1733, HHStA, CB 11, 1628, fols 99–100. See also p. 156. 63 Geheime Räte to George, Hanover, 6/3/1733, HHStA, CB 11, 1628, fols 103–5. 64 George to Geheime Räte, St James’s, 24/4/1733, ibid., fol. 116. 65 Addition to Hugo to George II, Regensburg, 29/4/1733, HHStA, CB 11, 3042: I, fol. 168. 66 George to Geheime Räte, St James’s, 15/5/1733, HHStA, CB 11, 1628, fols 122–3. 67 Hugo to George II, Regensburg, 29/10/1733, HHStA, CB 11, 3044: I, fols 240–1. 68 See Volker Press, ‘Kurhannover im System des alten Reichs 1692–1803’, in A.M. Birke and Kurt Kluxen, eds, England und Hannover (Munich, 1986), pp. 53–79. 69 Addition to Hugo to George II, Regensburg, 24/12/1733, HHStA, CB 11, 3044: II, fols 565–6.

178

WALPOLE AND THE POLISH SUCCESSION

should be noted. Contrary to the impression given by the opposition in Britain about Hanoverian intentions, he had not seized the chance to drag Britain into the Emperor’s war. Hugo had done exactly what he had been supposed to do in such circumstances. Reck had been told to ensure that the Austrians were aware of the content of any vota that he might put down in response to requests for help from the Emperor to George. This was to reassure the Austrians.70 Yet, if asked about George’s position as king, in relation to Poland, Hugo had been instructed to avoid discussions of George’s position but, if they were unavoidable, to answer only briefly. He should simply claim to be uninstructed. He must also keep these instructions secret.71 A picture of ‘Germans together’, with the Hanoverians queuing up to exploit British resources for Austrian ends, is misleading. The Austrians applied pressure both to British and Hanoverian officials to honour their treaty commitments. Both Britons and Hanoverians were reluctant to do so. Why were the Hanoverians unenthusiastic about fighting Charles VI’s war? The fourth clause of the Treaty of Ryswick, allowing those churches taken by catholics during Louis XIV’s occupation of the Palatinate to remain so after his withdrawal, had consistently provoked protestant ire.72 There were broader implications beyond the local situation in the Palatinate. Protestants perceived an increase in catholic power in the Empire. The clause suggested that the religious settlement of 1648 was not permanent, a fundamental of Imperial law, but was potentially subject to alteration. Consequently the Corpus wanted to abolish the clause’s provisions. This had been attempted at the Congress of Soissons.73 The problem was securing the Emperor’s agreement. In 1733, with the Emperor desperate for allies and troops to fight the French, such an opportunity seemed to have arrived. In November 1733 Hugo and Reck informed George that they had already discussed with the Saxon envoy how the abolition of the Ryswick clause could best be achieved in any future peace deal. They had concluded it was best to use the representatives of any of the protestant powers at the congress, as had been done at Soissons, rather than send a deputation from the Corpus.74 The Hanoverian privy council had reported that the Corpus wanted guidance on how to react to Austrian pressure for the Empire to declare war on France. The political situation within the Reich was fluid. The Wittelsbachs in Bavaria, the Palatinate and Cologne seemed determined to remain neutral. The Hanoverian privy council advised caution when considering how best to 70 George II to Reck, St James’s, 13/11/1733, HHStA, CB 11, 1845, fol. 7. The votum of the same date on fol. 5 of the same file made clear that France had attacked the entire Reich and this required a patriotic response. 71 George II to Hugo, St James’s, 13/11/1733, ibid., fol.9. 72 See p. 54. 73 See p. 135. 74 Hugo to George II, Regensburg, 7/11/1733, HHStA, CB 11, 3044: I, fols 279–82.

179

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

solve the religious grievances. Some protestants wanted to make a catholic declaration of the injustice of the Ryswick clause a precondition for agreeing to the declaration of war. The council thought this would do more harm than good.75 George agreed and instructed Hugo not to make such a declaration a condition of agreeing to the declaration of war.76 Hugo hoped he could convince the Corpus.77 But what were the advantages? George thought that he would achieve more by working on the Austrians privately than by entering into direct conflict with the catholic Stände. The confrontational tactics of the Corpus would probably crystallise opinion along confessional lines and hand the diplomatic advantage back to Bavaria and her allies. Instead George hoped to convince Vienna that his demands were reasonable, while Bavarian claims were hysterical. Hence, he asked Count Kinsky in London what the Austrians thought about the religious issue.78 The Austrians had suggested they might make a declaration on the Ryswick clause if George calmed the wilder spirits in Regensburg.79 Events in Regensburg did not proceed as George had wanted. The Bavarians had discovered that the Corpus intended to exploit the Emperor’s desire for the Reich to declare war to extract concessions on religious issues. They insinuated that there was a protestant campaign to undermine the catholics, no doubt hoping to persuade more catholics to back them on neutrality.80 Hugo reported that Austrian diplomats were worried about protestant demands and the likely catholic reaction to them.81 The Corpus were determined to send a memo to the Prinzipalkommissar about the Ryswick issue. Hugo and Reck thought that the Emperor would now try to avoid the catholics debating any memo, if this might either postpone or complicate their agreement to the declaration of war.82 Hugo and Reck were also aware that Prussia’s more bellicose attitude could be counterproductive. They thought further pressure on the Prinzipalkommissar and the catholic powers was only likely to make matters worse.83 Despite their fears the Austrians appeared to concede that the Ryswick clause should be abolished shortly afterwards.84 Whether this change can be attributed to protestant pressure is unclear. A majority of both the princely and electoral

75

Geheime Räte to George II, Hanover, 11/12/1733, HHStA, CB 11, 1824, fols 1–2. George II to Hugo, St James’s, 11/12/1733, ibid., fols 10–12. 77 Hugo to George II, Regensburg, 7/1/1734, HHStA, CB 11, 3045: I, fols 60–1. 78 George II to Geheime Räte, St James’s, 18/1/1734, HHStA, CB 11, 1824, fol. 16. 79 Robinson to Harrington, Vienna, 6/1/1734, PRO, SP 80/103, fol. 27. 80 Hugo and Reck to George II, Regensburg, 20/1/1734, HHStA, CB 11, 3045: I, fol. 135. 81 Hugo and Reck to George II, Regensburg, 1/2/1734, ibid., fol. 196r. 82 Hugo and Reck to George II, Regensburg, 4/2/1734, ibid., fol. 219. 83 Hugo and Reck to George II, Regensburg, 15/2/1734, HHStA, CB 11, 3045: II, fols 314–16. 84 Hugo and Reck to George II, Regensburg, 22/2/1734, ibid., fols 380–2. 76

180

WALPOLE AND THE POLISH SUCCESSION

colleges were prepared to insert a clause into the Reichsgutachten, issued in response to the request for the declaration of war, recognising that the Ryswick clause was contrary to the Westphalian settlement.85 The Bavarian representative in Regensburg claimed to Hugo that the declaration would undermine the Reich. Hugo responded that the declaration merely expressed the intention to return to the Westphalian settlements.86 The Konkommissar had admitted to Hugo that the clause had always been a source of discontent between the two confessional groups in the Reich and that it had been imposed on the Reich as the result of French threats in 1697.87 The Emperor, it seems, had realised that he needed protestant support for war against France. The declaration was the price he had to pay. The Wittelsbach electors’ arguments were weak. Protestants could claim they were willing to support the Emperor against the French, as opposed to endangering the Reich by remaining neutral. The concession was also extracted at a time when the threat from France had become acute again, so that it was possible to portray the 1697 terms as an insult to the whole Reich, and not just its protestant members. Only now, in March 1734, was George willing to dispatch troops to the Emperor. As he commented to one of his diplomats a little later, he hoped that this would be ‘a convincing proof of our patriotic disposition for the common good’.88 The timing is important. Allen suggests that George’s reluctance to send troops was attributable to his fears about the threat posed to the security of Hanover by Prussian troops in Mecklenburg.89 George’s dispatches to his envoy in Vienna, Diede, provide evidence for this.90 Yet the delay might also have been part of a ‘wait and see’ policy, as George had previously told Diede that he could assure the Emperor that George’s German troops would assist the Emperor against the French.91 Mention of worries about Prussia and Mecklenburg disappeared after November 1733, so it seems probable that resolving religious disputes also contributed to delaying the dispatch of troops. Hanoverian archival evidence shows that George was willing to support the Emperor but not unconditionally. He proceeded extremely cautiously. Hervey’s caricature of a bellicose buffoon with his heart set on leading his troops into battle is unsustainable.

85 Addition to Hugo and Reck to George II, Regensburg, 1/3/1734, HHStA, CB 11, 3045: III, fols 554–5. 86 Addition to Hugo to George, Regensburg, 5/3/1734, ibid., fols 572–3. 87 Hugo to George, Regensburg, 11/3/1734, ibid., fol. 605. 88 George II to Erffa, Richmond, 26/4/1734, HHStA, CB 11, 1845, fol. 49v. 89 Allen, Anglo-Hanoverian connection, p. 79. 90 George II to Diede, Hampton Court, 14/9/1733 and 9/10/1733, HHStA, Hannover 92 [hereafter Hann. 92], 2259, fols 42–5 and fol. 55. 91 George II to Diede, Hampton Court, 3/8/1733, ibid., fol. 26v.

181

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

The Ryswick clause and the peace settlement Efforts to remove the Ryswick clause continued during negotations of the peace settlement at the end of the war. By late 1735 rumours of an imminent peace were circulating. Consequently some in the Corpus expected that they would send a deputation to a general congress to ratify the peace treaties. The Saxons thought this unwise and argued that George could best represent the protestant interest at any congress.92 Prussia was one of the protestant powers most interested in sending a deputation, perhaps because neither Saxony nor Hanover wanted it.93 George had told Hugo in an earlier letter that he suspected Prussia might try to prolong the war out of enmity for Saxony. George wanted both to end the war and avoid sending a deputation from the Corpus. Hugo should persuade the Saxons to follow this course.94 The Dutch were also interested in a separate protestant deputation. George and Harrington made clear that they were against it.95 Horace Walpole learnt that the Dutch diplomat, Baron Gallieris, who had been so vocal in his support for the idea of a deputation, was exceeding his instructions.96 In the early months of 1736 both British and Hanoverian diplomats worked to avoid the dispatch of a deputation from the Corpus. They were ordered to do nothing about the Ryswick clause until the Emperor had revealed the terms of the peace deal to the Reich. The Hanoverian chancery in London ensured British officials were aware of the intricacies of the issues involved, as a memo for the duke of Newcastle detailing the history of the clause indicates.97 Following Gallieris’s unauthorised attempts to make the religious issue prominent in the peace negotiations, the Dutch had made clear that they did not think religious issues were central to a peace agreement.98 The Hanoverian privy council feared the apparent Dutch volte-face on the religious issue might unsettle protestants in the Empire. They told Hattorf they believed George should give reassurances about his continued commitment to the religious issue.99 The deputation issue became irrelevant because the Emperor refused to allow a peace congress to meet. Fleury and the Emperor agreed a set of

92

Hugo to George II, Regensburg, 7/11/1735, HHStA, CB 11, 3052: I, fols 215–16. Geheime Räte to George II, Hanover, 22/11/1735, HHStA, CB 11, 1854, fol. 4. 94 George II to Hugo, Hanover, 27/10/1735, HHStA, Hann. 92, 2260, fol. 172. 95 Pro Memoria, [Hanover?], 6/1/1736, ibid., fols 227–30 was a response to a Dutch request. 96 George II to Geheime Räte, St James’s, 23/1/1736, HHStA, Hann. 92, 2261, fol. 21. Note that this is in Hanoverian and not British files. 97 Pro Memoria, St James’s, 19/3/1736, ibid., fols 158–61. Newcastle was sent the memo to incorporate its contents in instructions to Waldegrave (fol. 161v). It was initialled by Hattorf. 98 See addition to Hugo and Reck to George II, Regensburg, 30/1/1736, HHStA, CB 11, 3053: I, fol. 78. 99 Geheime Räte to Hattorf, Hanover, 14/2/1736, HHStA, CB 11, 1854, fol. 34. 93

182

WALPOLE AND THE POLISH SUCCESSION

preliminaries without the arbitration of the Maritime powers.100 The Reichstag was simply asked to grant the Emperor a Vollmacht to conclude the peace. George told the privy council that he remained concerned about the Ryswick issue and that he would try to ensure that it was included in any final agreement.101 Various other protestant powers, such as Sweden, wanted George to pursue the Ryswick issue.102 Robinson was told that he, and other protestant diplomats in Vienna, should exert informal pressure over Ryswick and attempt to gain satisfaction from both the Emperor and, with the Emperor’s help, France.103 Robinson, meanwhile, had been fully informed of the background to the 1734 declaration. Robinson thought both France and the Emperor must be aware that the Maritime powers were unlikely to agree to any new treaty renewing the Ryswick provisions. Therefore, the chances of inserting something into the future treaty depended on ‘the more or less desire in France to have Maritime Powers parties to the future Treaty in question’.104 In May 1736 Robinson reported to Weston that although Prussia seemed dissatisfied with the Emperor’s conduct over the Ryswick clause, the other protestant powers had seemingly been satisfied by an Imperial declaration.105 Robinson doubted much could be done about the religious situation. He thought the Austrians still believed, despite all that had happened, they could automatically rely on the Maritime powers’ support.106 The British should resume their historic role of maintaining the balance of power. The British, with Dutch support, should lead the independent powers of Europe by siding with the house of Bourbon when the Habsburgs were stronger and the Austrians when the French had the ascendancy. Robinson thought Austria was still in danger because of the problems Charles’s death would cause.107 Perhaps Robinson felt that, within this grander scheme of things, the abolition of the Ryswick clause was not worth pursuing because of its potential for causing a further rupture with Austria. Horace Walpole, who had journeyed with George to Hanover, informed Robinson that he was to consult the Dutch, Swedish and Danish representatives in Vienna on the Ryswick issue. George had been petitioned by the Corpus to ensure that the article was not included in the peace treaty and he intended to do this. Robinson was to remind the Emperor of the good faith

100

For the negotiations, see Max Braubach, Versailles und Wien von Ludwig XIV. bis Kaunitz (Bonn, 1952), ch. 5. 101 George to Geheime Räte, St James’s, 9/3/1736, HHStA, CB 11, 1854, fol. 71v. 102 Addition to Hugo to George, Regensburg, 19/3/1736, HHStA, CB 11, 3053: I, fols 271–2. 103 Harrington to Robinson, Whitehall, 4/5/1736, PRO, SP 80/121. 104 Robinson to Harrington, Vienna, 5/5/1736, ibid. 105 Robinson to Weston, Vienna, 19/5/1736, ibid. 106 Robinson to H. Walpole, Vienna, 6/6/1736, ibid. 107 Ibid. 183

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

the protestants had shown by granting the Emperor full powers to negotiate a settlement. George had persuaded himself that the Emperor would use the powers properly ‘& not suffer the Interests of the Evangelical States of the Empire to be now forgot or sacrificed’.108 Throughout the summer of 1736, Robinson consulted fellow protestant diplomats about how they might best petition Charles on the Ryswick issue. The king was keen on joint action because he thought that it was more likely to succeed. Waldegrave in Paris had also been asked to take part in a similar coordinated action to petition the French.109 When the memo was finally presented in September, Robinson reported that the Austrians could not believe that the French had no objections to the removal of the Ryswick clause.110 An extended period of Austrian prevarication followed – Austrian officials in Paris claimed to know nothing about the clause, even though protestant diplomats in Vienna had been assured that the Austrians would work for its removal.111 Robinson’s reluctance to push too hard may also have found some resonance with the king. Horace Walpole told Trevor, the resident in The Hague, that although George was glad that the Dutch were prepared to help in efforts to get the clause removed, he was also glad that its abolition had not become a sine qua non of the peace, ‘because the forcing upon the Emperor & France a point of Religion in such strong terms might drive them closer together’ and create a dangerous alliance.112

The war in the public sphere Unsurprisingly, the war attracted attention in the public sphere. Pamphlets from Regensburg, preserved in Hanoverian archives, show that one prominent issue in 1734 was whether neutrality was legitimate. Some thought the Emperor’s declaration on the Ryswick issue suggested he was favouring protestants over catholics. Frage, ob der speciose Religions-Titel, oder Praetext hinlänglich seye, die Neutralitaet geltend zu machen addressed this issue.113 Hugo and Reck attributed it to a catholic priest.114 The author tried to separate the need to combat universal monarchy from righteous religious zeal. He claimed, for example, that the Spanish Armada was caused by Spain’s lust for universal

108

H. Walpole to Robinson, Hanover, 24/6/1736, PRO, SP 80/121. H. Walpole to Robinson, Hanover, 22/7/1736, PRO, SP 80/122. The memo must be polite, yet make clear how seriously the protestant powers took the issue. 110 Robinson to H. Walpole, Vienna, 1/9/1736, PRO, SP 80/123. 111 See the exchanges in PRO, SP 80/124, particularly Robinson to Horace Walpole, Vienna, 14 and 21/11/1736. 112 H. Walpole to Trevor, Hanover, 16/9/1736, PRO, SP 84/359, fol. 16. 113 For a MS version of the text, see HHStA, CB 11, 3048: I, fols 165–7. A printed version has been inserted afterwards. 114 Addition to Hugo and Reck to George II, Regensburg, 11/11/1734, ibid., fol. 162. 109

184

WALPOLE AND THE POLISH SUCCESSION

monarchy and secular power and not a pious desire to defend the true faith.115 Despite the Emperor’s recent promises about the Ryswick clause, it was wrong to portray the present conflict as one between a heterodox Emperor and the pious French. Instead it was necessary to combat Bourbon (secular) ambition for universal monarchy, regardless of their confession.116 Pro-Austrian catholics in the Reich felt it necessary to uncouple the concepts of universal monarchy and catholicism. Austria consistently claimed that the war was not a defence of the true faith (and certainly not to support protestantism, as the Bavarians claimed) but against Bourbon power.117 Summaries of this and other pamphlets appeared in the periodical press.118 Protestants emphasised the spurious nature of Bavarian claims about a religious war, perhaps because they hoped to achieve their aims by indicating both their loyalty to the Emperor and the legal basis of their claims about Ryswick. It was consequently tactically astute to portray their catholic rivals as zealots and themselves as reasonable. Other protestant periodicals argued the biggest threat to the Emperor was Bourbon power. The French might now be able to achieve universal dominion.119 The language of universal monarchy could be deployed in a variety of ways. A proper understanding depends on context. Consideration of tracts produced in Britain reinforces this point. The conflict in Poland provided an ideal opportunity for the opposition in Britain to criticise ministerial policy. The most famous tract to appear was William Pulteney’s The politicks on both sides.120 Pulteney, and most opposition authors, saw the various 1725 alliances as the cause of present foreign political difficulties.121 Ministerial policy since 1727 had been misguided. In particular, the Treaty of Seville was condemned for irritating the Emperor.122 The opposition had claimed then, correctly it now seemed, that the Emperor would not accept Spanish garrisons in Italy without the guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction.123 The second Treaty of Vienna (1731) had also failed to produce a lasting peace. The conflict in Poland was not accidental but the result of 115

Frage, ob der speciose Religions-Titel, oder Praetext hinlänglich seye, die Neutralitaet geltend zu machen (np, nd [1734]), sig. A3v. 116 Ibid., sigs B1–2. 117 See also the MSS of Ohn-interessierte Catholisch-gesinnte Gedancken enclosed in Hugo and Reck to George II, Regensburg, addition to 6/12/1734, HHStA, CB 11, 3048: II, fols 292–6. This argued that confessional concerns were simply a mask for Bavarian ambitions to take the Imperial title. 118 See Allerneuester Zustand von Europa (3 vols, Leipzig, 1734–6), ii, no. 16 (1735), pp. 683–9. The periodical’s author was probably Johann Zschachwitz, a professor of law and history at Halle. 119 Neue Europäische Fama, I, 6 (1735), pp. 461–2. 120 [William Pulteney], The Politicks on both sides, with regard to foreign affairs (2nd edn, London, 1734). 121 Ibid., p. 7. 122 Ibid., p. 47. 123 Ibid., p. 52. 185

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

ministerial incompetence.124 Valuable naval funds were being diverted to pay for the costs of unpopular land forces, particularly Hessian regiments.125 Thus, the tract encompasses standard opposition arguments in favour of a ‘blue water’ policy in contrast to the perceived continental strategy of the ruling whig oligarchy. The tract drew forth an anonymous response.126 Typically the author pointed out how dangerous the Austro-Spanish Treaty of Vienna (1725) had been. Only the credulous, such as the opposition, could possibly have believed the Emperor’s word that there was no secret treaty.127 The Ostend Company in the Austrian Netherlands was more than simply a commercial threat. The opposition had wanted Britain to join an Austro-Spanish treaty that was ‘calculated to wrest the Balance of Power out of the Hands of the Protestant Maritime Interest’ and place it in popish hands. How could such men be ‘esteem’d the Champions of the Protestant Cause, and Patrons of Trade and Navigation, who had so sincerely struggled to destroy both?’ 128 Blue water advocates had apparently claimed that theirs was the strategy most likely to secure the protestant interest. By contrast, the ministerial author thought that the opposition had only endangered it. The opposition frequently argued the sole reason the Spaniards had for allying with Austria had been their pique at the return of the Infanta (something, it was claimed, the ministry could have done more to prevent). The ministerial author countered that support for the Pretender had actually been one reason why the Spanish had agreed to the 1725 treaty.129 In the circumstances it had been imperative for the British to ally with France. Otherwise they had risked the French combining with Austria and Spain in support of the Jacobites, which would inevitably have posed a severe threat to the protestant interest both at home and abroad.130 Who could legitimately claim to be the best defender of protestantism was a crucial area of political debate. The costs of maintaining Hessian regiments had triggered debate inside and outside parliament in the early 1730s. Ministerial authors contended the troops provided diplomatic leverage.131 Parliament could not leave Hanover defenceless, if it was endangered through its connection with Britain. The obligations were strongly implied, even without a formal alliance.132 The opposition’s real

124

Ibid., p. 63. Ibid., p. 70. 126 A Series of wisdom and policy, manifested in a review of our Foreign Negotiations and Transactions for several years past. Being a complete answer to Politicks on both sides (London, 1735). 127 Ibid., pp. 10–11. 128 Ibid., p. 17. 129 Ibid., pp. 22–6. 130 Ibid., p. 31. 131 Ibid., p. 33. 132 Ibid., pp. 36–7. 125

186

WALPOLE AND THE POLISH SUCCESSION

aim in objecting to the troops was clear. Anti-Hessian politics were calculated to produce the opposition’s main aim ‘the Destruction of the Protestant Balance of Power in Europe, in order to transfer it securely into other Hands’.133 The second Treaty of Vienna (1731) was useful because it split Spain and Austria. Underlying the conclusion was the assumption that the maintenance of the balance of power was an active, rather than static, process. Alliances would change so English ministers must keep a watchful eye on Europe. Continental involvement was a necessity, not a luxury.134 Ministerial polemic viewed the maintenance of the balance of power and the protestant interest as central to British foreign policy. By contrast the opposition stood accused of being closet Jacobites, whose aim was to unite with Britain’s catholic enemies abroad to destroy English liberties and the protestant succession. Both sides continued to see the treaties of 1725 as defining the course of recent foreign policy. It was over the interpretation of ministerial reactions to the Austro-Spanish alliance of that year that they disagreed. Hervey’s account of Robert Walpole’s centrality needs radical revision. The split was not simply between the ‘correct’ blue water policy and the ‘false’ continental policy of those simply seeking to please the king. Court gossip needs to be balanced with both strategic calculation and a proper assessment of monarchical power. Moreover, Walpole was not the sole defender of a British ‘national interest’ in the face of George’s German proclivities. George was not simply a vehement anti-Gallican supporter of the Emperor. His loyalty came at a price. Part of that price related to reassurances about territorial disputes in Mecklenburg and the Rhineland. But George was also interested in extracting reassurances from the Emperor on confessional issues. George may have disagreed with members of the Corpus about how these reassurances might best be achieved but he was undoubtedly concerned. His concern explains why British diplomats and others favoured the idea of a protestant league in 1736 and 1737. Diplomatic efforts to remove the Ryswick clause ultimately failed. France and Austria reached a settlement without the mediation of the Maritime powers. The leverage the protestant powers had over Charles to keep his promises of 1734 was lost. The eventual peace settlement between Charles and France, signed in November 1738, was not introduced at Regensburg for ratification until March 1740.135 The settlement was still unratified when Charles died in October 1740. Yet once more, it is clear the fear of universal monarchy and the need to preserve the protestant interest and the balance of power were vital for legitimating ministerial policy. The defence of the protestant interest remained important both as rhetoric and policy in both Britain and Hanover in the 1730s.

133 134 135

Ibid., p. 39 (emphasis in original). Ibid., p. 71. Hugo to George II, Regensburg, 15/3/1740, HHStA, CB 11, 3070: II, fols 166–7. 187

7

The decline of the protestant interest?

The final chapter traces the interaction of the protestant interest and foreign policy to the outbreak of the Seven Years War. It is a story of partial decline: within diplomatic correspondence, and more popular discussions of policy, the linkage of the protestant interest and the balance of Europe observed in earlier chapters occurs less frequently. Phrases such as the ‘common cause’ and the ‘Old System’ appear instead. The chapter explores why this shift happened. The explanation partly lies in structural alterations to the international system. International relations were becoming more complicated as the number of ‘great powers’ increased. Prior to 1713, France had been viewed as the main (but not sole) threat to European protestantism. The Grand Alliance, even with catholic members, could, therefore, function as a protestant shield. French power declined after Louis XIV’s death. George I stressed protestant unity in the 1720s because one of his key diplomatic adversaries was now catholic Austria. Relations with Austria improved after 1740 so it seemed less opportune for George II to stress confessional difference. However, confessional language did not entirely disappear. Indeed the chapter illustrates how confessional language was variously deployed between 1740 and 1756, thus indicating its continuing utility and flexibility. More importantly, though, Prussia’s rise to great power status during the period upset several assumptions that had dominated British and Hanoverian thinking since 1688. The changing relationship between Britain, Hanover and the leading protestant powers, Prussia and the United Provinces needs to be considered, as do Frederick the Great’s policies and personality. The 1740s witnessed a very public dispute about the continuing suitability of the personal union. How closely this dispute was mirrored amongst the political elite will be discussed, as will the changing nature of the duke of Newcastle’s attitudes towards Hanover. It will also be possible to consider the strategic direction of foreign policy and whether the paths of Britain and Hanover were converging or diverging. The chapter combines analytical and chronological discussion so it is helpful to begin by providing a brief narrative sketch. Following the end of the War of the Polish succession, Austria was at war with the Ottoman empire from 1737 to 1739. Austrian participation in the war resulted from an alliance with Russia and the Russians gained far more than the Austrians from the 188

DECLINE OF PROTESTANT INTEREST?

conflict. This was symptomatic of a broader problem. The rise of Russia made her a useful ally for conflicts in western Europe. At the same time, Russia was keen to expand at the expense of the Ottomans. Ottoman, and later Polish, decline reduced the buffer zone between Austria, Prussia and Russia, thus increasing tensions between those powers. Austrian power looked to be in decline in the late 1730s.1 The British found themselves increasingly isolated. British relations with Spain deteriorated over trade disputes in the Americas, leading to war in 1739 (the War of Jenkins’ Ear).2 More general European warfare broke out in 1740, triggered by three deaths. In May 1740 Frederick William I of Prussia died and was succeeded by his son, who became Frederick II. The Emperor Charles VI died in October 1740. Charles lacked male heirs so had sought to regulate the succession through a system of guarantees known as the Pragmatic Sanction. The majority of European powers had promised to allow his daughter Maria Theresa to succeed him in all his hereditary territories.3 Finally, Tsarina Anna Ivanova also died in October 1740 and was succeeded in Russia by the infant Ivan IV. Seeing Austria weakened and Russia unlikely to act, Frederick broke his father’s promise and propelled himself onto the international scene by invading Silesia.4 A series of interrelated conflicts followed with fighting in the Empire, the Low Countries and Italy in which France, Austria, Prussia, Britain, the United Provinces and Hanover all became involved.5 Peace was finally made at Aachen in 1748. Charles VI’s death also triggered an Imperial election. In January 1742 the Habsburg family lost the Imperial title for the first time since 1437 when Elector Charles Albert of Bavaria, whose forces had made deep advances into Habsburg territory, was elected Charles VII. However, following Charles’s death in 1745, Maria Theresa’s husband, Francis Stephen of Lorraine, was elected Emperor and Habsburg honour restored. The trauma caused by the loss suggested to the duke of Newcastle that he could cement good relations with Maria Theresa by ensuring that such a situation would not arise again. Newcastle hoped to restore what he called the ‘Old System’ and AngloAustrian relations by promoting a scheme to elect Francis Stephen and Maria Theresa’s eldest son, Joseph, king of the Romans. Just as the Empire’s electors chose the Emperor, they could also elect the king of the Romans, or Emperor designate. Discussing this scheme enables consideration of differing

1

See Karl A. Roider, The reluctant ally: Austria’s policy in the Austro-Turkish War, 1737–1739 (Baton Rouge, 1972) and Michael Hochedlinger, Austria’s wars of emergence (London, 2003), pp. 212–18. For the impact of the rise of Russia, particularly on Hanover, see Walther Mediger, Moskaus Weg nach Europa (Brunswick, 1952). 2 The best recent discussion is Philip Woodfine, Britannia’s glories (Woodbridge, 1998). 3 See p. 134. 4 Frederick retrospectively argued Russia’s situation persuaded him to risk the Silesian invasion. See Frederick II, ‘Histoire de mon temps’ ed. Max Posner, in Publicationen aus den Preussischen Staatsarchiven, 4 (Leipzig, 1879), pp. 214–15. 5 See M.S. Anderson, The War of the Austrian succession (London, 1995). 189

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

Hanoverian and British priorities and how religion related to these. The period between 1740 and 1756 marked the emergence of both Prussia and Russia as great powers.6 The pentarchy of states (Britain, France, Austria, Prussia and Russia) which Leopold von Ranke famously argued remained vital for the structure of international relations well into the nineteenth century came into being.7 The Seven Years War, which broke out in 1756 and faciliated the consolidation of the pentarchy system, is the terminal point of this study. Having briefly sketched the background, discussing British and Hanoverian attitudes to Austria, the United Provinces and Prussia illuminates further the nature of change.

Austria Attitudes towards Austria were crucial for awareness of the protestant interest. In the 1720s Austria was seen as a popish power conspiring to promote universal monarchy and to destroy the liberties of Europe and of protestants within the Empire. By the later 1730s things had changed. Once more France appeared to be more likely to instigate universal monarchy and destroy Europe’s freedoms. Austria might now be needed as a potential ally for Britain and Hanover to ensure that a proper balance was maintained. The growth of interest in the ‘Old System’ reflected this possibility. The ‘Old System’ referred to the Grand Alliance formed during the War of the Spanish succession to combat Louis XIV. Britain, Hanover and Austria had all been members. Criticism of Austrian religious policy did not simply disappear because Austria was now considered an ally again. Austrian treatment of protestants features in subsequent discussions of both the nature of the ‘Old System’ more generally and how Austria dealt with Prussia’s emergence as a major rival. British diplomats in the late 1730s remained interested in protestant affairs in central Europe. While Sir Thomas Robinson, the British minister in Vienna, was away in April 1738, business was left in the hands of Isaac Dunant, the chargé d’affaires. Dunant wrote to Harrington, the secretary of state for the Northern department, to inform him that a large number of protestants had been imprisoned in Transylvania but Dunant, in the absence of a proper cipher, refused to discuss the case in more detail.8 A few days later Dunant returned

6

See Derek McKay and H.M. Scott, The rise of the great powers (London, 1983), chs 2–6. For pentarchy, see Heinz Duchhardt, Balance of Power und Pentarchie (Paderborn, 1997), pp. 7–19. For Ranke’s original 1833 essay, see Leopold von Ranke, ‘Die großen Mächte’, in Sämmtliche Werke (54 vols, Leipzig, 1874–90), 24 (Abhandlungen und Versuche, i), pp. 1–40. 8 Dunant to Harrington, Vienna, 16/4/1738, London, Public Record Office [hereafter PRO], State Papers [hereafter SP] 80/129, fol. 150r. The incident arose from the ongoing conflict between the Habsburgs and the Turks and, in particular, the failed Hungarian uprising led by József Rákóczy in March 1738. 7

190

DECLINE OF PROTESTANT INTEREST?

to religious themes. He reported to Harrington that Baron Knor, one of the Aulic counsellors, had converted to catholicism.9 Knor’s connections to the Austrian minister Bartenstein made him an important member of the council. Bartenstein was generally regarded as unfriendly to British interests.10 The Aulic council, as one of the highest courts of the Empire, was frequently called upon to adjudicate in religious disputes. Consequently the conversion of a leading counsellor threw into doubt the council’s recent decisions on religious matters. Conversion was important for advancement and patronage in the Empire, be it at the level of Saxon electors or humble jurists.11 Following his return to Vienna, Robinson told Harrington that the Austrian chancellor had enquired about current British views on Spain. Robinson admitted that, given his long absence, he felt like a stranger back in London but he had noticed a significant degree of popular anger against Spain. He had informed the chancellor that he had also observed that the ‘old Sore of the Ostend Company, and other late unkind Treatments, in the way of Trade’ had meant that the people of England had ‘fallen from that Tenderness . . . which they used to have for the very Name of Austria’.12 Robinson probably thought that this was a good way to exert pressure over commercial grievances but undersecretary Edward Weston’s answer to Robinson’s letter is revealing. Weston replied that an important reason for Austria’s unpopularity was that it persecuted protestants. Indeed he claimed ‘I have heard that more generally complained of in this Country, than all the rest put together’ and included details of a recent case of persecution received from Hamburg.13 Robinson was subsequently able to show that Hamburg reports about persecution of protestants in Vienna were misguided and actually related to a number of immigrant artisans from both confessions who had been forced to leave Vienna, due to local pressure.14 Robinson was not particularly sympathetic towards protestant complaints.15 Perhaps he had ‘gone native’ and was therefore reluctant to

9

Dunant to Harrington, Vienna, 26/5/1738, ibid., fol. 165r. Although from over a decade later, Newcastle’s complaints about Bartenstein in 1749 are typical. See Newcastle to W. Bentinck, Newcastle House, 3/3/1749, London, British Library [hereafter BL], Additional Manuscripts [hereafter Add. MSS] 32816, fol. 188 and Newcastle to C. Bentinck, Newcastle House, 29/12/1749, very secret, BL, Add. MSS 32819, fol. 305r. 11 Augustus of Saxony’s conversion to catholicism resulted, in addition to the Polish throne, in the marriage of his eldest son to a Habsburg archduchess. The Swiss diplomat, François Louis de Pesme, Seigneur de St Saphorin, one of Robinson’s predecessors in Vienna, ultimately left Imperial service because, as a protestant, he viewed his promotion prospects as limited. See S. Stelling-Michaud, La carrière diplomatique de F.-L. de Pesme, seigneur de Saint Saphorin. Vol. 1 Saint Saphorin et la politique de la Suisse pendant la Guerre de Succession d’Espagne (Villette-les-Cully, 1935), pp. 39–40. 12 Robinson to Harrington, Vienna, 28/5/1738, PRO, SP 80/130. 13 Weston to Robinson, Whitehall, 6/6/1738, BL, Add. MSS 23801. 14 Robinson to Weston, Vienna, 12/7/1738, PRO, SP 80/130. 15 Faced with another commission from London to help the Salzburgers bound for Georgia, 10

191

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

criticise. Others, further from the Austrians than Robinson, remained concerned about Austrian treatment of protestants. How events of the 1740s altered this picture is a theme to which it will be necessary to return later.

The United Provinces One result of the changes to the international situation in the 1740s was that the influence of the United Provinces in European affairs was declining.16 The effect this had on the protestant interest is best measured by recalling that Anglo-Dutch cooperation had been widely regarded as a key component of the defence of the protestant interest in Europe. Either Britain (and Hanover) would have to take the lead more in protestant affairs themselves or a new partner would have to be sought. The possibly detrimental effect of Dutch decline on the ability of the Maritime powers to continue in their role of ‘balancers’ within the European states system was not lost on contemporaries. The earl of Chesterfield, writing in 1745, observed that the Dutch form of government made them impotent and he thought that they would soon be subservient to the French. He feared a future peace would ‘not leave what us’d to be call’d the Ballance of Europe; and as the Dutch will certainly not be a power, we had better neglect them, than ourselves’.17 A shift had occurred from a communality of religious sentiment leading automatically to alliance towards a situation where each of the great powers had to look to its own interests and consider these above any other sort of connection. Once the Dutch realised that the French threat to their borders could be contained by neutrality agreements, the antipathy towards France that had held the Maritime powers together began to dissipate. While the trend may have been in this direction, it was both gradual and incomplete. Confessional concerns could still surface, especially in the area of dynastic attachments. The marriages of George II’s children, such as his daughter Anne to William IV of Orange, were frequently lauded as means of strengthening the protestant interest. Not all these matches proved successful in religio-political terms. One of George’s daughters, Mary, had married Frederick, eldest son of the landgrave of Hessen-Kassel. Mary’s marriage was far from happy. In 1754 it emerged that Frederick had converted to catholicism. This caused consternation in London. Newcastle wrote to

Robinson advised Weston of the great difficulties he would face and concluded ‘your good people in England, think it is enough to pray the intercession of the King without considering whether such an intercession is likely to be practicable’ (Robinson to Weston, Vienna, 28/5/1735, PRO, SP 80/115). 16 See Alice Clare Carter, The Dutch republic in Europe in the Seven Years War (London, 1971), ch. 1 and idem, Neutrality or commitment (London, 1975). 17 Chesterfield to Newcastle, Dublin Castle, 24/10/1745, apart, BL, Add. MSS 32705, fol. 284r. 192

DECLINE OF PROTESTANT INTEREST?

Joseph Yorke, British minister in The Hague, to solicit Dutch support for assurances for protestants in the landgrave’s lands, adding that ‘surely the Repu[blic]k will not refuse to concur in any Guaranty, in which the Protestant Religion is so much concern’d. It would be shameful, if it did.’18 Yorke replied that Anne was glad that George was determined to act and concluded that the Dutch of every rank could be depended upon ‘where the interest of Religion is concern’d, & she can’t pay her Court more than by exerting herself upon the occasion’.19 How the appeal to a common protestant heritage was used to cajole support from the Dutch during the War of the Austrian succession will be considered subsequently but it is now necessary to discuss the only viable alternative as a support to the protestant interest – Prussia.

Prussia and the changes of the 1740s Frederick the Great’s accession heralded change at a number of levels. Both British and Hanoverian officials wondered how best to deal with the new king. George II visited Hanover in the summer of 1740. The diplomatic situation was tense. Harrington, with the king in Hanover, told Trevor in Holland that it was imperative to remind the Dutch how the liberties of Europe and the protestant religion would be endangered if the Dutch failed to support the British against Spain.20 Relations between George and Frederick William I had been difficult but the change of monarch in Prussia potentially offered a new start. Harrington wrote enthusiastically to Newcastle in July 1740 to tell him about his meeting with Count Truchsess, who had been sent to inform George of Frederick William’s death. Harrington had told Truchsess about the importance of devising a plan to counter French ambition ‘and as a Bulwark to the Protestant Religion in particular’. He had told him what great things Frederick could do ‘and how ready and desirous His Majesty would be to join with him, in an Alliance for those important Purposes’. Harrington was disappointed to discover that Truchsess had no orders to negotiate.21 The tactic is an interesting one. Harrington clearly thought that an appeal to protestant unity might carry weight with the new king. George I had utilised this approach with considerable success in the early 1720s. George I had always held much more sway with his nephew Frederick William I than George II had ever managed to achieve. Perhaps George II thought that, with a new monarch, he could resume the role of senior adviser to the Prussian crown which his father had enjoyed.

18 19 20 21

Newcastle to J. Yorke, Newcastle House, 1/11/1754, BL, Add. MSS 32851, fol. 124r. J. Yorke to Newcastle, Hague, 5/11/1754, private, ibid., fol. 146. Harrington to Trevor, Hanover, 29/6/1740, PRO, SP 43/25, fol. 150v. Harrington to Newcastle, Hanover, 6/7/1740, ibid., fol. 201. 193

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

George used protestant solidarity to urge Prussia to prevent the growth of Bourbon power. Unsurprisingly religion did not feature in a similar appeal to Austria in October 1740. Harrington instructed Robinson to warn the Emperor of the dangers that might follow for Europe if Britain were exhausted by a conflict with both France and Spain. ‘How easy a Prey both the Emperor and the Rest of Europe must prove to the Power of that Family [the Bourbons], when the King who is one of the principal Bulwarks, should be disabled from giving any Assistance in the Common Cause.’22 George clearly wanted to secure his international position through treaties. An attempt had been made to secure an alliance with Prussia even before Harrington’s meetings with Truchsess. Gerlach Adolf von Münchhausen, the effective Hanoverian chief minister, had been dispatched by George to Berlin in June 1740.23 How to handle the death of the Prussian monarch had been considered before. In 1734, when Frederick William was seriously ill, George had sent draft instructions to the Geheime Räte in Hanover for any diplomat sent to Berlin on Frederick William’s death. These instructions included an appeal for better relations between Hanover and Prussia because it would help protestantism within the Empire.24 This particular provision was not included in Münchhausen’s instructions in 1740 but he nevertheless quickly formed the view that the Prussians were interested in an alliance.25 Having met the king on 12 June, Münchhausen reported back to George on 18 June. Münchhausen thought Frederick would probably be a better friend of the arts than his father had been. It was unlikely that all the court etiquette that Frederick William had banished would be reintroduced. Frederick was, however, much more francophile than his father and very interested in belles-lettres. He seemed indifferent to religion but Münchhausen had tried to impress upon him the dangers from France. France was plotting to establish a universal monarchy in the north. An alliance with George would provide the means to secure both the Reich and protestantism.26 Münchhausen’s observations on Frederick’s character and attitudes proved to be strikingly accurate. Yet, like Harrington, Münchhausen attempted to win Prussian support through stressing the advantages to protestantism (and the Reich) of an alliance. Münchhausen assumed Frederick could eventually be won over by careful management.27 Frederick, for his part, did little to discourage British and Hanoverian attempts to win an alliance. Harrington reported to Newcastle that the possibility of a future

22

Harrington to Robinson, Hanover, 10/10/1740, PRO, SP 43/26, fol. 262. For this mission, see F. Frensdorff, ‘G.A. von Münchhausens Berichte über seine Mission nach Berlin im Juni 1740’, Abhandlungen der Königlichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen. Philogisch-Historische Klasse, neue Folge 8: 2 (1904). 24 Frensdorff, ‘Münchhausens Berichte’, p. 11. 25 Ibid., pp. 13, 21. 26 Ibid., pp. 37–41. 27 Uriel Dann, Hanover and Great Britain, 1740–1760 (Leicester, 1991), p. 18. Dann also highlights Münchhausen’s prescience in observing Frederick’s fear of Russia. 23

194

DECLINE OF PROTESTANT INTEREST?

marriage alliance had been raised. George was keen because Münchhausen had told him that there was little prospect of Frederick producing heirs. Frederick had expressed interest but had excused himself from any formal commitment until he had acquainted himself properly with his own affairs ‘of which he was as yet quite ignorant’.28 Some British ministers were sceptical about George’s efforts to secure Prussia. Newcastle complained to Hardwicke that the advantages of the alliance seemed purely electoral and Britain would be forced into war with France to secure Prussian and Hanoverian gains. Moreover the larger Frederick’s demands, the more pleasing they were to George because it suggested that even greater Hanoverian advantages could be obtained in return.29 Trevor observed to Robinson that he hoped George could unite Germany ‘provided the cement of that Union be properly tempered with our Insulary interest’.30 British and Hanoverian fears that Frederick was also negotiating with France, to procure the best possible terms for Prussia, proved accurate and hopes of an alliance diminished after the invasion of Silesia.31 Frederick had assumed that he could use British resources to help Prussia and repay the debt by allowing Hanover to make territorial gains. The Hanoverian ministry was, however, reluctant to make gains and Frederick failed to appreciate that George’s dual roles as elector and king restricted his freedom of manoeuvre.32 The invasion of Silesia and Frederick’s alliance with France made it difficult to assimilate Frederick within a ‘protestant interest’ approach to foreign policy. By exploring differing assessments of Frederick’s actions it is clear Frederick’s emergence had not only a profound impact on the international scene but also on the continuing viability of the protestant interest as a unifying concept. The problem with Frederick, from the British and Hanoverian point of view, was his sincerity. He was adept at doing enough to make one believe that he was doing one thing, even when he was actually intending to do the precise opposite. For example, Frederick was perfectly willing to play the protestant card when it suited his purposes. In 1741 he justified his invasion of Silesia to George on the grounds that it enabled him to fulfil his historic role as a protector of protestants.33 To those accustomed to religion being a common concern, such an approach was likely to be appealing. In early 1742 Newcastle passed on some recent intelligence to Hardwicke, the lord chancellor, who was drafting the king’s speech from the throne for the opening of the 28

Harrington to Newcastle, Hanover, 29/6/1740, private, BL, Add. MSS 32693, fol. 425. Newcastle to Hardwicke, Claremont, 27/7/1740, BL, Add. MSS 35406, fol. 219. 30 Trevor to Robinson, Hague, 2/8/1740, BL, Add. MSS 23806, fol. 1r (in cipher). 31 See Hardwicke to Newcastle, Wimpole, 30/8/1740, private, BL, Add. MSS 32694, fol. 537v for the fear that Frederick was shopping around for the best alliance deal. 32 Dann, Hanover and Great Britain, p. 19. 33 Frederick II to George II, Berlin, 30/1/1741, Politische Correspondenz Friedrich’s des Grossen (46 vols, Berlin, 1879–1939), I, p. 186. 29

195

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

parliamentary session. Newcastle had recently received a letter from Villiers, a diplomat in central Europe, which reported Prussian, Saxon and Bavarian dissatisfaction with French policy. The letter had also recommended ‘an Union between Us, and Prussia: And that I would have the meaning of your Words: “The support of the Protestant Religion, and Liberties of Europe”’. 34 The phraseology and linkage of protestantism and Europe was a commonplace of such speeches but Newcastle endowed it with a particular meaning on this occasion. It is as if it reflected his aspiration for a union with Prussia, as part of a broader protestant alliance, despite all the evidence to the contrary. For evidence to the contrary there certainly was. Münchhausen noted that Frederick appeared indifferent to religion.35 Moreover, as Dann remarked, George himself was disappointed, hurt, indignant, envious and jealous of Frederick over his invasion of Silesia and ‘never failed to associate his nephew with the main chance’ and a capacity for Realpolitik that made George willing to change course if Hanover might gain territory.36 George’s Hanoverian Geheime Räte were equally shocked by the invasion of Silesia, describing Frederick as a prince ‘without faithfulness and religion’ (‘ohne Treu und Religion’), an unusually forceful condemnation of his actions.37 Nevertheless George attempted to assume his preferred role as mediator and tried to broker an agreement between Frederick and Maria Theresa in 1741. George sent the Earl Hyndford to negotiate with Frederick directly, after he had discovered what concessions Vienna might be prepared to make.38 Hyndford’s instructions made clear the necessity of impressing upon Frederick the dangers that would overtake both the balance and protestantism if the war continued.39 The likelihood or otherwise that Austria would actually concede Silesia to Prussia or that Prussia was willing to accept compensation elsewhere is less important than observing again how George sought to woo Frederick away from France with arguments based on balance of power and protestant interest ideas.40 Attempts to find a solution dragged on. George was forced to sign a neutrality agreement to prevent a French invasion of Hanover in September 1741. Hyndford had travelled to Frederick’s court and towards the end of 1741 he secured an hour alone with the king. Frederick began their discussion by

34

Newcastle to Hardwicke, Claremont, 10/1/1742, BL, Add. MSS 32699, fol. 14v. Emphasis in original. 35 Frensdorff, ‘Münchhausens Berichte’, p. 38. 36 Dann, Hanover and Great Britain, p. 24. 37 Ibid., p. 27. 38 For Hyndford’s various negotiations with Frederick, see Richard Lodge, Britain and Prussia in the eighteenth century (Oxford, 1923), ch. 2. 39 Harrington to Hyndford, Hanover, 2/6/1741, BL, Add. MSS 23807, fols 391–3. 40 M.S. Anderson (War of the Austrian succession, p. 72) identifies Bartenstein, whose potential opposition to British interests has already been noted, as the leader of those opposed to granting any concessions to Prussia. 196

DECLINE OF PROTESTANT INTEREST?

observing that recent changes in Russia meant that Prussia was now in a much better position militarily and Austria would therefore want to make peace.41 Hyndford then asked Frederick if he felt safer with the elector of Bavaria on his doorstep, supported by the French. Frederick responded he had sufficient assurances from the elector. Hyndford replied that ‘few princes of this age were fam’d for their bonne foi or their gratitude’. France was unlikely to destroy one great catholic rival in Germany and then ‘raise up another of a different religion such as His Majesty’. Frederick retorted that ‘as for the matter of Religion that is the least concern of Princes’. Hyndford acknowledged that some protestant princes were not so religious ‘as to make them bigots, yet that was not the case with the Catholicks, whose religion very often got the better of their interest’. Frederick must judge for himself what the consequences of religion and interest acting together would be. He should also consider the dangers that Russo-French cooperation posed for all the powers between them. Frederick responded that ‘when that happens, we must do as well as we can’.42 For Frederick, the ultimate Realpolitiker, religion was a matter of indifference to the prince. The obligations created by mutual aid and favours were enough to sustain a viable international system.43 Hyndford, on the other hand, used the standard British line that while religion might not be important for protestant princes, the same could not be said for catholics. Catholic bigotry and the inevitable drift towards the desire for dominance and universal monarchy, prominently represented by France, provided an ever-present danger for Europe. The gap between the two men symbolises the gulf between the politics of the protestant interest pursued by Britain and Hanover and Frederick’s new world order. Underlying Hyndford’s argument was the assumption that it was imperative to resolve Prussian differences with Maria Theresa, the queen of Hungary, because the growth of French power posed a much greater threat to European stability. Thus, when agreement had still not been reached in March 1742, Trevor commented to Robinson that ‘the Prussian Minister here, for fear People should still suspect His Master of having some sense left of His true Interest, & Relations, as a German, Protestant Potentate’ still appeared vehemently opposed to Maria Theresa.44 The British failed to comprehend that Prussia and Frederick might have interests of their own,

41

Extract from Hyndford to Harrington, 26/12/1741, BL, Add. MSS 23809, fol. 288. Frederick expected that the fall of Ostermann, following the removal of Tsar Ivan VI and his replacment by Tsarina Elizabeth would reduce the likelihood of Russian support for Maria Theresa. 42 Ibid., fol. 289r. 43 Frederick had not always thought like this. Schieder quotes a letter to von Natzmer from February 1732 that contains a highly traditional description of the duties of the Christian prince and the need to both encourage and disseminate protestantism. See Theodor Schieder, Frederick the Great edited and translated by Sabina Berkeley and H.M. Scott (London, 2000), p. 94. 44 Trevor to Robinson, Hague, 30/3/1742, BL, Add. MSS 23810, fol. 262r. 197

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

independent of participation in a vast system constructed to resist French power. They were slow to mark the Prussian transition from secondary to great power status. They were also incredulous that a protestant prince could ignore the dangers posed by catholicism. By late 1742 George wanted to act, as he put it, to free the German princes from French slavery. Carteret told Hyndford that George expected praise, rather than opposition, from ‘all true Members of the Empire’, presumably because he feared that Frederick would oppose his designs.45 George achieved some success with victory at the head of the Pragmatic Army at Dettingen on 27 June 1743.46 In the interim, however, difficulties had arisen with Prussia. Agreement between Prussia and Austria seemed closer but was dependent on an additional deal with Bavaria. George was deeply concerned by the proposal to give the Imperial (and protestant) free cities of Ulm, Augsburg and Regensburg to Bavaria. George thought that, with mature reflection, Frederick would realise that neither of them could allow this. How would the smaller protestant states, who looked to George and Frederick for protection, react when they discovered that Prussia and Britain–Hanover ‘were the first to offer up the Libertys & Conscience of three of the greatest Protestant Citys in Germany’ to Bavaria?47 The resultant loss of Prussian and Hanoverian/British influence in Holland, Switzerland the Corpus and the northern crowns should give Frederick pause for thought, as it had George. George also thought parliament would never agree to the proposal.48 George was further irritated because the Emperor (a Bavarian, not a Habsburg, at this point) was unwilling to suggest the secularisation of catholic bishoprics himself, for fear of offending other catholic powers, but wanted Prussia and Hanover to do his dirty work.49 Again the hope, and it was probably little more, that Frederick would play ‘confessional ball’ is apparent. Significantly some had moved past forlorn hope to active antagonism towards Prussia. Far from being the longed-for protestant hero, Horace Walpole the younger, artistic patron, politician and Sir Robert Walpole’s youngest son, in his ‘Memoirs from the Declaration of the War with Spain’, commented that Frederick was the ‘trampler of all treaties, religions, justice and interests but his own personal’.50 Frederick was a potential universal monarch. His criticism

45

Carteret to Hyndford, Whitehall, 7/12/1742, BL, Add. MSS 22531, fols 96–7. The impact of the battle on the public sphere in Austria, France, Britain and Hanover is considered in Sebastian Küster, Vier Monarchien – Vier Öffentlichkeiten: Kommunikation um die Schlacht bei Dettingen (Münster, 2004). 47 Carteret to Hyndford, Whitehall, 1/3/1743, ibid., fol. 113r. 48 Ibid., fol. 113v. 49 Ibid., fols 113v–114r. 50 H. Walpole (the younger), ‘Memoirs from the Declaration of the War with Spain’ in Horace Walpole, Memoirs of King George II ed. John Brooke (3 vols, New Haven, 1985), III, p. 129. 46

198

DECLINE OF PROTESTANT INTEREST?

of Frederick did not end there: when discussing toryism under Anne, he noted that she was the last British monarch to attempt to combine those two jarring principles Protestantism and absolute power. An unnatural mixture achieved in Denmark and Prussia, where the kings have arrived at enslaving the persons of their subjects without the aid of religion. An association as unnatural, as the contrary one of Popery and liberty in Poland and Venice.

Stuart despotism ensured that the Hanoverians adopted opposite principles.51 Walpole’s default assumption was still that popery went hand in hand with absolute power and protestantism with liberty. One reason why Frederick was so worrying was precisely because his actions seemed so unnatural. While Frederick’s unwillingness to settle provoked hostility amongst some British politicians, many were still prepared to defend him or at least to argue that he ought not to be humiliated. In May 1742 Trevor and Stair argued that it was unlikely that Frederick had made all his conquests in order to allow France to control Germany and destroy protestantism. Instead if a deal could be reached with Maria Theresa, Prussia might join an alliance with the Maritime powers and this protestant union would provide the best means to defend Austria and defeat France.52 News in June 1745 that the latest Austrian attack on Frederick in Silesia had met with little success prompted Horace Walpole the elder, Sir Robert’s brother, to write to Newcastle. Walpole was perfectly willing to describe Frederick as ‘vain glorious’ but thought that the latest fighting would have made him reconsider his position. His real concern, though, was with the general direction of the campaign. Revenge against a protestant prince with a thirst for territorial gain should not become the aim of the war but rather it should remain securing the balance and reducing the exorbitant power of France.53 The main task was avoiding French universal monarchy. Walpole was keen that even an objectionable protestant prince was not unnecessarily destroyed. Frederick’s arrival had undoubtedly upset a series of cherished assumptions in both Britain and Hanover. This becomes even clearer when the War of the Austrian succession and the problems it created are explored more fully.

The War of the Austrian succession One consequence of the French invasion of the Reich in 1741 was that George could only secure Hanover by signing a neutrality agreement. George was in Hanover when the agreement was signed so those left in London, particularly

51 52 53

Ibid., pp. 132–3. Stair and Trevor to Carteret, Hague, 24/5/1742, BL, Add. MSS 23811, fols 30–2. H. Walpole to Newcastle, Woolterton, 9/6/1745, BL, Add. MSS 32704, fol. 365r. 199

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

Newcastle and Hardwicke, the lord chancellor and a close ally of Newcastle, felt that they had been left in the dark about the negotiations. Newcastle felt frustrated that not enough had been done to help Maria Theresa. He thought parliament might have been willing to support her financially. Had electoral concerns not led to an unwillingness to countenance Prussian gains, it would have been possible to open negotiations between Prussia and Austria much earlier. Now fears that Frederick might attack Hanover prevented the Hanoverians from sending any troops to help Maria Theresa.54 Newcastle’s fears partly reflected the paranoia of a statesman unused to being away from the centre of the action, but his broader fear was clearly that Hanoverian neutrality was the precursor of unchallenged French domination on the continent. As he commented to Harrington, ‘what Lewis the 14th did but aim at, with a most victorious Army during the first part of His Reign, Lewis the 15th will bring about, and accomplish, perhaps without striking a Stroke’.55 Newcastle was already worried that, should the neutrality fail and France invade Hanover and it emerged that George had sought a neutrality agreement, no parliamentary funds would be secured to defend Hanover because of the previous failure to help Maria Theresa.56 Newcastle believed electoral influence had come before doing the right thing, although he acknowledged to Hardwicke that ministerial opinion was unlikely to make a difference: ‘the King, if he has a mind to do it [electoral neutrality], & can do it, will do it, without us’.57 During the summer of 1741 Newcastle still had to compete with Robert Walpole as the king’s chief minister left in London. The fall of Walpole and the return to office of Carteret created a new competitor for the king’s ear.58 The factional politics that followed Walpole’s fall from office were complicated.59 It took some time to establish a ministry that enjoyed the confidence of both king and parliament. Moreover Carteret’s eventual resignation in November 1744 marked a rare instance of a minister, who still enjoyed the king’s favour, being forced out against the king’s will. When Chesterfield joined the ministry as Lord Lieutenant of Ireland in 1745, George was forced to accept an outspoken critic of Hanover into the ministry. Chesterfield rose even further, becoming secretary of state in succession to Harrington in October 1746. The fate of both the protestant interest and support for the Hanoverian link was subject to the vagaries of partisan politics during the war. This emerges most clearly in the disputes over Hanoverian

54

Newcastle to Hardwicke, Claremont, 9/9/1741, very secret, BL, Add. MSS 32698, fols 16–20. 55 Newcastle to Harrington, Whitehall, 11/9/1741, private, ibid., fol. 36. 56 Considerations upon Ld Harrington’s letters, 24/8/1741, BL, Add. MSS 32697, fols 452–3. 57 Newcastle to Hardwicke, Claremont, 19/7/1741, BL, Add. MSS, 35407, fol. 44v. 58 Basil Williams, Carteret and Newcastle (Cambridge, 1943) is still useful. 59 J.B. Owen, The rise of the Pelhams (London, 1957) remains an invaluable introduction. 200

DECLINE OF PROTESTANT INTEREST?

troops in 1743–4.60 Patriot, and opposition, discourse used Hanover as an easy stick with which to beat the ministry. Of course, the partisan nature of debate over Hanover was nothing new, as previous chapters have demonstrated. The intensity of debate was unusual but it was hardly coincidental that it occurred in a period of more general political instability. Carteret was disliked by Newcastle, Hardwicke and Henry Pelham, partly because they had inherited Robert Walpole’s suspicion of him (Newcastle’s relations with Carteret, now earl of Granville, were considerably better in the 1750s). The Old Corps whigs thought Carteret was not ‘one of them’. As Newcastle put it in 1743, the sole object of Carteret’s recent schemes seemed to be ‘to set ourselves at the Head of the Empire; To appear a good German; and to prefer the Welfare of the Germanick Body, to all other considerations’.61 Carteret’s tendency to concentrate negotiations in his own hands and share little with others failed to endear him to his colleagues.62 Newcastle’s request to Hardwicke in October 1743 that they and Pelham should meet to discuss tactics for the forthcoming parliamentary session reflected his irritation at being kept in the dark over the course of diplomatic developments over the summer.63 Carteret was perhaps not as inclined to promote mere Hanoverian schemes as his detractors claimed. In March 1742 he told Hyndford that Frederick was in for a shock if he thought that George would abandon the ‘System of England’ and the ‘Liberties of Europe’ through threats to the electorate. George could rely on British support if Hanover were threatened. 64 As Williams argued, Carteret’s aim was not simply to support Hanover but to integrate the defence of Hanover into a broader scheme to maintain the balance of power.65 Carteret’s problem was not just his policies but his position. As secretary of state with the king in Hanover, he found himself, like Harrington before him, isolated from his colleagues in London. Isolation encouraged mutual distrust and misunderstanding. Every secretary of state who travelled to Hanover in the period found himself at odds, in one way or another, with those left behind. Moreover it is in this frequent absence that one can trace the evolution of modern cabinet government and the emergence of established differences between royal and ministerial views on foreign policy.66

60 See G.C. Gibbs, ‘English attitudes towards Hanover and the Hanoverian succession in the first half of the eighteenth century’, in A.M. Birke and Kurt Kluxen, eds, England und Hannover/England and Hanover (Munich, 1986), pp. 33–51. 61 Newcastle to Orford, Newcastle House, 22/7/1743, BL, Add. MSS 32700, fol. 315v. Robert Walpole was created earl of Orford in February 1742. 62 Williams, Carteret and Newcastle, p. 124. 63 Newcastle to Hardwicke, Claremont, 24/10/1743, BL, Add. MSS 32701, fol. 202. 64 Carteret to Hyndford, Whitehall, 30/3/1742, BL, Add. MSS 22531, fols 9v–10r. 65 Williams, Carteret and Newcastle, p. 125. 66 I intend to return to this theme on another occasion.

201

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

Newcastle’s observation to Hardwicke in November 1743 that he thought it unwise to attempt to take Hanoverian troops into British pay in the next parliamentary session indicates how Hanoverian issues had become part of domestic power struggles. Resisting payment for Hanoverian troops would represent a victory over Carteret and his schemes. Provided that Newcastle, Hardwicke and Pelham could reach some sort of accommodation with other opponents of Carteret’s measures, they could increase their bargaining power and the likelihood they would continue in office when Carteret’s measures failed. They could counter the accusation that they were preventing the continuation of the war by offering a subsidy to Austria for Saxon troops.67 It seems unlikely that Newcastle had become a principled opponent of ‘Hanoverian measures’. Rather, Newcastle’s distancing from Carteret was essentially pragmatic.68 He feared Carteret’s policies would bring political disaster. Newcastle’s objections to ‘Hanoverian measures’ between 1742 and 1744 were therefore related more to his dislike of Carteret than of Hanover. After Carteret’s fall, Newcastle admitted in a private letter to Harrington, who had come back in, that he was frustrated by the lack of progress on the peace negotiations. Carteret’s supporters claimed that the delays were due to Hanoverian issues and that the new ministry was far more ‘Hanoverian’ in orientation than Carteret had ever been. Newcastle was irritated because he felt the accusation contained an element of truth. Austrian prevarication and a lack of support from the Dutch was also unhelpful.69

The problem of the ‘Old System’ Irritation about protracted peace negotiations serves as a reminder that there was a distinctive vision of how an ideal settlement would look. Throughout the period from 1688 to 1740 one particularly prominent version of this vision for a stable Europe amongst Britons and Hanoverians relied upon the interaction of the protestant interest and the balance of power. However the linkage of these two concepts weakened after 1740, so what emerged in its place? The rise of ‘Old System’ thinking aptly illustrates the changes. The idea of an ‘Old System’ was not, of course, new. ‘Old System’ language was common in earlier exchanges with Austria because it was an easy way for British diplomats to emphasise areas of shared interests when attempts were being made to improve relations with Austria in the 1730s.70 Thus Harrington

67

Newcastle to Hardwicke, Claremont, 7/11/1743, BL, Add. MSS 32701, fols 238–9. Owen, Rise of the Pelhams, p. 192. 69 Newcastle to Harrington, Newcastle House, 26/7/1745, BL, Add. MSS 32704, fols 486–7. 70 Austria also used similar language when it suited. Newcastle reported to Harrington in August 1740 that Wasner, the Austrian minister in London, had talked of renewing the 68

202

DECLINE OF PROTESTANT INTEREST?

welcomed the apparent return of Imperial ministers to ‘the Old System’ in April 1739 but made clear that no formal alliance could occur before Austria had distanced herself from France.71 Of itself, a move away from protestant interest ideas towards a notion of the Old System was not necessarily a more realistic or modern approach to international relations.72 The approach based itself on the international situation at the turn of the eighteenth century and advocated a return to the alliance systems of that period (a Grand Alliance of Austria, the Maritime powers, and the ‘lesser’ German states against France). It failed to recognise the changes of the ensuing forty years. Specifically it was difficult to accommodate more recent Austro-Prussian rivalry within this system because the assumption was that both should have a common interest in countering the power of France. Thus, although George was keen to encourage reconciliation between Austria and Prussia in 1741 to prevent the growth of French power, arguing he wanted to preserve the liberties of Europe, the balance of power and the Reich,73 such an appeal glossed over important differences between Prussia and Austria.74 The frustration felt when Maria Theresa refused to pursue what to British minds was the ‘right’ strategy is palpable. Hyndford was still trying to negotiate a settlement in the summer of 1741 and he noted some of the potential terms in a dispatch to Harrington. Austria had offered Prussia parts of Limburg and was even prepared to give up Luxemburg to gain French neutrality but was unwilling to sacrifice Silesia. Maria Theresa claimed that her conscience would not allow her to give up anything from that part of her succession. Hyndford believed that clerical influence was preventing Maria Theresa from ceding Silesia. The clergy were worried that, even though Frederick had not shown a ‘great Spirit of Reformation’, he might confiscate their extensive revenues in Silesia. The large number of protestants in Silesia also made them reluctant to give it up. Hyndford wondered if Maria Theresa’s ‘tender Conscience’ should be allowed to endanger the liberties of Europe by aggrandising France. A sacrifice a third of the size that France was demanding would be sufficient to pacify Frederick.75 Interestingly, Hyndford attributed the failure to follow the ‘right’ strategy to popish priests, who, of course, would not be interested in the preservation of the balance of power.

Old System. See Newcastle to Harrington, Whitehall, 12/8/1740, separate, PRO, SP 43/27, fol. 154v. 71 Harrington to Robinson, Whitehall, 24/4/1739, BL, Add. MSS 23803, fol. 223. 72 See H.M. Scott, ‘“The True Principles of the Revolution”: the duke of Newcastle and the idea of the Old System’, in Jeremy Black, ed., Knights errant and true Englishmen (Edinburgh, 1989), pp. 55–91. 73 Harrington to Robinson, Whitehall, 17/4/1741, BL, Add. MSS 23807, fols 284–5. 74 Anderson, War of the Austrian succession, p. 79. 75 Hyndford to Harrington, Breslau, 5/8/1741, PRO, SP 43/29, fols 30–1. 203

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

Newcastle was overly optimistic about the chances of bringing about Austro-Prussian rapprochement. When Robinson had seemingly negotiated a settlement in July 1742, Newcastle congratulated him on the deal. He added that he was in strict connection with Carteret, the new secretary of state. As ‘a faithful Servant to the House of Austria’ he was sure that the queen of Hungary would not have to make further concessions in Germany and it might also be possible to find some sort of ‘compensation’ for her elsewhere. 76 Newcastle was a reasonably constant advocate of a pro-Austrian policy, hence his irritation when he thought Hanoverian issues were hindering active support for Maria Theresa. After Charles VII’s death in 1745, Newcastle was adamant that the Imperial title should return to Austria. The death provided an ideal opportunity to end the war. Domestically, it was imperative to end the war because failure to do so might allow Carteret to return to power. Newcastle thought Prussia would probably have to give up Silesia to satisfy Saxony.77 Again Newcastle overestimated the extent to which Prussia would simply follow the ‘best’ plan. When an Anglo-Prussian alliance had appeared a possibility in July 1740, Newcastle had told Harrington that it was an interesting prospect but would depend on the terms. More importantly, though, he hoped that it would be possible to win the Emperor, then still Charles VI, for the alliance. The new alliance would be the ‘Foundation of a new System (or rather of renewing the Old One) in Europe’ so it was right to get as many powers together that ‘from their Situation & Interest, are naturally Enemies to the Power of France’.78 Newcastle wanted to slot Prussia into existing arrangements, rather than acknowledge new great power status. The War of the Austrian succession caused considerable problems for attempts to conceptualise international relations within either a protestant interest framework or within a revived view of the Old System.

Newcastle and the Old System after 1748 Peace negotiations eventually produced the Peace of Aachen in October 1748. Newcastle’s attitude towards Hanover had been somewhat ambivalent during the course of the war. In 1748 Newcastle travelled to the continent with the king for the first time (he had been a secretary of state with responsibility for foreign affairs continuously since 1724). In Hanover Newcastle got to know Gerlach Adolf von Münchhausen and other leading Hanoverian ministers. It was convenient that Münchhausen’s younger brother, Philip, was

76

Newcastle to Robinson, Newcastle House, 5/7/1742, BL, Add. MSS 32802, fol. 309. Newcastle to Hardwicke, Newcastle House, 26/1/1745, BL, Add. MSS 32704, fols 41–2. 78 Newcastle to Harrington, Newcastle House, 25/7/1740, private, PRO, SP 43/27, fols 122v–123r. 77

204

DECLINE OF PROTESTANT INTEREST?

now the Hanoverian minister in charge of the Deutsche Kanzlei in London.79 Newcastle’s papers reveal an increase in correspondence with ministers in Hanover after the visit so personal contact probably improved his appreciation of Hanoverian concerns. The Hanoverians certainly pressed their ideas on Newcastle more forcefully after the visit. In December 1748 Newcastle received a memo in French about the current state of affairs in the Empire from ‘M. Münchhausen’.80 The memo urged Newcastle to remember the continuing dangers posed by France.81 In addition to trade rivalry, France’s differing religious views made them untrustworthy. The memo’s conclusion reminded Newcastle of the natural enmity between France and Britain and the unlikelihood that parliament would approve moves away from the established system (which meant cooperation with Austria against France).82 In some ways Münchhausen was already preaching to the converted but mention of parliament suggests an awareness on his part of the differing governmental systems in Britain and Hanover and the different pressures that operated on his British colleagues. Newcastle’s attempts to revive the Old System were contentious. Both Henry Pelham and Hardwicke had different attitudes to continental involvement. Henry Pelham has frequently been regarded as Robert Walpole’s true heir, in both foreign and domestic policy.83 Pelham’s comment to his brother in July 1748 that ‘I am as heartily for the Old System, if I understand it, as you can be; but a proud . . . and ungrateful court [Austria] is not to be got or retained by yielding to all their unreasonable demands, or by shewing them that our only object is, to have the honour of their countenance and approbation’ indicates Pelham’s scepticism.84 Newcastle remained concerned that, despite his words, Pelham did not really favour returning to the Old System. These concerns were predominantly expressed to Hardwicke who acted as an intermediary between the two brothers. Newcastle’s strategy from 1748 was to pursue a system of continental alliances and to maintain British naval power. His aim was to deter France from renewing conflict.85 His strategy combined both a ‘blue water’ reliance 79 Reed Browning dates Newcastle’s ‘conversion’ to a pro-Hanoverian line to 1746 (Reed Browning, The duke of Newcastle (New Haven, 1975), p. 139) but personal contacts undoubtedly helped to cement the conversion. 80 BL, Add. MSS 32815, fol. 249. The memo probably originated with Gerlach Adolf Münchhausen in Hanover and was then either sent to Newcastle directly or passed on by Philip. 81 For broader Hanoverian fears about French universal monarchy, see Theo König, Hannover und das Reich, 1740–1745 (Düsseldorf, 1938), p. 54. The work is a useful guide to Hanoverian attitudes in the period. 82 BL, Add. MSS 32815, fol. 249v. 83 Owen, Rise of the Pelhams, p. 40. 84 Pelham to Newcastle, Downing Street, 17/7/1748, most private, BL, Add. MSS 32715, fol. 307. 85 See Newcastle to Hardwicke, Hanover, 10/11/1748, BL, Add. MSS 35410, fols 70v–71r.

205

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

on the navy and continental alliance politics, characteristic of a whig approach to foreign policy since the Glorious Revolution. Newcastle felt success could best be achieved not simply by the provision of subsidies, although this was an element to his plan, but by a renewal of good relations with both Austria and the United Provinces. Both these powers must also play their part in the maintenance of the system.86 Newcastle remained very wary of Prussian intentions. Prussia should be given no opportunity to recommence conflict. Above all, it was vital to have a system because experience had shown the disasters that followed from the absence of one.87 Newcastle’s pro-Austrian sentiments were not universally accepted. Some thought that the peace in 1748 offered the chance to renew ties with Prussia. Henry Legge was particularly determined that his mission to Berlin would provide such an opportunity.88 Legge departed for Berlin before the Treaty of Aachen had been signed. It was rumoured that Frederick desired an alliance between Prussia and the Maritime powers. Legge wondered if Frederick ‘may have ambition . . . enough to wish and believe that out of the ruins of other States, that universal Monarchy which France has so long been aiming at may one day fall to the share of his Country’. Legge hoped that this was not the case, as well as wishing that Frederick would not prove set on ruining Austria. 89 Frederick made a great impression on Legge who wrote to Newcastle expressing the hope that the glorious task ‘of securing the liberties of Europe & the Protestant Cause’ against France might soon be achieved.90 Legge’s turn of phrase is worth noting. The aspiration for a protestant basis to a system for Europe had not disappeared completely. Newcastle was not convinced. In a private letter to Robinson, Newcastle mused on Frederick’s sincerity. If Frederick were prepared to unite with the Maritime powers, Austria and Russia and return to the Old System, then he might be worth having. If the alliance proposal was designed to split the Maritime powers from Austria, it should be rejected. Newcastle wondered how Frederick might be included in his plans for reviving the Old System because an alliance with Prussia was no substitute for the broader scheme.91 Newcastle’s cautious response to Legge included the plea that, as powers with natural affinities should unite, any alliance between the Maritime powers and Prussia should also include Austria and the Reich.92 Hardwicke warned Newcastle that his emphasis on the Old System made people suspect that he disliked Prussia. Prussia’s presence would strengthen a

86

Newcastle to Hardwicke, Hanover, 17/10/1748, very private, ibid., fol. 87. Ibid., fols 90–1. 88 For Legge’s mission, see Richard Lodge, ‘The mission of Henry Legge to Berlin, 1748’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 4th series 14 (1931), pp. 1–38. 89 Legge to Newcastle, Hanover, 24/4/1748, BL, Add. MSS 32812, fol. 41. 90 Legge to Newcastle, Berlin, 13/7/1748, BL, Add. MSS 32813, fol. 11r. 91 Newcastle to Robinson, Hanover, 16/7/1748, private, BL, Add. MSS 32813, fols 33–4. 92 Newcastle to Legge, Hanover, 17/7/1748, ibid., fol. 58. 87

206

DECLINE OF PROTESTANT INTEREST?

new alliance.93 Newcastle was clearly irritated by this. He informed his fellow secretary of state, Bedford, shortly afterwards that George was perfectly willing to accept Prussia into a broad alliance with Holland, Austria and Russia. Yet news of Legge’s conduct at Berlin was causing problems with all three of these powers and it was unclear what authority Legge had. Consequently George was unwilling to jeopardise his relations with his existing allies on the chance that a new accommodation might be reached with Prussia.94 Clearly Frederick’s conduct during the war had made Newcastle reluctant to ally with him. Frederick seemed too close to France. In such circumstances the language of the protestant interest would have been inappropriate. The Old System, on the other hand, offered the flexibility of encompassing Austria and the ability to describe Frederick as a French auxiliary without worrying about whether he should now be regarded as a great power in his own right. Discussion was lively about whether Newcastle’s revival of the Old System was the best way of tackling the international situation after the Peace of Aachen.95 Newcastle was still corresponding with Hardwicke about the suitability of his policies in September 1749. Newcastle maintained that it was vital to have a system on the continent to preserve the peace and prevent France and Prussia from breaking it.96 Such a policy would cost money. Robert Walpole’s mistake was not in the amount spent after Charles VI’s death to form an alliance against France but that he had spent unwisely.97 It was important to differentiate between proper economy and ill-judged parsimony.98 Discussion then turned to the use of subsidies in peacetime. Hardwicke had claimed that German princes made money by swapping sides during peace but Newcastle believed careful management would avoid the problem.99 Newcastle agreed with Hardwicke that maintaining a large navy was vital but this was not enough. A navy unsupported with even the Appearance of a Force, upon the Continent, will be of little use. It will provoke; but not effectually prevent. It may, indeed, be more easily carried here, as coinciding with the Notion of the Tories; But it will end, in a few years, in nothing. France will out doe us by Sea; when they have nothing to fear, by land; And they can have nothing to fear there, if we can have nothing to oppose them.100 93

Hardwicke to Newcastle, Powis House, 15/7/1748, BL, Add. MSS 32715, fol. 362v. Newcastle to Bedford, Hanover, 4/8/1748, private and apart, ibid., fols 451–2. 95 Newcastle informed William Bentinck in March 1749 he was experiencing difficulties because his colleagues feared that his devotion to the Old System and Austria would drag Britain into further conflict (Newcastle to W. Bentinck, Newcastle House, 3/3/1749, BL, Add. MSS 32816, fol. 188). 96 Newcastle to Hardwicke, Claremont, 2/9/1749, BL, Add. MSS 35410, fol. 141r. 97 Ibid., fol. 143r. 98 Ibid., fol. 144r. 99 Ibid., fol. 145r. 100 Ibid., fol. 153. 94

207

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

Newcastle stoutly defended a mixed strategy, although he was clearly aware of the popularity of ‘blue water’ politics in the House of Commons. Perhaps Newcastle’s new found determination to defend continental involvement was a product of his closer ties with Hanoverian ministers. As events over the next few years were to show, however, continental involvement had become central to Newcastle’s whole approach to foreign policy.

The Imperial election scheme By the time of Newcastle’s exchanges with Hardwicke, subsidies had ceased to be an issue of purely theoretical concern. Newcastle had steered a measure to grant £100,000 to Austria through parliament in March 1749. Newcastle thought that cash could buy him influence. His strategy was extended later in 1749 when the possibility of electing Maria Theresa’s son, Joseph, king of the Romans emerged.101 German electors were unlikely to give their votes without material inducement. The votes of Hanover, Bohemia, Trier and Mainz were assured. This left Cologne, the Palatinate, Bavaria, Saxony and Prussia. The Dutch had begun negotiations with Cologne so it was to Cologne that Newcastle turned first.102 By the end of the year Newcastle had secured a subsidy for Cologne, although, as he made clear to Charles Bentinck, it had not been easy.103 Bentinck replied how pleased the Dutch were with Newcastle’s efforts. He was shocked to hear there was support ‘for the Doctrine, that you ought for the future never to meddle with the affairs of the Continent, which I cannot but look upon as false Doctrine, Heresy, & Schism, from which the Lord deliver us’.104 Despite Newcastle’s best endeavours, antipathy towards a continental foreign policy had apparently increased after the war’s end. In such circumstances support for a common protestant interest uniting Britain and Hanover was bound to suffer as well.

101 See D.B. Horn, ‘The origins of the proposed election of the King of the Romans, 1748–50’, EHR, 42 (1927), pp. 361–70 and Reed Browning, ‘The duke of Newcastle and the Imperial election plan, 1749–1754’, Journal of British Studies, 7 (1967–8), pp. 28–47. The authors offer differing accounts of the origins of the plan (and Browning’s seems the more likely). They divide on assessments of Newcastle’s handling of the affair. Browning, as Newcastle’s biographer, is more sympathetic to the duke than Horn. 102 Browning, ‘Imperial election plan’, p. 34. 103 Newcastle to C. Bentinck, Newcastle House, 29/12/1749, BL, Add. MSS 32819, fol. 301. Bentinck was a leading Dutch statesman. His brother, William, was a close adviser of William IV of Orange. Their father was William III’s minister Hans Willem Bentinck, first earl of Portland. Charles and William were children of Hans Willem’s second marriage and had returned to the United Provinces to make their fortunes when Hans Willem’s English estates were inherited by their half-brother, Lord Woodstock, in 1709. 104 C. Bentinck to Newcastle, Hague, 13/1/1750, BL, Add. MSS 32820, fol. 20r.

208

DECLINE OF PROTESTANT INTEREST?

Newcastle remained determined to pursue his Imperial election strategy. Having secured Cologne, his next target was Bavaria. The Palatinate was too close to France and Prussia remained difficult. Augustus of Saxony was already heavily indebted to Hanover so Newcastle was keen to avoid the impression that British subsidies to Saxony were a covert means of enriching Hanover. Newcastle finally informed Vienna of his plan in April 1750. The Austrians were characteristically noncommittal.105 Hanoverian concerns about (still unresolved) protestant grievances complicated matters. Newcastle had returned with the king to Hanover in 1750 primarily to further the election project. He told Pelham that he had yet to talk to the Hanoverian ministers privately. However he was ‘not quite pleased with the Politicks here; which, I find, are very strong against the Court of Vienna’. This was because Austria continued to persecute protestants. Frederick had offered to support protestant claims against the Emperor’s most recent decree, and it seemed likely his offer would be accepted.106 Newcastle concluded that ‘tho’ I am, as much as anybody, for supporting the Protestants, in a proper manner, yet I know too well the General Influence, arising from particular Prejudices, in Politiks: and I wish, we may not feel it, in the affair of the King of the Romans’.107 Newcastle was clearly worried. He was suspicious of Frederick and feared that his cherished scheme might be wrecked. A few days later he informed Pelham that, while some protestant complaints were justified, he was concerned protests from the Corpus might negatively affect relations with Vienna. He was working hard to prevent a rupture.108 Münchhausen had cast doubt on whether the election scheme was possible probably because he disliked the idea rather than due to its inherent difficulty.109 Newcastle added a relieved postscript because he had just discovered at court that the Emperor had acceded to protestant demands.110 A few days later Newcastle received a note from Münchhausen listing outstanding protestant disputes. Münchhausen also requested help in resolving them, presumably by ensuring that pressure was maintained on the Emperor to keep his recent promises.111 While Hanoverian ministers were anxious for Britain to support Austria as an ally against France,112 they would not overlook perceived instances of protestant mistreatment. On the very day that he

105

Browning, ‘Imperial election plan’, p. 36. Newcastle to Pelham, Hanover, 31/5/1750, very secret, BL, Add. MSS 32730, fol. 361v. Emphasis in original. 107 Ibid., fol. 362r. Emphasis in original. 108 Newcastle to Pelham, Hanover, 2/6/1750, BL, Add. MSS 32730, fol. 375v. 109 Ibid., fol. 376v. 110 Ibid., fol. 378v. 111 [G.A.?] Münchhausen to Newcastle, Hanover, 8/6/1750, BL, Add. MSS 32821, fol. 281. The ‘Note touchant les Griefs du Corps Evangelique dans l’Empire’ dated 4/6/1750 follows on fol. 283. 112 See above p. 205. 106

209

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

received the list of complaints Newcastle wrote to Count William Bentinck, a leading Dutch statesman, urging him, amongst other things, to represent to Vienna the short-sightedness of thinking they could do as they pleased. The current situation demanded care and the cultivating of alliances. If the Austrians continued to ‘satisfy their bigotted Zeal, by Oppressing Protestants, whenever there is an Opportunity, all their best Friends will, at last, revolt from them . . . no system will be establish’d, and they, and all Europe, sooner or later, be subjected to France & Prussia’.113 Newcastle feared the greater good of establishing a system to combat France and Prussia might be lost if Austria failed to resolve religious disputes. Newcastle also noted that Frederick had offered to support George in measures to secure the rights of the Corpus. Newcastle added that ‘we are in hopes that the Emperor will not bring things to this Extremity, but I must beg you to represent the ill Consequences of such conduct’.114 Newcastle had sent the list of protestant grievances to Hardwicke. Hardwicke commented that only the Hohenlohe case had any merit; the rest were trifles.115 Continuing protestant complaints worried Newcastle. He had travelled to Hanover to ensure Joseph was elected king of the Romans and he was concerned that renewed religious tensions might derail these moves. As he remarked to Keith, the new British minister in Vienna, ‘for God’s sake, keep your Promise at the End of your Letter. Lose not one moment, in deciding that Affair of Hohenlo[h]e, in favour of the Protestants.’ Other protestant complaints should be resolved quickly and impartially.116 Newcastle told Pelham that there were different explanations for the resolution of the Hohenlohe affair. George claimed his steadiness and resolution, together with his intention to execute the commission from the Corpus had achieved the result. Newcastle’s strong orders to Keith also had an impact. This, at least, was Münchhausen’s view. Newcastle thought that George’s affection for Austria, as demonstrated by his willingness to further the election scheme, had probably encouraged the desired result, although he admitted that it was probably a combination of things that had ultimately proved

113

Newcastle to W. Bentinck, Hanover, 8/6/1750, BL, Add. MSS 32821, fol. 294r. Ibid., fol. 297r. 115 Hardwicke to Newcastle, Powis House, 22/6/1750, BL, Add. MSS 32721, fol. 145. The dispute in Hohenlohe, like so many confessional difficulties in the eighteenth-century Empire, was about a catholic ruler seeking to impose catholic practices, in various forms, on a predominantly protestant population. The Corpus Evangelicorum sought to intervene on the basis of earlier agreements, reached during the confessional tension of the 1720s. See Dieter Stievermann, ‘Politik und Konfession im 18. Jahrhundert’, Zeitschrift für historische Forschung, 18 (1991), p. 192 and Gabriele Haug-Moritz, Württembergischer Ständekonflikt und deutscher Dualismus (Stuttgart, 1992), pp. 157–8, pp. 192–5. Details of the earlier complaints can be found in Christian Gottfried Oertel, ed., Vollständiges Corpus Gravaminum Evangelicorum (4 vols, Regensburg, 1775), pp. 636–7. 116 Newcastle to Keith, Hanover, 3/7/1750, very private, BL, Add. MSS 32822, fol. 50v. 114

210

DECLINE OF PROTESTANT INTEREST?

decisive.117 Given Newcastle’s pro-Austrian sentiments and support for the election scheme, his explanation for Austrian concessions is hardly surprising. Yet whereas in earlier years, Hanoverians and Britons had agreed that protestant concerns should not be sacrificed to larger purposes, it seems Newcastle was now loathe to be distracted from his grand designs. By August 1750 an agreement had been reached to provide £40,000 to Bavaria over six years with half coming from Britain and a quarter each from Austria and the United Provinces. However in September Cologne raised the price of cooperation and the Austrians therefore postponed a vote.118 The failure to achieve a quick election did little to deter Newcastle. Meanwhile the difficulties multiplied. Prussia complained that an early election was contrary to Imperial law.119 William Bentinck was irritated that Newcastle was prepared to break the previous agreement with Cologne if they refused to give their vote. He also wanted to do more to win Saxony and the Palatinate instead.120 Subsequently the Dutch complained that rebuilding the Barrier fortresses should form part of any agreement to sort out the election issue.121 When it was rumoured in April 1751 that George might only continue with subsidy treaties to aid the election in his Hanoverian capacity, Holdernesse warned George that the Dutch were unlikely to agree: they still viewed their relationship with Britain as their primary means of security and Hanover, while a useful additional weight, was no substitute.122 Newcastle feared that protestant grievances were preventing the success of the scheme. In May 1751 he told Keith how worried George was about the prospect of renewed FrancoPrussian negotiations. Austria must act. A prompt resolution of outstanding protestant grievances and providing protestants with proper guarantees for the future would help. Frederick could no longer draw other protestant princes into his schemes so easily, ‘for it is a great Obstruction to His Majesty’s Endeavours to gain, and preserve, those Princes when it can be alleged, with any sort of foundation that the Protestants are continually harassed, and ill treated’.123 Once more Austrian concessions to protestants were seen as a 117

Newcastle to Pelham, Hanover, 4/7/1750, BL, Add. MSS 32721, fols 154–5. Browning, ‘Imperial election plan’, p. 38. 119 See a translation of George II to Frederick II, St James’s, 13/11/1750, BL, Add. MSS 32825, fol. 52v which counters this claim with previous examples of Prussian support for early elections. 120 Newcastle to Holdernesse, Hanover, 4/10/1750, most secret, BL, Add. MSS 32824, fols 65–6. Holdernesse had been appointed minister plenipotentiary to the Dutch republic in 1749. He succeeded Bedford as secretary of state for the Southern department in June 1751, partly because Newcastle thought Holdernesse more amenable to a broadly continentalist strategy than Bedford. 121 See Newcastle to Holdernesse, Whitehall, 4/1/1751, BL, Add. MSS 32826, fol. 13v where Newcastle argues the linkage was unachievable. 122 Holdernesse to Newcastle, Hague, 30/4/1751, very private, BL, Add. MSS 32827, fol. 275. 123 Newcastle to Keith, Whitehall, 31/5/1751, very secret, BL, Add. MSS 32828, fol. 62. 118

211

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

means to facilitate the more broadly beneficial election scheme. They would also provide an unusual means of countering Prussian influence. The appeal achieved little. Keith observed in July 1751 that Maria Theresa had told him that the best way to counter Franco-Prussian influence in the Empire was through engaging Russia. The Maritime powers must supply the necessary funds, which she acknowledged would be difficult.124 By September 1751 a subsidy had been secured for Saxony. Cologne’s defection to France increased the Saxon subsidy’s importance. The Austrians had decided that it would be unwise to attempt an election in the face of French opposition but had simply told Newcastle that they did not wish to rush an election. Newcastle still hoped that the scheme could be brought to a successful conclusion and renewed efforts to reach a deal in 1752. He wanted now to win Palatine support.125 Newcastle redoubled his diplomacy when he returned to Hanover with the king in 1752. He hoped that religious tensions would not become mixed up in attempts to secure the election and told Hyndford and Keith, the British diplomats in Vienna, that he had spoken to Vorster, an Austrian diplomat in Hanover, about the election scheme. He had emphasised to Vorster how religious disputes had no place in the matter in hand and ought therefore to be ignored. He thought Vorster had got the message.126 Münchhausen’s doubts about the value of the election had clearly not disappeared and Newcastle learnt from Hyndford that Vorster had been told by Münchhausen that Newcastle unfortunately still insisted upon pressing forward with the matter, despite his advice to the contrary.127 Religious tensions were still present beneath the surface. Hyndford had been warned by an Austrian diplomat that the Hanoverians wanted to use the continuing negotiations as a means of extracting religious concessions. 128 Newcastle, probably rightly, thought the Austrians were trying to create distrust between British and Hanoverian ministers and blamed Bartenstein. 129 Newcastle’s investigations in Hanover revealed that nothing untoward had happened and that the Hanoverian ministers’ advice to Hyndford was ‘very becoming the Minister of the King; who is the first Protestant Power in Europe’.130 A memo on religious grievances, dated 20 March 1752, revealed that the situation in

124

Keith to Newcastle, Vienna, 17/7/1751, private and secret, ibid., fol. 204. Newcastle had actually argued to Dickens, in Moscow, in March 1751 that Russia should support the election scheme as it would ensure that neither France nor Prussia could dominate the Empire and thus preserve the balance of power. As with Prussia, Newcastle was slow to realise that Russia might have other priorities than containing France. See Newcastle to Dickens, Whitehall, 8/3/1751, BL, Add. MSS 32827, fols 64–5. 125 Browning, ‘Imperial election plan’, pp. 39–41. 126 Newcastle to Hyndford and Keith, Hanover, 3/5/1752, BL, Add. MSS 32835, fol. 213. 127 Hyndford to Newcastle, Vienna, 25/5/1752, secret, BL, Add. MSS 32836, fol. 142. 128 Ibid., fol. 143. 129 Newcastle to Hyndford, Hanover, 3/6/1752, private, BL Add. MSS 32836, fol. 272. 130 Newcastle to Pelham, Hanover, 21/6/1752, very private, BL, Add. MSS 32727, fol. 372. 212

DECLINE OF PROTESTANT INTEREST?

Hohenlohe had still not been satisfactorily resolved and included the threat that, if a solution was not found, Hanover would combine with Prussia (thereby increasing Frederick’s power) to achieve a resolution.131 Newcastle discovered that the Austrians were once more using religious issues to cause trouble. Keene reported from Madrid that a rumour was circulating that the Austrians had refused to convoke a diet because of fears that France would press for the secularisation of several catholic bishoprics on Prussia’s behalf. Furthermore it was rumoured Hanover would also profit from the secularisations. Austria wanted to persuade catholic courts that an election was inadvisable at present. Spain would now press the pope to ensure that no alteration was made to the territories of the Empire.132 Newcastle was ultimately able to establish that this was a confusion with a proposal made by Charles VII in the 1740s and that there was no such agreement, but the damage was already done.133 Newcastle persuaded George to make one last appeal to Austria to call a diet.134 The prospects of success seemed increasingly bleak. The election scheme illustrates the strains both in the relationship between Britain and Hanover and in ideas of the protestant interest by the 1750s. On the one hand, the election scheme allowed Hanoverian ministers to indicate to Newcastle the continuing utility of the relationship with Britain.135 They provided British diplomats involved in subsidy negotiations with detailed local knowledge. Yet Hanoverian support came with strings attached. The quid pro quo was that British diplomatic pressure would be deployed to resolve protestant grievances within the Reich. Given the success of this tactic on previous occasions, it was not an intrinsically flawed strategy. The problem was Newcastle’s concern that his pet project would be sunk by what he regarded as trifles, despite his frequent claims to be a strong supporter of the protestant interest. Moreover Newcastle was by now far more wedded to the idea of the Old System and support for Austria than the protestant interest. Newcastle was prepared to make noises to Austria about the need to treat protestants better but, as his reaction to supposed Austrian concessions of June 1750 shows, he was convinced that this would be achieved far more easily by conciliating Austria than by coercion.

131

Memorandum on Religious Grievances, Hanover, 20/3/1752, ibid., fols 375–6. Keene to Newcastle, Madrid, July 1752, most secret and particular, BL, Add. MSS 32838, fol. 306 (all in cipher). 133 For Newcastle’s denial see Newcastle to Keene, 29/10/1752, most secret, BL, Add. MSS 32841, fol. 48. He also included a memo from the Hanoverians, dated 3/10/1752, to support his case (fol. 71). 134 Newcastle to Hyndford and Keith, Hanover, 3/6/1752, BL, Add. MSS 32836, fol. 258v. 135 Dann, Great Britain and Hanover, p. 83. 132

213

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

Subsidies and isolation Subsidies became intimately entwined with the fate of the Imperial election scheme. Yet Newcastle’s support for them, as an important element of his continental strategy, dates from the immediate aftermath of the war. Newcastle argued to Hardwicke in August 1749 that a sea-change was needed in British views of subsidies.136 Unless Britain was prepared to provide something, even in peace, then all hope of influencing the continent would be lost. Times had changed. As France was now prepared to offer subsidies, Britain must follow suit. ‘France has now wisely found out, that a little Money well apply’d, in Peace, may save millions in War.’137 Newcastle’s enthusiasm for subsidies was not shared by his colleagues. Hardwicke was worried by the precedent and warned that the United Provinces would not be able to help shoulder the costs. Wartime subsidies had grown very quickly and there was a risk that subsidies would become permanent, like the civil list. Hardwicke also reminded Newcastle of the domestic pressure that had accompanied Walpole’s increased spending in peacetime. The priority should be to reduce the national debt, difficult enough in itself.138 Hardwicke was unsure whether the most likely recipients of subsidies, German princes, had shown enough military prowess in the last war to warrant the costs.139 Pelham also doubted the value of subsidies. The Imperial election scheme caused several electors to remember old grievances they wanted resolved in exchange for their support. Pelham observed that the demands, financial and otherwise, were likely to be in proportion to the likelihood of the Emperor paying, rather than the justice of the case. Finding British cash might be difficult. He was concerned that a general war might provoke further Jacobite unrest.140 Pelham’s financial caution is unsurprising, given the position he held, but his concern with Jacobitism also suggests a slightly narrower field of policy vision than Newcastle’s. While conducting these discussions with his colleagues, Newcastle was also handling Hanoverian objections to the election scheme, centred on the Emperor’s continued mistreatment of protestants. Hardwicke was pleased that there was support for the protestant interest in Germany. He realised that George, as both king and elector, ought to monitor such matters. Yet a British monarch should surely ‘stand as clear of their [Imperial] particular interior Disputes as possible; tho’ I am sensible that, in our present circumstances, it requires very nice Steerage to manage it, & perhaps the best, that can be

136

Newcastle to Hardwicke, Newcastle House, 25/8/1749, private, BL, Add. MSS 32719, fol. 69. 137 Ibid., fol. 70r. 138 Hardwicke to Newcastle, Wimpole, 30/8/1749, BL, Add. MSS 32719, fol. 84. 139 Ibid., fol. 85r. 140 Pelham to Newcastle, np, 1/6/1750, private, BL, Add. MSS 32721, fol. 10. 214

DECLINE OF PROTESTANT INTEREST?

attained is to prevent any considerable Inconvenience arising from it’. 141 Hardwicke’s reluctance to spend money extended to caution over the wisdom of continued continental involvement. Pelham was similarly reluctant to become too closely involved in the affairs of the Corpus. A few weeks later he thanked Newcastle for the material from Münchhausen about protestant affairs but admitted that he was not really qualified to comment. Newcastle had sensibly avoided involving himself with an attempt to have the duke of Cumberland made a coadjutor of the bishop of Osnabrück. This was an electoral matter. It was not Britain’s concern and Britain should certainly not pay for it.142 Following a costly war both Pelham and Hardwicke were reluctant to involve Britain in expansive and expensive continental commitments, although Hardwicke was willing to spend money on the navy.143 Consequently Newcastle found it difficult to convince them of the merits of the Imperial election scheme. By extension it was also difficult to interest them in European protestant affairs. Hardwicke acknowledged that George needed to be aware of the protestant interest but was less clear that a British monarch had to intervene to help.144 Pelham and Hardwicke may have been sceptical about subsidies but Newcastle worked hard to convince William Pitt of their value. It is often assumed Pitt was an inveterate opponent of continental measures in this period. Newcastle was careful to tailor his message to appeal to some of Pitt’s known prejudices. He kept Pitt informed of the progress of the negotiations in the summer of 1750 and indicated that he had British interests in mind, for example by his strong complaints about recent French behaviour in the New World.145 Newcastle’s efforts did not go unrewarded, as Pitt spoke in favour of the Bavarian subsidy scheme when it was debated in parliament in January 1751.146 Newcastle was, however, sentimentally attached to the Imperial election scheme and was unwilling to give it up, even when the costs escalated. In October 1750, when Cologne wanted to renegotiate the terms of the subsidy agreement, Newcastle commented to Pelham that it would be unfortunate if the scheme fell apart for want of £9,000.147 By June 1752 the Palatinate was the chief target and Newcastle told Hardwicke that, although winning the

141

Hardwicke to Newcastle, Wimpole, 6/6/1750, ibid., fol. 48r. Pelham to Newcastle, Greenwich Park, 2/7/1750, ibid., fol. 255. 143 See Newcastle to Hardwicke, Newcastle House, 25/8/1749, very private, BL, Add. MSS 32719, fol. 73v. 144 Hardwicke seemed generally reluctant for Britain to become too involved in Imperial affairs. See Hardwicke to Newcastle, Wimpole, 23/8/1750, BL, Add. MSS 32722, fol. 236r. 145 Newcastle to Pitt, Hanover, 15/7/1750, BL, Add. MSS 32721, fols 249–51. 146 See the MS account of a House of Commons debate on the Bavarian subsidy in BL, Add. MSS 32724, fol. 129. Newcastle had told James Pelham that, because of Pitt’s support over Bavaria, Newcastle’s clients in the Commons should assist Pitt in other matters. See Newcastle to J. Pelham, Newcastle House, 30/1/1751, BL, Add. MSS 32724, fol. 105. 147 Newcastle to Pelham, Hanover, 25/10/1750, BL, Add. MSS 32723, fols 152–3. 142

215

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

Palatinate was likely to cost around £60,000, to refuse the money would be an ill-judged economy.148 Hardwicke and Pelham disagreed with Newcastle about the wisdom of the Imperial election scheme but all of them agreed that Austrian conduct over the scheme was yet another example of Austrian ingratitude.149 They failed to appreciate that Austria might have different interests and objectives. In a final effort to save the scheme, Newcastle told Keith in August 1752 to urge the Austrians that it was worth agreeing to the high demands of the Palatine elector to save the scheme (and, by extension, the Old System).150 The Palatine elector had set the price of his cooperation as the ius de non appellando – decisions taken in Palatine courts would be final and could not be appealed to either the Reichskammergericht or the Reichshofrat. It is understandable that the Emperor was unwilling to cede territorial legal sovereignty to one of his electors without the promise of something more tangible than support in an election scheme of dubious value in return.

Linguistic change Previous discussion has suggested a variety of reasons, related both to events and changes in the international system, why the linkage of the protestant interest and the balance of power observed in earlier chapters was undermined. The changing use of language in diplomatic discourse over the period provides further evidence of this trend, although context remained important. A memo from late 1742 or early 1743 sent to Newcastle about Swiss affairs, possibly by Sir Luke Schaub, still retained a strongly confessional feel in its analysis of the relationship between the various cantons.151 The link between the protestant interest and the balance of power remained strong. However, when Newcastle was discussing the French threat to the liberties of Europe with Waldegrave in 1739, only the balance of power was mentioned, not the protestant interest.152 Waldegrave subsequently reported that the French believed that the British would support Prussian claims in Jülich and Berg precisely because they would favour a protestant prince over a catholic but such ‘confessional’

148

Newcastle to Hardwicke, Hanover, 29/6/1752, very secret, BL, Add. MSS 32728, fols 27–31. 149 See, for example, Hardwicke to Newcastle, Powis House, 7/8/1752, very private, BL, Add. MSS 32729, fol. 39 or Newcastle to Keith, Newcastle House, 2/8/1751, very private, BL, Add. MSS 32829, fol. 9. 150 Newcastle to Keith, Hanover, 31/8/1752, very private, BL, Add. MSS 32839, fol. 384. 151 Memoire instructif par rapport aux Affaires de la Suisse, BL, Add. MSS 32803, fols 7–11. 152 Newcastle to Waldegrave, Whitehall, 5/1/1739, private and particular, BL, Add. MSS 32800, fols 23–35. 216

DECLINE OF PROTESTANT INTEREST?

comments were relatively unusual.153 This was all before Frederick’s accession. The ensuing war did much to fix Newcastle’s attitudes. By 1748 Newcastle described his political creed as based upon ‘the indissoluble Union between the Maritime Powers, & the House of Austria’.154 This was what Newcastle meant when he talked, as he frequently did, about the ‘common cause’ or the ‘Old System’. During 1748 Newcastle had engaged in frequent correspondence with his friends in Holland, the Bentincks, about the future state of Europe. Whereas earlier generations of British (and Hanoverian) officials had spoken of the Maritime powers’ duty to defend the liberties of Europe and the protestant interest, the latter had now largely disappeared from Newcastle’s diplomatic lexicon.155 Injunctions to the Dutch to act were now more frequently phrased in terms of the need to defend the ‘System of Europe’ or the ‘common cause’. The Dutch for their part had adopted similar language. They were increasingly wary of Prussia. William Bentinck reminded Newcastle of the need to keep Prussia in check in March 1750, arguing it would not only help the Dutch but also secure Hanover. Britain was the only power able to perform the task.156 In 1753 Bentinck reported that he had consulted the city of Amsterdam about their thoughts on Newcastle and Bentinck’s plans to preserve ‘the General System of Europe’. Bentinck was convinced that if Newcastle could succeed in his negotiations with Russia, Amsterdam’s worries about the Prussian threat would be neutralised.157 No longer did protestant fellow-feeling automatically lead to diplomatic alliances. Mention of protestant interests had unsurprisingly not figured often in relations with Austria even before 1748. Harrington had used the formulation the ‘common interest of Europe’ before the outbreak of the war. Carteret talked about the need to support ‘the House of Austria, & the Libertys of Europe’ when seeking help for Maria Theresa.158 Carteret described the agreement to send British troops to the continent in late 1742 to Robinson as a sign of George’s commitments to Austria and his engagements for ‘securing the Liberties of the Empire, and re-establishing the Balance of Power’.159 Carteret used the same terms when describing the agreement to Trevor in The Hague.160 However, in a further plea, Carteret urged the United Provinces to help the

153

Ciphered intelligence report in Waldegrave to Newcastle, 1/2/1739, private and particular, ibid., fol. 58. 154 Newcastle to Sandwich, Göhrde, 12/10/1748, private, BL, Add. MSS 32815, fol. 10v. 155 I have been able to find relatively few references to the protestant interest in Newcastle’s post 1748 correspondence and none to Dutch figures during the course of the peace negotiations. 156 W. Bentinck to Newcastle, Vienna, 25/3/1750, BL, Add. MSS 32820, fol. 324v. 157 W. Bentinck to Newcastle, Hague, 4/9/1753, BL, Add. MSS 32846, fol. 175v. 158 See Carteret to Robinson, Whitehall, 16/4/1742, BL, Add. MSS 22529, fol. 11v. 159 Carteret to Robinson, Whitehall, 7/12/1742, ibid., fol. 110. 160 Carteret to Trevor, Whitehall, 7/12/1742, BL, Add. MSS 22532, fol. 221. 217

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

queen of Hungary because of the dangers to the balance of power, the constitution of the Empire, the protestant religion and ‘every thing that can be dear & valuable to the Republick itself, as a free and independent State’.161 Carteret was perhaps not as indifferent to protestant concerns or as unwilling to ‘talk the talk’ as the usual picture of him as a worldly politician suggests. He told Robinson in March 1742 that George had spoken severely to Wasner, the Austrian minister in London, about reports of protestant persecution in Hungary. This was a poor return for all George and ‘His Protestant Parliament & subjects’ were doing to help Maria Theresa. It was difficult to imagine a policy that had ‘a greater tendency to alienate the minds of all Ranks of People’ in Britain and Holland and reduce support for Maria Theresa than ‘Her permitting any persecution or ill usage of their protestant Brethren’. It was in the queen’s interests to deal with protestant complaints immediately.162 Carteret’s observation to Robinson in 1744 that he could not understand Frederick’s ambition because it risked ‘overturning the Liberties of Europe, & all that can be dear & valuable to a Protestant Prince’ shows the broader influence of confession on political culture.163 Carteret’s personal piety may not have matched his official rhetoric. In May 1743 he informed Newcastle that he was using his Sunday morning to catch up with his correspondence while others were in church.164 Carteret’s attitudes towards the protestant interest might have evolved further if he had remained in office longer. Even after 1748, Münchhausen still mentioned the need to defend protestantism in the Empire often. Uriel Dann noted the tension between largely free-thinking British whig nobles and their deeply religious Hanoverian counterparts.165 Dann also suggested that references to the balance of power by the Geheime Räte were an oblique way of Hanoverians showing their awareness of British concerns.166 When Münchhausen talked about the need for Britain to balance Europe, he tried to concentrate the problems caused by French religious zeal.167 While such a linkage might have appealed to British ears in, say, 1720, it was less clear that it would after 1748. As early as 1740 Hardwicke had noted some ‘Considerations’ for how the peace might best be preserved. He thought that a balance remained important and an alliance should be formed against French ambitions. If other powers were not prepared to play their part, then Hardwicke thought that George should worry primarily about the interests and security of his own dominions ‘without interesting, or concerning Himself about the Fate of Europe in General: And this might

161

Carteret to Trevor, Whitehall, 14/12/1742, ibid., fol. 223. Carteret to Robinson, Whitehall, 18/3/1742, BL, Add. MSS 22529, fol. 172. 163 Carteret to Robinson, Whitehall, 16/10/1744, ibid., fol. 363v. 164 Carteret to Newcastle, Hague, 19/5/1743, particular, BL, Add. MSS 22536, fol. 5. 165 Dann, Hanover and Great Britain, p. 10. 166 Ibid., p. 30. 167 See the memo marked as being in Münchhausen’s letter of 8/12/1748 in BL, Add. MSS 32815, fol. 249. 162

218

DECLINE OF PROTESTANT INTEREST?

not be amiss to be insinuated to the several Powers, that are immediately concerned in Interest to have the Balance of Europe preserved’.168 Perhaps Britain no longer had to worry about the balance and could pursue an entirely different policy. The use of confessional language in more popular media exhibits a similar trend to that already seen amongst politicians and diplomats. The link observed previously between the balance of power, the protestant interest and universal monarchy in pamphlet literature was becoming less frequent. A pamphlet of 1740 sought to justify George’s absence from Britain, at a crucial stage in the ongoing war with Spain, on the grounds that George’s presence in Hanover could strengthen the protestant interest. Frederick William was reported to be severely ill and his death might prompt better relations with Prussia but George was required to negotiate in person.169 Reconciliation with Prussia would be merely the finishing touch to a grand alliance to preserve the balance of power in Europe.170 Such an alliance could unite Britain, Holland, Prussia, the Emperor, Russia and Denmark.171 It would be ‘so grand an Alliance in Favour of the Protestant Cause, of the Peace, and of the Liberties of Europe’. The alliance should prevent aid to Spain in an unjust war against Britain and secure peace.172 George’s trip would have distinct advantages to Britain. The desire to tie Prussia into a grand alliance against France has been observed before. The tract is typical of how it was thought best to deal with foreign policy problems prior to Frederick’s arrival. The author’s final observation also had a familiar ring. George’s diplomacy offered the chance for ‘a farther Strengthening of the Protestant Interest, by Disposing of, in Marriage, to Protestant Princes, the Princesses of the Blood Royal of England’.173 The threat of universal monarchy to protestantism also featured in a pamphlet from 1741. The author began with a standard history of the rise of the universal monarchist threat under Emperor Charles V and continuing with France after 1648.174 The author was careful not to take the meaning of universal monarch too literally – it could equally apply to those whose influence was universally felt, even if their territorial conquests were less than total. Louis XIV was a universal monarch in this sense. Sensitive definition showed why the term was appropriate and not simply a chimera.175 The author warned

168

Considerations, 7/10/1740, BL, Add. MSS 35406, fol. 268. The Consequences of His Majesty’s Journey to Hanover, at this critical Juncture (London, 1740), p. 6. 170 Ibid., p. 8. 171 Ibid., p. 10. 172 Ibid., p. 11. 173 Ibid., p. 11. 174 The groans of Germany: or the enquiry of a protestant German into the original cause of the present distractions of the Empire (3rd edn, London, 1741), pp. 1–2. 175 Groans of Germany, p. 5. 169

219

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

that the growth of French power posed a threat to the reformed religion.176 The date of publication and the claim that the elector of Hanover had not done enough to stop France suggests that the tract may have been an opposition or patriot one (or translated to support this view).177 The general thrust of the remaining argument was that not enough had been done to support Austria nor to improve relations with Prussia. 178 Instead of a plan ‘for preserving the House of Austria, the Protestant Religion and the Liberties of Europe, we have seen one of quite other Complexion pursued with great Earnestness’.179 This was clearly the Hanoverian neutrality arrangement. The blame for current difficulties lay with ministers who had abandoned the grand alliance and engaged with France and Spain. These engagements had now backfired with disastrous consequences.180 The use by the opposition of protestant interest arguments indicates again the contested nature of the term. The tract also shows that the effects of Frederick’s accession had not yet seeped down to the level of popular perception. Disquiet at Hanoverian neutrality was a prominent theme in tracts on foreign policy in the early part of the war.181 There was a general disbelief that Britain could avoid war but this was coupled with dissatisfaction that Britain’s involvement in a European war was caused by the Hanoverian connection.182 Livy was brought forward as an opponent of neutrality arrangements because they were likely to offend both sides.183 The same pamphlet argued that confederacies were the best way to defend Europe against universal monarchs.184 Britannia in Mourning sounded a different oppositional note. The tract was a dialogue between Jest and Earnest so it was perhaps possible to advance more unusual propositions under the guise of humour than might normally have been the case. Jest argued that there seemed to be no indelible link between popery and slavery and there were relatively few free, protestant states in Europe. There were also traces of liberty in a number of the catholic city states in Italy and in Poland so it was not obvious ‘that Christian Religion, whether Popish or Protestant, had any Thing in it, merely as Religion, that either strengthens or weakens the sacred Bands of Freedom’.185 The author wanted to explain conflict between nations in terms of interest rather than conflicting

176

Ibid., pp. 10–11. Ibid., p. 8. 178 Ibid., pp. 24–7. 179 Ibid., p. 28. 180 Ibid., p. 30. 181 Robert Harris, A patriot press (Oxford, 1993), p. 106. 182 For both arguments see A letter from a Member of the last Parliament, to a new Member of the Present, concerning the Conduct of the War with Spain (London, 1742), pp. 52, 59. 183 Political Grammar, adapted to the Meridian of Great Britain (London, 1742), p. 23. 184 Ibid., pp. 30–1. 185 Britannia in mourning (London, 1742), p. 26. 177

220

DECLINE OF PROTESTANT INTEREST?

confession.186 Hanoverian neutrality was a disaster because it increased pressure on Austria. Austria diverted French attention away from Britain.187 The decline in trade was far more important than religion and liberty.188 Such an approach reflects a growing tendency towards commercial whiggery.189 It was also part of a ‘patriot’ strand to the press.190 Patriots were staunch advocates of ‘blue water’ foreign policy, arguing that Britain’s island position enabled the avoidance of continental commitments. The navy was important as a means to defend Britain and to protect British trade overseas. The only sort of alliances that Britain needed to make were commercial ones.191 Patriotism posited a language of absolutes: it was a struggle of virtue, represented by the patriots, against the corruption of the court. Liberty and independence were constantly under threat from a decadent court.192 Hanover represented all that was wrong with court politics. It involved Britain in foreign wars. Indeed it was argued that all wars fought since 1715 had been for Hanover’s benefit. The cost of such wars was a means to transfer British funds to Hanover through subsidies.193 The accusation that Austria was being sacrificed to Hanoverian interests recurs in the publishing storm that followed publication of the Case of the Hanover forces in 1743.194 This is not the place to enter into what this debate reveals about the relationship between Britain and Hanover.195 However Horace Walpole (the elder) was less than impressed by the ministry’s efforts to promote his tract, written in response to Waller and Chesterfield’s The interest of Great Britain steadily pursued.196 In contrast

186

Ibid., p. 30. Ibid., p. 38. 188 Ibid., p. 65. 189 For commercial whiggery, and its competitors, see J.G.A. Pocock, Virtue, commerce and history (Cambridge, 1985). See also Bob Harris, Politics and the nation (Oxford, 2002), ch. 6. 190 See Harris, A patriot press for a thoughtful discussion of this aspect of the press. Harris has dealt with the oppositional press in the 1740s at some length so I have curtailed my own discussion of 1740s tracts. 191 Harris, Patriot press, pp. 88–9. 192 Ibid., pp. 48–9. 193 Frauke Geyken, ‘“The German language is spoken in Saxony with the greatest purity” or English images and perceptions of Germany in the eighteenth century’, in Joseph Canning and Hermann Wellenreuther, eds, Britain and Germany compared (Göttingen, 2001), pp. 60–2. 194 [Edmund Waller and Philip Dormer Stanhope, earl of Chesterfield], The case of the Hanover forces in the pay of Great Britain (London, 1743), p. 15. See Harris, Patriot press, ch. 5 for a broader discussion. 195 For two approaches to this issue see Geyken, ‘English images and perceptions of Germany’, pp. 59–70 and Tony Claydon, ‘Holland, Hanover and the fluidity of facts: further thoughts on national images and national identities in the eighteenth century’, in Canning and Wellenreuther, eds, Britain and Germany compared, pp. 87–97. 196 Harris, Patriot press, p. 129. 187

221

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

to the 1720s and 1730s, no great efforts were made to disseminate Walpole’s defences of ministerial foreign policy widely. Patriots attacked the very basis of interventionist foreign policy between 1742 and 1744. As Harris puts it, ‘these [interventionist] assumptions, notably “the balance of power” and the “Protestant interest”, it was argued, were merely devices to deceive the credulous into supporting ill-judged and often inconsistent measures (as demonstrated by [Robert] Walpole’s foreign policy), or worse’.197 Just as such ideas were losing their popularity amongst British politicians in the 1740s, they were also attacked in the public sphere. It is tempting to conclude that Harris’s work provides confirmation that the drift away from ideas of the protestant interest already observed in Newcastle’s advocacy of the Old System was mirrored in the popular press. There is something to this. However as Manfred Schlenke shows, confessional arguments received a great boost from Frederick’s alliance with Britain, against France and Austria, during the course of the Seven Years War. Schlenke also argues, as has been observed elsewhere in this chapter, that there were those, even before 1756, who dreamed of a protestant alliance of Britain and Prussia.198

Fast sermons There is one final area where debate about the protestant interest, universal monarchy and relations with Europe appears. Some of the secular reactions to the War of the Austrian succession have been considered already. Yet clerics also discussed the conflict from the pulpit. Sermons preached on the fast days proclaimed by the authorities to allow opportunity for national repentence (and subsequently published) provide a useful measure of changing attitudes. Days of national fasting were not solely prompted by the war – events such as the anniversary of the Great Fire of London and the execution of Charles I were commemorated in similar fashion. However the fast days of the 1740s were the first occasion since the end of the War of the Spanish succession to produce such a concentration of sermons. Tony Claydon has used the fast sermons of the 1690s to identify a strong strain of providentialism surrounding the government of William III.199 William was portrayed by his

197

Ibid., p. 93. See Manfred Schlenke, ‘England blickt nach Europe: das konfessionelle Argument in der englischen Politik um die Mitte des 18. Jahrhunderts’, in Paul Kluke and Peter Alter, eds, Aspekte der deutsch–britischen Beziehungen im Laufe der Jahrhunderte (Stuttgart, 1978), pp. 24–45 for a summary of the argument. Schlenke’s monograph England und das friderizianische Preussen 1740–1763 (Munich, 1963) discusses the issues in greater detail. See particularly pp. 171–225. 199 Tony Claydon, William III and the Godly revolution (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 28–52. 198

222

DECLINE OF PROTESTANT INTEREST?

clerical propagandists as a godly reformer who would combat the threat from Louis XIV and complete domestic reformation through a campaign for the reformation of manners. Steve Pincus has argued that it was not a providential understanding of the English as an elect nation in the late seventeenth century but the threat of universal monarchy that is the key to understanding complaints against Louis XIV.200 Claydon has subsequently suggested that these pictures are not necessarily incompatible. This book has argued that Pincus’s substitution of a language of universal monarchy for an essentially religious language in describing England’s enemies misses the point.201 Universal monarchy and popery were intimately related. The fast sermons of the 1740s suggest that certain aspects of the providentialist account were alive and well but they also show how the war helped to reinforce a perception of British difference. The logic lying behind fast days was simple. As Nicholas Carter put it, ‘God is the only giver of victory.’202 God’s providence alone would ensure victory.203 Therefore one function of such sermons was to identify the particular areas where repentance was most necessary and where the failure to turn away from sin was preventing military success. Defeat was a signal of divine wrath and needed to be taken seriously. One sermon from 1740 provides a typical account of what was wrong with Britain. James Miller argued that the war was right, as it was fought in self-defence and to support injured peoples ‘against a faithless, unbending, barbarous Foe’.204 However there was a need for fasting because of the number of sins currently afflicting Britain. Top of the list was the growth of irreligion and atheism.205 They were closely followed by the increased interest in luxury.206 Proper observation of the Sabbath had declined.207 Old struggles about how best to combat popery and secure religion, liberty and property had been forgotten amidst the race to acquire pensions or places in church and state.208 Other sermons included similar lists of

200

Steven Pincus, ‘“To protect English liberties”: the English nationalist revolution of 1688–1689’, in Tony Claydon and Ian McBride, eds, Protestantism and national identity (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 75–104. 201 See also Tony Claydon, ‘Protestantism, universal monarchy and Christendom in William’s war propaganda, 1689–1697’, in E. Mijers and D. Onnekink, eds, Redefining William III: the impact of the King-Stadholder in international context (forthcoming, Aldershot, 2006). 202 Nicholas Carter, The success of Arms depends upon God’s Providence (London, 1740), p. 10. 203 Ibid., p. 2. 204 James Miller, The Causes of Britain’s being a Reproach to her Neighbours (London, 1740), p. 1. 205 Ibid., p. 4. 206 Ibid., p. 6. 207 Ibid., p. 9. 208 Ibid., p. 15. 223

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

national vices. Reuben Clarke, preaching before the Commons in 1741, added an appeal for the legislature to pass laws to reduce drunkenness.209 Another preacher proclaimed the need for a national reformation of manners, if victory were to be secured.210 As well as identifying vice, fast sermons contained justifications for fighting the war and descriptions of what was at stake. Some sense of ideas of the balance of power can be seen in Walter Harte’s warning to the university of Oxford that ‘victory itself may be attended with very fatal consequences: and that the balance of power will be as much destroyed by over-weakening an enemy, as by aggrandizing an ally’.211 George Wightwicke hoped that God might direct parliament to take those measures that ‘may be most effectual for preserving the balance of power, the protestant interest, and the liberties of Europe’.212 Such strategic observations and a broader concern with the European situation were comparatively rare. More common was a historical account of the previous occasions on which divine providence had delivered Britain from the threat of popery. The reign of Elizabeth I was frequently seen as a period of extraordinary ‘providences’, with the Spanish Armada’s defeat most prominent among them.213 The discovery of the Gunpowder plot in 1605 was a similar example of divine intervention.214 By contrast, the reign of James II (and sometimes the execution of Charles I) was seen as punishment for national sins. 215 Britain’s enemies aimed to place a popish pretender on the throne, who would

209 Reuben Clarke, A Sermon preach’d before the Honourable House of Commons at St Margaret’s, Westminster, on Wednesday, Feb 4, 1740–1. Being the Day appointed by his Majesty’s Proclamation for a General Fast, on occasion of the present War with Spain (London, 1741), p. 18. 210 Henry Stebbing, A Fast Sermon on occasion of the Rebellion in Scotland in the year 1745. Preached at Grays Inn Chapel (London, 1745), p. 18. 211 Walter Harte, The reasonableness and advantage of National humiliations, upon the Approach of War (Oxford, 1740), p. 22. 212 George Wightwicke, National Repentence, the only way to prevent the ruin of a Sinful People (London, 1741), p. 43. 213 See, for example, Thomas Amory, The Prayer of King Jehoshaphat considered, and applied to the State of the Nation (2nd edn, London, 1745), p. 32, Philip Williams, A Sermon preached in the Parish Church at Starston in Norfolk, upon the Fast-Day, Dec. 18 1745 (Cambridge, 1745), p. 12, John White, A Sermon preached in the Parish Churches of Stoke and Nayland in the county of Suffolk, on the 18th of December, 1745 (London, 1746), p. 19, and Richard Canning, A Sermon preach’d Dec. 18, 1745, on occasion of the present rebellion (Ipswich, 1746), p. 14. 214 Amory, Prayer of King Jehoshaphat, p. 33 and Canning, A Sermon preach’d Dec. 18, 1745, p. 15. 215 Matthias Mawson, A Sermon preach’d before the House of Lords in the Abby-Church of Westminster, on Wednesday, February 4th, 1740 (London, 1740), p. 15 (James II) and Thomas Vaughan, King Jehosaphat’s devout practice on account of Foreign Invasion (Coventry, 1744), p. 27 (Charles I).

224

DECLINE OF PROTESTANT INTEREST?

destroy British liberties and religion.216 Thus the happy results of the Glorious Revolution and the accession of the Hanoverians in 1714 would be overturned. The French were seeking universal monarchy and to overrun all of Europe.217 It was even argued that atheism would provoke an increase in popery so national vice and the threat to national liberties were neatly linked.218 Anxiety about popery was particularly prominent during the 1745 Jacobite rebellion. The threat to both liberty and property loomed large in several sermons. The Jacobites would extend popery by force. 219 Bonnie Prince Charlie’s promises to defend the Church of England were unreliable because it was well known how James II had broken all his promises to uphold English law.220 The Young Pretender’s advisers were all papists and would therefore act accordingly, regardless of what he wanted.221 Should the Jacobites succeed, then British colonies would be given up to Spain. Britons would be sent off to fight the pope’s battles, instead of providing a refuge for persecuted protestants.222 The Pretender could not possibly rule according to British customs because where could he have learnt a respect for liberty in France, Spain or Italy?223 Ingratitude for past blessings might, it was admitted, be the cause of the present difficulties.224 The French were widely seen as responsible for the war. They had supported Spain and created trouble in Germany. Only British support for Maria Theresa had prevented France from destroying the liberties of Europe. 225 Evidence for describing the French as aspirant universal monarchs came from more than secular history. Sacred history suggested that the French were fulfilling the role that either the Moabites or the Assyrians or the Edomites had played in the Old Testament, in attacking the Hebrews and seeking dominion over

216

Clarke, A Sermon preach’d before the Commons, p. 8. Samuel Lisle, A Sermon preached before the House of Lords in the Abby-Church, Westminster, on Wednesday, April 11, 1744 (London, 1744), p. 20. 218 Lisle, Sermon before the Lords, p. 17 and Thomas Secker, A Sermon preached at King’s Street Chapel, in the Parish of St James, Westminster, on Wednesday, Feb. 4 1740–1 (London, 1741), p. 16. 219 Edward Arrowsmith, God’s Judgements considered, as to their Nature, and End; and the Use that should be made of them (London, 1745), pp. 20–1. 220 Ibid., p. 24. 221 Adam Ferguson, A Sermon preached in the Ersh language to His Majesty’s First Highland Regiment of Foot (London, 1746), p. 19. 222 Robert Hargreaves, A Patriot-Spirit, recommended in a Sermon, preached December the 18th, 1745 (York, 1746), pp. 46, 49. 223 Thomas Newton, A Sermon preach’d before the Honourable House of Commons at St Margaret’s Westminster on Wednesday, December 18, 1745 (London, 1745), p. 16. 224 Richard Meadowcroft, The causes of our National Dangers and Distress, assigned (2nd edn, London, 1746), p. 17. 225 Edward Arrowsmith, What ought to be the behaviour of Subjects in Time of War (London, 1744), pp. 6–7. 217

225

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

them.226 These comparisons reinforced the strong identification between the modern British and the ancient Hebrews. Parallels between British and Jewish history were seen in several areas. A link was drawn between the Hebrew escape from slavery in Egypt and breaking the chains of spiritual tyranny at the reformation – the return of the Pretender would result in renewed slavery.227 The English reformation was viewed as the only pure form of reformed religion and the enjoyment of this, coupled with the balanced nature of the British constitution, suggested that the British were indeed the ‘favourites of Heaven’.228 Much of the justification for fasting rested on Old Testament example. When the ancient Hebrews had faced great perils, such as foreign invasion, it was because they had departed from the paths of righteousness. Fasting, led by such pious monarchs as Hezekiah and Jehosaphat, had ensured that God’s wrath had been turned aside and the Hebrews had triumphed. The modern British found themselves in a similar situation, even when it was argued that theirs was a better lot than the ancient Hebrews because they were not so idolatrous and enjoyed more civil rights.229 Collectively, the fast sermons exhibit the trend observed by other authors on nationalism that identification with the ancient Hebrews was important for creating a sense of national feeling.230 Charles Kerrich admitted that the reformation had started elsewhere but argued England had always been ‘the principal Strength, Support, Bulwark, the Fortress of True Christianity, and the Protestant Cause’. It also had the best constitution in the world.231 In a similar vein Bernard Wilson praised the true spirit of liberty amongst Britons, past, present and future. Valuing liberty

226

See Thomas Vaughan, King Jehosaphat’s devout practice, pp. 13–25 (Moabites), Thomas Bradbury, The sin and punishment of Edom; Considered and applied, in a Sermon on the FastDay, January 9, 1744–5 (London, 1745), p. 15 (Edomites), John Auther, Human Dependance, and Religious confidence consider’d (London, 1744), pp. 5–8, and John Denne, A Sermon preached in the Parish Church of St Mary, Lambeth, upon April 11, 1744 (London, 1744), pp. 1–5 (Assyrians). 227 Lisle, A Sermon preached before the Lords, p. 17. 228 Harte, The reasonableness and advantage of National humiliations, p. 25. 229 Mawson, A sermon preach’d before the Lords, p. 7. 230 The only sermon (of more than sixty published between 1740 and 1748) to deny that the Hebrew/British parallel was simple and exact was William Warburton, The Nature of National Offences truly stated: And the peculiar case of the Jewish people rightly explained: shewing that Britain, in its present circumstances, may reasonably aspire to the distinguished Protection of Heaven (London, 1746). In common with some of his other work, Warburton came to similar conclusions to the rest of the authors – that Britain could expect God’s providence if it went through fasting – but for very different reasons. The parallelism was also evident, and intentional, in Handel’s ‘Judas Maccabaeus’. See Ruth Smith, ‘The meaning of Morrell’s liberetto of “Judas Maccabaeus”’, Music and Letters, 79 (1998), pp. 50–72. 231 Charles Kerrich, A Sermon preached at the Parish Church of Redenhall, and the Chapel of Harleston in the County of Norfolk (Norwich, 1746), p. 9. 226

DECLINE OF PROTESTANT INTEREST?

would ensure that the threat of foreign invasion would be avoided.232 Some authors acknowledged England’s famous liberties were not secured until 1688 but these liberties were still ‘unknown to most other Countries’. 233 Philip Bearcroft waxed lyrical about the special nature of English government, liberties, relations with the Almighty and the benefits of being an island.234 The blessings provided by geographical separateness from the continent featured in other panegyrics to the British constitution. 235 Other authors were more sanguine. Just as the ancient Hebrews had suffered from aping Babylonian customs, so modern Britons had learnt all their vices and follies from foreigners. Unless the trend were reversed, the advantages of the channel would be completely destroyed and Britain would become a province of the continent.236 Amid the glorying in God’s providential favour towards Britain, mention, let alone detailed consideration, of other European protestants was exceptional. Thomas Bradbury lamented the fate that had befallen the Prussians through their alliance with France. It was disastrous that a family that had been so eminent in the reformation should now have betrayed it. It was also surprising that Frederick the Great, who had written so eloquently against Machiavelli, should have proved such a precise student of his maxims.237 The aptly named Thomas Piety recalled the fate of protestants at Thorn and Salzburg in his roll call of the most notorious examples of catholic persecution.238 Other scholars have argued that conflict against France was critical for the formation of national identity in Britain in the eighteenth century.239 The resumption of open war in the 1740s, after a period of nearly thirty years of peace, no doubt contributed significantly to this process. The analysis of fast sermons shows how important the superiority of British freedoms, both civil and religious, had become. Awareness of these differences did not suddenly

232

Bernard Wilson, A Sermon preached at Newark, Nottinghamshire, on Wednesday April 11, 1744 (London, 1744), pp. 16–17. 233 William Adams, A Sermon preached at St Chad’s Church in Shrewsbury, November 10, 1742 (London, 1743), p. 10. 234 Philip Bearcroft, A Sermon preached before the Honourable House of Commons, at St Margaret’s Church, Westminster, on Wednesday April 11, 1744 (London, 1744), pp. 13–18. 235 H. Knight, The natural and providential Effects of national Virtue and Vice consider’d (London, 1742), pp. 19–20. 236 Miller, The Causes of Britain’s being a Reproach to her Neighbours, p. 15. 237 Bradbury, The sin and punishment of Edom, p. iii. 238 Thomas Piety, Fearing the Lord, and serving him in Truth, the Means of obtaining the Divine Protection; and preventing the Ruin of a Sinful People (London, 1746), p. 15. 239 See Linda Colley, Britons (New Haven, 1992) but the issue of whether this identity was ‘British’ or ‘English’ can be explored through the contributions to Claydon and McBride, Protestantism and national identity, Colin Kidd, British identities before nationalism (Cambridge, 1999), and Krishan Kumar, The making of English national identity (Cambridge, 2003), ch. 6. 227

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

appear in the 1740s but the general ideological polarisation that war initiated made them more visible. Earlier chapters have illustrated how Britons had claimed leadership of the protestant interest and sought to defend it. In some ways, the 1740s witnessed the climax of these developments. Yet, placing so much emphasis on British leadership implicitly served to indicate difference, rather than commonality. Patriotism and nationalism also undermined attempts to show areas of common interest between Britain and Hanover. There is, of course, considerable distance between simplistic popular paeans to national greatness and traditional elite diplomatic strategy. That said, in their different ways, both ‘blue water’ and ‘elect nation’ rhetoric undermined the claim that a continentalist foreign policy and balance of power politics were imperative to counteract the threat of universal monarchy and popery.

228

Conclusion Foreign policy in Britain and Hanover in the eighteenth century was based on ideas, not just immediate interests. Reconstructing the history of diplomatic thought throws valuable light on how Britons and Hanoverians thought about themselves and their rulers. It is common to regard the eighteenth century as characterised by the ‘enlightened’ diplomacy of the balance of power. Yet it is important to remember that the balance of power could mean different things to different people at different times. This does not render it meaningless. Rather, the historian must locate the specific meanings of the term. For the early eighteenth century, this study has illustrated how the balance of power was associated in the minds of diplomats, statesmen and their subjects in Britain and Hanover with the need to combat the threat of universal monarchy posed by ‘papist’ states. Hence it was important to remember what the balance of power was designed to replace, as well as what it was supposed to achieve. Although it was still occasionally possible to find instances of the drive towards universal monarchy being blamed on the malign forces of the pope, as George I did at times during the Palatinate crisis, more often than not, Austria, France or Spain were perceived to pose the greatest threat to the balance of power, due to their respective desires for universal monarchy. The maintenance of the balance of power went hand in hand with the need to defend the protestant interest. Assessments of which power posed the greatest threat to the protestant interest varied over time. Under William III the threat was clearly identified with Louis XIV’s France. While the Stuarts represented the twin evils of popery and arbitrary government at home, France stood for the fears of popery and universal monarchy abroad. Williamite policy in the 1690s sought to combat both. Thus the legacy that William was to bequeath to his Hanoverian successors was one of continental involvement, a policy which was to become the dominant strand within court whig foreign policy thinking. The proscription of the tories after 1715 and the consolidation of the whig oligarchy meant that ‘official’ British foreign policy was strongly European in orientation until George II’s death. Ministry and monarch agreed about the importance of both Europe and protestantism for much of the period. French power declined relatively after Louis XIV’s death. During a period of regency, France was less willing to engage in an expansionist foreign policy. Consequently perceptions of the nature of the threat to the European state system changed. The Austrian Habsburgs were now seen as the greater danger. 229

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

Territorially Charles VI had made considerable gains between 1714 and 1718.1 Both British and Hanoverian ministers were also worried by what they viewed as Habsburg ingratitude for the help given to them during the wars against Louis XIV. Fears also remained about the power and position of clerics in general, and the influence of Jesuit confessors in particular. To combat the threat posed to the international order by papist states, it was necessary for the Maritime powers to ally themselves with the weaker side in any conflict between major powers to prevent the victory and domination of the stronger. It was therefore important to secure an alliance with France in 1725 to prevent Austro-Spanish domination. The growth of Austrian power was already being viewed with suspicion since an Austrian alliance with Spain was evocative of Habsburg dominion in the sixteenth century. Perhaps Charles VI had ambitions to emulate his forebear and namesake, Charles V, both in territorial control and catholic zeal. The spectre of universal monarchy explains why the Austro-Spanish alliance provoked such strong reactions amongst British diplomats. These fears were reinforced by Hanoverian concerns. For Hanoverian officials the Emperor’s policies in the 1720s and his unwillingness to solve the religious disputes were viewed with considerable suspicion. French power was beginning to revive by the 1730s. During the War of the Polish succession it was not clear which side posed the greater threat to the balance of power. In such circumstances British neutrality was perhaps the safest option, although it is important not to overestimate the role played by Sir Robert Walpole in ensuring that Britain was not dragged into war. In some respects the period after 1740 might be seen as a return to an earlier pattern of international relations. Once more France was seen as the greatest threat to the stability of Europe. Diplomatic language reinforced this impression with talk of an Old System and a revival of the Grand Alliance of the Maritime powers and Austria to combat French power. Yet beneath the apparent familiarity lay a more complex reality. Frederick the Great’s accession ushered in a period of change. Diplomacy was becoming more complicated. Britain had already emerged as a great power by the end of the War of the Spanish succession. Brandenburg-Prussia and Russia were to achieve similar status in the period 1740 to 1763. The maintenance of the balance of power became more difficult. Whereas previously Britain had simply to support the weaker side in the ongoing Habsburg/Bourbon struggle to maintain some sort of equilibrium, the emergence of a multi-polar European states system made this task much harder. Frederick’s arrival also undermined the link between the balance of power, the protestant interest and universal monarchy. Frederick’s personal religious convictions were atheist but Prussia remained, confessionally speaking,

1 See Michael Hochedlinger, Austria’s wars of emergence, 1683–1797 (London, 2003), ch. 8.

230

CONCLUSION

a protestant state. The traditional link between threats to stability and popish government no longer seemed so plausible to British and Hanoverian statesmen. Frederick refused to fulfil his designated role. Not only was he unwilling to settle his differences with Maria Theresa to concentrate on (from an Anglo-Hanoverian viewpoint) the greater threat posed by France, he also, as Hyndford was to discover in late 1741, failed to appreciate the importance of confessional considerations for the conduct of international relations. Frederick was almost universally mistrusted by British and Hanoverian elites. Both George II and his ministers regarded him with suspicion. The prospects for an alliance system based upon dynastic links and confessional solidarity were therefore small. Frederick was praised as a protestant hero in more popular discourse during the Seven Years War, but this no longer reflected official views. Once the foundations of a worldview based upon the protestant interest had been undermined, it was difficult to reconstruct them, even when diplomatic circumstance seemed conducive to such a move. Moreover the revival of Old System ideas was also problematic for the protestant interest. Under Louis XIV it was relatively clear that, despite some incidents of persecution by the Habsburgs, the main threat to protestantism came from France, a view that was constantly emphasised by a vibrant Huguenot diaspora. However in the 1740s, partly because the expulsion of the Huguenots had been so effective, more incidents of persecution came from within Habsburg territories, potential allies, than from France, the inveterate enemy. This, in turn, led to a conflict between Newcastle’s desire to ally with Austria again and Hanoverian concerns about the ongoing confessional problems of the Empire. The significance of the Hanoverian connection for diplomacy has been a consistent theme of this study. After 1714 relations with Austria were complicated by the existence of a multiple monarchy. While Charles VI wanted to view George I as just another elector, George had other ideas. He was keen to use British power to further his Hanoverian interests. Access to British power arguably did much to enhance Hanoverian status within the Empire. Just as Saxony and Brandenburg had sought to increase their status in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries through dynastic unions and new royal titles, the Hanoverian electors acquired both hard and soft power with the accession to the British thrones. Not only did the personal union provide access to extensive British military and financial resources, it brought with it considerable status, prestige and bargaining power. Indeed it could be said that from 1714 to 1740, Hanover benefited more than the other north German electorates from the dynastic link to an extra-Imperial power. Once again Frederick the Great made a significant difference. However, it should also be remembered that it was not simply a case of Hanoverians benefiting at the expense of British interests. Opponents of ministerial foreign policy sought to suggest this, but such arguments were both partial and partisan. The defence of the protestant interest was an area where British and Hanoverian interests could combine, rather than conflict with each other. Indeed one of the reasons why such arguments carried weight was that 231

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

George I and II were able to draw on the earlier traditions of Williamite selfpresentation and emphasise their confessional credentials. After 1688 protestantism was an important means to justify succession arrangements within Britain. It remained so until the decline of the Jacobite threat – that is, until at least 1745. A protestant foreign policy and the protestant succession were mutally reinforcing arguments. As previous chapters have argued, one reason why Britons were concerned about the catholic threat abroad was because they feared that it might have domestic implications. Successive ministries remained concerned about a Stuart restoration, perhaps even after the threat ceased to be ‘real’. British and Hanoverian diplomats passed on every scrap of information relating both to the Pretender and the movements of his agents.2 The content of Jacobite propaganda is also interesting. Jacobites attacked the foreignness of George I and II as a means of drawing attention away from the unacceptable religion of their Stuart master. Ministerial supporters, on the other hand, went to great lengths to emphasise the Hanoverians’ protestant credentials, just as William III’s supporters had done in the 1690s. However, by the early 1750s British and Hanoverian views about the importance of the protestant interest and the balance of power had begun to diverge. Münchhausen and his colleagues stressed to Newcastle the importance of protestant concerns within the Empire. Their emphasis on protestantism and Britain as a balancer state was an attempt to use a language that they thought would be acceptable to British ministers. Newcastle was now more concerned to ensure the success of his Imperial election scheme and anxious lest an emphasis on confessional concerns disrupt his attempts to revive the Old System. British foreign policy was becoming increasingly global in its focus, whilst Hanoverian concerns remained predominantly related to central Europe.3 It is also worth noting that the emphasis on balance of power thinking within Hanoverian diplomacy before 1750 was relatively unusual and reflected the association with Britain; within the Empire, balance of power ideas, at both an official and academic level, appeared infrequently before the middle of the eighteenth century.4 It is important to remember the broad range of

2 Thus even in 1754 British ministers were keen to discover what truth there was to rumours that the (Old) Pretender was at death’s door, both to ascertain the movements of the rest of his family and assess the likely reaction of his followers. See Robinson to Albemarle, Whitehall, 20/6/1754, British Library, Additional Manuscripts 32849, fol. 270. 3 Thus I would tend to agree with Hermann Wellenreuther’s view that the period around the Seven Years War marked an important shift in the nature of the relationship between Britain and Hanover. See Hermann Wellenreuther, ‘Die Bedeutung des Siebenjährigen Kriegs für die englisch–hannoveranischen Beziehungen’, in A.M. Birke and Kurt Kluxen, eds, England und Hannover/England and Hanover (Munich, 1986), pp. 145–75 and idem, ‘Von der Interessenharmonie zur Dissoziation: Kurhannover und England in der Zeit der Personalunion’, Niedersächsisches Jahrbuch für Landesgeschichte, 67 (1995), pp. 23–42. 4 Heinz Duchhardt, ‘Reich und europäisches Staatensystem seit dem Westfälischen

232

CONCLUSION

reasons why British and Hanoverian policies had drifted apart. It was not simply because Carteret’s foreign policy from 1742 to 1744 had rendered a continentalist or Hanoverian policy unacceptable. The divergence was deeper than personal factors alone. In some ways the failure of the 1745 rebellion had finally ‘settled’ the confessional question in a British context. The same was not true in an Imperial context. Yet, despite the personal union with Britain, Hanover was not able to emerge as a diplomatic player with an identity and power base broader than the Empire alone, as Prussia did, in the 1740s and 1750s. Why did William III and the early Hanoverians feel the need to defend the protestant interest? It was not primarily from deep personal religious conviction on the part of George I and II, although this conviction was probably greater than is often credited.5 For William III the protestant interest was a means to rally support against Louis XIV. For the Hanoverians two sets of structural pressures were at work. In a German context it was necessary for the Hanoverian elector to be seen as a stalwart of the protestant interest in the Empire. Although Prussia subsequently emerged as the great defender of German protestants, this outcome still hung in the balance in the 1720s and 1730s. Moreover, it is interesting to speculate on what might have happened to the leadership of protestant Germany, had George II been able to exert as much influence on his nephew Frederick as his father had on Frederick William I.6 Frederick, of course, refused to accept the role of following his uncle’s lead. In a British context it was vital for George I and II to be seen to be defending protestants because their claims to the throne were legitimised on the basis of their religion. This was not lost on the public, who used the language of the protestant interest in attempts to persuade the ministry to act, or on ministers, who utilised the same language in their defences of royal foreign policy. The extent to which the defence of the protestant interest was a concern for various levels of society can be seen in the evidence produced from correspondence, pamphlets, textbooks and sermons in the preceding chapters. This is not to say that this concern outweighed all others – the very existence of Jacobitism shows that this was not the case. What it does show, however, is that there was a religious component to what might broadly be called ‘loyalist’ thought.

Frieden’, in Volker Press, ed., Alternativen zur Reichsverfassung in der Frühen Neuzeit? (Munich, 1995), p. 182. 5 See Stephen B. Baxter, ‘The myth of the Grand Alliance in the eighteenth century’, in Paul R. Sellin and Stephen B. Baxter, Anglo-Dutch cross currents in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Los Angeles, 1976), p. 46, which stresses George II’s generosity to religious refugees. 6 The extent to which Frederick the Great followed his own line in foreign affairs, acting as his own foreign minister, is illustrated in H.M. Scott, ‘Prussia’s royal foreign minister’, in Robert Oresko, G.C. Gibbs, and H.M. Scott, eds, Royal and republican sovereignty in early modern Europe (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 500–26. 233

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

Such a claim is important to remember because too often discussion of ‘religion’ in eighteenth-century Britain is associated with J.C.D. Clark’s confessional state and backward-looking toryism,7 which disguises the fact that the slogans of early eighteenth-century whigs included liberty, property and religion. Court whig ideas and outlook were protestant in the first half of the eighteenth century to an extent that has been previously overlooked. Religion and the whig vision of progress were not necessarily opposites. Lying behind much of this picture is the problem of secularisation and the role of religion in ‘modern’ politics. Increasingly historians are turning away from binary models of a religious pre-modernity and a secular modernity. German historians have emphasised the importance of religion in the formation of the modern state in their work on ‘confessionalisation’ theory.8 The view of the balance of power advanced here indicates its original association with religious ideas, even if the association was subsequently lost. Moreover, by indicating how it was believed that protestantism could best be defended on a national basis, through treaties and laws, this book also suggests that it is too simplistic to link the decline of an apocalyptic idiom and desire to destroy the anti-Christ with the decline of ‘religion’ and the rise of ‘modernity’. Furthermore, arguments that seem today to be entirely rational about the need for conscience to be sovereign in matters of religion, and the illegitimacy of state interference in belief were first made precisely because there was a fear that conscience was not sovereign and the state could coerce belief. More attention needs to be paid to both geography and chronology in understanding the spread of enlightenment. Protestants in the Empire in the 1720s and 1730s would be astonished to learn of historians describing the instances of persecution as anachronistic and isolated relics of a bygone age. Perhaps it is more appropriate to speak, as Hans Schmidt does, of ‘an age of slowly departing confessionalism’.9 Yet this was not simply a continuation of previous patterns of thought. An emphasis on the protestant interest and the balance of power marked a distinctive phase, differing from both the period of Wars of Religion and the more secularised world of Frederick the Great’s Realpolitik. While protestants had come to accept that they should not view all political action in strictly confessional terms, they feared that their catholic opponents still looked at the world through confessional spectacles. There was still a considerable distance between this world and Burke’s common Christian front of the 1790s, united against the atheism of the revolutionaries, where the most important battle was seen as 7

See J.C.D. Clark, English society (2nd edn, Cambridge, 2000). See Heinz Schilling, Nationale Identität und Konfession in der europäischen Neuzeit’, in Bernhard Giesen, ed., Nationale und kulturelle Identität (Frankfurt/Main, 1991), pp. 192–252. The ideas behind ‘confessionalisation’ theory are summarised in R. Po-chia Hsia, Social discipline in the reformation (London, 1989). 9 Hans Schmidt, Kürfurst Karl Philipp von der Pfalz als Reichsfürst (Mannheim, 1963), p. 148. 8

234

CONCLUSION

religion, irrespective of confession, against irreligion.10 The present work fits more comfortably into the chronology of the ‘long reformation’ than the ‘long eighteenth century’ because of its stress on the mid-century disjunction. Changes in British and Hanoverian diplomatic practice and tactics also deserve comment. Faced with two crises involving protestantism in the Empire and its environs, in 1719 and 1724, George I dispatched British diplomats. George II did not do the same, when faced with a similar crisis in 1731. Partly this reflects the changed relationship with Austria – in 1731, there was less to be gained from the Austrians by flexing British diplomatic muscle, as the treaty of March 1731 had already solved some outstanding concerns. However, George II was not an unconditional supporter of the Emperor, as his behaviour during the War of the Polish succession indicates. In general both George I and II were keen to work pragmatically to achieve security for protestants. Both were keen to present themselves as moderates, when compared with the more aggressive and confrontational Prussians. They were interested in extracting concessions from both Austria and France, in exchange for British support. The attempts to repeal the Ryswick clause should be viewed in this light. Ultimately these came to nothing. Nevertheless, the attempts of the Maritime powers to mediate between France and Austria in 1733 to 1735 might have been successful. In the end it was the exclusion from the peacemaking process which prevented the protestants from exerting more pressure on Charles VI to ensure that he did not renege on his 1734 promise. The emphasis on negotiation and diplomacy might also be seen as a further feature of an ‘enlightened’ approach to statecraft in which an analysis of interests could be used to achieve desired ends, rather than the application of brute force. Much could depend on the forces of personality – Wrisberg in Regensburg and Whitworth in Berlin were strong defenders of protestant interests. That said, the injunctions in instructions from London to defend the protestant interest were more than mere rhetoric. Words were frequently accompanied by deeds. It has often been assumed that religion was unimportant to foreign policy because it is difficult to point to situations where religion alone can be said to have determined policy. This negative, in terms of results, should not be taken at face value. Ideas and assumptions were also important, even though they are less easy to reconstruct than a simple chronology of decisions and actions. Close scrutiny of particular incidents offers a means to tap into a broader field of beliefs and to explore underlying patterns of thought. One of the purposes of this work has been to draw attention to a context for British history that has been largely overlooked. From 1688 to 1837, with the exception of the thirteen years of Anne’s reign, Britain’s monarch was

10

Although Nigel Aston has warned against placing too much emphasis on Christian unity over ongoing denominational division. See Nigel Aston, Christianity and revolutionary Europe (Cambridge, 2002), p. 223. 235

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

simultaneously the ruler of significant territory in continental Europe – the United Provinces under William III and Hanover under the Georges. Historians of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Britain are now very aware of the importance of the dynamic interactions between England, Scotland and Ireland for understanding developments within the British Isles. Some advocates of the ‘New British History’ wish to extend this perspective even further and indicate the ways in which Britain was part of an ‘Atlantic archipelago’, thus showing the links between the old world and the new. This has been an important and innovative development. Yet it should not come at the price of forgetting that as well as being an Atlantic, and increasingly in the eighteenth century an imperial, power, Britain had, through dynastic links, a European identity as well. The period covered by this book is that in which the effects of such a European identity can be felt most strongly. Under William III, George I and George II it is vital not to ignore the European aspects of British foreign policy. The links go deeper than that, though. As the previous chapters have shown strategic foreign policy decisions cannot easily be separated from a broader cultural awareness of a common protestant heritage. The channel was not so wide as might appear from the absence of European context in some of the existing literature. Instead of simply thinking about New British History, the insights provided by thinking of Britain as a composite state or multiple monarchy with a European aspect provide a more fruitful context for British history in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. The changing nature of the relationship with one part of that multiple monarchy, Hanover, has featured prominently in this study. Yet it is also worth reflecting on the importance of the relationship between Britain and the United Provinces, the other part of the multiple monarchy under William III, for the support of the protestant interest. Dutch power was declining by the 1740s. The traditional alliance between Britain and the United Provinces was undermined, partly because the religious, political and economic foundations of cooperation had been eroded.11 At various points in this study attention has been drawn to the pressure that the Dutch applied to both the British and Hanoverians to support the protestant interest. It would be unfair however to see the impulse for such efforts as coming solely from the Dutch. After all there were other occasions when British and Hanoverian diplomats drew attention to confessional issues to win Dutch support. That said, the loosening of ties between Britain and the United Provinces cannot have helped support for the protestant interest. Sir Thomas Robinson was probably exaggerating when he commented that the only area where the Dutch were willing to cooperate with the British at Vienna was in relation to instances of persecution in the middle of the 1730s but it indicates the extent to which religious solidarity could no longer necessarily override other interests.

11 Hugh Dunthorne, The Maritime powers, 1721–1740 (New York and London, 1986), p. 323.

236

CONCLUSION

It would be foolish to deny that a sense of separation of Britain from the continent grew over the course of the eighteenth century. As the final chapter indicated, an emphasis on the superiority of the British constitution in both its secular and ecclesiastical forms served to stress difference, rather than supranational confessional solidarity. The period from 1740 to 1763 also witnessed more warfare than the relatively peaceful preceding thirty-five years. War, as many historians have noted, can reinforce a sense of national identity. Certainly the attempts of clergymen during the War of the Austrian succession to make sense of British woes led to a strong emphasis on the parallel between the ancient Hebrews and the modern Britons. Coupled with a growth in British extra-European and imperial power, a sense of attachment to the continent gave way to a discourse of difference. Such views were reinforced by a whiggish historiographical account of English historical exceptionalism. It is a nice irony that whiggish historiography contributed to the marginalisation of the sense of protestant solidarity and European involvement which early eighteenth-century whig politicians were so familiar with from their political practice. This book has illustrated the complex and varied ways in which religious ideals and language interacted with other concerns. It has shown how an appreciation of broader intellectual and cultural context is necessary to understand fully the nature of political and diplomatic decision-making. It has stressed the importance of Europe for late Stuart and early Hanoverian diplomacy, monarchy and identity. There are other ways of approaching the history of foreign policy. Yet within any discussion of early eighteenth-century diplomacy and politics, the defence of the protestant interest should be given a prominent place.

237

Bibliography Manuscripts Cambridge, Cambridge University Library Cholmondeley (Houghton) Papers: Ch (H) 21–3, 25–6, 73–8 Cholmondeley (Houghton) Letters: 1706, 1722, 2137, 2153a, 2160–1, 2179, 2237, 2244, 2259, 2311, 2319, 2324, 2333–4, 2345, 2348–9, 2357–8, 2361, 2363, 2366, 2398, 2421, 2436, 2440, 2456–7, 2482 SPCK archive minute books: SPCK.MS A1/14–17 SPCK archive letterbooks: SPCK.MS D4/23–6 Farmington, CT, Lewis Walpole Library Hanbury Williams papers vols 1–6, 47 Weston papers vols 1–20 Halle, Archiv der Franckeschen Stiftung Missionsarchiv:

I B IV 4, I B7, I E 2, I K5 24 II G10, II H3 Hauptarchiv: A177:100, A180:31, A180:74 B8 C214, C345, C383, C504, C780:58 D58 K2, K4–6, K10–12, K17, K19–23, K25–6 Francke Nachlaß: Kap. 30 (England) Hanover, Hauptstaatsarchiv Calenberg Brief 11 (Holy Roman Empire): 1426, 1607–12, 1620, 1624, 1626, 1628, 1637–8, 1643–7, 1649–50, 1652, 1657–8, 1660, 1663–8, 1678, 1680, 1683–4, 1689–90, 1692, 1699, 1702–4, 1707–12, 1715–17, 1719–20, 1722, 1725, 1733, 1735–8, 1742, 1744–6, 1748–9, 1751, 1758, 1761–3, 1778–81, 1791, 1797–8, 1800, 1801, 1804, 1808, 1816–17, 1820, 1822–4, 1827, 1829, 1840, 1842, 1845, 1847, 1854, 2973–3075, 3475, 3559–60 238

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Calenberg Brief 24 (Foreign affairs): 77–85, 714, 720, 724, 727, 733–4, 736, 758, 764, 770, 773–4, 777, 1535, 1538, 1682–4, 1688, 1690, 1696, 1704, 1707–8, 1712–19, 1722–6, 1728–33, 1999, 2001–2, 2265, 2490, 2497, 2501–6, 3205–26, 4178, 4379, 4381, 4406, 4913–38, 5216, 5225–8, 5242–3, 5253, 5265, 5274–5, 5629, 5679, 5681, 6114, 6374–86, 6465–6, 7635, 8161, 8169 Hannover 91 (Nachläße): von Hattorf 1, 10, 33, 54 Jahns 8, 10 St Saphorin 1, 15, 16 Hannover 92 (Deutsche Kanzlei, London): 58, 79, 1061–2, 1141, 1158–9, 1341, 1870, 1964, 1969, 1977, 2093–5, 2110, 2222, 2253–4, 2257, 2259–64, 2474 London, British Library Stowe MSS 227–31, 242, 247 Lansdowne MS 1024 Additional MSS 22529–36 (Carteret papers) Additional MSS 23780–91, 97–8, 801–11 (Robinson papers) Additional MSS 31138 (Strafford papers) Additional MSS 32693–705, 715–30, 38–54, 65–81, 32800–3, 12–28, 35–51 (Newcastle papers) Additional MSS 35406–7, 10 (Hardwicke papers) Additional MSS 35837 Additional MSS 37348–51, 61, 72–85 (Whitworth papers) Additional MSS 47028–33 (Egmont letterbooks) Additional MSS 48981–2 (Townshend papers) Additional MSS 49970 (Bolingbroke letterbook) London, Public Record Office Colonial Office:

CO 5/666 (letters of Georgia trustees) CO 5/686 (journal of Georgia trustees) CO 5/689–90 (minutes of common council of Georgia) Foreign Office: FO 90/19 (Royal and secretaries letters, Germany) State Paper Office: SP 43/1–13, 25–9 (Regencies) SP 44/269–94 (entry books) SP 78/174, 78 (France) SP 80/60–3, 78–94, 99, 103–4, 115, 117–24, 129–30 (Austria) SP 81/118–21 (Hessen-Kassel), 160–8 (Hanover) 174–6 (Regensburg) SP 84/233, 273–4, 283–91, 359–60 (Holland) 239

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

SP 88/29–30 (Poland) SP 90/8–36 (Prussia) SP 100/10–15 (Foreign ministers: Germany and Holy Roman Empire) SP 104/42, 48, 212, 220–1, 248, 253 (letterbooks) SP 107/1–3 (intercepts) SP 110/78–9 (supplementary) SP 116/478

Printed primary material A Defence of the Measures of the Present Administration (London, 1731). A further account of the sufferings of the persecuted protestants in the archbishoprick of Saltzburg (London, 1733). A letter from a Member of the last Parliament, to a new Member of the Present, concerning the Conduct of the War with Spain (London, 1742). A Letter to the author of the History of the Lutheran Church, from a Country SchoolBoy (np, nd [1714]). A Second Enquiry into the Reasons of the conduct of Great Britain, with relation to the present state of affairs in Europe (London, 1726). A Series of wisdom and policy, manifested in a review of our Foreign Negotiations and Transactions for several years past. Being a complete answer to Politicks on both sides (London, 1735). A short review of the principal transactions in Europe, since the peach of Utrecht (London, 1729) An Account of the sufferings of the Persecuted Protestants in the Archbishoprick of Saltzburg (London, 1732). Adams, William, A sermon preached at St Chad’s Church in Shrewsbury, November 10, 1742 (London, 1743). Amory, Thomas, The Prayer of King Jehoshaphat considered, and applied to the State of the Nation (2nd edn, London, 1745). Analyse du traite d’Alliance, conclu à Hanover entre leurs Majestés tres-chretienne, Britannique, et Prussique, le 3. Sept. 1725 (np, nd [c. 1725–6]). [Arnell, William], The Free Briton Extraordinary: or, a short review of the British Affairs (2nd edn, London, 1730). Arrowsmith, Edward, What ought to be the behaviour of Subjects in Time of War (London, 1744). —— God’s Judgements considered, as to their Nature, and End; and the Use that should be made of them (London, 1745). Atkinson, Benjamin A., Good Princes nursing Fathers and nursing Mothers to the Church. A Sermon on the marriage of his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales (London, 1736). Ausführliche Historie derer Emigranten oder vertriebenen Lutheraner aus dem ErtzBißthum Saltzburg (2nd edn, Leipzig, 1732). 240

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Auther, John, Human Dependance, and Religious confidence consider’d (London, 1744). Bearcroft, Philip, A Sermon preached before the Honourable House of Commons, at St Margaret’s Church, Westminster, on Wednesday April 11, 1744 (London, 1744). Bethel, Slingsby, The interest of the princes and states of Europe (4th edn, London, 1694). [Bion, Jean], A faithful and exact Narrative of the horrid tragedy; lately acted at Thorn, in Polish Prussia (London, 1725). —— Relation exacte et sincere du Sujet qui a excité le funeste Tumulte de la Ville de Thorn (Amsterdam, 1725). Bradbury, Thomas, The sin and punishment of Edom; Considered and applied, in a Sermon on the Fast-Day, January 9, 1744–5 (London, 1745). Bragge, Robert, A brief essay concerning the soul of man shewing what, and how noble a being it is. To which is added, a short answer to that weighty Enquiry, Watchman, what of the night? Occasion’d by the Cruelty of the Jesuits at Thorn (2nd edn, London, 1725). Brett, Thomas, A review of Lutheran Principles (London, 1714). Britannia in mourning (London, 1742). Burke, Edmund, An Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs (London, 1791). —— Reflections on the revolution in France ed. J.C.D. Clark (Stanford, 2001). Burroughs, Joseph, Two sermons: the one against the traditions of the church of Rome; the other about the right manner of contending for the Christian faith: preached at Barbican in London, October 15. and 22. M.DCC.XXXII. on occasion of collecting for the relief of the persecuted Protestants of Saltzburg (London, 1732). Canning, Richard, A Sermon preach’d Dec. 18, 1745, on occasion of the present rebellion (Ipswich, 1746). Carter, Nicholas, The success of Arms depends upon God’s Providence (London, 1740). Clarke, Reuben, A Sermon preach’d before the Honourable House of Commons at St Margaret’s, Westminster, on Wednesday, Feb 4, 1740–1. Being the Day appointed by his Majesty’s Proclamation for a General Fast, on occasion of the present War with Spain (London, 1741). Cocks, Richard, A true and impartial inquiry made into the late bloody execution at Thorn (London, 1727). Coxe, William, Memoirs of the life and administration of Sir Robert Walpole (3 vols, London, 1798). [Davenant, Charles], Essays upon I. the Ballance of Power. II. The right of making war, peace and alliances. III. Universal Monarchy (London, 1701). Denne, John, A Sermon preached in the Parish Church of St Mary, Lambeth, upon April 11, 1744 (London, 1744). Diary of Viscount Percival afterwards first earl of Egmont ed. R.A. Roberts (Historical Manuscripts Commission, 3 vols, London, 1920–3). 241

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

[Defoe, Daniel], The evident approach of a war; and something of the necessity of it, in order to establish peace and preserve trade (London, 1727). Drögereit, Richard, ed., Quellen zur Geschichte Kurhannovers im Zeitalter der Personalunion mit England 1714–1803 (Hildesheim, 1949). Earbery, Matthias, An Historical Account of the Advantages that have accru’d to England, by the Succession in the Illustrious House of Hanover (London, 1722). —— The Second Part of the Advantages that have Accrued to England by the Succession in the Illustrious House of Hanover (London, 1722). Ferguson, Adam, A Sermon preached in the Ersh language to His Majesty’s First Highland Regiment of Foot (London, 1746). Fischer, Johann Gottlob, Reise-Beschreibung Der Saltzburg-Dürnberger Emigranten (Leipzig, 1734). Frage, ob der speciose Religions-Titel, oder Praetext hinlänglich seye, die Neutralitaet geltend zu machen (np, nd [1734]). Frederick II, ‘Histoire de mon temps’ ed. Max Posner, in Publicationen aus den Preussischen Staatsarchiven, 4 (Leipzig, 1879). —— Politische Correspondenz Friedrich’s des Grossen (46 vols, Berlin, 1879–1939). Gibson, William, A history of the affairs of Europe, from the peace of Utrecht to the conclusion of the Quadruple Alliance. With a treatise of the religious and civil interests of Europe (London, 1725). [Good, Benjamin?], The true interest of the Hanover Treaty consider’d (London, 1727). [Gordon, Thomas], A short view of the conspiracy with some reflections on the present state of affairs (London, 1723). —— An Authentick Narrative of the late proceedings at Thorn (London, 1725). —— Narré exact et impartial de ce qui concerne la sanglante Tragedie de Thorn, traduit de l’Anglois par Jean Bion (Amsterdam, 1725). Hargreaves, Robert, A Patriot-Spirit, recommended in a Sermon, preached December the 18th, 1745 (York, 1746). Harte, Walter, The reasonableness and advantage of National humiliations, upon the Approach of War (Oxford, 1740). [Hoadly, Benjamin], An enquiry into the reasons of the conduct of Great Britain, with relation to the present state of Affairs in Europe (London, 1727). —— A Defence of an Enquiry into the Reasons of the Conduct of Great Britain. Occasioned by the paper published in the Country Journal or Craftsman on Saturday, Jan. 4, 1728–9 (London, 1729). Hoffman, Christian Gottfried, Entwurff einer Einleitung zu dem Erkäntnis des gegenwärtigen Zustandes von Europa (Leipzig, 1720). [Jablonski, Daniel Ernst], Das Betrübte Thorn, Oder die Geschichte so sich zu Thorn Von Dem II. Jul. 1724. biß auf gegenwärtige Zeit zugetragen, Aus zuverläßigen Nachrichten Unverfänglich zusammen getragen, und der Recht- und Wahrheit-liebenden Welt zur Beurtheilung migetheilet (Berlin, 1725). [Jablonski, Johann Theodor], Thornische Deckwürdigkeiten, Worinnen die im Jahr Christi 1724 und vorhergehenden Zeiten verungluckte Stadt Thorn Im Königl. 242

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Pohlnischen Hertzogthum Preußen Von einer unparteyischen Feder gründlich vorgestellet wird (Berlin, 1726). Jones, George Fenwick, ed., Henry Newman’s Salzburger letterbooks (Athens, GA, 1966). Journals of the House of Commons. Journals of the House of Lords. Kahle, Ludwig Martin, La balance de l’Europe considerée comme la regle de la paix et de la guerre (Berlin and Göttingen, 1744). Kerrich, Charles, A Sermon preached at the Parish Church of Redenhall, and the Chapel of Harleston in the County of Norfolk (Norwich, 1746). King, Peter, ‘Notes of Domestic and Foreign Affairs, during the last years of the reign of George I and the early part of the reign of George II’, in Peter King, The Life of John Locke (new edn, 2 vols, London, 1830), ii, pp. 1–132 (paginated separately). Knight, H., The natural and providential Effects of national Virtue and Vice consider’d (London, 1742). Lehmann, Max, ed., Preussen und die katholische Kirche seit 1640 (9 vols, Leipzig, 1878–1902). Linnell, C.L.S, ed., The diaries of Thomas Wilson, D.D. (London, 1964). Lisle, Samuel, A Sermon preached before the House of Lords in the Abby-Church, Westminster, on Wednesday, April 11, 1744 (London, 1744). [Martyn, Benjamin], Reasons for establishing the colony of Georgia, with regard to the trade of Great Britain, the increase of our People, and the Employment and support it will afford to great numbers of our own poor, as well as foreign persecuted Protestants (London, 1733). Mawson, Matthias, A Sermon preach’d before the House of Lords in the AbbyChurch of Westminster, on Wednesday, February 4th, 1740 (London, 1740). Meadowcroft, Richard, The causes of our National Dangers and Distress, assigned (2nd edn, London, 1746). Mentzer, Balthasar, A vindication of the Lutheran Religion, from the charge of popery (London, 1720). Miller, James, The Causes of Britain’s being a Reproach to her Neighbours (London, 1740). Moser, Johann Jacob, Vollständiger Bericht Von der so berühmt- als fatalen Clausula Articuli IV. Pacis Ryswicensis (Frankfurt/Main, 1732). —— Derer Saltzburgischen Emigrations-Acten (Frankfurt/Main, 1732). Newman, A.N., ed., The parliamentary diary of Sir Edward Knatchbull, 1722–1730 (London, 1963). Newton, Thomas, A Sermon preach’d before the Honourable House of Commons at St Margaret’s Westminster on Wednesday, December 18, 1745 (London, 1745). Observations upon the Treaty between the Crowns of Great-Britain, France, and Spain, concluded at Seville on the Ninth of November, 1729, N.S. (London, 1729). 243

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

Oertel, Christian Gottfried, ed., Vollständiges Corpus Gravaminum Evangelicorum (4 vols, Regensburg, 1775). [Oglethorpe, James], A new and accurate account of the provinces of SouthCarolina and Georgia (London, 1732). Owen, Charles, The Danger of the Church and Kingdom from Foreigners consider’d; in several articles of the highest importance (London, 1721). —— An Alarm to protestant princes and people, who are all struck at in the popish cruelties at Thorn, and other barbarous executions abroad (London, 1725). Parry, Clive, ed., The consolidated treaty series (231 vols, New York, 1969–81). Piety, Thomas, Fearing the Lord, and serving him in Truth, the Means of obtaining the Divine Protection; and preventing the Ruin of a Sinful People (London, 1746). Political Grammar, adapted to the Meridian of Great Britain (London, 1742). Pufendorf, Samuel, An introduction to the history of the principal Kingdoms and States of Europe (6th edn, London, 1706). [Pulteney, William], A short view of the state of affairs, with relation to Great Britain, for the four years past; with some remarks on the Treaty lately published and Pamphlet intitled, Observations upon it (London, 1730). —— The Politicks on both sides, with regard to foreign affairs (2nd edn, London, 1734). Reasons against a war. In a letter to a member of Parliament. By an Old Whig (London, 1727). Reasons for a war, in order to establish the tranquility and commerce of Europe (London, 1729). Reflexions d’une Personne des-interessée sur le Memoire, que Monsieur Poyntz, Envoyé Extraordinaire & Ministre Plenipotentiare de Sa Majesté Brittanique à la Cour de Suede, a presenté le 4. Juin 1726 pour porter cette Couronne à l’accession au Traité de la Triple Alliance, conclu à Herrenhausen le 3. Septembre 1725 (n.p, 1727). Remarques sur l’Analyse du traité d’Hanover (np, nd [c. 1726]). Rohan, Henri, Duc de, A Treatise of the interest of the princes and states of Christendome trans. Henry Hunt (London, 1641). Rundle, Thomas, A Sermon preached at St George’s Church Hanover Square, on Sunday February 17, 1734. To recommend the Charity for establishing the New Colony of Georgia (London, 1734). Schmauß, Johann Jacob, Einleitung zu der Staats-Wissenschaft, und Erleuterung des von ihm herausgegebenen Corpus Juri Gentium Academici (2 vols, Leipzig, 1741–60). Schnath, Georg and Bothmer, Karl Freiherr von, eds, Aus den Erinnerungen des Hans Kaspar von Bothmer (Hildesheim, 1936). Secker, Thomas, A Sermon preached at King’s Street Chapel, in the Parish of St James, Westminster, on Wednesday, Feb. 4 1740–1 (London, 1741). Sedgwick, Romney, ed., Some materials towards memoirs of the reign of King George II by John, Lord Hervey (3 vols, London, 1931). [Shippen, William], Four speeches against continuing the Army, &c. As they were 244

BIBLIOGRAPHY

spoken on Several Occasions in the House of Commons. As also, a speech for relieving the unhappy sufferers in the charitable corporation; as it was spoken in the House of Commons, May 8. 1732. By W____ S____, Esq (London, 1732). Smith, Samuel, A Sermon preach’d before the Trustees for establishing the Colony of Georgia in America (London, 1733). Some observations of the present state of affairs, in a letter to a member of the House of Commons (London, 1731). Some useful and occasional remarks on a late seditious Libel, entitl’d Considerations on the Present State of Affairs in Europe (London, 1731). Stebbing, Henry, A Fast Sermon on occasion of the Rebellion in Scotland in the year 1745. Preached at Grays Inn Chapel (London, 1745). Stisser, Christian Friedrich, Freymütige und bescheidene Erinnerungen wider des berühmten Göttingischen Professors, Herrn Doctor Kahle, Abhandlung von der Balance Europens (Leipzig, 1745). —— Fortsetzung der freimütigen und bescheidenen Erinnerungen wider des berühmten Göttingischen Professors, Herrn Doctor Kahle, Abhandlung von der Balance Europens (Leipzig, 1746). Stollten, Christian Ludwig, Göttingische gelehrte Nachrichten von dem Jahre MDCCXXXXIIII (Göttingen, 1745). Struve, Burkard Gotthelf, Ausführlicher Bericht von der Pfaltzischen KirchenHistorie (Frankfurt/Main, 1721). The British Patriot, or a Timely Caveat against giving into the Measures of any Evil and Corrupt Minister (London, 1731). The case of the Hessian forces, in the pay of Great Britain, impartially and freely Examin’d (London, 1731). The Consequences of His Majesty’s Journey to Hanover, at this critical Juncture (London, 1740). The Danverian History of the Affairs of Europe, for the memorable year 1731 (London, 1732). The groans of Germany: or the enquiry of a protestant German into the original cause of the present distractions of the Empire (3rd edn, London, 1741). The Heidelberg Catechism: containing the Principles of the Christian Religion, for which the Protestants in the Palatinate have long been persecuted by the Jesuits (London, 1720). The Lutheran Liturgy: now us’d by the Protestants in the Reformed Churches of Germany, prov’d to agree with the Rites and Ceremonies in the several Offices of the Book of Common Prayer (2nd edn, London, 1715). The Parliamentary history of England, from the earliest period to the year 1803 (36 vols, London, 1809–20). The source of all the sufferings the Protestants in Thorn, in Great Britain &c. have undergone from Popish princes (London, 1726). The tallies of war and peace: or, what may be expected from the present situation of affairs in Europe (London, 1727). Trenchard, John and Gordon, Thomas, A collection of tracts by the late John Trenchard, esq; and Thomas Gordon, esq (2 vols, London, 1751). 245

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

Two Letters to the Right Honourable the Lord Viscount Townshend: shewing the seditious Tendency of several late pamphlets; more particularly of, A Review of the Lutheran Principles, by Thomas Brett; and of, A Letter to the Author of the Lutheran Church, from a Country School-Boy. By a Presbyter of the Church of England (London, 1714). Untersuchung der Ursachen, welche die Cron Spanien sowohl als Die Cron Engeland zu der jetzige Aufführung bewogen haben (Vienna, 1727). Urlsperger, Samuel, Der Nachrichten von der Kgl. Grossbritannischen Colonie Saltzburgischer Emigranten in America (3 vols, Halle, 1741–56). Vaughan, Thomas, King Jehosaphat’s devout practice on account of Foreign Invasion (Coventry, 1744). Wahrhafftige Historische Nachrichten von dem am 16. Jul. 1724 zu Thorn in Preussen passirten Tumult des gemeinen Volcks, und erfolgten scharffen Execution einiger Todt verurtheilten Personen, aus sicheren Nachrichten und expresses Verlangen, zu Steuer der Wahrheit dem Publico mitgetheilet von einem Liebhaber der Wahrheit (Jena, nd [1724–5]). [Waller, Edmund and Stanhope, Philip Dormer, earl of Chesterfield], The case of the Hanover forces in the pay of Great Britain (London, 1743). [Walpole, Horatio: and Poyntz, Stephen], Considerations on the present state of Affairs in Europe and particularly with Regard to the Number of Forces in the Pay of Great-Britain (London, 1731). Walpole, Horatio (the younger), Memoirs of King George II ed. John Brooke (3 vols New Haven, 1985). Warburton, William, The Nature of National Offences truly stated: And the peculiar case of the Jewish people rightly explained: shewing that Britain, in its present circumstances, may reasonably aspire to the distinguished Protection of Heaven (London, 1746). Watts, George, A sermon preached before the Trustees for establishing the Colony of Georgia in America; at their Anniversary Meeting in the Parish-Church of St Bridget, alias St Bride, in Fleetstreet, London: on Thursday, March 18. 1735 (London, 1736). Watts, Isaac, The religious improvement of publick events: a sermon preach’d at Berry-Street, June 18. 1727. On occasion of the death of our late gracious sovereign George I (2nd edn, London, 1727). White, John, A Sermon preached in the Parish Churches of Stoke and Nayland in the county of Suffolk, on the 18th of December, 1745 (London, 1746). Wightwicke, George, National Repentence, the only way to prevent the ruin of a Sinful People (London, 1741). Williams, Philip, A Sermon preached in the Parish Church at Starston in Norfolk, upon the Fast-Day, Dec. 18 1745 (Cambridge, 1745). Wilson, Bernard, A Sermon preached at Newark, Nottinghamshire, on Wednesday April 11, 1744 (London, 1744).

246

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Contemporary periodicals Allerneuester Zustand von Europa (3 vols, Leipzig, 1734–6). Europäischer Fama. Europäischer Staats-Cantzley. Neue Europäische Fama. Political State of Great Britain. The Present State of Europe: or the Historical and Political Monthly Mercury. The True Briton (2 vols, London, 1723).

Printed secondary material Adams, Simon, ‘Spain or the Netherlands? The dilemmas of early Stuart foreign policy’, in Tomlinson, ed., Before the English civil war, pp. 79–102. Agnew, D.C.A., Protestant exiles from France (3rd edn, 2 vols, London, 1886). Anderson, M.S., ‘Eighteenth-century theories of the balance of power’, in Hatton and Anderson, eds, Studies in diplomatic history, pp. 183–98. —— The rise of modern diplomacy, 1450–1919 (London, 1993). —— The War of the Austrian succession (London, 1995). Aretin, Karl Otmar von, Das Reich (Stuttgart, 1986). —— Das alte Reich, 1648–1806 (3 vols, Stuttgart, 1993–7). Arkell, R.L., Caroline of Ansbach (London, 1939). Armitage, David, ‘Greater Britain: a useful category of historical analysis?’, American Historical Review, 104 (1999), pp. 427–45. Aston, Nigel, Christianity and revolutionary Europe (Cambridge, 2002). Ball, Terence, Farr, James, and Hanson, Russell L., eds, Political innovation and conceptual change (Cambridge, 1989). Bate, Jonathan, The genius of Shakespeare (London, 1997). Baugh, Daniel A., ‘Great Britain’s “blue-water” policy, 1689–1815’, International History Review, 10 (1988), pp. 33–58. Baxter, Stephen B., ‘The myth of the Grand Alliance in the eighteenth century’, in Sellin and Baxter, Anglo-Dutch cross currents, pp. 41–59. —— ed., England’s rise to greatness, 1660–1763 (Berkeley, 1983). Beales, Derek, ‘Religion and culture’, in Blanning, ed., Eighteenth century, pp. 131–77. Beer, Adolf, ‘Zur Geschichte der Politik Karl’s VI.’, Historische Zeitschrift, 55 (1886), pp. 1–70. Begemann, Ulrike, ‘Die wirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen der Personalunion für Hannover’, in Rohloff, ed., Großbritannien und Hannover, pp. 367–89. Bernstorff, Hartwig Graf von, Andreas Gottlieb von Bernstorff 1649–1726: Staatsmann, Junker, Patriarch (Bochum, 1999). Beuleke, Wilhelm, Die Hugenotten in Niedersachsen (Hildesheim, 1960). Bewes, Wyndham Anstis, Church Briefs (London, 1896). 247

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

Biederbeck, Andreas, Der deutsche Reichstag zu Regensburg im Jahrzehnt nach dem spanischen Erbfolgekrieg 1714–1724 (Düsseldorf, 1937). Birke, A.H. and Kluxen, Kurt, eds, England und Hannover/England and Hanover (Munich, 1986). Biskup, Thomas, ‘Britain and Göttingen’, in Simms and Riotte, eds, The Hanoverian dimension in British history. Black, Jeremy, ‘George II reconsidered: a consideration of George’s influence on the control of foreign policy, in the first years of his reign’, Mitteilungen des österreichischen Staatsarchivs, 35 (1982), pp. 35–56. —— ‘The catholic threat and the British press in the 1720s and 1730s’, Journal of Religious History, 12 (1982–3), pp. 364–81. —— ed., Britain in the age of Walpole (London, 1984). —— British foreign policy in the age of Walpole (Edinburgh, 1985). —— ‘British neutrality in the War of the Polish succession, 1733–1735’, International History Review, 8 (1986), pp. 345–66. —— ‘Fresh light on the fall of Townshend’, Historical Journal, 29 (1986), pp. 41–64. —— Natural and necessary enemies: Anglo-French relations in the eighteenth century (Athens, GA, 1986). ——, ‘British foreign policy in the eighteenth century: a survey’, Journal of British Studies, 26 (1987), pp. 26–53. —— ‘The tory view of eighteenth-century British foreign policy’, Historical Journal, 31 (1988), pp. 469–77. —— ed., Knights errant and true Englishmen (Edinburgh, 1989). —— ‘Parliament and foreign policy in the age of Walpole: the case of the Hessians’, in idem, ed., Knights errant, pp. 41–54. —— America or Europe? British foreign policy, 1739–63 (London, 1998). —— ‘Confessional state or elect nation? Religion and identity in eighteenthcentury England’, in Claydon and McBride, eds, Protestantism and national identity, pp. 53–74. —— British diplomats and diplomacy, 1688–1800 (Exeter, 2001). —— Parliament and foreign policy in the eighteenth century (Cambridge, 2004). —— The Hanoverians (London, 2004). Black, Jeremy and Schweizer, Karl, ‘The British press and Europe in the 1730s’, in Schweizer and Black, eds, Politics and the press, pp. 33–48. Blanning, T.C.W., ‘“That horrid electorate” or “ma patrie germanique”? George III, Hanover and the Fürstenbund of 1785’, Historical Journal, 20 (1977), pp. 311–44. —— ed., The eighteenth century (Oxford, 2000). Boles, Laurence Huey jr, The Huguenots, the protestant interest, and the War of the Spanish succession, 1702–1714 (New York, 1997). Borgmann, Karl, Der deutsche Religionsstreit der Jahre 1719/1720 (Berlin, 1937). Bosbach, Franz, Monarchia Universalis: ein politischer Leitbegriff der frühen Neuzeit (Göttingen, 1988). 248

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bots, J.A.H. and Posthumus Meyjes, G.H.M., eds, La Révocation de l’Édit de Nantes et les Provinces-Unies 1685 (Amsterdam and Maarssen, 1986). Braubach, Max, Versailles und Wien von Ludwig XIV. bis Kaunitz (Bonn, 1952). Brewer, John, The sinews of power (London, 1989). Browning, Reed, ‘The duke of Newcastle and the Imperial election plan, 1749–1754’, Journal of British Studies, 7 (1967–8), pp. 28–47. —— The duke of Newcastle (New Haven and London, 1975). —— Political and constitutional ideas of the court whigs (Baton Rouge and London, 1982). Brunner, Daniel, Halle pietists in England (Göttingen, 1993). Bultmann, Phyliss and Bultmann, William A., ‘Claude Groteste de la Mothe and the Church of England, 1685 to 1713’, Proceedings of the Huguenot Society of London, 20 (1958–64), pp. 89–101. Burgdorf, Wolfgang, Reichskonstitution und Nation (Mainz, 1998). Burke, Peter, ‘Tacitism, scepticism, and reason of state’, in Burns and Goldie, eds, The Cambridge history of political thought, 1450–1700, pp. 479–98. Burkhardt, Johannes, Abschied von Religionskrieg: der Siebenjährige Krieg und die päpstliche Diplomatie (Tübingen, 1985). —— ‘Konfession als Argument in den zwischenstaatlichen Beziehungen. Friedenschancen und Religionskriegsgefahren in der Entspannungspolitik zwischen Ludwig XIV. und dem Kaiserhof’, in Duchhardt, ed., Rahmenbedingungen und Handlungsspielräume europäischer Außenpolitik, pp. 135–54. —— ‘Verfassungsprofil und Leistungsbilanz des immerwährenden Reichstags: zur Evaluierung einer frühmodernen Institution’, in Duchhardt and Schnettger, eds, Reichständische Libertät und Habsburgisches Kaisertum, pp. 151–83. Burleigh, Michael, Germany turns eastwards (Cambridge, 1988). Burns, J.H. and Goldie, Mark, eds, The Cambridge history of political thought, 1450–1700 (Cambridge, 1991). Butterfield, Herbert, ‘The balance of power’, in Butterfield and Wight, eds, Diplomatic investigations, pp. 132–48. Butterfield, Herbert and Wight, Martin, eds, Diplomatic investigations: essays in the theory of international politics (London, 1966). Canning, Joseph and Wellenreuther, Hermann, eds, Britain and Germany compared (Göttingen, 2001). Carter, Alice C., The Dutch republic in Europe in the Seven Years War (London, 1971). —— Neutrality or commitment (London, 1975). Chance, J.F., George I and the Northern War (London, 1909). —— The alliance of Hanover (London, 1923). Clark, J.C.D., ‘Protestantism, nationalism, and national identity, 1660–1832’, Historical Journal, 43 (2000), pp. 249–76. —— English society (2nd edn, Cambridge, 2000). Clarke, W.K. Lowther, A history of the SPCK (London, 1959). Claydon, Tony, William III and the Godly revolution (Cambridge, 1996). 249

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

—— ‘Holland, Hanover and the fluidity of facts: further thoughts on national images and national identities in the eighteenth century’, in Canning and Wellenreuther, eds, Britain and Germany compared, pp. 85–97. —— William III (London, 2002). —— ‘Protestantism, universal monarchy and Christendom in William’s war propaganda, 1689–1697’, in Mijers and Onnekink, eds, Redefining William III. Claydon, Tony, and McBride, Ian, eds, Protestantism and national identity (Cambridge, 1998). Coll, Alberto R., The wisdom of statecraft: Sir Herbert Butterfield and the philosophy of international politics (Durham, North Carolina, 1985). Colley, Linda, In defiance of oligarchy (Cambridge, 1982). —— ‘The apotheosis of George III: loyalty, royalty and the British nation, 1760–1820’, Past and Present, 102 (1984), pp. 94–129. —— Britons (New Haven and London, 1992). Cowie, Leonard W., Henry Newman (London, 1956). Dalton, Hermann, Daniel Ernst Jablonski (Berlin, 1903). Dann, Uriel, Hanover and Great Britain, 1740–1760 (Leicester, 1991). Delius, Walter, ‘Berliner kirchliche Unionsversuche im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert’, Jahrbuch für Berlin-Brandenburgischen Kirchengeschichte, 45 (1970), pp. 7–121. Dickinson, H.T., Liberty and property (London, 1977). Droysen, Johann Gustav, Geschichte der Preußische Politik, IV:ii, Friedrich Wilhelm I (Leipzig, 1869). —— Geschichte der Preußische Politik, IV:iii, Friedrich Wilhelm I (Leipzig, 1869). Duchhardt, Heinz, Protestantische Kaisertum und altes Reich (Wiesbaden, 1977). —— ‘England–Hannover und der europäische Friede 1714–1740’, in Birke and Kluxen, eds, England und Hannover, pp. 127–44. —— ed., Rahmenbedingungen und Handlungsspielräume europäischer Außenpolitik im Zeitalter Ludwigs XIV. (Berlin, 1991). —— ‘Reich und europäisches Staatensystem seit dem Westfälischen Frieden’, in Press, ed., Alternativen zur Reichsverfassung, pp. 179–87. —— Balance of Power und Pentarchie (Paderborn, Munich, Vienna, and Zurich, 1997). —— ed., Der Westfälische Friede (Munich, 1998). Duchhardt, Heinz and Schnettger, Matthias, eds, Reichständische Libertät und Habsburgisches Kaisertum (Mainz, 1999). Dunn, John, ed., The economic limits to modern politics (Cambridge, 1990). Dunthorne, Hugh, The Maritime powers, 1721–1740: a study of Anglo-Dutch relations in the age of Walpole (New York and London, 1986). Ehmer, Artur, Das Schrifttum zur Salzburger Emigration 1731/33 (Hamburg, 1975). Engel-Janosi, F., Klingenstein, G., and Lutz, H., eds, Fürst, Bürger, Mensch (Vienna, 1975). Ertman, Thomas, Birth of the Leviathan (Cambridge, 1997). 250

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Florey, Gerhard, Geschichte der Salzburger Protestanten und ihrer Emigration 1731/32 (Vienna, Cologne, and Graz, 1977). Forbes, Duncan, Hume’s philosophical politics (Cambridge, 1975). Frantz, Adolph, Das Katholische Directorium des Corpus Evangelicorum (Marburg, 1880). Frensdorff, F., ‘G.A. von Münchhausens Berichte über seine Mission nach Berlin im Juni 1740’, Abhandlungen der Königlichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen. Philogisch-Historische Klasse, neue Folge 8: 2 (1904). Fricke, Waltraut, Leibniz und die englische Sukzession des Hauses Hannover (Hildesheim, 1957). Friedrich, Karin, The other Prussia (Cambridge, 2000). Fritz, Paul S., The English ministers and Jacobitism between the rebellions of 1715 and 1745 (Toronto and Buffalo, 1975). Frydrychowiz, Romuald, ‘Die Vorgänge zu Thorn im Jahre 1724’, Zeitschrift des Westpreussischen Geschichtvereins, 11 (1884), pp. 73–98. Gagliardo, J.G., Reich and Nation (Bloomington and London, 1980). Gay, Peter, The enlightenment: an interpretation (2 vols, London, 1969). Gehling, Theo, Ein europäischer Diplomat am Kaiserhof zu Wien: François Louis de Pesme, Seigneur de Saint-Saphorin als englischer Resident am Wiener Hof, 1718–1727 (Bonn, 1964). Gerold, U., ‘G.L.F. Laves: der “hannoversche Klassizismus” und seine Anregungen aus der englischen Repräsentations- und Industriearchitektur’, in Rohloff, ed., Großbritannien und Hannover, pp. 553–70. Gestrich, Andreas, Absolutismus und Öffentlichkeit (Göttingen, 1994). Geyken, Frauke, ‘“The German language is spoken in Saxony with the greatest purity” or English images and perceptions of Germany in the eighteenth century’, in Canning and Wellenreuther, eds, Britain and Germany compared, pp. 37–70. Gibbs, Graham C., ‘Britain and the alliance of Hanover, April 1725–February 1726’, English Historical Review, 73 (1958), pp. 404–30. —— ‘Parliament and foreign policy in the age of Stanhope and Walpole’, English Historical Review, 77 (1962), pp. 18–37. —— ‘The revolution in foreign policy’, in Holmes, ed., Britain after the Glorious Revolution, pp. 59–79. —— ‘The role of the Dutch republic as the intellectual entrepôt of Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries’, Bijdragen en mededelingen betreffende de geschiedenis der Nederlanden, 86 (1971), pp. 323–49. —— ‘Some intellectual and political influences of the Huguenot emigrés in the United Provinces, c. 1680–1730’, Bijdragen en mededelingen betreffende de geschiedenis der Nederlanden, 90 (1975), pp. 255–87. —— ‘Huguenot contributions to the intellectual life of England, c. 1680–c. 1720, with some asides on the process of assimilation’, in Bots and Posthumus Meyjes, eds, La Révocation de l’Édit de Nantes, pp. 181–200. —— ‘English attitudes towards Hanover and the Hanoverian succession in 251

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

the first half of the eighteenth century’, in Birke and Kluxen, eds, England und Hannover, pp. 33–51. Giesen, Bernhard, ed., Nationale und kulturelle Identität: Studien zur Entwicklung des kollecktiven Bewußtseins in der Neuzeit (Frankfurt/Main, 1991). Gordon, Alexander, Freedom after ejection (Manchester, 1917). Green, Abigail, ‘The federal alternative? A new view of modern German history’, Historical Journal, 46 (2003), pp. 187–202. Gregg, Edward, Queen Anne (London, 1980). Greyerz, Kaspar von, ‘Secularization in early modern England (1660–c. 1750)’, in Lehmann, ed. Säkularisierung, Dechristianisierung, Rechristianisierung, pp. 86–100. Grieser, Rudolf, ‘Die Deutsche Kanzlei in London, ihre Entstehung und Anfänge’, Blätter für deutsche Landesgeschichte, 89 (1952), pp. 153–68. Gunn, J.A.W., Politics and the public interest in the seventeenth century (London, 1969). Gwynn, Robin, ‘The Huguenots in Britain, the “Protestant International” and the defeat of Louis XIV’, in Vigne and Littleton, eds, From strangers to citizens, pp. 412–24. Habermas, Jürgen, The structural transformation of the public sphere trans. Thomas Burger (Cambridge, 1989). Hans, Alfred, Die Kurpfälzische Religionsdeklaration von 1705 (Mainz, 1973). Hantsch, Hugo, Reichsvizekanzler Friedrich Karl Graf von Schönborn (1674–1746) (Augsburg, 1929). Harding, Nicholas B., ‘North African piracy, the Hanoverian carrying trade, and the British state, 1728–1828’, Historical Journal, 43 (2000), pp. 25–47. —— Europeanizing the Empire: Britain and Hanover, 1700–1837 (Woodbridge, 2005). Hargreaves-Mawdsley, W.N., Eighteenth-century Spain (London, 1979). Harris, Michael, London newspapers in the age of Walpole (London, 1987). —— ed., Studies in newspaper and periodical history: 1993 annual (Westport, Conn. and London, 1994). Harris, Robert, A patriot press (Oxford, 1993). —— Politics and the nation (Oxford, 2002). Harris, Tim, Politics under the later Stuarts (London, 1993). Harris, Tim, Seaward, Paul, and Goldie, Mark, eds, The politics of religion in Restoration England (Oxford, 1990). Härter, Karl, Reichstag und Revolution, 1789–1806 (Göttingen, 1992). Hartley, Janet M., Charles Whitworth (Aldershot, 2002). Hartmann, Stefan, ‘Die Polenpolitik König Friedrich Wilhelms I. von Preussen zur Zeit des “Thorner Blutgerichts” (1724–1725)’, Forschungen zur Brandenburgischen und Preussischen Geschichte, N.F. 5 (1995), pp. 31–58. Hatton, Ragnhild, Diplomatic relations between Great Britain and the Dutch republic, 1714–1721 (London, 1950). —— War and peace, 1680–1720: an inaugural lecture (London, 1969). —— ‘In search of an elusive ruler: source material for a biography of George 252

BIBLIOGRAPHY

I as elector and king’, in Engel-Janosi, Klingenstein, and Lutz, eds, Fürst, Bürger, Mensch, pp. 11–41. —— George I: elector and king (London, 1978). —— The Anglo-Hanoverian connection, 1714–1760: the Creighton trust lecture 1982 (London, 1982). —— ‘New light on George I of Great Britain’, in Baxter, ed., England’s rise to greatness, pp. 213–55. Hatton, Ragnhild and Anderson, M.S., eds, Studies in diplomatic history (London, 1970). Hatton, Ragnhild and Bromley, J.S., eds, William III and Louis XIV: essays by and for Mark A. Thomson (Liverpool, 1968). Haug-Moritz, Gabriele, ‘Kaisertum und Parität: Reichspolitik und Konfession nach dem Westfälischen Frieden’, Zeitschrift für historische Forschung, 19 (1992), pp. 445–82. —— Württembergischer Ständekonflikt und deutscher Dualismus: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Reichverbandes in der Mitte des 18. Jahrhunderts (Stuttgart, 1992). —— ‘Corpus Evangelicorum und deutscher Dualismus’, in Press, ed., Alternativen zur Reichsverfassung, pp. 189–207. Häusser, Ludwig, Geschichte der Rheinischen Pfalz (2 vols, 2nd edn, Heidelberg, 1856). Haydon, Colin, Anti-Catholicism in eighteenth-century England (Manchester, 1993). Hertz, Gerald B., ‘England and the Ostend Company’, English Historical Review, 22 (1907), pp. 255–79. Hintze, Otto, The historical essays of Otto Hintze ed. Felix Gilbert (New York, 1975). Hochedlinger, Michael, Austria’s wars of emergence (London, 2003). Holmes, Geoffrey, ed., Britain after the Glorious Revolution, 1689–1714 (London, 1969). Holmes, Geoffrey and Szechi, Daniel, The age of oligarchy (London, 1993). Hont, Istvan, ‘Free trade and the economic limits to national politics: neoMachiavellian political economy reconsidered’, in Dunn, ed., Economic limits, pp. 41–120. Horn, D.B., ‘The origins of the proposed election of the King of the Romans, 1748–50’, English Historical Review, 42 (1927), pp. 361–70. —— The British diplomatic service, 1689–1789 (Oxford, 1961). Houston, Alan and Pincus, Steve, eds, A nation transformed (Cambridge, 2001). Houston, Alan and Pincus, Steve, ‘Introduction: Modernity and laterseventeenth-century England’, in Houston and Pincus, eds, A nation transformed, pp. 1–19. Hsia, R. Po-chia, Social discipline in the reformation (London, 1989). Huelin, Gordon, ‘The relationship of Samuel Urlsperger to the “Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge”’, in Schwarz, ed., Urlsperger, pp. 151–60. 253

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

Hughes, Michael, Law and politics in eighteenth-century Germany (Woodbridge, 1988). Hunt, Lynn, Politics, culture, and class in the French revolution (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London, 1984). Huntington, Samuel P., The clash of civilisations (New York, 1996). Ingrao, Charles, The Habsburg monarchy, 1618–1815 (Cambridge, 1994). —— ‘Paul W. Schroeder’s balance of power: stability or anarchy?’, International History Review, 16 (1994), pp. 681–700. Jacobi, Franz, Das Thorner Blutgericht 1724 (Halle, 1896). —— ‘Neuere Forschungen über das Thorner Blutgericht 1724’, Zeitschrift des Westpreussischen Geschichtsvereins, 35 (1896), pp. 19–34. Jähnig, Bernhard and Letkemann, Peter, eds, Thorn: Königin der Weischsel (Göttingen, 1981). Johnson, James Turner, Ideology, reason, and the limitation of war: religious and secular concepts, 1200–1740 (Princeton, 1975). Jones, George Fenwick, The Salzburger Saga (Athens, GA, 1984). —— The Georgia Dutch: from the Rhine and Danube to the Savannah, 1733–1783 (Athens, GA, 1992). —— ‘Urlsperger und Eben-Ezer’, in Schwarz, ed., Urlsperger, pp. 191–9. Kaeber, Ernst, Die Idee des europäischen Gleichgewichts in der publizistischen Literatur vom 16. bis zur Mitte des 18. Jahrhunderts (Berlin, 1907). Kamp, Norbert, Wellenreuther, Hermann, and Hund, Friedrich, 250 Jahre Vorlesungen an der Georgia Augusta 1734–1984 (Göttingen, 1985). Kidd, Colin, British identities before nationalism (Cambridge, 1999). Klein, Fritz, ‘Die Einwanderung der “Berchtolsgadener Exulanten” in Kurhannover 1733’, Hannoversche Geschichtsblätter, 34 (1980), pp. 159–74. Klopp, Onno, Der Fall des Hauses Stuart und die Succession des Hauses Hannover (14 vols, Vienna, 1875–88). Klueting, Harm, Die Lehre von der Macht der Staaten (Berlin, 1986). Kluke, P. and Alter, Peter, eds, Aspekte der deutsch–britischen Beziehungen im Laufe der Jahrhunderte (Stuttgart, 1978). Knittle, Walter Allen, The early eighteenth-century Palatine emigration (Philadelphia, 1936). Koch, Ernst and Wallmann, Johannes, eds, Ernst Saloman Cyprian (1673–1745) (Gotha, 1996). König, Theo, Hannover und das Reich 1740–1745 (Düsseldorf, 1938). Kouri, E. I. and Scott, Tom, eds, Politics and society in Reformation Europe (London, 1987). Kumar, Krishan, The making of English national identity (Cambridge, 2003). Küster, Sebastian, Vier Monarchien – Vier Öffentlichkeiten: Kommunikation um die Schlacht bei Dettingen (Münster, 2004). Lampe, Joachim, Aristokratie, Hofadel und Staatspatriziat in Kurhannover (2 vols, Göttingen, 1963). Langford, Paul, The eighteenth century, 1688–1815 (London, 1976). —— A polite and commercial people (Oxford, 1989). 254

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Leavis, R. Barry, ‘The failure of the Anglo-Prussian ecumenical effort of 1710–1714’, Church History, 47 (1978), pp. 381–99. Lecky, W.E.H., History of England in the eighteenth century (New edn, 5 vols, London, 1901). Lehmann, Hartmut, ed. Säkularisierung, Dechristianisierung, Rechristianisierung im neuzeitlichen Europa (Göttingen, 1997). Lehmann, Max, Preussen und die katholische Kirche seit 1640 (9 vols, Leipzig, 1878–1902). Leth, Göran, ‘A protestant public sphere: the early European newspaper press’, in Harris, ed., Studies in newspaper and periodical history: 1993 annual, pp. 67–90. Lodge, Richard, Britain and Prussia in the eighteenth century (Oxford, 1923). —— ‘The mission of Henry Legge to Berlin, 1748’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 4th series 14 (1931), pp. 1–38. —— ‘English neutrality in the War of the Polish succession’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 4th series 14 (1931), pp. 141–73. Loewe, Victor, ‘Die Einwanderung der Berchtesgadener in Kurhannover 1733’, Zeitschrift des historischen Vereins für Niedersachsen (1902), pp. 64–84. Lossky, Andrew, ‘Ragnhild Marie Hatton: a personal appreciation’, in Oresko, Gibbs, and Scott, eds, Royal and republican sovereignty in early modern Europe, pp. 639–44. Luard, Evan, The balance of power: the system of international relations, 1648–1815 (London, 1992). Luh, Jürgen, Unheiliges Römisches Reich: der konfessionelle Gegensatz 1648 bis 1806 (Potsdam, 1995). McKay, Derek, ‘The struggle for control of George I’s northern policy, 1718–19’, Journal of Modern History, 45 (1973), pp. 367–86. —— Prince Eugene of Savoy (London, 1977). McKay, Derek and Scott, H.M., The rise of the great powers, 1648–1815 (London, 1983). McKendrick, Neil, Brewer, John, and Plumb, J.H., The birth of a consumer society: the commercialisation of eighteenth-century Britain (London, 1983). Marsch, Angelika, Die Salzburger Emigration in Bildern (Weißenhorn, 1977). Maurer, Michael, Kirche, Staat und Gesellschaft im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert (Munich, 1999). Mediger, Walther, Moskaus Weg nach Europa (Brunswick, 1952). —— Mecklenburg, Russland und England–Hannover 1706–1721 (2 vols, Hildesheim, 1967). —— ‘Great Britain, Hanover, and the rise of Prussia’, in Hatton and Anderson, eds, Studies in diplomatic history, pp. 199–213. Meier, Ernst von, Hannoversche Verfassungs- und Verwaltungsgeschichte, 1680–1866 (2 vols, Leipzig, 1898–9). Meinecke, Friedrich, Machiavellism: the doctrine of raison d’état and its place in modern history (trans. D. Scott, London, 1957). 255

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

Meisenburg, Friedrich, Der deutsche Reichstag während des Österreichischen Erbfolgekrieges (1740–1748) (Dillingen a. Donau, 1931). Melton, James Van Horn, The rise of the public in enlightenment Europe (Cambridge, 2001). Meyer, R. Heinrich, Vertreibung Salzburger und Berchtesgadener Protestanten und ihre Aufnahme in Kurhannover 1733 (Uslar (Solling), 1933). Michael, Wolfgang, Englische Geschichte im achtzehnten Jahrhundert (5 vols, Hamburg and Leipzig, 1896–1955). —— ‘Ein schwieriger diplomatischer Fall aus dem Jahre 1719’, Historische Zeitschrift, 88 (1902), pp. 56–68. —— England under George I (2 vols, London, 1936–9). Mijers, E. and Onnekink, David, eds, Redefining William III: the impact of the King- Stadholder in international context (forthcoming, Aldershot, 2006). Murray, John J., George I, the Baltic and the whig split of 1717 (London, 1969). Naumann, Martin, Österreich, England und das Reich, 1719–1732 (Berlin, 1936). Newman, A.N., The world turned inside out: new views on George II. An inaugural lecture delivered in the University of Leicester, 10 October 1987 (Leicester, 1987). Niedhart, Gottfried, Handel und Krieg in der britischen Weltpolitik, 1738–1763 (Munich, 1979). O’Reilly, William, ‘The Naturalization Act of 1709 and the settlement of Germans in Britain, Ireland and the colonies’, in Vigne and Littleton, eds, From strangers to citizens, pp. 492–502. Oberschelp, Reinhard, Politische Geschichte Niedersachsens, 1714–1803 (Hildesheim, 1983). Oresko, Robert, Gibbs, G.C., and Scott, H.M., eds, Royal and republican sovereignty in early modern Europe (Cambridge, 1997). Ortner, Franz, Reformation und Gegenreformation in Salzburg (Salzburg, 1981). Owen, J.B., The rise of the Pelhams (London, 1957). —— ‘George II reconsidered’, in Whiteman, Bromley, and Dickson, eds, Statesmen, scholars, and merchants, pp. 113–34. Pares, Richard, ‘American versus continental warfare, 1739–1763’, English Historical Review, 51 (1936), pp. 429–65. Pauli, Reinhold, ‘Jean Robethon und die Thronfolge des braunschweiglüneburgischen Hauses in England’, Nachrichten von der Königl. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften und der Georg- Augusts-Universität zu Göttingen, 16 (1881), pp. 409–37. —— Aufsätze zur englischen Geschichte neue Folge ed. Otto Hartwig (Leipzig, 1883). Pincus, Steven C.A., ‘The English debate over universal monarchy’, in Robertson, ed., Union for empire, pp. 37–62. —— Protestantism and patriotism: ideologies and the making of English foreign policy, 1650– 1668 (Cambridge, 1996). —— ‘“To protect English liberties”: the English nationalist revolution of 256

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1688–1689’, in Claydon and McBride, eds, Protestantism and national identity, pp. 75–104. —— ‘From holy cause to economic interest: the study of population and the invention of the state’, in Houston and Pincus, eds, A nation transformed, pp. 272–98. Plumb, J.H., Sir Robert Walpole (2 vols, London, 1956–60). —— The first four Georges (Harmondsworth, 1956). Pocock, J.G.A., ‘British history: a plea for a new subject’, Journal of Modern History, 47 (1975), pp. 601–21. —— The Machiavellian moment (Princeton, 1975). —— Virtue, commerce and history (Cambridge, 1985). —— ‘The new British history in Atlantic perspective: an Antipodean commentary’, American Historical Review, 104 (1999), pp. 490–500. Popkin, Richard H., ed., Millennarianism and messianism in English literature and thought, 1650–1800 (Leiden, 1988). Press, Volker, ‘Kurhannover im System des alten Reichs 1692–1803’, in Birke and Kluxen, eds, England und Hannover, pp. 53–79. —— ed., Alternativen zur Reichsverfassung in der Frühen Neuzeit? (Munich, 1995). —— ‘Die kaiserliche Stellung im Reich zwischen 1648 und 1740: Versuch einer Neubewertung’, in idem, Das alte Reich: ausgewählte Aufsätze, pp. 189–222. —— Das alte Reich: ausgewählte Aufsätze ed. Johannes Kunisch (Berlin, 1997). Quennell, Peter, Caroline of England (London, 1939). Raab, Felix, The English face of Machiavelli (London, 1964). Rabb, Theodore K., The struggle for stability in early modern Europe (New York, 1975). Ranke, Leopold von, Sämmtliche Werke (54 vols, Leipzig, 1874–90). Reese, Armin, Pax sit christiana (Düsseldorf, 1988). Repgen, Konrad, ‘Kriegslegitimationen in Alteuropa: Entwurf einer historischen Typologie’, Historische Zeitschrift, 241 (1985), pp. 27–49. —— ‘What is a “religious war”?’, in Kouri and Scott, eds, Politics and society in Reformation Europe, pp. 311–28. —— ‘Der Westfälische Friede und die Ursprünge des europäischen Gleichgewichts’, in idem, Von der Reformation zur Gegenwart, pp. 53–66. —— Von der Reformation zur Gegenwart eds Klaus Gotto and Hans Günter Hockerts (Paderborn, Munich, Vienna, and Zurich, 1988). Rexheuser, Rex, ed., Die Personalunionen von Sachsen–Polen und Hannover–England: ein Vergleich (Wiesbaden, 2005). Rhode, Gotthold, ‘England und das Thorner Blutgericht 1724’, Historische Zeitschrift, 164 (1941), pp. 496–528. —— Brandenburg-Preußen und die Protestanten in Polen 1640–1740 (Leipzig, 1941). Richter-Uhlig, Uta, Hof und Politik unter den Bedingungen der Personalunion zwischen Hannover und England (Hanover, 1992). 257

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

Riotte, Torsten, Hannover in der britischen Politik (1792–1815): dynastische Verbindung als Element außenpolitischer Entscheidungsfindung (Münster, 2004) Robertson, C. Grant, England under the Hanoverians (London, 1911). Robertson, John, ‘Empire and union: two concepts of the early modern european political order’, in idem, ed., A union for empire, pp. 3–36. —— ed., A union for empire (Cambridge, 1995). Rohloff, Heide N., ed., Großbritannien und Hannover: die Zeit der Personalunion, 1714–1837 (Frankfurt am Main, 1989). Roider, Karl A., The reluctant ally: Austria’s policy in the Austro-Turkish War, 1737–1739 (Baton Rouge, 1972). Rose, Craig, England in the 1690s (Oxford, 1999). Russell, Conrad, Unrevolutionary England, 1603–1642 (London, 1990). Salmonowicz, Stanislaw, ‘The Torún uproar of 1724’, Acta Poloniae Historica, 47 (1983), pp. 55–89. Sander, Harmut, ‘Das Thorner Blutgericht von 1724 in zeitgenössischen niederländischen Schriften’, in Jähnig and Letkemann, eds, Thorn, pp. 361–9. Schäfer, Christoph, Das Simultaneum: ein staatskirchenrechtliches, politisches und theologisches Problem des Alten Reiches (Frankfurt/Main, 1995). Schama, Simon, A history of Britain: the British wars, 1603–1776 (London, 2001). Schäufele, Wolf-Friedrich, Christoph Matthäus Pfaff und die Kirchenunionsbestrebungen des Corpus Evangelicorum, 1717–1726 (Mainz, 1998). Schieder, Theodor, Frederick the Great edited and translated by Sabina Berkeley and H.M. Scott (London, 2000). Schilling, Heinrich, Der Zwist Preußens und Hannovers 1729/1730 (Halle, 1912). Schilling, Heinz, ‘Nationale Identität und Konfession in der europäischen Neuzeit’, in Giesen, ed., Nationale und kulturelle Identität, pp. 192–252. Schindling, Anton, ‘The development of the Eternal Diet in Regensburg’, Supplement to Journal of Modern History, 58 (1986), pp. 64–75. Schlenke, Manfred, England und das friderizianische Preussen, 1740–1763 (Munich, 1963). —— ‘England blickt nach Europa: das konfessionelle Argument in der englischen Politik um die Mitte des 18. Jahrhunderts’, in Kluke and Alter, eds, Aspekte der deutsch–britischen Beziehungen, pp. 24–45. Schmidt, Hans, Kürfurst Karl Philipp von der Pfalz als Reichsfürst (Mannheim, 1963). Schnath, Georg, Geschichte Hannovers im Zeitalter der neunten Kur und der englischen Sukzession, 1674–1714 (4 vols, Hildesheim, 1938–82). —— ‘Briefe des Prinzen und Kurfürsten Georg Ludwig (Georgs I.) an seine Mutter Sophie 1681–1704’, Niedersächsisches Jahrbuch für Landesgeschichte, 48 (1976), pp. 249–305. Schroeder, Paul W., The transformation of European politics (Oxford, 1994). Schubert, Ernst, ‘Die Fürsorge der Hohenzollern für die evangelischen 258

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Auslanddiaspora’, Auslanddeutschtum und Evangelische Kirche, 1935, pp. 115–57. Schwarz, Reinhard, ed., Samuel Urlsperger (1685–1772) (Berlin, 1996). Schweizer, Karl W., ‘Edward Weston (1703–70): the papers of an eighteenthcentury under-secretary in the Lewis Walpole Library’, Yale Library Gazette, 71 (1996), pp. 43–8. Schweizer, Karl W. and Black, Jeremy, eds, Politics and the press in Hanoverian Britain (Lewiston, 1989). Scott, H.M., ‘“The True Principles of the Revolution”: the duke of Newcastle and the idea of the Old System’, in Black, ed., Knights errant, pp. 55–91. —— ‘The second “Hundred Years War”, 1689–1815’, Historical Journal, 35 (1992), pp. 443–69. —— ‘Paul W. Schroeder’s international system: the view from Vienna’, International History Review, 16 (1994), pp. 663–80. —— ‘Prussia’s royal foreign minister’, in Oresko, Gibbs, and Scott, eds, Royal and republican sovereignty, pp. 500–26. —— The emergence of the eastern powers, 1756–1775 (Cambridge, 2001). Scott, Jonathan, ‘England’s troubles: exhuming the Popish Plot’, in Harris, Seaward, and Goldie, eds, Politics of religion, pp. 107–31. —— England’s troubles (Cambridge, 2000). Sellin, Paul R. and Baxter, Stephen B., Anglo-Dutch cross currents in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Los Angeles, 1976). Sheehan, Michael, Balance of power: history and theory (London, 1996). Simms, Brendan, The impact of Napoleon (Cambridge, 1997). —— The struggle for mastery in Germany (Basingstoke, 1998). —— ‘Hanover in British policy, 1714–1783: interests and aims of the protagonists’, in Rexheuser, ed., Die Personalunionen von Sachsen–Polen und Hannover–England, pp. 311–34. —— At the heart of Europe: Britain–Hanover and the world, 1714–1783 (forthcoming). Simms, Brendan and Riotte, Torsten, eds, The Hanoverian Dimension in British History, 1714–1837 (Cambridge, forthcoming). Skinner, Quentin, ‘The state’, in Ball, Farr, and Hanson, eds, Political innovation, pp. 90–131. Smith, Hannah E., ‘The idea of a protestant monarchy in Britain, 1714–1760’, Past and Present, 185 (2004), pp. 91–118. —— Georgian monarchy: politics and culture in Britain, 1714–1760 (Cambridge, 2006). Smith, Ruth, Handel’s oratorios and eighteenth-century thought (Cambridge, 1995). —— ‘The meaning of Morrell’s liberetto of “Judas Maccabaeus”’, Music and Letters, 79 (1998), pp. 50–72. Stelling-Michaud, S., La carrière diplomatique de F.-L. de Pesme, seigneur de Saint Saphorin. Vol. 1 Saint Saphorin et la politique de la Suisse pendant la Guerre de Succession d’Espagne (Villette-les-Cully, 1935). 259

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

Stievermann, Dieter, ‘Politik und Konfession im 18. Jahrhundert’, Zeitschrift für historische Forschung, 18 (1991), pp. 177–99. Stolleis, Michael, Staat und Staatsräson in der frühen Neuzeit (Frankfurt/Main, 1990). Stoye, J.W., ‘Emperor Charles VI: the early years of the reign’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 5th series 12 (1962), pp. 63–84. Sykes, Norman, Edmund Gibson (Oxford, 1926). —— Daniel Ernst Jablonski and the Church of England (London, 1950). —— William Wake (2 vols, Cambridge, 1957). Targett, Simon, ‘Government and ideology during the whig supremacy: the political argument of Sir Robert Walpole’s newspaper propagandists’, Historical Journal, 37 (1994), pp. 289–317. Thomas, P.D.G., The House of Commons in the eighteenth century (Oxford, 1971). Thompson, Andrew C., ‘Popery, politics and private judgement in early Hanoverian Britain’, Historical Journal, 45 (2002), pp. 333–56. Thomson, Mark A., ‘Parliament and foreign policy, 1689–1714’, in Hatton and Bromley, eds, William III and Louis XIV, pp. 130–9. —— ‘The safeguarding of the protestant succession, 1702–18’, in Hatton and Bromley, eds, William III and Louis XIV, pp. 237–51. Tomlinson, Howard, ed., Before the English civil war (London, 1983). Trevelyan, G.M., History of England (London, 1926). Umbach, Maiken, Federalism and enlightenment in Germany, 1740–1806 (London, 2000). —— ed., German federalism: past, present and future (Basingstoke, 2002). Vietsch, Eberhard von, Das europäische Gleichgewicht (Leipzig, 1942). Vigne, Randolph and Littleton, Charles, eds, From strangers to citizens (Brighton, 2001). Walker, Mack, Johann Jacob Moser and the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation (Chapel Hill, 1981). —— The Salzburg transaction (Ithaca and London, 1992). Ward, A.W., Great Britain and Hanover (Oxford, 1899). Ward, W.R., Christianity under the Ancien Régime, 1648–1789 (Cambridge, 1999). Wellenreuther, Hermann, ‘Göttingen und England im achtzehnten Jahrhundert’, in Kamp, Wellenreuther, and Hund, 250 Jahre Vorlesungen, pp. 30–63. —— ‘Die Bedeutung des Siebenjährigen Kriegs für die englisch– hannoveranischen Beziehungen’, in Birke and Kluxen, eds, England und Hannover, pp. 145–75. —— ‘Von der Interressenharmonie zur Dissoziation: Kurhannover und England in der Zeit der Personalunion’, Niedersächsisches Jahrbuch für Landesgeschichte, 67 (1995), pp. 23–42. —— ‘On the public and private spheres, feelings, passions, beliefs in Christian, secular, and dechristianized worlds’, in Lehmann, ed., Säkularisierung, Dechristianisierung, Rechristianisierung, pp. 101–13. 260

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Whiteman, A., Bromley, J.S., and Dickson, P.G.M., eds, Statesmen, scholars, and merchants (Oxford, 1973). Wight, Martin, ‘The balance of power’, in Butterfield and Wight, eds, Diplomatic investigations, pp. 149–75. Williams, Basil, Stanhope: a study in eighteenth-century war and diplomacy (Oxford, 1932). —— Carteret and Newcastle (Cambridge, 1943). Wilson, Kathleen, The sense of the people (Cambridge, 1995). Wilson, Peter H., German armies (London, 1998). Wilson, Renate, ‘Continental protestant refugees and their protectors in Germany and London: communal and charitable networks’, Pietismus und Neuzeit, 20 (1994), pp. 107–24. Wilson, Walter, The history and antiquities of dissenting churches and meeting houses, in London, Westminster, and Southwark (4 vols, London, 1808–14). Woodfine, Philip, Britannia’s glories (Woodbridge, 1998). Worden, Blair, ‘The question of secularization’, in Houston and Pincus, eds, A nation transformed, pp. 20–40. Zwicker, Steven N., ‘England, Israel and the triumph of Roman virtue’, in Popkin, ed., Millennarianism, pp. 37–64. Zwiedineck-Südenhorst, Hans von, ‘Die Anerkennung der pragmatischen Sanktion Karl VI. durch das deutsche Reich’, Mitteilungen des Instituts für oesterreichische Geschichtsforschung, 16 (1895), pp. 276–341.

Unpublished dissertations Allen, Mitchell D., The Anglo-Hanoverian connection: 1727–1760 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Boston University, 2000). Belstler, Ulrich, Die Stellung des Corpus Evangelicorum in der Reichsverfassung (Inaugural-Dissertation, Tübingen, 1968). Finke, Hans-Joachim, The ‘Hanoverian Junta’, 1714–1719 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Delaware, 1970). Hymmen, Hans von, Der erste preussischen König und die Gegenreformation in der Pfalz (Inaugural-dissertation, Göttingen, 1904). Krol, Grzegorz, The Northern threat: Anglo-Russian diplomatic relations, 1716–1727 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, London School of Economics, University of London, 1992). Nishikawa, Sugiko, English attitudes toward continental protestants with particular reference to Church Briefs, c. 1680–1740 ( unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of London, 1998). Rohr, Theo, Der deutsche Reichstag vom Hubertusburger Frieden bis zum Bayerischen Erbfolgekrieg (1763–1778) (Inaugural-Dissertation, Bonn, 1968). Rother, Hermann, Die Auseinandersetzung zwischen Preussen und Hannover um Ostfriesland von 1690 bis 1744 (Inaugural-Dissertation, Göttingen, 1951). 261

BRITAIN, HANOVER AND THE PROTESTANT INTEREST

Smith, Hannah E., Georgian monarchical culture in England, 1714–60 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Cambridge, 2001). Thompson, A.C., The protestant interest and foreign policy in Britain and Hanover, 1719–1736 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Cambridge, 2003).

262

Index Aachen, peace of (1748) 189, 204, 207 Act of Settlement (1701) 12, 129–30, 146 Anglicanism see Church of England Anne, princess Royal 175, 192, 193 Anne, queen of England 46, 49–50, 53, 55–6, 58, 199 Anton Ulrich, duke of Wolfenbüttel 52–3 Augustus II, elector of Saxony and king of Poland 52, 98–100, 106–7, 169 Aulic Council see Reichshofrat Austria 22, 40, 65, 73, 115, 147, 186–7, 188–92, 194, 199, 203, 205, 206, 211, 213, 217–18, 220, 229–30 Austrian succession, war of (1740–8) 35, 60, 199–202, 222–8, 237 balance of power 8, 10, 14, 23, 29–36, 39–42, 127, 130, 132, 178, 186–7, 201, 202, 216, 218–19, 229, 230–1, 232 Bartenstein, Johann Christoph, Austrian statesman 191, 212 Bavaria, electorate of 47, 55–6, 64, 118–19, 134, 136, 139, 173, 179, 180–1, 185, 196, 198, 208, 209, 211, 215 Bentinck, Charles, Dutch statesman 208 Bentinck, William, Dutch statesman 210, 211, 217 Bernstorff, Andreas Gottlieb von, Hanoverian minister 51, 52, 58, 60, 69, 76 blue water policy 9, 30–1, 46, 146, 186, 205–6, 208, 221 Bolingbroke, Henry St John, 1st viscount 52, 57–60, 143, 144 Bothmer, Hans [Johann] Kaspar von, Hanoverian minister 57, 60, 69 Boyer, Abel, Huguenot journalist 1, 14, 86 Bremen and Verden, duchies of 47, 58, 73, 82, 96, 122, 130

Britain 226 as multiple monarchy 2, 131, 231–2 relations with Hanover 21, 23, 68–9, 131–2, 140–1, 144–9, 177, 186–7, 195, 200–1, 202, 205, 219, 221, 228, 231–2, 235–6 relations with Prussia 76, 95, 116–17, 143, 149–52, 188, 195, 204, 206, 219, 231 Burke, Edmund 41, 234–5 Cadogan, William, earl, soldier and diplomat 82–5, 88–9 Calvinism 1, 18, 61–2, 93, 105, 155 Cambrai, congress of 89–93, 127, 144 Carlos, Don, Spanish prince 134, 141–3 Caroline of Ansbach-Bayreuth, wife of George II 52, 168 Carteret, John, baron and (1744) 2nd Earl Granville 198, 200–2, 204, 217–18, 232 catholicism 18, 203 Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor 35, 38, 219, 230 Charles VI, Holy Roman Emperor 52, 66, 72–3, 76, 80–1, 83–5, 92, 94, 98, 121–4, 127, 132, 134, 149–50, 169, 178–81, 182–3, 189, 207, 230, 231 Charles VII, Holy Roman Emperor (Charles Albert of Bavaria) 189, 204, 213 Charlottenburg, Treaty of (1723) 95 Chesterfield, Philip Dormer Stanhope, 4th earl of 155, 192, 200, 221–2 Church of England 11–12, 43–4, 53, 60, 67–8, 73, 96, 110, 113–14, 127 Cologne, electorate-archbishopric of 47, 119, 134, 179, 208, 209, 211, 215 continental involvement see whig Corpus Catholicorum 20 Corpus Evangelicorum 20, 23, 52, 55–6, 67–8, 72, 76–7, 82–5, 90, 92–4, 98, 104–5, 123–4, 134, 135, 138–40, 263

INDEX 152, 156, 158, 166, 177–8, 179, 180, 187, 198, 209, 210 Denmark 59, 91, 120, 136, 183–4 Deutsche Kanzlei 6, 21, 83, 182, 205 Diede zum Fürstenstein, Johann von 140, 151, 155, 157, 173, 181 dissent 11–12, 114–15 Du Bourgay, Charles, British diplomat 10, 102–3, 150 Dutch republic, United Provinces 40, 88, 94, 105, 108–9, 120, 154–5, 156–7, 171, 173, 174–6, 183–4, 188, 192–3, 198, 211, 235–6 Egmont, John Percival, 1st earl of 111, 143, 144, 145, 161, 163 Eléonore Desmiers d’Olbreuse, wife of Georg-Wilhelm of Celle 50–1 Elisabeth Christine of Wolfenbüttel, wife of Charles VI 53 Empire see Holy Roman Empire enlightenment 3–4, 15, 41, 73, 80 Ernst August, elector of Hanover 47–8 Eugene of Savoy, Imperial general and statesman 80, 138 Finch, Edward, British diplomat 103–7, 109–10, 121 Finch, William, British diplomat 103, 109 Firmian, Leopold Anton von, archbishop of Salzburg 152–4 Flemming, Graf Jakob Heinrich von, Saxon minister 100, 103, 107 Fleury, André Hercule de, cardinal 116, 118, 141, 176, 182–3 foreign policy concepts of 2–3 confessional 39–40, 118 France 2, 40, 56, 115–17, 121, 147, 169, 178, 188, 195–6, 199, 203, 205, 207, 209, 212, 214, 220, 225, 229, 230 Francke, August Hermann 104, 110 Francke, Gotthilf August 159, 162 Frederick II, king in Prussia 24, 36, 188, 193–9, 201, 206, 218, 227, 230–1, 233 Frederick William I, king in Prussia 1, 67, 71, 76, 78–9, 85, 91, 99, 117, 120, 121, 126, 143, 149–51, 165, 166, 174, 189, 233 Georg Ludwig see George I

Georg Wilhelm, duke of Celle 47–8, 50–1, 52, 69 George I 1, 52–3, 57, 66, 81, 94–5, 98, 124, 126, 129–30, 133, 134, 188, 235 confessional role 11–12, 15–16, 33, 43, 46, 80, 93, 96, 108, 111, 112, 232, 233–4 dynastic strategy 10 Heidelberg troubles and 69–77, 229, 235 Imperial policy 23, 65, 67, 104, 109–10, 121–4 preference for Hanover 8 relations with Frederick William I 78–9, 193 religious convictions 4–5, 51, 233 Thorn crisis and 101–2, 234 George II 18, 52, 133, 168, 170, 173, 188, 193–8, 231, 235 confessional role 12–13, 33, 43, 46, 80, 232, 233–4 dynastic strategy 16, 149–51, 192–3 Imperial policy 23, 65, 135–41, 154–6, 178–81, 182–4 preference for Hanover 8 relations with Frederick William I 149–51, 165–7 religious convictions 4–5, 233 George III 4–5, 8 Georgia, colony of 157, 159–64 Gibson, Edmund, bishop of London 34 n. 53, 160 Glorious Revolution 1, 43, 45, 206, 225 Göttingen, university of 30, 33, 34–5 Grand Alliance 188, 203, 230 Great Northern War (1700–21) 58, 68, 70, 73–4, 125, 169 Haldane, James, British diplomat 15, 68–72, 76–7 Hanover, duchy of and (1692) electorate of 18, 21, 23, 68–9, 131–2, 140–1, 144–9, 177, 186–7, 188, 194, 199–200, 201, 209, 210, 213, 219–20, 221, 231, 232–3 Imperial politics 22, 51–4, 64, 92, 96, 107–10, 138–41, 156–8, 166, 177–81, 208, 214–15, 218 Privy Council 98–9, 122–3, 124–5, 135–41, 149, 157–8, 177–8, 179, 194, 196, 218 Regierungsreglement 6, 21 Hanover, Treaty of (1725) 118, 121, 126, 134

264

INDEX Hardwicke, Philip Yorke, 1st earl of 18, 195, 200, 201, 205, 207, 214–15, 218–19 Harrington, William Stanhope, 1st earl of 118, 126, 140, 154, 160, 171–3, 176, 182, 190–1, 193, 194 Hattorf, Johann Philipp von, Hanoverian minister 170, 182 Heidelberg, troubles in 1719 23, 61–2, 76, 229 Heidelberg catechism 61, 70, 76 Hervey, John, 2nd Baron Hervey of Ickworth 169–70, 174, 181 Hessen-Darmstadt 70–1, 108 Hessen-Kassel 15, 23, 64, 70, 85, 91, 94, 105, 120, 123, 124, 135–6, 142, 165, 173, 192 Hessian regiments 142, 144, 145–6, 186–7 Hoadly, Benjamin 9, 127–8 Holy Roman Empire 18–20, 26, 64, 121, 130–2, 134, 153–5, 178–81, 206, 208–13, 233, 234 House of Commons 6, 86–7, 129–30, 142–3, 162–3, 208 House of Lords 86–8 Hugo, Ludolf Dietrich von, Hanoverian diplomat 156–8, 161–2, 177, 178–9 Huguenots 4, 14, 40, 44, 49, 50–1, 86 Huldenberg, Daniel Erasmi von, Hanoverian diplomat 84, 101–2 Hyndford, John Carmichael, 3rd earl of 196–8, 201, 203, 212, 231 Ireland 11–12, 15, 123, 155 Jablonski, Daniel Ernst, Prussian court preacher 102–3, 104 Jacobitism 34, 38–9, 56, 95–6, 113, 119–20, 127, 143, 171, 186, 214, 225, 226, 231, 233 Joseph II 189, 208, 210 Jülich and Berg, duchies of 76, 150, 174, 216 Karl Philipp, elector Palatine 61–2, 67, 72, 81, 83 King, Peter, Lord Chancellor 131, 162 Kirchenrat (Palatine) 61–2, 67, 72, 74–5, 76 Le Heup, Isaac, British diplomat 121–4 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm von 48–9, 51

Leszczynski, Stanislas, Polish king 169, 172 Louis XIV 18, 37, 44, 48, 54, 57, 63, 200, 219, 223, 229 Louis XV 10, 115–16, 169, 200 Lutheranism 12, 18, 60, 75, 90, 93, 105, 155 Machiavelli, Niccolo 3, 14, 26–8, 40, 89, 227 Mainz, electorate-archbishopric of 47, 76, 83, 208 Maria-Theresa 189, 196, 197, 203, 208, 212, 217–18, 225, 231 Maritime powers (collective noun for Britain and the Dutch republic) 128, 155, 169, 175, 183, 199, 203, 206, 230, 235 Mecklenburg 73, 122, 140, 149–50, 171, 187 Mist, Nathaniel, Jacobite printer 88–9, 127 Münchhausen, Gerlach Adolf von, Hanoverian minister 99, 121–4, 125, 137–40, 194, 204–5, 209–10, 212, 216, 218, 232 Newcastle, Thomas Pelham-Holles, duke of 10, 18, 116–20, 133, 140, 162, 176, 182, 188, 189, 193, 195, 196, 200–2, 204, 206, 207, 208–13, 214–16, 217, 222, 232 Öffentlichkeit see public sphere Oglethorpe, James, British soldier and MP 160, 163–4, 167 Old System 188, 189, 190, 202–8, 213, 216, 222, 230, 231 Oliva, Treaty of (1660) 102, 106, 108–9, 116, 126 Osnabrück, prince-bishopric of 47, 215 Ostend company 34, 121–2, 124, 125, 129, 131, 134, 186, 191 Ottoman empire 188–9 Palatinate, electorate of 15, 44, 53–4, 74–5, 119, 134, 147–8, 179, 208, 211, 212, 215 papacy 81 Parliament see House of Commons, House of Lords Pelham, Henry 18, 143, 201, 205, 214–15 personal union of Britain and Hanover (1714–1837) 5–9 265

INDEX Peter the Great, tsar of Russia 102, 110, 115 Pfaff, Christoph Matthäus, protestant cleric 94, 104–5 Philip V, king of Spain 134 Poland 97–101, 106–7, 171–4 Polish succession, war of (1733–8) 8, 24, 40, 168, 178, 230, 235 popery 37, 38–9, 44, 118, 223, 225, 229 Poyntz, Stephen, British diplomat 140, 145–6 Pragmatic Sanction 127, 134, 151–2, 153, 154, 169, 172, 185, 189 Pretender see Jacobitism protestant interest 2–3, 5, 9–13, 15, 18, 23, 39–42, 87, 91–2, 112, 118, 132, 147, 150, 164, 167, 186, 187, 193, 195, 196, 200, 202, 213, 216, 217, 219, 226, 230–1, 233–4, 236–7 protestant succession 34, 46–50, 56, 59, 225 protestants persecution of 1, 42, 74, 156, 157, 191 union of 92–4, 104–5 Prussia 22, 47, 58, 64, 72, 82, 85, 88, 91–2, 94, 95–6, 99, 102–3, 105, 116–18, 120, 124, 135–41, 143, 149–52, 156–8, 165–6, 173, 177–8, 193–9, 203, 208, 212, 213, 216, 230, 231 leadership of German protestants 56, 71, 77–9, 100–1, 148–9, 165, 195, 233 public sphere 85–9, 111–15, 124–30, 133, 141–8, 152–3, 184–7, 219–22, 222–8 Pulteney, William, opposition MP 130, 143, 144–5, 185–6 reason of state 13–14 Reck, Johann von, Hanoverian diplomat 90, 94, 121, 135, 140–1, 152, 156–8, 161, 179 reformed see Calvinism Regensburg, city of 55–6, 198 Regensburg, Diet of see Reichstag Reich see Holy Roman Empire Reichshofrat 19, 155, 191 Reichskammergericht 19 Reichstag 17, 19–20, 44, 66, 67–8, 103–5, 117, 121–4, 134, 138–9, 154, 168, 178–9, 183, 187, 235 Robethon, Jean de 50–1, 53, 57, 60, 69 Robinson, Sir Thomas, British diplomat

118, 151–2, 154–5, 172, 183, 190–2, 194, 236 Russia 74, 90–2, 102–3, 108, 115, 169, 173–4, 188–90, 206, 212, 230 Ryswick, Treaty of (1697) 54–5, 57, 63, 76, 82, 125, 140, 166, 179, 180, 182–4, 185, 187, 235 Saint Saphorin, François Louis Pesme, seigneur de 56–7, 65–6, 72, 75–6, 80, 82–5, 88–9, 124 Salzburg 23, 26, 133, 152–4 Saxony, electorate of 16, 47, 68, 74, 92–4, 98, 102–3, 165, 177, 196, 208, 209, 211, 231 Saxony-Gotha 68, 85, 104, 124 Schaub, Sir Luke 70, 216 Schönborn, Graf Friedrich Karl von, Imperial vice-chancellor 65–6, 76, 80–1, 82, 94–5, 119 Seckendorff, Frederick von, Imperial general 138, 150 secularisation 28–9, 234 Seven Years War (1756–63) 1, 188, 190, 222 Seville, Treaty of (1729) 142, 147, 169, 185 Shippen, William, opposition MP 129–30, 143 Sinzendorf, Count Philip von, Austrian statesman 80, 82, 94 Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge (SPCK) 159–64, 165 Soissons, Congress of 133, 135–41, 144, 179 Sophia, electress of Hanover 46, 48–50 Spain 115, 119–20, 127, 147, 178, 187, 189, 193, 219, 229, 230 Spanish succession, war of (1701–13) 4, 29–30, 33–4, 45, 54–60, 64, 222, 230 Stanhope, James, 1st earl 15, 66, 70–1, 73–7, 82–5, 88–9, 90, 96 Stanhope, William see Harrington Starhemberg, Count Gundacker, Austrian statesman 80 States General 108–9, 154 Sweden 47, 58–60, 70, 74, 90, 92, 95, 108, 120, 125, 135–6, 183–4 Swiss cantons 94, 198 Thorn (Torun) 23, 97–8, 110–15, 129 Tilson, George, British official 75, 87, 102, 107, 150 tory 43–4, 133, 199, 207, 229, 234

266

INDEX Townshend, Charles, 2nd viscount 10, 56, 90–1, 105–7, 109, 121–4, 133, 140, 151, 169 Trier, electorate of 47, 119, 134, 208 United Provinces see Dutch republic universal monarchy 23, 35, 36–9, 127, 131, 147, 184–5, 199, 219–20, 225, 229, 230–1 Urlsperger, Samuel, protestant cleric 153, 159, 160–1 Utrecht, Treaty of (1713) 32, 57, 127 Vienna, 1st Treaty of (1725) 117–20, 121–2, 127–8, 131, 134, 142, 144–5, 147, 151, 186, 230 Vienna, 2nd Treaty of (1731) 151, 169, 185 Wake, William, archbishop of Canterbury 94, 102 Waldegrave, James, 1st earl 151, 184, 216 Walpole, Horatio (Horace), author and politician 198–9 Walpole, Horatio (Horace), diplomat 10, 116–20, 130, 140, 142–3, 145–6, 174–6, 182, 183–4, 199, 221–2 Walpole, Sir Robert, 1st earl of Orford 8, 24, 130, 133, 162, 163–4, 168–71, 175–6, 187, 200, 207, 230 wars of religion 4, 16–17, 29, 37–8, 40, 81, 96, 128, 185, 234

Westphalia, Treaty of (1648) confessional settlement 18–20, 54, 62, 63–4, 83, 104, 126, 136, 139 guarantors of 74, 84, 92, 96, 103 territorial division 47 as turning point in international relations 4, 25–7, 29, 32, 67 whig 43–4, 89, 95–6, 234 continental involvement 9, 30–1, 45–6, 60, 186, 205–6, 207, 208, 221, 229 historiography 8, 25, 43, 46, 237 Whitworth, Charles, baron, British diplomat 1, 17, 54–6, 59, 66, 73–7, 87, 89–92, 103, 235 William III 44–6, 48–9, 50–1, 54, 55, 60, 229, 233 as protestant hero 33, 43, 222–3, 232 Wolfenbüttel 52–3, 120, 124, 136, 139 Wrisberg, Rudolf Johann von, Hanoverian diplomat 52, 64, 65–6, 67–8, 72, 75, 77, 81, 83–4, 85, 90, 93–5, 99, 104, 107–10, 121, 125, 235 Württemberg 22, 23, 136, 139 Wusterhausen, Treaty of (1726) 120, 151 Wyndham, William, opposition MP 130, 143 Yorke, Joseph, British diplomat 193 Ziegenhagen, Frederick Michael 159–64

267