CliffsNotes on Hume's Concerning Principles of Morals

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HUME'S CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS Notes including • • • • • • •

Life and Background of the Author Introduction to the Work A Brief Synopsis Critical Commentaries Glossary Essay Topics and Review Questions Selected Bibliography

by Charles H. Patterson, Ph.D. Department of Philosophy University of Nebraska

LINCOLN, NEBRASKA 68501

1-800-228-4078 www.CLIFFS.com ISBN 0-8220-7262-9 © Copyright 1968 by Cliffs Notes, Inc. All Rights Reserved

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LIFE AND BACKGROUND OF THE AUTHOR David Hume, philosopher, historian, and man of letters, was a native of Scotland. Although engaged for short periods of time in a number of different pursuits, he was primarily a scholar, and his interest in the problems of philosophy became the dominant passion of his entire adult life. He was a man of moderate temperament, modest disposition, keen intellect, and sincere devotion to the cause of truth. He lived a relatively quiet type of life and was a highly respected member of the community in which he lived. He never married, although he enjoyed his associations with women, and his relations with friends and neighbors of both sexes were honorable and amiable. He spent the most of his life in either Scotland or England, with only relatively short periods of residence on the European continent. He served for a time as a member of the embassy in Paris, where he was well received by the French people, who came to speak of him as le bon David. For one who had been reared in a Scotch Presbyterian environment, his departure from customary religious practices and beliefs was shocking to many of his associates and friends. Their criticism of his behavior was annoying and at times caused him no little inconvenience, but he always remained true to his own convictions, and he never compromised his stand on any important issue in order to gain personal or financial advantage for himself. He was an independent thinker and had the courage to say in writing as well as orally what he thought was wrong about the society in which he lived. His candor and forthrightness on matters pertaining to both politics and religion furnished the occasion for many vigorous controversies. These were always carried on in a spirit of goodwill and without any personal animosity. Hume's critics might find all sorts of objection to his ideas, but they were never able to point to any defects in his moral character. The story of his life may be considered from one point of view as merely an expanded account of his writings, for these constituted his major interest, and it is for them that he has been remembered and will continue to be honored throughout the history of philosophy. David Hume was born on April 26, 1711, at Edinburgh in Scotland. His parents were people of good standing in the community. His father belonged to a branch of the family of the Earl of Home (sometimes spelled Hume), and his mother was the daughter of Sir David Falconer, who had been president of the College of Justice. While David was still an infant, his father died, leaving him with one older brother and a sister in the care of his mother, a woman of strong and sturdy character. The family had at one time been considered quite well-to-do, but because of certain financial reverses it was necessary for them to practice the most rigid economy. They were able, however, to live respectably, and his mother, who was devoted to the welfare of her children, used every opportunity for the advancement of their education. David's education began in the schools at Edinburgh. He followed the usual course of study, in which he achieved an average amount of success. At a comparatively early age, he developed a passion for literature and took to reading several of the great classics. Because of his studious disposition, sobriety, and industry, the members of his family thought he was especially fitted for the study of law. This he attempted but gave it up when it became apparent that he had a strong aversion to everything except philosophy and general learning. Abandoning the study of law, he turned all of his energies toward the pursuit of his new interest. His studies along this line were soon interrupted by a period of ill health which lasted for more than a year and which was diagnosed by his physician as a condition that was brought on by "the disease of the learned." Thinking that a different line of activity might be good for his health and hoping to strengthen the slender income of the family, he made a feeble try at business but with poor success. Following his brief adventure into the field of business, Hume returned to his academic pursuits, and for this purpose he left his home in Scotland and spent three years in France, during which time he

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formulated the plans for, and began the composition of, what was destined to become one of his major philosophical publications, the Treatise of Human Nature. It was a work of considerable size and eventually was published in three parts, which dealt, respectively, with the subjects of the understanding, the passions, and morals. Hume returned to London in 1737 and began negotiations for the publication of his manuscript. He encountered a series of difficulties in his efforts to find a publisher who would agree to print the book and arrange for its sale on terms that were agreeable to the author. A contract was finally arranged, and the first edition of the book appeared in 1738. The reception given the book during the first year after its publication was a bitter disappointment to Hume. He had hoped that the book would attract the attention not only of a small group of scholars but of educated people in general and that the arguments presented in it would win for the book and its author a favorable reception. Actually it attracted very little attention, and even those whose positions had been attacked by Hume's arguments were not disturbed to the point that they attempted to make any reply to what he had said. Hume's disappointment is reflected in his statement that the book "fell dead-born from the press." He did not allow this disappointment to discourage the continuation of his literary activities. Believing that the failure of the Treatise to win a more favorable reception was due at least in part to the academic nature of its subject matter, along with the particular style of writing that had been used, Hume now turned his attention to topics of a more popular interest. He wrote a series of essays on subjects that were more directly related to the fields of morals and politics. The series included such topics as Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences, the Dignity of Human Nature, Of Eloquence, Superstitution and Enthusiasm, Liberty of the Press, First Principles of Government, and several other topics along similar lines. The first volume of these essays was published in Edinburgh in 1742. Unlike the Treatise, these essays did attract a considerable amount of attention and were well received by the public. This reception encouraged Hume to broaden his interests still further and to write with a larger reading public in mind. The quality of the essays helped a great deal to establish for Hume the reputation of being an accomplished scholar, and when it was learned that the chair of Ethics and Pneumatical Philosophy at Edinburgh University was soon to be vacated, several of his friends undertook to have him appointed to that position. The idea was very much to Hume's liking, and he would have been glad to accept it. However, the appointment was blocked because of the opposition raised by certain influential men in the community who regarded some of the things which Hume had written on the subjects of morals, religion, and politics as heretical and unorthodox. This experience left a deep impression on Hume and was one of the factors which contributed toward a rising sense of distrust on his part for the established institutions of religion. In 1745, Hume received a letter from the Marquis of Annandale inviting him to live in his own home in London. Hume learned too that relatives and friends of the marquis were anxious to have him serve as a tutor and companion for the marquis, whose state of health, both physical and mental, seemed to require something of that kind. The remuneration which they offered Hume for his services was a strong inducement for him to accept. Up to this time, his very meager allowance had forced him to live in a most frugal manner, and now the prospect of a substantial increase was indeed a pleasant one. Hume was too cautious an individual to accept an invitation of this kind until all of the details connected with it had been carefully arranged. This having been done, he went to London and spent one year at the home of the marquis. He was not altogether unhappy with the situation, but he was not as successful as he had hoped with his job of tutoring. At the end of the year, when his services were terminated, he felt that the chief value gained from this experience had been the amount of money that was now added to his small fortune.

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Soon afterward, Hume received an invitation from General St. Clair to become a secretary to the military embassy to the courts of Vienna and Turin. This took him again to the continent, and while serving in this capacity, he wore the uniform of an officer. Again it was the financial return which he received for his services that constituted the chief benefit which he obtained from the appointment. He spent some time in each of the countries of Germany, Austria, and Italy, but the activities that were associated with military affairs were never his major interest. He wanted to continue with his literary pursuits and did so whenever the opportunity was available. While still in the services of the embassy, Hume decided to rewrite certain portions of the Treatise of Human Nature, using a style of writing which he hoped would win for the materials a more favorable reception than the one given on the first publication of the book. The rewriting was done at different intervals for separate sections of the book. The first section was rewritten under the title Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. It was published at Turin in Sardinia, but Hume tells us that its reception was only a little more successful than the earlier book had been. After finishing his work with the embassy, Hume returned to London and during the next two years spent the time quietly living at his brother's country estate, which was located not far from the city. This peaceful life in the country gave him the opportunity to devote his full time to literary efforts. It was during this period that he wrote and had published the second part of his series of essays. These were called Political Discourses. Soon afterward, he finished the rewriting of the third section of the Treatise of Human Nature. This was now published under the title Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751). The Political Discourses were published in Edinburgh in 1752. They were the first of Hume's writings to receive wide attention and favorable recognition immediately following their first publication. With reference to the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, Hume states in his autobiography that it came "unnoticed and unobserved in the world" even though he regarded it as incomparably the best of all the writings he had produced during his entire life. As the essays on moral and political subjects became better known, Hume's reputation as a philosopher of more than ordinary ability became well established. The sale of his books began to increase, and it was not long until he was able to receive an income of considerable size from this source. He was appointed librarian by the Faculty of Advocates, and though he received very little monetary compensation for this work, it gave him access to a large number of books having to do with those subjects in which he was most interested. It was while working as a librarian that Hume formed his plans for writing the History of England, a project which required several years for completion and one which came to be recognized as one of his greatest achievements. In order to limit the scope of this history to manageable size, he began with the accession of the House of Stuart and concluded the first volume with an account of the death of Charles I. Because he believed that he was writing an impartial account of the events that had taken place, he expected that his book would receive high praise from his contemporaries. In this he was sorely disappointed. The fact that he had expressed some sympathy for Charles I led to bitter attacks from English, Scotch, Irish, Whigs, and Tories. The book sank into oblivion; during a period of twelve months, no more than forty-five copies were sold. Although discouraged by the outcome of this first volume of his history, Hume did not abandon the project, nor did he cease to write on other topics of interest. During the next few years, he published in London a volume entitled Natural History of Religion. This book represented a rather wide departure from the popular conceptions of religion since it was based on a naturalistic rather than a supernaturalistic interpretation of religious phenomena. As an empiricist in philosophy, Hume believed that any reliable knowledge which we may have in any field of inquiry must be based on the facts of experience. From this point of view, he did not hesitate to expose what he regarded as the more obvious fallacies involved in

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popular notions about religion. The book, we are told, made an obscure entrance into the public mind and might not have attracted very much attention if no one had gone to the trouble of making a public denunciation of it. Fortunately for Hume, an attack was made by a certain Dr. Hurd, who wrote and circulated a pamphlet in which Hume's position on religious matters was made the subject of vicious and arrogant criticism. This aroused interest in Hume's book, which led to an increased number of sales. After some time Hume wrote another book called Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, in which his views were presented as a series of conversations between a skeptic, a philosopher, and an orthodox believer. On the advice of some of his friends who were disturbed by the opposition which Hume's earlier publications had aroused, this book was withheld from publication until after his death. The second volume of the History of England appeared in 1756, just two years after the first one had been printed. It covered the period from the death of Charles I to the time of the revolution. The third volume, which appeared in 1759, was an account of events which belonged to the Tudor period. In spite of the fact that Hume's political views were not always acceptable to his contemporaries, his reputation as an author had become well established and his books sold well. In 1763, Hume received an invitation from the Earl of Hertford to attend him on his embassy to Paris. The invitation was accepted, and later on Hume was appointed secretary to the embassy. While in Paris, he was received with great enthusiasm by the French people, who bestowed many honors on him. He returned to Edinburgh in 1769 with the expectation of spending the rest of his life in ease and in enjoyment of his rising reputation. He became ill in 1775, and when it became apparent that he did not have long to live, he was persuaded to write an autobiography. He died the following year.

INTRODUCTION TO THE WORK In his autobiography, written shortly before his death in 1776, David Hume made the following statement. "In the same year 1752 [sic] was published, at London, my Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals; which in my own opinion (who ought not to judge on that subject) is, of all my writings, historical, philosophical, or literary, incomparably the best." He had published by this time a number of books and several essays dealing with a wide range of subjects, but throughout his life his major interest had been in the field of philosophy, and in this area it was the subject of morality with which he had been most deeply concerned. Although his philosophical writings did not receive at first any wide popular acclaim, they did attract the attention of scholars and won the respect and admiration of some of the leading men of letters. Because Hume was a liberal as well as independent thinker and did not hesitate to attack popular notions concerning morality and religion, his writings created a considerable amount of opposition. He was bitterly opposed by some of the leading men of the church and was charged by them with being a heretic and an enemy of the Christian faith. On the philosophical side, he was severely criticized by the rationalists, who insisted that his teachings, if carried to their logical conclusions, would undermine not only the foundations of morality and religion but even of knowledge itself. During the century which followed Hume's death, his critics assumed that they had successfully replied to his arguments. Among philosophers and theologians, it was a generally accepted belief that many of his ideas had been refuted and his influence would continue to wane. This situation prevailed until about the end of the nineteenth century, but since that time there has been a remarkable change. During recent decades, the prestige of his writings has risen to greater heights than ever before, and Hume is now

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regarded as one of the great philosophers of modern times. Some familiarity with Hume's writings is usually considered to be an essential element in what is called a liberal education. His ideas constitute one of the most fruitful sources for contemporary systems of philosophy. This is especially true in regard to the field of ethics. Until comparatively recent times, the subject of morality has been presented from what is primarily either a rationalistic or a theological point of view. Now the trend is almost entirely in the opposite direction. The empirical method, which has been proven to be so successful in the natural sciences, has been extended to include the areas of morality and religion. In this respect, it has followed the course which was developed and used by David Hume. The study of Hume's Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals will be especially beneficial to those who wish to understand more thoroughly what is going on at the present time in what is often referred to as the new morality or the contemporary revolution in ethics. Two centuries have passed since the book was written, and to understand its real significance one must try to see it in the light of the conditions and circumstances which prevailed at that time.

A BRIEF SYNOPSIS Although David Hume wrote on a number of different subjects, it would appear that his predominant interest was in the field of morals. It is easy to understand why this was true since morality as he conceived it lies in the background of all human activities. Man is not only a thinking being, as was emphasized by the Greek philosophers, but he is also a social and an active being and it is with this phase of his life that morality is concerned. It is involved in the political affairs of individuals and nations, and the same is true with reference to the social and religious life of any community of persons. Nothing is more important in the life of an individual or in the life of a nation than the moral standards by which life is governed. It was for reasons of this kind that Hume was especially anxious to make careful inquiry concerning the origin and nature of moral principles. Indeed it can be said that the subject of morality was closely related to all of the topics with which his various published works were concerned. In the Treatise of Human Nature, which was Hume's first important publication, the first section of the book was devoted to an analysis of the human understanding. The purpose of this analysis was from one point of view only a preliminary step toward a more adequate interpretation of man's moral beliefs. Even in the History of England, which was written at a later date, there is presented an abundance of evidence to show that it is the morals of a nation which more than any other single factor determines its destiny. The significance of moral standards is emphasized again in the Essays on moral and political topics, which were so influential in establishing Hume's reputation as a scholar and an author. Finally, in the two books which he wrote on the subject of religion, the implications with reference to morals are especially prominent. The Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals was an attempt to place before the public in a more attractive style the materials that had been included in the third section of the Treatise of Human Nature. Hume's philosophy of morals has a number of important characteristics which it may be helpful to bear in mind before one reads the Enquiry itself. One of these is the sharp distinction which is made between the fields of logic and ethics. Logic has to do with man's activities as a thinking being; ethics and morality are concerned with his actions as a social being. Logic is a matter of reasoning, and its function is to ascertain facts; morals has to do with the field of values and cannot be derived from a mere statement of facts. It is true that reasoning is involved in both logic and ethics, but while logic is derived from the nature of reason, ethics is not. No amount of factual data, however complete it may be, is sufficient to tell one what it is that he ought to

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do. You cannot derive what ought to be from what is. It is only because humans are feeling creatures as well as thinking ones that value distinctions are possible and can indicate what it is that one ought to do. Failure to recognize these distinctions between the fields of facts and of values has in Hume's judgment been responsible for much of the confusion and the misunderstanding which has been characteristic of moral philosophy. By showing that moral judgments have their origin in the feelings rather than the intellect, he hopes to correct this situation. The procedure for determining facts is not the same as it is for recognizing distinctions of value. Hume's position is in this respect similar to that of Immanuel Kant, who recognized the difference between what he called the pure, or theoretical, reason and the practical reason. The theoretical reason belongs to the understanding, and its function is to enable one to arrive at a true or correct knowledge of the facts. Practical reason is that particular function of the mind that enables one to know what it is that he ought to do. Theoretical reason is the work of the intellect, but practical reason pertains to the will, or that which moves people to act. It is true there are many points of contrast in the moral philosophies of Kant and Hume, for Kant was a rationalist in his conception of morals and Hume was not. However, they were in agreement insofar as they both recognized an important difference between judgments of fact and judgments of value. One of the main reasons why Hume insisted that moral judgments are based on feelings rather than the intellect is that a mere awareness of facts is powerless to move one to act. People act as a result of their feelings and desires, and while it is true that these may be influenced by what they believe to be the facts, it is not the knowledge alone that moves the will or restrains it from acting. In the Treatise of Human Nature, Hume had said, "Tis not unreasonable for me to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger." The purpose of this statement was to emphasize the fact that preferences, like all moral obligations, arise from the feelings and cannot be derived from a mere awareness of the facts. Throughout all of his writings, Hume made use of the empirical method in his philosophy. Following the trend which had been established by such thinkers as Francis Bacon, John Locke, and George Berkeley, he held that all it is possible for anyone to know about themselves or the world in which they live must be derived from the facts of experience. There is no way of determining the nature of that which goes beyond the world of experience, and the belief in the possibility of such knowledge has been one of the main sources of dogmatism and the various forms of intolerance that have usually been associated with it. In his analysis of the human understanding, Hume had applied the empirical method in order to find an explanation for the way in which ideas are formed. Like other empiricists who had preceded him, he assumed that all ideas are derived from sense impressions, but on the basis of this assumption he went beyond the work of his predecessors and denied the possibility of any genuine knowledge of anything that transcends the data which is supplied by the senses. This means that no one can have any knowledge of an external world, of a material substance, a spiritual substance, a self, or of God. While it was clear enough that one may believe in the reality of any or all of these objects, it was pointed out that there is no logical foundation for these beliefs nor for the existence of the objects to which they refer. Strange as it may seem, this did not destroy the possibility of what is usually known as scientific knowledge. The so-called laws of nature are dependable at least to some degree even though they are only habits which have been formed in human minds on the basis of what has occurred in the past and the expectation that similar experiences will occur in the future. Because he denied the possibility of knowing anything that goes beyond the realm of experience, Hume has often been regarded as a thoroughgoing skeptic. However, he did not deny the usefulness of the concepts that are employed in scientific procedure, but he did offer a new explanation of the way in which these concepts are formed. The principles that are involved in scientific procedure are only constructions

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of the human mind, but they are reliable insofar as they can be used successfully in the ordering of human experiences. The use of the empirical method in the field of morals enabled Hume to show in a similar manner how it is that ideas concerning right and wrong conduct have come into existence. The conclusions reached in this area of experience were shocking to many of his contemporaries because they had long been accustomed to think of moral obligations as something that had been derived from some supreme authority and imposed on human beings by a power that was external to them. Whether this source of moral obligation was believed to be the will of God or derived from the nature of reason itself made little difference since the rules regulating conduct that were based upon it could be enforced by any political or ecclesiastical body that happened to be in power. This conception of morality was in Hume's opinion not only an unwarranted one but dangerous and at times injurious to the welfare of human beings. By showing that the principles of morality are not derived from an external authority but are drawn from the experiences of people, he believed he could present a far more accurate and satisfactory account of their origin and existence. Any adequate account of morality must recognize the difference between the realm of facts and the realm of morals. Sense experience is the source of all that can be known about facts, but values of any kind can be known only through the feelings. Since any given sense experience is generally regarded as having the same meaning for all people, it is possible for one person's conclusions relative to the facts to be verified by others. Feelings, on the other hand, are private and individual, and the way one person feels about a given type of conduct is not necessarily the same as another person will feel about it. Consideration of this point is what has led some of Hume's critics to charge that he was a skeptic in moral philosophy and identified good conduct with anything an individual might feel like doing. The charge was, however, an unwarranted one. It could be supported only if it could be shown that there is no common element in the way human beings feel about certain types of conduct. Hume believed that there is a common element in the feelings of people just as much as there is a common element in what they experience by means of the sense organs. He insisted that all normal human beings possess a feeling for humanity. This feeling is expressed in the sympathy which one feels toward the happiness and the sufferings of other people. It is this common element in the feelings of people that enables one to speak correctly concerning the principles of morals. If morality were merely a matter of individual feelings in which no common element could be recognized, there would be no principles involved. Principles of morality, although they may exist only in human minds, do remain constant, and since they are applicable to people in general, we must conclude that they are something more than individual feelings. Any empirical approach to the study of morals must begin with an investigation of those activities which are approved by the vast majority of persons. Accordingly, Hume begins with an analysis of benevolence and justice. These two virtues are selected because there is no type of conduct which is approved more universally than acts of benevolence or of justice in one's treatment of his fellow men. Likewise, it can be said there is general disapproval of injustice and of those actions which serve selfish interests at the expense of the welfare of others. If we inquire concerning the reasons for this approval and disapproval, we will find that usefulness or the lack of it is the explanation which can be given for the different attitudes which are expressed. The actions which are approved are the ones which promote the happiness and satisfy the essential needs of people. The ones which are disapproved tend to prevent the realization of these ends. It is important to note that it is the happiness and welfare of other persons that determine one's attitude as well as that which pertains to his own. The utility of one's actions as a means for bringing about the happiness and general welfare of the entire

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community in which one lives is for Hume the essential criterion of goodness. This emphasis on utility, which characterizes the whole of his moral philosophy, has led some people to classify him as a utilitarian. Whether this classification is correct will depend on the meaning which is given to that term. It was employed by Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill to designate that type of ethical philosophy which finds its standard of goodness in the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of persons. Hume does appear to have much in common with that doctrine, but he differs from it in one important respect: While he agrees with them in recognizing happiness as one of the things that are good, he does not admit that it is the only thing that is good. Human beings are complex organisms, and their total welfare includes more than the satisfaction of the one need for happiness. There are some aspects of Hume's moral philosophy that have led certain of his critics to believe that he advocated a purely selfish as well as individualistic conception of morals. This conclusion has been based on the fact that he derives the principles of morals from the feelings rather than reason. A person's feelings are always private, and since they are so constituted that they tend to produce an attitude of approval toward actions which are favorable to one's own interests and one of disapproval toward anything which is contrary to those interests, it would seem to indicate that morality is nothing more than following one's own personal desires. There were among Hume's contemporaries several noted thinkers who had expressed the view that all human actions are necessarily selfish and any pretense of altruism could be nothing more than a disguise for one's own selfishness. Hume was convinced that this position was an untenable one, and it certainly did not represent his view of morality. That it is perfectly natural for one to approve of actions favorable to his own interests and to disapprove of those which are contrary to it was too obvious to be denied. What Hume did deny was that it is impossible for one to be concerned about another person's welfare when this would contribute nothing to his own interests and might even be contrary to it. Human nature as he understood it was so constituted that no normal person can fail to approve of those actions which promote the well-being of individuals--even though it may be that of one's enemies. On the other hand, one cannot help but disapprove of acts of cruelty and wanton destruction regardless of who it is that may be the victims of such actions. This concern which one person feels toward all other human beings is what he meant by the sense of humanity and the feeling of sympathy which is characteristic of the entire human species. It is the presence of this element in human nature which prevents morality from becoming a purely selfish affair. It accounts for the fact that those actions which are generally considered as most praiseworthy are the ones in which persons voluntarily give up their own private interests in order to promote the welfare of others. Although Hume's position with reference to morality has often been characterized as an ethics of sentiment rather than of reason, it should be noted that in no instance does he disparage reason or insist that one ought to act contrary to it. Where he differs from his rationalistic predecessors is on the point of the origin of moral principles and the subjective character of their existence. Hume makes it clear in his presentation that reason alone cannot tell anyone what it is that he ought to do. Reason does have a very important function to perform in human life, but it has to do with consistency and with matters of fact. Apart from one's feelings, there can be no sense of obligation or what Immanuel Kant referred to as "oughtness." It is true that one s feelings may be influenced by what he believes to be the facts in the case, and it is in this connection that reason does have something to do with morality, but even in this respect it is the feeling rather than the factual data that is the essential element in any moral judgment.

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CRITICAL COMMENTARIES SECTION I Summary Those who deny that there is any difference between right and wrong, along with those whose opinions about morals are so fixed that they will not change no matter what evidence can be presented against them, are not likely to be influenced by argument. It is the part of wisdom to leave them alone and trust that in due time they will come to their senses and accept the view which to the average person seems so obvious that he is never inclined to doubt it. But acceptance of the idea that a valid distinction can be made between right and wrong does not settle all the questions that arise when one thinks seriously about the origin and meaning of moral beliefs. One of the major issues that has long been associated with moral philosophy has to do with the question of whether the basis for moral distinctions is to be found in the reason or in the sentiments and feelings experienced by human beings. The issue is as old as the history of philosophy and persists even to the present time. Among the ancient Greeks, there were those who regarded morality as essentially a matter of the feelings and attitudes which one displayed toward his fellow humans. At the same time, there were others who believed that goodness was primarily a matter of the intelligence. These opposing points of view can be found in almost every period of human history. There have been extremists on both sides of the question. On one side, they have shown a strong tendency to make morality purely a matter of the feelings, while their opponents have been equally convinced that it is purely a matter of the intellect. It requires only a small amount of reflection to see that both reason and the feelings are necessary for the formation of moral judgments, but there are differences of opinion concerning the respective place that should be assigned to each. It is for the purpose of throwing light on this important question that this study has been undertaken. It can be seen at once that the question of reason or sentiment as the basis for moral judgments is something more than an academic issue. The practical consequences which follow from these opposite points of view are of the greatest significance for estimating the values of human life. If moral judgments are derived from reason, they can be true or false. If they are based solely on the feelings, there can be no dispute concerning them. Truth is disputable but taste is not. Again, if moral judgments are true in the same sense that propositions in mathematics are true, they are not subject to change. The principles of morality would in that case be as eternal as the laws of mathematics. But if moral judgments are derived from the feelings, they do not remain constant. They will be as variable as the moods and sentiments of the individuals who make them. The issue is a crucial one so far as the status of moral principles is concerned. Arguments have been stated in abundance in support of each of these opposing positions. Hume's own position is very definitely on the side of those who place the greater emphasis on feelings rather than reason as the basis for moral beliefs. Several of Hume's contemporaries, as well as his predecessors, had given support to the rationalistic conception of ethics, and he was anxious to correct the errors which he saw in the views they had presented. His method for doing this was quite in harmony with the spirit of empiricism, which was being emphasized in the scientific inquiries of his day. In contrast with the rationalists, who had derived their principles of morality by making deductions from metaphysical assumptions, Hume believed it was necessary to study the facts of human experience and to

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draw only those conclusions which are warranted by the facts. He regarded the attempt to base morality on one's conception of the nature of the universe a misguided one. Any knowledge that can be gained with reference to morals must come from a different source. He therefore proposes to begin the inquiry by examining the way in which moral ideas have been formed. Because the principles of benevolence and justice have been widely recognized as virtuous by people of all races and cultures, he begins with an investigation of the meanings that have been associated with these terms. Commentary The first section of the Enquiry is a general introduction to the book as a whole. Hume begins with a clear statement of the major issue involved in ethical philosophy from the times of Plato and Aristotle to the day in which he lived. It might be added that the same problems are still the central ones in ethical discussions at the present time. The main point at issue has to do with the nature of the principles of morality. Are they static or dynamic? Do they remain the same for all people and for all time, or do they change along with the customs and environmental conditions of the people who are affected by them? Are they derived from some permanent and supreme source which never changes, or are they derived from the changing and transitory facts of human experience? Are moral principles based on reason or on feelings? Is the basis for morality to be found in some metaphysical conception of the universe, or is it derived solely from the particular facts of experience? These are the questions which moralists of all ages have tried to answer, and anyone who is familiar with contemporary literature on morals knows that the present time is no exception. It is significant that the title of Hume's book is called an Enquiry, for he was not under the illusion that he was able to pronounce the final answer to all of these questions. He abhorred dogmatism in any of its forms and did not want it to even appear that he was guilty of it in the writing of this book. Nevertheless, he did have some very definite convictions about the nature of morality, and he was confident that he could expose at least some of the errors that had been current in the ethical literature of his day and thus point the way toward a more adequate understanding of one of the most important areas of human existence. He knew very well that what he had to say would not be convincing to some people, for there are many persons whose minds have become so fixed on the acceptance of certain ideas that no amount or quality of argument would ever cause them to change. On the other hand, there are many persons who are intellectually honest and who will not hesitate to reexamine their beliefs in the light of new evidence, and it was to persons of this type that the message of his book was directed. One of the main sources of dogmatism in the field of morals has been the conviction that one's own beliefs are true and those of persons who do not agree are therefore false. It was the assumption on which convictions of this type are based that Hume called in question. Is it possible to have beliefs about what is morally right or wrong that are really true or false? The answer to this question would in his judgment depend on whether moral beliefs are like those based on matters of fact or the ones that are merely matters of taste. What one believes about matters of fact can be true or false, but this is not the case with reference to matters of taste. Apart from our own experiences, the only beliefs about which we can have complete or absolute certainty are the ones which are derived from reason alone. Propositions in the fields of mathematics and logic are illustrative of this type of certainty. Beliefs that are based on the facts of experience may have a high or low degree of probability, but those that are based on personal feelings and matters of individual preference cannot be called into question. It is for this reason that they cannot be said to be either true or false. To understand the nature of moral principles and beliefs, it is necessary to examine some typical ones for the purpose of determining their origin and the basis for their existence. Because acts of justice and benevolence are among those which are most widely approved, he begins with an analysis of them.

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SECTION II Summary "The epithets sociable, good-natured, humane, merciful, grateful, friendly, generous, beneficent, or their equivalents are known in all languages and universally express the highest merit which human nature is capable of attaining." The chief reason for this high esteem in which the virtue of benevolence is held is the fact that actions which are designated by these terms are so highly useful in promoting the welfare of the members of society. When the dying Pericles made his reply to those admirers who had been so lavish in their praises of him, he is reported to have said, "You have not observed that no citizen has ever yet worn mourning on my account." The great Athenian understood that people in public office win the respect and esteem of their fellow citizens not because of any noble traits of character which they have exhibited but rather because of the benefits which they have bestowed on the ones over whom they have ruled. It is these benefits that are responsible for the praises that are spoken at a later time. In displaying the praises of any humane action, there is one circumstance which is always present, and this is the bringing of happiness and satisfaction to the members of society. From this fact it may be concluded that "the utility resulting from the social virtues forms at least a part of their merit and is one source of that approbation and regard so universally paid to them." Plants and animals are valued because of their usefulness to human beings, and the same can be said of machines, as well as of various types of social organization. Even the occupations and professions which people follow are always evaluated according to their usefulness in promoting human welfare. When Cicero, the Roman statesman, was replying to the views expressed by the Epicureans, he said "Your gods cannot justly claim any worship or adoration with whatever imaginary perfections you may suppose them to be endowed. They are totally useless and inactive." The gods of religion are worthy of praise and devotion only insofar as they can do something that will be of benefit to human beings. When Zoroaster was asked what men should do in order to express their reverence for the deity, he replied that they should plant trees, cultivate their fields, take care of the animals, and perform other meritorious deeds. Actions are regarded as moral when they contribute toward the true interests of humanity; they are immoral insofar as they are contrary to these same interests. Liberality in giving is praiseworthy when it relieves distress and suffering, but it is no longer a virtue when it encourages laziness and lack of initiative on the part of those who receive it. "The social virtues are never regarded without their beneficial tendencies, nor viewed as barren and unfruitful." Commentary Of all the traits of character which find expression in the life of a human being, there is no one of them which is praised more highly or held in greater esteem by people in general than that of a benevolent attitude toward one's fellow humans. To say of any individual that he has so lived that the happiness of others has been increased and their opportunities for success made more available because of what he has done is to bestow upon that person the highest praise that can be imagined. A life of this kind is generally regarded as deserving of greater merit than can be gained by the accumulation of wealth or the holding of positions of responsibility and power. In contrast to this evaluation, it can be said that there is no trait of character which is so universally despised as that which is exemplified by the person who lives only for himself and without any regard or concern for the welfare of others. In view of this situation, it is appropriate to ask just what it is about the nature of benevolence that wins such wholehearted approval, and why is it that the lack of this trait is treated with scorn and contempt? Finding an answer to these questions should throw some light on the

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nature of moral principles in general. If benevolence is to be regarded as a virtue because it is the command of a supreme being or because it can be shown to be in harmony with the nature of the universe as a whole, then it would follow that its requirements should remain constant and not in any way dependent on the changing conditions and circumstances which arise from time to time. In this case, it would resemble what Immanuel Kant called the categorical imperative, or that which is always the right thing to do no matter what the circumstances may be. On the other hand, if an examination of instances in which benevolence has been involved should reveal that its approval has always been conditioned by circumstances relative to the welfare of human beings, this would indicate that the cause of its being regarded with approval is to be found not in some metaphysical or theological source but in the actual experiences of persons. One of the main criteria for determining the cause of a given phenomenon consists in finding a common factor which is always present whenever the phenomenon occurs. If it can be shown that whenever this common factor is not present the phenomenon does not occur, this will furnish additional evidence that the true cause has been located. It was by following these methods of procedure that Hume examined the nature of benevolence. It was pointed out that plants, animals, machinery, and even the occupations and professions which people follow are always valued in proportion to their usefulness in the promotion of human welfare. The same can be said with reference to the rulers who direct the affairs of government. People praise their rulers not because of any great achievement which they may have accomplished on their own behalf but solely because of the benefits which their subjects have received on account of the policies which have been followed. Liberality on the part of individuals and their devotion to the welfare of society are held in high esteem but only insofar as they are advantageous to the public interest. As soon as they go beyond that point and tend to lessen one's efforts to help himself, they are no longer regarded as virtuous acts. From findings of this sort, the conclusion is drawn that what makes benevolence a virtue is derived not from the motive of duty as some moralists have claimed but rather from the utility of the actions performed in the promotion of human welfare.

SECTION III PART 1 Summary Of all the social virtues, justice is the one that has been most widely acclaimed. Whether the basis for this virtue is to be found in the order of nature or consists only in the formulations which have been developed in human minds is a question concerning which there has been considerable disagreement. Hume begins the discussion by calling attention to the fact that justice has always been regarded as something that is useful to human society. Whether this usefulness is the sole factor that is responsible for the origin of justice is a matter that needs to be examined. It is likewise a matter of dispute whether usefulness constitutes the sole foundation for the merit which has been accorded to it. As an empiricist, Hume believes that any satisfactory answer to these questions must be obtained from an examination of the conditions and circumstances that have preceded any formulation of the principles of justice or have caused them to be altered in any way. The evidence which he presents seems to indicate quite clearly that usefulness to human society is the sole factor that is responsible for the origin of justice and for the high esteem with which it is universally held. He points out, for example, that in an imaginary society in which all the needs of people are

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supplied by a bountiful and beneficent nature, there would be no justice since the need for it would not arise. In a society of this kind, there would be no property rights, and any regulations concerning the holding or use of material goods would be superfluous. Something like this type of situation prevails at the present time with reference to the free uses of air and water. The same thing is true in a primitive society where there is more than enough land to meet the needs of the entire population. Within certain limitations, this is also true of the water in the oceans of the world. The use of this water for transportation and other purposes is free to all so long as there is no interference with a similar usage on the part of other people. Thus we see that justice comes into existence when the goods that are necessary for human welfare are not available in sufficient abundance so that everyone can have all that he wants. When this condition obtains, it becomes necessary to establish some principles for the proper distribution of the goods at hand. Private property then becomes an essential condition for the promotion of human welfare, and with the establishment of a system of rights and responsibilities, the principles of justice may be said to fulfill one of the major needs of human society. The dependence of these principles of justice upon their usefulness in meeting the needs of society rather than some characteristic of nature apart from human needs can be seen from the fact that their strict enforcement is suspended whenever there are more important needs which cannot be satisfied by obedience to them. For example, in the event of a flood or a famine, people do not hesitate to appropriate whatever goods are available and necessary in order to prevent starvation or to supply whatever it takes in order to preserve human life. This is done in spite of the fact that under normal circumstances actions of this kind would be regarded as a clear violation of the principles of justice. What is known as property rights are likewise set aside in the event of a shipwreck or any other disaster in which human life is endangered. Self-preservation always takes precedence over the principles of justice. The latter are regarded as binding only when they are able to serve as means toward the satisfaction of those ends which are considered to be of the greatest importance. This point is illustrated again in the attitude taken by society toward the punishment of criminals. The appropriate action in regard to those who have violated the laws of the land is to deprive them of their property, their liberty, and in extreme cases even of life itself. To do these things to law-abiding citizens would indeed be contrary to the principles of justice, but in the case of criminals these principles are suspended because it is a necessary means for the protection of society. International warfare provides another instance in which the principles of justice are suspended in the interests of achieving victory over the enemy. Nations that are at war with one another have no scruples about deceiving their enemies or destroying their property and taking possession of their land. In other words, the principles of justice are disregarded when they are not useful to the interests of those who are involved in the conflict. In all of these instances, it is evident that the rules of equity and justice owe their origin and their existence to the utility which results from their use. This is true no matter what the original state of human nature may have been. Whether the first state of humanity was the type represented by the golden age of ancient legends or that of a "war of all against all" as set forth in the writings of Thomas Hobbes, the origin and status of the principles of justice is essentially the same.

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PART 2 Summary The same conclusion relative to the nature of justice follows from an examination of particular laws which are designed to regulate both the holding and the use of property. The right of an individual to own property and to do with it whatever he pleases is considered to be just but only so long as this policy is in harmony with the best interests of society as a whole. When, as a result of this policy, the distribution of wealth enables some people to live in idleness and luxury while others must suffer from privation and a denial of opportunities to enjoy the good things of life, the situation is changed and the principles of justice that were formerly recognized can be followed no longer. It was for the purpose of correcting a situation of this kind that the so-called Levellers advocated an equal distribution of wealth to all the members of society. This was done in the name of justice and for the purpose of serving in a more satisfactory manner the interests of all the people. This system was obviously an impracticable one, as we are informed not only by historians but even by ordinary common sense. This ideal of perfect equality in spite of the noble purpose which inspired it turned out to be extremely pernicious to human society. Men are not equal in their abilities to perform the various tasks which are necessary in any well-ordered society. Neither do they possess the same degree of industry or care concerning the quality of work which they perform. To treat them all alike without regard to their abilities or their habits of industry will tend to discourage thrift and initiative on the part of the more capable members of society and encourage laziness and lack of responsibility on the part of others. Because a perfect equality of possessions does not serve the best interests of society, the principles of justice must be reformulated in a way that will avoid these unfortunate consequences. Concerning the laws that are designed to regulate the holding of property, Hume tells us that "we must be acquainted with the nature and situation of man, must reject appearances which may be false though specious; and must search for those rules which are, on the whole, useful and beneficial." There are instances in which the interests of society appear to be served by regulations which apply to a single person rather than to people in general. For example, it has been maintained that the first possession of a piece of property entitles one to ownership of that property. Under certain conditions, the enforcement of this rule does not work a hardship on any of the members of the community. However, when these conditions have changed, it is considered just and proper to violate any or all of the regulations concerning private property, provided that the welfare of society can be secured in no other way. A person's property is anything which it is lawful for him and for him alone to use. The rule by which this lawfulness is determined is that the welfare and happiness of society take precedence over everything else. Without this consideration, most, if not all, of the laws pertaining to justice and the holding of property would be meaningless or else grounded on some vague superstition of the people. "The necessity of justice to the support of society is the sole foundation of that virtue; and since no moral excellence is more highly esteemed, we may conclude that this circumstance of usefulness has, in general, the strongest energy and most entire command over our sentiments." Commentary Justice is the most widely acclaimed of the social virtues just as benevolence is so recognized among the individual virtues. The two are closely related since both of them have to do with promoting the welfare of other persons rather than serving exclusively one's own individual interests. They differ chiefly in the object to which generosity is extended. Benevolence is usually expressed in the attitude one takes toward the happiness and well-being of individuals, while justice is concerned with the welfare of society as a whole. The importance of justice in human affairs can be seen from the fact that government by law is

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based on this concept. Lawyers who are candidates for membership in a bar association are usually required to state under oath that they will use their offices in support of the principles of justice and will never act contrary to these principles in order to obtain personal benefits for themselves. Among the ancient Greek philosophers, justice was regarded as the all-inclusive virtue which was practically synonymous with righteous living. It had essentially the same meaning for individuals that it did for the state. Plato's Republic, for example, was an attempt on the part of the author to set forth the meaning of justice or what would be involved in living at one's best. The good life, as he described it, consisted in the harmonious functioning of the elements included in human nature. This applied to the activities carried on by the state in the same way that it did to the different capacities that were present in the case of each citizen. Hume's discussion concerning justice is for the purpose of indicating both the origin and the nature of this all-important virtue. As he understands it, the real nature of justice cannot be understood apart from its origin in the experience of human beings. The usefulness of justice like that of benevolence is something that no one ever questions. It is obvious that both of these virtues contribute in many ways toward the happiness and the security of people in general. But whether usefulness in promoting the welfare of society is in itself sufficient to account for the universal approval that is accorded to justice is something that has been open to question, and it is on this point that the inquiry is pursued. Hume is convinced that utility alone is a sufficient basis for recognizing the obligations of justice, and the arguments which he presents are for the purpose of supporting this conviction. One of the reasons which he advances for believing that justice is dependent on the existence of certain conditions in human society is the fact that when all the needs of society are supplied, no one is aware of any individual rights and hence there is no need for justice as a means for protecting them. This view has something in common with the one advocated by Thomas Hobbes in the early part of the seventeenth century. Hobbes had maintained that in the original state of humanity, which is that of a "war of all against all," there are no principles of justice since everyone is free to do whatever he pleases. Since this is an intolerable state of affairs which offers no adequate protection to anyone, individuals agree among themselves to surrender whatever rights they possess to a sovereign state. The state will then enact laws, and it is with the establishment of these rules of conduct that justice comes into existence. Because justice is the creation of the government that is in power, it will continue only so long as that state endures. Hume agrees that justice has a beginning, and it is quite possible that it may have an end, but he does not identify justice with the decrees of any government that may be in power. Instead, he maintains that justice comes into existence to meet the needs of people which are not supplied in any other way. One may imagine a society in which all the needs of all the people are supplied. In a society of that kind, there is no need for justice, and consequently it would not exist. Something like this is what we observe with respect to the air we breathe and the water we drink. No one would think of enacting laws to regulate the use of either air or water so long as there is an abundant supply of both and no one is ever injured by the amount that is consumed by others. Now, if all the commodities of human life were as free as air and water, no one would need to be concerned in the least about justice. Justice, according to Hume, arises only when the goods that are needed by human beings are not available to the extent that everyone can use all that they want without depriving others of the things that are

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necessary to satisfy their needs. Justice is for the purpose of regulating the distribution of the goods in society in the most equitable manner that is possible. There is no exact formula for doing this that will meet the needs of every situation that may arise. While it is true that the demands of justice will necessarily be stated in terms of general rules of conduct, it must be recognized that there is no rule that will be exactly what is needed for every particular occasion. Situations may develop in which it will be necessary to suspend the rules that under ordinary conditions would be observed. For example, in case of fire, flood, shipwreck, or famine, the rules pertaining to private property will be set aside in order to preserve human life. In times of war and other emergencies, the usual demands of justice are disregarded for the sake of some larger and more-inclusive good. Again, in the punishment of criminals we do not hesitate to deprive them of their property or their liberty, although in the case of law-abiding citizens, it would be considered a transgression of their rights to do anything of that kind. In the second part of his discussion of justice, Hume illustrates the transitory nature of this virtue by calling attention to the fact that no hard and fast rules can be set up for the distribution of property. Justice exists for the purpose of meeting the needs of society, and what will accomplish this end in one set of circumstances will not do at all when other conditions are present. To permit any individual to accumulate all that he can without violating the laws of the land will lead to unfortunate consequences. It gives to some persons far more than they need or will use in a manner that is good either for themselves or for the rest of society. At the same time, this method of distributing wealth makes it quite impossible for some persons to have as much as they really need. Neither extreme wealth nor extreme poverty are in the best interests of society as a whole. When these conditions have existed, there have been times when an attempt was made to correct the situation by giving to each person an equal share of the available wealth. Since the concept of justice is usually interpreted to mean some kind of equality, it might seem that this was a just way of distributing property. But this method fails to meet the needs of society since it ignores the matter of merit and gives to the undeserving on the same basis that it gives to the deserving. Obviously, then, the purposes of justice can be realized only by adapting the methods that are used to the particular situation that is involved. Do these arguments support the thesis that justice is a relative virtue, the nature of which is constantly changing with the different circumstances that arise? This appears to be Hume's position, and it is presented in contrast to the rationalistic interpretation of justice, which is that of an eternal or unchanging ideal that is not influenced by the conditions which exist in space and time. What Hume has demonstrated beyond any reasonable doubt is that our human understanding of justice does vary from one time to another. He has also made it clear that the application of the principles of justice will vary with the circumstances under which they are applied. But neither of these two points is sufficient to prove that there is nothing which remains constant about the nature of justice. Indeed, Hume's own discussion of the subject seems to imply that there is an unchanging element in justice, for he insists that its purpose is always that of meeting the needs of society. While it is true, as Hume has pointed out, that virtues do not exist apart from feelings of approval and disapproval, it is also true that feelings alone are not sufficient to account for a sense of duty or obligation. There is a rationalistic element and a feeling element involved in the nature of justice or any other virtue. It is always a mistake to interpret virtues as belonging wholly to the one or the other.

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SECTION IV Summary If everyone could understand clearly the advantages which he would gain from conformity to the principles of justice and equity and would exercise the perseverance and self-discipline which is necessary to give up satisfactions of the moment for his long-range interests, there would be no need for government or what may be called a political society. It is because this type of understanding and selfcontrol is not shared by all the members of society that we have laws and regulations along with the power of the state to enforce them. The sole reason why these laws must be obeyed is the fact that they constitute a useful method for preserving peace and order among the citizens of the state. Among the nations of the world, there is a similar need for principles of conduct by which their dealings with one another may be regulated. Within certain limits, we may say that the same principles of justice and equity which prevail among individuals are also necessary for the well-being of the nations. It is generally understood that even among nations that are at war with one another, there are some rules that should always be obeyed. The safety of ambassadors must be maintained, the use of poisoned weapons must be forbidden, humane treatment must be accorded to prisoners of war, and certain precautions must be observed to prevent the destruction of civilian centers of population. All of these rules are recognized as useful means for protecting the interests of states in general. There are, however, some important differences between kingdoms and individuals in their relations with one another. This accounts for the fact that many of the rules and regulations which have to do with the conduct of individuals within a given state are suspended in the area of international relations. In fact, the obligations of states to respect their commitments to one another are not regarded as binding to the same extent as they are among persons belonging to the same political unit. States may violate their treaties or alliances with one another whenever it appears essential to their own interests to do so. This type of action would not, except in the most extreme cases, be considered right and proper among individuals. The reason for this is that human nature cannot subsist without the association of individuals, which is made possible only by obedience to the principles of justice and equity. On the other hand, states or kingdoms can subsist by themselves even though it may be inconvenient and in some instances extremely difficult for them to do so. The important point is that agreements are binding among both individuals and states in direct proportion to their usefulness in maintaining the security and well being of human societies. Laws and customs pertaining to the behavior of the sexes can be seen to have their sole foundation in usefulness for promoting the peace and harmony of all who are concerned. Why, for examples, is chastity regarded as a virtue and adultery as a vice? The answer is that the comparatively long infancy of humanity requires the combination of parents and the security of a relatively stable home environment. Without these advantages, the child will not have the opportunity to grow and develop in a normal and healthy manner. Regulations pertaining to marriage and sexual relations are so useful in this connection that the desired conditions can scarcely be maintained without them. Apart from this usefulness, Hume tells us that the virtue of chastity would never have occurred to human beings. In general, according to Hume, the virtue of chastity is regarded as more important for women than for men. The reason for this is directly related to childbearing. However, the regulations which were established for the purpose of safeguarding the interests of children continue to be recognized beyond the period for which they were originally intended. This accounts for the fact that adultery is forbidden after the period of childbearing is over as well as before. Laws forbidding incest, along with other regulations having to do with the conduct of the sexes, have also been enacted in order to aid still further the welfare of children and the security of the home.

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Not all of the customs and conventions of society are incorporated into the laws of the land which makes it possible for them to be enforced by the police power of the state. Many of them are sustained merely by the force of public opinion. Nevertheless, violation of these customs may bring grave consequences to the offender, whose actions will be regarded as morally wrong. For example, tale-bearing and idle gossip concerning the private affairs of individuals are condemned in most societies and for very good reasons since they are a source of unhappiness and in many instances work great harm on the persons whose rights of privacy have been invaded. All of these rules and regulations come into existence because of their usefulness in promoting the welfare of human society. Without them, it would be quite impossible for individuals to live in peace and in harmony with one another. Every society finds it necessary to have rules of some kind for the protection of its members. Even criminals have their own code of laws which forbid such practices as reporting on one another, disclosing secret information, failure to keep their agreements with one another, and anything else which they regard as detrimental to their own interests. Commentary In this section, Hume illustrates his conception concerning the nature of justice by showing how it is set forth in the laws and customs that have been established in any well-regulated society. His discussion includes such items as laws pertaining to the tenure and use of private property, rules governing the conduct of international affairs, and customary behavior having to do with sex and marital relationships. In all of these instances, he is especially concerned to point out the dependence of these rules and regulations upon the changing needs of human beings as they adjust themselves to new and different environmental conditions. He argues that in an ideal society where there is an abundant supply of everything that is necessary for human welfare and where no one exploits other persons in order to gain some advantage for himself, there would be no need for justice; consequently, it would not exist. Justice, according to Hume, has no existence apart from the laws and customs through which it is expressed. These do not come into existence until the need for them arises, and what will meet the needs of individuals under one set of conditions will not necessarily be adequate for this purpose under new and changed circumstances. From these considerations, it would appear that there is nothing constant or unchanging about the nature of justice. On the contrary, it would seem that the real meaning of the term is something that varies from time to time in accordance with the needs of people and the conditions under which they live. The examples used in this section show beyond any reasonable doubt that the application of the principles of justice to concrete cases will always be dependent on the particular circumstances that are involved. For instance, what is considered to be just and right in matters pertaining to private property is determined by a number of different factors. Whether the property has been inherited, acquired by fraudulent means, needed for the satisfaction of debts, used in a manner that is detrimental to the interests of others, or subject to many other considerations are all matters which must be taken into account. Laws concerning property have been made solely for the purpose of meeting the needs of people, but because of changing conditions, this purpose has never been completely realized. In order to make progress toward that goal, it has been necessary to change the laws from time to time. In regard to sex morality, it is observed that a wide variety of customs and laws are recognized by different societies. Some of the rules and regulations are included in the laws of the land, but others are enforced only by the power of public opinion. The important point, so far as Hume's argument is concerned, is the fact that whatever the regulations concerning sex behavior may be, the only basis for their existence is that they have been regarded as necessary for the welfare of the society as a whole. It is true that some of the rules remain in force long after their immediate usefulness for a particular class of persons has been accomplished. It is also true that the moral standards which have been established are

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not always the same for both sexes. Nevertheless, it can be said that all of the laws and customs having to do with sex relationships had their origin in an attempt to meet the needs of the people as a whole. Furthermore, the changes that have taken place in these regulations from time to time have been directed toward the same end. There is no single rule concerning sex behavior that can be regarded as adequate under any and all conditions. Under certain circumstances, monogamy is the form which is best suited for human welfare, but under other conditions a different type of behavior may have more beneficial results. In the field of international relationships, there are certain rules of conduct which are essential in order to safeguard the security and the welfare of the nations that are involved. Although these rules had their origin in an attempt to meet the needs of human beings, they are not usually regarded in quite the same way as the laws which operate within the boundaries of the particular state to which one belongs. Nations do not hesitate to violate the terms of their agreements when it is to their own interest to do so. The reason for this is that the nations are not nearly so dependent on one another as is true of the people who belong to a single state. At the time when Hume lived, each nation was self-sufficient to a much greater degree than is true of the present day. Scientific developments have made the nations of the world more interdependent than at any previous period in human history. The new conditions have necessarily been accompanied by new and changing conceptions of international justice. Throughout his discussion of this topic, Hume has emphasized the fact that human conceptions of justice change from time to time. What one person or group of persons may regard as just will not necessarily coincide with the opinions held by other members of the same society. Any attempt to apply the principles of justice to concrete situations will vary with the different circumstances that arise. In this respect, the argument which he has presented is quite convincing. However, these facts do not warrant the conclusion that there is nothing constant or unchanging about the nature of justice. If decisions concerning the meaning of justice were entirely arbitrary, the term could mean anything, which would be equivalent to no meaning at all. Apparently Hume would not grant that this is the case, although there are passages in his treatment of the subject that would indicate this position or at least one that is closely related to it.

SECTION V PART 1 Summary It is generally recognized that no higher praise can be bestowed on an individual than to point out the many ways in which his activities have been useful in promoting the welfare of his fellow humans. Likewise, it may be said that nothing will indicate the disapprobation of people any more than the assertion that the person in question has never done anything which has been of significant use to the society in which he has lived. This commendation of usefulness and disapproval of the lack of it suggests that there must be some reason why people are in favor of the one and critical of the other. Various attempts have been made by ethical philosophers to account for this fact, and it is Hume's purpose in this section of the book to set the matter straight. Usefulness in this respect as the source of virtue and goodness is so commonly recognized that we often speak of the beneficial qualities of herbs and animals as their particular virtues even though it is only a

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caprice of language that prompts us to speak of them in that way. Why is it then that writers in the field of ethics have been so reluctant to account for goodness in terms of usefulness? Hume suggests that at least a part of the reason may be the difficulty encountered in trying to enumerate all of the effects of usefulness. At any rate, the attempt has usually been made to account for virtues by referring to other principles. Perhaps another reason is the fact that usefulness is so often interpreted in terms of selfish interests, while altruism is generally regarded as a higher motive. Skeptics have urged that all moral distinctions are the result of education which has been promoted by the politicians and the rulers of the state. These persons have produced the type of legislation that was favorable to their own selfish interests. They have professed an interest in the welfare of all the members of their society, but this has been merely a device to make the rules and regulations more acceptable to the people as a whole. By getting the people to believe that the new legislation is in their interests, the rulers have been more successful in serving their own selfish purposes. Hume admits that some of the rules for governing the conduct of people have been brought about in this manner, but he is vigorously opposed to the idea that this description is adequate to account for all of them. That there is a strong element of selfishness in human nature is something that cannot be denied, but it is also true that human beings are so constituted that within certain limits they respond in a favorable way to that which promotes the welfare of others even though it brings no direct advantage to themselves. Actions may arise from selfish interests, but it is also possible that they may be the result of more generous motives. As much as we value our own happiness and welfare, we cannot help but admire the conduct of persons who are willing to set aside their own selfish interests in order to further the cause of justice and the welfare of humanity. Some writers in the field of ethics have maintained that the actions which are usually called altruistic are in reality only disguised forms of self-interest. They support this claim by calling attention to the fact that man is a social being who is dependent on the members of society for those conditions which are essential to his own individual welfare. When the society to which he belongs suffers, he, as a member of that society, shares in the misfortune which has come to the group as a whole. In the same way, he profits as an individual from anything which promotes the welfare of the other members of his society. Thus it appears that all concern for such social virtues as justice and benevolence arises from the selfish interests of the individuals concerned. Again, Hume admits that while this explanation may account for some of the so-called altruistic actions which people perform, it is not sufficient to account for all of them. He gives several reasons in support of this conclusion. One of these reasons is the fact that we normally approve and even bestow high praise on virtuous actions of the past. We do this in spite of the fact that there is no way in which these past actions can be of any possible use to us in the future. Further than this, we even approve and applaud actions which may be contrary to our own interests. For example, in times of war and other forms of international conflict, we admire the heroic actions of our enemies when they risk their own lives and fortunes to save their fellow men. Our admiration for them still persists even though their actions have been of advantage to our enemies rather than to ourselves. Some people will say that we admire these past actions and noble endeavors on the part of our enemies because we imagine ourselves being in such a plight that behavior of this kind would be a distinct advantage to us. Hume rejects this explanation for the reason that "it is not conceivable how a real sentiment can arise from an imaginary interest." One who stands close to the edge of a precipice may experience a fear which is largely imaginary, but the more he understands the precautions that have been taken for his safety the less will be his fear. Quite the reverse is true in the field of morals, where the more he thinks about the situation the more clearly he distinguishes between vices and virtues.

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PART 2 Summary Because self-love is such a strong element in human nature, it is easy to understand why so many philosophers have regarded it as the sole basis on which all moral judgments have been made. That they have been mistaken in this can be shown by applying what Francis Bacon has termed a "crucial experiment." This can be done by examining instances in which an individual's private interest is separate from the public interest and even opposed to it. Situations of this kind are not uncommon. A person engaged in business may learn that his chief competitor has been stricken with a fatal illness or has become the victim of some horrible accident. If he is a person who reacts in a normal manner, he will experience a genuine sense of sorrow for the man who has suffered the misfortune. His sorrow will not have been brought about because of any harm to his own private interests but will be due to the fact that as a human being, he is naturally sympathetic toward others. Again it is perfectly normal for a person to rejoice over the good fortune of others even though it may have been brought about at the expense of what one may have desired for himself. Prolonged solitude does not bring enjoyment to an individual. To be happy, one must share his experiences with others. No normal person can be in a cheerful mood so long as those who are close to him are in a state of misery. Who is not pained by the tears and cries of a little child? Whenever one encounters the signs of sorrow and mourning, he is bound to feel a sense of compassion and of uneasiness. Wherever we go, and no matter what type of society we are associated with, it is still true that the joys and sorrows of other people excite within our own breasts feelings of pleasure or of uneasiness. This is not because of any selfish feelings we have toward ourselves but rather because of the tendency in our own nature to be sympathetic toward the feelings of other people. This characteristic of human nature is illustrated again in the case of the theater, where the feelings and attitudes of the actors on the stage are communicated to the people who make up the audience. Let the actors express anger, resentment, sorrow, or rejoicing, and these feelings will be imitated, though to a lesser degree, by the people who observe them. Something like this is, according to Hume, the reason why the most entertaining form of poetry is the pastoral type, wherein the images of a gentle and tender tranquillity are communicated to people in terms of the common experiences of everyday life. The reading of history furnishes another example of the way in which the feelings and sentiments of those who lived in former times are communicated to the ones who read about them. The noble actions of the past are applauded and the vices condemned as one does to some extent repeat within his own consciousness the deeds recorded in history. Anyone who is absolutely indifferent toward the deeds of the past will be equally indifferent toward the virtues and vices of the present. In view of these considerations, it must be recognized that the social virtues are in every way due to their utility, and while self-interest is always involved to some extent, it requires something more than that to account for the way in which people normally behave toward one another. On this point, Hume says, "Thus, in whatever light we take this subject, the merit ascribed to the social virtues appears still uniform and arises chiefly from that regard which the natural sentiment of benevolence engages us to pay to the interests of mankind and society." Commentary Having explained the origin of moral virtues in terms of usefulness, Hume now proceeds to tell us why it is that human beings always do approve of usefulness and disapprove of that which is contrary to it. It seems to be necessary to do this because most moralists in the past have been reluctant to give this

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explanation for the so-called virtues. They have referred to a number of different principles as the basis for moral goodness, but in Hume's opinion they have not succeeded in giving a satisfactory account of the virtues, nor have they been able to show why it is that they have been preferred to other types of conduct. Usefulness as the foundation for morality has been rejected for a number of different reasons, but the chief one is the fact that it has usually been identified with selfishness. In common parlance, selfish actions have generally been regarded as evil, while altruistic ones are associated with the idea of goodness. Hume rejects this classification, for in his judgment selfish actions are not necessarily evil, nor are altruistic ones necessarily good. One of the main purposes of this discussion is to show that usefulness is not necessarily opposed to altruism. When the term is properly understood, it will be seen to include not only activities which are favorable to one's own interests but also those that promote the welfare of others even though these may at times be contrary to what one would normally desire for himself. The argument which is presented in this connection is especially important because of its bearing on Hume's entire theory concerning morals. It implies a conception of human nature that rules out the possibility of moral decisions being nothing more than an arbitrary statement of one's wishes or desires. With reference to those who have insisted that pure selfishness is the sole basis for all morality, Hume points out that their doctrine rests on unproved and unwarranted assumptions. They have maintained that all actions are necessarily selfish because human nature is so constituted that no one can act contrary to his own interests. In support of this position, they have argued that the rules governing moral conduct have been put forth by politicians and other persons who have occupied positions of power. They have made the rules in harmony with their own selfish interests although they have, at the same time, pretended that they were made in the interests of their subjects. Anyone who wants to exploit others for his own gain will always find that it is much to his advantage to get people to believe he is acting in their behalf rather than for his own interests. It is even possible for a person to fool himself and thus to think that his actions are altruistic when as a matter of fact they are predominantly selfish. Hume rejects the assumptions on which this theory of morality is based. He does, however, recognize the element of truth which it contains. Human nature is selfish to some extent, but the doctrine that it is entirely selfish is like other false theories based on only a part of the truth. Human nature is both selfish and altruistic, or at any rate it is possible for actions to be either of one kind or the other. Nothing less than this assumption will account for the way in which human beings express their approval or disapproval of different types of conduct. That human nature has the capacity to act for something other than selfish ends is indicated in many different ways. Take, for example, the fact that any normal individual will approve acts of mercy and kindness which occurred in the distant past and which cannot possibly be regarded as having any particular advantage for himself. It is a very common thing for one to express praise and admiration for the noble and heroic deeds performed by persons who lived centuries ago. Expressions of this kind can mean nothing other than a natural tendency on the part of human beings to approve actions which have been directed toward the welfare of others and to do so regardless of any benefits to themselves which may have been derived from the deeds that were performed. The case for altruism is even stronger when we recognize that it is a normal procedure for one to approve the good fortune which comes to others even though they may be directly opposed to what he desires for himself. We cannot help but admire the courage, bravery, and loyalty of our enemies in times of war, and this in spite of the fact that what they are doing is directly opposed to the cause that we serve. In a similar manner, we are happy for the success that has been achieved by our competitors in business, and we have feelings of sorrow and regret when some tragic misfortune falls upon them.

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Sympathy for other people is an important characteristic of human nature, and it is for this reason that a person's approvals and disapprovals are determined not by selfish interests alone but also by that which pertains to the welfare of others. Moral sentiments do indeed have their source in utility, but it is a mistake to identify utility with selfishness alone.

SECTION VI PART 1 Summary In this section of the Enquiry, Hume examines still further the way in which moral sentiments are influenced by one's observation of qualities found in the lives of other people. For example, indolence, negligence, carelessness, credulity, fickleness, and similar qualities are not regarded as praiseworthy even though they may give immediate satisfaction and pleasure to the persons who possess them. The fact that these qualities are detrimental to the best interests of these persons by making them less capable of carrying on business transactions and performing other useful activities is something that gives to the observer a sentiment of disapproval and a feeling of uneasiness. It is from feelings of this type that one derives a sense of obligation or duty to avoid the development of these same qualities within himself. The qualities which have been mentioned are not absolutely bad in the sense that no amount of them is ever desirable under any circumstances. Rather, it is the Aristotelian doctrine of the golden mean which should be followed with reference to each of them. Qualities which are desirable when present in the right amount and under the right circumstances become detrimental to one's interests when there is either a deficiency or an excessive amount of them. The right amount is determined not by the way one feels about it at the moment but by a reasonable calculation with reference to one's entire nature and the proper development of his personality as a whole. It is the possession of these qualities in something other than the right amount that gives rise to the sense of disapproval on the part of the one who observes them. Quite the opposite occurs when the same qualities are present in the right amount, for this gives to the observer a sense of easiness and satisfaction which is characteristic of the virtues. In all instances, it is the utility of the qualities in question that determines whether they shall be regarded as virtues or as vices. In contrast with those thinkers who have maintained that moral sentiments are always the product of selflove, Hume insists that this is not true. His reason for believing that something other than self-love is involved is the fact that by no stretch of the imagination will it be possible for the observer of these qualities in other persons to exchange places with the ones who appear to benefit from them or in the case of the undesirable traits to suffer from their consequences. Since it is the other person who will reap the benefits or experience the ill effects, all selfish considerations are thereby excluded. Anyone who feels no concern at all for what happens to his fellow humans and who maintains an attitude of complete indifference toward that which brings either prosperity or ruin to his country will not recognize any distinctions of a moral nature in the qualities which are exemplified in the lives of others. The fact that distinctions of this kind are recognized by the great majority of persons is convincing evidence that something more than selfish interests are involved. Qualities are approved or disapproved on the basis of their being either useful or pernicious. This, according to Hume, is the sole foundation for all moral distinctions. Vices and virtues according to this criterion will compare most favorably with the one derived from those principles of morality which philosophers have tried to support in so many different ways.

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Writers in the field of ethics could profit from the example used in the physical sciences, where the same explanation was given to account for the revolutions of the moon and the falling of bodies which are close to the surface of the earth. If the force of gravity is sufficient to account for the wide variety of falling bodies, it should be possible in a similar manner to explain the origin and existence of the principles of morality by referring to a single cause. A few typical illustrations will show how this can be done. Discretion is one of the virtues which are so recognized because of their usefulness. Without it, one's relationship with neighbors and friends would always be imperiled. Human nature is such that there is always a strong tendency to give way to one's feelings and to allow a burst of temper to characterize the actions which follow. When this is done without restraint, it produces friction and at times even anger on the part of the persons involved. This brings harm not only to the ones who are spoken to but to the individual who does the speaking. While it is true that one's temper can never be suppressed completely nor the feelings entirely eliminated, it is possible to exercise caution and to employ enterprise and restraint in alternate succession as the occasions demands. Nothing contributes more toward a happy and harmonious relationship with one's peers than the use of a wise discretion in what one says and does. It safeguards one's own interests and, at the same time, prevents injuries to others. Industry and frugality are virtues whose benefits to the persons who possess them are so obvious that no argument is necessary to convince one of their merit. They provide a necessary means for the accumulation of goods, without which one would be unable to have security or the opportunity for the development of his capabilities and powers as a human being. These virtues are again illustrative of Aristotle's doctrine of the golden mean, for when they are present in too great an amount, they produce the vice of avarice, and when they are deficient or lacking in the proper amount, they give rise to prodigality. The virtues which consist of the right amount are not only pleasing to the individuals who possess them but are useful in promoting their best interests. On the other hand, the vices of avarice and prodigality are disapproved because they are hindrances rather than a help toward the achievement of that which is good. Honesty, fidelity, and truthfulness are virtues which are praised because of their immediate tendency to promote the best interests of society. Their value is not, however, confined to their immediate effects, for once these qualities have become an integral part of one's character, he will be known by others as a person who is stable, trustworthy, and capable of meeting important responsibilities. When these qualities are lacking, the person will be regarded as unstable and even contemptible. The need for a stable and honorable reputation is the reason for the merit which is accorded to the virtue of chastity. This is (according to Hume) especially true so far as the status of women is concerned. The highest regard which can be acquired by their sex is derived from their fidelity. When this is lacking, they lose respectability and are regarded as cheap and vulgar by the members of the community in which they live. Because of the many opportunities presented to them for secret indulgence of physical appetites, the welfare of society is dependent on a certain amount of modesty and reserve on their part. A single failure in this respect is sufficient to damage their reputation for the rest of life. Delinquency or cowardice on the part of men are usually overlooked when they have given evidence of a complete reformation of conduct. This is not true of the female members of society. Any dissolute behavior on their part is usually thought to indicate a weakness of character, which means that they are lacking in the will power to carry out any new resolutions which they may wish to fulfill. Whether this is a correct judgment concerning the character of women in comparison with that of men is not the point

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which Hume is trying to establish. His chief concern is to point out the reason why chastity among women is valued so highly and its violation so strongly disapproved. The reason is that its usefulness in promoting the welfare of society is so great that decency and order among human beings cannot be preserved without it. The list of qualities which are pleasant and agreeable to the persons who possess them and which, at the same time, may be regarded as virtues because of their usefulness to society as a whole can be extended to include a great deal more than the ones that have been mentioned. According to Hume, the list would include such items as temperance, patience, constancy, perseverance, forethought, secrecy, and facility of expression: "These and a thousand more of the same kind, no man will ever deny to be excellences and perfections." PART 2 Summary Among the qualities useful to ourselves which are generally considered to be praiseworthy, it is appropriate to mention bodily endowments and goods of fortune. Consideration of these will add further support to the general thesis concerning the origin and existence of moral sentiments. Among the ancient Greeks, it was customary to recognize beauty and strength in one's physical body as a mark of esteem. Men were admired for their broad shoulders, flat bellies, and well-proportioned bodies. Women were held in high esteem for their physical beauty. Their system of education was designed to promote physical charm and bodily health, as well as the proper development of the mind. The appearance of the body was considered to be in some sense an index of the soul, for one who was careless in his physical appearance would in all likelihood manifest similar traits in his conduct with his fellow humans. Beauty of the body and physical strength were both praised and admired, and the reason for it was the fact that these qualities were especially useful as means toward the fulfillment of those purposes for which human beings existed. A homely or deformed body was regarded as one of the greatest of misfortunes, and to be deprived of normal physical capacities was something that was not only regretful but was usually treated with contempt. Impotence among men and barrenness in women were occasions for reproach. Even in the case of statuary, it was a rule of the greatest importance to see that the figures were properly balanced and placed on the right center of gravity. Any departure from this rule would produce something that was ugly, for it would convey the ideas of falling, breakage, and pain. With regard to fortune or the accumulation of private possessions, it has usually been recognized that the amount of material goods which one can call his own is one way of determining the respect and esteem in which he is held by his fellow humans. To be sure, this is not the only factor that is important in estimating the moral worth of an individual, but under normal conditions it does indicate something about one's habits of industry, attention to matters of thrift, and the soundness of judgment in affairs relating to business transactions. If we ask ourselves why it is that people generally admire the rich and powerful in their midst, we will find that it is something more than selfish interests on our part that causes us to hold them in such high esteem. We simply cannot help but admire and approve those qualities in persons from whom we have no reason to suspect that we will ever derive any benefits. We even admire courage, thrift, and industry on the part of our enemies, although the fact that they possess these qualities may in the end prove quite disastrous to ourselves.

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Commentary The earlier sections of the Enquiry were devoted very largely to the task of showing that usefulness to ourselves and to others is the source of all moral sentiments. It now remains to see whether this explanation is sufficient to account for all of those qualities of conduct which are approved and disapproved by people in general. This appears to be necessary because any adequate system of moral philosophy must explain the origin of moral sentiments and must be able to account for all types of behavior which are recognized as morally good or evil. Hume begins in this section by examining a number of those qualities which are useful to ourselves. These include such items as discretion, industry, honesty, truthfulness, chastity, bodily endowments, and material goods. The list is not intended to be an exhaustive one, but it is sufficient to illustrate the class of qualities which he has in mind. At the beginning of this discussion, it is pointed out that whether these qualities are approved or disapproved is dependent on being present in the right amount. In this respect, Hume follows the principle that was set forth in Aristotle's doctrine of the golden mean. According to this doctrine, a certain quality constitutes a virtue when it is present in the right amount, but the same quality will be a vice when it is present in either a deficient or an excessive amount. The right amount must always be determined by reason rather than feelings, and it must be calculated with reference to the proper development of the personality as a whole. When interpreted in this manner, it can be seen quite readily that each of the qualities enumerated in this section is approved because of its usefulness to the individual who possesses it. Discretion, which is the ability to make wise decisions on important matters, is a quality the value of which can scarcely be overestimated. It enables one to evaluate merit in the persons with whom he is associated, to estimate the risks that are involved in business transactions, and to choose the better of alternative courses of action. So long as this quality is exercised in the right amount, it is useful to oneself and is something that he cannot help but admire in others. When it is carried to the extreme point which causes one to postpone any decision because of the possibility that he might be wrong, it becomes detrimental to one's own welfare and is something that one disapproves when he sees it in other persons. What is true of discretion can also be said concerning honesty, truthfulness, industry, chastity, and the other qualities that are mentioned. Under ordinary conditions, truthfulness and honesty are not only useful in the promotion of individual welfare but are essential for the transaction of social relationships. It is conceivable, however, that conditions may arise in which strict adherence to either of these qualities will be detrimental to the welfare of the persons involved. In instances of this kind, they are no longer approved. Industry and thrift are greatly admired for their usefulness in making one's life productive and of benefit to the society in which he lives, but when they are carried to the extreme of miserliness and lack of concern for the welfare of others, they become vices rather than virtues. Physical characteristics such as good posture, avoidance of excessive fat, gracefulness, and similar qualities are useful and admired unless they are carried to the extreme where they become ends in themselves rather than a means to the development of one's entire personality. The admiration which we normally feel toward the rich and the prosperous is due primarily to the fact that we credit them with the possession of those qualities which we approve, and this is likely to continue so long as their material goods are used for proper ends. When this condition no longer prevails, our attitude toward them is bound to change.

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SECTIONS VII & VIII Summary Besides those qualities which are approved on the basis of their usefulness either to ourselves or to others, there are a number of additional ones which are deemed to be praiseworthy because of their immediate effects and without any regard to their utility in connection with present or future needs. One of these is the attitude of cheerfulness, which is not only agreeable to the person who possesses it but is of such a nature that it is readily communicated to others. The cheerful person has a capacity for enjoyment which surpasses that of the individual who has a sour and melancholy disposition. He can meet the trials and hardships of daily living without being conquered by them. He can be happy in spite of perplexing problems. His sunny and radiant disposition makes life more pleasant for himself, and other persons find it a most agreeable experience to be in his presence. Quite the opposite is true when one encounters the person who is melancholy and who seldom refrains from looking only on the dark side of life. The longer one stays in his company, the stronger will be the tendency to share his unhappy attitude. The experience will be both disagreeable and painful. The effects will be realized immediately and quite apart from any calculation of what the future consequences of these attitudes may be. Another quality which wins immediate approval is what is often referred to as greatness of mind or dignity of character. We admire the individual who has the courage of his convictions and who dares to stand for what he believes to be right even though the position he holds is an unpopular one and will cause him to lose friends and financial benefits. The person who will not surrender his own soul for the sake of material gain or in order to win the plaudits of the crowd will be held in high esteem even by those whose interests may be injured by the cause which he supports. This point is well illustrated by a number of examples taken from the literature of the ancient world. Alexander, the ruler of Greece, is commended for his refusal to accept the offers made to him by Darius the Persian. His refusal exemplified the strength of character that did not allow him to compromise his stand in order to win personal benefits for himself. Phocion, who suffered a martyr's death, is reported to have turned to one of his fellow sufferers who was likewise facing execution and said to him, "Is it not glory enough for you that you die with Phocion?" Closely allied with these qualities is the philosophical tranquillity which enables one to rise above the affliction of pain, sorrow, anxieties, and various types of adversity. This quality is well illustrated in the character of the ancient Stoic philosophers. The true Stoic way of life was equally indifferent to poverty and prosperity, ease and discomfort, criticism and praise. To be sure, this goal of life was never completely realized. The ideal is far too high for perfect fulfillment by ordinary mortals. Nevertheless, it was a goal toward which one could strive, and moral progress could be measured in terms of proximity toward it. At any rate, we find that insofar as these qualities can be observed in any human being, they have always carried with them a sense of grandeur and they have produced a feeling of admiration and respect. This can be seen in the high esteem which we all have for the Socrates of ancient Athens, who maintained an attitude of serenity in the face of poverty and domestic vexations and who refused to escape from prison at a time when he had a full opportunity to do so. Benevolence is another quality which always wins immediate approval when one sees it manifested in other persons. Here again we have ample evidence to support the opinion that the approval of this quality is not due to its usefulness alone but also to the fact that as human beings we find it pleasant and agreeable to observe acts of kindness and mercy whenever we see them expressed. If the approval of

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these actions was due to their usefulness alone, we would not blame people in a kindly way for being too good when their generosity toward others exceeded its proper limits. Neither would we criticize in an adverse way the individual whom we regard as too high-spirited, too intrepid, or too indifferent toward the goods of fortune. We do make judgments of this kind whenever it seems to us that the actions under consideration have gone beyond that which is in harmony with the best interests of society. We have seen that in general, the qualities which are approved are the ones that are useful either to ourselves or to the other members of the society to which we belong. But just as there are some additional qualities which we find immediately agreeable to ourselves, so there are still other ones which are immediately agreeable to other persons. One of these is politeness, or what is sometimes designated as having good manners in the company of those with whom we are associated. The need for this quality arises from the natural tendency on the part of human beings to overestimate their own good points and to underestimate the evil ones. When this tendency is not held in check, the person who thus gives expression to his vanity and self-conceit makes himself especially obnoxious to those who observe his behavior. The same is true of the individual who, by preferring his own interests and comforts to those of his neighbors and associates, tries to get all he can for himself and to do so at the expense and discomfort of others. Calling such an individual impolite and disrespectful is one of the ways in which we express our disapproval of his conduct. On the other hand, we cannot help but admire the person who restrains these selfish and forward impulses in order to promote the happiness of others. Wit and ingenuity are also appreciated and admired by those who happen to observe them. Without giving any consideration to the reasons why this is true, the fact remains that these qualities make for good companionship. They are a stimulus to good conversation, and when they are expressed with moderation and good sense, they add to the joys of association The same can be said for such qualities as eloquence, modesty, cleanliness, and all of those habits of character which are usually associated with the idea of common decency. Even the use of the so-called white lie is generally approved, provided of course that there are no evil consequences of any more than a trivial nature and the untruth is stated solely for the purpose of being polite and of avoiding any unnecessary pain or embarrassment on the part of the one to whom it is told. Hume concludes this section by stating that besides all these agreeable qualities, "there is a manner, a grace, an ease, a genteelness, an I know-not-what, which some men possess above others, which is different from external beauty and comeliness, and which, however, catches our affections almost as suddenly and powerfully." Commentary Sections VII and VIII of the Enquiry have to do with those qualities of action which are immediately agreeable either to ourselves or to others. These are included because there are certain qualities of action which are generally recognized as good quite apart from their usefulness in satisfying the needs of people at some future time. They are good because of the immediate pleasure and agreeableness which characterizes the experiences. This might seem to suggest that Hume identifies the good with the pleasant, but this would be a misinterpretation of his doctrine. If the good and the pleasant were interchangeable terms, whatever is pleasant would necessarily be good, and this is something to which Hume would not agree. He recognizes as clearly as anyone else that a person may desire actions which are evil, and what is morally wrong may at the same time be pleasant and agreeable. What he holds is that what is good must be pleasant, but not everything that is pleasant is necessarily good.

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The inclusion of these qualities which are immediately agreeable and pleasant brings to light one of the major points in Hume's theory of morals. Apparently he recognized more clearly than the most of his predecessors that knowledge concerning matters of fact cannot by itself produce any concrete action. Throughout the Enquiry, he has insisted that the source of morality is to be found in that which is useful for satisfying the needs of people. It is to a very large extent the function of reason to find out just what it is that is capable of satisfying these needs. But once this knowledge has been obtained, the individual will not act in accordance with it unless he has the desire to do so. Man is a creature who acts according to his desires, and these may or may not be in harmony with the information which the intellect supplies. Among those qualities which are immediately agreeable to ourselves and are therefore regarded as good primarily for that reason, he enumerates such items as cheerfulness, greatness of mind, dignity of character, tranquillity, and benevolence. Among those which are immediately agreeable to others, he mentions politeness, good manners, wit, ingenuity, eloquence, modesty, and cleanliness. Although all of these qualities are in one sense of the word useful for the full development of one's personality and the immediate pleasure and satisfaction which they bring to the individuals involved, they are valued primarily for the pleasure and happiness which they bring to human beings. Hume is not in the strict sense of the term a hedonist, for while he recognizes that pleasure is a good thing, he knows that it is not the only thing that is good.

SECTION IX PART 1 Summary In this concluding section of the Enquiry, Hume attempts a further justification of the theory of morals which has been presented in the earlier sections of the book. He begins by calling attention to the fact that what he has said concerning the origin and existence of moral sentiments appears to be so obvious that it is strange indeed that anyone should have felt it necessary to elaborate any argument in defense of it. It would seem that common sense alone would be sufficient to make it clear to any fair-minded person that the principles of morality are all based on the approval of that which is pleasant and useful either to ourselves or to others and the disapproval of that which is contrary to these ends. In fact, we are told that this is sufficient for the great masses of ordinary folk, and had it not been for the confusion and lack of clear understanding on the part of certain learned philosophers and theologians, there would have been no occasion for writing this treatise on morals. However, confusion on the part of those who profess to be experts in the field leads to doubts and uncertainties among their followers, and it seems to be quite in order to attempt a clarification of the issues involved. So long as people judge matters of this kind by their natural and unprejudiced reason, they will be able to see morality in the light in which he has presented it. It is only when their minds have been corrupted by superstition and false religious notions that they are led astray. Under influences of this kind, they have set forth conceptions of the nature of morality that are not only ill-founded but in many instances have led to practices which are detrimental to human welfare. Hume is especially critical of a long list of practices which have been fostered in the name of morality but which in his judgment ought to be regarded as vices rather than virtues. The list includes such items as celibacy, fasting, penance, mortification of the flesh, self-denial, humility, silence, solitude, and what he calls "the whole train of monkish virtues." Obviously, he does not mean that any participation in these practices should be forbidden under any and all circumstances. Rather, he means that these practices in the sense in which they have been regarded as virtues by certain theologians and other leaders of the Church should be rejected.

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His opposition to them is based on the fact that they make no positive contribution toward the fulfillment of human needs. They do not advance a person's fortune. They do not make an individual a more valuable member of society. They do not qualify him for the entertainment of others, and neither do they increase his own capacity for self-enjoyment. Because they are neither agreeable nor useful in satisfying the needs of ourselves or of other people, it is a mistake to regard them as moral virtues which ought to be cultivated. The fact that Hume places so much emphasis on the matter of approval or disapproval as a criterion of morality has led some of his critics to charge that his doctrine is essentially a selfish one. However, a careful reading of the Enquiry shows beyond any doubt that this charge is an ill-founded one. Against those philosophers who have insisted that all human actions are selfishly motivated, Hume calls attention to the fact that there is present in all human beings a kind of humanitarian sentiment which naturally approves of that which is useful and serviceable to humanity and looks with disfavor on all those actions that are dangerous and pernicious. This does not mean that selfishness is excluded from human nature. It is very much a part of human nature and in many instances is so much stronger than any altruistic element that the latter may be completely overshadowed by the former. Concerning degrees of selfishness and of benevolence, we have no exact method of measurement, and it is idle to speculate about them. Nevertheless, it is sufficient to counteract the position of those who hold that the principles of morality are in every instance the expression of a purely selfish concern, if it can be shown that there is some spark of friendship for all human kind. The amount may be small, so small in fact that it is insufficient to move even a hand or a finger, but still it is enough to exercise an important influence on the mind. It is this influence that causes us, when other factors are equal, to "have a cool preference for what is useful and serviceable to mankind above what is pernicious and dangerous." From these considerations, it follows that the principles of morality are not derived from self-love alone. If they were, we would find no general area of agreement concerning the type of actions which are approved, and this is contrary to what actually is the case. Self-love is always directed toward the achievement of each individual's personal ambitions. We know that what is one person's ambitions is not that of another, and so long as each one is pursuing purely selfish aims, there is bound to be no end of conflict. The areas of agreement in the field of morals are altogether too great to be accounted for in this manner. They can be understood only on the basis of some common element which can be found in human nature. This is evidently what Hume means when he states that the humanity of one person is the same as the humanity of every other person. It is true that this sense of humanity is not as strong in some persons as it is in others, and its manifestation is often present in varying degrees. Nevertheless, the fact that it exists to some extent in all normal human beings is sufficient to explain that sense of approval which all people feel toward those acts of justice and benevolence which are beneficial either to ourselves or to others. What gains the approval of one person by touching his sense of humanity will also win the respect and admiration of all humanity. The natural desire for fame and a good reputation among one's fellow humans helps to keep alive this humane element in all persons.

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PART 2 Summary Having explained the universal sense of approbation for that which is virtuous and meritorious, it remains for Hume to show how the sense of obligation is related to that which is pleasant and agreeable. One of the major issues in all moral philosophy is that of the relationship between what one likes to do and what it is that he ought to do. It is not at all uncommon to find those who not only make a sharp distinction between these two but often find that they are directly opposed to each other. This is especially true of those who have advocated a rationalistic basis for ethics. Immanuel Kant in modern times, and the Stoic philosophers of the ancient world have maintained that the demands of reason do not normally coincide with human desires. From their point of view, the moral person is one who follows the dictates of his rational nature and keeps his feelings and desires under subjection and control. Hume does not agree with this position, and he believes he has good reasons for rejecting it. The main reason is that the intellect is by itself powerless to move the will and thus to produce any concrete actions. Its function is confined to that of supplying information concerning facts, and this alone is not sufficient to cause a person to act. Any system of morals that is derived from the nature of reason or any of its demands will not be carried out in actual practice unless there is a desire to act in conformity with it. There can be no merit in the establishment of a code of ethics that is so rigorous and austere that no one is able to follow it. What Hume proposes in contrast to an ethics of reason is one that is based on the natural feelings and desires of human beings. When the good is identified with that which is pleasant and agreeable to those humane elements in human nature which respond to whatever is beneficial to the members of society, it will be more likely to be followed. An ethics based on feelings and desires will not only have the advantage of being followed, but it will include all of those virtues which are beneficial to human beings, and at the same time it will exclude all of those practices which are detrimental to human welfare. Commentary At the beginning of this section, Hume explains in part one of the main purposes which led to the writing of the Enquiry. He wanted to counteract some of the unfortunate consequences which had been derived from the more popular conceptions of morality that were current in his day. One should bear in mind that at this time, the field of morality was for most people closely related to the area of religion. In both of these areas, it was customary to refer to divine revelation in support of what was believed to be true. This concept of revelation was usually interpreted to mean that the ideas associated with the will of God were communicated directly and infallibly to the minds of human beings. From this it would follow that certain individuals would know with absolute certainty the content of the mind of God with reference to human conduct. This would enable them to prescribe with definiteness and precision the exact rules and regulations which ought to be followed. Regardless of any merit which might be found in this practice of identifying one's beliefs about morality with the will of God, this kind of procedure was bound to have some very unfortunate consequences. For one thing, it tended to produce an attitude of arrogance on the part of those who claimed to know with certainty the distinctions between good and bad conduct. Furthermore, it led to intolerance and often to persecution of those who did not agree or who failed to conform to the requirements set forth. Again it lent support to the idea that certain types of conduct were always either good or bad, and this quite apart from the circumstances under which they were performed or the effects which they might have on the welfare of the people that were involved. It was in this way, according to Hume, that such practices as celibacy, fasting, penance, self-denial, and in his words "the whole train of monkish virtues" had come to be recognized as righteous behavior.

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Hume was convinced that many of these practices were not only ill-founded but decidedly detrimental to human welfare. He believed that something ought to be done to correct this situation. His method for doing this was to show that the principles of morality are in reality based on the facts of human experience and not on some authoritarian basis which claims to be identical with the will of God. It should be noted in this connection that Hume does not deny that there is something which may appropriately be called the will of God, but he does challenge the notion that any human being knows exactly what it is. Hence, it is a mistake to base the principles of morality on what one thinks the eternal and unchanging will of God may be. On the other hand, a system of morals that is derived from the facts of human experience can be adapted to the changing circumstances which arise from time to time. It can always be directed toward the welfare of human beings, and while the application of its principles will lack the rigidity of a formalistic system, it will provide for a greater amount of freedom for the people who are involved. In criticism of Hume's doctrine, it should be pointed out that, while a system of morals that is based solely on human experience does not have the same defects which appear in an authoritarian system, there are other ones which make its validity questionable. For example, one may ask whether there is anything in human experience that indicates any difference between what is good and what is bad or tells one what it is that he ought to do. Experience can tell us what consequences have followed certain actions, but this does not tell us whether the consequences have been good or bad. It may be that we like some of the consequences or that we dislike certain things that have happened, but this is not equivalent to saying which ones are good or which ones are bad. This much Hume appears to have recognized, for in his discussion of the function of reason, he makes it very clear that reason can reveal only matters of fact, and it is quite impossible to derive what ought to be from what is. However, there is no other way on an empirical basis for one to distinguish between activities that are good and the ones that are bad. Those who do attempt to make distinctions of this kind are forced by the logic of the situation to identify what is good with that which is approved because one finds it both pleasant and agreeable. This would imply that the word "good" in the moral sense of the term means nothing other than that which is liked or approved. This interpretation of goodness, while consistent with the empirical method which Hume followed, leaves unanswered some very difficult questions. How, for example, can one refer to any activity as bad so long as the person who is doing it finds it both pleasant and agreeable? Nevertheless, it is true that there are many instances in everyday life where activities that are generally regarded as bad are found to be pleasant and agreeable on the part of those who perform them. Hume attempts to avoid this difficulty by identifying actions as good only when they are approved by a majority of the members of a given society. This does appear to help the situation, but it does not answer in a satisfactory way the objections which may be raised to this method of dealing with the problem. On what basis can we say that in moral matters the opinion of the majority is necessarily the right one? Past experiences indicate quite clearly that majorities have often been in the wrong. At least they have done things which at a later date have come to be regarded as wrong. The fact of the matter is that any valid distinction between what is right and what is wrong implies some notion of a fixed standard according to which the judgment is made. Although the idea of a fixed standard of goodness has been rejected by Hume throughout the entire course of his arguments, he is forced to admit one into his system of moral philosophy in order to make it complete. He does this by admitting that human nature is so constituted that there is present in it a sense of humanity which always approves of that which is useful for the promotion of human welfare and which necessarily disapproves of that

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which is contrary to it. This sense of humanity, he tells us, is the same in all persons, although the extent to which it is expressed may vary with different individuals. This, accordingly, is the standard which in the last analysis determines whether an act is right or wrong. The place which Hume gives to the feelings in determining the moral quality of an act follows from his conviction that the intellect by itself is powerless to cause one to act. In this he was correct, and the point which he makes constitutes a valid criticism of Kant's rationalistic ethics. On the other hand, it must be recognized that it is just as impossible to build a system of ethics on feelings alone as it is to build one on the intellect alone. One's feelings are essential for moral conduct, but if these feelings are to have any significance in the determination of what is right, they must be guided by intelligence. The only way in which this can be done is for the intellect to apply the standard of goodness to the particular action in question.

APPENDIX I Summary One of the most controversial issues in the history of ethical theory has to do with the respective place that should be given to reason and to the feelings in the formation of moral judgments. Throughout the Enquiry, Hume has recognized that both reason and the feelings are necessarily involved in the development of the principles of morality. It has not, however, been made entirely clear just what he believes the function of each of these two factors to be, and it is for the purpose of clarifying this point that he has added this appendix to the earlier work. Because so much has been said in the various sections of the Enquiry concerning the feelings of approval for that which is useful and agreeable to ourselves and to others as the essential basis for morality, he now gives special attention to the subject of reason and the function which it performs in connection with moral sentiments. To make his position entirely clear, he finds it necessary to indicate both what it is that reason is capable of doing and what it is incapable of doing. This will not only throw light on the nature of the rational element that is involved in moral thinking, but it will enable one to avoid those errors which attribute to reason a function which properly belongs to the feelings. In the first place, it requires no argument at all to establish the fact that reason is an indispensable tool for finding out what actions are the ones most likely to be of the greatest use in meetings the needs of a human society. This information will need to be based on past experiences, and obviously reason, or correct thinking, will be involved in drawing inferences with reference to the meaning of these past events and the likelihood of similar occurrences taking place in the future. Calculations of this kind are not always an easy or simple process. Complications arise because what is of immediate benefit to one person or one group of persons may be detrimental to their interests in the future. Again, it is not at all uncommon for situations to develop where benefits to one group are at the same time decidedly injurious to others. Furthermore, because conditions are constantly changing, what was beneficial under one set of circumstances may be detrimental under the changed conditions. Reason must take into account all of these factors and determine with as much accuracy as is possible those actions which under the new and emerging conditions will be most useful in meeting human needs. Although reason is essential for the purpose of supplying the necessary information about what is useful and agreeable, it is not sufficient to produce either blame or approbation. Reason may tell us what is an adequate means toward a certain end, but it cannot tell us whether a particular end is good or bad. Only feeling or sentiment has the power to do that. So long as we are indifferent toward an end or goal, we will be indifferent toward the means which will produce it. Sentiment is necessary for moral decisions and this

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sentiment is none other than a feeling of approval for that which promotes the happiness of humanity and a resentment of that which produces misery in place of happiness. In support of this thesis, Hume calls attention to five important considerations. The first one is the fact that reason is competent to judge only two things: matters of fact and the relations which exist between things. Neither of these is sufficient to cause approval or disapproval of an action. The fact that a theft or a murder has been committed does not in itself constitute any grounds for a favorable or an unfavorable attitude toward what has occurred. As a mere statement of fact, it is indifferent so far as any moral consideration is concerned. What makes an act a crime is not something that exists apart from the minds of the persons who are thinking about it. That which is condemned or approved is not simply an awareness of the facts. Neither is it a matter of knowledge concerning the relationship of the facts to one another. It is only when the mental action or quality gives to the spectator a sentiment of approbation that we call it a virtuous act, or when it arouses a sentiment of resentment that we call it a vicious one. The second consideration has to do with the difference between mistakes concerning matters of fact and mistakes with reference to morals. To know that a certain geometrical figure is a triangle involves an awareness of the relationship of the parts to one another. Here we can know at once all of the relationships that are relevant to the problem. This is not the case when we are dealing with morals. When, for example, a person has been killed, we do not know at once all of the relationships that are involved. Consequently, we cannot say whether the act was a criminal one until we find out all the relevant circumstances under which the act took place. We need to know whether the killing was accidental or intentional, whether there was a sufficient justification if the act was intentional, and a number of other conditions which might have a direct bearing on the nature of the act. It is not until after all of these circumstances are known that the act can be praised or blamed, and even then it is the feelings, or the heart, that makes the decision rather than the intellect. The third point calls attention to the similarities between an awareness of natural beauty and one of moral beauty. In both instances, some account is taken of the relationship of parts to the whole. Natural beauty depends very largely on such items as proportion, position, and the relation of parts to one another. It would be quite absurd to maintain that the beauty of an object consists purely in a knowledge of the particular facts that are involved. It is only when an appreciation or response is felt on the part of the observer that it is said to be beautiful. A similar situation exists with reference to moral beauty. Whether a particular act is to be regarded as a vice or a virtue is not determined by a mere awareness of the facts but by the presence of a feeling or sentiment which because of the structure of human nature causes us to be pleased or pained by what has taken place. The fourth point is based on a comparison of the relationships involved in inanimate nature with the ones experienced in a moral situation. We do not censure a tree or a plant for destroying its parent in order to make possible its own growth and development, but we do regard it as a criminal act for a human being to kill his or her parents for any selfish purpose. The fact that the relationship between offspring and parents is the same in both cases is a clear indication that what is moral or immoral about an act is not simply a matter of relationship, knowledge of which is obtained through the reasoning process. The fifth consideration is the fact that the ultimate ends of human action can never be accounted for by reason. If we want to acquire health, the reason can supply information concerning the proper means for obtaining it, but reason cannot prescribe the ends for which the means shall be used. Many of the things which we normally desire are only the means for obtaining something else, and these in turn are often the means for some more ultimate goal.

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Means, however, must always be means for something, and somewhere along the line we must come to that which is no longer a means for something else but an end in itself. This is what we usually have in mind when we speak of the final ends, or goals, of human life. It is important to note in this connection that these final ends are necessarily the objects of feelings and desires. Unless we want to possess them, there is nothing in the nature of reason that tells us we ought to have them.

APPENDIX II Summary The question of whether there are any actions prompted by other than selfish motives has been a controversial issue throughout the history of ethical theory. From the time of the ancient Greek Sophists to the present day, there have been philosophers who have maintained that any action professed to have been done in the name of benevolence is nothing more than hypocrisy; that all so-called friendship is but a blind to conceal one's own selfish interests; and that the claim of being public-spirited is a farce often intended to fool the public, in many instances effectively fooling oneself. All of this implies a conception of human nature with which Hume has no sympathy at all. He believes that those who hold such views are under the influence of either a corrupted heart or superficial reasoning. Closely allied with this view and in some respects forming a part of it is the assertion that there can be no such thing as a disinterested action. Whenever one performs an act of kindness or generosity toward another person, it is said that he does so for the sake of the satisfaction which he himself will derive from it. This may involve a feeling of moral superiority on his part, the likelihood that he will be praised for the performance of a good deed, or any one of numerous other benefits of a similar nature. That a motivation of this kind is a real possibility Hume does not deny, but, at the same time, he asserts with emphasis that this is not the only possibility open to an individual. That one may act for the sake of someone else rather than for himself is evidenced by the fact that even those who have advocated theories of this kind do not as a rule behave in a manner which is in harmony with their doctrine. For the most part, they are men of kind disposition and generous impulses. Because of an element which is characteristic of human nature, they have found it impossible to avoid holding in esteem the person whose self-love gives way to a deep concern for the welfare of others, or despising the one whose self-gratification never goes beyond his own individual interests. In other words, the most important objection to the hypothesis that all actions are selfish is that this is contrary to the universal feelings of humanity.

APPENDIX III Summary The purpose of this Appendix is to supplement the discussion of justice found in the early sections of the Enquiry and to point out certain unique characteristics which distinguish this virtue from other ones which are usually classified as social in their reference. In the case of benevolence and other social virtues, the actions which are performed are directed toward a single object, and the happiness or other benefits resulting from the action are experienced immediately or at least in the foreseeable future. For example, a parent flees to the relief of his child or a generous man seizes the opportunity to serve a friend. If the child is rescued or the friend is benefited, the action is regarded as complete. A virtuous act has occurred, and this judgment has been made quite apart from any further consequences which may occur at some future date. The situation is different in the case of justice. What determines whether an act is just is not simply the

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immediate effects on a particular individual or even a relatively small group of persons but rather the effects on society as a whole and over a long period of time. This can be seen quite readily if one stops to consider the justification of any of our laws having to do with the holding of private property or the protection of human life. Take, for example, the punishment administered to criminals for their disregard of the rights of other people. The punishment may involve a serious injury to the person who receives it, but this is more than balanced by the protection which it gives to the other members of society. The same is true in regard to the system of taxation, which enables the government to take a portion of one's private property in order to provide benefits for the people as a whole. Laws which forbid the exploitation of child labor, the misrepresentation of goods which are offered for sale, the sale of drugs, or any other practice which is harmful to the members of society will deprive certain individuals of the opportunity to make increased profits for themselves. Nevertheless, the justice of these laws will be established if it can be shown that regulations of this kind are essential for the protection and welfare of society as a whole. In the kind of world in which we live, it is quite impossible for a government to establish laws of a general nature which will be of equal benefit to all of the people who are involved. Furthermore, that which may be injurious in its immediate effects may turn out to be beneficial in the long run. For these reasons, along with many others, it is not always an easy task to determine the precise course which justice demands in a given situation. There are, however, certain principles which may be recognized as pointing the way toward a just solution of the problems which arise. One of these is the avoidance of special privileges which are given to some persons but not to others. Another one is the necessity of taking into account the long-range interests of people rather than immediate satisfactions. Finally, it is the effect of a given policy toward meeting the needs of society as a whole insofar as this can be determined in advance that is the objective of the virtue of justice.

APPENDIX IV Summary Much of the disputation that has occurred in philosophical writings has been due either to ambiguity or vagueness in the use of words. Since words derive their meaning from the way in which they are used and different people do not always use words in the same way to express what they mean, it is easy to understand why disputes of this nature should arise. Hume states that he has tried to avoid this difficulty by a sparse use of the terms virtues and vices. He has chosen rather to speak of those actions which are useful and agreeable or their opposites. In spite of this caution on his part, some of his critics have insisted that he used the terms virtues and vices to include talents or capacities and a lack of these, whereas he should have made a clear distinction between virtues and talents or vices and a lack of certain abilities. It is in defense of the way he has used the terms virtues and vices that this appendix was written. He offers the following considerations in support of the terminology he has used. The boundary lines separating virtues and talents or vices and defects have never been sharply drawn, and there has been a considerable amount of overlapping in the way these terms have been used. Actions have been classified as voluntary and involuntary, but this does not distinguish between particular talents and the use which is made of them. Aristotle classified virtues as moral and intellectual, the former having to do with actions which are a means to an end and the latter with those activities which are ends in themselves rather than a means for something else. This again is a method of treating capacities and the use made of them as though they belonged together and could not be separated. The same may be said with reference to a division of activities on the basis of being directed by the head or the heart. It is quite

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possible for us to think of the intellect and the will as though they were separate faculties, but in our actual experience they are usually if not always combined. One reason why the language used in this connection is not precise is the fact that there is little if any distinction made in the estimation which we place on a person's abilities and the moral quality of the actions which he performs. To call a man stupid is to censure him as much as it is to call him lazy or shiftless. In general, society does not look with approval on either the knave or the coward. We admire both intelligence and generosity, and the one about as much as the other. Consequently, we adjust our estimation of a person if he excels in one but is lacking in the other. One who has a good head but a cold and indifferent heart is rated about the same as one who has a poor head but a warm and generous heart. The ancient moralists whom we have come to admire a great deal made little or no distinction between virtues and mental endowments. Plato, for example, suggests very strongly that wisdom and goodness belong together. Wrong decisions are in his judgment the result of ignorance, and, for this reason, the development of the mind will lead to the formation of a good character. Aristotle's doctrine of the golden mean emphasizes the importance of intelligence for determining the course of conduct which is midway between the extremes of excess and deficiency. The Stoic conception of the good life was one in which the feelings and appetites were brought under the control of one's rational nature. Modern philosophy, especially ethics, has been so closely related to theology that this accounts for much of the difference between contemporary views and the ones held by the ancients. The science of theology admits of no terms of composition but uses every branch of knowledge for its own purposes and pays little attention to the phenomena of nature or the proper exercise of one's intellectual capacities. From this point of view, the sole basis of virtue is obedience to divine commands, and hence the matter of voluntary or involuntary conduct is of major importance.

APPENDIXES I-IV Commentary The appendices which were added to the main portion of the Enquiry were intended to clarify some of the issues involved in the author's moral philosophy and possibly to answer some of the objections which might be raised concerning it. The inclusion of these appendixes is especially valuable for students who have experienced some difficulty in trying to understand what Hume has been saying about morals. In these additions to the original text, he has endeavored to deal directly with some of the major issues raised by his critics. In this way, he hoped to remove some of the ambiguities which might lead to misinterpretations of his doctrines. The purpose of the first appendix was to clarify his stand with reference to the place and function of reason in matters pertaining to morals. Because Hume had emphasized the role of the feelings in the development of moral beliefs more than had been done by any of his predecessors, it was only natural that some of his critics would think that he had given too large a place to the feelings and had neglected to give proper credit to the reasoning faculty. To eliminate any misunderstanding on this point, he now states very clearly just what it is that he believes reason can do and what it is that it cannot do toward the development of moral beliefs. Reason, according to Hume, is competent in those areas which have to do with matters of fact, and it is likewise capable of determining the relations that exist between things. Hence, in the field of morals, reason is an adequate tool for finding out what is useful for the particular ends which one has in mind. If you want to achieve health, acquire money, or go certain places, the use of your reasoning powers can tell you how these things may be accomplished. But reason cannot tell you whether these ends are good ends,

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nor does it have any power to tell you what it is that you ought to do. Reason can tell you what type of consequences are likely to follow certain courses of action, but it cannot tell you whether these consequences are good or bad. Any judgment that you make along these lines will be directed by the feelings rather than the reason. This does not mean that reason has nothing to do with the making of moral judgments, but rather that its true function is to determine means rather than ends. The second appendix is intended to clarify the meaning of the term self-love. Does this term connote only those actions which are selfish in the narrower sense of the word, or is it possible that it includes actions which are usually called altruistic? The question arises from the fact that moral sentiments are said to have their origin in the feelings. Whose feelings are referred to in this connection? Is it the person who makes the judgment or the persons whose welfare may be affected by it? Since the feelings are necessarily private and no one would voluntarily act for the sake of the welfare of other persons unless the idea was pleasant and agreeable to himself, it would appear that what one does for others is really done for the sake of his own pleasure. This conclusion, however, does not follow from the facts. It is quite possible that one's objective may be the welfare of others, and any pleasure which he may or may not receive from it is merely incidental to the action itself. An act that is performed for the sake of others can be called a selfish act only by defining selfishness so broadly that it would be logically impossible to have an exception to it. In this case, the term would become meaningless since it would be equivalent to saying that one does what he does. For self-love, or selfishness, to be a meaningful term, it must be defined in a way that is exclusive of some actions. In other words, it must be possible to distinguish between those actions which are exclusive of the welfare of others and those which are inclusive of it. Only the former can rightly be designated as acts of self-love. The third appendix explains somewhat further the meaning of the term justice as it was used in the earlier sections of the Enquiry. In these discussions, it was pointed out that justice, like all of the other virtues, is but a means for meeting the needs of people. In an ideal society where all the needs of all the people are supplied in abundance, there is no need for justice and therefore none would exist. This seems simple enough for anyone to understand, but when we stop to consider the application of the principles of justice to the particular problems which arise in human society, a number of complications appear. How, for example, can one say that a criminal is treated justly when he has been deprived of his property, his liberty, and perhaps even his life? Can we say that his needs have been met by this type of treatment? What about the situation that arises in connection with international warfare when innocent people are killed and their property destroyed in order to defeat the enemy? Is it just and right for society to provide for all the needs of people who refuse to put forth any efforts to take care of themselves? Hume's answer to these questions is that justice is designed to meet not merely the present particular needs of any individual but has to do with the future even more than the present and with society as a whole rather than certain particular units which may be included in it. This means that at times it may be necessary to sacrifice the present needs of individuals under certain circumstances in order to achieve the larger goal that includes the future and well-being of society as a whole. It should perhaps be pointed out that Hume's empirical method of accounting for the meaning of justice is scarcely adequate to support all that he has maintained concerning it. Experience does indicate very clearly the changing element that is involved in the application of justice to existing circumstances, but it does not point to any permanent or unchanging element in it. The unchanging element is nevertheless just as important as the changing element. The very fact that Hume makes reference to the "principles" of justice is sufficient to show that he recognizes something about the nature of justice that is not fully revealed by use of the empirical method. Again, his insistence that the future needs of society as a whole

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should be given preference to the present needs of certain individuals is something that remains constant and is not influenced by changing circumstances. In the fourth appendix, an attempt is made to eliminate some of the confusions which arise from the misuse of words. One of these consists in the identification of virtues with talents. The Greeks, for example, were often prone to identify goodness with intelligence. Plato had taught that ignorance was the chief source of evil. To call one stupid was regarded as a kind of reproach which carried with it a certain moral condemnation. The same idea has been carried over into modern times and has given support to the belief that education will overcome the evils that are present in society. Hume recognizes the error that is involved in this type of procedure, which has so often been characteristic of rationalistic moral philosophy. He states correctly that goodness is not the same as intelligence. Goodness always involves an act of the will. It is not the particular abilities with which one is endowed that determines his moral quality but rather the use which he makes of whatever talents he may possess. Another source of confusion has been the identification of what one believes to be right or wrong in the moral sense with the commands of God. This implies an absurd assumption on the part of the person who claims to know with infallible certainty just what the will of God is. It leads to arrogance, intolerance, and even persecution of innocent persons. One should recognize that ideas about right and wrong come first of all from human experience, and it is not until after this has been done that they are said to be commands of God.

GLOSSARY academic issue A subject that is of interest primarily to the schools. It is considered to be theoretical rather than practical. Annandale, Marquis of An English nobleman of the House of Annandale. His title of honor was next in point of dignity to that of duke. Aristotle A Greek philosopher (384-322 B.C.) who possessed one of the most brilliant minds of all time. His works are regarded among the great classics of the world. They include treatises on Metaphysics, Physics, Logic, Ethics, Rhetoric, and other subjects. authoritarian One who accepts a particular doctrine as true because it has been stated by someone whose views are not open to question. Bacon, Francis An English philosopher (1561-1626) who made important contributions to the field of inductive logic and who thus prepared the way for important developments in modern science.

Bentham, Jeremy An English philosopher (1748-1832) who was the author of Principles of Morals and Legislation and whose name is always associated with the development of the Utilitarian school of philosophy.

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Berkeley, George An Irish churchman and philosopher (1685-1753) who became famous for developing the notion that non-thinking matter does not exist. He was the author of the statement "to be is to be perceived." Cicero, Marcus Tullius Roman orator and statesman (106-43 B.C.). College of Justice A law college in Edinburgh. David Hume's maternal grandfather had been president of this college. crucial experiment A single experiment or observation which would be sufficient to prove or to disprove a given conclusion. Darius I The fourth king of Persia (558-485 B.C.). disease of the learned A term of reproach used to designate individuals who regarded themselves as superior to common or uneducated persons. dogmatism Positiveness in one's assertions when they are not supported by a sufficient amount of evidence. ecclesiastical Having to do with church affairs. Derived from the Greek word "ecclesia," which means church. empirical method A method of investigation which is based on the actual facts of experience rather than being derived from some universal proposition. empiricist One who uses the empirical method in his investigation of philosophical problems. Epicureans One of the Greek schools of philosophy. Its founder was Epicurus, who taught that pleasure is the norm and standard of goodness. Faculty of Advocates The governing board of the library in the city of Edinburgh, England. feeling for humanity This term was used by David Hume to designate what he regarded as the tendency on the part of all human beings to approve that which promotes the welfare of others. golden mean A term used by Aristotle to describe the moral virtues. It meant the course of conduct that is midway between excess and deficiency. Hobbes, Thomas A famous English philosopher (1588-1679) who wrote the Leviathan and whose name is also associated with the development of materialistic philosophy.

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Kant, Immanuel A German philosopher (1724-1804) whose writings have influenced modern thinking more than that of any other individual during the last two centuries. His Critique of Pure Reason, the Critique of Practical Reason, and the Critique of Judgment are regarded as classics in the fields of epistemology, ethics, and esthetics. Levellers The name of a reform party in Great Britain which arose about the year 1647 and whose aim was to establish equality among all the peoples of the land. liberal This term was applied to Hume because of many of his views on religion and politics which were departures from the generally accepted doctrines of his day. Locke, John An English philosopher (1632-1704) who was the author of Essay Concerning Human Understanding, a book which has influenced the course of philosophy since the time it first appeared. metaphysical assumption A belief concerning the nature of the universe which can neither be proved nor disproved. Mill, John Stuart An English philosopher (1806-73) whose writings in the fields of logic, ethics, psychology, and political science have been held in high esteem. naturalistic An explanation of religion and other phenomena without reference to any supernatural power. orthodox An orthodox believer is one who adheres to long-established customs and beliefs. oughtness A term that was used by Immanuel Kant to designate the sense of duty without reference to its particular content. Pericles A Greek statesman (498-429 B.C.) whose age was the most flourishing period of art and science experienced by that country. Plato A Greek philosopher (427-347 B.C.) who was the author of many famous dialogues, including the Republic, the Laws, and many others. One of the greatest minds of the ancient world. Pneumatical Philosophy, Ethics and The name given to one of the departments of learning in the University of Edinburgh. It is called pneumatical because it has to do with things of the spirit. practical reason This term was used by Immanuel Kant to designate that function of the mind that tells us what we ought to do.

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rationalist One who believes that reason is the primary source of truth. As this term is used in philosophy, it stands in contrast with empiricism, which regards experience as the main source of truth. Republic The name of one of Plato's most important dialogues. It has to do with the meaning of justice. skeptic One who doubts that the evidence supports the conclusion which has been drawn. Socrates A famous Greek philosopher (470-399 B.C.) who was the teacher of Plato and who died as a martyr for the cause of truth. Sophists The name given to a class of teachers in ancient Greece who charged fees for their services and whose doctrines were subjected to severe criticism by Socrates. Stoic The name that was given to a Greek school of philosophy. The name was derived from the place where the classes were held. Stuart, House of The family name of one of the lines of English kings. theoretical reason That function of the mind which enables one to know. It stands in contrast to the practical reason, or that which tells one what ought to be done. Treatise of Human Nature One of David Hume's major publications. It contains his views concerning the understanding, the passions, and morals. Tudor, House of The family name of one of the lines of English kings. utilitarian The name of a school of philosophy which has as its standard of goodness the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of persons. Zoroaster A Persian said to have been born about 660 B.C. and who became the founder of one of the great religions of the world. One of its main characteristics is that of a thoroughgoing ethical dualism.

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ESSAY TOPICS AND REVIEW QUESTIONS 1.

When and where did David Hume live? Mention several of the more important events in his life, and tell how they influenced his writings.

2.

Make a list of Hume's published writings in the approximate order in which they appeared. What is meant by his interest in the field of epistemology. Why did he think it was important?

3.

What is meant by the empirical method in philosophy? Why did Hume think this method was the appropriate one to use in the investigation of morals? How did this method differ from the rationalistic method?

4.

How is the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals related to the Treatise of Human Nature?

5.

One of the major issues in moral philosophy has been the question of whether the basis for moral distinctions is to be found in the reason or in the feelings. What difference does it make with reference to moral beliefs?

6.

What, according to Hume, has been the chief source of dogmatism in the field of morals? What are some of the evil consequences that follow from it? How can these be avoided?

7.

According to Hume, ethical judgments can be neither true nor false. Why? State the reasons why you do or do not agree with this position.

8.

Explain in some detail Hume's account of the origin of the virtue of benevolence. Do you think there is anything permanent or unchanging about this virtue? Give reasons for your answer.

9.

Do you agree with Hume's statement when he says that in an ideal society where all the needs of all the people are supplied in abundance justice, would not exist at all? Explain your answer.

10.

Hume tells us that in times of famine, shipwreck, or other major disasters, the meaning of justice is not the same as it is under normal circumstances. Tell why you do or do not think this is a correct statement.

11.

Who were the Levellers, and what did they believe concerning the way in which the wealth of society should be distributed? What was Hume's criticism with reference to this belief?

12.

Compare Hume's account concerning the origin of justice with the one given by Thomas Hobbes. What do these two views have in common, and in what respects are they different?

13.

Is there anything that is permanent and unchanging about the meaning of justice? If your answer is "no," tell why. If it is "yes," state what you think the unchanging element is. In either case, try to justify your answer.

14.

Some writers make a sharp distinction between the real meaning of justice and our human understanding of it. Tell why you do or do not regard this distinction as a valid one.

15.

Hume tells us that the rules and regulations concerning international affairs are not binding in quite the same way as the ones that have to do with relationships within a single state. What are

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his reasons? If you do not agree with him, tell why. 16.

Why is it, according to Hume, that utility is pleasant and agreeable to all the members of a human society? Do you think his argument on this point is a valid one?

17.

What is meant by a "crucial experiment"? What example does Hume use to prove that at least some actions are not necessarily selfish? Under what conditions are selfishness and altruism necessarily opposed? When are they not opposed?

18.

Discuss at some length Hume's conception of sympathy, and tell what place he gives to it in his moral philosophy.

19.

After enumerating qualities which are useful to ourselves, Hume explains that each of these must be interpreted in the light of Aristotle's doctrine of the golden mean. What does this mean?

20.

What reasons are given by Hume in support of his statement that the moral rules and regulations concerning chastity are not the same for both sexes?

21.

Mention several of the qualities which are immediately agreeable to ourselves and to others, and explain why Hume has included these in his account of the virtues.

22.

Hume tells us there are many types of action regarded as virtues which ought to be regarded as vices. Name several of them. Tell why they have been regarded as virtues and why Hume thinks they are really vices.

23.

Describe at some length Hume's position relative to the proper use of reason in the field of ethics. What, in his judgment are some of the things that reason is incompetent to do? In this connection, what is his criticism of Immanuel Kant's system of ethics?

24.

How, according to Hume, is the sense of obligation related to that which is pleasant and agreeable? Does this mean that whatever is pleasant and agreeable is therefore good? Explain.

25.

What do you regard as Hume's most important contributions to the study of ethics?

26.

What inconsistencies, if any, do you find in Hume's writings?

27.

Describe in a general way the influence of Hume's teachings on the subsequent development of moral philosophy.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY AIKEN, HENRY D. Hume's Moral and Political Philosophy. New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1948. A volume containing lengthy extracts from Hume's writings, especially the ones that deal directly with moral and political subjects. These extracts are preceded by a competent introduction to Hume's philosophy. The extracts were edited and the introduction written by a distinguished professor of philosophy. ANDERSON, ROBERT F. Hume's First Principles. Lincoln, Nebr.: University of Nebraska Press, 1966. An examination of the fundamental principles upon which Hume's philosophy was based. Although it has to do primarily with the Treatise of Human Nature, it is an excellent introduction to the moral and political

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aspects of Hume's philosophy. BLANSHARD, BRAND. Reason and Goodness. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1961. Written from the point of view of one regarded as an able exponent of idealist philosophy in America. It contains an analysis of British moral philosophy during the last two centuries. Chapter 4 presents in a very able manner what the author regards as the weaknesses in Hume's moral philosophy. BROAD, C. D. Five Types of Ethical Theory. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1930. This book, written by an eminent British philosopher, is generally recognized as one of the most competent analyses that has been published in this particular area. Chapter 4 is devoted to an exposition and presented in relation to the work of four other men whose writings on the subject of ethics have attracted a great deal of attention. HENDEL, CHARLES, W., ed. Hume--Selections. The Modern Student's Library. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1927. This volume of selections from Hume's philosophical writings is edited by a distinguished professor of philosophy who is widely known for his scholarly publications on Hume. The volume contains a lengthy introduction to the main aspects of Hume's philosophy. HURLBUTT, ROBERT H., III. Hume, Newton, and the Design Argument. Lincoln, Nebr.: University of Nebraska Press, 1965. This book has received wide recognition and high praise because of its scholarly analysis of certain aspects of Hume's philosophy. Although it deals more directly with Hume's religious philosophy, any student of Hume will find it stimulating and informative. The author's style of writing is delightful. JONES, W. T. A History of Western Philosophy, Vol.11. New York: Harcourt, Brace, & Co., 1952. For the beginning student who wishes to gain a brief but authentic account of the major elements in Hume's philosophy, the chapter on Hume in this volume is especially recommended. The author's summary and interpretation of Hume's thought is well illustrated with lengthy excerpts from his writings. It is generally regarded as one of the best accounts to be found in a textbook on the history of philosophy. KAUFMANN, WALTER. Philosophic Classics, Vol.11. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1961. This volume is especially valuable because it contains on pages 308-13 a complete copy of Hume's autobiography, which was written shortly before his death. It also contains a letter from Adam Smith about Hume's death and a complete copy of Hume's An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. MACNABB, D. G. C. David Hume--His Theory of Knowledge and Morality. Hutchinson University Library. London: Hutchinson House, 1951. A complete account of Hume's epistemology, based primarily on the Treatise of Human Nature but including references to other writings. It is especially valuable for showing the way in which Hume's moral theory is related to his views concerning the human understanding. MOSSNER, ERNEST C. The Forgotten Hume. New York: Columbia University Press, 1943. Written by a man who has made an exhaustive study concerning the life of David Hume, this volume deals primarily with the man rather than an account of his philosophical ideas. It is a delightful book to read and contributes much toward an appreciative account of the man and his work. _____. The Life of David Hume. Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1954. Beyond question the most thorough and authentic account of the life of David Hume available in the English language. In this volume the major events of his life are presented in relation to his published works. An excellent introduction to the study of Hume's philosophy.

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