Contentious Issues of Security and the Future of Turkey

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CONTENTIOUS ISSUES OF SECURITY AND THE FUTURE OF TURKEY

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Contentious Issues of Security and the Future of Turkey

Edited by NURSIN ATESOGLU GUNEY Yildiz Technical University, Turkey

© Nursin Atesoglu Guney 2007 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Nursin Atesoglu Guney has asserted her right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the editor of this work. Published by Ashgate Publishing Limited Gower House Croft Road Aldershot Hampshire GU11 3HR England

Ashgate Publishing Company Suite 420 101 Cherry Street Burlington, VT 05401-4405 USA

Ashgate website: http://www.ashgate.com British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Contentious issues of security and the future of Turkey 1. National security - Turkey 2. Turkey - Foreign relations - 21st century I. Guney, Nursin Atesoglu 327.5'61 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Contentious issues of security and the future of Turkey / edited by Nursin Atesoglu Guney. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-13: 978-0-7546-4931-1 1. Turkey--Foreign relations--1980- 2. Turkey--Strategic aspects. 3. National security--Turkey. I. Nursin Atesoglu Guney. DR477.C67 2006 327.561--dc22 2006025029

ISBN: 978-0-7546-4931-1 Printed and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham, Wiltshire.

Contents List of Tables and Appendices Notes on Contributors Preface List of Abbreviations Introduction Nursin Atesoglu Guney 1

A Tale of Two Centuries: Continuities in Turkish Foreign and Security Policy Gokhan Cetinsaya

vii ix xiii xv 1

5

2

Transatlantic Relations and Turkey Thomas S. Mowle

3

Turkey’s Potential (and Controversial) Contribution to the Global ‘Actorness’ of the EU Eduard Soler i Lecha

33

A Retrospective Analysis of Turkey-United States Relations in the Wake of the US War in Iraq in March 2003 Mahmut Bali Aykan

51

4

19

5

The ‘Iraq Factor’ in Turkey, EU and US Triangle since 9/11 Aysegul Sever

71

6

The Limits of Change: Turkey, Iran, Syria Ozden Zeynep Oktav

85

7

The New Power Calculations and ‘Structured’ Relations in the Fluctuating Security Environment of Eurasia Visne Korkmaz

8

Turkey and the Greater Black Sea Region Gareth M. Winrow

99

121

vi

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Contentious Issues of Security and the Future of Turkey

Twenty First Century Energy Security Debates: Opportunities and Constraints for Turkey Ibrahim Mazlum

135

10

Mediterranean Fault Line – The Future of Greece and Turkey H. Sonmez Atesoglu

151

11

Cycles of Transformation of the Cyprus Question Mustafa Turkes

159 159

12

The New Security Environment and Turkey’s ISAF Experience Nursin Atesoglu Guney

177

Conclusion Nursin Atesoglu Guney

191

Index

193

List of Tables and Appendices Tables 8.1 8.2

Turkey’s Trade with Selected States (million $) Turkey’s Investment and Contracting Work in Selected States as of 2005 (figures approx.)

135 136

Appendices 11.1 11.2 11.3 11.4

The Lipponen Letter Ecevit’s Reply Declaration by Turkey on Cyprus, 29 July 2005 Declaration by the European Community and Its Member States, 21 September 2005

173 174 175 176

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Notes on Contributors H. SONMEZ ATESOGLU is a Professor of Economics at the Clarkson University. Before joining Clarkson he served as an Economist at the International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C. Professor Atesoglu’s research interests include balance-of-payments and economic growth, defence spending and growth, and money and inflation. He is the author of numerous scholarly papers, including publications in Journal of Monetary Economics, The Review of Economics and Statistics, The Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Southern Economic Journal, Journal of Macroeconomics, Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, Kredit und Kapital, Review of International Economics, Applied Economics, Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, Defence and Peace Economics, Strategic Review and The American Political Science Review. MAHMUT BALI AYKAN is a Professor of International Relations at Marmara University. He has published widely on Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East and Turkey’s relations with the United States. His books include Turkey’s Role in the Organization of the Islamic Conference: 1960–1992; The Nature of Deviation From the Kemalist Heritage (1994), Turkey’s Policy Concerning the Gulf Crisis: 1990–1991; A Retrospective Analysis Since 1998 (in Turkish, 1998), and Turkey’s Foreign Policy Toward Israel in the Middle East of the Post-Cold War Era: 1989–1997 (in Turkish, 2000). GOKHAN CETINSAYA is Professor of History at Istanbul Technical University. He received the 1994 Middle East Studies Association of North America (MESA) Malcom H. Kerr Dissertation Award in Social Sciences and the British Society for Middle Eastern Studies (BRISMES)’s 1994 Leigh Douglas Award for Best Doctoral Dissertation (1995). He has published widely on Ottoman history and diplomatic history, the history and politics of modern Turkey, Turkish foreign policy and Middle Eastern history and politics. His recent publications include The Ottoman Administration of Iraq, 1890–1908 (forthcoming) and Turkish-Iranian Relations in Historical Perspective (in Turkish, forthcoming). NURSIN ATESOGLU GUNEY is Associate Professor of International Relations at Yildiz Technical University. Her interests include general issues of security, with special emphasis on Turkish foreign and security policy. Among her recent publications are New European Security Initiatives: NATO, the European Union and Turkey (with Esra Cayhan, in Turkish, 1996) and Security Strategies of West: The EU, NATO and the USA (in Turkish, forthcoming).

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VISNE KORKMAZ is a doctoral candidate at the University of Marmara. She is currently working on her doctoral dissertation, which focuses on the search for security and identity in and the role of identity in the security structures in of the Asia Pacific and East Asia region. Her other research interests include security politics in the exSoviet area. She is the author of Symphonic Personality: Asia, East and Eurasia in the History of Russian Political Thought (in Turkish, forthcoming). EDUARD SOLER I LECHA is a doctoral candidate in International Relations at the Autonomous University of Barcelona. He is currently working on his doctoral dissertation, focusing on the European actors in front of Turkey’s EU bid and the evolution and formation of their stances. He is also the Coordinator of the Mediterranean Programme at the CIDOB Foundation and is the author of a number of scholarly articles, including Turkey and Europe: A Two Face Mirror (with Erika Ruiz Sandoval, in Spanish, forthcoming), Turkey and the EU: A Long History with an Uncertain End (in Spanish, forthcoming). His research interests are EuroMediterranean Politics, Turkey’s EU application, Spanish foreign and Mediterranean Policy and the external activities of sub-national governments. IBRAHIM MAZLUM is Assistant Professor of International Relations at the University of Marmara. His main research areas are in theories of international relations, security issues, environmental change and Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. He was visiting scholar at London’s School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) in 2002–2003. THOMAS S. MOWLE is Associate Professor of Political Science and director of the Centre for the Study of Defence Policy, United States Air Force Academy. He is the author of Allies at Odds? The United States and the European Union (2004). OZDEN OKTAV is Assistant Professor of International Relations at Yildiz Technical University. She has published widely on issues including EU-US relations in the Middle East, Turkey’s foreign policy in the Middle East, especially towards Iran, and Turkish-US Relations in the Middle East and Central Asia. AYSEGUL SEVER is Associate Professor of International Relations at the University of Marmara. Her interests include the international politics of the Middle East and Turkey’s Middle East and foreign policies. She is the author of Turkey, the West and the Middle East in the Cold War Era, 1945–1958 (in Turkish, 1997). MUSTAFA TURKES is a Professor of International Relations at the Middle East Technical University. His main areas of interest include political developments and security issues in Eastern and Central Europe, Turkish foreign policy, and political and ideological tendencies in Turkey. He is the author of A National-Leftist Tendency: the Kadro Mowement (in Turkish, 1999) and co-editor of The Neighbours of Turkey (in Turkish, 2002).

Notes on Contributors

xi

GARETH M. WINROW is a Professor of International Relations at Bilgi University. His current research interests are Turkey, Central Asia and the Caucasus, oil and gas pipeline politics in Turkey and the Caspian and Black Sea Regions, security issues in Central Asia and the Caucasus and Turkey-Iraq Relations. He is the author of many books, including most recently, Dialogue with the Mediterranean: The Role of NATO’s Mediterranean Initiative (2000) and, Turkey and the Caucasus: Domestic Interests and Security Concerns (2000).

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Preface Contentious Issues of Security and the Future of Turkey The reasons behind the choice of this book’s main subject stems from current debates on Western security. Today, Turkey, due to its geographic proximity to converging major fault lines running through the Caucasus, Mediterranean and Middle East, is at the centre of the West’s common security concerns. In this book, the contributors discuss the challenges Turkey has faced since the turn of the century, concentrating on relations between Ankara, her neighbours and her relations with the ‘two Wests’ (the US and the EU). Many individuals have contributed to the production of this book. The authors of individual chapters proved exceptionally efficient in working to a demanding schedule and in taking into account diverse comments from referees and editor. Without Gul Tokay, H. Sonmez Atesoglu, Visne Korkmaz, Thomas S. Mowle, Suzan Koknar and Jane Bentz Atesoglu, the final manuscript would not have been completed. I also would like to thank Engin Urcan for his technical assistance in typing the material. This book is dedicated to the memory of my parents, Yegane Atesoglu and I.Etem Atesoglu, and to my daughter and husband. Nursin Atesoglu Guney Moda, Istanbul

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List of Abbreviations AKEL AKP ANAP Bcm/yr BMENA BTC CACO CAEC CD CENTCOM CENTO CFA-A CFSP CIMIC CIS COMISAF CSTO CTP CUP DSACEUR DSP DECA DEP EAPC EEC EMP ENP EOKA ESDP EU EUFOR EUFOR-ALTHEA EUMS EUPOL FCCC FYROM

Progressive Party of Working People Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (Justice and Development Party) Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party) Billion Cubic Meters per Year Broader Middle East and North Africa Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline Central Asian Cooperation Organization Central Asian Economic Union Committee/Commission on Disarmament United States Central Command Central Treaty Organization Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan Common Foreign and Security Policy Civil Military Cooperation Commonwealth of Independent States Commander of International Security Assistance Force Collective Security Treaty Organization Cumhuriyetci Turk Partisi (Republican Turkish Party) Committee of Union and Progress Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Demokratik Sol Parti (Democratic Left Party) Defence and Economic Cooperation Agreement Demokratik Emek Partisi (Democratic Labour Party) Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council European Economic Community Euro-Mediterranean Process European Neighbourhood Policy National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters European Security and Defence Policy European Union European Union Force EU Peacekeeping Operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina European Union Military Staff European Union Police Framework Convention on Climate Change Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

xvi

G8 GMEI GUUAM IAEA ICC ICJ IFOR ILSA IPAP IPTF ISAF KADEK KAZBAT KDP KFOR KRG LNG MBT MHP MTOE NAC NATO NEP NSS NTIM-I NTM-I OECD OIC OPEC OSCE PfP PKK PRT PSI PUK RATA RDF SAP SCO SCP SCR SEECP SES

Contentious Issues of Security and the Future of Turkey

Group 8 Greater Middle East Initiative Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldavia Group International Atomic Energy Agency International Criminal Court International Court of Justice NATO-led Implementation Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina US Iran and Libya Sanctions Act Individual Partnership Action Plan International Police Task Force International Security Assistance Force Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress Kazakhstan Peacekeeping Battalion The Kurdish Democratic Party Kosovo Force Kurdistan Regional Government Liquefied Natural Gas Mine Ban Treaty Milliyetci Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Action Party) Million Tones of Oil Equivalent North Atlantic Council North Atlantic Treaty Organization National Energy Policy National Security Strategy NATO Training Implementation Mission – Iraq NATO Training Mission – Iraq Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Organisation of the Islamic Conference Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe Partnership for Peace Kurdish Workers Party Provisional Construction Team Proliferation Security Initiative The Patriotic Union for Kurdistan Regional Anti-Terrorist Centre of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation The Central Asian Collective Rapid Deployment Force Stabilisation and Association Process Shanghai Cooperation Organization South Caucasus Pipeline Senior Civilian Representative South-Eastern European Cohesion Process Single Economic Space

List of Abbreviations

SFOR SHAPE TACIS TRACECA TRNC UK UN UNEP UNIIMOG UNMIBH UNMISUD UNOSOM-II UNPROFOR UNSC UNSCR UNSIMIC US USSR WMD

xvii

Stabilisation Force (in Bosnia and Herzegovina) Supreme Headquarters Allied Forces Europe Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States Transport Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus United Kingdom United Nations US’s National Energy Policy United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group United Nations Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina United Nations Mission in Sudan United Nations Operations in Somalia United Nations Protection Force United Nations Security Council United Nations Security Council Resolution The United Nations Settlement Implementation Mission in Cyprus United States The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Weapons of Mass Destruction

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Introduction Nursin Atesoglu Guney

The radical events that have been taken place since the end of the twentieth century, amongst the most important of which have been the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the September 11 attacks, have brought serious challenges to the international system. The parameters of Western threat perceptions have been fundamentally changed, with the threats of this new era now being terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, ethnic and civilian conflicts, the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), organized crime and failing/failed states, to name but a few. In the new strategies of the West, common security objectives and threat perceptions have been redefined. The European Union (EU) and the United States (US) still continue to differ on how to counter these threats. During the last couple of decades, the EU and US have identified the region in which Turkey is centrally located as the core of their security problems. The ‘zone of instability’ is the converging point of all the major fault lines crossing the Caucasus, Mediterranean and Middle East. Under the circumstances, Turkey, due to her presence in the region and her cultural and historical identity, as well as her geopolitical and strategic status, has become an important actor in her relations with the US and EU. This situation has brought Ankara into a pivotal role in Western geostrategic calculations. The crisis that erupted in NATO, the UN and EU just before and after the Iraq War, along with other new threats such as the spread of terrorism, the future of Iraq, the rift in transatlantic relations, the West’s current relations with Syria and Iran and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, have challenged the future orientation of Turkish foreign policy. Turkey has given utmost priority to maintaining close relations with both Europe and the US as part of her overall foreign policy objectives. The differences between the EU and US on the region, however, no doubt put Ankara in a challenging and difficult position in her relations with her neighbours. Thus, Ankara still has to adapt herself to the transatlantic rift. Many specialists in the US maintain that, ‘Unless the transatlantic rift proves temporary, Ankara may find itself in the undesirable position of having to choose between the United States and the European Union.’ Indeed, some conservatives in the US believe that ‘Turkey has adopted a more European line of thinking over Iraq and the Broader Middle East, at the expense of relations with Washington and Tel Aviv.’ Although relations between Turkey and the US after the war in Iraq were

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strained, the present problems of the region have led them to be more responsive to each other’s concerns. In some European circles Turkey is even considered a ‘problem solving actor’ rather than a consumer of security in her troubled neighbourhood and she is currently closer to Europe than to the US in many of her foreign policy views and objectives. In general, the ‘two Wests’ seem to share common security perceptions in the region. Their disagreement, however, lies on the implementation of their strategies. Although it is in everyone’s interest to have a secure and stable environment around Turkey, the differences between Brussels and Washington may be able to affect Turkey’s own foreign policy and security interests. In this book, the major developments influencing Turkish foreign policy and security interests are discussed and analysed. The contributors have tried to highlight Turkey’s forthcoming challenges and discuss the major factors that influence Turkey’s foreign and security policy. In the fourteen chapters, the current security debates involving this ‘triangular’ relationship between Ankara, Brussels, and Washington are presented and examined. In his chapter, ‘A Tale of Two Centuries: Continuities in Turkish Foreign and Security Policy’, Gokhan Cetinsaya focuses on historical aspects of Turkish foreign policy from the late Ottoman period to the present day, the emphasis being the major elements of change and continuity. At the end of his paper, Cetinsaya assesses Turkey’s security concerns and asks whether they can be viewed as a relatively new phenomenon or as related in some way to historical continuities. ‘Transatlantic Relations and Turkey’ by Thomas S. Mowle discusses the current rift in US-EU, EU-NATO and NATO-US relations with examples of specific cases. In discussing Turkey’s difficulties in pursuing her foreign policy objectives, Mowle argues that the two ‘Wests’ today present different futures for Turkey. ‘Turkey’s Potential (and Controversial) Contribution to the Global “Actorness” of the EU’ by Eduard Soler i Lecha asks and examines the question of ‘whether Turkey’s potential membership reinforces the EU’s global actorness.’ The paper begins with an analysis of the main characteristics of the new EU foreign policy and Turkey’s possible role in the its future, concentrating on the Balkans and the Mediterranean-Middle East as case studies, and goes on to highlight the compatibilities and the divergences between the EU and Turkey’s foreign policy objectives. In the conclusion, the author asks whether Turkey’s membership strengthens the EU’s role in global security affairs or not. In ‘A Retrospective Analysis of Turkey-United States Relations in the Wake of the US War against Iraq in March 2003’, Mahmut Bali Aykan discusses TurkishAmerican relations and analyses the factors that have shaped the continuities and changes in bilateral relations. The paper goes on to discuss the downward-spiralling relations between Ankara and Washington and ask whether they are conjectural or structural. ‘The “Iraq Factor” in the Turkey, EU and US Triangle since 9/11’ by Aysegul Sever argues that over the last decade the Iraqi issue has gained importance in

Introduction

3

Turkey’s foreign relations with the ‘two Wests’. In this comprehensive analysis, she examines the basic issues of confrontation and cooperation related to Iraq for both US-Turkey and EU-Turkey relations. In conclusion, the author suggests approaches Turkey can adopt in the developing triangular relationship of Washington, Brussels and Baghdad. In ‘The Limits of Change: Turkey, Iran, Syria’ Ozden Zeynep Oktav discusses Turkey’s rapprochement with Iran and Syria, which gained momentum after the Iraq war. The paper begins with an account of Turkey’s changing security perceptions at the turn of the century before moving on to discuss Turkey’s integration with the global community by means of future integration with the EU. Finally, the major policy shift from securitisation to security building, with a special emphasis on Turkey’s soft security identities is examined. ‘The New Power Calculations and “Structured” Relations in the Fluctuating Security Environment of Eurasia’ by Visne Korkmaz, focuses on the differences among the main powers – namely USA, Russia, China, India and the EU – in the Eurasian security realm since the beginning of Operation Endeavour and examines how the dynamic conditions of today’s Eurasia affect foreign policy-making capacity. Korkmaz concludes her article by discussing the conditions that may either limit or ease Turkey’s role in the Eurasian mainland. Gareth M. Winrow’s contribution, ‘Turkey and the Greater Black Sea Region’, examines Turkey’s policies towards this area in the post-Cold War era. Discussing relations with the Black Sea littoral states, including the Russian Federation and the southern Caucasus states, Winrow examines the impact of EU and US policies on Turkey in this region. Particular attention is given to security concerns and various multilateral initiatives proposed by Turkey. In ‘Twenty First Century Energy Security Debates: Opportunities and Constraints for Turkey’, Ibrahim Mazlum discusses the major actors involved in the Eurasian region. He examines the question of whether Turkey has any chance under the present circumstances of becoming the hub of the energy supply to the West and discuses the risks and opportunities facing Ankara. In ‘Mediterranean Fault Line – the Future of Greece and Turkey’, H. Sonmez Atesoglu, examines Turkish-Greek relations and argues that maintenance of peace and security in the region are the primary goals of both states. However, he also argues that their differences on foreign policy and security issues continue to be the main source of conflict concluding that both states are far from reaching any lasting solutions, the situation in the region thus remaining intense. Mustafa Turkes, in ‘Cycles of Transformation of the Cyprus Question’, discusses the Cyprus problem from the Annan Plan up to present day. In this comprehensive analysis, the author examines contested hegemonic projects that are proposed for Cyprus (such as the Greek Cypriot’s, the Turkish Cypriot’s, the EU’s, etc.). Turkes’ investigation asks whether these projects have any chance of saving Cyprus from the current deadlock. In the final contribution, ‘The New Security Environment and Turkey’s ISAF Experience’, Nursin Atesoglu Güney evaluates Turkey’s contribution to Western

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security. Furthermore, she focuses on Turkey’s recent peacekeeping experience in Afghanistan within these new parameters. The essay ends with an examination of possible future engagements for Ankara in western peace-keeping operations. Overall this book is intended to provide a new look at Turkey’s foreign and security policy for the twenty-first century. The contributors have discussed the challenges in Turkey’s foreign and security policies in the last two decades and have concentrated on relations between Ankara, her neighbours, and their relations with the two Wests. By this way, they seek to come up with new ideas that might be helpful in future and existing debates on Turkish foreign policy. One of the main priorities of Turkish foreign and security policy has been to maintain good relations with Europe and the US. In the last decade, Ankara has succeeded in pursuing balanced relations with the two Wests, despite the difficulties caused by their competing and sometimes conflicting security agendas. This rather difficult triangular relationship between Brussels, Washington and Ankara has from time to time displayed convergent or divergent points in the conduct of foreign policy. This situation has been felt primarily in Ankara’s own relations with her neighbours. But, under common security and threat perceptions, Turkey and the West will continue to cooperate as they used to in the past. With the valuable assistance of the authors, Contentious Issues of Security and the Future of Turkey tries to discuss and analyse possible challenges in Turkish foreign and security policy. Finally, we hope our colleagues, students, and other interested readers will find some value in our interpretations and analyses.

Chapter 1

A Tale of Two Centuries: Continuities in Turkish Foreign and Security Policy Gokhan Cetinsaya

For about two hundred years, from the late eighteenth until the late twentieth century, the Ottoman Empire and its successor, the Republic of Turkey, faced three prominent challenges. The first was a military and strategic threat posed by the Russian Empire and later by the Soviet Union; from the end of the eighteenth century until the end of the Cold War, the most important concern for Ottoman/Turkish statesmen (except for certain brief periods) was the regional challenge posed by Russia/Soviet Union. The second challenge was the emergence of nationalist ideas and movements in the Ottoman Empire after the French Revolution, first among non-Muslim elements, and then among non-Turkish Muslim elements. This development continued in new forms after the disintegration of the Empire. The third challenge that determined the course of the Ottoman/Turkish foreign policy was Turkey’s economic conditions and financial dependence on the West. These three interrelated challenges have determined the foreign and domestic (particularly her pro-Western orientation) policies of the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Turkey since the beginning of the nineteenth century. They have affected not only Turkey’s relations with her neighbours and the West but also her domestic politics through the process of westernisation. This essay seeks to examine the evolution of this pro-Western orientation, and to highlight certain continuities in Turkish foreign and security policy over the last two hundred years. From the fourteenth to the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire governed parts of Europe, and became involved in the continent’s affairs. Until the third quarter of the eighteenth century, Austria had been the main enemy and France the main ally. However, in the eighteenth century, the emergence of Russia as a great power brought about a shift in the balance of power, at the expense of the Ottoman Empire (see Naff 1984, 143–169). From the second half of the eighteenth century until 1917, Russia was the most immediate threat. The Ottoman Empire was in decline militarily, and Russia was eager to fill the vacuum that Ottoman weakness had created in the region. There were a series of Russo-Ottoman wars, resulting in the Russian invasion of Ottoman territory in the Balkans, Southeast Europe, and the Caucasus. The Ottomans were persistently defeated by the Russians (with the exception of the Crimean War of 1853–56), and the very heart of the Ottoman Empire, the capital Istanbul, was often threatened by the Russian army (see Kurat 1990; Muratoff 1953).

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Starting from the late eighteenth century, Russian advances continued into the Black Sea, eventually reaching it’s the western and eastern shores. After Russian victory in the war of 1768–74, the Porte was forced to sign the Treaty of Kucuk Kaynarca in 1774. This gave Russia a foothold on the northern shores of the Black Sea, recognised the independence of the Crimea, which was virtually delivered into the Russian orbit of control, and allowed Russian navigation rights in the Black Sea, as well as handing over to the Russians what they dubiously interpreted as a protectorate over the Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire (see Davison 1976, 463–483). Russia annexed the Crimea in 1783, and, after another war in 1787–92, captured further territory between the rivers Dniestr and Bug. During the turbulent diplomatic events and wars in the period following 1789, especially those between 1799 and 1812, the Ottomans, instead of pursuing the old policy of non-involvement in Europe, entered the European power alliances and became part of the continental state system. Although Ottoman Empire was weak in comparison with the European Great Powers, it remained a significant international actor whose independent decisions could materially influence the interests and behaviour of more powerful states (see Anderson 1966, 28–52). In the 1828–29 war with Russia, Ottoman forces were defeated and Edirne, located some 250 kilometres west of Istanbul, was captured by the Russians. Due to an epidemic in the army and a fear of a major European war, the Russians did not advance to Istanbul. Instead, Russia preferred to preserve a weak Ottoman Empire along its southern border as a buffer state for the coming decades. In the 1830s, especially during the Egyptian crisis (1831–41), considerations of defence and security became crucial in Ottoman thinking. Although the Ottoman state initiated a series of military reforms in order to cope with the Russian and other military threats which had arisen at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century, it was soon acknowledged that the Ottoman army was in no state to cope with the Russian army or any other modern army, for several internal reasons. It was thus the military defeats at the hands of Russia and Egypt that forced the Ottomans to change their foreign and security policy. The stated aim of the Ottoman statesmen was the survival and territorial integrity of the Empire. Throughout the nineteenth century, the principal threats were in three main zones of conflict: the Balkans (from national movements aided by Russia); along the straits of the Bosporus and Dardanelles (from Britain and Russia), and; Egypt and the rest of the Arab provinces (again, threatened by Britain and France). Ottoman statesmen were well aware of the fact that the Empire was militarily too weak to tackle these threats and effective diplomacy was thus regarded as an essential guarantee of the Empire’s survival. It was duly accepted that a war for territory against major European powers could not be won, unless supported by one or more of the others. The Empire thus had to resort to diplomatic manoeuvring, rather than risk unaided military resistance to any major European power. They attempted to exploit the balance of power between the Great Powers and exploit the rivalries, especially that between Britain and Russia. In terms of diplomacy, which was seen as the key to survival, two different approaches to the threats posed by the Great

A Tale of Two Centuries

7

Powers were considered throughout the nineteenth century: one was to avoid both conflict and close alliances by taking advantage of the balance of power system itself; the second was to establish a reasonably stable alliance with one or more of the European powers; in other words, an alliance with a power or combination of powers against the enemy (see Hale 2000, 13–43). In the Tanzimat period (1839–76), Ottoman statesmen opted to pursue the second approach. The fact that the Ottoman Empire was no match for Russia unless it was supported by one of the other European powers was widely accepted. Military and bureaucratic reforms needed time and power and until such time, the existing international situation had to be taken advantage of. This dilemma forced Ottoman statesmen to revise the traditional diplomacy in favour of a new type based upon cultivating relations with Britain and France and, to some extent, Austria. At the same time, to compliment the pro-Western orientation in foreign policy, the Ottomans launched the Tanzimat, in order to reform and survive in the age of nationalism and imperialism. The state underwent a period of westernisation in political, social, legal, and economic fields. As proclaimed in 1839, the Tanzimat reforms promised an overall reorganisation in every institution of state and society, from a more orderly tax collection to a fair and regular system of military conscription, and from a reform in education to a radical reorganisation of the justice system. The proposed reforms were partially based upon European models, and initiated an unprecedented, though slow, process of institutional and cultural ‘westernisation.’ In another respect, too, the Islamic and Ottoman tradition was partially severed, with the promise of civil equality for the Empire’s non-Muslim subjects. The westernizers of the Tanzimat believed that the Ottoman Empire could be saved only by being integrated into the Western political and economic system. It would be wiser for the Empire to join, rather than resist, Europe and would also benefit from joining the world economic system. In order to recruit their assistance in the struggle against Russia, the Porte offered the British certain financial incentives, so as to create a stronger bond (see Davison 1973). During the Tanzimat period, Britain (and France and Austria at times) emerged as the main supporter of the Ottoman Empire against Russia. From 1838 onwards, the protection and strengthening of the Ottoman Empire as a shield against Russia became the first priority of British strategy in the Near East and Eurasia. This policy reached its climax during the Crimean War of 1853–56, where Russia was defeated by coalition forces composed of Britain, France, and the Ottoman Empire. Under the Treaty of Paris, signed in March 1856, the territorial integrity and independence of the Empire was guaranteed, and the Porte was invited to ‘participate in the advantages of the public law and system (concert) of Europe’ (see Anderson 1970, 81). The Ottoman Empire was thus formally admitted by treaty into the European state system, and her European Great Power status recognised. The continuation of this recognition has ever since remained one of the Ottoman/Turkish state’s core foreign policy goals. The Treaty of Paris led to a period of calm in the Empire’s relations with the European powers, lasting until 1875. There were internal crises in the Balkans and

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Syria and Lebanon but no international crises. The Great Eastern Crisis of 1875– 77, however, was followed by a war with Russia (1877–78), during which Russian troops penetrated deep into the Balkans and Eastern Anatolia; by the end of January 1878, Russian troops had reached the outskirts of Istanbul (see Anderson 1966, 178– 219). The British declared their opposition to a Russian occupation of Istanbul and subsequently sent their fleet to defend the Ottoman capital. However, the Russians forced the Ottoman government to accept their own peace conditions and the Treaty of San Stefano, creating an enlarged state of Bulgaria, was signed in March 1878. As a result of British pressure and threats, the Russians agreed to submit the Treaty of San Stefano to an international congress in Berlin. In the meantime, the British guaranteed protection of eastern Anatolia, receiving the lease for Cyprus in exchange. The Congress of Berlin met in June 1878, and reduced the frontiers of the new Bulgarian state, placed Bosnia-Herzegovina under Austro-Hungarian occupation, and confirmed the cession of Batum, Kars, and Ardahan along the Caucasian border to Russia (see Anderson 1970, 108–112). With the Berlin settlement, the Ottoman Empire lost, in one stroke, one fifth of its population and two fifths of its territory. Taking into consideration the lessons of the Tanzimat foreign policy and the new international system which had been in force since 1871, Sultan Abdulhamid II (1876–1909) sensed that, as a result of the Treaty of Berlin, his empire needed to immediately seek a new foreign policy. Preoccupied with the Empire’s vulnerability to the influence of the European Great Powers, Abdulhamid’s primary foreign policy objective was to defend the Empire’s independence and territorial integrity. He feared not only a military attack from the outside, but also from within, via the Powers’ ‘peaceful penetration’ strategy, manifested, for example through the establishment of ‘zones of influence’ which could ultimately lead to partition, as had occurred in Egypt and India. Abdulhamid’s success in preserving the Empire’s integrity and independence for thirty years must be attributed primarily to his diplomacy. He reached the conclusion that the Ottoman Empire was exposed to too many potential foes in too many quarters; and that conflict could easily develop into a major war against numerous enemies and destroy the Empire. His foreign policy was one of moderation and neutrality towards the rival Great Powers. As he believed no Great Power alliance could protect the Ottoman Empire and that it was unwise to take sides in Great Power conflicts, he avoided peacetime alliances with them and maintained an overall diplomatic stance of ‘neutrality’ or ‘non-commitment’ and distanced the Empire from its former protector, Great Britain and harmonized relations with the Empire’s traditional enemy, Russia, initiating the longest period of peace in Russo-Ottoman relations since the Treaty of Kucuk Kaynarca (1774). He also initiated a series of close ties with Germany in order to restrain Britain and Russia (see Yasamee 1993, 20–36; Yasamee 1999, 223–232; Yasamee 1996). The strategy of neutrality and moderation did prove successful, at least until the late 1890s, but its success depended upon the existence of Great Power divisions and balances which the Ottoman Empire was able to manipulate: Russia and Britain competing for supremacy on the Straits, Russia and Austria-Hungary vying for primacy in the Balkans, Britain and France clashing in Egypt, and France and Italy

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competing in North Africa. After 1897, these securities disappeared, and reduced the Sultan’s freedom of manoeuvre: Austro-Hungary and Russia agreed on the Balkans, Italy drew closer to France, and Britain and Russia signed an alliance in 1907. The Young Turks, or the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), which came to power in 1908, partly as a reaction to Abdulhamid’s policies and partly as a response to the new international system after 1907, adopted a new foreign and security policy. The main aim was a defensive foreign policy and rapprochement with the Entente Powers (Britain, France and Russia). In order to save the territorial integrity of the Empire, the CUP (1908–1918), which, after the traumatic effect of the Balkan Wars (1912–13) on the Turkish political and military elites, was convinced that only an alliance with Britain and the Entente could guarantee the survival of what remained of the Empire, tried to seek support from London and Paris, but this proved impossible for the Great Power politics of the time, and by the start of the First World War, Turkey had failed to fulfil its objectives. The CUP leaders were convinced that neutrality would be disastrous for Turkey since it would leave her isolated and at the mercy of the belligerent states. In the end, the CUP formed an alliance with Germany and entered the war (see Kent 1984; Yasamee 1995, 229–268). During the First World War, the Ottoman Empire faced hostilities in eastern Anatolia against the Russians and in Mesopotamia, Arabia, and Palestine against the British and their allies. Although they successfully resisted an armada of BritishFrench naval and land forces in the Dardanelles in 1915, they were less successful in other areas: the Russians penetrated deep into eastern Anatolia and the British captured Baghdad, Palestine and Syria. Throughout the war, the Allies signed a number of agreements for the partition of the Ottoman Empire. As a result of the AngloFranco-Russian agreements of March–April 1915 (known as the Constantinople Agreement), Britain and France agreed that ‘the question of Constantinople and the Straits’ would finally be solved by annexing the area into the Russian Empire. Under the Sykes-Picot agreement of April-October 1916, Russia was also given most of eastern Anatolia (including Erzurum, Trabzon, Van and Bitlis), with France to receive Syria and Clicia and Britain to gain control of Palestine and Mesopotamia in exchange (see Fromkin 1991). By 1917, Russian forces occupied territories east of the Trabzon-Van line. The Ottomans/Turks should have been grateful to the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 as the Ottoman army was only able to regain eastern Anatolia after Russian forces had evacuated as a result of the outbreak of revolution at home. As a consequence of Russia’s withdrawal from the war, arrangements with Russia, including the Constantinople Agreement, were annulled. After the Armistice of Mudros on October 30, 1918, Britain, France and Italy submitted their respective demands, based on previous agreements, to the Paris Peace Conference and began to occupy several parts of Anatolia. The peace treaty with Turkey, known as the Treaty of Sevres, dated 10 August 1920, was extremely severe; not only did it strip the Ottoman Empire of all its Arab provinces, it also deprived the Turkish government control of the Straits, as well as create an independent Armenian state and envisage future Greek control of western Anatolia. The Turkish nationalists, led by Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk), organized an armed resistance movement against

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the Allies’ occupation and successfully fought the Greeks, French and Italians in western and southern Anatolia (see Mango 1999; Oran 2001a, 95–238; Hale 2000, 44–78). With the Bolshevik revolution a new chapter was opened in the history of Russian-Turkish relations. Although Mustafa Kemal’s ideas had little in common with the socialism of the Bolsheviks, Ankara and Moscow were brought together by a common fear of the Western Powers, especially Britain, and a common resentment towards the Treaty of Sevres. The Soviet-Turkish Treaty of Friendship (16 March 1921) marks the culmination of the rapprochement between the two governments (see Gokay 1997). The new government in Ankara became a natural ally of the Bolsheviks and a special relationship based on mutual interests was developed, culminating in the Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality (17 December 1925). This friendly atmosphere lasted (though with a cooling trend) until the outbreak of World War Two. The Lausanne Peace Treaty of July 1923, despite partially fulfilling the demands set by Ankara, gave international recognition to the new Republic of Turkey. In the post-Lausanne era, the focus of the Republic was on domestic re-structuring. Externally, efforts were directed at resolving the problems extant from the Lausanne negotiations, including border issues such as Mosul, the Straits and Alexandretta (Hatay), and the repayment of the Ottoman debt. In the new post-World War One international system, Turkish foreign policy, after resolving the unfinished matters of the Lausanne Conference, aimed at a normalisation of relations with the Great Powers and neighbouring countries (some of which were Great Powers). Ataturk’s foreign policy sought to assert the new Turkey’s absolute independence and sovereignty, and to this end, he pursued a neutralist attitude in abroad. Turkey showed a great respect for international laws and treaties and for the idea of collective security under the League of Nations, of which it became a member in 1932 (see Hale 2000, 44–78; Oran 2001a, 239–384). In the Ataturk period (1923–1938), Turkey’s Western orientation was gradually affirmed, and firmly established in the 1930s. This was true both internally and externally: internally, the Turkish elite initiated radical modernising reforms along Western lines whilst externally, in the turbulent events of that decade, they preferred to align themselves with the Western alliance instead of the Revisionist powers, the main aim being securing inclusion into the Western system of states, of which Turkey became a status quo power in the 1930s. Hitler and Mussolini’s revisionist policies gave Turkey impetus to form a security belt (or defensive alliances) on her western and eastern borders. Ankara played a leading role in the establishment of the Balkan Entente (Turkey, Greece, Romania, and Yugoslavia) in 1934, and the Saadabad Pact (Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan) in 1937. Italy, being a neighbour due to its possession of the Dodecanese, had now replaced Russia/USSR as the main strategic threat. Although the relations with the Soviet Union were at their warmest in the 1920s and early 1930s, Turkey began to distance itself from Moscow in the second half of the 1930s as relations with the Western powers (especially with Britain) improved considerably (see Hale 2000, 44–78; Oran 2001a, 239–384).

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In the rapidly deteriorating international environment of the late 1930s, Ismet Inonu (1938–1950), the second President of the Republic after Ataturk, was determined to maintain the country’s neutrality in the event of war, unless its vital interests were clearly at stake but the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of August 1939 prompted the signing of a military alliance with Britain and France (October 1939). As Ankara’s concern was the possibility of being drawn into a war with the Soviet Union, the Turkish Government wished to include Moscow in this alliance with no gain. During World War II, Turkey remained a non-belligerent ally of the anti-Nazi coalition until the concluding months of the conflict, at which time she joined the war. Although Turkey signed a military alliance with Britain and France, she opted for an out-of-the-war role, in spite of demands, incitements, threats and resentment on part of the Allies. What is more, despite German pressure, Turkey did not permit the passage of Axis troops, ships, or aircraft through or over Turkey and its waters, and the Montreux Convention was carefully enforced in the Straits. Turkey broke diplomatic relations with Germany in August 1944 and, in February 1945, declared war on Germany, a necessary precondition for participation in San Francisco Conference of April 1945, from which the United Nations (UN) emerged. Turkey duly became one of the fifty-one founding members of the UN (see Hale 2000, 79–108; Oran 2001a, 385–479; Deringil 1989). After the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, the Soviet Union once again became a major worry for Ankara and this had a significant impact on its policies during the war. Turkey was considerably disturbed by the Britain and the Soviets’ occupation (with the aim of guaranteeing transit routes and breaking German influence) of Iran from the north and south in August 1941, and by the Soviet presence in Iranian Azerbaijan, in particular by the encouragement and incitement of Kurdish and Azeri nationalism. Although Turkey expressed its concern about Soviet activity in the Kurdish and Azeri regions of Iran, it proved difficult to have these concerns countenanced in the midst of the war. Despite Allied assurances, the short-lived Kurdish and Azeri republics, established by the Soviets in Iran at the end of the war, would justify Turkish concerns (see Cetinsaya 1999, 41–79). In March 1945, Turkey was confronted with Soviet pressure and territorial demands, including a revision of the Montreux Convention, the establishment of bases in the Straits (and thus joint control of the waterway) and changes to the eastern border. As a result of this Soviet threat, Turkey’s links with the United States grew rapidly in the aftermath of World War Two and a mutual interest in keeping a check on Soviet expansionism provided the foundation for American-Turkish relations for the next forty years. The pattern of close bilateral ties with the United States began to take shape with the Truman Doctrine of March 1947, in which the US guaranteed Turkish and Greek security, pledging military and economic aid to both countries (see Hale 2000, 109–121; Kuniholm 1994). Turkey also subsequently participated in the United States-sponsored European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan) and, in support of the American Cold War strategy, contributed troops to UN forces in the Korean War (1950–53).

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Turkey was admitted to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) alliance in the autumn of 1951, having pursued membership not only for defence but also for political, economic and cultural reasons. Its admission to NATO, effective from February 1952, was preceded by an extensive study and debate of the strategy of extending the Alliance’s southern flank to include the eastern Mediterranean. With Turkish admission to the organisation, NATO now had a much longer land frontier with the Warsaw Pact, as well as a treaty interest in Turkey’s Black Sea coast and the Straits through which the Soviet Union had access to the Mediterranean. At the same time, Turkey brought the second largest body of military manpower (after the United States) to the alliance, in addition to access to sites for forward deployment and intelligence gathering. NATO’s Allied Land Forces Southeastern Europe Headquarters were established in Izmir and the Incirlik base near Adana was also developed for NATO purposes. A military facilities agreement with the United States in 1954 permitted the opening of other NATO installations and the stationing of United States forces in Turkey (see Oran 2001a, 522–575; Leffler 1985, 807–825; Athanassopoulou 1999). The deterioration of Turkish-Soviet relations marked an important turning point in the history of Turkish foreign and security policy in the twentieth century. Since the end of World War Two, Turkey had regarded the Soviet Union as its principal enemy. As outlined above, her suspicion of Soviet motives had its roots in imperial Russia’s attempts to extend its influence beyond the Black Sea to the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East. Throughout the Cold War, Turkey’s security considerations were shaped by the country’s vulnerability to Soviet military strength (see Oran 2001a, 499–521; Karpat 1975, 73–107). It faced twenty divisions of Soviet land forces close to the common border, which stretched for more than 500 kilometres in the Transcaucasus region of northern Turkey, and heavily populated areas were within easy range of Soviet fighter aircraft and bombers. Soviet naval vessels and submarines were also well positioned to take control of the Black Sea. As a member of NATO, Turkey had the vital mission of anchoring the Alliance’s southern flank against the military powers of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. Turkish armed forces were called upon to defend the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits and northeastern border with the Soviets in the Transcaucasus region. As a further containment of the Soviet Union in the Middle East, Turkey joined Britain, Iran, Iraq and Pakistan in the Baghdad Pact in 1955, a multilateral defence agreement which, after the overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy in 1958, became the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) (see Yesilbursa 2005; Sever 1997). Turkey played a vital diplomatic and strategic role as the bridge between the NATO and CENTO alliance systems. The basic principle of Turkish foreign policy in the 1950s was to be a part of the Western alliance and prove its strategic importance to her members. To that end, Turkey became an important player in the Cold War in the Middle East and pursued policies aimed at fostering relations with her allies, especially the US and Britain. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Turkey generally cooperated with other United States allies in the Middle East to contain the influence of pro-Soviet countries.

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As the Cold War developed, Turkey took a resolutely pro-Western stance, joining the Council of Europe in 1950, and becoming a member of the OECD in 1960. As a further attempt at westernisation, it applied for membership of the European Economic Community in 1959 (later to become the European Union). Although Turkey became an associate member in 1963, and signed an Additional Protocol in 1970, the development of relations with the European Union (EU) was greatly inhibited by domestic and economic conditions (see Oran 2001a, 808–853; BacMuftuler 1997). In the Détente period, Ankara’s disappointment over its isolation on the Cyprus issue in the international sphere and the lack of support from its allies in the Western bloc led her questioning the then existing foreign policy approach. Turkey began to question the merits of a one–dimensional foreign policy and, particularly from the mid-1960s onwards, tried to adopt a multi-dimensional foreign policy. There were several reasons for this policy change. Partly because of the developments in the Cold War and in the Western alliance, and partly because of the necessity to gain support in the UN for the Cyprus question, Ankara began concerted efforts to develop relations with the Soviet bloc and the non-aligned countries ( see Vali 1971; Karpat 1975). The transformation of Turkish-American relations played a significant role in Turkey’s search for this new multi-dimensional foreign policy. The problems of the 1960s and 1970s highlighted the fact that the country could not rely solely on the US (as it did in the 1950s) for its security and economic needs. In the early 1960s, two developments disappointed Turkey, giving rise to resentment and to a deep mistrust of her Western allies, later leading to crises in Turkish-American relations. The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 and the Cyprus crisis of 1963-64 (especially the Johnson Letter of 1964) had considerably harmful effects on the Turkish-American relationship (see Bolukbasi 1988; Oran 2001a, 716–768), which was further strained by Turkey’s military intervention in northern Cyprus in 1974, with the United States imposing an arms embargo in response to Turkey’s actions on the island. Ankara retaliated by suspending American military operations at all Turkish installations that were not clearly linked to NATO missions. The Cyprus issue was to sour American-Turkish relations for several years. Even after the United States Congress lifted the arms embargo in 1978, it was to be two years before bilateral defence cooperation and military assistance were restored to pre-1974 levels (see Oran 2001a, 681–715; Kunihom 1996, 45–69). The implications of the Cyprus issue for Turkish foreign policy were enormous. As a result of these developments in the 1970s, Turkey re-defined its national security, now stressing that the threat to national security came not only from the north (the Soviet Union) but also from the west (from a NATO ally – Greece) (See Sezer 1981; Boll 1979, 609–631). Two embargos in the 1970s – the arms embargo and the oil embargo – also encouraged her to further diversify her foreign policy. Attempts to normalize relations with the Arab world gained momentum, especially after the oil embargo, which had a hugely detrimental effect on Turkey. Ankara became less willing to provide unstinting support for the US in the Middle East, and began to pursue a pro-Arab and pro-Palestine policy in the region (see Robins 1991).

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Turkish suspicions of the Soviet Union gradually eased during the Détente era, paving the way for several bilateral economic cooperation agreements in the 1970s. As a result of steps taken to engage in a multi-dimensional foreign policy, the normalisation of Turkish-Soviet relations marked a major change in this period, but the relationship was limited to economic cooperation agreements and Soviet economic assistance to Turkey (assistance which was, however, quite substantial) (see Oran 2001a, 769–783). Nevertheless, this did not mean that Turkey was reorienting its foreign or security policy. It was still part of the Western alliance but was now also making an effort to diversify its foreign policy. Although it had gone through some significant changes in the 1960s and 1970s, the main principles of Turkish foreign policy remained the same. With the beginning of the ‘Second Cold War’ in 1979, Turkey’s strategic position was on the rise again. Two events in the year 1979 – the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian revolution – changed threat perceptions in Turkey and the US and led to closer ties between the two countries. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in particular revived Turkish fears of Soviet expansionism and led to a cooling of relations. During the 1980s, Turkish-American strategic cooperation increased and the relationship gradually recaptured the warmth of earlier years. Although Ankara resented continued attempts by the United States Congress to restrict military assistance to Turkey because of the Cyprus issue, Turgut Ozal, first as Prime Minister (1983–89) and then as President (1989–1993), generally viewed American administrations as sympathetic to Turkish interests and believed Turkey’s future security depended on the continuation of a strong relationship with the United States. Washington gave its support to Ozal’s liberal economic policies and, unlike European countries, did not publicly criticize Turkey over allegations of human rights violations (see Oran 2001b, 34–101; Sezer 1993; 215–231). In the 1980s, Turkey’s economic and domestic difficulties coupled with the external results of the 1980 military coup d’etat led to further problems (such as human rights) with the EU, and once again brought the country much closer to the US. In this period, while Turkey’s relations with the EU were subject to new crises, relations with the US strengthened. Indeed, after the 1980 coup, Turkey’s relations with the EU deteriorated; Turkey applied for membership in 1987, but was rejected in December 1989. ‘For the first time, ‘the West’ was no longer perceived as a unified entity in terms of Turkey’s foreign policy orientation’ (see Altunisik and Tur 2005, 111). In the 1980s, there emerged for the first time the notion or perception of ‘the two Wests’ in Turkish foreign policy. The end of the Cold War in 1989 and the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 fundamentally changed Turkey’s security environment. Changes in international and regional politics in the early 1990s had an enormous impact on Turkey’s threat perception, and on her perception of herself and her foreign relations (see Robbins 2003, 113–133). The disappearance of the Soviet threat and the perception of being excluded from Europe created a sense of vulnerability with respect to her position in the fast-changing international and regional environment. In this new environment, some Turkish elites began to reassess the country’s international position. Since the

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historical parameters of a 200-year period had disappeared, there emerged discussions about the need to reorient foreign/security policy in response to these changes (see Fuller and Lesser 1993). Both Turkish and Western analysts also questioned the role of NATO and Turkey’s role within NATO in the new security environment. However, they soon came to the conclusion that both NATO and Turkey needed each other in the post-Cold War period. From the Western perspective, the end of the Soviet threat did not mean the end of Turkey’s role. Given its geographical position, her contribution would continue to be vital for the West, especially in NATO’s new (out-of-area) missions. Moreover, new developments in the Balkans, Eurasia and the Middle East presented Turkey with new opportunities but also new risks, insecurities and challenges (see Rubin and Kirisci 2002; Larrabee and Lesser 2002; Aydin and Ismael 2003; Martin and Kerides 2004; Bal 2004). The period since 1990/91 has been one of destabilization and ambiguity in the region surrounding Turkey. Her borders have been threatened by turbulence among the newly independent republics of the Caucasus and by the new instabilities in the Middle East; Turkey remains at the centre of a region bubbling with ethnic and religious discord. These new threat perceptions, which have emerged as a result of ethnic and religious conflicts in the Balkans, Caucasia, and the Middle East, have created a new common ground for partnership between Turkey and the West. Turkey has continued to give importance to NATO due to new threats and instabilities in its region and has thus contributed resolutely to NATO missions in the area. Ankara’s participation in NATO’s operations in the Balkans in particular, carried out in order to secure and guarantee stability, created a favourable impression in EU circles regarding the positive future role Turkey may play in the Union. Despite the differences in identifying the parameters of new common threats between the ‘two Wests’ (the US and the EU), Turkey shares the West’s new global threat perceptions (global terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, etc), even though she has her own threat perceptions based on her national interests. Turkish political and military elites take new threat perceptions into account along with fundamental Ottoman/Turkish security priorities – namely, territorial integrity and the survival of the regime. Thus, with the end of the Cold War the parameters of the common threats perceived by the West and Turkey changed, but the two parties have reached a point of consensus in identifying new threats. By the beginning of the new millennium, a delicate stability in the Caucasus, and a relatively stable environment in the Balkans, especially in the areas under EU and NATO control, had emerged. But the Middle East continues to be a source of instability, not only locally but also for the international community at large. In this regard, the most vital security challenges Turkey has confronted in the last two decades have their sources in the Middle East, as seen during the First and Second Gulf Wars. A historical analysis reveals certain continuities in Turkish foreign and security policy, in terms of her Western orientation, from the late Ottoman period to the present day. Given the global and regional developments which have taken place since 9/11 and the Iraq war of 2003, it appears Turkey’s Western orientation

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in foreign and security policy will continue in the new millennium, although it now faces the dilemma of the ‘two Wests’. References Allen, W.E.D. and Muratoff, P. (1953), Caucasian Battlefields (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Altunisik, M.B. and Tur, O. (2005), Turkey: Challenges of Continuity and Change (London: Routledge Curzon). Anderson, M.S. (1966), The Eastern Question, 1774–1923 (London: Macmillan). Anderson, M.S. (ed.) (1970), The Great Powers and the Near East, 1774–1923 (London: Edward Arnold). Athanassopoulou, E. (1999), Turkey: Anglo-American Security Interests, 1945– 1952: The First Enlargement of NATO (London: Frank Cass). Aydin, M. and Ismael,T.Y. (eds) (2003), Turkey’s Foreign Policy in the 21st Century: A Changing Role in World Politics (Aldershot: Ashgate). Bac-Muftuler, M. (1997), Turkey’s Relations with a Changing Europe (Manchester: Manchester University Press). Bal, I. (ed.) (2004), Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post Cold War Era (Florida: BrownWalker Press). Boll, M.M. (1979), ‘Turkey’s New National Security Concept: What It Means for NATO’, Orbis, 23. Bolukbasi, S. (1988), Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus (Lanham, MD: University Press of America). Cetinsaya, G. (1999), ‘Ikinci Dunya Savasinda Turk-Iran Iliskileri, 1939–1945’, Strateji, 11. Davison, R.H. (1973), Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856–1876 (New York: Gordian Press). Davison, R.H. (1976), ‘Russian Skill and Turkish Imbecility: The Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji Reconsidered’, Slavic Review, 35. Deringil, S. (1989), Turkish Foreign Policy during the Second World War: An ‘Active’ Neutrality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Fromkin, D. (1991), A Peace to End All Peace: Creating the Modern Middle East, 1914–1922 (London: Penguin). Fuller, G. and Lesser, I.O. (1993), Turkey’s New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China (Santa Monica, CA: RAND). Gokay, B. (1997), A Clash of Empires: Turkey between Russian Bolshevism and British Imperialism, 1918–1923 (London: I.B. Tauris). Hale, W. (2000), Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774–2000 (London: Frank Cass). Hurewitz, J.C. (1961), ‘Ottoman Diplomacy and the European States System’, Middle East Journal, 15. Karpat, K.H. (ed.) (1975), ‘Turkish-Soviet Relations’, in Kemal H. Karpat (ed.), Turkey’s Foreign Policy in Transition, 1950–1974 (Leiden: E.J. Brill).

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Karpat, K.H. (ed.) (1975), Turkey’s Foreign Policy in Transition, 1950–1974 (Leiden: E.J. Brill). Kent, M. (ed.) (1984), The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire (London: George Allen & Unwin). Kuniholm, B. (1994), The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East (Princeton: Princeton University Press). Kuniholm, B. (1996), ‘Turkey and the West since World War II’, in Vojtech Mastny and R. Craig Nation (eds), Turkey Between East and West: New Challenges for a Rising Regional Power (Colorado: Westview Press). Kurat, A.N. (1990), Turkiye ve Rusya (Ankara: Kultur Bakanligi). Larrabee, F.S.and Lesser, I.O. (2002), Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty (Santa Monica, CA: RAND). Leffler, M.P. (1985), ‘Strategy, Diplomacy and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey and NATO, 1945–1952’, The Journal of American History, 71. Mango, A. (1999), Ataturk (London: John Murray). Martin, L.G. and Keridis, D. (eds) (2004), The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press). Naff, T. (1984), ‘The Ottoman Empire and the European States System’, in Bull, H. and Oran, B. (eds) (2001a), Turk Dis Politikasi, Cilt 1: 1919–1980 (Istanbul: Iletisim). Oran, B. (ed.) (2001b), Turk Dis Politikasi, Cilt 2: 1980–2001 (Istanbul: Iletisim). Robins, P. (1991), Turkey and the Middle East (London: RIIA, 1991). Robins, P. (2003), Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy since the Cold War (London: Hurst). Rubin, B. and Kirisci, K. (eds) (2002), Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power (Istanbul: Bogazici University Press). Sever, A. (1997), Soguk Savas Kusatmasinda Turkiye, Bati ve Ortadogu, 1945–1958 (Istanbul: Boyut). Sezer, D.B. (1981), Turkey’s Security Policies, Adelphi Papers 164 (London: IISS). Sezer, D.B. (1993) ‘Turkey and the Western Alliance in the 1980s’, in Atilla Eralp, Muharrem Tunay and Birol A. Yesilada (eds), The Political and Socioeconomic Transformation of Turkey (Westport: Praeger). Vali, F.A. (1971), Bridge Across the Bosporus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press). Watson, A. and Bull, H. (eds) (1985), The Expansion of International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Yasamee, F.A.K. (1993), ‘Abdulhamid II and the Ottoman Defence Problem’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 4/1. Yasamee, F.A.K (1996), Ottoman Diplomacy: Abdulhamid II and the Great Powers, 1878–1888 (Istanbul: ISIS). Yasamee, F.A.K. (1999), ‘Ottoman Diplomacy in the Era of Abdulhamid II, 1878– 1908’, in Cagdas Turk Diplomasisi: 200 Yillik Surec (Ankara: TTK). Yasamee, F.A.K. (2000), ‘The Ottoman Empire and European Alliances, 1815–

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1914’, The Great Ottoman-Turkish Civilization: Politics (Ankara: Yeni Turkiye Yayinlari). Yasamee, F.A.K. (1995), ‘“Ottoman Empire”, in Decisions of War, 1914’, in Keith Wilson (ed.), The Ottoman Empire (New York: St. Martin’s Press). Yesilbursa, B.K. (2005), The Baghdad Pact (London: Frank Cass).

Chapter 2

Transatlantic Relations and Turkey Thomas S. Mowle1

Introduction Samuel Huntington (see Huntington 1996, 144–9) describes Turkey as a ‘torn’ state, torn as he sees it between Islam and the ‘West’. This is simplistic, and not merely because Turkey has an identity, the centre of a widely spread cultural and linguistic area, mirroring its geography as a link between Europe and Asia. Huntington’s description is also simplistic because the ‘West’ is itself increasingly torn between two centres. The United States and Europe are no longer as tightly linked as they once were. These two ‘Wests’ present different futures for Turkey, and Turkish policy cannot help but be affected by their disagreements. On the one hand, for decades Turkish policy was seen as close to American policy; it has hosted American military bases, is one of NATO’s largest troop contributors, and on many issues through the 1990s adopted policy positions close to American preferences. On the other hand, Turkey is geographically closer to Europe and has begun discussions with the European Union for eventual membership, an aspiration which the United States has strongly supported. Turkish policy has been changing, moving closer to Europe. At some point Turkey will need to decide which part of the West its destiny is with – not explicitly, perhaps, but as an accumulation of its individual choices. Why must such a choice be made? European and American interests and policies have been drifting in different directions since the end of the Cold War. One reason for this is strategic – most European states no longer fear ideological or military domination by Moscow, so the American role as ‘protector’ of European freedom has vanished. European states are thus less willing to paper over their differences with American policy (see Kagan 2004; Mowle 2004, 9–10). A second reason is institutional – the European Union itself presents itself as an alternative power centre to the United States, enabling its member states to access wealth and public goods. In return, Brussels increasingly expects its members to support each other’s foreign policies – and they adjust their policies to meet (see Ladrech 1994; Smith 2000; Borzel 2002; Rynning 2003; and Johansson-Nogués 2004). So 1 The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defence or the U.S. Government.

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if Turkey aspires to join the European Union, it too will be expected to continue to adopt European preferences for internal and external policies. As the benefits of joining the Union become clear, Turkey will develop an affinity for European process, just like other members have. While Turkey will not face a direct question – are you with America or with Europe – it will find that Union membership will require it to increasingly make policy choices that place it on the European side of the divide. These choices have already begun. One area of division within the ‘West’ is over a host of multilateral agreements on human rights, arms control, and the environment. On these, Turkey’s initial position has been similar to the American, but over time it has changed its policies to move them closer to European standards. These disagreements with the United States extend beyond a matter of mere policy preferences, since in the case of the International Criminal Court and the Mine Ban Treaty, Turkey’s new positions directly obstruct American foreign policy. While Turkey is to some extent a bystander to these multilateral disagreements, it plays a central role with respect to EU access to NATO assets. As the Union has developed its European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), both it and NATO have wanted to be able to share planning facilities and other alliancecommon items. With Turkey outside the EU, it has taken strong steps to ensure that its interests would not be harmed by EU actions. Turkish interests are more directly affected by the European role in the Balkans, especially in Macedonia and Bosnia, and by the accession of Cyprus to the EU without a peace agreement being reached. The third dimension of intra-Western dispute is less well known, but equally affects Turkey. While NATO is sometimes equated in Europe with American interests, the relationship between NATO and the United States is also uneasy. The American operation in Afghanistan, ‘Enduring Freedom’, is separate from the NATO-run ISAF. NATO has taken on a minor share of the training of Iraqi security forces, separate again from the American operation. As the United States conducts operations independently of both NATO and the UN, its long-term commitment to NATO has been privately questioned by other NATO members (see Mowle 2005). Finally, it would also be simplistic to treat ‘Europe’ as unified. European countries have taken different stances over the war in Iraq. France and Germany opposed the war from the start, and tried to block NATO assistance to Turkey in 2003. Since the invasion, more states have opted out of the war, but Europe remains divided. Many of the new members, along with the UK, Netherlands, Italy, and others, have supported the coalition effort. Spain eventually joined Belgium, France, Germany, and the neutrals, in opposition to the war. Turkey’s opposition to the war – its parliamentary vote to turn down the American request to open a second front in Northern Iraq – was based on the economic and immigration legacy of the 1990–91 war and strong popular opposition to the war. In reaching this decision, however, Turkey adopted a position close to most of the European population. The symbolism here might best be captured by a comment exchanged between two French academics, upon hearing

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that the Turkish parliament had turned down the American request for transit in the upcoming war: ‘Ah, Turkey is European after all!’2 US-EU Relations Since the 1990s, relations between the United States and European Union have grown increasingly strained. The European Union began to implement its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) under the Maastricht Treaty just as the collapse of the Soviet Union created a strategic and ideological vacuum filled only by the United States. With European states increasingly adopting a preference for multilateral solutions to international problems, the Union faced a United States that continued to favour such solutions only when they were clearly to its benefit. In case after case, these disagreements over policy heightened into disagreements over global philosophy, as some Europeans demonized American reluctance to move towards global governance whilst American policy modulated into one of aggressively undermining European efforts. These include the Mine Ban Treaty, the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court, and the death penalty. The Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) was signed in Ottawa in December 1997, after negotiations led by Canada and Norway outside the consensus-driven United Nations Committee on Disarmament (CD). The treaty banned the production, export, stockpiling and use of anti-personnel landmines. The United States argued against the treaty, wanting exceptions for Korea and for the anti-handling features of its anti-tank landmines, as well as wanting better verification of its provisions and a delay in entry into force until most producers had signed. The EU was united in favour of the treaty, except for Finland, which wanted to retain landmines as an option for its long border with Russia, which was not guaranteed by NATO (see Cameron et al 1998; Mowle 2004, 46–50; Winslow 1997). The organizations that promoted the ban are using its success to lobby against cluster munitions and depleted uranium shells, both of which are more significant parts of the American arsenal than land mines (see Mowle 2004, 165; Cluster Munitions Coalition). Turkey was not among the 121 states that signed the MBT in 1996, but it acceded to the regime on 25 September 2003 (International Campaign to Ban Landmines). It did so jointly with Greece, which had held out against the treaty within the European Union, signed it in Ottawa, but delayed ratification until Turkey had joined as well. The two NATO allies maintain minefields along their mutual border; the treaty will require their removal by 2014 (Ban Mines USA). Turkish retention of landmines was a practical issue rather than a philosophical one – historically, it had more or less hostile countries on all its borders (including, perhaps, with Greece). Turkey had completed de-mining 2 Overheard by the author at the International Studies Association conference, Portland, OR, 1 March 2003.

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of its border with Bulgaria, at the time an impending NATO member, in 2002, and has been working on its borders with Georgia, Syria, and Armenia. Most significantly for transatlantic relations, Turkey is interpreting its obligations under the MBT as prohibiting American stockpiling or transit of landmines – an interpretation shared by some but not all states parties (see Landmine Monitor Report 2004). The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) was signed in July 1998; this is a second area where Turkey has moved from a position in accord with the United States to one in accord with Europe. The ICC, which came into existence in 2002, establishes a standing court to prosecute genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity in cases where they are not sufficiently investigated by national courts. It has jurisdiction over crimes committed on the territory of states parties and by citizens of states parties. American leadership was instrumental in writing the statute, but the United States voted against the final draft in Rome (see Lee 1999; Robertson 2000; Nesi and Politi 2001; Mowle 2004, 88–98). It signed in late December 2000, but in May 2002 sent a letter to the UN reading, in part, ‘the United States does not intend to become a party to the treaty. Accordingly, the United States has no legal obligations arising from its signature on December 31, 2000’.3 Not only did the United States ‘unsign’ the statute, it engaged in an intense diplomatic effort to isolate it, pursuing bilateral agreements under Article 98 that would specifically exempt Americans from its jurisdiction and holding up peacekeeping resolutions if they did not include immunity for non-ICC members (see Mowle 2004, 6–8). Turkey did not sign the Rome Statute, so was not affected by this American campaign. Its interest in joining the EU, however, led it to reconsider this position. In June 2003, the European Council adopted a common position on the ICC, calling for universal support and membership; it asked Turkey and other acceding or associated countries to adopt the same position.4 On 8 October 2004, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan told the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe that legal changes in Turkey allowed him to predict that ‘Turkey will, in the near future, ratify the Rome Statute and become a party to the International Criminal Court.’5 These changes, part of the overall effort to bring Turkish law into closer harmony with European norms, had included amending Article 38 of the Turkish constitution to read, ‘No citizen shall be extradited to a foreign country on account of an offence except under the obligations resulting from being a party to the International Criminal Court.’6 While Turkey’s status as 3 United Nations, . 4 European Council Common Position 2003/444/CFSP, 16 June 2003. 5 Address by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, at the Plenary Session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 6 Oct 04 (see ). 6 Turkish Constitution, as amended 22 May 2004, (see ).

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a NATO ally would protect it from some retaliatory actions by the United States, its accession to the ICC (along with joining the MBT) would create a new kind of tension with it and illustrate the impact of EU preferences on Turkish foreign policy. At the same time, Turkey also amended Article 38 of its constitution to prohibit the death penalty, following its parliamentary abolition in 2002; the punishment had not been applied since 1984 (see Mowle 2004, 108). Even Kurdish terrorist Abdullah Ocalan’s death sentence was commuted at that time to life in prison; Turkey is honouring the European Court of Human Rights’ ruling that his 1999 trial had been unfair.7 These policy adjustments are yet another sign of European influence, and one that may indirectly bring it into conflict with the United States. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union prohibits the death penalty or extradition to states where the death penalty is likely to be applied;8 adherence to this charter would be required for membership in the EU. While the United States has no objection to states abolishing the death penalty, the ban on extradition could effect terrorism prosecutions. Some European states have taken this a step further, declining to assist with investigations of suspects already in American custody, such as Zacarias Moussaoui, if the evidence could lead to the imposition of the death penalty (see Mowle 2004, 105). Turkish aspirations to join the European Union will also run into a fourth area of transatlantic disagreement – the Kyoto Protocol. Kyoto obligates the mostindustrialized states to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by 2008–12; Turkey would be part of that group under the Framework Convention for Climate Change (FCCC) if it had signed it; as it is, Turkey is not included in Kyoto’s Annex B.9 Turkey acceded to the FCCC in February 2004,10 however, and it would at some point probably be expected to assume some requirement to reduce its emissions if it ratified Kyoto. For that reason, on 18 February 2005, Environment Minister Osman Pepe said Turkish needs for further industrialization would prevent it from signing until ‘2015 at the earliest’.11 The EU has adopted country-specific targets that distribute its 8% reduction requirement among its members, including allowing some members to even increase their emissions (see Mowle 2004, 77–8). Turkey could try to fit into this ‘bubble’, but doing so would require other EU members to accept larger reductions – the other new members of the EU have their own individual targets under Kyoto, which they have maintained. 7 ‘Trial of Kurdish Leader “Unfair”’, BBC, 12 May 2005. 8 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (see articles 2 and 19 at ). 9 Global Climate Coalition (see ). 10 http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/convention/status_of_ratification/ application/pdf/ratlist.pdf. 11 ‘Turkey says it needs to industrialize before signing climate deal’, Agence France-Presse, 18 February, 2005, (see at ).

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EU-NATO Relations As the European Union honed its ability to act in concert in foreign policy, it began developing a security and defence dimension. France and the United Kingdom initiated this process with their Joint Declaration on European Defence at St Malo on 4 December 1998, calling for the creation of a ‘capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so’. Other Member States responded enthusiastically, volunteering forces to meet 1999’s Helsinki Headline Goals, creating the post of High Commissioner for the CFSP (Javier Solana), conducting operations in the Balkans and Africa, and creating an Armaments Agency to coordinate European defence requirements (see Mowle 2004, 126–34). This EU effort would have had little direct impact on Turkey, except that both the Europeans and Americans wanted to retain a place for NATO. NATO had been the common defence organization for Western Europe, including Turkey after it joined in 1952. While the disintegration of the Soviet Union and its European empire removed NATO’s original purpose, its members on both sides of the Atlantic sought, throughout the 1990s, to reconfigure NATO to meet newer threats. At the very least, its planning facilities, headquartered at Supreme Headquarters Allied Forces Europe (SHAPE) at Mons, Belgium, allowed the allied states to conduct operations – as an organization or as an ad hoc coalition – more efficiently through interoperable equipment and command structures. For the most pro-NATO countries, these planning facilities were central to maintaining alliance integrity and represented a way for the EU to inherit existing structures rather than going to the time and expense of devising their own. For the more pro-European countries, these planning facilities represented a check on European autonomy. Turkey would be at the centre of a four-year dispute over the terms of ‘Berlin Plus‘, the rules for European access to NATO planning resources, which were finally accepted in March 2003 (see Tofte 2003). Ultimately, NATO agreed that the EU will have assured access to common NATO resources, in particular the planning staff at SHAPE, in situations were NATO itself is not involved. The Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (DSACEUR) would have overall command of an ESDP mission, using a cell of the EU Military Staff (EUMS) co-located with SHAPE. If SHAPE or NATO resources were not available, then the EU would conduct its operation using a national planning centre. The final option would be to activate an EU headquarters.12 The central problem in agreeing to this plan was that the two organisations’ membership differed. Turkey was a member of NATO but not the EU; it had contributed more than the other non-EU members to the NATO assets that would now be available to the EU. Turkey’s concerns were not merely financial. It lies adjacent to several zones of conflict in which the EU could conceivably take 12 Berlin Plus is summarized at .

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action: the Aegean, the Balkans, Cyprus, the Caucasus, Iraq, and Israel. So Turkey threatened to use its veto in NATO to block EU access unless it would be assured of being able to participate in planning for operations in areas of special interest. In 2000, it described the EU’s plans for the ESDP as ‘far from being satisfactory’, as they ‘have not taken into consideration the important points of the NATO Summit and Council decisions’. In particular, Turkey wanted ‘regular participation … in daily planning and consultations, …full and equal participation in operations under the leadership of the EU where NATO capabilities will be used, …[and] full and equal participation in the decision-making process … where NATO capabilities will not be used’ (see Cakmakoglu 2000,12). The United States supported this basic position – Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s (1998) reaction to St Malo had been to insist upon ‘no discrimination against non-EU European NATO members, no duplication of effort or capabilities, and no decoupling of European security from North American allies’. France and Greece led a group of EU members who opposed such assured Turkish access (see Quinlan 2001, 46–7). While both countries argued that doing so would violate the Union’s integrity and autonomy, France also saw a deadlock in this area as a way to force the EU to develop a truly autonomous force. The Greek position was revealed in December 2001, after the US, UK, and Turkey worked out a plan, which Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit said met ‘our justified expectations … to a very large extent’. This agreement included assurances that NATO assets could not be used in an area of Turkish interest without Turkey’s participation and agreement. Greece, however, immediately objected, with Foreign Minister George Papandreou insisting upon ‘the autonomy of the European Union regarding issues of foreign policy and defence’, so ‘the fact that Turkey has agreed does not mean that Greece has agreed’.13 It took another year before the European Council found a way to resolve this deadlock. At the Copenhagen Council of December 2002, the EU agreed that access to NATO facilities for ESDP purposes would ‘apply only to those EU Member States which are also either NATO members or parties to the “Partnership for Peace”, and which have consequently concluded bilateral security agreements with NATO’. This excluded Cyprus (and Malta), meeting Turkish concerns, in a way that could be seen as rational in Greece. Resolution of Berlin Plus allowed the European Union to proceed with ESDP operations in the Balkans, operations in which Turkey participated. At the end of March 2003, the EU-run Operation CONCORDIA replaced the NATO peace operation in Macedonia. Turkey was one of 14 non-EU states (8 of which would shortly join the Union) that contributed forces to this mission.14 CONCORDIA lasted until 5 December 2003, at which point it was replaced by Operation EUPOL PROXIMA, a policing and training mission in Macedonia. Turkey is one of the four non-EU members that participated in this operation, which was extended in 13 ‘Greece Threatens EU Defence Deal’, BBC, 5 December 2001. 14 See .

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December 2004 for another year.15 On 2 December 2004, the EU took on their most ambitious operation, EUFOR-ALTHEA, a peace operation that followed the termination of NATO’s SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Once again, Turkey contributed troops to this mission; 229 (one-quarter) of the 886 troops contributed by 11 non-EU Members. The Turkish forces were deployed in spring 2005 mostly near Zenica.16 Turkey did not participate in the EU missions in Africa launched around this time. Resolution of Berlin Plus has allowed the EU to conduct operations in areas where it is primarily interested, allowed NATO (and the United States) to disengage from parts of the Balkans, and also allowed Turkey to participate in these operations as it wished – both countries are part of the UN-authorized Kosovo Force (KFOR), and have been since its inception.17 This is not the end of the story, however. The terms under which Berlin Plus access was defined in March 2003 have continued to disrupt discussions between NATO and the EU. Most EU member states would like to jointly discuss civil emergency response, terrorism, weapons proliferation, and many other issues that do not involve NATO assets. Turkey insists on Cyprus’ exclusion from discussion of any issue that may eventually trigger Berlin Plus rights of access, while the EU refuses to exclude a member state unless Berlin Plus is directly involved. Turkish accession to the European Union would eliminate this problem, of course, but in the meantime tensions remain in the intersection between the Union and NATO. NATO-US Relations In the preceding section, the NATO and American positions corresponded fairly closely. This is not always the case. The tension that has always existed between NATO and the United States today manifests itself in questions about support for USinitiated missions in Afghanistan and Iraq. In both cases, the United States conducts a mission distinct from NATO, but wants NATO to take on important supporting tasks. Turkey, as one of the most important members of NATO and the only one that shares its primary religious faith with those countries, is directly affected by these tensions. After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, NATO invoked its provisions for collective defence under Article 5. The American response, however, was conducted independently of NATO. British special forces were the only major European component of Operation ‘Enduring Freedom’, which began in October 2001 and continued as an ongoing effort to disrupt Taliban loyalists and cadres of Osama bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda organization. Once the Taliban were routed, Europeans began to 15 See and links from it, especially http://www.eupol-proxima.org/ >. 16 See and links from it, especially . 17 See .

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play a larger role in Afghanistan. The UK took the lead on the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul, beginning in December 2001. This 19-country force was notable in that the US retained operational control over it, but did not contribute forces to it (see Mowle 2004, 138–40). Initially, ISAF was an autonomous UN operation. On 20 June 2002, command passed to Turkey, the only primarily Islamic member of the coalition. Turkey led ISAF for six months before passing command to Germany and the Netherlands; in August 2003, NATO took control of ISAF with a German general remaining in command. As of spring 2005, Turkey was again in command, for six months beginning in February, and contributed 825 troops, about 10% of the total, and the third-largest contingent after Germany and Canada. One of the tensions between the United States and NATO with respect to this mission is that only 89 American troops were at that point assigned to ISAF.18 Turkey has also assumed a significant political role in Afghanistan – Hikmet Cetin was appointed Senior Civilian Representative in January 2004, coordinating relations between NATO, the UN, Afghanistan, the European Union, and other institutions.19 A similar distinction exists between the US operation in Iraq, ‘Iraqi Freedom’ (authorized under UNSCR 1546) and the NATO Training Mission – Iraq (NTM-I) – and its predecessor, the NATO Training Implementation Mission, Iraq (NTIMI). Turkey did not contribute forces to the military mission, and, as noted in the introduction, did not allow American or other coalition forces use Turkish territory as a staging ground for the war. After the UNSC authorized the ongoing mission in June 2004, Turkey expressed interest in sending forces to Iraq, but this was rejected by the newly sovereign Iraqi government. The Iraqis declined to accept forces from any neighbouring countries. This has held true under the two NATO missions – while Turkey contributes to the mission, as do all NATO members, it does not have forces in country.20 This is the only major European or NATO mission to which Turkey does not contribute troops. Iraq and Intra-European Divisions Each of the three prior sections describes a transatlantic gap that divides well-defined ‘Western’ institutions, gaps that affect Turkey directly. Iraq merits its own section because Europe itself is divided on the question – some members of NATO and the European Union participated in the invasion, occupation, and ongoing mission in Iraq, while other lobbied hard against it. This story is too well known to repeat here, except for an incident that had the potential to affect Turkey directly. As it became clear that war was likely, Turkey requested NATO assistance in order to be prepared for an attack from Iraq. France, Germany, and Belgium blocked this in the North Atlantic Council on the grounds that aid to Turkey would suggest that the decision 18 See . 19 See . 20 See .

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for war had already been made, and so reduce the chance of Iraqi cooperation. The dispute was resolved by taking it from the NAC to the Defence Planning Group, from which France continued to exclude itself. Germany and Belgium, unwilling to stand alone in the smaller group, decided not to block the request (see Berstein, 2003). Then Secretary-General Lord Robertson described this as ‘an unnecessary indulgence which must never be repeated’ (Robertson, 2003).21 The ensuing operation, ‘Display Deterrence’, began on 20 February 2003 and lasted until 16 April 2003. It included about 1000 NATO troops, supporting NATO airborne warning aircraft at Konya Air Base and Dutch, German, and American anti-aircraft Patriot missile batteries at Diyarbakir and Batman.22 While Turkey does not currently contribute forces to the missions in Iraq, it is deeply affected by the war there, in particular by its relationship with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), which has exercized substantial autonomy in Northern Iraq since 1991.23 The KRG’s authority in Dohuk, Irbil, and Sulaimaniya provinces is clearly delineated in the Iraqi Constitution. Federal power in Iraq covers only foreign and security policy, fiscal and trade policy, citizenship, and the distribution of water ‘from outside Iraq’, as well as the income from present (but not future) oil fields.24 Regional governments, such as the KRG, share power with Baghdad with respect to customs, electricity, environment, health, education, and ‘internal water resources’.25 All other issues are controlled by regions and provinces, and ‘priority shall be given to the [sub-national] law … in case of a dispute’.26 Furthermore, according to the constitution, ‘the federal government…shall undertake the management of oil and gas extracted from present fields’.27 The word ‘present’ suggests that future oil wealth is not under federal control, and thus could be reserved by the Kurds (and Shia Arabs in the South) for themselves. Nechirvan Barzani (2005), prime minister of the KRG, has written, ‘Kurdistan must have full ownership of our currently unexploited natural resources’, meaning those around Kirkuk. The future of Kirkuk, capital of Tamim province and host to the country’s secondlargest oil fields, is more troubling to Turkey. Both Kurds and Turkomen claim the city as their historic centre; no historical census data will convince either group to give up its claim.28 Under the new Iraqi Constitution, a referendum on Kirkuk’s status is to be held no later than December 2007.29 In anticipation of this referendum, 21 Lord George Robertson, Farewell Speech to the North Atlantic Council, NATO Headquarters, December 17, 2003. 22 See and . 23 For additional detail on this topic, (see Park (2004). 24 Iraqi Constitution, Article 107. 25 Iraqi Constitution, Article 110. 26 Iraqi Constitution, Article 111. 27 Iraqi Constitution, Article 109.1. 28 For an excellent discussion of Kirkuk and its politics (see Rosen 2005). Also (see alMufti 2003; Dawoodi 2004; Gharib 2004; and Osman 2004). 29 Iraqi Constitution, Article 136.

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thousands of Kurds have moved into Kirkuk, helping a Kirkuk Brotherhood List, including Kurds, Arabs and Turkomen, win 26 of 41 seats on the provincial council in January 2005 (see Nadir and Noji 2005).30 Despite the inclusiveness of their list, after the election they began conducting assembly meetings in Kurdish (see Sanders 2005). When Kurdish security and police were accused of illegal activities in culturally-divided Kirkuk, local officials refused to carry out a June 2005 Interior Ministry order to fire 2500 of them (see Faiaru and Shadid 2005; Wong 2005).31 Arabs and Turkomen have been arrested, apparently as part of a drive to increase the Kurdish population of the city before an expected referendum on transferring it to Kurdish control (see Rasan 2005). Kurdish forces played the major role in the early September 2005 assault on Tal Afar, largely inhabited by Sunni Turkomen (see Finer 2005). Perhaps even more troubling for Turkey is the prospect of an independent Kurdish state in what is now Northern Iraq. In an unofficial parallel referendum, a majority of Iraqi Kurds voted for independence in January 2005 (see Nadir 2005).32 The constitutional provisions, such as regional representation in embassies, and control of their own internal security,33 lay the practical (if not legal) foundation for a Kurdish region to secede, despite the verbal addition to Article 1 that, ‘this constitution is a guarantee for the unity of Iraq’.34 This begs the question of whether or not their leadership would fight for their independence. The Pershmerga forces that have fought Saddam (and each other) for decades remain intact, rolled into KRG defences. The Peshmerga have not, however, been able to win these wars and unless the Kurdish leadership believed it had a guarantee of outside assistance, they may not wish to risk losing what they have unless the Baghdad government takes it away. Even an autonomous KRG, however, acts as a model for political action by the Kurdish people of Turkey. The Iraqi Kurds have historically not supported Kurdish terrorist groups in Turkey, seeing their tactics as undermining their own aspirations. Iraqi Kurds have even supported Turkish operations on Iraqi territory aimed at the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) and its successor organizations, Kongra Gel and the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK). Turkey has pressed for American operations against the 5000 or so members of Kurdish terrorist organizations on Iraqi territory.35 While this final section of this chapter has focused largely on Iraq, that war must be seen in the context of transatlantic politics. If the major European states and the 30 Their numbers are at odds with the official IECI results, which are given here. 31 See also ‘Kurdish Police in Kirkuk Fired’, Addustour, reprinted in Iraqi Press Monitor, 7 June 2005. 32 Fleishman reports that 1.7 million Kurds, or 45% of the population, signed an independence petition (see Fleishman 2005). 33 Iraqi Constitution, Articles 111.4 and 117.5. 34 ‘Iraqi MPs Approve Charter Changes’, BBC News, 13 October 2005, . 35 ‘Turkish Army Criticizes US over Kurdish Rebels, Warns over Kirkuk’, Agence France-Presse, 20 April 2005, published at .

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United States had reached agreement on the war, hostilities and the ensuing occupation may have proceeded differently. Turkey may even have, in that case, allowed the use of its territory in the war, which may also have given it more influence with the Iraqi government – and the United States – in how post-war arrangements were made. As long as transatlantic differences continue, Turkish policy will take into account not only its direct interests but also the impact of implicitly ‘taking sides’. For example, while Turkey did not allow its territory to be used in 2003 for the land invasion of Iraq, Incirlik Air Base was used for refuelling during and after the operation. In May 2005 Turkey accepted an American request for use of the base to transport ‘nonlethal’ cargo to Iraq and Afghanistan (see Zaman 2005). Conclusion and The Future Turkish foreign policy, if not the state itself, is torn. Its initial instinct in many cases has been to adopt a position contrary to the European Union’s. If Turkey seeks to join the Union, it will need to demonstrate that it can and will follow policies that support the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. It has done this, adhering to the Mine Ban Treaty, abolishing the death penalty, and laying the groundwork for joining the International Criminal Court and Kyoto Protocol. On issues closer to core national security concerns, such as EU access to NATO facilities and the war in Iraq, Turkey continues to make decisions as it sees its own national interest. Even in these areas, however, Turkish policy independence may be compromised if it is to present itself as a ‘European’ country. Nevertheless, that is a choice that Turkey will have to make for itself, a choice that is conditioned by issues discussed in more detail in other chapters of this book. These issues include the advantages of joining the EU, Turkey’s assessment of whether or not it is likely to be invited, the status of Cypriot politics, and the development of Turkish ties with the larger linguistic community to its east. Turkey’s choices will also be affected by future developments in transatlantic relations. If the US joins the MBT or ICC, for example, that issue would no longer be a source of disagreement. Policy differences between Europe and the United States with respect to Iranian non-proliferation might force another choice on Turkey as a bordering state. Most importantly, political developments in Iraq will determine whether Turkey’s geopolitics include a relatively liberal, intact, and prospering neighbour, or a failing state divided into hostile enclaves seeking foreign support against one another. References Albright, M. (1998), ‘The Right Balance will Secure NATO’s Future’, Financial Times, 7 December. Ban Mines USA, . Barzani, N. (2005), ‘Why Kurdistan Insists on Kirkuk’, Financial Times, 15 August.

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Bernstein, R. with Weisman, S.R. (2003), ‘NATO Settles Rift Over Aid to Turks in Case of a War’, The New York Times, 17 February. Borzel, T. (2002), ‘Pace-Setting, Foot-Dragging, and Fence-Sitting: Member States Responses to Europeanization’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 40: 2, 193–214. Cakmakoglu, S. (2000), White Book Turkey 2000 (Ankara: Ministry of National Defence). Cameron M.A., Lawson, R.J. and Tomlin, B.W. (eds) (1998), To Walk Without Fear: The Global Movement to Ban Landmines (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Cluster Munitions Coalition, . Dawoodi, S. (2004), ‘Kurd Demos Spark Ethnic Conflict Concerns’, Iraqi Crisis Report 84, 11 October. Erdogan, R.T. (2004), Address at the Plenary Session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 6 Oct 04, . Faiaru, S. and Shadid, A. (2005), ‘Kurdish Officials Sanction Abductions in Kirkuk’, Washington Post, 15 June. Finer, J. (2005), ‘Informants Decide Fate of Iraqi Detainees’, Washington Post, 13 September. Fleishman, J. (2005), ‘Iraqi Kurds See Chance to Press for Statehood’, Los Angeles Times, 1 February. Gharib, S. (2004), ‘Kirkuk’s Displaced Still Homeless’, Iraqi Crisis Report 68, 14 June. Howorth, J. and Keeler, J. (eds) (2003), Defending Europe: The EU, NATO, and the Quest for European Autonomy (New York: Palgrave). Huntington, S.P. (1996), The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Touchstone). International Campaign to Ban Landmines, . Johansson-Nogués, E. (2004), ‘The Fifteen and the Accession States in the UN General Assembly: What Future for European Foreign Policy in the Coming Together of the “Old” and the “New” Europe?’, European Foreign Affairs Review, 9:1. Kagan, R. (2004), ‘America’s Crisis of Legitimacy’, Foreign Affairs, 83:2. Ladrech, R. (1994), ‘Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions: The Case of France’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 33:1. Landmine Monitor Report 2004, . Lee, R.S. (ed.) (1999), The International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute – Issues, Negotiations, Results (The Hague: Kluwer Law International). Mowle, T.S. (2004), Allies at Odds? The United States and the European Union (New York: Palgrave). Mowle, T.S. (2005), ‘American Policy and its Impact on the EU-NATO-US Relationship’, Dusseldorf Institute for Foreign and Security Policy, March. al-Mufti, N. (2003), ‘Turkomans under Threat’, Iraqi Crisis Report 24, 25 June. Nadir, T., ‘Kurds Stage Unofficial Independence Vote’, Iraqi Crisis Report 107, 31 January.

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Nadir, T. and Naji, Z. (2005), ‘Kurds Set Out Their Demands’, Iraqi Crisis Report 113, 18 February. Nesi, G. and Politi, M. (eds) (2001), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Challenge to Impunity (Aldershot: Ashgate). Osman, T. (2004), ‘Comment: A Kurdish Jerusalem’, Iraqi Crisis Report 84, 11 October. Park, B. (2004), ‘Iraq’s Kurds and Turkey: Challenges for US Policy’, Parameters, 34:3. Quinlan, M. (2001), European Defence Cooperation: Asset or Threat to NATO? (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Press). Rasan, D. (2005), ‘Kurdish Security Accused of Illegal Arrests’, Iraqi Crisis Report 138, 23 August. Robertson, G. (2000), Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle For Global Justice (New York: New Press). Rosen, N. (2005), ‘In the Balance’, The New York Times Magazine, 20 February. Rynning, S. (2003), ‘The European Union: Toward A Strategic Culture?’, Security Dialogue, 34:4. Sanders, E. (2005), ‘Kurds Wield New Power in Kirkuk Politics’, Los Angeles Times, 27 March. Smith, M. E. (2000), ‘Conforming to Europe: The Domestic Impact of EU Foreign Policy Co-Operation’, Journal of European Public Policy, 7:4. Tofte, S. (2003), ‘Non-EU NATO Members and the Issue of Discrimination’, in Jolyon Howorth and John Keeler (eds) (New York: Palgrave Macmillan). Winslow, P.C. (1997), Sowing the Dragon’s Teeth: Land Mines and the Global Legacy of War (Boston: Beacon Press). Wong, E. (2005), ‘Car Bombs Kill at Least 20 as Attacks Roil Northern Iraq’, The New York Times, 7 June. Zaman, A. (2005), ‘Turkey OKs Expanded Use of Key Air Base’, Los Angeles Times, 3 May.

Chapter 3

Turkey’s Potential (and Controversial) Contribution to the Global ‘Actorness’ of the EU Eduard Soler i Lecha

The EU decided to open negotiations in a last minute decision in October 2005. Turkey then started a long negotiation process, the results of which, as the EU itself often states, cannot be taken for granted. The months and years previous to this historical moment were characterized by an increasing debate in several EU countries on the suitability of incorporating Turkey into the EU. The debate was especially vociferous in countries such as France, Germany and the Netherlands, which were founding members of the EU/EEC project. In parallel, Turkey’s political classes have also been questioning the sincerity and fairness of the EU. One of the clearest effects of this frustration is the mounting Euroskepticism that has started to materialize in the face of the Turkish public’s seemingly diminishing enthusiasm for the EU bid (seeYilmaz 2005). The starting of accession negotiations was a step forward in a process that began in 1959 with Menderes’ application for association with the EEC and the subsequent signature of the Ankara Agreement in 1963. Since then, EU-Turkish relations have been characterized by a number of fluctuations, particularly during the last phase of these relations, as Turkey was officially considered a candidate country in 1999. Many topics have been discussed during these years. Among them, Turkey’s contribution to the EU’s foreign policy has been an argument frequently raised by the promoters of Turkey’s EU membership, both in Turkey and abroad. The AKP government has consequently placed significant emphasis on these aspects when ‘selling’ the membership application. Former Turkish governments did the same, with Mesut Yilmaz, for instance, speaking as a member of the European Convention, stating that, ‘as a country that is preparing itself for full membership, we believe that our assets will contribute to the projection of the EU as a global actor in all its dimensions’.1 However, as the President of the European Parliament depicted in a press article, the EU political classes and public opinion are not unanimous in this respect. 1 Intervention by Mesut Yilmaz at the plenary session of the European Convention held on March 21st 2002.

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According to Josep Borrell, whilst some believe that Turkey’s EU accession will mean the definitive denaturalisation of the EU’s raison d’être and will annihilate its capacity to influence world politics through a common foreign policy, others claim that with acceptance of Turkish membership the EU will be able to play a global role, providing a relationship with the Islamic World which will be radically different to that established by the US in the Middle East (see Borrell 2004). Simultaneously, the Commission, in its document entitled Issues Arising from Turkey’s Membership Perspective, affirmed that: from the point of view of the EU’s role in foreign affairs, Turkey’s accession brings both advantages and challenges. It could help to stabilize the conflict-prone zone of the Middle East, but it would bring the EU into more direct involvement with the difficult political and security problems of the region. Turkey being a member would give the EU greater weight in regional and world affairs, but it could also make decision-making, especially under unanimity, more complicated.2

This debate is not confined to political circles; academia has also been discussing Turkey’s contribution to European security as well. Barry Buzan and Thomas Diez (see Buzan and Diez 1999, 47) argued in a famous article that the EU may prefer to keep Turkey as a security insulator rather than become entangled in the security dynamics of Turkey’s neighbouring regions. On the contrary, Michael Emerson and Nathalie Tocci (see Tocci 2004, 31) have declared that Turkey’s integration would be ‘unambiguously positive’ for the EU’s foreign policy, enumerating several fields where cooperation could take place in win-win scenarios. Several authors have also pointed out that Turkey’s accession could weaken the EU’s foreign policy cohesion due to greater discord (see Wood and Quaisser 2005, 170) while others argue that Turkey’s membership would strengthen EU influence in global affairs, particularly in the defence arena (see Muftuler-Bac 2000). In sum, both the political and academic debate is open, setting up a fascinating research agenda for the next years. Three main questions need to be answered. First, whether Turkey’s membership (and, prior to this, its candidacy status) reinforces the EU’s global ‘actorness’.3 Second, whether Turkey’s willingness to be recognized as a regional power is a handicap or an asset in its attempt to persuade its European partners of the advantages of bringing her into the EU club. Third, does Turkey’s EU membership enhance or, on the contrary, attenuate Ankara’s influence in its neighbourhood and in global politics? Although the three questions are pertinent, this chapter will focus mainly on the first one. Our analysis will begin by evaluating the main characteristics of the emergent EU foreign policy and Turkey’s foreseeable place in it, taking into consideration 2 European Commission (2004) Issues arising from Turkey’s membership perspective {COM(2004) 656 final}, Brussels, 6 October 2004, SEC(2004) 1202, p. 12. 3 ‘Actorness’ refers to the capacities of a political entity to develop presence, to become identifiable, aggregate interests, formulate goals and policies and make and implement decisions.

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the outgoing evolution of Turkey’s foreign policy which, to some degree, is experiencing a ‘Europeanisation’ process.4 Two test cases will be presented to illustrate the compatibilities or divergences between the EU’s and Turkey’s foreign policies: the policy towards the Balkans and that towards the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Analysis of the first allows us to examine the question of whether Turkey’s membership will strengthen EU actorness in security matters or not, whilst analysis of the second examines the idea of Turkey’s membership and if it will transform the EU as a stronger political actor, playing a deeper role in the Israel-Arab conflict and developing a EU-led regionalism in that part of the world. Finally, the text concludes by exploring what could be the effects for the EU’s international interests if it decided unilaterally to stop the negotiation process and offered Turkey a consolation prize, that is, ‘privileged partnership’ instead of full membership. Turkey and the EU’s Foreign Policies in Transformation Throughout the last decade, the EU has made significant steps towards the development of a true European Foreign Policy. The Maastricht Treaty established the bases of the current Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which were slightly modified by the treaties of Amsterdam and Nice. Among those changes, one of the most significant was the creation of the figure of the High Representative for the CFSP, a post that has been occupied since its inception by Javier Solana.5 Afterwards the EU went on to launch a European Security and Defence Policy

4 Political science analysts and specialists on European integration have used the term ‘Europeanization’ to explain how national policies need to adapt to EU constraints but also how they can profit from new opportunities brought by to being a full member of the EU; this concept can also be applied to foreign policy analysis. Europeanization is a complex process which, traditionally, has been described as bidirectional. On the one hand there is a ‘bottom-up’ one, in which national actors address European actors and make claims on European issues, and, on the other, a ‘top-down’ one, in which European actors intervene in national policies and public debates in the name of European regulations and common interests. More recently, a horizontal linkage has been added, in which this process would take place through continuous inter-state contacts. In foreign policy, as well as in other EU policies, this multifaceted conceptualisation has generally been applied to EU member states. However, some have applied the concept to analyse the transformations occurring among candidate countries and Turkey should not be an exception. 5 The CFSP decision-making procedure was also altered in the Amsterdam Treaty, to allow qualified majority voting in areas where a Common Strategy had (unanimously) been agreed upon by the European Council first, and introduced the a ‘constructive abstention’ to areas where unanimity is still required for action. The Nice Treaty introduced the notion of Enhanced Cooperation in the area of the CFSP.

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(ESDP) at the Cologne European Council of June 1999 as an integral part of the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).6 Several crises have impelled the EU to reinforce its international actorness and reaction capabilities. War in the former Yugoslavia and, more recently, the September 11th attacks have made realisation of this process even more urgent. The Laeken Declaration illustrates this concern when it asked: ‘What is Europe’s role in this changed world? Does Europe not, now that it is finally unified, have a leading role to play in a new world order, that of a power able both to play a stabilising role worldwide and to point the way ahead for many countries and peoples?’7 Moreover, all public opinion surveys have been indicating that the EU public supports the development of both the CFSP and the ESDP.8 This new phase also lead to the adoption of the EU’s Security Strategy, adopted in December 2003, identifying the main threats affecting European and global security in a deliberate ploy to be dissociated from the National Security Strategy of the Bush administration.9 It also made possible the creation of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which plans to build a ring of ‘friendly countries’ from Russia to Morocco with which the EU may share everything but institutions.10 Finally, the EU Constitutional Treaty, which has not come into force because of the failed referenda in France and the Netherlands, strengthened the external dimension of the EU with measures such as the creation of an EU Minister of Foreign Affairs.11 Even if most of the ideas proposed in the European Convention in charge of the writing of the Constitution were backed by the Turkish representatives (see Nas 2003), several authors have argued that in the future Turkey will more probably be reluctant to move away from an intergovernmental approach in this area, particularly in sensitive issues (see Nas 2003; Hughes 2004, 55).

6 The institutional changes decided at Cologne were further elaborated at Helsinki, finalized at Santa Maria da Feira and finally adopted at Nice in December 2000. 7 ‘The Future of the European Union’, Laeken Declaration. Laeken,15 December 2001. 8 According to the last Eurobarometer pubished (number 63, 2005), the CFSP was supported by 67% and the Security and Defense Policy by 77% of EU public opinion. 9 A Secure Europe in a Better World, Brussels, 12 December 2003. 10 This is a bilateral and differentiating policy according to the ambitions and capabilities of the individual partner states, whose main instrument are single-country Action Plans. Turkey, as well as Romania, Bulgaria and the Balkans, are not included in this circle because as are delineated as future EU members. For more information on this policy, see the European Commission web site: . 11 However, some contemplate the possibility of adopting elements of the politically undisputed measures of the new Treaty before its ratification; this has been called ‘Nice-plus’. Among those measures, we find the Foreign Minister (in a probably somewhat watered-down version, meaning essentially the fusion of the two existing posts of High Representative and Commissioner for External Relations through an Inter-Institutional Agreement that has to make very clear when the FM acts in which function) as well as the External Action Service (see Kurpas 2005, 2).

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Turkey’s foreign policy has also undergone several transformations. For instance, she has been less inclined to instinctively align herself with the US and has developed a more cooperative policy regarding the solution of the division of Cyprus. Similarly, relations with some of her neighbours such as Greece, Syria and Georgia have improved considerably over the last few years. Thus, progressively, Turkey appears more as a problem-solving actor rather than as a problem-maker in such a turbulent area. As for EU-Turkish relations, Turkey has remained unaltered and has even reinforced its willingness to become a full member of the EU, rejecting other options, such as the Privileged Partnership offered by Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy. As some like to say, the EU question has achieved mystic proportions for Turkey, far beyond any material factors (see Rubin 2003, 1). It has become symbol of the successful completion of the long-term Ataturk revolution, involving the most basic and vital points of identity and orientation for Turkey. The opening of accession negotiations, in October 2005 was a first step in that direction which could lead to full membership of the EU in about a decade. Throughout the second half of the twentieth century, Turkey’s deeper integration into the EU/ECC was consistently thwarted, (due to a number of factors such as Turkey’s instable politics, the Cyprus intervention or Greece accession) yet this began to change in 1999. As for the EU side, one should remember the effect of the centre-left victories in several EU member states’ elections and particularly its effects in the German attitude towards Turkey-EU relations. The impressing change of strategy of the Greek government should be recalled as well. As for the Turkish side, the tripartite government (ANAP-DSPMHP) made considerable progress in fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria from 1999 onwards, making great strides in particular with the August 2002 reform package. However, it has been said that the AKP, to a far greater extent than any other political party of the previous era, has demonstrated the highest degree of commitment to the goal of full EU membership (see Onis 2003a, 30). In fact, different sets of measures have been adopted and implemented under this government to the point that in its October 2004 report, the European Commission stated that Turkey had sufficiently fulfilled the political criteria and subsequently recommended the opening of accession negotiations. The priotisation of EU membership has not necessarily meant that the Turkish Government has pushed other foreign priorities into the background. The Middle East, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Balkans, transatlantic relations and the Black Sea region remain central to Turkey’s foreign policy design. However, it is hard to see how a ‘Central Asia’ or ‘Islamic’ option could emerge as effective alternatives to continuing alignment with the European Union or how any government could put them into effect at an acceptable cost (see Hale and Avci 2001, 39). Moreover, Turkey seldom, if ever, sought to exploit its status as a middle power to act as a mediator in regional or global disputes (see Hale, 2002). In that sense, Turkey can qualify as a ‘status quo actor’ which, in spite of some analysts’ predictions, has not been more interventionist after the collapse of the former Soviet Union (see Robins

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2003, 7–8). In fact, Turkey’s attitude regarding the recent ‘revolutions’ in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan illustrate the maintenance of this dynamic. It might be argued that Turkey’s extremely prudent attitude towards its immediate neighbourhood, as well as the aforementioned problem-solving approach, are closely linked to the fact that all other foreign priorities are subordinate to the EU bid. Ankara is aware that being perceived as a regional power could be an asset in its course towards full membership but that it could also become a risk if the EU leaders perceive Turkey’s moves as contradictory with EU priorities abroad, particularly if these moves in some way made the regional environment more dangerous and instable. Forecasting an Inevitable Impact Turkey’s membership will certainly transform the EU, both internally and externally, just as all previous enlargement rounds have done. For instance, Spanish and Portuguese membership reinforced the Mediterranean policies of the EU and eased the upgrading (though still unsatisfactory for these two countries) of Latin America in the EU’s agenda (see Barbé 1999). In 2004, the Eastern Enlargement brought new priorities, new expertize and also new concerns. More interesting, the last enlargement had consequences in the EU’s foreign policy even before the final accession of the ten countries. The launching of the European Neighbourhood Policy, which is a direct response to the challenges of the expansion of the EU’s borders, is the best example of this phenomenon. Due to its size, population and, above all, geopolitical position, Turkey’s EU membership will have a great impact on EU foreign policy, perhaps even before full membership, which is why EU institutions, even at this early stage, are paying considerable attention to the compatibilities between Turkish and EU foreign policies. The EU interest on probing these compatibilities is linked to the fact that there is an increasing interdependence between Turkey and the EU’s security concerns. Turkey’s neighbourhood has become the source of many of Europe’s security concerns, including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and illegal trafficking of drugs and people, identified in the European Security Strategy (see Emerson and Tocci 2004, 1). Moreover, according to Atila Eralp, at the same time that Turkey’s security problems have already penetrated Europe and become internal to Europe, European security problems, such as the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo, have also become Turkey’s problems (see Eralp 2004, 76). In sum, neither Turkey nor the EU can face these threats alone; these challenges, as Abdullah Gul has recognized, require a joint response, for geographical, historical, political and economical reasons.12 However, this interdependence does not automatically mean that the security policies of both entities are compatible. As some have pointed out, 12 Keynote Address by Minister of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister Abdullah Gul, at the Symposium, ‘Turkey and the EU-Looking Beyond Prejudice’, Maastricht, 4–5 April 2004.

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precisely because the EU is building a security policy, there is margin for potential conflict between partners; ‘where there is no policy, there is no risk of conflict’ (see Sinan Ulgen 2003, 44). When evaluating Turkey’s impact on EU foreign policy, two main questions need to be answered. First, will Turkey support the consolidation of a strong and autonomous European Foreign and Security Policy? Second, will Turkey’s approach to security and to international affairs be compatible with the mainstream EU approach? Regarding the first question, one should note that the discourse of the Turkish authorities has combined support for the strengthening of the European Foreign Policy with the claim that transatlantic links should remain in central (see Gul 2004). In that sense, Turkey has traditionally been reluctant in its support of the building of a European Defence Policy independent of NATO. Somehow, Turkey’s official approach towards the transatlantic partnership is closer to the Central and Eastern European Countries than to the Franco-German axis. However, two elements have nuanced such a categorical assessment. The first was the clash between Ankara and Washington regarding the Iraqi crisis and the second is the strong opposition of the Turkish society towards US foreign policy, reflected in a number of recent surveys. Does this mean that the Turkish public support the building of an autonomous European foreign and security policy capable of facing the US? There are no concrete data on the subject but a recent ‘Eurobarometer’ showed that there was a significant evolution within the Turkish public regarding the expediency of having a European foreign policy: in the autumn 2004 survey, the notion of such a continentwide policy was supported by 54% of Turks compared to 69% of the EU-25; in the spring of 2005, this support rose to 63%, closer to the 67% of the EU-25.13 Hence, there are indications that the gap between the EU and Turkey may be bridged in the future and that the Turkish public could become fully supportive of an autonomous European foreign policy. The second question has been partially answered by the European Commission. As its report of October 2004 pointed out, ‘Turkey’s record of alignment with EU sanctions and restrictive measures, statements, declarations and demarches, demonstrated the considerable extent of common EU-Turkey views. In particular, Turkey has aligned itself with all EU declarations calling on the government of Iran to conclude and implement urgently and unconditionally the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and its Nuclear Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, together with the Additional Protocol’. Less positive, the report also noticed that, ‘with respect to the CSFP, despite its overall satisfactory record, Turkey aligns itself with significantly fewer EU declarations than the other candidate countries. This was particularly the case with declarations on issues related to Turkey’s neighbourhood (Georgia, Azerbaijan, Iraq, Ukraine), to certain Muslim countries and on human rights and democracy. Turkey is sometimes hesitant to align itself to EU positions on issues 13 All Eurobarometers can be downloaded from the European Commission site, see .

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touching its vital foreign policy and security interests. This is in marked difference to the conduct of all other candidate, associated and SAP countries’. Additionally, the report noticed that much was still to be done in achieving the development of the necessary administrative structures to adapt Turkey’s Foreign Policy to the CFSP functioning. In other words, the answer to the second question would be a ‘qualified yes’, urging an exploration in some critical dossiers of how Turkey may be brought closer to EU views. This is a complicated exercise as the gap exists not only at the political level but also at the level of public opinion. A telling example is the fact that the public in Turkey’s and within the EU express very different views regarding the international order. This is the case, for instance, in the attachment to multilateralism. In the 2004 Transatlantic Trends, Turks scored a record of 71% positive answers regarding the need to bypass the UN if the countries’ interests are involved (the mean of the European Countries was 44% and for the US 59%). On many of the questions raised in this survey, the Turkish public found itself somewhere between the US and European public views but their support for military action was substantially higher than that of the major transatlantic partners.14 To what extent do these features reflect the prevalence of what Pinar Bilgin (see Bilgin 2004) described as the clash of security cultures between Turkey and the EU during the nineties? Turkey’s position is somehow schizophrenic. As Ali Karaosmanoglu (see Karaosmanoglu 2004, 11) has pointed out, ‘while its EU candidacy, NATO membership, its active performance in the PfP and participation in peace operations are inspiring internationalization, multilateralism, cooperative security, democratic control of the armed forces and emphasis on societal and individual security, its regional environment is suggesting security through power politics and the sustained primacy of the nation-state’. Needless to say, only if the first face of Turkey’s security approach prevails, will Turkey’s membership be perceived as an asset. This will require a Europeanisation process of Turkey’s foreign policy and, simultaneously, a joint effort to reduce the risks in Turkey’s neighbourhood. Not only because it is going to become (or it is already) EU’s own neighbourhood but also because it is the best mean to avoid whatever negative consequences Turkey’s membership might have for the consolidation of a stronger and autonomous foreign policy or, what is essentially the same, the EU’s global actorness. In the second part of this chapter, two test-cases illustrate whether this process is already taking place and whether it could be the future evolution. We will concentrate on Turkey’s contribution to the enhancement of the EU’s role in security matters and its consolidation as a truly political actor in two priority areas: the Balkans and the Middle East. It would be useful to extrapolate some of our conclusions to other areas such as the Black Sea region, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Unfortunately the length of this chapter only allows us to focus on the aforementioned cases. 14 See Transatlantic Trends 2004 available from .

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The Balkans: A Test-Case in Security Matters The wars in former Yugoslavia struck hard at the European conscience. The EU proved to be unable to react to a drama happening in its very own backyard, obliging the US to assume the leading role in Bosnia and Kosovo. These crises pushed the EU to build a more coherent and strong policy towards the Balkans as well as strengthen its military capacities. The Balkan crises were also closely followed by Turkey, not only because of the evident proximity with the region but also for emotional reasons, related to a common history and to the family ties of a significant portion of current Turkey’s population, whose roots are to be found in the Western Balkans. During the different crises in Bosnia, Kosovo, FYROM and Albania, Turkey was seen in the EU and by the wider international community largely as a constructive and collaborative actor in the framework of NATO. Turkey dispatched around 1200 personnel to SFOR and KFOR, participated in the Italian-led Alba Operation in Albania and has been seen as a largely stabilizing force, with states, Turkey’s role in the Balkans even presented, in the words of Ian O. Lesser, as ‘a model of moderation and multilateralism’.15 For some, Turkey’s Balkan policy enhanced her international reputation and alliances (see Uzgel 2001, 65). In fact, Turkey’s participation in launching the South-Eastern European Cooperation Process (SEECP) and the Multinational Peacekeeping Force for South-Eastern Europe, as well as its active participation in the Stability Pact, have been favourably viewed in the EU and have contributed to the perception of Turkey as a security provider. Without Turkey’s conformity, the current involvement of the EU in Balkan security would be far more complex. The EU assumption of responsibilities was only possible once an agreement with Turkey had been concluded, in December 2002, on the use of NATO’s planning assets. This agreement was directly linked with the enhanced perspective of membership given by the Copenhagen European Council and it was only possible after a long negotiation process. However, Turkey’s political style at some stage of the negotiations was not appreciated by some European analysts, who argued that a larger degree of flexibility as well as a stronger willingness to compromise was needed (see Missiroli 2002, 19–20). In fact, Turkey has always been reluctant in its advocacy of an autonomous European defence policy as, in not being a full member of the EU, she sees herself as being ‘left out of the game’ (see Cayhan 2003, 46). Turkey’s fears were already visible regarding the Western European Union (see Cebeci 1999) and become stronger as the ESDP started to develop. The Turkish exclusion syndrome on the one hand and the defensive Greek stance on the other go some way to explaining why the agreement reached in December was only possible after long and tense negotiations. As Ozlem Terzi pointed out, Turkey’s main concern was regarding the formal decision-making process. The main concern relates to the fact that although Turkey is not a EU member, the EU crisis management forces are expected to serve in Turkey’s neighbouring 15 RAND, Turkish Society and Foreign Policy in Troubled Times, number 2 in A series, (see ).

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regions, which are of vital importance to Turkey’s own security (see Terzi 2004, 114). At the end, the agreement reached in December 2002 on the use of NATO capabilities concerned two missions, in Bosnia and FYROM; in order to satisfy Turkish worries, the document approved specified that ‘under no circumstances will the ESDP be used against an ally’ and that ‘Cyprus and Malta as members of the EU would not take part in any ESDP operations using NATO assets’. However, some authors complain that too often the EU documents tend to take ‘Turkey’s consent for all and for good’ for granted (see Turkes and Gokgoz 2004, 74–5). One of the best instruments in creating confidence between the EU and Turkey is to implicate Ankara as much as the Turkish government wishes in ESDP missions. In fact, it seems this is the current trend. Up to now, Turkey has participated in the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM) and the EU Operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (CONCORDIA). Turkey is also participating in the EU’s Operation ALTHEA in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which took over from NATO’s SFOR in December 2004, with more than two hundred soldiers. These are positive indicators of a joint EU-Turkish effort for the long-term stabilization of the area. Turkey is also supporting NATO enlargement towards the region and even offering the prospect of EU membership to the Western Balkans. Both Turkey and the EU consider the Balkans a priority area and their objectives are quite close. Moreover, Turkey’s presence in the Western Balkans can be seen as reassuring to both the local Muslim population and to the EU, being a positive alternative to the more radical groups of the Middle East (see Posch and Grgic 2005, 10). As well as potentially being the best field for developing a Europeanized Turkish foreign policy, the Balkans also illustrates how Turkey can contribute to stronger and more autonomous European Defence Policy. Turkey’s participation in EUled missions in the Balkans is already a good indicator of this Europeanization process but EU-Turkish cooperation should spread far beyond these missions. Other areas of cooperation may include enlarging the Customs Union towards the Balkans and forming a deeper teamwork in justice and home affairs, as well as in energy transportation networks (see Emerson and Tocci 2004, 11–12). Similarly, cooperation in defence should not be limited to the Balkans but both Turkey and the EU should contemplate Ankara’s future involvement in other EU missions, be them in Turkey’s neighbourhood (also in the Middle East as since 2006 the EU has had ESDP missions in the region) or further afield, in Africa, for instance. However, several analysts have noticed that the only way to achieve a full and satisfactory level of participation in the ESDP is by granting Turkey full membership of the EU (see Bagci and Yildiz 2004, 95). The Middle East and the Mediterranean: Will the EU Become a Stronger Political Actor? In addition to being at the top of both the EU’s and Turkey’s external agendas, the Middle East and Mediterranean region is also a main priority of the world’s hegemon, the US. Therefore, convergence or divergence regarding the Middle East

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will also determine to what extent Turkey’s membership is perceived as a burden or as an asset for enhancing EU’s actorness in this very critical region. Under this epigraph we will limit our analysis to two main issues: the conflict in Palestine and the competing regionalisms in this area where US and EU views have not always been concordant. As for the conflict in Palestine, it should be acknowledged that in spite of the huge financial efforts, the EU has proved to be a secondary political actor in the Middle East Peace Process, aware that the US’s leverage in this area is far greater than that of Brussels and that the internal divisions in the EU do not help to present itself as a single actor regarding the conflict. In spite of collaborating with the US in initiatives such as the Quartet, the EU has set itself apart from the US as far as Israeli methods of dealing with terrorism are concerned, for instance regarding the selective murders of Hamas leaders or the building of the wall encircling part of the West Bank. It is in this context that Turkey’s membership has often been presented as an input that could dramatically multiply the EU’s influence towards this area. Moreover, as happened with the Eastern enlargement effects on the EU foreign policy (the European Neighbourhood Policy), the effects Turkey’s accession into the EU may even be noted in the EU foreign policy in an earlier stage. As Steven Everts pointed out, when Turkey joins the EU, the Union and Turkish foreign policy as well as the Middle East itself are bound to change in unpredictable ways. Therefore, the debate should focus on Turkey’s influence on EU Middle East policy in the preaccession phase (see Everts 2004). While there is no doubt that Turkey’s membership will force the EU to follow the developments in that region closely, particularly those between Israel and the Palestinians, it is less evident whether the EU will succeed in maintaining a single and coherent policy regarding this everlasting conflict or split in a cacophony of single country views, aggravated further with the addition of a Turkish viewpoint. However, the current evolution of both the EU and the Turkish approach towards the conflict proves, in our view, that there exists ground for an increasing convergence.16 Back in 2002, a Greco-Turkish initiative sent a joint peace mission to Palestine and was able to meet with Yasir Arafat, Ariel Sharon and Shimon Peres during a period of great tension. EU institutions acknowledged this initiative and congratulated both states, often perceived as rivals, for sending out such a peace message. Turkey’s criticism on the methods employed by the Israeli government to fight against the Palestine rebellion is also much closer to EU stance than to the US attitude. It has been commented that ‘the recent cooling-off in Turkey’s relations with Israel can be regarded as part of the process of Europeanization in its foreign policy’ (see Cebeci and Raz-Netzer 2004, 194). Finally, Erdogan’s repeated announcement that Turkey is willing to play a constructive role in the solution of the conflict, for instance, by promoting confidence-building measures, is very much in line with EU interests and its approach to this conflict.17 More controversial is the recent role that Turkey has 16 For similar diagnosis see (Altunisik 2004) and (Everts 2004). 17 Erdogan’s visit to Israel and Palestine in 2005 illustrates this move.

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played after Hamas’ victory in the Palestinian legislative elections of 2006. Once the results were made public, both Turkey and Russia played a mediator role with Hamas, apparently trying to persuade them to recognise Israel and to act according to the Oslo agreements but also legitimising Hamas as an interlocutor. This episode illustrates that Turkey’s Middle Eastern policy can be at complementary and at the same time contradictory position with that of the EU. Nevertheless, if in the future Turkey places its diplomatic assets under the EU umbrella, this might lead to the amplification of the EU’s political leverage in the Middle Eastern conflict. For instance, the EU currently has two ESDP missions deployed in the region. One concerns police instruction and the other with border control between Gaza and Egypt. If Turkey did decide to get involved in these missions as other candidates such as Romania have done, it could be seen as a positive step. Nonetheless, not everybody agrees on the positive effects of Turkey’s membership. Some have even declared that, ‘the idea that Turkey can play the role of peace promoter between Israel and the Arab World because of its military cooperation sounds almost grotesque’ (see Jung 2001, 12). Once more this adds fuel to the academic and political debates. As mentioned above, the Middle East and Mediterranean is an area where competing regionalisms are developing. There are, in essence, two bodies at work here: a 10 year-old Euro-Mediterranean partnership (EMP) from which the US is excluded, and a recently proposed ‘Broader Middle East and North Africa’ (BMENA) initiative under the umbrella of the G-8 which is, in fact, a US project. These are formally independent frameworks, with different geographical scopes but with very similar agendas. As Jean-Marie Paugam and Dorothée Schmid remark, the BMENA and the EMP are concurrent projects under different leaderships (see Paugam and Schmid 2004). Thus, Turkey’s deeper involvement in the one or the other could indicate the degree of Europeanisation of its Middle Eastern Policy. Regarding the EMP, several authors like Ziya Onis (Onis 2003b, 86) and Tobias Schumacher (Schumacher 2004, 162) have pointed out that Turkey has been reluctant to play a more active role in the so-called ‘Barcelona Process’, on the assumption that playing such a role would be synonymous with accepting a subordinate status within the EU prior to the realisation of full-membership. It has been argued that once Turkey has started accession negotiations, she is and will be willing to become more involved in the EU’s Mediterranean Policy, precisely because it might became a fertile field for activity in EU foreign policy as it has been for countries such as France and Spain. The summit held in November 2005 in Barcelona, commemorating the 10th anniversary of the Process, was a key test. In the months preceding the summit, Turkey played a much more constructive role than in previous occasions, for instance presenting a non-paper in the Luxemburg ministerial conference with ideas to reinvigorate the EMP.18 As a pro-positive partner, Turkey 18 This paper was entitled ‘Turkey’s Views on the Future of the Euromed Process’ according to the Conclusions of the Luxembourg VII Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 30–31 May 2005.

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has insisted on the need for an institutional reform of the Barcelona Process and the convenience to open this framework to Mediterranean Balkan countries such as Albania. Furthermore, while most Arab countries sent second-rank representatives to the Euro-Mediterranean summit, Turkey was represented by the Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan showing a stronger commitment with the EMP than the other Mediterranean partners. Regarding the BMENA, Turkey has been actively involved in the launching of this initiative, based on an agenda of political, economical and social reform of a vast area, taking in Morocco, Afghanistan and the countries between. According to Yakup Beris and Asli Gurkan, AKP officials are seduced by a project in which Turkey participates as a ‘democratic partner’ and not as a target (see Beris and Gurkan 2005). However, a significant section of AKP’s religious base as well as a number of secularists have been particularly outspoken in their opposition to such a project. Similarly, some European countries, particularly those that have been more critical towards US Middle Eastern policy, might see this involvement as an attempt to weaken the European policies in this area. Turkey’s increasing cooperation with the US in the Middle East has been considered challenging for the EU, which harbours aspirations of being a major world power projecting itself in the region (see Altunisik 2004, 230). However, the fact that both Germany and France and the EU itself are involved as members of the G-8 in the BMENA invalidates any direct criticism towards Ankara. While the EU cannot blame Turkey for its involvement in the BMENA initiative, it can ask Turkey to become more involved in the EMP. Moreover, if ever Turkey decides to present the BMENA as the primary framework of EU efforts, pushing into the background the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, this might be seen as a negative prelude of Turkey’s possible impact on the EU’s Mediterranean and Middle Eastern Policy. For the moment, Turkey has wisely combined it’s a support of both initiatives. Both the BMENA and the EMP place political reform and promotion of democracy at the top of their respective agendas. In that sense, Turkey, as a Muslim and democratic nation, could serve as a model for Middle Eastern countries. This is a recurrent discourse of advocates of Turkey’s membership, both within and without. It is said that while granting the prospect of membership, the EU strengthens and consolidates the democratic character of Turkey and that, indirectly, impacts positively on the political transitions in the Middle East. In Joschka Fischer words, this ‘could inspire neighbouring countries and thus increase the prospect of democratic reforms being implemented there’ (see Fischer 2004, 21). Nonetheless, the applicability of the Turkish Model to its Arab and Persian neighbourhood is a very much disputable issue, as the academic and the political debates have amply illustrated.19 19 On the academic debate, see Everts 2004; Taspinar 2004; Altunisik 2005. The politicians opposed to Turkey’s membership have also denounced such arguments, arguing that Arab societies are relatively indifferent to political and social processes occurring in Turkey as they perceive her as alien to their own political traditions and that, even if they did

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Very much linked to this issue is the debate as to what extent Turkey’s EU membership would refute the thesis of a clash of civilisations between Islam and the West, not only at the international level but also at the European one. Abdullah Gul’s words exemplify these kinds of arguments when he says that ‘the successful conclusion of Turkey’s accession process to the EU will represent the harmonization of a predominantly Muslim society with the peoples of Europe on the basis of common universal and democratic values. This will, on the one hand, facilitate the better integration of millions of Muslim living in Europe, and, on the other, demonstrate to the Muslim world that Europe is serious about overcoming its exclusive reflexes when parties gather around shared values’ (see Gul 2004, 15). The socialist Spanish Prime Minister, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero in an interview with the Italian newspaper, La Reppublica, justified his support of Turkey’s candidacy on the ground that this is coherent with a certain idea of the EU as an ‘alliance of peoples and cultures’.20 In most cases, promoters of Turkey’s EU accession consider it positive both for world stability and for the EU’s prestige and political leverage. That is to say, it would enhance the EU’s global actorness. However, a significant number of Europeans diverge from this position, arguing that Turkey’s membership will increase communal and religious tensions in Europe (through the increase of migratory fluxes) and that it would impede the creation of a shared European identity which, in part, should be based on its religious roots, that is to say, Christianity. For them, Turkey should promote development and democracy in the Middle East as a leading player of the region, not as a part of Europe. The debate is, once more, wide open. Concluding Remarks: Is a ‘Privileged Partnership’ a Good Offer? Several European politicians, including Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy, have offered Turkey ‘special partnership’ status instead of full membership. This offer is quite imprecise. What would it mean? According to its proponents, it means offering Ankara everything but institutions. That is to say, a share of most EU policies and the establishment of an enhanced political dialogue but without participation in the decision-making forum. This is quite paradoxical, taking into account the fact that the full EU membership which has been offered to Turkey seems to exclude the most observe the country with greater interest, it would remain a false argument on the part of the advocates of Turkish membership as the EU is never going to offer membership to Middle Eastern or North African countries. 20 Quoted in ‘Zapatero: Europe’s Door Open to Turkey’ (see Turkish Daily News, 19 October 2004). In fact, the ‘alliance of civilisations’ as a response to the current threats affecting world security has become a motto of the current Spanish Foreign Policy and the Prime Minister have developed this idea in front of the UN General Assembly and the Arab League. Spain has found the support of the Turkish Minister in this initiative which still lacks some concretisation.

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important EU policies (agriculture, regional and cohesion policies, etc.) and the free movement of people. In any case, privileged partnership is not a sound proposal for the immense majority of Turkish officials. On the one hand, this offer seems to confirm that some in the EU are not ready to evaluate Turkey’s candidacy with the same criteria applied to the other candidates. On the other, it would highlight the failure of a forty-year Turkish diplomatic campaign. Consequently, if the EU decided to unilaterally halt the ongoing negotiation process and offered ‘privileged partnership’ instead, it would most likely imply a serious deterioration of Turkey’s relations with the EU and an increase in reactionary and nationalistic political and social forces. This would provably result in a change of attitude in Turkey’s foreign policy. A Hobbesian security culture would prevail over a more Kantian attitude and Turkey might become a coercive regional power. This would have complicated consequences for the stability of the EU neighbourhood, in the Balkans, Middle East and Caucasus, and may even affect the security of some EU countries such as Cyprus and Greece. In this scenario, Turkey could also play an obstructive role in NATO as far as strengthening of EU defence policy is concerned. Finally, it could also deteriorate the EU’s image in the Muslim world and may even create an feeling of exclusion among EU citizens of Muslim faith if an EU decision to halt negotiations is seen as resulting from Turkey’s being a big Muslim country. In sum, a unilateral break of accession negotiations and an offer of privileged partnership do not lead to a positive scenario as far as EU interests in the foreign and security field are concerned. Moreover, such a decision could seriously damage the EU’s credibility in global affairs. However, a normal negotiation process leading to full membership in approximately a decade does not automatically imply purely positive outcomes for the EU’s foreign and security interests either. Such benefits would depend on four main factors. First, whether the EU has an ambitious foreign and defence policy or not and is generous and confident enough to permit Turkey’s involvement even before its accession. Second, whether Turkey, at the end of the process, becomes what has been described as a ‘benign regional power’ instead of a ‘coercive’ one (see Onis 2003b, 85). Turkey should be seen by the EU as providing security as opposed to importing conflict. As Mustafa Kibaroglu has put it ‘the concerns of the security elite do not perfectly match the concerns of the political elite in Turkey’21. Third, to what extent Turkey is able to bury its image of being a Trojan horse of the US as this is a concern among a significant number of Europeans who oppose a systematic alignment with the US in the international domain. In that sense, we agree with Steven Everts when he argues that Turkey has made its EU membership 21 Concretely, this author argues that both parties have their own long-term strategies with clashing priorities for elevating Turkey to the level of advanced democratic states. Whose strategies and priorities will prevail (i.e. countering the threat perceived from the Middle East together with the US and Israel) or marching towards the West by complying with the EU priorities) is yet to be seen (see Kibaroglu 2004).

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aspirations the central tenet of its foreign policy, its pro-US stance, though remaining solid, now being less instinctive (see Everts 2004). The Iraqi crisis and Turkey’s position towards the Arab-Israeli conflict are quite illustrative of this positive tendency. Fourth and last, the evolution of Turkey’s neighbouring regions will also determine to what extent the EU will interpret Turkey’s membership as a burden or as an asset. If democracy, development and stability increase in the Balkans, in Russia, the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East, Turkey’s membership will make possible an intensification of Europe’s relations with this area without fearing its involvement in whatever regional conflict might occur. Thus, neither privileged partnership nor full membership guarantee per se a positive effect for the EU’s foreign and defence actorness. Nonetheless, the risks in the first case are much stronger than in the second one. Consequently, if EU-Turkish relations are analysed from the logic of the international interests of the EU, it is reasonable to recommend the normal continuation of accession negotiations and to expect full membership at the end of the process. This explains why the supporters of Turkey’s EU membership pay so much attention to this field while most of the opponents, that is to say, those offering a ‘privileged partnership’, tend to emphasize other aspects related to socio-economic, budgetary or identity concerns. References Altunisik, M. (2004), ‘Redefinition of Turkish Security Policies in the Middle East after the Cold War’, in Karaosmanoglu, A. and Tashan, S. (eds), The Europeanization of Turkey’s Security Policy: Prospects and Pitfalls (Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute). Altunisik, M. (2005), ‘The Turkish Model and Democratisation in the Middle East’, Arab Studies Quarterly, 27: 1–2. Bagci, H. and Yildiz, A. (2004), ‘Turkey and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP): From Confrontational to Cooperative Relationship’, in Karaosmanoglu, A. and Tashan, S. (eds), The Europeanization of Turkey’s Security Policy: Prospects and Pitfalls (Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute). Barbé, E. (1999), La Política Europea de España (Barcelona: Ariel). Beris, Y. and Gurkan, A. (2004), ‘Broader Middle East Initiative: Perceptions from Turkey’, Turkey in Focus (TUSIAD), 7. Bilgin, P. (2004), ‘Clash of Cultures? Differences between Turkey and the European Union on Security’, in Karaosmanoglu, A. and Tashan, S. (eds), The Europeanization of Turkey’s Security Policy: Prospects and Pitfalls (Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute). Borrell, J. (2004), ‘Turquie, l’alliance ou le choc’, Libération, 20 December. Buzan, B. and Diez, T. (1999), ‘The European Union and Turkey’, Survival, 41: 1. Cayhan, E. (2003), ‘Towards a European Security and Defense Policy: With or Without Turkey’, in Carkoglu, A. and Rubin. B., Turkey and the European Union, Domestic Politics, Economic Integration and International Dynamics (London: Frank Cass).

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Cebeci, M. (1999), ‘A Delicate Process of Participation: The Question of Participation of WEU Associate Members in Decision-Making for EU-led Petersberg Operations, with Special Reference to Turkey’, EU-ISS Occasional Paper, 10. Cebeci, M. and Raz-Netzer, K. (2004), ‘The Europeanisation Process in the Mediterranean: the Case of Turkish-Israeli Relations over the Last Decade’, in Xueren, P.G. (ed.), The European Union and the Mediterranean: The Mediterranean’s European Challenge Volume V (Malta: European Documentation and Research Centre). Celik, Y. (1999), Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy (Westport and London: Praeger). Emerson, M. and Tocci, N. (2004), ‘Turkey as a Bridgehead and Spearhead: Integrating EU and Turkish Foreign Policy’, EU-Turkey Working Papers, 1 (Brussels: CEPS). Eralp, A. (2004), ‘Turkey and the European Union’, in Martin, L. and Keridis, D. (eds), The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy (Cambridge: MIT Press). Everts, S. (2004), ‘An Asset but not a Model: Turkey, the EU and the Wider Middle East’, Centre for European Reform Essays. Fischer, J. (2004), ‘Turkey’s European Perspective: the German View’, Turkish Policy Quarterly 3: 3. Gul, A. (2004), ‘Turkey’s EU Membership: Seeing the Transatlantic Gains’, Turkish Policy Quarterly 3: 3. Hale, W. (2002), Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774–2000 (London and Portland: Frank Cass). Hale, W. and Avci, G. (2001), in Rubin, B. and Kirsici, K., Turkey in World Politics, an Emerging Multiregional Power (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner). Hughes, K. (2004), ‘The Political Dynamics of Turkish Accession in the EU: a European Success Story or the EU’s Most Contested Enlargement’, SIEPS Report, 9/2004. Jung, D. (2001), ‘Turkey and Europe: Ongoing Hypocrisy?’ Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, Working Paper, 35. Karaosmanoglu, A. (2004), ‘Globalisation and Its Impact on Turkey’s Security’, in Karaosmanoglu, A. and Tashan, S. (eds) (2004). Karaosmanoglu, A. and Tashan, S. (eds) (2004), The Europeanization of Turkey’s Security Policy: Prospects and Pitfalls (Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute). Kibaroglu, M. (2004), ‘Turkey’s Threat Perception from the East: A Roadblock in its March towards the West?’ in Karaosmanoglu, A. and Tashan, S. (eds) (2004). Kurpas, Sebastian (2005), ‘Should Ratification Proceed? An Assessment of Different Options after the Failed Referenda’, CEPS Policy Brief 75 (Brussels: CEPS). Missiroli, Antonio (2002), ‘EU-NATO Cooperation in Crisis Management: No Turkish Delight for ESDP’, Security Dialogue, 33: 1. Muftuler-Bac, Meltem (2000), ‘Turkey’s Role in the EU’s Security and Foreign Policies’, Security Dialogue 31: 4. Nas, Cigdem (2003), ‘National Report Turkey’, Fornet [website] accessed 6 April 2006.

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Onis, Z. (2003a), ‘Domestic Politics, International Norms and Challenges to the State: Turkey-EU Relations in the post-Helsinki Era’, in Carkoglu, A. and Rubin, B. (eds), Turkey and the European Union, Domestic Politics, Economic Integration and International Dynamics (London: Frank Cass). Onis, Z. (2003b), ‘Turkey and the Middle East after September 11: the Importance of the EU Dimension’, Turkish Policy Quarterly, 2: 4. Paugam, J.M. and Schmid, D. (2004), ‘Une Nouvelle Rivalité Transatlantique en Méditerranée’, Politique Etrangère, 69: 4. Posch, W. and Grgic, B. (2005), ‘Turkey and the EU: Strategic Implications for Central Europe’, Turkish Insight, 7: 1. Robins, P. (2003), Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy since the Cold War (London: Hurst & Company). Rubin, B. (2003), ‘Introduction’, in Carkoglu, A. and Rubin, B. (eds), Turkey and the European Union, Domestic Politics, Economic Integration and International Dynamics (London: Frank Cass). Schumacher, T. (2004), ‘Dance in-Walk out: Turkey, EU Membership and the Future of the Barcelona Process’, in Tocci, N. and Evin, A. (eds), Towards Accession Negotiations: Turkey’s Domestic and Foreign Policy Challenges Ahead (Florence: Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies). Soler i Lecha, E. (2003), ‘Turkey and the EU: Bringing together a Regional Power and a Global Actor’, Turkish Policy Quarterly, 2: 4. Taspinar, O. (2004), An Uneven Fit? The Turkish Model and the Arab World (Washington: Brookings). Terzi, O. (2004), ‘Evolving European Security Capabilities and EU-Turkish Relations’, Perceptions, Journal of International Affairs, 9: 1. Turkes, M. and Gokgoz, G. (2004), ‘Reflections on the EU Strategy Paper 2003 – Two Approaches, Moving Conditions and a New Juncture’, Perceptions, Journal of International Affairs, 9: 1. Ulgen, S. (2004), ‘Chaos and Power: Will Europe Become a Strategic Community’, Turkish Policy Quarterly, 2: 4. Uzgel, I. (2001), ‘The Balkans: Turkey’s Stabilising Role’, in Rubin, B. and Kirsici, K. (eds), Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner). Wood, S. and Quaisser, W. (2005), ‘Turkey’s Road to the EU: Political Dynamics, Strategic Context and Implications for Europe’, European Foreign Affairs Review, 10. Yilmaz, H. (2005), ‘Indicators of Euroscepticism in Turkish Public Opinion by the End of 2003: Basic Findings of A Survey’, in Yilmaz, H. (ed.), Placing Turkey on the Map of Europe (Istanbul: Bogazici University Press).

Chapter 4

A Retrospective Analysis of TurkeyUnited States Relations in the Wake of the US War in Iraq in March 2003 Mahmut Bali Aykan

In the period following the Turkish Grand National Assembly’s rejection (on 1 March 2003) of the United States (US) request for US troops to be deployed on Turkish soil for an attack on against the forces of Saddam Hussein of Iraq, the Turkey-US alliance has been described as having fallen into a state of ‘disarray’ (see Cagatay 2004, 43–52; Gunter, 2005, 113–123). Until recently, however, ‘the strategic partnership’, as the relationship between the two countries was conveniently but ambiguously labelled by both Turkish and American statesmen, was taken for granted.1 The arguments, to the effect that ‘the alliance between the two countries (was) moving in new directions filled with unprecedented challenges’, as this author had maintained in the mid-1990s, were met with scepticism2 (see Athanassopoulou 2001, 144–164; Aykan 1996, 344). It was then considered unlikely that the ‘competing priorities of the two countries and their different approaches to regional challenges’ would be likely to cause a sudden escalating tension between the two countries which would shake the alliance (see Aykan 1996, 356–357). Yet not only did all these developments actually take place in the wake of Turkey’s above-mentioned rejection of co-operation with the US against Iraq in 2003, but today’s observers generally expect them to become regular components of a relationship which has become increasingly difficult for the two sides to manage –despite the existence of seemingly enduring common interests binding the two countries together in the aftermath of the war of Iraq3 (see 1 At the very start of its formulation in the early 1990s, officials of the Turkish Foreign Affairs Ministry made it clear that the concept of “strategic co-operation” did not mean that Turkey and the US would share the same views in every area ranging from the Arab world to Greece. They stressed that the post-Gulf War co-operation between the two countries would continue to be limited, as it had been before the Gulf War, and that their foreign policy differences would persist (see Aykan 1996, 348). 2 For example, Ekavi Athanassopoulou wrote, ‘It is unlikely that Turkey’s autonomous policies will clash with fundamental American interests.’ 3 See for example the interview in the Turkish business daily Referans on 30 May 2005, with Kemal Koprulu, Founder and Chairman of the ARI Movement, on the current state of the

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MEMRI 2005; Gunter 2005; Cagatay 2004; el Serif 2005; Boland and Dinmore 2005; Gelinsky and Hermann 2005). In this respect, it is revealing that during the official visit of Turkish Premier R. Tayyip Erdogan to Washington in June 2005, US President George Bush carefully omitted the phrase ‘strategic partnership’ when characterising the nature of the current relationship between Turkey and the US .4 The fluctuations which have been regularly observed in Turkey-US relations in the wake of the US war against Iraq have their roots in the perceived differences between the two states concerning their international identity, places and functions – the last two will be referred to as ‘international orientations’ and ‘national roles’ in this work – in the post-Cold War international systemic structure. These causes remain hidden in the day-to-day or period-to-period changes in the official and nonofficial characterisations of the nature of the relationship between the two countries as mentioned above. A statement recently made by the Turkish Premier Recep Tayyip Erdogan as to the current state of Turkey-US relations is another case in point further clarifying this fact. In a manner questioning the underlying implication of President Bush’s statement as mentioned above, Premier Erdogan maintained that, in the wake of the troubled period starting from the US war against Iraq in 2003, TurkeyUS relations remained to the present day essentially ‘the same’ being based upon historically shared values, ‘… particularly democracy, (fundamental) freedoms, supremacy of law and liberal economy…’ (see Cumhuriyet 6 July 2005, 11). Yet, considered from an historical perspective, the differences between the US and Turkey over their international identities, places and functions in the international systemic structure have continuously shaped their different priorities and their approaches to these values, as noted by Premier Erdogan, in their domestic and foreign policies alike have been conditioned accordingly, from the time of the early encounters between the Ottoman Turks and the young US in the early 1800s to the present time. The basic factor of change in this relationship was related to changes in world politics, including the distribution of power among the states, the rise of challenges to the sovereign power of the state actor, and the accompanying change in the relations between states and non-state actors in the process of globalisation of world politics. In the face of these challenges, the two states have been obliged to adjust their relations with one another in accordance with their different foreign policy priorities. Despite these differences in priorities, the two states have, albeit with increasing difficulties, been able to maintain their alliance up to the present time as a result of perceived common interests which bind them in the international arena. Whether this will continue to be the case in the future in the face of continuing challenges is still open to question. The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the relations between Turkey and the US in terms of the factors of continuity and change that have historically applied and Turkey-US relations in MEMRI (The Middle East Media Research Institute). 4 Instead, Bush referred to Turkey-US relations as ‘strategic relations’ (see Cumhuriyet, 9 June 2005, 11).

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shaped them. In doing so, it aims to provide a useful analytical framework facilitating the understanding of the complex and changing dynamics of the relationship between the two countries without claiming to foresee future developments. The Factor of International Identity By international identity of a state what is meant here is a state’s self-perception of itself in terms of the basic values it espouses in the international arena that shape and/or influence priorities in her domestic and foreign policies. The Ottoman Empire, the predecessor of Turkey in the international arena, was a theocratic state from its inception to its demise. Its mission of carrying the banner of Islam to the very heart of Christian Europe resulted in her becoming continuously involved in balance of power politics in Europe and elsewhere. In contrast, a refraining from power politics and the ‘entangling alliances’ into which states are normally expected to be led formed the fundamental characteristic of US foreign policy, was originally conceived by the US’s founding fathers (see Hook and Spanier 2000). Liberal democracy and market economy have constituted the basic values espoused by the US in domestic politics reflecting on her foreign policy from its inception to present times. Thus, when a new secular democratic Turkish nation-state was formed under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal in 1923, the identities of the two states came closer to each other. One prominent similarity between them was that, despite some differences in their foreign policies stemming from their different geographical locations, both were committed to the preservation of international peace and order through a policy of establishing friendship with all states.5 Nevertheless, this new situation was not to create an ideological affinity towards one another. In contrast to the US ideology of ‘Liberalism’ with its universal connotations, ‘Kemalism’ could only be described as a ‘homeland ideology’ based upon the Turkish historical experience and limited to Turkey’s perceived national interests (see Karal 1981, 29). Thus, concerned primarily with Turkey’s national survival in an unfriendly international environment where European powers – particularly the United Kingdom – were seen as pursuing a divide and rule policy, Kemalist leaders gave priority to order in their domestic policy to be implemented by a benevolent authoritarian regime rather than by immediately addressing the issues of individual freedoms through the establishment of a liberal democratic regime after the US model. This difference of values soon created discord in the relationship between the two states. One of the reasons the US Senate refused to support the Treaty of Amity and Commerce signed between the US and Turkey in Lausanne in August 1923 that was 5 Foreign policy by setting an ‘example’ was the common characteristic of the two countries’ international missions. Ataturk’s dictum was ‘Peace at Home, Peace Abroad’. The US wished all nations well in their efforts towards development; similarly, Turkey encouraged other Muslim people in their efforts to gain independence. Neither was willing to undertake any commitments in that regard (see Aykan 1994; Tucker and Hendrickson 1992).

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substantially the same as the Treaty of Lausanne of July 1923, which gave birth to modern secular Turkey from the ashes of the now defunct Ottoman Empire, was the seemingly undemocratic nature of the Kemalist ideology implemented by the new leaders of Turkey headed by Mustafa Kemal. Under his rule the US Congressmen feared that ‘barbaric’ treatment of the non-Muslim populations by the Ottoman rulers – the ‘Armenian Massacre’ of the early twentieth century being remembered as a case in point – would be perpetuated (see Lippe 1997, 49–51, 54, 55). This American perception has carried on to the present and given rise to postCold War differences between the US and Turkey over the shortcomings of modern Turkish democracy and human rights policy manifesting itself over the issues of the treatment of the Kurds and non-Muslim minorities in Turkey6 (US Department of State 2005). In the wake of the 11 September 2001 attacks on America, from the US liberal internationalist perspective, the homeland Kemalist ideology, which continues to exert a substantial influence on Turkey’s domestic and foreign policy, is more than an outmoded ideological model in the contemporary globalizing world; in US eyes, it decreases Turkey’s value as an example of a moderate democratic Muslim state to be emulated in a new, reformed Middle East – with US leadership – composed of democratic Muslim states (see el Serif 2005; Boland and Dinmore 2005; Gelinsky and Hermann 2005; Ergin 2005, Cumhuriyet, 25 May 2005, 12, Milliyet 18 April 1995, Congar 2005b). To give one example which will be discussed later in this work, from the US perspective, the shortcomings of Turkish democracy, a result of the unresolved ‘Kurdish issue’ caused by perceivedly outmoded Kemalist nationalist values, have caused Turkey to interfere in various ways in the internal affairs of her neighbours in a region in the politics of which the US has become a direct participant following its interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq after 11 September 2001. However, it is a fact that despite these differences over values creating friction between the two states, every time the danger of a rupture in relations – mostly initiated, as is the case in the contemporary era, by the US Congress claiming to represent American public opinion – rose to the fore, the perceived common interests as pointed to by the US administration came to the rescue and salvaged the relations. Approval of a new treaty, ‘based on the original agreement negotiated at Lausanne’, between the US and Turkey by the same US Senate in 1930 was a case in point (see Lippe 1997, 62). Likewise, there were times, as in the period of the Cold War when the perception of common interests against the Soviets under the bipolar structure of the international system seemed overshadow ideological differences on democracy and human rights. Thus, the US supported Turkey’s incorporation into the Western world including the application for membership of the European Union, a process starting from early 1960s and extending into present times, despite continuing democratic shortcomings. Likewise, the US tolerated periodic temporary suspensions of democratic freedoms during the military interventions into the 6 According to a report prepared by the Turkish intelligent services, the real aim of the modern missionary activities in Turkey is to spread not only Christianity but also ethnic separatist values; particularly Kurdish nationalism (see Cumhuriyet, 11 June 2005, 6).

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Turkish democratic process from the 1960s to the 1980s, in a way that the Europeans never did. US administration have generally refused to explicitly acknowledge at the highest diplomatic levels the date of April 24 as the day of the commemoration of the ‘Armenian Genocide,’ allegedly committed during the Ottoman rule in the early twentieth century. They have made efforts to ensure modern Turkey’s perceived oppression of her Kurdish populations and undemocratic treatment of her nonMuslim minority citizens do not irreparably damage relations between the two countries. Even in the aftermath of Turkey’s rejection of cooperation with the US in its war against Iraq in 2003, when the unsympathetic attitude towards Turkey seemed to be no longer restricted to the US Congress but was shared by the US administration, including the President himself, the above-mentioned instinct to manage relations had not vanished altogether on both sides, despite unprecedented difficulties.7 The Factors of International Orientations and National Roles up to the PostSeptember 11 Period The international identities of Turkey and the US, from their historical origins to the present times, have always had a sizeable impact on their international orientations – the roles they assume in the international systemic structure, with both being members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Alliance, and their national roles, being the roles they assume concerning the politics of the region where they are primarily active, for example Turkey’s striving to maintain a balance in its relations with its neighbours and NATO allies in the Middle East. The changes in the international systemic structure have been amongst of the fundamental factors conditioning them. In the first place, behind the US Senate’s rejection of the 1923 Treaty of Amity and Commerce, differences of global and local priorities of interests exist between a young Turkish Republic which, as mentioned above, strived to maintain its survival in a still hostile neighbourhood, and the US, which equated peace with democracy and participated in the First World War with the purpose of making the world safe for democracy. To maintain order through a benevolent authoritarianism took precedence in Turkey over the establishment of a multiparty regime and elections which, according to the Kemalist rulers, was not yet ready for it (see Mumcu 1994). Ironic and perplexing as it may have seemed from the perspective of the Turkish statesmen, maintaining capitulations – an 7 Aside from the Bush administration’s continuing support in various degrees for Turkey’s causes concerning the EU, Cyprus and the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline project etc, President Bush also avoided explicit reference to ‘Genocide’ in his message of 24 April 2005, released on the 90th Anniversary of the ‘Armenian Genocide’, despite the Armenian lobby gaining strength in the US Congress following the Turkish Parliament’s rejection of the deployment of the US forces on Turkish soil against Iraq on 1 March 2003 (see Cumhuriyet 26 April 2005, 11).

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undemocratic means which the Kemalist rulers of Turkey were determined to abolish as one of the vestiges of European imperialism – was preferable to both the US State Department and opponents of ‘the “Other” Treaty of Lausanne’ in the US Senate who saw it a means of maintaining control over a young republic in order to protect her non-Muslim minorities from likely state prosecution (see Lippe 1997, 45, 49, 59). The international identities of the two states as mentioned above led to agreement over the value of maintaining world peace and stability based upon the supremacy of international law. Both pursued a policy of non-entanglement in the aftermath of the First World War as they saw this as the best means of serving their national interest, which was, in essence, the preservation of their national freedom of action. During, and in the immediate aftermath of World War One, the above-mentioned common foreign policy values had not changed. However, Turkey’s priority, as a local state, of maintaining its own security against the threats posed to it by the major powers of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and US priority of obtaining its global interests, which consisted of building a new world order under a global power management called the ‘four policemen’, including the USSR, made it difficult for the two states to co-ordinate their foreign policy actions (see Gaddis 1982; Gonlubol 1996, 137–199). During the height of the Cold War in the 1950s, Turkey and the US were united in their common opposition against the USSR, which they both considered the main threat against their common foreign policy values of maintaining world peace and stability within the context of the inviolability of international law. They were able to co-ordinate their foreign policy actions as members of the NATO Alliance, which constituted a major change in their international orientations thus far. One of the prominent examples of this co-ordination was the way this Alliance reflected Turkey’s regional role as a ‘bridge’ state. This role had been practiced during the Ataturk era when Turkey gave priority to diplomacy in its relations with all states as the most suitable way of contributing to the maintenance of regional peace and stability. In the 1950s, however, under the circumstances of a perceived Soviet threat to the region, the concept of a ‘bridge’ for Turkish policy-makers was interpreted as Turkey making efforts to bring the regional Muslim countries of the Arab states and Iran into Western-sponsored anti-Soviet military defence pacts. In cases such as Baghdad and Balkan Pacts and the US’ implementation of the Eisenhower Doctrine, the concern for diplomatic niceties seemed to have been driven into the background as Turkey’s co-operation with the US was allowed to work continue at the expense of good neighbourly relations with the regional states (see Gonlubol 1996, 237–271). However, even in this era of unprecedented co-operation and co-ordination between the two countries, their continuing different local and global priorities continued to create different approaches to basic pressing foreign policy issues, such as the challenge of Arab nationalism, the rapprochement between Syria and the USSR and security in the Balkans (see Sever 1998, 73–90; Stone 1994, 393).

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The 1960s and 1970s were decades when the different local and global priorities between Turkey and the US created different approaches to their international orientations and their regional roles were most revealingly manifested. The Cuban missile crisis of 1962, the Johnson letter of 1964, the Arab oil embargo in 1973 against the West and Turkey’s military intervention in Cyprus in 1974, triggering the imposition of a US arms embargo on Turkey in the following year, were cases in point. The abetting factor of these troubles experienced between the two states was the beginning of the partial Détente that began between the US and the USSR in the early 1960s, which gave way to the full Détente in the early 1970s and the accompanying decrease in Turkey’s perception of an imminent military threat from the USSR. The global and local priorities between the two states were revealed once again in the change in Turkey’s regional role from the above-mentioned effort of bringing the regional states to the Westernsponsored anti-Soviet military pacts to a determined effort to refrain from becoming involved in controversies between regional states and the West in the controversial relations among the regional states themselves. Diplomacy made a comeback in Turkish foreign policy as the best instrument for implementing this policy of balance, which revealed itself in the pursuit of benevolent neutrality to foster rapprochement with the regional and Eastern states in general. Turkish statesmen expected to utilize this rapprochement to gather international political and economic support from the non-Western world for its causes like Cyprus and internal economic development. This change in Turkey’s regional role was most revealingly brought to light in Turkey’s refusal to co-operate with the US and support Israel during the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Turkey made active diplomatic efforts to support the Palestinian cause in the international arena without, however, attempting to break off relations with Israel, a course of action Arab states were calling upon her to pursue (see Aykan 1993, 97–107). Even though the two sides managed to preserve their ties, even during a tense period between 1975 and 1978 when the US imposed an arms embargo on Turkey following the Turkish military involvement of Cyprus in 1974, it was really the DECA (Defence and Economic Co-operation Agreement) of March 1980 that represented the genuine return to active co-operation between the two states. The aiding factor was again the changing atmosphere between the US and the USSR, when the latter occupied Afghanistan in December 1979, posing an unprecedented threat to Western strategic interests in the oil region of the Persian Gulf – the stability of which had considerably already weakened in the wake of the revolution in Iran earlier the same year. The Afghanistan issue effectively sealed the fate of the already faltering Détente between the two superpowers. Throughout the continuation of this new period – the Second Cold War –and until the dismemberment of the Soviet Union in December 1991, Turkey’s regional role of refraining from involvement in relations between the West and the regional states had not changed. Turkey’s partial but direct involvement in US efforts to secure Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait in the years 1990/91 was not, contrary to

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perceptions, a deviation but an implementation of the above mentioned regional role as a result of unprecedented US-Soviet co-ordination of policy in the UN Security Council over a sensitive regional conflict (see Aykan 1998). The so-called post-Cold War period, starting with the collapse of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe in 1989, a process that culminated in the dismemberment of the USSR in 1991 and extends to the present day could, for the practical purposes of analysing Turkish-American relations, be studied by dividing it into two periods: the pre and post 11 September 2001 attacks on America. In the pre-September 11 era, the above-mentioned historical difficulty for Turkey and the US in managing co-operation and co-ordination in their relations, in the face of the differences between their global and local priorities, began to face unprecedented challenges. One of these challenges was how to adapt NATO, as the continuing common point between the international orientations of the two states despite the demise of the USSR, to the security requirements of the post-bipolar international environment in such a way that the historical management of differences between the local and global priorities of interests between the two states could be sustained. The basic problem here was not the difficulty of arriving at common perceptions of the new categories of threats after the demise of the USSR; although Turkey and the US have continued to share common interests of preserving peace and stability in the post-Cold War world against the common perception of myriad new threats, ranging from ethnic and religious conflicts to the proliferation of nuclear technology and terrorism, they have sometimes, because of their differing priorities, differed on how best to achieve this in a way mutually satisfying to their perceived security interests. Because such cases touched on their most sensitive security concerns, these differences were of a nature that caused each side to question the other’s trustworthines as a ‘strategic partner.’ A revealing case in point was the establishment of the new security architecture of Europe around the project of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) to develop the European Union’s (EU) military and non-military crisis management capability, as part of a strengthened common European policy on security and defence, in cooperation with NATO. When a controversy emerged between Turkey, as a NATO and non-EU member, and the EU on whether and how Turkey would participate in discussions and decisions within the EU concerning the ESDP from the onset of a crisis to the actual use of force to achieve its tasks, Turkey faced US pressure to act with moderation by not exercising its veto right in NATO to prevent the EU from using NATO’s assets whenever this was requested. Partly due to this pressure, Turkey finally and unwillingly agreed to a compromise solution with the EU, concluded in December 2002, that fell short of achieving an assurance of Turkey’s actual participation – rather than a mere EU promise to ‘consult’ – in the decision-making and implementation of an EU-led military operation conducted in the vicinity of Turkey with the potential of adversely affecting Turkish national security. On this matter, the primary concern of the US as a global power appeared to be preventing duplication, while NATO and the EU cooperated in removing a

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security burden from US shoulders. As the then Turkish foreign minister Ismail Cem pointed out, not without some rancour, concerning the ESDP, ‘the priority of the US was not a solution favoured by Turkey….even though this was preferred … but a future solution option’.8 The Factors of International Orientations and National Roles in the PostSeptember 11 Period In the post September 11 period, the above-mentioned challenge of co-ordinating their policies in the face of common interests and threats versus differing priorities has greatly increased. In the case of the US attacking the Taleban regime in Afghanistan in October 2001, it seemed that Turkey and the US successfully continued to co-ordinate their policies as they did on the issue of ESDP, despite the differing priorities of local and global interests which were also clearly evident in the Afghanistan case, as will be explained below. The real turning point, throwing the US-Turkey relationship into disarray, seems to have been reached with the rejection by the Turkish Parliament of the US request of the use of Turkish soil for US military use in a land attack against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Despite this development, the new period in the relationship continues to involve continuities with the past as well as differences. In terms of continuities; even in the case of Afghanistan, where Turkey coordinated her policy with the US by agreeing to dispatch a combat force of 90 soldiers, coming after a period of procrastination and at the expense of Turkey changing its original position to keep her involvement in the Afghanistan mission strictly peaceful,9 this did not herald a change in Turkey’s regional role of refraining from being a party to the disputes between Western and regional states. As in the case of the Kuwait crisis of 1990/91, US policy towards Afghanistan was also supported by the international society at large, the UN and NATO expressing support through their specific decisions.10 Furthermore, from Turkey’s local priority of interests, the role of NATO was particularly revealing in this case since, for the first time in its history, it decided to cite Article 5 in the face of a terrorist attack. This had been 8 See ‘interview with Foreign Minister Ismail Cem on the Turkish television channel CNN-Turk on 6 April 2001’, Disisleri Guncesi (A Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Publication) April 2001, Turkish Foreign Affairs Ministry , (see Aykan 2005, 344). 9 See ‘the press conference given by the Turkish Premier Bulent Ecevit on Turkey’s involvement in the Afghanistan issue on 1 November, 2001’ Disisleri Guncesi, November 2001, Turkish Foreign Affairs Ministry . 10 ‘The speech given by Turkish Defense Minister Sabahattin Cakmakoglu before the Turkish Grand National Assembly on 10 October 2001 explaining Turkey’s policy on Afghanistan’, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi (Records of the Turkish Grand National Assembly), Turkish Grand National Assembly Donem:21, Cilt:71, Yasama Yili:4, 5. Birlesim, 10 October 2001 .

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continually advocated by Turkey, victimised by international terrorism for decades, to no avail. For the first time there seemed to have appeared a real opportunity for Turkey to galvanise the support of both her Western allies and the international community at large for her prolonged efforts to neutralise the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) threat. The difference appears to be that the two sides now seem to have reached a stage in their relations where they are incapable of co-ordinating their policies as they had in the past, despite the fact that they sincerely want to co-operate in the light of a perception of enduring common interests in the post-September 11 period in world politics. The case in point on how to respond best to terrorism as a common threat seems to have dominated the other above-mentioned perception of common threats that have come to the fore following the dismemberment of the USSR. The differences between the two states on how to best meet the challenge of terrorism – that had already begun to surface during the Afghanistan mission, as will be examined below – became further amplified when the US decided to expand military activity from Afghanistan into Iraq. It seemed that Turkey, in the post-Cold War period, was now experiencing severe difficulty in implementing its principle of refraining from involvement in controversies between a Western ally and a regional state with which she had political and economic interests. From the standpoint of its local priority of interests, the difference with the Iraq case was that Turkey was expected by the US to aid its war efforts against Iraq when, in stark contrast to the previous cases of Kuwait and Afghanistan, this time there was no unity in NATO to support the US action – with this lack of unity of purpose in NATO soon spilling over into the position of the UN which was not supportive of US policies towards Iraq. Seen from its perceived global interests point of view, the US decision to attack Iraq was not surprising. The state of war between the US and Iraq had not ended with allied success in securing the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait in 1991. Since the Clinton administration, US authorities had been considering the military option, i.e, introduction of ground forces, against Saddam Hussein in case the limited use of force – demonstration of force, such as aerial strikes, etc – fell short of forcing Saddam regime to comply with UN resolutions.11 It appeared that the September 11 events had forced upon the US leaders the need for clarification of US strategic priorities; terrorism came forward as the most important threat, and war against Iraq was seen as an integral part of dealing with this threat. Exactly therein lay the clash of local and global priority of interests between Turkey and the US respectively. From Turkey’s standpoint, extending the Afghan war into Iraq would exacerbate rather than aid the war against terrorism. Since the very beginning of the war in Afghanistan, the Turks had been arguing that the fight against terrorism could not be separated from the aim of securing regional stability. For them, the local use of force by the US in Afghanistan and Iraq whilst the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli conflict remained unsolved would further 11 The Americans informed the Turks of such plans for the first time on 6 November 1998, which the Turks strictly opposed (see Yetkin 2004, 11–15).

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increase regional instability and thus enhance rather than control the threat posed by terrorism against the security of the Western countries12 (see White House 2001). This had been the classical line of the Turkish argument concerning the US policies related to security in the Persian Gulf since the 1960s (see Aykan 1996, 348). The US use of force would lead to a possible dismemberment of Iraq and increasing antiAmericanism in the region. Furthermore, according to the Turks, included among the consequences of a possible dismemberment of Iraq, was the possibility of the establishment of a separate Kurdish state in Northern Iraq; this would pose a direct threat to both Turkey’s national unity and territorial integrity as it would constitute an example to the secessionist Kurdish forces in Turkey.13 Even more directly, the possibility of continuing PKK attacks into Turkey’s southeastern provinces from Northern Iraq would compel the Turks to carry out military pursuits and mop-up operations in Northern Iraq for purposes of self-defence. Aside from the financial costs and technical difficulties14 this would complicate Turkey’s relations with the international community, which had always been critical of similar operations Turkey had undertaken since the 1980s. Although apparently sharing these Turkish concerns, neither of these two consequences mentioned by the Turks as further destabilizing the region convinced the US to change its policy of armed coercion against Iraq. Firstly, for the US statesmen, the establishment of democracy in Iraq would, with the support of the US for local parties, result in the establishment of a more stable Iraq, one more peaceful towards her neighbours and the US. Second, this would be the start of the establishment of democratic dominoes in the region which would, in turn, aid the solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, thus addressing the sentiments of anti-Americanism at its roots.15 With respect to the Turkish arguments as to how these consequences would 12 According to Turkish Premier Bulent Ecevit, the possibility of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict turning into a war constituted ‘probably’ a more dangerous regional threat than the Afghanistan issue. See ‘the statement made to that effect by Premier Ecevit on 4 December, 2001’, Disisleri Guncesi, December 2001, Turkish Foreign Affairs Ministry ; and see also ‘the speech made by Abdullah Gul on behalf of the Justice and Development Party and representatives of the other Turkish political parties before the Turkish Parliament on the same subject on 10 October, 2001’, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Donem: 21, Cilt: 71, Yasama Yili: 4, 5. Birlesim, 10 October 2001, . 13 The Turks indicated their awareness of the Kurdish leaders’ intentions to attract US intervention in Iraq on the expectation that this would facilitate the establishment of an independent Kurdish state in Northern Iraq. See the statement made by an official of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to that effect as cited by Jurgen Gottschlicht (see Gottschlicht 2001). 14 According to a study prepared by the Turkish Grand National Assembly Research Service in 2004, over the years Turkey has spent $ 80billion in total for its struggle against the PKK (see Cumhuriyet, 27 July 2005, 6). 15 See the full interview with the US Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz in May 2003 in Washington by Mehmet Ali Birand and Cengiz Candar (see Balbay 2004, 244– 256). The US Assistant Secretary of State Scott Carpenter stated that the US would thereupon apply more serious sanctions against “imitation democracies” such as the ones existing in

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affect Turkey’s national security in more direct ways, US policy seems firstly to have been based on the assumption that a federal Iraq, which would keep the Kurdish population – among others – more satisfied than it was during the Saddam regime, would hold on to Iraqi territorial integrity, without the likelihood of the establishment of a separate Kurdish state in Northern Iraq.16 Secondly, US statesmen still strongly believed that, consistent with their convictions throughout the 1990s, what posed a more significant threat to post-Cold War Turkey was the ‘Kurdish issue’ there. The roots of this threat stemmed not from an external origin but from the deficiencies of Turkish democracy and the shortcomings of the state of human rights in Turkey; these could be addressed firstly by abandoning the excessively nationalistic Kemalist approach.17 As a consequence of such an approach, US policy-makers are inclined to view Turkey’s current – and past –interventions in Northern Iraq, its current failure to support US policies of applying pressure against Syria and Iran, and probably even its current opposition to the US intention to expand the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) as a multinational effort to interdict the weapons of mass destruction proliferation-related shipments from the Mediterranean into the Black Sea region as the insistence of a failing domestic policy of democratisation. This, they believe, would weaken not only Turkey’s political stability and, in turn, world peace but also her expected value as a successful democratic Muslim state encouraging moderation as an antidote to anti-Americanism or anti-Westernism in regional politics.18 countries like Azerbaijan and Syria as part of an overall US effort “to change the status quo” in the Middle East to achieve stability through democratisation (see Cumhuriyet, 25 June 2005,10; el Serif 2005; Boland and Dinmore 2005; Gelinsky and Hermann 2005; Quadrennial Defense Report 2006). 16 See, for example, interview with Marc Grossmann, former US Ambassador to Turkey (Milliyet, 9 August 2005,19). 17 Even though the US officials generally refrain from explicitly targeting Kemalism they do not shy away from making statements that in order to become a ‘successful democracy’ Turkey must uphold in its political system values such as the supremacy of law, freedom of expression, an accountable government and religious freedoms (see Ergin 2005, 13). It seems that what is thus implied by the US officials is explicitly stated by Prof. Samuel Huntington in a speech he gave in Istanbul in which he emphasized that, ‘It is now due to reconsider the six arrows as they were stated by Kemal Ataturk 75 years ago’ in order to ‘change and adapt it’ to the necessities of the new times (Cumhuriyet, 25 May 2005, 12). 18 Ever since the 1990s, US administrations have held the opinion that in Turkey ‘moderate’ Kurdish political leaders ‘... must be granted the right to express themselves in the Turkish political system to solve the Kurdish issue’ (see Milliyet, 18 April 1995, 16). If and when this were to be realized, they seem to believe, Turkey would have no reason to fear the Kurdish separatists gaining footholds in the region (see Congar 2005b, 19; el Serif 2005; Boland and Dinmore 2005; Gelinsky and Hermann 2005). On Turkey-US differences concerning Iraq, Iran and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to be expanded from the Mediterranean into the Black Sea region (see Cumhuriyet, 26 March 2006, 9; Cumhuriyet, 2 March 2006, 11). Turkey is concerned that the new US policy on the PSI requires a revision of the Montreux Convention of 1936, which will upset peace and stability in the Black Sea region (see Cumhuriyet, 26 March 2006, 9; Cumhuriyet, 2 March 2006, 11).

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Thus, based upon the facts mentioned above, it could be argued that the most important – and unprecedented – clash of interests between Turkey and the US is based on their understanding of the concept of stability as the best-antidote against the common threat of international terrorism. Thus, Turkey and the US follow antithetical assumptions regarding the most suitable way of strengthening stability; this encourages antithetical policies that place them on a collision course unbefitting of allies. For example, their common interests of maintaining peace and stability cause them in principle to work against the PKK and in favour of regional democratisation. In reality, however, their different priorities cause them to differ on how this is best carried out.19 For the Turks, who have been confronted with increasing terrorist attacks in Turkey perpetrated by PKK militants operating from Northern Iraq since last year, neutralisation of the PKK is a priority in their policy towards Iraq. The Turks insist that the US could do more than it does today by at least arresting PKK leaders in Northern Iraq and handing them over to the Turkish authorities. This request, maintain the Turkish statesmen, is in complete accord with the UN Resolutions calling for international co-operation against global terrorism (see Cumhuriyet, 20 July 2005, 9). Concerning democratisation, even though they have announced their commitment ‘to expand democratic institutions and practices and to undertake joint activities that will support reform efforts ...’ within the region called the ‘Broader Middle East and North Africa’, the Turks are in favour of evolution rather than outside interference leading to revolution.20 From the US standpoint, however, their efforts to restore order in Iraq must not be jeopardized by the use of force against the PKK, which would make the US, already struggling to maintain order in Iraq, also have to confront the Kurds 19 Thus, in a recent briefing given by the second in command of the Turkish Armed Forces Gen. Ilker Basbug to the Turkish media; he stated that the ‘US has an intention but not a determination to fight against the PKK’ in Northern Iraq. During the military meetings between Turkey and the US, he went on to remark, US officials had expressed sympathy and understanding for Turkey’s justified concerns regarding the threat posed by PKK militants engaged in armed attacks against Turkish civilians and military from their safe havens in Northern Iraq. He added, however, that not only had they taken no action against the PKK in Northern Iraq, they also opposed the Turkish Armed Forces doing the same (see Cumhuriyet, 20 July 2005, 9). Gen. Basbug’s statement is reminiscent of the realist suggestion that states generally want to co-operate with one another but do not know how to co-ordinate, in contrast to the Liberal institutionalist quest for the reasons why it is hard for states in the international arena to co-operate (see Little 2001, 313). 20 Turkey, together with Yemen and Italy, assumed leadership in organizing the Democracy Assistance Dialogue, ‘an initiative to share experiences and best practices’ across the region of the Broader Middle East and North Africa within the context of a US-supported international democratisation project (see US Department of State 2004). The Turks stress that political, social and economic reforms in the Islamic world must come from within the Islamic countries and be in accordance with their legal systems. See the six conditions for launching reforms in the Middle East and similar places as stated by the Turkish foreign minister Abdullah Gul (see Milliyet, 29 June 2005, 21).

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in Northern Iraq, the only compliant ally of the US since the invasion of Iraq in 200321 (see Batur 2005, 20). Besides, as a result of a seemingly unpleasant historical image of the Turks US policymakers have grounds to suspect that, unrestrained, the Turks will attempt to find the remedy for their undemocratic regimes at home via continuous direct and indirect interference in the internal affairs of their neighbours, jeopardizing the stability of a region in which the US now has a vested interest. This point particularly applies to the foreseeable future in which it appears the US may contemplate a phased withdrawal of their forces from Iraq beginning in 2006, preparing to leave in their place an able Iraqi government structure that will survive the tough job of holding multi-ethnic Iraq together.22 Conclusion and Prospects for the Future As can be seen, the currently perceived disarray in the relations between Turkey and the US is a not altogether unexpected development when the relations between the two states are considered from a historical perspective. The basic disagreements as to how to best meet the common threats that cause this disarray stem from the different priorities of the two states as local and global actors, a fact evident in their historical relations. Even during periods when co-operation and co-ordination in their foreign policies seemed at their zenith, such as at the height of the Cold War in the 1950s and in the Afghanistan phase of the post-September 11 period, their relations were not immune from such disagreements. What makes the current era, starting with the US war against Iraq in March 2003 which ended in the US becoming an insider in the region, different from the 21 In rejecting the Turkish request that the US use force against the PKK in Northern Iraq, the US authorities reportedly responded that the US was fighting against the ‘global terrorism’ whereas Turkey was struggling against a ‘regional and ethnic movement’. About the latter they said, the US could do nothing (see Cumhuriyet, 15 July 2005, 6). Combined with its passivity, this seemingly ‘protective’ attitude of the US towards the PKK was seen by the Turkish security officials as an example of an ally’s ‘carelessness and treachery’ (see Farac 2005, 6). From the Turkish standpoint, what reinforces this perception of US ‘protectionism’ towards the PKK – questioning US sincerity to act against the PKK – is the permission given to Kurdish parties by the US to open offices with a flag in the city of Kerkuk in Northern Iraq, despite their apparent links to PKK. Thus, for the Turks, it seems the US supports legitimisation of the PKK in Iraq as in Turkey (see Cumhuriyet, 9 August 2005, 7). 22 It was considered ‘puzzling’ that, at the beginning of the year 2002, the US State Department reports on International Terrorism stated that the basic goal of the PKK was ‘to establish an independent, democratic Kurdish state in southeast Turkey, northern Iraq, and parts of Iran and Syria’. It was noted that the word ‘democratic’ had been omitted in the previous reports (see Congar 2005a, 20; US Department of State 2005). A statement issued by the US Administration pointed out that the US government was not opposed to possible Turkish military operations against the PKK within the borders of Turkey unless massive human rights violations occurred. From Turkey’s standpoint this statement was nothing but adding an insult to injury (see, Cumhuriyet, 14 July 2005, 6).

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preceding periods is that the gap between their respective perceptions of how best to counter the common threat has never been so wide. Currently, the US and Turkey’s approaches to the PKK are not the same, despite the fact that they both label it as a ‘terrorist organisation’. Since its emergence in the 1980s up to the present day, the PKK has always threatened Turkey’s national security in more direct ways and to a far greater extent than either the USSR or the international communism seen as being directed by the USSR ever had. Today there exists no USSR to provide an incentive for Turkey and the US to co-ordinate their actions against the PKK which, even though part of international terrorism, has never been a direct security concern of the US. This will continue to be the fundamental challenge facing the two countries in the foreseeable future. The real question will be whether they will display the determination to co-ordinate their policies in order to face the PKK as a common threat so that their continuing alliance will be meaningful. The answer to that question is not necessarily in the affirmative. As has been argued here, an uniquely challenging era has begun in their relations in which the US has shifted its former foreign policy of the pre-September 11 period, one of caution which did not fundamentally challenge the existing status quo in the region now called the Broader Middle East and North Africa, to a new one based on an unprecedented policy of actively exporting democracy abroad. Thus, for the US today, despite Turkey’s continuing importance for the defence of Western strategic interests, Turkey is no longer simply a democratically deficient state which can be tolerated as it was in the Cold War era because of its perceived contribution to the common cause of defending Western strategic interests against the common threat of USSR and communism; today, Turkey’s deficient democracy combined with its defiant foreign policy has itself, from the standpoint of the US, become a potential threat to current US strategic interests in promoting peace and stability in the new era through supporting the proliferation of democratic regimes that are expected to be peaceful towards their neighbours.23 23 It is emphasized in the ‘Ouadrennial Defence Review Report’ of February 2006 that it was necessary for the US to realize a shift in its defence policy from ‘... static alliances – to dynamic partnerships ... to meet the new strategic environment’ (see Ouadrennial Defence Review Report 2006). It is understood from the same report that under this new US defence policy, in order to be able to receive US military assistance, allies like Turkey are expected to demonstrate their ability ‘... to govern and police themselves effectively’. The report goes on to state that ‘assistance in today’s environment relies on the ability to improve states’ governance, administration, internal security and the rule of law in order to build partner governments’ legitimacy in the eyes of their own people and thereby inoculate societies against terrorism, insurgency and non-state threats’ (see Ouadrennial Defence Review Report 2006, 90). Referring to the statements made by US President George W. Bush to that effect, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice underlined the fact that the US’s relations were ‘not going to be as deep and strong with countries that are not reforming’ (see US Department of State 2005). Explaining US expectations from Turkey in the wake of the war in Iraq in March 2003, US Assistant Secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz bluntly stated that Turkey must

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In the case of PKK terrorism, which Turkey views as being encouraged by current US policy, albeit unintentionally, the question of how Ankara can tolerate the continuous violation of its most sacred sovereign security interests remains. How can Turkey be tolerated by the US if the latter cannot help regarding the former, as seems to be the case, as a living antithesis of the ‘democratic peace theory’ so long as this theory continues to be situated at the centre of its new foreign policy? The jury is still out on whether Turkey and the US will find a compromise, as they did in the past, based on the understanding that their mutual interests must override their differences. References Athanassopoulou, E. (2001), ‘American-Turkish Relations Since the End of the Cold War’, Middle East Policy, 8: 3. Aykan, M.B. (1993), ‘The Palestinian Question in Turkish Foreign Policy from the 1950s to the 1990s’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 25. Aykan, M.B. (1994), Turkey’s Role in the Organization of the Islamic Conference: 1960–1992. The Nature of Deviation from the Kemalist Heritage (New York: Vantage Press). Aykan, M.B. (1996), ‘Turkish Perspectives on Turkish-US Relations Concerning Persian Gulf Security in the post-Cold War Era: 1989–1995’, The Middle East Journal, 50: 3. Aykan, M.B. (1998), Turkiye’nin Kuveyt Krizi Politikasi (1990–91): 1998 Yilindan Geriye Yonelik Bir Yeniden Degerlendirme (Ankara: Dis Politika Enstitusu). Aykan, M.B. (2005), ‘Turkey and European Security and Defense Identity/Policy (ESDI/P): A Turkish View’, Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 13: 3. Balbay, M. (2004), Irak Batakliginda Turk-Amerikan Iliskileri (Istanbul: Cumhuriyet Kitaplari). Batur, N. (2005), Hurriyet, 15 July 2005. Boland, V. and Dinmore, G. (2005), Financial Times, 11 June, Dis Basinda Turkiye (Turkey in the Foreign Press), 13 June 2005, Basbakanlik Basin, Yayin ve Enformasyon Genel Mudurlugu . Cagatay, S. (2004), ‘Where Goes the US-Turkish Relationship?’, Middle East Quarterly. ‘Chairmen’s Summary: The Preparatory Meetings for Forum of the Future, September admit its mistake in failing to co-ordinate its policies with the US earlier on the Iraqi issue; subordinate itself to the US policies in the region; and be of assistance to the US wherever it can. See the full interview with the US Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz made in May 2003 in Washington by Mehmet Ali Birand and Cengiz Candar (see Balbay 2004, 244– 256). Evidently, this US expectation from Turkey will continue to affect US-Turkey relations in the foreseeable future (see Ouadrennial Defence Review Report 2006, 18, 23, 27, 28, 30, 31).

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24’ (2004), US Department of State [website], . Congar, Y. (2005a), Milliyet, 29 April 2005. Congar, Y. (2005b), Milliyet, 15 August 2005. ‘Country Reports on Terrorism’ (2005), US Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism [website], 27 April, . Cumhuriyet, 2 March 2006. Cumhuriyet, 26 March 2006. Cumhuriyet, 26 April 2005. Cumhuriyet, 25 May 2005. Cumhuriyet, 25 June 2005. Cumhuriyet, 6 July 2005. Cumhuriyet, 9 July 2005. Cumhuriyet, 14 July 2005. Cumhuriyet, 20 July 2005. Cumhuriyet, 27 July 2005. Cumhuriyet, 9 August 2005. Ergin, S. (2005), ‘Farewell Interview with the US Ambassador to Turkey Eric Edelman’, Milliyet, 19 June. Farac, M. (2005), Cumhuriyet, 15 July 2005. Gaddis, J.L. (1982), Strategies of Containment (New York: Oxford University Press). Gelinsky, K. and Hermann, R. (2005), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 10 June 2005, Dis Basinda Turkiye (Turkey in the Foreign Press), 13 June 2005, Basbakanlik Basin, Yayin ve Enformasyon Genel Mudurlugu http://www.byegm.gov.tr/ YAYINLARIMIZ/DISBASIN/2005/06/13x06x05.htm#%201. Gottschlicht, J. (2001), Die Tageszeitung, 10 October 2001, Dis Basinda Turkiye, 11 October 2001, Turkish Foreign Affairs Ministry, http://www.mfa.gov.tr. Gonlubol, M. et al. (1996), Olaylarla Turk Dis Politikasi 1919–1995, 9th Edition (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi). Gunter, M.M. (2005), ‘The US-Turkish Alliance in Disarray’, World Affairs, 167: 3. Hook, S.W. and Spanier, J. (2000), American Foreign Policy Since World War II, 15th Edition (Washington D.C.: CQ Press). ‘Interview with Foreign Minister Ismail Cem on the Turkish television channel CNNTurk on 6 April 2001’, Disisleri Guncesi (A Turkish Foreign Affairs Ministry Publication) April 2001, Turkish Foreign Affairs Ministry, . Karal, E.Z. (1981), ‘The Principles of Kemalism’, in Kazancigil, A. and Ozbudun, E. (eds), Ataturk: The Founder of a Modern State (London: C. Hurst and Company). Lippe, J.M.V. (1997), ‘The “Other” Treaty of Lausanne: The American Public and Official Debate on Turkish-American Relations’, The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations (Ankara: Ankara University Press).

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Little, R. (2004) ‘International regimes’, in Baylis, J. and Smith, S. (eds), The Globalization of World Politics – An Introduction to International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press). MEMRI (2005), Interview in the Turkish business daily Referans on 30 May 2005, with Kemal Koprulu, Founder and Chairman of the ARI Movement, ‘On the current state of Turkey-US relations’, MEMRI (The Middle East Media Research Institute)’, Special Dispatch Series, 9 June, No: 919 . Milliyet, 18 April 1995. Milliyet, 29 June 2005. Mumcu, U. (1994), Kurt-Islam Ayaklanmasi: 1919–1925, 14th Edition (Istanbul: Tekin Yayinevi). ‘Ouadrennial Defense Review Report’, Office of the Secretary of Defense, February 6, 2006, vii, The Project on Defence Alternatives, The Defence Strategy Review Page . ‘Press conference given by the Turkish Premier Bulent Ecevit on Turkey’s involvement in the Afghanistan issue on 1 November, 2001’, Disisleri Guncesi, November 2001, Turkish Foreign Affairs Ministry, . ‘Rice Says Democracy, Moderation Progressing in Middle East’ (2005), US Department of State [website], 9 June, . el Serif, Y. (2005), Al Hayat, 12 June, Dis Basinda Turkiye (Turkey in the Foreign Press), 13 June 2005, Basbakanlik Basin, Yayin ve Enformasyon Genel Mudurlugu [website] . Sever, A. (1998), ‘The Compliant Ally? Turkey and the West in the Middle East, 1954–58’, Middle Eastern Studies, 34: 2. ‘Speech given by Turkish Defense Minister Sabahattin Cakmakoglu before the Turkish Grand National Assembly on 10 October 2001 explaining Turkey’s policy on Afghanistan’, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi (Records of Turkish Grand National Assembly), Turkish Grand National Assembly, Donem: 21, Cilt: 71, Yasama Yili: 4, 5. Birlesim, 10 October 2001, [website] . ‘Statement made to that effect by Premier Ecevit on 4 December, 2001’, Disisleri Guncesi, December 2001, Turkish Foreign Affairs Ministry, http://www.mfa.gov.tr Stone, D.R. (1994), ‘The Balkan Pact and American Policy’, East European Quarterly, 28: 3. ‘The speech made by Abdullah Gul on behalf of the Justice and Development Party and representatives of the other Turkish political parties before the Turkish Parliament on 10 October, 2001’, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Donem: 21, Cilt: 71, Yasama Yili: 4, 5. Birlesim, 10 October 2001, http://www.tbmm.gov.tr. Tucker, R.W. and Hendrickson, D.C. (1992), The Imperial Temptation: The New World Order and America’s Purpose (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press).

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‘Turkey: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2004’ (2005), US Department of State [website], 28 February 2005, . ‘US-Russia-Turkey Partnership: Anti-Terrorism and Afghanistan’, prepared by a bipartisan Congressional delegation led by Representative Curt Weldon that visited Russia, Italy and Turkey between 26 September and 1 October, 2001, US Congress, House of Representatives 2 October 2001, White House (2001) [website], . Yetkin, M. (2004), Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gercek Oykusu, Second Edition (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi).

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Chapter 5

The ‘Iraq Factor’ in Turkey, EU and US Triangle since 9/11 Aysegul Sever

While Turkey’s bid for EU membership has long been a domineering issue in Turkey’s foreign policy, especially under the Justice and Development Party (AKP) administration, the Iraq problem has also become equally vital with its multifaceted reflections on the country’s internal and international posture since the 1991 Gulf war. A regional development other than the Cyprus dispute has for the first time affected Ankara’s relations with the West, particularly with Washington, more deeply than ever before.1 In due respect, the impact of the long running Iraqi debacle on comparative Turkey-US and Turkey-EU relations will be the main point of concern in this particular chapter. Iraq in US-Turkey Relations In the wake of 9/11, Turkey, with its secular and democratic system, was seen in Washington as a convenient partner in the Islamic world in the face of worsening relations between Islam and the West. The desire for cooperation was mutual (see Taspinar 2003, 3–4). Having long suffered from PKK (the Kurdistan Workers Party) terror, Ankara expected to have more a sympathetic hearing about its similar problems after the September attacks. Given that the US had generally approached the Kurdish question in Turkey ‘as an issue of terrorism,’ Ankara rightly sought even firmer support from Washington following 9/11 (see AICGS Newsletter 2004). Unlike the Europeans, Washington has generally supported the Turkish governments’ campaigns against the PKK/ Kongra-Gel. Concurrent with this, Turkish-US determination to cooperate against terror was in full swing in the aftermath of 9/11. In its first firm response to 9/11, Ankara wholeheartedly backed the US campaign in Afghanistan 1 Due to the turmoil in Cyprus Ankara’s intervention scenarios were on the agenda in the wake of the 1963 events. In 1964, the Turkish attempt was harshly brought to an end with an ultimatum like letter by US President Lyndon Johnson causing long term resentment on the Turkish side. Thereafter, it was Turkey’s intervention in to the Island in 1974 that created a real crisis in Turkish-American relations. As a response to the intervention, the US imposed an arms embargo on its NATO ally, Turkey from 1975to 1978 which comprised then the lowest point in the relations.

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by actively participating in the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) and twice assumed command. Following the Afghan operation, Iraq was next in the USA’s war on terror. Contrary to the Afghan war, the 2003 Iraq war was far from being a good example of cooperation between Ankara and Washington. The US decision to attack Iraq opened up a period of distrust, suspicion and ambiguity in bilateral relations, as was largely evident in the bilateral talks preceding the Iraqi operation and thereafter. Throughout the 1990s, both Washington and Ankara regarded the Saddam regime as a serious threat to regional security and Ankara therefore cooperated with Washington, regardless of its political and economic reservations. In particular, in allowing the US use of the Incirlik base, Ankara played a critical role in the creation of a safe heaven for the Kurds in Northern Iraq and for the formation of Operation Provide Comfort/Operation Northern Watch, notwithstanding serious doubts about Kurdish plans in Iraq and its possible implications for the Kurdish issue in Turkey. Meanwhile, the US was quite forthcoming in its approach to the ongoing Turkish dispute with the PKK in the 90s. Unlike the Europeans, Washington was more forthright in naming the PKK as a terrorist organisation than the Europeans. The US also played a critical role in the capture of PKK Chief Abdullah Ocalan in 1999 by providing intelligence to the Turkish authorities. On the other hand, US desire to depose Saddam by forceful means in the wake of 9/11 before giving more chance to diplomacy and UN efforts caused a breach of consensus between the two allies. Prior to the war, the newly elected AKP leadership, which defines itself as conservative democrat regardless of its Islamist roots, signalled that it would be a reluctant partner in a US-led operation against Iraq due to its desire to have a say in the reconstruction of Iraq, especially concerning the Kurdish question and its ongoing economic difficulties. The government’s indication that it would take a clear pro-American line during AKP leader Tayyip Erdogan’s visit to Washington D.C. in late December 2002 was short-lived. The pro-American stance was reversed on March 1, 2003, when the National Assembly, where the AKP holds an overall majority, rejected the motion for American troops to be deployed on Turkish soil. This was a serious setback both to the AKP government and the Bush administration as the Americans had already begun to make military preparations for opening a northern front in Iraq via Turkey. This rejection of the motion was generally described as a U-turn on the Turkish side, which accordingly resulted in increasing stress in Turkish-American relations and brought weeks of US-Turkish political, economic and military talks on Iraq to a standstill. Prior to the motion, the different interests and approaches of the two countries were on display and served to drive a wedge between them. On the Turkish side, the AKP government wanted assurance that an independent Kurdish state would not arise and that Turkey would receive economic compensation in return for its prospective assistance to the US on Iraq (see Idiz 2003, 41–2). The US side was characterized by its patronizing style and ‘race against time’ approach. The Turkish government’s ambivalent stance towards the Iraqi crisis (first siding with the US position, then deciding to remain on the sidelines in accordance with a legislative decision based mainly on domestic concerns) seriously strained relations

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by clearly exposing the fact that neither side could take the decades-old, deep-seated ties for granted (see Sever 2004). The multifaceted cordial relations, which were once defined as a ‘strategic partnership’ during the Clinton era became something of the past within a few months. From then on, US-Turkish relations would be in the process of restoration. The real point of divergence between the two allies with regard to Iraq has its origins in the Kurdish issue. Since the 1991 Gulf War, Turkey has always harboured suspicions of US aims over Northern Iraq and had its doubts about the objectives of US policy towards the Iraqi Kurds. Yet, it preferred to cooperate with the US to influence developments in the region until the motion was declined in 2003 (see Dagi 2002). Successive Turkish governments considered developments in Northern Iraq as part of their own Kurdish problem, especially after the internationalisation of the issue in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War. The protection of the territorial integrity of Iraq in reference to the developments in Northern Iraq became a constant feature of Ankara’s foreign policy calculations. The Iraqi problem, the possible spill over effects of the emergence of an autonomous/independent Kurdish region in Iraq has revived some of the long standing fears of Turkey, such as the partition, which evoked memories of Western plans for the dismemberment of Anatolia in the wake of World War One. PKK terror sanctioned Turkey consistently taking security measures in the classical sense of military security. This consequently brought about a further involvement of the military in the foreign policy making procedure (see Ozcan and Kut 1998, 67–110). On the other hand, with the capture of Ocalan in 1999, Ankara’s threat perception regarding the Kurdish issue had significantly improved. Moreover, Turkey’s EU membership process contributed to the improvement of conditions for the Kurds by responding to Kurdish desires for cultural and linguistic rights in Turkey. The importance of the recognition of some cultural rights has increasingly been accepted in the official circles so that the need for embracing security in a multifaceted fashion has come to the fore. The passage of the new legislation in August 2002 which allows Kurds to have Kurdish language education and television broadcasts in, Kurdish whilst abolishing martial law in the Southeast contributed to the easing of communal tension. In expectation of the opening of EU-Turkish accession talks, the AKP government recently pushed through another reform package, which included the very important step of abolishing the state security courts, allowing those imprisoned under that system to gain the right to appeal to the civilian courts.2 Despite these efforts to resolve the issue within the framework of democratisation, the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003 revived some old fears about the adverse impact of Kurdish autonomy on the Kurds of Turkey. In particular, the growing number of PKK attacks in the recent months and US hesitancy to eliminate PKK forces which found shelter in Iraq once again brought forward military means as a policy option 2 Under this new legislation, Kurdish deputies of former DEP (the Democratic Labour Party) Leyla Zana and her friends were released in 2004 after serving ten years in prison, which was much appreciated in the West.

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as opposed to democratization and advancement in cultural rights. Following the US occupation of Iraq, Turkey’s chances of intervening in Northern Iraq in order to conduct the so-called ‘hot pursuit’ operations against the PKK became very difficult. In contrast to the current situation, the US used to overlook regular Turkish military incursions into Northern Iraq in search of the PKK in the 1990s (see Gunter 2005, 113–123). There was a ‘modus vivendi’ in which the basic requirements of America, the Turks, and even the Iraqi Kurds were being met.3 However, American occupation dramatically ended US toleration of Turkish incursions into Iraq. The US officials declared that these Turkish actions in Northern Iraq would no longer be tolerated as the Iraqi Kurds had assumed the role of US ally on the northern front. For instance, when the Turkish government voiced its intention to place troops in Northern Iraq to prevent a possible flood of refugees and to check any possible spill over effects from Northern Iraq (especially the PKK) just after the US occupation of Iraq, it faced a firm reaction from its Western allies, with only the US, but also most EU countries raising opposition to any Turkish involvement in Northern Iraq (see Tocci 2003). This US reaction caused a good deal of resentment in Turkey. The reversal in alliance roles between Turkey and the Iraqi Kurds became even more obvious when the US arrested eleven Turkish Special Forces troops operating in Northern Iraq on July 4, 2003. While the Kurds were being treated as the staunchest allies of the Americans in the region, Turkey was denied any influential role in post-war Iraq. In preventing Turkey from being able to move against the PKK elements in the Qandil Mountains, the US discarded the opportunity for the restoration of the relations, which had had a low profile after the Iraqi motion had been surprisingly rejected. To date, US officials have failed to truly convince their Turkish counterparts about taking necessary precautions against PKK infiltrators from Iraq. They have generally argued that they have not had enough time or sufficient forces to lead a fight against the PKK militants whilst continuing around the clock operations against Arab insurgents (see The Economist 2005). Delays in taking serious steps against the PKK presence ironically pushed Turkey closer to Iran and Syria, whose policies have been harshly criticized by Washington. In the case of the Iraqi turmoil continuing and an unacceptable federal structure emerging, Turkey’s cooperation with Syria and Iran with regard to the containment of Iraqi Kurds may reach new heights. In his recent visit to Diyarbakir in Southeastern Turkey, which has a sizeable Kurdish population, Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan acknowledged Turkey having a ‘Kurdish problem’ but did not make it entirely clear what the problem was (see Bila 2005). Democratization and extended cultural rights together with improving economic conditions have lately been the preferred way to deal with the problem. But, the recent rise in PKK attacks after the organisation’s abandonment of the ceasefire has once again raised interest in the military as a way of tackling the Kurdish problem in Turkey. The funerals of Turkish soldiers killed by the PKK became scenes of the highest condemnation of PKK terror and of strong calls for firm action. The military, 3 In order to open up to the outside world through the sale of oil and inflow of necessary goods Iraqi Kurds were dependent on Turkey’s cooperation.

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together with the nationalists and the opposition parties, including those of the centre left, began to call for more solid action from the government. At this juncture, Turkey’s turning to punitive measures rather than continuing democratic efforts largely became dependent on the US attitude towards the PKK in Iraq in the face of the Turkish public’s growing demands for more forceful handling of PKK terror. Implementing cultural democratic reforms without halting the Kurdish rebellion can be seen as a weakness on the part of the government. Possible use of military force would also strengthen the military’s political role in Turkish politics regardless of the recent efforts to prioritize civilian role over the military.4 If the disinterested US position on the PKK persists and Ankara slows down its democratization process, relations between Turkey and the West as a whole could suffer. More importantly, the US attitude on this issue has also adversely influenced the public perception of the US in Turkey, which has been running very low since the advent of the US campaign in Iraq. It became clear on the last US-led Iraq war that ‘Turkey’s relevance to the US will be dependent less on Turkey’s military capabilities and geostrategic location as it used to be,’ but more on its democratic and pluralist credentials (see Oguzlu 2004). Turkey’s relevance as an ally would increase in the eyes of Americans if Turkey could solve its external and internal security problems through further democratization. The failure of Turkey to establish cordial and cooperative relations with the Kurds of Iraq as well as with its own Kurdish population, on the basis of democratic means, will likely confine Turkey’s ability to pursue pressure-free policies in its relations with its allies and regional neighbours. In the process, Turkey’s having good counterparts among its own Kurds to resolve her problems by peaceful means are also crucial (see Matur 2005). Moreover, Turkey’s sticking to soft security measures rather than hard ones are also closely related to what degree the EU would appreciate her efforts to meet the Copenhagen criteria and in turn lead the way forward with the accession talks. Should Turkey be able to resolve its Kurdish problem and improve its security posture with accession to the EU, not only would Turkey-US relations on Iraq improve but Turkish-US cooperation on the region-wide Middle Eastern initiatives would also gain momentum. For example, Turkey could have been a more active participant and initiator in projects such as the Greater Middle East Initiative (GMEI) when the Bush administration made it public in February 2004. However, Ankara’s security concerns as to the developments in Iraq seriously strained the channels of cooperation (see Looney 2005). By declaring this project, American authorities wished to fight against authoritarianism, economic backwardness, corruption and lack of democracy in the region, which are believed to rouse terrorist activities in the Middle East. Relying on pro-American but autocratic regimes turned out to be far from providing the regional security the US has been seeking in the Middle East. The GMEI, which included all the Arab League members, Turkey, Israel, Pakistan 4 For example the number of civilian members of the National Security Council was increased. Public scrutiny of defence expenditures is on the agenda.

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and Afghanistan, was presented to the world leaders during the June 2004 G8, USEU and NATO summits. By the end of the G8 meeting, the initiative was re-named as ‘Partnership for Progress and a Common Future with the Region of the Broader Middle East and North Africa’ (BMENA), emphasizing the necessity of multilateral cooperation in building up a politically and economically reformed Middle East (see Perthes 2004). In view of these, so long as Turkey remains a country which fails to provide harmony in cultural and religious issues within its borders and is persistently preoccupied by national security concerns, it cannot form a satisfactory partnership for any reform projects. Democratization, human rights issues and authoritarian politics are long-running problems of the Middle East and as long as Turkey remains occupied with similar problems, Ankara’s possible contribution in this venue would be none or negligible (see Aras 2004, 13). However, with its rich cultural and religious heritage, Ankara can at least offer a platform for a dialogue of civilizations. Any serious progress in Turkey’s EU journey would also considerably advance Turkey’s ability to influence the regional countries within the framework of BMENA. Therefore, US support to Turkey’s adherence to the EU is closely related to Turkey’s raising its capacity to assist American reform projects in the Middle East (see Taspinar 2005). In the BMENA, Turkey could play a critical role, especially in winning back countries having problems with the international community, such as Syria and Iran. Even though these countries have long been on a problematic path with the US, Turkey’s relations with these countries, especially with Syria, took a new turn after Syria expelled Ocalan in 1998. The exchange of high level visits became commonplace, even in the wake of Refik Harrari’s assassination in Lebanon. Along with the Iraqi question, the difference in the attitude to Syria became a matter of serious disagreement between US and Turkey in their respective regional policies. Turkey’s improving relations with its Middle Eastern neighbours very much resulted from Turkey’s desire to form a counter block against the disintegration of Iraq and the rise of any Kurdish independent entity in the region. Therefore, the Kurdish problem seems to be the main factor driving the improved relations among Turkey, Syrian and Iran (see Hanafi 2004). In addition to the above mentioned shortcomings that Turkey has in assuming an active role in any Western initiated regional project, Turkey has also had some serious misgivings about the way the GMEI/BMENA was introduced. The government agrees with the importance of the most of the issues, including the advancement in democratization, human rights and woman rights, which are underlined in the Initiative. Indeed, prior to the declaration of the GMEI, Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul called on Muslim countries to work against corruption, gender inequality, a lack of democracy and human rights violations at the Tehran meeting of the Organisations of the Islamic Conference in May 2003 (see Bektas 2003). Concerning GMEI/ BMENA, Ankara emphasized the importance of initiatives taking root inside the region rather than the imposition of any plan or program from the outside. In this respect, it stands closer to the EU’s reception of the initiative. Foreign Minister Gul warns that ‘change imposed from outside is doomed to failure… The initiative for change and reform in the Islamic world should come from within’ (see Newsweek

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2004). Contrary to the long-running rhetoric about Turkey being a model for the region, Turkish officials clearly pointed out that ‘Turkey cannot be a model for the rest of the region; it can only be an ‘example’ or an ‘inspiration’. Turks are not Arabs, and treating the Arabs as a homogenous unit is an error because of diversity among the Arabs and within the BMENA region’ (see Nixon Centre Program Brief). Furthermore the timing of the initiative was not favourable from the Turkish point of view as the public at large was alarmed at developments taking place in Iraq and anti-American sentiments were riding high. Any regional project is bound to fail unless the US passes the test of providing security and stability in Iraq. Consequently, a Turkey-US partnership on any joint venture, be it the BMENA or a common policy towards Syria, is very much dependent on to what extent the US and Turkey would be able to reconcile their priorities concerning Iraq. This was once again restated during President Bush’s National Security Adviser Stephan Hadley’s visit to Ankara on 24th September, 2005. During his stay, like former American visitors, he once more reaffirmed his government’s intention of taking all the necessary measures against the PKK at the earliest convenience (see Emiroglu 2005). While reassuring Turkey on the Iraqi issue, Hadley did not disguise the US preference for a more cordial standing from Turkey on the issues of Syria and Iran (see Congar 2005). Preventing PKK terror has been the number one issue in all US-Turkish talks, whether in Ankara or Washington, since early 2005 (see Cakirozer 2005). Similar assurances by the Americans were also given to Erdogan and Gul in their recent meetings with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and President Bush during the annual opening session of the UN Assembly in New York. The respective American and Turkish positions on the Iraqi constitution are also critical for the future of bilateral relations in the region. Together with other interested parties, Turkey awaits the rise of a governing administration in Iraq following the October 2005 election. The Kurds’ growing share in the future of Iraq with the right to form a regional government under the constitution ‘sets up a framework for decentralisation virtually unprecedented in the Middle East’ (see Special Report Iraq’s Constitution). The Kurdish demand of the right to self-determination in the Constitution increased Turkish fears regarding the rise of a Kurdish state with possible adverse repercussions on the Turkish side. To the liking of Ankara, the Kurdish right to self-determination was not included in the Constitution. Ankara long suggested a unitary parliamentary democracy for post-Saddam Iraq. Nonetheless, the developments after the war compelled Turkey to come to terms with federalism as long as the territorial integrity of Iraq remained intact (see Kohen 2005). Indeed, as early as October 1998 the Americans endorsed the federalism in Iraq in their meeting with the KDP (the Kurdistan Democratic Party) and the PUK (The Patriotic Union for Kurdistan) leaders in Washington. A federal solution, therefore, has long been on agenda. Under the circumstances, it appears that a federation based on geographical rather than ethnic or religious divisions, with a powerful federal government at the centre would be the best bet for Turkey from now on (see Turkmen; Gonensay 2003).

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The status of Kerkuk is also a very sensitive issue for Turkey. Ankara is very much against the city’s annexation into the Kurdish controlled region in the future, essentially for two major reasons. Firstly, Ankara does not wish to leave the Turkmens of Kerkuk at the mercy of Kurds should there be a federal or independent Kurdish administration; the Turkmen question makes Turkey highly sensitive to the Kerkuk issue. For example, the Turkish government lodged a complaint about the Kurds who were sent to vote in Kerkuk just before the December elections (see Cakirozer 2005). Again, Turkey is uneasy about the referendum that would be held in Kerkuk in 2007 in compliance with the Constitution. The Turkmen issue is relatively new in Turkey’s foreign policy towards Iraq. Until the 1990s, Turkey showed hardly any attention to the welfare of Turkmens in Iraq. This attitude was also consistent with the traditional Turkish foreign policy of keeping its distance from people of Turkish origin outside its own borders, with the exception of Cyprus. It is currently Ankara’s wish that Turkmens act united and take a decisive role in the reconstruction of the country, which would also raise Ankara’s ability to influence proceedings in Iraq. The Iraqi Turkmen Front’s poor performances in the January elections as well as the October elections were thus a disappointment for Turkey (see Barkey 2005, 7). In the constitutional process, Ankara also saw Sunni participation as crucial for the future stability of the country and therefore called for them to take part in the January elections, while the Sunnis themselves were boycotting the elections (see Cakiroz 2005). The Shias’ gaining the upper hand after the downfall of the Sunni-dominated Saddam regime makes Turkey uneasy about the future of Iraq. An unsatisfactory distribution of power among the Kurds, Sunnis and Shias could bring about internal chaos and the disintegration of Iraq, which is the last thing any Turkish government would wish to see in a neighbouring country. Being the only secular country in the region, officials in Ankara have also been troubled about references to Islam as the fundamental source of legislation and the notion that no law should contradict ‘the tenets of Islamic jurisprudence’ in the constitution pending the referendum (see The Economist 2005). Turkey has its own problems concerning the definition and implementation of secularism in the country, even on the 83rd anniversary of the Republic; Islamist movements and Kurdish terror were defined as the most serious challenges to Turkey’s national security in most national security assessments. Therefore, the rise of any Islamist regime in Iraq would be troublesome from Ankara’s point of view, in line with that of its Western allies, whatever the likelihood of such an occurrence may be. With these stated preferences at hand, Ankara seems to have left its traditional policy of remaining uninvolved in the internal affairs of its neighbours in the Middle East, which was very much the norm in the 1960s and 1970s. At present, Turkey wishes to coexist with a strong and democratically governed Iraq that represents the Iraqi Arabs as well as the Kurds, Turkmens and other ethnic and religious groups while keeping its territorial integrity intact. As long as US rebuilding of Iraq corresponds to these Turkish priorities, US-Turkish relations will recover from their recent setback. On the other hand, Turkey must complete democratic and economic reforms which will minimize the effects of domestic

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difficulties on the country’s ability to implement an outward-looking foreign policy that would give the country more space to manoeuvre in its relations with the outside world. Turkey and the EU on Iraq Turkey’s position on Iraq has had some similarities with those of most European countries on various issues, except the Kurdish problem, since the 1991 Gulf War. Similar to Turkey, in the 1991 Gulf War, Europeans backed the US-led operation against Iraq, a remarkable first transatlantic cooperation in the post-Cold War era. Thereafter, alongside Turkey, EU countries criticised the harsh application of US containment of Iraq in the 1990s and expressed their desire of easing sanctions and pursuing a ‘carrot and stick policy’ rather than a total isolation of Iraq. In the wake of 9/11, Europeans expressed their commitment to fight against terrorism, but opposed Americans’ pre-emptive doctrine and Washington’s unilateralism. Before the US invasion of Iraq, Europeans, like Turkey, expressed a wish to find alternate routes to war to eliminate the dangers emanating from Saddam’s fearful regime. As the war broke out, leading European nations (with the exception of Britain, Spain, Italy and the US’ new NATO allies) like Germany and France expressed their discontent with the move and transatlantic ties were seriously strained over the issue. Like Ankara, Europeans wished to give more chance to diplomacy and did not want to rush to war before exhausting all the options available. In this respect, when the Turkish parliament declined the American request to open a Northern Front from Turkey, the rejection was applauded by Europe, especially by anti-war countries (even in Britain due to the anti-war sentiment in the public) as a strong sign of maturing Turkish democracy, as Ankara had not given in to US pressure. The Iraqi issue became a serious point of divergence between the EU and US, just as it had been in Turkey-US relations. After the war, in the reconstruction of the country, Europeans sought a UN role and were not very forthcoming in assisting Iraq within a NATO framework. European allies of the coalition countries took some steps in training Iraqi security forces but this has been insubstantial. National contributions have remained largely ‘ad hoc’ in nature (see Youngs 2004, 17). Similarly, Turkey took steps to provide some training and related support. The EU currently assists Iraq through some financial packages and the training of officials, such as police officers and judges. In contrast to the above-mentioned points regarding the Iraqi situation, EUTurkish rapprochement over Iraq did not include the Kurdish issue, as had long been the case. Turkey’s concerns regarding the spill over effects of Kurdish autonomy in Iraq have never been shared by Turkey’s European allies. In European eyes, the issue is more related to a lack of democracy than to terrorism. The EU has continued to see Ankara’s Kurdish problem as an extension of its long failure to take steps in advancing Turkish democracy and recognise cultural, human and minority rights. For instance, when the US cooperated in the process of capturing Ocalan after his expulsion from Syria in October 1998, some European countries, including Greece

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and Italy, provided him shelter and declined extradition, causing a good deal of resentment on the Turkish side. Similarly, Turkish expectations that EU countries would be more receptive to Turkey’s position on the PKK in the aftermath of 9/11 were not fulfilled. The EU’s long reluctance to recognize the PKK as a terrorist organisation reaffirmed this disappointment. Kurds living in Europe, especially those that took refuge on political grounds, played a significant role in this European outlook (see Aydinli 2002, 220). ‘The EU has stressed the importance of preventive measures and prioritising political and economic instruments, and has questioned the effectiveness of punitive military measures’ (see Bagci and Kardas 2003, 24). Despite Turkey’s efforts, the EU excluded the PKK from its first ever published list of terrorist organisations, released in December 2001. The exclusion resulted in a great deal of disappointment in Turkey. Turkey’s diplomatic efforts eventually paid off and thus, on 2 May 2002, the PKK was added to the revised EU list (see Bagci and Kardas 2003, 24). At present, in view of the rise in PKK attacks, Turkey’s security concerns regarding the PKK and Iraq in general do not find resonance in EU circles. Any Turkish incursion would most likely incur heavy criticism should Ankara decide to deal with PKK groups in Iraq with cross border operations. AntiTurkey forces in Europe are quite ready to present Turkey’s EU membership as a potential security burden, signifying its closeness to war torn Iraq as well as to troublesome Syria and Iran. Contrarily, those who look at membership issue through geo-strategic lenses and those wanting the EU to take a leading role globally identify Turkey’s potential role in the Middle East as an important incentive for supporting Turkey’s membership bid. Over the years, Turkey’s EU membership bid has become closely intertwined with the ongoing Kurdish problem. The Kurdish issue has been a key concern, dominating Turkish-EU relations since the early 1990s (see Kilic 1998, 94–5). Turkey’s progress on the EU path would reduce her national security concerns regarding border security and territorial integrity and thus encourage Ankara to take further steps in recognising Kurdish identity. As a result, Turkey could also become a more influential player in the region in line with EU policies. On the other hand, the government may remain over-sensitive with regard to its territorial integrity and thus return to military means to deal with the problem. This would consequently worsen Turkey’s relations with the EU and decrease Turkey’s potential role as a Middle East player. With its role in assembling an OIC (the Organisation of Islamic Conference)EU conference on 12–13 February, 2002 Turkey proved that it could challenge the clash of civilizations thesis by means of advancing ties between the East and West (see Kosebalaban 2002). The AKP government has been quite forthcoming in improving ties with the Islamic world while prioritizing the EU in its foreign policy at the same time. Turkey’s successful lobbying for the election of a Turkish OIC secretary was meaningful in this respect. Should Turkey’s EU membership prospect gain more clarity, Turkey would be most valuable in strengthening the EU’s standing in the Middle East. Ankara’s willingness to participate in the EU’s regional policies in the Middle East & Mediterranean area will also gain momentum with the opening of accession negotiations. For example, when the EU launched the Barcelona Process

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in 1995, Ankara did not display any serious enthusiasm for it on the ground that its membership bid could be shelved in favour of a modest partnership within this Mediterranean framework. By means of promoting the Barcelona Process, Europeans moved much earlier than the Americans to promote democracy, economic liberalism and human rights in the region via a regional initiative. EU policy towards the region has traditionally been organized under three main headings; the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the EU-Gulf cooperation and the Middle East Peace Process, all of which have reflected serious EU efforts to create a unified position vis-à-vis the region (see the EU Mediterranean & Middle East Policy). In promoting these regional policies in general, the Barcelona process (the EU-Mediterranean Partnership) in particular, EU countries have attached great importance to the resolution of the Israel-Palestine problem in order to ensure real progress spreads throughout the area. This view has been largely shared by Ankara. Thus, when the US overlooked the Palestine problem while launching GMEI/BMENA, this attitude was criticised by both Europeans and Turkey. On the Palestine question, Turkey feels closer to the European way of handling the issue. This proves that there are extra venues of cooperation between the EU and Turkey in the region, the Palestine question being one of them. The EU has also enriched its relations with some Middle Eastern countries through the European Neighbourhood policy, which aims at improving relations with the countries in the neighbouring regions, including those in the Middle East that have no EU membership prospect.5 The clearer Turkey’s accession prospects become, the greater Turkey’s enthusiasm for joint ventures with the EU in the area will be. Turkey’s future role as a positively contributing EU member has already been categorically expressed by various Middle Eastern countries. On 17 December 2004, Turkey’s historic meeting with EU members to decide on a date for the start of the accession negotiations in Brussels had wide coverage in the Muslim world. The meeting was most closely watched by numerous Middle Eastern broadcasters and journalists. Turkey starting membership talks with the EU would raise her prestige among regional countries, including anti-western Syria and Iran, giving Ankara a chance of mediating between West and East with more confidence. It would consequently relieve itself of seeking security in cooperation with Syria and Iran vis-à-vis the rise of the Kurdish challenge. Although EU-US policy differences towards Syria and Iran have recently started to narrow, Turkey continues to feel obliged to be on good terms with Syria and Iran owing to the Iraqi situation and its regional and neighbouring relations. Nonetheless, if the international condemnation of Syria for its support for terrorism and of Iran for building nuclear weaponry persists, Ankara would have no choice but to slow down its interaction with these countries. Any setback in either EU-Turkey relations or the security situation in Iraq would render potential for EUTurkey cooperation in the area problematic. 5 The European Neighbourhood policy includes Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia , Ukraine and the Palestine Authority.

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Seeing that the US is the prominent player in Iraq, Turkey realises that its misgivings regarding the future federal structure, Kerkuk and the PKK issues can only be settled with no one but the Americans. In this context, the United States’ unilateral operation in Iraq has created a serious breach of consensus between the Americans and EU countries, but there is no possibility for Turkey to see the EU as a consistent alternative to the US in Iraq or to any other Middle Eastern problems. After the Iraqi elections, it appears that the transatlantic drift over Iraq has been narrowed at a rapid pace. In its second term, it seems that the Bush administration has given special importance to the task of restoring ties with Europeans. There are signs of serious improvement in relations regarding Iraq and the Middle East in general. French support for the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon and the EU’s growing patience with Iran concerning nuclear inspections has led to closer understanding between the two sides of the Atlantic. In view of this, Turkey leaning closer to the EU or US in a balancing manner should not be an overriding concern in Turkey’s foreign policy formulations towards the region. If Turkey took steps towards democratisation and economic progress in a determined manner, regardless of whether or not it becomes an EU member, its partnership with both of them would take place in more confident and resourceful atmosphere. References ‘ABD’den Samimi Poz’, Radikal, 25 Eylul 2005. Aras, Bulent (2004), ‘The Greater Middle East Initiative and Turkey’, Journal of International Studies, 3/1. ‘Armitage’a Ankara’da PKK Sorulacak’, 3 January 2005. Aydinli, E. (2002), ‘Between Security and Liberalization: Decoding Turkey’s Struggle with the PKK’, Security Dialogue, 33/2. Bagci, Hussein and Kardas, Saban (2003), ‘Post-11 September Impact: The Strategic Importance of Turkey Revisited’, Turkey’s Strategic Future, EFS Working Paper, No.13, CEPS/IISS European Security Forum (Brussels) [website], , accessed in July 2005. Barkey, H.J. (2005), ‘Turkey and Iraq – The Perils (and Prospects) of Proximity’, Special Report 141, [website] , accessed in June 2005. Bektas, U. (2003), ‘Islam Dunyasina Gul Dersi’, Milliyet, 29 May. Bektas, U. (2004), ‘Between East and West; Turkey is Perfectly Poised to Spearhead America’s Attempts to Reform the Middle East but Ankara Has Good Reason not to’, Newsweek International, 7 May. Bila, F.(2005), ‘Demirel’, in Kurt Realitesi ile Erdogan’in Kurt Sorunu’, Milliyet, 17 August. Cakirozer, U. (2005), ‘Hadley: PKK’ya Mudahale Zamani’, Milliyet, 25 September. Cakirozer, U. (2005), ‘ABD’ye Kerkuk Uyarisi’, Milliyet, 4 January. Cakirozer, U. (2005), ‘Ankara Sunnileri Tesvik Ediyor’, Milliyet, 15 January. Congar, Y. (2005), ‘Suriye-Lubnan Hatti ve Ankara’, Milliyet, 26 September.

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Dagi, I. (2002), ‘Limits of Turkey’s Strategic Partnership with the US: Iraq, Democratization and the EU’, Opinion Paper (Istanbul: Tusiad) [website], , accessed in July 2005. ‘The EU’s Mediterranean & Middle East Policy’[website], , accessed in May 2005. Buzan B., Waever O. and de Wilde J. (1998), Security: A New Framework For Analysis (London: Routledge). Cagatay, S. (2004) ‘A Turkish Rapprochement with Middle East Rogue States’, PolicyWatch [website], , accessed in July 2004.

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Chazan, G. (2003), ‘Turkey Strengthens Ties with Two US Adversaries: Iran, Syria’, Wall Street Journal [website] April 10. , accessed in January 2005. Congar, Y. (2005), ‘Firtinali Gunler’, Milliyet, 11 August. Congar, Y. (2005), ‘Bush ve Avrupa’, 28 February. Congar, Y. and Ozalp, G. (2005), ‘Iran’a Washington’dan Havuc, AB’den Sopa’, Milliyet, 12 March. Dagi, I.D. (2003), ‘Limits of Turkey’s “Strategic” Partnership with the USA: Issues of Iraq, Democratization and the EU’, Opinion Paper [website] , accessed in April 2005. Dougherty, J.E. and Pfaltzgraff, R.L. (2001), Contending Theories of International Relations, A Comprehensive Survey (New York: Longman). Dymond, J. (2004), ‘Turkey to Lead World Muslim Group’, BBC News [website], June 16, , accessed in July 2005. Fahim, A. (2003), ‘Syria: The Next Domino? Will It Be Stage Three?’, Z Features Online, vol. 16, no. 5, May. Fahim, A. (2005), ‘Gidecegiz Elbet’, Milliyet, 17 March. Firilla, A.L. (2005), ‘Turkey’s Search for a Third Option’, Turkish Policy Quarterly, Spring. Gaddis, J.L. (1987), The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (NewYork: Oxford University Press). Idiz, S. (2005), ‘Sam’a Bu Opucukleri Nicin Gonderiyoruz?’, Milliyet, 11 June. Jerusalem Post, 18 June, in Bonner, A. (2005), ‘Turkey, The European Union and Paradigm Shifts’, Middle East Policy, vol. 12, no. 1, Spring. Junemann, A. (2004), Euro-Mediterranean Relations after September 11: International, Regional, and Domestic Dynamics (London: Frank Cass). Karabat, A. (2005), ‘Turkish-US Relations Will be Determined by Syria’, Turkish Weekly, June 15. Karagiannis, E. (2003), ‘The US-Iranian Relationship after 11 September 2001 and the Transportation of Caspian Energy’, Central Asian Survey, vol. 22, no. 2/3, June/September. Karagiannis, E. (2005), ‘Leaving Lebanon’, Middle East International 18 March. Mearsheimer, J.J. (1999), ‘Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War’, Classic Readings of International Relations, Williams, P., Goldstein, D. and Shafritz, J. (eds) (USA: Wadsworth). Oguzlu, H.T. (2004), ‘Changing Dynamics of Turkey’s US and EU Relations’, Middle East Policy, vol. 11, no. 1, Spring. Perthes, V. (2004), ‘America’s “Greater Middle East” and Europe: Key Issues for Dialogue’, Middle East Policy, vol. 11, no. 3, Fall. Perthes, V. (2004), ‘Son Dakika Surprizi’, Milliyet, 28 July. Prados, A.B. (2003), ‘Syria: US Relations and Bilateral Issues’, CRS Issue Brief for Congress, 13 May.

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Singh, G. (2004), ‘Israel Tries Mending Eroded Alliance With Turkey’, Al-Jazeerah, 23 July. Salhani, C. (2003), ‘Syria At the Crossroads’, Middle East Policy, vol. 10, no. 3, Fall. Salhani, C. (2004), ‘Is Syria Changing?’, UPI Analysis, 2 April. Seker Gorener, A. (2005), ‘Turkey’s Relations with the Divided West: Changing Parameters’, Turkish Policy Quarterly, Spring. ‘Turkey, Syria Sign Free Trade Agreement, Bilaterals.org [website], December 23, (2004), < http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?id_article=1081>, accessed in January 2005. ‘Turkey and Syria Bury Differences’, BBC News [website] January 7, (2004), , accessed in July 2005. Ulsever, C. (2005), ‘Bush ve Iran’, Hurriyet, 19 January. Ulsever, C. (2005), ‘US Concerns Over Iran Poll Result’, BBC News [website], June 25 , accessed in August 2005. Weisman, S.R. (2004), ‘US-European Discord Over Iran is Deepening’, International Herald Tribune [website] 13 December, , accessed in April 2005. Weisman, S.R. (2004), ‘Bush Confronts New Challenge On Issue of Iran’, The NewYork Times, [website] 19 November, , accessed in May 2005. Wohlforth, W.C. (1999), ‘The Stability of a Unipolar World’, International Security, 24/1, Summer. Wohlforth, W.C. (2005), ‘ West Going Cold On Turkey’, The Times [website] June 11 , accessed in May 2005. Yavuz, H. (2003), Islamic Political Identity in Turkey (NewYork: Oxford University Press). Zunes, S. (2004), ‘US Policy towards Syria and the Triumph of Neo-Conservatism’, Middle East Policy, vol. 11, no. 1, Spring.

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Chapter 7

The New Power Calculations and ‘Structured’ Relations in the Fluctuating Security Environment of Eurasia Visne Korkmaz

Halford J. Mackinder defined Eurasia1 as the strategic ‘pivot area of the World’, and described the strategic transformations in the world system in terms of the local changes that result in different power realignments in the region.2 Recent strategic developments in the Caucasus and Central Asia are reminiscent of Mackinder’s Eurasia, although today’s Eurasia is slightly different from what he projected. Nowadays, the Caucasus-Central Asia is accepted as the focal point of Eurasia. 1 ‘Eurasia’ as a geographical concept is very ductile. Many analysts believe that Eurasia has no natural boundary. Depending on the policy makers’ purposes and orientation, ‘Eurasia’ may refer to countries located in what are considered as being Asia, the Middle East and Europe. Russia is generally supposed to be in the Eurasian realm. Also, the five ex-Soviet Republics – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – and the Caucasus states of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia are included in Eurasia. Afghanistan and Mongolia have historical linkages with the Eurasian realm because of the commercial and cultural relations in the Soviet era. The Xingjian Province of China has close cultural links with some of the Eurasian states like Kazakhstan. Iran, one of the Caspian littoral states, and Turkey, one of the Black Sea region countries, are frequently referred to as a part of Eurasia, not only from a cultural-political but also from an economic perspective since the end of the Cold War (see Gleason and Shaihutdinov 2005, 275). 2 Sir Halford John Mackinder (1861–1947) is noted for his geopolitical conception of the globe as divided into two camps, the ascendant Eurasian ‘heartland’ and the subordinate ‘maritime lands,’ including the other continents. He developed a thesis in political geography in 1904, ‘The Geographical Pivot of History.’ In it he argued that interior Asia and Eastern Europe (the heartland) had become the strategic centre of the ‘World Island’ as a result of the relative decline of sea power as against land power and of the economic and industrial development of southern Siberia. In Mackinder’s words, ‘who rules the heartland (Eurasia), rules the World Island (Europe-Asia-Africa); who rules the World Island, rules the World.’ Thus, the role of Britain and the United States, he considered, was to preserve a balance between the powers contending for control of the heartland. As a further stabilising factor, he proposed the creation of a tier of independent states to separate the land powers (Germany and Russia).

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The war in Afghanistan was a turning point in Eurasian security in terms of outside powers’ involvement. First of all, the states of the region seemed to be more convinced about the need for international co-operation because ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ that aimed to oust the Taliban from Afghanistan, had a catalysing impact on the region’s traditional security concerns, such as states’ territorial integrity. Another outcome of the operation was the creation of a new strategic landscape that connects Eurasian security with the Middle East and Southeast Asian security. In this environment the new and the old powers, Russia, China, India, Turkey, the USA and the EU, have come up with divergent and competing strategies for the states of the Caucasus, Central Asia and their neighbours. These divergent points of view in the security agendas of both the ‘two Wests’ (the USA and EU) and ‘three Easts’ (Russia, China and India) do not necessarily imply ‘the Great Game of the 21st Century’ (see Atal 2005, 101–105; Menon 2003, 187–204), though the current situation in Eurasia is far from being stable and secure. That is why the region is still a hard and soft security concern for the international community. For this reason, this chapter focuses on the new security strategies of the major powers in the region. The points of convergence and divergence among these powers help us to understand why and how fluctuations occur in the foreign policy orientations of the Eurasian states. Furthermore, this paper aims to answer the question of whether these new ‘structured’ relations in this changing regional environment limit or ease the role of Turkey on the Eurasian mainland. Transatlantic Contradictions in Eurasia Since the beginning of the 1990s, the Caucasus-Central Asia has been of interest to the West for the following reasons: (i) the rich hydrocarbon resources around the Caspian Basin, (ii) the emergence of newly independent but politically fragile states in the neighborhood of the Middle East and Afghanistan, and (iii) the spillover effect of failing states (see Korkmaz 2005, 19; Macfarlane 2004a, 125). On the eve of the post-Cold War period, the success of western strategy in Eurasia was based on the good relations between the two sides of the Atlantic (see Antenenko 2003, 10). In the 1990s, both Washington and Brussels had common strategic goals in the region. On the one hand, the West promoted the independence of the ex-Soviet states of Eurasia and supported their determination to be part of the global economy. On the other hand, in its attempts to improve Russian-Western relations, the West adopted rather cautious and modest policies, using the economic opportunities of the region. For this reason, Washington and Brussels refrained from having a military presence in Eurasia (see Meyer 2003, 120; Macfarlane 1999). During this period, the Eurasian states developed rather muted but stable relations with the West. For example, they joined in NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme, the EU’s TACIS and TRACECA programmes and the Energy Dialogue of the EU. They also signed Partnership Agreements with the EU, and cooperated with the OSCE. Furthermore, in 1997, for the first time, the NATO-Russian Council

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was initiated. Therefore, in the 1990s the states of Eurasia, especially those located in the Caucasus and Central Asia, ‘did not have to develop different strategies in their relations with Washington and Brussels’ (see Antenenko 2003, 10). Since 9/11 the Eurasian powers’ perception of the West as one common entity has not changed. Following the terrorist attacks on the US, the consensus that emerged among the Europeans, Americans and Russians accelerated the chances of a strengthened transatlantic partnership. However, the expectations related to the deeper transatlantic security cooperation turned out to be short-lived. The power asymmetries and different foreign policy preferences that have existed between Washington and Brussels become more visible as a net result of the US-led Iraq War. The divergences between the two sides of the Atlantic became clear, especially in the fields of non-proliferation and counter-terrorism (see Stulberg 2004, 282). In the struggle against terrorism, the Europeans preferred to take measures falling short of projecting power beyond their borders. On the contrary, the US concentrated efforts on combating terrorism beyond the Euro-Atlantic area by means of her global force projection capabilities (see Stulberg 2004, 283; Muller 2003). In the last couple of decades Washington has tried every means available, particularly military means, in the conduct of foreign policy to increase its influence.3 Conversely, Brussels has continued to act along the lines of Europe’s traditional foreign policy of ‘soft security’, that favours diplomatic and non-military approaches, and with the aim of challenging US unilateral policies, has accelerated its own Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In this regard Franco-BritishGerman defence cooperation became apparent.4 Despite aiming to operate beyond the borders of Europe this new cooperation does not contradict the Union’s soft security policy preferences in the conduct of foreign policy towards Eurasia. The Security Agenda of Washington in Eurasia Nowadays, the United States is assumed to be ‘the new power of Eurasia’, indicating Washington’s acquisition of basing rights for its military forces in the region. Even though this US military presence is a new phenomenon in Eurasia’s regional politics, it reflects the old foreign policy tendency of Washington – expansion of American ‘military power’ in parallel with US military commitments in the Middle East. 3 The National Security Strategy (NSS) released by the White House in September 2002, declared that ‘... military structured to deter massive Cold War era armies must be transformed to focus more on how an adversary might fight rather than where or when a war might occur’ (see White House 2002, 29). Although, the National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 2006 (see White House 2006) took into consideration diplomacy and regional security arrangements in the fight against the new threats, Washington did not retreat from acquiring all defensive and offensive military means. 4 The basic aim of this cooperation was to mobilize a well-equipped battle group that could also be deployed abroad.

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Until 1999, US Central Command (CENTCOM) was only responsible for US combat forces in the Persian Gulf. Since then, it has extended its sway to cover Central Asia and North Eastern Africa (see Klare 2003, 384). Accordingly, US combat forces were repositioned from Western Europe and East Asia to a region stretching from South-central Eurasia to Southwestern Asia. In this region, Washington’s main strategic goal is to create a web of small forward operation bases. These bases, socalled lily pads (see Cornell 2004a, 243) are made operational by the small supporting units and fighting forces deployed from the US in times of need. The growing US emphasis on a mix of air power and special operations to defeat hostile forces, in conjunction with the new bases outside the transatlantic area are expected to be the backbone of US strategy in the next couple of decades. This expectation led the Bush Administration to take a decision to reorganize the State Department, grouping the five Muslim Central Asian states together with the states of South Asia (Wright 2005a). Therefore, the strategic connection between the three regions – the Middle East, Eurasia and Southeast Asia – was clarified by American strategic military thinking.5 In the wake of the US operations in Afghanistan, the strategic connection between Eurasia and the other two regions was unquestionable. During Operation Enduring Freedom, there was a serious public protest in Pakistan over the use of air bases by US forces. Therefore, Washington saw the South Caucasus-Central Asia region as indispensable both for the successful prosecution of war in Afghanistan, and the accomplishment of the lily-pads strategy in the Middle East. Since 2003 the Central Asian Republics, especially Uzbekistan, have been crucially important for Washington to acquire intelligence, to support humanitarian cooperation and to have basing rights for the success of her military efforts in the broader Middle East. Following the September 11 attacks, the US succeeded in concluding bilateral agreements with Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan to establish military bases in Karsi-Khanabad (known as K2), Kokadiy (Uzbekistan) and Manas (Kyrgyzstan). To accommodate US transport aircraft another facility was acquired in the Kuliab region of Tajikistan to add to the Dushanbe air base that US forces used (see Bohr 2004, 490). For Washington, however, these basing and overflight rights were neither unconditional nor granted. In 2005, Tashkent requested US forces to leave Uzbekistan within 6 months, and the Uzbek government has since prohibited the use of the Khanabad base for direct US military operations.6 This decision by Tashkent led Washington to deploy its regional administrative contingent in Manas-Kyrgyzstan. 5 In NSS 2006, it was declared that American relations with South Asia, especially with Afghanistan, could serve as a foundation for deeper engagement throughout Central Asia (see White House 2006, 39–40). 6 The government of Tashkent actually sought a formal defence guarantee from the US. However the Uzbeks only achieved the signing of a Five Point Declaration on a Strategic Partnership and Cooperation, under which Washington confirmed that it would regard any external threat to Uzbekistan’s national security and territorial integrity with serious concern.

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However, the negative attitude in the Kyrgyz Republic towards US forces calls into question the feasibility of US strategic plans in Central Asia. The problems Washington has confronted in Central Asia have convinced some US policymakers to stress the importance of American (or NATO’s) military presence in the Black Sea region (see Cooley 2005, 91–2). However, Washington’s interests in Eurasia are not confined to the military interests of the US. Since American support for Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan is motivated by the US desire for energy security. The Bush Administration had already mentioned before 9/11 that Caspian security was vital to American national interests under the UNEP (the US’s National Energy Policy). For the First Bush Administration, Caspian energy had been crucial simply in terms of diversification of energy resources but in the post 9/11 period, Caspian energy has been regarded more as a strategic asset because of its importance to the future economic health of the Eurasian states to avert state-failure in the region (see Jones 2002; Myers and Soligo 2004, 261). Thus, in 2002, Washington extended security assistance to the Caspian littoral states, and in 2003 the Department of Defense financed the construction of a cooperative military base in the Caspian port city of Kazakhstan, Atyrau,7 in order to help Astana ensure the security of Caspian energy. In January 2004, the Bush Administration initiated a series of joint military exercises in the Caspian Sea to train the Azerbaijan naval fleet for the protection of offshore drilling platforms (see Berman 2004–2005, 62). With regard to the pipelines’ route, Washington is also training a special pipeline protection force in Georgia, and providing arms and military know-how to Tiblisi in order to improve energy security.8 Especially since the 2004 Trabzon meeting, at which Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey signed an agreement to coordinate their efforts to establish a common system for ensuring pipeline security, regional governments have not excluded the possibility of NATO and the US rendering technical support to secure the Baku-Tiblisi-Ceyhan pipeline (see Ismailova 2003). For the United States, security cooperation with the states of the South Caucasus was also vital. In the wake of Operation Enduring Freedom, these states provided overflight rights, and landing and refuelling facilities to American forces as the ‘only realistic route through which military aircraft could be deployed from NATO territory to Afghanistan.’9 The continuing US military presence in Central Asia continues and 7 In accordance with a five-year plan signed between Washington and Astana in September 2003, the US is also assisting the Kazakh military by providing military hardware and by initiating a train-and-equip programme for a KAZBAT peacekeeping battalion. Furthermore, Kazakhstan is planning to create a regional centre for KAZBAT through the use of NATO assets (see RFE/RL 2003; McDermott 2005). 8 In 2004 Washington renewed its train-and-equip programme for the Georgian military that had been initiated in the early months of 2002 (see Klare 2003, 386). 9 During Operation Enduring Freedom, the transition of forces through Iran and Russia was not an option. The Kremlin accepted opening Russian airspace for humanitarian and logistical US flights at the beginning, but she flatly rejected granting the right of transition for US combat aircraft (see Cornell 2004, 239; Cornell 2005, 113).

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extension of US force-deployment indicate that Washington’s plans are for a longterm presence in Eurasia. As such the US remains interested in security and military cooperation with the South Caucasian Republics. In US strategic thinking, the republics of the South Caucasus, particularly Azerbaijan, gained notably in importance after Operation Iraqi Freedom. Since Washington began to perceive its need for the troops of Muslim majority countries in order to contribute to peacekeeping operations and reconstruction missions both in Iraq and Afghanistan (see Shaffer 2005, 56–7). Consequently, on different occasions the US Administration has expressed an interest in establishing an airbase on the Apsheron peninsula of Baku. These efforts reveal how Washington has effectively established the US as a Eurasian state to support its policies in the Middle East. Moreover, it is the reason why the Bush Administration has preferred the formation of bilateral ties directly between Washington and the capitals of the Eurasia region at the expense of the development/improvement/enlargement of regional structures. The only exception to Washington’s Eurasian policy is its support for NATO’s extended role in the region. After NATO assumed command of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and enhanced the number of NATO-led Provincial Reconstruction teams in Afghanistan, relations between the states of the region and NATO gained crucial significance (see Scheffer 2004). NATO’s intention to strengthen the Alliance’s capability outside the transatlantic area was unquestionably declared by the decisions taken at NATO’s Prague Summit of 2002 (see NATO 2002). Despite no formal statement, one of the Summit’s results was ‘NATO’s military footprint in Southwest and Central Asia’ (see Lynch III 2005, 141–2) and for this reason no one was surprised when the Allies decided to focus their attention and efforts on Central Asia and the Caucasus at NATO’s Istanbul Summit Meeting of June 2004.10 For these two regions, a Special Representative of the Secretary General was appointed (see NATO 2004). The aim behind this appointment was not related to membership or non-membership for the region’s states.11 Rather, the logic behind the Istanbul decision was to improve the interoperability of the region’s states with NATO to meet the main challenges illustrated in NATO’s agenda (terrorism, proliferation, and ‘failed states’) (see NATO 2005). 10 By 2006, it was announced that with the exception of Turkmenistan (because of its officially neutral position) and Uzbekistan (because of her deteriorated relations with the Western capitals after the Andijan events), the other states of the region are increasing their cooperation with NATO in the PfP programme, and they are taking part in NATO’s Planning and Review Process. 11 It is not surprising see that many new European NATO members are not interested in NATO expansion in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Rather, the possibility of NATO expansion in the region was a motivation for the states of the region. For example, following 2004, Georgia was pictured as the most ambitious state of the region as far as going full membership of NATO was concerned and she signed an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with the Alliance to prove her interest in joining NATO, as Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan had previously done (see Cornell 2004b, 10–11).

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Washington’s support for multilateralized security in the region only with the assistance of NATO12 indicates that the outside powers sought to reshape relations in Eurasia in a manner consonant with their perceived global interests (see Macfarlane 2004b, 447), thereby bolstering the competition between different patterns of regional structures in the search for regional security. In this context, the most important feature of the US engagement in Eurasia is its bilateral focus. Washington’s approach is based on assistance to the states of the region in relative terms. Those states, which have been declared Washington’s and also NATO’s primary partner in the region (Uzbekistan in 2003 and Kazakhstan in 2005) have tended to act unilaterally. For example, the extent of US financial, military and technical assistance allocated to Uzbekistan from 2001–2004, created a sharper imbalance between the military capabilities of Tashkent and the other Central Asian Republics (see Bohr 2004, 492). Hence, the result of American assistance was the expansion of the ongoing power asymmetries among the Eurasian states, turning all attempts at bilateral security cooperation between Washington and the Eurasian states into a regional ‘balancing’13 mechanism that will trigger another balancing mechanism, now of a multilateral nature. This situation led (and will continue to lead) to the Eurasian states fluctuating between the US advocated pattern of multilateral security cooperation14 and multilateral regional security mechanisms initiated by Russia and China. In other words, Eurasian security will continue in a state of flux so long as the US supports bilaterally structured relations in the region, and positions herself as a regional actor that does not refrain from using military instruments in order to alter the structure of regional security. 12 One of the classical examples of NATO’s regional perspective is the Central Asian Battalion (composed of Kazakh-Kyrgz-Uzbek troops in the 1990s) which joined the Central Asian Economic Union (CAEC). The Battalion was trained in the framework of the PfP and has taken part in a series of joint peacekeeping exercises in which the USA, Russia and Turkey have sometimes participated. In December 2001, CAEC was transformed into the Central Asian Co-operation Organisation (CACO) to form a single security zone in the region. In December 2002, Afghanistan was invited to join CACO as an observer, and in July 2003, CACO committed itself in fighting terrorism, religious extremism and drug trafficking (see Allison 2004a, 474). All in all, CACO is a rhetorical organization. For this reason, Washington sought to reactivate GUUAM on the eve of its Yalta Summit of 2003. GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldavia) had been promoted by Washington in the mid1990s. At the Yalta Summit GUUAM states launched a project to train mobile anti-terrorist units, but actually the project remained as unrealised but ambitious initiative; the UkranianGeorgian and Azerbaijani Battalion, remained abortive (see Kuzio and Blagov 2003). 13 Balancing, like bandwagoning, is a variation of the institutional form of multilateralism. Through balancing mechanisms regional states might balance the existing or perceived threats by forming alliances with like-minded countries sharing the same threat perceptions (see Kay 2003, 126). 14 One of the most recent examples of such US sponsored regionalism by bilateral means is the ‘New Greater Central Asia’. This region not only covers five Muslim Central Asian states, but also has ties with India, Turkey and the EU (see Starr 2005).

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The Security Agenda of Brussels in Eurasia The Eurasian security realm, like that of the Middle East and North Africa, is located on the periphery of the EU (see Solana 2003). In the last couple of decades, it has been declared that the perceived new threats and risks are rooted in this area. It has also been accepted that political, economic and military instability in this periphery has the capacity to affect the Union’s security. Therefore, in defining its security and defence policies, the EU has had to take these three regions into consideration. On the one hand, the EU’s preferred policy instruments for maintaining security in this periphery (especially the Middle East) became a cause of rift in transatlantic relations. On the other hand, the divergence between the two sides of the Atlantic created a new impetus for the Union to improve its security and defence capabilities and in December 2003 the EU brought the European Security Strategy to life. This strategy highlights the importance of developing the Union’s capability for force projection both within and outside the context of the Atlantic Alliance. The elaboration of a new European battle group was also a clear indicator of Brussels’ intention to create a common foreign and security policy (CFSP). While the EU was trying to strengthen the security and defence policies of the Union, the Europeans have continued to emphasize the feasibility of the Union’s soft power in Eurasia. This ‘soft-power’ preference is based on the fact that Europe’s chosen security responsibilities are more regional and exercised close to home (see Strategic Survey 2005, 140). Only at the end of 2003, did Brussels start to retreat from this relatively distant approach towards the Eurasian states. The references made by Javier Solana at the June 2003 Thessaloniki Summit proved that the EU no longer perceived the region from the ex-Soviet perspective (see Solana 2003, 8). In an interview with Le Mond, Solana stated that ‘the EU’s ... objective is to effectively counter threats by developing a systematic policy of preventive engagement in, for instance ... the South Caucasus’ (see Lynch 2003, 171). In July 2003, also, a special representative for the South Caucasian states was appointed to ensure the coordination, consistency and effectiveness of the Union’s action in the region. On 14 June, 2004 the Commission decided to extend the EU’s neighbourhood policy to cover these three South Caucasian states. By this means, the EU seeks ways to enhance the Union’s political profile in the Eurasian security realm though the limits of preventive engagement are still blurred. Today, European military engagement in the Central Asia-Caucasus region is very restricted. The Europeans who participated militarily in Operation Endeavour Freedom used the American bases in Central Asia and when the ISAF mandate was transferred to NATO, the European military presence in Eurasia was increased in number. However, this increase did not pave the way for direct military assistance to the Central Asian states. Furthermore, the debates on Tiblisi’s request for Brussels to provide a replacement for the OSCE border monitoring mission on the GeorgiaRussia border near Chechnya failed to reach a consensus. However, some new member states of the EU have been liaising with the Georgian government to find

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alternatives to the OSCE mission after Russia vetoed an extension of its mandate at the OSCE (see Strategic Survey 2005, 160). Albeit relations between Brussels and the capitals of Eurasia have been defined as ‘bounded’, new opportunities for bilateral strategic relations between the EU states and the Central Asian Republics have emerged. For example, in July 2003, Paris offered Kazakhstan closer military-technical cooperation (see McDermott 2003). The prospect for a deeper EU-Eurasian relationship was also related to Europe’s increased energy reliance on the oil and gas imported from the Union’s periphery. The EU’s energy dependency has serious security implications. It is true that in Eurasia, the main European presence is in the form of European companies that fulfil the leading role in the major oil and gas projects (like BP, AGIP and Statoil) and for this reason the Europeans are compelled to be concerned about the economic and political developments that will affect Caspian regional security. Like Washington, the EU accepts that fundamentalist groups operating in stateless zones or on the occasion of state-failure pose serious threats to energy security. Thus, the EU recognizes the necessity of assisting state building in the South Caucasus, and in the Caspian region. However, many differences in policies related to Eurasian security between the US and the EU await resolution. This is mainly why Brussels and Washington continue to differ in characterizing Caspian states and no consensus has emerged over two general questions: What is to be the role of Tehran in Eurasian security and how will the US and EU manage Iran there? (see Shaffer 2003, 17–22). In the eyes of Washington, the Caspian area itself (or the South Caucasus or Central Asia) is not a source of instability and extremism. Rather, the region represents a fault-line concerning the threats of terrorism and proliferation of WMD created by the so-called rouge states of the Middle East. In contrast, Brussels sees the region, especially Central Asia, as being located in the arc of instability. For the Europeans, instability is not only related to the problems of hard security (terrorism etc), but also to the problems of soft security such as migration, repressive political systems, drug trafficking, international criminal organizations etc (see Antenenko 2003, 11; Coppieters 2003, 169). The EU report on regional strategy 2002–2006 was prepared to address these issues and it gave central importance to the region’s least developed countries such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan; considering, the Caucasus as a barrier against these recently emerged soft security threats. The Europeans seemed to believe that the roots of hard security problems lie within the region itself, not beyond it (in the Middle East). Without doubt, the soft security challenges from the Middle East and Afghanistan are also of concern in Europe’s Eurasian policy and to contain these threats the EU has tended to extend the function of its traditional regional programme, such as TACIS, to create a filter system in Central Asia, in the Caucasus and in the new neighbours, like Ukraine and Moldavia (see Coppieters 2003, 166). Nevertheless, the EU’s emphasis on soft security in the Eurasian realm has been reinforced, making its regional strategy clearly focused on supporting and developing regional cooperation. This is usually taken as an illustration of the

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Union’s normative power that may create a ‘regional domino effect’,15 although it is generally accepted that Washington’s tendency to develop a web of security through bilateral ties may block Brussels’ ability to impose a normative model. Ironically, this divergence between the two Atlantic capitals may support regional cooperation in a totally different sense. It is a well-known fact that, in contrast to US policies, the EU is pursuing a more coordinated policy with other international institutions and non-western powers in the region, like Russia, China and Iran. For this reason, the Europeans can more easily support the normalization of relations between the conflicting regional parties, like the strained relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia or between Georgia and Russia. In Eurasia, Washington is also in need of a resolution to these conflicts if the US is going to support cooperative security under the aegis of NATO. Thus, one can expect that Washington will advocate the EU’s possible future diplomatic and peacekeeping role, especially in the South Caucasus, with convergence between NATO’s and the EU’s strategic agendas being among the priorities of the US Eurasian strategy. In a similar manner, the interests of the two sides of the Atlantic can be converged in Eurasian energy security. Washington has already announced that working in cooperation and encouraging joint ventures to provide development in Caspian oil potential has become a strategic priority of all the western actors (see Stulberg 2004, 194). This leads to conclude that in Eurasia it is not necessary to exaggerate the distinctions in the approaches of the US and Europe (see Antenenko 2003, 14). While transatlantic conflict in the Middle East has substance, in Eurasia the position of the US and the EU are not in conflict if the main perceived threats and interests of both sides in the security are taken into consideration. A transatlantic rift is rather used to underline the importance of Moscow’s soft power and to create leverage to manage the power relations in the region by Eurasian states, and by their neighbours (including Turkey and Iran). Sometimes, even Europe itself can use the possibility of transatlantic contradiction in the region to manage strained transatlantic relations in the Middle East (see Lieven 2002, 245–259). Divergences in the Security Policies of Russia, China and India The new geopolitics in the Middle East and the American military presence in Iraq and Afghanistan have led Russia, China and India to reassess their earlier positions on the key issues of Eurasian security. Since the end of the Cold War, the possibility of a Moscow-Beijing-Delhi strategic triangle in Eurasian affairs has been debated in academic circles (see Trenin 2005, 73; Pant 2004a, 311–28; Kazi 2003). Thus, these three capitals seem to share (or are assumed to share) increasingly similar security concerns. However, one cannot ignore that they also continue to differ in their security understandings of the Eurasian politics. 15 Maull used this concept (regional domino effect) to highlight the power of the EU as a model for regional co-operation in the neighboring area (see Maull 2005, 789).

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The Security Agenda of Moscow in Eurasia Russian policy towards Eurasia is determined by the Kremlin’s two foreign policy goals: (i) supporting the revival of Moscow as an economic and military power in the region, and (ii) tackling the new security challenges that are rooted in the south and southeast of Russia’s borders. In this respect, Russian foreign and security policy depends foremost on the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In the eyes of the Kremlin the challenges which Moscow has confronted in Eurasia are ‘terrorism, separatism and extremism’.16 Russian strategists believe that the challenges rooted in the southern tier are interconnected. The Kremlin actually rejects the ‘axis of evil’ rhetoric of the Bush Administration and underlines the danger of a power vacuum in the Middle East, the Balkans, Somalia, some Asian countries and the Caucasus (see Allison 2004b, 279). Meanwhile, the geopolitical process that has been assumed to be enduring in the region is the expansion of external powers through military means. Moscow presumed this process, on its own, as a challenge. Thus, the draft military concept of 2003 states that ‘the extension of military blocs and alliances to the detriment of the military security of Russia and its allies, and the introduction of foreign troops onto the adjacent states’ territories’ were among the primary threats (see Bermen 2004–2005, 64). One could argue that President Putin seemed to accept a Western strategic presence in the Eurasian realm after 9/11. Indeed, behind this implicit Russian recognition of the western forces in Eurasia lies the Kremlin’s policy towards Afghanistan when the American campaign was initiated. Besides, the Kremlin tried to give an impression that Russia had changed her behaviour towards her Eurasian neighbours. Putin maintained in December 2003 that ‘the geopolitical battle has moved from the realm of a military conflict to the economic competition’ (see Perovic 2005, 65). Nevertheless, since 2000 when Washington objected to the British proposal to strengthen Russia-NATO ties, US-Russian strategic and economic co-operation has not been able to hide Moscow’s intention to create a web of security in Eurasia. In this regard, Russia used policy instruments on three different levels: (i) military integration in the body of the CIS, (ii) economic integration among the states of the region and (iii) regional cooperation mechanisms among the powers which have an interest in the security of the region. Russia has strengthened military integration by using both institutional and bilateral ties. In June 2000, the CIS Anti-terrorist Centre was created, and 16 Moscow’s policies towards each of the southern states differ, so it is difficult to analyze the incentives of Moscow’s regional initiatives in the Caucasus and Central Asia. However, in the security realm, new challenges emerged that are derived from the complex geopolitical processes in the region, and these perceived challenges unite the initiatives towards the South in a joint perspective, in the Russian Eurasian policy (see Zhenghong 2005, 21).

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Moscow reinvented the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).17 In April 2003 the member states decided to turn the CSTO into an Alliance that was called the co-equal of NATO (see Allison 2004b, 286; Zhenghong 2005, 24). The Central Asian Collective Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) was established by allocating battalions from the national armies of Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In the same year the Secretary General of the CSTO proposed forming closer ties with NATO to ensure international security. Therefore, the security structure of the CIS appeared in Russian eyes to be the perfect tool to make Moscow one of the global actors in international security. In June 2002 President Putin described the possible role of the CSTO as that of a security provider between East and West. Through the CSTO, Russia announced, she was ready to build an arc of stability by joining NATO in the West and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in the East (see Zhenghong 2005, 26). All of these efforts by Moscow to strengthen the CIS can be seen as an alternative to the other Western initiatives, like the PfP of NATO in ‘the era of the competitive regionalism’ (see Allison 2004a, 471). Russian attempts to strengthen bilateral security ties with the states of the region actually aim to develop an institutional framework based on CIS security. For instance, a permanent Russian military air base that was built in 2003 in Kant/ Kyrgyzstan is planned to provide air support to the RDF if an immediate force projection is needed. However, emphasis on the CIS does not mean that Russia has totally got rid of the possibility of unilateral action in Central Asia and the Caucasus. In October 2003 Russia revised its military doctrine, the so-called Ivanov Doctrine, which reserves the right to carry out pre-emptive strikes anywhere in the world and in the former Soviet republics if a threat against Russia emerges (see Trifonov 2003). In accordance with the Ivanov Doctrine, Russian aircraft deployed in Dushanbe/ Tajikistan are part of the Ural’s Air Force and Air Defence Army, not the RDF (see Allison 2004a, 287). Moreover, Russia has the 201st motorized Infantry Division, and a large contingent of border guards are deployed in Tajikistan, while in Armenia, she has sought ways to rearm the 102nd military base. Furthermore, Russia succeeded in reaching security agreements to counter regional threats with Turkmenistan in 2003 and with Uzbekistan in 2005 (see IWPR 2005). In 2004 Moscow and Astana prepared a draft for the joint use of Russian-Kazakh troops in the interests of security (see RFE/RL 2004). In the Ivanov Doctrine, possible reasons for Russian military intervention are defined on a broader spectrum, such as ethnic or political conflict, a threat to the economic welfare of Russia or a tendency to curtail democratic change (see IWPR 2003). Since 2003, Moscow has tried to guarantee a Russian military presence in the 17 By taking authority from the 1992 Tashkent Collective Security Treaty of the CIS states, in May 2002 CSTO was created by Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Belarussia and Armenia. Its military command is located in Moscow. It aims to address new threats in Eurasia by creating a rapid reaction force, a common air defence system and coordinated actions in security and defence policies of the member states.

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region in order to give substance to this military doctrine. Hence, Moscow proves its intention both to keep the military status quo in the region and to take control of events if this status quo is challenged by an outside power. The significance given to the status quo seems to be tested in terms of Caspian security. Towards the Caspian Basin, Russian policy is based on a priority of integrating Russian and other Caspian energy resources. Russia’s interest in the development of resources and the export routes of Caspian petroleum are linked to Moscow’s security concerns. The Kremlin is worried about the possibility of a power vacuum in this area of strategic assets. By 2000, Russia already had a high military profile and a growing naval presence in the region, although Moscow had stressed the importance of the demilitarization of the Caspian in the 1990s. To prevent a possible connection between Caspian security and NATO’s security agenda, Moscow has already related the Russian counter-terrorist campaign to the security of the Caspian. Following the Russian naval exercise of 2002 in the Caspian, the Kremlin pushed to create a collective rapid reaction force of the socalled Caspian Grouping among Russia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. However, subsequently, Kazakhstan resigned from this grouping and received US assistance to build her own navy. Thus, Russia has not been entirely successful in proving that she controls all the leverage to dissuade the Caspian states from accepting US assistance. Nevertheless, Moscow did have sufficient leverage to convince the Caspian states not to unconditionally pursue the US agenda in the region. The most important leverage in the hands of Russia is the plan for economic integration. Since by 2000 the most ambitious plan in the region was the creation of the Eurasian Economic Community.18 As long as western agendas in Eurasia have paid dividends, and negotiations between Washington and the states of the region suggest that they are inclined to support direct US military assistance, if it brings economic benefits, Russia has had to develop new and rival economic integration models. On the one hand, Russia joined the Central Asia Cooperation Organization (CACO)19 in which four of the Central Asian states are members. On the other hand, with Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus, Moscow created the Single Economic Space (SES) but in line with the EU, it excluded Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. All in all, despite Russian attempts to promote CIS modelling bodies and to strengthen its dimension, this seems to have had the contrary effect of actually reinforcing the Russian position as a main actor linking Western and Eastern Eurasia through economic assets and military power to protect these assets. 18 In May 2001 it was created among Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. 19 CACO, which was founded in 1994, provides a framework for addressing regional issues, including the sharing of energy resources. Apart from Turkmenistan, all the Central Asian states are members of the organization. In May 2004 these states accepted Russia as a new member and took the decision to create a regional common market.

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The Security Agenda of Beijing in Eurasia The emphasized centrality of Russia in Moscow’s Eurasian policy has created a rift between Russia and China in their views of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).20 In the past the SCO has been seen as a potential balancing mechanism to counteract the American potential for unilateral action in Eurasia. The declaration of the 2001 June SCO Summit defines the promotion of multi-polarity as a core institutional objective of the organization. This objective seems to be in accord with the New Security Concept of China21 where the Chinese security strategy towards Eurasia can be depicted. In it the use of force or the threat of use of force are replaced with multilateralism, mutual trust and regional coordination in order to counter the new threats, which are ‘separatism, fundamentalism and terrorism’ (see Peng-Chung 2004, 991). Accordingly, since the 1999 Bishkek Summit, this new regional coordination platform, the SCO has started dealing with terrorism and separatism. It can be surmised that China’s concerns in Xinjiang were converging with the interests of the Central Asian regimes. Therefore, the trans-border and intrastate security focus, together with the increasing presence of Western forces in the region, have turned the Shanghai platform into a kind of instrument in the hands of China as a regional balancing structure against Washington, resembling the CIS in the hands of Russia. It is expected that China will object to any sign of an indefinite presence of US troops in Central Asia after the logistical need for the missions in Afghanistan ends. In the aftermath of the Tulip Revolution (March 2005), during the SCO meeting in Astana, the leaders called on the US to set a deadline for evacuating her military forces from Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. While the US troops were leaving Uzbekistan, Condoleezza Rice, on her visit to Bishkek, ensured a continuing military presence in Manas (see Wright 2005b). In the years following 2001, Beijing, because of the US’s military presence in the axis of Southeast-South-Central Asia, is feeling encircled and isolated. On the one hand, Washington warmed its relationship with India and Pakistan simultaneously. While on the other hand, it encouraged the remilitarization of Japan, supported Manila to gain approval for the re-entry of American troops in the Philippines, strengthened military ties with Thailand and Australia and maybe, most important of all, increased military support and sales to Taiwan (see Lee 2002, 108). Because of the feeling of encirclement, China reinvented and reactivated the security branches of the SCO after the Iraq War. Before 2003, Chinese security and defence assistance to the states of the SCO were limited and on a bilateral basis, although the 20 The Shanghai Five (1996–2000), then called the Shanghai Forum, at the Summit of June 2001, transformed to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) with the membership of Uzbekistan. Apart from Tashkent, its membership includes Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. 21 The New Security Concept of China and its strategic framework were developed in the official white papers published in 1998 and 2000 (see Devika 2004).

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possibility of a deployment of Chinese troops in Central Asia was seriously discussed in 2001 (see Peng Chung 2004, 994). Following the October 2003 meeting in Tashkent, Beijing definitely became the main proponent of the regional anti-terrorist centre of the SCO, (RATA), which is located in Tashkent.22 In 2002, China and Kyrgyzstan held military counter-terrorism manoeuvres in their border zone and in August of 2003, a joint SCO command-post exercise took place in Kazakhstan with troops from Russia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, and in Xinjiang with troops from Kazakhstan. Following the October 2005 Summit, the Russian defence minister, Sergey Ivanov, proposed holding the first Indian-Chinese-Russian war game under SCO sponsorship (see Weir 2005, 4). The debate that followed Ivanov’s proposal proved that although all the Chinese attempts in the SCO are recognized as strategic balancing against Washington’s presence in Asia, in her Eurasian policy China has preferred to emphasize combating international terrorism. This is related mostly to Chinese energy security.23 In the last couple of decades China has been taking part in the provision of energy security in the region. Beijing signed a deal with Kazakhstan to develop two oil fields in exchange for building a pipeline from Xinjiang to Iran via Turkmenistan. In the distant future, this pipeline will link Iran with the Caspian Basin alongside another planned pipeline that links Kazakhstan to China (see Shuja 2005, 149). In this context, the deployment of Chinese troops in Central Asia under the framework of the SCO’s counter terrorism exercises is frequently speculated (see Lukin 2004, 37). The possibility of a Eurasian military confederacy based on the model of NATO was also mooted after the formation of the ‘Contact Group for Afghanistan’ in the SCO’s 2005 Summit and after the acceptance of Iran, Pakistan and India, with observer status, in the SCO. The Security Agenda of New Delhi in Eurasia After the September 11 attacks, India turned out to be one of the key actors in the new geopolitical bridge between Eurasia and South Asia because of (i) the enhanced strategic relationship between China and Russia and (ii) the increased strategic focus of the US in South Asia.24 22 Uzbekistan’s participation in the SCO’s security channels reinforced the intention of China to create a regional security initiative in which the region’s states will take part, especially when their internal security is at stake (see Allison 2004a, 479). 23 Chinese strategic thinking in recent years has marked a turning point. China has focused her attention on the control of sea-lines and the security of outward borders like East China or the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait and the Arabian Sea (through Pakistan) to secure the flow of oil and gas (see Vaughn 2004, 448). For Beijing, in this region the most important challenge to Chinese energy security is the potential for terrorist disruption (see Kenny 2004, 44). 24 It is known that the US tried to reach an agreement with Sri Lanka to establish a base there. This was traditionally within the sphere of Indian influence (see Ganguly and Scobel 2005, 37–43).

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The war in Afghanistan changed the South Asian geopolitics radically. Operation Enduring Freedom paved the way for a strategic alliance between Pakistan and the US and this is why certain groups in the US welcomed the Trans-Afghan pipeline project espoused by Pakistan for the transportation of Turkmen gas (see Kazi and Saeddi 2002). In this respect, India has to think seriously about policy alternatives to increase her power base in Afghanistan and Central Asia at the expense of Islamabad. In the last couple of decades, India has been planning to expand the security of trade and energy in Central Asia and in the Indian Ocean simultaneously. In order to gain strategic depth in Central Asia, India has consolidated her relations with Moscow and Tehran. As a result, in June 2000, India and Kazakhstan signed a memorandum of military and technical understanding. In pursuit of a similar agreement, India continued meeting with Kyrgyz officials (see Vaughn 2005, 451) and in May 2002, New Delhi established its first military base outside Indian territory in southern Tajikistan (see Akbarzadeh 2003, 224; Blank 2003). In 2003, it was speculated that India and Iran had signed an agreement that would allow India the use of Iranian military bases while at the same time New Delhi would cooperate with Tehran in the development of a new port complex, Chah Bahar, that could be a gateway to Central Asia. Meanwhile, China tacitly accepted India’s entry into the SCO, because of the fact that Moscow’s, Beijing’s and New Delhi’s interest in combating separatism and fundamentalism converge (see Pant 2004b, 371, 373). The Central Asian states also seem to support India’s entry to the regional security mechanisms for the following reasons: (i) it may ease Russian economic dominance of energy trade and security in the Caspian region and dilute Chinese influence on Kyrgyzstan and (ii) it may overcome US opposition to developing ties between Central Asian capitals and Tehran. A look at the security agendas of the major powers in Eurasian politics illuminates that there emerged a kind of competition among the various rival security projects. Today, in Eurasia, not only Central Asian-Caucasus states, but also other powers of the region (Moscow, Beijing and Delhi) are striving not to be excluded from these projects. The complexity of competition means that today’s Eurasia resembles neither Mackinder’s Eurasia (a realm that had to be contained) nor the Cold War’s Eurasia (a realm used to deter competing forces). Therefore, one cannot see the groupings in the region through the lenses of Cold War rhetoric (West vs. East or vice versa). However, in a certain sense, Eurasia is far from being stable and secure. As a result, the power representation of China, India and Russia in the region has addressed regional interdependency, and appeals to the leaders of the region who fear that the new US responsibilities in the Middle East, or the divergences in the transatlantic relations may reduce western assistance to Central Asian and Caucasian economies, and to the security of the region. Thus, the states of the region are expected to swing between different agendas in their foreign policy orientations. That is why today’s Eurasia can be defined as a realm of fluctuations.

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In Lieu of a Conclusion: What Can Ankara Do in this Realm of Fluctuations? The post-September 11 environment, as defined by the security agendas adopted by the major actors in the region, has further complicated the already muddled geo-strategic situation in Eurasia. Indeed, no one actually wants to resolve these complexities because all of the states, which are part of Eurasian security, have acquired a chance to gain leverage as a result of these complexities. This highly fragile balance compels Ankara to manage regional security problems on a bilateral basis. Forming bilateral relations for regional security in Eurasia is one of the traditional tools used by Turkish foreign policy makers. Throughout the 1990s, Ankara made the common perception of threats especially those of separatism, fundamentalism and proliferation of WMD the basis of good relations in the region. On this basis Turkey tended to use diplomatic instruments to create ‘damage control mechanisms’ with the states of the region. This tendency was also convenient for the ‘forward defence strategy’25 of Turkey. However, in the period since 2000 Ankara has noted that the issues raised by Turkey in her bilateral relations (such as avoiding parallel internationalisation of the Kurdish, Azeri, Chechen and Armenian questions in the Caucasus, or avoiding the connection between Islamic appeals and ethnic or civilian unrest in Central Asia) have repeatedly been put on the agenda of Western institutions. This implies that Turkey’s regional damage control mechanisms have been part of the agenda of Western (both the EU’s and US’s) political and security bodies (see Korkmaz 2005, 24). Despite the fact that Ankara intends to give the EU support in its efforts to create a ‘regional domino effect’, the possible convergence of the security agendas of Washington and Brussels may also create further difficulties for Turkey’s regional policies because, this indicates that Ankara is increasingly confronted with the situation in which Western actors and institutions define the neighbouring Eurasian security realm as either a fault-line or an area of instability. This situation may create problems in Turkey’s own relations with the states of the region and force her to balance her roles as a possible security provider as a NATO member and as a regional state in the Black Sea area. Consequently, Ankara simultaneously continues to support NATO’s agenda to increase the interoperability capacity of the region’s states, as she did in the Caucasus Working Group, while insisting on reserving regional security issues such as territorial disagreements or the security of transportation roads within the scope of bilateral relations. The last five years have proved that Turkey has cautiously become part of Eurasian security. To avoid direct military engagement, Ankara has occasionally announced that Caucasian-Central Asian security is to be an integral part of the security of the West (especially of European Security). Thus, Turkey has waited for 25 From the perspective of forward defence, regional problems must be solved before problems affecting Turkey. For details of this strategy (see Erickson 2004, 32).

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initial action from Western bodies whenever there has been tension in the region and demands from regional states have arisen. After the 9/11 attacks, energy security and Eurasian security have become directly linked to the security of the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Also, apart from Moscow, Beijing and Delhi, both Washington (with NATO) and Brussels have put themselves forward as security providers in Eurasia. The recent developments in Central Asia and the Caucasus, however, have demonstrated that the states of the region are neither ready for, nor convinced about adopting Western initiatives. Rather, the countries of the region have tried to improve national and regional security through interdependency. In the light of this, the crucial questions are whether Washington and Ankara’s interests will converge in the Eurasian security realm, and how Brussels will define the role of the Union in the Black Sea area and in the Caucasus. As a member of NATO and having candidate status to the Union, the answers to these questions will determine the range of flexibility in Turkish foreign and security policy in Eurasia. The difficulty lies in the fact that the answers to these two questions cannot be easily given. Rather, the answers are dependent on a parallel question of the extent to which Washington’s, Brussels’ and Ankara’s interests will converge in the Middle East. Until an answer to this question is clear, Ankara will continue to make efforts to improve the security of the region, not by choosing between the two Wests’ and the three Easts’ security agendas, but by underlying interdependency and international cooperation in the field of region’s security. References Akbarzadeh, S. (2003), ‘India and Pakistan’s Geostrategic Rivalry in Central Asia’, Contemporary South Asia, 12/2. Allison, R. (2004a), ‘Regionalism, Regional Structures and Security Management in Central Asia’, International Affairs, 80/3. Allison, R. (2004b), ‘Strategic Reassertion in Russia’s Central Asia Policy’, International Affairs, 80/2. Antenenko, O. (2003), ‘Transatlantic Contradictions in the Central Asian Region’, Central Asia’s Affair, no. 2. Atal, S. (2005), ‘The New Great Game’, National Interest, no. 81. Berman, I. (2004–2005), ‘The New Battle Ground: Central Asia and the Caucasus’, The Washington Quarterly, Winter. Blank, S. (2003), ‘India’s Mounting Military Presence in Central Asia’, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, February 10. Bohr, A. (2004), ‘Regionalism in Central Asia: New Geopolitics, Old Regional Order’, International Affairs, 80/3. Cooley, A. (2005), ‘Base Politics’, Foreign Affairs, November–December. Coppieters, B. (2003), ‘An EU Special Representative to a New Periphery’, The South Caucasus: A Challenge for the EU, Chaillot Papers, October.

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Cornell, S.E. (2004a), ‘The United States and Central Asia: In the Steppes to Stay?’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, vol. 17/2. Cornell, S.E. (2004b), ‘NATO after Enlargement: PFP Shifts Emphasis to Central Asia and the Caucasus’, NIAS NYTT, no. 2. Cornell, S.E. (2005), ‘US Engagement in the Caucasus: Changing Gears’, Helsinki Monitor, no. 2. Devika, S. (2004), ‘China’s New Security Concept’, The Pioneer, July 2. Erickson, E.J. (2004), ‘Turkey as Regional Hegemon – 2014: Strategic Implications for the United States’, Turkish Studies, 5/3. EU (2002), ‘Strategy Paper 2002–2006 and Indicative Programme 2002–2004 for Central Asia’ [website], , accessed in October 2005. EU (2003), ‘Wider Europe-Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with Our Eastern and Southern Neighbours’, Commission Communication COM (203) (Brussels). Ganguly, S. and Scobel, A. (2005), ‘India and the United States, Forging a Security Partnership’, World Policy Journal, Summer. Gleason, G. and Shaihutdinov, M.E. (2005), ‘Collective Security and Non-State Actors in Eurasia’, International Studies Perspectives, no. 6. Güney, N.A. and Aksu, F. (eds) (2005), The Prospects For Cooperation and Stability in the Caucasus, March 1st (Istanbul: Dogan Matbaa). Ismailova, G. (2003), ‘Georgia and Azerbaijan Support Joint Protection of Regional Energy Transportation’, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, February 26. IWPR (2003), ‘Muted Reactions to Russian Interventionism’ 13 November, [website], , accessed in February 2005. IWPR (2005), ‘Russian Troops Back in Uzbekistan’ [website] ,accessed in January 2006. Jones, E.A. (2002), ‘US Relations with Central Asia’ [website], accessed in March 2004. Kay, S. (2003), ‘Geopolitical Constraints and Institutional Innovation: the Dynamics of Multilateralism in Eurasia’, in Sperling, J. et al., Limiting Institutions? The Challenge of Eurasian Security Governance (New York: Manchester University Press). Kazi, A. (2003), ‘The Russia-China-India Strategic Understanding’, Central AsiaCaucasus Analyst, May 7. Kazi, A. and Saeddi, T. (2002), ‘India and the Politics of Trans-Afghan Gas Pipeline’, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, August 28. Kenny, H.J. (2004), ‘China and the Composition for Oil and Gas in Asia’, AsiaPacific Review, vol. 11, no. 2. Klare, M.T. (2003), ‘The Empire’s New Frontiers’, Current History, November. Korkmaz, V. (2005), ‘Dynamics of Turkish Foreign Policy Towards South Caucasus; Continuities and Changes’, in Güney, N.A. and Aksu, F. (eds.). Kuzio, T. and Blagov, S (2003), ‘GUUAM Makes Comeback Bid with US Support’

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Eurasianet [website], , accessed on 7 July 2003. Lee, O.M. (2002), ‘The Impact of the US War on Terrorism Upon US-China Relations’, Journal of Chinese Political Science, vol. 17, no. 1/2. Lieven, A. (2002), ‘The Secret Policemen’s Ball, The United States, Russia and International Order after 11 September’, International Affairs, 78/2. Lukin, A. (2004), ‘Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Problems and Prospects’, International Affairs, 50/3. Lynch, D. (2003), ‘The EU: Towards a Strategy’, The South Caucasus A Challenge for the EU, Chaillot Papers, October. Lynch III, T.F., (2005), ‘NATO Unbound: Out of Area Operations in the Greater Middle East’, Orbis, Winter. Macfarlane, S.N. (1999), Western Engagement in the Caucasus and Central Asia, (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs). Macfarlane, S.N. (2004a), ‘The Caucasus and Central Asia: Towards a Non-Strategy’ in Dannreuther, R. (ed.), European Union Foreign and Security Policy, Towards a Neighborhood Strategy, (New York: Routledge). Macfarlane, N.S. (2004b), ‘The United States and Regionalism in Central Asia’, International Affairs, 80/3. Maull, H.W. (2005), ‘Europe and the New Balance of the Global Order’, International Affairs, 81/4. McDermott, R.N. (2003), ‘The Kazakh Military Looks West’, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, July 16. McDermott, R.N. (2005), ‘Kazakhstan Lays Legal Basis for Deeper Cooperation with NATO’, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, November 2. Menon, R. (2003), ‘The New Great Game in Central Asia’, Survival, 45/2. Meyer, C.W. (2003), ‘America Discovers Central Asia’, Foreign Affairs, 82/2, March-April. Muller, H. (2003), ‘Terrorism, Proliferation: A European Threat Assessment’, Chaillot Papers, no. 58. Myers, J.A. and Soligo, R. (2004), ‘Re-evaluating US Strategic Priorities in the Caspian Region: Balancing Energy Resource Initiatives with Terrorism Containment’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, vol.17, no. 2. NATO (2002), ‘Prague Summit Declaration Issued by Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of North Atlantic Council in Prague, November 21, 2002’, [website], , accessed in February 2005. NATO (2004), ‘Appointment of the NATO Secretary General’s Special Representative for the Caucasus and Central Asia’, M2 Presswire, September 15. NATO (2005), ‘Speech by NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Spring Session’, M2 Presswire, May 31. Pant, H.V. (2004a), ‘The Moscow-Beijing-Delhi Strategic Triangle: An Idea Whose Time May Never Come’, Security Dialogue, 35/3. Pant, H.V. (2004b), ‘India and Iran: An Axis in the Making’, Asian Survey, 44/3. Peng Chung, C. (2004), ‘The Shanghai Co-operation Organization: China’s Changing Influence in Central Asia’, The China Quarterly.

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Perovic, J. (2005), ‘From Disengagement to Active Economic Competition: Russia’s Return to the South Caucasus and Central Asia’, Demokratizatsia. RFE/RL (2003), ‘Kazakhstan Building Military Base on Caspian with US Help’, Newsline, October 8. RFE/RL (2004), ‘Central Asia Report’, 19 January, [website], , accessed in February 2005. Shaffer, B. (2003), ‘Iran’s role in the South Caucasus and the Caspian Region: Diverging Views of the US and Europe’ in Iran and Its Neighbors (Berlin: SWP) [website] , accessed in February 2005. Shaffer, B. (2005), ‘US Foreign Policy toward the Caucasus: Trends in the Second Bush Administration’, in Güney, N.A. and Aksu, F. (eds), The Prospects For Cooperation and Stability in the Caucasus. Scheffer, J.H. (2004), ‘Speech by NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer during his visit to the Kyrgyz Republic on 19 October’, M2 Presswire, October 20. Shuja, S. (2005), ‘China, Iran and Central Asia: The Dawning of A New Partnership’, Contemporary Review, vol. 287, no. 1676. Solana, J. (2003), ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy’ (Brussels) [website], accessed in February 2005. Starr, F.S. (2005), ‘A Partnership for Central Asia’, Foreign Affairs, 84/4, July– August. Strategic Survey (2005), ‘Europe-Russia’, vol. 105, no. 1. Stulberg, A.N (2004), ‘“Fuelling” Transatlantic Entente in the Caspian Basin: Energy Security and Collective Action’, Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 25, no. 2. Trenin, D. (2005), ‘The Southern Vector’, International Affairs, vol. 51/4. Trifonov, D. (2003), ‘Ivanov Doctrine Reflects Moscow’s Growing Confidence in the CIS and Beyond’, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, November 19. Vaughn, B. (2004), ‘Indian Geopolitics, the United States and Evolving Correlates of Power in Asia’, Geopolitics, vol. 9, no. 2. Weir, F. (2005), ‘Push for Influence in Central Asia’, Christian Science Monitor, October 26, 97/233. White House (2002), National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington D.C.) White House (2006), National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington D.C.) Wright, R. (2005a), ‘Rice, on the Way to Central Asia, Reprimands Uzbekistan’, Washington Post, October 11. Wright, R. (2005b), ‘Kyrgystan Agrees to Continuing US Military Presence at Key Air Base’, Washington Post, October 12. Zhenghong, Z. (2005), ‘Regional Security in Central Asia and Russia after 9/11’, Far Eastern Affairs, vol. 33/1, January–March.

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Chapter 8

Turkey and the Greater Black Sea Region Gareth M. Winrow

The Greater Black Sea region has become increasingly important for policymakers in Ankara. The acknowledgement of various security threats and risks, the recognition of the importance of developing pipeline networks to transport hydrocarbons from the Caspian region and the Broader Middle East to markets in Turkey and Europe, and an awareness of the enhanced international interest in the Black Sea neighbourhood in the post-9/11 world and in the wake of the Rose and Orange Revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, has compelled the Turkish authorities to give more attention to the Black Sea area. The Black Sea is more than simply a corridor for the movement westwards of crude oil, natural gas and other goods, and for the illicit passage of drugs, migrants, terrorists, military equipment and components of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The Black Sea may be considered a ‘region in the making’ if not already ‘in being’, given the extent of regional cooperation. For the purposes of this chapter, the Greater Black Sea region encompasses the six Black Sea littoral states – Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine – together with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Moldova. Because of its strategic interests, Greece may also be included, but this chapter will not concentrate on Turkish-Greek relations, based as they are on a separate set of dynamics. In the Greater Black Sea region, policy-makers in Ankara have, in effect, sought recognition for Turkey as a benign regional middle power. Turkey has endeavoured in general to play a constructive role to enhance stability rather than use force to impose its presence in the area.1 Turkish officials have been involved in the ‘niche diplomacy’ of a middle power, where the resources of the Turkish state are targeted in ‘specific areas best able to generate returns worth having rather than trying to cover the field’.2 In practice, this niche diplomacy has entailed or sought to entail some of the classic instruments of middle power diplomacy – conflict mediation and multilateral diplomacy.3 However, with their emphasis on regional stability and their

1 For a discussion of benign and coercive regional powers, (see Onis 2003, 2). 2 This is a phrase coined by the then Minister of Foreign Affairs of Australia, Gareth Evans, and quoted in Cooper (see Cooper 1997, 5). 3 For a general discussion of these tools of a middle power, (see Cooper 1997, 9 and Ravenhill 1998, 312).

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support of state sovereignty and the territorial integrity of states, Turkish policymakers have also been pursuing the policy of a status-quo power. An Overview Although after the unravelling of the Soviet Union, Ankara had initially concentrated on striving to build ties with the so-called Turkic World, the Turkish authorities were also aware of the importance of fostering cooperation in the Greater Black Sea region. Thus Turkey sponsored and launched the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) in 1992. Ethnic conflicts in the South Caucasus in the early 1990s over NagornoKarabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and Moscow’s later exploitation of these unresolved disputes to maintain a high profile security presence, also forced Turkish governments to monitor developments in the region more closely. Nevertheless, a rapidly expanding trade and commercial partnership, which has continued to grow under the government of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), has led to a dramatic improvement in Turkish-Russian relations. Turkey and Russia are longstanding rivals in the Black Sea. After the end of the Cold War, mutual suspicions and tensions persisted throughout the 1990s over the Chechen and Kurdish issues. Duygu Sezer (see Sezer 2000, 1) referred to TurkishRussian relations as being based on ‘virtual rapprochement’. Open manifestations of hostility had disappeared to be replaced by cooperation in many fields and officials were in regular contact, but ‘genuine’ rapprochement was still lacking because of lingering mistrust among policy-makers. Under the AKP administration further steps were taken towards consolidating ties. Between December 2004 and July 2005 President Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan met on four occasions. In Ankara in December 2004, Putin and his Turkish counterpart Ahmet Necdet Sezer signed a Joint Declaration to upgrade relations to the level of an enhanced ‘multi-dimensional partnership’. There was a general feeling in Turkey that in contrast to the European Union (EU) and the USA, Russia was prepared to consider Turkey an equal negotiating partner. In the post 9/11 world, the USA, NATO and the EU have become more apprehensive about the threats and risks to European security from the Greater Black Sea region. Paragraph four of the Final Communiqué of NATO’s Istanbul Summit convened in June 2004 noted the ‘…importance of the Black Sea region for EuroAtlantic security’ (See North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2004). The European Security Strategy document adopted by EU Heads of State and Government in December 2003 referred to security challenges stemming from the problems of failed states, unresolved regional conflicts, organized crime, trafficking in drugs, women, illegal migrants and weaponry, as well as the threats posed by terrorists and the proliferation of WMD. The document spoke of tackling these threats by creating a ‘ring of well-governed countries’ around Europe’s borders (see European Security Strategy 2003). In line with these objectives, the EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) aims to encourage economic and political reforms in these countries and offer them ‘a stake’ in the EU’s internal market, but gives no guarantee that these

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countries would eventually become full members of the EU. Turkey has attempted to address risks and threats in the Greater Black Sea region through a number of multilateral initiatives. Before the Rose and Orange Revolutions, Turkey had developed good relations with Georgia and Ukraine. The geopolitical value of Georgia as an energy transit state had been appreciated and close ties have been maintained with the regime of Mikhail Saakashvili. In April 2004, Turkey and Ukraine agreed to a Comprehensive Joint Action Plan which stressed the need to strengthen stability in the Black Sea neighbourhood, and aimed to boost cooperation between the two states in various fields, including trade, transportation, agriculture, energy, science and technology, tourism and the environment (Anatolian News Agency 2004). This Plan provided the framework for further consolidating ties between Ankara and Kyiv after the Orange revolution. Nevertheless, there were evidently concerns among officials in Turkey that the ‘revolutions’ in Georgia and Ukraine could destabilize the Greater Black Sea region by sparking attempted popular uprisings elsewhere, and particularly in Azerbaijan. Ties have greatly improved with Bulgaria and Romania since the end of the Cold War. The Gagauz Turks are a well-treated minority in Moldova. Close economic, political and social links have been consolidated with energy-rich Azerbaijan. However, Ankara and Yerevan have yet to establish diplomatic ties and the TurkishArmenian land border has remained closed after escalating violence in the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh in 1993 compelled the Turkish authorities to impose a blockade on Armenia. Yerevan’s insistence that Ankara should acknowledge the Ottoman Empire’s ‘genocide’ against its Armenian subjects in 1915 continues to hinder the normalization of relations. In effect, Turkish policy-makers have indexed their policy to that of Azerbaijan, with Ankara promising not to establish diplomatic ties with Yerevan and open the land border until progress is made in resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. Nevertheless, in recent years there have been meetings between the Turkish and Armenian foreign ministers and regular flights between Turkey and Armenia have been opened. Turkey also helped facilitate Armenia’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and in 2005, up to 40,000 Armenians were, according to Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul, working in Istanbul alone (Turkish Daily News 2005). Economic Interests Turkey’s trade turnover with states in the Greater Black Sea region has continued to expand, with Russia in particular becoming a very significant trade partner (see Table 8.1). Turkey has a considerable negative trade balance with Russia and Ukraine. These figures, though, fail to take into account the extensive suitcase trade, where individuals carry home substantial amounts of Turkish consumer goods. Trade between Turkey and other Black Sea states is largely complementary; Turkey imports fuel, energy products and metals from Russia, exporting, in return, textiles, machinery and vehicles, chemical goods and food. Consumer goods and textiles are exported to Ukraine while Ukrainian scrap metals are imported.

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Although scarcely registered in official Turkish statistics, there is a regular trade turnover between Turkey and Armenia which amounts to at least $40 million annually. Turkish goods enter the Armenian market either through charter flights or overland via Georgia or Iran. According to a disputed World Bank study produced in 2000, the opening of the Turkish-Armenian frontier could result in a 30 per cent increase in Armenia’s Gross Domestic Product (see Khachatrian 2005). There have been problems in developing commercial ties with the region because of poor banking procedures, inadequate legal frameworks to protect investments, logistical bottlenecks, bureaucratic obstacles and endemic corruption. Turkish Eximbank has offered credits to boost trade turnover and support the construction of hotels and factories in Black Sea states. But not all of these credits have been taken up due to high interest rates, cumbersome procedures, and the incompetence of parties involved. Moreover, Azerbaijan and Georgia are encountering repayment difficulties, having accumulated substantial debts. Nevertheless, Turkish companies have made significant investments in the Greater Black Sea region, and a number of projects have been undertaken by Turkish construction firms (see Table 8.2). Turkey’s involvement in the Ukraine, which has included investments in telecommunications, transportation and the brewing industry, and contracting work in the construction of natural gas pipelines, bridges and roads, will most probably expand given that Ukraine has been officially declared a priority country in Turkey’s foreign economic relations (see Foreign Economic Relations Board of Turkey 2005, 20). Prospects for further investments in Bulgaria and Romania beckon too, as these states continue with their economic reforms. But there have been problems with the implementation of the 1998 PowerFor-Infrastructure agreement concluded by Ankara and Sofia. In 2004, the AKP administration suspended its purchases of electricity from Bulgaria on the grounds that the government in Sofia had failed to offer contracts to Turkish companies seeking to build power plants, dams and roads in Bulgaria. The pro-Russian business lobby in Turkey has become a powerful pressure group, seeking to ensure that Turkish-Russian relations continue to improve. Turkish construction companies such as ENKA, GAMA and Tekfen have made extensive investments in Russia and have helped construct pipelines and power stations in Turkey to deliver and work on Russian natural gas. Turkish-Russian commercial ties are set to be further bolstered by the transportation of larger amounts of Russian natural gas to Turkey to meet the latter’s rising energy needs. Two-thirds of Turkey’s gas imports originate from Russia, and Turkey is committed to importing 30 billion cubic meters (bcm) of Russian natural gas in 2010 to help satisfy a total expected demand of approximately 38.5 bcm.4 There have been complaints about the high price of this gas and the onerous take-or-pay obligations, but Turkish energy officials could obtain better terms given Gazprom’s interest in gas storage and internal distribution in the Turkish market. Gazprom is 4 For further details of relations between Turkey and Russia in the energy field see Chapter 9.

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also seeking to deliver its gas to Israel and Europe via the Turkish network – in the case of the latter, providing an alternative to piping gas through Ukraine. Given Turkey’s commitments in the future to procure gas from other states, re-exporting Russian natural gas previously committed to the Turkish market would help Ankara resolve the problem of possibly having over-contracted with regard to Russian gas imports. Such an arrangement would also enhance Turkey’s importance as an energy transportation corridor. In contrast to cooperation in natural gas, Turkey and Russia have been serious rivals concerning the transportation of crude oil. Officially, Moscow opposed the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline aimed at delivering Azerbaijani and possibly Kazakh crude to Europe via the Turkish Mediterranean port, on the grounds that it was not economically feasible. In practice, and in spite of improving relations with Ankara, the authorities in the Kremlin were concerned that the pipeline project would bolster Turkey’s prestige and influence in the Black Sea neighbourhood at Russia’s expense. Nevertheless, with the Baku-TbilisiCeyhan pipeline about to become operational in 2006, Russia and Turkey have been considering constructing a second Bosporus bypass pipeline across Turkish territory from Samsun to Ceyhan to transport in this case Russian and possibly Kazakh crude. Security Concerns The significance of the Black Sea for the security concerns of NATO, the USA and the EU will most probably increase. In its operations to overthrow the Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein in Iraq, the Bush administration used the Black Sea as an airspace corridor. American forces may have prepared ‘virtual’ bases in Azerbaijan, where pre-positioned equipment and airstrips could be employed to mount possible operations against Iran. In July 2003, the EU appointed a Special Representative for the Southern Caucasus to lend assistance to in resolving the frozen ethnic conflicts in the area. Aware of American and European concerns, Turkey could play a key role in the Greater Black Sea region to assist in tackling security risks and threats. Turkey lies on a major transit route for the shipment of Southwest Asian opiates to Europe, and also serves as a base and refining centre for leading narcotics traffickers and brokers. Profits from drugs could be used by secessionist groups in the Black Sea area, who may act as intermediaries in this illegal trade to acquire weapons which could further destabilise the region. Organized crime in the region also involves the smuggling of people and components of WMD. A paper prepared in 2003 referred to a Europol report which estimated that human trafficking in Turkey generated $500 million annually, with 75,000–100,000 people using Turkey as a transit country to seek illegal entry to the EU (see Polyakov 2003, 5). With regard to nuclear and radioactive materials, there are at least two trafficking routes from northern Iraq and Romania and Bulgaria which use Turkey as transit territory. According to the Turkish Atomic Energy

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Authority, there were 104 smuggling incidents involving such materials in Turkey between 1994–2002, with most of these substances originating from former Soviet states, and especially Kazakhstan (see Zaitseva 2002, 175–76). It is feared that these components could fall into the hands of Al Qaeda or Chechen terrorists. Turkey has concluded various agreements with neighbouring Black Sea states to coordinate work to combat terrorism and organized crime. Attempting to engage in the niche diplomacy of a benign regional middle power, Turkish officials have sought to facilitate the resolution of certain conflicts in the region. This would be in line also with Turkey’s interests as a status quo power refusing to acknowledge the claims of secessionist regimes. The reactivation of ethnic and territorial conflicts in the Caucasus could result in massive movements of refugees towards Turkey’s borders. In February 2001 Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem thus pushed for launching a trilateral dialogue between Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan, and declared that Turkey was willing to mediate in the NagornoKarabakh dispute (see Cem 2001). Turkey was one of the ten members of the Minsk Group of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), handed the task of resolving this dispute, but the three co-chairmen of the Group – France, Russia and the USA – have in recent times tended to dominate this body. Bearing in mind the absence of diplomatic relations between Ankara and Yerevan and the close ties between Ankara and Baku, Cem’s proposal to mediate singlehandedly in the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute was not taken seriously by Yerevan. In April 2004, the Armenian Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian stated that he was not opposed in principle to trilateral meetings of the foreign ministers of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkey(Turkish Daily News 2004). But this initiative has failed to develop in spite of the three foreign ministers gathering in Istanbul at the NATO Summit in the summer of 2004. Making use of generally warm relations with Tbilisi and the presence of 450,000–700,000 Turkish citizens of Abkhazian ethnic origin who have wellorganized lobbies in Turkey, Ankara has also endeavoured to mediate in the Georgian-Abkhazian dispute. A conference on confidence-building measures for Abkhazia was convened in Istanbul in June 1999, and Turkish diplomats attempted but failed to hold similar talks again in 2004. In May 2005, the Abkhazian ‘President’ Sergey Bagapsh declined a Turkish offer to mediate because of Ankara’s continuing military cooperation with Tbilisi (see Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline 2005). There would seem to be little prospect for Turkey to play an instrumental role in solving this dispute given Abkhazia’s perceptions of Turkey, Russia’s support for the Abkhazian cause, and Bagapsh’s insistence that he would only be satisfied with independence. This is in spite of Turkish vessels continuing to run the economic blockade imposed by Tbilisi – much to the annoyance of the Saakashvili regime – to deliver goods to the Abkhazian port of Sukhumi (see Hill and Taspinar 2006, 17). With no influential lobbies in Turkey, Ankara has not played an active role in the disputes over South Ossetia and the Transdniestria. Turkish authorities have, however, followed developments in Chechnya rather more closely.

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Throughout the 1990s, Moscow accused Ankara of supporting the Chechen cause when Chechen solidarity groups in Turkey raised money, provided equipment, and dispatched volunteers to fight in Chechnya. Russian officials, in turn, allowed groups sympathetic to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) to hold meetings in Moscow. The Kremlin’s refusal to grant PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan asylum in November 1998 marked a turning-point, and in November 1999 at the height of the Second Chechen War, Russia and Turkey concluded an anti-terrorism agreement. Nevertheless, Turkish officials had to resign themselves to the fact that Russia continued to maintain forces in the northern Caucasus which exceeded the ceilings imposed by the revised Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty signed in Istanbul in November 1999. Moreover, Russia still based its troops in Armenia and Georgia – although at the time of writing an agreement for Russian units to vacate their remaining two bases in Georgia by the end of 2007 had been reconfirmed. The rapprochement evident under the leaderships of Erdogan and Putin had been earlier signalled by a deal concluded by the Turkish and Russian foreign ministries in New York in November 2001 to consult one another with regard to their interests in Central Asia and the Caucasus. By early 2006 the Turkish military was considering purchasing Russian-produced attack helicopters and a version of the Russian S300 missile defence system. Nevertheless, the Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov could still note in February 2004 that most mercenaries killed or captured in Chechnya were Turks, and this would ‘inevitably’ have a ‘negative impact’ on Turkish-Russian relations (Reuters 2004). While it does appear that in the 1990s the Turkish authorities chose to turn a blind eye to the activities of Chechen solidarity groups based in Turkey, in recent years Ankara has pursued a policy in line with that of a status quo power committed to preserving territorial integrity and state sovereignty. This is in contrast to Moscow’s support for secessionist groups in the Greater Black Sea region in Transdniestria, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Such fundamentally different approaches followed by Ankara and Moscow must inevitably set limits on the extent of the rapprochement between Turkey and Russia. Careful to avoid binding defence agreements which could in future put Turkey in direct opposition to Russia, the Turkish Armed Forces have concluded a number of bilateral training and assistance agreements with other militaries in the region. Cooperation here is also carried out within NATO’s Partnership for Peace initiative. Turkish military personnel have been involved in the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) since 1994, monitoring the Georgian-Abkhazian ceasefire. Turkey is also actively participating in other multilateral security arrangements. These include membership of the Southeast European Brigade (SEEBRIG) and a role in the Southeast European Cooperation Process (SEECP). Turkey is also a part of the Southeast European Cooperation Initiative (SECI), which has established a Regional Centre to tackle trans-boundary crime and corruption, as well as terrorism. These various initiatives cover Southeastern Europe and are important for the Black Sea neighbourhood. As part of its niche diplomacy, Turkey has also sponsored

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separate multilateral arrangements which include Russia and Ukraine in addition to other states in the Greater Black Sea region. This is in accordance with the role of a benign regional middle power, seeking to enhance regional security and stability by promoting cooperative leadership with other states in the area. Multilateral Initiatives In Tbilisi in January 2000, President Suleyman Demirel called for the creation of a Caucasus Stability Pact to be modelled on the earlier Balkans Stability Pact, based on OSCE norms and values, and to be open to all OSCE member states (see Winrow 2000, 59–61). This would have excluded Iran, a state which occasionally attempted to mediate in the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. In Istanbul in February 2001, Foreign Minister Cem proposed a revised Caucasus Stability Pact in a 3+3+2 framework, which would cover the three states of the southern Caucasus together with Turkey, Iran and Russia, and which would receive technical support and financial assistance from the EU and the USA.5 Similar stability pacts were proposed by the Armenian, Georgian and Russian governments. However, these proposals were not implemented as conditions were not ripe for conflict resolution. The Chechen conflict was ongoing, and the ethnic disputes in Azerbaijan and Georgia remained frozen. The specific Turkish initiatives were doomed from the outset because of the absence of normalised relations between Ankara and Yerevan, and due to Moscow harbouring suspicions that Turkey was seeking to boost its prestige and influence in the Caucasus at its expense. The serious differences of opinion between Turkey and Russia concerning secessionist regimes in the region have been previously noted. Decision-makers in Ankara also failed to develop institutionalised trilateral cooperation with Baku and Tbilisi. Meeting in Trabzon in April 2002, Presidents Ahmet Necdet Sezer, Eduard Shevardnadze and Heidar Aliyev agreed to coordinate their actions against terrorism and organized crime, and to work together to protect oil and gas pipelines traversing their territories (see Katik 2002). The intention was to hold annual summits between the three leaders, with a proposed follow-up summit meeting in Tbilisi . This trilateral initiative was not pursued by the AKP administration, which focused more attention on cultivating ties with Moscow. Changes of leadership in Azerbaijan and Georgia also heralded the demise of the initiative, with the Saakashvili regime more eager to bolster ties with the authorities in Kyiv after the Orange revolution in Ukraine. Sponsored by Turkish President Turgut Ozal and inaugurated in Istanbul in June 1992, the BSEC was composed of the six Black Sea littoral states, together with Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Greece and Moldova-Serbia-Montenegro would also join at a later date. The BSEC soon became institutionalised, with its own permanent international secretariat, parliamentary assembly, trade and development bank and

5

See Cem 2001.

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various working groups. With the adoption of its Charter in May 1999, it became a regional economic organization. Turkish officials promoted the BSEC to boost trade and investment and to encourage good neighbourly relations. Although not addressing hard security issues, in recent years the BSEC has sought to tackle organized crime and corruption. The BSEC has a number of shortcomings, including a bloated bureaucracy, inefficient coordination among its many components, a shortage of resources, and a lack of proper aims and priorities, which its officials are attempting to address. The organisation has also been held hostage to Russian demands and has been impaired by Armenia and Azerbaijan’s conflicting interests. More funds have become available to finance studies on certain projects, and it is hoped that these will be topped up with support from the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development if the BSEC is able to foster closer ties with the EU. Turkish officials established the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Force (BLACKSEAFOR) and Operation Black Sea Harmony with the intention of tackling security problems. Composed of the Black Sea littoral states, BLACKSEAFOR was activated in 2001. Its initial brief envisaged cooperation in search and rescue operations, mine-sweeping missions and environmental protection, with good-will port visits and regular joint manoeuvres to be arranged. The naval force would only be assembled to conduct exercises for one month each year. But Turkish authorities have pushed for BLACKSEAFOR to be given permanent stand-by status with fixed headquarters. As a result of their lobbying, in March 2005 it was decided that BLACKSEAFOR should broaden its remit to include cooperation against terrorism and prevent the proliferation of WMD.6 It was also eventually agreed that BLACKSEAFOR should establish a permanent operation control centre, draft a multilateral memorandum for information exchange among its members, and carry out unscheduled activations to shadow ships in the Black Sea, suspected, for example, of carrying components of WMD (see Simon 2006, 5). At the time of writing there were indicators of increasing cooperation between BLACKSEAFOR and Operation Black Sea Harmony. Activated in March 2004, the latter was originally an exclusive Turkish air and naval operation to monitor and intercept suspicious vessels in the Black Sea which were approaching the Bosphorus. In a meeting of special representatives of BLACKSEAFOR in Kyiv in March 2006, Turkey’s invitation for other littoral states to participate in Operation Black Sea Harmony was reportedly welcomed (see MFA 2004). Turkey, the USA, and the EU in the Region In addition to security concerns and an interest in exploiting Caspian energy reserves, American commentators have argued that the USA should promote 6 For further details see , accessed 27 March 2006.

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democratisation in the Greater Black Sea region (see Asmus and Jackson 2004). In line with the policies of a status quo power, though, Turkish officials are troubled at the prospect that efforts to promote democratisation could lead to regional instability. Other dynamics are also at play. Turkish-US relations have suffered as a result of Ankara’s refusal to open up a northern front in the war against Iraq in 2003 and anti-Americanism in Turkey has increased after the Bush administration failed to launch a campaign against PKK rebels holed up in northern Iraq. In these circumstances, Turkish policy-makers were not enthusiastic about the possibility of the USA playing a more active role in the Black Sea area. As a regional middle power Turkey has been pursuing a set of policies which do not always coincide with those of the outside superpower. In contrast to the official statements released by the OSCE and the Bush administration, Turkish authorities have been much less critical of the manipulation of parliamentary and presidential elections in Azerbaijan. A popular revolution in Baku could destabilise a strategically important state with which Turkey has cultivated close economic and political relations. The reception in the White House of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in April 2006 did indicate, however, that Bush had revised his policy and placed more emphasis on Azerbaijan’s geopolitical importance. Turkish policy-makers appear to be more comfortable with a gradual, evolutionary transformation towards more democracy, as witnessed in Moldova in recent years under the Presidency of Vladimir Voronin. The success of political reforms in Georgia and Ukraine could lead to these states – especially Ukraine – becoming rivals to Turkey for EU membership. In testimonies delivered to the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee in March 2005, policy experts complained that Turkey and Russia were coordinating their policies in the Black Sea neighbourhood to forestall the spread of democratisation. It was claimed that there were those in Turkey and Russia who suspected Washington of encouraging revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine to foment instability in order to create an anti-Russian alliance and undermine Turkey’s security (see Jackson 2005; Baran 2005). Although these were clearly unsubstantiated accusations, they nevertheless contributed to the souring of what were already becoming problematic relations between Turkey and the USA. Turkey and Russia have opposed the extension of NATO’s Operation Active Endeavour from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea. This NATO naval deployment was targeted against the movement of terrorists and trade in WMD components. Both Ankara and Moscow argued that BLACKSEAFOR and Operation Black Sea Harmony were capable of intercepting suspicious shipping in the Black Sea. Turkish officials also argued that NATO was already active in the Black Sea through the presence of the Turkish, Bulgarian and Romanian navies. In practice, Russia was opposed to a US naval force in the Black Sea and Turkey was concerned that the Montreux Convention of 1936 should not be revised, which would place Turkish sovereignty over the Bosphorus and the Dardenelles in question. Article 18 of the Convention places restrictions on the number, type and length of stay (twenty-one days) of non-Black Sea states’ warships in the Black Sea. In his testimony to the

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US Senate, Jackson (2005, 7) called for the dispensing of the ‘archaic’ Montreux Convention. There have also been accusations that Turkey and Russia appear to be striving to establish a ‘naval condominium’ in the Black Sea (see Socor 2005). Bulgarian and Romanian officials, preparing to host US bases in their territories, seem to be sensitive to these charges. Aware of Turkey’s sensitivities, the USA did not officially request the extension of Operation Active Endeavour to the Black Sea, and by late April 2006 plans for extension were apparently shelved. This episode clearly caused tensions between Washington and Ankara, in spite of the Turkish navy and coastguard, within the framework of Operation Black Sea Harmony, providing NATO with intelligence on suspicious vessels transiting the Bosphorus (see Babaoglu 2005). The possible further development of relations between Turkey and the EU in the Greater Black Sea region as Ankara’s accession negotiations proceed could help to alleviate American concerns and dispel fears of an ostensibly emerging Turkish-Russian axis in the Black Sea. Given the EU’s developing interest in the Black Sea neighbourhood, Brussels could use Turkey’s contacts and experience to bolster its ties with the region. In particular, Brussels and Ankara could strengthen links between the EU and BSEC within the framework of the ENP. In its Strategy Paper on the ENP released in May 2004, the European Commission referred to the significance of regional and subregional cooperation to enhance security and stability, and in this context noted the ‘important role’ the BSEC could play (see Commission of the European Communities 2004, 30-1). A Turkey on track to join the EU could help develop an EU-BSEC relationship. However, the ENP itself remains a work in progress. Substantial sums will need to be offered to the ENP in the EU’s 2007–2013 financial perspective to make the policy effective, and the ENP may also yet fail to develop because it does not provide states such as Georgia and Ukraine guarantees of eventual EU membership. Turkey will become an invaluable corridor for the transportation of crude oil and especially natural gas from the Greater Black Sea region and the Broader Middle East to European markets. EU member states have become more aware of their dependence on Russian imports to meet 25% of their natural gas consumption needs, and much more conscious of their energy security concerns after Gazprom briefly suspended gas imports to Ukraine in January 2006. In the Annex to the ‘Green Paper on a European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy’, adopted by the European Commission in March 2006, the ‘strategic importance’ of Turkey for the delivery of oil and gas to Europe from the Caspian Sea, the Middle East, and northern Africa, as well as from Russia, was underlined (see Commission of the European Communities 2006, 37). Nevertheless, in spite of Turkey’s geopolitical value and the launching of accession negotiations, there is no guarantee that Turkey will eventually become a full EU member. The French public, traditionally sympathetic to Armenia because of the presence of the Armenian diaspora, will have to approve of Turkey’s membership in a referendum. Accession talks could collapse earlier over

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the Cyprus question, or perhaps over the insistence of the European Parliament and several EU member states that Ankara should first officially recognize that ‘genocide’ was committed against Armenians in 1915. A breakdown in accession talks could have serious repercussions on possible Turkey-EU cooperation in the Greater Black Sea region. Conclusion With regard to the Black Sea neighbourhood, officials in Ankara have to take into account what are at times the conflicting interests of the EU, USA and Russia. In spite of their rapidly expanding economic ties, speculation of an emerging TurkishRussian axis in the Black Sea is largely unfounded given that both leading regional powers have diverging aims and ambitions, especially over unresolved ethnic conflicts. However, it appears that US suspicions and concerns over Turkey’s regional role will only be dispelled if Ankara is more firmly anchored within the EU. Closer cooperation with Brussels would also enable officials in Ankara to project Turkey more effectively as a benign regional middle power. Conversely, a possible collapse in the Turkey-EU accession talks could push Ankara to gravitate towards Moscow and thereby raise alarm bells in Washington. The multilateral initiatives originally sponsored by Turkey could further develop, with the BSEC expanding ties with the EU, and with NATO tentatively building more contacts with BLACKSEAFOR and Operation Black Sea Harmony. Diplomats in Ankara are aware that Romania and Ukraine are cultivating a separate Black Sea regional initiative. Within the framework of the Community of Democratic Choice, Romania is working with the Council of Europe and other institutions to promote a Black Sea Forum for Dialogue and Partnership. In Kyiv in December 2005 , the Community of Democratic Choice of Baltic and Black Sea states was officially launched under Ukrainian sponsorship, with a follow-up meeting convened in Vilnius in May 2006. High-level Turkish delegations were conspicuously absent from the gatherings in Kyiv and Vilnius. However, presuming Turkish policy-makers continue to work together with other Black Sea states, the EU and other institutions, this initiative will most probably not run counter to Turkey’s interests in the Greater Black Sea region. References Anatolian News Agency (2004), ‘Erdogan Returns to Turkey’ [website], , accessed on 4 April. Asmus, R.D. and Jackson, B.P. (2004), ‘The Black Sea and the Frontiers of Freedom’, Policy Review, 125. Babaoglu, O. (2005), ‘The Black Sea Basin: A New Axis in Global Maritime Security’, Policywatch (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy) 1027, 24 August.

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Baran, Z. (2005), Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, SubCommittee on European Affairs. Hearing titled, ‘The Future of Democracy in the Black Sea Area’, 8 March, (Washington D.C.). Cem, Ismail (2001) ‘Speech given at the Caucasus Stability Pact Conference’, Economic and Social Studies Foundation of Turkey (TESEV), 17 February 2001. Commission of the European Communities (2004), ‘European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper’, Communication from the Commission, COM (2004) 373 Final, 12 May (Brussels). Commission of the European Communities (2006), ‘Annex to the Green Paper: A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy: What is at Stake – Background Document’, COM (2006) 105 Final, XXX, Brussels – SEC (2006) 317/2. Cooper, A.F. (1997), ‘Niche Diplomacy: A Conceptual Overview’, in Cooper (ed.). Cooper, A.F. (ed.) (1997), Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers after the Cold War (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan). EU (2003), ‘European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World’, European Council, 12 December (Brussels). Foreign Economic Relations Board of Turkey (2005), ‘Turkish Business in the BSEC Region: Direct Investments, Contracting Services, Prospects for Cooperation’, February (Istanbul). Hill, F. and Taspinar, O. (2006), ‘Russia and Turkey in the Caucasus: Moving Together to Preserve the Status Quo?’ Russie.Nei.Visions 8 (Institut Francais des Relations Internationales). Jackson, B.P. (2005), Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Sub-Committee on European Affairs. Hearing titled ‘The Future of Democracy in the Black Sea Area’, 8 March (Washington D.C.). Katik, M. (2002), ‘Caucasus Summit Cements Cooperation among Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia’, Eurasia Insight – Eurasianet.org, 3 May. Khachatrian, H. (2005), ‘Report: No Big Gains to Armenia if Turkey Lifts Blockade’, Business and Economics – Eurasianet.org, 9 August. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2004), ‘Istanbul Summit Communiqué issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting in the North Atlantic Council, Istanbul, 28 June’, PR/CP (2004) 096 (Brussels). Onis, Z. (2003), ‘Turkey and the Middle East after September 11’ [website], , accessed 17 February 2006. Polyakov, L. (2003), ‘New Security Threats in the Black Sea Region’. Presentation given at the Second bi-annual ECPR Conference, Marburg, 20 September [website], , accessed 1 April 2005. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline (2005), ‘Turkish Offers to Mediate Between Georgia, Abkhazia’, 9: 103, pt. 1, 1 June. Ravenhill, J. (1998), ‘Cycles of Middle Power Activism: Constraint and Choice in Australian and Canadian Foreign Policies’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 52: 3.

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Reuters (2004), ‘Russia Names Turkey as Source of Chechen Fighters’, 6 February. Sezer, D.B. (2000), ‘Turkish-Russian Relations: Geopolitical Competition and Economic Partnership’, Turkish Studies 1: 1. Simon, J. (2006), ‘Black Sea Regional Security Cooperation: Building Bridges and Barriers’, Harvard Black Sea Security Program Publications, 19 January [website], , accessed 17 February 2006. Socor, V. (2005), ‘Black Sea Watch’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 17 February. Turkish Daily News (2004), ‘Armenia Cautious on Trilateral Meeting with Turkey, Azerbaijan’, 21 April. Turkish Daily News (2005), ‘Foreign Minister Gul: 40,000 Armenians living in Istanbul’, 3 March. Winrow, G. (2000), Turkey and the Caucasus: Domestic Interests and Security Concerns (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs). Zaitseva, L. (2002), ‘Illicit Trafficking in the Southern Tier and Turkey since 1999: A Shift from Europe’, The Nonproliferation Review 9: 3.

Table 8.1 Turkey’s Trade with Selected States (million $)

Armenia

Bulgaria Georgia Moldova Romania Russian Fed. Ukraine

1996

1998

2000

2002

2003

2004

2005

239.9 39.2 156.9 362.8 110.3 32.5 14.4 14.5 314.0 441.3 1,511.6 1,921.1 267.5 761.7

327.2 50.3 213.3 367.4 164.1 91.0 27.7 11.8 468.2 344.7 1,347.8 2,155.0 274.3 988.8

230.4 95.6 252.9 465.4 131.8 155.3 26.2 7.0 325.8 673.9 643.9 3,886.6 258.1 981.6

231.4 64.6 380.3 508.4 103.2 137.9 40.0 20.7 566.5 661.8 1,172.0 3,891.7 313.3 991.1

315.5 122.6 621.7 689.5 155.1 273.9 46.8 10.7 873.3 956.0 1,367.6 5,451.3 465.0 1,331.5

403.9 135.6 894.3 959.5 199.7 306.7 66.4 27.1 1,235.4 1,699.6 1,859.2 9,033.1 575.8 2,509.4

0.4 525.7 271.9 1,178.5 1,189.1 271.4 301.5 80.8 31.4 1,783.6 2,280.6 2,374.4 12,856.8 817.9 2,632.4

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Azerbaijan

Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp.

Source: State Institute of Statistics of Turkey [website], and , accessed 2 April 2006.

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Table 8.2 Turkey’s Investment and Contracting Work in Selected States as of 2005 (figures approx.) Value of investments ($ mill) Azerbaijan Bulgaria Georgia Moldova Romania Russian Fed. Ukraine

1,500 150 125 40 400 1,500 100

Projects undertaken 126 N/A 19 10 43 813 48

Value of projects ($ mill) 1,380 N/A 260 45 943 14,000 815

Source: Foreign Economic Relations Board of Turkey (2005), ‘Turkish Business in the BSEC Region: Direct Investments, Contracting Services, Prospects for Cooperation’ (Istanbul).

Chapter 9

Twenty First Century Energy Security Debates: Opportunities and Constraints for Turkey Ibrahim Mazlum

The 1970s were important years in terms of energy security debates. The main event of that period, focusing the international community’s attention on their vulnerability to energy supplies interruptions, was the 1973 oil crisis which occurred as a result of the embargo by OPEC’s Arab members during the Yom Kippur War. The crisis led the embargoed countries to question their heavy dependence on external energy resources, and then, to securitize the energy issue. To use Buzan et. al.’s terms (see Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998, 24–25), they regarded the situation as ‘requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure’. The energy security issue was also easily linked with other issues in the Cold War years. For instance, the Carter Doctrine of 1980, declaring the US policy to protect Persian Gulf oil as a result of the threat perceived during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, was one of the outcomes of this security understanding. This policy, along with the Reagan Corollary to the Carter Doctrine has been part of US policy ‘ever since’ (see Klare 2004, 6). The issue of accessing sufficient oil at reasonable prices dominated the energy security debates for a long time. Similar discussions ensued with regard to natural gas as its consumption rose throughout the world in the 1990s and 2000s. According to the figures, the world gas trade increased by 12 percent in 2000 alone (see Financial Times Energy 2001, 1), and it could increase by 100 percent by the end of the next decade. It is also a relatively durable energy resource, although environmentally not the best option, since 95 percent of the world’s natural gas still remains underground according to estimates (see National Intelligence Council 2000, 28). On the other hand, whereas oil is a fungible global energy resource, this is not the case with natural gas, which has a more regional nature because the options for its transportation to the markets are more limited than for oil. Although natural gas can be shipped as liquefied natural gas (LNG), the cost is very high compared to pipelines currently. Therefore, networks of natural gas pipelines have expanded significantly over the last two decades as the most common transportation mode. In this study, Turkey’s regional energy policies are analyzed from various perspectives. Assessed in geographical terms, Turkey’s location has given her the role

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of a bridge between Europe, Asia and the Middle East, which has sometimes been overexploited in political discourses since the end of the Cold War. On issues where geography is truly important, Turkey’s location has granted her some opportunities and imposed some constraints in the conduct of foreign policies. Within the frame of political discourses on Turkey’s role as a bridge has changed according to different events in various times, she seems a real geographical bridge for the transportation of the hydrocarbon energy resources of the Caspian/Central Asian and Middle Eastern regions to the West. This situation is usually described in terms of Turkey being an ‘energy hub’ or ‘energy corridor’ in the East–West direction. Recently, the North–South and South–North directions have been spoken about for transporting Russian natural gas to Israel, and Egyptian gas to the West. According to Turkish officials, the East– West energy corridor would make Turkey the fourth biggest artery of supply and distributor to the EU after Russia, Algeria and the North Sea region (for example, see BYEGM 2005). Some analysts argue that this could strengthen Turkey’s role as an influential actor in the region and as a candidate country in the European Union’s energy security policies (see Loskot 2005, 22; Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005). Turkey’s Domestic and Regional Energy Policies Turkey’s economy is recovering rapidly after the 2001 economic crisis, leading to an increase in the country’s energy needs. Turkey’s domestic energy policy is directed towards closing the gap between domestic energy production and demand since the latter is rising at a rate of 8 percent per year (see Demirbas 2002, 1878). Turkey’s total energy demand was 81 million tons of oil equivalent (mtoe) in 2003. According to estimates, it is expected to reach 154 mtoe by 2010, and 282 mtoe by 2020. These figures show that the country’s energy demand will almost double by 2010 and quadruple by 2025 (see Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005). On the other hand, Turkey is a net importer of hydrocarbon energy resources. Ninety two percent (28.3 million tons) of her annual oil consumption is imported, while 8 percent (2.4 million tons) is supplied from indigenous resources (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources 2006). However, the latter share is expected to decrease further, making Turkey almost completely dependent on imports from other suppliers (see Demirbas 2002, 1879). The major suppliers of crude oil to Turkey are Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, the UAE and Russia. The Caspian suppliers will also be on the list when the recently constructed Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline begins to pump oil regularly. The share of natural gas in Turkey’s energy portfolio is more striking since the consumption of natural gas is growing very quickly and is rapidly becoming a preferred primary energy source for two reasons: first, natural gas is less polluting than the other hydrocarbon resources, coal and oil; and second, Turkey is located near the huge gas reserves of the Caspian/Central Asia and the Middle East. The electricity production has the lion’s share of total gas demand with 65 percent, followed by the

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industrial (19 percent) and residential sectors (14 percent) (see Energy Information Administration 2005, 5). Turkey’s demand for gas is expected to increase to 54 billion cubic metres per year (bcm/yr) by 2010 and 81 bcm/yr by 2020. The total amount of natural gas contracts with supplier countries is expected to increase to 60 bcm/yr in 2010 (see Isik 2004, 7). However, as Winrow (2004, 28) states, many analysts believe that Turkey will not consume that amount even if the economic growth rate continues steadily (see also Energy Information Administration 2005, 5). Turkey’s Energy Relations with Supplier Countries By 2010, Turkey will import more than half (58 percent) of her total gas demand from Russia (Energy Information Administration 2005, 6) and Russia will be her main supplier for a considerable time due to long-term natural gas contracts signed at the end of the 1990s. The Russian gas flows from two separate pipelines, divided 27 percent from the Western Gas Transit Route via Ukraine, Moldova, Romania and Bulgaria, and 31 percent from the recently constructed $3.2 billion Blue Stream Pipeline. The Blue Stream Pipeline is a twin 1,213 km natural gas pipeline, running from Izobilnoye to Dzhugba on Russia’s Black Sea coast. It then passes under the Black Sea to the Turkish port of Samsun, ending at Ankara in Central Anatolia. The pipeline was completed in October 2002 and gas started to flow in February 2003.1 Shortly after the gas flows started, Turkey suspended imports from Blue Stream for six months to force Russia to reduce her prices. This had been on the agenda since Turkey’s Energy Minister Hilmi Guler’s announcement of a revision to the energy policy in April 2003 by advocating more reliance on cheaper and indigenous energy resources (coal, geothermal and hydropower). The high cost of natural gas imports was the main complaint since gas contracts signed with Russia and Iran included ‘take-or-pay’ provisions which were disadvantageous for Turkey. Gas imports resumed in August 2003, and then, in November 2003 Russia’s Gasprom announced that the dispute with Turkey had been resolved by agreeing on a competitive price for Blue Stream gas. Since that time, the high price of Russian gas has remained on the agenda. Recently, Hilmi Guler stated that after his party (the Justice and Development Party – AKP) came to power in November 2002, they saved $339 million as of November 2005 by bargaining with the Russians. He also argued that Turkey has gained 40 bcm in ‘take-or-pay’ provisions (see Sabah Daily 6 January 2006). ‘Take-or-pay’ provisions were also a factor in a number of Turkey’s plans to store excess gas in summer the months when demand is low. In furtherance of this aim, the Ministry of Energy has started a couple of projects for building storage facilities. The first one in the Marmara region (1.6 bcm) is about to finish and will be in operation by mid-2006. The second one, under the Salt Lake near Ankara (5 1 Although Turkey was receiving Russian natural gas flows since February 2003, the official opening ceremony of the Blue Stream Project was held on 17 November 2005.

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bcm), is in the contracting phase. These facilities are important not only for storing the pre-paid gas, but also for increasing energy security by reducing the vulnerability of the country to supply interruptions during gas crises such as the recent one that broke out between Russia and Ukraine in January 2006. Although Russian officials have assured Turkey that they will supply excess gas from Blue Stream in case of a decrease from the Western pipeline passing through Ukraine during the crisis, the country’s heavy dependence on Russia as an external supplier has created fears once more. Although the two pipelines could be used interchangeably as Russia has promised, this would not be the case in a direct political and economic crisis between Turkey and Russia. Turkish energy officials thus state that the interchangeable usage of the two pipelines is limited. Blue Stream supplies 6 bcm/yr of gas to Turkey currently. In case of an interruption in the Western pipeline, Blue Stream would only supply an extra 1–2 bcm unless additional compressors are installed to reach the full capacity of 16 bcm/yr. In order to diversify its suppliers beyond Russia, Turkey has signed various gas contracts with a number of countries. Iranian natural gas was received from the pipeline constructed between Tebriz and Erzurum in late December 2001 by signing a $30 billion, 25-year deal. Turkey is expected to import 10 bcm/yr of Iranian gas by 2007. This represents an economically sound alternative to Russia. However, it is doubtful that future Turkish demand will absorb this amount, again because of overcontracting. As occurred in the Blue Stream case, Turkey first suspended gas imports in June 2002 and then resumed those five months later after succeeding in reducing the price of gas and the ‘take-or-pay’ percentage (see Energy Information Administration 2005, 7). Meanwhile, Iran and Greece signed a memorandum for cooperation in natural gas transportation in March 2002. This may create the possibility of the re-sale of excess Iranian gas to Greece and other European countries and also of transportation of the Iranian gas to European markets as Winrow (2004, 30) argues. In addition to contracts concluded with Russia and Iran, Turkey also signed a 15-year natural gas contract with Azerbaijan in March 2001. The purchase is going to take place starting from 2006, beginning with 2 bcm/yr, rising to 6.6 bcm/yr in 2009. The construction of the pipeline between Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum began in 2004. Officially called the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP), the new pipeline will transport Shah Deniz I field’s natural gas. Despite previous doubts about the feasibility of the project due to lack of gas demand in Turkey, Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, stated in February 2006 that Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia plan to open the pipeline by the end of 2006 (see Alexander’s Gas and Oil Connections 2006). Turkey’s Regional Projects Turkey may transfer non-consumed amounts of Azerbaijani gas to European countries (see Winrow 2004, 31) through the 3,400 km Nabucco Project, which is in the feasibility stage. The maximum capacity of the pipeline is projected

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to be 25 bcm/yr and it is expected to cost around 4.4 billion Euros, which is considered cost competitive by partners of the project in comparison with other new projects (see Roberts 2004, 10). It was planned by the project to deliver Caspian and Middle Eastern natural gas to European markets, including Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Austria. This is expected to increase the EU’s energy security by diversifying its supplies besides Russia. To further this aim, the Nabucco Company Pipeline Study GMBH was set up in mid-2004 by the gas companies from Turkey, Austria, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria, each of which holds an equal stake. After the recent Russian–Ukrainian gas crisis, the European Commission agreed to start the project in 2011 (see AB Haber 2006). The Turkey–Greece natural gas pipeline project is another venture to realize Turkey’s aim of reaching the European markets by interconnecting the natural gas grids of Turkey and Greece and establishing a Southern European Gas Ring. After completion of feasibility studies, a natural gas contract was signed between the two countries in December 2003. The pipeline is among the priority projects of the EU TEN programme. The first part of the project, a 300 km pipeline from Karacabey to Komotimi, is expected to be completed in 2006. The feasibility studies continue for the second part, which is an extension of the Turkish–Greek pipeline by a 280 km pipeline between Otranto and Stavrilimenas. The initial delivery of the pipeline will 0.75 bcm/yr. After the extension of the pipeline to Italy, it is expected to transport 11 bcm/yr gas to Greece and Italy. Three bcm/yr of that amount is to be delivered to Greece and the remaining 8 bcm/yr to Italy (see BOTAS 2006). As result of its efforts to transport Middle Eastern gas in the South–North direction, Turkey signed a contract with Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Romania to tap Egyptian natural gas for the Turkish and European markets. It was agreed in principle to construct a pipeline with a capacity of 10 bcm/yr and the Egyptian natural gas is expected to be delivered to Turkey at the beginning of 2008 (see Hurriyet Daily 20 March 2006). However, the realization of Turkey’s transit projects not only depends on Ankara’s success in pursuing effective policies in the region, but also the priorities and policies of the other major international and regional actors. Main Energy Actors in the Caspian/Central Asia Region Some analysts have been calling the political and economic struggle over the Caspian Basin and Central Asia the ‘Second Great Game’. As Sasley (2002, 287) argues, although this description may be ‘too ambitious’ since the landscape of world politics in the twentieth and twenty first centuries changed significantly, it is also true that the disintegration of the Soviet Union has given rise to political and economic struggles for the control of the Caspian Basin and Central Asia. The region’s untapped energy resources have attracted the major regional and international actors, primarily the United States, Russia, the EU, Iran and China, as well as Turkey.

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US Policies in the Region The United States perceived the Caspian Basin, Central Asia and Persian Gulf as the geographies in which ‘US vital interests to be dealt with in the language of geopolitics’ in the post-Cold War world (see Foster 2006). Therefore, Russia, Iran and China were seen as potential rivals extending their geopolitical influence into the energy-rich region. The US first sought access to Caspian oil supplies during the Clinton administration. Since the Caspian Basin is landlocked, oil and natural gas from the region should be transported to the world markets by pipelines. However, the Clinton administration was reluctant to see the Caspian oil flow through Russia and Iran because of the fear of Russian control over Western energy supplies and Iran’s efforts in pursuing a nuclear armament programme (see Klare 2004, 8). In conformity with this idea, one of the top foreign policy priorities of the Clinton administration was to give strong support to the building of a pipeline to transport oil from Baku on the Caspian Sea to the Turkish port of Ceyhan. When coupled with the Clinton administration’s considerations about underpinning those states’ dependence by creating new lines of transport and Turkey’s advantageous position as a NATO member in having a pipeline running through her territory (see Kober 2001, 103), the geopolitical considerations took precedence over economic considerations (see Winrow 2002, 167). As a result, the US gave her support to Turkey in the building of the new oil pipeline although it was economically disadvantageous over the Iranian alternative (see Oktav 2005, 26). The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, officially opened on 25 May 2005, is 1,774 km long and runs from Sangachal, Baku in the Caspian Sea to Ceyhan on the southern Mediterranean coast of Turkey. It is the second longest pipeline in the world. When operating at normal capacity in 2009, it will transport one million barrels per day (50 million tons/yr) and will supply approximately 1 percent of global demand. In March 2005, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan agreed to build a pipeline through the Caspian Sea connecting the Kashagan offshore oilfields near Aktau and Baku. This is expected to increase the amount of oil flowing through the BTC by 600,000 barrels per day and is regarded as being of the utmost importance by Kazakhstan since Astana expects to increase its production considerably by 2010 (see Kommersant Daily 25 May 2005). Even with the flow of projected Kashagan oil, however the BTC will not prove to be an alternative supply route to the Middle East. Therefore, it may not have a major impact on the diversification of oil supply for the West, although the US Secretary of Energy, Samuel Bodman, described the day that oil first pumped through the pipeline as ‘the day which is going to change the world’ (see Sabah Daily 25 May 2005). Instead, it is more of a strategic reserve, although some analysts, like Brenda Shaffer, argue ‘in today’s markets, even a small amount can have a big impact on prices’ (Schleifer 2005). The importance of the BTC lies more in its potential to provide political and economic stability through cooperation among the parties. Apart from its potential political and economic effects, the BTC is also important since it will reduce the environmental risks of the oil traffic going on in the Bosphorus. It is a difficult water passage to navigate safely for large oil

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tankers. After the collision of two vessels, which caused deaths and oil spill over the Bosphorus, Turkey introduced a new Safety of Passage Act in November 1994 and imposed some limitations on the passage of tankers carrying oil and hazardous substances through the Turkish Straits. This led Turkish officials to push strongly for the construction of the BTC by arguing that the Turkish Straits cannot be considered as crude oil pipelines (see Turkish Daily News 27 November 1997). During the Bush administration, the efforts to diversify US sources of imported energy were accelerated (see Klare 2004, 7). Indeed, the Bush administration perceived continuous access to oil resources as a national security issue. For instance, the National Energy Policy (NEP) designed by the Bush administration in May 2001 stipulated that the Persian Gulf region will remain vital to US national interests (see US National Energy Policy Development Group 2001). President Bush declared on 17 May 2001 during his speech to unveil the National Energy Policy that overdependence on any foreign source of energy leaves the United States ‘vulnerable to price shocks, supply interruptions, and in the worst case, blackmail’ (see CNN International 17 May 2001). The National Energy Policy calls for US efforts to strengthen trade alliances, work for greater oil production and facilitate the flow of needed investment and technology in a number of non-Gulf areas including the Caspian Basin (see US National Energy Policy Development Group 2001). Therefore, it can be contended that one of the major factors in shaping American foreign policy towards the Caucasus and Central Asia in the coming years will be US energy needs. Although the Clinton administration’s Caspian and Central Asian policies had been restricted to economic and diplomatic means, the Bush administration has also leant on military policies since 11 September 2001 and established military bases in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. US combat troops were deployed in the region during the intervention in Afghanistan. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s stance was supportive of the Bush administration as exemplified by the US being granted access to Russian airspace for humanitarian aims during the strikes in Afghanistan and also Russia’s benign tone towards the US when setting up bases in Central Asia. However, there has been growing concern among some Russian officials that Putin has allowed the US to gain too much influence in the region, and such influence could jeopardize Russia’s future security (see O’Hara 2004, 152). The reaction against the US may increase since the convergence of the US ‘war on terrorism’ and energy security – national security considerations may result in leading to a long-term US presence in the region (for a detailed analysis, see Jaffe and Soligo 2004, 255–68). Russia as the Dominant Actor in the Region As a ‘natural gas superpower’ (see Stulberg 2005, 13), Russia has attempted to recover its regional hegemony by pursuing more aggressive policies since the mid-1990s. Beginning with the former Russian President Boris Yeltsin and especially after the election of Vladimir Putin to the Russian presidency

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in March 2000, the Caspian region became one of Russia’s key foreign policy interests. While striving for economic and diplomatic influence in the region and lobbying on behalf of the Russian firms in joint energy projects on the one hand (see Stulberg 2005, 5–7), Russia proposed in January 2001 the formation of a Eurasian Gas Alliance by Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, on the other (see Bahgat 2002, 316). The tone of Russian diplomacy began to change after 2002. Putin concentrated on economic leverages again to increase Russian influence in the region. The change in Putin’s policies resulted in an Energy Dialogue with the United States in May 2002 aimed at promoting investment opportunities, joint development of oil and gas, modernization of the Russian oil sector and then possibly supplying the United States with Russian liquefied gas (see Stulberg 2005, 8–9). Although there are some doubts about its success in the long-term, ‘energy cooperation has become an integral part of the mutual security agenda’ for the first time (see Cohen 2002). Russia’s benign tone has also created new prospects for energy cooperation with Turkey. There have been recent developments in transporting Russian gas to third markets by extending the capacity of the Blue Stream Pipeline. Although currently, Russia does not leave Turkey the option to re-export the natural gas to European markets, Gasprom’s official, Tsigankov Stanislav Yevgenievich, recently stated that Turkey and Russia are discussing the option of transporting and comarketing Russian natural gas to Southeastern European markets and Israel via Turkey (see Sabah Daily 27 February 2006). It is reported that Russia intends to continue its gas imports to Italy and Greece through Turkey by bypassing Ukraine following the 2006 crisis. The project aims to transport 43 bcm/yr gas to those countries by laying a pipeline from Corum in Central Anatolia to Eskisehir in the west to connect Russian gas to the western grid (see Russia Online 26 February 2006). Iran’s Energy Policies in the Region The energy routes passing through Iran’s territory to world markets via the Persian Gulf have been long claimed by Iran as the shortest and therefore, economically most viable routes to transport the Caspian energy resources. However, the US opposes to the Iranian alternative because of concerns about Iran’s nuclear armament programme and Islamic radicalism. As a result of this policy, the US companies conducting business with Iran and non-US companies that have made large investments in the Iranian oil and gas sector are subject to sanctions under the US Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) of 1996 (see O’Hara 2004, 149–50). Although Iran is currently excluded from the Caspian projects, discussions have been conducted about a new pipeline to tap Iranian gas to India. However, the recent crisis between the United States and Iran on nuclear armament seems to have affected the realization of this project. During her visit to New Delhi in March 2006, the US

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Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, stated that India should not sign an agreement for the construction of the natural gas pipeline from Iran since the proposed project would ‘bolster Iran’s effort to accelerate the nuclear weapons program’ (see Middle East Newsline 20 March 2006). China as a Developing Economy The developing countries of the Asia–Pacific, especially China are manifesting an increasing appetite for energy to sustain their rapid development. According to estimates, if China’s energy consumption increases even to that of the lowest level of OECD-country, then it will be in need of two thirds of the entire world’s energy use today (see Conley and Phillips 2005, 108). Currently, coal has a major place (two thirds) in China’s energy portfolio, and natural gas has a minor share representing only 3 percent of total primary energy consumption in 2002. However, it is projected to increase at an annual rate of 7.8 percent (see Energy Information Administration 2005, 43). Therefore, Central Asia is a strategic region for China to meet the energy demands of her giant and energy-intensive economy. For this reason, Chinese companies have begun to invest in the oil and natural gas sectors in the region. Indeed, China has been strengthening her links in the region for a long time. In 1996, China acted as the leading actor in the realization of the Shanghai Five, including Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. After Uzbekistan joined the group in 2001, the forum renamed itself the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Considered as a means to counter growing US influence in the region, the SCO was turned into an international organization with a permanent secretariat in Beijing in June 2002. The SCO is also perceived by Beijing as an instrument to establish influence over Central Asia by promoting trade and Chinese investment in the region (see O’Hara 2004, 148). The European Union’s Energy Policies towards the Region The EU is of central importance to Turkey’s regional energy policies since it is one of the world’s largest energy consumers accounting for around 20 percent of global energy consumption. Its dependency on external energy supplies is around 50 percent currently, but it is estimated this will rise to 70 percent by 2030 (see European Commission 2000, 10). Hence, providing security for its external energy supplies is a crucially important strategic issue for the EU. A new energy policy to prevent a future energy supply crisis was formulated by the EU for the first time in its White Paper on Energy Policy issued in December 1995 (see Commission of the European Communities 1995). The diversification of energy supplies to ensure energy security was the first aspect of this policy with environmental protection and competitiveness of the energy markets being the other aspects laid out in the White Paper. After the White Paper, the European Commission published the Green Paper in 2000, which also underlined the need for diversification of energy supply routes

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and securing access to the energy resources of the Caspian region and North Africa (see European Commission 2000). The EU Commission’s report on the Green Paper published in 2005 suggested that the EU ‘must enter into strategic partnerships with major potential suppliers such as Russia and even far-off countries such as Iran’ (see European Commission 2005, 4). The EU Commission raised concerns about the physical and political risks linked to the transport of energy supply, especially of the gas sector (see European Union 2002, 14). Therefore, it is argued that Turkey is important for the EU in achieving long-term energy security by transporting energy resources from Azerbaijan, Iran, Egypt and Turkmenistan to Europe. It appears that the 2006 RussianUkrainian gas crisis raised the EU’s concerns once again about the diversification of energy supplies, which was recently outlined in the latest Green Paper of 8 March 2006. The paper argues in favour of establishing a ‘common external energy policy’, including deepening energy relations with major producers and consumers, a new strategic partnership with Russia, developing a pan-European Energy Community Treaty and a new Community mechanism to rapidly react to emergencies in external supplies (see European Commission 2006, 20). However, there are fears that some of the major states in the EU may continue to pursue their national energy policies, which would be detrimental to relations among the EU states. For example, the construction of a 1,200 km new Baltic gas pipeline connecting Russia and Germany under the Baltic Sea has already damaged German–Polish relations, with Warsaw arguing that it undermines the EU energy solidarity since it bypasses several countries in Central Europe and the Baltic region. Some analysts and politicians argue that the new pipeline is a ‘recipe for renewed threats, not only to Ukraine, but to the EU members like Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia and the three Baltic states’ (for example, see Tymoshenko 2006). Obviously, the policy of diversification of supply resources is not the only pillar of the EU energy policy. When taken on the basis of reducing the dependence on external energy supplies, the utilization of renewable energy resources is on the agenda as part of the overall EU energy policy. Although their share is limited in current energy portfolios, at around 6 percent including hydroelectricity, it is estimated this will increase gradually in the near future. The EU has set targets to meet 12 percent of its total energy consumption from renewable energy resources by 2010 (see Kuik 2003, 224). Also, relying more on renewable energy resources is one of the tools for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, in addition to increasing usage of cleaner gas technologies (see Beyli 2003, 363). The Kyoto Protocol of 1997 set the EU a target of reducing its greenhouse gas emissions by 8 percent beyond the 1990 base-level figures in the first commitment period of 2008–2012. However, the level of reduction reached was only around 1.7 percent below the 1990 baselevel, even excluding the 10 states which became members after 2004 (see European Environment Agency 2005, 5). This means the EU-15 should reduce their emissions 6.3 percent more to achieve the Kyoto targets. This may affect Turkey’s regional energy policies in a positive manner. Since the EU is increasingly relying on natural gas due to environmental considerations, it appears that Turkey has an increased chance to realize her aims.

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Conclusions The EU’s strengthening accent on the need to diversify its external energy sources provides an opportunity for Turkey to transport the East’s and South’s gas to the West. The 2006 Russian–Ukrainian gas crisis has given Turkey much leverage towards realizing her policies since the EU countries have begun to reconsider the feasibility of having such a dependence on Russia as a major supplier. Turkey’s candidacy for membership of the EU is another factor facilitating the realization of Turkey’s dreams. Turkey’s moves on energy appear to attract the EU since she is on the way to adapting to the EU’s standards and acquis. The more effort Turkey puts into her candidacy for the EU will lead to greater chance in being an energy corridor to the EU. Russia appears to be the most decisive factor after the EU in the realization of Turkey’s regional energy policies since she has considerable political and economic capability in the Caucasus/Central Asia region to shape the energy supply routes going to the Western markets. Therefore, seeking ways of cooperating with Russia would benefit Turkey in realizing her aims. Within these terms, Russia’s proposal to cooperate with Turkey in transporting her gas through the Blue Stream pipeline to the West and South appears to be an affirmative indicator of increasing ties between the two countries on the issue of energy. The level of stability in the Middle East is another factor affecting Turkey’s energy policies. The ongoing occupation of Iraq and the recent nuclear armament crisis between the US and Iran are the most important obstacles in establishing regionwide cooperation on energy. This is true especially for Iraq where the situation is worsening because of the increasing conflict among religious and ethnic groups. All in all, a simple prediction appears impossible on the future prospects of Turkey’s energy policies in the region considering the complexity of the issues in the region of which Turkey is a part. It is a multi-dimensional issue including geopolitical, geoeconomic and environmental considerations of the major actors and the shape that international and regional politics may take in the medium and long term. The definite one is that when recent developments are analyzed, it appears that favourable conditions have begun to emerge in recent years. References AB Haber (2006), ‘AB Enerji Kaynaklarini Cesitlendirecek’, 4 January [website], , accessed 14 January, 2006. Alexander’s Gas and Oil Connections (2006), ‘Turkey to Launch Baku-Erzurum Pipeline in 2006’ [website], 6 February, , accessed 8 February 2006. Bahgat, G. (2002), ‘Pipeline Diplomacy: The Geopolitics of the Caspian Sea Region’, International Studies Perspectives, 3. Beyli, A.V. (2003), ‘New Dimensions of Energy Security of the Enlarging EU and Their Impact on Relations with Russia’, European Integration, 25: 4, December.

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BOTAS (2006), ‘Turkiye-Yunanistan Dogal Gaz Boru Hatti Projesi’ [website], , accessed 25 March 2006. Buzan, B., Wæver O. and de Wilde, J. (1998), Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers). BYEGM (2005), ‘Basbakan Erdogan: ‘Mavi Akim Projesi, Birlikte Calismanin ve Guc Birliginin Eseridir’, TurkHaber [website], . CNN International (2001), ‘Transcript of Bush’s Energy Speech’, 17 May [website], , accessed 14 September 2005. Cohen, A. (2002), ‘After the Summit: US Focuses on Eurasian Energy Cooperation’, 6 July [website], , accessed 7 July 2005. Commission of the European Communities (1995), White Paper: An Energy Policy for the European Union, COM (95) 682 Final (Brussels: Commission of the European Communities). Conley, H. and Phillips, W. (2005), ‘Energy, Security, and Cooperation over the Next Quarter Century’, in Pirages, D. and Cousins, K. (eds), From Resource Scarcity to Ecological Security: Exploring New Limits to Growth (Cambridge: MIT Press). Demirbas, A. (2002), ‘Turkey Energy Overview Beginning in the Twenty-First Century’, Energy Conversation and Management, 43. Energy Information Administration (2005), Country Analysis Briefs: Turkey [website], , accessed 7 September 2005. Energy Information Administration (2005), International Energy Outlook 2005 (Washington: Energy Information Administration). European Commission (2000), Green Paper: Towards a European Strategy for the Security of Energy Supply, COM (2000) 769 Final (Brussels: European Commission). European Commission (2005), Report on the Green Paper on Energy: Four Years of European Initiatives (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities). European Commission (2006), Green Paper: A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy, COM (2006) 105 Final (Brussels: European Commission). European Environment Agency (2005), Greenhouse Gas Emission Trends and Projections in Europe 2005 (Copenhagen: EEA). European Union (2002), Energy: Let Us Overcome Our Dependence (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities). Financial Times Energy (2001), Gas Daily, 3 May. Foster, J.B. (2006), ‘The New Geopolitics of Empire’, Monthly Review 57: 8, January [website], , accessed 6 February 2006. Hurriyet Daily (2006), ‘Misir Dogalgazi 2008’de Turkiye’de’, 20 March.

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Isik, Y. (2004), ‘Turkey’s Energy Prospects in the EU-Turkey Context’, Centre for European Policy Studies EU-Turkey Working Papers, 9. Jaffe, A.M. and Soligo, R. (2004), ‘Re-evaluating US Strategic Priorities in the Caspian Region: Balancing Energy Resource Initiatives with Terrorism Containment’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 17: 2, July. Klare, M. (2004), ‘Bush-Cheney Energy Strategy: Procuring the Rest of the World’s Oil’, FPIF–Petropolitics Special Report, January [website], , accessed 14 September 2005. Kober, S. (2001), ‘The Great Game, Round II: Washington’s Misguided Support for the Baku-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline’, Insight Turkey, 3: 1, January–March. Kommersant Daily Newspaper (2005), ‘Revolutions in the Pipeline’, 25 May [website], , accessed 26 May 2005. Kuik, O. (2003), ‘Climate Change Policies, Energy Security and Carbon Dependency: Trade-offs for the European Union in the Longer Term’, International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, 3. Loskot, A. (2005), Turkey – An Energy Transit Corridor to the EU?, Warsaw: Center for Eastern Studies, January. Middle East Newsline (2006), ‘US Dismayed over Indian-Iran Gas Line’, 20 March [website], , accessed 21 March 2006. Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources (2006), [website], , accessed 18 February 2006. National Intelligence Council (2000), Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue about the Future with Nongovernment Experts (Washington: NIC). O’Hara, S.L. (2004), ‘Great Game or Grubby Game?: The Struggle for Control of the Caspian’, Geopolitics, 9: 1, Spring. Oktav, O.Z. (2005), ‘American Policies Towards the Caspian Sea and the BakuTbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline’, Perceptions, 10: 1, Spring. Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2005), ‘Turkey’s Energy Policy’ [http://www.mfa.gov.tr], accessed 4 June 2005. Roberts, J. (2004), ‘The Turkish Gate: Energy Transit and Security Issues’, Center for European Policy Studies EU-Turkey Working Papers, 11. Rusya Online (2006), ‘Guney Avrupa’ya Dogal Gaz Turkiye Uzerinden Gidecek’, 26 February [website], , accessed 2 March 2006. Sabah Daily (2005), ‘A.B.D. Enerji Bakani: Bugun Dunyayi Degistirecek Gun’, 25 May. Sabah Daily (2006), ‘Dogalgazda Avantaj Sagladik’, 6 January. Sabah Daily (2006), ‘Gaz Satisini Gorusuyoruz’, 27 February. Sasley, B. (2002), ‘Turkey’s Energy Politics’, in Rubin, B. and Kirisci, K. (eds), Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power (Istanbul: Bogazici Press). Schleifer, Y. (2005), ‘Pipeline Politics Give Turkey an Edge’, The Christian Science Monitor, 25 May [website], , accessed 4 June 2005.

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Stulberg, A.N. (2005), ‘Moving Beyond the Great Game: The Geoeconomics of Russia’s Influence in the Caspian Energy Bonanza’, Geopolitics, 10: 1, Spring. Turkish Daily News (1997), ‘Straits are Nor Crude Oil Pipeline’, 27 November. Tymoshenko, Y. (2006), ‘Ukraine’s Gas Settlement: The Wrong Solution’, Taipei Times [website], 9 January, , accessed 14 January 2006. US National Energy Policy Development Group (2001), National Energy Policy (Washington: NEPDG). Winrow G.M. (2002), ‘Orta Asya ve Trans-Kafkasya Politikasi’, in Makovsky, A. and Sayari, S. (eds), Turkiye’nin Yeni Dunyasi: Turk Dis Politikasinin Degisen Dinamikleri (Istanbul: Alfa Yayinlari). Winrow, G.M. (2004), ‘Turkey and East-West Gas Transportation Corridor’, Turkish Studies, 5: 2, Summer.

Chapter 10

Mediterranean Fault Line – The Future of Greece and Turkey H. Sonmez Atesoglu*

The maintenance of peace and stability in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean is an important goal for Greece and Turkey. Turks and Greeks alike recognize the potential economic and political benefits of enhanced peace and stability in the region. Major European states and the European Union desire peaceful relations between the two countries, one a member nation and the other aspiring full membership of the Union. A peaceful and stable relationship between these two NATO countries has long been an ongoing objective of the United States, the leader of NATO. This article discusses the potential for peace and stability between Greece and Turkey, between whom security concerns remain the main source of conflict in the 21st Century. A realist approach is adopted in assessing and interpreting relations between the two. This type of an analysis appears to be more fruitful since it emphasizes security considerations as the over-riding factor in determining international relations (see Nye Jr. 2003). The article starts with a discussion of the fundamental sources of conflict and specific issues between the two countries. It will be argued that there has been an increase in instability and the potential for war at the beginning of 21st Century. The developments that led to this increase, such as the shift in the balance of power in favour of Turkey, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the shift in the United States’ interests from Europe to the Middle East, and other important factors are discussed. Fundamental Sources of Instability In recent years there has been increasing cooperation between Greece and Turkey in many areas, of which certain developments stand out. Greece supported Turkey’s candidacy for European Union membership in 1999 whilst the current Turkish administration, led by Tayyip Erdogan and supported by the majority of Parliamentary representatives, has in recent years revealed a strong interest in improving and * I benefited from the comments of John J. Mearsheimer and Edward J. Erickson while writing this article; I would like to thank them. However, all views expressed and errors are my responsibility.

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enhancing Turkish-Greek relations. An important consequence of the improved relations has been the cancellation of the annual confrontational Greek and Turkish military exercises, which began in 2003 in the southeast Mediterranean. The above developments and other less significant cooperative and mutually accommodative events not mentioned here would suggest that the northeastern Mediterranean, the Aegean, and Thrace are becoming more peaceful than ever. It appears that peaceful relations between these neighbours are moving towards a further deepening and widening, brought about by the potential EU membership of Turkey and the northern (Turkish) part of Cyprus. These and other peaceful developments have led some commentators to announce the arrival of a détente between Greece and Turkey (see Lesser, Larrabee, Zanini, and Vlachos-Dengler 2001; Larrabee and Lesser 2003). But, underlying forces that determine international relations suggest a different and hazardous view. For its own security, the ascendant regional power, Turkey, believes it must control the Aegean and northeastern Mediterranean, including Cyprus whilst her powerful neighbour considers the Aegean and Cyprus to be part of Greece. The collusion of national interests along this security fault line in the Mediterranean is the fundamental source of security competition and conflict, and even perhaps of a war, between these countries. After the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the above source of potential conflict is further augmented by both countries’ need to influence the southern Balkans for their own security. Turkey needs to control the Aegean Sea for its security. Exports and imports crucial for Turkey’s expanding economy are ferried through the international sealanes in the Aegean and Turkey needs to insure that these sea-lanes are open at all times without restrictions or threats. Turkish politicians and security managers recognize the strategic importance of the Aegean Sea. Adversaries of Turkey can readily project force into the Anatoliaian hinterland from Cyprus, an island very close to her southern shores. Turkey is thus obliged to control the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus for its security. This strategic objective is also significant for the uninterrupted flow of trade using southern Turkish ports, which are becoming increasingly important for exporting Iraqi oil brought into the country from Turkey. The Caspian oil pipeline completed in May 2005 connects Baku-Tiblisi and the Turkish southern port of Ceyhan. Specific Issues There are several specific issues of conflict between the two states. First, there are Greek objections to the continued hold of Northern Cyprus by Turkish forces. Second, Greece is attempting to increase its territorial waters from six to twelve miles, and its air space from six to ten miles. Third, there are reports of military fortification of islands in eastern Aegean by Greece – contrary to the stipulations of the Lausanne Treaty, which determined the borders between the two countries after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Fourth, there have been occasional reports of oppression of the sizable Turkish minority in northern Greece (see Nation 1999; Wood 1998; Larrabee and Lesser 2003).

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There has been an intense security competition between the two countries since the 1950s, starting with the Greek insurgencies and independence activities in British-ruled Cyprus. The ongoing security competition was intensified by the Greek annexation movement in Cyprus who wanted to join mainland Greece, culminating in a war between Greece and Turkey in Cyprus in 1974 and the control of northern Cyprus by Turkey. With the exception of the early decades of the twentieth century, when the invading Greek army was defeated by Turkish forces and expelled from Asia Minor relations between these neighbours during the last decade have been more dangerous than ever before.1 The most serious recent confrontation, which stopped short of a war with the help of US political influence, was in 1996 over the sovereignty of two islets in the Aegean. Increased Instability At the beginning of the twenty-first century, there have been several developments which have led to increased instability and potential for conflict and war. Firstly, there has been a shift in the balance of power in favour of Turkey in recent decades.2 The economic and military power of Turkey has increased significantly both in absolute terms and, more importantly, relative to Greece. In the early 1920s, when the Turkish republic was established, her population was about three times larger than that of her western neighbour; by the year 2000, Turkey’s population had become approximately six times larger (see World Bank 2002a). The change in relative population advantage in favour of Turkey during the twentieth century was also matched by in increase in the relative size of each country’s GDP. In 2000, in Purchasing Power Parity basis, Turkish GDP was estimated to be nearly two and half times larger than that of her neighbour. The rise in Turkey’s latent power in comparison with Greece during the twentieth century has been coupled with a rise in her military power.3 For example, between 1992 and 2001, Turkey spent close to sixty-one billion dollars for defence, while Greek expenditure was about forty-one billion dollars.4 Another indication of this rise in Turkish military power is the quantity of weapons and ordnance the two 1 This was a remarkable achievement for Turkish forces, which were exhausted after enduring battles on several fronts. Operations conducted by Turkish forces during the First World War are discussed by Edward J. Erickson (see Erickson 2001). 2 Unless stated otherwise, e.g., economic power, the term ‘power’ throughout this article refers to military power (see Mearsheimer 2001, 55–82). 3 Per Capita GDP of Turkey is appreciably lower than that of Greece and Greece may be ahead of Turkey in terms of other measures of development. But, the size of the GDP, as a proxy for wealth, is the main determinant of latent power and thereby military power of a nation. Latent power is discussed by John J. Mearsheimer (see Mearseimer 2001). The source of GDP data is from World Development Indicators Database (see World Bank 2002b). 4 Figures are stated in 1998 prices and exchange rates in ‘Tables of NATO Military Expenditure by Category’ (see SIPRI Yearbook 2002).

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countries were able to import. Between 1996 and 2000, Greece’s defence imports were nearly four billion dollars while Turkey’s were closer to six billion (see The Economist 2002). There was also a qualitative growth in Turkish military power that was not matched by Greece. Some examples of these developments include: the deployment of KC-135 tankers and Preveze type submarines with a capability of launching Harpoon missiles while submerged; an establishment of the capability of rapid air deployment of 50,000 soldiers; and development of a battle experienced leadership and Special Forces. Military cooperation with Israel, including the areas of military technology and intelligence, further enhanced Turkey’s military power (see Atesoglu 2001; Lesser 2000; Inbar 2003, Erickson 2004). Second, the collapse of the Soviet Union had a significant impact on the GreekTurkish balance of power; Turkey now has the ability to concentrate almost all its forces against Greece. As the Soviet Union is no longer the primary security concern of Turkey, ex-Soviet republics such as Albania, Bulgaria, Kosovo, Macedonia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan are now free to cooperate with Turkey, which no longer has a common border with Russia. Turkey has signed a security pact with Albania, relations between Bulgaria and Turkey have improved substantially, with a significant portion of the ethnic Turks expelled from Bulgaria in the 1980s having now returned to their country and a company of soldiers from Azerbaijan and Georgia serve as part of the Turkish peace-keeping battalion in Kosovo wearing Turkish Army uniforms and equipped with Turkish weapons. Turkish forces have rebuilt an air base in Georgia. Turkey trained military officers of Macedonia and Azerbaijan, as well as modernizing the Macedonian military and offering to provide it with several F-5 fighters. These cooperative relations, which have only been made possible since the collapse of the Soviet Union, now allows Turkey, if required, to readily allocate most of its forces in western Turkey. Third, Turkey has been successful in defusing and politically and geographically containing the PKK, a militant Kurdish organisation and is politically consolidating the containment of PKK by increasing the cultural and political freedom of ethnic Kurds in Turkey. Although occasional skirmishes remain between Turkish forces and the PKK in the southeast of the country, the political and geographic containment of the PKK was effectively concluded with the arrest of their leader by Turkish Special Forces in Africa. The war against the PKK has been costly, but helped Turkish forces acquire both valuable battle experience and joint operation experience, as well as experience in conducting operations beyond the Republic’s domestic borders. Fourth, the United States is less likely to interfere on behalf of Greece in case of a conflict between these countries. In recent years, and especially after September 11, there has been a shift in United States security interests from Europe to the larger Middle East (encompassing countries from Afghanistan to Turkey). This has led to an increase in the strategic importance of Turkey for the United States – the only nation with effective power to influence both countries. Greece can no longer take for granted the counter balancing role of the United States, in a Greek-Turkish conflict, a structural change which enhances Turkish power in relation to Greece.

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In coping with potential security threats that may originate from Iran, Iraq and Syria, the shift in US interests from Europe to the Middle East has been instrumental for Turkey. After September 11, Turkey can count on effective and timely United States help in diffusing these threats. The leadership of the United States in confronting and containing Turkey’s southeastern neighbours should enable Turkey to economize in the allocation of security resources against the aforementioned countries, a development which in turn would enable Turkey to allocate more military assets against Greece. The friction caused by the US invasion of Iraq and, in particular, the Turkish refusal to allow the United States army to attack Iraq from home soil, has been diffused (see Park 2003). In response to the United States request Turkey, with the approval of parliament, agreed to provide troops to stabilize Iraq. The Turkish contribution, which did not materialize because of opposition from the Iraqi Governing Council, was expected to be a division consisting of two expanded brigades, which would have made Turkish forces the third largest military force in the country after those of Britain and the United States (see Hurriyet 2003, Aksam 2003). In addition to above developments, Turkey has provided Afghanistan with military assets and had the command of NATO forces there. More recent examples of improved relations between Turkey and the US include Turkey granting the US use of the Incirlik Air Base and the Iskenderun deep seaport for logistical purposes, and US agreement to the modernization of Turkish F-16 aircraft by Lockheed-Martin. Conclusion The Turkish hold on Northern Cyprus, her success in preventing the deployment of Russian-built S-300 missiles in Cyprus, her resolve in not allowing Greece to raise its territorial water rights to twelve miles from its current six miles, and the continuation of patrols, despite Greek objections, by the Turkish Air Force in the Aegean in areas considered international air space are all unmistakeable manifestations of the rise of Turkish power in comparison with her western neighbour (see Financial Times 2003, and Kathimerini, 2005, 2006). Greek policy makers recognize this rise in power and are attempting a balancing act by shifting the onus onto the Europeans. The best example of this strategy is the Greek objection to Turkish to participation in the management of the European Defence Force. At the grand strategic level, the Greeks, in supporting the Turkish candidacy for European Union membership, are trying to Europeanise security issues originating from the Mediterranean fault line (see Lesser, Larrabee, Zanini, and Vlachos-Dengler 2001). Turkey’s desire to be a full member of the European Union will limit her propensity to use the covert or actual military force and impel her to use a more cautious approach in managing security issues with Greece. However, if there is a war between Turkey and Greece, it is difficult to imagine European militarily involvement. Germany, for example, with more than two million ethnic Turks, would hesitate in deploying troops to participate against Turkish forces to resolve such a conflict. It should also be noted that British forces

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remained in their bases during the Turkish intervention in Cyprus in 1974. It appears that the security competition between Greece and Turkey, which would only be resolved by the two countries themselves should military conflict arise, is set to continue and the instability brought about by the Mediterranean fault line will be further amplified as Turkey’s economic and military power, in line with trends established in recent decades, continues to expand. For the maintenance of peace between the two countries, it would be prudent for the Greeks, whose official position has for a long time been one of denying the existence of any issues other than the delineation of the continental shelf, to recognize that there are issues between Greece and Turkey concerning the Aegean.5 The Greeks need to adopt a realistic approach to resolve the Cyprus issue and also need to recognize both the increase in Turkish power and the fact that a weak military arrangement that will leave Turkey strategically vulnerable in Cyprus, similar to the security arrangement before 1974, will not be acceptable to Turks at this time. Potential European Union membership, although considered an elusive aspiration by some Turks, appears to be a powerful attractor some in Turkey to take a more accommodating and compromising approach in resolving the Cyprus problem and other issues between the two countries.6 Recent examples of this development are Mr. Erdogan’s announcement in a 2004 Harvard University speech that Turkey can agree to give some land in Northern Cyprus to the Greeks in order to achieve a solution to the Cyprus issue (see Milliyet 2004), the Erdogan government’s support of the United Nations’ Annan plan for the unification of Cyprus, and Mr. Erdogan’s state visit to Greece in May 2004. Despite the growing disparity of power between the two countries, the potential economic and political benefits of Turkish European Union membership for both sides may persuade them to find lasting solutions to issues which not only bring about intense security competition but could also ultimately trigger a military conflagration. However, recent developments suggest these solutions are far from materialising. A lasting settlement in Cyprus remains remote, whilst in 2005, a crisis which almost led to war in 1996 was again ignited. In the skies over the Aegean, confrontations between Turkish and Greek air forces, which occurred on an almost daily basis in 2005, continue in 2006 despite an agreement reached between Greek and Turkish foreign ministers in 2005 establishing a hot line between their respective air force command centres in Larissa and Eskisehir (see Kathimerini, 2005). The security competition between Greece and Turkey remains intense. 5 Policy makers in Greece should recognize that the relative cost of projection of force for Turkey is lower today than it was in 1974. How differential growth in power changes the incentives for a nation to alter international order is discussed by Robert Gilpin (see Gilpin 1981, 95). 6 For example Erol Manisali is identifed as the leading Eurosceptic in Turkey by Mango (2002).

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References ‘Aerial Skirmishing Overshadows EU Summit’, Financial Times, June 17 2003. Aksam, August 22, 2003. Atesoglu, H.S. (2001), ‘Turkish National Security Strategy and Military Modernization’, Strategic Review, Winter. ‘Charlemagne, What Common Foreign Policy’, The Economist, September 21, 2002. Erickson, E.J. (2001), Ordered to Die, A History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War, Westport: Greenwood Press. Erickson, E.J. (2004), ‘Turkey as Regional Hegemon – 2014: Strategic Implications for the United States’, Turkish Studies, vol. 5, no. 3. Gilpin, R. (1981), War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Hurriyet, August 17, 2003. Inbar, E. (2003), ‘The Israeli-Turkish Strategic Partnership’, Middle East Security and Policy Studies, no. 53, The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel. Kathimerini, April, 13, 2004 [website], . Kathimerini, February, 2, 2006 [website], . Larrabee, F.S. and Lesser, I.O. (2003), Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty (RAND). Lesser, I.O. (2000), NATO Looks South (RAND). Lesser, I.O., Larrabee, F.S., Zanini, M. and Vlachos-Dengler, K. (2001), Greece’s New Geopolitics (RAND). Mango, A. (2002) ‘Turkey: A Move to the South Atlantic?’, Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 38, no. 1. Mearsheimer, J.J. (2001), The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York: W.W. Norton. MFA (2005), ‘Unilateral Turkish Claims in the Aegean’, Hellenic Republic [website], accessed October 2005. Milliyet, January 31, 2004. Nation, R.C. (1999), ‘Greek-Turkish Rivalry and the Mediterranean Security Dilemma’, in Mediterranean Security into the Coming Millennium, Blank, S.J. (ed.) (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College) [website], , accessed October 2005. Nye Jr,. J.S. (2003), Understanding International Conflicts, 4th edition, Longman, New York. Park, B. (2003), ‘Strategic Location, Political Dislocation: Turkey, the United States, and Northern Iraq’, Middle East Review of International Affairs, vol. 7, no. 2.

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SIPRI Yearbook (2002), ‘Appendix 6B, Tables of NATO Military Expenditure by Category’ [website], accessed in October 2005. ‘Transformed? A Survey of the Defence Industry’, The Economist, no. 120 (2002a). Wood, P.C. (1998), ‘Turkey: A Raising Regional Power? Relations with Europe and the Middle East, Old Dominion University’ [website], [webside] accessed in October 2005. World Bank (2002a), ‘Population 2000’, World Development Indicators Database. World Bank (2002b), ‘PPP GDP 2000’, World Development Indicators Database.

Chapter 11

Cycles of Transformation of the Cyprus Question Mustafa Turkes

The Cyprus question remains one of the most persistent of international problems and continues to hamper relations in the eastern Mediterranean to this day. The many initiatives which have been launched to resolve the issue have either resulted in total failure or have led to the context of the question being transformed. The objective of this paper is to identify continuities and changes in the Turkish and Greek strategies as well as to analyse the EU’s involvement as an actor and structure and to show cycles of transformation. With the failure of each initiative, the problems inherent in the Cyprus issue have multiplied. Here it is argued that the last EU initiative, the socalled Annan Plan, which was the EU’s hegemonic project, ended up with the same destiny and the current stage of negotiations on the issue have reached an impasse which has transformed and multiplied the problems in Cyprus. Continuity and Change in the Turkish and the Greek Strategies towards the Cyprus Question from 1960 to 1990 A brief background of the Cyprus question and the strategies adopted and implemented by the Greek (in association with Greece) and Turkish (in association with Turkey) Cypriots from 1960 onwards is needed to discern the continuities and changes in these strategies and to see how the Cyprus question is continually in a state of transformation. This may provide a better framework with which to analyse both the failure of the EU’s hegemonic project and the transformation of the problems. The origin of the Cyprus question goes as far back as 1878, when the British, in return for their support against Russian expansion, leased the island from the Ottomans, thereby establishing British hegemony in the Mediterranean basin (by the same token it may be stated that the Ottoman Empire had conquered the island in 1571 in order to establish its own supremacy in the same region) (see Turel 2002, 53–77; Tayfur 2002, 13–48). However, for the sake of brevity and clarity, it may be said that the actual Cyprus question appeared during the decolonisation process of the late 1950s. The 1959 and 1960 Treaties led to the recognition of the independence of the Republic of Cyprus from British colonial rule (see Sonyel 2003, 18). This settlement appears to have been satisfactory to the British as their presence on the island was

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secure with two military bases, and to a certain extent was also satisfactory to the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey since the 1960 Treaty established a power-sharing constitutional mechanism between Turkish and Greek Cypriots, with Turkey, along with the British and Greek governments, acting as guarantors. However, it appears that Greece and the Greek Cypriots did not find this settlement satisfactory since the 1960 Treaty did not provide them with the room to establish a unitary state. Being in a weakened position, the Greeks accepted the 1960 settlement, but would then embark upon a strategy of challenging this settlement on every possible occasion. I argue that from the very beginning to the present day, the Greek strategy has been based on two premises: one is to realise the abolition of the power-sharing constitutional mechanism between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots and the second, the deconstruction of the guarantee mechanism, both of which are embedded in the 1960 Treaty. The ultimate objective, which at times has included enosois (unification with Greece), has been the establishment of a single, unitary state on the island. Thus it is clear that the Greek Cypriots continuous pursuit of a strategy of challenging and attempting to revise the 1960 Treaty was implemented in order to replace the powersharing apparatus with a unified state. The Turkish strategy, on the other hand, has been based on two premises: to refuse any challenge to the power-sharing mechanism articulated in the 1960 Treaty and, if possible, to enhance the vested interests of the Turkish Cypriots within the framework of this power-sharing mechanism; the second was to prevent enosis (unification of Cyprus with Greece). It should be underlined that there is a clear link between the shifts in Greek policy and the responses given by Turkish governments. In other words, Turkish policies towards the Cyprus question have largely been formed in response to changes in Greek policy. The major shift in Greek policy took place in November 1963, with the Greek Cypriots unilaterally proposing amendments to thirteen articles of the 1960 Constitution (see Tayfur 2002, 34). Taking these articles altogether (see Sonyel 2003, 41), it is clear that the Greek Cypriots aimed at a deconstruction of the power-sharing mechanism enshrined in the 1960 Treaty, thereby reducing the rights and status of Turkish Cypriots from that of equal partners to that of a minority. When Turkey refused to accept such an amendment, EOKA, Greek paramilitary organization, launched its operation, killing many members of the Turkish community. In political terms, the Greek Cypriots tried to internationalise the problem, arguing that the 1960 Constitution was not functioning. From 1964 to 1974, the Greeks unilaterally shifted their policies, fluctuating between calls for a unitary state to one for enosis, with atrocities aimed at the Turkish Cypriots continually escalating. The international community did little to prevent these Greek atrocities and, in fact, can be said to have indirectly encouraged the Greek Cypriots’ unilateral change of the constitution. What is clear is that there is a clear continuity of the Greek strategy aimed at deconstructing the two fundamental provisions of the 1960 settlement, namely political equality between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the power-sharing mechanism and Turkey’s guarantor status. The choice between a unitary state model and enosis was a concern for Makarios, leader of the Greek community, and the

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Greek paramilitary organisation EOKA, neither of which made an acceptable offer to the Turkish Cypriots; as a result, the problem remained unsolved. As the Greeks unilaterally changed the 1960 constitution and carried out violent campaigns against the Turkish Cypriots, the Turkish government, in view of the fact that the international community seemed to be turning a blind eye to the unfolding events, had no option but to make use of its status as guarantor of the 1960 Treaty to bring an end to the atrocities and preserve the rights of the Turkish Cypriots. Thus, in 1974 the Turkish government decided to take military action (see Sonyel 2003, 346). The Cyprus issue was thus transformed once again. Following the Turkish military intervention of 1974, the Turkish Cypriots (in collaboration with the Republic of Turkey) increased their demands for political equality in any power-sharing mechanisms, ranging from the formation of a new partnership to a federation between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. The Greek Cypriots (with Greece’s backing) then turned to internationalisation of the Cyprus question, a strategy which had two objectives. The first was to show that Turkey was an occupying power, thus implying the international community had an obligation to apply pressure on Turkey to withdraw her forces from Northern Cyprus unconditionally; this would also have the effect of nullifying Turkey’s status as guarantor of the 1960 Treaty. The second was to achieve international recognition of the 1964 (but not 1960) Republic of Cyprus, thereby establishing a Greek-dominated unified state. The Greek Cypriots rejected the 1960 powersharing formula, as well as any form of federation or confederation (a confederation proposal was to be made by Turkey on 31 August 1998; see Hasguler 2002, 88). The Greek Cypriots’ demands were countenanced by the international community, which thus went on to give political support to the Greek Cypriots. The impact of this ill-founded international support for the Greek Cypriots was considerable and the Greek Cypriots were thus able to purposefully refrain from entering into negotiations with Turkish Cypriots. At times, it appeared the Greek Cypriot leader only expressed a willingness to negotiate in order to portray Rauf Denktas, the Turkish Cypriot leader, as an uncompromisingly difficult character, whilst Denktas continually argued that an enduring solution could only be possible when the Greek Cypriot leader recognised political equality between the two communities. The mistaken conviction that the Turkish side did not want to solve the problem and that Denktas was to blame for it was rapidly formed by the international community, an ill-founded conviction which helped consolidate the Greek Cypriots’ position, who were subsequently buoyed enough to reject any formula, demanding instead a unified Greek state within which Turkish Cypriots might be given minority, or, at best, citizenship, rights. The more the Greek Cypriots resisted a restoration or reconstruction of a powersharing mechanism based on political equality, the more the Turkish Cypriots increased their political demands for federation, which resulted in the declaration of an independent Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983, recognised only by Turkey (see Hasguler 2002, 258). The gap between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots had widened yet further.

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The basic assumption of the Turkish strategy from 1974 to 1983 was based on the premise that forcing the Greek Cypriots to sit at the table to discuss and obtain increased political equality for the Turkish Cypriots in a system of power-sharing was far better than minority status. The Greeks never intended to enter negotiations on such a formula, using delaying tactics and exploiting favourable international circumstances instead in an attempt to create a united Greek state within which the Turkish Cypriots would be given a minority status. It may be stated that the Turkish strategy was largely formed as a response to the Greek strategies of creating enosis (1967–1974) and, then, a united Greek state on the island. When the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was declared in 1983, it was stated that this would not prevent negotiations for a more acceptable solution. The objective of this was to provide a foundation with which the Turkish Cypriots would be able to conduct negotiations for equal representation and power-sharing on the island. This, however, did not fit into the Greek strategy of a unitary state model. What is clear is that the Cyprus question was first transformed by the Greeks in 1963 when they unilaterally amended the 1960 Constitution and carried out atrocities against the Turkish Cypriots. This left Turkey with no option but military intervention, thereby transforming the Cyprus question once more. The two sides increased their political demands, thus heightening the gap yet further, with one side demanding a unitary state and the other a return to a power-sharing mechanism in the form of federation. These two contested strategies resulted in a deliberately ambiguous status quo which was duly respected by both sides from 1975 through to 1990, without incident or violation. Despite the absence of any formal agreement or treaty, it can be said that this state of affairs was maintained as neither side was willing to compromise in their demands or objectives. The EU’s Internalisation of the Cyprus Question and the Formation of the EU’s Hegemonic Project The deliberately ambiguous status quo of 1975–1990 was to rapidly change once the EU, as a result of successful diplomatic manoeuvring by the Greeks within the context of EU enlargement, internalised the Cyprus question. The Greek government’s power of veto over the EU’s eastern enlargement would now be able to undermine this status quo and Greek policy makers now realised that they were able to link the Cyprus question to the EU’s eastern enlargement process. The Greek government categorically threatened to veto this process unless the Cyprus problem was given due attention by the European Union. While the Turkish governments kept arguing that the EU could not admit Cyprus to the union before the Cyprus question itself was solved, basing its argument on international law as well as the EU’s own criteria that border disputes should be settled before final accession, the Greek governments took a political stance and continually argued that there could be no eastern enlargement without the EU admitting Cyprus.

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Refuting its own principle, the EU internalised the Cyprus question, the EU Council responding favourably to the Greek Cypriots’ application. Thus, the Cyprus question, instead of being solved, was transformed for the third time, this time by the EU. The EU’s Tactical Retreat in the 1999 Helsinki Summit A careful study of the events, declarations, decisions and deals made by different circles in the EU suggest that the EU pursued a policy of tactical retreat in Helsinki (1999), finally leaving Turkey in a very difficult position in December 2004, in that Turkey was indirectly advised to accept an actual policy of retreat in Cyprus. Here, it may be said that there were a number of cycles of the transformation of the problems and a major transformation of the Cyprus question was the third, as noted above. In order to gain Greek consent for the eastern enlargement process, the EU made certain deals with Greece, notably allowing the Greek Cypriots to apply for EU membership in 1990, despite the presence of unresolved problems on the island. This was the first sign of Turkey being pushed into a corner. The Turkish governments, it appears, geared up their opposition to the positions taken by the EU and expressed their view that were the EU to admit Cyprus without solving the more fundamental issues first, then Turkey had recourse to a number of other options, including the annexation of Northern Cyprus. Such an increase of tension between Turkey and the EU turned into deadlock when the EU did fail to give a prospective date for Turkey’s candidateship at the 1997 Luxemburg Summit. As the core EU members did not wish to risk the eastern enlargement process, the Greek government was satisfied with the decision taken at the Luxembourg Summit, thus causing the Turkish government to suspend political dialogue with the EU for about two years. Rather than compromising with Turkey on issues such as lifting their economic embargo on Northern Cyprus, the EU relied more on political coercion, even threatening to exclude Turkey from the EU integration process. The Turkish government’s response of suspending political dialogue with the EU also meant that it would not engage in any negotiation with the EU over the Cyprus question. While the EU stepped up their internalising of the Cyprus question, Turkey continued to argue that the Cyprus question could only be solved within the framework of the UN. The deadlock was to be undone when the EU approached the Turkish government to persuade it to return to the negotiating table, signalling the beginning of the EU’s tactical retreat policy. The EU went beyond normal procedure, sending Javier Solana, high representative for the CFSP, and Gunter Verheugen, commissioner responsible for enlargement, to Ankara on the night of 10 December 1999 to hand over a letter signed by Paavo Lipponen, then term-president of the EU and Prime Minister of Finland, in which he tries to persuade Ecevit’s coalition government to resume political dialogue. Lipponen’s letter and Ecevit’s reply have thus far not been published in their entirety, though the contents of these letters were at the time partially publicised by the Greek and Turkish media with differing interpretations. While the Greek media

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publicised them to undermine their significance, the Turkish media placed emphasis on the words used by Lipponen as the term-president of the EU. Interestingly, EU officials did not put these official letters on the organisation’s website and Lipponen himself, rather unsurprisingly, remained silent about their meaning. It is therefore necessary to publish these letters in their entirety (see Lipponen Letter Appendix 1, and Ecevit’s Reply Appendix 2). A careful study of the contents of the two letters and of the Helsinki Summit decisions indicate that the EU pursued a policy of tactical retreat to bring the Turkish government to the negotiation table. The Lipponen letter says that the EU officially and unanimously made the decision ‘to confer upon Turkey the status of candidate state, on the same footing as any other candidate’ and that there would be no new criteria for Turkey. On the specific question of Cyprus issue, the letter states, ‘that the references to § 4 and 9a were not related to the criteria for accession but only to the political dialogue. The accession partnership will be drawn up on the basis of today’s Council decisions’. What is more, the letter further confirmed that, ‘concerning the accession of Cyprus, all relevant factors will be taken into account when the Council takes the decision’. Turkey’s strategy under Ecevit’s coalition government at the turning point of the Helsinki Summit of 1999 was based on the assumption that some compromise would be reached if Turkey were involved in the process of EU enlargement and the precondition for a compromise was the separation of the Cyprus question from Turkey’s application. Ecevit immediately replied in a letter dated 10 December 1999, stating, ‘I welcome the clarifications you have supplied to dispel any misunderstandings. Your letter constitutes an integral part of the acquis…’. Ecevit would then accept the invitation to join the working lunch in Helsinki the following day. Political dialogue was thus resumed. What is clear here is that Lipponen, as term-president of the EU, made three promises; first, that there would be no additional criteria for Turkey, second, that the Cyprus question would not be a factor in Turkey’s relations with the EU, and third, that all relevant factors would be taken into account before the final decision regarding Cyprus’ accession to the EU was made. This was the deal between the term-president and the Turkish government; however, soon after the Helsinki summit, the EU would treat this letter as though it did not exist and forgot the promises given to Turkey. According to Turkish officials, the Lipponen Letter is part of the EU acquis, but the letters were not even published on the EU’s website. I argue that this was the EU’s tactical retreat policy. In order to bring the Turkish government to the table for political dialogue, without which it might have looked at other options, the EU stepped back at the Helsinki summit with an official letter promising Turkey equal treatment and declaring that the Cyprus question would not be linked with her relations with the EU. As commented upon in the daily newspapers, there were two different views in the Ecevit coalition government: while Sukru Sina Gurel, Minister of State for Cyprus

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Affairs, argued that the Lipponen letter was not sufficient and instead of accepting the EU offer, Turkey should adopt an alternative strategy, though he did not clarify what this alternative strategy would be (except hinting at a possible annexation of Northern Cyprus if necessary); the other view was expressed by Mehmet Ali Irtemcelik, Minister of State for Human Rights and advisor to Vice Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz, who believed it would have been prudent for Turkey to accept the offer, seeing as the alternatives were far worse, with Turkish isolation being the possible consequence of failure to accept the offer. Ismail Cem, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey also advocated the latter view (see Cumhuriyet, 12, 13 December 1999). The subsequent events show that from the EU’s point of view, the tactical retreat policy was a success as the Ecevit government had entered into political dialogue, but with two conditions: first, the Cyprus question should not be a factor in Turkey’s application for EU membership and, a second, final decision on Cyprus’s application would only be given after all relevant factors were taken into account. At this stage, the Ecevit government’s strategy was, firstly, to separate the two issues and, if this policy failed, to link Cyprus’s EU application to Turkey’s own application for EU membership. Once Turkey returned to the table to resume political dialogue with the EU, with the assumption that the EU would keep its promises, the EU in turn geared up its commitment to the Cyprus question, forgetting the promises made in the Lipponen letter, bringing the EU back to its pre-Helsinki position. The result was a relocation of the Cyprus question: from being an issue to be dealt with within a UN framework to an internalisation of the Cyprus question by the EU, thereby receiving Turkey’s consent. This trend was accelerated as Turkey faced an economic crisis in 2001. The foreign policy design of the outgoing Ecevit government was radically revised by the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which won the November 2002 general election. The AKP government’s slogan on the Cyprus question was ‘no solution is not a solution’. A broader motto of the AKP’s foreign policy agenda, which was ‘zero problems with all neighbouring countries’, would reflect its more compromising tone. The Greek Cypriots interpreted this approach as a clear sign that the AKP government was ready to concede even more ground in the dispute and thus persisted in their refusal to negotiate with the Turkish Cypriots. The EU’s Hegemonic Project, AKP Government’s Stance and the Failure A member of the EU since 1981, successive Greek governments have refused to confront their outstanding problems with Turkey as a whole, choosing instead to deal with the individual problems in isolation by Europeanizing the issues selectively and separately, with the Cyprus question being the first and most significant. Determined to incorporate its periphery in Eastern Europe, it appears the EU made a deal with Greece: in return for Greece granting its assent to the eastern enlargement process, the EU would admit Cyprus to the Union, together with the other nine candidates. This was the hegemonic project of the EU.

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The EU hoped Turkey would be easily placated, that she would not resist the settling of the Cyprus question on terms favourable to the Greeks and that, as a by product, she would be restructured as the other candidate countries. Greece’s agenda-shaping role paved the way for an internalisation of the problems in the context of the EU. The subsequent events showed that the EU’s approach towards Turkey was to view the Turkish application for membership not as genuine integration but as a simple foreign policy matter. This is the point policymakers in Turkey failed to realise until late 2004. Turning to the AKP government’s foreign policy agenda, it can be seen that the founders of the AKP had been involved in anti-secular groups in domestic Turkish politics and were in a very delicate position. Acknowledging the fact that their collective rise to power was the result of the crisis of 2001 and the collapse of the centre-right political parties in the November 2002 election, the AKP government needed the firm backing of international structures. The USA gave its support on the premise that the AKP leadership would be supportive of US policies in the Middle East and that Turkey would provide a model of a moderate Muslim state for other Islamic regimes in the region. The EU supported the AKP government for the sake of its own hegemonic project in Cyprus. In short, the conjunctural overlapping interests of international structures and the AKP government’s Cyprus policy resulted in a ‘honeymoon’ atmosphere for about three years from 2003 to 2005. The AKP administration approached the EU with its foreign policy of ‘zero problems with all neighbouring countries’ and reached out to the Greek Cypriots to solve the Cyprus question. The AKP government, which was very helpful in implementing the EU’s hegemonic project, openly signalled that it would not continue with the previous foreign policy agenda of Ecevit’s coalition government, which was comprised of three options: ‘de-linking’ (of the Cyprus issue from Turkey’s EU application), ‘delay’ or, with the failure of either, a consideration of ‘other’ options. The AKP government from the beginning dropped the first and the third options and tried to focus on the second. When these efforts were ignored by the EU, the AKP administration, rather than searching for other options or recalling the contents of the Lipponen Letter, gave its consent to the EU’s hegemonic project and even went on to say that the AKP would be ‘one step further forward than the Greek Cypriots in solving the Cyprus question’. It appears that the AKP government wanted to show to the international community that it was not the Turkish but the Greek Cypriots who did not want to solve the problem. The foreign policy design of the AKP government was staunchly supported by EU officials, with the EU, Kofi Annan and the AKP government giving a clear message to the Turkish Cypriots that Denktas’ leadership in Northern Cyprus should be questioned (see Simsir 2003, 433) and, if possible, be replaced by Mehmet Ali Talat, leader of the opposition CTP (Republican Turkish Party). The financial crisis of 2001 in Turkey had a direct impact on the economy of Northern Cyprus and Turkish Cypriots, alarmed at the decline in their income and

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deterioration of economic circumstances, turned to the EU’s hegemonic project as a comprehensive and enduring solution to the Cyprus problem. There are certain turning points during which the EU redefined its hegemonic project. The first of these was the decision taken at the Helsinki Summit in 1999. The EU gave the impression that the two issues, Turkey’s membership and the Cyprus question, would separately be treated, while Turkish policy makers believed that by enhancing relations with the EU, a date for negotiations for full membership to start would be given. Soon after this tactical retreat, the EU started to link the two issues, ignoring the deal of ‘settlement first, membership next’. A careful examination of the EU’s Strategy Papers of 2003 and 2005 and the yearly Regular Reports show that no reference was made to the Lipponen Letter. The letter had given a guarantee to Bulent Ecevit, the then Prime Minister of Turkey, that the Cyprus issue would not be linked with Turkey’s accession to the EU. From 2003 onwards, the Commission, in the Strategy Paper and in Regular Reports gathered together under the title ‘Conclusions and Recommendations’, stated its hope for a re-united Cyprus joining the European Union on the basis of a comprehensive settlement. The burden of the solution was placed squarely on Turkey. The Commission went on to state that ‘the absence of a settlement could become a serious obstacle to Turkey’s EU aspirations’. While Turkey was given an obligation to solve the Cyprus question, Greek Cypriots were assured that the very same dispute would not form an obstacle on their way to membership of the Union. Coming as a surprise to many, Turkey was dismayed at the fact that the Commission had linked membership to a settlement of the Cyprus dispute. Aside from its hope to see a re-united Cyprus joining the Union on the basis of a comprehensive settlement, the Commission also revealed that it had urged all parties concerned, Turkey in particular, to lend full support to efforts to reach a comprehensive settlement. From 2003 onward, these statements had been combined and transformed into one somewhat galling but nonetheless predictable sentence: ‘the absence of a settlement could become a serious obstacle to Turkey’s EU aspirations.’ Analysing the content, style and assertiveness of the speeches and statements of the EU commissioners as well as the Strategy Papers and the Progress Reports, it is possible to argue that the Union decided to increase the pressure on Turkey in 2003, forcing her to make an actual retreat on the Cyprus question. This was a new phase in the ongoing Cyprus saga. The second of the significant turning points was the EU-backed Annan Plan, which was revised 5 times but essentially consisted of three parts. The first was recognition of a number of the Turkish Cypriots’ demands, deemed significant as there were references to power-sharing mechanisms, which had long been one of the community’s main objectives; however, it is clear that in the second part, the constitution, the rights mentioned are nullified. The third part is the maps. The problems associated with the ownership of estates in both parts of Cyprus had already been problematic and were further complicated by the proposal of the Annan Plan. According to one calculation, ten billion euros were needed to settle the property issues, which had not even been addressed in the proposed Annan Plan and

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which had not even been mentioned by the international community. It seems that the whole idea was based on the obsessive Anglo-Saxon belief that private property was the essence of the life. The style of diplomacy employed by the EU suggests that the AKP leadership was informed of the Annan Plan only after it had been drafted. An equally significant failure was the fact that EU officials, having assumed that the Greek Cypriots would readily accept the Plan, were already engaged in PR exercises in Northern Cyprus in an effort to ensure a positive vote in the referendum (24 April 2004). For this purpose, the EU extended twelve million Euros to three of the five municipalities in Northern Cyprus, giving a message to the remaining two municipalities that failure to fall in line would result in financial rewards being withheld. The EU as well as Turkish policymakers treated the Turkish Cypriots as instruments to be used in the realisation of foreign policy objectives. At the same time, the EU attempted to undermine and damage the political structure in Northern Cyprus, as well as coerce the political elite to bring down the TRNC. It is clear that the Turkish Cypriots were forced into a corner on the issue of whether to protect their semi-legal and quasiactual sovereignty rights or hand them over to the mercy of the Greek Cypriots – whom they had never wholeheartedly trusted anyway. In 2004 the EU, perhaps overconfidently, increased its pressure on the AKP government to bring their Cyprus policy in line with their own hegemonic project. Subsequent events clearly suggest that the AKP leadership did receive some verbal guarantee from EU officials and leading political actors regarding a lifting of the embargo on Northern Cyprus but there was no written form of this guarantee. It seems the AKP administration had not learnt any lessons from the episode of the Lipponen letter. Despite the lack of any written guarantee, the AKP leadership openly supported the Annan Plan, even though Denktas, then President of the TRNC, warned them that this support would undermine both Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots. The AKP government’s reaction to Denktas was in the spirit of ‘no solution is not a solution’ (see Simsir 2003, 115, 257). Interestingly, on 21 April 2004, the UK and United States drafted a resolution, to be presented to the UN Security Council, which aimed at establishing UNSIMIC (The United Nations Settlement Implementation Mission in Cyprus) on the island, which is, ultimately, a UN protectorate. What is more is that it proposed ‘the dissolution all Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot forces, including reserve units, and the removal of their arms from the island’ (S/2004/313, 21 April 2004, Part A (i)). With this draft resolution, the British, together with the US, tried to remove all other military forces from Cyprus, whilst at the same time, the British government had already reconsolidated its two sovereign military bases in Cyprus (see Protocol 3 of the Accession Treaty). The Russian Federation vetoed this draft proposal as it would have meant the removal of the Russian Federation from the Cyprus question, highlighting once more the importance of the island not only for Turkey and Greece but also for the British, the US, the Russian Federation and the EU. While Greek Cypriots reacted against this draft resolution and sent an envoy to encourage the Russian Federation to veto it, Abdullah Gul, Turkish Minister of

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Foreign Affairs, seemed to be unperturbed, even disinterested, by it, claiming it was ‘insignificant’ (see Cumhuriyet 22 April 2004) and perhaps predicting that it would in any case have been vetoed by the Russian Federation. The way in which the Annan Plan was put to a referendum was shameful as the authenticated version, the fifth, was only handed over to the parties concerned on 23 April 2004, one day before the referendum day (see UN 2004). Having decided to put the Annan Plan to a referendum in both southern and northern Cyprus for political reasons (namely, to show it possessed the capability of solving the Cyprus question and to restructure relations between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots), the EU sought legitimacy for its wish to see Southern Cyprus accepted into the EU without the more fundamental issues on the island being resolved first. Thus the problem was not solved but transformed once more. The outcome of the 24 April referendum proved a great failure, in the sense that the EU’s hegemonic project did not turn into a historic bloc, as the Greek Cypriots did not give their consent to the EU’s project. Sixty-five percent of Turkish Cypriots voted in favour whilst seventy-six percent of the Greek Cypriots voted against the Annan Plan. This result was read by Verheugen, chief architect of the EU’s Cyprus policy, who declared, ‘I have been deceived by Papadopoulos.’ Verheugen then argued that there was no return from the accession treaty signed between the southern Cypriots and the EU. Who deceived who is a matter of ethics, which is beyond the scope of this paper. Many unknown episodes remain concerning the deal between Verheugen and the Greek Cypriot leadership, which remains obscure; however, the EU and the Greek Cypriots seem to have overcome their difficulties due to the result of the referendum. Disappointed with the outcome, the AKP government tried to persuade its supporters that there was some success in the whole episode by arguing that Turkey, until then widely seen as culpable for the failure of the many attempts to solve the problems on the island, had now gained the sympathies and understanding of the international community, which now saw the Greek Cypriots as responsible for the intractable problems in Cyprus. Nonetheless, this buoyancy in Turkey lasted only one month. The EU took a decision immediately after the referendum to ease the embargo it had imposed on Northern Cyprus government, promising that direct trade between Northern Cyprus and the EU as well as promising 259 million euros to Northern Cyprus. After 1 May 2004, as a full member, the Greek Cypriots created obstacles to direct trade between Northern Cyprus and EU countries, and of the 259 million promised by the EU, only 139 million was granted, an amount which was not even free of Greek Cypriot control. Declaration versus Declaration and the Limbo The EU, assuming, somewhat presumptuously, that Turkey had no alternatives, increased its pressure on the AKP government, which brings us to the fourth significant turning point, the 17 December 2004 EU Brussels Summit decision. This time, the opening of negotiations with Turkey was linked to Turkey’s signing of the Additional Protocol to extend the Ankara Agreement to 10 new members,

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particularly to Southern Cyprus, while Turkey’s own quest for membership was defined as ‘an open-ended process, the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand’. However, it was stated that Turkey should be, ‘fully anchored in the European structures through the strongest possible bond’ (paragraph 23) and, ‘long transition periods, derogations, specific arrangements or permanent safeguard clauses, i.e., clauses which are permanently available as a basis for safeguard measures, may be considered.’ ‘Furthermore, the decision-taking process regarding the eventual establishment of freedom of movement of persons should allow for a maximum role of individual member states. Transitional arrangements or safeguards should be reviewed regarding their impact on competition or the functioning of the internal market’ (paragraph 19). All these meant that the EU had clearly returned to its pre-Helsinki position. On the 17th of December 2004, the AKP government, finding itself in a very embarrasing position, promised to sign the Additional Protocol in return for a date for accession talks to begin; the Protocol was duly signed on the 3rd of October 2005. The AKP government, however, seemingly wary of opening the way for legal recognition of the Republic of Cyprus, did not have the Protocol ratified by the Turkish Grand National Assembly, thus signalling the beginning of a war of nerves between the AKP administration and the EU. The AKP government issued its Cyprus declaration on the 29th of July 2005 (see appendix 3), which was followed by a counter declaration on the 21st of September 2005 by the European Community and its member states (see appendix 4). These two declarations, it may be stated, reflected the desire of the two parties to postpone the upcoming crisis. The EU wished to return to its pre-Helsinki position, with the difference that the EU, in contrast to the Turkish government, had by now consolidated its position. Moreover, the EU warned the Turkish government that it had until the end of 2006 to implement the Protocol. The current situation (May 2006) appears deadlocked in that the Turkish government would have been faced with a new set of problems had it implemented the Protocol and extended it to Southern Cyprus. Given the fact that the EU currently faces its own internal problems, it appears hesitant to take radical measures against Turkey. The question now is how long this impasse can be sustained. It remains to be seen whether the current situation will turn into a new status quo or a new cycle of crisis. Conclusion The conjunctural, overlapping policies of the EU and the AKP government have seemingly entered a new phase of mutual distrust, particularly for Turkish policy makers. There is a clear and growing disenchantment in Turkey, where even staunch supporters of the EU’s Cyprus policy have begun to question the way in which the issue has been tackled. Such a complex and, ultimately, injurious relationship between the EU and Turkey on the Cyprus question can no longer continue. The transformed elite in Northern Cyprus have also become aware of the fact that the Greek Cypriots’ negative position is not limited to Papadopoulos’ opposition but is

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shared by a very high percentage of people from all walks of life on the island and, in particular, among the younger generation of Greek Cypriots. It is clear that the Greek Cypriots will not accept any power-sharing mechanism or political equality of the Turkish Cypriots, but will look for a Greek-dominated unified state on the island instead. Establishment of such a state would lead to Turkish Cypriots becoming either a minority, or simply a large labour supply for the island. Not only did a high percentage of those in Southern Cyprus who voted in the referendum display a conviction that they would not accept anything but a unitary state, but the arrogant attitude of the Greek Cypriots reinforced this conviction, exemplified by the supposedly pro-unification AKEL refusing to even engage in talks with Talat, leader of the CTP and now president of TRNC, just before the referendum. The last general election in May 2006 in Southern Cyprus has further confirmed this conviction. EU policy makers have also realised that it is the Greek Cypriots who do not want to solve the Cyprus question. Even so, the EU now tends to base its argument on the so-called solidarity principle among EU members and this will either increase pressure on the Turkish government, assuming that Turkey has no alternative policy, or will postpone the Cyprus question until more favourable international circumstances emerge. The major problem for the EU now is how to stop Southern Cyprus from creating further significant problems. Over the last fifteen years, EU policy has encouraged the Greek Cypriots to take a firm stance in rejecting any solution except a Greek-dominated unitary state. The EU’s problem-solving capacity has been tested and ultimately proven to be a failure. The EU’s internalisation of the Cyprus question has transformed the problems, both in northern and southern Cyprus, with the Greek Cypriots now buoyant and the Turkish Cypriots disappointed, vulnerable and angry. Understandable but not acceptable is the fact that the EU’s failure is not discussed within the union itself. This failure has to be debated within the EU, or it will not be able to come to terms with its own weaknesses. Applying more pressure to Turkey in the name of the solidarity principle will only lead to further complications of the problems in Cyprus as well as in Turkey. The Cyprus question does not occupy a priority position on the agenda of core EU members such as Germany and France; the British government has already consolidated its legal position by registering sovereignty of its military bases in the island to the accession treaty of Republic of Cyprus. The Cyprus question is now a more significant issue, demanding the attention and energies of the major EU actors. As for Turkey, upon whom the majority of the problem areas and unsolved issues are now placed, questions remain. Can Turkey carry the whole burden and should she shoulder the entire burden in return for nothing? Can Verheugen and Erdogan, who both openly acknowledge they were deceived, persuade the public at large that the EU is a problem-solver? Can this style of diplomacy lead to an enduring solution in Cyprus? It seems unlikely. It is necessary to examine all the inclusive alternative strategies, ranging from a new partnership based on an equal power-

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sharing mechanism to reconsolidation of the TRNC; other options also have to be weighed up as contingency plans. If the Greek Cypriots are to be brought onto the right track, they must be made aware of the fact that the Turkish Cypriots have other options. If the EU is a civilian power, it should initiate a policy of demilitarisation of all the islands in the Mediterranean and Aegean seas. Convincing evidence for such a move would be the removal of British military bases from Cyprus. All in all, an enduring solution in Cyprus requires rationality, more sophisticated calculations and wisdom, all of which are lacking in the EU, in the British-US proposal and in the Greek Cypriots’ unitary state model. References Hasguler, M. and Inatci, U. (2003), Kibris’in Turuncusu (Anka Yayinlari: Istanbul). Hasguler, M. (2002), Kibris’ta Enosis ve Taksim Politikalarinin Sonu (Iletisim Yayinlari: Istanbul). Simsir, B.N. (2003), AB, AKP ve Kibris (Bilgi Yayinevi: Ankara). Sonyel, S.R. (2003), Cyprus The Destruction of A Republic and Its Aftermath (Cyrep: Lefkosa). Strategy Paper (2003) [website], , accessed 6 November 2003. Tayfur, M.F. (2002), ‘Akdeniz’de Bir Adanin Kalin Uclu Bir Kalemle Yazilmis Hikayesi: “Kibris”’, in Turel, O. (ed.). Turel, O. (ed.) (2002), Akdeniz’de Bir Ada (Imge Kitabevi: Ankara). Turel, O. (2002), ‘Dogu Akdeniz ve Kibris Uzerine Otuz Iki Paragraf, Tekmili Birden’, in Turel, O. (ed.). UN 2004 [website] , acceesed on 25 April 2004.

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Appendix 11.1: The Lipponen Letter 10. 12. 1999 Mr. Prime Minister, Today, the European Union has set out on a new course in its relations with the Republic of Turkey. I am very pleased to inform you officially on our unanimous decision to confer Turkey the status of candidate State, on the same footing as any other candidate. When, in the European Council, we discussed the draft conclusions annexed to this letter, I said, without been challenged, that in § 12 of the conclusions there was no new criteria added to those of Copenhagen and that the reference to § 4 and 9a was not in relation with the criteria for accession but only to the political dialogue. The accession partnership will be drawn up on the basis of today’s Council decisions. In § 4 the date of 2004 is not a deadline for the settlement of disputes through the ICJ but the date at which the European Council will review the situation relating to any outstanding dispute. Regarding Cyprus, a political settlement remains the aim of the EU. Concerning the accession of Cyprus, all relevant factors will be taken into account when the Council takes the decision. Paavo Lipponen In the light of this, I invite you with the other candidate States to our working lunch in Helsinki tomorrow.

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Appendix 11.2: Ecevit’s Reply 10 December 1999 Dear Mr. Prime Minister, I would like to acknowledge receipt of your kind letter of today providing clarifications on points contained in the Presidency Conclusions which have led to some misgivings on our part. I welcome the clarifications you have supplied to dispel any misunderstandings. Your letter constitutes an integral part of the acquis. It is against this background that I will set out the views of my government regarding the Presidency Conclusions in a statement that I intend to make later tonight. I will forward the text of this statement to you. Looking forward to meeting you in Helsinki, I remain, Yours sincerely, Bulent Ecevit

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Appendix 11.3: Declaration by Turkey on Cyprus, 29 July 2005 1. Turkey remains committed to finding a political settlement of the Cyprus issue and has clearly demonstrated its resolve in this regard. Accordingly, Turkey will continue to support the efforts of the UN Secretary-General towards achieving a comprehensive settlement which will lead to the establishment of a new bi-zonal partnership State. A just and lasting settlement would greatly contribute to peace, stability and harmonious relations in the region. 2. The Republic of Cyprus referred to in the Protocol is not the original partnership State established in 1960. 3. Turkey will thus continue to regard the Greek Cypriot authorities as exercising authority, control and jurisdiction only in the territory south of the buffer zone, as is currently the case, and as not representing the Turkish Cypriot people and will treat the acts performed by them accordingly. 4. Turkey declares that signature, ratification and implementation of this Protocol neither amount to any form of recognition of the Republic of Cyprus referred to in the Protocol; nor prejudice Turkey’s rights and obligations emanating from the Treaty of Guarantee, the Treaty of Alliance, and the Treaty of Establishment of 1960. 5. Turkey reaffirms that its existing relationship with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus remains unchanged by becoming a party to the Protocol. 6. Pending a comprehensive settlement, the position of Turkey on Cyprus will remain unchanged. Turkey expresses its readiness to establish relations with the new partnership State which will emerge following a comprehensive settlement in Cyprus.

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Appendix 11.4: Declaration by the European Community and Its Member States, 21 September 2005 1. The European Community and its Member States acknowledge the signature by Turkey of the Additional Protocol to the Agreement establishing an Association between the European Community and its Member States on the one part and Turkey on the other, in accordance with the conclusions of the European Council of December 2004. They regret that Turkey felt it necessary to make a declaration regarding the Republic of Cyprus at the time of signature. 2. The European Community and its Member States make clear that this declaration by Turkey is unilateral, does not form part of the Protocol and has no legal effect on Turkey’s obligations under the Protocol. 3. The European Community and its Member States expect full, non-discriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol, and the removal of all obstacles to the free movement of goods, including restrictions on means of transport. Turkey must apply the Protocol fully to all EU Member States. The EU will monitor this closely and evaluate full implementation in 2006. The European Community and its Member States stress that the opening of negotiations on the relevant chapters depends on Turkey’s implementation of its contractual obligations to all Member States. Failure to implement its obligations in full will affect the overall progress in the negotiations. 4. The European Community and its Member States recall that the Republic of Cyprus became a Member State of the European Union on 1st May 2004. They underline that they recognise only the Republic of Cyprus as a subject of international law. 5. Recognition of all Member States is a necessary component of the accession process. Accordingly, the EU underlines the importance it attaches to the normalisation of relations between Turkey and all EU Member States, as soon as possible. 6. The Council will ensure a follow-up on the progress made on all these issues in 2006. 7. In the context of this declaration, the European Community and its Member States agree on the importance of supporting the efforts of the UN Secretary General to bring about a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem in line with relevant UNSCRs and the principles on which the EU is founded, and that a just and lasting settlement will contribute to peace, stability and harmonious relations in the region.

Chapter 12

The New Security Environment and Turkey’s ISAF Experience Nursin Atesoglu Guney

The international community is currently facing two competing Western security agendas. There is a consensus between the two sides of the Atlantic that the Middle East is in need of a great transformation with both the US and the Europeans accepting that this is a source of new security threats in the twenty-first century. The two sides differ only over the means of fighting these new threats. The area of operation of these projects involves roughly the Middle East, North Africa and Asia. Thus, Turkey finds herself at the centre of this complex region. Today, Turkey’s and the West’s perceptions of the threats facing them generally coincide. Last year’s terrorist attacks in Istanbul, Madrid and London turned the world into the equivalent of a small village where one can find hardly any sanctuary. The changing conditions of security in the last couple of decades have moved Turkey and the two Wests closer to each other, but the rift in transatlantic relations that became evident in the last century has, at times, challenged Turkish foreign and security policy. Therefore, the future orientation of Western (US and European) strategies is expected to have a great impact on Turkey’s own foreign and security concerns. The logical means of fighting today’s security threats is by means of international cooperation. As a reliable and respected member of the international community since the end of the Cold War era, Turkey has continued to share the assets in her power with the West. In this regard, Turkey has taken part in many peace-keeping and humanitarian operations. But, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) experience was, of course, very important and unique in itself because it was realized in the midst of a transatlantic rift that became evident during the US-led war against Iraq. However, this situation did not stop Turkey from twice assuming the command of ISAF, which is known to be the most challenging peace-keeping operation that has been realized beyond NATO’s traditional area of operation. Thus, the contribution of Turkey to ISAF is the result of the convergence between Ankara’s and the West’s new strategic thinking. This chapter begins by examining the new security environment of the West and Turkey’s adaptation to it. This is followed by an examination of both the evolution of ISAF and Turkey’s role in it. In conclusion, Turkey’s possible contribution to the future of the West’s peace-keeping operations is evaluated.

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The New Security Environment and the West ‘The two very important events that the world community had witnessed at the turn of the century really affected the foundations of international relations, international organizations, as well as the strategies that dealt (till then) with the concepts of ‘threat’ and ‘security’’ (see SAREM 2004, 9–20). Since then, the international community has experienced a great transformation process. Firstly, the end of the Cold War created an opportunity to bring about a united and free Europe. But it has also brought new and unpredictable challenges like regional conflicts and civil wars. Secondly, the tragic events of 11 September, 2001 certainly marked an important turning point in the field of security. International organizations have inevitably found themselves responding to this radically changed environment. NATO members, starting from the 1990s onwards, have initiated a very important transformation process by adapting a new strategic concept as well as accepting new missions and capabilities. Simultaneously, the EU, in accepting a new Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and also initiating its enlargement process, tried to be an effective security actor (see Güney 2004, 17–20). In this new period, September 11 stood as the most crucial event that accelerated the two organizations’ (NATO’s and the EU’s) transformation processes. Furthermore, the 2004 terrorist attacks in Madrid and those in London in the summer of 2005 are expected to have a major impact on the evolution of current Western strategies. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, for a short period of time, transatlantic relations became closer then ever before. But later, as Ronald D. Asmus in his article ‘Rebuilding the Alliances’ in Foreign Affairs said, ‘the two sides lost themselves somewhere between Kabul and Baghdad’(see Asmus 2003, 1). Unsurprisingly, the US-led Iraq war caused great damage to relations between Washington and the Europeans. However, in 2006 the two sides of the Atlantic continue to share the same common security goals as evidence by the Bush Doctrine, the European Security Strategy document and NATO’s two strategic concepts. In these documents, ‘terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts and failed/failing states’ have been redefined as the new security threats of twenty-first century (see Guney 2004, 17–20). Today, the maintenance of stability in the immediate neighbourhood and beyond has gained importance in Western security agendas. However, the two sides of the Atlantic continue to disagree on how to confront the threats that they believe are emanating from the Middle East. For instance, in the European Security Strategy, the tools that the EU is inclined to use are called ‘pre-emptive’ engagement, which mainly involves the use of soft power whereas, during the implementation of the Bush Doctrine in Iraq, the international community witnessed the new use of US military power in the form of ‘pre-emptive’ strikes (see Spear 2003, 13). Furthermore, in the face of the new threats of this century, the Europeans are still insisting on favouring ‘multilateralism’ whereas the US administration, both before and since the Iraq war, have been attached to ‘unilateralism’(see Nye Jr. 2003, 63–4). This situation is still valid in 2006.

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Despite the US and the Europeans agreeing on the need for transformation the Middle East the two sides continue to pursue divergent foreign policies towards this region. For instance, finding a just and peaceful solution to the Israeli-Palestinian problem has first priority on the agenda of the European Common Foreign and Security Policies. According to European common wisdom, there is an urgent need to find a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict and to the problems of Iraq. Without solving these two problems, it is believed that stability in the Middle East, and beyond, cannot be guaranteed. As opposed to these European ‘multilateral’ policy preferences, the Bush administration today, both in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East, continues to operate along the parameters of the new American National Security Doctrine (see Solana 2003; White House 2006). In contrast, the US holds that stability in the Middle East cannot be established unless democracy, peace and freedom are guaranteed, leading to the US government making the ‘Greater Middle East Initiative’ (see White House 2003) public in 2004. After applying this strategy for about 15 to 25 years, Washington hopes to prevent the major threats currently emanating from the Middle East. This expectation of the US sounds optimistic but with today’s conditions this initiative seems rather difficult to achieve (see Bila 2004).1 Today, the instability in Iraq, the future of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the future of Afghanistan, and Iran and its armament programme, stand as imminent and challenging issues in this troubled region, and there is now an urgent need to find just, viable and durable solutions to these problems. The competing strategies of the West will be tested on these grounds. Turkey in the New Security Environment In the new security conditions of the post-Cold War era, Turkey has moved from the status of a flank country into a frontline one. Since then she has become open to the new hard and soft security threats. According to NATO’s MC-161 Document, ‘there are 16 regions which are determined by the Alliance as ‘unstable’ and ‘risky’ and unfortunately 13 of them are around Turkey. Similarly, the 16 potential crisis regions that are considered to be affecting European security by the EU are also in the vicinity of Turkey’ (see Mat 2003, 100). That is why Turkey and the surrounding neighbourhood have gained a critical place in the current security strategies of the West. 1 According to the Republican People’s Party’s (CHP) Deputy Chairman Onur Oymen, the initiative had certain shortcomings. For instance, (i) after the Iraq war anti-US feelings increased and thus the US has lost its credibility; (ii) it is impossible to restore democracy to the Muslim Middle Eastern countries without resorting to secularism. Also, it is a contradiction to accept both a religious state and democracy and in fact they cannot exist together; (iii) it is difficult to restore democracy from outside to those countries that have been ruled by totalitarian regimes for years. It would be healtier for regime change to be in accordance with countries own dynamics (see Bila, 2004).

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Turkey and the West today no longer face military threats of a conventional nature that were once both monolithic and visible. Instead, they are multi-dimensional and more dangerous (see MFA 2006). In this new security environment, both Turkey and the West have become obliged to take new measures. At present, the Western strategies have accepted ‘projecting stability’ as the first precondition of sustaining a stable and secure environment (see Scheffer 2005, 1–6). That is why both NATO and the EU have felt it necessary to introduce new initiatives like the new neighbourhood policy, Mediterranean Dialogue, and NATO’s Istanbul Initiative. Turkey, under the prevailing conditions of the 1990s decided to make important changes in her defence policy. The new threats to Ankara have been declared as weapons of mass destruction, religious fundamentalism, drugs, terrorism, political and economic instability and regional/ethnic conflicts (see Sheffer 2005, 38). In the wake of these threat perceptions, Ankara’s military strategy in the ‘2000 Defence White Paper of Turkey’ is redefined as deterrence, military contributions to crisis management and intervention, forward defence and collective security’ (see Sheffer 2005, 32). ‘Both of these ideas were then the extensions of the current NATO and American strategic vocabulary’ (see Sheffer 2005, 31). In order to meet the requirements of the new security environment, like other Western countries and leading international organizations (like NATO and the EU), Turkey has decided to upgrade her military capabilities. Ankara’s main objective behind this move was to maintain a realistic deterrence capability that aimed to provide the security of the homeland. For this reason, Turkey has embarked upon a new transformation process in her Armed Forces. These modernization efforts have certainly helped Turkey to become, more than ever, a net contributor to Western security in the field of peace-keeping operations. At the beginning of the 1990s, the Turkish General Staff, whose goal was to realize a Turkish Armed Forces transformation, consistent with the new Turkish defence policy, took very important measures. The new capabilities of the Turkish Military Forces were as follows: • • • • • •

50,000 strong rapid response force had been developed. 5-6 battalions were ready for immediate and long-range deployments. There was the capability to contribute simultaneously to four different contingencies for peace operations with the battalion sized units. A Turkish submarine could deployed over 15,000 miles. 12 home security battalions were now operational. Turkey hosted one of the NATO’s six high readiness deployable corps HQs (see Turkey and European Security Seminar 2004, 3–4).

The reforms initiated at the operational level in the Turkish military soon realized appropriate conditions of cooperation between Western and Turkish armies. At present, Turkey, with about 402,000 personnel has the second largest army in NATO after the US. In the last couple of decades Turkey’s Air Force (especially its inventory of F-16 fighters) has been upgraded and she now maintains the second

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largest air force in NATO. Similarly, Turkey has NATO’s second largest tank inventory, and is continuing to modernize her navy component consistent with the insecure environment (see Erickson 2004, 34). The reforms in the Turkish Armed Forces initiated in the last couple of decades, aimed to transform the Turkish military into a modern and smaller professional force, with higher deployability and fire-power. These reforms have enabled Turkey to contribute more to the internationally-led peace-keeping efforts begun in the 1990s and account for why Turkey, in her troubled region, has become a valuable partner in Western efforts to projecting stability. In the post-Cold War period, the Western perception of threats, in general, converged with those of Turkey. For this reason, Turkey’s geo-political and strategic importance counted most in the field of military cooperation between the two sides. Turkey’s location at the crossroads of the three continents, gives her strategic importance for the West. Likewise, Turkey is at the intersection of crucial maritime communication routes where the worldwide transportation goes through. Besides, 70 percent of the world’s known natural energy routes are situated around Turkey and this situation makes Ankara one of the most important routes for the transport of oil and natural gas from the Caucasus and the Central Asia to West (see Baynham 2003, 280–84). In the last couple of decades, Turkey has become a valuable asset in the humanitarian and peace-keeping operations of the leading international organizations. This is first of all due to Ankara’s well trained and experienced military forces, but the country’s culture and geographical location have also had an important impact. It is true that Turkey and the West are, in general, facing the same threats in this century. Therefore, the logical means of fighting these new threats is through international cooperation. So far, Turkey, being a reliable and respected member of the international community, continues to share all her assets with the Western community. Turkey has taken part in many peace-keeping and humanitarian operations2 but ISAF appears to be the 2 Starting from the 1990s onwards, Turkey has taken part in the following UN operations: UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG), between 1988–1991, with 10 personnel; UN Iraq-Kuwait Military Observer Group (UNIKOM), between 1991–2003, with 75 personnel; Operation ‘Sharp Guard’, aimed at monitoring the embargo of BosniaHerzegovina, between 1992–1996; with naval assets; Operation ‘Deny Flight’, aimed at implementing flight restrictions over Bosnia-Herzegovina, between 1993–1996, with an F-16 squadron; UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina, between 1993–1995, with a mechanized regiment of 1,450 troops; UN Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNMIBH), between 2000–2001, with one military advisor; UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM-II), between 1993–1994, with over 300 troops. For more than a year, this operation was under the command of a Turkish General. Moreover, Turkey has also played an important role in UN relief efforts for Northern Iraqi refugees during and after the first Gulf War. Turkey’s contributions to international peace and security continue despite the cost in terms of loss of life in the line of duty, not to mention the heavy financial burden. Currently, Turkey has five personnel in the Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) and will be providing three observers to the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMISUD). Likewise, Turkey has participated in

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most important and challenging one to date. That is why in this chapter, first priority is given to a brief explanation of ISAF operations and Turkey’s contribution to them. Then, to conclude, a brief assessment is made of Turkey’s future contributions to Western peace-keeping operations. ISAF Operations and Turkey’s Contribution To date, Turkey, has assumed command of ISAF twice. She was, in fact, among the first nations to join the global coalition against terrorism in Afghanistan. Ankara’s presence in ISAF then and now is related to her determination to maintain international cooperation in the face of global threats. The US-led ‘Enduring Freedom Operation’ had the purpose of both bringing down the Taliban regime and destroying the Al-Qaeda organization. After the military success of the US campaign, the political task of creating stable and secure conditions in Afghanistan became the main concern of the international community. Thus, in December 2001 at the Bonn Conference, under the UNSC resolution 1386, ISAF was created. The aim of ISAF was to support the newly-established Afghan Transitional government. Its goal was to achieve this mandate by both maintaining a secure environment in and around Kabul and supporting the reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan (see NATO 2006a). ISAF was not a UN force, but rather a coalition of the willing that had been deployed under the authority of the UN Security Council. It was based mainly on four United Nations Security Council resolutions (1386, 1413, 1444 and 1510). At the beginning of ISAF operations, individual nations volunteered to assume all operations led by NATO in the Balkans since 1995. As such, it contributed to IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina; KFOR in Kosovo; and Essential Harvest, Amber Fox and Allied Harmony in Macedonia. Turkey maintained her support for international efforts to enhance peace and stability in Macedonia after Operation Allied Harmony was terminated and the EU launched a military crisis management operation under the name ‘Concordia’. Turkey provided 11 personnel to this operation, which was later succeeded by the EU Police Mission, ‘Proxima’, in which Turkey currently has 8 personnel. It is beyond doubt that these operations have played a key role in re-establishing security and stability, thus contributing to the restoration of peace in the region. In total, around 800 Turkish troops are currently serving in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia and Albania. One hundred one Turkish police officers took part in the International Police Task Force (IPTF) in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the UN Mission in Kosovo. Since 1 January 2003 Turkey has also been contributing to the EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is the EU’s first civilian crisis management operation with 14 personnel. In accordance with the NATO Istanbul Summit decision, NATO’s SFOR operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina was terminated to be followed by the EU operation ‘EUFOR-ALTHEA’. This operation was launched on 2 December 2004, under the ‘Berlin plus’ arrangements, with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities. Turkey has maintained her contributions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, this time under EUFOR-ALTHEA. Turkey also contributes to the Integrated Police Unit (IPU) with 23 gendarmerie officers (see MFA 2006).

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command of the mission every six months. This situation remained unchanged until NATO assumed leadership of ISAF on 11 August 2003. The first ISAF mission was under UK leadership. The main problems of the Afghan Transitional Authority at that time stemmed from the insecure conditions of Afghanistan. ISAF forces in Afghanistan thus first tried to create conditions of a secure environment in and around Kabul. Turkey was among the other 18 nations that took part in the creation of the UK-led ISAF. Twelve of these nations were from NATO and five were from Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries (see Diego 2003). At the end of the UK-led ISAF period, Turkey volunteered to take command of ISAF II in Afghanistan for about six months. During Turkey’s leadership (20 June–20 December 2002), 22 nations3 contributed. Turkey’s ISAF leadership was prolonged for two more months but the mandate remained the same. ISAF II, under Turkish leadership, basically contributed to (see TSK 2006): (i) the maintenance of security in and around Kabul; (ii) the reconstruction and restoration efforts in the city; (iii) the education and health care of the Afghan people. Additionally, during the Turkish-led ISAF II Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC)4 activities were also carried out. These can be summarized as follows: 1. Circumcision of 247 Afghan children consisting of different ethnic groups 2. Restoration of the rehabilitation centre in Kabul Military Hospital and the assistance of technical documents 3. Restoration of a historical mosque in Kabul 4. Construction of 3 children’s playgrounds 5. Distribution of food for babies between the ages of 0–12 months 6. Digging wells of water, constructing a water depot and setting up water pumps in various regions of Kabul that are short of water 7. Distribution of toys to kindergartens and stationery materials to schools 8. Chlorination of the water wells in Kabul 3 Belgium and Portugal ceased their participation in ISAF II because of their commitments to NATO-led operations in the Balkans. In ISAF II new additional partner nations like Albania, Azerbaijan, Ireland, Lithuania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia have joined the force. The rest of the contributing nations remained the same as in ISAF I (see Diego 2003). 4 ISAF coordinates Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) projects throughout its area of operations. The CIMIC objectives are to assist the Commander of ISAF in his effort to support the Government of Afghanistan in maintaining and expanding security throughout the country, to support stabilization, reconstruction and nation-building activities, and to co-operate with International Organizations and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). The CIMIC teams work in close co-operation with the local population and authorities and assess the situation concerning education, health, water, sanitation and internally displaced persons and returnees. They also initiate and monitor projects funded by either national or international donors (see NATO 2006).

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9. Assistance of medication and health materials to hospitals 10. Providing desks and chairs to schools 11. Restoration of a high school in Kabul on a large scale, and providing desks and chairs to that school 12. Reconstruction of various numbers of clinics and hospitals 13. Restoration of various schools’ (see TSK 2006). The third ISAF mission became operational only after Germany and the Netherlands took over command from Turkey. In February 2003, ISAF III was placed under the operational support of NATO.5 Until then, most of the operational difficulties of the international peace-keeping force in Afghanistan had to be faced by the leading countries. It was only after NATO’s support that ISAF became able to overcome its operational problems. The NATO-led ISAF Period The terrorist attacks of September 11 have had an important impact on the political and military transformation of NATO. ‘For the first time in its history, the Alliance invoked Article 5 and then launched the Eagle Assist and Active Endeavour operations in the Mediterranean. Furthermore, the Alliance went on deploying AWACS aircraft to the US’ (Diego 2005). Later, at the foreign ministers meeting on 22 May 2002 in Reykjavik, the Alliance members reached the conclusion that the security threats of this century should be confronted, whenever necessary, beyond the borders of NATO.6 Thus, the Alliance, after that decision, became able to conduct military operations without geographic limitations. ‘So, it was on 16 April 2003, at the initiative of Germany, the Netherlands, and Canada, that the North Atlantic Council (NAC) decided to enhance NATO’s support to ISAF by taking on the command, coordination, and planning of the operation’ (see NATO 2006a). Consequently, on 11 August 2003 ISAF was placed under the strategic command of NATO. After this important decision, NATO was able to operate beyond the Euro-Atlantic area, though the new NATO-led ISAF operation continued to operate under the same UN mandate (1386).7 5 Germany and the Netherlands had turned to NATO in Autumn 2002 and demanded support for the planning and execution of the force. Then, in October 2002, the NAC approved the request, and thus the ISAF III headquarters was given access to the NATO intelligence and communications network (see NATO 2006). 6 At the Reykjavik meeting, it was decided that, ‘to carry out the full range of its missions, NATO must be able to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, sustain operations over distance and time, and achieve their objectives’ (see Diego 2005). 7 ISAF currently numbers around 6,500 troops from 26 allies, nine partner nations and two non-NATO/non-EAPC nations.

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What is more important is that by NATO heading the ISAF in Afghanistan, it has taken a significant step in the highly debated region called the ‘greater’ or ‘extended’ Middle East. When the US permanent representative to NATO, Nicholas Burns, said in Prague on 9 October 2003, ‘NATO’s future lies in the east and south’ (see Burns 2003), it was then perhaps difficult to believe in that conclusion. But after the Istanbul Summit of June 2004 and the decisions made about Afghanistan, Iraq and others, it became clear that NATO has a new vision. The decisions made, first at the Reykjavik and then at the Prague and Istanbul summits, made the Alliance’s ‘out of area’ concept something that belonged to past. Since then, the Alliance has begun to operate beyond the treaty area. The maintenance of security and the consolidation of Afghan national institutions were the two important objectives of ISAF in Afghanistan. In the past, it had tried to fulfill these difficult missions within UN mandates and that situation remains the same today. Today, the challenges in Afghanistan facing ISAF remain unchanged. They are: ‘(i) the problem of legitimization of the central government in Afghanistan. This issue embraces the intricate problem of the country’s centre-periphery relations, (ii) the problem of providing and extending the conditions of credible security and the rule of law beyond Kabul, (iii) the problem of the realization of Afghanistan’s economic reconstruction, and (iv) the difficult task of maintaining and managing the ethnic harmony of the country’ (see United States Institute of Peace 2003, 1). Most of the problems in Afghanistan mentioned above are not yet solved, and they continue to hinder the future of Kabul’s economic and political development.8 Expansion of NATO’s Mission in Afghanistan To date, two types of military presence in Afghanistan have been used in an attempt to stabilize the country’s security problems. The first was the Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFA-A), the American-led presence stationed in the southern part of Afghanistan, which, it carried out active combat operations. The second was the ISAF forces stationed in various parts of Afghanistan, which were responsible for conducting stability operations (see Erdagi 2005). However, despite their presence serious conditions of security have continued until now in Afghanistan, forcing NATO and CFA-A forces to undertake new measures. The first step in this direction was taken in October 2003 under UN Security Council Resolution 1510 when ISAF’s area of operation was extended to cover the whole of Afghanistan. In this regard, the Supreme Allied Commander, General James Jones, took command of the German-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) at Kunduz.9 This situation paved the way for the Alliance to establish its first presence 8 Since 2003 the security vacuum present in Afghanistan has been filled by the existing warlords (see United States Institute of Peace, 1). 9 PRTs are small teams of civilian and military personnel working in Afghanistan’s provinces to provide security for aid workers and help reconstruction work. They are the

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outside of Kabul, and since January 2004, ISAF has been present in the northern part of Afghanistan (see NATO 2004). Later, at the Istanbul Summit, in conformity with this expansion decision, the Alliance decided to establish four additional PRTs in Mazar-e-Sharif, Meymana, Feyzabad and Baghlan. On 1 October 2004, the first phase of the ISAF mission was completed.10 Then on 10 February 2005 NATO began the second phase of ISAF western expansion in Afghanistan. The Alliance first took command of PRTs in Herat and Farat; then, in September 2005, two more PRTs (one in Chagcharan and one in qal’eh-Now) were placed under the command of NATO.11 In the third phase of the ISAF expansion, the CFA-A forces in the south of Afghanistan will begin to hand over their responsibilities to NATO. This process is intended to be completed by the spring of 2006. Perito states that until then, ‘the United Kingdom would shift its military sources south and, along with the Netherlands, take over the American PRTs in Lahkar Gah and Tirin Khwt. Canada would take over Kandahar. The United States would retain control of Qalat. In the north, ISAF-led PRTs were expected to conduct traditional peace-keeping operations in a permissive environment. In the south, PRTs would be re-located with Coalition Combat units that would continue to conduct combat counterinsurgency operations. In the east along the Pakistani border, the United States would retain control of all PRTs’. The US, by its presence there, aims to avoid any possibility of infiltration by Taliban, Al-Qaeda or other terrorists (see Perito 2005). In the aftermath of the ISAF expansion, some NATO countries are said to be in charge of different parts of Afghanistan. For example, ‘Germany will take control of operations in the north, Italy of the west, Canada and Netherlands of the south, the United States the east, while France and Turkey will take control (on a rotational) basis of operations in the central area-including Kabul’ (see Erdagi 2005). ISAF is at present still operating with continued risks and constraints as it used to be in the past. The terrorist threats (like those from the remnants of Al-Qaeda and the neo-Taliban forces) to Afghanistan are still continuing today. As a matter of fact, ‘the activity of Al-Qaeda in southern and southeastern Afghanistan and random factional fighting in the country’s northern provinces are continuing factors that are challenging the ISAF mission’ (see United States Institute of Peace 2003). In Afghanistan, the presidential election of 2004 was an important event that helped legitimize the Afghan government in the eyes of the international community as well as the Afghan people. With the support of NATO (and the help of ISAF in providing security for the duration of the elections) the elections were key element supporting the three pillars of the Bonn Agreement: security, reconstruction and political stability (see NATO 2006a). In June 2005, the United States led 13 PRTs and ISAF directed nine (see Perito 2005, 1–10). 10 At the end of the first ISAF expansion, 3,600 square kilometres in and around Kabul and approximately 185,000 square kilometres in the north of Afghanistan were covered (see NATO 2006a). 11 At the end of its expansion in the north and west of Afghanistan, ISAF provides security assistance in nearly 50 percent on the country’s territory (see NATO 2006a).

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completed. Today, part of ISAF’s mission is to: (i) accomplish the attainment of the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) process in Afghanistan; (ii) assist the Kabul government in extending its authority throughout Afghanistan; (iii) provide the containment of heavy weapons as well as the build up of the Afghan army and police; and (iv) last but not least, try to contribute to the international efforts to eradicate, illegal drugs/narcotics production and trade in a challenging environment.12 In October 2003 ISAF’s mission in the country was expanded to cover the whole of Afghanistan. Turkey took the lead of ISAF for the second time in Afghanistan from 3 February – August 2005 with 1,400 troops (see MFA 2006). Turkey again fulfilled the responsibilities that were required for the mission. In fact, the Turkish lead of ISAF, twice, turned out to be very valuable from a military perspective. This stems from many factors, but Turkey’s own terrorism experience, in the fight against the PKK, proved to be the most crucial one. Moreover, Turkey’s close friendship and her historical ties with the Afghan people, as well as her Muslim identity, turned out to be very important in this mission (see MFA 2006). It seems the future success or failure of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan will determine the future orientation of US and NATO strategies. Therefore, at this stage, the present and future contribution of NATO and non-NATO countries appears to be very important. In this regard, Turkey today, as in the past, continues to give her support to the NATO-led mission. ‘In January 2004, NATO appointed Former minister Hikmet Cetin of Turkey to the post of Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) in Afghanistan. Cetin is responsible for advancing the political-military aspects of the Alliance’s engagement in Afghanistan and receives his guidance from the NAC. The work carried out by the SCR is crucial to the success of NATO’s mission of assisting the Afghan Transitional Government in fulfilling the Bonn Agreement commitments. He works in close co-ordination with the Commander of ISAF (COMISAF) and the UNAMA as well as with the Afghan authorities and other bodies of the international community present in the country’ (see NATO 2006b). Conclusion During the post-Cold War period, Turkey has contributed to the various UN, EU and US-led peace-keeping operations. This is related to the new security problems of the twenty-first century. During the last decade, Turkey sometimes faced competing and even contradicting policies of the two Wests. This situation stemmed from the rift in transatlantic relations. However, this fact did not stop Turkey fulfilling her peacekeeping responsibilities, be it in Afghanistan or elsewhere. Today Turkey, with her well trained and experienced armed forces, continues to be an important partner in Western and UN-led peace-keeping operations. The 12 The country’s problems like; the continuing drugs traffic, organized crime and the poor state of the local infrastructure, etc are still not solved (see Perito 2005; US Institute of Peace 2003).

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country’s geographic location and her cultural uniqueness obviously have added value in today’s Western calculations of security and Turkey’s potential role in it. References Asmus, R.D. (2003), ‘Rebuilding the Atlantic Alliance’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 82, no. 5. Baynham, S. (2003), ‘Eurasian Janus: Turkey’s Security and Defense Dilemmas in the Aftermath of the Iraq War’, Defense & Security Analysis, March 20. Bila, F. (2004), ‘Buyuk Ortadogu Projesi ve Demokrasi’, Milliyet, 10 June. Burns, R.N. (2003), ‘The New NATO and the Greater Middle East’, Remarks at Conference on NATO and the Greater Middle East, Prague, Czech Republic, October 19 [website], , accessed January 2006. Diego, A.P. (2003), ‘The Road to Kabul’, NATO Review [website], , accessed January 2006. Diego, A.P. (2005), ‘Afghanistan’s Transformational Challenge’, NATO Review [website], , accessed January 2006. Erdagi, E. (2005), ‘The ISAF Mission and Turkey’s Role in Rebuilding the Afghan State’, Policy Watch, no. 1052, Special Forum Report [website], , accessed January 2006. Erickson, E.J. (2004), ‘Turkey as Regional Hegemon – 2014: Strategic Implications for the United States’, Turkish Studies, 5/3, Autumn. ‘Fact Sheet: President Bush Calls for a “Forward Strategy of Freedom” to Promote Democracy in the Middle East’, The White House [website], , accessed January 2006. Guney, N.A. (2004), ‘Yeni Guvenlik Stratejilerindeki Ortak Tehdit Algilamalari: AB, ABD ve NATO’, in 2023. Mat, S. (2003), ‘AGSK’nin Gelecegi’, Ulusal Strateji, March. NATO (2004), ‘NATO Expands its Role in Afghanistan’ [website], , accessed January 2006. NATO (2006a), ‘NATO in Afghanistan: How Did the Operation Evolve?’ [website], , accessed January 2006. NATO (2006b), [website], , accessed April 2006. Nye Jr., J.S. (2003), ‘US Power and Strategy After Iraq’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 82, no. 4, July/August. Perito, R.M. (2005), ‘The US Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan’, Special Report 152 (Washington DC., United States Institute of Peace).

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SAREM (2004), Welcoming Address of the Second General Chief of Staff Ilker Basbug, in The Analysis of the Potential Crises Regions from the Perspectives of Turkey, NATO and the European Union and their Effects on Turkey’s Security, Ikinci Uluslararasi Sempozyum Bildirileri (Ankara: Genel Kurmay Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etut Baskanligi Yayinlari, Genel Kurmay Basim Evi), September/ October. Scheffer, J.H. (2005), ‘NATO’s 2004 Istanbul Summit: Charting the Alliance’s Ongoing Adaptation to 21st Century Risks and Challenges’, Turkish Policy Quarterly, 22 November. Solana, J. (2003), ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy’ (Brussels) [website], accessed in February 2005. Spear, J. (2003), ‘The Emergence of a European Strategic Personality’, Arms Control Today, November. TSK (2006), [website], , accessed January 2006. ‘Turkey and the European Security Seminar and Conference organized by TUSIAD and University of Birmingham’ (2004), 1–3 April, Istanbul, Turkey. ‘Turkey’s Security Perspectives and its Relations with NATO’ [website], , accessed January 2006. United States Institute of Peace (2003), ‘Unfinished Business in Afghanistan: Warlordism, Reconstruction and Ethnic Harmony’, Special Report 105, April. White House (2006), National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington D.C.).

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Conclusion Nursin Atesoglu Guney

The end of the twentieth century has seen a series of events, including the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the September 11 attacks, bring about new and serious challenges to the international system. Terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, ethnic and civilian conflicts, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), organised crime and failing/failed states, etc., are among the most important of these challenges and have radically changed the parameters of Western threat perceptions. Today the EU and the US still share common security objectives and threat perceptions. However, they continue to differ with regard to how to best combat these new threats. That is why, the ‘West’ can be said to be divided between two centres. Ensuring stability in Turkey’s immediate neighbourhood and beyond (the Middle East, the Mediterranean region and Eurasia) has become an important issue in the new security agendas of the ‘two Wests’, the result being that Turkey finds itself caught between divergent western security strategies and their areas of implementation. In the last couple of decades, Ankara, Brussels and Washington have cooperated in international efforts aimed at conflict prevention and management in the regions surrounding Turkey, and this is arguably due to the common security and threat perceptions that have moved Turkey and the ‘West’ closer to each other. Turkish participation in both NATO and EU peace-keeping operations in the Balkans has been important for the region’s stability. Furthermore, her cooperation with the West in different Eurasian initiatives has paved the way for the strengthening of local peace and stability. In view of the Middle East’s past and present problems, Turkey, as a regional state, defends regional peace, stability and prosperity. With this aim, Turkey has participated in various security initiatives – some initiated by the region’s countries, others projected by the capitals of the ‘two Wests’. In the aftermath of the US-led intervention in Iraq, Turkey was faced with the competing and sometimes conflicting foreign policies of Brussels and Washington with regard to the Middle East. Since then, the resolution of the region’s problems has gained immanency both for the two Wests and for the region’s countries, including Turkey. However, because of the deepening transatlantic divide, Ankara’s policies in the Middle East are sometimes in harmony with those of the EU, sometimes with those of the USA, and sometimes at odds with both.

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Another fault line geographically and historically connected to the Middle East is the Mediterranean region. Turkey, Washington and Brussels both support peace and stability in the region as part of their new security strategies. Yet, there are a number of obstacles to achieving comprehensive security in the Mediterranean and Aegean, the Cyprus question being one of the major stumbling blocks. To resolve the Cyprus issue, Turkey accepted the Annan plan, which was supported much of the international community. In spite of the support Ankara gave to the plan, the Cyprus issue appears to have become stalemated in 2006. In the current situation, it is probably safe to assume that Cyprus-Mediterranean-Aegean security will only be achieved when Turkey is a part of the EU decision-making mechanism. The current transatlantic rift is a challenge for Ankara and her relations with the two Wests, particularly in terms of EU and US policy regarding Turkey’s neighbours. In the Balkans, NATO and EU-led peacekeeping operations have strengthened stability in the region since the mid-1990s, demonstrating the two Wests’ ability to overcome, on the Balkan issue at least, divergent viewpoints. Though the two sides of the Atlantic have also continued to support divergent viewpoints in Eurasian security initiatives, they have also succeeded in building a common understanding on certain issues, such as the security of energy resources and the prevention of terrorism. These convergent interests of the two Wests have eased Ankara’s relations with the EU and the US, both in the Balkans and Eurasia. The area in which Ankara faces the biggest challenge arising from the deepening transatlantic divide is the Middle East, a rift which became even more pronounced during the US-led operation in Iraq. Due to western differences over the Middle East, the future of the Turkey-US-EU relationship has become a topic of intense debate. The ‘two Wests’ are a new factor in the relationship between Turkey, Washington and Brussels. Some experts, who have drawn attention to continuities in the relationship in terms of Turkey’s western-oriented foreign policy, beginning with the Tanzimat Reforms of the nineteenth century, speculate that Turkey ‘may find itself in an undesirable position of having to choose between the United States and the European Union’. Turkey has always been a part of the Western economic, political and security mechanism, which developed after WWII. Despite the prevailing rift in transatlantic relations, Ankara does not consider the divergent security policies of Brussels and Washington as non-complementary alternatives for the implementation of its foreign and security policies. With a long history of distinct and special relations with the US and Europe, Ankara is determined to pursue a policy whose aim is to maintain balanced relations with Brussels and Washington. The motives behind Turkey’s determination are linked not only to her traditional western-oriented foreign policy approach but also to her own regional policies.

Index Aegean Sea 152 Afghanistan xv, 4, 10, 14, 20, 26, 27, 30, 45, 54, 57, 59, 60, 61, 64, 68, 69, 71, 76, 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 109, 112, 113, 114, 125, 137, 143, 154, 155, 179, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189 Africa 24, 26, 42, 99, 102, 131, 154 Albania 41, 45, 128, 154, 182, 183 Alba Operation 41 Algeria 81, 90, 138 American National Security Doctrine 179 Anatolia 8, 9, 73, 139, 144 Ankara Agreement 33, 169 Annan Plan 3, 159, 167, 168, 169 Arab League 46, 75 Armenia 22, 81, 99, 108, 110, 121, 123, 124, 126, 127, 128, 129, 131, 133, 134 Armenian Genocide 55 Armistice of Mudros 9 Astana 103, 110, 112, 142 Austria 5, 7, 8, 141 Azerbaijan xvi, 11, 39, 62, 81, 87, 99, 103, 104, 105, 108, 111, 117, 121, 123, 124, 125, 126, 128, 129, 130, 133, 134, 140, 142, 146, 154, 183 Baghdad 3, 9, 12, 18, 28, 29, 56, 85, 93, 178 Baghdad Pact 12, 18 Baku xv, 55, 103, 104, 125, 126, 128, 130, 138, 140, 142, 147, 149, 152 Balkan Entente 10 Balkan Pact 56, 68 Balkans 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 15, 16, 20, 24, 25, 26, 35, 36, 37, 40, 41, 42, 47, 48, 50, 56, 109, 128, 152, 182, 183, 191, 192 Balkan War 9 Baltic Sea 146 Barcelona Process 44, 50, 80 Beijing 108, 112, 113, 114, 116, 118, 145

Belgium 24, 27, 183 Berlin Plus 24, 25, 26 Bishkek 112 Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) 122 Black Sea Forum for Dialogue and Partnership 132 Black Sea Harmony 129, 130, 131, 132 Black Sea Region xi, 3, 62, 121, 133, 134 Blue Stream Pipeline 139, 144 Bonn Agreement 186, 187 Bosnia xv, xvi, xvii, 8, 20, 26, 38, 41, 42, 181 Bosphorus 129, 130, 131, 142 Broader Middle East xv, 1, 44, 48, 63, 65, 76, 84, 121, 131 Brussels 2, 3, 4, 19, 34, 36, 43, 49, 81, 82, 83, 90, 100, 101, 106, 107, 108, 115, 116, 117, 119, 131, 132, 133, 148, 169, 191, 192 Bulgaria 8, 22, 36, 121, 123, 124, 125, 139, 141, 154 Bush Administration 102, 103, 104, 109, 119 Bush Doctrine 178 Canada 21, 27, 184, 186 Caspian xi, 96, 99, 100, 103, 107, 108, 111, 113, 114, 118, 119, 121, 129, 131, 138, 141, 142, 143, 144, 146, 147, 149, 150, 152 Caspian Energy 96, 150 Caspian Grouping 111 Caspian Sea 103, 131, 142, 147, 149 Caucasus xi, xiii, xvi, xvii, 1, 3, 5, 15, 25, 37, 40, 47, 48, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 122, 125, 126, 127, 128, 133, 134, 143, 147, 181 Caucasus Stability Pact 128, 133 Caucasus Working Group 115 Cem, Ismail 133

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Central Asia x, xi, xv, xvi, 37, 40, 48, 86, 96, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 127, 138, 141, 142, 143, 145, 147, 181 Central Asian Battalion 105 Central Asian Collective Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) 110 Central Asian Economic Union (CAEC) 105 Chechnya 106, 126, 127 China 3, 16, 99, 100, 105, 108, 112, 113, 114, 117, 118, 119, 141, 142, 145 Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) 183 Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFA-A) 185 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 21, 35, 101, 178 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) 127 Council of Europe 13, 22, 31, 132 Crimea 6 Crimean War 5, 7 Customs Union 42 Cyprus xvii, 3, 8, 13, 14, 16, 20, 25, 26, 37, 42, 47, 55, 57, 71, 78, 93, 132, 152, 153, 155, 156, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 175, 176, 192 Czech Republic 141, 146, 188 Damascus 87, 91, 92, 93, 94 Defence and Economic Cooperation Agreement xv Democracy Assistance Dialogue 63 Dushanbe 102, 110 Egypt 6, 8, 44, 81, 90, 141, 146 Enosis 172 Eurasia x, 3, 7, 15, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 133, 134, 191, 192 Eurasian Gas Alliance 144 Euro-Mediterranean Conference 44 Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 45, 81 Euro-Mediterranean Relations 96 European Community 170, 176 European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 36, 122

European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) 20, 36, 48, 58 European Security Strategy 38, 106, 119, 122, 133, 178 European Union ix, x, xv, 1, 13, 19, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 30, 31, 32, 36, 37, 41, 48, 49, 50, 54, 58, 85, 90, 92, 94, 95, 96, 118, 122, 138, 145, 146, 148, 149, 151, 155, 156, 162, 167, 173, 176, 189, 192 Finland 21, 163 First World War 9, 55, 56, 153, 157 France 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 20, 23, 24, 25, 27, 29, 31, 33, 36, 44, 45, 79, 93, 95, 126, 171, 186 Gazprom 124, 131 Georgia xvi, 22, 37, 38, 39, 81, 99, 103, 104, 105, 106, 108, 117, 121, 123, 124, 127, 128, 130, 131, 133, 140, 154, 181 Germany 8, 9, 11, 20, 27, 33, 45, 56, 79, 95, 99, 146, 155, 171, 184, 186 Great Britain 8 Greater Middle East Initiative xvi, 75, 82, 83, 93, 179 Greece 3, 10, 13, 21, 25, 37, 47, 51, 79, 88, 121, 128, 140, 141, 144, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 159, 160, 161, 163, 165, 166, 168 Greek Cypriot 3, 160, 161, 162, 163, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 175 Hamas 43, 44, 87 Hezbollah 87, 92 Hungary 8, 141, 146 India 3, 8, 100, 105, 108, 112, 113, 114, 116, 117, 118, 144 International Criminal Court xvi, 20, 21, 22, 30, 31, 32 International Police Task Force xvi, 182 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 27, 104, 177 Iran x, xvi, xvii, 1, 3, 10, 11, 12, 16, 39, 56, 57, 62, 64, 74, 76, 77, 80, 81, 82, 85, 87, 88, 89, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 99, 103, 107, 108, 113, 114, 118, 119,

Index 124, 125, 128, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 144, 146, 147, 149, 155, 179, 181 Iraq ix, xi, xvi, xvii, 1, 2, 3, 10, 12, 15, 20, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 39, 51, 52, 54, 55, 57, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 71, 72, 73, 75, 77, 78, 79, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 87, 88, 89, 90, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 101, 104, 108, 112, 125, 130, 138, 147, 155, 177, 178, 179, 181, 185, 188, 191, 192 Iraqi Governing Council 155 Ireland 183 Islamabad 114 Islamic Jihad 87 Israel ix, 25, 35, 43, 44, 47, 57, 75, 81, 87, 88, 89, 92, 97, 125, 138, 144, 154, 157 Istanbul ix, xiii, 5, 6, 8, 17, 50, 62, 66, 68, 69, 83, 89, 104, 117, 122, 123, 126, 127, 128, 133, 134, 149, 150, 172, 177, 180, 182, 185, 186, 189 Italy 8, 9, 10, 20, 63, 69, 79, 80, 141, 144, 186 Ivanov Doctrine 110, 119 Jordan 81, 141 Kabul 27, 178, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188 Kazakhstan xvi, 87, 99, 103, 105, 107, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 118, 119, 126, 142, 144, 145 Kirkuk 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 88 Konya Air Base 28 Korea 21 Korean War 11 Kosovo xvi, 26, 38, 41, 154, 182 Kosovo Force (KFOR) 26 Kucuk Kaynarca 6, 8 Kurdistan xvi, 28, 29, 30, 60, 71, 77, 85, 127 Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK) 29 Kurdistan Regional Government xvi, 28 Kuwait 57, 59, 60, 181 Kyoto Protocol 21, 23, 30, 146 Kyrgyzstan 38, 99, 102, 107, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 143, 145 Lausanne Peace Treaty 10 League of Nations 10

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Lebanon 8, 76, 81, 82, 91, 92, 96 Libya xvi, 81, 144 Lipponen Letter 164, 166, 167, 173 Lithuania 183 London x, 9, 16, 17, 18, 48, 49, 50, 67, 84, 95, 96, 118, 134, 177, 178 Macedonia xv, 20, 25, 42, 154, 182, 183 Madrid 177, 178 Malta 25, 42, 49 Mediterranean Dialogue 180 Mediterranean Fault Line 3, 151 Middle East ix, x, xiii, 1, 2, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 34, 35, 37, 40, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 52, 54, 55, 62, 63, 66, 68, 75, 77, 78, 80, 82, 83, 85, 87, 89, 90, 91, 92, 94, 95, 96, 97, 99, 100, 101, 102, 104, 106, 107, 108, 109, 114, 116, 118, 131, 133, 138, 141, 142, 145, 147, 149, 151, 154, 155, 157, 158, 166, 177, 178, 179, 185, 188, 191, 192 Middle East Peace Process 43, 81 Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) 21 Minsk Group 126 Moldavia xvi, 105, 107 Montenegro 128 Montreux Convention 11, 130 Morocco 36, 45, 81 Moscow 10, 11, 19, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 114, 116, 118, 119, 122, 125, 127, 128, 130, 132 Nabucco Project 140 Nagorno-Karabakh 122, 123, 126, 127, 128 Netherlands 20, 27, 33, 36, 93, 184, 186 New Delhi 113, 114, 144 North Africa xv, 9, 44, 46, 63, 65, 76, 84, 106, 146, 177 North Atlantic Council (NAC) 184 Northern Iraq 20, 32, 61, 62, 63, 64, 72, 73, 74, 157, 181 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 39 Nuclear Safeguards Agreement 39 Operation Endeavour Freedom 106 Operation Enduring Freedom 100, 102, 103, 114 Operation Iraqi Freedom 104 Operation Provide Comfort 72

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Contentious Issues of Security and the Future of Turkey

Orange Revolution 121, 123 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development xvi Organisation of the Islamic Conference xvi Ottoman Empire 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 16, 17, 18, 53, 54, 123, 152, 159

Sultan Abdulhamid II 8 Supreme Headquarters Allied Forces Europe xvii, 24 Syria 1, 3, 8, 9, 22, 37, 56, 62, 64, 74, 76, 77, 79, 81, 85, 87, 88, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 141, 155

Pakistan 12, 75, 102, 112, 113, 114, 116 Palestine 9, 13, 43, 81 Palestine Authority 81 Paris 7, 9, 107 Partnership for Peace (PfP) 100, 183 Pershmerga 29 Persian Gulf 57, 61, 66, 102, 137, 142, 143, 144 Philippines 112 Portugal 183 Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) 62

Taiwan Strait 113 Tajikistan 99, 102, 107, 110, 111, 112, 114, 143, 145 Taleban 59 Tanzimat 7, 8, 192 Tashkent 102, 105, 110, 112, 113 Tehran 76, 88, 89, 91, 93, 94, 107, 114 Thailand 112 Tiblisi 103, 106, 152 Transatlantic Relations 2, 19 Transcaucasus 12 Treaty of Alliance 175 Treaty of Establishment 175 Treaty of Guarantee 175 Treaty of Sevres 9, 10 Tulip Revolution 112 Tunisia 81 Turkish Cypriots 160, 161, 162, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 171, 172 Turkish General Staf 180 Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus xvii, 161, 162, 175 Turkish Straits 143 Turkmen 77, 78, 84, 114 Turkmenistan 87, 99, 104, 110, 111, 113, 144, 146 Turkomen 28

Quartet 43 Republic of Cyprus 159, 161, 170, 171, 175, 176 Republic of Turkey 5, 10, 138, 149, 161, 173 Rogue States 95 Romania 10, 36, 44, 121, 123, 124, 125, 132, 139, 141 Russia 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 21, 36, 44, 48, 69, 99, 100, 103, 105, 106, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 116, 117, 118, 119, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 150, 154 Russian Empire 5, 9 Russian Federation 3, 168 Saudi Arabia 138 Second World War 16 Serbia 128 Slovakia 141, 146 Slovenia 146 South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP) 140 Southern Cyprus 169, 170, 171 South Ossetia 122, 126, 127 Soviet Union 1, 5, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 21, 24, 37, 57, 86, 94, 122, 141, 151, 154, 191 Spain 20, 44, 46, 79 Stability Pact 41, 128

Ukraine xvi, 38, 39, 81, 105, 107, 111, 121, 123, 124, 125, 128, 130, 131, 132, 139, 140, 144, 146, 150 United Kingdom xvii, 24, 53, 186 United Nations (UN) 11 United Nations Security Council xvii, 91, 182 United States of America 101, 119 Uzbekistan xvi, 87, 99, 102, 104, 105, 110, 112, 113, 117, 119, 143, 144, 145 Washington ix, 1, 2, 3, 4, 14, 31, 32, 39, 50, 52, 61, 66, 67, 71, 72, 74, 77, 79, 84, 87, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 100, 101,

Index 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 109, 111, 112, 113, 115, 116, 119, 130, 131, 132, 133, 148, 149, 150, 178, 179, 188, 191, 192 Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 1 West Bank 43 Western Gas Transit Route 139

World War I 11, 17, 67 World War II 11, 17, 67 Yemen 63 Yom Kippur War 137 Yugoslavia 10, 36, 41, 152

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