EU Foreign Policy and Post-Soviet Conflicts: Stealth Intervention

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EU Foreign Policy and Post-­Soviet Conflicts

The European Union is still emerging as a fully fledged foreign policy actor. The vagaries of this process are clearly visible, yet insufficiently explained in the EU policies towards the post-­Soviet space. EU Foreign Policy and Post-­Soviet Conflicts examines EU intervention and non-­intervention in conflict resolution, with a specific focus on the EU’s role in the post-­Soviet conflicts in the South Caucasus and Moldova: Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-­Karabakh and Transnistria. It explains how EU foreign policy affected these conflicts, but more importantly what EU intervention in these conflicts reveal about the EU itself. Based on extensive field research, the author argues that the reluctant EU intervention in post-­Soviet conflicts results from a dichotomous relationship between EU institutions and some EU member states eager not to antagonize external actors such as Russia, or interested in other priorities. Popescu argues this demonstrates that EU institutions use policies of ‘stealth intervention’ where they seek to play a greater role in the post-­Soviet space, but they do so through relatively low-­profile, uncontroversial and depoliticized actions in order to avoid visible Russian opposition. Exploring an array of questions related to the EU as a foreign policy actor, this book traces the politics of conflict intervention by EU institutions using original empirical data related to the EU decision-making process and will be of interest to students and scholars of European politics, conflict resolution, foreign policy and post-­Soviet politics. Nicu Popescu is senior research fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations in London.

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71 EU Foreign Policy and Post-­Soviet Conflicts Stealth intervention Nicu Popescu

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EU Foreign Policy and ­ Post­-­Soviet­ Conflicts Stealth intervention Nicu Popescu

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First published 2011 by Routledge 2 Park Square Milton Park Abingdon Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business.

This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2011. To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.

© 2011 Nicu Popsecu The right of Nicu Popescu to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him/her in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Popescu, Nicu. EU foreign policy and post-­Soviet conflicts : stealth intervention / Nicu Popescu. p. cm. — (Routledge advances in european politics) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. European Union countries—Foreign relations—Former Soviet republics. 2. Former Soviet republics—Foreign relations—European Union countries. 3. Conflict management—Government policy— European Union countries. 4. European Union—Former Soviet republics. I. Title. JZ1570.A57F668 2011 341.242’2—dc22 2010025696

ISBN 0-203-83478-X Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 13: 978-­0-415-­58720-­4(hbk) ISBN 13: 978-­0-203-­83478-­7(ebk)

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To my parents

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Contents

Foreword Acknowledgements List of abbreviations 1 Introduction

xii xv xvii 1

2 EU foreign policy and conflict management

25

3 The EU’s piecemeal involvement in Transnistria

38

4 The EU’s reluctant engagement in Abkhazia and South Ossetia

66

5 The EU’s non-­involvement in Nagorno-­Karabakh

95

6 Conclusions: the EU’s involvement and reluctance

116

Notes Bibliography Index

134 139 153

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Foreword

My experience in conflict resolution has taught me a number of lessons. Here are just some of them. To begin with, I firmly believe in the fact that all conflicts can be solved. Peace is a question of will. I also believe that conflicts can only be solved through the engagement and support of local populations. However, outsiders can help. They cannot solve the conflicts as such, but they can mediate between the conflict parties, offer assistance to ease the sufferings of ordinary people and they can provide incentives to solidify peace. And above all, I firmly believe in the European Union’s ability to contribute to the resolution of such conflicts and its responsibility to be a force for good. The wars of the 90s in the Balkans showed us that the EU can neither change geography, nor lock itself behind closed doors. If the EU wants to live in a peaceful neighbourhood it needs to be pro-­active and forward-­looking. I have seen the positive effects of EU interventions in the Balkans and Aceh, Indonesia, but I have also seen how prevarication, lack of unity, late action, and even inaction by the international community, including the EU, made conflicts deadlier and longer than they could have been. The European Union carries enormous responsibility for global peace and human security. We are responsible both for our citizens and the citizens of regions affected by war. It is our responsibility to act – to prevent violence, to resolve conflicts and to help rebuild conflict regions. And this responsibility starts at home – in Europe. Eurobarometer opinion polls regularly show the public supports an outward-­looking EU: more than two-thirds favour a common European foreign policy. We have the biggest single market in the world, the largest aid budgets, tens of thousands of peacekeepers that are active all over the world, and a corps of 50,000 diplomats. There is also increasing international demand for EU actions. We have also seen through the process of enlargement and conflict resolution in the Balkans that we can make a real difference if we show leadership and abandon our introspection, for a serious engagement with the rest of the world. But this takes unity, courage, vision and greater coherence. Transforming Europe’s responsibilities into actions is a daunting task. Today it is only too often so that we in the European Union have too many divergent views on what is good for us collectively. In fact, the common good

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Foreword  xiii is often present only in official speeches. If we in the European Union are not capable of achieving more in terms of firm unified positions we cannot be credible and reliable partners. If that is our fate, why should anybody take us seriously as a European Union? If we cannot be a truly powerful force for good in our neighbourhood, how can we aspire then to becoming such a force on a global scale? The members of the European Union have not been as good as they should have been in tackling issues that present common challenges to them. As is well known in the early phases of European political cooperation, foreign policy was not one of those where governments would have been prepared to share any of their sovereignty. It is never easy. There are several painful examples of those early difficulties. We saw much of it as it came to dealings with the breakup of Yugoslavia. More recently, we have seen it in the context of the campaigns in Iraq and – to a lesser degree – in Afghanistan. For a number of years, part of the problem has been an institutional one. It has been difficult, if not impossible, to frame a common foreign and security policy as long as the institutions for it have been insufficient and weak. Today, however, we have a new situation. The rather fragile machinery for cooperation in foreign and security policy has been strengthened as the Lisbon Treaty entered into force in December 2009. Now the European Union has proper instruments for the conduct of a common foreign and security policy. It will have even fewer excuses not to act in the future. Of course, it may be unrealistic to expect that the members of the union would always find common positions. However, these new institutional arrangements should be that springboard towards a real European political union which will be capable of giving a larger contribution to the resolution of the major issues of our time. But moving on means learning from the lessons of our past performances. And the present book provides the ultimate guide to the EU’s performance in conflict management in the post-­Soviet space. This book zooms in on EU policies towards the conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria and Nagorno-­Karabakh and explains many of the interactions between the EU institutions, EU member states, Russia and the post-­Soviet states. It unwraps the dynamics and tensions of EU policy-­making, be it during the 2008 Georgian–Russian war, the deployment of the EU border assistance mission to Ukraine and Moldova, or the generally ambiguous interactions with Russia. This is not a book written based on research in a warm office. Nicu Popescu has criss-­crossed the conflict regions, felt the pulse of the internal policy-making process in Brussels and spoke to many persons who matter in the conflict resolution process – from presidents and mediators, to soldiers and refugees. The book looks at the often difficult waltzing between the EU and its external partners – Russia, Georgia or Moldova – and shows how these states try to use their friends in the EU to stir EU foreign policy action in this or that direction. It also shows how EU institutions try to

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xiv  Foreword expand their competencies in foreign policy through salami tactics, which Popescu calls ‘dosage’. Overall, the book shows in minutiae detail how much the EU has progressed in becoming a conflict management actor, but also how difficult and contradictory that process still is. The book also explains what the EU did, what the EU failed to do and what are the broader implications for the European Union’s foreign policy project as such. And it is equally useful that the book then zooms out to draw the necessary lessons for EU foreign policy at large. President Martti Ahtisaari

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Acknowledgements

My first thanks goes to those who are rarely mentioned or quoted in this book – the people who live in the conflict zones in question – students, peasants, taxi-­drivers, refugees, pensioners, teachers, aid workers, as well as politicians, diplomats, soldiers, policemen and peacekeepers. They have motivated me to understand these conflicts and EU’s policies towards them not as an abstract set of policy steps, but as moves that changed or failed to change realities on the ground and the lives of people living these realities. This book would have not been possible without literally hundreds of interlocutors, colleagues and friends with whom I discussed these issues over the years. My deepest gratitude goes to all those officials, experts, journalists, and others who spared their time to discuss EU and conflict management issues. Among them are: Arzu Abdullayeva, Anna Abrahamyan, Martti Ahtisaari, Tea Akhvlediani, Leila Alieva, Farda Asadov, Predrag Avramovic, Sergey Bagapsh, George Balan, Giorgi Baramidze, Paulo Barroso-­Simoes, Jean-­Yves Berthault, Carolyne Brown, Victor Chirila, Nika Chitadze, Dato Chochia, David Darchiashvili, Murat Djioev, Remi Duflot, George Dura, Per Eklund, Bjorn Fagerberg, Mark Fawcett, Vlad Filat, Vasyl Filipchuk, Sabine Fischer, Patricia Flor, Sabine Freizer, Archil Gegeshidze, Valeriu Gheorghiu, Giorgi Gogia, Kakha Gogolashvili, Heather Grabbe, Ryan Grist, Eva Gross, Adrian Guelke, Maxim Gunjia, Terhi Hakala, Jacqui Hale, Carl Hallergard, Gottfried Hanne, Hilde Hardeman, Carl Hartzell, Damien Helly, Paruyr Hovhannisyan, Tabib Husseynov, Beata Huszka, Adriaan Jacobovits de Szeged, Kestutis Jankauskas, Diana Janse, Bidzina Javakhishvili, Vova Kakhalia, Kaupo Kand, Sergi Kapanadze, Denis Keefe, Alison Kerr, Ivliane Khaindrava, Elene Khoshtaria, Batal Kobakhia, Jana Kobzova, Dora Konig, Daniel Korski, Tamuna Kovziridze, Liana Kvarchelia, Alex Kuhl, Daniel Kunin, Maxim Kuzovlev, Stanislav Lakoba, Angus Lapsley, Iurie Leanca, Mark Leonard, Robin Liddell, Valeri Litskai, Raul de Luzenberger, Vlada Lysenko, Karen Madoyan, Denis Matveev, Sergey Markedonov, Peter Michalko, Marianne Mikko, Hugues Mingarelli, Misha Mirzeishvili, Kalman Mizsei, Sofia Moreira de Sousa, Igor Munteanu, Tofig Musaev, Oazu Nantoi, Klaus Neukirch, Ghia Nodia, Gergana Noutcheva, Craig Oliphant, Louis O’Neill, John O’Rourke, Victor Osipov, Rasa Ostrauskaite, Zygimantas

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xvi  Acknowledgements Pavilionis, Veaceslav Pituscanu, Olaf Poeschke, Tevan Poghosyan, Andrei Popov, Kristi Raik, Andrew Rettman, Eugen Revenco, Gergely Romsics, Alex Rondeli, Maria van Ruiten, Mikheil Saakashvili, Stepan Safaryan, George Saghin, Dmitri Sanakoev, Dirk Schubel, Peter Semneby, Stefan Schleuning, Stas Secrieru, Sergei Shamba, Sergei Shirokov, Vasilii Sova, Mira Sovakar, Ion Stavila, Pirkka Tapiola, Ghia Tarkhan-­Mouravi, Richard Tibbels, Viorel Ursu, Marius Vahl, Tomas Valasek, Jacques Vantomme, Ernest Vardanyan, Grigol Vashadze, Andriy Veselovsky, Liliana Vitu, Radu Vrabie, Tom de Waal, Alan Waddams, Michael Webb, Annika Weidemann, Fredrik Wesslau, Gunnar Wiegand, Andrew Wilkens, Andrew Wilson, Nicholas Whyte, Temuri Yakobashvili, Zeynep Yanasmayan, Alexandros Yannis, Paata Zakareishvili, Levon Zourabian and many others. This book evolved from my doctoral dissertation at the Central European University in Budapest. I am deeply indebted to CEU and Erin Jenne who has encouraged and helped me think through in a systematic way the issues discussed in this book. I am also deeply indebted to Michael Emerson, Dov Lynch and Bruno Coppieters. It is through communication with them that I have arrived at this junction between two big topics – EU foreign policy and conflict management. Throughout the years I have been hosted by a number of institutions, all of which left their imprint on my research and helped me develop and refine the ideas in this book. I thank the EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris; the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in Brussels and Queens University Belfast. I have also benefited from the generous funding of the Open Society Institute and Compagnia di San Paolo. None of these institutions supported directly the writing of this book; however my cooperation with them greatly enriched my thinking and my experience with the conflict zones in questions. A special thanks goes to all my colleagues at the European Council on Foreign Relations in London (ECFR). ECFR provided me with the right mix of intellectually stimulating environment and the flexibility to take time off and work on this manuscript. I am also very thankful to those who generously read and commented on all of parts of this book: Peter Balazs, Bruno Coppieters, Elena Gnedina, Tabib Husseynov, Dov Lynch, Michael Merlingen, David Phinnemore, Nathalie Tocci and three anonymous reviewers. Undoubtedly, I take responsibility for any errors or shortcomings. My deep gratitude goes to Elena Gnedina for her constant intellectual engagement and advice while I worked on this book. Her critical eye and creative suggestions helped me clear and sort out many of the ideas in this book. Finally, I am deeply indebted to my parents, Nicolae and Vera, who have been waiting with impatience for the completion of this book, even though they would not be able to read it in English. This book is dedicated to them.

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Abbreviations

ATP Autonomous Trade Preferences CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy (Pre-­Lisbon Treaty name) CiO Chairman-­in-­office CIS Commonwealth of Independent States CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy (Post-­Lisbon Treaty name) EEAS European External Action Service ENP European Neighbourhood Policy ENPI European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument ESDP European Security and Defence Policy (Pre-­Lisbon Treaty name) EU European Union EUBAM EU Border Assistance Mission to Ukraine and Moldova EUSR European Union’s Special Representative EU SSR EU Security Sector Reform Mission GSP Generalized System of Preferences OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe PSC Political and Security Committee RELEX (DG) Directorate General for External Relations, European Commission UN United Nations USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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1 Introduction

European integration was conceived in the 1950s’ largely as a conflict resolution­exercise. Its means were economic, but the declared objective mainly polit­ical: to pacify Europe. As integration advanced and the potential for conflicts in Western Europe faded, the European Union’s concern with conflicts has became increasingly externalized. From the Balkans to the Middle East, and from the South Caucasus to Western Sahara, the European Union (EU) is encircled with conflicts that affect European security (European Security Strategy 2003). The EU has little choice but to consider action, because ‘In its neighbourhood and beyond, the EU cannot confine itself to the economic and political spheres; it also needs to be able to guarantee stability, prevent conflicts and manage crises on its own doorstep’ (European Commission 2004a). In a difficult milieu, the EU has become increasingly, though hesitantly, active in conflict management on its doorstep. But the EU’s actions have gone hand in hand with failures to act, and both have been equally revealing about the EU as a foreign policy actor. The EU’s main objective in the neighbourhood is to establish a ring of well-­governed, prosperous and democratic states. The Treaty of Lisbon even stipulates that the EU ‘shall develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries’ characterized by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation (Treaty of Lisbon 2007). But there is little the EU can do in the eastern neighbourhood without addressing the secessionist conflicts in Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-­Karabakh. One can hardly dream of good governance and functioning state institutions when the poorest European states invest heavily in their military, and do not control signifi­ cant parts of their borders, where smuggling and corruption in and around the conflict zones flourish, publics have become increasingly radicalized, military escalation is a plausible possibility, and defence spending growth has often been in the double-­digits. And this situation has persisted for almost two decades. The August 2008 war in Georgia tragically highlighted the fact that contrary to wide-­spread beliefs, these conflicts are not ‘frozen’. Their settlement is. A better analogy is that of a frozen river: the ice on the surface may be apparently immobile, but underneath it currents continue to run (Fall 2006). At times they erupted on the surface leading to renewed bloodshed as

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2  Introduction in Abkhazia in 1998 or South Ossetia in 2008. These conflict zones might be invisible on the map of the world, but they are real political phenomena that affect the development of the European foreign and security policy, as well as EU relations with virtually all of its partners in wider Europe: Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia Azerbaijan, Armenia and Turkey. With the launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2003, the EU has deployed a widening array of foreign policy instruments aimed at influencing conflict settlement patterns in these conflict areas. The EU appointed EU Special Representatives (EUSRs), launched conflict-­management­missions, became involved in conflict settlement talks and discussed the possibility to send peacekeepers. These measures went hand in hand with broader EU policies such as offering financial assistance, trade liberalization and visa facilitation; developing energy partnerships and inclusion in some EU agencies and programmes to all of its neighbours. Overall, the EU deployed several missions with over 400 personnel and spent hundreds of millions Euro on conflict management in the post-­Soviet space. However, the growing list of EU foreign policy actions is offset by a similarly expansive list of potential EU actions that have ultimately failed to materialize. Among these were the EU’s failures to deploy EU peacekeepers in Moldova and Nagorno-­Karabakh, border monitors in Georgia, or develop any semblance of policies on Nagorno-­Karabakh. Despite a fast-­growing European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and high-­level declaratory commitments to establish a strong EU presence in the neighbourhood, the level of EU engagement in conflict resolution in Moldova and the South Caucasus is unremarkable. It often paled in comparison to EU commitments to conflict resolution, not only in the Balkans, but also in sub-­Saharan Africa and the Greater Middle-­East.

The question: explaining EU conflict intervention The discussion whether and how EU institutions intervene in conflict settlement efforts is not just a theoretical exercise, as it potentially has huge implications for real life developments. The EU’s value added to international conflict management efforts partly stems from its size. A union of half a billion people that successfully ensured a largely peaceful Europe for the last 60 years, and now disburses over a half of global development assistance to poor and conflict-­prone regions can in theory become a truly global force for good. No single European country would be able to influence conflict settlement patterns the same as the EU could do. Thus the debate whether and how the EU intervenes in conflict management worldwide has relevance for the lives of hundreds of thousands of victims of territorial conflicts. Modern conflicts cannot have a purely military solution as they require a wide range of tools for conflict management ranging from huge amounts of economic aid, civilian policing in conflict areas and reforming courts and border management agencies. In theory, the EU is uniquely positioned to

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Introduction  3 provide such an integrated approach to conflict management where military and civilian capabilities can be blended together with reconciliation assistance, trade concessions and support for institution building. This is particularly so after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty which brings together the various foreign policy arms of the EU which had operated in a fragmented (and sometimes competing) manner. This book does not assume that EU intervention in conflict resolution is or will be inherently positive. In fact the EU, just like any other actor, can undertake actions that harm conflict settlement (Diez et al. 2008), and many would argue that it did just that in Cyprus or Kosovo. Moreover, this book does not assume that all EU member states should let a common EU foreign policy supersede their own national policies. However, all EU member states have expressed a clear determination to build an EU common foreign and security policy and contribute to conflict resolution in the neighbourhood through common actions. The Treaty on European Union states in its preamble that EU member states are ‘resolved to implement a common foreign and security policy including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, [. . .] thereby reinforcing the European identity and its independence in order to promote peace, security and progress in Europe and in the world’ (2008). How it scores in this ambition has clear cut practical, as well as theoretical, relevance. That is why this book seeks to assess how the EU acts as a conflict management actor. A number of empirical puzzles have been at the source of this research. Given the global ambitions of EU foreign policy, why does the EU choose to get involved in some conflicts in the neighbourhood, but not in others? Why and under what conditions does the EU decide to get involved in conflict management? What determines the scope and form of EU conflict resolution efforts? What is the impact of EU conflict management policies? Similarly important for our understanding of the EU is explaining the opposite: why and under what conditions does the EU choose not to get involved in conflicts? What makes the EU choose not to intervene? What are the mechanisms and motivations of the member states for blocking common EU action, particularly when no vital national interests are at stake? EU conflict management policies are an under-­theorized phenomenon, especially when it comes to explaining non-­involvement in conflicts in the eastern neighbourhood. In addressing this gap, some of the questions worth asking are: why is the EU involved in conflict resolution in Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but not in Nagorno-­Karabakh? More narrowly, why has the EU deployed border assistance teams to Moldova and Georgia, but avoided to even seriously discuss the sending of peacekeepers, at least before the August 2008 war? Perhaps, most important is the fact that identifying patterns in EU policies toward conflicts in the eastern neighbourhood also contributes to the more fundamental discussion on the nature of the EU as a foreign policy actor. This research sheds more light on the internal workings of the EU by

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4  Introduction asking questions such as: What is the relationship between EU institutions and member states in EU foreign policy? What drives EU involvement in conflicts? Is EU policy toward separatist conflicts in the neighbourhood merely a function of the interests of member states that dominate EU foreign policy? Do supranational institutions matter in initiating, shaping and implementing EU policies on conflict resolution? If they do matter, when, how and under what conditions will the workings of these institutions trump the interests of EU member states? Can general theories of European integration help to account for the patterns of EU conflict management policies? What are the dynamics of cooperation or competition between the various actors operating from within the EU and its member states when it comes to EU conflict management policies?

The literature Despite the fact that EU foreign policy is one of the most popular topics in European Union studies today, it remains chronically under-­theorized. Theoretical work on EU foreign policy is ‘meagre’ compared to work on the internal aspects of European integration. Given the rather unique character of the EU as an enterprise, it has been argued that it is not surprising that no general theory has arisen to explain EU foreign policy-­making (K. Smith 2004: 12). Philippe Schmitter, one of the pioneers of European integration theory, even claimed that: all students of regional integration [. . .] now understand that no single theory will be capable of explaining dynamics and predicting its outcome. The EU is already the most complex polity ever created by human artifice and it is going to become even more so before it reaches its end-­state – whatever that will be. (Schmitter 2004: 69) Indeed, most existing books and articles on EU foreign policy provide empirical and factual accounts of what EU foreign policy is and how it operates, but pay less attention to comprehensively theorizing EU foreign policy (White 2000; Nuttal 2000; K. Smith 2003; M. Smith 2003; Mahncke et al. 2004; Casarini and Musu 2007; Ginsberg 2007; Krotz 2009). This equally applies to the literature on EU conflict management, where most of the existing literature is predominantly empirical (Monar 2002; Piana 2002; Salmon 2002; Sourd 2005; Faria 2004; Ioannides 2006; Emerson and Gross 2007; Batt 2004, 2005; Knaus and Cox 2004; Martinelli 2006; Gunaryadi 2006; Grevi 2005; Tannam 1997; K. Smith 2003; de Vries 2002; Bourne 2003b; Sasse 2009). There is a growing body of literature using mid-­range theories to conceptualize the EU role in conflict management (Hill 2001; Comelli et al. 2007; Coppieters et al. 2004; Tocci 2004b; Barbe and Kienzle 2007; Papadimitriou et al. 2007; Kurowska and Tallis 2009; Gegout 2009; Hughes

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Introduction  5 2009). However, more often than not these studies do not offer a theoretical framework for understanding EU involvement in conflicts more generally and which could be applied to other cases of conflicts. Still, given the fact that EU conflict management is a relatively recent phenomenon, it could hardly be otherwise. Without taking stock of EU’s record in conflict management – one could hardly advance too far in theorizing it. Second, with some exceptions (Comelli et al. 2007; Coppieters et al. 2004; Diez et al. 2008; Gordon and Sasse 2008; Sasse 2009; Tocci 2007), the literature on EU conflict management tends to focus on single case studies (Aoun 2003; Diez 2000; Faria 2004; Kurowska and Tallis 2009; Nugent 2000; Rumelili 2007; Salmon 2002; Sourd 2005; Tocci 2004a). These case studies are rich in empirics concerning the workings of the EU, the policy instruments it uses and the impacts its actions have. Nonetheless, single case-­ studies do not allow for a comparative analysis of EU actions across cases, thereby limiting opportunities for valid generalizations across cases. There is an emerging literature comparing two or more cases of EU involvement, but they are also predominantly empirical or focus on specific EU policy instruments (such as civilian crisis-­management, or EU Special Representatives) across a number of conflicts (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2006; ICG 2006; Grevi 2007; Emerson and Gross 2007; Hughes 2009). Third, the bulk of the literature theorizing EU and conflict management has so far focused on states that were or are (potential) candidate states for EU membership – Cyprus, Central and Eastern Europe, Turkey and the Western Balkans (Diez 2002; Kelley 2004a; Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2006; Tocci 2007; Sebastian 2009; Gordon 2009). In all these cases, the EU has used its most potent external policy instrument so far – membership conditionality – investing enormous amounts of funding into promoting conflict resolution, supporting reforms and preventing conflicts. The EU policy toward secessionist conflicts in EU member states or candidate countries may thus tell us little about what drives the EU in conflict management efforts on a global scale. This is because EU foreign policy is largely tied up with enlargement policy in European cases of conflict and the degree of EU commitment to achieving conflict resolution goals is unlikely to be replicated elsewhere. But the most important limitation in virtually all the existing research on EU and conflict management ignores the EU decisions not to intervene, as analysts focus almost entirely on conflicts where EU involvement already occurs. EU decisions to intervene in such conflicts have variously been explained through humanitarian concerns (Sudan, DR Congo), geopolitics (Western Balkans, Moldova, the Middle East), commitment to alliance with the US (Iraq, Afghanistan) and external pressures and expectations for action (Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan, Chad, DR Congo, Moldova, Georgia). However, only a few studies seek to explain why the EU chooses non-­action in some cases (Helly 2003). In other words, virtually none of this scholarship explores non-­events, i.e. cases where the EU chose not to intervene.

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6  Introduction This creates a significant selection bias in attempts to explain EU conflict management policies. EU inaction or decisions not to intervene in conflicts provide additional information concerning the nature of the EU as a foreign policy actor, and such cases have significant untapped analytical potential. By studying only those cases where the EU engages in conflict settlement, one cannot answer important questions such as: Why and under what conditions does the EU decide to get involved in conflict resolution? When does the EU choose not to intervene? Once a decision to intervene is taken, what determines the type of intervention the EU will pursue? As this book argues, decisions about non-­involvement are as important and revealing about the nature of the EU as a foreign policy actor as the decisions to intervene. Therefore, one should take a step back in the policy process and study not just the results of EU interventions in conflicts, but how the EU decides to intervene, which has been largely overlooked in the existing literature. By problematizing the decision to intervene, and the way the EU proceeds to make such decisions, we can advance existing understandings of the pattern of EU engagement in conflicts worldwide. This book has greatly benefited from the numerous studies on EU conflict management which are mentioned above and seeks to bridge some of the lacunae in the existing literature. It develops and tests some of the claims already made about the EU, namely that the EU tends to work around the conflicts, rather than directly engage in conflict resolution efforts (ICG 2006a; Diez et al. 2008); that it is a mainly an economic, rather than a political, actor in conflict management (Gogia 2008; Hughes 2009); that non-­intervention is often due to a lack of agreement among EU states, rather than a lack of capabilities (Gegout 2009: 410); and that the EU sometimes prefers the policies of non-­action or declaratory actions, while avoiding doing anything substantive that would challenge the existing status quo (Helly 2003). It is equally important to understand the tensions between an EU that oscillates between a certain record of ‘no or insufficient action until a crisis has fully escalated’, and the entrapment it experiences in dealing with specific issues (Whitman and Wolff 2010: 10; and Schimmelfennig 2001; 2004; Sasse 2009). This book naturally builds on all the literature that has explained in such detail the EU’s actions in conflict management, opening the way to raise questions about the EU’s non-­actions as well.

Competing explanations Theories of European integration are a logical starting point for an analysis of the EU’s crisis-management policies. This book will make use of two theoretical frameworks – (liberal) intergovernmentalist and institutionalist – in order to understand and unwrap the politics of EU interventions and non-­ interventions in conflict management.

Introduction  7

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Intergovernmentalism Foreign affairs is the one policy area with the least delegation of authority to supranational institutions in Brussels, and the highest level of control by EU member states. Therefore it should be the ‘most likely’ case for confirming intergovernmentalist accounts of EU foreign policy action. Intergovernmentalists claim that integration with other states, particularly in foreign policy, is limited, if not close to impossible (Hoffmann 1964, 1995, 2000). As Stanley Hoffman argues ‘domestic differences and different world views obviously mean diverging foreign policies’ (Hoffmann 1966: 863). Therefore, states engage in inter-­state integration only when their interests converge (Grieco 1995: 35; Milward 1984). But even in such cases, states retain control of the outcomes of their bargaining, as well as the institutions they use to manage, enforce and supervise their agreements. Donald Puchala summarizes the core intergovernmentalist assumptions: ‘the initiators, promoters, mediators, legislators and promulgators of deepening and broadening European integration are the national governments in general, the governments of the major EU countries in particular, and heads of government, heads of state and powerful ministers most specifically. Agents associated with European institutions, exercise only marginal influence at best [. . .] and this, on many occasions, turns out to be either redundant or self-­defeating’ (Puchala 1999: 319). Because of the fundamentally diverging interests of member states, integration and cooperation usually happens at the speed of the least willing state, which leads to decisions reflecting the ‘lowest common denominator’ (Vaquer i Fanés, 2004: 94). However, such approaches do not take into account the domestic setting in which foreign policy preferences are developed (Hill 2003; Putnam 1988). To account for this, Andrew Moravcsik has developed a liberal intergovernmentalist theory of EU integration (Moravcsik 1991, 1993, 1998, 2005; Moravcsik and Vachudova 2005). If one applies this theoretical reading of the EU to conflict management policies, the analysis of the sources and conduct of EU conflict management policies (and foreign policy more generally) can be structured around three sets of issues – the way EU member states formulate their interests, the way they decide upon their joint (non-) actions through bargaining and the role of EU institutions in formulating EU’s policy outputs or lack of thereof. Interests formation First, cooperation between states is driven by patterns of rationally defined interest, where national leaders pursue the commercial interests of powerful economic actors in their respective countries (Moravcsik 1998: 3). When member states’ interests converge, integration advances. In this model the dominant (though not only) motivations of governments is ‘not geopolitical threats or ideals, but pressures to coordinate policy responses to rising opportunities for profitable economic exchange’ (Moravcsik 1998: 6–7). Moreover,

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8  Introduction when integration perceptibly generates positive geopolitical externalities, governments tend to support integration, but when integration is perceived to cause negative geopolitical externalities, governments tend to oppose it (Moravcsik 1998: 29). Under such a model, EU member states individually decide whether they have an interest in committing to conflict management policies. The domestic factors influencing this decision include political pressures from public opinion or domestic interest groups (businesses or ethnic diasporas) or geographic proximity to conflict zones that could lead to refugee inflows or spillover of organized crime. States can be motivated to promote, support or block EU conflict management due to the influence of a number of factors, such as public opinion, the interests of powerful economic actors within the member state, or because of a high level of interdependence between an EU member states and a neighbouring conflict due to geographic proximity. Domestic economic actors can have a stake in issues related to conflict management. Azerbaijan, for example, is an important oil- and gas-­producing country in the Caspian, an important destination for Western investment and a country enmeshed in a conflict with Armenia over the breakaway region of Nagorno-­Karabakh. Thus Western companies might have a stake in promoting stabilization and conflict resolution in Azerbaijan. But there also are concurrent considerations for domestic economic actors. A number of EU member states have domestic interest groups that oppose EU foreign policy actions that might irritate Russia since this can affect their business prospects in Russia. Many of these companies have big business interests in Russia and are actively lobbying EU governments not to challenge Russia on issues such as human rights or the common neighbourhood, including the secessionist conflicts in post-­Soviet space. Moreover, there are no opposing business lobbies that favour a more active EU support for states like Moldova or Georgia, since their economic interests in these countries are very limited. This is also consistent with Nye’s claim that multinationals can lobby their home governments on behalf of their host states (Nye 1974). EU member states may also have an interest in EU conflict management due to geographical proximity and interdependence with non-­EU member states. Integration of states can result from exogenous pressures generated by interdependence (Moravcsik 1998). This means that EU member states that are geographically closest to the conflicts of the eastern neighbourhood are most likely to be affected by their negative consequences and therefore are likely to be promoters of more active EU responses to the external dangers posed by instability in neighbouring countries. Bargaining and decision-­making in the EU Given their domestically-­formulated interests, EU states negotiate EU conflict management policies. The EU has limited foreign policy resources – from the number of militaries to deploy in peace support operations to development

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Introduction  9 funding – and various EU member states lobby for the EU to pay attention to specific conflicts in what is often a zero-­sum competition for resources. Under a liberal intergovernmentalist interpretation EU member states therefore bargain over the modalities and scale of EU involvement in conflict resolution, while the influence of EU institutions is negligible. Different EU member states have different stakes in each conflict. The policy-­drivers of EU involvement in post-­Soviet conflicts would be the new EU member states, particularly Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and the Baltic states, which have land or sea borders with the eastern neighbourhood, have the highest levels of interdependence with the countries of the eastern neighbourhood, and are most interested in the EU playing an active role in conflict resolution in the region. However, their interest in seeing an active EU in the eastern neighbourhood is generally moderate. To start with, they have other priorities – politicians and national bureaucracies in new EU member states are much more preoccupied with other political priorities such as joining the Euro zone, managing economic difficulties, joining the border-­free Schengen area (for Romania and Bulgaria) and obtaining the free movement of workers in the old EU member states. Their political energy is primarily directed at these objectives. They are also relatively far away from the South Caucasus – where three out of four post-­Soviet conflicts are located. They do not have big business groups or multinationals with significant interests in the eastern neighbourhood and their economic presence in these regions is limited. Only Moldova is in the immediate neighbourhood of the EU, but even it borders only on Romania, which joined the EU in 2007. Moreover, most are small states (except for Poland), and all of them are net-­recipients of EU funding – which reduces their relative bargaining power in the EU. They are asymmetrically dependent on the biggest EU budget contributors such as Germany. From an intergovernmentalist perspective, the ‘brakemen’ for EU conflict resolution in the eastern neighbourhood are expected to be the Southern states of the European Union. France, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Malta, Cyprus and Greece have a primary interest in the southern neighbours of the EU. After almost two decades of focusing on the East, they are calling for a reorientation toward the south to focus on conflicts in the Middle East, Western Sahara and Sub-­Saharan Africa, as well as the dangers of illegal immigration from the south; such issues have much greater salience for the southern states. Some of them also have post-­colonial interests and links to the southern neighbourhood of the EU. Therefore, the southern EU member states have high stakes in promoting a strong engagement of the EU south of the Mediterranean. Since the EU has limited foreign policy resources – from the number of troops that can be deployed in peace support operations to development funding – there is a certain degree of competition between the two neighbourhoods for EU attention, funds and commitment. This prioritization of the south is reinforced by the fact that some of these states – such as Italy, France, Greece and Cyprus – have very strong economic links to Russia, which only reinforces their scepticism regarding a greater EU role

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10  Introduction in the eastern neighbourhood that challenges Russia (Leonard and Popescu 2007). Moreover, France, Italy and Spain are also powerful players in the EU and their relative weight is much stronger than that of the new and mostly small EU member states. Consequently, the ‘brakemen’ in this area of EU decision-­making have much greater bargaining power in the EU than the new member states (which generally favour EU involvement in the post-­Soviet conflicts). This results in a much-­abridged version of EU crisis-management policies in the eastern neighbourhood. In between these two extremes lie the other EU member states. Germany is interested in a stable eastern neighbourhood, but it is also Russia’s most important economic partner which leads Berlin to vacillate between supporting strong EU conflict management policies and opposing them due to fears of irritating Russia. The Nordic states and the UK generally support increasing EU activism in the eastern neighbourhood, but have a low intensity of preferences on the subject and are therefore mostly supportive ‘policy-­takers’, rather than ‘policy-­drivers’ (Lessesnki 2009). With such internal ambivalence, the level of EU engagement in these conflicts is likely to be low. In a situation where every state has a veto, ‘brakemen’ have more bargaining power, while side-­payments and issue linkages are nearly ‘taboo’ in foreign policy issues (Smith 2004a: 97–8), it is inevitable that the EU continues to mainly move at the speed of the ‘lowest common denominator’ – which may amount to complete inaction or symbolic acts such as official declarations condemning the conflict (Smith 2004a: 102). The EU ‘brakemen’ often accept some low-­cost gestures of EU conflict resolution on issues of small significance in order to placate the ‘drivers’, but would prevent the development of full-­fledged and pro-­active policies. EU institutions From an intergovernmentalist perspective, EU institutions play a very limited role in EU foreign policy. In economic integration, institutions are established as independent enforcers of bargains between states, but their role in foreign policy is extremely limited because this area of cooperation is entirely intergovernmental. In the intergovernmentalist view, institutions primarily reflect the interests of powerful EU member states, and member states coordinate their foreign policy positions whenever possible to increase EU’s bargaining power toward external non-­EU actors. Thus, EU institutions are instruments for translating the preferences of powerful states into policy. They also tend to reflect the lowest common denominator agreements of member states. At the same time EU member states are in firm control of the EU institutions across policy domains. EU institutions do not play an independent role in this process, as member states keep institutions in check through their representatives in Brussels and the countries affected by the conflicts. When institutions overstep the lowest common denominator, they are penalized by EU member states.

Introduction  11

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Institutionalism An alternative account of EU foreign policy is provided by institutionalist theories. The central claims of institutionalism, as formulated by Pierson, is that states ‘may be in a strong position, seek to maximise their interests, and nevertheless carry out institutional and policy reforms that fundamentally transform their own positions (or those of their successors) in ways that are unanticipated and/or undesired’ (Pierson 1996: 126). While such theories recognize the importance of EU member states in shaping EU foreign policy (Pollack 1996: 430), EU institutions are seen to play an independent role in the process. Here, EU institutions are treated as intervening variables between EU member states preferences and policy outputs (Pollack 1996; Pollack 1997). They are thus able to generate policy outcomes that go beyond what the member states initially intended (Pollack 1998; Barnett and Finnemore 1999; Thelen and Steinmo 1992). The institutionalist interpretation of EU conflict management policies thus proceeds through the same three phases of analysing interest formation, decision-­making and the role of EU institutions. Interest formation An institutionalist account of EU conflict resolution would largely accept the premises of intergovernmentalist theory of interest formation which claim that the states are the primary actors in EU foreign policy, with two significant caveats however. First, the interests of states are established not only in the domestic setting, or as a result of exogenous pressures of interdependence, but also as a result of spillover (see below). Moreover, the interests of states are defined not only in domestic settings, but also as a result of spillover, which creates pressures to expand EU policy activities from one area to another. Another aspect of an institutionalist account of EU conflict resolution relates to the interests of EU institutions. They are able to pursue their interests as institutional agents with a certain degree of autonomy from EU member states (Stetter 2007). These institutions seek to maximize or preserve their foreign policy prerogatives and autonomy from member states. Negotiations and decision-­making at EU level Institutionalists acknowledge that states have a primary role in negotiating­ aspects of EU cooperation, particularly regarding foreign policy action. At the same time, EU institutions can also be actors in their own right. They often behave as separate autonomous actors in trying to advance their policy preferences. It has even been argued that on foreign policy issues, the EU high representative has been participating in the policy process ‘in a role resembling a forceful additional EU member’ (Jonsson and Stromvik 2005: 24). To do so, EU institutions can build alliances with other national

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12  Introduction governments, manipulate information or sponsor compromises. They are also important platforms where national governments can re-­define their interests. As Michael Smith argues, ‘consensus-­building and problem solving, peer-­pressure and persuasion, not bargaining and issue-­linkages’ are the norm for negotiating foreign policy actions (M. Smith 2004a: 107). In such a setting, states will sometimes prefer to resolve crises of contradictions by expanding mutual obligations (‘spillover’) rather than contracting or simply reasserting them (Schmitter 2004: 57). EU institutions Institutions also matter in negotiations over EU foreign policy. They can act as intervening variables in negotiation among EU states (Martin and Simmons 1998: 733). The EU institutions are likely to impact the bargains between EU member states for a number of reasons. First, institutions pursue power-­ maximising strategies (Puchala 1999: 318). Power comes from expanding mandates for action supported by EU member states, which makes the institutions natural drivers for more assertive EU conflict management policies. Thus, once the EU has appointed EU special representatives for certain conflict areas, one expects that these institutional agents will seek to promote joint EU action, expand the number of personnel under their command to promote a higher level of involvement through increased assistance and launch of EU-­led operations. Second, EU institutions can sometimes benefit from information asymmetries to promote greater involvement of the EU in conflict management in the eastern neighbourhood. Despite the fact that the EUSRs report regularly to member states in the Political and Security Committee, they often retain higher knowledge of the situation on the ground than an absolute majority of member states. EUSRs have local offices and interact with EU missions in Moldova/Ukraine and Georgia, while most EU member states do not have embassies in Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. EU institutions are therefore an important source of analysis, information and expertise, which are important because they shape the perceptions of EU member states on the stakes of the EU in various conflict areas (Grevi 2007: 33). Third, to achieve greater involvement in conflict management, EU institutions seek to increase the minimum level of tolerance for EU involvement in separatist conflicts. They use information asymmetries, agenda-­setting power, the support of pro-­active member states and external demands for EU involvement to argue their case and support the expansion of EU actions (‘spillover’). Institutions thus seek the gradual expansion of their own prerogatives by gradually locking in EU member states into new policy commitments. They can also exploit differences between member states to strengthen their positions (Pollack 1996, 1998). Fourth, EU institutions use external stimuli or crises situations to strengthen their demands vis-­à-vis EU member states for common action at the EU level

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Introduction  13 (Ginsberg 1999; Schmitter 2004: 59). As Krotz argued, ‘exogenous shocks, for example, major terrorist attacks, security crises or regional outbreaks of violence, energy shocks or natural or environmental disasters could generate political dynamics’ which amplify the degree of EU involvement in some policy areas (Krotz 2009: 570). Such external stimuli are used by pro-­active institutions­to convince reluctant member states to agree to common EU action. Such actions can then lock states into a path-­dependent attachment to institutions and increase the price of exit from institutional arrangements. Thus, while in the short run institutions may play the role assigned to them by negotiating states, over time institutions (agents) manage to relax the constraints imposed on them by states (principals), and gaps in control of institutions by member states emerge (Pierson 2004: 119). To explain how states become locked into institutions and how the latter expand their autonomy, functions and influence, institutionalist theories draw on the concept of spillover drawn from the neofunctionalist theory of European integration. Spillover is ‘a situation in which a given action, related to a specific goal, creates a situation in which a specific goal can be assured only by taking further actions and so forth’ (Lindberg 1963: 10), meaning that actions in one sector create pressures on adjacent sectors (Haas 58: 283–317). Through spillover, policy integration becomes self-­enforcing (Sandholtz and Sweet 1998: 6). However, spillover is neither automatic, nor always intended by those who engage in policy integration (Ohrgaard 1997: 17). Spillover occurs when there is a deliberate sponsorship of cooperative initiatives (see Rosamond 2000: 61; Tranholm-­Mikkelsen 1991: 13–16; Puchala 1999).

The argument Both liberal intergovernmentalist and institutionalist accounts explain important­aspects of EU intervention into post-­Soviet conflicts. Rather than refuting one or the other theory, this book tries to explain the conditions under which one or the other theory sheds greater light on EU policy-­making in conflict management. The book identifies that the patterns of EU intervention vary depending on whether the EU tries to tackle high- or low-­politics of conflict management. High-­politics refers to controversial, politicized and securitized EU decisions to intervene in conflict-­resolution processes where a danger of violence is present, or EU intervention is strongly opposed by other stakeholders. The low-politics of conflict management comprises routine and uncontroversial decisions to support conflict prevention or post-­conflict rehabilitation in non-­violent conflict zones through financial means or civilian crisis management capabilities. One of the main arguments of this book is that EU foreign policy is like a light airplane: it can fly without being caught on radar as long as it flies ‘low’. By flying low (and slow), such an airplane can advance quite far into ‘foreign’ territory. However, as soon as it increases its altitude, it will be detected by radars, and actions may be taken to halt the aircraft. The same applies to

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14  Introduction the role of EU institutions in conflict management. To avoid stepping on EU member states’ toes, EU institutions adopt a policy of stealth conflict intervention, where they move carefully and quietly by operating predominantly in the low-­politics of conflict resolution. By ‘flying low,’ they are capable of gradually extending their prerogatives and EU-­level foreign policy in low-­ politics issues. EU institutions sponsor the adoption by EU member states of low-­cost actions undertaken over longer periods of time, which can lead to a significant cumulated policy impact. I call this process ‘dosage’, which refers to the strategy of disaggregating policy objectives into sequences of low-­cost, technical and relatively uncontroversial policy actions, which are proposed by EU institutions one by one to member states over longer periods of time. Such a strategy decreases potential opposition to new policy initiatives (because they are low-­cost), but repeated again and again can amount to substantial policy changes. However, if certain issues suddenly become controversial, or EU institutions enter into high-­politics, and move too far from the anticipated lowest common denominator as part of their pro-­active approach to conflict management, EU member states may move to limit their autonomy, and the lowest common denominator tends to prevail. Moreover, this is a dynamic process. Some issues related to EU conflict management can emerge as low politics, but then move into high politics as a result of member states’ attention or externally-­driven politicization of the issue. The reverse is also possible. EU institutions might seek to depoliticize issues in order to be able to tackle them better (while also having greater autonomy of action in their foreign policy interventions). The nature and the controversiality of issues can vary over time, depending on external factors such as the security situation on the ground. Thus it is most useful to see the divergence between high- and low-­politics as a continuum where the border between the two varies across time and conflict zones. Political actors can transform low-politics issues into high-politics issues by escalating the political tensions around them or raising their salience by ‘securitizing’ them.1 Old definitions of high- and low-politics need to be reconsidered for the purposes of this analysis. In the EU integration literature (especially the neofunctionalism of the 60–70s), high-­politics used to refer to issues of political sovereignty, foreign policy, security, defence and/or identity of states, while low politics referred to issues of economic integration, built on routine exchanges between technocrats, which have clear and measurable gains for its participants (M. Smith 2003: 5–6). But this classical distinction is of little help in modern EU decision-­making. For a new classification one could use the distinction between routine and crisis policy-­making identified in the literature on foreign policy analysis (Webber and Smith 2002). Within such a distinction, routine policy-­making­ refers to decisions taken through a slow process of consultation and decision-­ making, with a high number of persons involved with choosing from a broad range of options in an extended time-­frame, where the potential costs of

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Introduction  15 policy failure are low and the use of force is unlikely. The opposite ideal type is ‘crisis policy’ making, which involves relatively urgent responses to surprise situations where a restricted numbers of policy makers decide from a narrow range of options. EU conflict management seems a priori likely to correspond to crisis policy-­ making, i.e. to the high-politics aspect of EU foreign policy. However, this is not always the case. The high-politics of EU conflict management refers to decisions that are controversial and can provoke political conflicts with external or internal actors, and/or involve a certain likelihood of violence. Consequently, high politics issues in conflict management can involve decisions to send peacekeepers, or other types of peace-­support operations such as border monitors or police missions in areas where personnel could be exposed to violence. But there is also a low-­politics of conflict management that can refer to relatively uncontroversial decision-­making, in environments with reduced potential for violence and low likelihood for provoking conflict with external actors. This mainly refers to technical aspects of EU influence on conflict resolution patterns through instruments such as financial assistance, low-­ cost sanctions, support for institution-­ building, education programmes, trade-­promotion­and the dispatch of border monitors or police officers in non-­violent environments. Such issues remain outside the public realm, and do not c­ omprise crisis situations. Based on the set of theoretical assumptions outlined above, this book puts forward the following claims regarding EU conflict management policies. H1: EU institutions enjoy greater autonomy in the low-­politics of foreign policy, while EU member states retain firm control of high-­politics issues in EU foreign policy. EU member states are the principal actors in EU foreign decision-­making. However, EU institutions also play a role in this process, and they work more effectively in low politics (Richardson 2005; M. Smith 2004b). Even if EU foreign policy is intergovernmental, a number of EU policy instruments that can be used in conflict management such as EU funding, sending technical missions to conflict zones, and negotiating conditional trade regimes are within the remit and mandates of the EU institutions. These are predominantly depoliticized issues. EU institutions also enjoy agenda-­setting power in these areas. However, their influence is limited in high-­politics aspects of EU conflict resolution, where there are threats of violence or where EU foreign policy activism can affect the relations with non-­EU strategic partners of EU member states such as Russia. On these later issues, EU member states retain strict control of the foreign policy agenda, not only at times of big bargains, but on an almost daily basis via Brussels-­based committees of EU member states representatives. Moreover, the more controversial a decision is for EU member states, the more intergovernmental is the decision-­making process. By advancing such a hypothesis, I seek to identify the conditions under which agency autonomy is higher, in order to test the institutionalist claim

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16  Introduction that agency autonomy varies in predictable ways based on the politicization of an issue (Pollack 2001: 229). This hypothesis is also in line with Peterson and Bomberg’s claim that ‘when issues preoccupy high-­level decision makers, particularly foreign ministers, the ability of policy networks to shape decisions is strictly limited’ (1999: 248). In a sense, EU institutions are better able to promote changes in policies, but when it comes to changes of policies, their influence is more limited. H2: EU institutions have an in-­built predilection to act in low politics, which makes EU policies skewed in favour of relatively uncontroversial, risk-­averse aspects of conflict management. Because EU institutions have more room for manoeuvre – more autonomy, more prerogatives and more policy space – in the low-­politics of conflict management, the EU institutions try to depoliticize the politics of EU interventions. To a certain extent the objective of EU foreign policy is to turn political issues into technical, even boring, issues. The bureaucratization and depoliticization of EU conflict management policies increases the room for manoeuvre of EU institutions. Consequently, the EU as an institution tends to favour low-­politics conflict management measures. This implies that the EU can be mainly concerned with modifying the context in which conflicts occur rather than getting involved in high profile conflict resolution efforts such as peace-­keeping, conflict mediation or high-­level diplomacy. Therefore, the EU works mainly ‘around’ the conflicts. Most EU operations have been either concerned with low-­politics issues such as customs and border management, rule of law, police training, security sector reform; or happened in relatively non-­violent environments with the agreement of both conflict parties. The EU is better at tackling shadow-­ trade war economies and curbing economic motives underlying conflicts than engaging in hard-­security issues (Weiss 2008: 13). The result is that in its predilection toward the low-­politics of conflict management, the EU is often driven by what is possible to achieve in Brussels, rather than by necessities on the ground. This leads to the EU deploying a plethora of small-­scale, technical and low-­politics operations which even some EU officials call ‘Mickey Mouse missions’.2 This predilection for low-­politics clearly marked EU conflict management efforts in the eastern neighbourhood, where the EU special representatives and the European Commission more often than not avoided undertaking high-­profile actions and opted for low-­visibility, technical and depoliticized EU actions. EU member states however disproportionately take the lead on military peacekeeping operations, where EU countries are involved either unilaterally, as part of ‘coalitions of the willing’, or under a UN mandate as in Lebanon, Afghanistan or Cyprus. H3: EU institutions seek to boost EU conflict management policies through a strategy of ‘dosage’. In order to circumvent potential opposition by member

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Introduction  17 states, EU institutions promote a series of low-­intensity measures that over time can amount to substantial policy packages. As with many other bureaucratic structures EU institutions are driven by a desire to expand their mandates and power. This is often constrained by EU member states due to national interests and sensitivities, competing priorities, or the expected impact of EU intervention on their relations with third countries. To minimize member states’ sensitivities, EU institutions disaggregate their policy objectives into smaller ‘doses’ of policy measures, which are then proposed one by one to member states over longer periods of time. By putting low-­ politics, low-­cost, technical and relatively uncontroversial policy proposals on the agenda, EU institutional agents decrease the likelihood of opposition by EU member states. They repeat this game again and again, which can amount over time to the build-­up of increasing levels of EU involvement. Once the EU makes policy commitments to some issues, it is easier to expand further actions since the EU’s resources and reputation are already at stake (Thomas 2008: 11) and the EU can become entrapped into dealing with certain situations. Due to ‘dosage’, it is often easier for EU institutions to expand their actions further by building on previous actions and arguing that the achievement of initial objectives necessitates a higher level of commitment to EU conflict management (spillover). The way it works in real life can roughly be the following. For example, EU policy-­makers might consider that the EU should engage with peace­keepers in conflict area Y if the EU wants to make a significant contribution to the settlement of that conflict. But these policy-­makers also know that this is unlikely to be accepted by certain EU member states. Thus, the policy-­makers will most likely not propose the deployment of EU peacekeepers, but will instead put forward less controversial measures, such as deploying civilian crisis-­management capabilities (border monitors, police trainers) or increasing­ economic assistance. This was the modus operandi of the EU in the conflict in Moldova. An example of the way the EU got involved in Moldova was the case of border management. Since early 2003, the European Commission has sponsored Moldova–Ukraine consultations on border management around Transnistria in order to prevent trafficking and smuggling in the region. Ukraine was reluctant at the time to accept joint border posts with Moldova or to invite an EU border monitoring mission. However, the 2004 Orange Revolution provided a window of opportunity for the EU to get involved in border-­ monitoring in this case. Initially, the EU deployed a 70-­person mission with a EUR 6 million budget for two years in late 2005. In March 2006, the EU pressed Ukraine to turn away Transnistrian goods without Moldovan customs stamps. In mid 2006, the EU institutions obtained an extension of the mission to 122 international experts and a tripling of the mission’s budget to EUR 20 million. In late 2007, the mandate of the mission was extended for another two years, and the budget was raised to EUR 24 million (and then extended again until 2011). Through a series of policy doses, the EU has increased its presence on the ground over time. Had the EU institutions

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18  Introduction requested such a big mission (122 persons, and a 24 million budget) from the very beginning, the likelihood of approval would have been lower. However, dosage is not a guaranteed recipe for an ever-­expanding EU role in foreign-­policy. EU member states can stop the expansionary zeal of the EU institutions by vetoing either big policy packages or even smaller policy ‘doses’ of measures. However, no EU member state wants to be seen as systematically ‘obstructionist’ of EU conflict management in the neighbourhood. Hence, states tend to coordinate obstructionism or hide behind one another’s backs. Such instances occurred on a number of occasions in the EU policy towards Georgia, but also during a brief Spanish–Moroccan spat over the Perejil Islands in 2002 when Morocco occupied a small Spanish island and the EU failed to speak with a single voice after (Monar 2002). Similarly, when EU representatives discuss common policy toward the neighbourhood, many EU member states speak out against a too assertive EU. Importantly, however, they do so in turns. As some EU policy-­makers observe, one day and on one issue, it is country X that speaks against such policies, while another day and on another issue, it is country Y that expresses its opposition. The result is what this book calls ‘carousel foot-­dragging’, which refers to situations where various EU member states delay or block EU foreign policy actions in turns, without being seen as systematically obstructionist. If dosage is a way to expand common EU foreign policy action, carousel foot-­dragging is a way to counter such pro-­active policies at little reputational cost for EU member states. H4: When EU institutions engage in high-­politics without a mandate from the member states, EU member states will attempt to roll back EU institutional activism, if necessary by punishing institutional agents. The strategy of dosage is not without risks. Pro-­active institutional agents sometimes cross the line (or ‘hit the ceiling’) by trying to promote policy packages that are too big, too high-­politics or too costly to be accepted by sceptical member states. To return to an earlier metaphor: when an airplane flies so high that it can be detected by radar, this is likely to provoke action to halt it. Similarly, when EU institutions move into high-­politics, EU member states may punish EU institutional agents by re-­asserting control over the policy agendas of institutional agents, opposing their initiatives or even terminating their mandates. This was the case with the then EU Special Representative on Moldova in 2005–2007 who was promoting the idea of an EU peacekeeping operation in Moldova against the wishes of several key EU members and had to resign in the end. H5: External actors can affect EU decision-­making by raising the controversiality of issues or by lobbying EU member states to promote specific approaches to policy. Thus external actors can contribute to blocking, delaying, or on the contrary accelerating EU interventions in conflict management. EU policy-­making is most often analyzed in terms of bargaining and policy input from EU member states only. But more often than not the fact

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Introduction  19 that non-­EU member states can promote or block EU policies through their bilateral­partnerships with EU member states is disregarded. For example, both Georgia and Moldova have so-­ called informal ‘groups of friends’ among EU member states that sometimes promote policy initiatives in the EU. However, such lobbying is often insufficient to galvanize EU intervention. The status quo (as the lowest common policy denominator) tends to prevail in EU decision-­making, since it is much easier to block policies in the EU than it is to initiate new ones (Pierson 1996; Van Schendelen 2005). This is all the more so in the area of EU foreign policy, where every single EU member state has a veto right, which is not the case for most economic issues where many decisions are taken by qualified majority voting. In addition, the EU tends to assess the costs and benefits of its conflict management, not only in terms of its potential for inducing peace, but also in terms of the intervention’s impact on EU relations with third parties. For example, the EU is interested in promoting peaceful settlements of the conflicts in Western Sahara and the South Caucasus, but this can complicate its relations with Morocco and Russia who oppose such EU interventions. In such cases, the EU is internally conflicted, with some member states preferring involvement and others preferring the status quo of non-­involvement. Moreover, external partners can pro-­actively limit EU interventions by pushing EU conflict management policies into the domain of high-­politics by publicizing the controversiality of EU decisions. Politicization can be a deliberate strategy to make EU decision-­making more intergovernmental, which limits the room for manoeuvre for pro-­active EU institutions and increases the likelihood of EU blockage. The more controversial a decision is, the more intergovernmental the decision-­making process becomes, which leads to greater constraints imposed on EU institutions. Until the 2008 war over South Ossetia, Russia had consistently opposed EU intervention in conflict management in Georgia and constantly introduced the Georgian conflicts into public debates, forcing EU member states to treat the issue through the prism of their relations with Russia. This in turn led to greater intergovernmental scrutiny of EU actions in Georgia and limited the policy discretion of EU institutional agents.

Case studies In order to test the above claims on EU conflict management, this book looks into the development of EU policies toward four secessionist conflicts in the former Soviet Union, namely the conflict in Transnistria (Moldova), Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Georgia) and Nagorno-­Karabakh (Azerbaijan). The four case studies have been selected for a number of reasons. First, in order to study what drives EU conflict management policies, one must understand how the EU negotiates competing priorities with respect to these conflicts. Thus, I excluded cases of EU involvement in former accession candidates (Cyprus) or prospective member countries (the Balkans), because they

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20  Introduction are not representative of EU foreign policy toward conflicts more generally. The conflicts in Cyprus and the Balkans are or had been situated in prospective EU member states, leading to the highest levels of political, diplomatic, military and/or financial EU involvement. Since most decisions regarding EU conflict management will not involve prospective member states, the conditions that dictate such high levels of EU engagement are unlikely to be replicated elsewhere. In order to understand what drives the EU as a foreign policy actor, not an ever-­enlarging entity, we need to look into cases of countries which are not likely to join the EU in any foreseeable future. To understand the EU as a conflict management actor, one must study EU decision-­making in conflicts where EU involvement is not a foregone conclusion in either direction, and explain what drives EU policy choices in relation to those conflicts. The European neighbourhood provides a good set of conflicts for analysis because many of the background conditions of the conflicts from an EU standpoint are the same and yet EU involvement has varied considerably across these cases. Second, I comparatively examine not the ethnic conflicts themselves, but EU policies toward these four conflicts. I disaggregate the case studies to multiply observations (Moravcsik 1998: 19) and look into variations in EU policies over time in each of the cases of EU involvement. This maximizes the number of observations, for there are many EU foreign policy actions with respect to each conflict. By examining the individual policy of the EU toward each of these cases, the variation of EU policies both across the four cases and within each case becomes evident (Kelly 2004: 11–12). In these four cases, EU policies have ranged from relatively high levels of EU involvement (for a non-­candidate country) in the Transnistrian conflict, to a virtual lack of involvement in Nagorno-­Karabakh. Third, by choosing these four conflicts I control for many background conditions that are common to the region, which allows for a coherent and systematic analysis of EU conflict management policies. In all four cases, the book deals with the involvement of the EU in conflicts that share many structural traits. They are all cases of violent secessionism where de facto states have managed to consolidate their separation from weak metropolitan centres as a result of military victories in the early nineties. One might argue that in the current studies of ethnic conflict there is already an in-­built preference to study violent conflicts (Jenne 2007). However, limiting this research to violent conflict is necessary for examining how EU institutions and member states respond to cases of conflict that clearly fall under their remit for conflict resolution. Fourth, these four conflicts represent roughly similar levels of involvement by external actors, which influence EU decisions to become involved in the conflicts. On the one hand, Russia is very present politically, economically and militarily in the secessionist entities (although slightly less so in Nagorno-­ Karabakh). Russia also tends to view with suspicion EU involvement in these conflicts, which are seen to be located in its sphere of geopolitical interests.

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Introduction  21 On the other hand, the likely demandeurs for EU involvement – Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan – are all small states, whose problems are not very important to most EU governments. All these countries are at roughly similar stages of development of their relationship with the EU under the European Neighbourhood Policy. In all four cases of conflict, EU involvement in the conflicts is likely to have an impact on EU relations with Russia. Thus, in all four cases, the EU has a roughly similar distribution of factors supporting or hampering EU conflict management interventions. Therefore, explaining the different patterns of EU conflict management across the eastern neighbourhood may shed light on what motivates EU decisions to become involved in some conflicts, but not in others more generally. Clearly, there are certain limitations that the case selection imposes on arriving at generalizable predictions concerning EU intervention in conflicts worldwide. To begin with, this book deals only with EU intervention (or lack of thereof ) in secessionist conflicts, and deliberately excludes any analysis of EU actions vis-­à-vis civil wars or inter-­state conflicts such as in Tajikistan in 1992–1997, in Algeria in 1991–2002, Afghanistan since 2001, or the Lebanon–Israeli war in 2006. Another limitation on the generalizability of these findings has to do with the unique geopolitics of the region. On the one hand, the ‘Russian factor’ unifies the grounds for comparison of the four cases, but can also limit (but not nullify) the applicability of conclusions from these case studies to areas of the world where Russia is not a major player. In this view, Russia is in many ways a unique factor in EU foreign policy. It is the only great power that shares a neighbourhood with the EU and is often apprehensive of the EU’s increasing involvement in post-­Soviet affairs. In their deeply interdependent relationship, Russia and the EU have developed a rather ambivalent relationship that alternates between competition and cooperation, partnership and mistrust. Russia is an important constraining factor for EU involvement in the region. At the same time such a pattern is not entirely unique. In a similar way, other important partners of the EU, such as Turkey or Morocco, constrain EU policies toward the Kurdish, Cypriot or Western Sahara conflicts. Thus the hypotheses advanced in this book are worth testing in other cases where the ‘Russia factor’ is not present.

Methods In order to identify what drives EU conflict management, I rely on process-­ tracing­to reveal the timing and sequence of EU actions and the attitudes of key actors driving EU foreign policy such as EU institutions and member states (George and Bennett 2005). In order to study the patterns of EU involvement in these four conflicts, I disaggregate the case studies in order to multiply observations of EU foreign policy. In doing so, I analyse the EU policy of involvement in conflict resolution by looking at the actors involved, the process of involvement, the stakes in the conflict, the instruments of

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22  Introduction EU involvement, the policy context and the policy output of the EU (White 1999: 46). Conducting research on the EU decision-­making on conflict interventions is difficult due to limited access to data. When one studies the impact of EU interventions in certain conflicts (as most existing literature does), there is much more information available than in the study of the EU’s internal (and confidential) decision-­making. My focus on explaining not just EU intervention, but also non-­intervention, complicates access to data even further. Internal EU foreign policy discussions and documents are not publicly accessible. Moreover, when the EU decides not to undertake certain actions vis-­à-vis secessionist conflicts, this is usually not reflected in the media. Hence, the necessity to rely extensively on interviews with EU and non-­EU stakeholders and policy-­makers. This allowed this book to uncover substantial new empirical data that has not been in the public domain so far. In the analysis itself, I rely extensively on in-­depth semi-­structured interviews with officials and experts that have been involved in each of these conflicts. I have conducted some three hundred interviews with more than two hundred officials and experts. These include EU Special Representatives and their teams; officials in the European Commission, EU Council Secretariat and the European External Action Service; members of the EU Border Support Team in Georgia and the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia, former members of EUJUST THEMIS Rule of Law Mission to Georgia, experts in the EU Border Assistance Mission in Moldova/Ukraine based in Odessa and field offices in Kuchurgan, Ukraine and members of the European Parliament. I have also benefited enormously from meetings with numerous other officials and experts from international organizations such as the OSCE and the UN, as well as Russia and Ukraine. Many of these interviews were undertaken during periods of longer stays across the countries and regions concerned. Altogether, I spent a year and a half in Brussels, a year in Moldova (and frequent visits to Transnistria) and circa three months in Georgia (through several trips). I also made two trips to Abkhazia (in 2006 and 2009), a trip into South Ossetia (April 2008) and another to the dividing line between Georgia and South Ossetia (March 2009). I also conducted research in Armenia (March 2006) and Azerbaijan (April 2008 and July 2009). My fieldwork was most exciting. I was driven around South Ossetia in armoured vehicles, as well as simple cars (not least on a bypass road to the Georgian villages that had been often mined and caught in cross-­fires). I once stood on a balcony with a pro-­Georgian South Ossetian official who was a potential target for assassination attempts by snipers located on the surrounding hills north of Tskhinvali. I flew into Abkhazia on UN helicopters and was one of the last people to benefit from the UN missions support there after the UN presence in the region was vetoed by Russia in June 2009. I was once accepted on a military patrol only because some soldiers on the frontline had Moldovan friends while serving in the Soviet army a few decades ago

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Introduction  23 and therefore decided to be helpful to another Moldovan (they could also greet and curse in Romanian). I have also been to the no man’s land ­between Georgian and Russian/Ossetian militaries facing each other just a few hundred metres out of Tskhinvali. And I paid a traffic fine in Transnistria because the car I drove was allegedly not corresponding to environmental standards (which was not true). In the course of my field work, I have discussed EU conflict management policies in the eastern neighbourhood with the president of Georgia, the prime minister of Moldova, as well as ministers and numerous officials from all levels dealing with foreign affairs, conflict resolution, refugees and home affairs in Moldova and Georgia. In Abkhazia, I met the de facto president, deputy prime ministers and the foreign minister of the secessionist entity. In South Ossetia, I met the de facto foreign minister of the region as well as the head of the pro-­Georgian administration of South Ossetia. Equally important have been my discussions with people in and from the conflict zones: journalists, students, internally displaced persons, businessmen, taxi-­drivers, civil society activists, policemen and soldiers on the frontline. Given that there is little public record of many EU initiatives and (non-) actions vis-­à-vis these conflict zones, during the interviews I focused on finding out information on the context and the processes of EU decision-­ making, failed initiatives, and what actors supported what policies.3 I also enquired how EU actions are perceived by the parties to the conflict. I have conducted the interviews in Russian, Romanian (the language spoken in Moldova), French and English. This allowed me to engage in conversations with the respondents in languages that they are most comfortable with, which minimized­misunderstandings and improved communication. Such an interview-­focused research methodology has obvious drawbacks. It is very difficult to make an exhaustive list of EU decisions to intervene or not. Personnel turnover in EU institutions is also quite high, and institutional memory low. Personal biases are another factor. To minimize distortion I have triangulated information, by asking the same questions, checking possible interpretations and accounts of EU (non-)actions from various decision-­makers involved not just in the EU, but also EU member states, the EU’s partner countries, Members of the European Parliament, journalist and media reports.

Overview of the book Throughout the book runs a story that seeks to explain EU intervention and non-­intervention in neighbourhood conflicts. Chapter 2 takes a detour to explain some of the aspects of the EU’s complex foreign policy machinery­, without which one cannot understand EU conflict management policies. Chapter 3 unpacks the case of EU conflict resolution in Transnistria, the conflict with the highest level of EU engagement in the eastern neighbourhood. Chapter 4 discusses the role of the EU in conflict resolution in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Chapter 5 explains some of the failed attempts of EU

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24  Introduction involvement in Nagorno-­Karabakh and why the EU is relatively uninvolved in this specific conflict. The issue of non-­involvement in Nagorno-­Karabakh provides a good test for the validity of the claims made here about the conditions under which the EU decides to become involved in conflicts more generally. After a detailed analysis of EU intervention and non-­interventions in conflict management, the case studies have found empirical evidence that support the claim that EU institutions have played a more significant independent role and have been able to influence policy outcomes predominantly in the low-­politics of conflict resolution. When it came to high-­visibility and controversial issues, however, EU member states were much more in control of the policy-­agenda leading to a much more clogged decision-­making process. At the same time, EU institutions tried to pursue a strategy of stealth engagement in secessionist conflicts through a strategy of ‘dosage’ by which they gradually ramp up the tolerance of EU member states to EU actions.

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2 EU foreign policy and conflict management

European integration has probably been the most successful exercise in ­conflict resolution in history. It started with the integration of the coal and steel ­industries of Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg in the early 1950s, and later became an economically integrated community of states, which has constituted the basis of a peaceful Europe for more than half a century. The driving forces behind European integration were economic, but the objectives were predominantly political. As integration advanced and the potential for conflicts in Western Europe faded, the European Union’s concern with conflicts gradually externalized. The EU’s concern was increasingly with non-­EU conflicts which could affect its security. After the end of the Cold War, the EU was dragged into efforts to prevent, manage and resolve potential and existing conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans. With eastern enlargement effectively accomplished and the EU’s common foreign and security policy developing apace, the EU has been playing an increasingly active role in conflict ­management worldwide. Before turning to the record of EU intervention in the post-­Soviet conflicts, this chapter seeks to clarify some of the complex ways in which the EU institutional machinery decides and acts in conflict management. It deals with the pre- and post-­Lisbon Treaty institutional arrangements of the EU. With a complicated and gradually changing division of authority on foreign policy issues between the European Commission, the EU Council and EU member states, such clarifications are necessary. In order to place the EU policies towards the post-­Soviet conflicts in the broader context, the chapter briefly outlines the EU’s global conflict management efforts, as well as the EU’s regional policies in the eastern neighbourhood.

The pre-­Lisbon EU institutional maze Describing the EU in a concise and precise manner is a challenge at the best of times. With policies decided and implemented by the Council of the EU, the European Commission, the European Parliament and EU member states, it is often difficult to find one’s way through the institutional maze called the EU.

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26  EU foreign policy and conflict management Not only is the EU a complex machinery, but at the time of writing it was also undergoing the most substantial reform of its foreign policy apparatus – the implementation of the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty. Consequently, this chapter will have to outline two sets of complex institutions – before and after the Lisbon Treaty. Since the period covered by the book mainly refers to the pre-­Lisbon world of EU foreign policy, making a detailed-­account of the EU pre-­Lisbon apparatus is necessary. It has been argued elsewhere that the very ‘messiness’ of the EU as a policy system makes it difficult to formulate reliable descriptions – let alone theoretical models – which will capture more than just a few aspects of the policy process (Richardson 2005). Thus, a short introduction to the institutional actors and Euro-­speak relevant for EU conflict management policies will facilitate the reading of the following chapters, which deal with specific cases of EU foreign policy on conflicts.1 What follows is far from an exhaustive description of how the EU works (see Hill and Smith 2005; Bomberg et al. 2008), but a snapshot of selected bits of the EU machinery that are needed to understand the record of EU policy towards the post-­Soviet conflicts. The EU Council Before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Council of the European Union, or EU Council, was the most important EU institution in the area of EU foreign policy, including the EU’s security and defence policies. On foreign policy matters the EU Council represented a whole network of bodies and institutional agents: the EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (its pre-­Lisbon title), a secretariat general, various committees of EU member states, working groups and EU Special Representatives. The council of foreign ministers – the General Affairs and External Relations Council – oversaw the Common Foreign and Security Policy, which also included the European Security and Defence Policy. The EU Council was the institution that dealt with EU policies toward issues of security, defence and conflict management. It also oversaw almost all EU operations worldwide which involved peacekeeping, policing, strengthening the rule of law, security sector reform and border controls. The Council Secretariat is a body of some 3,000 permanent EU civil servants and seconded personnel from the EU member states. Most of its personnel worked on issues other than foreign policy. However, those who were in charge of foreign policy provided logistical assistance, analysis and advice to the EU presidency, the former High Representative for CFSP Javier Solana (who was double-­hatted as the Secretary General of the Council), and prepared Council meetings. The secretariat was not only serving the EU member states, but was often a powerful player in its own right. In some ways, it could sometimes be as influential as a big member state due to its diplomatic ability to manoeuvre, persuade and set the agenda, though it obviously did not have a veto right on foreign policy issues.2

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EU foreign policy and conflict management  27 In order to streamline its policy formulation, the EU sometimes appointed special envoys on problematic countries or regions that needed particular EU attention, though the appointment of EUSRs as substitutes for policies has not been uncommon (Grevi 2007: 41). The EUSRs were appointed by the Council, and they reported more or less regularly to the High Representative and EU member states’ representatives to the Political and Security Committee (see below). As of mid 2010 the EU had 11 EUSRs (on Afghanistan/Pakistan, the African Union, the African Great Lakes Region, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Central Asia, Kosovo, Macedonia, the Middle East, Moldova, the South Caucasus and Sudan), but under the Lisbon Treaty their number was likely to be reduced. Their task was to represent the EU abroad, inform the EU member states and institutions and coordinate EU policies on conflict zones (Grevi 2007: 42). The EUSRs, in cooperation with their political advisors, officials from the Policy Unit and the Council Secretariat would write policy reports, advance policy recommendations and engage in diplomatic consultations with relevant stakeholders inside and outside the EU. EUSRs did not dispose of any significant budgets for financial aid or assistance, which rested with the European Commission (see below). Thus their political influence in some conflict areas could be potentially reduced due to the disjuncture between the EU’s diplomatic track and its external financial assistance, since EUSRs could rarely use financial leverage to achieve political or security objectives (Grevi 2007: 48). In the pre- and post-­Lisbon EU, member states exercise control over the EU Council institutional actors such as EUSRs through an extensive network of committees and working groups of Brussels-­based diplomats from EU member states. The nexus of EU decision-­making on EU conflict management is the Political and Security Committee (PSC). The PSC consists of ambassador-­ level representatives of all 27 EU member states. They are responsible for preparing the foreign policy decisions for the Council of Ministers, discussing and taking decisions on appropriate EU reactions to crises worldwide, as well as approving specific EU joint actions and crisis-­management operations (Juncos and Reynolds, 2007). The PSC also approves the candidates for the position of EUSRs. The latter also periodically report to the PSC, and have their policy initiatives approved by the PSC. The member states are also able to control EU institutional agents through a number of working groups of lower-­ranking EU member states’ diplomats that assist the PSC in its work (Juncos and Pomorska 2008). These groups are either sectoral such as the Committee for Civilian Crisis Management (CIVCOM) or the EU Military Committee (EUCM); or geographical such as the Working Party on Eastern Europe and Central Asia (COEST), or similar groups working on Asia (COASI), Africa (COAFR), or the Western Balkans (COWEB). These committees reinforce the networks through which the EU member states contribute to the formulation of EU foreign policy and maintain­oversight of EU institutions.

28  EU foreign policy and conflict management

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The European Commission The European Commission is the EU’s executive arm. It consists of 27 European Commissioners (one per member state) overseeing various policy areas ranging from agriculture to competition, telecommunications to enlargement. On a bureaucratic level, the Commission consists of directorates general (DGs). There is more than one European Commissioner who covers different aspects of foreign policy including EU enlargement, neighbourhood, humanitarian­ aid, development and trade. Before the Lisbon Treaty, the central institution for foreign policy-­making in the European Commission was the DG for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy (DG RELEX). DG RELEX ran EU delegations that functioned as something in between an embassy (with political personnel) and technical assistance offices in a majority of countries of the world. The European Commission had widespread competencies in economic aspects of foreign policy, external aid as well as conflict prevention. If the Council tended to be responsible for the ‘harder’ and more high-­politics aspects of foreign policy – such as defence, security and crisis-­management – the European Commission tended to deal with the ‘softer’ or low-­politics aspects, such as trade, development assistance, civilian crisis management and conflict prevention (Smith 2004a: 213). Overall, when it came to conflict management policies, the European Commission often saw its role as being mainly confined to providing aid and offering financial assistance in support of policies that could achieve

Table 2.1  EU foreign policy toolbox EU Council policy instruments •  •  •  •  •  • 

Démarches, declarations High-­level visits Diplomatic sanctions Diplomatic recognition Political dialogue EU Special Representatives

•  •  •  •  •  • 

Sponsoring peace conferences Sending election observers Sending civilian experts Sending peace-­keepers Imposing arms embargoes Offering EU membership

European Commission policy instruments •  C  onclusion of trade, cooperation or association agreements •  Tariff reduction •  Quota increase •  Trade preferences •  Providing aid •  Extending loans Source: Adapted from K. Smith 2003: 61–2.

•  Ban on exports or imports •  Delaying, suspending or denouncing agreements •  Tariff increase •  Quota decrease •  Withdrawing trade preferences •  Reducing or suspending aid •  Delaying granting of loans

EU foreign policy and conflict management  29

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economic and political reform in conflict zones, in the hope that this would create better conditions for conflict settlement, while the Council tended to see its role in more political terms (Gordon and Sasse 2008; Whitman and Wolff 2010), but none of these institutions had an integrated toolbox of political power and economic statecraft that could work in a coherent manner. EU’s pre-­Lisbon dysfunctionalities The EU’s institutional complexities created significant problems of political coordination­, external representation, as well as it generated an ambiguous division of competencies and inter-­institutional rivalries. At the highest political level the EU had two senior foreign policy figures: the High Representative for CFSP and a Commissioner for External Relations. In addition, rotating presidencies of the Council changing every six months also had the mandate to represent the EU abroad and set the foreign policy agenda. And all these actors were supposed to represent the EU worldwide and contribute to the development of a common foreign policy often leading to a certain cacophony. As Javier Solana, the first EU High Representative, argued once: ‘It is true that the job is not easy today, but one of the reasons for that is the internal organisation and division of hats’ (House of Commons 2008: 55). These dysfunctionalities manifested themselves on practically the entire range of foreign policy issues, including EU conflict management policies. When one analyses EU contributions to conflict settlement one can imagine a continuum of policy stages ranging from conflict-­prevention to crisis-­management­to conflict resolution. In the case of the EU, different EU institutions had different prerogatives to act at different stages in this continuum. And anyway, it was often difficult, if not impossible, to determine where conflict prevention ended (a Commission prerogative), and crisis-­management began (a Council prerogative). It was also difficult to tell what part of the process consisted of post-­conflict rehabilitation (a Commission prerogative, again). This created significant grey areas where the EU Council and the European Commission often clashed over control over policies. One EU Council official claimed that ‘it is natural that on EU conflict management the European Commission and the EU Council compete because they offer the same product. Like Pepsi and Coca Cola’.3 This clearly created ‘rivalry, competition and overlap’ (House of Commons 2008: 52), which complicated the coordination of EU policies and undermined­ their effectiveness. Feuding between the EU Council and European Commission sometimes undermined the effectiveness of EU foreign policy action. The Council had rather successfully followed an expansionist strategy in ESDP (Emerson and Gross 2007: 8) by giving itself mandates to enter into fields such as the rule of law, judiciary and civil protection, leading to a growing overlap with the Commission and growing competition between the two institutions. In 2005, the European Commission even took the EU Council to the European Court

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30  EU foreign policy and conflict management of Justice to defend its competencies in the area of small arms proliferation (Official Journal of the EU 2005). In addition to an unclear division of competencies, financial issues also came into play. The European Commission is the main institution in charge of the EU budget. So, while the EU Council had most foreign policy prerogatives, the European Commission had control of most of the EU funds. For example, the Commission’s 2008 budget for external policies (including development aid and humanitarian assistance) was EUR 7 billion (out of a total EU budget of EUR 129 billion), while the EU Council CFSP budget was at EUR 285 million (and even that was a significant increase on the 2007s EUR 159 million), making the Commission’s foreign policy budget 24 times bigger than that of the Council.4 This budgetary fragmentation has led to a certain disconnect between EU foreign policy and general EU economic, humanitarian or developmental objectives in third countries. In conflict management issues, such fragmentation had clear-­cut implications for the EU’s potential to intervene. For example, an EUSR that was involved in conflict settlement negotiations in a region could not use financial conditionality to press the conflict parties to compromise since it was the Commission which held the financial levers. Not could an EUSR condition the disbursement or threaten the withholding of funds to influence directly conflict settlement negotiations without agreement with the Commission. Clearly such a fragmentation of EU institutions, capabilities and players was inhibiting its foreign policy influence and needed to be tackled. The Lisbon Treaty: streamlining, not revolutionizing The efforts to reorganize the EU’s messy institutional set-­up were spearheaded  by the 2002 Laeken Declaration which resulted in a Constitutional Treaty presented in 2004. After the Treaty was rejected in referenda in France and the Netherlands in 2005, the EU reproduced its foreign policy provisions in the so-­called Treaty of Lisbon which entered into force on 1 December 2009 (not before another failed referendum in Ireland and a re-­run). The Lisbon Treaty envisaged the creation of the post of a permanent European Council President and the merger of the posts of the High Representative for CFSP with that of the Commissioner for External Relations into a newly-­titled High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who also became vice-­president of the European Commission (the ‘new’ High Representative in short). A former Belgian prime minister Herman van Rompuy became the first Council President, and Catherine Ashton took the post of the ‘new’ High Representative. The foreign policy divisions of the EU Council and the Commission’s directorate-­general for external relations were merged to create a European External Action Service – the first ever EU diplomatic service. The ‘new’ High

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EU foreign policy and conflict management  31 Representative also took over from the rotating presidencies the permanent chairmanship of meetings of EU foreign ministers when foreign policy is discussed (under the so-­called Foreign Affairs Council, as well as some lower-­level bodies such as the PSC). European Commission Delegations in third countries became EU embassies. At least some of the posts of EU Special Representatives were likely to be merged with the posts of the Heads of EU embassies in third countries. At the time of writing, in early 2010, the final shape of the European External Action Service remained to be finalized and clarified. Despite the fact that post-­Lisbon arrangements amounted to the most substantial overhaul of the EU foreign policy apparatus in a decade, it is unlikely that it will lead to a revolutionary change in the way the EU behaves on the international scene. EU member states still retain a veto right over foreign policy decisions and before the Lisbon Treaty the primary cause of EU foreign policy blockages were disagreements among EU member states or lack of political will to act, with institutional inconsistency playing only a tertiary role. Even at an institutional level, the Treaty provisions left quite a number of unanswered questions. The Lisbon Treaty improved the institutional framework for EU action, but in the end did not solve many problems, and while solving some problems potentially created new ones. To begin with, the president of the European Council was also entitled to represent the EU abroad, which chipped away at the exclusive right of the ‘new’ High Representative to represent the EU on a global state. Moreover, the potential for foreign policy fragmentation (already) within the European Commission was also quite evident with a number of new Commissioners staking claim to various bits of foreign policy. Of these, the most important (for the purpose of this book) was the creation of the post of Commissioner for enlargement and European neighbourhood. Under this model, the ‘new’ High Representative Catherine Ashton is in charge of foreign policy and crisis management; however the commissioner for enlargement and neighbourhood Stefan Fule is in charge of the Eastern neighbourhood including the countries of the South Caucasus and Moldova. And it remains yet to be seen which of the two is likely to emerge as the main conflict management player in the Eastern neighbourhood. In any case it would still take quite a number of years for the European External Action Service to operate for any credible assessment of its functionality and effectiveness to be made. Besides the institutional fixes that the Lisbon Treaty brought about, it could not solve some of the underlying problems of EU foreign policy such as divisions among EU member states and the lack of a serious commitment to pursue an assertive foreign policy worldwide. Already in the post-­Lisbon EU, senior European politicians argued that ‘the EU is weak because its member states are weak and Brussels is forced to act as the lowest common denominator’.5

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EU foreign policy and conflict management Despite institutional complexities, the EU has a substantial record of affecting conflict-­resolution patterns either by virtue of its existence or by virtue of its actions. In the former case, one can discuss the effects of European integration on conflict settlement patterns (Diez et al. 2008), and in the latter comprise the EU’s deliberate actions as a third party undertaken to influence conflicts either through its foreign policy in general, or more specifically through its Common Security and Defence Policies. A single chapter cannot do justice to the multiplicity and complexity of mechanisms through which the EU has affected conflict settlement patterns worldwide. However, a quick glance at these will help situate EU crisis-­management policies in the post-­Soviet space in a broader historical and political context, as well as the academic literature. European integration and conflicts The EU was largely the outgrowth of efforts to resolve tensions between Germany and France after World War II. In 1952 the EU’s precursor, the European Coal and Steel Community, was created as the first supranational institution in post-­war Europe where the six original member states (France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries) pooled sovereignty in the most sensitive sectors of the time. Steel and coal were the two resources necessary for war-­making for European states. By placing these under the control of a supranational authority, no state in the community could develop war capabilities over the others, and competition over resources (often a reason for war) would be pointless. With subsequent EU enlargements, the EU imported a number of violent secessionist conflicts into its borders – primarily Northern Ireland (Kennedy 1994, Salmon 2002; Hainsworth 1981; Tannam 1997; Hayward 2004; Diez et al. 2008), the Basque country (Bache and Jones 2000 Bourne 2003a) and since 2004 Cyprus.6 EU membership influenced the development of these conflicts. It has been widely argued that the EU framework provides an additional layer of governance (Hill 2001: 325) in which conflict settlement and power-­ sharing agreements can be embedded (Tocci 2004b; Coppieters et al. 2004), by ‘uploading’ disputed powers to other levels of governance, multiplying the levels of authority and providing opportunities to accommodate competing claims for control (Bourne 2003b: 392). The EU can also have an indirect impact on conflicts by diluting the importance of notions such as sovereignty and borders, thereby reducing the stakes in conflicts (Diez 2000; Diez et al. 2008; McCall 1998). Because of economic integration, lack of visa requirements, elimination of border controls and the introduction of a single currency, competing claims over contested territories affect to a lesser extent the daily lives of their residents. The EU has also had an impact on (potential) conflicts as part of the pro­ cess of EU enlargement. The EU’s expansion in the 90s has been the most

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EU foreign policy and conflict management  33 historically important and institutionally developed instance of EU foreign policy. EU enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe had an explicit conflict prevention dimension as it sought to prevent ethnic tensions between former socialist states (Jenne 2007; Kelley 2004a; Munuera 1994: 91). By making good neighbourly relations a pre-­condition for accession, the EU has decreased the potential for ethnic tensions in Central and Eastern Europe (Smith 2004). To achieve that, the EU promoted democracy and economic reforms in the region. It also advanced a set of accession criteria (the so-­called Copenhagen criteria) that made respect for human rights and minority protection one of the conditions of EU accession, even though there was no EU minority rights acquis, i.e. this was not an area where the EU had delegated power to act (Kelley 2004a: 192; Hill 2001: 323). The EU also made regional cooperation a condition of rapprochement with the EU, inducing the Central and East European states to sign treaties on friendship with each other as well as recognize one another’s borders as part of the Pact on Stability in Europe/ the Balladur Plan (Miall 2000; Manners 2004: 9). The EU has also made the EU accession conditional upon the implementation of OSCE and Council of Europe minority rights standards in the candidate states (Schimmelfennig et al. 2003). But if EU efforts in Central Europe were mainly focused on conflict-­ prevention­, Cyprus proved a challenge of an entirely different magnitude. This was a strongly entrenched conflict, with a history of violence, ethnic cleansing and having wide geopolitical ramifications (Bourne 2003b; Eralp and Beriker 2005; Nugent 2000; Romsics 2005; Sertoglu and Ozturk 2003; Tocci 2004a; Zervakis 2004). The accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the EU in 2004 created serious incentives for the first time in 30 years for the secessionist Turkish community to seek reunification. But it also made the Republic of Cyprus (the Greek Cypriots) more intransigent, as it expected that joining the EU as a separate entity would increase its future negotiating power vis-­à-vis Turkish Cyprus as well as its backer – Turkey (Rumelili 2007). Still, despite the fact that the process of EU accession managed to reverse the preferences of the conflict parties, it has not managed to solve the conflict. EU’s record as a security actor The EU’s first ever ambition to become a conflict management actor was famously formulated in relation to the Balkans in 1991 by the then prime minister of Luxembourg, Jacques Poos, who exclaimed that ‘l’heure de l’Europe – enfin arrivée’ (The hour of Europe has finally arrived). In reality, the EU only started to become a significant actor in the Balkans in the aftermath of the Kosovo campaign in 1999, when it was realized that the EU could not pursue security policies in the region without US military support. The EU’s failure to have any significant impact on the Balkan conflicts in the 90s highlighted the limitations of the EU’s diplomatic, economic and financial tools to prevent or solve violent ethnic conflicts. The soft power of the EU,

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34  EU foreign policy and conflict management without being backed by hard power and military capabilities, was of little use. This realization fuelled more than a decade of institutional build-­up of the foreign, security and defence policies of the EU. Starting with 1999, the EU member states committed to creating a pool of military and civilian peacekeeping capabilities ready to be deployed on short notice. The aim was to have militaries ready to conduct peacekeeping duties, as well as a capacity to gradually build up capabilities to conduct police, rule of law, border monitoring and security sector reform missions in conflict zones. In 2003 the EU deployed its first ever ESDP operation – a police mission to Bosnia. Then it gradually extended the remit of its conflict management actions by taking over peacekeeping missions from NATO in Macedonia in 2003 and Bosnia in 2004 (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2006; Emerson and Gross 2007; Piana 2002), as well as conducting two police missions in Macedonia in 2003–2006, and a large scale rule of law mission to Kosovo consisting of policemen, judges, prosecutors and customs officials since 2008 (Papadimitriou et al. 2007). Such missions addressed the short-­term priorities of security conflict de-­escalation, stabilization and capacity-­building for weak states (Juncos 2007: 57), but these needed to be complemented with longer term strategies to rebuild the Balkans. The response to this need came with an offer of EU accession through the Stabilisation and Association process for the Western Balkans (Johnson 2001; Phinnemore 2003; Batt 2004; Knaus and Cox 2004; Lehne 2004; Batt 2005; O’Brennan 2007; Recchia 2007). This was also complemented with substantial financial backing from the EU, making the Western Balkans the biggest recipients of EU funding per capita outside the EU. It is in the Balkans where the EU employed the whole range of policies – peace-­support operations, an EU accession perspective and substantial funding – to promote conflict resolution. But such a scale of instruments was unlikely to be replicated elsewhere. In addition to the Balkans, the EU also played an increasing role in conflict management efforts in the Middle East (see Aoun 2003; Newman and Yacobi 2004); sub-­Saharan Africa (Loisel 2004; Faria 2004; Lindstrom 2004; Sourd 2005; Gegout 2005; Martinelli 2006), Indonesia (Braud 2005; Grevi 2005; Gunaryadi 2006; Bivar 2005), Western Sahara7 (Darbouche and Zoubir 2008; Vaquer i Fanés 2004), and Sudan, Iraq and Afghanistan (Korski 2008). Since 2003 the EU also conducted or continues to conduct police missions in Palestine, Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of Congo; EU border assistance missions in Rafah (Palestine) and Moldova/Ukraine; rule of law missions to Georgia, Iraq and Kosovo; a naval mission off the coast of Somalia; security sector reform missions in DR Congo and Guinea-­Bissau; unarmed monitoring missions in Aceh, Indonesia and Georgia, as well as military peacekeeping operations in DR Congo, Chad and the Central African Republic (as well as support for African Union peacekeepers in Darfur). By mid 2010 the EU conducted 23 such operations, ranging from operations as small as 12 civilian experts (in Georgia) to 7,000 militaries (in Bosnia).

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EU foreign policy and conflict management  35 In these conflict zones the EU often had a presence, but no clear-­cut policies­. Most EU operations outside the Western Balkans have been very limited in scope, mandate, time frame, personnel and objectives. Only six of the 23 missions have been military in nature, suggesting a predilection for low-­intensity, civilian actions in relatively low-­risk environments. In this regard, many EU actions have been driven by internal imperatives, interests and bargaining outcomes of EU member states, rather than by considerations concerning what is effective, appropriate or necessary in some conflict areas (Aoun 2003: 300). It has also been argued that the EU has often spent huge sums of EU funding ‘without deep strategic policy thinking about what peace and reconciliation means [. . .], how it relates to a political accommodation, or how aid might contribute to stability and sustainable end to the conflict’ (Hughes 2009). Outside the Balkans the EU has often pursued some kind of ‘butterfly’ security policy – moving in and quickly out from conflicts zones, deploying lightweight missions, being very preoccupied with exit strategies and successes, and often leaving the long-­term objectives of stabilisation to the UN or other peacekeepers. As Nick Witney, former head of the European Defence Agency, once argued, ‘EU members have operated in a strategic vacuum; there has been little evidence of any coherent plan underlying the EU’s interventions. Though the European Security Strategy provides a good set of general principles, this does not explain why, for example, five out of the 20 operations [by 2008] have been in Congo’ (Witney 2008: 7).

The Eastern neighbourhood After sketching the global and regional context of EU conflict management actions, the chapter turns to outlining the context of EU’s policies in the eastern neighbourhood. As the 2004 EU enlargement to the East approached, EU member states feared that instability at their enlarged frontier would undermine the security of the EU. Hence, in 2003 the EU launched its European Neighbourhood Policy that aimed at creating a ring of well governed, stable, democratic and prosperous states in the neighbourhood, while avoiding talks over EU accession for countries like Ukraine or Moldova (Batt et al. 2003; Emerson 2004; Kelley 2004b). Under the ENP, the EU offered its neighbours strengthened political partnership, EU assistance, visa facilitation, trade liberalization, inclusion into some EU agencies and programmes in exchange for reforms and gradual implementation of the acquis (European Commission 2004b: 5). The EU also stated its interest in contributing to conflict resolution in the neighbourhood since: The negative effects of conflicts on economic and political development, especially where sustained over a long period, cannot be over-­estimated. These effects are not only domestic – so long as conflicts persist there is a danger of spillover. Conflict and political division in the Mediterranean (Western Sahara, Palestine) over the past half century has seriously

36  EU foreign policy and conflict management

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retarded the development of the region. Unrecognised statelets such as Transnistria are a magnet for organised crime and can destabilise or throw off course the process of state-­building, political consolidation and sustainable development (European Commission 2003a) Despite a strong EU declaratory commitment to help solve the conflicts in the neighbourhood, EU involvement in conflict management has not been particularly significant to date. The security dimension of ENP has been mainly focused on conflict prevention and post-­conflict rehabilitation rather than direct EU participation in the settlement of conflicts (European Commission 2001). This focus also resulted from the fact that direct crisis management has always been more controversial than prevention and post-­conflict rehabilitation. A European Commission document on the ENP stated that: ‘Once settlement has been reached, EU civil and crisis management capabilities could also be engaged in post-­conflict internal security arrangements. Additional sources of funding for post-­conflict reconstruction and development would be required’ (European Commission 2003a). However, most of the conflicts in the EU neighbourhood are deadlocked; thus, the pledge to contribute to post-­conflict rehabilitation is only of limited value as long as they remained unsolved. When it came to conflict resolution in the eastern neighbourhood, EU member states often found themselves divided. It is natural that EU member states do not ‘often have identical relations to third parties. They don’t necessarily have the same analysis of external issues, or the same interests, concerns and stakes. They also do not always react to the same events’ (Aoun 2003: 296). This naturally applied to an ENP that has been marked by a certain competition for EU political attention and economic resources between the southern and the eastern neighbourhood. This was summarized quite well by the Portuguese prime minister who once claimed that the EU has been focused too much on the east throughout the nineties, that such an approach had become outdated and that the south – the Middle East and Africa – had to become a priority (Parker 2007). At the same time, Germany, the Nordic and Central European member states often lobbied for a more active policy in the eastern neighbourhood, and paid less attention to the south. And even these states disagreed on the type of engagement with the eastern neighbours since some of them pursued a Russia-­first policy and others had much more critical views of Russia. Such conceptual divisions had implications for policy making. EU member states found themselves divided on how to deal with conflicts in the neighbourhood.

Conclusions EU foreign policy is labyrinthine. Until the Lisbon Treaty, EU foreign policy competencies had been divided between the EU Council and the European Commission, which complicated policy coordination. The Lisbon Treaty is

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EU foreign policy and conflict management  37 likely to streamline EU foreign policy-­making, but is unlikely to revolutio­narily solve many, if not most, of the EU’s problems with foreign policy-­making. These stem primarily from divisions among member states and/or reluctance to commit to assertive foreign policy action, and institutional incoherence had only been a tertiary factor. EU policies and approaches toward conflicts have been geographically wide but institutionally shallow, with the exception of the Balkans. The EU has a record of influencing conflict settlement patterns either by virtue of its existence, or by virtue of purposeful actions. Such actions have included diplomatic ­activism, the deployment of peacekeepers, police missions, military and civilian observers. Despite a multitude of missions, the EU barely has an established modus operandi on contribution to the settlement of conflicts. The EU as an institution is much more comfortable operating through civilian crisis-­management operations, financial assistance or political conditionality. The record of EU action in the European neighbourhood confirms this pattern. The following chapters will look in greater detail into EU conflict interventions in Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-­Karabakh. The next chapters argue that the EU institutions have been using the strategy of stealth engagement in these conflicts, by focusing on low politics measures and using dosage to extend their prerogatives. However, their actions have been considerably constrained by lack of local demand for EU intervention, Russian opposition to seeing a more assertive EU and EU member states that have drastically limited EU institutional activism each time Brussels touched upon highly political aspects of crisis-­management.

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3 The EU’s piecemeal involvement in Transnistria

Approximately 100 km from the border of the EU lies Transnistria – a secessionist­region in the east of Moldova. It is the nearest unsolved secessionist conflict in the EU’s neighbourhood. Transnistria is also perceived as the most ‘solvable’ of all post-­Soviet secessionist conflicts: the likelihood of violence in the region is virtually nil, and most of the issues pitching the conflict parties against each other are of political and economic nature, not ethnic or military as in South Caucasus. This chapter outlines the process of EU conflict resolution policies in Moldova. It argues that EU institutions have been able to increase their role in conflict management through dosage because the context of the conflict is determined by primarily low-­politics and soft-­security issues such as negotiations on power-­sharing, border management and combating organized crime. Tackling such issues gave ample room for manoeuvre for EU institutional activism in the region. EU institutions have tried to keep their activities related to border-­management in the region as depoliticized as possible. However, when EU institutions have tried to tackle hard security issues such as peacekeeping, they have encountered increased scrutiny and opposition from EU member states. Overall, the EU strategy of stealth intervention worked, as long as it did not touch upon high-­politics issues such as peacekeeping. The fact that Moldova sought to depoliticize the EU interventions in conflict settlement and maintained a low-­key approach to Russia only facilitated the EU’s stealth engagement. The chapter starts by explaining the context in which the conflict occurs, as well as Russia and Ukraine’s role in it. Then the chapter looks at EU approaches toward Moldova and the Transnistrian conflict in the 1990s. Finally it traces EU intervention in the conflict and the inter-­institutional dynamics behind EU policy on Transnistria, the two failed EU attempts to get involved with a peacekeeping mission in Moldova and the way the EU has contributed to the economic reunification of Moldova through incentives and pressures on Transnistria.

The EU’s piecemeal involvement in Transnistria  39

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The conflict in Transnistria Transnistria is a narrow strip of land separated from the main part of Moldova by the river Nistru. Transnistria has a territory of 4,163 km2 and a population of some 400,000 people compared to Moldova’s 3.4 million people. Moldova’s turn towards independence in 1991 provoked serious tensions with its eastern region of Transnistria, which preferred to remain part of the Soviet Union, declare independence or integrate with Russia. In 1992, the Moldovan government began to engage in a short war with the authorities in Transnistria, as a result of which approximately 1,500 people were killed. Hostilities ended after a Russian military intervention by the then Russian 14th army stationed in Transnistria.1 A complex tangle of mechanisms has been created to settle the conflict since the early 1990s (ICG 2006b; Lynch 2004; Popescu 2005). These include a trilateral peacekeeping operation consisting of Russian, Transnistrian and Moldovan troops, which was tasked with monitoring a demilitarized security zone separating the territory controlled by the Moldovan government from the territory controlled by the Transnistrian authorities. The peacekeeping operation is guided and supervised by a Joint Control Commission (JCC), which is composed of the two conflicting parties, with Russia, the OSCE and Ukraine as observers. In parallel, an on-­again off-­again political process of negotiations on the status of Transnistria has been underway, with Moldova and Transnistria as well as Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE as mediators. The negotiation mechanism was often referred to as the ‘five-­sided format’, but it became ‘5+2’ after the EU and the US joined it in 2005. Transnistria is the only one of the four conflicts analysed in this book where the secessionist conflict was not an outgrowth of clear-­cut ethnic cleavages. Even though there are some ethnic undertones, with Transnistria largely building its identity on anti-­Romanian/Moldovan feelings, it is not a conflict between Romanian-­speaking Moldovans and Russians. The populations of both Moldova and Transnistria are ethnically mixed (though to varying degrees), and there are many Moldovans living in Transnistria who support Transnistrian secession, and many ethnic Russians and Ukrainians in Moldova supported the country’s territorial integrity. The absence of clear ethnic dividing lines has meant that there is little animosity between the populations on the two sides of river Nistru. Unlike in Nagorno-­Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Transnistria is the only post-­Soviet secessionist conflict where there is little danger of a new war and where the circulation of peoples between the conflict zones is essentially unrestricted. There is a broad consensus in both Moldova and Transnistria that the solution to the conflict must be peaceful. Thus the lack of ethnic cleavages coupled with a rather peaceful environment on the ground creates the impression that this conflict is the most ‘solvable’ of the four. But the absence of ethnic cleavages was not enough to overcome deep economic, security and political factors that keep the conflict unsolved. The

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40  EU’s involvement in Transnistria Transnistrian authorities controlled a substantial portion of Moldova’s border­ with Ukraine, 470 km out of 1,222 km, as well as trade routes (roads and rail links) from Moldova to Russia and Ukraine, which created copious opportunities for rent-­seeking. The Transnistrian elites therefore had strong incentives to prevent the conflict from being solved (Lynch 2004). It created the right conditions for the Transnistrian leadership to accumulate resources and suppress internal opposition without much trouble (Keen 2001: 2). In addition, smuggling goods through Transnistria into Ukraine and Moldova has been a boon to criminal networks in Transnistria with serious ramifications for the rest of Moldova, Ukraine and Russia. Russia has traditionally used Transnistria as a tool to maintain geopolitical influence and military presence in Moldova and partly Ukraine. Transnistria could not have emerged without Russia, nor could it have survived as a de facto state (Lynch 2004). The European Court of Human Rights concluded in July 2004 that the Transnistrian Republic ‘remained under the effective authority, or at the very least under the decisive influence, of Russia, and in any event that it survived by virtue of the military, economic, financial and political support that Russia gave it’ (ECHR 2004). The Russian-­led peacekeeping operation has effectively guarded the borders of the secessionist entity, freezing a status quo that is favourable to one side. Russia maintains military forces in Transnistria. They number some 1,500 people with some 25,000 tons of armaments. In addition, Russia has massively subsidized the economy of the region by offering various forms of economic assistance and not demanding repayment of gas debts that reached a staggering USD 2 billion by 2010. Just to put things in context, when Russia cut off gas supplies to Ukraine, disrupting gas flows into the entire EU in January 2009, this happened because of a Ukrainian debt to Russia of USD 2 billion. Thus, Transnistria’s debt to Russia almost equalled that of Ukraine at that moment, but Ukraine’s population was 100 times bigger than that of Transnistria, and consequently Transnistria’s debt for gas to Russia was 100 times more per capita. Ukraine has traditionally played a rather ambiguous role in the Transnistrian conflict. It would seem that Ukraine would have a great interest in settling the conflict. The perpetuation of the conflict on Ukraine’s border contributes neither to regional stability, nor to Ukraine’s long-­term European and Euro-­ Atlantic aspirations. Ukraine is not interested in having Transnistria as a Kaliningrad-­type Russian exclave with Russian military presence on its border. Yet, Ukraine’s record on Transnistria is mixed. Transnistria could not survive without Ukraine’s periodic implicit support or at least friendly neutrality. All of the alleged Transnistrian smuggling and trafficking passes mainly through Ukraine: by sea, through the Odessa and Ilichiovsk ports, or by land. Influential interest groups in Ukraine have benefitted from ­corruption in Transnistria. Moldova’s corruption and weakness as a state and its lack of attractiveness for most ordinary Transnistrians has been another factor contributing to the continuance of the conflict. The then foreign minister of Transnistria, Valery Litskai, once claimed that if Moldova were Switzerland, Transnistria would be

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The EU’s piecemeal involvement in Transnistria  41

Map 3.1  Moldova with Transnistria. Copyright: CIA, The World Fact Book.

‘counting the minutes to join it as a canton’ (Ava.md 2008). In other words, there is little reason for most Transnistrians to support re-­unification with Moldova, which remains one of the poorest countries in Europe. The collusion of some parts of the Moldovan elites with Transnistria’s opaque interests groups also helped sustain the secessionist conflict.

The 90s: EU’s ambivalence over Moldova Throughout the 1990s, the EU pursued relations with Moldova under the so-­called Partnership and Cooperation Agreements and the TACIS assistance programme (Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States), as it did with any other post-­Soviet state, with the exception of the Baltics. Trade and political relations were limited and security relations were almost inexistent. The EU did not consider it a priority to contribute to conflict settlement in Transnistria, even though the EU financed the rebuilding of one bridge across the Nistru river that had been destroyed during the 1992 conflict (European Commission 2000). No EU member state played or tried to play any political role in settlement talks on Transnistria. Certainly, EU member states had security interests in

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42  EU’s involvement in Transnistria the area, but these were pursued through the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). EU member states also supported politically and financially the withdrawal of Russian military troops and equipment from Moldova. For this, a political agreement was concluded at the OSCE summit in Istanbul in November 1999 under which Russia agreed to the unconditional withdrawal of troops and weapons from Moldova (and Georgia) within a few years, while US and EU member states agreed to adapt the arms-­reduction Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. Russia however did not respect the Istanbul commitments and has maintained a military presence in Moldova against the country’s will and its own international commitments. For a decade after the 1992 war, the EU as an institution did not undertake any action to promote conflict resolution in Transnistria. Transnistria was the post-­Soviet secessionist conflict with the lowest level of European involvement (with the exception of the OSCE). In Nagorno-­Karabakh, France was part of the negotiating format; in Abkhazia – Germany, France and the United Kingdom were involved in conflict mediation through the UN; and in South Ossetia (and Abkhazia) the European Commission has directly financed successive post-­conflict rehabilitation projects. This stood in contrast to the case of Transnistria, where the EU was explicit in its desire to avoid any involvement with conflict resolution between 1992 and 2002. But this entrenched approach changed rather suddenly. By the second half of 2002, the EU was actively looking for ways to play a bigger role in resolving a conflict that would border the EU in just a few years.

2003–2004: testing the waters Moldova has for many years been the poorest state in Europe. The perception­ that the conflict in Transnistria affects the performance of the Moldovan state has permeated EU policy on Moldova. A 2002 European Commission paper on EU approaches to Moldova stated: ‘Moldova’s stability clearly matters to the EU. Within a few years, Moldova will be on the borders of an enlarged EU. It has been destabilised by weak government, armed conflict and secession, near economic collapse, organised crime and emigration [. . .] The EU needs to help Moldova address these problems’.2 Since late 2002, the EU has rapidly accelerated its involvement in Transnistria (Vahl and Emerson 2004; Vahl 2005). The turning point came with the launch of the discussions on the ENP in 2002, which provided the right moment for EU institutions to pro-­actively promote greater EU conflict resolution in the neighbourhood. Since then, the EU has used an increasing array of foreign policy instruments to affect the conflict resolution process. This proceeded in two phases. From 2003 to 2005, the EU took a number of steps to prepare the ground for involvement in the conflict settlement process. This was followed by a much more ambitious set of interventions after 2005 which transformed the EU into one of the key players in the settlement process.

Table 3.1  Timeline of EU policy on Transnistria

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1992–2002 •  Supporting OSCE conflict settlement efforts. No direct EU actions. 2003

•  E  U introduces a travel ban against 17 Transnistrian leaders (February). •  EU Council Secretariat sends experts to a Moldovan-­Transnistrian joint constitutional commission (February). •  The European Commission launches trilateral Moldova-­Ukraine-­ EU talks on border management (March). •  OSCE Dutch chairmanship proposes an EU peacekeeping operation in Moldova. Russia refuses (July). •  The Russian-­backed ‘Kozak Memorandum’ fails (November 2003).

2004

•  N  o negotiations on conflict settlement after the Kozak debacle. •  EU and Moldova negotiate the ENP Action Plan (throughout 2004). •  The European Commission introduces a ‘double-­checking’ mechanism for Transnistrian steel (September 2004).

2005

•  A  driaan Jacobovits is appointed as the first EU Special Representative on Moldova (March). •  Moldova and Ukraine invite the EU to deploy a border mission (June). •  The EU and US join the negotiations on Transnistria as mediators in the 5+2 format (September). •  EU Border Assistance Mission to Ukraine and Moldova is deployed with some 70 border police and customs experts (November). The EUSR team is extended with political advisors in Kiev, Odessa and Chisinau.

2006

•  T  he EU extends GSP Plus trade facilitation regime for Moldova (January). •  Ukraine stops accepting Transnistrian goods without Moldovan customs stamps (March). •  EUBAM budget is tripled and personnel is increased to approximately 100 experts (second half of the year). •  EUSR Jacobovits de Szeged promotes the idea of EU peacekeepers to Moldova. Some EU member states, Javier Solana and the Council Secretariat oppose it.

2007

•  K  alman Mizsei replaces Jacobovits de Szeged as EU Special Representative on Moldova (March). •  EUBAM mandate is extended for another two years. The number of EUBAM experts increases to 122. •  2007–2010 Moldova is the second biggest recipient of EU funding in the European neighbourhood.

2008

•  E  U Autonomous Trade Preferences are extended to Moldova (March). •  Moldova and the EU agree to work towards the establishment of a deep free trade area.

2009

•  D  ue to post-­electoral crisis, the EU is mostly focused on domestic politics in Moldova rather than the conflict in Transnistria. •  EUBAM’s mandate is prolonged until 2011.

2010

•  T  he EU temporarily suspends the travel ban against the Transnistrian leaders.

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Diplomatic actions Negotiations between Moldova and Transnistria over the settlement of the conflict have proceeded with ups and downs since the end of the war in 1992. Moments of rapprochement occurred in 1997 and 2001, but failed to translate into a settlement because the status quo was simply too lucrative for the secessionist authorities as well as corrupt elites in Moldova, Ukraine and Russia. A new opportunity came in the second half of 2002 when, in a breakthrough agreement, Moldova and Transnistria agreed to unite in a federal state. In late 2002 the parties agreed to set up a joint constitutional commission that would co-­author the constitution of a reunited state. It looked like Moldova and Transnistria were close to an agreement under which Transnistria would be reintegrated into a federal Moldova. For the first time, this triggered EU diplomatic activism on Transnistria. In early 2003 the Dutch chairmanship-­in-­office of the OSCE appointed Adriaan Jacobovits de Szeged as special representative on Transnistria. The EU and the Dutch OSCE chairmanship worked closely on Transnistria. Since early 2003, two EU Council officials (Kees van Rij and Carl Hartzell) and Jacobovits became observers to the Moldovan–Transnistrian joint constitutional commission that effectively took over the settlement negotiations from the five-­party talks. The constitutional commission ultimately failed in its task, but this marked a symbolic change in the conflict resolution mechanisms, with the EU becoming involved for the first time in negotiations over the status of Transnistria. Moreover, in the first half of 2003 the EU Council and the Dutch foreign ministry were engaged in intense consultations over the mechanisms of a possible peace support operation to be deployed in Moldova immediately after a political settlement (Lowenhardt 2004: 3). In parallel, the European Commission has started to tackle issues related to the lack of proper border controls between Ukraine and Moldova. Starting in March 2003, at the initiative of the European Commission, a series of trilateral consultations between Ukraine, Moldova and the EU were held in Brussels on the issue of joint border controls on the Moldovan–Ukrainian border, including its Transnistrian segment. The EU position was based on the assumption that ‘a key element in any effort to achieve a settlement relates to ensuring Moldova’s control over its entire customs territory’ (ENP Country Report on Moldova 2005). EU documents also asserted that ‘without effective customs control on the goods crossing Transnistria, smuggling is flourishing with serious consequences on the government budget and the rule of law’ (ibid.). The EU thus supported Moldova’s proposals for the creation of a joint border control between Moldova and Ukraine to ensure control over all of Moldova’s external borders. The EU also pledged funds to support the development of border infrastructure between Moldova and Ukraine.

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Sanctions The EU (and US) has also raised the stakes of conflict settlement by introducing­ a travel ban against the Transnistrian leadership in February 2003. The joint statement read: ‘The leadership of the secessionist Transnistrian region has continually demonstrated obstructionism and unwillingness to change the status quo, thereby impeding meaningful negotiations’ (EU Council 2003). In August 2004, the travel ban was extended to an additional ten officials from Transnistria who were responsible for the attempt to close down the Romanian-­language schools using the Latin alphabet (rather than Cyrillic) in Transnistria, which was a human rights violation (EU Presidency 2004). However, the sanctions did not achieve their expected result. They were certainly a nuisance for the Transnistrian leadership, but their costs did not outweigh the benefits they were getting from sustaining the conflict. Staying in power and in control of Transnistria was more important than travelling to the West. The ineffectiveness of sanctions made the EU consider adopting an approach based on engagement, rather than low-­scale coercion. In early 2010 the EU temporarily suspended the travel ban against Transnistria leaders for six months. The EU suspension of the travel ban could continue as long as the Transnistrian leaders were willing to show progress in negotiations. The failed EU peacekeeping in Moldova: part 1 Building on the momentum of increasing EU interest in the eastern neigh­ bourhood­, and the apparent progress on conflict settlement in Moldova, the Dutch OSCE Chairmanship-­in-­office circulated in June 2003 a ‘Food-­for-­ Thought Paper’ (2003) suggesting the deployment of an OSCE peace support operation in Moldova that would be conducted by the EU as the lead organization (with possible Russian and Ukrainian contributions). Jacobovits played a crucial role in promoting the idea of an EU peace support operation in Moldova. The idea was supported by the EU Council Secretariat, and was discussed in the EU Political and Security Committee and in the EU Military staff.3 All this had been done on the assumption that a conflict settlement agreement could be achieved by keeping up the momentum of negotiations, while increasing sanctions and diplomatic pressures on Transnistria to cooperate.­Such a peacekeeping mission would have likely led to a joint EU–Russia peacekeeping effort. It was considered by some EU officials and experts as a chance to build bottom up cooperation between Russia and the EU in the security field and develop examples of positive cooperation with Russia under the European Security and Defence Policy (Lynch 2003). However, Russia came out publicly against the plan. It was not willing to trade its dominance in the conflict management mechanisms in Transnistria for some illusory form of cooperation with the EU. The Russian foreign ministry issued a statement in July 2003 explicitly opposing any change in the Russian-­dominated peacekeeping format in Transnistria, and the EU put

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the idea aside. Talks of EU peacekeeping in Moldova immediately faded after Russia voiced its opposition. The very idea of EU peacekeepers in the post-­ Soviet space was considered ‘real dynamite’ in Moscow, leading to sudden politicization of the issue, raising Russia’s stakes in the conflict and triggering Putin’s personal involvement (Lowenhardt 2004: 4). The ‘Kozak Memorandum’ Debacle Recognizing that its monopoly over conflict settlement and peacekeeping in the post-Soviet space was being challenged, Russia moved quickly to regain the initiative. In the summer of 2003, President Putin appointed Dmitri Kozak, then first deputy head of presidential administration of the Russian Federation, as his personal envoy on conflict settlement in Transnistria. After treating Transnistria as an instrument for influencing Moldova and as an excuse to keep military troops in the region for over a decade, Russia apparently decided to push through a settlement on Transnistria before the EU could become influential in the region. After two months of secret negotiations outside the original five-­party talks, and without informing Ukraine, the EU, the US or the OSCE, Dmitri Kozak hammered out a framework document for a settlement. The agreement envisaged the creation of a new Moldovan Federation, with a long list of joint competencies between Moldova and Transnistria, ensuring that Russia had significant influence over the reunited state. Moreover, a secret version of the memorandum, initialled by the Moldovan president, allegedly allowed for the establishment of a Russian military base for 20 years. It was publicly announced that President Putin would travel to Chisinau to take part in the signing of the agreement on Moldova’s reunification on 25 November 2003. Russia asked the OSCE to support the agreement. Two days before the expected signature of the agreement, the EU High Representative Javier Solana, the OSCE Dutch chairman and the US Ambassador to Moldova all informed the Moldovan authorities that they were against the ‘Kozak Memorandum’ therefore impeding the signing of the memorandum. The EU, OSCE and US invoked the fact that the vague div­ision of competencies in the agreement was not likely to lead to a sustainable federative solution, but rather to a dysfunctional state that would require permanent mediation and intervention of an external actor, in this case Russia. As a result, Moldova cancelled the signature ceremony that was to be attended by Putin. The conflict could have been settled on Russian terms, but the EU and the US refused to accept such a development in EU’s new neighbourhood. The Kozak debacle lead to a complete breakdown of settlement talks for two years, a serious crisis in Moldova–Russia relations, and years of mutual recriminations between Russia and the EU over the issue. The EU’s actions were a clear affront to Russian objectives in the post-­Soviet states.

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Moldova in the European neighbourhood policy The context of broader EU–Moldova relations was also changing. Since late 2002, Moldova was included in the newly emerging European Neighbourhood Policy. In order to increase their cooperation, the EU and Moldova negotiated throughout most of 2004 the ENP Action Plan designed to serve as the main framework document for cooperation. The action plan envisaged a whole set of objectives and actions to be undertaken by Moldova and the EU to strengthen their cooperation. These include integrating parts of the acquis communautaire into Moldovan legislation, harmonizing standards and strengthening the political dialogue. While negotiating the ENP Action Plan, the EU was reluctant to commit to any concrete and significant actions to promote conflict resolution in Transnistria. The European Commission did not have a mandate from member states to do that, and there was no intra-­EU consensus on a ‘big-­bang’ EU engagement in conflict resolution in Transnistria. On Moldova’s insistence, the European Commission agreed to make Transnistria a first priority in the action plan, but only vaguely pledged to strengthen its engagement in conflict resolution and commit to post-­conflict rehabilitation arrangements and guarantees (EU–Moldova Action Plan 2005: 11–12). No concrete actions had been outlined thus far. However, the language of the action plan gave the European Commission some room for manoeuvre to increase its involvement in conflict settlement once the timing was right. The ‘testing of the waters’ in 2003–2004 provided a number of lessons for EU institutions. On the one hand, the Kozak debacle showed that no solution to the conflict could be found without the EU being part of the solution. On the other hand, no cavalry-­like assault on fortress Transnistria was likely to propel the EU into becoming a key player in conflict resolution, let alone solving the conflict. Apart from an extraordinary call from Solana to Voronin to halt the adoption of the Kozak Memorandum, the EU lacked the channels and the institutions to systematically influence the conflict settlement process. By sending Kozak as a special envoy, Russia easily sidelined the EU, the OSCE and Ukraine by engaging in secret talks with Moldova. The first year of active EU policy on Transnistria also showed that in the face of Russian opposition, and without a political agreement between Moldova and Transnistria, the EU could do little in the way of high-politics such as peacekeeping, and constitution-­writing for a reunited Moldova. After the Kozak debacle in late 2003, lingering tensions between Moldova and Russia, and Russian accusations that the EU had disrupted the deal out of ‘jealousy’ for Russian foreign policy successes, negotiations came to a halt in 2004 (Interfax 2008). At this point, virtually nothing was done in the way of direct negotiations over the conflict. In response, the EU focused on changing the context of the conflict. But even this was very difficult because real pressure could not be applied to the intransigent leadership of Transnistria without closer cooperation with Ukraine that under President Kuchma was not forthcoming.

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48  EU’s involvement in Transnistria Due to the disruption of Moldova–Russia relations, and the breakdown of five-­party talks, Moldova became a constant and vocal demandeur for EU conflict settlement in Transnistria, creating some external pressure and increasing expectations on the EU to deliver. This dynamic intensified after the 2004 enlargement, as such demands resonated with the new EU member states. These factors created fresh impetus for a more pro-­active EU policy on Transnistria. Throughout 2002–2003, the EU Council Secretariat and the European Commission pursued an expansionary strategy on the conflict settlement process. They tried to intervene in high politics issues by pushing an EU peacekeeping contribution to Moldova, and preventing Russia from pushing through with the Kozak Memorandum. However, the EU has not advanced too far in trying to reach a resolution of the conflict through high-­visibility measures. This made the EU focus increasingly on the low-­politics of conflict resolution such as border control issues. Quite in unison with the EU, Moldova also played the low-­politics game well, making it easier for EU institutions to increase their involvement in conflict settlement in Transnistria. Rather than adopting a conflictual approach to Russia, Moldova tried to depoliticize EU involvement in conflict settlement in Transnistria, and also focused on technical issues of cooperation such as border controls and trade related matters. Such an approach also had the advantage that Russia-­friendly EU member states, have often been much more supportive of EU intervention in Moldova, than in Georgia, since it was less politically controversial for EU–Russia relations.

EU conflict intervention in Transnistria in 2005–2010 Having gone through a number of failures, and against the background of an almost total freeze in the conflict settlement throughout 2004, the EU has engaged in building a more systematic and integrated approach to conflict resolution in Transnistria. Such an approach was based on two tenets. First, a more prosperous, economically attractive, and democratic Moldova was thought to be key to resolving the conflict, since this would make Moldova more attractive to Transnistrian residents (and to significant business interests in the region). Second, for conflict resolution to become more viable, the benefits to the authoritarian leadership of the frozen conflict had to be drastically reduced. EU policy focused on two broad objectives: making Moldova attractive, and reducing the benefits of corruption to secessionist elites. To achieve these objectives, three priorities for EU action have been identified: streamlining the diplomatic channels, applying more pressure on the secessionist entity, and convincing Ukraine to enforce border management measures on the Transnistrian section of the Ukraine–Moldova border. All these measures could be achieved without depending on Russian acquiescence, and could be undertaken through low-­politics measures making it easier for EU institutions

The EU’s piecemeal involvement in Transnistria  49 to act. EU actions were related to the low-politics of conflict settlement as they dealt with trade, economics, visas and customs controls, rather than peacekeeping or high-­level political interventions.

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The EU Special Representatives In early 2005, a decision was made to increase the profile of the EU in the region and streamline its diplomacy. In March, the EU appointed an EU Special Representative for Moldova. Adriaan Jacobovits de Szeged, the former special envoy of the OSCE Dutch chairmanship on Moldova was appointed as the first EU Special Representative (EUSR) on Moldova. He held this position from March 2005 until March 2007. His mandate was to ‘strengthen the EU contribution to the resolution of the Transnistria conflict’ (EU Council 2005/265). In this way, the EU intended to institutionalize its influence over the settlement process. Rather than appointing an EUSR to implement a ­policy, EU member states appointed an EUSR to develop a policy for the EU. Jacobovits was based in The Hague, which partly limited his ability to interact with EU member states representatives in Brussels and the European Commission. The second EUSR, Kalman Mizsei, was appointed in March 2007 and was based in Brussels, which facilitated interaction with member states and greater inclusion into the Brussels decision-­making machinery. The two EUSRs have also operated differently. While Jacobovits focused more narrowly on conflict settlement Transnistria, Kalman Mizsei took a broader approach and played a role in the broader issues related to the EU–Moldova political relations and even Moldovan domestic politics, particularly during 2009 when Moldova saw a breakdown of public order in April–May 2009 after elections which were considered unfair by the opposition (see Popescu 2009b). The way the EUSR operated revealed a number of aspects related to the interactions among EU institutions, EU member states and third countries that are the objects of the EU policy. The diplomatic presence of EU member states in Moldova was very limited and no EU member state was involved directly in the conflict settlement process (unlike in Abkhazia and Nagorno-­ Karabakh). Until the 2004 enlargement, only three EU member states had embassies in Moldova (the UK, France and Germany), and even the UK and French embassies usually had two or three diplomats. When the EUSR’s teams were strengthened with advisors based in Brussels, Chisinau, Kiev and Odessa (see below), the EUSR became one of the best informed EU policy actors on Transnistria. The EUSRs reports were distributed to all member states, making the EUSRs a key source of information, analysis and policy advice for EU member states on Transnistria. The EUSR’s team to a large extent shaped the perceptions of national foreign ministries concerning the conflict ­resolution process, and this influenced their perceptions of the EU policy needs on the ground. In this respect, EUSR Moldova enjoyed more influence than did EUSR South Caucasus, where member states had larger embassies and more entrenched foreign policies, which limited the influence of EUSRs

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concerning the way in which member states viewed EU priorities in the region. In short, the lack of involvement by EU member states in conflict resolution in Transnistria gave the EUSR more room for manoeuvre, as did the EUSR’s role as the central source of information and policy advice about Moldova. The ‘5+2’ conflict settlement negotiations Having appointed an EUSR with the aim of playing a greater diplomatic role in conflict settlement talks in Transnistria, the EU sought to join the conflict settlement talks, which until that moment were pursued in the so-­called ‘five-­party’ format (Moldova, Transnistria, Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE). Moldova has been a strong demandeur for EU and US involvement in the negotiations, since in Moldova’s view this would correct for Russia’s dominance in the talks. From the EU’s point of view, participation in settlement talks would increase the transparency of negotiations and reduce the possibility of a repeat of the situation around the ‘Kozak Memorandum’ in 2003, when settlement talks happened without the involvement of the EU. Transnistria and Russia have traditionally been opposed to EU involvement in conflict settlement talks. However, in September 2005 they accepted the EU and the US as observers in conflict settlement talks, thereby leading to the transformation of the format from the ‘five-­party’ to ‘5+2’. Despite its formal status as an observer, the role of the EU was no different from that of other actors involved. Still, EU involvement did not appear to make much of an impact. After just a few rounds of negotiations, Transnistria withdrew from the talks in March 2006 when Ukraine enacted a new border regime for goods exported by Transnistria (see below). The lack of progress in the 5+2 negotiations continued well into 2010 because Transnistria refused to take part in any meetings in such a format. This did not, however, prevent the EU from being rather active on changing realities on the ground around Transnistria. Preparing the EU Border Assistance Mission One of the key elements making the status quo in Transnistria attractive, therefore sustaining the secessionist problem, has been Transnistria’s control of 470 km of the border between Moldova and Ukraine. Allegedly, the elites in the secessionist region have been involved in smuggling and trafficking activities in collusion with Moldovan and Ukrainian partners. The alleged Transnistrian smuggling and trafficking passed mainly through Ukraine. One of the ways in which smuggling operated was the following. Certain good were delivered to the Ukrainian port of Odessa. According to the 1997 agreement, goods destined for Transnistria were not to be taxed in Ukraine (or Moldova), if Transnistria was declared the end destination of the goods. From Odessa, couriers with a single folder of documents could drive to the border posts, and stamp the documents at the Ukrainian customs and Transnistrian customs. The goods were thus considered to have entered

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The EU’s piecemeal involvement in Transnistria  51 Transnistria, though in reality they remained in Ukraine and were sold in Ukraine without any import customs duties.4 Another scheme was to import the goods into Transnistria, and then smuggle them back into Ukraine at night by bribing Ukrainian customs officials and the Transnistrian authorities (the son of Transnistria’s president was also head of the customs service), or through the green border.5 The border between Ukraine and the region of Transnistria is a ‘smuggler’s paradise’ – it is not demarcated and there are almost no natural barriers such as big rivers or mountains.6 For example a popular smuggled good was chicken legs. In six months between October 2005 and March 2006, Transnistria imported some 67 kg/per capita of chicken legs. Given that the consumption of chicken legs in Germany, for example, was 5.6 kg/per capita,7 it was obvious that Transnistria could not possibly have consumed the quantities of poultry that they claimed to have imported. They were instead smuggled into Ukraine or Moldova. EUBAM estimated that the Ukrainian budget lost EUR 43 million in customs duties over six months due to smuggled poultry alone. All these schemes were implemented by colluding Transnistrian, Ukrainian and Moldovan (customs) officials for private profit. The amounts of money involved were enormous, as the smuggling involved used cars, meat, cigarettes, spirits and many other goods. Little progress could be achieved on the political aspects of conflict resolution in Transnistria without tackling border management issues. Moldova was desperate to change the situation, but during the Kuchma presidency in Ukraine, the authorities were adamantly opposed to any attempt to enforce stricter border controls by accepting joint border posts with Moldova on Ukrainian territory or inviting EU border monitors. The Orange Revolution in late 2004 provided a window of opportunity to change Ukraine’s position, since Viktor Yushchenko, the new Ukrainian president, was eager to show his pro-­European credentials. EU institutions framed resolution of the border issue as a credibility test for the foreign policy of a post-­Kuchma Ukraine. The European Commission and the EU Council informally lobbied Ukraine to invite the EU to assist in border management. The result was that President Vladimir Voronin of Moldova and Viktor Yushchenko of Ukraine signed a joint letter on 2 June 2005 inviting the EU to contribute to border monitoring. The letter requested the EU to assist in the creation of an ‘international customs control arrangement and an effective border monitoring mechanism on the Transnistrian segment of the Moldova–Ukraine State border’ (EU Factsheet on EUBAM). Even though the EU institutions had acknowledged the need for such a mission for months if not years in advance, they could not have achieved it without evidence of ‘local demand’. Despite a clear EU interest to tackle the border issue – both to enforce border controls at the enlarged border of the EU and to contribute to conflict settlement in Transnistria – EU’s ability to pursue these interests depended more on local conditions than on the EU’s strategic calculations.

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52  EU’s involvement in Transnistria As a result of the Ukrainian–Moldovan letter in August 2005, the EU presented a memorandum on the creation of an EU Border Assistance Mission that would monitor and assist customs and border controls on the whole frontier between Moldova and Ukraine, including its Transnistrian sector. On 23–29 August 2005, the EU sent an EU Council–European Commission fact-­finding mission to Moldova and Ukraine to identify the needs on the ground. A memorandum of understanding on the creation of EUBAM was signed on 7 October 2005 (EU–Moldova–Ukraine Memorandum 2005). The EU Border Assistance Mission The mission was launched on 30 November 2005 by the then EU High repre­ sentative for CFSP Javier Solana and the European Commissioner for External Relations Benita Ferrero-­Waldner. According to the mission’s first mandate, it was supposed to be deployed for two years, with the possibility to extend it for another year. The initial budget of the Mission was some EUR 8 million. The main reasons for the launch of EUBAM was to ensure better border management in the conflict area, while at the same time undermining the economic basis of the Transnistrian secessionist regime whose main raison d’être was to benefit from opaque economic activities. An EU declaration stated that the mission’s objective was to strengthen ‘cooperation between the EU and the Moldovan and Ukrainian authorities in the fight against weapons trafficking, smuggling, organized crime and corruption. The Mission was also part of the EU’s ongoing commitment to helping to improve security and stability in the region [. . .] the EU hopes that the Mission will contribute to wider efforts to find a viable and sustainable solution to the Transnistria conflict’ (EU Presidency Statement 30.11.2005). The EU opted for a rather intrusive mandate and extensive operations. Formally, the mission did not have executive functions. However, it had the right to undertake unannounced visits to border units and customs points, to inland police stations; to be present and observe customs clearance procedures, examine documents and records including computerized data; request re-­examination and re-­assessment of goods already processed, etc. For most of 2006, the mission consisted of 70 border police and customs officials, not counting local staff (Banfi 2006). Thus, the total number of people working with the mission was some 120 people. Immediately after deployment, EUBAM officials, the European Commission and the EU Council started to argue that the existing personnel was insufficient in size to fulfil their objective. An EUBAM official argued that to be effective the mission should have some 200 border and customs experts, which was three times the size of the mission at that moment.8 Indeed, EUBAM was not very big. For example, the EU border assistance mission to the Gaza Strip, EUBAM Rafah had some 70 persons monitoring one border post, while in Moldova and Ukraine a similar number of people were supposed to monitor 470 km of un-­demarcated border. The EU officials involved persuaded the EU member

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The EU’s piecemeal involvement in Transnistria  53 states to approve an extension of the EU operations on the ground by saying that the original aim could not be achieved without further common action – a classical spillover argument. By mid 2006, EU member states agreed to increase the number of EUBAM personnel by some 30 more persons, to 100 EU personnel. The budget was almost tripled from EUR 8 to some EUR 20 million (EUBAM Annual Report 2005/2006). Once on the ground, the EU mission also requested from the Ukrainian and Moldovan authorities to allow EUBAM not only the monitoring of the Moldova–Ukraine border stricto sensu, but also customs operations at the Odessa and Ilichevsk ports in Ukraine, through which most of the Transnistrian trade was directed, and the Moldovan capital Chisinau. Thus, through a number of sequenced steps and ‘dosed’ requests, the EU institutions, after having deployed the border mission, enlarged its scope by increasing the number of personnel and budget. Then in late 2007, the mandate of the EUBAM was extended for another two years, the budget increased to EUR 24 million, and the number of international experts was raised to 122 people (plus 111 local staff ). This indicated a step-­by-­step EU involvement in the Ukrainian–Moldovan border region and a growing degree of EU intrusiveness into border-­management issues. Through its policies of dosage EUBAM also started to get increasingly involved in Moldova. In late 2008–early 2009, EUBAM started to look into possibilities to advise the Moldovan Centre for the fight against corruption and economic crime on anti-­corruption strategy. To achieve that, EUBAM co-­located one of its experts with the Moldovan anti-­corruption agency. Similarly, on 22 January 2009, EUBAM sponsored the signing of a trilateral agreement on cooperation between EUBAM and the Moldovan and Ukrainian intelligence agencies. Such activities have not been originally envisaged when EUBAM was launched, but demonstrated an expansionary strategy on the part of EUBAM in the implementation of its mandate. EUBAM challenged some of the corrupt practices that existed on the border before the launch of the mission (Kurowska and Tillis 2009). For example, due to the EU presence, the Ukrainian officials at the Kuchurgan border crossing point stopped the VIP treatment offered to Igor Smirnov, the self-­proclaimed president of Transnistria, who often crossed the border when travelling to Ukraine. Before EUBAM was deployed, Smirnov used to cross the border without even being checked, neither by the border guards, nor custom officers. After observing this practice, the EUBAM raised the issue with the Ukrainian customs service, arguing that there is no legal basis for such treatment since Smirnov is an ordinary citizen (of Russia, in fact) with no VIP status under the Ukrainian legislation; the practice has since stopped. Since then, Smirnov’s cortege started to be checked.9 While these changes have been insufficient to solve the conflict, it shows how one of the objectives of the mission – that of decreasing the benefits of the status quo for the leadership of Transnistria – was slowly being advanced through small actions.

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54  EU’s involvement in Transnistria Other actions have been less symbolic, but have had a greater impact on the momentum of the Transnistrian secessionist conflict. EUBAM focused on identifying weaknesses in border management in Ukraine and Moldova that were exploited by various criminal groupings operating around Transnistria. For example, EUBAM asserted that of the four agencies involved in border management in Ukraine and Moldova (a customs and a border services for Moldova and for Ukraine), only the Moldovan customs service had the legal prerogatives to investigate serious criminal violations (ICG 2006b). This meant that if smugglers were caught, the Ukrainian customs officers would have to call the police from nearby towns, and often wait for up to 2–3 hours for them to arrive. Custom officers had little incentives to investigate smuggling cases that used a lot of time and were not rewarded professionally. To counteract this, EUBAM recommended legislative amendments to allow Ukrainian border guards to launch criminal investigations. Another loophole related to the fact that, according to Ukrainian legislation, if smuggled goods were worth less than USD 10,000, the case could not be criminally prosecuted. This meant that smugglers who were caught could escape by only paying a fine and having their goods confiscated (but not the cars they used for smuggling). Thus the following smuggling scheme was executed: goods (for example chicken legs) were imported from ­anywhere in the world via Ukraine into Transnistria in large quantities. These would be distributed in mini-­vans carrying goods worth less than USD 10,000 that would try to cross the border back into Ukraine at night through the undemarcated border or through official customs points by bribing customs officials. This minimized the risks for smugglers. The result was millions of euro in lost customs revenues for the Ukrainian and Moldovan budgets. EUBAM pressed Ukraine to lower the threshold for the value of smuggled goods that would launch a criminal investigation and would increase the penalties for smuggling. Another EUBAM recommendation was related to border patrolling. For example, Ukrainian border patrols had a pre-­approved schedule for patrolling the border between Moldova and Ukraine that was centrally approved by the Ukrainian border guards’ service. So, officials in the central apparatus would know for a week in advance at what time and which place on the border each patrol would happen to be at any given moment. Smugglers could buy the patrolling schedule from corrupt border officers, and be aware of which parts of the border were patrolled at which time. Therefore, smugglers could plan their smuggling in a way that significantly reduced the risk of being caught by border patrols. EUBAM pressed the Ukrainian border service to decentralize planning of border patrols, so that each patrol decides what sections and what time it is going to inspect, making it more difficult for smugglers to predict patterns of border patrolling. EUBAM has identified numerous weaknesses of this kind and made 41 recommendations to the Ukrainian and Moldovan customs and border services on how to eliminate them.10

The EU’s piecemeal involvement in Transnistria  55

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Despite these important activities, the mission sought to avoid excessive politicization, presenting itself as a technical and politically neutral enterprise. But this meant that the mission’s support to conflict management in Transnistria would mainly be confined to ‘flanking issues’ (Kurowska and Tillis 2009: 63). Inter-­institutional aspects of EUBAM With the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in December 2009 the Commission and Council units dealing with foreign relations have been merged into a newly-­created European External Action Service. However, in a pre-­Lisbon environment EUBAM was an interesting case of inter-­institutional competition inside the EU, with the Commission and the Council competing for prerogatives in setting up the mission. From an intra-­EU point of view, EUBAM was a rare animal. It was one of the very few significant EU security policy endeavours that was not an ESDP operation, but a European Commission-­led mission. The story of how EUBAM became a Commission-­led mission started rather far away from Moldova – in Aceh, Indonesia which was making significant strides towards peace in the summer of 2005. The EU was invited to monitor a peace deal between rebels in Aceh region and the Indonesian government (Grevi 2005). The planning of the EU mission to Indonesia started a few weeks ahead to the planning for the mission to Moldova. The likelihood of success and the urgency of deployment in Aceh mobilized the EU foreign policy machinery to establish an EU Monitoring Mission in Aceh. But the Aceh mission ran into the difficulty of finding on short notice and in the summer months budgetary resources (Grevi 2005: 26–7). An inter-­institutional battle between the EU Council and the European Commission ensued. The EC could contribute financially to the mission, but wanted some oversight of the political operation, while the legal service of the EU Council argued that the EC could not have any political say over a crisis-­management operation. In the end, the EU managed to deploy by mid-­September a Council-­led 231-­person EU Monitoring Mission to Aceh. The EU mission to Aceh had a number of implications for planning the EU mission to Moldova. To start with, it showed that when confronted with a choice for priorities between an unsolved conflict in the neighbourhood and a successfully-­solved conflict in Asia, the EU Council gave priority to a quick foreign policy success over strategic imperatives to stabilize the immediate­neighbourhood. As a result of the mission to Aceh, the EU Council’s CFSP budget was exhausted by September 2005 and the Council could not financially­support a new mission (Beatty 2005). The European Commission seemed better prepared than the EU Council to launch EUBAM. The Commission had the funds via the Rapid Reaction Mechanism and other budgetary lines to launch such a mission (European Com­ mission, DG Relex 2005). After being sidelined from the Aceh mission, the

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56  EU’s involvement in Transnistria European Commission firmly defended its intention to run the EU mission to Moldova. The European Commission argued that EUBAM would not be a crisis-­management mission so much as a depoliticized technical-­support mission (Kurowska and Tallis 2009). Presented in this light, the mission would be more acceptable to Ukraine and less irritating to Russia, which had its own interests in Transnistria. It was also argued that having a high profile ESDP mission on the ground in Ukraine could have been more problematic politically in Ukraine since it would suggest that Ukraine could not manage its borders and was generally an unstable country, given that ESDP missions are launched in conflict regions.11 The European Commission has framed EUBAM as a low-­politics activity, in order to maintain institutional control of its actions, rather than let it become an EU Council (inter-­governmental) operation as was the case for all other EU crisis-­management operations. The European Commission thus insisted that EUBAM was not a conflict management mission (which it definitely was given its potentially big impact on the situation in Transnistria), but a technical-­ support and capacity building mission. The way EUBAM was presented demonstrated both the EU institutional bias in favour of low-­politics actions, and showed how the European Commission framed certain actions as technical non-­political measures in order to retain greater institutional autonomy. Presenting actions as low-­politics was used as a power-­maximizing strategy for institutions that tried to expand their mandates while still remaining under the radar of the member states. The European Commission also argued that the EU needed to build on the momentum of the Yuschenko–Voronin invitation and ‘seize the window of opportunity which may not last long’ (European Commission, DG Relex 2005). This suggested the extent to which the EU is dependent on external stimuli for launching such policies. In the end it was decided that EUBAM was to be a Commission-­led mission. However, the Council was given a say in the management of EUBAM through the double-­hatting of the Head of EUBAM as a European Commission official and Senior Political Advisor to the EUSR. However, the EUBAM itself was integrated in the line of command of the European Commission only. Part of the compromise was also the strengthening of the EUSR with four advisors on the border issue based in Chisinau, Kiev and Odessa. The EUSR Border team would consist of a Senior Political Advisor in Odessa who combines his/her function with that of the Head of EUBAM; a Senior Advisor in Kiev, a Liaison Officer in Odessa and one Advisor in Chisinau (later extended to two).12 Thus, it confirmed the not so uncommon situation that inside the EU, contradictions are sometimes solved by the mutual expansion of competencies. The European Commission has defended the low-­politics nature of its border support efforts in Transnistria in order to retain control over the issue. With time, the EUSR has had some influence over EUBAM, but in fact did not have a hands-­on approach to EUBAM and was concerned primarily with political negotiations around Transnistria. Meanwhile, DG RELEX in the European Commission became the main agency directing the work

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The EU’s piecemeal involvement in Transnistria  57 of EUBAM, while also trying to limit the EU Council’s involvement in the ­day-­to-­day running of EUBAM for fear of EUBAM being slowly taken over by EU member states.13 As the EU moved on to implement the provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon such inter-­institutional divisions have been gradually minimized since the running of all the EU operations has been centralized within one institution – the European External Action Service. The ENP: making Moldova attractive The EU has launched a number of potentially significant political and economic­measures aimed at supporting reforms in Moldova, with the implicit aim of making it more attractive for Transnistria. For example, in 2007 the EU signed with Moldova a visa-­facilitation agreement that would allow certain categories of Moldovan citizens, such as businessmen, students, academics, civil society activists, and lorry drivers to benefit from a less restrictive visa regime with the EU (Trauner and Kruse 2008). This led the Transnistrian Chamber of Commerce to request that the visa-­facilitation regime be applied to Transnistrian businessmen (with Moldovan passports) as well (Novyi Region 2007). Such measures increased incentives for the above mentioned categories of residents of Transnistria to apply for Moldovan passports. The EU has also significantly increased its financial assistance to Moldova. In 2007–2010 EU assistance for Moldova doubled to some EUR 250 million for three years with the launch of the ENP financial assistance instrument – the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) – which replaced TACIS. Thus Moldova became the second biggest recipient of EU funding per capita in the neighbourhood, just after Palestine. Georgia, for example, which has a population slightly larger than that of Moldova, received only EUR 120 million, while Ukraine – 12 times the population of Moldova – was pledged just double the amount of EU assistance to Moldova. However, due to the division of labour between the European Commission dealing with assistance and the EUSR involved in political negotiations, these funds could not be used as leverage to back up the EUSR’s political strategy on Transnistria. Another significant element of EU support is related to trade liberalization with Moldova. In 2006, the EU granted Moldova the so-­called Generalized System of Preferences Plus trade regime, lowering taxes for Moldovan exports to the EU. At the same time, after the introduction of the new customs regime in March 2006, Transnistrian companies could not export anything without registering with the Moldovan government. This forced virtually all Transnistrian exporters to register in Moldova, which made it possible for them to benefit from facilitated trade access to the EU. This proved beneficial for Transnistrian exports to the EU, which grew by 59 per cent between January 2006 and January 2008 according to the OSCE Mission to Moldova (Remler 2008). EU trade facilitation gave strong incentives for Transnistrian companies to operate under Moldovan law.

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58  EU’s involvement in Transnistria In 2008, the EU also extended to Moldova Autonomous Trade Preferences – a special regime applied only to the countries of the Western Balkans and Moldova. Such a regime amounts to a one-­sided, non-­reciprocal free trade area, before moving in a few years toward a full free trade area. Such a regime made it more attractive than ever for economic entities in the region to reintegrate into the Moldovan economic space. Moldova’s trade statistics showed a clear trend towards greater economic links to the European Union and that EU trade liberalization opened new markets for Moldovan (and Transnistrian exports). If in 1997 some 70 per cent of Moldovan exports went to the CIS and only 21 per cent to the EU then by 2008 – 51 per cent of exports went to the EU and 39 per cent to the CIS (with Russia having a roughly 15–17 per cent share of Moldovan external trade in 2008–2009). In 2006, the EU overtook the post-­Soviet states as Moldova’s biggest trading partner and the biggest destination for Moldovan exports. While Moldovan exports grew both to the CIS and the EU, they grew much faster towards the European Union (Statistica.md 2009). These examples showed how the European Commission has used a number of measures within the framework of the ENP action plan to influence conflict resolution in Moldova. These have been low-­level and technical in nature, but had the potential to have an impact on the structure of interests in the conflict region. Reintegrating Moldova’s economy The most politically significant and controversial action has been the EU’s coercive contribution to the economic reintegration of Moldova, by pressing Transnistrian companies to register with legal authorities in Chisinau. Under a 1997 deal between Moldova and Transnistria, the Moldovan government granted the secessionist Transnistrian authorities the right to conduct foreign economic relations and use the Moldovan customs stamp for those purposes. In exchange, the Transnistrian authorities agreed to accept Moldovan customs officers at the crossing points that the secessionist authorities controlled on the Moldova-­Ukraine border. However, the deal was not respected by Transnistria. Transnistria received the Moldovan customs stamp, but did not let Moldovan customs officers into its territory. This led Moldova to rescind Transnistria’s right to use Moldovan customs stamps (by replacing the custom stamps) in 2001. However, Ukraine continued accepting Transnistrian exports (and goods in transit for Russia) as though the expired Moldovan custom stamps were legal. This allowed Transnistrian companies to conduct import–export operations, without being legally part of the Moldovan economy and without paying taxes or customs duties in Moldova. The system worked to strengthen Transnistria’s secessionist aspirations and sustainability, while undermining the Moldovan economy. The situation could not be reversed without Ukraine ceasing to accept Transnistrian goods that lacked official Moldovan custom stamps. The EU

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The EU’s piecemeal involvement in Transnistria  59 and Moldova had pressed Ukraine for a number of years to stop accepting Transnistrian goods without Moldovan customs stamps – a measure that would force all Transnistrian companies to legally register with the Moldovan authorities. Following significant EU pressure on Ukraine, on 3 March 2006 Ukraine stopped accepting goods produced in Transnistria that did not bear Moldovan custom stamps, while Moldova agreed to facilitate the registration of Transnistrian companies in Chisinau. EU pressure on Ukraine to introduce a new border regime was not necessarily in the realm of low-­politics. In Transnistria and Russia, it was characterized as an economic blockade. The Transnistrians organized protests at the border, pressured the companies not to register with the Moldovan government (which made it impossible for them to export goods), and refused to take part in the 5+2 negotiations therefore blocking the process. In addition, Russia retaliated against Moldova by introducing a ban on Moldova wines, one of the most important export items for Moldova. However, after a few months, the Transnistrian companies succeeded in persuading the secessionist authorities to allow them to register in Chisinau. This has lead to a gradual registration of all exporting Transnistrian companies with the Moldovan authorities, meaning that these businesses had to keep double books – one for Transnistria and one for Moldova. It also made them subject to Moldovan legislation while increasing the leverage of the Moldovan government and the EU on business interests in the region. Once registered with the Moldovan government, the opportunity to benefit from better export regimes to the EU emerged. When the companies were not registered in Chisinau (and did not have the Moldovan custom stamps on exported goods), any goods exported from Transnistria to the EU were treated in the single market as ‘goods of non-­specified origin’ to which maximal taxes were applied. For legally-­registered Moldovan companies the situation was different. Moldova has been a member of the World Trade Organization and has benefited from a preferential trade regime with the EU (GSP, GSP Plus and then ATP). Once registered with the Moldovan authorities, Transnistrian companies could benefit from increased business opportunities under the EU–Moldova trade regime, while being exempt from paying taxes to the Moldovan authorities. Under ATP, the EU imposed no customs duties on Moldovan exports, though non-­tariff barriers and some quotas remained. Therefore, trading with the EU as a Moldovan company was much more profitable than trading as a Transnistrian entity (or even as a Ukrainian or Russian company). Certainly, the benefits were not automatic. Goods had to correspond to certain standards, with strict rules of origin and the right of the EU to exercise on-­site inspections to see if the goods were really produced in Moldova and corresponded to the production standards. The economic impact of the registration of Transnistrian companies with the Moldovan government and the EC dialogue with Transnistrian businesses has been significant. As already mentioned, the growth of Transnistrian exports to the EU in 2006–2008 was 59 per cent. The registration of Transnistrian

60  EU’s involvement in Transnistria

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companies in Chisinau also launched a process of creeping economic reintegration of Transnistrian businesses into the Moldovan economy. It did not solve the conflict per se, but it still was a significant confidence-­building measure which created new stakeholders in the conflict resolution process. The EU failed peacekeeping in Moldova: episode 2 Building on the momentum of EUBAM in 2005, which had effectively challenged­ the entrenched status quo around Transnistria, then EUSR Jacobovits tried to remove another critical source of support for the secessionist authorities in Transnistria – the Russian military presence, which had acted for more than a decade to entrench Transnistrian secessionism through ‘piece-­keeping’ rather than peace-­keeping (Socor 2006). Thus, in the first half of 2006, EUSR Jacobovits started to lobby for a change in the peacekeeping format in Transnistria whereby the EU would press Russia to accept a joint EU–Russia operation in Moldova in place of the existing Russia-­led operation. To achieve that, a number of steps were necessary. First, was the need to convince the EU to make the change in the peacekeeping format as the next priority for EU action in conflict resolution in Transnistria. Then the EU would need to pressure Russia to accept a change in the peacekeeping operation. Second, the EU would engage in operational planning for this peacekeeping mission through its military structures. It was also Jacobovits who promoted a change in the peacekeeping format in 2003 while working at the Dutch Foreign ministry as OSCE CiO representative on Moldova. A significant number of EU member states opposed the initiative. There were two main reasons for this. One was the lack of a formal conflict settlement between the conflict parties in Moldova. Sending EU peacekeepers to Moldova without a conflict settlement agreement could have locked EU forces for many years in a conflict that had been frozen for over a decade. The EU would have no exit strategy in this case and did not want to commit to an open-­ended process with limited hopes of success. But these reasons could not explain the outright refusal of some EU member states to even discuss contingency planning for EU involvement in case a settlement was achieved, since it was generally understood that in any post-­settlement context, the EU would be a key contributor to a peace-­support operation in Moldova. The key reason for blocking discussions over EU peacekeeping was the concern of a number of Russia-­friendly EU member states that such an EU initiative would complicate EU–Russia relations, especially since Russia had rejected any EU peacekeeping involvement in the conflict region in the summer of 2003. The divisions in the EU highlighted very clearly the importance of this factor. EU planning for a peace operation to Moldova was supported by eleven states: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, the United Kingdom and Romania (which was not yet a member state, but was present at all EU meetings since it was due to join on 1 January 2007). This group of states represented virtually all Central

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The EU’s piecemeal involvement in Transnistria  61 and East European EU member states, and old EU member states critical of Russia’s assertive foreign policy. Eight EU states were against operational planning for an EU peacekeeping in Moldova: Cyprus, Germany, Greece, Finland, France, Italy, Portugal and Spain. The governments of these states were Russia-­friendly (Germany, Finland, Greece); or were sceptical of any significant EU involvement in the eastern neighbourhood for fear of diverting resources from the southern neighbourhood (Portugal, Spain); or both (France, Italy, Cyprus).14 The fact that Germany and France were against the peacekeeping effort led the EU High Representative Javier Solana to adopt a similar position;15 this interestingly put EUSR Jacobovits at odds not only with some EU member states, but also with his immediate boss. Since the matter was related to peacekeeping, and Russia was adamantly opposed to such a measure, the issue entered the realm of high-­politics for many member states, who had kept a close eye on the issue. After the first attempt to promote EU peacekeeping in Moldova failed in 2003, it was known that Russia was opposed to it. Thus, the EUSR’s room for manoeuvre­on the issue was extremely limited. When EUSR Jacobovits continued to promote the issue, against the will of many member states and the High Representative Solana, he lost the support of EU member states and had to leave his job a few months later. This was a clear case where the EU member states sought to punish an institutional agent that pushed too far the limits of institutional autonomy. In early 2007, EUSR Jacobovits was replaced with EUSR Kalman Mizsei. The new EUSR’s room for manoeuvre was now considerably narrower in some respects than it had been previously since it was clear that the proposed change of the peacekeeping format was now explicitly off the table. Paradoxically, the EU had been readier to send peacekeepers to Moldova in 2003 (when no EU state was openly opposed to it) than in 2006. In 2003, EU plans to send peacekeepers to Moldova failed in the face of Russian opposition, while in 2006 they failed due to internal opposition in the EU. This occurred in spite of progress in EU enlargement to the East, the greater involvement of the EU in Transnistria and the launch of the European neighbourhood policy. This showed that despite a strong EU interest on the ground in advancing conflict resolution in Moldova, many member states considered relations with Russia more important. In fact, EU–Russia relations have been increasingly tense during President Putin’s second term in 2004–2008. This had to do with a Russia that was assertive in the neighbourhood, revisionist in its relations with the EU and increasingly authoritarian. A growing number of Russian commercial, diplomatic and political disputes with EU member states such as the United Kingdom, Estonia, Poland, Lithuania and many others, meant that the agenda was already too tense and many EU member states were even more reluctant to irritate Russia on an issue like Transnistria (Leonard and Popescu 2007). Thus EU member states have asserted strong control of the EU policy on Transnistria. This immediately led to a lowest common denominator policy on the peacekeeping issue, and the punishment

62  EU’s involvement in Transnistria of the institutional agent who lobbied for high-­politics EU actions in the face of opposition of some EU member states.

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EU impact in Moldova For a comprehensive analysis of EU conflict management policies the question is not just how successfully the EU managed to design policies, but what was their impact as well. In security terms, EU impact on conflict management in Transnistria has been minimal. Naturally, the low-­politics of conflict management is designed to avoid security issues, and it is unsurprising that EU’s impact on the security aspects of the Transnistrian conflict has been meagre. The Russian peacekeeping troops have remained an important element sustaining the status quo in Transnistria and ensuring Russia’s geopolitical goals in the region. Yet, unlike in Georgia there has been no war or no deterioration of the security situation in Moldova. However, this is primarily due to a clear Moldovan and Transnistrian commitment to solve the conflict through peaceful means only. This commitment, largely supported by the two societies, has been a constant factor throughout the 90s, well before the EU started to get engaged in the conflict settlement efforts. When it came to the diplomatic efforts to settle the conflict, the EU’s impact has also been modest. Despite the fact that the EU joined the ‘5+2’ negotiations format, this has not led to any great impulse towards conflict settlement. Transnistria could easily stonewall the ‘5+2’ format by refusing to take part in talks. Similarly, the introduction of a travel ban against Transnistrian leaders due to their obstructionism of talks in 2003 did not make them more forthcoming in conflict settlement talks which made the EU temporarily suspend the travel ban in 2010. However, one positive effects of EU’s inclusion into the settlement format was to internationalize the conflict settlement framework which minimized Russia’s ability to put pressure on Moldova as part of this format. The opening up of the format gave the EU political legitimacy and implicit acceptance to work on issues ‘around’ the conflict, such as border management and flagging economic incentives. As for EU’s impact on Russian policies vis-­à-vis Transnistria, such an impact has been nil. Irrespective of the EU, Russia continued to support the secessionist authorities in Transnistria, occasionally put pressure on Moldova, and maintain its military presence in the region irrespective of its commitments to withdraw the troops. However, EU’s impact has been greater on Ukraine. Partly due to EU pressure and the presence of EUBAM, partly due to Ukraine’s own internal changes, Ukraine has been less supportive of the secessionist authorities of Transnistria. The EU has had more impact on the economic aspects of conflict settlement. Over the years it had a number of objectives in this field, among them: make Moldova economically more attractive to Transnistria, reduce smuggling on the border (making the status quo less lucrative for the secessionist authorities), and offer incentives and pressures for Transnistrian economic actors to

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The EU’s piecemeal involvement in Transnistria  63 gradually become part of Moldova’s economic space. These objectives have been largely achieved through the deployment of EUBAM, the granting of trade preferences to Moldova and the registration of virtually all Transnistrian exporters with the Moldovan authorities. All these processes were not enough to achieve the resolution of the conflict in Transnistria. However, they have contributed to a situation of creeping de facto reintegration of Moldova on economic level which could yield some results in the future should the political will to solve the conflict become prevailing in both Moldova and Transnistria. Certainly, such economic aspects of the conflict would not be enough in themselves; however, they could constitute the groundwork for a potential future settlement of the conflict. Such a strategy would, however, only work in the long term. The EU could of course precipitate the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict by, for example, contributing to the ultimate build up of Moldova’s ‘attractiveness’ by offering it an EU accession perspective. However, the EU’s policy of supporting an ‘attractive’ Moldova has not gone as far as that. Overall, the EU’s impact on the low-­politics of conflict management has only been possible because the security situation allowed that (unlike in Georgia). But the EU’s contribution to the security environment has been rather small. It was Moldova and Transnistria, primarily, that created the peaceful conditions that allowed the deployment of EU low-­politics instruments of conflict management. Should Moldova and Transnistria be as unstable as the conflicts around Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-­Karabakh, the EU’s impact would have been much more modest. Moldova’s ‘Cyprus syndrome’ An unintended consequence of the EU’s evolving relationship with Moldova (and the EU’s irresistibility as a partner) has been the emergence of an early ‘Cyprus syndrome’ in Moldova. The Cyprus syndrome stems from the situation where the growing prosperity and EU accession of the Republic of Cyprus had a double effect: it made the Turkish community reconsider its 30 years of opposition to reunification and campaign in favour of conflict settlement, but it also made the Greek part of Cyprus more intransigent, aware of its growing bargaining power vis-­à-vis Turkey and Turkish community of Northern Cyprus, as well as less willing to make economic or political concessions to the secessionist region in order to achieve a settlement. Moldova is certainly not Cyprus. It is not yet joining the EU and remains the poorest state in Europe. Yet, it also faces a number of dilemmas related to conflict settlement. To begin with, Moldovan public opinion does not consider conflict settlement in Transnistria an important priority. Only 2 per cent of the public thought that the Transnistrian conflict should be the first priority for the government, and it came 9th in the ranking of priorities. Public opinion was more concerned with unemployment, organized crime, inflation and sometimes floods (IPP 2009). This clearly impacted on the way the

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64  EU’s involvement in Transnistria government saw its priorities. A senior official dealing with reintegration once even stated that when it comes to interaction with other ministries they behave as if ‘Moldova ends on Nistru’, i.e. does not include Transnistria. For a comparison, over 50 per cent of public opinion in Georgia and Azerbaijan persistently rank the secessionist conflicts as the most important challenge facing their country. In the case of Moldova, the implication of such relative disinterest with Transnistria is that the public would like to see the conflict settled, but are not very willing to make any serious compromises. At the same time, Moldova had a very high public support (over 70 per cent) for EU accession. So if Transnistria is perceived as making Moldova accession to the EU more complicated (due to Russian military presence or by giving Transnistria strong influence over Moldovan foreign policy as part of a power-­sharing agreement) the public would increasingly be likely to choose European integration over reunification with Transnistria (see Popescu 2004). Such trends have not resulted directly from EU policies, but rather of internal political dynamics in Moldova which were shaped by EU soft power.

Conclusions Throughout the 1990s, Transnistria was the conflict with the lowest level of European involvement in conflict resolution. With the launch of the European neighbourhood policy in 2003 and the 2004 round of EU enlargement, this has rapidly changed. EU institutions have taken a lead in conflict management efforts. Since no EU member states had been involved in conflict settlement mechanisms (as they did in Nagorno-­Karabakh and Abkhazia), EU institutions found it easier to become pro-­active in their policy on Transnistria without being afraid of challenging established national policies of EU member states. The handicap of non-­involvement in the 1990s actually facilitated subsequent EU involvement. Due to EU actions, Transnistrian businesses registered as Moldovan legal entities. Due to facilitated trade access to the EU as Moldovan legal entities, Transnistrian exports to the EU had been booming until the financial crisis of 2008–2009. The EU border assistance mission reduced smuggling around Transnistria, reducing the resilience of the secessionist leadership. Even without a formal resolution of the conflict, EU actions have set in motion a process of gradual, though slow, creeping reintegration of Moldova (which was not irreversible though). Dealing with the low-­politics of conflict settlement is where EU institutions had a comparative advantage (because of their prerogatives) and a higher degree of autonomy from EU member states. Transnistria was an ideal setting for low-­politics conflict management. It is a non-­violent conflict largely sustained through corrupt economic networks right at the border of the enlarged EU, and by its very nature it provided just the right mix of conditions for EU institutions to take the lead in conflict settlement efforts. The relatively high level of EU intervention in conflict settlement did not happen overnight. For fear of irritating Russia, many EU member states have

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The EU’s piecemeal involvement in Transnistria  65 been leery about supporting a too interventionist EU policy in Transnistria. To minimize opposition, EU institutions have ‘dosed’ their demands for action in the region. They have opted for policies of incremental intervention by ‘slicing’ their policies into low-­cost, relatively uncontroversial actions that over time amounted to a rather substantial level of EU involvement in Transnistria. This was conducive to facilitating and increasing EUBAM activities and liberalizing trade with Moldova. In just a few years of activities, EUBAM significantly expanded through dosage. But the EU’s low-­politics approach also constrained the EU’s ability to tackle more security-­relevant issues in the conflict settlement process. The EU could increasingly intervene in border-­related issues through a process of spillover, but found it extremely difficult to induce spillover into other, security-­related fields such as the issue of peacekeeping. EU peacekeeping missions to Moldova were considered twice. In 2003, an EU peacekeeping mission was blocked by Russia. More interestingly, in 2006 the EU Special Representative Moldova pushed for a greater EU peacekeeping role, but this initiative was blocked by the EU member states. They anticipated Russian resistance to the idea and they cared more about the need not to irritate Russia, than by advancing a change in the peacekeeping operation. EU member states asserted their control of pro-­active institutions, and rolled back the actions of the EUSR when he moved into high-­politics areas of conflict management. In both 2003 and 2006, peacekeeping was a high-­politics issue. However, in 2006 the issue was much more politically contentious because of Russia’s increasing assertiveness in international affairs, its previous refusal to accept cooperation with the EU on Transnistria in 2003, and a spiralling number of disputes between Russia and some EU member states. When touching upon the high-­politics of peacekeeping operations, intergovernmentalism (that is, the preferences of EU member states) explains the pattern of EU policy making. Despite reservations on the issue of peacekeeping, it is on Transnistria that the EU strategy of stealth intervention came closest to an integrated approach to conflict intervention where civilian, security, economic and political instruments have been synergetically brought together to advance the settlement of a conflict. However, such a low-­politics strategy could only work in the longer run. In the context of the EU foreign policy upgrades provided by the Treaty of Lisbon such synergies can only be strengthened, though are unlikely to lead to revolutionary EU involvement into high-­politics issues such as peacekeeping.

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4 The EU’s reluctant engagement in Abkhazia and South Ossetia

Georgia is among the most headline-­making post-­Soviet states. In the 90s it was led by one of the patriarchs of perestroika, the former Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze. It is the country that launched the wave of post-­Soviet ‘coloured’ popular revolts against rigged elections with its 2003 Rose Revolution, which made the then US President George W. Bush call it a ‘beacon of democracy’. But it is also the one post-­Soviet country that had the most wars – two secessionist wars in 1992–1994 with South Ossetia and Abkhazia, with an intra-­Georgian civil war in the background. Then on 8 August 2008, the day when most headlines were supposed to announce the opening of the Olympiad in Beijing and symbolize China’s rise to global power status, Georgia managed to steal the headlines with a new war in South Ossetia. The war sent shockwaves through Europe and resulted in the worst crisis between Russia and the US, NATO and the European Union. Georgia’s wars in the 90s were wars for the past – wars for the post-­Soviet legacy. But the war of 2008 was a war for the future – the war that was meant to draw the contours of the European security system, the limits of NATO enlargement, Russia’s relations with its post-­Soviet neighbours and the West, and test the European Union’s foreign policy ambitions and capabilities. Georgia’s secessionist conflicts over Abkhazia and South Ossetia raised important dilemmas for the EU regarding the scale of its involvement in the EU neighbourhood and its relations with Russia. Georgia also emerged as one of the most divisive issues in EU foreign policy. Hence, the story of EU conflict management in Georgia is full of contradictions, increased activism and sudden apathy, a desire to act in unison and a record of strong internal disagreements among the EU member states. Georgia’s multiple crises constantly kept it on the radar screens of EU diplomats, and limited the room for manoeuvre of EU institutions. Failed attempts to depoliticize EU conflict management policies have been a regular feature of the conflict environment. This chapter follows the structure of the previous section of the book. It starts by explaining the background to the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the EU approach to the region in the 1990s and the changes that came with the launch of the European neighbourhood policy. It then explains the driving factors behind EU policies towards Georgia’s conflicts before and

EU in Abkhazia and South Ossetia  67 after the 2008 war – the EU’s attempts to engage with the secessionist regions, beef-­up Georgia’s statehood and ultimately ‘re-­freeze’ the ‘unfrozen conflicts’.

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The conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia Abkhazia is a region on the Black Sea that de facto seceded from Georgia after a war in 1992–1993 (see Coppieters 2007; Coppieters et al. 2004; Duffy Toft 2003; Kaufman 2001; Popescu 2006a; 2006b, Zurcher 2007). Abkhazia’s territory is some 8,700 km2, and it borders Russia. Before the war, Abkhazia was an autonomous republic within Soviet Georgia, with a population of approximately 500,000 people; some 45 per cent were Georgians, 17 per cent Abkhaz, and the rest predominantly Armenians and Russians. Abkhazians are part of the North Caucasian Adyghean ethnic group that comprises Adyghs, Cherkessians and Kabardins. There are approximately 200,000 people today in Abkhazia (ICG 2006c). The conflict in Abkhazia claimed more than 10,000 lives between September 1992 and September 1993 with atrocities on both sides. The Abkhaz have won the war militarily and expelled not only the Georgian troops but also most of the Georgian population (numbering almost one-­half of the pre-­war population). Since then, some 50–60,000 Georgians (of the Mingrelian sub-­ ethnic group) have been allowed to return to the Gali region in the south of Abkhazia. Conflict settlement efforts have been sporadic and ineffective. A Russian-­led peacekeeping under the supervision of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) had a role in maintaining peace until 2008. However, these have led to few results and finally these mechanisms collapsed after the 2008 Russian–Georgian war: the UNOMIG mission was terminated after Russia vetoed its prolongation in June 2009. South Ossetia is a mountainous region on the southern side of the Caucasus mountains that fought to secede from Georgia in 1992. The region’s territory is approximately 3,900 km2. It borders the Russian region of North Ossetia, which has the same ethnic population as in South Ossetia. Until the 2008 war between Russia and Georgia over South Ossetia (see below), Georgian and Ossetian villages were intermingled like a chessboard. The region in its entirety is in a deep demographic crisis. The secessionist entity had some 30–35,000 people living in the villages under its control, while the Georgian-­controlled territories had another 20–25,000 people.1 After the August 2008 war, the absolute majority of ethnic Georgians as well as the Kurta administration have been forced out of the region, and the secessionist authorities of South Ossetia as well as the Russian military established full control of the region. Russia is deeply engaged in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Both regions are bordering on Russia and neither could have persisted in their secessionist bids without Russian support. Russian soldiers patrol the unrecognized borders of the two regions with Georgia. Almost all the inhabitants of the two secessionist regions have Russian passports. Both Abkhazia and South

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68  EU in Abkhazia and South Ossetia Ossetia use the Russian rouble as their official currency. Russia pays most of the pensions in the two regions. Most importantly, Russia offers significant economic and military support. Russia appoints many of the de facto state officials, from the posts of de facto prime minister in South Ossetia to ­ministers of defence to lower ranking officials. Both Abkhazia and South Ossetia have to some extent grosso modo ­‘outsourced’ their de facto independence to Russia (Popescu 2006a). After the 2008 war and the recognition of their independence by Russia, these trends have only intensified. After the EU insisted that it will not recognize their independence, their attitudes to the EU worsened significantly.2 Thus the paradox is that until August 2008 these two regions have been (to some extent) de facto independent, but unrecognized, while after 2008 they have become recognized, but not even de facto independent any more. The conflicts have been a constant source of tensions in Georgian–Russian relations. Russia’s main interest in the region has been to maintain its influence in post-­Soviet space; this has clashed with Georgia’s desire to join NATO, as well as challenge Russia’s monopoly over peacekeeping and conflict settlement mechanisms in the region. The post-­Rose Revolution efforts of the Saakashvili administration to de-­freeze and internationalize the conflict settlement pro­ cess produced a whole range of economic, political and security tensions with Russia. These included at various stages the introduction of Russian visas for Georgians, expulsions of Russian spies from Georgia in 2006, expulsions of Georgian emigrants from Russia, a Russian postal and air-­transportation blockade between 2006 and 2008, the closing of the only border-­crossing between Georgia and Russia (outside the border crossing points in Abkhazia and South Ossetia), and Georgia’s blocking Russia’s accession to the World Trade Organization due a Russian embargo on Georgian wine. Military tensions between Russian peacekeepers and Georgian police occurred regularly

Map 4.1  Georgia with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Copyright: CIA, The World Fact Book.

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EU in Abkhazia and South Ossetia  69 in the conflict zones. All these developments lead to broader tensions, not just between Russia and Georgia, but also NATO, the US and the EU. The Georgian–Russian simmering tensions intensified in early to mid-­2008 (see below). After a few nights of shelling and shootouts around Tskhinvali, where Ossetians shelled Georgian villages and vice versa, the Georgian army launched a full scale military attack on the South Ossetian capital late in the evening of 7 August. After heavy and indiscriminate shelling, the Georgian army captured the town on 8 August. Within just a few hours later, the Russian Federation moved troops into Georgia to recapture South Ossetia (see Valasek 2008, Tagliavini Report 2009). Virtually all the ethnic Georgians from South Ossetia fled the region, and the Georgian villages were destroyed by Ossetian militia. Then Russian troops moved into the rest of Georgia. In the midst of the Russian military campaign, Abkhazia also launched a military strike to capture the Georgian-­controlled enclave in Abkhazia of Upper Kodori. After five days of fighting, Russia halted its military campaign under a ceasefire mediated by the EU. On 26 August, Russia announced that it recognized the independence of both Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Medvedev Statement 26 August 2008), and was followed later by Nicaragua, Nauru and Venezuela. Such a politically charged context presented the EU with considerable challenges, raising big questions related to EU’s capacity to promote its neighbourhood policy objectives, strengthen its partnership with Russia and simply stay relevant in a region on its doorstep.

EU ambivalence in Georgia EU policies in the 1990s EU policies toward the countries of the South Caucasus were to a large extent marked by the instability and the conflicts of these countries. A 1999 EU document on the region asserted that ‘the root cause of a number of the three countries’ problems was their inability to resolve ethnic conflict. This stalemate has worsened humanitarian problems and held back the development of democratic institutions and a market economy (Bulletin EU 1999). Because of ethnic conflicts in the middle of the 1990s, the EU was even debating whether a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with the countries of the region could be signed. A 1995 European Commission communication on the South Caucasus asked, ‘how realistic is it to expect full implementation of the relatively high levels of obligations inherent to a PCA’ by countries that were facing the difficulties which confront the South Caucasus (European Commission 1995).3 Throughout the 90s, EU policies toward the South Caucasus in general and Georgia in particular have been marked by a Russia-­first approach. The 1995 Commission communication stated that ‘A key element in an eventual resolution of the conflicts will be the attitude of Russia’. The EU claimed that ‘given Russia’s drive to dominate the region militarily, many look at the

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Table 4.1  Timeline of EU policy on Abkhazia and South Ossetia 1990s

•  E  U member states’ policies are channeled via the OSCE and UN. •  France, Germany and UK are part of the conflict settlement process in Abkhazia. •  The European Commission starts funding post-­conflict rehabilitation programmes (since 1997).

2001

•  E  uropean Commission becomes an observer on economic issues in the Joint Control Commission in South Ossetia.

2002

•  U  K proposes the appointment of an EU Special Representative on the South Caucasus. The idea is rejected by other EU states.

2003

•  S outh Caucasus is not included in the European neighbourhood policy. •  Heikki Talvitie is appointed as the first EU Special Representative on the South Caucasus (July). •  The Rose Revolution takes place in Georgia (November).

2004

•  S outh Caucasus is included in the ENP (June 2004). •  EUJUST Themis Rule of Law mission is deployed to Georgia (July).

2005

•  G  eorgia invites the EU to take over the OSCE border monitoring operation (early 2005). •  EU sends a three-­persons Border Support Team (April), later extended to twelve persons (September).

2006

•  E  U becomes the biggest international donor to Abkhazia and South Ossetia (bar Russia). •  Peter Semneby is appointed EUSR with a strengthened mandate (February). •  EU and Georgia finalize negotiations on the ENP Action Plan.

2007

•  E  U fact finding mission to Abkhazia and South Ossetia (January). •  EU member states accept most proposals, but potential EU actions on customs and police liaison officers are delayed.

2008

•  T  ensions around the conflicts zones escalate (March–July). •  EU High Representative Javier Solana visits Abkhazia trying to diffuse tensions (June). •  Tensions around South Ossetia degenerate into a war between Russia and Georgia (August). •  Russia recognizes the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (August). •  The French EU presidency negotiates the cease fire agreement (August–September). •  Pierre Morel is appointed EUSR for the crisis in Georgia, while Peter Semneby remains EUSR for South Caucasus (September). •  EU deploys an EU Monitoring Mission to Georgia and offers assistance to Georgia’s reconstruction (October).

2009–2010

•  R  ussia continues to consolidate its control of Abkhazia and South Ossetia through military basis, economic presence etc. •  EU is a mediator in the Geneva peace process.

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EU in Abkhazia and South Ossetia  71 EU as the only other actor capable of playing a major political role’. Despite this assessment, the EU did not undertake such a role. The South Caucasus was simply too far away and too fraught with difficulties for the EU to want to intervene. Even though the EU as an institution had little involvement in Georgia’s conflicts, EU member states did (Rummel and Zullo 1999). Since 1994, France, Germany and the UK (along with Russia and the United States) were part of the Group of Friends of the UN Secretary General on Georgia that became involved in the mediation of the conflict in Abkhazia. Both France and the UK were sceptical of any efforts to develop a common EU policy toward the conflict resolution process, since both had national interests in the region and wanted to prevent any possible dilution of national policies by a common EU policy (Helly 2003: 225). In South Ossetia, the situation was different, as no EU member state was involved in conflict resolution mechanisms. Despite various levels of engagement from the international community, both conflict settlement processes remained ‘frozen’. It is not easy to talk of an EU policy toward the conflicts in the South Caucasus in the 1990s. There was virtually none. The EU retained a low profile, with little involvement in conflict settlement efforts, no direct involvement in mediation, and an undefined strategy for future involvement (Lynch 2006: 61). False start: 2002–2003 By 2002–2003, the lack of EU policy toward the South Caucasus was challenged­by a number of factors. With enlargement nearly accomplished and talks over a new neighbourhood policy underway, Georgia was a clear case in which the EU could play a greater role in conflict resolution. In 2002, the UK circulated a proposal in the EU suggesting the appointment of an EU Special Representative for South Caucasus. This happened roughly in parallel with the initiation by the UK of discussions over a new neighbourhood policy toward Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus in April 2002. From among the big EU member states, only Germany and the UK supported the idea. Small EU states had limited interests in the South Caucasus, their policy being limited to reactions and responses to demands from the region, and budgetary constraints on the EU (Helly 2003: 227). There were no policy drivers for greater EU involvement in Georgia’s conflicts and the UK’s initiative did not materialize. A similar false start was made in relation to the inclusion of the South Caucasus into the European neighbourhood policy. When the policy was launched the European Commission did not include the South Caucasus in the ENP, even though the 2003 European Security Strategy stated that the EU ‘should now take a stronger and more active interest in the problems of the Southern Caucasus, which will in due course also be a neighbouring region’ (European Security Strategy 2003). To counter this message of

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72  EU in Abkhazia and South Ossetia non-­engagement, the EU decided to appoint in July 2003 an EU Special Representative on the South Caucasus. Thus, interestingly enough, after being unable to appoint an EU Special Representative (EUSR) in 2002, the EU managed to agree to appoint an EUSR in mid-­2003, if only to offset the non-­ inclusion of the region into the neighbourhood policy. The same happened with the ENP. After having excluded them in 2003, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan were included into the ENP in mid-­2004. The EU also tried to get involved in conflict settlement negotiations. The European Commission became involved in the sessions on economic issues of the Joint Control Commission for South Ossetia between 2001 and 2008. The EU has also financed the operations of the JCC (EU Council Draft Joint Action 2006), by providing EUR 1.5 million to support the work of the JCC secretariat and its travel expenses and to support cooperation between Georgian and South Ossetian law-­enforcement agencies. In a certain sense, the European Commission ‘bought’ itself a place in the conflict settlement format, from which it intended to slowly develop greater influence on the political process. However, South Ossetia and Russia have been firm in their determination not to allow greater political influence for the EU in the conflict regions. Still, these efforts suggested a growing interest on behalf of the EU to play a bigger role in conflict-­settlement efforts in the region.

Working around the conflicts: ENP and Georgia in 2004–2008 The chapter turns to outlining the contours of EU policies towards the ­conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia at two levels. First, it looks into EU policies on Georgia. Even if they were not aimed directly at promoting conflict resolution, given EU’s focus on modifying ‘the context’ of the conflicts, such an approach is justified. Hence this part deals with EU’s launch of a Rule of Law mission to Georgia, the negotiations on the EU–Georgia action plan, the appointment on an EUSR for South Caucasus and an EU Border support team. Then the chapter moves into discussing specific EU policies targeting the conflict-­settlement process or the secessionist regions themselves. Already in 2002–2003, there were more discussions inside the EU on the need for a more substantial policy on the conflicts in the South Caucasus. But the EU had little capacity to act effectively (Whitman and Wolff 2009) and move beyond the lowest common denominator policy toward the region. An important event changed that. In November 2003, peaceful demonstrators against rigged elections overthrew Eduard Shevardnadze, the then Georgian president, in what became known as the Rose Revolution. The revolution was not only the first popular revolt against rigged elections in the region, but started to be perceived as a harbinger of a broader trend toward democratization in the former Soviet Union and even in the greater EU neighbourhood­ – from Georgia, through Ukraine to Kyrgyzstan and Lebanon (Emerson 2005). Georgia’s post-­revolutionary reformist zeal and efforts to come closer to the

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EU in Abkhazia and South Ossetia  73 EU, while reforming the country, were creating significant expectations for increased EU engagement with Georgia. One of the consequences of the post-­Rose Revolution climate was a new determination on the part of the Georgian government to solve its territorial conflicts and see greater EU involvement in the conflict settlement efforts. For the Saakashvili administration, the status quo around South Ossetia and Abkhazia was no longer acceptable. Georgia engaged on high-­level efforts to draw the international community’s attention to its conflicts. Regular visits to Brussels, high-­level US support, political tensions with Russia, brinkmanship in the conflict zones, threats to terminate the Russian peacekeeping mission and demands for the EU or NATO to deploy peacekeepers in the conflicts zones made sure Georgia’s conflicts remained on the radar screens. Even though the EU was committed to supporting Georgia’s reform process, it was neither ready, nor willing, to challenge Russia by assuming too high a profile in the conflict resolution processes in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia had the classic characteristics of conflicts that belonged to the high-politics domain. The likelihood of violence was high. A failed Georgian military attempt to assume control of South Ossetia in August 2004 only highlighted the risk of violence in the region. Periodic clashes and shoot-­outs in Abkhazia and South Ossetia were the norm. In addition, Russia played a very significant role in the region. It dominated the secessionist regions, was in open political conflict with Georgia, and actively opposed any EU involvement in the conflict resolution processes. Under such conditions low-­politics EU intervention was quasi-impossible. Due to the sensitivity of EU involvement in the region for EU–Russia relations, EU decision-­making on Georgia was firmly intergovernmental (Coppieters 2007). In addition, some EU member states’ did not consider that the Georgian administration’s strategy of ‘unfreezing the conflicts’ was wise. A number of Russia-­friendly EU states made sure the EU policy toward Georgia’s conflict developed at the slowest possible pace. As one EU official described the policy of EU engagement in conflict resolution in the eastern neighbourhood: ‘There is one taboo: that of [EU] military involvement in the CIS. Civilian missions can be sold to EU member states. But even mili­ tary advisors have no chance to be accepted! Because this will irritate the big neighbour [Russia]’.4 The only way to get EU institutions and EU member states to support a greater EU role in Georgia’s conflicts was to work on issues that were indirectly linked to conflict settlement. EU Special Representative In July 2003 the EU members states agreed on the appointment of an EUSR for South Caucasus. The EUSR South Caucasus was appointed, not because there was a strong EU consensus on the need for a pro-­active EU involvement in the South Caucasus, but rather to compensate the countries of the region for their exclusion (at that stage) from the ENP. The EUSR South Caucasus

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74  EU in Abkhazia and South Ossetia was appointed to substitute a policy, which has not been uncommon for the EU (Grevi 2007: 41). The EUSR was granted a rather weak mandate. Rather than appointing the EUSR to achieve conflict resolution, the mandate was that the EUSR should ‘support the United Nations Secretary General and his Special Representative for Georgia, the Group of Friends of the United Nations Secretary General for Georgia [. . .] and the conflict resolution mechanism for South Ossetia under the aegis of the OSCE’ (Official Journal of the EU 2003). No independent role for the EU was envisaged at that stage. The appointment of the EUSR South Caucasus was also marred by financial problems. There was no budget for such a position in 2003, and for the first six months, EUSR Talvitie was financed by Finland. Strikingly, he was based in Helsinki for the whole period of his mandate ( just like the first EUSR Moldova was based in the Hague because he happened to be a Dutch diplomat). But in time, the post of EUSR developed an institutional logic of its own. In February 2006, a new EUSR, Peter Semneby (Sweden), was appointed with a more ambitious political mandate. This time, the EUSR had a mandate ‘to assist creating the conditions for progress on settlement of conflicts’, rather than just support existing frameworks of conflict resolution. Peter Semneby also adopted a more pro-­active stance on the negotiation format. However, EUSR South Caucasus had to navigate much stormier waters than EUSR Moldova, and his room for manoeuvre and institutional autonomy was more limited. For a number of reasons, Georgia’s conflicts have remained far more in the domain of high-politics than has Moldova’s. Russia has been much more involved in Georgia’s conflicts. South Ossetia and Abkhazia are closer to Russia; the probability for violence in these regions was much higher than in Transnistria; and Russia and Georgia have been involved in a wide diplomatic, political and economic conflict with serious security implications. Moreover, Georgia was seeking to join NATO, which has only increased Russian animosity toward Georgian authorities. As one EU officials explained, ‘The Russia-­first approach of many member states is the most important factor limiting the EU policy toward Georgia’.5 Nor could the EUSR use substantial information asymmetries to strengthen his position vis-­à-vis member states. All of the big member states have had a strong diplomatic presence in Georgia since the 90s (which was not the case in Moldova). EU member states have been involved in conflict resolution in Abkhazia and Nagorno-­ Karabakh since the 90s, reducing the room for manoeuvre for the EUSR who needed to navigate within the narrower confines of pre-­established national policies toward the South Caucasus. These difficulties have culminated after the 2008 Georgians-­Russian war when less than two months after the war the EU appointed a French diplomat Pierre Morel as a separate EUSR for the conflicts in Georgia sidelining Peter Semneby from the dossier (see below).

EU in Abkhazia and South Ossetia  75

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EUJUST Themis rule of law mission Another EU attempt to bolster its presence in the region came through the launch of a rule of law mission EUJUST Themis in July 2004 (Helly 2006). By launching the mission, the EU aimed at showing high-­level political engagement with post-­revolution Georgia and support its democratization efforts. On the technical level, the mission had to help Georgia to address its problems in the criminal-­justice sector and to advise its leaders on future criminal-­justice reform (Official Journal of the EU 2004). The mission consisted of several senior EU experts (including judges, pro­ secutors and penitentiary experts) who were to be located at key positions within the Georgian government: the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Interior, the General Prosecutor’s Office, the Supreme Court of Georgia, the High Council of Justice, the Public Defender’s Office, the Court of Appeals in Tbilisi and the City Prosecutor’s Office in Tbilisi. The most important achievement of the mission was the adoption of a Strategy for Criminal Justice Reform by the Georgian government in May 2005.6 Still, this was a modest achievement. Elaborating a document was not the same as implementing it. The fact that the EU did not prolong the mandate of THEMIS reduced its impact on the reform process. The failed border monitoring Probably one of the most telling characteristics of the EU approach to Georgia and its conflicts is not what the EU did, but what it narrowly failed to do. At the end of 2004, Russia vetoed the continuation of the OSCE Border Monitoring Operation (BMO) in Georgia that was monitoring the Russian– Georgian border. This was happening during the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, when relations between Russia and the EU were quite strained. Georgia invited the EU to take over the terminated OSCE BMO and conduct a similar operation under the EU flag (Socor 2005a, 2005b). In response to Georgia’s invitation, the EU discussed four possible options. The first, and most ambitious, option was to take over the OSCE BMO entirely to make it an EU mission. A second option was to avoid placing the new mission under an EU flag, but instead support a ‘coalition of the willing’ mission to monitor the Georgian–Russian border. A third option was to launch an EU training mission for Georgian border guards. The fourth and weakest option was to send three EU border experts to advise Georgia on border reform (Socor 2006a). Inside the EU, the Baltic states supported by the UK were in favour of sending an EU border mission to Georgia, while France with the support of Belgium, Italy, Spain, and Greece, and to some extent Germany opposed such a move (Socor 2006a). After a few months of discussion, the fourth, most minimalistic option, prevailed. This choice was driven in large part by EU fears of irritating Russia.7

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76  EU in Abkhazia and South Ossetia Taking over the OSCE BMO would have been quite easy for the EU to do technically, but not politically.8 The OSCE BMO was manned by fewer than 150 people, and it would have been feasible for the EU to deploy this number of personnel. In fact, just a few months after the EU refused to deploy a monitoring mission to Georgia, it deployed an even larger 231-­strong mission to Aceh Indonesia. However, concerns about Russia made it difficult for the EU to agree internally on sending such a mission to Georgia (Socor 2006a). After Russia’s high-­profile termination of the mission, few member states were ready for a public affront to Russian interests in Georgia. Nor were they willing to be seen to be taking sides in the Russian–Georgian conflict. Since any high-­profile EU involvement in Georgia was seen through the prism of EU–Russia relations, intergovernmental decision-­making and lowest common denominator policies prevailed once more, and EU institutions or pro-­active EU member states could do little to clear the blockage. It would also be fair to note that many EU member states were hesitant to engage in conflict settlement efforts because they were worried about the way Georgia would make use of their presence for their own purposes.9 Some EU officials also think that the resolution of these conflicts in the foreseeable future was hopeless and therefore the best strategy was to keep them ‘frozen’, i.e. maintain­the status quo.10 Georgia’s ‘old’ and ‘new’ friends The failure to take over the OSCE border mission exposed clear-­cut divisions within the EU over its policy toward the separatist conflicts. On the one hand, there was a group of EU policy drivers. These included most of the new EU member states and countries like the UK or Sweden. Meanwhile, a group of ‘brakemen’ – France, Germany, Portugal, Spain, Greece, Italy, Austria and a few others – tried to minimize EU involvement in this capacity either because they enjoyed close relations with Russia, for fear of irritating Russia, or for fear that the EU paid too much attention to the eastern neighbourhood at the expense of the southern neighbours. As one EU diplomat explained: ‘Georgia is the most obvious case where the intra­EU competition for political ­attention and resources between southern vs eastern neighbourhood­is seen’.11 Notwithstanding such divisions, the number of states in favour of a pro-­active EU policy on Georgia has greatly increased with the May 2004 enlargement. In early 2005, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria founded the ‘New Group of Georgia’s Friends’ – a replica of the ‘old’ group of friends of Georgia that was seen as not active enough due to France and Germany’s Russia-­first approach to Georgia. The support of the New Group of Friends for the Georgian government against the secessionist entities, coupled with Georgia’s active requests for EU involvement, could not be easily dismissed by the other EU member states. Hence, the new group of friends played a role in increasing the EU’s attention to Georgia’s conflicts.

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EU in Abkhazia and South Ossetia  77 However, it also highlighted EU’s internal division: the ‘new friends’ were at times closer to Georgia’s view of the conflicts than to other EU member states; while some of the ‘old friends’ more often than not mistrusted Georgia or were unwilling to challenge Russia even if they disagreed with its policies. As one EU official argued: ‘by undermining unity between EU member states, the new group of friends harms the EU more than it helps Georgia’.12 Naturally, EU institutions were caught in between and were often hamstrung by such divisions between the member states. The result has been little improvement on the status quo – a low-­cost EU policy measure designed to placate the pro-­active­member states which came in the form on a border support team. EUSR Border support team Having been asked to take over a 150 persons strong border mission from the OSCE, in April 2005 the EU deployed a three-­person team of advisors on border issues under the banner of EUSR Border support team.13 In September 2005, the team was expanded to 13 EU personnel staff. Part of the team was co-­located in Georgian institutions, including the National Security Council of Georgia and the Border Guard Service of Georgia, while other parts of the team worked with Georgian border crossing to identify the needs and problems on the ground as well as to mentor Georgian border guards. The way EUSR BST was deployed suggested a number of things about EU’s modus operandi. First, EU institutions and pro-­active member states have used the strategy of dosage to expand EU engagement in Georgia. While initially the EU sent only 3 EU experts, it later increased the number of experts. When EU institutions could not undertake one big step toward involvement in Georgia’s border issues, it chose to take a number of smaller steps that led in the same direction. Over time, the EUSR border support team became comparable in personnel and scale of involvement to small ESDP missions in other regions. The strategy of dosage was thus deliberately used by the EU Special Representative on South Caucasus to expand involvement in the region. One EU official summarized the rationale for the politics of dosage in the following way: ‘The politics of little action has two objectives. It creates precedents for EU action in the region. It also prepares the ground for more substantive policy measures. Once the EU is engaged, we can build on that engagement, and the threshold of new actions becomes lower’.14 One could also add that this increases the potential for the EU to become ‘entrapped’ in conflict management issues (Sasse 2009). Second, in the face of Russian high-­level opposition to EU involvement in Georgia, the EU could not develop a policy on Georgia based solely on the merits of EU–Georgia relations and EU priorities in the South Caucasus. The EU had to take Russian sensitivities into account, and because of these sensitivities, many EU member states opposed any substantial EU involvement in Georgia. However, EU institutions were able to upgrade the lowest common denominator (the status quo ante, i.e. lack of any involvement in

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78  EU in Abkhazia and South Ossetia border issues in Georgia) by suggesting low-­cost low-­politics areas of EU involvement – the EUSR BST. The deployment of the EUSR BST showed that EU member states sometimes preferred to resolve crises of contradictions by expanding mutual obligations (‘spillover’) rather than contracting or simply reasserting them (Schmitter 2004: 57). Finally, another revealing element of EUSR BST was its status as a ‘stealth mission’. The border support team was not formally an ESDP operation; there was little mention of it on the EU websites where EU security operations are described, and it did not have a distinguishable ‘brand’ as do other missions (such as ‘Concordia’ in Macedonia, ‘Artemis’ in DR Congo, or ‘Altea’ in Bosnia). Even its designation as a ‘team’ was intended to downplay its importance by emphasizing that it was not a ‘mission’, but only a ‘support team’. This represented a break from past EU missions in the sense that the EU likes to publicize its operations worldwide and the contributions it brings to international stability through the ESDP. Importantly, the mandate of the EUSR BST did not cover areas of the Georgia–Russia border that were controlled by the secessionist authorities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The EU steered clear of involvement in issues that encroached on the high-­politics of conflict resolution, as well as from key areas of Georgian–Russian tensions. The EU has kept the EUSR border support team as low-­profile and depoliticized as possible. EU’s ‘stealth intervention’ strategy has worked, but only up to a ­certain point. In early 2007, the European Commission and the EU Special Representative suggested extending the mandate of the EUSR BST to cover the secessionist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the measure was vetoed by Greece, most likely because it was feared that such a measure would have irritated Russia. Here, the strategy of dosage appears to have ‘hit the ceiling’ and EU action was blocked when one member state declared that the EU institutions’ policy initiatives had ventured too far in the domain of high politics. The ENP Action Plan Under the ENP, the EU and Georgia agreed on a joint Action Plan in November 2006. The ENP Action Plan (ENP AP) per se was not an instance of EU conflict management; however, provisions on conflict resolution have been a key issue in EU–Georgia relations. During the negotiations on the ENP AP throughout 2006, the EU approach was to keep provisions on conflict resolution to a minimum, whereas Georgia wanted conflict resolution to be the first priority of the action plan (Gegeshidze 2006). However, the European Commission and the EU Council were rather insistent on avoiding any possibility of getting locked into a rhetorical promise to play a bigger role in Georgia’s conflicts. This contrasted with the EU’s readiness to make conflict resolution in Transnistria a top priority in the EU– Moldova action plan. Unlike in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, there was no

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EU in Abkhazia and South Ossetia  79 threat of violence in Transnistria, and the EU could focus on the low-­politics of conflict resolution through border assistance, and the use of economic pressures and incentives. In the end, the conflict resolution provisions were listed as only the sixth priority in the EU–Georgia Action Plan, which contrasted with the EU’s readiness to make conflict resolution the first priority in its action plans with Moldova and Azerbaijan. The EU declared that it is ready to ‘contribute to the conflicts settlement in Abkhazia, Georgia and Tskhinvali Region/ South Ossetia, Georgia (EU–Georgia ENP Action Plan 2006). However, the action plan did not envisage any clear steps toward greater EU contributions, though it acknowledged the importance of greater EU–Georgia cooperation on conflict resolution. Irrespective of what the action plans stipulated or not, the EU engaged on a series of steps to influence directly the conflict regions.

EU policies toward the conflicts Despite efforts to stay away from controversial aspects of conflict resolution in Georgia, the broader success of EU policy toward Georgia and the South Caucasus depended on at least some progress toward conflict settlement in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (European Commission 2003b). These conflicts led to disproportionate spending for the military, a lack of proper border controls, periodic outbreaks of tensions around the conflict areas and sustained nationalism across the region. The conflicts were thus diverting political and economic resources away from democracy building and economic and social reforms. Through a process of spillover from one area to another, EU political and economic objectives in Georgia proper created pressures for greater EU action on conflict resolution. Rehabilitation of conflict zones The first EU contribution to efforts to tackle the conflicts in Georgia has been through rehabilitation assistance to the conflict zones. The European Commission started to finance such activities in 1997.15 The EU’s declared objective of providing assistance was ‘to build greater trust between the conflict-­affected populations’ (European Commission Delegation to Georgia 2006). As already mentioned, in 2006–2007 the European Commission became the biggest international donor to the conflict regions, though much smaller than Russia’s un-­transparent assistance in the form of arms supplies, direct budgetary support and payment of pensions. Between 1997 and 2006, the EU committed some EUR 25 million for projects in Abkhazia. EU-­funded projects have remained as depoliticized as possible. The projects in Abkhazia focused on two priorities. First was economic rehabilitation and humanitarian assistance. In the conflict zone (the Gali region in the south of Abkhazia and the Georgian districts bordering Abkhazia), the EU has financed the rehabilitation

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80  EU in Abkhazia and South Ossetia of the Inguri hydropower plant, electricity networks, hospitals, basic utilities (water, sewage and waste management), and supporting farming and other agricultural activities. The EU has also supported d ­ e-­mining efforts, s­ upport for civil society development and confidence-­building measures. In South Ossetia, the EU funded projects of approximately EUR 8 million b ­ etween 1997 and 2006. These projects included the reconstruction of drinkable water supply networks; the rebuilding of schools, electricity, gas networks and railways; and support for agriculture development in different towns and villages of the conflict region. Not all these projects have been successful. The EU financed the rebuilding of a railway station in Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia. But because the local partners did not manage to rebuild the railroad itself, the renovated railway station remained unused.16 The political projects related to confidence-­ building activities through track-­two diplomacy between Georgians and South Ossetians, as well as financial support for the Joint Control Commission, have yielded little result in the face of high-­level tensions in the conflict zones.17 Despite modest levels of involvement, even humanitarian EU support has been politically motivated. Asked to explain the philosophy of the EU approach to assistance to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, one EU official noted that the EU objectives were: to decrease the (financial) dependence of the secessionist entities on Russia and give them an opportunity to diversify their economies; to create links between the secessionists and Tbilisi in order to promote reconciliation; and to promote knowledge about Europe and its values.18 However, these rather political objectives are presented as technical assistance with few political implications. As one EU official claimed, ‘The European Commission can get involved in the conflict areas because its assistance is apolitical. It is difficult for the EU to use political conditionality. The EU does not have enough leverage, or the right instruments’.19 This happens because as one observer put it, ‘What is EU’s few millions when Russia offers them a future?’(ICG 2006a). The EU institutions on the radar screen The EUSR and the European Commission have been active policy entrepreneurs­ on the South Caucasus. They have sought a gradual expansion of EU involvement in Georgia’s conflicts. They have used dosage strategies, i.e. using many small steps to expand their actions in Georgia. In January 2007, the EU Council and the European Commission sent a joint fact-­finding mission to Abkhazia and South Ossetia.20 As a result of the mission, the European Commission and the EU Council submitted in April 2007 a report with policy recommendations that needed to be approved by the member states in the Political and Security Committee. The policy recommendations of the EU institutions were a priori scaled down. They proceeded, not from what was necessary on the ground, but from what would potentially be acceptable to the most sceptical EU member states. One

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EU in Abkhazia and South Ossetia  81 EU official explained how EU institutions act on Georgia: ‘EU diplomats know what is realistic or not’.21 EU institutions thus adopted the risk-­averse and incremental strategy of dosage, not moving too far from what they believed to be the lowest common denominator policy, and putting forward low-­politics policy proposals. These included a number of rather uncontroversial policy recommendations for technical activities such as greater support and financing for civil society and youth support in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and greater support for institution-­building in Georgia’s customs service. At a more political level, the EU institutions suggested co-­locating an EU expert with the Georgian ministry of conflict resolution, which was in charge of conflict settlement in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The EU institutions also proposed the opening of European Information Centres in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. These ideas were accepted by EU member states. However, the strategy was less effective in policy areas that were more controversial, even though far from revolutionary. Another joint proposal advanced by the EU Council and the European Commission in the wake of the fact-­finding mission was to co-­locate an EU police liaison officer with UNOMIG (the UN mission involved in conflict settlement in Abkhazia until mid-­2009) and another with the OSCE. The EU officers were supposed to develop proposals on how the EU could play a bigger role in confidence-­building and policing in the conflict areas. This was controversial because it would take the EU into a whole new area of activity (policing) which was likely to provoke Russian opposition. In addition, Georgia itself was increasingly concerned that EU engagement with Abkhazia and South Ossetia might not lead to the reintegration of Georgia, while strengthening the international legitimacy of the secessionists. Given the controversy of such actions, EU member states carefully scrutinized the proposal. Following an April 2007 discussion over the proposals, EU member states requested more information and details from the EUSR and finally accepted the proposal in autumn 2007. A second controversial idea was the extension of the mandate of the EUSR BST to cover the sections of the Georgia–Russia border controlled by the secessionists regions and the extension of the EUSR BST by two new experts, one in charge of developing a dialogue on border issues around Abkhazia and the other around South Ossetia. This request amounted to a significant reversal of the initial mandate of EUSR BST which explicitly excluded such a possibility. Given the de facto integration of these entities into the economic and political space of the Russian federation, the EU’s gradual involvement into border management in the conflict zones was rather intrusive. Such an explicit attempt by the EU institutions to increase their profile and influence in the conflict regions had a number of objectives: to gain a foothold in conflict ­settlement efforts, decrease the dependence of the secessionist regions on Russia, and thereby undermine some of the factors that maintained the status

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82  EU in Abkhazia and South Ossetia quo in the conflict zones.22 Russia was almost certain to dislike such proposals, while acceptance by Abkhazia and South Ossetia (acting in cooper­ation with Russia) was far from certain. Given Russia’s opposition to the measure, the measure was likely to be subjected to greater inter-­governmental scrutiny. Even before submitting the proposals to a formal discussion in the Political and Security Committee, EUSR Peter Semneby met the Russian ambassador to the EU on 14 March 2007 and travelled to Moscow on 20 March 2007 in order to present his ideas to the Russian authorities, according to one partly declassified EU document (EU Council 2007). This indicated the extent to which the acceptance of internal, even classified, proposals on EU policy toward Georgia was dependent on the positions of external actors such as Russia. The proposal for extending the mandate of the EUSR BST to cover Abkhazia and South Ossetia was vetoed by Greece in April 2007, the only country to oppose the measure. The Greek representatives said that more information on the proposal was needed before a decision could be made, claiming that they received the proposal on too short notice. But one EU diplomat claimed that was not a bona fidae excuse since the content of the proposals was well-­ known in advance.23 Greece was the only state vetoing a proposal accepted by all other states. This was in line with Greece’s broader strategy of supporting Russian positions in the EU (Leonard and Popescu 2007). As one senior member state official said in an interview: ‘every possible EU step in the eastern neighbourhood that might even theoretically upset the Russians is opposed by Greece’.24 This illustrated another feature of EU politics that I call carousel foot-­ dragging. Many states were concerned that an EU that is too pro­active in the eastern neighbourhood would irritate Russia or divert EU foreign policy resources from other priorities such a focus on Africa or the southern neighbourhood. However, no EU member state wants to be perceived as systematically obstructionist (Van Schendelen 2005: 103). It is not considered appropriate to be seen as a ‘bad European’, and con­sistent obstruction can lead to isolation of a member state or even retaliation where other states respond by vetoing the proposals of the obstructionist state (Juncos and Pomorska 2008: 501). Consequently, the Russia-­friendly EU member states tended to speak in turns. As one EU member state official explained: ‘When we discuss post-­Soviet affairs, you can often see EU count­ries speaking up against a too assertive EU. They do so in turns. Today it is Greece, tomorrow it is Germany’. Moreover, such states often hide behind each other’s backs. This happens on many foreign policy issues such as the Spanish–Moroccan conflict over the Perejil islands where many member states are unwilling to be involved in the conflict hid behind France’s back (Monar 2002: 252). Greece’s veto in this case was probably supported tacitly by a number of other EU member states. The discussion on Georgia happened during the German presidency. One EU member state official present at the relevant

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EU in Abkhazia and South Ossetia  83 Political and Security Committee meeting said that the German presidency played a crucial role in shelving the issue of EU action on Georgia. It was explained that: ‘Normally when only one or two EU member states oppose something without any fundamental reason, the presidency suggests that ambassadors should get more instructions from their capitals and that the issue be discussed again in one or two weeks’ time. The German presidency could have reconvened such a discussion since only one EU member state was opposing the EUSR and Commission proposals on Georgia. But the presidency did not do that’.25 This was just one instance showing how the pre-­Lisbon presidency could contribute to shelving (as well as promoting) issues through its agenda-­setting power. Given that a single EU member state can veto a foreign policy proposal, it is relatively easy to block EU foreign policy initiatives. But carousel foot-­dragging makes it even easier, because it allows members to scupper substantive EU conflict management policies without any one EU country being seen as overly obstructionist. In the case of Georgia in 2008, Cyprus and Spain took the lead in opposing an EU peacekeeping mission to the region; this was an instance of carousel foot-­dragging since more states were sceptical of such a course of actions, but took cover behind these two states (International Herald Tribune 2008). The EU institutional behaviour described above suggests a number of broader patterns about EU as a foreign policy actor. To begin with, EU institutional agents – the EU Council and the European Commission – have been pro-­active in their push for greater EU conflict resolution. They have sponsored new initiatives that were deliberately low-­politics since this increased the likelihood that they would be accepted by EU member states. They also used dosage as a strategy to achieve greater EU involvement in conflict reso­ lution, since the deployment of police experts to the conflict regions was seen only as the first step toward greater EU involvement in civilian aspects of crisis management in the region. The least controversial proposals were accepted almost automatically by member states. However, the more controversial proposals – the deployment of police liaison officers and border-­guard experts to the conflict regions – faced problems. These two measures were not a major foreign policy initiative for the EU, since it only meant the deployment of four EU experts to two conflict regions. However, given the Russian opposition to such a measure, the issue became a high-­politics affair leading to greater intergovernmental scrutiny of the proposal and the vetoing of one policy recommendation by one of the most Russia-­friendly states in the EU. This suggests that external actors often establish the parameters of high-­politics issues for EU foreign policy in ways that are used to limit EU institutional activism by lobbying friendly EU member states. In any case, when EU institutions have ventured into policy areas of high-­politics, member states move to reassert control over their actions.

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Failed EU peacekeeping Perhaps the most politically sensitive issue for all the stakeholders in the conflict zones was the nature of the peacekeeping operations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. For years the EU member states refused to even seriously envisage a discussion on the change in peacekeeping arrangements in the two conflict zones. The fact that Russia provided military, economic and political ­support to the secessionist entities certainly implied that Russia has not been a neutral party to the conflict. In Georgia’s view, the Russian peacekeepers were part of the problem, not the solution. Given this, starting in 2004, the Georgian administration embarked on a large-­scale political and diplomatic effort to internationalize the peacekeeping operations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Internationalization implied the launch of new peacekeeping operations where Russia would remain involved but not as the sole peacekeeper. Georgia’s hope was that EU member states and other post-­Soviet states such as Ukraine, Moldova or Azerbaijan would also get involved in an internationally (UN or OSCE) supervised peace-­support operation. Throughout, Russia has opposed any changes in the peacekeeping format. Despite intensive diplomatic efforts on behalf of Georgia to internationalize their peacekeeping operations, the EU refused to even consider such an option until the 2008 war crisis. Most EU member states agreed that since Russia adamantly opposed such a measure, the issue was not worth raising in their negotiations with Russia. Georgia was told that the addition of EU peacekeepers could be explored only if Russia and the secessionist entities, together with Georgia, requested such a contribution. The 2008 war between Russia and Georgia demonstrated just how the presence of peacekeepers that were totally unacceptable to a conflict party actually contributed to the escalation of violence. It also showed how the absence of any credible and substantial international presence on the ground only made easier the escalation of the whirlwind of military tensions that ultimately led to the first full scale, inter state war after the Balkans.

Forced to intervene: the EU in the Russia–Georgia war When the war between Georgia and Russia over South Ossetia started on 8 August, most EU officials were on holiday. This was the first full-­scale war in Europe after the NATO campaign in Kosovo in 1999. Both wars exposed brutally the limits of EU’s ability to prevent and manage crises. But if in 1999 the EU had to rely on NATO and US hard power to manage the conflict, in 2008 in Georgia the EU was pushed to the forefront of international efforts to halt the war. The run-­up to the war As EU member states were trying to launch low-­scale conflict management instruments, the South Caucasus was unleashing big geopolitical storms.

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EU in Abkhazia and South Ossetia  85 Russia’s newly acquired and energy-­driven wealth led to more persistent efforts to re-­establish a sphere of influence in the post-­Soviet space (Popescu and Wilson 2009). The United States’ Bush administration (2000–2008) made loud democracy promotion a central tenet of its foreign policy, and Georgia became a key US ally. US–Russian relations were worsening by the day. The competitive race for the energy resources of the Caspian also intensified. Russia sought to maintain its monopoly of gas transit from Central Asia to Europe, while many EU member states and the US supported alternative routes such as Nabucco, where the South Caucasus was the only available transit corridor squeezed in between the monopolistic Russia and the problematic Iran. In the meantime, Georgia was making efforts to join NATO, which only fuelled a worsening relationship with Russia. By early 2008 all the elements of a crisis were in place. In February 2008, Kosovo declared independence with the support of the US and an absolute majority of EU member states. Russia strongly opposed Kosovo independence and threatened to apply the ‘Kosovo precedent’, i.e. the recognition of a secessionist entity, to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In the meantime NATO held a summit in Bucharest in early April 2008 where it promised that Ukraine and Georgia ‘will become members of NATO’ (NATO 2008). Due to German and French opposition NATO refused to include Georgia and Ukraine into the Membership Action Plan programme – which usually is the ante-­chamber of accession. However, the NATO member states agreed that in December 2008 the issue would be discussed again. This was a major red line for Russia which opposed NATO enlargement into the post-­Soviet space. The issue of the secessionist conflicts were a key element in Georgia’s NATO bid. Given NATO’s commitment to guarantee the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its member states, Georgia’s NATO aspirations were intrinsically interlinked with its secessionist conflicts. The existence of the two conflicts seriously undermined Georgia’s potential to be a security provider and hence join NATO since it raised the question of how NATO should approach the two conflicts if Georgia joined the Alliance. If the conflicts stayed unsolved, this could lead to a situation where Russia would be considered an aggressor that stations its troops on the territory of a NATO state. Or, if Georgia decided to re-­establish its territorial integrity through military means, while having the NATO security umbrella, the consequences could be equally serious. Either way, the perspective of re-­discussing Georgia’s NATO prospects by December 2008 acted as a galvanizing factor for both Georgian and Russian policies in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia had eight months to do its outmost to prevent Georgia from irreversibly moving towards NATO; while Georgia had the same eight months to try and either solve the secessionist conflicts or make sure they do not constitute a key factor in a new postponement­ of NATO accession. In the first half of 2008, using the Kosovo situation as an excuse, Russia stepped up its relations with both Abkhazia and South Ossetia and drastically increased its military presence in the two regions. Russia also deployed

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86  EU in Abkhazia and South Ossetia ‘rail troops’ into Abkhazia to re-­build the railway (making it easier and faster to move the Russian troops in, if necessary). Between March and early August provocations, tensions and shoot-­outs intensified. Georgia flew drones over Abkhazia and arrested Russian peacekeepers. Breaches of Georgian air space by Russian military aircraft intensified. Mutual shelling around South Ossetia became more frequent. Efforts to diffuse the tensions had been taken by almost all parties involved. Javier Solana and the German foreign minister Frank-­ Walter Steinmeier travelled to Abkhazia (on different occasions) in June and July. The Russian–Georgian dialogue also seemed to have intensified. In early June Georgian president Saakashvili travelled to Moscow where he allegedly discussed a peace plan with Russia which would envisage the partitioning of Abkhazia between Russian/Abkhaz and Georgian zones (Kommersant 2008a, 2008b). But these diplomatic efforts yielded little result. Russia had all the interest in seeing the situation deteriorate. The less secure Georgia looked, the less likely its chances of joining NATO would be. At the same time, hawkish voices in Georgia argued that the country cannot rely on the international community to help it solve its secessionist problems, and therefore a military solution should be considered before the annexation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to Russia became irreversible.26 As one Georgian official put it in July 2008, just two weeks before the August war: ‘If we don’t act now, we will lose Abkhazia and South Ossetia forever’.27 The EU’s modest and low-­politics conflict management instruments were not designed for the geopolitical storms unleashed around Georgia. Mediating the way out of the war The war lasted only five days (see above), but it brought the EU to the forefront of the international efforts to stop the war. France, which held the rotating presidency of the European Union, with President Nicolas Sarkozy in the driving seat, immediately engaged in a series of diplomatic efforts to stop the war. It mediated a cease-­fire between Georgia and Russia. On 13 August, the French president also convened an extraordinary meeting of the EU ­foreign affairs ministers to discuss Georgia. In parallel, German Chancellor Angela Merkel held a summit with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev on 15 August in Sochi, in which the main topic of the conversation was the Russian– Georgian war. On 1 September the EU convened as an emergency summit where it issued a statement on the conflict in Georgia and announced that it will appoint a new EU Special Representative for the crisis. Despite parallel efforts of EU states to stop the conflict, it was France that took the lead in managing the crisis and its aftermath by virtue of its presidency of the European Union which gave it the authority to speak and act on behalf of the entire block. On 8 September 2009, the EU Presidency and Russia agreed on the cease-­fire agreement dubbed the ‘Sarkozy–Medvedev’ plan.

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EU in Abkhazia and South Ossetia  87 Throughout the crisis, the EU High Representative for CFSP kept a low profile, partly because the French EU presidency sought to sideline him. Javier Solana did not visit Georgia or Russia in August, nor did he play any visible role in the diplomatic efforts to achieve the cease-­fire in August. He only went to Moscow with Nicolas Sarkozy on 8 September, a month after the conflict, to negotiate the conditions of Russian troops withdrawal from Georgia proper. Solana’s first visit to Georgia took place only on 30 September, almost two months after the outbreak of the war. Apparently France did a lot to sideline EU institutions during the management of the crisis. As one EU official claimed ‘the French presidency encouraged Javier Solana not to interrupt his August holiday’.28 If a smaller EU member state held the EU presidency (Slovenia had the EU presidency before France, and the Czech Republic after) one might assume that the High Representative Solana would have probably been the main EU actor managing the crisis. However, in the face of a big EU member states such as France, EU institutions have failed to provide such leadership, suggesting that on issues of high-­politics, as this undoubtedly was, EU institution had very little influence or room for manoeuvre whereas big EU member states, primarily France and Germany, were clearly in charge. The low profile of the EU institutions during the crisis were due to both their inherent weakness on foreign policy issues, especially vis-­à-vis big EU member states, but also because there was a clear French presidency effort to sideline them. Despite the low-­visibility of EU institutions, they still had a role to play. In response to the EU foreign affairs ministers’ meeting on 13 August, the EU Council Secretariat, in coordination with the European Commission, developed a paper on ‘Possible EU support to stabilizing the Georgian region’. The report suggested a number of immediate actions such as ensuring humanitarian access, temporary deployment of Council Secretariat General technical experts, liaising with the OSCE and UN, reinforcement of the EUSR office, and expansion of the role and reinforcement of the EU border support team. More broadly, the report discussed the following options for EU actions in the stabilization of Georgia: offering support to the UN and/or OSCE; deploying an EU interposition mission with armed peacekeepers separating the conflict parties; or deploying a civilian EU monitoring mission. The EU seriously considered a more robust contribution to peace support efforts in Georgia (in addition to strengthening OSCE and UN missions in the region). A first option was to deploy EU armed peacekeepers – as an interposition force between Georgia and Russia. Many member states were sceptical about such a possibility, with Spain and Cyprus apparently taking the lead in opposing the measure at an EU foreign affairs ministers’ extraordinary meeting a few days after the war (International Herald Tribune 2008). The second possibility was to deploy a civilian observation mission to monitor the cease-­fire and deter any possible renewed break-­out of hostilities. Unsurprisingly, the second option prevailed. The EU again opted in favour of non-­military ways to manage conflicts, and showed its predilection for

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88  EU in Abkhazia and South Ossetia the low-­politics of conflict management. During the negotiations over these possible options for EU action, member states were clearly in charge of the process with EU institutions put on the backburner. In October 2008 the EU deployed an EU monitoring mission to Georgia that numbered almost 300 unarmed observers who started to monitor the line of cease-­fire, but were not allowed into South Ossetia and Abkhazia by Russia and the secessionist authorities. For a comparison, just a year before the war in Georgia, EU member states had to contribute to the post-­war stabilization of another neighbouring country – Lebanon – where they sent some 7,000 military peacekeepers under a UN mandate. The crisis in Georgia was divisive for the EU. The UK, Sweden, the Baltic states and Poland were calling for sanctions against Russia. Countries like Germany, Spain, and Cyprus tended to put the blame on Georgia for initiating the military actions against South Ossetia, and hence provoking Russia (International Herald Tribune 2008). France oscillated in between. Initially, it avoided any tough retaliation against Russia, but its position gradually toughened, particularly as Russia appeared to ignore some of the provisions on the ceasefire, the French ambassador was detained by Russian soldiers for three hours in a Georgian town on 22 August (Kommersant 2008c), and Russia unilaterally recognized the independence of Georgia and South Ossetia on 27 August 2008. At an extraordinary EU summit dedicated to the war in Georgia on 1 September 2010 the EU managed to come with a united position. This often was referred to as a ‘success’. However, against the background of Russia’s non-­respect of the six-­points plan and opposition to letting the EU monitors into the secessionist regions (see below), this only exposed the fact that the EU often called ‘successes’ situations where it was united, and not necessarily ‘successful’ in achieving its goals. A few months after the crisis, in November–December 2008 the attitudes of EU member states towards Russia started to soften again, as more and more questions about Georgia’s conduct of the war emerged. Media reports of Georgian indiscriminate shelling of civilians in South Ossetia as well as the fact that Georgia was increasingly seen as the initiator of hostilities greatly undermined Georgia’s credibility as a partner in many EU member states. Many invoked the mistakes of the Georgian leadership as an excuse for EU’s non-­actions. An EU member state official even argued that ‘the EU can’t save Saakashvili from his own stupidity’.29 Clearly such arguments missed the point because the EU had to engage in difficult conflict zones such as the Balkans, sub-­Saharan Africa or the South Caucasus, not because it liked or not the local leadership, but because developments in these regions affect the EU. When the dust settled The EU’s response to the post-­war situation had to tackle diplomatic, security and economic issues. On the diplomatic front, as a result of the ­Medvedev–Sarkozy

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EU in Abkhazia and South Ossetia  89 plan a new process of consultations between the conflict parties was launched in Geneva. The EU became a key mediator in these talks. In this context the EU resorted to a highly unorthodox arrangement, even by the EU’s messy institutional standards, whereby it appointed a new EU Special Representative for these talks. As already discussed, Peter Semneby had been EUSR for the South Caucasus since 2006. During August 2008 he had spent most of the time in Georgia trying to diffuse the crisis. However, at the EU summit on 1 September 2008 it was declared that the EU would appoint another EUSR. Towards the end of September, Pierre Morel a senior French diplomat who was EUSR for Central Asia was also appointed EUSR for the crisis in Georgia. The situation was not very logical. Pierre Morel thus became EUSR for Central Asia, and at the same time EUSR for the crisis in Georgia (EU Council Joint Action 25.09.2008). Peter Semneby was kept as EUSR South Caucasus, but with his Georgia-­related responsibilities clearly trimmed. Gradually some kind of division of labour between the two EUSRs emerged. Pierre Morel focused on post-­war negotiations between Russia, Georgia and the secessionist entities as part of a so-­called Geneva process, while Peter Semneby dealt with ‘other issues’ related to the whole region. In any case EUSR South Caucasus was undermined (Whitman and Wolff 2010). By appointing a new French EUSR, the French EU presidency wanted to enforce greater control of EU policy towards the crisis in Georgia which was considered very sensitive for relations with Russia and highly political. The French were supported by a number of other EU member states that thought that Peter Semneby was too critical of Russia and a more ‘neutral’ EUSR was needed. As one EU member states put it, ‘in times of crisis the big EU member states could not let a Swedish diplomat handle such a sensitive dossier’.30 In economic terms, the war drastically undermined investor confidence in Georgia, especially since it happened when the global economic crisis of 2008–2009 started to hit Georgia as well. To help Georgia (and the conflict regions) ease some of the economic hardships, as well as help it rebuild some of its infrastructure destroyed during the war, an international donors conference for Georgia was convened on 22 October 2009. Some EUR 3.4 billion were pledged to Georgia, out of which EUR 614 million came from the EU and its member states’ budget (Georgia Donors Conference 2008). In addition, a significant amount of the money pledged by the international financial institutions, including the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EUR 703 million), the World Bank (EUR 402 million), the European Investment Bank (EUR 250 million) also came from European tax-­payers. The EU also convened an ‘Independent International Fact-­Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia’, more often referred to as the ‘Tagliavini commission’ because it was headed by a Swiss diplomat and former head of UNOMIG Heidi Tagliavini. The commission published a report in September 2009 on the causes and conduct of the war which highlighted the illegality of many of the Russian policies vis-­à-vis Abkhazia and South Ossetia, especially the granting of Russian passports and the subsequent claim that Russia had the right

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90  EU in Abkhazia and South Ossetia to protect its citizens through armed means on Georgia’s territory. But it also blamed Georgia for shelling the South Ossetian capital on 7–8 August thereby initiating the war (Tagliavini Report, 2009). The report also ­pointed to the inadequacy of EU policies in the region claiming that: ‘over the years there was a gradual increase in European involvement in Georgia, which may be called forthcoming in terms of economic aid, politically friendly on the bilateral side, cooperative but cautious on contentious political issues and [. . .] mostly distanced from sensitive security issues. A good case in point was the European reluctance to take over the Border Monitoring Mission on the Caucasus range facing Russia, after Russia had vetoed the hitherto OSCE engagement in 2004’ (Tagliavini Report 2009). The EU’s most important contribution to the post war stabilization has been the deployment of an EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) of unarmed observers. The mission consisted of over 300 monitors who were deployed to oversee the fulfilment of the Sarkozy–Medvedev cease-­fire agreement, which stipulated, among other things, a return of the armed forces to the status quo ante. The mission monitored the administrative borders of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The mandate explicitly stipulated that the mission operates throughout the territory of the entire Georgia, including Abkhazia and South Ossetia (EU Council Joint Action, 15 September 2008). However, Russia and the secessionist authorities of South Ossetia and Abkhazia did not allow the mission to enter the secessionist regions, since from their point of view they were not part of Georgia. This confined the mission to monitoring only the territory controlled by the government in Tbilisi. In 2009 Russia also vetoed the mandates of UNOMIG and the OSCE Mission to Georgia (Russia requested that the mandate of these missions mention implicitly or explicitly that Abkhazia and South Ossetia were not part of Georgia which was not acceptable for most other OSCE states and the UN Security Council). After the withdrawal of the UN and OSCE mission from Georgia, the EU remained the only international institution involved in maintaining stability in the conflict zones. Despite the existence of EUMM, peace remained fragile. Around South Ossetia Georgian and Russian military are situated within a few hundred metres of each other (and the Georgians are at roughly 1 km from the outskirts of Tskhinvali). Except for a few sandbags, there are no physical – natural or man-­made – barriers between the conflict parties. EUMM is not situated in between the conflict parties but on Georgian territory. EU monitors come to visit the Georgian checkpoints roughly once a day, and when there are shoot-­outs they report them.31 The effects of such monitoring are mainly psychological as they constraint parties from escalating the situation. However, this is far from being a sustainable basis for conflict stabilization in a situation that remains tense and can spiral out of control should any of the parties have an interest to do so again in the future. The overall objective of the EU has been to ‘re-­freeze’ the conflicts, while encouraging Georgia to focus on its own process of domestic reforms. EUMM

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EU in Abkhazia and South Ossetia  91 was an important element in this strategy of preventing the outbreak of new hostilities and let Georgia’s long-­term economic and political transformation act as the main conflict settlement strategy. But such an approach could only work in the long term. And it also raised the issue of the EU’s commitment in the mid to long term. Just a few months after the launch of EUMM some EU member states started to argue the need to terminate EUMM sooner rather than later.32 The head of EUMM Hansjoerg Haber also argued in March 2009 that the EU should ‘find an exit strategy since such missions should not exist forever’ (Echo Moskvy, 29 September 2009). This clearly fitted the pattern of EU interventions being ‘dominated by the desire for exit strategies and departure deadlines’ (Dobbins et al. 2008: 213) which often raises the spectre of peacekeepers leaving too early, rather than too late. The way the EU handled the international crisis around Georgia has confirmed the basic argument of this book. When it came to high-­politics issues such as the war in Georgia and a diplomatic confrontation with Russia, EU institutions have kept an extremely low profile politically. EU diplomatic efforts were firmly in the hands of EU member states, with France having the credibility and the power to be the voice of the EU in the crisis. France also sidelined the EU as an actor, be it the High Representative Javier Solana or the EUSR Peter Semneby, in the post-­war environment. The European Commission confined itself to humanitarian aid, and ordinary statements on the need for peace. The EU Council secretariat did the same. Despite strong engagement on the ground of the EUSR South Caucasus, the High Representative did not play any visible role in the efforts to mediate the conflict for almost a month after the conflict. And when it came to behind-­ the-­scenes diplomacy on EU contribution to peace support, the EU Council secretariat apparently favoured a civilian mission. EU member states were unwilling to send any significant peacekeeping force on the type of international peacekeeping missions in Lebanon or Cyprus. And even when a civilian mission was deployed, the EU’s commitment to a long-­term presence on the ground that would allow to ‘re-­freeze’ the situation was not unquestionable, as just like before the war many EU member states had little desire to be caught in a crisis.

The EU’s impact on Georgia’s conflicts The reluctance of EU member states to let the EU play any meaningful role in conflict management until the 2008 war made that war much more difficult to avoid. But, at the same time, the EU’s role in stopping the war and then stabilizing the situation has also been important. Hence the need to differentiate­between the EU’s interventions before 2008 and after. Until the 2008 war, the EU’s impact on security in the conflict zones has been close to nil. Worse, the EU had deliberately refused or avoided to even consider tackling some of the security dangers emanating from the tense Georgian–Russian relations (as in the case with the OSCE border monitoring

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92  EU in Abkhazia and South Ossetia operation), and hence failed to even continue what the OSCE was doing in terms of conflict prevention. Georgia’s tense security situation also drastically limited whatever impact EU’s low-­politics conflict management strategies could have. The EU’s input into the diplomatic efforts to advance conflict settlement until 2008 has also been largely irrelevant. The EU did not even manage to become part of the conflict settlement formats, let alone influence them. Nor has the EU managed to avert broader trends in Russia or Georgia, as well as Abkhazia and South Ossetia, that have finally contributed to the increasing tensions in the conflict zones. To a large extent all the relevant actors in these conflicts have designed their strategies and policies with scant regard of the EU. The economic and financial aspects of EU’s conflict management policies have yielded a similarly negligible effect. Unlike in the case of Transnistria, neither Abkhazia nor South Ossetia has any economic links to the EU. As for EU’s financial assistance to the conflict zones, this has managed to alleviate the hardships endured by people in these regions (a worthy goal in itself ), but hardly had any impact on the political or security aspects of the conflicts. The EU’s strategy of ‘making Georgia attractive’ was rather virtual. Such a strategy had its merits in the Moldovan–Transnistrian conflicts where ethnic issues played a smaller role and the war of the early 90s was more like a series of clashes rather than a full scale war. But changing the logic of the Abkhaz (and to some extent South Ossetian) conflict through economic calculations alone was rather illusory. Georgia’s conflict faced much deeper ethnic, cultural, historical, security and geopolitical cleavages to expect that Georgia becoming richer would alter the underlying causes and patterns of these conflicts. And even if such a strategy would have been sound, it certainly needed much more time and greater commitment from the EU to make it work. And the deteriorating security situation on the ground never allowed that anyway. Hence, the EU’s strategy of supporting Georgia’s economic attractiveness had limited effects. In fact, Georgia did become more prosperous under the Saakashvili administration, but this was due to internal reforms and attraction of foreign investments, with which the EU as such had little to do. The 2008 war propelled the EU to the frontline of conflict management efforts. During and immediately after the war the EU (presidency) was the key international actor that brokered the cease-­fire agreement. Some argue that thanks to the EU’s intervention Russia did not occupy even larger parts of Georgia (and perhaps the capital Tbilisi).33 Others argued that Russia did not plan to occupy Georgia anyway, and the Russian troops stopped when they achieved most of their objectives, while the EU’s influence on Russia was largely irrelevant.34 One could expect though that the EU played a certain role in stabilizing post-­war Georgia in a number of ways. First, immediately after the August 2008 war, Russia implied that it planned to ensure separate buffer zones around South Ossetia and Abkhazia (with possible Russian military presence) which would have taken even more territory out of the control of the Georgian government.35 However, probably due to the EU’s

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EU in Abkhazia and South Ossetia  93 diplomatic efforts and the presence of EUMM, such a scenario was averted. In the aftermath of the war, the EU has been important for the stabilization of the situation through the EUMM. After the war the EU also committed significant amounts of funding to Georgia and tried to maintain its post-­conflict rehabilitation assistance for Abkhazia (South Ossetia refused to accept EU funding). Such measures had an impact in helping the Georgian economy recover (or rather minimize its fall) and helped Abkhazia to prevent even further isolation. However, the effects of the measures on conflict settlement (even though they are worthy in themselves) were minimal at best. Overall, EU impact in Georgia has been even smaller than on Transnistria. The low-­politics of conflict management had close to no impact on the patterns of conflict against the background of high-­politics deterioration of the security situation driven by both Russia and Georgia and the larger geopolitical battles around Georgia. EU policies on Abkhazia and South Ossetia not only failed to contribute to conflict settlement, but also failed to prevent the drastic deterioration of the situation in the run up to the 2008 war.

Conclusions The conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia probably represent the most controversial cases of EU involvement in conflict resolution in the eastern neighbourhood. EU institutions have been preparing the ground for a greater role in conflict resolution since the second half of the 1990s, but few of their initiatives have materialized. Despite growing financial EU commitment to post-­conflict rehabilitation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the appointment of an EUSR and the launch of an EU Border support team in Georgia and attempts to play a bigger role in conflict mediation, the scale of EU engagement in conflict resolution in Georgia remained very low. The EU failed to respond to Georgia’s invitation for a border-­monitoring mission in 2005 and to at least consider raising with Russia the issue of changing the peacekeeping­ operation. The EU’s ambivalent policies toward Abkhazia and South Ossetia were largely the result of internal EU divisions and lack of strategic vision. Some EU states actively promoted stronger EU intervention in conflict settlement, while others strongly opposed such actions for fear that other areas of EU– Russia cooperation could be adversely affected. Thus, Georgia emerged as one of the most divisive issues inside the EU. Georgia’s efforts to join NATO, periodic escalation of violence in the conflict regions, Russia’s high-­level support for the secessionist entities and vehement opposition to EU intervention in the conflicts only politicized the issue further, ensuring that the issue of conflict management in Georgia remained in the realm of high politics where the EU had a minimal role to play. Under such circumstances, EU member states increasingly regarded any potential EU role in conflict settlement through the prism of EU relations with Russia. These factors ensured that EU

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94  EU in Abkhazia and South Ossetia ­ ecision-­making on Georgia’s conflicts was predominantly intergovernmental d and lowest common denominator policies prevailed. EU institutions have tried to bridge EU divisions on action in Georgia and break the inertia of non-­involvement by putting forward policy proposals of low-­politics action. Despite attempts to use ‘dosage’ strategies by EU institutions aimed at extending the level of EU engagement with the conflicts, these have worked to a much lesser extent than in Transnistria. Georgia’s often provocative and confrontational policies vis-­à-vis Russia did not help, since they made any chances of EU stealth intervention in conflict settlement only less likely. Russia-­friendly EU member states were much more determined to limit greater EU intervention in Georgia’s conflicts. Through the strategy of ‘carousel foot-­dragging’, EU member states were able to limit EU institutional activism on conflicts in the eastern neighbourhood. When it came to conflict intervention in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the EU has been far from its own professed ideal of an integrated approach to conflict management. EU actions have been scattered across a wide range of issues – from rule of law to border management and ad hoc conflict mediation. More often than not these actions had little serious commitment from the EU and especially its member states. The strategy of stealth EU intervention in conflict settlement process worked to a much more limited extent than in Moldova. Despite attempts to use stealth intervention, the high-­politics nature of Georgia’s conflicts for the EU and EU–Russia relations significantly reduced the chances for such an engagement. In the end the lack of a serious EU commitment to play a bigger role in Georgia’s conflict made even more likely the gradual escalation of violence that degenerated into the first ­full-­scale­European war in almost a decade.

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5 The EU’s non-­involvement in Nagorno-­Karabakh

Azerbaijan’s importance for European energy security, the dangers of renewed war and Russia’s less prominent role in the conflict could all make the conflict in Nagorno-­Karabakh a top priority for the EU in the South Caucasus. Despite this, Nagorno-­Karabakh is the conflict in post-­Soviet space in which the EU is least involved. Despite the relatively modest scale of EU interventions in conflict settlement processes in Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, EU policies toward Nagorno-­Karabakh pale even in comparison with the other cases. Nagorno-­Karabakh (along with Western Sahara) is perhaps one of the two secessionist conflicts in the European neighbourhood that the EU deals with hardly at all. Understanding why this is the case has explanatory value for understanding what drives and constrains the EU as a crisis management actor. The EU’s non-­involvement in Nagorno-­Karabakh serves as an important case for the narrative on EU (non-)involvement in conflict resolution. The EU’s non-­involvement in Nagorno-­Karabakh is the result of a lack of local demand from either Armenia or Azerbaijan. But internal EU politics also played a role in its failure to intervene. France, as co-­chair of the Minsk Group, has generally opposed a greater EU role in conflict mediation. This obviously had an inhibiting effect on efforts of EU institutions to develop a policy toward Nagorno-­Karabakh. Until the 2008 Georgia–Russia war, Nagorno-­Karabakh was believed to be the conflict in the region most likely to degenerate into war. Azerbaijan’s oil-­boom was seen as providing the resources for a military attempt to regain the secessionist region. This rather charged political and security atmosphere is just the kind of environment that places the Nagorno-­Karabakh conflict out of reach for the kind of conflict settlement policies the EU is good at: post-­conflict rehabilitation, confidence building and tackling soft-­security issues. When the potential for violence is involved, EU member states are firmly in charge of their policies toward such conflicts, especially when they have a stake in such regions. Even when it came to the Turkish–Armenian rapprochement launched in the aftermath of the August 2008 war in Georgia, the EU was hardly involved in the process, though it loomed somewhere in the background of Turkish foreign policy calculations.

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96  EU’s non-involvement in Nagorno-Karabakh This chapter traces the development of the EU approach to Nagorno-­ Karabakh, as well as the interaction between EU institutions and EU member states. It first presents the context of the conflict. Then it outlines the pursuit of EU policies in the 1990s. Second, it discusses the centrality of the conflict in the South Caucasus and EU stakes in the conflict. Third, the chapter discusses the EU approach to conflict resolution in Nagorno-­Karabakh. It outlines how the EU deals with the Nagorno-­Karabakh issue in its ENP Action Plans with Azerbaijan and Armenia and its relationship with the OSCE Minsk Group. The chapter also outlines the policy dilemmas facing an EU that is forced to stay neutral between Azerbaijan and Armenia and is hugely constrained in trying to engage with the conflict resolution process in the absence of a local demand for EU actions.

The conflict over Nagorno-­Karabakh The Nagorno-­Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (with a territory of 4,400 km2) was a region of Soviet Azerbaijan inhabited primarily by ethnic Armenians. As perestroika was unfolding in the Soviet Union, Karabakh Armenians voted on 20 February 1988 to leave the Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic and join the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic. This sparked an ethnic conflict between ethnic Armenians and ethnic Azeris, a Turkic people. Pogroms in Azerbaijan and Armenia led to mass expulsions of Azeris from Armenia and Armenians from Azerbaijan (De Waal 2004). After the dissolution of the USSR in December 1991, the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-­Karabakh became an inter-­state war (De Waal 2005). The situation escalated most seriously in the region of Nagorno-­Karabakh where a full scale war took place between 1992 and 1994 (though tensions had begun in 1988). After approximately 20,000 deaths, the war ended with the military victory of Armenia. This victory was facilitated by the fact that two contenders for the Azeri presidency and their armed supporters were engaged in a civil war (Zurcher 2007). Armenia not only ensured military control of Nagorno-­Karabakh, but also occupied seven other districts, amounting to some 16 per cent of the territory of Azerbaijan. Some 600,000 Azeris have been expelled from these Armenian-­occupied territories (only 40,000 of them from Nagorno-­Karabakh itself ). Since then, Armenia has used the territories as a bargaining chip in its negotiations with Azerbaijan, ready to withdraw from the occupied territories (but not from Nagorno-­Karabakh) as part of a comprehensive settlement. The situation has led to the introduction of a blockade against Armenia, not only by Azerbaijan, but also by Turkey, Azerbaijan’s closest international ally. The active hostilities ended with a ceasefire agreement in May 1994. Peace negotiations in Nagorno-­Karabakh have progressed with the mediation of the international community. Under the aegis of the OSCE, a group of international mediators called the Minsk Group has mediated between the conflict sides – Armenia and Azerbaijan, with the Nagorno-­Karabakh

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The EU’s non-involvement in Nagorno-Karabakh  97 authorities excluded from the talks. The three co-­chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group are Russia, France and the US. There is no peacekeeping force in Nagorno-­Karabakh, unlike in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria. The line of division between Armenian and Azeri troops is a heavily militarized area, where clashes, sniper fire and mine explosions are regular occurrences. The situation is nothing like a ‘frozen conflict’, which is a widely-­used misnomer. Despite a number of occasions when Armenia and Azerbaijan were ­allegedly close to achieving a negotiated solution, both countries have been subject to radicalizing pressures. On one hand, political life in Armenia has been dominated, not only by the issue of Nagorno-­Karabakh, but also by diasporic Karabakh Armenians. The first president of Armenia, Levon Ter-­Petrossian, was forced out of office in early 1998 after he allegedly accepted a compromise with Azerbaijan sponsored by the OSCE Minsk Group. He was replaced by Robert Kocharian, the first de facto president of Nagorno-­Karabakh in 1992–1997, who moved to Armenia as Ter-­Petrossian’s prime minister in early 1997, and in less than a year became Armenia’s president for ten years. In early 2008, Serzh Sargsyan, the designated successor to Kocharian, became president of Armenia after an election that was marred with irregularities. A close ally of Kocharian, Sargsyan was also an Armenian from Nagorno-­ Karabakh who fought against Azeri authorities during the hostilities. The dominance of Armenian politics (and the military) by Karabakh Armenians only accentuated the de facto military, economic and political integration between Armenia and Nagorno-­Karabakh, even though Nagorno-­Karabakh claims to be pursuing independent statehood. Another radicalizing pressure on Armenia has been the Armenian diaspora. Armenia has been quite isolated since its independence, squeezed as it is by a blockade by Azerbaijan and Turkey. Because of its conflict with Azerbaijan, it is excluded from many regional cooperation initiatives in the South Caucasus. Infrastructural projects such as oil and gas pipelines (Baku-­Tbilisi-­Ceyhan and Baku-­Tbilisi-­Erzurum) or railways have been built from Azerbaijan to Georgia and onwards to Turkey, bypassing Armenia. The large and influential Armenian diaspora worldwide (primarily in the US and France) has provided substantial economic assistance to both Armenia and Nagorno-­ Karabakh. The diaspora is an important source of investment, assistance for infrastructure rehabilitation, post-­conflict reconstruction and even lobbying for favourable engagement by Western powers. But the diaspora is also a key source of an uncompromising attitude toward Turkey and Azerbaijan. With many having descended from Armenians who emigrated from Turkey after the 1915 genocide, many perceive the war over Nagorno-­Karabakh as a continuation of century-­old attempts by Turks (Azeris included) to destroy the Armenian nation.1 Therefore, they are less inclined to accept compromises over highly-­symbolic issues as the status of Nagorno-­Karabakh or peace with Turkey and Azerbaijan. This has created internal disputes between Armenians in Armenia and Karabakh Armenians

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98  EU’s non-involvement in Nagorno-Karabakh

Map 5.1:  Azerbaijan with Nagorno-­Karabakh. Copyright: CIA, The World Fact Book.

and the diaspora over this issue. The former believes that all other priorities such as state building, regional cooperation, economic development and democracy-­building have been excessively subordinated to the issue of Nagorno-­Karabakh and genocide-­recognition promoted by the Karabakh Armenians and the diaspora.2 As one opposition politician from Armenian noted: ‘Armenia is occupied by Karabakh Armenians and the diaspora. They do not want a democratic Armenia. They primarily want an anti-­Turkish Armenia and are unwilling to compromise over Nagorno-­Karabakh’.3 Azerbaijans also have a broader set of issues determining its view and policies on the Nagorno-­Karabakh conflict. In Azerbaijan’s view, Armenia unlawfully occupied a significant part of its territory and expelled more than half a million people from their land. This was clearly a breach of international law. At the same time, the international community has not been unambiguously supportive of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. The OSCE Minsk Group did not pressure Armenia to accept a solution in line with Azerbaijan’s territor­ial integrity. At the same time, Azerbaijan has seen a political stabilization and consolidation of the political system around Heydar Aliev (president in 1993–2003) and his son Ilham Aliev (president since 2003) who have ensured authoritarian control of the country. With increasing oil prices and growing oil production, Azerbaijan was the fastest growing economy in the world in 2006 and 2007 with approximately +30 per cent GDP growth per year. Azerbaijan also had the highest defence spending in the region. Its defence budget is equivalent to the entire budget of Armenia (which

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The EU’s non-involvement in Nagorno-Karabakh  99 is also a smaller country). For these reasons, the Azeri officials believe that time will work in its favour with respect to the conflict, since the balance of power has been gradually shifting in favour of Azerbaijan. Indeed, Azerbaijan never excluded the use of military means to regain Nagorno-­Karabakh from Armenia (Ziyadov 2005). The Azeri Defence Minister even stated once that ‘If the issue is not settled so that Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity is preserved, a war is inevitable’ (RIA Novosti, 12 December 2009).

EU policy in the 90s The EU’s policies on the conflict in Nagorno-­Karabakh in the 1990s fit the pattern of generally hesitant and ill-­formulated EU conflict management pol­ icies described in greater detail in the previous chapter on Georgia (Demirag 2004). The EU’s approach was determined by its understanding that the conflicts in the region are at the core of political, security and economic existence of the South Caucasus, but also the realization that the EU’s impact on these conflicts is unlikely to be very substantial. Unlike the intra-­state conflicts in Moldova and Georgia, the conflict over Nagorno-­Karabakh has in many ways been an inter-­state conflict between two recognized states – Armenia and Azerbaijan – each having its own partnerships with the EU. This has created even greater pressure for neutrality on the EU, limiting its range of manoeuvre. Thus, any understanding of EU policy on Nagorno-­Karabakh cannot be taken out of the context of EU relations, not only with Azerbaijan, but also with Armenia. The EU’s relations with Azerbaijan and Armenia have been established by their Partnership and Cooperation Agreements. Under the EU’s financing programme for post-­Soviet states, TACIS Armenia has received EUR 380 ­million and Azerbaijan EUR 399 million in EU assistance between 1991 and 2008.4 Some of the funds for Azerbaijan have been dedicated to assisting the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) from Nagorno-­Karabakh and the adjacent occupied territories of Azerbaijan through feeding programmes, providing shelter for IDPs and refugees and medical programmes. Such assistance was believed to be important from a humanitarian point of view, but had almost no impact on the EU’s political profile in the region, and was unlikely to influence the dynamics of the conflict. Throughout the 90s, the region was too far geographically from the EU, while the EU was too concentrated on its institutional reforms, as well as the enlargement and development of CFSP, to be interested in playing a serious role in the South Caucasus and its conflicts. EU enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe in 2004 and 2007 and the development of the European Neighbourhood Policy have started to change the way the EU has viewed the conflicts in its eastern neighbourhood. Since 2003–2004, the EU has become increasingly involved in the conflicts in Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia as part of the development of its neighbourhood policy. But to what extent was the same true of the conflict in Nagorno-­Karabakh?

100  EU’s non-involvement in Nagorno-Karabakh Table 5.1  Timeline of EU policy on Nagorno-­Karabakh

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1992–present •  F  rance is co-­chair of the OSCE Minsk Group mediating between Armenia and Azerbaijan. •  France has been refusing to consider ceding its place to EU. 2003

•  The EU appoints an EUSR for the South Caucasus.

2004

•  A  zerbaijan and Armenia are included in the European Neighbourhood Policy.

2005

•  C  yprus delays negotiations on the ENP Action Plan with Azerbaijan because of Azeri links to Northern Cyprus (second half of the year).

2006

•  E  U discusses the possibility of sending peace-­keepers if there is a peace-­deal (first half of the year). •  ENP Action Plans with Armenia and Azerbaijan are finalized (November). •  Azerbaijan signs memorandum on energy cooperation with the EU (November).

2007

•  A  visit by EUSR Peter Semneby to Nagorno-­Karabakh is called off by Azerbaijan (June).

2008

•  T  he European Commission opens full-­fledged delegations in Azerbaijan and Armenia (February). •  Right after the war in Georgia, Turkey and Armenia initiate a process of rapprochement (September).

2009

•  T  urkey and Armenia negotiate the normalization of relations (throughout 2009).

2010

•  Turkish–Armenian talks run out of steam.

Nagorno-­Karabakh in the EU neighbourhood Nagorno-­Karabakh is one of the conflicts in the neighbourhood that the EU pledged to help solve. European Commissioner for External Relations Benita Ferrero-­Waldner stated that ‘resolving or at least de-­escalating the ­conflicts must be the first priority’ in the South Caucasus because these conflicts are the ‘most important impediments to the region’s development’ (Ferrero-­Waldner 2006). This was the case at least until the Russian–Georgian war in August 2008. First, Nagorno-­Karabakh has been seen as the conflict with the greatest potential for destabilizing the South Caucasus. Even though in the end South Ossetia was the place where war reignited, for years decision-­makers and experts considered Nagorno-­Karabakh to be a prime candidate for renewed war. The conflict over Nagorno-­Karabakh keeps Azerbaijan and Armenia in a situation of de jure (although not de facto) war, debilitating all efforts to establish greater regional cooperation while escalating the conflict into a wider regional tensions involving Turkey and Russia. It also fuels an arms

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The EU’s non-involvement in Nagorno-Karabakh  101 race which undermines the stability and economic and social development of the region. The conflict is used to excuse and strengthen authoritarianism in Armenia and Azerbaijan. The EU country strategy papers on Azerbaijan and Armenia state that the two countries are unlikely to achieve their full potential for development unless the conflict is solved.5 The conflict blocks regional trade and cooperation, has induced Turkey and Azerbaijan to maintain a blockade against Armenia and significantly undermined the transit potential of the whole South Caucasus that would otherwise be a natural transportation hub between the Caspian region and Europe. As the then European Commissioner for External Relations Ferrero-­Waldner put it, ‘defence expenditure in the region is going through the roof . . . There is a serious danger of the rhetoric lowering the threshold for war . . . Leaders have a responsibility to prepare their populations for peace, not war’ (Ferrero-­Waldner 2006). Moreover, the conflict in Nagorno-­Karabakh critically shapes the development of Azerbaijan, a state which is important for Europe’s energy interests in the Caspian region, and is a declared ‘strategic partner’ of the EU. Azerbaijan is the biggest state in the region, it is a producer of oil and gas, and the only state that can participate in European projects of ensuring European access to the oil and gas of Central Asia, while bypassing Russia and Iran. A joint Memorandum of Understanding on energy between the EU and Azerbaijan stated that ‘Azerbaijan is rapidly becoming a key producer as well as potentially an important transit country for hydrocarbon supplies to the EU from the Caspian Basin and Central Asia . . . The development of Shah Deniz gas production [in Azerbaijan-­n.a.], and the possible transit of natural gas from the Caspian region into EU markets remain high on the agenda’.6 Until the 2008 war over South Ossetia, the conflict in Nagorno-­Karabakh was perceived as having far broader implications for regional stability than was the case with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Nagorno-­Karabakh has blocked regional cooperation, fuelled a regional arms race, kept Turkey and Russia poised to intervene in possible hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and had implications for EU energy interests in the Caspian region. Many EU member states have proceeded to pursue their energy interests in Azerbaijan, and most of this energy diplomacy has remained at the national level, to the detriment of establishing a common EU foreign policy line in the region. All of these factors ensured that the Nagorno-­Karabakh conflict has remained in the domain of high-­politics.

EU policy on Nagorno-­Karabakh The launch of the ENP and the appointment of an EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus in 2003, the inclusion of the region into the ENP in 2004 have set the stage for a greater EU role in South Caucasus. These developments were a turning point for increased EU involvement in the conflicts in Georgia and Moldova. But to what extent have they also affected EU involvement in Nagorno-­Karabakh?

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The EU’s action plans with Armenia and Azerbaijan Throughout 2006, the EU has negotiated with Armenia and Azerbaijan their ENP action plans. The European Commission’s recommendations for negotiations on the Action Plan with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia avoided any clear directives toward the conflicts, referring only to a vaguely-­defined need for ‘further support for economic rehabilitation of the conflict zones in the context of conflict settlement’ (European Commission 2005). Armenia has generally been contemptuous of the EU’s determination to steer clear of conflict-­resolution issues. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan has insisted that the EU support its territorial integrity and commit to help reintegrate Nagorno-­Karabakh into the country. Both have been contrary to the EU’s intention to avoid conflict resolution issues in the Action Plans, since this would entail ‘excessive politicization’ of the Action Plan (Alieva 2006: 12). This contradicted the explicit focus of both the European Security Strategy and ENP documents on the need to contribute to conflict settlement in the neighbourhood. The EU institutions tried to keep the negotiations on the action plans as technical and as depoliticized as possible. The Azeri government’s conclusion was that the EU was not willing to assist in conflict resolution in Nagorno-­Karabakh,7 which contributed to Azerbaijan’s decision not to be too pushy for a greater EU conflict management role in the region. Another problem that affected the negotiations on the ENP AP related to a dispute between Azerbaijan and Cyprus. Azerbaijan, a Turkic-­speaking country and a strategic partner of Turkey, developed relations with the secessionist Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. In mid-­2005, an Azerbaijani air company flew one charter flight to Northern Cyprus and the prospect of Azerbaijan recognizing the passports of Northern Cyprus was raised (International Herald Tribune 2005). In Cyprus’s view, this challenged the territorial integrity of the internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus. As an EU member state, Cyprus was in a position to block the launch of EU–Azerbaijan negotiations on the Action Plan from mid-­2005 to early spring 2006. The blockage in negotiations with Azerbaijan affected EU relations­with all the South Caucasus states. Since the EU has maintained a regional approach to the South Caucasus, it has refrained from initiating negotiations with either Georgia or Armenia, in order not to differentiate them from Azerbaijan. As a result, the preferences of a single member state have halted the development of key EU policy instrument toward the region for more than half a year. In this way, Cyprus had an inhibitive effect on the development of the EU policy toward the region, and has to some extent undermined the credibility of the EU as an actor capable of pursuing its stated objectives in the neighbourhood.8 The Cyprus episode indicated that when one member state perceived that some actions challenged its territorial integrity, a high-­politics issue par excellence, it moved to assert and scrutinize the negotiations on the ENP Action Plan between EU institutions and Azerbaijan, thereby reducing to a minimum the institutional autonomy of Brussels-­based actors. This case

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The EU’s non-involvement in Nagorno-Karabakh  103 also demonstrated how technical negotiations pursued by the European Commission can quickly become high-­politics when they touch upon sensitive issues for member states. Paradoxically enough, Cyprus was in a diplomatic conflict with Azerbaijan over the flights to Northern Cyprus, but they were implicit ad hoc allies in pushing for a clause recognizing the ‘territorial integrity’ in the EU–Azerbaijan Action Plan against the preferences of the European Commission. Cyprus and Azerbaijan differed in their approach to North Cyprus, but they shared an interest in stressing their commitment to the principle of territorial integrity. Azerbaijan wanted a clear-­cut recognition of the territorial integrity of its country due to disputed territorial claims over Nagorno-­Karabakh, while Cyprus wanted recognition of territorial integrity of the island in order to prevent any partnership between the unrecognized Turkish Cyprus and Azerbaijan. As a result, the EU accepted that the second paragraph of the EU–Azerbaijan Action Plan, which stated that the EU, its member states and Azerbaijan would base their relations on a mutual commitment to ‘common values, including the respect of and support for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of internationally recognized borders of each other’. (EU–Azerbaijan Action Plan 2006). The EU also accepted that measures to support conflict resolution in Nagorno-­Karabakh would be the first priority of the document, though this was not its original intention. The issue of territorial integrity is a high-­politics and high-­salience one for most nation states in the world. But it is particularly sensitive for countries affected by secessionist conflicts, like Cyprus. During EU negotiations on the action plan with Azerbaijan, Cyprus, as an EU member state, sought to assert control of the EU institution’s position over the issue of ‘territorial integrity’. To do so, Cyprus first blocked negotiations on the Action Plan and then scrutinized the negotiations and lobbied the EU institutions to mention respect for ‘territorial integrity’ in the Action Plan as a key principle of EU– Azerbaijan relations. This suggested the limited autonomy of EU institutions even when one of the smallest of EU member states stakes out a position on a high-­politics issue such as the respect for ‘territorial integrity’. The Action Plans were finally made public in November 2006. The EU’s Action Plans with both Azerbaijan and Armenia contained practically identical language on Nagorno-­Karabakh, envisaging an intensification of EU efforts to promote conflict resolution, the implementation of de-­mining initiatives in the conflict region, support for IDPs and refugees, encouragement of people-­to-­people contacts as well as support for the OSCE Minsk Group mediating between the conflict parties. Leila Alieva argued that the ‘EU role as is reflected in the Action Plans does not shape an individual short-­term contribution of the EU in the power balance, which has been supporting the status quo for many years, but rather shapes EU role as a secondary and supporting for the other international organizations such as OSCE’ (Alieva 2006: 17).

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The EU’s neutrality game An EU official once stated, ‘Armenia’s occupation of a large part of Azerbaijan’s territory resulted from a military invasion and is clearly a violation of inter­national law. But the EU never stated this publicly’.9 This was because the EU has traditionally invested much energy and political effort in maintaining a neutral approach to the Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict over Nagorno-­Karabakh. The EU has tried to develop a balanced partnership with both Armenia and Azerbaijan, and avoided at all costs taking the sides. The EU’s attempts to play even-­handedly defined its approach to Nagorno-­ Karabakh resulted in contradictory policies. An EU official involved in negotiations said that the EU tried to maintain some level of transparency in these negotiations so that a certain balance of language and commitment would be maintained in the EU approach to Armenia on one hand, and Azerbaijan on the other.10 When the EU accepted a reference to ‘territorial integrity’ in Azerbaijan’s Action Plan, it had to accept Armenia’s request to include in its action plan a recognition of the principle of ‘self-­determination’ of peoples in order not to be perceived as favouring Azerbaijan (EU–Armenia Action Plan 2006: 16). In its quest for neutrality, the EU has moved from a non policy on Nagorno-­ Karabakh to a ‘personality split’, where one face of the EU recognized Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity while the other face of the EU recognized the region’s right to self-­determination, which is a central principle of Nagorno-­ Karabakh’s secessionist movement. This EU neutrality contrasted with the EU’s explicit and unambiguous support for Moldova and Georgia’s territorial integrity expressed on numerous occasions through unambiguous language.11 Because the disputes between Armenia and Azerbaijan are so strident, the EU has remained paralysed in the middle without having a clear-­cut approach toward conflict mediation. At the same time, the EU’s ambiguity over Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity significantly undermined credibility of EU actions inside Azerbaijan. As one Azeri official claimed: ‘during the ­negotiations on the action plan, Azerbaijan witnessed for the first time that the EU sees Nagorno-­Karabakh differently from the conflicts in Moldova and Georgia. In those countries the EU unambiguously supports their territorial integrity, while here in Azerbaijan EU claims that it supports ours, but at the same time says it does not preclude any status for the region’.12 EU, France and the OSCE Minsk Group The international framework for negotiations on conflict resolution in Nagorno-­Karabakh is the OSCE Minsk Group, with France, the US and Russia as co-­chairs since 1997 (ICG 2005: 9–10). The EU has supported the Minsk Group as a legitimate mediation mechanism. The EU’s action plans with both Armenia and Azerbaijan state that the EU will ‘increase political support to OSCE Minsk Group conflict settlement efforts’.

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The EU’s non-involvement in Nagorno-Karabakh  105 With the development of EU CFSP, and especially after the EU created the position of an EU Special Representative on South Caucasus, the issue of the EU involvement in the Minsk Group has been raised on a number of occasions. A possible option for the EU was to replace France as co-­chair of the Minsk Group, with a French diplomat still appointed to represent the EU. This would have strengthened the EU’s weight in the negotiations without decreasing Paris’ diplomatic profile (Helly 2007: 113). As one EU official claimed, ‘The French position in the Minsk Group is increasingly anomalous. France argues that it represents the EU, but it rarely consults properly with the other EU member states and the institutions in Brussels’.13 The French co-­chair of the OSCE Minsk Group makes presentations to EU institutions on conflict settlement in Nagorno-­Karabakh only about once a year (ICG 2006a). Even though single EU member states are usually too small to exert significant influence in the region by themselves (Nuriyev 2007: 5), France has refused to ‘Europeanize’ its co-­chairmanship of the OSCE Minsk Group either by ceding its place to the EU Special Representative or acting as the EU voice in the Minsk Group. For their part, EU institutions have been in no position to oppose the strong wishes of a single member state. Thus, like in Abkhazia (but not in Transnistria and South Ossetia), the presence of EU member states in conflict settlement mechanisms has inhibited greater involvement by EU institutions and limited their ability to pursue autonomously more active EU policies. In addition, the OSCE Minsk Group was perceived as being reasonably effective in bringing the sides close to a compromise and was seen as rea­ sonably neutral. This was certainly in contrast to the dysfunctional and very biased Russia-­dominated negotiations frameworks for resolving the conflict in Transnistria and South Ossetia. As one EU official claimed, the Minsk Group was worth supporting as long as it kept some momentum towards conflict settlement, but if it became ineffective, a greater EU push for EU involvement could emerge.14 Despite such arguments, the OSCE Minsk Group was not able to bridge the gap between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and notwithstanding its relative effectiveness or ineffectiveness, France has never been ready to accept its replacement by a collective EU diplomatic voice. In the meantime, Azerbaijan has grown increasingly wary of the Minsk Group’s activities due to its alleged ‘pro-­Armenian bias’ (RFE RL 2002, 2004). This is because the governments of France (and the US) are susceptible to strong Armenian diaspora lobbying, while Armenia was considered Russia’s main ally in the South Caucasus. Armenian diaspora politics France’s refusal to renounce its position in the Minsk Group in favour of the EU was at least partly driven by the presence of a numerous and influential Armenian diaspora in France. The Armenian diaspora has been lobbying the French government to pursue a more pro-­Armenian foreign policy than that

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106  EU’s non-involvement in Nagorno-Karabakh of the EU, and was opposed to France renouncing its co-­chairmanship of the Group.15 There is a strong Armenian presence in France (as well as in the US, which is the other co-­chair of the OSCE Minsk group). The Armenian diaspora is one of the most politically active diasporas in the world. It is politically mobilized and quite institutionalized, since for many decades it has promoted the issue of recognition of the 1915 Armenian genocide in Turkey worldwide (ESI 2009). Many Armenian diaspora associations are situated in France, such as the Committee for Defence of the Armenian Cause or in Brussels, such as Inside Europe or the European Friends of Armenia. Such organizations successfully lobbied the French parliament in 2006 to adopt a draft law making it a criminal offence to deny the existence of the Armenian genocide (Aydin, Carrera and Geyer 2006). As one French diplomat put it: ‘Armenian lobbies are influential enough to push for such laws in France’ suggesting that their influence on the French position in the Nagorno-­Karabakh peace process has not been without consequences.16 When the Nagorno-­Karabakh conflict erupted in late 80s–early 90s, Armenia and the Armenian diaspora saw the conflict with Turkic-­speaking Azerbaijan as a continuation of the 1915 conflict. Thus, the cause of Nagorno-­Karabakh became a second cause célèbre for the Armenian communities abroad. The fact that Turkey sided diplomatically with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-­Karabakh, and introduced a blockade against Armenia only led to further perceptions that Turkey and Azerbaijan were aligned against Armenians as part of centuries-­old conflict with ‘the Turks’. The Armenian communities of France are also active lobbyists in the European parliament.17 As Helly argues, France (along with the US) is a country where the Armenian communities are sufficiently involved in the policy making process to exercise a certain influence (Helly 2003: 454). The influence of the Armenian diaspora contrasts sharply with that of Azeris abroad (ESI 2009). Except for the Azeri community of Iran, most Azeris abroad are ­predominantly persons who emigrated due to the economic hardships of the 1990s. Therefore, they tended to have little interest in politics and still have few organizations to promote their interests. Still, fuelled by its ­oil-­wealth, Azerbaijan tried to rebalance this by stepping up its lobbying efforts in the West through PR companies and foundations such as the European Azerbaijan Society which became active in 2009. The lobbying of domestic interest groups is one of the factors that led France to oppose a greater EU role in the OSCE Minsk Group.18 The lobbying of EU member states by domestic interest groups affected policy at the EU level, and constrained the development of EU policies toward Nagorno-­Karabakh.19 These factors reduced the possibility for action of the EU institutions in trying to promote conflict resolution in Nagorno-­Karabakh. This is not unlike the impact of lobbying by various business groups in the EU that argue that the EU and EU member states should not challenge Russia on issues related to the eastern neighbourhood, including the conflicts in Georgia and Moldova.

The EU’s non-involvement in Nagorno-Karabakh  107 Since their primary interests are profits, they lobby the EU to avoid potential political tensions with Russia that might endanger their profits (Lucas 2008).

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The EU Special Representative The EU’s hesitant approach to conflict resolution in Nagorno-­Karabakh ­manifested itself not only in the modest scale of EU ambitions in the ENP Action Plan, but also in the activity of the EU Special Representative with respect to the conflict. The EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus (EUSR) – covering Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia – was appointed in 2003 with a mandate to ‘prevent conflicts in the region, to assist in the resolution of conflicts, and to prepare the return of peace, including through promoting the return of refugees and internally displaced persons’.20 The necessary background on the scope of the mandate and activities of the EUSRs for South Caucasus Heikki Talvitie (2003–2006) and Peter Semneby (since 2006) are discussed in greater detail in the previous chapter. Hampered by the lack of local demand for EU action, the EUSRs have generally had limited impact and room for involvement in conflict settlement in Nagorno-­Karabakh. Even since 2006, the mandate of the EUSR South Caucasus included the task of ‘contributing’, not just ‘assisting’ in conflict resolution (as was the case in 2003–2006) there was little action in this regard by EU institutions.21 Despite this mandate, and some diplomatic efforts to increase the EU profile in this issue-­area, little has been achieved. As one EU diplomat explained, ‘the EU does not want to undermine or get involved in the OSCE Minsk Group, when there are so many things to do on the ground. The EU is more interested in doing some projects in the conflict areas’.22 Throughout 2007, the EUSR South Caucasus was working behind the scenes to send a needs-­assessment mission to the conflict areas in Azerbaijan that could spearhead more EU action in the conflicts. This was supposed to replicate the fact-­finding mission that was sent to Abkhazia and South Ossetia in January 2007, which provided impetus for greater EU involvement in Georgia’s secessionist conflicts. As in all other conflicts, the EU ­institutions have adhered to low-­politics conflict resolution: seeking to develop post-­conflict rehabilitation projects, rather than getting involved in conflict-­ settlement negotiations. Throughout 2007–2008 they also tried to launch a process of gradual involvement (through dosage) into the conflict settlement process by sending a fact-­finding mission to Nagorno-­Karabakh that never materialized. But due to Azerbaijan’s sensitivities, even low-­level involvement by the EU was very difficult. On 17 June 2007, the EUSR Peter Semneby was supposed to visit Nagorno-­Karabakh after a visit to Yerevan, Armenia. The Azerbaijani side was preliminarily informed of this intention and tacitly approved it.23 En route from Yerevan to Nagorno-­Karabakh, the EUSR stopped half-­way and returned. Two of his political advisor, Mark Fawcett and Kaupo Kand (Armtown 2007), continued the journey whereas Semneby returned without

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108  EU’s non-involvement in Nagorno-Karabakh any public explanation. The last minute change in plans was allegedly due to a call from the Azerbaijani foreign minister who informed the EUSR that Azerbaijan opposed his visit to the region.24 The fact that previous EUSR Heikki Talvitie had been able to visit Nagorno-­ Karabakh twice during his mandate indicated that the room for manoeuvre for EU institutions in Nagorno-­Karabakh was narrowing because Azerbaijan was increasingly sceptical of the internal community’s role in the settlement process. With local opposition to EU foreign policy engagement, it was not surprising that the EU has been far more involved in Georgia’s conflict resolution processes than in that of Nagorno-­Karabakh. And despite the launching of ENP and an overall increasing level of EU diplomatic, economic and political presence in the neighbourhood, the EU’s involvement in Nagorno-­Karabakh has stagnated. Lack of EU projects There have been very few EU projects to support rehabilitation of the c­ onflict zones. The EU, working in parallel with the World Bank, UNHCR and UNDP financed between 1996 and 2000 the rehabilitation of water supplies, drinking and irrigation, housing, schools, electricity supplies, rail communications, agricultural and other economic activity in Fizuli and Agdam districts of Azerbaijan that were affected by the war, but outside Nagorno-­ Karabakh.25 However, the EU has not financed any projects on post-­conflict rehabilitation, nor democratization in or around the secessionist region of Nagorno-­Karabakh the way it has done in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Nor did it have full-­fledged European Commission Delegations in Azerbaijan and Armenia until 2008. Nor have there been any EU crisis management missions on the model of EUBAM in Moldova, or EUJUST Themis and EU Border Support Team in Georgia. Though, in early 2009 the EU deployed in Armenia a group of close to 15 EU advisors across a number of key public institutions, including the ministries of economy, foreign affairs, finance as well as the ombudsman office (Popescu and Wilson 2009), but this hardly had any conflict-­settlement dimension to it. The EU’s focus, clearly, was on the low politics of conflict resolution. However, such aid, while important from a humanitarian point of view, can hardly be perceived as a political contribution to conflict resolution. EU activities around the conflict could have focused on two priorities: assistance to internally displaced persons and refugees, as well as confidence and security building measures. EU officials realized that by providing more aid to the reintegration of 800,000 IDPs and refugees in Azerbaijan, it would contribute to greater stability in this country of 8.5 million people.26 The effects of some EU programmes to support the IDPs could have positive humanitarian and political effects. They could alleviate hardship, but also have de-­radicalizing effects on the IDPs, the great majority of whom are inclined to support a military solution to the conflict with Armenia. However, projects on the integration of IDPs are politically controversial in Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijani

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The EU’s non-involvement in Nagorno-Karabakh  109 government and many IDPs fear that such aid could solidify the status quo in the conflict zone, and decrease the likelihood of the IDPs returning home once there is a settlement. Thus, what would seem to be a feasible humanitarian and political objective for EU projects runs into controversy due to internal Azerbaijani politics. Armenia and Azerbaijan have faced ‘mirror dilemmas’ regarding a pos­ sible EU involvement in the conflict resolution efforts. Azerbaijan dislikes the status quo, making it too supportive of a more assertive EU policy seeking to offset the status quo through involvement of the Minsk Group. At the same time, Azerbaijan fears that greater involvement of the EU in the conflict area would legitimize the secessionist authorities and erode the blockade around Armenia and Nagorno-­Karabakh. Certainly, Azerbaijan has a record of criticizing the Minsk Group and trying to promote alternative formats for conflict resolution by raising Nagorno-­Karabakh in the Council of Europe, the UN and asking the EU for greater involvement. However, this effort has never been sustained long enough to make a difference and forum-­picking by Azerbaijan has not contributed to drawing the EU into the Minsk Group. Azerbaijan’s demands from the EU have also tended to be very general. As an Azerbaijani expert stated, ‘Azerbaijani government and civil society are very reactive. They have no ability to formulate concrete policy demands from the EU. The government asked for EU suggestions on its way to get involved in Nagorno-­Karabakh, rather than make concrete requests. The mood in Azerbaijan is that the EU and NATO should come and help us’.27 But Azerbaijan’s doubts about a clear-­cut EU support for its position led to a certain scepticism of EU engagement in the conflict settlement process. Armenia’s ambivalence about the EU stems from an inverse dilemma. Armenia would like the EU to play a bigger role in the conflict so long as this helps erode the blockade and confer greater legitimacy upon the authorities in Nagorno-­Karabakh. On the other hand, it is quite satisfied with the Minsk Group and the status quo around the conflict, so it is very careful not to offset it. In Nagorno-­Karabakh a rather extreme idea of making it into an EU protectorate was raised by the leader of the local communist party Hrant Melkumian, who stated that, ‘perhaps the most acceptable way would be if Nagorno-­ Karabakh appeared under the aegis of the EU until the resolution of the conflict (up to a referendum on the status of Nagorno-­Karabakh). Nagorno-­Karabakh would become a special area of the EU where the laws of the EU would be valid’ (Huliq.com/01.04.2007). But such an idea was too unrealistic. Such ambivalence on the part of the conflict parties has limited the scope of EU involvement in the rehabilitation of the conflict areas as it has done in Georgia or Moldova’s conflicts. One European diplomat in Baku explained: ‘The EU is more enthusiastic about playing a role in Transnistria. But Nagorno-­Karabakh is too difficult. And unlike Georgia or Moldova, Armenia and Azerbaijan did not force the issue on the agenda’.28 The attitude in the EU was that ‘no one has allowed us to do anything in Nagorno-­Karabakh . . . we would do something if we were asked by the sides’ (ICG 2006a). This

110  EU’s non-involvement in Nagorno-Karabakh approach has been consistent with the claim that the ENP is a demand-­driven policy (CEPS Event Report 2006), but it also went against the EU’s professed interest in stabilizing its neighbourhood.

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Waiting for peace: the EU in Nagorno-­Karabakh While the EU member states have done little to increase its contribution to conflict settlement in Nagorno-­Karabakh, it has declared its readiness to play a role in case the conflict is solved. The EUSR South Caucasus stated in May 2006 that the EU ‘will be expected to make a major contribution when a solution is found, and we are looking into the possibilities we have, both in terms of post-­conflict rehabilitation and also – if the parties should so desire – in terms of contributing peacekeepers. And possibly even leading a peacekeeping operation’ (De Waal 2006). In other words, the EU has been waiting for peace in order to act, rather than acting to promote peace. There are several options for a post-­conflict EU involvement aimed at reaching and consolidating a peace settlement. These include a possible contribution to a peacekeeping operation, reconstruction and rehabilitation of the conflict areas in Nagorno-­Karabakh proper as well as in the eight Azeri districts occupied by Armenia, support for the return of IDPs, de-­mining and demilitarization activities (ENPI Country Strategy Paper on Azerbaijan 2007). However, there seems to be a general consensus among EU member states that, ‘until there is a breakthrough in the settlement, the EU will not act’.29 In early 2006, Azerbaijan and Armenia apparently came very close to a solution on Nagorno-­Karabakh. There were very high expectations that a deal could be reached at an Armenia–Azerbaijan summit in Rambouillet in February or in Bucharest in June. Stemming from this optimism, the EU stated in January 2006 that it would be ready to contribute peacekeepers to Nagorno-­Karabakh or even undertake an EU-­led peace support ­operation.30 The Council of the EU launched a round of informal discussion on the ­­planning of a possible EU peacekeeping contribution. These discussions involved the Policy Unit in the Council and the military cell in the Council, with periodic consultations with the OSCE Headquarters in Vienna to identify the possible scope and needs of the peace support operation.31 However, these discussions have ceased since the Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents failed to achieve an agreement on the settlement back in 2006. The EU’s preference for post-­conflict involvement suggested a high degree of risk-­aversion in the EU approach to Nagorno-­Karabakh. It also suggested that on Nagorno-­Karabakh, the EU would be a policy-­taker, rather than a policy maker (Lessenski 2009). The problem with such an approach is that so far the structural factors keeping the conflict unsolved have not changed, and the EU has done little to offset it. Without EU member states’ support and little demand for EU action from the parties to the conflict, the EU can do little to contribute to conflict settlement.

The EU’s non-involvement in Nagorno-Karabakh  111

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The EU and Turkish–Armenian rapprochement Perhaps the only positive side-­effect of the 2008 war in Georgia was related to Armenian–Turkish relations. The war exposed the fragility of regional stability in the South Caucasus, which made Turkey and Armenia embark on a process of rapprochement. Due to the issue of genocide Turkish–Armenian relations have always been tense. The two countries did not even have diplomatic relations, and Turkey maintained a blockade against Armenia in 1993 in retaliation for Armenia’s occupation of Azeri territories. But right after the war in Georgia, the countries embarked on a process that aimed at establishing diplomatic relations and the opening of borders. The process started when the Armenian president invited his Turkish counterpart to a football match between Armenia and Turkey in early September 2008. The subsequent process of rapprochement was nicknamed ‘football diplomacy’. Turkey’s motives were based on a realization that, if left untackled, the dangerous web of contradictions in the South Caucasus could easily explode, leaving everyone else worse off, as the war in Georgia demonstrated. In addition Turkey calculated that stable and good relations with its neighbours would maximize its power. Hence the Turkish government embarked on an active neighbourhood policy under the banner of ‘zero problems with neighbours’. The Turkish foreign minister Ahmet Davutog˘lu identified the vision behind this policy well before he assumed office by arguing that: It is impossible for a country experiencing constant crises with neighbouring states to produce a regional and global foreign policy [. . .] Relations with these countries have to be detached from the long and difficult process involving polities and bureaucrats. A broader basis, focused largely on intra society relations, including economic and cultural elements, must be found. [. . .] A comprehensive peace plan and a package to develop economic and cultural relations have to be put into place simultaneously to overcome security crises with the closest neighbours [. . .] Particularly in our region, where authoritarian regimes are the norm, improving transport possibilities, extending cross-­border trade, increasing cultural exchange programs, and facilitating labour and capital movement [. . .] will help overcome problems stemming from the role of the central elites. (Davutog˘lu 2001) In addition, parts of the elites in Turkey has gradually came to the realization of the fact that the closing of border with Armenia ‘has done little to help resolve the problem of Nagorno-­Karabakh. It has not helped Azerbaijan, and has diminished Turkey’s role in the region. It has also undermined Turkey’s soft power’ (ESI 2009). In addition, solving problems with Armenia also played well into Turkey’s foreign policy image in both the EU (which Turkey

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112  EU’s non-involvement in Nagorno-Karabakh wants to join) and the US, and thus could help Turkish foreign policy goals elsewhere. Armenia has had its motives as well. While the economic interests in opening Armenia borders have always been obvious, political imperatives have also played a role. In late February 2008, a new Armenian president Serzh Sargsyan was elected. After the elections, mass protests took place in the capital Yerevan against alleged vote-­rigging which led to clashes with the police and the killing of at least ten. Sargsyan’s presidency started rather tragically. In such a context, Sargsyan had all the incentives to give a more positive imprint to his presidency, and the process of opening the border with Turkey was seen as one such potential project. The negotiations between Armenia and Turkey lead to the signing of a protocol providing for a sequence of steps to normalize relations (mutual recognition of borders, re-­establishing diplomatic relations, joint commission on the ‘1915 events’). The rapprochement was achieved with Swiss mediation. While the signing of the protocols on 10 October 2009 between Turkey and Armenia in Switzerland was attended by the EU High Representative Javier Solana and the French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner, the EU as such had little role to play in this ‘football diplomacy’. While the EU factor was present somewhere in the background (mainly in Turkish calculations) the EU was not a diplomatic actor in itself in this process. It supported the pro­ cess, but hardly played any important role in it. Nor have any of the parties involved in the process, be it Turkey, an EU candidate, nor Armenia, seen any need for a greater EU diplomatic or mediating role in the process. As Armando Garcia Schmidt argued, the EU witnessed the talks ‘with a benevolent kind of inactivity’ (2009).

Resentful Azerbaijan As described earlier, probably the biggest constraint on EU involvement in Nagorno-­Karabakh has been the lack of local demand from both Armenia and Azerbaijan. This stemmed predominantly from a belief in Azerbaijan that the EU would not bring a value-­added to the OSCE Minsk group and that its commitment to supporting Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity was suspect. An Azeri expert expressed this feeling by saying: ‘We do not demand for the EU to replace the Minsk Group because we do not believe in this format, so we don’t care’.32 Despite an ever-­increasing EU profile in the European neighbourhood, and a small but growing involvement of the EU in conflict resolution in Moldova and Georgia, the involvement of the EU in Nagorno-­ Karabakh is not inevitable. If anything, the political and security context in the region has only increased the constraints on EU actions, while Azerbaijan increasingly believed that reliance on its own forces, rather than international efforts, would help solve the conflict in Azerbaijan’s favour. Azerbaijan has become increasingly assertive in the region. On the domestic level, the rise of energy prices and rapid expansion of Azerbaijan’s oil industry,

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The EU’s non-involvement in Nagorno-Karabakh  113 booming western energy investments, and rapid economic growth all led Azerbaijan to believe that it is in a favourable strategic position vis-­à-vis Armenia. Even the global economic crisis that started in 2008 and the subsequent fall in oil prices did not significantly shatter such beliefs. In regional politics, Russia’s growing assertiveness in relations with the West (Leonard and Popescu 2007) has forced the EU to look for alternative energy supplies and energy corridors from the Caspian region to Europe, where Azerbaijan was a central state, as a producer of oil and less so of gas. This has also increased Azerbaijan’s importance as a potential transit hub for bringing Central Asian gas to Europe while bypassing Russia. Tensions around Iran have made Azerbaijan even more of a valued ally to the US and the EU in their efforts to contain Iran. All these factors have made Azerbaijan confi­ dent of its own economic future, political sovereignty and geopolitical room for manoeuvre. Azerbaijan has not been particularly interested in what the EU had to offer under the European neighbourhood policy either. Azerbaijan cared primarily about energy cooperation with the EU, much less about issues like the deep free trade, let alone EU efforts to support democratic reforms. If anything Azerbaijan wanted an ‘ENP a la carte’ where it could cherry pick from what the EU had to offer, while avoiding too deep an engagement with the EU particularly on issues of democratic reforms. But Azerbaijan also became increasingly resentful of regional trends. The Turkish–Armenian rapprochement partly fuelled this. From an Azeri perspective the opening of the Turkish–Armenian border only decreased the incentives for Armenia to make any progress towards the settlement of the conflict. Worse, it amounted to a ‘stab in the back’ by its closest ally – Turkey (Husseynov 2009). This came against the background of growing Azeri mistrust of the way the international community has handled ethnic conflicts. The declaration of Kosovo independence in February 2008, supported and recognized by the US and a majority of EU member states, had a number of repercussions on attitudes in Azerbaijan. First, it undermined Azerbaijan’s belief that the international community would defend its territorial integrity even though it was in accordance with international law. In the words of one expert from Azerbaijan, ‘After Kosovo, the central principle of the OSCE – that of inviolability of borders – is in tatters. How can we trust international institutions? How can we trust any promises of the OSCE, EU or the US?’33 This clearly reinforced Azerbaijani resentment that the EU was not supportive enough of its territorial integrity. Many in Azerbaijan thought that the international peacekeepers and the UN presence in Kosovo were initially accepted and legitimized by Serbia, but these then became institutions through which the international community later imposed a settlement on Serbia.34 This had immediate implications for the way Azerbaijan viewed international involvement in conflict resolution in Nagorno-­Karabakh. It first made Azerbaijan more wary than ever of international engagement with the secessionist authorities – even for

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114  EU’s non-involvement in Nagorno-Karabakh humanitarian, post-­conflict reconstruction or confidence-­building. It has also made Azerbaijan more ambivalent about possible international peacekeepers in Nagorno-­Karabakh, even if a negotiated solution were found with Armenia. In the aftermath of Kosovo, Azerbaijan concluded that the international peacekeeping presence had in fact steered Kosovo toward independence. Baku therefore became much less ready to see the peacekeepers as part of a negotiated solution, reducing the already low chances of such a settlement. Azerbaijan’s decreasing confidence in the international community, increasing assertiveness and rapidly growing defence spending has created a dangerous situation for Nagorno-­Karabakh. The potential for violence was high, making the conflict a high-­politics issue, while it also reduced Azerbaijan’s desire to accept a growing EU role in conflict resolution. At the same time, the 2008 war in Georgia somehow reduced the danger of war. Georgia’s failed effort to recapture militarily the secessionist regions, and Russia’s strong intervention to protect South Ossetia and Abkhazia reduced the attractiveness of a military solution in the short-­term to Azerbaijani authorities.

Conclusions Nagorno-­Karabakh is the conflict in which the EU has been the least involved over the past two decades. Unlike the cases of Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the EU is not pushing for a greater role in the conflict settlement in Nagorno-­Karabakh, while trying to play a careful balancing act between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The EU has been more ambivalent about supporting Azeri territorial integrity than that of Moldova and Georgia. It declared its readiness to contribute to peacekeeping once a settlement is reached, but its role in actually pushing for a settlement has been small. In other words, the EU had little if any policy toward the conflict in Nagorno-­Karabakh. This lack of EU policy is conditioned by a set of factors. Neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan has been actively lobbying for a greater EU role. If anything, Azerbaijan has become ever less disposed to seeing a greater role for international actors in conflict settlement in Nagorno-­Karabakh. EU member states such as France have had a certain inhibitive effect on the development of a consistent EU approach to Nagorno-­Karabakh and Azerbaijan due to national sensitivities. The context surrounding the Nagorno-­Karabakh conflict is characteristic of high-politics – the danger of violence has been palpable, European member states’ energy interests in the region have been strong, and the issue of the Armenian genocide in Turkey has remained politically salient in EU member states with strong Armenian diaspora. All these issues indirectly made Nagorno-­Karabakh a high-­politics issue for EU member states in the region. In such a context, the capacity of EU institutional agents to pursue a pro-­active policy on EU conflict resolution was limited. Many EU states had established unilateral approaches to the region, which was significantly reducing any scope for autonomy for EU action in the region. The presence

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The EU’s non-involvement in Nagorno-Karabakh  115 of such well-­defined national policies reduced almost to zero the EU’s ability to pursue a more interventionist policy toward the conflict. Facing a lack of local demand for EU action, a relatively high-­potential for violence and low probability of success even if the EU were to get involved, EU institutions have been confined to a marginal role in conflict resolution in Nagorno-­Karabakh. The same applied for the process of Turkish–Armenian rapprochement where the EU as an actor was only present somewhere in the background of the issue and there was little demand for its diplomatic interventions as well. On Nagorno-­Karabakh, EU institutions have tried to launch some uncontroversial and depoliticized ways to contribute to conflict resolution. However, even these failed due to the above-mentioned constraints. EU institutions were not even able to play the card of low-­politics involvement, and therefore could not launch a process of ever increasing EU engagement through dosage as it did in the other three secessionist conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria.

6 Conclusions

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The EU’s involvement and reluctance

That the EU has a global ambition to contribute to conflict resolution is clearly stated in its security strategy and many other EU foreign policy ­documents. It is no less clear that the EU has a capabilities–expectations gap (Hill 1993), where real EU foreign policy actions have not managed to catch up with the EU’s rhetoric and declared ambitions. This book has examined one of the many grey areas where EU rhetoric does not match reality – EU policy toward secessionist conflicts in the eastern neighbourhood. The conflicts in this region are important enough for the EU to pay attention, but not important enough to pursue strong EU foreign policy actions like in the Balkans. This book addressed some issues related to EU impact on conflict management patterns, but it primarily analysed the politics of EU involvement and non-­involvement in conflict settlement issues and drew some theoretical lessons about the EU as a foreign policy actor. The book has showed how EU institutions seek to increase their role in conflict settlement efforts in EU’s neighbourhood through a policy of stealth intervention that sought to advance EU conflict management priorities in the face of often sceptical or divided EU member states.

EU policies toward the conflicts The record of EU involvement in conflict settlement in the post-­ Soviet ­conflicts is mixed. Since the launch of the European neighbourhood policy in 2002/2003 the EU has been increasingly engaged with the unsolved territorial conflicts in the eastern neighbourhood. This concern has translated into policy outputs on a number of occasions, but the EU still fell short of a significant level of involvement in conflict settlement efforts.1 EU policies toward Transnistria The conflict around Transnistria, a secessionist region in Moldova, has ­experienced the greatest degree of EU involvement of the four cases explored in the book. From 2002, the EU has deployed a growing range of EU foreign policy tools to help advance conflict settlement. EU measures included the

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Conclusions  117 introduction and suspension of a travel ban against Transnistrian leaders, the appointment of an EU Special Representative, involvement in conflict settlement negotiations in the 5+2 format, and most importantly the launch of an EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM). The EU focus has been on attracting (through trade preferences) and coercing (through EUBAM and the customs regime) the Transnistrian business community to work as Moldova-­registered companies. EUBAM also adopted a rather expansionist interpretation of its mandate. Generally, the EU used coercive instruments against the Transnistrian leadership, a strategy of cooperation with the Transnistrian businesses, and it offered moderate support to Moldova to assist its reforms. The EU has been quite successful in pushing toward conflict settlement through low-­politics measures, but it has been less effective in high-­politics engagement. The EU failed twice in the efforts to contribute to the change of the Russian dominated peacekeeping operation in Moldova. An initial discussion about sending EU peacekeepers to Transnistria took place in 2003 on the initiative of the then Dutch presidency of the OSCE. It could have led to a joint EU–Russia peacekeeping effort, which was considered by many in Europe as a mechanism of strengthening the EU–Russia strategic partnership. After Russian opposition to EU peacekeepers, the EU abandoned the idea. But the second instance was even more revealing of the EU’s reluctance to get engaged. In 2006, the EU Special Representative on Moldova started to lobby EU member states to press Russia to accept a change in the peacekeeping format in Moldova. After some preliminary discussions, a number of EU member states, including France and Germany, joined by the then High Representative Javier Solana opposed the initiative. Consequently, the idea was rejected internally in the EU, and the EU never seriously raised it with Russia. But EU Special Representative Jacobovits continued to promote the idea against the opposition of the above-mentioned actors, and was ultimately forced to resign as a result. To a certain extent, the EU was readier to challenge Russian interests in the area by getting involved in peacekeeping in Moldova in 2003 than in 2006, as the first time the idea was at least not contested inside the EU. EU policies toward Abkhazia and South Ossetia Since the Rose Revolution in 2003, Georgia has been a persistent d ­ emandeur for greater EU involvement in conflict resolution. However, the EU has been reluctant to get involved in conflict-­settlement issues in order to avoid tensions with Russia, which recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and is deeply involved in these regions and is suspicious of any Western interference. Russia’s extremely tense relations with Georgia also meant the issue has been in the realm of high-­politics for Moscow. The Russian–Georgian war in 2008, and Georgia’s efforts to join NATO, only exacerbated the importance of the conflicts for Russia. This imposed great

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118  Conclusions constraints on the EU’s ability to play a bigger role in the conflict zones. Consequently, the EU has oscillated between strong internal and external expectations for actions and the intention to play a bigger role in the South Caucasus under the European neighbourhood policy, and the reluctance of some EU member states to authorize EU institutions to pursue specific policy objectives in the conflict areas. EU’s moments of increased activism on the conflicts more often than not were interrupted by introspective reluctance to engage because of constraints EU member states imposed on them. On the one hand, the EU has appointed an EU Special Representative, launched an EU Rule of Law Mission to Georgia, a Border Support Team and an EU Monitoring Mission. The European Commission also became the biggest international donor supporting post-­conflict rehabilitation in the conflict regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (not counting Russia’s financial and military support). EU assistance to the secessionist regions amounted to a total of EUR 33 million in 1997–2005. By offering assistance, the EU aimed at alleviating poverty, but also reducing the dependence of the secessionist entities on Moscow. On the other hand, the EU has refused to deploy a border monitoring mission following an invitation to do so by Georgia. Moreover EU institutions have never even raised the prospect of sending peacekeepers to Georgia until the Russia–Georgia war in August 2008. Perhaps even more indicative of the EU’s reluctance to act has been the persistent foot-­dragging by EU member states on low-politics measures proposed by EU institutions as happened when the EU institutions tried to deploy two experts in Georgia to initiate a dialogue on customs management with the secessionist authorities. Ultimately, the 2008 Georgian–Russian war constituted a huge impulse for EU intervention in conflict management; however this has also been marked by the EU’s circumspection and the rather defensive agenda of ‘freezing the conflicts’ and pushing them under the carpet. EU policy toward Nagorno-­Karabakh Nagorno-­ Karabakh is the conflict with virtually no EU involvement in ­settlement  efforts. The EU has not actively tried to play a greater role in conflict ­settlement efforts, and neither Azerbaijan nor Armenia have sought such a role. The EU did not disburse any funds to help the reconstruction of the conflict zone (like it did in South Ossetia and Abkhazia). In contrast to its support for Moldova and Georgia’s territorial integrity, the EU has maintained a more neutral approach toward the status of Nagorno-­Karabakh. Despite some efforts by the EU institutions to find a niche where it could contribute to the conflict settlement process, such efforts have been in vain. Either Azerbaijan opposed them, or France, which is part of the OSCE Minsk Group of mediators of the conflict, did not support them. The end result is the absence of meaningful EU involvement in the Nagorno-­Karabakh peace process. The EU has, however, declared its readiness to send a peacekeeping force if the conflict parties agreed on a settlement. This has never materialized

Conclusions  119 Table 6.1  EU involvement in post-­Soviet secessionist conflicts

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EU actions on the secessionist regions

Transnistria

Abkhazia

South Ossetia

Nagorno-­ Karabakh

Appointment of EU Special Representatives (for Moldova and South Caucasus)

✗

✗

✗

✗

EU involvement in negotiations

✗

✗

✗

ESDP/crisis management missions

✗

✗

✗

Funds for the rehabilitation of conflict zones

✗

✗

✗

Strengthening the metropolitan states

✗

✗

✗

Support for democracy and civil society

✗

✗

Targeted sanctions (travel restrictions)

✗

Economic pressures on the secessionists

✗

due to the clash of interests between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Finally, the EU played no active role in the Turkish–Armenian rapprochement except for being a supporter of the process and looming in the background of the Turkish motives in favour of engagement with Armenia. Overall, the EU came closest to a semblance of an integrated approach to conflict management in the case of Transnistria, where it could affect decisively conflict settlement patterns because its various actions had some synergies between them. However, this has not really been the case when it came to EU policies towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia, where EU institutions have been too constrained to pursue a long term, integrated approach to conflict resolution. The conflict in Nagorno-­Karabakh has not even seen the type of scattered and sporadic actions that the EU took vis-­à-vis the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. As the empirical record of EU intervention in conflict settlement efforts shows, EU institutions have pursued one strategy in one conflict and a different strategy in others. There has been little consistency in EU approaches, which remain fairly ad hoc. Despite such divergent behaviour, the EU policy toward these conflicts followed some patterns that are common across the cases.

High- versus low-politics of conflict management Liberal intergovernmentalist theories argue that EU policies are the result of bargaining among member states and that the performance of EU institutions

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120  Conclusions is dismal (Moravcsik 1998: 483). These bargaining outcomes are tilted in favour of member states with bigger bargaining power. Alternative claims by institutionalist theories focus on the fact that institutions have had an impact on these bargains, as institutions are sometimes able to pursue interests of their own as well as shape the bargaining between member states. This book examines these competing claims in light of the politics of EU conflict ­settlement efforts in the European neighbourhood. Institutional autonomy One of the key arguments of this book is that liberal intergovernmentalism better explains EU foreign policy decision-­making in high-­politics where EU institutional autonomy is nearly absent. However, in the low-­politics of conflict settlement EU institutions have played a more significant independent role and have been able to influence policy outcomes. This argument has been confirmed by EU behaviour across all four conflicts. EU institutions have been able to incrementally push for EU policies toward the low-politics of conflict resolution. European Commission has been able to offer funds for post conflict rehabilitation in South Ossetia and Abkhazia since 1997 and in Transnistria since 2008. The European Commission has financed numerous projects in the conflict zones in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and from 2006 became the biggest international donor to these conflict regions (while failing to finance any projects at the time in Nagorno-­Karabakh and Transnistria). Due to its assistance, the European Commission also became an observer on economic rehabilitation issues in the Joint Control Commission – the conflict-­settlement format in South Ossetia. The European Commission also developed an integrated package of economic measures aimed at influencing conflict settlement patterns in Moldova by offering a favourable trade regime to Moldova, making it possible for Transnistrian businesses to benefit from these only if they register with the government in Chisinau and putting pressure on Ukraine not to accept Transnistrian goods without Moldovan customs stamps. Because Transnistria is strongly dependent on foreign commerce, such conditionality has been successful in starting a process of creeping de facto reintegration of the single Moldovan economic space. Most importantly, this theoretical framework explains the very choice of conflicts where the EU has intervened, as the EU tended to become more involved in conflicts with perceived lower levels of violence most of the time, such as Transnistria and South Ossetia (before 2008). Beyond technical measures, EU member states remained firmly in control of EU policies toward more controversial and high politics aspects of conflict resolution. Conflict settlement efforts in the more violent conflicts of Abkhazia and Nagorno-­Karabakh remained dominated by EU member states (Germany, the UK and France in Abkhazia and France in Nagorno-­Karabakh) that were reluctant to see a greater EU role in the political aspects of conflict settlement. A similar process happened in South Ossetia after the 2008

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Conclusions  121 escalation of hostilities, with EU member states increasing their involvement and trying to limit the role of EU institutions be it the High Representative for CFSP or the EUSR for South Caucasus. A manipulation of EU institutional arrangements have not been uncommon when the EU appointed a second EUSR for the conflict in Georgia, which led to even greater foreign policy fragmentation. This confirmed the proposition that the more controversial a decision is, the more EU member states retain control of the policy process. This also shows the dynamic process of South Ossetia moving from a low-­ politics concern into a high-­politics concern due to escalation of hostilities, and consequent reduction in EU institutional autonomy. EU discussions over potential peacekeeping in the post-­Soviet space have been under close member state scrutiny, and EU institutional autonomy on such issues has been nil, owing to the high-­politics nature of peacekeeping issues and Russian opposition to it. The EU’s focus on low-­politics The fact that EU institutions have greater autonomy in the low-politics of conflict resolution left its imprint on the EU as a crisis-­management actor as it skewed EU conflict management toward relatively uncontroversial, ­risk-­averse aspects of conflict management. This pattern can be observed across all the four cases. In Transnistria, the EU has been concerned with economic and border-­management issues of conflict resolution. In South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the EU concentrated on post-­conflict rehabilitation funding, but remained very reluctant to push for the transformation of the security or political aspects of the conflict-­settlement process, since EU member state support was not guaranteed. On Nagorno-­Karabakh, the EU financed some programmes on the support for internally displaced persons in Azerbaijan. It also explored ideas for confidence building measures between the parties to the conflict, but did not go too far. The EU institutions did not raise the pro­ spects of changing the peacekeeping formats in Abkhazia and South Ossetia; and when the first EUSR Moldova insisted on pushing for such a change in Transnistria, he was dismissed. On all the aspects of EU intervention in conflict settlement, EU ­institutions have generally preferred a low-politics approach to conflict resolution and have generally shied away from high-­visibility political and security issues. This happened because EU institutions (particularly the European Commission) had greater discretion over low-politics policies such as trade or assistance, on which EU member states were likely to agree (a factor particularly important for the EUSRs). As conflict management remained predominantly in the high-­politics, the EU institutions had little room to manoeuvre for decisive action. In all four conflicts, the EU has focused on primarily working ‘around’ the conflicts and modifying the context in which they developed, rather than forcefully play in sensitive issues like peacekeeping. Such EU reliance on economic and

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122  Conclusions financial instruments in conflict settlement is widespread and it results from an assumption that economic mechanisms of cooperation are the basis on which peace is to be built (Aoun 2003: 300). It has been argued about EU’s conflict management role in Northern Ireland and Kosovo that the EU has spent huge amounts of money without clear political strategies (Hughes 2009). It would be justified to argue that a simi­ lar framework approach (though with much smaller sums of money) has informed EU policy towards the post-­Soviet conflicts. This seemed to bear some fruit in the case of Transnistria, but not in the South Caucasus where conflicts have been much more violent. But this led to a very fragmented and unfocused EU approach to the conflicts as the EU tried to spread its shallow foreign policy resources too thinly across a whole range of issues such as border management, strengthening rule of law, offering assistance, facilitating trade, promoting confidence-­building measures. The low-politics approach has often failed to meet the real needs on the ground, as the EU has followed a top-­down approach – defining the mission from what made sense in Brussels rather than from what was necessary on the ground. As one EU official explained: ‘when the EU does not have a policy, it tries to launch a mission’ while not always having a clear idea of what it tries to achieve.2 EU institutions have persistently scaled down their policy initiatives to minimal levels of what was possible to achieve in Brussels, rather than what they thought was needed for a decisive push towards conflict settlement. South Ossetia provided a remarkable example. EU institutional actors and many EU member state were aware that it was partly due to the dysfunctional Russian-­dominated peacekeeping mission in the region that tensions were drastically increasing in the run-­up to the 2008 war. But EU institutions never even proposed a greater EU role in peacekeeping because the opposition of a high number of EU member states was well-­known. Thus EU institutions remained focused on the low-politics of conflict settlement. While the EU invested for years in the reconstruction of the conflict zone and avoided getting involved with the conflicts politically or through peacekeepers, the parties to the conflict were preparing for war. When the war erupted in 2008, the EU’s low-politics attempts to promote conflict settlement found themselves in tatters, just like most of the buildings that were reconstructed with EU money have been destroyed. And in the end, the EU sent military observers anyway and committed EUR 1 billion. But the EU’s approach did not change much, even after the August 2008 war over South Ossetia. In the immediate aftermath of the war, EU member states – especially Germany – shied away from a commitment to send peacekeepers and pushed for a civilian EU mission on the ground. The distinction between high- and low-­politics is not static and there is no clear border between these two dimensions. This distinction can vary across cases and time. It is more useful to think of this distinction as a continuum, where issues are gradually politicized or depoliticized by the stakeholders

Conclusions  123 involved, and this has an impact on the floating relevance of EU institutional impact on crisis management policies pursued by the European Union.

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EU’s stealth intervention Because EU foreign policy remains an intergovernmental policy domain, there is a tendency for foreign policy decisions to regress to the lowest common denominator. In such a context, EU institutions try to upgrade the lowest common denominator. They use a strategy of dosage – promoting series of low-­intensity measures that over time can amount to substantial policy packages – to push for a greater EU role in conflict settlement efforts. In fact dosage is a strategy of EU institutions to push for a spillover of EU policies towards a particular issue. Three out of the four cases analysed in this book confirm the use of dosage. In Transnistria, the EU became gradually involved in border management issues – first by initiating and mediating a dialogue on border issues between Moldova and Ukraine, then by launching a border assistance mission that saw its budget and personnel exponentially grow, and finally by extending EUBAM activities into cooperation with local intelligence services and anti-­corruption agencies. EU institutions have used dosage in their policy toward Georgia as well, though less successfully. When Georgia invited the EU to send up to 150 border monitors to Georgia, the EU member states approved sending only three border experts. These were later extended to twelve in what became the EUSR Border Support Team in Georgia. EU institutions then tried to expand the mandate of the team and further increase the numbers of persons involved. However, these subsequent efforts by EU institutions to expand the area of activity of EUSR BST through dosage stalled due to member states’ blockages. ‘Dosage’ was used by EU institutions to expand its conflict management remit, but the success of these measures depended again on how low-­politics the measures were and the timing of dosage. In the end, the EU institutions managed to extend the degree of EU involvement in conflict settlement even in the face of sceptical EU member states, but only as long as they did not cross into the realm of high-­politics. When EU–Russia tensions were high, even the smallest technical EU initiative vis-­à-vis the conflict zones was bound to be closely scrutinized by EU member states. The case of Nagorno-­Karabakh neither confirms nor disconfirms this hypothesis concerning the EU’s use of dosage simply because EU institutions failed to try it in this case in the face of Azeri, Armenian and even French reluctance to see a greater EU role. The four cases discussed in this book show that EU institutions attempt to use dosage as a strategy to expand their own prerogatives on conflict resolution policies, but that this strategy does not always work. Still, such a strategy seems to be more effective in extending EU actions than a big-­bang approach to developing EU interventions in conflict settlement issues. The successful use of dosage confirms that the institutionalist (and neofunctionalist) claim that integration can advance as a result of spillover has some value

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124  Conclusions when applied to the politics of EU conflict management, but only insofar as the policy remains in the low-politics domain. But it also confirms that spillover is not automatic, and it can be easily stopped by EU member states when the issue becomes significant to them, which limits the potential for EU autonomous action. Despite clear limits to the EU’s institutional autonomy, their predilection for low-­politics measures and careful use of dosage as well as their institutional activism sometimes crossed the (sometimes) invisible boundaries of what is acceptable for some reluctant EU member states. When the conflict mediation efforts moved into the domain of high-politics, EU member states attempted to roll back institutional activism and even punished the EU officials responsible for promoting such policies. When EUSR Moldova pushed for a change in the peacekeeping operation in Moldova against the will of some big member states in 2006 and the then EU High Representative for CFSP, he was made to quit. Less dramatically, when the EUSR South Caucasus pushed for the extension of the mandate of the EU border support team, one member state vetoed it. External influences on the EU The most striking perhaps is the degree to which external actors can ­influence EU decision-­making by politicizing issues and defining what is high- and low-­ politics. EU member states have often reacted opportunistically to externally-­driven politicization of issues. In the eastern neighbourhood, Russia has actively opposed a greater EU role in conflict settlement efforts in the former Soviet Union, which it perceived as a zone of its own special interests. The eastern neighbourhood of the EU is one of the few regions of the world where an increased EU role in conflict management is actively opposed by one of the EU’s strategic partners (and sometimes competitor): Russia. Russia has politicized the secessionist conflicts through high-­level statements, military presence and active diplomacy in the post-­Soviet world. Such a level of politicization led many EU member states to approach their relations with many post-­Soviet states through the prism of their bilateral relations with Russia. This made many EU member states reluctant to support greater EU interventions in post-­Soviet conflicts. Russia has also challenged politically the EU border assistance mission in Moldova, and vetoed the OSCE border monitoring mission in Georgia in 2005. But the most striking escalation came with the launch of the 2008 Russian–Georgian war. In the face of Russian high-­priority actions in the post-­Soviet space, the EU carefully avoided measures that might seem confrontational from a Russian point of view. At the same time, EU member states, primarily France, which held the EU presidency, had taken a hands-­on approach in mediating the conflict between Russia and Georgia and sponsored a peace plan. Germany also held a summit with Russia in the aftermath of the crisis, while the High Representative on CFSP kept a very

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Conclusions  125 low profile. In times of war it was France, not the EU institutions, that took the lead in managing the crisis. By opposing EU involvement in the conflict management, Russia often transformed issues into high-politics which drastically reduced the autonomy of EU institutions and pushed EU policies closer to the lowest common denominator. Coupled with Russian bilateral lobbying of some EU member states, this sometimes brought to a halt the whole EU policy process. Because Russia was much more concerned with the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which lie on its border, these were also the two conflicts in which EU intervention was most controversial from its point of view. The EU is vulnerable to extra-­territorial influences (Richardson 2005: 6). The channels through which Russia could shape EU decision-­making have been multiple. To begin with, EU institutions sometimes even consulted with Russia before initiating some policy initiatives and presenting them formally to EU member states. But the most important mechanism is EU member states blocking or delaying EU initiatives for fear of irritating Russia. Sometimes EU governments anticipated that Russia would oppose some measures, while other times Russia apparently lobbied EU member states to block or push for some policies. Thus, EU policies toward Georgia’s conflicts often remained at the lowest common denominator. This was not the case in the Transnistrian conflict, where Russian influence and stakes were significant, but much lower than in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia did not play a similar role in Nagorno-­Karabakh where it is less directly involved. However, Azerbaijan itself has been reluctant to accept a greater EU role. The evidence in these cases support the hypothesis that EU institutions have had greater autonomy in low-­politics aspects of conflict resolution, which also made them biased toward taking relatively uncontroversial actions. At the same time, EU institutions have been trying to pro-­actively widen the scope of their actions through a strategy of ‘dosage’, by sponsoring compromises beyond EU member states that go beyond the lowest common denominator. When such efforts touch upon high-­politics, EU member states sought to roll back EU institutions that are seen to move too far away from the position of the most reluctant member states. At the same time, external actors did have a certain influence on the outcome of EU bargaining, since they lobby in favour or against EU interventions in conflict resolution through EU member states.

Collateral findings In addition to the findings above, a number of other observations concerning the nature of the EU as a foreign policy actor have also emerged. They relate to the external stimuli that enable or constrain EU actions and the way EU divisions affect EU crisis management policies. However, these are preliminary observations that might need to be analysed further to establish whether similar patterns of behaviour are present in other cases of EU conflict management policies.

126  Conclusions

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External stimuli EU conflict resolution tends to be externally-­driven, i.e. EU action is determined by external constraints or opportunities, more than by strategic design or EU interests. EU member states’ interests are often so diffused, if not contradictory, that the EU is often unable to pursue an integrated policy towards conflicts. It does not define clear objectives, nor subordinates policy measures to achieve those objectives. The EU is predominantly concerned with internal procedures, launching missions, while not always having a clear sequence of steps in mind. This made the EU react more to ‘local demand’ or ‘local opposition’ for EU action in conflict zones, than pursue its own strategic interests. This challenges the widespread claim that third party intervention in conflicts is usually explained by geostrategic interests (Carment and James 1996; Gegout 2009). Certainly, EU interests matter, but the timing and scope of EU actions are largely determined by the local conditions around the conflict area, rather than EU’s strategic choosing. ‘Windows of opportunity’ that emerge due to local political changes trigger EU actions. Events such as the Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003, the failure of the Kozak Memorandum in Moldova in 2003, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004, and the Georgia–Russia war over South Ossetia in 2008 have all led to increased engagement by the EU in the conflict management pro­ cesses. Outside such crisis points, EU remained much more constrained and cir­cumspect when it came to maximizing its involvement. Such correlation between EU actions that follows external stimuli is understandable, however it differs from a calculated, strategic approach. Generally, EU member states most often have diffused preferences when it comes to with dealing with secessionist conflicts outside EU member states and candidate countries, while the domestic salience of these conflicts is relatively low. At the same time, their interest in demonstrating a successful common EU foreign policy is high. Consequently, when external actors can reduce the effectiveness of EU involvement in a conflict, the EU prefers to stand aside, even if its interests are at stake. As one EU member state officials put it, ‘The EU needs not just successes. It needs shining successes’,3 which created a collective preference for declaring each EU operation an unqualified success (Witney 2008: 8). But it also created an aversion to intervene in conflicts where the danger of failure can be palpable. This explains EU’s reluctance to play a bigger role in conflict settlement in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-­Karabakh, where its impact would be limited without cooperation with actors on the ground. This meant that non-­EU actors enjoyed significant indirect influence over EU decisions concerning involvement in separatist conflicts. This is consistent with Richardson’s claim that the ‘EU’s policy-­agenda is permeable to extra-­territorial influences from non-­EU states’ (Richardson 2005: 6). Indeed, the EU has been much more at ease in getting involved in conflicts where there was strong local demand for such involvement from the conflict parties themselves. When such demand was present, EU institutions

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Conclusions  127 used this to strengthen their claims to more pro-­active conflict management policies. However, countries involved in conflicts – such as Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-­Karabakh, Morocco over Western Sahara, or Turkey over Kurdistan – can also constrain EU conflict m ­ anagement if they do not demand such involvement, or even oppose it. External stimuli can play an important role in triggering EU action. As a rule, EU documents indicate that the EU wants to contribute to the settlement of conflicts in the Middle East or the post-­Soviet space. However, in a world where EU foreign policy capabilities cannot cover all conflict areas or even conflicts in EU’s neighbourhood, the EU’s decisions concerning when, how and where to get involved in conflict resolution are often more influenced by local conditions than by EU strategic pursuit of its interests and/or values. This might be changing in time, as the EU might become more of a strategic foreign policy actor, where objectives, interests and actual actions are more closely interlinked in a policy framework. The creation of the External Action Service might contribute to that. However this is not the case yet. The analysis of the cases in this book suggests that the EU tends to be more active in those conflicts and on those issues where there is strong local demand for the EU. Because Moldova and Georgia have been strong demandeurs for a greater EU role in the resolution of their secessionist conflicts, while Azerbaijan was less, EU involvement in conflict resolution in Nagorno-­Karabakh has been virtually nil. The lack of local demand for EU actions is what makes the case of Nagorno-­ Karabakh so different from an EU standpoint from the conflicts in Georgia and Moldova. In these two countries, a key driver for EU involvement was a sustained, pro-­active and permanent effort by the Moldovan and Georgian governments to ask for greater EU role in the settlement of their conflicts. Those demands were also often clearly defined, such as the demand for the EU to become involved in the conflict mediation formats or deploy border assistance missions. Nothing of that sort happened in the case of Nagorno-­ Karabakh. Armenia was contemptuous of the Minsk Group and its co-­chairs’ position on the conflicts, while Azerbaijan has not consistently sought realistic ways for EU involvement either. EU divisions EU divisions played a huge constraining role on EU conflict management ­policies. Naturally, different geographies, histories and historical legacies mean that EU member states have different approaches to international politics. This is a phenomenon that leaves its imprint across most areas of EU foreign policy. But still, the European Neighbourhood Policy emerges as one of the most divisive issues for the EU. It faced two types of divisions. First, between committing resources to the southern neighbourhood on the one hand, or the eastern neighbourhood, on the other. The southern EU member states such as France, Italy, Spain, or Portugal have often been much more

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128  Conclusions concerned with the Middle East and Africa, than with the eastern neighbourhood. They tended to consider that after almost two decades of predominant concentration on Central and Eastern Europe, as well as the Balkans, the EU should pay more attention and resources to dealing with the challenges arising from the south, such as conflicts, radical Islam or immigration. Given that EU foreign policy resources have been limited, the EU’s southern member states have often been reluctant to see a greater EU role in the conflicts in the eastern neighbourhood. The dynamics of the east–south cleavage in the EU have also been determined by the fact that three big EU member states – France, Italy and Spain – lobbied intensively for a focus on the southern direction. These big member states have greater bargaining power than the proponents of the eastern dimension of the ENP that are primarily small (except Poland) and/or new EU member states, such as the Baltic states, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, but also countries like Sweden. In this context, the then High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana, has also manifested a much stronger personal involvement with conflict management in the south than in the east. This has resulted in much more frequent and higher level visits by EU officials to the Middle East, than to the South Caucasus or Moldova. In fact, Solana travelled only twice to Moldova during 10 years of tenure as EU High Representative for CFSP, while taking several trips to the Middle East annually (Popescu and Wilson 2009). The same applied to EU operations on the ground: the EU Border Assistance Mission in Rafah Palestine numbering some 70 persons was much bigger than the EU’s very limited personnel in the South Caucasus (though not in Moldova). EU member states’ contribution to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon keeping peace in Lebanon after the 2006 war was some 7,000 soldiers, which contrasted markedly with 300 civilian observers in Georgia. The Central-­European EU members have been naturally more inclined to support a stronger EU role in the post-­Soviet space, but they have rarely acted in concert and also had different priorities. The Baltic States and Poland favoured strong support for Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova; Romania and Bulgaria focused on promoting Black Sea synergy; and countries like Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia or the Czech Republic have mainly focused on Ukraine (and to some extent Moldova), but not on the South Caucasus. Older EU member states like the UK and Sweden have also supported a more pro-­active policy toward the conflicts in the post-­Soviet space. A second category of divisions has to do with differing attitudes to Russia. Some EU member states have been reluctant to support a more active EU in post-­Soviet secessionist conflicts for fear of irritating Russia. This consisted of a broad coalition of small and big, new and old, southern and northern EU member states such as Germany, France, Greece, Austria, Cyprus etc. These states have valued their bilateral relations with Russia over engagement in the eastern neighbourhood, and preferred not to see their political, economic or energy partnerships with Moscow suffer because of EU intervention in

Conclusions  129 conflict resolution in Moldova or the South Caucasus. These states opposed the ideas related to EU peacekeeping in Moldova or trimmed down proposals for greater EU intervention in conflicts over Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

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Carousel foot-­dragging Few brakemen want to be seen as persistently delaying greater EU intervention in its neighbourhood. Thus states tended to delay or block EU initiatives on intervention in conflict-­settlement processes in the post-­Soviet space in turns, in a phenomenon referred to in this book as carousel foot-­dragging. This presupposes a degree of informal coordination between like-­minded states which in EU jargon is sometimes called ‘pre-­cooking’ (Juncos and Pomorska 2008: 504). The presence of this phenomenon has been confirmed only in the case of EU policy toward the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia where Greece was the only state to delay for a year a number of minimalist steps by the EU to bolster its conflict management actions. Despite the fact that Greece came to the forefront of opposing EU initiatives, a number of other EU member states shared its reservations, but did not speak up. Few small states would block EU policy initiatives that do not affect their vital interests without having the tacit support of other EU member states. Evidence from other academic works suggests this phenomenon is present in other foreign policy issues as well, such as the Spanish–Moroccan conflict over the Perejil islands (Monar 2002: 252). Given that a single EU member state can veto a foreign policy proposal, it is relatively easy to block EU foreign policy initiatives. But carousel foot-­dragging makes it even easier, because it allows members to scupper substantive policy initiatives without any one EU country being seen as overly obstructionist. In a sense, carousel foot-­dragging has been a response of EU member states to EU institutions policies of dosage. Despite the fact that ‘carousel foot-­dragging’ and external lobbying limit EU interventions in conflict settlement issues, it would be wrong to see EU foreign policy as entirely paralysed. When the EU can have a decisive impact on conflict resolution patterns, it can get involved even in the face of local opposition. Between 2003 and 2008, the EU got substantially involved in conflict resolution in Moldova, even against Russian opposition, because it perceived that its impact could have a decisive impact on the settlement process. Such proactive involvement was possible because the success of EU actions was not dependent on cooperation with Russia, but on cooperation with Ukraine, which borders Transnistria. Similarly, in Georgia the preference of many EU member states was to do nothing. But given the EU’s problem-solving culture, EU member states sometimes preferred to resolve their contradictions by expanding their mutual obligations (‘spillover’). As the chapter on EU involvement in Georgia demonstrated, after the EU was invited to launch a large border monitoring mission to Georgia in 2005, which the majority of member states opposed, the outcome of negotiations in Brussels did not result in a total lack of action, but in the launch of a

130  Conclusions three-­person EU border support team in Georgia, which expanded over time in its personnel and mandate.

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Conflict management after the Lisbon Treaty The adoption of the Lisbon Treaty has been the most important reform related to EU foreign policy making since the EU started to take an interest in conflict management in the eastern neighbourhood. However, it will probably take at least a few years until the full blown effects of the creation of the External Action Service will be known. The post-­Lisbon institutional set-­up is creating better preconditions for more forceful EU foreign policy action, but primarily in those areas where most EU member states have strong political will to act, and no EU member states has strong political will to oppose (like Cyprus does in Turkish–EU relations). Thus one should differentiate the effects of the Lisbon Treaty on high-­politics and low-­politics issues. Therefore, on high-­politics issues the Lisbon Treaty is unlikely to be a revolutionary change. There has been wide consensus that the appointment of the relatively low-­profile Herman van Rompuy and Catherine Ashton as president of the European Council and High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy served as a clear indicator that EU member states want to remain in maximal political control of foreign policy and prefer a gradual, incremental and low-­key approach to the reform of the EU. This is likely to be exported into the EU conflict management policies in the eastern neighbourhood. Thus, if one looks at the concrete issues in the region, it is highly unlikely that the EU will suddenly engage in a process of strong security engagement in the eastern neighbourhood, deploying EU peacekeepers or launching major conflict settlement initiatives. In addition, on foreign policy issues, EU member states retain their veto rights, thus stonewalling tactics are not likely to disappear. The same goes for ‘carousel foot-­dragging’. The Lisbon Treaty as such does not make EU member states more committed or more active in foreign policy, nor does it automatically bridge existing EU divisions, which have been the greatest impediment to concerted and decisive EU foreign policy action. However, the Lisbon Treaty is more likely to have an acceleratory impact on the low-­politics of conflict resolution. In the pre-­Lisbon EU diplomatic and security efforts were very loosely coordinated with the broader context of EU policies such as political dialogue, financial assistance or trade facilitation. This was the result of vertical EU foreign policy fragmentation: in Brussels (between the EU Council and the European Commission) and on the ground (between the EUSRs and the heads of Commission Delegations). The creation of the External Action Service will gradually lead to the merger of most EUSRs with the heads of EU embassies, and an integration of the EU’s diplomatic, security, economic and political arms in Brussels into one institution. This is likely to make EU foreign policy more integrated and better coordinated. This is also likely to better bridge the technical aspects

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Conclusions  131 of foreign policy such as trade and economic assistance with political and security goals. Moreover, for years EU leaders and decision-­makers have spent tremendous amounts of political energy and time on the EU’s institutional reforms. With the Lisbon Treaty in force, at least part of this energy is being redirected into foreign policy. This does not bring a clear short-­term change in EU foreign policy, but can hopefully create a better background for an EU that is less introspective. As for conflict management in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-­ Karabakh, the real reason behind the EU’s reluctant efforts has been not only the lack of institutional coherence, but primarily the lack of political will by member states to intervene pro-­actively. Only in Transnistria, where EU conflict management has been mainly confined to low-­politics, could the greater post-­Lisbon institutional coherence bring about greater foreign policy effectiveness. But this is also likely to be predominantly confined to the low-­politics issues such as trade, rather than the issue of peacekeeping. And when it comes to the post-­Soviet conflicts, over the years there has been a serious problem of EU commitment to use the necessary foreign policy resources to achieve its stated goals. The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the creation of the European External Action Service is unlikely to change significantly the foreign policy instincts and interests of EU member states, at least not quickly.

Future research The research in this book opens up new directions for research on EU conflict management policies. First, perhaps the most promising and still under-­researched phenomenon in EU foreign policy is the politics of EU ­non-­actions. What do explicit EU decisions not to act tell us about the EU as a foreign policy actor? This is a question that is worth applying across most foreign policy domains. This book has made one step in this direction by tracing the politics and the factors behind EU non-­action in the post-­Soviet space. Naturally, any political actor, be it a political party, a nation-­state or an international organization like the EU always take decisions not to undertake this or that action. Non-­actions are as important to understand patterns of political behaviour as actions. However, as most EU studies are concerned with EU actions and impact, we are perhaps missing an important part of what the EU is and we can learn this part only by carefully studying further EU non-­actions. Second, it is worth testing to what extent the findings of this book – including the policies of stealth conflict intervention, dosage and carousel foot-dragging­– are confirmed by the record of EU intervention in other conflicts. Some preliminary data suggests that EU institutions might have a predilection for low-politics aspects of conflict resolution across a number of cases. The fact that most EU conflict management operations have been civilian in nature serves as an example. More importantly, the type of EU operations is also suggestive. Even in conflicts with a high degree

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132  Conclusions of violence, the EU has focused on low-­politics aspects of conflict resolution such as the rule of law (in Iraq), police assistance (Afghanistan), and border management (Palestine). The phenomena of ‘dosage’ and ‘carousel foot-­dragging’ are also worth exploring as mechanisms that facilitate and constrain EU action, respectively. What policy mechanisms other than the veto right do EU member states use to delay or block EU policies? To what extent are these strategies applied by EU institutions and EU member states across other cases? Is the assumption of pro-­active institutions applicable to all the cases of EU intervention in conflict resolution? A third avenue for further research relates to the role of external actors. This book has identified Russia as a key factor affecting EU foreign policy making. Many EU member states, and the EU institutions themselves, have been rather circumspect in their intervention in conflicts in the eastern neighbourhood for fear of upsetting Russia. Thus, a bigger question worth exploring is to what extent the EU avoids getting involved in conflict resolution in areas of its concerns for fear of upsetting third-­country partners. Apparently, EU has not played any active role in the conflict over Western Sahara since Morocco has opposed such a role (Darbouche and Zoubir 2008). Similarly, the EU role in the Kurdish conflict in Turkey is constrained by Turkish opposition to international intervention in domestic affairs (Tocci 2007). But are there cases where local opposition to EU interventions hampers EU foreign policy action? If so, under what conditions is the EU reluctant to get involved or actively promote intervention? When does it choose to intervene against local opposition and when does such opposition determine EU’s reluctance to intervene in conflict settlement patterns? Fourth, while the book establishes that external actors lobby the EU for action or inaction in certain conflicts, the concrete modalities of this remain under-­researched. It is clear that external partners lobby EU member states, and EU institutions consult external partners, even before tabling proposals to EU member states. But less clear are the channels, modalities and factors that determine the success of such lobbying. Hence, the big questions are how, and under what conditions, external actors can lobby effectively for or against EU foreign policy action. A somewhat parallel question is whether EU businesses become lobbyists for external powers in trying to limit EU foreign policy if an active EU complicates the operations of European businesses in countries such as Russia. Finally, this book has been written as the EU embarked upon one of its biggest reforms of its foreign policy machinery – the creation of the External Action Service made possible by the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. Thus it could only assess EU actions in the pre-­Lisbon environment, but also make informed guesses about the potential evolution of EU conflict management. It will take a few years for existing research to have a representative sample of EU decisions and non-­decisions under the post-­Lisbon rules, to understand and make credible conclusions about the effects of the Lisbon Treaty on EU conflict management policies.

Conclusions  133

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Concluding remarks Despite clear foreign policy ambitions and a declared desire to work toward the resolution of the conflicts in the European neighbourhood, the EU has remained a shallow actor in conflict management. No doubt the EU has been playing a greater role in conflict management in its eastern neighbourhood. But it often equated ‘success’ with ‘presence’ in certain conflict zones or ‘unity’ on problematic issues, rather than achievement of policy goals. In the face of important internal and external constraints, EU institutions have been trying to push for a greater EU role in conflict management in the neighbourhood through a policy of stealth intervention. But such involvement has frequently been driven or constrained by external actors, while the EU has tried to do too many things at once with limited resources, which led to insufficient synergies between EU diplomatic, security, and economic actions. The EU’s stra­tegic desire to promote peace on the European continent has all too often stumbled upon EU divisions, short-­term interests of EU member states, and inability to accept that in order to be effective the EU might need to be more assertive at times. Being nice to everyone has not always been the best of strategies. EU policy has been too focused on playing a role in post-­conflict settings and defining its action from what was possible in Brussels, while failing to play a more forceful role in pushing the conflicts on the ground toward resolution.

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Notes

1 Introduction 1 Ole Waever defines securitization as a processes whereby an issue is ‘presented as posing an existential threat to a designated referent or object’ (1989), while Barry Buzan (1997) identifies that securitization presupposes the assertion of an existential threat which ‘requires exceptional measures and/or emergency action to deal with it’ meaning that it is removed from the realm of politics to the realm of security (Dannreuther 2007). 2 Interview with EU Council Official, Brussels, October 2009. 3 I have a collection of some transcripts of these interviews and they can be made available on request. Most of the interviews were off-­the-­record, which means that I have to withhold names. Some interviews/discussions have not been transcribed, since the interviewees preferred if I did not take notes, or the conversations happened in less formal settings such as dinners, exchanges of replicas in an elevator, or while driving. 2  EU foreign policy and conflict management 1 For the sake of brevity and clarity, the book only focuses on the EU Council and the European Commission, but not the European Parliament as foreign policy actors. The European Parliament has rather modest competencies in foreign and security policy (Stetter 2007: 178), especially on issues related to conflict management. The European Parliament can influence EU foreign policy through public statements, organizing debates and public hearings on specific issues, voting for the CFSP budget once a year and ratifying EU agreements with third-­parties, which can have foreign policy implications. It also approves the European Commissioners in charge of various aspects of external relations, but this is only a once-­in-­five years opportunity and the parliament has a say on personalities, not on operational policies. Thus the role of the European Parliament in EU conflict management is minimal compared to other policy domains, its input in daily policy making is limited, and empirical evidence also suggests that contacts between the EU Council and the European Commission, on one hand, and the European Parliament, on the other, are rather sporadic. 2 Interviews with EU officials, Brussels, May 2008. 3 Interview with an EU Council Secretariat official, May 2008, Brussels. 4 See European Commission information on the EU 2008 Budget http://ec.europa. eu/budget/library/publications/budget_in_fig/dep_eu_budg_2008_en.pdf 5 Interview with a Tory shadow cabinet member, Brighton, 27 February 2010. 6 This study is concerned with EU involvement in contemporary violent secessionist­ conflicts, and therefore some (formerly) secessionist movements inside the EU

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Notes  135 such as Catalonia in Spain, Corsica in France, Flanders in Belgium, the Aaland Islands in Finland or South Tirol in Italy fall beyond the scope of this research. 7 Western Sahara (along with Nagorno-­Karabakh) is an interesting case of a neighbourhood conflict where the EU plays virtually no direct role. Contrary to UN Security Council resolution provisions, Morocco occupies Western Sahara, a former Spanish colony, and refuses to organize a referendum in Western Sahara where the local population would decide whether it wants to be independent or not. Morocco opposes EU involvement in the conflict resolution process. France, which has a special relationship with Morocco, shields the latter from international pressures (Darbouche and Zoubir 2008: 98–9). Moroccan opposition (with implicit French support) to EU conflict resolution hampers the development of any EU policy that would aim at solving the conflict. Moreover, EU–Morocco ENP Action Plan does not even mention Western Sahara and only has a vague reference to the need to ‘contribute to UN-­led efforts in the resolution of regional conflicts’ (2005). This contrasts with the way the EU has approached other conflicts in the neighbourhood, where the EU announced conflict resolution as one of its priorities and appointed EUSRs. Vaquer i Fanés argues that, despite the EU’s strong capacity to influence the Western Sahara conflict, and the existence of strong expectations for EU involvement, the EU has not been able to ‘go beyond the limits imposed on EU foreign policy by the intergovernmental nature of the CFSP when member states have diverging points of view’ (Vaquer i Fanés 2004: 113) a direct reference to France and to a lesser extent Spain (Darbouche and Zoubir 2008). 3  The EU’s piecemeal involvement in Transnistria 1 For a more detailed overview see Popescu 2005. 2 EU approach on Moldova (Unpublished, 2002). 3 Interview, Ministry of Defence of the United Kingdom, London, October 2003. 4 Interview with EU official, Brussels, June 2005. 5 Interview with EUBAM officials, Kuchurgan, May 2006. 6 Interview with EUBAM expert, Kuchurgan, May 2006. 7 Interview with EUBAM officials, Kuchurgan and Odessa, May 2006. 8 Interview with EUBAM official, Odessa, May 2006. 9 Interview with EU officials and Moldovan diplomats, Brussels, February 2006. Also see ‘Smirnov-­chasers with dash of cheek’, European Voice, Vol. 12 No. 8: 8 March 2006. 10 Interviews with EUBAM officials, Kuchurgan and Odessa, Ukraine, May 2006. 11 Interviews with diplomats in Chisinau, August 2005, and EU officials in Brussels, October 2005. 12 For details on the EUSR Border team, see a document of the Foreign Relations Counsellors Working Party addressed to the Political and Security Committee on ‘Reinforcement of the team of the EUSR for Moldova’, 13077/05, PESC 834, COEST 162, Brussels, 13 October 2005; and ‘Draft Council Joint Action amending the mandate of the European Union Special Representative for Moldova’, 13059/05, PESC 832, COEST 160, OC 683, 13 October 2005. 13 Interview with EU official, March 2008. 14 All the information on EU peacekeeping in Moldova were collected during­ interviews with EU member states diplomats and EU officials in Brussels, February– October 2006, February 2007, and October 2007. 15 Interviews in Brussels with EU member states officials in October and November 2007.

136  Notes

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4  The EU’s reluctant engagement in Abkhazia and South Ossetia 1 Both sides claim they had bigger populations. The numbers are based on estimates obtained during interviews in Tskhinvali, South Ossetia; Kurta, South Ossetia; and Tbilisi, April 2008. 2 Interviews in Sukhumi, Abkhazia, June 2009. 3 The document refers to South Caucasus as ‘Transcaucasia’, i.e. across the Caucasus Mountains, which is a translation from the Russian ‘Zakavkazie’. The three countries are certainly not ‘across the Caucasus’ from the EU standpoint. Thus, even at a discursive level, the South Caucasus did not exist yet for the EU, but instead was a Russian ‘province’ across the Caucasus Mountains. 4 Interview with an EU official, April 2008. 5 Interview with an EU official, Brussels, January 2008. 6 Strategy of the Reform of the Criminal Legislation of Georgia (Working group established by the Presidential Decree No. 914 of 19 October 2004), Tbilisi 2005. 7 Interviews with EU member states diplomats and EU officials in Brussels, October 2005 and February 2006. 8 Interview with a former member of EUSR border support team, Brussels, June 2006. 9 The author thanks Bruno Coppieters for suggesting this point. 10 Interview with one EU ambassador to a South Caucasus state. 11 Interview with an EU official, January 2008, Brussels. 12 Interview with an EU official, Brussels, 15 May 2008. 13 Council Joint Action 2006/121/CFSP of 20 February 2006 appointing the European Union Special Representative for the South Caucasus, Official Journal of the European Union, 21.02.2006, L 49/14. 14 Interview with an EU official, February 2008. 15 European Commission, EU’s relations with Georgia, Overview, http://ec.europa. eu/comm/external_relations/georgia/intro/index.htm 16 Observation and interviews in Tskhinvali, South Ossetia, April 2008. 17 Ibid. 18 Interview with EU official, Brussels, 12 June 2006. 19 Interview with EU official, July 2006. 20 Phone interview with an Abkhaz de facto official, January 2007. 21 Interview with an EU official, April 2008, Brussels. 22 Interview with an EU official, May 2007, Brussels. 23 Interview with EU officials in Brussels, May–June 2007, April 2008. 24 Interview with EU member state official, Brussels, 5 October 2007. 25 Interview with an EU member state official, Brussels, April 2008. 26 Interview with experts in Tbilisi, April and July 2008. 27 Interview in Tbilisi, July 2008. 28 Phone conversation with an EU official, August 2008. 29 Interview in Brussels, 8 November 2008. 30 Interview with EU member state official, Brussels, November 2008. 31 Interviews with Georgian military police representatives, Ergneti and Kvemo-­ Nikozi checkpoints, 15 March 2009; Interview with EUBAM monitor, 16 March 2009. 32 Interview with EU member state representative to COEST, Brussels, January 2009. 33 Interviews with EU officials, Brussels, May 2009. 34 Interviews with experts in Moscow, December 2009. 35 Phone interviews with EU officials in September 2009.

Notes  137

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5  The EU’s non-­involvement in Nagorno-­Karabakh 1 Interviews with experts in Armenia, Yerevan, March 2006. 2 Interviews with exerts in Armenia, Yerevan, March 2006. 3 Interview with an Armenian opposition politician, Tbilisi, April 2008. 4 See the Overview of the EU’s relations with Azerbaijan, http://ec.europa.eu/ external­_relations/azerbaidjan/intro/index.htm; Overview of the EU’s relations with Armenia, http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/armenia/intro/index.htm 5 European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), Country Strategy Paper on Azerbaijan 2007–2013, European Commission, 2007. Also see ENPI Country Strategy paper on Armenia, European Commission 2007. 6 Memorandum of Understanding on a Strategic Partnership between the European Union and the Republic of Azerbaijan in the Field of Energy, 7 November 2006. 7 Interview with Azeri official, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Baku, 4 April 2008. 8 Interview with Georgian and Armenian diplomats in October 2006, Brussels. 9 Interview with EU official, April 2008. 10 Interview with an EU diplomat, Brussels, February 2007. 11 For example see the EU–Moldova Action Plan, 2005, page 11; and EU–Georgia Action Plan which mentions territorial integrity four times in total on pages 10 and 17. 12 Interview with Azeri official, Baku, 4 April 2008. 13 Interview with an EU official, Brussels 1 June 2007 14 Interview with an EU diplomat, Brussels, 1 June 2007. 15 Interview with an EU diplomat, Brussels, 1 June 2007. 16 Interview with a French diplomat, April 2008. 17 In fact, political forces in France advocating against Turkish EU membership have also used the issue of the Armenian genocide in Turkey to thwart Turkey’s EU accession perspectives. In this sense Armenian lobbies have also played on the more salient strand of public opinion (particularly in France) that has opposed Turkish EU membership. 18 Interviews with EU member states officials, February 2006. 19 Interviews in EU member states’ officials Brussels, June 2007; and experts in Baku, Azerbaijan, April 2008. 20 Council Joint Action 2003/496/CFSP of 7 July 2003 concerning the appointment of an EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus, Official Journal of the European Union 8 July 2003, L 169/74. 21 Council Joint Action 2006/121/CFSP of 20 February 2006 appointing the European Union Special Representative for the South Caucasus, Official Journal of the European Union 21 February 2006, L 49/14. 22 Interview with an EU official, Brussels, 1 June 2007. 23 Interview with an EU official, Berlin, November 2007. 24 Interview with an EU official, Berlin, November 2007. 25 European Commission, Country Strategy Paper on Azerbaijan 2002–2006, 27 December 2001. 26 These 800,000 refugees and IDPs include Azeri refugees who left Armenia during the war, Azeri IDPs who flew from Nagorno-­Karabakh, and IDPs who left from the eight Azeri districts occupied by Armenia outside Nagorno-­Karabakh proper. 27 Phone interview with an Azeri expert, 6 June 2007. 28 Interview, EU member state diplomat, Baku, 3 April 2008. 29 Interview with an EU official, Brussels, 31 May 2007. 30 Interview with an EU official, Brussels, February 2006. 31 Interview with an EU official, Brussels, 31 May 2007. 32 Interview with an Azeri expert, Baku, July 2009. 33 Interview with Azeri expert, Baku, 3 April 2008. 34 Interviews with experts and officials in Baku, Azerbaijan, 3–4 April 2008.

138  Notes

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6 Conclusions 1 The conclusions are partly based on Popescu 2009. The author thanks the European Foreign Affairs Review for allowing to the extensive use of an earlier article (Popescu 2009) for the conclusions in this book. 2 Interview with an EU official, Brussels, June 2008. 3 Interview with an EU member state ambassador to the EU, Brussels, 14 May 2008.

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Newspaper articles Abkhazia.org. (2005) ‘Daleko li do Evropy ?’ [How Far is Europe?] Grazhdanskoe Obshestvo Magazine, Issue 55. Sukhumi. Armtown (2007) ‘EU Special Representative Didn’t Get to Nagorno-­Karabakh’, 20 June 2007, available at: http://www.armtown.com/news/en/azg/(2007)0620/ (2007)06(2001) (accessed 22 February 2009). Ava.md (2008) Interview with Valeri Litskai, 15 April 2008. Beatty, A. (2005) ‘Common Foreign Policy Budget Spent’, European Voice, 6 October 2005. Castle, S. (2008) ‘European Diplomats Seek Civilian Monitoring Mission to Georgia’, International Herald Tribune, 26 August 2008. Caucaz.com (2006) Peter Semneby. ‘A More Active Interest of the EU in Resolving the Conflicts’, Caucaz.com, 21 May 2006. Civil Georgia (2005a) ‘Rebuked at OSCE. Georgia Hopes for EU help’, 22 March 2005, available at: http://www.civil.ge Civil Georgia (2005b) ‘Three Experts from EU to Observe Russo-­Georgian Border’, 8.04. 2005, available at: http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=9557 (accessed 27 September 2010). Echo Moskvy (29.09.2009) Interview with Hansjorg Haber, available at: http://www.echo. msk.ru/programs/razvorot-­morning/623186-­echo/ (accessed 27 December 2009). European Voice (2006) ‘Smirnov-­Chasers with Dash of Cheek’, European Voice, 8 March 2006. Huliq.com (01.04.2007) ‘May Nagorno-­Karabakh Appear Under The Aegis of EU?’ Available at: http.//www.huliq.com/4784/may-­nagorno-­karabakh-­appear-­under-­ the-­aegis-­of-­eu (accessed 22 February 2009).

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152  Bibliography IHT (2005) ‘Azeris Give Support to Turkish Cyprus’, International Herald Tribune, 1 July 2005. Interfax (2008) Interview with Sergey Lavrov, the Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation. Interfax, 20 May 2008. Kommersant (2008a) ‘Defying the Whole World’, 22 August 2008, available at: http.// www.kommersant.com/p1014291/r_538/Russia_responds_to_the_West (accessed 22 February 2009). Kommersant (2008a) ‘Vygoda is Tupika’ 27 June 2008, available at: http://­kommersant. ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=906649 (accessed 28 December 2009). —— (2008b) ‘Peregovornyi Protest’ 28 June 2008, available at: http://kommersant. ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=907164 (accessed 28 December 2009). Novyi Region. (2007) ‘Kalman Mizsei Visited the Transnistrian Chamber of Commerce’, 23 November 2007, available at: http.//www.nr2.ru/pmr/151561.html (accessed 22 February 2009). Parker, G. (2007) ‘Portugal Set to Turn EU’s Focus from East to South’, Financial Times, 14 May 2007. Pridnestrovie (2005) Interview with Igor Smirnov, 21 April 2005, available at: http:// www.pridnestrovie-­daily.net. Regnum.ru (2005) ‘Evrosoyouz vlozhil v konflikty v Zakavkazie milliard evro’, [The European Union invested a billion into the South Caucasus conflicts], Interview with Yuri Dzitsoity, 18 April 2005. RFE RL. (2002) ‘As Minsk Group Marks 10 Years Karabakh Peace Appears More Elusive Than Ever’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 5 March 2002. —— (2004) ‘EU, Azerbaijan Discuss Nagorno-­Karabakh’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 19 May 2004. RIA Novosti (12.12.09) ‘War Likely if Azerbaijani Territorial Integrity Violated – Minister’, available at: http://en.rian.ru/exsoviet/(2009)1212/157212579.html (accessed 29 December 2009). Socor, V. (2005a) ‘Time Short, Options Narrowing, Call Needed for a New Georgia BMO’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, 21 February 2005. —— (2005b) ‘France Leads the EU’s Nyet to Georgia Border Monitoring’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 19 April 2005. —— (2006) ‘Moldova Can Follow Georgia’s Example on Russian ‘Peacekeeping’ Troops’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 15 May 2006. De Waal, T. (2006) ‘EU Could Assume Peacekeeping Role’, Institute for War and Peace Reporting No. 341, 25 May 2006. Ziyadov, T. (2005) ‘Arms Race in the South Caucasus: a Time Bomb?’ Eurasia Daily Monitor, 25 July 2005.

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Index

Abkhazia 1–3, 19, 22–3, 37, 39, 42, 49, 63–4, 66–95, 97, 99, 101, 105, 107–8, 114–15, 117–21, 125–6, 129, 131 accession: to EU 33–5, 63–4, 68; to NATO 85 Aceh 34, 55, 76 acquis communitaire 33, 35, 47 Afghanistan 5, 16, 21, 27, 34, 132 African Union 27, 34 aid 2, 27–8, 30, 35, 90–1, 108–9 Algeria 21 Aliev, Heydar 98 Aliev, Ilham 98 Armenia 2, 8, 12, 22, 67, 72, 95–115, 118–19, 123, 127 Armenian diaspora 97, 105–6, 114 Ashton, Baroness Catherine 30–1, 130 Austria 76, 128 Azerbaijan 2, 8, 12, 19, 21–2, 64, 72, 79, 84, 95–115, 118–19, 121, 125, 127 Balkans 1–2, 5, 19, 25, 27, 33–5, 37, 58, 84, 88, 116, 128 Baltic states 9, 75, 88, 128 see also Estonia; Latvia; Lithuania bargaining 7–10, 12, 18, 35, 63, 96, 119–20, 125, 128 Basque country 32 Belarus 71 Belgium 25, 75 Benelux countries 32 see also Belgium; Netherlands border controls 26, 32, 44, 48, 51, 79 borders 1, 9, 32–3, 42, 44, 56, 67, 93, 103, 111–13, 129; management of 2, 16–17, 38, 43, 48, 51–4, 62, 81, 94, 117, 121–3, 132; monitoring of

2, 15, 17, 22, 34, 39, 51–3, 55, 70, 75–6, 87–8, 90–1, 93, 118, 123–4, 129 Bosnia 34, 78; and Herzegovina 27 ‘brakemen’ 9–10, 76, 129 Bulgaria 9, 76, 128 bureaucracy 9, 16–17, 28 Bush, George W. 66 ‘carousel foot-dragging’ 18, 82–3, 94, 129–32 Central African Republic 34 CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy) 26, 29–30, 52, 55, 87, 99, 105, 121, 124, 128, 130 Chad 5, 34 CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) 58, 73 civil war 21, 66 coercion 45, 58, 117 Commissioner for External Relations 29–30, 52, 101 competition 4, 9, 21, 28–9, 32, 36, 55, 76 confidence building 60, 80–1, 95, 114, 121–2 conflict: intervention 2, 14, 22, 37, 48, 65, 94, 131; management 1–8, 10–21, 23–38, 45, 55–6, 62–6, 77–8, 83–4, 86, 88, 91–4, 99, 102, 116, 118–19, 121–33; prevention 13, 28–9, 33, 36, 92; resolution 1–6, 8–11, 13–16, 20–1, 23–5, 29, 32, 34–6, 38, 42, 44, 47–51, 58, 60–1, 64, 71–4, 78–9, 81, 83, 93, 95–6, 102–4, 106–9, 112–17, 119–21, 123, 125–7, 129–32; secessionist 1, 5, 8, 19, 21–2, 24, 32, 38–9, 41–2, 54, 64, 66, 85, 95, 103, 107, 115–16, 119, 124, 126–8;

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154  Index conflict (continued): separatist 4, 12, 76, 126; settlement 2–3, 6, 29–30, 32, 37–8, 41–3, 45, 51–60, 62–5, 67–8, 70–3, 75–6, 79, 81, 91–5, 102, 104–5, 107–10, 114, 116–24, 126, 129–30, 132; territorial 2, 73, 116; zones 1–2, 8, 13–15, 23, 27, 29, 34–5, 39, 69, 73, 79–82, 84, 88, 90–2, 102, 108–9, 118–19, 122–3, 126, 133 Congo, Democratic Republic of 5, 34–5, 78 convergence of interest 7 cooperation 1, 4, 7, 10–11, 21, 27–8, 33, 45, 47–8, 52–3, 65, 72, 79, 82, 93, 97–8, 100–1, 113, 117, 122–3, 126, 129 corruption 1, 40, 48, 52–3, 123 crime 8, 36, 38, 42, 52–3, 63 crisis management 5–6, 10, 13, 17, 27–9, 31–2, 36–7, 55–6, 83, 95, 108, 119, 121, 123, 125 customs 16–17, 34, 43–4, 49–54, 57–9, 70, 81, 117–18, 120 Cyprus 3, 5, 9, 16, 19–20, 32–3, 61–3, 83, 87–8, 91, 100–3, 128, 130 Czech Republic 60, 87, 128 Davutog˘lu, Ahmet 111 decision-making 8, 10–11, 14–15, 18–20, 22–4, 27, 49, 73, 76, 94, 120, 124–5 declaration 10, 28, 52, 113 de-mining 80, 103, 110 depoliticization 15–16, 38, 48, 56, 66, 78–9, 102, 115 development: assistance 2, 28, 30, 36, 44; economic 98, 101; funding 8–9; political 35, 69, 88, 101; social 80, 101; sustainable 36 DG RELEX (Directorate General for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy) 28, 55–6 ‘dosage’ 14, 16–18, 24, 37–8, 53, 65, 77–8, 80–1, 83, 89, 94, 107, 115, 123–5 economic: actors 6–8, 62; aid 2, 90; assistance 17, 40, 97, 131; integration 10, 14, 25, 32, 38, 58, 60, 97; interest 8, 112; means 1, 33, 48, 62, 65; reform 29, 33; resources 36, 79 energy 2, 13, 85, 95, 100–1, 104, 112–14, 128, 131; security 95

ENP (European Neighbourhood Policy) 2, 21, 28, 35–6, 42, 44, 47, 57, 70–3, 78, 99–101, 108, 110, 113, 127–8; Action Plan 43, 47, 58, 70, 78–9, 96, 100, 102, 107 ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy) 2, 26, 29, 34, 45, 55–6, 77–8, 119 Estonia 60–1, 76 ethnic factors 8, 20, 33, 38–9, 67, 69, 92, 96, 113 EU (European Union): Commission see European Commission; Council 22, 25–31, 33, 36, 43–5, 48–9, 51–2, 55–7, 72, 78, 80–3, 87, 89–91, 109–10, 130; funding 5, 8–9, 15, 30, 34–6, 43–4, 57, 70, 79–80, 93, 99, 119–21; institutions 2, 4, 7, 9–12, 14–21, 23–4, 27, 29–30, 37–8, 42, 47–9, 51, 53, 64–6, 73, 76–8, 80–1, 83, 87–8, 91, 93–6, 102–3, 105–8, 115–16, 118–23, 125, 127, 129, 131–3; reputation of 17–18 EUBAM (EU Border Assistance Mission) 22, 43, 50–7, 60, 62–3, 65, 108, 117, 123, 128 EUMM (EU Monitoring Mission) 22, 55, 70, 90–1, 93, 118 European Coal and Steel Community 32 European Commission 1, 16–17, 22, 25, 27–31, 36, 41–4, 47–9, 51–2, 55–8, 69–72, 78–81, 83, 87, 91, 100–3, 108, 118, 120–1, 130 European Court of Human Rights 40 European Court of Justice 30 European External Action Service 22, 31, 55, 57, 127, 130–2 European Parliament 22–3, 25 EUSRs (EU Special Representatives) 2, 12, 27, 30, 43, 49, 56–7, 72–4, 80–1, 83, 87, 89, 91, 93, 100, 107–8, 110, 121, 124, 130 exports 28, 50, 57–9, 63–4 external stimuli 126–7 Fawcett, Mark 107 Ferrero-Waldner, Benita 52, 100–1 Finland 61, 74 France 9–10, 25, 30, 32, 42, 49, 61, 70–1, 75–6, 82, 86–8, 91, 95, 97, 100, 104–6, 114, 117–18, 120, 124, 127–8 Fule, Stefan 31

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Index  155 gas 8, 40, 80, 85, 97, 101, 113 General Affairs and External Relations Council 26 geographic factors 8, 27, 37, 99, 127 geopolitical factors 5, 7, 20–1, 33, 40, 62, 84, 86, 92–3, 113 Georgia 1–3, 5, 8, 12, 18–19, 21–3, 34, 42, 48, 57, 62–4, 66–95, 97, 99–102, 104, 106–9, 111–12, 114, 117–18, 121, 123–4, 126–30 Germany 9–10, 25, 32, 36, 42, 49, 51, 61, 70–1, 75–6, 82, 87–8, 117, 120, 122, 124, 128 Greece 9, 61, 75–6, 78, 82, 128–9 Guinea-Bissau 34 Haber, Hansjoerg 91 Hartzell, Carl 44 high-politics 13–15, 18–19, 28, 38, 61–2, 65, 78, 83, 87, 91, 93–4, 101–3, 114, 117, 120–1, 123, 125, 130 High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 30 Hoffman, Stanley 7 human rights 8, 33, 45 Hungary 60, 128 Indonesia 34, 55, 76 information asymmetries 12, 74 institutionalist theory 6, 11, 13, 15, 120, 123 institution-building 3, 15, 81 integration of European states 1, 4, 6–8, 13, 25, 32, 64 intergovernmentalist theory 6–7, 9–11, 13, 119 intervention 2–3, 6, 13–14, 16–19, 21–5, 35, 37–9, 42, 46, 48–9, 65, 73, 78, 91–5, 114–16, 118–19, 121, 123–6, 128–9, 131–3 see also non-intervention investment 8, 89, 92, 97, 113 Iraq 5, 34, 132 Ireland 30, 60 Islam 128 Israel 21 Italy 9–10, 25, 32, 61, 75–6, 127–8 Jacobovits de Szeged, Adriaan 43–5, 49, 60–1, 117 Japan 126 Joint Control Commission 39, 70, 72, 80, 120

Kand, Kaupo 107 Kocharian, Robert 97 Kosovo 3, 27, 33–4, 84–5, 113–14, 122 Kouchner, Bernard 112 Kozak, Dmitri 46–7 ‘Kozak Memorandum’ 43, 46–8, 50, 126 Kuchma, Leonid 47, 51 Kurdistan 127 Kyrgyzstan 72 Laeken Declaration 30 Latvia 60, 76 Lebanon 16, 21, 72, 88, 91, 128 Lithuania 60–1, 76 Litskai, Valery 40 lobbying 8–9, 18–19, 36, 51, 60, 62, 83, 97, 103, 105–7, 114, 117, 125, 128–9, 132 lowest common denominator policies 7, 10, 14, 31, 61, 72, 76–7, 81, 94, 123, 125 low-politics 13–17, 24, 28, 38, 48, 56, 59, 62–5, 73, 78–9, 81, 83, 86, 88, 92–4, 107, 115, 117, 120–5, 130–2 Macedonia 27, 34, 78 Malta 9 Medvedev, Dmitry 69, 86, 88 Melkumian, Hrant 109 Merkel, Angela 86 Middle East 1–2, 5, 9, 27, 34, 36, 127–8 migration 9, 42, 128 Minsk Group 96, 98, 100, 103–7, 112, 118 Mizsei, Kalman 43, 49, 61 Moldova 2–3, 5, 8–9, 12, 17–19, 21–3, 27, 31, 34–5, 38–65, 71, 74, 78, 84, 92, 94, 99, 101, 104, 106, 108–9, 112, 114, 116–21, 123–4, 126–9 Moravcsik, Andrew 7 Morel, Pierre 70, 74, 89 Morocco 18–19, 21, 127, 132 multinational corporations 8–9 Nagorno-Karabakh 1–3, 8, 19–20, 24, 37, 39, 42, 49, 63–4, 74, 95–115, 118–21, 123, 125–7, 131 nationalism 79 NATO 34, 66, 68–9, 73–4, 84–6, 93, 109, 117 Nauru 69 Netherlands 25, 30, 60

156  Index

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neutrality 40, 55, 84, 89, 96, 99, 104–5, 118 Nicaragua 69 non-intervention 6, 22–4 see also intervention Nordic states 10, 36 see also Sweden Northern Ireland 32, 122 obstructionism 18, 45, 62, 82–3, 129 Orange Revolution 17, 51, 75, 126 OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) 22, 33, 39, 42–7, 49–50, 57, 60, 70, 74–7, 81, 84, 87, 90–1, 110, 113, 117, 124 Pakistan 27 Palestine 34–5, 57, 128, 132 peacekeeping 2–3, 15–18, 26, 34–5, 37–40, 43, 45–9, 60–2, 65, 67–8, 73, 83–4, 86–8, 91, 93, 97, 110, 113–14, 117–18, 121–2, 124, 129–31 Perejil Islands 18, 82, 129 Poland 9, 60–1, 76, 88, 128 police 15–17, 23, 34, 37, 43, 52, 54, 68, 70, 81, 83, 112, 132 policy: context 22; development 10, 19, 29, 96, 102, 105–6; outcomes 11, 24, 120; outputs 7, 11, 22, 116; preferences 7, 11 policy-making 4, 13, 18, 28, 36–7, 65, 106, 130; crisis 14–15 Poos, Jacques 33 Portugal 9, 61, 76, 127 PSC (Political and Security Committee) 12, 27, 31, 45, 80, 82–3 public opinion 8, 63 Puchala, Donald 7 Putin, Vladimir 46, 61 Rapid Reaction Mechanism 55 refugees 8, 23, 99, 103, 107–8 rehabilitation 13, 29, 36, 42, 47, 70, 79–80, 93, 95, 97, 102, 107–10, 118–21 Romania 9, 60, 76, 128 Rose Revolution 66, 70, 72, 117, 126 rule of law 16, 22, 26, 29, 34, 44, 70, 72, 75, 94, 118, 122, 132 Russia 2, 8–10, 15, 19–23, 36–40, 42–8, 50, 53, 56, 58–62, 64–95, 97, 100–1, 104–7, 113–14, 117–18, 121–6, 128–9, 132 Russia-first approach 36, 69, 74, 76

Russia-friendly states 48, 60–1, 73, 82–3, 94 Saakashvili, Mikheil 68, 73, 86, 88, 92 sanctions 15, 28, 45, 88, 119 Sargsyan, Serzh 97, 112 Sarkozy, Nicolas 86 Schengen Treaty 9 Schmidt, Armando Garcia 112 Schmitter, Philippe 4 secessionism 1, 5, 8, 19–24, 32–3, 38–42, 44–5, 48, 50, 52, 54, 58, 60, 62–4, 66–7, 72–3, 76, 78, 80–1, 84–6, 88–90, 93, 95, 102–4, 107–9, 113–16, 118–19, 124, 126–8 security, European 1, 66 see also ESDP security sector reform 16, 26, 34 self-determination 104 Semneby, Peter 70, 74, 82, 89, 91, 100, 107 Serbia 113 Shevardnadze, Eduard 66, 72 Slovakia 128 Slovenia 87, 128 Smirnov, Igor 53 Smith, Michael 12 smuggling 1, 17, 40, 44, 50–2, 54, 62, 64 Solana, Javier 26, 29, 43, 46–7, 52, 61, 70, 86–7, 91, 112, 117, 128 Somalia 34 South Caucasus 1–2, 9, 19, 27, 31, 38, 69–74, 77, 79–80, 84, 88, 95–7, 99–102, 105, 107, 118–19, 121–2, 124, 128–9 South Ossetia 1–3, 19, 22–3, 37, 39, 42, 63, 66–95, 97, 99–101, 105, 107–8, 114–15, 117–22, 125–6, 129, 131 sovereignty 14, 32, 85, 103, 113 Spain 9–10, 61, 75–6, 83, 87–8, 127–8 spillover 8, 11–13, 17, 35, 53, 65, 78–9, 123, 129; definition of 13 stability 1, 8, 33–6, 40, 42, 52, 55, 69, 78, 87–8, 90–3, 98, 100–1, 108, 110–11 stealth intervention 14, 24, 37–8, 65, 78, 94, 116, 123, 131, 133 Steinmeier, Frank-Walter 86 Sub-Saharan Africa 2, 9, 34, 88 Sudan 5, 27, 34 supranational institutions 4, 7, 32 Sweden 60, 74, 76, 88, 128 see also Nordic states

Index  157

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Switzerland 40, 112 Tagliavini, Heidi 89 Tagliavini Report 69, 90 Tajikistan 21 Talvitie, Heikki 70, 74, 107–8 Ter-Petrossian, Levon 97 third parties 19, 32, 36, 126 trade 3, 15–16, 28, 40–1, 43, 45, 48–9, 53, 57–9, 63–4, 101, 111, 113, 117, 120, 122, 130–1; liberalization 2, 35, 57–8, 65 Transnistria 1, 3, 17, 19–20, 22–3, 36–65, 74, 78, 92–5, 97, 99, 105, 109, 114–17, 119–23, 125, 129, 131 Treaty of Lisbon 1, 3, 25–31, 36, 55, 57, 65, 130–2 Turkey 2, 5, 21, 33, 63, 96–7, 100–2, 106, 111–14, 127, 132; and rapprochement with Armenia 95, 100, 111–13, 115, 119 UK (United Kingdom) 10, 42, 49, 60–1, 70–1, 75–6, 88, 120, 128 Ukraine 2, 12, 17, 22, 34–5, 39–40,

43–4, 46, 48, 50–4, 56–9, 62, 71–2, 75, 84–5, 117, 120, 123, 126, 128–9 UNOMIG (United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia) 67, 81, 89–90 US (United States) 5, 33, 39, 42–3, 45–6, 50, 66, 69, 71, 73, 85, 97, 104–6, 112–13 van Rij, Kees 44 van Rompuy, Herman 30, 130 Venezuela 69 veto: in EU 10, 18–19, 26, 31, 78, 82–3, 124, 129–30, 132; in UN 22, 67, 90 violence 13, 15, 33, 38, 73–4, 79, 84, 93–5, 114–15, 120, 131 Voronin, Vladimir 47, 51, 56 Western Sahara 1, 9, 19, 21, 34–5, 95, 127, 132 Witney, Nick 35 World Bank 89, 108 World Trade Organization 59, 68 Yushchenko, Victor 51