Evaluating the Euro-Mediterranean Relations (Routledge Advances in European Politics)

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Evaluating Euro-Mediterranean Relations

What are the prospects for the future of the Euro-Mediterranean area and what relevant role can the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership play in this future? After decades of a Mediterranean policy that was actually focused more on improving economic relations between Europe and the Mediterranean riparian states than anything else, the EU launched a more comprehensive Mediterranean policy in November 1995, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). The EMP has embraced political and security relations and socio-cultural relations as well as taking economics into account. As the tenth anniversary of this partnership approaches, this book discusses measures that could help transform this multilateral initiative from a boundary management exercise to a process that focuses more on encouraging boundary transformation. Euro-Mediterranean initiatives in the pipeline, such as the enhanced political dialogue, the Charter for Peace and Stability, the creation of a free-trade area, and justice and home affairs cooperation are also discussed. This book will interest all students and researchers of European and Mediterranean politics. Stephen C. Calleya is Deputy Director and Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies, University of Malta. He is also an adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Malta.

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Evaluating EuroMediterranean Relations Stephen C. Calleya

First published 2005 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” © 2005 Stephen C. Calleya All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. The publisher makes no representation, express or implied, with regard to the accuracy of the information contained in this book and cannot accept any legal responsibility or liability for any errors or omissions that may be made. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Calleya, Stephen C. Evaluating Euro-Mediterranean relations / Stephen C. Calleya. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-7146-5412-4 (hardback) 1. European Union countries—Relations—Mediterranean Region. 2. Mediterranean Region—Relations—European Union countries. 3. Geopolitics—European Union countries. 4. Geopolitics—Mediterranean Region. 5. International relations. I. Title. JZ1570. A5C35 2005 303.48′2401822—dc22 2004011266 ISBN 0-203-01764-1 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-7146-5412-4 (Hb)

To Professor Susan Strange (For sharing her wisdom and insight with me during my days at Warwick)

Contents

Foreword by Eberhard Rhein Acknowledgements List of abbreviations

ix xv xvii

Introduction The Euro-Mediterranean area 1 The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: political, economic and cultural relations 2 The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in the twenty-first century 4

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Euro-Mediterranean regional dynamics Conceptualizing regionalism in Europe and the Middle East 9 Regional dynamics in Southern Europe 16 Regional dynamics in the Mashreq 24 Regional dynamics in the Maghreb 30 Connections and disconnections: Southern Europe, the Mashreq and the Maghreb 34 The Euro-Mediterranean area: region or fault-line? 39 The Euro-Mediterranean Summits: from Barcelona to Valencia and beyond 47

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The political and security partnership The European Union’s Common Strategy on the Mediterranean 65 The Charter for Peace and Stability 67 Early warning: Euro-Mediterranean Coastguard Agency (EMCA) 70 Conflict prevention: functions of the Euro-Med Conflict Prevention Network 72

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Contents

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The socio-economic and cultural partnerships The state of play 88 Socio-economic realities 90 Economic prospects for the future 93 Clash of cultures and civilizations? 99 Empowering civil society 103

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The role of extra-regional powers in the Euro-Mediterranean area The role of a superpower: the United States 110 The role of international organizations and the case of NATO 117

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Euro-Mediterranean relations in the twenty-first century Regional and sub-regional dynamics in the Mediterranean area 126 The EMP after EU enlargement: time to evaluate 132 Prospects for the future: a regional assessment to 2020 138 Notes Select bibliography Index

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145 153 158

Foreword Eberhard Rhein

The Barcelona Process needs a strong push Almost a decade has passed since the signing of the Barcelona Declaration in November 1995, when the Foreign Ministers of the European Union (EU) and their colleagues from all the countries around the Mediterranean pledged to progressively establish a Euro-Mediterranean area of peace, stability and prosperity at the horizon of 2010. Since then we have seen profoundly asymmetrical developments in the EU and the Mediterranean: an EU frantically struggling to keep up with the constraints of globalization, a Mediterranean falling further behind. The EU has been moving into new areas. It has undertaken two major constitutional reforms, the Amsterdam and the Nice Treaties. It has successfully introduced a common currency, the Euro. It has virtually completed its single market for goods, services, capital and people. It has started to develop a common security machinery to be ready for action by 2003. It has made great strides towards a common area of law and security. The EU has also set itself the objective to become a knowledge society and a common area of research and science by 2010. It has readied itself for the fifth enlargement: by 2004, 10 new member countries from central Europe and the Mediterranean are expected to join the EU, after having undergone, during the last 10 years, a thorough transformation process of their economic, social and political systems. During the same period, most of the EU’s Mediterranean partner countries have moved ahead very slowly. The prosperity gap with Europe, especially Central European countries, has further widened. It would have widened even further without the general rise of oil prices and a significant slowdown of demographic growth, the only positive developments in the region. There has been no attempt whatever towards more economic, let alone political, integration. The Maghreb has not advanced a bit towards closer cooperation, contrary to what had been called for by the 1989 Treaty on the Maghreb Union. Throughout the Mediterranean area, the reform process has been lamentably slow. Privatization and deregulation of the economies are still in the very beginning. Hardly any country has made convincing strides on the path towards political accountability and democracy.

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The EU’s Mediterranean policy aims at profound economic, social and political reforms in the southern neighbour countries. Free trade and EU assistance are only instruments to that end. Yet the work of reform cannot be done by the EU alone. It has to be done by the Mediterranean countries themselves, their societies and above all the political elites. To that end, they have to realize that such reforms are in their long-term interest, in view of spreading education, more prosperity, better health, more political stability and less social tension and unrest. Such awareness is largely lacking on the part of the political elites. They are not prepared to abandon their privileged position to the market forces, to share power with other social forces, for example, the emerging entrepreneurial class, the trade unions or the opposition parties. With the exception of the two monarchies, namely Jordan and Morocco, all the countries on the southern shores are governed by quasi-military regimes without proper political legitimacy. This is the core of the problem and thus the main obstacle to the introduction of pluralistic societies. Therefore the commitment to respect democratic principles and basic human rights, which is an essential element of the association agreements, is likely to remain ‘lettre morte’ for many years to come. The EU approach is rightly a pragmatic and incremental one. It is based on the hope that the introduction of free trade will oblige the partner countries to introduce more and more elements of the market economy, to reduce the role of the state in the economy, to privatize, to do away with all sorts of bureaucratic obstacles to economic activity and investment, both foreign and domestic. The gradual spreading of market forces will have a triple effect on the societies. It will raise the standard of living of the population, it will create new power centres that will want to participate in the political decisions and it will weaken the role of the state bureaucracies, the military and other ‘cliques’. It will also enhance transparency of the system, accountability of the budget procedures through appropriate foreign assistance procedures. Very gradually it will tend to loosen the grip of the various political ‘mafias’ and family clans that presently cling to their power. The EU approach therefore seems to be basically correct. It is no different from that applied in the accession countries for the last 10 years that has achieved a great deal. But in Eastern Europe the EU had a much bigger prize to offer, i.e. membership in the club, and the EU interacted with European societies that wished nothing more than to return to the roots of their culture and to reunite with the rest of Europe. In the south, the EU’s leverage is infinitely more limited. The societies are infinitely less sophisticated, the rulers do not want to part with their privileges, and the EU offers just some ¤1 billion per year (instead of ¤3 billion) for a much bigger number of people (150 million instead of 100 million) that are much poorer (only 20–30 per cent of the living standard in the EU accession countries) and have an infinitely lower educational level. Concretely, the EU should therefore initially focus on the non-political, nonsensitive issues, such as issues related to the business and investment climate, the macroeconomic framework, the banking system, the educational system,

Foreword

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privatization, the legal system and the functioning of the judiciary. This is more than plenty on the agenda for the coming 5–10 years that needs to be addressed. It corresponds to the basic and urgent needs of the countries. It is mostly acceptable to the governments. It is part of their ongoing reform processes, however slowly they may proceed. What does this require from the EU side? More focus on this reform process, regular policy dialogue, both comprehensive and specific. Ideally, each of the Mediterranean partner countries that has ratified the association agreement should prepare an ‘association strategy’, a list of legislative reform actions to be implemented in a 3- to 5-year period. The EU should assist in the preparation of these programmes; it should put its funding behind them, monitor their implementation and disburse the funding according to the progress of implementation as is the case in structural adjustment financing. Why has the Barcelona Process come under fire from both the EU and the MED side? Essentially, because of slow progress in implementation of the EMP’s (Euro-Mediterranean Partnership) financial cooperation, of dispersal of efforts, of lack of a clear political message, of hesitation on the part of the Mediterranean countries. For the Mediterranean countries, it was the normal procedure: when something goes wrong at home, blame the other side for the shortcomings and divert the attention from ones own shortcomings. Both sides can do much better, provided they return to the basic strategic goals of the Barcelona Process and concentrate all their energy on getting reforms more effectively done. The high expectations raised in 1995 by the Barcelona Declaration have not been fulfilled. They will not be fulfilled in the future unless there is a profound change of awareness in the eight Arab Mediterranean partner countries. They have to ‘change gear’. Otherwise they will continue to fall behind Europe, Asia and America. They should take lessons from Hungary, Estonia or Bulgaria or, more recently, Turkey for what to do in order to enable their populations to enjoy a better life, more freedom, better education, more jobs and less pollution. Everywhere they will find similar answers: accountability and transparency of governments, market economy, higher standards of education, encouragement of civil society, particularly of women, privatization of the banking sector and major utilities, retreat of the government from direct interventions in the economic process. The EU is willing and able to support whatever reforms governments will be prepared to launch and implement. The Association Agreements signed with all the Mediterranean countries, except Syria, and financial assistance are elements of such support. The establishment of free trade between the EU and each of the Mediterranean countries will, in due time, have a positive impact on the functioning of their economies. The case of Tunisia, the only country that is already somewhat advanced on the road towards free trade is telling in that respect. But the EU should do much more to stimulate and accelerate the necessary reform process in the South, and it should do so urgently.

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The EU is itself in a new stage of socio-economic reforms. Since Spring 2000 it has been engaged in the ‘Lisbon Process’, through which it hopes to become the world’s most competitive economy by 2010. The EU should offer its full support to all those countries in the South willing to move ahead with serious socio-economic reforms. With those volunteering for a joint reform effort it should start a process of ‘open coordination’ in a few areas that are essential for more rapid socio-economic progress: education, information technology, deregulation, science and research, and good governance. In return, the partner countries would commit themselves to a set of reform objectives and a strict calendar for implementation. The EU would have to offer substantial financial assistance to certain packages of the reform process. It would focus its assistance on those countries participating in the joint exercise. In doing so, the EU would transpose its precious experience with the transition countries in Central Europe to the Mediterranean. This will require substantially more personal and financial commitment on the part of the EU Commission and member states than during the past 8 years.

The EU should learn to do better in the future First, the EU needs to adopt more of a strategic approach. The problems of the Mediterranean will not be solved within a few years. Both sides have to think and act with a long-term horizon, say 2020. Linked to this is ‘commitment’. It is hard to say that the EU has, in recent years, been truly committed to the cause of development in the Mediterranean. The Mediterranean has been just one among other priorities on the EU foreign policy agenda. The partner countries may not have eased the job. Whatever the past, without firm political will and commitment from both sides Barcelona will not succeed! Second, the EU should forget about public relations gimmicks. It should focus on those parts of the Barcelona Process that really matter for the long-term socioeconomic development. That is the standard by which coming generations will measure EU policies, not by the number of meetings that have been held or the volumes of papers produced. Third, the EU should focus on improving bilateral links. Reforms will have to be undertaken by each and every country. Therefore the EU will have to enter into the substance of societal, administrative, legal, political development blockages and try to unblock these. This will be a patient process that requires continuity of effort. It is here that much can be learnt from the experience with the accession countries. The EU should not be afraid of applying to the Mediterranean its technique of ‘accession strategies’ which would become ‘association strategies’. The EU should sit down with each of the countries willing to undergo the experience and fix medium-term objectives for education, market opening, judiciary reforms and the assistance to be offered for such reform programmes by the EU. In doing so, the EU should have the courage of using the ‘stick and carrot’ approach: funding

Foreword

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should be modulated according to the pace of reforms. The EU might start with the easy reforms, for example, customs procedures, tax laws, competition laws, so as to create ‘success stories’. Fourth, the regional approach should be somewhat downgraded and be given a new focus: the EU should try to introduce ‘open coordination’ (Lisbon Process) in the Mediterranean, for example, in fields like education, taxation, and privatization. Thus, the laggards may be shown how their own neighbours proceed and succeed. This may become an important tool of accelerating the overall pace of development, by creating emulation (and transparency) among the partner countries. Fifth, the regional approach should involve encouragement of south-south free trade. After the Declaration of Agadir, the time is ripe to go ahead with southsouth free trade. It may be best to start with the four most advanced countries but it should rapidly also associate the latecomers. Free trade among the south should be completed by 2010 at the latest. Sixth, the south-south free trade will only be attractive if the EU finally grants total cumulation of origin so that components from one country may be merged with those from any other Mediterranean country without value-added constraints. Otherwise business investors will not find it sufficiently attractive to produce in the Mediterranean for export to the EU. Without more foreign direct investment (FDI) the Mediterranean will not be able to catch up with other parts of the world. Seventh, the EU should be prepared to progressively increase its financial support for the Mediterranean. The ¤700–800 million p.a. for the whole region, Turkey included, is simply not good enough to make an impact. Eighth, financial support should be concentrated on the support of specific strategic policies, for example, education. The EU should try to bundle its own assistance with that of member states and multilateral donors and thus create more synergy. Ninth, the EU should focus its efforts on the eight Arab Mediterranean countries. These are the decisive elements for peace, stability and prosperity in the Mediterranean. Cyprus and Malta joined the EU in 2004. Turkey may follow by 2015. Israel is a case apart which requires a different sort of attention. The economic and social development of the Mediterranean does not depend exclusively on the progress registered towards peace between Israel and Palestine. The lack of peace must not be an alibi for the lack of reforms in the Maghreb or elsewhere. Tenth, with the progress of the south-south free-trade area (FTA) in the Mediterranean, it will become even more important to focus more on the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) (and Yemen) and to extend the FTA to this sub region of the Mediterranean. This is important to complete Euro-Arab free trade by about 2015. Eleventh, the EU should be much more open on the agricultural front. As it will liberalize its own agriculture, it should review its agricultural trade with the MED and progressively dismantle the remaining obstacles to free trade (calendars, reference prices, etc.). This will not constitute a big boost to agricultural exports from the south but deprive the south from exaggerated criticism of EU double standards.

xiv Foreword The Barcelona Process is ‘the only game in town’ and it will remain so for another two decades or longer. Europe cannot escape its southern neighbours, however messy their socio-economic situation may become, and the Mediterranean countries will not avoid Europe being a major reference for their future development, from market economy, to high-tech research, freedom of the press, good governance, democracy and human rights. The Barcelona Process must, however, not become a scapegoat for the failures of southern countries in doing their homework properly. The EU cannot undertake necessary reforms in the place of the governments in the partner countries. It can only make suggestions, share its own positive and negative experience with those who want to learn. It can try to transpose the basic methodology of the ‘Lisbon process’ with its ‘benchmarking’, ‘open coordination’ and target setting to those countries in the south that may wish to undertake a similar exercise adapted to their particular challenges. But it should – more than in the past – use its financial support, including that coming from individual member countries, to encourage and support those who are making serious reform efforts. It would be worthwhile to give a push in this direction and fill the Barcelona Process with new life, starting with one or two countries eager to push ahead their reforms. Once the ice is broken, others will follow suit.

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to the Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies, especially the Director of the Academy, Professor Jurg Gabriel, for supporting my academic endeavours. I also appreciate the support the entire Board of the Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies has provided throughout the years including the Rector of the University of Malta, Professor Roger Ellul Micallef, Professor David Attard, Dr John C. Grech, Ambassador Gaetan Naudi, Ambassador Cecilia Attard Pirotta, the late Professor Norman Scott, Dr Andri Bisaz, Professor Rachid Driss and Colin Jennings. I also thank the University of Malta for its continuous support of academic research. I am also grateful for the support that the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Malta, Dr Michael Frendo, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Malta have provided over the years. I also thank Ambassador Alfred Zarb and all the other EuroMediterranean Senior Officials who have shared their insight with me since the launching of the Barcelona Process. A special thanks goes to EU Commissioner Dr Joe Borg for his support throughout and to all those at the European Commission who have shared their expertise with me over the years, in particular Christian Leffler, Patrick Laurent, Michael Webb, Rafael Dochoa, Marc Pierini, Charlotte Bournoville, Michael Kohler, Patxi Acosta and Gisela von Buxhoeveden. Thanks also go to all my colleagues at the Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission (EuroMeSCo), especially Alvaro de Vasconcelos, Roberto Aliboni, George Joffee, May Dubarry, Volker Perthes, Gamal Soltan, Fouad Ammor, Thanos Dokos, Elvira Sanchez, Rene Leray, Maria do Roasario de Moraes Vaz, Mahadi Abdul Hadi, Claire Spencer and Emily Landau. Particular thanks go to Mark Heller of the Jaffee Centre with whom I have had the pleasure of working in recent years as co-director of the EuroMeSCo Working Group on Sub Regionalism in the Mediterranean. My gratitude also goes to Professor Guido de Marco, President Emeritus of the Republic of Malta, for sharing his vision of Euro-Mediterranean relations throughout the years. Thanks also go to Professor Ugo Mifsud Bonnici, President Emeritus of the Republic of Malta, for sharing his insight and supporting my academic research. I also thank Fr Peter Serracino-Inglott for sharing his thinking with me.

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Special thanks also go to Dr Eberhard Rhein, Senior Analyst at the European Policy Centre, Brussels, who agreed to write the Foreword to this book and for the relentless support that he has given me over the years. I thank also Dr Fred Tanner, Deputy Director of the Geneva Security Centre, and Dr Bechir Chourou, University of Tunisia, for their support. I also thank Dr Ludger Kuhnhardt, Director of the Centre for European Integration Studies (ZEI) of the University of Bonn, and Dr Christian Hanelt, Director of the Middle East and Mediterranean Unit, Bertelsmann Foundation, for sharing their expertise with me. Thanks also to Chris Vassallo for sharing his ‘real world’ views with me. Thanks also go to Professor Barry Buzan, my doctorate supervisor at the University of Warwick in the mid-1990s who helped me discover the world of international relations. I am also grateful to Dr Barbara Allen Roberson, Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, for sharing with me her thinking on Middle East and Mediterranean affairs during countless hours of discussion. Thanks also go to my brother, Peter Calleya, for providing his corrective expertise on so many drafts. The final version has been improved a great deal as a result of his advice and support. Thanks also to my parents for their support throughout. Final and special thanks go to my wife, Fleur, without whose patience and support this book would not have been possible.

List of abbreviations

BWC – Biological Weapons Convention CBM – Confidence-Building Measure CEFTA – Central European Free Trade Area CFSP – Common Foreign and Security Policy CM – Council of the Mediterranean CSBM – Confidence and Security Building Measure CSCM – Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean CWC – Chemical Weapons Convention EIB – European Investment Bank EMCA – Euro-Mediterranean Coastguard Agency EMCPC – Euro-Mediterranean Conflict Prevention Centre EMDA – Euro-Mediterranean Development Agency EMP – Euro-Mediterranean Partnership EP – European Parliament ESDP – European Security and Defence Policy EU – European Union EUMEDIS – Euro-Mediterranean Information Society EuroMeSCo – Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission FEMIP – Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership FDI – Foreign Direct Investment GCC – Gulf Cooperation Council MCG – Mediterranean Cooperation Group MD – Mediterranean Dialogue MENA – Middle East/North Africa MEPP – Middle East Peace Process NAFTA – North American Free Trade Area NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization NGO – Non-Governmental Organization NPT – Non Proliferation Treaty OSCE – Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe PBM – Partnership Building Measure PLO – Palestine Liberation Organization RUSI – Royal United Services Institute of Defence Studies

xviii List of abbreviations SME – Small and Medium Size Enterprises TBT – Test Ban Treaty UMA – Union Maghreb Arab UN – United Nations UNDP – United Nations Development Programme WEU – Western European Union WMD – Weapons of Mass Destruction WTO – World Trade Organization

Introduction

The Euro-Mediterranean area This book focuses on international relations in the Mediterranean area with a particular examination of patterns of relations in the Euro-Mediterranean area. More than a decade after the end of the Cold War it has become more clear that the bipolar international system of the latter part of the twentieth century has given way to a multipolar system with unipolar tendencies. A distinct feature of the post-Cold War transformation is that regional politics have gained significantly in relevance. The demise of the Soviet Union has left the world with only one superpower, the United States. Throughout the 1990s the United States opted to adopt a foreign policy of selective engagement. It was reluctant to become the world’s policeman. Since the election of George W. Bush as President in November 2000 and especially since the terror attacks of September 11th 2001, the United States has exercised unilateralist policies on a more frequent basis, including in its foreign policy overtures in the Mediterranean area. The other main actor in the Mediterranean in contemporary international relations is the European Union (EU). After decades of a Mediterranean policy that was actually more focused on improving economic relations between Europe and the Mediterranean riparian states than anything else, the EU launched a more comprehensive Mediterranean policy in November 1995, the so-called Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) that also embraced political and security relations and sociocultural relations. The EMP is certainly the most important regional process that currently exists in the Mediterranean as it brings together all of the European Union (EU) member states and 12 Mediterranean countries which are Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Syria, Lebanon, the Palestinian Authority, Turkey, Cyprus and Malta. (Cyprus and Malta became members of the EU in May 2004, thus reducing the number of Mediterranean partner countries to ten.) In the past decade the EMP has certainly strengthened north-south relations between the EU and the Mediterranean. The sheer amount of meetings and policy actions that have been launched since 1995 has resulted in the creation of an intricate web of political, academic and civil societal networks emerging that are all contributing to a more intensive north-south pattern of relations in this part of the world. In contrast, the EMP has only recently succeeded in spurring south-south

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Introduction

relations in the Mediterranean despite the high priority that has been given to this objective since the start of the EMP. The EU has consistently focused on assisting Mediterranean countries become more aware of the opportunities that exist in their neighbouring states, and offering the Mediterranean countries involved in the EMP incentive packages to pursue trans-Mediterranean ventures. The EMP has also ensured that the EU’s focus on enhancing relations with Central and Eastern Europe over the past decade is complemented by an outreach programme towards the Mediterranean that seeks to advance cooperative relations in the area. As the Barcelona Process approaches its tenth anniversary, Euro-Mediterranean policy makers need to think about measures that will help transform this multilateral initiative from a boundary management exercise to a process that focuses more on encouraging boundary transformation. Euro-Mediterranean initiatives that are in the pipeline and include the enhanced political dialogue, the Charter for Peace and Stability, the creation of a free-trade area, and justice and home affairs cooperation must seek to achieve more than maintenance of stable Euro-Mediterranean relations. If the EU wants to develop a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership that is sustainable it should introduce a series of measures that will allow and enable Mediterranean states to integrate into the international political economy that dominates global relations. The EU’s southern borderlands must also realize that the only policies that will improve their political and economic outlook are those that are home grown and implemented. If the EU’s neighbourhood policy towards the south is to be successful it must work closely with local reformers and not try to export modalities of reform that have been devised somewhere else. Given such a heterogeneous cluster of regional dynamics, is the EMP the correct mechanism to contend with the plethora of political, economic, and cultural security challenges largely emanating along Europe’s southern periphery? What measures can be introduced to make this process more effective and sustainable than it has during it first decade of operation? What are the prospects for the future of the Euro-Mediterranean area and what relevant role can the EMP play in this future?

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: political, economic and cultural relations At the first Euro-Mediterranean foreign ministerial meeting which took place in Barcelona in November 1995, the 27 partner countries established three principal areas of cooperation. The Barcelona Process set out three basic tasks: • • •

a political and security partnership with the aim of establishing a common area of peace and stability; an economic and financial partnership with the aim of creating an area of shared prosperity; a partnership in social, cultural and human affairs in an effort to promote understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil societies.

Introduction 3 When it comes to the direct tangible endeavours that the Euro-Mediterranean process should seek to realize it is crucial to ask again and again what will determine the success of the over-arching Barcelona Process? It will essentially be the Mediterranean countries’ ability to generate higher rates of growth than they achieved during the 1980s and 1990s. In an effort to shore up its external policy towards the Mediterranean the EU adopted a Common Strategy at the Santa Maria Da Fiera European Council which brought to a conclusion the Portuguese Presidency of the EU at the end of June 2000. The EU’s common strategy highlighted the fact that improvement in EuroMediterranean relations was dependent on the Mediterranean partner countries playing a more decisive role during the implementation stage of projects agreed upon. The Common Strategy also called for the active participation of the Mediterranean countries when it comes to defining a cooperative Euro-Med agenda as it is in the interest of Mediterranean states to draw up a list of meaningful actions. The common strategy actually invites them to do this: ‘the EU is bound to consider recommendations and concerns expressed by Mediterranean partners’. This specific invitation to Mediterranean states to adopt more of a self-help attitude in their interactions with the EU contrasts sharply with the approach to Euro-Mediterranean policy making in previous decades when the EU would more or less dictate the terms upon which cooperative ventures could take place. The cornerstone of the Euro-Mediterranean security partnership is the envisaged Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability. This document would serve as the framework within which Euro-Mediterranean security relations could be managed in the twenty-first century. A first glimpse of what the Charter for Peace and Stability could include was presented at the Third Euro-Mediterranean foreign ministerial meeting at Stuttgart in April 1999. The Charter is to be a politically binding and not legally binding document. The rule of consensus is to be applicable to all decisions, joint actions, measures and mechanisms. The Charter is to recognize the indivisibility of security in the Euro-Med sphere and beyond and to acknowledge the concept of comprehensive security. There is to be no interference in the settlement of current conflicts. The Charter would serve as a functional instrument for the implementation of the principles of the Barcelona Declaration. The establishment of an enhanced political dialogue is to remain a priority. Once the Charter was agreed upon, more of an effort could be dedicated to partnership building measures, good neighbourly relations, sub-regional cooperation and preventive diplomacy in the Euro-Mediterranean area. The lack of consensus that has emerged in recent years when it comes to agreeing upon a Charter for Peace and Stability dictates that Euro-Med states should focus on strengthening existing pragmatic partnership building measures (PBMs) as a precursor to a more sustainable multilateral initiative in future. PBMs will also assist in fostering a Euro-Mediterranean security culture in which the concepts of early warning and conflict prevention become operational. In the economic sector, by about 2010, the EU will have become by far the biggest single market and the world’s most concentrated area of economic prosperity and internal stability. It will comprise essentially all of Europe, east and west, more

4

Introduction

than 90 per cent of total European population, i.e. almost 500 million people (half of China or India), and have a combined gross domestic product (GDP) of some US $12,000 billion, an almost unimaginable figure. How will the non-EU riparian Mediterranean countries, from Turkey to Morocco, adapt to these profound geopolitical changes that will take place north of them in the next 12 years? How will they coexist with the future European giant? To what extent will they be drawn into its economic and political orbit? To what extent will they have to integrate with the European and consequently the world economy? These are questions of vital importance for both the EU and each of its Mediterranean neighbours. A key question to ask is, what will determine whether the Barcelona Process is ultimately a success or not? If economic prospects are to improve in the Mediterranean area the Barcelona Process must provide a stable political and security environment by reducing existing tensions and establishing a cooperative zone of security. This includes helping to improve social, cultural and human affairs across the Euro-Mediterranean area. The Mediterranean epitomizes many of the problems associated with the north-south debate. These include migration, terrorism, religious intolerance and the lack of human rights. Nurturing cooperative cross-cultural patterns of interaction which address these issues is a prerequisite to improving economic disparities and ethnic divisions in the area. Three areas where the Barcelona Process is already starting to contribute are education, human rights and women’s rights. Despite limited actions in each of the three areas, each area remains underdeveloped. A programme of activities that increases awareness of existing trends in each area and also seeks to further discussion on Euro-Mediterranean differences of opinion is essential if a social, cultural and human partnership worthy of such a name is to become a reality. The creation of a Euro-Mediterranean Foundation offers this possibility. The creation of a Euro-Mediterranean free-trade area will also impact on the environment. The free-trade area is likely to have a detrimental impact as the agricultural sector is forced to adopt more environmentally unfriendly practices of production in order to remain competitive. Specific sectors such as that of water and desertification will require immediate attention and environmental issues should be more directly addressed in the Euro-Mediterranean association agreements. When one explores the repercussions that a free-trade area will have on the question of human rights, one should focus on whether European and Mediterranean interpretations of such a complex issue as human rights can ever be harmonized? Human rights activists also have to concentrate their attention on such basic economic and social rights as the right to work, healthcare, education, civil protection, tolerance and the elimination of discrimination.

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in the twenty-first century Throughout its more than 30 years of direct engagement in the Mediterranean the European Union has failed to contain, let alone reverse, economic disparities

Introduction 5 between the northern and southern countries of the basin. It is also quite clear that little progress has been registered in removing the misperceptions and prejudice that currently exist in the region or in promoting further the principles of respect and understanding. A concerted effort in implementing specific goals in each of the three chapters of the Barcelona Declaration is certainly the most effective way to start tackling such problems. A conceptual re-think is thus necessary if the process of political, economic and cultural adaptation in the Euro-Mediterranean area is to be a successful one. The process and progress need to be carefully monitored. The question of the social impact of the implementation of a free-trade area is not a question of lessons and clichés, but of developing realistic policies to cope with the changes being introduced. The benefits of the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean free-trade area need to be better explained and maximized if the citizens of the Mediterranean area are expected to support this initiative. The name of the Euro-Mediterranean game is that of policy change – MEDA I and MEDA II, the financial facilities of the Barcelona Process during its first 10 years of operation are vehicles of such a change. While the EU is seeking to boost political, economic and financial activity across the Mediterranean through the Barcelona Process a basic message that has yet to resonate across the Mediterranean is that it is up to the countries of the area themselves to take the necessary steps to increase economic prosperity. It has taken the EU 30 years to launch and start implementing a comprehensive Euro-Mediterranean policy. If the Barcelona Process is to provide the foundation upon which a Pax Euro-Mediterranea is to be established over the next 30 years, it is essential that the EU focuses on spreading prosperity’s benefits more fairly with its neighbours in the south. The Mediterranean must not become a wall of poverty along the EU’s southern periphery. This is the ultimate challenge of the Barcelona Process. Regional relations in Europe and the Mediterranean since the launching of the Euro-Mediterranean Process (EMP) in November 1995 have underlined the fundamental fact that this geo-strategic area continues to be dominated by a mosaic of distinct sub-regional constellations, each evolving according to their own indigenous pattern of relations. Although geographically proximate, developments within Europe and the Mediterranean resemble those of a tale of two different worlds. At a time when the European Union has been harmonizing its policies and strengthening its common interests through a process of integration and enlargement, the Mediterranean world continues to be characterized by both limited cooperative and continuous conflictual patterns of relations that have prevented the emergence of a trans-Mediterranean security arrangement. To the north of the Mediterranean the EU has been advancing at great strides in its effort to prepare for the challenges of globalization. This includes furthering EMU, e-Europe, deregulation, fiscal stability, and company mergers, in an effort to strengthen high economic growth. As a consequence the technology and prosperity gap between the EU and the Mediterranean has been widening in recent years.

6

Introduction

It is also important to underline that geographic proximity is about the only factor that still brings Europe and the Mediterranean closely together at the start of the new millennium. This is evident when one compares the EU’s economic clout to that of the Mediterranean countries. The combined gross domestic product of Central and Eastern Europe, the Mediterranean partner countries and former Soviet Union is equivalent to that of Italy, with 10 times fewer people.1 The EU is therefore the rich core and the Mediterranean the poor periphery. The EU remains by far the most important economic partner of the Mediterranean countries, while individual states to the south account for only small percentages of the EU’s external trade. Even when taken together they account for about 15 per cent of the EU’s total exports and imports. This imbalance is mainly due to the difference in national incomes between the rich EU and its poor neighbouring countries. Since the launching of the Barcelona Process, the differences in economic restructuring within the Mediterranean between the front-runners such as Cyprus, Malta, Israel and Turkey and the rest of the slow reformers has also been growing. Cyprus and Malta are EU accession countries and joined the EU in May 2004. Turkey has completed its customs union with the EU after a 30-year transition period. It is now accelerating its economic and political reforms as part of its preparations to join the EU some time after 2010. Israel has enormously strengthened its links with Europe despite setbacks to a permanent settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the years to come it is likely to further intensify its economic, cultural and political ties with Europe and to turn increasingly into something like a ‘pseudo-member’ of the EU. The countries that have concluded Association Agreements with the EU, namely Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority, are likely to move ahead of Syria in terms of economic and, though more slowly, political reforms. Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan remain pace-setters within this grouping. The large gap in development trends in the adjacent regions of the EU is clear when one compares the eastern borderlands of the EU to those of the south. In recent years, EU accession countries have economically outpaced those in the Mediterranean. Countries in Central and Eastern Europe have made a remarkable transition towards democracy and a market economy. They have been much more successful in attracting foreign direct investment and portfolio capital and therefore substantially increasing the standard of living of their people than Mediterranean countries. Their trade with the EU has been growing at a much faster rate than that of the Mediterranean states. While such divergent development indicators give rise to concern, they are actually to be expected. Societies rarely move at the same pace. Nor do they respond with the same speed to external challenges. Yet the current pace of transition will result in a Mediterranean that is falling further behind the EU. The differentiation between accession and Mediterranean partner countries is also better understood when one takes into consideration the following facts. The accession countries of Central and Eastern Europe dispose of a much better human resources basis. The prospect of EU membership constitutes a far more powerful

Introduction 7 leverage for economic and political reforms than the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. The EU’s financial support per capita for the accession countries is about six times higher than for the Mediterranean partner countries. Often espoused as an EU programme for its southern flank to parallel its policies with neighbours to the east, the EMP does not offer the same incentive of EU membership to the majority of its Mediterranean partners. This calls into question the coherence of the economic logic underlying the EMP. While Eastern Europeans can expect ultimately that the free movement of labour (people) will coexist with the free movement of goods and capital between them and the rest of Europe, this is not the case in the Mediterranean. The absence of the free movement of people in the case of the EMP stresses the major difference between EU membership and EU partnership.2 Close to a decade into the Barcelona Process, Mediterranean countries continue to attract less than 2 per cent of international investment. This is mainly due to the region’s profile as a high-risk zone when it comes to political stability. It is also due to the fact that the Mediterranean market remains partitioned in a multitude of small markets. The entire Maghreb market corresponds only to the size of the internal Portuguese market. Internal transaction costs remain very high. The cost for shipping a container from Tunisia to Marseilles is higher than the cost for the same container between Marseilles and Asia.3 When addressing the Euro-African summit in Cairo in April 2000, Chris Patten, the EU Commissioner for External Relations, reiterated that new political commitments require new funding, a political reality that the EU Council of Ministers seem to have so far not appreciated. As a result, the EU is constantly finding itself in a position of political and economic over-stretch as the number of global commitments continues to increase. In recent years the EU has launched a Balkan stability pact and programmes that seek closer cooperation between the EU and Latin America and Asia. As the EU becomes more engrossed in implementation of its enlargement strategy and its neighbourhood policy there is also a risk that the priority once given to the Mediterranean could diminish. If such a risk is not to become a reality the Mediterranean countries must actively seek to engage the EU in political, economic and cultural policies that promote closer Euro-Mediterranean relations. The time has now come for the Barcelona Process to move beyond the talking and thinking stage and to concentrate on delivering tangible results that everyone can see and benefit from. Euro-Mediterranean initiatives that are in the pipeline and include the enhanced political dialogue, the Charter for peace and stability, the creation of a free-trade area, and justice and home affairs cooperation must become more visible to the public at large and seek to foster a durable Euro-Mediterranean partnership. If the EU and its Mediterranean partners want to develop a Euro-Mediterranean process that is sustainable they should introduce a series of measures that will enable them to work together in the trillion-euro-a-day international political economy that has emerged. The EU’s southern borderlands must also realize that the alternative to regional and international integration is economic recession and

8

Introduction

severe socio-economic difficulties. The only way to improve their political and economic outlook is for Mediterranean states to adapt home-grown reform policies to the realities of the global market. Trade statistics illustrate that this is not happening. Intra-regional Mediterranean trade remains stagnant. South-south cooperation is dormant with intra-regional trade in the Maghreb representing 5 per cent of their total trade. Statistics concerning intra-regional trade in the Mashreq is slightly more favourable at about 7 per cent. The conflict in the Middle East naturally disrupts such cooperation faster than a flick of the switch. One approach that may facilitate the task that the EU and Mediterranean countries face when it comes to upgrading the economic profile of the Mediterranean area is to focus on the promotion of sub regionalism. This exercise must result in the opening of sub-regional markets and the creation of sub-regional free-trade areas within the Mediterranean. Trade liberalization within the Euro-Mediterranean process has so far been taking place on a north-south basis. It is essential that the EU and its Mediterranean partners now focus their attention to opening transnational cooperation at a south-south level. This topic will be further examined in the concluding chapter of this book.

1

Euro-Mediterranean regional dynamics

Conceptualizing regionalism in Europe and the Middle East The main aim of this section is to identify the patterns of relations evolving in the international regions that are operating in the Mediterranean area. An attempt is made to assess the patterns of interaction within each existing international region in an effort to distinguish the nature of regional dynamics taking place. This is followed by an examination of the distinct sub groupings within each of the regions that border the Mediterranean, namely Southern Europe, the Levant and the Maghreb. After examining the patterns of interaction within each of these units, this section concludes with a review of the connections and disconnections between the three Mediterranean hinterlands in an effort to detect regional dynamics, which would suggest the re-emergence of a more cooperative or conflictual Mediterranean international region. The following criteria are necessary for an area to qualify as a region: the states’ pattern of cooperative or conflictual relations or interactions exhibit a particular degree of regularity and intensity to the extent that a change in their foreign policy actions have a direct influence on the policy making of neighbouring states; the states are proximate; the region consists of at least two but probably more states; the influence of intrusive action is considered. When this set of criteria is applied to the Mediterranean area, two prominent groupings of states emerges: namely the geographical space which borders the north-west sector of the Mediterranean which is labelled Europe, and the geographical area covering the south-eastern flank of the basin and is labelled the Middle East. The terminology used to define the position of different states in their respective sub region is the following: the core represents those states which form a central focus of international politics within an international region. The semi-periphery represents those states that actively participate within a given region and whose aspiration is membership of the core. The periphery represents those states within an international region which are alienated from the core sector in some degree by social, political, economic or organizational factors, but which still play a role in the politics of the region. The term Europe, as used in this analysis, does not coincide with the geographic definition: it includes all the European Union member states, plus Turkey.

10

Euro-Mediterranean regional dynamics

Although geographically Turkey lies on the periphery of the European continent, it is included in the European international region because the secular choice of Kemalist nationalism has brought the country into the Western and European sphere. Institutionally Turkey is a decisive component of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as demonstrated during the Gulf Wars of 1990–91 and 2003 and it is closely linked to the European Union, particularly after negotiating a customs union with Brussels in the mid-1990s.4 In short, Turkey shares strong intergovernmental and transnational links with Europe. Thus, the concept of a European region adopted in this study is geopolitical. As members or prospective members of the EU, all of the countries within this geo-strategic area share similar domestic and foreign policy concerns and have pledged to integrate their policies in accordance with the regulations of the Maastricht Treaty. This region also shares a similar line of ethno-cultural thinking, with an emphasis on the role of Latin Christendom in defining a community of states.5 The area also meets the other regional criteria in that it consists of more than two states, the countries considered are generally proximate in geopolitical terms, and all of the countries are affected by similar external constraints (they are members of the Western security system). Above all else, this international region is distinct from the areas in its vicinity because of the particular intensity of intergovernmental and cross-border interactions between the countries listed.6 Objections can always be raised regarding the cast of actors included in an international region.7 In such an exercise, the major methodological problem remains in drawing boundaries between such regions. One way to overcome the complexity of boundary delineation and simultaneously test the validity of the proposed international region is to verify that the intimacy of interaction among the participating states begins to wane as the edge of one international region and the start of the next is approached. This test certainly reinforces the notion of a European region, as this area shares similar constellations of political and economic patterns, which contrast sharply with the patterns of interaction and the Middle East. It is the latter international region, which mainly concerns us in this analysis of the Euro-Mediterranean area. Although Central and Eastern European patterns of relations influence regional dynamics in the Mediterranean, particularly those which involve Albania, Croatia and Bosnia, they have more of a direct impact on European relations than those of the Mediterranean. During the Cold War, the European international region was an area of uneven development. The creation of the European Economic Community in 1957, and the rival European Free Trade Association shortly afterwards, symbolize the alternative visions shared by European policy makers in the post-war period. The enactment of the Single European Act in 1986 and phases of EC enlargement (1973, 1981, 1986, 1995) have combined to make Europe, i.e. the EU and associate members, an intricate political and economic bloc. The level of integration achieved is evident when one notes that accepting to abide by the EU’s acquis communautaires is equivalent to agreeing to 14,000 pages of EU legislation.8

Euro-Mediterranean regional dynamics

11

Interdependence among the states of Europe is not a new phenomenon; intergovernmental ties are exemplified in the multiplicity of the EU. What has changed is the extension of globalization since the 1970s which has led to a rapid development of the networks of links between these states.9 Transnational patterns of interaction have engulfed the world at the end of the twentieth century. Europe is still organized politically into nation-states with sovereign governments, but increasing integration between these nations is gradually eroding the differences among national economies and undermining the autonomy of national governments. Profound technological, social and cultural changes have brought European states closer together by reducing the effective economic distance among them.10 Exchanges take the form of trade, investment, capital flows, cross-national corporations, large-scale movements of people, dense patterns of rail, road, sea and air traffic, and an instantaneous sharing of information, news and media.11 The European region is specifically characterized by these intricate transnational patterns of interaction. When coupled with already existing intergovernmental ties, this group of countries clearly demonstrates the attributes of a quasi-comprehensive international region, sharing similar social movements, economic shocks and political developments. Immediate developments in Europe during the post-Cold War period have been the attempts to consolidate economic and security cooperation. By 2003, convergence in both of these sectors was gradually taking place. The functioning of a single European currency and the establishment of a common foreign and security policy remain high on the political agenda. In security, European states are increasingly showing a willingness to coordinate their foreign policies. This is reflected in the similar priorities this group of countries attaches to external relations: bilateral relations within the European region are most important, followed by European Union affairs which are linked to EU ties with Eastern Europe, North America and Asia; ties with the Middle East are a distant third, and it is within this category that Mediterranean issues are considered. At first it might appear misleading to talk about the Middle East as a region, especially if one mistakenly perceives the Middle East as being on a par with Europe in being defined as a region. Yet, international regions vary in both nature and degree. Thus while the European model conforms to a certain modality of regionalism (cooperative transnational, intergovernmental and comprehensive dominant) the Middle East entity is of a completely different nature (conflictual intergovernmental and transnational dominant). The term Middle East, as used in this analysis, does not coincide with the geographical definition. It stretches from Morocco to the Persian Gulf. It is distinct from South Asia which lies to its east and black Africa which lies south of the Sahara. The Middle East international region includes the following sub groupings: the Maghreb, which is referred to usually as North Africa in the West but which is considered as part of the collective consciousness of the Arab Middle East (especially in an historical sense), the Levant, also referred to as the Mashreq, or the Fertile Crescent, which in this study includes Egypt and the Arabian Peninsula including the Persian Gulf which incorporates Iran.

12

Euro-Mediterranean regional dynamics

Although geographically Egypt is located along the North African coastline, it is included in the Levant because of its consistent northern policy concentration dating back to the nineteenth century and its clashes with the Ottoman Empire.12 Throughout the latter part of the twentieth century, Egypt also played a key role in intergovernmental relations across the Mashreq, involved in all of the major wars in the area and setting a precedent in the Arab World when it recognized Israel in the Camp David peace talks.13 The one salient reality that most unites this area is the Islamic religion and the history of the Islamic Empire. This common denominator has more recently been supplemented by what may be described as the transnational political force of Islam.14 This phenomenon, perhaps more than anything else, combines to create a potent Middle East region. Political Islam effectively challenges secular European nationalism which dominates an area that was Islamic for well over a millennium. One objective shared by Islam groups throughout this area is a return to a societal system that is indigenously Islamic. Seen from such a perspective, a secular national state is a continuation of external rule by other than direct physical means. It is at this political level, rather than at a religious one, that a clash between the West and Islam lies.15 As a people, Arabs enjoy a high degree of linguistic and cultural homogeneity. Despite the distinct regional dynamics at play within the various Middle Eastern sub groupings, most Arabs belong to the same religion, converse in the same language and share the same cultural traditions.16 These facts gave rise to the pan-Arab nationalist trend, which dominated intergovernmental regional proceedings throughout the 1950s and 1960s.17 They also played a significant role in the anti-colonial movement in Africa and in the development of the non-aligned movement. Like its European counterpart, the concept of a Middle Eastern region is geopolitical. However, the patterns of interaction between Middle East actors are much more erratic and more conflictual than cooperative in nature. This is not to deny that they may occasionally share certain concerns – primarily related to security – or might cooperate in specific fields, as has been the case in the energy sector. But the track record of the Arab League and other efforts to institutionalize relations in the Middle East, such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), clearly demonstrate the limits of cooperation among the majority of the countries within this region.18 Although each Middle East sub grouping has its own node of security interdependence with its own distinctive dynamics, there is enough cross-border interaction within the Middle East to justify identifying it as regional unit of analysis. Even though opposition towards Israel sometimes wanes, the two-dozen states in this region continue to share similar political and socio-economic challenges. These grievances are often voiced at Arab League meetings, which provide a legitimate forum in which the affairs of the different Middle Eastern sub groupings are brought together. The Middle East also meets the other criteria associated with an international region. It consists of more than two states and the countries considered are generally

Euro-Mediterranean regional dynamics

13

proximate in geopolitical terms. In sharing similar economic, political and cultural patterns, the Middle East is also affected by external challenges, which emanate from Western secularism. As emphasized above, it is the intensity of intergovernmental interactions between the countries in this area, which qualifies the Middle East as a region. When compared with the degree and nature of relations which exist across the Mediterranean, the distinct attributes of this region become even more pronounced. A comparative analysis of political and economic patterns in Europe and the Middle East reveals that comparable patterns of interaction are conspicuously absent. Europe and the Middle East developed very different patterns during the Cold War. Intergovernmental ties in the Middle East were relatively strong, as was reflected in the creation of the Arab League in 1944–45, which quickly grew to include 21 states.19 The process of decolonization and independence facilitated pan-Arab nationalism and Islam’s ability to create transnational political linkages across the whole international region. In the period between achieving independence and the end of the Cold War, the Middle East consolidated itself further as a distinct and mainly self-contained international region.20 Most of the states have been too preoccupied with distinct domestic or regional sub grouping security dynamics to attempt nurturing a complex network of relations with all the states in the region. Since the end of the Cold War, older patterns of relations have been released, as manifested in the force of political Islam. There has also been a shift in the patterns of amity and enmity within the region. Relations in the Levant momentarily improved following breakthroughs in the Arab-Israeli peace talks and then reverted to a conflictual pattern of interaction as peace talks broke down. In contrast, intergovernmental ties in the Maghreb throughout the 1990s were at an all time low, with the crisis in Algeria and the Libyan-Lockerbie affair becoming fixed diplomatic impasses. A review of post-Cold War events thus reveals that there is no consistent pattern of relations in the Middle East. In the Mashreq, political developments since the end of the Cold War have tended to increase the level of interdependence. In the Maghreb, the opposite process has largely taken place. Transnational flows in the Middle East are much less dense than in Europe and are more controlled. North-south non-state economic links radiate around the energy sector. Pipelines across the Maghreb stretch across the Mediterranean to Europe. Similar projects link the Persian Gulf to Europe and the Levant. But no intricate pattern of transnational interdependence involving trading links, cross-border investment and common institutions has yet been developed. South-south transnational patterns of interaction are mainly limited to the area of Islam. This low level of interdependence partly explains the high level of enmity in the Middle Eastern patterns of relations. Interdependence does not in itself determine either cooperation or conflict, but it does increase the stakes in relationships. The more a sense of common interests is apparent, the less likely is

14

Euro-Mediterranean regional dynamics

the outbreak of hostilities. This in fact is one of the reasons why the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was set up in 1952. A key difference between Europe and the Middle East is that, whereas the former has developed a multi-level international society in which international institutions, states and sub-national organizations all play important roles in managing cross-national transactions, the latter has not. Within the Middle East, the level of cross-national transactions is much lower and has not been institutionalized in any comprehensive manner. For example, the Arab League met with success in only six of seventy-seven conflictual situations it attempted to settle between 1945 and 1981.21 Similarly, other cooperative initiatives undertaken by sub-regional organizations, such as the Arab Maghreb Union, have never achieved any significant degree of real political or economic consensus. One can also say that centrifugal forces have superseded centripetal forces as the majority of states in the Maghreb see their future in securing market access to Europe. In the Middle East, post-Cold War efforts to increase economic and security cooperation are still at an embryonic stage. The international Middle East economic summits at Casablanca in October 1994 and Amman in October 1995 through to Doha in 1997 displayed many of the obstacles that would have to be overcome before this international region could begin to develop stronger transnational and institutional links.22 No measures have been introduced to tackle the indebtedness of certain Arab countries, which amounted to $142 billion in 1989 with a yearly debt service of $14 billion, or 33 per cent of the export earnings of these countries.23 In addition, within the Arab world the gap between the ‘north’, which groups the nine oil-producing countries with small populations (except for Algeria and Iraq), and the ‘south’, which groups the remaining twelve Arab countries, remains wide. The gross domestic product of the former group reached $300 billion in 1990 compared with a GDP of only $119 billion in the latter group.24 A shift to more cooperative indigenous political practices must therefore be coupled with large influxes of foreign direct investment if the necessary infrastructural changes are to occur so that transnational links can be strengthened. Perhaps valuable lessons can be learned from the 1970s, when economic links within the Arab world were considerable as a result of the boom in the petroleum industry. Intra-regional financial flows floundered in the 1980s as a decline in the demand for oil and the consequent slump in revenues settled in.25 In the Middle Eastern region in general, there is still no sign of convergence in foreign policy priorities. Each regional sub grouping continues to dedicate most of its diplomatic resources to local security challenges. For example, Syrian relations remain focused on developments with the Mashreq, while Moroccan contacts continue to focus on bilateral relations in the Maghreb. Contacts with the European Union continue to gain in prominence, although the Mashreq still concentrates on maintaining strong ties with the United States. As is the case with Europe, Mediterranean issues are a lower priority in the chain of foreign policy priorities. These contrasts highlight the differences in political, socio-economic and historical development between Europe and the Middle East. While some societies and

Euro-Mediterranean regional dynamics

15

states across the Mediterranean are in the European sphere of influence, others find themselves in the Middle Eastern one. The Mediterranean acts as a kind of divide between the countries in the area, several of which are at different stages and perhaps on different paths of historical evolution. In the short to medium term there seems little prospect of Middle Eastern societies rapidly adjusting to European patterns of relations or vice versa. Does this mean that it is impossible to develop a common Mediterranean order that may serve as a precursor to a Mediterranean region? Or is the developing pattern of transnational, intergovernmental, and institutional links at least capable of creating enough cooperation to limit conflicts across the Mediterranean divide? In the absence of any strong movement towards regionalism among the economies of Europe and the Middle East regions, it seems sensible to examine the patterns of relations within the context of three sub regions bordering the Mediterranean, that is, Southern Europe, the Levant and the Maghreb, and then to attempt to identify any trends towards regionalism in the area. International power relations are in constant flux; older power centres decline and new ones emerge for reasons that we only partially understand. The laws of economic motion appear to be one of the important factors in determining the processes of decay and revitalization. A central feature in the transformation of the present international system is the stabilization of some regional power centres and the emergence of new ones. This process is not actually new: it is an aspect of the general dynamics of international relations in which the relative strength of certain powers declines and new ones gradually emerge. A distinct feature of the current transformation is the fact that regional powers are now emerging outside the traditional core of the international system. By the end of the nineteenth century, European dominance was so absolute that it not only created a single global international system, but it also destroyed older regional patterns of interaction. Regional dynamics were largely absent from the international scene for most of recent history, as the Europeans pursued their own regional dynamics on a global scale. During the twentieth century, this extreme pattern of systemic dominance began to unravel.26 The period 1914 to 1989 saw the self-destruction of European, and to a certain extent Western, world power. The decolonization process between 1945 and 1965 set free the majority of remaining colonies in Asia and Africa. This permitted the re-emergence of regional patterns of interaction, albeit in a significantly different systemic context from that which had prevailed between 500 BC and AD 1500. In the ancient and classical world, international regions were the dominant structure in the international system. The period of Western domination saw the system level almost eliminate international cooperation. The decolonization process coupled with the collapse of the Cold War created conditions conducive to a resurgence of regional dynamics in the system. In the Mediterranean area, the decolonization process released many older patterns of regional international relations, somewhat veiled in new Western clothes. Countries such as Egypt and Morocco had roots that stretched back into ancient and classical times. Independence ushered in a period when old rivalries and fears

16

Euro-Mediterranean regional dynamics

could again be addressed. Apart from being directly influenced by the withdrawal of colonial powers from the Third World, the evolution of regional centres was also spurred by attempts at regional integration among developing countries and the development of economic and political forces within these new states. In addition, newly independent states emerged into an environment that was mainly under superpower and Western control. A large number of the new states therefore remained tied to some degree to the ex-metropolitan powers. In the Mediterranean, countries such as Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco remained dependent on France for both their currency and their military security.27 Around the Mediterranean basin, distinct regional dynamics also developed during this period. Along the northern shore, Southern European states became more intertwined in relations with their northern neighbours through the process of European integration. The admittance of Greece into the European Community (EC) in 1981 and of Spain and Portugal in 1986 shows how this area’s patterns of interaction became European dominant. In contrast, no such firm patterns of regional interaction occurred along the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean. Most of the new states in these areas were too weak to generate a durable pattern of regional relations in their first years as independent states. The majority of them were more concerned with domestic infrastructural problems and dedicated whatever resources they had to ameliorating their internal situation. As outlined at the start of this section, the picture that emerges around, but not across, the Mediterranean, at the end of the Cold War, is of two international regions: a quasi-comprehensive European region and an intergovernmental dominant Middle East region with limited transnational ties. Both entities incorporate sub groupings. The sub groupings which surround the Mediterranean are Southern Europe (subset of Europe), the Mashreq and the Maghreb (sub regions of the Middle East). Comprehending the degree and types of interaction within these sub groupings is important because they are primary points of contact between the international regions which encircle the Mediterranean.

Regional dynamics in Southern Europe Prior to examining the degree of interaction within Southern Europe it is important to underline that the Southern European label as used in this section does not coincide with the geographic definition. The concept of a Southern Europe area is geopolitical and is based on two main criteria: all the countries belong to or are associated with NATO or the European Union and all states referred to border on the Mediterranean. This sub region thus includes, from west to east, Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, Malta, Cyprus, Greece and Turkey. Although Southern European countries, particularly those who are already members of the EU, are perceived as sharing common political and economic objectives with other non-member Mediterranean states, this perception of solidarity is not strong enough to be reflected in permanent political structures.28 Throughout the Cold War, the large number of actors with diverse political agendas

Euro-Mediterranean regional dynamics

17

and the geographic discontinuity of the area added to the sense of political fragmentation. The end of the Cold War has assisted in removing some of the first factor. The emergence of Central and Eastern European countries from behind the Iron Curtain has resulted in the polarization of the Southern European grouping who are now in direct competition for foreign direct investment and assistance from the EU. This had initially generated perceptions among non-EU southern states, such as Malta and Cyprus, of isolation and marginalization. Members of the EU’s southern flank have reacted by starting to coordinate their political agenda much more in an effort to prevent Brussels from shifting its external focus totally to the east. The three consecutive EU presidencies of France, Spain and Italy during 1995 and 1996 and again in 2000, 2002 and 2003 respectively demonstrate the significance these Southern European countries attach to the Mediterranean area. Their concerted approach to crisis situations in the littoral, such as that of Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, and the civil war in Algeria, reveals at least the beginning of a common foreign policy approach. A second unifying factor is that the end of the Cold War has weakened the role of the non-aligned movement in this area. Countries such as Malta and Cyprus joined the EU in 2004. Foreign policy patterns in the Southern European area therefore reflect a tendency to becoming more homogeneous, i.e. members of similar political and military organizations: NATO-EU-OSCE. As the weighting of Mediterranean members increases in these security arrangements, transMediterranean policies could receive more attention in European security debates and simultaneously assist in moving Mediterranean issues further up the European foreign policy priority chain. A review of bilateral interactions within this sub grouping now follows in an attempt to identify what dimension they contribute to regional dynamics across the Mediterranean. This assessment will be followed by a similar analysis of the networks of bilateral relations in the Mashreq and the Maghreb. The state that wields the most power in the Southern European sub grouping is France. In fact, France remains a continental European, an Atlantic, and a Mediterranean power. Although the Mediterranean dimension of French security policy is often limited, its involvement in any Southern European scheme is essential if a proposal is to have any chance of success. This is evident if one examines the success rate of the various trans-Mediterranean security initiatives launched since the end of the Cold War. While the Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) remains a distant aspiration, the French Western Mediterranean 5 + 5 Forum got off to a rapid start and stalled after France’s reluctance to turn a blind eye on allegations linking Libya to acts of terrorism. France’s support has been essential in re-launching the 5 + 5 process. The main reason for France’s dominance in the Southern European sub grouping is its superiority in economic, political, and military terms. France’s position in the core sector of this group is bolstered by its nuclear deterrent force, its levels of military expenditure and its power projection capacities. Moreover, France’s current relations with the Maghreb countries, especially Algeria, its colonial past

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and the significance of North African immigrants in the French community all make Mediterranean and Southern European issues an integral part of the French national identity.29 Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, France’s position in Southern Europe has occasionally been challenged by Spain and Italy. Both have shown an increasing interest in becoming more active in creating stronger links with their counterparts on the southern shores of the Mediterranean. But a string of largely domestic episodes have prevented both Madrid and Rome from following through and realizing their external agenda. As a result, Spain and Italy remain in the semi-peripheral antechamber. Spain’s primary concern remains over the crisis in the Maghreb. It has made strenuous efforts to enhance its reputation in North Africa following the Gulf War of the early 1990s. For example, it has implemented a series of bilateral agreements, including an award of $1 billion worth of export credits to Algeria in 1992–93.30 In February 1996 Spain and Morocco agreed that they would commence with the first phase of a 22-km tunnel under the Straits of Gibraltar in 1997 that will facilitate bilateral trade between the two countries, which currently exceeds $1 billion. Spain has also argued consistently that the north-south dimension of security challenges have not been addressed by existing international security institutions. It is for this reason that it joined Italy in 1990 in announcing the necessity of creating a regional framework for dialogue and cooperation in the Mediterranean, namely the Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM). Spain’s geographic position, and the political and economic capital it has managed to achieve as a member of the EU, dictates that this Iberian country will continue to play a key role in Southern European affairs.31 Militarily, Spain is entrusted with ensuring access to and the safety of passage through the Straits of Gibraltar. It also has the resources to conduct tactical naval and air operations in the Western Mediterranean as demonstrated in the Perejil Islands incident in the summer of 2002 against Morocco.32 Spanish military bases are also useful transit points for operations conducted in the eastern Atlantic or eastern sector of the Mediterranean.33 Prior to the domestic political revolution, which engulfed Italy in the 1990s, Rome’s defence policy was also focusing more and more on the security dimension of north-south relations. In 1980, Rome signalled its intention to develop an active foreign policy in the Mediterranean when it decided to guarantee Malta’s neutrality. At the end of the 1980s, Italy promoted the idea of a stable cooperation framework stretching from the shores of the Mediterranean to Central Europe when it joined the ‘Esagonale’ (Hexagonal Group) with Austria, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland.34 After the Gulf War, Italy championed the notion that the time had come to fill the security vacuum in the Mediterranean basin. The concept of a CSCM was presented as one possible way of addressing the endemic political and economic instability in this area. This concept of comprehensive security is the leitmotif of all of Italy’s Mediterranean policies. Integrating economic, political and military means in a global cooperative strategy towards the Mediterranean is regarded as a much

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more effective approach than ad hoc bilateral actions. It is for this reason that Italy continues to prefer the EU as the main locus of European security and is reluctant to see an extension of NATO responsibilities in the Mediterranean.35 Italy and France are also keen to develop a federalist approach to EU decision making in security policy, with the EU becoming the main security institution in the basin. Other Southern European countries, such as Spain, prefer a more intergovernmental approach in this sector.36 The melting of the Cold War glacier has therefore once again allowed the Southern European core and semi-peripheral countries to play a much more direct role in the Mediterranean. After all, all three countries were at the forefront of the ‘scramble for Africa’ at the turn of the century when the Europeans divided North Africa amongst themselves. Their participation in the European Union is enabling these countries to institutionalize their naval cooperation in the area by formulating contingency combat plans. The three Southern European Union member states and Portugal established a joint land force, known as EuroFor, with a headquarters in Florence, and a naval force called EuroMarFor (European Marine Force), led by a French aircraft carrier at the start of 1995. The new forces were initially employed within the Western European Union (WEU) framework, but are also at the disposal of NATO.37 The setting up of a Medcorps between France, Italy, Spain and Portugal partly offsets the predominant position of the United States’ Sixth Fleet as each of these European states operate naval aircraft carriers.38 The launching of such a southern security structure assists the Southern European government assert a Southern Mediterranean orientation in the EU to counter what they perceive as an increasingly Germanic Europe, with its centre of gravity steadily moving north and east after the Nordic enlargement. The core and semi-peripheral sector of the Southern European sub grouping see their dominant positions as dependent on the stability of North Africa. ‘Stability’ in this sense means the avoidance of large-scale unrest and preservation of the status quo. Tensions between the Southern European and the Maghreb regional sub groupings are largely caused by economic, political, and cultural, rather than military issues. For example, the full-scale civil war in Algeria could have generated a flood of refugees across the Mediterranean that would have destabilized internal security in countries such as France. Another threat for which Europe has to make contingency plans is a territorial clash – for example campaigns concerning the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Mellila in Morocco and the Canary Islands could quickly intensify. Economic collapse is another substantial threat that has to be considered – the protection of important export markets and the security of large outstanding debts is vital if European economies are to continue their gradual but fragile recovery from recession. For example, in 1992 Algeria’s external debt was approximately $25 billion, of which more than $6 billion was owed to France.39 The fact that the major creditor, Coface – the French export credit department – had to write off its loans to Iraq after the Gulf War makes the protection of its investments in North Africa all the more compelling.

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The Spanish and Italian CSCM proposal and the participation of all three states in the Western Mediterranean Forum (‘5 + 5’ talks), coupled with the increasing number of joint manoeuvres between the naval and air forces of France, Italy and Spain, demonstrates the active interest of these Southern European states in contemporary international relations of their southern periphery. The strongest link between the Maghreb and Southern Europe is found in the energy sector. A gas pipeline is currently being constructed connecting Algerian gasfields through Morocco, with Spain and eventually France. Another pipeline linking Algerian gasfields with Italy, via Tunisia and the Straits of Sicily was opened in 1983 and has undergone adjustments to double its throughput capacity. These examples make it clear that the energy sector is the one area where cooperation across the Euro-Maghreb space is most active. Imitation of such cooperation in other areas, such as trade, investment, and technological exchange, would enhance economic solidarity between the two Mediterranean sub groupings and help to intensify cooperative north-south transnational relations.40 Other candidates that sometimes play roles that qualify them for inclusion in the Southern European semi-periphery are Greece, Turkey and Portugal. Their level of power permits them to execute foreign policy options that are primarily related to their immediate spheres of influence. Unlike the core and other more active semi-peripheral states in Southern Europe, their approach to external affairs is much more erratic and limited. Greece’s introduction of an embargo against FYROM (also called Macedonia) at the time of its EU Presidency in 1994 is indicative of such inconsistent patterns of external relations adopted by countries in this sector. Athens’s threat of vetoing the EU customs union with Turkey is another example of such an erratic approach.41 In addition, Greece initially was not able to use its EU membership to improve its economic position vis à vis the other EU member states.42 This may be partly explained by the second largest arms importer in the industrialized world for the period 1988–92.43 On a different note, Athens has somewhat succeeded in diluting its ‘bad boy’ image by forcing Mediterranean security issues back on to the European Union agenda, when it held the EU presidency in 1994.44 At the Corfu Summit, EU members endorsed the idea of convening a EuropeanMediterranean conference, which was convened during the Spanish-EU presidency in November 1995.45 Greece’s more recent policy of rapprochement with Turkey, its admittance to the Euro club and its constructive EU Presidency in the first half of 2003 that set the stage for EU enlargement in 2004 have been major boosts to Greece’s geopolitical position in the Euro-Mediterranean area. A continuation of such policy frameworks would enhance Greece’s ability to influence patterns of relations in this part of the world. Turkey is geographically and politically in the peripheral sector of the European international region, and the more specific Southern European sub grouping. It occupies an insulating position between the adjoining European and Middle Eastern regions.46 As an Islamic, but not Arab, secular state, and as the former

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imperial power in the Middle East, Turkey has no desire to become completely engulfed in the Middle East pattern of relations.47 The conflict situations and underdeveloped neighbours to its south and east provides Turkey with plenty of incentive to pursue further its contacts with the European international region. As a full member of NATO and the OSCE and an associate member of the EU, Turkey already has strong intergovernmental links with Europe and the United States.48 The challenge confronting Ankara has been to keep up with the transnational patterns taking place in Europe. Turkey signed an association agreement with the then EC in 1963. Its objective in establishing links with the EC was to enhance its European identity. Full EU integration would legitimize and thus stabilize the various cooperative transactions with Europe. But two basic problems have stalled Turkey’s 1987 formal application to join the EU. First is the essentially agricultural and underdeveloped nature of the country, that would drain the reserves of the Common Agricultural reserve, the European Investment Bank and the cohesion fund. Second, realizing that closer relations with Europe are being hampered by the Cypriot affair, Turkey has entered a process of dialogue with Greece under the supervision of the United Nations (UN) and EU to find a solution to this Island’s divide. Ankara has also signed a customs union with the EU and has actively been promoting transnational economic, financial and cultural links with Europe. Another area which supports Turkey’s institutional ties with Europe is its strategic location. Turkey’s role in the 1990–91 Gulf War re-established its position as an essential component in the western security alliance at precisely the time when the end of the Cold War forebode that Turkey could become a less significant player in the European region.49 This position has been somewhat undermined by Turkey’s obstructionist attitude during the American war against Iraq in 2003 when Turkey denied the United States access to Turkish bases in the run up to the war. In line with the other members of the Southern European sub grouping, Turkey shares the post-Cold War conviction that it risks being marginalized by the core sector of the European region, which is increasingly showing signs of establishing stronger ties with Central and Eastern European countries. If such a pattern of relations was sought at the expense of Southern European relations in general, and Turkish relations in particular, Turkey might be forced to reconsider more closely the level and nature of its relations with the Middle East. Ankara’s dependence on Arab oil and growing support for Turkish fundamentalism are already pressuring the country to reassess its position continuously vis à vis this region. A shift to a more Middle Eastern dominant foreign policy would naturally affect Turkey’s standing in Europe and could theoretically eliminate it from this international region altogether.50 In this respect, much will depend on the EU’s decision at the end of 2004 on whether to commence accession negotiations with Turkey or not. A negative stance would certainly lead Turkey to contemplate strengthening relations further with its immediate neighbours in the Middle East. Like its Southern European counterparts, Turkey is also concerned with similar post-Cold War security challenges. These include ideological confrontations between

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Islamic fundamentalists and secularists in North Africa, nationalistic and ethnic confrontations in the Balkans, and economic frustrations in both sub zones, which risk triggering international terrorism and massive population movements throughout Southern Europe. The key difference between Turkey and its Southern European neighbours is that while none of the others have direct territorial contact with the areas that breed potential threats to peace, Turkey does. Turkey is also keen to maintain secure access to the sea lines of communications in the Mediterranean. Yet, Turkey’s exclusion from the EU and its differences with Greece risks driving a wedge between it and the rest of the countries in the region and keeps it in the peripheral sector of the Southern European sub grouping.51 Another candidate in the peripheral sector of the Southern European sub grouping is Portugal. It is included largely because of its decision to balance European foreign policy priorities with its Atlantic, Latin American and African external dimensions. Although Portugal is a member of both NATO and the EU, it has maintained close links with ex-colonies and Portuguese speaking countries such as Angola and Brazil. Portugal maintains strong security relations with the United States and both countries have remained committed to their 1951 Defence Agreement. Lisbon’s main benefit from this close relationship is that the US has regularly re-equipped Portuguese armed forces and provided a constant supply of military and economic aid under the Lajes airbase agreement.52 Despite accession to the EU in 1986, Portugal continues to emphasize the importance of its transatlantic linkage, in contrast to its neighbour, Spain, which has demonstrated more of a willingness to establish a common European foreign and security policy. Portugal’s geographic position in the Atlantic also partly explains this difference in outlook. Thus, relations between the two Iberian countries are best described as cordial, with EU membership acting as a catalyst to an improvement in bilateral relations. One consequence of closer ties with Europe is that transnational ties with the rest of the continent have increased dramatically, as illustrated in the jump in trade with Spain for example, from 5 per cent of total trade in 1985 to 15 per cent in 1990.53 Portugal’s position in the Southern European sub grouping and the larger European region is perhaps best described as that of a balancer. Although it is committed to playing an active role in European Union affairs, it also regards itself as the champion of keeping the EU’s external affairs agenda as transparent as possible. Thus, although it supported the integration of the WEU into the EU, it does not perceive this security arrangement as exclusive from either NATO or the OSCE. Lisbon also shares the common Southern European concern of being marginalized as a result of the end of the Cold War. It therefore argues that EU support to Central and Eastern European countries should not overshadow the solidarity that has been shown to Africa, Latin America and the Middle East. In the last decade Portugal has therefore expanded its European dimension but not at the expense of its transatlantic and extra-continental ties. Its position in the Southern European sub grouping would have to be upgraded were it to commence

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dedicating more of its diplomatic resources towards European concerns. In the interim, Portugal already shows signs of moving in this direction by strengthening its relations with Maghreb countries, not only through participation in the Western Mediterranean Forum, but also through development of bilateral relations with Morocco and Algeria.54 A significant development to monitor in the years to come is the gradual shift of the islands of Malta and Cyprus from the peripheral sector of the Southern European sub grouping to the semi-periphery as both islands join the EU in 2004. Prior to joining the EU their influence in regional affairs has been somewhat limited. Yet both islands are located in sensitive geo-strategic positions and could potentially play proactive roles in their respective spheres of influence. As already evident from their respective negotiations with the EU, both Mediterranean islands are keen to shed their neutral and non-aligned movement image and to begin playing a more proactive role in international security. Both countries have also become keen advocates of establishing transMediterranean security initiatives, supporting the concept of a CSCM. The Maltese have also proposed the setting up of a Council of the Mediterranean, along the lines of a Council of Europe,55 and have initiated a drive to create a Euro-Mediterranean stability pact, a concept endorsed by the French at the Barcelona Conference in November 1995.56 From an economic perspective, both countries are already deeply entrenched in the European sphere of influence, conducting the majority of their trade with the European region. Admittance to the EU in 2004 will therefore position both Malta and Cyprus very well to start playing a more direct role in the evolution of EuroMediterranean affairs in the twenty-first century. One likely outcome is that either one or both of the islands find themselves in the semi-peripheral sector of the South European sub region, commensurate to the increase of their authority in the area. The liberation of Central and Eastern Europe, the demise of the Soviet Union, and the measures introduced to further the European Union experiment have forced the countries of Southern Europe to reassess their specific role as a Mediterranean sub zone and to ponder what impact post-Cold War changes will have on their identity. Interaction between the countries of Southern Europe is largely cooperative dominant. Exchanges are both intergovernmental and transnational in nature. However it is essential to note that patterns of relations are far more coordinated at a European level than at a Southern European one. In fact, EU member states in this sub grouping appear to be gradually moving towards a comprehensive type of regional arrangement with their northern neighbours. The EU can also be credited for fostering strong intergovernmental and transnational economic, political and social ties between these countries. The security dimension is however less durable in this sub grouping. Although members of the same political or military organizations (NATO, the EU or the OSCE), Southern European countries do not adhere to a common defence identity. While France has been an ardent supporter of the EU common foreign and security policy countries such as Spain, Italy, Portugal and Turkey continue to favour NATO.

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On the other hand, Malta and Cyprus have favoured trans-Mediterranean security initiatives. In any case, none of these Western security institutions have been able to extend their security guarantees to the Middle Eastern sub groupings bordering the Mediterranean. As a result, Southern Europe patterns of interaction are perceived by states in the Mashreq and Maghreb as largely divisive mechanisms. Overtures to overcome this perception have, to date, failed, despite the successful track record of the Mediterranean Forum and the re-launching of the Western Mediterranean 5 + 5 Forum. Southern European interaction with countries outside the Mediterranean theatre reflects the lack of foreign policy convergence among this sub-regional grouping. For example, after bilateral relations with other EU member states, countries such as France, Italy, Portugal and Spain dedicate most of their diplomatic resources on four priority locations: European Union affairs, bilateral relations with the Maghreb, bilateral contacts with the Mashreq, ties with Latin America and relations with former colonies throughout Africa. Mediterranean issues are therefore far down the list of foreign policy concerns, despite rhetoric often claiming the contrary. Interaction between these four Southern European countries and their external contacts is primarily of an economic and political nature. Military links are relatively limited. Social intercourse is much more restricted, due to legislation preventing the mass migration of Latin American and African citizens to the more affluent European continent. However, although Southern European external policies do not coincide, they do somewhat overlap.57 On a more positive note, Southern European countries do share a set of interests that have gained currency since the end of the Cold War. First, is the belief that their European sub grouping needs more binding social and economic cohesion. Southern European EU member states have consistently put forward political programmes, which focus on issues in and around the Mediterranean area at European Union Council meetings. An assessment of the 2000 French and 2002 Spanish EU presidencies and a glance at the 2003 Greek and Italian EU presidential programme reflects this trend. A second unifying factor is the conviction that measures need to be introduced to bridge the large gap between the two international regions which border the Mediterranean, and specifically Southern Europe, the Maghreb and the Mashreq. Measures to quell the revival of nationalism and emergence of racism in the area are also urgently required. However, an overall assessment of Southern European foreign policy priorities reveals that Mediterranean affairs are far down their external agenda, despite rhetoric claiming the contrary.

Regional dynamics in the Mashreq As described at the start of this section, the Middle East international region is divided into three basic geopolitical sub groupings; the Mashreq (also referred to as the Levant), the Maghreb and the Persian Gulf. Encompassing the eastern and southern sectors of the Mediterranean, it is the first two sub regions that concern us in this review of patterns of interactions in the Mediterranean area.

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The Mashreq label is used to represent those countries directly associated with the Middle East peace process: Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Egypt and the Palestinian Authority. Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia are excluded from this analysis as they are considered to be outside this geopolitical area. Turkey is also left out as it has been classified as primarily falling in the European region. In this section, the area of the Middle East coincides with both geographical and geopolitical interpretations. In this analysis, primary concern is given to those countries that have direct access to the Mediterranean affairs. These are Israel, Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. More than any other area of a comparable size, the Mashreq has been characterized by intense interaction as well as extremely acute regional conflicts. There is a high level of interconnectedness between Arab actors in this area at both a societal and a state level, a distinct characteristic among regions that comprise developing countries. Transnational social patterns of interaction include the movement of intellectuals, students, and especially workers who take up residence in other Arab countries for varying periods.58 Applying the regional model outlined earlier assists in conceptualizing which countries in the area yield the most power in this Middle East sub region. The core states in this sector are Israel and Egypt. For most of the post-war period, they have dominated the regional system of states in the Mashreq. They are also superior to other nations materially, militarily and in motivation. Israel’s predominant position in the Levant is due to its specific character as an extraterritorial state.59 In other words, as the only Jewish state, Israel is identified as the home of Diaspora Jews, including the six million Jews in North America who have provided Israel’s basic political, economic and financial support.60 Without this extensive international network of alliances, Israel’s existence, let alone its presence in the core sector of the Mashreq, would have been much more difficult to defend. Throughout the Cold War, Israel’s pattern of relations in the Levant has been predominantly conflictual. Intergovernmental relations did not officially take place until Egypt broke ranks with its fellow Arabs and recognized Israel in 1979. Transnational contacts were also limited to military patterns of interaction, mainly during the 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars. Transnational links in other sectors were largely non-existent. The September 1993 peace agreement with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the October 1994 peace treaty with Jordan finally paved the way for more cooperative transnational activities to take place in the Mashreq, particularly between Jordan and Israel. Joint business ventures between Tel Aviv and Amman have already developed, with agreements reached in the telecommunications and financial sectors. Foreign direct investment in this sub region is also gradually increasing, with the tourist sector the largest growing industry in the short term. The EU is the international organization which has offered the most investment capital to help develop and standardize neighbouring infrastructures. One project that has improved interaction between neighbouring countries in times of peace is the trans-Levant highway, joining Cairo and Riyadh in the South

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with Amman and Tel Aviv in the North. Such links are necessary if commercial and social interaction between these countries are to expand. In short, these limited cooperative intergovernmental and transnational interactions between the core states of the Mashreq and parts of its periphery bolster the relative position of Israel in this sub grouping. Israel’s ability to play a more proactive role in nonLevant affairs is limited due to the constant necessity to defend itself. To date, efforts to establish non-regional ties have mainly been directed towards forging stronger ties with Asia and not with countries in the Mediterranean. The immediate concerns of Israel continue to be Mashreq based. Its diplomatic activities continue to concentrate on trying to build a strong cooperative network of relations with Egypt and Jordan and strengthening it embryonic ties with the Palestinians. It is also seeking to nurture the rudimentary links it has established with other Arab countries in the Middle East, particularly Morocco and Tunisia. Given the fact that the economy of Israel is bigger than that of Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon combined, any steps towards establishing a free-trade area in this sub region will reinforce the position of Israel as the centre of gravity in the Middle East international region.61 The most assertive of the Arab states in the 1950s and 1960s was also the most stable: Egypt. During the leadership of President Gamal Abdal Nasser, Cairo emerged as the capital of the Arab world. Nasser adopted a foreign policy orientation, which identified Egypt as an Arab actor functioning within three basic rank-ordered ‘circles’: Arab, African and Islamic. Egypt’s concentration of power stemmed in part from its vast superiority in material capabilities. In the 1960s, Egypt possessed almost half of the military capabilities of all the Arab actors in the Mashreq, with more than a 2:1 advantage over its closest competitor, Iraq. Economic power was more evenly spread, with Egypt’s large population the second lowest per capita income in the area.62 The absence of a Mediterranean circle is understandable because it would have meant cooperative interaction with European Mediterranean countries and engagement in Cold War battles.63 During the 1970s and 1980s, Arab patterns of relations began to resemble more of an unbalanced multipolar system. Economic power began to play a far more important role than military power, mainly due to the importance attached to Arab oil. The large pool of surplus capital in the region led to a more cooperative pattern of relations among Arab states, with wealthy oil-producing states much more prepared to assist their weaker Arab neighbours. A lack of leaders like Nasser also resulted in the declining role of transnational political influence across the region. It was during this period that Syria experienced a significant increase in military capabilities and for a time occupied a position in the core sector. By the mid-1980s it had emerged as the largest Arab military power, slightly eclipsing Iraq and Egypt. Anwar Sadat’s recognition of Israel relegated Egypt out of the Arab world mainstream. One important consequence from its peace with Israel was improved relations with the Western world, particularly the United States, which started to furnish Cairo with regular military and civil aid. After a decade of enforced isolation, Cairo increased its activities in the Arab sphere in the latter half of the 1980s.

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By 1985, a recurring theme in Egypt’s foreign policy is that which emphasizes the interconnections between Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East.64 Egypt’s stature as a principal actor in the Arab world was officially restored at the Arab League Casablanca Summit in May 1989. President Mubarak set the tone of Egypt’s foreign policy in the 1990s in an address to the European Parliament in November 1991 when he suggested the creation of ‘a Mediterranean forum, which will increasingly expand to include all European and Middle Eastern nations’.65 In addition to this crucial role in the Arab-Israeli peace talks, Egypt has therefore sought to enhance its regional positioning by again trying to breathe life into the notion of a trans-Mediterranean security forum. Egypt introduced this shift in its foreign policy because it realized that the end of the Cold War created new opportunities and, simultaneously, new risks for Egypt. Fearing marginalization by Europe now that Central and Eastern Europe had emerged from behind the Iron Curtain and Southern European countries had excluded it from the ‘5 + 5’ process, Cairo saw the Mediterranean policy as mechanism through which Western European interests in the eastern sector of the basin could be strengthened. Moreover, the Mediterranean dimension also offered Egypt the opportunity of diversifying its external economic and political relations and not run the risk of becoming a US pawn in the area. Egypt outlined the extent of interaction it supports in the Mediterranean at the Ministerial Meeting of the Nucleus Group of the Mediterranean Forum held in Alexandria in July 1994.66 Discussion focused on issues of energy, science and technology for development, and environmental protection. The Mediterranean Forum which the Egyptians proposed can largely be called a technical institution which concentrates on channelling European capital to the southern shores of the Mediterranean. In contrast to France, Italy and Tunisia, Egypt is against the granting of a mandate in security matters.67 Thus, both Israel and Egypt have consistently manifested their ‘core’ credentials by demonstrating an ability to influence balance of power dynamics within their own region. The efforts of Israel to keep the peace process going and the endeavours of Egypt to adopt a more vocal Mediterranean foreign policy orientation are both attempts to preserve their respective positions of strength in the Mashreq. The semi-peripheral states in the Mashreq consist of Syria and Jordan. Their level of power permits them to play limited and selected roles in and around their own region. Unlike the core states, the semi-peripheral states tend to be more unpredictable when conducting their foreign policy, more ideological and less industrialized. Syria’s previous links with the Soviet Union and its spoiler attitude in the recent Middle East peace talks demonstrates this type of foreign policy behaviour. During the 1970s, an improvement in Syrian domestic political conditions and an increase in military reserves propelled the country to the forefront of relations in the Levant. Yet the late President Assad’s differences with Egypt and Iraq and his lukewarm relations with Saudi Arabia soon eliminated Syria from the Mashreq core system. By the late 1980s, Syria faced the double blow of having

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to live with a victorious Iraq on its eastern flank and the withdrawal of Soviet assistance.68 The distinctive characteristic of this sectoral division is that the countries classified possess enough power to entice external actors to assist them in their independent regional ambitions. Throughout the Cold War, Syria was one of the main client states of the Soviet Union in the Mashreq. In the 1990s, it became evident that a lasting Arab-Israeli peace cannot be brokered without the inclusion of Syria in a comprehensive peace agreement. In consequence, the United States has dedicated a large proportion of its diplomatic efforts in the Mashreq in trying to attract Syria towards the negotiating table. Seen from such a perspective, postCold War regional developments have had an ambiguous influence on the position of Syria in this sub region. This ambiguity stems from the fact that Syria is a key player in the Middle East peace process, yet faces marginalization because of its rejectionist stance. The limited power projection of Jordan is the main reason for its inclusion in the semi-periphery of the Mashreq. Its decision to sign a peace agreement with Israel in 1994 exhibits the limitations of its regional influence. Once the PLO followed the route taken by Egypt a decade earlier, Amman had little choice but to follow suit, or else risk being isolated from the main pattern of relations functioning in the area. Such an outcome would have relegated Jordan from the semiperiphery to the periphery of this sub grouping. Despite joining the peace process bandwagon, Jordanian relations with its Arab neighbours remain erratic. The opposition of King Hussein to the war against Iraq in the early 1990s drove a wedge between Amman and the rest of the Arab states that supported the UN coalition of forces. Jordan’s support of the American attack on Iraq in March 2003 helped to improve international perceptions of this country, although it has also increased support among anti-Western factions in the region. After a series of events which saw Amman lose diplomatic ground in the last few years, a few factors indicate that the relative position of Jordan in the semiperiphery of the Mashreq could begin to improve in the short term. One immediate benefit from the signing of the peace agreement with Israel in October 1994 is the rapid increase in cross-border activity between these two countries. The cooperative intergovernmental action between Jordan and Israel has triggered a plethora of transnational forces which include joint infrastructural programmes, cooperation in the financial sector and a rise in already devising plans to be able to act as a transfer point for commodities arriving from the West and destined for the Gulf and Saudi peninsula. The late King Hussein also introduced the first steps towards developing a democracy with the first multi-party elections held in 1993. The political stability of Jordan coupled with an increase in its domestic and international economic activities such as hosting the Middle East/North Africa economic summit in October 1995 assures that Amman will continue to play an active part in the Mashreq’s semi-periphery. If regional peace flourishes and Jordan is successful in executing its economic and financial programmes, the country could begin to play a more significant role in Mediterranean affairs. However, in the short term, Jordan will

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be caught up in investing all of its diplomatic resources in consolidating the Middle East peace process. The core and semi-peripheral states are the main players in a regional system. In contrast, peripheral states are much more passive, and are so weak they can only react to the international relations of their regions. In this case, the periphery includes Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority. These actors have very little or no influence in regional affairs. They are often within a regional powers’ sphere of influence or are completely side-lined by the more influential actors. In areas where geographic position, material weakness and internal political chaos have combined, a few peripheral states have emerged as battlegrounds, e.g. Lebanon. The balkanization of Lebanon has eased in the 1990s but the country remains to all intents and purposes a puppet of Syria. Palestinian representatives have also made a few significant steps forward following the agreement signed between Israel and the PLO in 1993. They, however, remain in the periphery of Levant interaction, largely dependent on other actors to help them voice their concerns. During the post-Cold War period, interaction between the countries of this sub grouping has shifted from cooperative to conflictual. The aftermath of the 1990–91 Gulf War saw a shift in regional alignments and ushered in a new core coalition of leading powers in the area that includes Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iraq. The prospect that Arab cooperation can prove durable has yet to prove itself true. The 1993 Israeli-Palestinian breakthrough has not turned out to be the permanent peace settlement that everyone was hoping it would. As a result intergovernmental conflictual patterns of relations remain the dominant type of interaction. The resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism has added to an increase in the enmity variable. Paradoxically, while prospects for economic links have gradually improved, political ties between Arab states in this sub grouping have weakened. An important contributing factor is the decline of pan-Arabism.69 This decline in the intensity of identification of the larger Arab community has also led to a reduction in commitment regarding Arab core issues. As a result, pan-Arab nationalist movements have weakened, fragmented or disappeared. Nevertheless, Arab societies and political systems remain interconnected and permeable to some degree.70 In the last decade there has been a clear increase in transnational responsiveness and cross-frontier ties based on Islam. The establishment of an Islamic state in future would likely act as a catalyst, and increase the density of cross-border interactions throughout the Middle East, as already witnessed in the Iraq war of 2003. While a diffusion of power has contributed to a more fragmented Mashreq sub region, historical and religious legacies continue to dictate the functioning of an intense pattern of relations. This is evident when one assesses the foreign policy priorities of the key actors in this region: bilateral regional relations remain top of the foreign policy agenda. These are followed by an urgency to establish strong relations with the United States. Bilateral contacts with the EU have also gained in prominence with Mediterranean relations per se figuring further down the foreign policy priority chain.

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To date, attempts to help improve relations within the Mashreq have not resulted in a diminishing of the intensity of conflictual relations. Israel’s security concerns continue to stand in the way of implementing a free-trade area in this sub region. It is also clear that the absence of a solid agreement between Israel and the Palestinians and a comprehensive peace settlement that embraces Syria and Lebanon continues to weaken any notion of Middle East integration. As a result, there is little scope to expect any of these actors to be in a position to contribute substantially to trans-Mediterranean security initiatives in the short term, even if Egypt continues to prove itself the exception.

Regional dynamics in the Maghreb The term Maghreb describes those countries that are located along the western coastline of North Africa. This consists of Algeria, Morocco, Libya and Tunisia. The concept of a Maghreb sub grouping adopted in this section is also a geopolitical one.71 The core states in this sector are Morocco and Algeria. Events in one of these states nearly always have an impact on the other, despite their objective differences. In addition, their cultural composition of similar, yet distinct blends of Arabo-Berber, Sunni-Muslim and African and European traditions help create intense patterns of cooperation and conflict. While patterns of interaction in Southern Europe have largely been cooperative dominant and the links in the Mashreq have been largely conflictual dominant, relations in the Maghreb have been much more mixed, with phases of conflict often being superseded by those of cooperation. One factor that helps to explain the intensity of relations between the states of the Maghreb sub grouping is the complementarity that exists among these countries. Rather than making it easier for them to cooperate, their infrastructural similarities make them arch-competitors. For example, Algerian industrialization policy is predicated on Algerian dominance of the Maghreb market, a policy bound to fail as others develop their own industrial base. Algeria and Morocco dominate the political, economic and military patterns of relations within this Middle Eastern sub region. Since achieving independence, these two countries have consistently attempted to tilt the balance of power equation in this sub region in their favour. In 1963 both clashed in a short-lived desert war over their inherited borders around the Western Sahara. In the past few decades Algeria, with the periodic support of Libya, has backed the Polisario Front in its struggle to assert the independence of a state – the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). On the other hand, Morocco has been attempting throughout to reintegrate this pre-colonial territory that was dismembered by the Spanish and French. Since 1991 the United Nations has managed to enforce a cease-fire in this area, but it has failed to enact a territorial referendum or otherwise propose a settlement that will bring long-term peace to the Western Sahara. Morocco has been able to sustain a favourable military supremacy for itself which has gradually eroded Polisario’s military, and more importantly, political objectives. It has also

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consolidated its position through population transfers to the Western Sahara and by increasing administrative control over Saharan population centres. Despite periodic improvements in relations between Morocco and Algeria through forums such as the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), the latter continues to provide financial assistance and territorial sanctuary to Polisario military forces. Recent efforts to broker a peaceful settlement to the Western Saharan issue by the United Nations have yet to break the gridlock that exists between the protagonists in this area. The Western Sahara conflict therefore continues to have the potential to erupt into a low-intensity conflict in future.72 This conflict seems set to follow the usual African pattern of brief hostilities until exhaustion of resources, followed by a cease-fire and then a lengthy period during which both progress and regress in the outcome of the conflict is registered.73 Trends in the last few decades indicate that Algeria’s position in the core sector of this sub region has been constantly slipping. The collapse of the oil prices in 1986 forced Algeria to reassess its policy of the 1970s and 1980s of regional hegemony. Algeria has been profoundly weakened by its internal conflict over the form of future governments in the 1990s. These factors have exacerbated further the fact that Algeria’s armed forces are much smaller than those of Morocco, placing further constraints on Algiers’ regional strategic ambitions. As part of the Arab Maghreb Union that it formed in February 1989 with Morocco, Tunisia, Libya and Mauritania, Algeria agreed to a mutual defence pact which place a further restraint on any military pretensions it might have in the region.74 Algeria’s failure to clamp down on Islamic militants and its insufficient managing of government crisis indicates that its role in the core sector has become that of a maverick rather than the regional stabilizer that it was in the past. In contrast, Morocco’s position seems to have been relatively strengthened. Its diplomatic handling of the ‘Perejil/Leyla’ Islands crisis against Spain in 2002 and its high profile handling of domestic terrorist activities in 2003 testifies to Morocco’s leadership aspirations in the Maghreb and throughout the Middle East. The semi-peripheral sector of the Maghreb consists of Libya and Tunisia. Libya’s level of power permits it to play a limited and selective role in and around this geopolitical area. Tripoli has constantly demonstrated a capability to be more ideological than its neighbours on numerous occasions. Libya is also less industrialized than either Algeria or Morocco. However, the distinctive feature that illustrates Libya’s semi-peripheral status that occasionally progressed towards the core sector is its ability to entice more powerful states to become involved in this sub region’s network of interactions. The Soviet Union’s Cold War track record gives clear credence to this fact. Moscow supplied the Gaddafi regime with both economic and military assistance throughout the 1970s and 1980s in exchange for access to its warm water ports scattered along the Gulf of Sidra. The 1986 bombing of Tripoli is another example of this ability to attract great power attention to the Maghreb. Of all the countries in the Maghreb only Libya’s hostility towards the West is endemic. It possesses a variety of short-range ballistic missiles that are capable of

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reaching Malta, Sicily and Southern Italy.75 It also has a submarine and air capacity that could potentially harass Western shipping lines in the western Mediterranean waterways. Given its size, it is perhaps the most militarized country on the North African littoral with as many as 2,300 tanks as against Morocco’s 250 and Algeria’s 900.76 The post-Cold War period has again witnessed the ability of Libya to maintain superpower and great power interest in the area, although now for different reasons. United Nations sanctions were introduced against Libya shortly after the downing of the Pan Am aeroplane over Lockerbie and remained in place throughout the 1990s. Although the Lockerbie affair cast a dark shadow over Libya and had a negative impact on Libya’s economic development, it did not affect the country’s main hydrocarbon export industry. From a political perspective, the whole affair can be viewed as actually enhancing the position of the Gaddafi regime internationally. The United States and the West in general seem resolved to accept that they are better off dealing with the devil they know rather than taking the risk of negotiating with less known political authorities that could emerge if a power vacuum were to develop in Tripoli.77 The Libyan government’s decision to start paying off the compensation claims of the Lockerbie families in August 2003 must be regarded as a positive step that allowed Libya to gradually integrate back into the international community of states. Much will, however, depend on what relations evolve between Washington and Tripoli. From a strategic standpoint it seems to make sense for Libya also to seek closer ties with the EU. Accepting the ‘acquis communautaire’ of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership would enable Libya to join this multilateral initiative that now brings together 25 European states and 10 Mediterranean partners. Libya’s track record is therefore typical of a number of post-Cold War states whose internal security dynamics present potential but not yet realized external security risks. At best, those states that are keen to promote stability in the western sector of the Mediterranean have one foreign policy option that will help avoid exacerbating the problem. Beyond economic support, the international community must find a way of bringing Tripoli back into the international society of states if the high level of potential instability is to be reduced. Failure to nurture cooperative links with Libya could result in repercussions that would extend beyond the sub region itself. These risks include an accelerated flow of refugees seeking political asylum especially to Italy, an exacerbation of racial and religious tensions both within North Africa and Europe and between North Africa and Europe, and the likely exportation of terrorist movements. In contrast, Tunisia is in the semi-peripheral sector of this sub region because of its sheer size in demographic, economic and military terms. With a population of one-third of either that of Algeria or Morocco and a birth rate falling faster than either, Tunisia has registered impressive growth figures in recent decades under the stewardships of Bourguiba and, after 1987, Ben Ali.78

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This is partly explained by the fact that the Tunisian economy is the most open to foreign investment in the area, a position it has held since the early 1970s. This puts Tunisia in a better position than its neighbours in relative terms to contend with its international debt which spiralled mid-way through the 1970s. In military terms, Tunisia is no match for either Algeria or Morocco. The former has an army four times larger and an air force six times larger than that of Tunisia. Tunisia’s foreign policy track record is much more consistent than that of its neighbours, opting to remain neutral in most cases of regional conflict. This policy has ironically promoted Tunisia to the front line of diplomatic activity in the Middle East. In 1978 the Arab League’s headquarters were moved to Tunis after Egypt was excluded from the League’s proceedings having signed the Camp David Accords. In 1982, the PLO headquarters were shifted to the outskirts of Tunis following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. However, Tunisia’s reluctance to support the UN coalition in the Gulf Crisis of 1990–91 seemed to start a process that has witnessed a general reduction of Tunisian influence in the Middle East. A drop in income from tourists and the cessation of exports to both Iraq and Kuwait resulted in a severe blow to the Tunisian economy. The short-lived improvement in relations in the Mashreq also somewhat reduced Tunisia’s fortunes, with the Arab League headquarters back in Cairo and the PLO now located in Jericho. Thus while the Middle East continues to exercise its historical and cultural hold over Tunisia, its distance from the main area of conflict has made it marginal to developments in the region itself. By contrast, Tunisia’s links with Europe are steadily increasing. In addition to an economic partnership with Europe through an association agreement within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership framework, Tunisia has also signed a series of bilateral agreements with Italy that has allowed it to increase its energy output across the Mediterranean. In the past decade Tunisia and Italy agreed to double the capacity of the 1983 gas pipeline that stretches across the Straits of Sicily to 40 billion cubic metres. Tunisia also started to export gas-generated electric power to Italy in the mid-1990s.79 An assessment of the patterns of interaction between countries in the Maghreb reflects their cooperative and conflictual nature. Interaction remains primarily intergovernmental, with transnational intercourse still at an embryonic stage. For example, intra-Maghreb trade remains at a few per cent. An increase in cross-border activity has been registered in the area of Islam, with fundamentalist groupings such as the Muslim Brotherhood supplying basic medical and educational services at a grass-roots level to help make up for the governmental inadequacies in these sectors. An analogy that accurately depicts the nature of interaction in the Maghreb is that of the checkerboard pattern of relations. According to this basic configuration of international relations, the states of the region have consistently acted as if ‘my neighbour is my enemy and my neighbour’s enemy is my friend’. This is the pattern of relations that was encouraged by the French during the nationalist period and it is the type of contact which has characterized relationships in the region thereafter. Even institutionalized attempts at regional unity, such as the African Union, Arab League and the Arab Maghreb Union, have been dominated and broken by this same pattern.80

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There is very little to suggest that this trend will change in the new millennium. Foreign policy considerations remain as divergent as ever, as highlighted in UMA proceedings held during the Gulf War of 1990–91. Morocco approved of a resolution ‘condemning the aggression against Kuwait, and Iraqi threats against the Gulf States’. Libya rejected it, Algeria abstained, while Tunisia boycotted the summit.81 Priorities in external affairs also remain varied. While bilateral relations in the Maghreb continue to receive special attention, the aftermath of the Algerian civil war and Libyan isolation have stalled any effective Arab Maghreb Union resolutions from taking place. At an UMA summit at Ras-Ahnouf in Libya in 1992, a Nine Point Plan of regional cooperation was initialled, stipulating the creation of a free exchange zone by the end of 1992, the creation of a customs union by the end of 1995, and the creation of a Common Maghreb Market by the end of 2000.82 In reality, little or no progress has been registered in removing trade barriers within the Maghreb. As a result, both Morocco and Tunisia have concentrated their diplomatic resources on establishing economic and political ties with the European Union. Both have signed and are implementing partnership agreements with the EU that will permit them to participate openly in European economic and financial circles. Algeria has also signed a partnership agreement leaving only Libya on the sidelines of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership framework. Historically, North Africa has only been a political and economic unit on very few occasions. There is no concept of a ‘Maghreb nation’ as there is of an ‘Arab nation’ despite efforts to institutionalize such a concept. In fact, no single Arabic word exists for the term North Africa, since ‘Maghreb’ refers properly to Morocco. The logic of reality thus points towards future relations in the Maghreb that are of accentuated conflict and interrupted cooperation, oscillating between these two poles, but never attaining either because of the multipolar division of power in this sub region. The increase of political and economic intergovernmental links between some of the countries in this area (Morocco, Tunisia and, more recently, Algeria) with Europe could be interpreted as signalling the start of a cross-fertilization or homogenization process between Europe and this sub region of the Middle East. However, transnational statistics, apart from those concerning the energy sector, reveal that this is unlikely to be the case. It should also be noted that interaction and interdependence do not necessarily indicate the emergence of a cooperative international region. They can also contain the ingredients of conflict as demonstrated in the Perejil Islands crisis. It is thus too early to speak of bridges being built across the Euro-Maghreb divide, let alone of a process that might lead to the development of an entity resembling a cooperative or conflict based Mediterranean region that incorporates Southern Europe, the Mashreq and the Maghreb.

Connections and disconnections: Southern Europe, the Mashreq and the Maghreb Having examined regional dynamics within Southern Europe, the Mashreq and the Maghreb, how objectively correct is it to claim that a Mediterranean region of

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some type is emerging? Are the patterns of interaction within and especially between these three sub regions strong enough to suggest the formation of a Mediterranean region? Do recent exchanges between Europe and the Middle East sub regions bordering the Mediterranean suggest the emergence of relations that are transnational or intergovernmental dominant? Or do relations across the basin constitute essentially distinct formations, each defined by interaction between the three sub regions bordering the Mediterranean? Traditionally, there is plenty that links these three sub regions of the Mediterranean. For almost a thousand years starting from Alexander the Great’s Empire until the end of the Pax Romana, the Mediterranean and its surrounding hinterlands formed part of a single political system dominated by Hellenistic culture. Throughout the seventh and eighth centuries, the Mediterranean served as a backdrop for the bitter military struggles between Christian Europe and the Islamic world. The start of the nineteenth century saw the Ottoman Empire decline to the point that they could no longer resist European expansion into the Middle East. This interest increased as oil became more of an important commodity by the turn of the century. The defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War resulted in the dismemberment of its Arab components into the League of Nations’ mandates and protectorates. The aspiration of Arab and Islamic unity was thus destroyed as the foundations for a number of separate states were laid. Despite the long history of interlinkage, the gradual European withdrawal from eastern and southern sectors of the Mediterranean opened up a window of opportunity for indigenous patterns of regional interaction to increase. Having exhausted itself in two World Wars, Europe yielded to superpower overlay. In the interim, indigenous forces within the Mashreq and the Maghreb sought to eliminate any imperial remnants from the vicinity. The Suez fiasco in 1956 and the expulsion of France from Algeria in 1962 severely undermined Europe’s position in the Mediterranean. By the start of the 1970s the United States and Soviet Union had replaced Europe as the principal actors in the basin. Although France maintained significant links with its former colonies in the Maghreb, the European’s strategic role in the Mediterranean was now mainly as allies of the United States. Throughout Southern Europe, national interests continue to shape different approaches towards the Mediterranean area. Within the general EU framework of cooperation and assistance, Southern European states feel they can act somewhat autonomously. This helps to explain the occasional competitive nature between France and Spain in the area.83 At an EU level, Southern European states have demonstrated that they are increasingly prepared to pool their diplomatic efforts to help lobby for more economic assistance to the southern Mediterranean countries. The states within this sub region therefore seem to be following a flexible dualtrack policy towards the Mediterranean, an independent bilateral approach as a national level and a coordinated multilateral approach at an EU level. The founding of the Arab League in 1944–45 is one of the first clear signs of indigenous patterns of regional interaction starting to gain ground in the Mashreq and the Maghreb. The League expanded to over 20 members and covered a

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geographical area spanning from the Atlantic coast of North Africa to the Arabian Sea. A common Arab identity and Islamic religion were strong enough cohesive elements for a politico-cultural forum to develop. Pan-Arab nationalism and Islam created transnational linkages of a largely political nature throughout the Mashreq and the Maghreb. The sheer number of states and the diversity of issues that has to be addressed guaranteed that this region would have its fair share of alliances, rivalries and wars. The question that has dominated the Middle East region is the Arab-Israeli conflict concerning the Palestinians. Practically all of the Arabs (especially Egypt, Jordan and Syria), found themselves pitted against Israel with short wars occurring at frequent intervals (1948, 1956, 1967, 1973, 1978, 1982). The Middle East peace process breakthrough of 1993 that augured for the evolution of a more cooperative dominant phase of relations proved short-lived as the Palestinian and Israeli conflict re-escalated at the turn of the new millennium. Further East, intense rivalry between the key actors of the Gulf, namely Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia, has shifted as Iraq is now occupied by a coalition of international forces led by the United States, Iran finds itself pressured by the United States and Saudi Arabia tries to cope with domestic strife. The withdrawal of Britain from the Gulf in the late 1960s allowed local regional dynamics to again develop unconstrained. The fiercest conflicts in the area to date are the 8-year Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s, the 1990–91 Gulf War and the Anglo-American war against Iraq in 2003. The Persian Gulf remains unstable as the reconstruction of Iraq, the isolation of Iran and the management of Saudi Arabia could all alter the balance of power equation in this area. An escalation of hostilities in any of these countries could easily spill over into the adjacent Mashreq sub region and as a result upset efforts to stabilize relations across the Middle East. In the Maghreb, less intense rivalries have developed between Algeria, Morocco, Libya and Tunisia. The principal flashpoint in this area is the Western Sahara where forces loyal to Algeria and those supported by Morocco continue to influence the succession struggle. The creation of the Arab Maghreb Union in 1989 between Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Tunisia and Mauritania seemed to usher in a period where very limited intergovernmental social, economic, political and military links could develop. It was also thought that the strengthening of this type of interaction would act as a catalyst to transnational patterns of interaction that are largely absent in the Maghreb. The Libyan-Lockerbie affair, the Algerian civil war and continuous rivalry between Morocco and Algeria have all but halted the process of establishing a more intensive cooperative intergovernmental Maghreb sub region. In short, different forms of regionalism are taking place in Southern Europe, the Mashreq and the Maghreb. It becomes easier to understand the different forms of regional development in each of these sub regions if one first clarifies the various levels of regional integration, from the lowest form of cooperation to the highest.84 When applied to the Mediterranean area, this classification of regional trading arrangements reveals the multitude of different schemes operating in a geographically proximate area. Southern Europe is by far the most integrated of the three sub

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regions encompassing the Mediterranean. As members of the EU and signatories of the European Single Act, the countries of this grouping have already established a free-trade area, a customs union, and a common market between them. In other words, countries in Southern Europe have eliminated completely quantitative trade restrictions and custom’s tariffs against each other’s goods and have agreed to adopt uniform import tariffs and common quota restrictions vis à vis countries outside this sub region. In addition, custom union provisions are extended to include the free movement of the factors of production (goods, people, capital and services) within and across the borders of participating states. Together with their counterparts in the EU and the newly admitted countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Malta and Cyprus, these countries are mapping out strategies to introduce higher forms of regional trading arrangements, namely economic and eventually political union. In contrast, no such patterns of commercial relations exist in the Mashreq or Maghreb. In the latter, the lowest level of regional trading exists, sectoral cooperation. This type of interaction occurs when cooperation is limited to welldefined sectors of production, such as oil and gas. Cross-border energy projects between Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia illustrate sectoral cooperation in the Maghreb. In the Mashreq, sectoral trading arrangements remain ad hoc, depending on the nature of governmental relations. Although limited to a few sectors, such as tourism, regional infrastructure projects that include Egypt, Jordan and Israel in the short term, and Lebanon and Syria in the longer term, are already being contemplated. Whether this low form of cooperation will eventually be upgraded to perhaps a free-trade area or a common market level of integration is an open question and depends largely on how successful the countries of the Mashreq and Maghreb are at sustaining peaceful regional relations. In the interim, the unsuccessful effort to spur commercial relations through the Middle East/North African (MENA) process in the 1990s demonstrated the obstacles that have to be overcome before higher forms of regional integration can be attained within each sub region of the Middle East. Focusing attention on the nature of interactions between Southern Europe, the Mashreq and the Maghreb, it is evident that no single recurrent pattern of interaction is discernable. Apart from energy and military ties with Europe, plus some residual intergovernmental cultural and political links, the post-independence Mashreq and Maghreb have evolved in their own distinctive ways. The process of Cold War superpower overlay in Europe and that of decolonization in the Mashreq and Maghreb has therefore seen the southern and eastern Mediterranean hinterlands become more introverted. Intergovernmental economic and military relations have continued unabated (oil and weapons purchases) but intergovernmental political and social ties have diminished and transnational linkages remain limited to the energy sector. Although Europe in general and Southern European states in particular have dedicated a slightly higher proportion of their economic and political resources in the post-Cold War period to their Middle Eastern neighbours, the level of political and economic

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interaction between the opposite shores of the Mediterranean remains limited. The concept of free trade between Europe and a few countries in the Middle East, namely Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Israel, remains a vision and is unlikely to be achieved by 2010 as stipulated in the Barcelona Declaration. Increasing socio-economic disparities between Europe and the Middle East reveals the lack of convergence that has been registered during the past two decades despite a series of ‘global Mediterranean policies’ and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership process since 1995. To summarize, an analysis of the degree and types of interaction in the Mediterranean area reveals that the disconnections between Europe and the Middle East far out measure the connections. This shows that references to centripetal tendencies in the Mediterranean exist more in theory than in practice. The Mediterranean Sea itself acts as a physical boundary between Europe and the Middle East. During the Cold War the Iron Curtain served the same purpose. However, the implosion of the Soviet Union has seen the notion of a European region expand to new frontiers. Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic states will become an integral part of European political, economic and social interaction upon membership of the EU in May 2004. Further East, the EU is already formulating a strategy labelled a ‘neighbourhood policy’ to manage relations with countries such as Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine and Russia. As referred to earlier, Turkey’s status in such constellations will largely depend on the EU’s decision on whether to commence accession negotiations with Ankara or not by the end of 2004. Accession into the EU would signal that Turkey has moved closer to the European orbit of relations in an economic and political sense, but its geographic position will continue to dictate that it remains linked in both intergovernmental and transnational terms to the Middle East. A review of relations between Southern Europe, the Mashreq and the Maghreb clearly demonstrates that although this collection of states in the Mediterranean area are geographically proximate, they have no common agenda and do not share perceptions of where their interests lie. Some of the geographically proximate states have strong bilateral relations with Europe. Others are closer to the Middle East region. Links between the sub regions bordering the Mediterranean and references to the notion of ‘Mediterraneanism’ seem to take place largely to bolster the position of individual states within their own region. The patterns of regional relations in the area do not indicate any tendencies towards an intensification in interaction between the states of the Mediterranean that would give credence to the notion of a Mediterranean region. It therefore appears the Southern European countries see certain states in and around the Mediterranean basin as strategically and economically important and thus want them in their sphere of influence. In much the same way, countries in the Mashreq and Maghreb identify states in the Mediterranean area as an important security concern and want them in their respective spheres of influence. This basic logic explains the pattern and nature of regional dynamics operating in the Mediterranean area. As a result, rather than an area where a ‘new’ international region is about to emerge, it is more accurate to see the Mediterranean at

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the start of the new millennium as a contact point between two different regions, Europe and the Middle East. References to a Mediterranean region are better described as boundary management devices rather than boundary transcending ones. Whether the Mediterranean becomes a permanent divide or a link between these two distinct regions depends on how far both sides are prepared to interact with one another.

The Euro-Mediterranean area: region or fault-line? The fluid nature of international relations since the end of the Cold War has resulted in a significant change in the diffusion of power throughout the international system. The Cold War bipolar system of states has been replaced by a more flexible pattern of relationships, with the only superpower, the United States of America, adopting a selective engagement foreign policy approach. Throughout the 1990s relations across the Euro-Mediterranean area have shifted from a cooperative dominant type of trend to more indifferent relationships within and between the sub regions of the Mediterranean. The collapse of the Middle East Peace Process towards the end of the millennium cast a dark shadow over Euro-Mediterranean relations in general and resulted in a perceptual divide gradually taking shape across cultural lines. The terror attacks of September 11th 2001 triggered a sudden chain reaction of fear that has raised awareness overnight of the necessity to re-think the concept of security. The anthrax in envelopes episode, accounting scandals and massive layoffs among major corporations, the Nasdaq average dropping from a high of 5,049 in March 2001 to the low thousands two years later, snipers terrorizing the Washington DC area, Code Orange warnings about additional terrorist attacks, and the SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) virus added to a sense of insecurity worldwide. The unilateralist diplomatic tendencies that the United States demonstrated especially during the run up to the attack against Iraq in March 2003 has put into question the entire multilateral emphasis that the United Nations and other international organizations have championed since the Second World War. The new world order that so many hoped for with the end of superpower rivalry in the postCold War world has quickly been replaced by a global security picture that is more disorderly than anything else. Alliances that have preserved global stability for decades no longer appear relevant as they fail to cope with the multitude of security challenges that the postCold War era has unleashed. State actors who have dominated international relations since the emergence of the Westphalian international system in 1648, again find their positions challenged by a number of non-state actors, including terrorist groups. What impact will this tension and clash between different actors in international relations have on the future international context within which regional relations take place? What consequences will the current wave of fluctuations have on the state system? Will the end of the east-west divide give way to a north-south divide?

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Will regional fault-lines separating different cultures and civilizations become a permanent feature of the emerging geopolitical landscape? The answers to the above questions will determine the nature of EuroMediterranean relations in the twenty-first century. Although it is too early to identify the contours of the international system, and by extension regional relations, that are emerging, it is clear that a reordering of the international system is taking place. It is also clear that those countries that seize the opportunities that are unfolding and navigate accordingly will be the winners in the system that emerges. The countries that do not act decisively will fall further behind and could become failed states in the not too distant future. The post-Cold War road map to date reveals that while a number of states and international organizations have succeeded in enhancing their power position by seizing opportunities that have appeared, others have diminished their standings. As the only superpower, the United States, has graduated to a hyperpower status. Other great powers have seen their star both shine and wane as security challenges force them to take strategic decisions. The major winners of the most recent round of international turbulence are evident. In recent years the United States has emerged militarily stronger and politically more decisive than during the 1990s. This augurs well for the United States in the years to come if it is able to learn from a number of lessons that are apparent at the start of the new millennium. Washington should realize that it is in its national interest to maintain close allies even though it is a superpower. A reassessment of its foreign policy priorities in the aftermath of the terror attacks in New York and Washington DC in its National Security Strategy review of September 2002 has led the United States to revitalize its global political, economic, and military outreach programmes. If America is able to remain engaged globally through the creation of a concert of alliances and partnerships its position as the only superpower in international relations is likely to remain unchallenged for decades to come. Russia has also succeeded in improving its position from its lowest point at the end of the Cold War by taking advantage of the shifting strategic alliances in the evolving international security framework. Membership of the G7 and the regular sharing of international limelight with other great powers has allowed Russia to regain some of the political grandeur of former Soviet days. Britain also starts the new millennium in a favourable position often having opted to play the role of deputy to the American superpower. In many ways Britain has strengthened its European, transatlantic and international hand by playing a leading role in this security paradigm shift. Reactivating the ‘special relationship’ with the United States will allow the United Kingdom to share in the global spoils that the Americans obtain. It will also enhance Britain’s international political, economic and military credibility as Britain is increasingly viewed as the junior power in the Anglo-American alliance. Ten years after its reunification, Germany continues to play a unifying role at a European level as the leading advocate of European Union expansion. Germany’s

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re-found international vigour has been somewhat dented by its diplomatic fallout with the United States in the months following the general election in Germany in September 2002. This should not overshadow the leading European role Germany is certainly destined to play, as perhaps best illustrated by the reconstruction of its capital Berlin and the more prolific role it is advocating in international relations. At the start of the twenty-first century, NATO has also transformed itself into a more versatile security arrangement that can tackle security challenges in Europe and beyond in a rapid manner. NATO’s immediate task will be to ensure that its forthcoming enlargement does not distract it from the global role that the world stage expects it to play. This topic will be elaborated upon in Chapter 4. In contrast, while the EU has sought to advance its common foreign and security policy (CFSP), its member states and other European countries have demonstrated an inability to deal with difficult challenges in a tactful manner. In the run up to the war against Iraq in the spring of 2003 the so-called ‘Vilnius 10’ (10 eastern European countries: Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) joined the heads of government of eight European NATO members (Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Italy, Spain, Poland, Portugal and Britain), who in an open letter supported the United States’ position against Iraq. This grouping of European states, which American Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld labelled the ‘new Europe’, was opposed by the ‘coalition of the unwilling’ led by France and Germany. This grouping of countries which also included extraEuropean powers such as Russia, China and several Arab and Muslim states were opposed to the use of force against Iraq in advance of another UN-authorized effort to certify Iraq disarmament. Although it is too early to determine what long-term impact such stark strategic differences will have on the emerging European security picture, it is clear that an effective common EU foreign and security policy is unlikely to emerge anytime soon. The admittance of 10 new members states to the EU in 2004 is also certain to slow down CFSP enthusiasm as the EU 25 re-define the parameters of their strategic partnership. A series of treaties, including Maastricht (1992), Amsterdam (1997) and more recently that of Nice (2000), has seen the European Union attempt to become a more decisive actor on the international stage. The Convention on the Future of Europe has allowed Europe to openly discuss sensitive issues in the run up to agreeing upon a constitution. The challenge that the EU faces of implementing its enlargement process, implementing an effective neighbourhood policy and succeeding in moving ahead with its institutional reform programme will be a difficult balancing act to perform. Failure to do so will however relegate this potential great power to the footnotes of history books in 50 years time. At a regional level, it is clear that there has been a resurgence of regional relations in different parts of the world. The two regions where relations have become more conflictual of late are Central Asia and the Middle East. This is an important development for the Euro-Mediterranean area as a whole as both regions directly

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influence the nature of relations across the Mediterranean. An escalation in tension across Central Asia that engulfed both Pakistan and India, both nuclear powers, would have a detrimental impact on international relations as a whole and increase regional tension in the Persian Gulf. The Middle East failure to implement the Oslo Peace accords during the 1990s has led to an increase in clashes between Israel and the Palestinians in the first years of the new century. The result has been a continuous decline of Arab political and economic reforms and a nose-dive in international perceptions of the Arab world. If the Arab world is to enhance its position in international relations it needs to maintain a united voice at an international level when it comes to the cause of a Palestinian state and also seek to stamp out extremists that seek a clash of civilization scenario. Belated overtures by the Bush administration in the United States and the Blair administration in Britain towards the recognition of a Palestinian state should be the Arab world’s defining cause at this moment in world history. An analysis of the society of states that are geographically proximate to the Mediterranean basin reveals two prominent regions. North-west of the Mediterranean is the geographical space which is labelled the European Union (EU). South-east of the Mediterranean basin is the geographical area which is labelled the Middle East. The four sub regions encompassing the Mediterranean are Southern Europe, the Balkans, the Maghreb and the Mashreq. As discussed earlier, each of the sub regions continue to follow different evolutionary patterns and there is very little to indicate that any of them will integrate with their counterparts across the Mediterranean any time soon. Relations across Southern Europe are largely cooperative dominant. Southern European EU member states have furthered their intergovernmental and transnational ties with the rest of Europe by signing up to the Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice treaties and by cooperating in the Convention on the future of Europe that is to formulate an EU constitution. In contrast, conflictual relations have consistently hindered closer cooperation between countries in the Balkans, the Maghreb and the Mashreq. Relations between these three sub regions of the Mediterranean remain primarily limited to an intergovernmental level. Cross-border types of interaction across the southern shores of the Mediterranean remain limited to the energy sector and Islamic political movements.85 The geopolitical shifts that have taken place throughout the Mediterranean since the Barcelona conference in November 1995 have forced Euro-Mediterranean strategists to reconsider what policy mechanisms should be introduced to ensure that the partnership goals outlined in the Barcelona Declaration are attainable. Shifts in patterns of relations in the Middle East and the Balkans during the last 5 years have forced the EU constantly to focus its attention on sub-regional relations in the area. The thaw in cold war relations in the Mashreq after the historic IsraeliPalestinian peace agreement of 1993 came to a practical halt with the election of Benjamin Netanyahu in late 1995. Aspirations that the Middle East peace process would become more comprehensive with the inclusion of both Syria and Lebanon were largely replaced by efforts to preserve the fragile peace process.

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Neither the Europeans nor the Americans were able to influence Israel’s more hard-line approach to the peace process that resulted in a freezing of peace negotiations. The suspension of the Middle East/North Africa (MENA) economic process in 1998 was the result of a concerted effort by the majority of Arab League members to terminate normal relations with Israel and revive the economic boycott against Israel.86 The election of Ehud Barak as Israeli Prime Minister in May 1999 saw a reactivation of the Middle East peace process. The Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000 and the elaborate peace talks between the Israelis and Palestinians under the auspices of the Americans at Camp David in July 2000 set the stage for a possible gradual permanent settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The inciting visit of Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon to the contested Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif area in Jerusalem sparked the massive outbreak of violence and resulted in the killing of dozens of people and wounding of hundreds that brought the peace process to an end. In his first speech after being declared Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon reiterated that he would actively seek to ensure that Jerusalem remains a united capital in Israel. Sharon’s first major policy initiative evolved around the theme of ‘A Plan for Strengthening Jerusalem’. Sharon’s intransigence over Jerusalem drew the Palestinian intifada into Jerusalem as a response to Sharon’s provocations. A hard-line Israeli government has weakened Arafat’s control of the Palestinian streets in the months thereafter. The collapse of the Oslo peace process has had a severe negative impact on the economy of the Middle East. The economy of Israel grew by 1–2 per cent in 2001, below the rate of population growth. As the Israeli stock market declined and unemployment in Israel climbed, the Palestinian economy hit rock bottom with unemployment hitting the majority of Palestinians. A decade after the Oslo Peace accords ushered in a sense of euphoria in the Middle East, a new sense of hope emerged in the spring of 2003 with the longawaited publication of the ‘Roadmap’ that is supposed to help Israel and the Palestinians return to the negotiating table after almost 3 years of bloodshed. While publication of the peace plan is certainly a positive development, a first assessment of the ‘Roadmap’ indicates that it appears too ambitious when it comes to keeping to timeframes. The delay in publishing it has already resulted in the goals set for 2003 being behind schedule. May 2003 was supposed to see the ending of terror and violence in the region and the commencement of creating Palestinian institutions that will be the backbone of an eventual Palestinian state. Phase Two of the ‘Roadmap’ between June 2003 and December 2003 is supposed to see efforts focused on creating an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders and attributes of sovereignty, based on a new constitution. This phase will actually start when Palestinian elections have been held and will seek to ensure ratification of a democratic Palestinian constitution. During this phase the sponsors of the ‘Roadmap’, the Quartet that consists of the United States, the European Union, the United Nations and Russia are also scheduled to convene an international conference to address the issue of supporting Palestinian economic recovery and formally launching the process that will lead to the creation of a Palestinian state.

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Phase Three of the ‘Roadmap’ scheduled for 2004 and 2005 is to consist of Israeli-Palestinian final status negotiations that are to iron out differences on all outstanding issues so that a permanent status agreement can be signed by 2005. If all goes according to plan, a second international conference will be convened at the start of 2004 to endorse the agreement reached on a provisional independent Palestinian state. The final agreement in 2005 would also consist of a permanent settlement of all issues including those concerning borders, Jerusalem, refugees and settlements. Support will also be forthcoming to support progress towards a comprehensive Middle East settlement between Israel and Lebanon and Syria. Despite the ‘Roadmap’s’ best intentions, it is evident that this peace plan can only be implemented if the indigenous actors in this conflict are finally prepared to coexist with one another. While Palestinian President Yasser Arafat and other Palestinian leaders such as former Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas expressed that they are satisfied with the targets set out in the ‘Roadmap’ document, it remains to be seen if they will be able to deliver the necessary reforms in the short timeframes indicated. The main actor to watch in the years to come is Israeli Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon. His coalition government and the Likud Party itself are certain to put pressure on him to resist agreement on freezing and dismantling of the settlements. Sharon has already indicated that Israel will want to negotiate some parts of the ‘Roadmap’ before moving to the final stages of implementation. This could result in a premature collapse of the entire initiative. The performance-based and goal-driven ‘Roadmap’ has been drawn and is to be executed under the auspices of the Quartet. Although the Quartet have pledged to meet regularly at senior levels to evaluate the parties’ performance on implementation of the plan, it is clear that only a more direct monitoring and enforcement stance is likely to ensure target dates being respected. The Quartet would certainly boost their profile in the region by appointing high profile envoys to the Middle East to monitor implementation of the ‘Roadmap’. At very least, the Quartet should agree to appoint one envoy to shuttle between the Israeli and Palestinian delegations and to be on hand whenever thorny issues risk derailing the entire process. If the Quartet is to be a credible sponsor of this Middle East peace initiative they must also be seen to be singing from the same song sheet. Differences that have surfaced at a transatlantic level between Europe and the United States and the divisions that emerged at the United Nations over the Iraq war in the first half of 2003 should be completely put aside if the Quartet is to have any influence on the course of Israeli-Palestinian relations. A concerted campaign to end the IsraeliPalestinian conflict and to establish a Palestinian state may actually facilitate the task of patching up differences between the great powers and simultaneously improve the perception of the entire Quartet, especially the United States, in the Middle East. Timing is everything if the ‘Roadmap’ is to be successful. The different phases can only be implemented if the provisions outlined in the previous phase have been achieved. Of course, even if the ‘Roadmap’ timeline slips somewhat, the goal of a permanent settlement is what ultimately matters. But a result-driven initiative

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such as the ‘Roadmap’ must be seen to be delivering the goods if the parties concerned are not to lose faith in this international peace plan. After the Oslo experience everyone concerned has an enhanced sense of realism. One hopes that the horrific experience of the alternative to peace will help both the Palestinians and the Israelis make the difficult compromises necessary if a permanent settlement to the Middle East conflict is to be found. Stability in the Middle East is dependent upon resolution of the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. The international community must dedicate the same effort and resolve that they did when dealing with Iraq towards resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Only then will a significant step have been taken towards transforming the Middle East region. In the Maghreb, efforts to promote more cooperative relations have also been at more or less of a standstill in recent years. Internal strife in Algeria and international sanctions against Libya have stifled attempts to reactivate the notion of a more integrated Maghreb, as was outlined in the Arab Maghreb Union Treaty of 1989.87 The European Union’s more active policy towards Algeria in 1998 and the visit by Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika to France in June 2000 have seen an improvement in Algerian relations with the international community of states.88 The United Nation’s decision to suspend the sanctions regime against Libya in 1999 and the EU’s invitation to Libya to attend the Euro-Mediterranean summit in Stuttgart in April 1999 have also helped create a more conducive Euro-Maghreb political climate. In any case, Libya’s decision to proceed with compensation to the families of the Lockerbie tragedy in 2003 follows in this trend. Diplomatic efforts to reactivate sub-regional initiatives such as the Arab Maghreb Union and the western Mediterranean 5 + 5 initiative that brings together Portugal, Spain, France, Italy and Malta together with Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya have so far met limited success. It appears that the EU should take advantage of this window of opportunity that has emerged and seek to play a more direct influential role in sub-regional relations across the Maghreb as will be further discussed later in this chapter. Along the northern shores of the Mediterranean, Southern European countries have also had to contend with an increase in turbulent relations in their vicinity throughout the 1990s and an improvement in relations more recently. Animosity between Greece and Turkey reached quasi-hostile intensity in early 1996 when a dispute over the sovereignty of a number of Aegean Islands resulted in an escalation of military movements on both sides. Diplomatic initiatives to formalize a set of good neighbourly principles in 1999 and 2000 have been promising but one should be cautious in equating a more cordial relationship between Greece and Turkey to a permanent cooperative relationship.89 Diplomatic interventions by the European Union and the United States, have so far not succeeded in breaking the Athens-Ankara stalemate over the thorny issue of a peaceful resolution to the Cypriot issue.90 Greco-Turkish relations will again be put to the test with the admission of Cyprus in May 2004 and by the EU’s decision concerning membership talks with Turkey that are due to be taken

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by the end of 2004. A positive outcome in both situations would set the stage for a more cooperative Greek-Turkish relationship in the decades to come. Since January 1997 Turkey has further strengthened its strategic alliance with Israel conducting a series of joint maritime search and rescue exercises. Naval exercises such as Operation Reliant Mermaid have taken place off the coast of Israel and included the participation of the United States and Jordan. The naval manoeuvres demonstrated this alliance’s ability to dominate pattern of relations in the eastern sector of the Mediterranean. The subsequent balance of power shift has resulted in an occasional outcry from Iran, Syria and prior to the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, also Iraq, who perceive the intensification of military cooperation as a direct threat to their sovereignty.91 Further West, stability in the Balkans has blown hot and cold. Regional relations received a boost in December 1997 when US President Clinton announced that US troops would remain stationed in the region until a more secure peace was achieved. Paradoxically, instability again emerged when the neighbouring country of Albania appeared to be on the brink of fragmentation. The increase in tension in Kosovo throughout 1998 and the outbreak of war between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Yugoslavia in March 1999 once again plunged the Balkans into turmoil. The fragile peace that has emerged with the creation of a Western Kosovo protectorate in no way guarantees that the decade of instability across the Balkans has come to an end.92 The EU’s Stability Pact to the Balkans and the Balkans states’ aspiration to become members of the EU augur for a more stable regional pattern of relations in this sub region of the Mediterranean than during the past decade. Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania are heading for EU membership before 2010. If their accession target date of 2007 is to be met Bulgaria and Romania need to step up their internal reform process. Croatia has lost precious time for reforms during the 1990s. It will find it near impossible to catch up with the two frontrunners, as negotiations will only start towards the end of 2004 when Bulgaria and Romania hope to finish their negotiations. The remaining Balkan countries (Albania, Bosnia, Macedonia, SerbiaMontenegro), together with Turkey should not expect to become EU members before 2015 because their political and economic reforms will take much more time and effort. Albania, Bosnia, Macedonia and Serbia-Montenegro have, however, been given an explicit membership perspective by the European Union. The European Council of June 2003 has underlined that ‘the Stabilisation and Association Process will remain the framework for the European course of the Western Balkan countries all the way to their future accession’. Their membership is unlikely to occur before 2015, as it will most probably take them more than a decade to comply fully with the Copenhagen criteria and align on the ‘acquis communautaire’. The pre-accession process is unlikely to start before the negotiations with Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia will have been concluded. For the next few years the EU neighbourhood policy in the Balkans will therefore be largely synonymous with reconstruction and development efforts, overcoming ethnic tensions and, above all, supporting political and economic reforms.

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The Euro-Mediterranean Summits: from Barcelona to Valencia and beyond The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) is certainly the most important regional process that currently exists in the Mediterranean as it brings together all of the European Union member states and 12 Mediterranean countries which are Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Syria, Lebanon, the Palestinian Authority, Turkey, Cyprus and Malta. In addition to strengthening north-south relations as the EU becomes more active in the Mediterranean, a high priority is also being given to nurturing southsouth relations that to date remain lacking. Specific efforts are being made to assist Mediterranean countries become more aware of the opportunities that exist in their neighbouring states, and offering the Mediterranean countries involved in the EMP incentive packages to pursue trans-Mediterranean ventures. After dedicating the majority of its external resources to Central and Eastern Europe at the start of the 1990s, the EU has attempted to use the EMP as a vehicle to revitalize its outreach programme towards the Mediterranean in an effort to spur cooperative relations in the area. At the first Euro-Mediterranean foreign ministerial conference which took place in Barcelona in November 1995 the 27 Euro-Mediterranean countries established three principal areas of cooperation: • • •

a political and security partnership with the aim of establishing a common area of peace and stability; an economic and financial partnership with the aim of creating an area of shared prosperity; a partnership in social, cultural and human affairs in an effort to promote understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil societies.93

The Barcelona Declaration stresses the strategic importance of the Mediterranean and is founded upon a basic understanding that future Euro-Mediterranean relations should be based on comprehensive cooperation and solidarity, in keeping with the privileged nature of the links forged by neighbourhood and history. The Euro-Mediterranean states also underlined their awareness that the new political, economic and social issues on both sides of the Mediterranean constitute common challenges and call for a coordinated overall response. As a result the EMP was established to act as a multilateral and lasting framework of relations based on a spirit of partnership, with due regard for the characteristics, values and distinguishing features peculiar to each of the participants. The Barcelona Declaration also stipulates that the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is not intended to replace the other activities and initiatives undertaken in the interests of the peace, stability and development of the region, but that it will seek to contribute to their success. The participants also supported the realization of a just, comprehensive and lasting peace settlement in the Middle East based on the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions and principles mentioned in

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the letter of invitation to the Madrid Middle East Peace Conference, including the principle land for peace, with all that this implies. The Euro-Mediterranean foreign ministers also agreed that the general objective of turning the Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity requires a strengthening of democracy and respect for human rights. It also requires a sustainable and balanced economic and social development programme and measures to combat poverty and promote greater understanding between cultures, which are all essential aspects of partnership. In the first chapter of the EMP dealing with the political and security partnership the participants agreed to act in accordance with the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as other obligations under international law, in particular those arising out of regional and international instruments to which they are party. They also agreed to develop the rule of law and democracy in their political systems, while recognizing in this framework the right of each of them to choose and freely to develop its own political, socio-cultural, economic and judicial system. Specific reference was also made to respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms and guarantee the effective legitimate exercise of such rights and freedoms, including freedom of expression, freedom of association for peaceful purposes and freedom of thought, conscience and religion, both individually and together with other members of the same group, without any discrimination on grounds of race, nationality, language, religion or sex. The 27 foreign ministers also agreed to respect and ensure respect for diversity and pluralism in their societies, to promote tolerance between different groups in society and to combat manifestations of intolerance, racism and xenophobia. The participants stress the importance of proper education in the matter of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The political and security partnership also calls for the settlement of disputes in the Euro-Mediterranean area by peaceful means and calls upon all participants to renounce recourse to the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of another participant, including the acquisition of territory by force. A commitment is also made to strengthen Euro-Mediterranean cooperation in preventing and combating terrorism, in particular by ratifying and applying the international instruments they have signed, by acceding to such instruments and by taking any other appropriate measure. Efforts are to be made to fight together against the expansion and diversification of organized crime and to combat the drugs problem in all its aspects. The Barcelona Declaration also promotes the concept of regional security by acting, inter alia, in favour of nuclear, chemical and biological non-proliferation through adherence to and compliance with a combination of international and regional nonproliferation regimes. This includes arms control and disarmament agreements such as Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), Test Ban Treaty (TBT) and/or regional arrangements such as weapons-free zones including their verification regimes.

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The Euro-Mediterranean states also agreed to pursue a mutually and effectively verifiable Middle East Zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems. The political and security chapter concludes with a reference to consider practical steps to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as well as excessive accumulation of conventional arms. It also calls upon EuroMediterranean countries to refrain from developing military capacity beyond their legitimate defence requirements, and at the same time reaffirming their resolve to achieve the same degree of security and mutual confidence with the lowest possible levels of troops and weaponry. Euro-Mediterranean signatories also agreed to promote conditions likely to develop good neighbourly relations among themselves and support processes aimed at stability, security, prosperity and regional and sub-regional cooperation. Specific attention was to be given to the promotion of any confidence and securitybuilding measures that could be taken between the parties with a view to the creation of an ‘area of peace and stability in the Mediterranean’, including the long-term possibility of establishing a Euro-Mediterranean pact, later defined as a Charter for Peace and Stability. In the economic and financial partnership, the participants emphasized the importance they attach to sustainable and balanced economic and social development with a view to achieving their objective of creating an area of shared prosperity. The partners acknowledged the difficulties that the question of debt can create for the economic development of the countries of the Mediterranean region. They agree, in view of the importance of their relations, to continue the dialogue in order to achieve progress in the competent institutions. The Euro-Mediterranean partners also agreed to accelerate the pace of sustainable socio-economic development and improve the living conditions of their populations, and increase the employment level and reduction in the development gap in the Euro-Mediterranean region. A narrowing of economic disparities would also be sought through the encouragement of regional cooperation and integration. The main goals of the economic and financial partnership would be the progressive establishment of a free-trade area, the implementation of appropriate economic cooperation and concerted action in the relevant areas and a substantial increase in the European Union’s financial assistance to its Mediterranean partners. The establishment of a free-trade area will be implemented through the new Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements between the European Union and the Mediterranean partners. The parties set 2010 as the target date for the gradual establishment of this area which will cover most trade with due observance of the obligations resulting from the World Trade Organization (WTO). With a view to developing gradual free trade in this area, tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade in manufactured products will be progressively eliminated in accordance with timetables to be negotiated between the partners. Trade in agricultural products is also to be liberalized progressively through reciprocal preferential access among the parties, as will trade in services including the right of establishment, having due regard to the GATS agreement.

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The participants decided to facilitate the progressive establishment of this free-trade area through the adoption of suitable measures as regard rules of origin, certification, protection of intellectual and industrial property rights and competition. They also agreed to pursue the development of policies based on the principles of the market economy and the integration of their economies taking into account their respective needs and levels of development. A particular effort was to be dedicated to the adjustment and modernization of economic and social structures, giving priority to the promotion and development of the private sector and to the upgrading of the productive sector and to the establishment of an appropriate institutional and regulatory framework for a market economy. The Euro-Mediterranean countries also agreed to endeavour to mitigate the negative social consequences that may result from such economic and financial adjustment, by promoting programmes for the benefit of the poorest populations. The promotion of mechanisms to foster transfers of technology from north to south was also to be part of the economic and financial partnership agenda. When it came to economic cooperation, the Euro-Mediterranean states agreed to cooperate in numerous areas some of which follow: they acknowledged that economic development must be supported both by internal savings, the basis of investment, and by direct foreign investment. The Euro-Mediterranean states stressed the importance of creating an environment conducive to investment, in particular by the progressive elimination of obstacles to such investment which could lead to the transfer of technology and increase production and exports. They also reaffirmed that regional cooperation on a voluntary basis, particularly with a view to developing trade between the partners themselves, so-called south-south regional integration, is a key factor in promoting the creation of a free-trade area. Euro-Mediterranean foreign ministers also emphasized their interdependence with regard to the environment, which necessitates a regional approach and increased cooperation, as well as better coordination of existing multilateral programmes. They also confirmed their attachment to the Barcelona Convention and the Mediterranean Action Plan and recognized the importance of reconciling economic development with environmental protection, of integrating environmental concerns into the relevant aspects of economic policy. All EMP states also agreed to establish a short- and medium-term priority action programme, including combating desertification, and concentrating on appropriate technical and financial support for such actions. Other commitments included recognition of the key role of women in development and an undertaking to promote their active participation in economic and social life and in the creation of employment. EMP states also stressed the importance of the conservation and rational management of fish stocks and of the improvement of cooperation on research into stocks, including aquaculture, and undertake to facilitate scientific training and research and to envisage creating joint instruments. The economic and financial partnership also acknowledged the pivotal role of the energy sector and called for a strengthening of cooperation in the field of energy

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policies. It also recognized that water supply together with suitable management and development of resources are priority issues for all Mediterranean partners and that cooperation should be developed in these areas. The Euro-Mediterranean participants also agreed to cooperate in several other areas such as that of developing and improving infrastructures, including through the establishment of an efficient transport system, the development information technologies and the modernization of telecommunications. They also undertook to respect the principles of international maritime law, in particular freedom to provide services in international transport and free access to international cargoes. The results of the ongoing multilateral trade negotiation on maritime transport services being conducted within the WTO are also to be taken into account when agreed. Reference was also made to the fact that science and technology have a significant influence on socio-economic development. The Euro-Mediterranean countries therefore agreed to strengthen scientific research capacity and development, and contribute to the training of scientific and technical staff and promote participation in joint research projects based on the creation of scientific networks. The Barcelona Declaration also has a financial cooperation pillar that some analysts have argued is the main reason why Mediterranean partners signed up to the EMP in the first place. In the Barcelona Declaration the Euro-Mediterranean states acknowledge that the creation of a free-trade area and the success of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership require a substantial increase in financial assistance, which must above all encourage sustainable indigenous development and the mobilization of local economic operators. Reference was made to the fact that the Cannes European Council in 1994 agreed to set aside ECU 4,685 million for this financial assistance in the form of available Community budget funds for the period 1995–99. This would be supplemented by European Investment Bank (EIB) assistance in the form of increased loans and the bilateral financial contributions from the Member States. Effective financial cooperation would be managed in the framework of a multi-annual programme, taking into account the special characteristics of each of the partners. The social, cultural and human affairs chapter of the EMP focuses on identifying mechanism that will assist in developing human resources, promoting understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil societies. The Barcelona Declaration stipulates that the Euro-Mediterranean partnership must contribute to enhancing educational levels throughout the region, whilst laying special emphasis on the Mediterranean partners. To this end, a regular dialogue on educational policies would take place, initially focusing on vocational training, technology in education, the universities and other higher education establishments and research. In this context as well as in other areas, particular attention will be paid to the role of women. The Euro-Arab Business School in Granada and the European Foundation in Turin are also identified as key institutions that will contribute to such cooperation. This partnership called for a meeting of representatives of the vocational training sector (policy makers, academics, trainers, etc.) to share modern management

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approaches. A similar meeting would also take place of representatives of universities and higher education establishments. The European Commission also committed itself to strengthening its ongoing MED-Campus programme. The EMP also called upon municipalities and regional authorities to be closely involved in the operation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The nurturing of a dialogue between cultures and civilizations was also included as a high priority in this sector of the partnership. The importance of improving mutual understanding by promoting cultural exchanges and knowledge of languages was highlighted. A work programme that would focus on cultural and creative heritage, cultural and artistic events, co-productions (theatre and cinema), translations and other means of cultural dissemination, and training was requested. The EMP would seek to foster a greater understanding among the major religions present in the Euro-Mediterranean region in an effort to facilitate greater mutual tolerance and cooperation. Support would be given to periodic meetings of representatives of religions and religious institutions as well as theologians, academics and others concerned, with the aim of breaking down prejudice, ignorance and fanaticism and fostering cooperation at grass-roots level. The Barcelona Declaration also recognized the important role that the media play when it comes to fostering a better cultural understanding. The European Union pledged to actively promote such interaction, in particular through the ongoing MED-Media programme. It also emphasized the fact that youth exchanges should be the means to prepare future generations for a closer cooperation between the Euro-Mediterranean partners. A Euro-Mediterranean youth exchange programme would therefore be established based on experience acquired in Europe and taking account of the Mediterranean partners’ needs. Euro-Mediterranean senior officials would also meet periodically to discuss measures likely to facilitate human exchanges resulting from the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, especially those involving officials, scientists, academics, businessmen, students and sportsmen, including the improvement and simplification of administrative procedures, particularly where unnecessary administrative obstacles might exist. The EMP partners also agreed to cooperate on raising awareness, information and prevention in the healthcare sector. They also pledged to develop public health services, in particular healthcare, primary health centres, maternal and child health care services, family planning, epidemiological supervision systems and measures to control communicable diseases. This would include training of health and healthadministration personnel and medical cooperation in the event of natural disasters. Given the importance of the issue of migration for Euro-Mediterranean relations, the EMP states agreed to encourage meetings that would focus on making proposals to manage migration flows and pressures. These meetings will take account of experience acquired, inter alia, under the MED-Migration programme, particularly as regards improving the living conditions of migrants legally established in the Union. Fighting terrorism was also highlighted as a top priority for all the parties. To that end, officials agreed to meet periodically with the aim of strengthening

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cooperation among police and judicial and other authorities. In this context, consideration will be given, in particular, to stepping up exchanges of information and improving extradition procedures. Euro-Mediterranean officials would also meet periodically to discuss practical measures which can be taken to improve cooperation among police, judicial, customs, administrative and other authorities in order to combat, in particular, drug trafficking and organized crime, including smuggling. In the final section of the Barcelona Declaration entitled ‘Institutional Contacts’, the EMP states agreed to concentrate on establishing a Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Dialogue. An Inter-Parliamentary Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean was held in Malta in November 1995. The European Parliament would take the initiative with other parliaments concerning the future Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Dialogue, which could enable the elected representatives of the partners to exchange ideas on a wide range of issues. Regular contacts among other European institutions, in particular the Economic and Social Committee of the European Community, and their Mediterranean counterparts, would seek to contribute to a better understanding of the major issues relevant in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The main task at the second foreign ministerial Euro-Mediterranean meeting in Malta in April 1997 was to ensure that the Middle East peace process stalemate did not completely stall the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The Malta meeting is the only meeting of its kind so far to be held in a Mediterranean partner country, a clear indication of the long way yet to go before one can truly talk of a common partnership. Given the more indifferent patterns of regional relations that exist in the Mediterranean than those that existed in November 1995, it was no small feat that the second EMP meeting could take place. The high turnout of foreign ministers at the EMP meeting in Malta, particularly the presence of Syria, Israel and the Palestinian Authority, illustrates the importance that the participating countries attach to the process that offers the possibility of extending cooperative patterns of relations at several levels. Top of the agenda was the endorsement, or at least elaboration, of a Charter for Peace and Stability that would lay the foundations for the peaceful resolution of crisis situations and conflicts throughout the Euro-Mediterranean area. Such a Charter would enable the partners to identify the factors of friction and tension in the Euro-Mediterranean area and to carry out an assessment of how such destabilizing focal points could be managed. In actual fact the Malta Declaration indicated the little headway that was registered in moving ahead with implementing such a goal: The Participants take note of the work of Senior Officials on a Charter for peace and stability in the Euro-Mediterranean region, and instruct them to continue the preparatory work, taking due account of the exchanged documents, in order to submit an agreed text at a future Ministerial Meeting when political circumstances allow. (Malta Declaration, May 1997)94

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The vagueness of the above phrase is a clear indication of the lack of progress that has been achieved in conceptualizing a framework for setting up a pan-EuroMediterranean security arrangement. The partner countries found it difficult to commit themselves to an incremental work programme that would nurture cooperative relations, a prerequisite to introducing a functional Charter. They also failed to hammer out a specific timetable within which such a framework of analysis could be introduced. The stalemate in the Middle East made it all but impossible even to contemplate moving ahead in such a direction, a harbinger of developments to come. The Euro-Mediterranean Process was given a new boost of confidence at an informal gathering of foreign ministers of the participating countries in Palermo in June 1998 during the British Presidency of the EU. The meeting helped to chart a less ambitious work plan in an effort to assist EMP countries define a practical package of confidence building measures that would create the necessary atmosphere within which a more elaborate mechanism, such as a security charter could be fleshed out.95 The Third Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Ministerial conference that took place in Stuttgart in mid-April 1999 provided another opportunity to examine how the EMP had progressed since its launching in Barcelona in November 1995.96 The Stuttgart conference served the purpose of injecting another dosage of realpolitik into the Barcelona Process. Whereas the second Euro-Mediterranean ministerial meeting in April 1997 in Malta was overshadowed by the stalemate that was developing in the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP), the Stuttgart conference was constantly overtaken by diplomatic overtures that were unfolding in the Kosovo crisis. It is therefore clear that the EMP is not a cooperative security initiative that should be viewed in isolation of regional dynamics unfolding simultaneously in the vicinity of the Euro-Mediterranean area. Geopolitical shifts that have occurred in the Mediterranean since the launching of the Barcelona Process and the course of events surrounding subsequent high-level Euro-Mediterranean ministerial meetings have made it blatantly clear that a strategic reassessment on how to implement the goals outlined in the Barcelona Declaration is immediately necessary. The Stuttgart conclusions again supported the continuation of the MEPP. While a welcome development, the EU has not succeeded in doing much more than pay lip service to the goal of revitalizing the MEPP. The fact that the Barcelona Process has not had a significant positive impact on the MEPP between 1997 and 2003 underlines this basic fact. While the success of the EMP is dependent upon advancement of the MEPP, the EMP has had very little influence, if any at all, on the MEPP. If Euro-Mediterranean policy makers are serious about influencing the MEPP in future, a number of factors should be taken into consideration. Ignoring actual relations is no longer a credible position to adopt. The EU should seriously consider applying the concept of conditionality more consistently when it comes to dispersing political and economic resources to the Middle East region.

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Engaging high-level Israeli and Palestinian officials on the theme of a future cooperative Middle East through a regular process of dialogue under the auspices of the EMP should also commence in earnest. The EU should also signal that it is prepared to boost significantly regional assistance to those sub regions of the Mediterranean that demonstrate the most promising signs of progress. This will serve as an incentive to those advocating a peaceful path to regional relations in the Mediterranean. This is particularly the case now that regional relations in the Middle East and the Maghreb are at a crossroads. The ‘Roadmap’ peace plan that envisages an atmosphere more conducive to a finality of peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians and efforts to reintegrate Libya and Algeria into a Maghreb sub-regional framework offer a good basis upon which more cooperative Euro-Mediterranean relations may be advanced. Taking into consideration the particular sub-regional trends that are currently manifesting themselves in the Mediterranean area is a prerequisite to spurring sub-regional and intra-regional cooperation. Elaboration of the political and security chapter of the EMP took a step forward at the Stuttgart Euro-Mediterranean foreign ministerial meeting with a renewed commitment to support already existing partnership building measures. This includes developing further the Euro-Mediterranean Information and Training Seminars for diplomats that have been held twice yearly since October 1996 (Malta Seminars) and foreign policy activities of the Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission (EuroMeSCo). Both have been contributing to the shaping of a culture of dialogue and cooperation through informal exchange and open discussions between practitioners involved in the implementation of the EMP. Such interaction at the human dimension level of cooperation is an area that needs to be further strengthened. The inclusion of guidelines for elaborating a Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability at the Stuttgart foreign ministerial meeting was also a positive development. Identifying the framework within which a security charter can be spelt out is essential if progress in such an endeavour is to be registered. It is, however, clear that a Euro-Mediterranean Security Charter remains a medium- to long-term goal, that is, 5–10 years from now. In the interim, the guidelines that have been published are a good exercise in taking stock of what security concepts may be applicable in due course. EuroMediterranean security strategists should focus their analyses on identifying what sections of the guidelines can be introduced in a gradual manner, as implementation of the Barcelona Process takes place. At the Stuttgart meeting the EU also committed itself to continue financing the Euro-Mediterranean process between 2000 and 2006, although no precise funds were earmarked. The EU also took the necessary step of eliminating bureaucratic bottlenecks of financing with the introduction of simpler MEDA funding procedures. This has helped to avoid a situation where the interest of the Mediterranean partners participating in cooperative Euro-Mediterranean ventures was certain to wane. The Stuttgart conference also provided a number of positive inputs that could boost the EMP partnership if properly harnessed. The invitation to Libya to

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attend the foreign ministerial meeting was a first step towards integrating this geo-strategically important North African country into the international community of states. The gradual integration of Libya into the EMP framework will facilitate the task of furthering transnational cooperation across the southern shores of the Mediterranean in general and the Maghreb in particular. It could even facilitate re-launching efforts to activate the dormant Arab Maghreb Union (UMA) process that sought to emulate the European experience of integration. Stuttgart also identified a number of important events around which the EMP will evolve in the twenty-first century. The decision to organize an investment conference and informal Foreign Ministerial conference during the first half of 2000 during the Portuguese Presidency of the EU allowed policy makers to monitor developments in each chapter of the process. In a follow-up to the Stuttgart meeting Euro-Mediterranean foreign ministers met in Lisbon in May 2000 for a think-tank type meeting to discuss the state of the Euro-Mediterranean process. At the gathering there was a general consensus that the EMP process would need to be re-launched during the French Presidency in the second half of 2000. The EU Council of Ministers also agreed to adopt a declaration on ‘Revitalising the Euro-Med Partnership’. This document served as a framework upon which the Fourth Barcelona Foreign Ministerial meeting took place in November 2000. The holding of the Fourth Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Ministerial Meeting in Marseilles in November 2000 during the French Presidency of the EU also demonstrated the clear commitment that the EU and its partner countries have to implement further the objectives of the Barcelona Declaration. This is particularly clear when one considers the extremely difficult phase that Middle East relations have been experiencing since the collapse of peace talks at Camp David in July 2000. At the Foreign Ministerial meeting in Marseilles the ministers reconfirmed the necessity to reinforce the political dialogue even though the adoption of the Charter for Peace and Stability will have to wait until political circumstances allow. In the economic and financial sector the ministers also reconfirmed the objective of creating a free-trade area by 2010 and called for an acceleration of ongoing association agreement negotiations with Algeria, Syria and Lebanon. The EU also announced a budget of 5.35 billion Euro for the new MEDA programme (2000–6) and the European Investment Bank allocated ¤6.4 billion for aid loans to the Mediterranean for 2000–7, with an additional ¤1 billion put in reserve. The total EU budget for the Mediterranean area during this period is therefore ¤ 12.75 billion. In the social, cultural and human sector the ministers stressed the importance of training and employment and recommended the concerted preparation in the year 2001 of a regional programme in the field of Justice and Internal Affairs. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs also announced that they would meet again during the Belgian Presidency of the EU in the second half of 2001 and that the Fifth Euro-Mediterranean foreign ministerial conference would take place in the first half of 2002 during the Spanish Presidency of the EU. Meeting at regular intervals has allowed the Euro-Mediterranean states to take stock of

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developments in their region of the world and also focus on issues that are hampering implementation of the Euro-Med agenda. The Valencia Euro-Mediterranean foreign ministerial summit in April 2002 served as an opportunity to take stock of the EMP 6 years after its launching and also to focus on a more short-term agenda that would strengthen the EMP’s relevance to everyone involved in this process. In an effort to address the incomplete implementation of the main objectives of the Barcelona Declaration, the EMP foreign ministers agreed to establish an Action Plan on reinforced political dialogue, further development of economic, commercial and financial cooperation and renewed emphasis on the social, cultural and human dimension. In the political and security partnership section of the Valencia Action Plan the EMP states committed themselves to further an effective dialogue on political and security matters, including on European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and to enhance the stability of democratic institutions. They also agreed to focus more on the issue of conflict prevention, crisis management and to monitor more closely the impact of EU enlargement on the EMP. Reference was again also made to the drafting of a Charter for Peace and Stability although no specific timeframe was put forward. The issues of human rights, and terrorism were also addressed. The Valencia Action Plan also calls for a strengthening of existing partnership building measures such as the Malta Seminars and the Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission (EuroMeSCo) and calls for the identification of new partnership building measures that would seek to strengthen good neighbourly relations on a regional and sub-regional basis. In the economic and financial partnership section of the Valencia Action Plan the EMP states renewed their commitment to the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean free-trade area by 2010 and called for the conclusion of association agreement negotiations with Syria and an acceleration of the ratification and implementation processes in all other partner states. The Valencia Action Plan also expressed its strong support for efforts to enhance south-south integration and applauded efforts by Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan and Egypt that had agreed to establish a free-trade area by 2007 through the Agadir Process. A commitment was also made to support efforts that furthered free trade in the service sector, improving market access in agriculture, and improvement of financial cooperation including improvement of the management of the MEDA programme. Of particular interest was the highlighting of the fact that the European Investment Bank was planning to make available ¤2 billion a year of net lending and risk sharing commitments to the EMP partner countries to 2006, including a growing share to finance private sector projects. The Action Plan also took note of the interest expressed by the Mediterranean partners in the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean Development Bank to promote investment and economic development. Although Spain supported this initiative from the start of its EU Presidency, it was unable to attract enough support among other EU member states to win a firm commitment to set up such a financial

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institution. The Action Plan leaves open the possibility of establishing an EIB majority owned subsidiary in the Mediterranean, but only after evaluating the track record of the existing economic and financial facility towards the end of 2003. In an effort to increase the EMP’s visibility the Valencia Action Plan also commits EMP states to further implementation of projects in the transport, energy, telecommunications, tourism and investment sectors. The importance of ensuring sustainable development with a high degree of environmental protection was also stipulated. In the social, cultural and human dimension of the Valencia Action Plan the emphasis was put on strengthening cooperation in the field of justice, combating drug trafficking, organized crime and terrorism as well as illegal migration. A ministerial conference on Migration would be held in the second half of 2003. Taking place a little more than 6 months after the terror attacks of September 11th 2001, the Valencia Action Plan also attaches special interest to the promotion of dialogues between cultures and civilizations. For the first time, an explicit reference is made to the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean Foundation to promote a dialogue of cultures and civilizations and to increase the visibility of the Barcelona Process through intellectual, cultural and civil society exchanges. The Euro-Med Foundation would be based in the principle of co-ownership and work in close coordination with other similar institutions including private sector entities. The Valencia summit also endorsed the Action Programme on Dialogue between Cultures and Civilisations aiming at Youth, Education and the Media. Existing programmes such as Euromed Heritage and Euromed AudioVisual would be further strengthened. A programme on Information and Communication would be launched with the specific aim of improving the visibility of the EMP. Support was again extended to measures aiming at improving the social dimension of Euro-Mediterranean relations and cooperation between local entities. The Valencia Action Plan also welcomes the holding of the Civil Forum in Valencia and agreed to define further measures to ensure closer cooperation between civil society and the governmental dimension of the EMP. The Valencia Action Plan calls for the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly as proposed by the European Parliament (EP). EuroMed senior officials are called upon to liaise with the Parliaments of the EuroMediterranean partners and the EP to examine the necessary arrangements to facilitate the establishment of such an institution. It was also agreed that the Valencia Action Plan would be the object of a first evaluation at the next official Euro-Mediterranean Conference of foreign ministers, (Barcelona VI), that would be held in Naples in December 2003 under the auspices of the Italian EU Presidency. In May 2003 Euro-Mediterranean foreign ministers met for a mid-term meeting in Crete. The purpose of the meeting was to take stock of the progress registered in the EMP, particularly in the implementation of the Valencia Action Plan and to discuss the future development of the EMP, especially in light of the future enlargement of the EU.

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A substantial change would take place following EU enlargement as the membership of the EMP would increase to 35 states. The EU Commission has already proposed the establishment of a new EU neighbourhood framework as set out in its Communication on ‘Wider Europe – Neighbourhood’.97 At the Crete summit the foreign ministers discussed the latest developments in the Middle East and the Mediterranean. They welcomed the publication of the Middle East ‘Roadmap’ that envisaged the creation of a Palestinian state by 2005. The Ministers reiterated that the Middle East Peace Process and the Barcelona Process are complementary and the EMP should therefore seek to make a positive contribution to the stabilization of the Mediterranean region. The Greek EU Presidency hosted the Crete meeting and welcomed a Libyan delegation, and other special guests that included the Arab League and Arab Maghreb Union (UMA) and Mauritania. In the political and security partnership participants reiterated their support for concerted action in tackling sources of instability such as terrorism and reconfirmed the mandate of the Senior Officials to continue working on a Charter for Peace and Stability that would be adopted when the political situation in the Mediterranean allows. Support for the EU Commission’s Communication on ‘Reinvigorating EU actions on Human Rights with Mediterranean partners’ and for the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly was also forthcoming. In the economic and financial partnership the foreign ministers renewed their support, this time in the form of technical expertise, for the Agadir Agreement providing for free trade between Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan and Egypt by 2006. The participants also acknowledged the good progress registered with the Association Agreements: such agreements are now in force with Tunisia, Morocco, Israel and Jordan, and on an interim basis with the Palestinian Authority and Lebanon. Egypt and Algeria have yet to ratify their Association Agreements and Syria is still negotiating such an agreement. The Crete Conclusions welcomed the setting up of the Facility for EuroMediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP) launched in October 2002. They also recalled that FEMIP would be evaluated towards the end of 2003 so that a decision on incorporation of an EIB majority owned subsidiary dedicated to EMP countries could be taken. The social, cultural and human partnership confirmed that agreement on the regional programme on justice, combating drugs, organized crime and terrorism and the social integration of migrants and the movement of people was a significant achievement of the Valencia Action Plan. The foreign ministers endorsed the Valencia Action programme for the dialogue of cultures and civilizations focusing on Youth, Education and Media and supported the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean Foundation. In fact, the Crete Conclusions consist of two annexes, the first entitled ‘Guiding Principles for the Dialogue Between Cultures and Civilisations’ and the second entitled ‘Euro-Mediterranean Foundation on a Dialogue of Cultures’ that also contains an indicative list of activities that such a Foundation could implement. The elaborate documentation dedicated to the establishment of a EuroMediterranean Foundation is certainly one of the most significant outcomes of the

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Crete meeting. If the guidelines succeed in serving as a basis upon which an actual EMP Foundation is set up in the near future this would certainly be a breakthrough in the chapter dealing with the promotion of a social, cultural, and human partnership. The foreign ministers also took note of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Arab Human Development Report and agreed that the proposals put forward on addressing the social consequences of economic transition should be considered within the third chapter of the EMP. In an attempt to increase the EMP’s visibility, the participants at Crete also welcomed implementation of the regional programme on information and communication. The so-called ‘Euromed Dialogue’ would project its messages through television and radio to encourage a dialogue and raise public awareness of activities taking place within the EMP framework. Given the more indifferent patterns of regional relations that have dominated Mediterranean relations than those that existed in November 1995, it is no small feat that the Euro-Mediterranean process has continued to evolve. The consecutive high turnout of foreign ministers at EMP meetings in Malta, Palermo, Stuttgart, Lisbon, Marseilles, Brussels, Valencia and Crete testifies to the importance that the participating countries continue to attach to the Barcelona Process. As the Barcelona Process approaches its tenth anniversary in 2005, the participating Euro-Mediterranean countries should take stock of progress registered in each of the different cooperative sectors they are seeking to advance. The groundwork for the eventual introduction of a Charter for Peace and Stability, preparations for the smooth functioning of a Euro-Med free-trade area and the establishment of an interactive Euro-Mediterranean Foundation that brings civil society together at regular intervals should be the priority areas that policy makers focus on. A review of the Valencia Action Plan of April 2002 that identifies those areas of cooperation where implementation of confidence-building measures can proceed in the short term should also take place.

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The political and security partnership

The first chapter of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership dealing with political and security relations across the Euro-Mediterranean area has often been described as the main pillar of the Barcelona Process. The need to establish a security structure in a heterogeneous region as the Mediterranean has long been identified as a necessity if sources of insecurity are going to be managed in a constructive manner. The most comprehensive of security initiatives to be proposed in the Mediterranean in the post-Cold War era prior to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was the Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM).98 The CSCM proposal was put forward by Italian Foreign Minister Gianni De Michelis at the Paris ministerial meeting of the Euro-Arab Dialogue in December 1989 and by Spanish Foreign Minister Francisco Fernandez Ordonez in his presentation at the Ottawa Open Skies Conference in February 1990.99 The CSCM initiative was officially launched at the Palma de Majorca meeting in September 1990 when the Italian-Spanish ‘Non-paper on CSCM’ was circulated. It essentially advocated a debate on Euro-Mediterranean security issues and put forward three basic arguments to attract political support. First, from an historical perspective, the indivisibility of security in Europe and the Mediterranean was emphasized. Echoing the CSCE (Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe) Helsinki Act of 1975, the case was put forward that ignoring the Mediterranean would be equivalent to Europe ignoring its own history and identity. Second, the interdependent nature of security dictated that Europe participate in Mediterranean affairs if it wanted to influence international relations in this part of the world. Third, instability in the Middle East at the start of the post-Cold War, notably in Iraq, highlighted the urgent need for a crisis prevention mechanism in the Mediterranean.100 All three rationalistic arguments would later become fundamental selling points of the political and security chapter of the Barcelona Process. To date, the CSCM has not moved beyond the theoretical stage of debate. In the past decade the foreign policy priorities of Italy and Spain have shifted away from the Mediterranean to European and global concerns. While Spain has rekindled its Mediterranean vocation through the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (the EMP was of course launched in Barcelona), Italy has not focused on the Mediterranean in any concerted manner in recent years.

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The CSCM and to a certain extent, the subsequent Euro-Mediterranean political and security partnership, have also suffered from what can perhaps be best described as a lack of regional and international champions. The Southern European EU states of Portugal, Spain, France, Italy and Greece were not able throughout the 1990s to form an effective sub-regional political lobbyist type grouping that would advance Mediterranean security issues within the EU policy-making framework. As a result, Mediterranean security concerns have either been paid lip service, downplayed or completely ignored as the process of EU deepening and widening dominated regional affairs. Without the explicit support of either the European Union or the United States, the CSCM has remained a non-starter.101 In contrast, while the EMP enjoys the full backing of all EU member states and Mediterranean partners, the United States has not been invited to participate in this process. Exclusion of the world’s only superpower in the EMP security debate is often regarded as a major weakness of this process, given the United States’ direct role in Mediterranean relations and its power projection capability in the Middle East. The positive steps registered between the Palestinian Authority and Israel during the mid-1990s and again during the Euro-Mediterranean foreign ministerial conference in Malta in April 1997, and up to the Camp David peace talks of July 2000, shed light on the positive influence the European Union can have on the outcome of regional relations. If the EU is to have a more direct positive impact on relations in the Mediterranean it must seek to increase the level of interdependence between Europe and the Mediterranean. A Euro-Mediterranean partnership must succeed and not precede such regional dynamics. Intergovernmental interaction must be complemented by commercial and civil societal interaction if a comprehensive partnership is to be achieved. The EMP political and security partnership agenda as outlined once again at the Euro-Mediterranean foreign ministerial summit in Crete in May 2003 remains an ambitious one. EMP states are committed to maintaining an effective dialogue on security matters especially the evolution of the EU’s Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in an effort to avoid the creation of new security fault-lines across the Mediterranean. They are also committed to developing preventive diplomacy mechanisms in a specific effort to manage the security challenges of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). With so much good will constantly being expressed on a regular basis at EMP foreign ministerial meetings why has the Euro-Mediterranean political and security partnership not succeeded in producing a Charter for Peace and Stability after a euphoric start to security cooperation in the first few years of the EMP? Whose security interests is the EMP really seeking to advance – the European Union’s interests as critics of the EMP regularly pronounce or that of all the Euro-Mediterranean area as envisaged in the Barcelona Declaration? What are the prospects for a more active and effective EU external policy towards the Mediterranean, including relations in the Middle East? To date, the European Union remains an economic hegemon in the Mediterranean area. All the countries in the basin are highly dependent on conducting trade with

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Europe. The aspiration of creating a Euro-Mediterranean free-trade area by the year 2010 as stipulated in the Barcelona Declaration of 1995 and the negotiation of ‘association agreements’ with the Mediterranean partner countries in the interim augur well for a more assertive EU economic role in the Mediterranean. Whether this process will enable the EU to establish a more proactive political role with its southern periphery is however no foregone conclusion. Such an outcome will depend largely on how successful Brussels is in implementing its goal of establishing a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) as envisaged in the Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice Treaties. The appointment of such a prolific individual as Javier Solana to the post of High Representative of the CFSP and the creation of a policy planning unit for security policy a few years ago are certainly developments that could be seen as stepping stones towards a more effective common foreign and security policy. Harbingers of a more active EU foreign policy towards the Mediterranean and by extension the Middle East would be wise to recall that European attempts to influence regional dynamics in their vicinity have met with limited success in even the recent past: the Bosnian fiasco, the Kosovo conflict and especially the run up to the war against Iraq in the Spring of 2003 are all valid cases in point. On the other hand, European Union diplomatic overtures leading up to the Malta, Stuttgart, Marseille and Valencia Euro-Mediterranean foreign ministerial summits tend to suggest that EU member states possess the political will to pool their diplomatic resources into a single decision-making process when it comes to policies towards the Mediterranean. Although national interests continue to supersede the notion of a collective security approach to regional affairs, as witnessed in the Perejil Islands incident between Morocco and Spain in summer 2002, the Euro-Mediterranean process is at least providing the EU with a mechanism through which it can interact with the Mediterranean in a more coherent and systematic manner. Nevertheless, the European Union will have to advance carefully if it is not to upset the concept of ‘balancing’ in relations between Mediterranean states and their external patrons. If the EU is perceived as attempting to dominate intraMediterranean patterns of interaction, non-EU Mediterranean countries could retaliate by becoming less cooperative in their dealings with specific EU member states that have substantial political and economic interests in the area. The consequences of such a turn of events would be very high if such a transMediterranean backlash were to include the key oil and gas producers. Perceptions of a more hegemonic EU could also fuel support for political movements that advocate anti-Western policies across the Arab world, adding to insecurity across the Euro-Mediterranean region. The more hard-line European and American security policies that have been introduced since the terror attacks of September 11th 2001 and the instantaneous cable television coverage across the Arab world through such outlets as the Al Jazeera television network have already helped to increase anti-Western sentiments across the southern shores of the Mediterranean. The mishandling of Euro-Mediterranean political and security relations would only further such resentment.

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The European Union must therefore seek to implement a Euro-Mediterranean political and security policy that addresses the concerns of both EU and Mediterranean states. Such a policy should be formulated through an intense political dialogue between EU and Mediterranean countries and implemented in such a manner that everyone’s security rights are respected. The European Union must also formulate an external affairs strategy towards the Middle East that does not appear to be duplicating Washington’s endeavours to broker a peace settlement in the region. Failure to adopt such a policy will only diminish already scarce transatlantic political and economic resources. It could also lead to a situation where the European involvement in the Middle East is regarded more through a competitive lens than a complementary one. The fluid nature of contemporary international relations in the Middle East certainly offers the European Union an opportunity to upgrade its influence in this geo-strategically proximate region. One option that could assist the EU in becoming more effective in the region is to introduce a political mechanism that will allow it to adopt a more regular, rapid and flexible type of involvement in the Middle East. This could take the form of creating a specific ad hoc committee that would assist the EU’s special envoy to the Middle East. This committee would be mandated to update the EU Commission and the Council of Ministers constantly about regional patterns of relations and peace process developments. The introduction of such a committee would also facilitate communication flows between Europe and the Middle East protagonists, a confidence building measure in itself. If a Middle East peace breakthrough does not emerge in the near future as a result of the ‘Roadmap’ initiative the international community under the leadership of the United States should step back from the current stalemate and conduct a complete reassessment of the Middle East situation. The European Union must also do more than simply accept its subordinate role in the region – it is a major economic player in the Middle East and should seek to play as important a political role. For some reason the EU has so far not sought the active role in the Mediterranean area that one would expect from a regional power that is so geographically proximate to the Middle East. EU membership of Cyprus in 2004 and potential EU membership negotiations with Turkey starting in 2005 will bring the ‘Middle East backyard’ even closer to the EU’s borders. Until it seeks to play an important role in this geo-strategic theatre the EU’s aspiration of projecting a common foreign and security policy will remain a fallacy. When it comes to re-thinking how to accommodate both the Israelis and the Palestinians once the ‘Roadmap’ is implemented a number of strategic models could serve as a useful guide. A Westphalianization blueprint would call for the immediate recognition of a Palestinian state. A Finlandization model would establish a neutral Palestinian state. A Vaticanization model would lead to the establishment of a religious trusteeship. A Sinaification approach would call for an international peacekeeping force to monitor agreed upon borders. A Bosnification model would seek to replicate some of the provisions adopted in the Dayton peace plan, while

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a Brusselization approach could be considered when it comes to discussing the future of Jerusalem, with the disputed city perhaps becoming the administrative capital of both Israel and Palestine.102 Given the direct bearing the Middle East peace process is already having on the evolution of the Euro-Mediterranean process, it certainly seems logical for the Europeans to dedicate more attention to Middle East affairs. The complementary nature of the MEPP and the EMP is clear, but the EMP’s potential to make a positive contribution to the stabilization of the Middle East has yet to be fully realized. This is an area where the EMP political and security partnership need to focus their attention in the years ahead.

The European Union’s Common Strategy on the Mediterranean The Common Strategy of the EU on the Mediterranean was adopted at the Santa Maria Da Fiera European Council which brought to a conclusion the Portuguese Presidency of the EU at the end of June 2000. The adoption of the third common CFSP strategy in accordance with the Amsterdam Treaty, following those of Russia and Ukraine, is seen by itself as a positive act. It underlined the importance that the EU member states attribute to the Mediterranean – ‘an area where member states have important common interests’. It also allows the European Union to implement the strategy by deciding with qualified majority voting common actions.103 The common strategy remains, however, no more than a formal framework. It spells out what the EU main interests in the region are and by what general means they might be pursued. Although it sets the stage upon which future actions can be taken, it is quite shallow on what specific action the EU will introduce in subsequent years in order to further these goals. The Common Strategy thus consists of general options and guidelines and no more should be expected of such a document. Once again the EU clarifies the geographic coverage in this area – the Maghreb including Libya and the Mashreq, all the southern and eastern riparian states of the Mediterranean, which will indefinitely remain non-EU members. Turkey, Cyprus and Malta are not regarded as part of this picture as they are seen as potential members of the EU and thus form part of the EU’s Accession strategies. In fact Malta and Cyprus joined the EU in May 2004 and a decision on starting membership negotiations with Turkey is due by the end of 2004. In terms of substance, the new emphasis on Justice and Home Affairs (migration, border controls, organized crime, visa requirements) is an important issue. The common strategy opens an entirely new chapter given that this topic did not exist at the time of the Barcelona Declaration and only came into force with the signing of the Amsterdam Treaty. The Common Strategy should therefore be credited for introducing this important security component to the EMP agenda, that is now being largely addressed in social, cultural and human dimension of the partnership.

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The EU’s Common Strategy towards the Mediterranean also attempted to raise the important role that the EU should play in the Middle East Peace Process. For the first time, the EU is explicit that it will assume a more proactive position in the Middle East region once a post-peace situation is achieved. At such a stage the EU commits itself to participate in the implementation of security arrangements on the ground and also commits to provide its expertise to help stabilize the post-peace era. As always, the implementation track record will be the real test of so many declarations and good intentions. More than 30 years after launching its global Mediterranean policy towards the Mediterranean it is clear that the EU has learned a number of lessons in the area. Each EU Presidency now has to present to the Council of Ministers a report on the ‘priorities of implementation of this Common Strategy’. Euro-Mediterranean initiatives are now regularly monitored in an effort to maintain progress when it comes to implementation. This has helped to assure that the Mediterranean remains high on the agenda regardless of the country that happens to be in charge of the EU Presidency. In cases where a Presidency does not live up to this commitment the EU Commission can be counted upon to push Mediterranean matters forward. In the latter half of 2000 the French EU Presidency sought to reassess and re-launch the EU’s Mediterranean priority menu. The holding of the Fourth EuroMediterranean Foreign Ministerial Meeting in Marseilles in mid-November served as good opportunity to give the Euro-Mediterranean process the political push it requires. The beginning of a dialogue on home and justice affairs was an essential step that provided the framework upon which the Barcelona Process could move beyond the declaratory stage. Failure to adopt a Charter for Peace and Stability, however, stifled further progress in the Euro-Mediterranean political and security sector. The time has therefore come for all EMP states to identify specific objectives and target dates over a 5-year period as this would give credibility to the overall goal of creating a common Euro-Mediterranean space of peace and stability. If the EU’s common strategy is to be effective the Mediterranean partner countries will have to play a decisive role during the implementation stage. When it comes to the selection of operation measures this should take place with the active participation of the Mediterranean countries. It is in the Mediterranean states’ interest to draw up a list of meaningful actions. The common strategy actually invites them to do this: ‘the EU is bound to consider recommendations and concerns expressed by Mediterranean partners’.104 Up to now the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has been essentially EU driven. If this process is to remain sustainable the Mediterranean partners must adopt a more proactive approach. This is precisely what the Common Strategy offers – a more dynamic relationship between the EU and the Mediterranean. The Mediterranean countries would do well to follow the example of the EU accession countries which have been much more active in recent years in articulating their security concerns. The Mediterranean candidate countries of Cyprus and Malta can serve as role models when it comes to the programmes of transition that can be implemented given the advanced restructuring activities they have experienced as a result of their efforts to become members of the EU.

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If the EU policy towards the Mediterranean is to become more effective it should continue to benefit from the concept of ‘reinforced cooperation’ as enshrined in the Amsterdam Treaty. The EU should provide more incentives to those that are capable and willing to move ahead faster than the rest, with the door remaining open for the laggards. The Mediterranean states should also consider adopting more of the EU’s message of flexibility. When it comes to expressing priorities, concerns and proposing measures, one should not require unanimity of all the partners, not even all of the Arab partners. Consensus can be maintained on general principles but not when it comes to implementation. Otherwise the process will remain too cumbersome. Unless a more flexible approach is adopted, the more active EuroMediterranean relationship the Common Strategy document calls for will not be attainable.

The Charter for Peace and Stability A first glimpse of what the Charter for Peace and Stability could include was presented at the Third Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Ministerial Meeting at Stuttgart in April 1999. International political circumstances, particularly those in the Middle East did not allow for the adoption of the Charter for Peace and Stability at the Marseilles foreign minister meeting in 2000. The Euro-Mediterranean states, however, committed themselves to continue pursuing this initiative until the opportune moment arrives to adopt such a security framework. The Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability is to be a politically binding and not legally binding document. The rule of consensus is to be applicable to all decisions, joint actions, measures and mechanisms. The Charter is to recognize the indivisibility of security in the Euro-Med sphere and beyond and to acknowledge the concept of comprehensive security. There is to be no interference in the settlement of current conflicts.105 The Charter is to serve as a functional instrument for the implementation of the principles of the Barcelona Declaration. The establishment of an enhanced political dialogue, which remains an aspiration, is to become a top priority. The Charter also envisages more of an effort being dedicated to partnership building measures, good neighbourly relations, sub-regional cooperation and preventive diplomacy. All are essential cooperative measures that need to be further strengthened if stability in the Mediterranean is to become a dominant pattern of relations. The primary function of the enhanced political dialogue will be to prevent tensions and crises, maintain peace and stability and ensure the application of the Charter for Peace and Stability. Cooperative security measures are to be adopted by consensus. In order to ensure that such an agenda is implemented, regular and ad hoc meetings at Ministerial and civil servant (Senior Officials) level and ad hoc groups for specific tasks are to take place. It is essential that an appropriate institutional framework be set up to ensure that provisions of the Charter are enforced. Partnership building measures could include elements of the three chapters of the Barcelona Declaration where they relate to peace and stability.

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Measures to improve good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation could include furthering cross-border projects and creating sub-regional networks of cooperation. Bilateral agreements should aim at promoting a dialogue between cultures and religions as well as an enhancement of human relations. Preventive diplomacy, crisis-management measures and post-conflict rehabilitation are to be developed on a strictly voluntary and consensual basis in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership without interference of other institutions and bilateral efforts. This effort will include encouraging more consultations between member state countries to establish structures for crisis prevention, and developing procedures of clarification, mediation and conciliation for settling disputes between parties by peaceful means of their own choice. The Charter should also encourage Euro-Mediterranean states to accede and adhere to appropriate international conventions and foster Euro-Mediterranean cooperation in peace keeping. Workshops should also seek to identify the root causes of instability and tension in the region. In order to ensure that the Charter for Peace and Stability is implemented the elaboration of the Charter is to be an item on the agenda of each meeting of the Group of Senior Officials. The establishment of task forces, working groups and round tables on individual topics should take place so that all interested parties can participate in this undertaking. The aim of all EMP states should now be to ensure that the Charter for Peace and Stability is introduced by 2005 so that it can start contributing more directly to the creation of a common area of peace and stability, shared prosperity and socio-cultural development in the Mediterranean region. This will include promoting common values and shared principles, the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the promotion of understanding, transparency, predictability and tolerance between the cultures, religions and civilizations of the peoples of the Euro-Mediterranean region. The Charter will also provide the security framework within which EuroMediterranean states are also to address more effectively global challenges to security that include terrorism, organized crime, illicit drug trafficking, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and delivery of systems thereof, degradation of the natural environment, xenophobia, illegal immigration and trafficking of human beings. Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs), areas free of weapons of mass destruction, disarmament and arms control commitments and non-proliferation conventions should also be considered.106 The Charter for Peace and Stability will seek to generate codes of conduct in an area where they are absent. It therefore has a normative purpose despite its non-binding legal character. The Charter will also focus on civil-military and good governance in the first instance, but efforts to promote military cooperation and interaction with other regional organizations will follow at the opportune moment.107 A marathon of foreign ministerial meetings and a more intensive dialogue between Euro-Mediterranean Senior Officials should take place in order to draft the Charter for Peace and Stability so that it can be presented at a forthcoming

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Euro-Mediterranean foreign ministerial meeting, preferably before the tenth anniversary of the EMP in 2005. In the interim, a number of political and security measures as discussed earlier should be immediately considered in order to revitalize the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Process. The role of the Senior Officials should be upgraded akin to the OSCE permanent council. The fact that the civil servants working directly on Euro-Mediterranean affairs will start to meet on a more regular basis will ensure more continuity in the working programme and also provide a higher profile of their activities. A decade after the launching of the EMP and more than three decades after launching its Mediterranean Global Policy towards the Mediterranean it is clear that the EU should seek to project a more clear and prolific profile of its activities. It is essential that the Charter for Peace and Stability be perceived as a functional security mechanism. Euro-Mediterranean officials should avoid dedicating a great deal of time and resources to the Charter without ensuring its incremental implementation. Otherwise the Charter will become little more than an academic exercise with no practical impact on the geopolitical area in question. The Charter for Peace and Stability should therefore be accompanied by an annex that consists of a short-term pragmatic work programme. This programme can consist of short-, medium- and long-term partnership building measures. The work programme will then be regularly reviewed and implementation of the programme monitored. This will allow the Euro-Mediterranean states to develop coresponsibility in the joint actions that are agreed upon. The fact that the Charter is not to interfere in current disputes demonstrates that the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership will remain an exercise in managing relations and maintaining stability in the short term. This should not prohibit special task forces already starting to identify areas of cooperation that can take place in a post-conflict resolution phase. Specific task forces can already be set up to formulate peace-building plans in the Middle East, Cyprus and the Western Sahara. Failure to introduce a Charter for Peace and Stability in the Euro-Mediterranean area so far should come as no surprise given that the objective it seeks to realize is that of placing two asymmetrical regions, Europe and the Middle East, on an equal footing and attempting to integrate them into a single institutional framework.108 A comparison of regional dynamics in Europe and the Middle East results in a starkly different evolutionary pattern being followed. While the European continent consists of a community of states engaged in a process of regional integration, the Middle East remains a region where the dynamics of fragmentation dominate. The Mediterranean is a common boundary between these two international regions and separates democracy from autocracy, market economies from underdeveloped economies, modern societies from archaic social structures struggling with the pressures of modernization. These political, social and economic disparities are further compounded by the high and negligible demographic growth rates in the Middle East and Europe respectively, and the military superiority of the West in general.109

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The Euro-Mediterranean states have not been able to agree upon a Charter for Peace and Stability because they are not convinced that such a Charter will address the security concerns that they are most concerned about. The system of intergovernmental relations across the Euro-Mediterranean area remains too weak at a social, economic and military level to advance the notion of a common security agenda in the near future. While transnational security risks do exist, transnational linkages are not yet strong enough to allow for the commencement of a transnational security mechanism. The EMP must be credited for succeeding in spurring intergovernmental connections at all levels but it has very limited success when it comes to furthering transnational types of interaction in the Euro-Mediterranean. Fostering such patterns of interaction is necessary if the idea of a common Euro-Mediterranean security agenda as envisaged by the Charter for Peace and Stability is to move beyond the drawing board stage of development. The Charter for Peace and Stability window of opportunity must become a gateway of pragmatic partnership building measures if it is to remain a sustainable multilateral initiative. Its underlying ‘cooperative’ approach to security also needs to reflect more of the conflictual patterns of relations that exist across the Mediterranean. It should also foster a Euro-Mediterranean security culture in which the concepts of early warning and conflict prevention become operational.

Early warning: Euro-Mediterranean Coastguard Agency (EMCA) Although the Euro-Mediterranean political and security partnership has yet to achieve the high sounding goal of a Security Charter or Pact as the Barcelona Declaration indicates, there is no reason why EMP states should not focus on introducing a less ambitious security mechanism that can assist in addressing some of the practical security challenges that all riparian states are facing. The common bond that all Mediterranean states share is their maritime heritage and the security threats that result from such a common geographical reality. At the moment there are no elaborate mechanisms to contend with such security crises as an accidental collision at sea between transport tankers crossing through the choke points of the Mediterranean basin, such as the Straits of Sicily. Very few practical measures are also being taken to tackle the alarming rate of degradation that is currently taking place in the marine environmental sector. As a result, marine biology and everything linked to maritime activities, including tourism, is suffering more and more year in and year out. Two other sources of instability that have benefited from the security vacuum that exists are traffickers in drugs and human beings. The ever-increasing proliferation of drug consignments which are reaching ever deeper into the civil societies of the Mediterranean and the accentuation of illegal migratory flows from south to north have already negatively affected the lives of millions of people in the Euro-Mediterranean area and risk destabilizing the legal structures of all EMP states.

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At this point in the EMP process, a concerted effort should be made to take incremental steps immediately towards setting up an early warning mechanism that can assess the significance of such security issues and their likely impact on Euro-Mediterranean relations in future. Once this has been realized the cooperative maritime security network can be instructed to draw up optional policy positions on security issues that are regarded as the most serious. Such an exercise in itself will raise awareness of the vulnerable position Mediterranean states are currently in and the weak defence mechanism they have at their disposal to cope with such security threats. Ideally, in the next few years one should also investigate the feasibility of setting up a Euro-Mediterranean Coastguard Agency (EMCA) that would be mandated to coordinate the cooperative security network with a mission statement and plan of action similar to those carried out by a coastguard. The EMCA should initially carry out stop and search exercises in two principal areas: maritime safety and maritime pollution. This phase could be enhanced at a later stage by monitoring other aspects of security that include narcotics trafficking and the transport of illegal migrants.110 It is essential that this initiative should be introduced in as flexible a manner as is possible. Such an early warning mechanism should be open to any of the EuroMediterranean partner states that wish to participate. Those countries with the most experience in the area of maritime cooperation, such as Italy and Spain, should share their expertise with other willing and able Mediterranean states. EMCA can also seek the maritime security technical expertise that has already been achieved by the EU and NATO through their respective experiences in EuroMarFor and Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean. If an early warning mechanism is to start functioning any two or more EMP members should start cooperating in specific sectors, such as that pertaining to maritime safety without having to wait until all partners are ready. This will enable the EMCA to evolve along sub-regional lines. As the EMCA widens and deepens its activities attention can also be given to the feasibility of establishing a fully fledged Euro-Mediterranean Coastguard at a later date. In addition to strengthening political and security channels of communication, the establishment of such a Euro-Mediterranean early warning network will assist in cultivating more intense crisis management mechanisms in an area where these are lacking. Practical confidence building measures will enhance the level of trust between Euro-Mediterranean states and therefore set the stage for a more intricate security strategy to follow. Areas where partnership-building measures can be introduced include conducting simulation exercises of oil spills, ensuring that international standards are observed during the cleaning of oil tankers, and monitoring the activities of non-Mediterranean fishing boats that are operating in the Mediterranean with a particular emphasis on over-fishing. The neglect of such security risks has already had severe consequences in some parts of the world that have seen their entire ecological and service industries wiped out overnight. The natural geographical characteristics of the Mediterranean expose it to even more serious consequences should any of the above security risks

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continue to take place unchecked. It is therefore in all EMP states’ interest to seek the creation of such a network in the shortest time frame possible. Whether the political will to launch such a security mechanism can be found is of course entirely another matter.

Conflict prevention: functions of the Euro-Med Conflict Prevention Network The very fluid nature of international relations since the terror attacks of September 11th 2001 has resulted in an ever-changing global security environment. Perceptual changes taking place in the security environment of the EuroMediterranean area demand a re-think by everyone when it comes to managing sources of instability. The European Union enlargement process, NATO enlargement and the new American strategic doctrine dictate that a more coordinated approach towards security in the Mediterranean should be adopted if sources of instability are to be contained. More than ever, the concept of security is also under review worldwide. Since the end of the Cold War there has been a gradual shift away from traditional security concerns that focus on military threats to so-called soft-security issues that include organized crime, drug trafficking, illegal migration and terrorism, which is dominating strategic analysis. The Mediterranean is already a geo-strategic area with numerous sources of instability which risk escalating and threatening regional and international stability. Regional dynamics that need to be urgently addressed include the collapse of failed states, the increase of terrorist activities, the Middle East conflict, proliferation of all types of weapons, energy security, and the ever-increasing economic disparity. Given the rapid security sea-change under way, what can be done to minimize the escalation of regional tensions to outright conflict? An analysis of the EMP political and security partnership would not be complete without an analysis of the concept of conflict prevention. The study that follows consists of a specific focus on conflict prevention at a regional level (the Euro-Mediterranean area) in post-Cold War relations. Despite the uncertainties that accompany any conflict prevention measure, it is always to some extent possible to define in advance a general strategy. The analysis that follows offers a set of clearly defined rules, principles and mechanisms that form the basis of a strategic planning doctrine that can be applied whenever such crisis situations emerge. The concept of conflict prevention has become a regular feature of all Euro-Mediterranean Partnership communiqués. A decade into the EMP, the verbal consensus that has been expressed in this sector needs to be supported by practical measures if the concept of conflict prevention is to become operational. Since the launching of the Barcelona Process in November 1995 the 27 EuroMediterranean Foreign Ministers agreed on the need to develop and sustain Partnership Building Measures. While recognizing the constraints that currently exist, a commitment was also made to focus on the concept of global stability and the need to develop common perceptions of the factors that contribute to it.111

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As already discussed, the Annex to the Chairman’s Formal Conclusions at the Third Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Ministerial Meeting in Stuttgart in April 1999 provides a specific framework for elaborating a Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability for the first time. The guidelines emphasize that the Charter will serve as a functional instrument for the implementation of the principles of the Barcelona Declaration.112 The Annex stipulates that the establishment of an enhanced political dialogue, in appropriate institutional framework and on adequate levels, will have priority. It is also stated that the dispositions regarding partnership-building measures, good neighbourly relations, sub-regional cooperation and preventive diplomacy will be developed in an evolutionary way and progressively strengthened. It is within this context that the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean Conflict Prevention Centre (EMCPC) should take place. The primary function of the Centre will be to enhance political dialogue in order to prevent tensions and crises as outlined in the Annex. This will include establishing specific arrangements for conflict prevention and elaborating upon partnership building measures that promote crisis prevention. The Guidelines for Elaborating a Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability already spell out the parameters within which the modus operandi of a Euro-Mediterranean conflict prevention Centre can be set up. These include: encouraging consultations between countries to establish structures for crisis prevention meetings, developing procedures of clarification, mediation and conciliation for settling disputes between parties by peaceful means of their own choice, encouraging judicial settlement of differences and disputes, acceding and adhering to appropriate international conventions, and setting up a structure of workshops that identify root causes of instability and tension. The first step that needs to be taken prior to the setting up of an EMCPC is to identify the circumstances in which effective action could be considered and the means most suited to a given situation, in order to prevent a conflict breaking out or escalating. The concept does not of course presume that a conflict will necessarily break out. It should also be stipulated from the outset that conflict prevention should not be confused with conflict pre-emption. The concept of conflict prevention is one that regards diplomacy taking the lead, even if it is supported by military capabilities. Pre-emption indicates that military capabilities will take the lead, perhaps supported by diplomacy. It is especially important that such a distinction is clear to all EMP states given the United States decision in September 2002 to adopt a foreign policy doctrine that is based on a policy of pre-emptive actions. An operational definition of prevention means intervening at the right moment to prevent social, ethnic and political tensions from developing into violent conflict. In practice this means pressuring a state to start negotiating with the relevant groups or communities concerned and to introduce the structural reforms needed to defuse the crises. There is no doubt that this is a demanding task. Adequate resources are required to identify and monitor inequalities and tensions between different linguistic or

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ethnic communities in addition to the analytical capacity to pinpoint the causes and potential development of the situation. A particular effort must be made to ensure that the analysis, diagnosis and recommendations for action remain unbiased and objective. Conflict prevention therefore consists of concerted actions whose aim is to deter, resolve and/or halt disputes before they erupt. The goal must be to intervene diplomatically before any escalation of internal or external violence occurs and thus avoid widespread hostilities.113 Conflict prevention requires accurate knowledge, a precise assessment of the problem and ‘mobilization’, which are complex to organize due to the varied nature of interethnic conflicts. It is therefore essential to be able to distinguish symptoms of instability as a set of distinctive preliminary signs such as repressive measures, the radicalization of political rhetoric or excessive arms purchases. The initial case put forward by the Anglo-American coalition against Iraq at the United Nations in late 2002 and the subsequent debate about the merits of such a war are good examples of the importance of intelligence when it comes to conceiving conflict prevention operations. Inaccurate analysis of a situation may result in more instability that was originally the case and international condemnation of any diplomatic actions being pursued. The difficulty in distinguishing the possible variables that could lead to a conflict breaking out hampers decisions on the measures to be taken. Conflicts often evolve in a manner that often contradicts predictions. Certain preventive measures sometimes have the opposite effect to that expected. This is quite often due to the fact that an incorrect interpretation of the aim of an external intervention occurs. It is clear that more than one preventive measure can be adopted in any given situation and that what may at first seem the most appropriate or have proved effective in other instances may prove unsuited to a given situation in practice. On the other hand, the need to adapt to each specific case does not imply that having a set of clearly defined rules, principles and mechanisms is an invalid approach. Despite the uncertainties that accompany any conflict prevention measure, it is always to some extent possible to define in advance a general strategy for identifying the causes as well as the means to be employed in any intervention. A first step in this direction is to define clearly the objective of intervention. Conflicts are a fact of life, due to the combative nature of our species. A conflict-free society is unimaginable. The challenge is to find peaceful solutions instead of remaining neutral while conflicts are resolved.114 Two preliminary questions that also need to be addressed are, how can conflicts be prevented by extra-regional actors, and how can a state or international organization make decisions that will defuse tensions before the outbreak of violence? The answers to these two questions need to be clearly spelt out before the EMP seeks to introduce such a mechanism in the Mediterranean. Otherwise the heterogeneous political nature of the Mediterranean is likely to result in a situation where security misperceptions multiply whenever conflict prevention measures are being pondered. A basic problem with conflict prevention is that international relations until recently have been governed by the fundamental principle of non-interference by

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individual states or by the international community in any country’s internal affairs. Since the League of Nations was created in 1919 and some would argue even since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, sovereignty has been an essential part of the law by which countries conduct their relations with each other. As this principle is enshrined in the UN Charter, bilateral negotiation has been the sole possibility open to a state or international organization wishing to act inside another state. NATO’s war in Kosovo was the first direct challenge by an alliance of powerful military countries to the internal untouchable status of dictators. Although NATO accepted that Kosovo was part of the sovereign country labelled Yugoslavia, it was not prepared to allow Mr Milosevic to carry out his campaign of ethnic cleansing.115 One must therefore ask whether the more recent decision by the international community in 2003 to intervene within the borders of a sovereign country, this time in the case of Iraq, creates a more conducive atmosphere in contemporary international relations for the establishment of a conflict prevention centre in the Mediterranean? Will riparian Mediterranean states regard the setting up of a conflict prevention centre as an intrusive action that can interfere in their sovereign rights? Or will such an institution be regarded as a mechanism that can assist them to protect their interests? Overcoming problems associated with coordination are important, but they will add up to nothing if not accompanied by political will. The problem with the concept of conflict prevention is that it raises as many ambiguities as it seeks to resolve. The prevention of conflicts should not be confused with the management of conflicts, during the stage of the outbreak of hostilities and armed confrontation and the resolution of conflicts following the cessation of hostilities. Political choice is inherent in conflict prevention – it often implies adopting a political position, which excludes the idea of political neutrality: there can never actually be truly neutral mediation between parties as numerous post-Cold War conflicts have demonstrated. Political will is therefore absolutely crucial in conflict prevention. Its absence can often be attributed to a lack of means, too high costs or the lack of vital interests. In any case far from being an abstract mechanism, conflict prevention is a reflection of the consequences of the actions of government. The failure of conflict prevention measures often results from the absence of common perceptions, the primacy of special political and economic interests and insufficient political will as it does from the inadequacy of available conflict prevention mechanisms. Given the heterogeneous make-up of the Mediterranean area, specific attention needs to be dedicated to this point. The decision to act quite often does not result from a direct attack on a state’s vital interests (territorial integrity, economic interests) and not even from the first signs of a potential conflict, but rather from the perception of a momentum that is contrary to the interests of international or regional stability. It is also clear that the psychological and financial costs of taking no action, even if they are difficult to quantify, are much higher in the long run. The transatlantic perceptual gap on whether to take military action against Iraq a decade after Desert Storm and Iraq’s consistent determination to acquire weapons of mass

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destruction demonstrates the increasing political and economic cost of having not dealt with this issue in a more comprehensive manner in the early 1990s. The traditional approach of the concept of prevention which only covers diplomatic mediation is limited in that it does not take into account all the various political options which include the option of using force. In contrast, an approach that is too open-ended runs the risk of becoming entangled with a state’s overall foreign and security policy. Some observers argue that the role of conflict prevention should not be given too high a priority for a number of reasons. These can include the fact that there is an absence of a major risk of destabilization at the international level, or the occasional hypothetical nature of predictions that a conflict will break out, and non-interference in internal affairs. Advocates of conflict prevention also have to take into consideration constraints imposed by reduced defence budgets. It is also a fact that prevention is a daunting political task for any country or international organization to undertake. Prevention means intervening before there are many casualties, hence before public awareness of the problem takes place. By definition, successful prevention takes place when nothing happens, which means that there will be no public opinion and no political benefits to be derived from success.116 The main objective of the Euro-Mediterranean Conflict Prevention Centre (EMCPC) would therefore be to nurture a political, economic and cultural dialogue between Euro-Mediterranean partner countries. A specific effort should be made to dispel the ‘clash of civilizations’ scenario that Samuel P. Huntington had elaborated in his book of the same name.116a A Euro-Mediterranean CPC will have to focus on intensifying sub-regional cooperation in the Maghreb and the Mashreq in an effort to nurture a convergence of civilizations scenario across the Mediterranean. When setting up a conflict prevention centre it is worth considering two prerequisites. The first stems from the fact that conflicts are multidimensional in nature. The second is that it is in the interest of the international community jointly to solve conflicts and overcome bureaucratic obstacles through the creation of a single conceptual and institutional framework.117 The conflict prevention mechanism that should be adopted needs to be specifically designed to tackle existing and potential risks and threats. Such contingency plans should focus on developing crisis-management principles and procedures on a sub-regional basis across the Mediterranean area.118 A concept that should be considered is that of creating flexible forces that can be deployed in each security eventuality that emerges. The European Union’s Rapid Reaction Force could be a candidate in this regard. Once NATO digests its enlargement challenge as agreed upon at the Prague Summit in November 2002 NATO should also envisage making available its rapid response forces to the Mediterranean. In order for this to become operational, multilateral agreements on intelligence exchange and air space surveillance, and substantial investments in facilities for the reception and sustaining of peace-enforcing and peace-keeping units, need to occur. Sensitive regional defence issues should be tackled at a later date.

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Regional situation centres around the Mediterranean can also be set up around the Mediterranean at a later date to monitor activities under this mandate.119 Consideration should also be given to opening the doors of the maritime security arrangement of EuroMarFor to its southern Mediterranean neighbours (at least offer observer status in the short term). This will help dispel the negative perceptions that have been generated since the establishment of this maritime security force. Once the EMCPC is operational this force can become the actual confidence building enforcer of the early warning Euro-Mediterranean Coastguard Agency. Arriving at such a threshold will ensure that elaborate forms of confidence building and crisis prevention measures that seek further to advance regional disarmament as spelt out in the guidelines of the Charter for Peace and Stability will be functional. The introduction of a Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability will also assist in creating a climate where the partner countries can develop command and control mechanisms to intervene as early as possible in crisis situations. Acting only after an aggressor has acquired territory or access to natural resources is to force the unwelcome choice between a massive military response and a major strategic debacle. The later the international community and security organizations intervene, the larger the cost and the less chance to restore stability. Conflict prevention should be regarded as a series of political options ranging from the non-coercive to coercive measures – diplomatic, political, economic, military instruments appropriate to the evolution of a dispute before it erupts into conflict in the spirit of Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations. (Article 33, para. 1 of Chapter VI (Pacific Settlement of Disputes) of the Charter of the United Nations stipulates that ‘The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their choice’.)120 The Euro-Mediterranean conflict prevention centre should be based on Article VIII of the United Nations Charter. This calls for the creation of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies, and their activities are consistent with the purposes of the UN.121 The initial objectives of the conflict prevention centre should focus on the following: the formulation of principles and codes of conduct to shape the relations between participating states. These principles would include those of the Barcelona Declaration and therefore be similar to the principles found in the Helsinki Final Act. These include: • • • • • •

sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty; avoidance of threat or the use of force; inviolability of frontiers; territorial integrity of states; peaceful settlement of disputes; non-intervention in internal affairs;

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•

reespect for fundamental rights and fundamental freedom, including the freedoms of thought, conscience, religion and belief; equal rights and self-determination of peoples; cooperation among states; fight against terrorism, organized crime and drugs; fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law.

• • • •

Once the conflict prevention centre is fully operational a more intense set of objectives should be undertaken. These include: • • • • • • •

monitoring political, military and economic matters of interest to countries and the Euro-Med Partnership process itself; supervising and operating communications among focal points which have already been established as a confidence building measure (CBM); maintaining and updating background information for crisis prevention and management; being prepared to provide facilities in case a contingency staff is set up with respect to a given crisis or conflict; supporting briefings to the public and private bodies; providing a continuous flow of information to members according to mandates; providing information to media.

At this stage a decision will have to be taken on what the scope of instruments will be at the disposal of the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC). These would range from fact-finding and observer missions, diplomatic and economic forms of pressure and the deployment of peace-keeping troops. The introduction of economic and diplomatic sanctions can be supplemented by the use of force if there is an escalation of violence.122 A distinction of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ types of measures needs to be conducted in order to ensure that the application of such measures corresponds to the types of disputes to which they are being applied. A basic formula that can be adopted is one in which non-coercive strategies are adopted in the early stages of a dispute whereas coercive strategies are applied when hostilities have escalated. A short-, medium- and long-term-based strategy is appropriate irrespective of the intensity of the dispute. Particular attention needs to be given to long-term implications if any action taken is to be regarded as credible. This includes brainstorming about an exit strategy even before a final decision about taking action is conducted. In order for a conflict prevention mechanism to be effective it is also important to be able to distinguish between the immediate causes and the underlying causes of any particular crisis. An adequate conflict prevention strategy presupposes an ability to identify the immediate internal causes of the dispute which can be classified in four categories: structural (weakness of the state’s authority, ethno-geographic distribution); political (the nature of the political system, interethnic relations, elites); economic and social (discrimination); and cultural (cultural rights and mutual perceptions).123

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Attention must then be directed towards the underlying causes (historical memory and perceptions, relational models) that form the fertile ground in which the immediate causes flourish. Analysis of these causes will make it possible to define the means to be applied in a conflict resolution approach. When it comes to time-scales – whereas the immediate causes can be tackled in the short term, the underlying causes call for more long-term measures. Yet both should start together in order not to undermine medium to long-term preventive measures. When it comes to the internal and external dynamics of a crisis situation, a decision needs to be taken as to whether they should be addressed together or separately. Even though it will ultimately depend on the willingness of the indigenous parties to find a lasting solution to crises as they emerge, a comprehensive solution calls for an approach that combines both the internal and the external dimensions of a crisis. In other words, conflict prevention measures should be regional in nature as any internal conflict will inevitably have a regional dimension and implications. The CPC should also be in a position to put forward proposals for the further elaboration of Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs). It should also promote other security-related issues of arms control, and in particular the proliferation in the Euro-Mediterranean area of weapons of mass destruction and long-range ballistic missiles.124 Arms control should be regarded as including not only arms reductions or disarmament, but also measures to strengthen regional security and the diminishment of the use of military force as an instrument of national policy. The objectives of CSBMs are to prevent war by misunderstanding or miscalculation, to reduce the possibility of surprise attack and to reduce the ability to use military forces for the purpose of political intimidation or for carrying out foreign policy. It is therefore essential that this take place in a transparent and thus predictable manner. CSBMs can be further categorized into two levels of analysis: technical-military CSBMs, which are at the tactical operational level of military policy and politicalmilitary CSBMs, which can be considered to be declarations of intent concerning the planned use of force. CSBMs could include the following: • • • • • •

exchanges of information between military establishments; prenotification of military movements; prenotification of major military movements; establishing a treaty for the prevention of accidents at sea; establishing a Search and Rescue agreement that would incorporate the concept discussed above in relation to the setting up of a Euro-Mediterranean Maritime Coastguard; declaratory statements of intent – this includes identifying the relevant participants, identifying and defining the zone of operation, examining the preconditions for negotiations and implementation, and assessing alternative methods of verification compliance and prospective arms control agreements.125

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The EMCPC should also serve as a centre of excellence when it comes to organizing seminars and conferences on topics that support regional stability across the Mediterranean area. The intention would be to promote education and training in support of conflict prevention and arms control, and to function as a communications and data base centre. These seminars could be composed of government and military officials and specialists from think-tanks and academia.126 Such an exercise could follow the structure of the already existing EMP political and security confidence building measure, the Euro-Mediterranean Information and Training Seminars for Diplomats that take place twice yearly in Malta.127 The purpose of the new body will be to enhance stability and security across the Euro-Mediterranean area. The EMCPC will be a forum within which regional participants can take stock of and review all other activities contributing to peace and security in the area. The EMCPC framework will not replace already existing conflict prevention initiatives such as Middle East peace efforts, nor would it replicate the measures already considered and the arrangements already adopted by participants. When it comes to an appropriate conceptual framework for regulating the Euro-Med conflict prevention centre’s actions these should take into account the following administrative and institutional procedures. At a political level, the establishment of a democratization process over a period of time that would include setting up institutions, a constitution, an electoral system, human and minority rights and the media needs to take place. Similar actions also need to take place in the economic field (privatization, the banking system, budget) and the military dimension (civil-military relations, defence industry, arms control). Both conditionality and accountability need to be clearly defined concepts when it comes to economic and financial assistance. The possibility of sanctions (negative) and an incentive scheme (positive) should be attached to the implementation of reforms. Criteria for membership into international security institutions such as NATO and the OSCE should be clearly spelt out. One should also examine the use and participation of the armed forces in humanitarian missions and tasks. The goal of this endeavour would be to indicate the relations between armed forces and civilian institutions to arrive at a more rational and efficient use of their various specialist capabilities. In a region as heterogeneous as the Mediterranean area, the main sponsor of the Euro-Mediterranean conflict prevention centre should be the European Union. It possesses the resources, political and economic links and expertise to manage such an institution in the Mediterranean. Its status in the region will allow it to act as a mediator, facilitator and/or guarantor in crisis management situations. The EU should also work as closely as possible with NATO in this area as cooperation between these two regional organizations has already succeeded in stabilizing the situation in the Balkans. Several NATO-EU ad hoc working groups have already been established to examine how NATO could support the EU operationally when Europe decides to take the lead in handling crises. Similar cooperation in the field of conflict prevention should take place.

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Close NATO-EU cooperation when it comes to institutional relations will help ensure that conflict prevention planning will be coherent and avoids duplication. Arrangements must be agreed to ensure the participation of all those that would like to contribute. The role of decision making and action should be left as far as is possible to the main actors directly involved in a crisis. This will assist in guarding against the perception that the EU is trying to impose its political will upon the Mediterranean area. The EU has a wide range of mechanisms in the economic, political and social domains that will enable it to influence decision makers at the local level when it comes to complying with preventive measures. It is only once the majority of local actors, both at governmental level and the public at large, perceive that more will be gained by compliance, that preventive measures will be able to attain their true objective. This is not meant to exclude the participation of extra-regional powers in the EMCPC. On the contrary, all those actors that affect the region’s security dynamics, particularly NATO, should be encouraged to join as partners. A formula for involving the United States in the Centre is essential if the EMCPC is to be regarded as a credible conflict prevention mechanism. When setting up the structural design of the EMCPC it is crucial that a series of guidelines be taken into consideration to ensure that the new regional body is able to function smoothly. Basic questions that will have to be addressed include: who will be responsible for commissioning missions; which unit or committee will be responsible for deciding upon operations; and which component of the CPC will be accountable for the implementation of measures that are adopted? Given the geographical and geopolitical proximity of the European Union to the EMCPC it seems logical to examine the various obstacles that the EU itself has had to overcome in order to gradually develop an effective common foreign security policy structure. The fact that the EU common foreign and security policy is taking shape is not a guarantee that the EU will establish a more proactive political role with its southern periphery in future. Such an outcome will depend largely on how successful Brussels is in implementing its goal of establishing a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) as envisaged in the strategic concept draft document presented by the EU’s high Representative for External Affairs to the European Parliament in mid-2003. Since his appointment as High Representative of the CFSP the prolific Javier Solana and the EU’s policy planning unit for security policy have helped raise the EU’s profile in security matters worldwide. The track record of the High Representative and the policy planning and early warning unit offer interesting insight into the type of mechanisms that the EMCPC can adopt at an early stage of development. Top of the international agenda must be development of more flexible and rapid reaction military forces than those in operation today and a concerted European effort to reduce the military capabilities gap that exists with the United States. So far the EU still lacks sufficient air-lift and sea-lift capacity, communications equipment, intelligence-gathering satellites and aircraft and precision guided weapons. Procurement decisions in recent years do not show that the EU is serious

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about bridging the capabilities gap between itself and the United States in the foreseeable future. The 60-day deployment deadline that the EU has set for its Rapid Reaction Force is going to be especially tough to meet. Yet as events since September 11th 2001 demonstrated, new security threats can surface unexpectedly and anywhere in the world. If the world is to supersede the sense of insecurity that has settled upon everyone since the terror attacks in the United States and terror attacks like the bombing in Bali in October 2002, the international community must take the necessary steps to manage such threats in a more effective manner. The numerous teething problems that conflict prevention or similar post-Cold War operations have encountered throughout the 1990s also offers plenty of food for thought when it comes to drawing up a EMCPC command and control structure. Should the regional CPC adopt a Contact Group type of approach to regional security challenges or does it make more sense to adopt a UN Security Council or OSCE type of decision-making process? Is it perhaps more feasible to introduce a limited version of NATO SitCen and also take advantage of NATO’s envisaged Response Force?128 It is also essential that the EMCPC’s relationship to the eventual EuroMediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability is also made clear from the start. The numerous roles that the EMCPC can play in this regard include those of enforcer of the Charter, coordinating body of measures introduced as a result of the evolution of the Charter, or an agency that monitors actions undertaken by security networks that are set up once the Charter is introduced. This will assist in removing any risk that proponents of the Charter for Peace and Stability may perceive the EMCPC as a regional security arrangement through a competitive lens. The EMCPC should also tap into the large number of already existing academic institutions, public-policy institutes and non-governmental organizations, such as the EuroMeSCo network of foreign policy institutes that are tackling the technical and analytical dimension of conflict prevention. The bringing together of researchers and specialists from different Mediterranean countries to monitor regional developments, warn concerned parties of potential conflict situations and suggest alternative policies that might further their prevention will help to ensure that the proposed centre will become one of excellence in the shortest timeframe possible.129 The establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean Conflict Prevention Centre is certainly an initiative that will help manage security and stability across this very heterogeneous region of the world. The setting up of such a regional framework will also dispel some regional perceptions that the Mediterranean is gradually being down graded in the post-Cold War era. The risk of such a view settling in at the start of the new millennium is particularly high given that the great powers of the post-Cold War and international organizations have now upgraded their attention in adjacent regions of the Mediterranean, namely the Balkans, Eastern Europe and the Gulf. It would also be a strategic error if the United States and the European Union dedicate political and economic resources to the Balkan stability pact and Eastern Europe at the expense of other important strategic areas, including the Mediterranean area. Foreign policy strategists who are seeking to establish peace and stability

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around Europe should introduce policies that seek to balance regional interests and not turn regional security into a zero-sum-game. It is precisely because of the importance of such a regional security initiative that the creation of the EMCPC needs to be implemented in a coherent and consistent manner. First, the setting up of the EMCPC should be gradual. No country should feel under pressure or even forced to participate in the initiative but allowed to contribute to the endeavour at their own pace. Countries of the Euro-Mediterranean region will have to recognize for themselves that it is in their own self-interest to become actively engaged in such an exercise. Failure to do so will prevent them from being able to forge closer political and economic ties with one another and strengthen security ties with international institutions such as the European Union. Second, the European Union must guard against promising the Mediterranean area more than it can deliver. The introduction of the euro, the EU enlargement process, and development of a common foreign and security policy already means that the EU plate will remain very full for the next few years. The EU is thus better off offering the region a conflict prevention framework that does not totally rely on its services to function. In order for the creation of the EMCPC to be successful it is essential that the Euro-Mediterranean partner countries of the Mediterranean become more vocal, open, and engaged in the post-Cold War regional security environment that is evolving around them. Southern European states such as Spain, Italy and France, together with southern Mediterranean states such as Morocco and Egypt, are well positioned to take the lead in such an endeavour. If no Mediterranean states take the lead they will have no one but themselves to blame for being marginalized from the wider international security framework that is emerging. In retrospect, a number of additional lessons can already be learnt from past conflict prevention attempts. These lessons should serve as a guide when setting up a Euro-Mediterranean conflict prevention centre. The first is that individual governments acting alone to prevent conflicts are ineffective. National biases and interests are far too strong. It is more logical that analysis and proposed solutions should come from an ad hoc unit created for this purpose, which is international in its composition. The setting up of a conflict prevention unit by the EU in early 1997 is a good example of the type of model that can be adopted. A second lesson is that appropriate mechanisms should be set up for political, not charitable reasons. This will help ensure that the political will is available when the time comes to set the structures in motion. A third important point is that of identifying prevention with discretion. Measures taken to prevent the escalation of conflicts need to be kept as low key as possible to give confidence building measures a chance to flourish. Fourth, parties to the conflict should be aware of the fact that the cost of conflict exceeds the cost of avoiding it. Fifth, third parties should be convinced that certain developments are just a prelude to serious conflict which might affect some of their valued national interests, and that the cost of preventive action is lower than attempts at conflict resolution afterwards.

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Sixth, third parties should have the capacity to anticipate conflict and intervene in a timely and proper manner.130 More than 10 years after the end of the Cold War it is in both the EU’s and the countries of the Mediterranean’s interest to strengthen political and security relations. Steps that can be taken to realize this include integrating in the shortest timeframe possible the EU membership applications of Mediterranean candidates Malta and Cyprus, upgrading relations with Turkey and developing a more proactive Euro-Mediterranean Partnership process that includes the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean Conflict Prevention Centre. Such measures will assist in the complex task of identifying EuroMediterranean common interests, a prerequisite to being able to nurture a common Euro-Mediterranean political will. This is the strategy that should emerge from the Common Strategy document on the Mediterranean that the European Union adopted in 2000. Two developments in the western and eastern sectors of the Mediterranean respectively also offer external powers such as the EU an excellent opportunity to move ahead with attempts to establish a conflict prevention network across the Mediterranean. At the Euro-Mediterranean foreign ministerial meeting in Valencia in April 2002 ministers were particularly supportive of the Agadir Declaration of May 2001 announcing the establishment of a free-trade area between Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan by 2006, an important step towards realizing the goal of south-south cooperation.131 All four countries are also members of NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue. The Agadir initiative should facilitate the task of North African countries reactivating the moribund Arab Maghreb Union (UMA) that was created in 1989 and seeks to create a common market between Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Mauritania and Libya. Further east, interest in moving ahead with the Middle East Peace Process has again been activated since publication of the Road Map that envisages the creation of a Palestinian state by 2005. This positive pattern of regional dynamics calls for the advancement of a conflict prevention network in a geo-strategic area where it is essential if any subsequent peace agreement is to be upheld. Closer cooperation between the European Union, NATO and the United States is essential if such a mechanism is to become operational anytime soon. The EU’s commitment to establishing a conflict prevention network in the Mediterranean as stipulated in the Euro-Mediterranean Valencia Action Plan of April 2002 and NATO’s determination to upgrade its Mediterranean Dialogue at the Prague Summit of November 2002 offer a good opportunity to advance conflict prevention measures in the Mediterranean area.132 In addition to the intrinsic value of such an initiative, the establishment of a EMCPC will also increase visibility and a sense of ownership of the EuroMediterranean Process as a whole, a factor that to date remains lacking. It is only through such credible partnership building measures that the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and its goal of maintaining stability across the Mediterranean will remain sustainable long term.

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The socio-economic and cultural partnerships

The second chapter of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is the economic and financial partnership. The main aim of this dimension of the EMP is to create a Euro-Mediterranean area of shared prosperity, no small task given the incredible economic disparities that exist in this part of the world. The Euro-Mediterranean foreign ministers stressed the importance they attached to sustainable and balanced economic and social development with a view to achieving their objective of creating an area of shared prosperity in the Barcelona Declaration. They also acknowledged the difficulties that the question of debt can create for the economic development of the countries of the Mediterranean region, an issue that has yet to be resolved in a satisfactory manner. The three principal long-term objectives of the economic and financial partnership are: acceleration of the pace of sustainable socio-economic development; improvement of the living conditions of all Euro-Mediterranean populations, that includes an increase in the employment level and reduction in the development gap in the Euro-Mediterranean region; and encouragement of regional cooperation and integration. The above objectives are to be realized through the progressive establishment of a free-trade area, the implementation of appropriate economic cooperation and concerted action in the relevant areas and a substantial increase in the European Union’s financial assistance to its Mediterranean partners. The Barcelona Declaration stipulates that the free-trade area will be established through the new Euro-Mediterranean Agreements and free-trade agreements between partners of the European Union. The Euro-Mediterranean states have set 2010 as the target date for the gradual establishment of this area which will cover most trade with due observance of the obligations resulting from the WTO. After a slow start, Association Agreements with Mediterranean Partners have largely all been negotiated as will later be discussed. The goal of a free-trade area is therefore on track even if the date of 2010 slips by a couple of years. With a view to developing gradual free trade in this area tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade in manufactured products will be progressively eliminated in accordance with timetables to be negotiated between the partners. The Euro-Mediterranean states decided to facilitate the progressive establishment of this free-trade area through a number of measures that include the adoption of suitable measures as

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regard rules of origin, certification, protection of intellectual and industrial property rights and competition, the pursuit and the development of policies based on the principles of market economy and the integration of their economies taking into account their respective needs and levels of development. They also agreed to adjust and modernize their economic and social structures, giving priority to the promotion and development of the private sector, to the upgrading of the productive sector and to the establishment of an appropriate institutional and regulatory framework for a market economy. The Euro-Mediterranean countries also agreed to endeavour to mitigate the negative social consequences which may result from this adjustment, by promoting programmes for the benefit of the neediest populations. This is certainly one of the most controversial aspects of this partnership as no comprehensive compensation fund has yet been created at a regional level to assist those sectors that will be negatively hit by the creation of a free-trade area, especially during the transitory years of this process. The economic and financial partnership also acknowledges that economic development must be supported both by internal savings, the basis of investment, and by direct foreign investment. But successive calls for the nurturing of an environment conducive to investment, in particular by the progressive elimination of obstacles to such investment that could lead to the transfer of technology and increase production and exports have so far been matched by very little support in any tangible format. The same goes for the call for regional cooperation on a voluntary basis. Whereas regional integration has moved ahead in other parts of the world, regional and sub-regional cooperation in the Mediterranean remains at an embryonic stage, particularly when it comes to developing trade between the partners themselves, a key factor in promoting the creation of a free-trade area. A major stumbling block in the creation of a more balanced Euro-Mediterranean economic and financial region is the fact that the majority of Mediterranean countries have not yet demonstrated an ability to abandon their colonial dependency policies for the more progressive interdependent policies that the Barcelona Process seeks to achieve. As a result structural reform and the establishment of more open economies across the Mediterranean remains a slow process. Other factors that continue to hinder the competitive edge of Mediterranean states include the limited role that women continue to play in development, and the lack of scientific training and research when it comes to sustainable development. The management of key resources such as water is also an area that remains a priority for all Mediterranean partners. During the last 8 years of the EMP, much analysis has focused on the agricultural dimension of the partnership with the majority of Mediterranean states calling for the removal of barriers in Europe to their produce. Although Euro-Mediterranean countries have agreed to cooperate in modernizing and restructuring agriculture and in promoting integrated rural development, they have not been able to create a level playing field where agricultural products are allowed to flow freely. One area where cooperation had progressed is the energy sector. Already, 25 per cent of Europe’s oil and gas is imported from North Africa. Pipelines linking

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Algeria with Italy through the Straits of Sicily and Algeria with the Iberian Peninsula through the Straits of Gibraltar have also been upgraded to cope with an ever increasing demand of energy in Europe. The EMP’s ability to strengthen cooperation and intensify dialogue in the field of energy policies and to create the appropriate framework conditions for investments and the activities of energy companies begs the question why similar advances have not been achieved in other areas of economic cooperation. If the Euro-Mediterranean economic and financial partnership is to result in a more prosperous Mediterranean area emerging, more attention needs to be dedicated to introducing policies in a number of areas that were actually highlighted in the Barcelona Declaration of 1995. These include developing and improving infrastructures, including through the establishment of an efficient transport system, the development information technologies and the modernization of telecommunications. Further action must also be taken to ensure respect for the principles of international maritime law, in particular freedom to provide services in international transport and free access to international cargoes. A more concerted effort is also called for when it comes to encouraging cooperation between local authorities and in support of regional planning. In this respect more commitment needs to be forthcoming to ensure the promotion of cooperation on statistics in order to harmonize methods and exchange data. Ultimately, no amount of assistance will improve the Mediterranean people’s standard of living unless they are prepared to help themselves. Mediterranean countries will only reap the benefits from the establishment of a free-trade area if they are able to identify niche areas of economic growth. Plenty of attention has been given to the amount of financial assistance that is available through the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Critics often argue that the amount of assistance is a pittance when compared to the economic challenges that Mediterranean countries along the southern shores of the basin are facing. In reality, more analysis should be dedicated to ensuring that the funds that are being made available have a larger catalytic effect in the region. The EMP will never be a substitute to the difficult reform process that Mediterranean countries must experience if they want to become more competitive. By about 2010 the EU will have become by far the largest single market and the world’s most concentrated area of economic prosperity and internal stability. It will comprise essentially all of Europe, east and west, more than 90 per cent of total European population, i.e. almost 500 million people (half of China or India), and have a combined GDP of some US$12,000 billion, an almost unimaginable figure. How will the 10 non-EU riparian Mediterranean countries, from Turkey to Morocco, adapt to these profound geopolitical changes that will take place north of them in the next 12 years? How will they coexist with the future European giant? To what extent will they be drawn into its economic and political orbit? To what extent will they have to integrate with the European and consequently the world economy? These are economic and financial questions of vital importance for both the EU and each of its Mediterranean neighbours.

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Do the Mediterranean countries still have a real alternative to joining the Euro-Mediterranean free-trade area? Could they try to stay in a sort of splendid isolation within their tiny national economies, surrounding themselves by high walls of protection and ignoring the profound technological and economic changes taking place around them? To date, Mediterranean trade with Europe is marginal. The majority of Mediterranean countries are dependent on European markets. If Mediterranean countries are to increase their ability to penetrate the global market they must diversify and improve their export capabilities. They must also have access to larger and more lucrative markets than is currently the case. Economic development always starts at home. It can never be imposed from the outside. It is a matter of the right mixture between individual freedom of action and the right government policies. This goes for each and every country of the globe, small or big, rich or poor. It is important to keep these basic considerations in mind when asking about the role that one very specific, and not the most important, economic policy, the one related to trade with the rest of the world, can play. It was this basic philosophy, the conviction that prosperity is best enhanced in a climate of competition and free trade, that induced the EU and its Mediterranean neighbours in Barcelona in November 1995 to envisage the setting up of a vast EuroMediterranean free-trade area. This free-trade area will be a zone where goods and progressively also services should be traded free of any restrictions, as if within national borders. Deregulation and liberalization are therefore very much the name of the game. This objective was elaborated on in a comprehensive policy document, the Barcelona Declaration, in November 1995. The 27 foreign ministers of the signatory states, that is, all 15 European Union member states and 12 Mediterranean countries, agreed to work towards establishing a Euro-Mediterranean free-trade area within 15 years, by about 2010.133

The state of play Where do we stand presently with the implementation of a Euro-Mediterranean free-trade area? What remains to be done? What are the obstacles on the way? And what are the chances of the target date of 2010 being respected? From the EU side, the situation looks as follows: •

•

With five Mediterranean countries (Israel, Turkey, Malta, Cyprus, Palestine), covering almost 50 per cent of all EU trade with the Mediterranean free trade has been essentially completed (totally for manufactured products, partially for agricultural products). (Malta and Cyprus became part of the EU’s single market when they joined the EU in May 2004.) With six countries (Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon and Algeria) free trade has been agreed; it will be progressively established during a 12-year transition period and should essentially be completed by the target date of 2010.

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With one country (Syria) negotiations are still under way. Assuming optimistically that these will be concluded by the end of 2004, followed by 2 years of ratification, free trade might be completed by 2015 only.

Free trade between Mediterranean countries and the EU should open the way for free trade among the Mediterranean countries themselves. Indeed, it is difficult to contemplate that high import duties or other import restrictions will continue to choke intra-regional trade as economies become more deregulated. Intra-Mediterranean free trade therefore follows as a logical corollary from Euro-Mediterranean free trade. Presently Mediterranean countries do less than 10 per cent of their total trade among themselves. This is clearly insufficient for neighbouring countries. The trade potential is insufficiently exploited because of high, sometimes even prohibitive trade barriers, every country attempting to protect its tiny manufacturing sector as well as its agriculture. Enhancing horizontal trade patterns across the Mediterranean is therefore one of the central goals of the Barcelona Process. The EMP has so far failed seriously to support financially intra-regional economic cooperation in the region. Only 10 per cent of the overall MEDA I funding budget (1995–99) was allocated to regional initiatives. The remaining 90 per cent has been earmarked for bilateral cooperative agreements between the EU and its southern partners. If anything, this is likely to lead to an increase in vertical trade. A more logical alternative was adopted in the MEDA II budget (2000–6) when a larger proportion of the budget was earmarked for regional projects. Such projects seek to assist Mediterranean countries establish industrial sectors in areas where they already have a comparative advantage. This will avoid wasting the already limited funding that is available and simultaneously ensure that a more diversified Mediterranean economic base is created. The EU should also introduce a series of measures that are aimed at increasing the regional absorption capacity of Mediterranean partner countries. The specific criteria on the number of partner countries that need to participate in order to obtain funding through the Euro-Mediterranean Information Society (EUMEDIS) programme is a good example of the type of conditionality that could be attached to future regional funding. Every project must include at least two EU and two Mediterranean states to be considered. The more EMP states participating in a project, the better the chances of obtaining MEDA funding.134 Free trade must be transparent and comprehensive, if it is to have the desired impact on the patterns of trade and production. If it is to be realized during a transition period of 5–10 years, the calendar must be clear and absolutely trustworthy. The agreed tariff cuts must be implemented 100 per cent, and not be replaced by other even more restrictive trade obstacles. Monitoring and policing of the agreements has to be seen as absolutely indispensable for the credibility of the whole enterprise. For economic operators to believe in the process, they must anticipate its results and help to bring it about. All this has so far not been the case for the Arab countries’ efforts to establish free trade among themselves.

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What role can the EU play in order to boost the growth rate in the Mediterranean and thereby contribute to a more stable social, political and economic situation? The EU can only play a marginal role. The EU’s leverage to influence economic policy across the Mediterranean is extremely limited. It is a fallacy to believe that any of the countries of the Mediterranean will change their course of economic policy for ¤100–150 million of grant assistance. The EU has no other means but to convince through setting examples in its own field and through monitoring. At most, it might assume the role of ‘coach’ as it is doing with some success when it comes to the accession countries.135 In the Euro-Mediterranean economic realm the facility consists essentially of a ‘bilateral contract’ Association Treaty between the EU and the respective Mediterranean country. Through such agreements, Mediterranean countries commit themselves to open their markets to EU exports within a bilateral free-trade area. The EU commits itself to bolster the adjustment process through stepped-up, but totally insufficient, financial assistance and a policy dialogue. If the EU is to start playing a more direct role in implementing Euro-Mediterranean initiatives it must bolster the financial and human resources available to this multilateral process. This contract between the EU and the specific Mediterranean partners is nothing but an external catalyst which pushes the country under the appropriate pressure to implement difficult social and political reforms. The serious work, more than 80 per cent, has to be carried out by the Mediterranean country. The EU is little more than a benevolent monitor in this process.

Socio-economic realities A few years after the launching of the Barcelona Process it is apparent that Mediterranean countries cannot cope with the necessary restructuring that needs to be carried out on their own. The EU must therefore encourage and support consolidation of reform efforts in the region by offering a comprehensive package of economic incentives. Given that the Euro-Mediterranean process is a long-term process, the EU should share its experience in the fields of employability, entrepreneurship, adaptability and equal opportunities with its Mediterranean partners. The EU should also lead by example and help Mediterranean countries contend with serious political and social issues such as migration and organized crime. EU free-trade adjustment programmes must not only focus on the macroeconomic context within which this is occurring, but also on the microeconomic context, that is, the domestic dimension of the equation. If the Euro-Mediterranean partnership goal of creating a region of peace and prosperity is to be achieved and the process is to be a catalyst to economic and financial prosperity, then the EU should ensure that sufficient capital flows to the Mediterranean are available to fine-tune the restructuring being proposed. Policy recommendations that will ensure the sustainability of the EuroMediterranean process and will not impinge upon the social rights of EuroMediterranean citizens include the setting up of a Social Compensation Fund to

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protect those sectors of society that will be adversely affected by free-trade provisions. A Euro-Mediterranean Social Safety Fund would assist the poorest sectors of society during this period of transition and thus introduce a dosage of accountability and credibility in this area of economic reform. Such a Fund would therefore serve as a mechanism to buffer against macroeconomic shocks.136 In the short to medium term it also appears essential that some type of a compensation fund be created for those sectors of the population in the least developed countries of the Mediterranean that will suffer most of the socio-economic brunt that free trade could bring with it. Such political action will also give credence to the EU claim that its main interest is to ameliorate socio-economic living conditions throughout the Mediterranean area. It should however be emphasized that such a Fund would remain an emergency mechanism and not become a system that encourages dependency. Issues that would be addressed by such a Fund would include those of unemployment, underemployment, job training, integration of the female population into the workforce and elimination of child labour. Other basics that would be catered for would be ensuring access to universal education, nutrition, healthcare and social services. One could also contemplate setting up a Euro-Mediterranean Social Charter that would address the negative impact that the establishment of a free-trade area will have on society. A major concern of all Mediterranean partner countries is that of generating employment. It is crucial that the public and private sector introduce policies that will promote job creation, economic security and a more equal distribution of wealth and justice. Those conducting the process of the redistribution of resources should take note of the fact that the privileged elite are benefiting from the status quo and also the reforms that are introduced. This is demonstrated from the increase in economic disparities between and within the countries of the Mediterranean. If the removal of systems that maintain job protection are not to result in more unemployment, policies need to be introduced that ensure labour mobility and the cross-border movement of people without discrimination and human rights violations that are often encountered by job seekers in foreign countries. When assessing the impact that the free-trade area will have on small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) it is evident that there will be a reduction in certain sectors unless they are protected and assisted through the process of change. Policy guidelines in this area of economic reform should focus on providing such concerns with easier access to capital that can be used to upgrade utilities and improve working conditions. Privatization will result in smaller domestic markets and clusters of technological innovation. The transfer of technology and the introduction of a more effective system of standardization are thus a prerequisite to ensuring that SMEs are able to penetrate new export markets. It is also significant to note that the reduction of trade barriers in several eastern Mediterranean economies has already led to the undercutting of local SMEs in key sectors by imports from Southern Europe.

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A concerted effort must also take place to assist SMEs in the Mediterranean area to identify and penetrate new markets. One measure that can facilitate this task is to promote more effectively marketing strategies by SME clusters producing the same product. The delivery of credit, technology and know-how will all be ineffective unless the market constraint is overcome.137 The promotion of employment programmes through initiatives supported by the Euro-Mediterranean process is certainly a step in the correct direction but is far too little to have a significant impact on the problem. It is estimated that approximately 20 million people are still excluded from job re-training and creation programmes. Unless more attention is given to the human dimension of the Euro-Mediterranean process in general and education and vocational training in particular the goal of avoiding a lost generation scenario in which a large sector of society never find employment will not be achieved. It is also crucial that the type of training is not solely market driven but that it focuses on formulating training programmes that will assist in adapting to the changing environment and avoiding a brain drain relationship. When examining what part trade unions can play in the restructuring process it is clear that trade unions have a more significant role to play than simply that of crisis managers. The business sector and trade unions must find ways and means of working more closely together to manage transition. In order to be more effective it is also essential for trade unions to become more democratic when recruiting membership. Trade unions should seek to elaborate strategies that are more complementary than confrontational with government-led initiatives. After all, trade unions are the collective voice of the working people. During the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean free-trade area, trade unions have an essential role to play as managers of change and not as guardians of the status quo.138 When focusing on the issue of economic reform and the key challenges facing developing countries in the Mediterranean, the issue of competitiveness is a dominant feature. Can the Mediterranean Partner countries ever reach a level of development from which they can seriously compete at an international level? Liberalization of the Mediterranean economies will certainly lead to company closures, reduction in indigenous industrial sectors and contribute to short-term impoverishment. To make up for this downturn the capital saved from public restructuring needs to be applied to programmes of vocational training. Education and training programmes that ensure labour flexibility are essential if negative aspects of economic liberalization are to be avoided. In order to compete on a more level playing field the Mediterranean Partner countries must immediately seek to reduce the element of risk quite often associated with investment in this region of the world. A concerted effort must also take place to promote the conditions that are conducive to nurturing a climate of growth. This includes securing a more effective transfer of technology and strengthening research and development programmes. While difficult choices would have to be made by the governments concerned, policy makers should focus on the instruments and policies that are most satisfactory

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to manage the transition that will take place. Governments across the Mediterranean have yet to trigger a proactive corporate Mediterranean attitude among entrepreneurs in the region. Unless policy makers are able to engage the private sector as partners in the restructuring exercise they are carrying out, they will not be able to take full advantage of the opportunities that a deregulated economic environment will offer. Policy makers in the region should also bear in mind what the costs of not taking the necessary reform actions will be in the years to come. Critics of the establishment of a free-trade area should offer serious alternatives to the measures currently being undertaken if they want to be credible. Serious efforts to manage regional debt, avoid the emergence of leopard spot economies, and reduce arms procurement allocations that continue to absorb significant proportions of developing country budgets are all necessary. Unless the Mediterranean is able to improve its economic diplomacy track record by introducing the necessary measures to attract the attention of international investors, the latter are much more likely to be attracted to other developing regions. Both Central and Eastern Europe (Central European Free Trade Area: CEFTA), and the southern cone of Latin America (Mercosur), have already demonstrated an ability to integrate with one another and are therefore better positioned to reap the benefits of globalization. An increase in private flows of capital to the Mediterranean will only result if the countries concerned move away from dependency upon the energy sector and the low margin ends of the textile and tourism markets towards high value-added industries such as specialized tourism and garment and component production. There is also a necessity to diversify in investment instruments, so that larger flows of portfolio investments bolster the performance of Mediterranean stock markets.139

Economic prospects for the future A key question to ask is, what will determine whether the Barcelona Process is ultimately a success or not? If economic prospects are to improve in the Mediterranean area the Barcelona Process must provide a stable political and security environment by reducing existing tensions and establishing a cooperative zone of security. Economically, success will essentially be the capacity of the Mediterranean countries to generate higher rates of growth than they have achieved during the 1980s and 1990s. The target should be 6 per cent per annum. How can a higher growth rate in the Mediterranean area on a sustainable basis be best achieved? By creating an attractive business environment that is conducive to domestic and foreign investment. The primary role of government should be to stabilize and guide relations with the EU as the partnership process evolves. As the scope for government action in the regulatory field continues to shrink to the benefit of the business community, government and the private sector should cooperate more closely as a general source of information and guidance on external business opportunities.

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The main objective of this exercise would be to help business to understand the meaning of EU-inspired economic policies. The governments of the EuroMediterranean countries should, whenever necessary, be the advocates of Mediterranean business in Brussels and most important help business draw the correct conclusions and decide the right strategies from EU-wide policies. Existing economic and financial institutions will either have to find a special ‘niche’ in which to survive as independent companies or merge with one of the emerging European networks. Whatever the outcome, privatization and restructuring of the fragmented financial sector is an absolute ‘must’ and the sooner rapid action takes place the better. Industry has to focus totally on future export markets, on the manufacture of highly specialized components that can be easily shipped to Europe and the rest of the world. Establishing links with major European companies that may help in product development, financing and marketing is crucial. This should be the main strategic objective of governments in the Mediterranean. A more attractive business environment would consist of essentially four elements. These are freedom for business to operate without government restrictions or interference, full respect of the rule of law, full transparency of legislation, and free competition domestically and internationally.140 Freedom for business to operate without government restrictions or interference sounds commonplace to European and North American entrepreneurs but in the Mediterranean business remains the hostage of immense bureaucracy and political cronyism. Full respect of the rule of law means laws must be applied without any discrimination, government intervention or bribery, and regardless of nationality, religion or political affiliation. When it comes to full transparency of legislation, all laws must be accessible and understandable by every one so as to constitute a safeguard against discretionary application by government. Free domestic and international competition is crucial. Without a functioning competitive system there will be neither economic efficiency nor incentive to higher performance. All of the above is achievable even without major financial resources – they could all be provided for by MEDA funding, if requested. But it requires political commitment at the highest level and a strategy to implement a medium-term, about a 5-year programme of reforms, and thus create trust in the business community and civil society about the seriousness of the government’s reform plans. Transformation of the Mediterranean business climate does not require innovation or miracles. A corporate Mediterranean identity can be nurtured if one selects from the numerous recipes that have been tested over the last 50 years in many different parts of the world. It is of course crucial that one chooses the bestsuited examples. For the Mediterranean countries, the examples of Estonia, Cyprus, Malta, Hungary, Portugal and Ireland constitute ideal reference frameworks where to obtain good advice and even assistance. What role should the EU play in this effort? Given its wealth of experience in this area during the past 10 years in the European transition countries the EU could help if requested to do so. European business can also play an active part

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in this exercise. Jointly with business from the south, the EU could help define the precise rules of engagement to be taken by the host government. A more propitious business environment constitutes the single most important factor to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). The Mediterranean has been doing poorly when it comes to FDI. Barely some $6 billion were invested in 1998 in the 12 Mediterranean countries, of which almost one-third was in a tiny country like Israel and another 25–30 per cent in oil and gas exploration and distribution in countries such as Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia and Syria. In comparison, the accession countries have harvested four times as much FDI in each of the last 2 years ($25 billion). A qualified labour force that includes specialized workers, technicians, computer engineers and scientists, at low labour costs constitutes another major asset for attracting more investment and containing the brain drain. Hungary is a successful example of a long-term policy focused on promoting scientific achievements. A functioning capital market is the final must for a successful economy, in particular for venture capital and financing of SMEs. Mediterranean governments must essentially focus on a few essential policy lines. First the legal, judiciary, administrative and above all else political reforms in view of improving the business climate must be implemented. Second, streamlining the banking sector (privatization, banking supervision, total independence from government interference) is essential. Third, stepping up government spending on education, especially vocational training and research and development is of immediate urgency. Fourth, governments must focus on completing the privatization process in the shortest time possible. On the contrary, a number of policy measures currently discussed within the Mediterranean framework should be put on the back burner. In this manner all participants – governments, business, civil society and the EU – will be able to focus for the coming 5 years, at least, on the few key issues that really matter for the Mediterranean countries. In the present overall situation, regional cooperation (south-south) should not be pursued as a top priority. Intra-Mediterranean free trade is, of course, desirable, but not at a price of diverting too much political energy to it. At the present stage of low-level industrialization and development, the Mediterranean countries are not likely to reap the same advantage from it as Europe. Even in Central Europe, the focus is on the bilateral links with the EU and not on the poor neighbours of the Central European Free Trade Area (CEFTA).141 Israel, Malta and Cyprus have developed very successfully without any links of regional cooperation outside Europe. The hub and spoke relationship may not please economists and political scientists, but, at least in the early stages of development, it has proved to be a very efficient engine for development of a country, whether in Israel, Tunisia or Turkey. Rather than facilitate the establishment of a trans-Mediterranean region, the EU’s Barcelona Process has in some ways been stifling the emergence of such a zone of trade. Although the Commission has allocated $7.8 billion for development aid to the Mediterranean region for the years 2000–6, bureaucracy initially hindered the

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distribution of the funds. This is not acceptable if the Barcelona Process is to become an effective mechanism. More straightforward and transparent financial distribution procedures must be immediately introduced. Fortunately there has been a better diffusion of funds in recent years. Since the launching of the Barcelona Process there has been far too much of an emphasis on agriculture. Agriculture will not be the engine for growth and development anywhere in the Mediterranean. All Mediterranean countries, with the possible exception of Turkey, will suffer from an increasingly dramatic scarcity of water. They will all, except Turkey, become net importers of foodstuffs. Food exports therefore are not the way out of their development conundrum. It will always remain a niche business, with some fruits and vegetables of high quality in the winter season. But for the Mediterranean countries as a whole these exports are not likely ever to amount to more than 5 per cent of total exports to Europe. Europe, both east and south, will become increasingly more competitive in the medium term. A fully fledged agricultural free-trade area between the EU and the Mediterranean is an illusion. Neither the EU nor any of the Mediterranean partner countries are politically prepared to take commitments in that direction. Both sides should take measures to improve the functioning of the present tariff quotas for selected agricultural products. There is no excuse for the EU to be so reluctant to introduce such minute concessions. There is also no urgency to define the exchange rates of the Mediterranean countries in relation to the euro or whatever basket of currencies. Exchange rates should be left to the market forces. Countries such as Lebanon and Turkey, but also those of the EU demonstrate that economic development need not at all be hampered by fluctuating exchange rates, as long as the market forces are allowed to play free of central bank interference and government interventions.142 If the fiscal policy of a country is sound, the exchange rate should normally not vary substantially compared to the euro zone. Government should therefore focus on their fiscal and financial situations. The exchange rate can be treated with benign neglect. What are the next steps that the Mediterranean needs to take? In analogy to the ‘accession partnerships’ which define the measures to be taken in order to make each of the 13 accession countries eligible for membership, one might elaborate ‘association partnerships’ in view of defining and implementing comprehensive 5-year strategies of economic reforms.143 The individual ‘association partners’ such as Tunisia, Morocco and Jordan would have to agree on the basic policy objectives to be achieved, the implementing measures and the time-frame. The EU could follow a triple role in such an exercise. It should allocate essentially all its financial assistance for the implementation of the agreed policy framework, as is currently the case with the PHARE programme. It should direct the partner country to sources of information, technical assistance and other useful support available in Europe. It should also monitor the process very closely so as to become co-responsible for the success of the ‘association partnership’.

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If the Euro-Mediterranean Process (EMP) is therefore to be regarded as a credible initiative it will have to identify and operationalize a series of cooperative crossborder projects that will act as a catalyst to increase the interest of international investors to this part of the world. Otherwise, the objective of establishing a more economically balanced Euro-Mediterranean area will not transpire. Although free trade in itself is likely to increase the level of trade between the northern and southern countries of the Mediterranean, there is nothing to guarantee that this will necessarily reduce the wide level of economic disparities that currently exist. In fact, an increase in EU exports to the Mediterranean would only exacerbate the negative balance of payments which countries in the south are experiencing. The harsh economic realities that Mexico has had to confront since signing up to the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) agreement is indicative of the negative impact the introduction of free-trade measures can have upon developing countries. In effect, the creation of a free-trade area could end up reinforcing current north-south and south-south divides as riparian states of the Mediterranean find it more and more difficult to attract international investment. The creation of a free-trade area is nevertheless certain to boost trade. The increase of transparency and the removal of opaqueness in the economic sector will have a commercial multiplier effect in the region as domestic restructuring deals with issues such as public procurement, state aid, monopolies, norms and certification. But there should be no reason for euphoria. Even supposing the Mediterranean countries will be successful in streamlining and restructuring their manufacturing industries and in developing competitive export opportunities, this will not transform all of them into Mediterranean ‘tigers’. Policy makers should therefore set realistic economic growth targets in order to avoid raising expectations too high. Turkey’s example shows, however, that the intensity of trade between Europe and individual Arab countries can grow enormously, especially for countries like Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia, provided more entrepreneurs discover the art of developing export markets. Free trade should by 2020 also extend to the GCC countries and Europe. The completion of the Association Agreement between Egypt and the EU will give a boost in that direction. The inclusion of the Gulf countries (Iraq) into this network will substantially strengthen Euro-Arab relations, both in a vertical and a horizontal sense. The question must also be asked, what impact will the outflow of capital have on the Mediterranean area as economic and financial policies become more liberal? Will the free flow of capital result in a situation where the rich become richer and the poor become poorer? It is thus essential that the Mediterranean countries must work towards creating an economic and financial institutional design that will generate wealth. At the start of the twenty-first century the label ‘emerging markets’ is actually regarded by some as being synonymous with weak economies. The international economic crisis that began in the Asia-Pacific and later spread to Russia and Latin America has left a negative perception in the eyes of international investors interested in investing in developing countries.

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If international economic organizations, such as the European Investment Bank (EIB), are serious about assisting the Mediterranean countries they should adopt more proactive strategies towards this area. This should include offering developing states credit guarantees and introducing measures to address the serious debt burden several countries in the region are coping with. Now that a period of time has lapsed since the launching of the Barcelona Process the following questions should be addressed: • • •

How realistic and feasible is the goal of creating a Euro-Med free-trade area, given the enormous socio-economic disparities that exist across the EuroMediterranean area? Should a more flexible integration model and timeframe be considered given the heterogeneous nature of the Partner countries? What should a post-free-trade area strategy consist of?

The majority of Mediterranean countries are aware that an economic restructuring phase is necessary but it is a bitter pill they would rather refrain from swallowing. International economic institutions have, to date, failed to communicate the message that unless such a transition exercise takes place in the near future, the Mediterranean will run the risk of being relegated to the doldrums of the globalization process. Mediterranean countries have so far not capitalized on the comparative advantages that they possess in a globalized world. They are close to a large trading bloc – the EU, and also located on a busy sea route – the Mediterranean. Both are natural advantages that should be harnessed to attract the technological revolution and international investment that will improve the economic growth rates. But before this can happen Mediterranean countries must eliminate artificial barriers that are prohibiting trade. The security and prosperity of states today is connected to the global movement of goods, capital, information and people. Mediterranean states have yet to realize that keeping these channels of commerce and technology open can be as important as defending a border. Tapping into the information highway and also ensuring an ability to apply the information by improving education and research and development programmes is long overdue. Rich countries are rich because of their ability to produce, not only consume. Few Mediterranean countries can be classified as innovators in the world market place. A larger number can be classified as adopters of technology and commodities. But far too high a number of people in the Mediterranean remain cut off from the benefits of post-Cold War prosperity which include expanded access to healthcare and education.144 Questions that urgently need to be addressed in order to ensure that the social impact of implementing a free-trade area in the Mediterranean region is not a negative one include: What economic sectors across the Euro-Mediterranean have not improved in the last decade? Are social standards in a free fall? Is free trade a social curse or a blessing?

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Have countries in the Mediterranean area done better compared to those that are not participating in a free-trade area scheme? Will economic development result in more political openness? What more needs to be done beyond economic reforms to establish a more comprehensive social order? What impact will EU enlargement have on the Barcelona Process? The answers to these questions will determine the extent to which the EuroMediterranean process of regional integration is able to promote economic growth, social development, poverty alleviation and productive investment in the Mediterranean area.

Clash of cultures and civilizations? The third chapter of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership focuses on perhaps the most important dimension of Euro-Mediterranean relations – the people to people dimension. The partnership in social, cultural and human affairs calls for the development of human affairs and the promotion of a better understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil societies. The Euro-Mediterranean states recognize that the traditions of culture and civilization throughout the Mediterranean region, dialogue between these cultures and exchanges at human, scientific and technological level are an essential factor in bringing their peoples closer, promoting understanding between them and improving their perception of each other. In this spirit, the Euro-Mediterranean foreign ministers in Barcelona agreed to work towards a more integrated intercultural Euro-Mediterranean society that would be established through numerous initiatives. These included reaffirming that dialogue and respect between cultures and religions are a necessary precondition for bringing the peoples closer. In this connection EMP states stressed the importance that the mass media can play in the reciprocal recognition and understanding of cultures as a source of mutual enrichment. They also emphasized the essential nature of the development of human resources, both as regards the education and training of young people in particular and in the area of culture. They expressed their intent to promote cultural exchanges and knowledge of other languages, respecting the cultural identity of each partner, and to implement a lasting policy of educational and cultural programmes. The EMP countries also underlined the importance of the health sector for sustainable development and expressed their intention of promoting the effective participation of the community in operations to improve health and wellbeing. They also recognized the importance of social development which, in their view, must go hand in hand with any economic development. Particular importance was also attached to respect for fundamental social rights, including the right to development. From the very start of the EMP, participating states recognized the essential contribution civil society can make in the process of development of the EuroMediterranean partnership, especially as an essential factor for greater understanding and closeness between peoples.

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The EMP Civil Forum, whose meetings usually bring together leaders of political and civil society, the cultural and religious world, universities, the research community, the media, organizations, the trade unions and public and private enterprises, and usually coincide with those of the EMP foreign ministerial summits, is a direct by-product of this undertaking to involve civil society in the development of the EMP. The Barcelona Declaration also recognizes the importance of encouraging contacts and exchanges between young people in the context of programmes for decentralized cooperation. The subsequent creation of a Euro-Med Youth network is a direct result of this factor. While the Barcelona Process pledged its support for the establishment of democratic institutions and for the strengthening of the role of law and civil society, it has been careful not to intervene in sensitive areas that might risk the spirit of cooperation. The same goes for the demographic control. The EMP states recognize that current population trends represent a priority challenge that must be counterbalanced by appropriate policies to accelerate economic take-off. They have not, however, taken any direct controversial action such as seeking to introduce policies of birth control. Another area that was highlighted as a priority area in the Barcelona Declaration when it comes to relations in the Euro-Mediterranean area is that of migration. Most of the pledges in this sector are long term and rather vague: EMP states agreed to strengthen their cooperation to reduce migratory pressures, among other things through vocational training programmes and programmes of assistance for job creation. They undertake to guarantee protection of all the rights recognized under existing legislation of migrants legally resident in their respective territories. Interestingly enough the EMP states also agreed to strengthen cooperation by means of various measures to prevent terrorism and fight it more effectively together. Although this pledge was made 6 years before the horrific terror attacks in New York and Washington DC of September 11th 2001, it did not succeed in avoiding such an attack. It would of course be unfair to blame the EMP for such a failure. Yet the fact that most of the September 11th attack recruits were from sub regions adjacent to the Mediterranean and the fact that existing cooperation in the field of terrorist intelligence sharing did not foil such an attack highlights the long way the EMP states still have to go to establish a serious counter-terrorism intelligence network. The fact that combating terrorism and other forms of social ills such as drug trafficking, international crime and corruption are referred to in the EMP social, cultural and human affairs dimension indicates the interdependent nature of the three chapters of the Barcelona Process. While each chapter has set a specific set of partnership objectives, they are all interconnected and therefore to be pursued simultaneously. The Mediterranean therefore epitomizes many of the problems associated with the north-south debate in international relations. Issues such as migration, terrorism, religious intolerance and the lack of human rights have been on the north-south agenda for decades.145

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What makes such issues of high importance in the Mediterranean area is the fact that little progress has so far been registered in improving the situation in each of these distinctive areas. Nurturing cooperative cross-cultural patterns of interaction that address these issues is a prerequisite to improving economic disparities and eliminating ethnic divisions in the area. The Mediterranean is the historic crossroads for diverse ethnic, cultural and religious traditions. How can these be safeguarded and respected while at the same time tolerance and understanding are promoted? Can the Barcelona Process’s social, cultural and human affairs proposals for educational exchanges be turned into concrete and practical programmes that have a direct positive impact at a grass-roots level in the Mediterranean? A dialogue of cultures and civilizations has become the rallying cry of this sector of the EMP. Three areas where the Barcelona Process is already contributing are education, human rights and women’s rights. While each area remains underdeveloped, the EMP must be credited for starting a process of cooperation where little or no positive interaction was previously taking place. A programme of activities that increase awareness of existing trends in each area and also seeks to further discussion on Euro-Mediterranean differences of opinion is essential if a social, cultural and human partnership worthy of such a name is to become a reality. A concerted effort is thus required to remove misperceptions and prejudice which continue to exist across the Mediterranean. This is where international cultural activities, such as cultural tourism, may play a strategic role as culture brings about relations based on trust. Tangible proposals that actually initiate cross-cultural ventures of cooperation and seek to further the principles of respect and understanding that are still lacking are long overdue. The Charter for Peace and Stability offers an excellent opportunity to promote a better understanding and mutual acceptance of the cultures, religions and civilizations of the peoples of the Euro-Mediterranean area. An emphasis needs to take place to promote the common values and shared principles that do exist across the Mediterranean. Issues that need to be given more prominence in future Barcelona Process activities are human rights, the enhancement of democracy, and the importance of tolerance in contemporary world affairs. The human dimension of the Process also deserves more attention with specific programmes dedicated to urgent questions such as that of migration. Common socio-economic concerns could be another point of embarkation in this respect. It should be mentioned that Euro-Mediterranean networks of economic cooperation have already been created in a number of areas and include Chambers of Commerce, Federations of Industry, commercial fairs, export promotion bodies and banking associations. These networks aim at establishing permanent links that will enable the exchange of information and projects that will facilitate agreement on respective policies and better implementation. The third chapter of the EMP termed ‘Partnership in Social and Human Affairs: Promoting Exchanges between Civil Societies’ promotes the idea that the countries concerned should work to encourage the participation of civil society in the EMP.

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This is to involve joint efforts in education and training, social development, policies designed to reduce migratory pressures, the fight against drug trafficking, terrorism and international crime, judicial cooperation, the fight against racism and xenophobia, and a campaign against corruption. Further ideas that have been proposed include joint efforts with regard to culture and media, health policy, the promotion of exchanges and development of contact among young people in the framework of a decentralized cooperation programme. Throughout there has been an emphasis on the importance of dialogue between cultures, and exchanges at human, scientific and technological level. This is deemed as an essential factor in bringing people closer, promoting understanding between them and improving their perception of one another. But, whereas the political and security and the economic and financial chapters of the EMP have been handled in a ‘fast-track’ manner by the different states participating in the Barcelona Process, the social and cultural chapter has been the subject of long debates and discussions. This is largely due to the fact that the Arab and European views differ sharply on issues such as human rights, immigration, terrorism, the right of political asylum and the role of civil society. The Barcelona Declaration acknowledges the essential role civil society must play in the EMP. The Euro-Med Civil Forum, which took place in November 1995, was the first formal consolidation of civil society as a partner within the process. It gathered 1,200 experts from very diverse fields, representing civil society in countries from the northern, eastern and southern shores of the Mediterranean. The second Euro-Med Civil Forum took place in Naples in December 1997. Even if one points to the various cultural aspects that have been tackled in these meetings and the numerous projects that were approved in the field of cultural heritage, progress has been slow and difficult. Few tangible results have emanated from the ministerial meetings that have taken place.146 The Third Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting in Stuttgart nevertheless reaffirmed the importance of the Civil Forum underlining that regional and local authorities should be more closely associated, as should the business community and the non-governmental organizations. Several Civil Fora were also held in parallel with the Stuttgart conference and these gatherings put forward recommendations for future activities concerning human rights, the environment and the setting up of a Euro-Med Forum of Trade Unions. The constructive remarks made during the Civil Forum that are included in the Stuttgart Conclusions could have had more of an impact if follow up meetings focused more on strengthening the dialogue between governments and civil society.147 An attempt to re-launch the social, cultural and human affairs partnership took place at the Valencia foreign ministerial meeting of April 2002. The Valencia Action plan reiterates the importance of promoting cooperation in the field of culture and of the need to involve the general population with a view to furthering mutual understanding and combating misconceptions and stereotypes. The Valencia conference also agreed to the principle of creating a Euro-Mediterranean Foundation to promote a dialogue of cultures and civilizations. Foreign Ministers also agreed to increase the visibility of the EMP through intellectual, cultural and

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civil society exchanges. It was agreed that the Foundation should be based on the principle of co-ownership and work in close coordination with other similar institutions including private sector entities. The Valencia Action Plan also endorses the idea of enhancing the Civil Forum process of meetings and calls for an earlier involvement of civil society in EMP decision making. The Plan does not however specify how such a synergy can be created and does not spell out a timetable to support the objective that is highlighted. As a result, the Civil Forum process is not as an effective a mechanism as it could be when it comes to influencing the EMP agenda. The convening of the Civil Forum in Crete in May 2003 did succeed in focusing on the important issue of promoting a dialogue of cultures and civilizations. But the Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Ministers also once again encouraged the Civil Forum and other similar initiatives to try to organize a more structured process so that they could influence more directly on going Euro-Mediterranean debates at a governmental level. Naturally, such efforts should in no way undermine the autonomy of the actors involved and there should be no attempt at institutionalizing the role of participating organizations. It therefore remains to be seen if current efforts at improving the Civil Forum will produce a more policyoriented outcome.

Empowering civil society Almost a decade into the Euro-Mediterranean Process it is clear that civil fora must play a more direct role in the implementation phase of the Process if this multilateral initiative is to be strengthened and sustainable. It is only through the direct participation of non-governmental organizations that a more grass-roots type of Euro-Mediterranean community will be nurtured. So far this has not happened. However, before significant steps can be taken in this direction the EU must itself decide what policy positions it is prepared to adopt in this sector of the Partnership. For example, should the EU turn a blind eye to regimes whose respect for human rights and democratic principles are widely criticized throughout the Mediterranean? If not, how can Europe’s concerns be turned into actions that receive widespread popular support in the region? What can be done to further strengthen the role of civil society? The creation of a Euro-Mediterranean free-trade area will also impact on the environment. The free-trade area is likely to have a detrimental impact as the agricultural sector is forced to adopt more environmentally unfriendly practices of production in order to remain competitive. Specific sectors such as that of water and desertification will require immediate attention and environmental issues should be more directly addressed in the Euro-Mediterranean association agreements. The Euro-Mediterranean Partner countries also need to ensure enforcement of legislation in this area by the authorities concerned. After all, Mediterranean Partner countries are signatories of numerous environmental conventions. The process of labelling should also be introduced to prevent environmental dumping. Civil society must also become more vocal when it comes to raising awareness of the

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environmental issues at stake. A practical recommendation is that of introducing a debt for nature relief scheme. This would help improve the economic situation and safeguard the environment of the countries concerned simultaneously.148 When one explores the repercussions that a free-trade area will have on the question of human rights, one should focus on whether European and Mediterranean interpretations of such a complex issue as human rights can ever be harmonized? Human rights activists also have to concentrate their attention on such basic economic and social rights as the right to work, healthcare, education, civil protection, tolerance and the elimination of discrimination. It should also be noted that the Euro-Mediterranean process has so far not succeeded in fostering a dialogue between the civilizations across the Mediterranean that will eventually help remove prejudice and misperceptions and encourage respect of different traditions in the EuroMediterranean area. In order to demonstrate that it is more serious in advancing the third chapter of the Barcelona Process, the EU should consider a number of proposals that would generate more interest in this sector. In the last 8 years the Euro-Mediterranean Process has not succeeded in promoting an open and constructive dialogue between the civilizations in the Mediterranean. A programme that consists of regular meetings between different representatives of cultural groups around the Mediterranean would help establish a more coherent framework upon which such a dialogue could be nurtured. As access to the information age becomes more widely spread, the EU and its Mediterranean Partners should launch a series of activities that promotes a more objective portrayal of cultural characteristics found in the Mediterranean. Audio-visual programmes and educational documentaries should be produced for distribution in the European and international media. The Euro-Mediterranean partners should also encourage the development of civil society and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Although networks of NGOs have been set up in some areas, policy makers have not taken advantage of the expertise and support that such networks can offer. Involving NGOs and civil society more directly in Euro-Mediterranean affairs would assist in nurturing a sense of national unity and stem the threat of rising ethnic, religious and social conflicts. The EU should also consider establishing a Euro-Mediterranean Institute for Democracy and entrust it with the implementation of a democracy building programme similar to what has been undertaken in the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.149 Fleshing out such an elaborate programme of activities will have an immediate positive impact upon the contribution civil fora are making to regional stability across the Euro-Mediterranean area. Since 1995, grass-root involvement in the Barcelona Process has remained limited to a few areas of cooperation. As a result, the EMP is often regarded as high on rhetoric but low on substance by several cultural NGOs. In order to overcome this perception the Euro-Mediterranean countries should increase resources dedicated towards social issues in general and improve basic

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programmes such as those of education and healthcare. The EMP should also upgrade the role of civil fora in the Process by giving them a higher profile in proceedings. Unless civil fora are allowed to participate in high-level meetings it is almost certain that their support will not be forthcoming during the implementation stage of cooperative projects. In the Annex to the Crete Conclusions of May 2003 the Euro-Mediterranean foreign ministers dedicate a great deal of energy towards mapping out the parameters of what a dialogue between cultures and civilizations in the Mediterranean should take into consideration. As stipulated in the Valencia Action Plan the Dialogue between cultures and civilization should respect pluralism, diversity and cultural specificities, promote equality and mutual respect and seek the avoidance and reduction of prejudices and stereotypes. The Dialogue should aim to achieve not only a better understanding of ‘the other’ but also offer solutions for persistent problems. The ultimate goal of the Dialogue should not be to change ‘the other’ but rather to live peacefully with ‘the other’.150 The Crete Annex further stipulates that the Dialogue between cultures and civilizations is an appropriate instrument to achieve constructive interaction and effective cooperation among nations of the Euro-Mediterranean area. It should therefore seek to fight fanaticism of any kind, extremism, racism and xenophobia. Such a process should promote an understanding of other models of society and different ways of thinking and ways of acting to coexist. Once set up the Foundation will seek to promote knowledge, recognition and mutual respect between the cultures, traditions and values that prevail in all EuroMediterranean countries. It will also seek to nurture respect for each other based on tolerance and acceptance of differences in all countries. The Foundation will also aim at fostering a decentralized process of agenda setting by encouraging all relevant institutions in the different Euro-Mediterranean countries to contribute to the Dialogue between cultures and civilizations. Annex 2 of the Crete Conclusions of May 2003 goes a step further and explains the importance of establishing a Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for a dialogue of cultures and civilizations in order to achieve the goals set out in Chapter Three of the Barcelona Declaration of 1995. The Foundation will be a new intergovernmental instrument that will provide a dynamic structure within which a true sense of joint ownership of the EMP can evolve. Realization of objectives spelt out in Chapter Three of the Barcelona Declaration requires actions whose objective is to reach the maximum number of citizens and simultaneously aspire to overcome barriers that are blocking information that will assist in achieving a greater understanding of one another. The setting up of an institution in the field of culture will allow for a more coordinated approach when it comes to identifying and executing projects that are relevant to the dialogue of cultures and increased cultural cooperation. The Euro-Mediterranean Foundation will also be able to provide an inventory of cooperation between existing networks of foundations, NGOs and other institutions of civil society, whether public or private, national or international, that operate in the Euro-Mediterranean area.

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The main objectives of the Foundation will be threefold: to identify, develop and promote areas of cultural convergence between the countries and peoples of the Mediterranean, with the aim of avoiding stereotypes; to hold a close and regular dialogue between cultural circles often kept outside the main diplomatic and cultural circles; and to serve as a catalyst for promoting exchanges, cooperation and mobility between people at all levels, targeting in particular the young and activities relevant to the young. In order to avoid a duplication of effort with others already contributing to closer cultural cooperation in the Mediterranean area the Annex to the Crete Conclusions also highlights the types of activities that should be implemented. These include promoting exchanges between cultural and intellectual circles in a wider sense, promoting continuous cultural debate using in particular multi-media techniques in cooperation with important existing media outlets, and supporting important events that symbolize mutual understanding. The Euro-Mediterranean Foundation therefore represents the most fascinating step taken to date by the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in the field of social, cultural and human affairs. Naturally, outlining what such a Foundation should seek to achieve is not the same as actually implementing such an agenda. The premature euphoria that surrounded the publishing of the Guidelines for a Charter for Peace and Stability in the Annex to the Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Ministerial Stuttgart Conclusions of April 1999 is a valid case in point. Yet the post-9/11 international climate seems much more conducive to providing the political will necessary to see such an ambitious undertaking as the establishment of Euro-Mediterranean Foundation actually come to fruition. Misperceptions and prejudice are barriers that must be overcome if the battle against a clash of civilizations scenario is to be avoided. The fact that the Foundation would seek to promote a debate and create a framework within which a dialogue on cultures, societies and civilizations could take place in the Euro-Mediterranean area is certainly a step in the right direction as it will assist in combating those that seek to fuel a hatred of ‘the other’. A key goal that the Foundation will have to keep in mind is that of disseminating the dialogue to as wide an audience as possible. The so-called Annex to Annex 2 of the foreign ministerial Crete Conclusions offers a very interesting indicative list of activities that would go a long way to ensuring that such a goal is achieved. This would include organizing seminars and conferences on Euro-Mediterranean relations as a programme of continuous meetings, talks and publications. It would also include endowing research scholarships on Euro-Mediterranean relations and launching cultural exchange programmes. In order to maximize synergies, the Foundation would also coordinate its activities with those of other international organizations such as UNESCO. An effort will also be made to produce textbooks on the heritage and values of successive civilizations that make up the history of the Mediterranean. A major effort will also be made to ensure that a broad range of participants that include academics, professionals, governmental officials and non-governmental organizations are involved in cultural debates.

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The Foundation will also seek to prepare programmes on cultures and arts of the Mediterranean and encourage TV channels on both shores of the Mediterranean to broadcast them with subtitles translation. The use of videoconferencing and other modern technology to supplement mobility programmes will also be widely promoted and governments should encourage north-to-south and south-to-north youth cultural tourism that consists of book and heritage exhibitions and traditional music and theatre festivals. There is no question that if set up along the guidelines stipulated in the Annex of the Crete Conclusions of May 2003 the Euro-Mediterranean Foundation will go a long way to raising awareness of the Barcelona Process. By reaching out to millions of Euro-Mediterranean citizens and disseminating information about the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership the Foundation will fill a vacuum in the EMP to date, namely that of information provider and agenda setter. The goal of establishing a ‘Euro-Med label’ is a positive one as long as it does not substitute for an effective policy platform that seeks to bring the peoples of Europe and the Mediterranean closer together.

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The role of extra-regional powers in the Euro-Mediterranean area

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the influence that external actors have on regional development. Having considered the impact that the European Union is having on regional relations in the Mediterranean, a review of the influence that the leading actor in international relations, the United States, and the most powerful political and military alliance in the vicinity, NATO, are having on regional relations in the Mediterranean follows. A specific effort will be made to investigate the reasons behind extra-regional powers involvement in the internal development of international regions. This will include exploring the extent to which external actors can influence the basic pattern of regional alignments. External intervention in a region can occur for numerous reasons. Extra-regional powers have often become embroiled in a region because of their rivalry with one another. When rivalry between external powers has been intense, they have typically been more ready to become involved in regional politics. Conversely, when their rivalry has been cooperative, they often appear less concerned about regional relations. For example, throughout the Cold War, the superpowers became entangled in regional affairs as a means of containing each other’s spheres of influence. Such regional rivalries have often left the major powers hostage to the relationships between the states of the region. Several analysts believed that the diminution of rivalry between the two superpowers with the end of the Cold War would usher in a period where regional affairs would become less important from a strategic perspective. While the disappearance of the Soviet Union has allowed the United States to become much more selective in its foreign policy areas of engagement, regional affairs have quite often dictated the course of such selections as witnessed in the Balkans and more recently in central Asia. It is also a fact that there are circumstances that have not been affected by the end of the Cold War. External powers have often intervened in a region to pursue specific self-interests. External interaction in the Persian Gulf is an example of such intrusive behaviour. External actors are attracted to this sub region of the Mediterranean because of their dependence on the reliable flow of oil and the abundance of oil reserves in countries such as Saudi Arabia and Iraq, the world number one and number two oil reserve countries respectively.

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External powers can also become involved in international regions to act as ‘balancers of power’. Extra-regional powers can be invited in by any one country seeking assistance to help preserve or consolidate a balance of power within their region. The more intense the regional adversity, the more urgently external assistance will be sought. In reality, major great powers can also bully their way into regional relations, but their involvement is greatly facilitated by the presence of regional rivalries. Wriggins classifies external involvement in international regions under two headings: ‘the pull factor’ and ‘the push factor’. The first dynamic operates when regional actors issue invitations to non-regional powers to intervene. The second dynamic operates when competition among non-regional powers leads them to seek client-states to help bolster their position.151 A number of factors can contribute to an increase in acts of intervention by external powers in a particular area. First, international systems encompassing large number of states which endure high levels of internal instability are likely to have a high incidence of intervention. External powers will be attracted to intervene for at least two reasons: to gain a strategic foothold in the area and to prevent any one actor from becoming a regional hegemon in the region. Second, regional systems that are characterized by ideological divisions and competition are prone to military intervention. States within international regions seeking to become regional power centres will interfere in the affairs of their neighbours to upset the balance of power in their favour. A third systemic factor stimulating intervention is asymmetry in the distribution of power. More or less equal states have the capacity to resist each other’s attempts to intervene in their internal affairs. In such systems where distribution of power is equally shared, the incidence of intervention is likely to be low. By contrast, systems in which power is unevenly distributed will be intervention prone. An analysis of the Mediterranean area reveals that this part of the world consists of all three characteristics that make it very attractive to extra-regional intervention. The heterogeneous make-up of the Mediterranean and the high level of instability in the different sub regions surrounding the basin are a powerful source of intrusive interest in the Mediterranean. Extra-regional actors are continuously monitoring the position of their allies throughout the world and quite often are prepared to intervene if the position of their ally is in any way threatened. The ‘West versus the Rest’ ideological rivalry that has gained in importance since the end of the Cold War and is often referred to as a clash of civilizations scenario is also a potential source of friction in the Mediterranean where the world’s three leading religions of Christendom, Islam and Judaism are to be found. The Mediterranean is also an area where the asymmetry in the distribution of power continues to grow between the prosperous North and the impoverished South. Intrusive players in international relations are those external actors who are politically engaged in a direct manner in the pattern of relations in a specific region. An external actor becomes a significant actor in an international region or

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sub region when its actions affect the balance of power within this grouping of states.

The role of a superpower: the United States As the only superpower in international relations, the United States qualifies as one of the principal intrusive actors in the Mediterranean area. It projects enough political, economic and military authority in the basin to influence the trend of relations through its strong network of bilateral contacts in the area. Key strategic relations include those with Israel, Egypt, Morocco, Portugal, Italy and Spain. The United States’ primary role in international institutions such as NATO, the OSCE, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) also allows it to penetrate the Mediterranean area from a multilateral perspective and enables it to influence sub-regional dynamics in Southern Europe, the Maghreb and the Mashreq in a more covert manner. The United States has sustained its strong strategic position in the eastern sector of the Mediterranean and especially in the Middle East through comprehensive diplomatic intergovernmental and commercial ties with regional power players. For example, both Israel and Egypt have enjoyed extensive military and political support from the United States in recent decades. The multiplicity of economic, cultural and military ties existing between these regional power centres and Washington reflects the importance attached to Israel and Egypt as a stabilizing and friendly influence in the Middle East. Throughout the Cold War American interests in the Mediterranean area were largely shaped by the mutual rivalry it shared with the Soviet Union. In February 1947 Britain informed the United States that it was no longer able to guarantee the independence of Greece and Turkey. Confronted with the choice of filling the vacuum left by the British withdrawal or permitting the eastern sector of the Mediterranean to enter the Soviet orbit, the United States chose to protect the strategic waterway by launching the Truman Doctrine of March 1947. This development represented the formal aspect of an American commitment to the Mediterranean. In a limited way, the American presence was reminiscent of that of Britain in previous centuries: it provided the United States with a foothold for achieving desired ends elsewhere, namely in relation to continental Europe and the Middle East region. The British structure of authority coupled with American economic and military resources provided the cornerstone of US policy that was to prevent any Soviet hegemonic threat to Europe or Africa. At the height of its power in the Mediterranean basin the United States had the following facilities at its disposal in case a crisis emerged: military bases in Morocco, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Turkey and Greece. It could also call on British bases in Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus and Aden. Such an extensive network of facilities provided Washington with plenty of flexibility when it came to formulating strategic policies towards the Mediterranean area. Two reasons help to explain the rationale behind American containment policy in the early years after the Second World War: to counter Soviet efforts to dominate

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relations in the eastern Mediterranean and in the Middle East and to counterbalance the actual projection of Soviet military power into continental Europe. The United States made use of Italy in the west and Greece and Turkey in the east to realize this policy of containment. At no time were the internal affairs of the Mediterranean countries considered as important in themselves. Washington was strictly interested in maintaining a string of bases from which it could monitor any regional patterns of interaction that could alter the balance of power against it. The Mediterranean was therefore regarded as a strategic operating theatre from which the United States could project its foreign policy goals. The raison d’être of American involvement in the Mediterranean during the Cold War can be summed up in order of priority as follows: • • • •

ensuring the free flow of oil to the Western world, particularly Western Europe; guaranteeing free access to the sea-lines of communication that connect the Atlantic Ocean to the Eastern world; enhancing the political and military cohesion of NATO and defending its continental Europe against Soviet pressure; countering Soviet attempts to gain influence throughout the Middle East, particularly the Persian Gulf, but also the Mashreq in general and the Maghreb.

The United States was therefore perceived as the guardian of Mediterranean stability by its allies, and the custodian of the status quo by its enemies. Although the United States was under constant pressure to monitor Soviet actions in the area, challenges to America’s position in the basin tended to come from two other sources independent of Moscow. First, militant Arab nationalism which was a reflection of the Arab-Israeli conflict and, in the 1980s, manifested itself in the form of international terrorism. Second, unsettling domestic trends in some NATO allies, especially the tense relationship that developed between Greece and Turkey. Throughout the second half of the twentieth century America’s foreign policy objectives in the Middle East have been both global and regional in nature.152 Up to the early 1970s, east-west rivalry dictated that the support of regional actors be one of America’s main concerns in the Mediterranean. This was particularly the case when both Egypt and Syria turned to the Soviet bloc for armaments in 1955, thus permitting Moscow to gain its first significant foothold in the Arab world. American intervention in the Suez affair helped the United States shed its image as a new colonial power among some Arab states. But the Iraqi revolution in 1958, the 1967 Six Day War and the 1973 Yom Kippur War quickly undermined Washington’s attempts to become a more effective mediator in the ArabIsraeli conflict. Although this conflict did not threaten Western European security directly, apart from the economic panic it caused after oil price hikes in 1973, the threat of a Middle Eastern apocalypse has often been a source of friction between the United States and Western Europe.153 Given the fact that Western Europe is more dependent on Middle Eastern oil supplies and more vulnerable to the threat of terrorism, and given their deeper historical

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links with this region, European countries have often been more sympathetic to Arab demands than their American counterparts. For example, Spain, Greece and Turkey joined members of the European Community in 1973 in refusing Washington access to their bases and facilities to support Israel. The shifting nature of strategic alliances in the post-Cold War world and the very fluid nature of such alliances as witnessed in the build up to the attack against Iraq in the spring of 2003 allow the United States to formulate strategic alliances with European countries on a more ad hoc basis than previously the case when it comes to crisis situations in the Middle East. But the perception of America being more sympathetic than Europe in general towards Israel continues. The continuous presence of the US Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean demonstrates Washington’s strategic interest in this part of the world. During the Cold War the structure of the Fleet consisted of two carriers and approximately fifty surface ships. The rationale for the Sixth Fleet was traditionally based upon eastwest considerations, that is, to bolster NATO’s southern flank and to participate in US nuclear deterrence. On two occasions, the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973, the Americans and Soviets engaged in a fierce balance of power struggle with their respective clients in the region, and in the latter incident the United States was even put on a strategic nuclear alert.154 Although the United States decided initially to announce cutbacks in its deployable carrier battle groups in the aftermath of the Cold War, the Sixth Fleet continues to fulfil both military and political roles in the Mediterranean. After the terror attacks of September 11th 2001 most Mediterranean states are in favour of the Sixth Fleet remaining in the littoral as insurance against potential forces of instability.155 In the past decade technological developments have significantly reduced the role of sea power. Advances in aircraft and missile technology coupled with advancements in lift capabilities and progress in projecting power have resulted in a situation where land-based systems have become far more dominant in the sea combat environment. This is particularly the case in the land-locked Mediterranean. It is primarily in the ‘choke’ points of the basin such as the Straits of Gibraltar, the Straits of Sicily and the Suez Canal that are obligatory points of passage that maritime power, in the form of submarines, remain a dominant force. Submarines retain their comparative advantage due to the high thermal gradients, the elevated salinity of the sea, the uneven conformation of the seabed, and the heavy traffic of ships in the area.156 On the northern shore of the Mediterranean, American foreign policy has largely been geared towards preserving the status quo throughout NATO’s southern flank. With the challenge of Eurocommunism long gone, the United States has largely focused on maintaining coherent cooperative relations between both Greece and Turkey. A combination of both stick and carrot tactics have been applied to ensure base rights in the area. Intensive diplomatic negotiations and an increase in financial assistance enabled Washington to reach agreements with most allies on a regular basis, including Socialist governments in Spain and Greece. The threat

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of withdrawing assistance to both Athens and Ankara has also allowed the Sixth Fleet home-porting rights for most of the latter half of the last century – Greece withdrew this right between 1974 and 1980 after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. American foreign policy at the start of the new millennium is evolving from the concept of pre-emption that is highlighted in the September 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States.157 American national interests in the Mediterranean are identified as: • • •

to assure security of access to oil reserves from the Persian Gulf; to maintain strategic and political access to Israel; to nurture American-Arab relations in the area along the lines of the strong relationship that exists between the United States and Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

The United States leadership role in the Kuwaiti-Iraq crisis in the early 1990s and its continuous defence of Saudi Arabia and removal of the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq in 2003 have enhanced America’s reputation as a proactive player in Middle Eastern affairs. The focus of American interests since the end of the Cold War have gradually shifted to the eastern sector of the basin, where Washington has intensified its bilateral contacts with countries such as Turkey, Israel and Egypt and through NATO’s AFSOUTH command and control.158 Whereas the challenge confronting the United States throughout the 1990s was how to justify domestically the presence of such a formidable force half way around the world, the importance of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean and its counterpart, the Fifth Fleet in the Persian Gulf, are now regarded as essential components of US foreign policy in the aftermath of the 2001 terror attacks. The United States continues to play the dual role in the littoral as a strategic guarantor and crisis manager of disputes. The more erratic nature of post-Cold War regional dynamics operating in the Mediterranean has made executing such a policy more difficult. Keeping the sea-lines open for access to and the free flow of oil remains a crucial American goal. Yet the United States has shown a readiness to share the burden of crisis management with the Europeans as demonstrated in its policy approaches towards the former Yugoslavia and Algeria. Although the terror attacks of September 11th 2001 dictate that the United States retain a vigilante force in the Mediterranean area it is still a relevant exercise to speculate what would happen if Washington were to withdraw its forces from the Mediterranean, much like the British did in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf during the first half of the twentieth century. An American exit from the Mediterranean would immediately result in a power vacuum in the area. Such an outcome would enable regional power centres such as Israel, Turkey and potentially Libya to conduct more autonomous foreign policies than currently the case. An American withdrawal would also see bilateral types of external intervention in regional affairs make way for multilateral types of intervention. As a result, international organizations would become the more prolific non-regional actors in Mediterranean international relations.

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In theory, one may argue that an American exit from the Mediterranean would push countries in the area into harmonizing their foreign policies and adopting a common Mediterranean identity. The extra-regional nature of foreign policy priorities of most riparian states indicates that the opposite is likely to happen. Moreover, a total withdrawal would make it practically impossible to craft a credible regional security structure.159 The Gulf War in the early 1990s illustrated that Southern European countries are prepared to coalesce in a crisis if the United States is willing to lead such a coalition force. Without American supervision, and especially military assistance, it would be impossible that the countries of the Mediterranean could muster the necessary military and political will to act effectively in the fields of crisis management, conflict prevention and conflict resolution. In the post-Cold War era great powers have three main choices that they can adhere to when conducting their foreign policies. They can act unilaterally, they can advance bilateral relations, or they can engage in multilateral collaboration. The past decade has seen the United States employ a mixture of all three in its foreign policy agenda, with the unilateralist streak becoming more dominant with each passing year.160 Advocates of an American unilateral foreign policy would do well to consider the downside to such an approach in international relations. The escalation of cost in going it alone is not something that should be easily dismissed. For example, while the war against Iraq in 2003 could be regarded as a feasible economic enterprise, the cost of keeping the peace in the same country runs into billions of dollars monthly and is already leading many American politicians to argue in favour of creating a multinational force in Iraq. Second, any great power acting unilaterally in a far away region runs the risk of being isolated by other main actors in the international system. The transatlantic split that the war against Iraq caused is a clear example of such an outcome. Unilateral action should therefore be reserved for situations where a great power is under direct threat of attack, as the United States was on September 11th 2001. An assessment of the types of interaction the superpower has with Mediterranean littoral states reveals political, economic and military ties remain the most important. Intergovernmental links are mainly concerned with these types of cooperation, with cultural ties remaining largely ad hoc. The end of the east-west confrontation has forced all regional leaders, including those in the Mediterranean, to reassess their sources of external support. The change from a bipolar to a more unipolar and multipolar international system has created a new strategic environment for external actors in different regions of the world. External assistance has become somewhat more effective in influencing regional dynamics. In the cut-throat world of globalization only those regional actors who are deemed politically stable and economically productive are being extended lines of credit that are required to make a difference to their overall international position. The southern countries of the Mediterranean continue to attract less external capital than those of East Asia and even less than some others in Latin America. This is due to a number of reasons that include political uncertainty,

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administrative obstruction, a comparatively unskilled labour force and an inadequate infrastructure.161 The disappearance of the Soviet Union has left the United States as the predominant external military actor in the Mediterranean, and has allowed it to consolidate it position in the basin. The presence of a single superpower could help moderate local crises, as Washington mutes rivalries by cutting off supplies to mavericks in the area. As an economic hegemon in the Mediterranean, the EU could assist the United States in this sector by complementing American military power with economic support. But such coordination will not be easy to achieve given the competitive nature of transatlantic relations in the post-Cold War era. At a bilateral level the United States also remains the dominant great power in the Mediterranean. America is the leading external actor in the region with strong political, economic and military ties to its Southern European allies in NATO. It also has comprehensive agreements with Israel, Egypt, Cyprus, Malta, Tunisia and Morocco. The sheer economic and defensive power that the United States possesses ensures that it will continue to attract the attention of Mediterranean countries in forthcoming decades. While contemporary international relations has seen the United States become more concerned with regional relations in the eastern sector of the Mediterranean basin, EU countries have focused a great deal of their attention on events in the western sector of the basin. As an external great power the United States can act more independently in the Mediterranean than European great powers bordering the Mediterranean, such as France which is more vulnerable to retaliation from action in the Maghreb given its geographical proximity and large Maghrebi emigrant community. In any case, although the leading intrusive power in the world, the fact remains that while the United States continues to influence regional dynamics, it cannot dictate patterns of relations within international regions, not even the Mediterranean. The state of flux that the international system has been in since the end of the Cold War has led all actors in the international system, including great powers, to be much more flexible in their foreign policy endeavours than during the period 1945–89. Such flexibility is another factor regarded by many theorists as a hallmark of effective great power concerts.162 In situations where the direct interests of the extra-regional states are concerned they will react decisively as demonstrated by the United States in the Gulf War of 1990–91 and again in the war against Iraq in 2003. The collapse of the Cold War international system has reduced the successor states’ ability to intervene in regional affairs. Russia has had to dedicate the majority of its political and military resources to securing its own borders, as the Chechnya conflict highlights. Moscow’s reduction in support to countries around the Mediterranean has been somewhat made up for by an increase in support from the United States and European Union. The diminution of Soviet influence in the Mediterranean area has resulted in a gradual increase in regional ties with the West in general, and the United States in particular. Countries such as Egypt, Jordan, Greece and Turkey already benefit

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from monetary and defence arrangements with Washington. Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Malta and Cyprus have all been seeking and gaining closer ties with the EU. However, continued domestic and regional instability continues to impede riparian states from attaining far reaching agreements with great powers. Future external relations in the Mediterranean area will depend less on the activity of the non-regional powers and more on how riparian states consolidate their power and perceive their geo-strategic interests. For example, arms flows to the eastern and southern sectors of the Mediterranean continue at a steady pace due to the lack of progress registered in the Arab-Israeli peace process and other regional peace initiatives such as that concerning the Western Sahara. Regional powers in different Middle Eastern sub regions are even more determined than before to shore up their defences now that patron support can no longer be taken for granted. The termination of the Cold War has therefore forced regional powers to reassess their foreign policy objectives. One outcome that is already noticeable is that regional challenges of the future lie more in the economic and financial battles for markets than the military battles for territory. One incentive for regional states to end border conflicts (Arab-Israeli, Greece-Turkey-Cyprus) is so they can participate in the international political economy without any restrictions. The globalization of economic activity which is characterized by the growing frequency of crossborder transactions, the ever-increasing volume of trade, the growing strength of international investment and the enhanced complexity of the international division of labour, is therefore likely to increase centrifugal tendencies throughout the international system and especially in less developed areas such as the Mediterranean. In the post-Cold War international system the United States remains unchallenged as the only superpower. Throughout the 1990s the United States spent an average of $280 billion annually on defence. An important outcome of the US National Security Strategy of September 2002 is that defence spending is due to increase to as much as $400 billion a year or 3 per cent of American GDP. Even if Americans decide to dedicate 4 per cent of their GDP – a defence budget in excess of $500 billion annually – it would still represent a smaller proportion of national wealth than Americans spent throughout the Cold War. Even Paul Kennedy who invented the term ‘imperial overstretch’ in the late 1980s, when the United States was spending around 7 per cent of its GDP on defence, believes the United States can sustain its current military spending levels and its current global dominance far into the future.163 The Bush administration’s new National Security Strategy was formulated in response to the terror attacks of September 11th 2001. Yet aside from a few references to the concept of ‘pre-emption’ which is not completely a new concept in any case, the strategy essentially restates the goals of American foreign policy that have been in place since the end of the Second World War. The Bush strategy to continue promoting democracy echoes the goals of presidencies such as Harry Truman, John F. Kennedy and Ronald Reagan. The declaration to guarantee America’s pre-eminent military position and to fend off challenges from other

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powers is the foundation stone upon which American foreign policy has been built over the last half century. Naturally much will depend on the United States’ ability to implement the National Security Strategy in the years ahead. Allies in Europe and the Middle East can certainly count on Washington’s support to destroy terrorist networks in their neighbourhood. The United States and international organizations such as the World Bank can also be expected to assist those countries that are seen to be supporting the fight against global terrorism. The United States is also determined to expand its free trade agreements with other countries in the Middle East as outlined by President Bush in the first half of 2003. In any case, the absolute superiority of the United States air, naval and military power at the start of the new millennium dictates that Washington will continue to control the international sea-lines of communication across the Mediterranean. American strategic interests in the Mediterranean area will largely focus on the eastern sector of the basin, namely the Middle East region in general and the Mashreq and Persian Gulf sub regions in particular. This part of the world is crucial to stabilizing the adjacent region of Central Asia and also to guaranteeing the security of Israel and also access to oil resources throughout this century. Reconstruction of Iraq and a permanent settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will remain high on the American foreign policy agenda throughout the first decade of the twenty-first century. Success in Iraq is a crucial piece in the post-September 11th puzzle as it will provide the United States with a listening post and launching pad in the heart of the Middle East. Control of Baghdad will facilitate America’s task of managing relations throughout Central Asia and the rest of the Middle East. A resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will also deliver geopolitical dividends and assist in repairing the perceptual rift that exists between the United States and a large segment of the Arab world. Although the 2002 American National Security Strategy does not refer directly to the Mediterranean, it is clear that this historical waterway and theatre of operation will remain a top priority in American foreign policy planning. Upgrading of the Fifth and Sixth Fleets operating in the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean, respectively, will continue to take place as will the search for new strategic allies and the strengthening of old ones in the Euro-Mediterranean area. Mastery of the Mediterranean will allow the United States to project its power in proximate regions on short notice and also deter any potential aggressors that might seek to take advantage were a Mediterranean power vacuum allowed to develop.

The role of international organizations and the case of NATO When examining the role that international organizations play in regional relations it is essential to focus on the political interests and coalitions that lie behind the strategic objectives of such international organizations. Freedom of navigation has been a principal concern for all external actors who have an interest in the Mediterranean. Historically, the sea has been the chief

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medium for cultural and economic exchanges and for political and military ventures. When the basin was controlled by Mediterranean states they based their strategic considerations on the nature of their physical position and the paramount position of the Mediterranean in the international political economy. The pattern of relations between internal and external actors in the Mediterranean changed significantly in the twentieth century once the process of decolonization became irreversible. By the mid-1950s a number of international organizations had already expressed anti-colonial tendencies. In 1918 the Covenant of the League of Nations stressed the right to self-determination and in 1945 the Charter of the United Nations reiterated this principle. Both contributed to establishing an international consensus that was hostile to the possession of colonial territories. By the 1960s, Third World nationalism had gained in prominence. The two superpowers had little choice but to accommodate a third force in international affairs once the non-aligned conference was held in Bandung in 1955. Given the intersection of the east-west and the north-south divisions in the Mediterranean it perhaps comes as little surprise that two of the founding fathers of non-alignment, Tito and Nasser, came from two countries in the Mediterranean area.164 The international system experienced a sea change in structural design at the end of the Cold War as power alignments shifted. The lifting of superpower overlay has allowed for a resurgence of regional dynamics in all parts of the world including the Mediterranean. Fears that the United States would become a global hegemonic power have surfaced from time to time throughout the 1990s and have been rekindled by the proactive foreign policy stance that Washington has adopted since September 11th 2001. The scenario of a ‘back to the future’ course of events emerging, with great power patron-client relationships of the past resurfacing, has also not appeared. The emergence of a ‘new’ hegemonic actor on the international scene also remains an illusion. Yet it is clear that international organizations such as the EU are playing a more active role in regional politics. The relegation of superpower politics to the history books has coincided with an increase in multilateral intergovernmental and transnational patterns of interaction. The end of the Cold War has ushered in a period where the realm of external actors’ ability to influence international regional relations has changed. Bilateral types of intrusive intervention are often being superseded by multilateral types of intervention as international organizations become more active in regional affairs. This is evident when one compares the nature of intrusive action during the Cold War in the Mediterranean with that of the last decade. The disappearance of the Soviet Union and the reluctance of the United States to act unilaterally on several occasions throughout the 1990s have allowed international organizations such as the EU and NATO to play a much more active part in the Mediterranean theatre of operations. A number of other indicators also appear to support this thesis. First, the multifaceted security challenges that great powers perceive as emanating from this area are convincing them that international organizations are better equipped to contend with such risks. Second, the high costs of confronting such security challenges favours a collective intrusive response that shares economic burdens. Third, the

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Mediterranean remains a geo-strategic area of importance, both as an international waterway and because of its energy producing capacity. It is therefore in the interest of all international actors that sea-lines of communication in the Mediterranean remain open. A multilateral approach to such security challenges is less of a political risk than unilateral action would be. While the United States remains the predominant military actor in the Mediterranean basin, the EU is the leading economic player in the basin through its Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. This development is conducive to an increase of international organization involvement in the area. Several international organizations operate in the Mediterranean area. These include the United Nations (UN), the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Arab League which includes the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and of course the European Union (EU). Since the end of the Cold War NATO has gone through several phases of soulsearching in an attempt to identify what new roles it can play in the post-Cold War security arena. In the Mediterranean the Atlantic Alliance has sought to extend its multilateral approach in two ways: by establishing a confidence building network with non-member Mediterranean states through its Mediterranean dialogue programme and by fostering a politico-security culture similar to that which exists in Europe. Traditionally, NATO has always included the Mediterranean dimension in its forecasting. Italy was among the 12 original signatories of the Treaty. After 1949, the Alliance reaffirmed its commitment to the Mediterranean as three of the four new members of the Alliance were from Southern Europe. The significance attached to the Mediterranean and its flanking areas is further highlighted by the fact that two-thirds of the 15 Alliance-relevant regional conflicts have occurred in this area since 1956.165 NATO’s approach to the Mediterranean has undergone considerable evolution since 1949. Three specific innovations took place during the Cold War which retain their significance today: • • •

A special group for consultations on the Mediterranean was set up in 1967 in an application of Article IV of the Washington Treaty. This consultative process promotes consensual views among Alliance members. In 1975 the Alliance endorsed the idea of a Mediterranean basket within the framework of the OSCE. This step is one of the first to recognize the importance of an institutional dimension to trans-Mediterranean affairs. In 1982 the Alliance confirmed that it was legitimate for member states to respond unilaterally to requests from third parties for assistance against aggression and that such actions would be compensated for by other NATO assets. As a result, redeployments from the Mediterranean were often replaced by those from other member states.

Throughout the Cold War both the Canadians and the Americans cooperated with their European allies to ensure strategic depth and deterrence in the geographically

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and geopolitically varied parameters of the Mediterranean. As a result NATO succeeded in ensuring strategic cohesion across Southern Europe and provided a security insurance that was respected. It also advanced stability and political rapprochement between countries traditionally at odds with one another and helped maintain the defence modernization of Southern European members. In the post-Cold War world of the 1990s NATO attempted to transform its posture and approach in the Mediterranean. The first main change was a conceptual one. At the 1989 Anniversary Summit and in the Strategic Concept of 1991 in Rome, the Alliance acknowledged the multifaceted security challenges confronting it. In addition to traditional threats, NATO also highlighted numerous other problems such as proliferation of WMD, terrorism, economic disparities, environmental degradation and mass migration. NATO also accepted to participate in the emerging interlocking institutional arrangement in which different security institutions such as the OSCE, the EU, the UN and NATO all contributed to the resolution of conflicts. The second change that has taken place relates to NATO’s defence reorganization. The Alliance has improved its operational mobility and flexibility. An emphasis was also put on increasing multinational operations. This experience equipped the Alliance to address the spectrum of security challenges in the Mediterranean. NATO’s third shift is linked to the practical experience that the Alliance has had in recent years in the Mediterranean. A number of particular episodes stand out. NATO’s contribution to the 1991 Persian Gulf War was paradoxical in nature. Although not directly involved in the war itself, NATO played a decisive role in the successful military prosecution of the war. Consultations, information-sharing and policy concentration conducted through NATO channels helped to galvanize international support for UN resolutions against Iraq. NATO’s deployment of its mobile air force to Turkey not only bolstered the latter’s defences but also enhanced intelligence collecting throughout the Mediterranean. The Alliance also supplied essential logistical and communications support to the 12 nations who actually had forces on the ground during the war.166 The 1991 Gulf War advanced the thesis that post-Cold War crises could be dealt with successfully if the indispensable importance of harmonizing the Washington treaty with the UN Charter was recognized. This thesis was underlined by NATO’s role in another episode it had to confront, the Balkan crisis. The lack of a concerted North American and European perspective on the military and political demands associated with the conflict in the former Yugoslavia is one reason that UN resolutions in the area have not been fully enforced. In an effort to contain and end the war in the Balkans, NATO adopted a series of policies that included participating in monitoring operations in the Adriatic alongside EU under UN resolutions. NATO also oversaw UN authorized no-fly zones in Bosnia increasing collaboration between the EU, UN and NATO and cooperation with Hungary and Albania. NATO also continues to indirectly influence the evolution of the Middle East peace process. Although not directly involved in the regional dynamics of the Middle East, NATO is a decisive third party that acts as a buttress to the functional EU economic role and American military role in this region. This fact was clearly

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demonstrated in the 1990–91 Gulf War when NATO refuelling bases and other logistical support greatly accelerated the Desert Shield build-up and the Desert Storm campaign.167 NATO’s involvement in the Gulf War, its participation in the Balkan conflict and Afghanistan and constant references to a NATO peace-keeping force in the aftermath of a Middle East peaceful settlement between Israel and the Palestinians, make it highly likely that this international organization will be an active player in future crisis situations across the Mediterranean. This more active scenario presents both risks and opportunities for countries in the basin. An increase in the emergence of failed states, as was the case in Algeria in the mid-1990s, could easily prompt a rapid reaction NATO response to safeguard expatriates and protect vital petrochemical installations. This is especially the case now that NATO is committed to establishing a Rapid Reaction Force as stipulated at the Prague Summit in November 2002. Conversely, countries in the Mediterranean can now take advantage of NATO’s renewed interest in the area by opening wide-ranging security discussions with the Alliance. Such a process of dialogue could help dispel some of the misperceptions that exist on both sides of the Mediterranean. NATO’s institutional efforts to further relations with its northern and eastern neighbours through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and Partnership for Peace (PfP) programmes have resulted in membership invitations to the vast majority of states in this catchment area. In contrast, NATO’s policy towards the south has, to date, been restricted to a dialogue with a select number of countries in the Mediterranean. Details of the Alliance’s ‘southern strategy’ were spelled out by NATO officials in February 1995. Five countries in the Maghreb and the Mashreq, namely Morocco, Tunisia, Mauritania, Egypt and Israel, were selected as the first countries to join this process of enhanced communication.168 Algeria and Jordan subsequently became members of the NATO-Mediterranean dialogue bringing the total to seven Mediterranean countries participating in the NATO programme towards the Mediterranean. In recent years a specific effort has been made to improve the level of coordination between NATO’s Mediterranean policy and the EU’s common foreign and security policy. NATO officials regularly consult with their EU counterparts to explain their respective strategic objectives towards the Mediterranean. But policy coordination remains at an embryonic stage and there is no indication that a policy harmonization process between NATO and the EU in the Mediterranean is on the cards. NATO’s initial decision in the post-Cold War era not to set up a new security policy arm in the Mediterranean area such as a ‘NACC-South’ has been under constant review and a decade after the end of the Cold War the idea of creating a NATO-Mediterranean Partnership has emerged.169 A number of indicators support the creation of such a forum: • •

NATO’s advanced command and control structure could serve as a vehicle for promoting a security dialogue with non-member NATO countries; the lessons learned through the outreach programmes such as Partnership for Peace with Central and Eastern Europe are applicable in the South as the

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The role of extra-regional powers security challenges in this region are also related to transitory post-Cold War realities; NATO’s links with Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia through NACC-like mechanisms provide a forum through which ties between these regions and the Mediterranean could be developed; by extending its diplomatic and military machinery southwards, NATO, together with other European organizations such as the EU, OSCE and Council of Europe, could ensure their participation in any future trans-Mediterranean security arrangement, such as the proposal of the CSCM.

At their meeting in Reykjavik in May 2002, NATO Foreign Ministers decided: ‘to upgrade their political and practical dimensions of our Mediterranean Dialogue, including by consulting with Mediterranean partners on security matters of common concern, including terrorist-related issues, as appropriate. These efforts aim at bringing our Mediterranean partners even closer to NATO and give fresh impetus to the Dialogue by the Prague Summit.’170 The current objective of NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) is to contribute to regional security and stability, achieve better mutual understanding and dispel any misconceptions about NATO among Mediterranean countries. Since its establishment in 1995 the MD has been gradually strengthened in line with its progressive character. In particular, at their Summit in July 1997 NATO Heads of State and Government decided to establish the Mediterranean Cooperation Group (MCG) operating under the authority of the North Atlantic Council.171 During his keynote speech at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies (RUSI) in June 2003, NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson identified five areas where NATO should upgrade its relationship with its Mediterranean Dialogue partners in the near future. Terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, crisis management, defence reform and military-to-military cooperation are regarded as the main areas where an enhanced NATO-Mediterranean security framework would assist in achieving a more secure Euro-Mediterranean area. NATO’s interest of upgrading its current dialogue to a partnership with the Mediterranean reflects a genuine effort to strengthen its influence in an area where other international organizations of a different ethnic background such as the Arab Maghreb Union and the Arab League already operate. NATO’s increasing concern with developments in the Mediterranean also echo the Alliance’s 1994 Declaration that security in Europe is greatly influenced by security in the Mediterranean.172 The post-Cold War period is proving to be a continuous test to the raison d’être of NATO as the dividing lines of the past have either faded or disappeared completely. While the Alliance has found common ground in the fight against international terrorism this period of rapid flux presents NATO with an identity crisis which is exacerbated when seen through the lens of such a diverse area as the Mediterranean. NATO’s Partnership initiative offers the Alliance an opportunity to forge new links with non-member Mediterranean countries. Although the financial and political

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costs of developing an active alliance network across the waterway will be high, the costs of failing to establish such a system could be higher in the long term, should instability from the Mediterranean spread towards the north. NATO’s successful Cold War track record and its ability to re-shape its security agenda in the past decade makes it one of the most prominent security institutions functioning today. As transatlantic relations have evolved and at times become more strained, the transatlantic commitment to NATO has not wavered. Talk of a NATO collapse has proved premature. One way to preserve the cohesiveness of the Alliance is to identify common security ground in the new security environment that has emerged. The Mediterranean and by extension, the Middle East, offer the Alliance such an opportunity. By forming coalitions and relationships with other international organizations in the basin, NATO could play a direct role in helping to prevent the emergence of conflictual patterns of relations between Europe and the Mediterranean. Such relations could easily evolve if political and military misperceptions and the increase in the proliferation of weapons is not checked in the short term. The participation of Mediterranean countries in NATO activities will also assist in removing some of the negative perceptions that some of the southern Mediterranean states have of the Alliance. Permitting countries in the Maghreb and the Mashreq to attend certain NATO policy sessions will demonstrate that NATO is a common defence grouping that does not seek aggressive military intentions. Almost a decade of interaction through the MD has exposed Mediterranean partner countries to NATO terminology, doctrine and procedures. The further inclusion of non-member Mediterranean states in NATO’s consultative framework will go some way towards dispelling misperceptions on both sides of the Mediterranean and would facilitate the task of generating cooperative intergovernmental interaction in the sensitive area of military issues. The interoperability of MD partner forces with NATO has increased and is an area that deserves better exposure. Egypt, Jordan and Morocco have all made significant contributions in peace-keeping missions in the Balkans and Morocco had the third-largest non-NATO troop count in both Bosnia and Kosovo in 2003. NATO is also currently contributing to security in the Mediterranean through its maritime mission codenamed Operation Active Endeavour. The operation is a NATO Article V mission in support of the United States in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001. The operation consists of four separate elements. First, through this operation NATO is seeking to maintain a deterrence presence and surveillance and inspection capability in the eastern sector of the Mediterranean. Second, NATO is carrying out regular route surveys especially in choke points which are the most important passages and harbours of the Mediterranean Sea. Third, NATO is providing escort to designated vessels transiting the Straits of Gibraltar and fourthly, NATO is seeking to enhance relations with Mediterranean Dialogue partners. NATO’s counter-terrorism operation in the Mediterranean has also been extended in early 2003 to include escorting non-military ships through the Straits of Gibraltar to protect them against possible terrorist attacks. Operation Active Endeavour has

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already seen 30,000 vessels hailed, 9 boarded and more than 240 escorted. Its contribution to stability in the region should not be underestimated as the security umbrella that is being offered has already resulted in a 20 per cent decrease of maritime insurance premiums in the region and an estimated reduction in illegal immigration by 50 per cent.173 As the most active political and military international organization in the EuroMediterranean area, NATO has the capacity to influence the pattern of relations across and around the Mediterranean basin. NATO’s Partnership initiative towards the Mediterranean should aim at influencing positively indigenous patterns of relations and be built upon such trends. Like other international organizations, most notably the EU, NATO should expect to find it difficult to implement a comprehensive and coherent security programme in such a diverse area as the Mediterranean. Overcoming apathy for additional security initiatives and superseding complacent perspectives across the Mediterranean will be no easy task. But the alternative of a security fault-line emerging between Europe and the southern shores of the Mediterranean should be enough of an incentive for NATO to pursue a partnership with all the resources it has at its disposal. The end of the Cold War, the process of EU integration and the transformation of the international security landscape have changed the parameters of Mediterranean regional politics. One significant shift is that Mediterranean littoral states are much more keen to develop active relations with the rest of the world. Although they may still be apprehensive about the implications of an enhanced American or European role in the area, Mediterranean states are more prepared to open their doors to the process of globalization than in the past. Post-Cold War realities have forced outside powers and international organizations to re-evaluate their policies towards the Mediterranean. Conversely, regional leaders have had to explore new external alignments in light of the sea-change in the international system since 1989. First is the Arab-Israeli conflict. The peace treaties signed between Israel and the PLO and Israel and Jordan opened the door to a more peaceful Middle East in the long term. The gradual rapprochement between Israel and the Arab world has the additional benefit of removing one of the stumbling blocks that has prevented closer relations between the Mashreq and other sub regions of the Mediterranean such as the Maghreb. The second shift in Mediterranean policy is both internally and externally motivated. After years of being accused of marginalizing and isolating its southern flank, the EU has started to implement its most comprehensive policy in the Mediterranean, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Rather than trying to establish some kind of co-prosperity sphere or an outer zone of suzerainty in the Mediterranean, the EMP is best regarded as an attempt to manage regional relations across the Mediterranean. In reality, the EU on its own does not have the resources to contend with the economic disparities that exist in the Mediterranean. The fact that Europe has developed a multi-level international society in which international organizations such as the EU, the OSCE and NATO can interact with states and sub-national institutions, puts Europe in a strong position to approach security issues in the Mediterranean. Given the lack of unity in the security perceptions

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of the countries in the Mediterranean and those powers with an interest in the area, it is unrealistic to assume that a single international organization can address the security challenges that are present in the Mediterranean. A more realistic alternative is one in which a single international organization, such as the EU, is assisted by others who have the resources and an interest in the international relations of the Mediterranean. As the international organization with the largest proportion of Mediterranean member states and the most active socio-economic actor in the basin, the EU seems the best-positioned candidate to lead European initiatives in the Mediterranean. Now that NATO has somewhat evolved from a Cold War military dominant alliance to a more diplomatic post-Cold War transatlantic alliance it can also play a more active confidence-building role in the Mediterranean. But an increased NATO presence in the Mediterranean must guard against fuelling accusations of ‘neoimperialist’ designs by transnational political movements of a fundamentalist nature that are active throughout the Middle Eastern region. American participation in NATO often makes this organization appear more like a vehicle of superpower interests than one concerned with addressing Mediterranean concerns. Absent the creation of a trans-Mediterranean international forum, that would certainly be perceived as much more representative of Mediterranean regional interests, the EU currently appears the most acceptable international organization that can intensify cooperative patterns of relations throughout the Mediterranean. Elaboration of its neighbourhood policy in the years to come should focus on implementing such a strategy. It is a truism that the end of the Cold War has released the superpower grip on the Mediterranean. But the indicators discussed above suggest that one type of intrusive system (bipolar superpower model) has made way for a different type of intrusive system (uni-multipolar great power model). This more multipolar design is reflected in the increase of activity registered by international organizations in regional relations worldwide, including in the Mediterranean. In the decade ahead, the strategic goal of international organizations operating in the Mediterranean must be to introduce measures that reduce the regional dynamics of fragmentation that continue to dominate Middle Eastern relations and could result in the emergence of failed states along Europe’s southern periphery.

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Euro-Mediterranean relations in the twenty-first century

Regional and sub-regional dynamics in the Mediterranean area An assessment of regional dynamics in the Mediterranean area at the start of the twenty-first century indicates that efforts by countries in the Mediterranean to try to integrate further into the emerging international system have met with limited success. Mediterranean countries have viewed global and regional shifts since the end of the Cold War as more of a risk than an opportunity when it comes to political and economic competition. Successive attempts to enhance regional and sub-regional dynamics across the Mediterranean have remained at an embryonic stage at best. A review of foreign policy priorities of the riparian states reveals a divergence in agenda setting with either EU membership or regional affairs dominating the foreign policy elite. There is nothing to indicate that an intensification of trans-Mediterranean regional dynamics is taking place. On the contrary, centrifugal tendencies are the main characteristic in relationships between Mediterranean countries. An analysis of patterns of relations in southern Europe, the Maghreb and the Mashreq, reveals that all countries bordering the Mediterranean have strategic commitments outside this international waterway. Southern European states continue to focus their attention on developments in the EU and Europe as a whole. In contrast, countries in the southern and eastern sectors of the basin are primarily concerned with events in their own sub regions and the Middle East as a whole. Rather than giving a high priority to Mediterranean issues, countries such as Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Israel continue to invest more of their foreign policy resources on strengthening ties with the EU and the United States. The vision of a prosperous and peaceful Mediterranean region has not been enough to lead riparian states to sacrifice strategic economic and military links which they have outside this geo-strategic area, for the sake of a Mediterranean orientation. A lack of consensus among some riparian states in the Mediterranean has also undermined efforts to nurture trans-Mediterranean relations. France has shown little interest to advance initiatives that seek a strengthening of relations across the Mediterranean. In recent years it has focused much more of its diplomatic resources on influencing international affairs at large than regional relations in areas such as the Mediterranean.

Euro-Mediterranean relations 127 The same can be said of other potential Mediterranean ‘champions’ such as Italy and Spain. Both have shifted their foreign policy agenda towards a more EU-oriented goal setting than any serious interest in fostering closer ties between countries in the Mediterranean. Occasional attempts to focus international attention to the concept of a Mediterranean regional paradigm have not been successful as proponents of such schemes are usually unable to articulate what the objectives of such a forum would be. Another fundamental stumbling block preventing a resurgence of transMediterranean relations in the post-Cold War era is the fact that regional dynamics in the different sub regions of the Mediterranean remain too asymmetrical to be put into a single institutional framework. Socio-economic, political and military disparities that exist between the northern and southern shores are so divergent that it often seems an impossible task to try and institutionalize the interests of so many different interest groups into one regional forum. Theoretically, a prosperous and peaceful Mediterranean region should stand a chance of functioning. The number of actors in the vicinity, the already existing intergovernmental links and the diversity of views are somewhat similar to the pattern that existed in Cold War Europe when the CSCE was first established. Yet a number of differences distinguish the Mediterranean from its European hinterland. First, the countries of the Mediterranean do not perceive themselves as sharing common strategic goals or even a collective identity. Such essential characteristics remain absent or too weak to build a cohesive region in the short term. It is also clear that the settlement of long-standing divisions in the area, such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, is not going to be a panacea for the entire Arab world. Less hostile Arab-Israeli relations will not automatically result in the emergence of a cooperative region in the Mashreq. Another major difference between Cold War Europe and the post-Cold War Mediterranean is that Mediterranean security issues continue to lack the international political support that multilateral initiatives such as the CSCE had on its side. The Mediterranean area is not highlighted regularly enough by such leading powers as the United States, Britain, France, Russia, Germany, the EU, NATO or the UN to attract the necessary resources to start bridging the divide that exists between the northern and southern shores of the basin. The EU on its own lacks the political and economic means to correct the socioeconomic and political disparities in the Mediterranean. This is even more the case now that the EU is digesting its greatest enlargement of 10 new members and is seeking to play a more active international role through its neighbourhood policy. As already discussed, while individual EU member states such as Spain and Italy have the potential to play a more influential role in the Mediterranean, they have so far shown very little interest in launching such a policy. The United States can certainly help make up for some of Europe’s shortcomings along its southern periphery. After all, cooperating in the Mediterranean could be a policy that assists in strengthening the transatlantic partnership at a stage in history when its entire raison d’être is being questioned.

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The post-Cold War era has already witnessed an increase in both unilateralist and multilateralist tendencies. The end of the Cold War has seen an increase in the proliferation of international interventions that began during the first Bush administration with the invasion of Panama in 1989, the Persian Gulf War in 1991, and the humanitarian intervention in Somalia in 1992. This trend continued during the Clinton years with interventions in Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo and again in the George W. Bush administration in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.174 One could also think that after the terror attacks of September 11th 2001 Washington would be more interested in helping to avoid the emergence of new fault-lines such as those that threaten neighbouring countries in the Mediterranean. America has, however, opted to focus its superpower attention on the eastern sector of the Mediterranean basin and beyond in central Asia. Improving the livelihood of the millions of people along the southern shores of the Mediterranean has not emerged as a foreign policy goal, a strategic error that could come back to haunt the superpower in the decade ahead. If the clash of civilizations scenario is not to attract tens of thousands of recruits in the years ahead the West must find ways of opening further channels of communication with all governments in the Mediterranean, including possible Islamic regimes. Otherwise the slow process of democraticization in the Maghreb and the Mashreq will come to a halt and the wave of anti-Western radicalization may increase. Some estimates envisage as many as 20 million people in North Africa opting for emigration into Europe in the coming few years, where salaries are anything between eight to ten times higher than in the South. The emergence of a ‘Fortresslike Europe’, where borders are sealed in an effort to discourage possible migrants, would only exacerbate this problem further. European policy makers should recall that large communities of workers originating in sub region of the Mediterranean such as the Maghreb, have already made a significant contribution to the success of European industry.175 The perception of racist and exclusionary migration policies towards their kin across the Mediterranean will only aggravate regional social insecurity and could be used as a mechanism to fuel the possibility of a ‘cold war’ between Islam and the West. The proliferation of conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction since the end of the Cold War increases the serious nature of such a development in contemporary international relations. While there is no questioning the military superiority of the West over any of the countries in the Middle East region, there is no denying that a proliferation of weapons in such a volatile area as the Mediterranean could have serious consequences. More than a decade since the end of the Cold War there are clearer signs that the east-west divide of the past is being replaced by an international security system where north-south divisions are becoming the dominant feature. Unlike the European continent where the fall of the Berlin Wall ushered in a period of reconciliation, the Mediterranean remains a frontier area of divisions. European and Middle East international region disparities and conflict continue to be the hallmark of Mediterranean interchange.

Euro-Mediterranean relations 129 While the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has sought to arrest the process of polarization between the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean, the post-Cold War era has so far not seen a significant reversal of this trend. This structural development is what is stifling the establishment of a cooperative Mediterranean region. It is, however, fundamentally clear that the EMP offers a unique opportunity to strengthen political, economic and cultural ties across the Euro-Mediterranean area. But such progress will only be registered if all the EMP partner countries direct their actions at the causes rather than the symptoms of contemporary disparities and security risks. This is not to say that humanitarian and development assistance is not essential, but this should not become a substitute for efforts that are geared towards increasing higher levels of cooperation between the countries of the Mediterranean. Throughout its 30 years of direct engagement in the Mediterranean the European Union has failed to contain, let alone reverse, economic disparities between the northern and southern countries of the basin. It is also quite clear that little progress has been registered in removing the misperceptions and prejudice that currently exist in the region or in promoting further the principles of respect and understanding. A concerted effort in implementing specific goals in each of the three chapters of the Barcelona Declaration is certainly the most effective way to start tackling such problems. Close to a decade since the launching of the EMP it is clear that the Barcelona Process is simply a vehicle that can assist those Mediterranean countries that are interested in modernizing their societies, their political systems and their economies through the process of post-Cold War transition. But the EMP is only a potential vehicle of change – it is up to the Mediterranean countries themselves to take up the challenge. The time has therefore come for the EU to take seriously the concerted call coming from the South to move away from assistance to a true partnership. The EU Common Strategy on the Mediterranean adopted in June 2000 calls for a more interactive and dynamic relationship between the EU and the Mediterranean. It is a strategic perspective that the EU now needs to flesh out by introducing policies that will engage the Mediterranean states more directly in the implementation of joint projects. Unless the EU becomes more directly involved in the conception and the monitoring of the reform process, Mediterranean countries will continue to lack the external benevolent monitor and coach. While the Association Agreements provide for a public policy dialogue, so far these provisions have remained a dead letter. It is therefore essential to endow the EU Commission with the necessary human and financial resources to engage in such an exercise and the sooner the better. It is also important that the Euro-Mediterranean member states consider introducing an element of flexibility when it comes to implementing programmes. Enhanced cooperation will only be possible if those that are able and willing to move ahead are allowed to move faster. Countries that are not able or determined to push ahead a reform agenda would do well to abstain, at least temporarily.

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When reviewing admission of new members careful consideration should be given to their capacity and willingness to implement the Barcelona acquis. Those that are not prepared to adopt such a programme should not be admitted as they will only constitute ‘dead weight’ for the more performing members of the club. At the same time, the EU should not be expected to deliver the impossible in the Mediterranean. An analysis of the ability of international organizations to influence regional relations reveals that while they are often capable of having an impact on the regional patterns of relations they are unable to alter the basic pattern of regional alignment and conflict within such international regions. Contemporary EU involvement in the Mediterranean is a good example of an international organization’s limited ability to influence regional dynamics. The first decade of the EU’s Mediterranean Partnership policy is best seen as a boundary management exercise, rather than a boundary transformation one.176 The EMP’s principal aim has so far been to safeguard the process of regional integration in Europe from that of fragmentation that is active throughout the Middle East. More emphasis now needs to be dedicated to helping improve the outlook of Mediterranean citizens by transforming the area into a more stable and prosperous one. A conceptual re-think is thus necessary if the process of political, economic and cultural adaptation is to be a successful one. The process and progress need to be carefully monitored. The question of the social impact of the implementation of a free-trade area is not a question of lessons and clichés, but of developing realistic policies to cope with the changes being introduced. The decision to establish a free-trade area is certain to have a social cost. Having decided to implement a free-trade area, the Barcelona Process calls for all of the Partner countries to cooperate at numerous levels in order to ensure a smooth transition that will include safeguarding the Rule of Law to ensure stability. The success or failure of the EMP will actually determine whether the Mediterranean becomes a crossroads of tension, outright conflict and an economic wasteland, or whether it becomes a cooperative zone of peace, prosperity and tolerance. The EMP still holds a great deal of potential, but only if it is adapted to the ever-changing regional security dynamics it is attempting to stabilize. At the start of the twenty-first century, the Mediterranean is more akin to a fault-line between the prosperous North and an impoverished South. The key development to watch in the Mediterranean in the next decade will be to see whether the phase of cooperative competition that has dominated post-Cold War relations to date is eventually superseded by an era of conflictual competition. If this age of socio-economic indifference scenario does take hold, disorder will dominate Mediterranean relations and as resources are depleted, the region will become an economic wasteland. The only way this scenario can be avoided is if the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership process is overhauled, international institutions such as the World Bank, OECD, and the IMF become more altruistic in their dealings with the region, and the Mediterranean countries themselves adopt a self-help mentality. Rather than undermine or diminish the significance of the EMP, the growing socio-economic

Euro-Mediterranean relations 131 disparities across the Mediterranean underlines further the significance of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the only multilateral process of its kind in the area. A number of additional strategic questions need to be addressed if the challenge of superseding sources of instability in the Mediterranean is to be achieved in the years ahead. The time has come to re-visit the issue of establishing a more coherent and effective link between the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the two leading actors that have been examined in Chapter 4, namely the United States and NATO. The enormous task facing the EU in the Mediterranean and the comprehensive nature of the EMP makes it logical to identify measures where both the United States and NATO can play a more direct role in implementing the Barcelona Declaration agenda. There is no doubt that both America and NATO can share essential experience they have developed in the Euro-Mediterranean area when it comes to realizing the goals set out in the political and security chapter of the Barcelona Process. While neither Washington nor the Atlantic Alliance should be allowed to dictate the EMP course of events, their involvement in contemporary Euro-Mediterranean relations is likely to give a kick-start to the stalemate that has captured the EuroMediterranean political and security dialogue. Inviting representatives from the United States and NATO to EMP foreign ministerial meetings will also boost the credibility of such gatherings, just as inviting representatives from the Arab League and the Arab Maghreb Union is already achieving. They can be invited in an observer’s capacity and allowed to interact with key policy makers seeking to improve Euro-Mediterranean relations. Another question that needs to be addressed seriously is the extent to which the EU truly speaks a common language when it comes to the Mediterranean. It is not yet evident that all EU member states regard the Mediterranean as a strategic concern. References to a common foreign and security policy sometimes ring hollow when it comes to support of the EMP. Northern European states have so far not demonstrated enough of a commitment to the EMP. It will be interesting to observe whether the large increase of non-Mediterranean EU member states in 2004 after the next round of EU enlargement results in a diminution of support towards Mediterranean policies. EU member states from Northern and Eastern Europe would do well to remember that security in Europe is indivisible from security in the Mediterranean. In contrast, Southern EU member states continue to forward Mediterranean oriented policies, even though a consistent and coherent policy framework is quite often lacking. Better coordination between the Southern EU member states in the first instance and eventually all EU member states when it comes to implementation of the EMP agenda is a prerequisite to realizing the ambitious goals set out in the Barcelona Declaration. The horrific turn of events on September 11th 2001 is evidence enough of what could happen if the disconnect between different cultures and civilizations is allowed to grow. With the benefit of hindsight, the Barcelona Declaration of November 1995 identified several of the contemporary security challenges that need to be dealt with if the ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis is not to become more of

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a possibility. Terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction have become household security concerns after the terror attacks of September 11th 2001. The threats that advances in technology have brought are also more apparent as life in the digital age is already demonstrating. Without a common political, economic and cultural channel of communication misperceptions across the Mediterranean will result in a permanent divide between the prosperous northern shores of the basin and the impoverished southern shores of the Mediterranean Sea. The emergence of such a fault-line would have dire consequences for all peoples in the Mediterranean area and beyond.

The EMP after EU enlargement: time to evaluate When it comes to the direct tangible endeavours that the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership process should seek to realize it is crucial to ask again and again what will determine the success of the over-arching Barcelona Process? What policy approaches will facilitate implementation of the ambitious Barcelona Declaration of November 1995? As the EU enlarges and relations across the Mediterranean continue to evolve at different speeds and in different directions should the EU consider concentrating more of its political and economic resources at the sub-regional level of Mediterranean relations? What instruments and mechanisms will boost the Mediterranean countries’ ability to generate higher rates of growth than they achieved during the 1980s and 1990s? The Barcelona Process agenda beyond 2005 must seek to address the above issues in a direct manner if the EMP is to remain a relevant multilateral forum in the decade ahead. In the more short term, the 27 partner countries must introduce a basic type of confidence building measure network that will enable them to manage and contain the large number of political and economic security challenges that risk upsetting stability across the Euro-Mediterranean area. The long list of ‘soft’ political security issues that could derail the EMP include maritime safety, border disputes, environmental pollution, narcotics trafficking, and the flow of illegal migration. Economic security issues that need to be addressed urgently if the economic and social malaise in the south is to be mitigated include absorption of structural unemployment, fiscal stability, debt service and financing of higher expenditure for education. A confidence building initiative that can be introduced as part of an exercise that aims at the nurturing of a Euro-Mediterranean profile within the framework of the EMP is that of establishing a Euro-Mediterranean Development Agency (EMDA). The EMDA’s principal objective would be to promote the dissemination of information relating to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in an effort to enhance the level of transparency when it comes to taking decisions about the allocation of funds. Now that the European Commission has appropriated billions of euros through MEDA I and MEDA II, a review of appropriation procedures should take place to identify those initiatives that have helped to improve Euro-Mediterranean relations

Euro-Mediterranean relations 133 since 1995 and to assist in identifying additional measures that should be introduced to help strengthen the Barcelona Process further.177 If progress is to be registered in each specific partnership chapter of the EMP it is clear that there is a need to monitor closely the large number of inter- and intra-regional cooperative ventures that have already been endorsed. Closer scrutiny of the process by both the EU and Mediterranean countries will ensure that both sides become co-responsible for the success of the agreements reached. The lack of co-ownership of the EMP has been a major weakness of the EMP during its first decade of operations. The EU led approach to date must give way to a more balanced Euro-Med policy-making mechanism that guarantees the Mediterranean partners a voice in decision making. Apart from its intrinsic value, a coordinating centre such as the EuroMediterranean Development Agency (EMDA) will help overcome inconsistencies in the process and facilitate informal exchanges of views on a wide variety of subjects of common interest. It should also seek to distribute cooperative funds that have been committed in the shortest time possible. In line with the general framework of cooperation envisaged in the Barcelona Declaration of 1995, the EMDA’s chief objective will be to encourage development in the following sectors: • • • • •

at a macroeconomic level, with the maximum degree of convergence between economic, monetary and budgetary policies; promoting investment by standardizing trade regulations and customs legislation; systematic monitoring of initiatives that the EMP is seeking to operationalize such as industrial zones and centres of special services; enhancing cooperation in sectors as diverse as science, technology, education, infrastructure, environment and tourism; strengthening dialogue on social issues, including the narco-industry, migratory trends and cultural exchanges.

The overall objective of the EMDA will be to assist in upgrading sectoral cooperative arrangements that currently take place in the energy, tourism and infrastructural sectors. Such measures are an indispensable part of the procedure that will have to be established if a free-trade area is to become a reality in the 2010–15 timeframe. The EMDA will thus be a clearing house of EMP information. Its main goal will be to build a Euro-Mediterranean community of values by strengthening the cooperative regimes that were outlined in the Barcelona Declaration. In the medium term, the societal issues that the EMP will need to address if socio-economic conditions are to improve include the promotion of food production, trade exchanges, industrial cooperation and debt rescheduling and relief. An upgrade also needs to take place in investment capital, particularly in the communication, transport and tourism sectors, which are the very growth areas of the economies of most developing countries across the Mediterranean. Here some progress has already been registered with the launching of the Euro-Mediterranean Transport Forum and the Euro-Mediterranean Information Society (EUMEDIS).178

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Closer cooperation between the countries concerned will also facilitate the promotion of alternative sources of energy such as solar and wind energy which would make production costs cheaper and more sustainable. In the longer term, the creation of a flexible political and economic security framework that is already addressing soft security issues as those outlined earlier will set the stage for tackling more sensitive security challenges which include intolerant fundamentalism, demographic expansion and outright conflict. The evolution of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) has not been as positive as many had expected or hoped when the Partnership was first launched in 1995. While the lack of momentous progress should not lead the EU to abandon the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, it is obvious that the EMP is a long-term process that can only be sustained if it is supported by more short- to medium-term sub-regional processes.179 With the benefit of hindsight, it appears that the European Union was actually on firmer ground when it launched the Euro-Maghreb partnership process in 1992, immediately after the end of the Cold War, with a distinctly sub-regional approach. That initiative brought together a much more cohesive geographic group of countries that demonstrated a potential to define a common agenda. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, however, has struggled to maintain momentum as contrasting sub-regional dynamics in the northern, southern, eastern and western sectors of the Mediterranean have made it all but impossible to hammer out a progressive common agenda among the 27 members. Fortunately, 7 years after the start of the EMP, the European Union recognized the importance of promoting sub-regional patterns of interaction in the Mediterranean. The specific commitment to supporting sub-regional dynamics that the EU made in the April 2002 Valencia Action Plan is a welcome development that will hopefully be followed by serious political and technical support for sub-regional initiatives that have once again emerged across the Mediterranean.180 As the EU becomes a more compact regional actor in international relations, sub regionalism appears to be the most realistic type of cooperative framework that can be advanced in the Mediterranean during the next decade, particularly in the Maghreb. The EU should focus more of its diplomatic attention on encouraging sub-regional cooperation within the EMP rather than attempting to implement a Mediterranean wide plan of action as outlined in the Barcelona Declaration of November 1995. It is important to bear in mind that there is nothing necessarily natural, inevitable or permanent about regions.181 On the contrary, the parameters within which international actors perform are constantly changing. History shows that there are various motivations behind regional integration, but the engine of progress has usually been some powerful individual actor. Since 1989, the void left in the Mediterranean by the end of the Cold War has been filled, at least partially, by the European Union. EU enlargement will have an important impact on the EMP – it will further tilt the balance of relations towards Europe and the East given that the EU of 25 members will include several Eastern European countries and also 2 current

Euro-Mediterranean relations 135 Euro-Mediterranean partner countries, namely Malta and Cyprus. Thus the EMP will shift from a balance of 15 EU member states and 12 Mediterranean partner states to one of 25 EU member states and only 10 Mediterranean partner states. This imbalance will grow even more distinct when a subsequent round of enlargement, scheduled in 2007, could encompass Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia. Moreover, EU enlargement will also bring about a shift in the composition of the remaining non-EU membership. Of the 10 Mediterranean members (11, if Libya – with observer status – is included), 8 (or 9) will be Arab states. Of the other two, Turkey in any case has the status of a potential EU adherent, in the sense that it has not only expressed an interest in joining but has also been assured that a date for the start of negotiations about accession will be set some time in the future. That will leave Israel in a distinctly anomalous position.182 Not only will Israel be the odd man out politically, given that enlargement will endow the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue with an increasingly Euro-Arab character, it will also be strikingly different from all the remaining Mediterranean NonMember Countries in terms of the character of its socio-economic and political systems, which more closely resemble those of current EU members than do those of the Arab states or even of the accession countries. This means that the obstacles to Israeli integration in any Mediterranean regional or sub-regional grouping are as much due to structural impediments as to political conflict.183 The need to address this anomaly already exists and will become even more urgent in a post-enlargement EMP, particularly if the sub-regional impulse gathers momentum and the Euro-Mediterranean/Arab dialogue focuses on Euro-Maghreb and Euro-Mashreq tracks. The most obvious institutional response to the anomaly is to separate the EuroIsraeli dialogue from the broader Euro-Arab dialogue. In the first instance, as a transitional arrangement until Turkey’s ultimate status is clarified, this might be done by establishing a third multi-/bilateral axis that would include Israel and Turkey, which have anyway moved forward in a kind of sub-regional grouping. This grouping might even be expanded to include the Balkan countries. Thereafter, depending on what happens with Turkey’s accession, conditions might allow the pursuit of several alternative courses: the emergence of a EuroIsraeli Partnership and Cooperation Agreement of the type the EU has with Russia and Ukraine; membership in the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), hence, in the European Economic Area, on a footing similar to that of EFTA states (or Switzerland) that favour economic integration with Europe but will not or cannot join the EU as a political entity; or even full EU membership.184 None of these alternatives would preclude continuing participation in the EMP through involvement in sub-regional groupings in the Eastern Mediterranean. This sub-regional approach would not entail formal dissolution of the EMP. All current and prospective members could maintain their membership, whatever their status in sub-regional groups (whether defined by geography or functionality). Moreover, it could even facilitate the more efficient operation of other subregional groupings by compartmentalizing the Israeli-Arab conflict. Regardless of whether this has been a real impediment or merely a diversion, it has nevertheless

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complicated EMP proceedings, sometimes to the point of paralysis. Pending a resolution of the conflict, minimizing if not eliminating the number of EMP fora in which Israelis and Arabs participate together might facilitate more focused attention by all parties on the economic, social and governance issues that are at the heart of the Mediterranean experiment. Such a sub-regional approach with respect to Israel is also firmly grounded in long-standing EU policy. More than 8 years ago, the European Council, at its Essen Summit, concluded that Israel ‘should enjoy special status in its relations with the European Union on the basis of reciprocity and common interests’.185 Thus far, this ‘special status’ has not found any institutional expression apart from Israeli participation in the Fifth and Sixth Frameworks on Research and Development. But the reality of Israel’s anomalous position in what will remain of the ‘Mediterranean Non-Member Countries’ bloc will become even more blatant following enlargement, particularly as the visions of Middle Eastern regional socio-economic cooperation inspired by the original Madrid Conference and the MENA Economic Conferences continue to recede further into the indefinite future. To the extent that this reality finds expression in an EU-Israel/Turkey relationship or (after Turkish accession) a different EU-Israel relationship, it could logically be complemented by restructured EU-Maghreb and EU-Mashreq dialogues. In the former case, Libya’s observer status could be regularized and the Partnership could also be enlarged to include Mauritania, as well. The latter (like Jordan) is not geographically contiguous to the Mediterranean, but it does form part of the Maghreb socio-cultural system, a fact recognized by its inclusion in the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue. Moreover, the restructuring of the Euro-Maghreb dialogue along these lines might encourage the kind of sub-regional cooperation envisaged in the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA) and even help revitalize that moribund organization. Finally, an EU-wide commitment to the Maghreb Dialogue would provide an ingredient missing from the West Mediterranean Forum (5 + 5) and might make possible a security structure in which sub-regional conflicts like the Perejil/Leyla Island dispute and the Western Sahara conflict could be better contained or resolved. As far as the Mashreq is concerned, it might also be profitably restructured by the eventual inclusion of Iraq. Assuming that the regime change there leads to some significant positive change in the country’s orientation, there may well emerge a strong desire on the part of both Iraq and its neighbours to reintegrate Iraq in the Mashreq system. Iraq’s incorporation in the Partnership would also enable Europe to play a constructive role in such a process. Beyond Iraq, it might also be worthwhile to think about either the extension of the EU-Mashreq dialogue to the Gulf or, alternatively, the further pursuit of the EU-GCC dialogue to entrench and strengthen the sub-regional cooperation that already exists there. EU enlargement is certain to have a psychological impact on Euro-Mediterranean perceptions as the centre of gravity shifts further east in Europe and further away from the Mediterranean. The EU’s main challenge is therefore to implement an

Euro-Mediterranean relations 137 agenda that guards against such perceptions becoming a reality or diluting the European Union’s commitment towards the Mediterranean. The challenge in the next decade will be to ensure that Europe realizes that it is in its interest to continue committing its political and economic attention to the Mediterranean. The Mediterranean countries have an essential role to play in this challenge. They must adopt policies that attract the attention of Europeans and guard against being marginalized due to global forces of international integration. Focusing on sub-regional Mediterranean groupings is one way of ensuring that any shifts in the EU agenda do not take place at the expense of Mediterranean support. Sub regionalism will allow the Mediterranean partners to voice their concerns more consistently and directly to the EU than has been the case during the jumbo EMP meetings that have been taking place since 1995. Sub-regional structures will also enhance the sense of ownership among Mediterranean countries as they are encouraged to assume more responsibility for the sub-regional groupings in which they participate. The launching of a new economic and financial mechanism, such as a EuroMediterranean Development Bank or a similar institution as envisaged in the Euro-Mediterranean Crete Conclusions of May 2003 that facilitates access to venture capital and introduces more the concepts of accountability and conditionality in Euro-Mediterranean relations is also long overdue. The main purpose of such an institution should be to increase trade flows to the Mediterranean and open up European markets to more commodities from the Mediterranean, including agriculture. If the EU wants to increase security in the Mediterranean at a human level it needs to decide whether it is going to export more jobs to its southern neighbours or whether it is prepared to absorb some of the excess employment capacity that is due to grow further in the next decade. Current projections estimate that the population of North Africa and the Middle East is due to grow from 200 million to 300 million by 2020. Unless the countries along the southern shores of the Mediterranean are able to increase their economic growth significantly to above 6 per cent per annum, unemployment figures in this part of the world are scheduled to increase rapidly in the next 10 years. This demographic time-bomb is therefore certain to be a source of instability in the Euro-Mediterranean area if not tackled in a concerted manner in the near future. The security vacuum that exists in the Mediterranean today is fertile ground where sources of instability such as terrorism, illegal migration, organized crime and the risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are certain to multiply. If the existing perceptual and prosperity gap between the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean are allowed to increase, tension and hostilities will also become more widespread. The only way the Mediterranean can avoid becoming a wall of poverty and zone of indifference where the clash of civilization scenario becomes more of a possibility, is if a more international concerted approach to security challenges in the area is immediately introduced. This is the

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ultimate challenge facing riparian Mediterranean states and the international community.

Prospects for the future: a regional assessment to 2020 A number of indicators extant today can be used to project the strategic environment in the Mediterranean to 2020. Unless these indicators change significantly, the environment for the next two decades can already be identified. The speed at which events in Europe and the Middle East are moving makes it likely that the shape this part of the world will take by 2020 will be clearly discernible during the first few years of this century. The United States and Europe will continue to depend on the Gulf and Maghreb for much of their energy supplies. They will however be joined by the likes of China and India that will need to satisfy their growing energy demands and therefore access to these areas will remain a high foreign policy priority. If European Union efforts to foster inter-Mediterranean political and economic cooperation are to succeed they must be complemented by initiatives that Mediterranean states themselves initiate as part of a process that aims to create a transnational network upon which cross-border types of economic and financial interaction can take place. To date, the Mediterranean has not succeeded in creating an environment where people, products, ideas and services are allowed to flow freely. At the moment there are too many bottlenecks in the system and this will prohibit the region from competing and prospering in the global village of tomorrow. During the first two decades of the new millennium the United States will shift its foreign policy concerns in the region further east, focusing on the management of relations in the Mashreq and the Gulf. The rest of the Mediterranean will become a European Union sphere of influence once a common foreign and security policy is operational. In the short term, the EU’s priority will be to achieve internal cohesiveness through the successful implementation of economic and monetary union and the introduction of institutional structures that will enable it to integrate as many Central and Eastern European countries as is feasible. The EU has an opportunity to further strengthen its external relations in the Mediterranean by strengthening its political and economic ties with the three European Union Mediterranean candidates of Malta, Cyprus and Turkey. Relations with the three countries are currently proceeding at different levels and different speeds. In the interim, the EU will continue to manage instability that may emerge along its southern periphery as outlined in the draft security strategy announced by EU External Affairs Representative, Javier Solana, in mid-2003.186 The European Union Security Strategy is the closest thinking yet to the American equivalent of a National Security Strategy. Entitled a Secure Europe in a Better World the document identifies new security threats in the current international system. The document highlights what the EU’s main strategic objectives should be and spells out what the policy implications for the EU will be.

Euro-Mediterranean relations 139 By 2004, the EU of 25 states with over 450 million people producing a quarter of the world’s Gross National Product (GNP) will be a truly global actor. As such, it should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security. It is already clear that no single country is able to tackle today’s security problems single-handedly. The strategic review indicated that since the end of the Cold War almost 4 million people have died in wars, 90 per cent of them civilians. Over 18 million people worldwide have been left homeless as a result of conflict. Half the world’s population, almost 3 billion people, live on less than ¤2 a day. Every year, 45 million continue to die out of hunger and malnutrition. Three great global infectious diseases – AIDS (acute immune deficiency syndrome), tuberculosis and malaria – killed over 6 million people in 2002, most of them in Africa. Energy dependence is also a strategic concern for the EU. Europe is the world’s largest importer of oil and gas. Imports account for about 50 per cent of energy consumption today. This is forecast to rise to 70 per cent by 2030. Most EU energy imports come from the Gulf, Russia and North Africa. Large-scale aggression against any EU member states is now improbable. Instead Europe faces new security threats that are more diverse, less visible and less predictable. The three main security threats that the EU faces are terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the impact of failed states and organized crime. International terrorism is a strategic threat that everyone faces. Contemporary terrorist movements seem willing to use unlimited violence and cause massive casualties. Europe is both a target and base for such terrorists. Proliferation of WMD is the single most important threat to peace and security among states. Everything possible must be done to thwart a WMD arms race, especially in the Middle East. The most frightening scenario is one in which terrorist groups acquire weapons of mass destruction. In several parts of the world, bad governance, civil conflict and the easy availability of small arms have led to a weakening of state and social structures. Somalia, Liberia and Afghanistan are the best-known recent examples. The weakness of such states is often exploited and sometimes caused by criminal elements. Revenues from drugs and other illicit activities have kept several private armies in power. The review indicates that the EU should have three principal strategic objectives. First, it should contribute to stability and good governance in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood. Second, the EU will seek to build an international order based on effective multilateralism. Third, the EU should deal with challenges as they emerge in a rapid manner. Through its neighbourhood policy the EU will be seeking to secure its borders by promoting a ring of well-governed countries to the east and south of Europe. The over-riding goal of this policy will be to ensure that enlargement does not create new dividing lines in Europe. The EU is already seeking to project prosperity and resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict is a strategic priority for Europe. Stability in the Middle East depends on such an outcome. Measures must also be introduced to bolster the Barcelona Process by dedicating more resources and commitment to the EMP objectives of enhancing economic, security and cultural cooperation with the Mediterranean.

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The EU is also in favour of a multilateral international system. It will therefore continue to support the WTO, OSCE, Council of Europe, and other regional institutions such as ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and Mercosur. The fundamental framework for international relations is to remain the United Nations Charter. The EU will also continue to support the International Criminal Court. Realizing that pre-emptive engagement can avoid more serious problems in the future the EU has upgraded its counter-terrorist capability in response to the September 11th 2001 terror attacks. It is also pursuing policies against WMD proliferation and the EU and member states have intervened to help failed states in the Balkans, East Timor and in Africa. In light of contemporary security challenges what are the policy implications for Europe? The strategic review calls for a more active, more coherent and more capable common foreign and security policy (CFSP). The EU is seeking to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid and, when necessary, robust intervention. The EU also plans to focus on both military and civilian capabilities, a major difference from the United States, that is concentrating its efforts on a more effective military. The strategic review calls for more EU defence and an avoidance of duplication among member states. A stronger diplomatic capability is also highlighted and improved sharing of intelligence and a common threat assessment are regarded as an essential basis for common action. The EU also recognizes that the transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable. Acting together, the EU and the United States will be a formidable force of security in world affairs. The EU also aims to develop strategic partnerships with Russia, Japan, China, Canada and India, all regional power players in their respective parts of the world. In the Mediterranean the progressive establishment of Euro-Mediterranean free trade in the coming 20 years will have far-reaching consequences for Mediterranean societies and economies. Euro-Mediterranean policy makers must articulate more clearly the positive goals and the timeframe it will take to implement such goals. Emphasizing that the Barcelona Process is a long-term initiative will also help eliminate the high expectations that have dominated the EMP since 1995. By 2020 the EMP will vastly enhance the volume of trade within that gigantic trade area. One may expect that by 2020 the participating 40 or so countries will do 50–60 per cent of all their trade within the zone. In the next two decades the EMP will also have a positive impact on the amount of foreign direct investment in the Mediterranean countries. Assured market access and an improved overall political and economic environment will facilitate the task of attracting European, American and Asian investors to this region of the world. In addition, the EMP will accelerate the pace of social and political reforms. As the Euro-Mediterranean free-trade area becomes operational, the business community is certain to want to have a say in political matters, whether these concern the tax regime, the level of education, the functioning of the judiciary or social security.

Euro-Mediterranean relations 141 However, this being said, free trade is no panacea to inadequacies of economic policies or of social injustice. Nor will it introduce Western democracy quasiovernight. Free trade may act as a powerful agent of social and economic change, as we have seen in Europe for the last 40 years, but only if many other conditions even more difficult to achieve are fulfilled. This can only be done by each country on its own, according to its specific requirements and possibilities. Europe can serve as an example, even as a precedent, but it cannot do the reform work for others. The hard work of learning must always be done by those directly concerned, be they individuals or societies. This is the message that the EU needs to communicate to its Mediterranean partners. The launching of an enhanced political dialogue through the Charter for Peace and Stability provides the EU with an excellent opportunity to introduce two basic features that have been absent from the EMP: responsibility and accountability. Both will upgrade the Mediterranean states’ participation in the EMP. Responsibility and accountability will provide the Mediterranean with a sense of ownership of a process that has to date been largely EU driven. It will also assist in eliminating the ‘Us and Them’ perception that the Mediterranean countries have of the EMP. Almost a decade into the Euro-Mediterranean Process a reality check reveals a large number of lessons. Overcoming such obstacles will ensure that the next decade of the EMP is more constructive. Given the state of international relations in the Mediterranean, the EuroMediterranean process is probably the most adequate type of multilateral forum that can further cooperative security in the area. The process is to be credited for committing the Europeans to cooperate with their Mediterranean neighbours in a much more comprehensive sense than previously was the case. The EU must however be aware that it cannot influence relations significantly in the Mediterranean without dedicating more resources, both human and financial, to the area. Brussels must appreciate that the challenge that the EMP offers is enormous. One should not overlook the fact that the EMP is the only regional institutional arrangement that brings together such a large number of Mediterranean countries. To date, no other trans-Mediterranean security arrangement has been able to move beyond the theoretical stage of development. Euro-Mediterranean ministerial meetings have shed light on the fact that the objectives spelt out in the Barcelona Declaration will not become attainable without a focused in-depth series of work plans that are more short-term oriented in nature. The Charter for Peace and Stability should include a work programme annex that will outline a plan of action with specific objectives and target dates. This will provide more coherence to the EMP and also allow policy makers to monitor progress on a regular basis. A review of the Euro-Mediterranean foreign ministerial meetings from Barcelona in 1995 to Crete in 2003 highlights a number of other lessons that should be taken note of if the EMP is to become a more effective process. First, the EMP continues to lack visibility. Few European taxpayers or Mediterranean beneficiaries are aware of the Euro-Mediterranean cooperative networks that have

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been established or of the partnership building measures that have been introduced or are about to be launched. The Euro-Mediterranean Partners should focus their attention during the next 5 years to ensuring that the EMP has enough of a direct positive impact on the Euro-Mediterranean citizens it is supposed to be addressing. As discussed earlier, raising awareness of the EMP can be overcome by directing more of future EuroMediterranean programmes to the civil societal level. Second, the Euro-Mediterranean partnership runs the serious risk of being downgraded on the European Union international agenda. The launching of the euro, the enlargement process towards Central and Eastern Europe and the increase in interest to develop a post-Kosovo EU/Balkan strategic relationship, could gradually lead to a marginalization of the Mediterranean. The Mediterranean partner countries must avoid this from happening in the years to come and would therefore do well to adopt a more progressive and constructive attitude towards Brussels in order to avoid such an attitude of indifference settling in. Introducing more comprehensive cooperative agreements such as the ‘association partnerships’ discussed earlier could be a formula that boosts EU interests in the Mediterranean. Third, the increase in attention to the third pillar of the EMP that deals with social, cultural, and human affairs must result in a tangible work programme if such efforts are to be sustainable. This volet was severely neglected up until the launching of the Valencia Action Plan in April 2002. Interest and awareness of the EMP at a grass-roots level remains at an all time low and should be tackled as a high priority through the recently set up communications information programme. Closer cross-cultural cooperation can only be achieved if a more concerted effort is made to seek a convergence on the basic values that are part and parcel of the civilizations surrounding the Mediterranean area. The establishment of a functioning Euro-Mediterranean Foundation that seeks to promote a dialogue between cultures and civilization around the Mediterranean offers this possibility. Fourth, as highlighted earlier, the EMP needs to focus more effectively its limited resources to areas that are gradually showing signs of improvement. Three such areas that have dominated proceedings since 1995 are regional and subregional cooperation, agricultural free trade and fixed exchange rates. The EU and its Mediterranean partners would do well to continue assisting such developments that are important to the success of the EMP in the medium to long term. In many ways the Barcelona Process is a farsighted and novel initiative. Some scholars believe that the EMP is so ahead of its time that it is unrealistic to achieve the objectives stipulated in the Barcelona Declaration. A major problem with the EMP is that it takes little account, if any, of the need for prior resolution of existing disputes in the Mediterranean area that include the Arab-Israeli, Cyprus and Western Sahara conflicts. It is highly unlikely that protagonists in each of these disputes can enter into cooperative security arrangements without first resolving their antagonisms. In the post-Cold War world there is also a tendency for the process of globalization to focus too exclusively on economic growth at the expense of the sacrifices

Euro-Mediterranean relations 143 that have to be made at a social level. International financial organizations are more often than not showing no pity with the poor sectors of society. Very little attention is also being dedicated to the quality and quantity of international assistance that is being offered. International assistance, including that being offered within the Euro-Mediterranean process, needs to focus more on the human dimension of this equation. It is ridiculous to blame the victim for shortcomings of the economic model that is being established. The age of globalization has brought a fifteenfold increase in world trade, a fourfold increase in production, and a doubling of per capita income. Such economic benefits have yet to be realized in the Mediterranean area. The Barcelona Process in general and the establishment of a free-trade area in particular, are expected to assist in improving the Mediterranean socio-economic outlook. In reality, the EMP has yet to achieve such an objective. No programme will be sustainable in the long term unless it is based on consensus and legitimacy and pays attention to the limits of tolerance of society. Policy makers need to pay more attention to what people want and what is preventing them from obtaining their goals. It is not really a question of time limits but which policies are required to achieve the goals being sought. A gradualist approach is perhaps a better option as it will allow reasonable time for society to be able to adapt and cope with the changes that are being proposed and introduced. It is crucial for policy makers to create win-win situations where all sectors of society are able to benefit. Almost a decade has passed since the signing of the Barcelona Declaration in November 1995, when the Foreign Ministers of the EU and their counter parts from 12 Mediterranean countries pledged to progressively establish a EuroMediterranean area of peace, stability and prosperity at the horizon of 2010. Since then, profoundly asymmetrical developments in the EU and the Mediterranean have taken place: an EU frantically struggling to keep up with the constraints of globalization, a Mediterranean falling further behind. In recent years the EU has been moving into new areas. It has undertaken two major constitutional reforms, the Amsterdam and the Nice Treaties and is seeking to ratify a new constitution agreed upon during the Irish Presidency of the EU in the first half of 2004. It has successfully introduced a common currency, the euro. It has virtually completed its single market for goods, services, capital and people. It has started to develop a common security machinery to be ready for action by 2005. The EU has also made great strides towards a common area of law and security and it has set itself the objective to become a knowledge society and a common area of research and science by 2010. The European Union has also proceeded with its fifth enlargement in 2004. The 10 new member countries from central Europe and the Mediterranean have joined the EU after having undergone a thorough transformation process of their economic, social and political systems over the past 10 years. During the same period, most of the EU’s Mediterranean partner countries have moved ahead very slowly. The prosperity gap with Europe, especially Central European countries, has further widened. It would have widened even further

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without the positive fluctuations in the price of oil from time to time and a significant slowdown of demographic growth. It has taken the EU 30 years to launch and start implementing a comprehensive Euro-Mediterranean policy. If the Barcelona Process is to provide the foundation upon which a Pax Euro-Mediterranea is to be established over the next 30 years, it is essential that the EU focuses on spreading prosperity’s benefits more fairly with its neighbours in the south. The Mediterranean must not become a wall of poverty along the EU’s southern periphery. This is the ultimate challenge facing the international community in the Mediterranean. The three most active external actors in the Mediterranean, the EU, the United States and NATO must focus their political and economic resources on ensuring that the Mediterranean does not become a permanent north-south divide. If the existing perceptual and prosperity gap between the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean are allowed to increase, tension and hostilities across the Mediterranean will also become more widespread. In such circumstances, sources of instability that include terrorism, illegal migration, the proliferation of weapons and drug trafficking are certain to multiply. Given the common strategic interests the EU, the United States and NATO have in the Mediterranean, coordinating their policies towards this part of this world will also provide them with an opportunity to further strengthen transatlantic relations. Only the creation of a cooperative Mediterranean region in which the perceptual and prosperity gap is addressed, reduced and gradually eliminated, will ensure that the Mediterranean does not become a zone of indifference and an eventual economic wasteland. Integrating the Mediterranean into the twenty-first century international system through mechanisms such as the EU’s recently launched ‘Neighbourhood Policy’ and a sustainable Middle East Peace Process is the immediate challenge that the international community must confront. Otherwise, transnational sources of instability emanating from the Mediterranean will continue to manifest themselves at a regional and international level.

Notes

1 Dauderstadt, Michael, The EU and its poor neighbours: how the centres could help those on their periphery, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 1997, p. 5. 2 Hollis, Rosemary, ‘Barcelona’s First Pillar: An Appropriate Concept for Security Relations?’, in Behrendt, Sven and Hanelt, Christian-Peter (eds), Bound to Co-operate – Europe and the Middle East, Güterslou: Bertelsmann Foundation Publications, 2001, p. 114. 3 Patten, Chris, ‘The European Union’s External Policy and the Mediterranean’, MEDA Team Information, Issue No. 8, 1 April 2000. 4 Aliboni, Roberto (ed.), Southern European Security, London: Pinter Publishers, 1992, pp. 1–2; see also Buzan, Barry, People, States and Fear, An Agenda for International Security Studies, in the Post Cold War Era, Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991, p. 196. 5 Koenigsberger, H. G., Medieval Europe 400–1500, New York: Longman Group, 1987, pp. 136–210, and Pirenne, H., A History of Europe from the Invasions to the XVI Century, London: George Allen & Unwin Publishers, 1936, pp. 1–46. 6 Miall, H. (ed.), Redefining Europe, New Patterns of Conflict and Cooperation, London: Pinter Publishers, 1994, pp. 1–3. 7 Buzan, op. cit., pp. 196–200. 8 Calleya, S., ‘Europe After Maastricht’, Sunday Times (Malta), 26 September 1993, p. 37. 9 Miall, H. (ed.), op. cit., p. 5. 10 Bryant, R. C., ‘Global Change’, The Brookings Review, Fall 1994, p. 42. 11 Wallace, W., The Dynamics of European Integration, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs/Pinter Publishers, 1990, pp. 8–12. 12 Selim, M. El-Sayed, ‘Mediterranean: A New Dimension in Egypt’s Foreign Policy’, Paper prepared for presentation at the American Political Science Association, New York, 1994, p. 2. 13 Ajami, F., ‘The End of Pan-Arabism’, Foreign Affairs, Winter, 1978–79, pp. 89–155. 14 Buzan, B., op. cit., p. 196. 15 Agha, H., ‘The Middle East and Europe: the Post-Cold War Climate’, in Miall, H. (ed.), Redefining Europe, London: Pinter Publishers, 1994, p. 24. 16 Korany, B. and Dessouki, A. E. H. (eds), The Foreign Policies of Arab States, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991, p. 33. 17 Vatikiotis, P. J., Arab and Regional Politics in the Middle East, London: Croom Helm, 1984, pp. 77–116. 18 Salame, G., ‘Integration in the Arab World: The Institutional Framework’, in Luciani, G. and Salame, G., The Politics of Arab Integration, London: Croom Helm, 1988, pp. 256–79.

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19 Buzan, B. and Roberson, B., ‘Europe and the Middle East: Drifting Towards Societal Cold War?’, in Waever, O., Buzan, B., Kelstrup, M. and Lemaitre, P. (eds), Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe, London: Pinter Publishers, 1993, p. 136. 20 Ibid., p. 137. 21 Awad, I., ‘The Future of Regional and Subregional Organisation in the Arab World’, in Tschirigi, D. (ed.), The Arab World Today, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994, p. 153. 22 Blair, E., ‘Winning Over the World’s Investors’, MEED, 39 (40), 6 October 1995, pp. 4–5. 23 Hitti, N., ‘The Internationalisation of the State in the Middle East’, in Sakamoto, Y. (ed.), Global Transformation, Challenges to the State System, Tokyo: UN University Press, 1994, p. 89. 24 Ibid., p. 90. 25 Noble, P. C., ‘The Arab System: Pressures, Constraints and Opportunities’, in Korany, B. and Dessouki, A. E. H. (eds), The Foreign Policies of Arab States, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991, p. 58. 26 Buzan, B., Waever, O. and Wilde, J., Regional Security: A Post-Cold War Framework Analysis, Working Paper, Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, Copenhagen, 1994, pp. 7–8. 27 Ibid. 28 Aliboni, op. cit., 1992, p. 2. 29 Carle, C., ‘France, the Mediterranean and Southern European Security’, in Aliboni, R. (ed.), Southern European Security, London: Pinter Publishers, 1992, p. 41. 30 Blunden, M., ‘Insecurity on Europe’s Southern Flank’, Survival, 36 (2), Summer 1994, p. 140. 31 Agarwal J. P., Hiemenz, U., Langhammer, R. and Nunnenkamp, P., ‘EC Economic Integration and its Impact on Foreign Direct Investment and Developing Countries’, in Ohno, K. and Okamoto, Y. (eds), Regional Integration and Foreign Direct Investment: Implications For Developing Countries, Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies, 1994, pp. 346–58. 32 Vasconcelos, Alvaro, ‘Perejil/Leila: Lessons for Europe Why Have All Failed?’, The Real Instituto El Cano, 17 July 2002. See also Maddy-Weitzman, Bruce, ‘The Spanish-Moroccan Crisis and the Future of Euro-Mediterranean Relations: Farce or Harbinger of Things to Come?’, Tel Aviv Notes, No. 46, July 30, 2002. 33 Rodrigo, F., ‘The End of the Reluctant Partner: Spain and Western Security in the 1990s’, in Aliboni, R., op. cit., 1992, pp. 103–4. 34 Greco, E. and Guazzone, L., ‘Continuity and Change in Italy’s Security Policy’, in Aliboni, R., op. cit., 1992, p. 73. 35 Ibid., p. 78. 36 Aliboni, R., op. cit., 1992, p. 13. 37 Financial Times, 2-6-95, p. 2, see also Financial Times, 27/28-11-93, p. 2. 38 WEU Report, 15-6-94. 39 Swan, R., ‘France the Scapegoat’, Middle East International, 24, January 1992, p. 7. See also Gillespie, R., The Western Sahara Conflict and Sub Regional Co-operation, EuroMeSCo Working Paper, 2003. 40 Dumas, Marie-Lucy (ed.), Mediterranee Occidentale: Securite et Cooperation, Paris: Fondation Pour les Etudes de Defense Nationale, 1992, p. 154. See also Gillespie, R., ibid., 2003. 41 Financial Times, ‘Separation Mars Middle East Integration’ 10-2-95, p. 2. 42 Agarwal, J. P. et al., op. cit., 1994, pp. 346–58. 43 Hockenos, P., ‘Arms Bizarre’, In These Times, 18 (19), 8, August 1994, p. 22. 44 Agence Europe, 26-6-94, p. 1 and p. 4. 45 Ibid.

Notes 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

147

Buzan, B., op. cit., p. 196. Buzan, B. and Roberson, B., op. cit., 1993, p. 36. Hockenos, P., op. cit., 1994, pp. 21–2. Sezer, D. B., ‘Prospects for Southern Security: A Turkish Perspective’, in Aliboni, R., op. cit., 1992, pp. 122–6. Buzan, B., op. cit., pp. 215–21. See also Liel, A., The Turkey/Israel/Jordan Strategic Dialogue: What Implications for the Eastern Mediterranean and the EuroMediterranean Partnership, EuroMeSCo Working Paper, 2003. Sezer, D. B., op. cit., 1992, pp. 132–33. Santos, H., ‘The Portuguese National Security Policy’ in Aliboni, R., op. cit., 1992, pp. 89–91. Agarwal et al., op. cit., 1994. Ibid., p. 92. Calleya, S., ‘Malta’s Post-Cold War Perspective on Mediterranean Security’, in Gillespie, R. (ed.), Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 1, London: Pinter Publishers, 1994, pp. 138–47. Calleya, S., ‘Reassessing Mediterranean Security’, in House of Commons Defence Committee Third Report, NATO’s Southern Flank, London: HMSO, 13 March 1996. Vasconcelos, A., ‘The Shaping of a Subregional Identity’, in Aliboni, R., op. cit., 1992, p. 23. Noble, P. C., op. cit., pp. 55–7. Korany B. and Dessouki, A. E. H., op. cit., 1991, p. 41. Brecher, M., ‘The Middle East Subordinate System and its Impact on Israel’s Foreign Policy’, International Studies Quarterly, 13 (2), June 1969, p. 137. International Herald Tribune, ‘Identity Jolt for Europe: It’s Still Special but not as Special as Before’, 16-2-95, p. 8. Noble, P. C., op. cit., 1991, p. 62. Selim, M. El-Sayed, op. cit., 1994, pp. 6–7. Ajami, F., op. cit., 1978, pp. 108–38. Selim, M. El-Sayed, op. cit., 1994, pp. 6–7. Calleya, S., ‘Reassessing Mediterranean Security’, Sunday Times (Malta), 1994, p. 33; see also Selim, M. El-Sayed, op. cit., 1994, pp. 15–17. Selim, M. El-Sayed, op. cit., 1994, p. 16. Hinnebusch, R. A., ‘The Foreign Policy of Syria’, in Korany, B. and Dessouki, A. E. H., op. cit., 1991, pp. 374–409. Ajami, F., op. cit., 1978, pp. 357–68; see also Ajami, F., The Arab Predicament, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. Noble, P. C., op. cit., 1991, p. 60. Spencer, C., ‘The Maghreb in the 1990s’, Adelphi Papers, No. 274, Brasseys for IISS, 1993, pp. 5–7. Bauer, G. E., ‘The Morocco-Polisario Conflict: Prospects for Saharan Stability in the 1990s’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 5 (1), 1994, pp. 111–29; see also Spencer, C., op. cit., 1993, pp. 44–5 and Gillespie, R., op. cit., 2003. Zartman, I. W., ‘Maghrebi Politics and Mediterranean Conflict’, in Luciani, G. (ed.), The Mediterranean Region, London: Croom Helm, 1984, p. 153. Joffé, G., ‘The European Union and the Maghreb’, in Gillespie, R. (ed.), Mediterranean Politics, London: Pinter Publishers, 1994, pp. 25–7. Farley, J., ‘The Mediterranean – Southern Threats to Northern Shores?’, The World Today, 50 (2), February 1994, p. 34. The Military Balance, 1994–1995, IISS. Calleya, S., op. cit. (note 66), 1994, p. 33. Zartman, I. W., op. cit., 1984, p. 161. Spencer, C., op. cit., 1993, p. 52. Zartman, I. W., op. cit., 1984, p. 159.

148

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81 Biad, A., ‘The Maghreb’s Response to the Gulf War’, Mediterranean Social Sciences Review, 1 (1), April 1993, p. 25. 82 Ibid., p. 31 and p. 34. 83 Ortega, A., ‘Relations with the Maghreb’, in Holmes, J. M. (ed.), Maelstrom, Cambridge, MA: The World Peace Foundation, 1995, p. 43. 84 Gibb, R., ‘Regionalism in the World Economy’, in Gibb, R. and Michalak, W. (eds), Continental Trading Blocs, Chichester: John Wiley and Sons Publishing, 1994, p. 24. 85 Calleya, C. Stephen, Navigating Regional Dynamics in the Post-Cold War World, Patterns of Relations in the Mediterranean Area, Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1997, pp. 131–140. See also Calleya, C. Stephen, ‘The Euro-Mediterranean Process After Malta: What Prospects?’, Mediterranean Politics, 2 (2), Autumn 1997, pp. 1–22. 86 International Herald Tribune, ‘Arab States Recommend Sanctions on Israel’, 1 April 1997, p. 1. 87 Joffé, George, ‘The European Union and the Maghreb’, in Gillespie, Richard (ed.), Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 1, London: Pinter Publishers, 1994, pp. 22–45. See also Camier, Alice, The Countries of the Greater Arab Maghreb and the European Community, Commission of the European Communities, DE 68, Jan. 1994. 88 Time International, ‘The Warm Embrace’, 26 June 2000, pp. 30–31. 89 Associated Press, ‘Greece-Turkey Agree to Meetings’, 30 June 1999. 90 Coufoudakis, Van, ‘Greek Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: Issues and Challenges’, Mediterranean Quarterly, 7 (3), 1996, pp. 26–41. 91 International Herald Tribune, ‘Turk-Israeli Exercise: An Alliance Building Steam’, 20–21 December 1997, p. 1 and p. 4. 92 Time International, ‘Who Really Won?, 21 June 1999, pp. 20–23. 93 Commission of the European Communities, ‘Barcelona Declaration adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference’ (27 and 28 November 1995). For analysis of run-up to the Barcelona conference and the Declaration see Esther Barbé, ‘The Barcelona Conference: Launching Pad of a Process’, Mediterranean Politics, 1 (1), 1996, pp. 25–42. 94 ‘Malta Declaration’ adopted at Euro-Mediterranean Senior Officials meeting, Brussels, 7 May 1997, p. 5. 95 EuroMeSCo Joint Report, April 1997, pp. 29–36. For an analysis of prospects for arms limitations and confidence building measures after the Malta meeting see Tanner, Fred, ‘The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Prospects for Arms Limitations and Confidence Building after Malta’, The International Spectator, XXXII, April–June 1997, pp. 3–26. 96 Chairman’s Formal Conclusions, Third Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers, Stuttgart, 15–16 April 1999. 97 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, ‘Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours’ (COM, 2003, 104 final of 11.03.03), esp. pp. 9–10. http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/ euromed/publications.htm 98 Calleya, C. Stephen, Navigating Regional Dynamics in the Post-Cold War World: Patterns of Relations in the Mediterranean Area, Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1997. 99 ‘The CSCM non-paper’, Internal document, Rome: Italian Foreign Ministry 1991, p. 152. 100 Ghebali, Y., ‘Toward a Mediterranean Helsinki-Type Process’, Mediterranean Quarterly, 4 (1), Winter 1993, p. 152 101 Latter, R., ‘Mediterranean Security, Uncertainties and Opportunities in a Changing World’, Mediterranean Security Conference Report based on Wilton Park Conference 372, pp. 21–25, October 1991, London: HMSO, p. 153. 102 Agence Europe, ‘EU/Mediterranean’, 6 February 1998, p. 2.

Notes

149

103 The Common Strategy of the EU on the Mediterranean was adopted at the Santa Maria Da Fiera European Council which brought to a conclusion the Portuguese Presidency of the EU at the end of June 2000. 104 Ibid. 105 Chairman’s Formal Conclusions, Third Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers, Stuttgart, 15–16 April 1999. 106 Ibid. 107 Hollis, Rosemary, op. cit., 2001, pp. 120–124. 108 Calleya, S., op. cit., 1997, Chapter 3. 109 Calleya, Stephen, ‘Regional Dynamics in the Mediterranean’, in Calleya, Stephen (ed.), Regionalism in the Post-Cold War World, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000, p. 154. 110 Ibid., pp. 126–128. 111 Liotta, P. H., Future Talk: Building the Hybrid Security Community in the EuroMediterranean, Jerome E. Levy Occasional Paper, The United States Naval War College, February 2002. See also Aliboni, Roberto, ‘Re-Setting the Euro-Mediterranean Security Agenda’, The International Spectator, XXXIII (4), October–December 1998, p. 14. 112 Annex to the Chairman’s Formal Conclusions, Third Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Ministerial Meeting, Stuttgart, April 1999. 113 Desjardins, Marie-France, ‘Rethinking Confidence-Building Measures’, Adelphi Papers 307, IISS, Oxford University Press, Dec. 1996, pp. 7–23. 114 Albinoni, R., Proposals for a MedForum Conflict Prevention Agenda, Istituto Affari Internazionale, Rome, June 2002. See also Rocard, Michel, ‘A New EU Framework For Tackling Crises’, in How Can Europe Prevent Conflicts?, Philip Morris Institute Paper 14, London: Philip Morris Institute for Public Policy Research, November 1997, pp. 42–56. 115 The Economist, ‘The New GeoPolitics’, 31 July 1999, p. 14. 116 Rocard, M., op. cit., 1997. 116a Huntingdon, Samuel, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996. 117 Missiroli, Antonio (ed.), Enlargement and European Defence after 11 September, EU-ISS Chaillot Papers 53, Institute for Security Studies, Paris, June 2002. See also Rotfeld, A., How Can Europe prevent Conflicts?, Philip Morris Institute Paper, London: Philip Morris Institute for Public Policy Research, November 1997, pp. 56–68. 118 Tanner, Fred, op. cit., April–June 1997, pp. 20–24. 119 Aliboni, Roberto, Guazzone, Laura and Pioppi, Daniela, Early Warning and Conflict Prevention in the Euro-Med Area, IAI Quaderni, Istituto Affari Internazionali, December 2001. See also Biad, Abdelwahab, ‘Conflict Prevention in the Euro-Med Partnership: Challenges and Prospects’, The International Spectator, XXXIV (2), April–June 1999, pp. 109–122. 120 Clement, Sophia, Conflict Prevention in the Balkans, Chaillot Papers 30, Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, Paris, December 1997. 121 Toukan, Abdullah, ‘A Plan for Euro-Med Conflict Prevention’, in How Can Europe Prevent Conflicts, Philip Morris Institute Paper, London: Philip Morris Institute for Public Policy Research, November 1997, pp. 80–91. 122 Calleya, S., op. cit., 2000, Chapter 6, pp. 115–154. 123 Aliboni, Roberto, The Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability: Perspectives and Priorities, EuroMeSCo paper, April 1998. 124 Brown, Michael E., ‘The Causes and Regional Dimensions of Internal Conflict’, in The Internal Dimensions of Conflict, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1996. 125 Spencer, Claire, ‘Building Confidence in the Mediterranean’, Mediterranean Politics, 2 (2), Autumn 1997, pp. 23–48. See also Lesser, Ian, ‘The Renaissance of Mediterranean Security?’, Foreign Service Journal, October 2001.

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126 Toukan, A., op. cit. See also Soltan, Gamal Abdel Gawad and Aly, Abdel Monem Said, ‘The Middle East Experience with Conflict Prevention’, The International Spectator, XXXIV (2), April–June 1999, p. 108. 127 Chairman’s Formal Conclusions, Third Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers, Stuttgart, 15–16 April 1999, paragraph 13. (In the course of the implementation of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership process, the necessity for shaping a culture of dialogue and cooperation among the European member states and its Mediterranean Partners has continually been emphasized. As one of the results, the European Commission has entrusted the Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies, University of Malta, to run a semi-annual Information and Training Seminar for Euro-Mediterranean desk officers of the 27 partner countries. The first 15 Euro-Med Information and Training Seminars between 1996 and 2003 consisted of a series of presentations with a primary objective of familiarization with the Euro-Mediterranean Process. Subject areas examined were: the EU institutional setting and decision-making patterns, the question of how to deal with the EU in practical terms, and the selected aspects of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership and its implementation. An additional feature in recent years was the Euro-Mediterranean web site (see: www.euromed-seminars.org.mt), a project that the European Commission entrusted the Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies to design and to operationalize. This project aims at facilitating the flow of information between the Euro-Mediterranean partner countries and became fully functional at the tenth EuroMediterranean ministerial meeting in Malta.) 128 Aliboni, R., op. cit., April 1998. 129 Soltan, G. and Aly, Monem Said, op. cit., 1999, and Aliboni, ibid. 130 Soltan, G. and Aly, Monem Said, ibid., 1999, p. 32. 131 ‘Presidency Conclusions’, Fifth Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers, Valencia, 22–23 April 2002, p. 2. 132 Valencia Action Plan, Fifth Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers, Valencia, 22–23 April 2002, p. 2. 133 ‘Barcelona Declaration adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference’ (27 and 28 November 1995). 134 See: http://europa.eu.int/comm.scr/indexen.htm and www.ispo.be/eumedis/Welcome. htm 135 Rhein, Eberhard, ‘Where is the EU Heading?’, Paper presented at Conference on Euro-Mediterranean Economic and Financial Partnership, July 2000. 136 Calleya, C. Stephen, ‘The Social Impact of Free Trade in the Euro-Mediterranean Region’, Wilton Park Paper, No. 150, May 2000, p. 12. 137 Ibid., p. 27. 138 Ibid., p. 28. 139 Marin, Manuel, ‘Partners in Progress’, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, Vol. 2, London, 1997, pp. 7–8. 140 Rhien, Eberhard, ‘European Regionalism – Where is it Heading?’, in Calleya, Stephen (ed.), Regionalism in the Post-Cold War World, Aldershot: Ashgate 2000, pp. 25–33. 141 Rhein, Eberhard, ‘Euro-Med Free Trade Area for 2010: Whom Will it Benefit?’, in Joffé, George (ed.), Perspectives on Development, The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, London: Frank Cass Publications, 1999, pp. 3–15. 142 Rhein, Eberhard, op. cit., 2000, pp. 25–33. 143 Ibid. 144 Sachs, Jeffrey, ‘A New Map of the World’, The Economist, 24 June 2000, pp. 99–101. 145 Brandt, Willy, North-South, A Program for Survival, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1981. 146 Roque, Maria Angels, ‘Position Paper on the Role of Civil Society’, Intercultural Dialogue in the Mediterranean, Malta: Foundation for International Studies, 1997, pp. 18–23.

Notes

151

147 Commission of the European Communities, ‘Chairman’s Formal Conclusions’, Third Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers, Stuttgart, 15–16 April 1999, paragraph 30. 148 Rhein, op. cit., 2000, p. 38. 149 Makram-Ebeid, Mona, ‘Prospects For Euro-Mediterranean Relations’, Intercultural Dialogue in the Mediterranean, Malta: Foundation for International Studies, 1997, pp. 38–53. 150 Commission of the European Communities, ‘Presidency Conclusions’, Mid-Term Euro-Mediterranean Conference, Crete, 26–27 May 2003. 151 Wriggins, W. H., Gause, F. G. and Lyons, T. P., The Dynamics of Regional Politics: Four Systems on the Indian Ocean Rim, New York: Columbia University Press, 1992, p. 167. 152 Atherson, Jr., A. L., ‘Arabs, Israelis, and Americans: A Reconsideration’, Foreign Affairs, 62 (5), Summer 1984, pp. 1194 –209. 153 Campbell, J. C., ‘Les Etats-Unis et L’Europe au Moyen Orient: Interets communs et politique divergentes’, Politique Internationale, 7, 1980, pp. 165–86. 154 Weinland, R. G., ‘Superpower Naval Diplomacy in the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War: A Case Study’, The Washington Papers, VI (61), Beverley Hills, Sage Publications, 1979, pp. 7–53. 155 Lok, Janssen, ‘Carrier Cuts will hit Sixth Fleet’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 16 (17), 26 October 1991, p. 747, and Latter, R., 1992, op. cit., p. 10. 156 Cremasco, M., ‘NATO’s Southern Flank in the East-West Balance’, Lo Spettatore Internazionale, XIX (1), January–March, 1979, pp. 13–32. 157 The White House: National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002. 158 Latter, R., op. cit., 1992 p. 9; see also Lesser, I., Mediterranean Security: New Perspectives and Implications for U.S. Policy, Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1992, pp. 1–10. 159 Synder, J. C., ‘Proliferation Threats to Security in NATO’s Southern Region’, Mediterranean Quarterly, 4 (1), Winter 1993, pp. 109–10. 160 Kagan, R., Of Paradise and Power, America and Europe in the New World Order, New York: Alfred A. Knopf Publishers, 2003. 161 Strange, S., ‘European Direct Investment in North Africa: The Investor’s Perspective’, in Ayubi, N. N. (ed.), Distant Neighbours, Reading: Ithaca Press, 1995, pp. 249–250. 162 Kegley, Jr., C. W. and Raymond, G., A Multipolar Peace, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994, pp. 218–20. 163 Kagan, R., op. cit., p. 69 and pp. 98–9 and see Kennedy, Paul, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, London: Fontana Press, 1988, pp. 665–698. 164 Fenech, D., ‘East-West to North-South in the Mediterranean’, Geojournal, 31 (2), October 1993, p. 136. 165 George, B., The Alliance at the Flashpoint of a New Era, NATO Review, 1993, p. 9. 166 Snyder, op. cit., 1993, pp. 102–19. 167 Snyder, ibid., pp. 109–10. 168 Financial Times, 9-2-95, p. 6; Calleya, C. Stephen, Navigating Regional Dynamics, op. cit. (Note 85), 1997, p. 222. 169 Robertson, G., NATO and the Mediterranean – Moving from Dialogue Towards Partnership, April 2002, Keynote Speech at Royal United Services Institute Conference. 170 Upgrading The Mediterranean Dialogue, NATO Issues, www.nato.int/med-dial/ upgrading.htm, May 2003. 171 Dokos, Thanos, NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue: Prospects and Policy Recommendations, ELIAMEP Policy Paper, No. 3, 2003. See also de Santis, Nicola, ‘NATO’s Agenda and the Mediterranean Dialogue’, in Brauch, Hans Gunter, Liotta, P. H., Marquina, Antonio, Rogers, Paul. F., El-Sayed Selim, Mohammed (eds),

152

172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180

181 182 183 184

185 186

Notes Security and the Environment in the Mediterranean, Berlin: Springer Verlag, 2003, pp. 177–180. Declaration of the Brussels NATO summit 10/11-1-94. Robertson, G., NATO and Mediterranean Security: Practical Steps Towards Partnership, June 2003, Keynote Speech at Royal United Services Institute Conference. Kagan, R., op. cit., 2003, p. 27. Joffe, G., op. cit., 1994, p. 163. Calleya, S., op. cit., 1997, p. 186. Commission of the European Communities, ‘Chairman’s Formal Conclusions’ (1999), Third Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers, Stuttgart, 15–16 April 1999, paragraph 18, p. 3. See http://europa.eu.int/comm.scr/index_en.htm and www.ispo.cec.be/eumedis/ Welcome.htm Nadal, Miquel, ‘The Barcelona Process: Background and Vision’, in B. Huldt, M. Engman and E. Davidson (eds), Euro-Mediterranean Security and the Barcelona Process, Strategic Yearbook, Swedish National Defence College, 2003, pp. 19–27. Commission of the European Communities, ‘Presidency Conclusions’, Fifth EuroMediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers, Valencia, 22–23 April, 2002, p. 2. See also Valencia Action Plan, Vth Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers, Valencia, April 2002, p. 2, www.euromed-seminars.org.mt Modelski, G., ‘International Relations and Area Studies: the Case of South-East Asia’, International Relations, 2, April 1961, p. 150. Gabriel, Sigmar, The Middle East – Partner for Europe, Herzliya: Friedrich Ebert Foundation Israel Office, 2002, pp. 18–19. Veit, Winfried , A European Perspective for Israel: A Key to Solving the Middle East Conflict, Herzliya: Friedrich Ebert Foundation, February 2003, p. 11. Some of these alternatives are explored in greater detail in Alfred Tovias, Mapping Israel’s Policy Options Regarding Its Future Institutionalised Relations with the European Union, Middle East & Euro-Med Working Paper No. 3, Brussels: CEPS, March 2003. European Council, Presidency Conclusions, ‘The European Union’s External Relations’, chapter 2, 9 December 1994. Solana, Javier, A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Commission, June 2003.

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Index

A Abbas, Mahmoud, 44 Accession strategies, xii Accountability, xi Afghanistan Bush administration, 128 African Union, 33 Agricultural focus EMP, 87 Agricultural free-trade EU Mediterranean region, 96 Agriculture Barcelona Process, 95 EU, xiii Algeria, 6 Arab Maghreb Union, 31 internal strife, 45 Maghreb Union, 31 American foreign policy September 11, 2002, 113 American unilateral foreign policy, 114 Anglo-American coalition Iraq, 74 Arab(s) cultural homogeneity, 12 EMP participation, 136 linguistic homogeneity, 12 political system, 29 Arab-Israeli peace talks Egypt, 27 Arab League, 14, 33 Arab Maghreb Union, 31, 33, 56 Algeria, 31 diplomatic efforts, 45 Arab Mediterranean countries, xiii Arafat, Yasser, 44

Association partnerships, 96 Association Southeast Asian Nations, 140 Atlantic Alliance, 131

B Balkans NATO, 120 regional relations, 46 stability pact, 7 Barcelona Declaration, ix, xi, 48, 57 cultural understanding, 52 decentralized cooperation, 100 EMP, 57, 102 EU Foreign Ministers, 143 European Union, 52 international security exchanges, 53 objectives, 105 Barcelona Process, ix, xiv, 4, 61, 90, 100 agriculture, 95 economics Mediterranean region, 93 EMP process, 132 under fire, xi free-trade area, 130 Mediterranean region economics, 93 Middle East Peace Process, 59 Berlin Wall France, 18 Brussels EMP, 141 Bulgaria European Union, 46 Bush administration Afghanistan, 128 Iraq, 128

Index 159

C Cannes European Council, 51 Central Europe EMP, 47 liberation, 23 CFSP. See Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Chairman’s Formal Conclusions Annex, 73 Charter for Peace and Stability EMP, 141 Civilian living conditions EMP, 49 Civilization clash EMP, 99 Civilization dialogue EMP, 101 Cold War CSCE Europe, 127 EMCPC designing command and control structure, 82 Euro-Meditarranean political relationships, 84 international power diffusion, 39 international system collapse, 115 multilateralist tendencies, 128 NATO, 120, 122 realities, 124 security concerns, 72 super power rivalry diminution, 108 termination, 116 United States, 40, 110 unitlateralist tendencies, 128 Commission EMP, 59 Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), 61 Cold War, 127 Helsinki Act 1975, 61 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), 140 EU, 41 proactive political approach, 63 Common Strategy, 3 Communication programs EMP, 60 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Mediterranean (CSCM), 61 nonstarter, 62 support lacking, 62

Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM), 79 two analysis levels, 79–80 Conflict prevention, 73 political choice, 75 political will, 75 priority ranking, 76 time-scales, 79 traditional approach, 76 variation measures, 78 Conflict Prevention Centre, 78 Conflicts, 74 Crete Annex, 105 Crete Conclusions Euro-Meditarranean Foundation, 107 Crisis management mechanisms EMP, 71 Crisis situation external dynamics, 79 internal dynamics, 79 Croatia European Union, 46 CSBM, 79 two analysis levels, 79–80 CSCE. See Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) CSCM. See Conference on Security and Cooperation in Mediterranean (CSCM) Cultural and civilization dialogues EMP, 52 Cultural dialogue EMP, 101 Cultural homogeneity Arabs, 12 Cultural partnerships, 85–107 Cultural understanding Barcelona Declaration, 52 Culture and art programmes Euro-Meditarranean Foundation, 107 Culture clash EMP, 99 Cyprus islands developments, 23 trans-Mediterranean security initiatives, 24

D Decentralized cooperation Barcelona Declaration, 100 Desert Storm Iraq, 75–76

160

Index

Direct foreign investments Euro-Mediterranean region, 50 Drug trafficking Euro-Mediterranean region, 70

E Eastern Europe EMP, 47 liberation, 23 Economic analysis EMP, 72 Economic attention Euro-Mediterranean region, 137 Economic development Euro-Mediterranean economic and financial partnership, 86 Economic partnership agenda Euro-Mediterranean region, 50 Economics Barcelona Process Mediterranean region, 93 Egypt, 6 Arab-Israeli peace talks, 27 concentrated power, 26 EU Association agreement, 97 northern policy concentration, 12 EIB, 56 Mediterranean region, 98 Valencia Action Plan, 58 EMCA, 70–72 security, 71 EMCPC. See Euro-Mediterranean Conflict Prevention Centre (EMCPC) EMDA chief objectives, 133–134 EMP. See Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) Energy imports EU, 139 Environmental independence Euro-Mediterranean region, 50 EU. See European Union (EU) EURO EMCPC introduction role, 83 Euro-Israeli dialogue separation, 135 Euro-Maghreb dialogue, 136 Euromed Audio-Visual, 58 Euromed Heritage, 58 Euro-Mediterranean

area, 1–2 future prospects, i Cold War political relationships, 84 economic and financial partnership economic development, 86 international maritime law, 87 principal objectives, 85–86 support base, 86 foreign ministers Barcelona Declaration, 86 free trade, 4, 63 creation, 103 current state, 88–90 region, 39–47 direct foreign investments, 50 drug trafficking, 70 economic attention, 137 economic partnership agenda, 50 environmental independence, 50 extra-regional powers, 108–144 forming economic balance, 86 human trafficking, 70 infrastructure development and improvement, 51 intergovernmental relations, 70 political attention, 137 political partnership agenda, 50 science and technology, 51 security issues, 71 women political participation, 50 women social participation, 50 regional dynamics, 9–60 relations, 40 twenty-first century, 126–144 security partnership, 3 society, 99 states weapons free zone, 49 Universal Declaration of Human Rights cooperation with, 48 Euro-Mediterranean Charter EMCPC relationship, 82 introduction failure, 69 peace and stability, 3, 67 Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability, 3 Euro-Mediterranean Coastguard Agency (EMCA), 70–72 security, 71 Euro-Mediterranean Conflict Prevention Centre (EMCPC), 73, 76

Index 161 Cold War designing command and control structure, 82 conceptual framework, 80 creation criteria, 83 creation manner, 83 EURO introduction role, 83 Euro-Mediterranean Charter relationship, 82 initial objectives, 77–78 international security institutions security criteria, 80 main objective, 76 structural design, 81 United Nations Charter, 77 Euro-Mediterranean Conflict Prevention Network, 72–84 Euro-Mediterranean Development Agency (EMDA), 133 chief objectives, 133–134 EMP, 133 Euro-Mediterranean Development Bank, 57 Euro-Mediterranean Foundation, 58, 105 Crete Conclusions, 107 culture and art programmes, 107 EMP, 106 key goals, 106 main objectives, 106 Euro-Mediterranean Information and Training Seminars, 55 Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), 1, 5, 7, 47 agricultural focus, 87 Barcelona Declaration, 57, 102 Brussels, 141 Central Europe, 47 Charter for Peace and Stability, 141 Civil Forum, 100 civilian living conditions, 49 civilization clash, 99 civilization dialogue, 101 communication programs, 60 crisis management mechanisms, 71 cultural and civilization dialogues, 52 cultural dialogue, 101 culture clash, 99 Eastern Europe, 47 economic analysis, 72 EIB, 58 EMDA, 133 essential framework factors, 102 EU, 66

enlargement, evaluation, 132–138 international agenda, 142 support, 62 Euro-Meditarranean charter, 69 Euro-Meditarranean Foundation, 106 Euro-Mediterranean Process, 56 geopolitical shifts, 54 health sector, 99 improvement criteria, 142 Middle East peace process, 53 NAFTA, 97 participation Arabs, 136 peace and prosperity goal, 90 polarization process, 129 political, economical and cultural relations, 2–4 political analysis, 72 political and security partnership, 61–84 positive expectations not me, 134 preventive diplomacy, 68 prevent terrorism, 100 principal aim, 130 process Barcelona Process, 132 progression, 54 security warning mechanisms, 71 socioeconomic concerns, 101 socioeconomic development, 49 strategic questions, 131 Stuttgart conference, 55 technology programs, 60 twenty-first century, 4–8 United States NATO, 131 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 48 Euro-Mediterranean Process, 54 employment program promotion, 92 obstacles, 141 policy recommendations, 90 Euro-Mediterranean Security Charter, 55 Euro-Mediterranean Senior Officials, 68 role, 68 Euro-Mediterranean Social Charter, 91 Euro-Mediterranean Social Safety Fund, 91 Euro-Mediterranean Summits, 47–57 Europe Cold War CSCE, 127 economic developments, 10 security cooperation, 10 decolonization process, 15 economic collapse, 19

162

Index

historical developments, 14 interdependence, 10 Mediterranean trade, 88 Middle East comparative analysis, 13 socioeconomic disparities, 38 multilevel international society, 14, 124 nineteenth century expansion, 35 political developments, 14 regional model, 11 socioeconomic developments, 14 sphere of influence, 22 19th century dominance, 15 United States transatlantic level, 44 European Community of European integration, 16 European expansion Soviet Union, 38 European Investment Bank (EIB), 56 Mediterranean region, 98 Valencia Action Plan, 58 European Mediterranean Civil Forum, 102 European Mediterranean Development Bank, 137 European relations Mediterranean region NATO, 123 European Security and Defense Policy, 57 European Single Act, 37 European Union (EU), 1 affairs, 22 agricultural front, xiii Association Agreements, 6 Barcelona Declaration, 52 Bulgaria, 46 CFSP proactive political approach, 63 common foreign and security policy, 41 Croatia, 46 development trends, 6 economic partners, 6 educational levels, x effective political mechanisms, 64 Egypt Association agreement, 97 EMP, 66 international agenda, 142 process length, 134 energy imports, 139 enlargement EMP evaluation, 132–138 non-EU membership, 135

Foreign Ministers Barcelona Declaration, 143 geographical proximity, 6 globalization, 5 Greek Presidency, 59 insufficient economic means, 127 insufficient political means, 127 International Criminal Court, 140 knowledge society, ix market forces, x Mashreq region, 138 Mediterranean partners, 104 Mediterranean region, 42 agricultural free-trade, 96 balancing relations, 63 future cooperation, 138 Mediterranean strategy, 65–67 EMP, 65 home affairs, 65 justice, 65 Middle East Peace Process, 66 peace and stability, 67–70 Middle East external affairs strategy, 64 NATO, 72 United States, 144 United States cooperation, 84 neighborhood policy, 38 Portuguese Presidency, 56 Presidency, 66 prosperity gap, ix reform process, 129 relationship Israel and Turkey, 136 Romania, 46 Southern Europe, 16 strategic approach, xii strategic defense review, 140 support EMP, 62 Turkey, 38 External international involvement headings, 109 External intervention, 108 External power intervention acts affecting factors, 109 External powers power balancers, 109

F Financial support for Mediterranean, xiii Foreign direct investment, 95

Index 163 Fortress like Europe, 128 France Berlin Wall, 18 sub group dominance, 17 Free trade area (FTA), xiii Barcelona Process, 130 creation, 103 Euro-Mediterranean, 4, 63, 103 current state, 88–90 repercussions, 104 transparency, 89 FTA. See Free trade area (FTA)

G GCC, xiii Globalization EU, 5 Greece international embargo, 20 Gross National Product, 139 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), xiii Gulf War Southern Europe region, 114

Islam Cold War amity patterns, 13 enmity patterns, 13 decolonization, 13 history Mediterranean region, 35 independence, 13 transitional political force, 12 Israel, 43 army withdrawal Lebanon, 43 Cold War, 25 Egypt, 26 power dynamics, 27 EMP participation, 136 and Turkey EU relationship, 136 Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 45

J Jordan, 6 King Hussein, 28 political stability, 28

H

L

Helsinki Act 1975 CSCE, 61 Hungary scientific achievements, 95 Hussein, 28

Lebanon, 6 Israel army withdrawal, 43 Legislation transparency Mediterranean region, 94 Liberation Central Europe, 23 Eastern Europe, 23 Libya Cold War, 32 economic support, 32 United Nations, 33 Linguistic homogeneity Arabs, 12 Lisbon Process, xiii

I International economic summit Middle East, 14 International embargo Greece, 20 International power diffusion Cold War, 39 International region pattern evolution Mediterranean region, 9 International security exchanges Barcelona Declaration, 53 International security institutions EMCPC security criteria, 80 Iraq Anglo-American coalition, 74 Bush administration, 128 Desert Storm, 75–76 reconstruction United States, 117

M Maghreb, xiii, 8 Algeria, 30 Libya, 31 Mashreq, 34–39 Morocco, 30 NATO policy, 123 region bilateral relations, 34 country interaction, 33 economic intergovernmental links, 34

164

Index

Middle East region, 55 political intergovernmental links, 34 rivalries, 36 sub region, 32, 134 Tunisia, 32 regional dynamics, 30–34 Southern Europe, 20 Tunisia, 31 Maghreb Union, 31, 33, 56 Algeria, 31 diplomatic efforts, 45 Malta islands developments, 23 trans-Mediterranean security initiatives, 24 Maritime security arrangement Mediterranean region, 77 Mashreq Jordan, 28 NATO policy, 123 region EU, 138 regional dynamics, 24–30 Southern Europe, 34–39 sub regions power diffusion, 29 Mediterranean Cold War, 19 financial support for, xiii global policies, 38 member states international organizations, 125 partners accession differentiation, 6–7 association partnerships, 142 civil society, 104 employment, 91 EU, 89 nongovernmental organizations, 104 socioeconomic outlook, 143 strategy Middle East Peace Process, EU, 66 trade Europe, 88 Mediterranean region avoiding economic vastness, 144 Barcelona Process, 93 business freedom, 94 Christian history, 35 Cold War, 16, 119–120 cooperative cross-cultural pattern interaction, 101

decolonization process, 15 economic liberalization, 92 economic restructuring phase, 98 economics, 93 EIB, 98 empowering civil society, 103–107 EU, 42 agricultural free-trade, 96 direct engagement, 129 economic growth, 90 flexibility, 67 policy, 67 political growth, 90 social growth, 90 external actors pattern relations, 118 future economic prospects, 93–99 future prospect regional assessment, 138–144 governments, 95 hindered competition, 87 innovations, 119–120 insufficient external monitor and coach, 129 insufficient technology, 98 internal actors pattern relations, 118 international region pattern evolution, 9 Islamic history, 35 legislation transparency, 94 maritime security arrangement, 77 NATO Cold War, 119 policy measures, 95 regional dynamics, 126 security vacuum, 137 SME, 92 socioeconomic realities, 90–93 sub groups, 9 trade, 89 sub-regional dynamics, 126 United States dual role, 113 U.S. Sixth Fleet, 112 Middle East enmity pattern relations, 13 Europe comparative analysis, 13 socioeconomic disparities, 38 historical developments, 14 international economic summit, 14 Maghreb region, 55 multilevel international society, 14 Oslo Peace, 42, 43 political developments, 14

Index 165 policy Maghreb, 123 Mashreq, 123 Southern Europe, 16 Turkey, 120 United States, 131 EU, 144

regional model, 11 socioeconomic developments, 14 sub groups dynamics, 12 Middle East Peace Process Barcelona Process, 59 EMP, 53 Mediterranean strategy EU, 66 United States, 64 Morocco, 6 United Nations, 30 Multilateralist tendencies Cold War, 128 Multilevel international society Europe, 14, 124 Middle East, 14

O

N

P

NAFTA, 97 EMP, 97 National Security Strategy United States, 41, 113, 117 NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) “Neighborhood Policy,” 144 911. See September 11th North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), 97 EMP, 97 North Atlantic Cooperation Council, 121 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) American participation, 125 Arab League, 122 Balkan conflict, 121 Balkans, 120 Cold War, 120, 122 counter-terrorism, 123 EMP, 121–122 EU, 72 cooperation, 81, 84 United States, 84, 144 international organizations’ role, 117–124 Kosovo war, 75 Mediterranean Cold War, 119 dialogue, 84, 122 policy, 121 region, 119 OSCE, 21 partnership indigenous pattern relations, 124

Palestine Liberation Organization, 25 Palestinian Authority, 6 Israel, 62 Palestinian-Israeli conflict, 45 Pan-Arabism decline, 29 Pan-Arab nationalism, 36 Partnership building measures (PBMs), 3 Partnership for Peace, 121 PBMs, 3 Peace and prosperity goal EMP, 90 Political and security partnership EMP, 61–84 Portugal geographic position, 22 Portuguese Presidency European Union, 56 Power balancers external powers, 109 Preventive diplomacy EMP, 68 Prevent terrorism EMP, 100 Pull factor, 109 Push factor, 109

Open coordination, xiii Operation Active Endeavour, 71, 123 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) NATO, 21 Oslo Peace Middle East, 42, 43 Ottoman Empire, 35

R Region criteria qualification, 9 definition terminology, 9 Regional dynamics external assistance, 114

166

Index

Restructuring process trade-unions’ role, 92 Romania European Union, 46 Rumsfeld, Donald, 41

S Sadat, Anwar, 26 Santa Maria Da Fiera European Council, 3, 65 Sea power present technological advancements, 112 Sectoral cooperation, 37 Security concerns Cold War, 72 criteria EMCPC, 80 EMCA, 71 issues Euro-Mediterranean region, 71 vacuum Mediterranean region, 137 warning mechanisms EMP, 71 Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean Conference, 18 Security and political partnership EMP, 61–84 September 11th 2002 American foreign policy, 113 2001 terror attacks, 72 Sharon, Ariel, 43 Small and medium size enterprises (SME) Mediterranean region, 92 Socioeconomic concerns EMP, 101 Socioeconomic development EMP, 49 Socioeconomic difficulties, 8 Socioeconomic partnerships, 85–107 Socioeconomic realities Mediterranean region, 90–93 Solana, Javier, 81 Southern Europe European Union, 16 Maghreb, 20 Mashreq, 34–39 NATO, 16 region Gulf War, 114 regional dynamics, 16–24 regionalism, 36

sub groups, 17 Turkey, 22 South south free trade, xiii South south relations, 1–2 Soviet Union demise, 1 European expansion, 38 external military actor, 115 Spain economic capital, 18 geographic position, 18 political capital, 18 Stuttgart conference EMP, 55 Syria, xi, 6 Cold War, 28 domestic political conditions, 27

T Third World nationalism, 118 Trans-Mediterranean relations resurgence prevention factors, 127 Trans-Mediterranean security, 141 initiatives Cyprus islands, 24 Malta islands, 24 Transparency, xi Tunisia, xi, 6 Maghreb, 31 sub region, 32 Turkey, xiii, 6 Cold War, 21 European Union, 38 geographic position, 20–21 Israel, 46 EU relationship, 136 political capital, 20–21 Southern Europe, 22

U UNDP, 60 United Nations Anglo-American coalition, 74 Libya, 33 Morocco, 30 United Nations Charter EMCPC, 77 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 60 United States bilateral level, 115 Bush administration, 42

Index 167 Cold War, 40, 110 Mediterranean region, 111 U.S. Sixth Fleet, 112 cooperation EU and NATO, 84 EMP NATO, 131 EU, 115 Europe transatlantic level, 44 geographic position, 110 Iraq reconstruction, 117 lone superpower, 116 Mediterranean region dual role, 113 Mediterranean stabilizer, 111 Middle East Peace Process, 64 military actor, 119 National Security Strategy, 41, 113, 117 NATO, 131 EU, 144 superpower role, 110–117 Unitlateralist tendencies Cold War, 128

Universal Declaration of Human Rights EMP, 48 Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, 48 U.S. Sixth Fleet Mediterranean region, 112

V Valencia Action Plan, 57 Civil Forum process, 103 cultural cooperation, 102 EIB, 58

W Weapons Mass Destruction, 139 Western European Union, 19 Westphalia Treaty 1648, 75 West versus the Rest’ ideological rivalry, 109 Women Euro-Mediterranean region political participation, 50