Islamism, democracy and liberalism in Turkey: the case of the AKP

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Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey

The Justice and Development Party (AKP) was elected to power in 2002 and since then Turkish politics has undergone considerable change. This book is a comprehensive analysis of the AKP, in terms not just of its ideological agenda but also of its social basis and performance in office in the main theatres of public policy - political reform, and cultural, economic and foreign policies. Based on an extensive analysis of official and party documents, interviews, academic sources and media coverage, the book outlines the main features of the current global debate on the relationship between Islam, Islamism and democracy. While most top AKP leaders come from an Islamist background, the party has behaved as a moderate, centre-right, conservative democratic party who are fully committed to democracy, a free market economy and Turkey'S EU membership. The book explores and analyses these changes in Turkish politics, and provides coverage of the workings of the contemporary Turkish political systems, policy and ideological issues that go to the heart of Turkish identity. Filling a gap in the existing Turkish and English literature on the subject, this book will be an important contribution to Political Science, particularly in the areas of Turkish politics, Middle Eastern studies, Islamic studies and comparative politics. Ergun Ozbudun is Professor of Constitutional Law and Political Science at Bilkent University. William Hale is the former Professor of Turkish Politics in the School of Oriental and African Studies of the University of London. He is a specialist on the politics of the Middle East, especially Turkey, and has written a number of papers and books on modern Turkish politics and history.

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5. Democratization in Morocco The political elite and .struggles for power in the post-independence state Lise Storm

6. Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey The Making of the Justice and Development Party Omit Cizre 7. The United States and Iran Sanctions, Wars and the Policy of Dual Containment SasalZ Fayazmaltesh

8. Civil Society in Algeria The Political Functions of Associational Life Alldrea Liveralli 9. Jordanian-Israeli Relations The Peace building Experience Mutayyam al O'rall

Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Politics 10. Kemalism in Turkish Politics The Republican People's Party, Secularism and Nationalism Sillal! Ciddi 11. Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey The Case of the AKP William Hale alld Ergul! Ozbudull

1I1

Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey The case of the AKP William Hale and Ergun Ozbudun

LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published 2010 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN Simulraneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Avenue, ~ew York, NY 10016 Routledge is all imprillt of the Taylor & Frallcis Group. all blfonlla busilless

© 2010 William Hale and Ergun Ozbudun Typeset in Times New Roman by Cadmus Communication Printed by the MPG Books Group in the UK All rights reserved. No pan of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguillg ill P;,blicatioll Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of COllgress Catalogillg ;', Publicatioll Data Hale, William M. Islamism, democracy, and liberaiism in Turkey: the case of the AKPlWilIiam Hale and Ergun Ozbudun p. em. - (Routledge studies in Middle Eastern polities; 11) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. AI< Patti (Turkey) 2. Turkey - politics and government - 19803. Islam and politics - Turkey. 4. Liberalism - Turkey. I. Ozbudun, Ergun. II. Title. JQ1809.A8A4372009 324.2561'04-dc22 2009004288 ISBN ISBN ISBN ISBN

10: 0-415-48470-7 (hbk) 10: 0-203-87335-1 (ebk) 13: 978-0-415-48470-1 (hbk) 13: 978-0-203-87335-9 (ebk)

r d

Contents

~~~~

~

Introduction

Xl

PART I

The AKP's history, ideology, social bases and organisation

1

1 The history of Islamist parties in Turkey: from the National Order Party to the 1ustice and Development Party (AKP)

3

2 The AKP's ideology:· Conservative democracy

20

3 The AKP's social bases: A new centre-right coalition?

30

4 Party organisation

44

PART II

The AKP in government

53

5 Democratising reforms and constitutional issues

55

6 Cultural policies: Creeping Islamisation or politics of avoidance?

68

7 The AKP government and the military

80

8 The AKP and the Turkish economy

99

9 Foreign policy and the AKP

Conclusions Notes Sources Bibliography Index

119

148 159 190 193 205

Tables

8.1

Gross Domestic Product, 2000-07

8.2 Wholesale and consumer price indices, 2001-08 (per cent change, year on year) 8.3

Consolidated central government finances, 2000-07, YTL billion

8.4 Summary balance of payments statistics, 2002-07 ($ billion) 8.5

Foreign merchandise trade, by country groups

106 108 109 111 113

~ II

Introduction Islam, democracy and the Turkish expenence

Since the" end of the cold war, two apparently contradictory trends have shaped global politics. On the one hand, the collapse of communism prompted the conclusion that democratic government is now 'the only game in town', even if its application has, at best, only been patchy in many parts of the world. On the other hand, the rise of political Islamism among Muslim communities accounting for around 23 per cent of the world's population" appears to have issued a crucial challenge to the apparent hegemony of what many Muslims see as alien values, primarily promoted by the United States, as the world's only superpower. For some, these two movements have been seen as causally related: that is to say that the demise of communism has arguably left Islamism as the major challenger to liberalism, in the new 'clash of civilisations' originally proposed by Samuel P. Huntington. In this divide, Turkey is seen as occupying a crucial position, having a foot in both camps. On the one hand, the big majority of its population consists of devout Muslims, mainly of the Sunni denomination. Historically, the Ottoman Empire, the predecessor to the present Turkish republic, was a leading (if not the leading) Muslim state between the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries. On the other hand, since the 1920s Turkey has been a constitutionally secular republic - subsequently, a member of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and now a candidate .for membership of the European Union. Huntington's conclusion was that Turkey was a· 'torn society', divided between a political elite, which saw it as part of the West, while large 'elements in Turkish society' refused to accept this definition, seeing their country as part of the Muslim middle east.! These proposals have been widely criticised astoo sweeping and inconsistent with observable facts. The argument has been sharpened by the growth of Islamist parties and movements in Turkey since the 1970s, and the emergence from them of the Justice and Development Party [Adalet ve Kalklnma Partisi (AKP)], which has ruled Turkey since its victory in the general elections of 2002. For some, this story has been seen as a beacon of hope for the Muslim world, a clear sign that democratic government is perfectly possible in a Muslim society, even when the ruling party has faith-based roots. By others, the AKP is seen as no more than a facade, behind which radical

XII

lslamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey

Islamists hope to impose an authoritarian Islamist state. Against this background, the purpose of this book is to examine the AKP, not only in terms of its ideological agenda but also of its social basis and performance in office in the main theatres of public policy - 'political reform and cultural, economic and foreign policies. The hope is that the factual record of actual performance may help to answer some of the questions in the broader conceptual debate about Islam and democratic government. In doing this, our aim has been to keep the narrative and its analysis as straightforward as possible, so as to make them widely accessible. Generally, at present, there is a large and constantly growing literature on Islam, Islamism and politics, and on Turkey's political development over the last 50 years, of which this Introduction can offer no more than a brief summary. Its limited purpose is to provide readers who are new to the subject, with background information, which will help them to assess and understand what follows, besides putting the Turkish story into a broader perspective. The first section outlines the main features of the current global debate on the relationship between Islam, Islamism and democracy, especially where it has relevance for the Turkish experience. The second section summarises the evolution of secularism in Turkey, and of the centre-right parties, which have dominated Turkish politics following the country's sometimes faltering transition to democratic politics since the 1950s. It is argued that both of these have had significant effects on the ideas, policies and performance of the AKP. Islam, Islamism and democracy: the broader debate In the ongoing argument about the relationship betwee!! ~slll~.a!1.~ demo~ racy, one schQ9! of thought, categorised as Orientalist, argues that since ~has a totaliSi'characte,i' (a-'totirway"ofIlfe"rather than Just a ieligio1iT ~1V aI]..Jl6soli!tr~fgQi~i~ent:.collld&put~its-precep.ts_!nto practice. A forth~ right sta~ement of this viewpoint is given by Elie Kedourie, who argues that there is nothing in the political traditions of Islam which might make ideas of constitutional or representative government familiar or even intelligible. In his words The notion of a state as a specific territorial entity which is endowed with sovereignty, the notion of popular sovereignty as the foundation of governmental legitimacy, the idea of representation, of elections, of popular suffrage, of political institutions being regulated by laws laid down by a parliamentary assembly, of these laws being guarded and upheld by an independent judiciary, the ideas of the secularity of the state, of society being composed of a multitude of self-activating autonomous groups and associations - all these are profoundly alien to the Muslim political tradition. 2

Introduction

xiii

This assertion emphasises that, following the classical scholar al-Ghazali (1058-1111), Muslim tradition requires obedience to any ruler, however despotic, as being preferable to the suffering caused by rebellion or civil war: hence, it effectively demands the prohibition of all dissent. 3 Expanding this line of thought and carrying it through to the modern age, P.]. Vatikiotis maintains that 'the Islamic order is being put forward as the imperative total alternative to a pluralist system'.4 A younger generation of scholars, such as Patricia Crone and Daniel Pipes, who have been classified as neo-Orientalists, reach similar conclusions, but for quite different reasons. The orientalists stress the power of the state in Muslim societies and its abillly to gm.tmJ.$hat is assumed to be a ;'eak civil society, whereas the neo-ori~!~!i~!L~J:gue tb.1!!, Islam']'J~entral political proolem~,liJu~..e.n thatth;;ate has been too weak or that Isf~~ demands too much of it, rather than Jh.~tTr::h-;~ ,pe~n all-powerful. 'ISlaiiiic ·idearsaieTmpOssTbie'i:~'f~lfir;-he~~~:·Muslims are ultimately bound to reject the legitimacy of any actual state. This argument is enlarged by the proposal that, historically, Muslim society was both strong and essentially tribal. The state failed to draw strength from it and was doomed to be unstable. This allegedly obstructed the development of a modern civil society or democratic government. S These criticisms draw strength from the fact that many modern Islamist movements and some governments make no pretence of basing their proposals on anything other than a highly conservative interpretation of Islamic tradition and specifically reject any sort of accommodation with pluralist democracy. Some movements, such as the Egyptian-based Takfir w'al Hijra ('Denunciation and Emigration') or al-Qaeda, openly advocate the use of terrorism to attain their objectives. Others, such as the Lebanese Hezbollah or the Palestinian Hamas, are prepared to operate either as non-violent participants in multi-party systems or as terrorists when it suits them. They may embrace ballots but are not prepared to give up the use of bullets, according to their self-defined circumstances. On the latter account, they cannot be counted as democrats. 6 Moreover, those who do not resort to terrorism may also reject liberal democracy. A classic case is that of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini who, in lectures delivered to his students in the Iraqi-Shi'ite shrine city of Najaf ten years before the Iranian revolution, argued that his version of an Islamic government would be conditional rather than despotic, but in the sense that it would be obliged to adhere to Islamic law (shari'a) based on divine revelation, rather than that enacted by elected representatives of the people. God, not the electorate, was to be sovereign in the Islamic republic. 7 Similarly, the government of Saudi Arabia claims that it maintains a system of rule endowed with a higher legitimacy than that of democracy, since it is based on the Qur'an and hadith, or traditions of the prophet Muhammad. This is supported by the personal legitimacy of King 'Abd al-'Aziz, the founder of the Saudi state and some of his successors, as well as the ability

XIV

Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey

of the regime to deliver welfare benefits to the society, but not by democratic political structures. 8 Both the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Saudi kingdom can be said to have embraced what can be called the Islamist state project, even if they have somewhat different versions of it. This rests on the notion of the sovereig1)iY of God, ratber tban that of the people, and the supremacy oj shari'a rather ~han democratically enacted legislation. It rejects many democratic rights, by Iegitimising discrimination between its citizens on the basis of gender and religion, and imposing severe restrictions on freedoms of speech and association. In Iran, candidates for election are vetted by the regime, to make sure that basic opponents are· excluded. This is not to suggest that such restrictions are confined to avowedly Islamic states, since the Muslim middle east contains many other autocracies and dictatorships. The difference is that the . Islamist state project tries to legitimise autocracy in the name of Islam, rather than secular narratives, such as those of nationalism or socialism. Against this project, a substantial group of scholars, as well as many Islamist politicians, may be categorised as reformist§.,...r:ather than fundamentalists, since they argue for what they claim is a Muslim version of democracy. Like the fundamentalists, the reformists treat the assumeci"prac:-tice"lri°"ille- earliest phase of Islam, the 'era of felicity? of the prophet Muhammad and the first four Caliphs, as their benchmark, but claim that this can be interpreted as legitimising democratic rule. This assertion is backed up by arguments to the effect that either Wamic traditions correspond to democratic practices (even if these have not always been observed) or that received Muslim proposals should be revised, in the light of reinterpretation of the Islamic message. This school of thought can be hdd to include, for instance, the Egyptian reformist Rashid Rida, the 'young Ottoman' constitutionalist Namlk Kemal and the Austrian-Jewish convert to Islam Muhammad Asad. Reformist Islamists argue, among other things, that the tradition of shura (consultation), in which a Muslim ruler was supposed to consult leaders of the community before taking decisions, and of bai'a (the oath of allegiance which they were required to take to a newly appointed Caliph) implies Islamic legitimacy for the idea of an elected legislature and head of state. In the early Caliphate, it is claimed that the ruler was chosen by the members of the community rather than imposed by force, as had historically been the case in later Muslim states.9 It is also argued that while ultimate sovereignty is still vested in God, political power is vested in 'viceregents', defined as the whole Muslim community.lo Nonetheless, these proposals leave the reformers with, at best, varying and ambiguous answers to crucial questions. If the law is still based on shari'a, should this be divided into an untouchable core, clearly defined by God's word (nass) and flexible elements, which can be open to interpretation (ijtihad) as the reformists urge? If so, this still leaves a huge proportion of law outside the competence of an elected legislature. Does the principle of shura entitle the assembly to the normal powers vested in a democratic

Introduction

xv

legislature, of oversight and control, or can it merely express an opinion to the executive, with no guarantee that its advice will be heeded (as is the case in the Consultative Assembly, Mailis al-Shura, established in Saudi Arabia in 1992)? Who should be entitled to sit in it - democratically elected representatives or merely the leaders of the community, as was apparently the case in the early years of Islam? The same question can be posed about those who are entitled to elect the ruler. If political power is vested in the whole Muslim community, where does this leave non-Muslims?11 In some countries, what may be called reformist Islamist parties have, when allowed, competed in parliamentary elections as more or less legitimate participants - examples being those of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Jordan and, arguably, the National Salvation and Welfare parties in Turkey (see pp. 3-18). However, these unanswered questions leave many critics with severe doubts whether they would observe democratic principles if they were elected to power, or would step down if they suffered subsequent electoral defeat. 'One person, one vote, one time' could be the result of taking their democratic claims at face value. 12 Needless to say, this is far from exhausting the debate on the relationship between Islam, Islamism and democracy in modern Muslim societies. A large body of commentators accepts that democracy has been a feeble plant, especially in the middle east, but conclude that this is due to societal factors rather than the Muslim religion as such. The weakness of civil society in most middle-eastern countries, the co-option of the bourgeoisie by state elites and the rulers' capacity to develop successful survival strategies are held to be the main reasons for the persistence of authoritarian regimes in most of the region. 13 The observation that the Muslim faith itself is not the main cause of the lack of democracy in most Muslim societies leads into an important proposal by Bassam Tibi, who stresses the difference between Islam as a religion and Islamism as a political ideology. In his words, 'Islam and Islamism are ·two different issues. In re-thinking Islam, one can reach positive conclusions about the compatibility of democracy and Islam, but this cannot be achieved by Islamism' (italics added).14 This would evidently apply to both the fundamentalist and reformist Isla mist projects outlined earlier. Hence, Tibi joins Robert Hefner in calling for a 'civil Islam', which 'rejects the mirage of the "Islamic" state'.15 An important exposition of this proposal is that of the Iranian academic Abdol Karim Soroush, who originally supported the Iranian revolution in 1979, but whose ideas were later condemned by the regime. To summarise, Soroush argues, like Tibi, that a religious understanding will have to adapt to democracy, not the other way round; a religion 'that is oblivious to human rights •.• is not tenable in the modern world'. The 'heart of a religious society' is a freely chosen faith, not coercion and conformity. However, democracy does not require believers to abandon their convictions; Soroush suggests that, in fact, democracy cannot prosper without a commitment to moral principles, and religion is thus the best guarantor of democracy. 16

xvi

Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey

In essence, the contention of this third Jl~bQQI of thought is that Muslim societies, like those attached to othe!: r(!ligions, are p-erfecdr cap-able _gf adopting democratic systems of gover!1_!p~I1.J-,_p_rQyided they abandon IslamIsm as a pciliticalproject,eltli.er-ln-it~ fundamentalist or refor.-':l!i~_t.version~, aoortie- relIgious leadership is prepared to accept this. This does not mean thaFrhey have to abandon faith-based values; as in other societies, these will constitute a perfectly legitimate terrain of democratic debate. In Turkey, the AKP cannot be said to have accepted all of Soroush's proposals; for instance, he suggests that shari'a may still be a basis for modern legislation,17 whereas the AKP avoids any attempt to refer to divine revelation as the basis for legislation. This is not to suggest that there will be no conflict between the party and those attached to a rigid version of secularism, or who reject cultural values based on religion. As in other non-Muslim democratic societies, there are likely to be fierce conflicts over such topics as the role of religion (and what religion) in public education, controls over the sale of alcohol, the acceptance of homosexual relations between adults, and the censorship of books, plays and films judged offensive to religious beliefs ..Conflicts-over divorce,_abortion-and..m:tificial birth_conttoLhue been high on the polit~al ~gendas _~LseY~r..at Clg~!i~n countries.!....ald~_Q.l,!gh less so in most Muslim ~~9Cleties.-- On-the-other..hana,_ tlie_fexed~question-whether-Gitiz&ns-should- be _~~e.d __to_wear. .dr~_s_s..refleGting-their...religious_attachmentsjn..state..institu:"

¥~n~,~ec.ial.ly i(!!!~l_a~~~~ ~~?~?y.~e~, _~~~~~?V~~._~~~~~-f-__ ~~~~~_ip

ur ey, as It IS now m some western European countnes. Brmgmg these issues OritOthe- poliiicilagendacannor- be-~~i~(t~ be-~()I.itrary t~ democratic principles, since in the many societies - Christian and Jewish, as well as Muslim - where religious beliefs play an important role in shaping public attitudes, this is an inevitable as well as a legitimate part of democratic processes. Examining how the AKP, as a government, has dealt with these issues, as well as other areas of public policy less affected by cultural values, is the main purpose of this book.

Secularism, liberalism and conservatism in Turkey What makes the Turkish debate over religion and politics particularly acute

I is that, unlike any other Muslim country, Turkey is constitutionally a secular state. Between 1923 and his death in 1938, Kemal Atatiirk, the founder of , the Turkish republic, did not just sweep away the ruling institutions of the Ottoman Empire, but also the idea that the state's legitimacy rested on its attachment to Islam. In the words carved above the Speaker's chair in the Grand National Assembly - the Republic's parliament - 'Sovereignty belongs to the Nation' (by implication, not to God). Since 1937, Turkey has officially described itself as a secular republic. The unalterable Article 2 of the present constitution states that 'The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and social state', whereas Article 24 stipulates that 'No one shall be allowed to exploit or abuse religion or religious feelings, or things held

Introduction

XVII

sacred by religion, in any manner whatsoever, for the purpose of personal or political influence, or for even partially basing the fundamental, social, economic, political and legal order of the state on religious tenets'.IS Article 87 of the Political Parties Law of 1983 repeats this formula, whereas Article 86 of the law makes it illegal for political parties to attempt to change the secular nature of the state or re-establish the Caliphate {the nominal leadership of the world's Muslim community, which was appropriated by the Ottoman Sultans, and abolished in 1924).19 Parties that are deemed to have broken these rules can be dissolved by order of the Constitutional Court - as the AKP nearly was in' 2008 (see pp. 74-5). When ending the Caliphate, the founders of the republic closed down all the previous religious colleges (medreses), and in 1926 replaced the previous Islamically based civil and other legal codes with new versions based strictly on western models. The religious brotherhoods (tarikats), which had long played an important role in Turkish Islam, and in practice still do, and the wearing of the fez, were both banned in 1925. In 1928, the Arabic script was compulsorily replaced with a version of the Latin alphabet. However, in taking these radical steps, the state did not entirely cut its links with Sunni Islam. In 1924, and as a replacement for the office of the Seyh Ul-jslam (the head of the Sunni religious establishment in the Ottoman Empire), the government established a 'Presidency of Religious Affairs' (Diyanet j§leri Ba§kanlzgt), attached to the Prime Minister's office. This put all Sunni religious functionaries and properties under state control {the heterodox Alevi minority, which may account for around 15 per cent of the population, was left out of the official picture, as it still is).20 In effect, the republic did not attempt to abolish Sunni Islam, but to control it. This control mechanism means that, whatever its secularist credentials, the state cannot simply leave organised religion to its own devices, as is the case in other secular republics such as the United States, but must constantly interact with it, at the risk of conflict. Atatiirk's modernist programme had sweeping successes: in fact, it seems safe to say that, without it, Turkey would be nowhere near the level of political, economical and cultural development, which it has reached today. Originally, his popular legitimacy rested on his role as Ghazi, the victor in a war of national resistance against the European (read, 'Christian') powers who tried,to divide up most of Turkey's territory among themselves after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918. He used this quite traditional type of legitimacy to launch a drive for anti-traditional change, but his status as a national hero has remained virtually unchallenged, even among those who do not take easily to some of his tenets. The Kemalist project adopted topdown methods, reinforcing legal fiats with a concerted programme of public education, designed to imbue the population with modernist, secular and nationalist values. The penetration of this cultural revolution was not complete. Among the ruling elite - the state bureaucrats, army officers and urban professionals of the new republic - attachment to Kemalism became an

XVlll

Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism ilt Turkey

article of faith. However, among the rural masses traditional values, some of them pre-Islamic and Muslim remained as powerful couni:er-attachments to Kemalist nationalist modernism. This divide, described by ~erif Mardin, in what has now become a classic definition, as the cleavage between the state-dominated centre and the periphery, has dominated most academic analysis of post-war Turkish politics. 21 It is not entirely cultural however. At the end of the Second World War, ismet inonii, Atatiirk's successor as President, allowed the formation of an opposition to the ruling Republican People's Party (CHP). This took shape as the Democrat Party (DP), led by Adnan Menderes, which won power in a sweeping election victory in 1950, and stayed in government until it was removed by a military coup d'etat in 1960. Essentially, the Democrats represented a coalition of disparate oppositional "fQrces, of which Muslim conservatives were only a minor part. The DP's leadership was mainly composed of free professionals, like laWyers, doctors and businessmen, together with some landowners (a group that included Menderes himself) who effectively constituted a counter-elite to the state-dominated coalition, which had ruled Turkey since 1923, and to a large extent before thatP In demanding an end to the authoritarian rule of the CHP, the DP stood not just for the establishment c,>f democratic government, but also an end to the dominating role of the state in the economy, which the CHP had established through a programme of state-led industrialisation and a greater emphasis on agricultural development, which the CHP had generally neglected. Building mainly on its rural electoral base and exploiting its control of state resources, the party established powerful networks of clientelist interdependencies that helped sustain it in power. With Turkey's front-line position in the cold war, it also made a clear option - not disputed by the CHP - for international alliance with the western powers. In this, the DP created the main building blocks of what can be called the liberal centre-right tradition in Turkish politics - that is, attachment to private enterprise (aided, on occasion, by the state), majoritarian democracy (with a tinge of cultural conservatism), clientelist populism and a westernoriented foreign policy. Unlike conservative parties in western Europe, parties in this tradition have had an anti-establishment bias, in that they have opposed the statist elite, which ruled Turkey until 1950, combining this with an important electoral base in the poorer sections of Turkish society, in town and village, as well as the non-state bourgeoisie. These elements remain major parts of the AKP's political persona. Although the DP could cou~t on the votes of many religiously oriented conservatives, it made limited concessions to them, and these mainly in its early years in power. These included acceptance that the Muslim call to prayer (adhan, or ezan in Turkish) should be delivered in Arabic rather than Turkish, the establishment of state schools to train Muslim chaplains and preachers (imam Hatip Okullart), an increase in the budget of the Presidency of Religious Affairs, and the building of many new mosques, although in many cases these were financed by private

bltroduction

XIX

foundations rather than the state. On the other hand, the DP government made no attempt to alter the secular civil and criminal legal codes in accordance with conservative Muslim beliefs or to withdraw the secular definition of the republic. It rigorously prosecuted members of the Ticani religious order who attacked statues of Atatiirk, passing a law punishing those convicted of 'Crimes against Atatiirk' in 1951. The opposition Nation Party (MP), which attracted the votes of staunchly religious conservatives, was closed down in 1953 (later, the more liberal elements of the party re-established it as the Republican Nation Party, or CMP).23 Among the many charges that were levelled against the DP leaders when they were put on trial by the subsequent military regime in 1960-61, resulting in the execution of Menderes and two of his cabinet colleagues, trying to destroy secularism was not included. The military returned to its barracks in November 1961, allowing the reestablishment of elected civilian government under a new and more liberal constitution. The junta had closed down the DP and tried to prevent its resuscitation. Nonetheless, the Justice Party (AP), which was recognised as its effective successor, quickly emerged as the major player on the centreright of Turkish politics. Siileyman Demirel, who took over the leadership of the party in 1964, led it to an election victory in 1965, and headed a successful administration until 1969, when he increased his party's majority in new elections. In 1971, however, he was forced to resign by another military intervention. In 1973, when full civilian government was restored, the AP lost its majority, although it became the lead partner in two unstable coalitions during 1975-77 and 1977-78, before forming a minority government in 1979. In September 1980, the AP government was again overthrown by a military coup, following a serious breakdown of law and order, and an economic collapse. Along with all the other pre-coup parties, it was closed down by the military government in October 1981. Effectively, the AP inherited the former DP's electoral mantle, and most of its policies - the main difference between the two being that Demirel initially sought an accommodation rather than confrontation with the military chiefs, although this later proved ineffective. 24 While the AP confirmed support for private enterprise against economic etatism, rapid changes in the Turkish economy since the 1950s - in particular, the growth of an e1ectorally important working class of ex-rural migrants who crowded into the squatter settlements, which now surrounded Turkey'S main cities - meant that it was more dependent on the urban vote than the DP had been. Hence, it promoted such policies as general health insurance and unemployment compensation, as well as subsidies for agricultural producers, claiming that it aimed to establish a 'social welfare state', even if this aim was not properly realised.li The son of a village family, Demirel is an observant Muslim, and his party drew some support from cultural conservatives, but, like Menderes, he never allowed their ideas much more than a subsidiary role in the AP's policies. The party proclaimed that it was 'attached to moral values and

xx Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey beliefs'. 'Civilisation' did not mean lack of religion (dinsizlik) - in fact, the most civilised nations were the most moral and religious ones, it daimed. 26 Like the DP, the AP promoted the spread of religious education through the imam Hatip schools and courses on the Qur'an for school pupils (Kuran kurslarz), but it never attempted to withdraw laws restricting the role of religion in politics or the secular legal codes. In Demirel's words, it was acceptable to 'serve Islam, but Islam cannot be pushed into the service of politics'.27 The importance of religion in the AP's persona was additionally reduced by the fact that, by the 1970s, it was being rivalled by Necmettin Erbakan's National Salvation Party (MSP), which drew away the support of the more ardently conservative Muslim voters (see pp. 3-4). Like their predecessors of 1960-61, the military chiefs who overthrew Demirel's government in 1980, eventually returned power to an elected parliament in 1983. Unlike them, however, they adopted what could be called a revisionist interpretation of secularism, in that they sought to promote a nationalised adaptation of Islam, as a replacement for the radical leftist ideology, which, they believed, had penetrated the minds of the young during the pre-coup period. This discourse, known as the 'Turkish-Islamic Synthesis' (Turk-islam Sentezi) tried to overcome the perceived gap between Kemalist nationalism and Islam by arguing that Turks had played the leading role in Muslim history, as warriors and rulers, and that being a Muslim was thus quite compatible with attachment to the Turkish national identity;28 More controversially - and much to the ire of ardent secularists within the Kemalist camp - they also inserted a provision into Article 24 of the new constitution, which they issued in 1982, stating that '[I]nstruction in religious culture and moral education shall be compulsory in the curricula of primary and secondary schools'. 29 Much of this approach, along with the ideological heritage of the DP and AP, was adopted by Turgut Ozal, the third in the succession of Turkish centre-right leaders. As the founder and chairman of the Motherland Party (ANAP), Ozal took over the premiership following general elections held in November 1983, and remained the dominant figure in Turkish politics until ANAP lost its overall majority in parliament in the elections of October 1991. Like his contemporaries, Ronald Reagan in the United States and Margaret Thatcher in Britain, Ozal was a firm believer in market economics, and reducing the role of the state, especially in the economy, to a minimum. Under his government, taxes and other controls on imports were drastically reduced, the Turkish Lira was made fully convertible, and bank interest rates, previously fixed by the government, were determined by the market. Until the late 1980s, this programme brought impressive results, including restored economic growth, a sharp increase in exports and increased investor confidence. As President between 1989 and his death in 2003, he gave vital support to the coalition powers in the Gulf War of 1991, and even made an unsuccessful application for Turkey to join the European Union (then the European Community).

Introduction

xxi

The ANAP government also made some concessions to religious conservatives although, as in the case of its centre-right predecessors, most of these avoided a head-on challenge to the secular state. Like Demirel, Turgut Ozal was a devout Muslim. In his earlier years, he had had close connections with the National Salvation Party, of which his brother Korkut was deputy chairman, and had himself unsuccessfully competed as a candidate for the party in the general elections of 1977. His personal commitment to the Muslim faith encouraged the view, expressed by a German observer in the late 1980s, that he was Turkey'S 'least Kemalist' Prime Minister,3o or even, in the view of Kenan Evren, the head of the military government during 1980-83, and President between 1982 and 1989, that he was a positive danger for Kemalism. 31 Under the ANAP government, the network of imam Hatip schools was again expanded, their curriculum changed to include inculcation of the 'Turkish Islamic Synthesis', and the mosque-building programme was continuedY Ozal's most controversial move was to attempt to lift the ban on the wearing of Islamic headscarves by women university students, although this was effectively stymied by a decision of the Constitutional Court in 1989.33 However, Ozal was far from being a dogmatic Muslim conservative. After his election to the presidency in 1989, a group within ANAP combining religious conservatives and hard-line nationalists, known as the 'Holy Alliance', tried to swing the party towards its views, but Ozal successfully opposed this, securing the election to the party chair of Mesut Yllmaz, now the leader of the liberal wing of the party.34 Before Ozal entered politics, his time as a student in the United States in the 1950s and his career at the World Bank during 1971-73 had brought him into close contact with western ideas, of which he had a good understanding. His sojourns in America also endowed him with a deep regard for American pluralism and the American understanding of secularism. In essence, he believed that Islam as a religion could be combined with modernity, within a liberal perspective. In the United States, people of different faiths had sought and found religious and political freedom. Their faith endowed Americans with a live morality. The state could be secular, but not individuals, who were left free to practise their religions. 3s Later, this attitude was closely mirrored by that of the AKP. In essence, Ozal continued the centre-right tradition inherited from the DP and AP, albeit with a greater emphasis on internationalism and a fuller commitment to the open economy. Against this, however, radical Islamism was gaining ground during the late 1980s and 1990s. The story of this more radical response is narrated in the following chapter.

Part I

The AKP's history, ideology, social bases and organis~tion

I

1

The history of Islamist parties in Turkey from the National Order Party to the Justice and Development Party (AKP)

The first Turkish political party with explicit Islamic references was the Milli Nizam Partisi (MNP-National Order Party) founded on 28 January 1970 under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan, an independent deputy from Konya and a professor of engineering at the prestigious istanbul Technical University.1 Mehmet Zahit Kotku, the sheikh of the' iskender Pa§a community of the Nak§ibendi order (tarikat) strongly encouraged the formation of an Islamist party. Erbakan and some of the other founders of the MNP belonged to that community. But the party was also joined by some prominent members of another influential Islamic community, the Nurcus. 2 The MNP was closed down by the Constitutional Court in 1971 on account of its alleged anti-secular activities, pardy as a result of the political conjuncture created by the military intervention on 12 March 1971. A successor party was founded on 11 October 1972 under the name of the National Salvation Party (Mill! Selamet Partisi (MSP)). The first leader of the party was Siileyman Arif Emre, but he was soon replaced by Erbakan. The MSP contested the 1973 parliamentary elections and emerged as a medium-size party with 11.8 per cent of the votes and 48 assembly seats. Because no party had a majority of seats and the two major parties (the Republican People's Party, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP) and the Justice Party, Adalet Partisi (AP) were reluctant to cooperate, the parliamentary arithmetics put the MSP in the position of the king-maker. Thus, the MSP first joined the coalition government of the left-of-centre Biilent Ecevit with Erbakan as the deputy prime minister. After the collapse of the CHP-MSP government in 1974, the MSP joined ranks with the other right-wing parties, namely AP, the Nationalist Action Party, Milliyet~i Hareket Partisi (MHP) and the Republican Reliance Party Cumhuriyet~i Giiven Partisi (CGP) in Siileyman Demirel's so-called Nationalist Front Government. The MSP's vote share fell to 8.6 per cent in the 1977 parliamentary elections and its Assembly contingent was halved to 24. One reason for this decline may be the desertion of the Nurcus on account of policy differences with Erhakan. However, the MSP was again a partner in Dernirel's new Nationalist Front government until the government fell as a result of the desertion of some AP deputies to support a CHP-dominated government formed by Ecevit.

4

/slamism, Democracy and Liberalism ill Turkey

The MSP was closed down together with all the other political parties by the military (National Security Council) government in 1981 and 'its leadership cadres were tried on account of their alleged anti-secular activities. At the end, they were acquitted, however, and when the National Security Council permitted the formation of new political parties in 1983 the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi (RP)), representing the same political line, was established under the leadership of Ahmet Tekdal. Erbakan and the leading cadres of the MSP, like those of the other pre-12 September 1980 political parties, were constitutionally banned from political activities for a period of ten years. Moreover, the National Security Council did not permit the RP to contend in the 1983 elections. The RP had a modest start in the 1984 local (provincial assemblies) elections in which all legally established parties could participate with 4.4 per cent of the votes; In the 1987 parliamentary elections, following the repeal of the constitutional ban on the political activities of former political leaders and the return of Erbakan to the RP leadership, the party polled 7.2 per cent of votes, but was unable to send any representatives to parliament because of the 10 per cent national threshold. The RP increased its votes to 9.8 in the 1989 local elections, and it contested the 1991 parliamentary elections in alliance with the MHP and the Reformist Democracy Party (IDP). The alliance received 16.9 per cent of the vote enabling the RP to be represented in the Assembly by some 40 deputies (after the MHP deputies resigned and returned to their fold). ~ The spectacular rise of the RP took place in the local elections of 1994 when it increased its votes to 19.1 per cent and captured the mayoralties of 29 provincial centres including I!>tanbul and Ankara, which came as a great shock to the secularist establishment. The RP further improved its showing in the parliamentary elections of 1995 with 21.4 per cent of the votes and 158 out of the 550 seats in parliament making it the strongest party. In the fragmented composition of the 1995 parliament, the RP was able to form a coalition government with the centre-right True Path Party (Dogru Yol Partisi (DYP)) in 1996 despite the efforts of the secular establishment to prevent the formation of an RP-dominated government. The RP-DYP government of Erbakan lasted for only eleven months and was forced to resign in 1997 under strong pressure by the military and most of the leading secular civil society organisations. The process leading to the fall of the Erbakan government is commonly called 'the 28 February process' in reference to the 28 February 1997 meeting of the National Security Council whose declaraJ tion was a not-too-subtle ultimatum to the government.3 The fall of the RP-DYP government was followed by the closing down of the RP in 1998 by the Constitutional Court on account of its anti-secular activities. The Court also banned Erbakan and six other leading members of the RP (including its two vice-presidents and three MPs) from political activities for a period of five years in accordance with Article 69 'of the Constitution. 4 The 28 February 1997 process also involved the introduction of a number of

The history of Islamist parties il1 Turkey

5

restrIctions on religious education and the activities of Islamist leaning business firms. The RP was immediately substituted by a new party, the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi (FP}) under the leadership of Recai Kutan, an old associate of Necmettin Erbakan. Although all RP deputies and most of its cadres joined the FP, the latter's discourse was much more moderate and circumspect than that of the forme.rJhe short life of the FP witnessed a growing confronta-tion between the so-called traditionalist (gelel1ekfiler) and the modernist (yenilikfiler) wings of the Islamist movement. The beginnings of this cleavage go back to the 1990s as will be analysed in greater detail later. But now the conflict came to the fore when at the FP Congress in 2000, Abdullah Giil, the candidate of the modernists, challenged Recai Kutan, the incumbent leader and the candidate of the traditionalists, for party leadership. Giil lost the race by a small margin (he got 521 votes against 633 for Kutan) in a competition unprecedented in the history of Turkish Islamist parties. 5 The Congress was the harbinger of the split between the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi (SP)) which was to take place a year later. The FP contested the 1999 parliamentary elections in which its percent"";. age of votes fell to 15.4 making it the third largest party in parliament. This rather significant decline may be because of the more moderate and conciliatory approach of the party, as well as because of the confusion in the Islamist voters' minds as a result of the closure of the RP. In any case, the FP's moderation could not save it from being closed down by the Constitutional Court in 2001 on account of its agitation for the repeal of the headscarfban on female university students. The banning of the FP finalised the split between the modernists and the I traditionalists. T\:e former founded the AKP under the leadership- of Recep . Tayyip Erdogan, while the latter were orga~~s~(:U!.l_d!~..sP_undeLtheJe_adership_oT~ecai kut_an. The AKP the 2002 parliamentary el~ctions with a landslide with 34.3 per cent of the vote and almost two-thirds of parliamentary seats, while the SP was reduced to an insignificant minor party with \ \ only 2.5 per cent of the votes.

I(

won

The 'national outlook' ideology The Islamist parties in Turkey from the MNP to SP have referred to their ideology as the 'national outlook' (mill; goru§) and maintained this ideological line consistently, with only slight variations, over time. The constitutional and legal bans on the anti-secular activities of political patties did not permit these parties to explicitly use the Islamic terms and symbols. There is no doubt, however, that what was meant by the 'national' outlook was an Islamic outlook. Similarly, their promise to enhance 'national and moral values' (mzlli ve manev; degerler) has to be understood as the promotion of Islamic values.

6 Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey The national outlook ideology posits a fundamental conflict between civilisation. The forWestern (i.e. Judeo-Christian) civilisation and mer is 'false' (batt!) in the sense -Of restiIiifiipoidOrc:e, while the latter is based on righteousness (hak). Western civilisation is described as materialist, oppresive and colonialist, and doomed to extinction. 6 This fundamental opposition to Western civilisation has led the national outlook parties to take an extremely negative view of Turkey'S Westernisation process. In their view, the once-glorious Ottoman Empire began to decline and disintegrate when it started to imitate the West. By the same token, they are strongly critical of the secularising republican reforms. Erbakan has argued that the long years of the CHP rule harboured a strong hostility towards Islam. 7 Therefore, the national outlook parties accuse all other Turkish parties of being blind imitators of the West, either of its exploitative capitalist version, or its materialist socialist version. 8 The national outlook parties' anti-Westernism is also strongly reflected in their foreign policy choices. They are vehemently against Turkey'S accession to the EU, the customs union with it, and critical of NATO. They describe the EU as a ~_Christian Club' and predict that Turkey'S membership would result in her complete loss of sovereignty and cultural identity, as well as in her economic exploitation. Erbaka~_has gone so far as suggesting that once Turkey becomes an EU membe~Jsra~would also join the organisation immediately, and thus Turkey and-Israel would be the same state. Turkey's application for membership is 'a treason against our history, concept of civilisation, culture and most important of all, our independence'.9 The national outlook parties envisage an Islamic world unified under Turkey's leadership. Turkey, because of her geographical position, large popula:tion and historical legacy,· is the Muslim country best qualified for such leadership. More specifically, they put forward the idea of an Islamic United Nations, an Islamic UNESCO, an Islamic NATO and an Islamic Common Market with Islamic dinar as its monetary unit. 10 Finally, the national outlook parties' foreign policy is strongly coloured by anti-Zionism, often bordering on anti-semitism. They view Israel as an iIIegmmate ana expansionist state whose ultimate aim is to create greater Israel by occupying, Syria, Egypt and Turkey. Even the United Nations Organisation was established in order to create an Israeli state. ll The following quotations by Erbakan are good examples of his anti-Zionism: 'Zionists are seeking to assimilate Turkey and pull us from our historical Islamic roots through integrating Turkey to the European Economic Community.' 'Whenever the UN talks about human rights, it means the rights of the Jews but nothing else.' 'Since the European Community is a single state, Turkey's membership means being a single state with Israel. The goal is to create a ' Greater Israel by integrating Turkey to the Community.'12 The national outlook parties' Islamism also contains a strong dose of Turkish natiQDalism. While the universal character of Islam is emphasised, the potential leadership role of Turkey in the Islamic world is also constantly alluded to. Thus, they praise the glories of the Ottoman past and declare the

IstamrC-

I

I

The history of IsIamist parties in Turkey

7

restoration of its former grandeur as one of their principal objectives. 13 Hence, their slogan 'Recreating Grand Turkey'. The national outlook parties' views on democracy and secularism were ambivalent at best. Although some radical Islamist groups categorically reject democracy as un-Islamic and blasphemous (kii(iir),14 the leaders of the national outlook parties prudently refrained from challenging the basic premises of democracy and declared elections as the only legitimate route to political power. Moreover, the MSP members did not take part in the violent political actions of the late 1970s. On the other hand, it is not clear whether they attribute only an instrumental value to democracy or see it as an end in itself. The statements by Erbakan and Tayyip Erdogan (at that time the mayor of Istanbul) lend support to the former view. They both stated that democracy was not an aim, but a means, a means to establish the 'order of happiness' (saadet nizami), apparently referring to the time of Prophet Muhammad, usually called the 'age of happiness' (asr-t saadet) in Islamic writings. 1s The RP's 1995 electoral campaign described the current political system of Turkey not as a democracy, but as a 'fraud', a 'guided democracy' and a 'dark-room regime,' and announced its intention to establish a 'real pluralistic democracy'. Apart from promises to enhance freedom of conscience and to make greater use of referenda and popular councils,16 real democracy was never defined. Erbakan and other RP spokesmen often emphasised that Turkey'S population was 99 per cent Muslim, and therefore there were only two groups of voters in Turkey: the RP supporters and the potential RP supporters, a notion hardly compatible with a truly pluralistic conception of society. Erbakan even said in October 1996 that soon the RP would have so many members that elections would no longer be necessary. They would just go to the notary public and get their victory registered. Thus, even a sympathetic observer argues that 'Erbakan's main concern was the politics not of pluralism but of authenticity. He believed that there is an authentic Muslim identity and voice that should govern day-to-day politics. Within the context of Erbakan's authenticity, there seemed to be limited room for pluralism and tolerance.'17 Ru§en