Old Europe, New Security: Evolution for a Complex World

Citation preview

Old Europe, New Security Evolution for a Complex World

Edited by Janet Adamski, Mary Troy Johnson and Christina M. Schweiss

OLD EUROPE, NEW SECURITY

Ethics and Global Politics Series Editors: Tom Lansford and Patrick Hayden Since the end of the Cold War, explorations of ethical considerations within global politics and on the development of foreign policy have assumed a growing importance in the .elds of politics and international studies. New theories, policies, institutions, and actors are called for to address difficult normative questions arising from the conduct of international affairs in a rapidly changing world. This series provides an exciting new forum for creative research that engages both the theory and practice of contemporary world politics, in light of the challenges and dilemmas of the evolving international order. Also in the series Peaceful Resistance Advancing Human Rights and Democratic Freedoms Robert M. Press ISBN 0 7546 4713 7 The Ethics of Refugee Policy Christina Boswell ISBN 0 7546 4519 3 Justice and Violence Political Violence, Pacifism and Cultural Transformation Edited by Allan Eickelmann, Eric Nelson and Tom Lansford ISBN 0 7546 4546 0 Global Ethics and Civil Society Edited by John Eade and Darren O’Byrne ISBN 0 7546 4214 3 In War We Trust The Bush Doctrine and the Pursuit of Just War Chris J. Dolan ISBN 0 7546 4234 8 Cosmopolitan Global Politics Patrick Hayden ISBN 0 7546 4276 3

Old Europe, New Security Evolution for a Complex World

Edited by JANET ADAMSKI University of Mary Hardin-Baylor, USA MARY TROY JOHNSON Loyola University, New Orleans, USA CHRISTINA M. SCHWEISS United States Military Academy and United States Joint Forces Command, USA

© Janet Adamski, Mary Troy Johnson and Christina M. Schweiss 2006 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Janet Adamski, Mary Troy Johnson and Christina M. Schweiss have asserted their moral right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the editors of this work. Published by Ashgate Publishing Limited Ashgate Publishing Company Gower House Suite 420 Croft Road 101 Cherry Street Aldershot Burlington, VT 05401-4405 Hampshire GU11 3HR USA England Ashgate website: http://www.ashgate.com British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Old Europe, new security : evolution for a complex world. (Ethics and global politics) 1. European Union 2. National security - Europe 3. National security - European Union countries 4. Europe - Foreign relations - 1989- 5. European Union countries - Foreign relations I. Adamski, Janet II. Johnson, Mary Troy III. Schweiss, Christina M. 327.4'0090511 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Old Europe, new security : evolution for a complex world / edited by Janet Adamski, Mary Troy Johnson and Christina M. Schweiss. p. cm. -- (Ethics and global politics) Includes index. ISBN 0-7546-4644-0 1. Security, International. 2. National security--Europe. 3. Europe--Foreign relations--1989- I. Adamski, Janet. II. Johnson, Mary Troy. III. Schweiss, Christina M. IV. Series. JZ5588.053 2006 355'.03304--dc22

2006002741

ISBN-10: 0 7546 4644 0 ISBN-13: 978-0-7546-4644-0 Printed and bound in Great Britain by MPG Books Ltd. Bodmin, Cornwall.

Contents List of Contributors Preface Acknowledgements List of Abbreviations

vii ix xv xvii

PART 1 EUROPEAN SECURITY CONCEPTUALIZED 1

Transatlantic Security Values: Hegemonic Versus Shared Power Mary Troy Johnson

3

2

Historical Precedents for the Current European Security and Defense Policy Janet Adamski

3

Symbolic Security: Europe Takes a Human Face P. H. Liotta

4

European Security and Defense Policy: The EU’s Search for a Strategic Role Kenneth Keulman

5

European Security Institutions and Structures Charles Krupnick

57

6

NATO’s Transformation Christopher M. Jones

71

7

European Security and Defense Policy: Capabilities for a Complex World Christina M. Schweiss

15 27

43

85

PART 2 EUROPEAN SECURITY IN ACTION 8

The European Union in the Balkans: From Intervention to Accession Christina M. Schweiss and Cindy R. Jebb

101

Old Europe, New Security

vi

9

The European Union and The Middle East: The Benefits of Soft Power 117 Ruth Margolies Beitler

10

The European Union and the Russian Federation Vidya Nadkarni

131

11

Latin American Security: European Perspectives and Approaches Joaquín Roy

147

12

Conclusions Janet Adamski and Mary Troy Johnson

163

Index

169

List of Contributors Dr. Janet Adamski, University of Mary Hardin-Baylor Dr. Ruth Margolies Beitler, United States Military Academy Colonel Cindy R. Jebb, United States Military Academy Dr. Mary Troy Johnson, Loyola University, New Orleans Dr. Christopher M. Jones, Northern Illinois University Dr. Kenneth Keulman, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University Dr. Charles Krupnick, United States Army War College Dr. P. H. Liotta, Pell Center for International Relations and Public Policy at Salve Regina University Dr. Vidya Nadkarni, University of San Diego Dr. Joaquín Roy, European Union Center at the University of Miami Major Christina M. Schweiss, United States Military Academy and United States Joint Forces Command

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Preface US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld publicly bandied about the term, “Old Europe.” to significant public comment at the annual Munich Conference on Security Policy, in 2003. Revisit Munich in February 2005 as German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder spoke for Old Europe. He began his speech recalling the devastating 26 December 2004 tsunami and underlining its message, “that we live in one world.” In a moment’s time, he moved to mention of the United Nations and its role in international peace and security. In the next breath, he surveyed the range of security threats, “the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional instability and failing states. However, poverty and underdevelopment pose no less a threat.” These, he argued, were the conditions that have led to terrorism (at last, he mentioned the word on the minds of most Americans attending the conference). He referred to the .ght against terrorism where Americans are likely to substitute war, and he entered a reminder that the strategy “must not be limited to military and police measures.” Sending a clear signal, Schröder declared of German security policy, “We are formulating it in Europe, for Europe, and from Europe.” How recently was it that the Germany’s security policy was formulated in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), by Germany? Initially, US leaders explained differences between the United States and key European allies over how to approach the security crisis in Iraq as retrograde attitudes of “Old Europe.” Even though the term rose to the fore amidst transient transatlantic political sniping, the motivations behind its use have not diminished over time. Instead, divisions have deepened as the most powerful representatives of “Old Europe” have sought to define security objectives more closely and establish a policy as a counter to that of the United States in the post-11 September world. Far from reflecting a passé approach that eventually will be swept away by new technologies and unprecedented security challenges, Europeans seek new methods that oppose themselves to elements of U.S. policy; especially, as they see it, too great an emphasis on military solutions and resort to, if not preference for, unilateralism. Serious observers cannot help but conclude that the transatlantic security differences that have emerged are more than superficial and that they will continue to have a significant impact on U.S.-EU relations, as well as the multilateral institutional architecture that has governed the post-World War II era. With the passage of time, the Cold War appears to have been one formative piece of European security. An equally determinative piece was the integration of Europe, which has led to fundamental changes of the security environment of that region. The perspective of this book is that, through the integrative process, the European conception of security has transformed fundamentally. The states involved have developed new strategies and goals broadly conceived to use novel instruments



Old Europe, New Security

as they reconceptualize the role of sovereign countries. Traditional notions of sovereignty show themselves as incompatible with the European vision of security. Since the time of the defeat of the European Defense Community (EDC) in the French parliament in 1954, conventional wisdom has held that states will not give up sovereignty on issues of “high politics.” In reality though, Germany in those years only exercised the powers of a semi-sovereign, living with Allied regulations on remilitarization and prohibition against its development of nuclear weapons, while Britain and France made concessions to the United States in exchange for nuclear cooperation. These and other European countries pooled sovereignty in NATO while the United States occupied the hegemonic position in that organization. One must question the fiction of full sovereignty of European countries when they accepted the positioning of foreign troops on their soil through this period. Rather than focusing on diminished sovereignty, however, we can note that this situation freed resources and enabled European countries to look inward to build regional structures of governance. Their integration, in turn, reinforced the trend away from traditional security approaches implemented through self-help and concerns centered on national interests. The question no longer is whether European countries will give up sovereignty in defense and security but how, to what extent, and with whom they will pursue common policies. Thus, European conceptions of security are post-national, based on achieving goals in multiple contexts (regional, international and non-governmental); they also are partially post-military. Whereas the advent of the United Nations (UN) widely was perceived as “beating swords into plowshares,” the maturing of European integration over more than a half-century has not led so much to the conversion of military arsenals into instruments of peace, as it has led to the development of new instruments and the exploration of new contexts. Many of the criticisms of Western Europeans’ reluctance to engage in the 2003 war in Iraq come from a perception that their governments are “weak on defense” and unwilling to “pull their own weight” in the international system. Thus, “Old Europe,” as Rumsfeld designated his Atlantic Alliance allies, to distinguish them from the shiny fresh, cooperative “New Europe” to the East, yet again is relying on the United States to solve shared security problems. In this volume, we argue for a very different explanation of Western Europe’s choices and policies. Key to our thesis is that the Europeans, rather than shirking on defense, instead are expanding the levers they have to apply to the post-Cold War array of security and defense problems. Rather than a reliance on military force as a primary tool, they are developing instruments that rely on economics, diplomacy, even the engagement brought by the possibility of membership in the European Union. Additionally, in contrast to a US policy characterized by a willingness to “go it alone,” if necessary, the Europeans, through the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and UN increasingly are coordinating their actions. As well, they jointly are building mechanisms that can be used to strengthen their coordination. Thus, this volume recasts the perceptions of a Western Europe unwilling to look beyond direct national interest, and willing to rely on US spending in money and troops, to a more nuanced picture. Why else

Preface

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have Europeans, rather than minimizing their obligations as would seem a logical outcome of the Rumsfeld thesis, seemingly enlarged them, taking on a new set of responsibilities that they hope to carry out, as Europeans? Together, we find that the answers that the chapters in this work depict help to fill in the details of a very different picture and interpretation of European security. The image our contributors draw shows how the transatlantic partners have evolved differently in their conception of threats, chosen solutions and preferred tools with which to respond. It is the task of this volume to examine the emergent European security approach from multiple perspectives and in multiple formations and geographic contexts. The approach utilized is deliberately integrative and broad, reflecting the character of European security, which also provides its distinctiveness. European security cannot be located in one region or in one institution, nor its objectives simply stated, for a responsible national government has not centrally planned the policy. Further, the policy still is emergent. Responding to Europe’s war-torn history, it results from the experience of European integration, part and parcel of the process of integration and a reflection of its values. The EU integrates political relations not only internally but in its connectedness to the rest of the world. Therefore, EU security seeks to capitalize on this wide range of relations. Furthermore, the EU more broadly defines global security challenges than does the United States. As a result, security analyses of the EU must be able to recognize and take into account this diffusion of power, various operational levels and contexts, and determine the cumulative effect. Ultimately, this work aims to make sense of European security by overlaying disparate pieces of an approach that developed incrementally, across multiple contexts and assessing its current and potential impact on global security and transatlantic security. For the purposes of this volume, “Old Europe” refers to the states of Western Europe as they refashioned themselves after World War II, admitting the necessity of regionalization. The primary institutional form of Old Europe is the EU; however, this study considers that the power and influence of regional Europe must also be measured in multiple fora and along multiple tiers of decision-making. Thus, in painting this alternative picture, we will focus on a number of key questions. Among these are: What are the motivations of the European actors? If they simply are shirking their responsibilities, then we would expect to find them putting fewer resources into security and defense. Perhaps, they conceive of the likely threats differently than does the United States. Thus, we must consider how these actors conceive of security and of defense. Do they focus on one more than on the other? Do the tools on which they depend, or on which they are concentrating, better address one or the other of these core national goals? To what extent is European security rooted in historical experiences and precedents emerging in contemporary political values and attitudes that inform a distinct regional security culture? What are the institutions of European security, and how has the post-World War II regional security architecture adapted to a changing security context that includes not only new threats but also global transformation? Further, why build additional structures; what do the ESDP and CFSP do that NATO does not? In addition, how do Europeans pursue security interests through intergovernmental relations

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and collective participation in international institutions and legal regimes? Taken together, is the approach that currently presents itself viable considering its emphasis on means other than military, and given European military assets significantly less robust than those of the United States? In summary, to what extent are the values, structures, processes and instruments of European security a new departure? Is this approach one determined by a lack of military capacity and a neglect of power, or is it the rejection of traditional means in favor of a re-conceptualization of security that better meets the needs of a complex world? Thus, the work is split into two parts taking two different, yet related approaches. It opens with more theoretical and historical chapters, while the book’s second half includes chapters that trace the European Union’s security approach to specific geographical regions. Dr. Johnston begins the book with a reflection on the values that inform European security considerations and how they differ, in part, from those held by leaders in the United States. Together with Dr. Adamski’s chapter, which looks at historical security preferences as expressed by Europeans in the Brussels Treaty Organization and European Defense Community debates, this helps to explain the current trajectory of disagreement in the Atlantic Alliance. Dr. Liotta’s discussion of the European security conception carries forward the two previous chapters, explaining how the Europeans have sought to actualize values and preferences into policy. Dr. Keulmann’s chapter directs us to a deeper consderation of policy preferences, demonstrating how they have been actualized in European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) and CFSP. The final three chapters in the first section give the reader a fine-grained look first at European structures and then at NATO, especially its post-Cold War changes. Dr. Krupnick provides a detailed examination of the pieces of the European security structure while Major Schweiss focuses on the operational capabilities the European Union has developed to date and the framework within that organization, which supports them. Dr. Jones contributes a chapter that helps to place NATO within this larger debate, explaining its transformation and the rationale behind its changes. In the second section of the volume, Colonel Jebb and Major Schweiss look at how the Europeans responded to the situation in the Balkans, concluding with a more positive assessment of European security than many other analysts. Dr. Beitler observes the complex situation in the Middle East, and finds the Europeans’ approach and tools – often at variance with those of the United States, has yielded dissimilar results. Dr. Nadkarni explores the EU’s security approach to its largest, perhaps most important neighbor, the Russian Federation. She finds that the multiplicity of areas on which they negotiate makes for a complex and somewhat unpredictable security relationship. This section closes with Dr. Roy’s detailed inquiry into the particular role that Europeans have played in Latin America, over time, as well as today. This book began as a collaboration dating to the transformative year for global security, 2001. Four of the authors traveled to Brussels, in that summer, as members of a NATO briefing team sponsored by the Atlantic Council. An emergent European security policy already was apparent before the 2001 World Trade Center bombing and, consequently transatlantic differences over how to defeat terrorism were

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evident. The first defense official from the United States had been assigned to the U.S. mission to the EU in Brussels, a sign that ESDI was being taken seriously. During our briefings, differences between the United States and Europeans over NATO’s Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) were also in the air. The United States was determined to see that Europeans modernized their militaries to keep pace with the upgrading zeal of the new Bush administration (a.k.a. “the Revolution in Military Affairs”). U.S. military technologies had dominated in Kosovo, exposing a gap that the United States wanted closed, if it were again to prosecute war as an alliance effort. Alternatively, it would, in the future, pursue war only within coalitions of the willing. The Europeans, for their part, wanted to close the gap on their own terms, in their own time, and through the new structures they planned within the EU. In addition, from their view, the “cultural-values” gap on issues such as the use of force and human rights also deserved significant attention. In summer 2001, this book might have seemed premature, as an identity does not make a policy. Now the time is here for consideration of these issues, with the necessity of finding ways of redoubling transatlantic cooperation in the face of potentially disastrous transnational threats. Janet Adamski, Mary Troy Johnson and Christina M. Schweiss Austin, Texas; Baton Rouge, LA and Chesapeake, VA

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Acknowledgements The ideas and considerations that fill this book were cultivated and encouraged by the heady environment of a 2001 faculty seminar hosted and sponsored by the Atlantic Council, organized by Frances G. Burwell and Jennifer L. Chomistek. Then, Colonel Russ Howard’s 2003 invitation to West Point, to participate in the 55th Annual Student Conference on United States Affairs (SCUSA), allowed several contributors a further opportunity to advance their collaboration on this undertaking. Additionally, we met and worked together at various International Studies Association and European Union Studies Association conferences. In the best sense of the word, we networked at these professional exchanges, sustaining and advancing our work as we moved the project to completion. This iterated exchange helped us to negotiate some of the twists that democracy EU-style introduced. Over the course of our venture, leaders in several EU states, along with the voters of France and the Netherlands, determined that the Community method would remain one of “fits and starts”—fascinating to study, impossible to predict, and the very devil to explain to students in the United States. Further, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita dealt various contributors a one-two punch no one could have expected, making our previous close collaboration vital to the endeavor’s success. In concluding this step of this venture, we are keenly aware of the generosity of so many necessary to make this possible. Thus, we express our appreciation for the help of all those at the University of Mary Hardin-Baylor, Loyola University, New Orleans, and the United States Military Academy, who granted us time and the other resources necessary to work on this book. Further, we owe a tremendous debt to our larger family of colleagues who were so generous with their prudent advice and gentle criticisms. All remaining mistakes are our responsibility. As well, we thank our families for their patience and support in allowing us the freedom necessary to complete this project. A special note of thanks to the editors at Ashgate, not often do they hear and accept that one—literally—has missed a deadline because contributors are lost (temporarily) due to natural disasters. They handled our brief return to the frustration of neither email nor telephone communication, not once but twice, with patience and aplomb.

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List of Abbreviations €

Euro

AWACS

Airborne Warning and Control Systems

Benelux

Benelux Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg Customs Unions

BTO

Brussels Treaty Organization

CAP

Common Agricultural Policy

CARDS

Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization

CARIFTA

Caribbean Free Trade Association

CARICOM

Caribbean Community

CEEC

Central and Eastern European Countries

CEUMC

Chief or Chairman of the EU Military Committee

CFE

Conventional Forces Europe

CFSP

Common Foreign and Security Policy

CHODs

Chiefs of Defense

CIS

Commonwealth of Independent States

CJTF

Combined Joint Task Force

Comecom

Council for Mutual Economic Assistance

COREPER

Committee of Permanent Representatives

CPCO or pre-CPCO

Centre de Planification et de Conduite des Opérations

CSCE

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

CSR

Common Strategy on Russia

DG

Directorate General

DGEUMS

Director General EUMS

DRC

Democratic Republic of the Congo

DSACEUR

Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe

EBRD

European Bank for Reconstruction and Development

EC

European Community

xviii

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ECAP

European Capability Action Plan

ECB

European Central Bank

ECHO

European Community Humanitarian Office

ECJ

European Court of Justice

ECSC

European Coal and Steel Community

EDA

European Defense Agency

EDC

European Defense Community

EDF

European Development Fund

EEC

European Economic Community

EFP

European Foreign Policy

EIB

European Investment Bank

EMP

Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

EMU

European Monetary Union

ENP

European Neighbourhood Policy

EP

European Parliament

EPC

European Political Community or European Political Cooperation

ERP

European Recovery Program

ERRF

European Rapid Reaction Force

ESDI

European Security and Defense Identity

ESDP

European Security and Defense Policy

ESF

European Social Fund

ESS

European Security Strategy

EU

European Union

EUMC

Military Committee of the European Union or European Union Military Committee

EUMS

Military Staff of the European Union or European Union Military Staff

EUPAT

EU Police Advisory Team

EUPM

EU Police Mission

EURATOM

European Atomic Energy Community

EUROFOR

Rapid Deployment Force

FDI

Foreign Direct Investment

List of Abbreviations

xix

FTAA

Free Trade Area of the Americas

FRY

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

FRYOM

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

G7

Group of Seven

GAC

General Affairs Council

GAERC

General Affairs and External Relations Council

GAN

GosAtomnadzor

GCC

Gulf Cooperation Council

GDP

Gross Domestic Product

GMP

Global Mediterranean Policy

HAMAS

Islamic Resistance Movement

ICC

International Criminal Court

IFOR

Implementation Forces

IGC

Intergovernmental Conference

IMP

Integrated Mediterranean Programmes

ISAF

International Security Assistance Forces

JCS

Joint Chiefs of Staff

JHA

Justice and Home Affairs

KFOR

Kosovo Force

KLA

Kosovo Liberation Army

LAC

Latin American and Caribbean

MEPP

Middle East Peace Process

MERCOSUR

Southern American Common Market

MTS

Middle Term Strategy

NAC

North Atlantic Council

NAFTA

North American Free Trade Agreement

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGOs

Nongovernmental Organizations

NLA

National Liberation Army

NNPT

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

OECD

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

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Old Europe, New Security

OEEC

Organization for European Economic Cooperation

OHQ

Operational Headquarters

OPEC

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

OSCE

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

OT

Occupied Territory

PA

Palestinian Authority

PCA

Partnership and Cooperation Agreement

PfP

Partnership for Peace

PHARE

Poland and Hungary Aid for Economic Reconstruction

PLO

Palestinian Liberation Organization

PSC

Political and Security Committee

QMV

Qualified Majority Voting

R&D

Research and Development

RF

Russian Federation

ROE

Rules of Engagement

RRF

Rapid Reaction Force

RRM

Rapid Reaction Mechanism

SAA

Stabilization/Stability and Association Agreements

SAP

Stabilization and Association Process

SAPARD

Special Accession Program for Agriculture and Rural Development

SEA

Single European Act

SFOR

Stabilization Forces

SG/HR of CFSP Secretary General/High Representative of CFSP SHAPE

Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe

TACIS

Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States

TEU

Treaty of European Union

UK

United Kingdom

UN

United Nations

UNDP

UN Development Programme

UNHCR

UN High Commissioner for Refugees

List of Abbreviations

UNIMIK

UN Interim Mission in Kosovo

UNPROFOR

UN Protection Force

UNRWA

UN Relief and Works Agency

UNSCR

UN Security Council Resolution

USSR

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WEAG

Western European Armaments Group

WEOG

Western Europe and Others Group

WEU

Western European Union

WMD

Weapons of Mass Destruction

WTO

World Trade Organization

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Part 1 European Security Conceptualized

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Chapter 1

Transatlantic Security Values: Hegemonic Versus Shared Power Mary Troy Johnson

Loyola University New Orleans

American elites and members of the US public are skeptical about European Union (EU) intentions to develop and implement a European security policy. They maintain many reasons for opposing EU efforts in this area, from redundancy with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to the current lack of realistic European military capabilities for carrying out independent security actions. Repeatedly, they speak of the common values that have been the glue of a transatlantic security relationship for over half a century. Confidence in these values continued to be expressed in analyses of European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) as late as 2003, as James Fergusson stated, “It is difficult to imagine the actual political conditions short of relatively benign peace support operations where both the United States and Europe would not share similar interests and values.” In this view, transatlantic relations have rested on a foundation of common values, enhanced by two world wars in which the reward for victory was the rescue of democracy, the ultimate value. The shared commitment to democracy has not faded. If anything, the rise of global terror has awakened democratic powers to the realization that democracy has not spread far enough. It has resurrected the language of values, especially in the United States, which portrays the US–led war against terror as a desperate attempt to defend freedom, to defeat an onslaught against its way of life. Yet, in the face of such a fundamental threat, disunity in transatlantic relations has provoked bitter recriminations and intruded on the common sympathy felt throughout Europe and the United States after 11 September. Heightening observers’ concerns, the rift has occurred at the level of fundamental values, which makes it more serious than a situation of striving for temporary political gain by the various actors. Furthermore, the official understanding of the rift in the United States may not grasp the profound nature of differences and the potentially serious consequences for transatlantic relations. Political analyst, Robert Kagan, for one, realizes that European beliefs, what he terms “Europe’s new sense ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� James Fergusson, “The Coupling Paradox,” in Moens, Alexander, Cohen, Lenard J., and Sens, Allen G., eds. NATO and European Security: Alliance Politics from the End of the Cold War to the Age of Terrorism. (Westport, CT, 2003), p. 166.



Old Europe, New Security

of mission,” are threatened by “America’s power and its willingness to exercise that power–unilaterally if necessary….” However, is it US power or the US willingness to use force as the way to determine power that is the problem? Casting the division in terms that Kagan has popularized, those “of paradise and power,” tends to create a dichotomy that reflects only American concerns. Paradise, á la Europe (read wealth), is as much an American preoccupation as it is a European one. Kagan claims that Europeans afford their paradise by coasting on US military expenditures while Europeans contend that the world’s toleration of US debt makes these expenditures possible. Further, Europeans claim that they understand power at least as well as Americans and have not put aside power ambitions but have transformed the instruments and goals of power. Indeed, the dichotomy of “hegemonic power” versus “shared power” more closely reflects the way Europeans understand the polar US–EU experiences. The Europeans are not convinced that hegemony translates into global security in contrast to their approach: working with other countries on global governance, respect for human rights and reducing economic disparities. This conception also proposes a much more serious transformation of the New World Order than that envisioned by the Europeans neglecting power and settling into a paradisiacal enclave. Terrorism has made clear that these enclaves no longer exist, a fact already recognized in European countries that have been the targets of political extremists. A world order based on shared power is also one that the United States opposes as it has defined a national security strategy that aspires for domination, so that it can make the world safe for democracy. This paper maintains that the most significant determinant of how far the EU moves forward with its security plans is the extent to which the United States and the EU reach an agreement on values they want to pursue in common. If the EU is motivated by a political culture that embraces distinct values in the security realm, its members will pursue goals different from those that inform existing security arrangements. They will be able to mobilize publics to fund development of independent capabilities, and that enterprise will be politically legitimate. Whereas common values have been the foundation of transatlantic security, increasingly, common values, understood and emphasized differently, and even uncommon values, now influence and direct European security. This essay explores the values we assume the United States and Europe possess in common to point out new departures. In some cases, the values considered are also instruments. For example, increasing European reliance on supranationalism and internationalism assumes the utility of specific institutions and processes. Clearly, however, the choice of these instruments is tied to values. Indeed, we see institutions as the expression of the values of a society, albeit on the elite level, as well as political resistance to ��������������� Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order Alfred A. Knopf (New York, 2003). Kagan recognizes the seriousness of EU–US perception gap, referring to ‘fundamental differences in the worldviews of a strong United States and a relatively weaker Europe,” p. 37. However, eschewing power, Kagan sees Europe as weak and unable to stop American ambitions.

Transatlantic Security Values



institutions as an indicator of value preferences. Values also can be gleaned from political dialogue, interpretation of political rhetoric, scholarly analysis of history and politics, public opinion polls, indeed, the rich variety of political activity past and present, which informs the analytical approach adopted below. Rule of Law Over the past half–century, European integration has led to changing conceptions and behaviors in relation to the rule of law. The EU experience for member countries has included submission to regional law and acceptance of a regional court, the European Court of Justice. Meanwhile, through the concomitant Council of Europe process, the European Court of Human Rights has established itself as no other court of its kind has done. Whereas foreign ministries have remained dominant in human rights policies in other countries and regions of the world, adjudication trumps political concerns in the European region. Even the British, most prone to promoting a backlash against sovereignty– encroaching developments, have tended to transfer internal respect for the rule of law to the regional level. The British often point to their sterling record of implementing EU law as evidence they are “good Europeans.” More resistant to the legal authority of the European Court of Human Rights, under Tony Blair, the British have joined fully and have implemented the legal human rights regime. On one key issue that divides the United States and Europeans, the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the British have come out strongly in favor of the independence of this body, even though it meant controversy with the United States. In preliminary negotiations, when the United States took the position that the UN Security Council should have the ultimate authority to decide which cases should be prosecuted, Britain was the first of the permanent members of the Security Council to break ranks with the United States, rejecting the US position as “legally and morally untenable.” The contemporary understanding of democracy throughout the EU firmly bases itself on the values of 19th century liberalism, inclusive of the rule of law. The tradition is so entrenched that establishing levels of legal authority transcending the national level have not brooked the kind of opposition one finds in the United States. In the Bush–Kerry presidential debate of 2004, Kerry’s reference to a “global test” to determine the appropriateness of the use of force seemed to hurt him in the polls. A prominent scholar of democracy in the United States defines the components of that state’s constitutional liberalism, “…it draws on the philosophical strain, beginning with the Greeks and Romans, which emphasizes individual liberty. It is constitutional because it places the rule of law at the center.” �������������������� Clyde Prestowitz, Rogue Nation: American Unilateralism and the Failure of Good Intentions. (New York, 2003), p. 158. �������� Fareed Zakaria, ��������� The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (New York, 2003), p. 19.



Old Europe, New Security

Precisely, the constraining power of constitutionalism poses a problem to certain groups in the United States. One journalist well schooled in US politics, referring to “nationalists and neo–conservatives” in the Bush administration noted, “Where they agree is in their rejection of moral or legal constraints on the sovereign independence of the US.” As for the difference between the United States and Europe, he notes, “The US believes in unbridled freedom of action. Europeans believe in international rules.” During the George W. Bush administration, suspicion of international treaty obligations has been brought into high relief, with the United States withdrawing from previous treaty commitments and ongoing negotiations, as well as preferring unilateral initiatives to multilateral negotiations to launch new strategies. Although the Bush administration’s approach departs from practice of administrations throughout the post–World War II era, it is an approach with some historical basis. A case in point is that the US “special relationship” with Britain is based on informal understandings rather than legal texts. Nicholas explains this preference of the United States as “a by–product of a tough folk memory, particularly strong on the American side, which regarded all diplomatic agreements as the entangling wiles not merely of a foreign power but of a positively illiberal ancien régime, wherever located.” In summary, values compete and bear different results in the European and US contexts. Freedom and independence reign supreme in the United States and work against the conception of the rule of law as the foundation of an international order, largely because the United States cannot continence an international order that might limit its own activities. Human Rights In the area of human rights in Europe, values and institutions have interacted in a transformative and mutual reinforcing way. Among EU members, a stable consensus in support of promoting human rights domestically and internationally exists. As with the rule of law, this consensus has historical support and motivation. Human rights concerns root themselves in various sources from a change in post–colonial attitudes towards former subjects to the emphasis on universalism and equality found in socialist philosophy. For the Germans, in particular, advocating human rights is a coming to terms with the country’s past history of the Holocaust. Therefore, it is for other Europeans who either participated in totalitarian violence or suffered under it. A rich institutional architecture comprising national, regional and international institutions supports human rights in Europe. Assuring the compatibility and continuity of these different levels has been the object of formal efforts. In addition to institutionalization, human rights have benefited from legal advances. Europeans ����������������������������������������������������������� Martin Wolf, “The transatlantic alliance is in trouble.” Financial Times. 20 May 2003 http://news.ft.com/s01/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=Ft.com. ������ Ibid. ���������������� H.G. Nicholas, Britain and the United States. (London, 1963), p. 24.

Transatlantic Security Values



have been innovative to the extent they have developed novel legal practices and institutions to protect human rights. For example, Belgium made an advance by acting on the universal jurisdiction that the international crime of genocide demands, and seeking to prosecute offenders in its national courts. Predictably, the threat of prosecution of US officials mired the state in a controversy with the United States. Out of concern that prominent Americans would come under jurisdiction of the 1993 Belgian law (for example, General Tommy Franks for his role in the second Gulf War), US officials threatened to withhold funds for building new NATO headquarters in that country if the country refused to change the law. Amendments to the law made it possible to block politically “trumped–up” charges within twenty–four hours. Although the change was used effectively to clear charges against US leaders within a day, the United States did not quit the fight until Belgium finally abandoned the cause. Using punitive political threats the United States also has tried to keep the International Criminal Court from becoming operational. As for the ad hoc international tribunals to try war crimes and crimes against humanity in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, the United States joined with Europeans to create these instruments. The tribunals were replete with deficiencies. The most glaring failure of the ad hoc tribunal for the former Yugoslavia was the failure to arrest the most notorious suspects. The head of the UN mission in Bosnia, Jacques Paul Klein, on his departure after ten years in the position, commented about the discredit done by not arresting Radovan Karadzic, “All the other good that has been done here by the international community is undermined by his continued freedom.” The EU has kept up the pressure on states that hope to join the Union to make arrests and turn suspects over to the tribunal, showing that they remain serious about establishing international justice. For all the gaping shortcomings of these early efforts, socialization in international justice does not seem to have been lost on Europeans. A foremost authority in the field, Samantha Power, has commented on the “introspection” in European countries that took place because of the massacre at Srebrenica and the genocide in Rwanda, noting the same exercise was denied in the United States.10 Official investigations occurred in the Netherlands and France for their part in the tragedy of Srebrenica and in France and Belgium for their failure to prevent the Rwanda genocide. Terrorism has now focused Americans on other issues. The rationale of “humanitarian intervention” seemed to have established itself with NATO’s Kosovo bombing campaign. However, the 2003 Iraq War only became a humanitarian intervention as a justification after the fact. A New York Times journalist observed on 6 February 2003, “While the Bush administration is ready to intervene in Iraq in ���������������������������������������������������������� Paul Ames, “Belgium Debates Future of War Crimes Law.” The Associated Press. 21 June, 2003; America Online. ������������������������������������������������������������������������� Alexander S. Dragicevic, “U.N. Official Laments Karadzic”s Freedom.” The Associated Press, 10 January 2003; America Online. 10 Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide. (New York, 2002), p. 510.



Old Europe, New Security

the name of national security; there is no indication that humanitarian intervention is still a feature of American policy.”11 As Europeans demonstrate increasing awareness of their responsibility to uphold human rights in their global roles, they also are more willing to consolidate international safeguards. Pease and Forsythe stated, concerning Western Europe, “The subject matter of human rights was almost as fully internationalized as conceivable.”12 These scholars gauge the activities of European countries, especially in their support for “great specificity and broad if not always deep monitoring procedures” on the international level as evidence “that human rights has emerged as one of the major values to be pursued through world politics.”13 Europe also makes a distinct contribution in the extent to which regional institutions facilitate and support the work of international human rights bodies and standards. Self–consciously, the EU seeks to bring its human rights policies and structures into conformity with the instruments of the UN. As well, in the previous decade, the European Parliament became an activist in the human rights field. “During the 1990s the Parliament increasingly asserted its interest in EU diplomacy and regularly held emergency debates and made recommendations, especially regarding human rights violations….”14 By the same token, the EU enlargement process gave a high priority to the realization of human rights in the candidate countries. European political leaders and officials, through a vast array of “interlocking” contexts, are invested heavily in seeing their efforts succeed and in remaining accountable to a supportive public. Relationship between the Use of Force and Diplomacy Today, much is made in the United States of the extent to which Europeans have come to rely on it for security and of the predominance on the continent of “old” thinking. In the eyes of some American leaders, Europe is “old” in more ways than one. Especially in terms of the balance European leaders prefer between the use of force and diplomacy, they are open to the charge of perpetuating the “old” and fearing the “new,” of being overly cautious, if not cowardly and timid, in the face of changing global responsibilities and the post–September 11 call to make sacrifices. Certainly, European instincts on when, how and in what conditions to use force are historically based, as the history of Europe is the history of war. However, in their 11 Quoted in Robert S. McNamara, and James G. Blight, Wilson’s Ghost: Reducing Conflict, Killing, and Catastrophe in the 21st Century. (New York, 2001), p. 247. 12 Kelly Kate Pease, and David P. Forsythe, “Human Rights, Humanitarian Intervention, and World Politics.” Human Rights Quarterly. May 1993. See section II, “The Internationalization of Human Rights.” 13 Ibid. 14 Carol Cosgrove–Sacks, “The EU as an International Actor,” in Cosgrove–Sacks, ed. Europe, Diplomacy and Development: New Issues in EU Relations with Developing Countries. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001, p. 23.

Transatlantic Security Values



understanding of the nuances of the interaction of force and diplomacy, Europeans see themselves as having overcome their history, as being able to offer a mature worldview. Rather than “old” thinking, they practice a new approach learned only by brutal destruction and unnecessary sacrifice of entire generations to war. Many Europeans reject the exceptionalism the United States uses as the basis for its claim of legitimacy for its unilateral use of force. According to Simon Serfarty, “All too often, they [Europeans] tend to view America as a fortunate giant that must be taught the ways of the world lest it might do damage to their ways in the world.”15 For their part, Americans do not take kindly to condescension, especially coming from Europeans. Surely this informs the observation that Americans “…see Europeans as ungrateful free riders who have never met a dictator they wouldn”t appease and take advantage of America’s defense umbrella to posture smugly as morally superior.”16 The core of the problem comes from changing attitudes towards constraints on the use of force. This results from the advent of terrorism as a primary threat and the refinements of the use of force, especially in targeting, that new military technologies have made (and continue to make) possible. Europeans see the development of international institutions to act as constraints on the use of force as their special contribution to an evolving international society. They date their progress from the nineteenth century Concert of Europe, convened to bring order to the continent after the Napoleonic Wars, through the Hague Conferences at the start of the twentieth century launched over concerns about an intensifying arms race in Europe. The previous century also saw bold experiments in collective security through the League of Nations and the United Nations. Throughout the second half of the 1900s until now, Europeans, certainly with the help of Americans, built on the Nuremberg Trials’ enshrinement of definitions of crimes against humanity and war crimes as prosecutable under international law. Work on human rights took place in the context of positive laws meant to enhance the prospects for peace and reduce the resort to war. Not only are Europeans wedded to the concept of progress, they are self–consciously correcting for a brutal past. As commander of the Kosovo bombing campaign, NATO’s first war, as well as the first war to defend against human rights abuses, General Wesley Clark came to understand the historical basis of European attitudes towards the use of force. He wrote, “The use of military force was increasingly constrained. The Allies’ hideous firebombing of Dresden which reduced the city to ashes and rubble in February, 1945, would never recur.”17

15 Simon Serfarty, “Security gaps–A US view of a changing world.” Challenge Europe on–line Journal. 15 October, 2000; www.theepc.be/Challenge_?Europe/memo3. asp?ID=279. 16 Prestowitz, p. 237. 17 General Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat. (New York, 2001), p. 8.

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Not only was war to be avoided, but in the event of war, damage to humanity was to be limited, again harking back to the centuries old tradition of the “laws of war,” codified in the Geneva Conventions. Concerned with protection of civilians, Europeans were prone to criticize the United States for bombing from fifteen thousand feet above Kosovo, which did not allow for as clear a discernment of targets. From the US perspective, precision bombing gave greater utility to the use of force precisely because it killed fewer civilians. Clearly, both sides were looking at the same phenomenon through different lenses. The clash pitted those who believe that a bomb is a bomb against those who believe a bomb can be improved upon; it divided those who have sought to eradicate war as an instrument from those who seek to refine the instrument in a world where war is destiny. The 2001 US– led action against the Taliban in Afghanistan again incited calls for restraint, for selective bombing, although they were more muted in the face of the tragedy in the United States. While the source of attitudes towards military action may be “old,” the security approach the Europeans have embraced is a departure from the past. Indeed, the Europeans, much influenced by their experience in the EU, have shown innovation in the area of diplomacy. The continent’s leaders long have touted their skills in traditional diplomacy. The development of new forms and modes of diplomacy is an achievement original to Europe. Europeans believe peace in Europe has been maintained since World War II with the supranational diplomacy institutionalized in the EU. The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) that Jean Monnet designed served as one of the most important and groundbreaking “constraints” on the use of force between historic enemies, France and Germany. The ECSC was also an exercise in “preventive” diplomacy, that emphasis remains very strong in European diplomacy today. Ideologically, the intervention in the Balkans throughout the 1990s was based on humanitarian reasons. Strategically, the rationale for intervention was one of prevention. “To stop the killing” was not only a humanitarian appeal, but also a pre– emptive one; the intervention sought to do something before all–out war erupted and spread to become another European war. Influential US journalist, Jim Hoagland, dubbed one of the diplomatic modes utilized in the Balkans “the humble ceasefire.” His specific reference was to an interruption in hostilities in Macedonia in order to make room for a political process initially sponsored by NATO and the EU, for which the EU eventually assumed full responsibility as the United States turned its attention to Iraq. Hoagland captured the choice decision–makers made in the Balkans in these words: “… the road to tamping down Southeastern Europe’s brutal ethnic wars now passes through patient, measured and disciplined application of political, economic and military pressure from the outside rather than grand operations of war and peace.”18

18 Jim Hoagland, “The Humble Cease–Fire.” The Washington Post. 12 July 2001; www.washingtonpost.com/wp–dyn/articles/A49663–2001Jul11.html.

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11

Patience is definitely a quality the Europeans demonstrate in their conduct of diplomacy. It is also a value, in that Europeans tend to believe that each increment of the diplomatic process must be exhausted before a resort to the use of force is legitimate. Professor Body–Gendrot, states in relation to the European objections to war in Iraq, “We have long tradition of preferring diplomacy to action.”19 Diplomacy was Europe’s instrument of choice once NATO adopted the policy of deterrence of the Soviet Union in the latter decades of the Cold War. At the beginning of Ronald Reagan’s presidency, European members of NATO embraced a “dual track” approach for allied defense, which coupled the deployment of new intermediate range missiles in Europe with the start of arms control negotiations; the new administration, with Richard Perle in the lead on this issue, buckled at the “negotiating part” of the agreement. Eventually, former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher carried Washington to this compromise. A failure to agree would have had enormous consequences. According to a biographer for Reagan and Thatcher, “What was at stake was the whole process of arms talks in Reagan’s first term….”20 The question still lingers in some American minds whether the Europeans commitment to diplomacy really is incurable pacifism. Significantly, outside observers must not take the preference for diplomacy as a choice of pacifism in all conditions. The one recent case in which diplomacy was not a preference put forth by the majority of European leaders was occasioned by the 2001 World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks. The French President Jacques Chirac led the UN Security Council to define the attack as one that permitted self–defense, the only remaining justification under international law for unilateral use of force. European opinion remained firmly in support of the US war in Afghanistan, even in face of humanitarian tragedies. However, Europeans experienced conceptual dissonance in the ‘war’ against terror, which materialized in the allies’ dissension regarding the war against Iraq. Jolyon Howorth and John Keeler noted: “Most European leaders, with the notable exception of Britain’s Tony Blair, insisted that the emerging campaign against Al–Qaeda was not a “war”, and that attention had to be paid to the root causes of terrorism.”21 In summary, the Europeans employ what may be described as a “transactional” approach to conflict. According to Clyde Prestowitz, “As a result of their history, Europeans downplay nationalism and seem to indulge in endless negotiations to resolve dangerous issues.”22 The EU’s foreign policy chief, Javier Solana, stated this approach another way. He referred to the EU as having “a specific culture based on 19 Mort Rosenblum, “Europeans Press for Iraq Diplomacy.” The Associated Press. 23 January 2003; America Online. 20 Geoffrey Smith, Reagan and Thatcher. (London, 1990). 21 Jolyon Howorth and John T.S. Keeler, “The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy,” in Howorth and Keeler, eds., Defending Europe: The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy. (New York, 2003), p. 13. 22 Prestowitz, p. 236.

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conflict prevention through dialogue and sensitivity to the economic and social roots of violence,” an apt description of the supranational process Europeans have used in their relations with each other for over a half–century.23 Supranationalism and Internationalism Supranationalism, on a technical level, describes the structures and processes of integration the EU has achieved. In addition, supranationalism has ideological significance, embodying the belief that peace is served best by countries that define their interests with reference to other countries and engage jointly in the pursuit of common interests. This commitment manifests itself in common authoritative institutions that, in turn, pursue benefits for those collectively engaged. The supranational experience provides learning about cooperation and the governance of cross–boundary issues. Internally, the Union provides mechanisms for EU regional government; externally, EU members recommend their supranational experience. They encourage others to follow the methods and practices that have worked so well for them in reducing and resolving conflict. These include regular and ongoing elite contacts up and down the bureaucratic and political chains of command, jointly conceived and executed policies, and legal agreements that provide stability and require behavioral conformity from members. In fact, legal arrangements provide the glue for the complex system of interactions. Sven Biscop refers to the “role–model function of the EU,” in connection with the external influence the EU security concept has.24 Europeans self–consciously promote the successes they have gleaned from their common experiences. For example, the “Neighbourhood Policy” targets the new democracies in Eastern and Central Europe and has as its goal an area of shared prosperity and values.” So encompassing and potentially influential is this initiative that Biscop refers to it as “probably the most significant achievement since the start of the European integration project itself.”25 Supranationalism is the value that binds an increasing number of countries with “Old Europe.” It also is the value that binds the other security values that have been discussed. The emphasis on legalism in supranational negotiations is consistent with the emphases on constitutionalism among Europeans in building a new international order and the legitimacy with which they view the structures and instruments of international law. Supranationalism poses itself against unilateralism and absolute sovereignty. The supranational process offers an alternative to the use of force while the supranational idea opposes war. Finally, supranationalism is qualitatively different from the multilateralism so much discussed today in the context of transatlantic relations. It involves the 23 Ibid, p. 240. 24 Sven Biscop and Rik Coolsaet, “The World is the Stage—A Global Security Strategy for the European Union,” policy papers no. 8, December 2003, for Notre Europe, p. 34. 25 Ibid., as quoted in, p. 16.

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13

“abrogation” of sovereignty Monnet insisted upon as a part of the first European community, the ECSC, usually in the form of common institutions. Furthermore, it requires a critical assessment of national sovereignty and its utility for international governance and security. The United States is neither multilateral nor supranational. According to security thinkers in the United States, McNamara and Blight, In other words, there may be some positive effect of going through the motions of consulting allies and other members of the UN Security Council regarding how, and how fast, to proceed, but there is not even a pretense [on the part of the United States] of consulting anyone over whether to proceed, or toward which objective.26

Europeans are confounded by the unwillingness of the United States to consider their interests, their input, and their experience, all of which are influenced profoundly and fundamentally by the practice of supranationalism, the opposite experience of US hegemony. The internationalism Europeans pursue is one that, ideally, places the international community above the state, human rights above national sovereignty, and international constitutionalism above freedom. The United States values these same things, but prioritizes them differently. The extent to which security concerns after 11 September have determined the ordering of values in US security policy has been no less than alarming to many Europeans. Whereas Europe’s concern in the past was that the United Sates would withdraw from global responsibilities, now the concern is that the world’s “only superpower” is pursuing a form of militant and bellicose internationalism. Many Europeans characterize this U.S. policy as destructive of the values that Europe and the United States advanced in common in the post–war era and the international order they aimed to create. Supranationalism in Europe and hegemony in the United States only serve to increase the distance between the two, on the level of deep cultural and instinctive attachments.

26 McNamara and Blight, pp. 265–266.

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Chapter 2

Historical Precedents for the Current European Security and Defense Policy Janet Adamski

University of Mary Hardin-Baylor Back to the Future The Western European Union (WEU) and European Union’s (EU) ventures into the creation of an autonomous, all–European force have contributed to a serious rift within the Atlantic Alliance. This division has some familiar touchstones: continental versus Anglo–American and Europeanist versus Atlanticist. It goes beyond orientation, however, to methods and perhaps to questions of values. These differences underlie the West Europeans’ first and principal use of diplomatic and cultural ‘soft’ power—relational and organizational tools—to achieve agreed security goals multilaterally. This is set against a perception, at least, of the United States’ significant reliance on and preference for ‘hard’ economic and military power (or the threat of its use) with few restrictions on the pursuit of self–defined defensive national interests. Some argue that this is no more than growing pains involved in the evolution away from a bipolar, Cold War system to a new arrangement capable of confronting asymmetric threats from nihilistic, non–state actors. Others, however, argue that we are witnessing the end of ‘permanent’ alliances, at least the permanent Atlantic Alliance, which never again will provide the answer to these new global threats. Temporary or permanent, these divergences may contribute to the fraying of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) ability to agree to and to carry out collective missions. Recall, for example, the refusal by some members of NATO to entertain Turkey’s request for assistance prior to the United States’ incursion into Iraq in March 2003 and the flap over the Europeans’ decision to build their own headquarters [see Krupnick, Chapter 5], rather than rely on existing NATO facilities. Still, while both political leaders and academics have characterized these divergences and their outcomes as unprecedented, in many ways they reflect a return to preferences West Europeans expressed following World War II. The intervention of a militarized period of the Cold War and the hegemony of the United States and ����������������������������� See for example Joseph Nye, The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone, (New York: 2002) and “Propaganda Isn’t the Way: Soft Power” 10 January 2003 The International Herald Tribune accessed from http://www.ksg.harvard. edu/news/opeds/2003/nye_soft_power_iht_011003.htm.

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Soviet Union in defining the battlefield and the weapons used in later years simply delayed the actuation of these affinities. The historical experiences of many Western Europeans that led to the formation of these values, interests and preferences have not changed, however; in fact, we saw the Europeans pursuing soft power and security through such venues as European integration and the United Nations. Thus, we should not be surprised to see Europe’s post–war choices re–asserted as first preferences, as Cold War strictures erode. Nor should we interpret them simply as a hostile reaction stemming from a foreign policy dispute with a single US administration. Instead, this work argues that these preferences are of much longer heritage, as shown by the historical record. Other chapters in this volume examine the reasons for the differences in security penchants of leaders in Western Europe and the United States, as well as likely outcomes of these divergences. The goal of this work is to examine two early expressions of the preferences of the Europeans as they began to assume that identity in addition to their national identities. Following the Second World War, through the creation of the Brussels Treaty Organization (BTO) and throughout the European Defense Community (EDC) debate, West Europeans contemplated the development of a regional defense commitment, even force, albeit with the United States’ approval and support. Significantly, in both of these previous efforts the Europeans approached the development of a security apparatus in which international law, as well as economic, cultural and social programs, supplemented and constrained the use of military power. The treaties for both organizations set up programs for negotiations that would help to reach multilateral outcomes, and both made explicit reference to receiving UN approval before using military means. Practically, the Europeans had little chance of rearming with sufficient conventional forces to stop a determined Warsaw Treaty Organization attack. This left them with few better choices than a dual strategy of seeking to keep the United States and its unconventional weapons guarantee as one track, while minimizing potential threats through the internationalization of laws and values, along with promotion of economic interdependence, development and diplomatic ties as a second track. Thus, without rejecting explicit recourse to military means, we find clear evidence of an European inclination to soft power tools that is asserting itself again. Given that these preferences clearly were established as early as post–World War II, why the need now for a return to that approach? Instead of building an European army as a part of an overarching structure with significant soft power capabilities, following the 1955 rehabilitation of the Federal Republic of Germany as an armed state, Europeans developed military capabilities in national and NATO settings. They also constructed diplomatic, as well as economic and social development tools nationally, but especially focused on the European Community and United Nations arenas. The post–Cold War, post–Maastricht EU now offers the possibility for achieving a full range of hard and soft power instruments under a unified political leadership envisioned by such early Europeans as Paul–Henri Spaak, Jean Monnet and Altiero Spinelli more than half a century ago.

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Brussels Treaty Organization The earliest postwar European security agreements were mutual–aid treaties signed against Germany. First came the March 1947 Treaty of Dunkirk between Britain and France. It created a fifty–year obligation to come to each other’s aid “…if they become involved in hostilities with Germany either in consequence of armed attack …as a result of agreed action taken against Germany…or as a result of enforcement action taken against Germany by the United Nations Security Council.” A year later, on 17 March 1948, the Brussels Treaty followed. This agreement provided for collective self–defense in case of aggression against any of the signatories—Britain, France and the Benelux countries. Interestingly, other organizational aims come first in the treaty. Thus, Article One calls for the contracting powers to “organize and co–ordinate their economic activities as to produce the best possible results, by the elimination of conflict in their economic policies, the co–ordination of production and the development of commercial exchanges.” Article Two obliges signatories to increase citizen understanding of the “principles which [sic] form the basis of their common civilization” by such means as “cultural exchanges.” It is not until Article Four that we find the provision for military aid in the case of an armed attack. We should note that the treaty stipulates that this aid should be in “in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations” and that Article Five requires immediate notification of the Security Council as well as gives the Security Council the power to call the actions to an end. Thus, the Pact extended cooperation beyond the hard power policies of armed response to the soft power sphere of diplomatic relations, values and culture. Further, it established a permanent forum for member states’ negotiation and discussion through a Consultative Council, made up of the members’ Foreign Ministers and the Western Defense Committee, whose membership was the states’ Defense Ministers. Finally, a common secretariat supported the work done under the Brussels Treaty. The Treaty signaled members’ agreement on such fundamental issues as human rights and the rule of law [see Johnston, Chapter 1]. Other states could accede to the Treaty only by acceptance of these principles. As one author, contemporary to the Treaty negotiations, wrote, “The fundamental idea seems to be that these rights and freedoms are the essence of our way of life, and that, in accepting obligations for collective self–defence and in co–operating in other matters, the parties are

����������������������������������������������������������� Officially “The Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance.” ����������������������������������������� For text, see Sir William Eric Beckett, The North Atlantic Treaty, The Brussels Treaty and the Charter of the United Nations, No. 12 The Library of World Affairs (London, 1950).  Formally “The Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self–Defence.” For good discussion, see Max Beloff, Europe and the Europeans: An International Discussion, A Report Prepared at the Request of the Council of Europe (London, 1957) p. 158. The full text of the Treaty is available at: http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/ intdip/westeu/we001.htm.

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really defending the one way of life which their peoples would find tolerable.” US President Harry Truman praised this effort as a “…notable step in the direction of unity in Europe, for the protection and preservation of its civilization.” He added that such an effort was worthy of support by the United States, and from June 1948, US military experts participated in meetings of the BTO Defense Ministers and Chiefs of Staff. Truman’s encouragement, together with the on–going Soviet– orchestrated blockade of West Berlin (June 1948–September 1949), helped to overcome opposition in the US Congress, which made a formal treaty commitment to the defense of Western Europe in 1949 with the North Atlantic Treaty. The US Role in Shaping the Post–War Europe Leaders of both the United States and the countries of Western Europe had unrealistic expectations of Europe’s post-war strength and thus, its ability to recover quickly after the cessation of hostilities. As late as November 1943, President Franklin Roosevelt referred to Britain as one of the Four Policemen, together with the United States, Britain, and China. These ‘policemen of the world’ he thought, would serve as enforcers responsible for maintaining a new, peaceful, global order. Clearly, Roosevelt did not anticipate his closest ally’s post–war weakness, much less the conditions in other European states. In the United States, political leaders initially believed that the institution of a free trade regime, along with further loans, would provide whatever fuel necessary to restart the world’s economies, including those of Western Europe. François Duchêne, Jean Monnet’s aide and biographer recalled “…the United States designed the postwar loans to put Europe on its feet so that it could soon run itself.”10 The harsh conditions of 1946–47, especially that winter, showed that not only defeated Germany and devastated France, but even victorious Britain—in short all of Europe—needed emergency aid.11 Therefore, when the United Kingdom’s  Beckett p. 23.  Truman’s speech cited in Paul–Henri Spaak, The Continuing Battle: Memoirs of a European 1936–1966, trans. Henry Fox (Boston, 1971) p. 149.  Lord Ismay, NATO: The First Five Years 1949–1954, p. 9 available through http:// www.nato.int/archives/ist5years/chapters/1.htm.  “[P]rovided the last achieves a unified central government.” John Lamberton Harper, American Visions of Europe: Franklin D. Roosevelt, George F. Kennan, and Dean G. Acheson (Cambridge, 1996) p. 82 citing Roosevelt.  John Lewis Gaddis citing 29 November 1943 conversation between Roosevelt and Stalin, Strategies of Containment a Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (Oxford, 1982), p. 363. 10 François Duchêne, Jean Monnet: The First Statesman of Interdependence (NY, 1994), p. 158. 11 A revisionist school says that conditions were hard but not harsh, that threats of starvation and freezing were propaganda ploys to pry money out of the comfortable, warm and well–fed citizens of the United States. The interested reader can find traditional interpretations

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government, in early 1947, informed the United States that it had to abrogate its financial and military commitments to Greece and Turkey, areas where civil war threatened, the United States reacted on two fronts with the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan.12 These projects signaled a fundamental shift in the European policy of the United States. As it became obvious that Western Europe could neither defend itself nor provide for itself economically, the United States changed its original ‘hands off’ policy, symbolized by the abrupt end of Lend–Lease to the Allies and the ‘Four Ds’ policy in Germany.13 As early as September 1946, Truman’s Secretary of State, Jimmy Byrnes, announced a change in the United States’ policy toward Europe including the continued presence of United States troops on the ground in Europe for as long as was needed to protect against Soviet aggression.14 On 11 July 1947, General Lucius Clay, who administered the United States’ zone of Germany, formally received a replacement of Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) order 1067, with JCS 1779.15 The new directive called for an economically and politically rehabilitated (and self–supporting) Germany to contribute to a stable and thriving Europe.16 Then came the Truman Doctrine, which pledged support for the fight of “free peoples who are resisting subjugation.”17 Clearly, its ambit was broader than just Greece and Turkey from which the United Kingdom had had to withdraw; it sent an aggressive message to Moscow. of the harsh conditions in such US government publications as ERP in France and Recovery: Two Years Later. 12 When the Greeks refused to lay down their arms to the restored Greek monarchy, it was in Britain’s interest to portray the ELAS–wing of the Greek resistance as a tool of the Soviet Communists. Later scholarship asserts instead a domestic and regional dimension to anti–government actions. Alfred Grosser, The Western Alliance: European–American Relations since 1945, trans. Michael Shaw (New York, 1982), pp. 43-4. For a reflection on the process of the ‘hand over’ of these regions to the United States that captures a sense of elite US policymaker sentiment, see Joseph M. Jones, The Fifteen Weeks (February 11–June 5, 1947) (New York, 1955) Chapter one (available from http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/ jones1.htm). 13 Lend–Lease was a US policy derived from the 11 March 1941 legislation “An Act to Promote the Defense of the United States,” which authorized the president to assist anti– Axis states with food and equipment, creating, according to President Roosevelt, an “arsenal of democracy” while the United States remained neutral, officially. The four Ds were denazification, democratization, decartelization and demilitarization. 14 R. C. Mowat, Creating the European Community (London, 1973) p. 36 and Grosser p. 57. 15 JCS 1067 represented a War Department compromise with the Morganthau Group in the Treasury Department. The Morganthau Group had pushed for pastoralization of Germany, or its return to an agricultural economy. 16 Grosser p. 63 and Henry C. Wallich, Mainsprings of the German Revival, Yale Studies in Economics: 5 (New Haven, 1955) p. 348. 17 Derek Urwin, The Community of Europe: A History of Integration since 1945 (London, 1991) p. 15.

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With the Truman Doctrine, the United States began a policy of containment of Soviet expansionism across the globe. West Europeans quickly realized that one price of this commitment by the United States was a rearmed, sovereign Germany.18 The German Question Soon it was obvious that the defense of Western Europe meant the rehabilitation of West Germany. Any regional security structure needed the contribution of German resources to the collective good of keeping at bay the Soviet military, which did not stand down after World War II.19 As early as 1947, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff reported that without German resources to stop them, Soviet forces could overrun Western Europe before the United States mobilized its troops.20 Once it was clear, in 1949, that the Soviets had broken the atomic monopoly of the United States, the situation seemed critical.21 That year’s North Atlantic Treaty was a self–help, defensive compact in which each country pledged to supply troops “according to its means” for the goal of repelling external aggression against any member. Original signatories included the United States, Canada, Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the United Kingdom.22 This membership reflected a significant front–line gap in the membership however—the Federal Republic of Germany.23 Two influences provided the means for resolving this situation. The first was the pressure of United States policymakers, powered by a perception of imminent Soviet expansionism and their willingness to retreat to a perimeter defense if West Europeans did not cooperate. The second was the inspiration of European elites seeking European integration.24 In late 1949, German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer created a stir when he declared the West Germans would be willing to discuss a role in a European Army within 18 Grosser p. 125. 19 Of the estimated 200 Soviet divisions still on a war footing, more than 25 were in East Germany. As well, the East Germans formed a Peoples’ Police force that numbered 48,000 by the summer of 1949, armed with infantry weapons and light tanks. By 1950, it had added reconnaissance aircraft and a fully mechanized regiment. By contrast, the Allies kept seven divisions in the Federal Republic of Germany. Terence Prittie, Konrad Adenauer 1876–1967 (London, 1972) pp. 159–60. 20 Clive Archer and Fiona Butler, The European Community: Structure and Process (NY, 1992) p. 12. 21 Louis Halle, The Cold War as History (New York, 1967) p. 261. 22 Because of anti–Fascist sentiment, General Francisco Franco’s Spain failed to gain entry. 23 Given NATO’s September 1950 adoption of a forward strategy, this opening was particularly troubling. See for example text of Secretary Dulles’ 22 December 1953 speech in the 4 January 1954 Department of State Bulletin, pp. 5–6. 24 Altiero Spinelli, “The Growth of the European Movement Since World War II,” in European Integration, ed. C. Grove Haines (Baltimore, 1957) p. 47.

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the framework of the BTO’s Western Union. As his dealings with the Allied High Commission demonstrated, Adenauer was the consummate bargainer. He wanted normalization of his country’s status, security and European integration. Thus, he showed his unwillingness to rearm on any terms but his own: It must be made clear once and for all that I am fundamentally opposed to the rearmament of the German Republic and therefore also to the creation of a new German Wehrmacht…. The Allies have disarmed us, and the moral and legal duty rests on them to defend us… . If the Allies demand that we should take part in the defense of Western Europe, I should be in favor, not of an independent Wehrmacht, but of a German contingent in a European force.25

According to the Chancellor’s chosen biographer, the German leader’s willingness to discuss German rearmament came from a belief that a common European defense would bring about political integration of the member states.26 As Adenauer said, “If the West helps strengthen West Germany, it will be the best contribution to the consolidation of Western Europe… . The only sure way to stop the Russians is for the West to be so strong as never to let the Russians get started at all.”27 Though not immediately taken up by the High Commissioners, this ‘offer’ provoked loud protests from many sectors of West German society. Accordingly, in spring 1950, Adenauer tried for a more modest goal—approval of the creation of a federal police force equivalent to the East German Peoples’ Police. The outbreak of the Korean War in June of that year, on the heels of the Allies’ rejection of Adenauer’s proposed police force, changed the tenor of the debate. Activities on the Korean Peninsula, for both ideological and practical reasons, highlighted the urgency of arming West Germany. The parallels between divided Korea and divided Germany were stark. Germans experienced real fear about Soviet intentions to unite their country by force. At the same time, the United States was pressing fellow NATO members to increase the resources they devoted to Europe’s defense, in order to free the United States’ military assets for the Korean theater. On 24 July 1950, US High Commissioner of the Allied Control Council for Germany John McCloy officially requested that the Germans be armed against Soviet aggression. Two months later, President Truman proposed that German soldiers make up ten of the sixty planned European NATO divisions. At September 1950 meetings with British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin and French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, US Secretary of State Dean Acheson pressed for the introduction of armed

25 Paul Weymar quoting Adenauer’s interview with John Leacacos, Bonn correspondent to The Cleveland Plain Dealer, in Adenauer: His Authorized Biography, trans. Peter de Mendelssohn (New York, 1957) p. 310. 26 Weymar p. 351. See various reports and interviews with Adenauer from December 1949–January 1950. 27 The New York Times, 4 December 1949.

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German forces within the unified NATO structure.28 The French balked at rearming Germany within NATO. Instead, they returned with a proposal to include an armed West Germany in a West European defense structure. As with prior proposals, the Europeans disagreed on how such an organization should look, with the French preferring a Western European slant to the defensive agreement while the British were agitating for a North Atlantic one. The European Defense and Political Communities Reacting to the suggestion that West Germany join NATO, France’s Prime Minister, on 24 October 1950, launched the Pleven Plan, which quickly became the European Defense Community (EDC).29 This plan proposed a single military force made up by pooling soldiers and resources of various nationalities into forty standing divisions.30 Under it, German soldiers would serve in a common army made up of soldiers from each member country serving in mixed divisions. Further, the community would have an integrated command structure. The rearmed Germans could not be used in a national army nor were they to serve at greater than company strength. This multinational entity would have “judicial powers over individual soldiers [and] jurisdiction over licensing and placing of armament contracts.”31 At Italian insistence, Article 38 of the EDC Treaty provided for the regulation of European Defense Force’s by a European Political Community (EPC) and a European Minister of Defense.32 As well, a common budget and common institutions would support the EPC. At the other states’ request, Belgian leader Paul–Henri Spaak convened an Ad Hoc Assembly of members of the European Coal and Steel Community’s (ECSC) Assembly and the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe to draft a constitution for the political organization. Under Spaak’s leadership, the Assembly drew up a constitution for the EPC. Its creators envisioned that the EPC would gradually would absorb both the ECSC and the EDC. Its institutions would include a bicameral legislature. This legislative body would have a Peoples’ Chamber, elected by universal, direct and equal suffrage and a Senate, chosen by national parliaments. A Council of Ministers 28 For the US perspective on these talks, see the September 1950 telegrams between Truman and Acheson available at http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/ nato/large/index.php. 29 See the partial text of the Pleven Plan at http://www.euhistory.leidenuniv.nl/index. php3?m=10&c=51 and find the EDC Treaty (in French) at http://mjp.univ–perp.fr/europe/ 1952ced.htm. 30 Spaak p. 155. 31 Henry Mason, The European Coal and Steel Community: An Experiment in Supranationalism (The Hague, 1955) p. 134. 32 Archer p. 13, Urwin pp. 60–68, Spaak p. 155, and Prittie p. 163. The Italian delegation proposed from the beginning that the EDC have its own parliament and fiscal powers. Spinelli p. 59.

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and a European Executive Council, including a Senate–chosen President, and other members selected by the President would hold executive authority. The Court of Justice of the ECSC and an advisory Economic and Social Committee would serve to assist these institutions. Reflecting the desire to make this more than just a defensive construction, responsibilities of the EPC included making treaties, setting taxes, obtaining loans and working toward the creation of a common market.33 At the urging of the Dutch, drafters expanded the EPC’s competence to include, eventually, coordination of the monetary and fiscal policies of member states and establishment of a common market.34 Thus, this approach to defending Europe represented a common military force controlled by a political authority with significant economic powers. Members agreed to sacrifice sovereignty on the issues closest to the heart of the state—military and political decisions. The signatories contracted to build the military structure into the existing supranational structures of the ECSC.35 As well, the powers the states agreed to sacrifice were for the long– term; the original draft described the Community as “indissoluble,” in later drafts, as “an irrevocable fifty–year commitment.”36 This structure met the demands of Germany, namely that it be allowed to join as an equal member and that the whole enterprise be geared to the integration— political, military and economic—of Europe.37 West Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy and France signed the EDC Treaty on 27 and 28 May 1952.38 Great Britain and the United States agreed to provide additional security guarantees once the Treaty came into force.39 And yet, NATO Given this agreement, why the eventual development of NATO to handle European defense and the European Economic Community to regulate economic integration? Among the EDC’s putative members, France was in an impossible position. It sought to restore German military power to the degree that Germany could deter the Soviets but not threaten French security, or to use White’s felicitous phrase, to build

33 Beloff pp. 163–65. 34 Spinelli p. 60, Dirk Spierenburg and Raymond Poidevin, A History of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community: Supranationality in Operation, trans. Translation Service of the European Communities (London, 1994) pp. 44–5 and Beloff p. 179. 35 Spinelli p. 59. 36 Beloff p. 180. 37 Talks began between the Germans and the High Commission in September 1951 to replace the Occupation Statute with freely negotiated contractual agreements consequent to bringing Germany into the EDC. Prittie p. 165. 38 These treaties, the Bonn and Paris Agreements, called for the return of Germany sovereignty upon the completion of the European Defense Community. 39 Spaak p. 156.

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a “one–way army.”40 Therefore, Paris, whose past policies of bilateral agreements and whose strategy of weakening Germany through dismemberment or annexation the Allies had rejected, had to find a new way. With its proposed EDC, France sought to tame German power through “…the integration of a peaceful Germany in a United Europe in which the Germans…will be able to give up all idea of dominating it.”41 This new approach was not a success. The French–parented European Defense Community Treaty missed ratification by the French Assembly on 30 August 1954.42 Some in France agreed with Louis Terrenoire, one of General Charles de Gaulle’s closest advisors, who warned during the debates on 1949’s Petersberg Protocol, which began the restoration of West German sovereignty, “Europe is a fiction and you are going to integrate Germany into this fiction.”43 The Gaullists and others wanted more than a ‘fiction’ to keep France safe—at this point they trusted German motives less than they feared US threats to disengage. In any case, France derailed this all–European security structure. Throughout the EDC process, the United States threatened to abandon its defense commitments to the continent unless states agreed to include a rearmed West Germany.44 Finally, in October 1954, the Europeans solved the related problems of German rearmament and an enhanced West European defense by an agreement, which expanded the 1948 Brussels Pact to include West Germany and Italy. The Pact re–formed as the Western European Union (WEU), which then became a part of the NATO defense system.45 Thus, Germany rearmed under the aegis of NATO, with an agreement not to produce atomic, biological or chemical weapons. At the same time, the Western 40 Theodore White, Fire in the Ashes: Europe at Mid-Century (New York, 1953) p. 267. Thus, the French sought the impossible – a German military stronger than the Soviet army yet weaker than France’s own forces. Simon Serfaty, The Elusive Enemy: American Foreign Policy Since World War II (Boston, 1972) p. 10. 41 Serfaty p. 11, quoting Georges Bidault, then France’s Foreign Minister. 42 The bill did not fail ratification, instead by a vote of 319 to 264, debate on the EDC Treaty closed. Prittie p. 191. 43 As cited in Serfaty p. 14. 44 For example, Secretary of State Dulles told the National Press Club that at a recent NATO meeting he had “mentioned the importance of action soon, and said that if there was not an early and affirmative response, the United States would have to undertake an ‘agonizing reappraisal’ of basic foreign policy in relation to Europe.” Dept. of State Bulletin, 4 January 1954 report of 22 December 1953 speech, p. 5. The day after Dulles’ speech, President Eisenhower issued a press release affirming Dulles’ statement and added “failure to consummate the EDC would confront the United States with the necessity of reappraising its basic policies as regards Europe.” DSB, 4 January 1954, 23 December 1953 release, p. 7. Even more forcefully, Spaak, then Premier of Belgium, remembered, “Dulles made it clear to me that if the existing state of uncertainty, due to French hesitation, continued, the USA would be unable to proceed with its policy of military aid to Europe.” Spaak p. 159. 45 Serfaty p. 21 and Prittie p. 191.

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Allies abolished the Occupation Statute and disbanded the High Commission.46 This defensive grouping had the Atlanticist tilt that the British favored. Unlike the planned EDC, NATO did not integrate troops into a common army. Moreover, as the predominant partner, the United States rather than a European state provided a supreme commander for NATO forces. Finally, Washington pledged nuclear protection to Western Europe as a ‘shield’ to work in tandem with the ‘sword’ of (largely European) conventional forces. Despite the language of the North Atlantic Treaty (drawn from the Brussels Treaty), which referred to economic and social cooperation, NATO’s clear focus has been on military power and defense. Accordingly, Europeans have relied on other organizations to develop and coordinate soft power resources and to build security, including the rehabilitation of the World War II aggressor states Germany and Italy into the family of western European states. While NATO has focused on defense, Europeans have turned to the United Nations and the European Community/Union for expanded security initiatives. These include constructing habits of cooperation, economic interdependence, rule of law, respect for human rights, common political values and state building—goals best met with soft power resources. Consequently, the renewed European interest in development of an autonomous military force within the well–developed economic, social and political apparatus of the European Union does not reflect a radical new choice, but rather a return to long– articulated preferences. Freed from the militarized construct of the Cold War, and facing the multi–faceted challenges of terrorism, poverty, inequality, immigration and the like, Europeans have returned to the preferences developed in response to their unique historical experiences with war and nationalism.

46 Prittie p. 193.

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Chapter 3

Symbolic Security: Europe Takes a Human Face P. H. Liotta

Pell Center for International Relations and Public Policy, Salve Regina University The human tragedy reaches its climax in the fact that after all the exertions and sacrifices of hundreds of millions of people and of the victories of the Righteous Cause, we have still not found Peace or Security. Winston Churchill

As these words are written, the sixtieth anniversary of the liberation of the Nazi death camps at Auschwitz is being “celebrated.” It is no accident that the inheritors of the legacy of Auschwitz, Vladimir Putin (President of the Russian Federation, representing the liberator), Gerhard Schroeder (Chancellor of Germany, as the oppressor), and Ariel Sharon (of Israel, as the victim) were all present for the occasion. The symbolism and the reality of the Auschwitz gathering suggest that Europe stood prepared to accept shared memory and collective guilt for the failures of the past, not the least of which is the memory of the Holocaust. Indeed, Europe, as identity and as a union, has undergone an extraordinary transformation in the post–Cold War era, much of which has only accelerated in these times we refer to with a kind of post–modern vagueness – knowing more what these times are not, rather than what they are. The philosopher J. Peter Burgess has summarized aptly, nonetheless, recognition of this European shift: In New & Old Wars, Mary Kaldor argues that a new type of organized violence has developed, beginning in the 1980s and 1990s, as one aspect of the globalized era. The new wars are, according to Kaldor, characterized by a blurring of the distinctions between war, organized crime, and wide–scale violations of human rights. In contrast to the geo–political goals of earlier wars, the new wars are about identity politics. Kaldor argues that in the context of globalization, ideological and territorial cleavages of an earlier era have increasingly been supplanted by an emerging political cleavage between cosmopolitanism, based on inclusive, univeralist multicultural values, and the politics of particularistic identities. The evolution of the European Defense and Security Policy has evolved in the shadow of this mutation. A European culture with dubious historical reputation for cosmopolitanism is being thrust upon the global stage at the very moment when its geopolitical concepts are poised on the precipice of desuetude. With [EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Javier] Solana’s

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Old Europe, New Security Thessaloniki Summit document, “A Secure Europe in a Better World” the European community of values is being transformed into a security community.

Reflecting this recognition, “A Secure Europe in a Better World” – most commonly known as the European Security Strategy (ESS) – stands in notable and stark contrast to the 17 September 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America. Specifically, the European Union strategy emphasizes the notion of co–operative engagement, relying on the strength of 450 million members and the recognition that no one country – perhaps in direct contrast to the U.S. national strategy – can “go it alone.” Although the concept of “sharing hegemony” between the U.S. and Europe seems immensely sensible, reality equally dictates that this sharing is unlikely to occur in the near future. Documents and policies regarding the development of a European CFSP have emerged – particularly with the 2001 “Helsinki Declaration” and the call for a 60,000 member European Rapid Reaction Force – that emphasize the necessity of Europe having the ability for independent action. Such action would allow for independence from powerful allies (such as the United States) and from powerful alliances (such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization – NATO). Moreover, the evolution of the European Defense “responsibility” has focused on the so–called Petersberg tasks, which look to development of European humanitarian and crisis response capabilities, that nevertheless fall short of a full–scale intervention force, with the ability to sustain operations over a prolonged time.– As drawn from Article 17.2 of the Treaty of the European Union, and originally stated in the (now defunct) Western European Union Petersberg Declaration of June 1992, these responsibilities entail

 Drawn from an abstract of a presentation at the Pell Center for International Relations and Public Policy, Newport Rhode Island, titled “Culture Wars? War Is already a Culture,” 6 December 2004, at a workshop titled “Prepared for Peace? The Use and Abuse of ‘Culture’ in Military Simulations, Training and Education.” Professor Burgess refers to the work by Mary Kaldor, titled New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Palo Alto, California: Stanford University Press, 1999). Notably, Kaldor was the instrumental force between the creation and production of A Human Security Doctrine for Europe: The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities.  (2 February 2005); (2 February 2005).  For the best argument in favor of such an approach, see Christina M. Schweiss, “Sharing Hegemony: The Future of Transatlantic Security,” Co–operation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association, Volume 38, Number 3, pp. 211–34.  Useful references for outlining the background and conceptual approaches to the CFSP are available online through the European Union Institute for Security Studies, to include Hans–Georg Ehrhart, What Model for the CFSP? Chaillot Papers 55 < http://www. iss–eu.org/chaillot/chai55e.pdf>; Maartje Rutten, From Nice to Laeken: European Defence: Core Documents, Chaillot Papers 51 < http://www.iss–eu.org/chaillot/chai51e.pdf>; Maartje Rutten, From St–Malo to Nice: European Defence: Core Documents, Chaillot Papers 47 < http://www.isseu.org/chaillot/chai47e. pdf> (2 February 2005).

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“humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.” While the purpose of this chapter is not expressly to detail the chronology, conceptual development, and evolution of European defence policy, it is worth noting that the European Union, under the emerging common security and defence policy, may become the ‘lead’ agency for long–term human security initiatives – to include ‘out-of-area’ operations. (Equally, it appears far less likely that the United States will direct in this arena.) Before detailing why and how Europe seeks to promote such security protection initiatives, nonetheless, we must consider varying approaches to the concept of security itself – and why this may well matter for Europe. Approaching Symbolic Security: New and Old Concepts Although security – as basic concept – is frequently considered in the study and analysis of policy decisions, its essential meaning ought to be more widely disagreed than agreed on. Considered a basic concept in policy and academic debates, security is, in stark reality, a quantity that is not basic at any register. Moreover, oftentimes in debates an issue is framed as a security “referent” almost exclusively in terms of “threat” and causal, seemingly inevitable, linkages to violence. By couching “non– traditional” concepts such as environmental security and human security solely on their relationship to potential or real threats (most often within a topology of power), however, such concepts immediately become hostage to “traditional” state–centered, national security paradigms. To be blunt, there have been specific reasons for those intending to affect the debate to use such (perhaps even unintentional) strategies: doing so makes the topic both accessible for decision makers and provides a basis for determining present and future policy. Most often, such decision makers only conceive of security concepts in a power-dominant, state-centric mindset. There is hazard, nevertheless, of adding the term “security” to either environmental or human–centered concerns. Conflating national security, human security, and environmental security all within a distinct  Martin Ortega, Petersberg Tasks and Missions of the European Union Force. < http:// www.iss–eu.org/esdp/04–mo.pdf> (3 February 2005).  In recent debates, there has been a proliferation of descriptors added to the basic term “security.” Each of these descriptors lends a perhaps slightly different connotation as well. To speak of economic security, geographic security, gender security, cultural security, environmental security, ethnic security, military security, physical security, psychological security, political security, societal security, or human security, suggests specific (and probably necessary) recognitions as well as unduly privileges these recognitions with discrete identities that do not depend on, or can exist without, interdependence on other identities.  Portions of this section appeared in earlier versions in “Boomerang Effect: The Convergence of National and Human Security,” Security Dialogue, December 2002, Volume 33, Number 4, pp. 473–88, and “Through the Looking Glass: Creeping Vulnerabilities and the Re–ordering of Security,” March 2005, Volume 36, Number 1, pp. 69–90.

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conceptual framework, furthermore, is not only precarious; it also entails potential hypocrisy. Not all security issues involve “threats”; rather, the notion of vulnerabilities is as serious to some peoples – and some regions – as the familiar “threat” metaphor of armies massing at the borders, or barbarians at the gates. Those who form policy and make critical decisions on behalf of states and of peoples must, ever increasingly, focus on aspects of traditional “national security,” in which military forces likely will continue to play a preëminent role, as well as human security, in which “nontraditional” security issues predominate. In a future where both “hard” and “soft” security will matter, those involved in policy decisions (and those affected by such decisions) increasingly will need to focus on aspects of both threats and vulnerabilities. As we shall see in the following section, nonetheless, it remains unclear if the emerging European approach to security has distinguished fully between these critical categories. A threat is identifiable, often immediate, and requires an understandable response. Military force, for example, traditionally has been sized against threats: to defend a state against external aggression, to protect vital national interests, and enhance state security. (The size of the U.S. and USSR nuclear arsenals during the Cold War made perhaps more sense than today because the perceived threat of global holocaust in the context of a bipolar, ideological struggle was far greater then.) A threat, in short, is either clearly visible or commonly acknowledged. A vulnerability is often only an indicator, often not clearly identifiable, often linked to a complex interdependence among related issues, and does not always suggest a correct or even adequate response. While disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, criminality, narco–trafficking, political repression, and environmental hazards are at least somewhat related issues and do affect the security of states and individuals, the best response to these related issues, in terms of security, is not at all clear. While Canada, for example, has emphasized the relevance of human and environmental security to “high politics,” and attempted to restructure its armed forces to meet these challenges, the relevance of military state–centered forces to address or “solve” non–state–centered issues is questionable. Further, a vulnerability (unlike a threat) is not clearly perceived, often not well understood, and usually a source of contention. Compounding the problem, the time element in the perception of vulnerability must be recognized. Some suggest that the core identity in a security response to issues involving human or environmental security is that of recognizing a condition of extreme vulnerability. Extreme vulnerability can arise from living under conditions of severe economic depravation, to victims of natural disasters, and to those caught in the midst of war and internal conflicts. Nevertheless, there are also cases of long–term vulnerability in which the best response is uncertain. I term these problematic security concerns creeping vulnerability. Given the uncertainty, the complexity, and the sheer non–linear unpredictability of creeping vulnerabilities, the frequent – and classic – mistake of the decision maker is to respond with the “gut reaction.” Thus, the intuitive

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response to situations of clear ambiguity is, classically, to do nothing at all. The more appropriate response is to take an adaptive posture and to avoid the inclination to act on gut instinct. To be clear here: avoiding disastrous long–term impacts of creeping vulnerabilities (which can evolve over decades) requires strategic planning, strategic investment, and strategic attention. To date, states and international institutions seem woefully unprepared for such strategic necessities. Moreover, environmental and human security, since they are contentious issues, often fall victim to the ­do nothing response because of their vulnerability–based conditions in which the clearly identifiable cause and the desired prevented effect are often ambiguous. Plausible “creeping vulnerability” scenarios thus reasonably might include: • different levels of population growth in various regions, particularly between the “developed” and the “emerging” world – to incorporate disproportionate population growth – youth bulges – and levels of urbanization unseen in human history; • the outbreak and the rapid spread of disease among specific “target” populations (such as HIV/AIDS) as well as the spread of new strains of emerging contagions such as SARS; • significant climate change due to increased temperatures, decline in precipitation, and rising sea levels; • the scarcity of water and other natural resources in specific regions, and the compounding growth among populations dependent on transboundary water resources; • the decline in food production and the need to increase imported goods; • progressing soil erosion and desertification; • increased urbanization and pollution in “megacities” (populations of ten million or more) around the globe, with the recognition that over the next two decades, most will migrate to urban environments that lack the infrastructure to support rapid, concentrated population growth; • the lack of warning systems for natural disasters and environmental impacts – from earthquakes to tsunamis to land erosion. These emerging vulnerabilities will not mitigate or replace more traditional hard security dilemmas. Rather, we will see the continued reality of threat–based conditions contending with the rise of various vulnerability–based urgencies. Paradoxically, creeping vulnerabilities likely will receive the least attention, even as their interdependent complexities grow increasingly difficult to address.  The European Union, following the United Nations model of conflict prevention and early warning, has made concrete advances in decision–making procedures and monitoring systems to begin to address these creeping vulnerabilities before they become threats.  Admittedly, my suppositions above that insist on a distinction between threat and vulnerability become somewhat suspect in the so–called “Age of Terror.” While no one

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In the classical sense, security – from the Latin securitas – refers to tranquility and freedom from care, or what Cicero termed the absence of anxiety upon which the fulfilled life depends. Notably, numerous governmental and international reports that focus on the terms “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want” emphasize a universalistic notion that security is a basic, and elemental, need. In the once widely accepted realist understanding, the state was the sole guarantor of this anxiety absence: security extended downwards from states to individuals; conversely, the stable state extended upwards in its relations to influence the security of the international system. Individual security, stemming from the liberal thought of the Enlightenment, also was considered both a unique and collective good.10 Moreover, despite the abundance of theoretical and conceptual approaches in recent history, the right of states to protect themselves under the rubric of “national security” and through traditional instruments of power (political, economic, and especially military) has never been challenged sufficiently. The responsibility, however, for the guarantee of the individual good – under any security rubric – has never been obvious. Therefore, the future will require decision makers to focus on a broad – and broadening – understanding of the meaning of security. The 1994 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report, for example, attempted to recognize a necessary conceptual shift: The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of nuclear holocaust. It has been related to nation–states more than people. . . . Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily lives. For many of them, security symbolized protection from the threat of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime [or terrorism], social conflict, political doubts that certain states and actors are under “threat” from al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah, the shadowy nature of such loosely grouped networks defies the traditional sense of threat. Loose terrorist “networks” often display the following characteristics: the facility to operate effectively as a lateral (and noncentralized) network, the ability to learn, the capacity to anticipate, and the capability to “self–organize” or reconstitute after they have been struck. As such, these networks operate on the fault line between threat and vulnerability, and too narrow a focus on either “threat” or “vulnerability” will only lead to frustration – and failure. 10 Adam Smith, for example, in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, mentions only the security of the sovereign, who possesses a standing army to protect him against popular discontent, and is thus “secure” and able to allow his subject the liberty of political “remonstrance.” By contrast, M. J. de Condorcet’s argument, in the late eighteenth century, suggested that the economic security of individuals was an essential condition for political society; fear – and the fear of fear – were for Condorcet the enemies of liberal politics. These distinctions are considered ably in Emma Rothschild’s “What is Security? The Quest for World Order”, Dædulus: The Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Volume 124, Number 3 (June 1995), available at http://web.lexis–nexis.com; also see: Emma Rothschild, “Economic Security and Social Security,” paper presented to the UNRISD Conference on Rethinking Social Development, Center for History and Economics, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1995.

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repression and environmental hazards. With the dark shadows of the Cold War receding, one can see that many conflicts are within nations rather than between nations.11

In 2003, the UN Commission on Human Security expanded this concept to include protection for peoples suffering through violent conflict, for those who are dislocated, for those in post–conflict situations, and for protecting and improving conditions of poverty, health, and knowledge.12 Essentially, states and regions, in a globalized context, no longer can afford solely to emphasize national security issues without recognizing that abstract concepts such as values, norms, and expectations also influence both choice and outcome. In its most recent declarations, the European Union appears to have incorporated these recognitions as a basic ethos in approaching security. Yet, despite the “clean” distinctions made in Table 3.1, there is danger in following the precepts of one security concept at the expense of another.13

11 UN Development Programme (UNDP). UN Human Development Report (New York, 1994), 3; pp. 22–3. 12 Commission on Human Security, Protecting and Empowering People. (19 June 2003). 13 Earlier versions of this still evolving table were partially inspired by Bjorn Møller’s presentation titled “Global, National, Societal, and Human Security: A General Discussion with a Case Study from the Middle East” at the 4th Pan–European International Relations Conference in Canterbury, United Kingdom, and as part of Security and Environment in the Mediterranean: Conceptualizing Security and Environmental Conflict, Han Günter Brauch, P. H. Liotta, Antonio Marquina, Paul Rogers & Mohammed El–Sayed Selim, eds. (Berlin: Springer Books, 2003): Bjorn Møller, Chapter 12, “National, Societal and Human Security: Discus­sion – Case Study of the Israel–Palestine Conflict”, as well as work presented to the Faculty of Civil Defence in Belgrade, Serbia, and published in Ljudska Bezbednost [Human Security] 1(1) under the title “National, Societal and Human Security”, 2003. Notably, the following table is markedly different in several critical areas. The author fundamentally argues that those in the so–called Copenhagen School – notably Wæver, Buzan, & de Wilde (1995, 1998, 2003, 2004) – are inevitably delinking their arguments from effective use in the foreseeable future for policy decisions of most states.

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Table 3.1: Form of Security

Alternative Security Concepts Tradition & Origin

Environmental NonTraditional

National “Embedded”

Human

Traditional, RealistBased Traditional & NonTraditional, Realist- & LiberalBased

NonTraditional, Liberal- & MarxistBased

Speci.c Focus

Specific Concerns

Hazards/ (Threats and Vulnerabilities) Eco-System Global Humankind Sustainability through: Resource Depletion, Scarcity, War, & Ecological Destruction The State Sovereignty, Challenges from Territorial other States (& Integrity Stateless Actors) States, Identity/ Nations, Nations, Inclusion/ Societal Morality/Values/ Migrants, & Groups, Alien Culture Conduct, Economic Quality of Life, Classes, Wealth Political Distribution & Action Committees, Political Cohesion & Interest Groups Individuals, Humankind, Human Rights, Rule of Law, & Development

Survival, Human Development, Identity, & Governance

The Government, Globalization, & Natural Catastrophe & Change

Some brief explanation of the concepts used in this graphic might prove useful. In essence, the distinctions move from a “top–down” global emphasis to a “bottom– up” individual focus. Environmental security emphasizes the sustained viability of the ecosystem, while recognizing that the ecosystem itself is perhaps the ultimate weapon of mass destruction. Yet from an alternative point of view, humankind itself is the ultimate threat to the ecosystem. Thus, from a radically extreme perspective, elimination of humanity proves the ultimate guarantee of the ecosystem’s survival.

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National security represents the traditional understanding of security, to include the protection of territory and citizens from external threats – from other states, and, more recently, “stateless” actors. Hyper–emphasis on state security, especially in the emergence of “homeland security,” affects other concepts of security, especially regarding the practice of individual liberties and the freedom to participate openly in civil society. Embedded security is not synonymous with the more commonly used term “societal security.” Rather, embedded security is somewhat symbiotically (perhaps parasitically) linked to other security concepts. It often represents the narrow interests of specific communities, nations, or political action groups within a state. In its extreme form, it can lead to social stratification, the fracturing of “common” interests, and xenophobia. Human security, other than a common agreement on the focus on the individual, is still an emerging concept. In the September 1999 issue of Security Dialogue, Astri Suhrke pointed to a fundamental bifurcation from which human security as conceptual approach and policy principle continues to suffer: Is it related more to long–term “human development,” such as was suggested in the 1994 United Nations Human Development Report, or (as a security issue) does it constitute a principle of intervention during immediate crisis, such as Rwanda in 1994 or Kosovo in 1999 or even Iraq in 2003?14 The answer to either question is “Nes” – a little bit of “no” and a little “yes.” Thus, while some (including this author in the past) have argued that there may be a growing convergence between what was called traditionally “national security” and the still developing concept of “human security,” there appears to be an even more powerful counterargument in which the opposite trend is apparent.15 In interventions as disparate as Somalia in 1993 to Liberia (at various stages of disintegration) to the Balkans in the 1990s and Iraq in 2003, there seems to have emerged an overt increase in American and British pursuit of aggressive, self–defined interest, accompanied by an uneven commitment to issues involving human security. Thus, Prime Minister Tony Blair spoke of “universal values” and President George W. Bush proclaimed, “Freedom is the non–negotiable demand of human dignity.” George W. Bush, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, released 17 September 2002. Available at whitehouse.gov.nsc/nss/2002/nssintro.html Yet, foreign policy choices regarding intervention were made almost exclusively when such choices 14 See Astri Suhrke’s useful discussion in “Human Security and the Interests of the State,” Security Dialogue, Volume 30, Number 3, September 1999, pp. 270–71. 15 For one perspective that suggested that a convergence between human and national security was occurring in the period after September 11, 2001, see P. H. Liotta, “Boomerang Effect: The Convergence of National and Human Security,” Security Dialogue, Volume 33, Number 4, pp. 473–88, as well as the responses of: Brooke A. Smith–Windsor, “Terrorism, Individual Security, and the Role of the Military: A Reply to Liotta,” Security Dialogue, Volume 33, Number 4, pp. 489–94; P. H. Liotta, “Converging Interests and Agendas: The Boomerang Returns,” Security Dialogue, Volume 33, Number 4, pp. 495–8.

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satisfied the narrow, selfish and direct “national security interests” of more powerful states.16 Satisfaction of certain aspects of human security were purely incidental. As the blatant international failure in 1994 to do anything in Rwanda illustrates – other than a collective decision to do nothing – human security is hardly proving to be the sine qua non for decisions by states to intervene in the affairs of other states. In other words, taken to extreme forms, human security and national security can be conceptualized as antagonistic rather than convergent approaches. Each, in its exclusive recognition, remains problematic. Implementing human security thus rests uncomfortably on the horns of a dilemma. While the effort to promote human security in the arena of “high politics” on the part of the Canadian and Norwegian governments since the 1990s is known well, there is a temptation to proselytize righteously as well. Such so–called “middle power” states, after all, can exercise significant moral clout by emphasizing that the rights of the individual are at least as important as protecting the territorial and sovereign integrity of the state. Yet when larger powers, particularly those with significant militaries (such as the United States or the United Kingdom), advocate similar positions, it is their overwhelming power that is recognized, respected and resented. On the one hand, what is perceived as the “moral clout” of the middle power is sensed as “hegemony unbridled” when it is emphasized in a similar fashion by major powers. On the other hand, when states take actions in the name, or in the principled following, of human security, their motives often are linked inextricably to issues that are embedded in the more traditional concepts of “national security” and protection of the state. Idealism thus becomes enmeshed in realism; actions taken on behalf of the powerless are determined only by the powerful.17 As Packer 16 For the most clarifying statement of the “Blair Doctrine,” see “The Doctrine of the International Community,” delivered to the Chicago Press Club during the U.S.–led NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999. The Bush position is expressed in the National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 17 September 2002, most specifically in the “Introduction” and “II. Champion Aspirations for Human Dignity.” 17 Accordingly, we witness 150,000 American forces deployed to Iraq in 2003 but only six communication, command and control specialists initially put ashore in Liberia to support Nigerian peacekeepers in stability and security operations. Nominally, both scenarios involve regime change and stabilizing regional security – as well as intervention for the protection of citizens abused by the state. Yet the physical and economic geography of Iraq place it at the center of a region declared “vital” to U.S. interests, awash in petroleum and natural gas resources. National security interests, in the form of geopolitics, again triumphs. Moreover, the alleged bellicosity of the former Iraqi regime, particularly regarding potential or actual possession of weapons of mass destruction, clearly supported more traditional national security interests such as defense of the homeland and protection of one’s territory from attack. Liberia, while clearly a regional troublemaker, never posed a “threat” to the United States or any of its close allies. (Make no mistake: It was a brutal, authoritarian regime that threatened its own people as well as the entire security architecture of West Africa but remained little more than a perceived peripheral threat for many.)

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notes, referring to both the Kosovo and Iraq interventions, and the state–declared reasons for them: “The [Bush] Administration] has given idealism a bad name, and it will now take years to rescue Václav Havel from Paul Wolfowitz.”18 Undoubtedly, increasing numbers now speak out on behalf of what the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty has termed the “responsibility to protect.” The title the Commission used for its final report, released 18 December 2001, available at http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf. This is the responsibility of some agency or state (whether it be a superpower such as the United States or an institution such as the United Nations) to enforce the principle of security that sovereign states owe to their citizens. However, there is a dark side of this proposition, of course: the “responsibility to protect” also means the “right to intervene.” In the topology of power, dominant states will intervene at the time and place of their choosing. Although it is unclear how permanent or deep the damage was from the 2003 U.S.–European transatlantic rift (over intervention in Iraq), there are warning signals. As Kagan notes, a crisis of legitimacy has emerged: The fact remains that Kosovo war was illegal, and not only because it lacked Security Council authorization: Serbia had not committed any aggression against another state but was slaughtering its own ethnic Albanian population. The intervention therefore violated the sovereign equality of all [states], a cardinal principle – of the UN Charter and the bedrock principle of international law for centuries. During the Kosovo conflict, Henry Kissinger warned that ‘the abrupt abandonment of the concept of national sovereignty’ risked unmooring the world from any notion of order, legal or otherwise. Many Europeans rejected this complaint at the time. Back then…before the Iraq war…they did not seem to believe that international legitimacy resided exclusively with the Security Council, or in the UN Charter, or even in traditional principles of international law. Instead, they believed in the legitimacy of their common postmodern moral values.19

In 2003, during the dispute over Iraq, those postmodern values were not shared or even understood universally. Europe Incorporates Human Security In September 2004, the European Union released an official document titled A Human Security Doctrine for Europe, which detailed the scope, organization, and intent that the EU “should build its security policy on a ‘human security doctrine’, aimed at protecting individuals through law–enforcement with the occasional use of force’.”20 Taking into account the need for complementarities in civil and military 18 George Packer, “War and Ideas,” New Yorker, (5 July 2004), p. 32. 19 Robert Kagan, “America’s Crisis of Legitimacy,” Foreign Affairs, Volume 83, Number 2 (March/April 2004), p. 75. 20 From the press release, S239/04, “Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP, Responds to Report by Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities. (7 February 2005). 21 Press Release, “Europe Needs a Human Security Doctrine – And New Force with One Third [sic] Civilians.” (7 February 2005). 22 A Human Security Doctrine for Europe: The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, p. 5. http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/Human%20Security %20Report%20Full.pdf> (7 February 2005).

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of force never is detailed in official documents and declarations, the sentiment to respect “freedom” is unquestionable: There is only one force of history that can break the reign of hatred and resentment, and expose the pretensions of tyrants, and reward the hopes of the decent and tolerant, and that is the force of human freedom…. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world…. Freedom, by its nature, must be chosen, and defended by citizens, and sustained by the rule of law and the protection of minorities. And when the soul of a nation finally speaks, the institutions that arise may reflect customs and traditions very different from our own. America will not impose our own style of government on the unwilling. Our goal instead is to help others find their own voice, attain their own freedom, and make their own way.23

The U.S. strategy does not detail specifically how military forces uphold human security; rather, the priorities remain the good practice of governments and development.24 The enemy of freedom, especially emphasized in the Bush 2002 State of the Union address, is terrorism, which must be targeted and destroyed.25 In contrast, and with its limiting focus on human security as law enforcement with the occasional use of force, the EU human security doctrine emphasizes legal frameworks and institutions (such as the International Criminal Court – which the U.S. has refused to recognize) and developing specific guidelines and criteria that could authorize intervention exclusive of UN Security Council authorization.26 While emphasizing the need to prevent “gross human rights violations,” the declaration is quite specific: The [Human Security] doctrine [for Europe] comprises three elements: •

•

A set of seven principles for operations in situations of severe insecurity that apply to both ends and means. These principles are: the primacy of human rights, clear political authority, multilateralism, a bottom–up approach, regional focus, the use of legal instruments and the appropriate use of force. The report puts particular emphasis on the bottom–up approach; on communication, consultation, dialogue and partnership with the local population in order to improve early warning, intelligence gathering, mobilization of local support, implementation and sustainability. A ‘Human Security Response Force’, initially composed of 15,000 men and women, of whom at least one third would be civilian (police, legal experts, development and humanitarian specialists, administrators, etc.). The Force

23 President George W. Bush’s “Second Inaugural Address,” 20 January 2005. http:// www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/01/20050120–1.html (February 10, 2005). 24 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, in particular “Introduction”, pp. i–ii. < http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf> (9 February 2005). 25 The President’s “State of the Union Address,” 29 January 2002. http://www. whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/01/20050120–1.html (10 February 2005) 26 A Human Security Doctrine for Europe, 4.2 “A Legal Framework,” pp. 20–22.

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•

would be drawn from dedicated troops and civilian capabilities already made available by member states as well as a proposed ‘Human Security Volunteer Service’. A new legal framework to govern both decisions to intervene and operations on the ground. This would build on the domestic law of host states, the domestic law of sending states, international criminal law, international human rights law and international humanitarian law.27

By detailing “capabilities” in the form of force structure and organization – especially the EU Human Security Response Force of 15,000 personnel (roughly the size of a division) – the doctrine notably comprises both military and civilian specialists, able to deploy to locales as disparate as Macedonia, Kosovo, or the Democratic Republic of Congo. The force itself would be tiered, drawing first on staff and headquarters capabilities from Brussels, with a secondary force of 5,000 personnel able to deploy in ten days. The final tier of 5,000 personnel would remain at lower level of readiness but periodically would train and exercise together.28 The force itself would draw both from a professional core, with a civilian component of doctors, medical personnel, legal specialists, human rights monitors, and those who “straddle” the military/police divide such as Carabinieri or gendarmerie. The final aspect of this organization would be the “Human Security Volunteer Service.”29 The force would be expected to be culturally aware, multinational, attuned to the multiple dimensions of conflict and intervention, and imbued with a specific, dedicated ethos. Non–governmental organizations (NGOs) and private corporations might comprise part of the “Human Security Volunteer Service.” In short, while this EU Human Security Force would represent an ambitious, even breathtaking initiative to respond to crisis challenges, it remains little more than a response to violence, to direct threats, and is nothing more than a well thought through intervention force proposal. The old cliché that describes this trap is an apt reminder: If all you have is a hammer, then every problem begins to look like a nail. Surely, as the interventions in Somalia and in the Balkans illustrate, traditional applications of military security may not be the best, and are certainly not the only, viable strategic instruments. Yet little consideration has been given to how – other than through intervention – it should or could response to emerging vulnerabilities of individuals and regions in crisis. To the contrary, the EU document draws its emphasis from five specific threats identified in the ESS: terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, failing states, and organized crime.30 27 From the “Executive Summary,” Barcelona, A Human Security Doctrine for Europe, p. 1. 28 Ibid., pp. 18–19. 29 Ibid., 20. 30 A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003, pp. 6–9. (7 February 2005).

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Thus, while treating (specifically human) security policy as an ethos – indeed even a critical transformative ethos – is essential, it remains unclear how the European Union truly is broadening its capabilities to respond, other than addressing the necessity to act, to be ready to intervene when necessary, and to have the organization and structure to do so.31 How to deal with strategic challenges (such as long–term investment and planning) or pragmatic factors (such as the vulnerability of unarmed civilian specialists in intervention situations) remain, as yet, unanswered. Nevertheless, at least the dialogue has begun. Moving to a European Security Commitment Ultimately, all states and all alliances are far from what O’Hanlon and Singer term a global intervention capability on behalf of “humanitarian transformation.”32 Granted, the threat of mass casualty terrorism now exists anytime, anywhere – and states and regions are responding differently to this challenge. Yet the global community today also faces many of the same problems of the 1990s: civil wars, faltering states, humanitarian crises. Moreover, the deteriorating conditions caused by “creeping vulnerabilities” further intensify the likely complexity of the future security dynamic. While European states and the European Union are no closer perhaps than anyone else to addressing how best to solve these challenges, they have at least acknowledged the need to think, act and organize differently to prepare for this future. While sounding the death knell for NATO is hardly a certainty, many believe this has become more of a possibility in recent years. Charles Kupchan, a former U.S. National Security Council member, has been quite clear in his views on the security dilemma: The Atlantic alliance appears poised for demise. Its founder and primary patron, the United States, is losing interest in the alliance, resulting in a military pact that is hollowing out and of diminishing geopolitical relevance…. Europe’s security order is thus in the process of becoming much more European and much less Atlantic.33

At one point in history (known as the Cold War), the “hard” security map took precedence over all other mental maps – and NATO was the key security linkage. Neither of these past realities may prove to be applicable in the future. 31 For the argument that human security requires a critical transformative ethos, see Kyle Grayson, “Securitization and the Boomerang Debate: A Rejoinder to Liotta and Smith– Windsor,” Security Dialogue, 2003, Volume 34, Number 3, pp. 337–43, and “A Challenge to Power over Knowledge in Traditional Security Studies,” Security Dialogue, 2004, Volume 35, Number 3, p. 357. 32 Michael O’Hanlon and P. W. Singer, “The Humanitarian Transformation: Expanding Global Intervention Capacity,” Survival, Volume 46, Number 1, Spring 2004, pp. 77–99. 33 Charles A. Kupchan, “The Rise of Europe, America’s Changing Internationalism, and the End of U.S. Primacy,” Political Science Quarterly, Volume 18, Number 2 (2003), pp. 225–26.

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Today, when we speak of the business of security – for the individual, the state, the community and for regions – we find us ourselves mired in a complex web of seemingly endless contradictions. Perhaps one of the most overlooked aspects of the broadening future security architecture lies in how Greater Europe has attempted to address common aspects of security and interests, rather than the exclusive self– interests of states. NATO expansion, in other words, is not the only security measure being tested in the evolving Europe. To the contrary, other players in the institutional map of Europe have gained in influence and significance: the European Union (obviously), the Partnership for Peace (PfP), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), as well as a number of sub–regional associations. The PfP, for example, once seen as a kind of halfway house for NATO membership, is now recognized to be a more fluid and dynamic process to encourage associated members to participate in multiple peacekeeping and peace maintenance operations, whether in Europe or out–of–area. PfP, in its modest way, helped pave the security map for American and coalition operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq, even as its founders once thought it only a doorway to NATO, and its applicants considered it little more than a testing ground for entry into Greater Europe. What is happening in Europe, whether one refers to it as co–operative security or comprehensive security, has implications far beyond the region itself in this century. In essence, a grand experiment in security architecture is taking place. It is not clear that this experiment is doomed to failure. There are geographic as well as conceptual reasons why Europe has attempted to approach these “new” security challenges directly. In the broadest sense, the “new” map of Greater Europe includes Turkey, the Ukraine, the Russian Federation, and perhaps even Christian Armenia and Georgia, as well as Muslim Azerbaijan. Greater Europe therefore inevitably will fold into the geographies of North Africa and the Middle East as well. The conflict and the blending of these various states and nations represent both a new symbolic geography and symbolic security for Greater Europe. As Maria Todorova states it, “Europe ends where politicians want it to end.”34 Inevitably, the mental maps that decision makers use have everything to do with how and where they draw the line. A real debate ought to be taking place today. Rather than dismiss human security outright, a larger examination of what forms of security are relevant and right among communities, states, regions, and which even might apply to a global rule–set – and what types of security are not relevant – seems appropriate and necessary. If this occurs, a truly remarkable tectonic shift might take place in the conduct of international relations and human affairs. Remarkably, the European Union may help to propel this debate toward a more powerful, definitive and understandable solution.

34 Maria Nikolaeva Todorova, Imagining the Balkans (New York, 1997), pp. 160; 139.

Chapter 4

European Security and Defense Policy: The EU’s Search for a Strategic Role Kenneth Keulman

Weatherhead Center for International Affairs Harvard University

The commemoration of the 60th anniversary of the D–Day landings had the resonance of a requiem, and not only on account of the soldiers who perished on that day. On both sides of the Atlantic, there exists a perception that the Atlantic Alliance that developed out of World War II and was victorious in the Cold War, is wavering in an attempt to revive from the severe demands it has borne during the last several years. Eleven September and the “war on terrorism” signaled a decisive moment in U.S.–European relations and the ensuing Iraq war in 2003 placed the alliance under severe stress. So much so that the question: Is the alliance moving toward transatlantic drift? – is a viable one. During the postwar period, with its bipolar global ordinance, United States’ assurance of European defense was taken at face value, as was the disposition of Europe for security. The congruence of U.S.–European interest was an important element in the creation of the postwar global system. Complex events resulted in a division of Europe into spheres of influence on both a global and regional level. The Soviets were contained within their own territory because of the alliance, and America became the ascendant power throughout the rest of the world. The transatlantic alliance produced stability. It also created the myth that for America, Europe continued to be the most critical strategic and diplomatic region, one with which America was joined not only by essential security and economic interests, but also by shared values and culture. Not long after September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush made unequivocal what had been apparent ever since the closing stages of the Cold War – the transatlantic alliance was no longer the focal point of the United States’ worldview . The Cold War served as a naive but functional means to perceive the issue of world order. It concentrated U.S. endeavor on strengthening the military capability necessary to deter Soviet belligerence and economic, military, and political coalitions necessary to contain Soviet objectives. For America’s West European allies, the United States’ anti–Soviet fixation resulted in a better situation than the scattered and  ������������������������������� See “A Creaking Partnership,” The Economist, 5 June, 2004, pp. 22–24.

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somewhat unconstrained U.S. goals of the wartime period. Yet, this nascent ideal of the “American Century” and its consequent U.S. hegemony evoked serious qualms in Western Europe, as well as in the Soviet Union. Stalin affirmed his own ambitions in enforcing Russian supremacy in Eastern Europe. But the ensuing Cold War was useful from a West European standpoint. It held in check United States ambitions within the more tractable aim of restraining Soviet provocation. The abrupt demise of the Soviet “threat” demanded a new delineation of the apprehensions, aspirations, and policies of both Europeans and Americans. One analyst of U.S. foreign policy maintains that Europe today has moved beyond power into a self–contained Kantian world of rules, laws, and negotiation, while America functions in a Hobbesian world in which rules and laws are inconstant and military force is frequently required. Yet, neither Europe nor America has at any time been either Kantian or Hobbesian. Instead, they continually follow foreign policies that contain elements of both positions. European Political Integration The development of the European Community (EC) toward political and economic union is an exceptional accomplishment in modern politics. The motivation, though, for European governments to relinquish sovereign privileges and synchronize economic policies, is contested. Do these measures of consolidation exhibit the ascendance of federalist principles, the significance of national security issues, the achievement of technocratic innovation, or the dexterity of political entrepreneurs? None of these explanations are in themselves adequate to decipher the growth of the European community. While it remains a disputed explanation, evidence implies that integration has mainly been about economic interdependence and liberalization. Politicians pragmatically and aggressively sought national economic superiority by means of conventional diplomatic methods such as utilizing an unbalanced form of interdependence and finessing institutional responsibilities. The majority of interpretations of national preferences in favor of or opposing European integration underscore ideology or geopolitical interest. The core of geopolitical interpretations of national preferences regarding economic cooperation exists in the connection between economic policies and fundamental political and  cf. David Calleo, “American National Interest and the new Europe: The Millennium has not yet Arrived.” in Daniel Chirot (ed.), The Crisis of Leninism and the Decline of the Left: The Revolutions of 1989 (Seattle, 1992).  Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power, p. 3. A shorter version of this essay originally appeared as an article entitled “Power and Weakness” in Policy Review (June/July 2002). Kagan’s provocative article portrayed the developing fissure between Europe and America as a consequence of the basic divergence in the way in which each perceives the world.  See John Gillingham, European Integration, 1950–2003: Superstate or New Market Economy? (Cambridge, 2003).

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military objectives. The concentration is on collateral effects of economic integration. Thus, integration is not a goal in itself but a mechanism by which to manage loftier political interests. The aims of these interests may involve defense against a military threat to political autonomy and territorial integrity, or encompass a situation when a danger to autonomy or territory is viewed as an offense against national identity. No matter what the security issues, the contention is a comparable one: states are more disposed to collaborate economically with those nations with which they are affiliated in tracking a specific geopolitical aim. This notion appears credible since the international system is viewed as a chaotic and inherently hazardous environment. Risks to autonomy and security, consequently, are foremost among incentives for state action, even when engaging in economic transactions. Yet, there is still debate over the conceptual connection between economic collaboration and dangers to security. Credible geopolitical understandings of European integration emphasize the requirement to react to a danger by regulating the security elements of economic integration, yet the exact type of danger and reaction may shift. On the long road toward European integration, Europe’s new constitution encountered a decisive ‘non’ in a referendum in France in May 2005, when a divided nation obstructed the next step forward for the 25–member European Union (EU). For the first time, a major founding member countered the existing course of European integration. This was followed by another rejection of the EU’s historic first charter in the Netherlands in June. This rejection may well thrust the European Union into an exceptional crisis and leave Europe gridlocked. Domestic issues currently govern the agenda of European nations. An EU more focused on its internal problems during a period of significant international challenges is a probable result. One of the concerns reflected in the vote was the potential future Turkish membership in the Union. The disarray over the constitution as well as over the budget, contributes to an undermining of efforts toward further integration. European Security and Defense Identity The integration of foreign and defense policy has been contentious. When initially considered as a possibility in 1990, the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), had two principal partisans, and one major adversary. Those who approved were Germany and France, with Great Britain as a general rule, against. The U.S., like Britain, was apprehensive from the start. This can be observed in the Alliance’s New Strategic Concept (released in November 1991) – the first NATO strategy after the end of the Cold War, when any mention of the “European Pillar” is circumvented. Karl Kaiser, at that time Director of the German Council on Foreign Relations, recalls  Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca, 1998), pp. 27–8.  Ibid., p. 29.

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from contacts with the George H.W. Bush administration, particularly with National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, that “they were very reluctant on the issue and preferred NATO to remain the instrument of Western security. On the other hand, they had to give in a little, and set up the Berlin–plus arrangement. It was a constant battle, not facilitated by French dogmatism.” Making up the divisions were questions of European Union political integration, national interests, defense expenditures, leadership, threat perception and cooperation with Russia. Less than a decade later, the identical questions still obstructed development of an authentic European security and defense identity, notwithstanding important proclamations by NATO in 1994 and 1996 for the institution and functioning of this form of identity. Given the activity of NATO in the Gulf War and its achievements vis–à–vis the Implementation Forces (IFOR) and Stabilization Forces (SFOR) in Bosnia, and the inclusion of Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland into NATO, it may seem that a proficient ESDI is even less probable. Yet the continuous integration of the European Union, particularly with the introduction of a European Monetary Union (EMU) and progressive enlargement, thrusts defense and security more and more into the arena of European Union affairs. This also corresponds with the shifting character of security policy, in which non–military factors – the Union’s “civilian power” character – are increasing in importance. Common Foreign and Security Policy The European Union has abolished numerous intrastate obstacles to investment and trade; approved a single currency for the majority of its member states; consented to common policies regulating environmental protection, foreign trade, and antitrust; and is advancing common border security policies and improved collaboration between the courts and police. With so much intensive action, demands have mounted to conclude the reforms by augmenting them with a common foreign and security policy, along with a military force. The European Union is developing a rapid–response force which will be made up of 60,000 troops, 1,000 military aircraft, 400 maritime vessels and 5,000 armed police. A military force derived from this would be able to remain in the field for a year. The far–reaching argument that took place during spring 2003 within the European Union over the Iraq conflict, while ordinarily viewed as evidence that the Union has no common foreign policy, may in reality act as a force for unity. If this is the case, it will be only one in a chain of events that moved Europeans toward increasing solidarity. The problems Europeans met with the United States in the Bosnia and Kosovo hostilities and the indication purveyed by these hostilities of the large breach in military capabilities between America and Europe, resulted  Personal communication: Karl Kaiser, 6 August, 2005.  Emil J. Kirchner, “Second Pillar and Eastern Enlargement: The Prospects for a European Security and Defence Identity,” in James Sperling (ed.), Europe in Change: Two Tiers or Two Speeds? (Manchester, U.K., 1999), p. 46.

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in intensifying motivation on the part of European Union members to strengthen military collaboration among themselves. The direction that the Kosovo conflict followed justifies those who maintain that a central feature of the post–cold war international system is the inauguration of updated security priorities. These new priorities demand a reexamination not only of the connection between the military and economic aspects of security policy, but also of the connections between military and economic security institutions. Responses to the issue of comparative military inadequacy as well as the need for more cooperation were addressed at the French–UK summit in St–Malo in 1998. Central elements of this shared awareness were validated at higher echelon political levels in the European Union, with the purpose of fortifying and expanding Union institutions. The two trilateral summits held in September and November 2003 by Britain, France, and Germany in the course of the dissension over Iraq confirm the significance they attribute to cooperation on foreign and security policy. This orientation has been attended by the expansion of new organizational arrangements, in the “ Brusselization” of Union foreign policy. Since the Cologne European Council of June 1999, the European Union has put into effect a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). In October 1999, former NATO Secretary General Javier Solana became the first designated European Union High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) [currently EU Minister for Foreign Affairs]. A new entity, the Political and Security Committee, was established in Brussels, staffed by ambassadors from the Union member countries who were mandated with initiating common policies. The European Security and Defense Policy marks a movement away from the civilian nature of the EU and its institutional connection with NATO. This transition has been contentious and complicated. A ‘militarized’ European Union demands a suitable structure and culture, as well as policies and their implementation, if it is to bring about productive associations with other international organizations. Results will rely on both the political will of European nations and America. The European Council consequently must be able to rely on Member States or NATO military forces for certain military security functions. The military character of this project marks the termination of an arrangement developed in the early 1950s between the United States and Western Europe about the deployment of military instruments in foreign policy, an agreement in which NATO, the Western European Union (WEU) and the nation–states themselves regulated Europe’s security, and the European Community/Union was a civilian organization. ESDP is altering some of the basic presuppositions on which parts of the integration initiative were based since the 1950s.10 Throughout the period of the Cold War, the European Commission was considered the central point of a civilian–power European community. It was directed by  Cf. James Sperling, ed., Europe in Change: Two Tiers or Two Speeds?, p. ix. 10 ����������������������������������������������������������� Anne Deighton, The European Security and Defence Policy,” Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 40/4 (November 2002), pp. 719–20.

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the belief that, after two devastating world wars, Europe had to begin resolving emergent hostilities without recourse to armed conflict. Notions about what security consists of, and the character of the threats to security have broadened since the end of the 1980s. Security is today ordinarily understood as signifying more than stability or absence of war, though historically the EU was inaugurated as a civilian establishment that would promote peace within and beyond its borders. Even from its ‘Petersberg’ definition, security as now understood in Europe is not only about the circumvention of violence and war by the deployment of military mechanisms. It encompasses humanitarian and human rights issues, along with environmental, economic, and criminal questions. With the end of the Cold War, a maturing understanding developed that security in Europe demands the reconstruction of injured and defenseless societies bordering the EU into sustainable democratic countries by facilitating economic development, conscientious governance, and conflict prevention. The demise of the former Soviet Union’s Eastern bloc has had an effect on the EU’s own understanding of its international character. It developed common expectations about the role of peacekeeping, intervention, ‘protectorates,’ nation–building, pooled sovereignty, and relations with the United Nations (UN) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The EU has attempted to extend influence beyond its borders with an increasing scope of mechanisms. Reconstruction work in the Balkans is only one instance of this attempt.11 The integration of foreign and security policy has been divisive. Is the EU able to make ESDP genuinely functional, transforming its diplomatic and economic influence into a more proficient political capability? Is it able to discern the crucial arena in which governmental striving and organizational controls are mutually able to fashion the conditions for activity? If the European Union is to have this arena in which to be a thoroughgoing strategic institution, it will need the type of cultural circumstances within which it is able to advance consistent policies sustained by an organizational framework and an efficient apparatus for achieving its policy objectives. It also requires the ability to articulate its dealings with nations and other international institutions.12 The ‘Berlaymont’ revival The closest entity to a peer that America confronts is the European Union, and any number of analysts perceive Europe and the United States as headed for a political clash,13 some semblance of which was provided by the U.S. conflict with France and Germany over America’s incursion into Iraq. Europe pays out approximately two– thirds of what America spends on defense, yet has more active military personnel, and encompasses two nations in possession of nuclear weapons. Though in the 11 ��������������� Ibid., p. 727. 12 Ibid., p. 728. 13 ������������� Joseph Nye, The Paradox of American Power (Oxford, 2002) p. 30.

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context of soft power (a term coined by Joseph Nye in the late 1980s, referring to the cultural and ideological appeal of one culture for another), European societies have possessed a certain magnetism world–wide. An archetype endures that politics Brussels–style has little to do with popular initiatives and conscientious citizens, that this politics does not have to give any consideration to street protests, but exists only in the intangible milieu of statistics, sets of laws, and reports. And there is a legitimate anxiety, for reasons such as the geographical distance between the Brussels bureaucracy and ordinary citizens. Yet in reality, the European constitutional settlement compels firm controls on European Union policy. And the sensation of Europe coming together around Brussels has held a fascination for Eastern Europe and Turkey. Governments in these regions have started to fashion their policies in order to adapt to Brussels. Europeans have been significant leaders and taken on major responsibilities in international organizations. The Political Context The Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice Treaties declare as a continuing objective the strengthening of a European defense policy. Yet many member states also belong to NATO, and defense and security questions are an integral element of their foreign policy. Some members, such as the U. K. and France, possess global interests and capabilities for engagement. The EU cannot develop a substantive foreign policy without generating its own capacities for military operations. A movement in this direction developed after the conference between the UK and France in St–Malo. Because of the procedures initiated at the meeting and furthered by the EU, authentic politico–military organizations were put in place under the aegis of the EU’s Council of Ministers. The member states have agreed on important capability goals – the Helsinki Headline Goal – for crisis management responsibilities. Following on St–Malo, the Franco–German declaration of 22 January 2003, and the Franco–British declaration at Le Touquet of 4 February 2003, as the Iraq conflict went into a critical stage, established that there is a political will shared by the more steadfast nations. Proposals made by Michel Barnier, at the time a member of the European Commission, and which were considered by the Convention were meant to increase the ability of the EU for decision–making and action on security and defense in conformity with obligations involved in the Atlantic Alliance. These initiatives were accepted by representatives of the governments of member states, the responsibility of which it was to shape the draft Constitution into its final form. The European Council did not achieve consensus on the Constitution when it convened in Brussels in December 2003, yet the catalyst accorded to defense matters constituted an advance, with the resolution to institute new functional military organizations under the aegis of the EU. This was a step toward constructing a political Europe in which member states understand the necessity to operate in

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concert since it is to their benefit to do so.14 The lesson of the first five years of ESDP is that greater consideration needs to be paid to constructive political conflict resolution if the EU is to steer clear of more disasters on its own soil. It is essential to fortify both the mechanisms and the institutions. Yet the mechanisms and institutions will not accomplish much without adequate policies. The period from when ESDP was first originated at the European Council summits in Cologne and Helsinki in 1999 to its first stabilization deployments in crisis regions in the Balkans and Africa in 2000–04 corresponds with the fifth legislative term of the European Parliament (EP). The hesitancy of the first years, typifying the dominant political culture, has been replaced by a more confident orientation toward the security policy element of the EU. Globalization One of the reasons for the significance of the security and defense policy of the EU has to do with globalization: in a globalized and anarchic world, it is not feasible to detach prosperity from security. The economic sway now exercised by the EU – 25% of world GNP, 450 million inhabitants – their growth and the tighter integration of their economies imply that Europeans cannot exempt themselves from international upheavals or avoid their obligations to lessen the negative impact of globalization. The goal of Javier Solana from the outset was to promote the EU as a global political actor, able to muster the resources at hand: diplomatic, economic, humanitarian, as well as military, to act in a consistent and efficient way. The European Security Strategy (ESS) adopted by the 25 Heads of State and Government in 2003, is the EU’s “strategic identity card”: a global security actor, attentive vis–à–vis the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, and conventional causes of instability: the break–up of states, regional conflicts, organized crime. A reliable security actor, both more involved in prevention and management of crises, resolved to acquire the required diplomatic, military, and industrial capacities.15 The Changing Role of Military Capacity – Soft Security The advance of science and technology had paradoxical consequences for the military during the 20th century. While it shaped America as the sole hyper–power in the world, it also intensified the social and political toll of deploying military force. Ironically, nuclear weapons systems were constitutive of deterrence strategy, yet 14 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Michael Barnier, Part II, “Actors and Witnesses,” Chapter 9, in Nicole Gnesotto (ed.), EU Security and Defense Policy: The first five years (1999–2004) (Paris, 2004), pp. 169–70. 15 ���������������������������������������������������� Javier Solana, “Preface” in Nicole Gnesotto (ed.), EU Security and Defence Policy: The first five years (1999-2004) (Paris, 2004), p. 6.

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were so lethal that they would result in mutually assured destruction if used against an antagonist who had achieved nuclear parity. The apprehension over nuclear weapons issues in the early 1980s, especially in the United States and Western Europe, was unparalleled.16 Cultural shifts within western democracies also raised the costs of deploying military force. Postindustrial democracies concentrate on welfare rather than military conquest, and they have an aversion to ‘excessive’ casualties. This reality does not, though, imply that they will renounce going to war. These cultural shifts have progressed further in Europe than the United States, as Robert Kagan maintains, though as a number of commentators have pointed out, his characterization that Americans are from Mars and Europeans from Venus oversimplifies the dissimilarities.17 The Venus figure of a Kantian Europe has been altered to resemble a realist notion of EU security concerns. Both conceptions – effective multilateralism and preventative engagement – are indefinite concepts that will take on a more exact meaning in real conflicts. Yet they still exemplify an important shift from a civilian–only EU. The deployment of force, though as a last resort, is considered essential in particular situations.18 The EU is currently in charge of a number of police and military actions in the Balkans, and completed its first foreign military operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003. This is one reason why the attempt of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld during the Iraq War to separate “old Europe” from “new Europe” was maladroit. Though America still benefits from a reserve of benevolence in Eastern Europe because of its conflict with the Soviet Union after 1945, Eastern Europeans view their long–range values and prospects as consonant with the EU and do not want to be put in a position of having to opt between America or Europe. In reality, the European Union is their only viable option. The Union is aware that it has this soft– power advantage and exercises it to achieve the policy goals it favors. Yet it is also the case that the United States is more involved in soft power than is ordinarily conceded, and on occasion more taken up than the European Union, in spite of the EU’s distinctive involvement in development projects. Europeans have entered more readily into the difficult labor of nation building that the United States originally renounced at the beginning of the Bush administration. Europeans are frequently more proficient than America in making use of civilian assets that increase soft power. Recently Europe has likewise been more proficient at employing multilateral institutions than the United States. In a world in which unilateralism is unpopular, the European tendency toward multilateralism makes European states’ policies appealing to any number of other states. 16 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� For a commentary on aspects of this situation, see Kenneth Keulman, “Nuclear Ethics – ‘The Challenge of Peace’,” in Kenneth Keulman (ed.), Critical Moments in Religious History (Macon, GA, 1993), pp. 203–4) for instance. 17 ������������������������������� See, for example, Joseph Nye, Soft Power, p. 19. 18 Jean–Yves Haine, “An Historical Perspective,” in Nicole Gnesotto (ed.), EU Secutiry and Defence Policy: The first five years (1999-2004) (Paris, 2004), p. 52.

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An example of the European Union’s developing soft power is the perception that it is a constructive agent in resolving global predicaments. In the course of the Iraq War, Eastern Europeans and Turks evaluated the European Union more favorably than America for taking up a constructive stance on a diversity of problems extending from environmental policy to curtailing poverty to countering terrorists. Although any number of Eastern European heads of state endorsed the U.S.–led invasion, their people viewed the European Union as playing a more constructive part than America on a number of transnational initiatives.19 There are reasons for restraining the military aspirations of the EU. These concern both its character and its capacities. Debates about CFSP currently have been only of secondary importance to controversies that have seethed over ESDP. Inherent in these debates is a minimizing of the accomplishments of the European Union in less military aspects of foreign affairs. This soft power resides in the capability to influence and exercise appeal. It develops from the charisma of a nation’s culture, political objectives, and policies. Allusions to ‘soft power’ have unwarranted deprecatory connotations. The EU has carried out a significant, if frequently overlooked mission in protecting territories vulnerable to instability by employing political, economic, and technical methods. The Union mission in Bosnia exemplifies an incisive trial case of its capacity to execute this type of low–profile but nonetheless vital assignment. The constituents of crisis management are as significant in the context of the maintenance of security, as military sorties. The Convention working group on defense dedicates little analysis to the issue of civilian capacities, although para. 50 on renovating the Petersberg tasks indicates assignments that are militarily less arduous although vital to conflict prevention and management.20 Those, like Donald Rumsfeld, who speak disparagingly of “Old Europe” (as though this were an insult), misjudge its vigor. As with any energetic constitutional government, the European Union combines disparate but correlative ideals: shared interests and special interests, individuality and community, unity and diversity, collective action and a balance of power. In the same way as it is ill–advised to minimize the dynamism of the European Union, it is incorrect to think that it is indifferent to the exercise of power. In reality, because of its own bloody past, Europe today is highly cognizant of power. It is particularly conscious of the seductions and perils of asymmetric power. Its instinctual inclination is in the direction of constructing an evenhanded arrangement of states to manage power. When confronted with conflict, Europe’s tendency favors

19������������� ������������ Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York, 2004). see Chapter 3. 20��������������� �������������� Anand Menon, Enhancing the Effectiveness of the EU’s Foreign Defence Policies, Centre for European Policy Studies Brief, No. 29 (Brussels, 2002), p. 4. Available from http:// shops.ceps.be/BookDetail.php?item_id=1002.

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conciliation, moving toward discovering common ground. It has become adept at consolidating soft power to urge disputing factions toward agreement.21 Types of security policy other than those based in the military, are a constitutive addition to the reestablishment and preservation of stability and also an important way in which the EU is able to extend the fundamental principles on which it is founded. As the most prominent model of an international coalition whose affiliates have attempted to refrain from violence as a first response to conflict and developed collaborative devices to calibrate their interactions, the European Union is well positioned to serve as an exemplar for these types of interactions, for other polities. By taking on a position in its international relations that depends more on instruments other than those of the armed forces, the EU will strengthen its assertion that it acts as a prototype for novel types of interstate relations. None of this is to imply that the EU will abdicate engaging in military action other than circumscribed peacekeeping missions. Instead, the contention is that such missions should ordinarily be executed within the context of NATO. It is NATO that delivers security against incipient dangers in the Balkans, the Middle East, and the Mediterranean that would exceed the unexceptional capabilities of the European Rapid Reaction Force. Determining the Union’s restricted military missions would offer a possibility for it to become involved in effective consultations with NATO regarding the best possible division of duties between the two organizations. Demonstrating dedication to, rather than rivalry by way of the Union, with NATO is a means for its European affiliates to strengthen that institution, especially if this includes a disposition to dialogue about ways of refining European involvement in the Alliance. Under this type of rubric, NATO–category missions could be employed for every important military action, with the Union undertaking less arduous actions, and sustaining NATO with non–military measures in any emergency. In this manner, the two organizations might evolve a reciprocal association, consequently increasing their mutual capacity to guarantee security. 22 “Double Containment” Function of the European Union and NATO As the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union develops over the next decade, America will need to reexamine its orientation both to the European Union and NATO. The Union will probably persist in increasing the spectrum of subjects covered by CFSP. If the new European Security Strategy provides an indication, developing European unanimity in the domain of security may assist, rather than hinder, transatlantic cooperation. The European Union confronts many reservations about its genuineness in building up an authentic crisis intervention capability. It will confront even more intensive inquiries if it tracks the aim of 21 See David Calleo, “Power, Wealth and Wisdom.” The National Interest, No 72, (Summer 2003), p. 15. 22 Cf. Menon, pp. 4-5.

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collective European defense. The central question will be the Union’s political will, gauged by its military capabilities and defense expenditures.23 The provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty, and the enlargement of The European Union, allow for a recalibration of voting weights within the Union as well as the further development of multi–level governance, with regard to CFSP. The gradual institutionalization of security in Europe, however, is not able to conceal the ‘double containment’ function of both NATO and the EU. The European Union and NATO have significant responsibilities in fashioning a legally recognized international order and a less reductionist understanding of interest; and are a factor in the weakening of the containment role that supported both organizations during the postwar period. Both NATO and the EU make possible the capacity of members to steer clear of disputes by generating a greater degree of understanding for one another’s view of self–interest as well as generating more interest in the goals common to states.24 Following September 11, 2001, EU–NATO synergy became an element of a wider transatlantic controversy, which saw in 2003 a real disconnect because of the Iraq war – a source of discord within the EU. And NATO was divided over assistance to Turkey. During this period of tension, though, both institutions signed the “Berlin– plus” agreement. Since the Anglo–French summit at St–Malo, the essence of the EU–NATO association has involved tension between Atlantic primacy and the level of European independence. Over the last ten years, these questions have found a number of replies, resulting in a more inclusive argument regarding the mutable character of international security and America’s aims on the continent. A Strategic European Union Foreign Policy One of the inconsistencies of the EU is that, in supplying an extraordinary level of security to its citizens, it is hesitant in fashioning a strategy to safeguard that security. The expansion of the EU is a significant enhancement of modern international security, yet the continued vigor of the EU demands a tactic to determine the way in which Europe will extend itself in the future in order to preserve what it achieves for its members. It will need to advance even more in order to consolidate the EU and also specify with which states it will develop alliances. It will also be essential to verify with what instruments and locations Europe will establish a presence in order to forestall dangers from arriving at Europe’s borders.25 For the collective circumstances of the EU, the best resources imaginable have no purpose if there exists no political will to exert influence and act in the international arena. While the development of military capacities can be the subject of technical 23 See Leslie S. Lebl, “European Union Defense Policy: An American Perspective,” Policy Analysis, 24 June, 2004, p. 12. 24 Sperling 1999, p. 189. 25 Alexander Randos, Part II, “Actors and Witnesses,” Chapter 19, in Nicole Gnesotto (ed.), EU Security and Defence Policy: The first five years (1999-2004) (Paris, 2004), pp. 233–9.

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negotiations among its members, creating a form of mutual political will, a matching strategic objective, a shared understanding of the commitments and obligations of the EU, engages a different reality. As the Iraq imbroglio demonstrated, there exists no underlying connection between military capacities or organizations and the fashioning of a common foreign policy. Between the increasing militarization of the EU and emergence of an EU foreign policy – strangely overlooked since 1999 – the breach is a significant one. Yet, it is in that spectrum of non–military instruments of intervention – political dialogue with other areas of the world, humanitarian and development aid, trade pacts – that the additional worth of the EU is to be discerned. If, as the European Security Strategy maintains, the majority of crises do not have only military resolutions, then the genuine significance of the European Security and Defense Policy needs to be revived. It is a means to an end, a device at the assistance of a policy and not a surrogate for the policy itself.26 The Lost World of Atlanticism? With the European Union on the brink of altering the balance of power for the 21st century, the ongoing clash between America and Europe has serious consequences for the future. The United States’ appeal in Europe has lessened over the last several years. One of the principal reasons for this has to do with U.S. foreign policy. In Europe, significant majorities perceive the Bush administration’s unilateralism as a significant international hazard for Europe over the next decade. Within the European Union, the likelihood that it will decide to balance U.S. military forces is remote. In order to do so, it would mean a 2–3 times increase in military budgets in the majority of European countries. Yet it is to the EU’s benefit to develop its own strategies, since American policies now appear to diverge from those that have been developing in the Union. America also does not now view the Atlantic Alliance as the necessary site for its dealings with European allies. The majority of the EU’s new international initiatives: policy vis–à–vis Iran, ESS itself, anti–proliferation tactics, are at one level rejoinders to U.S. policies. Europeans may also believe that having a connection with U.S. military forces marks them as potential victims for assault by radical Islamists. America, in turn, could determine that respecting European sentiments is an obstacle in the struggle against terrorists. Consequently, for divergent motives, both parties might want to weaken the bonds of the transatlantic alliance.27 Yet a radical split between Europe and the United States would make it more difficult to engage in the construction of global governmental networks for the enforcement of transnational agreements, international human rights law, or facilitating judicial cooperation in transnational litigation. All of these projects 26 Nicole Gnesotto, “ESDP, Results and Prospects,” in Nicole Gnesotto, (ed.), EU Security and Defence Policy: The first five years (1999-2004) (Paris, 2004). 27 Robert O. Keohane, “Ironies of Sovereignty: The European Union and the United States), in Journal of Common Market Studies 40/4 (November 2002), p. 761.

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demand collaboration by liberal democracies, whose locus is in the Atlantic region. Thus collaboration is critical, even as both sides confront the causes of the current transatlantic rift. Currently other developments are taking place outside the predicament between the United States and the European Union.28 Multilateral regional security agreements might be a factor in counterbalancing the hazards of a unipolar world. America continues to play a significant role in maintaining regional security agreements in many regions of the globe. Yet when United States’ military force is unilaterally deployed or its security assurances are no longer reliable, collaboration among regional institutions may produce another type of option for coordinating a semblance of a global security order.

28 See Amitav Acharya, “Regional security groups: Their day has come,” The Straits Times, 20 October, 2004.

Chapter 5

European Security Institutions and Structures Charles Krupnick

US Army War College

The countries of what is now the European Union (EU) have been developing institutions and processes for creating and implementing a common foreign policy since the early 1970s. Security concerns were added in the 1980s and 1990s and now, into the twenty–first century, defense and military arrangements are taking shape. The European Union of 2005 has the ways and means to develop security and defense policy and, at least in limited fashion, to deploy and control operational military units. This is a huge change from the Cold War period when even to utter the words defense or military in the same sentence as European Community was daring and perhaps imprudent. The Community managed trade and economic issues while the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Europe’s alliance with the United States took care of defense and military arrangements. The new perspective has many sources, most fundamentally the end of the Soviet/Russian threat, but also the widening political and cultural distance between Europe and the United States and the spillover from other areas of Community development. EU military initiatives in turn can enhance European integration by creating imperatives for common action and by the socializing effect of shared danger and sacrifice. This chapter examines the development of security institutions and structures within and associated with the European Union, focusing particularly on activities subsequent to the 1998 Anglo–French summit in St. Malo. A great deal has been  The opinions expressed in this chapter are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the opinions and policies of the US Army War College, the US Army, the Department of Defense, or any other branch of the US Government.  The words foreign policy, security, defense, and military are used in various and ambiguous ways in security studies and in transatlantic and European relations. Michael E. Smith tries to clarify, distinguishing “‘defense cooperation,’ where military force is the exclusive or primary policy tool, from foreign/security policy cooperation, where diplomatic or economic tools tend to dominate.” Michael E. Smith, Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 13. Smith’s book also provides a great deal of information and analysis on the development of EPC and CFSP.

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accomplished and the modest security and defense goals currently formulated are within reach of existing institutions. Ambitions much beyond humanitarian, peacekeeping, and low–level crisis interventions (the Petersberg Tasks) await another round or two of European integration and institutional change, an unlikely prospect in the near term given the traumatic EU constitution ratification experience. European Security during the Cold War Security was always a core idea of the architects of the European Union and its predecessor organizations. Following the pattern of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) formed in 1951, Western Europe considered a European Defense Community (EDC) where European national armies would be integrated down to very low unit levels and where political control would be vested in a supranational European Political Community. The proposals were discarded in 1954 with much rancor but led to designation of the Western European Union (WEU) as a Europe–only defense organization, bolstered by the mutual security commitments of the Modified Brussels Treaty. With the bitterness of EDC debates still fresh but benefiting from NATO’s security guarantee, six European countries signed the Treaties of Rome in 1957 founding the European Economic Community (EEC—the Common Market) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). Each was patterned after the ECSC and each avoided security issues, with the EEC Treaty specifying only that national defense industries could be protected from the coming single market. Proposals to formalize a Community role for security and defense surfaced from time to time, often by French initiative and sometimes involving the WEU, but none came close to implementation. In the early 1970s, the Community unveiled a common foreign policy aspiration with the beginning of European Political Cooperation (EPC). EPC used existing practices of periodic meetings of national leaders and foreign ministers to coordinate areas of common concern, but remained separate from Community decision–making and administrative procedures. Deliberation would sometimes reach consensus on particular issues and resulted in the release of joint communiqués and commitments to common action. EPC was tested and found wanting when addressing the Middle East crises of the 1970s, but showed promise during the Conferences on Security and Cooperation in Europe held at the same time. During the 1980s, EPC expanded its issue–area competence into security affairs and provided an occasional common European voice as the end–game of the Cold War played out; it also became more institutionalized and acquired administrative support from the Council’s General Secretariat in Brussels. In 1987, the Single European Act legally recognized the EPC as a Community process.

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Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) The end of the Cold War encouraged proposals for much greater European cooperation in security affairs, including some advocating a substantial autonomous defense and military role for the Community. The compromise Title V to the 1992 Treaty of European Union (the Maastricht Treaty) established a Common Foreign and Security Policy for the now–named European Union (EU) that mandated security cooperation among member countries, “including the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense.” The European Union also embraced the WEU as its defense and military arm while the WEU dubbed itself the “defense component of the European Union” and “the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.” In the landmark June 1992 Petersberg Declaration, the WEU committed itself to frequent defense minister meetings and to developing a military staff capability (military staffs are discussed further in the section titled “European Union Military Staff”). This took form as the WEU Planning Cell established in October 1992 and responsible for “preparing contingency plans for the employment for forces under WEU auspices” and for “preparing recommendations for the necessary command, control and communication arrangements, including standing operating procedures for headquarters which might be selected.” The WEU also took on the so–called Petersberg Tasks where “military units of WEU member states, acting under the authority of the WEU, could be employed for humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.” These have been the core intent of any seriously discussed proposal for autonomous European military activity. NATO worked closely with the WEU and by the mid–1990s, the two organizations had arrangements in place where NATO assets and capabilities could be made available for WEU–led military operations. At the same time, the European Union was being criticized for its ineffective role in the crises in Yugoslavia and for its relative inaction elsewhere in the world. The Amsterdam Treaty agreed to in 1997 took a number of steps to advance CFSP, such as creating the position of Secretary General/High Representative (SG/HR) of the CFSP and establishing the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit. However, the United States opposed and the United Kingdom effectively thwarted proposals for EU defense and military activity. Still, a dramatic change in UK policy was almost at hand.

 EC Maastricht Treaty, Article D, paragraph 1.  Petersberg Declaration, Western European Union Council of Ministers, Bonn, 19 June 1992, para. II, 9.  Petersberg Declaration, para. II, 4.

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St. Malo and European Security and Defense Policy In December 1998, UK Prime Minister Tony Blair and French President Jacques Chirac met at St. Malo in France and agreed that the European Union should have the capacity for autonomous military action, backed up with “credible military forces.” The United Kingdom finally had accepted an EU military role. The reasons for Blair’s turnabout were not entirely clear but seemed influenced by a number of factors. One was geostrategic: as transatlantic interests diverged with time Europe may well want to intervene militarily in situations where the United States would not, as had already occurred in the Balkans and Africa. British leaders had hoped that a WEU closely linked to NATO could do this, but the WEU had little elite or popular appeal nor had it developed very fast or far since the end of the Cold War; in the minds of many European leaders, the WEU was associated too closely with NATO to be considered a legitimate European enterprise. On the other hand, if Europe failed to take on more defense responsibilities and to develop greater military capabilities it risked further strains in the US–Europe alliance—a sentiment already apparent in the US Congress. Another Blair concern may have been UK influence in Europe: an expanded EU defense and military role would need British assets and leadership and would give the British government an opportunity to counter declining UK influence in EU economic matters since the United Kingdom seemed destined to remain outside the Eurozone for the foreseeable future. Momentum for change increased shortly after St. Malo with Europe’s embarrassing participation in the spring 1999 NATO campaign against Serbia to halt its repression of Kosovo Albanians. The combat phase of action turned into a dramatic demonstration of American air power and precision munitions while Europe played a largely secondary military role. The Cologne European Council in June 1999 echoed St. Malo and called for the European Union to “assume its responsibilities regarding a common European policy on security and defense.” In December 1999, the Helsinki European Council called for the establishment of “new political and military bodies and structures” within the Council of Ministers “to enable the Union to ensure the necessary political guidance and strategic direction to operations.” With the Nice European Council in December 2000, EU leaders formally designated the new bodies as the Political and Security Committee (PSC),  “Joint declaration on European defence,” British–French Summit, St. Malo, 3–4 December 1998.  Jean–Yves Haine favors the British strategic shift while Desmond Dinan emphasizes the euro explanation for St. Malo. Jean–Yves Haine, “An historical perspective,” in EU Security and Defence Policy: The first five years (1999–2004), ed. Nicole Gnesotto (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2004), 42–43; Desmond Dinan, Europe Recast: A History of European Union (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004), 316.  “European Council Declarations on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defense,” Presidency Conclusions, Cologne European Council, 3–4 June 1999.  “Common European Policy on Security and Defence,” Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, 10–11 December 1999.

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the Military Committee of the European Union (EUMC), and the European Union Military Staff (EUMS).10 These, along with other organizations and arrangements associated with CFSP and ESDP, are the subject of the remainder of this chapter. European Council and the Presidency The heads of state and/or government of EU member countries have been meeting periodically since the founding of the several European communities. These gatherings took on added importance with the advent of EPC in the 1970s; since 1974, the leaders have been meeting about four times a year and have styled themselves the European Council. The meetings are a good opportunity to promote European integration and to work for consensus on the direction of European action and development—including foreign and security policy issues.11 The European Commission President and, on foreign policy issues, the Secretary General/High Representative (SG/HR, discussed below), also attend European Council meetings. As with all intergovernmental procedures of the Community, the country holding the presidency of the Council of the European Union (discussed below) has a leadership and organizational role in the European Council. Rotating among member states every six months, the presidency country provides the public face for Council decisions and uses national assets to implement them—such as delivering demarches to external actors. To foster continuity and assist with the administrative and representative burdens of the presidency, a troika arrangement was established where the resources of the member country that had just finished the presidency and the one that would have it next were made available to the current presidency. This was changed with the Amsterdam Treaty to the present arrangement where the current presidency is assisted by the Commission and the SG/HR, and “if need be” the next member state to hold the presidency.12 Council of the European Union The three main structures of the European Union are the European Commission, the Parliament, and the Council of the European Union (formerly the Council of Ministers, i.e., the cabinet ministers of member countries, and commonly referred to as “the Council”). CFSP and ESDP rest firmly within the Council, but with developing connections to the Commission and the Parliament. The Amsterdam Treaty mandated that EPC and CFSP be discussed within the General Affairs Council configuration of the Council, which generally means foreign ministers. The name was altered in June 2002 at the Seville European Council to the General Affairs and External 10 Presidency Conclusions, Nice European Council Meeting, 7–9 December 2000. 11 European Council description, “European Union Documents,” (17 March 2005). 12 Article 18 to the “Treaty of European Union.”

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Relations Council (GAERC), one of twelve possible Council configurations.13 The GAERC meets monthly in separate General Affairs and External Relations sessions, with the former usually attended by deputy ministers and dealing with concerns that affect more than one Community issue area, such as budgetary, institutional, and administrative matters. General Affairs also coordinates preparations for and follow– up to meetings of the European Council. External Relations sessions generally are attended by the ministers themselves and deal with CFSP, ESDP, foreign trade, and development, among other issues. Defense ministers have accompanied their foreign ministers to GAERC meetings from time to time in recent years and met on their own in GAERC session for the first time in November 2004. The ministers usually make decisions by consensus (unanimous decision) but allow qualified majority voting for decisions “applying a common strategy already defined by the European Council” and for any decisions “implementing a joint action or common position already adopted by the Council.”14 The daily business of the Council is carried out by the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER—abbreviated from the French Comité des représentants permanents) made up of national permanent representatives (ambassadors) to the European Union in Brussels. There are now two of these: COREPER 1 for General Affairs issues, with the deputy ambassador usually in attendance, and COREPER 2 for External Relations, attended by the ambassador.15 The Political and Security Committee, however, shares daily management of ESDP. Political and Security Committee During the EPC period, the Political Committee was responsible for monitoring international affairs and advising foreign ministers on international issues and policy alternatives. It was composed of senior members of each country’s foreign policy establishment—usually their political directors—and met sporadically at first but eventually about every month. Policy coordination was aided by the development of the COREU communications system (an encrypted telex/electronic communications system among member foreign ministries) facilitating a rapid vetting of issues and by the use of junior foreign ministry officials—the European correspondents—to make up for the absence of a developed secretariat. With the Single European Act and 13 Other Council configurations are Economic and Financial Affairs, Justice and Home Affairs, Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs, Competitiveness (Internal Market, Industry and Research), Transport, Telecommunications and Energy, Agriculture and Fisheries, Environment, and Education, Youth and Culture. “Measures Concerning the Structure and Functioning of the Council,” Presidency Conclusions, Seville, 21–22 June 2002, Annex II, SN 200/02. 14 Activities of the European Union in the “Common Foreign and Security Policies,” (10 March 2005). 15 “Reference–Political Guide,” Politics.CO.UK, (15 June 2005).

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evolution of CFSP after Maastricht, the Political Committee became a Community institution supported by the Council General Secretariat. To meet the political and oversight needs of ESDP, the Nice Treaty established the Political and Security Committee (PSC)—often called COPS for its French acronym (le Comité politique et de securité).16 Beginning operations in March 2000 and fully operational by June 2001, the PSC generally meets at least twice a week at the permanent representatives level, i.e., national officials of ambassador rank but usually junior to members of COREPER—plus Commission delegates. National representatives are responsible to their home ministry Political Directors who themselves can meet as the Political and Security Committee, superseding the Political Committee. PSC usually is chaired by the country holding the presidency although the SG/HR has a continuing leadership role and may chair the committee during a crisis. The uniformed Chairman of the European Military Committee (discussed below) also may participate in committee meetings. PSC monitors the international situation on a continuing basis and makes recommendations to the Council for EU action to include military options; it also exercises strategic direction and political control over deployed EU military forces.17 With its persistent association and SG/HR as de facto leader, PSC could develop esprit de corps and common purpose to become a more autonomous actor in EU security and defense affairs—as was the case with the Political Committee.18 At present, the PSC overlaps too closely with COREPER competencies and maneuvers in a bureaucratic process with at least one too many layers. Meetings between PSC and the North Atlantic Council (the NAC—NATO’s key political decision body), for example, have generally been unproductive because of the lack of authority given PSC officials. Secretary General/High Representative EU external relations have lacked a single spokesperson. While the Commission President and External Relations Commissioner spoke for Community concerns, the rotating Council presidency was charged with implementing the intergovernmental CFSP. More powerful member states also voiced opinions and were little hesitant to defend their own international interests. To address these concerns, the Amsterdam Treaty mandated the position of High Representative for the CFSP as the EU’s senior foreign policy official and gave it responsibilities as Secretary General of the Council as well—hence the Secretary 16 For a more thorough look at ESDP institutions, including organizational diagrams and arrangements with NATO, see Trevor C. Salmon and Alistair J. K. Shepherd, Toward a European Army: A Military Power in the Making? (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), Chapter 4, “ESDP’s Institutions,” 87–112. 17 Council Decision of 22 January 2001 setting up the Political and Security Committee (2001/78/CFSP), Official Journal of the European Communities. 18 Smith, Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy, 79.

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General/High Representative (SG/HR) title. The designated official can assist the Council in the creation and execution of CFSP through actions such as diplomatic contact with external actors and providing continuity across the rotating presidencies. The Amsterdam Treaty directed the dual–hatting of the SG/HR as Secretary General of the WEU to facilitate the integration of WEU functions into the European Union. The Policy Unit, also mandated by the Amsterdam Treaty and previously called the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit, was created to monitor, analyze, and assess international developments over the long–term but has become, according to Claire Piana, a support staff for the everyday duties of the SG/HR.19 In 1999, the five–year assignment was given to Javier Solana who had just finished service as NATO Secretary General and thereby gave hope to the United States and other Atlanticist allies that CFSP would not move too far from transatlantic sympathies and arrangements. The next logical step, now tied to the EU constitution controversy, would be to consolidate the position’s intergovernmental and public authority with the prerogatives and resources of the supranational External Relations Commissioner. Military Committee of the European Union The Military Committee of the European Union (EUMC) was mandated by the Nice Treaty and became fully operational in April 2001; as with the PSC and SG/HR, it is institutionally located within the GAERC. The committee is composed of the Chiefs of Defense (CHODs—the senior uniformed military officer) of each EU member country except Denmark, which does not participate in CFSP/ESDP, and gives military advice and recommendations to PSC as well as providing direction to the European Union Military Staff (EUMS). EUMC meets about monthly and is represented on a continuing basis by Military Representatives (Milreps) to the European Union from each country. All members of both the European Union and NATO have the same Milrep in the two organizations, except for Belgium and France. CEUMC is represented on a continuing basis by the Chief of the Military Committee (CEUMC), a four star military officer from a member state and preferably a former Chief of Defense.20 The first CEUMC was General Gustav Hägglund of Finland, the second and current one is General Rolando Mosca Moschini of Italy, and the third—to take over in 2007—reportedly will be General Wolfgang Schneiderhan of Germany.21 The CEUMC attends meetings of the Council when discussing 19 Claire Piana, “The EU Decision Making Process in the Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Case of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,” paper delivered at the 43rd Annual ISA Convention, New Orleans LA, 24–27 March 2002, endnote 7. 20 Council Decision of 22 January 2001 setting up the Military Committee of the European Union (2001/79/CFSP), Official Journal of the European Communities. 21 Honor Mahony, “German to get top EU military job,” EUObserver.com, 7 February 2005, (1 February 2005).

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defense issues, serves as military advisor to the SG/HR, and is the primary EU point of contact for operational commanders during military operations. The CEUMC can also be something of an independent world actor: Hägglund was surprisingly public about his opinions on the need for NATO–EU military cooperation and for action to quell violence in the Darfur region of Sudan.22 The Military Working Group helps coordinate the military initiatives of member states in support of the EUMC and is composed of representatives from each member state, usually the deputy military representatives from national embassies in Brussels.23 EUMC is also supported by the much more significant European Union Military Staff. European Union Military Staff Modern military operations demand seamless interfaces between highly trained people and sophisticated equipment and the ability to get forces quickly to crisis locations and to sustain them with appropriate logistics. When multinational political purpose, intelligence needs, and contemporary rules of engagement are added to the mix, the leadership and management burdens can be enormous. Since the advent of the industrial age and the battlefield successes of the Prussian General Staff during the second half of the nineteenth century, major military powers like the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and the NATO alliance have maintained sizable professional staffs to employ their military forces effectively. American and allied joint staffs often are divided into specialized sections using “J” prefixes. The US Joint Staff at the Pentagon, for example, has directorates designated as J–1 Personnel, J–2 Intelligence, J–3 Operations, J–4 Logistics, J–5 Strategic Plans, J–6 C4 Systems, J–7 Operational Plans, and J–8 Force Structure. With its worldwide obligations and interests, the United States has military staffs at various levels of command, with the Joint Staff focused on strategic planning, regional Combatant Commander staffs on theater planning, and Operational Commanders on armed forces in action, whether for combat, training, or peacekeeping missions. As joint and multinational operations, rapid deployability, and battlefield integration become essential to warfare, the importance and required expertise of centralized staffs are likely to increase. After the Maastricht agreements of the early 1990s, the WEU began setting up its Planning Cell (a military staff) in Brussels to keep track of forces available and to prepare contingency plans for their use—what could be called force or strategic planning. The Planning Cell was also responsible for command and control arrangements and for headquarters operating procedures, moving in the direction of operational planning and headquarters functions. The cell developed modestly during the 1990s, particularly after the 1994 Berlin NATO summit where Combined 22 BBC News, UK Edition, 14 April 2004, citing a Financial Times interview of General Hägglund, (14 April 2005). 23 “ESDP Glossary,” (12 June 2005).

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Joint Task Forces (CJTF) and other arrangements were created to make possible European military missions with NATO assets and capabilities. The WEU also was involved in a number of operations supporting the European Union and NATO, such as providing a police contingent to assist EU administration of Mostar in Bosnia and augmenting NATO to enforce naval sanctions against Serbia—both in the mid– 1990s. The June 1999 Cologne European Council decided to incorporate most of the WEU functions into the European Union; the subsequent Nice Treaty mandated the creation of the European Union Military Staff (EUMS)—established in January 2001 and supplanting the WEU Planning Cell. EUMS is a part of GAERC and consists of about 140 mostly military personnel from member countries.24 It has separate divisions for Policy and Plans, Intelligence, Operations and Exercises, Logistics and Resources, and Communications and Information Systems and conducts early warning, situation assessment, and strategic planning for EU execution of the Petersberg Tasks, including identification of available European national and multinational forces.25 A three–star flag officer, currently Lt. General Rainer Schuwirth of Germany, heads EUMS as the Director General (DGEUMS).26 EUMS coordinates with EU member states and NATO when conducting military operations. Three distinct variants of operations under EU authority are anticipated: those using NATO assets and capabilities; those under EU member lead–nation command (framework operations); and, those controlled by EUMS itself. EU–NATO Operations At French insistence, agreements on WEU use of NATO assets and capabilities were discarded following St. Malo and new negotiations begun between the European Union and NATO. Discussions were difficult and sometimes acrimonious, but ultimately resulted in the December 2002 NATO–EU Declaration on ESDP—the so–called Berlin Plus agreement. Where NATO as a whole is not engaged, the European Union can use NATO assets and capabilities (such as elements of SHAPE’s planning and command structure) for autonomous European operations, with the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR—the second in command of NATO forces and always a non–US officer) designated as Operation Commander of EU forces. To facilitate coordination between the two organizations, a small 24 Developments in European security and defense were affected by the differing memberships of NATO, the European Union, and the WEU. The European Union, unlike NATO and the WEU, contained several countries (i.e., Austria, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden) which were avowed neutrals during the Cold War and which retain neutralist sympathies. 25 Council Decision of 22 January 2001 on the establishment of the Military Staff of the European Union (2001/80/CFSP), Official Journal of the European Communities. 26 Dieter Farwick, “EU Military Staff and NATO: Light in the Tunnel,” World Security Network, 21 November 2003, (10 February 2005).

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EU Planning Cell was established at Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE) and NATO representatives were assigned to EUMS in 2004. Operation Althea, the 2004 EU takeover of the Bosnia peacekeeping operation from NATO, was organized through the Berlin Plus agreement with British General John Reith (DSACEUR) as the EU Operation Commander and British Major General A. David Leakey as the EU Force Commander in Sarajevo. While working closely with NATO, the EU commanders nonetheless report only to EU bodies such as the PSC and EUMC, which then decide what information to pass on to NATO or other organizations.27 EU Framework Operations Most EU military operations are likely to employ the existing staff of a major EU country, such as the United Kingdom, France, or Germany, and to have that country provide the leadership or framework role. In 1996, the United Kingdom established a permanent Joint Headquarters at Northwood in Middlesex that was designed to control both British and multinational forces and to work with organizations like NATO and the European Union. The complex has a military staff of over 600 with functions similar to the US joint staffs previously described. Capabilities include a Joint Rapid Reaction Force with a deployable Joint Task Force Headquarters.28 The French Centre de Planification et de Conduite des Opérations (CPCO or commonly pre–CPCO) near Paris is also capable of controlling EU operational forces, having its own strategic and operational planning capabilities and good access to intelligence and command structures.29 Operation Artemis, the summer 2004 EU operation to counter ethnic violence in the Congo, was French led and used the CPCO headquarters without reliance on NATO.30 Germany is also vying for headquarters status with its Potsdam–Geltow complex near Berlin. The facility controls Germany’s operating forces and was the German–Dutch Operations and Coordination Center during the third International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan.31

27 “ESDP takes over from NATO: Operation ALTHEA, coherent, effective and democratically accountable?” European Security Review, No. 24, October 2004, 3–4. 28 British Permanent Joint Headquarters website, (10 March 2005). 29 “EU operational planning: The politics of defence,” IISS, Strategic Comments, Vol. 9, Iss. 10, December 2003. (17 March 2005). 30 Dov Lynch and Antonio Missiroli, “ESDP Operations,” EU Institute for Security Studies, (17 March 2005). 31 “The Spirit of Potsdam,” Germany Calling, from www.german–foreign–policy.com, translated by Edward Spalton and staff of Free Nations, (16 March 2005).

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EU EUMS Operation Proposals for a dedicated military headquarters within the EU organization itself have been controversial because the staff would tend to duplicate NATO functions and could, in time, supplant them. This is plausible because military budgets are tight in Europe and expenses can be reduced by eliminating redundancies. The dispute became very public as an upshot of the diplomatic clash between France and Germany on the one side and the United States on the other during the buildup and execution of Operation Iraqi Freedom—the US–led intervention in Iraq. In April 2003, the leadership of Belgium, France, Germany, and Luxembourg proposed that a European Military Cell for planning and operational control be established at a nearly abandoned Belgian military base in Tervuren—a suburb of Brussels. Strong criticism from US and UK officials followed immediately, with US Ambassador to NATO Nicholas Burns noting: “What we cannot support and will not support is the creation of an alternative EU military headquarters, whether it’s in Tervuren or some other place, in Brussels or elsewhere.” He continued: “That would be, we think, duplicative, needlessly costly and that would be in essence a contradiction to the Berlin Plus agreements.”32 In September 2003, UK Prime Minister Blair, French President Chirac, and German Chancellor Schröder met in Berlin and nonetheless endorsed the establishment of an EU headquarters for military operations, but not at Tervuren. The December 2003 European Council agreed to and authorized the establishment of a civil-military cell within the EUMS organization in Brussels. This “operational strategic planning unit” will be separate from the strategic mission of EUMS and will not involve a standing headquarters, but rather the capacity to create one when necessary. In addition to their day–to–day tasks, EUMS personnel will have designated operational staff responsibility and will serve as the core group to be augmented by EU member country personnel when needed to run a headquarters.33 The cell is being established in the EU Cortenberg building in Brussels and will be fully operational by 2007.34 One of the unique aspects of anticipated EU military operations is the close coordination between military and civilian agencies and activities, a natural outgrowth of the EU focus on the Petersberg Tasks and the civilian rather than military elements of power. One of the EU Headline Goals 2010 was to establish the “civil–military cell within EUMS, with the capacity rapidly to set–up an operation center for a particular operation.” This proposal received enthusiastic commitment from member countries to provide police, rule of law, civilian administration, 32 Jitendra Joshi, “US holds out strongly against EU military HQ,” Agence France Presse, 30 September 2003, (10 March 2005). 33 “European Defence: NATO/EU Consultation, Planning and Operations,” Presidency conclusions accepted by the December 2003 European Council. 34 “Schuman Letter 190,” 29 November 2004. (1 February 2005).

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and civil protection for EU operations.35 The December 2004 European Council endorsed the initiative and called for the establishment of the operations center by January 2006.36 These initiatives should give greater coherence to EU interventions, but might also encourage more extensive use of EU military mechanisms than would otherwise be the case. While not originally assigned the role of military headquarters, EUMS has been moving toward that capacity since 2003. In describing the Cortenberg facility and staff, French commentators noted, “the worm is in the fruit, and it will grow.”37 Conclusion EU institutions and structures are playing a more significant role in European and world security affairs than they did just a few years ago. In the first half of 2005, the European Union was managing six ESDP missions—military operations in Bosnia, police missions in Bosnia, Macedonia, and Kinshasa (Congo), and rule of law missions in Georgia and Iraq—and seemed destined for a role in Darfur, Sudan. Europeans are reacting to twenty–first century international events with measured autonomy, often looking to the European Union for security and defense cooperation rather than the transatlantic relationship. Additional capability for future missions will come with the establishment of the new situation center to distribute intelligence and the completion of the EUMS operational strategic planning unit. Of particular importance is the development of thirteen multinational Battlegroups—reinforced battalions of about 1500 soldiers—to be available for EU use by 2007. A number of issues should be addressed, however, to make CFSP/ESDP more effective and certainly if there is the need and will to move much beyond the Petersberg Tasks. Regardless of the fate of the EU constitution, policymaking and command and control functions among the Council, SG/HR, PSC, COREPER, and Commission should be clarified and simplified. More problematic are deficits in Europe’s military capability. Although committed to improvement under the Headline Goal 2010 agreement and guided by the new European Defense Agency, few EU member states are willing to accommodate the increase in spending necessary for substantial improvements in military equipment and in the training of military personnel. These problems notwithstanding, the European Union is today a significant actor in security and defense affairs and is likely to increase its relevance in the years ahead.

35 “EU Headline Goal 2010.” 36 Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, 16–17 December 2004. 37 “EU operational planning,” Strategic Comments, December 2003.

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Chapter 6

NATO’s Transformation Christopher M. Jones

Northern Illinois University

In the years since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has experienced a period of remarkable transformation. No longer confronted with the military threat of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, the North Atlantic alliance has shifted its attention and resources to international terrorism, humanitarian and refugee crises, and other sources of instability. It has fought a war, imposed a naval blockade, and carried out air strikes. Peacekeeping missions in BosniaHerzegovina, Kosovo, and Macedonia have been followed by the organization’s first out-of-area operation beyond the Euro-Atlantic area—command and coordination of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. NATO also has provided training, equipment, and technical assistance to Iraqi security forces. These actions have been accompanied by other important developments. In response to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, NATO invoked its Article Five collective defense commitment for the first time in its history, deploying its Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) aircraft to monitor American skies and standing naval forces to patrol the eastern Mediterranean. In recent years, NATO has instituted a new military command structure, established an elite rapid response force, and agreed to take on a global role in the war on terrorism and the suppression of weapons of mass destruction. Further, it has begun to develop a fledging strategic partnership with the European Union (EU). Formal working relationships and decision-making procedures have been established with Russia, Ukraine and twenty-eight other Partners for Peace (PfP) states, ten of which subsequently have become members of the NATO alliance. Ground even has been broken for a new state-of-the-art headquarters in Brussels. In the words of the organization’s former Secretary General, Lord George Robertson, “This ain’t your daddy’s NATO.” Perhaps the most profound institutional change has been NATO enlargement. With the formal accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to the Washington Treaty in 1999, three former members of the Soviet bloc joined the North  The author wishes to thank Eric M. Jones and Jeffrey R. Margevich for their research assistance.  For instance, see speech by NATO General Secretary Lord George Robertson at the Welt am Sonntag Forum, Berlin, Germany, 3 November 2003.

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Atlantic alliance on its fiftieth anniversary. In 2004, NATO extended membership to seven more states. This enlargement included additional members of the defunct Warsaw Pact (Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia), a portion of the former Yugoslavia (Slovenia) and, most remarkably, three former Soviet republics (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania). Moreover, this wave of expansion is not likely to be the last. NATO has a longstanding “open door” policy and is committed to creating an organization that, in the words of U.S. President George W. Bush, encompasses “all of Europe’s new democracies, from the Baltic to the Black Sea and all that lie in between.” Thus, it is conceivable that today’s twenty-six-member NATO eventually could evolve into a pan-European security community. The political logic behind NATO enlargement is simple and undeniably compelling. According to a 1995 NATO study, widening the alliance is intended to bring a permanent end to Cold War divisions, foster democratic consolidation in Eastern Europe, and ensure security and stability throughout the entire Euro-Atlantic area. It also designed to “complement broader trends toward integration, notably the enlargement of the European Union (EU) and the strengthening of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).” From the perspective of the United States, enlargement offers the added advantage of maintaining NATO’s standing as the preeminent European security organization and sustains a conduit for continued American political and military engagement on the continent. The acceptance of this rationale by NATO’s members and two rounds of postCold War enlargement have placed the organization and the larger European security environment on a path of profound transformation. NATO’s very identity and purpose are changing from a narrowly focused military alliance to a broad security community tied together more by common political values than a clearly defined adversary. While it is certainly premature for Charles Krauthammer to declare, “NATO, as a military alliance, is dead,” it is true that the institution has evolved into something more than a collective defense organization. At the same time, collective security increasingly is used to describe NATO as it grows in membership and types of activity. Yet in the Kantian or Wilsonian sense of the word, NATO is not close to being a true collective security organization. To qualify it would have to include most of the states within the 55-member OSCE, including Russia. Instead, today’s

 See Section 39, “Enlargement,” of the Alliance’s Strategic Concept, Approved by the heads of States and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Washington, D.C., 23 April 1999, www.nato.int. ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Remarks by President George W. Bush in an “Address to the Faculty and Students of Warsaw University,” Warsaw, Poland, 15 June 2001, www.whitehouse.gov.  North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “The Opening Up of the Alliance,” The 1995 Study on NATO’s Enlargement, Chapter 3, http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb030101. htm.  Charles Krauthammer, “Re-imagining NATO: NATO is Dead. Long Live NATO,” Washington Post, 24 May 2002.

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NATO appears to be, in Ted Galen Carpenter’s words, “a weird hybrid entity – part alliance and part collective security organization.” Collective defense and collective security are distinct terms with different definitions and manifestations (discussed below). Both concepts, however, encompass military relationships involving a group of states; and NATO at its core remains a military organization. Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to examine how enlargement, a distinctly political process motivated by a compelling political logic, affects the two military roles of NATO: collective defense and collective security. In short, is an enlarged NATO likely to be more or less effective in fulfilling these dual military missions? NATO’s Collective Defense Mission Even though NATO has embraced new activities beyond the geographic bounds of its membership, it remains at its core a collective defense organization. Collective defense is tied to the realist tradition of international relations theory, which advances the belief that national security is best ensured by thinking and preparing in terms of worst-case scenarios. In short, a collective defense organization is a military alliance that a limited number of states join through a treaty committing to protect one another from a specific outside threat, namely another state or group of states. An attack on one member of the organization is considered an attack on all and triggers a collective response. Article Five of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty outlines NATO’s collective defense commitment. As NATO grows, its capability to guarantee collective defense to all its members and thus, the credibility of that commitment, come into question. Most notably, the decision to bring NATO to the doorstep of the Russian Federation by extending membership to the “captive nations” of the former Soviet Union—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—is surely consistent with the political rationale of enlargement. More important, it constitutes a truly monumental event in the history of Europe. Yet the inclusion of the Baltic States within NATO defies all military logic. One might argue that today “NATO’s military’s tasks are surely less important than its political roles.” NATO’s founding members, which have embraced enlargement in recent years, clearly hold this view. Yet the three Baltic States do not share such a perspective. Their drive to join the alliance was motivated largely, although not entirely, by a desire to gain the protection of Article Five. As one observer comments,

 Ted Galen Carpenter, “Strategic Evasions and the Drive for NATO Enlargement,” In NATO Enlargement: Illusions and Reality, eds. Ted Galen Carpenter and Barbara Conry (Washington, D.C.: 1998), pp. 17–18.  “Debate: Can NATO Remain an Effective Military Alliance if it keeps Growing?” NATO Review (Spring 2002), http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2002/issue1/english/debate. html.

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Old Europe, New Security They loathe the Russians, are suspicious of other Europeans, and are attracted to the Americans. For these central and east Europeans, it is true today what was true for many Western Europeans fifty years ago: the purpose of NATO is to keep the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down.

In the more diplomatic words of the Estonian ambassador to NATO, “First and foremost, NATO for Estonia is a security issue. We [tried] different options during the previous century. They didn’t work. So now, we are trying to get all the security guarantees we can find, and NATO is definitely the only hard security guarantee available.”10 However, NATO does not have the military capability and credibility to deliver on its collective defense commitment should the Baltic States ever request it. From a realist perspective, this state of affairs is troubling. Despite its current weaknesses, it is conceivable that in the future, a resurgent Russia could back away from its deepening relationship with NATO and act aggressively toward its neighbors in the Near Abroad. Russia’s transition to a fully developed democracy and market economy is far from certain, especially if President Vladimir Putin’s recent infringements on political freedoms are any indication.11 It is important to note that a formal accord between NATO and Russia precludes the “deploy[ment of] nuclear weapons on the territory of new members,”12 thereby depriving NATO of an important and credible deterrent or, if necessary, a viable defense. To quote one scholar, “every serious military analyst believes the United States can only credibly defend the Baltic States by featuring nuclear weapons as a means.”13 In the absence of nuclear weapons, NATO deterrence and defense rest on conventional force strength. Yet there are serious impediments. As with nuclear weapons, NATO has agreed not to establish permanent bases in Eastern Europe. The 1997 Founding Act states that NATO will pursue “collective defense and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces.”14 Even if geopolitical conditions were to change, NATO is unlikely to modify or abrogate this commitment out of concern that it would antagonize Russia  James Kurth, “The Next NATO: Building an American Commonwealth of Nations,” The National Interest (Fall 2001), p. 8. 10 Interview of Ambassador Harri Tiido, Head of the Mission of the Republic Estonia to NATO, 27 October 2003, http://www.nato.int/invitees2004/estonia.htm. 11 For instance, see William Safire, “The Russian Reversion,” New York Times, 10 December 2003; William Safire, “Putin’s Creeping Coup,” New York Times, 9 February 2004; and Associated Press, “Powell Shows Concern about Russia Voting,” New York Times, 14 March 2004. 12 “Founding Act of Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation,” Paris, France, 27 May 1997, http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/fndacta.htm. 13 Kurth 2001, p. 13. 14 “Founding Act,” 1997.

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and create a significant diplomatic crisis it would prefer to avoid. Collective defense, therefore, will have to be provided by existing troops in existing locations. However, there are roughly 116,000 U.S. troops stationed in Western Europe today. This is only a fraction of the 300,000 troops that were present during the Cold War and a decision already has been made to bring this number below 100,000 in the near future.15 It is also important to note that, if the events of the last several years are any indication, these remaining troops and their European counterparts will be directed toward an array of collective security activities rather than fully prepared for collective defense duties. One observer writes that NATO has “invest[ed] less attention and resources in collective defense capabilities, owing to the focus on cultivating cooperative programs with former adversaries and the judgement that large-scale contingencies requiring collective defense are unlikely in the foreseeable future.”16 In addition, it is questionable whether the United States possesses the long-term political will or the economic and military capacity to maintain a sizeable force in Europe. The global war on terrorism already has stretched American resources to their limit, with more U.S. troops deployed to more places around the world than at any time in history. Thus, it is possible that U.S. troops based in the European theater will be shifted to “hot spots” for extended periods or a decision will be made to draw down U.S. European force levels to generate resources for regions where the United States has more pressing security interests. For example, the Pentagon revealed a proposal in June 2004 to withdraw two Army divisions from Germany and return the troops to the United States.17 Long before the war on terrorism, some observers already were raising concerns about the ability of the United States and its allies to reestablish the military assets should a future threat from a resurgent Russia emerge. David Yost observed in 1998, “Many military facilities in NATO Europe have been closed permanently; some have been converted to other functions, while reserve capabilities—including trained personnel and industrial assets—have also been reduced.”18 This pattern is likely to continue rather than reverse. If the United States becomes less willing or able to provide for the defense of an enlarged NATO, then that burden will fall upon the organization’s European members. However, America’s allies are in no position to assume this responsibility given the significant military capabilities gap that exists between them and the United States. As one analyst writes, European militaries, unlike their American counterpart, are plagued by 15 See Steven R. Weisman, “Powell Seeks to Reassure Russians on New Troops,” New York Times, 28 January 2004; and “Major U.S. Troop Deployments,” http://www.cnn.com/ interactive/maps/world/fullpage.troop.deployments/world.index.html, accessed 1 March 2004. 16 David S. Yost, “The New NATO and Collective Security,” Survival 40 (Summer 1998), p. 141. 17 Michael R. Gordon, “A Pentagon Plan Would Cut Back G.I.s in Germany,” New York Times, 4 June 2004, http://www.nytimes.com. 18 Yost 1998, p. 149.

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Old Europe, New Security insufficient air transport to deploy forces with their equipment; inadequate air-toair refueling; a lack of precision-strike, all weather-offensive fighter capability and precision-guided munitions; insufficient reconnaissance and intelligence capabilities at both the strategic and tactical level; inadequate deployable command and control; inadequate capacity to suppress enemy air defense; and shortfalls in secure, interoperable communications.19

European deficiencies in interoperability or commonality of command, control, communication, and intelligence systems are a major obstacle to effective multilateral military action. Collectively, these shortcomings explain why Operation Allied Force in Kosovo in the spring of 1999 was an American-dominated campaign despite it being a NATO-authorized action. According to a recent RAND study, the United States deployed more than 700 of the total 1,055 aircraft and flew nearly eighty percent of the sorties during the 78-day campaign. Furthermore, seventy percent of the U.S. contribution comprised support aircraft that were essential for critical functions, such as reconnaissance, tactical jamming, and airlift. The same report notes that “given the restrictive rules of engagement (ROE) and weather conditions, [America’s] highly accurate weapons proved to be indispensable in prosecuting the air war.”20 European military deficiencies were a key reason why the Bush administration did not want to fight a NATO-led war in Afghanistan. As a result, Strobe Talbott notes, “the United States flew 90 percent of the sorties and delivered 99 percent of the precision-guided bombs against targets in Afghanistan [in 2001]. By this index, Operation Enduring Freedom was nearly an all-American display of power.”21 These operational realities result from the military spending patterns of the United States and its NATO allies. While the United States devotes slightly more than three percent of its massive Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defense, its allies spend considerably less of their smaller GDPs. Illustrative figures include France (2.6 percent), the United Kingdom (2.3 percent), Italy (1.6 percent), Germany, Belgium, and Denmark (1.4 percent), Spain (1.2 percent), and Canada (1.1 percent).22 The result is that the United States spends more in a week on defense than Canada spends in an entire year.23 Sir Ian Forbes observed in 2004: 19 James Appathurai, “Closing the Capabilities Gap,” NATO Review (Autumn 2002), http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2002/issue3/english/art1.html. 20 John E. Peters, Stuart Johnson, Nora Bensahel, Timothy Liston, and Traci Williams, European Contributions to Operation Allied Force: Implications for Transatlantic Cooperation (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), pp. 23–4. 21 Strobe Talbott, “From Prague to Baghdad: NATO at Risk,” Foreign Affairs 81, 6 (November/December 2002), p. 55. 22 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Fact Book 2003, http://www.cia.gov/cia/ publications/factbook/index.html. 23 Canada spends about U.S. $7.6 billion annually on defense. For more information on the poor state of Canada’s armed forces, see “Who’s Guarding Canada?” Foreign Policy 141 (March/April 2004), pp. 14–15.

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Certainly, the current situation is unhealthy. The U.S. defense budget is more than $400 billion this year, plus an additional $87 billion or so for Iraq and Afghanistan operations and reconstruction. This leaves the United States outspending Europe and NATO countries and Canada on defense by between 50 and 350 percent, in terms of gross domestic product. There are 2 million people in uniform in European NATO countries, compared to about half that in the United States. Yet of these 2 million soldiers, less than 200,000 are readily deployable.24

In fact, the United States outspends the other twenty-five members of NATO combined. In 2006, the annual U.S. defense budget will equal the rest of the world’s military expenditures.25 Perhaps a more telling consideration is the difference in the way the United States and European states allocate their defense money. “Military research and development funding by European countries in NATO was 25 percent of U.S. spending in 2000. Procurement funding by NATO Europe has declined 2.2 percent, since 1995, while U.S. spending increased by 6.5 percent in that period.”26 The persistence of such spending patterns has contributed significantly to the qualitative and technological divide between the American military and its European counterparts. NATO has sought to close the military capabilities gap and enhance interoperability, first through the Defense Capabilities Initiative launched at the Washington summit in 1999 and more recently with the Prague Capabilities Commitment in 2002.27 However, NATO’s Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, at a high-level conference on transformation in April 2005 noted his displeasure with the lack of progress toward addressing European shortfalls in a number of military areas, as well as the overall decline in most NATO members’ defense spending.28 In sum, the European members are woefully unprepared to assume more of NATO’s collective defense

24 Sir Ian Forbes, “Minding the Gap,” Foreign Policy 141 (March/April 2004), p. 76. 25 Guy Andersen, “U.S. Defense Budget Will Equal ROW Combined within 12 Months,” Jane’s Defence Industry, 4 May 2005, http://www.janes.com/defence/news/jdi/jdi050504_1_ n.shtml. 26 Allen G. Sens, “The Widening Atlantic, Part II: Transatlanticism, the New NATO, and Canada,” In NATO and European Security: Alliance Politics from the End of the Cold War to the Age of Terrorism, Eds. Alexander Moens, Lenard J. Cohen and Allen G. Sens (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), p. 27. 27 For more information, see “Defense Capabilities Initiative,” NATO Fact Sheet, 9 August 2000, http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/nato-dci.htm; and “Prague Summit Declaration,” NATO Press Release, 21 November 2002, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/ p02–127e.htm. 28 Speech by Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, NATO Secretary General’s Annual Conference, “Transforming NATO – A Political and Military Challenge,” 14 April 2005, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2005/s050414a.htm. Also see Craig S. Smith, “Germany to Overhaul Military and Reduce Defense Spending,” New York Times, 14 January 2004, http://www.nytimes.com; and Alan Cowell, “Britain Is Planning to Cut Troops by 15,000,” New York Times, 22 July 2004, http://www.nytimes.com.

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burden should the United States choose to scale back its military commitment on the continent in a significant way. NATO’s Collective Security Mission Collective security is tied to the liberal or idealist tradition of international relations theory. It is a system whereby a large number of big and small states join together, usually through a universal organization, and make an explicit treaty commitment to renounce the use of force to settle disputes. Should a state within the system opt for aggression rather than negotiation, the other members of the organization are committed to join together to oppose the aggressor state. The goal of the system is to maintain peace within the international community. Of course, NATO is not a collective security organization in this regard. As a military alliance, it was established in 1949 to protect a limited number of members from an external rather than an internal threat of aggression. Each successive round of enlargement broadens the institution and moves it further in the direction of a collective security organization. However, David Yost explains that collective security is applied best to present-day NATO to characterize its members’ aspiration “to build and uphold a sense of solidarity and shared responsibility in matters affecting international peace and security.”29 In this sense, he explains collective security actions, which generally are initiated with the agreement of the major powers, can encompass “mediation and conciliation, economic sanctions, preventive or coercive force deployments, peacekeeping, crisis management and peace enforcement.”30 Examples would include NATO’s multiple out-of-area operations in the Balkans. As NATO grows larger, will its collective security tasks become easier or more difficult? Certainly, there are factors related to NATO enlargement that could enhance collective security. For instance, Bulgaria and Romania’s entry into NATO strengthens European borders against transnational threats, such as arms smuggling, illicit narcotics, the trafficking of people, terrorism, and international crime.31 More important, the addition of the territory and airspace of new member states in Eastern Europe will make it easier and more cost-effective for the organization to project force and respond to contingencies along what Asmus, Kugler and Larrabee term the “two arcs” of crisis. “The first is the eastern arc: the zone of instability running between Germany and Russia from northern Europe through Turkey, the Caucasus and middle Asia. The second is the southern arc, running through northern Africa

29 Yost 1998, p. 137. 30 Ibid. 31 See His Excellency Simeon Sax-Coburg, Prime Minister of Bulgaria, “NATO Enlargement in Southeast Europe: America’s Interest,” Heritage Lecture #741, 26 April 2002, The Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C. http://www.heritage.org/Research?Europe/ HL741.cfm.

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and the Mediterranean into the Middle East and Southwest Asia.”32 In addition, troops from NATO’s ten newest members bring the alliance’s overall number of combat personnel back to Cold War levels. The influx of Eastern European troops also will serve to offset any loss of U.S. troops created by permanent downsizing or temporary transfers to other parts of the world. Furthermore, new NATO members have a proven record of accomplishment, having been very supportive of collective security missions in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq in recent years. Beneath the surface, however, these considerations may not be as positive as they appear. Instead of being strategic assets in advancing NATO’s collective security mission, the Eastern European members have the potential to become strategic liabilities. Stated differently, the newest member states may become sources of crisis and instability rather than serving as steady outposts for the projection of NATO capabilities in the two arcs of crisis. After all, these ethnically diverse countries still are proceeding through the bumpy processes of democratic consolidation and economic modernization. Before the latest round of enlargement, Richard Rupp rightly expressed concern for an already taxed organization becoming overburdened with more security challenges than it can handle. [I]f NATO expands as currently designed, the organization will be required to address security issues that no organization could effectively and successfully manage. Each new NATO state will bring to the organization known and unknown security issues that the organization may become treaty-bound to engage. The list of potential conflicts is myriad: Poland-Belarus, Kaliningrad-Lithuania, Hungary-Slovenia, Romania-Serbia, and Bulgaria-Macedonia, to note but a few. While efforts have been made to ameliorate these issues, many of these are age-old conflicts that rushed treaties designed to placate Brussels will not settle.33

Concerns also must be raised on the issue of Eastern European states bolstering NATO’s conventional troop strength. Raw numbers do not offer a complete picture. If the longstanding Western European members of the alliance lag far behind their American ally in the critical military capabilities necessary to conduct effective, well-coordinated multinational collective security responses, then what can be said of the new Eastern European members of NATO? How many years will it take these countries to bring their armed forces to NATO’s standards? Currently, these states roughly mirror their Western European counterparts in terms of percentage of GDP devoted to military spending, ranging from Latvia at 1.2 percent to Bulgaria at 2.7 percent.34 Of course, the GDP of an Eastern European member of NATO is but a small fraction of a fully developed, Western European country, such as Germany or 32 Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler and F. Stephen Larrabee, “Building a New NATO,” Foreign Affairs 72, 4 (September/October 1993), p. 29. 33 Richard Rupp, “NATO 1949 and NATO 2000: From Collective Defense toward Collective Security,” Journal of Strategic Studies, 23 (2000), p. 171. 34 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Fact Book 2003, http://www.cia.gov/cia/ publications/factbook/index.html.

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the United Kingdom. Thus, even if the new states were committed to raising their annual defense expenditures, something the Western Europeans have been unwilling to do, this effort would have a minimal effect on NATO’s overall capability. After all, it will take the Eastern Europeans considerable time just to bring their military equipment and practices into conformity with those of current NATO states. Collectively, these new members will widen rather than narrow capabilities gap between the United States and its twenty-five NATO allies. As noted, the states that aspire to NATO membership have been enthusiastic if not model participants in many of the organization’s recent out-of-area operations. Rupp observes, however, that “it is unlikely that the primary motivation for participation was concern about the Bosnia situation per se; it was part of their concerted campaigns to…[win] full NATO membership with Article 5 security assurances.”35 Will these states remain strong contributors to collective security efforts once they enter NATO? This is not a cynical question, but rather a legitimate concern given the limited national resources and unique security interests of these countries. While many believe that the new Eastern European members of NATO will be strong supporters of American views within the alliance, it is quite conceivable that, over time, they will have a different assessment of where the alliance should concentrate its collective security or out-of-area operations. On the one hand, the three Baltic States, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia are more likely to be concerned about the sources of instability within Eastern and Southeastern Europe than the United States is. On the other hand, prominent voices within the U.S. foreign policy community, troubled by the threat posed by international terrorism, have called upon NATO to direct its attention and resources toward other regions of the world, such as the Middle East. Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.), chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, wrote in 2002, “NATO must and will become an effective organization in the war on terrorism by addressing those countries directly involved and isolating those who continue to proliferate weapons of mass destruction (WMD).”36 Senator John Warner (R-Va.), chair of the Senate Arms Services Committee, a year later, advocated the insertion of a NATO force as a buffer between the Israelis and the Palestinians in an effort to advance the peace process.37 More recently, U.S. Marine Corps General James Jones, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, proclaimed the greater Middle East to be the “geostrategic center of interest for the alliance.”38 The fact that United States and its European allies, both old and new, may have divergent views about which security threats and regions are central and which are 35 Rupp 2000, pp. 164–5. 36 Richard Lugar, “Redefining NATO’s Mission: preventing WMD Terrorism,” Washington Quarterly 25 (Summer 2002), p. 11. 37 Jonathan Broader, Carolyn Skorneck, Jonathan Riehl, and John Cochran, “Warner Again Pitches Plan for NATO Middle East Buffer,” CQ Weekly 61 (14 June 2003), 1469–70. 38 “Jones Discusses Changing ‘Troop Footprint’ in Europe,” FDCH Regulatory Intelligence Database, 10 October 2003.

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more peripheral is one reason why it may be increasingly difficult for NATO to undertake collective action as it enlarges. Another reason is the serious political differences that exist between members of the alliance on a range of issues. On one level, conflict has emerged over broad foreign policy from international trade to the value of particular global treaties to the best approach to address threats, such as terrorism and nuclear proliferation. On another level, there have been splits over matters related to the alliance itself, including but certainly not limited to the war in Iraq, European Security and Defense Identity, Balkans policy, and the growing military capabilities gap. Of course, the most prominent disagreements find the United States on one side and its allies, France and Germany on the other. However, there also have been notable points of contention among the Europeans on matters at both levels – broad foreign policy issues as well as specific NATO policies. Of course, there always have been disagreements within NATO. Sources of contention have included burden sharing, nuclear strategy, and the integrated military command, to name just a few. However, these differences were overshadowed by the common threat the members faced during the Cold War. With this shared challenge removed, varied assessments of the gravity of international terrorism, and more countries joining the organization, it is likely that different interests and threat assessments will emerge and will serve as serious impediments to effective collective security. In fact, the war in Kosovo provided first indications of this emerging reality. All of NATO’s then nineteen members supported Operation Allied Force, but only thirteen participated in the air campaign. To maintain political consensus within NATO, the details of the mission were the product of extensive consultation, deliberation and compromise among the allies, which led to criticisms that it was a war by committee. This process had a clear impact on the operation’s speed, intensity, and scope. As Jonathan Marcus observed in 1999, “This has been a very democratic war, waged by 19 democracies at the lowest common denominator of risk.”39 The Kosovo experience led the United States to bypass NATO when it attacked Afghanistan following the devastation of 11 September 2001. As Lawrence Kaplan observes, “The campaign against al Qaeda and its Taliban hosts was run from MacDill Air Force base in Tampa, Florida, without reference to SHAPE [Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe] or to the civilian authorities in Brussels.”40 Exclusive U.S. command of the war in Afghanistan avoided many of the problems associated with the Kosovo campaign: alliance politics, the challenge of operational coordination among members’ militaries, and European resentment over the Pentagon’s unwillingness to share intelligence with allies for fear it would be leaked. 39 Jonathan Marcus, “A Distant Trumpet,” Washington Quarterly, 22 (Summer 1999), pp. 1469-70. electronic version, http://firstsearch.oclc.org/images/WSPL/wsppdf1/HTNL/ 00163/1P72. 40 Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO Divided, NATO United: The Evolution of an Alliance (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004), pp. 136–7.

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NATO only became involved seriously in Afghanistan when the United States shifted its attention and resources to the war in Iraq and the mission in Afghanistan changed from war fighting to peacekeeping. Yet NATO’s Afghan mission has been far from successful given European countries’ failure to provide adequate troops and equipment.41 Last, a reverse scenario emerged in Iraq. Instead of deliberately relegating its allies to the sidelines, the United States actively sought their support and involvement. Yet several NATO states opposed a prewar plan initiated by the United States to protect Turkey and then subsequently refused to support Operation Iraqi Freedom all together. Episodes of these types are likely to become more common in an enlarged NATO of twenty-six states. As Kosovo illustrated, there are likely to be “free riders”—NATO members that agree with an action and offer their political support but nothing else. This hollow backing may be the result of resource constraints, domestic politics, economic or diplomatic considerations, or an assessment that genuine national interests are not at stake. As the Afghanistan case instructs, a NATO state may choose to work outside the alliance when its vital interests are at stake. Going it alone or working with a select group of likeminded allies may be easier than trying to win the unanimous support of an ever-larger organization. After all, NATO is an institution governed by consensus decision-making procedures, so any one member has the capacity to block an action. Circumventing NATO offers a country the added advantage of greater operational control, versus waging a war by committee, in which political expediency may override sound military decision-making. Last, the Iraq experience demonstrates that a NATO state can request the support of its allies based on a calculation of its own national interest and receive only limited backing due to political differences within the organization. The obligations of a mutual defense treaty do not trump a country’s own constitutional processes. Thus, a NATO member following the language of Article Five, “deem[s]” what action is “necessary,”42 and can refuse to participate without violating its treaty commitment. NATO is not a collective security organization in the Kantian or Wilsonian sense. However, the preceding discussion illustrates that it nonetheless, has the potential to suffer from some of the classic deficiencies associated with collective security arrangements embedded in universal organizations, such as the failed League of Nations or the unwieldy 191-member United Nations. These arrangements assume all member states will agree on the identity of the aggressor, manifest an interest in opposing the aggressor, and actively work to oppose the aggressor. Of course, these assumptions go unfulfilled as some actors find it difficult to move automatically from national interest to collective interest. As the size and diversity of NATO’s membership grows through enlargement, these sorts of problems will 41 See Michael R. Gordon, “NATO Flirts with Failure in Afghanistan,” New York Times, 21 May 2004, http://www.nytimes.com; “NATO Fails a Test,” The Economist, 371 (8380) 19 June 2004, pp. 12–13; and “Reinforcements Needed,” The Economist, 371 (8380), 19 June 2004, pp. 41–2. 42 See paragraph one of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, 1949.

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intensify, making it difficult for the institution to reach consensus and to conduct collective security actions such as recent out-of-area operations. Consequently, ad hoc coalitions of “willing” NATO and non-NATO states may become a more common response to European and non-European security challenges than action from a cohesive Atlantic alliance. The United States already has waged a war in Iraq with such a coalition. Moreover, the EU Constitution allows a defense task to be entrusted to a small group of willing and able member states that can decide among themselves how to implement the task.43 From a broader perspective, the deepening process of European integration will further complicate the prospects for future NATO military cooperation. First, NATO-EU coordination will be undermined by the fact that their memberships are not identical. There are NATO members that never will be part of the EU, most notably Canada and the United States, and there are EU members that will never join NATO. The neutral states of Austria, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden are noteworthy. Second, there are countries that are members of both NATO and the EU. In particular, France and Germany, which enjoy dual membership, see the EU as a far better vehicle for exercising and extending their influence. France and Germany’s opposition to the U.S. war in Iraq could be a harbinger of a future EU security policy. If so, such policy will be dominated by the French and Germans who actively are seeking to establish European independence from American foreign policy. Since NATO is a conduit for U.S. regional and global influence, France and Germany, along with their closest European partners, increasingly will gravitate away from the alliance, searching instead for EU solutions to European security problems while obstructing NATO responses to non-European challenges that may be of greatest concern to the United States. Furthermore, Jeffrey Cimbalo’s despairing reading of the European Constitution leads him to conclude that the document’s “[v]arious provisions…cannot be reconciled with the existing obligations of NATO membership.” Therefore, he is convinced that, despite statements to the contrary, the EU views defense cooperation with NATO as a necessity only until it can muster its own common security policy.44 Conclusion This chapter does not deny the compelling political logic underlying NATO enlargement. Leaders on both sides of the Atlantic have determined over the last decade that there are distinct political advantages to widening the alliance to include parts of the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact as well as other Eastern European 43 See European Union, “The Policies of the Union: Defence Policy,” A Constitution for Europe Fact Sheet, http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/constitution/defense_en.htm. 44 Jeffrey L. Cimbalo, “Saving NATO from Europe,” Foreign Affairs 83, 6 (November/ December 2004), p. 114. For a full text of the European Constitution, see http://ue.eu.int/ igcpdf/en/04/cg00/cg00087-re01.en04.pdf.

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states. However, forging a broad security community through enlargement based on common political values serves to impede rather than advance NATO’s dual military missions of collective defense and collective security. That is, a broader NATO is not a more secure NATO, if security is defined in military terms. Whether this trend can be reversed rests largely upon the NATO leaders and member states that, to this point, have embraced the enlargement process enthusiastically. Measures can be implemented to strengthen military credibility and effectiveness, but that requires political will and difficult decisions, which have been in short supply in recent years. • Will the enlargement process be suspended until the countries admitted in the two most recent rounds are fully integrated military members of NATO? • If membership is extended beyond twenty-six states, will NATO consider modifying or ending its Article Five collective defense commitment? • Will the 1997 Founding Act with Russia be modified to allow NATO to place permanent bases and nuclear weapons on the territories of Eastern European members of NATO? • Will the United States maintain a sufficient number of conventional troops in Europe to facilitate credible deterrence and defense? • Will the European members of NATO spend the necessary funds in the appropriate manner to narrow the widening military capabilities gap within the alliance? • Can the United States and its NATO allies in Western and Eastern Europe move beyond the promulgation of lofty goals and principles to agree jointly to a set of military threats, interests, and areas of operation that will define future collective security actions? • Can NATO and the EU create a sustainable working relationship (e.g., a division of labor) that ensures both organizations’ future relevance and effectiveness within the realm of European security affairs? • Will an enlarged NATO adopt new decision-making mechanisms, such as an end to consensus rule, to ensure that a single state cannot block actions that have the support of a majority of members? Tackling such issues will not be easy, but doing so will ensure that the NATO of the early twenty-first century will not be merely a politically significant institution, but a militarily effective one as well. As NATO’s own Secretary General observed in April 2005, “political and military transformation are two sides of the same coin. You can’t have one without the other.”45

45 De Hoop Scheffer 2005, “Transforming NATO.”

Chapter 7

European Security and Defense Policy: Capabilities for a Complex World

Christina M. Schweiss

United States Military Academy

In recent years, trade wars over such sensitive national sectors as steel and agriculture have forced the United States to confront the fact that the European Union (EU) is indeed a global economic actor. With its member states voluntarily “pooling sovereignty” within supranational institutions in such areas as trade and monetary policy, the European entity as a whole is certainly greater than the sum of its parts. To date, the United States has not extended its recognition of the European Union’s increasing international voice and presence to the realm of politics and security. Preferring to maintain the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as the centerpiece of multilateral European relations, the United States traditionally has viewed EU efforts to improve its pooled capabilities outside of that framework, as a threat to the Atlantic Alliance. President George W. Bush’s historic visit to the European Union in February 2005, the first visit of an American President to the actual EU institutions in Brussels, could mark a turning point leading to a new U.S.–EU political relationship. Any new security relationship, however, must be based on a deep understanding of the strategies and capabilities of both sides. The aim of this chapter is to explore traditional American perceptions or misperceptions of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), and to develop an understanding of what the European Union brings to the partnership by describing the unique security strategy and capabilities that it has evolved since 1999. Stark American criticism of the European Union’s recent security advances, framed by its traditional NATO–centric view, is compounded by an apparent lack of understanding of the complexities of the European Union’s institutional structures ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� The views expressed in this paper are those of the author, and do not represent the official views of the Institute for National Security Studies, the US Air Force Academy, the Academic Research Division, the Department of Social Sciences, the United States Military Academy and the United States Joint Forces Command, or any other entity of the Department of Defense. The author gratefully acknowledges the support of the Academic Research Division, US Military Academy; and the Institute for National Security Studies, US Air Force Academy for this project.

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and decision–making processes. U.S. criticism of the EU falls into four main categories: 1) its inability to “speak with one voice”; 2) its lack of a shared threat perception; 3) member states’ lack of military capabilities; and 4) lack of shared risk aversion as a roadblock to military action. Examining and debunking these criticisms highlights the European Union’s unique capabilities. At the same time, it begins to make a case for the EU’s emergence as a complementary partner to the United States in ensuring global security. This chapter focuses specifically on the European Union and the institutional structures and decision–making procedures that support the pooling of economic, political, and military capabilities toward a common approach to foreign policy. The sovereign states of Europe have not, of course, surrendered their own foreign policies to the Union, but increasingly even bilateral defense cooperation agreements within Europe are informed by the common European vision. An exploration of the progress made in multiple areas over the past decade paints a picture of the materialization of a truly common, unique, and effective approach to global politics and security within the European Union. Does Europe Speak with a Single Voice? The hour of Europe was supposed to have dawned at the end of the Cold War, when the Balkans exploded into ethnic civil war. U.S. Secretary of State James Baker declared, “We don’t have a dog in this fight,” and called the Balkans a “European problem.” [See Chapter 9, for discussion of same issue in context of Middle East] German unilateral recognition of Croatia and Slovenia came before the rest of Europe was ready to extend such a relationship and accelerated the implosion of the Yugoslav state in 1991, showing Europe’s continuing inability to “speak with one voice.” This diplomatic failure provided the impetus Europe had needed, since its failed Defense Community initiative in the early 1950s, finally to add a security dimension to European integration via Maastricht’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which went into effect in 1993. Yet a decade after the birth of the CFSP, a few highly publicized events have reinforced the idea that Europe still does not speak with one voice. On 30 January 2003, The Wall Street Journal published a letter signed by the heads of state and government of eight European countries who desired to let the world know that not all of Europe was opposed to the US drive to war in Iraq. Quickly dubbed the “Gang of Eight,” the letter caused many to claim that CFSP was dead. In April 2003, Germany, France, Belgium, and Luxembourg held a Defense Mini–Summit, which strongly called for a more autonomous European defense capability, including a military operational headquarters separate from NATO. The summit sparked �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Lack of shared risk aversion refers to a lack of consensus among EU member states to risk the lives of their national troops in any given military mission. ������������������������������� Laura Silber and Alan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (New York: TV Books, 1996) 159.

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controversy within Europe, as NATO–loyalists such as the United Kingdom and Italy feared a decoupling of the Atlantic Alliance in favor of a separate European defense structure. Later, agreements between the United Kingdom, France, and Germany to move ahead with a more combat–capable, joint Rapid Reaction Force, caused an outcry from the rest of the EU, which accused the “Big Three” of trying to bypass the restrictions imposed by the Treaty of Nice on closer cooperation in defense matters without unanimity. The US media focuses on these things. The fact that “the Europeans” have entrusted their supranational Commission with authority over external affairs– including tens of billions of euros spent on foreign financial and humanitarian aid and nation–building endeavors from the Balkans to the former Soviet states and Afghanistan—never has been highlighted in the American press. This ignores the fact that the 25 sovereign member states of the European Union achieved consensus and voluntarily have paid for, and sent military and civilian police forces on fifteen different missions since early 2003, four military, nine police/security and two rule of law undertakings. As well, those in the United States have overlooked, misunderstood or had misrepresented that, as of this printing over “70,000 EU soldiers are deployed worldwide, under UN, NATO or EU flags.” These missions span the globe from Europe’s backyard in the Balkans to northern and sub-Saharan Africa to the Middle East and even the Far East. The EU quickly is proving itself a valuable contributor to global security. Further, the European Constitution, although failing ratification in 2006, was agreed to by all heads of state and government, including the provisions for strengthening ESDP. Unlike all previous treaties, which specifically constrained the scope and function of CFSP and ESDP, “[w]ith the constitution …constraints are either scrapped or the conditions for doing away with them in the future are set.” The Constitution would put to rest the previously mentioned disputes over smaller groups of member states forging ahead in the area of defense cooperation, overriding the Nice Treaty, which forbade the application of this “enhanced cooperation” to security and defense. While it is true that ratification failed, those who think this will derail the entire Constitution fail to understand the very nature and spirit of European integration. Whether or not the Constitutional Treaty is amended and ratified in the coming years, it has set in motion a process that cannot be stopped, whereby individual member states form “coalitions of the willing” to act in the name of Europe. Indeed, many such projects already are underway based on the unanimous agreement of heads of state and government, not waiting for the public to weigh in during the lengthy ratification process. ��������������������������������������� Nicole Gnesotto, “Bush in Europe II,” The International Herald Tribune, 19 February 2005, accessed through http://www.iss-eu.org/new/analysis/analy104.html, . ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Antonio Missiroli, “The constitutional treaty: ‘enabling text’ for foreign policy and defence,” European Voice, 21–7 October 2004, accessed through http://www.iss-eu.org/new/ analysis/analy097.html, .

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It is true that the difficult “hard power” issues, such as Iraq, still serve to highlight the differences among European states. It also is true that the European Union habitually reaches agreement where it can, and tables the “tough issues” for later, with the hope of building greater consensus. In the early 1950s, the European Community failed in its first attempt to form a political union complete with a common defense. Over time, with gradually increasing functional integration, agreement evolved over this issue. Today, in all things “soft power,” European states seem to see eye–to–eye, enabling them to clear the current high hurdle of unanimity in order to reach common positions on a wide variety of diplomatic issues and to take action to support those positions. Soft power has become the defining core security competency of the European Union. The remainder of this chapter discusses European cooperation and unique capabilities designed specifically to wield soft power, while Part II of this book highlights several cases of these common policies and capabilities in action. Do the Europeans Have a Shared Threat Perception? The most glaring omission of the CFSP and later, the ESDP, was a common threat perception shared by every member state of the European Union. A threat assessment provides the basis of any country’s explicit or implicit national security strategy, which lays out the framework for its foreign policy actions. Lack of a common assessment caused the European Union’s foreign policy to drift, and while agreement on soft power issues seemed easy to reach, the Union laid itself open to the types of internal conflicts witnessed recently when faced with the more controversial hard power issues. Recognizing this serious omission, EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana unveiled a draft European Security Strategy at the European Council Summit in Thessaloniki in June 2003. The Council adopted “A Secure Europe in a Better World,” as the European Union’s equivalent of a National Security Strategy in December of that year. This was an extremely significant move and represented the first shared threat assessment within the EU. The EU’s threat assessment is remarkably similar to that of the United States, as expressed in its own National Security Strategy. Where the United States and Europe differ is in their strategies for combating the threats. The European Security Strategy also is significant in that it clearly makes the case that the EU, by virtue of its immense size and prosperity, is a global actor. Moreover, it represents a call for US recognition of a new transatlantic partnership based on complementary strategies for achieving the same objectives: “Acting together, the European Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world. If we build up capabilities and increase coherence, we will be a more credible

�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� The terms threat perception and threat assessment are used synonymously in this text and refer to the manifestation of a state or international organization’s perceived threats to national or international security through official documents such as security strategies or official statements by leadership.

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actor and a more influential partner.” Solana reiterated this message on the eve of President Bush’s visit to the EU in February 2005: “The US–European partnership remains the world’s most important force for peace and security around the world. We will never abolish our differences. But these are mostly over tactics; on the objectives, we agree.” Solana continued, “we are determined to seize this invitation to partnership and demonstrate that a strong and united Europe is the most capable, like–minded partner the US can find.” Europe has made tremendous strides in the area of capabilities since 1999, and it is to this third topic that we now turn. Do the Europeans Have the Capabilities to Execute a Robust Foreign Policy? The EU and its Critics There is no shortage of criticism on both sides of the Atlantic about European military capabilities. The United States has chastised Europe for decades for failing to shoulder its “fair share” of the defense budget burden. There is plenty of evidence to back up this criticism. European defense budgets are miniscule compared to those of the United States. Only nine of the 25 EU member states spend the minimum two percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defense that NATO policy encourages.10 Average defense expenditure in the European Union is 1.9 percent of GDP, about half that of the United States. In raw figures, European cumulative defense spending was only about $186 billion, compared to US expenditures of $460 billion in 2004. When it comes to military Research and Development (R&D), Europe in 2001 spent a combined total of $9.1 billion, compared to the US $39.3 billion.11 The way in which these smaller European defense budgets are spent is also open to much criticism. The Europeans waste money on duplication of effort in the R&D and procurement process. Then–Secretary General of NATO Lord Robertson recently dismissed the European NATO members’ combined $236 billion dollar defense spending12 as a “waste of money” because of their inability to deploy quickly � A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy Brussels, 12 December 2003, p. 15. Available at . ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� During President Bush’s visit and the preceding visit of the Secretary of State, US officials extended an invitation to the EU to begin to heal the rift caused by the Iraq war and move forward in a new security partnership with the US to confront threats to global security. ������������������������������������������������������������� Javier Solana, “A Partnership for Action,” accessed through http://ue.eu.int/cms3_ applications/solana/index.asp?lang=EN&cmsid=246, . 10 Burkard Schmitt, “Defence expenditure,” (last update February 2005) from the European Union’s Institute for Security Studies, http://www.iss-eu.org/. This document provides a complete list of defense expenditures in the EU–25. 11 Ibid. 12 We can account for most of the difference between the EU and NATO totals in defense spending by Turkey’s significant defense spending as a NATO, but non–EU member state.

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in response to a crisis.13 The EU Commission agreed: “[A]part from absolute levels of spending which are necessarily a function of their respective objectives, Europe yields much less in terms of operational capabilities. The real military capability of the EU Member States is estimated at ten percent of that in the US. This issue has repercussions for the transatlantic relationship.”14 The EU’s own Institute for Security Studies concurred: “Due to fragmented defence markets and disparate procurement policies, European countries are burdened by costly duplication. As a consequence, the EU as a whole receives much less value in exchange for its military spending than the U.S.”15 These issues combined, have led to a failure to develop the resources and equipment required to undertake significant military missions without the help of the United States. As of November 2004, the EU identified 37 remaining “capabilities shortfalls” and 20 “catalogue deficits.”16,17 The EU assesses capabilities every six months as a part of the “Capability Development Mechanism,” and makes improvements through the work of the European Capability Action Plan (ECAP). These efforts are accompanied by those of “project groups,” which identify particular problems and remedy them “…through acquisition or other solutions such as leasing, multi–nationalization and considering possibilities for role specialization.”18 While these numbers show room for significant spending increases, Europe has taken concrete steps toward making CFSP and ESDP a reality, as the July 2004 creation of the European Defense Agency (EDA) shows. This powerful new agency ultimately will be responsible for steering consolidation of military R&D and procurement to eliminate wasteful duplication of effort and to realize economies of scale. Initially resisted by large defense corporations and protectionist member governments, opposition fell away in the latter half of 2003, a sure sign that the Europeans finally are serious about improving their defense capabilities. In fact, 13 Michael Smith, “NATO Secretary General Slams Spending ‘Waste’: Euro Partners Criticized for Squandering,” Calgary Herald Telegraph online, 9 November 2002. 14 Commission of the European Communities (2003) ‘European Defence–Industrial and Market Issues: Towards an EU Defence Equipment Policy’, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Brussels, 11 March 2003. 15 Schmitt. 16 Capabilities shortfalls refers to those items of equipment or troops that do not exist in any member state, and which must be leased and/or developed over time. Catalogue deficits refers to those items of existing equipment or troops that were promised by EU member states in the original Helsinki Headline Goal capabilities catalogue, but which have yet to be made fully available to the EU. 17 Council of the European Union, “Capabilities Improvement Chart II/2004,” Brussels, 17 November 2004, available from http://ue.eu.int/cms3_applications/aplications/solana/ index.asp?lang=EN&cmsid=246, . 18 Council of the European Union, Declaration on EU Military Capabilities, 19 May 2003, 4; and Burkard Schmitt, “European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP),” from the European Union’s Institute for Security Studies, http://www.iss-eu.org/.

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the European defense industry currently is undergoing a radical and much–needed consolidation. It is seeing results through footholds gained in foreign defense markets. In early 2005, a European company won the competition to produce the next version of the American President’s Marine One helicopter! Of course when the results were announced, the version that most Americans heard was that Lockheed Martin (a lesser American partner in the European venture) had beat out incumbent French company Sikorsky, a sign of the contentious relations between the United States and Europe. These rationalization and efficiency efforts have gone largely unnoticed in the United States because levels of European defense spending are not expected to increase significantly in upcoming years. Critics in the United States fail to realize two things. First, the European strategy is to do “more with the same,” and there is much room for improved coordination among 25 sovereign states. Second, the capabilities the Europeans are pursuing are designed for conflict on the lower end of the spectrum, or smaller operations on the higher end – conflicts that do not require massive spending on huge quantities of aircraft carriers, combat aircraft, tanks, precision–guided munitions and other high–technology assets. Wedded to “spend more” and “hard power” strategies, the EU’s critics have missed much of the Europeans’ progress and many of their accomplishments since 1999. This criticism also overlooks concrete European military contributions to global security in recent years. In force deployments alone, for example, EU member states contribute 90 percent of the troops currently in Bosnia and Kosovo.19 In Afghanistan, where 33 states (30 of which are European/Eurasian) contribute 4,600 troops to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul, EU member states contribute 92 percent of the total force. The United States accounts for only a fraction of the ISAF soldiers in Afghanistan.20 With this as a starting point, the remainder of this chapter highlights European mission–focus, decision–making procedures, and capabilities. Capabilities for a Complex World The capabilities of the European Union to deal with crisis management situations fall into two categories: economic and humanitarian aid and projects, and political and diplomatic intervention and military action. Responsibility for the former traditionally lies with the supranational Commission, while the latter falls to the intergovernmental Council. Recognizing that humanitarian aid ultimately is a political tool, the European Constitution would have the External Affairs directorate of the Commission and the CFSP offices in the Council into a single External Action Service, under the leadership of a single EU Foreign Minister. Despite failure in 19 Gnesotto, “Bush in Europe II”. 20 Haine, and NATO, “NATO Takes on Afghanistan Mission,” 11 August 2003, available from http://www.reliefweb.int. The ISAF numbers do not include U.S. troops deployed to Afghanistan outside of the NATO mission in Kabul.

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ratification, consensus has allowed portions of this consolidation to get underway in Brussels. All tools in the European arsenal—diplomatic, economic, and military—are coordinated carefully in peace operations. The decision–making procedures for the deployment of ESDP capabilities, while fairly complicated to the outside observer, actually are rather simple methods for achieving consensus and action from 25 sovereign states. [See Krupnick, Chapter 5 for more.] At the core lies a clear focus on conflict prevention and facilitating “peaceful solutions to disputes” by “addressing the root–causes of conflicts.”21 Thus, “[a]ccording to the European vision, the socio–economic root causes of threats are inseparable from their direct violent or military manifestations.”22 These principles spring directly from the political culture of cosmopolitanism in Europe, and have been at the heart of the European Union since it added foreign and security policy to its competencies in 1992. After 11 September 2001, the EU noted “In order to succeed, the fight against international terrorism must be underpinned by policies that address the root causes of radical discontent.”23 The EU has focused all of its efforts, both supranational and intergovernmental, on a strategy of conflict prevention. In February 2001, the Council passed a Regulation establishing a “‘Rapid Reaction Mechanism’, designed to allow the Community to respond in a rapid, efficient and flexible manner, to situations of urgency or crisis or to the emergence of crisis.”24 This Regulation clearly outlines decision–making procedures and responsibilities. The Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) is designed to “mobilize resources within hours or days rather than weeks or months.”25 The EU has completed RRM programs in Afghanistan, Nepal and between Lebanon and Israel; currently it has financing components to support programs in Bolivia, Iraq, Liberia, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, and Central Asia.26 “The EU and its member states provide 55 percent of total aid flows—about 30 billion euros per year—to more

21 Anonymous, “EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflict,” available from http://www.eu2001.se/static/eng/pdf/violent.pdf, 1. 22 Nicole Gnesotto, “European Strategy as a Model,” EU–ISS Newsletter, No. 9, January 2004, available from http://www.iss-eu.org/new/analysis/analy063e.html. 23 Europa, Official website of the European Union, “Conflict Prevention and Civilian Crisis Management: Conflict Prevention” http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/ cpcm/cp.htm. 24 Council Regulation (EC) No 381/2001 of 26 February 2001, “Creating a RapidReaction Mechanism,” 1, available from the Official Journal of the European Communities on Europa. 25 Europa, Official website of the European Union, “Common Foreign & Security Policy: ‘Council adopts Rapid Reaction Mechanism; Commission now in position to intervene fast in civilian crisis management’,” IP/01/255, Brussels, 26 February 2001, http://europa.eu.int/ comm/external_relations/cfsp/news/ip_01_255.htm. 26 For complete reports, see http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cpcm/rrm/ press.htm, .

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than 160 countries and organizations worldwide.”27 Clearly, the EU has established itself as a global actor, with aid programs extending far beyond its geographic neighborhood. In early 2001, the Commission issued its Communication on Conflict Prevention, which set out four main objectives. These are: to coordinate better all EU instruments to get at the root causes of conflict in a systemic way; to target specific “cross–cutting issues” (drug, weapons, and human trafficking; competition over scarce resources); to improve the EU’s capacity to react quickly to potential conflicts; and to promote international cooperation on these issues through a multilateral approach.28 The Commission also developed a “Checklist for Root Causes of Conflict,”29 which underpins the EU’s focus on “early warning, action, and policy coherence.”30 While connections now exist between the Commission and the Council for handling crises using the full range of available capabilities, both civilian and military, a new External Action Service clearly would make this process more efficient. An intergovernmental organization with a Common Foreign and Security Policy must have the military muscle to back up its foreign policy – a fact that led to the creation of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in 1999 after a final European humiliation in Kosovo.31 ESDP is a subset of CFSP, and originally was designed to revolve around the Petersberg Tasks, defined in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 as “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.”32 These sprang from the EU’s deeply ingrained commitment to conflict prevention and to proactive strategies. The military “teeth” of the ESDP originally was to consist of a 60,000 strong European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF), capable of deploying within 60 days and sustainable for up to one year in theater—the “Helsinki Headline Goals.” This force was designed specifically to conduct missions that fell under the Petersberg Tasks. Criticism of the force, or lack thereof, was brutal from the start. Even some European sources were skeptical, including one quoted as saying that the ERRF was a “force without soldiers, a command without a headquarters, an operation without a mission, and planning without discussion.”33 One EU official added, “The Rapid Reaction Force is neither rapid nor a force. . . . [T]he rapid reaction force is not a standing European army but a catalogue of the most compatible troop modules and military

27 Gnesotto, “Bush in Europe II”. 28 Europa, Official website of the European Union, “Conflict Prevention and Civilian Crisis Management: Conflict Prevention.” 29 Checklist can be found at http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cpcm/cp/list. htm. 30 Anonymous, “EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflict,” 2. 31 For further explanation of EU actions in the Balkans, please refer to the case study Chapter 8. 32 SCADPlus Glossary, http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/cig/g4000p.htm. 33 BBC Worldwide Monitoring, “European Rapid Reaction Force Seen as ‘Phantom’,” Die Welt, 3 April 2002.

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equipment possible from the armies of the European states.”34 These criticisms, while founded in some ways, showed a lack of understanding of ESDP operations. The presence of troops and equipment in the “force catalogue” does not give the European Union the authority to use them at its discretion. Member states must approve every decision to use force, and they ultimately may not provide troops and equipment to a particular mission. Deployment decisions originate with the Political and Security Committee (PSC), which “exercises political control and strategic direction of the EU’s military response to the crisis.”35 The PSC is a standing body that meets weekly in Brussels, so when a crisis arises, it can assemble quickly to address the issue and make a decision. Decisions to commit military or civilian police forces to a crisis must be unanimous, requiring the consent of all EU member states.36 Once the PSC unanimously agrees to take military action in a given case, such as responding to the request of the United Nations to provide a peacekeeping brigade to Bunia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in the summer of 2003, it passes the decision to the EU Military Committee (EUMC), which is “the highest military body established within the Council. It is composed of the Chiefs of Defence represented by their military representatives in Brussels. The EUMC gives military advice and makes recommendations to the PSC on all military matters within the EU.”37 Not every state is required to send forces (and there appears to be no pressure to do so), but if the PSC agrees to support an EU operation (if the vote is not unanimous, the mission is scrapped), states must pay part of the common costs of the mission.38 Mission financing procedures are outlined in the ATHENA mechanism, established in February 2004 by a Council Decision.39 Herein lies the answer to the fourth criticism of the European defense and security efforts outlined at the start of this chapter. Since no state is required to send troops on any specific mission, the EU does not need a shared risk assessment. Further, in the fifteen ESDP missions conducted to date, this has not represented a roadblock to action. This “consensus to allow a coalition of the willing to contribute forces,” to do so, has become a trademark of the EU in recent years, as it struggles to further integration in the face of “deepening” functionality and “widening” membership. 34 Ibid. 35 Missiroli. 36 Denmark opted out of ESDP and is not included in these structures. 37 Ibid. 38 In general, when the PSC makes a unanimous decision to deploy troops, every member state agrees to pay a portion of the “common costs” of the mission, such as strategic lift, billeting, etc. Each member state’s share of the cost is determined by its percentage of the EU’s total Gross Domestic Product. In addition to these common costs, those member states agreeing to contribute troops pay additional costs associated with their own troops, such as special deployment pays, etc. 39 Council Decision 2004/197/CFSP of 23 February 2004, “establishing a mechanism to administer the financing of common costs of European Union operations having military or defence implications,” accessed through http://ue.eu.int/ .

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Failure to understand this unique aspect of EU decision–making has led to much skepticism in the United States about the EU’s ability to achieve consensus on the use of force. Even when it has reached consensus and deployed forces, as with the DRC mission (Operation ARTEMIS), doubts about the EU as a global actor led many, or at least those who knew the mission existed, to dismiss it as another French operation in Africa. Although France did take the lead and provided the bulk of troops for the mission, approval of the mission came through the PSC. Further, the troops flew the EU’s “circle of stars,” not the French flag. The deployment was approved unanimously by the EU member states, all of which were responsible for their GDP–keyed share of the costs. Even the reluctant Germans provided a contingent of several hundred troops to the mission. Its EU mandate distinctly sets Operation ARTEMIS apart from recent unilateral European missions in the Ivory Coast (France) and Sierra Leone (UK).40 ARTEMIS also is significant in that it was the first autonomous EU military operation that did not rely on NATO support. As well, it laid the foundation for the further development of an EU–UN partnership for peace operations. The EU’s involvement does not end after achieving political approval and force commitments for such missions. It must plan the details of the operation. This involves the EU Military Staff (EUMS), which “provides military expertise and support to the ESDP, [involving] early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning for Petersberg tasks including identification of European national and multinational forces and …implementing policies and decisions as directed by the EUMC.”41 A member state may be designated the “framework nation” by the PSC and EUMC, which grants it the authority for operational mission planning—selection of military strategy and tactics. France, for example, was the framework nation for Operation ARTEMIS in the DRC. This high profile position may have led to the misunderstanding of that action as a unilateral one. Operational Headquarters (OHQs), which the ESDP framework lists as a command and control capability, have caused great controversy in official US circles. The EU hoped to eliminate the need for multiple national OHQs by building its own (EU) OHQ facility in Tervuren, outside of Brussels—the “Tervuren Initiative,” announced in April 2003. This plan provoked an extreme reaction in the United States, which expressed distrust and suspicion of the OHQs for duplicating capabilities and decoupling the Atlantic Alliance. The United States preferred to continue operating under the “Berlin Plus” framework set up between the EU and NATO in December 2002. Under this framework, the EU can undertake military operations that make use of NATO planning capabilities and headquarters assets. The EU conducted the first such mission in Macedonia, in 2003, when it took over the tiny peacekeeping operation from NATO and implemented “Operation CONCORDIA.” The second 40 For more information, see “EU Military Operation in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC / ARTEMIS)” available through http://ue.eu.int/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=605&lang =en&mode=g. 41 Ibid.

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operation is underway in Bosnia, where the EU took over the military mission from NATO in December 2004, employing the EUFOR forces under Operation ALTHEA.42 Ultimately, the EU still is testing the viability of Berlin Plus, and the US and the EU have compromised on liaison offices with the EU Military Staff in Brussels and the NATO operational headquarters in Mons. Internally, the EU continues to find ways to enhance its own operational planning capabilities [Please see Krupnick, Chapter 5]. Beginning in 2003, the EU moved beyond the constraints of the Petersberg Tasks and the questionable deployability of the ERRF. The concept of “crisis management” now includes anticipation of higher intensity of conflict and counter–terrorism activities. Toward this end, the EU published “Headline Goal 2010” in 2004, which directs the creation of Rapid Response EU Battlegroups, the minimum military effective, credible, rapidly deployable, coherent force package capable of stand–alone operations, or for the initial phase of larger operations. The Battlegroup is based on a combined arms, battalion sized force and reinforced with Combat Support and Combat Service Support elements. A Battlegroup can be formed by a Framework Nation or by a multinational coalition of Member States.43

There are 13 Battlegroups planned for Full Operational Capability in 2007, with Initial Operational Capability already available via the Battlegroups of the United Kingdom and France. 44 Deployment of these packages must begin within five days of a political decision to commence an operation, with mission implementation beginning on the ground within another five days. This capability far surpasses the Helsinki Headline Goals. Additionally, the concept is identical to the new US Army “Units of Action” or “Brigade Combat Teams” under the “modularity” concept, except, of course, on a smaller scale. The decision–making process and planning procedures outlined in this section also apply to the deployment of civilian policing assets provided by the member states. Under the ESDP, the member states have made available 5,000 civilian police officers, 280 civilian “rule of law experts,” and 2,000 civil protection personnel for civilian crisis management.45 These assets are fully deployable, and the civilian police component has been utilized heavily in the Balkans, as described in Chapter 42 For more information, see http://www.delmkd.cec.eu.int/en/Concordia/main.htm and http://www.euforbih.org/, . 43 Military Capability Commitment Conference, Brussels, 22 November 2004, “Declaration on European Military Capabilities,” available from http://ue.eu.int/, . This document contains a full description of the Battlegroups concept. 44 In EU parlance, full operational capability generally means the ability to operate across the full spectrum of the Petersberg Tasks, to include the high end, while initial operational capability excludes the highest end Tasks (tasks of combat forces in crisis management). 45 European Communities, Training Civilian Experts for International Peace Missions: EC Project on Training for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2003, 4.

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8, as well as by the new EU Police Mission in Kinshasa, DRC.46 In addition, the first “Rule of Law” mission launched in 2004 to Georgia—EUJUST THEMIS— uses them.47 The civilian aspect of crisis management is an area of strong emphasis within the European Union. Here the Commission again works hand–in–hand with the Council, which overall is responsible for ESDP. While the Commission stays clear of military matters, it is involved closely in the civilian aspects of crisis management, focusing in particular on “police, rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection.”48 To this end, one of the Commission’s strongest points is its training program. The institution’s educational undertakings are highlighted in “Training Civilian Experts for International Peace Missions.” The Council mandated this task, to “develop a coordinated EU training policy in the field of ESDP, encompassing both civilian and military dimensions,”49 at its June 2003 Thessaloniki Summit. A network of educational centers “offers training for judges, prosecutors and human rights observers, local administrators, social workers, teachers and infrastructure experts, as well as other categories of interested civilian experts, on how to apply their professional skills in conflict–stricken environments.”50 A new capability the EU is pursuing as part of its defense integration comes from the creation of a European Gendarmerie—a paramilitary police or constabulary force that “combine[s] law–enforcement expertise, which is often the primary postconflict need, with military training, a military structure and more fire–power than police.”51 Currently, four European states possess such paramilitary police units— Spain, France, Italy, and Portugal. The most well known of these are the Italian Carabinieri, who “work alongside regular police in Italy, but answer to the Ministry of Defense. At home, they have taken on the Mafia and Red Brigade terrorists. Deployed in the Balkans in the 1990s, they won positive reviews for their work with local communities.”52 The more than 300 Carabinieri currently deployed in Iraq “are perceived by local populations as friendlier and more approachable than other military forces.”53 The Carabinieri took the lead in Bosnia and Kosovo in the formation of “Multinational Specialized Units,” which the EU hopes to duplicate 46 For more information, see “European Union Police Mission in Kinshasa (DRC) – (EUPOL KINSHASA)” available from http://ue.eu.int/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=788&lang =en&mode=g, . 47 For more information, see “European Union Rule of Law Mission to Georgia: EUJUST THEMIS,” available from http://ue.eu.int, . 48 Europa, “Conflict Prevention and Civilian Crisis Management: Civilian Crisis Management,” http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cpcm/cm.htm. 49 European Communities, 4. 50 Ibid, 3. 51 Doug Bereuter, “Consider a Constabulary,” DefenseNews, 10 November 2003, 45. 52 Tom Kington, “Italian Carabinieri Stay Firm Despite Iraq Attack,” DefenseNews, 1 December 2003, 6. 53 Irene Peroni, “Italy Shocked at Soldiers’ Attack,” BBC News online, 12 November 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3265245.stm.

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with its proposed “Integrated Police Units” (IPUs). These forces differ distinctly from the police forces conducting EU Police Missions in Bosnia and Macedonia, in that they have the combat capability to be utilized in a military role, as well as for civilian policing.54 Italy has taken the lead in setting up such a force for the EU. Conclusion No one can make a case for the Europeans, across the board, being committed to improving their hard power defense capabilities. Neither could anyone make a legitimate argument that there is any desire within the member states of the European Union to spend more on defense. The EU’s political culture prioritizes its spending, and for the near future, these are social programs and agricultural subsidies. Together, these consume enormous chunks of the European Union’s budget. It is not clear that even a massive terrorist attack in Europe would change these preferences. In the immediate aftermath of the March 2004 terror bombings of the commuter trains in Madrid, Spain, the public response focused on demands for withdrawal from Iraq rather than on a declaration of a “war on terror.” In the few European states that sent troops to Iraq, in fact, leaders took enormous political risks and defied public opinion to support the United States. To understand the European contribution to global security and the progress they have made toward that end, one must move beyond a single–minded focus on hard power and increased military spending. The Eurocracy, which is difficult for many outside observers to understand, does share a single vision for conflict prevention. The decision–making procedures that operationalize that vision, while complicated, have been tested successfully on numerous occasions in the past two years. Significantly, the Europeans recognize their own shortfalls and the political constraints they face in correcting them. Accordingly, they have developed appropriate solutions – ranging from pooling existing resources, to leasing55 and role specialization for short term fixes, to consolidation of procurement and R&D policies for a permanent solution to equipment acquisition. The European Union is quite serious about its global responsibility for conflict prevention and crisis management. It has made significant progress toward that end in the past two years, with serious commitment to completing what it set out to do at St. Malo in 1999. Rather than criticizing these efforts, the United States should reconsider how valuable these contributions are to global security. The second part of this book is dedicated to highlighting the EU’s critical role in ensuring security in numerous regions around the world.

54 Tom Kington, “EU, Italy Work to Form European Gendarmerie,” DefenseNews, 8 December 2003, 4. 55 The EU, for example, has leased strategic lift aircraft from Russia and the Ukraine in order to transport troops to the Balkans and the DRC.

Part 2

European Security in Action Part I of this book laid out the basis, evolution, conception, and operational framework of Europe’s new security architecture. With this understanding of Old Europe’s New Security, we now offer a series of regional case studies that exemplify this unique approach to global security. In Chapter Eight, Christina Schweiss and Cindy Jebb present a case study of European security in action—the Balkans. Here, they argue, was Old Europe’s catalyst to implement its New Security, coming from a humiliating inability to act as Yugoslavia crumbled in the early 1990s. Still “muddling through” during Kosovo’s ethnic cleansing in 1999, Europe finally has turned the corner, making European Security and Defense Policy a reality, with the Balkans its primary testing ground. Schweiss and Jebb describe Europe’s approach in the Balkans as one of member state building as opposed to either a more authoritarian post–conflict occupation, or a less comprehensive, traditional approach to state building. After outlining the history of European Union involvement in the Balkans, they offer an in–depth look at Macedonia to highlight this member state building approach. Next, Ruth Beitler explores Europe’s policies in the Middle East in Chapter Nine. With a long history of involvement in the region, Europe progressively has strengthened its institutional links to the Middle East through such venues as the Euro–Mediterranean Partnership council. With a focus on socio–economic, rather than traditional defense, issues, the EU has sought to promote conflict resolution through peaceful means, most recently and notably in Israel, as a member of the Quartet, and in Iran. Beitler outlines the EU’s application of its capacity–building approach with its newest ESDP mission to provide civil administration and rule of law support to the fledgling Iraqi democracy. In Chapter Ten, Vidya Nadkarni explores the EU’s “multi–faceted but ambivalent relationship” with the Russian Federation, the EU’s powerful neighbor to the east. At the crux of the debate over the strategic partnership between Russia and the EU lie very different ideas about what constitutes security, with the EU’s focus on human security transcending Russia’s more traditional views of national security. Despite these divergences Nadkarni asserts, there are powerful incentives for EU–Russian cooperation in trade, energy, and the environment, all of which the European security conception includes. In the final regional case study, Joaquín Roy examines Europe’s historical relationship with Latin America, in comparison to that of the United States, in Chapter ������������������������������������������������������������������������������ The United States, Russian Federation, European Union and the United Nations together make up the Quartet.

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Eleven. While the United States has focused narrowly in trade and investment, Europe, he asserts, looks more broadly to the economic and social roots of insecurity in Latin America. Further, he argues that the European Union better understands the need to remedy domestic markets’ weaknesses with increasing, cohesive integration. Using the legacy of Spanish colonialism as an access point, Roy examines the EU’s recent re–assertion of influence in the region, given the relative lack of US attention post–11 September. The cases on which these authors focus clearly illustrate the implementation and evolution of Europe’s “soft security” doctrine as it becomes a reality. The authors chronicle the extension of European influence around the globe, and empirically validate the legitimacy and growing effectiveness of the European differentiated approach to global stability.

Chapter 8

The European Union in the Balkans: From Intervention to Accession Christina M. Schweiss and Cindy R. Jebb United States Military Academy

Any study of European security developments in the post–Cold War era must begin in the Balkans. Here, in its own backyard, Europe has moved from the failure and humiliation of the early 1990s to a demonstration of its newfound unity of purpose and unique capabilities. Europe’s political integration, begun under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in 1992, was in fact a direct result of the diplomatic failures experienced in Yugoslavia at the beginning of the decade. The 1999 addition of security procedures and military capabilities to give teeth to the CFSP, introduced under the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), again resulted from events in the Balkans—namely the humiliation of the capabilities gap displayed in the Kosovo air war earlier in the year. With the United States flying over 85 percent of the sorties in the war and the limited number of European aircraft, coupled with their lack of technology to deliver precision–guided munitions day and night in all weather, the gap was glaring and undeniable. The Member–State Building Approach The European Union (EU) not only has stretched the traditional concepts of European identity and of security, it continues to develop its capacity to realize these new models in very concrete ways. Although some criticize its incremental approach towards new challenges, it has made real headway. We will examine the foundational principles of the EU that have made it an enviable alternative not only for each new and potential new member states, but also for the region and the region’s neighbors to the south and east overall. While all non–EU states in the EU neighborhood have their own unique challenges, they must be addressed within a regional context because of spillover effects. Through creative and tenacious application of a myriad of institutional tools, the EU may have developed the best method for addressing the uncertainties and complexities of today’s security challenges. Through the EU’s  Gerald Knaus and Marcus Cox, “Building Democracy After Conflict: The ‘Helsinki Moment’ in Southeastern Europe,” Journal of Democracy, 16/1 (January 2005), pp. 40-41.

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engagement with indigenous elites, institutions, and societies, it has facilitated weak states’ legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens while producing significant results on its own, thus demonstrating its state–like capacity. Gerald Knaus and Marcus Cox argue that the EU’s strength comes from its adoption of a member–state building approach towards candidate states. They describe this as a sophisticated overture to countries that have formal recognition as EU candidate member states. This model describes an empathetic approach in which the EU works closely with a candidate state’s leaders to map out, jointly, a unique path that eventually leads to social, economic and political development. They contrast this consultative approach with the authoritarian state model that one sees in Bosnia–Herzegovina and Kosovo. This second model uses an international structure that dominates the social, political, and economic spheres and that may not be accountable to the citizens of the state. Further, these authors briefly contrast the member–state building approach with the traditional capacity–building model that relies on non–coercive and development strategies normally found in the international development community, including the EU. “There are stark differences in approach—and results—between the authoritarian state building model used in the Bosnia–Herzegovina and Kosovo protectorates and the member–state building model applied to EU candidate countries. While aid has declined steadily over time in the protectorates, it has accelerated as candidate countries implement the changes/reforms needed to meet EU standards. The protectorates also have no requirement for co–financing from domestic sources with the result that reconstruction aid replaces domestic investment and causes massive distortions in public–spending patterns.” The authoritative approach views all local institutions as obstacles and prefers to eliminate them, while the member–state building approach views local institutions as a means to develop legitimacy and a starting point for building indigenous state capacities. At some point in this process, the candidate state reaches a “tipping point” as the full political spectrum of the citizenry adopts a “common vision of a better society. It is this mobilization of political energy that gives the EU integration process its extraordinary potency.” Currently, the EU is considering a southeast expansion that could include states from Croatia to Turkey. This is not an easy undertaking, as this area presents both common regional challenges and unique state–based difficulties. The expansion could include the international protectorates of Bosnia–Herzegovina and Kosovo, each with unique post–conflict issues; the dangerous and persistent border and

�������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Gerald Knaus and Marcus Cox, “Building Democracy After Conflict: The ‘Helsinki Moment’ in Southeastern Europe,” Journal of Democracy, Vol 16, no 1 (January 2005): 40–1. ������������� Ibid, 48–49. ���������� Ibid, 49. ���������� Ibid, 41.

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sovereignty issues among Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo; Albania, still a weak state; and Turkey, which brings its own slate of challenges. Moreover, the social and economic conditions vary significantly from state to state. Bosnia and Kosovo suffered war that resulted in tremendous population displacements; Serbia suffered economic and particularly industrial setbacks; Albania, Kosovo, and Turkey all face the challenge of modernizing an agricultural sector that includes subsistence farmers living in unpromising conditions. How the EU proceeds will be critical not only to the potential member states, but also to the organization itself. So far, the EU seems the best alternative for Europe, but there is more at stake than the future of the European continent. Given the global nature of many of today’s security challenges, more than Europe should support the EU’s efforts to extend prosperity and freedom within its neighborhood as far as possible. A History of the EU in the Balkans—Evolution of the Approach “Old Europe’s” new approach to security was conceived and tested in the Balkans, a troubled neighboring region with geographic “rights” via the Copenhagen Criteria to EU membership. The member–state building approach used with the 2004 EU entrant states, the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs), continued in the Balkans. Here, however, the difficult security situation required the addition of police and military tools not required by the peaceful revolutions in the Balkans’ neighbors to the north. CFSP in the Balkans: From Inception to Validation Diplomacy and Intervention in the Early 1990s: An Exercise in Failure: As peaceful revolution began across Central and Eastern Europe in 1989, with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the unification of Germany and the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union, the rumblings of imminent war grew louder in the Balkans. Yugoslavia was held together for decades by the iron fist of its post–World War II leader, Josip Broz Tito until his death in 1980. Now, however, nationalist leaders on all sides, manipulating ethnic tensions, were tearing it apart. Preoccupied by the 1991 Gulf War and the desire to downsize and restructure its armed forces for the post–Cold War world, the United States clearly sent the signal, through Secretary of State James Baker, that it considered the trouble brewing in the Balkans to be a “European problem.” The pre–Maastricht European Community (EC) had focused mainly on economic integration, and what would later become the CFSP of the EU was only a vague language in the Maastricht Treaty when civil war broke out in the Balkans in 1991. “Yugoslavia, the first armed conflict of the post–Cold War age, presented the historic challenge that Europe needed to prove its singleness of purpose. In a phrase ���������� Ibid, 39. �������������������������������� Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (New York: TV Books, 1996) 159.

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that would haunt him, Jacques Poos, Luxembourg’s Foreign Minister, declared, ‘The hour of Europe has dawned’.” Confidence and optimism soon gave way to embarrassment and humiliation as efforts at diplomatic and military intervention in the Balkans failed to produce a peace settlement and an end to the fighting. Diplomatic chaos resulted from the lack of a European CFSP in 1991; the troika of last, current, and next EU presidency states in the rotation made a diplomatic show of expressing its support for the continuing unity of the Yugoslav federation and its presidency, while Germany’s Foreign Minister, Hans Dietrich Genscher, simultaneously conducted bilateral negotiations with Slovenia and Croatia and called for international recognition of their independence. “Genscher made it clear that if the EC did not move towards recognition, then Germany would break ranks and recognize [them] unilaterally.”10 Unwilling to place the Yugoslav peace process ahead of European unity, the leadership of the EC acceded to German demands and formally recognized the independence of Croatia and Slovenia in January 1992. This premature recognition, offered before the rest of the international community was prepared to extend the same diplomatic courtesy, inevitably had disastrous consequences for another of Yugoslavia’s republics. “The march to war in Bosnia– Herzegovina… gathered speed when war erupted in neighboring Croatia, but might have been prevented if the European Community had not recognized Croatia as an independent state in January 1992.”11 With Slovenia and Croatia internationally recognized as independent from Yugoslavia, Serbia dominated what was left of the country. Had Germany heeded international calls for caution in condoning the fragmentation of the Yugoslav state, it is possible that other solutions involving new power–sharing arrangements may have been found with the Serbs not feeling threatened by the break–up of “Greater Serbia.” Bosnia’s President Alija Izetbegovic then faced a stark choice—either to seek recognition or remain in Serb–dominated Yugoslavia. The EC forged ahead with recognition and the United States reluctantly followed, persuading itself that recognition would mean peace. For the Bosnian Serbs it meant war. Their leader, Radovan Karadzic, had threatened that if Bosnia were recognized as an independent state; it would be stillborn and not survive a single day. The Serbs moved and war erupted. The darkest predictions were fulfilled.12 Military failure and ignominy soon followed failed attempts to intervene with diplomacy in Croatia and Bosnia. Lines of responsibility for peacekeeping operations in the Balkans were blurred as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United Nations (UN), and the member states of the European Community (EC), precursor to the later EU, each conducted operations in Bosnia through 1995, ������ Ibid. ��������������� Ibid. 162–163. 10 Ibid. 199. 11 Ibid. 205 12 Ibid.

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uncoordinated with each other. France and Britain contributed the bulk of the troops to the UN peacekeeping operation and, as the UN considered a withdrawal, increased their contributions through a newly created Rapid Reaction Force (RRF). “The Rapid Reaction Force had combat capability, and would be operating not under the auspices of the UN but rather on orders directly from London and Paris.”13 The Dutch also sent fresh forces to Bosnia, thirty of whom the Serbs took hostage in July 1995, during the siege and slaughter of the Muslim population at Srebrenica, a UN “safe area.”14 “The humiliation of [Dutch] UN peacekeepers chained to lamp–posts and military installations to head off further NATO air strikes in June, the defeat of Srebrenica, and, finally, the gradual emergence of evidence of the mass murder of Muslims… brought international efforts to end the war to an all–time low.”15 Faced with the prospect of a mortifying UN withdrawal from Bosnia, the United States stepped in and took over diplomatic negotiations, brokering the Dayton Peace Accord in November 1995. The EU’s failure to solidify a CFSP, even after making it a pillar of integration at Maastricht, reduced European credibility to such an extent that it had only a cursory role in the Dayton negotiations. Dayton’s architect, Richard Holbrooke, acknowledged, “The Europeans had a great deal to contribute, and would be essential for success.”16 Nevertheless, the European contribution proved problematic. Beginning the negotiations with a large Contact Group, Holbrooke quickly narrowed the ineffective group down to six senior representatives. Still, “this arrangement reflected a deeper difficulty within the European Union: who spoke for Europe?”17 This problem had been famously described by Henry Kissinger when someone in the State Department had said that they had better consult with Europe on some issue. ‘And what,’ Kissinger had rumbled to his staff, ‘is Europe’s phone number?’ Now, two decades later, and despite the E.U.’s frequent lip service to a common defense and foreign policy, Kissinger’s question was still relevant.18 European Union Peace Envoy Carl Bildt, a former Swedish prime minister, became a co–chair of the Contact Group at Dayton. British and French Contact Group representatives, however, told Holbrooke privately that, “Bildt could not speak for their governments on certain issues.”19 This made Bildt’s title and position meaningless. The dilemma was clear: the EU “did not exist as a single negotiating entity…. [N]ations which still aspired to greatness and global influence wanted to retain an independent voice on foreign policy.”20 The ‘hour of Europe’ that had dawned in 1991, set in 1995. 13 Ibid. 355–356. 14 Ibid. 357. 15 Ibid. 355. 16 Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: The Modern Library, 1998) 241. 17 Ibid. 242. 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid.

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Turning the Corner: Initiatives for Stabilization The Royaumont Process: Motivated ���������������������������������������������������������� by the desire to take a more active role in the Balkan peace process, the EU launched the Royaumont Process during the French Presidency in December 1996, one year after the implementation of the Dayton Accord. This initiative, also known as “the process for stability and goodneighbourliness in south–eastern Europe,”21 came from the Conference of Paris on the Peace in Bosnia– Herzegovina. Participants in the Royaumont Process included the rump state of Yugoslavia and its former territories, now independent states, as well as Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Turkey, the EU member states, Russia, and the United States. The United States led on military peacekeeping operations, while the EU’s Royaumont Process promoted human rights, civil society and cultural activities22 in support of implementing the peace agreement in Bosnia. The EU brought the Royaumont Process into its institutional structure, when in November 1998 the Council of Ministers, through the adoption of a common position, incorporated it into CFSP.23 The Regional Approach: In April 1997, the EU General Affairs Council (GAC), composed of member states’ Foreign Ministers, adopted the Regional Approach, which established political and economic conditions for developing bilateral relations with five countries of Southeastern Europe—Albania, Bosnia–Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM).24 Reminiscent of the Copenhagen Criteria, the Regional Approach demanded, “respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law, protection of minorities, [and] market economy reforms’25 as pre–conditions for bilateral relations between the EU and these countries. Bilateral relations included the enticing incentives of trade with the EU, financial and economic assistance, and contractual relations.26 The Regional Approach listed as its two primary objectives reinforcing the successful implementation of the peace agreements and the creation of an area of political stability and economic prosperity.27 Toward these ends, requirements for bilateral 21 http://europa.eu.int/comm./external_relations/news/01_00/ip_00_65.htm (Europa website, European Commission: External Relations), “Anna Diamantopoulou participates in ‘Royaumonrt’ process in order to promote social and civil dialogue in south–eastern Europe,” Brussels, 21 January 2000. 22 http://europa.eu.int/comm./external_relations/see/infos/brochure.pdf (EU’s External Relations website), pdf brochure “The European Union and southeast Europe – Building a brighter future” (September 2000) 10. 23 http://europa.eu.int/comm./external_relations/news/01_00/ip_00_65.htm. 24 Ibid. 25 Ibid. 26 http://europa.eu.int/comm./external_relations/see/sap/index.htm (Europa website, European Commission: External Relations), “The Stabilisation and Association Process for countries of South–Eastern Europe.” 27 Ibid.

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relations with the EU also included regional cooperation, defined as “the readiness of the beneficiary country to engage in cross–border cooperation and to extend[,] where appropriate[,] similar advantages to other countries of the region.”28 Understandably, the EU would not penalize a state for reluctance on the part of potential partners.29 Just as the CEECs took individual tracks toward EU accession, the countries under the Regional Approach are treated separately based on their past involvement in the region’s wars and the status of their political systems and economies. Thus, the failure of one country does not hinder the progress of another. The Regional Approach provides a positive incentive for the countries of the region to comply with the peace agreements and to overcome ethnic differences internally and externally—peace and civil harmony are prerequisites for economic prosperity. Further, programs such as CARDS (Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization) underpin EU regional programs in the Balkans and Eurasia.30 Through this and other development, reconstruction, and assistance programs, the EU provided more than 6.1 billion euros to the states of South Eastern Europe in the decade between 1991 and 2001.31 Such aid programs proved successful in preparing the eight former Warsaw Pact countries for admission into the EU in May 2004. As well, they offer an enormous incentive for states in Europe and Eurasia to consolidate their new democracy. Crisis in Kosovo: The Rambouillet Agreement and Beyond: By February 1999, the EU had made great progress toward its goal of speaking with one voice on foreign affairs under the CFSP. On the 23rd of that month, in response to the newest Balkan crisis in Kosovo, the EU, under the leadership of French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine and British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Robin Cook, brokered the Rambouillet Interim Agreement for Peace and Self–Government in Kosovo.32 Although ultimately the agreement failed to prevent war in Kosovo, rogue Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic, who refused to abide by the agreement and proceeded with his campaign of ethnic cleansing in the province, receives the blame for this. The EU, although unable to contribute significantly to the subsequent NATO air campaign relative to the contributions of the US, had reversed earlier diplomatic failures in this coordinated effort at Rambouillet and in the ensuing months. Overcoming a previous tendency toward confusing and disruptive bilateral negotiations and statements, the Council and the Commission issued unified EU 28 http://europa.eu.int/comm./external_relations/see/docs/conditionality_29_april_ 97.htm (Europa website, European Commission: External Relations), “Application of Conditionality with a view to developing a Coherent EU–Strategy for the Relations with the Countries of the Region” (from Annex III to Council Conclusions – Luxembourg, 29/30 April 1997). 29 Ibid. 30 http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/actions/asp.htm. 31 http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/index.htm. 32 http://www.monde–diplomatique.fr/dossiers/kosovo/rambouillet.html, “Rambouillet Interim Agreement for Peace and Self–Government in Kosovo” (23 Feb 99).

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statements and declarations in response to the crisis in April 1999.33 The carefully worded, yet stern diplomatic warnings that went unheeded by President Milosevic proved, however, that the EU had to develop legitimate military capabilities if it wanted to be taken seriously as an international foreign policy actor. Kosovo ultimately contributed to the advent of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and the commitment, in November 2000, to create a European Rapid Reaction Force to respond to regional crises. Meanwhile, the EU continued to focus on non–military measures to stabilize the region. The Stabilization and Association Process: In the midst of the Kosovo crisis of 1999, the EU declared its “particular interest in the region, because of its geographic proximity to Member States and candidate countries,” emphasizing the likely destabilizing effects of volatility in that neighborhood.34 Building on the Regional Approach created in 1997, in May 1999 the Commission proposed the creation of an enhanced program called the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP). In justifying the maintenance of the Regional Approach as a building block to the SAP, the EU declared the problems in the Balkans to be of an “inextricably regional nature… reinforc[ing] the need for a regional approach to the problem.”35 EU leaders argued that further development of the Regional Approach was essential due to the “failure of the countries to adequately respond to the incentives already offered.”36 Examples of this included the ongoing actions of FRY President Milosevic, the continuing nationalist policies of Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, and the failure to attain a lasting solution to the de facto partition of Bosnia– Herzegovina. The proposed SAP would “offer higher incentives than before”37 in an attempt to achieve the long–term stabilization of the region. EU actors envisioned the SAP, defined as “a tailor–made, progressive approach that takes into account the individual situation of each country”38 as the cornerstone of their Common Strategy towards the Western Balkans, announced in the 1998 33 http://europa.eu.int/comm./external_relations/see/councils/lux_8_april_99.htm (Europa website, European Commission: External Relations), “Special Council Meeting – General Affairs – Luxembourg, 8 April 1999, Kosovo – Council Conclusions” (document number PRES/99/94) and http://europa.eu.int/comm./external_relations/see/councils/lux_26_ apr_99.htm (Europa website, European Commission: External Relations), “2173rd Council Meeting – General Affairs – Luxembourg, 26 April 1999, Kosovo Crisis – Conclusions” (document number PRES/99/118). 34 http://europa.eu.int/comm./external_relations/see/com_99_235/ (Europa website, European Commission: External Relations), “The Stabilisation and Association Process for countries of South–Eastern Europe” (Commission Communication to the Council and European Parliament, COM (99) 235 – 26.05.1999). 35 Ibid. 36 http://europa.eu.int/comm./external_relations/see/com_99_235/3.htm, Section 3 “Further development of the Regional Approach.” 37 Ibid. 38 http://europa.eu.int/comm./external_relations/see/infos/brochure.pdf 11.

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Vienna Council.39 The primary tool of the SAP would be Stability and Association Agreements (SAAs) with each of the five countries covered under the original Regional Approach. The SAAs would be the Balkan equivalent of the Europe Agreements for the CEECs and the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements for the countries of the former Soviet Union, which embody contractual relations with the EU. The SAAs, as did the Europe Agreements, would precede the opening of accession negotiations and provide the prospect of membership following the candidate’s completion of Amsterdam Treaty requirements and the Copenhagen Criteria.40 Along the way, the SAAs would provide opportunities for developing trade relations with the EU, receipt of financial assistance, assistance with “state–building” tasks to promote democracy, cooperation in justice and home affairs (JHA), and development of political dialogue with the EU.41 The SAP and accompanying SAAs mark the “official” start of the “member–state building” approach in the Balkans. In 1999, both Albania and the FYROM had contractual relations with the EU in the form of Cooperation Agreements.42 The SAAs were intended to replace the Cooperation Agreements, or the prospect of such an agreement, for each of the five countries with a “new, more advanced relationship.”43 Requirements for starting negotiations toward an SAA remained those set out under the Regional Approach. The EU again emphasized regional cooperation among the five countries as a primary condition for the start of negotiations.44 The SAP contained other elements open to potential candidates that had not yet met the conditions required to begin the SAA process.45 A country not yet ready to start SAA negotiations still could work toward developing trade relations, receiving economic and state–building assistance, cooperating in JHA, and developing political dialogue with the EU. In short, failure to meet initial requirements for an SAA, prevented or delayed candidacy, but did not preclude a country from receiving indispensable aid from the EU in preparation for reaching that stage. The parallels between the SAP and the CEEC’s accession process are clear. As with the process that led to the CEEC’s membership, the SAP is an individualized process that ensures that “some countries can progress faster than others.”46 In addition, the EU provides conditional political and economic assistance to any country aspiring to EU membership in an effort to help it achieve that goal. Each formal agreement a candidate state reaches can move it a step closer to EU accession. The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe: The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, initiated by the EU through a Common Position of the Council on 17 May 39 http://europa.eu.int/comm./external_relations/see/sap/index.htm. 40 http://europa.eu.int/comm./external_relations/see/com_99_235/3.htm. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid. 43 Ibid. 44 Ibid. 45 http://europa.eu.int/comm./external_relations/see/sap/index.htm. 46 http://europa.eu.int/comm./external_relations/see/infos/brochure.pdf 11.

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199947 and signed in Cologne on 10 June 1999, goes beyond a SAP. Rather, it is a broad world partnership for the promotion of peace, stability, and economic development in the Balkans. “It lays down the framework for co–operation between the European Union, the European Commission, the United States, Russia, Japan, southeastern European countries, Turkey, and other countries including regional and international organizations and international financing institutions.”48 Both the EU and the United States regarded support for this agreement as a priority of their New Transatlantic Agenda.49 They launched the Stability Pact on 30 July 1999 at a summit in Sarajevo, with all participants present. In order to coordinate efforts and review progress under the Stability Pact, the EU created a South Eastern Europe Regional Table with Working Tables for democratization and human rights; economic reconstruction, development, and cooperation; and security issues.50 While “the Stability Pact is not a direct instrument of the EU… the EU is a major contributor to its work.”51 Namely, much of the work under the Stability Pact is being accomplished via the EU’s SAP and, the EU has continued to take the lead in this area even beyond its initiation of the Pact. Bringing together and coordinating the efforts of major players, including powers such as the United States, Russia, and Japan, plus the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, NATO, the UN, the Western European Union, the International Monetary Fund, and World Bank, represents a significant achievement for the EU. It particularly is remarkable that it has developed this role as an international actor after its struggles in the Balkans in the early 1990s. ESDP in the Balkans: Born and Raised: On 1 January 2003, the EU performed its very first civilian crisis management operation under ESDP with its Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia. In a country where the paramilitary police had been instruments of terror for ethnically–based political parties, the EU recognized the need to legitimize the state forces. Thus, it exclusively focused on restoring the rule of law and pursuing focused mission objectives: development of police independence and accountability, fighting organized crime and corruption, ensuring the financial viability and sustainability of the local police, and pursuing institution– and capacity– building measures. The EUPM force as of January 2006 has 170 international police officers from 24 EU and nine non- EU countries, joining the 200 BiH police. Additionally, the EUPM has deployed civilian “rule of law” experts in Bosnia. The 47 http://europa.eu.int/comm./external_relations/see/docs/stability_pact_17_may_ 99.htm (Europa website, European Commission: External Relations), “Common Position concerning the launching of the Stability Pact of the EU on South–Eastern Europe” (from Annex to Council Conclusions – Brussels, 17 May 1999). 48 http://europa.eu.int/comm./external_relations/see/infos/brochure.pdf 10. 49 http://europa.eu.int/comm./external_relations/see/stapact/10_june_99.htm (Europa website, European Commission: External Relations), “Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe” (Cologne, 10 June 1999). 50 http://europa.eu.int/comm./external_relations/see/stapact/10_june_99.htm. 51 http://europa.eu.int/comm./external_relations/see/infos/brochure.pdf 10.

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operation is widespread, with a presence in twelve major regional headquarters throughout both the Republic of Srpska and the Muslim–Croat Federation of BiH.52 The EUPM’s updated mandate–it is slated to run through 2007–is to transition to control by BiH police. The mission is a major success. “The police have really changed from a tool of the state and an instrument of war into an organization designed to serve the people rather than oppress them.”53 The EUPM was designed to run for exactly three years, with the mandate set to expire at the end of 2005. In comparison with ill–defined US “exit strategies,” the European Union takes the achievement of its well defined and narrowly focused mandates, within a set period, very seriously, as seen in the three–month interim mission in the Congo last summer. In March 2003, the organization’s first military mission began in Macedonia, making use of the new Berlin–Plus framework. Dubbed “Operation Concordia,” this nine–month EU Force (EUFOR) operation was a follow–on to NATO’s peacekeeping undertaking in Macedonia. Involving just 400 military personnel, but representing 26 contributing states, Macedonia was a perfect first mission for the EU to test its military concepts under ESDP. “The core aim of the operation was, at the explicit request of the FYROM government, to contribute further to a stable secure environment and to allow the implementation of the August 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement.”54 On 15 December 2003, Operation Concordia ended—and significantly, no other international security forces replaced EUFOR. Macedonia no longer has any foreign military forces as it has progressed beyond the need for such a presence, with the active engagement of the EU in the context of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. As the flag was lowered from the Operation Concordia headquarters, the EU flag was hoisted over the headquarters of a new police mission code–named PROXIMA. This ESDP mission, the fourth in a single year, was approved by the Council in September 2003, at the invitation of the Macedonian government. PROXIMA, a one year mission that ended 14 December 2005, consisted of 200 civilian police officers from 32 states, mainly the same states providing police forces to the EUPM in neighboring Bosnia. Similar to its sister mission, PROXIMA’s goals included restoration of law and order in the state, which encompassed fighting organized crime, complete reform of the Interior Ministry and police, the creation of border police, confidence–building measures between the local police and the population, and enhanced police cooperation between neighboring states.55 It was replaced on 52 European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, data available from http://www.eupm.org/mission/so.htm. 53 Brian Whitmore, “Bosnia Offers Lesson in Nation Building: Perseverance, Patience Pay Off,” Boston Globe, October 12, 2003, A.22. 54 “EU Military Operation in Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM): Operation ‘Concordia’,” available at http://ue.eu.int/arym/index.asp?lang=EN. 55 “European Union Police Mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (PROXIMA),” available at http://ue.eu.int/pesd/proxima/index.asp.

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15 December by EUPAT, or the EU Policy Advisory Team, with 30 advisors. EUPAT is set to run for six months. After initial resistance, the United States finally agreed to transfer NATO’s Stabilization Force (SFOR) military mission in Bosnia to the EU in December 2004. Under EUFOR Operation ALTHEA, which utilizes the Berlin–Plus framework with NATO, 33 states contributed 7,000 troops to continue the monitoring of the Dayton Accords. More significantly, the EU sees this mission as part of the larger political process for Bosnia. The June 2003 Thessaloniki Declaration confirmed that the future of the Western Balkans is with the EU. The Stabilisation and Association Process is the framework for the European course of BiH, all the way to future accession. It is within this wider context of European integration that a comprehensive policy for addressing BiH’s security needs has to be situated.56 With the launch of ALTHEA, the EU has brought its final set of ESDP tools to bear on its member–state building approach to the Balkans. ALTHEA is the first military mission conducted after the passage of the new EU Security Strategy. Javier Solana, High Representative for CFSP, speaks of it as a test case for a coherent European strategy. “It will be the first case where the EU deploys economic, trade, humanitarian, and military instruments to transform a post conflict society. Bosnia will be a concrete test of our ability to ensure that our trade, development, political and security instruments can follow the same agenda.”57 Member–State Building Case Study: Macedonia Macedonia has been described at various times and by several leading authorities simply as a miracle. Such a description depends on what one defines as a success. Clearly, the fact that throughout the 1990s Macedonia did not descend into the horrific conflict witnessed to its north proclaims its uniqueness. It continued on a democratic path, albeit one marked by fits and starts, even while absorbing over 300,000 refugees from Kosovo. Yet, within Macedonia and on its periphery many are afraid to breathe a sigh of relief. At various times, it appeared that Macedonia had reached the “tipping point” that would put it on a solid footing, yet at just those times, sporadic violence and sustained economic stagnation reminded the region and the world that it was not safe to exhale just yet. Why should this tiny country be cause for such concern? For one, it holds many lessons, as it has persisted along a democratic path in the midst of a tremendously violent neighborhood. On the other hand, it still has not turned the corner to make these gains permanent. We believe that in order to understand its success and failures, one must look to Macedonia itself, the EU, and the international community in general.58 56 http://www.euforbih.org/sheets/fs050103a.htm. 57 Honor Mahony, “Irish Asked to Implement EU Security Strategy,” EUObserver.com, January 8, 2004. 58 For a detailed account of Macedonia since its independence, see P.H. Liotta and Cindy R. Jebb, Mapping Macedonia: Idea and Identity, (Westport: Praeger, 2004).

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In a speech to the German Bundestag, Christopher Patten, then the EU’s External Relations Commissioner, described Macedonia as an example of flourishing EU foreign policy:59 In many ways this has been the greatest success of European foreign policy over the past few years. In 2001, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was in touching distance of collapsing into an all–out civil war. Skopje could easily have become another Sarajevo. The European Union acted firmly and decisively to stop that in its tracks. We brokered the Lake Ohrid Agreement which laid down the basis for a fair deal for the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’s minority communities….A new EU Police Mission is working hard now to improve things further… .60

Impressive as these achievements are, a paragraph cannot sum up Macedonia’s “success.” While the Ohrid peace agreement ended conflict in Macedonia in August 2001, the root causes of the conflict persist. Robert Hislope warns us that the persistent troika of criminals, terrorists, and nationalist politicians, the cause of this instability, has regional and historical precedent.61 He describes three factors that provide sustenance to the ethnic Albanian paramilitary forces that operate in Macedonia. First, Macedonia is the direct “recipient” of conflicts begun in Kosovo. He and others have linked the 1999 Kosovo war and the 2000 conflict in Kosovo’s Presevo Valley to the 2001 uprising in Macedonia. Second, the rural, ethnic Albanian population in Macedonia has learned to “practice politics as violence.” Such factors as uneven economic development, illiteracy, rural poverty, sustained unemployment above thirty percent, weak institutions, lack of rule of law, etc.—enticed the young, male population from the Macedonian countryside to join the National Liberation Army (NLA). Finally, a potent mix of organized criminals and nationalist politicians who profit from smuggling activities that involve drugs, prostitutes, and contraband cigarettes also contributes to the instability. The nexus of criminal, political, and ethnic interests in these activities have precluded the Macedonian state, thus far, from establishing real democratic state control of these smuggling corridors. Still, the good news is that Macedonia did not decay into conflict in 2001, and that it was able to address real grievances in the political arena. Clearly, not everyone in Macedonia saw Ohrid as a positive step, as many ethnic Slavs found the terms disturbing. Ohrid, while rightly hailed for stopping conflict, reminds us that forging a way ahead requires sensitivities to ethnic identities and state loyalties, while eliciting an acceptance of a broadly shared European identity by all parties.62 59 Robert Hislope, “Crime and Honor in a Weak State: Parliamentary Forces and Violence in Macedonia,” Problems of Post-Communism, 51/3 (May/June 2004), pp. 1819. 60 Robert Hislope, “Between a Bad Peace and a Good War: Insights and Lessons from the Almost–War in Macdeonia,” Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol 26, no. 1 (January 2003): 24. 61 Ibid. 62 On a trip to Macedonia, it was clear that some of the Ohrid terms were not widely embraced by many ethnic Slavs, especially as leaders of the National Liberation Army (NLA)

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In addition, while Macedonia struggles to find a way ahead, the EU has learned a great deal over the last decade. Initially, it could offer Macedonia hope…a commodity that kept the state moving forward. The allure of EU membership affected the political choices made by elites and tempered the actions of even nationalist leaning leaders.63 Macedonia signed the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe in 1999, which signaled an economic opportunity, yet it did not include a clear path forward to realize it. In 2001, during serious NLA attacks in western and northeastern Macedonia, the EU offered the government a Stabilization and Association Agreement and an Interim Agreement. This kept the promise of European Union inclusion alive and helped to stifle ethnic backlashes.64 Robert Hislope recounts that here“…the point of flexibility has revealed Macedonian elites valued European integration and economic aid over a nationalist programme…..The haggling would continue but the path to the August peace deal had been found. Bereft of a military to force talks, EU negotiators discovered that money talks with force.”65 Hislope further argues that the EU and the Macedonian regime found their partnership fruitful, as the EU realized that the Macedonian regime was open to compromise and “Risk averse Macedonian politicians placed international standing above an uncompromising ethnic hegemony and a reckless military campaign. Ethnic actors operating from stronger states, with more confidence and commitment, with bigger militaries, and with a greater desire to right historical wrongs, may not be as immune to EU overtures.”66 The EU has continued to refine its member–state building model by increasing tangible support to Macedonia while working together with the state’s leaders. In March 2003, Macedonian President Boris Trajkovski and the EU agreed on the introduction of an EU peacekeeping force to replace the NATO mission there.67 Based on an invitation from Macedonia’s Prime Minister, the EU established PROXIMA. Moreover, in June 2004, the first meeting of the Stabilisation and Association Committee and Macedonia took place. The SAA will commit the EU and Macedonia further to working together towards “political, economic, and institutional stabilization of the country, institution building and public administration reform, enhanced trade and economic cooperation, legal approximation with the Community acquis and strengthened cooperation on justice and home affairs. The full implementation of the Agreement will also create a climate for the development entered the political arena. (authors refer to ethnic Slavs as ethnic Macedonians as well). See Liotta and Jebb, 96–7. See David Cameron, “The Tough Trials Ahead for the EU’s Eastern Expansion,” Current History Vol. 103, Iss. 671 (March 2004): that based on some EU polls of some member state populations, support for expansion is ambivalent. 63 Alina Mungui–Pippidi, “Europe moves Eastward: Beyond the new Borders,” Journal of Democracy, Vol 15, No. 1 (January 2004), 50–51. 64 Liotta and Jebb, 83. 65 Hislope, 145. 66 Ibid, 146. 67 “18 March 2003: ESDP – Operation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia – Council Conclusions,” http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/intro/gac.htm Accessed on 13 Feb 2005.

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of trade and investment which are crucial factors for the economic restructuring and the modernization of the country.”68 The EU’s determination to engage in the hard work of reform is reflected by then European Commission President Romano Prodi’s 1 October 2004 hand delivery of a list of over 1400 questions to the Macedonian Prime Minister, seeking to gauge progress toward the acquis. This will be the basis of further work to help Macedonia to transform.69 Of course, it is still a troubled land. The furor over a recent redistricting law, which gave more autonomy to ethnic Albanian localities, almost caused renewed ethnic strife and reminded the world that Macedonia is still struggling.70 Given Macedonia’s real problems, which must be addressed head–on, its path towards reform on all fronts will be important not just to its citizens, but to the region and, frankly, to the world. Prodi reminded Macedonians that the way ahead “requires courage and determination, openness to others, to your neighbors, to other partners, to new ideas.” If they implement these new ideas, however, the rewards include “full participation in the European integration process, access to pre–accession funds, funds which have been used successfully—helping the countries which joined the EU to upgrade their infrastructure and tackle pressing problems of unemployment.”71 He reiterated to the Macedonians that, “Joining the EU will mean participation in a community of around half a billion people, with free circulation of goods, persons, services, ideas. It will mean the preservation of your cultural identity or identities and their enrichment through communication with other cultures.”72 There is a great deal at stake. The EU offers a path not just for potential member states, but also for the region. The EU represents a unifying factor for the neighborhood that may reform society, politics, economics, and rule of law, further.73 As the EU reconceptualizes “Europe,” both in terms of geography and identity, it offers a real possibility of extending prosperity and freedom on a grander scale. Even for states far outside the growing EU’s geographic realm, similar assistance programs, which help strengthen economies, civil administration, and the rule of law using all of the tools in the EU’s store, mirror the member–state building approach and achieve largely the same effect. Few countries in the world would turn down the generous assistance of the European Union. The reality is that the EU’s vision for the Balkans and other beneficiary states will engender hard work, which—at times—seems painstakingly slow and inefficient. Subsequently, the way ahead will 68 “EU–fyROM: Stablisation and Association Agreement enters into Force,” http:// europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/news/2004 accessed on 13 February 2005. 69 Knaus and Cox, 44–5. 70 Joseph, 113–14. 71 “Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission: On the Path to the EU: Challenges and Opportunities,” http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_realtions/news/prodi accessed on 13 Feb 2005. 72 Ibid. 73 Liotta and Jebb, 85.

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require courageous, thoughtful, and empathetic leaders from all parties to realize a better society for all.

Chapter 9

The European Union and The Middle East: The Benefits of Soft Power Ruth Margolies Beitler

United States Military Academy

The relationship between the United States and the European Union (EU) concerning the Middle East has been contentious, at best. The contrasting EU and US perspectives on the Middle East emanate from differing geographical prisms coupled with alternative concerns and interests. According to Volker Perthes, “divergent priorities and different perceptions of threats distinguish policy making on either side of the Atlantic.” For the United States, maintaining the security of Israel and unfettered access to oil have remained key interests in the Middle East and although these objectives do not necessarily conflict with Europe’s goal of regional stability, pursuit of them has led to dissimilar approaches to policy. Moreover, the United States continues to seek pro–American regimes in the region. Further, it has undertaken to push for democratic political development—using military force, if necessary—as a strategic imperative. The Europeans, like the Americans, champion the promotion of democracy to secure national interests, yet their approach to building democratic regimes contrasts with that of their transatlantic ally. As evident with the US invasion and subsequent overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq in March 2003, hard power was clearly the American weapon of choice. Several large EU members, including France and Germany, vociferously objected to the US–led invasion of Iraq and advocated continuing United Nations’ inspections to locate Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Many European states supported the pursuit of a diplomatic approach to cajole Iraq into playing by the rules of the international community rather than unseating Saddam Hussein with a military invasion. Additionally, Europe’s goals for the Middle East include a peaceful resolution of the Arab–Israeli conflict and engagement, rather than containment, of Iran. For the Europeans, who are close neighbors of the Middle East and strong trading partners, regional stability remains high on their list of interests. Europe’s direct involvement in the Middle East, most specifically through the British and French mandate system following World War I, has affected its current perception of and relationship with ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Volker Perthes, “Points of Difference, Cases for Cooperation: European Critiques of US Middle East Policy,” Middle East Report (Fall, 1988), p. 30.

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the region. Given the profound historical interconnections between Europe and the Middle East, a relationship perpetuated by the large Middle Eastern population residing in Europe, it is obvious that strong cultural, economic and historical ties inextricably link the two. The purpose of this chapter is to explore the European Union’s use of soft power, with regard to influencing regional stability in the Middle East, whether it offers a viable alternative to the United States’ traditional use of hard power. The first section discusses the historical and institutional connections between the EU and the Middle East that have influenced the development of the regime’s philosophy preferring soft power. The next sections explore the EU’s approach to the Middle East, specifically the Israeli–Palestinian Peace Process and Iran. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the EU’s overall approach to the Middle East. Europe and the Middle East: A History History undoubtedly has influenced Europe’s approach to the Middle East. For centuries, the Middle East provided European powers with overland trade routes to the Far East where Arab traders functioned as intermediaries. Yet in 1498, when Vasco da Gama found a new sea route to India, the Arabs’ importance as middlemen declined. Additionally, European advances in both production and military technology, coupled with the weakening of the Ottoman Empire, opened the way for imperialistic ventures into the region. While Germany established strong ties with the Ottoman Empire, the Middle East served as a French and British battleground for hegemony in the region. As such, France looked upon Egypt with interest, to balance British influence in India. Although Napoleon Bonaparte invaded Egypt in 1798, he withdrew French troops by 1801. Recognizing Europe’s growing military superiority, however, Mehemet Ali, the Ottoman governor of Egypt, after repelling a British military attack in 1811, brought French advisors to Egypt and sent Egyptians to study the latest military technology in France. Furthermore, owing to the important geographic location of Egypt, the French built the Suez Canal in 1869. Due to the incompetence of Egyptians leaders after the death of Mehemet Ali in 1849 and “European chicanery,” Egypt ran up an enormous debt, the ramifications of which were significant. To protect their loans, the British ���������������������������������������������������������� Marc Otte, “Towards an EU Strategy for the Middle East,” World Security Newsletter, 12 March 2004. Available at http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com. ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� The concept of hard power refers to the use of coercive military force or inducements to compel or deter states from acting. Contrastingly, the object of soft power is to “attract others by the legitimacy of U.S. policies and the values that underlie them.” For a discussion of hard and soft power, see Joseph S. Nye Jr., “The Decline of America’s Soft Power,: Foreign Affairs Vol. 83, Issue 3 (May/June 2004), p. 16. See also, Joseph S. Nye Jr., “The Velvet Hegemon,” Foreign Policy (May/June 2003), pp. 74–6. �������������������������������������������������������� Roy R. Anderson, Robert F. Seidbert and Jon G. Wagner, Politics and Change in the Middle East: Sources of Conflict and Accommodation (New Jersey, 1998), p. 59.

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and French established political control over Egypt in 1879; eventually the British invaded Egypt in 1882. Forced to sell shares of the Canal to this colonizing power to finance its debt, Egypt essentially mortgaged its control, ushering in over seventy– five years of influence by the United Kingdom. During World War I, the British and French negotiated which Middle East areas each would control after the war. The agreement between British diplomat, Mark Sykes, and French negotiator, George Picot (known as the Sykes–Picot agreement, ratified in May 1916), defined the areas of their states’ control. At the end of World War I, the San Remo Peace conference of 1920 created a series of mandates designating British control of contemporary Jordan and Iraq and French direction of modern–day Syria and Lebanon, with Palestine as an international zone. The fact that some of these territories overlapped with areas promised to the Arabs contributed to increasing resentment towards the League–of–Nations–enforced British and French mandatory power. Europe and the Middle East: Institutional Links As history clearly shows, “the Mediterranean has always occupied a prominent role in the attainment of European peace due to its critical geopolitical position, representing the crossroads and natural bridge between three continents.” Moreover, as neighbors, instability in the Middle East directly affects the Europeans in the form of increased population migrations and diminished access to much–needed oil supplies. Aside from geography, Europe’s perception that regional cooperation leads to increased human security greatly influences its policies towards the Middle East. For the EU, the preamble of the 1957 Treaty of Rome illuminates Europe’s view that states should settle political conflicts through negotiations rather than confrontation. The EU’s raison d’être is the rule of law and a commitment to common institutions, in conjunction with the establishment of interdependencies that make the use of hard power less palatable. Unmistakably, a more idealistic European perspective counters the realpolitik guiding recent US policy in the Middle East. Over the last thirty years, Europe’s approach to the Middle East has had several components, including the Euro–Arab dialogue, increased institutional links by means of the Euro–Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and a broad relationship with

���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� The contradictions of these promises are examined in detail in Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab–Israeli Conflict (New York, 1988), pp. 42–50 and in Howard M. Sachar, A History of Israel: From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970), pp. 92–6. ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Dimitris N. Chryssochoou and Dimitris K. Xenakis, “Prospects for Euro–Mediterranean Governance,” The Review of International Affairs Vol. 2, No. 4 (Summer 2003), p. 47. ��������������������������������� Chryssochoou and Xenakis, p. 52. ��������������������������������������������������������������������� Rory Miller, “The PLO Factor in Euro–Israeli Relations, 1964–1992,” Israel Affairs 10/1 (Autumn/Winter 2004), p. 124.

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the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The Euro–Arab dialogue was conceptualized subsequent to the October 1973 war in the Middle East, with the intention of strengthening economic cooperation between the two regions.10 On 6 November 1973, the European Community (EC) issued a communiqué on the Arab–Israeli conflict that launched a variety of informal and formal contacts between the EC and the Arab states. Arab leaders, who saw the United States as biased, responded with interest to what they perceived as Europe’s largely even–handed approach to the conflict.11 The United States opposed the dialogue because during the oil or Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) price and supply crisis, US leaders thought that consumer countries as a group should confront producer states, as opposed to a separate European dialogue with the Arab countries. The Euro–Mediterranean Partnership, established after the EU’s Barcelona Conference in November 1995, formalized a relationship between the EU and twelve Mediterranean governments including Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, and the Palestinian Authority (PA). The idea behind the EMP was to harmonize previously uncoordinated bilateral policies to “give birth to a coordinated regional regime with an institutional life of its own, based on clearly defined rules of the game, as well as mutually reinforcing norms and principles.”12 The crucial goal of the EMP was provision of a security framework through cooperation and value convergence “extending well beyond traditional forms of collective security.”13 This approach was rooted in the belief that the Mediterranean presented socio–economic, rather than military, challenges to Europe and, as such, it could mitigate disputes by intensifying the economic relationships among the countries. It also came from the perception that utilizing consensus building through peaceful mechanisms would lead to the creation of a civil society supportive of democracy.14 Some scholars have argued that, although in theory the EMP advocates the creation of shared values, in reality, it reflects a more defensive posture towards the Mediterranean than anticipated.15 For example, in the 1990s, Europe created the EUROFOR (rapid deployment force) in part as a response to the quest for weapons of mass destruction by Mediterranean states, most notably, Libya and Syria. As such, many perceive Europe as modifying its cooperative approach to the Mediterranean ��������������������������������������������������������� Nivien Saleh, “The European Union and the Gulf States,” Middle East Policy (October 1999). Accessed on 29 December 2004 at http://proquest.umi.com. 10 Derek Hopwood, “Euro–Arab Dialogue Symposium,” British Society for Middle Eastern Studies 10 (1983). Accessed on 22 February 2005 at http://jstor.org. 11 Ahmad Sidqi Al–Dijani, “The PLO and the Euro–Arab Dialogue,” Journal of Palestine Studies 9 (Spring, 1980), pp. 81–2. 12 Chryssochoou and Xenakis, p. 48. 13 Richard Youngs, “European Approaches to Security in the Mediterranean,” Middle East Journal 57 (Summer 2003), p. 414. 14 Marc Otte, “Towards an EU Strategy for the Middle East,” World Security Network Newsletter 12 March 2004. 15 Youngs, pp. 414–15.

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“towards more traditional containment perspectives.”16 Since the attacks of 11 September 2001, the defensive nature of Europe’s policy towards the Mediterranean has become more acute. For instance, at the fifth ministerial meeting of the EMP in April 2002, the agenda included counter–terrorist cooperation. Additionally, the EU signed association agreements with Algeria and Lebanon dealing with anti–terrorist strategies.17 Further, the EU has attempted to forge a closer relationship with the Gulf Cooperation Council to deepen cooperation with the states of the Gulf region. In 1990, building on the 1988 Cooperation Agreement, the EU and GCC established an institutional framework defining their relationship. The agreement has three pillars, including creation of a free trade zone and increased economic and political cooperation.18 This framework stressed increased economic and technical relations and improved diversification of the Gulf States’ economies.19 By establishing a free trade zone, the Europeans had hoped to “institutionalize interdependence,” as a means of leveraging their economic relations to increase stability in the region. However, the inability of the groups to agree on the terms of a free trade arrangement has hampered progress in this arena severely. Unable to conclude a free trade agreement, the EU and GCC countries opted to concentrate on political and economic cooperation to achieve their goals. For the EU, closer ties with the Gulf States afford the European countries an opportunity for broader interactions with the rest of the Arab world. The EU recognizes the Gulf States’ ability to act as brokers between it and other states in the region, just as Saudi Arabia helped the United States negotiate with Libya over the Lockerbie bombings.20 Europeans view these institutional linkages as a vital tool of soft power for building stability in the Middle East. Historically, the United States has taken a much “harder” approach to the Middle East than Europe, and has not rejected the use of sanctions and military force as instruments of power. During the 1970s and 1980s, whereas the United States attempted to isolate the extremist Syrian and Libyan regimes, some European states, most notably Italy, had strong ties with these governments. According to Bruce Hoffman, in the 1980s the Italians aspired to an increased role in the Mediterranean and therefore resented American diplomatic efforts in the region.21 In 1985, after the United States had intercepted the Palestinian terrorists who had hijacked the cruise ship, the Achille Lauro, and forced their plane to land in Italy, the Italian government, fearful of jeopardizing its relationship with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), allowed the leader of the hijackers to escape. When Libyan–supported

66.

16 Youngs, p. 417. 17 Youngs, p. 417. 18 Saleh. 19 Saleh. 20 Saleh. 21 Bruce Hoffman, “Is Europe Soft on Terrorism?” Foreign Policy (Summer 1999), p.

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terrorists bombed a disco in West Berlin, killing American soldiers, the United States retaliated by bombing Libya. Disagreeing with this use of force, France and Spain refused to allow American planes to pass through their airspace for the raid.22 The European press also excoriated the United States for potentially opening the door to increased terrorism and violence. Despite discord between the Europeans and Americans, the European Community eventually implemented sanctions against Libya hoping to deter any further US attacks on that country.23 Although both the United States and Europe contend that democratic regime change is in their interests, Europeans are less likely to demand democratic transformation as a prerequisite to negotiations.24 A glaring example of this is US President George W. Bush’s insistence, following 11 September 2001, on “regime change” in the Palestinian Authority before the peace process could proceed. The United States made Palestinian Authority President Yasser Arafat persona non grata, and with Israel, sought to isolate him. The Europeans, in contrast, continued to meet with Arafat. For them, the creation of regional structures or regimes pushing for gradual internal change is much more efficacious than external imposition of change. The Palestinian–Israeli Peace Process Aside from expanding institutional linkages in the Middle East, the EU has taken a keen interest in several crucial issues. Europe has had a long history of involvement in the Arab–Israeli peace process and has sought increased participation since the 1991 Gulf War.25 In the 1970s, the Europeans had no unified stance on the Arab– Israeli conflict, with rifts most pronounced during the period following the Six Day War in 1967. Germany and France diverged drastically in their approach to both the Arab world and Israel. France, although supportive of the Jewish state in its early years, as its collusion with Israel and Britain in the Suez campaign of 1956 implies, was critical of Israel’s occupation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights and Sinai after the Six Day War, while Germany assumed a more sympathetic stance towards Israel.26 The Venice Declaration of 1980, however, reflected the European Community’s ambition of playing a greater role in the Arab–Israeli peace process and presenting a more united European front. The declaration acknowledged that

22 “Most Allies Condemn Raid; Britain, Israel Voice Support Self–Defense, Fears of More Violence Cited,” Los Angeles Times 15 April 1986. Accessed 28 January 2005 at http:// proquest.umi.com. 23 Hoffman, p. 68. 24 Perthes, p. 131. 25 Robert K. Olson, “Partners in the Peace Process: The United States and Europe,” Journal of Palestine Studies vol. 26/4 (Summer, 1997), p. 78. 26 Alain Dieckhoff, “The European Union and the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict, Inroads (Winter 2005), p. 53. Accessed on 29 December 2004 at http://proquest.umi.com.

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the Palestinians had a right to self–determination and that the PLO would have to partake in any peace process, which the Israelis vehemently opposed.27 The European approach to the Arab–Israeli conflict has been to advocate the importance of international law. Thus, it supports a two–state solution based on the general principle of the partition of Palestine.28 Europe’s stand, as presented in the Venice Declaration, is that Israeli settlements in the land occupied during the 1967 Six Day War are illegal, as are any modifications of property in the Occupied Territories, or movement of populations to live there.29 Following the first Gulf War in 1991, European states participated in the US–sponsored Madrid Conference in the multilateral negotiations.30 Although Europe contributed to multilateral level talks on water, economics, arms control, refugees and the environment, the United States controlled bilateral talks between the various Arab states and Israel. Despite Europe’s smaller role in the Peace Process as compared to the United States, the EU maintains a variety of soft power tools for conducting effective diplomacy in the Middle East due to its institutional and economic linkages with the region. The Barcelona Conference between the EU and the Mediterranean states set the parameters for political, economic and cultural partnerships.31 Significantly for the Arab–Israeli conflict, the conference brought together Syrian and Israeli delegates, providing an opportunity to promote dialogue.32 Additionally, after the Israelis and Palestinians signed the Oslo Accords in 1993, the EU provided 3.47 billion euros for Palestinian development between 1994 and 2001, more than the United States offered.33 The Europeans also monitored legislative elections in the Palestinian territories in 1996. As such, the EU’s economic influence on the Peace Process, particularly with respect to the Palestinians, has the potential 27 Rosemary Hollis, “Europe and the Middle East: Power by Stealth?” International Affairs 73, (1997), p. 18. 28 In 1947, the United Nations called for the partition of Palestine into two states, a Jewish and Arab one. Israel accepted the partition and declared independence on 15 May 1948. Five Arab states attacked Israel after its declaration and during the course of the war, Israel gained more land than given them in the partition. Additionally, Jordan maintained control of the West Bank that had been granted to the Palestinians, while Egypt took the Gaza Strip. As such, no Palestinian state was created. For a brief history of the Arab–Israeli conflict, see Ian J. Bickerton and Carla J. Klausner, A Concise History of the Arab–Israeli Conflict New Jersey, 1995. 29 Dieckhoff. 30 The Madrid Conference followed two tracks, multilateral and bilateral. The multilateral talks dealt with five key areas including water, environment, arms control, refugees and economic development. States from the region, along with several international players attended these meetings. The bilateral level entailed four sets of negotiations between the Israelis and the Jordanians, Syrians, Lebanese and Palestinians. 31 For a complete explanation of the triple partnership see Eric Philippart, “The Euro– Mediterranean Partnership: A Critical Evaluation of an Ambitious Scheme,” European Foreign Affairs Review 8 (2003), pp. 201–20. 32 Chryssochoou and Xenakis, p. 56. 33 Dieckhoff.

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to move incrementally “to a point where its own economic weight counts for more than that of the United States in most of the countries of the Middle East.”34 Due to Europe’s trade with the Middle East, along with its donations to poor economies there, “Europe has all the makings of a major player in the region and has only to translate this into political clout.”35 One obstacle to the European Union playing a greater role in the Middle East, comparable to that of the United States, stems from the incongruous policies implemented bilaterally by EU members. At times, it is difficult to identify a united EU policy as not all members speak with a common voice about the Middle East. In many instances, for example, Britain has sided with the United States on issues dealing with the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, and clearly concerning the invasion of Iraq in March 2003. Europeans admit that the Americans possess the influence and force necessary to convene something on the order of the Madrid Conference, but argue that the EU retains a soft power advantage, having “more of the necessary skills and patience required for building regional structures, facilitating second–track and people– to–people diplomacy and organizing mid–term confidence–building exercises.”36 Moreover, by attaching conditions to EU grants and loans to the PA, the Europeans hope to foster effective and legitimate government in the Palestinian territories.37 Still, some scholars argue that the Europeans have not succeeded in influencing the process due to their disunity of approach and their inability to force the implementation of good governance.38 Currently, a door is open for Europe to broaden its role in the process, as the United States is not considered an “honest broker” and is labeled by much of the Arab world as squarely in Israel’s corner. From the Palestinian and Arab perspectives, US policy in the Middle East often is hypocritical, as it forbids Arabs to do things that it sanctions for Israelis. The Arab press is rife with examples of regional leaders denouncing US policy in the region as one of “double standards.”39 Consequently, many influential Arabs have called for a greater role for the Europeans in the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP), as a counterbalance to the US support of Israel.40 As Hoffman contends, “many European countries … had long historical legacies as colonial powers in the Middle East and North Africa that often engendered greater

34 Hollis, p. 29. 35 Hollis, p. 17. 36 Perthes, p. 32. 37 Dieckhoff. 38 Marek Arnaud, “The Israeli–Palestinian Conflict: Is there a Way Out?” Australian Journal of International Affairs 57 (July 2003), p. 250. 39 See Damascus, Syrian Arab Television Network in Arabic, 28 December 2001, FBISNES (29 December 2001). 40 Rosemary Hollis, “Europe and the Middle East: Power by Stealth?” International Affairs 73, (1997), p. 15.

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sympathy with their former Arab subjects than with Israel.”41 Israel perceives the EU, as not only pro–Palestinian, but also anti–Israeli. Thus, the Israelis have been reluctant to have European powers mediate the conflict. Despite Europe’s attempt to use diplomatic and economic tools to ameliorate relations between the two sides, Europe’s ability to influence the process remains secondary to the United States. Stuck in a vicious circle, some argue that the EMP is dependent upon developments from the MEPP and, therefore, is ineffective when that process is faltering. The November 2000 Marseille meeting of the EMP is a case in point. Due to the Al–Aqsa intifada, which began in September 2000, Syria and Lebanon boycotted the meeting at which members were scheduled to vote on the Charter for Peace and Stability, leading to a breakdown in the Peace Process.42 Furthermore, both the United States and Israel have hampered Europe’s ability to influence the Peace Process. The two states attempted to sidetrack an enhanced European role in the Madrid conference for two reasons.43 First, Israel perceived the EU as having pro–Arab policies and thus feared European participation would lead to it being asked to make difficult concessions. Second, the United States wanted to retain control of the process so it could direct outcomes and secure its interests. To stem the heightened violence in the Middle East after September 2000, the United States, Russia, the European Union and the United Nations—known as the Quartet—drafted a Road Map for Peace in December 2002. The proposal called for a Palestinian state by 2005, while deferring settlement of such complex issues the return of Palestinian refugees and the status of Jerusalem.44 Although discussed prior to the beginning of war with Iraq on 19 March 2003, the Quartet did not introduce the Road Map until after the overthrow Saddam Hussein. In June 2003, President George W. Bush, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas met in Aqaba, Jordan, for a summit to begin implementation of the Road Map and although the European Union was included in the Road Map, it played no role in the summit.45 The United States assumed the leading role, marginalizing the Europeans. President Bush’s created a monitoring team, headed by Ambassador John Wolf.46

65.

41 Bruce Hoffman, “Is Europe Soft on Terrorism?” Foreign Policy (Summer 1999), p.

42 Dieckhoff. 43 Olson, p. 80. 44 Neil King Jr. and Jeanne Cummings, “Road Map Seeks Palestinian State Within a Year,” Wall Street Journal 28 February 2003, p. A7. For a full discussion of the Road Map, see US Department of State, “A Performance–Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two–State Solution to the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict,” 30 April 2003. Accessed 1 October 2004 from http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/20062.htm. 45 For a discussion of the summit, see Robin Wright, “Mideast Summit: Sharon, Abbas Agree to Take Initial Steps Toward Peace,” Los Angeles Times 5 June 2003, p. A1. Accessed on 2 October 2004 from http://proquest.umi.com. 46 Suzanne Goldenberg, “Bush Puts Peace Monitors in Place,” Guardian (UK) 6 June 2003, p. 17. Accessed 1 October 2004 from http://proquest.umi.com.

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The Road Map led to a ceasefire that began on 29 June 2003. On 14 August however, Israel assassinated a Palestinian militant—a member of Islamic Jihad— who, Israel claimed, was responsible for planning suicide attacks and, who was in the midst of planning a new assault.47 In response, HAMAS, the Islamic Resistance Movement, carried out an attack on 19 August, which killed twenty Israelis. By 21 August, the ceasefire was over.48 Once again, the Peace Process was in tatters. With the death of Yasser Arafat in November 2004, Europe has the opportunity to take a leading role in a revitalized peace process. The Europeans are hoping to deliver a “dramatic new initiative” on the Palestinian–Israeli issue.49 After the US overthrow of Saddam Hussein, Britain, France and others pressed for increased US interest in getting the process back on track and implementing the Road Map, which includes a role for the Europeans. In February 2005, Egypt brokered a meeting between Israeli Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, and Palestinian President, Mahmoud Abbas, to implement a new cease–fire. Relations with Iran Iran provides another issue on which American and European methods diverge dramatically. Members of the European Union argue that it was their soft power approach to Iran, rather than veiled hard power threats by the United States—that Iran would suffer the same fate as its neighbor Iraq—that led Iran to consent to nuclear inspections in 2004. A European diplomat commenting on Iran’s decision to permit nuclear inspections surmised that, “the Iranians did not do this because they feared EU military actions. They did it because they want a relationship with us and want to keep channels open.”50 Following the 1979 Iranian Revolution that brought the Ayatollah Khomeini to power, Iran perceived Europe as a counterweight that could “neutralize the impact of unprecedented political and economic pressure put on it by various US administrations.”51 From Europe’s perspective, Iran did not evoke the same fear of “evil empire” that it did for the United States. This divergent view has an important historical component and explains, in part, Europe’s different approach to Iran. Whereas the United States enmeshed itself completely in the political and military affairs of the Pahlavi regime, European states were not as entangled in the Shah’s government. 47 Guy Chazan, “Militant is Killed, Further Clouding Truce in Mideast,” Wall Street Journal 15 August, 2003, p. A6. 48 Nicole Gaouette, “Road Map in Peril as Cease–fire Ends,” Christian Science Monitor 22 August 2003. Accessed on 1 October 2003 from http://proquest.umi.com. 49 “Chirac–lite,” Economist 20 November 2004. Accessed 22 February 2005 at http:// ehost. 50 Ian Black, “EU Turns ‘Rogue State’ into Conditional Friend,” Guardian 22 October 2003. Accessed atfrom http://proquest.umi.com, 19 March 2004. 51 Adam Tarock, “Iran–Western Europe Relations on the Mend,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies (1999), p. 41.

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After the Shah’s ouster, Iranians did not view Europe in the same negative light in which they perceived the United States, leaving open the possibility of more positive relations.52 Additionally, after the Iranian Revolution, Europeans preferred dialogue and economic engagement to sanctions. In 1996, when the United States pressured the EU to threaten Iran with an end to this dialogue unless Iran condemned the wave of terrorist attacks in Israel, the EU refused. Many of the attacks in Israel were perpetrated by HAMAS, the Islamic Resistance Movement, which benefits from Iran’s direct support.53 Despite US pressure, EU leaders were reluctant to sever diplomatic ties with Iran. They were aware that economic and business links would continue even in the absence of diplomatic interaction, indicating a growth of European strength vis–à–vis the Americans. As Adam Tarock contends, “it has become a battle of political wills between Washington and Teheran, for the former to keep the EU countries away from Iran, and for the latter to keep the EU as close to it as possible.”54 European leaders clearly favor constructive engagement and “critical dialogue” rather than US–style containment when dealing with Tehran. The common European sentiment is that, through engagement, the EU could establish economic and political linkages that would moderate the activity of a more radical and conservative government in Iran. When in 1996, the United States passed the Iran–Libya Sanctions Act requiring sanctions on countries investing more than a certain amount in the oil and gas industries in those states, the Europeans resented the legislation and perceived it as an American constraint on their freedom of action in the international arena.55 With the growing strength of the European Union, however, Europe has been able to resist American coercion, as a 1997 deal between the National Iranian Oil Company and a French, Russian and Malaysian consortium showed.56 Although the United States threatened France with sanctions, it never implemented the punitive measures due to Europe’s mounting power. In December 2004, France, Britain and Germany began talks with Iran offering political and economic rewards in exchange for guarantees that Iran is not currently, and will not in the future, develop nuclear weapons.57 In contrast to Europe’s conciliatory gestures, the US administration had been hinting at military action to halt Iran’s nuclear production. Still, during a February 2005 visit to Europe, President Bush implied a willingness to offer incentives to Iran to give up its nuclear 52 Tarock, pp. 44–5. 53 “European Union Threatens to Cut Off Talks with Iran,” St. Louis Dispatch 11 March, 1996. Accessed from http://proquest.umi.com, 19 March 2005. 54 Tarock, p. 43. 55 Hollis, p. 16. 56 Anne Swardson, “France, U.S. at Odds on Iran Oil Deal; Contract Could Result in American Sanctions,” Washington Post 30 September 1997. Accessed from http://proquest. umi.com on 29 January 2005. 57 Elaine Sciolino, “United States and Europe Differ Over Strategy on Iran,” New York Times, 29 January 2005, p. A 3.

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ambitions.58 Clearly, European discussions with the United States regarding Iran’s nuclear issue have begun to influence U.S. actions. Conclusion The views of the EU member states on the United States’ response following the terrorist attacks on 11 September, displayed their heterogeneity vividly, although the United States and Europe shared a more unified approach to Afghanistan.59 A clear division between the United States and several European states’ approaches to dealing with Iraq precipitated a period of challenging and tense relations between the transatlantic allies. France and Germany refused to consider joining US–led military action in Iraq, while Britain continued as America’s staunchest ally. Despite the discord among its member states concerning Iraq, EU actions since the beginning of the war and during the post–war period have reinforced its commitment to utilizing economic power to pursue stability in the region. In June 2004, Europe agreed to a strategy toward Iraq that, after 2006, would lead to a trade agreement, additional aid and continued political and cultural discussions.60 The EU pledged 1.25 billion euros for Iraqi reconstruction and added 200 million euros to support the electoral process.61 Clearly, the Europeans want to help restore stability to the region. In addition to financial aid, in November 2004, the EU agreed to train senior Iraqi police, prosecutors, judges and prison directors.62 This is in line with European values—strengthening the rule of law, here in Iraq, and reliance on soft power. Furthermore, in February 2005, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) offered to train and equip Iraq’s security forces. The training, however, will happen in Brussels.63 The decision to train soldiers outside Iraq reflects the Europeans’ continued reluctance to be associated with the United States’ Iraq military operation. As Joseph Nye contends, the United States should consider using “soft power” to implement its goals in the global arena as hard military might is “not a sufficient

58 Elizabeth Bumiller, “Bush may Weigh Incentives to Dissuade Iran,” New York Times, 24 February 2005, p. A1. 59 After 11 September, NATO invoked Article Five of its charter, which pledges to help members defend themselves if attacked from abroad. Additionally, in 2003, NATO assumed control of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan to help secure and reconstruct the country. 60 Ian Black, “News Roundup: Middle East: EU Pledges on Aid to Baghdad,” Guardian 13 July 2004, p. 10. Accessed 5 February 2005 at http://proquest.umi.com. 61 See www.iss-eu.org/new/analysis/analy104.html. 62 Philip Shishkin, “EU to Train Iraqi Police, Prosecutors,” Wall Street Journal 3 November 2004. Accessed 5 February 2005 at http://proquest.umi.com. 63 Elaine Sciolino, “NATO Agrees on Modest Plan for Training Iraqi Forces,” New York Times, 23 February 2005, p. A7.

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response.”64 Similarly, in Hoffman’s analysis of the charge that Europe is “soft on terrorism,” he criticizes the United States’ hard–line approach as ineffective. As evidence, he offers the fact that the US bombing of Libya in 1986 had little impact on its president, Muammar Qaddafi, as Libyan involvement in the Pan Am 103 bombing in 1988 demonstrated.65 Hoffman’s concludes that despite divergent approaches to terrorism, a “good cop, bad cop arrangement, with Europe pursuing engagement with state sponsors of terrorism”66 and the United States threatening military action and economic sanctions, might provide a successful ad hoc strategy. As such, this paper is not equating Europe’s reaction to terrorism with its policy on Iraq, but uses it as an example of how the divergent US and EU approaches might be intertwined. With the January 2005 elections in Iraq and the Palestinian territories, perhaps the time has come for Europe and the United States to engage the new regimes with “softer power.” This, until now largely European approach, may be more useful for achieving sustained regional stability in the Middle East.

64 Joseph S. Nye Jr., “Foreign Policy: Sell it Softly; Persuasively Promoting American Values and Culture will Work Better than either Carrots or Threats to Influence the Middle East,” Los Angeles Times, 25 April 2004. Accessed 29 December 2004 at http://proquest.umi. com. 65 Hoffman, p. 74. 66 Hoffman, p. 74.

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Chapter 10

The European Union and the Russian Federation Vidya Nadkarni

University of San Diego

The relationship between the European Union (EU) and the Russian Federation (RF) is the outcome of a dynamic process of interaction involving the complex interplay of conflicting worldviews, complementary and divergent interests, and shared security concerns. This mix of factors has yielded a multi–faceted but ambivalent relationship resting on ill–defined foundations. At the crux of the ongoing dialogue between Moscow and Brussels lie differing interpretations of the nature and substance of the “strategic partnership” declared by the two sides in 1999. The “strategic” aspects of the partnership have yet to be fleshed out fully. The interlocutors continue to engage each other in unavailing attempts to reconcile the strong European predilection toward value congruence as the basis for their close interaction with the Russian insistence on an uncompromising defense of the country’s sovereignty and interests, even when such a stance might contravene European norms. This debate is occurring within a fluid environment. First, because the EU is at once a supranational entity seeking to speak with one voice and a collection of member–states with bilateral ties to Russia, there are often discrepancies in policies and approaches toward Russia. Indeed, Russia simultaneously has cultivated the EU and assiduously courted those member–states, especially Germany, France, and sometimes the United Kingdom, with which its interests intersect most strongly. Second, Russia itself is in the process of adjusting to a precipitous decline in status and power, with its leaders seeking to carve out an independent place and voice for the country in Europe and the world. Under such circumstances, attempts by the EU to push Russia in the direction of conformity with European values often come up against nationalist resistance. Third, the 2004 EU enlargement, which extended the acquis communitaire to countries of the former Soviet Union’s outer and inner empires, expanded the scope and range of the EU–Russia agenda, even as it introduced a thick layer of Cold War residue into the mix. From a geopolitical perspective, Russia has not been sanguine about ceding influence to the EU either in countries formerly within the Soviet ambit (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia) or in erstwhile Soviet republics (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia). Its concerns have mounted as leaders in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine have sought closer ties and eventual membership in the EU.

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It is in this space that the EU stress on values and the Russian emphasis on interests collide most strongly. Referring to the EU Wider Europe/New Neighborhood initiative that targets new neighbors in Europe and North Africa, Russia’s deputy foreign minister Vladimir Chizov warned: We understand its (the EU’s) natural aspiration to elaborate a strategy ‘…with the outside world for a [sic] long term.’ Nonetheless, we believe that the interests of other countries must be fully taken into account…. Should this add up to a new issue of the concept of buffer states…nothing will come of it…. Russia does not regard itself as either an object or subject of this policy.

Finally, neither the EU nor Russia can fail to recognize the long shadow cast by the United States over much of the globe. The EU–Russia relationship is of necessity refracted by both parties through the prism of American power and influence. This chapter begins with an examination of the institutional links that anchor the EU–Russia relationship, followed by an exploration of the cooperation established by the two sides in the areas of trade, energy, the environment, external and internal security, and concludes with a discussion of the role of the dynamic environment within which this relationship is unfolding. Institutional Links Viewing internal and external aspects of security as inextricably linked, the EU approach to relations with Russia has transcended cooperation on traditional threats to peace and incorporated cooperation on trade and energy issues with engagement on “soft” security threats from Russia in the areas of nuclear safety, transnational crime, drug–trafficking, illegal immigration, spread of diseases, and environmental pollution. Thus, the EU’s cooperation objectives have called for Russia’s development “as a prosperous market for EU exports and investments and a reliable source of EU energy supplies, as well as a stable, predictable, and cooperative partner for security in Europe.” In the Union’s view the consolidation of democratic and civic institutions, the development of the rule of law, respect for human rights, media pluralism, and Russia’s integration into international institutions are the sine qua non of a strong and sustained partnership. To further this effort, in 1991 the EU established the Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) program under which it allocated over 2.6 billion euros to Russia between 1991 and 2004 to support liberal reform. ������������������������������������������������������������ Vladimir Chizov, “European Union: A Partnership Strategy,” International Affairs, Moscow. Volume 50/6 (2004), pp. 84–5. ��������������������������������������������������������������������������� “Russia: Country Strategy Paper 2002–2006” . ���������������� Rolf Schuette, EU–Russia Relations: Interests and Values—A European Perspective, Carnegie Papers No. 54, December 2004. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Washington, D.C., 2004), p. 15.

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These principles were encoded in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) that, though signed in 1994, only came into force in 1997, delayed by EU concerns over Russia’s first war in Chechnya (1994–96). With EU enlargement, a protocol to the PCA signed in April 2004 extended the agreement to the ten new member–states effective May 1, 2004. While the PCA interwove the Union’s economic and security interests with a deep commitment to shared European values, its primary emphasis was on trade and economic issues. The PCA also established a dense institutional web to anchor the relationship. It set up a process of biennial EU–Russia summits, annual meetings at the ministerial level under the aegis of the Cooperation Council [reconstituted as the Permanent Cooperation Council (PCC) in 2003], and regular consultations at the sub–ministerial levels under functionally specific sub–committees. In 1999, to clarify their respective mutual goals, each country articulated a strategy in discrete documents. The EU released the Common Strategy on Russia (CSR) in June 1999; Russia adopted the Middle Term Strategy (MTS) in October 1999. Each document is instructive in delineating shared concerns and divergent outlooks. On an instrumental level, the CSR recognized the importance of engaging Russia in a joint response to security challenges in Europe and “facilitating the participation of Russia when the EU avails itself of the WEU for missions of the range within the Petersberg tasks.” These tasks included rescue operations, humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, and crisis management. On a normative level, the CSR placed the question of values at the center of the EU–Russia agenda, arguing, as Dov Lynch stated, “that for Russia to return to the ‘European family,’ it had to become like Europe.” The MTS, by contrast, sought to assert Russia’s prerogatives in the area of sovereignty and the definition of its national interest, saw the economic modernization project as the chief driver of its relations with the EU, and pointedly abjured any intention of seeking EU membership. In the words of Vladimir Chizov, Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister, “it is the purely practical issues of strengthening strategic partnership on an equal and mutually beneficial basis that are at the top of the agenda of our relations with an enlarged EU.” The results of the biennial summits established under the PCA between the Russian President on the one hand and the EU troika10 on the other, have served as a useful barometer for gauging the evolution of the relationship. Reflecting the PCA’s ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� “Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation,” 1994. . ���������������������������������������������������������������������������� “Common Strategy of the EU of 4 June 1999 on Russia,” . ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� “Russia’s Middle Term Strategy towards the EU (2000–2010)” . ������������������������������������������������������� “Common Strategy of the EU on Russia of 4 June 1999”. ������������ Dov Lynch, Russia Faces Europe, Chaillot Papers No. 60. (Paris 2003), p. 57. �������������������������������������������������������������������������� Chizov, “European Union: A Partnership Strategy,” p. 81. Emphasis added. 10 The EU Council President, the High Representative for the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSFP), and the President of the EU Commission make up the troika.

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largely instrumental focus, the early summits represented no more than information exchanges on the progress of economic and political reform in Russia, with the February 1999 Moscow summit overshadowed by concern over the fallout of the August 1998 financial crisis and possible EU response. In summit meetings pursuant to the adoption of the CSR, the EU pushed Russia more assertively on the “values” vector. The MTS, just as assertively, threw down the gauntlet to the EU on the “values” question. This issue dominated the October 1999 Helsinki summit as the Chechen crisis was brewing again in Russia. It took center stage at the May 2000 summit after Russia, under the stewardship of Prime Minister and later President Vladimir Putin, launched the Second Chechen War in late 1999. This military operation came on the heels of terrorist attacks in Moscow, which the Russian government blamed on Chechen insurgents. As a result, the war had and continues to have broad domestic support; but the Chechnya issue has preoccupied EU leaders, who have refused to accept the Russian conflation of the Chechen insurgency with terrorism. Joint statements at EU–Russia summits between 2000 and 2001 without exception reflected strong EU concerns in this area. Rolf Schuette, a European scholar, identified the joint statement at the May 2001 Moscow summit as the strongest and clearest expression of EU concern over values. The statement declared, inter alia, that “a strong civil society is necessary in a modern democratic state. The continued development of independent media is a cornerstone of democratic societies. Freedom of speech and pluralism in the media are essential democratic principles and core values for a genuine EU–Russia partnership.”11 The statement also reiterated the Union’s serious reservations over the war in Chechnya and called on Russia to seek a political solution to the crisis, noting the work of the Council of Europe and requesting the return of the Assistance Group of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to Chechnya. However, the summit also identified crisis management in Europe as an important area of cooperation, and at the October 2001 EU–Russia summit in Brussels, set up a system of monthly meetings between the EU Political and Security Committee troika and the Russian ambassador to the EU in order to facilitate continuing dialogue on security and defense policies. The September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States placed the threat from global terrorism on the EU–Russia agenda and focused attention on prospects for joint policing, intelligence sharing, and other cooperative measures to combat this menace. Thereafter, the values issue received routine but cursory mention as concern over terrorism and other interests came to dominate discussions. At the May 2002 summit in Moscow, the two sides discussed the possibility of using Russia’s long– haul air transportation to provide strategic airlift capability for European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) operations as well as Russian participation in the EU Police Mission in Bosnia–Herzegovina.12 The latter occurred in November 2003, 11 Cited in Schuette, “EU–Russia Relations,” p. 20. 12 Tuomas Forsberg, “The EU–Russia Security Relationship: Why the Opportunity was Missed,” European Foreign Affairs Review, No. 9, (2004), p. 252.

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when Russian representatives took part in an EU Command and Staff exercise.13 Continuing Chechen insurgent attacks in Russia also allowed President Putin to present Chechnya as an integral part of a seamless front in the global war against terrorism and to launch moves in the domestic arena to limit media independence and assert Moscow’s control over Russia’s regions14–actions that appeared to contravene democratic norms.15 Concerned over such developments, in late 2004 Chris Patten, External Relations Commissioner of the EU, stressed his hope “that the government of the Russian Federation will not conclude that the only answer to terrorism is to increase the power of the Kremlin,” adding that “there is not much good history on that side of the proposition.”16 In spite of these differences, the Union and Russia have proceeded to investigate ways of infusing greater substance into the relationship by working to develop four common spaces—an economic space; a space of freedom, security, and justice; a space of external security; and a space of education, research, and culture—an idea adumbrated at the 2003 St. Petersburg summit. The November 2004 summit in The Hague was devoted to further discussions on this concept. The future shape of EU–Russia ties will hinge in large measure on the compromises each side is willing to make on the vectors of values and interests. For an enduring and meaningful partnership, each party will have to agree on the common ground upon which to build a strategic relationship. The chief obstacles to the achievement of this goal are the very divergent conceptualizations of security by the two sides. The EU champions a concept of security that includes people as well as states. Such a view transcends the traditional definition of security as national security, or the security of the state, to embrace a more expansive vision that refers not merely to the physical safety of people but to respect for human dignity and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The EU therefore sees the promotion of democracy and rule of law within the state along with the development of a stronger international society, well–functioning international institutions, and rule– based international order, as integral aspects of an indivisible security.17 European dependence and vulnerability along an interconnected infrastructure in transport, energy, and information, and threats from terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and organized crime are security challenges that often thrive in the disorder and injustice spawned within weak or failed states. The Union therefore sees the emergence of a world of well–governed democratic states as the “best protection” for European security.18 13 Chizov, “European Union: A Partnership Strategy,” p. 83. 14 The Russian Federation is divided into republics and regions. The former have a greater degree of autonomy from central control. 15 William Schneider, “Putin’s Power Grab,” National Journal, 36/39, (25 September 2004), p. 2940. 16 Quoted in Ibid. 17 European Council “A Secure Europe in a Better World,” European Security Strategy A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy, (Brussels: 2003). . 18 Ibid.

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The Russian view of security is cast in the traditional mold of realpolitik. Proceeding from an ineluctable emphasis on interests, national security is seen in terms of safeguarding the sovereignty of the state from internal and external threats and reclaiming Russia’s role as a great power. Economic modernization, the protection of territorial integrity, the reassertion of influence in the post–Soviet space, and combating unconventional threats from terrorism, drug trafficking, and organized crime represent core Russian concerns. These divergent views on security yield differing emphases in the areas of economic, environmental, and external security. The following section discusses how policy choices in each of these issue areas play out. Economics as Security: Trade and Energy EU–Russia complementarities in trade and energy are strong. Russia needs the EU to help it achieve its economic rebuilding and reform programs. The EU needs Russia as a reliable source of energy to insulate the Union from vulnerabilities arising from dependence on Middle Eastern oil. From the Russian perspective, the bedrock of the EU–RF partnership centers on a robust economic engagement. President Putin has accorded primary importance to Russia’s economic modernization and its integration into the global economy, upon which both its power and its long–term security depend. The EU, as the RF’s largest trading partner, is indispensable to the achievement of Russia’s economic goals. In 2002, the EU share of Russia’s imports stood at nearly 25 percent. The EU was the destination for 35 percent of Russia’s exports, a number that rose to over 50 percent with EU enlargement.19 EU countries accounted for almost 50 percent of the foreign investment in Russia in 2002.20 While Russian imports account for only five percent of the EU’s overall foreign trade, there is a hard strategic edge to these imports that the small number belies. Oil and gas represent the primary EU imports from Russia and play an important role in the EU’s goal of energy security. Russia’s one–sided dependence on the EU for trade is balanced somewhat by Europe’s need for Russia’s energy supplies. Russia has sought EU support for its membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and better market access for its products. The EU, through the Energy Partnership, has worked to improve Russia’s legal and business culture for investments in the energy sector.21 The complementarity 19 “Bilateral Trade Relations: Russia” (updated 10/2004). For 2002 figures, see Lynch, Russia Faces Europe, p. 16. 20 Aleksei Likhachev, “Russia’s Economic Interests in an [sic] United Europe,” International Affairs, Moscow. 50/5, p. 75. 21 EU-Russia Energy Dialogue, Fifth Progress Report, presented by Russian Minister of Energy and Industry Victor Khristenko and European Commission Director-General François Lamoureux, Moscow/Brussels, November 2004. .

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of interests, however, does not insulate this area from value conflicts. Russia wants non–intrusive investment support for modernizing its economy, especially its energy sector, and protection of its energy position in and its trade with the EU. At the same time, the EU’s objectives of long–term stability of energy supplies are predicated on the reform and liberalization of the Russian market.22 Their interests, nonetheless, are strong enough to dissuade both sides from playing an economic zero–sum game. Thus, in dealing with the economic implications of EU enlargement, Russia, after some initial balking, conceded to the expansion of the PCA to the enlarged Union. In return, the EU undertook to recognize long–term Russian gas contracts with affected new member–states and endorsed existing supply contracts for nuclear material concluded with new members before enlargement. It also exempted Russia from quantitative EU import restrictions on fossil fuels set in place to reduce vulnerability in terms of dependence on any single source of energy. Further, it allowed the free transit of energy products to the Kaliningrad region, which became a Russian enclave inside the EU after enlargement.23 With Russia’s ratification, after heavy EU pressure, of the Kyoto Protocol in 2004 and EU agreement to support Russia’s accession to the WTO, TACIS technical assistance was earmarked for energy efficient pilot projects in Archangelsk, Astrakhan, and Kaliningrad.24 These pilot projects have focused on the use of renewable energy and the promotion of energy efficiency in buildings and in urban transportation. Transport in particular has been targeted as a sector with rapidly rising energy consumption and significant and rising emissions of carbon dioxide. Trade and investment on the one hand, and energy on the other, represent core security concerns for Russia and the EU respectively. Russian leaders recognize that their country’s future status and influence in the world are heavily dependent on its economic viability; strong economic links to the EU represent a crucial part of the Russian strategy for renewal. This factor, more than any other, led President Putin to declare unequivocally that Russia’s future rested on a primary engagement with, rather than a move away from, Europe and the western world. Aleksei Likhachev, deputy chair of the Russian State Duma Committee for Economic, Political, and Business Enterprise, declared that Europe occupied a position of “indisputable priority” in Russia’s foreign economic strategy.25 Similarly, Russia features prominently in the EU goal of diversification of its energy sources, and while EU targets call for decreasing the percentage of its energy imports from Russia, projections show the absolute volume of imports will increase in response to a sharp rise in EU energy demands.

22 On these points, see Lynch, Russia Faces Europe, p. 65. 23 EU–Russia Energy Dialogue, Fifth Progress Report, p. 2. For a list of specific EU concessions, see Likhachev, “Russia’s Economic Interests in an [sic] United Europe,” p. 77. 24 EU–Russia Energy Dialogue, Fifth Progress Report. 25 Likhachev, “Russia’s Economic Interests in an [sic] United Europe,” p. 75.

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Environment as Security Russia is the unfortunate legatee of over seventy years of mismanagement and neglect of the environment. Enlargement has brought the Union to Russia’s borders and consequently has magnified the urgency of environmental security for the EU. The EU–Russia dialogue has focused primarily on nuclear safety, but also has included discussions on climate change and pollution in the Baltic Sea. Complementing multilateral international efforts, the EU has assumed a prominent role in helping Russia and other post–Soviet states ensure the safety of their nuclear reactors. Very early after the collapse of the Soviet Union, EU members of the Group of 7 (G7) joined with Japan, Canada, and the United States, at their annual 1992 Munich summit, to adopt a nuclear safety strategy. Reactors of Soviet design were classified into upgradeable and non–upgradeable categories, with assistance programs planned for negotiating agreements with host governments for upgrading the former and decommissioning the latter.26 Spurred by the 1986 Chernobyl accident in Ukraine, following which the EU joined multilateral efforts in constructing a shelter around the nuclear core, the EU’s TACIS nuclear safety program has been proactive in helping to promote an effective nuclear safety culture. Steps include continuous support for regulatory bodies, on– site assistance and help in the development and implementation of strategies to deal with nuclear waste disposal in the context of wider international cooperation. In the case of Russia in particular, the EU has expressed concern over the independence and effectiveness of the nuclear regulatory agency GosAtomnadzor (GAN) and Russia’s policy of extending the life of its first–generation reactors.27 In this area, as in others, EU standards for nuclear safety often come up against Russian decisions based on its economic interests. Thus, for example, the EU did not consider the request of Russian authorities for on–site assistance at the Kursk-1 nuclear power plant, which operates a first–generation nuclear reactor, as the EU position on these reactors is that they should be decommissioned.28 The EU–Russia dialogue on replacement of the first–generation reactors takes place within a joint working group, and the Union is supporting the completion and safety enhancement of reactors of modern design under construction. Of a total indicative budget for 2004–06 of €429 million for enhancement of the nuclear safety culture, disposal of spent fuel, participation in multilateral funds, technical support and assistance in establishing a technology center, an estimated €173 million are dedicated to Russia.29 The EU is engaged in other efforts as well. It has expressed concern over the disposal of spent nuclear submarine fuel and has indicated its willingness to join 26 “Nuclear Safety in Central Europe and the Independent States–The Issue” . 27 “Nuclear Safety Indicative Program, 2004–2006, Including ISTC–STCU,” p. 57, (24–11–2003). 28 Ibid, p. 10. 29 Ibid, p. 24.

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with the international community in assisting Russia financially in developing ways of reducing environmental risk in the Baltic Sea region, in the northwest of Russia and on the EU’s doorstep. The Union also worked to persuade Russia to support multilateral efforts to address climate change by ratifying the Kyoto Protocol, a step that Russian lawmakers took in October 2004. The signing of the Protocol paved the way for the EU and Russia to cooperate in the carbon trading system30 and to invest funds to replace aging and high–polluting factories in Russia. Moreover, in return for Russia’s accession to the Kyoto Protocol, the EU promised to support Russia’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO). President Putin acknowledged this linkage when he stated, “The EU has been accommodating with regard to the WTO, [and in return] we will be expediting the signing of the Kyoto Protocol.”31 Environmental threats represent one of several “soft security” issues aggressively targeted by the EU in its comprehensive approach to human security on the European continent. EU programs in this area have the potential to benefit Russia’s economic development without unduly compromising Russian sovereignty. Internal and External Security Mounting threats in both Europe and the rest of the world in the post–Cold War period have generated a crowded EU–Russia security agenda. The 1990s disorder in the Balkans, which led to crises in Bosnia and Kosovo in the early and later part of the decade respectively, demonstrated the weakened influence of Russia and the impotence of the EU in dealing with post–Cold War flashpoints in Europe. Russia was able neither to restrain its client, Serbia, nor to block an American–led North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military response to these crises. The EU, hamstrung by its inability to develop a coordinated foreign policy stance or a credible intervention capacity, had no choice but to defer to American leadership. Coming on the heels of the August 1998 financial crisis, the 1999 Kosovo crisis and accompanying NATO military response in the face of serious Russian reservations, strengthened President Putin’s resolve to focus the energies and resources of the Russian state on economic renewal and on fighting the domestic insurgency in Chechnya. Putin’s inward focus was an overt acknowledgement that the first step in amending Russia’s battered status and resurrecting its influence was through a concerted effort to strengthen the Russian economy and the Russian state. The 1999 Kosovo crisis spurred EU efforts to reinvigorate the CFSP which, although formalized in the 1991 Maastricht Treaty, had remained largely a moribund initiative. As part of this effort, the Union in 1999 also launched the ESDP to allow for a more robust European role in guaranteeing security on the continent and elsewhere. 30 The trading system allows countries that exceed their carbon emissions quota to trade the excess with countries that fall below their treaty limits. 31 Quoted in Likhachev, “Russia’s Economic Interests in an [sic] United Europe,” p. 84.

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Whereas in the 1990s economic interests formed the primary basis for Russia’s interaction with the EU, the year 2000 marked the beginning of a more intensive political and security engagement. The launching of the Second Chechen War, however, has made for a frosty atmosphere for this emerging security dialogue. The global war against terrorism launched by the United States in 2001 and the American–led war against Iraq in 2003, represent two other crucial developments that factor into the EU–Russia discussions on security issues. The threat of terrorism deepened EU–Russia cooperation in law enforcement and information sharing vis– à–vis terrorist networks and financing. It deflected the EU’s focus on human rights violations in Chechnya by introducing a thick patina of common security concerns centering on terrorist threats. Russia also played a pivotal role, joining EU stalwarts France and Germany in challenging the 2003 war in Iraq, as the EU membership split into opposing camps on this issue. The support of the Iraq war by prospective EU members in Eastern Europe drew a sharp rebuke from French President Jacques Chirac, who warned darkly, but ultimately ineffectively, of dire consequences relating to their upcoming EU entry. The EU–Russia security agenda spans multiple geographic regions and encompasses the new threats from non–state actors. In general, on matters relating to security, the positions of the EU and Russia converge more easily on issues geographically farther removed from Eastern Europe and the post–Soviet space. Within its traditional sphere of control, Russia’s leaders have stronger historical claims and interests in exercising influence. Outside this region, a fluid post–Cold War environment has allowed the EU, with the cooperation of affected states, to seek a more intrusive role as a human rights gendarme, without triggering Russian resistance. Chechnya From the Russian perspective, the EU view on Chechnya represents an unacceptable intrusion into Russia’s internal affairs. For Russian leaders, the unlawful Chechen insurgency is a grave security threat and a challenge to the country’s territorial integrity. The insurgents’ links with transnational crime, drug trafficking, and terrorism have required, in their view, a forceful response from the Russian state. President Putin unapologetically has argued in various EU fora that the war in Chechnya was necessary and unavoidable in order to protect Russia’s territorial integrity and to fight against terrorism. EU officials, while accepting the need to combat terrorism, have repudiated the Russian characterization of the Chechen conflict and called for a politically negotiated resolution that seeks to address very real Chechen grievances. They also have been harshly critical of the Russian record on human rights in Chechnya and have pressed the Russian government to allow Western monitors and aid agencies access to the region. Moreover, the EU has questioned the legitimacy of Russian–sponsored elections in Chechnya—an assessment that drew protests from President Putin. The extent to which this issue

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impairs the EU–Russia relationship depends on how seriously the EU pushes the values vector in its dialogue with Russia. The Post–Soviet Space Between 1999 and 2004, NATO and the EU have enveloped many countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet space within their folds. This has sparked concern in Russia about the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) negotiated in 1990. Russian leaders argue that the changing balance of conventional forces in favor of NATO, after two successive rounds of expansion, requires a renegotiation of the CFE Treaty because of new existential realities. On the other hand, encroaching NATO and EU borders have convinced Russia of the need to engage with the West in order to join forces when such a stance would support Russian interests or to negotiate an acceptable modus vivendi on matters of disagreement. In the early 1990s, Russia thus registered loud protests when the Council of Europe admitted Estonia as a member, in spite of language legislation that discriminated against its sizable Russian minority population. The Council had held up Russian admission to the body until 1996—first, because of the presence of Russian troops in the Baltic countries; then, after the troop withdrawal process was completed in September 1994, because of the need to harmonize its human rights legislation with European standards; and finally, because of its 1994 invasion of Chechnya. Russia’s deputy foreign minister Vladimir Chizov remarked that while the Council of Europe was a “major contributor to the creation of a common legal space,” it was “unfortunately oftentimes divided into a [sic] ‘EU segment,’ which follow[ed] a unified course set in Brussels and other member countries.”32 However, Russia generally has been supportive of the ESDP and has worked with the Union to develop mutually acceptable solutions to the Kaliningrad transit issue in anticipation of the 2004 EU enlargement that rendered Kaliningrad a Russian enclave within the EU. A major area of EU concern has been Russia’s role in the emerging nationalist conflicts in the Caucasus region and the western fringes of Russia. Russia wielded considerable influence in affecting the course of violent conflicts between Azerbaijan and Armenia; between the Georgian government and rebels in Abkhazia and South Ossetia; and between Moldova and the breakaway Russian–backed Transnistria region. Russian leaders have resented the intrusive monitoring role of the Council of Europe and the OSCE and their excoriation of the Russian record on human rights in dealing with conflicts in the post–Soviet space. This criticism, they believe, is spearheaded by EU members in both these bodies, joined also by the United States in the OSCE. EU–Russia sparring in this area is likely to continue. Many countries in the Eurasian region are attracted to the EU’s normative model and seek to emulate it in hopes of integrating with Western institutions in the future. Russia’s reliance on power and its goal of satisfying its own traditional security interests in exercising 32 Chizov, “European Union: A Partnership Strategy,” p. 79.

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influence in the Eurasian region, serve to drive these countries into the arms of the West. Ukraine’s 2004–05 “Orange Revolution” provides an instructive example. The choice before the Ukrainian electorate in the presidential elections was between liberal reformer and pro–Westerner Viktor Yushchenko and pro–Russian Viktor Yanukovich. Following an election widely claimed by EU and other Western observers to be rigged, ordinary citizens repudiated Yanukovich’s victory, took to the street by the millions and, with Western support, successfully pressured the Ukrainian government of President Kuchma to call for a revote. In this second election, Yushchenko was named Ukraine’s new President. The Ukraine episode frayed an already tenuous EU–Russia discourse on Russia’s role in the post–Soviet space, but both sides realize that their deep, underlying interests in other areas are too important to ignore. This awareness of mutual dependence makes a serious rupture improbable. Beyond the Post–Soviet Space Farther away from the post–Soviet space, the EU–Russia nexus is stronger. On Middle East issues, a similarity of perspectives on the Israeli–Palestinian issue, centering on a two–state solution, bolsters EU–Russian cooperation. Russia is part of the Middle East “Quartet,” which includes the United States, the EU, and the United Nations (UN). Russia joined the EU in supporting the Afghanistan phase of the American–led war against terrorism. However, the war against Iraq in 2003 presented a more complex picture. As noted before, EU countries fractured on this issue: the governments of France and Germany, supported by the governments of the Scandinavian countries, led the charge against a U.S. invasion, while the governments of the United Kingdom, Spain, Portugal and Italy supported the American move. The new post–Cold War era NATO members in East–Central Europe lined up on the American side, but long–time NATO member Turkey balked. The publics in most EU countries were largely unsupportive of the war. Russia objected to the unilateral American expansion of the war against terrorism and stood with France and Germany in refusing to join President George W. Bush’s “coalition of the willing.” Russia nonetheless has been a cooperative partner with the United States and Europe in undertaking substantive measures to combat terrorism. These efforts have included an agreement to exchange intelligence on terrorist activities and networks, to block financial resources for terrorism, to work toward greater judicial and law enforcement cooperation, and to take joint action on combating organized crime. An agreement signed in 2003 paved the way for police cooperation between Russian police and EUROPOL.33 Russia also supports Western non–proliferation efforts. Further, it shares with the EU a strong inclination for working with the United Nations, especially the Security Council, in the resolution of important international issues. The Union and Russia have stressed the need for respecting international law 33 Schuette, “EU–Russia Relations,” p. 11.

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traditions and expressed a preference for multilateralism. The primary difference in shared approaches, however, lies in the bases of these convergent views: Values tempered with interests inform the EU approach, while interests primarily shape the Russian perspective. The Dynamic Environment The EU has been called variously a framework organization, a loose confederation, and a union of sovereign states. As a post–national entity with a European identity that has sought, not always successfully, to shed the carapace of nationalist particularism, the EU approaches its relations with other countries along the vectors of values and interests. Defining its interests within the context of its values, central to which are democracy, the rule of law, and a holistic approach to human security, the EU can be a demanding and difficult partner. The EU’s interlocutor, Russia, is a country in the throes of a comprehensive socio–political–economic transformation. Consequently, its identity has been uprooted from its communist superpower moorings and replaced with an, as yet, ideologically vapid but strongly statist nationalism. Based on these differences alone, the EU–Russia relationship would be a challenging one. However, the EU is also a collection of member–states with varying levels of influence, economic power, and individual histories of bilateral ties with Russia. Its post–national visage, at times, can be a collage of separate national faces operating alone or in shifting coalitions. These shifting coalitions sometimes involve the Big Three—Germany, France, and the United Kingdom— acting in tandem on matters relating to Russia. Often, the Big Three are willing to forsake strict adherence to an EU–wide values vector to protect more immediate interests, by overlooking for instance Russian transgressions in Chechnya, in order to secure lasting cooperation in the war against terrorism. This is in contrast to the Scandinavian countries or the new member–states of East–Central Europe for whom Cold War memories of a predatory Russia are more recent. Thus, EU policies are at once the lowest common denominator among many national voices, independently negotiated bilateral policies by its member–states with non–EU countries, and an aspired-to, common, normatively–derived European set of guiding principles. Faced with such an array of choices and faces, Russia has alternately, and sometimes simultaneously, engaged the EU and its individual member–states in a relentless pursuit of its interests. As Ksenia Kudayeva of the Carnegie Moscow Center notes, “Russia sees relations with the EU to be much less important than bilateral relations with member–states that carry the most political weight, namely France, Germany, and, to some extent, Britain.”34 Pekka Sutela, head of the Bank of Finland Institute for Economics in Transition, agrees: “Moscow tends to use individual EU capitals to 34 Quoted in “Russia and the European Union,” a panel discussion on EU Enlargement. .

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circumvent common EU policies.”35 In the post-11 September atmosphere, the Union deemphasized the values dimension as leaders in major EU countries sought Russia’s support in fighting terrorism and later in opposing American unilateralism in Iraq. At the November 2003 EU–Russia summit, Italy’s Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, who held the EU Presidency, expressed sympathy for Putin’s domestic policies in general and Chechnya in particular. Concerned over discrepancies between the overall EU approach toward Russia and those of its member–states, the EU Council of Heads of States and Governments commissioned an assessment report on the state of EU–Russia relations in December 2003. The resultant February 2004 Report from the EU Commission called for a “tougher line on political and economic issues and criticized Russia’s record on democracy and human rights and attitudes toward its neighbors.”36 EU enlargement has added member–states with acute Cold War memories that are more likely to take a hard line vis–à–vis Russia on the values dimension. Georgy Kiselev expressed Russian concerns on this issue when he observed that the EU’s inclusion of “newcomers from central and eastern Europe whose ‘young’ and ‘defiant’ position with regard to Russia” was “at odds with the stances of Berlin and Paris.”37 Konstantin Kosachev, the Russian State Duma’s International Affairs committee chair, stated that after EU enlargement in May 2004, the EU had taken to “lecturing Russia and applying if not double, then obviously exaggerated standards to it.”38 Elsewhere he added that these members had brought into the EU and NATO the phobias of past years.39 Aleksandr Grushko, director of the pan–European Cooperation department of the Russian Foreign Ministry, objected to the Union’s logic of basing relations with Russia on the “do as I do” principle: “Russia cannot behave that way and partnership will develop only on the basis of equality and respect for [each other’s] interests.”40 The looming power and global influence of the United States represents another major variable in the evolving Brussels–Moscow relationship. Neither the EU nor Russia can afford to allow mutual cooperation to jeopardize its own relationship with the United States. The post–Cold War tangle of challenges, however, has created a complicated pattern of relationships among the United States, the EU, and Russia in which alignments between the EU and Russia, and between Russia and the United 35 Ibid. 36 Dmitri Litvinovich, “Russia and Europe: Unhappy New(ish) Neighbors,” Moscow, Transitions Online, �������������������������������� 8 March 2004, Item No: 12625570. 37 Georgy Kiselev, “Russia–EU: A Useful Crisis,” Johnson’s Russia List, November 10, 2004. #13. . 38 “Russian Duma Official Says No Trusting Relations with EU,” Moscow Interfax, 21 December 2004 in Foreign Broadcast Information Service FBIS–SOV–2004–1223, Daily Report. 39 “Russian MPs Participation in Inter–parliamentary Assemblies Increases in 2004,” Moscow ITAR–TASS, 21 December 2004, in FBIS–SOV–2004–1221, Daily Report. 40 “Russian Foreign Ministry Official Says EU Taking Hegemonic Line with Russia,” Moscow Interfax, 14 December, 2004, in FBIS–SOV–2004–1215, Daily Report.

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States are tactical and issue–specific rather than strategic. Russia’s insistence on speaking the language of interests has found a ready echo in Washington, which while engaging in the rhetoric of values, has been less harshly critical of perceived Russian lapses than has the EU. Shared security goals, ranging from terrorism to WMD proliferation, bind the two countries together. As a vital US ally in the global war against terrorism, President Putin has, in American eyes, successfully argued the case that Chechnya is another battlefront in this war. Echoing President Bush’s call after 11 September to take the battle to the enemy, President Putin declared with respect to Russia’s Chechen insurgency, “If we retreat today, they will come back tomorrow. . . . By localising the conflict, we will drive them into caves. That is exactly where they belong. And we will destroy them in their caves.”41 Likewise, the EU has been careful to cast CFSP and ESDP as developing in cooperation with, rather than independently of, NATO and the United States, and has been supportive of the larger American goals of combating terrorism, WMD proliferation, and the related threats of drug trafficking and organized crime. If Russia had at one time seen ESDP as a counterweight to American influence, it soon concluded that Washington’s role in Europe, with European consent, continues to be consequential.42 US unilateralism, however, has discomfited the EU, which has a strong multilateral bent. The Union has been unsupportive of such unilateral American moves as its refusal to join the International Criminal Court and to sign the Kyoto Protocol, its withdrawal from the Anti–Ballistic Missile Treaty, and the 2003 war in Iraq. On all these issues, except for the Kyoto Protocol, which Russia signed only after EU inducement, Moscow’s views coincided with those of the EU. However, the Brussels–Moscow convergence in these areas has been narrowly limited to the issues at hand. In the post–Soviet space, Russia, the EU, and the United States may compete for influence in a region where the coexistence of energy resources and instability make it a vital security zone. If expanding NATO and EU boundaries were to encroach upon this region, the potential for friction between Russia on the one hand, and the EU and the United States on the other, would increase, as Russian interests would be pitted against Western interests and values. Conclusion In October 1999, High Representative of the EU for CFSP Javier Solana declared “developing the partnership with Russia is the most important, the most urgent and most challenging task that the EU faces at the beginning of the 21st century.”43 41 Lynch, Russia Faces Europe, p. 26. 42 See Tuomas Forsberg, “The EU–Russia Security Relationship: Why the Opportunity was Missed,” p. 258. 43 Quoted in Lynch, Russia Faces Europe, p. 61.

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Whether the EU–Russia relationship evolves into a genuine partnership or revolves primarily around economic and narrowly defined security complementarities hinges on the willingness of the two sides to come to an agreement on the interests versus values question. The paradox for Russia, as Nadezhda Arbatova has trenchantly observed, is that while democratization is a “necessary precondition for Russia’s integration into the Euroatlantic space of cooperation,” integration is the prerequisite for democratization.44 European scholars have noted that the EU approach to a Russia that is not seeking membership in the Union cannot be inflexible on the values vector.45 Recent commentary on the state of EU–Russia relations illustrates the value gulf. Marc Franco, head of the EU Commission delegation to Russia, described Russia as a classical state and the EU as a postindustrial state. He added that similar principles of human rights and democracy were essential for cooperation.46 Arguing that Chechnya had become one of the main obstacles to the Russia–EU dialogue, Georgy Kiselev stated that while Europe viewed human rights as the main problem in Chechnya, Russia saw it as a fight against terrorism. Further, just as an EU engrossed in integrating its new members attached more importance to European values, Russia, focused on internal threats, was “also ready to defend its values.”47 The future direction and depth of EU–Russia ties will depend on the importance placed by the EU on the values dimension. EU engagement with Russia is inevitable as a function of geographic proximity and intertwined economic and security interests. A deeper relationship, however, will depend on whether the EU plays a nurturing or a punitive role with respect to the European values it would like to see Russia embrace, and whether Russia is willing to work toward allaying EU concerns over the values dimension.

44 Quoted in “The World We’re In” International Affairs, Moscow. Volume 50, Issue 4, 2004, p. 123. 45 Lynch, Russia Faces Europe, p. 79. 46 Quoted in “Russian Foreign Ministry Official Says EU Taking Hegemonic Line with Russia,” FBIS–SOV–2004–1215, Daily Report. 47 Kiselev, “Russia–EU: A Useful Crisis.”

Chapter 11

Latin American Security: European Perspectives and Approaches Joaquín Roy

University of Miami

History and Diagnosis After 11 September, Latin America almost disappeared from the U.S. and European radar screens. In the past, those in the north went through cycles of enthusiastic interest, intervention and then benign neglect towards Latin America. Now, the terrorist attacks of 2001 have triggered another one of these cycles that, historically, have ended with Latin Americans sighing for attention. Then they get it, but generally for non–salutatory reasons—chaos, revolutions, and dictatorships. Throughout most of the preceding century, the United States has attended to its Southern neighbors when something has activated its security nerves. And, usually, European interests in Latin America have reawakened in reaction to perceived wrong or outdated moves by Washington. Recently, however, Europeans have become more assertive, relying on a sense of moral and historical obligation. The waning of the traditional, narrow security paradigm that dominated the Cold War generated collateral damage as the disappearance of the threat posed by the Soviet Union—real or imagined—has left a vacuum. This gap has been refilled very slowly with the rephrasing and rethinking of traditional concepts. “Security” outside of Cold War constrictions, for example, has been internalized in a wider and more complex way. On both sides of the Atlantic, think tanks, governments and scholars have considered this new concept, with Latin America as a focus. ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ In the drafting of this chapter, the author would like to thank by Karl Buck (Council of the European Union) and Detlef Nolte (University of Hamburg) for their recommendations, sugestions, and advice on documentation, and Wendy Grenade (Assistant Editor of the EU Center of the University of Miami) for her editing help. ���������������������������������� For a sample: Ana María Salazar, Seguridad nacional hoy: el reto de las democracies. (México, 2002); Fundación CIDOB, Nuevos temas de seguridad en América Latina (Barcelona, 2002); Pedro Villagra Delgado, . “Un nuevo paradigma de seguridad hemisférica,” Foreign Affairs en español, (octubre–diciembre 2003), pp.130–43; Gustavo Iruegas, “Seguridad multimensional,” Foreign Affairs en español, (octubre–diciembre 2003), pp. 150–53; Francisco Rojas Aravena, “La CES del hemisferio americano,” Foreign Affairs en español, (octubre–diciembre 2003), pp. 172–9.

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The United States has adapted gradually to the new circumstances, in part because it dramatically has become a target of the new threats including drug trafficking and uncontrolled migration. However, Europe detected the new paradigm much earlier, observing this scenario geographically distant from it. Past European tragedies, which led the governments to follow the path of integration and the pooling of sovereignty, have made them sensitive to Latin American ills. An Overview The European and U.S. cycle of interest and disdain for Latin America is anchored in the colonial legacy—the Europeans were there first, but the United States soon staked a claim. Once independence movements expelled Europe, most especially Spain, the United States, heeding “Manifest Destiny,” decreed that European empires should not return where their dominance had ended. Only select surviving colonial outposts were allowed to remain in the Caribbean. US President James Monroe’s 1823 Doctrine reigned supreme. Washington received any attempt to violate this “understanding” with energetic opposition. The most resounding warning came in 1898 with US intervention in Spanish–held Cuba after the sinking of the USS Maine. The United States did not see its job simply as keeping Europeans out of the hemisphere, however. It also sought to order the Latin American space in particular ways. Thus, U.S. President Teddy Roosevelt sent warships to support rebelling Panamanians seeking independence from Colombia, while securing an agreement to allow building and control of the Panama Canal. Subsequent interventions abounded around the larger Caribbean, with U.S. military occupations in Nicaragua, Haiti, Cuba and the Dominican Republic. The United States focused its security attention on Latin America during World War II, worried about Nazi infiltration and possible Japanese invasion. With his “Good Neighbor” policy, President Franklin Roosevelt managed to guarantee the loyalty and the active military participation of most Latin American countries (Brazil and Colombia, especially) in the Allied war effort. Even reluctant Argentina, under governments cozy with Germany and admiring of Benito Mussolini’s Italy, ended up in the Allied band. After the war, the United States imposed a security “Pax Americana,” freeing the subcontinent from nuclear weapons proliferation, replicating NATO’s classic obligations in case of an “outside” attack, and adopting a Cold War logic with a protective blanket over the Latin American republics. The most dramatic activation ������������������������������������������������������������������������ For a representative analysis using the new scope, see the work of the network RECAL: http://www.recalnet.org/documentos_trabajo.asp; http:// www.recalnet.org/informe_avance.asp, http://www.recalnet.org/libros.htm, and one of the resulting compilation of research: Klaus Bodemer (ed.), El nuevo escenario de (in)seguridad en América Latina: ¿amenaza para la democracia? (Caracas, 2002).

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of this came when the United States imposed a blockade on Cuba after finding that it was harboring Soviet–made weapons with nuclear capability, the missile crisis of October 1963. A Treaty of Mutual Assistance among the states of the Americas has remained in force through the period. At the same time, the historical European presence in Latin America was succeeded during the Twentieth Century by what is called today “civil society.” Millions of emigrants, responding to “pull and push” forces, were pulled to Latin America, similar to the attraction of the United States. Led by Spaniards (ironically, more immigrants arrived in Cuba after Spain’s defeat in 1898 than ever before), thousands of Europeans arrived in Latin America, making it their new home. This trend lasted well into the 1950s. The last large emigration wave took place after the end of the Spanish Civil War in 1939 and World War II in 1945, when political refugees linked with the usual crop of hungry and destitute huddled masses. The linguistic link was kept mostly with Spain, but commercial interests were reinforced with Britain, while France managed to infiltrate the fertile terrain of culture. Consequently, European ideologies served as a base for the development of the political movements of the Latin American republics. In sum, despite U.S. efforts, Europeans continued coming to and influencing Latin America, where many societies expressed notable gratitude for the contributions made by the new political refugees or economic expatriates. Retracing the steps of the conquistadors, an impressive number of European priests and nuns, most especially from Spain, filled the void in public educational and health assistance. Recently, reversing a trend propelled by job seeking in the Americas, Spaniards have led Europeans in surpassing traditional U.S. dominance in the field of investment. Taking advantage of the on–going privatization process in most Latin American states, Spanish companies now own key communication, transport, banking and energy holdings in important Latin American countries, including Argentina, Perú, and even Brazil. During the second part of the Twentieth Century, while European reconstruction and EU style integration proceeded steadily, Latin America also was “rediscovered” by Europeans with a mix of guilt for past mistakes and enthusiasm for its opportunities for experimentation. Europeans and Americans basically agreed in identifying the threat emanating from Moscow as the pivotal danger to Latin America. However, here, more than with other world regions, the European vision and the U.S. strategy did not exactly coincide regarding the roots of the indigenous problems and the proper remedies. New Problems Democratic rebirth and development in Latin America have been dramatic. A quarter of a century ago, only three Latin American countries (Venezuela, Colombia, and Costa Rica) were formal democracies. Today, all of states, with the exception of Cuba, are under liberal democratic control. The armed forces are, for the most part, back in their barracks, condemned for past crimes and excesses. Their political

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influence is weak compared to their previous overwhelming power. Ironically, however, the continent poses more uncertainties today than before. The “end of history” has not translated into an effective installation of idyllic liberal democratic peace in Latin America. Instead, the ideological range dominating the political scene has become more complex and has witnessed the rebirth and strengthening of genuinely Latin American phenomena such as populism. Moreover, although it has been a historical failure by all accounts, indigenous–led activity has rocked the shaky pillars of unstable democracies in the Andean countries, especially Bolivia and Ecuador. Significantly, in certain countries, particularly Venezuela and Ecuador, successful military leaders with a populist, left–leaning approach, by priming the indigenous and marginalized sectors, have enacted a latent rebirth of the Peruvian military’s top–down experiment of the 1960s. In a cruel irony, survival of the Cuban regime, a sort of ideological “Jurassic Park,” is not viewed as a threat to continental security anymore, with the exception of those in certain circles in Washington and Miami. To the contrary, the Castro dictatorship is a manageable evil compared with the much worse scenario of internal upheaval or the more damaging, but even less–likely scenario of U.S. military intervention, the only trigger capable of executing a drastic ending to such a long– lasting totalitarian regime. Cuba remains an historical relic of the pivotal security threat of the second half of the Twentieth Century. The “national security doctrine” driving the Latin American military leaders, who took over the crumbling democratic or populist regimes in the 1950s and 1960s, was based on assumptions, elevated to dogma, which few in the establishment questioned. The military was convinced that it was the only solid and perennial institution capable of guaranteeing the survival of the state as designed after independence. Government was incapable (or unwilling) of meeting the demands of the new human dimensions presented by increased immigration from outside, and rural to urban population flows. Only the Army stood firm, propelled by patriotic duty. The Cuban Revolution stood as a beacon revered by the masses in search of new solutions proposed by populist, left–leaning leadership. The military correctly diagnosed, however, that in a Latin America–wide new patria, proletariat–friendly and dominated by Havana and Moscow, it would be out of a job. This prospect it energetically—and criminally, in view of the “dirty wars” executed in the Southern Cone and some Central American countries—opposed at all costs. Power holders in Latin America and the United States, as well as Europe, all perceived this revolutionary threat. However, most European leaders and scholars differed with the conservative Latin American and U.S. assessment of the causes that led to the revolutionary challenge. The European diagnosis and American view differed on the nature of the roots of the spiral formed, on one hand, by political subversion, violent uprisings, guerrilla insurgency, and generalized opposition to the status quo, and on the other hand by the official reprisals and state–controlled terror. According to U.S. analyses (most notably during the Nixon and Reagan administrations), the instability generated by the confrontations was inspired and

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controlled by the axis formed by Cuba and the Soviet Union. Social and economic origins were secondary. Fearing the Cold War potential for expansion and confrontation, Europe often issued a second opinion. European Perceptions The lack of a European focus on some of the pressing security issues dominating the attention of U.S. officials results from the fact that to Europeans, Latin America is a relative zone of peace. It has settled its border conflicts mainly through negotiation. Further, historically, the Latin American record of state clashes and full–fledged wars is rather limited, minute compared to the nasty European legacy that led to the formation of the European Union. In view of the social and economic realities of Latin America, the European agenda settled on development cooperation as an integral part of a modern model of a security policy, a mechanism of crisis prevention. This focus allows the identification of some areas of concurrence between the European and U.S. priorities: the fight against poverty, environmental protection, the modernization of the state institutions, and the strengthening of the society. In fact, European views coincide with frequent Western Hemispheric declarations dominated by the Latin American concerns. Mitigating the dangers mentioned in inter–American forums would be endorsed easily by Europeans, with immediate agreement from U.S. officials: terrorism, transnational organized crime, drug trafficking and consumption problems, corruption, money laundering, illegal arms trafficking, attacks on cyber security, as well as access, possession, and use of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery by terrorists. The context of these potential or real threats is the shaky survival of political systems that are seen as extremely weak. This scene is dominated by a state of exclusion and social marginalization of sectors of the population that generates new forms of criminality, such as kidnappings. In the past, this scourge was limited to certain sectors of society, only targeting the highest economic levels, and selected personalities. It now affects everyone. European decision–makers would back the priorities expressed in inter–American declarations and agendas: strengthening civil society networks; reducing social inequalities by targeting the most disadvantaged groups; and, a true novelty in recent times, best dramatized in the wake of the East Asia tsunami tragedy, strengthening �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� As a model on all counts (depth of research, skilful evaluation, and synthesis), the trendsetting paper by Detlef Nolte is necessary for any review of this subject: “Problems for Latin American Security and its Implications for Europe: A German Perspective.” Jean Monnet Chair/Miami European Union Center, Working Paper: October, 2004. http://www. miami.edu/eucenter/noltfinal.pdf. Additionally, researchers may benefit from reading: Jörg Faust, and Dirk Messner, Development Policy as a Core Element of European Security Policy German Development Institute/ Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE), Bonn DIE Discussion Paper No. 3, 2004 http://www.die–gdi.de/die_homepage.nsf/ FSdpub?OpenFrameset. ������������������������������������������������������������������������������ For example, see the OAS Special Conference on Security (27–28 October 2003).

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natural disaster prevention. The ultimate result of this sense of insecurity is a progressive reduction of trust in the democratic system, and a rise in the temptation to resort to authoritarian solutions. Underpinning this is rampant corruption, at even higher levels than in other underdeveloped regions. Intimately connected to this social plague is a lack of job opportunities and of education. The emphasis in reports by conservative U.S. institutes and by the U.S. military differs from European thought. Legacies of the Cold War and alarming analysis derived from the experience of the terrorist crisis of 11 September, mix with arguments concerning the threats posed by old–fashioned criminals, the role of illegal armies, and terrorist groups allegedly influenced by Islamic fundamentalism, in addition to potential use of biological weapons. Although prudently absent from government documents, some scholars and independent observers argue that this vision is dictated by a sense of self–survival and the need to obtain the funding. Europeans agree with the Latin Americans about the urgency of addressing many issues including the Colombian drug production and trafficking, which have spilled into Bolivia, Perú and Ecuador, because these states produce all consumed cocaine. As well, Europeans stress that poverty is a threat to Latin American democracies, and that it is the inherent source of criminality and political violence. The weakness of the state, an apparent contradiction in a continent where government often has been perceived as oppressive, is an invitation to the expansion of extralegal activities, offering havens for global organized crime and an ideal environment for terrorist networks. European observers, however, are skeptical about an alleged coalition of Islamic fundamentalism and native guerrilla organizations to which some U.S. observers have given credence. Illegal immigration is a major concern in an expanded EU. Initially, Europeans also feared that the restrictions imposed by the United States on Latin American immigration in the aftermath of the 11 September terrorist attacks would shift migration to Europe. However, the problem has affected only some countries, most especially Spain. Finally, European experts side with their Latin American counterparts in emphasizing the preservation of the ecosystem, endangered by the perturbing changes in global climate. There is a shared conviction that sustainable development is linked to the conservation of natural resources. The ecological devastation that provides the backdrop of the impoverishment of Haiti dramatizes this, as hunger and despair have led to mass migration, crime, and political instability. ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ Although experts have questioned percentages, the statistics are alarming. Around fifty percent of Latin American citizens would be inclined to authoritarian solutions in view that democracy does not guarantee personal and human security. See the United Nations Development Program 2004 Study, Democracy in Latin America. http://www.undp.org/ democracy_report_latin_america/. ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Some Latin American states rank as the most corrupt societies, surpassing the poorest countries of Africa and Asia. See periodic ratings by Transparency International (http://www. transparency.org/) for comparative measures.

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European Remedies The EU–Experience and Model Due to cultural cohesiveness and similar levels of development, the Latin American and Caribbean bloc of states should be, in principle, the area of the planet most receptive to the European example of regional integration. With the new century, realities and projects such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) often are referred to as the Bolivarian dream come true, in the image of the European Union. However, achievements have been disappointing. In contrast to the level of political declarations and commitment made by certain governments of the leading countries with historical, political or economic linkages with the area (Spain, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and to a lesser extent Portugal), the Latin America news content in European media has diminished in recent years, as has public opinion and interest. Further, trade figures are dismally low, with commercial exchanges between the two regions representing about six percent of the world total. Only investment in certain areas and by certain European countries has caught the attention of experts and casual observers. Nonetheless, for more than two decades, and most especially when the EC transformed itself into the EU, Latin America became the object of European desire for replication by its adoption and adaptation of the European model of integration. In fact, the generalized perception in the Americas that the European process finally became serious, led to the decision to develop the North America Free Trade Area, in essence the expansion of a free trade pact between the United States and Canada to cover Mexico. As a natural spillover move of the same logic, in 1994, President Bill Clinton took up the Initiative of the Americas earlier proposed by President George H. W. Bush as an inspiration for the founding of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). Almost simultaneously, Latin America responded by forming MERCOSUR, in essence a pact between Argentina and Brazil to stop competing in key strategic areas, which incorporated Uruguay and Paraguay, with Chile and Bolivia waiting on the sidelines. Closer to the U.S. home, the Central American and Caribbean regional integration networks waited for the right opportunity to implement one of the two apparently differing concepts of integration. The U.S.–inspired method stressed the centrality of trade and investment, sidestepping other dimensions and avoiding the sticky and sensitive areas of institution building and shared sovereignty. As expected, Europe favored the other approach, the supranational approach that in principle was present in the foundational intentions of MERCOSUR and

�������������������������������������������������������������������������������� S������������������������������������������������������������������������������ imón Bolívar, the Liberator, won victories against Spanish colonial forces in Venezuela, Ecuador, Perú and Upper Perú. He then sought to join present–day Colombia, Venezuela and later Ecuador into Gran Colombia, ultimately a doomed project.

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for a long time has been, theoretically, the aim of CARICOM. Starting with the modest experiment of the Central American efforts nurtured with EU grants, Brussels encouraged the building of a regional institutional framework, with the hope that expectations of benefits would motivate the Latin Americans to adopt the EU model. However, after a long period of insistence, a more realistic assessment has set in for European–Latin American relations. In spite of the energy invested in the crafting of agreements between blocs, the most ambitious and practical free trade and cooperation deals between the two regions have been reached with two individual countries, Chile10 and Mexico.11 The explanation for this apparent failure of the EU strategy is complex and difficult to synthesize, but a selection of factors are notable. The fact that Chile and Mexico have completed European deals should be credited to three reasons. First, neither country belongs to any Latin American subregional bloc; this leaves them unencumbered to consider other offers. Next, Chile has been more successful than its neighbors in nurturing an open economy, relatively free from some of the ills of other countries, in terms of investment security and a lesser degree of inequality. Finally, Mexico offers the opportunity of operating in the wider NAFTA market. Alternatively, institutional features militated against the EU strategy elsewhere. The slowness in closing a deal with any of the blocs is traced back to the issue of state sovereignty. States’ guarding of their traditional prerogatives makes building common institutions with some minimal autonomous negotiation power in the subregional arrangements, similar to the ones in the EU, impossible. As well, subsidies to agriculture within the EU, central to the piece of the European model, present a further obstacle. Aware of resistance to some of the central ingredients of European integration, EU officials ceased insisting on the institution–building requirement. Instead, they elected to concentrate on the more practical dimensions of trade, protection for investments, respect for human rights and democracy (inspired by the demands of the reborn Latin American democracies, to guarantee consolidation of newly recovered civil liberties), and later the new dimensions of security. This shifting of priorities does not mean that Brussels has abandoned its past discourse. The EU has kept in reserve its message stressing the need to deepen the regional integration process, hoping that eventually the Latin Americans will learn to distinguish its process from the US–inspired method, with its narrow scope based solely on trade. ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� In 1972, Commonwealth Caribbean leaders decided to transform the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA) into a Common Market. They established the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), signing the Treaty of Chaguaramas on 4 July 1973. It now has fifteen full and five associate members. 10 For detailed description of the EU‘s relations with Chile see: European Commission, http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/chile/intro/index.htm. 11 For detailed descrioption of the EU‘s relations with Mexico see: European Commission, http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/mexico/intro/index.htm.

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As differentiated regional blocs, Latin America and Europe have expressed a common front in several traditional areas of security: arms non–proliferation and reductions in support for United Nations efforts in conflict prevention and resolution, reduction in military spending, confidence building, and a consensus on the new security threats.12 While explicit considerations of security are not part of their political dialogue, they have raised specific concerns about the increased availability of light armaments in Central America and the danger posed by antipersonnel mines. Areas of likely agreement include professionalization of the military, mutual confidence building measures, and projects for establishing “peace zones” in specific subregions, such as Central America and MERCOSUR. There is consensus in Europe and Latin America that they should form a common front for cooperation in international fora, joining efforts for effective arms control, pursuing active and generous participation in UN peace maintenance operations, and using positive experiences in crisis management and bi–national and multinational units. The need to insert security items into bi–regional agreements has been stressed prominently. The attention and resources devoted to the EU’s Common Strategy on the Mediterranean region should be considered a model for Latin America. The EU’s Global and Latin American Strategies Recognizing its role as a global political actor, the European Union has been building an institutional and resource framework to meet new demands and to respond in an integrated way. The development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the creation of the position of its High Representative, held by Javier Solana, which the EU Constitution calls for consolidating with the post of Commissioner for External Relations, are only two signs of the political will of the EU to strengthen its global presence. The European Security Strategy (ESS)13 is the most recent result of the expression of this vision. Its major elements are responsibility regarding security (to EU citizens, neighbors and the world), support for effective multilateralism, regional cooperation, comprehensive understanding of sources of security threats, and a strategy of crisis prevention. Although global in scope, all mechanisms also are applicable to Latin America: battling terrorism, drug trafficking, concern for good governance and development, a special attention to equality and social cohesion, as well as regional integration.14 12 For an assessment see: Jesper Tvevad, “La agenda de seguridad en las relaciones Europa–América Latina,” in Klaus Bodener, et. al (eds). El triángulo atlántico: América Latina, Europa y los Estados Unidos en el sistema internacional cambiante. Available at http://www.fasoc.cl/files/articulo/ART410fc1ce3809b.pdf, 2002, pp. 112–23. 13 European Union, Council, European Security Strategy. http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/ cmsUpload/78367.pdf 14 For an insider view, see: Karl Buck, “Strategic Hemispheric Objectives for the Next Decade.” Jean Monnet Chair/Miami European Union Center Working Paper: October, 2004. http://www.miami.edu/eucenter/buckfinal.pdf

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The institutionalized relationship between the European Union and Latin America includes a bi–regional approach, specialized dialogues with subregions, trade relations, and development cooperation. The bi–regional dimension is expressed by the link established with the Rio Group15 and by a strategic partnership between Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). The EU–Rio Group is a meeting ground for political dialogue, where EU–Latin American relations are enhanced. The EU-LAC consists of periodic summits of the Heads of State and Government of Latin America, the Caribbean and the European Union; the initial meeting was in Rio de Janeiro 28–29 June 1999.16 Its objective was to strengthen political, economic, and cultural understanding with the purpose of encouraging the development of a strategic partnership, with priorities for future joint action in the political and economic fields. The second summit, Madrid 17–18 May 2002,17 emphasized three main pillars: political dialogue, economic and financial relations including trade and capital, and co–operation in a number of areas. The third EU–LAC Summit took place 28 May 2004, in Guadalajara, Mexico,18 with the largest participation ever (58 countries, after EU enlargement). The novelties of the agenda included social cohesion as a centerpiece. Social cohesion is a crucial concept, intimately linked to poverty, inequality and social exclusion. It quickly has become a new field of EU–LAC cooperation. Citing the objective of the Europeans’ Social Policy Agenda, social cohesion seeks “to prevent and eradicate poverty and exclusion and promote the integration and participation of all in economic and social life.”19 Their understanding is that economic growth alone is not enough to eradicate poverty; that leads to marginalization. That democracy is sustainable in a context of inequality is dismissed summarily in all rigorous analysis emanating from the EU and partnerships with other organizations and think tanks.20

15 The Rio Group, established in 1986, consists of 19 Latin American states seeking to develop common foreign policies on a number of issues. 16 For description of EU’s relations with the Rio Group see: European Commission, http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/la/rio/sum_06_99.htm. 17 For discussion of EU/LAC Madrid Summit see: European Commission, http://europa. eu.int/comm/world/lac/. 18 For discussion of the EU/LAC Guadalajara Summit see: European Commission, EU/ LAC Summit in Mexico: http://europa.eu.int/comm/world/lac–guadal/00_index.htm. 19 For documentation of the Social Policy Agenda of this meeting see: European see: European Commission, http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/social_policy_agenda/ com379_en.pdf. 20 For sample of EU Commission and IDB cooperation, see: Carlo Benetti and Fernando Carrillo ¿Democracia con desigualdad? Una mirada de Europa hacia América Latina. (Washington, D.C., 2004.)

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In addition to the bi–regional approach, the EU has specialized dialogues with each subregion—MERCOSUR,21 Central America,22 and the Andean Community23— and, as noted above, it has individual agreements with Mexico and Chile. The EU gradually has deepened its economic and trade links to all these partners, more than doubling trade between 1990 and 2002. Its Generalized System of Preferences provides preferential access to EU markets for Andean (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Perú and Venezuela) and Central American countries as partial incentive to them to continue their fight against production of illegal drugs.24 Additionally, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Latin America rose dramatically in the second half of the 1990s. This new phenomenon largely resulted from the states’ privatization efforts, focusing initially on the industrial sectors and subsequently on the service sectors, notably banking and communications. During this period, the European Union became the largest source of investment in Latin America, and Latin America became the EU’s principal destination for FDI in emerging markets. European foreign direct investment inflows peaked in 2000, but since have declined. However, the accumulation of European investment in Latin America and the Caribbean continued to increase and, in 2002, totaled more than € 200 billion. Further, the European Investment Bank (EIB), active in the region since the early 1990s, has signed framework agreements with fifteen Latin American countries. Agreements between the EU and Latin American states and subregions have political as well as economic dimensions.25 All standard agreements now include a clause committing to mutual respect for democratic principles and human rights. The pacts also contain language about industrial, scientific, technical and environmental co–operation, and regarding action against illicit drugs. Financial programs aim for more–equal wealth distribution and environmental protection. Specific programs seek to make Latin America more competitive in the global market and society. Finally, the EU’s humanitarian aid has evolved from a modest program in the 1980s to a full agency, the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO),26 with a specific focus on Latin America.27 Among its programs is assistance to displaced 21 For documentation of EU relations with MERCOSUR, see: European Commission, http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/mercosur/intro/index.htm. 22 For description of EU relations with Central America see: European Commission, http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/ca/index.htm. 23 For discussion of EU-Andean Community relations see: European Commission, http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/andean/intro/index.ht. 24 For comprehensive documentation of EU-LA trade relations see: European Commission, Bilateral Trade Relations, http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/bilateral/index_ en.htm. 25 For documentation of EU Humanitarian Aid see: European Commission, http://europa. eu.int/comm/europeaid/index_en.htm. 26 See detailed description: European Commission, Humanitarian Aid http://europa. eu.int/comm/echo/index_en.htm. 27 ����������������������������������������������������������������� For report on the EU-LAC Madrid Summit see: European Commission, http:// europa.eu.int/comm/world/lac/aid.htm.

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people and victims of natural disasters, including supply of emergency food aid in the wake of catastrophes. Contrasts with U.S. Approaches Differences in Therapy No matter how energetic the European efforts in Latin America are, the reality is that the United States is the overpowering presence there. Still, both parties can recognize the differences in their approaches and learn from them. There is consensus regarding assessment of the contemporary threats to hemispheric security. Where Europeans and Americans differ is in the nature and shape of the remedies to be applied. Europe fears that the end of a cycle of neglect by the United States usually is followed by unilateral spasmodic moves—a sort of shock therapy, often in connection with military actions. Europeans are prone to prescribe multilateral, slow, and civil society–connected strategies. In concrete terms, Europe does not believe that the armed forces are appropriate agents in police activities, while the United States, supports the notion of joint military–police strategies. The blurring of the lines between “security” and “defense” in the U.S. strategy clashes with the European view that this leads to the militarization of security, when a more comprehensive treatment is needed badly. For Europe, this approach is a return to the old–time logic of national security controlled by the military, with its temptation to return to authoritarianism. However, there is a basic agreement on division of labor: Europe admits that the United States is equipped best to act militarily, and European governments eschew this area, rightly interpreting that Washington would oppose any attempts. Nonetheless, as in Haiti, when called upon, the Europeans are prepared to provide the soft side of the military in pacification missions. For the United States, the security threats emanating from Latin America revolve around two principal axes: international terrorism and drug trafficking. For the Latin Americans, the real evil is poverty, and crime and political instability are their priority areas. Here they are in good company with Europeans, although Europeans also understand and accept D.C.’s priority areas. While the United States tends to tilt towards military solutions, Europe concentrates on reforms in state and society. Europe uses “soft power” and carrots, while Washington still has in reserve the use of a stick. Europeans believe that most Latin American security problems could be dealt with by a well–managed dose of “soft power” composed of economic and trade development cooperation, political dialogue or persuasion, and development assistance. Most of the pressing societal problems, police forces rather than the military, could handle better. However, Europeans are well aware that good intentions only go so far. While free trade is offered as part of development, Latin America is confronted with the tenacity of the EU agricultural subsidies, a cornerstone of Europe that few there

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are ready to relinquish. Further, the EU is immersed in its largest–ever expansion, with the result that future development funding to Latin America and other parts of the world that do not garner the urgent strategic attention of that eastern border of Europe and the Mediterranean do, may be scarce. The EU’s growing involvement in other world regions, which have more immediate strategic importance, has limited funds available for Latin America. If the Europeans should reduce their engagement in the region and if the U.S. administration should concentrate its efforts on Latin American militaries, a real risk exists of the return to the political confrontations of the 1960s and 1970s. Latin America has much to gain from continued engagement with Europe on security–related matters. Lessons from the Past The 1970s and 1980s saw the eruption of bloody confrontations in Central America, with guerrilla movements seeking to spread revolution throughout the isthmus. Nicaragua’s Sandinista Revolution particularly, caught the alarmed attention of Washington, most acutely, the Reagan administration. For different reasons, the area drew European interest. The U.S. assessment was that the spreading state of war, within the limits of each country, was sponsored and manipulated by Cuba and the Soviet Union, and was threatening the stability of U.S. neighbor, Mexico.28 Europeans had a different diagnosis; further, they saw an opportunity for experimenting with novel solutions and approaches. Barely overcoming its own limitations and lack of a global vision, the European Community together with key European governments, seized the moment to concentrate their efforts in an area that was geographically manageable and presented the potential for adaptation of European experiences in pacification, reconciliation, and regional integration. European political parties (led by German Christian Democrats and Socialists, and a reinvigorated Spanish democracy that joined the Community in 1986), focusing on past continental experiences, sought to strengthen the capabilities of local political formations. The United States initially saw the European initiative as interference in a strategic area. Nonetheless, targeting poverty and inequality as the most important sources of the bloody confrontations, Europe provided development funding and agreed to a comprehensive plan of cooperation institutionalized as the San José Process. Central America received more EC aid per capita that any other region. Partially due to this effort, Central American states signed the peace accords that started them on their journeys toward to reconstruction and development. Placing security measures under the administration of the United Nations, European governments (supplying military and police expertise) contributed greatly to the pacification and democratic development of the whole area.29 28 Mexico still was under the hegemonic domination of the Insitutional Party of the Revolution, the PRI, which effectively controlled the state until 2000. 29 For a comprehensive view of the EU’s contributions to the Central American peace process and reconstruction, see: Joaqúin Roy (ed.), The Reconstruction of Central America:

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Although the overall results were not as expected (regional integration has stalled), the experience is a reference and a case study. Two pivotal factors of the Central American experience have informed subsequent EU strategies in Latin America: identification of poverty and inequality (i.e. the social dimension) as the primary source and threat to the security of the subcontinent, and recognition of the need for cohesive regional integration to remedy the weaknesses of the local economies in the global market. Two other cases—Cuba and Colombia—display the triangular relations that highlight the sometimes–contradictory approaches taken by the United States and the European Union toward countries in the region today. With both, the United States originated the initial actions, while the reactions were European. In each instance, the United States relied on an expanded concept of national security to justify its policies and behaviors. Finally, Europeans disagreed with measures taken by Washington in each. Far from accepting Cuba as a threat to continental security, Europeans considered the roots of the embargo imposed by the United States (expropriations) as a matter for bilateral resolution. Europe never honored the U.S. embargo and continued to trade with Cuba. After the Cold War ended, European investment and tourism partially filled the vacuum left by Soviet subsidies. When the U.S. government expanded embargo measures with extraterritorial laws such as Helms–Burton,30 the European response was swift.31 When the United States threatened to confront European protests in the context of the World Trade Organization, claiming national security measures, the Europeans stood firm, with the result of a 1998 compromise between Brussels and Washington.32 Since then, Europe has maintained a policy of “constructive engagement” with Cuba, conditioning the development of a cooperation agreement, on respect for human rights and democratic reform, while Washington

the role of the European Community. (Coral Gables, FL,1991). 30 This law, formally the “Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996,” allows use of U.S. courts to sue foreign companies and individuals allegedly benefiting from properties confiscated by the Cuban government. 31 For a comprehensive account of the international opposition to Helms–Burton, see Joaquín Roy, Cuba, the United States and the Helms–Burton Doctrine: International Reactions (Gainesville, FL, 2000); Joaqúin Roy covers concrete dimensions of the general issue are treated in: “The Helms–Burton Law: Development, Consequences, and Legacy for Inter–American and European–US Relations,” Journal of Inter–American Studies and World Affairs, (Fall 1997), pp. 77–108; “European Alternatives to the Helms–Burton Law,” Collegium, 10/3 (1998), pp. 3-7. “Europe, Cuba, the U.S. Embargo, and the Helms–Burton Law,” in Richard N. Haass, (ed.), Transatlantic Tension: The United States, Europe, and Problem Countries. (Washington, D.C., 1999), pp. 29–47. 32 This compromise continues the waiving, in six–month increments, of the implementation of the provision of Title III of the Helms–Burton Act, which gives access to the US court system to press claims against foreign entities for economic activities taking place in Cuba.

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has pursued a policy aimed at regime change.33 In contrast with the U.S. inclusion of Cuba in an “Axis of Evil,” Europe opts for a policy of “Access to Evil.”34 For Europeans, the embargo only contributes to the strengthening of Castro’s regime. These different approaches are evident in Colombia as well. By the 1990s, the long–running Colombian civil war had reached the point of engendering the collapse of the state, with a part of the national territory under the control of guerrillas. The state’s government, with U.S. inspiration, constructed a comprehensive plan of economic and political rescue, laced with military and police assistance. Endorsed instantly by Washington, “Plan Colombia” was rejected immediately by European governments, EU institutions and civil society as counter–productive.35 They argued its military dimensions had the potential of degenerating into a regional conflict.36 Further, the coalition formed by drug–producers and –traffickers and land control by the guerrillas, represented novelties that needed to be addressed, which the Plan did not do. Additionally, the origins of the internal conflict run deep; they can be traced back to poverty and the unavailability of productive land, not problems open to the solutions proposed. Moreover, poverty, per se, is not the ultimate culprit, but signals absolute levels of inequality, contrasting to an alarming degree even with other underdeveloped regions. Once more, Washington and Europe agree on the assessment of the threat to regional security, but disagree on the correct remedies. Conclusion European views of Latin American security problems have evolved from a distant approach to a more hands–on consideration of the continent’s ills, which has the potential to affect cooperation between the two regions. Thus far, Europe has contributed a generous dose of development aid and expertise in the area of regional 33 For a selection of recent publications of this subject, see: Joaquín Roy, “A Review of the European Perceptions of Cuba,” North–South Center. Working Paper No. 12, February 2003. http://www.miami.edu/nsc/publications/pubs–WP–pdf/12WP.pdf; “The European Perception of Cuba: from Frustration to Irritation.” Occasional Paper. Miami European Union Center/ Jean Monnet Chair, Vol. 3, No. 2, August 2003. http://www.miami.edu/eucenter/royfinal. pdf; “The European Perception of Cuba: from Frustration to Irritation.” Update of previous entry. Canadian Foundation for the Americas (FOCAL). Background Briefing. September 2003. http://www.focal.ca/images/pdf/Cuba_EU.pdf; “The European Union and Cuba in the aftermath of Castro’s ‘fall’.” Occasional Paper. Miami European Union Center/Jean Monnet Chair, Vol. 4, No. 14, October 2004. http://www.miami.edu/eucenter/roycubafinal.pdf. 34 Metaphorical image apparently crafted by Karl Buck (Council of the European Union). 35 See Joaquín Roy, “Europe: Neither Plan Colombia, nor Peace Process: from Good Intentions to High Frustration,” Working Paper No. 11, North–South Center, January 2003. http://www.miami.edu/nsc/publications/pubs–WP–pdf/WP11.pdf. 36 For an updated assessment of the security situation, see: Fundación Seguridad y Democracia, Colombia: Balance de seguridad 2004. (Bogotá, 2004). http://www. seguridadydemocracia.org/documentosocasionales/BalancedeSeguridad2004.pdf.

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integration. However, additional investment and trade opportunities are endangered by innate and apparently endemic shortcomings of the Latin American societies. Poverty, inequality, and a lack of trust in democratic institutions have resulted in a climate of insecurity beyond traditional defense and military concerns. Having experienced the same problems in the interwar period, which led to the suicidal World War II confrontation, Europe has tried to share the lessons of its past with Latin America. Although disagreements still exist with political and economic elites of Latin America, as well as in the decision–making circles of the United States, they have built a consensus on the priorities and remedies to be applied. This creates the potential for an effective coalition to contribute to the consolidation of the rule of law and social improvement in the in the region that, in many ways, is the most familiar to Europeans.

Chapter 12

Conclusions Janet Adamski and Mary Troy Johnson

University of Mary Hardin-Baylor and University of Loyola, New Orleans

The European Union (EU) is an expanding and expansionary power with the allure of the world’s largest market and values that inform universal standards on a wide range of issues. Increasingly, the EU represents a powerful united voice on trade and other economic issues. Further, when many international institutions address political issues, the EU more often than not has the strongest voice, the result of bloc voting by EU members and aspirants, as well as the growing number of countries that agree with EU positions on the use of force, human rights and the environment. The EU practically has stepped forward to fill a void left by the United States’ retreat from its moral authority, won at such a high price during the two world wars and the post–war period. Concomitantly, the United States seems to have lost its almost automatic majorities in the UN General Assembly as that body’s membership grew to represent a more contentious set of states and interests, some of which do not trust US motives. Countries that once invited in the US military have become suspicious of it. Majorities in many countries say they do not agree with US policies and positions. Ironically, while since 11 September, the United States has embraced moral objectives in its foreign policy and justified its use of force for the ends of spreading freedom and democracy, the EU succeeded in spreading and supporting these values in 2004 through ten state enlargement, without military means or imposition by force. The prospects of joining the EU have become so attractive that neighboring (and non–neighboring) countries struggle for a place in the accession line. Would–be members have made radical legal and constitutional changes to show the EU that they are “good” Europeans. Thus, many potential member states have expanded human rights, both group and individual. For example, a number of countries have eliminated laws making homosexuality illegal, and Turkey has removed legal sanctions against adultery, protecting women who previously could have been punished by death. States carved from the former Yugoslavia have agreed to cooperate with the UN Security Council’s international tribunal on war crimes in the Balkans, arresting and turning over suspects. The United States argues that its actions in the Middle East and elsewhere secure itself and the world by spreading freedom, democracy and rule of law. If we measure security in this way, then we must acknowledge the role that Europe has played from the rehabilitation of Germany and Italy following

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World War II throughout the reformation-through-inclusion of at least eight former Soviet bloc states. Europe too, deserves to have its contributions recognized and appreciated. More often than not though, policymakers and commentators in the United States find Europe lacking, overlooking its strengths in the security realm, strengths that the United States itself recently has neglected in its own policy. Diplomacy is central to the pursuit of security in Europe, as a primary option to try before the use of force. This comes from a belief that force provides a solution only in the most strictly constructed and legally constrained circumstances. Additionally, those who created the institutions of European integration are convinced that it represents a new kind of power, capable of pursing a new kind of diplomacy. In essence, a supranational Europe has innovated supranational diplomacy. In the past, traditional diplomacy might bring to the table commitments on the part of individual countries and their allies, which others may or may not have relied upon, depending on experience with, and reputation of, the states involved. Supranational diplomacy, on the other hand, is transacted within legally prescribed parameters that define the mutual obligations of the partners, while striving to extend legal ties to others through diplomatic negotiations. The legal context in which supranational diplomacy takes place already is extensive and continues to develop, adding more certainty to the climate in which actors make agreements. Supranational diplomacy serves as a multiplier of potential “carrots and sticks,” at the same time interlinking relations with a range of actors and institutions. International law and institutions help define issues and, progressively, provide enforcement capacity for agreements as well as rewards and punishments. While Europeans exploit the possibilities of diplomatic instruments, many in the United States have become disillusioned with diplomacy. As a result, “the Bush administration acts as if the world has entered a post–diplomatic age, in which making speeches or issuing ultimatums takes the place of give–and–take negotiations.” The unilateralism that Washington favors not only devalues diplomacy it also devalues multilateralism. Indeed, the price the United States is paying, as radical Islamists single out and highlight its action to mobilize followers, and friends make themselves scarce, follows the logic of unilateralism to the extreme. Unilateralism has fed adverse perceptions of US foreign policy and its goals. Accordingly, American unilateralism is rampant and, as a result, anti–Americanism is on the rise worldwide. Countries that cooperate with the United States often do so for purely instrumental reasons, not because they want to emulate its example. The switch from the soft power of attraction to the hard power of coercion carries a heavy price: the loss of legitimacy and authority. ������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, “Bush’s Revolution,” reprinted in Andrew Bennett and George Shambaugh, eds., Taking Sides: Clashing Views on Controversial Issues (Dubuque, IA: 2006), p. 27. ����������������������������� Manfred B. Steger, 2nd ed., Globalism: Market Ideology Meets Terrorism (Lanham, MD: 2005), p. 151.

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If unilateralism is an option, especially if it is the preferred option, a country need not concern itself with relationship building. Europeans, acting multilaterally, benefit from the relationships they establish. Through them, they develop new capacities for pursuing their goals in international relations. Europeans also consciously support the capacities of multilateral institutions, making them more effective for the work states cannot do, or choose not to do, on their own. Pursuing a multilateral course also has the possibility of transforming individually held values into universally shared values. Governments can get even more and better results if they work together to reflect their common values in international law and increase the capacities of international institutions that publicize, promote and on occasion, enforce that law. The EU has gone far, not only as a role model but also in setting agendas in international institutions and cultivating international support for its values and goals. To the extent that democracy and human rights promotion foster security, multilateral cooperation reinforces those values. As states strive for peace, they accept legal and political obligations through international institutions that lead to more sustained and consistent policy. Having been persuaded through soft power, other states may accept these norms and behaviors multiplying the effect of the initial states’ engagements. Multilateralism has a more direct relationship to security than spreading the values that support human security, as important as that may be. It also has a bearing on so–called hard security issues. The use of force is not what many Europeans object to, but the illegal and illegitimate use of force. Indeed, many Europeans classified the Kosovo bombing campaign as a NATO effort in support of human rights and, consequently, considered it legitimate. The US–led action in Afghanistan, beginning in 2001, gives another example of the use of force that carried the full support of Europeans, also deemed legitimate, as NATO and the UN Security Council supported these efforts. With the French in the chair in the immediate days after 11 September, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1368, in which it considered “individual” or “collective self–defense” to be legal in response to the terrorist attacks. Previously, an individual–unilateral right of self–defense to counter an act of terrorism had never been recognized by this body. In this instance, multilateralism was used to underpin a unilateral response, a great irony to those who oppose multilateral institutions for the constraints they pose on unilateral action. Multilateral security is also a fact on the ground, especially in terms of countering terrorism. Every step in the process of defeating terrorists who operate from nonstate-bound networks may be subject to multilateral cooperation, from intelligence gathering, to finance tracing, to apprehension and conviction of suspects. From the perspective of many Europeans, military force is not the most effective instrument to use against terrorists. Leaders of the United States and the EU disagree about choice of instruments. Whereas the leaders in Washington believe the Europeans have gone soft in their lack of political will to use force, Europeans see themselves adapting to the changing security environment while maintaining the capabilities to deal with traditional threats.

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The gravest threat of all becomes a reality when terrorists gain weapons of mass destruction. Graham Allison sounded the alarm in Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe. He argued that a global effort directed at securing nuclear materials and stopping proliferation can succeed. Allison maintained, “The United States and its allies have the power to define and enforce global constraints on nuclear weapons.” The potential contribution the EU can make to such an effort must not be understated. Its members are states that possess nuclear weapons and have nuclear industries. They know how to secure nuclear weapons and materials and can share their experience with other countries seeking to upgrade their nuclear security, increasing the security of all states. The very structure of the European Union offers an advantage to enhancing security. The states of Old Europe have many advantages that flow from having functional governments: from legislatures that can draft relevant and effective legislation to law enforcement officials who can access information, coordinate diverse activities and translate their efforts into action. The EU offers another advantage that stems from the good relations it has fostered with international institutions and non–governmental organizations (NGOs): its citizens have developed habits of cooperation that make them less likely to resist “pooling sovereignty” in international institutions and in support of international law. President George W. Bush’s call for all of the countries of the world to sign the twelve UN counter–terrorism conventions may seem odd given current US-UN relations but needed little explanation to European publics. In recent public opinion polls, European citizens have shown high levels of support for Europe to take on a greater international leadership role. According to the poll the German Marshall Fund conducted in 2004, 71 percent of the Europeans polled supported the notion, “the EU should become a superpower like the U.S.” The poll seemed to register a contrary response as well, however, as majorities in each of the nine countries sampled stated they were against increased defense spending. It may not be possible to square that circle, but it may be possible, somewhat, to straighten out the curves. When Europeans think of a superpower, its “hard” military character is certainly less prominent. Their support for Europe taking the lead in the world follows disappointment with what they see as militant US leadership. Most Europeans do not accept a US policy that envisions military force as an instrument that can or should create the conditions for peace. Therefore, it is likely a European superpower would not define itself predominantly as a military power and conceivable that it would distinguish itself by military restraint. Roberto Aliboni finds evidence of this distinction in US and EU approaches: “The extreme Realpolitik American attitude, wherein democracy may be brought about and enforced manu militari

����������������� Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe (New York, 2004), p. 191. ���������������������������������������������������������������������������� “The German Marshall Fund of the United States, “Transatlantic Trends 2004 Partners,” p.6. Available http://transatlantictrends.org/doc/2004_english_key.pdf.

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through regime change, clashes with the extreme European position, which supports democratic change through consensus, confidence–building, and cooperation.” In the final analysis, how do we explain a security policy that relies on so many non–military means? Clearly, it is difficult to conceptualize the European security policy with customary tools and language, because it is both more and less than a traditional security policy. It is more in its emphasis on the root causes of insecurity and less in its geopolitical content. European security goes beyond traditional defense by arguing that security threats can be traced to causal sources. Threats, therefore, are seen in terms of the situations that are believed to have produced them. Political instability, economic deprivation, gross human rights violations, the absence or breakdown of the rule of law—these situations incite conflict and feed political extremism. Hence, strategies others might dismiss only as good governance strategies are key to achieving security objectives by removing the breeding ground for threats. Sven Biscop sees the 1995 European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in this larger light. Whereas the main thrust of this policy is to support political and economic reform in the Mediterranean Region, Biscop directs our attention to another potential. He describes ways in which Europeans could incorporate foreign and security objectives further into their policies with the “ultimate objective” being “an effective security partnership, i.e., joint mechanisms for early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management, based on a common strategic assessment.” Security becomes an end product of integration. The EU is comfortable enough defining an area, such as the Mediterranean, for the purposes of spreading integration, modeled on its own experience, and folding security objectives into the overall policy in the context of cooperative security. When it comes to staking out strategic interests and identifying a location as the source of a threat, however, the EU balks. In contrast, the United States is more wedded to a territorial concept of defense. President Bush did not hesitate to put the enemies of the United States on notice when he singled out Iraq, Iran and North Korea as forming an “axis of evil” in January 2002, using fighting language that sent shudders through Europe. In the same vein, the United States’ determination to see NATO go out–of–area, suggests defense is based on moving armies to the place where the threat emanates. Facing similar challenges, Europeans are much less likely to consider them as linked to a place, and they question the utility of relatively stationary armies in response to mobile and global phenomena, as well as �������������������������������������������������������������������������� Roberto Aliboni, “The Europe–Mediterranean Partnership and Transatlantic Challenges,” p. 14. Available at http://transatlantic.sais–jhu.edu/PDF/publications/Albiono. pdf. ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ Sven Biscop, “Effective Multilateralism: Bringing The European Way Into Practice,” in Biscop, ed., Audit of European Strategy, Egmont Papers, no. 3, Royal Institute for International Relations (Gent, Belgium, 2004), p. 29. ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� State of the Union address by President George W. Bush, 29 January, 2002. http:// www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129–11.html.

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instability that may have root causes in poverty, underdevelopment, environmental challenges and ethnic conflicts. At first sight, the geopolitical deficit in European security seems to expose the critical missing element. However, once we understand that European security does not limit itself to traditional defense conceptions, any more than the European integrative project models itself on the state, the neglect of geopolitical interests seems almost deliberate. European security does not so much chart new territory as operates off the map. Indeed, the de–emphasis on territorially based threats may be an advantage for conceptualizing how to cope with the new networks of threats (rather than strictly state–based actors). The focus may be the critical one: how to approach threats that are not subject to traditional military containment. The Europeans seek to contribute to a new security paradigm, one that deserves serious consideration by all US decision–makers who truly believe that, post–11 September, the world is changed.

Index Abbas, Prime Minister Mahmoud 125, 126 Achille Lauro 121 Adenauer, Chancellor Konrad 20-21 Afghanistan 10, 11, 42, 76, 77, 79, 81-2, 87, 92, 128, 142, 165 Enduring Freedom, Operation 76 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 67, 71, 91, 91 n. 20, 128 n. 59 Allied Force, Operation, see Balkans ALTHEA, Operation, see Balkans Amsterdam Treaty 49, 54, 59, 61, 63-4, 109 Andean Community 157 Andean countries 150 Arab-Israeli Peace Process 122-6 Arafat, President Yasser 122, 126 Argentina 148, 149, 153 Armenia 42, 141 ARTEMIS, Operation, see Democratic Republic of the Congo Article Five see NATO Atlantic Alliance ix, 15, 41, 43, 49, 55-6, 59, 71, 72, 83, 85, 87, 95 Auschwitz 27 Austria 66 n. 24, 83 Azerbaijan 42, 141 the Balkans 51, 53, 60, 86, 97, 98 n. 55, 101-16 Bosnia/Bosnia-Herzegovina 46, 52, 69, 80, 91, 102, 103, 104, 114 Administration of Mostar 66 ALTHEA, Operation 67, 96, 112 EU Police Mission 69, 97, 98, 11011, 134 Croatia 86, 102, 104, 106 Kosovo 7, 9-10, 35, 37, 40, 46-7, 60, 71, 81, 82, 91, 93, 97, 101, 102, 103, 107, 108, 112, 113, 139, 165 Allied Force, Operation 76, 81 Regional Approach 106-8, 109

Macedonia 10, 69, 71, 79, 95, 99, 106, 111, 112-16 CONCORDIA, Operation 95, 111 EU Police Mission 69, 98, 113 (Lake) Ohrid Agreement 111, 113, 113 n. 62 PROXIMA, Operation 111, 114 Rambouillet Agreement 107-8 Royaumont Process 106 Serbia 37, 60, 66, 79, 103, 104, 139 Slovenia 72, 29, 80, 86, 104 Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe 109-10, 114 Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAA) 114 Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) 108-9 Belgium 7, 20, 23, 64, 68, 76, 86 Benelux States, 17 BerlinPlus, see NATO-EU Declaration on ESDP the “Big Three” 87, 143 Blair, Prime Minister Tony 5, 11, 35, 60, 68; see also Britainand United Kingdom Bolívar, Simón 153 n. 8 Bolivia 92, 150, 152, 153, 157 Bosnia, see Balkans Brazil 148, 149, 153 Britain/the British ix, 5, 6, 17, 18-19, 19 n. 12, 22, 23, 15, 35, 45, 47, 49, 60, 105, 118-19, 122, 124, 126, 127, 128, 143,149; see also United Kingdom Brussels Treaty Organization 16, 17-18, 24 Bulgaria 72, 78, 79, 80, 106 Burns, Ambassador Nicholas 68 Bush, President George W./Bush administration xii, 6, 7, 35, 37, 39, 43, 46, 51, 55, 72, 76, 85, 122, 125, 127, 142, 164, 166, 167

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Canada 20, 30, 76, 76 n. 23, 77, 83, 138, 153 Carabinieri 40, 97 Caribbean 148, 153, 156, 157 Caribbean Community (CARICOM) 154 n. 9 Castro, Fidel 150, 161 Central America 150, 153, 154, 155, 157, 159, 160 Centre de Planification et de Conduite des Opérations (CPCO) 67 Chechnya/Chechen 133, 134, 135, 139, 140-41, 143, 144, 145, 146 and human rights 140, 146 Chief/Chairman of the European Union Military Committee (CEUMC) 63-5 Chiefs of Defense (CHODS) 64 Chile 153, 154, 157 Chirac, President Jacques 11, 60, 68, 140 Clay, General Lucius 19 Cold War viii, 11, 15, 16, 25, 30, 33, 41, 43-4, 47-8, 57, 58, 59, 60, 72, 75, 81, 86, 131, 143, 144, 147, 148, 151, 152, 160 collective defense 71, 73-8, 84 collective security 9, 72, 73, 78-83 Cologne European Council, see European Council Colombia/Colombian 148, 149, 152, 153 n. 8, 157, 160, 161 Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) 65-6 Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) 62, 63, 69 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) ix, 9, 46-8, 52-3, 54, 59, 61-4, 69, 86, 87, 88, 90, 91, 93, 101, 103-5, 106, 107, 139, 145, 155 Common Strategy on Russia 133-4 Concert of Europe 9 CONCORDIA, Operation, see Balkans Congo, see Democratic Republic of the Congo COPS, see Political and Security Committee COREU communication system 62 Cortenberg building 68-9 Costa Rica 149 Council of Europe 5, 22, 134, 141 creeping vulnerabilities 30-31 Croatia, see Balkans

CSR, see Common Strategy on Russia Cuba/Cuban 148, 149, 150, 151, 159, 16061, 160 n. 30 and n. 32 Czech Republic 46, 71, 131 Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 40, 51, 67, 94 Operation ARTEMIS 67, 95 EU Police Mission inKinshasa 69, 97, 97 n. 46, 111 Denmark 20, 64, 76, 94 n. 36 Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) 66 development cooperation 151, 156, 158 Dominican Republic 148 “double containment” 53-4 DSACEUR, see Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe Eastern European membership inNATO 79-80, 83 Ecuador 150, 152, 153 n. 8, 157 Egypt and the Suez Canal 118-19 Estonia 72, 73, 74, 131, 141 EMP, see Euro Mediterranean Partnership environmental security 29, 30, 34, 138 EUJUST THEMIS, see Georgia Euro-Arab Dialogue 119-20 Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) 119-22, 125 European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) 58 European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) 90 European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 10, 13, 22-3, 58 European Commission President 61, 63, 115 European Community (EC) 16, 25, 47, 88, 103, 104, 120, 122, 153, 159 political integration 44-5 European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) 157 European Council 47, 49, 61-2, 68, 69 Cologne Meeting 47, 50, 60, 66 configurations 62, 62 n.13 General Affairs Council (GAC) 61, 62, 106 General Affairs and External Relations

Index Council (GAERC) 61-2, 64, 66 eneral Secretariat 58, 63 G Helsinki Meeting 50, 60 Nice Meeting 60 Seville Meeting 61 Thessaloniki Meeting 88, 97 European Court of Human Rights 5 European Court of Justice 5, 23 European Defense Agency (EDA) 69, 90 European Defense Community (EDC) ix, 16, 22-5, 58, 86 European defense spending 76-7, 79, 89-91, 166 European Economic Community (EEC) 23, 58 European Parliament 8, 50, 61 European Political Community (EPC) 22-3, 58 European Political Cooperation (EPC) 58, 61, 62 Political Committee 62-3 European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) 28, 53, 93, 96, 105, 108 European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) 45-6, 50, 81 European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) ix, 3, 47-50, 52, 55, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 67, 69, Chapter 7 passim, 101, 108, 110-12, 134, 139, 140, 141, 145 civilian capabilities 96-7 Rule of Law missions 69, 87, 96; see also individual country missions European Security Strategy 28, 40, 50, 53-5, 88, 155 European Union BerlinPlus/EU Declaration on ESDP 46, 54, 66-8, 95, 96, 111, 112 civil-military cell 68 Common Strategy on Russia 133-4; see also Russia Constitution 45, 49, 58, 64, 69, 83, 87, 91, 155 External Relations Commissioner 63-4, 155 Human Security Doctrine 37, 38, 39 Human Security Volunteer Service 40 Planning Cell at SHAPE 66-7 political integration 44-6, 101

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troop deployments 40, 51, 87, 91, 93, 94; see also relevant countries/regions European Union Military Committee (EUMC) 61, 64-5, 67, 94 European Union Military Staff (EUMS) 61, 64-5, 67, 94, 95 European Union Police Mission (EUPM), see relevant state/region Finland 66 n. 24, 83 “Four Policemen” 18 framework operations 66, 67, 95, 96 France/the French ix, 7, 10, 17, 18, 20, 22, 23, 24, 45, 47, 48, 49, 64, 65, 68, 76, 81, 83, 86, 87, 95, 96, 97, 105, 117, 118, 119, 122, 126, 127, 128, 131, 140, 142, 143, 149, 153, 165 free riders 9, 82 Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) 153 freedom 3, 6, 13, 17, 32, 35, 39, 103, 115, 127, 134, 135, 163 GCC, see Gulf Cooperation Council Gendarmerie 40, 97 General Affairs Council (GAC), see European Council General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), see European Council Geneva Conventions 10 genocide 7 Georgia 42, 131, 141 EU rule of law mission (EUJUST THEMIS) 69, 97 German Question 20-22 Germany/the Germans viii, 6, 10, Chapter 2 passim, 45, 47, 48, 67, 68, 75, 76, 78, 81, 83, 86, 87, 95, 103, 104, 117, 118, 122, 127, 128, 131, 140, 142, 143, 148, 153, 163 Greece/the Greeks 19, 19 n. 12 guerrillas 150, 152, 159, 161 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 120-21 Hägglund, General Gustav 64 Haiti 148, 152, 158

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HAMAS, The Islamic Resistance Movement 126, 127 Headline Goals 2010/ EU Battlegroups 68-9, 96 hegemonic power/hegemony of the United States ix, 4, 13, 15, 28, 36, 44 Helms-Burton Law 160, 160 n. 30 and n. 32 Helsinki European Council, see European Council Helsinki Headline Goals 28, 49, 90 n. 16, 93, 96 Hoop Scheffer, Secretary General Jaap de 77 human security 29, 30, 31, 34-42 Hungary 46, 71, 79, 106, 131

Joint Rapid Reaction Force (UK)67, 87

Iceland 20 immigration 25, 132, 150, 152 International Criminal Court 5, 7, 39, 145 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), see Afghanistan Iran 55, 117, 126-8, 167 nuclear inspections 126 Revolution (1979) 126-7 Iran-Libya Sanctions Act 127 Iraq 71, 92, 97, 119, 129, 167 EU internal difference over Iraq 46, 47, 88, 49, 52, 54, 55, 81, 86, 98, 124, 128, 140, 142, 144 EU rule of law mission 69 Iraqi Freedom, Operation 68, 76, 82 2003 War 7, 15, 35, 36 n. 17, 42, 77, 79, 82, 83, 92, 125, 126, 140, 142, 144; see also United States and European Union United States’ differences with European allies over viii, ix, 11, 15, 37, 48, 68, 82, 83, 86, 89 n. 8, 98, 117, 128, 140, 144, 145 Ireland 20, 66, 83 Islamic fundamentalism/Islamists 55, 152, 164 Israel/Israelis 90, 92, 99, 117, 120, 122-6, 127 Italy/Italians 20, 23, 24, 25, 76, 87, 97, 98, 121, 142, 148, 153, 164

McCloy, US High Commander John 21 Macedonia, see Balkans Mexico 153, 154, 157, 159, 159 n. 28 Middle Term Strategy 133-4 Military Committee of the European Union, see European Union Military Committee Military Representatives (Milreps) 64 Military Staff of the European Union, see European Union Military Staff Military Working Group 65 Modified Brussels Treaty 58 Moldova 131, 141 Monnet, Jean 10, 13, 14, 16 Monroe Doctrine 148 Moschini, General Rolando 64 Moscow 19, 131, 134, 142, 144, 145, 149, 150; see also Soviet Union and Russia Mostar, Administration of, see Balkans MTS, see Middle Term Strategy multilateralism 12, 39, 51, 143, 155, 164, 165

joint staff directorates 65

Kagan, Robert 3, 4, 37, 51 Korean War 21 Kosovo, see Balkans LatinAmerica and the Caribbean (LAC) 156 Latvia 72, 73, 79, 131 League of Nations 9, 82, 119 Leakey, Major General A. David 67 Libya 120-22, 127, 129 Lithuania 72, 73, 79, 131 Lockerbie bombings 121 Lugar, Senator Richard 80

NAFTA, see North American Free Trade Agreement national security doctrine 150-51, 158 National Security Strategy (US) 28, 35, 38, 88 the Netherlands 7, 20, 23, 45 Nicaragua 148, 159 Nice European Council, see European Council

Index Nice Treaties/Treaty 49, 63, 64, 66, 87 North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) 153, 154 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) viii, ix, 3, 7, 10, 11, 15, 23, 24-5, 28, 45, 46-7, 49, 53, 57-60, 63, 64, 65-8, 85, 86, 89, 95, 104, 105, 107, 110, 112, 114, 128, 139, 141, 142, 145, 165, 167 1997 Founding Act 74 BerlinPlus/EU Declaration on ESDP 46, 54, 66-8, 95, 96, 111, 112 enlargement 42, 46, 71, 72, 73, 78, 79, 82, 83, 145 and the EU 28, 46, 47, 53-4, 57, 60, 65, 66-8, 83, 84, 86, 145 headquarters 7, 15, 71 North Atlantic Council (NAC) 63 North Atlantic Treaty 18, 20, 25 and Article Five 17, 71, 73, 80, 82 n. 4, 128 n. 59 and member defense spending 76-8, 89, 89 n. 12 and relations with the United States 11, 85, 15, 46, 75, 80, 81, 83, 139, 142, 145, 165 and representative at EUMS 67 and transformation Chapter 6 passim and the United States 82 and WEU 24, 47, 59, 60, 66, 66 n. 24 Northwood, Joint Headquarters at (UK) 67 Norway/Norwegians 20 Nye, Joseph 49, 128 Operational Headquarters (OHQs) of the EU 68, 86, 95 Organization for Security and Cooperation inEurope (OSCE) 42, 48, 72, 110, 134, 141 Palestine 119, 123, 123 n. 28 Palestine Liberation Organization 121, 123 Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process 122-6 Panama 148 Paraguay 153 paramilitary police 97, 110 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) 133, 137

173

PCA, see Partnership and Cooperation Agreement Perú 149, 152, 153 n. 8, 157 Petersberg Declaration 28, 48, 59 Petersberg Tasks 28-9, 52, 58, 59, 66, 68, 69, 93, 95, 96, 96 n. 44, 133 Plan Colombia 161 Poland 46, 71, 79, 131 Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit 59, 64 Political and Security Committee (PSC) 60, 62-3, 64, 67, 69, 94, 94 n. 38, 95 Portugal 20, 97, 142, 153 post-Cold War ix, 16, 27, 45, 47, 101, 103, 139, 140, 142, 144 Potsdam-Geltow 67 PROXIMA, Operation, see Balkans Putin, President Vladimir 27, 74, 134, 135, 136, 137, 139, 140, 144, 145 qualified majority voting 62 the Quartet 99 n. 1, 125, 142 Rambouillet Agreement, see Balkans Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) 92 Reith, General John 67 Rio Group 156, 156 n. 15 Road Map for Peace 125-6 Robertson, Secretary General Lord George 71, 89 Romania 72, 79, 80, 106 Royaumont Process, see Balkans Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense Donald viii, ix, 51-2 Russia/Russian Federation 42, 43-4, 46, 57, 65, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 98 n. 55, 99 n.1, 106, 110, 125, Chapter 10 passim; see also Moscow and Soviet Union and the EU 98, 99, Chapter 10 passim energy partnership 136-7 institutional links 132-6 St. Malo 47, 49, 54, 57, 60-61, 66, 98 San Remo Peace Conference 119 Schneiderhan, General Wolfgang 64 Schroeder/Schröder, Chancellor Gerhard viii, 27, 68

174

Old Europe, New Security

Schuwirth, Lt. General Rainer 66 Secretary General/High Representative (SG/HR) 59, 61, 63-4, 69 Serbia, see Balkans Sharon, Ariel 27, 125, 126 Single European Act (SEA) 58, 62 Slovakia 72, 80, 131 Slovenia, see Balkans soft power 15, 16, 17, 25, 49, 50-53, 88, Chapter 9 passim, 158, 164, 165 “special relationship” 6 Solana, SG/HR Javier 11, 47, 50, 64, 88, 89, 91, 112, 145, 155 Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) 153, 155, 157 Southern Cone 150 Soviet Union 11, 16, 44, 48, 51, 71, 73, 83, 103, 138, 147, 151, 159; see also Moscow and Russia Spaak, Paul-Henri 16, 22, 24 n. 44 Spain20 n. 22, 76, 97, 98, 122, 142, 148, 149, 152 Srebrenica 7, 105; see also Balkans Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, see Balkans Stabilization and Association Agreements, see Balkans Stabilization and Association Process, see Balkans supranational/supranationalism 4, 10, 12-13, 23, 58, 64, 85, 87, 91, 92, 131, 153, 164 Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE) 66, 67, 81 sustainable development 152 Sweden 66 n. 24, 83 Sykes-Picot Agreement 119 TACIS, see Technical Assistance to Commonwealth of Independent States Taliban 10, 81 Technical Assistance to CIS Countries (TACIS) 132 and energy 137 and nuclear safety 138 terror/terrorism/terrorists viii, 3, 4, 9, 11, 25, 31-2, 32 n. 9, 38, 39, 40, 41, 43, 50, 52, 55, 71, 75, 78, 80, 81, 81, 92, 96,

97, 98, 110, 113, 121, 122, 127, 128, 129, 134, 135, 136, 140, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 150, 151, 152, 155, 158, 165, 166 Tervuren, (Belgium)/Tervuren Initiative 68, 95 Treaties/Treaty of Rome (1957) 58, 119 Treaty of Amsterdam, see Amsterdam Treaty Treaty of Dunkirk 17 Treaty of European Union (TEU – the Maastricht Treaty) 28, 49, 59, 63, 65, 86, 93 103, 105, 140 the Troika 61, 104, 133, 133 n. 10, 134 Truman Doctrine 19-20 Turkey/Turks 19, 42, 49, 52, 54, 78, 82, 89 n. 12, 102, 103, 106, 110, 120, 142, 163 Ukraine 42, 71, 98 n. 55, 131, 138, 142 United Kingdom/UK ix, 19, 20, 36, 59, 60, 65, 67, 76, 80, 87, 96, 119, 131, 142, 143, 153; see also Britain United Nations viii, ix, 9, 16, 17, 25, 31 n.8, 37, 48, 82, 94, 99 n. 1, 104, 117, 123 n. 28, 125, 142, 124, 155, 159 Security Council 5, 11, 13, 17, 37, 39, 142, 163, 165 United States ix, x, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 29, 36, 37, 41, 43-4, 46, 47, 50-51, 55-6, 57, 59, 64, 65, 68, 72, 74, 75, 76, 78, 80, 81, 83, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 95, 101, 103, 104, 106, 110, 112, 117, 118, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 132, 134, 138, 140, 141, 142, 144, 145, 147, 148, 149, 150, 152, 153, 158, 159, 160, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167; see also Afghanistan, Iraq and NATO Congress 18, 60 defense spending 9, 76-7, 89 Uruguay 153 Venezuela 149, 150, 153 n. 8, 157 Venice Declaration (1980) 122-3

Index Warner, Senator John 80 Warsaw Pact/Warsaw Treaty Organization 16, 71, 72, 83, 107 Western European Union (WEU) 15, 24, 47, 58-60, 64, 65-6, 66 n. 24, 133 Planning Cell, 59, 65-6

175

World Trade Organization (WTO) 136, 137, 139, 160 Yugoslavia 7, 59, Chapter 8 passim; see also Balkans