Response to Commentaries

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Response to Commentaries [by Kitcher and Hesse] Thomas S. Kuhn PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Vol. 1982, Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers. (1982), pp. 712-716. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0270-8647%281982%291982%3C712%3ARTC%5BKA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-W PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association is currently published by The University of Chicago Press.

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Response to Commentaries

Thomas S. Kuhn

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

I am grateful to my commentators for their patience with my delays,

for the thoughtfulness of their criticism, and for the proposal that I

supply a written reply. With much that they have to say I fully

agree, but not with all. Part of our residual disagreement rests on

misunderstanding, and with that part I begin.

Kitcher (pp. 692-693) suggests I believe his "procedure of interpre-

tation", his "interpretive strategy", breaks down when confronted with

incommensurable parts of an older scientific vocabulary. I take it

that by "interpretive strategy" he means his procedure for identi-

fying in modern language the referents of older terms. But I do not

mean to have implied that that strategy need ever break down. On the

contrary, I have suggested that it is an essential tool of the histor-

ian/interpreter. If it anywhere necessarily breaks down, which I

doubt, then in that place interpretation is impossible.

Kitcher may read the preceding sentence as a tautology, for he appears to regard his reference-determining procedure as itself interpretation, rather than merely a prerequisite to it. Mary Hesse sees what is missing when she says that for interpretation, "We have not only to say that phlogiston sometimes referred to hydrogen and sometimes to absorption of oxygen, but we have to convey the whole ontology of phlogiston in order to make plausible why it was taken to be a single natural kind" (p. 707, her italics). The processes to which she refers are independent, and the older literature of the history of science provides countless examples of the ease with which one may complete the first without taking even a step towards the second. The result is an essential ingredient of Whig history. So far I have been dealing only with misunderstanding. As I now

continue, a more substantive sort of disagreement may begin to emerge.

(In this area no clear line separates misunderstanding from substan-

tive disagreement.) Kitcher supposes that interpretation makes

PSA 1982, Volume 2, pp. 712-716 Copyright @ 1983 by the philosophy of Science Association

possible "full communication across the revolutionary divide" and that

the process by which it does so is "extending the resources of the

home language", for example by the addition of terms like 'phlogiston'

and its relatives. (p. 691). About at least the second of these points

Kitcher is, I think, seriously mistaken. Though languages are enrich-

able, they can only be enriched in certain directions. The language

of twentieth-century chemistry has, for example, been enriched by

adding the names of new elements like berkelium and nobelium. But

there is no coherent or interpretable way to add the name of a quality-

bearing principle without altering what it is to be an element and a

good deal else besides. Such alterations are not simply enrichments;

they change rather than add to what was there before; and the language

that results from them can no longer directly render all laws of modern

chemistry. In particular, those laws involving the term "element"

escape it.

Is "full communication" nevertheless possible between an eighteenth-

and twentieth-century chemist, as Kitcher supposes? Perhaps, yes, but

only if one of the two learns the other's language, becoming, in that

sense, a participant in the other's practice of chemistry. That trans-

formation can be achieved, but the people who then communicate are only

in a Pickwickian sense chemists of different centuries. Such communi-

cation does permit significant (though not complete) comparison of the

effectiveness of the two modes of practice, but that was never for me

in question. What was and is at issue is not significant comparabi-

lity but rather the shaping of cognition by language, a point by no

means epistemologically innocuous. My claim has been that key state-

ments of an older science, including some that would ordinarily be

considered merely descriptive, cannot be rendered in the language of

a later science and vice versa. By the language of a science I here

mean not only the parts of that language in actual use but also all

extensions that can be incorporated in that language without altering

components already in place.

What I have in mind may be clarified if I sketch a response to Mary

Hesse's call for a new theory of meaning. I share her conviction

that traditional meaning-theory is bankrupt and that some sort of

replacement, not purely extensional, is needed. I suspect also that

HesseandI are close in our guesses about what that replacement will

look like. But she is somehow missing the shape of my guess both

when she supposes that my brief remarks abouthomologous taxonomies are

not directed towards a theory of meaning and also when she describes

my discussion of 'doux'/'douce' and of 'esprit' as concerned with a

kind of "meaning-trope" rather than directly and literally with mean-

ing. ( p . 709).

everting to my earlier metaphor, which is all that present space to be a node in a multidimensional lexical permits, let me take '&' network where its position is specified by its distance from such '&I, etc. To know what '-' means is other nodes as ' E ' ,

t o p o s s e s s t h e r e l e v a n t network t o g e t h e r w i t h some s e t of t e c h n i q u e s s u f f i c i e n t t o a t t a c h t o t h e 'd o u x ' node t h e same e x p e r i e n c e s , o b j e c t s , o r s i t u a t i o n s , a s a r e a s s o c i a t e d w i t h i t by o t h e r F r e n c h s p e a k e r s . So l o n g a s it l i n k s t h e r i g h t r e f e r e n t s t o t h e r i g h t n o d e s , t h e p a r t i c u l a r s e t of t e c h n i q u e s employed makes no d i f f e r e n c e ; t h e meaning o f c o n s i s t s s i m p l y of i t s s t r u c t u r a l r e l a t i o n t o o t h e r t e r m s o f t h e n e t i s i t s e l f r e c i p r o c a l l y i m p l i c a t e d i n t h e meanings work. S i n c e '=' of t h e s e o t h e r t e r m s , none of them, t a k e n by i t s e l f , h a s a n independ e n t l y s p e c i f i a b l e meaning.

'e'

Some of t h e i n t e r - t e r m r e l a t i o n s c o n s t i t u t i v e of meaning, e . g . , On ' d o u x ' -- ' m o u ' , a r e m e t a p h o r - l i k e , b u t t h e y a r e n o t metaphor. t h e c o n t r a r y , what h a s s o f a r been i n q u e s t i o n i s t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f l i t e r a l meanings w i t h o u t which t h e r e c o u l d b e n e i t h e r metaphor n o r other tropes. Tropes f u n c t i o n by s u g g e s t i n g a l t e r n a t e l e x i c a l s t r u c t u r e s c o n s t r u c t i b l e w i t h t h e same n o d e s , and t h e i r v e r y p o s s i b i l i t y depends upon t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a p r i m a r y network w i t h which t h e suggested a l t e r n a t e i s contrasted o r i n tension. Though t h e r e a r e t r o p e s , o r something v e r y l i k e them, i n s c i e n c e , t h e y have b e e n no p a r t of t h e s u b j e c t of my p a p e r . Note now t h a t t h e E n g l i s h t e r m ' s w e e t ' i s a l s o a node i n a l e x i c a l network where i t s p o s i t i o n i s s p e c i f i e d by i t s d i s t a n c e from s u c h o t h e r t e r m s a s ' s o f t ' and ' s u g a r y ' . But t h o s e r e l a t i v e d i s t a n c e s a r e n o t t h e same a s t h o s e i n t h e network f o r F r e n c h , and t h e E n g l i s h nodes a t t a c h t o o n l y some o f t h e same s i t u a t i o n s and p r o p e r t i e s a s t h e most n e a r l y c o r r e s p o n d i n g nodes i n t h e network f o r F r e n c h . That l a c k of s t r u c t u r a l homology i s what makes t h e s e p o r t i o n s of t h e French and E n g l i s h v o c a b u l a r i e s incommensurable. Any a t t e m p t t o remove t h e i n c o m m e n s u r a b i l i t y , s a y by i n s e r t i n g a node f o r ' s w e e t ' i n t h e F r e n c h network, would change p r e e x i s t i n g d i s t a n c e r e l a t i o n s and t h u s a l t e r , r a t h e r t h a n s i m p l y e x t e n d , t h e p r e e x i s t i n g s t r u c t u r e . I am u n c e r t a i n a b o u t t h e sympathy w i t h which Hesse w i l l r e c e i v e t h e s e a s - y e t undeveloped a p e r z u s , b u t t h e y s h o u l d a t l e a s t i n d i c a t e t h e e x t e n t t o which my t a l k of taxonomies i s d i r e c t e d by c o n c e r n f o r a t h e o r y of meaning. I t u r n f i n a l l y t o a problem r a i s e d , though i n d i f f e r e n t ways, by b o t h my commentators. Hesse s u g g e s t s t h a t my c o n d i t i o n t h a t taxonomy b e s h a r e d i s p r o b a b l y t o o s t r o n g and t h a t "approximate s h a r i n g " o r " s i g n i f i c a n t i n t e r s e c t i o n " of taxonomies w i l l p r o b a b l y do " i n t h e p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n s i n which s p e a k e r s of d i f f e r e n t l a n g u a g e s f i n d thems e l v e s " ( p . 708, h e r i t a l i c s ) . K i t c h e r t h i n k s i n c o m m e n s u r a b i l i t y i s t o o common t o b e a c r i t e r i o n of r e v o l u t i o n a r y change and s u s p e c t s t h a t I am, i n any c a s e , no l o n g e r c o n c e r n e d t o d i s t i n g u i s h s h a r p l y between normal and r e v o l u t i o n a r y development i n s c i e n c e . (p. 697). I see t h e f o r c e of t h e s e p o s i t i o n s , f o r my own view of r e v o l u t i o n a r y change h a s i n c r e a s i n g l y moderated a s K i t c h e r s u p p o s e s . Nevertheless, I think he and Hesse push t h e c a s e f o r c o n t i n u i t y of change t o o f a r . Let me s k e t c h a p o s i t i o n I mean e l s e w h e r e t o d e v e l o p and d e f e n d .

The c o n c e p t o f a s c i e n t i f i c r e v o l u t i o n o r i g i n a t e d i n t h e d i s c o v e r y t h a t t o u n d e r s t a n d any p a r t of t h e s c i e n c e o f t h e p a s t t h e h i s t o r i a n must f i r s t l e a r n t h e l a n g u a g e i n which t h a t p a s t was w r i t t e n . Attempts a t t r a n s l a t i o n i n t o a l a t e r language a r e bound t o f a i l , and t h e languageS i n c e sucl e a r n i n g p r o c e s s i s t h e r e f o r e i n t e r p r e t i v e and h e m e n e u t i c . c e s s i n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s g e n e r a l l y a c h i e v e d i n l a r g e chunks ( " b r e a k i n g i n t o t h e h e r m e n e u t i c c i r c l e " ) , t h e h i s t o r i a n ' s d i s c o v e r y of t h e p a s t r e p e a t e d l y i n v o l v e s t h e sudden r e c o g n i t i o n o f new p a t t e r n s o r g e s t a l t s . I t follows t h a t t h e h i s t o r i a n , a t l e a s t , does experience r e v o l u t i o n s . Those t h e s e s were a t t h e h e a r t of my o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n , and on them I would s t i l l i n s i s t . Whether s c i e n t i s t s , moving t h r o u g h t i m e i n a d i r e c t i o n o p p o s i t e t o t h e h i s t o r i a n ' s , a l s o e x p e r i e n c e r e v o l u t i o n s i s l e f t open by what I have so f a r said. I f t h e y do, t h e i r s h i f t s i n g e s t a l t w i l l o r d i n a r i l y be s m a l l e r t h a n t h e h i s t o r i a n ' s f o r what t h e l a t t e r e x p e r i e n c e s a s a s i n g l e r e v o l u t i o n a r y change w i l l u s u a l l y have been s p r e a d o v e r a number It is not of s u c h changes d u r i n g t h e development of t h e s c i e n c e s . c l e a r , f u r t h e r m o r e , t h a t even t h o s e s m a l l changes need have had t h e c h a r a c t e r of r e v o l u t i o n s . Might n o t t h e h o l i s t i c l a n g u a g e changes t h a t t h e h i s t o r i a n e x p e r i e n c e s a s r e v o l u t i o n a r y have t a k e n p l a c e o r i g i n a l l y by a p r o c e s s o f g r a d u a l l i n g u i s t i c d r i f t ? I n p r i n c i p l e , t h e y m i g h t , and i n some r e a l m s o f d i s c o u r s e , p o l i t i c a l l i f e , f o r example, t h e y presumably d o , b u t n o t , I t h i n k , o r d i n a r i l y i n t h e developed s c i e n c e s . T h e r e , h o l i s t i c changes t e n d t o happen a l l a t once a s i n t h e g e s t a l t s w i t c h e s t o which I have l i k e n e d r e v o l u t i o n s before. P a r t of t h e evidence f o r t h a t p o s i t i o n remains e m p i r i c a l , r e p o r t s o f "aha" e x p e r i e n c e s , c a s e s o f m u t u a l incomprehension, and s o on. But t h e r e i s a l s o a t h e o r e t i c a l argument which may i n c r e a s e u n d e r s t a n d i n g of what I t a k e t o b e i n v o l v e d . So long a s t h e members of a s p e e c h community a g r e e on a number of s t a n d a r d examples ( p a r a d i g m s ) , t h e u t i l i t y of t e r m s l i k e ' d e m o c r a c y ' , ' j u s t i c e ' , o r ' e q u i t y ' i s n o t much t h r e a t e n e d by t h e o c c u r r e n c e a l s o of c a s e s i n which community members d i f f e r a b o u t t h e a p p l i c a b i l i t y o f t h e s e terms. Words of t h i s s o r t need n o t f u n c t i o n u n e q u i v o c a l l y ; f u z z i n e s s a t t h e b o r d e r s i s e x p e c t e d ; and i t i s t h e a c c e p t a n c e of f u z z i n e s s t h a t p e r m i t s d r i f t , t h e g r a d u a l warping of t h e meanings o f a s e t of i n t e r r e l a t e d t e r m s o v e r t i m e . I n t h e s c i e n c e s , on t h e o t h e r hand, p e r s i s t e n t d i s a g r e e m e n t a s t o w h e t h e r s u b s t a n c e x i s a n e l e m e n t o r a compound, w h e t h e r c e l e s t i a l body y i s a p l a n e t o r a comet, o r whether p a r t i c l e 5 i s a p r o t o n o r a n e u t r o n , would q u i c k l y c a s t d o u b t on t h e i n t e g r i t y o f t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g c o n c e p t s . I n the sciences b o r d e r l i n e c a s e s o f t h i s s o r t a r e s o u r c e s of c r i s i s , and d r i f t i s correspondingly i n h i b i t e d . I n s t e a d , p r e s s u r e s b u i l d up u n t i l a new v i e w p o i n t , i n c l u d i n g new u s e s f o r p a r t s of l a n g u a g e , i s i n t r o d u c e d . I f I were now r e w r i t i n g The S t r u c t u r e of S c i e n t i f i c R e v o l u t i o n s , I would emphasize l a n g u a g e change more and t h e n o m a l / r e v o l u t i o n a r y distinction less. But I would s t i l l d i s c u s s t h e s p e c i a l d i f f i c u l t i e s

t h e s c i e n c e s e x p e r i e n c e w i t h h o l i s t i c l a n g u a g e change, and I would a t t e m p t t o e x p l a i n t h a t d i f f i c u l t y a s r e s u l t i n g from t h e s c i e n c e s ' need f o r s p e c i a l precision i n reference determination.