Rise And Demise: Comparing World Systems (New Perspectives in Sociology)

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Rise And Demise: Comparing World Systems (New Perspectives in Sociology)

Rise and Demise New Perspectives in Sociology Char& Elly and $con McNall, Series Editors [email protected] a d Dmke: GompdTing Wrrt

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Rise and Demise

New Perspectives in Sociology Char& Elly and $con McNall, Series Editors [email protected] a d Dmke: GompdTing Wrrtld-Sgscms2

Chrisg~pherChase-Dunn and F~eac$iam and Pminbg~,mirb FORTHCOMIMG

Hirtov Wz"~6,olrt a Subject, David Ashley

Rise an Comparing World-Systems Christopher Chase-Dunn and

i// A Member of the Perseus Books Group

For D&lziek L)ak Cztrtis, and Golard Andrew

New Perpectiues


ALI rights resewed, Printed in the United States of h e r i c a . No part of this publication may be rqroduced or transmitted in any form or by any mems, electronic or mechanical, induding photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, wichout permission in writing from the publisher, Copyright Q 19") by Wesrview Press, A Mmber of the Persms Books Group X'ublisheci in t 39'7 in the Unit& States of Arnerica by Wesmiew Press, 5500 General Avenue, Bodder, Colorado 80301-2877, and in the United Kingdom by Westview Press, 12 Hi&s Clopse Road, Cumnor E-litl, Oxford O X 3Jj Librar)r of Congress Gatatrogng-in-Publication Data Chase-Dunn, Christopher K. Rise and demise : wmparing world-systems / Christopher Chase-Dunn and Thornas D. Hdl p, cm. Inctudes bibliographical referenas mci index, ISBM 0-8133-1005-9 (had). - lSBM 0-8133-10067 (pbk.) I.. Social change-History, 2. Capitatism-History. 3. Economic history, 1, Hdl, n o m a D., 19-46- . 11. Title. HMI Ol'C4f;ll: 1997 3 0 3 . 4 ' 0 9 4 ~ l2



The paper used in this pubfiation meersl the reqirements of tfie h e r i m Nationd Standard for Permanence of &per for Ringed Library Materids 233.48-15284,




Pa1-t' one Concepts and Def~nitions 1 A Hundred Flowers Bloom: Approaches to World-Systems

2 Defining World-Systems

3 Two, Three, Many World-Systems

Pdrt Two

Explaining World-SystemEvolation 4 New Territories: The Problem of Incorporation

5 The Semiperiphery: Seedbed of Change G Iterations and Trmsformations: A Theory of World-Systems Evolution

Pdrt Three Investigations: Cases and Comparisons

7 A Very Small World-System


8 The Unification of Mroeurasia: Circa 500 ~ . ~ . ~ , - 1 4C.E. 00



The Europe-Centered Srjtem

f. 87

vi I C0nlenl.s

10 Cross-System Comparisons: Similarities and Differences

11 The Transformation of World-Systems 12 Conclusions, Questions, Speculations

NOLS [email protected]~ R.fere~ces About. the B ~ o kalzd Authors


nbhs 8.1

Cycles of Chinese empires and steppe confederations


Hypothetical population sizes of polities and interaction nets across dtgerent fypes of world-systems

6;z"pres Nesting of the boundaries of the four networks of exchange 3.1 4,f 4.2


Three independent warld-systems Three world-systems merged at prestigt.-goods and information newor& Three vvorld-systems with merged prestige-goods and informarian nemorks, nivo with merged politicallmilitary neturark-s Continuum of incorporation


The population pressure/~ntensificat:ion/hierar~hy


formation model The iteration model with temporary direct eEecrs


Major eras of Mroeurasia

10.1 10.2 10.3

The incorporarion of melvr PMNs into the Crntrd PMN The expansion of the Centrd md East Asian nemorks Cydm af rise and fall of polity sizes punctuated with

10.4 10.5 f 0.6 t 0.7

intermittent jumps Corewide empirc: versus hegemony Ciry and empire sizes in the Central PMN Ciry and empire sizes in the East Asian PMN Central and Eat: h i a n city size distributions



10.9 10,1Q f 0. l l

Ccntrd and East Asian largest cities Central. and Ease Asian empire sixs Centrd, East Asian, and lncliic SPIs Genera!, Ezse Asian, and Xndic largest cities

Mdps 7.1 7.2

Indigenous peoples of Ca\ifornia Wintu subregions and neighboring groups

8.1 8.2

Mroeurasia and vzious circuits of .crack Silk Road empires The Silk Roads Afroeurasian sea lanes The etxtenr of Islam The Mangok Empire

8.3 8.4 8.5 8-6


As we noted in our introduction to Core/Per;iPhery Relationr in Precapitalirt ~ o r l d r (1991), we probably crossed paths for the first time on a BART train from cheap digs in Berkeley to San Francisco on the way to the 1982 American Sociological Association meetings. Over the years we found an increasing convergence of interests and began to work toeether. As early as 1985, when Chase-Dunn was writing the last chapters of Global Formation (1989), he realized that a major unresolved problem in world-systems is how the basic structures and developmental logics of world-systems become transformed. Around the same time, as Wall was finishing Social Ghartgil ira the Sou&west, he remained puzzled by those "world-system-like" relarions that had shaped social change in that region for many centuries before European contact and created a complex set of intergroup relations that subsequent Spanish intrusion drastically reshaped. As Chase-Dunn was negotiating with 'Westview Press to publish what originally had been the outtkes from f;lobal firmdtiorz on precapitalist world-systems and Hall w a rtlthinking-for the umpteen& time-what the study: of nomads showed about ineotporation and frontier formacion, our interests corrve~edmore tightly, We began with pulling rogether some papers from various conferences for Gre/ Peripliey RehLions in Precapil;alisir W~rkdsas a preliminary to writing a monograph on the comparative study of world-sgrsterns, The phrase ""rise and demise" h our ritXe was borrowed from Immanuel Wallerstein's (1974a) famous essay, "The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist Syseern." Our ideas have evolved considerably since we began our comparative study of world-systems, but the basic problem raised in Wdlersrein's discussion-how do wrld-systems change their basic nature?-mmains the focus of our eRorrs. Along the way, bits and pieces of our collaborative efforts have been published in many forms. But over the years, as we have presented our findings at various academic conferences, discussed issues with many colleagues, and considered comments, suggestions, corrections, and the like by many reviewers, we have thought and rethought our arguments. Nwertheless this book remains a work in progress. In fact, it is a part of a continuing conversation with Andre Gunder Frank, Barry Gills, George Modelski, Stephen Sanderson, William Thompson, Bavid Wilkinson, jonathan Friedman, we have "stofen" much hisRohert Denmark, and many others. To steal a tine-= torical information-from Wiflim McNeill, it has been use&! to be forced, or to force ourselves, to a temporary closure to get the story out h r others ta see.

Of the many conferences where we have presented our work, nvo held in 1995 were especially important. An early version of this book was the subject of a review panel at the International Studies Association meeting held in Chicago in February. Commentators were wlliam McNeill, Ceorge Modelski, Matthew Melko, Jonathan Friedman, and Barry Gills. h w e e n the time W sent drafrs to the commentators and the meeting itself, we had already rwised our schema for spatidly bounding world-systems by adding an information n e w r k . We based this revision on our readings of history and especially on accounts by Katherine Moseley and Alice Willard of the role of Islam in mediwd West Africa. The need to consider information turned out to be Professor McNeillYschief criticism, and so he was pleased to find that we had dready taken his critique to heart--before he made it. The second meeting was the conference, "World System Histoy: The Social Science of Long-Term Change," held at Universiry of Lund, Sweden, March 25-28, cospansored by the Swedish Research Council and the Wenner-Gren Foundation, This conference, organized by Robert Denemark and Jonathan Friedman, brought the scholars mentioned above, along with some fellow travelers and interested observers. The discussions during the conference convinced us rhar our comparative perspective is an important contribution and that we had reached su&cienr closure to share our ideas with a broader audience. We would like to achowledge the mntributions made to our theoretical hrnulations and empirid research by Immanuel Wallerstein, S m i r b i n , Giovanni Arrighi, Kajsa Ebolm, Stephen Sanderson, Mbert Bergesen, Terry Boswell, Gary Feinman, Richard Elanton, Andrew Sherratt, Peter Peregrine, Micchell Alien, Rein %ageperas Elaine Sundahl, S, Edward Clewerr, Nice Willad, Mahua Sarkar, Hena Emmolaeva, Sunil Sahu, Richard Schauffier, Eric Silverman, Andrew Boswarrh, &thy Woods, and ICgljiy Mann, VB1: dso thank John EIallingsworth, carrographer at Indiana Universiry, wfno produced the figures and maps for Chapters 3,4, and 8. His probing questions in preparing our figures from sketches on napkins and maps culled from various sources fed to several refinements and new research ques~ions. Thonlas D, Hall is indebted to the Faculty Development Comnrittee, the John and Janice Fisher Fund for Faculty Development, and the Presidential Discretionar). Fund at DePauw University for support that helped in the research for this book, For travel m conferences, and for funds to spend rime in Baltimore with Christo~her Chase-Dunn, He is also indebted to several colleagues-Darrd Ia Lone in particular-and especialy students in many classes for probing questions and ~uzzledlooks that prompted him to rework and refine many explanations and examples. ina all^, he the Asian Institute of Technology for the use of e-mail connections that dbwed continued coilattoration on this book even while accompanying his wife on her American Library Association international fellowship. thanks to Carolyn k-lock and Mac and Frances ChaseHe also owes Dunn for gracious hospitdiry and putting up with his many visits to C a a ChaseDunn over years of work on this book. At home, Jean Poland has borne with good humor a partner lost somewhere in the ancient world. She also made important Pro-

ven in areas far from fession;tt csntributions as a top-notch bibliographic sleut her native sciencc. and engineering t u d W dso wish to extend our thanks to the many archaeologists and anthropologists who have not merely toberated but welcomed our carpecbagging into cheir bailiwicks, We owe a similar debt m the membet-s af the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations for welcoming and educating us and for many Iively discussions. We w e special thanks to Georgc Modelski, Stephen Sanderson, and NIitchell M e n fur seviewing the entire manuscript. AU made useful suggestions. Mitchell Atlen not only reviewed the manuscript bur &a bmught to bear his many years as an editor in suggestions on boohaking. He has dso done us the singular honor of r&ng our work very seriously in his ovvn interesting a,nd masterhi dissertation on rhe Neo-hsyrian world-system. h r , but far from least, m owe a huge debt to Dean Bil-kenkamp, farmer sociolo n edirar ar Weswim for wrking with us on this project as it w n t chraugh many revisions and reconceptudizations. He was a treasure to work with. ]ill Rothenberg made the transition to a new editor easy, and made the myriad tasks of converting a manuscript into a book as speedy and painless as possible. Evolutionarytheories have come and gone, and now they are coming again. Is this merely an oscillation back and forth between equally meaningless cave shadows, or is there a spiral toward a truer omprehension of the patterns of human history! We hope the latter, m d here 3s our best shot.

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Events like the Eall of the Berlin Wdl, the breakup of &c Soviet Union, the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),ethnic warfare in the forchaos in mer Yugoslavia, in central Asian countries, and in Africa, Chad, Somdia, and Liberia, the formation of the European Union (EU), and so on all suggest that a major realignment of global political economy may be in process. "The relative decline of the united States and the relative rise of fapan and Germany are further evidence that major changes are occurring in the "wdd-system." But like a close election with fewer than 50 percent of the precincts reporting, or a close hatball game early in the third quarter, or a partially cooked souffle, the final results are notoriously dlff;culr to predict. One way m pre&ct the consequenms of rapidly shiftin%,events is to make short, linear extensions in the direction along whict-r change is already occurring. X f the change is nodinear, howmer, as mmy major social chmges we, b e n even short-term predicus, Another strategy, one that is mre diEcdt, is to compare Gurrent mditions with those of ealier major socid cltsmges and to look fbr resemblances. This ofien entails much more than reading the past into ehe hture. It requires undersmding past proasses, then using thar undenmding to predict whexe current conditions might go, given the best understmding of current procases and conditions, A major breakthrough in the social sciences since the f 370s &at may help us to reexamine the prctsent in Light of the past has been the discovery and andysis of socid structures and processes b v t n d the Ievei of the nariond state-the discovery of the ""modern world-system."'" The world-systems pmadigm2 (terms in boldface may be found in the glossary at the end of rhe book) analyres a n w level of social organization-a global hierarchical division of labor thar includes households, neighborhoods, communities, firms, regions, states, the world market, and the intersrate system of competing states. A key insight of this approach is that the most important unit af analysis Eor the study of social change i s nor societies or stares but the emire world-system. Changes in organization are not endogenous to individual societies. Rather, they are a consequence of complex interactions among local, regional, socierd, and giobal processes. Over the past 12,000 years many small-scde intersocietd nerworks have merged into a sinde gtobd political economy, the "modern world-system." We focus on those processes by which small-scde world-systems expanded and merged into a single global system.

Many observers suggest that the wents noted in our opening paragraph indicate that the modern world-system is changing in fundamental ways. But are these changes redly fundamental, a rewriting of the rules of the game, or are they more or less routine, a reshuffling of the same old deck or a game of musical chairs?We propose to address this question by modifying and expanding Immanuel Walfer~tein'~ wrld-system theorr into a general account of the role of inrersacietaf interactions in social change. We are not attempting to rewrite the history of the world. Rather, we are building a general model that we-and, we hope, otherwmay use to reexamine the history of the wodd. Though world-systems theory was developed to explain the history of nariond societies and global patterns of development in the modern age, it is not simply a matter of "international relations." Rather, it is a holistic structure of local, re.. gional, national, interstate, transnational, and global relations. Thus, for example, the world market is composed of all the national markers plus d l the international market exchanges. The modern world-system is stratified by what is termed a core/periphery hierarchy in which core regions dominate and exploir peripheral regions. The core is composed of the "advanced" or "developed" core states--those in Western Europe, the United States, and Japan-themselves unequally powerful and competing with one another. The periphery consists of the least powerful countries in the system and includes many of the states in Mrica, h i a , and Latin America. Some stares are in the semiperiphery becavse they are in an intermediate position in the corefperiphery hierarchy. Thou& they sometimes dominate peripheral areas, they are usually dominated by core areas (e.g., Brazil, Mexico, Sout-h Korea, Taiw n , India), The corelperiphery h i e r a ~ is h~ a kndamentd stmccure of the modern world-vtem &at is reproduced over time rather than eliminated by national development. All countries-and the whole world-system-"develop"" over time, but the relative gap b e m e n core and periphery is reproduced. Some regions are upwardly or downwardly mobile in this hierarchy, but most only run hard in order to stay in the same place. This modern system emerged in the sixteenth century in Europe and expanded to incorporate the whole globe by the early mentieth century (~dlerstein 1!??$a, 1374b). We use the concepts developed to explain the modern world-system as a basis from which to develop our conceptual apparatus and theory of long-term social change. The basic concepts that have been developed for andyzing the modern world-system-world-system, world-economy, interstate system, corefperiphery hierarchy--must be redefined to some extent to make them useful for Cornparing the modern system with prehistoric, ancient, classical, and medieval systems. we seek to understand how world-systems have changed fundamentally. This is a of the logic of systemic reproduction. Hence much of what is commonly studied as sacid change may be irrelevant to the transformation problem. A system may experience an q a n s i o n of scale or the rise and MI of new a r e areas without

undergoing a qualitative transformation of its logic of reproduction. We hope that our focus on systemic transformation will help us to assess whether current changes are Eclndmentrzl or recurrent. The question of systemic transformation is not only a matter of academic curiosiv. It is also a crucial question for the future of our species. If the logic of world-systern reproduction is basically similar across many world-systems, or if developmental logic only oscillates between state-based and private forms of capital accumulation (as several world-system wholars contend), this has important implications for possible futures, We seek to learn h a l earlier transbrmations about thc potentials and processes by which the contempoclry world-system might be transformed into a more balanced, peaceful, and humane world sociery. The comparative study of world-systems raises a number of important questions. Are world-systems the most fundamental units of social development! Are core/ periphery relations similar in all world-systems? Or, as Owen Latrimore (1962b) claimed, does each historical core produce the kind of periphery that is appropriate to irs own nature! If many world-systems exhibit unwen development in which new cores replace old ones, does this process differ in important ways across very diEerenr kinds of world-systems! Is it true that precapitalist world-economies always became world-empires? Is the polity of the modern world-system permanently strucrured as an interstate ~ s r e m If ? there is a rcndenq Eur wrld-economies to become w r l d empires, is it true that the modern world-system has resisted this tendency for an unusudly long time? h d if the modern system is indeed atypically resistant to empire Formarion, why is this so? These questions and their imswers presume much about the way in which W dassify, categarize, and conceptualize human social interaction and institutions, By the use of such terms as "ssystem logic" we do not presume a determinist v i m of human hisrory- Nor by ""evolution" do we presume a unitinear, progressive, continuous process of change from simple to complex sociev. History is usudly discontinuous, conjunctural, and somewhat open-ended. Nevertheless, certain long-run parrerns are observable. 'iWe hope that an explmation of these parferns may improve our collective chances of survivai, Our thmreticaf formulation is a synthesis of W& by mmy scholars horn different academic di~iptineswho haw anatped premodern scares and sociedes, &me ethnographers, archaeologists, historians, political scientisrs, geographers, and sociologists have employed explicit world-system concepts to analyze premodern systems and to compare them with the modern system. This literature, which began with Jane S&neider3simportant 1377 article, "W= There a Pre-capitalist World-System?" has expanded rapidly in recent years. We have dso made use of many studies that do not use explicit world-system concepts but that are nevertheless directly relevant to coxxrpanng world-systems. We contend thar shifting the focal unit oEandysis from societies to world-systems will produce more powerful theories of bag-run historical devdopment and that these theories will have important implications &orthe possibilities ;md probabilities

that our own global system will face in the next half century. We do not claim to present the final word. On the contrary, we aim to stimulate further empirical research and continued theory building. The intellectual history of theories of social change has seesawed between grandiose wolutionary theories on the one hand and historicist description on the other.3 This oscillation has been progressive because the nuo phases have interacted with one another to produce both more accurate generalizations and more theoretically relevant descriptions. Neo-evolutionism has been rejected for another round of hhtoricism that stresses the uniqueness of places, mentalities, and cultures. This Iatest crisis of theory, like earlier ones, has been buttressed by the repetition of old claims that social science is impossible because human being are not billiard balls and by new (and often correct) charges that social theories have been used to justify domination and exploitation. Undaunted by all this deconstructionist and postmodernist nay-saying, we sally forth to jump-start a new theoretical research program (Lakatos 1778) by formulating a theory of the development of world-systems that is sensitive to both the conjunctural and the systematic differaces beween mrious kinds of systems.4 While postmodernists are celebrating the demise of grand theories and social science seems headed into another long night of Paradigm Lost, we boldly proclaim Paradigm Regained.5 We defitle irooru-ytem~as inrer-societal networkr, that are s).stemic. By ""sstemic" we mean that they exhibit patterned structural reproduction and dwelopment. We concend that the developmental logics of world-systems are not all the same, though they do share some generd properties, Of interest to us are the processes by which wdd-systems undergo transformations of their denccloprnental logics, Until the end of the nineteenth centuxy, when the entire giobe became inwrporated into a single intersocietd nemork, processes of transformation occurred as a result of both internal world-system logic and occasional exogenous impacts due to the diffusion of cultural artifacts, migrations from other world-systems, andior climatic changes or ocher "natural," that is, nonhuman, causes, We envision a sequence of changes in which thousands of very small-scale wodd-systems merged into Larger systems, which eventually merged to become the global modern world-system. Our use of the term woru-ystem for small-scale interaction nenvorks requires explanation. We conceive of a world-system as an interactional entity that is self-contained in the sense that the important social processes that reproduce or transform social structures are within that iateractional entity. Before the development of oceanic transportation, there were no consequential interactions berween Eurasia and the Americas. Before the emergence of regular long-distance trading expeditions, local groups lived in substantially independent systems delimited by nenvorks of down-the-line trade. In such systems rhe spatial gradient of the consequences of an event or action for any one local group was rather steep. Thus these people lived in small-scale interaction nerworks, even though interactions of trade, warfare, and intermarriage ofren crossed cultural boundaries. These were autonomous "worlds" in the sense that nearly all of the important processes affecting the reproduction of so-

ciat structures were contained wtghin these: small nemorh, One major question, then, is, How and why did these many small systems coalesce and transform over many millennia into a single, glottai world-system? It is important to emphasize that we are nor proposing a unilinear theory of evolution in which a single small system goes through a series of stages that eventually result in a global system; that is, we eschew all teleological explanations.6 On the contrary, we recognize that past transformations were similar across different regions only in a broad sense and thar development has always been spatially unwen. It is this pattern of unwen development involving both changes of organization within world-systems and leapfrogging across world-systems that we seek to explain. We will develop a working, heuristic rypology of world-systems as a tool to facilitate comparisons. There is no reason to expect one type necessarily to change into anorher, although certain kinds of organization and production are necessary before other features can emerge. The conditions under which such changes o a u r is &at we seek to expiain. Our theory specifies ecological constraints and demographic forces within which the uneven dwelopment of social structures occurs. We affirm the importance of material production practices, resource constraints, environmental degradation, and population pressures, but we also myhasize the celal-Airy of c b s e social institutions that facilitate consctnsus, Legitimate power, and structure compecicion and conflict within and bemeen societies, It is important to remember that social drvelopment is uneven across both space and digerent institutional realms, Spatially uneven develc~pmentmealis thar those regions that have developed a new Level of social complexiry and political hierarchy rypidly are not the locations where further increases in complority or hierarchy occur. Thus the "leading edge" of increases in societai mmplexiry typicdly moves through space. Institutional uneuenness means that changes in complexiy or hierarchy do not vccur in ail institutionjl rrafms simultaneously.This is why the mix of institutional features in any particular sociecy is usually developnerrtnlly unewn. We analyzc processes of cyclical rise and fall of hierarchies such as chiefdoms, states, empires, and modern hegemonic core powers. We also study those rare instances in which the scale of polities increases greatly. We portray social change as a series of iterations as world-systems grow from very small to global. In order to eventually understand the particularities of wodd-systems we must first build a framework for comparison that abstracts from the particular. We need to abstract from space and time, to suspend considerations of scale and location, and to think analytically about the simplest structural features of world-systems. All world-systems, large and small, involve nenvorks of interaction among a set of socially wnstructed gmups or societies. These n e w o h of interaction must be important for the reproduction or systemic change of the "intern$ social features of the constituent groups. As world-systems expand and combine to become larger, the general model must be modified to take into account the peculiarities of each transfnrmxcion in scale and social organization. Thus the transition from nomadism to world-systems containing sedentary villagers is somewhat different from

the transition from sedentary villages to chiefdoms, or from chiefdoms to stares, or from states to empires, or from empires to the capitalist world-economy. A chronograph of the process we wish to study and explain would look like a river system in which many small, rivulets flow into creeks, which flow into strealas, which Aow into rivers, which join together finally in a single immense river (see Chapter 10). Most other world-system theorists begin their studies with rivers that already contained states and cities. Because we want to search for important structural differences as well as similarities, and because we want to study as many instances of fundamental transformation as possible, we choose to begin with very small creeks-those local systems composed of sedentary hunter-gatherers who began the geopolitical game of defending particular territories. Our analysis proceeds in terms of iterations of a basic model that must be respecified somewhat as the scale and nature of processes of uneven development expand and change. Our ultimate purpose is to develop a theory of transformations of world-systems usehi h creating a more humane vld cullectively ration4 world in the future, We assume that Ltnowlecilge of past transhrmarions will shed light on the possibilities and ptob;zbilities for Euture trzmsformation. G i x n the narrow time horizon that the current dizzyinf: rate of social change produces for most people, this may seem f a fetched, Most social scientis~who are interested in the hture are content to focus an one or another recent dcrvelopment in technoloa, policy, or organization and to projecc this im a future touted as the next wave or the latest stage of capitalism. The notion that there could be anything eIse but apitdism in the worId"s hture is currently understood as either a n a h n i s t i c cornplsning or merely wishfrtl thinhng. Nevertheless, we propose that understanding past transfbrmtions will help rrs to understand filcure possibifities, Even more mshly perhaps, we hope that such understanding will help us all to act: in ways that will promote the more humane of the possible futures. m e t h e r or not this is a fool" errand, only time will tel. We are convinced, however, that it is a task worthy of susrained eFIEort. Because our analytic strategy is iterative, we have organized the book in four parts. The first part presents definitions, our concepts, and theoretical accounts of world-system transformations. Since we draw on several disciplines and sometimes scveral different schools within each discipline we trace the pedigrees of our concepts in Chapter 1. We note how and why we came to the modifications we have made in each. W do not claim to present a thorough review of each of our predecessors but rather to indicate where we took, and often modified, concepts, ideas, and theoretical insights from others. In Chapter 2 we present our definition of world-systems and our approach to modes of accumulation. We end with a brief overview of relations within world-systems and a sketch of measurement problems. In Chapter 3 we present a provisional rypology of world-systems to guide our discussions and develop a few elementary hypotheses about world-systems. We then devote considerable attention to the problem of bounding world-~stems,conceptually and spatially. We end with a description of what a theory of world-systems transformations should do.

Part Two addresses the problem of how and why world-system change. We begin in Chapter 4 with a discussion of the problem of incorporation, that is, what h p pens when new areas and new regions are drawn into an expanding world-system. A key issue here is how incorporated areas, peoples, and social processes are transformed by incorporation. This is important to all wolutionary discourse because many changes that have been thought to be due to internal evolutionary processes were in fact results of incorporation. In Chapter 5 we address the problem of semiperipheral regions and actors who, we show, have often been major initiators of world-system transformations. Chapter G completes Part Two with a theory of world-system evolution. We discuss a basic model and then describe how and why it changes at times, leading to transformations of world-systems. In Part Three we use the analyses from Parr Two and the concepts From Part One to examine three different cases and to explicate the imporrant similarities and differences in different types of world-systems. In these chapters we not only show how such case studies might be done but also how case studies lead to modifications in concepts and theories. It w u t d be preferable to have a large number of worldsystems of each rype for format campaative rtnaiysis and proposition testing, but this l& of sophisrimion will have to wait. We begin with an exminatian of vvhat is probably the smallest limiting case of a world-system: prehistoric northern Cdifornia. This helps us to sort out what properties are general to all world-systems and to exmine the vestion of cordperiphery relations in a system that was radicdiy diffexent from larger and more hierarchid systems, We then turn to an andysis of the expanding linkages that formed in Mroeurasia from about 500 years B.C.E. to about 1500 C.E.7 This puts flesh on the theoretical bones of our approach to incorporation and mergers explicated in Chapter 4. Our third case study is a reexamination of the modern world-system in the light of our comparative perspective and our theory of world-system evolution. This produces new insights and revisions of our understanding of the contemporary system. In Chapter 10 we underrake a formal comparison of different types of world-systems, though this is necessarily a tentative and aploratory effort because of the pauciv of exisring studies. In Part Four we draw conclusions, raise questions, and speculate (some might think wildly) about the future of the modern world-system. In Chapter 11 we address the issue of transformations. Though we see convincing evidence that there have indeed been transformations in world-systems, we also note that there have been important continuities. O n the basis of these transformations and continuities, we speculate about the kinds of future transformations that might occur and offer some comments about agents and actions that might either encourage or discourage some of these processes. Thus we come full circle to the issues we raised at the beginning of this introduction. Finally, we conclude with a chapter that summarizes our findings and describes the many as yet unanswered questions. We think that this is the best organization for this book. However, some readers may prefer to proceed in other orders. To facilitate this we have included a glossary so that readers can easily check what we mean by our terms. Precisely because we

have borrowed from many different discipiines, and from competing schools within them, these definitions are important. For instancle, among many social scientise (and the general public) the terms "smte,'"hatioo," and ""country" are wed as synonyms and intexchanged freely, To those scholars who study internationai poiitia, etbniciry, or natioaalism (and other related topics) the diEerences beweean these terms are of crucial significance. We also use a number of terms from archaeolae;y and anthropology etrat are nat widely known in tht: other social science disciplines, Readers who eschew definition4 discussiocts migfit start with Part Two and jump to Part Four to see our overall argument, using Parts One and Three to fill in any gaps. Orhers may chaase to begin with the case studies in Part Three to see hovv we use out concepts. "However a reaeter approaches the book, vve stress chat the enrire book is oniiy the first round of an iteraim process that moves Erom theory to reexamination of data, back to theory, and so on. Though we have written it as one such iteration, it is the result of several such cycles for us. Hence this book by na means constitutes a camplete theory, Rather, it is, we hope, a well-reasoned starting point from which to study the historical evolution of wrld-systems. We Eurrher hope that by taking down the '"ceiling panels'hand exposing the formulation and reformulation of theory in the light of evidence, we will inspire others to join us in studying past transformations--not only because it is a fascinating project but also for the light it may shed on our collective future.


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Concepts and Definitions

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A Hundred Flowers Bloom: Approdches to World-Systems

In this chapter we summarize the main theoretical issues raised by scholars whose work contributed to the dwelopment of the vvorld-system perspective or who are extending this approach to precapitdist settings. Our discussion is organized into three interrelated topics: definitions of wrld-systems; * spatial bounding of uvarld-systems; and * the problem of systemic bgk. The world-systems perspective has expanded the temporal and spatial scope of theorizing about social change. Qur undersanding of modesnir). has been radizaiiy trmsbrmed by the study of the Europe-centered world-system over the past five hundred yeas. But the analysis of a single system encounters methodologicaf and theoretid limitations, If we are to fathom hndamentai, change, we need to comprehend the causes of those struclural "constants"" that are usually taken for p m d in the modern world-system. These structrlrat constants exhibit variation when we broaden the scope of comparison to include very different kinds of world-systems. Ase itlcerscate syscenls or core/pesiphery hierarcbies inevitable featurn of dl hrrman X world-vstems share a similar underlying dmelopmenarganirntional whales? Do d rat logic, or do systemic logics undeqo fundamental quditative transhrmations?VC"e can best addregs these qwstions througl? a comparative perspe~tivethat emplo)ls evidence produced by historians, geographers, ethnographers, erhnohisrorians, and archaeologists on human activities m r veqi long periods of time-much longer than the five-hundred-year span of the modern world-system. In order to expand the scope of comparison we must modify those concepts originally developed for the analysis of the modern world-system. We nlust take care to avoid projecting contemporary reality onto the past. A rather large body of literature has emerged in which scholars from severat QifiFerenr academic discirlines (,Fociology, political science, history, anthropoio&yIand archaeolog) have utilized world-systems concepts to analye prernodern systems.' These theorericali, conceptual, and empiri-

12 1 Apprmlli5es to WorU Systems

cal efkrts provide the basic tools with which we begin to rethink very long-term human social change. The involvement af scholars from many disciplines brings semantic dimculties. Most archaeologists, for example, use the term "prehismric" to refrrr to societies thar do not keep written records. They do not mean to imply that such societies are nonhistorical in the sensc of mechanically determined systems in which human will plays little part in social change. Many world-system anthropologists and archaeologists demonstrate proper sensitivity to the issues of historiciry and open-endedness in social change (e.g., Friedman and Rowlands X 977; Kahf 19874. Only a few sociologists, those least familiar with prelirerate societies, have argued that history-in the sense of historical action---only begins with the emergence of states.2 Anthropologists and archaeologists are considerably less paranoid about the "e-word," evolution, than are most historians and sociologists. They usually make a clear distinction hemeen biolotjjcd and social evolution. They canstruct multilinear, conjwncturat, and pmbabilistic models-that is models that include many paths of change, where the specific path mken is a coilsequence of the specitic conditions and rhe probabilities for each path at the p i n t of change, These differ vastly from the unitinear deterrrrinist nightmarer; that haunt those who shun the word '%volution'" (see Sanderson 1990). Even within this broad area of agreement, there are competing concepts ofwhat a uvorid-system is. W begin with a revim of them.

Contending Definitions of World-Systems Several scholars restrict the wncept of a world-system to those intersocied systems that contain states and cities (e.g., Frank and Gills 2333a). Others claim thar smaller stateless and classless syslcms also can be meaningfixlly studied using world-systems concepts and that including these in the scope of comparison adds useful variation for the understanding of processes of structural transformation (e.g., Collins 1992). This diEerence raises the issue of whether or not a world-system m m have rr core/ periphery hierarchy. Some build this into the definition, while others think it importang to study variation in the degree to which different systems have socially structured intersocietal inequalities. Some classless and sateless systems apparently do not have core/periphery hierarchies. Virtually all contending definitions of world-systems claim or imply that the particular lands of interaction upon which they focus are necessary or systemic, but there are vociferous disputes about the relative importance of specific kinds of interconnectedness. Fernand Braudel (1375, i984), a major forerunner of world-systems analysis, developed his terminology in order to make sense of the modern Europe-cenrered world-system. Thus he considers commodity trade to be the most important type of interconnection. He also thought that hegemony is best defined in terms of economic domination, which is arguably the case for the modern world-system but is

Approaches to WorU S~s~erns / 13

debatable for earlier world-systems, fn world-systems in which the dominant means of accumulation ofwealth was payment of taes, fees, or other tribute, socially stmctured inequalities, including those bemeen an imperial a r e and dominated peripheral regions, rested more on politicallmilitaq power than on economic power. Immanuei Waiterstein conceives of world-systems as multicultural economies in which there is a division of tabor in the production of foods and raw materials necessary for everyday life, This "bulk goods" definition af wdd-spterns is certainly an important aspect of systemic cross-cultural interaction in many systems. Wallerstein contendf that newarks of h e production, distribution, and consumption of basic goods cre.ate the systemic uniry of a ~ o r f d ~ t c r m In .todafs tvurld-system a map of the material l i n k that connect each of us wirh the &bd eGonomy codd begin with breagat. Unfike ancient fora_gers or subsistence farmers, we do not produce much of what we eat, hther, "carnmodix).chins" "link the food we eat f i r breaHasr to the labor and resources of distant others. T h y might go most directly to nearby truck, dairy, and poultry farms. Mare oken some of our breakfast was grown on other continencf, TIle fuel used to produce food on local fasms typicdly came horn fzr may, It would not take very many links to trace our material comections wirh people dl over the globe.3 Wdlerstein (13842) also distinguishes bemeen u.orld,-systems and "iminisystems,'" m e r e a s wodd-systems are defined as regiond divisions of labor composed of several diEerent culrurd groups, nrinisysrems are defind as ""smdl-scafesystem covering a limited geographicai area, within which all that is essential for the survival of the colIectivity is done. We might think of such systems as bearing the motto: one ewnorny, one policy, one culture. That is to say the boundaries of the division of labor, the structures of governancf;.,and the d u e s , iiorms, and languqe which are current are more or less the same" "allerstein 1384b, 148). Wallerstein contends that small-sale stateless and dassless systems were minisystems because there was little exchange of h o d and ravv materials across cultural andlor political boundaries. Other q e s of interconnection thar have been proposed as consrituting systemic relations are exchanges of prestige goods, political protection, regularized military confiia, and information exchange nemorks. Each of these has its advaates. The earliest debate is about bulk goods versus prestige goods (vvllich Wallerstein caHs "preciosirieC). Fresti&egwds are symbolicaliy irnport-nnt pods, ypicaily exotic imports, often of high value to weight ratio, that confer prestige on the owner. A prestige-goods emnomy is an exchange nemork in which a local leader monopolizes the supply of prestige goods that he uses to revvard subardinates. Walfesstein(1974a, 4 1-42) conten& that the exchangr of 'pmiosiries" (by which he means luxury goods urilized primanty by eXites) does not produce important systemic ef"fecrs,Jane khneider (1377)and many others {e.g., Friedmm and Rawlands 1377; Blanton, Kowalewski, and Feinman 1392; kregrine 1332, 1936) argue that s w h prestige-goods economies constitute systemic nemorks because the ahility o f Local leaders to monopolize the supply of these goods is an important mainstay of their power, and changes in the availabiltry of such goods can haw important eEects

on the society's authorilty structures. Monopolized tlxotic imports are used to reward subordinates and in rnmy sysrenls are necessary for important social rituals such as marriage.

Other theorists have emphasized political interconnections in def ning sprcms. d following "rule of churnb for connecte&ess": Charles Tay (1 984,621 has s u ~ e s t the the actions o f powerholders in one region of a newark rapidly (say within a year) and visibly (say in changes actudfy reported by nearby observers) aEEect the vvelfare of at least a significant minorirry (say a tenth) of the population in another region of the nemork. Such a criterion indubitably m&es our own worfd a single system. . . . The same criterion, however, implies that human histoory has seen many world systems, often simultaneousIy dominating diEferent parts of the globe. Only in the last few huncil~dyears, by trbe criterion of rapid, visible, and significant influences, could someone plausibly argue for all the world as a single system.

This definition Eocuses on intentionat political authority that is popularly yerceived. The requirement that interconnections be visible to the connecred actors excludes consideration of opaque objective relations, Mam (1367, 71Ef.) argued thar market societies normdly operate in terms of a "fetishism of cammodities'Yin which objective relationships bemeen human producers are hidden behind what appear to be retations among things-commodities and their prices. In the contemporary world-system most actors are only vagurzly aware of the extent of the dobal new& of prsducrion that materidly links them with the labor of distant others, thou& recently chm has been a sigtlificant increase in this awareness. David wlkjnson (1987b) takes a different political approach. He &uses on the importance of interaction through conflict, especially military competition. Thus two empires that regularly engage each other in military confrontations are part of the same system. Citing Ceorg S m m l and Lewis Coser, "VVi1hnsenwrites: GonfIict alwdys integrates in a mildly significant wap in that the transaction of conflicting atways creates a new sociaf e n r i ~ the , conttict itselt: But durable conflict also integrates more significantly, by creating a new social entiry that contains the conAict but is not reducible to it, within which the conflict must be seen as occurring, which is often ofa larger scale and ionger-lived than the conflict that constituted it. It is therefore legitirnace, and it is indeed necessary; m pasit the existence of a social system, a single socid whote, wen where rye can find no evidence af that whole existence other than the prstracted, recurrent or habitual fighdng of a pair a f belligerents. Such continuing relations, however hastite, bemeen goups Irtowwer different, necessarily indica~athat both are (were or have become) parts of some larger group or system (Wilkcinson 1387S, 34; emphasis in original.)

Beawe WiIkinson Fncuses only on state-bzd urbarlizcd "civilizations," he excltxdes from cornideration those intersocied n e w o r b in which there are no states, but his criterion could also be applied to them. For example, Raymond Kelly (1985) has studied the ways in which habitual raiding b e m e n Nuer and Dinka pastoraiists reproduced their kjn-based social structures in a hcinating instance of "I-ribdimperidism."

Another approach to defining intersocietal linkages has been formulated by Scbortrnan and Urban (1387, 1932a, 1332b, 19924. Their revievv of the development of theoretical perspectives in archaeology provides valuable insights into the contributions of dihsionism, studies of acculturation, ecological/evolutionism,and world-system approaches to intersocietal interactions. They also review and evaluate the literature of the last ouo decades on the archaeological study of trade. Their own theoretical formulation of the problem of intersocietal linkages focuses on the concept of information, which is defined broadly as "enere, materials, social institutions, and ideas" (Schortman and Urban 1987, 68). They point out that the economic aspects of trade are only parr of intersocietal interaction, and they emphasize ideological diffusion and especially cross-cultural intermarriages among elites involved in prestige-goods economies. Though Schortman and Urban emphasize the importance of the symbolic and culturd aspects of trade for some intersocietal systems, they completely ignore the systemic aspects of military competition emphasized by Wilknson. One problem with trying to be specific about the most important and systemic types of interaction is that these probably vary greatly across different kinds of world-systems. Nwertheiess, it is important for comparafive research to specie the mosr signi6cant types of connecredness.

at Are the Parts of a World-System! Another issue might be called the subunir problem-what are the parts that constitute world-systems?When we use the term "intersocietal networks" we seem to imply that the important subunits are "societies," but this is not necessarily so. Much recent analysis has emphasized the difficulties of bounding societies even wirhin the modern world-system (e.g., Tilly 1984). In rhe modern world-system there are many national states, a few multinational states, several states that govern only portions of nations,4 many transnationd actors, and societd elements operating at the global level. There is no single kind of subunit, and many subunits are not easily bounded. The study of the modern world-system is much more than the study of "international relation$ among states. By "whole sysrem" we mean individuals, households, neighborhoods, firms, communities, cities, and so on, as well as states and the interstate system.5 The subunit problem is even more complicated when we try to compare the modern world-system with precapitalist wodd-systems of very different sizes and kinds. Eric Wolf (1982) cautions that group boundaries are inherently Fuzzy and permeable. Wolf claims that "by endowing nations, societies, or cultures with the qualities of internally homogeneous and externally distinctive and bounded objects, we create a model of the world as a global pool hall in which the entities spin off each other like so many hard and round billiard balls"" (1382,Q. Schartrnan and Urban's solution is to define the subunit as a "spatially delimited body of individuals living within and adapting to a specific physical environment" (1987,631. This may work well for some systems, but it ignores important larger and smaller subunits.

The way out of this problem is to recognize that the sizes and types of organizations that interact within regional world-systems vary, and larger ytemr have increarin& nested and ouer(apping kvel- oforganization. In the simplest intergroup systems, households are politically organized at the village or intervillage iwei, and there are no larger overarching political organizations. Households and villages are important subunics in all wrld-systems, large and small. One imnportant digerence iberween smaller, regional world-systems and larger, more complex wodd-systems is the size of polities m d the range of direct economic, military, and culnzral interactionf. The task, then, is not to define a sinde type of subunit that is common to 41 worldsystems b ~ rather ~ t to pay attention to the rypes and scdes of organization within each world-system.

Spatid Boundaries of World-Systems Disputes over which kinds of cannectedness to emphasize are related to disagreements over the best way to spatially bound wadd-systems. The shift of the unit of analysis from societies to tvorld-systems suggests to us that interconnections ralher than uniformities are the important features of boundedness, because wodd-systems are usually composed of differentiat-ed bur interacting parts, There are, however, scbotxs wha bound systems by their shared charaeteristies. Those who have debated the best ways to spasially bound "civilizations" (e.g., Melko and Scoer 1387; Melko 1394) have divided themselves into the ""cullturdists,"who stress the homogeneiv of cencral values as defining civilimrional boundaries, a d the "ssruauralisrs," who use criteria of interconnection rather &an homogeneiv, The trditiotl of ""culrure zrea studies'" (e.g., Wissler 1927; Kroeher 19 18, 1336, 1345) &a focwes on eypological hornogeneities to define culturai ~ g i o n s Stcphen . Kowalewski (19928, 1992b, 1916) suggests that world-systems in precontact North America were contiguous with the "culture areas" designated by anthropologists on the hasis of cultural element distributions. This is an instance of using [email protected] similarities to bvuxxd systems rather than actual interactbn patterns. Interaction densities were often as high across the boundaries of culture areas as they were within them (see kregrine and Feinman 1396). Wallerstein (1979b) uses modes of production to bound world-systems spatially. He uses mode of production in its conventional Marxian sense: a deep structural logic that is composed of forces of production (technolog) and relations of production (class relations). Wallerstein contends that Europe and the Ottoman Empire were separate systems because capitalism was dominant in Europe but not in the Ottoman Empire. This use of mode of production as a bounding criterion is very confusing. If we assume, as Wallerstein does, that each world-system has only one mode of production, it becomes impossible to analyze those systems in which modes of production are contending with one another. This unnecessarily complicates the study of how modes of production are transformed within world-systems. Many scholars avoid rhis problem by focusing on interactions to bound systems. The scholars who focus on interconnections employ sweral different approaches. Virtu-

Approdches to World Systems



ally all agree that world-systems are neovorks of intersocietal interaction, but the type of interaction, the frequency of interacrion that constitutes a system, and the distances over which interactions have important consequences are in great dispute. In order to study world-systems comparatively we must conceptualize the spatial boundaries of such systems in a way that facilitates comparisons of very different kinds of intersocietal n e w o r b with the modern system. We must also address a number of problems encountered in all nenvork analyses. These include:

* * a

* *

d i g e r m i d interaction dnsities, thar is, diEerences in the frequency and intensiry of interactions; nest& structures, that is, whether smalfer s).stems arc embedded within larger ones, like a series of Russian dolls; direct and indirect cnnneaions, that is, down-the-line versus direct exchatigess; hierarchical versus decentrdized neworks, that is, n e w o r b that stack up neatly, each larger one subsuming smaller ones, or those having web-like structures; levels of hierarchy that is, how many layers a system has; and mujticentrie hierarchies in which the anters are either direcdy connected or only indirectly connected througb shared periphesies.

In addition to these complexities, the type of connection and the institutional nature of interactions are important. Thus even if we decide to fircus oniy on material exchanges, it is important to know what is bekg exchanged and what is the institutional nature of the exchange (gifr, tribute, comlnodiry trade, etc.). It is a commonplace thar everyrhing in the universe is in some way connected to everphing else. An example of this is Gerhard k n s k i and Jean Lensk, who say that; Throughout fnisror~human societies have established and maintained relations with one another. . , During much of the past direct ties were limited rs neighboring societies, since direct relations with distant societies w r e not possible, But, even then, indirect relations existed. Sociery A mainmined ties with Sociefy B, which in turn, maktained ties with Sociev C, and so on &roughour the syftem. No s o c i e ~ was ever totally cut off from the world system of societies for long, since even the most isolated societies had ocwiond contacts with others. With advances in transportation and communication during the last five thousand years, relations bervveen societies have increased geatly and direct relations have been established bemeen societies far removed fram one another. As a result, the world system of socieries has grown more integrated and more complex, and has come ro exercise a greater influence on the life of individuat societies (1387, 51).


This notion of a single gloM system in ruztiquiy ignores the pmblcm of '%UOF-the gradient af degradation of consequenas wer space. Systemness implies that things that happm in one bcdity have important cansequences for either the reproduction or the change of socjd structufcs in atlotEler bdir?i; Though e v e ~ h i n gin the universe is in some way connected with evevhing else, only some of these connections are imporcant. Neighboring p u p s af foragers (hunter-gatherers) may have im-

pormt interactions ~ 4 t one h anoher, but in the absence of long-distance communications and transportation, these are wt likely to have irnporranr consequences far groups that are great distances away. Thus we a r p e that there wre myrid small wdd-systems that mnnrally became joined into the single global system of today. World-systems scholars can be arrayed along a confinuum of "lumpas"' and ""Splitters." The extreme lurnpexf are those who see only one global system far b a k in time (e.g., the Leaskis). h a n g those who agree that the Afroeurafian sysbcm was separate from the Mesoamerican system before 1492, there are disagreements about how many =parate sysrems there were in the h e r i c a s or in the Old World (hank and Gills 1993a; Hall 133Gb; Kowdewski 1336). Extreme splitters are those who hcus only on l a d ymcesses to the exclusion of all mure distant connections, Despite heir emphasis on the world-system, h d r e Gunder Frmk and Barry K, Gills (13934 do not deny &at here were autonomous world-sysrrems on k t h before the skteenth century C.E. &&er, their contenrion chat the conremporv world-system has e out of Maaporamia and exancient rmts (5,000 years) focusm on the system that panded to mnrudly include the entire globe, Frank and Cilts are toward the "luumpei" end of the continuum becatlse they ague &at interacrionf m r e sflstemic earlier, alld on a fager s d e , than do most oher schofxs. We are toward che "splitter""end of the continuurn. We argue chat our positisn is both ernpiridy more accurate and scientifidy cautious. If the ""luxnper~shodd prove to be mare accurate, this shodd emerge during the course ofempirid invetigations originating from a "splittei" approach. Alzather diaculry Eor bounding wrid-sycems is the question of endogenous (internal) systems versus exogenous (external) impacts. If the sweer potato had not somehow got from R r u ta the Hawgiian Islands in prehistoric times, the large semiarid regions of the Hawaiian archipelago would not have been able to susrain dense populations, and arguably, the hierarchical, complex chieMoms rhar Captain Jarnes Cook found would not have devduged, The dihsion of gemtic materids and technologies can have profound long-distance effects even though there are no regularized or frequent interactions. But should we conclude thar prehistoric Hawaii and k r u were in the s w e vvorld-system because of the difftlsion of the sweet porato? A notion ofsystemness should distinguish benveen, on the one hand, endogenous processes that are regularly interactive and systemic, and on the other, exogenous impacts that may have large effects on a system but are not part of that system. Climatic changes may have important impacts on human societies, but we do not try to include them as endogenous variables in our models of social systems.&Similarly, long-distance diffusion is an important process that musr be studied in its own right, and its impact on local systems must be acknowledged and understood, but models of social change must distinguish benveen endogenous processes and exogenous impacts. This is a replay of the old "internal/external" problem, but here the unit of analysis is the world-system rather than the sociey Whereas world-systems analysts oken must remind other social scientists that their time horizons are too short, it is also possible for time horizons to be too long. A generalized version of the approach to time scale taken by David Wilkinson

(1988a) and Charles E l y (1984) will probably turn out to he quite useful for ernpiricdly bounding world-systems. Wilkinson defines interconnectedness in terms of "regularized" military confiict, by which he means politicallmilitary interactions that are perceived by the actors as likely to be repeated soon enough that it makes sense to take this posgbiliry into =count in social action, Wilkinson does not count a connec.rion &at is constituted by a single war, such as Aexander"snvasion of India. Charles Tilly's (1984, 62) criteria of interaction-based conneaednas suggest another way to bound world-systems spatialy.Though his suggested criteria are somewhat arbitrary, m y method of bounding systems empiricdly wilt be forced to adapt conventions of this kind. Similaf criteria would need to be specified for exchange nenvorks of bulk goods and prestige goods. The arrival in Egypt of one piece of silk from China does not a y t e m make. Another issue is the question of whole systems versus parts of systems. Some analysts (e.g., Santley and Alexander 1992) focus on coreiperiphery structures as the unit of analpis, This appmacih has m problems. First, it is possible that some world-systems do not have corelperiphefystruerures, The exbtence and namre of regional stratification should be investigated rather than assumed. Second, there may be several care regions, each with its own periphery or there may be peripheries that CO= [email protected] Emusing on carelperiphare intermediate bemeen two non~~ntiguous e interacery structures as the focal unit m&es it diEcu1r to a a d ~ nonhierarchical tions and complex whole systems. Fernmd Braudel(1484,27) d&na the boundaries of wodd-systems in terms of the scope of ezonornic hegexnony of a single cicy-state. Thus he describes wadd-syr;rems ccnrered on Venice, Malacca, Genoa, Anewerp, and the like. Defining a nmoxk in terms of a single c3cnrer precludes the posibitiry of multicentric n e w o h , It i s like treating rb-e Rrirish Empire as a sepafare v t e m fCom h e French Empire. The re&q w a that these were colonial empires witlnin a single, larger, multicentric, intersocied fy;ctem. Man5 if not most, mcient world-systems were aiso multicentric in the sense that either &e core area were camtituted as m interstate system of swerd autonomous smta, or there were a few large empires ineeracring with one allothec There were also irnprrant insmces of noncontiguous core regions &at vvere intpracting with one mother in important ways. The Afroewraian wrld-system had three sepxate core sea linked by long-dismce trade and by inreractions with shxed peripherd regions (see Chapter 8 and Abu-L,u&od 1387, 1983). Cxtnversdy vve should not asume &at a311 sy-srems are multicentric. hther, the =tent of centralimtion shortfd be a strbject of resezch.

System-centricVersus Locale-centric Bounding The search far bounded mdd-systems also must addras the problem of direct and indirect links. Only impmable physical barriers produce separace nenvorb if we cmsider very indirect connections, as do the Lensks. Even this criterion produces a large number of rjvorld-syslems b h r e the advent of regdarized oceanic transportation. Still, it seem advisable to use a criterion of a steeply declining grdient of con-

sequences of events and actions to hrther restria what we consider to be significant indirect connections. Thus, even though each precontact California tribelet was connected to its neighboring tribelets and therefore to the entire North h e r i c a n continent rhrough i n d i ~ c connections, t the gradient far such connections declined steeply, even within norchern California (set. Chapter 71. What this means is that when we are considering down-the-tine interactions in which a group interaco primarily with its immediate neighbors and has fav direct long-distance interactions, we will not find world-system boundaries (e.g., regions where the density of interaction is low) arcept insofar as these may be created by naturd barless to interaction such as mountains, deserts, or oceans, In such cases it m&es sense to choose one group as the fbcus of anatpis and to use it to determine the boundaria of the relevarzt interacciond nercvork, taking the grdient of decline into account. If wr focus on a psricular b c d e we m bound the world-system in rht: sense of the r d e v m Local md regionat interaction n e w o r b of which the people in chat l o d e are a part. l F w choose a disrent tocaie as the f o d point, the boundaries uf the relevant worfd-system will shift. In this sjruation a "grouy-centric" approach to spatial boundarie is necessary because of the unbroken nature of most interaction nemorh. Obviously, however, when there are steep gradients, they should be used to define the system, f n such cases the boundaries &he system do rt.ot change when mention skrifrs from one locale to another, Once we can bound a system, the question of how it works arises.

Systemic Logic The very term y t e m implies that an entity works in some specified way-that is, it has a "'logic." Most theoretical approaches have either an explicit a r an implicit model of the underlying logic that operates in world-systems. The terms for this logic vary. Some refer to it as the mode of production or mode of accumulation. Orhers reveal their ass~zmprionsabout system dynacrrics in their descriptions of central processes such as state formation, cycles of political centralization and decentralization, or modes of socid integration. Besides the descriptive content that is given to notions of systemic logic, there are different metatheoreticai positions7 regarding the ways in which systemic logics change or remain the same. Some, the "logical continuationists," argue that worldsystems all have pretty much the same system logic; others, the "qualitative transformationists," contend that systcrn logics undergo hndamentd transformations, The transformationists disagree over the definitions of different system logics and the timing of transformations. We begin with those theorists who maintain that all world-systems have essentially the same logic,

Logical Continwrtionists This discussion is somewhat compficated by the different positions taken on whether or not stateless intersocietal n e t w o r l ought to be analyzed as world-

systems. It is obviously easier to maintain that systemic logic does not change fundamentally if one excludes the substantidly different cases from consideration. There are five theoretical positions that contend that there are no great watersheds in system logic: the ge~politicrapproach, the capital imperialkm approach, the rarionol choice or "formalist" approach, cultural ecology, and the population prmure approach. In other words, among those who say that nothing changes, there are five different descriptions of &at which does not change.

Geopolitics. The geopolitics approach is taken by those who stress the universal importance of power politics. David wlkinson (1987a, 1987b) focuses primarily on the rise and fdl of stares-the oscillation beween interstare systems and "uniwrsal states." This is the srate-as-war-machine 'heorealist7\pproach that has been a major theoretical ,school in international darions within political science. Wikinson sees the power process as operating in fundamentally similar ways in all historical epochs, arncient and modern. iis Wilkinson quips, "diamonds may be forever, but clubs are trumps," Geopulicics and Weberian stare legilirnacy are also e m p h a f i ~ dby sociolagist Randall Gollins (1378, 138I, 1986bf. We argues with respect to state territoriat expansion chat there is a m intemening h e a r d 4 rule. That is, states do not expand successfully when that expasion entails Ieaping over, or passing rhrozlh, the heardand of some c o v e t i n g state. Inevirahly expansion becomes too expensive, strains tinancid resources, and often l a d s to delegirimizcdtion of the current regime, In tributary systems rhis can lead to a palace coup or m a t e an opening for a semiperipheral smte to conquer an overextended core state.8 ColXins also uses these ideas to undersrand processes of alliance formation in En-based world-ystems (1392). His willingness to consider kin-based systems in these terms adds considerable scope to the comyarative approach. A somevvhat diEerent variant of the state-cencric approacb is taken by Michael Mann (1986). Mann emphasizes the importance of 'krechniques of power," by which he means all sorts of institutiond inventions that allow states to exercise control over great expans(ss of territory. Though this includes politid, orgmizaeiod, and religious innovations, Mands primary focus is on military technology and organization. Althnugh Mann sees inlportant changes as contingent upon the development of nevv techniques o f power, power itseff remains the crucial Factor wiithin all Systems. Rationd Choice. Rational choice universalisrs are Aose who argue that market models and individual rationality are useful for understanding all types of human social systems. This approach is also called "formalism." Philip Curtin (1984) defends the formatist position in connection with his study of cmss-cultud trade in world history To be sure, be adds careh1 consideration of the roles of various social. instirutions in the pursuit of profit in his analyses of widely dispersed ethnic groups who speciafize in trade (which he calls "trade diasprasW")nd more-or-less self-contained trade necvuorh with wide consensus on the ruXes of trade (which he calls "trade ec-


/ Approaches to WorBSystems

umenes"). Curtin shows that long-distance trade has ofren been conducted by and through trade diasporas and that the formation of a cross-culturally shared set of assumptions about the basic rules of exchange, a trade ecurnene, lessens the need for specialized trding ethnicities. Most of the formalists have not utilized world-system concepts explicitly, although much of their work is useful for world-systems analysis. Marvin Harris (1977, 1979) also emphasizes economic rationality and efficiency in his analyses of the mlterial bases of culture (cdlcd "'culturd materialism"). Blanton, Kowalewski, Feinman, and Appel (198 1) employ a formalist approach to explain several patterns of evidence fmrn ancient Mesoamerica, The formalist approach has been applied to hunrer-gatherers in "optimal foraging" models that have implications for intergroup interactions in very smdl worldTstems. Such models, based on formal economics and studies of animal foraging patterns, explain technological intensification and diversification of foraging patterns in terms of individual and family "rational choices" in minimizing procurement costs. According to this approach, a mix of braging activities, 21 exploited at the same procurement costs, should remain stable except when upset by changes in populatian density, techndog, or the envrronment lfohnson and Earle 1987, t 2).

Capital Imperisrlism. Some scholars contend that the geopdicics of apiralism has been the dominanr force in both ancient an3 modern world-systems. Kajsa E b o l m

and Jonathan Friedman (1982) and Frank and Gilfs (ig"33a) claim that capitalist accumulation has been an importam process since the emergence of the first stares in Mesopotamia, These authors contend that there has been a single world-system for 5,000 years that displays a logic that oscillates b e m e n periods in which states are the main engi~esof accumdation followed by periods in which private walthaccumdaring fmilies are the central actors, Efiolnn and Fricdmm call. the logic of this V t e m "capital irnperialism."g These authors p r t r q world history as having had a mntinuous sysrem logic that has keen rpproduced as the systern e x p d e d , empires ruse and fell, old core regions declined, and new ones emerged. They see coreiperiphery economic exploitation as having been essential to the construction of new core regions. The modern world-system is understood as a continuation of these long-term processes. These authors deny that there have been systemic trmsformatiofis such as that from feudalism to capitatism. hther, the logic af capital imperidism eanFinued in the context of a shift of hegemony from East to West. Frank ( l 391, 1393a) contends that the notion of a transition from apiralism to socialism is also a theoretical error that will only confuse our understanding of urodd-system processes,

Cultural Ecology. The ecologid evolutionism of Gerhard Lenski (Lenski 1966; Lensk and Lenski 1387) combines the culnrral ecolog devdoped by Julian Steward (1955)-which emphasizes the interaction benveen society and environment---with a focus on changes in productive technology as the main engine of social wolution.

Approaches to Work Systems

/ 23

Cultural ecologists see social change as social adjustments or inventions that are intended to maintain a baiancse bemeen social institutions and local ecaloe. Grrfturaf ecology traditionally has been applied locally and has tended to ignore intersocietal interactions, in part as a reaction to the macrodiffusionism of V. Gordon Childe (1936, 1951)[email protected] original theory of technology-led development focused primarily on societies, but he has moved in the direction of applying his theory to the world-system.

Population Pressure. Esther Boserup (1965) developed a "demographic" theory that focuses more tightly than cultural ecology on population growth and population pressure as the master variables behind social change. Technological change is explained as an adaptation to population densiry nearing or exceeding the farrying capaciryll of the environment under a given technological regime. Cultural ecology and pressure have important implications for world-system development when they are combined with the idea of social and ecological circumscriptionl2 proposed by Robert Carneiro (1370, 1981). Carneiro explains the social organizational ruptures that produced the first states in terms of population pressure in a geographic sitlration in which outmigration was impossible ur very costly, Under these conctitions people stay and fight. Sometimes fighting may be controlled by the invention of laxger-scde political opnization that regulates resource use, The notion of social circumscriptian requires analysis o f relations among peoples in adjacent regions, Thus it is quite Gongruent with m&-systerns studies. The elements of population pressure, technological change, conflict, and circumscriyrion are eombined in diEerent ways tily diEerenr theorists, but these are the main ingxedients that comprise most of the recent explanations of long-run cufturat evolution by archaeologists and many anthropologists (e.g., Johnson and Earle 1987). Usually the scholars who construct these theories emphasize continuity thrttugh time and hence see uniformiv across df,system logics, and so we bave included these with the continuationist approaches. We now turn to those theorists who argue that wad$-system evolution has been m w k d by significant changes in system logic.

Qualitative transformationiscs include Polanyian substantivists, neo-Maxxist modesof-production theorists, and M a i s t structurdists in anthropolog. Substantivism.13 Karl Polanyi (1344, 1377; see &o Ddton 1968) argues that dif; &rent kinds of sacieties have qualitariveiy diEferent institutions For producing social order. His analysis is focufed on types of exchange, or modes of integration, Small societies, Potaqi contends, vvere integrated by reciprocd exchange system based on culturally defined rights and obligations. The moral order, usudly expressed in kin-

24 1 Appmcbes to WorU Systems

ship terms, provided a basis for the production and exchange of goods in these societies. Thus the social structure, based on kinship, promoted norms and values that emphasixd sharing and wiprodry and motivated individual behavior toward the attainment of social approval, I"o1;myi charactt7rl~sthe emergence of more hierarchical societies as the rise of "redistriburive" forms of exchange in which a central authority gathered necessary resources and redistributed them. Exchange in such systems was characterized as "state-administered." Those persons directly involved in executing these exchanges were described as agents of the state rather than as merchants operating on their own account. In more complex and larger-scale systems Polanyi Focuses on the importance rtf price-setting xuakets" as the key integrative mechanism. Polanyi sees the emergence of market relations as a long-term development in which monetized exchange penetrated more and more deeply into sociery, and price-setting market mechanisms replaced customary or politically set rates of exchange. He emphasizes the socidly coftstructed historicity of markers as w l l as their Eailure to provide, by themselves, far many of the necessities of social order in mmptcx societies. m i l e Polanyi and his followers do not explicitly m d ~ world-systems, e both their rheoreti d concepts and many of their empirical studies arc relevant for comparative worldsystem andlysis (e,g., blanyi, Arensberg, and Pearson 1357). Polanyi$ schema has been modified in some respects by those neo-Maists who share a transformational approach 14th Polanyi {addressed in the follwing section), but it has also been vigomusfy attacked by the 'Tformdists'" who emphasize the rational ecunomie basis for decisionmjklng in d l human societies. Mu& of the attack on Polanyi has been based on research that has found that some of his empirical claims were untrue, There is convincing evidence that marketlike mechanisms existed within certain early state-bwed systems that X"ol.anyicjailned w r e markedess. For example, Polanyi (1957a) points to the Kultepe tablets as evidence supporting his case that trade b e m e n B r a z e - b e h s u r and hacolia was scare-administered, h a n d y sis of these and the discwery of additional tablets have shown that Polanyi's interpretation is mistaken in important respects (Currin 1384; Allen 1392, 1936).V%at remains in dispute is the relative significance of these early forms of market exchange for the systems in question. Even hough market systems may have been important in state-based systems much earlier than Polanyi claims, there have certainly been societies that had no market mechanisms whatsoever, Thus Palanyiystheoretical point about the historiciy of markets stands, Modes of Praduction. Some neo-Marxists have combined f)olanyiYsaanlysis of modes of integration with Marx's analysis of modes of production (Wolf 1982; Shlins 1 9 2 ; b i n 1380, 1331; Wdlerstein X 374a, 1374b). Mode-of-production analysis concentrates on the nature of the institutional mechanisms of accumulation (Taylor 1979; Russell 1989). In so-called kin-based societies accumulation and the mobilization nf social labor was accomplished through die mechanism af the moral order-socially agreed-upon rights and obligations, usually embedded in kinship relations.15 This type of integration closely resembles Polanyi's "reciprociry."

Approaches to WorId Systems / 25 As socieeies became rnore hierafchicd, a class of nonproducers used indtutions based on coercive control of key msources (means of production) to exrract surplus product from direct producers. Though this was organized as hierarchical kinship relations in complex chiefdoms, some class societies eventually developed stares in which the institutional bases of power and property were separated from kinship ties, Stace-based systems used politically suuctul-cd coercion as the main basis Eor the extraction of surplus product from direct producers. Amin and Wolf term the predominant underlying logic behind appropriation in such societies the "tributary modes of production." This type of integration differs from Polanyi's "redistribution" primarily in its emphasis on the element of organized coercion that stands behind state-based accumulation, Cornmodification is a process in which the exchange of social goads comes to take place in price-setting markets. The emergence of cornmodified land, wealth, goods, and labor eventually created the basis for a capitalist logic of accumulation based on the produetion and safe of commodities using cornmodified labor. There are important distinctions bemeen merchant capitalism and producticln capitalism, but as with Polanyi, the dwelopment of clornmodificarion is understood as a longterm process in which marketlike relations penetrate rnore and more areas of societies and intersocietd relations. The E3alanyianlMarxist approach. to transformation argues that different fogia may be present in the s m e sysrem, but that in most Vsterns a sin& logic dominates and reshapes oriter institutions into forms more or Iess congruent wirh ic. Most of the scholars who take this approach argue that vvodd-systems were predominantly kin-based until the emergence of the first states. Tributw modes predominated in world-systems cnmposd of states and empires, thou& cornmodification developed slowly and partidly throughout c-he history of the tributary vworld-systems, The strong dexvelopment of capitalist tbrces in China nearly led to the emergmce of capitalism as a predominant mode in the Sung and early Ming dynasties. According to this approach, capilalism W%Ssuccessful in becoming a My prehminant mode of productinn for the first time in modcrn 1Europe.l" s2 Stracturdism, fonathan Friedman and Michael Rowlands (1377) see a major transformation in systemic logic occurring with the rise of states, but they emphasize the continuities of "capital imperialism'' from then on. Their theory of the transformation from kin-based to state-based society is an explicitly world-system and structuralist Marxist interpretation of the politics of kinship. Their work develops the intergroup interaction aspects of the debate in the kinship literature between d lEarnund Leach (1354) and Ciaude LRYi-Strauss (1%9). Leach$ w o h a n d ~ the oscillarion bemeen hierarchid and egditarian kinship systems. Friedman and Rowlands theorize the ways in which strategies of wife-giving and wife-taking among chiefly rivals interact with changes in gender relations and prestige-goods economies to produce new levels of centralization and hierarchy. Friedman (1982) has employed this theory to explain rhe rise and fall of chieEdoms and variations in social structure across Melanesia and Polynesia.

In a more remnt contribution Eriedman (1332a) reviews and presents afresh the theoretical strugges that motivated E b o l m and him to formulate a nevv approach to the problem of sytemic lo*, They, like several other world-system schdars, have been traumarized by the orthodox "productionist" Mamisrs, They have also m t e d to the "vulgar materidism'hof Narvin Harris by emphasizing the institutionai and culturd aspects af social structure. Rather than simply renaming and retooling modes-oEproduction. concepts fctr vvarld-systems use, they have formulated a nevv version of sysremic logic that marries gopolitics and accumulation-the oscillaring logic of ccc;2pital-imperiali~mm" Friedrnan and Elchotm also substitute the t e r n '"lobat sysr-em" for world-system, but they do not mean to imply that there has been a single system on earth for millennia. For them a '"global system" i s a large regional system that includes many socjeries, FriedmaA explication of the diaerences between prestige-goods systems and ""capid imperialism"' is a d u a b i e contribution to our ullderstanding of y t e r n change, The three main theoretical issues--tk conceptdization of world-systems, the spatial bounding of these systems, and the problem of system logic-are fundamental to the project of comparative and historical analysis. The question of continuationism versus transformationism is important both for social science and for politics. In the following chapter we describe our positions on these onceptual issues.

The sumey of related approaches presented in the prwious chapter provides the materials we need to construct our own conceptual apparatus. In order to understand the reproduction and transhrrnarion of basic structures of world-ystems, we mWt compare systems that have very different structures.1 Our task is to construct concepts sufficiently broad and flexible to capture similarities and differences across very diEescnt wurld-ystenrs without becoming so v q u e as to he vacuous. We agxee with chose who contend that the most important institutional structures are those that are related to the mobilization of social labar and the accumulation of social surplus, lmmanuel Wlterstein built his analysis of the modern world-system around the notion of an intersocietd division of labor in the production of basic goads and the idea of capitalist accumulation, These ideas cannot simply be exported wholesaie to very different systems, They must be modiSied significantly. Hence in this chapter we draw on our discussion in Chapter 1 to rethink world-systern csncepts. W then discucs rhe relations among modes of accumulation, vvorldsystms, and mrelperiphery relations and finish vvith a few rcmarh on operationdization and measurement of our concepts. This prepares us to suggest a few simple hypotheses for mmparative research in Chapter 3, and it is the first srep in an iterative process that moves h r n theory consvuction to empirical invrstigation and then back to theory construction.

Our Definition of World-Systems As we noted in the prwious chapter, Wdlerstein (1374a, 1374b, 1W73a) &fin6 a world-system as a mulriculturai nemork of the exchange of "necessities." A multiculrural nework is one in vvhich economic exchange links a number of culturally different sacieties in which people speak diEerent lanwages and have sommvhat different normative institurions. Wdlerstein distinguishes belween WO ryyes of world-systems: wrld-empires and urorld-economies. A vuortd-empire: is an intersocietd division of labor that is encompassed by a single overarching imperial polity. A worldeconomy is an intersocietd division of Labor that: is po1i"ically organized as an interstare system-a multicentric system of unequal and competing states (like the

modern international system). As we have seen, Wajlerstein (1984a) excludes stateless societies (minisystems) from his category of world-systems because (allegedly) important economic exchanges occur only within single cultures. However, archaeological and ethnographic evidence shows that most peoples who live in stateless and classless societies are engaged in important cross-cultural interactions (including exchange of basic foodstuffs) that &ect their cultural reproduction and historical development (e.g., Sahfins 1372). Thus, contra Wallerst-ein, vve contend rhat small stateless and classless systems also can be studied meaningfully with world-systems concepts. Including stateless world-systems in the scope of comparison also extends the range of variation, This inclusion raises the issue of whether or not world-systems must have core/periphery hierarchies-that is, some type of domination bemeen components of Ihe system, We conceive of hierarchy as a variable characteristic.This allows us to study differences in the degree and nature of intersocietal inequalities in diEerent wrld-systems, W' posit the theoretical possibility of a world-system that does not have a corelperiphery hierarchy but that is rather an egditarian world-system of equal exchange among sociat entities. This hypothetical yossibilily separates the world-vstern conept from the carelperiphery conwpt and makes intersocietd hierarchy an empirid question rather than a theo~ricalassumption, Hence we define world-systems as int-ersociegalnetworks k whz'ch the interacliizolzs @.g.,@&de, waf&re2intermdwz'age, infnrmahn) are importantfir the reproduction uf tlre ZPIterrzal s ~ u ~ t ~ lOfthe r e s c07npugite u n i dad ~ importdntb afect chdngej that ucczlr .in tbtllca locdl fwctzlres. The inchsion of very small world-systems in the scope. of comparison necessitates a broader term-""camposite unitsm-in place of the usual ""sac7ieties'Yn our definior 'ktribesa'-are often so tion, The boundaries of nonstate social units-""bands" fuzzy that the concept of "'socier)pmis misleading. Furrhcrmore, many state-based world-systems include stateless societies, most of which have been transfornled by their interaction with states into class sewents or ethnic groups (issues discussed in more detail in Chapter 4). Thus we prefer broad concepts that reflect a fuzzy world. Finally, some readers may objecc to applying the term 'Cvorld-s)astem'\o mall regional networks of societies beiause the word "world" implies a large scale or global extent. W use the term "world-system" ca refer m the whole social context in which people live and the material nenvorks important to their daily lives. The intersocietal interaction networks of sedentary foragers (e.g., in preconract northern Californiasee Chapter 7) were quite small in comparison with the contemporary global system. Still, they constituted the universe of social interactions that sustained and transformed the social structum in vvhich the people lived," Our empirical universe for comparison, then, includes those sedentary small, medium, and large world-systems rhat have exisred on earth over the past 12,000 years. In this manner we maximize the variation among cases in order to study rhe few basic transformations that have occurred in human history. Similarly, in order to rnJerstand the conditions rhat generate intersocierd inequalities, we must examine

a e s in which they are absent. We now turn to a discussion of sptemic logics and transtormatrons,

Modes of Accumda.lion The world-systems perspective has stimulated a new approach to the understanding of capitalism that emphasizes the necessiry of peripheral forms of capitalism, the importance of the interstate system, and the various forms and degrees of the cornmodification of labor within the capiralist wrld-economy (Chase-Bunn 1989). The extension of the world-systems perspective to precapitalist settings raises new questions and reopens old debates about other modes of accumulation and systemic transformations, One such debate is that between the ""sbsranrivists"" and the "formalists" @iscussed in Chapter 1 ) . Substantivists argue that exchange relations are embedded in social struccurrs, where;as formalists argue that economic rationality is found in ail human societies, Another is that bemeen the ""pimitivists'" and the "modernists"" about the natures of modern, classid, and ancient societir;s.3 The modernists a r p e that economic dwelopment in the ancient or classiclll worlds already involved commodified relations and processes of economic developmenr quite similar in their basic narure to modern societies (e.g., Rostovtzft' 1341). The primitivises emphaize the existence of importanr ditiFmnces bemeen m d e r n and classical societies with respect to the logic of competition, the rationdiv of accounting practices, the nature of taxation, forms of properry, vpes of labor control, and so on (e.g.. Finlry

1373). As we saw in the preceding chapter, these debates have been reincarnated in the discussions of the "cvital-imperialist" mock of accumulation f E b o l m and Friedman 1982) and the argument for 5,000 years of continuous capital accumulation fFxank and Gils 1S75;t3a),The arguments of these scholars are similar to those of the formdiscs and the modernists. O n the other side, the claims of the transformationisrs reinvigorate the ideas of the substantivists and the primitivists. In order ta shed light on these debates, we formulate otzr concepts in ways that facilitate evduatian by camparative empirical research, We carpect that if the continuarionists (Ekholm and Friedman; Frank and Gills) are correct, they wift be able to demonstrate the existence of impatant similaritis among all worfd-systems. Likewise, if we (the tratlsformatianisrs) are corrcct, we expect to be able to demonstrate the existence of fundamental transformations in systemic processes through detailed empirical ;md exglicitly compafarive: studies. In order to clariq the terms in this debate, we define mode of aecumdatian as .the deqp s~uccurallogic ofproducrion, dirhiblrrion, exchange, and arcumrrlzrion. We prefer it to ""mode of production" "came vve do not want to restrict our focus solety to the analysis of pronzlction, Rather, we wmt to Eocus on the institution4 mechanisms by which labor is mobilized and social reproduction is accomplished. In all societies reproduction and change are related to the accumulation of surplus. Even egalitarian

(clasless) groups organizd accumulation in the sense that foodscuffs vvere stored and resource =age was socially regulated. We derive the following heuristic ry.polo~from the works oEAmin (1380, 1991) and Wolf (1982), supplemented by those of Polanyi (1144,1977). We distinguish among four classes of systemic logics:

I. &a-baed modes of aecumuhtion in whicb social. Iabor, distribution, and collective accumulation are mobilized by means of normative integration based on consensual definitions of value, obligations, affective ties, kinship networks, and rules of conduct-a mard order; 2, eibytarg,modes, in which accumulation of surplus product is mobilized by means of politicdly institutiondized coercion based on codified law and formally organixd military pwer; 3. capz'taiistm&, in which land, labor, wealth, and goods are cornmodified and strondy exposed to the forces of price-setting markets and accumuliation occurs primarily through the production of commodities using cornmodified labor; and 4,sociaji~tmodes, a hypothetical chss of logics in which major policy, investment, and allnation decisions alr: contmiled democratically by the people they affect according co a logic of collective rationaliry, We emphasize that this tygolog is heuristic and subject to reformulation on the basis of: further empirical research, We choose term that arc: broady fantiliar to smdents of long-term social change. We note flrrcher that the ty~,ologiesd d o p e d by m s t wolutionay rhinkers are broady convewnt, even Mibile digering in rhe details.4 VV;1 now turn to the relationship bemeen modes of acmmulatiort and world-systems.

World-Systems and Modes o f Accumulation Comparisons benveen the contemporary global political economy and earlier regional intersocietd systems raise the question of whether human societies sometimes change their basic modes of social reproduction, or only alternate bemeen different forms of the same basic logic. We refine this question by further examination of the relationship between world-systems and modes of accumulation. As we noted earlier, we use ""accumulation" instead of ""yoduction" m emphsize that we do not resuict our analysis to production processes or class relations. Since all world-systems are organized at several iwels, the understanding of class relations and production necessitates comprehension of all levels of control and resistance. By mode of accumulation we mean a bgic ofdevelopment in which the reproduction of social structures and cyclical processes occur by means of certain rypical forms of int e p t i o n and conrrol. The main katures of modes of accumulation that can be used as empirical indicators are forms of exchange (gifr-giving, state-administered exchange, market trade)

and forms of control that are employed to mobilize social labor andior to extract surplus product (normative regulation, serfdom, slavery, taxation, tribute, wage-labor). We recognize that different modes of accumulation are often present within the same system, and that some forms of exchange and control have elements of more than one mode. We speak of 'predominant" modes, and our analysis of transitions arld transfDrmatinn utilims bter-Canelk (1378) norions of arl;k~lat.ion(complementary interpenetration of rwo modes) and connddz'ett'on(conflict and competition beween diEerent modes). We do not ciairn that modes of accumulation are features of whole societies or of whole world-systems. As logics of interaction, modes of accumulation may exist at any level of a system (see Chase-Dunn 1989,335-337). The broad category of tributary modes includes both centralized and decentralized political forms that rely on organized coercion to mobilize labor and to extract taxation, tribute, or rent. Thus feudalism is a subrype of the tributary mode, one of its most decentralized forms. Similarly, the so-called "Asiatic" form, in which the state owns the land, is one of the most centralized forms of the tributary mode. We daim &at diEerent modes may coexist within the same system, and W afso acknowledge that some forms of organization are best understood as transitional or mixed. For example, clzs-stratified but stateless systems in which kinship metqhors are used to legitimate the exploiration of commoners by a noble class (e.g., precontact camptex cbiefdoms in Hawaii) constitute a mix of Erin-based and state-basd (coercive) systems.5 Slavery is often found in mixed modes. Slavrry in tributary modes is usuatly based on state-organized coercion, but when slaves are treated as the private properry of individuals and can be traded on a price-setting markiet, slavery is partially commodified labor. We conceive of the cornmodification of labor as a variable, with cornmodi6ed slavery depending more on laws and a coercivc state apparatus than does rbe cornmodification of labor time in the mge system. "[email protected]" k another mixed made that is made up of both capitalism and socialism. We contend that the socialist mode has never been predominant in any existing society or world-system, and thus, in a pure form, it is an empirically empty category. The communisr states were mixtures of capitalism, socialism, and tributary modes. We maintain that the p~ssibz'liyof rons.cructing a soeidist mode remainsdespite the failure of artempls to do so up to now." These possible transitional and mixed forms clutter and complicate the analysis of transitions and transformations. Still, we contend that there have been qualitatively distinct logics of accumulation. We do not assume a theory of unilinear evolution by which one mode necessarily changes into mother. Rather, ule seek m uncover, via ernpirid analyses, the patterns, possibilities, and probabilities of past transformations. We assert further that modes of accumulation are digerentidly desirable with r e s p a to their mnsequences for the yualiy &human life. We aIso contend that it is possible-even if difficult-to use knowledge of past transitions to help humans to choose m o n g more desirable future alternatives. Obviously this Last contention

must remain more of a hope than an established claim until we: can explain past transitions and dclimir Etlture possibilities. VCTe see the coherence of m d e s of productton, relations of prodztct-ion, m d Forces of production as a typical consequence of the integration of local and intersocietal interaction processes within the dctminant mode of dccarrrghtion, Many world-system articulate different modes into a single, larger, more-or-less coherent system that derives from the dominant mode of accumulation. Rather b a n to proclaim ex cathedra how these modes of production articulate and how transformations happen, we seek to study them empirically. Such empirical research is necessary to evaluate the transformationist-continuationistdebate. Our typolog). and concepts diger Erom chose of other mdd-system scholars, In the following sections we r w i w these differences in order to clarify our position.

Contending Approaches to World-Systems and Modes o f Acc hmanuel Wlerstein argues that the trwition bemeen feujalism and capidism in Europe during the long sixteenth century (that is, 1450-1640 [WaHerstein f374hj) constituted a change in mode ofproduction, He defines capitdism as a &ature of the whole world-system, not of i t s parts (1373bf.This "tordiry assumption"" is motivated by WdJerscein's intention m emphasize the importmm of peripheral. exploitation for the reproduction of capitdism, a goal char can dso, however, be Xcomplished by redefining capitalism as including both core and peripheral forms (see Chase-Dunn 1383, chap. I). An unfortunate implicarion of the "totality assumption'' is that each world-system can have only one mode of production, since the mode of production is a feature of a whole world-system. This theoretical assumption makes the study of transitions benveen modes of production difftcult because it implies that transformation occurs in a whole system simultaneously.Thus under Wallerstein's formulation it is theoretically impossible to have world-systems in which modes of production are contending with one another or in which a predominant mode is articulated with other modes. Wallerstein dso uses mode of production to spatially bound world-systems. He claims that the Ottoman Empire and India were external arenas of the modern world-system hefore Europe incorporated them into its hierarchical division of labor became the Ottoman Empire and India were noncapitalirt. Thus, despite extensive trade and political and military interactions, especially beween the Ottoman Empire and Europe, Wallerstein defines the Ottoman Empire, India, and Europe as separate world-systems, In contrast, we argue that modes of accumulation should not be used to ptially bound luorld-ryrtmr. Rather, as we elaborate in Chapter 3,interactions and interconnections of ail sorts should be used to delineate world-system boundaries. Once

whole world-systems and regions within world-systems have been so defined, empiricd studies should determine which, modes of accumulation are predominant. Similarly, actual historical processes of transformation should be studied in order to build a theory of transformations. Some scholars do not employ any explicit notion of systemic logic, though they often seem to have implicit models. As we have seen, David Wilkinsoris (1987b) valuable work on "civilizarions/world systems" is based on a state-centric model that sees state building, war making, and power politics as the central processes in all systems in which there are cities, He thus excludes what we have called kin-based world-systems. Because wlkinson defines civilizations in terms of regularizPdpolitical-military inreracrion, he sees the expansion of "Central Civilization" from the merger of the Mesopotamian and Egyptian civilizations about 1500 B.C.E. to today's global system as a continuous, if episodic, pr~cess.~ Wilkinson also describes the dternation bemeen "universal states" and ""sates systems" in his twelve different civilizations. This work is quite useful for studying similarities m d difiFerences across dif3cerent world-systems. Wilkjnson does acknowledge that the madern interstare system is more raistmt to mpire Fortnation rhan were earlier systems; he attributes this to the invention of bdance-of-power policies by European statesmen who were (and are) willing to mobiliv "general war" in order to prevent any one state from ~~stematicdly conquering the others. Thus he sees no watershed bemeen the madern era of ""Centrd Civilization" and its earlier eras-except for the invention of rhe bdmrze-of-power strategy, In contrst, Chase-Dunn (23305) argues rhar the unusually high resistance of the: modem interstate vstem to empire formation is due to the predominance of capidism. Capitalists prefer a multicentric internalional political system, Hence tht: most powerful states in the modern interstate system do not try to create a corewide empire but seek rather to sustain the iacerstace system. This is because their main method of accumulation is commodity production, which contrasts with precapitalist systems, in which state power icelf w s the main basis of accumulatjon, thrortgh taxes or tribute. Phrased differently capilalist states are qualitatively diEerent f r m tributary stata. Ozhttr analysrs do propose explicit ideas about systemic logic but argue that this iogii: did not change with the rise of modern Elrrope. Tn Efiolm and Fridman's (f 382;) origin4 work comparing ancient, clasficd, and modern world-systems, they empbasixd several systemic continuities that were presented a9 features of a 'kapitatimperialist" mode of production. ?They stresed the imporrance of core exploitation of peripheries, the rise and Eall of core povvers, and the emergnce of former peripheral areas as n m core powers. They dso emphasized the alternaring phases of centralization and decentralizarion of policicd power in stace-based wndd-systems and the -lid apansion of ""pi-*atem "foss of exploitation by core ekes in competition with state accmulation. This c"lynamic of intra-rding-class competition accctunts far the rise and fall of states, the phases of centrdizacion/decentra1ization, and the emergence of new core regions,

Tke formdation drveloped by Frank and Gills (1393a) is simifar to the E b o l m and Friedman approach in many respects. Howmer, hey contend that insread of one "capitd-imperialis? mode of production, there are w o mdes of accumulation. These are stare and private modes of accumulation, which are articulated yet contend with each other throughout the history of the 5,000-year-old world-system. Ekholm and Friedman and Frank and Gills explicitly argue that there was no important transformation berween an earlier tributary mode and the capitalist mode. They argue, rather, that states have dways been central to aaurnulation and remain so. In their view, markets, money, and private wealth have always been important, although state and private forms of accumulation alternate in relative importance. Earlier work by Friedman and Rowlands (1977) and Friedman (1982) developed a world-system theory of the transition from kin-based to state-based systems that focused on changes in kinship structures and regional interactions, especially prestige-goods economies. That work explicitly acknowledged the analyric comparability of scareless autd state-based vvorld-systems*m i l e Friedman and Rowlands acknowledged a trmsition from kin-based to tributary modes, Ehoim and Friedman (1382) deny a significant transition from tributary to capitalist mod=. 'Ib suppart their contention about a cccapital-imperialisr"'mode, Ekholm and Friedman point to growing evidence that markets, crade, and money existed much further back and to a much greater extent in the ancient world than was formerly accepted. We also accept the new widence, but W dispute the conclusion that the existence of Mesopotamian markets proves that capitalist accumulation has always been the dominant made of accumulation, In contra~r,we see commodiry forms of vvealth, goods, land, and labor as emerging slowly within the tributary mode of accumutation. Similarly$Charles Tilfqs (1930) recent swdy of European state formation bemeen 300 and 1330 C.E. focuses on statef, state mlkjng2and warfare as master variables of change, However, Tiliy explicitly discwes the role of capitalism and capitalists in European states as they increl-tseb their powers over domestic groups, He identiiies capitalism and capitalists with cities. Hence trading cities are one of the major distinguishing variables that =plain different paths to state formation. Still, Tilly does not observe that beween 900 and X 900 C.& the political power of European capidists was multiplied by their increasing control over national states in the core of a world-system. In 900 C.E. European ca~italisrswere rulers of a few semiperipheral ciry-states. Only in the sevenceench-century Dutch state did apitaiists take power in a core swte, By 1990 capitalists controlled the majority of stares, Tillys definition of c a p i d is part of why he does not see an impartant transition in the mode of accumulation in Europe. Me deiines a p i r d "'generouslf as ""any tangible mobile resources, and enforceable claims on such resources'' (Tilly 1990, 17). By this definition, a Nuer headmaris cows are capital. This is similar to Frank and GilhW(1993a) definition of accurnu1;it-ion, whi& is any savings or wealth. For us, in contrat, capital is cornmodified wealth used to produce commodities. Thus, as we

specified in Chapter 1, capitalist accumulation is the amassing of wealth by means of the production and sale of commodities for profit, whereas general accumulation is the amassing of wealth in any form. Capiralirr accumulation is not equivalent to all accumulation. The storing of yams by a Trobriand chief is not capitalist accumulation; nor is the hoarding of treasure in temples or cathedrals. Attending to these differenca in the nature of social resources m&es it much eaisier to see &at the modern world-system has qualitatively different dynamics than earlier systems. Now that we have clarified our definitions of world-systems and modes of production, we turn to a discussion of how the parts of a world-system are interconnected.

Core/Periphery Relations Funcrionalist theorists tend to see ail hiemrchies, including intersocietal ones, as serving some systemic need. As a result, many theorists see exploitation and domination everyhere that inequalily, in any form, exists. We contend that core/ periphery relations need to be consiclered on a case-byecase basis lest vve ignore or misperceive instances of systemic: egualiry or wevolution of societies at different levels of development. Considerable controversy still exists about the best way to conceptualize and measure coreness and yeripheraliry in the modern global political economy (e.g., Arri$i and Dra.ngel 1386; Chase-Dunn 1389, chap. 10)- The issues become even more complex when we considrr comparisons of intersocietal hierarchies across very different kinds of world-systems. Here we need a general concept that can accommodate considerable variation. We also need to allow for the possibility that some world-systems may have core/periphery relations with little or no hierarchy or inequaiities, or no corelperiphery relations at dl, Applying the notion of a corelperiphery hierarchy to world-systems other than the modern world-system is itself somewhat controversid (Bairoch 1975; O%Ben 1382; Stern l988a, 1988b; Wdlerstein 1388).The economic historian Paul Bairoch (1186) argues that premodern coreiperiphery relations were unimportant because differences in the level of living between the populations of core and peripheral areas were minimal, at least compared to the large gap that has emerged during the industrialization of modern Europe. Most historians of the ancient empires would disagree with the statement that corelperiphery relations were unimporrant. Although a sizable portion of both core and peripheral populations lived dose to the level of subsistence, important differences in socid structure did exist. Some schdars have claimed that the extraction of resources from peripheral peoples was necessary far the maintenance of ancient states and empires (e.g., Eisenstadt 1961; Ekholm 1980). However, the large difference in inlernd stratihation bemeen core and periyherd areas that Bairoch nosed may turn out to be an important struczurd difference bemeen the modern wrld-system a d earlier world-systems. Though in the modern wodd-system there is rypically less in-

come inequality among households within core societies than within peripheral societies, this relationship was undoubtedly the reverse in many of the ancient world-systems, in which the core was an urbanized and class-stratified society and the periphery contruned less-stratified groups of pastoralists and horticulturdisrs, We distinguish two aspects of codperiphery relations. The first tve call core! periphery differentiation, in which societies at different levels of omplexity and population densiry are in interaction with each other wirhin the same world-system as we defined it earlier. The second we call corelperiphery hierarchy, in which positical, economic, or ideological domination exists among different sociedes within the same world-system. This includes political domination and unequal exchange as well as extraction of resources through raiding, taxation, and tribute. We are aiso interested in cultural definitions of superioritylinferiority and how these may interact with more objective forms of exploitation and dominaion. We distinguish between differentiation atld hierarchy because we think it is mistaken to assume that all relations among "more developed" and "less developed" societies involve exploitation and/or processes of the development of underdwelopment.Undeed, there may be cases in whi& domination exists bemeen societies at nearly the same level of compiexirry or even cases in which the "less complex" society dominates a "more complexy'sociev ORthe one hand, W seek to andya*:how Bifferences within socieries or regions such as size, complexity, [email protected] groductivity, and internal stratification are related to intersocietal domination. O n the other hand, W wish to study the effects of variarions in cordperiphery relations on the nature, longevity, and kinds of social change in boch cure and peripheral societies or regions. m intentionally omit consideration of the nature ofwhat is produced and traded bemeen wres and peripheries in our definition of these conceprs, The notion that coreness and peripherality in the modefn wrfd-system are essentially constituted around a division of labor in which the care yraduces manufacrwed goods and the periphery produces raw materials is itsdf coxatrwersial (CbaseDunn 1983, chap. 10; Martin 19344. Furthermore, important revers& of this relationship sanetimes occurred within ancient world-systems, Kohl (1387a, I987b) cites evidena that in the ancient Mesopotamian world-system, steatite (swpstone) bowls w r e manufactured on the peripheral franian plateau and tra$ed to the core cities of the Mesopotamian lowland in exchange for hod. This is the reverse of the core mmufacruringiperipherd raw materials division of labor typical of the modern world-system. The explanation for it is relatively straightfonvard. In the absence of cheap bulk transportation it is easier to move already manufactured goods to the core than to move the raw materials there. The point is that the patterns of corej~eripheryrelations found in the modern world-system may not be typical of earlier world-systems. Such differences should be the foci of comparative investigation. This can best be pursued by nor building these dstinctions into our definition o f corelperiphery relations. Ralher, we need to investigate the linkages berween intersocietal differentiation and core/periphery

domination in each case. We also hold that the question of the nature and degree of systemic interaction beoveen rwo locales is prior to the question of coreiperiphery relations. Mitchell Allen (1996, chap. 1) has dweloped the concept of a "contested periphery," a peripheral region for which one or more core regions compete. O n the basis of an elaborate case-study of Philistia and its relations to the Neo-Assyrian and Egyptian world-systems, he finds that once an area has been incorporated into one world-system it can more easily be moved into another world-system than if it were being incorporated for the first time. Not surprisingly, contested peripheries have more Leverage in responding to core demands. Furthermore, what is a periphery to one core region can become a semiperiphery to another. If such a region provides access to vaiuabfe resources or other cores, it can often leverqe this control into a semiperipheral relationship. (This issue is further discussed in Chapter 5.) We also need to rethink the idea of the semiperiphery. As with coreness and peripherdity, the definition ofthe semiperiphery remains controversid even within the modern world-system (Chase-Wunn 1980, 2388, 1389, chap. 10, 199Oa; Arrighi 1985; hrighi and Drangel 1986).m e n applied to premodern senings, the semiperiphery concept is even more problematic. m a t k i d of semiperipheries have existed?m a t roies have they piayed in the repmduction or transfornacion of each system? Have some corelperiphery structures had no semiperipheries?Have others had multiple semiperipkeral layrrs?We adwcare that the semiperiphery be defined SUEciently broadly to encompass all of the following meanings: 1. A semiperipheral region may be one that mixes both core and peripherd forms of organization. 2. A semiperipheral region may be spatially located benveen core and peripheral regions. 3. A semiperipheral region may be spatially located beween m o or more competing core regtons,y 4. Mediating activities between core and peripheral areas may be carried out in semiperipheral regions, 5. A semiperipheral area may be one in which institutiond Eeanxres are in some ways intermediate between those forms found in core and periphery.

Sorting out these different types of semiperipheries remains an empirical as well as a theoretical problem. Until more detailed comparisons among different kinds of world-systems are completed, it would be premature to define the semiperiphery concept more narrowly. It is not wise to assume a priori that all core/periphery hierarchies have three distinct tiers. The existence or noneGstence of one or more middle tiers should be determined empirically, as should the roles those tiers play in system reproduction or rransformation.10 We discuss the role of the semiperiphery in the development of world-systems in greater detail in Chapter 5. We now turn to some of the difficulties in operationalizing these concepts.

Measurement PrabXems Undoubtedly we must operationalize the concepts of world-systems and core/ periphery relacions in various ways for different cases. Stial, we must think about how to operationdize concepts in ways that facilitate comparisons of cases in order to test general propositions. Comparable measures will be especially important for studies &at. compare smeraf world-systems using f o r d methods. We may find that it is necessary to use different empirical criteria for bounding world-systems depending on the type of system being analyzed. Though this would be somewhat messy, at least it would make the analytic comparison ofvery difkrenr world-systems possible. Our multicriteria conceptualizatian of boundaries requires us to examine the spatial properties of exchange and interaaiosr netuiorks. We also need to consider methods for determining the fall-off of the consequences of mats, Archaeological methods for examining trade newarks are rather well developed. One method is to look for typological similarities in artifaco and to ssume that these reflect interaction. This is usehi, but it can also be probiematic because oEGdmn's problem in reverse: Typological similarities can emerge due to independent invention or what is somecimes c d k d pardie1 evolurion rather than because of interaction." "milarfy, it may not be possible to distinguish empirically bervveen the spread of an idea and of a refated material object. For instance, did stirrltps themselves spread rapidly throughout Eurasia, or only the knotvledgr: that such a device wtls a signikarlr enhancement to mounted combat? archaeologists have made great strides in the saurcing of materials, which allows precise determination of the origins of several kinds of lithic materids, ceramics, some kinds of sheIls, some types of metals, and occasionally ofskcietal remains through DNA anaiysis, For example, it possibfe to determine the chemical fingerprint of obsidian (volcanic glass) fmm a particular natural S O U T G ~location. Once this is Icnown, the distribution across digerenc archaeological sites of this kind of obsidian rnay be determined, If several different sources of obsidian vvere used Eur the rnanukcture of projectile points, the overlappirlg neworks of distriburion from these sources rnay be determined. Since it is also possible to date the working of obsidian by measuring the ttaickness of the hydration rind, it is possible to study changes over time in the nenvorks of obsidian distribution (see, e.g., Mughes 1986, 13R3). Testing hypotheses about the operation of coreiperipher~hierarchies requires, idedlp that we be able to compare A ~ e e sof inrersocietd exploitation and of the stability of coreiperiphery hierarchies. Further, we distinguish m types of interaction effects, Eollowing MYrdal (1971). Under some circumstances core-periphey inreraction causes peripheral areas to become more corelike. We call these spread effecrs. Other sorts of interaaions may cause development of underdevelopment in peripheral areas. We call these backwash effects. We would like to compare rates of intersocietai m b i l i q and the relativc balance of spread and backwash effeas for

differential rates of development berween cores and peripheries. These operational problems have not yet been resolved even for the contemporary global world-systern. Nevertheless, we want to designate clearly the desiderata of a general comparative research project so that case studies ma)l be undertaken with these purposes in mind. The problems of measuring differences in the magnitude of inequalities across social systems are well known. When the kinds of resources that are socially valued differ and the dimensions of inequdiry are structured in completely different ways, statements about relative degrees of overall inequdiry are problematic. This is just as true of intersocietal inequalities as of intrasocierd inequalities. Though it is often povjible to rank objects wirhin a system, such rank orderings do not help with the question of the magnirude of inequalities. For this, interval or ratio level measurement is required. Nevertheless, rough estimations of differential magnitudes of inrrasocietal inequalities have been made convincingly by Lens& (1 966) across very different societa1 types (e.g., hunter-gatherer, horticultural, agrarian, and industrial). We propose to make analogous "guesstimates" of degrees of inequality across very different corelgeriphery hierarchies. The problem of indicators of corelperiphery inequaliry has been considered by some archaeologists. Ofien it is simply assumed that archaeological indicators of corelperiphery diRerentiation may be taken as rvidence of mrelperiphery hierarchy, For a m p l e , the existence of a settlement system in which villages and towns are of subsrantidly unequal populatim sizes may be interpreted as indicating hierarchical interaction beween large and smdl settlemenrs (e.g., Nissen 1988).As many archaeologists have recogniued, differentiation may exist without domination (e.g., Renfrew and Cherry 1986), Not all exchmge is unequaf. exchmge, Looking for more direct archaeological evidence for cordperiphery dclminacion is challenging, Lamberg-Karlavsky f 1975) has argued that the villqe of Tepe Y&ya on the Iranian plateau (vvhere carved soapstone bowls were manufactured and exported to the Sumerian cities) must have been subjected to unequal exchange because burials did nor become richer at Tepe Yahya over the long period during which trade occurred. This case contrasts with many others in which involvement in regional exchange networks did lead to increased local stratification as indicated by the emergence of richer burials (e.g., Marfoe 2987). Such observations might be used to differentiate b e w e n nonexploitative and exploitative intersocierd interactions and to study the trajectory of interactions within paticular world-systems. The use of mortuary evidence may, however, encaunter grave problems. Wedthier Native Californians were cremated, while the remains of poorer vi1l;;lgers were buried. In this case the appearan= of more daborate burials l Of course, there are causes of could mean less rather than gearer l ~ c a stratification. changes in burial practices other than the nacure of intersocietal interaction. Although archaeologists have made amazing strides in the use of recoverable results to develop indicators of the spatial structure and the social form of exchange (Schortman and Urban 1987, 49-55), archaeological widence alone is often quite

yrobtematic Tor the kind af inkreaces vve want to make. This is why it is importam to study cases for which archaeological data may be combined with historical Bocwmentary or ethnogaphie widence, Naw that we have defined the concepts we are using and considered same o f the problems of operationalizarion, we turn to a discussion of the theoretical scope of comparative world-systems malysis and present some general hypotheses about similariries and digerences across this universe of world-system,

Twq Three, Many World-Systems

In this chapter we begin by presenting our working rypology of world-systems as a tool for making comparisons. We then use that typology and the discussions in the previous chapters to derive four sets of hypotheses about world-systems. Finally, we delineate how we bound world-systems spatially and conclude with a sketch of how a theory of world-system transformations might be consaucted.

A Working Typology of World-Systems We base this cypoloa on our discussion of modes of accumulatinn and on dtstinctions in recent li~rarureon sacid evolution and historical dmlapment. These categories are not fixed boxes into which a omplar set of intersocierd nerworks must be stuffed. Rather, they are a set of general signposts to guide comparisons across the immense variety of world-systems. The smallest and earliest wodd-systems have kin-based, normative modes o f accumujation. In wrld-spstms without classes or states or markets, kin-based mechanisms of control and distribution are the predonlinant sources of sociak cohesion. We strongly disagree with Patricia Cron& f 1386, 1389) charaaerizxion of these societies as based an "'nartlrd" or "biologicalmrelationships such as age and pnder. Kin ties, groups, and gender relations are socially constructed in ail human societies. These instinrtions are compctsed of cultural qreernents about the nature of roles, role obligations, and ri&ts, The cruciat institution here is language and symbolic meaning.' Kn-based societies are normatively replated because cuXturaJiy agreedupon understanding constitute the basic glue of the social order, and these are not backed up by states or market integration. Xn stace-based and marker modes, other fypes of imgration take the determinative role in regulating social relaions. This does not mean, howwer, that kinship, age, and gender cease to have social inportance. Ratherpwe emphasize thal normative factors become secondary in shaping social relations. How this transition occurs, how many rimes it has occurred, and the rmge of Aexihilir).of the transformarions ~emainimporlanr probtems.2 The tributary mode of accumulation entails the use of organized c o e ~ i o nto mobilize labor. A ruling class establishes control wer some essential social resource and


1 Tit?#Three, Marzy Wt?r&-Systems

then uses this controt to extract "surplus product" from direct producers. There are many different instituriond forms by which this has been acamplished-for example, taxation, tribute, serfdom, slavery, comge, and so on. Most historical systems in d i s h tributary accumularion was pr-edominant mixed a v u i e ~of these forms of surplus apropriation, Many of these syscems alfo included elements of both kinbased and market forms o f integration, but in ways that reinforced the fundamental coercive state-based logic of the tributary mode. The capitalist- mode of accumulation is based on the commodiy farm-the mediation of human interaceion by price-setting markets, and markezlike instinltions, The commodifiation af goods, land, wealth, and labor are never complete within capitalist systems, but here markets play a much w a t e r role than in Vstems dominated by other modes, Aspects of other modes continue to be fomd, but they generally supplement the reproduction of cornmodified relations. Thus, most wdd-systems contain more tban the predomitlant mode of accumulation, For instance, mosc t r i b u t q sysrerns contain an urban sector that has an important price-setting market and a rural sector that mobilizes labor through kin obligations. Each such sector, vievved in narrow isolation, mi&t appear to be capitalist or kin-based, respectively. In broader view, though, each sector is embedded within a system in which state-based coercion is the predominant form of integration. We wish to distinguish benveen world-systems in which kin-based, state-based, and capitalist modes of production are predominant without denying the possibility that some parts of some overall systems have characteristics that resemble other modes. By utilizing rhese distinctions we are in no way endorsing a unilinear model of wolution. Historical dwelopment is open-ended and path dependent. That is, it operates on a social structure ~rovidedby historical legacy within the confines of its current context. Important bifurcations and discontinuities of dwelopment, rapid transformations, and instances oEdevoXution are normal characteristics of the histaricd processes of social change (see Lenski 1976; Sanderson 1990, 1995a). Our argument that world-systems are the primary unit of analysis for understanding these processes does not vitiate the importance of processes that operate within societies. A world-system is composed not only of intersocietal interactions but also of the totality of interactions that constitute the whole social, economic, and political system. In order to study the processes and patterns by which modes of production become transformed, we present a working typology of world-systems based on the modes of accumulation introduced in the receding chapters. This typology is not a replacement for the study of very long sequences of historical change in particular regions. Not is it a means of spatially bounding world-systems. Rather, it is a tool for organizing comparison,."

I. Kn-based mode dominant A, Stateless, classless I. Sedentary foragers, horticulruralists, pasroralists 2. Big-man sprems

TWCI, Three, M a ~ yWorI(a!-Systems 1 43

B, Ghiefdoms (classes but not states) IT, Tributary modes dominant (states, cities)$ A. Primary state-based world-systems (Mesopotamia, Egypt, Indus Valley, Ganges Valley, China, Precolumbian Mexico and Peru)

B. Primary empires in which a number of previously autonomous states have been unified by conquest (Agade, Old Kingdom Egypt, Magahda, Chou, Teorihuacm, Huarij

C. Multicentered world-systems composed of empires, states, and peripheral regions (Near East, India, China, Mesoamerica, Peru)

D. Commercializing state-based world-systems in which important aspects of cornmodification have developed but the system is still dominated by the logic of the tributary modes (Afroeurasian world-system, including Roman, Indian, and Chinese core regions) ITI. Capicatist mode dominant A. The Europe-centered subsystem since the seventeenth century B. The global modern world-sptem The smallest autonomous polities were nomddic foragitlg groups. 'l'hese groups usuaib consisted of a cluster of families vvho genertiHy lived together and associated with other such groups that shared language and culture. Anthropologists call such gmups bmds. Band membership was somewhat fluid, The intersocietal relations among many of these were a series of overlapping networks, each with a band at the center, wirh [email protected] fading with distance, shaped by terrain and resource availabilily, We include such systems in the smpe of wodd-system comparisons. Thus 13deofithic nomads canstitute Auid and moving world-syscems in vvhich constituent groups competed for ~erritoryBut territorialism as welt as the processes of competition and cooperation that we associate with territorial groups became much more sustained and organized once groups became sedenrarized. These first sedentary societies w r e Frequclntly in interaction vvirh nomads, and so world-sysrems with sedentary villagers exhibit a pattern of nomadsedentafy relacions that was important for millennia in the development of larger and more hierarchical systems, Hence we begin our comparative s t d y ofworld-systems with those sedenmry foragers (complex hunter-gtherers) who lived most of the year in harnlets.5 Okcn called tribelets, these groups usudly consisted of a single village but sometimes included two or three vitlages under the nominal ""leadershiy"'of a single headrnari, A headman is a leader by virtue of person4 charisma and respected abilities, typically in oratory, mediaion, hunting, and fighting. He Ieads by infiuence, Typically, rrihelets defined communal territarial botlndaries and engaged in regularized intergroup rdations rhar constituted very small warld-systems. As population densiv increased, foraging strategies sametimes became more diversified and intensification of production sometimes occurred, giving rise to horticultural or pastoral groups.

44 I Two, Three, M d y WorId-S3s~ems Big-man systems sometimes emerged where there were pressures to increase coordination among groups. A big m m is a leader who operates by persuasion and prestige and whose prestige is based on his abiliry to infiueme his followers to m a s s wealth for give-away ceremonies. A big man is more powerful than a headman, but less powerful than a chief (see Shlins 1963). In classless societies, relatively small inequalities of power, presdge, and wealth are based almost entirely on culturally defined age and gcnder cfiteria, Sometimes a big m m succeeded in institutionalizing access to substantial social resources, giving him coercive powr. His resources wouid then be somevJhat autonomous from the control of other lineage heads. Typically, but not always, his ogce was hereditary; Under these conditions he is catled a chid, A chiefdonn is ai stratifid poliry that relies on generalized institutions for regional coordination and control. It usually has a hierarchid &nship structure that legitimates chiefly authoriry. Chiefdoms are distinguished from less stratified stateless societies by the size of the poliry, ppoulation densiry, intensification of production, and, obviously, the degree of inrernal stratification. Complex chiefdoms are larger stratified polities. In some cbiefdams a noble d a s s a group of people with shared and distinctive politicoeconomic interesrs-formed, which had increasing control over basic societal resources (land, water, trade, and so on). Such a class uses politically institutionalized means to appropriate surplus product based on the &or of direct producers. In chietiioms the institutional basis of rhis appropriation Is a kinship order in d i c h lirzcages are ranked or genealogicat senioriy is specifjed. We include under the heading '"kin-based mode dominant" all those vvurtd-SFtems in. which none of the societies may be said to have had stares; here kinship is the predominant mode of mumulation. This category includes a wide variery of types, often labeled aj "tribes" in common parlance. This practice is unfortunate because the use of a single term implies a kind of unity of form that is far from the truth. Some anthropologists use the term tribe more narrowly to describe those groups that range from large big-man systems to small chiefdoms (see Fried 1975 for a more detailed discussion), There is a similar confusion with regard m the term "chief," which in common parlance is used for headman, big man, and chief as we defined it above. The formation of states mark a clear watersbed in socierd and world-system organization. A state (following Johnson and Earle 1987, 246) is a regionally organized society with specialized regional institutions-militaly and bureaucratic-that perform the tasks of control and management. A stare is distinguished from a complex chiefdom by the degree to which specialized control organizations nor based on kinship have develaped. A key problem in historical development is how chiefdoms and stares first developed out of less hierarchical kin-based societies. The causal reladonship b e w e n primary state formation and dass formation has been the focus of a long and vociferous debate among anthropologists (e.g., Fried 1967, 1975; Service 1975; Carneiro 1970, 1978, 1981).We follow many anthropologists in adopting the important distinction

berween pristine or primary states (which developed wirhout contact with other prior existing states) and reactive or secondary states (which developed in interaction with other states). The same distinction can, of course, be applied m empires, and W do so in category 11-B of our ypolog.6 Much of the work done on the emergence of primary chiefdoms and primary states has not considered explicitly that these developments occurred within the context of existing intersocietal nenvorks and coreiperiphery relations. But some of the literature does consider the interaction4 and regional context in which primary state formadon occurred.7 Contrary to any simple Functionat theory of state formation, the archaeological evidence indicates that increases in social hierarchies are problematic and conftict-ridden. Some of the evidence about the rise and fall of chiefifarns is summarized in Michaef Mannhssay on "how prehistoric penpies evaded power" (1386, chap. 2). Patricia Crone (1986) argues that primary state formation occurred only twice in human histov, once in Mesopotamia and oncc in Mmoamerica. Conrrary to our list in item 11-A above, she argues that stare formation in E u p t , the Indus Valtey, the Ganges Valley, China, and Peru were secondary, having been importantly stimulated by the prior dwelopmetlts in Lowr Mesopoamia and Meico.8 Cmn& emphasis on kinship as "naturz!" form of sociai order leads her to disthguish bemeen "tribal" and '%emple3\conomies. She argues that primary state formation in !Llesopotamia and Mexico took the form of '"remple economies," in i n k h religon constituted a new form of social organizrttion that did not utilize kinship as its basis. All producers were seen as slaves of god, inchuding political leaders. Thus, according to Gone, the first stares w r e ""egaliearian.'" competition, especially vvarfare, increased bemeen ciry-states, military leaders were able to displace refigious leaders, One major defect of this explanation is the lack of an account for the origin of rhe new religions. There is evidence that these retigons were vehicles for the seizmre o h i d power via control of specializd knowledge nwessary to operate production systems, 'I'he portray2 of p r i m q state formation as "editarim" fdls easily incu Eirmiondism. The theory of circunlxriptian proposed by Carneiro (1970) and developed by Mann (1986) mci Jahnson and Earle (1987) takes l a d and regiond social strtrcrures into Xcount and is a much more permasive explmation of primary state Eormation. According to the circumscription hypothesis, intensification of the production of food normally leads to population growth and increased pressure on local resources. If people have access to new regions in which production processes with which they are familiar can be undertaken, they will migrate. State formation occurs when na outlet exists for emigration (a condition of circumscription) and so consequent population pressure susmills increasing competition &r scarce resources. This kind of competition leads to conflict and endemic warfare. ConAict can be reduced through the erection of hierarchical structures (states) that enforce the social peace and regulate the use of resources, This approach can also fall into a functionalist made. Obviously some members of society benefit more than others when stares emerge. The uneven, rise-and-fall na-

ture of state formation indicates that the process is m r h i n g but smooth. Mands principle that people will try to wade power is evinced in the emergence of class conflict and conflict among elite groups vying for power in the new states. These states also contend with each other for access to trade routes and for opportunities to obtain raw materials from distant sources. A division of labor b e m e n core producers and peripheral hinterlands emerges and becomes another arena of struggle. The transition from "temple economy" to militarized ciry-states mentioned by Crone is consistent with this scenario of increasing competition. This process opemted differently to some extent in each instance of primary state formation. Early empire formarion in the valley of the Nile was facilitated by topography. A key centrdizable resource, control of riverine transport and communications was fairly simply accomplished by a single political organization-the Egyptian state. The less centralizabie transportation network of Mesopotamia operated to susrain a multicentric inter-ciy-state system for hundreds of ycars. What at times confuses discussions of the larger context of state formation is the role of nomadic peoples. Once states existed, nomadic groups were greatly transformed by their interactions with states. It is for this reason that we must be extremely cautious in using more recent historicd howledge of nomad-sedentary interactions in our eRorts to explain the origins of primar). states.9 Studies of nomad-sedentary retations demonstratrc: char nomadic groups, whether foragers or patoralists, okrn oscillated bemeen trading and raiding. This is because ciry-dweIlers and nomads produced very different tyres of goods and were subject to very different patterns of stress and volatitlry (see Cribb 1331, chap. 3). Nemad raids prompted the development of defensive meGhaaisms on the part of urbanized core societies, both passive (vvalled cicies) and active (wmies and, %&erthe domestication of horses, czvalries), Military organizarions that had been developed For deknsc against nomads were often also useful against sedentary neighbors, leading to a situation of continual military competition. The specifics of such competition, its variability, and its consequences for further historical development remain empirical problems. A key point here is that we must examine the entire interaction system if vve are to understand these transformations. Within category II (tributary modes dominant) there are a number of distinctions that need to be explained. We hypothesize that primary state-based world-systems were politically structured as interstate systems of competing ciry-states within a core region. Secondary multicentric empire systems are distinguished from primary empire systems by the prior existence of empires and oken by the larger size of the constituent empires. The commercializing Afmeurasian world-system is distinguished from most earlier systems by its size, the existence of widely separated core regions, and most important, the increasing cornmodification of goods, land, wealth, and labor. The use of money spread to the day-to-day lives of common people with the dwelopment ot standardized denominations of coins, Forms of credit and interest became widespread and important. Wage labor and other semicornmodified forms of labor

TWO, Three, Many Worlict-Systems 1 47

control became more common. Price-setting markets and commodity production for sde became more widespread within the political economy. wthin empires, rulers becme somewhat more sophisticated about the way in Aich r h q taxed merchants and commodity producers so as not to "kill the golden goose." Outside the bounds of empires, in interstitial semiperipheral regions, autonomous cly-states controlled by merchant and production capidists created and susmined market relations beween empires and periphed regions. The degree of cornmodification increased, but unevenly and not in the same way in each area. There were spuru ahead and then either dwolution to subsistence feudalism or reafserrim of imperial contr~lof the economy, The cuming to predominance of capitalism in a care region was a tipping point that nearly occurred first in Sung and Ming China (Fitzpatrick 1992). The differential impact of the Mongol Empire stalled capitalist development in China and created the opportunity for Europe, a former peripherd region, to emerge as the first regional sptem in which capitdism was the pfedorninant mode of accumuiation. The expanding European system then spread capidism around the vvorld, W do not want sur rypolog to generate a lot of dispute about which cases go into vvhich categories, Obviously there are many borderline cases for which it is difficult to decide. Rather, the point is to define a set of ~ p that e vvill ~ dim us to investigate the problem of structurd similarities and diEerences. A cornpiemenary approach would be to analyze very long historical sequences that include the transformations of rfie social structural chamcteBstiu &at we arf: wing to distinguish m o n g our types. This would eliminate the probXern of "transitional""cases 2nd would focus attention on those m4or trmsformations that must be studied in order to provide a comparative bask far understanding the psssjbilities of hndamentd change in our own time. We contend that the job of mapping out strucmral similarities and diff-erencesis Jogically prior to the analysis of processes of transformation. We now present some general queseions and working hypotl-reses rhar emerge kom our comparative appmach.

Questions and Hypotheses The most pneral questions for a comparative study of world-systems are: I. Do all world-systems have coreiperiphery differentiation andlor core/periphery hierarchies? 2. Do the smbiliry, magnitude, and nature of core/periphery relations vary systematicaily with the types of societies that compose world-systems? 3, What is the relationship beween curefperipberp diKerentision and core/ periphery hierarchy within single world-systems and over the range of woddsystem types? 4, m a t are the relationships bemeen codperiphery structures and processes and the reproductionlrransformation of basic systemic logics?

48 /


Three; M a ~ W~r&-System.~ y

5. '\What are the similarities and diPfefences b e m e n sequences of political centralization and decentdization across diKerent kinds of world-systems? lntersocierai n e w o r b in which the constituent societies are d Z II at about the same level of complexity do not have coreiperiphery differentiation as defined above. Nevertheless, they may evince coreiperiphery hierarchy if some of these societies exploit or dominate others. Do all world-systems have relatively stable coreiperiphery hierarchies in the sense that some societies exploit or dominate others over extended periods of time? This involves consideration of the nature, degree, and longeviry of inrersocietal exploitation atid domination. In addition, it is desirable to consider differential rates of development, "coevolution," the development of underdevelopment, and processes aEecting these to determine if and how socially structured intetsocieral relaions may produce these results. AIso of inrerest are the relative sizes of core, peripheral, and semiyeripherd areas a d the namre of retations among core societies and among peripheral societies,

Our first hypothesis is that stable relations of ineclrsocietd domination are digcult to create and reproduce in the absence of hierarchicd social institutions within the societies involved, The development of intern4 strarification and forms of she state are quire important for the stabilizarion and reproduction of ~areiperipher~ exptoitaGon, and vice versa, Thus we hypathesize that kin-baed intcrsocietd systems had only minimal and short-lived corelperiphery hierarchies, We expecr that those wodd-systems composed of chidess sedentaq foragers did not have any regularized intersocietal domination or exploitation. We suppose that intersocietal exploitation among sedentary foraging groups is limited to episodic raiding and competition over favorable natural sites. When these egalitarian societies became involved in interaction with more hierarchical societies, they may have engaged in raiding for captives to trade. War-captive slavery in these societies did not usually create a permanent class of slave producers because slaves must be incorporated into existing kinship n e m o r h if their labor is to be mobilized. Kinship nenvorks of this kind bestow righo as well as obligations, and so slaves did not usually form a permanent class of exploited producers (Patterson 1982).1° kistiansen (1 982, 1987, 1991) has studied local and regional hierarchical relations among Bronze-Age chiefdoms in Scandinavia. fithough he uses the terms core and periphery to describe these relations, he characterizes them as based on the "ritual superioriry" of local centers over hinterlands based on the control of prestige goods. Friedman and Rowlands (1977) have argued that coreiperiphery structures based solely on prestige-goods economies are relatively unsrable. To some extent this is because it may be dimcult for the elites to monopolize the importation of prestige goods. Conrrol of a periphery by a core rhat is based solely on the supply of presrige goods or ritual superioriry is likely to be unstable. This is because peripheral areas

may readily substitute other goods, or they may adopt core-like characteristics when the ideological structure of intersocietal stratification is not backed up by military coercion or more stringent dependencies on nonreplaceable goods. 13restige-goods hierarchies and reiigious hierarchies are morr subject to redetinirion by oppressed groups, whereas military advantages and monopolies of basic foods or raw materials are Less easily outmaneuvered. Katherine Spielmanris (1989, 1991a, 1991b, 1991c) discussion of Plains-Pueblo interactions is of considerable interest here. She delineates two ways in which exchange berween what had theretofore been relatively autonomous groups could have dweloped into systemic exchange (coreiperiphery differentiation in our terms). The first scenario, h i c h she favors, is rnzktgdlism, in which sedentaq horticufturaIists (the Pueblo peoples) engaged in systematic exchange with nomadic hunters (Plains groups) in such a way that the total caloric intake over the necessary variety of food types mutually benefited both Plains and Pueblos. The second possible explanarion, fawred by Wilcox (1331) m d Baugh (1931), is bufering, in which sedentary agricdrurdiscs used exchange with nomadic hunters to buEer volatile production resdts in marginal horticultural !an& The lafter characerizatio~isuggesB the possibiliry of unequal exchange and the existence of a kind of corelperiphery hitlrarchy, The ability to differentiate empirically beween equal. exchange and exploitation is one of the most chdlenging problems for wrld-sysrems research. Core-peripher). relations difier in their effects on the interacting sncieties in different world-systems. Under some ciwcunstances, core-periphery interactions cause spead eKects, whereas orher sons of interactions cause baclhmh efecrs. It is not entirely ciear at this point which conditions prmoce spreari eEfects m d h i & conditions p r m o r e bacbash effecrs, The foIlowing m o hypothee suggest some generd patterns,

Hypothesis 2 Our second hypothesis is that the stabiliry and exploitariveness of core/~eripheryhierarchies increasr with the degree of stratiiicatiun within core societies and with the development of ""tchniques of powerY"Mann 1986), which enable centrdized empires to extract taxes and tribute from peripheral regions. Specialized military organization, logistics, srrategy, and weaponry as well as organizational techniques for ruling distant prwinces and extracting tribute and t s e s are the key instirwions that dlow core daminatisn to work, We hypothesize that primary states were more successful at extracting resources from peripheral areas than kn-based cores$but still not %is suaessfuX af later, more centrdized, empires. Furthermore, in early state systems, spread effects due to interaction with original core areas (Schoman and Urban 138> Renfrew and Cherry 1386) were relatively strong in comparison with bacbash eRecrf. This was because the techniques for concentrating and susr&ning resources in the care were Less developed than in later empires,"



Tuto, Three, Many W"orIld-Systems

Thus we further hypothesize that co~iperipheryhimrchies wcre relatively more stable, more hierarchical, and more underdevelopmental for peripheral regions once centralized empires emerged and perkcred their techniques of powr.

Our third hypothesis is that the arpansion of long-distance exchange and the growth of market forms of exchange and monetary systems increased spread effects relative to backwash effects. Peripheral regions were able to adopt the social and technological features of core regions more quickly once long-distance trade became more intensified and commodified. The more sophisticated empires learned to extract surplus from market trade without smothering it. Empires that provided pacification and protected trade routes strenglthened spread eEects.12 Commercidized states also lamed ro control some of the disruptive aspects of market relations. h c i e n t mrelperiphery hierarchies were often. centrd to the reproduction of centralized stare apparatuses. Keirh Hopkins (1978b) contends that the Roman Empire W% a system that, like capitalism, needed to expand in order to suwive. But unlike z-he capitalist world-economy; its expansion was based drnost exclusively on the conquest and exyloitation of peripherd regions. The importation of booty and daves and the distribution of land and dependent laborers to a growing class of nonprodlrcers were the major 4narnic forces causing g r m h in the h n a n system. W e n the empire reached a zero rate of return in terms of spatid expansion it was no Iongrr able to pmvidc: the resources necessq to sumin its growing owrhmd casts. It then began to turn in upon itself, and eventually crumbled. Hopkinsb model, which is similar to the andysis of hderson (19744, sees the ""brbarian invasians" as emgenaus shocks that coajuncturally dismembered a state that was already fdling f;om its ovvn contrdictians. However, the analysis of Eurasia as a single world-system of which the Rornan Empirc was a part casts the barbarian invasions in a nav light (see Chapter 8). In China the mode of accumulation was "tributary""in the sense that coercive power was used to extract surplus product from peasants, but this accumulation was accomplished with little exploitation of peripheral regions. At the eastern end of the Eurasian system the periphery regularly exploited the core for the two millennia bemeen around 500 B,C.E, and 1500 C.E. and had mqor egects on the dwelopment of Chinese civilization (Barfield 1989; see also Chagter 8). m e r h e r as a source of exploitable resources or military threats, ~eripheralregions were important to the reproduction and transformation of social structures within the core regions of the d a f s i d world. The emergent predominance of capitalism in the Europe-centered subsystem pmduced a coreiperiphery hierarchy in which the gap berween core and periphery rapidly increased. This occurred because technological change was much more rapid than it had been in systems dominated by the tributaq mode. This was due to rhe historidly unique effeccs of capitalism on incentives for rwolutianizing technology.

Two, Three, Many WDTM-Systems 1


Capitalism also protected the interstate system against empire formation by substituting the rise and fall of hegemonic core powers for the rise and fall of corewide empires (see Chase-Dunn 1 990b). This helped to sustain the high rate of technological innovation and implemenration. The core/periphery gap in the modern world-systern is a relative one in which peripheral areas do develop, but at much slower rates than the core. Regarding the matter of orelperiphery relations and transformations of the mode of accumulation, world-system theory contends that capitalism is buffered from its own developmental contradictions by the coreiperiphery hierarchy (Chase-Dunn 1989, chap. 11). This implies that peripheral capitalism and core exploitation of the periphery should be understood ar necessary and constirutive parts of the capitalist mode of accumulation. The modern core/periphery hierarchy acts to sustain the multipoliry structure of the core (the interstate system) and to disorganize those political forces within core states that would try to transform capitalism into socialism. This last consequence i s accomplished primarily by sustaining national class alliances benveen labor and capital within core states. This alliance is cemented by intracore rivdry and peripheral exploitarion.

Many semiperipheral regions have played important roles in large-scale social change. We hyyothesize that &is is becarlse of the organizational opportunities available to groups who are "'in the middie'hf corelperiphery hierarchies. Semiperipheral regions, vve argue, are unusually fertile mnes for social innovarion because they c m combine periipherai and core elements in new ways, and they are less constrained by core domination than are peripherd areas, and less committed than older core regions to the institutiond baaage that [email protected] with core starus, We expect that the particular techniques used by upwardly mobile semiperirheries vary dgpertding on the nature of the wodd-system in which they are operating. b u r vpes of semiperipheral development are delineatecl in Chapter S .

These woricing hypotheses form a srafting poiac for systematic empirical [email protected] of the evolution of world-systems. By redefining world-systems in general terms, vve propose to sort out the important similariris and digerenas that oughr to be the explicit backdrop for understanding past transfsrmations a i d futurc human possibilities. Not m y h i n g is different now, nor is everything the same. In order to know tvhich things are importantly different and which things are importantly the s m e , it is helph1 to have a systematic rheoretical frmework for comparing vvaridsystems. Eventuatly it will be necessary to compare formally large numbers of worldsystems in order to evduate Ery-potheses about similarities, diEerences, and the causal connections bemeen structures and transformations.



Two,Three, Many WQ~M-Systems

Now that we have explained our comparative framework, we must address the probfem of spatially bounding world-s)rstems.

Spatial Boundaries: A Multicriteria Approach We follow those theorists who stu-CLy interaction n e w o r h rather than those who study dktributjons of cultural or social traits. The latter do not address the problem of interconnectedness. In general we think that it is presumptuous to argue that some forms of interaction are alway causally more importmt h r social change than others. Since the relative irrrpsrtance of diKerent types of interaction probably varies across different kinds of systems, statements about relative importance should be the result of research, not its initial assumptions. O n the basis of our discussion in Chapter 1, we propose usillg four ypes of exchanges or inresacrions br bounding criteria:

* bulk-goods nemork (BGN) prestige-goods nenvork (PGN) politicd-tllnnilitary11ework f13h?rilN) * information nenvork (IN) Both economic and politicat forms of interaction are important features of alI world-system n e w o r b , VVi: agree with Wallerstein (1374a, 1374b, I979a) that bulk-goods exchanges are very important and constitutive hrms of interconnection, but we also agree with Schneider (1977) that luxury goods, especially when they are used in a prestige-goods economy, are very important for the reproduction of power structures. Intermarriage nenrorks are also central institutions of interconnectedness in most systems, but especially in kin-based systems, where the exchange of marriage partners is a fundamental basis of geopolitics and geoeconomics. We also agree with Tilly (1984, 62) and Wilkinson (19873, 1987b) that political interconnections are important. We employ the criterion of regularized politicd-military conflict proposed by Wilkinson. Often this will produce a nenvork different from the bulkgoods and prestige-goods networks. Following the insights of Schortman and Urban (1387), discussions of civilizationists (Melko and Scott 1187; Melko 1975), and Jerry Bentleqs (1913) masterful survey of cross-cultural encounters in Eurasia, we now that nerworks of information in a variety of Forms, including ideology, religion, and tecfinicat information, must also be induded as s boundir~gmechanism. We do not expect the information network to coincide with any of the orher nenvorks. Hence all regularized material and social exchanges should be included as crireria for bounding world-systems. This formulation makes it necessary to consider how relatively localized nenvorks of bulk-goods exchange, intermarriage, and political interaction are embedded within larger networks of prestige-goods exchange in many systems. We must also consider rhe relationship of the information nenvork to the other nemorks.

TWQ* Three;Mgny Work-Systems 1 53

The use of multiple bounding criteria often will result in nested lwels of system boundedness. Generally, bulk goods will compose the smallest regional interaction net. Politicallmilitary interaction will compose a larger net that may include more than one bulk-goods net, and prestige-goods exchanges will link even larger regions that may contain one or more politid/military nets (see Figure 3. l). We expect the information net to be of the same order of size as the prestige goods nec sometimes larger, sometimes smaller. At first it may seem counterintuitive to have the information boundary inside the presdge goods exchange, since exchange of goods rypically implies some exchange of infornation. There are, howwer, well-known mechanisms by which goods can be exchanged beyond the range of information. First is down-the-line trade. When trade goes from partner to partner, the physical objects may move dong unaltered, but information rypicdly will be garbled and lost. Anyone who has observed the transformations of a phrase whispered from person to person recognizes how quickly information may be Lost. Occasionally, when wxfate is severe, the politicallmilitary bouxldav may cut the Aow of information even tvhle prestig goods may eftectiwly cross the boundary via circuitous down-the-line exchanges (this is indicated in Figure 3. X by the Lobe of the infbrmation net in the lower right that coincides with one politicallmilitary net). The bulk-goods net of the b m a n Empire was smaller than the system of regularized milirary interaaions of which the Romarrs were a part. The prestige-pods network, utitizing the '"Silk Roads," linked the Chinese, Indian, and Romm core regions into an Afroeurasian PGN. Finally; sometimes missionaries or explorers regularly carried information beyond the bounds of prestige or luxury goods exc h a v (see Cfiapter 8). Rather than to apply the term mrid-system to only one of these types of linkage and using other words for the others, we propose that entire world-systems are constituted by all of these f a r m of linkage. In order to be clear, vvrz will use terms that indicate the interaction nemorks we are studying, Thus we shall rekr to bulk-goods nenvorks fBGNs), prestige-goods nenvorks (PGNs), poiirical/militafy newarks (BMNs), and information n e m o r h (INS). All of rhese nets in combination constitute an entire world-system, We do not claim that the newarks will always be n e s t 4 in t-he fashion described. Indeed, the relative sizes of rhese fbur boundary criteria remain a tharetical and empirial problem. Occasionalty, as in both clre modern global wodd-system and some earlier geographically isalated systems (e.g., the Hawaiian Islands), these four netwrks converge. This convergence may be an important characteristic that diRerentiares so= world-system h r n others. In many caes the boundaries of t h e networks may [email protected] hzzy. It will be necessary to deline kgrees of cannectedness and to study the importance of different sorts of connections for social change. Here again, hrther enlpirical research will guide the specification of nenvork boundaries, We use the notion of fall-off to bound world-systems. Thus, as described in Chapter L , world-systems are best bounded on a "group-centric" rather than a

$4 1 Two, Three, iMany WO?&-Systems

FIGUM 3.1 Nesting of the Boundaries of the Four Nenvorks of Exchange

""system-centric" basis. Colin Renfxew7s(1475, 1377) discussion of models of falloff provides a t o d f70r determining different kinds of exchange. We me the idea of fall-off in a more general sense tu include the fparial range of any kind of action. Obviously, the spatial range of consequences of all kinds of action increase as transport and communications costs decrease. Since there is considerable ethnographic and archaeological evidence that even nomadic foragers can pass goods over great distances, it is conceivable-even likely---that the prestige-goods net may be several orders o f magnitude Iarger than the ather nets,'" Thus we use the notion of "fall-off" of effects over space to bound the neovork, of interacdon that importantly impfngf: upon ally focd locale. The wdd-system of which any locality is a part includes those peoples whose actions in production, communication, warfare, alliance, and trade have a large and interactive impact on that locality, k is also impoxtmt to distinguish bemeen endogenous systemic inttraction processes and exogenous impacts that may importantly change a system but are not part of that system. For example, maize difFused from Mesoamerica to eastern North Annerica, bur rhat need not mean that the w o areas were past of the same world-system. Or a virulent pahogen mighc contact and ravage a population with

no developed immunity. But such an event does not necessarily mean that the region from which the microparasite came and the region it penetrated are parts of a single interactive system. Interactions must be two-way and regularized to be systemic. One-shot deals do not a system make, We hold that the question of the nature and degree of systemic interaction between two locales is prior to the question of corelperiphery relations. The first question for any focal locale is about the nature and spatial characteristicsof its links with the four interaction newarks we have described. This question is prior to any mnsideration of corelperiphery position because one region must be linked to another by systemic interaction in order for consideration of core/periphery relations to be relevant. We also note that the question of corelperiphery relations mwt be arkedfor eadi nemork. It is more difficult to project power over long distances, and so we should not expect to find strong corelperiphery hierarchies in the information or prestige-goods nenvorks. Armed with a working t y p o l o ~and some guides for mapping world-systems, we now suggest how to begin building a theory of world-system transformations,

Steps Toward a Theory o f Transformations Fram our andyses of modes of accumulation we can see that there are only three major watersheds m compare:

t . the transition Erom kin-based ro state-based f tributapy) logics; 2. the transition from sate-based (tributary) to capitalist Iogics; and 3, a possible transition from a capitalist to a socialist (or other) logic. Since the third transition has not yet occurred, we actually have only WO transformations of modes of accumulation to study. Since theory-building must be based on carehi comparative studies of all instances of transformations, we must examine all of the following:

* all instances of p r i r n v chiefiorn formation; * all occurrences of primary state formation; * instances of failed transformations, such as Sung China, wherft capitalism almost emerged; and * the singfe emergence of the capitdist mode of accurxluiation. We have not completed such a comparative studgi. At this point we can onlly offer our desiderata for constructing a theory of transformations and formulate some tentative questions to be pursued. First and foremost we reiterate that it is important to analyze entire world-systems in order to understand transformations. Second, we argue that the discovery of similarities among world-systems or continuities within the same expanding system over

56 6 Two, Three,nifany Vor(d-Sy~~:erns time should not prevent us from perceiving and andping Important transformations. Indeed, only the clear specification of particular similarities m d continuities will enable us to say with precision what has redly chalged. We propose the follwing four research straregies: 1. Hierarc'ny shouid be appsoacbd as an empirkal issue, not as a theoretical assumption. [email protected] hierarchy, the units that are hierarehially relate& the forms of ~nrpfoitationand domination, rates of mobility, rates of expansion, peripherdizatian versus more egalitarian inreraction, the dwelupment of undercimlopment xrsus comlution-these are matters to be investigated in each cae, 2. Comodification should be conceptudized as a variable process. It should be broken down into the subcoqonents of land, labor, weal&, and goods. The forms of cornmodification should be a n d ~ dThe . extent and importance of commodil-icatianfhould be determined in comparative:perspecrive. Types of goods, forms of production, nature of payment, importance of price-setting, competitive marker fortes, atld the timing of spread should be determimd by carehi studies. 3. World-sptem interaction nemorks should be studied mpir.idly in terms of densitis, types of contact, and relationships between the four proposed interaction net+bulk-gooh, presrige-goads, politicallmjlitary intermion, and information =change, 4.The concrete study af transfbrmadon must artend to the histofical particularities of the systems being srudied. Though pacterns and ~ n e r apfinciples l may emerge from comparative analysis, they must be grounded in historical details. The assembly of a data set containing large numbers of world-systems will enable us to separate some of the more conjunctural aspects of the transformation problem from i s more systemic aspects. On the one hand, a theory of transformations can be constructed only if genera tendencies can be found. On the other hand, efforts to understand particular transformations must pay attention to the unique aspects of the relevant world-system and the nature of the modes of production involved. Before presenting our theory of world-system evolution, we need to discuss two other important sets of processes. In Chapter 4 we andyze the processes of incorporation that occur when formerly separate world-systems merge or when one engulfs another. In Chapter 5 we study the vital and volatile roles of semiperipheral regions in world-vstem change,



Explaining World-SystemEvolution

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New Territories: The Problem of lncolporation

World-systems with core/periphery hierarchies have become increasingly successhl social predators. They have absorbed, engulfed, incorporated, and merged with other world-systems for thousands of years. The results of absorption are quite varied: Some groups have been eliminated, either by annihilation or assimilation into the absorbing group; others have become ethnic minorities; some have become colonies; still others have been able to maintain limit& autonomy; md some retained extensive autonomy as parts of larger multicore world-systems. While conventional world-sysrm theory has paid considera& attention to the incorporation of periyhexd regions inro the modern world-systemt not much atcention has been given to the incorporation of stateless world-systems or to the mergers of world-systerns chat bad sirnilar levels of comylcr=xir)t;Our compamtive approach, and especiaXIy our reconceprualizacion of ~orelperipher~ relations and the spatial bounding of world-systems, provides a new perspective on the incorporation problem. Relevant literatures include comparative frontier history, studies of assimilation, and the interactions of BiEerent civilizations,

The Problem o f Incorporation We argue that the problem of vcemic Iinkqe and the problem of mrelperipher): refarians &odd be analyticdly sepwtcd. The first empirial question to be answered i s the question of systemic linkage and its nature. If m o regions are not interactively linked it makes little sense ta ask about their possible coreiperiphery relations, In our exschema of spatial necuvorks, linkage can occur in several ways-hdk-pods change, prestige-pods exchange, political-mihrary intermion, and information exchange. The question of corelperiphery relations must be askedfor edch $these networks of possible systemic interaction. Xncoryoracion involves systems that were Eormerly separate becoming linked to one another. figure 4.1 illustrates three separate world-systems. Studies sf incorporation into the modern world-sptem have focused on rhe expansion of the Europe-

FlGLaU 4.1 Three Independent World-Systems

centered core and its spreading domination of peripheralized areas. A more general and comparative approach to the incorporation problem also studies the expansions of other kinds of systems into regions occupied by peoples with less complex social organization. We also need to study mergers benveen v t e m s that have comparable levels of complexity. Our spatial nenvork schema implies that incorporations or mergers can occur at each neovork iwel. Thus separate systems are first likely to interact through their information nenvorks. If one or both are expanding, they will

later become part of a single prestige-goods nenvork (see Figure 4.29, and later still they will join into a single politicallmilitary network (Figure 4.3) and then a single bulk-goods nemork. This sequence is the same regardless of the relative lwels of complexity of the systems, But their relative levels of complexiry will often be an important element in the nature of the interactions that: occur. The biggest difEerence bemeen our comparative approach and earlier approaches that focus primarily on the expansion of the modern world-system is the realization that the incorporated regions are parts of existing world-systems, albeit ones that may be rather different from the incorporating system. Many writers have emphasized the problematic nature of incorporation into the modern world-system (Aguirre Beltran 1779; Arrighi 1979; T. Hall 1983, 1986, 1989; Hopkins et al. 1987; Snipp 198Ga, 138Gb; So 1984; Sokolovsky 1985; Wallerstein and Martin 1979).We conceptualize incorporation as a continuum that ranges from weak to strong (see T. Hall 1986, 1989). Labeling as periphecll all kinds of strong and weak incorporation masks important variations and makes it more difficult to understand JiRerent processes and outcomes that occur on the borden of world-systems. Incorporation is a continuum (see Figure 4.4). At the weak pole are areas crrtcrnal. to a worid-system; next are areas where contact h a been slight. We c41 these m e r d wenas and conact peripheries, respectively Xn the middle r a n g are ~pberies,or [email protected] re&ge."indly, at the strong pole are M-bfawn or dependent peripheries. Many studies af modern world-system theory focus primarily on the latter (Chilcote and Johnson 1983; Chilcote 1384; Chirot 1381; h g i n 1985). One important mnsiderarion in any case of incarpation is the degree of emnomic articulation bemeen an expanding world-syftem and a region that is being absorbed. It is important to determine the quantit). of goods rransferrerl, the type of p o d s (e.g., the amount of labor invofved in their pmduction and h e t h e r they are raw products, manufactured goods, or prestige pods), the degtee of centralization of che exchange: process, and the relative importance of the trgnsfer to each econmy. At the weak pole of the continuum in Figure 4.4 are areas only slightly connected to an expanding world-system; the primary influence will be from core areas to peripherai areas. For instance, the ful-s taken from northwest North h e r i c a w r e not vitd to European economies, yet the trade produced major social and economic changes in indigenous world-systems.2 We must note here that there is a problem of size disparity. Often trade with one peripheral region has no major impact on the core, whereas trade with all peripheries combined may have a significant impact. Thus the fur trade as a whole generated a sizable demand from the European core for cheaply manufactured silnple rnetd tools, At the strong pole, exchange is important to core development and often transfnrrns peripheral regions considerably. These regiians suEer Erom backwash eFFects, Influence and goods still flow in both directions, but net product and wealth Bows

FIGUW 4.2 'lhree World-Systems Mergd at ksrige-Goods and Enfarrnarion Weworks

F I G U E 4.3 Three World-Systems with Merged Prestige-Goods and fnf;lrmacian Nenvorks, Two with Merged I)01iricd/Milirw Nemorks

F1GUE 4.4 Continuum of incorporation (modified from Hall 1986, 1383) Strength of Incorporation





Impact of Core on Periphev








Impact of Periphey on Core None

Names for Types of Peripheries Hall and ChaseDunn and Hall

External Arena


Marginal or Full-Blown/ [email protected] of k h g e Dependent



External h e n a



Frank and Gills











1 a

hripherdization nPeripheqor Structural Interdependence


d Periphey

are toward the core. This conceptudization differs somewha horn that of csnvttntional studies of the modern world-system, which concentrate on strongly integrated peripheries. Since the Eheofy of the modern world-system explicitly focuses only on the capitdist wodd-economy, its primary concern is with the accumulation of capital and the transformation of productive processes that further that goal. Thus incorporation is defined as "the integration of its production processes into the interdependent network o f production processes that constitute the world market" (Wallerstein and Martin 1979, 113).This is called effective or real incorporation, which is "'a situation in which the pattrrns of production and reproduction %ical of externd arenas have ceased ro be dominant within the regon and tend to disintewte qua syscems" (Arrighi 1 973, 162). A situation in which "poliriral domination by an external power andlor economic relations with the capitalist world-economy have been established but the dominant patterns of production and reproduction within the region are stiH those typicaj of cnrternd arenas'" is termed nominal or faxrnaf inmrporation. Furthermore, "fefvcn if

they are not, d~ouldfor any reason political domination cease andior ecvnomic rclations with the capitalist world-econamy be severed, there wwld be a tenJiency tow r d the re-establishment of those patterns'" (Axrighi 1379, 161-1 62). Sokolovsky aelds that "Lilt follows &at while power relacions are a vital aspect of the systm, by itself plunder does not constitute effective incorporation" (1985, 49). Both Arrighi (1973) and Sokolovsky 0985) make it clear that for conventionaf wurld-system theory, incorporation invotves only effectbe incorporatian.3 Wdlerstein (1989, chap. 3) argues that for the rnodcrn wdd-system, even when an area has been plundered by a core power, ic is naf yet incorporated and peripheralixd until local poduction has become integrdly linked into the "commodity chains'" of the larger world-system, It has often been observed that plunder preceded the development of coerced production in both the ancient empires and the Europecentesed world-system. Indeed, there may have been systems, such as the NuerDinka m e (Kelly 19851, in d i c h plunder W% the sole form of coreipePiphery interaction. Plunder can have profound consequences for l o d groups and may he a central feature of some wrl.d-systems. Follovving Wilkinson, vve indude regularized plunder as a form of incorporation ( h e politicailmilitary net). Thus West Africa w s incorporated into the modern A d - s y s t e m when slave raiding became regularized rather than, as Walferstein would have it, aftet the development of colonial agriculture in Mrica.4 Ewlronric exploitation is a more stable form of exploitation than plunder because it does not decimate the periphed society to the same extent that plunder does, nor typially d o a it ehaust resources as rapidly, It is not the case, however, that precapitalist cores only extracted tribute and left production processes untouched. The lncas completely reorgmized production in incorporated territories and, relocated intensified horticulture could be carried out (La populations m new regions in &i& Lone and La Lone 1987; h b n e 1382, 1331, 1333).$A comparative appmach must t~ccommodarevarious forms af incorporation and examine their consequences for social chalzge in both the core and the periphery. Wi: have noted that the study of incorporation into the modern world-system has emphasized transformations of production over political domination, luxury or prestige-goods trade, or plundering of resources. Alvin So (1984) criticizes the concept of incorporation for being too simple. He distinguishes beoveen political and economic incorporation, and he shows how the Opium Wars (1840s) ~rompteda lessening of incorporation for Canton and an increase for Shanghai. According to So, the reduced incorporation of Canton in the 1840s gave rise to unemployment, peasant uprisings, and rebellions. He emphasizes that incorporation is a process that is strongly shaped by local actions and conditions. Here it is important to clarify how our approach to incorporation differs from the conventional approach as well as from So's modified version. The rows labeled "Wdlerstein"' and Xrrighi" in Figrrre 4.4 illustralr the differences. h one level the diEfercnce is a judgment call about just how much incorporation consti~utesincarporation. Our conceptualization sets the lwel considerably lower than in other mod-

els. At a deeper level, there is a disagreement about just what constitutes incorporation-irreversible change, or malleable change. We opt for the latter for the reasons discussed in the following secdon,

Problems Due to a Truncated Continuum of Incorporation The assumption that the severing of "nominal" incorporation would result in "a tendency toward the re-establishment of those [former] patterns" (Arrighi 1971, 161-162) traps conventional world-system theory into several serious empirical and theoretical errors, First, the eEects of m n short-term weak incorporation are ofeen quite drastic for some peripheral regions and peoples. Second, though there is indeed some tendency to return to the status quo ante, change induced by even mild incorporation ofren tends to persist--even when the degree of incorporation is lowered or eliminated. These two points in turn underscore the importance of conceptualizing incorporation as a continuum, not as a series of stages. Finally, for our discussion of world-system tclnsformations the most important error is to misread radically the processes of' sociocuftural evulution (see Sanderson 1930, 1 9 % ; or Lenski, Nolan, and k m s k 1335). Severd examples ofthe effects of even slight incorporation on those peoples and fegions incorparaced are discussed in Part Three of t h s book, but w o dramatic exarnples come from the encounters bemeen Europeans and the indigenous populations of North. h e r i c a . Early after contact flare sixteenth and eady seventeenth centuries) fur trade benveen various indigenous groups and Europeans began and accelerated, This trade brought several dramaric Ghangcs to indigenous social organization. First was a dependenq on Errropeaa p o d s as metd pots and cutcing implements replaced more frarrgible pots, baskets, and stone tools. Griricaf here was that acquisition of important goods (such as guns) for which indigenous peoples could not manufacture substitutes. As the desire for European goods turned into a need, more furs were required in order to acquire European goods. This led to loverharvesc. ing of game and a chain reaction of expansion in search of new hunting grounds, which in turn heightened warfare. Increased competition for hunting grounds changed the nature of warfare--an agile wrrior sometimes can dodge an arrow (&ler 1%32),"bur not a bullet, so line fighting gave way to what we would today call guerrilla fighting---and converted guns from a luxury to a necessity. The pursuit of furs pushed some peoples toward a different cype of social organization in which families scattered in the winter to pursue fur-bearing animals (Meyer 1994). Combined with increased hunting, this increasingly left women in charge of home camps with men absent for long periods. In other regions the increase in fighting led to increased fortifications. Finally, increased travel, contact, and migration helped to spread epidemic diseases, often ahead of European contact. The impact of disease could be devastating to the maintenance af local social structures ( k f f 1331; Thornton 1387; Thornton, Miller, and Warren


Findly*it shoufd be noted that in the southeast Cherokees be volved in what Dunaway ( 2 394, 1996a, 1396b) calls "a puttin by Fareign merchant-entrepreneurs" (1934, 237). In this case nor only was culture transfarmed but also techniqucss of production w r e changlrd. This was thus effective incorporation even in rhe terms of conventionat world-system theov: ""As export production was entrenched, there emerged new hunting and warfare techniques, an altered division of labor within the household and within the village, and a reformed relationhip with precoloniai sociecy t m d secular and national governance, event u d y creating the 'tribal half-govemment\chat permitted the Europeans to treat the Cherokees as a unified corporate entity" (Dunaway I; 994,237). The second example is the spread of horses from colonies in New Mexico to Apachean arld other foraging groups, especially those groups living on the fringes of what we h o w today as the Great Plains (Secoy 1953; Mishkin 1940).The difision of this new means of transportation and hunting, the horse, dramatically ttansfarmed all groltps who q u i r e d it, Homes differ from mosr other hopean-introduced technulogies: They reproduce wirhout any human intemention; and with human internemion r e p r h c t i o n is even faster. Possession of horses transfarmed a rare and dangerous hunt into m e with far less darrgr and fal- greater chance of success, It allowed bofh eoncentratkn and dispersal of gopulations' and transformed ersmhil sedentay (or sometimes semisdentay) horticulrlrralists inm full-time nomadic hunters. The access to a readily available, high quality protein8 sourcebison-allowed papulacion efBorescence alld attracted migranrs to the piains, especially those from Eorested areas who were losing territory to better armed fur gatherers. Again, competition and warfare increased. The availabiliry of horses produced some of the rnosr drmatic social transformations that c m e from even mijd incorporation into the European world-econorny.9 These two examples highlight the second and third theoretical difficulties that arise from too narrm a focus on "eeffeceive" or "full-bluwxiYncorporarion. Short of removing horses from the Great Plains, there is no way Plains Indians cultures could have returned to the status quo ante. Many Plains groups were only slightly incorporated into the European world-system, at best as contact peripheries. Many analysts would consider them to be in the "external. arena" "because horses had become feral in the VVest and contact with Europeans had been severed, Tfte riegree o lack of--incorporation of Plains groups highlights the inherent fuzziness of rhe lower limits of incorporation. Our point here is not to draw some arbitrary line but rather to emphasize the care that must be taken when studying incorporarion. The fur trade might provide a better fit with the notion of formal (but not effective) incorporation. Here one can imagine the disappearance of Europeans and rhe cessation of trade in metal goods. Given time, social relations and organizadon might have rerurned to previous conditions, assuming a replenishing of game and popukdon recovery from disease. Howwer, this would have been rather unlikely First, population recovery would not necessarily have led to restoration of prior social conditions. Epidemics can sometimes undermine the very basis of culture and social structure if too

New Errit~ries / 67

many of those who possess special knowledge die. Short of population reurvery, previous social structures may not be able to be rebuilt for lack of personnel to s& them. As population does recover, people may discover new solutions to old problems, which may di&r considerably from the "old" solutions that were lost during the decline. Furthermore, to the degree that European goods were seen as useful, attempts would have been made to acquire them through alternative channels, if such misted, or to dwelop ways of making substitutes. Here we should not lose sight of the impact on basic knowledge. Once a group has seen a technology, its members at least know that it exists. Depending on resources and fundamental skills, they may or may not be able to reconstruct it. Even when they cannot reconstruct it, knowledge of its existence may precipitate quests to acquire it that would not othemise have occurred. Both of these scenarios illustrate how in some cases the distinction bemeen information and prestige goods can blur and how the nvo can blend together. The impact of new knowledge, like that of horses or disease, sometimes can reverberate throughout a vvortd-system. These exaples demonstrate the utilirry of conceptualizing incorporation as a continuum rather than as a dichommy or even as three or four srages. k r y mild degrees of incorporation often bring significant and irreversibie chant;es to incorporated groups, Other examples may be gleaned horn the hisfor)r of what is now the k u t h west of the United States. Toward the end of the era of Spanish control, in the Late eighteenth cerztur;v, there was an increase in the degree of incorporation and a consequent decline in frontier wrfare, TVhen the degree of incorporation lessened wirh the unrest and wentud rebdlion of Mexico against Spain (1 810-1 82l), fightiq bemeen Emntier Hispanic sealers and nomndic Indian groups increased on the hncier as stare resources used for rations to guarantee the peace becme scarce (Hail 1389, and n,d.). If we restrict the range of incorporation to the strmg (efiFective) pole, the ratlge of social changes provoked by men slight shifis in depee of incorporation are masked because this restriction inadverrently holds incoryoratiort constant, Consequently the social, political, and cultural changes engendered by slight shifts in degree of incorporation are not noticed. Thus it becomes all too easy to assume that the various nonstate societies observed on the expanding edge of the modern world-system are representxive of antecedent social ferms4espire the already rtemonstrated massive effects of wen quire mild incorporation.lO wthout using the terminology of hcorporation, Eric Wolf (1.982)calls artention to the massive charrges that the exyansiun of the European world-economy has had on all types of incorporated societies, m e n early theorists assumed that these =re either exact replicas or even only close analogues of earlier forms of society, they were led to massive mistakes in what it was they sought to explain by social wolution. To assume that either fur-trading North American Indians or Central Asian pastoralists were representative uf forms of societies in the discant past conflat& the results of dead=, or even millennia, of interaction with pristine conditions. The effects of slight incorporation are not limited to the modern world-system. Significant social cIranges occurred with low levels of incorporation in preapitaliist

world-systems as w l l . To cxclude the milder forms of incorporation h m examination would block from study some of rhe most interesting types of social change caused by the expansion of earlier world-systems. Thfel is midence for complex egecrs of incorpuratisn in precapitrtlist wrld-sy-sterns. Brian Ferguson and Neil mitehead f 1932a, 1932b) have compiled a series of studies of confrontations benveen stares and nonstate societies in what they call the "tribal zane.'The "tribd mne" is that region on the borders of states in which surrounding nonstate groups of various types come into contact with state societies, They intentionally use "tribe" as a covering term for all sorts of nonstate societies ranging from the simplest band-organized groups to sprawling chiefdoms. Their conclusion is that the Hobbesian image of t r i M peoples rests on three fdlacies: (I) that postcontact conditions and relations are a continuation of preconract conditions and relations; (2) that ethnic divisions are sumivats of precontact di\E.isions;and (3) that tribal warfare is unreasoned hostility. Implicit in their discussion is the observation that these failacies rest on a deeper false assumption that crhnogrqhers, ethnohistorians, and historians usually-have M1 accc;ss to the relevant context of contact. The first fdIacy is demonstrated in the accounts of the North Mrican frontier of Rome (Mattingly 1332), medieval Sri Lmka (Gunawardana t 3921, the h t e c and Spanish conquests in Mesoamerica (Wassig 19921, warfare in West Af-rica since 1650 (Law 13321, colonial northeatern South h e r i c a whitehead 13W2),kr-trading lroquois (Abler 1992), highland Peru (Brown and Fernandez t 932), the Yanomami in Venezuela (Ferpson 19921, and contemporary Papua New Guinea (Srrathern 1932). In all these cases both state-tribe warfare and intertribal warfare incrased substmtia1Iy &r state contact. This is evidence for increased violence, not the creation of violence. Ferguson and m i r e h e a d (1332a, 1992b) do not propose that some idyllic busseauian paradise existed until nas9 stares came along and destroyed it. More subtly, they propose that state contact intensified violence and sometimes transformed it into more virulent forms, Most of these accounts also illustrate the second faIla9 in showing how groups are tlanshmed or cremd through interzrions that can either amdgamate or fragment previously existing groups. The transformation from an autonomous nonsrate sociery to a generally subordinate ethnic group is neither automatic nor a matter of merely accepting the rule of the state. Rather, it is a complex process in which identities, cultures, and social organizations are transformed. Hence group identities are not primordial survivds but rather complex products of contact. As for the third Mlaq, there is a logic, not "unreasoned hostility," behind; tribal warf i e . The most common basis of conflict is over access to resources controfXed or praduced by the contacting state. Srate goods may be used for very different political ends by leaders in nonstate societies, rypically to enhance prestige and to gain followers. Thus such leaders not only need ac~rssto these p o d s hut also they must block the access of their comperitors, giving rise to inter- and sometimes intragioup warfare. When state goods significantly affect survival, as with metal tools in North America or guns nearly evewhere, these goods are transformed into necessities. In West

New Er~t""tories

1 63

Africa members of a group without guns often found themselves on a one-way voyage to the Americas. This is also why trading and raiding so frequently alternate in such situations. If there is no "legitimate" way to acquire state cantroiled goo whether due to a ban on trade or a lack of suitable goods to exchange---then raiding becomes the only means of acquiring them. Because leaders in kin-ordered prestige hierarchies used goods differently, state ofi ficials ofren did not understand the sources of codict, and so they simply labeled it "unreasoned hosdliw" This attitude is reinforced by a widespread assumption on the part of state oficials that nonstate peoples are "barbarians," "backward," and "inferior." Interestingly enough, officials who actually understood the customs of nonstate societies were not rare. Typically these omcids had been born in the contact zone or they had spent a long time there. Equally typically, central state omcials did not listen to their advice.1' Finally, Ferguson and Whitehead note that the context of contact is vitally important, but not determinative, for the Iwel of violence. The kind of state making contact and the motive forces driving state expansion interact with Local conditions to produce myriad local consequences. To focus solely on the state or solely on local conditions is to miss the point-it is the ingmaclion of the m o that shapes events. h d r e w Sherrarr has come to some quite similar conclusions in several papers on Bronx-Age Europe (1993a, 199331, 1333c, 13936). Sherratt studies the interactions bemeen the Near Eastern and Mediterranean urbanized core region and peripheral regions in Eurape during the Bronze Age. He argues that there is a margin beyond the periphey. "The characteristic of the margin," he says, ""isthat it is dasslillated by time-lag phenomena-"escapes"-rather than structurd interdependence with the core" "herratc 1393a, 43). His margin corresponds roughly to our contact and marginal peripheries or our regions of rekge. The latter appellation is particularly apt, in that what be calls "escapes'hare the s m e processes t h t we note .far regions of refuge (kilowing c\guirre Beltran 1979) where older social forms are somecnes preserwd. That is, they ""ecape'>pressures for change exerted in more tightly incurporated areas. He reserves the term "'structural interdependence,'hhlch indudes supplying raw materiats, for the periphery. His periphery corresponds to our rrtll-blown peripheral and semiperipheral regions.12 Shemtt describes how p o d s oken f l m d via long chains from the Near Eastern core through the periphery and then into northern Europe. He notes that the nodal points of connection to Europe in the Bronze Age eventually became important centers on their own. He uses these nodes to divide the Bronre-Age world-system into zona of core, periphery, and margin.

Other Lessons from the Expanded Continuum of Incorporation The preceding discussion suggests m other areas related to incorporation that require furtl~erspecification. One is the problem of frontiers, and the other is the relevance of the types of social groups coming into contact.

World-system expansion necessarily entaifed contact betvveen formerly unconnected groups, Hence world-systems are major creators of frontiers, or boundary zones becween different rypes of groups. Indeed, we argue that world-systems create at least four different types of frontiers along their edges, corresponding to types of interaction nemorks, We contend, as do Ferguson and m i t e h e a d (1392b), that a theory of frontier creation and transformation should be part of a theory of worldsystems (see also Kutsche 133X),

Incorporation creates and rransforms frontiers. Howwer, the frontier concept suffers from the same theoretical problems as rhe concept of periphery. A frontier is a social relationship worked our in space. The connection benveen the relationship and its sparial expression is problematic,= &chard Slatta's (1990, 1992) metaphor of the "frontier as membrane" suggests another way of vtewing the relationship between world-systems and frontiers: Frontiers are zones where incorp~rarjonrakes place, The hntier-as-membrane metaphor also helps ro highlight a problem of scale. Vicvved from a global perspective, the frontier is relativefy narrow, m6 sharp. W e d mar% closely, it is a broad zone with asiderable internal difterenriation, both spatially and temporally; At either level, d i s s e n t types of expanding systcrns have diferenr cypes of boundary membranes, each type varying in the types and dgrees of permeability to Aom across or through them. Incorporation into the modern vvorld-system occurs at severaj geographical scales-local, regional, giohal-simulraneously and recursively. The world-systen serves as the larger, thou$ not always determinative, context for broad regionat processe+which often are state-based or narional. Simifarly, regional (or state) processes serve as a context for subregional! (or substate) processes. Finally, all of these sefvc as contexts h r Local pracesses, Thus froncier social change is tbe resuft of simulraneaus and recursive interactions, d l of d i c h have class, ethnic, geographic, gender, economic, and pditical componenrs. We aIso note that different levels and diEerent factors may work to counteract each other. At times they may 'be so well baianced that no changes occur. Hence what appears "static" may actually be very dynamic, but temporarily balanced. Seeking a primary facror or locus for these processes is a fool's errand. Rather, it is the interactions bemeen and among 41 these factors that shape frontier evenrs, Several sets of general factors warrant special discussion. Physical and social geography play major roles in shaping frontiers and incarporation.

Phyrical and Social Geography The comparative study of world-systems brings a renewed appreciation of the effects of interaction bemeen peagles living in diff'erent ecological zones, Owen Lattimore

( 1340, 1362a) and Williarn McNeill(1964), among many others, have drawn attention to the boundary benveen nonarable grasslands and arable lands, the steppe and the sown. Both observe that this boundary is really a lone in which regular rainfall drops below the limit for agriculture. O n the steppe side dwell nomads; on the sown side dwell farmers. Slight shifrs in climate or in the drought tolerance of crops allow some shifting of the boundary zone. Still, the zone is relatively fixed. It should also be noted that these differences are not necessarily ""racial" or "rchnic" but are differences of adaptation. Sometimes people on both sides of the zone are physiologically identical but culturally different. Indeed, it is not unusual for individuals or Families to switch modes of adaptation (see Barth 1969 and Hadand 1967 for examples). Typicdly, howwer, they change identities when they do. Borders b e m e n ecological regions often, but not always, produce interesting cross-border interactions that alter the social nature of groups on both sides. A less familiar example is that of the differences benveen plains (or valleys) and mountainous regions. Plains, because they are largely undigerentiated, facilitate gradients, continua, and general similariry in adaptations and cultures. Mountainous areas, especially highly differentiated regions like the Great Basin ( D ' h e d o 1981) or mountainous regions of California (Heizer 1978) in the western United States, facilitafe the formation of sharper boundaries as well as much finer local digerentiation. On the Great Plains in the United States there was co~isiderabIeconverpnce of American Indian Plains cultures (X,o\Nie 1944; Woebel 13821, vvhereas Apachean group, man). o f vvhorn dwelt in the Basin and Range Province, were highiy diEerentiated (see Hafl 1983, and n,d.; Melody 1977; Qrtiz 1979, 1983). "Thc point is &at nature and sociey interact, and in so doing they redefine the usav of the Land and the social organization of those who exploit it.14 The interaction bemeen valley people and hi0 people is perhaps the earliest form taken by carelperipbery differentialion, The most important point about [email protected] borders (emphasized by Lattimore) is that these are fertile locations for studying the emergence of intergroup interactions that transform the nature of the participating groups and consritute intergroup systems composed of very different kinds of people. This is the stuff of comparative world-systems analysis. The spatial dimension also enters in the form of social geography, or the geopolitical location of incorporated groups. The role of incorporated groups as buffers or barriers often depends on their location relative to world-system expansion. Groups that occupy valued environments in the path of expansion typically constitute barriers to be "pacified," displaced, or destroyed. Groups occupying environments that are marginal to the path of expansion yet interposed b e m e n the expanding system and its adversaries may assume the role of geopolitical buffers. In colonial New Spain, Spanish officials constantly sought to subdue Apache bands because they blocked internal communication, whereas they used Gomancbe bands (after 1786) as a buEer against intrusion by European adversaries (HaEl 1989, and n.d.). The distinnion between bufi;er and barrier roles, howmer, is easily conflate$ with the distinction bemeen internd and externd frontiers.15 h externat frontier is one

72 1 New 7i?rritories

on Ebe edges of an expanding world-system. Groups on external frontiers are: more likely to serve as buffers than as barriers. An internal frontier is one that is encapsulated wirhin an expanding syftem. A familiar example is the interior of Horth h e r ica, which was settled by Europeans later than were the coastal regions, Most of the last battles with Nacive b e r i c a n s were fought in this incerior region. These distinctions help to make sense of the varied responses of nonstate peoples to wotld-system encmachment, When an expanding s>.stemreyuires xcess to transportation nodes, the removd of indigenous populations constitutes conquest- However, if the system s& the people, typically far slaves, their withdraw4 from the region constitutes defeat of the sptem and escape from incorporation. Thus the same action-leaving traditionally occupied territory-constitutes opposite consequences, depending on the gods of the expanding system (see Gunawardana 1992). These distinctions help to [email protected] pmcctsses of marginal incorporation. W e n incorporation is very weak, in the marginal range, the incorporating agertc"yYs concern vvith frontier groups diminishes as these groups retreac into less desirable envirmments beyond the f-lontier zone. The respite aEords these "marginal" groups the Itlxcury of time and space to adapt to new geopoliticd and cuiturat circumstanas; it may also rn&e the difference bemeen survivd and annihilation, Hence the survivd of indigenous groups m y depend as much on the degree to which they are incorporated as an their tenaciry and skills of resistance. Phrased diRerentfy, a group with great cultural tenacity and strong powers of resistance might survive moderate incorporaeion while another group with leser sklis and powers might nor, Environment, technology, and geographical location play impormnt roles in the process o f incorporation. Incorporation is likely to remain weak, in the marginal range, if the frontier area contains few valuable resources and if it does not block expansion. When this is the case, indigenous groups have a higher likelihood of survival with some degree of socid and cultural integrity. This is the major explanation for the marked success of Native h e r i c a n groups in .Arimna, New Mexico, and much of the invrior western United States (Hdl 1389). It is important to note that when resources are redefined by expanding systems, the degree of incorporation will change. The recent history of the Southwest of the United States offers esnsiderable support for this conclusion, As water, uranium, oil, and coal have increaed in vdue since World T a r 11, more serious attempts have been made to incorporate Navajos and other Southwestern groups more hlly into the political economy of the United States.

am: Systematic Differences Incorporation varies with differences in levels of complexity between the incorporating wodd-system and the incorporated group. Not all new groups encountered in expansions were nonstate societies. Sometimes an expanding world-system contacted smaller state systems or even formerly isolated state-based world-systems. Given the variery of effects of contact, it seems reasonable to posit that the incorpa-

New 2rritarics

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ration process is shaped by both the type of world-system doing the incorporating and the type of group being incorporated. The heuristic rypology we presented in Chapter 3 suggests that there are a very large number of possible combinations. Certainly encounters b e m e n systems are much more likely to result in engulfment of one by the other if the engulfer is much more complex and hierarchical than the eng u l f ~Similarly, . a merging is more likely if the rwo have similar levels of complexity. It is also likely that mergers will differ significantly depending on the levels of comploriry of the pairs even when they are similar. Frontier formation processes berween nvo systems of sedentary hunter-gatherers will probably be very different from those between tcvo systems cromposed of commercialized states and empires. We will consider two types of incorporating systems: tributary and capitalist world-systems; and nvo types of incorporated p u p s or territories: nonscate societies and states. We will also discuss the phenomenon of mergers between world-systems at similar lwds of coml~lait)l,

As a broad cjass, nonstate societies seem to be both the most oken victimized and most problematic of all types of incorporated groups. Within this broad class there are important difirenca. h discussed in the preceding chaprers, nonstate societies vary from bmdf of nomadic foragers through complex chiefcloms, The simpler nonstate sociaies are rypicall~nomadic, h e r e a s the more complex groups are fy-pically sedentary, The fundmentaf probiem with incorporation of nonstate: societies is the incompacibiliy in the arrangenrmt of political institutions, At nonswe soci&s are s o w f o m of irin-ordrtred syftem, whereas the m o rypes af world-sptems we are discussing are s t a n - b e d , ,As we have seen, these organizing principles are fundmendly diEerent, and thus members from each type of socier)~have difficdry in understanding how the other worh. Colonial histories are crowded with examplas of leaders in one of these rypes describing che other as wiehout "ordei or without "rewn." However, S noted above, state %eats with extensive frontier experience and indigenous leaders with extensive experience with state agents do come to understand each other. Still, problems persist, Ti~oughrtrere art: a large numbcr of teasons why this is so---lack of funds to continue subsistence supplements ("rations") to support nonstate societies whose resource base has been eroded, Lack of "legitimate" means of acquiring state-produced or state-monopolized goods, unontrolled "outlaws" on either side who violate agreements, third parties who manipulate or men foment hostilities, natural disasters that disrupt relations, diseases, and so on-the key reason is the way in which political decisions are reached and enforced. Nonstate societies are sometimes described as being "acephalous," that is, without a (political) head. A better description is that political authority is diffuse, decisions are reached by consensus, and those who do not comply are free to fission off into a new group. Indeed, disagreement over important decisions is one of the major causes

74 1 New El"ritaries

of group Rssioning." Mmy types of nonstate societies are celebrated for their radicd democracy and eg;liitarianism. Thou& these celebrations do have some factual basis, they are ofien overstared. Not all adults had q u a l say, and frequendy nut d l adult males had equal say. Rather, opinions vvere tveiphted by the status of the individual mahng the statement-and there were many criteria for status differences. Still, decisions were most ot'cen achieved by consensus and enforced only through potential foss of sacid esteem for failure to folIow them. This, of course, is at odds with any bureaucratic or authoritarian form of gowr. m e t h e r decisions come from legislative Lodies, dictators, kings, or councils of noble~,in tribucary and capitalist states implementation of decisions can be imposed on ail members of the sociecy; More importmt, there are specific mechanisms by tYhich decisions are made, promulgated, and enforced. Officials operating from such a system have great digcuity in deafing with the difise aurhority structures follnd in nonstate societies. Indeed, the incompatibiliv is so great that one of the major eKom of state-based wodd-systems in deding with newly incorporated nonstate societies is to impose suficient political ~entrafilationto produce a decisionmaking system that is compatible with itself, In northwest New Spain, colonial oficiats gave canes of ofice and other insigtlia, and sometimes stipends, ru appointed leadefi among nonstate peopies. In 1786, h e n Gornanche bands sought peace with Spaniards in NW Mexico, the governor insisted that they elect one chief over all the ban&. This a r m p c did not quite work, but it did antralize and unite Comanche decisionmaking more than had ever been the case before (Hdl 1389). The southern fur trade led to massive changes among the Cherokee villages, developing a central political organization that was considerably digercnt from earlier forms (Dunaway f 394, 1336a, 1336h). Romans imposed organization on various Germanic tribes, and Chinese officials constantly sought to deal with one central authority among Central Asian nomads. The bmad similarities in this problem and its solutions among modern capitalist states, early mercantile capitalist systems (or advanced tributary systems, such as early colonial Spain), Rome, and China through several dynasties suggest that there are minimal differences benreen capitalist and tributary coreiperiphery hierarchies with respect to incorporation of nonstate societies. We emphacize "minimal differences"---not "no differences." Comparative studies have only begun. The major difference, on the basis of comparisons beween early colonial Spain and early industrial United States (Hall 1989) and beween both of these and the Chinese empire (Hall f 33 1 a, 1391'121, appears to be one of r e l a t h politid and economic power. The modern world-system since the nineteenth century is so much more powerful than even the largest nonstate confederacy that it is far easier for it to impose a more centralized political organization on stateless peoples. As the Mongol conquest demonstrated so dramatically, the process of imposed centralization can get out of control (from the point of view of the incorporating system) and produce a rival state that threatens or conquers the old core. This is an unusual consequence of imposed centralization because most old core states shift from

imposed centralization to "divide-and-conquer" strategies az soon as peripheral polities begin to pose a threat. The Mongol example raises a second, but related, problem of incorporation of nonstate societies. The transformation produced by imposed centralization may be so great that the result is no longer the same type of social organization-that is, a state may be created. Many of these states are inherently unstable. This was generally the case for steppe confederations. They usually continued only as long as goods were supplied from the sedentary core 'partner" (see Chapter 8). Even the Mongols were core-dependent in this way. To paraphrase a common Chinese saying, an empire can be conquered from horseback, but it cannot be ruled from there. The steppe empires could only persist by extracting surplus from the core regions. Phenomena of this sort led Arrighi ( I 979) to argue that if world-system domination ceases, the formerly incorporated region will return to its previous condition. The issue of reversibiliry of incurparation is more complex, however, as seen in Sherratt's discussion of the effect of a collapse of a core area on marginal zones (our cmtact and m q i n a l peripheries): One point to emphasize is that what happened in the a r e was a collapse of centrdized, command economies, which itself removed political consrrainrs on technologies and the movement of strategic materials, . . . Xt also involved a fundamental technological chane, from bronze to iron (which was deferred in much of temperare Europe for another hdf millennium). Europe and other areas mentioned undoubtedly received same spinoflf from the end of pdace monopofies on certain crafi skills, and h m the more opportunistic trading pattern rhat resulted; but they also maintained a pattern of economic activity based on the circulation of bronze. In a sense, rherefore, they maintained a consemative attitude whibt benefiting from the indirect results of urban coltagse, It should &so be borne in mind that prehistoric, marginal, Bronze-&e economies were not sirnply evotutionary stages in the devetcspmenc of urhanism and statehood; they had their own rnotivations and dynamic, even rhou$n some of the preconditions were provided by the existence of urban systems elsmhere, Many of rhe mechanisms of circulation were actively resisting the kinds of commodifLcation and de-personalized exchanges which characterized urban trade nemorks. The gromh of competirive destruction (paraliteled by a comparable gowrh in production) which produced the massive hoards of Urnfieid bronzework can be seen as symptomatic of the insecuriry of indigenous elites when threatened by new sources of p o w r (Sherratt 1943a, 36-37).

As Andre Gunder Frank (1969a) argues with respect to the modern world-system, the collapse of a c o r e o r sevemnce of connections to a core-can have positive effects on full-blown peripheries. But a loosening of incorporation can lead either to prosperiry or to dedine in marginal or contact peripheries. If the core is extracting some local resource, such as human captives for slaves, the loosening or severing of that connection would typkally allow a return of local prosperity. If, on the other hand, the core supplied some resource h tvhicb there was no local substitute, such as guns, any prosperiry that was a consequence of access to that resource would typically collapse with its loss (Half 1383).

Prestige-goods systems are especially prone to this type of effect. If some rare good is used by local elites to shore up their position, then loss of access undermines cheir position unless they can f nd a substitute that they can also monopolize. If the good could be produced locally, however, then the changes to which it gave rise need not reverse, As Shwratt notes, locai eiites may evcn resist the adoyt-ion of new technologies when those technologies thrcaten tkeir monopolies, Thus severxrrcc:of a connection or loosening of incorporation can produce radically different and indeed opposite effects, depending on the precise nature of the connection,

The incorporation of states is the stueof history. Since most states developed a system of writing and constructed buildings and monuments rhat often survived their disappearance, we have an abundance of historical and archaeological evidence on the incorporation of states. Tbas histoy, of course, has not been mld in terms of incorporation (but see So 1484, 1986). Mevetrheless, some major points are clear. First, the incmporation of states nearly always occurs ar the stronger pole of the continuum of incorpsation. Because states are by definition organized, they are often capable of mounting more than token resistance to incorporation, Since the expanding cote is seeking either n m , or at least cheaper, labor or mawilable, scarce, or cheaper resources, it does not undertake the incorporation. of anather state lightly. It is a major task. Second, geographic dimensions are impartant. Following she "no intervening heartland" "rule (Collins 1378, f 981, 1986b; see dso Chapter l), expansion that entails passing thrauefil the heartland of another state is likely to fail, Hence mnsr successful exyansion is into contiguous territories. Third, there is ar least one major difference bet-tveen rribrlcary and capitalist world-sysrems with respect to state incorporation. Tributary empires more often engage in plunder, whereas the capitdist system seems to favor capitalist production, even of ravv materids. To be sure, this comes dose m plunkr in its elfects (Bunker 1384), but there is a vast difference becweerl Pizarro plundering che palace of the Inea and mentieth-century mining operations in Brazil.

The Merging of World-Systems By defining worid-systems as self-contained, we imply that they cannot interact importantly with one another. But our multilevel nested neovork approach to spatial bounding of world-systems and the notion of degrees of systemfiess allow us to consider different degrees of interaction that occur in the processes of world-system mergers, We argue in Chapter 8 rhat all of Mroeurasia was a single muIticore prestigegoods nerwork for over 2,000 years. We have presented evidence (see Chapter 10 and Cbase-Dunn and Hall f 395af on the correlation of empire sizes and city sizes

New TeM.gorics / 77 that indicates that this n u t u d interaction was nontrivial in its conseqtlences, Indeed, the city and empix size data strongly suggest that important linkages t n q have begun as much as a thousand years before the period of the main narrative that we present in Chapter 8 (see Bosworth 1995). The idea of the incorporation of a state-based world-system raises several theoretical problems. Merger is a process of incorporation that rypicdly occurs between systems that have similar degrees of complexiry and hierarchy. If we use Afroeurasia as an example, merger is marked by equal exchange (Amin 1911) in a multicore system whose inrerdcciotss involved only the information and presrige-goods neworb. The merger ofworld-systems does not result in the peripheralization of one by the other. Rather, it constitutes a new, larger world-system in which the two formerly separate systems play more-or-less equal parts. The two most well-known instances are the merger of the Mesopotamian and Egyptian systems and the merger of Ahoeurasia. Many small systems must have merged to make larger ones* These processes need to be studied comparatively in order to discover: (1) whether worldsystem mergers differ across rypes of world-~sterns;and (2) the important differences in incorporaion in the infirrmafion, prestige-goods, pditicallmifirary, and bulk-goods nemorks, By the late wentierh century there are virtually no nonstate societies or systems char have not already experienced at least some degree of incorporation into statebased wodd-vsterns, and most have experienmd severd mves of incnrporation. The results of incorporation range from ggnocide, through cuituricide,"7 to transformation into a nlinoriry group, same of vvhich may; like some Native h e r i c a n gl-oups, retain a degree of political and cultural autonomy wichjn the larger sysrern. The iaterplay of tvorid-systemic, national, regions), and local factors that shape these results is complex and poorly understood, One of the important emer.gent mnstraints on the modern world-system is that there are no more new territories or peoples to incorporate. The bad news is that human cultural diversity has contracted greatly with the elimination of stateless peoples. Efforts to preserve stateless cultures will probably not succeed, except in the sense of legitimating cultural tourism. The best that can be done is to assimilate people in a humane way rather than killing them or exploiting them. The good news is that in the absence of more people and territories to conquer and incorporate, the modern world-system will be forced to resolve its internal conrradictions by means of transformation rather than expansion. This is a topic we address in the following chapters. We now turn to a consideration of the semiperipheral zones and the roles they pfay in restructerring world-systems.

The Semiperiphery: Seedbed of Chdnge In this chapter we propose that corelperiphery hierarchies are important structural elements in the reproduction of world-systems and that semiperipheral ioatrions within corelperipfiery structures are important loci of Ebrces that transform worldsystems. The comparative study of corelperiphery hierarchies began with s m r d earlier vvorks an "frontiers" (e.g., Iattinore 1340; McNeiij 1364;Adams W71,but the task of sorcing out the digerem fypes of regional dominanceldependence relations and examining their importance, t-br the dynamks of social dweloptnent is only in its infancy. Mere we discuss first our g%nerdconcepcualizatican of rhe semiperipbtry. Then we cons-icter four diEerent but xelared geenmal farnulations of a theory of swid change. Finally, we examine severat types of sociai change char n a y be understood as instmces of st.miperipht.raE development. We employ the conceptuatizarions of corelperiphery diEerentiation and corelperiphery hierarchy already considered in Chapter 2.

The Semiperiphery Concept The idea of the semiperiphery was first applied to the modern wdd-system by Imrnanuel Wallerstein (1974a, 15)74b, 1373b). In various parts of Wallerstein's historical and more theoretical analyses of the Europe-entered vvarld-system fir suggesrs severd m~aningsof the cctnapc of the semiperiphery, In Chapter 2 vve conceptualized the semiperiphery to include:

1. regions that mix both core and peripheral forms of organization; 2. regions spatially located bemeen core and peripheral regions; 3. regions spatially locared bemeen nvca or more competing core rrgions; 4. regions in which mediating activities linking core and peripheral areas take place; and 5. regions in which institutional features are intermediare in form between those forms faund in adjacent core and peripheral areas. For alI of these, W expect that sexniperipherat regions will be dominated by the core but wiil at the same time dominate peripheraf areas.qhese five aiternarive

forms of semiperipheraliry are dependent on the nature of the coreiperiphery relations that exist in any particular world-system. This is because core, periphery, and semiperiphery are relational concepts that are context-dependent. Nevertheless, we may abstract from particular systems to consider whether or not there may be patterned regularities that correspond to these a n a l p i d distinctions.

Four Approaches to Semiperipheral Development Generally stated, our contendon is that remiper+heral arpa are like4 to generate new inrtitutionalformr that nanrform yrm strurhlrer and modcr qfaccumulation. These changes ofren lead to the upward mobiliry of these same semiperipheral actors in the core/periphery hierarchy. We will see that the semiperiphery is fertile ground for social, organizational, and technical innovation and has an advantageous location for the establishment of new centers of power. That is why the structural position of the semipe.r+hev has such evolutionary. significance. Bebre we turn to a consideration of severd types of smiperipheral dmelopment that illustrate this general principle, we will summarize four earlier theoretical approaches that utilized diEept;.nt fanguag but &at ovedap significantly with the theory of semiperipheral dmefopment that we pmpose. The purpose of this reuiew is to bntmduce several possible ~-elatr;-d approaches that may help us to specify more cleady our gene& formulation and ro 6ne-tune its apyf icalion to digerent types of circumstances. The fnur approaches we will consider are: Leon Trotsws "~awsof unwen and combined development"; * Aexander Gerschenkrsn's '2dvantages of bacbardness""; * Elrnan Scrvice"sevctlutionay potentifl; and * Garroli Quigley's ""institutiondimionof an instrument of apansion.'" +

Once we have summarized the reievant parts of these approaches, we will show

k m the!, relate to our theory of seniperipherd dwelopmcnt, Trratsk;JI. Leon Trotsky (1.3321,a professional revdutimary, w t e a history of the Russian rmotution thar began with a discussion of the "historic Laws" of "uneven and combined development." He used this formulation to explain the "peculiar" form of capitalist development in Russia and the stage-skipping that was evident (from a Marxist viewpaint) in the sequence of Russian revolutionary transformations m compared to the English and French revolutions. We will see that both Sefvice and Gerschenlrron bear an intellectual debt to Trosky T'Protsky's most generd brmulations are as follows: Unevenness, the most generat law of the historic process, reveals itsdf most sharply and cc~mpled~ in the Jcstiny of the bachardt countries. Under the whip of external necassiey their backward culture is compelled to make leaps. From the universal taw of unttvenness thus derives another law which, for lack of a berlrer n m e , we may call the law

of eombiaasa!de~eI~pme~g-by which vvc: mean a drawing together of the different stages of the journey, a combining of separate steps, an amalgam of archaic with more conremporary forms (Trotsb 1932, SE; emphariis in originaf).

Trotsb also writes: A ba c hard country assimilates the material and incelectud ceonquesgs of the advanced


countries. But this does not mean &at it falIows them slavishly, . . Atthough cornpelled co foiiow after the advanced counrries, a bacbtrrd wsunrr). does nar take things in the same ortier. The privilege of historic back.niardness--and such a privilege exists-permits, or rather conapds, the adoption of whatever is ready in advance of any specified date, skipping a d o l e series of intermediate stags. Savages throw away their bows and arrows for rifles all at once, without traveling the road which lay beween those WO weapons in the past, . . . The dwelapmenr of historically bachard nations leads necessarily to a peculiar combination of difirent stages in the historic process Crrotsky l932,4-5).

Trotsky formulates the idea of the advantage that "habard"" societies have in being able easily to adopt or innovate new forms, their ability to leapfrog "stages of development," and the beneficiai eKeccs of being able to remmbine diEerenc elerncncs. Gerschekon. &exander Gerschenkron (1362), an economic historian, Eurther develops the idea of "the advantages of bachardness" cu explain the rapid industrialimtion of cert&n countries that followed Britain's iead in. the late nineteenth and early wentieth centuries. According to Gerschenkron, countries that have certain natural and argnizational fearures favorabk to indrlstridizntiosl c m rapidly industrialize bp imgorning production technalog)l, althougtr the mechanisms they employ acrd the srcforal path of econonlic change hey follovv will diEer sieigcandy from those b u d in the originai industridizer, Gerschenkrrocis discussion facuses primarily an Germany, but he also considers France and Russia. Gerschenkron notes that rapid secondary industridization has aspects that are similar to social movernena in chat economic change occurs across many secton together and the whole process involves a spirit that. combines entrepreneurship with collective enthusiam, He emphasizes the importance of innotrations in banking and of state sponsorship o f economic development in these cses of ""catchingup" with the leader. According to Gerschenhon, the most important ""natural condition" that tacititates economic growth is the availability of raw materials. Organizationally*it is imporrant to have a unified stace, as opposed to a colIe~tionof baronies (e.g., Germany before 1876). Serfdom is mentioned as a social organizational barrier ta industrialization, but Gersclrenhon argue that the very lack of an industrid iabor force might hilitate rapid industrialization by encouraging the adoption of the most upto-dare lahor-saving production ceebnotog* Though Gerfchenkron generalb argues that ""bcbardness" is a boon for rapid change, under some drcumstances he srrggests that there is such a thing xs too much

bachrdness, as in the contrast he draws bemeen Russia and Germany. This is felicitous for our reinterpretation of his approach in terms of a distinction benveen periphery and semiperiphery

The anthropologist Elman Service first published his discussion of "evolutionary potential" in a volume coedited with Marshal Sahlins (Sahlins and Service 1960; Service 1971). Service argues that development is usually discontinuous in space, with older localities losing dominance to new centers. He posits an interaction between "adaptation" and "adaptiviry" that produces this uneven development in space. Adaptation refers to an institutional adjustment to social and environmental pressures for change. Adaptivity, in contrast, is the abiliry to make adaptive changes in response to social or environmental changes. A highly adapted sociery rypicdly has very low adaptiviry (Service 1971). An innovation in technologv, social organization, or cultural institutions may allow a sociery to become well adapted to a natural or socioeconomic environment, but the very investment in that innovation, or constellation of innovations, will at a later point in rime inhibit the abiliry of the society to adapt to new circumstances.Adaptation usually invalves specialization and the investment of resources, whereas adaptiviry is the qualiry of being able to make new changers. Service argues that a general process of social evolution-the interaction between adaptation and adaptiviv-accounts for the rise and fall of civilizations, the spatial discontinuity of innovations in cultural techniques such as writing, and the rise and fall of contemporary nation-stares. He addresses the issue o f the benefits and casts of specialization raised in the literacure on biological evolution, but his formulation is clearly directed toward an explanation of uneven social development. Older regions became entrenched in earlier adaptations, whereas newly develaping areas can '"ake the hest and Leave the rest,'"ervicc acknowledges his debt to Trotsky by quoting Trotsky on the rapid, stage-skipping nature of Russian industrialization, Service.

QutigIey* Carrolt Quigle): (1979), a historian, reformlaces Anold Toynbee's approach to the rise and fall of civilizations. According te, Quigley?civilizations rise because semiperipherd regions innovate instruments of expansion, These become institutionalized, eventually the organizations stultify and decay, and then the process repeats itself. Quigley (1979, 366) actually used the term "semiperiphery." His theory of rise and fall is formulated as a series of seven stages: mixture, gestation, expansion, age of conflict, universal empire, decay, and invasion. @g)+ discussions of the stages of mixture and gestation are suggestive of serniperipheral devdopment, Me writes: Every civilization, indeed every society, begins with ;z mixture af m0 or more cuitura. . . . But such casual culturd mixture is of little signifiance unless there comes into existence in rhe zone of mixture a new culture, arising from the mixture but diEesent from

i t s constituent parts. . . . The contributing societies may be civilizations or merely producing societies (agricultural or pastoral) or merely parftsitic societies (with hunting or fishing. . . . Since cultural mixture awurs on the hrders of societies, civifizations rarety succeed one another in the same geographicat area, but undergo a displacement in space, . . . But on the borders of societies there is a considerable mutual interpenerration of social customs, and there arise, accardingty, alternative ways of saris6ing human needs, . . . [C]ivitizations have generdly arisen on the periphey of earlier civilizations. Cananice, Hittire, and Minoan civilizations arose on the edges of Mesopotmim civilization (Quiglv 1973, 147-148).

Missing from Gerschenkron and Trotsky is any consideration of rhe mechanisms that bring about organizationd inertia and resistance to new aclapcarions in older core regions. They discuss why "bacbwdnessn is an advantge, but not why being first. is sometimes a disadvantage. Sewice and Quigley do consider both sides of these processes, but only in the most general t m s , and Quigley writes quite a lot b o u t ossification and eEorrs to refom institutions in aId core regions, One problem with dI of these approaches is that they are farmulated in terms of levets or stages of development, and therebre they largely ignore the hierarchical and structurd afpects of relations beween societies within a system, Bachard or serniperipheral areas catch up, but there is little attention to the importame of this as upward rnobilicy w i t h a Iasgr socially structurd regional hierarchy, AI1 these approaches are covatibIe, however3with the notion that a smiperiphera1 Iocation is a fruitf;h locus of transformational changes. But how might worldsystem mechanisms of intersocietd damination and exploitation, and processes of the developxncmt of underdevelopment fit imo this approach? A theory of semiperipheral development is not x claim that catching up or becoming a new center of domination is possible for all regions. As we have said, the extent to which sorejperiphexy hierarchies and uneven d e v e l o p e n t are reproduced must be determined for each world-system. There have been world-sysrems in which the spread effects of development are much stronger than the backwash e&crs of underdevelopmenc, All hierarchical world-systems seem t a experience uneven development and cycles of political centralizadon/decentralization, We would like to determine those aspects of semiperipheral development that are common to different types of world-systems and those aspects that differ across types. We also need to point out that upward mobiliry and transformational action are not necessarily the same thing. It is possible to succeed within a system without transforming the rules of that system. And it is ~ossibleto change the logic of social action wirhout moving toward a more powerful ou centrat locarinn in a system. But these rwo analytically separable features often do occur together. We now turn to a consideration of cases in order to concretize this discussion.

Types of Semiperipheral Development Once again we present a heuristic typology. This, we promise, is the last. This time we want to designate different kinds of semiperipheral development. Some of these ypes overlap, and in one category there is only one empirical case. Nevertheless, in order to construct the general notion, it is necessary to designate important differe n e s among the fcrllowing types:

I.. conquest by semiperipheral marcher (i.e., frontier or border) chiefdoms;

2.canquest Ezy semiprripheral marcher states; 3. extensive and intensive commadification by semiperipheraf capidist cirystates;

4. the rise of European hegemony-an

upwardly mobile and transformational region; 5, the rise and fall of hef~emoniccore stares vvirhin rbe Europe-tenrered vvorldsystem; and 6, the emergence of revcalurlonar).challenges to capitalism in the Mrniperiphery of the contemporav world-sptem.

The phenomenon of tbc: rise and faII of chiefdoms has been studied in several different contexts by anthropologists.2 Chiefly plities interaa with and carnpete with one another in sets that W refer to as ingerchiefdom systems. The pmcesss o f rise and fall involves conlpetition among actual nnd potentid paramount chiefs. The territaries and peoples under the contml of a single paramount grow as he succeeds in expanding his domain, usually by conquest. The strains of maintaining an expanded domain often eventually Lead to fragmentation back into smaller independent polities. Marshd Sahlins (1372, 141-148) desaibes such a proass for the case of precontact Hawaii. Kristian Kristiansm (1331) sees an analycicdly similar process in rbe cycficaf changes that occurred among polities in Bronze-Age Scmdinavia and northern Europe. Along with the rise and fall phenomenon, which is qclical around some equilibrium of poliv size, rises sometimes occur that dramaticdly expand the scale of political organization by forming a single policy that i s much larger than any previous domain in the region. Our model of semipesipherat chiefdom conquest is taken horn Patrick Kirch:c (1 984, 191-202) analysis of the evolution of Polynesian chiefdoms. Kirch presencs a model of population growth and lineage stratification for a single hypothetical Pacific island, though he is thinking about the actual case of the big island of Hatvaii. The principle of successive p~imogenitureis organized in Mmaii (and in Polynesia generally) on the basis of conical clans.3 Genealogical lines are ranked in terms of closeness to the original ancestor, and each person theoretically has a unique and intransitiw position in this system of ranked seniority, In practice this

system operated as a theoretical ideal. Competing claims were settled by force and genealogies were reconstructed according to the outcomes of struggles among contending chiefs. Nevertheless, the principle of genealogical senioriry was an important one in legiirimating rule. In Havvaii this principle evotved to include a radical separation bemeen chiefs and w m o n e r s , aiid the practice of brother-sister marriages among sacred chiefs and chiefesses produced the highest possible senioriry for offspring. KircKs model for colonization and population growth works as follows. A colonizing party of Polynmims lands on an isiand and occupies the mosr Eavorable location, ustraliy on the windward side of the idand. The windward side receives the most rainfall and is generally the best for agriculture. Another locational desideratum is offshore reefs that make for good fishing locations. When the best location becomes fully occupied because of population growth, this community "hives off"-splits in m--to o a u y y the second mosr favorable lomtion an the windward side, The second communiry is headed by a chiefwho has less senioriry than the line that rules the original founding community, This process continues untif the windward side is occupied, at which point locations on the leeward side of the island will be occupied in the order from best to least desirable. This produces an island in which the ecological desirabi1it.y of locations maps perkctly with the kinship hierarchy. Kirch goes on to propose that after the island is Gild, continuing population growth either wilt generate pressures for furtkr migration to other islands or will result in intensification of conflict and eventually in pressures for islandwide hierwchy brmation. He s u a e s c that successful conquest eEorrs are likely to come from regions that are ecologically Less b a r e d , such as the Leeward side oE the isiand of Hawaii, where large-scale irrigation was not feaible R r c h 1984, 204). The junior line from a moderately marginal ecological ioation h d both the motive and the means to challenge the ofd hierarchy, This modei may be interpreted in world-system terns as follows. An intra-island corelperiphery structure emerged in which ecological factors and kimhip hierarchy corresponded. Continuing population @~wrh created pressures for itltensificacion of pmducrion, aacerbation of confiict, and hierarchy formation. These pressures eventually r e s d d in the formation of islandwide chiefdoms by means of conquest, and the successful conqueror chief was likely to come from one of the junior lines on the less ecologically favored side of the island. This is fascinating because of its a n d r i c sirnilasiry to a process known to occur in state-based systems-the formation of empires by. semiperipheral marcher states.

Semiperipheral Marcher States Secondaxy state-formation on the marches%has frgquently been xcognized as a phenomenon that is rdated to the rise and fall of empires and the shift of hegemony within interstare systems, Of interest to a theory of semiperipheral development are

the processes that facilitate new and adaptive organizational forms in marcher states and that inhibit or obstruct effective responses in older core regions. Borh of these have been discussed in general terms by civiiizationists, historians, and historical sociologists. Rather than to review this extensive literature, we illustrate with a particular case, the conquest of Sumer by the Akadians. There have been many clear cases of semiperipheral marcher stare conquest of older core regions. A list of such cases known to most world historians would include: the Akkadian Empire, the Kassites, Assur, Upper Egypt, the Medes, Achaemenids, Hittires, Hyksos, Macedonia, Rome, Normans, Maurya, Shang, Chou, Manchus, Glrecs, Aztecs, Huari, and Xnca, In all these cases the semiperipheral state conquered an older core region and set up a new, larger core state. W mean to exclude conquerors who either were peripheral or simply decimated the ald center without setting up a new regime. We also exclude corewide conquests by states rhat have long been in the core, or that are restoring their former glory by making a comeback. The origin4 position of a conqueror within a core/periphery hierarchy is important, and so is the position of the conquered region. Conquests of regions rhat do not have core status do not count. Thus this conceptualization contains w o components: the strcngth of the emerging semiperipherat marcher and the strength of the old core. Some cores fall to marauders largely because of their own internal processes of disorganization, whereas others, thoutl;h not rapidly decaying, are nevercheless unable to stave off powerful &ailengers. The intent of constructing the marcher-state category is not to produce a pure ideal type but rather to help to specify a set of pmcesses of semiperipheral dcvclopment that are v e y diffefent from those that operate in the other gmerd categories rhat vvc. consider later.

The Sumerian interstate sptem and wodd-economy lasted For seven h u n d d years before it was transformed into an empire for the first time by Sargon of k a d e . These ciy-stares interacted within the context of a regionat economic nework that included a coreiperiphery division of labor with surrounding pastoralists, rain-watered horticulturalisa, and specialized quarrying and manufacturing villages. In the Sumerian core, irrigated agriculture was the basis of the first cities. These cities were potitidly autonomous, although they shared a pantheon and the first written language. The early states were theocracies governed by temple priests and an assembly of lineage heads. As the development of this form of organization spread up and down the alluvial plain of the fertile crescent and as land appropriate to this form of production became more scarce, the ciry-states began to transform into political organizations based on an elected war leader, a lugal. The power of the lugal gradually increased as warfare among city-states became more frequent and more important as a means of controlling trade mutes and acess to raw materials. Thougih recent evidence reveals the existence of some farms of cornmadificatioti of land and of a

m o n q economy, most production, distribution, and trade W cluried out by xccipr o d kin nerworks linked together by the political apparatuses of temple and palace. Both spread and backwash effects apparently operated in the coreiperiphery hierarchy, although the extent, nature, and foms o f domination and exploitation aft: uncertain. The emphasis has been on spl-ead eEects beause it is obvious that irrigated agriculture difFused within the Tigris-Euphrates Aood plain and leapfrogged to other areas. It is also clear that surrounding pastordists and horticdturaf communities became specialized in production for exchange with the core region. The core region exported grain, but also textiles and ocher manufactured goods. We know, however, that manufamring emerged also in remote villages near stcardte (soapsrune) deposits, as W have seen, due to transportation costs (see Chaprer 2). Similarly, throughout the Bronze: and Iron Ages, metalworking was often =sockred with mountain societies, Friedman and Rowlands (1377) cornend that the main dynamic of exchange among cities within the core area was based an a prestige-goods economy, This, they argue, made it h a d fsr oIder core cities to monopolize power rc;.sources, Psestigegoods ecftnomies are vulnerable to copying or redebition of the symbolic goods rhat signif;r high statm, The pantheon of shared gods within the Sumerian core indicates a struggle aver the claims of different city deities to superior position within the regiond pantheon. I p r DiakonoE (f 39 1) argues that exploitation within the f umerim region was primarily based on "internd" extraction of surplus product from subjugated classes rather than '"external" exploitation based on political-military subjugation. i-re contrasts this early period with a fater period &'warrior empires" in which conquest and exploieatioa became much more important.. From cbe surviving mrbical literature of Suner we know that kings took armies into peripherat areas to obtain scarce objects such as wood for construction, However, Ridonoff claims rhat such dominance relations were unstable, The multicentric nature of the Sumerian care may have allwed peripheraf groups to play competing cities against one another. VVe knaw that the Sumerian cities atttmpted to control peripherd resources by establishing settler colonies in peripheral regions (Algae 1993). Yet Michael Mann (1986) argues that wen these colonies were difficult to control under the circumstances of high overland transport costs and severe logistical problems. The question of the importance of coreiperiphery hierarchy in the Sumerian or any other world-system and rhe relative importance of spread versus backwash effects can oaIy be derermined by surveying the whole system. Kohl (1988) compares rrvo peripheral regions, Eanscaucasia and Western Turkestan, and concludes that these two are= devdoped rather autonomous and successfirl new cetlters in imeracrion with the Sumerian core in the Bronz &e. But a s d y that Focused on the nineteenth-century United Stares or rwentietb-century fapan (or South Korea or Taiwan) might conclude that upward mobility or rapid spread effects are the usual case in the modern mdd-system. h y decision about what is rypical must be based of devdapon a s u m v of the whole system and must take account of rehtt've

ment. Peripheries are nor areas that do nor change at all. They are areas that develop corelike features more slowly than the relevant core. Peripheralimtion oken inwlves the development in the periphery of social-structural features that impede dertber development toward that of the core. Any comparative study of corelperiphery hierarchies should take these matters into account. Sargon, the eventual king of the city of b a d e , served as a young cupbearer to the king of Kish, one of the old cities of the Sumerim core in southern Mesopotamia. Sargon was originally from Agade, perhaps a recently established city upriver from the old core region. b a d e may have been populated by recently settled nomadic pasroralists who had settled on the fringes of the Sumerian core (McNeill 1963). In any case, the residents of Agade were speakers of Akkadian, a Semitic (i.e., nonSumerian) language.6 The Sumerian interstate system had already begun to manifest the feamres of a bdance-of-power mechanism and the rise and fdl of hegemons, but no city had managed to conquer the whole core region. Sargon led the ians on a military campaign that defeated all the other cities as well as much of the peripheral hinterland and erected the first cmpire-stare on Earth, one composed o f hrmerly sovereign cicy"states. There is a great deal of disagreement about the relative importance of different Factors that Led to the m a d i a n conquest. Because of the scarciry af evidence it is impossible to h o w Ear sure which interpretation is the best, but it is nevertheless interesting to elaborate and distinguish bemeen two models, both of vvhich sre compatible with a general theary of smiperipheral development. Firsc, Man&s (1386) developmentd history of power techniques emphasizes the irnporrance of military technology and organization in the expansion a f empires. In his chapter on the "first empires of dominarion," Mmn lays out an admirable model of the contradicca~ forces of centralization and decentrdi-earionthat operated in the ancient empires. He also suggests, "'at bad been hitherto semiperipheral areas became, in a sense, the new core of civilization. Marcher lords were the pioneers of hegemonic empire"' (1386, 130). Speaking explicitly of the W a d i a n conquest, Mana claims that the recently serrled pastoralists combined peripheral with core-rype military techiyues in a way that gave them an advantage over the older Sumerian core. The Sumerians used heavy infantfy phaiatlxes and cumbersome chariots drawn by equids, ""prhaps onager and ass hybrids7Y(Rlann1386, 132). True horses for riding, or more mobile and spe+ chariots, had not yet been developd. The core infantry w e ~ e"'suited for sIour; methodical campaigns whereby small densely settled areas could be conquered and defended. They arose from the necasircy to defend the early ciry-state and perhaps to conquer its immediate neigfnbors" (Mann 1386, 132E.J. According to Mann, the U a d i a n s mmbined h e w infantry Eorce with the use of a mvvEy developed composite bow Man& contention that Sargon combined peripheral and core-type military techniques rests on his claim that this type of bow was a peripheral product. "[Alrchery," he writes, "was apparently developing rapidly

from hunting practices, and the use of the bow seems to have given a comparative advantag to the marcfiers if combined with infmtry farce'" ( 1986, 133). Mann also asserts that the old core was in some ways "ripe for the picking." Core development stimulated new needs and capabilities in periphed peoples. Trade routes by which core areas were supplied increasingly needed military protection. Though the old core still had a comparative advantage in production, reliance on long-distance trade exposed merchants to raiding and tribute extraction. Competition among core ciry-states ofren spurred the dwelopment of semiperipheral marchers directly as core states made aliances with marchers in order to win struggles within rhe core. Manris discussion of 'biecemed treachery" (1986, 141) suggests that cleavages within the core state societies were developing. In the context of a discussion of the difficult supply problems of an ancient conquering army, Mann points out that campaigns approached one city-state at a time, and success was dependent on a quick victov Both superior force and "coercive negotiations" were important. "The defenders were not being offered much of a choice,'' Mann writes. "If they resisted, they might be killed or enslaved; if they surrendered, their entire visible surplus might be pillaged and their walls hacked down. But a discontented cousin or younger son and his faction could be pmmised more, and the city delivered up by them. This Eaction wadd be added to the army or kft in &age of the city"' (1986, l 4 1). A second, rztber &Rerent yet complementary, picture is presenrcd by the Soviet hs~riologistIgor DiakonoE (199 l), Diakonoff focuses nofe on dass relations in his explanation of how the ians conquered Sumer, dthou& he dsa mentions the importance of Sargon's use of the bow. He writes, "It is entirely possible that Sargon had armss to ym-tree for hazel-tree) groves in the foochilts of Iran and Asia Minor, or &at a campsite kovv; gtued together from horn, w o d , and sinews, had alxady (1331,85).7 been invented at that time" (l DialranoE GIaims that the conquest by tbe Akkadians was based on both ethnic and class factors. He mites: kgends of much later times describe Sagon the Ancient as a man of very humble origin, and &ere Is no reson to doubt the credibilirfr of this tradition. ft was said that he was a gardener, the adopted son a f a water-bearer, m d that he 'oeame a cupbearet:af the 1ugd of Kish, . , . The fact that Sargan had no roots in the traditional names and did not depend on the nabiliry dlowecf him to draw his support from the common people, forming a militia which might have been more or less voluntary ( 2 99 l , 84).

Another contributing factor to the superior solidarity and motivation o f the Akkadian =my may have been derived ffom their status as Semitic spekers who had only recently settled down from pastoralism (but see note 6 earlier). Pastordisrs generally have a kinship structure that promotes solidarity among male lineage heads, and their experience with domesticated animals is easily transformed into the husbanding of peoples (McNeill 1963; Hall 199 1a; Barfield 1993). A kin-based reciprocal society can more easily mobilize collective energies &an a more stratified urbanized society. In contrast, in ciry-states private properry and the differentiation between temple and palace increased competition within the urban ruling class, and increasing strat-

ificarion between dasses made mobilization of the commoners for warfare rnore dependenr on material incentives and less susceptible to calls for sacrifice in the name of the sociery. The "piecemeal treacherf that Mann mentions may well have been a function of increasing competition and conflict within the ruling classes of the old Sumerian core. As to increasing interclass polarization, Diakonoffwrites: h Lagash the events which led m the coup of Ziruinimgina attest to the accurnutarion of many grievances against the prevailing order. Sargon could enwunter support everywhere, The poorest community mmher4: may have been intrresced in curbing the inordinate growth of the nome aristocracfs power; service in Sagon's army offered them hope for social and marerid betterment. . . . But also within the temple and the smte economies, the personnel was srratificd tu such a degree char it was aiways easy to bind here people who were wifling to help rfescroy the norne order (1391,ffS).

The disagreements over matters of fact regarding the Akkadian conquest stem from problems of the availability of evidence for this most ancient case of semiperipherd marcher conquest. This makes it difficult to draw firm conclusions about dich mechanisms w r e important and about the general implications of &is example far Gases of semiperipheral marcher conquest. The portant b e a w e it was first, and because it trmsformed the basic logic of a world-systern more completely than did later instances, Imnic;tlly, as Diakonoff points out, "the papuhr masses, who had supported Sargon, ~ i n e little d from his victory and mncually Iost considerably, because a despotic and bureaucratic form of government became more established in Mesopotamia and lasted far mitlennid' (Z391, 87). The semiperipheral region &at combined elements of a peripheral kin-bsed mode o f accumulation with those of the ore csibuafy mode sac~eededin diminating many of the vestiges of rhe kin-baed mode that had remain& in the old core and in establishing a more centralized, rnore exyloiracive, purer form of the tributary mode than had ever existed before. In a related but somewhat different approach to the phenomenon of semiperipherd marcker states, Randall Collins (1378) contends that the advantage of states in the marchlands h primarily geomilitary. Because they are near the edge of the core ""hearrland," they do nor need to defend several borders at once, and so they can concentrate their resources on a strategy of conquesr thar adds territory sequentially without threats from the rear. The disadvantage of older core powers is that they n u s t deknd themselws from many sides, and so their resources are spread thinly. This explanation may account for some aspects of the semiperiphera1 marcher stare phenomenon, but we doubt that the purely geopolitical advanrages of tocatian a n the marches is the most: important factor. T h e exact comhination of elements that allowed semiperipheral marchers to conquer alder cares undoubtedly varied horn instance to instance, and these different combinations also varied in their degree of fit with a general theory of semiperipheral development. Only a comprehensive study of a large and representative number of instances of semiperipheral conquest and failed attempts can sort our the general kom the syccific aspects of this phenomenon.

Autonomous Capi;t;dIistCip-States The historical process of commercialization wlithin the states and empires dominated by the tributary modes of a~cumulationhas not received suficient scholarly attention. It has been ignored because of the vociferous debate bemeen those who focus on the diEerences bemeen the ancient and the modem world and those others who argue that the instinct to truck and barter is a universd featurn of human nature and thus that all societies can be a n d ~ ind terms of the model of "economic man." We side with Karl Polanyi and the substantivists with respect to distinguishing among normative, politiclal, and market-based forms of social integmtion, We do not think that mmket rationdiy is ""naturd." h t h e r , as Mam claimed, the m a r k t and the camrnodificztion of aspeccs of life are socially construcred institutions. 'The debate b e m e n the substantivists and the formalists has clouded the andysis caf the historical development of cornmodified forms within the contat of normative and tributary modes of production. The substantivists rend to argue that either market forces did not exist in the anGient wrld or that they were so encumbered as to be unimportant. The prirnitiviscs, such as Mm Weber (1381) and Moses Finley (1973), argue that ancient capidism was fitndanlentatly diEerent from modern cayidism and that the dynamics of ancrient society were not importantfy aected by mxket forces. This debate about similarities and digerenees has obscured the study of the actual processes of commodification of land, labor, wealth, and goods and the causes and conseyuences of commdificarion for the dynamia of development within the tributary modes of accumulation. The fact that market dations are not daminanr does not by itself prove that their existence in certain spheres is unimporrant, and in any case, since we knew that apitalist production eventudty beame the ctominanr mode of aaumulation, and since we want to b o w how modes become transformed, it makes sense to study the actual processes of commercidimion and their agencs. Out third rype of semiperipheral dwelopment focuses on capital& c i ~ - s ~ " in d mthe rmrpenpheral interstices of empirer dominated by the hibutdry mode of accumzrhtion. What do we mean by capitalism in this setting! We reject the dichotomous distinction berween ancient and modern capitdism in favor of the notion of Agreeer ofrommodz$cation. Even wichin modern capitalism, perfectly operating price-setting markets are a rarity, especially for 'problematic" commodities such as labor. The extent to which competitive bidding by buyers and sellers sets exchange ratios (prices) is a variabk that is influenced by the operation of both normative and political (coercive) regulation. Capitalism has become the dominant mode of accumulation in a socioeconomic system when market forces have greater weight in the determination of the dynamics of growth, reproduction, and decline (and greater weight in the competitive struggle determining the distribution of social resources) than normative or political-coercive forms of regulation. In the ancient world, money (commodified wealth), markets, interest, cornmodified labor, and the production of commodities were more limited and less purely dweloped rhan these institutions have become in the modern world. Commodification was a process that was uneven. But there were increasingly significant degrees of cornmodification, and some actors are helphlly understood as having been merchant capitalists and production capitalists in the ancient world-systems.

The question of the control of states by "capitalist$ is problematic as well. Control and it is always shared or conditioned to some extent. Control is is also a most easily seen in its effects. Srate policy is bent toward the provision of protection rent, in Frederick Lane's (1173, 1979) sense.8 Lane defines protection rent as the differential returns received by merchants whose trading efforts are supported by a costefficient and protection-providing state. This assumes that the point of state policy is to maintain (and extend) the conditions for profitable trade at minimal cost. This definition a n be extended easily to cover the foreign and domestic policies that are beneficial to capitdist accumulation through production as well as trade. No state measures up to the pure type because all states must to some extent make compromises with other groups besides capitalists, but some of the autonomous capitdist-dominated city-states of antiquiry approach the pure case closely. The mix berween those emphasizing merchant capitalism (accumulation through exploiting price differentials across different regions) and ~roductionof commodities for sale varies across cities and, over time, within cities. Some cities combine these forms of capidism with a more typical (in the context of tributary-mode empires) accumulation through taxation and tribute. There are also important differences depending upon the sectors in which capitdist production is conducted. The Greeks combined production of wheat, olives, and wine for use and for sale in a partially commercialized economy thac requircld control over agricultural land (RostovtzeE 1341). This vvas a more cosnmodified mode of accumulation than that found -within the Large territorial empires, but it was less cornmodified than the approach employed by the Phoenicians, The Phoenician citystates concentrated on merchant capitalism and the production of manufactures for export. This meant that they did not need to control large tracts of h d , Hence their cities w r e built on pmonrories thac could be protected from armies by naval force. They did utilize nearby land for truck gardens to supplement staple food imports, but this did not weigh them down with the need to contml large land areas. This dvantage fir capitdism is emphasized by Fernand Braudel (1984) in his study of merchant cities in Europe. h o t h e r complication in the delineation of a class of autonomous cirystates is their degree of autonomy. One reason why the autonomous city-states of antiquig- were semiperipheral is that they were on the edges of, or the boundaries berween, large territorid empires. These empires were the dominant core of the ancient world-systems. +atidly the capitalist ciry-states were often located such that t h q could easily mediate trade benveen the core empires and peripheral regions. But the autonomy of these cities varied. Often rhey acted as allies to one or another empire, ;md t h q were somtimes swallowed up by imperid expansion (Frankenstein 1373). Some cities within empires were allowed partial autonomy for merchant and production capitalism, and this was increasingly the case as tributary-mode conquerors became more sophisticared about hovv to extract suplus. As empires themselves became more cornmerciatized, kings and emperors learned to tax merchants rather than expropriating them outright, and canquered cities were granted some autonomy to pursue production and trade. The point here is that autonomy is another

variable. We focus primarily on those cities that had formal sovereignry, but we recognix that merchant cities within tributary empires sometimes played an important role in the expansion of commodification (e.g., Tlateloco, Canton, Babylon, Osaka). Some cases of sovereign semiperipheral capitalist city-states are: Dilmun, Byblas, Tyre, Sidon, Carthage, Malacca, Venice, Florence, Genoa, Anrwerp, and the cities of the Hanseatic League. Another list might be constructed of semiautonomous towns that carried on extensive trade as a rauIt of their location. on overland routes, such as those on the Silk Road that made a living by linking the distant cores of Eurasia. Some of these, t i k the specialized maritime cities, obtained much of their basic foodstuffs through trade, and served as agents of cornmodification. Karl Polanyi's students and colleagues (Polanyi, Arensberg, and Pearson 1957) utilized the concept of the "port of trade" to characterize long-distance state-administered exchange in the context of the early empires. The idea is that real price-setting markets are not operating because exchange is regulated by political deals among stares, and merchants oyeme prlmariiy as stace agents. Subsequent research h a Kvealed new evidence that some of the cases studied by Polanyi and his students did indeed have independent merchant-s trading on their own accomt as well as extensive monerization (e.g., Currin 1384). Polanyi's w e d ! iqlicalion is that ports of trade are simply reflections of tile Jominanr- tributar). mode of production. They supposedly do not constitute important agents of social cfiange toward a more commercialized type of economy, It may be the case that some cities in neutral zones rnediating trade benveen enyires truly were inert ports of trade in the Potanyian sense. But Pofanyi did not choose to andilyze most of the maritime cicy-states we listed above. These were a g e m af market forces withjn the interstices of trihmry empires, and their activities were an important stimulus to the further commodification of large regions, including peripherd areas and the tributary empires themselves, Mamk (1967, chap. 20) analysis of merchant capitalism discusses how under some circumstmces the action afmerchants in bvying chmp and selling dear not ody e q d izes prices across digerent tegions but also encourses production for exchange and specialization. For Mam, labor only becomes a commodity under the wage vstem, in which workers self their labor power (time) to apitdis~s.Market forces subject produeers ro the constraint of average sock* n e e s q labor time, This means that marker: fares will eliminate hrms of production that are ine6Gient in terms of the utilimtion of labor; that is, new hrms of Iabor-saving technology will be implemented and will drive dder bms out. M a a csnsidercld w q e l&or tu be the only form of labor mobif a i o n appmyriaci: m apitafism, mile we qree &at this is the most flexible form (dlowirlg market forces most easily to restructuf-t.the prduction p r e s s ) , we note rhzt wim other fsrnls of partjy cornmodified labor (e.g., chattel slavery) and men uncommodified labor (e.g., serfdom) have k e n used for commodiry pmduainn in both the ancient and the modern world-systehns, Though this kind of capitdism was not as cornmodified as the modern kind is, it shodd be smdied rather than wept under the rug. The pmcesses by which regions became integrated into a larger market economy began with the commodification of goods through the carrying trade of merchanhs, Wrchants m m things from areas where prices are low to areas where prices are

high. The abiliry to do this depends on the existence of forms of transportation that are economic in the sense that the transport costs do not consume the profit. A human carrier cannot economically carry corn farther than the distance over which he will eat his pack full of corn (Drennan 1984)-and this is true regardless of the mode of accumulation. Hence transport costs are the main determinants of the concentric rings within which bulk goods and lighter prestige goods move, which is also an important reason why trade-based cities are usually built near waterways. Another reason why semiperipheral capitalist city-states tend so rely on water transportation and naval power has to do with their interaction with conquest-based tributary empires. Merchant cities located inland are much more susceptible to conquest than those located on coasts, promontories, or islands that can be supplied and defended by naval forces. These maritime powers usually combine merchant shipping with naval supremacy, and they are ofren considered "pirates" by their competitors. But it is mistaken to characrerize many of the cities on our list simply in terms of merchant capitalism. In many cases they specialized in manufacturing particular products for export in conjunction with their carrying trade, and this aspect of their operation also functioned to expand and deepen market demand. The Phoenician cities of Sidon and Tyre borrowed glassmaking technology from the Egyptians and manufactured relatively cheap glass vases, which they exported to the entire Mediterranean littoral. The Carthaginians reproduced Greek-style pottery and statuary for export. Besides reminding us of Taiwan, these examples show how the Phoeniciaas were agents of technological change thraugh the operation of socially necessaq labor rime within an ancient world-system. Semiperipheral capitalist ciw-states pperfbrmed the role of trade diasporas (see Cbapter I and also Curtin 1984). They not only encouraged cornsnod* pfoduction and exchanges by providing demand for local surpluses, but they also helped to forge rhe interculturaf bases of regularized cross-cultural.trade by familiarizing people with she producrs and ideas of distant Lands, This was transformationa) action, but not upward mobility as long as the tributary moctes of accumulation. remained dominant, It was only with the emeqence of a dense and very commerciafized regonal system in Europe that capiratist states moved from xhe semiperiphery to the core.

"TheRke of the West" Although we deal at greater length with the "rise of the West" later (in Pars Three), we also need to consider it briefly here as a type of semiperipheral development. The rise of the West combined two dif-ferent types of semiperipherd developmentmarcher staces and capitalist city-states-to produce a new form that migbr he labeled a '"semiperipheral marcher world-system," But because Europe was never really a separate system, it should rather be called a semiperipheral matcher region. The conhsion about EuropeGeripheraliry can be resolved by analysis on four spatial scales: developments within Europe; changrs that ocsurred in Europe" peripheral and then semiperipherd relationship with rhe eastern Mediterraneati and western h i m core region; Europe's links (sometimes interrupsecf)with the other core regions

in (ndia and China; and changes that vvere occurring in the Afmeurasian prestigegoods nemork (PGN) as a whole, The three separate cores of the Mroeurasian system constituted separate politicdlmi1itar)r nemorks (PMNs) &at had long been linked in a larger prestige-pods and inbrmation nemork (see Chapcer 8). At first Europe was a periphery; then a semiperiphery of the Near Eastern core. Then it began to f~trmits own internal mre q i o n and to dominate its own periphery. Finally it came to dominate the older cores of the Near East, India, and China, These shiks are mnsidered in detail in Ghapters 8, 10, and I l .

Rire and Fall of Hegemonic Core States According to Wailerstein, hegemony is a situation in which one core state has an unusually large share of world economic and military power over other core states, Under this definition, there have been three hegernonies in the Europe-centered systern since the seventeenth century: the Dutch, the British, and the United States. In the modern world-system, we argue, the cantexr is a larger world-economy in vvhich capitalism has become the dominant mode of accumulation. Thus the nature of competition and the types of institutional innovations employed by successful rising semiyeripherd powers are somewhat different. All of the three states that became hegemonic core states were semiperipheral beFore they achieved mrt: satus, The Netherlands was a wedatld &ere Protestant rebds Erom htvverp ~etreatedErom the f panish h k e ofAlva, The strongest Eurspean state at the time was Spain. Protestantism was a religion of the semiperiphery, an ideology that democratized access to the deity and challenged the authoriry of the old core, The Dutch Republic uniquely combined features of earlier capitalist ciry-states with a federalist nation-state policy dominated by the merchants and production capitdists of h s t e r d a m (Taylar 1934).The Dutch had the first capitdisc stare with core starus. England was a relatively strong medievd state, but its role in the international economy was as an exporter of raw materials, mainly wool, to manufacturing cities on the continent. EfForts to gain control of trade (e.g., the expulsion of Jews, the formation of the Merchant Adventurers) and to support import substitution began in the time of Queen Elizabeth I, as did colonialism and the raiding of Spanish galleons by state-sanctioned privateers. The eventual success of these policies in expanding trade and manufacturing for the home and export markets led England to core status in the eighteenth century, and then to hegemony in the nineteenth. The United States was peripheral during the eighteenth century, although the "triangle trades," shipping, ship-building, and some manufacturing, had already developed in New England before the Revolutionary War. The South remained a classical producer of peripheral raw materials employing coerced (slave) labor until the Civil War, but the North and the West developed core capitalism, hpiring core capitalists and statesmen struggled politically against those who had a vested interest in the export of raw materials to the European core from 1816 until the Civil War. The North and the South struggled over control of the federal state and such issues as tarif6 and land-distribution policy. The western farmers shifted their sym-

pathies in synchrony with the world market price of wheat. When the price was high they supported free trade. When the price was low they supported Henry Clafs ""American Systemn--tariff protection for industry and government-subsidized transportation links (Chase-Dunn 1980). The United States was semiperipher4 in the sense that it contained within it a mixture of core and peripheral activities, and U.S. merchants mediated trade between the European core and the Caribbean and Latin American peripher).. The United States reached core status in ~ economic hegemony after World War I. Only after World War II the 1 8 8 0 ~and was poliridlmilicary hegemony ernbraced. The hegemonic sequence, stages of hegemony, and the causes of both rise and decline have been andyed using comparisons of the three hegemons with each other and with otber core and periphera! states within the modern world-system (ChaseDunn 1989, chap. 9).Though these cases fir the general model of semiperipherd development, a detailed comparison of the mechanisms of rise and fall with those operating in earlier semiperipheral marcher states reveals important differences as well as general similarities. In the capitalist mode of accumulation, the paths to success of these rising begernuns relied much more on comparative advantage in the pmdtrcrion of commodities and the use of military power to protect trade routes and access to raw macerid inpucs to commodity- production. M i l l q power was used m facititate capitdist accumulation, In earlier semiperipheral marcher states coercive power was itself the direct mechanism of zccumulation. This is simply another way of saying that the logic of competition shified awa;v from the extraction of taxes and tribute by tnilitarf' FRrce to the accusnul%rionof profit through ccrmxnodil). prociuctioa. The most successful states in the modern capitalist world-system have been capitalist states, Of course there have been other ""pths of development" within the modern wrld-system. Prnssia and Japan attained early success through state-building and militav strength that w r e m c h more rerniniscerrt of the tribvtary stratee, only later converting to commodity producrion, The case of RussialUSSR was jlso very different. The dependen~eo f capitalism on the interstate qstem (see ChaseDunn 1989, chap. 7 )has reproduced the logic of geopolitics even while commodiry production bemme the dominant mode of accumufarion, h o r h e r important difFerence bemeen uneven cltrvelopment within the modern world-system and in earlier systems is in the degree of disruption a w e d by the faI1 of old core centers and the rise of new ones. Since the capitalist world-economy is politically organized as a permanently multicentric interstate system, with multiple competing states in the core, the process of rise and fall of hegemons appears to be more routinized and less disruptive for the sys.tem as a whole. m e n tribute and taxation are the main forms of accumulation, the failure of an empire is quite disruptive of all social relations. But in a system of generalized commodiry production the center of power, based now more on competitive advantage in production, can move from Holland to England to the United States with relatively fewer disruptive consequences for the operalion of the syfrern as a whole. For exmple, the fail of the western portinn of the Roman Empire was not fatal Eor the European region, but recuvery took a long time, at least in comparison with the consequences of the decline of

a modern hegemon. We contend that this difference is largely a consequence of the transformation of the mode of accumulation. The most problematic instances of semiperiphery-based change are actual or potential challenges to capitalism. Trotsky; approach may be extended to consideration of the socialist experimenr in the Soviet Union. Chase-Dunn has argued elsewhere (1 982, 1992~)that the Soviet Union never successf;llty esablished a.n autonomous and selfreproducing socialisr mode of production. Nevertheless, it posed the most powerful challenge to capitaiism in the modern world-system. China has posed a similar challenge. Both are casct of challenge from semiperipheral regions. This supports our argument that hndamentdly new organizational forms, activities with very different logics of operation, are likely to emerge first in semiperipheral area where both core and peripheral forms are combined and development is subjected to very contradictory forces. We explore this theme Further in the following section and in Part Four.

Conclusions We now return to the discussion of theoretical problems in the light of our ansideration of the different types of semiperipheral development. The different vocabularies used by Trotsky, Gerschenkron, Quigley, and Service are only semantic problems. W e t h e r vve talk of stages, phases, or levds of devetopmnt or of wolution is not reA y crucial. A more serious problem confronting rhe effort to formulate a coherent theory of semiperipheral develupment is the potential For conhsion and circuiiariry in the definitions of structural posirrons tvithin a corefperiphery hierarchy It could be true by definition that n e ~ cores r aare previous semiyeripheries, but this tautology would not explain anything. m e n W are considefing the question of u p & mobittv-rhe moving ofa semiperipheral polity into core sratus /or hegemony ar empire-formation) need to distingukh bemeen position in the corelperiphery hierarchy and changes in thar posirion, In the case of'che modern wdd-s;vstenl this is accornpIished by examining relsive indicators of wrld-system position comparatively at one point in time and rates of chalzgr over tinre in thostl. indiators relative to the population of competing actors. For example, if \we may consider, as some do (e.g., Arrighi and Drangel 1$186),gross national product (GNP) per capita to be a good indicator of a country's position in rhe contemporary core/periphery hierarchy, then rhe growth rate of GNP per capita can be used as an indicator of change or stabiliry in world-system position when it is compared to the growth rates of all the other countries in the system. A semiperipherd country wili have a GNP per capita that is roughly incermeniare in the distribution of cross-national comparisons, whereas an zlpwrdb nzabile miperigherrzl muvtq will h e a re1ative.f~high economic g o m h rare (e,g., South Korea, Taiwan). Of course an enci~c:army of researchers and bureaucrats have worked on methods of national economic accouming and cross-national comparisons for fifty years to produce the concepts, operations, and actual data thar n a k t these quancitafive measurements possible, and even so, the data are skimpy bebre 1150. But the existence of these data for the global political economy demonstrates char the distinction be-

meen position in a core/periphery hierarchy and change in that position can, in principle, be meaningful for earlier intersocietd hierarchies. The solution is to develop concrete understmdings of the forms that earlier corelperiphe~hierarchies have taken, and to conceive of mobiliy within these hierarchies as relative to the development of the exlstiiig inrersociecal nemork as a whole. Our discussion of semiperipherd marcher states intentionally excluded both core and peripheral conquerors, but a real test of our hypothesis must indude these as well as conquerors who emerged from regions previously unconnected with the relevant world-system. Our proposition is that conquerors from the semiperiphery are most likely to perform empire-formation and the expansion of empires, whereas peripheral or external invaders are more likely to be destroyers or to form very shortlived states. Tianshrmational -ion by semiperipheral marcher stares involves the expansion and further institutionalization of the tributary mode of production. The relationship benveen nomadic pastoralists and states supports these contentions (Eor more derails, see C h q t e r 8 and also ffd 1383, f 33 1a).Most often nomadic pastoralists are employed as border guards of empires (e.g., Comanches, Cossacks). Those that succeed in cunquering core areas are rarely snccesshf in forming long-lasting empires. It is rather recently sealed pastoralists who have already under$one some state-formation of their ovvn who are the prime calldidates to be empire builders. In the act of settling down on the edges of a core region, these nomadic so~ieciesbecome semiperipheral (e.g., the Madians), A comp~hensivetest of &is thesis would need to survey the universe of empire-formations and elassi+ the corelperiphery posi.tions of all the empire brtilders. David WiLkinscm"s ( 1 391, 124-145) exmination of cores and core shifts in thirteen pstiticdlmilitary n e w o r b is one way to solve rhe eirculariv problem mentioned earlier. There are several logicat dternativrs involved in core shifi-s,The newly risen core pawer may be a formerly semiperipherd city or state, but it may also be: a resurgent older core state; a peripheral people that conquers and descro;ys a core region but does not establish a new core state; or a peripheral people that conquers an old core and does establish a new care state. These logical alternatives eliminate the t a u t o l o ~Wilkinsonk ~ study provides support far our hyporhesis, but diRerences in our respective definitions of semiperiphery ctoud rhat support.") Wlkinsods survv of core shifts in PMNs reveals that the most fjrcquenr type of core shift is one in which a semiperipherd state conquers an old core and cxates a new hegemonic power. But other types of core shifts also occur frequently. Wilkinson notes a pattern that he calls a ""shuttle," in which hegemony moves back and forth beween two regions. And there are many cases of semiperipheral ascent, the rise to core status of semiperipheral regions chat 3Q not conqwr the old core. The theory of semiperipherd development also claims that semiperipheral areas are disproportionately the locus of agents of major social rrmsfoxmations. In o&r to evaluate this broad claim we would need m define and operatiundizts the differences bet-vveen activities that simply reproduce the dominant mode of accumulation from activities that expand and develop the dominant mode or that expand the logic of a new mode,

Do b t h success within tke ntodern wodd-system and transformative influences on the mode of accumulation come disproportionately fmm semiperipheral countries? Obviously we are nor arguing that all semiperipherd areas are transformative or upwardly mobile. Rather, our contention is that those countries that display the greatest successes at capitalism have been formerly semiperipheral, and also that the most significant challenges to the logic of capitalism have emerged from the semiperiphery. We submit that the first daim, that the most successful capitalist countries (i.e., the hegemonsf were indeed prwiously semiperipberal, This does not establish that serniperipheraliry is a prerequisite to success. What we have not addressed is why some challengers succeed and others do not. This is a much mote complicated matter. The transformation to a socialist mode of accumulation is even more problematic. V(ie contend that the kirge communist star ina and Ehe Soviet Union-underwent the most transfomative strunurd changes toward socialism, hough they did not succeed in est;lblishing a self-reproducingsocialist mode of accumdariun. RmidUSSR was obiously semiperipherd, But what about China? 13y most economic measures (e.g., GNP per capita) China is still a peripheral country, But we coneend that Cbiraa was never cctmpletely peripheralizd as a result of incorporation into the expm&tlg Europe-entered world-system, tho& rgions Mrjhin China were. The cwltural and political stren* of Gkim enabled it to resist colonimtion by the W a t and to rnaincrtia political wiry and some military strengzh, These &tares contributed to the strong mrablishment of instinitional f e a t u r ~of swialism &at have prouen digcult to rwerse despite more than a deade of eEm. These ktures aiso contribute to Chinis upward mobairy within the capitalist wodd-economy hpeccs of socidism have atso emerged within both core and periphcraI countries, but we submit that these have been less transformative than the dnanges that occurred in China and the Soviet Union. We are not arguing that socidism is impossible in the core or the periphery but rather that it is more likcly to emerge strongly in the semigeripheq. This is because the modern core/periphery hierarchy stimulates class struggle in the semiperiphery whereas it cross-cuts and dampens it in both the core and the ~eriphery(ChaseDunn 1981, chap. 10). The current (1990s) phase of "free-market reforms" in both the formcr Soviet Union and China do not vitiate our argument. It may wtl he that these regions may invent a new mode of accumulation that is neither socialism nor capitalism. Though that remains to be seen, it is clear that semiperipheral regions will continue to challenge &c capitdist wrld-syskm in various ways. The notion of semiperipherd development is only part of our theoretical urplanation of the historical evolution of world-systems. In the next chapter we wnsider a sequence of interactions among processes of population growth, environmental degradation, population pressure, conflict, hierarchy formation, and the intensification of production. Iterations of these interactions, along with the transformations of m d e s of sccumulation, account fi)r the main patterns of sociaf change over the past 12,000 years in which myriad small-scale egalitarian world-systems have become incorporated into a single global capidist system.

Iterdtions dnd Transfo A Theoly of World-SystemsEvolution

In this chapter we formulate our theoretical explanation of the historical evolution of world-qstems. We Bstracr from scale-the incrcsing size of v~orld-~tern+to explain the rise of larger and more hierarchical polities and the development of more and more energy-utilizing production. Our expianatiw is constructed as a basic model that gaes through iterations in which systems g r m brger and qualizative transformations of mades of accumuhtictn occur. As new modes of accumulation emerge they do not alter the general Eorm of the basic model, but they do change the ways in which the basic variables aEecc one another. The transformation of modes of accumuiation occurred ehrnugh wrtd-sptem processes of uneven development in vvhich semiperipheral actors constructed transformational innovarions. The scope of our theory spans the 12,000 years since the Mesofithie: establishment of sedentary societies, This theory combines the idea of iterations of a basic model with transformations in mades of accumufation,&call that we me the term ""modeof accurnuIatian" in the sense of the deep structural logic of production, distribution, exchange, and accumulation in order to focus on the institutional mechanisms by which labor is mobilized and social reproduction is accomplished. This allows us to account for both systemic similarities and differences across world-system types. We also specify versions of the basic model that account for particular transformations--the Neolithic "revolution," the rise of early states, and the emergent predominance of capitalist accumulation. The contextual substrata of human social change are those demographic and ecological facts that are built into the natural universe. Nature is not a uniform upon which humans erect their condos. The dimaric, topographical, and geological features of the earth vary from place to place, as does the composition of the biosphere. Human beings are part of the biosphere and human culture is built upon the bumpy surface of biologicat, topographic, gotogical, and climatic wriation. Variations in these media impose wnstraints on what can be erected and on the sustainabiliey of the constructions. The species-specific biological constraints on human behavior are less limiting than for all other animals because of the unusually large proportion of the human brain

100 / Itergrions and [email protected]

that is composed of unpreprogrammed (noninstinctive) cortex. This unprogrammed mentdiry makes it possible for individuals to take up the latest culturd "software," and for the species it makes rapid and Aexible cuitural adaptation possible. Thus, culturd evoluciotl is much fwter than bioloE;rcal evolution. Still, constraints remain embedded in both our brains and our bowels: Both need clean water and shelter. Constraints are in our mintrfs, too. Most of them are socidly constructed, and thus can be reconstructed. Some co~~straints, however, are more fundamentd.

Similairies The main constraints and moving forces behind human social change have been demographic and economic. Demographically there is a tendency for the human population to expand, though all societies structure and regulate this tendency culturally The organizarional costs of feguilatirlg population growth we heavy and difficult to impose evenly over the long run. A s s the pmcesses of social %volutionfced back positively on popuktion grawth in most systems. Tkus population growth is both a consequence and a basic stimulus of fundamental social change. bpujation growth and the more cornplicaed notion of population yressurc are not p i m e movers because they are both causes and consequences a f evolutionary. processes, The natural environment in a specific locale can support only so many human beings. This is the so-cdled carrying capacity of the environment, )Pap&tian pressure occurs when the population density (the number of people per unit of land area) rises to levels that degrade natural resources in a way that increases the cos= of pmduction. m e n &er hunting reduces the deer poputation alld makes it necessary h r hunters to travel longer distances, this is population pressure at work. Thus population pressure and environmental degradation can operate as important forces on social change without ever qproaching the absolute c a v i n g capaciy of a f ocale, Pspuiatlon pressure explains much abouc nomadism and shifting agriculnlre, People eat tap nature and then must moye on. It is not necessary For nature to be cornpietely destroyed, however. Well before this happens, the amount of efFort needed to obtain the same return will have increased substantially; This is a fine incentive to move, or m do something diEereotly However, people usually prefer to continue in the way that they know as long as this does not require substantially greater effort. George Zipf's (1947) principle of least effort is a force that operates in all human soaetres. bputariun pressurt: causef conflict over scarce resources and encourages emigration. If it is possible to move to a new area where the old methods of production can continue, no change in production technology need occur. Emigration lowers population preswre in the original homeland. h o t h e r possibility is violent conflict in which people are killed--which lowers the population pressure. Some systems get stuck in a viciaus cycle of population buildup followed by interlsified wzfare that functions as the demographic regulator.

lterations and %dz'rmations


5 01

Ecology structures the economics of least effort because it limits available resources and potential alternative resources. As world-systems become more complex and hierarchical, these ecological limits and potentids change their spatial scale because of changes in social organization and r e c h n o l o ~Our perspective here differs horn thar of Lens&, MoXan, and Lens& (1395).They contend that techoliogical. development of societies reduces the importance of ecological determinants of social srructure. They argue that the social structures of foraging societies are much more determined by the features of the local ecology than are the social structures of industrial societies. We agree with this if the focus is only on local ecological features. However, a world-systems perspective allows us to see that the scale of ecological constraints grows with the expanding scale of inrersocietd nenvorks and technological developmenr. Thus local ecological features are less important for a continental world-system than for a mu& smaller regional wrld-system. Local ecological features are also not very important forces in a global world-system. But continental and global ecological constraints become more important as wrld-systems increase in size, So as local features of the naturd environment decrease in importance, ecological features and processes that are larger in scale rise in importance as constraints on =sources and suscainabiliry. Environmental degradation in the form of dehrestation on one island or soil &$etion in one valley is replaced by threats to gtoM &aturcs such as depletion of the ozone layer. Hence as the scale of ecological constraim expmds, their importance as constraints on social structure chacrges but does not diminish overafl, The principle o f least eftbrt applies mast purely and forcelirlly to the economic behaviar of households, m e n households are autonomous and able to obtain access ro necessary resources, t-he princiyfe of least effort is the major determinant of subsistence hehavior. This changes considerablywhen households become culturally, politicatly, and econornicafly controlled by hierarchical or srratified social orders. In such socierd contexts the prindple of least eEort conrinues to operate, but it is masked bp insritutiond mechanisms thar extract much greater amaunts of labor from huuseholds by means of coercion, exchange, or ideological mystifiation. Technological i~lnotiatinnsand the adoprion o f intensified pmduction practices (which we term intensification) act in turn on population growth by increasing the number of people who can be fed and sheltered within a given area of land. This stimulates the population to rise, or rather it reduces rhe incentives to maintain the (costly) cultural and social regulations on population expansion. Population densiry then tends to increase to the point at which resources are again pressed and the whole cycle goes around again. As systems become larger, and especially as they become more diversified, regulation or maintenance of the overall system becomes more complex. Those systems that develop hierarchical structures are generally betrer able to manage these compiexiries. Our basic model represents the main processes that are involved in hierarchy formation and technological intensification. Hierarchy formation is a general term that refers to increases in socially structured inequalities within or among societies (e.g.,

dass formation, state formation, or exnpire formation). Intensification refen to the implementation of changes in production t e c h n o i o ~that increase the productivity of land, i&sr, or other resources, Our model contains six other variables: population growth, environmental degradation, population pressure, emigration, circumscription, and conflict. Figure 6.1 illustrares the causal relations that we posit among these variables. This "iteration"hodel is derived primarily Fram a narriage of the theories of anthropologists Marvin Harris (1979), Robert Carneiro (1170, 1981), and Mark Cohen (l 977). As we mentioned earlier, population growth in a locale leads to environmental degradation, and this leads to population pressure. Even without reaching carrying capaciry, exploitation of the best resources causes the amount of effort required to obtain sufficient food and raw materials to rise,"he increased eEort required to maintain past levels of production and consumption often motivates people to emigrate to new locations. Such emigration lowers population pressure until population growth has again pushed against local resources. Emigration eventually 611s up the available alternative locations, leading to a condition of circumscription (Carneiro 1970). The uption of emigmion to reduce popularim pressure depends on both social and environmental contexts. If a riverine flood plain is surrounded primarily by deserts and mountains, emigrants from the Aood plain will not be able to conrinue the kind of lifesryle to which they have become accustomed. This is environmental circumscription. If &ere are adjacerlt river valleys but they are already filled with people like those in the original valfey, emigration is likely to involve a fight or other costs. This is social circumscription. Cifcumscription raises the costs of emigration and so encourqes people in the origind lacale to consider alternative solutions to the problem of popdarion pressure. One resuIt is often increased conflict over scasce resources, which may operate as a demographic regulator, reducing popdarion pressure, Alternatively, people in a circumscribed and conflictive situation can either adopt intensifred production or accept a more hierarchical organization2 structure that regulates conflict by imposing a peace and regulating access to resources. It is evident that people resist both of these solutions when they can, or when the costs of doing so arc not too great. hragcrs who know a b u t horticultural techniques refuse to employ them because they prefer to harvest nature rather than to engage in the backbreaking labor of farming. Migrating peoples who happened upon a land abundant with food, such as the horticultural Polynesian discoverers of New Zealand, largely abandoned planting for the joys of the hunt until the hunting had sufficiently reduced the available meat to make planting once again necessary (Krch 1984). As for hierarchy, people would generdly rather do it themselves. They migrate may ftom chiefs, from kings, from feudal lords, and from slave omers if l a d s are available for occupation. Only when the costs of voting with their feet are too great do they opt to stay and serve. Carneiro (1970, 1981) developed the hypothesis of circumscription to explain chiefdom formation and primary state formation. But circumscription was also important in the dwelogment of Mesotithic sedencism and

164 1 Iterdtz'onsand Ean$~mzations

the adoption of new production practices such as diversified foraging and horticulture. We contend that circumscription is also an important force in the contemporary global system, But how and when does a high level of confiict created by population pressure and ecological degradation in a circumscribed setting result in the emergence of a new level of hierarchy? First, increased conflict may not lead to hierarchy formation. A period of violent warfare may itself "solve the problem" because people are killed and population density decreases. In Figure 6.1 this is illustrated by the negative a r r w from conBict to popularion prctssure, Patrick Krch (199 1) describes the cast: of the Marquesan chiefdoms caught in a vicious cycle of warfare and population gromh in which a new level of political hierarchy never emerged. In other cases one group successfully conquers other groups and puts together a larger policy that brings peace to the region. This is the scenario that Carneiro paints. To this m would add that hierarcby formation by conquest occurred most hquently d e n a semiperipherd potiy conquered an d d core. Our modification of the model brings together the elemem of coreiperipheq hierarchy with considerations of "internal" stratification and class struggle. Semiperipheral polities in precapitalist mid--ems generdly had less internal su-acification than older care polities. An example of this scenario is D i k o n o F s (199 1) wrsion of the emerl;;ence of the M a d i a n Empire recounted in Chapter 5. Older core regions dweloped greater internal inequalities and greater divisions among different factions in the ruling groups, Seernipperipheral marcher states (and semiperipherd marcher chiefdoms) usudly had less class inequaliry and more solidariy among efites. This gave them an imporcmt militav advantage over older core regions and attowed them to conquer whole core regions and construct larger polities, Mjrch's (1,384) model of semiperipheral hierarchy formation in Potynesian interchirfdom systems points to the impormnt feature of serniperipherd polities" generally oul-vying regions that wre tess ecologically desirrtble than those occupied by older a r e regons. In these marginat regions the application of core techniques of production reached their ecological limitatrons more quickly.This sometimes caused new forms of productive technolag to emerge in these semiyeripherd regions and motivated polities Erom these stressed regions to be willing to take the risks associated with attempts to conquer the older core chiefdoms. The stress approach formulated by Brian Mayden (l 98 1) to explain technological intensification contends that ecologically marginal regions experience population pressure more strongly and are more likely to implement technological changes. This pardlels our formulation of the semiperiphery as the locus of transfotmation, The iteration model proposed in Figure 6.1 does not operate within single societies. Er is a model that requires intersocietal interaction as the context of social change. Social circumscription is generdly produced by competition among culturally diEerent or politically autonomous groups, Some world-sysrem anthropologists reject this model because they associate it with the ecological-evolutionary approach developed by Julian Steward (1955), which emphasized the relevance for social

structures of local ecological katures. S t e w a d approach. was partly a reaction to the long-distance difhionism of V. Gordon Childe (1951). Diffusionism and the importance of long-distance trade have become important new foci of attention with the rise of the world- terns perspective, and we think rightly so. But we also insist that understanding world-systems evolution requires attention to whole systems, including local, regional, and interregional interactions. From this point of view, the Iiarris-Cametiro-Gohen model is an i m p u r w t contribution &at should be d e n seriously as a basis for devising a wodd-s)rscems theory of social evolution. This model does not explain the exact kind of social change that Eakes place, Nor does it explain where or exactIy d e n social change takes place, But it does point ta the major procases and contexcllal features that are important Fctr explaining chc most general features of human social change--increasing population density, scale, and hierarchy of social organizarior-r, The thick pclsitive feedback a r r w s in Figure 6.1 bemeen hierarchy formation and intensification are meant to stand for a number of ways in which these two procrsses interact, While the h r m of this interaction is different in diRerent kinds of world-sytems, societies in all s).stems face simitar chaiIenges, "Technologicai development and the use of intensified methods of production encounter four basic problems in all world-systems. Tbe retative importance of these prohlems varies dependillg upon demographic and ecological factors and upon the instituriand structures that alreally exist. Nevertheless, these probIems are recurrent, and they present possibilities for further institutionat change and hierarchy building. The four social problems that accompany or follow changes in production techxlotogy are:

1. increased wmpecicion andlor coafiict; 2. new scarcities of necessar). resources; 3. dependence on new types of production and resultant risk of failure; and 4. collective needs for savings and investment in relatively long-term, large-scale projects. Every change in the organization of production tends to disrupr existing rnechanisrns of social order, leading to increasing competition and consict. Man: formulated this notion as the revolutionary effects that technological change (change in forces of production) had on societd superstructures such as political and religious institutions. Older institutions that produce order, whatever they may be, are subjected to strains when new production schemes are introduced. These scrains, in turn, may produce new levels and kinds of destructive conflict, Of course conflict and competition are normal processes within all world-systems, but here we are talking about large rises in the levels of conAict and competition, well beyond their "norrnaf" levels. Different modes of accumulation have very different effects on the processes and rates of technological innovation and the restructuring of production processes. Dif-

106 i Iteradoas and [email protected]

ferent modes of accumulation also have very different degrees of tolerance for technojogical change. In some modes very minor changs may provoke major disorganization, whereas in o t h m technological crlrange itself is somewhat "nomdized" by the existence of institutional mechanisms that allow polities and cultures to adapt to technological changes without major disruptions or breakdown in social order. At one extreme is the nearly total collapse of an Australian Aboriginal band upon first being p r ~ e n t e dwith steel axes (Sharp 29$2), i"rt the other extreme is the modern world-sysrem, in which mechanisms have developed to smooth the absorption of tremendous technological changes. The second genera problem is the emergence of new scarcities as a consequence of technological development, which may be played out in several different ways. First, new methods of production oken demand inputs that are not available or are dimcult to produce locally. This is a spur to trade with or to conquer other regions. Second, a rise in the availabiliry of, say, food as a result of changes in farming technology may enable local population to rise, and this may in turn deplete other local resources. This is also a spur to trade or conquer. Third, technological change that is labor saving may allow horimntd specidizacion by releaing Iabor for other pursuits. Sonretimes such putsuia create additional dernand for goods not available locaJll?r, Additional potentid surplus resulting horn technological change may be appmpsiated by old or netvv elites and may also result in demand for other goods not obtainable Xocalfy. Old elites with new resources or new elias may also undertake new political Jliances, trade links, or military campaigns irrespective of any needs for imprted macerid goods because these kinds of enterprises provide legitimation and addiriond sourea of support for maintaining or further expanding kierachies, The third general problem that accompanies technological change is potential resource scarcities resulting from growing dependena on new surplus produced by the new technology. If an increase in food supply leads to population growth, then the new food source must be reliable or there can be grave consequences. All new strategies involve some risk. Strategies that reduce production diversity by specializing in some particular kind of production are particularly risky because of the consequences of that specializatioris failure. The shift from diversified foraging to rnixed horticulrure and then to agricultural monocropping involved a massive long-term specialization that increased the productiviry of land and labor. This shift exposed popuiations to extreme dependence on a very few cultigens. Institutional responses to such production risks include the maintenance of resource fallbacks, starage facilities, and the development of interregional political alliances and trade ties. This problem is another spur to interregiona) integration and a set of possible opportunities for hierarchy formation. These instirutional adaptations may become very complex in environments, or under technologies of production, that are highly volatile. For instance, herding of sheep is a very volatile process, especially at lambing time, when an early frost can kill nearly all the new lambs (Cribb 1991). Similarly, when ~lantersgrow crops whose growing cycle is very close to the average growing season, agriculture is also

Iterati~nsand EdnJjforndtZ~n~ I 107

highly volatile. Occasionally, rwo techniques with different volatility cycles may be combined to minimize risk in an otherwise very marginal environment. This is one impetus for continued interaction systems benveen nomadic and sedentary peoples (see, e.g., SpieImann 1931a, f 331b, f 39 1c). The fourth problem that often arises concomitantly with technological change is the demand for nevv forms of collcctivc savings and investment in new long-term projects. All societies need ways to store resources in order to provide for seasonal or other shortMs. "This kind of "accumulation" occurs even in the egditariall bands of Paleslithie nomadic hunters. Storage is facilitat-ed by sedentism, and so sedentary foragers further develop techniques of collective saving. If technological change results in increased population densiry, this usudly creates new intermittent scarcities and thus an expanded need for collective saving. Technological change may also make some older brms of p d u c r i o n insufficienl: b r meeting the needs o f eirher an expanded population ar a new hierarchy. Ir may be desirable to engage in other [email protected] fvrms of production in order to meet such needs, and these ofien require the pooiing of resourcos or the expenditure of fabor on large projecrs that have long-term dividends. Thus the construction of granaries, irrigation systems, fish-wirs, and so on requires the investment of social resources. These kinds of collective invesment may be organized and controlled by egalitarian alliances mobilized by temporav or specialized leaders, but they also provide opportunities for mare centralized, hierarchical, and "permanent'" control by emergent. elites, Of course once such efites have emerged they may underrke such projects for their own purposes. At every level of organizational complcxiry there are several possible structural solutions ra each of these problems. The determination. of which of these solutions is adopred in any particular instmce is excremei). complex, involving the interaction of broad constraitrts, the particularities of ecolou*md the prior i~~stitutionaf terrain In each world-system. Illstirutianal mechanisms for resolving these pmblems may take either hierarchiml or egalitarian Eorms. Hierarchical political forms often win out over egalitarian hrms because of heir superiorities in competirion and conflict over egalitarian forms. The example of semiperipheral marcher states having less-stratified polities than older core states does not contradict this generalization because these very semiperipheral marcher states often go on to construct iarger and mare hierarchical empires that exceed the earlier levels of hierarchy in the older core stares they have conquered. Each Ievel of complexicy and system size seems to have a l e d of hierarchy that is a central tendency around which the leading polities oscillate. These levels are occasiondly and abruptly increaed by means of the success of new conqueror pohtles, Is this just another version af neofunctionalism? It might seem so in that we have presented a list of social needs and suggested that social change occurs to meet these needs. But we do not understand this as the progressive realization of universal social needs for the good of all. In all hierarchical societies and in all corelperiphery hierarchies, the powerful act to preserve or expand their power at the expense of the less powerhl. The less powerful are not inert, however. They resist, and the outcome is

108 / Iteations and Ean$~rrndtiom

an unstable and fluctuating balance of forces made visible in a,IL hierarchical systems by sequences of political centralimtion and deantralization. Though it is not true &at everyone benefits equally (as functianahsts claim), nor is it true char only the mmbess of the ruling classes have benefited from social evolution, Rnfers have sometimes had to solve problems for evesyone in order to mainoin their privileges and powers. A e n , we are not explaining change teleologically It is not rhe result of these changes that caused them. Rather, those grows that developed structures with a comparariw advantagcl suavived better, and other groups adopted similar scruCcures. But what about progress! Stephen Sanderson's (1975a, chap. 8) ovewiew of the question of progress in social ewlucion is a balanced and acclurate appraisal that avoids both smug functionatism and generalized doomsterism. As Sanderson points out, despite the fact that "progress" is necessarily a matter of the values of the observer, several rypes of improvement may be defined that correspond to most people's notions of progress, and these may be maluated mrc: or less obectively, Many of the r-egressive aspecrs of long-term social change are demonstrable along with several important aspects of improvement, especidly with the coming of industrial capitdism and its associated social changes. Acknowledging the progressive aspects of capitalism relative to agrarian empires (as Marx did) does not require the conclusion that capitalism is the best possible sysrern Far human beings. 'I'a sum up: Economic processes operate in a context of demographic forces and ecologiical constraints m produce ~echnojogicdchatlge and hierarchy hsmation, This feeds back into demographic processes and fomard into social organizational potentials through four general problems: new forms and levels of competition, new scarcicies, new risks, and new demands fsr savings rtnd investment. Popularion pressure, emigration, and rhe search for new resources at contribute to the periodic mgamiott and contraction, or pulsarian, that o c c w in dl WO*-systems. These contexruaf and social feacura of human systems have produced the general patterns of social change: an evuiution over the past 12,000 years from lowdensicy nomdic bands of big-gme hunters with few intergroup social ties, to a single highdensiry integrated global nenvork of hierarchical industrial societies. This model crsvers the general causal processes that are invalved in each local qstern and the phenomenon of sptem expansion. Ifwe stopped here vve would be arguing, as do the concinuationists, rhat all worldsystems are the same. We hold, however, rhat there are important differences beNveen systems. m a t are these differences and how are they to be e?rp)ained by our evoiutionary model?

Bcmeen this schematic model of ge~ieralsocial wolurion and the particularistic history of events and social changes is an intermediate level of theoretic4 specification, The nature of compelition and moperation alters qualimtively as wrld-sptems be-

come larger and more complex. These changes affect the nature of poiiticd and economic integration and the forms taken by societal and intersocietd hierarchies. In addition to the sinsilarities discussed in the preceding section, alf hierarchid world-systems exhibit cycles of political centralization and decentralization. The processes of hierarchy formation are unstable over rime, resulting in rise-and-fall patterns. The dynamicf of these cycles contain the mots ofwrld-system digeirences. Complex societies and empires are subject to decreasing marginal returns that lead to overshoot and collapse (Tainter 1988).These processes are analogous to what happens in chiefdoms. The Long-run consequence of general social evolution has been greater hierarchy and spatidly larger economic and political integration. The development of great Leaps in hierarchy, complexity, and policy size has been uneven in space, such that the leading edge has moved and continues to move from region to region. The reason a wdd-systems model is superior to other formutarions is that this unevenness is not random but rather is s~stematicdlyreIated to intersocierd hierarchy and differentiation, All hierarchical systems undergo the rise m d falt of hierarchies; some undergo increases in the level of technology and organization through processes that are importantly structured by intrrsociecal relations. MW organimtianal forms typically develop in regions that art. semiperipheral, and so the nature of corelperiphery relations are aiways important concexcual fearures of tho,ce historical periods in which fundamental transformations occur. That said, we must now address the problem of how world-system types &fkr developmentdly. The ireration rnodei depicted in Figure G. 1 does not simply go round and round prohcing more comptex, more hierarchicd, and Larger world-,eystems. Our main theoreticxl apparatrrs for addfessing this poblern is the concept of made of accumulation (or systemic logic) discussed in Chapter 2, We argue thar the underlying logic of cornpetilion and cclopmtion has airered over time and that these qualimtive transformations in sptemic Logic have caused irnpnrtant changes in rhe way in whlch the basic model and processes of political integrationldisintegration work. We present this as a series of iterations of the general model described earlier in which the mode of mumulation changes along with expansion of spatial scale and degrees of hierarchy. The features or pafcerned pcesses that all world-systems share-technological change, demographic expansion, spatial integration, and the rise and fdl of politirs-are imporlancly modified by the nature of the logic of social production and accumulation thar is predominant in each system,

The Big Question We claim, then, rkat the causal relations of the iceration model change with system transhrmacions of the mode of accumulacicm. But why do the system cransformatlons occur! In order eo have a theory of sacid evolution, we need to do more than invokc: these major watersheds of human history. We need to explain them. A single general explanation of human social evotution could easily be vacuous. It might nor tell us much of what we want to know about what kinds of changes to ex-

1 10 /

Iterations and "1;~n~rmariolzr

pect and d e n and where to expect them in any particular instance. Thus the structural-functiondist evolutionism of Tdcott Parsons (1966) is formulated at such an abstract level of analysis that it is of little or no help in understanding historical development. The proposition of economic formalism that all social mfution resutrs from natural scarcities, individual rationdity, and the progressive realization of efficiency is similarly vacuous and seems to be contradicted by more than merely aberrant exceptions. Sandersods (1 995a, chap. 1) statement of general background assumptions for a theory of social evolution is excellent for the most part but does nor itself constitute a causal theory of social evolution that explains the major transformations of systemic logic, Rather, Sanderson constructs a digerenc theory h r each transfsrmation. Each of these is consisrent with his materidist theoretical strategy, but the proximate causes of transformation differ from case to case. We will explain our formulation by first considering Sanderson's and then showing how ours is different. Sanderson uses the Hmis-Carneiro-Cohen model outlined earlier to explain Mesolitbic sedenrism, Neolithic horticulture, and the emergence of primary (or pristine) states. For primary scare formation he combines Carneiroyscircumscription theory with the class srruggie theory of Morton Fried (1367). We agree that class struggle is an important dimension of chiefdom formation and that stare formation (as fnrmdlated earlier in connection with the nocion of senitperipheral marchers) also is importantly a&cted hy bath intraclass and inferdass struggle. We also agree that this represents an important addition to the basic Harris-Garneiro-Cokren model. m a t happens is that the geogolirid logic of competition importantly modifies the way in which the underlying popularion pressure model workc. But this relation, contra Sanderson, does not completely replace the underlying population pressure model. Rather, the demographic and rnareriai constraints af the underlying. model continue to serve as important limitations on more complex and mare: hierarchical s).stems. Efowever, the rise of intensified praduction and hieradical polities modifies the ways in which the basic variables work. This is especidly true during periods of expansion. The demographic and ecological constraints reappear in periods of contraction, and especially in those extreme contractions that Joseph Tainter (1988) calls collapse. Sandenon rightly emphasizes the important fact of the parallel evolution of major transhrmatinns (Rleotirhic "'revolution," rise of early states) in several unconnected regions of the world. However, he underemphasizes the importance of long-distance interaction within several of these ~ g i o n sThis , causes him to ignore factors such as diffusion of information and prestige-goods trade that are important from a worldsystems perspective. He is a splirter, not a lumper. But his oversplitting is unnecessary to his basic point that parallel evolution in unconnected locations was due ro underlying similarities in the causal structure of social evolution. m e n it comes to the emcrgnce of secondary states and empires, Sandclrson is silent on the role of population pressure. He contends that agrarian states have no

evolutionary logic, in the sense that they do not contain a dynamic that produces a transformation of basic systemic logic. This is reminiscent of the approach that Mam took in his notion of the "Asiatic mode of production.'%arx saw agrarian empires as an "evolutionary cul-de-sac" of repetitive dynastic cycles in which powerhl landhoiding aristocrats and inert peasant masses stew in their own juices for thousands of years. But Sandersan does not daim to& agrarian inertia, Rather, he sees agrarian empires as having only a weak evolutionary impetus relative to &at of earlier or later systems. Sanderson acknowledges the growing size of tributary empires and cites Rein Taagepera3s(1 1978a) excellent studies of the growth and decline curves of empire territorial sizes. Sanderson also stresses the importance of a very long-term trend of commercialization in which small regions became increasingly interlinked by trade mutes and prohc'ion for exchange. Our formulation is very different. We see the agrarian empires as world-vtems in which geopolitical dynamics and the development of new "techniques of power" (Mann 1986) continued to expand the size of ~olities,the intensiry of production, and the scale of exchange in a context in which the basic causal substrata continued to be the iteration model we have outfind. Population pressure, circumscription, and confiict were important motors of social change, but they were lnudifid in theiroperation to sonar extent by regional corelpc?riphery dynamics and long-distance trade, Sanderson expiains the long-term cammercidizarion trend to which he points a a Eundamentai cause of &e eventad erncxgence of capitalism (and vve agree) as foiIows: '"Ngrarian eIites could not dispense with merchants because they provided goods and semices that agrarian elites greatly desired" (t 995% 175). Our explanation is BiEerent brause w e Focus on world-systems rather than on individual states. We contend that interstate get;tp~l;ticalcfynamics combined with &ass struggle (both urban and rural) to produce the rise-and-fait phenomenon. The size of the ixrgezst stare in a PMN gat. bigger and then smaller again ap dynasties rose and fell and conquests =re successful or fell apart. This repeated cycle of rise and fall was occasionally punctuated by a steplik increase in the size of the largest pofiy. Borh rise-and-fa11 oscillations and ocmional huge expansions of rhe size of empires may be seen in Taagpera's studies (tE)78a, X378b, 1379) of the territorial sizes of ernpires. The steplike expansions not only engulfed whole core regions but dso incorporated large periphgral regions and linked hrmerly noncontiguous cores together into new farge empires (see Figure 10,3).These major expansions were almost always carried out by semiperipherd marcher states, The causal ciynamic was usually some variation of that described above to account For primary stxe formarion. The possibiliry of larger conquests was also hcilitated by the spred of new agricultural production techniques over wide areas and the development of secondary chiefcioms and states within these periphed regions. Once an gricultural surplus W% being produced and apyropriated by local elites in a ,@on, a conqueror could come in md demand erihute. The syred of agricrtlrural. intensification and local hi-

l t 2 / Iterations a d E d n $ r m a t i ~ ~ ~

erarchy also facilitated the production of prestige goods and scarce raw materids for export. This was an important cause of the expansion of the s i x and density of trade networks. The existence of these trade networks also provided an important incentive for further mnquest in order ro safeguard and control the nervvorks. The emperors sometimes tried to control trade directly by appointing their own reyrcsentatives to carry out transactions with distant polities---the so-called stateadministered trade emphasized by Polanyi (1957a). Such efforts required the suppression of competing traders. Also it was often difficult to prevent the trading agents from trading on their own account. An alternative was to allow independent merchants to carry on trade and to tax their accumulations. The ubiquitous negative characterization of nerchaacs in agrarian civilizations may be a culturaf consequence of efforts by territorial political elites to undercut the political challenges that wealthy merchants often posed. Successful conquerors learned to rely on autonomous merchants both to obtain desired goads and as source of revenue, but this often came to pose a political threat when wealthy merchants challenged military leaders Cor control of the state. The history of Chinese dynasties reveals a weilk n w n pattern in which the mmdarin state allowed great economic freedoms to merchants and producers during periods of expansion but then confiscated their properties when poiitical competition fm the cont-roI of the state became too threatening, "The orher importanc dement of our explanation of the Long rise of capidism is the phenomenon of semiperipheral capitalist ciry-states described in Chapter 5. As the level of prodnctian within staws, empires, and peripheral regions rose, a niche emerged for small maritirne trading states specializing in carrying goods from region to region. These states were politically dominated by merchant capitalists and so they were the first capicatist states on Earth. They often enpged in important production of commoditiei; for sde. They wewe a p t s o f the expansion csf production for exchange and long-distance trade nemorks because they economically integrated h-Aung regions and encouraged peoples to produce for exchange. A world-system appmach allows us to see how this new form of smiperipheral developrnenr acted to transhrm the tributav world-systems and to create the h i s for the eventud predominance of capitalism. Sanderson's silence on the role of popuiation pressure in the evolution of statebased world-systems stems from the ways in which the logic of geopolitics and trade expansion modify the effects of popuiation density during periods of expansion. m e n states, production for =change, and trade necworks are growing, ~ o ~ u l a t i o n density has a positive effect on hierarchy formation and intensification. However, this effect does not operate through the mechanisms of ecological degradation, circumscription, and intensified conflict. Rarher, greater population densities have direct positive effects on hierarchy formation and intensification during periods of expansion. In a sense, the superstructure of geopolitical accumulation overrides the underlying demographic and resource scarciry constraints of the iteration model. Conversely, in periods of contraction, and especially when contraction is rapid and

Iterati~nsand Zdn$rmatiions

1 1 13

deep--the phenomenon of collapse investigated by Tainter (1988)---the still- resent demographic, ecological, and circumscription factors reemerge. It is in this sense that the iteration model cantinues to be an important undedying basis of wolution of state-baed world-systems, Sanderson; explanation of the transformation to capitalism employs yet a third rnodel. This combines the 4,000-year secular rise of commercialization of trade networks with five factors that explain why (according to Sanderson) capitalism first became a predominant logic of accumulation in Japan and Europe. We agree with Sanderson, as will be seen in Dart Three, that the long-run commercialization trend eventually reached a level ar which the transition to a system of predominantly capitalist accumulation was inevitable. From this point of view the important thing to explain is the long-run trend, not the proximate conditions that account for why the capitalist transition occurred first in the place or places that it did. Sanderson dso cantends that population pressure and circumscription werr: not important causal factors in the transition to capitalism. He notes that European capitalist transformation occurred following the demographic disaster of the Black Death, which reduced population pressure in Europe. He argues that rapid population growth in bo& Europe and Japan facilitated capitalist development rather &an stirnulacing a crisis of populatian pressure. He presents supportive smtements to this eEect from one of the main proponents of population pressure theory, Ester Boserup (198 I f . Again vve note that the dynamics of rhe institutionat superstruccure transform the ways in which the demographic and ecologicaf,constraints work during periods of expansion. Thus population densily an3 grovvth sometimes directly facilitated capitalist a~cumwiationrather than provoking it by means of its effects on ecological degradation and conflict. Similarly, in some cases ecological degradation operated directly on technological intensification rather than by means of increasing confiict. Richad Wilkinson (1373) shows evidence thal: deforestation in England was an important stimulus to the development of coal production. Once the market mechanism is working, resource scarcities may provoke substitutions without the much more disrupdve processes of conflict and violent competition. But rapid population growth also does cause disruption in modern societies. Jack Galdstane (1331) demonstrates that both reform movements and revof utions are caused by the effects of rapid population growrh in expanding state expenditures beyond state revenues. Goldstone seeks to explain why revoiutions came in waves throughout Eurasia during the early modern period (1500-1 850). His primary cases are the English revolution in 1640, the French rewlution in 1789, the transition from Ming to Qng rule in China in 1644, and the seizure of power by the K6priilii viziers in the Ottoman empire in the mid-to-late swenteenth century These revolutions began with state breakclown, followed by elite competition over control of the state and its reconstruction, and ended with renewed stability, State breakdown, Goldstone's major concern, is a result of the complex interaction of population growth with social structure,

1 14 / Iteratioli~and %an$rmat;;orar

Population growth causes state expenditures to outstrip state revenues. As the revenue gap increases, the state must either raise new taxes or cut-tail expenditures, The grow& of elite population heigt7tens corngetition Far resources and pctsitions. Kising grain prices create new wedth holders who, if blocked by traditionat or new barriers, h e c a m a marginal elite, Population gromh increases the proportion of young persons who, due to unemplqment or underemployment, become an impoverish& group with high potentid far m a s action. The inlcrease in poverv further strains state raoures, As conditions deteriorate, efites and commoners lose confidence in the state and elim struggle for cantrol and promote reform, If a formerly marginaf elite seizes power and if the prevailing culture has an esehatological tradition, reform radicaiizes into revolution. If any of these companents is absent or very weak, reform or fdl of a regime are typical results. GoXbstone bses his explanation on controlled comparisons among his cases. He presenrs evidence to support the asgument thar trade, and themfore world-systemic processes, do little to shape these revolutions, I-le hriher claims generaliv for his explanation, at least for the early modern period, thmughour Euraia. Goidsmne's demographic andysis of rclvotutioas firs nicely with our mplanaeion of world-system evolution. Indeed, his explanatim can be interpreted as a special case of the same processes a n d v d in dosrr detaiI. We disagree, h o w e r , with his claim that rivorld-system processes do m t have eEects on staa crises, To be fair; he is addressing conventional world-system theory, not comparative world-system theory. Still, his rejection of important roles for trade and world-systems relations is unwarranted and stems from a lack of appreciation of how demographic changes-both declinas and i n c r e a e e a r e Rot exugenous to the social system but are in fact m s e quences a f large-sde world-system interactions. Ellrafia w d ~linked by trade at least by the lasr centuries before rhe conmon era (see Chapter 8). In the first few centuries of the common era this linkage became sufficiently strong to transmit pathogens from China to Rome, unleashing epidemia in bath. This recurred in the century &er the M o a g ~ l stemporarily merged Afroeurasia into a single PMN when the Hack Death swept through Europe and epidemics occurred in China. Goldsrone acknowledges that the severe population losses brought by the Black Death set the conditions for a rather spectacular population increase a couple of centuries later when European populatians had built up immunities and dimate changes favored increased agricultural production. He also recognizes that the Black Death was spread by the Mongols, probably via rats in their baggage, which they had picked up in earlier steppe wars. What Goldstone does not acknowledge is thar the pathways along which the pathogens spread were precisely those by which the Eurasian PGN was linked (see Chapter 8). That is, the occurrence of epidemics was nor an exogenous or a randomly induced change but rather one that worked along predictable world-systemic pathways. Now, when we add to this the linkages implied by the correlation of urban and empire growhidecline phases in the MediterraneaniWest Asian and East Asian

PMNs (see Chapter 101, the syncbronicity of the revolutions that Goldstone examines is: readily explained. Population pressure thus has both direct positive effects on capitalist transformation and indkect effects throutSfi the festructuring of poljtical instirutions. As Tainter (1988) shows, the capitalist system also eventually develops levels of mmplexir)i that engender decreasing marginal returns. Hence the modern system also faces the possibility of decline or collapse in which the more unhappy mechanisms of the ireration model-ecological degradation, circumscription, and conflict--become more regular shapers of socid change. Rather than abandon the basic iteration modd for completely different explanations of ho.w transbrmatiorls take place in comptex and, hierarchical systems, we explain why the iteration model ~ieldscenter stage to geopolitical and capitalist dynamics only to come forth again during periods of collapse and crisis. The basic demographic, economic, and emlogical constraints posited in the iteration model do not become irrelwant, Rather, &at happens is that institutional superstructures such as states and capitalist accumulation temporarily overcome these constraine by raising the pace of spatial expansion and technological development. But eventually even these institutional mechanisms run into limirations yased by the material substraum of demographic, economic, and sological factors. This modifies the model in Figure 6,l by a d d i q posicive a r m s direcdy from popuiation pressure to borh hierarchy formation and intensification (see Figure 6.2). m e n markt mechanisms articulate growing scarcities (e.g., deforestation in England) these provide economic incentives for new kinds nf production (e.g., the coal industr).). These instituciunal inventions axe responses to the constraints and opportunities created by ecological degradation axld population pressure. They alow for greater popuhtion growth and clensity by temporarily bypassing the confiictive path in the iteration model, We say this is temporary because eventually population pressures emerge that create problems on a scale that the existing institutional structures cannot hmdle. This teads to a return to the conflictive path of the iteration model. Our mrM-system approach to social evolution cwbines the focus on semiperipheral developmefit and an andysis of the changing d y n a i c s that occur within geopolitical and economic pmcesses to explain the major system transfol:mations. These operate somewhat JiEerently in the different trarzsformarions, but they. do not ever c a m p l e ~ htranscend the basic iteration madd. We agree with Sanderson that the iteration model explains Mesollithic sedentism, Neolirhic chiefdorn formation, and early state formation in a direct manner. The only thing W w u l d add is that chiefctam formation axld stare Formacion were importantly influenced by semiperiphesal devdopment. The causal elements in the iteration model afkct older a r e regions and semiperipheral regions differarty and &is cmsticules an imprtant world-system modification of the Harris-Carneiro-Cohen modet. "Ib recapitulate, population pressure aEects hierarGhy formation and technological. change directly once states and commodities have come into existence rather thm thruugh the mechanisms of conflict and circumswi~:ion, Rut the path of causalic]i.

that goes through conflict and cir~umscriptionis yet again important even in the prescnce of stares and commodities during periods of institutional breakdown and system collapse. In this sense rhrre is a single underlying model of transhrmxions, though it works somewhat differently once states and markets have become widespread social forms. The mrld-sysrem unit of anaiysis is important at every level because of the phenomenon of semiperipheral dwelopmenr and because circurnscripcion does nnc happen wirhin sociedes but o d y in intersocieral systems. V e now turn fmm the abstract to the somewhat less abstract and consider a numbeh of case studies of particdar world-systems, beginning with one that was very


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In this chapter we describe the results of a research project' that focused on a single small-scale world-system that existed in northern California before the Gold Rush of 1849: a local and regional interaction system peopled by sedentary foragers--hunter-gatherers-who lived in permanent villages. This case study was undertaken in order to explore basic ~roblemsin conceptualizing small-scale world-systems and comparing them with larger systems. We also examine the nature of the interaction syscen in precontact northern Califarnia m determine whether or nor '%essentialwinteractions were carried utlc autonomously within cuiturat entities. VVt- use this case study to gain insight into h e first Formations sf core/penpber). hierarchies and to address the question of systemic transfnrmation. It is srill rather commonly assumed that sedenrisrn first emerged with horticutture, Arhaeologists have found salid evidence that shows chat sedentism and social cornptexlty preceded the first horticulture by thousan& of years in the Near East and in othgr regions (Price and Brown 1385; Price 1331). Natufian is the name that archaeologists have given to the first culture of Mesolithic sedentary foragers to emerge in the Levant. Of course che kincl of diversified arid intensive faraging that was the basis of early seder-rtism may be understood as a kind of pmtohorticulture. It involved the management and labor-intensive and regulated use of natural resources and provided for insurance in times of scarcit-y; The esrabiishment of collective use rights over particular territorid natural resources may have been a pivot2 institutional invention of the first sedentary foragers. But what kinds of intergroup relations did they have? Were early territorial groups specialized in warfare! Did they engage in expansion by conquest? Did they eng;ye in local or long-distance trade across cultural boundaries? Did the sedenraq villagers exploit or dominate rheir still-nomadic neighbors! By what processes did sedentism spread, and how and why did horticulture emerge thousands of years thence? We will never know the answer to many of these questions because archaeological evidence by itself is incapable of telling us the answers. But we can srudy peoples with many of the same attribuns as rhe early Hatufians who survived into the nineteenth century and about whom we have both archaeological and ethnographic evidence. This is the most important reason for focusing on northern California, a region that

was quite isolated from state-based and e m complex chiefdom-based world-vstems

until the 1820s. In the 1820s the first Euromerican fur trappers explored the northernmost part of California, the home of people we call the Wintu and their neighbors. It was not until 1849, the year of the California Gold Rush, that the life-ways of the Native Californians at the north end of the Sacramento Valley were radically altered. Before that, a very small world-system was in full operation.2 Unlike most ethnographically known foragers, the Native Californians occupied ecologically prime sites. Most of the forager peoples that have been studied by ethnographers were nomadic because they had been pushed into ecologically marginal regions by more hierarchical peoples. But before the emergence of hierarchical social systems many foragers lived in areas in which nature was so producdve that relatively dense and sedentary occupation was possible. Relative isolation allowed such societies to survive until 140 years ago in northern California. Hencc we study these relatively sedentary foragers to gain insights into egalitarian, kinbased world-systems.

The Case o f Northern CdifPornia Naciw Calibxnians lived in small but densefy packed villages in a region in which nature provided great stores of food for [email protected] They used stone teats. Though they did not make pats, the w m n made highly useful and stunningly beautiful baskets. They did noc plant corn or other cultigens, though they occasionally and informally planted tobacccl. They had domestiated dogs. They harvaed nacure and mmaged the natural enviromenr in order to preseNe and expmd its productivity, Gonrrary ta the idea of Native Americans as havjng selfreproducing autarkic sodeties, the peoples of northern California interacted intensively vvith their immediate neighbors, even across linpistic boundaries (see Map 7.1). The study bcused an the norchern end of the Sacramento Wley a d i t s surrounding foothills and mountains, an area for which there is a large corpus of both ethnographic and archaeological evidence. The ethnographic studies, mainly carried out in the early decades of the rwentieth century by Alfred Kroeber and his colleagues and students at the University of California at Berkeley (Kroeber 1976 [1925]; DuBois 19351, have been mightily criticized by a younger generation of anthropologists, but these studies still represent the most thorough ethnographic and linguistic research on any region occupied by sedentary foragers. This region has also been the focus of a great deal of archaeological research since the 1930s. The world-systems perspective suggests that we examine intergroup relations and hthese interact with, rtjproduce, or change, locaI p u p structures, In practice this means that we must decerrnine the nature of interaction nemarles of several kinds. We need to construct a social geography of the production, exchange, and consumption of food and ocher basic raw marerids of werydiay life, We need to study conflict, an important aspect of sociality in all societies and in all intersocietd systems. We need to srudy the patterns of marriage and inrermarriage among groups. We also

MAP 7.1 Indigenous peoples of California. (From Heizer 1978, ix.) Note: This map is a heuristic guide rather than an authoritative representation of actud territories at any particular time. For more information, see Heizer.

need t s consider information flows, cultural influences, and systemic cultural similarities and di&rences across Interacting regions, h northern California s m e of this work was afready d m e through the application of the " d t u r e area" approach. to mapping cultural, Linguistic, and material characteristics of groups (Kroeber 1976 (19251; Voegefin 1942,247-252). However, our focus on interaction n e w o r b requires us to go beyond the mapping of crrifural actributrs and to try to reconstruct the actual interaction nerworks, In order to do &is, we study "merits'" in the d o c u m e n t q and ethnogfaphic record as well as indirect elridence of interaction as it is revealed by archaeotogy. The distribution of cultural elements is an important aspect of any regional interaction system, but we also want to know the pat-terns of internctions themselves. For this W can use the methods that archaeologists have developed for stutlying exchange (e.g., sourcing of trade items) and the ethnogrzphic, linguistic, d docllmentary records that reveal intergroup inrerxtion. The Wintu projea w n t beyond general characterizations af inreractian in the ethnographic and documeneary record by coding reported evezts or mtgd ilzstdrzces rbat indicate interaction. We coded the foilwing sorts BE events in a survey of the ethnographic and documentar): litemure: 1. pracurement trek-trips to gather food or raw materials, visite;, and excursions for the purpose of obtaining spiritual powr; 2. exchange events, including trade feasts, midway trade, and collective hunting and gathering events; 3. conflict trvents, including disputes, raids, line wars, bactles, and reratiarory attacks; 4. celebrations, induding war dances, dream dances, "big times," puberty ceremonies, cult gatherings, and the like; 5. marriqes; and G. villages, including information about location, size, names of headmen, and also information about boundaries bemeen linguistic groups. The project focused primarily on precontact events (those that occurred before 1850), but we also collected postcontact events that occurred up to the 1120s. Coding the events required careful line-by-line reading of each document while filling in code sheets ibr each of rhe six interacrion topics just listed.3 Xn addition to interaction event coding, we analyzed linguistic data in order to examine intergroup relations. The extensive information collected by linguists on place names was used to study differences in the nature of Wintu relations with the Yana, Achomawi, and Chimariko linguisdc groups (see Map 7.2). We also reanaly~edsome archaeological data on obsidian projectile points in order to study trade patterns, and we employed archaeological data to study the expansion of the Wintu inm territory formerly held by I-Tokan-speakinggroups.

The Wintu and Their Neighbars The wntu speak a language in the Penutian Linguistic stock. At the time of the arrival of Euroamericans (referred ta here as "wntact") the Wintu occupied a land area of approxirnatd~4,800 square kilnmefers at the norrhern end of the Sacramento Valley near the resent-day city of Redding and some of the surrounding foothills and mountains. The total Wintu-speaking population at the rime of contact is estirnaced to have been about 5,300 (Cook 1.976, 15-16), The Wintu lived in racher small villages, the largest containing about 250 people, but had a relatively high population density since villages were located rather close to one another along the rivers and creeks. Like most other Native Californians, the Wintu had a diversified and relatively intensive mode of foraging. They hunted small and big game, gathered plants, roots, seeds, acorns, grubs, and grasshoppers. They fished, especially for the salmon that were seasonally plentiful in the rivers along which they lived. Bean and Lawton (1976) call the diversified and intensified form of foraging found in Native California "prooagricuiiture?' because of the methods they used to increase and sustain the resources they were harvesting from nature. Winru women produced baskets that were so tightly woven that they were used for water-carrying and cooking, Linguistic and archaeological evidence sugesrs that the ancestral W n t u migrated into Wifornia from southwestern Qrcgon about 1,200 years ago (misrler 1977; Clmett and Sundahl 1982, 1990). 7"hey first esfablished themselves along the hanks of the Sacrarnento Rver in the Sammento hlley. This wave of immigrating Penurian speakers included ancestors of rhe people that are: known ethrrngraphically as the Wirrtu, the Nsmlak (Central Winrun), and the Parvvin. The Wincu occupied the west side of the northern end of h e Sacramento VaIley, and the NonzXak and the Fawin occupied the river banks m d the west side of the n i l y do\*.nstream to the delta area near San Francisco Bay (see Map '7.1). Archaeologists identify the ethnic Wintu with an archaeological assemblage known as the Shasta Complex.4 Elaine Sundahl (1986, 1181) periodized the history of the Shasta Complex into three phases. A basic assemblage that signals the presence of the ancestral Wintu marks the earliest phase (700 C.E. to 1200 c.E.) of Wintu settlement. During the second phase (1200 C.E. to 1600 c.E.) the Wintu became linked into a prestige-goods nenvork that traded Olivella bipltcam, Gbcimenlr, and Haliorir shells, used primarily for decorations (Bennyhoff and Hughes 1987). These shells came from the northwestern CaXifor~iiacoast and were traded across Wintu territory up the Pir River and into the Great Basin of Nevada to the east. This trade nework is thought to have peaked between 700 C.E. and 1500 C.E. In the third phase of the Shasta Complex (1600 C.E. to the contact period) several new attributes appeared, induding clamshell disk beads, indicating the incorporation of the Wintu inrn a new trade nemozk. The clamshell disk beads, manufactured primatily by the h r n o , are the hallmark of Phase 2 of the Central California Late EIorizon, This

A VP?y Small WorU-System / t 27

trade nenuork, linking central and northern California, emerged about 1500 C.E. and reached Redding not long a k r that. The wntu were politicdly organized as independent tribelets, usually consisting of a single village but sometimes composed of groups of two or three villages under the authority of a single headman. It must be emphasized that the term 'cwntu" refers to a linguistic group, not a politically organized group. There was no formal organization above the level of tribekt, but tribders oken cooperated with one another on specific projects or came together for celebrations and religious ceremonies. Occasionally a headman m u l d have alliances in nlmy cribelers xross a wide area,but this was nor accompanied by formal institutionalization of a wider inheritable chidy authority. Our comparative approach encourages us to consider the possibiliry that intersocieta1 interaction nerwofks could have been constituted as egditarim rzlations and composed of egalitarian groups. In Native California we find such a system. Recent reinterpretations of indigenous California societies claim that Kroeber and his students systematicdly ignored aspecls of hierwchy (e.g., Jackson 1986). Grtainly some families had mare wedth and status than others. The eldest sons of headmen were expeaed to take up the duties of leadership, but they did not always do so, Sons of headmen who lackcd oraroricd skills or other desirable leadership characteristi~sdid not become headmen. The headman colleaed goods from villvrs far use in trading -with outsiders and for settling disputes, but rhe acorn granaries were not his p p e r r y . M!hmilies used the granaries, m d the headman ensured each family a fair share.5 m e n a rich man or wonam died, the Wincu typically burned or buried most of the person's sheH bead-money, baskets, and other property. This dramatically constrai~led rhe accumulation of resources through inkerirance (DuBais 1335, 66). This is an example of haw nonstate peoples "'avoided power'"(Maan 1986) by means of imtitutions that impeded the formarion of social hjerarchies based on accumulard weattll. Some men and women bad specialized vocations that enabled them to gather more resources and prestige than others, Craft specidists were respected, as were those who cultivated spiritual powers and techniques of healing. A successful sbamaa was well p a d and ofren praised. However, too many hilures or suspicion of witchcraft couicf lead to the death o f a shaman at the hands of his or her ctients.6 Some scholars have emphasized the extent to which inequtalisies between richer and poorer families may be undersrood as constituting an incipient or emergcnt $ass system (e.g., Jackson 1986). Headmen oken had more than one wik. Typidfy a third or fourth wife would be from a relatively distant tribelet. These marriages gave headmen a wide kin nenvork on which to draw when support was needed. Although a heaciman's power W* primarily based on charismatic auttloriy dependent on the assent of the followers, he did have greater ascess ra social resources because of wider kin nerworks. The central role of headmen in intergroup relations, as representatives and leaciers, undoubtedly gave h e m other dvarxrages wer people within their viilages Uackson 1986). In these respects rhe Wintu had somewhat more intragroup inequality than nomadic foragers, but they definitely had less inequality than class-organized societies or complex chiefdoms. There were no formal rankings of lineages,

as h u n d m o n g the Northwest C a s t societies of: North America, and far less ernphasis on private property and distinctions of wealth. Although celebrations and "trade feast3 displayed some of the aspects of big-man systems, this did not take on the more extreme forms of accumulation and conspicuous consumption that many big-man systems exhibited. If a big-man redistribution system was developing in central California, it w a only in its very early stages. The Wintu, like other California Indians, engaged in important interactions with neighboring groups. Some of these neighbors were other Wintu villages or tribeleo, but others were non-Penutian-speaking people. The Wintu linguistic group was surrounded by nine other Linguistic groups.7 Linguistic differentiation is an important and fascinating characteristic of Native California societies. Even within the Wintu linguistic group there were important regional differences in dialect. The Hokan speakers, neighbors of many Wintu tribeiets, spoke a language from a completely different linguistic stock. This linguistic situation made the Bow of information across groups in the region more difficult. Still, multilingualism, especially among families of headmen, was an important part of rho intetgmnp comnlunications structure. Thus we have a curious combinsion of intense cuftural localism, in which groups strongly emphasized the superioriry of their ways over those of immediate neighbors, along with larger regional interaction nervvoth, based on linguistic and maritd ties. The main key to this locallcosmopolitan structure was the institurion of headman yoiy~ynyin which secand or, moxc: usuaily, third wives came fmm distant villages, This enabled hadmen to learn "foreign" dialects and fanguqes, ts communicate with distant headmen, and to forgo atlianms that were the basis of intergroup cooperation. The Wintu and their neighbars were part of a larger intersocieral predgc.-pods network chat linked them with distant gmups. The most archaeologically visible trade items include obsidian and beads made of seshdfs. Obsidian ""bmks""(small worhble pieces) were used te make arrowheads. As W have seen, &er 1500 C.E. m extensive network developed on the basis of clmshdl disk beds that linked the wntu and their nonhern Sacrmento "JaJley n&&bors with grows far down the Sacramento River. were collected in Bodega. Bay near the species Smidomus nzl~.aIIz", The clams, the ocean just north of San Francisco by the Coast Miwok and the Pomo. The shells w r e fashioned into disk beads by cr& spcddists. W a l e shells were traded to the Patwin, occupants of the lower Sacramento Vdley, who also manufactured beads. 'fhese beads diger4 kern those traded earlier in thar they frtnctioncd primarib as a medium of exchange and had specific exchange-value. Among the Pomo, for instance, a good imported bow was valued at 4,000 clamshell disk beads, whereas among the Wintu, vvho were dose to the source of chf: m o d used to m&e good bows, the same bscv was worth only 40 to 60 backs (DuBois 1335,27;h e b 1926, 178).5

Inergroup N w o r k and Boundaries We call this system small, but exactly what was the spatial scale of Wintu village interaction with respect to trade, warfare, settlement systems, communications, and

intermarriage! It would be ideal to map the nenvorks of involvement that linked Wintu households, villages, and tribelets with each other and with their non-Wintu neighhors. This would mean knowing all the material, cultural, cooperative, and conAiaive patterns of interaction. If trade and direct food procurement are interlinked, we need to understand the spatial nature of both. For each household, where did all the food consumed in a year originate? What percentages of which kinds of food, materials, and finished goods were obtained by direct procurement and processing, or by exchange or sharing, and who were the exchange or sharing partners! Most households produced most of their own food by appropriating it directly from the natural environment. ALmost 41 men hunted or fished and women gathered. The spatid nature of these activities are fairly well understood. Spring and surnmer expeditions to temporary camps were undertaken by most of the people. Families and village coresidents collectively accumulated and prepared stocks of acorns, dried salmon, and dried deer meat for use during the winters. This of course involved households in a net of sharing with other village memberr. Hunting groups also shared kills with covillagers according to a customary division. Occasional multiwillage hunting, fishing, or gathering events were another institution tfnar linked villages in sharing nemorks. Deer were sametimes hunted by groups of men from several diEerent villages, Large groups composed of people from m m y villaps fished, especially during the spring and fail salmon runs. Sometimes an cspecidly Ixrge ""harvest"of clover would p r a q t an invitation for the gathering of people from many distant villages, 1hese instances of sharing resources in callective hunting or gafhering were similar in h a i o n to the "trade Feasts" (discussed later) chat were held among nei&boring viflages, prempnrafy abundance of resources allowed some groups to build alliances and create obligations among other goups in other areas. At another: time, when local resowrces were short, such obfigations w u f d he ritpaid. There W no hard-and-hsc distinction hemeen "trade" and "gifc-giving'" song these people. Qlll exchanges----sharing wirhout immediate recompense as well as excilange of goodscreated and sustained dliances and served the obtainment of resources. Everyone wanted to be known as gnerous. People vvho were ungenerous acquired a bad reputation qtlickly; and this could have been dife-threatening liabiliry in a system in which the moral order was the main glue that held society together. Individual people were dependent on their Families and covillagers for survival, and villages were dqendenr on other villages for their long-term viability, We know that the Wintu sometimes acquired raw materials or finished goods through trade, but they also occasiondiy w n t on medium-distaizce procurement treks. E x t h w was with eifher contiguous tribelets or with tribelets contiguous with contiguous trihelets, There w r e no long-distance trading cxpeditians. Almost all formal trade and gift-giving was undertaken by headmen. Headmen asked people from their tribelet to contribute to the stock of p o d s m be traded or given, and they carried out the ""hrgaining"" and exchanges. Ckaim of such exchanges made up dawnthe-line trade, which moved finished goods and raw materials over great distances. P


130 1 A Very Small wrU-Sy~tem

Most of the obsidian used by the Wintu in the Redding area was obtained from Local outcmppings of Tusciln obsidian,g but some of their obsidian came from much more distant sources (Sundahl 1384).J m e s Davis (1974) repom that damshett disk beads moved north, from the Pomu in exchange h r a southern ftow of "pelts, sinewbacked bows, and stonework.'W~>avisalso reports VC"k1ter Goldschmidt's (1951, 336337) conclusion that "the Central and Northern Wintun (Wintu) acted as middle-men in this exchange, contributing little or nothing to the fiow except perhaps the regrinding of imperfect shell beads, yet profiting from the opposing streams of difhsion."

Core/&ripheuy Relations Another issue is the qllcstion of careiperiphery relations in northern California.The matter of intersocietal hierarchy must be addressed at nuo levels: the relationships b e m e n the Wintu and their immediate neighbors; and the nature of the larger interregionai interaction sphere in which the Wintu were lafaced. VVe hypothesiwd in Chapter 3 that mreiperiphery hierarchies are m t likely to exist in world-systems in whiclh the constituent societies have not developed internal stratification. The existence of states is thought to be a necessary prerequisite to &c establishment of stable inrersocietal dominaion and exploitarion. As we have noted, isrtersscietd dzfirenbiation means that m o or more societies that have: &Rerent degrees of complexiry, poiiy size, or hierarchy are linked to one a n d e r cfirolrl;Ix important inrerzctions within the same world-system. Intersocietal hierdrehy r v i r e s chat m e or some of the linked societies explait or dominate the others. In the greater scope of comparison m o n g small-scalc, middle-sizd, and global mdd-systems it mi&t be eay to m d u d e that the intefsocied system in norrltern Cdifornia:did not evince either mrelpenlphery cliEerenciagian or mre[pe~pheryhierarchy. AU rtle groups within this region had similarb low levels of socid campleGv and inwmd hierachy because they were d1 [email protected] societim. There wxe no urbanlrurd or wen farmeriforager interactions. Thus rhere was no great degree of corejperiphery diG feremiarion. As for incergroup mploication or damination, if these =re present &q wodd seem ro have been minim4 in mmpa~isonwith the txikute wtraction and economic exploitation to be found in more hiexarchid intersocietal sysrems. But this first approximation does not answer all the questions that the world-systern perspective might pose about corelperiphery relations in this small-scale system. m e n W look more closely we find that there w r e important aspects of Winru social organization that differentiated them from their Hokan-speaking neighbors. Vere these JiEerences significant enaugk to affect r)le interactions berween these groups! If intergroup interactions were relatively egalitarian, what factors allowed this situation to be reproduced? Was it simply a matter of population densiry and intrasocierd hierarchfs not having reached a level at which inmsocietal inequatities and etxploication were possible, or were there insitutionat mechai~~isms that reproduced intergroup egaf irarianism?

S e a h e a t and S~lbsirtenceSystems The Wintu lived in closely packed villags located on fiats along the rivers and creeks of their territory. The villages varied in size from about 20 to about 250 people. These villages were spaced fairly evenly along the waternays with every second or third village being rather large. These larger villages were usually the home villages of the headman o f a tribelet and they usudy contained a relatively large earth lodge in which councils and ceremonies rook place. This was a simple wo-tiered settlement system composed of larger villages with smaller villages berween them.I0 In studying similarities and differences between the Wintu and their neighbors it vvould be desirable to have a fairly exact understanding of the settletllctnt systems and the seasonal patterns of resource use. Edward S. Clewett and Elaine Sundahl (1982) note that archaeological evidence suggests two different parrerns of subsistence and land use in this region. The Wintu are thought to have led a more sedentary existence in the sense that they spent a greater part of the year in relarively large and permanent riverine villages (Shasta Coatpjex), The Hokan speakers engaged in a somewhat less sedentary and upland subsistence pattern ("Tehama Parrern'hr the "milling stone pzoyli'). Rather rhan making imemive use of the riverine environment, the milling stone people visited riverine sites annually for short periods, spending the greater part of the year in upland hunting sites in which their main sensipermnent villqes were located. On the basis of linguistic, ethnographic, and archaeoiogicat evidence, Clewett and Slindahl associate the Shasra Cornpie with the Wintu, and the 'Tehama 1)attem or milling stone people with the neighboring Eltokan spe&ers, especiafily the Yana. The subsistence models that di&rentiate these two parcerns of resource use imply correspondingy difkrent settlement.systems. Wintu villages should be larger on the wrage. They should be located relatively more dos+ to one another on major fishbearing rivers, Yana villages shurtld be smaller, relatively farther from one another, and located on smail creeks rather &an large rivers. Village size and location data supporr the hypotheticat model: permanent (wincer) VVintu villages exhibiting a two-tiered settlement system in which each larger village is surrounded up- and downriver by two or three smaller villages, and each large village having a dance lodge (ceremoniaf center), 1 The subsistence pattern difkrences between the Wintu and the H a h n speakers show up in the archaeological record as different cultural assemblages, hough the dife somewhat jumbled in some cases beause of local dihsian.12 The wntu exploited fishing more intensively. This is indicated by the presence of bonetipped harpoons in the archaeological record. The wntu also employed a different method for grinding a c o r n e t h e hopper mortar---and they exploited acorns more intensively rhan the H o b - s p e a d n g groups. The H o b groups primarily used manos and rnetarres for grinding seeds-&us the "milling stone" label.i"hese diEerences in tool kits suggest greater sedentism among the Wintu on the basis of food storage. How do the preceding discussions reflect back on our questions a b u t . core/ periphery relations? A case could certainly be made for coreiperipirery dgferencin-

tion on the basis of the indicated dif3Ferences bervveen Winru and Hokan settlement systems, population densities, and subsistence patterns. Though all the players were foragers, the Wintu system of foraging concentrated on the harvesting and accumulation of salmon Bour.14 This important source of protein was quantitadveiy superior to the food stores of other groups. This enabled the Wintu to support larger popularions, ro trade more, and to have greater population densiry and growth. Foragers need to be especially careful about population growth because it means greater pressure on resources, which they can easily deplete. Many hunter-gatherers institutionalize population control through infanticide or birth control practices. It is likely that the Hokan speakers regulated population growth more swerely than the Wintu did, Still, careiperiphery differentiation does not necessarily mean coreiperiphery hierarchy. The rwo conditions are hypothetically independent. Societies of unequal size and degree of hierarchy may engage in interaction without the larger society's exploiting the smdler. h we have mentioned, archaeological and ethnographic m i d m e indicates that the Wintu were @xp;uldinginto the territories of their Hokan-speaking neighboss. Is not the displacement of one group by another an indicamr of corelpefiphcry hierarchy? If so, could the indigenous northern California world-system have been structured as a r k r i n e core people surrounded by peripheral hill dwellers? We consider this hypothesis in the t'ottowing seaion,

Local Ewrhanges, Cekbrations, and Pronrrement New& Wintu trade was part of a diversified strareu of food and raw material procurement. Though each household procured most of irs own food and raw materials directly from nature, a significant m d structurally itnporfmt share of the necessary food and materials were obtained from other househol$s within the village and from other villages within the home tribelet. The main way in which food was traded was through the institution that h d r e w l? Vayda (1967) has catled the "trade feast.'Vuring a rime of economic abundance a headman would send out runners ro invite neighboring and distant allied headmen to bring their people to a "big time." On the appointed day the guests would arrive in groups and the host would announce the names of the invited headmen as they approached. The celebration consisted of dances, meals, and religious ceremonies, oken lasting for several days. Trading and gift-giving usually occurred at the end of rhe "big rime." The host would give piles of food for guests to take home in exchange for whatever contributions they would choose to make, usudly payment in shdl-bead "monef or other goods, Trading of food among villages and tribelecs also occurred at special intermediate locations bennieen regions. A group with a surplus of something w u l d s a d a message to another group to m e t at a midpoint for trade, Vayda (1967) and Napoleon A C h a p o n (1370) argue that trade feasts and other forms of exchange were mechanisms that allowed v i l l q s to tap into the surpluses of

neighbors during times of shortage. This was a hedge against bad years in which, for one or mother reason, the local acorns or other resources w r e scarce, Such a mechanism allows a large sedentary population to live in an area by equalizing the distribution of raources across time and space. Trade also eaabiished aitiancr. relationships that could be mobilized foir ather purposes such as support in wrrrfare, future marriqes, and so on, Groups occupying different ecological zones engaged in complementary exchange. What Goldschmidr says of the Nomlaki Wintun was probably also was true of the Wintu just to the north: "The trading between the foothill Wintun on the one hand and the valley groups on the other was a transfer of the surplus produce of one environment for the digerenr produce of another. The imporcam articles of transfer in this east-west trding =re pine nuts, acorns, mounlain seeds and animals from the foothill people for salmon and river animals from the valley" (1 95 1,336). Tracing the use and the trade of obsidian is another important way to study exchange in California (Ericson 1977; Jackson 1986). Obsidian was the preferred material for the manukcture of arrovvheads, spearheads, and long hives h e w e it is very sharp and re2ativeIy easy to wrk, The sprttid distribution of remered obsidian arrowheads can r m a i parrerns o f a h a n g e among prehistoric peoples because obsiciian can be dated and ""surced," Ra\Y obsidian is obtaind from particular sites, and each site usud1y i7as an idelltifiahle unique chemical '%ngerprint.'TTbe origillal procurement site can thus be determined for each obsidian arrowhead. Study of the distribution of arrowhead sources and of changes in that distribution reveals trade patterns and changes in trade patterns. Sourcing reveals that the Wintu primarily used an inferior type af obsidian that was locally available rather than trading for a superior variery thar came fsom Medicine Lake, a i a d e sixty klometers north of their territory. This indimes that the Wincu preferred to quaray their own local obsidian, &spite its inferioriey to the ""Eoreignmobsidian, rather than to trade or to make dangerous procureneat treks. This in turn suggests that the Wintu nay not h m been an very good terms with their northern neighbors.

Warfare was not a frequent or specialized practice, but it played a significant role in the maintenance of and changes in territorid bouahries. Tribelets held communal properry in the sense that particular areas were claimed for hunting and gathering activities, If people horn one tribelet wanted to procure resources from an area claimed by another they were required to obtain permission from the local headman. This was often facilitated by the presentation of gifts. Use of a tribelet's territory without permission was defined as trespass and was a cause of grievance and sometimes conflict. IF someone were accused of trespass or some other crime, the offended headman would request payment from the oEender9sheadman. In cases of wrongful death, a somewhat standardized "blood payment" would be demanded. If this was nnor forthcoming, the next step was most often a "line wr."

Line wars were a mechanism for resolving congicts through the we of threats and regulated violence. Warriors from the WO tribelets would meet at an agreed-upon spot dressed in war gear and ready to do battle. The nuo headmen would then negotiate a bit more. If they could reach agreement on restitution, the ""bttIe" was call& off. Othenvise the two sides would position themselves, and hostilities would begin untit one or more warriors were injured. Then discussions were reconvened to see if an agreement could now be reached. If nor, there were more hostilities until it was possible to conclude a settlement. Line wrs occurred both among Wintu of different tribelets and berween Wintu and non-Wintu tribelets. While this institution underlines the absence of higher "tribal" authority, it also shows that conflictive reladons among tribelets were regulated in a manner that prevented the amount o f destruction from reaching levels that would accompany a less ritualixd form of warfare. Howmer, there was also another lcind of mrfare-raids. Sometimes one group w u l d artack the viiiage or viilages of another group, bwIljng houses, killing residents, and taking captives. This more destructive form of w a r h ~was, we think, more likely to occur bemeen groups who regarded one another as permanent enemies and who were engaged in competition for territory We are particularly interested in boundaries between groups and in interactions across such boundaries, and hence we want to investigate the reported existence of '"buffer zones""andlor 'hneutrd territory*"In other areas of California, ethnographers haw reported the existence of "neutral territories" that no group claimed. These areas w r e wailable for exploitation by any p u p that chose to do so (Heizer and Treganza 4 371,356). BuEer mnes and neutrd ground have rather different imphcations for procases of intergroup interaction. Buffer zones imply that groups are in conflicr; here, unoccupied intewening territory reduces the likelihood of destructive encounters,f5 Neutral territory implies a m o pacific ~ and cooperative system. fim Johnston (1W78) has surmised that there was a "no-ma&-lnnd'" along the east side of the Sacramenro Kvet between Central Wintun (Nomlak) and Yana settlements and that this sewed as a buffer zone beniveen the two groups. The northern Cdifornia project also invwigated possible &&races in Winm relations with different non-Wintu groups. Archaeological and linguisric evidence implies that the Penutian-spealung Winru were relatively late arrivals in northern California and that h e y were slowly disylatcing Hokm spe&ers to the north, norrheast, and east (Whistkr 1977;McCarthy 1 9 s ) . If this is so, then we could expect rhat especially conflictive relations may have been the rule beween the Wintu and the Hokan speakers, but other evidence indicates that this displacement may have been taking place in different ways in different regions. Wintu relations with the Yana were ethnographically known to have been quite condictive. The Wintu regarded the Yana as heir tradirional enemies. Raid-type battles bemeen the Wncu and the Yana have been reported. lames Dotta (1980) inrerprets the exisrence of a string of small villages along the Wintu-Yana border as a defensive picker line rhat was intended to protect the W i m heartland from attack.

19f. &v Small VorM-Sjstenz / 135

However, Wintu relations with a different group of Hakan speakers, the Okwanuchu, appear to have been much less conAictive wen though the Wintu seem to have been displacing the Okwanuchu. We hypothesized that Mintu expansion occurred in several di&rent ways, One way was for the Wintu to establish villages within the seaond-use regions of other groups. If the Hokan spekers were not exploiting riverine resources on a ear-round or lengthy basis, the Wintu could establish a new village upriver from existing wntu villages in traditionally Hokan territory during the season of Hokan absence. If the H o b speakers decided to contest this new presence upon their return, the Wintu could call upon adjacent Wintu villages for help. Because rhe Winru population density was higher, and because the Wintu tended to intermarry into more distant villages than the H o h n speakers did, the Wintu w u l d have been able to muster a larger number of warriors than the Hokm speakers in case a dispute were to turn to violence. Thus not only differences beween wntu and H o h n serdernent systems but also diEerences in kinship politics and intermarriage patterns wouid have given the Wintu an advantage in warfare. But there are other processes by which the Wintu might have spread into formerly Hakm territories. In some border regions people spoke both Wintu and H o b Ianwages. It is possible that either Wintu men married non-Wintu women and moved into these areas, or Wintu women married non-Wintu men. Either way (or both ways) a formerly Hokan village could become M W i n t ~ i ~ This d , n kind ~ of Ulrintuization could occur without conflict, and in fact it would require: p o d relations, Margaret Guilford-Kardell and James Dotta (1380) report the presence of villaggs on the upper McCtoud River, the northern limit of Wintu expansion, in which both the Wintu and O b a n u c h u languqes were spoken. We andyed linguistic data on plam-names and c o d i c t e m s data to shed light on these digerent forms of exparrsion. Both anaifyses supported the conclusion that Wintu relations with the Yana w r e quite canflictiw, whems relations with the Pit River groups w r e moderately so, Relations vvith the Chimariko people of the Trinity River d r ~ n a g eto the west were found to be much more amicable. Ecological factors and technological differences seem to arzcount for these diEEerences (see Chase-Dunn 1332a; Chase-Dunn and Mann forthcoming),

Intermarriage benveen groups is an important form of intergroup integration in nearly all world-systems. But in some systems the patterns of intergroup marriage are a key aspect of systems of alliances among polities and regions. This is especially true of the so-called kin-based world-s).stems because mechanisms of order based on states and markets do not exist (Collins 1992). Patterns of intermarriage both integrate and are funclarnentaf to interregional hierarchy formation in some systems. Intermarriage across tribelet and linguistic boundaries was an important mechanism far Eacilitating alliances in norchern Califiarnia. As Dufiuis notes, 'There was no rule of exogamy, but the closeness of relationship within a local group often

fostered marriages outside the village. Gatherings included villages of the same or adjoining subareas and therefore extrwillage marriages were generafty contracted on these occasions" (1935, 56). Many of the marriages across noncontiguous tribelets and across linguistic boundaries involved a headman marrying a third wife. Second wives were most often the sisters of first wives, In this manner the leading families of different areas could become linked. This was important for resource sharing or for mobilizing support during conflict. Most men had only one wife. A wealthy and powerful man might have more, but it was ram for a man to have more than three wives, The institutional aspects of marriage did nor differ greatly across groups in norrhern California, wen across linguistic boundaries. In no case was bride-price an important dererminant of marriage, though the custom was that a headman marrying a woman from a distant village made a gift of p o d s to the family of the woman, As the prelude to most marriages, a person would move to the village of the desired spouse and begin working wrth the family*If it was a man he w u l d begin hunting for the family of the woman he desired. Women also occasionally took tbe initiative, If the family accepted the gifts of food, it meant that they were in favor of the union. If the desired partner chose to be absent when the suitor aypeared it w s soon concluded that be or she w a not interested, and the family then owed the suitor a debt for whatever the suitor had already given. m e n a cou,le moved in cogether, the w o bmilies exchanged gifts of about equal value. A couple known to be having regular intercourse willrout living together vvas publicly ridiculed by the viHage headman. A man whose wife died could expect that her family would provide him with another wife, usually a sister or a cousin. XE w a the same for a wife whose husband died. His family w u l d be responsible for her needs and w d d try to supply a new husband or at least to help her obtain food and other necessities. All groups had rather dramatic gender role differentiation. Meds and women's work were separated by taboo. The menstrual hut was a feature of all these groups. Vet w m e n occasiondly served in the role of head and were powerfu.1 docrors, so ir was more a matter of gender differentiation than gender hierarchy. As with most foraging societies, women had important powers and were substantially equal to men. The Yma carried the degree of gender digerentiation further than the other groups. They are famous for having had rather different languages for men and women (Sapir and Spier 1943). We know from the ethnographic literature that most men married only one wife, from a nearby village. It was the village headmen who tended to marry women from distant villages, and so they were more likely to marry a woman from a different linguistic group,. Jonathan Friedman and Michael Rowlands's (1977) theory of kin-based core formation in tribes and chiefdoms focuses on changes in the politics of kinship and gender relations that allow a core group to gain advantages over other regions. In more egalitarian regional systems a balanced alliance takes a form in which marriages across group boundaries are reciprocated such that an approximately equal number

of men from each group marry women from the other group. In such a system of marriage reciprociry there are no asymmetries. As tribes develop into chiefdoms, a "wife-giving" strategy emerges in which senior lineages marry their daughters to junior Iineaga in exchange f i r transfers of wealth known as "bride-price,'? In symms that are even more hierarchicat-complex chiefdoms and eariy states-there is a shift toward "wife-raking" on the part of the core group. In this structure, sacred chiefs in the dominant group marly more women from the dominated group than vice versa, X n order to examine differences in intermarriage patrerns that might reflect coreiperiphery hierarchy, we coded all the Wintu-Hokan intermarriages that could be found in the erhnographic and documentary literature to determine if these were bdanced or asymmetrical, It is possible that the Wintu were engaging in a wife-giving strategy as postulated by Friedman and Rowlands, whereas a balance of wife-giving and wife-t&ng among the linguistic groups would indicare i n r e r p u p equdiry. The widence indicates that 1-heW n t u were overvuhelminglywife-takers. Nine out of ten interfinguiscic marriages had Wintu husbands m d non-Wintu wives. The Uana were doing about equal amounts of wife-giving and wife-taking. The kchomawi wre wik-giving in all. three precontact cases, and the Acsegewi were wife-giving in three of the four precantact cases. What does this mean reerding the question of cofelperiphe~relations? Here we need to put our results into a larger comparative perspective. Recall E'riedman and Rowlands's claim &at the first transition from rrihal to chieHom organization involves a parcern of wife-giving in exchange for wed&. IS it possible that sonzething like this w a oaurring in northern California? Ef so, since wife-giving is the opposite of wife-raking, it would be the Arsegewi who were emerging as chiefs because they had the highest ratio of wife-giving, The Wintu would be serving as kin-based periphery because they were providing surplus to the diefly core of Atsegewi and khomavvi wife-givers. We daubc strongly that this is tkrr correct interpretation of our findings. In fact we suggest just the opposite. lLLr we have seen, the W n t u were wik-takers fsorn the other groups, and they were much more likely to take wives in inter-linguisric-graup marriages than to give them. The Yana [Wokan-speak,ing hill pmple shown to be on hostile terms wixh the Wintu) wre both giving and taking,wives. The Achomawi (also Hokan spekers but accuping a riverine environment similar to that of the Vintu) were wifcl-given. The Arsegewi, upland cousins and neighbors of the Achomawi and the h n a , were also wife-givers. We suspect that rhe problem here is that Friedman and Rowlands did not consider extrmdy egditarian systems in their theory of core formation in kin-based systems. Their model begins with groups that already have seniority among lineages and a hierarchicat notion of relationship with the ancestors and creator deities. They also assume that bride-price is a significant aspect of marriage such that the mounts of wealth that are transferred are significant in material terms and reflect a larger shared moral order. But none of these conditions existed in northern California.

Lineages were not ranked. Indeeb, dans did not exist. There were patdocal tendencies, but patrilodicy W% not mandatoy Matrilocaliry also occurred, The religious beliefs of the people were extremely egalitarian. There was little hierarchy among the many powers and beings. Many groups believed that Coyote, the trickster, had created the universe. No families or lineages had special relationships with deities or sacred ancestors. Rather, it was the job of each individual to seek out and establish relations with those spiritual forces that were to become his or her special ally. An individual who obtained a great deal of this kind of "power" was more likely to become a shaman, but each person constructed his or her own relationship to the spiritual world. This kind of religious cosmology is quite resistant to claims of seniority or hierarchy. Regarding bride-prim, headmen did give giks to the families of the women thax they married from distant villages. But these gifts did not constitute a signihcant transfer of material wealth from one group to another. The symbolic significance of these transfers of surplus probably redounded more to the benefit of the $ivers than of the receivers. Thus we think that wife-taking rather than wife-giving was an organizatioatai indication of a r e status in this system. The W n t u heads could marry more Yana and Achornawi women bemuse they had more wealth and (less interestingjy) because there were more Wintu heads, This also redounded to their benefit by giving them aXIies in distant: vi1lag;es. W should note that wife-t&ng does convey material advantagr: in the form of the productive and reproduak apaciry of the women taken. The: asymmetric maxrying o f more Mromen from mother group brings also the labor involved in raising infants to adulthood and the womnb reproductive capacity. This could be considered to be a significant form of labor rxtraction. However, for it to constitute an impofi"ant degree of unequal excshanget, the number of w m e n taken would have to comprise a sizable proportion of the population. While the Wintu headmen took more wives than they gave daughters, it would appear that the number did not m o u n t u, a large proportion of any of these groups. The intermarriage data, though limited, suggest the existence of a mitd coref periphery relationship beoveen the Vintu and their neighbors in which the wntu were the core and the Hokan sgekers w r e peripherai. As W have explained, we argue that wife-taking rather than wife-giving was an aspect of coreness. This was not the symmetrical exchange of women hypothesized as ypicd of egalitaian systems. Perhaps an asymmetry based on wife-raking is a precursor to tribe formation. Friedman and Ro&nds begin with tribes, but tribes must emerge: from less centrdi z d systems, k h a p s it is a structure of wife-taking rhat Leak to the formation of larger tdbai dtiances*

Wntu Expansion: Archaeologicd and Linguistic Evidence Did the WntulWokm relationship constitute a cordperiphery hierarchy? There is no indication that the Wintu extrmed sipificant quantities of resources from the

A %ry Small Wo~ld-Syftm 1 139

Hokan peoples through unequal exchange or by coercive threan. The trade that existed across this linguistic boundary probably involved fairly equal exchanges because rhe Winru did not exercise political power over Hokan peoples in a way that might bias the terms of trade. Nor did the Wintu have a monopoly over anything needed by the Hokan speakers that might have served as a basis for unequal exchange. Though the Wintu very occasionally took captives from the Hokan-speaking groups, they were themselves taken captive in turn. We have no indication that this kind of appropriation of labor had important consequences for any of these groups. l7 But the Wintu were expanding into Hokan territories at the expense of Hokanspeaking groups. Does this constitute exploitation or domination in the usual sense? It might be argued that the "resource" that was being extracted was land irseif-the most crucial of resources for foragers. If we are willing to consider this as a form of core/periphery exploitation, then it is important to determine the rate of Wintu expansion, The rate of territorial apansion is ixxxyortmr for che question of intersocieral hierarchy. Tf the rate was very slow, it w u l d not have b e n manifested as a serious pmbs W w u l d expect rersistance ro lem for displaced groups. If the expansion ~ i a rapid, be greater, and W would look br Wintm strategies to overcome this resisance. Arctlaeolog-icd ettidence &out: the spread of the Shasta Complex can be used to i&r the rare of Wintu advance from the origin2 Erametand on the Sacramento Kver near kdding. 1s The hstest estimated advance rate is m e n y f o u r years per kilometer, or a rittle mioe than four kilometers in a hundred years, This rather slow rate of advance may not have been very important to either the W n t u or the groups they were displacing. In some area, however, Wintu advance probably did not take rhe form of a slow, steady pace. 'The establishment of new villriiges must have occurred in discrete jumps, and these must have been noticeable to the peoples whose lands were being occupied, Such incursions, and the conflictive encolmeers c-fiat were likely to fsltaw, pmbably account for the negative attitudes that ethnographers have documented in Wintu-Yana relations, We will return to this problem in the concluding seaion of this chapter.

Larger Regional Interactions What about the relationship between the Wintu and groups farther down the Sacramento Valtey? (See Map 7. f .) As we have explained, the clamshcll disk bead trade necwork in central California linked very distant groups through down-the-line exchange. The largest preconract towns in northern California were in the region near the SacramentoiSan Joaquin delta. Single towns along the Sacramento River in the Patwin territory of Colusa Counry are thought to have had populations as large as 1,200. As noted, the largest Wintu villages held about 250 people. The adjaent Clear Lake regjon was inhahkcd by the bmo-Hobn speakers who are the most

140 1 A Very SrnaLL W~rM-Sysrenz

widely known of northern California linguistic groups. Pomo villages were also significantly larger than the largest Wintu villages. The Pomo produced beautiful baskets and were also the manufacturers of "moneyw-strings of clmshell disk beads-that served as the main medium of exchange throughout northern California. The Pomo lived around and near Clear Lake, a large body of water nestled in rhe Coast Range berween the Central Valley and the kcific Ocean, They had access to clamshells from the coast-the raw rnaterial for the production of clamshell disk beads. The Fanuin-Penutian speakers who entered California in the same wave of immigration with the Wintu--shared a long border with the Pomo linguistic group. Both the Pomo and the Parwin were heavily involved in the larger t d e nemork in which clamshell disk beads flowed north from the Clear Lake and delta region and other goods such as pelts, obsidian, bows, and feathers flowed south. Did this nenvork of exchange constitute a coreiperiphery hierarchy in which the Wintu were peripherd or semiperipheral participants and the Parno and the &win were a core region?This is redly two questions. First, were the long-distance interactions rhat linked the Wintu with the PaminlPomo significant enough in intensity for each group that it would be meaningful to consider them as part of a single world-system? Second, if they were part of a single nenvork, was this an egalitarian exchange nemork or wem some parties gaining at the expense of others? First W will consider the significance of the interconnections among the norrhern and southern gmps, &fore about 1500 C.E. there was litrle long-distance trade. h earlier trade nerurork linhng the Winru with northwestern cawtd California to the west and the Great Basin to the east had declined. The spatial boundaries of the world-system of which. Winm were a part were quite localized after the decline of' rhr eat-west nemork and before the rise of the north-south nemork. The emergence of the north-south clamshell disk. head nervvork in the sixteenth centul-y created an overarhing context in which long-distance trade and the Iocal nerworks of illceraction became incrwingty linked, The trade was down-the-line, so there were no direct interaaions. No one ever craveled h e whole lrngth of the Sacramento Wley on a trade mission or any other kind of mission. Indirect interactions involved many links. It is about 120 hlometers down the river from WEntu territory to Pawin territory. lf vve assume that there was a diRerent cribelet wery five kilometers, then there were tvveny-five tribelets bemeen Cocconwood Creek (rhe southern edge of the Wintu territory) and the northern edge of Panvin territory in what is now Colusa County. If each tribelet traded directly with the neighbor of its neighbor, then every trade item had ro pass through a minimum of about welve transactions to get from Pawin to wntu territoy The gradient of decline in interactiond consequences may have been very great in such a system. We know rhat the proportion of all goods supplied by this long-distan= trade was rather small. W dso know that linguistic diEerences vvere immense of a lingua franca." Information over short distances, rrhere was little in the flows weuld thus have been rather constrained.2"

The long-distance down-the-line trade was one kind of prestige-goods economy in which local headmen were able to obtain "money" and other m t i c goods. In order to understand the relative importance of these interactions for reproducing or changing local social structures, we must consider what would have happened if such exchangs had been interrupted or radically changed. As we have seen, prestige goods can be quite important for the maintenance of local power structures (Schneider 1977).Howwer, the possibility of substitutions of one prestige good for another renders such systems unstable (Friedman and RowLands 1377). Hence we think that prestige-goods connections ma)r haw either very important or only epiphenomenal consequences for local social srructures depending on the nancre 4th l& smrcturer and the intmcietal context. The Wintu headmen were not highly dependent upon their monopoly of exotic prestige goods because the hierarchies they headed were themselves quite small. The authority they had was quite limited and based on the trust given them by their people. We doubt that the regalia they wore or the trade-gained goods they distributed were necessary sources of support for these headmen, However, the availability of a medium of exchange such as damshell disk "protomoney'" facilitated those local transactions o f hndamental goods among adjacent groups that were essential to the maintenance of rciatively high population densities of sedentary foragers. Clamshell disk motley was important: because it was a symbol of d u e that was recopized across a wide area, It vvas a relarively durable, stalldadized, and divisible good that could serve as a measure of rates of achange (prias) bemeen different kinds of goods, Reflecting on the use of demalia shells by the Yurok, Chagnon (1370, 18) says, "The conctusion we reach is that it was f-unctiondly necessary for the h r o k to 'desire' dentalia, but onb if they were obtained from their neighbors. The social prestige involved with obtaining wcaltb in &is fashion effected a more stable adaptation to the distribution of resources by allowing trade to be the dternafjve to raid in times of locali insuficiencf (emphasis in origind). Rather than shore up a local power hierarchy, the central California prestigeg o o h economy reinforced local trade ties. This allowed local groups to build up "credit" with their neighbors and to use this credit during periods of local resource shortage. This system of socidly structured insurance increased complementary production and facilitared alliances across village groups, It also reduced the likelihood of destructive raiding as a response to shortages.2' We conclude that the long-distance prestige-goods nerwork was systemic in northern Cdifornia. What about the question of core/periphery relations at the lwel of the long-distance n e w r k ? Again we must distinguish benveen core/periphery differentiation and corelperiphery hierarchy The differences in village size and population densiry between the Wintu and the Patwin would seem to indicate a degree of core/periphery digerentiatian. Since there were no direct interactions, the southerners could nor have dominated the Wintu policicdIy or militasily, But perhaps the southerners were exploiting the Wintu indirectly by means of the prestige-goods exchange. For this to

have k e n the case there would have had to have been unequal exchange in the prest i g - p o d s trade such that the southemen were g h i n g more from the trade than the W ~ n t uwere. The problem of uneyual exchang is an extremely sticky one, Those who use this concept usually mean that unequal amounts of labor are being exchanged such that the exploited party is tmnsferring labor power to the fxploiting p a w We know very little about the exacr amounts of labor tirne and other scarce resources that were expended in the production of the goods that wre traded. We h o v v that a bow cost the Pomo 4,000 beads. In a market economy, the "price" would incliude labor, transportation, raw mareriats, and transaction costs. If it w a a bow that had been manufactured by the Wintu from yew trees obtained on the upper McCloud River, it would have passed through many hands un its w y to Clear Lake. In the absence of ethnographic knowledge about the labor time used in production, it might be possible to employ drlscriptions of the labor processes to estimate experimental~ythe amotint of labor tirne involved.22 It is plain that the PornalPanvin w r e not extcacting massive mounts of sur$us tabor fram peripheratixd peoples. Extremely unequd e d m g must be accompainiecl by some form of coercion, wthout coercion, the peripheral peo$%s will simply cease to engage in the e x c b g e . Xt is the costs of vvithdrawd that determine &e limits of exploitation. In the cafe o f rhe wntu, accw to damshel dLk beads was an advantage because of the sjlutasy eEecrs chat this storable form of w d t h had on the tocd exchaage neworb*Thus the local interac$on neworb and the Iong-&stmce imracrion network were linked, Still, swermce kom a ~ e s to s "money would have decreaed (but nut elimhated) the abili~,of local groups to even out resource imbaimces, This furm of linkage bemeen the prestige-goods economy and lowl relations is very different from that of the more well-known cases. In instances studied by Schneider (19771, Peregrine (199 1, 19921, and many others, a monopoly over prestige goods by a local elite serves to reinforce the authority and power relations by which the elite holds a dependent subordinate class in thrall. The kinds of hierarchical kinship relations and interregional power structures that usually accompany this kind of Iocalilong-distance linkage-regional chiefdoms or states-were unknown in central and northern California. Certainly there were small differences in wealth and power among people, but leaders used their limited wealth and power primarily as instruments for assuring the access of their communities to necessary and desired resources. Our skepticism about functionalist explanations should not prevent us from seeing genuine collective functions when we find them. We have been discussing the importance of the long-distance trade from the Wintu side, but what about the consequences for the Pomo and the Pawin? The common explanation for the unusually large towns and high population densities in the lower Sacramento Valley and around Clear Lake focuses on environmental factors. These regions were extraordinarily rich in resources even by California standards. But the case can be made that the emergence of the long-distance trade may have facilitated even larger towns and greater social complexiry in this region.

A Very Small W~rU-System 1 943

Many groups had access to the clamshells. The Coast Miwok lived on Bodega Bay. But they were not the ones to specidiz in the production of money. The Pomo were able to spend large amounts of labor on rhis kind of production precisely because they lived in a rich environment where food surpluses could easily support a group of specialized shell-bead manufacturers. This is an instance of the cumulation of resources in which environmental wedth facilitata the creation of socid wedth, which in turn allows for the importation of valuable goods. So the increasing complexity of the Pomo and the P a h n (large villages, secret societies, etc.) may have been due to both envimnmentd advantages and the ability of these groups to export a manufaftured p o d that was socidly valued aver a wide territosy. To some extent, then, the corelike features of these groups depended on their participation in the larger trade nemork. The PomolPawin felationshiy is sornewhac suggestive of a corelsemiprriphefyrelationship. The Parwin were Penutians with a riverine adaptation and they had somewhat larger villages along a largc river in, the Central Valley. The b m o wre Hokan-speaking hill people who also enjoyed a fruitful setting--the Clear Lake region, The h m o were able ro cake a h n r a g e of their proximity both, to shdls and to the relaeively dense Pcnutim trade necwork ro become producers of damsbell disk beads, leading to rheir further elaboration of social compleriiry. This is reminiscent of other situations described in Chapcer 5 in vvhich '"senriperipheraY peopies in other vvorld-systems manage to engge in innovation and upward mclbiliy- The Po'omo m;ly be an instmce of this kind of phenomenon.

Conclusions m a t can vve conclude from this world-sptems snlny of prehistoric northern California?We found support for the general hypothesis that these groups were interacting with one another in intense and important ways despite the fact that most of the food and raw materials for everyday life were produced within households. Ceremonies, trade feasts, permissions given for [email protected] into the territories of neighbors, and intermarriages with people from noncontiguous villages and across finguistic boundaries support this general conetusion. Conflict data shaw that resource use was pardally regulated through the maintenance of and challenges to collective pmperry rights. Archaeological data on obsidian sourcing show that there were pressures for selfsugciency; The fact that neither the Wintu nor the Yana used much Medicine Lake obsidian, despite its obvious superioriry as a material for making arrowheads, shows that srrategic as well as economic considerations influenced. the distribution of raw materials. Conffictive interaction with groups to the north apparently precluded significant amounts of trading for Medicine Lake obsidian as well as procurement treks to the Medicine Lake highlands. This reliance on local, but inferior, sbddian is not evidence of noi-zinteraction but is rather evidence of the nature of interaction bemeen contiguous groups,

Regarding the question of local corelperiphery relations, we found the following. When we look closely at the intergroup relations benveen the Wintu groups and the Hokan-speaking groups we notice certain significant differences. The Wintu had higher population density, more alliances linking villages and extended families with one another, and a more concentrated protein source. Riverine fishing technology enabled them to harvest and store salmon flour, a source of protein that was much less susceptible to depletion than large game hunting. This constituted a mild case of corejperiphery differentiation. The valley-dwelling Wintu were in the position of core vis-a-vis the hill-dwelling Hokan spe&ers, These differences account for the ability of the Wintu to expand into the territories of surrounding groups. In some cases this expansion occurred through the establishment of wntu villages in territory previously exploited by contiguous groups. This is the kind of expansion that probably resulted in the W i n d s moving to the east toward Cow Creek to establish the "picket Line" villages observed by Dotta (1980) and the esrablishment of Wintu villages on the lower course of the Squaw Creek drainage studied by Sundahl (1992). In other cases Winru orpansion probably occurred through a process of acculturation in which the Wintu married into other groups and brought the Wintu ranpage, social organization, m d tecbnolog along with them. This may well have: hem facilitaterl by the patterns of vvife-t&ng that were found in the analysis of infermarri"ges, Linguistic widen= based on place-names indicates this kind of relationship with the Chimafiko (Gase-Dunn and Mann Corthcoming). Instances of expansion &m+ the esrablishment o f new? wholly W n t u villages ofcen may have involved violent confrontation with displaced groups. h such cases some mi&t argue thal the notion-of corelperipheryhierarchy ought to be employcld. But we have shown hat the m e of Wintu advance m extremely slovv.The taklng of land is a hrndamentd form of aploiration and aught to be part of any notion of corelperiphery hierarchy. But the origind M n t u imntigration into the Sactmenta Valley trroughr them into a niche that was only being lightly utilized by other groups, m e n they had f;kd that niche they bczgan to press on the m m v i d Rgions of the H o h n spekers, but the rare of advance w s so slow that it c m only be considered a very mild End of corelperipheryhierarchy, It is interesting that the rate of Wintu acivanccz indicated by archaeological evidence seems to have been faster into the areas h e r e we think they w r e engaging in acculturation (into the 'T"rinity drainage territory of the Chimarih) than it was to the east and northeast &ere W suspect there were more antagonistic forms of expansion. The event data on conNias were t m sparse kbr farrnal adysis. However, they did show thar conflict m n t s nmong Wintu subregions were nearly as ffequent as conflicts b e m e n the W a t u and neighboring linguistic groups, W fslund little support Fur our hypothesis thar within-linguistic-group conflicts would be less violent than bemeer.1-linguistic-group conflicts. This may have been due in part to the scarciq of evidence about line war events, which may not have been as likely to be reported as larger and more violent raids ;mJ battles. The Wintu-Wintu conflicts that we know about were rather violent affairs.


World-System / 145

The finding that supports the notion of a core/periphery hierarchy with the wntu as core is the intermarriage data on wife-taking. While the Wintu may have been having confiicrive relationships with their neighbors, they were also marrying them and thus making alliances with them. The antagonistic relationship with the Yana must have been somewhat tempered by the number of Yana-Wintu marriages. The fact that these were avenuhelmingly Wintu wife-taking marriages must also tell us something about the Wintu-Yana relationship. We know that wntu headmen were much more likely to be able to afford to give the appropriate gifts in order to marry a Yana wife than the Yana headmen were. This probably was not a consequence of the Wintlis exploiting the Yana but more likely because the Winru occupied a richer environment and exploited it in a way that produced more exchangeable resources. It is interesting that despite the relatively higher rate at which Wintu headmen were marrying Yana women, the wntu were not expanding into Yana territory. It is somwhat ironic that the one case of military expansionism about uvhich m know the most invulva a Wintu hadman (Sidipomita) whose father had been a Yana headman. Sidipowita3s father was one of the two known cases in vvhich a Yana hedman had married a wntu woman, The son Led what (in other world-systems) might be considered a senliperipheral marcher attemp at conqueft and the formation of a larger big-man policy, His ef%ortwas backed by both Redding VVintu and, Yana allies, The fact that this conquest was defeated indicates that the sptem wras not yet ready for hierwchy formation. Stilt, that it w a attempted may be construed as favoring the notion of incipient hierarchy formation, We conclude that the Winttr were part of an egalitarian netvvark of intersocietd relations. The greater parr of food aad raw materials procurement and competitiun for land had a relatively s m d spatid scale, with most important interactions occurring within xn eighr).tkilometer radius of any frarting point. More distant interactions were indirect, but some goods did move very long distances. We conclude that the dynamics of these longer-distance interaction nets came to have important consequences for local social structures. Unlike more hierarchical prestige-goods economies, this did not operate through the mechanism of shoring up local power hierarchies. Rather, the availability of clamshell disk beads--.a medlum of wealth storage and exchange-from the long-distance network facilitated the more local complementary exchange neworb. This provided each community with a safery net against temporary shortages, and it facilitated the trading and kinship alliances that linked local communities. This alternative to raiding as a mechanism of making up far shortages allowed for higher overall population densities and relatively less confiictive and destructive relations among contiguous groups. In these ways the longdistance nenvork was an important element behind the trends of increasing population density, diversification, and intensification of foraging practices that were occurring in centrd and northern Cdifornia. What we think we see in late prehistoric California is a sequence in which the emergence of long-distance trade was facilitating the formation of local complemen-

146 / A

Small WorM-Syftem

tary nenvorlcs of production and exchange. Tkis appears to have o~curredwith the formation of only very we& intrasocietd and intersocietd hierarchies. We think that the long-distance trade was consticured primarily in terms of equal exchange, This may have benefited the southerners (the Pomo and the Pawin) a bit more than the other participanrs, hut no one was k i n g significantlyexploited, It is likely that fttrther increases in population densitl, would eventudiy have led to rising &Is of competition and conflict m o n g groups for territory and resources. Despice the rapid rate of population increse in the late prehistoric centuries, the continued existence of neutrd territories in California indicates that the land was not yet completely ""full,'Toatinued popuIation growh would eventually have Led to a condition of population pressure and increased competition. And this in turn would have created possibilities for l o d elites to erect more hierarchid institutions, and perhap for the emergence of mare hierarchical relations among competing groups* The Porno or the Parvvin may have been the most likely to develop tribes and Aiefdorns first, The emergence of '"secret societies," especially intense among the Parno and the Pawin, showed aspects of religious hierarchy that indicate possible incipient complexity and potential stratification. The rapid spreead of secret societies throughoul northern Califbrnia in response ta the Euroamerican invasion may i d i care an institutional receptiviv to more hierarchy and larger-scale politic2 integration. If so, the California world-sptem may have been a case in which incipient hierarchy formation was interrupted by the incursion af an alreaidy hierarchical and spatialiy mu& larger world-sptem,

What implications does this case study have for the comparative study of world-systerns?The hypothesis that internally egditarian systems do not have the institutional bases to support unequal intersocietd relations is supported. Mild coreiperiphery diEerentiation corresponded with mild cordperiphery hierarchy. The hypothesis that institutional mechanisms in egditarian systems undercut the emergence of hierarchy is also supported. Regarding within-group [eveling, the destruction of wealth upon a persods death undercuts accumulation through inherirance. Regarding intergroup reproduction of equality, the institution of headmen marrying sisters constrained the building up of alliances with distant villages. Attempts at conquest were averted by collective action. The multicriteria approach to spatially bounding world-systems outlined in Chapter 3 was also supported. The bulk-goods nenvorks were very small-scale, yet these were linked in important ways with larger inrermarriv, celebration, conflictive, and prestige-goods nemorks. In some cases, such as Wintu-Yana interaction, bulk-goods exchanges were minimal despite the fact that groups were intensively interacting in other ways. Especially for this case, it would be folly to define world-system boundaries exclusively in terms of a buibgoods division of labor.



,?mall World-System / X 47"

We conciude that this was indeed a world-system, not a "minisystem," "sterni-

cdly important interactions of several different sorts were occurring across cultural boundaries, There w r e no systemically autarkc culturd groups in nortbcrn California, Even if vstems can be found in which all important int-eraccionsoccur within a single homogeneous cultural and linguistic ontext it would still be important to study how different interaction nets are structured and whether or not core/periphery relations exist. So even if there are "minisystems," they should be compared to wortd-systems. The archaeological data indicare the rise and fall of spatidly different prestigegoods nenvorks--first the east-west OIivella biplicata net, then the north-south clamshell disk bead net-which suggests the notion of pulsation, a general pattern in which world-system n e w o r h expand their spatial scales and then contract. Tkomas L. Jacksan (X 932) contends that archaeologicd evidence from other regions in CdiEornia indicates the existence of periods of interregiond integration followd by periods of localization in which groups returned to self-sufficiency and emphasized heir cuiturd distinctiveness from other groups. This k i d of phenomenon is also thought to have occurred in the Mesolithic Euxopean context (Price t 991). This pattern of interaction2 expansion and contraction may be a feature of all world-systerns large and small, Wllat abour the question of transfomationism versus conrinuationism? We conclude that the mode of accumulation that was predominant in precontact Cdifornia was qualitatively digerent from both stav-baed and capitdisr world-sysrems, 'The logic of saciat reproduction, the nature of accualulation, and the institutional methods of mobilizing social Iabsr were primarily organized as socially constructed kin relations, These kinship structurm were mad= of normative social control. They were a cansenswal moral order in wbich the rigbts and obligations of persons were emhedcied in family rotes, Exchange within villages was organixd entireXy as sfraring, These were the main institutions that facilitated social action, Intergroup relations in this system also hnctioned primarily in terms ofappeds to moral order. Trade was organized primarily as gifr-giving, and exchangers competed with one another to establish a reputation for generosiy. The standardized medium of exchange (clamshell disk beads) was used only for intergroup trade and settlemena. This was not true money because its use was quire limited to specific contexts. It was a standardized, but not a generalized, medium of exchange. Though this was important for reproducing local structures, as W have explained, it could in no way be constrwed as "commercialimtion" or merchant capitalism. Rather, it was prestige-goods exchange among village heads. Though the rates of exchange among different trade items reflected scarciry and transport costs, these should not be construed as "prices" because there were no price-setting markets and the institutiond nature of exchange was gift-giving, not competitive buying and selling. Even conflict w s regulated by appeds to justice, as in the institution of the line war, This vvas really a method of settling disputes m o n g groups. Xr W= entirely dependent upon shared notions of what constituted equivalent injuries. Raid-type wars

148 1 A Vary Smlt World-System

were elements of a nonnormative systemic inreraction but were not very central ac-

tivities for any of the groups we studied. Raid warfare did, however, play a role in maintaining and changing collective territorial boundaries. But territorial boundaries were also chmged (slowly) by m a n s of acculturation through inrermarriage, as we saw in the case of Wintu expansion into Chimariko territory. Even territorial expansion was Largely carried out by means of kinship structures. Such a system should not be construed as having important elements of rributw or state-based modes of accumulation. Accumulation occurred collectively, mainly within villages, through such activities as the storage of foods, the building of fish-weirs, and the burning of brushy areas to provide more grasslands far game. These activities vvere organixd by means of kinship rehtions and communit)l eEorcs, Individual accumulation of wealth. misted but w a strondy constrained by leveling mechanisms. To call this "capita accumulatian" would certajnfy be sr-eczhing the concept of capital beyond the bre&ng point. Nor W% it tributary accumulation, If the mode of accumulation was neither capitalist nor tributary, this case study supports the transforrnacionist position, 'The predominance, of a qualitatively diEerent logic of social reproduction in this very small world-system means that there must have been transformations in the modes of accumulation. Not all world-systerns are the s m e , at ~ei4.S~ as far as their modes of accumulation are concerned, If these Californians are reasonably represencarive of an earlier s a g of world-system evolution, then there must have been qualitative transformations from kin-based modes to tributary or capitdist modes. From this very small world-system, we turn to an examination of the largest triburary world-system ever known-t\froeurasia.

[Iln the latter deades of the second century &C., China consciously entered into regular contact with the other civilizations of Eurasia. Organized trade routes, bath by [and and by sea, soon Lindred the faur great cultures of the continent [Chinese, Indian, Mid&e Eastern, and Raman]. In addition, Eurasia's cenrrd sea of grass provided a third linkage, more xnsitivrr ro military than to mercantile enterprise. . . . Thus, the Btraisian ecumene was closed as ncver before. This event may be compared with the far more famous closure of the global ecurnene in the sixteenth ta ei$teenth centuries A.D., whm European explorers, merchants, and missionaries systematically opened up the cloasc and istan& of dI the world to Western enterprise (McNeiH 1963, 2371.

William El. McNeill's comment highlights a major structural event in the process by which several largely separate wodd-systems in Afrocurasia became linked into a single interactive system in a series of waves of integration and $isintegration between 500 B.C.E. and 1400 C.E. This Afroeurasian system first emerged with trade connections between China and Rome some 2,200 years ago. It expanded, contracted, and nearly decoupled in a series of oscillations for over two millennia. 21 became united mosc fully under Cbinggis Khan (formerly speIIed Genghis) in the thirteenth century, onfy to decouple again under early Ming rule in China (early fifteenth century). Throughout these changes South and Southeast Asia remained transit grounds whose dynamics were less tightly coupfed to the emerging Afroeurasian world-system, but they nevertheless played an important role. O u t o f the ashes of the collapsed Mongol Empire the northwestern European periphery, following the pattern of semiperipheral development, transformed into a new type of intensely capitalist regional system that eventually came to dominate the older core regions and to incorporate the rest of rhe globe. In this chapter we examine some of the complex hisory of the emerging Mraeurasian uvorld-system. Before embaking on our historical explorations, however, it would he useful ro revlw the major theoretical issues vve wiIl be addressing through this explsmtisn.

'The nevv connections among the various previously autonomous world-systems that came to form the Afroeurasian world-system raise once again issues of (1) continuity versus transformation; (2) the nature of world-system boundaries; (3) the processes of mrgers and the incorporation of states and nonstate societies; and (4) the role of semiperipherd areas in hierarchy Eornation and systernic transformatian, We argue &at before the first opening of the Silk Road there were at least three major state-based world-systems on the Eurasian landmass: the Chlnese, Lhe South Asian, and the Wesr Asian.1 These three o r e regions became involved in long processes of mutual incorporation that was uneven and sporadic, with periods of increasing and decreasing incorporation. At times they joined to form a single system constituted by the equal exchange of luxury goods and bullion among the three main core regions (Amin 1991). This system was righrly Linked beoueen 200 B.C.E. and 200 C.E., 500 and 900 C.E., and 1200 to 1400 C.E. At other times the system decoupled into largely autonomous smaller world-systems, but after each successive decoupling the separated regions were increasingly transformed by their interactions with the larger whole. m a t oaurred was the merging of the lagest neworb, the information and the prestige-goods nets while the politicalimilitary and bulk-goods nets remain distinct (except under the Mongols, when the militarylpolitid net also merged briefly). m e t h e r or not the formation of the Mroertrasian world-system constitutes a r merely a rxe-farm of incorporation, it is dear that the constituent core regions and the nav larpr system incorporateli several smaller vvorld-systems-norably in West Mrica and Southeast Asia, This process of incorporation of previously mtonomous systems unleashed significant changes within the newly incorporated regions. As we have seen in the previous chapters, more complexly organized societies transformed their less complex neighbors. This often occurred through the incorporation of a less complex society into a more complex c ~ r e l p e r i p h ehierarchy. ~ During these rwo millennia the incorporation and transformation of nonstate societies increased dramatically. What remains less clear is whether the processes of incorporation were themselves transformed, or if only the relative density of different degrees of incorporation changed. The problematic roles of paftoralists also slygest new processes of incorporation and coreiperipheryhierarchy formation. As we will see, some of the most dramatic changes to occur in these nvo millennia were due to the nomadic pastoralists of Central Asia (Barfield 1989; Frank 1992). These nomads had a much larger effect on the core/Periphey hierarchies into which they were incorporated than did nomadic foragers, sedentary foragers, or sedentary horticulturalists. The most dramatic example of this, of course, was the Mongol conquest of much of Eurasia in the rhirteenth century.

Afroeurasian World-Systems Since 500 B.C.E. The most difficult and problematic era of world-system history is the history of the Eurasian landmass and the shifting, pulsing variations in prestige-goods trade, polit-

ical-military interactions, bulk-goods trade, and information exchange nenuorks. The available histories of the states, empires, and nonstate societies occupying this region are more than any one scholar can master in a lifetime. Nevertheless, we will try to draw a systematic account from those materiais &at we have examined. The first problem to consider is how to periodize this history. Jerry Bentley (1913) divides the past two millennia into four eras. First is the era of the ancient Silk Roads, from about 200 B.C.E. to about 400 G.E. It is notable that the Roman and Han Empires rose and fell in tandem. Virulent diseases communicated along the Silk Road seem to have played a major role in the ending of this era. The second era runs From the seventh thmugb tenth century. In this era sea lanes w r e opened and the vulume of traft;c increased significandy, Many historians see a major shift occurring around 1000 C.E. (McNeill 1963, 1982; Bentley 1993; Bechirh 1987b; Alsu-Lu%)lad1983; Bartlett 1393). Stilt, in some areas the second phase blends into the third era from approximately 1000 to 1350 C.E. Trade again increased on both land and sea, but more dramatic was the rise of steppe n o m d empires, especially the Mongol Empirc: in the thirteenth century. This is also the era in which Europe was 'hade," as Robert Bartlett (1393) so aptly phrases it, Finally, afier a centuwy or more of demographic recovev the modern European era of expansion began in the !are fifteenth century, These eras are not discrece, nor are they geographially uniform, but rather seglle into each other and wary spatialh (see Figure 8.1). The second major problem is hotv to o r w i z the discussion of the various states and empires of Eurasia. We follow McNeil12s(1363) lead in moving h m east to west: the Chinese Empire, South Asian states (India), and h e n the West Asian and Mediterranean states. Regarding the VVest h i m and Mediterranean core region we will adapt David mlkinssn's (1987a, X987b) terminolow and refer tu this as the. "'Central System,""?e also adapt Wilkinson's terms for the China-centered and Ganges-anrered regions-Far Eastern and fndic vvorld-systems. Rome had been a periphery of the Central System but became part of the core of the system during the first phase of this era. Because history nwer just begins at a point in time, we sketch some of the major structural events that occurred before our first phase to give some sense of historical continuities. Though the geographic divisions are conventional, they denote real divisions, albeit divisions that shift and blur through time (see Map 8, X).

In this period both the Roman Empire (Dyson 1985; Mattingly 1992; Wells 1992; Whittaker 1994) and the Han Dynasry (Lattimore 1340; Barfield 1989, 1990; Fried 1952) began to expand ounuard, seeking outlets for products and sources of scarce materials. Central Asian nomads played a crucial role in opening and maintaining this trade (Barfield 1989; Frank 1992; Hodgson 1974a, 1974b; Teggart 1939; McNeill 1963). In world-system terms, three relatively isolated world-systems merged at the level of the prestige-goods net. Ideas, products, and

l 52 / The Unl;fcca$io~ ~fA$I"oezkrasia

1200 S.G.E.

400 G,E.,

GO0 c , ~ .

FIGUW 8, I Major Eras of Afroeurasia;

people moved along the Silk Roads. The roads over the Hindu Kush and along the Indian Ocean littoral also drew the South Asian world-system into this newly merging larger world-system, although not as tightly. Though this was not the first contact benveen the two world-systems at opposite ends of the Eurasian landmass,3 it was the first instance of sust"crlt"nedtrade. Direct trade bemeen China and Rome, in the sense of Roman or Chinese merchants carrying goods the entire distance, did not occur. Still, the links in the chain of down-the-line trade became fewer and longer and the volume and velocity of trade reached levels higher than ever before.

Three Tributary World-Systems During the last six centuries B.C.E. major changes took place throughout Eurasia. In the east, growing from the early Shang Dynasty (1520-1027 B.c.E.), a statebased world-system developed in what we now know as China during the first millennium B.C.E. It was marked by severd centuries of mrfare, the so-calted Warring States period (403-221 B.c.E.), and finally was united into a corewide empire in 221 B.C.E. by Shih Huang Ti in the Ch'in dynasry (221-206 B.c.E.). This shortlived empire was replaced by n*o succeeding Han dynasties (201 I3.C.E.-9 C.E.; 24-220 c.E.). The region was not united again until the rise of the Sui dynasty in the 590s C.E. During this time the extent of sinicized territory expanded greatly from its Yellow River homeland to include a much larger territory, approximately the size of modern China, plus a tongue of territory extending into the Tarirn Basin (see Map 8.2). In the early part of this era control by a growing Chinese landlord class was more easily accomplished than in the Central and lndic systems because it was more difficult for peasants to escape to adjacent territory suitable for farming. This circumscription factor led to relatively early and stable empire formation in China.

Also during this time a uniquely Chinese linkage b e w e n military, religious, and familial leadership developed in association with the keeping of written records. 'The classwide literacy of the Mandarins is the main reason that so much more is known about early China than about many other early states. During the Warring States period the old landed nobility was supplanted by a "gentry" that did not necessarily have a hereditary daim on land and peasants but that nevertheless controlled them. The rise of the gentry was accompanied by an increasingly elaborate bureaucratic machinery for administering the state. This social order persisted for the next two millennia with only relatively minor changes. Much less is known about South Asia. This is due in part to the persistence of oral tradition until quite late as well as a primary focus on religious and philosophical, as opposed to political and economic, topiw in ord and written literature. Geographic features contributed to Indic isolation. Surrounded by mountains, jungles, and ocean, South Asia may have been invaded less ofien rhan other regions. Invaders, such as the Aryans and Alexander the Great, crpicdly came from the northwest. Consequently there was less external pressure to unite In order to am= large armies for defense, Many centuries after the so-called Ayan invasion of the Ganges VdIey (around 800 B.G.E.) Iocd states began to develop in what is now northwest India, During this time the caste divisions developed, as did Budhism and Jainism, Not until 32 1 B,C.E,, when Mauryan rule was established in the wake of Mexander's invasion (32'7-325 B.G.E.), did anything approximating a corrwide empire dewlop, Even Mauvan rule did not unite all of India, however; this was nor achieved until the British conquat, The Mauryan Empire collapsed Late in the second century B.C.E. Smaller warring states dominated the region until Gupra reunification in 320 C.E. From the time of the Mauryan Empire, Indian traders, travelers, and monks made numerous contacts with Southeast Asian states and with Central his, The most notable aspects of these contacu were trade and the spread of Buddhism (Bentley 1993; Beckwith 1187a, 1387b, 1387~).It is interesting to note that this empire flourished at the same time that both China and Rome were divided into numerous waning states, Indian merchants in Southeast Asia brought the Hindu idea of divine kingship as well as prestige goods, and these influences led to local srate formation (Whearley 1975). In the Wen Asian (Central) system the older Mesopotamian and Egyptian core regions4 had become linked, first by trade but later, around 1500 B.C.E., into a single PMN. This core region was interacting by means of trade with much of Europe and the Indus River valley during the Bronze Age, but the Indic and Central PMNs were not yet linked into a single sustained interaction system of allying and conflicting states. The rise of large empires, especially the Assyrian and Persian (Achaemenid) Empires, brought most of the core region into a single corewide state. These early states were not "marketless," as Karl Polanyi (1957a) claims. Merchants sometimes operated on their own account rather rhan being agents of states, and interest was charged on loans in Sumerian city-states, the earliest of the early states.

But the relative importance of cornmodified production and exchange in these states was still quite low in comparison with later commercialized empires.

Already in the Mesopotamian and E ~ p t i a nworld-system the phenomenon of autonomous semiperipherd city-states specializing in rrade b e m e n the larger states and empires had appeared. Dilmun probably played this role in linking Mesopotamia with the Indus River valley, and Byblos carried goods from Egypt to the Lwant. The Phoenician cities specialized in naval power and maritime trade to a much greater extenr than did the Greek cities. Phoenician cities, like later Itdian ciwstares (especially Venice), had little capaciv to produce their own agricultural goods. Rather, they relied on their ability to purchase food in exchange for the goods that they traded. The Phoenician cities also went beyond the merchant role, producing certain manufactured goods for exporr. These were probably the first states in whicb capitdists (merchants and phocfucers of manufactures for sale) conrrded the state machinery. They played a central role in the promotion of production for exchange in the whole Mediterranean littoral and beyond because they encouraged trade b e m e n states and empires and they carried goads to peripheral regions, encouraging producers to sell their surpluses in exchange for imports. This process was a main force behind the long-term secular trend toward commercidization in the tributary world-qsterns (Sanderson 1334c, ]C 3 3 5 ~ ) . Early in the fifth century B.G.E. Creek ciry-states came into conflict with the Persian Empire. By the late fifth century B.C.E. Greeks, led by the Athenian navy, prevented conquest by the l>ersians and rivded the Phoenicians as major traders on the Medterranean (Thompson 1935). Their success was based in large part on the use of booty to pay otherwise landless and unemployed citizens as oarsmen in their ships. Early in the fourth century B.C.E, Phitip of Macedon (353-336 B.C.E.), by enricing the sons of nables to his court, was ahle to curtail incessant internaf rivalry and mount a united attack on the Greek city-states. By 338 Philip had conquered Greece, "The political history of the Greek city-states in the 6Frh and fourth centuries B.C. offers a classic example of hovv dispersed sovereignty, operating within a balance-of-power system, may evolve throuy;ll a series of unstable alliances t w a r d the hegemony of a single marchland state" (McNeill 1963, 258). This is the rypical semiperipherat marcher state strategy described in Chapter 5. But Greece m s yet only a semiperipherd region in the larger Central System. The conquests by Philip's son, ALcxander, Hellenized the whale core and briefly extended the empire all the way to India. The conquest of India was only a temporary linking of the Central and the Tndic PMNs, Alexander's empire fell into three, maklng a Central PMN in which the interstate system was composed of large tributary empires and smaller adjacent states, The Greeks expanded into the western Medicesanean by htlnding autonnmous eoimies, as ha$ the Phoenicians. Earlier migrations fiom the East had established Etruscan agriculrure and cities on the Italian peninsula. Beginning as a local stateless tribe incorporated into the Etruscan and the larger Mediterranean nerworks (Ros-

tovtzeff 1960), the Romans formed an expansive, loosely federated military alliance that conquered the Italian peninsula. Rome used the same strategy of federation-requiring conquered peoples to support Rome in military actions but allowing them to maintain Local customs-to conquer the entire Medlterranem region. This was another famous instance of empire formation by a semiperipheral marcher state. By the close of the third century B.C.E. Rome had conquered the eastern Mediterranean and defeated Carthaginian (Phoenician) rivals in North Africa. A Carthaginian faction had established a colony in Spain that was pursuing a territorial strategy rattler than the more usual Phoenician mwitime-trade approach to walth, Mannibal embarked on a semiperipheral marcher state path that nearly led to the conquest of Rome but br the besitance af the mare traditiond faction in Carthage, which failed to resupply him at the crucial moment. The Romans never forgot this close call. They destroyed Carthage and purchased Hannibdb life from the Parthian king who bad givecl him as;c.lum. Late in the first century B.C.E. Occavian, knowcl as Calsar Augustus, succeeded in converting t h kr-flung Ruman mnyuesfs into an integrated empire. Kome eventually dominated trade and one of the two core empires of the Central System, stretching from the Iberian peninsula to the boders of PsthEan Empire. The Parthian Empire was also a core state within the PMN of the Centrd System and hence was not a world-empire in the Walfersteinian sense, Rather, the core had become relatively cenrrdixd under the control of m a large empires, The Central PMN had been Iinkcld to the Indic PMN by mealls of prestige-goods W t h the t r d e d e n Mesopotamia traded with the early states on the Indus KXP, decline of the Indus states, trade declined but was reestablished when states arose in the Ganges Valley. Thus the Central and Indic PMNs were part of a single larger PGN in which the rwo nonadjacent core regions had engaged in equal exchange of Iuxury gaods probably since about 18120 B.C.E. (Mtkinson 1332, GO), Nexander the Great's conquests (334-323 B.C.E.), had they been sustained, would have cornbined them at the politicalimificary net Level. This trade connection became much stronger as the Roman Empire consolidated its power in the Mediterranean during the second century f3.6.E. The Roman Empire was orgnized primarily around expansionary mnquesr and the import of booty and slaves into Rome. But there also dweloped a significant marker sector in which goods, labor (in the form o f both slaves and wage workers), property, and wealth were exchanged as commodities. Roman contract law was an important basis for market exchange. Though Rome was a rather highly commercialized sysrem in comparison with earlier empires, accumulation remained predominantly organized through the use of coercive state power, and the dynamics of expansion and contraaion WE primarily tied to the Logic of'conquat, taxation, and tribute. The histories of Rome and China are parallel in many ways: the timing of their respective rises to dominance, the domination by military leaders, constant political intrigues, and frequent bureaucratic corruption. Interestingly, geographical transition m e s between areas that supported agriculture capable of producing significant

surplus and those only cay~bleof supporting subsistence seem to define frontiers more than do poliq* politics, or warfare (Lattirnore 1940; m i t t k e r 1394, 85-86), Finally, the three world-systems each had a nested quality: Trade in prestige or luxury goods and informarion Aovvs extended beyond military control, vvhich in turn exceeded the range of bulk-goods exchange (see Figure 3.1). There were even more significant differences. The Roman Empire was much more pluralistic, a feature that stemmed from its federation strategy. The family played a less central role in Rome. Roman agriculture was far less intensive. Most significandy, Rome and China faced very digerent "barbarians,'" that is, nonstate foes: Rome's enemies never succeeded in witing into a single force, &ereas Chings did regularly-a topic to which we n w turn.

In 1939 Frederick 'J.?'eggart, in his famous book, Rome d~ldChina argued that the warfxre on the eastern borders of the Roman Empire and the western barder nC China were correhred. We further aygued that the mechanism of correlation w a the movements of various Central Asia steppe peoples, Though he posited a cannection, Teggart did not M y specifjl. its mechanisms. That is the task we approach in this section. Xn generai, Central Asian nomadic groups have what anthropologists cdl a segm e n t lineage ~ structwe (Barfield 1393; Sahlins 1361). The important feature of this social structure is that it allows easy formation of allianas and allows a former enemy to became an ally, often rarjondized within a kinship metaphor. This allawed a leadcr to ntanipuhte Ehe prestige-goods econmy to przsmore wider and wider alliances, &us purfing larger and iarger armies of allies ar his disposd. The Cimmerians and Scythians, who may well have been thc first mounted pastordists, appeared sometime in the ninth century B.C.E, Chinese accouats of horseriding nomads first appear sometime in the fourth century B.C.E. The formation of the first large steppe confederacy, the Hsiung-nu, coincided with formation of the Ch'in dynasty in China in the late third century B.C.E. (see Table 8.1). As we will see, this W ~ Snot brtuitom. It was the first cycle of the simultaneous rise and fall of Chinese dynasties and steppe confederations, There are several recurrens themes in nomad-sedentary relations in Chinese history and several new interpretations.6 First, the expansion of sedentary agriculture displace?d nomads fitrther into the steppe. T h i s expanslon was limired by a combination of agriculturd technology and local ecolog- Sometimes agriculturists who were near &is Iimit adapted a pastorail way of making a living. At other times pastoralisa became sedentary. These cantradictory processes created a mixed zone along some parts of the Chinese frontier. Where the vegetative zones were sharp, so was the frontier, The nomad-sedentary disrinrtion was thus fundamentalIy one of livelihood, not of race or ethnicity, This is an early emmple of the persistence of a

prABLE8. X

Cycles of Chinese E~npiresand Sreppe Confederations

1. CKin and Han 221 B.C.E.220 C.E.

Hsiung-Nu 203 f3.G.E155 C.E. h c i e n t Silk

Cycle I

2. Disruption 220-58 X

bads 3. T'o-pa Wet (md others) 384-556 1st Turkish

4,Sui and T'aang

552-630 2nd Turkish Sea lanes open 683-734 Uighur 745-840

58 1-907

1000 C.E,

7. Chin

Major changes and Mongol Era

ourchen) 1115-1234

8. y w ( M ~ q o l lMongol 1206-1 368 Qirats Eastern Mongols Zu1~~rars

Cycle 3 3. Ming 1368-1644

10, CIrding 161C+1322

cultural boundary despite rontinual movement of individuats, fmilies, or groups across it (Barth 1363; Hadand 1969). Second, there were wmes af rnigrariorrs or invasions muving &m east to west across the Eurasian landmass. These were driven by the interaction of geographic and political Factors, & McNeifl (5982, 17; 1387, 26%) points out, there is a pdient in tenlperature m d precipitation from cast ta west over the Eurasia steppe, with the west having becter pmurr candicions, Howwer, there is a ~ounterateracrion in the east: the Chinese Empire.7 Third, since nomads generaILy produced firtfe of interest or value to agricdtural Chinese, they often used thxearf to induce trade: Trading and raiding were alterna-

tive means to the same ends Uagchid and Symons 1989, chap* If , f i a a n o v (1983, 202E) points out that there was a distinct asymmety in the demand for this trade. Nomads, due to their specialization, had a much stronger need for sedentary goods-both atgricultrtral goods and handicr;Ifts-than sedentary peoples had far nomad products. The strongest demand for exchanges with nomads came from a second rype of trade, one in which nomads played an intermediary role among sedentary peoples. Still, this asymmetry in demand for trade explains why nomads ofren forced the issue via raiding The Chinese eventually developed a cavalry to fight nomads. Some studies show that raiding correlated with changing conditions of trade and changing state stabiliry (Szynkiewicz 1989, 154; Barfield 1989). Chinese officials acquiesced to this trade as a way of controlling nomads. Nomad leaders used prestige goods in addition to basic needs in the nomad politicd economy m shore up and syrnbalizxt their power. These interactions fucIed changes both in China and alllong nomads, In times of stare decline, nomadic leaders sometimes s e m d as protectors of bdeaguered areas, X n times of state ascendance, urzihed Chinese response promoted wider u n i v among nomads. NomaQ wefe as ofien a source of change as receivers of change. In his insightful histoy Of Central Asia, Thonlas Barfield (L9831 andyzes the interconnections beween the rise arld fall of the Chinese Empire and various nomad empires, He documents the intimate connection beween Chinese Empire and nomad polirial orpnization, A key feature of Rarfielh annlysis is Fhe distinction beevveen inner- and outer-frontier straregies. In the outer-frontier s m t e g a dominant nomad leader used violent attacks to rerriEy Chinese oEficids, alternating becvveen war and peace to raise tribute payments and improve rems of trade. He assiduously avoided taking over Chinese territory and the entangiernents in Chinese politia that conquest would mail. The innerfrontier stratep sometimes developd when a nomad confederarim began to disintegrate. Some contending nomad facrion leader, typically of a weaker faction, would seek alliance with some Chinese officials against his nomad rivals. The Chinese officials acquiesced, intending to use "barbarians againsr barbarians."B The nomad Faction leader sometimes used the Chinese military to aid in the defeat of his rivals and used Fiver with rhe Chinese to sever the Aow of Chinese goods to his rivals. This alfowed the nomad leader allied with the Chinese to incmse his power and influence by using his near-monopoly of access to Chinese goods to gain supporters. This manipulation was especially effective in a segmentary lineage system in which exotic goods were used to enhance the status and reputation of leaders-that is, in a prestige-goods economy. Once the nomad leader became dominant he could either use his new power base to unify nomad groups and return to an ourer-frontier strategy or leave them poiiticaJly hqmented and consolidace daminsion in a Limited regiion. The oscillation bemeen inner- and oueer-frontier strategies was the mechanism that linked strong nomad polities with strong Chinese empires and fragmentation of nomad confederacies with fragmentation of the Chinese Empire. Only when the empire was strong could it be "milked" continuously via an outer-frontier strategy.

The &$cation



/ 161

When rhe empire was weak, nomad leaders tended to favor an inner-frontier strategv, m&ng alliances with local "warlords." This oscillation also explains the relative permanence of the "perilous frontier," as Barfield (1 983) has dubbed it. Nomads could not rule a sedentary popdation without giving up their nomadism. Conversely, however, sedentary states could not concept by sedentarizing them. They could control them by a cornbination of constructing barriers and employing highly mobile troops, which could essentially beat the pastoralists at their own game-decisive hit-and-run victories flattimore 19G2a, 485). Thus Central Asian pstordists, especiaHy the Mongols, could build huge empires, but could not maintain them. Conversely, the Chinese could manipulate, but nwer conquer, their nomadic adversaries. The sinicization of nomads has been noted often, but the "Mongolization" of frontier Chinese has been noted rarely (e.g., Lartimore 1340, 1962a). The Afroeurasim-wide eEects of the oscillation bemeen inner- and outer-frontier strategies rwerberated along the steppe gradient and were sometimes manifested by the movements of mounted pastadists to the west. m e n the Chinese world-s).stem became multicentric h e associated steppe confederacy would also fragment. h o n g Central Asian pastoralists poljcical confiict was often settled by migration of the weaker party into new territory. Since &c confederacy that had Formerly been atlied with the Chinese Empire was often initialty larger and stronger than its rivals located further from China, it could canquer or d i s y h them. This often led to a net displacement wesward af nomadic groups. In short, rhe a r e region in western h i a was subjected to repeated invasions by the losers in a long chain of displacemenrs. In Chapter 10 we present comparative evidence that shows a syxrchronizatim of the rise and fa11 of empires and the growth and dedine of cities in the Far Eastern and Genrral PMNs. It is our hypothesis that the main cause ofthis synchmnization was the corelperiphery process decribcd earlier in which Gerltral Asian steppe nomads interacted with %rarian empires on both ends of Eurasia.3 We are not arguing that nomad raids were the main cause of collapses of Chinese and West Asian empires. Imperial collapses were to a large extent due to overextension and diminishing returns (Tainter 1388; Hopkins 1978a). But these dynamics often initiated migrations, and intensified nomad raiding accelerated the processes of imperial demise, The analysis of steppe empires has interesting implications for debates about the role of class relations in state formation. In traditional Manrist accounts, stares only arise after classes are formed. Though there were differences in wealth among Central Asian nornrtds, to call these classes is an overstatement, Furthermore, there was the recurrent problem that when these "states" collapsed, the nomads reverted to "tribal" organization. The problem here is the assumption that state formation is entirely endogenous. Steppe empires were the only purely "tributary" states in the sense that the surplus that they extracted was from other states, not from their own peasants. The formation of steppe confederacies was a process that can only be explained by takng world-system relations into aaount. But this was an unusual case in which

the less complex and hierarchicd periphery (in terms of wrelperiphery differentiation) exploited the more complex core region. It is this case more than any other that justifies our insistence that the relationship beween cmiperipbery differentiation and corelperiphery hierarchy must be empiricdly studied in each case, There is a sense in which the steppe conkderades may be understood as semipef W consider the Chinese Empire to be the WE, the rcrnote nomacts to be ripherd. X the periphery, and a steppe confederation to be the semiperiphery we have an intriguing process b r world-system theorizing. The semiperiphery grows because of unequal e x c h a n ~in its favor with the core, and it uses its power m block the formation of rival semiperipheries. Yet it remains dependent on the core in the sense that this relatianshiy is contingent on prosperiry in the core [email protected] The contradiction of the semiperiphery"s exploiting the core is resolved to some extent by the consideration of relative sizes. Ghinese stares eypicdly were one hundred or more times more populous than steppe confederacies. Hence what they gave to steppe nornllds wm reJatively minor in comparison with other exchanges but vitd to the nomads, That is why the same exchange was seen by nomads as a matter of 'tribute," whefeas the Chinese always thought of it as " g i h " or ""bhes'"Uagchid and Symons 1383, chaps. 2 and 4). The nonstate peoples that Rome faced were more varied and pregnteci a &Rerent set of proble~ns(Dyfon 1985). Aong the eastern and southern (that is, North Mrican) Iimits of the empire tbe nonstare peoples wre broadly similar. On the European borders, peuples vaxied from shiking cultivators to compIex chieiFdoms, As is ypical d e n states elxcounrer nonstare societies, Rome exerted considerable, if unwen, pressure toward political centralization among its nonstate neighborn. Wmt Afian nomads diger considerably from Centrd Asian nomads. The kinship Structures of West Asian and North African nomads m r e generdfy less amenable to expansion by "fictive" kin incorporation. This may have reflected important geographical differences (narrow valleys versus open plains) (see Barfield 1990). Most nomads on the estern and southern limits of the Centrd PMN shified mare readily and more often bemeen sedentary and nomadic liFesyles (Cribb 't 331). This mlly have been because these nomads, especidly in North Africa and in areas where they occupied highly varied terrain, were often transh~rnant.'~ Because of this, they often had a much more symbiotic relationship with the sedentary agriculturalists within whose territory and economy they were tightly embedded (Barfield 1993, 94). Finally, Roman strategy toward nonstate societies differed considerably from that of the Chinese and even that of the Parthians, Seleucids, Sassanians, and other West Asian states. Consistent with its early federation strateg, Rome often sought to eaIist erstulbile nonstare foes as allies. Their strateg dtemated bemeen what Koss Hassig (1992) calls territorial (or direct) and hegemonic (or indirect) control. D. 1. Mattingly (1992) notes in his analysis of Roman conflicts with North African nomads that contrary to Edward Lutwak's (1976) famous analysis of Roman strategy, they did not always try to keep nomads out, wen in the late empire. "Roman frontiers of whatever type (walls, earthwork, rivers, mountains, deserts, or

road and fort nemorh) =re not intended to be lines o f blockade or first defenses against invading forces. Rather they were filters, designed to facilitate observation and supervision of movement benveen the territorial and hegemonic mnes" (Mattingly 1992, 56). In other words, Rome lured nomads into an inner-frontier strategy and impeded a shift to an outer-fromier strategy by a judicious combination of tribute, alliances, and divide-and-conquer techniques (Mattingly X 932, 54). The geographic and kinship differences that we noted earlier reinforced these techniques. Beeause of these differences, h m e seldom if ever faced concerted nomad confederations of the type that challenged China. This, however, did not eliminate nomad threats and impacts on Rome and the other large empires of the Central PMN. In Central Asia it was the cycle of nomad confederacies that caused the synchroniciry of border warhre in China and Rome and drove the unification and dissalution of the Moeurasian-wide prestige-goods and information nets. Howwer, war and migration were only part of the nomad connection. The steppe peoples also were important links in trade,

Though steppe nomads played important roles in trade, they were not the fundamental cause of the strong Bow of trade that developed along the Silk Roads. Significant differences in the internd dpamics of Rome and China heled the demand for trade b e m e n them. Roman expansion was driven by the dynamics of elite competition, a need for slaves to W& unoccupieJ land, and e m p l o p e n t far b m a n cicizens (Hopkns 1378a). The legions arrracted free peasant producers f a m the c o w rxyside, and large slave-worked plantations replaced the small Exrms. The demand for both urban and agriculturd slave labor was great, which in turn provide$ an additional incentive for military expansion and the raking of waf-caytive slaves, Elite competition was expressed in military adventures abroad and in conspicuaus consumption at home (Hopkins 1378a). This led to a t ~ m e n d o u sdemand for l u u ries through which elites could demonstrate and validate their status and wedth, which ernailed a strong demand for "exotics'"see Helms 1988). Silk in particular was highfy saugght because of its luxurious and exotic qualities and because there was no tocal substitute or ntail-equivalent, China, in contrast, expanded by incorporating new territory, transforming incorporated peoples into Chinese peasants, and thus expanding its tax base (Lattimore 1940). 7'he demand for trade in China seemed to vacillate. Early Han efForts m set up trading bases in, "Ferghana""fin what is n w Mghanistan and was then part of the so-called "Western countries""") indicate that the desire h r trade was sometimes strong. W i l e the Chinese exported silk and sometimes sought n w markets Eor it, the west supplied little that the Chinese wmted besides gold. Thus, in gcnend, the Knman demand for trade was greater than t h Chinese demand, Trade from Rome W China passed &rough many middlenxen, and numemus subsidiary scardecs sprang up along the Silk Roach m profit from this trade. Sometimes

nomadic groups formed alliances with these new statelets and even occacionally took on the trading rote thmsekes. M a y groups sought to monopolize rhe trade, but the plethora of would-be carriers and the crsxistence of alternative routes made this neady impossible, Silk did not travel directly from China to Rome.12 Rather, it passed through several stages. Xc the emern end of the trade many locd lords, either nomakl leaders or rufers of the 'Western countries," xquired more silk than they could consume, either themselves or as "gifts" to followers or payment for other goods or services. Hence many tocal sfates and nomad leaders acquired a @cat deal of surplus silk, and they a c t i d y sou&t new rnarkcts for it. Indeed, silk was so common, it was ohen used for money, Silk left the ""Western countries'%y several routes (see Map 5.3).The trade passed through and sometimes around India, and then to Rome either along the coas ther overland or by short sea voyages-or, beginning sometime in the first century C&., across the Arabian Sea. Alternate routes passed through Parthia and other West Asian states. Silk was ahen processed, including unrweling and rewaving, in Syria on the borctertands bemeen the Parthian Empire an$ the &man Empire (Hudson l 9 3 1 , 91-92; Vii 1967, 1 58; ~VcNeillli 3"a, 33). Nomacis played other roles in the trade, notllbly that of protectors of trade. C.GE Simkin (f 968,4548) shows that the major cost of ancicnr: trade, in con~rrntwith early nineteenth century trade, was not that of transportanon (in terms of labor costs) but rarller the high corn af frequent raids while moving goods over long distances.13 TTbere was clearly a need to protect trade from nomad raiding, Trade could be protected and nomads heId at bay biy various combinatians of granting access to local trade, paying tribute (ofren called "giPls"' or "bribei"), or hiring nomads as protectors. m e n these protectors were part of a strong confekracy; the protection was good. Hmever, if the confederacy begarr to disintegrat.e, the now-competing factian+dong with former enemies-would increase their raidirtg in order to acquire eicher some of the p o d s being transported or their own rewards for protection. Thus anything that undermined a steppe confederacy would smerely disrupt trade. Once the trade began, it g r w by expmding to other p o d s , and it fed to g e n e d prosperity. This trade constituted an elaborate type of prestige-goods system. Bulk goods did not travel far, but their exchange increased in both volume and range, vvhich furthered the use of silk as a medium of exchange in western China, It also led ro some wpansion of grain pmduction and trade in order to feed the various oEcials e to promote and pmtect and armies sent to the western borders by C h i n ~ officiats the trade (YE1967,143-149). m a t W= the role and vdue of this trade to Rome and China? Given the lack of records this is extraordinarily digcult to determine. Beygnd the paucity af data there are severe problems of comparisons of the value of trade in tributary systems. Tributary systems, dmpire the width they amass, remain largely subsistence economies. One catl argue, as Simkin does 0968,45E),that the appropriate conrgarison is not

between d u e of trade and of all production but rather between value of trade and state expenses and rmenues. The former amparison would render the trade almost i n s i g d a n t ; in the latter it would be substantial, O R thf: basis of estimates from Pliny (who wrote in the first century G.E.), Simkin (1968, 45) aPgues that the total value of eastern imports-most of which came through India-was about one-half of the total annud tribute collected in the first century B.C.E., or about nvo-thirds of Tiberius's rreasury.14 The treasury of Wmg Mang, emperor of China in 23 C.E., was rwency-wo times larger than Rome's annual imports. While these comparisons must be taken with due caution, they reinforce the points that the trade was more imponant in Rome than in China and that it was substantial. During the second century C.E. this trade began to decline, &din, records arr sparse, so much of what happened must be pieced together from various types of evidence. In addition to silk and a few orher exotics, technologies, ideas, ideologies, and pathogens also were exchanged. The larter produced devastating eEects in both Rome and China (Bentley 1333; McNeill 1376, chap. 3). At the far ends of thc trade circuits human populations were exposed to new and deadly diseases that rapidly beegidemic, These epidemics had both direct and indirect effects. Directly, loss of popdation undercut the capacicy to conduct trade. Producers and consumers of silk were lost; various secondary aftisans who supported the trade were lost; the popdadon of traders declined; and the food-producing poyulation that sustained all of rhe others declined. Population decline and attendant loss of prospericy gave rise in turn to several indirect eEects. McNeill(1976, chap, 3) argues that severe popularion losses, Erom one-quafter to one-third sf the population, undercut the ahiflty of the peasant population to srrppart hose dependent on it. This severdy curtailed the power of central governments and mntribttted to and perhaps caused the collapse of those governments and gave rise to internal conflicts-which disrupted trade as well. The disruption of trade curtailed the middleman and protector roles of nomads and oasis trading cities and hence their souxces of revenue, Nomad ruiers had used wealth siphoned f r m this trade to build confederacies and to expand their spheres of inffuenccl, Trade in grain and the establishment of military aglculturd caters (fi 1367, 43ff=)had alllowed the papulation of some local oases and caravan-serving cities to exceed local ecologid carrying capcity: For sedentary occupants this meant that they had to ernigare when trade declined. For some nomads the ctecline in trade undercut the dternative sources of wealth, undermining political mnfedemtbns. This led in turn to the mwcment of nomadic groups, each displacing the next, and setting off migrations and raiding at both ends of Central Asia. Raiding, in turn, further disrupted relations and may have hrthered the spread of disease. Given the number of pacrllel routes and the lucrative rewards of the trade, trade continued, but at an abated rate. Continued trade accudly intensified the effeas of new diseses. TOsee hovv this is so, we point to research on the eEects of disease on North American hdians.15 Rus-

seU Thornton and his students (Thornton, Miller, and Wamn 1331) have rnodeIed the effects of repeated exposure to new diseases on population recovery. They find that population decline may continue, and recovery may be extremely slow, depending on the timing of the repeated exposures, population growth rates, and especially age structure and age-specific mortaliry rates. These same factors may shape the rate at which a population develops immunity to the new disease. The process involves an increase in antibodies in those exposed to the disease as well as changes in the microorganisms causing the disease that lessen their mortaliry effects. The timing of exposures also effects the development of immunities and the transformation af virulent diseaes into "childhood" illnesses. If more than a generation passes without exposure, the second exposure will approximate a "virgin soil3'exposure. This will cause severe population losses. It is important to note that severe population losses are due not only to the disease itself but also to the severe disruption of the social fabric. Often this disruption means that simple health inputs such as supplies of food and water for the infirm ate disrupted, which in turn may increase the mortalig- rate tremendously. Some combinations of these factors may lead to very severe population losseshalf or m o r e w h i c h persist for centuries. Indigenous populations in North America lost on the order of 90 percent of their population and only began recovery at the start of the mentierh cenrury (Thornton 1387). The recovery of N a t k American populations was slowed by the effects of colonialism (Stiffarm and Lane 1972), including warfare. In small groups these effects could destroy all semblance of social structure an$. order. Those that do sunrive ofiren flee the territory and are [email protected]$ into other groups. When this does not spread the disease, it leads to significant reorganization of the social landscape. Small groups subject to these conditions are also readily susceptible to recruitment into new religions (Thornton 1986). Larger groups are somewhat better able to withstand the rapid popdation loss, Here again, here are parallels in the ancient w d d . G i l w r s , rivalry among core states, and nomad invasions w u l d have promoted similar ef-fecw. Hence for regions at the ends a f the Silk Roads, population decIines were probably quire severe, which could have been a major cause of the relative decline in trade from 200 to GO0 C.E. The effects on intrasocietd class and ethnic relations of these changes remain unclear. It is imporrant to note that trade did nor stop complcrely, but it declined sharply, The digerences in the epidemics in Rome and in China were no doubt due to the differences in the various ancillary factors that amplified or attenuated the effects of exposure to new pathogens. Similar processes may have affected South Asian states but probably much more weakly. To the extent that trade was seaborne, and if the sea journeys were longer than the incubation period of diseases, trade may have been far less severely disrupted. This may be why changes in South Asia were only loosely coupled, if at all, to changes in Rome and China, which as vve have seen were mart: tightly coupled. McNeill (1976) suggests another reason. Due to a warm, humid climate, populations in India may have already developed immunity to some of

168 / The Uiz$cat.7on of AJ;.oetlrasia

these diseases. Hence trade wuid not have unleashed epidemics, or at least not of the same magnitude, Thus military activity along the frontiers of b e and China had major eEects on surrounding peoples by increasing both intertribal and state-tribal warfiire (see Chapter 4,and also Ferguson and mitehead 1332a). Tribal peoples were often d r w n more tightly into these world-systems through prestige-goods economies as states used their monopolies of access to luuf)r goods to influence and sometimes control toed tribal leaders*The success of this strategy increased the demand For luxury goods, increased trade and traffic, and hence spread disease, Thus the Mroeurasiat.1system became more intqrated, but &at integration Ied to subsequent, tempotasy disintegration of the ystem.

Cira 600- 1000 C.E.: The Emergence of New Empires and Other Changes Sometime around 600 C.E. trade began to recover. According to Jerry Bentley this recovery ""depended again on the foundatioll of large imperial states, such as the Tang, Abbasid, and Cardingian empires, which pacified vast srrerches of Eurasia, and on the cooperation of nomadic peoples who provided transportation links bemeen settled regions""(1933,27). New trade routes across the Tndjan Owan opened other avenues of trade not sut>jectto nomad raiding, but subject- to vagaries oaf windpowered navigation and to dismption by a dlEerenc kind of nomad-pirates. The significance of alternate routes offered by the sea lanes should not be minimized. Sailing the sea lanes relied on the monsoons in the Arabian Sea, the Bay of Bengal, and the Seuth China Sea, and these routes brought new peoples into the trade circuits of the Mroeurasian system (see Map 8.4). Indian and Chinese influence in Southeast Asia and Melanesia strengthened and expanded, incorporating formerly isolated local wrld-systems into the Afroeurasian PGN, The gravvch of trade on the sea routes meant increased camgetition with the Silk Roads. Islam too spread along these routes, serving as an ideologicd integrator throughout much of the enlarged and more tightly integrated Afroeurasian PGN. Philip Curtids (1984) study of trade diasporas and wade ecumenes is relevant to dweloping an understanding of the power of Islam as a cross-cultural integrating force. Curtin points out that specialized ethnic groups often play the merchant role in cross-cultural trade because distant kinsmen can trust one another. So cross-cdtural trade is often in the hands of an ethnic "trade diaspora." As mss-cutturd trade becomes more dense and regularized, the ultimate consumers become more familiar with one another, and cross-cultural understandings suEcient to undemrite longdistance trade emerge. The specialized trading ethniciries then lose their control as a trade ecumene emerges. Islam was a powerful wmbinatian of trade diaspora and trade ecumene: Because it is an evangelical "world religion,"lG its traders not only trusted one another but also converted the peoples with whom they traded, thus creating a trade ecumene.

In this phase commerce along the Silk Roads and oceanic paths reached theretofore unprecedented levels in world history. In world-system terms, the incorporation was tighter but remained at the level of the prestige-goods net. But as we have noted, local bulk-goods production and regional politicallmilitary dynamics were also partly reorganized because of integration into the larger PGN.

Conventional accounts of Chinese history follow the succession of Chinese dynasties: Sui 48 1-618; T'ang 618-307, Sung 960-1279. As is often the case, such conventions obscure more than they reveal (McNeill 1987, 321). The key events and processes in this era are the reunification of China under the Sui and early T'ang rulers, the opening of the Grand Canal benveen the Yellow and Yangtze Rivers, the change in center of population density from the Yellow to the Yangtze River valley (which was tied to the shift from field grains to rice paddy agriculture), swerd military losses in the mid-ighth century, and the attempt to close the borders in the mid-ninth century, These events and processes are all intertwined. Reunification under the Sui allowed new internal prosperity. It was tied with the gradual shifring of population centers to the wuth on the basis of an increasing reliance on rice cultivation and a graduafly developing resistance to the more prevadent pathogens in the south,'s The increaing reliance an rice cultivation may have been the key change. Rice can yroduce more cdories per unit of l a d than any other p i n , Howwer, this production requires huge amaunts of human lahor. The hig)ler populalions made more people available to impound water for more paddy and to build dams and dikes to control water. This in eurn spread rice cultivation throughout the Slangtx Kver vdlep further inereasing population. One of the water pmjects to emerge from these efforts was the Grand Canal, which opened in 605, The canal allowed a tremendous increase in commerce beween the ecoiogicdly diEerenc Y d l m and Uangtte River v a l l q , which now included bulk goods. This facilitated hrrther development of and greatly increased the role of marker exchange inside China (Chi f 363 p3351). These changes also produced more ~ 4 t h Hence . rulers could build larger treasuries without raising the tax rate, The demand for fabor undercut the abilicy of the stare to maintain standing armies and thus made the use of ""barbarians to fight barbarians" even more acrracrive. The i n c m e in revenues made it relativeiy easy to wntirzue the use o f "bribes" and "gifts" to entice frontier nomads into alliances. However, when these armies met defeats at the hands of Koreans in 612414 (McNeil 1963,463)and of Muslims in Centcll Asia in the eighth century, revolts erupted and China's overland trade with the outside began to decrease sharply Complications arising from animosities over new religions led to proclamations closing the borders in 843-846, further curtailing overland foreign trade. The vast increase in internal trade rendered losses from

the decline in emrnal trade relatively inconsequential. Furthermore, the expansion of sea trade from southern China ports more than compensated far these losses.

South Ask The Muslim caliphares in the west (discussed later) blocked Indian trade connections with China via the Sitk Road. Only the northeat, toward what is now Nepal and Tibet, was open to the spread of Indian infiuences. For the most parr this was an era of warring petty princes in India, with none achiwing hegemony of any significant geographical or temporal extent. The seeds for animosity between Muslim and Hindu were sown, and Hinduism revived to become a domjnant retigion. Much of the seaborne trade was taken over by Arab shippers, Most important here was increasing Muslim knowledge of the monsoon cycle in South Asia. This allowed the development of overlapping circuits of trade, most of which became dominated by Muslim merchants (Chaudhuri 1985). The first voyages all the way from China to Affica and West Asia m e made in this era, alchortgh they remailled quite hazardous. The lndic system was thus importantly affected by the Muslim expansion,

WesgernAsia Two major developments oaurred in the West Asian p a t of the Gencral PMN in this era, along with one seemingly minor change, Rrst W* the gradual development of the use of large horses and armored men to fight nomads. The roots of this development go back to at least the first century B.C.E. among the Paarthians, but techniques expanded during the middle of the first millennium C.E, (McNeill 1382, 18-20; t 387, 28 IfE), This allowed the West h i a n states some control of nomad assaults and plzyed a significanr role in shifiing same of those assaults nortlzvvard toward Europe. The second major d d o p r n e n t was the appearance and spread of Islam, From the 630s on, IsIatnic religion erupted out of Arabia to conquer much of Western Asia by the mid-seventh century. By the mid-eighth century Islam had spread to the borders of China and India in the east and acruss North Africa to Spain in the west (see Map 8-51, The spread of Xslarn brought new knowledge, the r e v i d o f old knowledge, and the spread of new technologies to the west. It tightened the connectiom vvirhin the inhrmation net and mated a very large trade ecumme. The rnle of Arabs in convqing the ancient classics of Greece to Eumpe is widely acknowledged, Charles Martel, building on howledge gained in Gghts against Muslims, used mounted armed warriors in 732. This brought to Europe key technologies-large horses, ali'alh to feed them, armar Eor the men riding them, and stirrups both to make horses usable for shock combat and to aXfaw the mounted use of crossbows. All these inventions played an important role in European knighthood and feudajism.l 9

W must note that Islam was a siltglllarly eEcient "tecknique of power" (Mann 1386) for uniting faction-prone tribai peoples and small states. It also facilitated the expansion of trade in several ways. Besides the trade diaspora-ecumene aspect, the rise of Islam contributed to the emergene of the fibasid Empire, which made trade safer. And within Islam, merchants were honored instead of disparaged (as they were in most tributary systems)- Indeed, Muhmmad had been a merchant, This made it harder for rulers to confiscate the wealth of merchants by casting it as "ill-gotten," which in turn reduced the pressure for successful mefchants to use their wealth to b y titles. A seemingly minor development in the sixth century changed the demand for trade with China. Traders succeeded in smuggling moth larvae of the silkworm into Byzantium, allowing the development of local production rather than merely reprocessing of silk. As this "import-substitution" industry developed, it lowered the demand for Chinese silk, facilitating orher processes that were also undercutting trade with China. During the early part of the em, when Muslim u n i y w a strung, trade across the Sahara into West Africa began to dwelop. This eighth-century caravan trade brought gold and other sub-Saharan African goods to North Mrica and thence to Europe and West Asia. It also brought Islam to W s t M r i a . Trade and Islam cmbined with Is4 developmclnc processes to cause the rise of staces and empires in the region surrounding the bend of the Miger Kver near Timbuktu (Moseley 1992; Will& t 333).Thus did the Central PGN incorporate West Mrica, In the ninth century, under the Zlmavad Caliphate, this new Muslim unity began to break down. tinder r-be succeeding Abbasid Caliphate the uniry collay?sed into numerous wning staees. Though this did not stop trade, it cur-tailed it because it baaxne more diflieult to move go& overland through wrring states. This coincided with unrest in China, which dso currajlled trade.

Mediterranean and Northern Europe20 e less tightly incorSeveral major changes took $ace in &is region even as ir be porated into the Afroeurasian world-system. The By~antine(eastern Roman) Empire suEered setbacks on afl sides and shrank somewhat before making minor expansions in the ninth century. The West became increasingly margindized and isolated-to the south by Muslims, and to the north and vvest by hostile non-Christian societies and invading nomads. Long-distance trade declined and cities shrank. This isolation W a major factor in the development of European feudalism. Still, major technological changes took place. Oken overlooked but very important was the spread of the moidboarct plw. This simple invention did tufo important things. First, rather than simply tearing a long hole in the soil as the scratch plow does, it turns the soil over. This exposes the roots of weeds to the sun and allows the tops to compost into fertilizer. Second, since the plow only turned soil to one side, when fields were piiawed the same way year &er year the net eRect was to

pile soil toward tile center of the field, leaving tmnches beween fields, thereby buildk g an eEective drainage system. This was wry important in the heavy, wet soils of northern Europe. Though present in northern Europe very early in this era, the moldboard plow spread Erlrther after the Franh invaded. It opened new lands to cultivation as Forests were cleared for farming. By about f 000 C,E, it was used widely in northwest Ezlrspe, with the averall effect of increasing rhe canrylng capacity for human papulations. Alongside this change was the slow spread ofthe manorial economy and the me of mounted, armored men (knif5hes) to defend territories, This, too, spread slowiy but accelerated greatly under Magyar and Viking attacks in the [ace ninth century, Recently Klavs hndsborg (139 1, 15792) has suggested that Viking raiding, which played an important role in the spread of knighthood, was due to decreasing trade with Mrlslim merchants via the b i g a River route. The decline in trade lawere$. the suppiy of silver, prompting Vikings to seek it in raids on wstern European population centers. As with the ckanges in China, these changes were all cornplexiy interlinkd. Europeans introduced one change in the mounted, armored warrior: the change &om crossbow combat to shock combat used by hights, The diffusion of the stirrup was important because it enabled the warrior to stay on the horse ( m i t e 1362). The reasons i*or the shift to shock combat are uncle= but are probably related to the limiced utility of projectile weapons in heavily foresred regions, In any case, these knights were singuiar.ly &ective in combating invading, iightly armared nomads, ðer they came by land or sea. Hwever, they wre not as e&ctive along Europe's "steppe frontier" (McNeill 19641, where the absence of forests undermined their advantage and where their d e c r e ~ mobility due to weight made them easy targflrs for d highly mobile mounted nomads. Because of this, light cavalry was more prevalent in eastern Europe, and interestindy, also in Ireland (BmIett 1333, 70ff.). Knights, however, were expensive to maintain. Frankish traditions of equality slowed the spread of the manorial system often used to support knights because of resistance to the enserhent of peasants, However, when nomad attacks increased, the resistance declined and the system spread, @kg rise to what W know as the classical Eumpean kdal system. The similarly gradual spread of Christianity and the attendant spread of Latin as the official Church language facilitated continued communication and cultural unicy a m s s many warring local kingdoms, Within this system towns held a someh a t anomalous place. They w r e not parr of the growing fgudat structure, but existed more or less outside of it, Townsmen were able to play one local Xord ag&nst another to maintain independence; all lords had an interest in mainraining towns, d o s e m e r c h a n ~supplied then with luxury goods. Towns began to grow late in this em, but did not become large until sometime &er 1000 G.E. In the expansion phase of the period frsrn 600 to 1000 C.E. inccrrporation as bath wider and deeper than in thr previous era*Pgrts of sub-Sakaran Mrica, South-

The Un$cation ofAfioezlraid



east Asia, and some of northern Europe were pulled into the Mroeurasian PGN. In the declining phase the system became more differentiated. Yet within each of these areas integration became somewhat more intense, albeit in different ways in the various regions. In China, due to the labor and water requirements of rice cultivation, the borders benveen the steppe and the sown became much sharper than on the western edge of the steppes. In western Asia and in Europe the climatic zones of arable land and pasture land overlapped extensively. Hence more land was subject to dispute for use in one or the other production technique. The spread of Islam and trade contributed to sharper barriers benveen Islam and Christianiry in the West and beween Islam and Confucianism in the East. Thus, as Michaei Mann has obsefved (1386),religions as "cechiiiyues of power" are singdady effective in uniting empires, but they also build barriers beweefz empires by defining competing ideologies and identities. In Central Asia, Tibetan Buddhism played an important role in pxoducing some cultural uniy According to Christopher I. Beckwith (1987a, 7),"Of all the eEeccz of the T i b e m expansion, the most long-lasting was not primarily politicat, but rather cultural in nature," h some cases Buddhism vvas sufficienrly strongly adapted to enable the "Tangut Empire to resist the onslaught of Istarn (see also R e c h i & 1387b, l987c). While vve suspect that there w s more to it than this, the important role of religions cannot be denied, The ways in. which northern Europe became more, then less, incorporated shaped Eke course of social change there. The rise and subsequent transfclrmations of northern European social organization were intimately bound up with the chalzging intermnnections to the Afroeurasian PGN and IN. The hilure to attend fully to hose connections is the Eundarnenmi source of the inadequacies of so many expianations of the rise and demise of European feuddism,

In the fifty years before and after 1000 C.E. massive changes in Eurasia were under way. hputations in both the eastern and western ends of the Eurasian land-mass had

achieved an equilibrium with pathogenic microorganisms, and so population, economic production, and productiviry increased. Northern European towns began to be founded-or refounded--and to grow dramatically. Trade within northern Eurep and beween northern Europe md the outside world increased. f;or the first time in history some areas in norrhern Europe began to surpass Mediterranean Europe in wealth and productivity. These changes gave rise to the Eurasim wodd-system of the thirteenth century so wonderfully described by ]anet Abu-Lughod (1187, 1989). The most dramatic events of the entire era, however, were not trade and prosperity. Rather, they were the merging of most of the Mroeurasian PGN into a single politicdimilitary net via the Mongol conquests, and the subsequent systemwide depopulation~due to incursions of the bubonic plague. These epidemics contributed to the disarticulation of &is new, if ephemeral, Eurasian-wide PMN.

The Sung dynasty came to power in 970. As we have already seen, it furthered the development begun by its Sui predecessors. In this era prosperiry revived. Much of this g r w t h was fueled by the introduction of a new strain of rice that natured quickly enough to allow nnio craps a year (McNeill 1387, 327). This dowed further population growth, increased tax revenues, and increased surplus that could be traded. Though this "green revolution'' based on the new rice was the mast spectacular in terms of effects on population, it was not the only new technology. Gunpowder was discovered and put to use in siege warfare, though it was used more often in fireworks. Since the major enemies of the Chinese were nomads, there W= little use for heavy artillery, and warfare was not an art esteemed for its own sake (McNeill 1382, 330). The compaFs was in use by 1100, allowing Chinese ships to navigate more reliably on the open seas. The generat productivity of the economy is refiecced in iron production, which reached levels not attained in England until 700 years later (McNeill 1382, 2 6 2 7 ) " The Sung economy also evinced a high degree of commercialIzation. Paper money was used, and George Mod&& and William R. Thotnpsoal (1335) claim that hndratieRwaves (forty- to sixy-year business qcies) can be inferred from the sequences of economic growth m d stapation that occurred during the Sung dyna,~ty,21 There was, however, a key gap in Chinese prosperiv. Following now-ancient techniques for dealing with nomads, the Sung never controlled the north. Encfeed, the a i r a n stare ( h o w n as the Liao dynasy, 307-1 1125) ruled the north from Beijing until supplanted by the Manchuria-based Jurchens, who conquered it in 1123 and ruled until 1234, The Jurchens expanded their territory southward almost to the Yangtze Ever, They also unleashed more movexnent of nomads dong the stqpe gradient and indirectly contributed to the rise of the Mongoi confederacy led. by Timujin, known as Chinii;gis I(han.22 Khubilai, a descendant of Chinggis, conquered and became ruler of China in 1253 and founded the Viim +natty j 1260--13G8).2Typical of Monpls, he &red trade, took knowledge where he could get it, and treated knowledgeable foreigners with respect. Marco Palo, the famed Venetian merchant, served in his court as an adviser Erom 1275 to 1232. Under Mongol rule trade across the Sifk Road increased considerably, When the Mongols were overthrown and replaced by the Mings in 1368, the capital was moved to Beijing because of fears of further Mongol attacks. The need for soldiers in the north, the fear of r i d centers of p m r , a need to assert central irnperid control, and a disgust with foreigners and traders led the Mings to forbid werseas apedirions in 1424.24 They ddayed enfbrcment of the rltting so that Admiral Zheng He (Cheng Ho) could make one last voyage (1431-1433) to India and Mrica (Bentley 1333, 168-1 70; Levathes 1994. The withdrawal of the Chinese lek the Indian Ocean open to European penetration with minirnd opposition a few decades later. Had the Ct-tinese remained a more

active maritime power and continued their expansion into the Indian Ocean, their clear naval superioriry would doubtless have made it much harder for Europeans to gain a foothold in the Indian Ocean trade. This was even more the case in the South China Sea. During this era Japan's feudalism expanded. Like England in the West, Japan was somewhat protected by virtue of being surrounded by the sea. A timely storm and organized resistance allowed Japan to repulse an attempted Mongol sea invasion in 1281. This bolstered Japan$ sense of power and dampened Mongol enthusiasm for mixed sea-land ventures. Superfluous Japanese samurai, that is to say, sons of nobility without land, were further inspired to take their military prowess to the sea. Many of them became pirates preying on coastal trade as far south as Southeast Asia. This contributed to the growrh and independence of coastal Japanese towns. Still, for ail these changes, the major story of this era is that of the Mongols.

The Mongol conquest was probably the most world-changing event of this era. We follow Barfield's account and interpretation of it: "The exceptional nature of the Mongol Empire has been largely misunderstood because, as the most powerful nomadic state that ever existed, it was p ~ s u r n e dto be the culmination of poiitical evolution on the steppe rather than the exception that it was" (Barfield 1991, 48). The entire sequence W% exceptional in several ways: in Chinggiis rise to power, in the Juschen reaction to it, in the extent of the conquest, m d in the establishment of SWeral diEerent cizy-based states, including the m a n dynasry. Ghinggis rose to leatlership from a ver)r marginal position, Oftczn even his w n relarives opposed hirn.25 Consequently he did plot reIy on kinship to organisze his supporters but rather on loydty and aucacracic conml. His mrlltitribai elite was d r w n from friends and retainers: Chinggisk paolitial organization was nor, therefore, rhe culmination of a long waiving steppe tradition because it rejected the Imperid confederacy model, Instead, the Mongol state was based on the principles of centralized administration, the destruction of tribal paeterns of leadership, and a rigid discipline ta a degree previously unknown among nomads. It was a unique creation. f i e r the fall of the Mongol Empire the nomads reverted to the older and more tracfiriand imperid mnfederacy model of orvization (Barfield.


This new-s#e state then confronted a Jurchen state in norrhern China, itself a semiperipheral marcher state out of Manchuria, that refused to follow the time-honored Chinese path of appeasement. In pursuing the familiaf outer Erantier strategy of destrucriw raids to inspire appeassernent, Chinggis overplayed his hand and somewhat reluctantly conquered 1:orthern China. This, along with Chinggis's low colerance far resistance, led to vvjdespread destruction of cities and agriculturd infrastructure. It was mly with Khubilai that the Motlgals took up the resgonsibiliry of ruling northern China rather than despoiling it,

The Mongol Empire for rhe first time united most of Eursia into a single empire-dtfiough, to he sure, the merger was far from complete (see Maf, 8.6). E g p t and North Mric;l were not rnilicarity incorporafed beause of the strong resistance of the Mamlukes. Western Europe remained outside the Mongol Empire, in part because of the inhospidiry of forest zones m mounted archers (tindner 1381, 1983) as we12 as the success of bights in the forest zone (McNeill 1963, 1%4, 1982). As noted, Japan repelled aubilai's seaborne invasion in 1281 (McNeill 1982,43). Mongol success can be attributed to factoa and processes occurring at different levels simultaneously (Sarnnders I97 I ; Morgan 19886; Lindner 1381, 1383; Barfield 1389). First, the states they attacked in western his were we& and vulnerable to conquest. Their ecological adaptations were much more fragile than was the case in China. 'Ihe lvongols, u n w m of this>am&d with vigor. m e r c a s in China destroyed towns were eventually rebuilt and repopulated, in southwest Asia such destruction often became permanent, especially when irrigation sprems were ruined, Mongol aversion to l o d administration frequently left no one capable of rebuilding destroyed systems (Barfield 1989,201-202). Second, conrinual warbre made a ctient relacionship with the Mongols an attractive '%bargain," "Poljties that accepted Mongol terms (in Manchwia, ICsrea, Uighar oasa) were not d e s t r o ~ dand often kept their own leaders, Polities that continued to resist the Mongols or repudiated treaties (Chin China, wesrern TurErestan, and the Tangut kitlgdom.) were punished and oken destroyed. Ghinggis was particularly intoieranr of disloydry. Funitlve,wars "were so devastating that they led to the overthrow o f the ruling dynasties and, by default, their direct incorporation into the Mongof Empire3"(rarfield 1983, 200). This was different Erurn all preview Centrd h i m nomad conquests. In che w s r they destroyed some states and were forced to incorporate and administer others. In the east they w r e ultimately trapped $ their own vigor into founding a new dynasry in China. A third factor in Mongol success was the continued presence of pastoral nomads who maintained a flexible kin-ordered social structure that allowed them to recruit other nomads and even sedentary groups into a larger and larger machine for conquest. By choosing leaders for loyalty and performance, Chinggis built a command structure that would not easily segment along tribal lines. Fourth was the presence of several leaders who astutely balanced the drive for conquest and plunder with the needs of administration. According to Thomas T. Allsen (19871, M ~ n g k e(Khubilai's brother) was able to implement administcltive innovations by keeping conservatives occupied in (successful) battles, giving him a free hand in the center, As Rudi Lindner (1981, 1983) notes with regard to the Ottomans, analysis based on powerful leaders is not a reversion to a "great man theory" of history. Rather, it is a recognition that Mongol leadership was a form of big-man leadership (Sahlins 1961, 1163, 1368; see also Chapter 3) that was strongly shaped by an especially ompetenr leader. Specifically, Mongol leaders were able for some time to maintain a suficient volume of plunder and tribute to ensure the loyalry of tribes that might

othewise have been inclined to leave the confederation. In short, internally they perfected the outer-frontier strategy of "milking" sedentary states, even as externally they overplayed it, A fifth factor in Mongol success was superior Iagistic ability in military cosnmunication, transportation, and movement. This superioriry was rooted in the pastoral way of life: ready availability of horses, intimate knowledge of geography and abiliry to move their entire means of production (families and herds) with them. Utilizing these advantages, all the great khans-if only temporarily-were able to capitdize on their inclusive kinship structure and permeable group boundaries. Conquered groups could switch allegiance rather than die fighting a losing battle. This worked well with other pastoralists and less well with sedentary peoples. Continued expansion a l t w i a d the problem of revenue by a constant inflow of booty. It dso minimized factional rivalry and quieted objections to the changes that came with empire. Superior communications and mobiliry facilitated the formation of large armies. However, these advantages were inherent17 wflstable, and hence temposary, This instabiliry was rooted in political and technological problems. The political problem lay in the succession of rulers. A big man comes to power on the basis of his persand skills, not the least of which are diance building and warfare. Hencc sucwssion to rulerhip required dmonstrated success in fighting. For the Mongols these problems vvere exacerbared by the competing, and at times congicting, principles of lateral and lineal succession.2Vhe lack of clear priorities inevitably led to succession by arms. Institutionalization of succession would have undermined the very basis of leadership, Hence it is not simply that the Mongol Empire &led to institutionalize politicd succession (as Eisenstdt [l3633 arpes), but that Mongols could not institutionalize political succession and remain Mongols, The same problems were inherent in political c o n t d and revenue garnering. Mongol superiority in communication and mobility of warriors and resources also contribured to instabiliry, These capabilities were crucial parts of pastoral life and were awilable to all patoral p u p s and leaders, This made it iMpossiblc for any one leader to monopolix control of strategic resources as a means of ~oercirlgcompliance, Dissenters could simply fold their cents and leave with their herds. The materid basis of this situation was the adaptxion to the volatile and uncertain steppe environment. A flexible kinship system, a fluid form of leadership that can respond quickly to changing circumstances, and a pastoral economy together form a highly adaptive culture for living in a volatile steppe environment. Though this culture cvas very effective for organizing mobile armies of conquest, it also created inherent limits to expansion. It was not well adapted to the administration of sedentary agricultural production. Thus the edge of the steppe remained a permanent frontier {Lartimore 1940; Lindner 1983; McNeifl 1964; %itt&er 1334). Mongol unity, which lasted little more than a century, brought major changes. It opened a third, northern, connection benveen China and Europe, directly over the steppes, bypassing connections through what is now southern Iran and Iraq or through the Indian Ocean. The steady traffic across the steppes opened other circuits

of trade: "Gradually a north-south exchange of slaves and furs for the goods of civilization supplemented the east-west flow of goods that initially sustained the caravans" (Bentley 1923, 56). One of the most important consequences of Mongol unification was the transmission of a hitherto isolated rat-and-flea-borne disease-the Black Death, or bubonic plague-to Europe and China (McNeill 1976). The Black Death first swept through China in 1331, causing immense population losses, and through Europe in 1348, ultimately killing one-third to one-half of the population and thus fundamentally altering relations between lords and peasants. It took Europe over a century to recover. According to McNeill (1976, 132-175), the Mongol role in the spread of the plague may have also been an important cause of their own undoing. Briefly, the bacillus Errinid peitir (also known as ParreureLLa pertir) may have been moved by Mongols from Manchuria to the Central h i a n steppes, where it became endemic among native rodents. From there it was spread to both China and Europe and may well have infected many Central Asian nomads. If so, this would be another factor in slowing Mongol expansion. The spread to China in 1331 would have contributed to undermining the strength of the Yiian dynasty, which fell in 1368. Finally, this would mplain why, &r the fdl of the Mongol Empire, net migration was alato the steppe by sedentary peopla, rather &an movemencfionz the steppe by nomads. The pathologcal consequences of the Monpl coquest were dearb as dramatic as the politicai-economic consequences.

Sometime around 1000 ( 3 . ~ .Turkish tribes began moving fxom. che sleppe into various western h i a n regions, In many ways this was more important than the initid spread of Islam because the tributary empire they helped to build was so powerful (Barfield 1990)." The movement seems to have been motivated by the usual steppe gradient: factors: fierce competitors to the east, more attmaiw lands to the west. Most of the Turks accepted Islam, albeit lightly. Many Turks became cEective, if troublesome, troops for the Abbasid rulers in Baghdad. Their acceprance into the Muslim world generated a great deal of political unrest and disorganization. Still, they were a major factor behind much of Muslim expansion in this era. "Seljuk Turk filtered into Asia Minor," writes McNeill, ""and after the Battle of Manzikert (107 1) pushed the Byzantine frontier back neatly to Constantinople" (McNeill 1987, 375). This provided one justification for the first Crusade in 1096. By 1093 the crusaders captured Jerusalem and left behind a series of small states along the eastern shore of the Mediterranean. Their success was ;E; much due to Muslim poflticd disarray as to their mefforts, This W ehe only Crusade to reach Jerusalem, S d d i n recaptu~dJerrlsdenz in 1187 and dattoyed nearly all of the Frankish states. Mwlim traders spread d o ~ n the coast of East Africa and destroyed the West African kingdom of Ghana in 1096. Many Central Asian groups were converted to

Islm, and a few Muslim communities dclveloped in western China, Bemeen 1860 and 1200 Muslims nearly doubled the territory they held, In the thirteen& century much of Muslim mrritory was Bverrun by the Mongols. Baghdad wsls sacked in 1258. The Qnoman Empire was built by Turkish warriors, fn the fourteenth century the Turks crossed into Europe and dekated the Serbs at Kosavo in 1389. Though the territory influenced by Islamic religion was not reduced, the Mongol conquests shattered Mvluslim unily, and the old West Asian core region never repinecl its ymminence,

South &"a Shortly aker 1000 C.E. some Turks left -tern Asia and invaded northern India. By 1200 Mudims ruled northern India, consolidating thcir conquests in che Sultanate of Delhi f1206---1426).This brought the Indian subcontinent permanently into the Central PMN. Because these Turks wore their Islam lightly, they w r e able to make compromises with their Hindu subjects. This accommodation, along with the absence of any Mongol invasions, concrihuted to the stabiliry of this state. Why the Mongols never invaded. Tndia is not adequately explained, It would seem that the mountains and jungles were not a sufficient harrier, as indicared by Khubilaii incursion into what is now Myanmar (Burma) in the period 1283-1285. Because the Mongols used rapid postal systems built on horse relays to administer their empire., they may have redized &at these administmive techniqua would not work in tropical areas. This, along with higher mountain barriers, would have made the conquest of India less attractive, As noted, the trade across Central Asia ofFered an alternative to expensive routes through the mountains m India: on the wzy west.

Europe In the iate tenth and early cleventh centuries Sanninavia, Poland, and Hungav bee Christianized, spreading northern European influence and facilitating trade.28 As trade incresed, towns began to grow m d expand. By plqing one lord againsr another and by using wealth to purchase independence, a relatively rare form of municipal poliry began to spread throughout northwest Europe---towns that were more or less independent of any noble ruler and accustomed to self-governance.29 Towns became attractive to peasants who wanted to escape harsh conditions of serfdom on manors. Though towns offered opportunities that did not exist on the manor, they also were frequently lethal to newcomers not adjusted to diseases borne of close living. StadtIaP marhtfrei (city air makes you free) but dso sometimes dead. 'Ib some extt3nt, the availabilit). of towns as an dternative to the manor gave peasants a somewhat improved bargaining position vis-bvis nobles (Bartlett 1793). In 1204 Venetians participating in the fourth Crusade attacked and conquered Byzantium, further consolidating their control of trade in the Mediterranean. Despite the ascendancy of the Venerians, the new prosperity in northern Europe

The U~$c&tionof Afoezllrasz'a 1 183

brought population growth and moved the population "center of gravity" of Europe north of the Alps b r the first time. The Mongol conquests did not have direct efFects in western Europe. The aftermath of the conquests, howwer, was devastating in Europe. As noted earlier, the bubonic plague, spread by traders traveling across the steppe, swept into Europe in 1348, killing berween one-third and one-half of the population. As with earlier epidemics, this one returned periodically for several decades, and European population did not fully recover until sometime in the sixteenth century. European prosperity was undermined and economic and political conditions remained uncertain. The new shortage of labor led to labor scarcity and an improvement of the terms under which peacants worked, both on the manor and in the towns. Though the Mongol conquest was an exception to the steppe empirelagrarian empire pattern, ir was not an anomaly in world-systems terms: Once again a semiperipheral marcher state conquered an old core by building on its middleman trading role and militay a$vantry;es, The Mongols broke from the steppelqrarian pattern by overplaying the outer-frontier strategy. Instead of using violence to extort resources from agrarian states, they attacked too vigorously and actually conquered some surrounding stares, including China. The Mongol conquest created a single Eurasian state that encompassed all but India and a fiw peripheral and semiperipheral regions, It temporarily linked the Central and the Far Eatern PMNs in to a single Mroeurasian intmtate sysrem (recall that the Indic PMN had already been incorporated inro the Central Ph4N). However, this new multicored wortd-system was especially unstable, despite its being the most systemic of all Afroeurasian tnrorld-systems to date. The empire w a simply too large to be naintailled logistically, Foltwing Randall Gollins's "no intervening heartland rule'ysee Chapter 11, none of the potential corewide empires-the Mings, the Ottomans, or any of the Locnf states in India-could mount an expedition to conquer any of the others. Even Timur the Lame's (Tamerlane, ruled 1360-1405) rebuilt empire disintegrated upon his death, although in this case the lack of a rule of succmsion may have been a more important factor, Furthermore, the Mongals did not produce anfiing that was needed or w n t e d by the world market. Even more than most tributary ruling classes, they w r e "macmparasites'"jMcNeill 1392) d o s e wedth came from siphoning off some of the trade that traversed their terricw or from extracting tribute from agrwian empires. The Mongol clonquest did, however, bring massive change"n the economic and political balances among the constituent world-systems. China's growing lead in technology and productiviry was set back as the Mings concentrated on protecting their northern border from further nomad incursions. India was ignored and did not share in the new overland trade across the steppes. Western Asia was shattered by a series of nomad incursions that reshaped rhe states there and undermined any semblanci: of Muslim interstate u n i v Meawhile, in E w p e , growing trade began the long process of increasing the strength of rnerchaflts and financiers relarive to &at of the kings, the nobility, and

the Ghurch. The opening of n m pathways and increased favor toward mer&ants had whetted European appetites for firrther trade, and ultimately for more direct routes to the East. This was a miZjor spur to Eurvean explmacion of the globe in the following centuries. Janet Abu-Lugbod (1987, 1383, 1333) suaests that it is not so much that the West rose as that the East fell. h far as the Chinese are concerned, though, the East did not fall; they simply took their ships and went home-leaving the field open to European upstara, Abu-Lu&od (1993) notes atso that the Indian Ocean trade had not been dominated by any one trading group. Consequently the various competing traders were not accustomed to defending against rivafs bent on hegemonic control of trade. m a t do we learn about vuorld-systems from this quick rour of W O millennia of history? With respect to issues of wntinuiry and transfamation, we note similar patterns of change at the wstern and eastern ends of Moeurasi they were connected in a single system mueh eadier than many historians haw thought. Ir appears that Indian and Central Asian states did not follow the same patterns, or at least nor as closely. Both often played a middernan or bmker role in exchange berween the two core regions at the extreme ends of Eurasia, Because both China and Rame were termini of trade circuits, they m r e tightly tied to shifrs in volume and velociv of tr~de.India, however, participated in multiplc circuirs of trade-nnro for the ChinamRome trade, and smral others into Easr Mrica and Southeast Asia. South Asian trade centel-s could shift either outlets or sour~esof goods, or both, fa compensate for changes in ocher circuits and thus insulate themselves from the consequences af sharp decreases its trade along the various Silk RoaA-including disruptions from epidemics. 1ntcresting;ly the W O middlennan areas, Gentral Asia and South h i a , experienced very diEerenr, types of state formaron. The steppe confederations wcre large and short-iived, "The stafes of India w r r relatively smaiil, and the Eew large empircs that did emerge were usually not concurrent with large empires in western h i a or the Far East. It is interesting to speculate about the extreme ends of this system: England and Japan. Both are islands, insulated from land invasions. Both developed feudal systems with towns that were more autonomous from the tributasy social structure rhan was typical throughout the rest of Afroeurasia. Moreover, the timing of these developments in the nvo geographic extremes is close. If Japan had equally navigable rivers and accessible coal and iron deposits, as England had, would it have emerged even sooner as a contender for the core hegemon position in the modern world-system?30 With respect to the issue of incorporation, the history of the Mroeurasian worldsystem makes it clear that incorporation need not necessarily entail peripherdization. Incorporation was involved in the transformation of three formerly autonomous world-systems into one larger, multicentric world-system. Furthermore, components of the formerly independent systems were significantly transformed by the merger. Contact with peripheral zones sometimes transformed those zones into semiperipheral or even core zones. In the most dramatic such merger in

world history, the Mongol Central Asian periphery became for nearly a century the corewide empire of the entire Mroeurasian world-syjtem.31 Also, we must recognize that this merging of world-systems proceeded along at least two somewhat autonomous dimensions corresponding to the two nemorks that merged. The first was the trade dimension, which ranges, as noted, from longdistance trade in goods with a very high ratio of value to weight, to goods with a low ratio of value ro weight. The second was the politicdimilitary dimension of regularized political relations, which may range from constant warfare to generalized peace. These two dimensions are not quite independent because intensive warfare all but obviates trade, whereas intense trade produces a major incentive for peace. Steppe nomad raiding was an unusual combination of the two dimensions that facilitated extraction of surplus from agrarian states. If the four nets change and merge in somewhat different patterns, might it not also be the case that each net has its m ke)l inmntions (whether [email protected] by independent invention or diffusion from another source) that are either causes of or responses to major changes? Religions, such as Buddhism, Chrisrianiry, or Islam, were important innovations in the information net and represented new rechniques of ideological power. Stirrups, gunpowder, and shock combat were important innovations in the p~liticalimilita~ net. The campass was imponant in both the prestige-goods and bulk-goods net. The list could be extended. Following the reverberations of any one of these inventions would be one way of tracing the impacr of each of the newarks on the others and on the world-system as a whole.32 Imorporation of slates or of nonstate societies into the system is clearly a complex process as well, as a matter of degree-not simply a binary " i d h r "out of" the system. Curwry comparisons in the relations hemeen Rome and its peripherat '"arbarians" and China m d its peripheral "barbarians" demonstrates that incorporationeven for nonstate societies-is not a passive process, Rathel; it is one that the incnrporated peoples strive to control and manipulate. The Mongol experience, exceptional as it was, demonstrates that incorporated peoples, on occasion, m q gain the upper hand. The Mroeurasian system set the stage Eor the emergence of global tlegemony by further developing the institutions of large-scale poliricd control and the institutions of long-range trade. The developtnent of large states and empires occurred in the conrext of a trade newark that was larger than any state, Thus the politicd structure was most oken multicentric even within PMNs, and this encuuraged rulers to dlow mare autonomy to merchants. The grovving commercializatiotl of the tributary empires also was reflected in the cornmodification o f land, labor, and wedth within empires. As we have seen, the cyclical gain in scope and strength of the large-scale yrestige-goods nemorks created iocal demand Eor h o d and. basic goods and sdxnulated the bulk-goods nemorh. Though bulk-goods production remained largely for the use of direct producefs, the growth of cities created a demand for production of food for e x h a n g . In the tribumy empires the main mechanisms for ennsuring the availability of supplies for the cities w r e the coescive institutions of the state. But mar-

kers played a larger and larger mle in the later commercialized empires. h a result, thr institutiom that eventually allowed capitatism to become rhe predominant farm of accumulation in Europe were dmelaped in rhe commercialized agrarian empires, and e s ~ c i a l l yby the semiperipherai capitalist city-states, Besides the malter of the predominant- mode of accumulation, there was another major difference benveen the Mroeurasian sysrern and the Europe-centered global system that menruatly merged, Bath ,syftems were pnliricaliy. multicentric in the sense that no single stale controlled the whole system. But the Afroeurasian sysrern was mufricentric in a much more fundamental sense. The three care regions were nonconciguous and were never part of a single PMN before the rise of Eumpzan hegemony. They were integrated by prestige-goods exchange, and this had important systemic effects on all three core mgions. Bur the system was not as systemic then as it was to become Iater, when all the core regions became part of a single interacting PMN. Thus, because the nenuorks have all become global in the msdern world-system, it is much more a single system than the .Afroeurasian system ever was, Now we shdl mnsider the similarities m d diEerences among our whole panoply of world-systems large and small.

How does the comparative world-systems perspective modify our view of the modern world-system? This is our third "case study.'"mmanuel Wallerstein's interpretive hisrory of the modern world-system analyzes the emergence of agrarian capitalism out of the crisis of European feudalism in the sixteenth century and then rells the story of the s y s t e d cycles, trends, hegemonic shiks, and expansion to a global scale. Thou& we agrm wirh the overall &rust of Waflersteink analysis, our comparative perspective suggesrs a few changes. h d r e Cunder Frank and Barx). K, Gills (l 3334 argue for 5,000 years of cnnrinuity in the processes of hegmonic rise and fall, cycles of govvth and stagnation, and exploitation of peripheral hinterlands, We agree with some ofrhese contiauities, hut our spatid and temporal bounding is mart. nuanced, and we srrcsngly disagree with the assertion that no qualitative transhrmaclon of the mode of accumulation accompanied the rise of European hegemony,

Europe and the Central System Europe was composed of autonomous smal-scale world-systems urrcil the Bronze Age. The slow spread of horticulture and the Indo-European Iinguistic stock h r r l Wiest Asia resuited in a symbiosis hcween farmus and fsragers in many of the Neolithic egalitarian systems of Europe (Renfrew 1987; Gregg 1988). Bulk-goods and politicd/military neworks were quite localized, because their effects declined rapidly because of extremely dificult communications and transportation conditions, Local coreiperiphery differentiation existed between farming and foraging societies, but there w i little in the way of corelyeriphery hierarchy. Europe became linked into a weaMy connected long-distance information nenvork through down-the-line diffusion of certain s~1iscicand technologid ideas from the West Asian homeland oF Heolirhic farming societies and, later, early stares (Sherratt 193a). The bartles berwern dihsionisu (lumpers) and local autonomous development theorists (splitters) have raged mightily among those scholars who study the emergence of complcxiry in Europe. V: Godon Childe's (1936) dihsionism rnv have been somewhar overstated, though mmg of his claims have been substantiated by re-

188 /

The Egraple-Geyztercd System

cent archaeological evidence. Though the kin-based egalitarian societies of Mesolithic and Neolithic Europe did not slavishly copy inAuences from the West Asian system, they adopted many types of pottery and tools that were then produced in local and regional styles. The exposure to infiuences emanating from the West Asian core also precipitated the building of megaliths in Europe. Andrew Sherratt (1993a) summarizes the archaeological evidence for his explanation of the long-term incorporation of Europe into the West Asian Central System. Sherratt (1993a, figure 4) depicts the spread o f Farming, Rat-based pottery, copper malang, and the plow from southeastern to northwestern Europe. Some of these change were introduced by migrations, whereas others were caused by the adoption of new practices by extant peoples. These linkages were not yer strong enough ro constitute systemic interaction, and thus Europe was not truly integrated into the PGN af the Central System until the rise of Bronze-Age long-distance trade in prestige goods. During the Bronze Age regularized down-the-line trade in prestige goods (bronze, amber, etc.) linked the Mediterranean, temperate Europe, and Scandinavia into the PGN of the West Asian system (Sherratt 1993a). The linkages tightened and relaxed and then tightened more tightly during the Bronze and early Iron Plges.1 European chiefdams arose on the basis of new religious hierarchies and military organizations char used imported prestige goods as sacred symbols (Kristiansen 1387, 1931). The Iron Age broughr new agriculrural tectlnologies that further increased the productivirjr of the land. Popuiation densiries increased and trade links again strengthened [Wells t 380, 1984; Sherract and Sherratt 1331). Sherratc (1993a) conrendf that it was during the Iron &e that Europe first became integrated into the West Asian R G P j as a p d u c e r of raw malerids in exchange for the manufactured goods of the eastern Mediterranean core. The fioenician capitalist ciry-states linked the whole Mediterranean littoral by direct trade with the West Asian and Egptian empires. The rise of states in what is nowr Italy--the Ettuscans and the Romans-brought most of the rest of Europe into the Cenrral PMN and eventuaJ1.y into the Centrd BGN. Rome integrated the villas of its provinces in Europe into the Mediterranean system of food production, From &is time on, Europe was firmly part of the Certtrd System. It was never again a separate world-system, despite the fact that it was temporarily cut off from the long-distance trade by the rise of the Islamic empires. Indeed, feudal involution was mainly a result of Muslim refusal to trade with infidels. Arguing that Europe was a separate system during this period is a mistake that is similar to that of arguing that the Soviet bloc was a separate system in the twentieth century because there was little trade with the West, In both cases enmiy and c m petition had enormous systemic consequences, This is one diarence that we have with Wdlerstein's interpretation, He argues that the modern wrld-system was a separate system from the tributary empires of West Asia. His argument does not hinge on separate economic divisions o f labor based on the production and exchange of necessary goods. Rather, Wallerstein in-

The &rope-Ccntered System

1 189

vokes a diEemt criterion-mode of production-&r his contention that Europe was a separate sjstem. Though we agree that Europe developed an especidly concentrated and powerful form of capitalism, we do not agree that this means that it was a separate system. Rather, it was a subregion ofa hrgpr ryrtem throughout the period during which capitalism developed. Indeed, we cannot explain the emerging predominance of capitalism in Europe without understanding the earlier history of this larger context and the particular connections that Europe had with the larger system.

The Rise of Europe What occurred in Europe after the extremely decentralized feudalism of the later cerlcuries of the 6rst millennium C.E. was the formation of a regional core within which capitalism eventually became the predominant mode of accumulation. This was made possible by both the long development of capitalist institutions in the commercidizing Afmeurasian PCN and the particular position that Europe occupied in that larger system during the period of regiond core formation and capitalist transformation. Capitalist institutions were highly developed in the Hellenistic Mediterranean and in the Roman Empire, Capitalist markets, money, contract law, and the iw of private property wre all institutional developments that were well elaborated in Rume, The reemergence of capitalist commodiry pmduction during the European renaissance rediscovered these instimtions and made effective use of them in che construction of a strongly capitafist system. The wekness of territorial states in Europe was a knction both of the demise of the (western) Romm Empire and the Muslim blockade, This weakness of centralized states made it possible for capitdist ciy-states to burlch closely to one ianother and to develop a strong region4 system of eammodity production and commercial finance. Though the existen= of capitalist city-states was nor new, their densiry in a small region in which there were no large tributaly states was umsual. m e n larger stares did emerge in Europe they cornbined tributary logic with a d e p d e n c e on capitalism. Perry Anderson ( 1374a) has characterized the ""absolutist" European states as "feudalism writ large." Although these states used feudal forms of legitimation and organizational ideolog (the benefice and fief), the monarchs were oftm in debt to relatively autonomous merchants and financiers, Their abilities to make war on one another were constrained or bcilicated by their aGcess to resources controlled by these finaciers. The key ro the emerging of the predominance of capitalism was not the unique cultural and organizational characteristics of European feuddism 11 3744 or the "normative pacification" of Chrisiizacion of sover+nd"hderson tendom (Mann 1986). h t h e r , it was the context of European feudalism-a very decencrdized, weak tributal-y mode of ;tccumutation-embedded in the market forces of rbe aEroeurasian PGN that allowed capitalism to displace the tributary mode of accumulation. It was not the fall of the East but rather the continued strength of rributav states in West and East Asia thac prevented capitalism from becoming pre-

dominant here. Europe was in the right place at the right time to host the rise of apitalist predominance. The emerging Europeatl interstare system of small and medium-sixd sates w s stabilized by saong capitalism. Capitdist accumulation provided an important alternative source of surplus product for states, to some extent reducing the pressure for trjbutary expansion. When empire buifdcrs did emerge, the coalitions formed against them were strong, though these still involved large tributary states.2 The rise of a capitalist nation-state in a core region in the seventeenth century-the Dutch Republic---was made possible by the already-strong world market and was itself the cause of the future strengthening of international markets. Though there had been many earlier capitalist states, these had been city-states occupying semiperipheral positions. The Dutch Republic was the first nationd state with core status to be controlled by capitalists. By combining the economic policies of ciry-states with the protective capacity of territorial states, the Dutch invented a new version of state power that led the developing capitalist regional speenr in Eumpe in the seventeenth century (Taylor 1394), Once the pattern of hegemonic rise and fall had brought capitalist states to the ledership role, the chances of there being a restorxion of the tributary mode WE greatly reduced, It vvas at this point-the seventeenth-century Dutch hegemonythat capitalism hrcame &c predominant made of accrrn7ulation in t-he European subsystem. How was this transformation Gcilirated by Europe's insertion into the larger Central Sysrem?We have alrea+ mentioned that the prior [email protected] irrstitutions in Rome and China created a cultural, legal, and economic heritage that was conducive to capitalist development, fc was the weakness of tributary states in Europe, itself the consequence of Ectroyean peripheralimtio after the fall of Rome, that allowed epitalist accumulation to become so strong. The Mustirn blockage of trade with the East created reactiw culrurd solidaric). among Elrropean Christian elite5 during the time of the Crusades.This facilitated the emergence of a politically multicentric interstate sptem and atlowed Eor a relativek greater degree of marketbased international interaceion, m e n the blockade was broken, merchants, bankers, and commodity producers emerged as important players in cities and states, and they rebuilt a regional economy that embodied commodified exchange and production much more thoroughly than any other region had. China is the important case Eor comparison, A simitarly strong emergence of markets, money and commodiry production during the Sung dynasty in the tenth century C.E. was eventudly suppressed by Eke strong tributary state of the Mandarins. The abserrce of such a centralized triburary empire in Europe allowed cqitalists and capitdism co gain a strong hold on political power. What was Europe's position in the corelperiphery structures of the larger Mroeurasian system?W'e need to ask this question for each level of nemork-BGr.j, PMN, PGN, and IN-and we need to consider both coreiperiphel-~a differentiation and core/periphery hierarchy. Regarding the bulk-goods nerwork, Europe was tem-

porarily disconnected from Vest Asia during the Muslim blockade. The feudal manorial economy was based on local self-subsistence. Thus there was no larger division of labor in bulk goods during this period. When these connections reemerged, Europe had developed agricultural production that was nearly as productive as agriculture in the West Asian empires. However, European cities did not become as large as the capital cities of the Near East until the eighteenth century-not because of less productive agriculture, but because of the smaller and less centralized states. In the Central politi~dimilitar~ nework, Europe was in a peripheral position after the fdt. of western Rome and the rise of Islam. Strong West Asian states expanded into Europe, and weak European states were conquered, dominated, and sometimes forced to pay tribute to the West Asian core states. Thus there was a political-military coreiperipher~hierarchy, and Europe was in the periphery. With regard to the Afmeurasian prestige-goods net, Europe was almost disconnected during the Muslim blockde, and this disconnection reflected its peripheral position in the PMN. M e r the Mochde was brak-en, Europe rose to semiperipheral status in the Cenrrd PMN with the rise of more powerful European states. But &at was Europe's position in the largcr Afroeurafian PGN afrer the fall of the blockade? Janet Abu-Lughod (1987, 1989) and Samir h i n (1991) have portrayed the exchange of prestige p o d s among Eucopean, West Asian, Indic, and East h i a n core regions as equal exchange in the world-system of the thirteenth century. Gunder Frank (1994)has argued that Europe remained in a peripheral relationship with Ghina long afier the Eormarion of a regional core in Europe. T h i s mnrention is supported by the nature a f the goods exchanged and the egorts of rhe players in different regions to find alternatives to &is trade. As Jane fchneider (X973 has noted, Europe was importing Chinese manufactures in exchange for bullion, Chinese porcelain and silks were the main produccs that Europeans desired. Europeans searched fong and hard to find substitmm less costly than silver and gold to trade Lilr Chincse goods. American ginseng and Indian opium are famous examples. Both European and West h i a n states also engaged in i m p r r substifutim in order to avoid the costly trade with China and to make profits by selling to other nearby buyers, Sassanid Iran expanded the production of silk in the seventllenlh century (Foran 1333), and the porcelain industry w s esrablisbed in Lower Saony in the eighteenth century. Indeed, European imports af Indian cotton tutiles were a major spur to the dwelopment of industrial cotton textile manufacturing in the English midlands in the eighteenth century, another m e of "import-substitution-indus~:ridiz%ti~n." These substitutions support the notion that the long-distance trade with China was one of unequd exchange in which the Chinese were gaining greater returns. Frank contends that China was the core of the Afroeurasian wrld-system. If the exchange had been equal the Europeans and the West Asian states would not have tried so hard to c h a n g the terms. But if this was indeed unequal exchange, what was its basis! It was certainly not due to China's erercise of politicallmilitary power over its distant customers. Though European states would later exploit peripheral regions by using political/military coercion to extract surplus product, China did not project

132 /

The E~rope-Ce~tered System

military coercion across Afroeurasia. Rather, the unequal exchange was primarily due to Chinese economic and technologid s9eriorit.y. China could produce hi&ly valued goods and self them for high prices because the Westerners had no alternative sources of supply (Wolf 1982). The unequal exchange beoveen Europe and China was based on "tecchnalagical rent,"" As we saw in Chapter 8, there was a Long and complex history of information Bows throughout Eurasia. For ar least two millennia, ideas, ideologies, and information have moved back and forth across the landmass. The preponderance of movement has been from east to west. The compass, gunpowder, paper money, and even the stirrup, among many other things, came to Europe from the east. European attemps to '"self" their ideologies, especixtly Christianiry, in the cast were dismd failures. Even at the level of the information net, then, the exchange wa?j unequal and was a further motivation for European exploration. Still, these exchailges did nor form a basis for domination or exploitation. China was not seeking this trade, the Europeans were. In short, there was corelperiphery diRerentiation, but not cord periphery hierarchy. Hence European peripheraiiry had m o forms: poEiticallrnilitaryw e h e s s with respect to the West Asian care states, and technologid bachardness relxrive to some industries in China and Tndia, Bmh of these w d i t i o n s spurred Europeans to cieveinp a neur fnrm of the relationship bemeen political and economic power-a combination of the strategy of semiperipheral marcher states and semiperipheral capieaiist city-states, European arms and navd power undemenr rapid technological dgveiopment because of the extremely competiuve rdationships among che European states themselves. Further, Eumpean capitdism W= able to improve upon earlier institutional inventions-money, credit, contract law, private property, w q e labor-because the logic of tribufary accumulation vvas relatively weak. In &is sense European hegemony was another case of semiperipheral innovation and upward mobitiq, but this time it was an entire regional core that eventudly came to doPninate the other core rqions of the Mroeurasian qstcm.

The Modern World-System in Comparative Perspective What does our comparative approach tells us about the structural similarities and differences bemeen tke modern wdd-s).stm and earlier regiond world-systems? Our comparative perspective has abstracted from scale in order to observe structural similarities and diEerences, 'but differences o f scale may- be important in their own right. The modern world-system now includes all continents and all peoples-a vastly increased number of people because of the rapid population growth in the past few centuries, Do population size and territorial scale matter for the processes of social reproduction and change that are of focal importance for social science! Braudel (1975) spoke of the thirty-day world as an important limit on long-distance economic exchange relationships. By this Braudel meant that transportation and communica-

tions technology limits the size of a system to those regions that can be reached within thirty days. By this criterion the global world-system is far "smaller" than the intercontinental networks of the eie;hteexrth and ninmenrh centuries, New transportation and communications technologies have integrated the contemporary system much morr: tightly r-han were earlier systems. What about population size?Does it matter for the logic of social structures whether or not a system contains 10,000people (as northern California did) or 5 billion! Some have contended that normative regulation requires face-to-face interaction. If this is true, the number of people that can be integrated by normative regulation is necessarily few. Politidimilitary integration requires only the knowledge of sanctions, and market integration requires only the knowledge of prices. That is allegedly why these modes are much better for integrating large numbers of people. There may be some truth to these assertions. But the development of mass media as well as new (and cheaper) forms of communication has undoubtedly decreased whatever scale [email protected] mxket and pditidhilirary integratinn have over normative integration.5

iterations in the Modern System We will now apply the model of iterations (see Chapter G) to the conrernpmry global world-system. In Chapter 10 we will consider the relevance of the iteration model to the emergence o f predominant capidism in the Mroeurasian system. The iteration model involvrs population growth, enviranmental degradation, popdation pressure, emigation, circumscriptiun, confiict, hierarchy formation, intensification, and hrrher population growth (see Figure Gel). Most of these terms are the same ones we use to describe the modern world-system, except for intensification, Xntensification refers to changes in the technology of groduaion that involve greater efGciencies in the use of labor, land, or other scare resources. h p i d y growing population densiy an all continents constra_insthe possibilities Far emigrarion as an alternative to new structurd innovations, The last ErontiersAntarctica, the seabeds, deserts, and ourer space-are costly environmenrs that may yield some resources but almosr certainly vvill not swtain new Large popularions economicdly. This means cl-tar both crzvironmental and social circumscription are wen more importmt concextud stimulants to transformation in the modern system than they have been in earlier regiond spcems. Furthermore, though. some tribucuy states (such as Rome) needed to expand in order to survive, capitdism intensifies this systemic feature to a new level. The redization prohlem is the need to expand markets in order to redizc. the profits o f more and more mmrnodicy production. Capitdism handles this by geographical expansion, by commodi$ing more and more aspeccs of Life, and by paring some workers , expansion of the more so that h e y can purchase additional p r o d u c ~ Geographical capidisr syswm has reached global limits. Gommodificacion and Keynesimism still have room for expsiort. But these eventudly will constrain capitdist expansion, which in turn will exacerbate further the contradictions of capitdism,

Environmenraf degradation continues to push new technological innovations and to exacerbate population pressure. W have dready argued that the spatial scde of envimnmend degradation increases with the size of the system. Once the system has become global the possibilities of escape from ecological ruin are greatly reduced. Global industrial development wrecks the environment on a globd scale, where% earlier intensiftcarion wrecked it on a more local or regional scale. Since the modern system is global, it is even m m cifcumscribed than earlier SFterns wre. f i s t earlier system could expmd spatidly in order to resolve internal contradictions. Most contained more than one noncondguous core region. We contend thar the modern world-system has only one care because the interactions among geographically disrant core states are much denser and involve a single global BGN. Thus a possible future rise to hegemony of the northeast Asian region m u l d be an instance of mobility occurring within a single glob4 core rather than the rise of a new unconnected core region. This is very different from the kind of leapfrogging dwelopment that: occurred in earlier syscems. Circumscription constrains the modern world-system to salve its contraciictions within itselE Muttistare systems are not unique to the modern system. Indeed, dl the earlier state-based 13MNsconmined more than one state in their core regiom. But the modern systgm is diEerent in its average degrer: of palitid dc~erttralizationin the core. The diEerence bemeen the earlier oscitlatiion bemeen interstate spterns and "universal states" and the modern rise m d fdl of hegemonic core powers is one of the most important qualitatix changes that differentiate the modern world-system Erom earlier state-based ystems. The continuing stabiliry of the Sn,terr;tatesystem in the Etrropct-centered worldsystem is based primarily on the &cts that the institutions of capitalism have on the process of the rise and hll of hegemonic core powers. Capiraiist commodity production allows owners of capital to accumulate wealth by the production and sale of commodities. This Earm of ac.cumulation has different implications for the acrivities of states than does che tributary mode of accumuhtion, in which politid organilation itsetfuras the most central institution &at facilitated accumulation. In societies dominated by the tributary mode, the state and state-enforced monopolies and relations of production (serfdom, slavery, helotry, etc.) are used to gather tribute andior tmes. If markets and commodiry pmduction exisfesd, t h y were usualb articulated with and dominated by the logic of political competition and state-based coercion. Success in such a system goes to those who are best able to organize institutions of politicat power and coercion. Real capitalism has not been a system in which state power is abolished or in which states never interfere with market forces. bther, it is a system in which the most successful competitors use state power to facilitate capitalist accumulation. This does not mean that tmation m d tribute are abolished but rather that: they are utilized to support the search for profit-m&ng opportunities in the world market. The capitalist state is not a state that is uniformly controlled by capitalists, nor is it a state that never interfefereswith rrrxket forces. The most successful states, those that

The Earope- Cencev~dSystem

I f 95

have become hegemons, ofren use state-based coercion both to reproduce the institutional basis for capitalist accumulation and to extend the opportunities of national capitalists to make profits abroad. The "ideal" of the iairsez+ire state has never existed except as a political ideology that one group of capitalists has used against an older group with more state-supported privileges. Even the most successful capitalist states have systematically used state power to create and sustain conditions for profitable accumulation. Free trade is the ideology of successful hegemonic powers who have a significant comparative advantage in production costs. But to get to that position ever/ upwardly mobile country has engaged in protection of those strategic industrial sectors that would otherwise perish from the competition of imporrs, We do not contend that every state in the Eurspe-entered worfd-economy has been a capitalist stare. Rather, we argue that the logic of capitalist accumulation has become increasingly significant as a determinant of state policy and that the most successful srares have been the oncs that h m bent sate power to the purposes of gain through production, trade, and finance. A relevant distinction that is often made in histories of the European interstate system is that bemeen s t ~ &at a pursued a "continentaI'>oklicy and states that purswed a "maritime'>pOIic)r (Fox 1971, 1931). Thus trenie, Portugd, the Nether-lands, and Britain are said to have used their naval power at the behest of international trade, whereas the Wltpsburgs, France, and Germany often engaged in a policy of attempting to conquer neighboring territory, The ""continental" strategy can in some bvays be understood as a throwback to the tributary mode of accumdatiun, an approach that was successful in transfoming many precapitdist system into corewide empires. The most successful states in the modern system have not pied to create a c~rewide empire, This is a major difference from precapitalist systems that requires expianation. The three hegemons (the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United Scares) have acted to suppan and maintain the interstate system, even during their periods of decline. The challenges to the interstate system have come from certain other upwardly mobile stares trying to aggrandize their standing by t&ng over other core states, Why are the strongest stares in the modern world-system-the hegemons-uninterested in conquering other core states? Part of the reason is that these are the most capitalist states in the sense that the ruling classes that control them gain and sustain their w e d ~ hprimarily &mu$ commodiry production. Freedom of: trade and the ability to move capital from less profitable to more profitable investments are very important to capitalists. The inrerstate system allows for capital mobiliry and prevents a c~entrdizedg o b d state &m exerting politic4 control over invt.stment decisions. The interstate system is thus a necessary structural basis for the capitalist mode of accumulation (Chase-Dunn 1983). It is not hard to understand why a rising hegemon supporcs the interstare system, but what about a declining one? Why is it that a declining hegemon that still has a preponderance of military power is not tempted toward corewide empire building

when other core powers are gaining a competitive advantge in production? Indeed, a number of observers have noted that declining hegemons do try to prop up their position by expmding more resouras on arms, a response that often simply exacerbates their economic dedine (Thomyson 1988; Goldstein 1388; Kennedy 1388). But a military buildup is not necessarily an effort to conquer other core states. It is striking that no modern hegemon has ever undertaken a course toward direct global rule, despite the opportunities that existed following world wars in which more aggressive stares have been defeated. The most important reason for the lack of interest shown by declining hegemons toward corewide empire is that the itlstitrltions of internaciotral capital investment ohen make it possible for the dominant capitalist groups within dedining hegemons to spread their capital into regions that have higher ral-es of profit. These 'Ynternattond" capitdiscs then no longer have such a vested interest in the home economy, But they have a strong interest in maincaining the multicentric interstare system. This also is part of the explanation for the vacillation of declining hegemons on Tariffprotection and a rationalimd national industrial policy, With their capital now invested where profits are higher, in other states and in international finance, the capitalists wihin the hegemon are uninterested in either world political damination or costfy efirts to rehabilitate the dedining national economy of the hegmonic state. This is one of the main reasons that hegemonic dedine is not reversible. Regarding conflict, warfare occurs a h o s t constantly in the madern interstate system, but there is a fiftr-year rise and fdl of the srveriry of wars among core staces (Goldstein 1988). h h e r than occurring during pe~iodsof economic stagnation, the most intense period of core war usually occurs near the end of a period of relatively rapid economic growth when states have greater resources available for war making. World wars are the arbiters of hegemonic transition, as they were in earlier state-based systems. Durirlg periods in whicln there is a strong hegemonic core power there tend to be fewer and less intense wars, a state of affairs called "hegemanic stabiliq.." The discussion of intensification in the iteration model refers ta the invention and implementation of new technologies of production. There is general agreement that capitalism revolutionizes technology much more quickly than state-based systems because it provides strong incentives for producers to produce more efficiently. When price competition is an important determinant of production [email protected] and the final price of a product, an entrepreneur who can produce and sell that product more cheaply will take a larger share of the market. But we know that the conditions of pure price competition are actually somewhat atypical within "real" capitalism. Monopoly and oligopoly are much more often found in both input and final goods markets. Yet capitalism indisputably does revolutionize t e c h n o l o ~much more rapidly than did earlier modes of accumulation, and the rate of technological change has itself changed radically over the past 400 years. Why is this so? First, the idea of incentives to producers does operate to a greater extent than it did in earlier systems. Despite a number of nonmarket influences on prices, the op-

eration of market forces in the modern warid-system is indisputably much grealer than in earlier systems. Though the "competitive sector" of small firms is usually less than one-hdf of the economF it serves as an important source of motivation for individuds and firms. The idea that you can get rich bp inventing a berter mouse trap undoubtedly stimulates a great deal of innovation even if it is rarely the inventors hemselves who are the big winners on better m o w traps. Monopoly capitalism continues to rwolutionize technology because even though market regulation of prices is weak, large companies compete for market shares by introducing new products and variations on old ones. This competition through product innovation is a major force behind large cxpendimres on research and dwelopment. The Weberians see capitalist developmmt as a gcneral process of rationdiation and bufeaucratization. Capitdism develops farms of calculation such as capitat accounting that make it possible to determine much more precisely the profitabiliry of different activities. This encourages technological change because it improves the abiliv to catculate e a c i e n q and to evduate h r n a t i v e methods of prrxtuction. The problem with this approach is that it equates the rather peculiar socid, political, and economic institutions that have historically caused industridization with a timeless "rationdi~."It relegates ctaims about the injustices that have mompanied these institutions to "irrational" or ""pimodid" concerns about values. Weber and most Wlreberiaas assume that rationdiry works best when it is undertaken by individuals or firms seeking to maximize their own returns, The identification of capitalism with rationalicy and the equating of collective needs or claims of injuscice with irrarionaliry is a much too convenienr support for the conclusion that capitalism is the best of all possible worlds, If collective interests we incalcufable and democratic planning is impossible, then the best that can be done is to allow people to vote with their dollars. Never mind that so many have so few of these votes. The pariticd structure of global capitalism-the interstate system-does not guarantee monopolies at the level of the w r f d market. The world market is very dye n m i c and competitiw in almost all industries despite the existence of oligopolies within states. States as well as fims are, competitors for world mariket shares, and states are increasingly becoming major investors in research and development of new technologies Eor the production of p o d s for the wrld market. What is new about this is the diren involvement of states in the dwelopment of new products for sale. Much older is state sponsorship of military research and development. As Charles Tilly (1990) has so persuasively shown for the European states, states made war and war made stares. Military technology has been changing for 2 million years, but a geometric increase in the destructiveness of weaponry has accompanied capitalist industrialization. William McNeill (1982) argues that this is because industfiaiization proJuces more walth, and thus states have more resources, and so they do what they have always done (arm and make war), but now on the larger scale that has been made possible by industrialization, Capitalist industrialization has resulted in a number of socid trends that have greatly increased the rate of technological change. Some of these have been due both

to the ways in which people have resisted capitalist dwelopment and to the will of capitdists themselves. Mass eduation is an important srructusal basis of tecftnoiogic d innovation, State expenditures on m m education have developed in response to the needs of capitdists for skilled wrkers and the demands of citilxlns to acquire marketable skills. The consumerist culture of capitalist societies is a major mechanism for inregrating middte classes into the apitalist ""success story." The expansion of mass consumption has been the partial result of the "realization problem" by which capitalists need egective demand for the commodities they produce>d ~ the d partid resuIt of polkicd class struggles in which certdin groups of primary smor and middle-class vvorkers have obtained higher incoma, especially in core societies, Tkis kind of income rcdistribucion in core countries has spurred technological change in consumer industries as firms compete for marlret shares throu& product innovation and built-in obsolescence. This kind of ccchnologid revoiut-ion is only '"Ecieenc" (and profirable) as long as environmental costs are externalized. This in turn depends on the maintenance of an appropriate political structure. 'While many of the problems crated by this kind of consumption are g o b d in extent, the interstate system and the coxelpiphery hierarcfty m&e coordinated solutions difficult, Capitalism not only provides the resouxces for vast core-stace expenditures on military technology f m d reinforces t-he structural need for Enilitary competirion), but it also produces resources Eor the expansion of technid and scienrific pursuits. Such expenditures obviously spur technological innovation and p l q an important role in the competition among core firms and states for shares of the world market. The "Japan Incorpmated"' model--in which state expenclitures on educarion and science are coordinated with a nationat industrial policy designed to citpture a large share of the hture wad$ market fsr the most profitable commodities-has become the exemplar of rational state capitalism, "Intensification" often leads to a new round of population growh, and this begins another revolution of the iteration wheel, In the madern world-system the relatianship also works this way, but it is complicated by what has become known as the demographic revolution. In the most developed wuntries the birth rate has declined because parents have been able to provide for their children without requiring the children to do immediately productive work. The shift toward a labor-free childhood has caused children to become economically costly to parents, and so the number of children that each couple bears has decreased. In less dweloped countries, where the shift to a culture of nonworking children has not taken hold, children continue to be an economic aset, and so the number of children in each family remains high. Public health megsures have lowered mortaliry rates. The consequent population explosion in peripheral and semiperipheral countries is well known. In a long-run comparative perspective it is the periphery that illustrates the typical relationship beoveen technological change and population growth, whereas the demographic revolution in the core is unique, at least in its extent. But since the majoriry of the population remains in noncore countries, the overall result is that the global population is

The Ear~pe-Cmtered System



rising, and this is leading to many of the consequences that population growh has led to in the pat-pressure on natural resources, pressures for migrarion, md circumscription, The rapid increases in agricultural productiviry over the past XQO years have altowed food production more or Iess to keep pace with rapid population expansion, but many observers (e.g., Meadows, Meadows, and Randers B92; Worldwatch 1994) daubr that the rate of increase in agricultural, productivlry can be sustained for many more decades, Thus the classical force of population pressure on food supplies is likely to visit the modern world-sysm with the same ~ n e r a patl terns that earlier sptems experience onflict and pressure for a new form of hierarchy formation. Before we further exmine possible futures, W will shifi from case studies to a farrnd comparison of world-systems and our tentative conclusions regarding the probIem af systemic transformations.

In this chapter we generate tentative conclusions on the basis of comparisons of small and large world-systems, We consider the diEexence sysnm size makes in the relative population sizes of the various interaction neworb, and we summarize the w r k of others on the expanding bouadaries of che Central PMN and PGN. VVe discuss those general processes that seem ro operate in all or most world-systems: pulsations of nemork g r o d and contraction, the rise md fall of larger polities, oscillation bemeen political and market-based brms of accumulation, rurd the emergence of more unequal and mom stable cordperiphery hierarchies. We review comparisons of urban growth and changes in the size of empires in several difgerent PMNs, These comparisons shed light on hpothesized periods of growh and stagnatinn. Fmthermore, they support rhe claim that important ystemic processes IinEred distant regions much earlier than has typically been accepted. We also discuss some additional insi&w: that our comparative approach produces about the ways in which the modern wdd-system is similar or different from eaxiler systemsTrue cross-world-system raearch wodd require comparable data on ten or more of each of our ten world-system ypes, Such a "smple" would dfow us to exmine systematically propositions about similarities and differences across systems and to measure the ""typic;J""parameters of diEerem kinds of systems. Since wrld-systems have become fewer as they have become larger, we do not have, for instance, ten capitdist vvodd-ecsnornies to compare, Hence we must advance tentative generalizations on the basis of the patchy widence of those case studies and comparisons that have been done. We begin with a discussion of system size and a table of hypothetical "average" nemork and poliry sizes.

Size Our structural approach to studying world-systems abstracts from population size and territorial scale to compare the structural patterns of very small systems with very large ones. We orpect that the r&tive sizes of the interaction networks within a system will vary in different kinds of world-systems. Thus we discuss the "typical"

sizes of different kinds of world-systems to develop hypotheses about the variations in the relative size of the different interaction nemorks. Table 10.1 shows rough estimates of "typical" population sizes of types of polities, bulk-goods neworks, intermarriage networki, politicallmilitary nenvorks, and prestige-goods and information nenvorkr across world-system types.' The numbers in Table 10.1 are hypothetical averages for the universe of world-systems of each type. Though we hypothesize a central tendency for each type of world-system, we expect that considerable variation within each type is likely to be systematically related to the dwelopmentd trajectories of panicular systems. We further note that all interaction nerworks expand and contract, or pulsate, with respect to both their spatial extent and the number of people that are linked. F u r t h o r e , rhe relative sizes of digerent n e w o h nay diEer accordinf: to the prior developmental history of each system. For example, those simple chiefdom systems that have never been through a phare of complex chieftainship may differ significantly in terms of the size of their trade nenvorks from those simple chiefdoms that have dwolved from former prestige goods-based chiefdoms (e.g., Friedman 1982).Such complications must be subjected to careful cross-world-system research, but for now the following centrat tendencies are our best hypotheses. The kypothesi~dpoliry sizes are Eor the rypically hrgest polities in each system. As wrld-systems have become larger, the diEerent interaction nemorks have converged in terms of both population size and territorial =tent, and simpler systems have been either eliminaled or integra~dinto larger, more complex, and more hierarchical systems. Again, Table 1Q.I is heuristic, not definiti~;it suggests questions for comparative research.

From Many, One Another way of comparing world-systems is to map spatiocempordiythe boundaries of different systems as they merged to become the global modern world-system. Because of his pioneering work in comparing world-systems, we adopt David wlkinson's (1987b, 1991) work on the expanding boundaries of regularized political/military interaction ncnvorks. All states dnd regions that are regularly engaged in either military conflict or alliance with one another are part ofthe same PMN. Using this rule, Wilkinson produced a chronograph, reproduced in modified form in Figure 10.1. This shows how twelve PMNs containing cities and states were engulfed by what we calt the Centrd PMN.2 The Central PMN was formed in the merger of Mesopotamian and Egyptian PMNs about 1500 B.C.E. Wilkinson, working from the comparative civilizations tradition, excludes systems that do not have cities larger than 10,000 in population, and so the PMNs of stateless and ciryless world-systems are not included in Figure 10.1. If they had been included, each of the tributary branches of the Central PMN vvauld be cornposed of several smaller branches that came tagther at an earlier tine, The result would resemble a system of creeks and smaller rivers converging into a main Large river-the Central System.

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mG),%9Qe0_333 r-1NWESOO ooo E

c " N N


FIGUW 10.L. The Incorporation o f Twelve PMNs into the Central PMN, (Mer Wilkiinson 198"7,32)

The chronograph in Figure 10.1 shows whcn the several separate PMNs became intepatd into the Cenrrd PMN. Our Figure 10,X is based on Wilkinson's 0387b, 32) chronograph, but it digers in some details, Our f i p x e shows the emergence in Norrh America of an early state-based politicallmilitary nemork, rhe Mississippian PMN, centered at CaEioka (East St. Louis). WiXknson (1392, 86) is unsure of whether the Mississippian PGN was separare or was x northern extension oiF the MElxican PGN.3 Wilkinson (X 392, 1333a) has dso designated the spatial boundaries of larger Uoikumenes,f'4or trade n e w o h , and the points in time at wtaich they merged, These correspond to the prest-ige-goods newarks of out multicriteria ap-

proach to spatiai boundaries, lf w e were co rrdraw Figure 1Q. L using the Loundaries of oikumenes it would look quice similar, though the dates aforlg the left margin would shik down because regiom w r e always linked by trade earlier than they were linked by politicalimilitary interaction. For example, the linkage of the separate Egptian and Mesopotaim PMNs into the same prestige-pods trade nemorlc occurred before 2250 ~.C.~,,hwhereas their mager into a single PMN (shavvn in Figure 10.1) did not occur until 1500 B,C,E. We do not choose to d l eirher the PMN or the PGN the "realY~wurld-system. Rather, we have argued that the whole ("real") system, from the perspective of any one place, consists of at1 the nested newarks that inzginge upon that place. Typically the integrarion of two separate world-sytems occurs in stages. First they make contact via dowti-the-line information flaws, Then their PGNs touch. Later their PMNs merge, and aker that their separate BGNs come together. Figure 10.2 illustrates how this looks when we consider the puisating expansion and merging of two wd-systems-the Central and the East Asian s)rsrems.~As in the &monograph in F i g u ~10,l, time moves down the vertical axis and both the Central and the Eastern vstems becsme larger. The PCNs of each systexn come into contact first and then retract as both systems pulsate. The PMNs join epistxtidtp in the Mongnt Empire and then separate again, not to be rctjoined until the nineteenth century.

m a t are the common ctclvelopmentai pacterns that can he observed in all sedentary wrld-systems, including very smdl-scak systcms composed of sedentary foragers as well as the contemporary global political economy! All world-systems pulsate in the sense that the spariai scale of integration, erpeciaNy by trade, becomes larger and then rmallpr again. During the enlarging phase, trade network, grow in territorialsize and becolme rn0l.e dense in terms of the frequenq of transactions.7 During the declining phase, trade slackens and local areas become less connected and reorganize around se16suficiency. Local identities and the culturd distinctions b e m e n local groups and outsiders are emphasized. The point here is that all world-systems undergo these sequences of expansion and contraction, even very small, egalitarian ones. In the next section we discuss a pattern that is widespread but not universal--the rise and fall of large core polities. That pattern, it seems, does not occur in egalitarian world-systems. We have found no archaeologicd or ethnographic reports of cycles of increasing and decreasing size of polities among sedentary foragers. Rise-and-fall patterns are definitely present in systems composed of chiefdoms. But pulsation occurs in all systems. In systems of sedentary foragers, trade nerworks are institutiondired as down-theline exchanges of gifts among local leaders. Goods move long distances, but &ere are no long-distance traders. In northern Caiifornia (Chapter 7) we saw archaeological midence for pulsation cycles as the rise of one d e nenuork, its dedine, and the rise of a nnu, larger trade nework. Thornas L. Jackson (1992) links the declines to periods of

"iodization" in prehistoric California. Similar sequences have been noted in the late prehistoric Great Lakes region of No& America (Milner 1991) and in Mesolithic Europe (Price 199f ). David Wilkinson's (1932, 1393a) specification of trade nemork boutdaries includes several instances of contraction. Eor example, in 1200 3.C.E. the Centrd PGN had retrwted from both its eastern md its western limits, India w a no Longer connected by m d e to the old core region in watern Asia, nor was the western Mediterrmean (wfkinson 1332, 66). This w a an instance of pulsation-waves of territorial expansion followed by either slower expmsion or actual spatial contraction, wlkinson notes the irnportant trade beween Wan China and Rome, but he does not consider the Qntrd and East h i m PGNs to have been linked until 1522 C.E. We contend &at these WO PGNs were syftemidly linked during the Rornan and Han e m p i ~ s but , that this connection weakened and broke and then was reesrablished in the midde of the first mlllennizlnn C.E. (see Chapter 8). This W% another instmce of pulsation. In rhe modem world-system we have had the crisis of che seventeenth century and periodic waves in international economic integration followed by dedines of trade , now-g(obal system also continues to unand emphasis on nationd a u t ~ bThis dergo spatial expansion and contraction despite the fact that it encompasses the whole globe. Prwures for the exploration and exploitation of the seabeds, the moon, and outer space obviously vary conjoindy with economic cycles. All world-systems undergo pufsation.

All hierarchical intersocieta systems go through sequences of centrdizarion and decentrdiarion of economic, political, and socid povver, That is, they rise md M,By rise and fall we refer primarily to changes in the distribution of power among interacting polities r&r than tlre degree of hierachy chin policies, l n t e r d tziera&y may vary indegmdendy or in opposition to the distribution ofpower a o n g polities. For example, semiperiphed mar&er states chat canquer older core and crate cormide empires are often origindly less stratified than the older core states hey conquer, Like sratcs, chiefdams emerge in secs in which chiefly pafities interact md cornpete with one another; these inrerchiefdom vrems exhibit a pattern of rise and fdl in which the rerritorial and population size of the l z g a t polities rise and then decline (Sahlins 1972, 144-148; Mann 1986, chap. 2; Friedman and Rowlands 1377).8The dynamics of this sequence in "ystems cornposed of chiefdoms, in which power is orgmized around hierarchid lrinship relations, diEer in important ways from the dynaxnia of rise and Eall that operate in systems composed oftrue states. Some chiefdoms develop techniques of power that supplement and go bvond the maaphors of hierafchkal kinship, Thus single policies become able to exercise cantrol aver larger areas, and the interaction neworb composed of these larger scat= grow larger and more ddensely interconnected.

Cross-System Compartjons 1 267

The sequence of the rise and fall of states occurs in all known interssystems. In some the competition among a set of states wirhin a single core region of a worldsystem takes the form of the rise and fall of hegemonic core powers, a process that we know well in the modern world-system. In others, and more frequently, the cycle of political centrdization/decenrrai.imtiontakes the form of the alternation between an interstate system and what David wlkinson (1987b) has called a "universal state," or approximately what Immanuel Wallerstein calls a "world-empire." A universal state or world-empire is a core region that has been brought under the control of a single state, whereas an interstate system contains a number of competing states within one contiguous core region, Wilkinson (1992, 54) designates periodizations of interstate systems and universal states for eleven state-based PMNs. His chronograph of rise and fdl shows that all the urbanized PMNs he has studied have dternated back and forth bemeen centrdized and less centrdiwd political stmaures. In addition to these cycles of the rise and Eall of large politia, tbere is a longrun trend toward the increasing size of polities and the decreasing number of autonomous polities on Earth (Carneiro 1978). Rein Taagepera's (1978a, 2 978b, 1379) studies of changes in the territorial sizes of the largest empires over the pasr 4,000 years dcmonstrare the cycles of political centrdization and decentratizatian and the occsiond sttrplike increases in poliry size. The combination of the Iongterm trend of increming size of polities G-th the mediurn-term process of political c e n t ~ d i ~ a i o n / d e ~ e n t ~ d is i ~illustrated a t i ~ n in Figuxe 10.3. T e e p e r & studies show that the size of the largest empires on Earth o d l a t e d up and down for long periods and then jumped up in r q i d rises &at corresponded to the wide mnquestz; by those semiperipheral marcher states that crated empires across whole core regons, Webknown examples arc: the i m Empire, the hsyrim Empire, Alexander's conquests, and the Koman Empire, Figure 10.3 is a simflifred and idealized model based an Taageperak studies of the terrirarial size of the largest states and empires and on Carneiro's (1378) discussion o w e long-term wolutionary trend from many mall polities to few large ones, Figure 10.3 shodd not be read to imply that m e q system fsllowed this pattern. Rather, this patrem is the result of plotting the largest systems on Ear& over time on the same gaph. Some systems never formed hierxchi r exampk, the se&ntav foragers of California. Orhers rose and then declined and never rose again. Friedman's (1982) model of Melanesian systems understands them as former prestigethat devolved into smaller and less hierarchical polities when trade so dense that hierarchies based on monopolizing imporu could no longer be sustained. Even though some individual systems do not wince the riseand-fall panern, many experienced it repeatedly. Only a few undenvent the qualitative leaps in polity size indicated in Figure 10.3. These are of interest not only because they changed the spatial scale of states and empires but also because they are assodared with the devebpment of new techniques of power that dlovved rulers to extract r a o u r ~ over s a much broader territory;

Undoubtedly the strategies of players at the different size levels in Figure 10.3 are qualitatively different. For example, the strategy appropriate to the creation of a compla: dtiefdom is quite different from those that would function to create an empire out of separate states or to consolidate hegemony over other core stares in the modern world-system. There are also qualitatively different strategies that work under difFerent circumstances in the same warU-gx~cmppers, Thus Fried(1382) notes that prestige-goods systems allow for the creation of complex chiefdoms when long-dis~nceh a d irfimibte but that a very different strategy is necessary in regions in which regularized long-distance trade beween quite different polities is more cosdy and therefore irregular or lacking. According to Friedman (1982) this explains why prestige-goods chiefdoms emerged in Melanesia and western Polynesia (where inteclrchipelago trade was more feasible), h e r e % ia estem Parynesia and Hawaii w e r e long-distance trade was much more difficult) large and hierarchid polities had to rely on the ability of the chiefly dass to control acass m land an3 other resources.9 Btanton et d, (1993) h v e a n d p d WO distina strategies that interacted in the dmlopment of the Mesoamerican wdd-system. Certaidy there we diEerent strategies that are appmpriate to the rise of hegemons in thc:modern world-sysrern.10 h d r e Gunder Frank and Barry K. Gills (13334 have b d t upon the w r k of b j s a Ebolm and Jonathm Friedman (1982) to conceptudize m d study the sequences of palitid centrdization and decentrdimtion that have occurred in the C e n t d System over the past 5,000 years, This =quence is vvelt-hown to studenes of politird histov as the rise and fall of empires, The sequence of political centrdizarionldecentEalizaition is a prime a m p l e of a continuity bemeen the m&rn worldsystem of the past 500 years and the earlier Central System. Indeed, wen chiefdombased world-systems exhibit a somewhat similar pattern. But these processes also wince important differences in various kinds of system. Both chiefdom systems and state-based systems became centralized through military conquest, but the polities erected by chiefiy conquerors relied on kinship alliances in order to implement regional control, whereas states made use of speciali d , non-kin control institutions. This is a major reason why state-based empires were able to incorporate larger territories and populations than chiefdom-based polities did. In the modern world-system the pattern of political centrdizationldecentrdization takes the form of the rise and fdl of hegemonic core powers. This is analpidly similar to the rise and fall of empires, but the dfirenre~aw imponmr. In the process of empire-formation, a "rogue powerm-most often a semiperipheral marcher stare-onquers the other core smtes to form a universat state or a ""vvorld sate," Well-known examples are the Roman Empire and the Han Empire. Wallerstein juxtaposes the political structure of the modern world-system (an interstate system of competing states vvirhin a single economic &vision of l&or) with a l i e r uworld-empires" in which the economic division of labor allegedly came to be encompassed by a single state.l 1

In reality there have been no whole economic divisions of labor in which a single state encompassed the entire division of labor. Even the largest of states have traded both bulk and prestige goods with their neighbors. There have been many large stares that managed to conquer all or nearly all of the adjacent core region, however. This is the peak of pafiticd wntrdization in such system. It is convenient to conceptdize centrdization and d~entralizationas two ends of a continuum, Thus there have not been true "world-empires" in the sense that a single state encompassed an entire trade nemork: (either a PGN or a BGN). bther, the so-cdled world-empires have a relatively high degree of control over a relatively large proportion of a world-system. The term we prefer, because it is more precise, is corewide empire. This more exactly indicates the structure of precapidist world-systems and usehuiy contrasts that structure with the nature of empires that have existed in the modern world-system-colonial empires. Both the capitalist and precapitalist world-systems have had colonial empires (in which core states conquer and dominate peripherd q i o n s ) , but the modern (capicdist) world-system has not had carewide empires, State-baed world-systems prior to the madern one oscitlated bemeen corewide empires and interstate systems. In some regions the decentrrzfimtion trend went so fix as to break the system up into ministates, Thus feudalism may be understood as a very decentrdized form of a state-based symem. Figure 10.4 illustrates the structural diEerence bemeen a corewide empire m d a hegemonic core state. In the modern wrld-system rhe cycle of palitid centrdizationl&cendizarion takes the Parm d r h e rise and M1 of hgernonic core powers, As we noted in Chapter 3, the hegemon is the most powerful. state in the system, but it nmer takes over the other core states, This is not merely a systematic diljFerence in the degree of peak political concentration, The whole nanrre of the proass of rise and fdf is dif-ferentin the modem world-system. This structurd diEet72nce is primarily due to the reliatively much grearer importance &at capitalist accunsdation has in the nnodiern. system.

The Long Rise of Capitalism As we argued in Chapter 9, capitalist accumulation-the appropriation of surplus value from the production and sale of commodities--is not unique to the modern wodd-system. Frank (1993a, 1393b 1994, 1995) is correct to note that this kind of activiry existed well before the sixteenth century. But existence is not predominance. Coxnmodified forms of wedth, land, goods, and labor &sted a ~ became d more impoMnt over the 5,000-year history of the state-based world-systems, but capitalism only began to predominate over the tributary modes of accumulation in the Europecentered subregion of the Central System in the wenteenth century. The tributav modes of accumulation rely more directly on organized political power to extract surplus product. Taxation, tribute, and other forms of exploitation that rely directly on politic2 coercion are the primary means by which ruling dasses

2 12 / Cross-System Campaus"s~as

appropriate surplus product in societies that are based on the tributary modes. The early state-based wrld-systems were mkes of modes of accumulation in which tributary modes formed over the top of kin-based modes. But even in these early stares there is evidence that some commodified forms existed. Thus Igor M. DiakonoE (1954) found documentary evidence of the sale of land in pre-Sargonic Sumer. But these commodified forms were rudimentary and did not play an important role in the dynamics of development of early state-based systems. As empires grew and trade nenuorks expanded, cornmodified forms of wealth, goods, land, and even wage labor, appeared within the commercializing empires. Borh Rome and Han China had important market mechanisms, but these societies, even while becoming linked to one another in a single Eurasian prestige-goods nenvork, remained predominantly governed by the logic of politicallmilitary conquest and the extraction of surplus prduct from peaant farmers. Cornmodification in tenth-century Sung China was much more developed. Paper money, elaborate credit institutions, and perhaps bndratieff waves were attributes of the Sung industrial revolution (Modelski and Thompson 19951, but the Chinese capitalists did not succeed in taking state power. There had already been capitalist states on Earrh for millennia, but these were always semiperipheral capitalist cirystates (such as the Phoenicim cities) that made a living in the interstices benveen the tributary empires. The first capitdist national state in a core region was the Dutch Republic of the seventeenth century, and this is the most important indication that capitalism was becoming more prominent in rhe European subsystem than in any other region. AS W argued in Chapter 5, the phenomenon of capitdist civ-states w s known to the anclienl w r l d at least as br back as the first Phoenician cities. This phenornemn was by no rslea~lsunique to Europe, Malacca m a semiperipherd capitalist citystate working the trade bemeerx Chinese, Siarnese, Indian, and Javan tributary srates. We contend that semiperipherat capitdist ci-cy-stata were the main qenrs of the spread of the institutions of cornmodification to the tributary empires and to periplreral ngions, h Europe the capitdisc ciry-scares hat afw after the eleventh century (Venice, Florence, Genoa, the Manseatic cities) were unusually densely concentrated in a region Iackng s m n g cenrrd authoriry. E h o l m and Friedrnan (1982) paint ouc an important cyclical phmmenon that occurred In state-based world-sysrems-osciuation b e m e n accumulation by merchant families using market mechanisms and private ownership of property versus more reliance on state-uwned properry and state-backed mechmisms of accumulation-taation and tribute ydymem. They note that successhl core regimes m r e olien originally based on starcs-organized accumulation but that over time state prerogatives and monopdies were chdlengctd by an exyanding walthy gmup of fanilies eng%ing in private accumulation, These incursions on state w n m l eventually led to problem of order and ro either the decline of the care regime or the r e a d l i s h e n t of a strong centralized state. Within our larger, long-term trend of growing capidist accumulation, we achowledge this medium-run oscillation bemeen state-

based and private capitalist accumulation in the context of the still predominantly tributary world-systems. This phenomenon has also been observed by Henri Pirenne (1953,5 16; quoted in hrighi 1994,243) in the context of the European subsystem.

and Decline Cycles Frank and Gills ( l 932; Frank 1333b) have periodized the histouy of their postulated 5,000-year-old world-system into cycles of economic expansion and contraction of approximately 500 years in length. They understood these cycles as composed of apin population, in trade and production, in proximately 250-year upswings of ciry sizes, and in number of diplomatic missions, followed by 250-year downswings (Frank 1393b, 384, 389). These cycles are alleged to have occurred simultaneously across the whole Eurasian landmass beginning in the Bronze Age (1700 B.c.E.). Christopher Chase-Dunn and Alice wllard ( l 993) used Tertius Chandler5 (1987) city population data to evaluate the GillsIFrank periodization of expansion and contraction phases. The Chase-Dunn and Wllard study empfoyed a mesure of urban population size-the sum of the populations of the three largest cities. Of course urban g r m h alone may not be a good indicator of overdl growh; the expasion and commercialization of agriculture in the countryside is certainly i m p o r a t for economic gramh, With these limieations in mind, Chafe-Dunn and WiHaxd report little support for the GjllsiFmnk phases. They find five time periods in vvfiich urban gromh or &dine corresponds to rhe GilXslFrank phases, but five other periods in whicfn the growh data centradict the GilIslFrank perrodizacion. In addition to these results, h e y score a draw for the period bemeen 125011300 and 1450 G.E. because there wre two correspondences and WO contradictions in this period. A coin toss could have done as welt. Two other studies have used data on cities to mduate the GiifslFrmk periodization, David wlkin~on (1935bf dso used Chandler's (1987) city population data to evduate the GillslFrank cycles, Wi1k;inson used the decreaes in tke number of cities in Chandlerb lists and decreases in the size of largest city as indicators of decline phases. He found some support for the general notion that PMNs and PGNs do go through cyclical phases of growth and decline. Some of the periods of growth and decline postulated by Gills and Frank are confirmed by Wilkinsods study, but his analysis dso shows that s o m of the Gills and Frank phases are inconsistent with the city population data. Wilkinson also shows that the subregions within the whole Eurasian landmass are ofren out of sync with other subregions on decline phases. h d r e w Bomorth (1335) also uses dam on the sizes and number of cities listed in Chandler5 (1987) lists of the menv-five j a r p c cities to evaluate the GiIlslFrank phases. He atso wnsiders the city size distrjbution as indicated by the ratio of the population of the largest to the nuenry-fifth largest city. Bosworth found strong support for eight of the GillslFrank phases and mild or moderate support for another six. He found contradictory evidence for only one of the GillslFrank phases.

Another way to evaluate the GillslFrank periodimion is displayed in Figures 10.5 and 10.6,Figure 10.5 shows FranFs (1333b) A and B phases dong with data on empire sizes and the population sizes of the largest cities in the Central PMN. The A pfiases are hypothetica! expansion phases, and B phases are contraction phrases. Figure f 0.5 show that the cicy populations are a poor cool for waluating Franks phases because they are so spoty for the first 1,700 years. But after 250 C.E. the city populations are more frequent. Here they reveal a sequential pattern of rise and fall that does not correspond well with the Gills/Frank phases. The data on the territorial, sizes of empires are better for evaluating the Gills/Frank phases becausrs they have no gaps. The empirt: size data in Figure 10.5 reveal that indeed there are sequences of expansion and contraction in the history of the Central PMN. Their periodicity varies, and they correspond only approximately with the GilldFrank periodizatim, Fiere 10-6shows how the GitlslFrmk periodization firs with the empire and cicy size data fbr the East Asian PMN. Here ag4n the city data are spotty fbr the early half of the chart. Eor the facter half, the city data fend only partial support for the Gils/P;rmk phases. Their A phase bemeen 500 arid 800 C&. corresponds vvell with a rise in city s k s , and the B phase from 800 to 1050 C.E. corresponds to a period of declining ciry sizes. But the follovvinf; A phase, k m . 1050 to 1300, contains both a fall and a rise, and the fotlowing ]B phase is a period of risiw rather than declining city sizes, The East Asian empire sizes show a panern of rise and fdl, but thiese carrespond only ayproximately with the GillsIFrank phases. It is tempting to suppose that G i b and Frank may have midiqnosed the vow& and decline cycles because they lump the Central and the East Asian systems together in their Eurasian world-system as apples and oranges. While we doubt the accuracy of their periodmtions, the following section demonstrates that these apples and oranges are ripening and rotting in the s m e seasons.

East Asian and Cenud Spchronicities The Chase-Dunn and Will& (1973) study of changes in city size distributions and urban growth produced a strange and perplexing discovery. While separately analping changes in the city size distributions of the Centrd and East Asian PMNs they accidentally discovered that these two sequences correspond with one anorher over time. Figure 10.7 shows the Standardized Primacy Indices (SPIs)lZ for the Central and East h i m PMNs from GQO l3.C.E. to 1800 C.E. Though we had been quite skepticd of Franks claim that there was a single Eurasian world-system far earlier than anyone had imagined, the accidental discovery of this temporal correspondence led us to reevaluate our position on the lumpedsplitter continuum. Even a rabid anti-Frankan would notice striking correspondences benveen the temporal rises and fdls depict& in Figure 10.7. The correspondence is not perfect. The Pearson's r correlation coeffcient beween the SPIs is .44 (p c .03)on the basis of oyenty-four time points. In Figure 10.7 we

see that the SPIs of the East Asian and Central PMNs were moving together from 430 B.C.E. until 1000 C.E. From 1000 to l l00 they moved in radically opposite directions, but then they moved together again until [email protected] C&., when &e Central PMN began a descent to flatness" that did not occur in E a t Ask. Now let us look at changes in the sizes of the largest cities in the Central and East Asian PMNs in Figure 10.8. Here the correspondence is even greater. The Pearsods r ~rrelationcoefficient is .79 for mnty-four time points (p c ,0001). From 1360 B.C.E. to 1200 B.C.E. the largest city in the Centrd PMN declined a bit in population size while in the East Asian PMN there was little change. Then the two rose and fell together as if they were parmen in a wala. The East Asian PMN undenuent a Isge dip bemeea 1600 and IG50 C.E. &at did not occur in the Cen trd PMN. For those readers who see the smoke but not the gun, Figure 10.9 shows the correspondence beoueen the sizes of East Asian and Central empires from 1500 B.C.E. to 1800 C.E. The terrirorid sire of empires is plotted along the vertical axis as square megmerers (x100)," The Pearson5 r orr re hi on coeEcient b r these two variables is .30 for sixty time points (p c .000 X ) . Inspection of Rgure 10.3 rwe& considerable similafities but also some imporrant differences. The clorrespondence bemeen the empires" rises and falls bet;ins after 200 B.C.E.; befare that &ere is no correspondence. Tbe rise of &e Assyrims and Achaemenicif mrrespnds with no Iarge empire in East Asia. Indeed, the correlation bemeen empire size in the two PMNs bemeen 1500 A'CE. and 600 B.C.E. is dighrfy negative (t = -.21, n = 15,p .460), Part of the positive correlaion for the whole time range is due to the rise and Eafl of the h/langol Emplre b e m e n 1250 and 1350 C.E. The Eurasian-wide Mongol Empire temgorririly united the Centxal and East Asian W N s , and hence the huge spike in this period represenrs the immense territorial size of this short-lived state. men vve remove &e Mongol Empire from the calculations, the carrelation weEcient dmps from .30 to .81 on the basis of f i e e i g h t time points (p K .0001). It is also likely to be the case &at the correlation is so high because of the trend over time in both systems for larger empires to appear in later centuries. Both the Central and the East h i m empire sizes are d l correlated with tirne aver the period covered by Figure 10.9. The correlation coefficient beoveen the year (with B.C.E. years as negative numbers) and the Centrd empire sizes is .66 (p c 0001)~and for rhe East Asian empixe s i m it is .G1 (p ,0001). We can remove the trend aspect of the correlation between the East Asian and Central empire sizes by calculating a partial correlation that controls for time. When we control for year and remove the Mongol Empire, the correlation beween the Gentrd and East Asian PMNs is still .(iX (p .:,0001) on the basis of f?l.ffy-five time points. 'This proves that the synchronicity is not due to the trend by which empires get larger over rime. Rather, the empire sizes in these two distant regions are rising and fdling together. So what was going on here? Was this really one big system since the Bronve Age, as Frank and Gills (13334 claim? David Vdkinson"s criterion of political-military interconnectedness does not join Centrd and h c Asian PMNs until the nineteenth


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century, when China was subjected to treaty ports by the West. But Wilkinson's criterion of involvement in a single prestige-goods trade network links China with West Asia, Europe, and Africa as early as 622 C.E. {W~lkinson1992, 80). Wilknson's proxy for trade links is the orisrence of sizable intermediate cities. Discussing the growth of intermediate citia on the Silk Road circa 622 C.E., wlkinson writes, "Kashgar is the current indicator of the not-exdusively-Chinese character of East Asian civilization. Its presence, along wirh Samarkand, suggests that enough Eurasian trade exists to enrol1 the Far Eastern oikumene in the Old Qikumene." This may be so, but it does not account for simultanwus ups and downs in China and watern Asia since 200 B.C.E. or even earlier, m a t does? Is it perhaps the case that, though Franks periodizations of growth and dedine are somewhat misspecified, the general idea of a single AFroeurasian world-system with nearly synchronous phases of growth and decline is correct?We hesitate to so conclude. But what are the drernatives?

Indic Egceptiondism Erst we shoufcf paint out that the s m e omparisons with the l d i c PMN, intermediate in space benvmn the East Asian and Centrd PMNs, bear much less fruit. Neither the lndic SPZs nor the Xndic urban poyldations rise and fill closely with either Cmtrd or East Asian PMNs.15 Figures 10.10 and 10.11 plot the Indic SPls and largest cities, respectively, alongside those of the Central and East Asian PMNs, In figure 10.10 the lndic SPI shows rises and falls, but these do not generally correspond vvrth those o f slne other nvo PMNs. The IndiclGenrrd correlation is .l7 for eighteen time points but is not smtisticallp significant fp .51), and the l l n d i d h t h i a n cormlacion is .21 for &&teen time poina, also not statisticadly significsu-rt(p c ,401. Figure 10.1t plots the largest hdic city sizes alongside those of Central a d East Asian PMNs, Here there is some correspondence, but it is quite weak. The IndiclCentral correlation is -26 for weary-three time points, but it is not statistically significant (p c .23). The IndiclEast Asian correlation, however, is .49 for ovenrythree time points, and it is staristically significaot (pa .018). T h e large discrepancies visible in Figure 10.11 are benveen 100 B.C.E. and 1300 C.E. There was an early period of large cities in India, but it declines quickly, and no new large cities emerge until the Moghuls come 1,200 years later. During this period both the Central and the East Asian PMNs had a longer-lived original period of large cities and the rise and fall of another period of large cities. If &ere is a single Afroeurasian world-system, why does the Indic region not march to the same dntmmer? It is, of course, posible that certain external inffuences affected both Central and East Asian PMNs. Perhaps sunspots or climate drange?Another candidate is epidemic diseases that spread across urban populations, carried by long-distance traders, as was the bubonic plague. wlliam McNei11 (1176) has shown &at epidemic disews spread across h e Eurasian continent in waves of destruction in phmes much earlier &an the wll-known piques that occurred ac the end ofthe first:

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millennium C.E. The theoretical question that this raises is t h extent to which diseases might be understood as endogenous to a single system rather than an exagenous vector that has an impact upon nvo separate systems. It is well known to demographers that the effects of epidemics are temporary in most cases. Cities usually recover from wen massive degopulations due to death from diseases. If this is Ehe Gase diseases mi&t account far temporay depopdarions across h a s i a but not for the more long-lasting waves of growth and decline or changes in city size hierarchies. Another candidate for exogenous factor is "bbarbatian" invasions, We have shown that these sometimes have large effects on city systems. The precipitous drop in the East Asian SPI hemeen I XOO and 1150 C.E. was undoubtedlv due to the invwion and conquest by the Ch'in Tartars. But the Mongol invasion and conquest in the following century had only a minor effect on the city system of China. One problem thus is that of understmding the circumtanres under which invaions have massive e E e a versus those under which they have only moderate effects. Did more-or-less conwmporanmus surges of peripheral poplarions out of Cenrrd Asia aEect the East Asian and Central city vsterns in such similar ways as to produce some of the similarities obsewed in Fipres 10.8 and 10.92 XE &is vvas the case, should this be understood as an exogenous factor affecting two separate systems, or as an endogenous Feature of a sinde interactive system? Another possibility is that urbanizing world-systems go thmu& similar sequences of development, cycles of polilical cenualizacionldecemratization,and trends of long-term city gromh. If m o such disconnected systems happened to start at the same time, pardel evolution mi&t produce similar trajecmries, India does not fit the pattern, buc perhaps its starting p i n t W= at a diEerent time, Comparison of the Indic PMN gaphs with those ofthe East Asian and G n t r d PMNs reveals the lndic sysrem to fbllovv a completely diEerent sequence that does not correspond to the others even if the time scale is shified. It appears rather that Xndia did start at the same time but that its trajectory was digerenc. These findings support the hypotheses that there was indeed a Eurasian-wide system that strongly affected the Central and East Asian PMNs. More research murit be done to test for the possibiliry that the synchronicities were the result of dimate change. This would involve the gathering of indicators of local dimate change over the relwant time period and the correlation of these with the other variables.16 Resear& should d s try ~ to determine whether the syncihronicifies are due to changs in trade and/or changes in the activities of Central Asian nomads.

By calling small and larger intersocietd nenvorks world-systems we are asserting that there are simitarities beween them, But beyond the definitional questions, what patterns of structure or process are universal among all the systemic nerworks from sedentary foragers to the modern global system! On the basis of our research on northern California (Chapter 71, we claim that all wodd-systems do have something


I 225

like core/periphery relations, but in some, especially small systems composed of small and egalitarian societies, corelperiphery differentiation is subtle and core/ periphery hierarchy, if it odsts, is mild. These egalitarian sFtems do not seem to undergo cycles of the rise and fall of regional or local hierarchies, although this conclusion should be seen as tentative, More reseach must be done an wodd-systems of sedentary foragers, big-man systems, and chiefdoms. Preliminary research on precontact Hawaiian complex chiefdoms indicates that there were cycles of rise and fall and that there were important aspects of core/periphery differentiation, but that the core/periphery hierarchies that existed at the local and regional levels were relatively mild and, when they did emerge, were unstable (Ermolaeva 1993; Chase-Dunn and Ermolaeva I 994). Another important similariry across different types of world-systems involves the nested nature of interaction newark. We found &at egalitarim systems have interm i o n nemorh of bulk-goods exchange, intermarriage, and po1iticdlmiIitar)r interaction that are nested inside prestige-gmds trade m d inhrmation nemorks. In this they are like most other wdd-systems. Even the isolated Haw&ian systt3m displayed a nested nenvork, though it was mainly confined to the Hawaiian archipelago. The most important aception is the nrodern gtobal sysrem, in which the various iatetaction n e w o r b have converged. The one macmstrucmrd pattern of systemic chmge that is universal is the phenomenon of pulsacion-the dternating apmsion and contraction of spatial integration. Waves of apansion of nemork size are follovved lay periods in vvhich n e w o r b either cantract or expand much mofe slowly. This phenomenon was noted in Cdifornia and we think that it charactaim alI systems, including the conrempsraty one, The rise and MI of political hierarchy and regional integration by polities characterizes ail warld-systems mepc those very small ones that are composed of very egditarian societies. Interchiefdom systems evince rise and fdl, as do sate spterns, and systems composed of secandasy errrpires and sfates. In the madern world-system the political centdizationidecentrdization sequence takes the form of the rise of hegemons and their dedine. As discussed earlier, this pattern differs importantly from the sequence of interstate systems/corewide states that were characteristic of world-systerns in which &e tributaq modes of accumulation E r e dominant. Frank and Gills (1993a) correctly note that Eurasia was a single prestige-goods nenrork (they di it the world-system) with three nonadjacent core regions (China, India, and the Near Easr), and that Europe was long peripheral to this systerne17The evidence of synchronicity that we presented earlier supports their contention that this network was imporrantly systemic much earlier than many historians have supposed. Though it is possible that this synchronization of growrh and dedine periods at different ends of the Eurasian landmass was due to climate change or some other nonsocial cause, more likely it was due to either interactions with intervening steppe nomads or changes in the intensity of long-distance trade across the Silk Roads. Frank (1994) is also right to point out that Europe remained peripheral or semiperipheral vis-a-vis Asia until at least the eighteenth century. Recent research on city

226 / Cross-System Compghsons

populations in the Central PMN demonstrates that the largest cities in the nenvork of politicallmilitary interaction that included Europe were the capitals of large tributary states such as the Ottoman Empire or the Moghul Empire (Bosworth 1995; Chase-Dunn and Willard 1994). European cities such as Paris and London did not become the l x g s t cicies in the Central PMN until 1750. Yet it would be mbtaken to ignore the u n u s d aspects of the core formation that had been occurring in Europe since the elwenth cenrury. This was yet another example of semiperipherd development--k rise of a formerly peripheral region and the formation of a local core. This general phenomenon had occurred many times before. But the European semiperipherd dwelopment was different in its processes and structures. Market forces and state power in the hands of capitalists were stronger in E w p e precisely: because the tributaq structures were we& and demntralized. European feudalism was important, not so much because of iu cultural or orpnizationd content, bur beeause it ~ v a sa very cfecentrdizrtd and weak form of the tributary mode of production. The institutions of capitalism, long developed in Rome and in China, finally took hold in western Europe because those tributary states were too vveak to curtail the gxowh of wealth accmulatian by merchant and production capitalists. This occurred first in the unusually densely ~ackeddty-states, and later in the nation4 states.

CorelPeriphery Relations Several other structural features of the Europe-centered subsystem indicate its uniqueness. We have already merttioned how the riseand-faH pattern of h e p o n s digers from the earlier pattern of the rise and fall o f empires. The sour= of this difference is found in fhe apiralist economies of the hegemonic statm in the modern world-system. Since they were pursuing wealth primarily by means of commodity production, they did nor seek to conquer adjacent core regions. Rather, they used state power to build a world order in which they could make profits from commodity production. Not all states were as capitalist as the hegemonic sates, howwer. Second-tier core states sometimes opted for versions of the marcher srate strategy and tried to conquer the core. The Hapsburgs, Napoleonic France, and twentieth-antury Germany were all challengers of this type. A second major structurd difference berween the modern world-system and the earlier Afroeurasian system lies in the nature of coreiperiphe~relations. The ability to srtract resources from peripherd areas has long been an important component of successful accumulation in state-based world-systems, and this is also true in the modern world-system. But there is an interesting and important difference-the reversa of the location of relative intrasocietd inequalities. In state-based world-systems, core societies had relatively greater internal inequalities than did peripheral societies. Typically core states were urbanized and class-stratified while peripheral societies were composed of nomadic pastordists or horticulturalisu or less densely concentrated peoples living in smaller towns or villages. These kinds of peripheral

Cross-Sysgem Comparisons 1 227

groups typically had less internal inequaliry than did rhe core states with which they were linkd. In the modern world-system this situation has rwersed. Core societies typically have less (relative) internal inequaliry than do peripheral societies. The kinds of jobs &X are concentrated in the core, as weII as the development of tvelfae states in the core, have expanded the size of the middle classes within core societies to ~roducea more-or-less diamond-shaped distribution of income that bulges in the middle. Typical peripheral societies, on the other hand, have pyramidal income distributions in which there is a sand rich dite, a ratfier smdl midde class, and a v e q large mass of very poor peogle.18 This reversal in the location of rebcive internal inequality bervveen cares and peripheries was mainly a consequence of the dwelopment and concentration af compln: economies needing skilled labor in the cote and the politics of democracy and the welfare state that have accompanied capitalist industrialization. These processes have occurred in tandem wirh and have been dependent upon the dwelopmmt of peripheral capitalism, colonialism, and neocolonialism in the periphery, which collecrively have produced the greater relative inequalities within peripheral societies. Core capidism is dependent upon peripheral capitafism in parr be~auseexploitarion of the periphery provides some of the resources that core capital uses to pay higher incomes to WE mrkers, Furthermore, tlze reprohaion of an underdeveloped periphery Legitimates the nationd capitalllabol. atliances that have provided a relative harmony in dass relations in the core and undercut radical challenges to capitalis power (Chase-Dunn 1983, chap. I I), We do not daim &at all core workers compose a "labor aristocracy" in the modern world-system. Obviously groups within the core working class compete against each other, and so= are ""downsized" or %treamlinedBin the competition of core capitdisa with one another, But the overall effect of core/periphery relations is to undercut challenges to capitalism uritfiin core smtes, In premodern systems, core/periphery relations were also important for sustaining the social order ofthe core (e.g., the bread and circuses of Rome), but not to the same extent, because the system did not produce relatively more equal distributions of income and political power in the core than in the periphely. Thus the corelperiphery hierarchy has become an wen more important strucrural feature of the modern wodd-system than it was in earlier state-based systems. This change in structure corresponds to the relarively greater stabiliv of power structrures in the modem wrldsystem because of the relatively greater harmony of class interesrs wirhin the core. Though bread-and-circus dynamics operared in ancient h e , they were far less developed &an the welfare state apparatuses of rhe modern world-system. A third important difference involves the degree of corelperiphery hierarchy. We have found that small systems composed of egalitarian societies were n a i y egalitarian with regard to interregional relations. Core/periphery relations have taken very different forms in different systems, but there has been a genera movement from less stable and less unequal regional hierarchies to more stable and more unequal ones as

world-systems have become larger. This is because the "techniques of povver" "arm 1986) have wolved to facilitate hierarchical accumulation over greater distances and mofe people. Of c o m e there has been upward and downwrd mobiliv of regions in every vstem, but we surmise that the rak of this kind of mobilicy has decreased with the growing size of the system. A fourth imporlant diEerenm, sugested by Frank (person& cmmunication), is that the Central System before 1800 contained rhree nonadjacent core regions, each with its "own" corelperiphery hierarchy, whereas the rise of the European core produced a global system with a single core region and a single core/peripheryhierarchy. This eliminated the former equal exchanges among nonontiguow and culturally diEerent core regions. A fihh related uniqueness is the convergence of the diEerent kinds of interaction nenrorks in the modern world-system. Nearly dl former systems were composed of nested interaction neworks in vvhich bulk-goods e x c h a n ~ s w r e small, politicallmilitary newarks were larger, and preslige-pods and information networh we= even larger. With the rise of the Europe-centered system we have the incrensing convergenm of these four vpes of interaction in a single global nemork that includes all these rypes of interaction. The gobdimtion of bulk-pads trade and the single w r l d polity af nationat states, as well as the precipirolls drop in transpormtion and communications costs, create a single integrated core despite the remaining physid distances bemeen core states in Europe, N o d h e r i c d , and East &ia. Thus the rising comparative advantage of Japan and China is akin more to unevpn development within a core region than to the uneven develapment of dismnt cores in the earlier multicore structure of the Centrd System. Our comparative approach also suggests further research on the relationships between the patterns we have observed as they work within and berween worldsystem types. We have observed that all systems pulsate, even the smallest and the largest. The phenomenon of rise and fall emerges with the development of hierarchy. It is certainly present in interchiefdom systems and may be present in bigman systems. Oscillation--the alternation benreen private, market-mediated accumulation and accumulation more heavily reliant on state institutionsemerges as soon as markets, money, and private land ownership become possible and continues in the modern world-system. Indeed, the contemporary campaign for privatization and deregulation is a phase of that oscillation. But what are the causal and temporal relationships benveen these three cycles-pulsation, rise and fall, and oscillation! Are these relationships similar or different across world-system types? It would be simple to posit synchroniciry of the three sequences, but we can think of instances in vvhich they do not coincide in time, For exampie, recall Friedman's (1382) discussion af Melanesian big-man systems, These earlier, more hierarchical chiefdoms devolved into smaller and less hierarchical polities because the local elites were unable to monopolize trade in a system that was becoming more economically integrated. In this case pulsation was on the upswing while political decentralization was also occurring. So a simple hypothesis of syn-

chronicity does not hold across all systems. Further research must be done on these cycles and their interactions. The extension of the wrld-system perspective back in rime can thus be used m tease out the di&rences in structures and processes as well as the similarities across time and across diRerenr systems. Perhaps it is natural that the similarities should be emphasized first (as do Frank and Gills [f 99341, since most social scientists are stifl in the habit of studying single societies rather than world-systems. But in order ta unhrstmd both socid reproduction and so&dGhange we need ro apply the worldsystems perspective to all intersocietal neworb, not just those that are quite like the present one. Given this evidence-which W find compelling-what else can W say. about transformations?That is the subject of the next chapter.

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PART Conclusions


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In this penultimate chapter we present our tentative conclusions about how modes of accumulation have become transFarmed in world-systems. We also consider the implications of our comparative world-systems approach for understanding the possible futures of the modern world-system. The comparative world-systems approach is far h.om a finished product. More case studies and comparative cross-world-systern research are needed to fine-tune the cunceprs, to rework the typolc?gies, and to further test the generalizations and hypotheses. We have constructed a theoretical research program, but we have only begun to do the relwant research. We think nevertbeless that we shodd praent our tentative surmises about the big queftions.

One of om m ~ purposes n in develoging the comparative vvorld-systems frameork to enable us to study hovv rransformacions of systemic hgic have a c t d l y occurred in world-systems, In Ghqter 2 we asserted that there have been nxro cornplete major transformations in systemic logics: from kin-based modes of accumulation to state-based modes, and from state-based modes to the capitalist mode, Ve dso posited another possible future transkrmation from the capitalist mode m a socialist m d e , Here is what vve: think are the generd characteristics of the transformal.ions we have discerned. By definition, transformations involve gualirative changer in the baric Eagz'c of a c c ~ m u ~ The t z ' ~nature ~ ~ of the mobilization of social labor and the accumulation of social resources undergoes fundamentd changes. Our first, unsurprising, conclusion is that rramfimationr have ocnrmed. By this we mean that the basic systemic logics of dwelopment and accumulation have undergone qualitative changes. The logic of development and accumdacion found in the case o f the Wintu and their neighbors was very di8:erent from that found in state-based world-systems. In preconract nortbern California, social labar was mobilized primarily by means of a normative order constructed as kinship obligations. State-based logic is fundamentally different because it relies on instimtilrns uE political coercion to mobilize labar and to accumulate surplus product through taxation and tribute payments. State-


based logic differs fundamentally from capitalist logic. Capitalism mobilizes social labor by means of labor markets and it accumulates by producing commodities and selling them. There have been major qualitative transformations in the dwelopmental logics of world-systems, and thus the continuationists are wrong. The continuationists are not completely wrong, howwer. Important continuities transcend the different kinds of world-systems, as we saw in Chapter 10. The model of iterations works in all types ofworld-systems even though the modes of accumulation are different. ALL systems pubate as trade linkages among regions strengthen and expand, then waken and contract. All systems with social Dzierarchies rig and fall as local and regional polities undergo periods of centralization followed by periods of decentralization. However, the nature of these cyclical processes changed when the mode of accumulation changed. Pulsation in nonhierarchical systems became associated with rise and fall in hierarchical systems. The rise and fall cycle changed from empire formation to hegemonic rise and f d in the transition from tributav to capitalist ~ r e x n s , The term "transformation" may be somewhat misleading because it implies not only a major change but also a rapid one. The long rise of sates and the long rise of capidism occurred by m a n s of a combination of slow, cumulative changes and more cataclysmic conquests and rwolutions. The contrasting cataclysmic and glacial cumlation models are bath correct. Transformations occurred over very long time periods, and the processes i n v o h d both slow cumulation of &anges by the d i h sion of technologies and institutions, and more caraclysmic events in which new structures were ereaed aver the top of ox in bemeen earlier structures. We hyporhesize char an accurate qtlmtitative measure of g o d over time in a new systemic logic (if such measurement vvere possible) wodcl reveal a combination of a steady upwad trend, a short-term oscillation, and a series o f larger cataclysmic steps. The spread of commodtcy production by semiperipherd capitalist ciy-states w a not cataflysmic. The semiperipheral apitdist city-srares were perhaps the most important agents of the reorpnization of production for exchange in l o d e s and the linkage of these locales into much larger trading nenvorks that facilitated both new kinds of tributary empires and the eventual emergence of pfedonrinant capitdim. The expanding scale of empires and trade neovorks in the Central System during the predominance of the tributaly modes was a consequence of the operation of the iteration model. These expanding scales created a niche for semiperipherd capitalist city-states and thus contributed to che long-term development of capitalism. But as in the case of semiperipheral Europe, those successful semiperipherd marcher scltes that expanded empires and made larger trade nemorks possible were not themselves overpopulated. Rather, the way that the ~opulationpressure/circumscription model worked in both expanding tributary systems and in the trmsformation to q i t d i s m was by creating constraints on old core regions that were beyond their capacities to transcend, The old core regions tben becme ripe Eor the &ng by less constrained semiperipheral actors. This is also how the population pressurelcircumscription model contributed to the emergence of predominant capitalism in the seventeenth-

The I"ranff2macian-of WO?&-System 1 235

wntury European subsystem and its eventual successful "conquest" of the older tributary cores. The ways in which new modes of accumulation emerged differed to some srtent depending on the nature of the modes. The state-based modes emerged out of a long process in which kinship structures themselves became more hierarchical. Complex Gkieidoms w r e class societies in which hierachical kinship metaphors =re the institutiond basis of class inequalities. These systems of ranked lineges and conical clans developed class structures in which commoners became divorced from kinbased claims to land or other fesoufces. Complex chiefdoms also organized investments in infrastructure and spread more intensive technologies of production. These, in turn, developed the infrastructurd bases that made possible the erection of yet more stratified and hierarchical polities--the fint states. Notably, the early states developed in regions that were adjacent to but bey~nd the contrc3.l of areas containing complm cbiefdoms. Thus the theocratic ciy-states in the Tigris-Euphrates floodplain emerged after the prior development of rather large settlements in the adjacent Susima Plain (Nissen 1388).This "uneven dwelopment" was an early instance of a semiperipheral region outdoing an older core region. It was an originall episode in the trmsition from complex chiefdoms to early states, Both ecological and socid circumscription were important k m r s in these dmelopments. The availability of a relatively uninhabited floodplain adjacent to the Susiana Plain may have unkrcut the development of states in the upland vdley. The eventual filling of the Tgris-Euphrates region with cily-stares and irrigated agriculture fadirated the emergence of the Major leaps in the degee of hierarchy formation and the size of polities w r e uneven in space, such that a particdar locdity that developed a larger or more hierarchical polity W% not likely to accomplish another leap ofthis sort. But this does not mean that the location of hierarcby fbrrnafion was random across space hther, hierarchy formation occurred repeale* withi= worId-qstemr rather than within individual polities. Even so-called primary. or pristine state formaeion did not occur in Locations that had no prior exposure to relatively hiexarchid polities such as complex chiefdoms. Each of the known cases of independent state formation occurred in regions where there had already been earlier large serrlement sptems and probably compla chiefifoms. Thus even pristine hierarchy formation was m ingeracfz'vezl,~r&ystempmcess. This W% even more obviously the case with secsndary or reactive state formation. The early stares did not eliminate all aspecrs of kin-based social or Rarher, they were erected over the top of kn-based relations that then b ulated with the new predominant mode of accumulation (Zagarell 1986). Normative regulation continued to play an important role at the level of households and communities within the early states, and new types of normative structures legitimated the states themselves. Theocracies dweloped state autonomy by delinking the temple economy from kinship obligations. Whether or not this theocratic phase was coercive, the theocratic states were soon transformed into more militwized states be-

cause of increasing competition with other newly emergent states. This involved a new level of coercive accumulation. The diarchicdl oscillation between the palace and the temple was an ideologid and institutional field of struggle for the dwelopment of new tributary institutions throughout the long period of the predominance of the tributay modes, Early states were agents of further infrastructural investments and of long-distance trade. Both reactive (secondary) state formation in other regions and growing longdistance trade led to further intensification of material production. This in turn created the infrasrructural basis of even larger and more hierarchicd states. The early empirg states organized tributasy accumulation on a farigcr s d e , but that scale would not have been possible without the prior expansion of agriculture. The tributary modes of accumulation thus spred by canquest, by feartive (seconday) state formation, and by the diffusion of productive technologies to distant regions. The a n d o e to ecologjd succession, in which more wlmplex forms of life establish themselves over the top of earlier levels of biotic energy accumulation, suggests itself The phenomenon ofserniperipherd marcher srates occur& in a context in which states were farming, distant coFe regions wre emerging, and agriculrure and intensified trade were spreading. It was the serniperipherd conquerors who created the qualitative l a p s in the size of polities that were illustrated in Figufe 10.3. These serniperipherd conquerors were innovators of both militav techniques and rechrtiques of governance thar allowed centralized power to be mercised over larger territories. Extraction of resouras via taxation and tribute was the primary means o f accumulation in tributary systems, The monopolimtion of trade routes, exotic imports, and the taxation of trade by stares were important Aternative sources of Kcumulation. State monopolization ended to stifle trade, where% a more indirect approach led to greater state returns in the long run. Emperors eventually learned that they could gain more in the long run by allowing merchants a limited autonomy and then txinf; their profits. States were the inventors of standtzrdized v v e a l t h d a i n ~ of e precious memls---for the purposes of administered trade and tribute collection. Merchants were the agents of the cornmodification of wealth-the generalimion of media of exchange to facilitate trade. Cornmodified land and interest-beaing loans w r e invented in the wry earliest states, but they were not yet central features ofthe overall mode of accumulation. These institutions spread in importance inside and in the interstices between the commercidizing secondary empires. State expansion, via conquest, was often directed at securing access to high-demand rare producu. The building of larger empires was accompanied by the spread of cornmodified wealth, goods, land, and labor. Semiperipheral capitalist ciry-states were the main agents o f the spread of commodified goods. Their activities stimulated the production of surpluses for the long-disrance trade. Social and ecological circumscription were imporrant features of the evolutionary changes that took place in the tributary modes. The concept of circumscription emphasizes regional contextual factors that facilitate or constrain state formation

and the intensification of production activities. The logistical factors involved in long-distance transportation and communications constrained the emergence of larger empires. Easy transportation and communication along the quite navigable Nile River led to early empire formation in Egypt, whereas the more difficult Tigris and Euphrates Rivers prolonged the existence of an interstate system in Mesopotamia, The development of adjacent agricultural regions and states was also an important condition facilitating or constraining the emergence of large empires. There is little point in conquering a territory if little surplus is produced there (unless it is a strategic link to a richer zone or an important trade node). Moreover, it is far easier to extract surplus from a region that already has an existing tributary structure. Thus both the growth of surplus production and the spread of institutional structures of exploitation facilitated the construction of larger and larger state structures. As agriculture and states spread, they made possible the erection of larger political structures. Howwer, one state's possibilities for expansion by conquest were constrained by the existence of already Iarge and power-ful states in adjacent regions if chose neighboring states wesc pmerful enough to prevent conquest. Thus cantextual features could both constrain and facilitate expansion, Too little development in adjacent regions made expansion unprofitable, and too much development prevented it. The costs of escape by means of emigration from large states increased as people became more dependent upon scares br the protection of trade mutes and the maintenance of productive infrastructure. Social circumscription is a question of the relative costs of staying versus leaving. The tendency for peoples to try to escape hierarchies came to be counterbdanced by both coercive farce and the infrastructurd and trade-basetd surpltlses that the t r i b u t q empires were able m musteK Some tributary states (e.g., Nea-Afsyrians, Tncas) utilized forced migration as a tedniyue of control and surplus extraction, thus intervening directly to alter the relationship berween popufations and the land. Contextual factors were also involved in the emergence of capitalist institutions and their spread. Production for archang vvas much easier once more land-efificient technologies of production were widely spread. So the growth of markets was facilitated by the spread of agricultural techniques. One reason the Greeks erected such a cammodified system was that their articulated agricultural practices (olives, grapes, wheat) were well suited to the efficient production of surpluses in the Mediterranean littoral (Rostovtxff 1341). Contextual factors also facilitated the rise of semiperipheral capitalist city-states. The development of commercial trade inside the tributary empires expanded markets and supplies for the trading ciry-states. The supplies they brought to the empires from far-off regions helped to dissuade the empires from conquering them (Frankensrein 1979). As the older capitalist city-states succeeded in spreading commodity production, they created the basis for nov, specialized trading states; hence the number of such states grew, and they moved into new regions.

Contextual factors also made possible the wentual concentration of many capitalist city-states in a single region-the European "dorsal spine." One such contextual factor was the absence in Europe of a tributary state sufficiently powerhl to extract tribute or taxes or to threaten the operations of the ciry-states. h o t h e r was the existence of the much larger Asian cornmodifred empires. The institutional heritage of contract law, money, and market institutions from the Roman Empire and the immediate economic opportunities for trading with the larger Afroeurasian system strongly stimulated the European cities despite their proximiry to each other. Local and regional maxkets were too small to stirnutate such growth by themselves. Their dense concentration in one region spurred the dwelopment of markets, cornmodicy producers, and an interstate system that was congruent with capitalism, Whereas the tributary modes emerged and dweloped over the top of the kinbased modes, the capitaist mode (cornmodification) emerged within spaces inside %nd bemeen the tributary states. The capitdist mode did not, b o w e r , become predominant in any region until capitalist states emerged in the core region of the European subregion. As vve have said, the first capitdisc c m sate was the Dul-cb k p u b lic in the seventeenth century, The cotnmon feature here is that even though transfomationd institucivns tended to arise first in the serniperipherp it W* necessary for a core polity to beconre the q e n t of a new made of accumulation in order For that nevv mode to bemrne predomiaant. Semiperipheral upward mobiliry usually has dmlopmental consequences, but they may be of w o andpicaily diAFerent sorts, The rise of a semiperipheral polity sometimes contributes to the hrther dwelopment of an misting predominant mode of accumufation. At other times it m&es a more direct contribution ca transforming the old mode into a new mode. It is sometimes the case that the hrther dmIopment of an existing predominant mode dso creates the basis for transcending that m&.NW modes are not simply the opposite of old ones. Rather, they d m h p from eRorts to solve the problems created by the contradictians within the current mode, This is neither automaric nor unidirectiand; historical strudes and agencies are involved, and things rarely turn out as the protagonists intend. But transformations occur as a result of efiForts to fix the prablems created by the current mode, This is not a nice, smooth lamarkian learning model. Nor does it imply that change in the direction of a general trend, often erroneously labeled "progress," is inevitable. Yet there is a trend to the process of change &at has occurred by both longterm accretionary and more cataclysmic processes. A further point is that not all change is in the direction of the general trend. Sometimes there is no change. Other times change may proceed in the opposite direction of the general trend. We also wish to reemphasize the problem of teleological reasoning and our critique of the notion of 'progress." There is no necerrary direction to these changes. Rather, there is an historical trend. Indeed, if stability is the prime desire, then the Marquesans are the most successM of all peoples for having controlled change.

To sum up, transformations involve circumscription, systemic contradictions, uneven development, and corelperiphery relations. Agents of transformation most ofien come from serniperipherd [email protected],

What might these observations tell us about the possibilities for transformation in the contemporary world-system? Our original motivation for comparing world-systems was to build a scientific basis for understanding the potentials and transformational processes of the modern world-system. Of course we need to repeat that we are not inevirablists or unilinear evolutionists. The contemporary system could destroy itself along with 3 billion years of biological wolution. Even if that does not happen, there are several pssible ~msformationsthat migfit rake place, nor just me. The future we are discussing is the next fav centuries. It took about 5,000 years for human societies to invent the first states after che first sedentary comrnunitim had emerged. It took another 4,500 yean for capidism to become a predominant mode of accumularion in a large rqion. In this ternpord &mework of compaxison, predamiaant capitaism is still very new-a veritable idant, frill, the rate of social chwge has incrmed g e ~ m e t r i since d ~ the eighteen& century,z In our view a p i d i s m as a vstern c o n ~ n such s massive int-ernd mntradctions that it is udikely to antinue as the global predominant mode of accmulation for more &an a fw cenmries, The contemporary world-system is far from the best of all possible mrorlds. Exploiration, oppression, and w r h r e are endemic and systemicafly rgprodued, Xt may be that exploitation and oppression are relatively less onerous, at least in the mentieth century, than they were in earlier world-systems, but wasfare has vown more destmctive, The proportion of nationd population~lrilled in "industrial"" wars has risen geometrically (Galtung 1980).Rapid technological &vancement, so fruithl in the area of material production, has, in the realm of military hardware, produced a species-threatening horror (McNeil1 1382). We argue &at the deadly rise oF industrial warfare has been caused by capitalism. The "normal" operation of capitalist uneven development, periodic economic and politicat crises, mJ a cycle of world wars constitutes, in combination with nuclear weapons, a p t a z t i d (even probable) death sentence for our planet.3 This problem supersedes all others in importance, but its solution cannot be separated from the processes by which capitalism produces nor only t e c h n o l o ~and growth but also uneven development and underdevelopment. Briefly and crudely, one solution w d d be to transform the inarstare system into a corewide world smte, Wodd stare formation may be the only instirutiond mechanism that can, in the long run, prwent the large-scale use of nuclear weapons. Along this avenue of thought, the question becomes that of the means by which w r l d state fornation can occur as well as that of what kind of m r l d state it would be. Our analysis of historical world-systems does not provide happy implications for this problem. In all cases corewide empire formation occurred through conquest,

most ofien by an upwaray mobile semipeFipherd state. Instances of p e a e m confederation, a far more pdatable Eorm of state formation, w r e rare, Virtually none of these were core wide, M m occurred in noncore regions suhected to external threat. Chinese dynasties, as Lattimore (1940) points out, were usually formed after long periods of warfare and disorder when a cansensus had formed aound one central state that could provide order. In o w iteration modet this is the p e r i d of conflicr that preceda state formation. Unfortunatety such a long-term period oE disorder is tikely to be fatal in h e modern context, although it is possible &at a near-catastrophe, in which some large portion of the world's population was annihilated, might create the political will among the survivors to sustain an effective monopoly of nuclear violence. This is the scenario painted by W Warren Wqar in his Shon Hirtory ofghe F~lure(1332). This scenario of doom, hmewr, is not one &at can form the basis dpofiticaf action. If it hagpens, those who survive will make the best of it, In the meantime the only sane path is to promote peaceful cooperation and contractual lirnirations of a m s buildups among potentially conflierive powers, and to promote the institutionbuilding of inrernational orgmizatians that can move toward the provision of global security; A samavhat more encoursing iftdication is sugested by the circumscription hypothesis, Recall that regions from which escape was dificdt were more likely to develop states, The Earth is such a "region," Fl*t to externa-1,arenas is no longer possible, except in the imagination. New,last, and final h n t i e r s are inspirational images, but the fact is that the crew of spaceship Earth must now learn to survive together. This may be an i m p r t m t condition for the emergence of a $OMpofiticd qstem that can replate conflict. The record ofsuclh effarts as have been made is not very encouraging, but W cannot aEord to stop trying. Even a small increase in global securiw which may be undone in periods of growing strain, may provide a basis for further integration at a later date. We can see a spiraling pattern of increasing international politid integration from the Concert of Europe through the League of Nations to the United Nations and the proliferation of world organizations (Murphy 1994). Though these weak forms of global governance did not much alter the patterns of hegemonic rise and fall and the cycle of world wars over the past 200 years, the spirding strengthening of global governance might, if it continues, eventually lead to a world state that can eEeaively prevent warfare among core states. We examine the contemporary transformation problem in comparative context by brieAy cataloging possible changes and assessing rhe likelihood of each. Whereas most earlier world-systems contained multiple noncontiguous core regions and were sometimes influenced by exogenous social impacts, the contemporary global capitalist system has only one core and is no longer influenced by social forces coming from outside the system. This means that transformation can only occur as a result of internal processes--with the usual exception of nonanthropogenic catastrophes, such as volcano eruptions, collisions with comets or asteroids, and so on. The contempo-

The Zamfimdtio~~ of WorM-Systems / 241

rary system is even more systemic than earlier regional systems were, and it must resolve i rs own contradictions. Devolution into a new xrsion of the tributary modes Is certainly yosible. This couid take the form ofa centrdixd world fascist state based on centrdizad coercion, or a decentcllized form in which regional and local states use coercive force ro protect [email protected] one another and to extract resources from their "own'"oayu1ations. We surmise rhat the decentrdized form would not be very stable because of the immense destructiveness of weaponry. Warfare would most likely cause such a system to annihifare all humm life on the Earth. Capidism might itself erect a world state in order to try to regulate some of the problems that the free market and the reign of global corporations create. More likely capitdism will try to reproduce the interstate system because this limits the ability of any single state to regulate capital. We contend that a world state is likely to emerge within the next hundred years as a result of rhe continuation of the trend toward international politkd integration that has resulted from the actions of capitdistf and the eRorts of exploited groups to protect: tlaernselves. This world state would likely be dominated by rbe hegemony of global capital far a time. However, if the fascist alternative were avoided, it might undergo a reform process that wutd lead co $ o M democmic socialism." m a t does our study of world-systems and modes of accumulation imply about a possible transition to globaf democratic socialism-a more democmtic and collectively rariourd mode of accumdation? As we Rave seen, capiralists first c m e to state power in semiperipheral areas. But it w a not until qiralism came ta control core states that the capitalist mode became predominant, Some of the semiperipheral capitalist ciry-stws w r e anzbivdent, tending to return to tributary accumulation to consolidate their successes.5 Capitdist srates hail a hard time in world-sysrems dominated by the tributasy modes of accurnulatian. It was only aker a long period in which mafket relations wihin and k w e e n states aad mpires had grown in importance that core states became able to sustain a stable commitment to accumulation through commodity production for the world market. Before the demise of h e Soviet Union some socidists contended that world socialism would wentually emerge by means of a domino process, the simple accretion of socialist parties coming to power in separate srates (e.g., Szymanski 1982). ChaseDunn (1982) contended rhat the domino theory was wrong because the socialist mode of accumulation L difficult to sustain in a world-syrem in which capitalism remains predominant. This point would hardly need to be argued now. But a krther point is worth menrioning: It may be the growh of internarional and transnational forms of socialism rhat might mentually dlow this new mode of accumulation to become predominant. Seen in a long-run comparative perspective, the struggle for democratic socialism within o r e states, though currently in the doldrums, is crucial for eventual systemic transformadon. Contemporary involvement in electoral politics, in coalition

formation, and in reformist movements represents a realistic adjustment to the current period of neoliberal ideological hegemony, A new mode of ac~umdation builds by accretion in the interstices of an old one. The continuation of capitalist uneven development will likely spur new, broad, populist, antisystem movements. World socialists should be prepared to provide direction and leadership to such movements lest they be harnessed by reactionaries or neofascists. A period of social polarization is quite likely, and this, in the context of the potential nuclear holocaust, is a frightening prospect. Building ties of cooperation and friendship among peoples, developing institutions based on democratic and collectively rational (i.e., ~lanned)economic organization and exchange, and implemenring a more ecologically balanced and egalitarian fonn of global development are important both as immediate gods and as long-run means for reducing the probabilig- of systemically produced warfaae, A vivid contrast b e m e n the historical transition to capitalkm and the potential transition to democratic socialism stems from differences in the logics of the nuo modes of accumulation. Capidism can exist and thrive as a subsystem in the intersrices of another mode of production, as it did For many centuries, gradually creating the institutional bases for its own eventual predominance. Its individualist and partial rationalicy thrives in a wmpetitive and conaictive setting. Democratic socialism, in contrat, is a holistic made of accumulatton in which the whole arena of interaction must be orgmized on a collectiveiy ration4 and dem c r a i c basis in which recipmciry and p t i r i d l y articulated redistribution play important rotes, Hence eEarts to build socialist relations (those &at sumive) tend to become reinregraced into the institutional logic of capitdism bemuse they [email protected] exposed to the strong forces of the larger capitalist system. But the interaction of capid i s m and socidism has produced a spiral in which the spatial s d e of organization of each has increased in interaction with the other-the spiral of capitaiism and socidism (Chase-Dunn 1332~). People have long struggled against market forces that would convert them into wmmodities. Guilds, labor unions, cooperatives, socialist parties, welfare states, communist sates, and movements Eor national liberation in peripheral areas are all social movements that have attempted to resist cornmodification and exploitation. So, too, are many of the contemporary "fundamentalist" and conservative movements. Many justify their resistance through ideologies that originated in tributary

world-systems (Islam and Christianity). For the most part, these struggles have been Subverted by the growing scale and wider institutionalization of the capitalist world market. Even the largest communist states found themselves influenced not only by the military threats of the capitalist core states but also by the opportunities of the world market for high technology and profitable commodity production. The partial rationdities of state capitalism and state socialism do not in themselves help to build cooperation at the world lwel. Rather, they create a world in which semicollectivized subunits compete with one another militarily and through commodity production.

This does not mean that egorts by socidist parties to come to state power in the periphery and semiperiphery will cease or should cease, or that socialists in core states should stop trying to organize more humane, just, and democratic institutions. But it does imply that these efforts done will not be enough. Democratic socialism must be organized as well at the lwel that has been attained by the capiralist mode of accumulation, and that is the &lobalIevsl, That is why transnationd and international socidist forms of exchange and political organizations are crucial. The struggle for socialism already has a history of 200 years. Labor unions, workers' cooperatives, agrarian cooperatives, socialist parties, and communist states have all tried to protect members from exploitation and to transform the capitalist system into a more collectively rational mode of accumulation. These eAorts have interacted with the trends and cydes of capitalism. The increasing scale of socialist organizational forms has been an important force behind the expansion and reorganization of capitalism. Workers' struggles were the main force behind democratic reforms (Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992). Labor movements caused wages to rise and supported the emergence of wlfare states in the core. This was an important spur to capicafist cttxpansion into the peril?healy, Socidist parties played their part in these s m e reform movements, Gummunist sraces in the: semiperiphexy made the strongest eEorts to create a selfsustain in^ socialist mode of accumulation, though they wre greatly compromised by the need to orgmize military and economic protection from a p i d i s t core states, The successes o f the communisr states at catching up urirlsl qitlllist induscridization, m%sseducation, urbanizarion, and health care were anorher important stimulus to r&rm within the capitalist states a d to the rising international liberalism. promoted by the United States in the mentiah century. The communist threat sustained U.S, leadership and "Westerd\solidariry and facilitated the emergence of an even more integrated and spatially larger m r l d market than bad existed behre, The technological dynamism of gtobal capitalism and the extraordinav costs of the modern arms race led to she reincorporatian of the Soviet Union into the internationd poliry of the capitdist sates and ta the paftid reincorporation o f China, Thus capitalism has wolved partly as a result of the socidist chdlenges mounted over the past 200 years. Wave these challenges now ended, with the ideological hegemony of neoliberdism?We think not, because the structurd causes of socidist chtallenges-uneven development, increasing inequalities, environmental degradation-are still prwdent. Despite the globd scale of capitalist organization and the new forms of production that are characterized as "flexible accumulation," we expect that both old and new forms of resistance will again play an important part on the stage of world polirics, Socialist modes of integration and exchange involve democratic planning that organizes reciprocity and politicdly mediated forms of redistribution that can place limiu; on the operation of uneven development and unequal exchange. Some of these ends can also be achiwed by socialist markets. The Soviet tendency to try to convert all exchanges into redistributive exchange was excessive. Markers are good

institutions for providing some goods and sewices and need not be subsumed by an all-encompassing planned economy as long as certain functions, such as collective securiry and planning for basic infrastructural dwelupment, are socidized. Johan Galtung's (1980) vision of a multicentric, multilevel world economy emphasizes self-reliance at various levels wherever feasible and encourages a multicultural approach in which peoples and civilizations cultivate their own expressive forms and identities. Many other social theorists vvbo see the horrors of existing capitalism and the soulless future painted by the ideologues of capitalist globalization have emphasized self-reliance and multiculturalism. Contemporary nationalisms, ethnic identities, and alternative lifestyles are part of the postmodernist philosophy and are motivated by pswerftll currents oF resistance to the declining cultural, economic, and political hegemony of the United Stares and the older European core. Jonathan Friedman (1992b 1994) produces evidence that multiculturalism and identity resistance have occurred during periods of hegemonic decline in all state-based world-systems.6 The question here is whether or not it makes sense to try to construct a better world around these decentralization hrces, or whether we should instead build a more humane, bdanced, and sustainable global system. who argues that overcoming the probIn this we side with Wagar (1992, 19951% lems that capitalism has creaced (daager of terminaf. wrfare, ecalvgicat crisis, and huge inequalities) will require the construction of a democratic and sacidist warld kderat state, Wqarbision of the future indudes an ecocopia of decenrrdized mmmunities, but this can only emerge after the work of creating a more baianced, sust-ainabte, and integrated rnrorld sociery has been done. The instrument that W w r rhe w r l d socialist state is a "World h r y " Dapite proposes for the job Qf huildi~~g currenr unhappiness with the Old Left and farrnal orpizaticsns in generai kcause of their "digarc;hicdmtendencies, Wags contends that there is redly no wrkable alternative to a dedicarced and rationdizd o r p i m t i o n for carrying out the pmcess of "nundializarion." This is not the place to engage the issues rajsed by the idea of-the Wodd Parry, But w e a n t e n d that Wagar could "o rright. What about semiperipheral development! We have already noted that the communisr states were semiperiphecll. Class struggles in the capitalist world-system have been dampened by nationalism in both the core and in the periphery. In rhe care, the domination of the periphery and competition with other core states have operated to reinforce nationalism at the expense of working-dass solidarity in several ways. In the periphery, peasants and workers have either been suppressed by elites in alliance with the core or they havt: made common nationaiist dliances with elements of rhe elite against the core. Thus class struggle was either suppressed or weakened by nariondism in both the core and the periphery; In the semiperiphery, class struggles have been less dampened by the corelperiphery hierarchy. The contradictory interests of semiperipheral elites and masses regarding alternative development paths have provided contexts in which strong peas-

ant/worker socialist and communist parties could come to state power. The Russian and Chinese Revolutions are the best examples, but the Mexican Revolution and populist regimes in Brazil and India also fit this model to some extent. We predict that semiperipheral challenges to capitalism will continue to emerge in the future. The industridimion of the semiperiphesy has already led to important labor movements and elecroral chdlenges. It is likely that these forces will continue to grow. If all the semiperipheral industrializing countries could attain core status these movements might pose only mild challenges to capitalism. But it is quire likely that most of the semiperipheral countries will not move into the core. This will create the context for &tug democratic socialist movements to come to state povver (demrdlp or by means of revolution) in the semiperiphery. Older forms of socialist organization will require retooling for the new conditions of global capitalism. Newly socialist states can learn from the mistakes as well as the pattial successes of the Soviet Union and People's Republic of China- h b o r unions will organize in new ways to meet the chdlenges of global capitalism and flexible specialization---though it must be remembered rhar many of the older forms of orpnizarian are still quite usable and appropriate, Mass-production industry (brdism) has not been eliminated by flexible specialimion. Rather, much of it has moved to the semiperiyhery. Trade unions of the traditional kind will continue to be quite relevant in these contexts. Both trade unions and socialist parties need to d d o p internationd structures for protecting constitwnts and the environmenr. We mentioned earlier that sociaiism does not thrive in the interstices as wff as capitalism does, Socialism-democraric and colIective rationality-requires much more in the way of normative structures than do capitalism or tributary systems; it is much more dependent on consensus among all the people and across different types of people. In this way it bears some similarity to the kinbased worid-systems, The communications technology that the capitalist world-system has produced can greatly facilitate the formation of world society while at the same time allowing people to understand one another's differences. The emergence of global democracy will require more than an international civil sociery composed of national elites, though this is how it is emerging. Trade unions and socialist parties need to understand the dynamics of the modern world-system and the prospects for transforming it into a socialist system. This will require organization at the global level, though that must be linked to local and regional organizations. Communications technology will help in this grand organizational task. But a clear understanding of the developmental dynamics of the capitalist world-system will also be necessary. The processes of globalization are an important arena of contention for ideological and organimtional hegemony Despite the current hegemony of neoliberalism we are optimistic about the prospects for world socialism if we can survive the next window of vulnerability without bringing on a nudeaf holocaust. World state Formation and internationat

and rransnationat socialist organiation and forms of exchange are thus our pxescriptioas Eor political action. Further comparative study of vvorld-systems and earlier systemic transformxions will help us ta survive and to build the instirurians of a more peacehi and just vvorld. W;e have made great advances in the narural and biological scienw that have trmsformed us from sewmts of the gods to kings sf the junge. Social science a n now help us to understand our own past and to shape a mare harmonious and wise collective &cure, In the final chapter vve summarize our findhgs and suggest questions for kture research.


Conclusi~nsQuestions, Speculations

In this final chapter we summarize the ground we have covered, draw some conclusions, note the ground we have missed, raise some new questions, and r w i w our speculations about possible futures for the contemporary wodd-system. We begin with a smmary,

Con~~u~ioxxs We have made several major arguments throughout this book. These constitute the foundation of a theoretical research program for constructing new explanations of social evolution based on world-systems as the unit of analysis. First, sociocultural evolution should be studied from a "vvorld-sysrem" or intersocied inzeraction perspective. Approaches that focus solely on change in individual "societies" or "groupb' fail adequately to attend to the effects of intersocietd interaction on social and cultural change. These eEects have been important since the beginning of sedentary human societies. The comparative mahod for understanding socid change muss be applied to cross-cultural interaaion nemorks because it is these that evolve, not only individuad societks. World-systems axe a hndamenral unit of vstemic social change in both small and large systems, Both long-term studies of single systems and systematic comparisons of many diEerent systems are valuable methodological appmaches for evduaring propositions about the historical evolution ofvvorld-systems, Second, in order to be usehl, conmpts developed for explaining and interpreting the history of the modern world-system must be modified extensively to deal with the problem of comparing ratfaer diEefent kinds of wdd-vstems. These changes ofien entail transhrming underiying assumptions in theories of the modern worldsystem into empirid questions. Thus we defrne mrld-systems as i ~ t e ~ f ~ net~i~tal wrks in which $156 irrtera&i~ns( ~ d e ,wdrflare, ilztemeiage, i~firnaagiun, t?$~.) are impartant fir the reprodgetion the inlernal s,rzscgul.es of t;hc cumpusiE-e %nitsand importanldy afea chasges $ha$occur in thefe hcat smcares. We separate the definitions of wrld-systems and corelperiphery structures, arguing that core/periphery relations should be investigated rather than a w e d , We bound systems by starting at


a particular point and noting all the important interaction networks that impinge on that point. We note that for many systems the largest interaction nerworks are those that pass information (INS) but &at these are only weakly systemic. The second largest networks are those in which prestige goods are exchanged (PGNs). These are sometimes (but not always) systemically important, and the basis of this importance is diEerent in diEerent systems. Many prestige-goods n e w o r b are i m p m n t because Lod elites maintain control and extract resources from local groups because they are able to monopolize the importation of socially necessary prestige goods. In California we found a prestigegoods neovork &at was s~temicallyimportant because it facilitated smaller networks in which basic foods were exchanged. Politicallmilitary interaction nets based on conAicts and alliances (PMNs) are usually smaller than prestige-goods neworb. Finally, nemoulss based on the exchange of basic foods and raw materials (BGNs) are usually smaller than PMNs. We note that eaGh of rhese nemorks may or may not be systemically important in any particular system, Furfhermare, the way in which they are important may be diff2erent in diEerent systems. Nwertheless we surmise that the size hierachy of these nets generally corresponds to their differential importance for local structural reproduction, In other vrords, it is usually the case &at information neworks are only w & y important, whereas bulk-goods nets are aiway~systemicalty hporrant. A piausible hyporhesis here is that tbe four necjvorks gener* evince significantly &Eferent degrea of vstemness. In order from wekest rn strangest these m: the information net, tke prmtige-pods net, the poliricatlmilita~net, and the bulk-pads net. Thus the positions of diEerent authclrs on the question of spatially bounding world-systems may be somewhat reconciled. Wdlersteids bounding of world-systerns in term of bulk-pods neworks may be understod as the mast consernative, because bulk goods are virtually always important, whereas larger nets (PMNs, PGNs) may in some cases not be systemically very important, In asserting the generdization ofdifferenrid importance we do not mean to substitute this supposition for careful research to &ermine the sptemic importance of the diEerent nets in each case. Furthermore, it may be the case that when nenvorks coincid-as in the modern world-system--the effect on system coherence or systemness is multiplicative, not simply additive. In separating the concept of world-syjtem from that of corelperiphery relations we allow for the examination of the rise of corelperiphery structures in world-systerns rather than excluding this phenomenon by definition. In our approach the spatial dimensions of each of the systemic nertvorks are determincld 6 ~and t then the ined+A state cannot be in a core (or peproblem of corelperiphery relations is ripheral) position relative to another society unless it is systemically connected with it. We also distinguish beoveen core/periphery differentiation and corelperiphery hierarchy. Corelperiphery differentiation exists if WO societies with different levels of population densiry, complurity, or internal hierarchy are importantly interacting. But this stilt does not tell us about possible power relationships bemeen rhese WO

societies. Corelperiphery hierarchy exists when one society is exploiting or dominating another. The determination of coreiperiphe~relations (both differentiation and hierarchy) must be made at each kvel ofnrmork interaction. It is generally difficult for one sociery to exploit or dominate another society that is very distant from itself, and thus corelperiphery hierarchies are more likely to exist within smaller neovorks (BGNs and PMNs) and less likely to exist in larger ones (PGNs and IN), Our nested newark, architecture sheds light on an important matter raised in the approach developed by Frank and Gills (1993a)-the idea of superhegemony. Superhegemony is alleged to occur when a single system has noncontiguous core regions and one of these core regions economically exploits a distant and separate core region. The debate between Wilkinson (1 993b) and Frank and Gills over superhegemony may be resolved in terms of the differences berween a system connected only by the informational and prestige-goods nenvorks versus those also connected by the politicd/military networks. Disagreements between Braudel and Wallerstein on the one hand and Frank, Gills, Wilkinson, and ourselves on the other about whether or not the Onoman Empire was systemidly connected with the Europe-centered system can be resolved by studying the connections by the inbrmation, prestig-goods, politicatlmilirary, and bulk-pods nemorks separately, Third, wrld-system evohtion involves three interlinked promses: srmiperipheral development (Chapter 51, icerations of population pressure and hierarchy formation, and transFctrmations of modes of accumulation (Chayter 6). These three processes account far &e evolution of hum= societies born thousands of nomadic foraging bands to the single complex and global sptem of today, Semiperipherd development linked corelperiphery structures to institutianai innovations that expanded and tralzstbrmed social nemorks. Iteraions of population pressure, intensification, and hierarchy formation provided the engines of development and the dyna&s of political rise and 611 &at are visible in all systems. The transformations of modes of accumularion altered the nature and dynmics of produceion, distribution, anci accurnularion. This in turn changed the way the processes of rise and fdl and expansion operated. This theory needs further elaboration and testing, but we think that we have included d l the essential elements for explaining the wolution of world-systems. The case studies in Chapters 7,8, and 9 apply our theoretical apparatus to specific instances: first, a very small and e$itariw vvorld-system in nonhern Cdihrnial second, the Mroeurasian system as it pulsated back and forth benveen regiond and interregiond nemorks and as core [email protected] interaaed and affected one another; and third, the modern capitalist world-system. These applications show how our conceptual apparatus works. These studies caused us to rethink some of our analytic proposds, notably adding the information net to our considerations, Our reconceptualization of the problem of incorporation-the processes by which formerly separate systems became linked-is informed by our case studies and utilizes the nested nenvorks approach. We expanded the continuum between contact peripheries and h11 incorporation developed by Thomas Hall (1386, 1989)

to include each of the four interwtion types. h we have noted, all systems tend to expand at times. When they do, they absorb or displace other peoples and smdler vstems. 'The ways in which fhey incorporate new territories and peoples sseern to vary with changes in modes of accumulation. Because the study of state-level peoples generally has been divorced from the study of nonstate peoples, these differences haw seldom been studied and cunsquently are poorly understood, In Chapters 9 and 10 we discussed the modern world-system in terms of the light shed by our comparative perspective. The modern world-system shares many general characteristics with other systems: cycles of rise and fdall, pulsation, and pressures for (and processes of) internal differentiation and similariry. But what is truly unique about the modern world-system! We argue that the mode of acc~rnulation-ca~italist acmmulation-is a unique feature o f the modern world-system in the sense that it has become the predominant logic of the system. This accounc; for the unusually rapid rate at which the modern world-system revolutionizes technology. The population pressure/intensification/hierarckyformation model has developed technology in all systems since the Stone b e , but the modern world-system is unique in the extent to which it provides incentivgs far the creation and implementation of new technologies, The iterations of the basic model continue to occur in the modem world-system but with certain important digeraces due to the predominance of capitalist accunutation. As W noted earlier, the modern w t e m is atso the rim lage system in which the faur n e w o h have come to coincidie spatially Obviously too, it is the first m r M system ta be truly d o M , to encompass the entire planet. Other chaxacteristics are less clearly unique, The oft-noted intersrate system (multiple and, competing states) is clewly not unique to rhe modern vvarld-s)lstem, But the modern system may bp: unique in the longrviy and degree of decentrdimion of power in the core and in the mechanisms by which the cycle of rise and fafl operate. The sequence of hegemanic rise and fdI &at has occurred for 500 yeats in the Europe-centered regional system is substantially different from the alternation beween state systems and universal states that characterized most eadier state-based systems. We also argued in Chapter 9 that Europe has long been systemicdly linked with the West Asian system and has long been part of a systemic prestige-goods nerwork of Afroeurasian scope. We also contend that the rise of Europe was due both to i t s semiperipheral position in the larger Afroeurasian system and to its ability to implement &lly the institutional characteristics of capitalism that were already present, but in a more diluted form, in the larger Afroeurasian system. We agree that, as Frmk and Gills (1993a) have argued, Europe remained in a somewhat peripheral relationship with China until quite recently, and that this is indicated by the terms of vade by which Europe paid for Chinese manufactured goods with silver and gold. But Europe was not a fully peripherdized segment of a China-centered coreiperiphery hierarchy because China did not control Europe militarily and did not have any direct control over Europe's access to bulk goods. Thus the superhegemony of China over Europe, unlike the hegemonis of later European sates, was based solely on sue

periorities in the production of fine goods. This was hegemony, but it was not of the hilly imperid kind.

Questions Though our theoretical research program requires both close case studies of single systems and formal comparisons of a large number of systems to test the hypotheses we have proposed, we have gune ahead in the absence of these to suggest what such studies might find. Much more research must be done before W a n be certain about the utility of our &amwork Regarding the empiria of the nested networh approach, we have employed the decisions made by David Wilkinson about the expanding boundaries of the Central PGN and the Central PMN. Wilkinson's chronographs are a helpful beginning, but they need to be restudied with an eye to the problems of pulsation and fall-off. No one has yet proposed a chronograph of the expansion of the Central information net or the Central bulk-goods net. Both of these involve tremmdous dificdties reprding the problem of fdl-oE-the spatial extent of systemic eRects. Since nearly all bulk-goods nets conneer with local neighbors, there are few breaks or discontinuities over space. But this does not mean that systemic consequences of changes (e.g., shortages or surpluses) ortend indefinitely The range of systemic interaction is a funaim of transportatinn and communications costs, and these change greatly across systems. Research on this aspect of interaction is very mu& needed at this point. Another Iacuna in the boundaries realm is the bounding of kin-based systems. wlkinson"s work focuses only on systems that have cities, Few smaller and less bierarchicd systems have had their interaction nemork boundaries specified. We have proposed that lzll world-vstems puhate in the sense that interaction netw r k s expand and contrast, or at least expand more rapidly and then less rapidiy. VVe also surmise that ;illsyscems that contain hierarchid forms of social organization exhibit cycles of rise and Eall in which the largest polities grow and then decline in power. These propositions suggest several further questions: Are the +es of pulsation of each of the four kinds of interaction temporafly relateci to each other in r e p jar vvays in most qstems? That is, does pulsation in the size of PGNs correspond temporally with pulsations ia PMNs or BGNsZ h d are the pulsarion cycles tempordly correlated with the sequences of centdiation and decentrdiation of political power among polities?Just what is driving these tvvo diarenr (7ycIical processes and how are t h i s causes related! Our evoiurionav theory of iterations in the population pressurelintensificationl hierarchy formtion model, dong vvith the idea of semiperipheral dmelopment, proposes a generd explanation for the relationships m o n g these processes. But we recognizr: that it will take more sophisticated stadia to verify the exisace of these cycles and to determine their causes, One of the largest debates i s on the issue of transformations of modes of amumuiacion. fithough we outlined in Chaper 11 our best guesses regatding the transhr-

mation problem, explicit long-term and camparative studies of transformarions need to be done. There are important differenceswithin the broad rypes that we have designated as kin-based systems. Some are without hierarchy and have little accumulation (e.g. ! h a g San, Wintu), and others have greater hierarchy (tribes and chieMoms) and more accumulation. Our study of the Wintu revealed only mild f o m s of core/ periphery hierarchy h this very smdi and egditarian system, m a t has not been done are close studies of more complex and hierarchical kin-based systems (big-man systems and chiefdoms) to determine to what extent corejperiphery hierarchies exist and how they operate. Though we have proposed a hypothesis about the role of semiperipheral marcher chiefdoms in the rise of larger chieay polities, this has not yet been evaluated by means o f a close case study, We have made a rough evaluation of the hypothesis of semiperipheraldwelopment in Chapter 5 by utilizing David Wlkinson's (1991) specification of changes in cores, peripheries, and semiperipheries in twelve state-based PMNs. This problem requires further study. There is a partial mismatch b e m e n our definition of semiperiphery and wlkinson's that might after our conclusions if it we= 6x4. VVhat needs to be done is a new consideration o f upward and dwnward mobility in the cases that Wilkinson covers and an extension of this kind of study to a representative smple of kn-based systems. A doser study of the phenomenon of semiperipheral capitalist city-stares vvould dso provide a firmer waftration of our contention chat these entities played an imporcant role in the spreading and intensification of comodification, Our hypotheses in Chapter 30 about the relative sizes of diEererzt interaction nets need to be confronted by empirical studies; in order m be substantised, they require format mmparisans of a large number of diRerear systems, The mearch reported in Chapter 10 about the reiaeionships bemeen empire and city sizes in different PMNs must be improved by the use of mare and berrer data. Our serendipitous finding of synchronicities beniveen the Central and East Asian PMNs requires further a m i n a tion, Were there similar synchronicities of urban and empire gromh in earlier separate PMNs that were connected ro the same PGN, for example, Egypt and Mesopotamia! Why did the Indic patterns diverge from those found in the Central and East h i a n PMNsZ And what caused the CentrdlEat Asian synchroniciry? These are fundamental questions that can only be resolved by further research.

Many authors contend that the contemporary system has undergone fundamental changes during the 1980s and 1990s. We disagree with this assessment. ChaseDunn (1994), for example, has argued that most of the visible changes in technology, globdization of investment and trade, the demise o f the Soviet Union, and the appearance of "world culture" do not constitute fundamend changes in the logic of the modern world-system. We contend rather char: the fystemic m d s and c;ycles that have been characteristic Eeatures of the modern systenz for hundreds of years are

continuing and that fundamental change has not yet occurred. But we argue that fundamental change (systemic transformation) is likely to occur within the next few centuries. In Chapter 11 we outlined sweral possible scenarios for future transformation. In one version, the world-systemic cycles and trends continue much as they have in the past, and the whole system is destroyed by a war among core powers. According to the projections of Donella Meadows, Dennis L. Meadows, and Jargen Randers (1992) on world population, resource consumption, and pollution, a ecological disaster could produce much the same consequences as a nuclear war. Another possibiliry we envision is the emergence of a world state. This would involve another round of the iteration cycle in which a global state emerges to deal with global problems. But in the past the iteration model has usually operated through long phases of conflict and centralization by conquest. These mechanisms would likely be fatal under contemporary levels of military destructiveness. The trmsfc(rmatiun of the rise-and-Eall sequence horn empire formation to hegernonic rise and hll involved an increafe in the importance o f economic cornperition over politicallmilitary competition, hough it did not eliminate wrfa,re, But this longrun evolutionary trend may presage the eyentud eliminariorr of vvaffare as a method of choosing globd 'leadership." The problem is to find an dternative to corrqlxest as a mechanism for allovviq global pollrid integation, It is obvious that democratic politicat institutions at the global level could s m several purposes-the legitimation of a giobd collective sectlrity provider; a mechanism for addressing global environmend problems; and an opening for democratizing m d balancing the processes of economic development. We also discuss& the prospects and nacure of a possiMc future tmnsfamarion from capitalism to democratic socialism. We suggest that further experiments with socialism are likeiy to emerge in the contemporary semiperiphery and that the rise to predominance of socialism as a mode of accumulation will require global socialist organizations, Though the main purpose of this book has been to construct a scaffolding for the comparative study of world-systems, our ulcimare goal is ta use this apparatus to address the real problems and possibilities of the contemporary system. To do that well will require further research and more refined theorizing. Our speculations here are meant to prod others to join the effort to provide a solid scientific basis for understanding our species and the processes ofsocid evolution.

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l. The world-systems perspective was developed by Samir h i n (1980, 1983, 1330, 1931), h d r e Gunder Frank (1966, 1369a, 1369b), Ciovanni Arrighi (1379, 1985, X 9341, Imnzanuel Wallerstein (13*74a, 13748, 1373a, 1973b, 1380, 138"ia, 1989, 1990, 133 2391b, 1932a, 1332b, 19941, and other scholars at the Fernand Braudel Center of the State Tjniversiry of Mew York at Binghamron. Shannon (t936) provides a readable introduction to the world-systems perspective. Martin (13944 provides a detailed assessment of developments in rhe nvo decades since Wdferstein's introduction of world-system theory (1974a, 1974b), and Chase-Dunn and Grimes 0 9 9 5 ) and Hall (1926~)summarize recent developments, 2. A paradigm is a very p e r d frmmork from vvhich specific theories are constructed, See Thamas m n 1970, 1927, for detailed discussiom oafparadigms. 3. For example, see Nisber 1363, Eenski's ((1376) reply, and Granovetrer's (1973) usefuj discussion. Sanderson (1990) presents an exhaustive rwiew of the issues and discusses world-system theory explicitly in a later book (1992). Some other relevant wocb are: Mams 1966; Adams and Nissen 1372; h d e r s o n 1374a, f 974b; Price and Brown 1385; Childe 1936, 135 1; Fried 1 3 6 3 Glassman 1386; Gledhilf. 1388; GledbiI1, Bender, and Larsen 1388; Gregg 1388, 1931; John A. Half 1986, 1987; John R Hall X 332; Harris 1977, 19"i"; Huntington 'f 9 15; Johnson and Earle 138% knski 1 366; Lenski and Nolan 1284, 1986; Mann 1386; Modetski and Thompson 1395; Parsons 1966; Paynter 1989; QuigIey 1973; Sahlins and Service 1360; Service l971 1375; Stevvard 1355; Teggart 1318, 1925, 1933; Tilly 1386; Trigger 5984, 1230; Upham 1390; Max Veber lL375; and Wrigfit 1386, 4. h & mSherratc (1995) m&es a very sirnitlv argument about achaeolop. m i l e recognizing the need to &construct old concepts, he arpas forcehlly that the time has come to reconstruct "the grand narrative" of human hbroy. He, too, makes the point rhat dit the "postwhatever" movements are merely phases on the way to rahinking our concepts, and not the end of theorizing, as some misr&enly believe. 5. A line we stole with brazen folly, From our dear coueque, Goldfmk, Wdt_y. 6. A teleolof3.liealexptmation is one rhat explains an outcame in terms of find awm or uiriman: purposes, We arpe-m do df sGientific ewfutionay ti~inkerethatsocial change and evolution we due to prior causes, nor innmment purposes, "7 We foUovv the new convention in listing dates: C.E, for "common era" 2nd B.G.E. for "before the common era," which replace A.D. and B.C. f,

Chapter 1 1. Since the mid-1970s there have been many studies that have applied vvortd-sysrems concepts to p f e - s k t e e n t h - ~ e ~systems. t ~ r ~ The first of these were the studies by Pailes and Whitecotton (1375, 19791, Schneider (19771, mitecotton and Pailes ( l 979, 1383, 19861, E b a l m and Friedman (1980, 19821, Friedman (1383), and Ebotm (1980). Mote recent works that expficitly discuss the relevance of world-systems concepts are: Kohl 1978, 1973, 1981, 1385, 1387a, 198";7$, 1392; Kohl and Wrighr 1377; Btanton and Feinman 1984; Upharn 1982, 1986, 1990, 1992; Edens 1992; Kowalewski 1382, 1390, 1392a, 1992b, 1936; La Lone 2 992; Nasaney 1931; Oxrien 1332a, S 992b; Pdes and Reff S 985; Wilkinson 1976,1387a, 1987b, 19882, 1988b, 1990, 1991,1332, S 393a, 1993b, 1935a, 1395b; m i t e and Burton 1987; McGuire 1380, 1983, 1986, 1383, 1392, 1936; A g a x 1983, 1993; Gailey and Patterssn 43872, 1387b, 1388; Bau& 1984, 1931, 1392; Schortman 1989; Schortman and Urban 1987, 1392a, 1932b, 1392~;Dincauze and Hasensrab 1989; Feinrnan and Nicholas 1990, 199 1a, 199 9Z b, 1392, 1996; Patterson 1930; Peregrine 1931, 1992, 1395, 1996; Peregrine and Feinman 1996; Callins 1992; Kepecs, Feinman, and Boucher 1944; Upham, Lightfoot, and Jewett 1983; Upham, Feinman, and Nichotas 1992; Berquist 1395; Aden f 992, f 396; Woolf 1990; and the arrictes by Foster, Mathien, Stark, and WiLcox in col[tectionsedited by Mathien and McGuire (1986); articles by Haselgrove, Hedeqer, Gistiansen (as awe11 as Gistiansen 1982), hrsen, Liverani, Rowlands, and Zaccagnini in Rowlmcfs, Larsen, and Gistiansen 1987; Champion 1989a, 1389b; Champion and Champion 1986; articles by Helms, Santley and Aexander, Weigand, Wells, and mitecotton in Sehortman and Urban 1992a; articles by Ltntz, Spielmmn, and Wilcox (as -well as Wilcox 1333) in Spielmann f 93 1a (and see also Spielmann 1983); articles by ChaseDunn and Hall, Gills and Frank, and Sanderson in Chase-Dunn and Hall 139 1a (and see also Chase-Dunn and Hail 1932, S 333a, 1393b, f 994, 1995a, I995b; Hail 199Ga, 1994t>, 1936~;and Hall and Chase-Dunn 1936); articles by Nien, BIanton et al., Collins, Firzpat"& Friedman, Mosetey, O'Brien, and Upham et al. in a special issue of R e ~ i wan comparing vvorld-systems, edited and introduced by Chase-Dunn (1932b); and articles by Boworth, McNeil, and Sanderson as well as introductory essays by Sanderson and Sanderson and Half in Sanderson 133Fb. Andre Gunder Frank and Barry E;, Gills have written a great deal about preqitalist wortd-systems; sec Frank 1989, li990a, 193Ob, f 931, 1932, 1993a, 3393b, 1934, 1335; Frank and Giils 1930,1992, 1393b, 1995; and GiIfs arid Frank 1391, 1992. There are important articles by Abu-Lughod, Wdierstein, and Wlkinson in Frank and Ciljs 1393a. We have reviewed much of this tixerature in detail in Hall and Chase-Dunn 1923, S 994. 2.Michaei Mann (1986, chap. 2) claims thar general evolution ended and history began with the emergence of the first states. According to Mann, prior to the formation of early states social change was uprehistoric"in the sense thar wolurionary processes (mainly ecological constraints) set tight limits on the kinds of social organization rhar were possihie, and human action had very Little effect in determining the nature of social change. Mann introduces the protagonist of the first empire formation, Sargon of Agade, as the first historical actor on Earth. But Mann's sawn discussion of how ""prehistoric peoples evaded power" suggests that intentional action and struggles over social institutions were important elements of social organization well before the emergence of states. ~ t h n o graphic studies support the notion thar srareless societies exhibit historicity in Manni

3. Qn commodiy chains, see Gereffi and Korzenimicz (2993). 4. We use the terms state and nagion in their technical senses. See the giossw for definitions, 5. Suck a unitdizy, a hawhoid or ethnic g r u u p m a y haw considerably &Rerent characterisrics in diEerent types of worfd-systems, For an [email protected] discussion of this problem with res p t ro ethniciry, see Wall 1384, Wlliam Martin (1994b)notes that the modern, core-centric versions of most of these subunics have been accepted as "namrd" for so Long that their existence in other forms is unthinkable. 6. We note, however, that in the present h m a n s m y 7 by their Burn actions, be aecting climtic A m p . Anthr~po~enic dimace change is an endogenous variable in hum= social wolution. Though these knds of eEecrs may have misted on a small scde in the p s t , most climatic changes were exogenous to social molution, We have in mind here clearly external effects such as solar flares or collisions with comets. 7.A met;itheoreticd consicteration is a basic assumprion about the way the w r l d works. The didt36tic and the chaos theory ;ire exmples, In the case of systemic t o g a those who attempt to explicate the nature of logics usually acsume that logics become transformed, where= those theorists who only imply systemic logic usudly assume continuir2.; It is important ra m k e these assumptions explicit, m d it would be desirable to formdiz contending theories so that their contrary empirical implications could be subjected to research. 8. E;or an application to the collapse of the Soviet Union see GItins I986b, chap. 8, and Coltins and Wafter 1932. 9, E b o l m and Friedmm are not strict "continwtionists""beause they do accept chat there was a transformation of systemic logic when. prestige-gooh economies evolved into urbani=d states in which ""abstract wedth"" (apital) be e an important element of social reproduction. But once states appear, Ebafns and Friedman emphasize the continuiay of systemic Logic across df state-based systems, ancient and modern. Thus their position (especidly in Friedman 19322) straddles our continuationist-trmsforma~ianistdkision. They are transfermat ion is^ in that they achowledge a major shik with the invention of states; h e y are conclnuationisfs in that they a r p e that the logic of capital imperidism dominates all systems once smtes %re invented. 10. Efizabeth Brurnfiel (1992) criticizes cuiturd ecolol;ists for overemphasizing the natural environment and for ne$ecting such factors as gender, class, and faction. We find her critique [email protected], and our approach attends to these factors while also achowledging the importmce of demographic and ecological process. I I, "Carving apacity" i s discussed in more detail in Chapter G, 12. "Circumscription7'is discussed in more detail in Chapter G, 13. In addition to sourca cited in this section, the f-izlfowingarticles describe the substantivis~formdistissues in more detail: Dalton 1968; Gledhiil and Larsen 2 982; Wopkns 1957; Pearsun 1357; Polanyi 1344, 1957a, I357b, 137'7; and Polanyi, Arensberg, and karson 1357. 14. Many forms of exchange that look X k i markets are not price-setting markets, In no society are all socid objects commodified, but market societies are those in which the provision of substantial elements of the daily life of the averqe member are commodities whose exchange is mediated by market forcets. X 5. AIl societies accumulate resources, which some schohrs refer to as "capital," But capitalist accumulation in Mm's sense is a qualitatively digerent process from that which is used by nomadic pastoralists to increase their herds or by sedenm~yforagers to stare food. Thus we distinguish beween g n e r d accumulation-the a m s i n g af wealth in any form-mci =pi-

d s r accmuiafiam-the massing of wed& in the form of stored Labor-vdue (capitad) in a system in which Labor has become a commodiry; 16. The transformationists diEr among themselves rega&ng heir claims about the timing of the rise to predominance of the capitalist mode of production in modsirn Europe. Wdlerstein (1974b) claims that the transition to "qrarian mpidism" occurred in the "long sixteenth century," from 1450 to 1640, Wolf (1982) sides with many other Mamists who dare the arrival aC fully dweloped industrid capitalism as occurring with the industrial rcrvolution of the ei$teenth century;

Chapter 2 l. A comparative research strategy requires the study of a group of c m s across which the variables of interest vary Bemuse we axe intermred in apbining the basic structurd features of vvorld-$>"stemswe need to compre cases that have very diRerent structure, 2, We are M O tdkng ~ here about socid cosmograph~the conscious awarenas of Interaction neworb, but rather of rhe objective interaction nemorh rhemeives, Direct interactions require consciousness but indirect interactions do not, Xn both global and snnaIler re~;ion;li. world-s)lstems the objective world of indirect economic and political interconnections is usuaily much larger than that portion of rhe system of which people are consciowly aware. The wod& of people iiving in stacetess mcieties were relatiwly small, in term of both hose interactiom of which they were aware and those whose in&rect egecrs inauenad the social structura in which they lived. 3. Peason (1957) provides a helpful re-view of the older literamre on this debate. 4, Moseiey and Wdlerstein (1978) present a wehi concordance of most ewiutionary rypo~og2es. 5. Another mixed mode is the 'Gamanic mode of production" or "decentrdi~dstratified socieey'3escribed by kistiansen (1991, 19) in connection with his study of systemic cycles in Bronz-&e Europe, 6. Thb argument is elaborated in Chase-Dunn 1392~.Obviomly, too, there may be yet other modes of amumulation, as yet unthought ofmd unseen. 7. A sommhat modified version of Wilkinsonkcbronograph of this process is presented later, in Chapter I Q. 8. The phrase "the development of underdevelopment" was coined by h d r e Eunder Frank (1966) to descrik the procas in which core countries extract resources from their economic andlor political cotoaia. This corelperiphey aploitation not only biocb develop ment in the periphery but also systematicallydistorts dwelopment in harmbl ways. Thus it is the eorelperiphery retationship itself &at taws ""underdevelopment." 3. Jon Befquist (1395) brought this possibility to our artentian in his discussion of the Achaemenid empire's treatment of its various western colonies. MitcheII dfen (1996), as noted earlier, discusses this issue in considerable detail. 18. Greg Woolf (1990) argues that there w a no semiperiphery in rhe Roman world-ystern aaording to Wdlerstein's definition, However, the situation he describes would seem to fit some of our other types of semiperipheries. The larger paint i s &at the conksion &at Woolf points out is generated by an averly narow definition of rfie semiperiphery. I I. Galtonk probiem, simply stated, is that in the absence of complete isolation, it is nearly impossible to ciisrin~khindependent invention (or p x d d woltltion) from d i h i o n . Here we are adkasing the rwerse problem: Pardel farms -not be a w e d to demonamte interaction

because of the possibilicl~of i n d ~ n d e ninvention t or p d d woXution. Our point is rlre kteraaion nemorh must be discovered by m m s other &an aftifact similaritiesor merences.

Chapter 3 l. Sewice (1975) paints out the irony &at, contrary to notions of "savage anwchy," satelea societia are the most "civilixd" in the sense that the mord order is the most impoaafitt producer of social integration. 2. Some antlhropolo&ts have indiated ;an impnant watershed within the category we have designated as Irin-based. With increased inscitutiandimion of relations among hamlets, intergroup m;uliage t&es on importance as a m m s of stabilizing intergroup aliianes, Coninequalicy that distrol of marriage by male linage heads is a form of pawer based on tinguishes such systems. MeiUassoux (1981) designates such societies as opemting according to the logic of a c4domesticmode of production." Work by Gailey (1385, 1987) and Sifverblatt (1387, 1388)sugests that the dmelopment of a "domestic mode of production" and the transition from chiefdom to sraee art: part and parcel of both the universd subordination of w m e a in state societies and the tl-czmetndousvariabilify in the ypes and degrea of such subordination. The interplay of gender roles and status digerentiais, the transition from chiefdom to state, and intermwriage as a pofitid alliance system need careful study and rahinking, especidly vvith respect to the formation of corelperiphexy hierarchies. This is one of several instances where feminist critiques of the mde-centric approach to heorizing is especidy apt (see Ward 1993, 1930). 3. Thou$ the theoretied approach behind these distinctions is M a i a n , the categories produced are somewhat congruent with those issuing from very digereat perspectives, Thus societim in which the kin-bmd mode is predominant correspond roughiy to Parsons$ (3366) "primitive" mcieries and k m & and lanskiS (1987) preqrarian (hunter-gatherer, horticultural) societies. Societie~in which the tributay (state-bad) modes are dominant are roughly equivalent to Parsons"s"ancient7' anand k n s k and LensMs "sgrarim'' categories; and societies claminatecl try the capidist mode overlap to ssorne extent vvith ksonds "modern'band Lens& and hnski"s "industrial""societies. There are imponant thearerid diEEerences bemeen these perspectives, to be sure, but our point here is that tlhe generd caregories of compwison are similar at the operaion4 level. 4. The t r i b u t q mode accounts for rnost of written history. Our distinctions within this broad category are based on size, complexiry, and psliticd structures, but we expect that these divisions correspond to important digereaces in institutional Features and developmental promsses. 5. Many standad evolutionq studies assume that sedentism occurrd first a o n g neolitfiic borticdruralists and that [email protected]&ems (foragers) were nowdie, This is partly a consequence of ethnographic studies of recent [email protected], rnost of whom have lived in vey stark environments because they have been pushed our of prime locations by more hierwchicall peoples. Earlier for%ers were able to occupy ecotogidly grime tocations. It was in these locations h a t mesoli&c sedentay and population-deme sociaies first dimlopecl in the kvant some 12,000 years ago (Henry 1985).There are a fm ethnographidly known emmpies of sedentary.forqers (e.g., Native Cdifornizns), See Chapter 7. G. The primry versus secondq (or "reactive") distinction can also be applied to tribes and chiefdams. Reactive or secon* social c h a p implies that inrer;lctions beween various socid structures induce changm in some of them rowad fncreseci similarity; Far a m p l e , a

sate system interacting with a big-man system may induce the formation of a tribe with appointed leaders and may even induce the formation of a chiefdom (Hdi 1983, t 983). 7. We revimed in Chapter l the explicir mrfd-systems approxh developed by Friedman and. Rowlands (1377). Orhers who take account of regional relations are Carneiro (1970, 1978, X 98 1) and knfrew and Cherry (1986). 8. The issue of h i & instances of state formation were primary and which were secondary is a m m p k one. Those who argue &at state formation in China was largly a consequence of the diffusion of bronze-making technology and the chariot from West h i a tend to ignore the local and regiond conditions in China that led up to the emergence of the %ang state. h emerging debate among those utilizing rhe world-systems perspective to analyze premodern social change is shaping up between the "lumpers" and the "splitten" (discussed in Chapter I). This debate has an earlier incarnarion vvihin archaeolog bemeen the difisionisrs and &e ecological school. The difisioniscs amended that long-distance diEusion of cultural elements vvas a central causal factor in most 1 o d dwelopmencs, whereas the cultural ecologists focused on Local interacrions with the natural environment. 'l"hose atchaeoio&istsand anthropologists adopting a world-systems approach are ofien reacting to the overly ""local" focus of the cutcurd ecologists, but they also remember rhe simplistic and facile use of difision models. bng-distance interaction can oc-cur in severa'l ways and can have vaious effects depending upon what is already going on in a Lodity or region. One purpose of our conceprudiatfsn of world-systems is to facilitate empirical smdy of the consequences of daerenr kinds of long-distance interacticms for lacd social structures. 9, For analyses of nomad-sebentav relations, see Chapters 4and. 8 and Halt 1931a, 195)1b. 10. An intermediate case is that of the Nuer-Binka relationship studied by KetXy (1985). The Nuer, pasrordkts in the Sudan, lacked strong and permanent chiefs, but they did have three levels of hierarchy among villages that enabled them rc~form larger war bands than the neighboring Di&, who were similar pastordists, but had only two levels of incratribd hierarchy Thus the Nuer systemarically raided the Dinka for attIe and women, and apanded into Dinka territory over a 150-year period, Though the Nuer w r e dearly exploiting the D i n b by appropriating cattle and women, the limited forms of hierarchy vvithin the Nuer society prevented this relationship from stabilizing into a corelpetiphery hierarchy based on aploitation of coerced fabor in the periphery; The D i n h women taken as captives were rapidy assimilated into Nuer kinship structures. I 1. Arguments to this effect have atready been put forth by KoM (1387b) and by Di&onoff (1973) for rhe Sumerian-centered wottd-system, but contrary evidence has been found by h b e r g - G r l o v s b (13'75). Renfrew" (l 986) model of early sate modules and peer interaction emphasizes the cowolutionasy spects of polity formation in chieMorns and early states. Howevex; findings based on one ar n;vo instances are not: sugcient for testing our propositions. Only fairly comprehensive and complete studies that compare:a h r g number of whole worid-systems can clonfirm or disprove these hygothesef. X2. Mann (1986, chap. 5) emphasizes the beneficial eEects on economic development of the ummpulsory cooperation* and pacifiation of large areas organized by the early conquest empires, Other scholars (e.g., Di&onoE 1973) emphasize the exploitative and destructive effects rhat these empires had on peripheral regions. Ir is undoubtedy the case that some ernpiras had greater beneficid effects &an others. These matters need ro be sorted out by studies that examine all the regions within each relevmt wortd-system and systematicdky compare world-systems.

13. Recall from Chapter I the d i f i i o n of the yam frorn Peru to H a w ~ iThough . we are not concerned with rare, one-shot excursions, such as the yam or Eric the Red, for these pup-centric bounded systems, jwt h e r e to bound &em remains a thorny empirical and heoretid &sue,

Chapter 4 t . The term "region of sehge" "(~guirre Beltran X 979) describes aretas that are anfy partially incorporated into a state system. hrtial incorporation has Ehe ansequence of Fteezing social change within such are*. This "presenes" the area in rwo ways. First, it sets it side for future dweIopmenr. Secand, it "presewes" older, "traditional," social forms and hence: is a "refuge'" for social forms that have k e n destroyed elswhere in the system, 2, These procssa are discussed more hlly later in this chapter. Eric Wolf (2982), R Nick hrdulias (f5)90),and Thornas Abler (1332) pravide summary &scwsions and introductions to the vast literature on the frtr trade, We note hnher &at h e fur trade in southeastern North h e r i c a , in what is known as southern AppAchia, digered significantly from that in the norrhemt. Tmde in deerskns was a major industq, often second onIy to exporo of tobacco or cotton, This trade was much more impartant to European powers since it invotved Iarge qwtities of staples, Gnsequently, incorporation processes digered in a number of ways, These are discuss& in detit by Wifma 8,Dunaway in her book (I 996a, chap, 2) and in her article (15)96b), which examines incorporation through both convention4 world-systems andysis and the approach we advance in this chqrer, 3. Wdlerstein &scribes the digereaces beween them: < ' m a tyou [Half]call 'contact periphery" is exactly what I mean tty 'external, aena.' The mamd arena L aniy of inrerest if &ere b sorne market articulation. The question is what kind, V7hat you cdf hmgind periphery" is what we have been calking "incorporation' and what you. d 1 "full-blown periphery" vve have b e n calling the process of peripherdization that occurs only &er our 'incorporation"' (personal communication, October 2 5, 1985; published as note 3 in Hall 1386). 4. If we use the criteria of trade in bullion, West Mrica has been linked to the Mediterranean and Near Estern core regions since at least 800 C.E. (Curtin f 290, 32). Most of the gofd wins, which played an important part in the Euraian world-system, were minted frorn West Mrican gold in tium and EWE (Abu-Lughod 1983). MoseIv ( (932) and WiIlard 61933) study the long-rern incarpomtian of West a r i a , 5. Many scholars distinwish bemen empires and modern national states in terms of indirect versus direct rule (e.g., %fly 1390). It is deged that empires did not pnetrate deeply into local social or economic processes. The comparative study uf preeapitalist empires, howwer, reveals rhrrr the extent of penetration varied greatly, The Aztecs gathered tribute by military &reat, rarely even bothering to chmge the leadership of local polities (Wassip, 1388). In cantrast, the Incas h n h e n t d f y reorgmized l a d economic and social structures, 6, This is documented for sorne caes in nlclfrh America. In the Old %rid b m eventually becme so powerhl that his w a no longer possible, 7. Qn the one hand, hose groups who conr-inuedoceasiond gadening could now @&er in liwges @@upsbeause the increw4 trmspomtion egcienq of horses &a &owed them to hunt over fager e b e d base. On Ehe other hand, chose groups t h t were entirely nomadic, o now travel a mu& wi& rmge of territory; See Secay 1953.

8. Meat ffom the h e r i a n bison has a higher protein conrent than beef or chicken, but lower tevels of fat, cholesterol, and dories than beef, clzicken, or pork, 3. &where in k i n h e r i c a the spread aF Fed horses and cattle also vastly disrupted indigenous worid-systtems (ffaretta and MarkoE 19'18) and in the 1 3 a m p regiion of muthern South h e r i c a gave f i e to a whole new type of sociecy: the Gauchos (Slatta 1483). 1Q. Our study of the mntu praented in Chapter 7 is potentidly subject to rhis k n d of error, We have careffrlly considered the zchaeological and erhnograpbic evidence with this in mind. 1l. For dierailed examples, see Barfield l989 or Hall 1983. 12. The point here is not terminolog, but underlying similariry in andysa, Sherratt's "margin'' corresponds approximately to the range hom our contact &mu& margind peripheries. The concept of "hinterlandt"' used by Frmk and Gills (1993a), Gitfs and Frank (1391), and Gollins (1978, 1981) also corresponds rou$lly to the same range of d e p e s of incorporation. 13. Our andysls of frontiers draws upon but is diKerent from Frederick Jackson Turner's classic work, See Hofstadter and Lipset 1968; Jeftlrey and Weber 1934; Latrirnore 1340, 1962a; MarkoR 1934; Norton 1383; Bsborne and Rogerson 1978; Paynter 1385; Slatta 1992; Taylor 19722;and Weber 1386, 1387. 14. This analysis is confirmed in the w r k of Rudi Lindner (138 l , 1383). He a p e s that the Huns abandoned the use of horses after invading Europe w s t of the Carpathians. The movement to foresred areas made horses a Iiabiliry, hampered a nomadic lifestyle, and promoted sedentaxy Iiving. IS. The distinction bemeen aternaf and internd frontiers should nor be conhsed with Barfield's (1389) distinction bemeen inner and outer frontier strategies; these are discused in Chpter 8. 16. The underlying caruse is ofien population irnbdance with raaurces, which usually creates political or religious dkagreements and Eactiondization. I-fence fissioning, which states see as problematic, had important positive survkd consequences for nonstate societies because it distributed and redisrributed ~apulationspatially, 1 7 Culturicide, ofien called "culturd genocide," refers to a process in which a culture is destroyed, even thou& not ail individrt& in that culture are killed. For an insightM discussion of this process for Native h e r i c a n groups, see J a m s Fenelon 1395, 1996.

Chapter 5 I. This last form of semiperipherdiry has been termed subim imp er id ism" by Marini (1972). 2. See hderson 1394 for a useful recent revim* 3, A conical clan is an extensive common descent group, ranlced and segmented along genesfogicai lines and patrilineai in ideological bias. 4. March lands ar &c mxches are terms for border or frontier areas. A "marcher" is one who inhabits such area, and a mrcher sate is a border or frontier state. ims. The city is Agade. 5. The Imguqe is M a d i a n and the people are G. Some s&oIars of the ancient Near East dispute the idea that the U a d i a n s were recendy settled pastordists, contgnding that Surnerian and alldim spe&ers ha$ resided next to one another in this region for millennia, Evidence relevant to determining the corelperiphery position of Agade in the Sumerian system is thin. The archaeologiml site of &ade has never been found. But documentary etrideace suppora the claim that it W% located weII north and upriver of the old Mesopomian core region, and the Fact that the

tuted the M a d i a n language for the older writtm Sumrim supports the interpretation of the dian anquerars as ~rniperipherdmarchers. 7, Contrary to Mann's claim that Sargon used heav infantry, [email protected] (139 l, SS) says, "Sargon and his succesors changed the traditional bade tactics by replacing the small, heavily armed detachments large mases of lightly arm&, mobile wariors, who either fougfit in chain formations or dispersed." 8. Mann (1986) uses the term uproteetion renf to mean extraction of surpius by coercive taxation of merchants, We would clssify thb as one farm of the tributary mode. Lane's sage sugests rather the nature of policy and action taken by cqi~aIiststates. 3. WiIkrinsoni distinction bemeen semiperiphey and periphery is diEerent from that in our definition, For Wilknson a semipriphery is "strongly connected to the core (younger, fringward, remote, more recently attached, weker, poorer, more bachard)," and a periphery is ''we&y mnnected . . . (nomads; pwant subsistence producers nor yet artached to a city . . .)" "05)31, 121). Xn our concept, full-blown peripheries are strongIy cannecteed, bur they are even poorer, weker, and so on than semiperipheria, Thus Wilkinson's semiperiphery contains both our semiperiphery and ar Least part of our periphev, This difference mems that we cannot completely rely on Wilkinson5 suwq for our analysis. Et is bqond our means now to recode W11kinson"s sumep and so we can only counsel aution regarding inferenms made here on the basis of his catdogue of core shifts. That said, we can still learn from exmining wIkinson's sumv. All of his cases (PMNs) are state-bazd system with ciries larger than 10,000 In population, and so chiefdom world-systems are acluded, Many core shifts involve not the conquest of an old core state but rather the rise in an adjacent region of a new core area. We call these insmnces of %emiperipherd ascent." There are dso instances of "core return," in which a formerly powerhi core state resumes hegemonic status,

Chapter G l. One major criticism of the popuia~ionpressure expIanation of hierwchy formation and intensification is based on the edstence of regions in which population densiry had not yet reached "carving capacityn and yet hierarch or intensification occurred. The population pressure model need not claim to explain all. hierarchy formation and intensification in order to explain much of it. Furhermore, population prasure can &ect resource availabiliv and thus create economic pressures well before a region or l o d e has become so ppufated that no

Chapter 7 1, A cornpiere presentation of the findings of this project, which was supparted by the National Science Foundation, is contained in Chase-Dunn and Mann (forthcoming). Throughout this chapter, "wes includes all of the people who worked on the project: E=atherine Woods, Elaine SundAf, Ed Clewett, M&= Sarbr, Elena Errnolama, Glly Mann, and Tern CdF-ee, 2. As vve discussed in Chapter 4, most societies of the End we studied in northern Cdifornia m t e fundmentdly altered by longdistmce interaction with state-baed systems before they became ahnogxapifiicafly known. Marry cantemporary ethnographers, now sensitive to

this problem, r e b e to believe that the farqers of northern Gdihrnia were pristine in this regard. The Spanish rnissions had stopped at Sonoma and only one exploring party had entered the lower Sacrmento V d l q before the late 1820s. The Russian fur trappers at Fort Ross had influenced Ehe Parno, but this influence did not extend very far inland. The psibilicy of epidemic diseases a n n o t be completely diswunted, but Sherburne Cook (1355) does not think that there were epidemics before t 830 to 1833. The Winru were not invalvd in the fur trde, and "war in the tribal zone" w a not a phenomenon that occurred in norhem California. The incorporation W= not gradual. hther, it was sudden and severe, Thou& the indigenous groups continued to operate much as they had for centuries up until f 843, &er that they were nmsively disrupted. Only a few ahnographers worked in the 18&0s,and the most thorough and profession&work was done in the 1320s and 1930s. By this time the Winru worldsystem was a "memory culture." 'This is why it is so important to supplement the ethnographic widence with archaeotogid resach. 3. This coding project was origindy intended to cover the entire corpus of literature about the Wintu and aU their immediately contiguous neighbring linguistic groups, but we rediwd early on that this wodd be impossible beawe this literatwe is too vat, We then concentrated our focus on the northeastern qmkanc of the world-system surrounding the Winnr (see Map "7 l). This corresponds to the Shasta in the nomrb, the Pit Rver groups (Achomawi, Atsegewi) in the northmt, and the Yma in the east, For other a r w we coded only those ments that involved interaction with the Wintu, vvfierw for the S h ~ t a Pit , Rver, and Yma gaups we the W~ntu. mded all the interaction wents, whether ar not they involved interaction The fist of sources from which we coded is available via the internet for perm4 or retrievd from the World-System Archive (wsptems) at http://csEwforada.edu/wsystem/wsarch,hmf in the A p p n d k subdirectory under Chase-Dunnlwintu-append"ur-a. 4,Xn antral California the cultural assemblage that is similar to the Shasra CornpIex is termed the h p s t i n e httern (Moracro 1984). 5. This is what Wdter Colds&midt (1352, 324) reports for the Nod&, and it undaubtedty holds for the Wintu as well. G. We follow anthropologid convention and use the term ashman" for m y of a variery of part-time religious-magid-spiritud-gharmaco10gidspecidists found in nonstatc: societies, Such specialists are ofien cdted "medicine men" m o n g Nartk h e r i c a n Indians, They are digerent from ""priests," who typidly praaice religion Ml-time m d are ofiEicials in an institusful shamans decrikd here is quite typical, and not a tionalized church. The fate of uns specid characteristic of norhem Cdifomia groups. 7. The nine surrounding linguistic group were the Naml& Winrun ta the south (another group of hutian-speakers); the Yuk, Lass&, hngatl, Chimariko, and Nevv River Shasta group to Ehe w t ; the Ohanuchu 1.o the nor&; the Pit River (Achommi) to the norhwest; and the Northern m d Central Uana to the east (see Theodoratus 1381). 8. The Wintu were dso on the southern edge af a large n o h e r n trading nemork that exchanged Den~iigrnshells ftaoth shells, also called dentalium, p l u d dentdid. Arehaeol~~ical ~ d e n c indicates e that this was of relatively minor importance far Efre Mntu in comparison with the trade in clamshell disk beads, 9. Obsidian is volcanic $ass, a material with a very sharp edge, that was used to fahion arrowheads and knife blade. Tmmn obsidian is a type of volanic glass similar to that found in Tuxmy. 10, Barbara ESocek (239 1) wgues that h e cIose clustering of arcfiaeologicd sites in the San Francisquito drainage (San Francism Peninsula) may be due to a paaern of "short distance

sedentism" whereby villages were relocated periodically within a local area. It is possible that the M n t u dso utilized such a pattern in some areas, This might account for the eistence of very dosely spaced archaeological s i t s along some streams. The dose spacing of these rites m&s it difficult co believe that they were all owupied sirnuftaneousllj.."Short distance sedentism" might be the explanatian. I I. Wayat C. Wiant$ (t 381) study of the foutlrern Vana subsktence and settlentent pattern confirms the distinctions posited krc. The Tehanra or milling stone pattern. does not wark very well for the Achamawi and the Okwanucbu, probably because r h q $weloped a more riverine-oriented subsistence srratee &ex contact with the Wintu. 12, Hate that che association of a apeopk" with archaeological pamrns is a clomplex problem. S&Es and technologies can be learned and passed on vvihut people moving. Changes in patterns could as easily indicate changes in habits as in inhabitants. 13. Mortas ancf pestles were present m o n g H o b groups prior to Wimu mid but were not nearly as common as milling stones. The Wintu probably introduced the first hopper mortars. 14. Sdmon flour is produced by dying and powdering the flesh of salmon. It is a highly nutritive and storable source of protein, 2 5- Meiissa L Mqer (2324) reports: a similar buffer beween the Anishinmbe and M o t a peofles in &at is now the Dkotas and Minnesota. 16. Sydney M. Lamb (1462) and Thomar L. Jacbon (1989) report insranas of this kind of peacehl aaulmration in other are= of California. 17. Just to the northln,the &do= were engaged in ptematic slave r&ding in which captives m r e sold to groups linked with the Columbia River basin system of slave exchange (Neashm 1374 [ 19571). But this did not have an impact on the relations bemeen the Wintu md their neighbors, 18. A complete explanation of this usqe of archeologid midence to m i m e Wntu expaxlsion is contained in Chase-Dunn and Mann forthcoming. 13. DuBsis (1935) reports that the Winttl had two counting systems, one for clmshdl dish and mother for "ordinary purposes." The t e r m used to a u n t clamsheU disks were shwed with the Noml& (adjacent neighbors to the south), and DuBais suggats that &is r n q indime "a relaFion beween the souefrern origin of dmshell disks and a muttrern rernrinology in counting them" (1935, 71). 20, Despite the fact that all the intermediate groups spoke Penutian fanpages that were derived from a sinde protolanguage, the fangwga were rnutudfy unintelligible over rather short distances. Even within the tertitoq that W identif"yas Wintu there urexe mutually uninreoigibie didects. 21- At contact the Wintu were participating in two difterent prestige-goods nemorfrs. m e n focal people have only one source of socidly recognized symbols of value, they are somewhat dependent on &at source, but acccu to two different presrige-goods neororks decreaes dependence on either one. The m forms of wealth nay be substitutable. But archaeologid evidence suggests &at wntu panicipation in the northern prestige-goods nenvork was rather minimal. The ethnographic evidence s u ~ e s t sthat the dentdia sheIis obtained from the north served more as adornment than as protomoney. Consequently, access to the northern supply source would not have apprsciahly reduced Wintu dependence on the clmshelX disk nennrork, 22.Hudson (1975 i18971, 9-20) provides a fairly derailed description of the process by which d m s h e l disk beads were produed.

Chapter 8 1. There vvas atso an emerging smte-based world-system in Southeast Asia. 2. As does Wikknson, ule use the rerm "antrai"" only in a geographical sense. This is the system that dmeloped states and citie first and that eventually Incorporated dt other systems into itzlf, 3. kchaeologists have fitund h a t is very likely to be Chinese silk in an ancient Egptian context. A little silk does not a system make, but a lot of silk does. 4.See M e n 1996 for a characterization of the Mesapotmian and Ewptian wrld-systems, 5. "Bubariadkcomes from the Greek and mrans essentially "non-Greek," much ar "gntile" means non-Hebrew. m i l e the term b derogatary from h e point of v i m of =civilized" people, not eveyone, even in ancient times, took it that way (e.g., Philip oEMacedon also was hewn quite proudly as ""Philip the Barbarian"). The bar paper vve have found (Becbith L987d) on the concept of "barbarimmin Chinese unfortunately remains unpubldecl. In it n now, aauafly;. Becbith apes that She concept "arbarim' does not exist in despite all the culturd influence via Conan movies and similar never did exist; it's s purely Western idea, Of course the peoples that Westerners in the past d t e d barbdroi (and so on) were found nat only in the War but in the East-md other directions 13s well; they just weren't perceived by the Chinese throu& the cultural construct of the %ubxianm' (personat mmmunication, October 2 1, 1396). ion of G n t r d Asian nomadts &amon M e l d 1989, 1990, 1331,1933; httimore 1940, 13G2a, 1962b, 1980; Kh t 383; Irons 1979; B u r n h a 1379; M o w 1386; Seman. 1389, 1992; an and M a h X 931; S v & m i a f 383; Jagchid and Syrnons 1989; and h c h & 1987a, I987b,198Xc,1931. Jqchid and S ~ o nf s1383, intro,) rwim the debates in this fiteramre, Haft (133fa, 199lb) and F r d (1992) oEer vvorld-qstems intep~tatioas. 19. McNeilX also maps this gradient f 1987,266,323). 8. The pfirae "bartbarians against bubariauxs""is hund often in translations of Chinese acc o m a of frontier policy; A specific citation is found in Vii 1967, X 5. See also Kwanten 1979, 12K; and Becbith 1387d. 3. Note that shihs in climate that cut the produaiviry oflocaf. graiag lands could produce identicd effmts. Research needs to be done on whether climate chmge could have produced the vnchronizarion of empire rise and fdl in the G n t r d and Far Eastern systems. 10. Trashurnant nomads move m o n g more-or-less h e d cmps, rypidly beween summer and winter graing pastures where they spend much of the y e a Hence they are sometimes called semisedentq beawe they live in MO diEerent more-or-less fixed plams and do not move frequently Truly nomadic pastardiscs keep moving, even if they foIlow m essent i d y standad circuit. The shift to firlly sedentary life was easier for transhurnant peoples than for true nomads, 11. Vii (1367, 133) uses the term "Wmtern countries'' to refer not only to the numerous smdl client srates incorporated early in the former Han dynasty in Central Asia but: also to India, Pathia, and Rome, More typically, thou$, &l: term w a used m refer to those small states at the western edge of the Chinese empire, as we do here. 12. SE Eluhon 1331; McNeili 1963,1976,1387; Simkin t 368; and Yti 1967. 13. Sirnkin (1968, 47) cites ancient Indian documents that list interest rates for trade loans: ordinaq secured loans, 1S perant per mnum; trade loans, 5 percent per nzo?z$h;caravan loans, 10 perant per unongh; and sea ioms, 20 percent per morztill, "rhou& not ancIusive, this is a good indicatian of the relative risks involved in diAFerent modes of trade trmspon.

14. Simkn (1968,451 estimates that this trade was worth about 10 million British pounds in 1367'. In the mid-1930s that would be about US$X20 million, not a very large amount in terms of international trade, but not a trivial m o u n t eitfier. enohky 1387; [email protected] 1391;n o r n t o n 1387; md m i t e 1090. 15. See Crssby 1372, 1386; 16. A m d d rctligion separates membership in the moral mrnrnunity from ethnicity or kinship, dlovving the creation of a moral order that integrates peoples from diEererent cultural backgrounds, 17. Major murces for rhis section are Elvin 1373 and McNeill 1363, 1376, 1382, 1387. 18. The spread of rice cultivation and the occuparion of the Yangne River v a U q go very Ear back in Chinae history, The key point here is that thme processes accelerated greatly during this era. 12. VVe are n&ng neither an '3slam caufed eve"ythingwnor an "'inevitabilif argument. Rather, vve are claiming that cantact with Islamic fighters spread this technology mare rapidly than othewise would have been the case. 20, This section draws from Pirenne 1337, if 380; McNeiIt 1363, 1364; Bloch 1961; Bartlat 1323; and Sanderson 1995a. 2f . For a rwiew of the literature on KondratiefPcycles, see GGdscein 1988. 22, We are fatlowing new transliterations-Zlteijing (Peking) and Chinggis QCenghis). Khan is generic term for rukr, Chingis Khan means "ruler of all b e m e n the seas'7McNeilI 1387,3386). 23, Barfidd (1383,21 1) shows the lineage from Chingis. 24, See Fitzpatrick 15192 for a world-system explication and interpretation of these changes. 25. Ths Secret Histoy af1he Mongolr ( M n 1984) is the basic source for conditions during ChinggisS lifetime. 26. Larerd decent or s u ~ a s i o nrefers to inherimce that passes from older to younger sons, where% IineaiT descent refers to inheritance that [email protected] from father to son. Lined descent may be by primogeniture, that is, to the first-born (legitimate) son, or uIrimogeniture, that is, to the fast-born (legitimate) son. The practice of polygny compliates all these forms of descent. Barfield f 1289) offers many detailed accounts of how this wrked-and how it did not work-aong Centrd Asian nomads. 27. Thomas Barfield (persond correspondence February X 0, 1334) suagsa that the spread ~ of Islam (600-1000) is often overrated because of its later accompfishmenrs. C o n v e r ~ kthe Turkish conquat is oFeen underrated because of the Turks' subsequent conversion to Islm (see Barfleld X 990). 28. Such conversions may suggest a key role for IdeoIoe in social change. But Barden (1393) notes that rlijters who saw the vdue of trade and dliancles often decirfed that access wodd be improved if they converted. 23. Two points bear elaboration here, First, rhis situation W% nor unique to Europe but had pardtds in Japan. Second, self rule was not mass dernocraq but r d e by rich merchants and guilds. 30. See Sanderson 1994d and 193% for an extended comparison of Japan and Western Europe. 31. Figures 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 allectivety comprise a very abstract portrayaf of what happened in Afraeurasitt, The scale is wmng, but the idea of merging systems is right, 32. We thank WilIiarn R. Thompson for pointing out how these "key inventions" are linked to the vaious nets. See:Thompson 2 330 and Glfins 198Ga.

Chapter 9 1, On the famous "amber routikonnecting the Mediterranm with the Bdric, Sherratt ( f 933a, 47) writes, " tE)nterrupted in the cenruries before 3 000 BC, it reappeared c. 300,

shifted = w a d s c. 700, disappeared For sclmc centuricts again, bekm re-emerging in Roman times, . , ." 2. The Hapsbutg egort to converr the nasmnr Europan capitdist inrerstate system into a corewide tributary empire (Wdlerstein 1974b) was only stop* by the French aflimce with the Bttornm Empire, 3. Ea this r e p d , the s p r d of Frankish cuIture dwrihed in ;Thefikr'~gofEgrape (Bardett 1993) wm douMy significant. On the one hand, it helped to create a common culture that facilitated trade, while an the other, ir did not succeed in building stares suficienrly Iarg to hold traders in line. 4. This w a structurally sinnlar to rhe relationship bemeen the Wintu and the distant and rn0l.e developed f"oma/Pamin reprced in Chapter 7. 5. Generally poiiticallmifirafy and market Integratian are stsperior to normative regulation far cross-cultural interaction. Howwer, as we allude to in the text, new, tecbnsiogiies of cornmttnication-the interner, celXdar phones, satellite systems, and so on-my charzge radicafty the relative scales of normative, politicdfmilitasy; and market integration. Drsspite some of the wilder cltaints of advertisers, this has not happened-yet,

Chapter 10 e in TabIe 10.1 that prestige-gmds netvvorh and information netou$ this is ofien not the w e in a a u d intemction neworb, 2. We modik WiIIr;inson's terminolog). for purposes of clziry. He refers to PMNs as "civie to engulf all the other formerly fizations," and so he maps how "Central civilization" separate PMMs. Willrinson uses the term "centrd" only as a geographic& dmipation, as do we. The fact thar it was the Central System that ate all the others is nor irecwariry evidence of its progressive nature. 3. The archaeologicali widence on this issue is problematic. Our reading of the evidence is rhat there vvas a down-&e-line informarionaj linhge and that if there wm a PGN linkage, it was extremely weak, 4, Witkinson defines ""oikumene" as ""a trading arm, a domain internatty knit by a nework of trade routes, in which there is enou& internal trade so that the whole t d h g area evolva to a significanr degree as a system, while trade ounide the area, thou& perhaps important both ro the oikwene and to other aikumenes wirfr which it trades, is not suffieJently dense and significant to cause system-level development to encompass thefe external systems"' (1392,SS-46). 5. This merger af prestige-goods nets m y have occurred as early as 3000 13,C.E. (Marbe t 387). .Men ( l 336) contends that state formation in the Egptian world-s~ystemwas importantly infiuenced by interaaion with the Mesopotamian wdd-VS=. G. Figure 10.2 is not drawn to scale. It is a heuristic illustration of the processes of pulsating expasion and rnergng. 7 . Of course BGNs and PGNs m y be related to one mother in diEerent ways in diEerent systems. Recall that in northern California the late prehistoric PGN facilitated rhe expansion and inrensification of the BGN, The mechanisms of tinhge differ in true prestige-goods sys-

tems (Friedman and &lands 1377), but here ag&n the m levels of interaction expand and contract together. 8, The most complete and recent review of the lirerature on the rise and fdl of Fhiefdoms is contained in David G, hdersonk (1334) study of the Savannafi River chiefdoms. 3. 'This is also a possible contextual explallation For tbe important structural and strategic digerences bemeen complex chieMoms and state that are: based on "staple finance" versus those based on "W&& finance" "Atroy and Earle X 385). 10. The differences m o n g strategies within similar world-systems (e.g., chiefdom-bsed systems) are probably smaller than the differences benveen strategies in completely different types of wrtd-systems. 11. The tern 'tvorld-empire" has been used to refer to single triburav states such as S s sanid Iran (e.g., Farm 1Q33),but &is is a mistaken usage because d1 tributary states are invohed in trade of basic p o d s with other regions, TInus they are not h o l e world-s)istems but rather are parts of systems. f 2. The Standarclixd Primacy Index Is an indicator of e h relative stevness or Batness of a ciry size distribution (see Wdters 1985). Every settlement systetn has a size distribution that varies from Bat (in which secdements or citias in a region have approsmatety the same pepulation sizes) to steep (in which the Iwgest city is much Larger than the second largest city and so forth). Urban geographers postulate a W-cdzlled raxzk-six rule in which the second largest ciry is half the size ofthe farget, the third Iargat is one-rbird the size of the largest, and so on. The SPJ uses the rmLsim rule as a norm and calculates a statistic in which zero corresponds to a rank-size distribution. Negative scores are fiat relative to the rank-six rule and positive scores are steep, 13..See h e prwioufi no= for an expiation of relative flatness ofa ciry size distribution, 14. A megarneter is one million meters. 15. We have few numbers for Indic empire sizes, and so we are unable to compare these with Far Eastern and Central empire sizes. Future research should supplement -raagepera's X ( 378a, 1378b, f 379) data with In&c empire sizes. 16. Climate change codd also have been a result rather than a cause of urban and empire growth and decline. This posibiliry could also be ined with fine-grained dam on the timing of dimate changa. 17. This arpment was first made in world-sptem e r m by Jane Schneider ( J 977) and was developed and elaborated in Jmet Alou-Lu&ds (1987, 1983) study of the ehineenth centuv 28. Recent increases in the inequdiv of wedth and income distribution in the United States run in the direction of a Third World-like stra~iffcadonsyftem, but rhe remaining differences are still very large.

Chapter 1 I. 1. Diachy is a dual politic4 stmcture in which there are two more-or-less equd kngs in one polify, Many ckefdorns and early states had both a m i l i t q and a religious leader, 2. Recall the model of increafing territorial size of tributary empires (Figure 10.3). At the beginning of m y one of the major leap it is digcult ro distinpish k m e e n a slightly farvr-than~ypicatAucruation from the anset of a major qualimti-veshift. Once the shik is we11 under way it becomes very clear, Given the volatile nature of apitdism, it is especially hard to distind guish-in advance-a new, major, cjudicative shift from a more-or-less ~ p i fluctuation.

3. For a fuller explanation of &is scenario and its muEs, see Chase-Dunn and Podobnik 19312. A rehted future that emghwiws the interaction of region2 chdfengrs to d o b d leaders is presented in bier and Thompson 1934, 4, We are using the term "socidisd' to mean a mode of accumuIarion that is qualitatively i apitafisnn. Such a sptem wsu'rd have both mQredmocratic and callects"@e&more r a f i ~ m&an no more thm a faint resemblance to those of the former Soviet Union or the PeapIe5 &public of China. 5. h s u r made the transformation from a semiperipheral. trading city to the capitai of the hsyrian. Empire. Garhage more than flirted with the marcher-stare roure, led by Hannibd, but in the crucial moment the supporters of capitdisr accumulation in the Cuthaginian stare carried the day and support for EZmnibaf"sventure was nat dkpatched- Rome survived and parr of its own rise a mxncher state induded the complete destruction of Carthage. G. Even surviving ""indigenous peapla" use the United Nations and internation4 law to pratea their rights IWjmer 1393). That is, chey are protecting their right to remain digereat by accepting dominant definitions about what it m e a s to be diEerent and haw a people struggks to remain diigerent. One reason this tzric works is that the denid of indigenous claims oken undermines the overail ideoloe of legtimate state sovereigny. This is why even states with large populations that indude small indigenous minorities (e.g., Canada and the Unit& States) strondy resist indigenous rights movements (Russell 2 994; Churchill 1339.

Gloss advation: an institutionat adjustment to social and environmental pressures for change, adapmtion undercuts dpdut'g. 151 acfa+vityl the attilcy to make adaptive changw in responsr: to any social or environmental changes, adaptivicy aids ahp~t-ion.ET] bachwh egecr: core-peri$ery interaction &at muses a peripheral area to &emmemore underdmeloped, [2] band: a cluster of fmilies who ge:enerdly five together and ssociate with other such groups chat share language m d culture. Band membership is vpidty somewhat Auid. [3] big mm: a Ieder who operates by gersuasion and prestig and whose prestige is based on his ability to inftuena his followers to amass uredth for giive-away mremonies, A big mm is more poweM thm a headmn, but less powehl. than a cht"af(fafi1insf 963). E33 ba-goocls nmork (BGN): the newark of exchanges of ""necessities," or tow vafue-toweight ratio goods; m i d l y the smallest exchange nemork in a. wovB-qstem. 131 w i d cornmodified wedth used to produce commodities, F21 apitdism: production of goods (commaditiees)for sde on a market, See afsa merchang capitalz'sm, 151 apidi~trw m d ~ i o nthe : amassing of weadth by means of the m&ng of profits from cornmodity produaion, [ 1'j carryi.ugcagaciy the popdation any natural environment can suppon wi&in a specified region with a given production technology. [ 1 ] cEeE a leder with institutionalixd access to substmtid social resource, gving him coercive power. His resaurca are somewht autonomous fmm the control of other tineage ha&, Typical15 but not always, an hereditav ofice. E31 Aiddam: a stratified p f i that ~ relies on generdized institutions for regiond coordination and controli, usually a. hierachid Enship strucrure that legitimates chiefly authoriq. 131 scdption: a situation in which emigration is blocked by physid barriers (environmental circumscription) or by social barriers such as a ~ampetingpopulation (socid circumscription), or both. [G] dms: a group of people with shared and distinctive paXiticoe~onomicinteresa. f3J colanid empire: a situation in which m e or more core states dominate peripheral regions.


m e r e terms are t&en directly from marhet source vve cite that source, m e n only m authoaor's n m e is mentioned, ule are &ng that a d o & general sense withour quoting directly, Terms in italics have their own entry elsmhere in the glossaq. We note In square brackes the chapter in the text where the term is first wed,

cornmodifiaGon:the process or result of turning somefhing into a commodip. Commdification is a matter of degee. [l] comma&y: a srandzdiwd goad produad for sale on a pricesetting market. [E J commodiq chains: neworh that link aU the actors involved in the praducrion and consump tion of a commodiy-from food producers for workers, raw-nra~rialproducers, transportation, finad production, and find consumers. 11 wnical clan: an extensive common descent group, rank& and segmented d o s genealogical lines and pattilined in ideologid bias. f5) matact periphery: a petipheq that is nxinimdly incorporated into a uroru-ystem. ThiS is the vvekesr level of the continurn of incerporarion, much weaker than nomi~di

caqoration. 141 core: regon of a war&-ystm that dominates the system. Typicatky it consists of the most cornplex social groups in the system. [fntroductionj wmlpe~pherydiEerentiadon: societies at &&rent levels of complexiry and popufation densitly are in interaction with each other. [2] corelperipheq hierarchy: intersocietd domination or apfoitation. [2] mr&& empire: a sin$e state controls most of the territory witl.lin the care of a woru-pstem. l101 dvendent:periphery (M-bIampedphefy): a periphery that is m&mally incorporated into a worU-~sgem.This is the strongat level of the continuum of incorporation, where dwelopmenr of undetdevelopment t&es place, See also &cdue (m0i~copordtion,[4] development of mderdeveiopmenr: h e process in which dmeloping countrie extract apital from their e m n o ~ m&or c political colcmies, which not only blocks development but also systematicdly distorrs dmeitopment in harm&[ ways-that is, it is the relationship itself that causes ""lzncierdwelopnnent,"" [2] dam-he-line trade: a system of trade in which A trades to B, who trades to 6, who rrades to D, and so on, In &is type of system goods can travel a long way without the endpoints ever aming into contact. [lntrodwtion] eEecGve (red) incopraGan: "a situation in which the patterns of produaion and repducrion rypicd of aternd arenas have ceased to be dominant within the region and rend to disintegrate qua systemsn (krighi 1379, 162). [4] =tern4 mna: m uea outside of a ~org-ysbem.f41 a e r d &antier:a mne of i n w r p o r a t i on the e d ~ ofs an apanding zuor&-9stm. [4] W-OR:the gradient of degadation of consequentid eEeca aver space. [l] formd incorpsra&axl:see nominal i~eoporntion.[4] M-blomperiphety: see depen&ntpm$he~ [43 Gdton5 ppfobiem:in the absence of complete isolation, it is diEcult to distin~ishindependent invention (or pardlef e-voturion)from difision. [2f hedrnaxl: a Leader by virtue of persond chaaisma zlnd fapeered abilities, widlyin oratory; mediation, hunting, and fighting. He leads by influence, A headman is less powerM &m a big m n and much less powerfut than a chi4 f3] hegemon: h e one core stare with an unusuaily large share of wrfd economic and military power over other core states, [5] hegemadc squence: the rise and fall of hegernons. [Sf hegemonF a situation in which one core sate has an unusudly lyarge share of world emnornic ltnd milimq power over other core states, [S]

Iriersuctzy fomahon: an increw in socidly structured inequalities within or m o n g societies (e.g., class formation, sate formation, empire formation), [@ infsrm&onnet (IN):rhe nemork of exchmge of information in a variety of formssinduding ideolog, reIidon, technid information, and culture. 1.31 inemi6ahon: the impjementarion of changes in production technology that increase the produaivity of land, labor, or other resources. [G] inserchiefdam system: a set of chiefdoi that make diimca and war with one another. 151 inernd hnsier: a zane of incorporation that is encapsulated within an expanding system.

f4 Ltersmte Ftem: a set of intemdng sates that make allimas and war with one anoher. E1.J

[email protected] wavm: forty- to skymyear economic qcles of growh and stagnation, discovered by the Soviet emnomist N&oialai Kondrarieflf:[g] least eEsrt, principle of: pople usually prefer to continue in the way that they h o w as long as his does not require substantiallygreater eEort. [G] periphev: a pwFipher;v &at is incorporated into a zvclr&-gstm more strongly than a [email protected], but more w d y than a d p d ~pe&phe~. t Equivalent to a [email protected]~nof r&ge* L41 mer&mm apit&m: accumulation through exploiting price differentids acros digerent regions. [S] minisystems: small-sde systems in which all weidly essential n m o r k are cantsned within a singe cultural or linguistic group (Wdlerstein 1984, f dB). [f 1 made aC mmutfadon: a logic of development in which the reproducrian of social structures and cyclical processes occur by means of certain vpicaf forms of integation and control, a deep suucruraf. logic of production, distribution, exchnge, and a=urnularion, Ernpirid indiators are forms of ex&ange and forms of control wed to mobilk social labor andlor to extract surplus product. ERerenc modes af accumulation may be praenr in rhe same system, and some forms of exchange and control: have elernenrs of more than one mode, Cenerdl~one mode "predominates," "J mode. of prodw~on:a deep structural logic that is camposed of forca of production (technolog:) and relations of production (class rehrions). [I] nation: a group of people with a shued identisy and sense of separate sovereignry; f I] =don-state: a group of people with a shxed identity who are citizens or sutrj~tsof the same state*[l] no intemening heardand rule: sates do not expand successEinlly when that expansion entails leaping over or passing through the heartland of a competing stare (Collins 2 978, 1ss11.t r j namind (formd) incorparation: "political domination by an external power andlor economic relations with the capidist wrld-economy have been established but the dominant d ptterns of production and reproduction within thr: region are still chase ~ iof externat l 12). fli] aenas" (iairrighi .373,161-1 oscillation; the ajrernation bemmn pri~ate,mwket-mediated accurnularion versus amunndation more heavily reliant on state institutions. [[email protected]] p-&p: a very generd gramwork from whiclz specific theories are constructed, [Introduction] p ~ p h e v region : of a wor~-ystenzthat is dominated by the core and semiperiphery. Tpicdly it consiscs of the temt complex social groups in the system, [Introduction]

paltidfmiitiq newark (PMN): the nemork of re&% poXiticaX or m i l i t q uexchnges,"' including warfare and sxatecrd; fypicdly a medium-sid newark in a wor&-~sgem.C33 papdadon presswe: population densia). (the number of people per unit of land area) rises to levels that degrade natural resources in a way that increma the custs of prodmtion, l(i] p ~ s t k gmds: e symbolidy important goods, rypicalfy exotic imports, oken of hi& vdue-toweight ratio, whose ownership confers prestige on the owner, [l] prestige-gooh emnomy systemic =change nervvork in which i& teaders monopoliiu: the supply o f vmbolicatEy imporrant go&, y p i d l y exotic imparts (prestige goods), which they use to rewxd subordinates. In many systems these p o d s art. d&ned as necessasy for important social rituals such as marriage, f l] pmstige-gaads news& (PGN): the nervvark of exchanges of "prestige" or luxury goods, or high vafue-to-weie;ht ratio goods; ypicdly the laxgat exchang nework in a wor&ys~m. 131 pria-sening market: a maket in which rhe competitive buying and selIing of goods by actors opaating to maximize their own returns lugely determines the rates of exchrsnge ((prices) mong traded goods. f l] pdstine smte (primv state): a state that dmelopct-si without con~~act with orher aisting stata, 131 protecrion rent: the diEerential returns received by merchants whose trading eEorts ate sugported by a cost-egcient and protection-providingstate. (See Lane 13"i"J ,)[53 pdation: periodic spatial expansion and contraction of interaaion nemorh, f73 reactive fsemndv) social change: a consequence of interactions bemeen various social structures that induce cfiangs in some of them toward inc wcdve sme: a srace that developed in reaction to interactions with other already existing smtes, Also known as a seconday stare, 131 xgion, of = h e : describes an area that is an& partidly incorporated into a state system. This tends to free= socid chmge and hence: (1) it sets the a r a aside for hture development; and (2) it "praemes" older, "trariitiond," social forms and is a "rehge" for social forms that have been destroyed elsmhere in the system, ( f i r Aguirre Beltrm X 373.) 141 dse and fd: cycles of intersocietd poiitid mntrdimtion and decentrdirntion, usually indicated by g o m h (or decline) of the largest core polity, (61 secondw sate: see reactive sta.dte. E33 segmentary linew:a Form o f kifiship that a n activate ties at vwious levels of relatedness. Support or opposition in any conflict is governed by the degree: of relatedness of two g o u p . This i s encapsulated in the proverb 'Me against my brother; my brother and I against the clan; my clan and us against the tribe; my tribe, my clan, nr). brother, and I agknst the world," (For further discussion see Barheld 1993, esp(3cidly 75K) [&l sennipedpheral dwelapnsent: semiperipheries are fercile locations for innovatims in re&niques of power that enable u p a r d mabiliry and the transfarmtion of mrU-gstcms. 151 [email protected]:an intermediate location in an intersocied coielperiphery structure. [lntroduction] shwan: any of a variev of part-time re~igious-rnagi~-spiritud-pbarm~fo~c~ specialists found in nonstate societies. They are different from "priesrs," who cypidfiy practice [email protected] and are oEficials in an institutiondid church. L71 soeidy xreassw Iabor time: the amount o f labor required to produuce a commodity using the current standzd technology' [41

spread eEect: care-pedpher). Interactions that cause peripheraf areas to become more coreitik. L27 sate: a rcl";ionallyorpnized societ.y with specidizd regional institutiom-military and bureaucraric-that perform the task of control and manqement gohnson and h r l e 1387, 246). [I] tehniqaw of power: Michael Manni term for politied and cultural institutions that facilitate the wielding of pawer: "They aH have in common a capxiey to improve the infrsrrucrure of collective and distributive power, and they ail have a proved survivd mpacivS"(h/fann 1986,525). f ll tegealogy: a teleoiogical explanation explains an outcome in term of find causes or ultimate purposgs. [Xntroduction] trade b p o r a : Philip Curtink term (1984) far speciafi~dtrading ethnicity that occupies a smrtering af setdements for conducting trade across cultural baundstries. [l] trade ecumene: Fhilip Currin"s term (1384) far a region in which the norms of trade are widely understood and agreed upon among formerly separate and digerent:culcurd groups. A trade ecumene obviates the need for trade diaspora. 111 exanshummt: a fifesryte in which nom& move arnong more-or-tm fixed amps, ypically bemeen summer and winter grazing pastures where they spend much of h e par. Sometimes cJled semisedentary becawe they Live in two diRerent places but move bemeen them seasonally; [g] tribe: an overly g n e r d term referring to any of the kin-ordered groups (tr"t"beIlet',6&-man ystern, chiefalom). [3] taribdet: u s d l y consists of a sin$e village but sometimes indudes WO or three viIlages under the nomind "leadership" aFa sinde heahan. [75 warld-eanam~an intersocietd division ofhbor in which the care is palitidly structured as an intersare system-a system of competing states. 121 world-empi~e:an intersocietal division of f a h r &at h politically controtled by a single state.

PI w~rld-sysgems:intersocietd nemorh in which h e interactions (trade, warfare, intermarriage, information, etc.) are innpoaant far the reproduction of the internal srmctures of the cornposite units and Impormntly aRect changes that occur in &ae Iocd structures, C21

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Uii, Uing-slxih. 191i7. P& a d %amion ia Han G h h :A S t d j l;n the Smcmrt"of Sino-Barbarialz Ec~mmic&&$ions, Berkelv: Universiry of Cdifornia Press, Zaccagnini, Carlo. 1987. "hpeccs of C e ~ m o n i dExchange in the Near East During the Late e 13tM"phqin the Ancient WorM, d t e d by Micfiael Second Millennium B,C" h C m ~ and Rawkm&, Mogens Lmsen, md Gistian kistiansen, 5745. Cambridge, England; C m bridge Universiry Press, figareg, Allen, 1986. UTrade,Women, Class, and S o c i q in Plncient Western Asia." C~zlment Anrihr~poIogy2'75 (December):4 15430. Zip&Gearge K. 1943. Hgnzan Bebavior and the Princ+le oflemt [email protected]@. embridge, M:Addison-Wesl;~,

About the Book and Authors Spanning 12,000 years of social change, this bo& examines the ways in which world-9tems evolve. A compaative study of stateiw smieties, state-based regional empires, and the modern global capitalkt political emnomy, it reveals h e underlying processes at w r k in the reprsduction and trmsformarion of sscial, emnomic, and pofitid structures. Chase-Dunn and Half show that srardess societies dweloped in the context of regional interswietd nemorks that diEered significansly from larger and more hierarchical wrfd-vstems. The processes by which chiefdoms rose and feu had broad similarities with the ways in which sates, empires, and modern hegentonic core stares have expedenced uneven develop ment. Most world-systems e&ibit a pattan of politid centrdimtion and decentrdization, but the mechanisms and prowsses of chmge differ sipiliwdy, b o k n g at the systemic similarities and diRerencses among smail-scale, middle-sized, and global world-systems, the authors address such questions as: Do all world-systems have earelperiphery hierachies in which the development of one area neczessitates the underdwelopment of another? How were kin-based logics of socid intepatian transfo~medinto statebased tribumy logics, and how did capitalism emerge within the intersticm of tribumry states and empires wenrualIy ta become rhe predominant Iogic of accumullation?How did the rise of commodiry production and the mentuai domimnce of capitalist accumulation modi6 the prwases iby which politid cenrers rise a f l d fall? Bse and D m k ogers fwraching explmatians of social chang, showing how the cornpsarive study of worjd-system increaes our understanding of early histoxy, the contemporary glob4 syftem, and future possibilities for world society,

Cfistopher Chm-D is pxofesar of socidolr;y at Johns Hopkins Universiqr Thornas D. Hall is Later M, Jones Professor off ocioloe;y at BePauw Universiry,

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Index Plibbasid Empire, 172 filer, Thornas S., 65, 68 &U-Lughod, Jmec L., 19,151,175,184,131 Achomawi people, 137,138 Adms, Wdiam V,, 78 Adaptation, 81 Adaptivircy, 8 1 Mria, 64,6849, 172,26l (n4). See ako Mroeurasian world-vstem &oeurmisian world-system, 149-1 86, 250-25 1 Centrid h i m nomacis, 158-163, f T9(rable) cordperiphery reladons, 150, 161, 162, 130-192 and disease, 114-1 15, 151, 16GX67, 175,181,183 and Ewope-antered world-sptenr, 187-189, X90 implications, 184-1 86 incorporation, 76,777, 1$0, 172, 17&175,284185 and Islam, 168, 172,1;73(figure),173, 175,281-183,267(nn19,27) land trade, 165-1 64, 165(figure), 16&168,2GG(nl l), 267(nn13, 14) mqs, 153, 155, 165, 269,173, 173 100&1400 G.E., 175-184 periodimt-ion, 1S If, t 52(fipre) populatian pressure, 1f 3-1 14 pr-600 ca. history, 150-268 sea trade, 168, 163(figurc) and semiperipheries, 94, I62 bf)&1000 G.E., 168, 170-175,267(nE9) theoretical issues, 150 and world-systems wolsgy;4 M 7 worl&system Mlithin, 151, 152,154, 156-t SS, 26B(n2)

Agriculture, 106-1 07, 1 I 1-1 12, 193. Sge also Technologicd intensifiation buirre Beltrm, Goado, 61,63,26 1(R 1 ) &an Empire, 104, 256(n2), 262(n5), 2G3(n7) semiperipheries, 85-83,537,262-263(nb) Alaander, Rani T,, E 3 rsrlexander the Great, 156, '157 NW, Guillermo, 86 Nlen, Mitchell, 24,37,28B(n5) alsen, Thornas, T., 1'78 "herican System," 35 b i n , Samir, 24,25,30,77, 150, X 9 X Anderson, Perry*TO, 2 83 hrhropoiogy; 12, 3; (i,260(n8). See akso pecgc topics Appd, JiII, 22 k c h ~ a l o t12,38,3940,260(a8) ~~; Hor&ern California, 126- 12';7,2G(n4), 265(nX2) See [email protected] qecgc t~pics heasherg, Conrad M,, 24,32 Arrighi, Giovmni, 35,37,61,63,64,65, "j7,9G, 212 Asiatic mode sf producrion, 3X, X X X At~gewipeople, 137 Augustine Paaern, 264(n4) h t w , 261fn5) B a c h a h eEects, 38-39, 50, 86 B&roch, Paul, 35 Balance-of-power srratep, 33 Bands, 43 Barfield, Thomas J., 50,88, 1TO, 151, 152, 158, IGO, 161, 162,177, 178, 181, ZG'i"Cn2"7) Bxrh, Frederik, 7 1, 7i 512 ffarrlett, Roberr, 151, 174, 182

Bau&, "rim~thy~ 43 Bean, bwe11 John, 126 Becbitln, Christopher l,, 15 1, 154 175, 26G(n5) BennyhoR Jarnes A., 126 Bentley, Jerry, 52, f 51, 154,166,168, 176, 181 BGN, See Buk-goads neworks Big-man systems, 44, 128, 178, 180 [email protected], 39-1 00 Bison, G6,262(~8) Black Death, 114, 175, 181, 183 Bhnton, E h r d , 13,22,203 Bocek, Barbara, 2G5(n 10) Boserug, hther, 23, I13 Bomorrh, Bndrmp"7, 2 13,226 Braudel, Fernand, 12-13, 13,35, 192-1 33, 249 Bride-price, 136, 137, 138 Brown, Jmes A., 121 Brown, Michael X;,, G8 Brumfiel, Elkabetfi, 257(n 2 0) Bubonic pique. See Black Death Bud&ism, 175 Buffering, 49,7 1, 134,265CnfS) Bulk-gm& nemorh (BCN), 52,53,61, specific systems 190-1 9 1. See Banker, Ste$en G., 76 tine Empire, 172, 182 California, Sea Northern California Capital, defined, 34-35 Capitdism and Mroeurasb world-system, 186 capird imperidism, 22,23,34, 257(nf)) chaflenges to, 96,245 China, 25,47, 130 and cornmerci;ltization, f 11, 1 13 and core/peripbev relations, 22,33, 50-51,190,192 and cross-~stelxxmmparisans, 2 10, 212-223 defined, 34 and egective incorporation, G3 and expansion, 193 and future transformation, 5,239,24 1, 242,243

and incorporation, 74,li"G and intersrar-esystems, 194-1 36 and modes of production, 25,32,258(nn 15, 16) and pputation prcsure, 112-1 13, 234235 and rise-md-fdl patterns, 111-1 12 f anderson theory; f l f , I I3 and semiperipheries, 30-.33, 112,24 1, 27Q(nfi) and state formation, 34,236 and technologicd inreasificadon, 136-1 98 todity assumption, 32 See also Capitdiist accumdation; Europecentered vvctrld-system Capitalist accumufation, 30, 35, 5 1, 113, 196,258(n15) and systemic logic, 25 and \nrorId-systems typotoe, 42, 2591n3) See aho Capidism Carneiro, bbert, 23,44,45, 103, 164, 105, 110,IX5,207 Carving capaciry; 23, f 00, 1'74,257(n1I), 263(n l ) Cattle, 262(nC)) Centrd h i a n nomads, 158-163, 153(table), 170, 176, 266(nn 8,3) kinship systems, 1-62, 180,2Gfin2G) See aho Mongols Gentrdination/decentrdiza,tion,19,7675, 209 Central System, 15 1,246(n2) and Europe-centered wxtd-system, 183-184, 187-1 83, 13Q,268(nn l, 3) and glob4 modern world-system creation, 201,203,204,268(n2) grodldecline cycles, 2 14-22 1, 2 f 5-2 17(figures),219-220(fipres) e.E. history, 182-1 84, [email protected]@g1400 26Rn23) pre4OO c,a, history, l 54, 156-1 58 pulsation, 204, ;?OTi(figure),206 600- 1000 G,E, hktoq* I7 1, 172, 174-1 75 and systemic iogic, 33

See a& Mroeurasim world-qstem; Globat modern vvorid-system Chagnon, Napoleon A., 132,14 1 Chmdler, Tertius, 2 12,213 Chase-Dunn, Christopher, 23,31,32,33, 35,36,37, 51,76, 35,36, 98, 135, 144, 135,212,214,225,226,227, 24 l , 242,252 Chauauri, K. N.,I71 Cheng Ho. See Zheng We Cherokee people, 66 Cherv, John E, 35),43 Chi, CKao-tin& 170 Chiefdoms, 25,44, 83-84, 103, l X 0, 137, 2&3(nn3, 10) Chilcate, Rondd H,, 61 Chitdc, V1 Eordon, 23, 105, 187-188 China and " " b z i m ' b n a p t , 170,266(nn S, 8) capirdist development in, 25,47, X 90 and Gentrd Asian nonrah, 158, 153-160, 159ftable),1TlQ, I76,266(nn 8,3) corelperiphey relations, 50 and Eppt, 266(n3) and Europe-antered wodd-ystem, 98, 191-192,250-251 and global modern world-system, 245 incarpration, 6 4 7 4 and iteration modej, 1I2 modes af accumulation, 212 1000-.1400 history; 2 76-1 78, 1'73(6gure), 18&18 1 prAO0 G.E, histoe 152, l S4 role in Mroeurasian world-system, 15 1, 152 and Raman Empire, 1SX, 152,157-1 58 as semiperipher)., 36,38 600.-1000 e,E, histaw* 170-1 71, 267(ni 8 ) state formation, 260(n&) See abo Mroeurasian world-qstem; Far Eastern world-system; Mongols Chinais Khan, 149,176, 177,178 Chirar, Daniel, 61 Christianiry, 174, 182, 132,267(n28) Circumcription, 23, 104,240,257(n 12)

and state Farmrarion, 45, 102 and systemic trmsformation, 234235, 23G237 Sm aka Popularion p~ssure Civ-states, 19,85-89,212,236. S e e a h ~ pecgc p s t m and topics Class, 44,127,138 and semiperipberies, 88-89,244 and state formation, 4 U 5 , l 10, 161--162 See Classless societies; Intraacieral inqulrliGes ClssIess societia, 13,28,29-30. Sr?eako Egditarianism Clay, Henry, 35 CIewett, S. Uward, 124, 2 3t Climate. See Climatic changes; b i a g i d mnes Climatic ehangs, 18, 257(nGf Coast: Miwok people, 128,143 Gohen, Mwk, 103,105, 110, l 1S Collapse phenomenon, t 12-1 13 Gllins, h n d d , X2,21,76,83, 135, 183 Colonid empires, 2 10 Golonidism, 167 Commercialization, 1l 1, l 13, 176, 185-1 86 Cammodification, 2 5 , 4 M 7 , 56, 238 t e s i s ~ ~ to, c e 242 and semiperipheries, S)@,? 1,2 12 See abo Capitdism; Capitalist ;tccumuiation Commotltiry chAns, 13 Commodity trade, 12 CommuniraGons techmoloe, 245,268(n5) Communist states, 3 1,243,245 Conflict and future transformation, 239,240, 24 1,242 and $obd modern world-system, 136, 239 and interaction neruvorks, 14, 19,33,52, 53,83 in kin-based societies, 6 M 3 Norchern California, 133-1 35, l 44, 145, 147-148 and population pressure, 100, 104

raiding, 46, 134, 147-148, 164 See [email protected] technoloa; pecgc t~pics C o n i d dans, 83-84,262(n3) Consumerism, 138 Contact peripheries, G X, 83,261(133) Gnrested periphery, 37 Cook, Sherburne E, 126 Gorelperiphe~relations, X2,35-37,4748, 224225 Mroeurasian world-system, a 520, 161, 162,13&192 and capidism, 22,33,50-5 1, 130, 132 and chiefdoms, 84 cmss-system compaiwn, 22&228, 263(n 18) defined, 2 and definitions of world-qsrem, 28-23, 247,24&243 dwelopmenr of underdevelopment, 32, 258fn8) diEerentiarion vs. hierarchy, 36, l30 and gender roles, 253(n2) gob& modern .world-system, 227, 263(n18) and incorporation, 37,59,75 and kin-bwd societietj, 4-3,260 (n 10) mesuremeat problem, 38-33 Nonhean California, 130, 131-2 32, 13&-133,1bsiO,X41-142,144,145 and plunder, 64 and spatiaf bound&=, 19,55 spreadlbachah egects, 38-33, $0-5 1 and state formarion, 46 and techniques of power, 49-50, 26Qfnll) See a h Semiperipheries Core-wide empira, 2 10 Coser, hvvis, 14 Cribb, Ragem; 46, 106, 162 Crone, Patricia, 41,45,46 Cross-system comparison, 20&223 capitdism, 2 X 0-2 13 corelperiphe~relations, 22&228 and glob4 merging, 2201,203-204, 203(fipre), 268(n2)

grod/&cIine cycles, 2 t 3-224, 2 15-2 17(6gurm), 2 19-22O(figures), 263(n 12) pulsation, 20&20Gp 2OStfipre) rise-and-fall panerns, 206-2 1Q, 208(Eigure), 2 l l (figure), 263(nn 3, 10) sirnilaritiesldiEe~ences~ 224226, 228-222) size, 200-201,202(table), 268(n1) Cmsades, 18 1, 182, 130,268(n3) Culturd ecology, 22-23> 257(n 10),260(n8) Cdmrd genocide, See Cutturicide Cdturdists, 16 CuXmrd materialism, 22 Culture area studies, 16, f 22, 124 Culturicide, 77,262(n 17) Curtin, Philip E)., 2142,24,92,93, 168 Dalton, George, 23-24 Davis, Jmes, 130 Decentralized stratified sociay, See Germanic mode ofaccurndation Deconstructionisnr, 4,255tn4) Dernographics. See Population pressure Dependent peripheries. See Full-blown peripheria DiAonoEf.;Igor M,, 86,88,89,104,2 12, 26 l(n12), 263(n7) Diarch~231,269(n1) Difiion, 18,105,174, 187-188, 253(n1l), 260(n8), 26 1(n13). See a& Interaction nemorh Dinh, 64,2,60(n10) Disae and Mroeuraim wodd-system, X 1 4 1X 5, tfil,t6&167,175,181,183 and Europem-North h e r i c a n contact:, G5,6a7,166-167 immunity; 167- 168 and towns, 182 Divkians of labor, 13, 188, 131,210 Botta, Jmes, 134,134,144 Bownethe-line interactions, 4-5,20,53, 129-130,146141, X88 Drmgel, Jessica, 3T537,96

Drennan, Robert D., 33 DuBois, G r a , 122, 127, 128, 135-1 36, 265 (n 19) Dunaway, Wilma, 6 6 7 4 Dutch hpuMic, 94, 190,238 Qson, Stephen L., 15 1, 162 Earle, Timothy, 22,23,44,45 h t Asian world-system, t 5 1,204, 205(figure), 206 fi:aIogid constraints, 5,93, 180-10 1, 11O Ecolot;Icaf: zones, 70-7 l, 84, 103, X 04, 167-168 Education, 198 EEeaive incorporation, 63 Egalitarimism, 28,225 northern Cafifornia, 127-1 28, 137-138, 142, 145,146 See also Clasfms societies Egpt, mcient, 77,2a(n3). See czko Central system Eisenstadt, S. N., 35, I80 Ebolm, hjsa, 22,26,23,33,34,35,209, 212,257(n3) Empires, 33,47,49-50,37,207,261 (n5) and corelperipkey reIarions, 49-50, 5 2 and iteration model, 111-1 12 See abu Tribucaq world-systems; pecgc enzpims and ystm Endogenous vs. aogenous impacts, X 8 England, 34,177,184 Environmental circumcription, 1f)2(fie;ure), 203 Environmentd degradanon, 1Q l , 102(figwej, 103,134 Ericson, Jonahm E., 133 Ermolaeva, Eiena, 225 Ethnic groups, 68, 168 Europe. See Mroeurasian vvorld-system; Central System; Europe-centered world-qstem European-North h e r i c m contaa, 7 4 7 7 and & w e , 65, GM7,166-167 and frontiers, 71, 72 and inwrporation &eor)r, 61, 6 5 4 7 , 261 (&I, 262fnn 6-43] Nonhern Gali;Fornia, 122, 146,264(n2)

Ewope-centered wodd-system, 187- X32 and Central System, f 83-184, X 87-183, 190,268fnn X, 3) and China, 38,191-192,250-25 1 contextual facxors, 238 and co~/peripher).relations, 19% 192 hqemonic core smtes, 9 4 9 6 , 134-1 35, 250 modes of amumulation, 25,33,258fn f G) and Ottoman Empire, 249,268(n2) and plunder, 64 rise 06 33, 189-1 92 as serniperiphery; 93-94 and trade, 2 83-1 84 See Capidism Evolution, 12. See a h Systemic transformtion Evolutionary potential, 81 External arena, 61, 63,261 (n3) External frontiers, 7 1-72 Fdl-oK 17-18,38,53--55 Far &tern wodd-system. See East Aim vvarid-system grodldedine cycles, 2 14-22 1, 215-21 7(figures),213-220ffipre~j See a& *oeurasian world-sy.stem; China Feinman, Gary M,, 13, 14,22 Feminism, 249(n2) Ferguson, Brian, 68,69,70, f G8 Fernandez, Eduudo, 68 Feudalism, 31 dwelopmenr of, 171, 172,174,188 transition to capitalism, 22,32,47 Finley, Moses, 29,536 Fissianing, 73-74,262(n 1G) Finparrick, John, 47 Flexible aaumdation, 2 0 , 2 4 5 b r q i n g , 222, 121. See Q& Hunter-etherers Foran, J o h , 19X Fordism, 2 1-22,23,30,110 Foster-Cater, kdm, 3 1 Fox, Mwxd W., l 95 Frmk, h d r e Gunder, 12, 18,22,29,34, 75, 150, 152, 187, 132,209,210, 212,213, 214,218,225,228,229, 249,250,248(nS)

Franlrenstein, Swan, 91,237 Friedman, Jonahm, 12, 13,22,25-26,23, 33,34,48,8G, 136,132, 138, 141, 206,207,203,212,228,244, 257"(n9) Fried, Mmton, 44, 110, 151 Frontiers, 70-72, 16&161, 180, 193,240, 262(nn 14, 15) Full-blow prigherim, G1 Functiandism, 35,45,107-108, 110,142 Futwe tmdarmation, 6,239-24,252-253 and population presure, 193 and sacidism, 24 1-244,245-246 Gaifey; Christine 259(n2) Gdron's problem, 38,253(n l 1) Gdtu-ng,Johan, 239,244 Gencier roles, 65, 136,253(n2) Genghis Khan. See Chingis Genocide, 77 Geopolitics approach, 2 1 Germanic mode of aaumulation, 258(nS) Gershenhon, Aexaxxder, 2 3 , 8 M 1,82 Gills, Barry K., 12, 18,22,23,34, 1187, 2C)9,212,213,214,218,22$, 223, 243,256 GIobd modern world-system, 192-1 99 and, Mroeursian world-system, 185-1 86 mcient roots of, 18,22 circumscription in, f 04 and conflict, 136,239 carejperipheq rdations, 227,269(n 18) current redipment, 1 , 2 future trmsformatian, G, 199,23%246, 252-253 incorporation, 63,64,77 interaction newark, 228,250 iteration modeI., 193- 199 lack of &onriers, 133,240 resbtance to, 243,244 and semiperipheries, 96 size oE, 191-1 92,268(nS) technologicd intensificattion, 136-1 33, 233,250 Sec. C b b d madem wrfd-system eration

Global m d e m world-system creation, 1,4, 5,203(figure), 268(n2) and Centrd System, 201,203,204, 205(fiwre>,268(n2) and prestige-gm& neworb, 20S204, 268(nn 4,s) GNP: See Gross natariand product Gol&chmidt, Wdter, 130, 133 Goldstein, Joshua, 196 GolAtone, Jack, 113, 114, 115 Gold trade, 26 1(n4) Grace, mcient, 31 Gres, Susm A,, 187 Gros national produa (GNP), 96 Growhidecline cycla, 2 13-224, 215-2 17(figures), 219-220(6pres) Cuiffard-Grdeil, Mwgwa, 135 Gunawardana, R.I"I.L.H,, 68,72 Hdruld, Gunnar, 7 l , X S9 Hdi, m o m D,, ~ 18,bl,@, 71,72,74, 75,76,88,37,249 Wapsbure; Empire, 2(58(n2) Harris, Mamin, 22,2G, 103, 105, 110, 1l S Hassig, bss, 68, 162 Haw&i, See Polynesk Haycien, Brim, 104 Headmen, 43, 127, 128, 132, 133, 136, 138, I45 Heg~nonicsequence, 35 Hegemony, 12-1 3,13,22 of care sat-, 9"1-.26,13&135,209,216, 2 l l (figure] Heimr, b b e r t E, 71, 134 Helms, Mary W., l63 Hierwchy formarion, 1O X- 104, IO;?(figure), 115, I 16(fipre), 263(n l) and hnctiondism, 107- 108 northern California, 145 unevennas of, 235 See akfa Grelperiphery rehtions; Egditarimism; Intraocierd inequalities Hinterlmd, 262(n 122 Hobbes, Thornas, 68 Hodgson, hrlxshdl, G, S,, 152 Hoebel, E. A., 71

H o h spders, 131, 134, 135, 137, 138133, 143. See ahfoNorhern Cdifarnia Wopkins, Qith, 5O,bl, 161, l63 Horses, 66, I7 1, 174,2G2(nn 7,9, X 4) Hudson, C. F., 164 Hu&a, E c h r d E., 38,126 HURS,262(n l 4) Hunter-gatherers, 22,43,253-260(n5), SCE abo Forsing IN. Sae Information neworb Incas, M, 261(nS) Incorporation, 53-7"7 6GO(figure) Mraeurasian world-vstem, 76,77, 150, 1'72,17&17%,X8&185 continuum of, 61,63,63(figure), G5,67, 24?-250,26l(n1),242(n12) conventiond theory; 63-65,2G 1(n3) and corelperiphery relations, 37, 53,75 and empires, 26 l (n4) and frontiers, 7&72,262(nn 14, 15) and inter;tx:ttionneworb, 53,6041, 62(fipre), 249-250 as mallable &anger 6 5 4 9 mild forms, G 5 4 8 precapitdisr vvorld-syftems, 64,6749, 26 1(n5) reversibiliry; 7% stateless sacieties, 72,73-76,77, 262(n l&) vvarld-system merging, 76-77 Indic world-system, l S 1, l 54, 17l , l 82 gromhldecline cycles, 22 1-224, 222-223(figures) Sce [email protected] world-system Informat-ion nmorkri (IN), 52,43, 188, 132 and incorporation, G&61,67 Intensification, S"ee Tecbndogicait intensification Interaction newark, 5, 12, 13, 54(fipl.e), 248 and conflict, 14, 19,33,52, 53,83 cross-system comparison, 225,228 Galton's problm, 38,259(nf 1) global modern world-system, 228,250 and incorporation, 5 9 , 6 M 1,62(figuxe), 249-250

indirect, 258fn2) multiple theorim, 12-2 5 multiple types, 52-55,6041, 261fn13) Narhern Cdifornia, 122, 124 and spatid boundaries, 16-1 7, 18-1 3 Spatid boundaries; pecgc nemorks and ~ s t m s Interchiefdorn systems, 83, 206 Xntemd frontiers, 72 International law9276(nG) In ternational relations field, 2 1 Interstate systems, 33,35, 19&X96,207 Inrrasocied inequdiries, 12-1 3 , 4 5 4 6 nonhern Cdiflornia, 39, 127-1 28, 264(nn 5,G) See d o am; Coreiperiphery rdatiom; Hierarchy formation Xdarn md Mroeurasian world-system, 168, 171, 172, 173(fiprer), 175, 181-282, 26nnn 13,27) and Europe-centered world-system, 188, 130,231 Iteration model, 54,33-117, 1 O2(figure), 116 (figure) [email protected] constr&nts, 39-1 00 and capitalism, 112-1 f 3 and disease, l 14- 2 l 5 ecologicd consrraints, 5,39, f 00-10 X, 110 mcl fusure trmsformation, 253 and global modern world-system, 133-139 populathn pressure, 100-1 04, lQ2(fipre), 113-1 14, 2 l%,l E G[Egure>, 263(n l) and progress l 08 and rwolutions, 113-1 14 tecbnolegid intensifiation, 101, 102(fipre),103, 105-107, 111-1 12, 115, 116(fipre), 263(n l) Jackon, Thornas L., 127,133,147,205 Jqchid, Sechin, 160, 162 Japan, 17'7, 178, 184, X98,267(n29) Johnssn, Atim W, 22,23,44,4S Johnson, Dale L., 61

Keliy, bymond C., 14,64,260(nXO) Kennedy, Paul, 196 a m n o v , hatoly M., 1GO Gubifai f i a n , 176, 177, 1182 Min-based societies, 25, 30, 52, 88 eonfiict, 6 8 4 9 m d corelperiphery relations, 4849, 260(n10) and. worjd-systems typolog, 4 l , 4344, 259-2GO(nn 2 , 3 , 5) St.eako Northern Gafifornia; Stateless societies Knsbip systems, 23-24,206 G n t r d Asian nomads, 162,180, 267(n26) conical clans, 8%84,262(n3) Mongols, 180,267(n26) northern California, 135-1 38 Krch, Patrick, 83-84, 103, 104 h i g h s , 1"7,174, 278 KohX, Phillip L., 12,36, 86 Kondratieff waves, 176, 2 12 bwdewsh, S q h e n A., 13, 16,18,22 histiansen, Ksktim, 48,82, 188,258(n5) boeber, Afred L., 16, 122, 124, 127 Ku~che,Paul, 70 h b s r movement, 244,245 Essa-faIre ideal, 135 tos, Imre, 4 La tone, DxreI1 E., 64 L;1 Lone, MW B., 64 hmberg-kiovsky, C. C., 39 Lane, Frederick, 9 1 Lane, Pbii, Jr., 167 hairnore, &en, 3,7&7 1,78, t 5 1, 158, 161,163,180, 240 Law, b b i n , 68 Lamon, Harry, 126 Leach, Mmund, 25 L w t eEort ~rincipfe,100- 10 1 k n s k , Cerhard, 17, 18, 19,22-23,39,42, 65, 101,253(n3) IRnsk,Jm, 17, 18,19,22-231 65,101, 259(n3)

k a t h e s , Louise, 176 Wi-Strauss, Chude, 25 Lindner, Rudi, 178, 18Q,262(n14) Line wars, 133-1 34 Linguistic digerenriation, 123(6gure), t 28, 264(n7), 265(n20) Laeb, Mwin M,, 128 hwie, Roberr H., 71 LutwA, Mwsd, 162 Maerdifisionism, 23 Mann, Michael, 21,45,49,86, 87-88, 83, 111, 127, 135, 144, 172, 175, 189, 2QQ,228,254(n2),261(n12\),263(nn 7,82 Marcher states, 8&83,37,38, 111, 156, 172, 183,236,262(n4) Marfoe, h o n , 33 Marginal peripheries, G 1,63,26l (n l) Markt models, 2I-22,24,25?-258(n 14) Market. socidism, 3 1 Marriqe in ]kin-based societies, 52,259(112) Northern California, 128, 135, 135-138, 144, 145 See allro Knsbiip systems Maxtel, Chules, 17 1 Martin, Willim G., 36,61, 63,2$7(n5) Mannism, 105, 108, 2 2 1, 258(n16), 259(n3) on cornmodification, 14,T)O on merchant capitdism, 92,2G3(n3) on systemic transformation, 2 6 2 6 $m [email protected] aaumdation; Modes of production Martingly, D. j.,68, 151, 162-163 Mauvm Empire, 154 McCarthy, Helm, 134 McNeiH, WiUiam H., 76,78, 87,88, 143, 151, 152, 156, 153,164, 166, 167-268,170,171~174,176,178, 180,181,183,197,221,233 Meadows, Dennis L,, 199,253 Meadms, Donell%,133,253 Meillassoux, Claude, 253(n2) Melko, Matthew, 16, 52 Mefacfy; MicltaePel E., '71 Merchant capitdism, 9 1, 92-33

Merging, 7G77, 185. See [email protected] modern world-lf;).stemereation; Inco~oration Mesopoaia, 36,39,77,85,[email protected]). See a& u a d i a n Empire;Gntral System Mqer, Nefissa L., 65 Military t e c h o l o ~87-88,236,263(n7) , and Mroeurasian world-system, l 7 1, 174, 176, 185,267(n13) and inarporarion, 65 nuclmr wapons, 233,240,242 Miller, E m , 65, 1G? Milner, Ctaire McHde, 2aG Minisysrems, 13 Minoriq groups, 77. See aho Ethnic groups Mishkn, Bernard, 66 Mississippim politidlmiliary nework, 203,268(n3) Mixed modes of accumulation, 31,258fn5) Modelski, George, 1 7 6 2X 2 Modernkzs, 29 Modes of accumufation, 24,30-35, 148 &fined, 29-30 flexible, 243,245 iteration model of transformation, 99, 105-107 and systemic transformation, 3 1-32, 55, 235 and world-systems vpolou, 4 1-42 See [email protected] accumulation; Modes of production; Sacidism; Systemic logic Modes of integrarion, 23 Modes of production, 16-1 7,2425,32, 258(nn 13, 14) m d incorporation, 63,66 See aho MoOes of accumulation; Systemic logic Modoc people, 2G5(n 17) Miin&e f i a n , X78 Mongoh, 47,1SO,151, 177-181, 173f&gure),2 18 big-man system, 17'8,180 and entrdiation, 74-75 and digwe, 114, 181, 183 and Europe, 183 and Xslm, 182

overtfirow of, 176 Moral order, 23-24, 129, 147,2591nl) Morgan, David, 178 Moseley, Gherine R, 172 Multiclulruralism, 244,270(n6) Murphy, CAg, 240 Muruailism, 49 Myrdd, Gunnar, 38 Natiw hericans, See Euvean-North h e r i m calltact Navajo people, 72 Neo-evolurisnism, 4 Neolithie arevolution,'' f l Q Netkrlands. See Dutch Republic Mew Zedmd, 103 Nissen, Hans J., 39,235 "No inte~eninghearland rule," 2 , 7 6 , 183 Noian, Patrick, 65, 10 1 Nomadism, 4G,7 5,37,107 and Mroeursian trade, l G>lG Centrai Asia, 158-163, f 53(table), 170, 176,26G(nn 8,3),267(n26) md horse introduction, 66,262(n?) transbumant, IG2,266(nla) See a& pec$cpeoples Nomind incorporation, 4 3 4 4 Manstate societia. See Stateias societies North h & c a n - E u r o p w contact. See Europem-North h e r i c a n contact Northern California, 121-148,264(n3) [email protected]=, 33, 126127, 264fln4),2G5(n X 2) conflict, 13S135, 244, f 45, 147-148 corelperiphery relations, 130, 131-232, 138-1399 140, 241-142,144, 545 and definitions of world-systems, 28 European contact, X 22, X 46,2a(n2) imgllications, 146- 148 interaction neworb, 122, 124 intraocietd ineqdicies, 39, 127-128, 2G4(nn S, 6) linguistic differentiation, f 23(6;ure), 128,264(n7), 265(n20) maps, f 23(figure), 125(figure) marriage, 128, 135, 135-138, 144, 145

obsidian, 130, 133, 143,2&(n32) prestige-goods neworb, 128, 141, 142,

145-l46,264(n8),265(n21) putation, 147,204,206 regisnd inuractions, 128, 139- 143, 265(nn 13-2 1) setrlemenrlsubistencepatterns, 131-1 32, 2GS(nn 11-14) spatid hundaries, 20, 12-8-1 30, 146147 trade fm0,128, 129,132-I33 as warid-system, X 22,264(n2) Nuclear weapons, 239,240,242 Nuer, G4,260([email protected] QBrien, Patrick, 35 Obsidian, 130, 133, 143,264(n9) Ocravian, 11 $7 Qikumenes, 203,268(04) O h m u c h u people, 135 Q p i m Wars, 64 Qpdrnd foraging models, 22 Qniz, dfonso, 71 Oscillation, 22,2 l 2-2 13,234,236 Oaoman Empire, 182,243,268(n2) Paradigms, 1 Pardlel evolutian, 38 Parsons, Tdcott, l XO, 259(n3) P ~ t o r apeoples, l 88,97,150,158-159. See abo Nomadism; pcrc$cpeophs Patterson, Orlmdo, 48 Pawin people, t 40, 141, 342, 146 Pexson, Harry W, 24,92 ®rine, Perer N., 13, 16, 142 Persim Empire, l56 PGN. See Prarige-goods neworb Philip of Macedon, l56 Phaenida, 3 1,5)3, 156,188,2 12 Pirefine, Efenri, 2 13 Pique. See Black Death; Disease Plaim paples, 43,66,7 1,2G2(nn 7,8) Pliny, 166 Plunder, G4,76 PMN. See Po1itic;dlmilirar)rnemrltr; Pobnyi, k1,23-24,25,30,30,32, 112, 154

P?alitid/miiitw neworb (IPMN), 14, 19, 33, 52, 53 and Europe-antered world-~sam,131 and inwrporation, 61,64 and senriperipheries, 83, 37, 263(n l 0) See ako sptecz$c pstm Polo, Mmco, 176 Polynesia, 18,83-84, 103, 104,225 h r n o people, 128, 139-140, 142, 143, 146. See Northern Cdifomia Popufation pressure, 23,45,262(n16) and capidism, I 12-1 13,234-235 and $obd modm world-vtem, 1518-1 29 and iteration model, 100-104, I 02(fipfo, 113-1 14, I l$,l lG(figure), 263(nl) and last egort principke, [email protected] Q X Sanderson theor)., 11% l f l , t 12 See aho Circumscription bsrmodernism, 4,244 Preapitdiso world-systems, l 5,64,6749, 26 1(1151,See aho En-baed societies; Tributary world-systems; spec$c societies dad tqia Prehistory, 12,256(n2). Sett dho specgc wor&-sg?ftm

Prarige-po& aemorkr; (PGN), X 3- 14,25, 52,53 Mroeur~ianworld-system, l 58, X 64, l86 Europe-centered warXd-~~;~tem, E 88, 19X and global modern wrid-syistem cration, 203-204,268(n4) importmce of, 248 and incorporation, 61,76 norhern California, t 28, 14l, 142, l4%146,264(n8),265(n21) See allso pec$c ~ ~ t r n s Price, T. Douglas, 121, 147,206 Price-se~ingmarketr;, 24,47,92, 247-258(n14) Primary states, 45 Primitivism, 29, 90 Pristine srares. Sec Primslry sates Prducrive rechnolap, 22,257(nX 1) Progrm, l08 Protatiaa rent, 31,263(n8)

Protein avAlability, GG,262(n8) Puebio pmple, 43 Msation, 108,147,205(figure), 263(n7) system similarities, 206206,225,234

b i n , Charles, 61 &ding, 46, 134, 147-148, 114 h d e r s , Jargen, 193,253 h d s b o r g , aavs, 174 h t i o n d choim approaches. See Formalism Ractive srates, Sea Seconhry states Realhtion problem, 138 Redistribution, 25 Daniel X, 65 Regions of rehge, See &rglnd peripherim Religions, 45, 138, 167 and Mroeurasim vvorld-system, 168, 172, 175,185 wrId, 168,261;7(n16) See alfo sptcfFc religt'alw Renfrm, Colin R, 33,43, 54, 187 Revalutions, 113-1 14 R=-and-fdt paterns, 208(6g u ~ )269 , (an 3, If)) hegemonic core stata, 9 4 3 6 , 134-1 35, 209,2 10,2l 1(fipre), 234 and iterarion model, 109, X 11-1 52 and state formation, 4 5 4 6 system similarities, 2 0 6 2 16, 225,234, 269(n 16) Roman Empire, 50, 53,74, 157, X 88,212 and China, 15X, 152,157-1 58 and nomah, 162-163 and semiperipheries, 95-96 See [email protected] world-system Rome and China (Tegarr), 158 Rostoez& MihAl, 29,31, 157,237 Rowlmcts, MichaeI l., 12, 13,25,34,48, 86,136,237, 138,141,266 Rueschexneyer, Dietrich, 243 Rwsell, Tames 24 bssia, 98, [email protected] fnion Sdins, MarsMl D,, 24, 28,444, 82,83, 158,178,206

Saladin, 181 Sanderson, Stephen K., X 2,42,65, 108, 110-111,112,113,115,156 Santley, Rsbert S,, 13 Sapir, Mwud, 136 S ~ g a n85,87,256(&) , Saunders, J. J., 178 Scheider, Jane, 3, 13,52, 141,142, 191 Schortman, a w a r d M,, 15,354 49,52 Scott, highton R., 1 6 5 2 Secondary social chnge, 260(n6) S~ondasysat-, 45 Secay, Frmk R, 66 Sedentism, 43, 103, 167,12 1, 253-266(n5), 2G2(n 14) Segmentary lineage, 158 Semiperipheries, 2,37, 7&-98,259(n10) Mraeuraian world-sptem, 9 4 162 and eagitdism, 90-33,112,241, 27Q(n5> Central System, 156 chiefdam, 83-84 ciy-states, 85-82,2 12, 236, 237-238 and class, 88-89,244 cross--ern ampatison, 225-228 and future trmsformation, 241,246245 G e r ~ h e k a ntheory, 80-8 1 hegemonic core states, 3496 and hierarchy formation, 104 macher states, 8683,9"7 11l 156, 183, 236,262(n4) Quigley theory; 81-82 rise of Eurap, 93-94 Semics:theory, 81 and systemic transformation, 5 l, 104, 237-238 Ttarsky theory, 79-80 Tpes oE, "7-73 Wilkinson rheoxy, 37,2631n 10) Senrice, Elm= R, 44,73,81,82,253(nl) Shmsmf, 127, 138,264(n6) Sharp, Lauristan, 106 Shasta, [email protected]=, 126-1 27,13 1,133, 264(n4) Sherratt, hdrewt 63,75, 76, 187, 188, 255(n4), 268(n1) Sherratt, Sman, 288 l,

Shih Huang Ti, 152 Short Histoy ofthe Fgtrcre, A Wagar), 240 Shuttle pattern, 97 Silk trade, 163-1 64, 172 Siitverblatt, Xrene, 25S)(n2) Sim&n, C.G,F*,164, 166,267(nn 13, 14) Simmel, Ceorg, 14 SLatm, Richard, 70 Slavery, 3 3f,34, 163, 2CS(n17) and incorporation, 64,6849,72 SmtJL-sde interaction neworh, 4 5 Snipp, C. Mattheuv, 61 So, Nvin, 61,64,76 Sacid circumscription, 102(fipre), 103, 104,237 Social cosmogapfiy, 258(n2) Socidism, 30,3 1,270(n4) and &cure trmsformation, 24 1-244, 245-246 m d serniperipheries, 96,38 Sacidly necessv laibior time, 32,263(n3) Sokolavsb, f oan, 6 1,64 South Asia. See aroeuraian wrld-system; Xndic world-system Soviet Union, 96,98,243,245. See aho Rmsia Spatial boundaries, 1 6 2 0 , 38 and ecotogicd zones, 7 t and mod= of aaurndation, 32-33 multicriteria approach, 52-55, 146, 2.47-248,261 (n13) Northern Cdifornia, 20, 128- 130, 146147 Sea L Z ~ Interaction O nmorks Spielmmn, btherine, 43, 107 Spier, kslie, 136 Spread eaects, 3&---33,5&5 1,84 Smre-:-centricapproaches, 12,21,25G(n2) Sate formation, 25, 103,257(n3) and capitalism, 34, 236 and class, 4 U 5 , 1 1 0 , f 61-112 glabd, 239-240,253 and intrasocietal inqdities, 45-46 and prestige-goods nemorh, 268(nS) g r i m y vs, secondaq 45,26O(n8) unevenness of2 235-236

m d world-s~temscypolae84 M 6 , 260(n8) See abo Systemic trmsformtion Stateless societia, 13, 20-21, 259(n1) md definitions of world-syfl;ems, 28, 258(n2) historiciy of, 246(n2) and incorporation, 72,7%?6,77, 262tn16) Stares. See Ciry-states; State-centric approaches; Seate formation; specgc states atad ~ ~ t m s Stephens, Evelyne Huber, 243 f tephens, John D., 243 Stern, Stwe f ,,35 Srmad, Jdian, 22,104505 Stigarxn, knorc A., 1G7 Strahem, hdrew, 68 Structurd interdependence, 63 Strucrurdism, 16-17, 110 Subimperialism, 262(n l) Substmtivism, 23-24,29,90, 257-258(n1%) Subunit problem, 15-1 G, 2$7(nS) Smer, See Mesopatarnia S u n a f ,Elaine, 126, 130, 131, 144 Superhegemany, 249 Symons, Vm Jay, 160, 1G2 Systtemic logic, 2 6 2 6 implicit modeis, 33 logical continuationists, 20-23, 25nn99 metasheoreticd positions, 20,257(n7) qualitascive transformationisrs, 2 S 2 6 See aka Mods of accumulation; S"ystemic transformadon Systemic transformation, 2-3,233-246 and a p i d imperidism, 257(n3) contmrud faccors, 237-238 and culrurd ecalog, 22-23 and deconstmctionis:m, 4,255(n4) denial 06 20-23 hture possib8ities, 3, 133,239-246, 252-253 generd chuacreristics a&233-233,243 and incorporation, 65

and modes of accumulation, 31-32,55, 235 and m d e s of production, 1 6 2 5 rare of, 239,270(n2) research strategies, 55-56 Sandersan theory, 110-1 11 semndaryr 260(nG) and semiperipheries, 5 1, 104,237-238 and substmtivism, 23-24 theories, 23-26 and rotairy asumption, 32 unwenness of, 5,234236,238 variation in, 5-6, 10&1Q9 See ghrd Iteration modld; Serniperipheria Szymmski, fiberr, 24 1 Szyaewicz, SIawoj, 160

Transpomtian, 33,35, 192-1 93,237 Treganm, A. E., 134 Xibal imperialism, 14 Tribaf zone, 68 TribeIecs, 20,43, 127, 133 Tribes, 44 Triburav wodd-systems, 30, 31 cqiazliism within, 30-93,263(n8) and incorporation, 74,76 o~ilhtionin, 2 12-2 13 and wrld-qstems ypology, 4 1-42, 4U7,259(nn 3, 41 See &Q qec$c g s ~ am d topics T r ~ t s kTeon, , 73-80,81,82,36 Turks, I8 1,182,267(n27), See [email protected] ottoman Empire

Twepera, Rein, 1l l , 267 T&nter, foseph A., 109, 110, 113, 115, 161 TmerXane. S"ee Timur the h e Tangut Empire, 175 Taylor, John G., 24, 694, 130 Techiques of power, 21,49-50, 172, 175, 26O(n 1l) Technological intensification, 22, 104 Mroeurafian world-system, 172, 174 dobd moctern world-system, 136-199, 239,250 and iteration model, 101, 102(figure), 103,1Q5-107, 111-112,115, l I G(figure), 263Cnl) TechnoIogicd rent, 192 Te&gart,Frderick J,, 152, 158 Teleological explanations, 5,25 5(nlj) Thompsan, Wilfiam R., 156, 176, 196,212 Thornton, Russell, 65, 1 6 167 Tibet, 175 Charles, 14, 15, 19,34,52, 137 Time s d e , 18-1 9 Xmur the h e , 183 Totality assumption, 32 Towns, 174, 182,267(n28) Taynbee, Arxlold, 8 1 Trade di~poraslecumenes,2 l-22,693, 168, 1'71,172 Transhumant nomads, 162,26G(n10)

Underdwelopment, dwelopment of, 32,36, 258(n81 Unetqual =changes 2 42, t 3 1-1 32 United Smtes, 9 6 3 5 Universal sate, 207 Urbm, Patricia A., 15, 33,49, $2 Vayh, h & e w E, 132 Violence. See Conflict; Military re&naIog)l Voegelin, Elrrninie W., 124 Waw, W. F a r e n , 240,244

Wdlerstein, Immanuel, 2, 13, 16,24,22, 28, 32,35, 52,61,63,64, '78, 188-189,207,209,248,243, 258(n16), 261(n3) Warfwe. See Gnflict; Military rechnolw Warren, Jonahan, 65, 167 "Was There a Pre-capitdist World-System?" (Schneider), 3 Weber, Mm, 2 1,30,147 Wells, Peter S,, 151, 188 Wmt Mrlca, 64,6843, 172,261(n4) meatley, Paul, 154 mktler, MenneA W., 126, 134 m i r e , Lynn, Jr., 174 mitehead, Neil, 68, "7, 168 %itt&er, C. R, 151, 158, 180 W b t , Wayne C., 265(n11)

Wife-t&ing. See Marriqe Wilcox, David R., 43 Wilkimon, David, 14, 1S, 18-13,2 2,33, 52,6497, t 51, 1 5 7 201,203,206, 207,213,218,221,243,251,252, 263(n10), 2G8(n2) wlkinson, Richxd, 113 Wiltard, Alice, 172,212,214,226 Wintu people, See Nonhern California Visler, Chrk, 16 WoIF, Eric R, X5,24,25,30,67, 192, 258(n16) Wool6 Greg, 2S3(rr X 0) World-economies, 27-28 World-empires, 27,207,209,269(nl X) World marker, 2 World-systems defined, 44-5,12-l 5, 27-23,247-243 measurement problems, 3840,253(n1 l) reseach strategia, 55-56,247,25 5-252 See a b Wodd-systems ~ theory; Worldv t e m s ypolog; pec$c topics

World-systems theory, 11-26 spatid boundaries, 16-20? 32-33,38 subunit problem, 15-.lCi,257(n5] systemic logicz20-26,257(n7) See a& pec$c epics World-systems rypology, 41-47, 253-zGO(n-5;) and gender ineqdiry; 253(n2) p r i m v vs. ~condarydisinction, 45, 260(nn G, 8) sedentism, 43,259-2GO(n5) state formation, 4UG,260(n8) theoretid approach, 259(a3) Worldwatch, 199

%arell, rUlen, 235 Zheng He, X 76 Zpf, Gearge, 100