Socialism Unbound

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SECOND EDITIOP.;

Stephen Eric Bronner

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" A Menlber of the Perseus Books Group

A11 rights reserved, Printed in the Unitcd Statcs of America. No part of this publicatiotl may be in any form or by any meaxls, etecrronic or mechanical, including reproduced or tra~~srnttted lhhotocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval sysecm, without permissiotl in writing from &c publishcl: Copyright 43 2001 by Westview Press, A :Member of the Perseus Books Group Published in 2(301 in the United States of America by westview Press, 5500 C:cntral Avex~ue, Boulder, Colorado 80301-2877, and in the United Kingdom by Westview Press, 12 Hid's Copse Road, riafrmiere, Karen Sulfivan, and my editor at Routledge, IWaureen MacGrogan, this book would probably riot have seen the light of day, As for Leo Wiegrnan and David McBride of Westview Press, let me just say how much 1 appreciated their enthusiasm for bringing out this new edition, Finally, I would like to offer a special thanks to my wife, Anne Burns,

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ce to the Second Edition Soczi3.lism Unboztnd first aypeared in 1990, The Berlin Wall had just fallen and the Soviet Union was in a crisis that scmn would turn into its death throes* IVikhail Corbachev was still in power and, incredibly, it seemed as if his sclerotic communist state might yet make way for a new form of sociaiisxn with dexnocratic political foundations. Movements committed to liberal constitutionalism, whose dyllamics still remain theoretidly undeveloped, were taking to the streets almost everywhere in Eastern Europe. Hopes on the left were high. In the popular imagination, however, the final collapse of the Soviet Union in I991 seemed to vindicate the policies of Ronald Reagan an3 Margaret Thatcher. 1,aissez-hire became the rallyingcry for most farmer dissiderlcs m d the new party professionals in Eastern Europe, Meanwhile, in the R s t , attempts to temper market excesses were c o n d e ~ ~ n easd anachronistic. Left politics suddenly stood discredited, Indeed, soon enough, the attack on ""socialism" would turn into an attack on welfare liberalism and the values assc~ciatedwith the 1960s. Socialisnz U~boundoffered a new libertarian socialist perspective amid tlze erosion of cornrnunism in the East and the effects of a conservative counterrevr~ltltionin the West. It introduced new ethical principles, new categories, and a new appr~aCh.Mainrstream critics corzdemned the work for chainplaning class politics just when the seeming alternative to capitalism had lost its validity. Meanwhile certain left-wing intellectuals castigated its critique of teleolt~gicaloytimis~rtand populist assumptions. But ten years make a difference, Academic studies in industrial relations now often call upan the labor movement to reassert its ""ciass" character, though they often have little sense of what this might ideologically imply, and most progressives are searching for answers beyond those offered by identity politics. The debilitating effects of the transition to capitalism in the East, and the economic dislocations attendant upon the shift from an industrial to an information society in the \Vest, have given, socialist thinking a new role to play, No remedies seemed available when the dissidents of Eastern Europe were driven to the political margins in hvor of party professionals and the initial outburst of revolutionary enthusiasm gave way before the economic inequities, corruption, and material insecurity associated with attempts to inrtrodnce a market econoiRy. Unemployment and the accumulated costs of

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conservative rule began growing in Western Europe wllile, in tl-re United States, an ongoing economic boom accompanied increasing inequality, Transnational institutions like the International Monetary Fund started exercising greater arbitrary power than ever before wl-riie fragmentation among workers intensified. Dealing with such changes demands more than has previously been offered by the establishmentc?rimLeft, Traditional wisdom now rests on what was obviously the focal point for the attack on the conservative policies of the 1980s: the election of President Bill Glintor1 in 1992. Over the next few years, social democratic parties and ""progressive" phticians would be swept into power in any llumher of cc.,untries. Mixing old-fashioned social democratic promises with an almost unmitigated admiration fc~rthe Clinton electoral strategy of bringing "m~derate"voters into the progressive fold, new leaders like Tony Blair and Gerl-rard Sckroeder galvanized the electorate in England and Germany Soon enough, however, both leaders began speaking of 'Tiscal discipline," "personal initiative," and a "'lean" "state. Each ~1ltirnatc;Iyrefused to address a growing inequality of wealth and already unequal systems of taxation skewed in favr~rof the wealthy They instead decided to roll back welfare policies, throttle the left wing within their own parties, lessen dze social responsibilities of big business and-perhaps for want of gertuinely new ideas of their own-embrace many premises of "'trickle down" ecor1omics. Gtobaliza tion seemed to ~ustifysuch policies, The new constraints on state action, the new mobility of capital, and the rise of new financial institutions had supposedly created new h m s of systemic stabitit). reinfcjrced by tl-re lack of genuine alternatives or movements, But globalization is not a llatural process. Current trends toward deregulation can he co~ltestedboth nationalfy and especially through internatio~~al cooperation, Xt is a matter of political will, But that is clearly lacking. The R~issianCommunist Party now blends nostalgia for the economic benefits provided by the former Soviet state with cowardly expressions of anti-Semitism and demagogic nationalism wllile, elsewilere in the East, some ex-communists are transforming themselves into social democrats and others have begun trumpeting the need for neoliberal policies. In a sense, however, the refusal to engage glc~halization in a critical manner has been even more striking in tl-re West. The search for a '"third way" 'or a "'new middte,'" or what has most recently been termed ""progressivegovernance," has clearIy devolved into a general accommodation of capitalism and its values*Most R s t e r n socialist parties have lost their nerve and, in the Ullited States, the Democrats have increasingly begun to resemble what had been the Iiberal wing of the Republican Party in the years before the Reagan revolution. Given its skepticism ~ g a r d i n gmore-. compliant views of class action, with its new internationalist commitment to liberal democracy and econt~micjustice, SocZdtESm Unhound might actually retain a greater salience today than

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when the book first appeared. The current disjunction between progeessive ideals and ct>nserwatiwepractice is particularly grave. It is threatening to parafyze the purwit of wrkersktllxcerns by socializing the costs and privatizing the berlefics of public policy. A chasm is ever inore surely separating the interests of mainstream social democratic and progressive parties from those of their swn mass base whose members are ever more surely being faced with voting for the ever more indiscernible "ksser of the two evils." Sociaiism Linhot%~;ld sought to highlight the importance of political action inside and outside the erectoral arena. Its claim that socialism is not equivalent with any institutional arrangement speaks directly to the current situation. It suggests that, Ieft to their own devices, established progressive organizations succumb to a pc-~liticsof bureaucratic self-interest. Neither the party nor the trade union can any longer be considered the incarnation of hope in the manner of times past. The need exists lctr a political project capable of articulating the common interests of working people and new k ~ m of s solidarity appropriate for the new miHennium. The attempt to develop such a project, to recast sociaiism as an ethical tlteory with a practical intent, was the original political purpose behind the writing of this book, Unbridled opportunism by existing organizatio~is,combined with a certain support for socialist positions among tl-reir constituencies, is precisely what has put the ethical question back on the historical agenda. Revived attempts to conflate politics with administration by the professionals, combined with the growing manipulation of political symbols for mass consumption, have undermined the ability to think &out new organizational forms, radical. demands, and the ideological. requiremerits for unified forms of class action, A different and more critical approach has become necessary. But it is no longer enough to reject reality and insist upon rehahilitating the "true"" alternative, an ontr~odednotion of workers councils, an atavistic belief in "national self-determination," or the libertarian pall1 not taken by the Russian Revolution. Critique needs a positive rekrent. A new critical standpoint m s t prove capable of contesting the mistakes and appropriating the contributions of the socialist past. Socialism Unboz-tndtried to show what the traditioil generated by the la~ ~practice, ft illur~inatedthe dybor movement has to offer in t h e and naxnics informing that intellecttial tradition, its limits no less than its contributions, under circumstances in which radicals were already becoming inrzreasingly Lznaware of their own past. New corzditions warrant a new edition, This new edition offers stylistic alterations, corrects mistakes, revises certain arguments, and highlights relevant insights that were previously underplayed. All tile chapters have also been reworked in light s f new developments especially tlzose concerning the logic of reformism and the Qynarnics of communism, But the most important revisions occur in the last chapter, These shift the discourse.. Having explicated socialism as a regulative idea, with the purpose of transfc~rmingcapitalist reality, I have taken

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tendency occurred precisely in those advanced industrial states where democracy was already constituted, or would become constituted without the need for political radical action by the refc~rmiststhemselves, ft is notewortlzy that social democratic reforrnisrn had Xittle appeal for the struggtes of colonized peoples against imperialism. It has also proven incapabie of confronting the growth of cynicism and apathy among the very groups to which it should appeal, Thintgs have grown even worse for revisionism with the rise of the '"third wab" or a neorevisionism, intent upon rolling back many of its origitlal successes. Reformists have generally been unwilling to admit the structural dependency of their undertakings on the whims of capital. They have been unable to conceive of a political response to reaction, let alone the possibility of counterrevolution, and they have been insistent on suhodina ting inrternational commitments to national exigencies and long-term to short-term issues, The original revisionist attack on "metaphysics" made it ever more difficult to forward any speculative criteria for ethical judgment and this, in turn, l-retped transfonr.1 a coherent social democratic worldview into a potitics of drift. Ali of this demands a critique of the unexamined epistemologic : this tendency, Thus, cal premises as weli as the underlying d y n a ~ ~ iof ""Euard Bernstein and the Logic of Revisionism" confronts the institutiunai and philosophicat limits o f an instrumental politics that threatens both the meaning and identity of the socialist proiect, h somewhat different ayproach is necessary, however, when dealing with Leninism. Its totalitarian impulse has been duly recognized, Especially give11 the prejudices of a "pstcoi~munist"world, however, illuminating the integrity of the original theory has become a matter of some importance, Leninism was a worldview with implications for political organization and the state, nationalism and internationalism, as well as i~nperiafism and a revolutionary ethic. ""Lninisxn and Beyand" explores the dynamics of the theory, the alternatives it might have generated, and how political choices made within a changing historical complex influenced the character of its assau 'ft on tlze internationalist, republican, and egalitarian principles inhrming the class ideal. Initially concerned with bringing &out a bourgeois revolution where capitalism was weak and the proletariat small, no less than Bernstein, Lenin too was wiliing to reach out to g o u p s other than the working class. But, according to Lenin, this required making the political organization independent of its empirical base and substituting it for the proletariat as the revolutionary agent of socialist transformation, Incarnating the possibility of concerted revolutionay action by the oppressed, the p a r y became the repository of ""true consciousness," wl~ich,in turn, enabled it to treat all adversaries-includiq those with actual support from the profetariatpurely as conditions warra~~ted.

An etl-ricai or speculative component, predicated on revolutionary cornmitment, was nevertheless evident in the thought of this great ""Machiavellian'9from the beginning. This alone enabled Lenin to cmceive of the party as tl-re bearer of ""true consciousness" a d ~ustifiedtactical changes as well as compromises with other classes. It also allowed him to disregard all charges of opportunism artcl engage in the anti-imperialist: quest lor ""rational selt--determination" without fear of liquidating inrernationafist proletarian principles. Lenin" conception of the party was predicated on a vobuntaristic reinterpretatiori of Marxism that would highlight its revolgtionrlry implications for econamicaily underdeveloped societies without liberal traditioils or a mass labor movement. Indeed, its usuccess" was inversely related to the existence of democratic institutions and economic advancement in any given nation. An etl-ric built on revolutionary commitment demands revision, however, once powu has been seized in a national context and the possibilities for inrternatioxzal revolutiori have waned, Yet, that is precisely what did not OCcur even as history seerned to abandon the nascent regime, Faced with the failure of the pmletarian uprisings in the West following Wc~rtdWar I, the Bolshevik state found itself znorally rudderless. Forgetting that a movemerit in power differs from one on the rise, and implicitly assuming tile revolutionary commitment of his vanguard, Lenin refused to accept the need for countervailing organizations to institutionally check what would become an arbitrary exercise of power by the party, Thus, revolutionary socialist identity was cc~nsolidatedat the expense of those radical democratic values that Marx and Engeis no less than Matltsky and Bernstein had called upon the politicai organizations of the working class to realize, In this way? Lenin helped set the stage for his successor. Whatever the continuity between 1,eninisrr-r and Stalinism, however, elements of discontinuity also existed in marters ranging from tile character of tl-re party to the use of terror, from its organizational style to the cult of the personality, from domestic policy to the role of cultrrre and fc~reignpolicy. In fact, the coherence of Lenin's original theory was destroyed by Stalin, whose ad hoc pronouncements resuited in little more than an arbitrary dogma designed to meet the immediate instrurnerital exigencies of party practice. Miflions were sacrificed as one compromise followed another and '"proletarian internationalism"" became a mere veil for the pursuit of the Soviet Union" national interest, But the terror and the lies ultimately took their toll. Especially following Stalin's deatl-t, the USSR lost the aura and ""rvolutionary privilege" it bad once possessed among the exploited and the dippossessed. Gradually it became apparent that the only ""scialist'\tate, even if it had emergcd from the depti-rs of superstition and underdevelopment to become a superpower, was n w a state like any other. And so, even before the events of 19139, the former communist parties found themselves

bereft of ideulr~gyand politicai purpose. Soxne turned to nationalism, and even anti-Semitism, while others sought to reinvent themselves in the guise of traditit)nal social democracy P;;o less than with the Western reformist parties, howevel; a sense of drift would infect tile once proud Western cornmunlst movement. A standpoint for criticism and a positive afternative can be found within the '"underground" tradition of socialist theory m d praccice inauguritled by Rosa Luxemburg, Emphasizing the critical elements within :Warxian theor?; seeking to actualize the ~zntappedpotential of the class ideal, she rutl~lesslycriticized tile instrumentaiism of both umritical reformers and Bolsheviks by refusing to accept any mechanical unification of "socialist" interests between party and base. This immediately put her at a disadvantage inside the party burea~zcracy and among party professionals. Luxexnburg believed the party should attempt to raise tl-re self-administrative capacities of the base and, perhaps ultimately, create the conditions for its own disappearance. Breaking dowz-~the identification of freedom with any set of institutions, she implicirIy saw socialism as a process liricalconservatism. Fragmentation is now the hallmark of tl-re Left and it makes ritrle sense sirnyiy to suppiexnenc "cclass" with '*racep and ""sex." Attempts tc-, forge a sustainable unity on this basis ignores the bureaucratic preoccupation with autonomy by interest groups and the often mutualIy exclusive character of their epistemological assuxnptions. A new perspective has become necessary, Insofar as the current dynaii~icsof fragmentation remain uncontested, moreover, it becsmes ever more difficult to envision the prerequisite political conditions for unity along with the basic values tc-,which the Left should stand zknambiguousty co~nmitted,

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Neither postmodern nor analytic philosophy ofkrs much for any movement tbat mEst set priorities and establish categories for making political judgments. The 1980s have shown how particularist and instrumeritd ideologies, buttressed by political organizations witit a vested interest in autont>my, serve to uildermine the commitment to universal values, Without such values, it is impossibk to formulate the csnditions for class tzniq necessary to contest the power of capitaf or creaee the institutions that might fwther economic ey uality and democratic accountability. Indeed, while rejecting the belief that this situation n l l ~ s tchange, Socialism Urthouvtd attempts to resist the present inceilectual state of affairs. Rehsing to define itself by the thinking of either 1848 or 1968, rejecting the ""politics of experience" no less than an academic philosophy blind to its practical implications, it seeks to reassert the critical tnoiBent within a virtually forgotten tradition. Attempting to recast the dltal burden of working-class politics, which invt~ivescons~ectinguniversal political principles with particrxlar economic interests, it asstimes r~eitherthat various forms of particularism of ""necessity" heed political cosmopolitanism nor that it is sufficient mechanically to link the "'working class" with women, minorities, and other such constittiencies.. Cornpetition over scarce resources, and the need to rebuild with each new issue, rnakes it irnperative to formulate a standpoint capable of speaking to the concerns of workers in every oppressed group while privifeging none. Single issue coalitions are still necessary in practice, but the power of capital is also still dependent on the degree of unity among working people, Indeed, that is the reason for inrtroducing the class ideal, This category equitably embraces the egalitarian concerns of the new social movements even as it mair-rtains a distinct class standpoint committed to transiorming the existing logic of accumulation, It is predicated on those values of democrac)r, econornic justice, and internationdim that continue to define the most emancipatory possibilities of the socialist project, Cor~mitmentto the class ideal calls for contesting the privilege currently accorded autonorny with civic responsibility, local participation with the accountability of alE institutioils, national sovereignty with internationalism, provincia! sentimerits with cosmopolitan values, There is no possibili~ of evasion, Particularism and identity politics perhaps provide an option. But, if unity is the goal in practice, principles capable of fostering this unity must be chosen in theory. That choice lacks all teleologicai guarantees. It is based a n purely speculative consideratioils and, to this extent, a trailsfarmatioil of the traditioilal tlnderstanding of the relation betweeri theory and practice is required. In the past, teleological beliefs made it possible to assume that the insights of theory would necessarily be trailslated into practice, That assumption has lost its validity Socialist poiitical theory can no longer guarantee the real-

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ization of its concerns any rnore than the popular acceptance of the fogicai prerequisites for an emancipated order, Practice is no longer, then, the ulrimate arbiter of theoretical ""truth,'Y~oialistpolitical theory can forward positive proposals and illuminate opportunities for political practice. It can unearth the exploitative implications of the existing system of production and it can highligi~tthe critical inornent within the socialist project, Nevertheless, its reassertion of the link between theory and practice can occur only from the standpoint of theory itself. That is not very cssrtforting. A starrce of this sort offers no certainty that sacrifice in the present will ever be redeemed througli a more humane future, Nor is any organization seen as holding the key to uftimate success. A sc~cialismuilbound rests on little more than an ethical commitmeilt to a set of ux~realizedideals, But, then, no serious ethic has ever been constructed on tl-re guarantee of success or reward. As Brecht put the matter: "kcan go one way, and ailother tc-,oW-and the alternatives are far more nuanced than the old choice between sociaiisrn and barbarism, Freedom continrxes to contest the darkness, But it can wither, Witcllout a reinvigorated cornmitment to the goals of internationalism, political democracy, and economic justice, history will be made in the breach. And that humanity simply can no longer afford. S.E,B.

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The Democratic Legacy o Karl Marx and Frederick Enge

As Karl Marx ancl Frederick Engels were finishing The Communist Martifesto, a specter was hauntix~gEurope, Heine knew it. T(3cquevilte knew it, Mazzini and Wauxnier, Lassalle and Merternich knew it as well. Across the political spectrum, everyone with eyes to see knew it. How could they not? The upheavals of 1848 occurred because the October Revolution of l917 was not the only one that history would betray. The great French Revolution hacl produced an emperor who fell before an epoch of '"restorationm-a "swamp" ((Stendbal) wherein the l-ropes of Dantan, Marat, and Robespierre drowned as surely as the dreams of Beethoven and Schiller,. Ruled by a decayed aristocracy, this restoratiol~was dorninated by ideolr~gicaicornxnitments to irrationalism, elitism, provincialism, chauvinism, mysticism, racism, and ailti-Semitism, The remaining liberals bided their time, With hearts still o n the barricades, they were thrilled at the Kevuf wian af 1W, which deposed Charles X, finalfy ended the threat of a return to feudal absolutism, and ushered in King Louis-Phillippe who dressed in suits and knew the vaiue of cornInerce, Nevertheless, those same liberais m u g have experienced a twinge of discomfort when they read tlze closing lines of G e t h e " F ~ a u sor~ first looked at Defacrr>ix\ LLiberty Lecadi~zgthe People. The ""bourgeois king" was nor one of their own, but his regime changed them, A slow, though irreversible, process began that ultimately turned this previously revolutionary class into the complacent inheritor of what would becoxne an increasingly dangerous heritage. Far all tl-re tensions between liberal and popular conceptions of democracy, the bourgeoisie once felt that its interests were identifiable with those of " h e Peoplem-by which

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was meant nut sixnply those of coxnman birth, but the lowly and the insulted, the excluded and the disil-rherited. Now, however, the existence of the masses was fast becoming foreign to the class that had formerly claimed to speak in its name. And yet, as unemployed artisans and hungry workers seethed with anger over the economic crisis of 1847 as well as the corrupt regime of Louis XVJTJ, the bt~urgeoisiedecided to stand up for its old ideals one last time. Thus, in 1848, this class confronted its traditional aristocratic enemy with the republican demand h r sufiage, Wfjrkers everywhere rejoiced and initially supported the call for a ripubligue d&mocrat.igue,But disquiet spread, and, soon enough, tlze buurgeoisie was appalled by what it had uilleashed, Feeling the emptiness in their stomachs, working people recalled 1830, when the great capitalist TAafficteproudly proclaimed ""From now on the bartkers will rule,'"& when the saying went around, ""The 13eople has wan a victory; the genttemen share the spoils.'TTfiis time it would be difkrent, and, as action from below complemented the bourgeois attack from above, the revolutionary gaal chaaged. By demandixlg a r k p ~ b l i q ~dkmocratique e el sock& that would reorganize labor, institutionalize the right to work, redistribute wealth, and erid the inequiries of tlze market, the Parisim workers went beyond their comrades elsewhere. They recogtlized that, without meaningful social and material equalit)., the root ideal of democracy would be seriously corrtpromised, The 13arisian workers thus saw their demand for socioeconomic equalitj~as an extensroil, or radicalization, of the c~riginalbourgeois democratic impulse. So it was that the most radical ~zndertakirrgsof 1848 sougl-rt to link political democracy, predicated on free elections and civil liberties according to the rule of law, with the creation of egalitarian material conditions, or social democracy, From that tixne, the f~~ndamental practical question for the socialist movement has been whether the one form of democracy might he extended inta the other peacefully through reforms or whether such an extension would demand a revolutionary transfarrnation of the entire systexn. The historical convergence of formal democratic and substantive egalitarian aspirations in 1848, however; also had a profound theoretical corzsequence: socialism ernerged as a public ideal tlsat, unlike otlzer radical egalitarian ic of materdc~ctrinesrooted in religious values, offered a d e ~ ~ o c r a tdefense ial and social equaiity

In Quest of Equality The demands raised during the revolutions of 1848 produced a critical mtjmerit in socialist theory with which to confrt'ront the authoritarian deforma-

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tions of the future, At the same time, however, they left the bourgeoisie in a terrible dilemma,' Clearly, it feared that attempts to link political democracy with In q ~ e s t i c msocialct would threaten private property, Nevertheless, it also dreaded the possible poIicicai consequences of embarking upon an unqualified defense of its wealth and privileges, Conditions differed from couritry to country;' some situations saw greater success for the bourgeoisie or the workers than others; in some instances a new governmental form was generated, in others not; in some cases the bourgeoisie was actually challenged by the wc~rkers,in others not, Especially in France, wl~erethe dynamic bellind the international events exhibited its starkest features, previously antagonistic classes like the aristocracy and bourgeoisie formed a tacit alliance that crushed the insurgent workers. But, throughout Europe, it soon became apparent that the failure of the revolutions had resulted in an order doxninated politically by the aristocracy and ecoilc~micalfyby the bourgeoisie," Thus, the bourgeoisie learned the difference between the trappings and the content of power: Every revolution bequeaths its Legacy, and 1848 was no exception, The reactionary Metternich felt and the meteoric Garibaldi rose, whife, for a few years, France experienced republicanism. But the new dawn turned to dusk quickly enough. As the E-iapbsburgs attempted to turn back the cIock, and Napoleon JII forged a csalition to support his new form of Caesarism, the faiture of republican aspirations in Germany paved the way for Bismarck and stunted the development of liberalism well into the twentieth century, The once unified bourgeoisie split over these events. Some recsiled in disgust, others played their roles behind the scenes. It: didn't matter, AI1 over the continent, it had become clear that the bourgeoisie was 110 Longer cap&l"le of leading a revolution. Its time for utopian dreams and radical democratic values had passed: Rousseau, Kant, and Hegel made way for Gomte, Spencer, and Schopenhauer, The most radical ideals of the revolutionary bourgeoisie now came to inspire the partisans of yet another class: the workers. For close to a century, the practical choices and ideological self-identification of working-class movemerits would remain interwoven with attempts to appropriate that betrayed revolutionary inheritance of 17'889 and t 848, As a consequence, every spokesperson for the working class was fc~rcedto address bn& the ~lnfulrilledpcjlitical promises of the bourgeoisie and the construction of a unique socialist vision. Among those leaders were bohernians, committed workers, disillusioned bourgeois, fatlen aristocrats, intellectuals, and artists, Ail suffered under severe economic hardships. Most were outcasts, hunted by tl-re police, and shunted from one country to anotl-rer, The risks were real, and the danger for Louis Blanc in demanding the ""right to work" was no less than for the anarchist Pierre Proudhon in calling for

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workerskooperatives or for Marx and Engels in portraying the working class as the key to the riddle of capitalist production, As for that working class, it was surely not a unified and hosrtogeneous industrial ""poletariat." Workers wl-ro received wages mixed with petty artisans of various stripes to form an inchoate urban mass of highly disparate skills and status, If at all, they were org~nizedinto secret societies. Isolated and mostly illiterate, impoverished and robbed of their dignity, they were despised by ""society." h a l l relative to the peasantry, surrounded by an increasingly complacent bourgeoisie and an anachronistic set of precapitalist classes, this bbworkingclass" stood alone. The Iast might yet become first, But, ideofc~gically,ttha would demand employing the unfwlfified promises of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution against the very class that had once made them. In keeping with their coxnmirrnent to Reason and the "'rule of law,"'" the great philosophers of the revolutionary bourgeoisie had sought to curb the aristocraq" arbitrav use of political power."n arguably its xnosc radical iormulation, that undertaking was predicated on a utopian canceyciun of the "c>bject9' or society. uility between the individual ""sbject" "and Inherently democratic, incarnating a notion of equality under the rule sf law, the vision of ""subject-object unity" povided a rational standpoint for confronting feudal. institutions that arbitrarily oppressed the mass of individuals and hindered their potentia t for self-realization. This dream of expanding the yararnerers of democritric action far all individuals in a community led Rousseau to place primacy on the "general will" over the particularistic interests that ruled feudal society. It l SO enabled Kant to understand "enlightenment," not merely as material or ""sientific" progress, but as a moral development predicated on the gadlml emergence of the intellect from the shackles of: arhitrarity imposed dogma," The historical progress of "Reason" was seen as ushering in a Rechlssti-sat; or state under the rule of Iaw, to supplant an old feudal order built on the arbitrary dictates of an a11-yowerfrri king and the special privileges of an aristocracy, Of course, the substantive exploitation of Iabor in civil society underpinned the formally democratic system that the bourgeoisie wished to institute. Even Hegel could envision t l ~ econstriction of arbitrary autlzority only in the realm of the state and, given the historical moment, it made sense for the representatives of the bourgeoisie to preoccupy themselves with law, constitutians, and the "'palitical."T Stilf, it is foolish to indthge in a dry reductionism that obscures the ideological sources of action, tocke was quite sincere ifl assuming that accumulation was firlite and property infinite; Adarn Srnitlz honestly thought that an "invisible hand" "guided tlze market; and Rousseau was not merely avoiding the basic issue by separating the quesrion of private property from that of democracy. Many of the great C aI

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bourgeois thinkers genuinely believed that econoxnic justice would take care of itself, It was with a clear conscience that this rising class either irnpticitly or explicitly identified its quest for formal democracy with the substantive interests of humanity as such, But there is a difference between a class on the rise and a class in powcc That difl.'ere~iceappears in how it philosophically sees itself and history as well. The philosophers of the revolutionary bourgeoisie still l-rad worlds to conquel; and their various speculative conceptions of the ""good life3" whether in the explicit form of a subject-object urlity or not, gave meaning to that enterprise. By 1848, however, those worlds had disappeared as '*suhject9'was sundered from ""object." Thus, the most radical, critical, and utc-,pian moment of bowgeois thought vanished from the initiators of what would become the two dominant currents of nod ern philosophy August Cornte" work of the 1840s inaugurated a "positivism" that sought to prcjvide '"scientific" foundations h r the unlolding of a new and finai stage of humas existence, Relinquishing the critical ele~nentof idealist philosophy, he sought to extend the "psitive" trut1-r criteria of' the nat~tral sciences into the realm c>f society. His new approach coilsciously attempted to exclude the normative coxlcerns of the subject from the "objective7' world and its analysis. Around the same time, beginning from a fundmentally different perspective, Saren Kierkegaard set the stage for nod ern ""eistentiafism" even as he divorced the obective world of "necessity" from the subjective concern with ""authenticiry." In seeking to overcome historicism, Kierkegaard rendered solidarity impossible by emphasizing the primacy of experiential truth and an inner subjectivity, All that remained for the individual was to dwell a n the unalterable conditions of his or her own is~latioil, With the retreat from the atternpt to relate subject and object, the new phitofophies of yusitivisrn and existentiaiism began to shift bourgeois philosophy away horn its earlier concerns, And this only makes sense if philosophy exhibits a connection with history and class inerest. Indeed, under the circumstances, the philosophical retreat by the bourgeoisie left the xnost radical implications of its once radical vision for realization by a new revulutionary class. That vision would prove crucial to the political worldview of :rsXarx and Engels, Whatever the problems with their analysis, or their criticism of 1845, the experience fundamentally affected them.8 Along with various other radical nineteenth-century thinkers, tl-rey recognized both tl-rat the bourgeoisie had betrayed its democratic values and that not only state power, but the power of capital was arbitrary if those who decided on its use were not held accountable to citizens and workers. h4arx and Engels, in short, did nt>tconsider political democracy irrelevant. Instead, from the beginning they wished to attack the way its most radical. substantive implica-

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tions were stunted by the bourgeaisie.9 Indeed, it is a great lr~ssthat Marx never systematized llis views on the French Revolutir>n or wrr>te his ptanried history of the Convention in 1793.10 As for Engels, he faced the limits of tl-re new order concretely, Before meeting i2rlarx, he had published The Condition of the W o r k t ~ gCkzss in E ~ z g h ~ This d . work graphically portrayed the nightmare of proletaria13existence. Robbed of maeerial rights, working people found their political Liberties violated ever more openly Things seemed only to get worse. As one economic crisis followed anothef; without reference to the exploitation in civil society, even democracy in tl-re realm of the state gradually began to appear as an '*ahstra~lion, A basic transformation in the meaning of "'democracy" "began to take ptace, Where the bourgeoisie had traditiorzally viewed it as formal, politicai, and ~uridicai,the representatives of the workers now wished to rnake the concept substas~tive,economic, and practical." Where Marx subsequently defined pot itical democracy as "'the: final h r m of emancipation within the prevailing order of tl-rings" in in@the Jewish Questz'tzn, he never considered it commensurate with the concept of democracy as such or its ~lnrealizedpotentiavz Support for a given republic was contingent on the degree to wbicl-r it allowed iar the practice of democracy and the ability of the working class to effectively organize its interests, These interests, in turn, were tied to the extension of democracy into civil society, The situation was radically different with the bourgeoisie. Its material interests in preserving control over capital prevented any assumption that such a development would (jccur peacefully. This was the csntc;xt in which Marx and Engels discovered a ""proletariat" "generated by the capitalist production process, whose interests were both fovmrkll'y and s~bstapztiz~ety democratic-and so identifiable with the interests of humanity as such, Socialism was, from tl-re first, predicated on a democratic political project whose potential fur realization was interconnected with the dynamics of capitalist production. As a consequence, it makes little sense to reducr: the entire enterprise to some preordained "antipaXitical9' econamism. iliIarx and Engels always emphasized the need for programmatic initiatives and organisation. They supported the English Chartists, tried to make contact with progressive movements on the continent, and founded clre Neue Rhei~hcheZeitza~g,which they called ""TheOrgan of Democracy""; in facb Marx even served as the vice president of the Belgian Society of Fraternal Democrats. The real point for Marx and Engcls was always political. And, in keeping with the prevailing wisdom of other nineteenthcentury radicals, t h y believed that control over the wealth of bourgeois society was not an end in itself. Instead, na less than the anarchists or most social reformers, they maintained that the real end was a stateless and

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classless order that would finally accuaiiae and give substantive meaning to the great slogan of "'liberty, eyualith and fraternity."= "deed, for this very reason, Marx could maintain that "the proletariat has no goals of its own to actt1aiize~"l4 The socialist movement saw material inequality as only the most visible sign of:that utopian promise betrayed by the bourgeoisie. The promise itself would utrimatdy be rehshioned, and not forgatten. The fight for democracy would now he undertaken in the name of a classless and universal "communist" order for which ""sciaIismm would serve as the "trransitior~,'" Communism would fulfill all democratic and egalitarian aspirations and ahoiish the alienatiq institutional forms inherited from the past, Indeed, a radical understanding of democracy would initially provide the concept of co~nrnrmismwith its emiancq~torycontent. This commitment to democracy contests the notion that an unbridgeable chasm sumehr>wseparates the "'young Marx," the ""radical democrat9balld tltopian humanist, from the ""jacobirt" Marx of 1848 or the later dogmatist who sougl-tt to provide a ""scientific" eeiaboration of history's ""ion laws." Marx changed over the years, and the concept of democracy was emp1o)ied in mally ways. But it makes little sexise, ever more pedantically, to difirentiate periods within his thought so dramatically that any attempt to form a general impression of his undertaking becomes impossih1e.l Such an interpretation, not 0n1y lifts Marx's work h m a polifi~ialas wer) as a historical contexr: that manifests fundamental moments of continuity, but also ohscures the fact that-even as categories were dropped and others discovered-hasic themes rernained constax~t,lG Democracy was one of them. Though lt/(farxand Engeis did make certain scattered undemocratic statements at various times in roughly forty volu~nesof work, their identificatior~with the heritage of the revoIutionary bourgeoisie is evident thraugl-rout, It: appears as clearly in the earliest essays on "wood theft" as in the attempt to overcome a iragmented and alienated world in the cmcept of "ispecies being," as surely in T h e Ezghteenth Brumuire or T h e Civil War ~ P ZFrance as in the discussion of the "inverted world" in Capital, The theoretical work of lt/(farx and Engels, inoreover, stood in direct relation to their practical activities. Beyond changing historical conditions, or the tactical priority given to one form organization over another, their democratic commitment appears in the revolutions of 1848 as manifestly as in their work with the First Internationat, as obviausly in the support they extended to the Paris Commune as in that given to the creation of the first modern mass socialist parties. Xndeed, the attempt to provide form a1-d content to democracy provides the point of entry into tl-re political theory of Marx and Engels Manzfesto. and The Com~~unzs;k

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The Manifesto A politizcll polemic s f roughly thirty pages, The Copflraunist Munzfsto has been treated by scholars like the Stlrnma T'heologica. Every phrase and sentence has been carefully scrutinized; the work has been attacked for this mistalien prediction and criticized k>r t h t empirical error, for this statement and that assumption,l7 There is probtlbly no coxnparable work, other than the Bible, that has ever been put under the microscope in quite the same way. And still the forest is ~zsuallyfost for the trees. It took cetituries for cite bourgeoisie to justify its revolr against leudalism by positing capitalism as an economic aitertlative to the manor, liberalism as a political alternative to the "&vine right of kings," and Protestantism as an ideological alterrtative to Catholicism. Even the greatest polemicists of the revolutionq bourgeoisie like Sieyks and Paine could not pull these various moments of struggle together into a coherent whole, Nevertheless, that is precisely what defi~lesthe great success of The Communzst Manzfesto, Beyond its flaws, this work provided a totally unsopl~isricacedaudience with an immanellt analysis of the capitalist system along with the most rudi~uentaryoutlines for a socialist alternative. It forwaded a positive set of bbtran~itional'a programmatic dexnands for the present along with a utc-,pian vision for the future, It propounded a theory that gave meaning to the suffering workers experienced an3 supplanted the need for otherworldly religion with a secular faith in thexnseives and their cause. This little pamphlet did nothing less than place the workiw class on the side of political democracy9~ustice,and the future. The Gommzlni,ct Mnn$estu was an anticipatory work. Even though peasants constitmed the overwhelming majority of society, and the aristocracy was politicalty dominant at the time, it envisioned the future as defined by workers and capitalists, Even without considering the revolutions of 1848, it foresaw the betrayals of the bourgeoisie and called upon the working class to lead the ""battle for democracy,'YIl,ongbefore the prerequisite co11Qitions had tltemselves come to pass, it called upon workers to establish political organizations, a democratic state, and a viable internationalism, Indeed, the whole becomes more than the sutrl of its parts-and the result is a remarkable intellectual achievement, This achievement would ultirnately become defined as a creative synthesis of French rltctpian thought, German idealism, and English political ecorrorny.'Wwen, Fourieg and Saint-Simon bad pointed to a new set of values as well as the pssibility of developing an alternative to the existing system of capitalist exploitation." Marx and Engels fused this notion of an ernmcipatary alternative with the metl-rodalogicalinsight, culled froxn the young Wegel,"btha afl institutions are transient and that history is driven by a conflict whose determinations depend upon the given structure or "total-

226 Dc~~ucr~t-ic l l g d q uf Karl Mdrx nnd Frederick EngeL * 9

ity" dmt defines them.21 The source h r this confilicc they h u n d in English politic4 economy, whose most important representatives, in spite of their ahistrlrical framework, illurni~~ated the workings of the capitalist production process and how it defines the exisring totality, The Commu~isrManiJ~stodiscussed capitalist production in terms of contradictions-rnc~st notably between the social production and private appropriation of wealth-whose resolution would ""inevitably" result from the triumph of the w o r k i ~ ~class g and the introduction of socialism, Building on Hegel, Marx and Engels saw the future as derivative of a ""s~agetheory" in which differem classes defined different historical epochs, Capitalism, as the Erzglish political economists showed, was based on an unending quest for profits. This led Marx to identify capitalism with a new "commodity form" "that would reduce ail relatit>rlsto what Thornas Carlyle origillally termed the "cash nexus" and tend to force precapitdist classes-like the petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry-to become either capitalists or workers. Most would obviously become workers. Capitalists, however, would also coxnpete, and many of the Least successlui would then fall into the ranks of the proletariat as capital itself became concentrated in fewer and fewer hands. At the saiine time, market competition would engender constant tecl-rnolagical innovation even as it rnade "'living labor" expendable-theret.>y swelling the ranks of the "idustrial reserve army of the ~znemyloyed."Productivity would increase, but buying power would not, and, as a consequence, the "rate of profit" would tend t o fall so that recurrent crises would result with ever greater farce. Meanwhile, the bourgeoisie's own cornmitmellt to scierlce and reason would lead to the demystification of the universe and the growing insight among workers that a new and more rational system was necessary. Thus, Marx and Engels could write that in the new period ""all that is solid melts into air, all tl-rat is holy becomes profane, and man is at fast compelled to face with sober seilses, his reat conditions of life, and his relations with his kind,"zl Marx and Engels assumed that the proletariat was capable of breaking the p o w u {of the reigning ideology, comprehending its position within capitalist socief-);and seizing control of those enormous productive fc~rcesthat the bourgeoisie had unieashed," Through their "scientific" analysis, they conduded that the working class would come to understand its own power and create a new order that would realize in practice the humanistic values articujated in the theory of tl-re revolutionary bourgeoisie and the utopian sc~ciatists,Indeed, where the previous commitme.tlts to ""radical demc~cracy" irrspired by the French Revolution helped shape the idea of socialism as a b"ransition," h e utopian ideas of the Econornzc and Philosophic Manzascril;lfs of l844 provided the normative content for the new ""communist" society that would brir-rg ""prehistory" to an end,

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Tlze "scientific" hfabors of Marx and Engels were anything but valuefree." They were informed, from the first, by a positive concern with an emancipatory alternative, and critique of the existing order was harnessed to a utopian understanding of democracy, Marx and Engels sought to reveal those economic tendencies, which the proletariat would act upon politicalt3/, in order to abolish the existing forms of repression from the perspective of an unrealized freedom.25 This is the real meaning behind what would become the famous phrase from the last of the Theses 0%Fegerbach: ""philosophers have only interpreted the world; the point, however, is to change it." A speculative moment thus existed in the desire of the two friends to further the transformation of capitalism as well as in their famous claim that "history is the history of class struggle."Zb That speculative moment had nothing to do with abstract theorizing or tl-re formation of purely metaphysical assertions, It was rather part and parcel of a transformativo project that class action wouId reatize. Neverthefess, this only begs the question surrounding the definition of the "working class" and what xniglzt be termed irs class ideal. Contrary to pc~pularopinion, Marx and Engels did not begin their analysis in The Commuest Manifesto horn an ""empirical" perspective, That is not merely a philosopl_lical claim, but a historical one. At the time, an empirical point of investigative departure would obviously have fed them to champion romantic and anarchist proponents of " h e poor," "like Heine or Proudhon, and give center stage to the then huge peasailtry rather than a tiny proletariat. Instead, their argrlment derived from an exposition of the logic of capitalist accumulation, Essentially9 by questioning how production and distributioil are constituted, IVarx and Engels derived a structural detinitisn of ""cfass."2' As the century wore on, that structural analysis received ever greater empirical vaiidation. Even so, from the first, an ideal in search of realization was intrinsic to the ""objective" inquiry into capitalist society. The founciers of "'scientific socialism" were always concerned with questions pertaining to the political constitution of tl-re class, Indeed, speaking "'dialectically," the "&terminism"' of the historical process only makes serise when referex~ceis made to the morBerit of ""f-reedom" in which the working class-tl-rraugh organized political action-will bring capitalism to ail end, As students of Megel, Marx and Ellgels believed that "^objective" truths cannot exist without their "'subjective'kcamprehension-4 that, by definition, a contriddiction can only be formulated from the standpoint of its future resolution. ""Every class struggle is a politicai struggle'"% they could write and, if only for this reason, they assumed a speculative principle of organizational and ideological unity beyond the empirical conditions in which the proletariat might find itself. An implicit class ideal, which inctlr-

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porates the radicai dexnocratic ideais of bourgeois philosophy, was thus an element in the notion of class developed by Marx and Engels. But why should this speculative csncept have remained implicit? 'The, answer derives, not merely from tl-re attempt by Marx and Engels to distinguish their ""scientific"' enterprise f%c-~m a soft moral concern for the poot; but from another philosophical assumption that they inherited from Hegel: everything in the "essence" of a phenomenon will become evident in the historical series of its "appearances," With this insight the ideal and the real, the metaphysical, and the empirical, the present and the future cease to exist as mutually excltlsive terms, The proletarian ""agent" cccrulri! only realize the goal of revolutionary transhmation by consciously acting a n the possibilities that were empirically unfolding through capitalism9$structural contradictions. Thus, the authors of The Commutzis"sta~ifestowere able to synthesize three divergent notions of class: tl-re structural, the empirical, and the speculative,

Class Action Deriving their structurtrt concept of a working class from the logic of the accumuiation process, believing that the intensification of capitalism's contradictions would becsme empirically apparent, Marx and Engels had little doubt about their speculal~zveclaim regarding the proletariat and its revolutionary role, Recognizing the objective ""necessity" br institutionalizing a new econoinic order, it only made sense that the proletariat should make use of its 'Treedom" to engage in the decisive subjective act of political transformation, The dream of bourgeois philosophers for a utopian '"subject-abject" ~znis)rwould subsequently become transvnlz-led in Marx and Engels" new conception of the proletariat and its "communist" mission+29 There should, however, be 110 inisunderstanding, Xt was x1ot some metaphysical desire to make History conscious of itself, or further the march of Reason in suxne abstract sense, that inspired tl-re commitment of Marx and Engels to the working class. They were not simply spin~lingout the implications of Hegelian philosophy for politics. Marx and Engels wished to corrfront the terrible reality before their eyes, and the burgeoning industrial revolution seemed to justif.y their belief that most prc~letarlanswould hecome factory workers, But they also knew that the majority was not yet composed of indrtstrial laborers and that, for both political and philosophical reasons, a historically contingent and empirical description should not exhaust the csttegov of class." That is why they provided a structural definition of tl-re proletariat as the class that sells its ""labor power" or time on the market, rather than merely its "blabor" or empirical skills," Thus, even while bound to a specific historical. phasel the theory of Marx and Engels

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remained open to capitalist conditions in wllich the ernpiricai composition of the working class might change.?" Once again, however, the normative purpose of the inquiry plays a crucial role in the choice of definition. Clearly, empirical differences within the working class-such as skill or status-were precisely what a unified movemerit would have to surmount in political terms. But this could only occur by projecting an idea of unity predicated on those uniuersill prolrtariiz~in~erczststhat a political movement would have to highlight.3TThe speculative mofnerit of indeterminate uriity thus received an ~bfectivereferent in the empiricaljy indeterminate concept of ""Iabor power." Only from such a standpoint could the 'c~bjective"social or economic concept of class fit with the '"subjective" political enterprise of the Communist League fur which Marx and Engels wrote The Commu~zzstMufzifestc:, in the first place.34 Agai% inore than metaphysics plays a role in determining the importance of this speculative moment in the wndersta~idingof class. The proletariat may have logically presented itself as the revolutionary ""agent" h e to its particular position within the production process, But it also stood alone in its commitment to the legacy of what the American historian R. R. Palmer called the ""age of democratic revolution." Though intellectuals and bohemian~certainly mounted the barricades in 1846, einpirical events would verify the claim of The Cornmu~istMrznz'festo that the working class alone could ensure its own emancipation m d the incroduccion of a new democratic order.33 After all, on what other class could the workers l-rave relied? The aristocracy opposed all revolutionary experiments and all notions of dexnocracy. At best, the bourgeoisie supported only formal demcxracy. The peasants, the class that would prove most irnporta~itin bringing Napoleon XI1 to power, were shifting their hatred from the aristocracy to the bourgeoisie and the prcjletarians who defined the production process of modern Iii"e.3" Tlze ""Xrrmpenproletariatlacomprised tlre Mobile Ct~urds,which crushed the workers' uprising oljune 1848 with horrible brutality,'Wiverl all this, it only made sense for ~Marxand EngeIs to believe that the industrial proletariat would have to lead any popular movement for democratic change. The unique aspect of the socialist project, its need to fulfil1 the radical political promises of the revolutionary bowgeoisie and still fight h r its own concerns, thus becomes apparent where the c o m b i ~ e di~terest.in substantive and formal democracy is seen as class specific. Still, the bourgeaisie condemned the new movement of the prc~letariatas antidemocratic. From its class standpoint, this was totally logical. The proletariat alone seriously threatened the new capitalist order. In fact, seeking a solution to /a question socia/e and disgusted with the authoritarian direction that ""democratic" politics was taking, the French workers in W

.

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June 1848 actualty turned their guns on tl-re Second Republic for which they had fought in February." Nevertheless, a certain ideological conviction also allowed bourgeois liberals to oppose the workers with a clear conscience. Traditioilally, liberalism had associated the commitment to democracy with respect for the minrority and the sanctity of private propery+-3% palitical commitment to democracy was not seen as necessarily demanding its extension into the economic realm, lMost did not even recognize the problem. With a few exceptions, like John Stuart Mill, bourgeois liberals believed that the very concern with substantive democracy constiru ted a breach of democratic principles. Thus, ~Uarxand Engels cc~uldargue that the real emancipatory moment of 1848 involved the yuest not merely Eor a republic, but for that so~jcl.liStrepublic whose realization would occupy them throughout tl-reir lives. Indeed, this is what lies behind Marx's claim that "the real birthplace of the bourgeois repubtic was not the Februdry victory; it was the Jurte No less than many of their sc~cialistand anarchist comrades, IVarx and Engels wished to break the connectioil between property and democracy, It strtx~tedthe implications of a radical idea and it enabled a small and econaxnically ernpowered minority to paralyze the will of tl-re majority, The bourget>isie,of course, was appalled by the socialist attempt to extend democratic principles and only fdt its positio~ljustified by Marx and Engels's caXI for a "dictatorship of the proletaria," Given the later misuse of the term, their fears can be seen as prophetic. Nevertheless, it is important to consider the issue these tl-rinkerssought to address: the problem of power in a revol ~ltionarycontext, None of the great bourget~isphilosophers had ever seriously confronted the question of counterrevalution. Marx and Engels looked back to the Jacobins whom tl-rey saw as the democratic defenders of the First Republic and the architects of The f)ecliZmtio;t.t of the Righb of M i r ~srad Citixen. They aiso saw the ways in which the French Revolution was undermined by the Vendke and its reactionary allies abroad. Indeed, seeking to learn from that historical experience, the): were the first to suggest that force might be necessary to delcnd the next revolution, With this in mind, ~ V a r xand Engels introduced the idea of a ""dctatarship of the proletariat."'"l Though predicated s n a "dialectical'7nversion of the bourgeoisie's use of political democracy to justify economic dictatorship, the '"dicratorship of the proletariat" would prove an unfortunate term, The two friends and most of their followers believed that this dictatorship would prove of brief duration. Its purpose was to ensure the creation of conditions wilerein tl-re vast working-class majority might successfully press its interests against the antidemocratic intentions of a small capitalist andlor aristocratic minority4""X"hs, Marx and Engels could

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stress that '?he first step in tl-re revolution by tl-re working class is to raise the proletariat to the position of the ruling class, to win the battle of dem~uacy. Only because the dictatorsl-ripof the proletariat was understood as an inherently democratic phenomenon could the ""transitional" state of socialism stand in soiBe plausible relatio11 to the future " c o i ~ m u ~ ~ isociety. st" With real wealth in the hands of a new class-wl-rose own interests lay in developing a new classless society predicated on a new logic of accumulation-----thetraditional state necessary to repress the exploited classes would supposedly become irrelevant. An "administration of things"hou1d take precedence over ""the administration of people." h fact, precisely because the '"eommunist" 'order was predicated on a radical extension of the socialist transition" democratic aspects, quantitative develt~pmentsin the one could be seen as ultimately producing a qualitatively different order of existence in the other, Indeed, fclr this very reason, it became unnecessary for Marx and Engels to posit an abrrrgt ruptwre beween the two phases of development, The "withering away of the state'" was tc-o mark the creation of a "free association of producers" and the end of "'prehistory'The ina~zgurationof real X-ristary under "caxnmunism" would become dependent upon the realization of democracy" most radical implications. For "prehistory" was seer1 as being made behind the backs of people-whether t h r ~ ~ u gthe h "marchy of the marketplace" or institutions lacking in dexnocratic accountability, And s,it only makes sense that the ability to ""make" "story should ultimately depend upon the creation of: democratic institutions that would fir-rallyenable humanity to arrive at its decisions without regard lor economically exploitative class interests.44 Again, this formulation stands in accord with a partic~xiarappropriation of the mast radical elements within bourgeois idealism. Having abolished class distinctioils and surmounted scarcity, or the conditioils in which the political ability to shape events no longer relies on unequal control over society's snaterial resources, the ""cunning of history" megel) could then become subjugated to the conscious control of: the "universal class.'' Attempting to surmount the "ialienatcd" "separation benitreerr the state and civil societit; the cornrnunity and the individual, the purpose and legitimation of this new ""c>mmunistWorder would rest upon abolishing the arbitrary exercise of power. Jt is in principle the opposite of any totalitarian regime: The Creedom of the coilectivity would be defined in relation to the freedom accorded the individual, Thus, reformulating the traditional notion of a ""sbMarx and Engels could insist that "the free development ject-object" ~l~~iity, of each serve as the condition far the free development of alI,"4-" Their perspective, of cowse, presupposes that the expansion of capitalism would turn the vast nrlmber of peasants and artisans into workers and "

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so produce an ever-expanding proletariat. It was for this reason, against the explicitly antipolitical pcrsitions taken by anarchists and '"topian" socialists alike, that Marx and Engels argued so vehemently for general suffrage and emphasized tl-reir political cornxnitxnent to develop the unzversal interests of working people." h the same vein, it was because they considered capitalism an international p h e n s m e n o ~that ~ they called for an international perspective and opposed tl~oselike Fichte who had previously argued for a "national" economic form of socialism (or t-fa~delss~anr), They were clear enough in stating their belief that the Communist League to which they belongcd sl-rould "labour everywhere for the union and agreement of the democratic parties crf all countries,"'37

Internationalisxn was anotl-rer one of those cherished socialist ideals that the working class inherited froxn the revolutionary bourgeoisie. The idea has its crwn history.4X After Grotius laid down the modern hundatior~sfor international law, Kant called for the development of a new "'universal history with a cosmopolitan intent" and claimed that ""prpetual peace" could exist only under a federated republican world order. The logic of capitalist production never had anything to do with nationalism, But Thomas Baine was probably the first to make workers truly aware of their common explcritation in The Rights oo(Marz.49 The notion of "rights" is indeed an inherently internationalist concept grounded in detrtocracy artd it onfy hllows that the Jacobins should have sought to spread them beyond their national borders. The attack on internationalism, by the same token, becatrte part m ~ dparcel of a generalized assault on enlightenment values. It combined a respect for prejudice, racism, and the organic community with contempt for critical reason, democratic institutions, and the masses. Such reactionary values mixed with marters of national interest as Prussia, Austria, and England waged war against a desperate France, which, in the years following Thermidor, ultimately turned to Napoleon." RReing from its defeats, resendul at the victorious counrerrevolution, it was only in 1830 that the capitalist class finally made peace with the nation-state. Even so, Mazzini and others immediately began the attempt tct create an international fc~rm of organization. That attempt failed, but it provided an inspirarion, Thus, the attempt to realize internationalism fell into the hands of the working class. The internationalism of The Communist Manifesto stands within this tradition. Marx and E~zgelsknew that the class struggle would initially break out within specific nations,$l and recognized that revoLutions im-

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pelled by tl-re structural dynamics of capitalisrn would vary in character, But they also saw the need fc~ran international organization to cwrdinate the discrete struggles of workers. The extension of international revolutionq solidarity, the tacticai attexnpt to subvert the stability of reactionary states like czarist Russia, became the criteria that Marx and Engels used to judge various national movements, Their judgxnents in foreign policy, however, were generalty made on a case-by-case basis, And this often led to confusion, They usually apposed imperiatist policies in practice and thus often supported movements frir ""national self-determinatian"" in Ireiand and Poiand. At tl-re sane time, in theorb they maintained that nationalism served the interests of the capitalist class and that imperialism served to batter down the '"Chinese walls" of tradition in uderdeveloped countries like India. The fact is that they never really articulated a general theory of imperialism or nationalism and what would become known as the right to national self-determination, Instead, Marx and Engels subordinated 60th to the development of capitalism as a world system and an independent analysis of ixnperiafism to contingent interpretations of its effects. Their principle concern was the victory of the bourgeoisie over the remnants of fet~dalisxnin order to prepare the patl-r for a proletarian future.52 Jn this vein, they promulgated the need for oppressed nations to define their own fate even as they inaintained that a simple commitment to nationalisrn otlscured the international characler of the capitalist system. ~ V a r xand Engels knew that natioilalism tetlded to interfere with the creation of class consfiousness and artificially divide workers through the provincialism it fostered. They also deplored the way in which it sanctified the given political order as well as a particular fc~rmof bureaucratic organization. Perhaps most importantly, however, they believed that natio~lalism served to buttress imperialist adventures and a militarist mentality, Xn this sense, they thought that it helped produce and justify wars-whose victims would become the workers themselves. Marx and Engeis retained a lifelong commitment to internationalism, The revalutions of 1848 were internatiotlal in character, and their failure did not deter them. Still, following the defeat s f those undertakings, Marx and Engels brake with rnany of their former friends who believed that the working-class movement should coiltinue as though nothing bad happened, Cut off from, practical activiit): the founders of ""scientificsocialism" experienced tl-re 1850s as a difficult decade. It was also a time of econornic prosperity during which the legislation Eor a ten-hour day was finally put into practice in England while a workerskcooperative movement began in France. But it was lrorn the standpoint of political rather than economic progress that i2/larx and Engels judged the most important perions of their lives, Whatever the internationalist stirrings among English trade unions,

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and revolutionary exile organizations, the decade was rnarked by intense counterrevolutionary repression.f' Thus, the two friends withdrew from practical, poritics and concentrated on political ccjmmentar). and scholarly work. The 1840s offered new hope. An imprtant development had taken place in Germany. There the charismatic labor leader, Ferdinand Lassalfe, had founded that country3 first working-class party-the Allgemtri;r.ceWeubcher Artleitertrerezn (General German WorkersY~ociety1.54 Calling fc~runiversal sufirage and the assumption of political power by the proletariat, workers' cooperatives and various economic reforms, Lassalle secretly sough a tactical aliiance with Bismarck to bring about changes from above, He considered such a stance ~ustifiedprecisely because the weak and ideologically backward bourgeoisie appeared little better than the aristocrats or the cconservative peasantry, It was Lasalle, ratl-rer than Marx, who actually developed the notion that all nonproletarian classes and strata constituted "one reactionary mass." ft vvas also his desire to employ an aristocratic state tc) bring about reforms that cast Marx in the Light of appearing '"antipolitical'" and opposing state action to redress grievances. Interestingly, though Lassalle'?; tactics were arguably quite justifiable and even prophetic,Fj ~Marxand Engels opposed them on principle. They disageed sharpjy with his emphasis on cooperatives, as they bad years before with Z,ouis Blanc's ideas on the safBe subject. Brtt the reali conflict between these giants of the nascent German fabor movarlenc involved their dilfserent perceptions about the fundamental purpose of the socialist project. Tt~roughouttheir lives, Marx and Engeis saw strcialism as the fulfiilment of bourgeois liberalism3 revolutionary prornise-and so as an attack on alt vestiges of feudal powcc Consequently, where a tactical alliance with the bourgeoisie or even the vast peasantry always remained a possibility to further the struggle for dexnocracy, an alliance with tl-re reactionary aristocracy was out o f the question. A point of principte was at stake that had nothing to do with the theoretical issues of whether; in tl-re abstract, state action could improve the plight of the proletariat or ecnnomics should take absolute precedence over pnlitics, It was rather a matter of whether to engage in political compromise at any price. Marx and Engels were certain that Bismarck wished merely to exchange economic reforms for an ahandonment of the proletarian movement's pofitical purpose: it was a profound insight since this m precisely what would happen in tlze Prussian dictator" attempt to provide a new set of weifare refc~rmsto compensate for the antistxialist laws of 1878-1 890. Marx and Engels also believed that casting one's lot with the Prussian state would strengthen the class enemy, further nationalist identifications on the part of the proletariat, and so hinder the development of internationalism, Tt~us,throughout the years of corztroversy with Lassalte, Marx and Engels

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essentially remained true to tl-reir democratic, socialist, and internationalist beliefs of 1848, But, still, they were delighted when, in 8 6 6 , their devoted follt~wers, Willielm Liebknecl-rt and August Bebel, founded the Sozzi;rldemokria~ische Arbez'terpartcrz' (Social Democratic Lahor Party), which, in 18'75 at Gotha, ~lnitedwith Lassalle" sorgarzizatio~ito fonn the Socialist Workers Party of Germany; later, in 1890 following the lifting of the antisocialist laws, this party would reconstitute itself as the German Social Democratic Party (SPD). The future brightened as events kept pace elsewhere, i n Italy, Garibafdi once again attacked the rnonarchy and the power of tl-re Cf-rurcl-r. In France, the elections of 1863 shook Napoleon III. In that same year, the Poles rose for the third time since 1830 agaiilst their Russian masters and a t t e ~ ~ p t etod create a provisional goverment, In Russia itself, the Czar abolished serfdom and the ernperor of Austria grudgngly accepted a relatively progressive constitution. Then, too, the fragmented English union movemerit began to amalgamate while, ofren against its owzi e c o n o ~ ~inic terests, t l ~ a country" t working class chose to support tl-re North during the American Civit War in a remarkable display of socialist and democratic principle.5" Progress of this sort, however, was met by yet another international capitalist of-lensive that sought to crush burgeoning strike movements through the use of fttreign scab workers. Everything seemed to make the need for international proletarian cooperation ixnperative. Building on tl-re links between French and British workers, a set of orgailizational meetings took ptace that resulted in the creatioli of a First Irztematiorial-wirt7 Marx ptaying a preeminent organizational and inteltectt~alraile'f7 This povertystricken organization, whose influence far omweighed its actual membership, fasted as a serious entiv only from 8 6 4 to 1872, But its importarxcr: was not defined by its duration. The First International showed that internationalism, meful national reform work, an emphasis on class consciousness and a commitment to democracy could coexist, Indeed, along with his formulation of its ""GeneralRules,'Warxrx"s'"naugural Address" is oone of his most significant pieces and indicative of his enduring concerns. Despite the earlier jacobin ir~flnexzceand the previous call for direct revolutionary action, a fundamental connection still exists between the practical project of The Cvmmun&g Mnnz'fc?sto and the political positions taken by Marx and Engels in the First: International, Here, again, capitalism is understood as an international systern in which the workers must seek to secure their own emancipation. Here again, it is not a matter of struggling for "class privileges" bm fur ""equal rights and duties, and the e~bolitionof all class rule," Here again, there is the ethical imperative to develr~puniversal interests a m o q workers and constrain the arbitrary use of: power that appears in the f a ~ ~ o line: u s ""no rights without duties, no duties without rights,"-5"

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In keeping with The Gommurzkt Manifesto, tl-re ""Xaugural Address" also calls Eor an extension of political democracy to destroy the ""economical subjection of the man of labor to the monopoliser of the trteans of labor," Q~~eseions of political organization and the importance of building consciousness recur. Even as lt/(farx%prediction that the working class would become the great majority m starting to gair~empirical validity in the 1 8 5 0 ~ ~ he continued to maintain that ""numbers weigh only in the balance, if united by combinatioil and led by knowledge."* Once again implicitly positing a speculative ideal of irttraclass equality and unity, Marx"s ""fauguraI Address" calIed upon workers to overcorne thezr prejtxdices with regard to "color; creed, and natiuilalitp.'9t reiterated his coilvictioil that a political organization was necessary to articulate "'the common aspirations of the working class'5n order to ftlrther the coxlquest of state power. The First hternational was that organization, Abiding by democratic procedures, it was essentially structured along federalist lines with a strong General Council-which would give rise to mch corztroversy, The Geiieral Council enabled the First International to settle squabbles among member parties, serve as a clearing house, initiate proposals, and coordinate strategy, Aware that unique prolslems existed in particular nations, committed to aid in the creation of new democrapic working-class movements, the First International never had a dogmatic position on what political form these new trtovements should take. Revolutionary in aim, "Marxists'>nd socialists within the First International still found it quite logical to support the struggles of members to achieve particular reforms s w h as a shomr work week. Marx was somewhat cox~cernedthat the lack of coercive meaxls to enforce decrees would make the power of both the International and the General Council purely moral in character. But he also recogilized the lxed to work with people who did not share his views. His followers never had a real majority, and the fact that his ideas defined the general prograrn was probably due more to the lack of a coherent alternative than anyching else.6o Anarchists still look to tl-re First International as a prime example of Marxist authoritarianism But the reality is somewhat different. Marx and Engels consistently took the most democratic pr>sitioil possible given immediate exigencies and the tendencies toward sectarian frag~rtentation within the organization, The First International was wracked by Qissension from the start, But, in contrast to popular opinion, the mast crucial conflicts had little to d o with economics or teleological determinism, Actually, Marx was willing to compromise on most economic issues. The "'Inaugural Address" wen gave a nod of approval to cr~operativeassociations in order to assuage socialist refomers, and nothing was said about nationalizing private property to avoid offending tl-re anarchists. Ir was also not Marxists alone who were willing to employ the belief that a new ~ltopiztnorder lay on the horizm. The real debates in the First Xnternational

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took place over the primacy of organizational politics.61 These essentially centered on whether to organize politically from a class standpoint, further the quest for reforms, and use the state as a lever of chmlge, The deknse of these positions pitted Marxists and socialists against a diverse opposition that actually had more in common than uize would care to thii1k.62 The conflict betweex? Marx arid Pierre Prorrdhon stretched back to before the revolutions of 1848," Against Marx" emphasis upon industrial, production, control of private property by the state, and poIitical action, Proudhon's supporters wished to divide ali property evenly. Their goal was to create workerskooperatives, which, through the instit~~tion of "'free credit" or a ""Bank of Exchange," wtvouid allow lor control of production and consumption in terms of '"mutuat aid3"a term that would later receive popular currency in the writings of Peter Kropotkin. In seeking t a create this new form of econornic organization by educational means, however, the Broudllonists opposed the formation of a poIiticai party, electoral, activity, or a seizure of powef; They rejected any restriction on ""freedornm-including ""heedom of contractw-wl~iclk. put them in the somew hat embarrassing position of arguing against the eight-hour day. Anarckisrn was also promulgated by tl-re followers of Mikl-rail Bakunin and Louis-Auguste Blanqui, Whatever the differences between them, in contrast to the Proudhonists, both groups placed their hopes upon either a sponrmeous uprising of the populace or an assault on the state by a conspiratorial vanguard. Rejecting all political actiotz that did not directly further either the direct seizure of power W a revolt frr~mbelow however, the objective result of their argurnents mirrored tl-rose of Broudhon and his fo1lowers. Indeed, according to Bianqui, nothing could come of reform while Bakunin's funda~entalcriticism of Marx rested on his unswerving belief that a socialist ""transitionm-even in tlze forrn of a republic-would result in only another ""prisonfor the prc>letariat+" In the tradition of Godwin and Rousseau, these anarchists within the International saw people as inl-rerently good. It was the state that bad corrupted them, and SO it was the state that would have to be destroyed. Iiz his own way3 each of the major anarchists believed that the people could be trusted absolutely, They would recognize their enemy once a small vanguard provided them with a symbol of revolt, The people would then rise spontaneously through a general strike and introduce direct particigatctv democracy, All this made the need for polirical organization and tlze quest for legislative reform irrelevant. ignoring all thoughts of potential strwtural conflict among the oppressed, the anarchists found it unnecessary to forward either a political prograrn or a distinctly class perspective, Building working-class unity through an organization that could sustain itself over time was, in their opinion, lot the real issue, Spontaneiq was what the all-

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archists cherisl-red. Consequently they concerned themselves with instigating ""direct action" "(BLanqui), promulgating the call for an ""armed riot" (Bakunin), and providing revolutionary symbols for the masses through what Nechayev would later term ""the propaganda of the deed." Tile ailarchists generally organized themselves in conspiratorial groups and, it became almost natural for them to believe that conspiracies shaped events. This &ten led them to embrace other paranoid beliefs like antiSemitism. As the ailarchists tmsted one another, so did they deeply distrust all centralized authority and formal structures. Thus, against Marx, Bakunin essentially proposed a termination of the General Council's authority in hvor of a torally decentralized approach to the International that would leave each member party autonomtlus, Committed to realizing refc~rmsalong the revolutionary path, and developing the organization4 preconditions b r class unit5 Marx saw the anarchist proposals as catastropl-tic, His dismay only increased when they created an organization within the organisation to further their aims. Attempting to bring the anarchists under control, he sought-perhaps somewhat undiptomaticaliy and with a certain ruthlessrress-to impose the General Council's powers over the various national sectiorzs.6Vn turn, that policy was condexnned as ""autfioritarian" and, as ~ V a r xsought to expel. the anarchist opposition, the First International stood on the verge of collapse. His tactic was successful, but it was a hollow victory. Disgusted with the endless squabbling, the Chartists threatened to secede, the Lassalfeans voiced their displeasure, Blanqui" fcollowers openly talked of seizinf, the General Cc~uncit,and the class enemy reveled in the confusion. It was as a consequence of all this that Marx decided to effectively liquidate the First International by shifting its headquarters to New York. Xn corltrast to his future ft~llowers in the Second and the Third Internationals, Marx never mechanically identified any particular political organization with the ultimate interests of the working class. Having served its historical purposes, any organization could be abandoned witbout regret, It is tfserefore a mistake to believe that Marx was obsessively concerned with bureaucratic organization or with the centralization of power, Under the circur~stances,he was simply correct in attacking his opponentshncrirical calls for decentralization. In fact, the chaos foreseen by :Varx became evident in 1873, when the anarchists created their own rurr.lp ""antiauthoritarian'" international organization. The new movement accomplished notl-ring beyond passing a variety of resolutions, one of which recommended that all members learn chemistry in order to make bombs. Indeed, the new Internaticcr-zalAlliance was str confrtsed tlaat, soon enough, xnany mernbers were openly calling for the reconstitution of the c>riginal organization whose operating structure they bad previously helped to destroy65

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Given the controversy between socialists and anarchists, along with the vicious infighting between personalities as powerful as Marx and Bakunin, it is amazing that the First International acco~nplishedanything at all. Nonetheless, its acl-rievemetlcswere quite significant, The First Xrlrernational helped the English city workers acquire suffrage. It aided in the struggle to oppose the Europearr ruling classes who, almost uniformly, supported the Soutl-r in tl-re American Civil War." It raised xnoney for numerous strikes on the Continent. Its actions prevented the use of ft~reignscabs to undermine the Engtish wsrkers9battie for the nim-hour day. Perhaps inost importantly, however, the organization created a climate of trust among European workers that helped pave the way for the creation of a Second International h o m the rubble of the Franco-Prussian War and the Paris Com~nune. Tlze First International combined pacifism in terms of national wars with revolutionary militailcy in terms of class coilflict. Faced with an impending war between Germany and France, the member parties of the First Enternationat acted honorably. Manifestoes calling for peace were issued, and some strikes were even attempted. Such actions were made all the more difficult since informatit>r~was scarce and confused. At the time, it appeared-falsely"-that Napoleon I11 had instigated the conflict and that Bismarck was acting in a purely '"defensive" manner. German workers were therefore divided in their attitudes. Followers of Ferdinaind Z,assalle, who would later prove crucial to the development of Gerxnan social democracy's "right-wing," generally supported the war against France. Most Marxists, however, refused either to condone the aggression of Napoleon I X X or place their confidence in Bismarck, They initially abstained from voting, later argued against annexations fallowing the Cermarl victory, and ultimately fouild the~nselvesaccused of treasorl. Thus, the two men who would lead the German Social Democratic Party in the coming decades became heroes to the European working class: h g u s t Bebel and Wilhelm Liebknecht.

The Commune Marx had anticipated that war with Bismarck would sourld ""the deathknell of the Second Empire," though he thought this might usher in a revolution, what he envisioned was very different from the event that shook the foundations of Eumpean society and created perhaps the most vibrant expression of working-class rule down to the present: the Paris Comxnune." NCIless than the October Revt~lution,the Paris Commune was born of national defeat and abdication of responsibility by the central government. No iess than the Russian Revolution, bourgeois regimes

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conspired to destroy it. Nevertheless, wl-rere in Moscow the revolution survived and gave birth to an authoritarian state, the fsilcd uprising in Paris continues to symbolize the most radical possibility of proletarian rule-a " "dicca torship of the yrof etariat " 'defined by parciciyatory democracy,G9 Ernile Zola's The Delmcle: beautifully tells the story of how Paris rose after tl-re Second Ernpire l-rad collapsed at Sedan, and how the new French government, headed by Adulphe Thiers, shamefwlly withdrew to Versailles, As Marx feared, the working class and the eritire Left was carried away by dreams of 17993, Beset by thoughts al treason, even after the peace treaty was signed, they sought to continue the struggle as a patriotic revt~lutionary war, Under conditions defined by what Rotsky would later describe as ""dual p~wer,"in which a republican government formally proclaimed its sovereignty even as it lacked substantive authority, the workers created a new form of political organization to abolish all institmional checks on the democratic power of the masses, But 18"7 was not 1793 or 1 848. In contrast to the events of bygone days, the revolutionary workers received no support from either the peasantry or the bcturgeoisie, What is inore, seeing the ckance to combine ideology with national purpose, Bismarck put 10,000 Frencl-r prisoners of war at the disposal of Thiers to quell the revolt, destroy the International, and further reduce any future threat frorn Germany" seighhor. Iscrlated, surrounded, and outmanned, witl-rout l-rope of supplies or relief, the starving workers of Paris valiantly defended their Commuile. Its heroes were people like Gustave Courtlet, I,ouise Michel, and Jules Vallks, while its values became explicit in Eugkne 130ttier's The I~ternntiu~nEe. The Paris Commune instituted free, eyuat, and universal stiffrage for the first time and radicalized the traditional commitment of the working class to democracy, A11 public positions were decided by elections, instant recall was instituted, all officials received wr>rkers9wages, and many believed that the Com~nunewouid realize the "economic emaricipation" "of the workers, But that was not tl-re primary goal, Instead, the Carnmune sought to create a free federation of autonomous local communities, Its strrtctrrre had much in cofnmoxi with the democratic palzs, the medieval free cities, and the rest of those experiments that together form the political tissue for what Ernst Bloch called ""the underground history of the revolwtion,'" Interestingly enougl-r, the First International had little to do with the Paris Cr>mmune and ~ V a r x even less, The Paris section of the Internatiorial was not dominated by Marxists, and Marx himself was l-righly pessirnistic about the uprising horn the start, The political leadership of the Commune was instead composed of Prtrudbonists, old-style Jacobins, and foIIowers of Blanqui.7" Whatever the proletarian support

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far this experiment, Marx was correct in claiming that its vanguard had proposed a confused economic policy, Even the anarchists refused to demand the abolition of private property or the seizure of the Bank of France. Tl-re apparatus by whicl-r parisl-r councils, directly accountable to their constituencies, formed commissions to conduct the everyday affairs of governace was also curn hersoine and inefficient, But tile Paris; Cornmune was a daring attempt to supplant the previous commitment to bourgeois republicanism with a qualitatively digttrent farm of democracy Perhaps its Parisian central conlmittee should have attempted to centralize autkority.71 Probably it should l-rave sued for peace or repressed the saboteurs and enemies from within, ~211;arxand Engels certainly thought so. In fact, the two friends had criticisms of every movement with which they ever associated themselves. But, in ct>rltrast to their future followers Marx and Engels supported every genuinely revolutionary experirneilt uildertakeil by workers and ilumerous refc~rmistmovements as welf, The co~nfnitmentto revolutionary tolerance and the rejection of suicidal sectarianism were constants of their politics, IVarx publidy eildorsed the Gornmunards with his pamphlet The Civil War irr. Frafice. Such an endorsement was also necessary for purely practical reasons, He was probably the dominmt figure in the International and, for right or wrong, the establishment press had identified that organization with the eveiits of 1871, Under the circumstances, anything other than a statement of solidarity would have been irresponsible, Besides, Marx believed that the end of the Commune would spell the destruction of the most militant segment of the French proletariat and the hopes for a revolutionary transformation in that country for quite some time, Thus, he was concerned with its legacy for the future, In this vein, Marx's support cannot be divorced from his critique of the Paris Cornmune, It may have shown the importance of civic commitment by the masses for any revolutionary experiment. It may have evidenced the theoretical point Marx woutd later elaborate in Capital: that it was not what was produced that would defille a new socialist order, but rather how that production would take place. Still, where the anarchists essentially believed that this spontaneous explosion of political com~nitmentwould simply sustain itself, Marx remained skeptical.72 That is probably why he did not see tbe Paris Commune as a fixed and finished goal far the futum, but rather as a symbol for the ""transitional'"itictatorship of the proletariat. Indeed, perhaps somewhat disingenuously, Marx claimed that the Coinmuilek actual goal lay in its ""vague aspiratians" tctward a "republic" that would fi~lally""abolish ail cfass rule.""' That ~Marxcould support both the Paris Commune and the vision of a republic has ~ v e rise n to much confusion, The theoretical problem stems from the seeming co~~tradiction between his understanding of the state in

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The Communb~Manifesto, and the Inazilgural Address, and The Gi-vzl War in Frrrlnce.7"arkining back t o the revolutionary democracy of Rohespierre,75 the Maaitfesto had called upon the wc~rkersof 1848 to organize, seize control of the existing state apparatus, ernplay it: in the naxne of the great majority to crush tile counterrevolution and then, only later, institute a qualitatively new society. Marx and Engeis would soon return to that stance. Nevertheless, the pressure of events in 18"7 led them to demand that the proletariat smash the existing state apparatus and, abruptlyy institute a new order. Insight into the political context of tl-re Paris Carnxnune, rather than abstract textual ailaiysis, alone provides a resolution to this problem, The Third Republic was being formed just as the Parisian workers were beginning to rise.7"These two forms of institutional organization were indeed mtr~l.ciall?, ezlusive and Marx" criticisms of the ""democrats'balld ""republicans" makes sense in the historical context. Whatever his sympathies far al supporting Thiers would have republicanism in the I ~ a ~ g u r Address, meant accepting a ""~epubfic'9hat would not only clearly act against tl-re revolutionary interests of workers, hm possibly even degenerate into a new Caesarist form of dictatorship, Reactionary monarchists dominated the original constitutional proceedings far a third republic and, even after a settlement between ruling classes was fitlally achieved in 18'75, the aristocracy refused tc_t reconcile itself to democracy while the bourgeoisie railed against anything tl-rat might rexnotely threaten existing property relations. At the same time, whatever the prt.>hlemswith the Third Republic, the radically decentralized Paris Commune lacked its reproductive institutions: even a "free association of producers" would need to sustain its future existence, There was only one way out h r Marx and Engels: view the Cornmune as the ""transition" to a socialist republic that, witl-r a proletarian majority and appropriate institutions, might create the conditions far suhstantivc equality and an ongoing democratic order. This would perhaps mean piaying fast and loose with the idea of a "transition." h~tltMarx and Engels could thereby keep their commitment to previously defined ends, differentiate themselves from bourgeois democrats as well as anarchists, and still remain flexible with regard to the marter of means. lntergreting the Commune in this way would furthermore provide evidence fc~rtheir claim that the manner in which the working class subjectively organized itself during the ttransition would depend upon empirically specific conditions tl-rat no theory could articulate a priori, The heedom of the working class could thus not be identified with any particular institutional form. Interpreting the Paris Coxnmune in this way would ultimately make it possiHe to contest tl-re repressive policies of any particular organization claiming to incarnate the interests of the w r k i n g class from within iVarxism itserf," The experience of

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the Paris Comxnune once again exexnplifies the crucial theoretical point: the critical momellt of lt/(farxismties in its reflexive character and its commitmerit to the unfinished character of democrac)i Perhaps more than any other single event in tl-re socialist tradition, tl-re Paris Commune called into question the values of capitalist production and the structure of the bourgeois state. ft made also made clear how Marx and Engels understood the ""dictatorship of the proletariat." "'2"h e3aris Commune shr>wedthat the truly socialist character of such a regime is defined neither by who rules it, nor what purely econoinic reforms it brings about, but rather by what it does to foster democracy and dexnocratic dccisionmaking. Even though the Commune" t~rganizationaifom is no longer relevant to the needs of an advanced indtistrial society, it nevertheless crystallizes the real purpose of the socialist project: the attempt to expand the setfadministrative possibilities of working people (Selbst~dtigkeit). The repression fc~Ilt>wing the Commune" defeat was borrible.78 More died in the first ""bloody week" than in the French Revolution% eerltire "reign of terror." h the wake of tl-re Commune, the First InternationaX was popularized as a huge conspiracy directed against the foundations of civilization. There were numerous calls for its suppression and the arrest of its members by the concerfed acrion of European states. Indeed, were it not for Engiand's rdiusal. to participate, asylum would have been denied to all progressive political refugees, civil fiberties might essentially have been suspended througl-raut Europe, and a powerful. international police force constructed, The destructiox~of the Commune marked the end of revolutiox~ary Jacobinisxn in Western Europe. Conservative forces took control everywhere on the Continent and during tbese years the image of Robespierre a funda~nentaitrax~sfurmation-frofn heroic revolutionary de~lx~dervvent mocrat to bloodthirsty dicrator.79 General suft-rage now became undermined through government frauds and the suppression of radical movements, A resurgence of a~~archism, only this time in the Form of individual acts of terrorism, reflected the deca)l,"%r/larxism provided an alternative, and, to paraphrase the young il/larx, it finally seemed that reality had risen to the idea,

Marxism and Democracy The Paris Com~nunemade Marx-the ""Red Doctor of Terror'Linto a world figure. His importance for the fahor movement, howeve5 was ultimately determined by the relevance of his theories for understanding the development of capitalism during this last quarter of the nineteenth century. Previously his writirtgs had achieved a certain inteflectuai. renown, and

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l-re l-rad gained scattered followers tl-rrougl-routEurope. But, though it was possible to speak of '\VarxistsW before this time, '\lularxism" was really a product of the years following the C o ~ ~ m u n e . The last quarter of the nineteenth centtary witnessed a trexnendous expansion of Europe's productive capacities. Along with this technological tralxsforntation, an explosion in the s i x artd militancy of the industrial working class took place. Unernplr~ymentincreased and, if tl-ris contributed to the substitutic.,n of: trade unions far the old workershssocia tions and guilds, it also created recurring crises of overproduction, thereby fostesir-rg doubts about the intrinsic balance betvveen supply and demand that Adarn Smith" '"invisible hand" was meailt to ensure, The economic, political, and even idealogical conditians fclr a response to capitalism were thus different from either I848 or 1 8"7 . Real develr~pmentsseexned in accord with tl-re predictions of a Marxian "'science" that had always sought to distinguish itself from ""bourgeois metayhysics3\and justify its ""revolutionary'kconclusions in objective terms.81 Given his belief- in the revolutionary character of capitalism, and the way in which it generated its ""own gravediggers," Marx" analyses also made it easy to assume that ""progress" was ideiitifiable with the extension of capitalism's producrive farces, which the political representative of an expanding proletariat would soon inherit, Thus, it became llatural far social democrats to identify ""progress'kith economic growth and the poliricaX interests of their own organizatian.82 Between the rapid growth in numbers, and the rapid development of technologl;, however, increasing competition for jobs posed a threat to the potential unity of the working class and the econamic security of its mernhers. Wtjrkers had only their numbers with which to confront the ecc-~nomic might of capital and the political power enjoyed by the aristocracy, Resistance demanded unity from tl-rose seexningly countless workers, which obviously implied the need for a political party to articulate their interests, New conditions enabled the new Xabor parties to take on a mass character. The new ideology of 'Warxisrn" could only prove useful in determining the interests of- their members, defining their relatioil to the rest of sc~ciety, and forwarding the twin goal of f a m a l '>olitical" and substantive ""scial" "dernracy, Ideology, however9is not quite the correct word. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Marxism took on an ever more ""objective'\and "clr~sed-I'character precisely because it seexned to comprehend act~~ally existing trends, Engels, with the approval of ~lularx,may have contributed to the transformation of the original approach into a fixed systeEn with The Diabetics of fitare (l876) and the Anti-DfihrSng. (1878). This atrexnyt to introduce dialectics into the natural sciences and so invent a philosophy of nature, however, had nothing to do with authoritarianism; that would

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await its later sophistic political perversion under very different conditions. The point was rather to prt.>videa new fcjundation, at once speculative and scientific, for the theory and its teleological projections. Attempting to build on the most progressive ttlinkers of tl-re time, these imxnensely popular works provided the masses with a camprehellshle secular worldview to conlront religion and a rational, teleological, basis for political c o i ~ m i t ment, Indeed, such intellecc~ialcornerstones of Marxism served to build political ct>nsciousnesseven as they "'scientifically" g~~aranteed the realization of a refurbished democratic vt sion, Marxism was built through the efforts of Engels,g3 who survived l-ris friend, as well as younger thinkers like Karl Kautsky in Cermanh Ceorgi Plekhanov in Rttssia, Marx9s son-in-law Paul L a h g u e in France, and a host of other activists in other nations. Once again the ruling classes trembled. The social revol~tz'on,wllose development ltratrx l-rad already prophesized in 1848, seemed now to be taking shape befc~retheir eyes, VVasnk it obvious that the politiccl/ revolutiofz would "kevitably"?folir)w? Affer all, from the standpoim of Marx's contemporaries, what else were the ewetlcs following the Commune other than a confirmation of the master9s prediction that the economic workings of capitalism would prodrzce its own "gravedigger." Perhaps social democrats no longer mounted the barricades like the communards.84 But repression remained severe and, throughout Europe, the organizational activities of social democracy led to constant harassment and sometimes even exile for many in the leadership, As for the masses, accarding tc) the strictures of marxian orthodoxy, sacrifice in the present would he rewarded and justified by the collapse of capitalism and the consrruccion of a humane socialist order in the future. Untold thousands died in strikes or demonstrations while befieving themselves part of a historical process that would ultimately produce a ""tap into the realm of freedom" "ngels) wherein nr>subject would be treated instrumentally as an object. Marx himself may have favored speaking of a dictatorship of the proletariat along mare radical lines. But most believed that a republican farxn of democracy would prove sufticient for the proletariat to organize itself, resofve class csnflict, and ultimately usher in the long-awaited stage of "communism." Perl-raps they ignored the immanent dynamics of bureaucracy, the constraints that capitalist democraq can place on tile working class, along with a host of other hctors that would inhibit such a development. Yet everyone knew that social dexnocracyk calls for a republic, civil liberties, and unhindered universal sufti-age constituted a directly political threat to the status q~zo.So why shouldn't these "'scientiSir'>partis;lns of the proleuriat have considered themselves the new revolutionary heirs of 1789 and its democratic legacy!g"

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An integrative process was taking place, and a measure of bureaucracy was already emerging within the party. But the increasing size of the movemerit only intensified the faith of the working class in an ultimately successful revolutionary outcome as well as its commitment to republicanisxn. The achievement of reforms would pave the way for a relatively quick and bloolltess democratic seizure of pc~wm.The only question was whether the bourgeoisie could be trusted to respect the results of its owr-r legal and political order,%" Traditional socialist wisdom held that the extent of revolutionary violence fundamentally depended on the accions of the ruling classes rather than the proletariat.87 The stronger tbe democratic institutions in which the proletariat could g r a y the greater the democratic expe"ience of its membership, the more peaceful and rapid the inevitable revolution, From such a perspective, three possible strategies for proletarian action emerged-all of which could find justification in the writings of 1Marx.M Where economic development and democratic institutions coexistec"[, as in EngIand or the United States, a strategy of gradualist reforxn seemed only logical; this stance would later receive a general theoreticai articulation from Eduard Bernstein. Under conditions of ecorlomic backwardness and authoritarian repression, by contrast, such reformist tactics were impractical; it was either wait for the "hws" of capitalist development to assert themselves ot; in the mancler of Lenin, attempt a direct seimre of politics! power. Germany and most European nations, l-rowever, were experiencing an intense form of capitalist development under imperial regimes whose authoritariarlism was at [east partially mitigated by certain representative institutions. Tizis led Karl Kautsky and his faltawers to exnphasize the way in which capitalism would create an ever-expanding constituency for mass socialist parties whose success would ultimately generate a demt~craticpoliticai revolution with a rninirnum of violence, Everywhere mass proletarian parties were rendering politically irrelevant the old theories of Marx's enemies: Proudhon, Bakunin, and Bianqui. in the face of this burgeoning sociaiist rnovemetlc, the old anarchist calls for "direct actioil" or an "armed cr>upmxsouilded childish. Syildicalism maintained a certain influence in France, which only makes sense give11 the romantic legacy of the Commune, but more generally anarchism became confined to the most industrially underdeveloped areas such as Italy, Rmsia, and Spain, or where ~zniquecorrditions applied as in Switzerland. As fllr as Austria, England, Germany, and Scandinavia were concerned, anarchism was already an anachrc~nismbefore the twentieth century had even begun. In these nations, Marxis~nemerged as a finished system of philosophy and, in concert with an expanding industrial proletariat, it helped in the construction of the first truly mass democratic politicai parties on the Continent.

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Dexnocratcy became the process and the purpose for a world socialist movement inspired by the teleological guarantees of ~Marxism.Against those who would simply stress the connection between orthodox Marxism and tlze authoritarianism of Lenin and Stalin, Ceorge Lichtheim was quite correct when he termed the IVarx of C=agital""the theorist of the democratic labor movernent.'The millions of workers, who braved such extreme risks in joining the parties of what in 1589 would become the Second Inter~~ational, and who fought b r economic equality and democratic institutions," would surely have beer1 appalted to hear that they were "mtipolitical" or that marxism was a ""ttalitarian" "ilosophy inl-rerentty bent on establishing a "closed st>ciety."'""iVarxists everywhere understood that an arduous agenda of political work and a common set of obviously democratic goals informed their enterprise, There was simply n o qriestio~lof the to be free, and they saw the party forcing workers to be Gee, They wn~z~ed vehicle of their freedom in those democratic mass parties that mplicitly ptaced themselves under the ban~lerof Marxism, Marx and Engels may have miscalculated regarding tlze ""inevitable" collapse of capitalism and the cc~mingof socialism, They were surely irresponsible in their use sf terms like "the dictatorship of the proletariat" and their view of political institutions, not just their vision of a communist utopia, often seems grossly indeterminate. But they saw the connection between economic and political democracy* They were also the first to understand capitalism as a world system and highlight the need for an internationalist politics of resistance, The point is worth considering, since, for all the talk of gloltafization, there has been little wjllingness to articulate a radical response to the xnost debilitating effects of a globally restructured capitalist economy The insights of Marx and Engels into the commodity form, the trend toward corrcentratioll of wealtlz, and the technological proclivities sf capita lism are as trencl-rant as ever, They understood the structural antagonisms between capital and la bor along with the importance of a class perspective for defining the poiitical possihilbties of the exploited and disempowered. Their ""scientific socia"tism'krystallized the real trends of their time. Unbridled optimism infused the will to resist in the years i~nmediatelyfollowing the master" deatlz in 1883. The allure of Marxism did not derive from an empq determinism or a passive belief in the coming revolution, It made the sources of oppression visible and it extracted political commitment from countless impoverished and disconsolate workers. The power of ~Marxisrnwas not an iliusion, Its ability to link theory with practice, republicainisrn with socialism, would decline only after its most Irrr~damentalassuxnption was called into question by Eduard Bernstein and Lenin: namely, that capitalist development would engender an ever-expanding working class intent on its prescribed revolutionary mission.

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Telealogical certainty regarding the triumph of socialism is a thing af the past, along with the unity that once existed between the structural, the empirical, and the speculative notions of class. Highlighting the speculative moment, the class ideal, at least makes possible an imcnanellt confrontation with tile ways in which sc~ciafismbas been perverted. Only once that takes place can theory, again, help forge the new vision of a world in which progress ceases "m resemble that hideous pagan idol, w l ~ awould not drink the nectar but fr'rom the skulls of the slain."91

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Kautsky: The Rise and Orthodox Marxism

For over a quarter of a ceiitury? Karl, Kautsky was the preeminerit theoretician of social de~nocracpand the authentic interpreter of the Marxian legacyWe was a friend of iVarx and Ellgels as well as a prolific scholar whose valuable historical works include The Oriyins of Christi-anity and Preczdrsors to Scrci~lism.He was the founder of Die ncrucr Zeit, which, under his editorial reign, became the major intellectual Marxist publication of tlze era. Along with Eduard Bernstein, he coauthi>red the E@rr Program that served as the guiding docu~neritof the German Social Democratic Party and the inspiration for virtually every other European socialist organization, He intervened in the major political events of his time and he was an important figure at countless poiitical meetings who forwarded numerous resolutions. Indeed, Karl Kautsky was an intellectual activist wlzo brought Marx's thought to the attention of millions and whose political influence proformdly stamped the nascent: social de~nocraticmovement. But today his achievements are hrgotten.Wnly the demstating criticisms, begun during Kautsky" lifetime and rehabilitated during the 1960s, are rernembered.3 The reasons transcend the qudity of his writings. His life lacks the drama of Rosa Luxemburg's or Lenin's and he is identified with an unyielding orthodoxy, Ultra-leftists castigate his preoccupation with organization and reyubiicanism. Those with nostalgia for the communist cause still consider him the ""renegade" who sold out the European working class and opposed Lenin's revolution. Modern social democrats, for their part, view birn as the defencier of an sutworn ideology against the new pragmatism developed by refarrnists like Eduard Bernstein. There is a certain truth to these criticisms. Still, they do not exhaust either the importance or the relevance of Karl Kautsky's contribution,

Especialiy in the present context, it is useful to remember that he considered republicanism the precondition for socialism, Kautsky was a principled d e ~ ~ o c rand a t his historical determinism enabIed him to contest the terrorism and authoritarianism of the Russian Revolution. He was clear about the dangers attendant upon attempting to skip phases of historical development and he was always skeptical of voluntarism. His interpretation may, for better or worse, stilt define the mainstream economistic Ltnderstanding of: Marxism, But, if his thinking was deterministic, it was not frztalistic. Xt spurred activism. Kautsky was opposed to nationalization totlt cuztrt, he recognized the dangers of bureaucracy, and his '"rnunicipalism" hghlighted the need far participation and the reinvigoration of civil society, Kamsky also considered it imprudent to assume power at any cost and, given the o p p o r t u n i s ~of~ contemporary lefr-wing parties, examining his original view of social dernocracy as a movernent of protest and opposition is well worth the effort. Understanding the changes social democracy has undergone is, in any eventl impossihfe without a sense of the original movement and tl-re ideology that originally inspired it,

Marxism for the Masses Kari Kautsky rdected the values and presuppositions of social dernocracy during its most vibrant period. He responded to events in his own way, Btrt his thinking was fc~rmedthrough a certain rigid understanding o f Marx, He was always a popularizer. And he was proud of it, After all, it was r i o t the varied m d complex, philosophically rich and self-refiexive, dimensions of i2narx's massive output that ""gripped the masses," "stead it was Kautsk* simpfified version of the theory that vaiidated the famous link between '"heory 'band "practice." His '\orthodox" "interpretation of iMarx mirrored a unique historical situation in which the working class was indeed leading "the people" in its strt~gglefor republics n democracy and econornic justice. Workers were committed to a party with an il~ternationalorganization that manifestly seemed tct represent their inwrests and there seemed ntr need to distinguish between the historical rnethod of Marx and the system of Marxism or between its potetintially critical character and its instrumental usage as an ideology* Marxism, from Kautskyk standpoint, was a unified scl-rema that explained the totality of existence, Throughout his life" work he maintained that both the natural and the social w r l d could be encompassed within a single overriding theory, Always closer to positivism than idealist dialectics, in keeping with EngeIs" A~nli-DGhring and lrhe DiaEectics cif Nat~dre, Kautsky i n s l s ~ dthat Marxian inyuiy deyerids upon the truth criteria of

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the natural sciences, such as the validity of universal Iaws, causality, and a value-free standpoint. He believed that the "scientific" character of Marxism alone differentiated it from ""bourgeois'Vorms of social theory even as it gave the working class its sense of destiny and theoresical privilege, Indeed, mirroring what were certainly iIMarx% ambitions, Kautsky produced a seamless theoretical whole." His popularization of tl-ze first volume of Das Kapital, entitled The Econ01.7.iricDoctrine o(KarE Marx, was enormously successhl, and the argument was quite clear. Given that capitalism is predicrtted upcm calculr-lble units of production m d consumption, profit and loss, it stands open to causal and, in principle, mathematical investigation. Its causal effects, ht>wever, are uilfy activated in terms of its fundame.tltal "laws." "These economic laws, in turn, become open to objective analysis and determine both the ideological and political developments within the particular society. Kawsky sought to oppose the seemingly mystifying metaphysics of ideafists of Richard Wagner and like Hegel along with the romantic irratio~~alisnt the nationalistic ilrlperialism advocated by Heinrich von Treitschke, both of whom were also staunch anti-Semites. 111 this reactioilary German inteltectuai climate, ""am?ost by default Kari Kautsky had few challenges to his intellectual ascendancy at the turn of the 1890s.""' He saw capitalism as driven by the fundat~entalcontradiction between social production and private appropriation of weatth. This still relativeIy new economic systexn would bring all precapitalist classes into its orbit. Due to the more efficient character of capitalist production with its cornmodit). farm, emphasis on investment, and quantifiable market criteria, atavistic classes like tl-re aristocracy or the petty bourgeoisie would either adapt or die. The market system would ultimately make them fall into either the bourgeoisie or, inost tikely, the proletariat. Under this market system, the working class would be forced to sell its time or "labor power" while the total revenue of the firms that hire these workers, minus wages and depreciation, would define the s ~ r p l u sthat capitalists appropriated. Izt contrast to previous stages of development, reinvestment of capital in technology was required in order to supplant living labor, reduce costs, produce more efficiently, and compete with other firms. Technology heightens the contradictions sternming froxn the capitalist production process, It can be employed to shorten the work week and produce goods better, cheaper, and h t e r . But it also tends to throw people out of work, intensify the need for further reinvestmem, and supposedly create a "falling rate of prc~fit,"Mare is produced even as fewer and fewer are able to buy the goods in question. Technology helps generate the "inevitable" crisis of overproduction by ruining smaller enterprises, depressing wages, and swelling the ranks of the unemployed "industrial serve army.'" S~lcfia crisis always benefits the larger firms able to weather the storm by

concentrating capital in fewer l-rands. Accumulation tl-ren begins once again on a higher plane. Nevertheless, the endless quest to generate profits will produce another and still another crisis of ever-increasing severity resultir-rg in war and other forms of social cl~aas. Kautsky retained a structural view of capitalism. But be never denied that ideas matter and that certain prophetic individuds could anticigatc; future developments.6 He also maintained that ideologies and political occurrences emerge in objectively discernible, direct responses to the accumulation process and the concrete economic class interests that derive frorn it,T The contribution of Marx was seen in terms of penetrating tl-re ""laws" of capitalist accumulation and opening them to empirical verificatictn, It is true that Kautsky could provide only an inadequate sc3lution to the "transfornation problem"-or how values are translated into prices. But, like Bernstein, he leIt that the empirical verification l o r Marx" theory rested upon the tendency of monopoiics to shrink the number of capitalists and expand the size of the working class. Kautsky's views s n the concentration of capital, the blling rate of profit and the quesrion of "immkeracion," hdeed provided an explanation for the rapid political development of European social democracy during the last quarter of the riineteenrh cent Llry* The political moment was often hidden in Kautsky" thought, but it never disappeared entirely, Despite his commitment to the "inevitable" col lapse of capitalism, he knew that Engeis had posited a choice for the f~xturebetween sc~cialismand barbarism, Confidellt about the outcome of historical developrrtent, however, he rejected speculative concerrts s r any other fc~rm of ""prescientific" or '"re-Marxist" ""ufoyianism." Until the end of his fife, he maintained that the ""objective" "development of capitalism would, throt~gh"nat~zralnecessit)iWcul~ninatein crisis a i d nttirnately a situation wherein tl-re proletariat could rnake a democratic revoltltion. He always placed primacy on the teileological aspect of Marxism and thereby suspended the need for an independent ethic or the formulation of a class idea!, But, still, class consciousness and organization in preparation of the coming revolution became matters of crucial concern. Thus, even if Kautsky's thinkilag may not have generated revolutionary action, it undoubtedly inspired activism and confidence in the party, Herein lies the principal confusion pertaining to orthodox Marxism, If activism is defined in terms of fostering a sense of what Georg I,ukcics terxned " h e actt~alityof the revolution," h e n it is legitimate to condemn the thought of Kautsky for its quietism,"nt if activism implies a commitmerit to furthering the political work of the labor movement, and deeyening class consciousness, then it rnakes fittie sense to criticize his materialism for inducing passivity. Just as predestination generated a desire to know whether one is a meml?er of the elect,hnd thereby inspired believers to ac-

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cumulate wealtl-r in order t a gain a hint of God" jjudgxnent, orthodox ~Marxismcreated a desire in workers to bring the "inevitable" ~rerv.olution about that much sooxler. Thus, they joined the labor movement and worked for its triumph. It was not for inhibiting pojjcical engagement that b u t s k y gained the adulation of the masses during a period of capitalist expansion and revolutionary stagnation.

The Golden Age Italian socialists affectionately called Karl Kautsky ""the pope of i2narxism.'" The label was warranted. Kamsky provided an entire generation of European workers with a particular form of: socialist identity. No longer was it necessaq far them to invoke the spirit of Blanqui; no longer would they have to mount the barricades like the Communards; no longer was it importax~tto deal with muddieheaded ax~archists.Democratic mass orgmizations of the proletariat were on the rise and they offered the working class a new world of possibilities. EspeciaHiy in Germany and Austria: The Social Democratic party was far rnorc than an organization for conducrir~gelections, %.inning votes, or inflcrencjng legislation. Xt embraced the whoIe life of its 111embers; it had a women" snovelnent . . . it was soon to have a youth mt>vernenr;its C:ongresses tlehated at length the question whether workers should drink spirits or-with a foretaste of 'socialist realismLthc piacc of sex in 111odern art. Socialist colnposers wrote socialist songs which were sung with enthusiasm by socialist cl~oralsocieties, A whoie range of pubticadc~ns, daily, weekly, monthly, annually, aII over Germany providect instructtorl and entertainil~entfor each section of the working c-lass-fro111 the high theoretical Neue Zeit in wl~ichMarxist first principles were tliscussed, to the satirical Wahre Jakob, or the Ruch der Jzrgend for proletarian clzildren prod~rccdby Victor Adler's wife Emma. hiore and snore the Social Delnoc-ratic Party forrnecf a world t>f its t>wn, a society within the state, which ahsorbecf the interests, energies and tmagir~atiorlof its members, while its leaders acquired a 111ythological status usually reserved, in England at least, for the royal fat11ily.lo

Everywhere a coxnmitment was growing to tl-re new Second International that proudly considered itself ready to inherit the revoIutionary mantle of ~Varx's cold organization. And those workers who flocked to it were not fools. They knew that only the labor movement stood for both political democracy and substantive equality, In lukewarm fashion, the bourgeoisie supported one and not the other. The aristocrats, peasants, and petty bourgeoisie sttppc~rtedneither, Social democrats could legitimately claim that no

other party l-rad ever created sirnitar conditions for participation a n the part of its membership or expanded the range of free public debate and diversity of opinion in like mamer. The ""self-isolatiorr"of the working class in nations like Germany was, moreover, not self-chasen.12 IVost workers correctly considered the German Reich as an authoritarian and militaristic state that structurally reinforced the alliax~cebetween Junker aristocrats and great industrialists against the proletariat, These classes were obsessed by counterrevolutionary fears of political democracy, And these fears, in turn, 0n1y intensified the hopes of the ruled. Thns, where in the 1870s the members of this ragtag organization nurnbered in the thousands, in 1887, ""Social Democracy polled 1 0 3 % of the votes in the Reichstag elections; in 1890, 19.7%; in 1893,23.3%; in f898,27.2%); and in 1903,3 X .7%."'2 Given these numbers, most workers and party reg~llarscould believe that the claims of orthodox Marxism were being validated by empirical reality. Who could deny that social democracy was the wave of the future, that the consciousness of the workers was maturing in a steady and regulated hshion, tbat the social revolution was being achieved, and that a political shift of power loorned on the htzizon? Other socialists from Erlrope to the Orient Looked at German events as prefigurations for the development of their otvn labor parties, Kautskyss "'scientific socialism," in short, expressed a real trend. It evidenced what Hegel would have called the pkilosophicai "truth" of the epoch, The lahor movement was seemingly unfolding in conjunction with the "hws" 'of cllpitaiism itself. Kautsky believed that these laws were specific to capitalism and tbat they involved people in a particular mode af class interaction. He understood, of course, that capitalism could nt>t he abstractly divorced from preceding epochs and that the new system must: be conceived within ttle continuum of history, His Erhik would indeed argue that the basis of all human activity is already apparent in the animal kingdom. This work presents one of the first and most important attempts at developing a Marxian antl-rropology. The use of language, the development of technology with its concomitant division of labox, and ttle subsequent ability of humanity to tra~~sforn? itself and its world are seen as deriving from a process af adaptation. The same holds for morals, Through natural selection, those that help the grimp survive and cooperate become ingrained and hallowed. Those that have a difkrent effect become vilified, Darwin" theory of evolution was pervasive in the bourgeois culture af the late nineteellth century and also within the socialist intellectual milieu." Its interpreters included lesser figures Like Herbert S y e n c e ~But Marx" admiration h r the author of 8 r i g k ofthe Species was well known, and so there was really nothing strange in Kmtsky turtling to the great scientist for ttzeoretical guidance.1Vn fact, he first became interested in

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Darwin wllile still a student at the University of Vienna and Kautsky initially envisioned Die ueue Zeit as a journal committed to popularizing the thought of bath Darwh and Marx, After all, both pfovided an attack upon religion, metaphysics, and philosophical obscurantism, Unfortunately, however, Kautsky made an epistemological erroc Ulllike Darwin, but in a manner much like Spencer, he simply a s s u ~ ~ ethat d evolution involved "pogeess." Xt was on this assumption that Kautsky based his belief that evolution provided the link betweerr the llattlral world and humail history as well as the natural and the social sciex~ces.There is even a sense in which Kautsky built his Marxist materialism on the evolutionary foundations provided by Darwin. Civilization becomes part of a continuum that stretches back to the nat~lralworld. But this continu~zrn.is considered subject to decisive ruptures and history is seen as developing through social contradictions. The division of fabot; for example, is understood as being profoundly affected by the particular natural environment in which certain groLips find themselves. A certain form of cooperation between them is subseqmcnrly necessary even when one group is pitted against others for control over the given econrlmic surplus. According to Kautsky, the critical ethical question is whelher the doxninant group recognizes the norms of cooperation it espouses in terms of its actual practice. If it does not, then new norms must be developed by the oypressed group to help overturn the ""decadent" "stern. Ideas and values becoxne ""weapons" h the social struggle. Thus, Kautsky could write: Not only the worker, but the scientist as wet1 needs mc~ratincentives, New sciet~tificinsigbcs always violate traditional, ingrained t>pinions, In societies that ir~elltdcciasscs, a new scientific insight tends to irnpingc on class interests, To find and spread scientific truths incompatible with vested interests ~l-teansto ask for warJ5

IVost orthodox i2/iarxists9including Kautsky, did not believe that the collapse (Zswammenbrrrch)of capitalism would simp.ly usher in socialism-as many interpreters would care to think. They instead maintained that the proletariat must first recog-nize the morally bankrupt character of the existing order and the way it breeds economic crises, undemocratic uses of political power, and egoistic values, These Marxists considered moral coi~mirment crucial Eor the success ol the socialist undertaking. Xt is indeed a gross historical misreprrselltation to GIniin that consciousness was somehow "the forgotten dimension of the class strrrggle""jBourdieuj, Building class consciousness went on twenty-lour hows a day in the labor movement. It was moreover the stalwarts of ilJlarxian ""orthodoxy" "like Kautskp who gave priority to the party rather than the trade uniuns.l6 They

could downplay the role of consciousness in tl-reory only because they took idet>logicalwork far granted in practice. It is also a mistake to claim that Kautsky simply trtisunderstood Kant and the character of: "fithics'3ecause l-re refused to consider it an independent discipline.1' It seerned that history was justifyiq his teleologicai beliefs and, if only for this reason, Kautsky had no need to ccjncern himself with the qrlestioris Kant posed, The issue for him was not, as for Kant, how universal hurnanist values and ends are derived from an epistemological standpoint, Kautsky started from the assumptioll that history must realize precisely those ethical concerns to which Kant was committed. Kautskyk interest was therefore l-ristoricalrather than epistemological, He did not wish to explore the capacities far moral judgment or Inquire into which realm of philosophical analysis they might belong. Instead, he wanted to ~znderstandhow values change in differefit eras for different classes and what would foster democratic rationalist ideals among workers. This concern was intimately connected with Kautsky" bbelief that the bourgeoisie of the late nineteemk century had surrendered the radical democratic ideals and internationalist values that its revolutionary proponents had once espoused." Only the proletariat is now in the "objective" pyositiorl to end the exploitation and oppression of ""prehistory." Its morality should thus preserve and extend humanitfs unreafized yearnings far freedom that reached their apex in the democratic, egalitarian, and humanistic values forwarded in the great bourgeois revol utions. Kautsky understood socialism as the extension of democracy into civil swiety and he considered the future proletarian revolution as the inheritor of 1688 and 1789.1" While inspired by the past, however, the proletarian revolution must still prove different from its predecessors. Where the earlier revolutions had only been the work of a mix~ority,nlxow the vast trtajoritj~of society would abolish botl-r the political artd the economic hundations of arbitrary power, A qualitative change fi-om the past would take place. Thus, in one o f his most important essays, Kautsky fc~lioweclHegel and Marx by drawing an analvgy between revolution and human birth." That image indeed incarnates the self-perception of the young social democratic movement and it becomes crucial for any assessmerit of orthodox Marxism.

Parry and State Despised by the bourgeoisie, branded as "irabble without a fatherland" by the kaiser and the Junker aristocrat); the early social democrats csnsidered themselves l-rarbingers of a new world, Prior to World War X, only France and Switzerland were republics, and tbere was hardly a state that adhered to the principle of one person, one vote. The Cerman state fashioned by

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Bismarck was particularly cuxnbersoxne and autocratic. 13russia ruled tl-re principalities of the Reich like satellites, and a political structure arose wherein social demt~cracycould run its candidates fc~rparliament without real hope of ministries since the kaiser alone was in the position to choose the chailcelior and his most important cabinet members. This created a sit~lationin which the proletariat could grow along the parliamentary course even though there was nu chance whatsoever of is assuming power. Thus, according to orthodox ~MarxistsIikc Kautsky, the need for a democratic revoXution.21 The issue was not that social dexnocracy ignored the tension between the bureaucratic character of the longed-for republican state and the stateless communist society of the future, Subordinating the direct fight for communism to the struggle for a republic seemed legitimate. Democracy was a revolutionary demand at the time and it also appeared as the necessary soc26ZEisd prerequisite fur introducing a new stage of more radical political development in the future. The real problem was not the ideological cornrnitrnent to a republic, but the inability to press for its realization in a conseq uent manner. This failing derived less frc~mhypocrisy than the political position of the SPD within imperial Germany. Ostracized within a deeply reactionary milieu, with Iittle influence on decisionmaking, social democracy held to the . " movement also conposicion ""rrot a man or a penny for this s y s r e ~ ~ The stituted what was often called a ""state within a state," Its Leadership served as a virtual shadow government, and Kautsky became the principai theoretical exponent of "'opposititrtn" as a political tactic.22 The strength of his policy derived from its ~ a l i s m there ; was a lack of potential partners for a coalition due to the stubbornness of the ruling elites and their contempt for social democracy. it also kept the party from losing its radical kIan a r engaging in voluntaristic attexnpts to take power under conditions in which compromise of its democratic commitments would prove necessary. Kautsky placed teleological certainty regarding the socialist future over the contingency of a purely etllical comxnitnlent to achieve it. By the same token, however, his stance left the party in a quandary about how to use the power deriving from its growing electoral constituency. Indeed, ""since, according to Mautsky, the revolution could not be arbitrarily brr~ughtabout, and since nothing could be said about when and uilder what conditions it would occur, no ideas existed about the corlcrete way to power: organization became a substitute for political action.'?x3 Kautsky's concerrl with organization in the present was ideologically justified by the need to prepare for the syskmic "breakdowrx'9that loomed in the f~tture.But he never established a plausible connection between xneans and ends: an electoral was not the same as a revolutionary movement and, arguablb the tactics necessary for the one precluded the other. Thus, under

the circumstances, it was less a rnatter of orthodox Marxists neglecting "'politics" per se than using the '?inevitable" collapse as a type of compensatorq" myth for the political impasse in which they found themselves. Not every activist bought into this myth. The impact of Karl :rsTarx upon the young social democratic movement has always been somewhat exaggerated, whereas the importance of Ferdinand Lassaille has been undervalued. Aict~~ally, the Lassalfean General German Workersyociety, which merged with its ~Varxianrivals to form the German Socialist Workers" Party (SAPD) in 1875, did not have to change either its political tactics or empl-rasis on state-directed econornisrn when it entered the new organization. The trade unionists and politicians influenced by Lassalfe would constitute a pc>werful trend within the labor movement and, following the nearly twelve years of intense repression beginning in 1878 urlder Bismarck" antisocialist laws, they accepted ~Warxisnnas a unifying ideology for the newly titled German Social Democratic Party only insofar as it met their particular concerns. The ideological result was a conglttmeration of very different standpoints that, ironicaily, came to be known as ""orthodox :Marxism. Of course, Kautsky-and even Berrrstein prior tct 18982"sougllt to appose those tenets of Lassalle" theory that its supporters wished to impart into Marxism. They inveighed against the "hirnseration" tthesis, the belief that nonproletarian strata inherently constituted "one reactionary mass,'" and the idea that the existing autocratic state could serve as the Lever for social transformation, But, here, the "'pope of Marxism" was unslrccessful, Heresy mixed with canonical dogma. It wasn't his fa~zlt.When theory "grips the masses," when the goal is unity, and when certain texts can lend credence to an opponent's interpretation, di&rences and nuances are often lost, In the very act of responding to such ideas, and attempting to balance practical interests, the positions of Marx and Lassalle blended in the rnind of the average prcdietaean, Both of the original factions understood that only a new party with a new class base could possibly realize the democratic values betrayed in the bourget>isrevolutions of the past, The importance of these values and their revolutionary character were only reinforced bp the introduction of the antisocialist laws." Therere was general agreement about this, The question was whether, lacking a genuirrely revolutionary situation, the nonrevc>lutionary commitment to pariiamer~taryactivity in an imperial regime and the preoccupation with economic relowlx.1 should serve as ends unto tl~emselves.26 Judgments regarding the "inxnkently" ~ d u t i o n a r yor reformist character of tl-re SPD only make sense when the context in which the xnovement has been placed is takell into account. Thus, concerns with maintaining even the most minimal conditions for efectoral activity had radical republi"

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can ixnplicatians in the 1880s tl-rat tl-rey would not l-rave a decade later, After 190.5, these same concerns tended to inhibit revolutionary republicanism and new offensive f a r m of proletarian organization such as the mass strike and the soviets.27 This transformation of the r n e a n e behind p a a i c ~ ~ ldear mands helps explain many of the political and theoretical differences within a unified parry with a hegemonic worldview Few in the leadership of the SPD were concerned witl-r the basic criticisms Marx had raised against the Cotha Program when his internal memorandum was published posthumousfy by Engels in 1890. By that tilne, the SPD's commitment to creating a republic was widely recognized and, given the domestic repression in Germany, it wc.,ufd liave been fc~olhardyfor the party to highlight the need for a dictatorsllip of the proletariat, With the creation of a Second International, inoretlver, the concern Marx expressed fifteeri years earlier regarding the neglect of internationalisxn no Longer seerned relevant. Finally, with respect to separating issues of distribution from issues of production, it was clear that inost party meinhers were primarily concerned with econamic inequality, Control over the production process assumed importance only with regard to the question of political power. This is where the basic differences arose betweeri the three theorists with whorn the three factions of the SPD would ultimately identify themselves. Their positions were not mutually exclusive in every detail, which often allowed for collaboration between them, but the differexices were still real,. Eduard Bernstein was content to accept a constitutional monarchy and maintain the structure of the existing production process while Rosa 1,uxemhurg dreamed of proletarian administration over the production process through the rnass strike. As for Kari Kautsky, along with the party majorir)i,B he remained committed to parliamentary rule and the electoral path while emphasizing issues of distribution in the preserit and a transformation of the production process in tl-re futtlre.29

Programs and Practice In 1891, Kautsky wrote his commentary on the Erfurl Programnz. It would serve as a guiding document lor both the SX3Dand the entire Second International. Fashioned loosely after The Commzkrzisi:Manifesto, the prog r m was split irt two parts. The second part, originally drafted by Bernstein, emphasized the need for particular reforms ranging from zmiversa/ suifrage to a graduated incc~metax, nationaiization of major industries, the eight-hour Jay? and the right to a free burial. The first part, written by Kautsky, was a model of Marxian orthodoxy tl-rat empl-rasized t l ~ e need to gain state power and faretold the '"inevitable" collapse of capitalism through ""natural,necessity,"30

Despite tl-re temptation, it would be a mistake to read the respective positions of Kautsky and Bernstein in their debate over "revisionism" in 1898 back into their respective iabors on the socialist platform of 1890. TE would also be a mistake to believe that the emphasis on "natural necessity" "aduced an antipolitical passivism or rendered class conscic->usnessir~levant. Indeed, this becomes evident frorn a fllrntrus paragraph in the progracn: We tlo n ~wish t to say that the abolition t>f private property or the exploitation of the means of production will t>cscur by itself, that the irresistible development through natural ncccssity will take placc urittzout human action. Nor do we wish to say that all soc~alrelorll-ts are useless or that those who suffer the ccjnsecluences of the ccjntratliction between prcjductive forces and the existing relations of production haw rlorhirlg to do other than srarld idly by with ttlicir hands in their pockets waiting for this contradiction to be avercome.31

Tlzough Lassalle originally coined the phrase ""sknce behind the masses," it holds equally well for Kautsky" view. No less than the partisans of the First and the Third Internationals, members of the Second International did not believe that the revolution would simply occur of its own accord through the ""objective" "economic warkings af capitalism. Quite the contrary, The teleological system Kautsky Eashioned from Marxss work did not make the workers antipolitical. Indeed with its claims regarding the "inevitable" "revolution, orthodox Marxism actually spurred political activity by intensifying the desire of workers to bring socialism into existence more quickly. In revolution as in birth, obstacles can accur." Thase German social democrats who had so vc->cifemuslyfought for the legalization of their p a r v from 1878 to 1890 were now forced to garner votes in hostile surroundings and maintain a belief that the potemid for garnering inore wouid be assured. Such hopes were supported by the theory of the '"inevitable" "collapse of capitalism and the ever-expanding proletariat, Illiterate artd degraded, constantly threatened with reprisals, the warking class understood that this theory called upon them to join the social democratic parties that incarx~atedtheir future, The problem with the E r f ~ r tProgrcam~nhad nothing to da with either fostering the passivity of the workers or embracing the ""immiseration thesis."33 ?"he real problem was of a different sort. Though the pamphlet xnde clear tl-rat no series of reforms could substitute for a political act af transformation, its teleological perspective presupposed what was only a contingent link between the growth of the SPB and the strengthening of its radical commitments to reform and revolution, irnmediate needs and trailsitional dernands, nationat forms of electr>ralactivity and internatioilal

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solidarity." There was no discussion of tl-re means necessary for transforming the sc~cialsystem or dciending the new regime. But theorists often forget the difference between a political manifesto and a philosophical treatise. The one must respond to sociopolitical exigencies and prospects while the other need not. Regarding issues such as these, the Erfu~t:Program vvas corzstrained by the inrterrtsts of those divergerit factions with which the SPD had to contend, Indeed, Kautsky would c o n h m t some of these neglected concerns in The Social Revo!zafz'on, This remarkable little political pamphlet has been unjustly forgotten and helps explain Kautsky" influence upon Lenin, Luxemburg and the entire left wing of the Secc-~ndInternational before 1910, It predicted the gr~jwth of monopoly capitalism and the dangers of a '"reactionary democracy'" with unaccountable institutions that might csnstrict civil liberties as welt as socialist activity, it emphasized that the SPD should remain a b'class,'a rather than a multiclass party of democratic reform if only to deal with the likelihood of "co~znterrevolution,'TThe pamphlet also makes clear that, contrary to popular opinion, Kautsky did not demand tl-re nationalization of all businesses, but only the larger and failing firms. Eie was quite flexible and he never identified socialism with an uriyielding national plan. The Social Revolution recogllized the need for a socialist ethos of solidarity and it envisaged a new intellectual and cultural life under socialism. Indeed, while refusing to provide a blueprint, Kautsky tried to confront: real obstacles inhibiting the creation of a new society and call fortlt a new spirit of civic responsibility in its citizenry. The Social Reuolzartz"oncreated a new fascination with the ""Euture state" (ZukunJtsstaatf that socialism would instit~tte,and xnuch l-ras been said about the semirefigious character of orthodox ~Warxism,But this ideology did not constitute religion in the usual meaning of the term. Its questions were not existetlciai and its proponents believed they had empirical proof for their beliefs. They looked to this world rather than the aherlife for their of salvation. In the German Empire, where religion really was an gi~~piLIm the masses," Marxism called upon the oppressed and exploited to take control of their lives and to stand up for themsetves In a political rnailner.35 Indeed, if Marxism must be understood in religious terms, tl-ren it should be at least be considered a form of ""secular faith*"

The Road to Power This faith ultimately focused on ""tie day" of proletarian triumph. Kautsky l-rad drawn the crucial distinction between the "social" and the "'poIiticalm revolution. The assumption behind his understanding of so-

cialist politics, l-rowever, was the existence af a link between them. Tl1e social revolmion was what Marx had in mind when he wrote that the capitalist systeEB would create its own gravediggers by generating a12 everexpanding proletarian consrrluency far the SPB,36 Witli workers entering the political arena, the party could thus ever more vociferously demand various economic reforms, which, in turn, would haste12 the dissolution of the system. Indeed, corresponding to the insights of ""Marxian science," the social revoitrtion was predicated on the "'necessary" implications of capitalist development. Kautsky rejected tl-re idea that economic reforms waufd enable capitalism tc-, "evrotve" into socialism, A ""political revc.>1utioi19'was necessary in order to rectify the injustices of the e x i s t i e electoral system in Germany and thereby prepare the way for the next phase of "'socialist" ddevelopment, Undertaken once the party had secured the support of tl-re great proletarian majoriry, most likely occurring during a moment of crisis, this quick and relatively bloodless act would involve the final conquest of state power, Though the social revolution woufd create its structural preconditions, tl-ris political rewlution would depend on contingent historical factors for which it was impossible to predict m y particular tactic inr advance, Mautsky" interpretation of orthodox Marxism was never based a n the eradication of freedom and contingency in the name of necessity and determinism. Me inrstead Iiked to speak of "'determinate volition'Qor a freedom conditioned by circurnstances,i7 The refusal to fashion a concrete strategy for the seizure of state power, however, left Kautsky and his fc~iluwersin the position of emphasizing the ""necessary'2evelopments occurring in the present aver those contingent and unpredictable circumstances af the future, It became, far him, a matter of maintaining the cc~nnectionbetween the social and the political revofution. fn his mind, this meant expanding the membership of the SPD wllile keeping its revcliutionary identity intact. Buttressed by his belief in historical teleology, yuestioning the constant calls for c o i ~ p r o i ~ i by s e the right wing of the SPD, tile result was a politics af ""apposition," Kautsky correctly believed tl-rat, under the monarchy9 the SPD had no real possibility of exercising power or any serious chance of participating in the hrrnation of national policy. His politics of opposition also furthered a sense of internal cohesion, class solidarity, and a commitment t o republican values within the movement. Neverthekss, this starlce also helped ~ustifythe charge that his "'economic determinism" was devoid of ""pulitics" a r an explicitly narrnative coxnmitmeilt to a class ideal. Again, the context is crucial. Errtergng from the underfhround in 1890, a qualitative political revolution had already taken place. The infant SPD had been born and a steady regulated course was beginning to unfold as the child grew into a responsible adult, According to Kautsky, that course

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would continue so fang as the party retained its class identity, revolutionary vision, and political harmony His view of revolution was predicated on ~ztilizingand extending those organizing possibilities that had emerged with the rexnoval of the antisocialist laws. These laws l-rad proven traumatic fur all social democrats of Kautsky's generation. In fact, their implementatiorz was so drastic that: Ger~rgvon Vollmal; a respected party activist, caused a sensation by claiming that only through an irnrnediate revolution could these repressive laws be lifted, When such an action proved unnecessary, he became the first major proponent of reformism within the SPB, Few social democrats, in any event, could have found fault with Bebet's dramatic recollections in a speech to the Dresden Pafty Congress of 1903: Blows simply rained tlown t>nus and everything was broken up. One city after anotl~er,including the surrc>unding tlistricts, was put into a state of siege, Hundreds and hurldreds of our cotnrades became unexnploycd and we uwrc drtvcn froin our homes like rmangy dogs, . . . W11en I recall fiow we were made to report at the potice station, had our measurements taken and were treated generally like criminals, photographed and then givcn three days to clear out-this was an cxperienc-e X shall relnember as tong as I live.38

Fear af ever l-raving to ga thraugh such regression again combined with a recognition tl-rat the Prussian state" attempt to destroy social democracy had faiied, The party had broken the pc-~werof Bismarck and probably played the crucial role in his fall. The popularity of Kautsky's thought, in this vein, reflected the political breakthrough that had occurred at the moment of the SPB's legalization. Its success in the struggle against the authoritarian excesses of the Bismarckiax~state would illdeed endow it with a revohtionary aura." But, particularly as the trade unions grew stronger and the party bureaucracy Larger,"Qtl~e "revolutionary" iimgact of the old teIcofogical vision fell away trtore and trtore. It became ever clearer that an etl~icaland practical choice was necessary between the commitment to revolution and the reformist demand that the party make greater efforts to integrate itself into the given order and shoulder ministerial responsibility. Kautsky's politics of opposition was a way of stalfing that decision, Standing outside the corridors of power, while continuing to work for the immediate tasks at hand, l-re sougl-rt to maintain the party's unique identity by pushing the socialist revolution ever further into the future, Past sttccess was used to ~ u s t i kthe prospect of an emancipated future. Kautsky and his followers were unwilling to entertain new strategies af either the reformist c>r revolutionary sort, This indeed helps explain their vacillation especialiy following the final sptit in the SPD's left-wing faction in 191Q,

Tensions had already arisen foilowing the first electoral setback ever suffered by the SPD in 1905. Even though the p a q would regain its momentum, its leaders now began to feel themselves on the defensive.. By 1909, a staunchly reactionary coalition had assurned power in Cerrnany wllile imperialist ambitions and chauvinism were also on the rise. The original coalition of factions within the SPD now divided over yuestic~nsof political and ideological strategy. Indeed, marked by strikes from below and new expressions of proletarian militancy, 1910 was a year of polarization within the party. Old Lassalleans, trade unionists, and party bureaucrats sought to dispense with tl-re radical ideolr~gy,forward a policy of class compromise with regard to social programs, and often provide support br what was hecoming a blatantly imperialist foreign policy, Meanwhile, on the "'Ieft," Rosa and her followers were calling upon the SPD to e~rttrlatethe TA~zxe~rtburg Rkissian mass strike of 190.5, Faced with the cl-range in political climate, the danger posed to traditional party tactics by the Left and the original ortbodox theory by the Right, Kautsky took a different stance, He justified it by providing a self-criticism of his own former optimism regarding the mass strike.4 Since the revolution had failed where the rulit utopian to expect its sucing class was the weakest, he now co~~sidered cess where tl-re ruling class retained support from the strongest army in tl-re world, 3% be sure, Kamsky was willing to entertain the use c>f a "&fensive'\nlass strike as a last resort tct protect democratic gains under exceptionai circumstances. Given the recent electoral defeat and tl-re tl-rreat of repression, however, he considered it suicidal t o maintain his prior c~mmitmenttc) an ""offensive'hse of the mass strike. And so, rejecting the revisionists no less than l-ris former radical allies, Kautsky proposed a variation on his politics of opposition, His new ""strategy of attrition"' would be predicated o n maintaining a traditional farrrt of class politics while waiting for tl-re laws of capitalist deveiopxnent to reassert tl-remselves and reverse the reactionary trend. Thus, in ail article on the Prussian elections, Kautsky could write the line that would become famous for its future implications: ""X is not coxnpromise in action tl-rat is dangerous, but compromise in prc~gram." Kautsky and his supporters found themselves occupying the center between the two tactions. Willing to consider a defensive mass strike in order to preserve previous demooratic gains, but not an offensive mass strike intent m introducing a new form of workerskcsntrol, Kautsky opposed the economism and political al,portunism of the reformists even wl~ilewishing to woid the "adventurism'" 05 the radicals, Questions regarding the pc>litical passivity of orthodox Marxism now t c t ~ kon. new meaning while the argurnent about constituting an opposition last its radical flavor. Indeed, 1909 was the year in which Kautsky provided the virtual credo for his party faction and gave literal meaning to what he had stated in aesopian

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language for the benefit of the censors in 1 893; The SPD is a '"revolutionary party that does not make revolution."'""

Many would recall that phrase in 193 4, Coxnmitted to the traditional pacifism of prewar social democracy, Kautsky had been critical of the burgeoning militarism in imperial Germany since the beginning of his career. He was particularly fearful of the army being set loose upon the "internal enemy,"4-' But, like all progressives, he hated and feared the tzar," R m o r s of mobilization by Russia, cynically promulgated by the kaiser, coupled with the sudden iltflation of chauvirtist sentiments amtrng the working. class." To be sure, he was l-resitantin assenting to a "class truce" fiat would liquidate the plitical independence of the party and foreclose any chance to contact pacifist forces in other larlds in order to terminate the conflict. Me was also suspicious of tl-re kaiser" imperialis axnbitions in asking far war credits. Newrtheless, with respect to the historical judgment of his role in the events feadin~to World War X, it didn" tmateer, N o less than tl-re other leading representatives of his generation, tl-re irnperialist war that Kautsky had beell expectiilg now took him by surprise," hacking any plan for concerted action, or the institutional ability to demand coxnyliallce from i t s members, the Second International helplessly watched its own diss~Iutioi~ as one member party after another succumbed to domestic threats froin the doininant classes as well as the war l-rysteria of their own constituencies.47 Two years of the most debilitating compromises folfowed and, by 1916, European social demc-~cracyin general-and German social democracy in particular-----wassplit: where one bkajority'9action sought to conquer at all costs and annex new territories, the other essentially called for peace and a return to the status quo ante, Kautsky belonged to the second group. He was neither an imperialist lackey nor a ""social chauvinist.'We and his supporters had traditionally been the great critics of Germany's imperialist ambitions. Their pacifism l-rad placed them directly at odds with the politicians who brought about the catastrc~phicconflict. Kautsky adamantly maintained that linguistically distinct groups had a claim on nationality, thereby atlticipating the position usually associated with. Lenin, and that each nation had the right to defend itself if attacked, In fact, personally, he wished to grant war credits only if the kaiser would explicitly state that Germany was engafSlng in a purely ""dknsive" war without territorial ambitions. Unfortunately, however, the government was unwilling to make such a statement, And so, Kautsky was fc>rcedto choose beween hreaking the tra-

dition of party discipline and voting against his beliefs, He chose the latter, Kautsky submitted to the authcrrity of the party and his faction lost its independence. No longer would it prove possible far him to mediate between the far Left of the SPD led by Rosa Luxernburg and the "revisioni~ts'~ whose theoretical-if not practical-spokesperson was Eduard Bertlstein, The center had made its decision, Ignored by the Right, Kautsky and his followers soon enough found themselves despised by the Left, Chauvinist sentiments among the "ma jar it-y sociaiists" hrdetled as the war dragged on, Ever more disgusted, hamstrung by the dictates of party discipline, Kautsky along with Bernstein and others from their generation made the painful decision to break from the party they bad helped form and constitme the Independent Social Demc~craticParty (USPD)in 1916.JThey would only rejoin the parent organization at the beginning of the 1920s when electoral losses and internal ideological scrife forced the new movement to choose between the SPD and the German Commuilist Party (KPD) that had been founded in 1231 9, Nevertheless, by then, it was already too late. Even as the USPD sought to resurrect the SPD of old, the Russian Revolution was ushering in a new epoch. The working class had split, and no longer was it possibte autoinatically to identify its interests with those of any single organization. The old certainty was gone, and identity now became an issue that turned comrade against comrade. IVilitants quickly shifted their allegiance and vented their anger on the leaders of the Second International, wllo had led the working class into the abyss. Even wl-riie the majority of workers in the Western nations vehemently rejected the Bolsheviks, radicals ernbraced Lenin" followers, who had remained true to their revolutionary principles and steadfast in their desire to turn the international war into ail itlternational class war= Rcvoiutionary sentiments spread through a devastated Europe. With the collapse of tile Western Front, and the abdication of Kaiser Wilhelm XI in 1; 918, Germally experienced mass uprisings amoilg workers calling either for soviets along Russian Iirtes OF; at the very least, purging the monarchist bureaucracy and tile military as well as curtaiiing the power of capital and partitioning the aristocratic estates. The revolntisaaries sought, in short, to abolish the old order or sulx~dinateit to the new republic in which the "majority" faction of the SPD, led by Friedrich Eberc and Phillip Scheidemann, reluctantly found itself at the forefratlt.49 The \Veimar Republic was the product of an aborted revolution. An opportunity existed, if not to bring about a new democratic form of bbsoviet" regime, then, at a minimum, to introduce a democracy grounded in a democratic civil society. Wc3rkers recsgnized their enemies and their interests. They basically acted in accordance with the political values and traditions of the SPD, But the party ruthlessly suppressed its own constituency. It chose to csmpro~nisewith Germany9s moft reactionary forces and thereby

Kad hutsty: 7 %Rise ~ nnd Fill of QrthodmMarxz'~1"pz * 5 1

forestall the ernergence of a more radical regime, Or, putting it in terms Kautsky would have understood, in November 1918, the SPD employed the ""political" revolution to stymie its "social " c(~u~iterpart.~@ No less than Marx and Engels, he believed tl-rat the ""beakdown" of the [>Id order woutd be precipitated through an extertlal event like w a The ~ events of November, however, threw him into a typical quandaty, A supporter of tl-re new parliaxnent, he remained open to cooperation with the workers' councils that had spontaneously risen throughout much of Germany Appalled at the thought of repressing a wc~rkers'movemerit like the Spartacus Group, which was led by Rosa Luxexnburg and Karl Liebknect, Kautskp nonetheless shied away from cdling fc~rsocializing the great industrial firms and aristocratic estates or demanding a purge of the counterrevolutic~narybureaucracy and military, He could not envision a policy that might provide a ""social" foundation Zbr the "pajitical" revohtion. His politics, however, stood in accord with his derrtocratic commitments. The new republic fed by tl-re fPB could be seen as invalidating the need for further qualitative change or a prc~letarianseizure of power. Democracy seemed its own reward. AII the more ironic then that so marry should later have identified not simply Marxism-leninim, but Marxism itself: with totalitarianisrrr,CI The decisiczri by Kautsky and his associates to uncor~ditionally s u p p ~ rthe t new V(ieimar regime solidified the theoretical connection of orthodox Marxism and repubtican dexnocracy. The strategic situation did not necessarily favor a more radical course, The Soviet Union could have offered little in the way of tangible support and, aside from the dire prospecrs for the Left should events have led to an open civil war, it is highly doubtful whether the victorious allies would have tolerated the prociamatiol~of a soviet regime in Germany. But, for Kautsky, it was not enough to accept the political situation in strategic terms. Kautsky also sought to explain it in theoretical terms and, here, he was ultitllately unsuccessful. His revolutionary theory was incapable of anchoring the nascent regime. Asked to provide a new party program for the I925 party congress in Ijeideiberg, and help confront a growing political identity deficit in the SPD, Karrtskg could produce only a stale remake of the E r f g r ~Program. There was surely sorrtething like historical lustice in the emotional reconciliation that took place between Karl Ka~ztskyand Edtlard Bernstein in the year before this party congress,"3 The clock seemed to have been set back. Kawsky had anticipated what would become uncritical support from the S P n for the V(ieimar Republic and Bernstein had anticipated the economic policies it would pursue. The SPD seemed unified once again. It seemed again ready to fuse the theory at-orthodox ~Marxismwith the practice of reform, But times bad changed, Kautsky's brand of Marxism had become an

anachronism. The real revolution had been made by tlze Bolsheviks wllorn Kautsky condemned for their ""bonapartism" and their commitment to what in his view, given the ""pematnre'\haracter of the entire enterprise, could only result in a form of ""hrracks socialism.""" The Western labor movement, by the same token, c o d d no longer simply stand in opposition, Jf it was easy for Kautsky to castigate the Bolsheviks for their corznterrevslucionary perversion of the socialist idea,'"t was more difficult to oppose the call fc>r workerskcouncils in favor of what was clearly a bourgeois republic, Unlike his fc~rmerprottgci., Rosa Luxemhurg, his attack on Lenin's authoritarianism lacked any reference to an actual revolutionary experiment in progress. At the same time, his criticism of refr~rmismas a simple extension of liberalism lacked an alternative set of political ambitions to justi.fy his more radical theory. His Marxism could now neither inspire a politics of reform nor specify a revolutionary go, l to serve. The publication of The Materiakf Cozceptioz of Nistov (1927) didn't heip matters, This was not merely due to the mistaken belief he expressed that fascism, because its base of support supposedly came atmost exclusively from the lumpenproletariat, had no chance of success in Germany It was rather that this final grandiose attempt to spsterrlatize his views on the dialectics of nature and history, society and plzilosoplzy, left him in a state of political paralysis, Other thinkers had, of course, previousfy pointed tct the existence of historical stages and, even earlier, the manner in which successful forms of government rest on certain ecoilomic presuppositions, M a r s and Ellgels had secured the co~1nectionbetween these two insights. But Kautskg now stressed thexn in a way that his mentors did not and he denied the voluntarist and activist elements in their thought genuine importance, Stage theory became the tctol with which to contest the Bolshevik ateemyt to shortcircuit the movement of I-ristory, But historical materialim couid no longer guarantee what it had guaranteed in times past. Democracy and socialism, reform and revolution, ecsnoxnics and politics, nationalisxn and internationalism, now increasingly appeared mutuafly exclusive. The connection that Kautsky sought to create betweeri them had fallen asunder. Xt was as if Edrrard Bernstein had appropriated one part of Kautsky's worldview for his theory of social reform while Lenin had embraced the other for his drxtrine of political revolution, Orthodox Marxism lost its cohere~ice.It could no longer corzfront the practicai issues facing the fabor movement, Indeed, when Kautsky died in I938 at the age of eighty-hw; the optimistic assumptions of his theory had already been invalidated bp the Nazi triuxnph. There is something poignant in recalling what he wrote to Eduard Bernstein during their debate: "If the materialist conception of history and the conception of the proletariat as the driving force of the coming social

Kad hutsty: 7 %Rise ~ nnd Fill of QrthodmMarxz'~1"pz * 53

revolution should ever be overcome, then I must indeed confess, then I would be finished. Then my life would nt> Ionger have any content.'""Ut the time of Kautskp% death he was left with nothing to fight the heretics. Unable to contest the political practice of social democratic reformism, or confront the rigid communist dogma with an alternative revolutionary vision, Kautsky csuld neither question his original assutrtptions nor corrfrctrrt the new conditions of a new era, Thus, orthodox Marxism passed from history. Against his opponents, however, Kautsk y understood that a social derntrcratic parw without a sense of socialism would soon degeneraee into just another parry and that the communist attempt to construct socialism without republican commitments would result only in an amhoritarian perversion of the idea. There is also a sense in which his politics of: opposition can serve as a corrective bath to the anti-institutional voluntarisrn reminiscent c>f the 1960s and the bureaucratic opportunism of the present. In this vein, perhaps, Xiautsky still has something to teach: N~tfiiit~g could be rnore urrong than the view that in politics only the inrcrcsrs of the rnoment arc decisive, that distant ideals have no practical i~lpartancc, that we wiII obtain all tlie better results in our electioneering, say, the mare p~acticatly~ that is the more soberly and pettily we comport ourselves, the more we speak ordy of taxes and customs d~rties,uf poIicc chicanery and health insurance and the like, and the more we treat aLtr great future goals like a past love sl our youtl~,on whom we still glatlty tt>ok back in our l~earts,but with whom we prefer no longer tu have any connection it1 publiceF7

Perhaps because he served as a reminder of an exhilarating time when the l a b ~ movement r still took its theory and values seriously3Xiautskg became an ernbarritssmenc to b o t l ~major paticical organizations of the working class in the postwar period. As the social democrats ever more surely distanced themselves from the thought of their ""nogmatic" hfonner prophet, the coxnxnunists sougl-rt only to condexnn the 'Straitor" to tile working class. Thus, neither rnovemellt was willing to pay its debt to the man who had so clearly influenced them both-a man who, whatever his failings, cs~rtmitted his life to tl-re workiw class and tile democratic character of tl-te socialist project.

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Eduard Bernstein and the Revisionism

Eduard Bernstein had been a friend and collaborator of Katrl Katutskyk for close to twenty years. Born in 1850, the son of Jewish working-class parents, be worked at a hank in his younger years, and participated in the Gotha Congress of 2 875, which gave birth to what would ultimately become the SPD. An early admirer of Eugen Dhhring, like so many others, he k c m e a Marxist after reading Etlgels9sattack on the anti-Semitic philosopher of violence, An editor of the influential The Social Democwt, exiled to England during the period of the antisocialist laws, Bernstein was a socialist of impeccable credentials who originally saw his '?revision" "of Marxism f master's critical enterprise. as entirely within the spirit t ~ the By the time of his death in 1932, he had served as a deputy in the Reichstag h r close to a quarter of a century, What9$more, he was a scholar of the British and Ger~naniabor movements as well as the editor of Lassalle" writings and the letters of Marx and Engels. No Less than tl-rey, he believed that Marxism must comprehend reality and so respoild to Ilew conditions. It was to prevent the degeneration of theory into ideology that Bernstein launched his assault upon orthodox Marxism,l Even his staunchest critics agreed that his undertaking was motivated by the best intentions and inany actually praised him for daring to express the reality of the social democratic movexnent in theoretical terms.2 Edttard Bernstein was not a theorist on the Xevei of Marx, ZAnxen?burg,or even Lenin. He was concerned with ideas and, like inany of his comrades, he wrote on a wide variety of topics ranging from foreign affairs to taxation to the impact of ideas. Part of his influence, bowever, derived from a certain utilitariax~readiness to reject theory. Bernstein's revisionism gener-

56

* Edaard lier~zstcinand the logic ofl&visionism

ated a lr~gicwhose instrumental character ultimately turned against his own ideals, His more opportunistic hllowers would indeed simply justify themselves in terms of political exigencies. There is something ironic about this since, fullowing his early fiing with orthodox ilifarxism, Bernstein became deeply influenced by Kant, E-ie also learned much from members of the famt~usFabian Society and English socialists like Rarnsay MacDonald, It rnakes sense that he should have sought tc-,conilect his revisionism with English liberal philcrsophy.T"fh two converged in a f c ~ mOf e ~ i r i c i s mwith strong skepticist and utilitarian irnplications, Bernstein initially wisl-red, following Engels, to distinguisla between the scientific and the utopian forms of socialism with an eye on eliminating the latter'wis concern was that the older theory now lacked empirical verification for its claims and, as he stated in the preface to the French translation of E u ~ I ~ t i o ~ Sa~r cyk l i S mhis , was basically norhing inore than "m attempt at =vision, vision, and clarification of marxist socialism."""gainst his intentior~s,however, his new "evolutionary socialism" "shattered the ass m y t i u n s of tl-re old theory and became an alternative to revofurionary iMarxism. Certain critics have argued that Eduard Bernstein's revision of Marxian ortl-rodoxy bears little relevance to the contemporary practice of mainstream stxial democracy.6 He was nt:, party hack, he had his problems with the trade ~znions,and he was genuinely preoccupied with the sppression s f working people. Bernstein was also acutely concerned with political etl-rics. He was sympathetic to Kantss idea of the moral politician and he was insistent upon connecting means and ends,' But his preoccupation with sl~urtterm calcttlable gains, his utilitarian understanding of socialist politics, made his general approach appealing to those with whom be actually had Indeed, especially given recelit developments, it is imgorlittle in COT~~EROXZ.. rant to consider just how far tl-re logic of revisionism has taken its supporters from the original enterprise of Eduard Bernstein, The success of his revisionist ~zndertakirrgis so obvious that his foillowers have virtually identified it with the very movement whose official dogma he originally sought to transform. Their political record is mixed, They have squandered numerous opportunities to enact radical chmge. But they rarely succumbed to authoritarian temptations and their policies dearly irnproved the lives of working people. Genuine reformers played a significant role in introducing the modern welfare state. There are reasons why Eduard Bernstein and his hilowers can be deeply proud of their tradition. Xt makes little sense to condemn revisionism by insisting upon the misreading of Marx by its founder.Vts political allure, after all, has been real: Marx himself liked to say that a good piece of iactory legislation is worth a dozen revolutionary manifestos. The refc~mrenvisioned by Bernstein and his successors hebed bring about the passing of laissez-faire capitalism, and he

Edcinrd Bernstei~nnd t.hc logic uf I&uisiunis1"pz * 57

was surely correct in maintaining that the outstanding contributions of social democracy involved its commitment t~ raising wages, shortrlling labor time, an3 improving working conditions,Y facial dernocratic reformisxn has constrained tlze wllip of tlze market and generally expmded democratic participation in the process. It has provided the goods, or at least some of them, and its Iogic appears based on common sense, Its justification seexns somehow self-evident. Precisely for this reason, however, its assumptiolls bave remained unexamined along with its blindness to the contradictio~lsgenerated by the capitalist prduction process. Revisionisxn exaggerated the importance of economic self-interest and thereby neglected the role of ider>logicaifactors. The ethic introduced by Bernstein is, perhaps for this reason, radically underdeveloped, It offers Little with which to c m b a t wllat has become a self-serving politics of compromise by contexnporary social democratic organizations and fragmenting forms of self-interested particularism at the base, Thus, the need to expose the ideulugiclal elements of this supposediy anti-idectlogical theory. Especially during the 1960s, and then again in the 1 9 9 0 many ~ ~ people began to question the pc-~litics of reformism and the complacency of the social detrlocratic movement. There is stiH discontent concerr~ingthe extent of its integration into the status quo, its bureaucratic professionalism, the Qebilitating identity crisis it has generated, and its diminishing commitment to its working-class constituency, Confronting reformism in theory and practice, however, is no easy task, It initially calls far illttminating the material and organizational interests that an ideology of compromise tends to hide, Jt atso involves k i n g the structural constraints on policy that reformist epistemology refuses to articulate, It means questioning reformisxn" style and ethical foundations. In short, it requires dealing critically with Eduard Bernstein's revisionism not merely i r ~terms of its ability to confront new material conditions, but also in terxns of how its Iogic has been turned against the refcjrmist ends it clriginally sc~ughtto serve.

The Genesis of Revisionism Revisionism was the product of a context in which orthodox IVarxism dc~minatedthe workersbc->veme.tlt.A symbiotic relation existed between them an3 it is important to urlderstand that the revisionim debate took place within a shared universe of thought.lWeither Eduard Bernsteit~nor Karl Kautsky had a positive view of the Hegelian impact on ~Varx,Nor was either able to confront the capitalist totality in the manEler of Rosa Luxemburg,fj Both believed in the objectivity of natural science and the validity of its methods for social scientific analysis. Both also retained a firm trust in the enlightenment notiorl of linear progress along with a fundamen-

5 8 * Edaard lier~zstcinand the logic ofl&visionism

tally positivistic conception of materialism.12 Theoretical differences were therefore derived from similar p~mises.. But there were also ininor differences and misundersta~ldingsbetween Kautsky and Bernstein that would have prohund implications. Bernstein3 notion of evolution was obviously influenced by Darwin, as surely as was the dialectic of Kautsky, hut the revisionist theory of social develaprrtent was not tied to a broader antl-rropological conception.13 Bernstein no less than his friend sought to defend science and materialism from idealism and metaphysics, But Bernstein saw the threat emanating frt~rnthe apocalyptic visions and utopian goals of orthodox Marxism. He felt that proletarian irzterests could not be left to teleological guarantees. They must instead be understood as desired aims for which struggle was necessary14 Kautsky hixnself would prabably not have disagreed with the substance of this idea, of course, only with its formulalion. In contrast to Kautsky, however, Bernstein refused to accept the proposition that necessity required conscious will or action. This erlabled I-rirn to heco~nethe first within the Marxist tradition to divorce society from n a t ~ ~ rlaws, a l But, in so doing, he actually drew on a h r more traditional and po6tivistic understanding of materialism than Kautsky Bernstein"s thinking was also more grounded in ""econoxnism," The ""vulgar" econornisrn for which Marxism has been so soundly criticized-though never by Bernstein himself-would prove far more important lor the development of revisionism and contemporary social democracy tl-ran for Marxism itself. Bernstein wanted a republic as surely as Karl Kautsky and, just as surely, the means for achieving it eluded him. Against Kautskb however, he was willing to table talk about its creation and privilege tl-re quest for economic over political demands in the Germany of Kaiser Wilhelm,is But this issue is salielzt only within a revolutionary discourse.. Bernstein was as outspoken in his condemnation of Bolshevism as Kautsky,f"he political confiict between Kautsky and Bernstein indeed became irrelevant with the creation of the Weirnar Republic. Bernstein was intent upon displacing a tl-reory predicated on an impending catastrophe with a new form of gradualism. But he basically stood in broad tactical agreement with the political leaders of the older social democratic generation like Viktor Adler, Ignaz Auer, August Bebel, and Karf Kautsky." No less than they, he was aware that orthodox Marxism had contributed to the success of the SPD, It had helped in ~ustifyinga parliamentary course, generating a coxnmitrnent to dexnocratic trade unionism, gaining votes lor the party, and attempting to realize those refc~rmselahorated in the Ellfurl Pvogriam, In his retrospective analysis horn Sect to f i r 9 ( l 91. l),however, Bernstein noted the very success of the SPD l-rad helped create new conditions to which the old theory could no Longer respondthus inaking it ail obstacle to future progress.

Edcinrd Bernstei~nnd t.hc logic uf I&uisiunis1"pz * 59

Two paths seemed to present themselves: reform and revolution, And, here, the issue was never Bernstein" lack of dialectical sophistication. His argumentation was completely in Iine with the thinking of Masx, Historical conditions had seemingly invalidated many of the claims made by orthodox Marxism and thereby shattered the unification of theory and practice it propounded. New conditions precipitated a moment of decision,lVernstein Izad only scorn for those who would complacently accept the dualism between '"evolutionary phraseology" and urefc>rmist9' practice. Thus, in keeping with Marx, he insisted upun the need to "'forward a unity between tl-reory and reality, between tl-re phrase and the action. lFor though] in the normal course of events this dualism can be bridged by demag0guer-y . , . in every crucial situation it wiH become a severe Believing that the SPD was pursuing a fundamentally reformist practice anywab Bernstein demailded that the party appear as what it actually was and drop the revolutionary Jargc~n.This made it necessav to confront the presuppositions of Marxist ""science" horn a critical standpoint.Z" According to Bernsrein, economic indicators no Ionger Justified the assumption that capitalism would coltapse, As far as he was concerned, and there is some truth to the claicn, credit had solved the crisis character of capitalism. Capital was not becoming concentrated in fewer hands and the working class was not growing into the emajoritg of society. Instead, he argued that the peasantry was remaining stable wlliie the middle strata and a class of smaller entrepreneurs was on the rise. Clearly, all this would have both theoretical and practical implicatiotls, The refusal to deaf with these changed circuxnstances would, in his opinion, result only in political miscalculation. Thus, he could write that: I regard it as my duty tc) stand up for the right of a socialist revisionism based on sclet~ceand the demands of practical struggle. Arrogance has always been thc defining trait of any orthodoxy, By "orthodoxy" do nor mcan the adhrrence to specific convictions ar views, but the process af strangting wide-ranging theories, tl~erehyturning tl~eminto rigid formulas and unassailable dog117as.ll

Bcmstc;k"s analysis corrtradicted the airon iaws'\of Marxian srthodoxv, The ""social" no longer underpkned the ""political" wrevolrttion: history had sundered tlle connection between thern. Under the circumstances, Bernstein framed the alternatives in terms of maintaining the traditional socialist co~~rnitment to democratic principles and pursuing a politics of reform or abandoning tl-rose principles and calling far the revolutionary seizure of power by a minority in the manner of Blanqui.22 Justification for both positions can be found in the writings of Marx and Engels. In the view of

60 * Edaard lier~zstcinand the logic ofl&visionism

Bernstein, l-rowever, the choice was self-evident: tl-re SPW would l-rave to begin the arduous process of ""persuading" nonproletarian classes and groups about the value of socialism.2" The existing political consteilatian, he believed, also made this possible. England had its constitutional monarchy a i d France its Third Republic while the United States appeared as a beacon of democracy. Even in Germanh a degree of civil liberties had resulted from lifting the antisocialist laws, It seemed that the development of capitalism was iiltrinsically tied to the extension of democratic forms, Thus, Bernstein could ignore the revolutionary concern with overthrowing the autl-zoritarian political systern in Germany and develop his standpoint without reference to any particular governmental farm. His aim was to secure the co~iditionsnecessary for pursuinrg ecorzomic reforms that rnost like15 in turn, would dernand a politics of compromise. Because the working class was no longer expailding, Bernstein believed that sociatists wo~ildhave to gain support from the peasantry as we!! as the petty bourgeoisie and parts of tl-re ""pogressive" burgeoisie, Such an undertaking would prove possible, however, on0; if social democracy surrendered its traditional revolutionary or politicnl standpoint, with its unique class goals like the "dictatorship of the proletariat,"" and its incernar-ionaiist rhetoric, which frightened away more moderate voters. Indeed, according to Bernstein, furthering the proletarian interest in the new corrtext would mean transhnning a revolutionary party of workers into a populist, multiclass party ""of tbe people" "i~l,kspiart.cgi) capable of reflecting the sum of their divergent interests. Eduard Bernstein was intent on ideologically reorienting the SPW because, from his perspective, advancing the real economic interests of workers was more important than trtaintaining the prescribed teleotogical end that their party originally sought to serve. He may have retained a notion of the classtess society in Evolutionary Soeiillisnz, But it was a thin ideal predicated on the inability of any class to define state policy and it thereby fit perfectly with his norions of partnership and compromise. His p a l of the classless society was left without content, without epistemological justification, without scieritific grounding, without political purpose, and witlzout any way of linking theory and practice, Indeed, as he succinctly put the matter in his famous formulation, ""Iopenly admit it, I have very little interest or feeling for what is commtrnly understsoci as the "final goathof: socialism. This goal, wllatever it rnay be, is nothing at all to me, the movement is everything."2*l Ortl-rodox Marxisxn had already been criticized by various ""socialists frorn tl-re lecturn" ~athedersoxz'alisten),including Wrner Sombart, and by others on the right of the SPD like Gomad Schmidt and Georg von Voilmar,

Edcinrd Bernstei~nnd t.hc logic uf I&uisiunis1"pz * 61

A radical faction known as "the youngsters" " i e Jungen) had also been ruthlessly suppressed for its attack on the party leadership from the "Le.'" Edrrard Bernstein, however, was the first to inaugurate a thorough critique of orthodox Marxism from inside the social dexnocratic mainstream. It is surely the case that he identified &Marxiantheory with what Kautsky and others of: his gerieration understood by it,.'-V~cmstc;jn'sconcern w a w i t h the Marxism of his time, This was no rnere acadernic or "marxolc~gical" controversy. It was at great political cost that Bernstein made his arguments, Indeed, supported by those with h r more opportunistic views than his own, he lost the support of genuine comrades Like K ~ u t s k y . ~ ~ Revisionism chalfenged the privileged status of both the working class and the socialist goali, Were it proven correct, not only would ~Marxismlose it would also becoi~eimpossible for its its stiperiority as a '"science,'"hrrt partisans to claim "'objectively" that socialism stood on the side of history But there were also practical matters. The labor nnovennellt was undergoing a profound transf(>rmation. Truly9a sect had turned into a party. Not only was it becoming inextricably linked to a burgeoning trade union movement, the SPD was also generating an internal bureaucracy to ftzcilitate organizational activities and create jobs for its partisans.2' Bernstein" aapproach perfectly suited tl-ris growing constituency within the SPD. Indeed, the ultimate success of revisionism derived Less frtjm the fact that it better ascertained the ""real '"interests of workers than that it anticipated those that were becoming daminant within their political party, Influenced by the Fabians, who combined trade unioslist coslvictions with the sensibility of committed civil servants, Bernstein's thinking justified both the economic and antipolitical preoccupations of tl-re party bureauof the movement cracy and union officials, These included f u t ~ ~ leaders re like Friedrich Ebert, Karl Legien, and Gustav Nsske. They were m(>stlycareerists unconcerned with ideas and ideals, Even before World War X, which they enthusiastically supported, their views ohen conflicted with those of Bernstein. Nevertheless, the original revisio~list"doctrine soon Iost ali distinctness at the bands of his followers and was melted down with reactionary attitudes of all sc~rts."Zg Major figures like Viktor Adler, Heinrich Cunow, Parvus (Alexander Helphand), Georgi Plekhanav, Kautsky, and-a bove all-Rosa Luxexnburg attacked Bernsteil~during the revisionism debate. It is, however, partieularly useful to corzsider the arguments of August Bebel, He was an orthoQax Marxist and a bureaucrat who fed German social democracy for over a quarter of a century Behel was also essentially uninterested in theory. He was certainly utilitarian hi~nselfbut he sensed the practical das~gerposed by revisionism to the identity of the SPD and the coherence of its palkics. Thus, he could write:

62

* Edaard lier~zstcinand the logic ofl&visionism

Tactics il't~istfit the conditions under which we live and struggle. That is generally recognized as a matter of course by t l ~ eparty as a whole . . . I can only remind you t>f Will~elrnLiebknecbt" drastic words: if necessary, change the tactics 24 times in 24 hours, Rut the eorlflict really lies over wl~cthcrin the given il-tonnent a different or changed tactic i s necessary, and ~tltimatelyhow far such a change should take hold, For there is something that should exist under any circumstances. The tactics must continually he directed towarcis a view of the basic assumptians (Crf.z~z~ris2txe) and goal of the party. . . . Far, if this is not done tlxn we must cease calling ourselves social democrats because we mzest thcn call oursclvcs social Liberals frorn that point or1.29

The self-evident superiorit). accorded Eduard Bernsteids positiorl today was not quite so self-evident when the Hannover Congress csnvened in 1899. Revisionisrn was formally condemned. Few believed that the proposed shift in ideology would actually benefit the party, The controversy over "immiseration," for example, appeared as intellectual hairsplitting given the poverty of the proletariat. As far as the growth of that class was concerned, moreover, the real issue far most party members was whether support for the SPD was increasing-and it was. Also, even if Bernstein were correct about tl-re role of credit in curbing crises, Marx and his foflowers had always said that breakdown would result frorn a worldwide conflagration caused bp imperialist policies and war rather than simply through an economic collapse.3@ Even inore importantl Bernstein" call for class compromise probably seemed more utopian than the future possibilit). of a proletarian revolution, His warnings against antagonizing the peasants and the petty bourgeoisie (lllit;eelszand) must have sounded strmge indeed give11 the iron support those classes extended to a regime that had no intention whatsoever of itlstit~~ting a real parliamentary democracy." No less than Kaiser Wilhelm, who maintained his belief in the "divine right of kings" a d would not step foot in the Reichst~g,everyone knew that-----withouta profound transfc~rm a t i o n t h e f13D would continue to exist as a state within the state, Consequently, whatever the problems with IVarxian theory, the vast majority of the SPD thought it absurd to abandon a standpoint that had inspired the entire European working class for over a generation.32 Despite the formal defeat, however, substantive victory loo~nedon the horizc-m. ft is douhtt;ll wlaether Eduard Bernsteill would have enjoyed his triuxnph. He may have disagreed with his ortl-rodox friends about the impending revolution. He may have assumed that a linear development of socioeconomic reforms had already supplanted the need for contesting the barriers of capitalist society, He may have sought to identify socialism with the liberal welfare state and the yuest fi>r reforms with a technocratic populisrn. But, he was still part of a mtlvernent in which, following 1848, the

Edcinrd Bernstei~nnd t.hc logic uf I&uisiunis1"pz * 63

belief in democracy had been fused with a socialist vision of capitalist transformation, fndeed, until the end, Bernstein would support '"the general social development and a specific movement of the working class."j"

Ethics and Compromise Eduard Bernstein was persotlally committed to placing primacy on improving the economic interests of workers, But the truth is that his theory Lzndermined the notion of class and, perl-raps more important, provided nothing that could seriously substitute for class consciousness. His ethical undertaking combined a vague humanism with democratic and egalitarian sentiments, Bernstein rlever forwarded anything iike a cfass ideal capable s f articulating the coxnmon interests of working people, rendering all social institutions accountable, and resisting the increasingly instrumental logic of the party apparatus. fndeed, he was rlever concerned with the problems ideological disillusionmetlr might pose for tl-re movement or the role internationalism might play in the struggle against capitalism, TTelec,lcjgical grlarantees had previoustp rendered such matters more or less irrelevant." "~1st activists believed that the Longed for socialist "'futwe was appearing as prewnt," employing the phrase of Wilheim Liebknecht, and that there was no need for an independent ethic, Austro-Marxists would later highlight its importance." In 1898, however, ethics was stilt essentially the preserve of a neo-Kantian intelligentsia with mots in buhemia and the acaidet~y." krnstein introdt~cedthe theme into Marxism and thereby raised a host of normative questions for socialist tl~eoryto answer, BLlt he never developed the epistemological foundations of his ethic any more than the logic informing it or the different purposes it might serve. Eduard Bernstein expressed tl-re philosoghicai predilections of most revisionists by calling upon socialists to ""give up cant and return to Ka~1t.''-~7 His intent was obviously to preserve the critical, rationalistic, and liberal heritage of this enlightenment tl-rinker. In a deeper sense, however, his understanding of Kant has usually been misconstrued. Against other Kantian socialists of his generation like Max Adler, or Kurt Eisner, or Gustav Landauer, Bernstein demanded that socialists embrace tl-reskeptical-rather than the radical ideal&$-strain within the great phiIosopherSs thought. Only fater in fife, when his influence had waned, would Bernsteir~beco~ne interested in a transcendent standpoint to guide the individual subject in making political chc~ices. Bernstein's immediate aim was to invoke, using the terms of Kant, "pure" rather than "practical" mason. Only the empirical realm comprehended by the natural sciences, according to Kant, defines what can be known with any degree of certainty, And so, especially give11 the !lack of

64 * Edaard lier~zstcinand the logic ofl&visionism

empirical verification far rnany of Marx3 most important claims, Berllsteill called upon genuil-re materialists to reject all structural postulates that, like the labor theory of value, seemed entar~gledin the "tripwires of Qialectics.""3 Or, putting it another way, Bernstein sought t a maintain the integrity c>f empirical knowledge-if not empiricism proper since he always accepted causality-by preventing the intrusion of what he considered "metaphysics" into the realm of ""skence." His confrontation with orthodox ~Marxismwas, precisely in this sense, an example of critical phiiosophy, Thus, in keeping with the positivistic assumptiorzs of his time, he could write: '" propose a fundamental division between science and assumption, knowledge and inclil-ration (volition), and immanent and televlogical necessity-terms that are continw,usiy being cc~nfusedin socialist literature."40 Bernstein" ethics was derivative from the beginning. He justified a politics of partnership because "an econt->micas welt as a moral (rechtll'ches)relationship is thereby expressed,'"""~ he said little about which "partner" has the ability to define what gaals. Socialism became one political project among many Eliminating not only teleology but, in principle, all speculative categories from the investigate inquiry made it impossible for him to ernploy any structural referent for claims regarding exploitation or disenfrar1chisement.42 bb(3Lass"thereby lr~stits normative connotation; it became stripped of any connection with class consciousness, Bernstein was quite clear when he lloted that class is "a socio-economic concept based solely upon objective economic and bdicial characteristics,"""" Fragmentarion of the class into its constituent strata pursuing their own economic interests and legal remedies, while searching for other forms of subjective identification, lies at the heart of his de5nitiorz.M The way in which the class conflicts informint5 a structure of production helps constitute the workings of society is simply ignored. He offered no way of speaking about hc~wclass relations are created, manipulated, or reproduced; the totality disappears."" But the skeptic still had his illusions, Bernstein eqtrated the discrete economic reforms achieved under capitajism not merely with mitigating the of a whip of the market, hut with the ""organic growrth'~iliri;r?einwachse socialis alternative," It was the same with dem~xracy:he did not simply call far a republic, but klleved that the reprtblic would ultimately lead to a decelitraiization of power and a new form of: democracy.47 The connection between ends and rneans upon which Bernstein insisted was, in his own case, much less tight than he wished to believe. The gap between them was overcsme by surreptitious!y introducing a notion of progress that, while standing beyond empirical verification, remained as optimistic and linear as that of any orthodox Marxist." KO Joess than the deacons of orthodox)r, but without the power of their teleology, Bernstein essentially maintainecl that

Edcinrd Bernstei~nnd t.hc logic uf I&uisiunis1"pz * 65

one reform would generate another, tl-rereby gradually bringing about the sc~cialistsociety, Socialism would be introduced piecemeal into a capitalist society through the legislative redistribution of wealth. This goaX, in his view, made it incumbent upon the SPD to compromise with other organizations representing other nonproletarian classes and strata. The point for Bernstein was to garner support from as xnany quarters of society as possible far as many legislative reforms as possible. Thus, the empirical. understanding of class engendered a politics of "'partnership'3redicated on the achievement of incremental reforms througl-r calculable cornpro~nises with the party as baker, Compromise takes priority over a n y ideological sense of class interest and, if only for this reason, the party trtust transform political into economic, ideological into bureaucratic, and structtirat or long-term into contingent short-term concerns, The political role of the masses becomes ever smaller, ""Experts'Yncreasingly make the complex decisions fc3r an organization that attempts to unite divergent interests on instrumental or utifitrtrian grounds. The revisionist theory renders all interests reconcilaHe, in principle, and therefore strips them of any ideological attachirtents. This general way of thinking would indeed inform the u a n s f r m i o n of mainstream social demc~cracy:its abandonment of the symbols traditionally connected with the lahor movement and its concern with balancing the needs of workers with those of capital or the nation. Reformism shields itself from criticism by those concerned with the implications of ""rrade-oifs,"4' the loss of a xnoral high ground, and the manner in which sl-rort-term gains can produce Long-term tosses. Such issues simply cannot he raised from within the logic of revisionism. Its philosophical skepticism, its assault on sgecufatiorl and structure, provides the activist with a self-serving dogma. Since ultimate goais cannot be employed to evaluate instrumental means, a tautology results in which compromise assumes a transcendent value in its own right, Heirnut Schmidt put the matter bluntly: "each citizen must he capable of consenting to an orderly procedure of conflict settlement by compromise. We must be prepared to accept the loss of stringency a n 3 consistency which goes with that. For: no peace without comproxnise."j0 There is nothing wrong with this statement by the hrmer chancellor of Gemany: it would be absurd simply to reject any form of co~rtpromiseon any isstie. The problem lies only in what Schmidt neglected to say and what is hardly ever addressed: perhaps the individual must be prepared not just to accept compromise but, under certain conditions, also prove capable of raising principled objections to comproxnise. Condexnning radicals fur their idealism, or their lack of pragmatism, has always been easy. It is more difficult for utilitarian reformers to provide a normative justification fclr what is often

66 * Edaard ljer~zstcinand the logic ofl&visionism

cowardice and sheer opportunism. These words should not imply a rejection c>f that commitment to "activity in the present" (Cegenwar~arbez't)upon which Bernstein and his fc~llwersprided themselves, Without the irttroduction of the ends compromise should serve, however, political decisiomaking becomes defined arbitrarily. It secures those who actual!y make the decisions from anything other thari the instrumental criticism embraced by the unreflective reformer in the first place. It is legitimate, however, for socialists to consider whether any particular co~rtpromiseaids in achieving further gains in the futwe.q"They have the obligation of raising questions regarding whether tl-re cornpromise in question will build rather than impede future forms of class solidarity. Current events have not preserved them irom deciding whether any given policy might strengthen, using the told forlnulatiori of Marx, the ""political econorny of capital" or the "political economy of labor." In judging a compomise, moreover, socialists cannot simply refuse to ask whether other courses of action were possible at the time. That Iiving standards of the working class have risen does nor eradicate this type of concern. Xt does not prove that more radical alternatives were unavailable any more than that movemerits of the frrture must follow the opportunistic tactics of the present.5" An ideology of comprorrtise results from the unwillhgness to deal with concerns of this sort, This ideology is predicated on an unexairtined origigal compromise illto which the instruxnenral reformer has entered even before any particular grievance has been opened to adjudication. The original co~rtprornisestands beyond any give11tactic, Jt defines both an attitude and a style: the attitude of a Lobbyist and the style of a tecl-rnocrat. Contemporary social democrats are popuiarly seen as retaining this attitude and elllbodying this style, T t is thus unsurprisirtg that they shouId inspire so little trust. Kurt hcholsky beautifully satirized their ideology in the German context in his ""Songof Compromise": Let U S strike a Izttle comprt~mise It wozald be so very var3~nice On the (me hatzd-and the other. . . This kztz~iof tb71';1~zg /?as its appeal In CGarman34 for szdre, s&icces?ssLies itl the dad Let gas strike a ligrle coq2romise.

Eduard Bernstein's ethic would have profound implications for how he and his successors viewed the relatioll between party and base, Its inadequacies

Edcinrd Bernstei~nnd t.hc logic uf I&uisiunis1"pz * 67

opened the way for subverting what was still a tl-reory of socialist development into a self-serviq ideology far party regulars, Lacking practical criteria of ethical ~udgment,and a stance capable of takillg ideology and structure into account, reforms undertaken in the name of orgatlizational expediency would gradually assume the status of ends unto themselves. The orenization would now justify itself to itself: working people would ever more surely be ignored as a referent in decisionmaking. Increased participation harbored a threat not merely to the bureaucracy and its professionals, but also to the increasingly symbiotic connection between the reformist organization and the regirne &rough whicl-r reforms would be implemented. The virtual etimi~~atiun of the old socialist puhiic sphere in the years following World War II, when the new tendency truly began to dominate the movement, was only logical. Bernstein was candid in stating tl-rat: "only with a quite srnalt number can one propose or expect serious inclination far, and understanding of, endeavors which go beyond the inere amelioration of lahor.'"4 Revisionist politics denigrated ideological commitments in favt~rof utilitarian rationaliv from the start, Bernstein can even he seen as criticizing Marx and Engets not for being too materialistic or too economistic, but for not being materialistic or econornistic enough. He surely viewed the old boys as being still far too pretjccupied with issues of class consciousness and political revolution, Judging the utilitarian assumptions of Betnstc;in and his followers, if only for tl-ris reason, remains a matter of some importance, Their thinking had little to say about the aljure of nationalism though it took the nation-state fOr granted as the site for political activity The self-styled pragrnatisrn of Bernsteink followers, in the same vein, prevented them from understandinf, the Nazis and too often, in a difl'erent way, the various revoiutionar). or anti-imperialist movements of the Third World. Revisionism was the product of: a working class located in advanced nation-states that often harbored imperialist interests or designsers Certain of its advocates-if not usually Bernstein himself-dreamed of the short-term gains that would accrue to the industrial proletariat from supporting the imperialist foreign policies of their respective mtionstates." Such benefits were often justified by making reference to the "national interest" a r spoutil~gnonsense similar to Kipling's thoughts cm the "white man's burden," Many revisionists objected.. But utilitarian lt~gic makes it difficult to counter the prospect of economic benefits with normative claims, Neither the original revisionists nor their followers have ever beer1 able to understand the strivings - for national self-determinatiw or gain adherents among tl-re masses wllo languished under the colonial yoke. Even with the rise of: globalization during the last quarter of the twentieth century> and the growth of trmsnational organizations, they

68

* Edaard lier~zstcinand the logic ofl&visionism

l-rave contributed virtually nothing to developing a new and appropriate notictn of internationalism or deepenkg the ideologicai commitment to these new institutior~s, Perhaps it is true that people will struggle for noneconomic gains only under exceptioilal circumstances; it would be absurd to discount the importance of ecsnrrmic motivations it? analyzing events. But these exceptional circumstances seem to present thexnselves again and again, It is not merely a matter of pointing to the idealism behind the mass strike of 1905 in Russia or the aaltruis~rt,of those who fought in the Spallish Civil %r. More is involved than insisting upon the selflessness of many who journeyed south during the Civil Rights movement in ""freedom summer" (or who demonstrated in rfianallmen Square and Eastern Europe during 1989, There is something basic at stake, It is a matter of recsgniaing ilz princzpk the limits of economic calculation and tl-re role of ideology and normarive commitment in shaping political action, History is richer than the one-sided utilitarian assumptions of revisicrnists and tl-reir xnodern followers, Because tl-re ""fdamental tendency of all htxreaucratic thc~ughtis to turn all problems of politics into problems of administrati0n,"57 however, the appropriate sense of richness dissolves into an instruxnental cynicism." Truly9 the absence is the presence in an argument that amounts to little more than a self-fulfilling pmphecy. Any ideological activity thereby becomes ""irrationaf" and a closed systeErt, results from wllat was originally construed as an exercise in critical pl-rilosophy:sq the attack upon ideology itself becsmes ideologicaf. Eduard Bernsteill was right, SociaIism is in desperate need s f an ethic, Precisely because the utilitarian elements of his Irrgic contest tl-re use of specuiative judgment, however, he was ultimately never able to provide one, great phrase that the workUndoubtedly, he sincerely believed in IAassalle3s ing class is ""re rock on which the church of the present should be built." Nevertheless, Bernstein's conception of ""ethicai socialism left a legacy of ~lncertaintyabout which faith the priests should embrace and whose god they should serve.

An Excursus: Ministerialism, Participation, and Opposition That uncertainty would only increase as the socialist movement became ever more directly confronted with the qriestion of pawer. Its growth, both organizationally and nuxnericall3.; xnade such a confrctncarion inevitableand raised a new set of issues, Out of powet; and without serious legislative or bureaucratic influence, party activists initially found it easy to inaintain

Edcinrd Bernstei~nnd t.hc logic uf I&uisiunis1"pz * 63

that the interests of the organization were identicai with those of its disenfranchised base and that the rights for which the proIetariat was fighting nationally were reaily urliversal in character, Nevertheless, the prospect of actually participating in a governmental cabinet-not to speak of ruling a nation-called all this into questioi~, Participaticrn at any price remailts the rallying cry of the political hack white stubborn preoccupation with doctrinal purity excuses the refusal to take ~sponsibilityfor actualizing a program, ir becomes a matter of balancing different commitments and developkg criteria reffarding the legitimacy of participation at any particular time, There is subsequently surnething useful about considering a crucial event in the history of the Second Inter~~ational. Indeed, the "i211iflerand Affair" provides a compressed exampie of a cruder farm of revisionism and its implications for the socialist movement, During the Dreyfus Affair, against the traditional appositional and antibourgeois sentiments crf orthodctx Mafxists like Jules Guesde,"hhe wellknown socialist politician Alexandre Millerand was asked to join a guvernmental coalition beaded by Renk Waldeck-Rousseau.. Justihing his actions by a generally perceived atrthcrritarian threat to the Third Republic, Millerand entered the Waldeck-Rousseau cabinet in 1899 without a mandate and without permission from his party. His political fears fc~rFrench democracy were surely legitimate and he probably felt that joitling the government would give him the chance to implement certain labor-protection laws-which it did, General Gaston de Gallifet, however, also received a post in that s m e cabinet, Simply sitting across the table from the ""butcher" of the Parisian Gommunards was insulting to the memc-~ryof these revolutionary martyrs, That insult was only compounded when the VValdeck-Rousseau government chose to conclude an alliance with an arch-reactionary R~issiawhose czar, in an ironic twist, wound up decorating the embarrassed socialist Millerand, while workers de~nonstratedoutside. The governEnent of Waldeck-Roussea u was indeed marked by bloody strikes and dernonstrations: there was even one to commemorate the rising of the Communards in which a number of workers were killed. Millerand was, naturally, forced to share responsibility for the actions of his government, As even moderate socialists protested, the Wa]i&ckRousseau cabinet fell and the next regime began to undermine Millerand3 legislative achievements. Wacked by bitter dissension, the unity of the French socialist movement, laboriously achieved in 1904, w ~ ~ u be l d based on a fr~nal rejection of ""ministeriatisrn.'~~ for the inarl whose name would become sy nonymous with "oppartunism," he moved ever mare surely to the Right and, following World War I, became a founder of the reactionary "natio~talb k ~ c . ' ' ~ ~

TO

* Edaard lier~zstcinand the logic ofl&visionism

Of course, it is impossiMe to predict the consequences of such a politicai tactic in advance, But the response of the Second International t o the Millerand Affair was quite interesting, Fofl~wingthe decisiorz of a French party congress, it condemned him while simultaneously passing a motionargued by Kautsky-that justified socialist participation in bourgeclis p v ernrnents under tznspecified exceptional circumstances. Bernstein's own position was not very different." It was only sensible. The door t a participatioil had been opened even if it could be shut at ally moment. But this said little about the ethical principle involved. The idea of Jemtrcratic socialism speaks to the connection between accountability and class sc~lidarityThese two values, of course, can conflict. But, usually, the concern for class solidarity stands in coherent relation with the commitmeilts to those democratic hrms that grtjtect workers and offer the powibility for organizing tl-rexn. Jean Jaurks employed tl-ris kind of thinking to link the cause of socialism with a defense of republican institutions in the Dreyfus Aifair.63 But the opposite holds just as well: Kautsky maintained that Miilerand was being ""used" by the class enemy because his actions unduly cornprornised the workershc~vements,The ambition and intransigence of Millerand not only tzndercut the discipline and identisrr of his party, but also served to furtlzer dissension and fragmentation within tlze international movement as a whole. Afexandre Mlterarxd tried pointing to historical csnditions and defending his actions in terms of orthodox Marxism. But the opportt~nistoutsmarted himself. This tactic prt>bahIy cost him the chance to serve as the most eminent symbol for international revisionism during his lifetime, But there is a sense in wtsich he ultimately trit~xnphedover Bernstein, Tlze Millerand Affair showed the strength of those among the revisionists who were willillg simply to seek power at any cost. It expressed the growing power of the political hack in social democracy tong before the outbreak of the First World War, As far as Rosa Luxemburg was csncerned, in fact, the Millerand Affair crystallized the confiict between those committed to the radical spirit of social democracy and the opportunist crtrrellt seekillg to conquer it, The Affair trtade ctear to her the difkrence between those intent tzyorr making "the independent political struggle of the socialist Party the permgent, f ~ n d a r n e ~ t aelement l and unity with b~urgeaisradicals the varyimg and incz'desztclll elernent'hax~dthose for whom "the alliance with the bourgeois democrats became the cclnstanz; and the independent political struggles the accidental elemeilt."64 Bernstein was mildly critical of the decision made by Millerand. But his irritation derived primarily from the unfortunate consequences of the affair, It was, fc~rhim, simply a "bad experience" frc,m~which it was dangerous to draw general conclusions."' Bernstein never actually dealt with the princi-

Edcinrd Bernstei~nnd t.hc logic uf I&uisiunis1"pz * 7 1

ples involved. The Millerand Affair indeed provides an insight into the weakness of his ethical perspective when obliged to deal with the temptations of instrumental action, Disregarding poiitical consistency and wltimate aims in the naxne of organizational exigencies can weaken the resolve of the movement and narrow the range of its future-. alternatives. The failed legacy of Lenin made this cleac In a very different way, however, social democracy would becoxne plagued by ttte same tendency, There is Little sense in contemporary sociaiists defining themselves by what they oppose, Simply ignoring existing social democratic or progressive parties will not rnake them go away. Those coxnxnitted to radical change cannot accept the alternatives of remaining inside or outside existing institutions and organizations, Better to begin thinking about new organizational possibilities and new sites fclr political action: the "mass association,""" in this vein, is neither a party in the traditional sense nor a mere coaiition reducible to the sum of interests composing it. Something like the "'Poor People's Movement32ounded by the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., or the civic groups that were so important in the East European revolts of 1989, offer models a n which contemporary socialists can build. The organizational question is a trtatter not merely of techtlique, hut imagination. Ideas maccrr: the refusal to take principles seriously leads not only to the sunender of ultimate goals, but the progressive agenda as well, This development indeed marks the new sociaX democratic trends that have transbrmed the old revisionism into sornething alrnost unrecognizable.

hesent and Past Advocates of new social democratic trends like the ""tird way" or the "new middle" or what is now called ""pogressive governance," who took power dwing the 2990s in England and Germany, have turned what revisionists originaIly regarded as a necessity into a virtue. They view their enterprise as innovative atld offer a tlew point of departure for social dernucracy:h7 they wish to trtove "beyond left and right," They are tegitimately concerned with environmental devastation on the global plane. But they l-rigl-rligltt the pressures of glr~balizationand call for curtailing state intervention in the economy, rolling back public services, and reinvigorating "civil society'"% The end of the cold war, they believe, has put a new premiuxn on introducing bbefficiertcy"into the welfare state. This makes necessary a perspective bent upoil st>cializingthe costs and privatizing the benefits of public policy, Thus, the new social de~rtocratsseek to lessen their reliance upon the industrial working class and attract new support from the new social movements whose members are supposedly concerned less with economic issues than "lifestyle."

72 * Edaard lier~zstcinand the logic ofl&visionism

Proponents of tl-re tl-rird way, or what might better be terxned ;r.teoreul'sionism, embrace a mixed market-although less mixed and more market than in times past, They justify abandoning Iegislative attempts to constrairl multinational corporations. They also tend to overestimate the gains rnade by working people over the last decades, the ability of the market tu deal with environmental devastation, and the power of what Ult-ich Beck initially termed the ""suboalitics" "pursued by tl-re new social xnovements," The assault on designations like "left and right'" and the new preoccupation with eff-lciency legitimates the pursuit of new c s ~ ~ p r o m i s eand s a policics primarily directed towards ""yung upwardly mobile intetlectuals'kr ""yppies," This new trend indeed ignores the way in which the end of the cold war has enabled people to see the problems produced by the glolsal market and the need for new global remedies. Most striking is the lack of anything realty new in the new vision: the only difference between this neorevisic-lnism and its predecessor is the lack of emphasis upon the ecorromic interests of workers and the lack of corrcern with socialist goals, It should be clear by now that Bernstein was already intent a n transfoming a proletarian into a ""people" party" capable of representing a multitude of interests and, in principle, lifestyfes, He believed in the use of expertise and the need Ear ""eenter-lefi" alliances. The logic of his enterprise was, moreover, directed against ideology from the very beginning. The notion of a mixed economy in which priorities r-2nd interests were constantly shifiing was also apparent in Bernstein's thinking from the start, Indeed, ~ u s as t revisionists sought tc-,divorce the distribution n so they tried process fro^^ the prerequisites of the a c c u ~ ~ d a t i oprocess,70 to preserve the state from the pressures of class conflict. The state is the political arena in which conflict resolution over the distributiorz of public goods takes place. But the objective reality of capitalism does not vanish quite so easily, An imbalance of class power remains to which reformers would increasingly acquiesce in the process of fc~rmulating and then pressing their grievances. Such a course would be justified by eradicating a class perspective in favor of a liberal political framework, The liberal understanding, after all, views society as composed of abstract citizens with individual rights; T. H. Marshall could, in this respect, view the welfare state as tile most complete substantive expression of these rights. Bernstein would surely have agreed. The differences between liberal and socialist politics indeed became increasingly unimportant to him, Bernstein saw control over distri h~ztionas dependent upon the ability to wield legislative power. He also saw the achievement of such power as the product of eiectoral successes that are, in turn, determined bp the simple aggregation of individual voters and interests. This view assumes that voters drive the electoral prwess and that links between the state and capitalist elites are purely contingent in nature.71 In spite of the pressure empiri-

Edcinrd Bernstei~nnd t.hc logic uf I&uisiunis1"pz * 73

caj interests may exert," therefore, tl-re state is accorded a "neutral"\haracter, This makes it possible to assume that the capitalist state will allow for a sustained policy of socialist reform and the gradual "abolition of class contradictions. "73 Eduard Bernstein never explored the systemic limits to instrumental reform under capitalist democracy. Believirrg that the achievement of discrete economic reforms wifl h i l d the constituency of the social dexnocratic movement, and diminish the power of capital, he never considered what subvertirtg the political independence of the workers tnovement might imply far the future of social democracy, Unconcerned with the geowing fragmentation of workers brought about by changes in capitalism, and thc: rise of the acfrninistrativc state, it never occurred to him that the "'partners" c o d fzot have equal power due to a disparity of organizational resources and the structural imperatives of the existing production process, Indeed, whatever his genuil~edemocratic commitme.tlts, Bernstein never even assumed that &!l parliamentary democracy was riecessary for the introduction of socialisrn in the first place, Bernstein was correct in suggesting that the republican state is not simply subordinate to the empirical interests of capitalist elites. Only with a measure of neutrality, or ""relative autonaxny," can a state punish particular malkasants, protect civil liberties, and settle dispmes between classes or given sectors within any given class.% But he radically underestimated the dependence of the state upon its elites. Because capitalists retain private control over investment, on which employment is dependent, "the satisfaction of the interests of capitalists is a necessary condition for the satisfaction s f all other interests within the systexn."7Thus, though the state will not only serve the interests of capitalists in every instance, it will generally identify its irrterest wit h what may be deemed the collective capitalist interest, The revisionist logic cannoc call any of this into question and, especially in periods of economic downturn, workers pay the price. h r i n g these times the benefits of the welfare state are trtost necessary and relevant. Brtt it is precisely at tl-rese times that capital is most unwilliw to pay lor them. And this creates a terribie quandary. If the state is used to coerce capitai then the cry of totalimrianism arises; if it is not then the party must dasrtpen the radicalism ot its base m d higbligl-rt the needs of capital, Vacillation is the usual response, Employment depends upon the ability of capital to secure a steady rate of profit on investmerit and, without ir-rvestment, there will be no employment. Thus, the search lor policies capable of balancing the economic interests of workers with the need tt-, secure possibEe investmerit by capitalists-possible since, according to the logic of revisionism, capitai cannot be coerced, only cajoled. Capital usually has the final word-and this fundamentally influences what especially the mtlre timid reformers can derrtand. Even bolder reform-

74 * Edaard lier~zstcinand the logic ofl&visionism

ers will find it difficult to cut sharply into capitalist profirs on pain of capital flight: it was a lesscm learned L7itterty by Franqois Mitterrand when, following his electoral victory in 1980, he was forced to retract his promises of radical socialist refurrn in the face of capitalis disinvesrrnent. Short-term profits for capital. must be secured as the precondition for long-term growth-from which ""ctizens3kill hopefully benefit.7WChoosing not to seek control: over the business cycle or socialize investment, once the fongterm bill comes due in the form of a new ecoilomic downturn, the more instrumentaf rehrmers will most likely acquiesce when capital catls for the retraction of previous programs. The logic of revisionism anticipated the tactical acceptance of "'austerity'" or "fiscal responsibility" lung hefclre the introduction of the "third way." It envisiorled not onty a cessation of new demands, but possibly the rollback of old reforms as well. Neorevisionisrs have only radicalized this possibility in frxshioning a response to the pressures of globalization, the decline of the inrdustrial proletariat, and the new need for efficiency, They have narrowed the range of utility for state intervention and, in place of the division between left and right, they have turned the desire for a ""center-left" coalition nt illto a matter of principle. Anthony Giddens, the most i ~ n p ~ r t a theoretician of the ""tl-rird way," puts the matter succinctly wllen l-re writes: The egalitarianism of the aid left was noble in intent, but as its rightist critics say has soxlletirnes led to perverse consecjuences. . . . "Fhe welfare state, seen by mast as the core t>f social tlernocsratic politics, today creates almost as many problcxns as it re~olves.~7

But problems for whom? It has now becsme abundantly clear: progressive resistance agaix~stneorevisionism rests upon the commitment not merely to establish new reforms, bur also to reaffirm prior gains. Rosa Luxemburg was prescient in claiming that utilitarian reformers arc inherently engaged in a ""tabour of Sisyphs." Present exigencies can always require abandoning past gains and beginning the entire process of reform anew There is indeed something ironic that a thinker so influenced by teleological hopes of: her own should have been so poix~tedin seeing the teleological fallacy in the theory of her oppone11~. Little remains today from Bernstein's original belief in a steady growth of reforms whose cumulative impact will produce a socialist transformation of capitalism, Criticism of his thought does not rest, however, upon the simple rejection of reforms or refarmism, h depends instead upon contesting the refusal of neorevisionists to press the reformist agenda in a consistent fashion especially under conditions when workers must bear the brunt of economic downturn, Or, putting it another way, ironically, the critique

Edcinrd Bernstei~nnd t.hc logic uf I&uisiunis1"pz * 75

of the revisionist lr~gicis ultimately directed against the Iaxity of its etl-ricai commitment to meaningful reform,

The End of Crisis Eduard Bernstein predicated his theory of evolutionary socialism on the assumption that capitalism had c>vercomeits crisis character?K In this be was obviously incorrect, Even ignrtring cataclysmic evelits like the great depression of 1929, or periods ol capitalis reorganization like the m i d - 1 9 7 0 ~ ~ smaiier recessions have continued to take place at an alarming rate since 1898. It is one thing to reject clairns that capitaiisrn is inevitably heading towards a breakdown and quite another to maintail? that fluctuations of the business cycle-or periodic crises-are inere aberrations of an essentially sound system. There is, however, some question about whether Bernstein caricatured the concept of ""crisis'"~?iy viewing it in terms of a preordained ecmoxnic breakdown," Thus, the importance of examining his views on the rnatter more closely, Xt should be stated from the outset: there is a certain naivete in believing that crises are necessarily unwelcome occurrences for the capitalist systexn. During such times, of course, the majority of the population suffers-and the weak suffer the most. But this does not imply that all segments of capital, or even the collective capitalist interest, will suffer either at all or in the same way. Periods of economic downturn can open new possibilities for clearing the market, reducing wages, rationalizing competition between firms, realizing xnergers, and so on. In fact-, using the terminology of Hegel, a periodic crisis can appear as the momentary self-negation of the capitalist system that allows accumulation to recommence on a new plane. It is also mistaken to believe that growtil always allies the interests of capitalists and workers. modern global expansioil has rendered big business increasingly mobile and, under the threat of capital flight, workers have been called upon to hear reductions in benefits offered by the welfare state. It is today a yuestion of whether an ethics intent upon resisting increasing economic inequalit). m d growing fragme~itationaEBong the exploited will make reference to structural confiiccs of interest and employ a revamped notion of class+jr a class ideal-in its philosophical framework. Neorevisiollism employs the instrumental, logic of times past, but directs it against the slogans and concerns of a reformism committed to furthering the interests of worker-s. Its proponents understand that the national paradigm of their predecessors has beer1 supplanted and many of thern support the transnatianal institutions emerging in Europe and elsewllere as well as the United Nations, But their instrumental logic prevents thern from fc~ster-

76 * Edaard ljer~zstcinand the logic ofl&visionism

ing tl-re development of an internationalism capable of contesting glr~balization. Echoing the global needs of capitai, supporting only the creation of yet another alienating hweaucracy, neorevisionists find themselves countenancing precisely those periodic crises whose effects their particular constituency fears the mt~st. Utilitarian reformers have always beer1 willing to exchange social stability for any form of utoyim experimentation and future gains for immediate concessions, Conservative social democrats took part in crushing workingclass movements horn belr>w like the Spartacus Rebetlion of 191 9 and, on occasion, even chase to abandon their decnucratic principles entirely as in the case at- Paul Faure and the majority of French socialists who accepted the Vichy regime of 1940. But the logic t.f revisionism does ntjt necessarily h v o r one x~otionof refc)rm over another. It instead seeks to understand every decision simply as an ad hoc response to a given situation. Just like any other fmm of organized practice, however, even the revisionist logic surreptitiously retains a guiding principle. This princigfe ultimately has Xittie to do with extending political democracy or even insuring the best possible deal for any set of constituents. It is defined by something else: a dogmatic csncern with achievirlg the best possible conditions for furthering tl-re instrumental practice of tl-re particular organization in question. Such indeed is the hidden interest within what appears as a purely pragmatic form ~f anti-ideological politics, Eduard Bernstein initially contributed to dispelling the illusions of a Marxian teleology that hindered reformist politics even as it iacked any revolutionar)i role to play. While rejecting its "fixed and finished" 'system, however, he ~znwittinglycreated a new one that-in its own terms-became just as fixed and just as finished, This system eliminates the structural contradictions throrigh which capitalist society sustains itself and thereby leaves them as they are. It ultirntltely renders issues of class power irrelevant and, even more importantly$ absolves the organization from any responsibility regardTTh sptem permits 0nly irlstruing the g ' c t ~ n s ~ i ~ ~Of~ sitsn ct~nstituency, e~~" mental criticism of instrurnental concerns and thereby, perhaps unwittingly, fosters the political identity crisis that has plagued the labor movement throughorit the last half of the ~ e n t i e t hcentury. -Indeed, if only for these reasons, contemporary socialists must confront not only the old dogmas, but the new ones as well.

Leninism and Beyond

Leninisrn has surrendered: its supporters l-rave been dispersed and its victims curse them from their graves. Its integrity has been withdrawn and its q p e a l has been destroyed. The abject failure of the communist experiment makes it itiffic~lltto imagine the rBasses it inspired, the sacrifices it received, the moral capital it once possessed, the reverence accorded its leaders, and the utopian hopes it inflamed, Wc~rldhistory has reildered its judgment: T&eninismis a thing of the past, Especially in the postcornmunist climate, however, it is important to bring balance and a sense of historical perspective into our view of events, Questions regarding the connection between Lenin and his heirs, and whether the entire undertliking could have t~trrtedout differently, are still worth asking, The difficult transition of communist into parliamentary states is aiso better understood when the mariner in which the Soviet &ion was transformed from an authoritarian into a totalitarian, and then back into an authoritarian, state are taken into account, The implications deriving from the disintegratiol~of the communist experiment, its ethical and practical costs, l-rave still not been fully grasped by many on the Left. Leninism was as much a product of the collapse of orthodox Marxism as revisionism. But it privileged the political over the social revolution, the party over the trade unions, and the ""mission" over the empirical character of the proletariat, Leninism was the mirror image of revisionism. Two organizational views squared off against one another, A ""dictatorshipof the proletariat" confronted tl-re bourgeois republic, Communist revolution contested a politics of socialist refc~rmwith little to offer those languishing in the colonial territories. Mc>ral relativism opposed a vague universafism. Indeed, nu less than revisionisxn, Leninism expressed more than the rnere quest for power and more-. than a set of contingent responses to unique historical circumstances.

Leninisrn confronted tl-re old-fashioned ""sage theory" of history with a new voluntarism, It projected a politics of will powered by an ethical commitment to the basic elemerits of the class ideal: radical democracy, social justice, and internationalism. Equating tl-rese values with their own interests and ignoring the need lor institutional accountabifitb howevet; the communists squandered the colisiderable moral capital they inherited from their role in bringing about the Russian Revolutian, Understanding this development calls for moving beyond what Simone de Beauvoir termed '"he force of circumsrance," reconsidering forgotten alternatives, and reconstructing the bond between tl-reory and practice, This begins with the vanguard party whose embodiment of ""rue" rrevulutionary consciousness turned it into the substitute for the proletariat as the agerit of history. The new party was organized to assure discipline, secrec)i and flexibility in the b c e of economic backwardness and severe political repression, h t its "dem~craticcentralist" form of decisionmaking, which called for public ~znanimityon the part of all members on all matters, harbored a presentiment of what was to corne, Lenin felt himself justified in treating all opponents-whether socialist or not-in a totally instrumental and expedititxts manner and this same Iogic would later be ernployed against critics of the new regirne and rivals of its leader witli far more drastic consequences. Indeed, the same Iogic initially used to make and then preserve the Russian Revolution annihilated the possihilir). of realizing its goals. Dictatorship was introduced in the hope of instituting a more radical form of democracy, Ecoxiomic justice was undertakexi on the basis of ""pimitive socialist accuxnulation," but with an eye on the robust rnodern society of: the future, Even "'socialism in one country" initially reflected more despair over the failure of revulutiorzary hopes in the afrermath of the first world war tl-ran an abandonment of revolutionary aspirations, But the means abolished the ends: the internatic>naistruggle against capitalism was co~~promised and '"socialist'kconstruction became identified with the most barbaric forrns of modernization. The cornrnunists were ultimately left without any purpose other than the perpetuation of their owil dictatc3rs h i p a n d so, were ethically rudderless, Different policy cl-roices made during the 1920s could l-rave prodtlced something other than a '"totalitarian" regime in the 1930s, just as diCferent policy choices in the 1980s could have prevented the disintegration of tfze USSR in the 1 9 9 0 ~Only ~ the party, L~owever,was in the position to make those choices; the victorious Bolsheviks crushed all movements and institutions capable of contesting their understanding of socialism or providing institutional checks upon thern. With the party in the saddle, once tl-re irrtplications of ""democratic centralism" had been radicalized, the organiza-

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tional theory invented by Lenin could be used against all attempts to limit the power of Stalin, This indeed would produce a qualitative rupture in what otherwise seems a logical develop~nent:life within the party, its more eqerirnental policies, its use of terror, its propaganda, and its aims were all trailsformed. There was illdeed a shift from Lenitlism to Stalinism. Just as Stalin liquidated the racjical meaning of Leliinisrn while still ernploying it for legitimacy, however, his successors sougle to distance tl-remselves from him without fully breaking with the system be had. dominated. The militant style, the turgid propaganda, and even the fear deriving from the uninhibited exercise of arbitrary power all began becoxning increasingly obsolete following the death of Stalin, In seeking merely to reform all this, however, the communist regime Lost its original ""revolutionary privilege>" which Stalin desperately sought to retaitl, and opened itself to comparison with other socialist nations. A spirit of malaise and corruption increasingly took hold. This spirit would indeed hasten the collapse of the USSR and, with the riew iniflenniurn, aiso leave its mark on the new Russia,

Underdevelopment and Revolution Despite its glittering literary tradition, turn-of-the-centw Russia was a provincial backwater, shrouded in religious mysticism and illiteracy*Its secret police was notorious throughout the civilized world and, as various works like the Autobiography of Maxim Gorky so graphically portra yed, the most terrible misery burdened the vast majority. The peasantry had only been freed from seddom in 1863 and, though foreign investment was spurring industrialization in isolated cities, imperial Russia still Iagged behind the West politically artd economically The country lacked a proletariat and a trade union movexnent along with a bourgeoisie informed by the democratic values of the Enlightenme~ltclr the French Revt~lution,And so, while Wstern social demtrcracy was predicated on the existe~iceof a gen$$il.telabor rnovement inhrrned by the liberai legacy of the bourgeoisie, communism was not, Therein lies perhaps the most prt>fc~undreason for the tragic defc2rmation of the Russian Revolution,l Revtllution was, in Dct, a mere speculative possibility when the Russian Social Demc-~craticParty (RSDP) was formed in 1898, Recognizing they were stuck within a sernikudal context, most inernhers of the RSDP attempted to draw the practical consequences of ortl~odoxMarxism and its stage theory of history. This view essentially claimed that capitalism must reach its productive limit befcjre the proletariat can bring about a revolution. The majority of the RSDP tl~usconcluded that the party should foster bc~urget-,isdevelopment and, in order to mitigate its worst effects, trade

union activity axnong the proletariat, Inspired by a specuiative befief in " h e actuality of revof utioil," "2hile also embracing the theory of orthodc~x Marxism, Lenin headed the opposition. Barn into a middfe class family in 1870, Lenin was sixteen when his brother Alexander was hanged for his participation in a plot tu assassinate the czar-. Admitted to Kazan Universit?; where he planned to study law, he was expelled for taking part in a student demonstration, This led him into revolutionary circles and he began the systematic study of Marxism. E-fe t in radical circles when he published a was already ;l. p r o ~ ~ i n e nfigure Marxist attack on anarchism, "What the Triends of the 13eoplehre . . . 'a (1894) and, by 1895, he had been arrested for organizing workers in St. Petershurg, While in Siberian exile, Lenin wrote The Deuelopment of Capitalism irr Russia ( f 8991, which claimed only a bourgeois and demc~cratic revolution would prove possiHe in the near future given the econamic backwardrless of Russia. Economic determinism marked Lenin's early studies on Russian economic development and the diminishing role of the peasantry, His Materz'alhm and Empiria-Criticism ( 2 908), written in order to combat an empiricism and an irrational b r m of idealism enjoying brief popularity in the Iabor movement, exl~ibitedeven stronger traits of ""vulgar1Varxism.""' But his tt~inkingalways sought to link the real with the ideal: the tactical response to existillg conditions was always strategically formulated with a specific revot utionary purpose in mind. After ernbarking upon a study of Hegel while living as an exile in Zurich, in fact, he expticitly stated that ""ltelligent idealism is closer to intelligent materialism than stupid materialisxn,""4ntiII 1917, hc~wever,most considered Lenin little more than a particularly crude and sectarian adherent of orthodox Marxism. E-fe was late in recognizing that what r~atteredwas ultimately Iess the level of economic development in a nation than its revolutionary potential. Only in 1917 would Lenin embrace the idea of a "'permanent revolution," which had been developed in 1905 by Trotsky 61116 Akxander Helphand (who was known as Yarvus),s and insist that the proletariat must seize pc-~wer* Lenin held Kautsky in high esteem until 1914. He praised him in various works including What Is 7% Be Do~ze.5Lenin learned from Kautsky that no intrinsic connection exists between fostering bourgeois economic conditions, or furthering trade union activity, and creating the prerequisite political consciousness frw overtllrowing the r~onarchyand ushering in a republic. He, too, reached the conclusion that ignoring the qualitative difference between economic gains and political power would inevitably result in reformism. Lenin never simply rejeaed the use of parfiar~entary tactics and he usually supported dernands for higller wages, shorter hours, and improved workillg conditions. He knew that a revolutionary movement could not grow simply by feeding the masses dreams of uttrpia. In

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keeping with Kautsky, he ernphasized that such tactics and dexnands are not ends unto themselves, With even more certitude than the radicals in Western Europe, moreover, Lenin believed that the prospects for meaningful reform were no greater than the possibilities for revolution in the Russia of 1902. Marx and Engeis had already stated in The Comml~utzstManifesto that, before any revolution could take place, a part of the ruling class must "'break off"" and lain the oppressed. Lenin appropriated their insight and highlighted the need for radical action even in the face of objective constraints. He knew that the authors of the Matzifesto had kept tl-reir eyes cast upon the French Revolution while writing it. Marx and Er-tgels were aware that 1789 did not take place in the nation with the strongest bourgeoisie of the timel It was subsequently logical for Lenin tct interpret the importarxcr: of revolutionary acrion in tile face of objective constraims, employing a group of disaffecred inrellecruals to instill the requisite consciousness into the masses, and perhaps even establish a proletarian version s f an 'kedncational dictatorship,'" Lenin would indeed place his own revolutionary aspiratioils in coherent relation with those of the French Revolution and, in this vein, he csuld even view his communists as "Jacobins inseparably finked to the proletariat.'' Lenin was convinced that the weak bourgeoisie of: imperial Russia, whose m m b e r s were mostly supportive of the imperial r e g h e , would prove unwilling and unable to carry through the revolution by itself, A revofutiorlary undertaking in an econt>micalllybackward natioil would invt>lve not merely the bourgeois and proletarian classes, according to Lenin, but also the peasants and even elements of the antisocialist middle strata. Or putting it another way, following the basic idea of Marx and Engels in 1848, Lenin essentially sought a bourgeois revolution that would lay the groundwork for an attack upon the bourgeoisie.7 Solidibing a revolutionary alliance of ctasses with sbviousl y confticting concerns while still giving primacy to proIetarian interests, in his view, required a ""party of a new type.'?erhaps it would prove possible for such a party, after shifting class alliances from thtjse employed during the first bourgeois phase of the revolution,bo lead the proletariat into the second socialist phase. In any event, however, Lenin considered the European model of an open demc-~craticlabor party with loose rules h r admission si172pIy i n a p p r o p r i ~ efor coordinating underground resistartce in a huge ernyire with a ferocious secret police. Only a centralized a d disciplined vanguard of '"rc~fessional revolutionary intellectuals" could prove capalzle of securing secrecy in a far-flung orgmization, maintairting lines of cornmunication, coordinating political activity, distributing illegal propaganda, and preservi~~g the revolutic,nary goal during nonrevolutionary periods,

Lenin" '""arty of a new type" was not merely a product of Rkissian conditions. His innovation reflected what was becoming a more general European preoccupation: the turn of the century was marked by ii~odernist avant-garde groups like the fauves, the expressionists, and the lutkirists no less than the explosion of "elite theory" "generated by thinkers like Rvberto Michels, Gaetano Mosca, and Vilfredo Pareto. The organizational theory of Lenin was also influenced by controversies taking place within the Second International, The criticisms leveled at Eduard Bernstein and his followers during the revisionism debate were directly relevant to Lenin's own orthodox criticisms of the Mensheviks in the organizational controversy of li902,9 This was the context in which Lenin formulated his most radical claim. Consciousrzess must be brought to workers from the outside: "The history of all countries shows that the working class, exclusively by its own effort, is able to develop only trade union consciousness.""'" Kautsky wouid surely have endorsed the idea and perhaps even Eduard Berr~stein.In colltrast to them, however, Lenin was willing to draw the conclusions from his insight for a revolutionary politics. The party must not only inject the requisite consciousness into the proletariat from ""outside" kits ranlks,l1 but serve as the only agent of the revolutionary enterprise, It must link "empirical" with "'utopian" interests, and shoulder the responsibiIity for ""imputing" the level of revolutionary conscit>usness among workers in any historical circumstance in the hrmation of yolicy.12 Lenin wanted as centralized and disciplined an organization as possibte, His ~znderstandingof class struggle was in terms (of an almost military notion of class war. Party members should be ahfe to fight for their positions within the organization, at least in principle, hut they would have to support the "party line" in public. He erivisioned the party as a pyralllid composed of cells organized in a hierarchical manner: crucial decisions would be made at the top and advice would rise up from the bottom, The very reasons that led him to invent his particular organizational mt~delalso fed him to subordinate tl-re individual to the party and ignore democratic procedures, Lenin meant to "revise" 'Marxism in order to deal with the political underdevelop~~e~lr rather than employ it as a problems raised by eco~~omic fixed and finished system, He must surely have believed, no less than Bernstein, that his critics were the dogmatists. It was with a certain prophetic quality, however, that Trstsky criticized his future comrade's bcst~bstitutioniscn"": ""Lenin" methods lead to this: the party organization (the caucus) at first substitutes itself for the party as a whole; then the Central Committee substitutes itself far the (organization; and finally a single Qicta torhsubstitutes l-rirnsellfor the Central Committee. 3 Lenin believed he couId substitute the vmguard for the working class as the agent of revolution because he believed that their interests were identi"

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cai, Identifying agency and "true" consciousness with the party, however, renders the base indeterminate and turns it into little more than a ""vac~lurn."" Since any class or combination of classes can ultimately serve as the foundation for the new organizalional agmt of revoluti~n,the vanguard can be used far an); end, There is ultimately nothing "'Marxist" about it, Qne revolutionq goal can easily be substituted for another given a shifc in the balance of class forces and party needs. Fascists and religious zealots along with representatives from any number of other viewpoints s to employ the notion of a ""vanwould incieed all find t h e ~ ~ s e l v eable guard"' with xnuch prof"it. Lenin may have sought to make the party responsive to the masses: he even opened it to new members in moments of crisis like 1 f l 7 and 1921.15 The proletariat was also originally used as its point of reference, But the party always had the final word. Qcrescions of institutional accountlzbilicy and the dangers of democratic centralism were never given their due, The ""rvolutionary privilege" 'of the party was seen as resting on its embodiment of b'tr~ef'consciousness, Any coxnpeting political organization or institmion was always considered an expression of ""false consciousness" by definition-no matter what its function or empirical support from the working class. Indeed, from the first, tire Bolsheviks felt themselves entitled to deal with their oppnents In terms of plitical expediency rather than fro117 the standpoint of what was then known as ""revolutionarytolerance.'" Leninisxn never had any room for reciprocity or universal tlnderstandings of ethics. Ethical commitment to a "categorical imperative of revolution" may have infc~rmedLenin's notion of the vanguard party.16 But issues of fegality or illegaiicy,f7 truthfullless 0r lying, violence or nonviolence, were rendered contingent from the start, A difference In style, or what Leon Blrrrn would later call ""an incompatibility of feeling and morality," sseyarated the Balsheviks from all otl-ter socialist movements. Their tone, their arrogance, and their invective were fmeign to European socialists. They developed a distillct idetitity that had a profound effect on the meaning they would ascribe to socialism. TI-reir befief in tl-re party was exaggerated and unquestioning. The subservience of the individual to the party was based on trust in its missi~~n, and trust was seemingly enrjugh. Lenin was a student of the French Revolution, the revolutions of 1848, and the Paris Commune. He must surely have seen how the politics of the bo~zrgetrisieand its philosophy changed once it had gained power. But Lenin was unable to apply this insight from tl-re past to his own situation: he saw no need for institutional checks a n the party, He simply assumed it would be diflferent with his communists because they were communists, They would nut allow self-interest to undermine solidarity or bureaucracy to extinguish the prospect of utopia, Lenin could indeed have benefited horn the insight of MYlilovan Djilas, once a comrnrmist and later a prisoner

for many years under Tito, who wrote: ""Ipolitics, inore than in anything else, the beginning of everything lies in moral indignation and in doubt of the good intentions of others."I"

The Transition md the Dictatorship of the Proletariat Tl1e Russian Revolution struck the world like a thunderbolt, Lenin's Bolsheviks were instantly transfc~rmedfrom a little-know11 sect into worldhistorical actors. Euphoria gripped the masses, Betrayed by the social democrats, weary after four pears of death notices and rationing, they saw the October Revolution as opening a period in wlphich everything seemed possible, Not force alone, hut the utopian dream of an egalitarian and democratic communist society inspired the masses tct those incredible sacrifices they would make in tlphe coxning years.19 As much as any other single pamphlet, Lenin's The Sgate arzd Reuolzrtion inflamed those early hopes for an end to "prehistory'hnd the creation of an emancipatory alternative to capitaiisxn. Xn fact, this work still provides an inspiration for many "'ultra-leftists" and 'kcouncilists." At the same time, however, Lenin's most ~ztopianwork provides a fundamental insight into the authoritarian character of his vision. Written during the crucial period between Russia" bbowgeois and communist revolutions, its arguments did not embody the practical experience of the October Revolution, but rather presented Lenin's general ideas on the state, beyond any immediate concert1 with Russian conditions.zVt forwarded the ~ztopianmoment of workers' democraq Nevertheless, its irnnlediate political purpose was different, Lenin9$pamphlet was intended as an attack upon both his social democratic and anarchist critics, Xt served to distinguish the communist position and provide his followers with an explicit revolutionary standpoint, Social democrats had always maintained that the state could be used to transfc~rm a capitalist into a socialist society, Since the state can only serve the interests of the ruling class, however, Lenin argued tl-rat the atsexnpt to ernploy the capitalist state to transform capitalism must prove illusory. The old state apparatus must be mashed along with the class enemy. But this should not be seen as justifping anarchism. Demanding rlphe imrnediare abolition of the ss such ieads anarchists to evade crucial questions cclncerning how to dei-end the revolutioll against its enemies and how to establish conditions for the tratnsition to a ""higher" "phase of comxnunisrn and a "free association of producers," TTheir refusal to ccjnfront the reality of cclunterrev-

olutionary as well as revolutionary power turns anarchists into tl-re worst kind of utopians. Thus, whatever their differences with the social democrats, anarchist views on the "withering away of the state'hsupposedly left them just as politically rnisguided.21 The histc3rical coiltext in which the pamphlet was written is crucial. Lenin was, at the time, departing from the legal path to power urlder Kerensky" provisional government and beginning the illegal struggle to make the revolution '"ermanent."2"t was already clear that the seizure of power would demand a military defensc of the revolution against its enemies. This alone seemed to iustify the need for a highly discipiir-red and centralized workers\tatc. EIardly anyone: before had seriously dealt with the problems of the transition, however, or been willing to consider whether the traditional form of state was adequate for the inevitable struggte against the equally inevitable reacrion. Lenin was tl-re first to link the question of the transition with an organizational response to the prospect of courlterrevolu tion. The S ~ a t eand Revolzstion breathed new file into the idea of the 13aris Commune, which, essentially from its collapse to the events of October 191 7, existed merely as a symbol without any real referent in the theoreticaX or practical debates arnong socialists, Lenin" call fur a direct attack on the state, nt->less than discussroil about its "withering away," "existed only at the boundaries of socialist discourse in the Second International. There was both drama and daring in Lenin" contention that tl-re socialist revolution will consist "not in the new class commanding, gover~lingwith the aid of the 01d state machine, but in this class sm~shingthis machine and commanding, governing with tl-re aid of a new rnachine."23 Marx origirxally envisioned the transition as taking place under conditions of abundance, The new proletarian regime would extend democracy and, in so doing, attack the privileged classes. It would also institute a new set of humanized production relations, no longer constrained by the imperatives of capimt accumulation, and create the foundations for a "'leap into the realm of freedom.'" centralized socialist state would thus simultaneously defend the revolution and facilitate the emergence (11a communist society in fclr the free developwhich ""the free developmerit of each is the co~lditit~n ment of al." Lenin's ideas were the same in the abstract. But the attempt to realize them without a mass-based Iabor mt>vementand under conditiails of economic ~znderdevelopmentwould give them a very different suhsk~ntive meaning, Russian bt~c kwardness rnade it incuxnbent upon the ""new" "state machine to accumulate capital under numerous constraints imposed by the counterrevolution even as it simultaneously sought to introduce a new set of production relations. Thus, from the very start, a set of rnutually excl~tsive undertakings defined the Bolshevik project.

The need for accumulation would supplant tl-re hope of utopia. Justifying this demanded the redefinition of both the transition and the '"leap into the realm of freedom," The frlrmer would involve substituting rule by the vanguard for the extension of democratcy,24 while the latter would involve equating modernization with socialism," Understanding the communist experiment is illdeed impossible without a sense of the political meaning behind this redefinition. In virtual despair, while preoccupied with securing an improvement in agriculture and mising productivity, Lenin spoke about the need to ~nairrtain an apparatus s f compulsion and identified ""Communism as Soviet power pl~rsthe electrification of the whole countryW2"rfhe Soviet Union would have to employ the same values of production as its capitalist adversary and, without the constraints imposed by institutional: accountabilith reduce individuals to a "factor of production" in a xnore radical iashion, Bolshevik control over tl-re "commanding heigllts" of the economy appeared necessary to ensure what Preobrazhensky first termed "primitive socialist accumulation." Indeed, before long, the revolrttionary vanguard would find itself transhnned into tl-re custodian of a rigid bureaucratic order fearful of libertarian innr>vations,27 The Russian Revolution was noc the outcorne of a fully develoycd capitalisxn, It lacked nut merely a proletariat, but also an indigenous bourgeoisie, The Bolsheviks were left shouldering the burden of modernization, This was the precisely why orthodox 1Warxists believed that the communist seizure of power was premature and why they dzougl-rt that it would result. in the sacrifice of democracy. Gramsci indeed admitted what everyone knew when he, a supporter of Lenin, stated that the events of October 1917 constituted a ""revolution against Mar! Marxk C~pztal~"28 But the critics evaded the question of "'what is to be done2'7t becanle a matter of embracing the activist o r the structurai. strain witllin Marxism. Lenin's voluntairisrn xnay have reflected the underdevelopment of ixnperial Russia, But there was little with wilich to cr>nfrr>nt"objective" cconditioils other than the commnist vanguard. The "'dictatorship of the proletariat'" l-rad, in this vein, always been considered an unfortunate necessity, The State and R ~ " z ~ o / %turned ~ ~ o Eit into a virtue: belief in the '"dictatorship of the proIetariat'%ould now define the ""true" Marxist, But, ux~derthe commux~ist state, perhaps there was stilt a cha~zceto modernize the country and also create the conditions for its own disaipyearance,xY Thus, Lenin could write that it is ozly: from the rnoXnerlt aII mcxnbcrs of society, or at least thc vast majority t~ave learned to actminister tllc state thcmsclvcs, havc takcn this ururk into their owrl hands, have organized cantraf over the insignificant capitalist il-tinarir~aver the gentry who wish to preserve tlzeir capitalist habits and over workers who t~avebccn thoroughly corruptcct by capitaiistn-fro this rnorncnt the need for

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government of any kind begins to disappear altogether. The more complete the detl-tocrac-y,the nearer the moment when it bec-oil-tesLtnnecessary. The more demc~craticthe "staeebhicb consists c>f the armed workers, and wl~ichis %no longcr a stare in the proper sense of the word', the rnorc rapidly euery f o m of state begins to wither away.""

The call for a state ""which is no Ir~ngera state in the proper sense of the word" raised the image of the Paris Commune. But, in contrast to Marx, Lenin did not see this experimental order as the transition to one that would institutionalize democratic procedures. That would have meant returning to republican institutions and, obviously, subverting the primacy of the party, Lenin was left with a yawning chasm separating the ideal of a authoritarian and new coERmune fro^^ the reality of an increasi~~gly poverty-stricken nation. He recognized the problexn and so refused to provide an ironclad prcjmise fc~rthe realization of the future communist society in his most utopian work." Neither in theory nor praxis was he able to bridge the chasm. Wl-zere implementing the ideal wauld have meant destroying the revolutionary state, crushiilg the counterrevolutian and sirnply transforming underdeveloped material conditions meant deferring the dream. The S a t e and Rrvot~riont l ~ u sprovides an excellent example of how the limits within even the most utr>pian theory are conditioned by the constraints on political action in a specific historical c011text. Mitigating the ever-deepening contradiction between ideal and reality would have demailded an event whose realization stor>doutside the control of Lenin and the Bolsheviks: revolutiox~in the West. Successfrtl revolutions in the economically advanced nations would have curtailed the intervention c>f those previously warring allies in support of the " m i t e " counterrevolution. They would also have provided military and technr~logicalsupport lrjr the devastated USSR and lessened the burden of underdevelopment. Bailking oil the possibility of international revolution was not outlandish, Disgrlst with W11rld War I had, since 9 1 6, syarked working-class revolts in much of Europe. Everywilere it was possible to hear the call ior bbsoviets'a or '"councils" tthat would aholish the need for a state "in the proper sense of the word." Many social democrats and even anarchists initially aligned themselves wit11 Lenin. The principled Mensl-revik leader, jfulius Martov, recognized that the revolution was "'sick," But he also recognized that the Bolsheviks had significant support among the pprletariat and that the alternative to them rnigbt prove even more distasteiul.3WPlis position was indeed not very different from the u n h i r k forgotten anarchist poet, Erich MGhsam, who grasped the spirit of the times wl~c;rrhe wrote: The revtllutic->naryactivists of the urhole world placed themselves on the side of thc Russian Revolcrtion, In Russia itself, the divisiorls bctwecn the various rev-

olutionary tendencies had not yet reached fruitian, A coalition of Bofsfieviks and Social Revolutionaries ruled from jat~uaryuntil Alarcll 1919, The anarcllists fouglit under Makhno in common with the Red Army against the white gcrlcrals of the courlterrcvolution. Especially abroad, it1 fact, the unity of all revol~ltionariesand the defense of the revolution assumed a near tloty status, Only after the Bolsheviks succeeded in assuming power for themselves, after they began to persecute their prcviacrs allies, did it hccornc possible ever1 abroad to differentiate between the Revojution and the Bolshevik-Communist X3arty.33

The State and Revolutior.t provided the regime with a symbol of radicai democracy and, even under Stalin, the suviets were never formally abolished. Trotsky had argued that the soviets provided a practical. revolutionary function insofar as they would "'give unity to the revolutionary struggle."" But there was a sense in which Lenin always distrusted these organs of democratic rule, Me did not, for example, understand their importance i r ~1905, But it was also reasonable for him to admire the idea that political representatives be paid the same as workers, that instant recall should reign, that "the coak'bhoufd have a chance at running the state, and that a new fc~rmof goverriance shoulit combine legislative, executive, and ~udicial functions. He also Learned from experience, Lenin quickly grasped the role soviets might play in undermining the provisional government of Mexander Kerensky,"" This self-appointed regirne lacked the conlidace of the workers and the peasants, remained coxnrnirted to continuing tl-re war, and accepted support from what would become important elements of the counterrevolution. Its overthrow appeared ever rBore rlecessary as Russia moved closer to chaos.36 Thus, Lenin afiied himself with the insurgent revuIutionary masses under the general slogan, All Power to the Sc~viets! The alliance was purely tactical, But, then, things were less clear during the revolutionary upsurge that swept imperial Russia than they rnay now appear, The strength and even the political complexion of the usoviets' movemerit was open to debate." The supaorc given by urbm soviets to the Bolslleviks and otl-rer socialist parties did not extend to the countryside, It was also highly questionable whether the soviets bad the mity, the resolve, or the administrative capacity to carry through a civil war fet alone forward a viable program for tl-re transition, This may provide the historim1 reason for a crucial omission in The State and Ravol~tion,Lenin never did provide an analysis of the structural role of the soviet either in terxns of its relation to the party or l-row it might adjudicate conflicting interests within a fragmented society, As surely as he divorced the vanguard party from the proletariat it claimed to represent, so did he separate the soviet from its function in the political order, This type of institutiotlal indeterminacy, however, marks Lenin's entire theory of the

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state. It always ignored fundaxnental difkrences in governance in favor of formal class definitir~ilsof the state. Thus, he could write: The dictatorship aE a sz'tzgle class is necessary not only for every class society in general, not only for the proletariat wfiich lias averthrown the bourgeoisie, but also for t l ~ eentire historic;rrt period which separates capitalism from the "lassless society" frorn communism, Bourgeois states arc most varied in form, but their essence is the same: all these states, whatever their farm, in the final analysis are inevitably tlze dictatrlrshq of the bozdrgeokie, Tile transition from capitalism to cornmrtnisxn is ccrtatnly hound to yicijd a tremendous abundance and variety af political forms, but the essence will inevitably be the same: the dictatorshif~of the profetarkt,38

Lenin seemed unaware that the fmm of government possesses its otvn dynamic. Ese was crlntent to equate ""governmeilt" with " s t a t e S b d , as a consequence, this most "'political'Warxist had virtually nothing to say cf. bOut institutional politics. The reason is clear: the only way of privileging his authoritarian dictatorship of the proletariat was by arguing that in essence, whether democratic or authoritarian, every bourgeois state is the same "dictarorship of the bourgeoisie," His shift of slogans horn ""AllPower to the Soviets" "to ""The Bc-,lsheviks IVust Assume Power" was thus consistent.-39 The difference between a decentralized democratic and a centralized aurhoritarian regime i s merely a matter of expediency: the only salient cluestion is which can best repress the fcrrces of rmction and express the "true" needs of the working class."J And, horn Lenin3 perspective, that is something only the vanguard can decide. The ""newmachine'bill be socialise only insofar as it supports interests favorable to the most advanced sector of the pmletariar~movement: the Bolshevik Party. a

The Wretched of the Earth T&eninismriever had much appeal for workers in advanced industrial societies. But that was not the case for the oppressed living under colonial rule. The great transformation of the twenties11 centtary was undoubtedly the liberation of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Though some movemeilts of national self-determination were inspired by religion, and others by charismatic personalities, most were profoundly influenced by Leninisrn in the theory they employed no less than the practice in which they engaged. Its countless believers were not mere dupes any more than their movemerits were simply pawns far tlze USSR, There were indeed legitimate reasons for the appeal of Leninism among the most wretched of the earrh,

Perhaps the Russian Revolution did not bring about the victory of international socialism, hut it was stiU the first nationalj revolutioil of the modern age, Xt had taken place in an economically backward nation and its vanguard provided an illustration of l-raw to sustain an insurgent movement under harsh political conditions. Leninism offered the prospect of a national front composed of various classes and dominated by the revolutionary organization. Its wiftingness to place ""politics in com~nand" aiso obviwsly had trernendws appeal in areas lncking an indigenous bourgeoisie and where national land reform wouicl prove necessary The modernizing success of tl-re USSR-if not the bloodshed-would serve as ail ir-rspiration, But there was something else: imperialism and the plight of the colonized had been relatively neglected." Lenin brought both into the suciafist limelight in fmperiirlism: The Highest Stilge of Gup2~lzfn.t.The pamphlet filled a vacuum. ~Marxhad subordinated the nt-jtion to capitalism and he was un~~ down the ""Chinese sentimerltal ahc~utthe way in which it V I P C I L ~ break walls of tradition" and transform precapita list na tions, Revisionists were often supporters of imperialism while the analytic skills of Kautsky and Rosa I,uxemburg did not compensate for their inability to provide political advice to those fighting colonial rule. Lenin's brocl-rure may have been marred by various empirical errors, and it never envisioned the possibili~ of what might he termed ""socialist irnperialism.'Wevertheless, it provided what other works lacked: a political understanding of imperialism and a practical respoilse to its continuation. fmpericzlism is Lenin's finest theoretical effort. Written durirtg Wc3rld War I, its explanatory power reaches beyond tl-rat event. It ties together his ideas on revolution, the party, nationalism, and internationafism, It also marks his most original contribution and his break with orthodoxy. The pamphlet draws on the work of John A. t i d s o n , Rudolf Hilferding, and Wikofai h k h a r i n . In fusing their insights with his own, however, Lenin created sorrtething genuinely new. With this work, indeed, it became possibk to speak a bout " Marxism-Leninism."" EIobson was a liberal and a socialist, and also the teacher of John Maynard Keynes. He had argued in his influential study of 1902 that the ""econornic taproot" of irnyerialjsm derived from those ""seifish" sectors of capital that greedily sought to export their surplus-no matter what the consequences f'or the nation as a wi~ole." 'Tarasitical" in character, tl-rese interesis threatened the "common good" through the militarist and ultrachauvinist tendencies they strengthened as welt as through the negligible bellefits that would accrue to the natic~nfrorn, pursuing an imperialist course. Nevertheless, tl-rrough state action, electoral activity, and heightened awareness, liobson believed that such parasitical interests could be controlted.

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Lenin appropriated the notion tbat imperialism rests on tl-re attempt to export an overproduced swplrrs and the ensuing exploitative relation that arises between an ecsnorrtica!ly aclvanced nation and its colonies. In corrtrast to Hobson, however, Lenin rejected tlie idea that this or tbat particular capitalist interest was ""prasitical." Ifnstead, the capitalist system itself was seeri as being defined by seemingly irrational imperialist policies, Lenin considered imperialism a necessary imperative that had arisen as a consequence of changes in the organizational structure of capitalism itself. 1st making this claim, he profited from the work of the great Marxist ecorrornist Rttdolf Hilferding,"' who argued in 19t l tliat tl-re banks and ""finance capital" had gained hegemony over other capitalist sectors of the economy." This had made it possible to regrllate inarkets through stare intervention, secure investment outlets, and the exercise of financial leverage. Hilferding believed, in fact, that the state might mitigate conflicts be~ween capital and Iabor to the point where this new form of '"organized capitalism'kcould conceivably continue forever. Thus, he challeliged the idea of an inevicable capitalist collapse from within the tradition of orthodox iMarxism. Building on Hilkrdtng, while critical of his reformism, Lenin suggested that the predominance of finance capital and its fusion with a new incerventionist state had resulted in a '%&her" and final stage of capitalism. A new linkage is seeri as existir-rg hetween imperialism, Illilitarism, and capitc?lism, Monopolies now increasingly compete over markets and heighten what Lenin termed ""unequal development."@ The result is a twofold contradiction in which the advanced nations compete with one another over colonies even as tensions ernerge between each and its subject peoples. By engaging in imperialist policies and rationalizing exploitation more ef6ciently3however, these ecsnosrticalty advanced nations can y uell donlestic class conflict. Imperiaiism allows them to collect ""spergrofirs" and, with the "crumbs" of these profits, buy off their own proletariat with social programs and vario~zsforms of state assistance, Thus, according to Lenin, imperialism generates a ""labor aristocracy" in tl-re advanced nations whose interests are inimical to those of the masses languishing under colonid exploitation. Tn this vein, according to Brrkharin, it no longer makes sense to speak about international solidarity in traditional terrns. The world is witnessing a split beween the "'haves" and the "havet-nots" along East-West lines46 Organized capitalism has produced a ""fusion" btween the administrative, the economic, and the politicat futlctions of bourgeois society resultin, ~na type of "'national trust." Neither Bukharin nor Lenin ever meant to imply that revofutio11 was impossible or unnecessary in the 7Xiest. But it was a question of where to look m d Lenin believed that the best possibility was a revojution at the point of intersection, so to speak, between the haves and r, using a phrase his pamphlet would make famous, at the Q

'

"weakest link in the chain." His work indeed suggested that revolution would spread from East to West and that is precisely what occurred in the aftermath of the Russian Revolutior~, Imperklism showed why capitalist nations were driven to challenge each other for markets. It exposed the bidden source of the militarism and chauvinism that had set nation against nation. It clarified why Italy3 still economically underdeveloped, should have been fate in entering the war and why a rapidly industrializing Germany should have followed an especially beilicose policy in the years leading up to the war," It ralso provided an explanation in Marxist terms of what at the time seerned almost incomprehensible: the "'great betrayal" of European social democracy and its ~Mairxistleaders. Above all, however, Lenin offered reasons why the revolution did not take place in any of the advanced Western nations as Marx l-rixnself predicted and why it occurred-and could occur again-in the poorest parts of the globe. The problems with fmpevi~lzsmhave beer1 endlessly documented. Its idea of a ""lbor aristocracy" thesis was empirically flawed: crllics argued that workers in imperialist states were not always better off and skilled workers i r ~Germany were, for example, often the most radical in their views,"Vhe pamphlet cannot explain why the bulk of world trade is still carried on among the advanced nations and, in fact, not every economically advanced nation has engaged in imperialist policies. Imperialism is reduced to an ecsnomic reflex of capitalism and the contingent charactw of foreign policy is essentially ignored." Thus, lmpevilalzsm manifests trtany o f the same inadequacies as The Sate artd Remlgtion. But these criticisms had little relevance for what would become the antiimperialist struggles for national self-determination. ~Vustrecognized that the proletariat w a ~still far better off than the colonia;ec"t and enough Western workers now recognized tl-rat they l-rad been misled hy the imperialist ambitions of their governments and that they had received little in exchange For their acceptance of a "class truce." What the concept of a ""bar aristacracy" lacked in tl-reoreticai rigor, in short, it retained in practicai salience, Lenin's ttbe.t>ry seeming1y justified his split with the Second International. It was also evident that the revolutionary winds had changed direction: they were now indeed blowing from East to West. lmperiialism fit perfectly with the views Lenin had already articulated prior to the war on the right to ""national self-determinatio~z." He had always maintained tl-rat revoltttion in an econoxnically bt~ckwardnation required the proletariat to ally itself with the bourgeoisie and other classes. Concerted action demanded a unifying ideology and in this way, according to Lenin, supporting the right to national self-determination was a prerequisite for success in the first, or anti-imperialist phase, of the revolution, it is certainly true that repression of nationalist movements by the czars had

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created enorrnous discontent, and support for the Rkissian Revolution was in large measure dependellt upon them, At the same time, however, Lenin only wished to rerider ""negative support" tto nationalist mtrvements since ""beyond tlzat begins the ~oositivebctivityof tl-re bourgeoisie striving to fortify nationalism,"-SVhus, the need for a vanguard party capable of engaging in coalition politics and shiking its ""line" without ever sacrificing its unique class interests or its commitment to the next socialist stage of the revr~lutioil, Lenin believed in general equality among national cuftwres within a nation-sta te and general equality axnong socialist nation-sta tes within the Cornmuilist International when it was farmed in 1919, But he also assumed that minorities would see their economic interests in amalgamating into larger national units and remaining part of a socialist nation.51 He even suggested that minorities learn the doxninant language of their particular area for the same reason, Lenin could subsequently state that any minority had the political right to secede from a nation even as he maintained that this right would not necessarily be exercised. He always underscored his belief that nationalism is not an end unto itself.51 Proclaiming national self-determination as a transcendent right, however, conflicted witls the impossibility of grmting it once nations made the decision to secede from the nascent Soviet Union." Or, putting it another way3 the USSR fc~unditself in the position of extending this right only to those nations it did not control and only nominally to its own minorities. Taking this logic a step further, the cardinal problem of Lenin" sentire theory emerges: the horribie repression of nationalist aspirations in the Ukraille and Ceorgia,s4 and elsewhere, becomes legitimate in principle because imperialism under socialism is impossible by definition, Lenin still trtain~ainedthat the proletariat should play a leaditlg role in the anti-imperialist struggle and that tlse ultimate liberation of the colr~nies depended upon revolution in the Western nations, This stallce led him to break with his former Indian prottgci. Manabandra Roy who, anticipating Mao Tse-tung and Ho Chi Minhr, wished to highlight tlze independent role of the peasantry rather than simply subordinate its interests to those of other classes.sj Lenin called tapon his vanguard initially to offer support for bbpr~gressi~e'a bourgeois democratic revoi~ttionsin preparation for a cornmunist seizure of power. As against Stalin, who truly had no coherent policy for the underdeveloped world, Lenin sought to link the bourgeois struggle against imperiafism with the proletarian struggle against capitalisxn. He had argued that the Soviet Union should initially present itself as the supportive n i b of all bourgeois-nationaI-democratic revolutions. Only when the vanguard of clze proletariat and peasantry actually seized power should it become the model for rapid idustrial development along a noncapitalist path. r6 Nothing more than trust in the part5 however, prevents

negative from turning into positive support for the national revolution. Then, too, the rise of various neutralist states with very different ideologica l concerns would underlnirte the connection between an ti-imperialism and anticapitaiism-between serving as an alIy and serving as a model-that Lenin had presupposed, The two stages of the same revt->lutionaryprocess would, soon enough, turn into mutually exclusive strategic alternatives.57 Officially, of course, tl-re Soviet Union continued to offer itself as a model f ~ "pogressive" r movements in the colonial world, But its wiiliwness to ally with what were often reactionary military or religious regimes irnpt ied the need for retreat from tl-re revolutionary goals of the past. ""CounterimperiaIism7' rather than "anticapitalism" mscrbsequently became its overriding concern during the cold war. This did not necessarily preclude support b r genrlir~elyprogressive rrtovements and states in the former colonial world. Nevertl-reless, in keeping with changing national interests, the USSR arbitrarily designated as progressive any regime that claimed to oppose the Western b5imperiaIist'kenem~ Historical Qevefopmentswould shatter wl-rat remained of the original theory Globalization has nothing in common with Lenin" understanding of inlyerialisrrt and the explosion of sovereign states in the former colonized territories invalidates his views of the strugde against it, Resistance can no longer rely on ""natioilal self-determination.'' Human rights will instead piay an expanded role in contesting the arbitrary exercise of power. Dealing with transnational issues like immigration and the environxnent no less than poverty and the arrogance of dobal capital requires international parties, ~lnir>ns,and interests working within strengthened international institutions like the United Nations. A new cosmopolitan ideolr~gymight yet retrieve the commitment to social justice and democracy betrayed by so many nationafist movements of the past. In any event, however, the next progressive attexnpts to coordinate the interests of the wretched and exploited will have little in common with Leninism or the interpretive changes it suffered at the hands of its successors.

Guardians of the Revotutisrr Jn 1918, however, things were different. The Bolsheviks could look back proudly at what they had accomplished, All along, they were the ones who had dared, In tile prewar years, they had sugered innumerable hurniliatiuns. Before the war, as a minority, they had split Russian social democracy over the need to organize around a speculative belief in the coming revolution. When Vdcorld War I broke out, again% the tide of popular opinion, tbe Bolsheviks rejected the policies of the Wstern ""tabor aristocracy.'" Lenin stood by his principles and, refusing even to compromise with the

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""sociat pacifists" who now opposed the conilict, he alone called upon the international prt.>Ietariatto turn the war ktweerr ~lationsinto an international class war, Then, in October 191 7 , the Bolsheviks became the driving force for the first prolecarim revolution in world history, The others had talked; they had acted. N a y in 1918, the capitalist powers were ready to wage an ofiensive, and I,enim5s ""csmmunists'"ere faced with pet another challenge: defend the revolution that they had introduced. World War 1 had caused e.tlc>rmousdevastation, and it was still not over when the February Revolution of 1 9 17 brought a democratic provisional government into existence, Its leaders did not wish to offend crucial Western economic interests. They hoped to mailltain political support from reactionary segrnents of Russian society. They worried about the loss of Russian prestige in international affairs and t h y sought to preserve their l-ronor. The new regime led by Alexander Kerensky, for all these reasons, stubbornly committed itself to continuing the war effort even as it lacked solid backing: from its own citizens. As the war took its toll, the imperial army cruxnbled and the national administration fell into disarray. Workers spontaneously began to socialize their factories while, in keeping with Lenin's slogan of "Land, Bread, and Peace!" peasants started to divide the old estates among tbexnselves. Production came to a virtual standstill, anarchy ruled in the countryside, and the rtlbie collapsed. This indeed framed the context in which tlze Bolsheviks took power, They too were split over how to handle the war issue. Some like Bukharin wished t o cr~ntinuethe war in order to foster revolution in the West, whereas others feared the domestic econt~micconsequences of withdrawal. Lenin favored unconditional peace. But the party majority chose to disregard his arguments and instead backed Trotsky" position of '"neither war nor peace*" That polic~,however, turned into a disaster, As negotiations contir-rued at Brest-Litovsk, the German army penetrated ever lurrher into the Soviet Union. There was little time to spare when the Central Committee reversed itself and endmsed Lenin's sine. By then, conditions k r peace had grown stiffer and enorrnous chunks of territuv appeared to have been lost.58 But the Bolsheviks had garnered support from the most active proletarian eienlents of the population and passive support him segmelits of other classes like the peasantry, No other force could possibly have reesca"oiished stability by pulling Russia out of Wortd War I and saving the country from an antidemocratic counterrevolution whose ferocity would becsme so notorious that it actually aided the ""Reds" "ring the Civil War.5Vn 1917, putting the matter bluiztly, the choice was not betweerr a robust republic and the dictatctrship of: the proletariat. ft was rather between an unreyresentarive and ineffectual bourgeois democrat& whicll was clearly leading the country into chaos, or some form of authoritarian order. The question was merely whether that order would be White or Red,

The provisional government was plagued by dissension from the start, heyoild the disruptioils caused by the Bc-,lsheviks, and its other m a ~ o rnatiorlal parties were in disarray, No liberal party had serious support from below and none of eke radical parties would have been willing to cancel the enormous fc~reigndebts the imperial regime bad amassed." But there were other issues as well. The Social Revolutionary Party was paralyzed over continuing the war effort and it quickly split, Its small '"left" faccion rerained a revolutionary democratic program, though it lacked a genuine mass base, while its large ""rght'9faction had a strong base in the peasalltry, but lacked a coherent political prograxn. It was indeed d ~ inability e of the Left Social Revt>lutionaries to harness the discontent of the peasantry that led them into their shc~rt-livedcoalition with the Bolsheviks, As for the Mensheviks, the tradition4 enemies of Lenin, their support for the war and the provisional government left tl-rem with only a narrow base of support among the prcjletariat. The soviets were, moreover, obviously disorgmized and they lacked a plan for either waging the civil war or reconstructing the economy on a national basis. Thus, the Bolsheviks emerged as the only political force on the Ieft capable of linking the interests of workers and peasants arid t'orrrtulating radical policies t'or dealing with a nation still enmeshed in war and threatened with counterrevolution, Lenin's abolition of the provisional government could have been justified either through cfianneling power to trtore radical institutions like the soviets or by calling for new elections to a new and more representative Constituent Assembly. With the soviets generally seen as defir-ting the new regime and a civif war looming 017 the horizon, howevel; he believed there was no going back to a republic. But the soviets would never rule Russia. Though. workers organized from beiow in 1918 to secure contrc~lover the shop floor, and money vvas effectively abolished, this had as much to do with the collapse of the ruble as ideological comxnitxnents. With the onset of the civif war, "'6reen" anarchist bands, under the leadership of Makhno, reigned over parts of Russia and dealt with the Reds and the Whites as circrrrrtsrances dictated. Internal sabotage and assassinations grew more frequent. Administrative and economic disintegration cr~ntinued,The Whites, meanand military support from those previously while, began receiving eco~~u~rtic warring Western states whose elites now realized that they l-rad something in common: a desire to end the communist experiixent.~~ "Those who are not far us are against us" became the rallying cry, It was when the war broke out in 1918 that support for the Bolsl-reviksand support for the Russian Revolution became identical in the eyes of the world.^^ As Trotsky traversed the f oviet Union, irtdefatigably organizing and directing tl-re nascent Red Army, a ferocious civif war raged whose outcome was by no means a Eoregone cc~nclusion,With the country isolated within the inrternatiorzal commnnitr, hcing economic collapse and internal revolts, it

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was no wander that the Bolsheviks should l-rave become obsessed with unity, discipline, economic efficiency, and the administrative centraiiaation of power. Jn this way, revolutionary euphoria at the level of the soviets combined with the party's policy of ""war cornmunisxn" to create the parallel construction of a new society-from the bottom up and from the top down, Amid sabotage and starvation in the cities, armed detacl-rments of Bolsheviks seized food from the peasants and attempts were made to collectivize the cstmtryside. But this only led to a further decline in agricultural production, especially given the allied blockade and the skills of the peasants at woiding requisitioning. Rationing soon became necessary along with the manifest need to rebuild Russia" shattered transportation and co~rtrnrmicatio11 systems. Thus, a centrally controlled ""militarizationof labor" was instituted that conflicted with the suvietsAesire for decentralised democracy, Contradictions between erids and means, which had already been intimated in The S t ~ t eand Revolution, became apparent as the ""heroic period" of the Russian Revolution drew to a close. The years from 1918 to 15321 were marked by experimental social policies. These ir~volvedeverything from introducing abortion rights and divorce to attacking antiSemitism, fostering awnt-garde culture, and transhrming everyday life, Nevertheless, underpinnkg these developments was a draconian economic and political policy that, most agreed, would have to give way before a new approach. The Bolshevik triumph in the civil war seemed to trtitigate the need for "war communisxn" and its l-rarshest authoritarian controls. The trade unioils demanded democracy, an end to the rnifitarizatioil of labor, a i d the protection of workers from further austerity trteasures. As peasant revolts spread throughout the countryside to protest the first experiments with collectivization and hrced requisitions,a Ertoreover, nostalgia arose far the irnmediate aftermath of the revolrrticzn. Opposed to both the Constituent Assembly and tl-re Bolsheviks, harking back to 1905, radical proponents of the soviets sought to extend democracy through a new commitmeilt to decentralized shop-tloor corztrol rather than to a general prograrrt of ""workers' controleWb"he cry grew for ""soviets without Bwlsheviks9?hat w d d culminate in the Krc-~nstadtrising of 1921 and its ruthless suppression under the stewardship of Trotsky." "Indeed, Richard Pipes was basically correct in fabeling this year as the "false Thermid~r,"b~ Just when a decisive reaction against the Bolsheviks vvas taking shape, interestingly enough, Stalin began his rise ttr genuine eminence within the party," The specter of counterrevc>Iuticzn and economic despair still lingered. The communists naturally feared the political demands of the Krol~stadtsailors more than any econmic demands, And so, foliowing the

insurrectian, econornic changes were made to assuage tlze peasants and the workers. Though Lenin and the Bolsheviks surely remembered that the demand for economic capitalist rights had helped undo Robespierre and usher in the Thermidor, war communism was scrapped soon after the Bolshevik victory at Kronstadt in favor of the New Economic Program (NEP) of 1921. This program introduced the "second period" 'of the revolution (l92 1-28), It was time h r a ""breathing spell" 'both at home and abroad. Lenin elaborated this belief in LeRWirtgr Co.n.rmunism:An J~faurti(eDijordel; which called upon the newly bunded Communist International to oppose revohtioilary adventurism and instead crlncentrate upon building unioils and mass parties throughout Europe, He also admitted that the NEP involved a revolutionary retreat, Money was reintroduced and a system for taxing agricutt ~ ~ r production al was instituted. In the countryside, forced requisitioning and collectivizatiolil came to an end as peasants were allowed to sell their surplus olx the open inarket, At the same time, the Bolsheviks took control over the ""cornmanding heigl~ts"of the economy, emasculated tlze soviets, ended the militarization ul labor, and began to industrialize in a slow regulated fashion. Thns, in exchange fc~rpc~iiticalcontrol, the party was willing to risk the return of capitafisrn and, in exchange for future xnodernization that would benefit workers, it granted peasants the right to earn profits from which the state could gamer income through taxes.. NEP was a cornproxnise faslzioned by the party to placate the divergent concerns of classes with conflicting interests. But bureaucracy blossomed as midd!emen (""NEP-~nen'"profited from the market atmosphere while class distinctians grew in the countryside, Even worse, a "price scissors" "med. As increased farm production led to lower prices far agricultural products, minimal gains in manufacturing exacerbated demand and generated high prices for industrial comrnodities. Though the poor crop of 1924 texnporarily solved the crisis, the price scissors foreshadowed futum peasant discontent,bVn that same year, Lenin died at the age of fifty-hr: Wlzile despairing over the Soviet Union's bureaucratic degeneration, and the power Stalill was amassi~~g, a stroke had already left him incapacitated in 1922, By then, all frirces hostile to the Bolsheviks had beer1 vanquished. But the civil war had Left the party decimated and, more oxninously, previously extra-party forms of opposition had begun to express their interests fmm within the party itself. That was why Lenin decided to instifilte a "temporary" h n on factions. The need for discipline had seemingly become more pronounced just as it appeared necessary to open the gates of the party and admit untutored and unskilled "workers from the bench." This situation gave new importance to the position of General Secretary occupied by the still relatively unknown party bureaucrat: josef' Stalin.@

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The Civil War created the foundations for what would follow. Originally, the Bolshevik obsession with poiitical hegemony had derived from an almost frantic attempt to create power out of a vacuum, Lenin and his followers believed that the councry was beset by a host of conflicting interests unable to grasp the general will or establish any revolutionary amhority capable of enft3rcing effective rules for conflict resolution.70 Its quest for order and centralized au~hority~ however, left the communist leadership directly pitted against what would become an array of competing forces: the Kerenky government and those who desired a constituent assembl.): the soviets, other socialist parties, tl-re trade unions, and ultimately even internal party dissidents. But, while the Bolsheviks were shutting down ail the institutional structures wherein such conflicting ""factional'"interests might be expressed, the divergent collcerns and interests of extra-party groups did not just disappear. They simply shifted frorn one political arena to the other: from the provisional government to the soviets, from the soviets to the trade unions and peasant associations, and finall?:,once other cssrtpeting institutions had been eliminated, frorn these organizations to the Comnnui-ristParty itself, Wit11 the failure to realize the promises of a bourgeois revolution, as Rosa Luxernburg anticipated,7ha~horitarianismfed upon itself and the public realm became ever more circumscribed. The responses by the Bolsheviks to these countervailing forces did not merely constitute a set of discrete, instrumental decisions, Revolution and counterrevolution created a situation in which one repressive act quickly became a precedent far the next. A political dynamic took shape, justified by the needs of the part)., that gave credence to Max Weber" famous stateinent that ideolog is not like ''a cab, which one can have stopped at orre" ppleasme: it is ail. or nothir~g.'"L The vanguard party tried to stand above the interests of particular classes and groups. But what was possible for a party leading a revolution became impossible for a party leading a state, ft quickly became apparent that the new order had not solved the problem of class conflict. Lenin even admitted as much when he put forward the polemical question: "'If the ram and the goat Ml out, rBust the lynx of counterrevolution be allowed to devour them both?'' The vanguard identified its interests with those of the proletariat and the socialist state. But, frorn the very first, a qriestion lingered, Was this state really either proletarian or socialist? Lenin himself had admitted that the Soviet Union was a "'dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry." Attempting tct identify socialism with modernization, and the nationalization of industrial concerns, he stared openly that the nascent Soviet Union would be lucky if it entered the stage of '"state capitalism" in the near future," Was the party building capitalism or building socialism?

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The best for which the party and the revolutionary masses could hope was the elimination of precapitalist conditions under a state they believed was ultimately preparing h r a future leap into the socialist realm of freedam. Each step towards modernization would have to be presented as a step tc3wards socialism and any cc~mpetingclaim as a threat to bath the national irrterest and the revolutionary project. Ethics was thereby thrown into the battle and made subservient to the cause. Even before Stalin, morality had been subordinated to the class struggle; moral was seen as what serves the interest of the party a1-d immoral as what hinders it, fn keeping with Trotsky and others, against the eternal and universal catechisrm of morality, Lenin consistently maintained that ""communist morality amounts tc-, the struggle for the confirmation of proletarian dictatorship,"x Teleolog imbued the party and its dictatorship with a historical ""pivilege" over all other parties and states. Allegiance on. the part of tl-re mernhership was unconditional: the party retained the ""truth" 'of the historical process or, as Brecht wrote in The Measures Takert, "the party has a thousand eyes, we have only two." With the legitimacy of tile party resting on faith in the inevitable triumph of socialism in the USSR, a myth of ihllibility was gradually wclvetz around its leadership and the choices it made. 75 'Wecessity" was increasingly used to justiif. every mistake and every retreat, But the refusal of Lenin to countenance checks on the party and its dictatctrship, his support for the invasion of Poland, his overestimation of revolt~tionarysentiment in Europe during the X-reroic years, were not ait matters of histc-,rical.necessity, It was the same with his initial advancement of Stalin and his general faults in matters of persorrnel. Lenin was blind to the institutional consequences of policy choices like his ""remporary" reliance on terror or his ban on factions. Until the very e d , in fact, Ire never realized what Max Weber knew: ever). organization tends to become bureaucratic and every hreaucracy seeks to grow even at the expense of those whose interests it claims to represent, Only through the use of myth was it possible to evade the col-rsequences of these insigkts, Indeed, only through sucl-r a "myth" could Lenin's followers justify their power and present the Soviet Unioi-2 as what it clearly was not: a s~~cialist wr>rkers>tate.

Into the Darkness Lenin had named and criticized, albeit some mtlre forcefully than others, a number of passible successors in his famous "Last rfestament": Leon Trotsky, Grigory Zinoviev? Wi kolai Bukharizz, Georgi Pyatakov, Lev Kametlev, and Josef Stalin, The first, the logical candidate to inherit Lenin's mantle, would he tried ir-2 ahsentia and later murdered in IMexico by an agent of the Comintern: the others would ail be judicially liquidated hp the

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last, and least famous, of the group, None of the rivals to Stalin fasl-rioneda program capable of dealing with the new situation fc~llowingthe death of Lenin: the hilure of the international revolution, the changed role of the party, and the requirements of industrialization. Stalin l-rirnself would vacillate on all these issues and this served him well. more was involved, however, than the failure s f the other conte~idersto formulate an insight into bkecessity" or grasp ""objective conditions," 76 Their political miscalculations and inadequate skills at political infighting, no less than their commitmerit to democratic ce~itralism,were just as important in their defeat, ftatin's "revolution from above" z d v e d various issues begged by tl-re Bolshevik conquest of power and the isolation of the Soviet Union following the failed uprisings in the West. It identified internationalism with support for the slogan of ""socialism in one country'Yt ttransbrmed a revolutionary into a bureaucratic party to meet the needs of " s ~ c i a ~ i s t ' ~ construction in a nonrevolutionary age. It confronted the economic backwardness of the USSR by combining rapid industrializatiw with forced collectivization of the peasantry, It, tinally, answered questions regarding the duration of the dictatorship, and justified the reliance on terror, with the self-serving claim that class struggle wouId inevitably sharpen during the construction of socialism. How was all this accompIished?77Stalirr3srise in the party had been Lznspectacular, but steady. Born in the province of Cectrgia in 8 7 9 , he had served as a bank robber, guerilla, functionary, and party leader, Considered an expert on the question o f nationalities,78 he had caught the eye of Lenin who raised him to the Central Committee. There he stayed in the background and built a network af contacts, Using l-ris new position of General Secretary, Stalin slowly began to appoint his prot6gCs to administrative vacancies caused by the civil war. Cautious and duplicitous, he became a power broker par excellence. After building his foundation at tl-re base, Stalin was SOCI~Ienough in the position to seek support from prestigious Bolsheviks like Kameriev and Zinoviev in what would become his momentous battle against Leon Trotsky. Indeed, whatever his enormous visibility, Trotsky had become vultlerable. Though most clearly idetitified as Lenin's partl-rer and heir, he had only joined the Bolsheviks in 191'7, and many stilt rernernbered his bitter conflicts with Lenin from 1902. Party Eunctioilaries and leaders alike feared the former leader of the 1905 Petrograd Soviet, organizer of the assault on the Winter Palace in 1917, architect of the Red Army, and conqueror of Kronstadt, They distrusted this profoundly Western intellectual who was as c o ~ ~ k ~ r t awriting ble literary criticism? or history, o r political theory, as negotiating the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, As arrogant as he was brilliant, Trotsky's popular appeal and woridwide v i r t ~ ~ofe his posifame actually worked agairrst him in party circles.T"y

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tion and personality, unlike f ta lin, Trot sky ultimately found himself forced to take a stand on every issue. As time went by, any sense of nuance vanished, and he became identified with an ~znco~~promisingly radical foreign policy along with a rigid antipeasant and proindustrializatim line, It also did not take much, especially with the help of Stalin and his friends, for party officials to think that in Trotsky it detected the specter of ""honapartism." Thus, the myth of "Trotskyism'hmerged.~" Trotsky" aannhitious and is~competei~t c>pponents like Kamenev and Zinoviev lacked any coherer~tvision for the future of the Soviet Unio11. Beyand their personal dislike of him, however, they leared that Trotsky would upset the delicate compromise between classes that had emerged from NER Stalin played on those fears even as he refused to take a definitive stand. And so, while joining the attacks on Trotsky3he shrewdly undermined Kaxnenev and Zinoviev in order to pursue a new alliance with the leading Bolshevik economist and theorist of NEP: Nikolai Bukharin. E-Iis support came horn the peasmtry and, anticipating the policies of Mikhail Gorbachev, Buklzarin wished to continue NE13 in order to steer a course towards market socialism.8We also soug;hr a more moderate foreign policy. These three concerns along with his personal, ambitions led Bukharin to ally himself with Slalin rather tlzan Trotsky. It was already too late when Zinoviev and Kamenev attempted to reconcile with Rotsky in a futile attempt to oppose the general secretary and his new supporter, After the dust lzad settled, tlze "Left Opposition" was squashed. Once Trotsky had been deposed as a potential rival, however, Stalin quickly turned against Brrkharin, The general secretary appropriated Trotsky's earlier calls for rapid industrialization and, assuring himself a built-in scapegoat fc~rthe future, readmitted his @eat enemy's supporters to the part).. Thus, "Stalinism" "began with a dramatic left turn in 1328 that brought the second period of the revolution to an end. Jealousies and intrigues may have marked the struggle to succeed Lenin. But political controversies were carried on within a fr~ndamer1taXfrarnework of political agreement, No major figure questioned the primary of the party and democracy only became an issue when a particular faction found itself out of power, They all identified morality with the interests of the party and thereby, once Stalin took over, lacked any independent moral foundation for further resistance.82 Ait of them aiso wished to avoid a potentially explosive confrontation with the peasantry and all believed that industrialization constituted the prerequisite for socialism. Every claimant to the throne of Lenin understood that the revr>lutions in the West had beer1 lost-at least temporarily-and that the Soviet Union was threatened with encirclement. ~ndeed,whatever their particular disagreements over foreign polich all of them also endorsed the ""reuoiutionary privilege" o' f the USSR.

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All this has fed many commentators to conclude that tlze develr~pmentof the Soviet Glnioil woulid have been fundamentalty the same even if Stajin's enemies had gained corrtrol," "st as the ~zttraleftis unable to distinguish alternatives for capitalisxn, however, its enexnies have ignored the alternative possibilities that existed within communism. IVore was ixlvolved during the second period than simply a choice betweeri the principal actors: Buklzarin, Trotsky, and Stalin, Each brought with l ~ i ma coterie and, wlzen considering the policies of the victc-~r,it is often forgotten that Stalin" lieutenants had as much, if not Inore, to gain from the e h i n a t i o n s f the opposition as he did, Each also had divergent opinions about whether prioriw should be given to the needs of the proletariat, the needs of the peasantry, or a compromise between classes, A genuine choice existed between different stpIes of leadership with different aims and, ultimatel!; different policies.84 The party a h n e was capable of making such a decision and herein lies the prirtciple responsibility of Lenin and the Bolsheviks for what followed, The outcoxne would have been authoritarian even if Stalin had been defeated, All members viewed the party as sovereign. But there were different ~lnderstandingsof what this implied.gVrotsky and Bukharin boch suyparted its early ""txnparary" el.eor of 1919 and the suppression of the Kronstadt sailors, Neither of them ever seriously considered the need far a permanent reghre of fewor, however, let alone one that wouId make the party subordinate to the secret police.86 Their understanding of the party was similar to that of Lenin, Their disputes, no matter how vitriolic, were still carried on along political lines, Under Stalin, however, power would be used to settle grudges." Old mistakes were rehabilitated: other charges aside, for example, Mamenev and Zinoviev would be condemned for breaking party discipline by publicly opposing the seizure of power in 1917 even though Lenin had accepted them back into the party. Party fife changed and party rule would exist in I l m e only: the entire organization became subordinated to the will of Stalin. And so, by the end of elze 15330~~ tlze Communist 13arty had little in common with the old vanguard.g"rotsky and Bukharin were Bofsheviks: Stalin would ultimately ban use of the term. He replaced the "ibolshevih-'" with tlze "apparatchik'bllo was cruder, more subservient, more bureaucratic, and iess trained in the traditions of revolutionary struggle.gVTl~e party of '"professional revolutionary intellectuals" was turned into a party of fawning bureaucrats and thugs. This clzange was connecred to a burgeoning clillrate of paranoia and corruptictn that Stalin consciously fostered.90 The Soviet Union under Stalin was indeed run less by a government in m y ordinary sense of the word than a "miixtttre of conspiracy, Mafia, and court."'" If not riecessariIy in theor5 then certainly in practice, a sharp and decisive break took place beween Leninism and Stalirtism.

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The greater the concentration of power, tl-re more omnipotent the leader, the more importallt become y uestians of: political style. Trotsky and Bukharin were cosmpolitan intellectuals with sophisticated artistic tastes.92 Their interpretations of Marxism were, whatever tl-reir faults, very different than what Stalin uilderstood as ""dialectical materiallism,"~h is hard to believe either would have championed Stalin" sater attacks on natural science or quackery like ""Lysenkaism." There is also little evidence that either would have instituted allything like what Trotsky called the ""Stalin school of falsification" or consented to the rewriting of history and retouching of photographs in order to glorify their own exploits and abolish those of their critics. Trotsky and Bukharin were far more sympathetic tc-,modern art than their rival and neither was ail advocate of "socialist realism."g"ndeed, while both supported nggative censorship over works that were explicitly critical of tl-re revoIution, neither ever demanded that scbolarly or artistic works must positz'ueiy support a particular party standpoint.9" Rotsky" economic program emphasized the need far rapid industrialization, It undc~ubtedlylacked the moderation of the NEP that Bukharin sought to preserve. Neither Trotskp nor Brtkharin, however, envisioned simultaneously industrializing and collectivizing the nation, Terror would probably have been employed. But their supporters were of a different political caliber than Stalin's and, again, whatever their faults, they did not employ power purely for personal advancement or to settle old grudges. Trotsky and Bukhariil were assimilated Jews, but it is unlikely that either would have engaged in the anti-Semitic campaigns of Stalin" slater years. Both prided thexnselves on their ruthlessness in the name of tl-re cause, But Bukharin was a better administrator than Stalin, Trotsky would undoubtedly have made a better commar~derin chief: Yq-rundreds of tlzousands of lives, perhaps millions, were unnecessarily wasted dttring the early stages of the German invasion of Russia in 1941, Indeed, wbtever the failings of Trotsky and Bukharin, their policies opposed those of Stalin when it came to Nazisxn and a host of otl-rer issues,

Stalinism The triuxnph of Stalin was predicated on his recognition that tl-re failure of the Western revolutions constituted more tl-ran a temporary setback, His provincialism served him well in the llew coi~text,He understood better than his opponents that the time of the ""professional rev~lntionaryinteltect~~al'q-rad passed: a new communist with less exalted attitudes was required for the great task of:socialist construction, This undertaking was, moreovet; heroic and revolutionary in a new way. The goal of Stalin was more con-

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crete than the international revolution identified with Trotsky and more inspiring than the calltiaus reliance on established economic policies exhibited bp Bukharin. More was involved than rnti~lessnessor terror in winning the great struggle for power. There is a sense in whicl-r Stalin was looking to the future while his enemies were anchored in the past, Industrialization of the USSR was the foremost priority when Stalin took power in 1928. Such a policy, however, presupposed greater agricultural productivity and Lower prices for farm goods, Production had increased in the NEP period. But the policy had also resulted in the formation of a wealthy peasant stratum, or kulaks, wl-rich controlled rnuch of the yearly crop and kept it off the market due to lcrw prices. If grain was tight for domestic consumption, mtjreover, it was alscr inadewate for export, This only made things worse since agricnltural profits were seer1 as the source for investment in heavy industry. Such was the context for Stalir-r" '""se-tcond revolution from above" in which he undertook to cdlectivize agriculture and industrialize the country sirnultaneuusly.97 Agricultural profits would now be requisitioned even as industrial development was undertaken without the appropriate degree of investment, Lahor discipline was employed against the proletariat by lengtl-rening the working day, introducing piecework, severely punishing unexcused absence, issuing residence permits, Lowering wages, rationing food stuffs, and exploiting child labor. But the peasantry suffered the most. They died by the rnitlions due to the combination of incompetence by tl-rose charged with collectivization, the unrealistic expectations of Stalin himself, the ambitisns of the secret police, and the artificid famines induced during the 1920s and 1930s. But that wasnk all. The prospects of success for the new policy obviously depended upon eliminating recalcitrant elements in the party OF those identified with the interest of either class. Indeed, if introducing the new industrial plan was possiHle only by empowering the secret police, it simultaneously demanded instituting a new "'cult of the gersonali ty. '' The first five-year plan was greeced with tremendous entl-rusiasm. But the "'plan" ddid not constitute an integrated program for development. Instead, it called for the rapid modernization of key industries without any regard far consumer needs.98 InefGcicncy was built into it, which helped create the basis for a semilegal black market and also was used to justify the coming terror, Structurirtg the plan in that way, no less than enfcjrcing it as Stalin did, was a choice rather t b m a necessity.gVts unreachabfe production goals, and barbaric enforcement, ironically, brought a measure of success in the devehpment of heavy indrtftr)i'"Us one plan iollowed anotl-ref;however, the price of success became ever higher. The myth of infallibility surrounding the party and its Leader thereby took on increasing importance, Evwthing was thrown behind the modernizing effort: constriction of sex-

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ual freedarn occurred in con~unctionwith the increasing regulation of art and the condemnation of free time. Every cost paid by the populace and every step in the creation of a police state was iderrtified with the creation of socialism. The jusrification for all of this was the ideological postulate of Stalin, which ran counter to the thinking of lt/(farxnt>less than the views of Trotsky and Bukharin, that class cor~flictmust intensify the riearer a nation gets to socialism. Terror was used to answer every problem, correct every mistake, meet every criticism, and confmnt every particular interest or co~intervailing force, Conspiracies were uncovered everywilere. 131atswere "exposed" &at sought to overthrow the USSR and its Stalinist leadership, A11 this only intensified the original paranoid fears-thereby drawing ever mare rigid boutldaries between ""us'"and "them" kboth poIitically a i ~ dmt~rally.The terror insured atomization and unity with the figure of Scalin by suttversing all i~~termediate institutions stmding between the individual and the state. Ever). segmerit of the population was affected by the waves of terror. The terror was both more and Iess tlzan an atteinpt to extract the most out of i ""pimitive socialist accumulatioil," It was not merely a matter t ~ attacking the class enemy, but of consolidating Stalin" personal rule and squaring old grudges.1" The terror struck friend and foe alike, and terms like "guilts' ail$ '5nn0cence" became meaningless. Indeed, E-llailnah Arendt was correct in suggesting that the very arbitrariness of the terror was crucial for the success of the new totalitarian regime.102 Attacks on individuals in the part5 mosdy industrial experts, had taken place earlier. But the assault on the party as an irtstitution began in response to the assassination of Sergei Kirov.1" He had been one of Stalin's early sllpporters and, as "the darling of the party," probably his last genuine rival. There remains littie doubt that Sta Xi11 himself orchestrated the assassination. But the most likely culprit took charge ol the investigation. Trotsky was transfigured into Satan and Bukharin was pushed into the background, The first major purge foilowed quickly, Then the Leningrad party organization, which had traditionally served as a base of Zinaviev's support, was liquidated. Soon afterwards, Zinoviev himself and Kamenev were r~urdered,Then came the Moscow Trials, highlighted by the sensational "confession'kf Bukharin-"Wext it was the militarh thereby leaving the Soviet Union unprepared for the Nazi invasion. The armed forces were demoralized, and there was confusio~iover the chain of command following the collapse of tlze Hitler-Stalin pact of 1939.1O5 Stalin reacted by renewing the terror and insisting that soldiers fight to the death. Those captured were deemed traitors and, making good on his word, after the war thousands of repatriated Soviet soldiers were shipped to concentration and labor camps, Suwicion and distrust were not by-prr>ducts of Stalinism, but rather essential to it, The beginning of the cold war brought

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with it new demands for absolute partisansl-rip, which fed ta a new domestic terror in 1946-48 and its extension into Eastern Europe.1"" The results were monstrous, unimaginable: it is estimated that prisoners in a m p s by the late 1940s numbered between twelve and fourteen mittion.107 There had emerged, in short, what Daniel Rvusset would tater call a ""concetltration camp universe." "Necessity" &Q not demand any of tl-ris. It did not dexnand tl-re horrendous inefficiency, the terrible waste in lives, the blunders in military and foreigrl policy, or the corruption and the lying. History did not somehow require the countless individual incidents of bestiality recounted so graphically by the survivors,f" There was no telet-,logical impetus leading from Lenin to Stalin and it makes little setlse blavning the utopia11 element in Marx,lo9 fet alone what was branded in the notorious Black Book of G o ~ ~ u ~ asz s" hI e. left ~ idea," for totalitarianism. It has already been shown how d i f f e ~ n interpretations t of Marx, and the "left idea,'" could produce very different outcomes. Tndeed, precisely for this reason, those seeking a teleological explanation of Scatinism stand in danger of defining their a~lricommunistposition by the very thinking they oppose. Communism and Nazism: a difkrence exists between a philosophy bent on exnancipation, which was eventtaally corrupted by its supporters, and a philosophy that was rotten from the start, Communism envisioned a free and equal ""association of producers,'khereas the Nazis called for the subordination of the world to the "master race." One may not have lived LIPto its claims but tile other was something no decent person could, in principle, accept, Even if Stalin may have sought to achieve somewhat more rational and limited ends than E-Xitler,lfohowever, the structure of their dictatr3rships, the style in which their police operated, the "authoritarian personality'\of their supporters, the propaganda to which they listened, were roughly the sane, It is acadexnic wl~etherf t a l k emerged from witl-rin the prevailing system and Hitler was an outsider. It also matters little to susvivors whether Stalin was eng~gedin a modernizing project and Hitler was not: it is absurd to argue over whether the elimination of classes is somehow less appalling than the extermination of races. Getting drawn into this kind of cold war debate was a mistalee from the beginning. Tr constitutes an insult to those wl-ro sufkred so terribly under both systexns. But few are content with being ideological orpltar-rs and, ~ u s as t John D. Rockefeller gave away dimes to newsboys m d contributed to many charitable causes, comxnunists under f talin were supportive of various progressive struggles. Memories linger, Nostalgia exists for the old sense of revolutionary purpose, Many living in the new Russia look hack to the past and hope for the emergence of a new strongman in the future, Some xnay even recall the Dmous claim of Georg Luktics that the worst form of sociajism is better than the best form of capitalism. But they forget the retort of Ernst Bloch

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that the worst form of socialism is no s~cialismat all. Too much time has indeed been wasted dciending Stalinism against charges that it was worse, or no better, than Nazism, There is no room left b r erreuses or qualification. The malogies falter that once were drawn hetweell Stalin and Cromwell, Napoliei,n, or even Lenin. Each of them also played his part in destroying a generation. But they unleashed the progressive values of an incipient alternative order. Stalin left behind nothing worthy of being called a legacy, He trampled on every value of: the original iabtor movement, His regime led to the association of Marxism with a socialism of gray and communism with terrorpure and simple, hdeed, when the monster finally died in 1953, the profusion of public sorrow hid a sigh of relief.

The Communist International Stalin transformed world communism. Its former commitment to international class struggle gave way before an unqualified greoccupation with natiorzal interest, But it was again a sittiation in which Lenin himself laid the groundwork for the perversion of his ideas. Already while in Zurich during the war years he had begun planning for a new form of international organization with the power to enforce its decrees: the Second Interrlational had effecrive'iy declared itself bankrupt when its mcrnber parties chose to support their respective governments in 1914. Over the next few years, Lenin participated with other dissidents in what would becc~methe famous antiwar congresses in Zimmerwald and Kienthal. His stands, however, were certainly not designed to build his shrjrt-term influence within the antiwar opposition, The overwhelming majority opposed his demand for an attack on the ""sacial chauvinists" in their national parties, his slogans for turning the world war into an internatioilat class war and, above all, his calf for a new Third International.1 l l Lenin considered the creatioil of a new inter~lationalurganizatioil even more necessary in the aftermath of the Russian Revolution, The proletarian ~lprisingsin Central Europe and the burgeoning tide of anti-Soviet propaganda, no less than the dire straits of the fledgling diccatorsl-rip, made coordination among communists in different nations into a matter of some importance. Stlpport for the new Communist Tnternatiorzal m only logical during the early years of the revolution wllen the Bolsheviks were desperately waiting far salvation from abroad.i'z But, if the spirit of revolution still prevailed in Europe when the Communist International was established in 1919, no Communist Party outside Bulgaria had either taken power or found itself capable of effectively influencing its government by 1922. The contintzed existence of an organization dedicated to interna-

tional revolution certainly did not help matters. The USSR found itself isolated, impoverished, and in need of both allies and foreign investment, Lenin's misguided attempt to carry the revolution into Poland failed miserabl?r,N3and it was the same with other attempts to implernenc m ""offensive" strategy elsewhere."z" European wc->rkersbegan finding their way back to social democracy following these defeats and right-wing authoritarians took power in rnany countries: Hortky in Hungary, Pilsudski in Pc~land,and Mussolini in Italy. A counterrevolution was brewing and fear of communism was gripping the West, Lee- W i ~ gCommzlnkm: An hfanrile Disorder ('1920) antici yated the need for a revolutionary reprieve and it expressed the sentiments in foreign policy of what would become the New Ecoilomic Program. The pamphiet attacked the politics of ultralek revolutionaries in favor of building mass parties through trade union work and electoral activiry.jf5 Continued support for the Comintern, given this shift in line, would have been illogical unless Lenin and his followers were geiiuinelg concerned with preserving the unique identity of tl-reir movement, The Cornintern provided the Soviet Union with a revofutionrlry symbol and, perhaps more important, an organizational capacity to foster international action should more favorable conditions for insurgency arise. Its maintenance enabled the masses to see the shift in Lenin's foreign policy for what it was: the tactical holding action of a revolutionary inovenlent in a time of capitalist stabiiity.116 Lenin had originally designed his orgilnizatiwal theory with an eye on maintaining a revofutioilary commitment during nonrevolutionary periods. The same thinking explains his insistence that the acceptance of the '221 Points" serve as a condition for any party" entry into the Cornintern,"7 It demanded that every member party maintain ail undergrouild organization and, tlzrorzgh acceptance of ""democratic centralism,'\obey the instructions of the Cornintern. Sucl-r requirements, again, may have made sense in 1919, Given the noilrevolutionary context of 1921122, however, they must have appeared foofish in strictly utilitarian terms: these conditions csst the cornmuniscs dearly in Italy and elsewhere. But Lenin undoubtedly leared his Cr~nninternbecoming a new version of the socialist ir-rternatioilal, His inhis transigence regarding the 2 t Points is expiicable only by recog~~izing speculative commitment to international revolution that Qirninislaed during the ""scond period" "of the USSR and that completely eroded uilder Stalin, During the early years of the Comintern, the USSR was merely primus i ~ t e pnres,jfx r Its growing dominance developed due to the failure of the Western revolutions and its being lefr as the only existivlg "'socialiist" state, This context proituced Lenin's scattered references to ""socialism in one country" that Stalin would later turn into the fulcrurn of l-ris worXdview. Belief in this idea increased the sense of revolutionary privilege needed to justify the subordination of ail corn~nunistinterests to those of the USSR.

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Thus, foilowing Lenin" deatlz, what he had introdtlced as a holding action on revolutionary politics became a permanent feature of Soviet foreign policy, As tlze gap widened between the brutal present and tlze utopian f u t ~ ~in re the USSR, the need fcrr discipline and conformity grevv,lfY The 21 Points were used to realize this goal within the world communist mtrvement,l") The understanding of the vanguard and its attendant cornmitment to dexnocratic centralism was changed fram a tactic necessary to confront Russian conditions into a strategic postulate, Member parties of the Comintern became locked into abiding by decisions increasingly made in Moscow. The USSR became the focus of their identity and uilcr>nditional obedience the essence of their military style. Thus, ever more surely, the member parties of the Third International fcjund themselves slaves of the revolutiori that had already been achieved, ratlier than agents generating the transformation of their own nations. Securing such ideological obedience demanded coercion. ASone faction in tlze Soviet Union replaced anottier, and those in positions of autlzority were ousted, the substitution of one ""Line" f i ~ another r and the purge of recalcitrant members followed in the Comintern. This dynarllic becosrtes clearest in tlze case of the large German Communist Party (KPD). It began shortly after the Spartacus Revolt of 1919 with the expulsion of Paul Levi,121 the fc~rmer inrtimate of Rosa Luxemburg and her successor as leader of the party, for criticizing the disastrous ""rvolt~tionary" "strategy imposed upon the German communists by Lenin and Trotsky The next stage was worse: flew preoccupations with discipiille produced the ""bolshevization"' of the KPD in 1925-26 under the direction of Grigori Zinoviev in Moscow and his puppets Ruth Fischer and Arkadij Maslow in Berlin,"The last vestiges of a viable demtrcratic centralism were liquidated in that pwge. The substitution of Fisclzer and Maslow by Stafin's henchman, E r n s ThClmann, can indeed almost he viewed as anticlimactic, The foreign poficy s f Lenin was a radical interlude in the history of Russia:"3 his Br~lsheviksconsidered international class conflict as the strategic premise under1ying even the most conciliatory tactics. The secoild period of tlze revolution ( 1 92 1-28) r~arkeda time in which dissent became more constricted and rnernber parties were unable to develop any constructive policies. Stalin's foreign policy, however, eradicated any internationalist concerns. It sought only to exploit the conflicts between nations and reinstate traditional aims lzarking back to tlze time of Peter the Great: a barrier against invasion from Central Europe; warm water ports to the South; control s f the Balkmis; and security against Asia.lzYT'he result was a foreign policy whose dizzying changes of the '"arty line" ukimateiy dernoraiized and disillusioiled its own surporters

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In 1928, Stalin inaugurated the infaxnous ""t-rird period" with his ""scialfascist" thesis that identified social democrats with Nazis, All critics of co~~rnrmism were now lumped together and the Comintern refllsed to support repubfican regimes against rnounting threats from the Right, This sectarian policy would later be ~ustifiedby the belief that Hitler would only last five years and the seemingly revolutionary slogan ""After Hitler, Us!" lt clearly l-relped bring the Nazis to power, More might have been involved, however, than a simple miscaiculation by Stalin, Give11 his desire to intensify csnflicts among Western natiowstates, which would buy time for the USSR to industrialize, l-ris unprincipled "kle turn" may well have been predicated on a secret wish to have the Nazis in power. The year 1936 would witness a change in "line" when Stalin called upon co~~rnrmists evevwhere to support the ""popular front." C~rrlciailelections pitting the Right against tl-re Left were ready to take place in France, and it had become clear that Elitler would Iast more than five years.125 Dissatisfaction with tl-re social-hscist line had already become evident and, at the saxne tixne, a call far sdidaricy abroad might deflect criticism of the terrible purges taking place at hr>me. But this policy was also provisional in charactes: The communists refused ministries in Leon Bt urn's Popular Front government so that they might rexnain free to criticize it, Ferxnenting ""~volutionary" "discontent over its farmally neutral stance during the Spanish civil war, and its economic policies, they simultaneously opposed direct intervention in parliament and equivocated over the spontaneous strike wave of 2936, From tl-te first, wbatever the excellent organizing efforts of the co~~rnrmists, their support for the popular front was purely provisional. This was made clear in 1939 when Stalin concluded his i n k n o u s pact with Elitier, It sprang more from the perception that the West was Incapable of oyposirtg Nazi expansionism, and that Hitler offered a better deal, than tlre fact that a Sovier agreement with tile Western democracies was unreadable. A pact with Germany would, again, provide Stalin with time to reconsolidate his forces fczllc~wing the purge s f Marshai Tlrkhachevsky and the army Leadersbip,l26 It also promised the chance to extend the borders of the Soviet Zlniczil, remove Poland as a threat, and incorporate Lithuania artd Estonia.'" Stalin was indeed intent on meeting all his obligations to Germany and it is important to remember that participation by the Soviet Union in W r l d War II was occasioned only by the invasion of its terrirory in 1941 .Q% National interest understandably became paramount once the war began: it resulted in the dissolution of the Comintern in 1943, This step was taken in order for communist parties to fight against fascism bp using national slogans.'" It also enahled Stalin to deal with their leaders individually a i d thereby divide any potential opposition that might emerge in the afrermath

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of the war. Even more importandy, l-rowever, the liquidation of this ""rvolutionary" [organization appeared as an act of good will intended to convince the Allies that the time had come to open a second front a e i n s t Hitler. It didnk cost Stalin much, The end of the war brought a rapid expansion of communist influence along with a general euphoria that produced new hopes for the cotlli~lgpeace, The posibility seemed to present itself through the introduction of new organizations, like the World Trade Union Federation, intent on unifying social democrats and communists. Unfortunately, however, any prospects for such unity were doomed once the cold war began and social democrats, alxnost unanimousl-~r, sided with the West. The year 1947 saw the articulation of the Truman Doctrine, and Stalin was ready with his response, In that same year, the Cominform (Communist Tnformatiox~Bureau) was secretly convened in Poiand.1-30 Present were only the leaders of nine East Eurc~peannation-states, cantrolled by the Soviet Union; there was no participation by non-European parties, and the communist leaderships of France, Traly, and Greece were not even invited. The birth of the new organization was also imrnedialely greeted by a new set of pwges to insure the existence of reliable cc~mmunist goverr-rmentscm the borders of the USSR, Soon enough, NATO faced the Warsaw Pact and Europe was partitioned into spheres of influence, Since the lines were basicaily drawn where the respecdve armies of East and West had liberated the various subjugated nations from the Nazis, for all tl-re cold war rhetoric, tl-re division was already a virtual fait accompii by the war" end. Stalin essentially respected the lines of demarcation. Far weaker than the W s t both economically and militarily, l-re surely considered the acquisition of Eastern Europe well worth the cynical sellout of those revolutionary movements that existed at the time in JtaIy and Greece, The Soviet Union w u l d engage in only two instances of direct arrned conflict outside Eastern Europe: at the Chinese border, wl~ich points to the traditional fear of Asia by Russia, and in Afghanistan, which was seer1 as lying within its sphere of influence and necessary to secure its soutl-rernflank. From its vicrory in World War 11, the Soviet Union received almost everything that it had traditionally wanted: a barrier against European invasion, control of the Balkans, and warn-water ports to the Soutl-r. Just when Stalin was seeking to reaffirm his totalitarian control, hc~wever, challenges arose to his hegemony over the wt~rldcommunist movement, Tito asserted the independence of Yugoslavia in I948 and, following the triumph of .iMao Tse-tung, conflicts of ideological and practical interest produced the Sino-Soviet split of 1953, Far trtore signiticmt, however, was the success of anti-imperialist struggles and the ernergence of neutral states like India. Certainly by 1968, whatever support the Soviet Unir~nextended to national revolutionary movements, it no longer made sense to speak of a

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unified coxnmunist ""movement,"Ql Neutral nations no less tl-ran cornxnunist parties elsewhere would increasingly give or withhold support Eor the USSR on a case-bp-case basis.l"z The nation had squandered its moral capital. Indeed, long before its final dissoicxtion in 1991, the moral authority of the USSR had become a thing of the past.

Breaking

Chains

A new leadership composed of Nikita Khrushchev, Lavrentii Beria, Georgei Malenkov, and Viacfieslav Molotov appeared ready to begin the postStalinist trmsitioi~,It seemed clear to all i~lvoivedthat the USSR required a different approaci~to power in the 1950s.. ft could no Ionger be ruled on the basis of terror-thus tl-re elimination of Beria, tlte forxner head of the secret police and biographer of Stalin, It would have to distance itself hom the old administration and its inefficiency-thus the elimination of Maienkav. It would need a new and more principled foreign policy-thus the elimination of Molotov, an architect of the pact with Nazi Germany Khrrlshchev was not identified with any of: these insritutians and policies in quite the same way. A rnan who had risen under Stalin, and participated in his crimes, he called for reestablishing the primacy of the party and the power of the Central Committee.fl3" This indeed lay bel-rixld the secret Twentietl-r Party Congress of 1956 in which Stalin" crimes were partially revealed,l"" The congress signaled a more liberal attitude towards cultural expression and placed restrictions on the terror apparatus. Xt conde~nnedthe "cult of the personality'bnd marked an attempt to restore the principles of Ieadership associatd wit11 Lenin. C m p s were dismantled, political prisoners freed, and political officials were given some degree of securicy regardillg their psitions and their lives. The m o rigid ~ forms of conformity and censorship were relaxed. Uncetisored writings of atrociries and blunders associated with tl-re recent past were circulated and Khrusl-rchev personally intervened to assure the publication of: Qne Day i~ the Life of Itlnn De~zzsortich by Alexander Solzheni tsyn. In keeping with f tlkte a d Revolztion, moreover, Khrt~skchevsought to mitigate the alienation of ordinary citizens hy introducing new farms participation associated with what is now understood as civil society135 Leninism would be reinvigarated in order to overcorne the legacy of Stalinism. Reasserting the primacy of the party and the vision of a "full scale construction of cssrtmunism" had Ied Khushchev in 1961, while visiting the United States, to claim "We will bury you!" A bureaucratic party and increased production, however, could not change the meager prospects of international revolrxtion. Leriinisrn was never viable as ail establishmentarian

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doctrine and its priviteging of the party-state was a standing impediment to the liberal rule of law The new freedom was, in a sense, as arbitrary as the old terroc The extexit to which dissidents could dissent was never made explicit and Mhrushchev was in line with Lenin's way of thinking when he sent troops to suppras the anticommunist uprising of 1956 in E-Iungary, TAeninismhad helped pave the way for totalitarianism and, if a critical engagement with its autl-roritarian ixnplications was never undertaken, there were also limits to the constraints that could be imposed on what Sartre bad appropriately termed the "ghost of Stalii-t," The new leadership was itself implicated in the crimes of t1.e old regime. But the limits of reform did not merely derive from their fears. The public sphere of the nation and the myth of the party s t w d in danger of being wrecked through a full disclosure of the past, Aher all, it was Stalin who l-rad incarnated the very idea of sucialisxn for an entire generation. It was Stalin who had laid dr~wnthe industrial infrastructure. It was Stalin who had defined ctlltural life, It was Stalin who appeared to have brought the Soviet Union its victory in World War If. It was Stalin wllo l-rad been deified in every conceivable way. Indeed, it was Stalin who had given pmpose to the indescribable horrors fie had imposed on the Russian people during the 1930s and the war years. This fcrrmer sense of revolutionary purpose was lost after the dictator's death. Despite attempts to refashion party unir)i and perhaps even a cuft of Lenin,13Qthe old myth of historical infallibility surrounding the party was undermined by an explosion of semi-official criticism, With its breign policy defined by a narrow perception of national interest, along with the use of utleqltal trade agreements and ""mixed coxnpanies" to exploit its satellites,'" its own citizens began to doubt its pronouncements against imperialism, Even before the fall of Khrushchev, the nation started experiencing a deep malaise or, better, a keling that Kierkegaard, in a dirferent context, called the ""srckness unto death." k~roilically,by callling for a rejection of Khrushchev% "adventurisr~,"Brezhnev capitalized olx this trend. During his seemingly endless reign, soviet socialism becaxne identified with a joyless authoritarianism that served no revolutionary purpose and fostered n o libertarian goals, The ""fullscale construction of communism'" was abandoned as utopian aild even the trumpeted welfi2re state of the USSR could offer little to recommend it in camparison with Scandinavia, Stalin was partially rehabilitated in his more conservative aspects against: Lenin and, in keeping wit11 this move, the state machine received new fegitimacy. Its il~terestswere self-evictent, however, wile11 Brezhnev ordered the invasion of Czechlosfavakia in 1968. The party may have still been privileged in theory, but its bureaucratic and careerisr elements were given primacy in practice m d the attempt to foster civil society withered. The ~zomezklilrtzdrawas liberated from subservience to the party.138 In this

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vein, moreover, Brezl-rnev completed the transformation of the older Stalinist form of '"rash-planning73into an elaborately controlled and subsidized system wherein the prices of hunclreds and thousands of commodities were fixed by tl-re government amid a growing semilegal black market,flg in the face of the ppostcommunist transition, which has introduced bitter poverty and curtailrnent of state benefits, many now look back fondly on the Brezhnev years. Bm such nostalgia is misguided. Corruption was rampant and the decision to engage in an arms race with the United States l-relped produce the econurnic debacle that would Lead to the dissolution of the USSR, A new fc~rmof ""legitimation crisis," a p l o y i q the phrase of Jhrgen Habermas, began taking hold, Marxist rituals no less than the old Stalinist style had already been rendered obsolete, Mass cofrtmunicatit>r~ was subverting the remaining forms of censorship and turning culture into an international commodity Especially given the rise of Western living standards, it was becoming ever trtore difficult simply to denigrate consuxner goods in favor of military hardware white the bureaucratic elite, or not7.irenklalura9reaped the benefits. The USSR was also losing ecr>nc>mic ground as the Brezhnev years came to a close: most had become willing to admit that replating an economy of more than a billion articles was inefficient and that lack of accountability was creating a situation in which shortages were reinforced by waste. Freezes and thaws continued during the Brezhnev era as various elite coalitions struggled with one anr~therover adrni~listrativedecisions and budgetary priorities. Waiting in the wings stood a younger ruling stratum that included Alexei Kosygin, Andrei Cromybo, Yuri Andropav, Konstailtin Cherneilkceaild, also, ~MikhailGorbachev: The more rigid bureaucrats sought to defend against the future, h bitter conflict arose between the neo-Stalinist followers of Brezl-rnev and Chernenko and the young neo-leninist modernizers, supported by Andropov, who took power and held it briefly until his untirnely death, it was atready clear when the "period of stagnadon'+as finally corning to an end, however, that the old system was breaking dowil and that a radical adjustment to the imperatives of capitaiist accumulation w u l d have to take place.1" Nevertheless, iew expected the impact tl-rat Andropov" pprtkgk, Mikl-rail Corbt~cX-rev,would have on Russia and the world. Gorbaclnev maintained a commitment to the primacy of the part& but he also believed in the need for a dexnocratic rejuvenation (glluamg)of tl-re nation and the introductioil of market initiatives (pemstrol;Gcaf.Already in 1988, which marked the first televised Party Congress, Gorbachev sought to re-empower the soviets as popular electoral organs of day-to-day administrative and legal decisic-~nmaking.He called for five-year terms for elected officials and a new presidetitial system based on multicandidate efections by

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a 1,500-mernber Congress of People" Deputies that would also elect a 400member standing legislature, This radical undertaking did not occur ex nihilo, Indeed, nt:, less than Khrushcheti, Corht~cl-revand his supporters Legitimized themselves by making reference to a certain intmpretation of Leninism, They looked to the period g fight an of NEP and envisioned Lenin heading a party desperately t ~ h to increasingly corrupt bureaucracy and use capitalist tools to improve a fagging economy, Corbacfiev and his supporters wished to curb the bureaucrach roll back centralized planning, and gradually end collectivized agriculture. Their aim was to proxnote democratic management and self-administration in the factories and, by transforming the pricing system, make foreign investment more attractive. Spending on consumer goods was to be increased, aiong with discretionary income, while defense expenditures were to be c~lrtaiied. Control over the Eastern bloc was to be lc~osenedand reiations with tl-re Western democracies improved. New liberal cultural and political policies created a climate of respect abroad and, for a brief period, enthusiasm at l-roxne. Political prisoners were released and the possibilities for exnigration expanded. A reexamination c>f the Soviet past begall, Old Bolsheviks like Bukharin and Karl, Radek were rehabilitated and certain of Trotsky's writings were published for the first time. The specter of fear receded, Corbachev brought the cold war to an end. P3is fareig~rpolicy was bold and decisive, He called for a moratctriutrl on nuclear testing and experiments in cl-rernical warfare, and dramatic cuts in conventional forces, He was intent upon expanding the power of the United Nations and the jurisdiction of the World Court, In conjunction with the withdrawal from Afgilanistan, moreova, Gurbact-rev repudiated the Brezhnev Doctrine that justified interference in Eastern Europe to protect against "antisocialist" forces. His policies also provided the moral and practical impetus for the mass strikes that tumbled the old-line coxnmunist gavernrnents in Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and elsewhere: it was Gorbachev whose refusal to support repression of mass demonstrations led to the collapse of the Gerxnan Dexnocratic Republic. His 1989 Address to the Council of Europe illdeed expressed the desire to build a "common house,'bn expression coined by Leon Blum in the aftermath, of W r l d War I, which foreshadowed the integration of R ~ ~ s sinto i a the West. Perestri~ikahstered a set of rising expectations for immediate ecc-~nomic improvement. But the transition to a form of market socialism, perhaps on the model of Scandinavia, was sabotaged by the sheer inertia of entrenched bureaucrats who felt themselves threatened by glasnost. They tried to block the devolution of centralized economic authority At the same time, however, the introduction of 'kommodity money" generlzced new forms of competition for resources among the managers of decentralized units, Mong with new incentives and pricing policies, the emphasis on market

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mechanisms-especiaily in agriculture-produd inflation and other serious economic burdens for the working class, The new climate of freedom also fostered previously repressed nationalist sentiments among states comprising the former Soviet Union, Gorbachev unleashed the forces that would bring &out the disintegration of the UfSR.1" Perestroika and glasnost were not halfhearted measures. The institution of democratic procedures, the new comxnitment to the rule of law, the attack on authoritarian culture and the pestering virus of anti-Semitisrn, went beyond a simple reform of the old regime. They inspired a new fibera! vision of civil society, But tlze unrezllized expectations for immediate economic improvement resulted in mass resentment and disillusionment followed. The ensuing economic degeneration, the loss of interrtational prestige, the corruption of democrach and the seeming decay of moral values, would all he bXarned on Corb.1c-l-rev, The sheer rapidity with which evev-rts c>ccurredonly made things wwse: it would indeed seem that the USSR was ""oneday a 11ligl.L~ empire, the next, rubble, " l a Cmmunists condemned Gorbachev b r betraying the party and anticommunists for refusing to break with it. He found himself a u g h t between his early supporters of reform, now intent: on rstdicalizing the process l-re had begun, and the old guard equally intent on rolling it back, The right criticized him for his utopianism and the left for his conservatism, But they were both wrong, His undertaking remains the single most intelligeiit exyerimem with institutional democracy in tl-re history of Russia,

.

Endgame On August 19, 1991, the rnedia reported that a coup had been attempted in the Soviet Union: its failure led to the dissolution of the communist regime.1"" For more than forty-eight hours, the w r l d heid its breath. The forces of demt~cracywere pitted against those of authoritarimim. Mikhail Gorbachev staod under house arrest, Yanks ruxnbled tl-rrough the streets for the first time since the falf of Khrushchev in 1964, The Baltic nations of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were placed ~znderrnilitary rule. Resistance crystaitized around Boris Yeitsin in Moscow. Thousands gatl-rered at tile Winter Palace in Leningrad, perhaps the peatest symbol of 1%7, and elsewhere, Democratic media and newspapers were closed down; curfews were ordered in the cities. Troop movements in Soviet Georgia and elsewhere gave every indication that the coup had been planned Eor some time Glasnost and perestroika seemed ready to ~znraveland the nation stood on the brink of civil war, The seizure of power was attempted under the rubric of the "National State Emergericy Corrtmittee,'Weaided by Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov

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and President Cennadi Yanayev, both of whorn had gained their posts only due to the personal intercession of Carbachew, it was composed of representatives fro~nthe defense estabIishinent, the KGB, arid various cornmunist-dominated farmer and worker organizations. The incompetence exhibited by the Committee was remarkable. %Itsin and major figures of the giref~rm'hmovement,no less than other middle and low level opponents, remained free. The plotters overestimated the collesion of the arrny and underestimated the need fhr a recngnizahle leader. Nor were they able to articulate a coherent program to deal with the nation's ills. The undertaking was conceived without a clear dehition of leadership roles, a coherent rnilitary strateg).; or an understanding of the degree to which democratic political hopes had taken root. For all that, however, 250,000 handcufff were ordered and reams of blank arrest orders printed.. This w a ~indeed a ""putsch of f0ols." The plc>tterstried to stuff the genie of rebrm back into the bottle, They sought to reverse the trerid towards the "free market," a pluralistic society, and multiparty elections. Mainraining the unaccounra bilisy of the militaryindustrial complex, and fueling it with scarce resources at the expense of consumer goods, was their primary goal. Former ideological justifications, however, no longer made even superficial sense. Their offer of auuthoritarianism plus a discredited form of economic planning testified to the bankruptcy of com~nunisrn,its supporters did not so much corzfrorzt one view of the future wirh mother as, in the words of Zbigrliew Brzezitlski, attemp to set the future against the past, Structural factors doomed the junta. But they also created the fih-eiihood of a revolt in the first place. More was involved than the axnbitions of a k w power-hungry apparatcbiks or even a communist leadership sta~ldingin the shadows, An imyending unioti treaty i n ~ n on t redresskg the imbaiarrcr: of power among the states of the USSR, a worsening economic crisis buttressed by lack of economic support fi-om the West, the decay of the communist parry, and a political identity deficit, created the context in which contingent decisions were made. On August 17, 1491, just two days before the attempted seizure of power, Aleksander N. Yakolev-the so-called ""gdfather of perestr0ika"predicted a Staiinist coup as he resigned from the coxnmunist party, Months before, Eduard Shewardnaze, who had helped bring the cold war to a close as Gorbachev" foreign minister, stated publicly that dictatorship in tile USSR was irnminent and surrendered his post. Yakovlev was not taken seriously9 and it was originally assumed that the dictatorship of: which Shevardrlaze spoke was to have been led bp Corbachev himself. indeed, enough responsible people believed tl-rat his express request for these feaders to remaisl at his side was a mere ploy,

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Around the beginning of 1991, in between periods rnarked by concern over the disintegration of central authority, the Western press talked incessantly about how Gorbachev was af~assingpower. This was, in turn, used to justify the critical posture of Yeltsin and those ""radicals" wishing to speed up the economic and political changes that the Soviet leader bad initially set in motion. They supported a plan, tabled by Corbachev, to introduce tl-re market in ""S00 days," They called for dismantling the central state and autonomy fc~rthe fifteen republics. They condemned Gorhachev for refusing to challenge the militarh the KGB, and the still powerful communist bureaucracy. With support from the radicals eroding, he and the moderates turned to the "conservatives," Allies were I I C ) ~sought among those who had opposed perestroika and glasnost from the beginning, Jstdeed, often with hyperbolic ftourish, Yeftsin and Shevardnaze accused Gorbachev of poor judgment and perhaps even of having had a hand in the conspiracy.

Confronted by an implacable right wing seeking to ihitzit democratic change, and a radical Left wing seeking a rupture with the past, Gorbachev must have considered his primary aim to avoid civil war, A practitioner of co~~promise, he mistakenly believed that the c(~~nmunist parry could be reforxned. He also rnade serious errors in matters of personnel, trusting and q p ~ i n t i n gfigures who would play important roles in the attempted coup, Gorbachev undoubtedly bears a degree of responsibility fur the events, and he admitted as rnuch. His constant sbifling from one set of allies to another created uncertainty and a self-fulfilling prophecy regarding his own political. weakness. Jf Yakovlev and Shevardnnze were aware of a possible coup, however, it stands to reason that Gorbachev knew of it as well, A "mini-rehellion'' hd,after all, been attempted on June 17, 1991, when Prime Minister Pavlov, with support from the future rebels, asked parliament to enhance his powers at the expense of the president. Gorbachev may have sounded optimistic in public after heating back the attack, but he drew away from the raclicals in the following weeks. Perhaps he overestimated the extent to which cabinet posts would placate the old guard. Nevertheless, the claim that he should simply have dropped any connection to the party stalwarts can only be made otit of context. Sanctimonious comments by f tlevardnaze tl-rat Gorbachev ""skould have "listened to me' and 'quit'" "simply ignored political reality and the responsi~ have intensibilities of leadership, Divisiolls within the Soviet U n i o ~could fied, cornxnunists at the grass roots might have attempted to slow reforms even more, the country could have been thrown into gearer chaos, and the still pr>werful party might well have embarked earfier s n the adventure it undertook in August. 13erl-rapsa coup would have been attempted sooner or later anyway. But it also might have occurred under more propitious cir-

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curnstances, Had it succeeded, surely, Gorbachev would have been condemned by those who later criticized his failure to recognize fully the corruption of the commrmist party, Indeed, whatever the posturing of the rradicals, it only made sense for him to accernyt staving off a coup by seeking to work with conservatives in the communist party, It is a rnistake simply to judge the choices of yesterday by the evelits of today, That is especially the case given that the policies of the radicals helped gush Curbacbev to the right in the first place, They never explained how they wished to bring about a capitalist transformatioli of the USSR in 500 days. S~lbsequentill-conceived attempts would plunge the nation into virtual bankruptcy and there is something pathetic about Yeltsin's later admission; "'it was all more difficult than we first anticipated.'" The: radicals also opposed Gorhachev's sensible and progressive plan for the devolution of centralized autl~orityand tl~eyadamantly criticized his refusal to act sooner in offering autonomy to the republics. This makes it all the more ironic that Ueltsin should have left (office on January 1,2000, enmeshed in a genocidal war aimed at squashing the quest b r national seif-determination by Ghecl-mya. Then too, the radicals castigated Cc>rbachevfor maintaining a co~nmuxiistculture, thereby inhibiting investmerit and economic aid from the Western democracies. Respect for pariiarnentarism and the courts has notably declined under the corrupt regime of Ycltsin, however, and Eoreign inrvestment is still woefrllly inadequate. The radicals never co~isideredthat Western policy might have been predicated less on prudence or a ""capital shortage" than a desire to further weaken a disintegrating superpower. Gorbachev's attempt to affirm the spirit of social detnocracy, inr this vein, went hand in hand with an ever inore obvious internationalist cornmitment. By way of contrast, bowever, the new leaders of Russia have embarked on a riew riationalist course, often with riew expressions of nuclear saber rattling, and its standing among nations is far lower than it was in 1991, The problems of times past have indeed only been rendered more acute with the dissotutiori of the "former Union." f ocialisrn has, of course, been discredited, Identified with communist authoritarianism, rather than the democratic traditions of the Western labor movement, visions of the ""market" continue to irilspire reformers. Privalizing especially srndler firxns was perhaps unavoidable. An errelusive reliance on the market, however, was utopian from the beginning, Evevwhere the trar~sirionhas prove11 severe. Outmoded larger industries have provoked little interest frorn buyers and econornic hardship have forced most ordinary people to sell their publicly distributed shares in what are iargely failing industries, thereby produci27g an "iembourgeoisement"" of the nurnenklatura and strengthening the hand of an emergent Mafia. Representatives of the old bureaucracy and the new IVafia would indeed

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use their connections, cash, and expertise to dominate the new firms and wield eilormc>uspower in the new order. Distortion of all social institutions at the expelise of working people has been the consequence of an increasingly ineyuitabie and irnaccountable concentration of wealth. Pitting markets against state intervention in dogmatic hshisn is already no longer viable: the real issue is the degree of mix between them. Planning may l-rave proven notoriously weak in specifying consumer deinands, hut it is a mistake tc-,assume that the market will inevitably rebuild the infrasrructure, surmount unempIoyinent, or guarantee decent wages in the near future, Maintaining the welfare state is surely as pressing as the need h r policies devoted to fostering a free market. Economic desperation might lead many states of the former USSR to engage in various forms of economic cooperation among themselves as they look west for investment. But the wave of repressed nationalist passion unleashed in the wake of the cnwith industrial prr>drrctiurtand authoritarian control unfolded instead. History offers every movement only one cl-ranceat success: the task for the next century involves redefining the nt>tion of success and imagining anew the next mc>numents to freedom,

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A Bridge to the Present: Rosa Luxemburg and the Underground Tradition

Economic refc~rmismand political authoritaria~iismvied for influence over the labor movement for most of the twentieth century But there was always anotl-rer tradition lurking in tl-re background. Its trajectory would extend from the Paris Commune and the Russian mass strike of 190.5 tc-,the European workers' uprisings of 19 18-23 over the Spa~iishCivil War and to the student revolts of 1968. Its partisans were eclectic and bound by a spirit o f revolutionary humanism and libertarian socialism. most of them are regrettably forgotten. The most visible representative of this underground tradition remains Rosa Luxemburg.l Two films have been made about her, she rernains the subject of scholarly work,Z her death is still marked by mass demonstrations, and the German Party of Democratic Socialism has even named a foundation alter her. Luxemburg was one of those genuinely charismatic personalities who extracted intense loyalty horn her hiends and, according to cllose who participated in l-rer classes at the social desnocratic party school, she must also have been an exceptional teacher. Luxemburg had her difficulties as a Pole and a Jew But she made her way, She confronted the sexism of inany in the Second International and she sl-rowed tl-rat a woman could become a major theorist, a superb orator, and a leading revolutionary activist. Her brutal death at the hands of protofascist soldiers during the Spartacus Revolt sf 1919, and the later camrnunist assault on the ""syphilitic bacilllis of ~~ her as a genuine heretic and an Luxemburgism" "ring the 1 9 2 0 certified autl~eriticinartyr.

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It was understandable that, following her death, friends should have begun publishing works intended to humanize Luxemburg in the public eye.' But the crlrrelit preoccupation with her personal life and her sense of identity, or lack of it,"has resulted in a discussion more inrent on determining what she was, or how she should have "felt," than what she thought and what she did. Luxemburg herself would have had little use for any of this. She scorned all attexnpts to "transform political questions into persona!, sentimental ~ i l e s , "And ~ she was right. Luxemburg was ir-rdeed sensitive and brave and she died tragically. Brtt there were surely trtany men and women-just as sensitive and just as brave-who died just as tragically. The point is to discern her real contributions. Luxemhurg" sensibility and charisma say nothillg about her salience, There is n o use artificially trying to turn her into a forerunner of fe~rtinist theory or practice," It also makes little sense debating her Jewish or Polish "'identity" 'or suggesting that her support far national cultural autonomy somehow mitigates her critique of the right to natisnaf self-determination. Luxemburg was uninterested in tl-re influential Jewish Bund in imperial Russia, she rejected Polish natioilalism, and she vehemently disageed with activists intent on farming a separate women's movement like Lili Braun, Luxemburg deserves to be judged in the terms by wl-rich she defined herself, Her struggles were undertaken in the name of socialism, democrach and internationalisxn, Sl-re was beholden to no dogma. fl-re ernplayed the method of Marx to contest his own predictions and claims.' Consistent in her attacks o n reforrrtism, and clear about the authoritarian dangers of cornxnunisxn, her reflections on the mass strike are remarkably salient in thinking ahrout 1989, Ekr views oil inter~latioilafismand ""self-admiilistration" a k o strike a chord given the need for a progressive response to globalization. There is something invigorating, moreaver, ahout her radical understanding of democracy and its rcde in public life. Indeed, perhaps more than any other thi~tkerof the "'golden age,'"~er ideas speak to the concerns of modern activists intent upon changing the progressive discourse.

Internationalism and Imperialism Born in the fittte city of Zamosc, 13aland, in 18'71, to a middle-class Jewish faxnily, Rosa Luxemburg experienced, firsthand, the terrible Jewish pogrom of 1881 in VVarsaw.8 It left an indelible mark and she would maintain a profound concern with what is today called human rights. tuxernburg never sought to deny what she was, but she refused to make what she was the foundation of her politics, Her position came down to the following:

The duty aE the class party of the proletariat to protest and resist national appression arises not from any special 'right of nations"just as, for example, its striving for the social and political equality of sexes does nor at all resuit from any special 'rights of worncnhhhich the nlovemcnt of bourgeois emancipation refers to.. Tl-tis duty arises solely from the general opposition to every form af social inequality and social domination, in a word, from the basic position t>f socialism.9

Luxem burg first became involved in socialist politics during her high school years wllen she participated in various clandestine and semiclandestine organizations like the radicatly internationalist and partially. terrorist Her activities Ied to her tliglzt shortly after gradc>rgailizationPrOkll~~aridt~lO ~lationfmm Poland to Zurich, where she met her future lover Leo Jogiches who, whatever the personal. and romantic conflicts between t h e ~ n , ~rc-' mained her political collaborator until her death. In Zurich she studied mathematics, natural science, law, and political econoiBy at the rmiversity There she also first systematicaiIy read the works of Marx and Engcls and completed her dissertation The I n d ~ s ~ r i Derrelc~pment al of Poi~nd(1898). Xts conclusions stood in accord with those of her articles for the journal she and Jwiches founded in 1 5133; Sprawa Robofizicxs (The WorkersToice),'" The Jrrdustrz~lDevelopme~tof Potand argr~edthat Polish industrial development was dependent upon that of Russian capitalism. The implications were clear: support for Polish nationalism must prove counterproductive for st>ciafists since its success would hinder the general economic developrrtent of the Russian empire on which the expansion of the proletariat depended, It would also underxnine class solidarity and divert concern from overthrowing the czar. Luxemburg no less than Lenin sought to make a b0urgeois r e v o I u t i ~against ~ ~ the inclinations of an underdeveloped and servile bourgeoisie, But she drew different conclusions: the weakness af the bourgeoisie would make any practicai concession by an ideologically cohesive proletariat unnecessary This belief put her at odds with the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) and its chief, josef Pilsudski, who would later defect from socialism altogether as the dictator of Poland in the 1920s. TA~zxemburg and Jogiches wished to place primacy upon securing a constitution for the Russian exnpire rather than national self-determination for Poland, This indeed led them to form the Social Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania (SDMPL). Luxernburg" critique of nationalism was distinctive, She opposed the support for Polish independence given by ~Marxand EngeLs and then seconded by Kari Kautsky and tlze major figures of the Second International.13 It was a daring position for her to take, Luxemburg may not have learned the lesson of 1848 when she identified nationalism solely with the interests of the bourgeoisie and the petty-bourgeoisie. Unlike Trotsky or Lenin,

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moreover, she proba bly never fully coxnprehended Marx" strategic idea that the national revolution had to serve as an opening to tbe permanent international revolution. Unwilling to remain content with merely quoting what &Varxsaid, however, she was unabatid to contest his stance in the light of her empirical reseafch and with an eye a n its modern implications.l4 Th~ls,IAuxemburgemployed Marx's method to criticize his own posititin on Polis1.r independence.25 Virtllally all her contemporaries assumed that support for nationalismwhether in the form of respect for "national" "interests or sel&determination-could stand in accord with internationalist principles. Bernstein wrote little about the matter: it was enough that the quest for politicai reforms should take place within national boundaries and, in the best scenario, that their acl~ievementwc~uldfoster cooperation betweeri nations. Xt was, of course, different for Lenin. He endorsed the ""right to national selfdetermination" as a principle and a constituent element of the international revolutionary enterprise. He rlever assumed that every minority would exercise this right, given econornic exigencies and the existence of m ideotogically disciplined vanguard supposedjy immune to nationalist temptations, Lenin surely anticipated the rise of national liberation movemerits in a way Luxemburg did not: sl-re was clearly mistaken wllen, following tlze onset of World War I, she claimed that national wars were no longer possible.26 But, ironically, Luxemburg understood the power of natianalisrn better tl-ran her opponents, In contrast to Lenin or Bernstein, for l-rer, it was not susceptible to manipulation by the vanguard and its allure could not simply he forestalled bp the prospect of economic gain. Luxemburg never considered nationalism as a necessary step in bringing about internationalism. Instead of relying upon historical ""laws," or the march of the ""dialectic," "she always insisted on establishing a plausible relation between means and ends. Luxemburg believed that an unqualified commitment to the right of national self-determination would chain the socialist movement to the ideology of tl-re very class it opposed.17 Championing nationalism would prevent workers from understanding the class structure of the state and its increasingly atavistic character in the light of global capitalist expansion. She also recognized that securing civil liberties dernanded mare than the institutional blank check provided by the uilyualified commitment tc-,nationalism, Morerlver, she believed, this ideolrlgy could only help inspire militarism and imperialist ambitions. Luxemburg would indeed develrlp this idea in The Accumzklation of Capital / 1913 ) . What became her major economic work, once again, pitted her against Bernstein and Lenia-as well as, in a certain way, Marx l-rixnseif. Luxemburg sought to investigate the systemic coilditioils that made capitalist accu~~ulation possible rather than the empirical or organizational b r m s

that capital would take. She agreed with Marx that goods had to be sold in order to accumulate the pmfits that capitalists would reinvest to perpetuate the systerrt. Brtt she claimed that his analysis in the second volume of Bas Kapital had not fully grasped the implications stexnrning from the growing i~lrbalancebetween the increase of goods and the buying power of constimers. Because capitalist production outstrips demand, according to Luxemburg, there is m appafcl.nt incentive fnr mpitalists to reinvest, Unless s w h investment takes place, however, the system will collapse, Something within the very strucrure of cayiralism must subsequently allow for the consumption of its surplus and the likelihood o f reinvestment, The ability to export what has been overproduced to prccapitalist territories thus becomes the safety valve for the systerrt. Or putting it another way: capitalism not only depevids upon imperialism, but the existence of noncapitalist areas is required for its very swvival. Insofar as these territories are brought into the capitalist orbit, bowever, the system produces its own ~ Z S ~ O T Z C limit L J ~ beyond which looms its breakdawn. But that is for the future. The interim will be marked by imreasing competition among capitalist states for these steadily dirninislling precapitalist territories, Herein lies the connection between capitalism, militarisart, nationalism, and imperialism. Lenin was wroilg. Imperialism is not the "highest stage of capitalism," according to I,rrxemburg, but a constituent element of capitalism frcm its inception. This calls into question his belief that the proletariat must engage in a two-stage process of revt>lutionin which it must first ally with the bourgeoisie against the colonial aggressor under the banner of natiollalism and, only then, atsexnpt the socialist revolution, By the same taken, against the revisionists, Luxemburg stressed that imperialism is not susceptible to reform. Effectively opposing it is impossible without opposing capitalism. Socialist politics xnust su bsequentl y abolish its political reliance upon "mtional interest" in favor of an internationalism alone capable of furthering the anti-imperialist struggle. This positior7, indeed fit perfectly with the argurnent outlined by Luxexnburg nearly twenty years earlier in The litzd2.1striaiDevelop~7.irentof Palalzd. Luxemburg never assutrted that the breakdown of capitalism wc~uldmechanically result in the creation of socialism.18 But she did maintaii~that a breakdown was inscribed within the logic of the system and that capitalism could not continue once it became a closed system, With her insistence that overproduction is the cause for the impending crisis, moreover, she ignored the fact that economic crises can result from any number of causes ranging from a falling rate of profit to faulty credit policies. I,uxemburg underestimated the role capitalist governments can play in warding off disaster by subsidizing industries, manipulating fiscal policies, and introducing welfare legislation. She paid little attention to how busirtesses can

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overcome stagnation and avoid coltapse by reorganizing or simply intensifying exploitation. Luxemburg also tended to forget that economic crisis can serve a positive function for the accumulation process by clearing away inefficient industries and failing xnarkets, Nevertheless, the marginality of her imperialism thesis was not merely due to its logical flaws. In contrast to the theory of Lenin, whose arguments ~ustifyhis belief in the need for a vanguard, her perspective lacks any organizational or stritregic program for anti-imperialist struggles. The elegance of her structural analysis does not comyensatc; for her inability to explail? why nationalism has proven so dorninant arnong the expioired. Her rejection of ""naconal self-determination"" would also not villy conflict with the interests of many nationalist cIiques, which claim to rule in the name of the masses, but gerhaps also with the genuine sentinlerits of the masses themselves, Her powerful descriptive theory, in short, lacked any major insights for political practice, The Accumuliaficrz of Capital provided a retort to those right-wing social Qernocrats who believed that capitalism was not dependent upon expansion and that, if pursued, imperialism could take the form of "'peaceful expansion." in contrast to the rekjmers, however, Luxemburg offered no possibitity for rnitigatiftg imperialist policies other than by revolution, Sl~erejected their belief that imperialist policies retain a csntiqent character even as her theory made it difficult to explailn why not every capitalist state elllbrstced tl-rern. Imperialism became, for her, an all or nothing proposition. Its political character, its independent dynamic, was obscured by her economic theory. The Acc~muliktiortof Clapif~zlis devoid of both the organizational implications of Leninism and the possibilities for intervention offered by rcvisionism. Imperialism is lefr as a structural component of capitalism breeding the worst ideological values and the most dangerous practical undertakings. Bttt that is insufficient, ""Socialist" sates I-rave clearly nut been preserved from imperialist amhitions and it was not simply economic motives driving the imperialist policies of Nazi Germany in Russia or the United States in Vietnam, 'The choice is also never simply between revolution and despaic Imperialist policies have been successiully contested within the hamework of capitalism and, especially in the modern era, international instit~~tions are becoming increasingly capable of opposing tl-re imperialist ambitions of certain nation-states. Rosa Luxemburg iived her slogan that "the International is the fatherland of the proletariat." But she uilderescimaeed the importance of transclass movements and international organizations, like the Red Cross, dedicated to peace* Luxernburg also did riot envisiori a situation in which it would become necessary to support existing international instit~~tions in spire of their '"bourgeois" "character, But her work contests the still popular attelBpts to identify the left with nationat or ethnic aspirations. it also begs

questions concerning tl-re need for new forxns of international coordination predicated on new understandings of class coizscit>us~zess, Her thinking c m indeed only inspire the development of a new internationalist form of political theory,

Organization and Empowerment Following shortly on the completion of her thesis, uninterested in retrirning to Poland, Rosa Luxernburg arranged a marriage of convenience, She left Zurich for Germany, whose Social Democratic Parry (SPC)) stocd at the center of the world stage and served as the fortress of orthodox Marxism, TArzxemburgwould remain active in East European politics throughout her life, and many of her friends and followers like jogiches, Feliks Dzersinski, and Adolf Warski played prominent roles in the communist movement, Neverthefess, she w u l d gain her worldwide fame in Germany, Kautsky took l-rer under his wing, August Bebel, Franz Mehring, and Wilbelm Liehknecht noted her combination of intellect, boundless energy, and oratorical skill. She agreed with their contention that socialism was the inheritor of enlightenrneilt political theory and her outlook was already teleological. She understood the revolution as the work of the great majority of society, which capitalism would render proletarian, and its aim as the establisl-rxnent of civil liberties and republican institutions, She was already willing to judge issues in terms of their impact upon the ""seif-administration" 'of the working class." But she was also proud that the SPD had grown to the point where keeping it illegal 'had become impossible for the German authorities, That the labor movement was growing elsewhere only seemed to justify the a~nalgamof reformist proposals and revoluticr>nary theory in tlie Erfizrt Program. Her shock was real when Eduard Bernstein began publishing the articles that would comprise Euolutionlxr)! Socicalism. The eruytjng storm brought her into the iimeligilc wlzile sl-re was still in her twenties. Other more famous figures had already entered the fray. But Luxemburg provided the most articulate resyollse to the revisior~iStheresy in her painphlet Reform or Revol~tion(1898). It too opposed claims that capitalism was no longer ""objectively" and ""revitably" "~ome-td to destruction, that the middle strata were 0x1 the rise, and that the extension of credit had overcome the contradictions associated with tl-re capitalist accuxnutation process,"WShe too insisted that capiralisrn must be seen in structural terms rather than in terms of ""empirical capitalists'" who, accordkg to Lrzxemburg, hacl by now given way to xnonopoiistic f i r m and trusts,z1 Her work highlighted the structural, contradictions of the production process and refused to subordinate them to questions of redistribution.22

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Capitalism is also seen as bearing nu intrinsic relation to dexnocracy, It can coexist with any number of political forms, and it constitutes no "'general law of hi~toricdevelop~~ent,""" Luxemburg rejected ""economic determinism," and any crude division between base and superstructure, Thus, even in 1898, she coulld note that: kiateriatists who assert that econo~nicdevetopment rushes lleadlong, like an autonomous locomotive on the tracks af history, and that polidcs, ideologh etc. are ccjntetlt to toddle behind like forsaken, passive freight wagons-you urank find evcn a trace of such a conception, not evcn in the most backurard Russian provinces (and, as you know, in this respect, they are very talented in Russia; on recluesc they will prepare for you such a gruel t>li>tdand new marertalists that you wiII feel ail toj~)sy-turv~y). If ever you st~oujdfind S L ~ C ~aZ prodigy, have hit11 exfiibited in the waxworks.~4

Reform or Revolution ofkred rnore tl-ran a simple defense of established beliefs. Luxemburg considered the warnings against any "pre~natt~re" seizure of power, which had become a staple of orthodox Marxism, absurd since they always posited a fixed point outside and independent of the ctass struggle as a basis of iudgxnent*" She maintained that the SPD sl~ouldbe a party of "'class struggle and not of "historical laws."'2~ And so: where Bernstein called upon the SPD to alter its theory to fit its reformist practice, and Kautsky wished to reassert the objective truth of Marxism, Luxexnburg demanded that the party act in accordance with its self-professed revolutionary goal. Understanding the goal in purely metaphysical terms would result in adventurism, according to Luxexnburg, wllile ignoring the goal entirely would transform the struggle for socialism into the struggle to ameliorate capitalism.27 Her pamphlet constituted an attempt to help social democracy "grope on its road of development between tile following two rocks: abandoning the mass character of the party or abandoning its final aim, faljitlg into bourgeois reformism or into sectarianism, alarchism or opport~nl~m."~~ But the immediate daxlger in 1898 was reformism, Its contempt for theory was, according to Luxemburg, an intrinsic part of its appeal.% Its unacknowledged philosophical assurnpions retained practical implications: an unwiHingness to lc-,c~kbeyond the llistorical moment and the given system, She considered its exclusive emphasis upon short-term interests dangerous for the long-term prospects of the movement, Luxernburg wauld subsequently reject the proposal of the arch-revisionist, Max Schippel, that the SPn support an increase in military expenditure in order to reduce unemployment," Indeed, from the beginning, Luxemburg argued that the work of the party must be based less on the prospect of economic benefits than the pursuit of princI&)ie,

Her pampl-rlet offered a political critique concerning the limits of economic reform, It showed why trade unions can never govern the actual level of wages or resolve the contradiction betweeri the social production and private appropriation of wealth under capitalism, Dealing with the structure of the econom).; according to Luxemburg, demands political power, Without it, so long as capitalism exists, any reform granted under one set of conditions can always be retracred under another: Luxemburg rejected the evolutionary idea that one reform will build upon the next and that socialism will ""automaticatlp'\ernrge from the daily struggle s f the working class.31 She would indeed earn the undying hatred of the unions with her claim that their exclusive emphasis oil economic issues would result only in a "lahor of Sisyphus." But Luxernburg was equally scathing in her criticisms of vanguardism, An acknowledged expert on Eastern Europe within the Second International, she kept abreast of developments and welcomed the creation of a unified Russian Social Democratic Party (RSDP) in 1898. She also knew it would be beset by tensions between those wishing to imitate Western social democracy and a younger group intent on transforming the organization into a revolutionary "vanguard'Vfor the struggle against a serniabsolweist police state. Undereslimacing the extent of the breach between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, which few fully understood, Luxemburg called for unity following the bitter RSDP party congress of 1902. As her l-ropes dwindled over the years, however, she rnoved away frarn the Mensheviks who bad begun allying themselves with Pilsudski and the PPS, Neverthefess, she would remain committed to the spirit of her original response to Lenin's W!?a6?atIs To Be f)~;t;re?(2903) and 0 ~ Step e Forward, Two Steps Back ( 1904). When Lenin" parllghlet first appeared, inerestingly enough, it caused very little fuss in the West, Given the backward econornic and political conditions of Imperial Russia, it seemed merely a cruder exposition of what everyone already knew: the party incorporated the politic4 possibilities of the proletariat, party members must accept party discipline, and party activists, who were usually intellectuals, must forge the ""cunsciousness" of the masses. Luxemburg was among the few who recognized its importance, She stood close to Lenin on most political rnatters pertaining to the Second International, But her essa).; QvylxtzizatiozaE Qzcwtioas of R ~ s s i aSocial ~ Democracy j 1904), rejected his emphasis upon bringing revolutionary consciousness to the working class ""Eorn the outside." it also insisted that consciousness could uilly emerge organically t h r o q h the democratic interaction bemeerr a party and its constituent+" Many consider Lttxemburg an apostle of '%spontaneity.""3 But that is a mistake. She recognized the need for political organization, but she was also in tent on mitigating its burea~zcraticdevelopment. An organic under-

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standing of the class struggIe informed her equalty organic understanding of the way in which class consciousness arose from it. If she considered Lenin's notion of the vanguard more indebted to Rlanqui than to Narx, and contested his military understanding of organization, sl-re also considered the trade unions as primarily "defensive'bnd rejected the technocratic character of revisionisrrt. Achieving economic reforms, in her view, did not directly translate into political power. She understood that organizing a disparate and fragmented working class required some degree of centralization. But she feared an "ultracer~tralism""that, while seeking to prevent opportunism by fiat, would undermine the prospects of proletarian self-administration, Thus, she could write that: If the Social Democratic tactics are not created by a central coil-tmittee, but by the whole party-or better still by the whole rnovement-then it is obviously necessary tl~atthe inciividuat party srganizadc~nsI~avethe elbow-roc~mwhich alone rnakcs possible the crtiiization OF the rneans presented by the givcr~situation to strengthen the struggle, as well as to develop the revoXutionary initiative. The ultracentralism whicl~Lenin demancts seems to us, I~owever,not at all positive and creative, but esserltially sterile and ctarntnccring. IAenin9s concern is essentially the control af the activity af the party and not its fruition, the narrowing and not t l ~ eticveft>pmenr,the I~arassmentand not the unification c>f the movement.34

Luxemburg believed that political decisiomaking trtust depend upon public debate at the base, Tf socialism is to transfc~rmworkers from ""dad machines" into the ""free and independent directors" of society as a whole, as she hoped, then they must have the chance to Learn and exercise their knowledge* Building corzsciousness at the base was, for her, more important than simply elnbracing the instrumental exigencies of the organization. Thus, in what would hecc->mea famc->usphrase, she frankly admitted that ""erars made bp a truly revoiutionary labor mtlvernent are historically infinitely more fruitftri and more valuable than tl-re infallibility of the best of all possible 'central committees,""""' Just as she rejected the vision of a party run by bureaucrats, and almost exclusiveiy concerned with econoxnic iss~~es, she opposed the idea of a revolutionary organizatioil intent upon erecting an "absc~lutedividing wall" htween members and According CO Luxe~nburg,whik the party should seek to inpuelzce the masses-by formult3ting a program, carrying on with revolutionary agitation during periods of 1~11, and playing a fundamentally pedagogic role-it should not have the arrctgance tct rule them. Freedom was, in her view, never identifiable with the intaests of the vanguard.37 The key to her political theory is m org~nizatianaldialectic wherein the party should actually seek to create the basis for its own disappearance.

Tl-ris rneans mobilizing the latent self-adxninistrative capacities of the masses. But Luxemburg never specified any particular relation between the moi~entsof "t~rgaxiization,enlighteriment and struggie.'Yerhaps that was only sensible since tlle relation bemeen them woufd be constantly shifting, In any event, however, she had little use f m rigid organizational proscript i o n ~Her , political aim was simply tct confrolit the socialist means of struggle with tl-re dernocratic ends tl-rey were meant to serve. That would prove difficult enough,

Mass Action and Solidarity Luxexnburg was always concerned more with the working class than its organization, Opportunism was, t'or her; a way of shifting the emphasis in the wrong direction'" This form of thinking was, for her, the handmaiden s f burea~zcracy.Organizational hierarchy, instrumental reason, regulated division of labor, and routine all militate against the self-administration of the proietariat. Resisting revisionist calls for evolutionary refc~rmor an authoritariarl vanguard, however; seemed possible only if its purposive aim-the revofution-had a secure phitasophical foundation. And so, in keeping with her elders, she chose tc-,view ~Warxismas a ""sience." hxemburg was aware that class consciousness was a contingent phenorneaion and she needed the objective insight into reality upon which the subjective accion of the proletariat could rely. "Scientific socialism" provided the rational basis for her belief in the future sticcess of her radical democratic vision, Placing the empowement of the class over the exigencies of the party would put Luxemburg at odds with the party regulars of birth social democracy and commux~ism.it turned her into an outsider far more surely than her background or her gender. Her probiexns began with the enthusiasm she expressed for the Belgian mass strike of 1902,39 m d the personal attacks against her intensified during the Russian Revolution of 1905. The future was seemingly prefigured in these new expressions of dmocratic self-&inistratioil, Luxernbmg saw bow a general strike by over 300,0630 workers had spread from the cod towzls to Brussels, thereby paralgzing the state and resulting in various radical political reforms, if nor, to her dismay, the enfranchisement of women,-'" The uprising subsided, But when the next strike wave broke out in Russia, she was ready, Her concern with crystallizing practice in theory inspired what is undoubtedly her finest work: Muss Strike, Party9 and Trade Ufzz'onsf 1906). Luxemburg called for importing the new form s f struggle into a11 old world: the East should now offer guidance to the West. The general strike had originally been the philosophical province of anarcho-syndicalism before Trotsky's coilahorator on the "permanent revolution,'Viexander

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Helphand, better known as Parvus, appropriated it far Marxisxn.41 h t Luxemburg went further, She interpreted the mass strike as reflective of new historical deveIoyr~entsto which genuine revolutionaries m s r respand. f he again ernplayed tl-re method of Marx against the positions taken by Marx himself, Thus, in keeping with her approach to issues like Polish independence, she could write: ""lf,therefore, the Russian Revol~ztionof 19005 makes imperative a fundamental revision in the old position of Marxism on the yuestion of the mass strike, It is once again only Marxism whose general methods and viewpoints have thereby, in a new form, won the victory, The Moor's beloved can die only at the hand of the Moor."42 Luxemburg viewed the mass strike not merely as a single spontaneous action ill the mailner of the anarchists, or even certain radical socialists, but as a process. And this only makes sense given the historical context of its composition, It: is, after alt, misleading to speak of the Rt~ssianRevolution of ""1905," A strike wave had been building since 1902, when workers rose in Batui~.In December of that year the strikes spread to Rostov-on-Don, while 1903 witnessed outbreaks first in Baku and then in Tiflis, Odessa, Kiev, and other cities, Nevertheless, it was only in 1905 that this movement gained worldwide attention with a strike of 140,000 workers irt St. Petersburg, which prodticed a ""sviet " whose ""presiding spirit" was tl-re youthful Trc>tsky.43 News spread slowly to the West, but when it fir-rally came, it struck with incredible force. The response in the bourgeois press was hysterical. Luxemburg was castigated as a traitorous Jew, a ""blood-thirsty hitch," a Polish agitator, and much worse, The Reverend Friedrich Narrmann, leader of the 13rogressiveParty, attacked her personally for supporting violent revolutioil in tire East while sitting safely in Germany. Her answer was to take a pseudonym artcl leave immediately for Warsaw then still part of the R~issianEmpire, wl-rere tl-re revolution was in progress, There, before her arrest in 1906, she experienced firsthand the power and innovative possibilities of the masses in democratically organizing their r~ilieu,Her observations are quite telling: Workers everywhere are, by themselves, reaching agreell-tents whereby for instance, the employed g ~ v eup one day's wages every week for the unemployed. Or, where ernpfsyrnet~tis reduced to four days a week, there they arrange it in such ;Iway that na onc is Iaid off, but that cvcryonc works a fcw hours less per week, Atl this i s done as a ~l-tatterof course, with such slrnpliciry and smoothness that t l ~ e1)arty is infc~rmedc->fit onty in passing. . . . And then too, an interesting result of the revolution: in all factories, cornmitrccs, eiiected by the workdecide on all tl-tatters relating to working ers, have arisen 'on their own,"Mich conditions, hirings and firings c>f workers, etc. The employer has actually ccascd being "he master it1 his owl1 hou~c.'~*I.

But, for alI tl-rat, the prospect of a mass strike in Gerxnany provoked a party crisis on par with the revisionism debate. Between the genuine fear it created among the propertied classes and the middle strata, and the jingoism it artificially generated on the far right, the SPD suffered its first severe electoral defeat, Nearly half its parliamentary seats were lost as nonprc~letarian voters abandoned the party in the elections of 1907. Jts right wing was incensed. Openly threatening to split tl-re trade unions from the party, blaming the loss on the radicals, the trade union Ieader Karl Legien made the conservative yositiori clear when he stated: "the general strike i s general nonsense, Not much support was fc~rrficomingfrom the followers of Kautsky He had helped garner funds t o secure Luxcmburg" release from a Polish prison. No less than Bernstein, howeve5 he was skeptical &out her romantic depictions of events, Kautsky criticized her transforxnation of what seemed a tactic into a general strategy. The mass strike might prove useful f0r ""defensive purposes," o' r to prevent incursions on gains already won, but its "~ffensive"employment was another matter. Kautsky castigated Luxemburg h r adventurism and ignoring the prospect of governmental repressiori against both the workers and their organizations, The political differences between them illtensified until they exploded in 1910, whereupon Luxemburg found herself relegated to the Ieadership of a relatively small ""radical'Vaction within the party But the broader implications of the split were even worse. It immeasurably strengtl-rened the right wing of the SPD whose partisans would ultimately cause the party to endorse the entry of Germany into World War X, Luxexnburg's theory of the mass strike took the dexnocratic irnpulse within orthc~dr~x :Marxism to its most radical conclusiotl, It confronted what she considered an artificial distinction betweeri the economic struggle of the trade unions and the politicat. struggle of the party, The mass strike can, in this w a b be seen as offering an organic response to the concerns of both Bernstein and Lenin.""t was, after all, neither tl-re culxnination of a policy tlrat stressed incrememal economic reforms nor the product of a plan by some central committee. Luxemburg saw it instead as the spontaneous result of empirical developmerits i ~ d i r e c t l yinfluericed by a party engaged in a pedagogic pracess, Thus, she argued the need for prepamtor?, work and the creation of ""lriction" htween classes, Manifesting the latent possibilities of the working class, while perhaps lasting years, the mass strike would undoubtedly ga through periods of radical ebb and flow-" Understanding the mass strike as an expression of proletarian self-administratic~n,and irreducible to any estahiished organizationd form,"' she viewed it as the "phenomenal form of the prc~letarian struggle in revt>lution," The pmduct of a radicalized class consciousness, and also its producer, she colisdered it experimental in character: the mass

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strike would generate new institutions and then, at a different stage of the struggle, still newer ones. Indeed, if WO5 introduced a new legislature (Duma)and the short-lived promise of a ft~rty-hourweek, it also generated a vision of proletarim democracy more radical than what had been envisaged by bourgeois liberalism. This image a proletariat gathering its revolutionav energies stayed with her during the war years. She spent most of them in a tiny prison cell where she responded to the critics of her imperialism thesis in a work kr~ownas the Antikritik ( 1 9 1 S), transiated Russiar~authors into German, composed her beautiful letters to friends and Lovers, and-under tl-re pseudonym Junius-produced the great pacifist pamphlet with a revolutionaq intent: The Crisis of German Social Denzo~rdcyf 1916). "The Junius Brochure" created a sensation. Jt reflected the spirit of the generally unreported antiwar demonstrations in 1914 of 30,000 in Berlin and 35,000 in Dresden'" It inercilessly assaulted the SPD for its false estimation of what the war would entail, its of-tsessican with votes, its cowardice in the face of public opinion, its obeisance to imperial autl-rority, and its abdication of working-class interests. The organizational question was again seen by her less as a primary concern than as a function t ~ fthe demands raised by the class struggle at a crucial historical conjuncttlre, Thus, she could write: That is the difference between the great historical upl~eavats,and the small sl~ow-demc)nstrationsthat a well-disciplined party can carry out in times c>f pcacc, ordcrly, urell-trained pcrforinanccs, responding obediently to the baton in the hands af the party leaders, The great historical tlo~iritself c-1-eates the forms that wit1 carry the revt~tutionarymtjvements to a successful outcome, creates and irnpravises rlcw %.capons, enricfies the arsenal of the people with weapons unknown and unheard af by the parties and their teadcrs.49

Luxemburg decried tl-re party" unbrid!ed instrurnentalism by claiming that its support for the war had tied its hands and saved no lives. Where the SPD could have become a rallying point of antiwar opposition, a beacon of sanjt)l and civilization, it chose instead to betray socialist internationalism and help bring about a monumental calamity. Honor dexnanded that the party roif the dice, according to Luxemburg, but its leaders walked away horn the table: VouId the masses have supported the social dcmocrracy it1 its atdtudc against the urar?That is a question that na orlc can answer. But neither is it an important one. Did our parliail-tentarians demand an absolute assurance a l victory from the generals of t l ~ ef3russian army before vtlting in favor of war credits? Wltar is true of military arinics is equal!): true of revolutionary arinies, They go

into the figtit, wherever necessity dernands it, witli~o~it previous assurance af success. At worst, tile party would liave been doomed, in the first few il-tonths of the war, to political ineffectua1ity.j"

Luxemburg insisted that the SPD should have called for a mass strike even without assurances of success. She was correct in noting that the pragmatism of the party lzad proven prohundly unpragxnacic: it was indeed condemned to ""politicalineffectuality." Her call to act simply on principle made her unique among swialists, It highlighted her courage and her charisma, It also justified her own ""ipractical" decision to risk imprisonment for her convictions. This becomes evident in a justly famous letter from prison, which provides an insight into her personality and her politics, to Mathilde Wurnt, who stood close to Kautsky and would later serve as a Reichstag deputy fur the US13D: In your i~-tefanctiolyview, I have been complaining that you peopte are not il-tarc-king~ t to p the cannon" snoutb. Wot il-tarc-hii~gYs a good one! You people do not march; you do not even watli; you creep. It is not simply a difference t>f degree, but rather of kind. On the whoIe, YOZ.~peopIe are a difirent zoological species than 2, and your grousing, peevish, cowardly and ball-tiearted nature has never been as alien, as hateful to me, as it is now. Yc3u think that audacity uwuld surely please you, but: becausc of it orlc car1 bc thrown into the cooler and i s then kaf little t~se!%ch!-yo~t il-tiserable little snercenaries. You would be ready enough to put a fittle bit of %eroismkup for sale-but only Yfsr cash," even if only for three rnoutdy copper pennies. After all, orlc must irnmediatciy see its '~use'onthe sates counter, . . . For you people, the simple words of lionest and upright men have not been spoken: 'Here I stand, I can" do tjtherwise; God help mc!Yduckily,world t~istory,crp urlril this point, has not been rnactc by people like yourselves., Otherwise, we wouldnk have llad a Reformation, and we probably would still be living in the anczera rkgime,51

Luxemburg was a romantic revolutionary, She had no use for the utilitarian caution of the socialist party leaders and her resistance to the war took the fc~:ormof a moral appeal. Brit her antiwar politics were not all that different from those, now in the minority of the SPD, who Xzad already grown sick of the slaughter by 1915. The only important pt~liticianin the antiwar movement wiiling ttr take a trtore radical position, and calf for turning the international war between states into an international revolutionary class war, was Lenin, He considered Luxemburg too soh on the need for a break with the social derrtocrats and the creatiorl of a new organiza tion, too preoccupied with the spontaneous rising of the masses and too accepting of '%opportunism," h x e m b u r g did indeed believe that social democracy could reinvigorate itself. She rejected varxguardism, op-

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posed tl-re call for a new international organization, and never t ~ ~ r n el-rer d back on the original values informing her politics. At the same time, however, criticism by the right-wkg "majority" (of: the SPB was growing increasingly vicious, M m y of its members felt personally insulted by the Junius Brochure and they considered it evidence of her impracticality and revolutionary fanaticism, They accused Luxea~burgof breaking party discipline, defeatism, and setting tl-re stage lor a split in the labor movement. She would indeed soon help found a group k~lownas the Spartacists that would serve as the nucleus for the German Communist Party (KPD).Luxemburg was also explicit in demanding tl-rtlt the antiwar movement build the revolutionary and anti-imperiaiist instincts of ttle masses and that the movement rehabilitate ttle old slogan of "war against war,"52 But her pacifism was never absolute: she understood war as a historical phenomenon which, in the modern context, lacked its earlier progressive fmction."3 Her revulsion was directed apinst ""bourgeois" wars and she obviously endorsed revolutionary action by tl-re working class.f4 This she considered a constructive rather than a destructive undertaking. Interestingly enough, in contrast: tct Lenin, she never gave it any military connutatians, Proletarian revolution was seen by her as a transformative political action ir-rte~ztupon minimizing the use of violence. E3er democratic image of this radical project wc~uldindeed prove decisive for her response to the expfusive events of 1917: The R~ssianReuolgtion (1918).

Liberty and Revolution Written in jail far 13autLevi, l-rer courageous successor as leader of the KPD, l-rer essay attempted to qut~lifyhis unbridled enthusiasm for the Bolshevik Revolution, It was, of course, also m e a t for puhlicatian, Believing it might provide fuel for the counterrevolution, however, Levi convinced Luxemburg not to publish it. His feelings cl-ranged soon enough when, after calling upon the Comintern to reverse its ""oflensive" mvolutionary strategy following the defeat of the Spartacrrs Revolt, Lenin and Trotsky ordered his unprepared and underrnmned party to embark on the March Action of 1920. Its failure led Levi to insist that they assume public responsibility and, in response, Lenin expetted him from the Conlinter11 for breach of discipline in 1921.55 The Russian Revolution appeared in Europe the fc>lluwing year: it would only be published in East Germany in 1963 and in Russia in 1990.56 The pamphlet stands in the tradition of ~Varx'sE k h t e e ~ t hBmmaiue, In ill health, suffering the general psychological effects of imprisonment, TAuxemhurghad no library facilities and little current infc~rmationother

than newspapers, But her work would prove as trenchant and prophetic as any testimony ever prc~ducedby the contemporary of a world-historical event. Wrinen as a lesson for the future, without any explicir policy recommendacions, xnmy of her specific criticisms can be contested," But the mistakes of the pamphlet recede behind its ethical consistency and democratic impulse, The whole loc~mslarger than the sum of its parts. Luxemburg was critical of Lenin" signing of tlre Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. She was not alone in her skepticism, But she had little sense about the desperate rztifitary straits in which the USSR found itself and her prediction that only an international revolution could end the imperialist war would grove both empirically false and politically unhelpftnl, Her limited understanding the Russian situation was also apparent in her critique of Bolshevik agrarian policy. She didn" seem to realize that Lenin had already been faced with a fait accompli when he told the peasants: "Go take the land for yourselves." Her call for immediate collectivization would undoubtedly have turned the peasarttry against the new state artd brought about great bloodshed: this was, in fact, precisely what occurred during the ill-fated Elungarian Revr~lutioilof 1919. But, still, she anticipated how 1 a stratum of property-owning peasants Bolshevik policy ~ 0 ~ 1 1 7 produce with ma~erialinterests inimically opposed to any fuc~tresocialization of the economy.% She also foresaw the corrflicts between "tr~wnand country'" that would result from Lenin's policy if not the solution Stalin would introduce with his own farm of collectivization. Her own stance was clear: the revolutir~naryst>cietycannot achieve socialist aims by using capitalist methods, It was the same with respect to the ""right" of national self-determination. Pler earlier writings already made clear that such an appeal bad no ptace in the revolutionary arsenal, Luxelztburg considered it mismken simply to assume that support for national movements of liberation in tire Russian border states would create faithful allies for the revolution," She also corrsidered it potentially dangerous to the univ of the USSR and unrealistic. The Bolsheviks would find thelxlselves in the contradictory position of offering independence to those nations over which they lacked control, or direct pofitical interest, while detiying it to the rest, Luxemburg again rejected the idea tl-rat support for nationalism was a necessary step in bringing about internationalism, Most important, however, was the matter of democracy. Ar"inilaabiIir)r to admit defeat in W r l d War I or deal with a loorning counterrevolution, according to Lenin and Ec>tsky,justified the abolition of the provisional governrztent and the creation of a ""cJictatorship of the proletariat" k d by the Bolsheviks. Luxemburg rernained unconvinced, Dissolution of the provisional government could have been legitimated, from her perspective, either by convening a new constituent assembly or transkrring power to the

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thriving ""sviet" movement. But the Bolsheviks rejected both options in firvor of a one-party state."J She feared the effect of this decision and the use of terror upon the future of the revolution no less than the meaning of socialisxn. Luxernburg recognized that a single dynaxnic tied the elimination of representative democracy with its civil liberties to the subjugation of the soviets and the repression of political life in the countr). as a whote. It is rule by terror which demoralizes, . . . In place of the represet~tativebodies created by general popular elections, Lenin and Trotsky have laid down the sovicts as the only true rcprcscntation of the Iaboring masses. Rut with the rcpression af potiticaf tile in the land as a vvfiote, life in the soviets 11'tust also become mclre and more cripplecf, . . . Without a free struggle t>f opinitjn, tife dies out in every public institution, hccumcs a mere semblance of life, in whicli oniy the bureat~crac~l remains as the active eletl~ent,. . . Tlte pubtic life of countries with limited freedom is so poverty-stricket~,so miserable, s s rigid, so utlfruitfut, precisciy bccausc, through the exciuston of dcxnorraw, it cuts off the living sources of all spiriruai riches and progress. . . . The whole 11'tass af the people must take part in it. Otherwise, sociatism will be decreed from behind a few official desks by a dozen inte~lcctuaIs.~l

Luxemburg rehsed to choose between a republic and soviets: only in 1919 dwing the Spartacus Revolt would she unequivocally eridorse the creation of workersband soldiers"kounci1s." Her pamphlet also does not deal with the yuestion regarding which institutional form might best secure civil o n Bolsheviks to permit mliberties: I,uxemburg was csntent to call ~ ~ p the restricted heedom of the press and assembly, expand the dialogue, and allow hitherto neglected iilterests to emerge, She was adamant it1 her contention that the supposedly new proletarian dicta torship must in traduce radical t y new democratic forms of proletarian self-administration. Indeed, extending her earlier criticisms of the vanguard party, she condemned Lenin's restrictions on what she liked to call the '"school of public life,'" There is no place in Luxemburg7sunderstanding of socialism for party decrees, draconian penalties, and the arbitrary use af force, The dictatorship of the proletariat must be the work of a class rather than a cfique acting in its name. It must distinguish itself "in the mnrzger ofapplying dernoc~ac34not in its elimination, ''a Socialism is an experiment and its interests are irreducible to those of any party or institution. Becausr: the purpose of the "transition" is to provide the proletariat with a chance to exercise its power, according to Luxernburg, the ability to contest authority lies at the heart of the entire enterprise. Therein lies the ineaning behind her famous claim that "'freedom onIy for the supporters of t l ~ egovernment, only for the xnembers of one party-however numerous they may he-is no freedom at all. Freedom is ~ n f and y exciusively freedom for the one who thir~ksdifferently."&

Rosa Luxemhurg may l-rave been more radical in her vision of socialist democracy than Kautsky and other social democrats. She was also surely more supportive of the revolutionary seizure of power in B17. But singuiar was really her interrlationalisc interpretation of the events and her contention that the authoritarian developmeilt t3i the Soviet Union was not inevitable. Luxe~nburgsaw its defor~nationsless as a result of economic backwardness than as the political failure of Western social democracy to meet its international revolutionary obligations. Her '5partacus Letters'" argued that the Bolsheviks' use of terror and their suspension of democratic rights were expressions of weakness deriving kern the isolation of the revolutionary undertaking in Russia, Luxembwg also stated her position succinctly in a private letter to Warski: To be sure, terrorism indicates fut~darnentatweakness, but the terror is tlirected against internal enemies wl~osel~opesrest upon the cc>ntinuation of capitalism outside Russia, and wl-to receive suppart and encouragement for rhcir views from abroad, If the European revolution takes place, the Russian counterrevolutionaries will t ~ o tonly lose this support, but-more importantlytheir courage as w e i t . In stzort, the rcrrur in Rtlssia is ahovc all an exprcsston of the weakness of the European proletariat.6"

Luxernburg recognized the bankruptcy of the Second International in 1914, But, in contrast to Lenin, she sought a revamped socialist international with democratic prtxedures aild open, mass parties. She sensed the da~lgersatte~idantupon the formation of: a new international and its domination by the Bolsheviks. Even in 1919, Luxemburg was hesitant about splitting communists off from the majority of workers still loyal to the socialists.a Nevertheless, lollowing her release from prison, she resumed her activity in support of the Spartacists and, when its members I-relped farm the KPD, she agreed to serve as its first p ~ s i d e n t . Luxemburg appeared terribly frail tlc>llowit-tgher release from prison, her hair had turned white, and Alfred Diihlin acs~~ally irnplied h a t her judgment was impaired by a nervous breakhwn in his novel Karl ztnd Rom (1950). Her feelings were clearly torn with respect to the KPD. She srrpparted its public advocacy of revolutionary ""svietsm+r orworkerskouncifs, in imitation of the Bolshevik experiment. But she had no desire to bring Eastern authoritarianism to a Western state,"" Neither the Spartacists nor the fledgling KPD had the support of a proletarian majority, and Luxemburg opposed the decision to begin a revoiutionary uprising in Berlin. But she remained at her post when she was dramatically outvoted, The sarne late awaited her proposal to participate in the parliarnentary elections for a National Assembly that would solidify the nascent Weimar Republic. And so, ironically, Luxemburg found herself in the rni-

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narity of tl-re only inovement she was ever elected to lead, Wishing to stay '*in coiltact with the masses," however, she made her peace with the Spartacus Revolt. I,~zxemhurgindeed became its most visibk symbol when sl-re was beaten to death in 1919 by prota-Nazi thugs in the employ of a new provisional government led by same of her most vicious detractors in the SPD,G7

The Underground Legacy That was the year in which socialism was lost, Ftrllowing the defeat of Spartacus, the coliapse of the Bavarian Soviet, and the failure of the Hrrngarian Revofution, any real chance of bringing about tile international revolution in support of an increasingly isolated and authoritarian USSR was effectively nullified. The opportunity of translating the revolutionary dream into reality m u l d never again preselit itself in quite the same way: Socialism turned into a regulative ideal, Rosa Luxemhurg would never have agreed with this analysis. She would never have gone that far. Her ideas were stiH expressive of the old world. But, like few others, she provided an insight into the new one, Luxexnburg may have seen capitalism as objectively harboring the seeds of its own destruction: the crash looming in the future, beyond the ""litnit'"on expansion imposed by imperialism, would ultimately condernn it to the dustbin of history. But she was also among the very few who tmly foresaw the global character of capitalism, its planetary reach, and the iimyortance of inrternationalisrn for any modern hrrn ot left-wing politics. Her ti-rinking would also play a pivotal role, though still uswLIy un;tcknc)wledged,6X in transforming historical materialism from a ""science" into a critical illethod preoccupied with questions of consciousness and intent on highlighting radicai democratic aims, Indeed, if her critique of refomism may seem outmoded in7 its assumptions and its language, it anticipates the conceits of modern pragmatists whose instrumentalism has undermined class solidarity and the spirit of resistance. Realizing that mass action always incorporates an experimental dimension, highlighting the ideals of popular empowerment, Luxemburg never identified the interests of working people with those of even the most dynamic party or revolutionar). iRovement. She refused to admit that socialism is exhausted by the reforms m d programs of professional politicians. Luxemburg hated watering down difierences and seeking to please all factions and imerests. In a world where the language of politics is becsming increasingly narrow, and professional, her thinking provides a useful corrective to the ideology of compromise.

Luxemburg has rnuch to offer in making sense of 1989 and, especially given the lack of an alternative general outlook, it is appalling how her theory of the mass strike has been igiored. The year 1989 wasI 01: GOU~SC, riot simply a revisitation of 1905. Activists everywliere in Eastern Europe, however, sought the introduction of a constitutional republic and a new democratic form of civil society. The uprisir-rgswere prepared less by the tactics of any underground party than by traditions of resistance and the most diverse forms of pedagogical work. The demonstrations and strikes, moreover, spread from one nation tct the riext over decades: from the m k e r s h p r i s i n g of 1953 in East Berlin to the upheaval in Poland and tlze Hungarian Revolt of 1456 to the Prague Spring of 1468 and the formation of Sotidarity in Gdansk in 1980 to the street actions of 1989 in East Germany and P-Tungary and the ""veivet revolution" in Czechostovakia. There is a sense in which aft of this was part of the same process: the mass strike undertaken in. new conditions and with self-c~nsciouslyliberal aims. Luxelllbrtrg also has a unique consribution to make in terms of what is commonly known as ""dexnocratic theory," She was concerned with the lack of itlstitutional accouiltahility nt> less than the self-administrative capacities of working people, By introducing the production process as a point of reference and raising the image of "soviets" or workerskounciis, however, she looked beyond a notion of democracy diur>rced from economic life or grounded in nostalgic visions of the New Errgtand '"town meeting. " It is simply astonisl~ingthat most self-styled radical democrats should simply ignore the mass strike and the councilist tradition, T&uxemburghighlighted the arbitrary power exercised by capital n o less than the impact ot reification and alienarion on everyday Life, She indeed projected a world in which workers no longer serve as a simple cost of production and in which derntrcracy becomes a genrtine part of everyday life. Luxernhurg still. understood svcialism as the alcernt~tive,the emancipated other, guaranteed in some way by the dialectical workings of capitalism, But she refused to rely upon what Hegel called the ""cunning" of history. Luxemburg rejected the notion that capitalist rnetlzods could produce socialist results, nationalism would somehow generate icttematioilaiism and authoritarianism would ultimately produce democracy. Her principled concern with unifying rneans and ends in practice contested the avowedly teleological framework of her general themy Indeed, if the thought of Lenin was pm&-cated on what has been called the ""teleoiogical suspension of the ethical,'"he politics of Luxernht~rgrested upon an ethical suspension of tlze teleaiogical. There is a decidedly romantic quality in her thinking and her critics were largely correct in noting her exaggerated corztempt for bureaucracy and her Iack of concern with the institutional foundations of a deinocratic order. Luxemburg was never quite sure what she wanted. She opposed a purely

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formal parliamentarism as surely as an unchecked authoritarianism. Her convictions had little resollance with what woulld become the dominailt sentiments of the socialist and the communist movements. Her thinking would also prove unbecoming in a fater age marked by instrurnentalism and subjectivism, The martyr could work no miracles: her influence diminished following her death and her politics found itself expelled from the school: of public fife. Her tradition was driven underground. But it would resurface from time to tirne. It might even resurface again when the next attempt is made to light the torch of freedorn.

Recasting the Pro Theory o

Have the courage to see ckearjy. -Victor S e v e

The specter is n o Io~lgerhaunting anything, Coliditions have changedeconomically, pctliticall.~i;artcl ideologically. Enlploying an eighteenthcentury understanding af the market is anachronistic. The terrain of struggle is different and exploitation in the industrially advanced societies is no longer what was exhibited in the novels of Dickens, Z d a , or Upton Siwlaia: The 'kclass enemy" is no longer the capitalist in his cop hat and fur coat or the racist imperialist of old, Fighting a phantom is a waste of time: the face of the eriemy is now more benign, Workers clearly enjoy tarrgible benefits from capitalist democracies wllase resilience and productivity would have previously been considered unimaginable, The capitatist production process retains its contradictions, and its priorities are still skewed. Ironically, however, the success of trade unions and iabor parties in making capitalism deliver some of the goods has subverted both their once self-evident sense of purpose and the implicit trust tl-rey csmmanded from working people, With the integration of social demc~racy~ and the degeneration of comm u n i s ~ the ~ , '"culture industry '"egari tempering the ideological friction generated by a once powerful proletarian public sphere,"Labor parties made way far new social movements and class conscic~usnessfor a new pre-

occupation with ""ieatity." The authoritarian bent of anti-imperiafist revolutioils and the decrepit rule of post-Stalinist cliques in the commuilist world only seemed to confirm the belief that change in forms of owmersl~ip had done nothing to xnake work either more meaningful or power less conspicuous,' The possibility of imagining an alternative p e w ever more difficult,? 1Man;v now share the bbelief that socialism is not ""different" ffrorn capitalism, but simply offers xnore of the same-if adxnitcedly to more people, Few any longer believe in the apocalyptic ""crisis" mvisioned by iWarx, His economic predictions might yet come to pass, and a future heightening of more traditional class conflict m@ht also occur. None of this, however, can any longer be uilderstood as being prescribed by capitalism, Such a development is contingent upon pc>litical choices that do not mechanically derive from purely economic assumptions. Far this reason, putting it in philosophical terms, Kant is required to texnper the prophetic excesses of ililarx even if Marx remains necessary in order to mitigate the transcendentalism of Kant. it is clear: rto sig~lificantmovement or organization firmly believes any longer that capitaiisxn willgenerate its gravediggers or that its breakdown is somehow commensurate with the advance of sr>cialism, Visiorls of evolutionary reform and revolutit>r~aryrornax~ticismboth iack agmts capable of realizing their airns. Erosion of past gains has xnarked the last quarter of the twentieth century while faith in the looming breakdown, or the coming proletarian revolution, has as little justifcacion as waiting for Godot, Refijrms and policies historically associated with the labor movement have been appropriated by its enemies: there is subsequently no sense in continuing to envision socialism as an aggregaCc of fixed demands which, as Engels once put it in a different context, "'cilce discovered, had merely to be learned by heart.'" By the same token, utopia has become richer than what was imagined in the past, The sober visions of Thomas More and Francis Bacon no Less than the technological utopias ranging from St. Sirnon to Edward Bellmy seem boring and outdated, There are new existential and psychological issues, unimagined and unexplored tecl-znulogical possibilities, new concerns raised by ferninism and ecology, which do not fit neatly into the old ha~nework, But mitigating the worst effects of xnarket discipline, rendering public institutions acct>untahle, and contesting parochialism remain inescapable elements of heedom. Dealing with the class strwture of capitalism, in the same vein, still serves as the precondition for confronting the Larger problerns of an emancipated society, Advc-jcates of socialism must prove mtxe bold and yet more modest. Socialism was never understood in terms of utopia, Jt was traditionally identified with the transition to communism. But coxnmunism is discredited and socialism can now exist only as a regulative ideal, Without a framework capable of linking it to capitalist reality, and the corrtradictory impulses of its own history, it hangs in the abstract, Socialisxn requires a the-

ory capable of illuminating its misguided practices and its lasting achievemetzts, Thus the need for a critical theory of socialism. ""Socialism3%asbeen distorted in every imaginable way, Xt has been associated witlz repression and religion, provinciaiisxn and nationalism, sectarians and popuiists, Developing a new understanding requires linking an immanent critique of its historical development with a sense of what remains unrealized ham its past. The labor movexnenc was initiafly inspired by the ideals of equalit).; democracy, and internationalism. Of course, these derive from the stil unfulfilled promises of the revolutionan;. bourgeoisie, O d y the commitxnent to them, however, can situate contexnporary thinking about socialism within its historical tradition of theory and practice, Connecting the particular class interest of workers with the uiziversal ideals of the bourgeoisie, shwldering the dual burdert, remains the task of contemporay socialists. A critical theory of socialism is predicated on binding principle with interest, It assumes the need tc-, overcome an alienated relationship between social insthutions and individual citize~is.But it refuses to provide fixed guidelines for such an undertakiw, It assumes the existetlce of people willing to confront moral dilemmas and choose between alternatives, This is not to deny the power of ideulogy But it rejects an rrndifkre~itiatedview of the concept, Both the rules of evidence and racism, h r example, are ""ieological" "enomena. Even whiIe the rules of evidence can he distorted, however, they obviorrsiy contribute to constraining the arbitrary exercise of power in a way that racisrn does not, The class ideal, with its concern for securing the orgnnizational possibilities of working people and their personal liberties, becomes criterion for judging the utiliv of the diverse ideological practices handed down from the past. Only through the class ideal can its advocates begin the work of appropriating what is relevant for their own vision. Ideas are not redtlcible to the context in which they were forged, They oft-en evidence an unfulfiHed radical and even utopian content, fdeolog is more than a veil cast over the inaterial interests of do~nination:it is also a mystified response to real misery. This was tlze point that Marx sought to make in his famous discussion of religion when he wrote: Religious suffering is the expressiot~of reat suffering and at t l ~ esame time the protest against real suffering, Religion is the sigh t>f the sppressecf creature, the heart of a heartless wortd, as it is the spirit of spiritless conditions. Xt is the opi~tmof the people, . . . Tlte abolition of religion as people's illusory happiness is the tlernand for tl~eirreal happiness, The demand to abandon illusions about their condition is a demand to abandon a condition wl~iclirequires iXIusions, The criticism af religion is thus in embryo a criticism of the vale of tears whose halo is religion. . . . Criticism has plucked irnagit~aryRowers from the chain, not so that man wilt wear the chain that is without fantasy or consolat that fie will throw it off and pl~ickthe living Rower.' tion b ~ t so

Abolisl-ring oppression requires more than criticism: it also demands positive proposals, The major figures of the labor movement were willing to provide tlzem, Their willir~gnessto face the new problems posed by histr~ricai development sl-roufd serve as an inspiration for theorists enmeshed in textual exegesis and academic self-promotion, Unfortunateljr, however, even the most important fig~zresof the fabor movemerit have become little more than vague memories. Perhaps that is because they sought to privilege the coi~nectionbetween theory aizd practice. This was true for Marx no Less than for Kautsky, who transformed his inetlzoci into a systc;m, and those intent on developing the old approach in order to deaf with new conditions. It was true fc~rBernstein, Lenin, and Luxcmburg, But this is no longer the concern of most still engaged with the socialist tradition. They remain enmeshed in the old style, Coming to terms with the past in a critical fashion, of course, is nut the same as simply breaking with it. Renewing tlze radical spirit of the stxiafist undertaking is possible only by appropriating and transvaluing the unrealized values animating the original ~zndertaking.This means illuminating the repressed interests of working people and articulaeing the political and ideological requirements for initiating a respr>nse.Such is the reason socialisr~can now he ~znderstclodonly as a new critical theory with a positive intent.

Socialist Ethics and the Invested World Emancipation has become a contingent enterprise, Socialism can no longer be seen as the immanent product of capitalism or tl-re unfolding of history. The claillrs of its Eounders, the ecr>nomic or political arrangements envisioned by their followers, have all been called into question. Socialism is on tl-re defensive and resistance against tlie modern form of capitalism is being undertaken, when it is being undertaken, not because it is somehow on the historical agenda, or heca~zseit is dialectically "necessar~"h t hecause it is rnorrzlly appropriate. The proletariat l-ras lost its privileged status and its historical mission. Philostqbical refurbishment cannot make good the failure of historical a g e n q OnIy the ethical impulse of the socialist undertaking, its original emphasis upon tl-re protest against in~ustice,retains its validity, Substitnting ethics for teleologl;, however, carries a high price, ft withdraws the certainty of ""success. " The connection between capitalist crisis and stxiaiist progress is sundered. Sacrifices demanded in the present can no longer be secured by the certain belief in a better future, The understanding of resistance changes; the imroductiun of an alternative is no longer assured. The systematic delineation of a future goal makes way for a criticat method of inquiry. The ideal takes precedence over the material.

The old bond between theory and practice dissolves. History provides no comfort. Quite the contrary A critical theory of socialism is lefr in the position of rubbing it against the grain, Theory can only speculate on the prerequisites for forms of practice wl-rose "'success" will then be disputed, once again, in terms of theory. The implication of t h i s situation is clear: the connection bemeen theory and practice can only be determined from the standpoint of theory itself. Qr, putting it another way9 political theory stloutd perhaps speak to the concerns of practice, But commitment to such an imperative can no longer be based t m the assurance that it will. Tile academic temptations, the possibilities for evasion, have become too great. Philosophical refurbishment cannot make good the failure of historical agency: the proletariat has lost its privileged status and its historical Illission, fts movements and its poiitical organizations have faded into l-ristory, Changed historical conditions call for reversing the traditional relation hetweell existence and consciousness: it is necessary to privilege a new f;orm of idealism rather than an anachronistic materialism, Sundering the idea of socialism from any fixed institutional clairns or teleological guarailtees undermines its ability tc-, serve as ail all-embracing worldview ft cannot provide a solution for every private problem. Xts ethic l-ras little to say about personal or religious beliefs other than that the sacred offers no privileged insight into the workings of the profane and that religious institutions should be treated 1-10 differently from any others. A critical theory of socialism serves as a corrective for dogxnatism, little more, It cannot substitute for theology or phenomenology. It must insist that establishing ""tuth"is less important than securing the ability to question further, This new form of critical theory will be less concerned with the experiential self-assertion higMighted by Friedrich Nietzsche than with the ""open society'"rojected by Karl Popper. Intent upon contesting all forms of mystification, seeking to endow choices with mural integrity, socialist ethics appropriates the insight of Thornas Hobbes regarding the inhereritly imprudent consequences of legislating personal opinion. Its partisans can merely project the conditions necessary fc~rindividuals to make their choices responsibly and without arbitrary constraints, Their commitment is directed toward exparlding the institutional arena of personal choice and the opcions from which individuais may choose, Important decisions are, of course, usually influenced by ecorlorrtic calculation and prejudices ix~heritedfrom the past, But these influences are what a genuinely socialist politics seeks to eliminate. The commitment is to process, in the same way as with liberalism, but a notion of process uncontaminated by that which disadvantages working people under capitalism or any other systern of expluiratian, A critical theory of sc~cialismis publzc in character."ts claims must stand open to debate and critical scrutiny, Purely private opinions or preferences,

buccressed by prejudice or experiertce, are insuff"icient. Claims must be considered with a speculative view toward their poiitical impact whether as the source of legislation, inspiration, or programe7Public life thereby becsmes the objective referent far a socialist ethic, Its quality is seen as having a profound impact a n the sensibility of citizens and, if only fclr this reason, the theory cannot assume an autonomous subject divorced kom the empirical realm of ""necessity;" h recognizes that life choices are not made in a vacuum and that they are influenced by economic standing, political institutions, and pedagogy" The irreducible freedom of the subject is seen as receiving its definition from the context in wlrich it is exercised. Socialist ethics considers the personal text incomprehensihie without reference to the social context. Providing a coherent critique of that context, formulatir-rg a sense of what should be done, ultimately depends upon the ability to articulate a practical cr2erl'of.tof politicaf judgment. Its legitirnation can derive neither from ontological claims of philosophy nor the orJustification for this practical criterion ganic tradition of a co~~rnunity, must instead prove logicat insofar as any emmcipatory order presupposes its existence; histokccrl insafar as it can conf'ront practice with an ernancipatory purpose; specalative insofar as it allows for the evaluation of any given proposal; and practical insohr as it can inform an organizing principle of resistance, Accou~abilityof power is the practicaI criterion for a critical theory of socialism. Or, p~lctingit another way, sociaiisrn is the attempt to constrain the arbitrary exercise of public power, Such a stance obviously implies empowering the disempowered and evaluating issues in terms of their potential impact on the weak and the unprotected. The critique of power without reciprocity and power predicated on bias underpins any progressive confrontation with the status quo and any ur~derstar~ding of a genuinely emancipated order, f uclr a critique begins by identifying those generalizsbte interests suppressed by the existing order, Only then is it possible to generate claims concerning the legitimacy of existing institutions.8 The accountability of power is the most basic generalizahle interest of political life. Xt informed liberal thought and it also rmderyinned the original sociaiist understanding of democracy, Highlighting it would place socialist theory in coherent relatioil with what is best in the revolutionary heritage of bourgeois political phi losophy. Emphasizing accounta bil itp would also help in j~rdgingpast practices and facilitate tire creation of a worthwhile socialist tradition capable of speaking to the current age, This faundation for political critique has been ignored for too long, Perhaps that is because history rather than plrilosophy justifies its validity, The past shows that the extent to which the liberal rule of law is absent is the extent to of its powhich arbitrary power and terror are exercised, The justificatio~~

liticai claim subsequently relies less on the contorted phil~jsophical arguments of self-styled "pustmetaphysical" thinkers than the willingness to abandon philosophical pretenses and make reference to history itself. Indeed, from such a perspective, perhaps the greatest contribution of Marx derives from the lesser known second of the Eleven Theses on Feuerbach: The q~~estion wfiether ht~tlianthinking can pretend to objective truth is not a theoretical but a practical question, Man rnust prove the truth, i.e. the reality and power, the "tl~is-sided~~ess" of his thinking in practice. The dispute aver the reality or non-reality of thinking that is isofatcd from practice is a purely scholastic question.

Anchoring discourse etlzics on a ""universal pragmatics," wlzick is content to ignore issues of power concerning how an agenda is set, doesnk help a stance is merely the flip side of a populist and communimatters."uch tarian standpoint i n ~ n on t subordinatir~g~zniversalprinciples to local customs and incapable of drawing qualitative distinctions between traditions-10 History suggests that the universal principles unclerpinning the liberal rule of Xaw rather than the contingency of custom best aliows for the contestation of prejudice and inequality, Even the most liberal system, of course, will attempt to chain the future to the past. It is subsequently a matter of d e h i n g the terms in which specific traditions function. Kant makes this clear when he writes: An age cannot conclude a pact and take an oath upan it to commit the succeeding age to a situation. in which it would be impossible for the latter to enlarge even its most important ktlowtedge, to eliminate error, and altogether to progress in enlightenment. Such a thing would bc a erirne against hurnarl nature, the original destiny of which consists in such prctgess, Succeeding generations are entirely justifiecf in discarding such decisions as unauthorized and criminal. The touchstone of all this to bc agreed upon as a Iaw for people is to bc found in the q~~estion whether a people coujd impose sucl~a law upon itselE.I1

The universal underpinnings of rationalisxn is tlze point on which liheralism and socialism converge, But the socialist ethic is not reducib'le to liberal bwgetjis principles, It recognizes that constraints on liberty can have m econornic as weII as a political source, Socialist ethics thus inherently speaks to the connection between liberty and equality. It contests tlze priorities associated with the capitalist production process and, far this reason, introduces a class perspective. This is indeed the reef on which even the most sofiisticated forms of Vernocratic theory" founder: their criteria for ethical judgment are elaborated without reference tc-, the way their ideals are ihibited by systemic constraints on the ability to organize reslstance.l'

Tlzere has been too much posturing: belief in Qexnocracy for contemporary intellectuals has become as self-evident as the monafchy was fcrr classical authors," "There are no longer any available authoritarian political options for a progressive politics. The real threat to Qexnocracy is posed by the economic policies of neoiiberalism, It has become a matter of opposing the transformation of d e ~ ~ o c r a tinstitutions ic into playgrounds for elites intent upon maintaining their power over Qecisionxnaking procedures at the expense of structurally disadvantaged groups. The principal intellectual goal for a critical theory of socialism lies in breaking the popular assumption, which has onfy grown stranger following the collapse of the USSR, concernixlg tlie inherent link betweet1 the market and den~ocracy, Emphasizing the accctuntability of capital, understanding capital as a social institution, provides a step in the right direction. It distinguishes socialist ethics from its liberal counterparts and the more tillrid expressions of "democratic theory'" critical theory of socialism brings to light not merely tl-re arbitrary power exercised by the state and state actors, or tl-re i~lrpactof inequitable forms of distrihtion, but also the biases deriving from the structure of production. Accumulation does not simply occur througlz individuals buying and selling goods and services: capitalism is not a flea market, It remains dependent on the contradiction between social production a1-d private appropriation of wealth. Production is not concerned with individuality, It is instead predicated on calculability, which, from the standpoint of "elficiency," calls upon employers to view workers as a simple ""factor'bof produaion, The individual becomes an ob~ect,a cog in the machine, and the needs of capital are given precedence over those of workers. The modern production process indeed still rellects Welf)first described by Hegel and then by the ""inverted worldm@verkehrtP. Marx.14 This inverted world is defined by the "commodity form" which, as a nation becomes more economically advanced, will ever more surely turn ever more aspects of fife into ever xnore products for sale, &Moneyaids in this task by acting as a universal, objective, and mathematical medium of exchange. It valorizes every c~mmodityin terms that allow for predictability as well as the specific determination of efficiency and profit. &~?rtali~r7~iue diffetrences between commodities are reduced to g~al.ztz"tatI'z~e ones so that the l a b ~ power r sold by individuals on the market is ultimately evaluated by the same standard as any otl-rer commodity. And so, while the worker becomes merely one commodity among others from the standpoint of capital, money assumes a special status under capitalism: it serves both as a standard for xneasuring all vatlie and as a comrnodiry in its own right, Exdlange value displaces use value. This is not a neutral phenomenon as the logistics of reduction, or the increasing uniformity of work time, might

suggest, It is too often forgotten that: ""hhind tl-re reduction of men to agents and bearers of exchange values lies the domination of men over men, This remains the basic hct, in spite of the difficulties with which from time to time many of the categories of politicai science are confrontedeWu Capital becomes the sllbject of the system and the end of human acrivity while the worker, who still produces the wealth of nations, becomes the ob~ector means for the constitution and expansion of capital. And so, from the standpoint of the inverted world, there is a hidden truth to the popular sayi~zgthat "money makes money," lnsofar as capital is the subject of the existing accumulation process, and tl-re worker the object, economic activity becomes narrowiy defined by the pursuit of profit rather than by the freely determined needs of the commui~ityas a whole, Employed privately, itrbitriaril~~ aad without democratic accc~z-irtt~Ciilit35 the purpose of capital is to garner more of itself. Indeed, while capital takes on an ""cther-worldly" (jenseitig) life of its own, its real (dzesseiriyj producers are stripped of their subjectivity Capital remains ""alienated" in a very specific way: its accountability is restricted to its particular shareholders. Democracy is truncated insofar as the exercise of ecollonlic power devolves ~zpctna capitalist minority. Conditions of investxnent and labor are arbitrarily determined while tl-re majority of working people lack any serious input into the production process in which they are engaged.'" critical theory of socialism is, lor this reason, incerlt upon fiksing the general liberal concerns of political life with the specific interests of working people or refashioning the dual burden of the labor movement in a modern form. It resists the ""naturai" idexitification beween the "use" and ""exchange" value of objects.17 It rrefuses to remain trapped within the logic of an inverted world. The logic s f this inverted world explains the obsession with a csnception of progress unconcerned with its impact upon the enviranxnent, an individualism essei~tiallyunconcerned with its impact upoil the community, and an empirical understanding of production essentially devoid of interest in the quality of life enjoyed by its producers, The doxninance of this logic indeed explains the disappearance of the inverted world as an object of political critique, Sri& a critique would oppose viewing "'use vaiue'keither as an irrelevant counterpoint to "exchange" or as some purely metaphysical essence within an object. It would understand '"use'" not simply in terms of prr>titahilir)sor the arbitrary workings of a ""free" market, but in terms of its democratic politicai determination, The socialist struggle is still primarily informed by the struggle for time and the ability to enjoy it, Such is the purpose bellirrd conceiving of ""use'" in a political manner. Envisioning a new logic of accumulation is of relevance only insofar as it privileges this puz-pose, The issue is no longer one of inrvoking utopia, calling for the abolition of the state, or insisting upon the

need for a ""newscience," The fight far time is a prime ethical undertaking for a critical theory of socialism, It implies an ongoing project intent upon furthering a sitrratic2n in which "use will n o longer be determined by the minimum time of production; but the time devoted to different articles will he determined by the degree of their social utility."1X It is self-defeating simply to deny the need for eftjciency and the primacy of exchange value, ffrstasteful labor and incentives are intrinsic elements of production, Or, putting it ailother way, ""necessitys3s inscribed within the idea of work: it is a matter of Illitigating its impact, Marx understood this when he became concrete in his prescriptions for the future by claiming: thc realm of freedarn actually begins only wl~crclahor wl~icfiis detcrmir~cciby ncecssiry and mundane considerations ccascs; thus in rile very nature of things it ties beyand the sphere af actual material production. just as the savage IIILIS~ wrestle with nature to satisfy his wants, to maintain and reproduce Life, s s must civilized man, and hc must d o so in all social forxnarions and crrldcr all possible rnodes of production.19

The world is not a village. Providing a serious response to this alienated reality does nor depend upon inveming some new romantic vision of a decentralized community meager in its wants and needs, Gcjntrol over the production process can never be complete and, from the standpoint of abolishing alienation, never radicai enough, focialisrn will become irrelevant if it is simply identified with the ofher, New strategies are necessary for rationally reguiating the interchange with nature, relideririg accountable the blind forces of the market, and introducing technology capable of reducing the work week ztnder capitalism20 Or, in rnore gerieral terms, policies m s t be invented that are capable of making the structure and direction of production matters of public accountability. Such an undertaking reaches back to the beginnings of the labor movement and includes rnore recent experiments like the Swedish Meidner Plan and various otl-rers for "codetermination'~M1'l'~bestz'mmung). These plans, respectively, call for compensatory takeovers of leading industries by ~lnionsand a sharing of mnagement responsibilities so that: workers thexnselves can have an input into setting priorities for national production. It can plausibly he argued that such plans were insufficient. But the truth is that nt:, such plan is ever sufficient. Democracy is always insufficient, There is never enough freedom. The question is whetl~erthe existence of necessity should preclude the discussion of practical ideas. It can. The thinking of those who ignore necessity in the name of utopia is merely the flip side of tl-rose wllo simply build the depelldence of workers on capital into their theories. This dependence is what a critical theory of socialism must contest in the naEne of a new commitment to Iiberal democracy,

economic justice and cosmopolitan principles capable of-at gating reification,

least-xniti-

Reificatietn and S L I Cdependence ~ is predicated on the existence of the inverted world and the institutional reproduction of ""rclification" (lier&1zglichungf.z1The latter concept means technically that something historical and something human is being rendered calcuiable or understood as a "thing." Reification eradicates normative values from the decisionmaking process and t h e ~ h y depoiiticizes it. The increasing sway of instrumental =ason and a technical consciousness reflects the repression of ethics as a basic category of social existence," h~nsistenceupon its relevance thus becomes a form of resistance against reification, Such resistance involves mtrre than simply articulating the positive goals generated by philosophical idealism and linking them with a critique of the material coiltext that denies their realization. Insofar as their realization can no longer be guaranteed after all, what Megel and Marx understood as the connection between theory and practice breaks down, An ethical decision is required in order to connect them in the first place, Even this, however, does not tell the whole story. Truth is no longer concrete: if practice 1-10 longer guarantees the validity of theory then the connection between theory and practice can only be established from the standpoint of philosophical reflection informed by what Jiirgen Habermas termed an ""emancipatory interest. " Its advocates understand how different institutions can influence the general commitmerit to such an interest for better or worse, The same is true in terrns of the economic priorities set by a socircy and its production process. Social conditions alfect the perception of freedom and, for this reason, discussions about freedom canr-Iotrernain strtck at the Ievei of t'ormai reciprocity among individuals. Ethics has a radical political function, by the same token, only insofar as it makes reference to the workings of capitalism and the csncrete irnplicatiorls of the ways in which it produces and reproduces itself. Neoliberalism intensifies and highlights how priorities under capitalism become sleewed: money still talks too loud, education is increasingly meaningful only insofar as it is associated with a better job, work life for the majority is stultiliying, and commercialism infects everything from sex to religion, Above all, however, treating capital: as the subject of the producrion process leads to an understanding of the need far regulation as an infringement on freedom. In this same vein, of course, turning workers into a cost of production is ~znderstoodas a by-product of necessity,

Ignored is tl-re way in which reification intrudes upon the experience of working people, bolsters the inverted world, and thereby fc~stersa profound serise of inkriority and uncertainty among them. Working people are taught to distrust their own capacities and for tl-ris reason, especially with the help of the culture industrb often identify with their exploiters. Counteracting such trends should be the prime purpose inforrrting any new socialist pedagogy. Even when looking backwards, of cclurse, it is importailt to understand: workers were riever simply robots, genuirre emotions betweeri people ohviously existed, m d erl-rics was a practical part of everyday life, But reification distorts relations between people and their world. The love of a parent for a child may ultimately have nothing to dcr with money or the commadiity hrm. But the expression of such love is still intrinsically connected with the ability to provide far tl-re child on par with otl-rers. Only tl-re most naive seiltimeiltalists can consider such concerns irrefevailt when it comes to love, A critical theory of socialism higmights such concerns in order to master them or, better, to render them unworthy as a social measure." It seeks conditions in which discussion can take place without reference to the prej~ldicesatteridant on purely ~rtateriatir~rmsof self-interest, Instrumental thinking and a utilitarian understanding of self-interest have resulted in a virtual "second nature" far the individual, This second nature is inore thari axi "artificial social constructW";ithas becofrte ari intrinsic element of modern life, It cannot be uprooted in one stroke by even the most radical revolution: it grows back. Trends within the iabr~rmovement have colitested this secolid nature if not the conditions for its reappearance on various occasions. Nevertheless, in a way, most of these rornantic undertakings were misguided from the beginning. Modern production is impossible without some degree of insrrumental rationalicy and any exercise of autllority demands a degree of bweaucracy The real question involves less the erosion of subjectivity through instrumerital reason than the possibility of relidering social institutioris and public practices accoultca"oe to citizens, Tfiere will always be a conflict between the exigencies of organization and the demands of freedom, The philos~phical recourse to transcendence doesn't help matters: it is not enough to suggest that tlumanity will realize its self-administrative potential ar: a later date or that individuals will gain their fulfillment in another life. Freedom has no destiny. Power, production, and bureaucracy cannot be ignored in order to contest alienation all4 reification. What demands transformation are the activities whereby people are turned into instruments for securing profit a i d power.2Witi-rer the understanding of reification will change in the name of reinvigorating political practice or the old ddnition of reification will remain in place and radical politics will remain paraiyzed. Freed~)~rt irt~lstbe treated concretely, Issues of power m s t be seen as turn-

ing on accountabifity, prodtlction on its priorities, and bureaucracy on the functions it can serve. A critical theory of socialism trtust shift gears, Modernity is a complex phenomenon composed of different systems and subsystems with different logics and practices, Calling for simply bringing them all under a form of workers' control is oversimplified: the welfare state tends toward ""l[cco~rtmodi&ingm various needs of xnodern life even while new forms of instit~ltionai accountability are necessary for sophisticated scientific undertakings like space travel or gene technology, The philosophical discussions of the n d discussions about alienpast have little to offer here, The old i a tion and reificatioil have lost their validiry, The two we= once considered interchangeable, But there is a difference between them where the former is a psychological condition for which utopia is the only response, by contrast, tl-re fatter is a condition susceptible tc-,intervention in the here and new. New farms of critical sc~cialisttheory must prove mtlre determinate than their predecessors and draw the distinction. This means rnore than simply illuxninating the unacknowledged norms and interests hidden beneath supposedly neutral phenomena in fitvor of more generalizable rlorlns and interests.25 It also involves sycciffring the practices of quatitatively different subsystexns witl~inthe production process and confronting them with new institutions capable of providing a degree of public accountability Only by specifying what limits accountability and strengthens the arbitrary exercise of power in given institutional arenas of action does it become possible to speak concretely about the assault on reification. The attack on alienation and reification can take place from divwse political viewpoints. Fascists believed that they too were attacking these phenomena given their preoccupatio~lwith intuition; anarchists surely thought the same given their attack a n progress, There is a species of romantic anticapitalism from which a critical theory of socialism must distinguish itself, That is possible only by insisting upon the rationality of norrrtative discourse, the need to subordinate instrumental decisionxnaking processes to democratic ends, and the willingness to place priority upon public goods over purely private interests. There is no contradiction in suggesting that institutions are necessary in order to contest reification, Rendering them accountable rquires civic com~nitment ancl participation. But that doesnk cchallge matters. Organization, bureaucracy, and power are the only means by which working people can resist being ide~ltifiedas factors of productiion. Tke goal of a worlii in which no subject is treated as a means to an end is ~zsefrrlas a regulative idea, But it is not realizable. A politics predicated a n expanding the life options of working people, however, is a practical response to ""aecessity." Xt implies only shifting priorities or, putting the matter differently, be-

ginning the process of reinverting the "inverted world," Such is the sense in which a critical theory of socialism is predicated on a permanent revolution of subjectivity.

The Pursuit of Unity and the Vagaries of Class The time is long past when ally political party or movement can claim to embody the "true'bor ""universal" interests of humanity Particularly following the 196Os, it is no lr~ngertenable to maintain tltat class exltausts the identity of the subject or that it can speak to the immediacy of oppression in all its varied guises*Willing to draw the implications of teleological cc11lapse, and the failure of the proletariat as a revuiutionary agent, a new gexieration of intellectuals sought to reassert that threatened moment of subjectivity. "'New social movements" merged among women, among people of color and diverse sexual orientations, and a r ~ o n gthose concerned with the environernent, They became intent upon reformulating the spirit of resistance and the claim to freedom in existential and cultural rather than in merely economic or political terms. These movements raised the consciousness of rnitlions. They brought to the fc~refrontneglected concerns ranging from the threat of ecological disaster to incest, They raised issues speaking to the experience of everyday life in new ways, They contested conformity in the name of difference and they insisted that universal values of equality nt>teradicate the uniqueness of those with different sexual orientations a d races. They highlighted the powerful connection between cultural and political issues. They indeed gave voice to those who had been previously excluded and ig~lored. Brit the cultural changes introduced by the new social movements occurred white an overarching attack on the econurnic and political gains secured in the 1930s and 1960s was underway. Organizing art.>undgoals associated with identiq and the cuftwraf transft~rmationof everyday fife, in fact, inay act~~ally have facilitated tlle econornic and political counterattack of the 1980s. Unity gave way to division and reciprocity to often self-serving nations tof autonc)my, A critical theory of socialism raises the need for reflection upon these matters and the importance of dealing wit11 their implications. Especially following the death of Rev. Martin L~itherKing, Jr., srganizing in the United States began to take place around transclass issues and particular identity claims. There was arguably little choice. The transition from an industrial to an infcjrmation society m taking place, the old proletariat was dissolving, and a conservative assault was beginning against class-based organizations, There is nothing surprising about the inability of these new social movements tco coxltest the effects of arl accumuIation

process predicated on the very category that they sougl-rt to surmount. Smprising is only the willingness to explain away this develcjpment by suggesting that the eiew social movements were primarily "middle class" and that politics is now dominated by a ""pastmaterialist" discourse,26 EarIier forms were concerned with civil rights, welfafcl. rights, and the political rnohilization of minorities and women. These are obviously material concerns of direct interest to working people, Highlighting the unique experiences of oppressed groups, isolating issues of usually particular concern, catne later during the late 1970s and 1980s. They expressed the decline of the original radicallsxn and they generated a dynaxnic of frapentation intent upon providing an ever greater specificity of idenriv claims. This made rnatters more complex, The dialogue expanded as recognition of differences grew. fn keepir-rg with this develop~nent,however, interest groups multiplied wllose bureaucracies sought organizational autonomy Each logically wished to privilege the problems of its constituency. h d so, while reforms enabling new forms of cultural expression a i d curtailing discrimination in everyday life were introduced, a broader political frapentation of progressive forces took place, Various " p ~ s t m ~ d e mide" ologies arose intent on contesting universalism and legitimating the new politics. Thus, with the left Lacking an appropriate political perspective on the need for unil;~,c q i t a l began roiting back previous legislative gains and engaging in the most concentrated growth s f monopolies in world history, Generating an alternative cannot sixnply rely on iterating the common dreams or legislative issues arcjund which people" can unify.27 Such a stance goes nowhere without taking into accoun"s.the role of class, the striving for autonomy by interest groups, and the legitimate emphasis on diversity raised by the new social movements. The idea of a common purpose itself needs reformulation: it is a rnatter of making wsmen3 rights, homophobia, and the enwironrnent part of a class agenda. New catepries are required that are capable of illuminating and contesting strwtural imbalances of power, No theory can ohviousty grlarantee the resolution of all future conflicts between particular groups organized around gender or race and others based a n class i n t e ~ s t Whether , to privilege the former or the latter, one group or issue over another, depends upon circumstances as well as the given organization in which an individtlal chooses to work. It is also impossible to determine with certitude whether the best way to forward generalizable principles is through some type of movemerit coalition or a political party nansforxned to meet new needs, Political parties and social movements serve different purposewt different times. Their utitity also depends ~zporrthe systc;m in which they operate. In the United States, with its weak party structure and single-member districts in which the '"winner takes all," for example, institutions militate against ideological parties and there is an incentive for social movements to

transform themselves into traditional interest groups with a bureaucratic concern h r autonomy. But this does not mean that parties cannot become more ideological under given circumstances or that these interest groups cannot prove useful for radical forms of action. The innportant socialist activist ~Michaelkfarritlgton was not wrong in calling upon socialists in the United States to serve as gadflies and work within the Democratic Party, He was merely wrong in suggesting that this is tlze only useful political work in which they can engage and that they must exert pressure, so to speak, in a suit and tie. The organizational question must be envisioned in a new way. There is no loilger a genuine connection betweell the party and the movement and, for this reason, a critical theory of stxialism must highlight the need to exert pressure on progressive political organjmtions in a publicly demcrrrstr~tive way, This means, in turn, intensifying the friction between existing organizatir>ns and their mass base in creative ways. Especiafly where parties are ideologically csnverging, or the possibilities of burea~zcraticredress are purposely overcomplicated, disruption can prove a tactic,zg It has been shown time and again: coileerted actioil in the streets with clearly articulated generalizable aims can prodwe responses beyond those available by sirnply Iobbying legisiators. Working people no longer owe ally particular party anything: it is the same with unions. WI~atevertheir importance, without a movement pushing them, their interest in radicalizlng demands dissipates and the potential for corruption gows. The passing of the classical industrial proletariat has made it xlecessary to fill the void with a new form of ""social movement unionism."2WClass still remains the general determinant of the exploited and the disenfranchised. But its empirical content has changed along with its self-understandir~g.The distrust of existing progressive organizations is dangerous, but palpable, Criticai tlzeory must deal with this situation, It is now more a matter of what perspectives and values socialists should propagate than which party or organizatioll they should join. Undoubtedly? i r ~the future, socialists will have to work both inside and oucside the existing political. arrangement. A critical theory of socialism privileges the interests of the base over those of the organization. Visions of a new parry may be most suitable for il~spiriingactivists during conservative upswings m d perhaps privileging movements is necessary during periods of liberal or progressive rule. But there is also a sense in which eitlzer of these options is constraining. It may be best t o consider an organizatic>nal form more structured and broader in scope than a single-issue coalition if less structured and less prone to coxnproxnise than a party. Looking back to the civil rights movement, and the poor peclples' moverneilt, this new form might be termed a mass association, Such an association can focus on r~ultipleissues: it can

also indtlce a uniquely broad and tlniversal form of ideological entlzusiasxn. Its positioning between a party and an interest, however, leaves its empirical. base indeterminate, There is a danger of it either reaching too far in quest of challenging the system or falling back into a xnore traditional coafitlon. Politics is contingent. Brtt still this contingenq is srructwred by external. factors. These are what a critical theory of sociafisxn must investigate, Rigidly attempting to compartmentalize a complex society is hopeless: its econmics, politics, and culture are intewoveti, Cult~tralnorms and polidcai interests can obviously overlap in issues like abortion, or other concerns lleeding an electoral mandate. Yet the practical need exists to make rough or heuristic distinctions between subsystems. Cultural norms may serve as a r action, but they can1i~)timma17elitly address either precondition k ~ mass the cornplex of political power or the structural logic of production. The production and reproduction of economic power, by the same token, retains its own logic and, in turn, this subsystem is protected by a political. ayparacus capable of coercing agreernent or achieving consensus in specific circumstances. Contesting the biases of the production process is possible only if the theory in question retains an immanent point of reference, This obviausiy makes the interpretation of class a matter of crucial importance. Marx had fused its strwtural and empirical expressions with a political purpose in his original, teieological csnception. As it riow stands, however, the struct~~ral and empirical understandings of class l-rave become almost mutually exclusive while its speculative or political moment has essentially been discarded, The old tripartite notion of class hits lost its validity. Only its fragments are employed as foundations for the dominant interpretatiotls. The most popular is a12 empirical view of: class. Eduard Bernstein believed the concept would becoxne concrete by defining it in tenns of income, lifestyle, and occupatian, Its immediacy is enormously attractive, If such an inrteryretation is useful fc~racademic or statistical purposes, however, it neither forwards any prerequisites for political unity among working people nor highlights the structurali constraints on the development of a cIass politics, George 1,ichtheim was correct when he wrote that: "'if social gradations are invariably ascribed to class difkrences, tile real significance of class is lost and we are cast into a linguistic labyrinth where rank and status are systematicaily confused with the key problem of political power and its economic foundation."30 Empirical understandings of class igr~orequestions col~cerningreification and the implications of the production process, They are uncritical insofar as they fuel instrurnentalism and, when translated to the new social movements, logically project a pofitics based on single-issue coalitions. The advantages of small cliques with clearly defined privclte interests as against

mass movements with generalizable goals are simply accepted as inevitable. It is the same with the ways in which single-issue coatitions compete with one another over scarce resources and the attention of activists. Little mention is made of haw these coalitions fall apart and then reconstitute tl~emselves. It is almost as if radical politics were predicated upon constantly reinventing the wheel, Structural interpretations of class serve as an alternative. Such views begin with the assumption that the capitaiist production process will expand the number of those selling their "ilafior power'?ather than any particular type ot (indusrrial) labor, Secretaries, salespeople, service employees, as well as all those who do not ""directly" produce "slxrplus value'hnow become part of the working class. According to this interpretation, the working class is not defined by any one palpable occupational activity or lifestyle, but only by the sale and purchase of tirne. ""Glass" hereby loses its n i n e t e e i t - e t connr~tationwith respect to industrial workers, The concept is made to stand in coherent relation to the modern development of the cornmadity form. But the eradication of empirical diffe~ncesbetween workers in theory does not translate into their disappearance in practice. They retain their impact outside of the structural category*The issue has nothing to do with the concerns of academic pedants who cannot dihrentiate between those who work as highly paid executives with stock options and those who work in underpaid service industries. These differences are obvious and lack any irnpact on developi~lga class politics. Crucial are really the middle managers and supervisory personnel. These are not the high-powered members of what has been termed a ""professional managerial class," h t rather those who fctcilitate production without retaining any actual control over it, They are tctrn in their allegiances and there is a danger in simply ascribing tct them cornrnon political interests or solidarity witl-r either capital or labor, Unless the structural analysis can cr~nvincinglydeal with this stratum, however, its ""objective'>mtification dissolves. Tile prerequisites for gerierating a geriuine political response to the scruccural imbalances of power generated by the production process are left hanging in the abstract.31 Of course, the lr~osenessof this structural definition can be seen as the legitimate expression of a reality in wllich class position nu longer dictates any particular political stance. But it is also true that the empirical definition of class is no longer self-evidently tied to the structural contradictions of capitalism. Only a tiny minority owns the bulk of wealch in advanced capitalist societies. At the same tirne the boundaries between ownership and control have become increasingly blurry. The "managerial revolution'" has resulted in many of the rulers selling their labar power even ti~ough their interests have nothing in common with those of the ruled,

If the attraction of the empirical view of class derives from its imxnediacy, the structural interpretation holds out hope. The vast majority of society are seen as members of the working class and it is merely a qriestion of appealing to tbexn. The working cIass becomes ""tlze people." The struct~~ral interpretation of class thereby easily generates pragmatist and populist arguments: the success of tt working class party can be seen as resting upon the ability to present itself as a ""yarty of the people'" ilirzlkspiartei).There is also an vbvious sense in which this claim is legitimate. But it does not ir-rvalidate the reality of a situatioll in which the "people" are dependent on the decisions of a class minority. The point at issue is, of course, less the insistence on using the word ""class" than developing a stance in keeping with the socialist idea and the interests of working people. Such an undertaking, however; requires a willingness to divorce the interests of the "peopie" from those who control the great bulk of social wealth as well as tl~eir hirelings with a vested interest in fostering the exploitation of those beneath tl.rem.32 Thus, urtcricically, ""class'hsIips in the back door. Confronting this sis~~ation is possible only by placing transformatz've on the political. or speculative rather than the structural and the empirical mther ideology capable of justifying any set of tactics, Economic rationality is insuliicient: predicated on self-interest, unregulated by broader ideals, it generates a moral economy of the separate deal among the various factions of the movement. Coercion is, by the same token, no longer a viable option for the imposition ol unity, Only an etl-rical commitment remains. This is not much, of course. But then, again, it reflects the real state of affairs. Wc~rkingpeople are on the deknsive and their parties are in a state ol intellectual disarray, The class idea! speaks to a new politics fiom below. h provides tile perquisite for any sustainable progressive eilterprise: a category seeking coordination among the disempowered in7 order to iduence existing parties or unions or interests in a progressive manner. Coordination of this sort cannot m t l r from the top down or firom the outside in. Working people are primarily organized in social movements and, if only for this reason, women must push the class ideal in the woxnen3 movement and people of cc~lormust foster it in their movements, Wc~men have inrdeed achieved some success inr organizing women workers while recognizing their special concerns as wurnen in terms of various issues including sexual harassmeilt by bosses and coworkers. Unions are also increasingly recogrlizirzg the way in which their members are citizens living in cornrnunities with enviranxnental concerns. Indeed, whatever her traditional way of framing the matter, Rosa Luxcmburg had a sense of what is involved when she wrote: The proposition that Social Democracy is the representative of rtzc class interests of the proIcrartat but that it i s at thc same time the representative of all the progressive interests of society and of all oppressed victiil-ts of bourgeois society is not to be utlcterstood as saying that in the program of Social Llemocracy aII these interests arc ideally synthcsizcd, This proposition bccorncs truc thro~tghthe process of historical development by which Soclat Democracy, as a political party, vacfually becomes the haven of t l ~ edifferent dissatisfied elements of society, becoming a party of the peropIe opposcct to a tiny mir~orityof capitalist rulers, But Soclal Democracy rnrtst always know how to subordinate the present pains of this coft>rfutl~erdt>f recruits to the ultimate goals t>f the urorking class; it must know tzow to ir~tegratethe non-proletarian spirit of rrtpposition into revol~ttionaryproletarian action; in a word, it r n ~ x sknow t how to assimilate, to digest these elements which come to it.34

But again the contingent character of the socialist ethic has become ever more pronounced, Not only have each of the social movements congealed illto an interest group with a bureaucratic structure, whose agexida is very

difkrent from that of its base, but those individuals committed to the class ideal within those g o u p s confront a particularly difficult challenge: they must contest not merely the prevailing orthodoxy of the establisl~edorder, but often that ol those with whom they are emotionally and existentially aligned. They are left with nothing more than a philosophicaI category whatever its practical intent. But that intent is real. The class ideal is primarily concerned with coordinating the panoply of progressive interests competing fc~rpublic attention. It cuts across the tines of identity by highlighting the needs of working people in each of the new social movements w i t h o ~ in ~ t pri~cipleprivifeging the interests of any. The class ideal is an organizing tool with a tmnsf~jrmatztle purpose, But there is no reason to expect that its prescriptions in theory will necessarily be translated into practice, Undertaking suclz a transiation is itself predicated on an ethical decision inforrned by the willingness to contest ideology and appropriate its uilreallzed emancipatory values, The class idea! derives its normative impulses from the socialist tradition. Its practical criterion of judgrnent remains tl-re need to constrain tl-re arbitrary exercise of power and its judgments are valid only insohr as they stand open to discussion and critical scrutiny, Intent upon expanding democracy, the class ideal seeks to render all social institutions publicly accountable and to guarantee civil liberties for the maximum reasonable exercise of individual freedom, Committed to ecotzomic equality, it calls klr mitigating the whip of tl-re xnarket and the prioricies of capitalist production. Prcsjecting a new i n t e r ~ a t i o ~ a l i s m it ,attempts to confront the worst inlylicatiorzs of globalizatiorz and the limitations of the 11;ltion-state. Thus, the class ideal envisions a free political determination of econurnic "use" and the cosmoplitan sensibility required by a new farm of pIanetarp life, The class ideal is a response to the failure of teleology a113 an understanding of dialectics in which historical outcomes prescribed normative judgments, Schitler had already said that ""wortd history is the court of worldly judgment.'"~ut the old song in which the end ~ustifiedthe means was constantly played out of key, Tl-rere was always the nagging question: what justifies the end? And the only answer is the means used to achieve it. The world of necessity, political reality, may often prevent making a perfect fit: between them in practice, But this doesn't thee the ixnportance of establishing a regulative principle in theory. Erecting a plausible connection hetweer1 ends and means is a prime concern of the class ideal. This concern indeed reflects the existing hislorical conjuncture in which theory and practice have been sundered and there remains only the ethical com~nitznentto unite them, Contesting capital and determining public priorities in a dexnocratic fashion Iogically requires an intraclass unity itself dependent upon respect for formaf democratic values and procedures, Sexis~nand racisin are unaccept-

able even when ernplayed by movements of the exploited or by parties supposedly intent upcm ftlrthering a program for the disenfranchised. The republican traditiorr always showed an implicit rmderstanding of the way in which true self-rule cannot depend on oppression or exclusion. A genuine rejection of teleology implies that any new political movement committed to a socialist vision must prefig~rethe emancipatory ~ u t c t ~ ~itl fseeks e to realize. Attempting to realize the faxnous injunction "from each according to his ability. . ," ccnnt>t wait until the creation of socialism, There is nt->dialectic capable of makirlg good a broken promise. A critical theory of sacialisxn must prove far more modest than the teleological theory of times past. Its skepticism will undoubtedly irritate activists, but its purpose is not to inhibit pc>litical actioi~,It merely calls on activists to recognize that histtrry has not conformed ttr the predictions of l-ristoricalxnacerialisxn and that no organization can be seen as incarnating the future. Workers are more fragmented than ever before and, in the postmodern era, cynicism has b e c o ~ ~the e substitute for hope. Comxnitxnent is now contingent upon an ethical decision. Alt this raises the stakes by making clear the need for imagination in transfc>rming realicy, But it also withdraws the ability to rely on historical guarantees. Saying that is sixnpiy recognizing reality, Tl-rus, strangely enough, the idealist interpretation of the socialist project ulrimately becomes justified on materialist grounds.

Empowerment and Domination The class ideal cannot project paradise. Socialism can only approximate fi-eedo~~: it eludes every attempt to objecti+ and finish it. The ideal stands in asyxnptvtic relation to the real and, if onfy for this reason, socialism lacks a fixed model, It is no longer commensurate with any state, party, or policy position, Socialism no less than liberalism or conservatism has been interpreted in countless ways and given numerous connotations. Looking back into Marx for an explanation of what it "wally" meant doesn" help matters. The real aim of socialism is a liberation of subjectivity that no system can ever exhaust. The matter can indeed he stated in the following way: Can socialism be an organic whole? Those who want a perfect socialism are not socialists, TIiey substitute a system for the futtness t>f I~urnanity.They perfect ir~srirutionsinstead of making them fir the nccds of pcaplc. Rcwarc frst they ~tltirnatelyfit people to institutions, Tl-tere c-an never be peace between man and man" works. But it is true that tl~erenever was less peace between them than now.35

The socialist idea juts beyond its historical determinations. But those determinations and experieilces must he taken into account, Ect~nomicplanning and socializatiorz have shown their limits: it was foolish to believe that the central government could regulate the production of a billion products. Market mechanisms are necessary for an effective response to changing consumer needs, It is no longer an all or nothing choice between state and market, but rather the degree of mix between them. This indeed wit1 have profound implications far the idea of a ""transition," And, in this regard, the dictatorship of tlae proletariat is no ionger a11 option:" it has not m t y been discredited in practice, but the emancipatory character of its legitimating purpose, the final communist goal, is no Longer self-evident, The institutions of both the transitiona! state and classless society remain singularly i~rdeterminatein the work of Marx.37 More imporcant, flowever, is the insight that t11e abolition of private property is less an end unto itself than a means to transform conditions in which workers are treated merely as a factor of production. The real issue is less whether the state or private individuals own t11e means of production than whether they are used to liberate those in daily contact with tbern.38 Arbitrary power is exercised by institutions other than the state and large capitalist concerns. This suggests the need for a proliferating set of interxnediate associatioils between the state and the market capahle of guaranteeing that a diversity s f impulses are brought to bear upon the decisionmaking process.39 A criticall theory of socialism must insist oil ever more interest g o u p s articulating their coilcerlls in the political process. The class ideal does not simply demand the abolition of particular interests in the name sf a broader unity. Questions remair-r, however, concerning the structure that hest fosters pltrralis~rtand civil liberties. Republicartism is still, in this regard, not fully appreciaed by many on the left, There remains a lingering nostalgia ior decentralized forms of pafticipation and, among many whr> look back to longing for workerskcouncils." Historical the radicalism s f the 1 9 6 0 a~ ~ experience suggests, however, that sustaining pluralism and civil liberties constitute serious problems fbr communitarian understandings of politics intent upon rejecting a more universal. and centralized frame of institutional reference. The dangers became ayparent during the revolutions of 1918-23, in Spain anloilg the allarchists during the 1930s, and especially atrtong the councils intent upcm prznishing collaborators that spontaneously arose in France and Italy fol!owing Wosfd War XL41 There is somethillg deeply misguided about viewing power as a wallturn in which less of it is good artd more of it is bad: the issue is not the concentration of power, but its accountability. Decentralized forms of local rule tend to indulge in cronyism, provincialism, and prejudice," T"~i>cql.reville indeed already recognized the potential

for a tyranny of the majority over the minority in the town meetings of New England. Advocates of self-management understandably highlight the need for participation at the local level. But t h y often forget how this can undermine the response to powerft~l.b usiness concerns and they are often simp!); unaware of the ways in which certain industries, like the airlines, may not prove corzducive to local control, Even mtlre important, advocates of self-managexnent t m d to underestimate the difficulties associated with coordinating production as well as setting priorities and efficiendy employing resources, Absent the state, whose elilllination a radical commitment to decentralization foreshadows, the market is the only serious alternative for coordinating production. Sii~cemarker decisions are ultimately predicated on autont>mt>usindividual choices, however, this means that the only real alternative to state csordination is no coordination at all, Thus, the potential subservience of a radicaity decentralized community to blind market forces.43 The great struggles for political democracy and economic equality have generally been connected since 1848. A strong state capable of intervening in the market need not diminish participation, Artacks on the welhre state, in fact, have usually occurred in concert with an attack an unions and community organizations. Willingness to consider the need for a republican state and a centralized assault upon poverq? by the same token, does not preclude an attack upon apathy or a call for increased "civic virtue." New possibilities for public involvement are an aim of every genuinely democratic form of government. There is surely a role h r "'secondary associations"' functioning between the national state and the market.4"ut the rnatter of involvement must be thou&t throu& rnore radically, It i s important to consider that:

new computer tecfitlolsgies and data banks could be used to make information democratically available to all individuals in society and could establish communication networks linktllg individuals of simitar ir~tereststogether, wtziitc il-taking possible new il-todes for the excfiange of information and ideas, New video tecfitlolsgies make possible new modes of media prcjduction, and provide the possibility of more control of ox1e3 ccornmunicattox~senvironmcnt, X3ublic access television could il-take possible il-tore participatory media and the cc>mmunicatic~tl of radical subcultures and g;rr>upsexcluded from mainstream mcdia, while satellite television makes possible nationwide-tndecct worldwidens the opportunity to broadcast a wide range of alternative vicws.4s

Proponents of decentralization canriot igzlore the trtanner in which the impact of new technological develctp~rtentspredicated on irnmerise invest-

ment extend beyond the sum of local interests in a national community. They also cannot cotlvenie~ltlypresuppose the willinwess of: every community to contribute to the good of every individual in society as a whole: whether in the case of providing funds for natural catastroyl-res, parks and free public spaces in disadvantaged areas, or hrthering eqttal participation through free child care or aid for the handicapped, The same holds true with respect to the willingness of all localities to eradicate racial or sexual prejudices. There is simply no avoiding the need to balance the concern for participation at the local level with a centralized response. Mowl-rere is this more apparent tl-ran with respect to ecology. The ongaing split between environmentalists and unions, which was addressed perhaps for the first time in the alliance between ""teamstersand turtles" h the Seattle demonstrations of 1939 against the World Trade Organization, has in Large part been due to the way in which tl-re external costs of environmental legislation have been unfairly shifted to workers:" only the state can introcrtrtce the massive retraining programs necessary in order to decrease these costs, Wit11 respect to the environment itself, moreover, simply rolling back technolog?i is not a serious option: leaviq the regeneration of the environment: to the laws of nature trterely betrays a new form of the old teleological prejudice, Investment by states and international orgatlizations is necessary to reverse existing trends and attempt the trtassive repair of what has already been destroyed. Any sensible environmental policy must note that the crucial decisions about the possible effects of: a product on the ecosystem must be made befort., and not after, it is produced: it should be incumbent upon the producer rather than the conswner to demonstrate with some positive degree of certainty that any new article is safe rather than merely arglle negatively that it is not dangerous. The burden of proof should lie with the producer, Bttc regulating and sanctioning Large firms is virtually impossible for local forms of political organization based upon direct democracy, Something different is required in order to tnake broader determinations about ""use" and what is ""socially necessary" in dealing with the environment. Indeed, the realities of a modern suciet): make it impossible to contemplate a genuinely democratic and egalitarian politics without some recourse to bureaucratic organization and the state. The dialectic of the universal and the partiftilar reasserts itself. Tensions between the exigencies of centralism and iocal interests canxlot be resolved in a single stroke. It is increasingly a xnatter of specifying the bureaucratic terms in which bureaucratic accountability is strengthened, s kexpand the role Any new forrrt of socialist politics t r t ~ ~ s a g a i n to of citizen initiatives, national referenda, and diversified interests. But the emphasis upotl participation should not be understood as all-encampassing. The socialist idea cannot: be identified with endless meetings. ft must

keep in mind that individuals have the right to private lives in order to improve themselves in differeilt ways, and-perhaps above ail--enjoy their leisure, Froxn the struggle far the ten-l-rour day and the abolition of child labor in the nineteenth century to the introduction of two-week vacations in France by the Popular Front in 1936, free time has traditionally been a basic concern of workillg people. Tlze new inhrmation society rnay olrcr the potentiai for shortening the workweek witR~)utdecreasing real wages, But that potexitial is not being fully realized: the wsrkweek has dropped to tl-rirty-five hours in some nations like France, whereas elsewhere, like in the United States, it is radically on the rise." 'Middle management and supervisory personnel are, arguably, suffering from this development the most. The web, e-mail, beepers, and cellphones are not the answer. Technology, by itself, is not the determining factor, It is rather the way is is employed, which depends upon the strength of working class organizations and, just as importantly, the pressure exerted upon them from below* Economic developments do not mechanically translate into political victories, Simply relying upon the introcluction of temporary work, the possibilities attendant upon changing occupations, the shift: to the service sectr>r, and the new forms of intellectual labor is insufficiexlt, It has already been noted that the socialist idea, above all, rests upon the fight for time and what might be termed the ""uncoupling" "between incoxne and employment." Different plans abound for waging the battle: the negative income tax, full employment schemes, the wealth tax, lt~weringthe age of retirement, and more. The decision over policy is a contingent matter, The aim of the policy is not. The struggle far time is ultimately the struggle of individuals to determine their lives beyond the bo~zndsof ""necessity.

The Institutional Imperative Contesting necessity means privileging institutional accountability over any unyielding commitment to either centralization or decentralization. Tlze principle of ""subsidiarity,'%Rick is already being employed by a number of transnational instjtrttions, can serve as a useful guide: it relegates only those hnctions incapable of being perhrmed by locai organizations to inore centralized institutions, It is a question of higl.tlighting which best serves the ultimate aim: substituting the "iadmil?istration of tlaings"9for the "iadmir~istration of people."so No strict line can divide the two, however, so long as scarcity exists. And there should be no mistake. Scarcity becotrtes apparent not merely in ecs-

nomic terxns, but also indirectly in thase institutions wherein political power is unduly influenced by an imbalance of resources, The lack of '20cial capital'%ecomes apparent in how the courts of most natiorzs unfairly treat xninorities and, particularly in tl-re United Srates, how people of color are disprc3pc1rtionately subject to prisosl discipline and police harassment. Civil Iibertirs and a written constitution are obviously necessary, But they are insufficient for establishing a socialist conception of dernocracy. Socialists must analyze the ways in which institutions actualfy function with respect to their impact upon classes and gro~tps.~I Hegel knew that progress is marked by an increasing ability to draw categorical distii~ctions:and this means distincticlns within a particular system c>r regime, Just as socialism and communism have appeared in various guises, after all, capitalism and democracy can take any nu~rtberof differefit forxns. Qualitative differences exist between the policies of Roosevelr and Thatcher no iess the regi~nesof Ueltsin and Mandela. These differences are real rather than superficial, Xt helps little to emphasize the structural constraints on change without a sense of wllat strategy might best proxnote class univ and institutional accountability in particular circumstances, There are still those who refuse to distinguish between programs and between regixnes, They re~ectcoxnproxnise wit11 the systexn tout court by promulgating an indeterminate vision of utopia predicated on the withering away of the state.52 Reft~singto speak of institutions to constrict the passible arbitrary use of power in tl-re new order, they are content to presuppose a decisive rupture with the past that will somehow resuIt in the harmonious unity of all particulars. They prize the aesthetic experiertce of "eras" oar ""desire" or ""sbjectivity," h t the manner in whicl-r such experiences should translate themselves into reality, how paradise might sustain itself, rarely becomes a fit topic of discussion: it would necessarily introduce m elerrlent of atienation, a form of institutional thinking, wl-rose elimination is the ptlrpose behind the entire enterprise. Such visions of emancipation base everytllilag on the creation of what trtight he termed a utopian sensibility, Of course, it is completely legitimate to speak about an education of the theme in senses or, better, the sensibiIit)r of indiviCfuds, This is a dc~~rtinant modern literature, which is far better equipped to dexnonstrate its importance than political theory, It underpins the 'kducatioslal novel'" (BiMungsromtzrt)introduced by h l t a i r e , Fielding, and Goethe and then later developed by Stendhal, BaXzac, and FXaubert. Even Marx occasionally expressed an interest in such ideas and Oscar Wilde among others coilcerrzed himself with "the soul of man under socialism,'Yssues ranging from developing new fnnns of aesthetic aypreciation and the experience of diffetrent cuitures to fighting against the increasing vulgarity of ever-yday life

R~ccl~dng the Prqject: Prologuefir a Critical 7i5eary of1.I'ociali~rn

173

and cruelty to animals are legitimate concerns for tl-rose interested in forging a more decent way of life. Dealing with the sensibiiir~:of citizens, however, should not presuppose the need for a "new xnan," This idea is religious in origin: it derived from the conversion experience before it was appropriated by leaders of the great millenarian movements like Thorrtas Mijlnzer.f-?TII modernity, for better or worse, it became part of the ideological arsenal employed on the left by romantic revolutionaries ranging h m Leon 'Ti-otsky to Che Cuevara and Mao fie-tung, Prophecy was, of course, mixed with propaganda. But their new man was at least associated with a revoiutian in progess. The new serssibiilry of the new man was seen as having concrete prerequisites and an agent for their realization whether in the form of the religious elect, a social class, or a political party. Utopia can still serve a positive purpose,f4 It can illtlminate the li~nitatioils of our own society and our own experietlces, It can inspire action nt->less than sacrifice even if these efforts will inevitably fall short of t h i r goal. Utopia can project old hopes like the conquest of death and new possibilities like those associated with parapsychology' All of this has its place. The danger of utopia becomes manikst when the wish is turned into dogma, thereby justifiyiw any means in order to realize an inherently ill-defined end, But it also appears when the partisans of utopia ignore the ways in which their syecuiations hear the scars of historical oppression. Even the trtost utopian ideas can never fully escape the historical context of repression and, if only for this reason, the call for their direct translation into practice has always spdled disaster. The utopian vision is, ironically, never ~ztopialxenough. Thus, utopia must rexnain utopia. Attempting to invoke the "real" redolutioi~or a utopian state as the practical criterion for ~udgingpolitics gexierates a stance in which no form s f radical action can ever prove radical enough. Every positive reform thereby becomes just another guise for oppression. Each concrete step made to free the individual becomes redefined in terms of its opposite: liberalization sf sexuality serves the regressive power of the existing order, xn~lceriafaffluence creates spiritual impoverishment, leisure produces increased conformit5 and so on. Extreme Eormtrlations of this position have even insisted that resistance rexnain metaphysical in order to retain its purity* The logic is as ~CIIICIWS: the semblance ttf freedom makes reflection upon one" stwn freedom inccjmparabIy mclre difficult than formerly when sucl~reflection stoc>ctin ccjntratliction t o manifest unfrcedorn, thus srrerlgrhcntng dcpendcncc . . . only in so far as it withdraws from a praxis which has degenerated into its apposite, from the ever-cbangitlg production of what is always the same, from the service of the

c-txstoil-terwile l-timself serves the rnaniputato from Man can culture be faithful to rnan,$S

nly in so far as it withdraws

The indeterminacy of this position undercuts its moment of truth: How certain reforms further democracy3soften the whip of the market, and contest provincialism is simply ignored, UItraradicaIism of this sort becomes pseudoradicalism. Xt slips a purely arbitrary definition of qualitative change into politics and thereby turns resistance, the most radical of concepts, into little more than an apolitical game of the imagination. It is indeed useful to consider tha t: Radicalistn is not a form of expcricncc, C)ncc tllc ground of real cxpcriencc is surrcnderect, a hierarchy of radicalism arises. Surmounting it demands-or so it W O L I I ~appear-still greater radicatism. . . . Karl Mraus described this promdure wit11 the announcernetlt: We have raised our standard once again, Nctvv, only one problexn remains: no one can meer it any I ~ n g c r . ~ "

Utt~piais a function of the imaginative faculty, what might be considered an anthropological, desire for the best: life, while socialis~nis a regulative ideal. Thinking about socialisrn as the alrsolgte other produces only marginalization and an inability to think about the prdlems and choices facing collternporary society, It is self-dekating to exclude from socialist politics anything other than a revolutionary assault on the accumulation process and the state. Dreams of an emancipated future are an intrinsic part of every m j o r moveinent, hut these dreams are not enougI3. Divorcing socialisxn from its commitment to reforxn-especially in the name of a utopia or still undefined "transitionm-is tantamount to denying sociaIisrs the chance to garner popular support,r' InIringements on the market have materially improved the lives of workers, heightened their sense at-self-worth, provided them with leisure, mitigated social it~equality, and constrained the arhitrav exercise of power, Such refurrns made society more accountable to its citizens and, in tt~isway, stood in accord with the practicai criterion underpinning the stxialist ethic and the class ideal, Tile hest reforms are those quickly taken for granted. They become part of the adrninisrrtltive ayparattts in which issues are increasingly defined in bureaucratic terms: refusing to deal with this reality in favor of visions about participatov democracy and workerskcontrol is simply irresponsible. Advocates of socialisrn have a different task. They must maintain the pressure a n bureaucratic organizations both in terms of preserving old gains and securing new ones, The radicalism of any particular reform, moreover, cannot be ~udgedin tl-re abstract. Thus, the Vichy government would use Leon Blum" supporl: for the forty-hour week and WO-week paid

vacations as evidence in his trial for ""treasonm-a trial that led to the extradition and incarceratioil of the former sc~cialistleader in Etuchenwald. Reform is often, admittedly, a boring entesprise, The dramatic qualit). of politics is seemingly lost when squt~bblii~g takes place over whether dentai insurance should cover periodo~ltalwork, whether drug prescriptions should be paid by Medicare, or whether the minimum wage should he raised by a dollar, But these little things l-rave a qualitative impact on the everyday life of working people, Jean-Paul Sartre put the matter very well, though in a different context, when he wrote: I know that certain lofty spirits rnakc a name for themselves by tlitustrious refusals, They say no, What about it? These refusaIs arc appearances w1zicf-t hide a shail-teftll but utter submissicbn. 1 hate the pretense that tra~l-ttl-tefs people's minds and sells us cheap nobifity. X > refuse is not to say no, but to mc~difyby urark. It is a mistake to think that the revolutionary refuses capitalist society outright, How co~ildhe, since he is inside ir? On the contrary, he accepts it as a fact which ~ustifieshis revututionary action, "Change the wsrlrf,>ays Marx. "Change life,' says Rirnbacrd. WeII and good: clzarlgr tfiem if you can. That 11-teansyou wilt accept many things in order to ~l-todifya few. Refusal assutl-tes its true nature witlzin action: it is the abstract moment t>f aegativity.j%

Achieving the prograrn of reforms associated with the welfare state constituted a set of real victories. Xt makes little sense to argue that the great European labor movements of the 1920s and 1930s in Austria, France, and Germany were not ""socialist" "enough, Sectariar~criticism of this sort abstracts from tl-re terrain of the real, The socialist tradition deserves greater qpw"ciation for its swcesses, Its partisans transhrmed liberal potitics and extended the suffrage beyond a relatively small elite, They obligated the state to interfere with the previously unquestioned rigl-rts of cayital.sg They gave workers a sense of dignity and brought them into public Life, These activists, whether "successful" in the revolutionary sense or not, still provided a ""victory of tl-re political economy of labor over the political economy of capital" (~Varx),They gave a socialist meaning to the extension of democracy into civil socieq. The probiern is not reformism, but tl-re retreat from a politics of radicai reform. Just this has been lost: the ability to imagine the nonreformist impact of reforms,"j The old undersanding of the connection between reform and revolution has fatfen asunder, Botl~are under attack, But tl-rose intent on maintaining the supercession at- the old difference between '"eft and right" 'are focused on the wrong issue. The enemies of equality and the accountability of institutions on the right, ironically, often understand this better than those oil the left, They know that reforms can have a radical

function, that they can shake up existing institutional arrangements, wllich is precisely why they seek to identify the modern left with the left of the 1930s and the 1960s. All this presupposes conditions condtlcive for promulgating and implemellting reforms. But these conditions still do not exist in most nations. Revolution has become a dream, and a sorry one at that. But there is still a sense in which what l-reId for yesterday still holds today: the m l y way to judge the need for revolution is by determining the capacity of the system to accommodate reforrn. Thus, its ~ustification depends upon the a bif ity of revolutionaries to articulate a pattern ol exploitatim and oppression that stands beyond any possibility of institmionat redress from within the system. Teleological guarantees concwning the emancipatory character of the revolution have fallen by the wayside, 1.1would be foolish to ignore how its partisans have tended to equate their own needs with the people they claim to represent. The communist experience shows the danger of turning the constriction of keedom into a virtue, Never mind the talk about historical justifications, or popular prejudices indticed by the dominant ideology, lntrst have engaged in terror and the suppression of h~zmanrights. The degree of support for a revolutionary regime by socialists can onfy be depelldent upon the degree to which its institutions evidellce accountahiliry to the public at farge, Thus, no Iess than with reform, the vafidity of revslution becomes predicated on contingent judgment rather than historical necessity. Giving either absolute priority is a inistake: each has become a tactic rather tl-ran a goal in its own right, The stakes are higher, of course, when the commitment is made to pursue a revolutionary course, Ignorilq its potential costs is an expression of irresponsible adventurism, But just as there is a dogma of revolution, so is tl-rere a dogxna of reform. Its advocates ignore the fact that the weifare state is still a capitalist state, that investment still remains in private hands, and that reforms are possibfe only if their costs do not overly threaten an acceptable rate of profits and capitalists are convinced that they face worse alternatives, Uncritical reformers, tot>often, refuse to discuss the implications of a situation in which it is still much easier for the rich than for the poor to organize themselves, define the agenda, unify on issues, gain access to information, and raise funds for pc-~litical purpos-. This dogma of reform indeed blinds its practitioners to the structural mechanisms by which welfare capitalism still privileges the capitalist class and farces working people to live lives of meaningless, debilitating, and often dangerous work. Relativizing the status of rdorm, and especially revolution,"' goes hand in hand with abandoning the concept of the end of history. Both have become subordinate to the class ideal that can reveal how, within a given

context, a particular approacl-r can best approximate the goals of tl-re socialist project: the political empowerment of working people and the lessening of their structural depedency on capital, Or, putting it another wa)i, the choice of tactic depends upon a judgment concerning w11icl-r can best further the class ideal under the conditioils in which the movemeilt must operate.

Notes for a New Internationalism Common wisdom suggests that there is little left unfulfilled from the grogessive legacy of the past other than the goal of democracy. But there is also the matter of econorrtic justice a n d the need for a n international response to globalization. A, belief in dexnocracy does not necessarily imply a commitment to either, Distrust of state intervention in the market was a product of the neoliberai revolutioll while the collapse of com~rtunismengendered suspicions of all universal perspectives, If the critique of neoiiberalisrn in the name of economic justice has many vtlices, however, the discourse surrounding internationalism re~rtainsradically underdeveloped Multinational corporations and new transnational hanciaf inslitutions have turned capitalism and its commodity form into a global phenomenon: the critical theory of socialism trtust provide the outlines for a response* Undertaking this challenge, however, demands a willingness to contest pc-~pularcultural assumptions and traditional political ioyafties, Much of the left still stresses sutmt>ded notions of state sovereigzlty a n d national self-dererxninalion. International insritutions, wlzere they exist or have jurisdiction at all, still remain weak in relation to the political powers of the natioxl-state, Many remember how slow the United Nations was in responding to various crises in Bosnia or Rwanda. The possibiliry of forging an internationalist response to international capitalism seems remote, TAackixlgan icjeology capable of prescribing some worldwicje collvergence of interests, moreover, many question wlzetlter the interests of workers in economically advaxlced nations are even compatible with those elsewhere, Nationaiistrt and internationalism were originally fused with a reyublican cornmitxnent in the era of the great bourgeois revolutions of the eig1.rteenth century, It was more or iess beiieved that people of every nation had the rriglzt to decide their fate in a democratic fashion. This swnce became coupled with a sense of class soXidaripy once the sclciaiist tabor movemeilt arose, But the coilnectioil between republican nationalism and internationalism in the labor moveirtent collapsed with the support frir World War I provided by socialists in the Second International. The fissure between internationalism and democracy quickly fc~llowedwith the arid the dissolution of class solidarity with the erection of the Ct~rnir~terx~

anti-imperialist revolutions attendant upon tl-re end of World War If and the emergence of the Cold War. An anticofonial revolutionary wave inoved from Xndia arid China to Vietnaxn and Algeria to Cuba and the Congo. In conjunction with disgust over the integration of social democracy, and disiflusionment with communism, its partisans inflamed the imagination of Western radicals. The 1960s witnessed an outpouring of revolutionary popuiism and romantic identification with figures like Mao Tse-tung, Ghe Cuevara, and Ho Chi Minh. Many considered Lenin jrtstified in claillting that the international revolution would begin at the "weakest link in the cl-rain" and then spread to the Western natioils. Nevertheless, the argument was naive even at the time. The new populism ignored the difference between an economically underdeveloped xiation with a peasantry sufkritlg ~znderimperial rule and an advanced industrial society with its new social movements. The alliance between the two worlds was never hrthcoming and, soon enough, misgnided revolutionary zeal combined with frustration among a tiny self-appointed vanguard that valorized terrorisxn and the urban guerrilln.sz internationafism thereby became a posture; identification with the economicafly underdeveloped nations remained purely symbolic. The idea stands in need of reappropriation, Internationalism was always a strong ideological component of class consciousness though the institutions for pursukg proletarian uniq were rnostty dominated by the national interests of their most powerful members. Under present circumstances, however, this situation has changed. International institutions created by the bourgeoisie are gaining a fife of their own while the appeal of internationalism axnong warkers is, at best, lukewarm. An increasingly rnobile form of capital now serves as the vanguard for internationalism while workers, ever fearful of capital, flight, seem more bent upon resisting globalization in national terms. Thus, the speculative character of the class ideat assumes particular importance when applied to the prcjspects for internationalism, Old-fashiotled opcimism is no lmger warranted, No inherent comyatibility exists between the needs of a particular state and others in the world community. Material interests of workers in one riation aiso need not converge with those in other nations. The interests of the whole are not simply reducible to the empirical interests of each," This is ttrue even when considering the introductic~nof universal labtlr standards. Xmpfementing them will probably result in costs for the richest warkers in the richest nations even while industrial prtgress will prt>duce hardship for the poorest workers in the poorest xiations. N o less than with natioris, so with factions within classes, there are those desirous of maintaining the status yuo and others desirous of changing it, Indeed, just as new unifying forms of class consciousriess will not simply result horn, the advocacy of particularistic

forms of self-identification, new fonns of internationalism will not emerge independent of support for their institutional expressions. Traditional understandings of itlternational revolution fall by the wayside. Marx knew that the revolution would not break out globally, but rather within national boundaries, and today the thought of an apocaiyptic transfurmation of natiorr-sates into a world c~mmunityis utopian in the worst sense. Even if revolution could transform the political systexns and cultural values of most states, moreover, the new regimes would still have to negotiate the conditions ~znderwhich an intrusion on national sovereignty might be countenanced, There has been no alternative proposal to a representative form of planetary government predicated on some notion of subsidiarity, Thus, it only makes sense that Leon Blum, Rubert Schumann, Jean Monnet, and Willy Brarrdt-----ratherthan more ostensibly "radicat" figures-should have led tl-re fighC for internationalism in the postwar period, Condemning "bourgeois" ininstitutioils like the European Parliament and the Urlited Nations is less fruitful than inventing new ways of rendering them more democratically accountable to tl-re bulk of their membersl-rip. This means highlighting the need for international. unions and global interest groups capable of representirtg disenfranchised corrstituencies, such as women and gays in traditional societies, and willing to contest both international capital and national forms of authoritarianism. Mitigating natiorlaf chauvinism and the arbitrary exercise of state power is possible m l y through further empowerment of already existing transnational organizations. Nevertheless, if the hurgetlning planetary framework offers new opportunities, it also poses dangers for democracy and socialism. Everyday people fear the incroducrion of )let new layers of bureaucracy. Many still cling to their national traditions and religious customs. The success of bourgeois internationalism has been accompanied by a chauvinist and provincial reaction in Austria, France, Switzerland, and elsewhere, Legitimating such movements through compromise can only prove self-dckating, whatever the t e ~ ~ p t a t i oofn i m ~ ~ e d i abenefits,""" te Engaging in a purely technacraeic ~ustificationfor internationalism, by the same token, will also not do the trick, It will leave the new institutions and organizations with an identity deficit and a potential crisis of legitimation. Adapting to the new political environment of the next millenniuxn is not just an ecoilomic or organizational y ~iestion,h t an existential ailcl cultural one as well, It is a matter of appealing to the heart as well as the mind. New possibilities for communication and travel, new opportunities for learning &out foreign civilizations, are helping bring about the decline of established religions and provincial understandings of community. Ncjstalgia fclr a rnytkical community or a mythical past has grown stale, What Richard Rorty has termed ""etbnu-solidarity" is self-serving at best, dangerous at worst, and literally reactionar).." People are increasingly changing their oc-

cupations, moving rnore often, and meeting others with experiences different from their own. Immigration is taking pIace, often on a massive scale in many parts of the globe, and intermarriage is b e c o ~ ~ i nagpart of everyday life, Old-fashioned notions of race inherited from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries are headed fc~rthe dustbin of history and perhaps the various nagging forms of intolerance will fallow suit. Raditional notions of internaiondism, hawever, are insufficient for bringing this about. They must be complemented with the introduction of a new sosnzopotifi?rase~zsibili$?l* Just as the assault on reification is not simply the trmsfer of control aver property, h t rather a change in the way in which workers are treated in their work life, internationalism cannot be left at the purely institutianal level. It must speak to the way in which people live or, better, can jive in the future. Internationatism is not simply a matter of political tactics, but of convictions. Its acceptance requires a commitment to the radical redistribution of planetav resources and a notion of human rights grounded in constit~~tional democracy, But it also requires a new sensibility intent upon making good the new promises for the expansion of individual experience offered by the new infc3rmation society This depends upon new educational strategies capable of inspiring a cosmopolitanism appropriate to what is becoming a new form of planetary life, The cosmopolitan implications of i n t e r a t a m call. for recasting the socialist project. A new approach rttusc highlight the ways in which the RUCtuatlons of the international economy, along with the power of the great multinationals, stand outside the control of any state. But it must also highlight how planetary life i s deteriorating in t l ~ ename of progress, Entire species are vanishing, dohal warming is already showing its effects, poorer nations are serving as garbage dumps for the refuse of the richest, and diseases like cholera, dysentery, and AIDS are ravaging continents, Provincial ideas of nationalism and slogans of national self-determination no longer have anythir~gtc) offer in the face of such issnes, Of course, problems will arise; poor staees and rich will, for different reasons, refuse to countenance curtailment on sovereignty. The ~lationalinterest will uscmlly take precedence over the concern with global issues, Nevertheless, it is time to envision a different world shared in common with others: econornicallli, politically9a d culturalty,

Economically A new international division of labor is making the universal implications of the commodity form ever more evident," h conjunction with an increasirng reservoir of cheap labor, and the new technology of transportation and communication that allows for its employment, the manufacture of a

single product can occur in many production sites throughout tlze world. "'Extended chains of production" are now being broken down into infinitely small suhprocesses, which take ptace where labor is cheapest with respect to the particular process involved, Capital can simply f y where it pleases as the lure of production sites rather than markets generates competition among nations and multinationals, Internationally an3 nationally, this has also occasioned a sharp increase in competition between skilled and unskilled labor. Indeed, the ongoing transnational reorganization of capitalism goes a long way toward explaining the chauvinism underpinning the ""rig-it turn" in tlze politics of advanced industrial societies during the last part of the twentieth century. Redressing gohal imbalances of ecorrc>micpower requires political institutions capable of regulating multinationals, assistirlg in the settlement of world debt, and extending tlze most basic achievexnents of tlze welfare state to the international arena, It demands innovative policies f m refinancing loans, democratizing transnational financial i n s t i t ~ ~ t b n levying s, taxes, curbing capital flight, and dealing with unequal deveioprnetlc. Economic reforms of global magnitude presuppose the politicat power to enforce them and support is necessary for professional burea~zcraciesto staff transnationai institutions like the United Nations and tl-re European 13arliament. Securing the accountability of such bureaucracies is possible only by new forms of international political action and a new irrternational rmderstanding of civic or, better, planetary responsibility, The question for those cornmitted to the socialist idea is whether they are willing to enter the fray.

The ideas of both political dexnocracy and econurnic equality remain incomplete without reference to imernationalism. No kss than the adjudication of conflicts between interests within a state, conflicts between nations will also demand processes and institutions for redressirlg grievances. No nation is any longer willing to admit that war is a legitirnate part of everyday politics and each praises peace. Discussions about the "right" to intervene in the workings of sovereigl~states have already grown anachronistic: autarky is a tlzing of the past, economic intervention by capital is already taken place, and the real question involves less the rights and respansibilities of states than their conduct as members of a planetary commnity. Human rights has become an accepted component of international relations, Its implications for the constraint of arbitrary power, civil liberties, and the creatiorx of a planetary community CtlaIaenge the despots and the exploiters. There lzas been much debate about tlze way Xzuman rights lzas been used t o justify intervention by the United Natioils and also, mtxe unifaterally, the United States. But traditional ideas about nonintervention under

any circumstances have lost their salience: the "right" to interfere with genocide in a particular instance, when such actioil has a realistic possibility of success, is ir~trinsicallylegitimate reg~rdlessof whether this same policy is being applied everywhere else on the planet in equal fashion, Human rights converge with the class interests of working people and the poor. It is they, after all, who usually bear the brunt of anthoritarian policies predicated a n tl-re arbitrary exercise of power, The potential impact on the lowly and the insulted is the principal criterion far judging any form of policy including foreign policy. The choice for socialists is clear when an authoritarian movement committed to economic reform con-l-rontsa capitalist dictatorship and perhaps even clearer when an amhoritarian movement confronts a stxialist democracy. Neutrality is, in the same vein, the logical course when neither side offers the prospect of either political democracy or economic reform, A judgment becomes more difficuit, haweve4 when a viable capitalist democracy confronts an econc>micallyreformminded authoritarianism The resulting ambivalence indeed made it possible for progressives to employ the national interest as a point of primary reference white it ellabled more radical intellectuals tc-,define their views on foreign policy in terms of what Maurice Merlea~z-Ponvcalkcl "a-ccommunism." But this situation has chailged. The national interest has watered down the capaciq to deaf with globaI problems even when they harbor a national impact. Clsoosing between hurnan rights and national self-determination is also quite different from choosing between the interests of two superpawers, By the same token, however, fewer criteria for reaching political j~zdgments now exist and, what's wworse, tl-rey often conflict, There is no general consensus about principles, or their trailslation into reality, which helps exptain the radical divisions among progressives over Iraq and Kosovo, No ironclad way exists for a pplying interna tionalist principles. Support for this c>r that action will again depend upon a speculative ~udgmentconcerning which policy will best serve the weakest among those effected by i~ Only with. this aim in mind can it prove possi"ve for a stance to be genuinely internationalist, Such a stance must prove willing to surport intervention, or criticism of intervention, depending upon what has the best chance ior preventing the abuse of I.ruman rights and the improvement of conditions for those incapable of raising their own voices,

Culturally Commitment to the globe is commitment to an ideai.67 A new internationalism requires a new sense of cosxnopalitan conviction, It is easy to be fooled: every nation nt>wconsiders itself "&mocraticW and nt>elite is willing publicly to identify its people with the 'krabble,'Traditit>nal or provincial re-

sponses are texnpting ways of protesting the xnanner in which the world has become dominated by a staildardized set of cultural norms that have been formed inr the most powerful natiorzs and propagated by a small group of huge firms, But there is no avoiding reality. The new social movements are in the process of generating an international. public sphere comprised of conkrences, newspapers, publishing ventures, websites, and rBore. They have had an impact on the media and they I-rave shown that it is a question of transforming the culture industry rather than aholishing it, There is no ~00177for , yet another attempt to create a closed society or for a retreat into mythological visions of the past grounded in religious intolerance, cultural provincialism, or ethnic chauvii~ism,The cosmopolitan sensibility is indeed the most basic requirement fc~rbeginning the task of reshaping the common inrheritance from the past,

Socialism has become a dirty ward: even its proponents fear tlse way in which it has been misappropriated while forgetting s w h perversion of intent has also been the fate of terms like liberalism, populism, progressivism, anarchisxn, and communism. But the hope for finding yet another word is misplaced. Perhaps the proletariat is a thing of the past, but capitalisin is not. Jt has for the first time taken global form and everywhere its advocates are engaged in an unremitting assault on tlse welfare state, Tlsere is little sense in abandoning terms like "'left" and "right'" when neoliberals and neoconservatives are setting the agenda. The interests of working people disappear when normative categories become technocratic and slogans appeal to all of the people all of the time, Better ftjr socialists to rediscover the radical edge in their thinking, There is a need for inspiring ideals and the most potentially radicaX is the ideal of inrernalionalism. Only with a new internationalist commitment can the socialist idea confront the Iingering forms of authoritarianism and an increasingly powerful capitalist logic of accumuiation, Only by recognizing the way in which socialism is no longer what it once was can the class ideal confirm the connection betweeri the unfulfilled vaiues of the labor movement, the moment of critique within its seemingly encrusted ideology, and the need for posztiue speculative prc~posalscapable of expanding the realm of personal experience, Only with such values is it possible to csrlceive of socialism as an onwing project that seeks to foster that infinite richness of huxnan ingenuity and productivity whose possibilities can never be determined in advane.

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Notes

Chapter 1 1. ""The ctasses whose social slavery the constitution is to perpetuate, proletariat, peasantry9 petty bourgeoisie, it puts in possession of political power through t~niversatsuflrage. And fro111 the class whose aid social power it sanctions, the bourgeoisic, it withdraws tile paiiitical guarantees of ttzis power. It farces the politicat rule of the bourgeoisie into democratic conditions, wl~ichat every mc)ment help the hosrite classes to victory and jetljpardizc the very foundations of bourgeois society. From the ones it demands that they should not go forwarcl from political to social emancipation; frorn the others that they sho~ildnot go back fro111 social to potitical emancipation." Karl &?iarx, "The Class Struggles in France 1848 to 18.50,'' in Karl k1arx and Frederick Engels, Selected Works, 3 vols. (hfoscow, Z969), 1:235-236. 2. See Elrederick Engels, ""Revolution and Counter-revotutian in Gertz-tany," in Selected iVorks, 1:300ff. O n the revolutions of 1848, scc F. J. Hohsbaurm, The Age of Revolutic~n,2 789-1 8148 (New York, 19621, and ;The Age of Claf~ttcll,2 848-1 875 (New York, 19';79),pp. 3-27; Arthur Roscnbcrg, Democracy l a d Socialism: A Contribzatic~nt o the 1)oEiticclE El-iStclr3~of the Past 250 Bars, trans, C;eorge Roset~ (New York, 19391, pp, 59-133; see also Priscilla Robertson, Revr>lz4dions~(18412: A Sc~cklHl"stclr3~j13rinceton, 1952); Auguste (:ornu, Karl Marx et fa revolz4tiol.t de 2 848 (Paris, 1948). 3, The rcvotuttans of 1848 crItixnately prod~rceda situation in which by "stigrnatising as 'sociaIistic' what it llad previousty extolled as 'liheral,' the bourgeoisie cornfesses tfzat its own interests dictate that it should be dclivcrcd frorn the danger t>f its own r ~ / ethat, ; in order to restore tranquillity in the cout~try,its bourgeois parliament must, first of all, bc given its quietus; that in order to preserve its social power intact, its political power must he broken; tlzat the individual bourgeois can contin~teto exploit the other classes and to en)oy ~tndisturbedproperty, family? religion and order snty on condition that tlieir class he condemned atong with the other classes to like a poiitical nultity; that in order to save its purse, it must forget the crown, and the sward rhat i s to safeguard it must at the same time be h~~slig over its own liead as a sword of Darnocles," Karl hfarx, "The Eighteenth Rrtr maire of ZdoutsBonaparte," itn SeEecrcd iVorks, 1:436. 4, ""The conflict revotving around natural law and the whole revolutionary period of rtze bourgeoisie was based or1 the assumption rhat the forxnai equality and

universality of the law (and hence its rattanaliqr) was able at the same tixnc t a determitle its content. This was expressed in the assa~tlra n the varied and picturesque rncdtey of privileges dating back to the hfictdte Agcs and also in thc attack on the I?ivine Right of Kit~gs,The revolutionary bt~urgeoisclass refused to admit- that a legal rclatiansliip has a vaEid foualdattoxl mcrciy because it existed in fact, 'Burn your laws and make new ones!Yc>ftaire counseled; Whence can new laws be obtained? Frail-t R e a s o n t W T e o r g I,uk5cs, History azzd Class Corzscioz~sness: Stzddies irz Marxist llialectics, trans. Kodney Livingstone (Cambridge, hfass,, 2 9-72],p, 207. See also Ernst Blocfi, ATatz&ralLaw and Human I>iztii.ll"ty,trans. Dennis J, Schmidt (Cambridge, Mass., 1986), pp. 36-44, 66-75, 23 1-2085. ""X Iforcc creates right, tfie effect changes wttti the cause: every force that is greater tl~anthe first succeeds to its right, As soon as it is possible to tlisobey with impunity, disobcdtcncc is legitirnatc; and tlze srrorlgesr being always in the right, the t>nly thing that matters is to act so as to become the strongest," "all-jacques Rousseau, The Social Cantract and Discr>urses, trans. C2,U.H. Cote (Idondon, I983), p. 168, 6. Zrnlnantlef Mant, ""An Answer to the Question: T h a t Is Entightenll~ent?"' in K ~ n t kPoEiricaE Writins, ed. Hans Rciss (Cambridge, 1970), pp. 54ff. 7.BIandine Kriegei, The S&& and the Rule o(JJaw trans, hfarc A, I,e13ain and jcffrcy 6". Cohcrl (Princeton, 1995); Ulrich Preuss, Gonstit;ta$iol.talRevoEzadon: The Link Betweelf Corzstztzetzorzalzsm arzd 13rogress, trans. Lleboralz Lucas Scbneider (Atlantic Highlands, PU"J,, 1995). 8. Note the insightful analysis, which empl~asizesthe concern with democracy, t>f Karl mars cl^, "i'trarxYteltung in der europaiscl~enRevofutian von 1848 " in lJolitiscI~eTexte, ed. Erich Ckrlach und Jiirgen Seifcrt (Frankhrtlhfain, I974), pp. 3"lrlEf. 9. ""Kcasan has always existed, but not always it1 rational form, Thc critic, thcrcfore, can start with any for111 of tl~eoreticatand prac-ticaj consciousness and develop the true actuality our of the forms inherent in existing actuality as its ought-to-be and goal. As far as actual life is concerned, the political state especially contains in all its modem forms the den~arldsof reason, even where the political sratc is not yet conscious t>f socialistic:tlemands, And the political state does not stop here. Everywl~ere it cfairns reason as reajized, Equally, ilowever, it eveqwhere gets into the contradiction between its ideal cl~aracterand its real presuppositiot~s,""Karl hlarxJ "Letter tc) Arnotd Ruge Septell-tber l 843," in WritII1.zgsof $he Youtzg Marx on PhiEosr,phy and Society, ed. and trans. I,oyd D, Faston and Kurt H, Guddat (Nrw York, l94;17"),p. 21 3. 1C).A compilation of h%arx%writir~gson the Frcncli Revolution, along with a tendentious commentary, appears in Francc~isFuret, iMarx and the French RevoEzetiorz, trans, Deborah Kan F'urct (f Hegel's view of bureaucracy as incarnating the ""universal" interest af the state. In this vein, he can write: ""Beaucsacy considers itself the finite purpose of the state, Since bureaucracy converts its "farmal* purposes into its contents, it everywhere comes in conflict with 'real9 purposes. It is, tlliercforc, compelled to pass off what is formal for the content

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and the corltent for what is formal. Hence everything has a doubie meaning, a real and a bt~reatlcraticrneaning." Karl Ptfarx, ""Gtvit Soclety and Bureaucracy,'3n iVrititzgs of the Votlzzg Marx, pp, 185-1 86. For rnore on thc implitcattoxls Marx draws from t l ~ econtradictiot~between tlze universalist interests of a fc>rmallyrational democratic state and tbc selfish concerns promulgated by the civil society that it protects, see Kart Marx, ""On the Jewish Questiot~,"in inbid, pp. 224-225,235-23'7, 240-29 1. 12, Slztt>mc.> Avineri, The Sock1 and I%oliticalT i ~ t ~ ~ofg hKarl t Marx (New York, 1968), pp. 46-47. 13, ""Soctalistn originatcct as a workcrs"rotest movement, not oniy against the system of capitalist exploitation to which they were subjected, but also against the social injustlcc which the systern embodied and the notorious spirit of rltthfcss greed by whicl~it was governed. It was the ethos of Socialism-its promise of a world oi sociat justice and human solidarity-urhtch had aroused the cnthustasm wirfiitt the mt>vemet~t."Jutius Uraunthal, History of the Jntenzational, 3 vt>fs,,trans, Henry Chtlins, Peter Ford and Kenneth Mitcfiell (New York and Boulder, 1980), 3:.509, 14, KarI :CTarx, "Letter to Arnsld Ruge, September 1843," in inrititzgs of the You~zgMarx, pp. 2 14-2 1.5. 15. For the classic argument, sec I,ouis AIthusscs and Ftienrlc Baltbar, Relading Ckpital, trans. Ben Brewster (l,andan, 1970), and especially Louis Althusser, For Mnrx, trans. by Ben Brcwster (New York, 1970). 16. Georg Lukics, ller jurzge iwarx: Sehre philc~s{ophischeEntwicklst~rgvtxz 2 840 bis f 844 (PfGitlltngen, 1965), and Istvan i"c4cszaros, Mcrrx's Theory of Alinerzatio~ (London, 1978), pp, 2 17ff. 17. The iz-tost intettigent way to approacfi this iz-tanifesto, the wfiole of wfiicfi can fit on a single, normal-sized wait poster, is to begin by noting that it ""erred not in its appreciation of class struggle tlnder capitalism, but in its belief that such conflict would culxninate quickly in revolutionary socialism, As Marx wrotc to Engcls in 1863, practical as well as scientific doubts soon crept in. hfarx eventuatly y~~alified every one of the hasic tcndcncics of cagitalistn and rook note of opposing cconorntc t>rpolitical forces that might abate a common European revolutionary storm." Alan Gilbert, Marx5 Politia: Comn2zatzists and Citizens (New Brunsvcrick, N.J., 1981), p. 1.32, 18, Frederick Engels, ""Socialism: Utopian and Scientific," in Sekcted VVisrks, 3:115ff. 19. In this regard, see the first chapter of Vincent Cieoghegan, Utopin;rzism and Mnrxism (Iaondcln,1988). 20. Elrederick Engets, ""tudwig Feuerbach and the End of GIassical Cierman Philosophy," in in~eEectcdWorks, 3:3355F, 2 1, This is important given the misunderstanding aver the tfistinctic>nbetweet1 tfie economic ""hsc" and the politicallideologtd ""sperstructurc." Usually this distinction is seen as real rather than merely heuristic. Indeed, it is inccjrrect to claim that "econoiz-tic relations are to be strictly separated from the rest, or that tl~eycan he, even in a purely conceptuat setlse. The unity of sociat life is so strong that the only posslhlc distiizction is a iz-tetl~odotogicalone, for tfie ptlrpose af tfirouring light 0x1 any particular one of thc fundamcntai rclatic-jnships. It is a corn-

pIete mistake to thtrlk that Marx" differentiation between base and superstructurc was an absolute distinction between two different, overfapping spheres." Franz jakubowski, IQeologqf am! Superstructfdre in Hktorical Matenalisnz, trans. Anne Booth (lstldotl, I978), p, 37, O n the ccjncept t>f ""tc,tality," see the outstanding intclIcctuai history by Martin Jay, Marxism artd Totality: The Adve$?tziresof w Co~zceptfrtlnz Lukkcs to Habermas (Berkeley, 1985)" 22. Mart iwarx and Frederick Engels, "The Communist hfanifesto," in Selected Wcjrks, F,:I11, 23. ""Tl-rebourgeoisie, during its rule af scarce one hundred years, has created more massive and more colossal productive forces than have at1 preceding generation$ together'" Ibid,, p, 113. 24. ""Nothing distinguishes acrthentic from vuigar Marxism so rnuch as its relation to the problems resutting from the movement of thought from Katzt to Hcgel, . . . Ictcalist philosophy, it1 its Kantian form, had shown that the intuitively given worlcl of experience was not sometl~ingultimate, but rather tlze result t ~ the l shaping and t~nifyit-rgactivities af the Subject. As a result, hrllarx was aware that a materiafist critique must avoid fattitzg back into a primitive t>bjectivism.He therefore had to ctndertake a nonidealist reconstruction of the problem of the possible coexistence of an objective urorld of cxpericncc and a unified consctousncss of it, instead of abstractly denying the idealist view as such," Alfred Schil-tidt, The Concept of Nagtare i~zMarx, tram. Rerl Fowkes (I,ondon, 1977 lX,p. 113. 2.5. In that same famous tetter to Kuge of September 1843, Marx claims that the necd to engage in a "rclent!css criticistn of aII existing conditions" starts with '"siticism of politics, wit11 taking sides in politics, hence with actual struggles, and identifying o~irselveswitl-r.thell-t." Wtltf;tzgsofthe You~zgMarx, pp. 21 l f f , 26. hlarx and Engets, "The C:ommunist Manifesto," p 1108, 27. For an analysis af the primacy of production, as constitutive of the totality in which the production, distribution, and corlsumption of particular cornmodjtics arc rnoil-tents, see Karl Xfarx The Crz-ttzdrkser Pozdn~iatio~zs of the CXgique of Political Econom;t~, trans. &fartin Nicolaus (New York, 19731, pp. 83-109, 28, Marx and Engels, "The Communist LUanifesto," p. F, 16, 29, Sec Karl htarx, "T'hcses on Fcucrbach," Selected Works, 1:13-14, #l and #3, It is quite possible to turn tl~isvision t>f the proletariat, as the ""sbject-object" of history, into a full-btown rnetaphysic as Cieorg Luk6cs did in Hist0l.y and CEass Consciszdsness, Nevertheless, it is also possible to emphasize the constitutive role si consciousness witfno~itresorting to il-tetapbysicat a r avert teteologlcal claims. In this (New. York, 1963 ed.), pp. 186ff. regard, see Karl Korsch, Karl ~ U a m 30. Thus, precisely at the time when aiil-tast everyone was identifying the working ctass urittz the indcrstrtal proletariat, Engels acided the following note to the work he and his friend had written forty years earlier: "By bourgeoisie is meant the cfass si modern capitalists, owners of the means of social production and employers of wage labor. By proletariat, the class of wage taborers who, having no means t>f production af their awn, are redctced to selling their tabor power in order to live." Marx and Engefs, ""The Communist iUanifesto," p 108. 31. T'lzis category af ""labor power" was first proposed in 1847, when Marx entered into his heated corltroversy uiith Pruuctf-ron. Here is the introduction to the concept of ""rification" and the falno~tsdiscussion af "the fetishism of commodi-

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tics"" that urauld appear in (2apital more than twenty years later. "Time is everything, man is nothing; be is at the il-tast time's ccacass, Quality no longer il-tatters. Quantity alone decides everything: lzour for hour, day for day." Kart Marx, The lJoverty of f3hik)sophy(New York, 19631, p. 54. 32, Similarly, capital is not identifiable with empirical capitalists or their interests, C:apitalist property is defined by an accumulation process in which it can historically take different foril-ts, Thus, in one period, property and capital can be defined in terms of an individual" sowings, wl~ereasin anotl~erit can separate itself entirety from the individual and take a social for111 as in the case of the corporation. Note the discussion by Kucfalf Hitfcrding, FiE'zafzce CapzfailaE: A Sttady itz t?~eLatest Phase of Capitali"sr DcveEopment, ed. Tom Bottomore and trans, haorris Watnick and Sam Gordcjn (Idondon,1981), pp. 10'7ff. 33. ""The Commut~istsare distinguished from the other working cfass parties by this only: 1) In the national struggles of the proletarians of the different countries, they point out and bring to the front the common interests t>f the entire proletariat, independentfy of all nationatity. 2) In the various stages af devetopment which the struggle of the working cfass against the bourgeoisie has to pass through, they always and everywhere represent the interests of tile movement as a whole," hfarx and E~zgrls"The Communist hlanifesto," p. 120. 34. The C:ornm~xnist1,eague was a small group of individ~ralswho, in Jacobin fashion, urisfzect to play the role of a revolutiorlary ""vanguard," But in contrast to l,enin% vision, Marx and Engels maintaine~jthat the communists ""donot form a separate party opposed to other working-class parties. They have no interests separate and apart from those t>f t l ~ eprc~letariatas a whole. They tlo not set up any sectarian principles of their own, by which to shape and il-tould the proletarian movemet~t," Ibid., p, 119, For the background, see hfax Netttau, ""Iotlctoner komrnunistische Diskussir>nen, 1845: Nach den1 ProtokoILbuch des C.A.B.V." in Archiu fiar dze Geschichte des ,Soxialiswzus uzzd Qer Arbeiterbewegzanff(Berlin, 1922), ZQ:362-391; see also Ernst Schraeplers, "Der Bund der Ciereci-tten. Seine T'atigkeit in Idondon1840-1 84'7," in Archiv fur Soxialgeschicbtc (Ht-lannovcr,1962), pp. 5-29, 3.5, Marx, ""The Eighteentlz Ururnaire of Louis Bonaparte," pp. 484406, 36, Ibid., pp, 478-482, 37, Kart Marx, ""The Class Struggles in France, I848 to 1850," p. 219 and passii1-t. 38, "The defeat t>f I848 left Marx and Engels with a bitter taste. "They would adLeague that in the next bourgeois revolution the proletariat vise the C:o~nm~xnist must seize the initiative, push tile revolution beyond any rncrc cornmitxnent to formal parltamentarism, and make it ""permanent" until a srzccessfut proletarian seizure of pourer could take piiace, Less than eight montlzs tater, however, they ahandcrned this "utrra-Left" "andpoint and so Inrc>ugl.tt tl~eirrelcztic>ns with the Communist 1,eague to a stormy end, See Karl hlarx and Frederick Engels, "Address to the Centraf Committee of the Communist I,eague," in Selected Works, 2:175-185. For the rninutes af the last meeting of the C:o~nil-tunistLeague" Central. 248-252. C:ornmittee, see Irzterrtcatiorzd Review of SockE his tor^^ 1 (1"36);), 39. Beca~tseliberal rights were seen as intrinsicatly connected to the maintenance of private property and class society, hiarx later reiterated an old line frorn ""The C:o~nil-tuni?it kianifesto" as 11e implored the new Gerll-tan Social Democratic Parry

not to rexnajn corltent with b o ~ ~ r g ecivil ~ t s rights but to cross ""cc rlarrow tiorizon af bo~irgeoisrigl-tt . . . in its entirety and [let] soc~etyinscribe on its banners: From eacli according to 11is ability, to each aecorciing to his needs." Kart Xlarx, "Critique t>f the Gc>thaI)rogramme," in Selected Wt~rRs,3:18-19, 40, Marx, "The Class Struggles in Frarlcc 18413 to 2 850," pp.224. 41. J o h t ~Ehret~berg,The l>l'ctdtorshzp of the I)roEetanLlt: iMarxzfnz3 T!~eor3~of Socialkt Democracy (New York, 3 9"32), 42, Kart Kautsky, T h e Dictatorsbif) of the l+roletari~t, trans. H. J. Stenning (Ann Arbor, 2971), pp. 42-58, See also Rosa Lt~xernburg, ""The Russian Rcvolution,'"n Rosa 1,uxernburg Speaks, ed, &tar)?-AliccWaters (Ncw York, 2970), pp. 391-394. 43, ~Marxand Engcls, ""The Communist Xlanifcsto," p. 126, 44, In this setlse, :vlarx and Engels" notion of the "communist utopia," with its empliasts on abolishing those exploitative irrtcrcsts that distort communicatiorl and cliannel knowledge in particular tlirections, prcjvides a basis for the notion of ""undistarted cornm-ctnication." See Jtirgen I-tabertl-tas, KnowEe~ige of Hunza~z Irzterests, trans. Jererny J. Shapirs jBostt>n, 1971j, pp. 187ff. 45. h2arx and Engets, "The C;otl-til-t~inist hfanifesto," p. 1127. 46, Uncrittcally accepting a neo-Aristotelian view of ""ral" politics as separate from economic "necessit?;" and ignoring the entire history of the workitlg class movement, some of tfie rnost scxninal urorks of Amcricarl political tficory vicw Marx as ""antipoliticat" and as a thinker who breaks with the "geac tradition" of political theory. Sec Sheldon Wolin, Polztiw a d Visz'on:Gonti~zaityiz~tdI:zrzovatjo~ zn Westertz Polli'tical Tijogght (Boston, 1960), pp. 414-419; and Hannah Arendt, The E-liurna~zCo~zdz'tz'otz( N e w York, Z 959f, pp, 163ffEf, 277-1 96, 47, Alarx and Engets, "The C:ommunist hfanifesto," p 1137, 48. kticheline R. Ishay, Itzterrzacio~zaEismamri Its :SBe$rawlihiinneapolis, 1995). 49. Jullus Eraunthat, History on(the I~zter~atiojtzal', 1:9-13. SO. From then on, "every revolution in any European country, no matter wilether it liad Liberal, democratic, or gerlcral national airns, l-rad to reckon with the arined intervention of the conservative rna~orpowers. Consequet~tlythe international European counter-revolution sgoxltarleously producecl a revolutionary International," R~osenberg,Benztlcrcrcy and Socialism, p, 75. 51. """rtzaug1-tnot in substance, yet in form, the struggle of the proletariat with the bourgeoisie is at first a national struggle." Marx and Engefs, "The Commltt~ist hfanifesto," p. 118. 52. ""Rt it1 any courltry the rute of ttic bourgeoisie is impossible witfiout: national independence. . . . Thus, if the Itevolution of 1848 was not a socialist revolution, it paved the umy, prcparcd tfic grourld for the h t ~ e c. . . Without restoring autonomy and unity to each nation, it will be impossible to acl~ievethe internatiot~alunion of thc proIecartat, or the peaceful and intelligent co-operation of these nations toward common airns." "gets, "hdface" to the 1893 Italian e~fitiont>f "The Communist hfanifesto," in Selected Works, 1:107, 53. "Alter the failure of the Iilevt>Lutic>nof 1848, all party t>rganisations and party journals of the working classes were, on the Continent, cl-ushed by the iron hard af force, the rnost advar-rced sons of labour fleet in despair to tllic Transatlantic Repubtic, and the short-lived cfreail-ts of ell-tancipation vanisl~edbefore an epoch of

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191

ind~rstrtalfever, moral marasme, and political reaction,"" Kart Xlarx, "Inacrgural Address af the Working &fen's International Association," in Seiected Works, 2: 15. 54. Franz Mehrtng, Geschichte der dezatschen Soxialderuzokrcalie, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1968), 27'-156. 55. Koscnberg, Rernocr~cyand Sociallsnz, pp, 156-1 62. 56. Braunthal, History of the Irztemcati(1~za1~ 1:86, 57. Note the classic work by David Rjazanov, "Zur Gesc-hicl~teder ersten Internationale," kin Marx-EngeEs-Arcbiv (Frankfmt/h%ain,19251, pp. 119-202; and C;.X>.H. Cole, A Hzstory of Socialkt T h o ~ g h tMarxism : a~zdAnarclhism, 2 859-1 890 (Iaondon, 1960). See also I,. E, Mins, rd., Folarzdifzg of the First: I~zternalional:A Doczt@zentary Record (New York, 19.33; a d d a n s Gerth, ed., T h e First I~zter~atiorzai: Mi~ztateso f the Hagzae Go~gressof 2 872 (&ladison, 1958). 58. Kart ~Marx,"General Rules t>f the International Wc~rkingMen" Assoc-iati~)n,~' in SeEected Works, 2: 2 13, 59. Ibid,, p, 17. 60. The link between theory and practice can also be seen more literally, In the same way that "The Communist Manifesto" was tied to the revolutions of 1848, it is interesting to note that tile most radical and emancipatory working-class movement to that point in time should t~aveemerged preciscty in the period that Xlarx was finishing the first vof~tmeof Das Kapital, See Karl Marsch, M a r x k m a ~ d Philosoph)~,trans. Frcd Halliday (Iaondax1,19;70),pp. 51-52, 154ff. 61. Mote the tiiscussistl in hlichael Forman, ltzterrzationaiism artd the Labor Movement (University park, Pa,: 1998). 62, For an excellent tiiscussion of &%arxand llis t>pponents within the First International, see X3atll Tholnas, k r l Marx and the Anarchkts (l,ondon, Z '380); and Franz Mebring, Kart Marx: The Stnr)i of His L$@, trans, Edward Fiageratd (Antin Arhor, 1969), pp. 317-356, 387-500. 63, Sec John Fhrenherg, Pro~dhorzand Hls Age ( AtIarltic Highlands, 1996). 64, "T1.re tlistorian is certainjy free to postulate what would have happened if the General CounctI had not harctcned its line on the sections, for this harderling undoubtedly hastened the end. It is quite possible that Rexibfe tactics would have postponed the demise of tile First International. But the end was crnavoidable; tile "Odl 1nternational"vv.a~ ciocjmed to disappear sooner or later." "ques Freymt>tindand hfiklos kfolnar, ""Tile Rlse and Fall of the First International," in T h e Kevulzttio~zaryIrztenzatiorzals, 1864-2 943, ed. Alilsract M, l3raclikovitcb (Stanfc~rd, 19661, pp. 3 1-32. 65. Bracrnthal, History of the I~zter~atiorzat, 1:191--194, 66. Karf kiarx"s letter to Abraharn Lincoln and also his ""Address to the National Labor Union of the United States," it1 Selected Wc~rks,2:22, 156-157. 67. Braunthal, History of the I~tterrzcatic~rza 1:145, 68. Far a dramatic rendering of this revu/uttonary expertmcnt, sec Prosper l,issagary, Histoire de Ia Kummune ale 2872 (Paris, 1329 ec4.f; and Stewart ~ (Ithaca, 2973), See also, Mart Edwards, ed., The C ~ m m ~ a n a r d~s( P l a r i s1871 Korsch, "Der Pariser Kornrnutineaufstand 1871-Die Russiche Revolution 1926," in Politischs Tcxte, pp. Z28fI. 69. Bcfarc his death in 1895 at the age of seventy-five, Engcls corlcludcd tliiat the barricade had become anacfironistic and he threw his support to a social deil-tacratic

movement cornmi~edto parliamentasism, But still he could close his intr~duction to the 189 1 edition af lifarx" The Civil War in Fra~zcewith the words: ""L& at the Paris Commune. That was the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" "$elected Works, 2: 189). 70, See the admiring description and ttoxnagc to Blanqui in the autobiography of jules \iallCs, 77/28Insurrecti(~rzkt,trans, Sandy Petrey (Englewood C:tiffs3 hi=)., 1"371), pp, 119ff. ";7. Note Engetsk controversial intrt>cfuctit>nto tlre I891 ecfition of Marx" The C:it.'il \Bar in Fra~zce,22:186, 72. It is correct to rnair~tainthat ""no Rousscauist overtorlcs of direct democrracy can be traced in Marx" description af the cornrm~ine,"Avineri, Tha Social apzd Political T??oughto(Karl Mlarx, p, 2 11. 73. Mere Marx and Engets dificred from tlreir followers in tlre Second and the Third Internationals. Both would tatcr turn the Parts Commune into the finat utopian prcjduct of h e i r respective "transitionat" "ecjries t>f the state-wl~iclr involved pariia~mentaryrepubticanisrn on the one ltand and party dictatorship on the other. In neitlrer case did this putative end bear any relation to tlze means that were to bring it about. 74. h$ehring, Klarl Marx, pp. 4.52453. 75. The radical del-t-tocraticrole of Rabespierre and the therrnidorian reaction that fo-ollowedltis faXt are explored in the classic studies by Albert Marhicz, The Prench Kevulutir~n,trans. by Catherine ALison Phitiips (New York, 1964 ed.) and After Robespierre: The Thcrmidorzdn Reacrio~,trans- Cathertrle AIison Phtllips (New York, 196.5 ed,). 76, On the Eorl-t-tationof the Tl-tird Republic, see Daniel Halevy, The E1211 of the Notables, ed, Afain Silvera jiMiddlecowt~,C:onn,: 1974), 77. Thus, it becomes possible to advance a conception af hfarxisrn that is "undogxnatic and antidogmatic, historical and critical, and u~htcltis therefore materialist in the strictest sense of the word. In contrast: to the orthodox critics, this conception invulvcs the appticatian of tftc materialist conccpticlr-r uf history to tftc materialist ccjnception of history itself," l ~ o r s c lMarxkm ~, a ~ IY~ilosophy, d p. 92, 78. Rracrnthal, History (of the Inrer~atiorzal,1:156--164. 79, Rosenberg, Demtlcuacy arzd Socialism, pp. 217-218, 80. Terrorism became a worldwide phenarnenan but proved particularly strong in the Russian Empire. That is reflected in literary works of the time, such as Turgenev's F~d$j?ers a~zdSo~zsas well as Uostoyevsky" The Possessed. 81. Turnir~gMarxism from a "criticat theory" of society irlro a sctcrlcc was irrelevant with respect to its ""antipotiticaf" "potential. Instead the "transformation of Xlarxism into a %seicntific"octrine. emptied of any genuine phllasopftic contentand hence powerless to stern tlze inrush of romantic irrationalism which began in the 1890's arid reaehect a disastrous cttmax in the 1930%-was destinect to be a Eactor of crucial importance, thougl~negatively: it helped to bring about that cleavage between the democratic tabour movet-t-tentand the tradittonal idealist outfaok af the middle class inteiliget~tsiawlrich Fascism was later to exptt>it with such fatal results," George Lichtheim, Marxism: Aft Historical and Cril;iccal Studj~(New York, 1973 cct,), p, 243.

Notes

193

82. Henry Pacl~ter~ ""The Ictca of Progress it1 Xlarxism," in Soci~lisnzi ~ zHzstol.3": PolitzcaI Essays of Henry Paclrrter, ed. Stepben Eric Bronner (New York, 1984), pp. 65$5. 83. S. H. Kigby, ""Egels After Marx: Histclry," and l,awret~ceWitde, ""Engels and the Contradictions of Kcvolutlorlary Strategy" in Engels affer iZ/Iarx, ecis. ManCred B, Steger and Terrell Carver (University Park, Pa., 1999f,pp. 109ff, I97ff. 84. Regardless of how his statetnent was used by the various factions af the German mt)vemetlt, Engels was justified in 189.5 when he claimed that his rejection af the barricades was no rejection of :\lrarxisrn% revolutionary character, Quite the opposite, He saw that the enemy rexnairled the saxne: the aristocratic opponents of political de~i-tocracyand tlie bourgeois opponents af substantive ecluality. He never agreed with the "revisionist" current of the Second International, which opposed the notion of revotutiot~tozat cozart and argued that the proletariat sl~ouldemploy only Iegat rneans on the road to power. Ncvcrthetess, he knew that the empirical basis as well as the meaning of "revolution" had changecl from the Jacobin vision of 1848, Engels "I~itroduction," kin The Glass Struggles in France 21348 to 2850, I: 2 96-200. 85, Here it i s important to re~i-tembertIiat the political purpose befiind Engels's Anti-Diff'hrt~zg, a core work of "scientific" matertalistn that positeci the four "bfaws" a l dialectics operative in nature and society, was to attack a burgeoning anti-Semitic and irrationalist tendency within the S113 Ied by Fuger1 I)iithrtng, who claimed that history was tlze prc~ductof violet~ce,See Dieter LXiwe and KIaus Tenfelcfe, ""Zur Rczeptiorl Eugcn I>iitftrtngs in der dcutschen Arbettcrbewegung in den 18"70er jahren," in Wisse~?schclf"tlicI.Jcv~ S~lai~alismzcsupzd Arbeiterbewegzd~g: Begrzffsgeschz'chte urzd Z)Ghri?zg-Rac?ptionJScliriften aus dem Marl-hfarx-X-Ea~ls#24 (Trier; 1980). 86. ''""Tl~emain question-one which history never resafved because it cannot be resolved once and for all-was wliether the bourgcatsic would respect its own tegal arder in case af an electoral trfu~i~ph of soclafism. If sociaftsts were to use the institution of suffrage-established by the bourgeoisie in its struggle against ahsotutism-to win elections and to legislate society toward socialism, would the Inourgcolsic not revert to illegal rneans to defend its interests? This is wliat had happened in France in 18.51, and it seemed tiliely tlzat it would happen again." Adarn Przeworski, Gapidalism and Social Democrac~~ (Cambridge, 1985), p, 9. 87. For an interesting discussion, see Ckrl Landauer, Eurc_jpearzSockEism, 2 volt;, (Kerkeley, 19S9f, I: I32ff. 812. See Henri E,eEebvrc, The Socioln~lof lMcarx, t r a m Norbert (iuterman (Ncw York, ISris), pp. 16'7ff. 89, """iYilhcnthe International was forxncd in 1864, tlic principle of political ecluality for the working class t>na tfemt>cratic basis had by no means been recognized in a majority of European states. T13e working classes had as yet gained no measure t>f political emancipation, While it is true that, to a certain extent they had a share in the acfiievements of ho~trgeaisdelnocracy and its hard-won area of freedom-freedcrm of thought, of cot~scienceand civic: rights-they were allt>wed na participation in governrnentaf power; excluded from thc franctiise, they were subjected to the political regime uf the property ourning classes, The struggle for

the universal right to vote as a means of liberating the working classes fratn the political rule of the middle class had been one of the leading objectives in the fight of the Soelalisr parries during the period of thc First and Second Intcrnationats. f3artiarnentary tlernt>cracb foutlded stl universal suffrage and today accepted unqucstionir~gtyas a sta~ldardrequirement for any poiirical system, indeed rcpresents one of the achievemetlts of the Socialist movernetlt." haunthal, History of t/?e jlntertzatiofzal, 3:503. See also S~tsannehliller, Das I'"rablenz der Preiher't km Soxialisnzus (Franlifurt, 1964). 90, cl. Karl Popper, The Open Society a~zdjlts Enemies (X3rinc-eton,19501, pp, 274Ff. 91. Karl hfarx, "The Future Results of British Rule in India," in Karl Xbiarx on (Jolonialism atzd ~Wodenzixation,ed. Shlorno Avirrcri (New. York, 1969), p. 139.

Chapter 2 1. Wcrncr Rturncnberg, Karl Kautskys lliterarisches Werk: Eine bihliographische Oherszc/>t(Gravenliage, 1960). 2. A corrective is provided in the excellent btograpfiy by Gary f>, Stcenso11, Karl Kaadtsky, 1854-1 938: iMarxism ia the Cl~lssicalYears (Pittsburgh, 19781. Also see jolin H. Ka~ttsky,Karl Kagktsky: Xblarxkm, RevoEz-dtion a~zdDemocrac~j(New Brunswick, N.J., 1994) and Adassirno Satvadori, Karl K a ~ t s k yand the Socialist Revulzl.rion, 2 880-1938, trans, jolln Rorhscfiiid (I,ondon, 1979). 3. See V. X. Ixnin, "The Proletarian Rcvoluriorl and the Renegade K a ~ t s k y ~in" Selected Works, 3 vols. (hloscoy 1964), 3:6S-1.50; I,eon Trotsky, Terrorism mzd (Jornnzza~zism:A Reply t o Karl Kautsky (Ann Arbor, 1961); KarI Korsch, Rk materialistisc C~eschichtsauffasst.t~zg:Eine Azdseznnrtdersetzz~~zgmit Kaul Kazdtsky (f,cipzig, 1x29); Paul hlattick, "Karl Kacrtsky: From khrx t o Hitier;" it1 A ~ t i Brrrlshevik f:ommurzism (New York, 1978), pp. 1-17. 4. On the reception of ktarxistli in the young SPII, see Karl Brockschmidt (Ceorg Brandis), Die Deutsche Sozialdemokratie bz's zztm Fall ales Sozialistertgesetzcs (I,eipzig, 1931f , 5. Nicf-rolas Sargardt, The Germalz fdca nf ~MzEirarisnz:Radical artd SocinEist C;ritics, 1866-2 914 (nlyt>bjectiveand totally non-idcofsgicat reatity, 2 ) Law and the State which are atready somewfiat less real because they are clad in ideology, and 3) pure ideofagy which is objectless and totatty unreal ('pure rubbish")," Kari Korscl~,iwarxisnz and Phzlosophy, trans. Fred Halliday (I,andon, 2970), p. 73. 8. The most sophisticated version of this critique is provided by Korsch, Die materzdlls~ischeCes~hi~btsaz.lffd:ssz.ttzg~ pp, 3Ef and 81ff. 9. Xlax Weber, The Prc~testa~tt Ethic atzd the .Ypirit of C:zapz;calism,trans. YaIcort f3arsons (New York, 1958), pp. 155ff. 10, J a m s JoII, The S e c o ~ dI~zter~atiorzal, f 889-1 9 14 (New York, 19661, p. 65,

Notes

195

11. Susanne hlillcr, ""Sozialdcxnakratic crnd 1"iberalismus: Ein t~istortsches BundnisYYn Dernskvatk urzd Diktahr: G'eist utzd Cwtalt polilischer Herrschaft bz I>eul~;ichland urzd E.;z-tropa,ed. Xlanfred F'unke et al. (Bann, 19X7), p, 68, 12. Cart E. Schorske, Ciernzczn Social Democracy9 2 90.5-1 91 7 (New York, I955), p. 7 , 13. Note the monograpl~by Kicbard Weikart, Socklist L>arwi~ism:k;volz$tz"o~z in Cermatz SociaEist Thought from Marx to Ber~zstein(San Francisco, 1999), pp. I5"7f, 14. Rudalf Walther, . . . alper ~zachder Siitz~ifIzat kommen wir, uttd nur wir: 'Z~usanzme~zbnachsthec)rze,' Mn/larxisnzf$s zuzd politisches Refizit in der $PI> 2 890-1 924 (Frankfurt, 1981f, pp. 95-100. (Stuttgart, 15, KarI Katrtsky, Ethik uzzd nzaterialistlsche Ges~tlictl~saz-.tffassuzzg 1986), p. 142, 16. Salvador;, K ~ r Kaa;csFry l and the Sociolist Reuc~fl~kti~~z, pp, 108ff. 17. cf. Leszek Kalakowski, Main Currc?t?tsof Mcrrxisnz, 3 vt~ls,trans, I), S, Falla (Oxford, 19781, 2:35ff. 18. ""lthe H~-fohemoflernstate, social tlernocsrtlcy was always t l ~ espeaker for any group with detl-tacraticdemands emanating from the revolutionary years whose interests, crndcr the infli~enceof any rlumb~rof factors, were occasionalty or continually darnpened by the feft-liberal parties." &filler, ""Sziaidemokratie und 1.i beralismus,""p. 62, 19, All major figures of the Second International were intet~selyinterested in tfiese revolutions* In this respect, Kautsky contributed his I>ie Klassengegerzsatze vvn l789: Zzkm C~urzdertjshrigef? fJ'ede~2ktagder grosset? Revolz$tion (Stuttgart, 1889), while Ed~lardBernstein actuaily inflttenced &tax VE"eber and orher scholars with his CrcjmweEl arzd Comnzztnism: Soczcllz'sm and Democracy the {Great English Revslutiolz, trans, H. j. Stennillg (New York, 1963). 20. Karl Kz\utsky3The Social Revolurzon, trans. A. hl, Wood and hlay Wood (Chicago, ZSZO), p. 17, 21, "What is the use of ttlic growth of our inflcrencc, our power it1 the Reichstag, if the Keichstag itself has no influence and power, . . . The resistance to tlze establtsfimcrlr of a truly parttarnenrary rcgixne must be ovcrcorne; the government of the Reich must be made a committee of the Keichstag." Kgrt Kautsky, The Road to Power: Reflectiuns on Growi~zgirzto the Revulglion, ed, jolin H. Kautsky and trans, Raymond LVeyer (Atlantic Highlands, N.j,, 19921, p. 69, 22, See Ciusta Esping-Anderson, Poiitics Agatnst Markets: The Social Demomtic Road to Power (Prir~cetctn,19851, pp, 17ff. 23. Helga Grebing, HBtory ofthe German I,abour Movement: A Survey, trans, Edith Kaerner (IdearningtonSpa, 3985), p, "7. 24, See Homer Kogers, ""Before the Revisionist C:ontroversy: Kautsky, Rcrnstein, and the hleantng of Xlarxisxn, 1895-1898," PPh*D. dtss,, Harvard University, 1984, 25. George I,icl-ttliiei~x,Marxism: An Historical a~zdCri2ical Stgdy (New York, I965), p-26326. The SPD ""Lft" was nor dagmaticalily opposed to reform in general or parliamcntarism in particular. "iMarx and ExlgeIs concluctcd The (Jomn2u~zist~Mlanifesto

with a list of undramatic reforms deemed desirable from a socialist perspective, Rasa L-ctxetl-tburgand Karl Kautsky paid tribute to the %ocial,'or "ohtical,hutage as a necessary precondition for uplifting the politically dangerous siurn proletariat and far strengthening working class unity under conditions of unemployment and poverty" Esping-Anderso~l,PoEitics Agai~zstMnrkeb, p, 146. 27. Kautsky saw the council, t>r"soviet," as an instrument of mt>bilizationrather than as an alternative to state power and the Inass strike rnerely as a ""defensive" maneuver to maintain existing liberties, See Karl Kautsky, L>er polztzsche Massenstreik (Berlin, I9l4), and Safvadari, KarE Kaartsky a ~ dthe Socialr'st Revolzdtion, pp. 228ff. 28, "The pofitical goal inscribed on the flag of the SPD, and for which it had fought for so long, was to substitute a parliamentary democracy for the constitutional mc~narchyof witllelmine Germany, . . . The partiamentary state was not a tacticat calcuiadon for the socialists, but rather a matter of prirrciple and tile primary political gc~at."h n s t Wc3lfgang Bczcket~forde,"Der Zusammenhruch der Mt~narchie rind die Entstehung der Weirxarer Rep-ctblik," in Die Weimarer Reprrblik 191 8-1 93.1: 1301itik, Wirtscj~aft,CesellscI~aft,ed. Kart Dietrich Uracher et al. (Bonn, 2987), p. 30. See a!so Heinrich August Wlnkler, Die Sozialdemokratie und die Revolz.tt.ion f 9 113119 (Berlin and Ronn, 1979), p, 54ff. 29. ""Kar~tskydeveloped two central thelnes: the indispensability of parltail-tent as an instrument of gavernxnent . . . and the need to win a majority of parliament, treating elections as a fut~damentatstrategic avenue of the tabor movernetlt. . . . In his cornrnerltary on the Erfurt Programme, the democratic republic, the conquest t>f a parliamentary majority through the strength and influence w o t ~by the Social Democracy in its political and social struggles, and the use of parliamentary tegistation for sscialist purposes, constitute tlle very content of the dictatorship t>f the proIetariat.""'alvadori, Karl Kazatsky and the Socllalkt Revolgtz'on, p, 35, 30. ""Iis impossible to understand the theory building in the SPD if orlc assumes a fixed, unctianging view of those theories including, especially, the breakdown tlteory. Tlreary buifdiftg was rnuch more a process of continual adaptation to the rcaf historical process itself, and the particular claims and responses regarding the new situations must be seen and comprcf-tended in thctr specific contexts." Rudolf Waltl-ter, . . . aber nach der Sz$rzd)lut ktjlmnze~?wir utzd m r wiz; p. 28, Wirl-t regard to the Erfurt Prograil-t, see pp, 59-95, 3 1, Karl Kautsky, Das Erfidrter lJrc>gramnz.In sei~zerngrzarzdsdtzliche~zTezl erlagged (Hannover, 1964), p, ZQI, 32, " " I d o not believe that the German ruting ctass will allow Social Democracy to develop indefinitely along legal lines., . . . The more it increases its political power, the more certain it is that i t s adversaries will overthrow the c~nstitutio~l and replace it with a regime in which the workers are violently oppressed, their organizations brokcn crp by force-a regirne based on brrtte force which will require the most vigorous countermeasures." Kautsky, Der pc~li'tischeiWclssenstrcik, pp. 8 f -83, 33. The idea af an "iron taw" regarding the increasing impoverisfiment of the working class is a 1,assatlean tegacy, though a certain justificatit>n for it may be f o ~ ~ nindhfarx? writings. A thorough discussion stands o ~ ~ t s i the d c pesent context, but Kautsky always understood irnxn iseration ( Verelendzangf i 11 term.; of increasir~g ""insecurity7'-which obviously gives the concept a political twist. hdced, be was

Notes

197

logically consisterlt on the issue, although, against Bernstcit~,Kacrtsky sornewhat disit-tgenuously maintailled that the Erfidrt Prrjgramm contained not a word on the objective "brcakdourn'kf capitalism, u~htchis directly related to the imxntscration tl~esis,Karl Kautsky, Bernstein urzd das sozl;rldt.rnokmtzsche I%rtlgramnz: Eine Antikritilk (Stuttgart, 18991, p. 43, 34. Salvadori puts the matter in an intelligent way: "Of ccjurse, t l ~ epossibility that a gap could arise between the theoreticat section of the program, with its socialist tjbjectives, and the practical sectic~n,with its struggle for democratic reforms withit1 the existing order, certai11157 existed. But such a possibility was not autoznatically inherent itr the program itself. A csntradictior-r could cxnerge in the concrete case of the growth af the workershmovement not being accompanied by an ecluivalent crisis of capitafism as a dominant social systern-in other urards, if capitalisxn conserved sufficietlt stretlgtl~to assure t l ~ edevelopment t>f the forces of production while silliiultit~~e~u~ly rnaintatrling effective co~ltrofover the proletariat. Xn that event, the category of historical becessity,\undcrstood as the guarantee that the struggle for democracy would be transformed into a crisls af the dominant system, would inevitably ftxe its utility and potetlcy. The result woutd then be an impasse for Soc~alDemocracy." "Saldori, Karl Kautsky and the Socialkd Rcvolglion p. 32. 35, Hatts-tiirtch Wehler, The German Enzlpirt? f 872-/g18 trans, KIm 'T'rayner (1,eamington Spa, lf38Sf, pp, 11Sff. SQ. Eduard Davtd and Gcorg von Vollmar provided the first hints of what would become the ""revisionism tlehate" through their claim tl~att l ~ epeasantry would not succumb to proIetariantzation and that it would follow an independent road of development. Kautskyk incisive argumeglts are f~rmulatedin his D i e Agrarfrage Ezrze Obersz'cht iiber die Tendc~zzendev vnodcrnen I,andurzrsch~ft und die Agrarpolt'L-ik der Sozhldemrzkratie (Stuttgart, 1902); atso note t l ~ eexcellent tliscussion by Rogers, ""Bfore the Revisionist Gontroversy," pp. 2 32-2 24. 37. Kacrtsky, The Road to Power, p. 26. 38. Cited by jc~liusBra~~nthal, History of $be jlnter?zakioncll,za,3 vols., trans, Henry Coltins, Percr Ford, and Kennesh X1It~fmeII(New York, 19120), 1 :26ff. 39. "The myth of the party, whicl~its later development ccjuld not undermine, derived lroxn the time of the antisociafjst laws, For twelve years, the party combated the strongest governmental force in the Europe of that time, But, even after the repeal af those laws, the party relnained a pariah and, even for ~l-tanyleft liberals, a threat to civilization [BWrgerschreckj. . . . Nonetheless, the growth of a tendency wfiict~called for entry into the given state fra~neworkco~tldnot be denied, and the more that the party found its function within the existing order the stranger tlzc divisions within the party that would rnake their appearance," hicltcfi Matthias, Mnrxzsmusstudien (TGbingen, 1957), p. 173. 48, In ccjntrast to t l ~ eweak beginnings of tile tratle utlion movement in (;ermany, "the ratio bervcrecn Social X>cmocratic votcs and trade union rncrnbcrs charlged in favor of the tatter. Eight to one in 1893, it reached atmc~stfour to one in 1898, three to ane in 1903. By the tinle of the elections of I90T the ratio was about two to one and one quarter; it remained t l ~ esame in t l ~ eelections of 1912, where the party had 4,250,000 votes, the trade t~nions,2,530,000 members, Trade union members constitutcd an ever-increasing proportion of the party" voters." Scborskc, G'ermalz Social Demucrac~ipp,13.

41. Salvador;, K ~ r Kaa;csFry l and the So~iolistR ~ U C J ~ ~ Z 133ff. ~L~OPZ,~~, 42, Kautsky, The Road tc:, Power, p. 34, 43, Stargardt, The Genrziz~tIdea o(Mili;carism, p, 85. 44. The SPD would justify its tlecision to support the ~ a n t i n of g war credits to tfic kaiser by arguing that tfie Russia11czar was thc principle opponent of democracy and progress. Its leaders even tilied to quote Xlarx, Engels, and Rebel to that effect, Czl~ooslngto proclairn a "civil truce" in the domestic class struggle, emphasizing their ccjncern for Germany" '"ationat interest,'$ they threw internationalism averboard. For a devastating critique af the SPL>%stance on the war, see Rasa Iduxexnburg, "The Junius Pamphlet: The Crisis in the (;erman Social Democracy,"" in kfary-Alice Waters, ed., Rosa Luxenzburg Speaks (New York, 29701, pp. 257ff. 45. In his Sozialzsterz utzd Krieg j13rague, 1337), Kautsky claimed that t l ~ eproletarian membership of the S1312 was far more enthusiastic at the thought of war than the leadership, Stefan Zweig, among others, also ct>nfrms this generaity accepted memoir ~l The world of V e s k r ~ i a y(New Ycjrk, 1943). For a position in itis b e a ~ t t i f ~ revisionist argument that disputeohis claim, see John Zerzan, "Clrigins and hfeaning of World War I," "dos 49 (Fa11 2981 ), pp. 97-116. 46. Toward the end af his Iife, Kautsky urould show an affinity for wl~atwould c a n e to be known as the ""ultra-irnperiaIistn7' thesis. Formtxlated by Rudolf Hilfcrding, this arguxncnt suggests that in a projected new phase of impcrtaltsxn dominatlt states under the sway t>f intert~ationaitrusts woulcl divide the world, In principle tfiis would enable capitalism to survive forever-despite the repression that it engenderelf. It is thus useful to consider Kautsky" earlier, oft-stated view that irnperiatis11-tis not endemic to capitalism but rnerely a il-tatter of policy, See the interpretation, wbicl~compares Kautskyk views wirl~those of Joseph Schumpeter, by John H, Ka-cttsky, Kark Kaidtskzy, pp. 1 3 1ff. 47. For more on this, see the chapter entitled "In the Cradle of itlodernity: Social Uetl-tocracy and the First World War," in Stephen Eric Bronner, Illometzts of I>ecisiofif:PoEiti~alHistory and the Crises of Radicalzsm (New York, 1992), pp, I%f, 48. Schorske, Gematz Social I>eunocmc3avid joncs, The Lost Rebarc: Gerpzatz Socialist 1999). Itztellectfdals avd %;l.alitaviia~zism(Cl~~cago, 52. Sec Karl Kautskh X>er Heitielberger Prc~granzm(Berlin, 1925). 53.. Note the discussic~nby Karl Korsch, "The f3ksssing t>f Marxian Orthoctoxy: Rernstcir~-Kautsky-IX~~~emh~rg-X.X.entn" in Revolutiorzary Thec~rycd, I>ouglas Ketlrlier (Austin, Texas, 197'7), pp. 176fI. 54, Kautsky would ultimately w r ~ t efive different full-length criticisms of the Russian Kevotutioti; his general view was consistent, principled, and prophetic, He aboiitiort of the delnocratic ""poviwas, from the start, appalled by the cotl~tl~unist sional government" headed by Alexander Kercnsky in February 1917. His materiali s t ~also ~ made him skeptical regarding the el-nancipatory prospects af a proletarian revoIutior1 undertaken in an econornicatty undercievclopcd nation. At the core of his criticjut, however, was his ethical commitment to ma jority rule, representative government, and the mainterlanec of civil Itbcrties. In particular, see Kart Kautsky, The L>ictatorshifj c ~ t-he f f3roletdnat (New York, 1971j. SS. Ma~~tsky had already been critical of the socialist tl~ovementin Russia prior to World War I, He was aghast at their contentiousness, and, generally, liie extended support to the different factions of Russian social democracy at different times., But this changed following the Russian Revolution. By the late 1920s, Kautsky had reached the conc-lusir>nthat the Bolsfieviks were no better than fascists. He had na entliiusiasxn for their industrialization plans, and he found it both incredible and naive that the Stalinist teaclersl~ipshould be willing to impose five years t>f utter misery on the population it1 orcter to attain perfect abundance in the future, Note the discussit>nby Andre Liehich, Frcrm the Other Shore: Russkn SockE Democracy after 2921 (Czarnbridge, Mass,, 29971, pp. 55-Sb, 166ff. 56. Cited in Weikart, Socialzst L>arwinism, p, 1 61, 57. Ka~~tsky, The Road to laowcr,p. 15,

Chapter 1. In his provocative dissertation Horncr joncs suggested that Remstein's origir~al argument stemmed from a Alarxist attack upon the political policies pursued by the followers of Willielm Idiebknecl>tin England. These he saw as Rlanquist deviations and a variant of utopian socialism, whiclii snty later he came to see as tlefining hfarxiss~~ itself. Homer Jones, ""Before the Revisionist C:ontroversy: Ka~ttsky? Bernstein, and the ivleatiing of Marxism 189.5-1898," Pl)h,l), diss., Harvard Universitb 1984, pp. S23ff, 538--539, and passiil~. 2, KarL Korsch, "Thc Passing of Marxtarl C)rthodoxy,"" in Karl Korscb: Revulgliotzaqf Theor3 ed. Douglas Kellr~er(Austin, Tx., 1977), pp. 176ff. See also Georg X.,uktics, "Rernstcin's Triump1-t: Notes on the Essays Written in Honour of Karl Kaucsky" Seve~itiethBirthday," in in30Ez"tzcal Writirzgs, 2 91 9-1 929: The quest it^^ to( Parllanze~ztarknzatzd CJt/~erEssays ect, Rodney 1,ivingstone and trans, Mtchael McColgan (Cambridge, Mass,, 1372), pp. 12,751. 3. Ed~iardBernstein, CromwelE a~zdCommzdtzz"sm: Socialkm and D e m o m c y a'rz the {Great E~zglishRev~lgtl'o~t, trans. El, J. Stenning (New York, 1938).

4. Andrzej Walicki, Marxism a ~ t dthe L e ~ piaro the Ki~zgQomnf Freedom: The Rise and fill of the Communist Utopia (Stanfard, 1995f, p, 20%. 5. Eduard Bernstcir~,"2'" hly Socialist Critics" "(190O) in Selected ivrititzgs nf E d ~ a r dBrjtmsteifz, 2WQ-292 2, ed, and trans. ivlanfred Steger (Atlantic Higbfands, N-J., 1996), p. 3.k 6 , Henry Pacl~ter,"The Ambiguous l,egacy of Eduard Bernstein," in inocklism in Hllstory ed, Steplien Fric Bronner (New York, 1984), pp, 256-258. 7. Manfred B. Steger, "keidricb Engels and the Origins of (;erman Kevisic~nism: Another Look," in in~ngeksafter Marx, ed. kianfred B, Steger and Terrell Carver (University Park, Pa,, 1999), p. 186, 8. cf. X3recfeg 'irranicki, Gesdichte des Marxis:smz.cs, 2 vols. (Frankfurt at11 kiain, 19722 2:2290ff. 9, Uert~stein,"Revisionism in Sociat 13emc)cracym"(1989), in Selected Writi~zgs, pp. 72ff. 10. Note t l ~ eexcellent anthotttgy edited by H. Tudor and J. M. Tudor, Marxism and Social Democrac~~r The Revisionist Debate, 2 896-1898 (London, 1988). Also, see E, IXikli, Der Reuiszonisnzl-ts der deutsche7-t marxkbscI~enTj7eorz"e: 2 890-1 9 14 (Zurich, 1936). 11. For I4~~k6cs9 Xlarxism is fundamentally a method that starlds beyand any spccific e~l-tpiricalpredictions. Beginning from a Hegelian stance, I,t~k&cs p k e s the concept of "totality" at the center of hjarxist it~quiry,Georp I*ukhcs, History a ~ t d Class (7onsczousnt.s~:S t ~ d i c sin iwarxist Di~lectzcs,trans. Kttdney l,ivingstone (Cambridge, Mass., 1972 j, pp. 27-45. 12, Cl~ristianCineuss, "Um den Einklang von Theorie und 13raxis: Eduard in Xbiar;t-bmusst~.cldz"e~z (TGbingen, t9S7), p. 2 16. Bernstein tlnd der Revisionis~l~us," Also, note Uernsteink stwn characterization of materiaiism in k;volutionary Social&wz, trans, Editl-r.G. Harvey (New York, 196I), pp. 6ff. 13. Richard Weikart, Socz'aEist Rarwinisnz: E ~ F . ; ~ o ~ zin$ ~German: ~oE Socialist Thotaght from Marx to, Benzsteirz (San Francisco, 19-53), pp. 195ff. 14. Fduard Kernstcin, ""How Is Scientific Socialism Passible?" in Selected W Y Z " ~ ~BP. % ~8S9ff. , 15, This was what Kautsky mearlt when he wrote that: "if fernstein mearls that we rnust first have tlerno>cracyfor social democracy to move step by step toward its ~ reversed, the triu~nphof de~l-tacracy for L I ~is victory? so Z say the sittxation for L I is determine~fby the victory of the prcjtetariat," Cited in Rudolf Watther, . . . aher nach der Siirz~liPutkonzmen wir urzd tzar wir. Zusarn~nerbr~c~stl~eorze: Marxisnzus wzd politkches I>efizit irz der SPD f 890-1 914 (Frankfurt am Main, 1981), p, 140, 16. Eduard Bernstein, "The Bolshevist Brand of Soclatism" (l921 f, in Selected ivriti~gs,pp. 179ff. 17. It is even legitimate to cfairn that the srtl~odoxyttf Kautsky and t l ~ erevisionism of fcrnstein lead to the same practical result, X*ukBcs ""Rrnstcink Triumph," pp. 127-133, 18. It is in this context that Zgnaz Auer" falno~tscynicat rebuke to Bernstein rnust be ut~derstood:"My dear Ede, what you want is not sc~methingwhich one deczdw upon, not soil-tething that one talks about, but something that one does [in practice!." "uitrd Kcrnsrcir~,Igfzaz Auer (Rerfin, 19071, p. 6.3.

Notes

201

19, Frtedrtch Adlcr, ed., Viktor AdEers Rriefwechsel rnit Azagust Rebel zand Karl KazatskjqVienna, 1954), p. 259. 20. The literal rendering of Eduard Bern(lteir13origir~altitie reads very differently, Bernstein was seeking to immanet~tfyquestion what the S131) had taken for granted, In general, Harvcy's translation is so unreliabXe-and the editing so arbirrary-that the English version of Bernsteink scfassic: has been seriously compromised. Since the ariginat, p~tblicationof Soclldlism Ert-tbot.tfzd,a far better translation of Bernstein's work has appeared under the title The l%econditions of Suciialkm, ed. and trans, Henry Tudor (Cail-tbridge,1993). 21*Fciuard Rernstein, "The Xlarx Cult and tfic Rigfit to Revise"" (3903) in Selecged Writitzgs, p, 46. 22. Posing the alternatives in this way is crucial to the interpretations presented by Peter Gay, Tile Dzlemma of Democratic Socklism: Eduard Bert?stein"s(:hal"le$?ge to ~"cifarx (New York, 1952) and Pierre Angel, Eduard Renzstei~et E'Evctlzktion Qza SockEr'sme Allenzand f 13aris, 196 l). 23. The leader a l Austrian Social Democracy, Viktor Adler, put the ~l-tatterthis way: "Theory is not my field, work that out with Kart Kautsky. What irritates me the most i s the tactical side. You construct your conception of revalut-f~n,in wfiich not a soul bcllcvcs any tongcr outside of a few ancient policemen, and rlfien emphatically claim: we are nor a party of 'reval~ttion,%ut rather a party of refortl-t." AAdter, Rriefwechsel, p. 298, 24, Bernstein, k;volz$tir~~zcary Suciialisnz, p. xxii, 2.5. Watther, . . . aher nach QerSufzdcias:kornnzen wir zand fzur wiq pp. 121Fff. 26. See Kart Kautsky, Bernstein z*r~zddias sozl;aEdcmtjkratische Prc~gramnz:Eitte Antikrita'k (Stuttgart, 1899). 27. Gerhard A. Kitter, Die Arheiterheweg~rzgtm Wilhelmhzischerz Reich (BerlinUahfern, 1963),pp. Zt37ff, 28. (;ay, The Dilemma of Democratic SochEism, p. 2.55, 29. Adler, Briefwechsel, pp. 265,269, 30, Julius Rraunthal, HZst-csl.3"o f t b e fitzfer~zatio~a1, 3 vols., trans. Henry Collins, f3eter Forct, and Kenneth MitchelI (New "Cork, 1980],2:8, 3 1. That was not the case evcrywherc. In Scandinavia, where family farming induced t l ~ ef-ormation t>f cooperative associadc)ns, the peasantry and important sectors of the petty bourgeoisie showed a liberal and democratic bent that made an altiance wit11 social democracy possible. This alliance was crucial in tlifferentiating the path of Scandinavian sociatisl~lfrom the rest of Europe, See Gosta EspitlgAnderson, Politics A ~ i n s rMarkets: The Soczal Renzocmtic Road to I3ower (Princeton, 25685), p. 29 and passim, 32. Rracrnthal, Elistory ofthe I~zternatiorzal,1:265--271. 33. Uertlstein, "Revisionism in Social l3emocracy,'>. 67, 34. For an early critique of this position, sec Hcxldrik de Xlan, I,e sc_sci~lisme constrz4cti;iCjI%ris, 1933),pp. 2 111, 3.5- See Xblarxkm~szand Ethzk: Texte m m tzertknntlsche~zSozialarmus, hrsq. Rafael tle la Vega and Hans jorg Sanctliiihler (Frankfurt am Adain, I9"7C)), 36, Rcrnstetn and his philosopl~icalsupporters were connected to the empiricist Xlarhurg school, rather than the subjccrivist Swabtar1 branch, of nco-Kantianistn.

Scc Axldrcw Arato, "Thc Neo-llrtealist I>cfcnsc of Subjectivity" in TeEr_ts 21 (Fall 19741, pp, 1013-161. Also note the contribution by Karbara I3rygctlskt Wrighr, "Sublime Ambition: Art, Polidcs, and Ethical XrIeaEism it1 the Cultrrral Journals of Cierman Expressionism," in Passion and RehelEl'un: The Exgresssr'o3.zis~Heritagc~,ed. Stephen Eric Bronner and Dougf as Meliner (New York, t 98 81, pp. 82-1 12. 37. Bel-nstein, Evolzddio~zaqfSocia'alism, pp. 222-223. Si~cialkm:Eduard Bernsteilcz 38, Matinfred Steger, The Quest for Evt~lz~tionary and Social Democracy (C:ambridge, 1997), pp, 115ff. 39. See l,ucio Colletti, ""Brnstein anct the hlarxism of t l ~ eSecond Inter~inatic~nk~t,'' in Ide~flogya d Societai; trans. John Xlcrrington in Fronz Rozdsselau to Lenin: SLU~ECS and Judith White (New York, 19"i"2),pp, 45-1 08, 40. Eduard Rernstcin, ""Tetealtsxn, Theory of Struggle, and Sclcncc" ((3 9021, in Selecged IVrE'tilzgs, p, 106. 4 1. See Walther, . . . aber ~tach$er Szi~dfiutk ommen wir utzd nur wir, pp. 13 1ff. 42, A sittxation resutts in which ""the frame af reference according to which we evaluate facts vanisl~esand we are left wit11 a series of evetints all eclual as far as their inner sigtzificance is cotincernect," Kari Mannheim, Ideology atzd litopza: An I~ztr(ld~ctio~z t o the Sociology of Knowledge, trans. 1,ouis Wirtl~and Ectward Shils, pp. 192ff. and 253. 43, Eduard Remstrin, "Class and Class Struggle""(1905f, in Selected iVri$i~zgs,p. 126. 44. klax Weber, Economy and Soci~ty,2 vofs,, ed. Guenther Rath and GIat~s Witticfi (Kerkeley, 19781, 1:302-307,2:926-939. 45. ""The vulgar ~l-taterialists,even in the ~l-toderng~tisedonned by Bernstein and others, do not 90 beyond the reproduction of the immediate simple determinatints of social life. . . . They take the facts in abstract isolation, exptaining tlzern t>nly in 1,ukrics, Nzftory and C:lass terms of abstract laws related to the concrete totalityes;"$ (Jo~tscious~zess, pp. 9, 47-55, 61-67. 46, Eduard Rernsrein, "Wltat Xs Socialism?" it1 Selected Writi~zgs,p. 158, 916), in 47. Eduard Rernstein, "The Sociatist Conception of Democracy" (l Selecged Writitzgs, p, 145, 48. ""A particular version of liistory-cum-deve1.op1nent, with liberal resonances, call-teto play a key role in revisionist socialism, Evolutionis~nwas both the c-ontinuf more traditional utinilinear view of progress already evident in the eig1.tation t ~ the teentlz century and an alternative attempt to tegitimate social processes scientifically by an appeal to the new finclings of biologists, ratl~erthan pl~ilosopfiers,logicians, or historians,"" hlicharl Frccden, Ideolr,gzcls and IJolI~icaETheory: A Corzceptual Approach (Oxford, 1996), p. 436, 49, It is quite possiblr that the attempt to garner support frorn every imagir~ablc constituencjl will produce a trade-off resultitlg in loss of support from working people. See Adarn Przeworski and John Sprague, Paper Scones: A Hr'sdol?f of Electoral Socialkm (Mew York, 1983. 50, Helmut Scbmidt, "kedingungen des soziaten Friedens," kin L>emokratiscC;ler Sozlalkml-ts ia den acj~tzigerJahrerz, ecf, Kicbard L.6wentl1at (Frankfurt, 1379), p. 52, 51. Espir~g-Anderson,Politics Agrzizst Markets, pp. 147-148.

52. 'Tmpirictst epfstexnology is intrinsically ideological sincc it irnpItcttIy denies the existence of any historical alternatives: white the proposlrion that deradicalizatiorl coincided tzistortcall y wiet-i embourgcoisemcnt is capable of being judged true t>r false, the prt)position that workers became deradicalized hecagse their material conditions improvcct is not subject to such a tcsr unless the other possibilities arc explicitfy deniecf." Adam 13rzeworski, "Material Interests, Class Compromise, and the s Soczety 1 0 (1980) 129-30. Transition to Soc~alism,"h l i ~ i c and 53, Kurt Tuchoisky, "L3as Lied vorn Kc~mprc>miss,"in Gesamnzelte Werke 29/9-1920 (Reinbek, 19891, 2:S7-S8, 54. Rcrnstctn, E1~.;volzattonaql Socialisnz, p, 107. SS. Interestingly enough, prior to 18%, Bernstein anticipated certain arguments of Rosa Idtrxexnhurgin a debate with Ernest Rclfort Bax who, in turn, voiced some t>f the claims that would underpin L,et?in's theory of imperialism, jones, "Before the 291 ff, Revisionist Cc>ntroversy," pppp, 56, Thus, in revisit>nist:terms, it made perfect setlse for Max Scl~ippelto support strengthening Ciermany's nnay in 1899 since such a policy would provide jobs and also for Bernstein himself to see certain "pactical" virtues in German imperialism, Naturally, neither thought that he was contributing to those forces that wo~ildlead E~iropcinto World War I. hlany other examples could be brought tu bear. See Rosa Luxernburg, "Militia and kiilitarisr-n," in Selected Polztical Writins, ed. Dick Howard (New York, 1971), pp. 135ff. 57. A4ant?heim, Ideolo~gyarzd Utopia, p. I 18. 58. Gcorgc Bernrtrd Shaw toid Kernsteix~that he hoped the Fabians would become "the Jesuits t>f Socialism," muarc1 Bernstein, My Yecars in Exile (Londot?, 2920), p. 226, 59, "The ~uristicatlministrative mentality constructs only closed static systems t>f thougl-tt and is always faced with the paradoxical. task af having to incorporate into its system new laws, whtc1-t arisc out of the crnsysrcxnatizcd interaction of tiving forces as if they were only a further elaboration of the original system." hfannlieim, Ideolog~f alalzd Utopia, p, 1 19. 68, For an overview on tlie reception t>f Marxism in France, wit11 particular ernphasts on j-rties (iuesde, see E, H. bsses, Rer Marxisnzus in Fra~zkreich1871-1 9115 (Berlin, 1932)61. AIexandre Zevaes, Hbtoricu dtd socialisme et d2.c cclmmzanisme el-t F ~ G F Z C ~ (13aris, 19.17); Car1 Landauer, Ezaropecatz Soctalzsm: A I-lhtor~!of Ideas atzd Movements, 2 vots. (Berketey, t 9S9f, 2:318ff, 62, ""Stubborn attachment to splendid isolation actually could crldangcr the party by sacrificing its natural obligation to adl~linisterthoughtf~rllyand well the well-being of aII, Hotding power entails heigfztencd respo~lsibility,That is why I have always voted against resolutions that tencSetf to tt>ck the party into a rigid position well irt advancc of eiections. The ordy differerlee I sec between kevisionism\and kraticalism~iesin the fclrmer" ernpl~asist>n maintaining tjpenness and freectorn of choice while the latter places more weight on retaining its separate status vis-a-vis all nonsocialist parties, " "ernstein, "From Sometlne 13ronounced llead" ( 190.5) in Selected \Vrztifzgs, p, 63. 63, JaurEs, the great leadcr of Frenclz socialism, supported Xlillerand in the controversy because he believed that any dcil-tocraticrneans should be ell-tployedin fur-

thcrtng the corlccrns of a working ctass clear about its goals and responsibilities. For an interesting discussion, 1,eszek Kofakoswki, Mam Czlrretz;cs of Marxism: T h e GoEden Age trans. RS, Falla (New York, 1978), 2:136ff. 64- Rosa L,uxemburg, ""S)ciatist Crisis in France," in in~osa1,zaxenzhzarg ,Speaks ed. Xlary-Alice Waters (New York, Z 9701, p. 1 01 , 6.5, Bernstein, "horn Sometjne f3ronounced Llead," p 63. 66. Stepben Eric Bronner, fdms in Action: Politzcal Tradz'tzu~zirz the Twentieth Century (Idanham,hicl,, 19991, pp. 322ff. 67. Anthony Ciiddens, The T'i~zrd Way: The Rel-tewal of Social Democracy (Oxford, 19"38), pp, 27%. 68. Note the fine overview of this idea provided in John Ehrenberg, CiuiE S ~ c i c ? ~ : The Critical Hzstory of an Idea (New York, 1999). 69, For a criticat appraisal, see Stephen Eric Ursnner, ""Ec)log;v, I)otitic;s, and Risk: Thc Suctal Theory of Utricfi Beck," ktn C=iapz'taEismNlalure SociaEism 6(3 f (Mclrcl~1995), pp. 67ff. 70. kiarx had propfietically warned the SPD not to ""take over Eroi1-t the bourgeois economists the consideradon of distribution as independent of the mode of production and hence present socialisl-t-t as turning principaily a n distribution." Xfarx, ""Critique of thc Gsrha Program" in Karl h4arx and Frcdertck Engels, Sekcgenl Wri~i~tgs, 3 VOLS. (Moscoa;~,1969), 3:20, Atso, for a Inore tl~eoreticalaccount, sec Kart h$arx%'""lntroducrion" in Gr~ncalrisse:I~zrroductionto the ( J r i ~ i q ~ e of Polztic~EE E ; ; C C I Htrans, I I ~ ~ c-.clz?zeof the llenzocrats arzd the Pztture cl f American lJolitiw (New York, 2986). 72, It was realty reformists w l ~ o ,sl~aringthe same empiricist assurnptic>ns as Bernstein, engaged in the strongest forms of econoi-t-ticreductianism by claiming tfiat the capitalist state scrvcs the intcrcsrs of various capitatists or u h a t urouid come to be called a ""power etite." Note the classic study by C:, W &fills, Tbe Power EIite (New York, 1956). 73. Cliristopher I'ierson, Marxist T j ~ e o r yatzd llemocratic: I\olitics (Berkeley, 19861, pp. 31 ff, W. It is atways a yuestitjn, naturally, of what is meant by ""relative"? TTE Weimar Republic was print-ipatty undermined by its economic elites with support Eroi1-t the military, and its reactionary legal bureaucracy was anything hut evenhanded in punishing rnalfeasants of the left and the right, Note the disctxssion in Stephen Eric Rronncr, "Working Class Politics and the Nazi Triumph," in Morncrzts of l3ecisiol.t: Politicltrl Hi;St~ryand the Crises .so(KaHz'cdlism(New York, 2994), pp. 33ff. 75. This speaks to tllie logic of the systern, including tllie welfare apparatus that is based on tax revenues: ""There must be production for employmetit, There must be invcstxncrlt for prodrtcrion. And there must be an expectation of profit Ear invcstment, The requirement tjf profitable accumulation is not efirninatecf by the welfare state." Joshua C:ohen and joel Rogcrs, On Denzocrac~~: Tou~arda Transjforwzatiotz of Amencan Suciety (New York, 19831, pp. 52--53. 76, The tack of pubiic control over investment makes it difficult to assure colnpliancc with the original bargain. Gohen and Rogcrs arc correct in claiming that "workers are agreeing to soi-t-tetbingthey are doing now, nalnety, restraining wages.

Notes

205

Capitalists are agreeing to do something it1 the future, narncly, invest a ccrtair~share af profits." hid,, pp. 59-60, 77, (;Iddcns, The Third Way, p. IS. 78- Watther, . . . aber nach &r Si$nd@tatkommen wir UPZBFZZ.LY w i pppp. ~ 142fi, 79. A purely objccrivc notion of crisis is as politically wortt-tless as a purely empirical notion of class, A subject, in the form of an tjrganized and conscit>usrnovernent, is always necessary to view a crisis as sucli rather than as a mere fluctuation in tlze economy. See Russell Jacoby, ""The 1301itics c>f the Crisis Theory," T e k ~ s23 (Spring 1975), and ""The Political Economy af Chss Ur-rconsciousness,""Tiireory and Society 5jl) (January 1978).

Chapter 4 1. Gcorge Idichtt-teirn,"Stalinism," in Collected Essays (New York, 1973), pp. 280-28 I, 2. Georg Lukgcs, I,eni~:A Studj~on the Eit-tity of His Thought, trans. Nicolas jacobs (Cambridge, Mass,, 19711, p. 11, 3. A critique af the ""refIection theory" of knowledge, which played such a dol-ninarlt role in Mcrxterklisruz ajt-td E ~ p i r i ~ ~ - C : ~ " i t z is " ~ provided s " ~ r y ~ ~ by Karl Korscl-t, Marxism and X3hzlosc-ighx trans, Fred Halliday (London, 1970), pp. 89-126, Also note Axlton Pannckock, 1,e~zinas F3hilnsc>pher/Idondon,197.9, pp, 66-9 1. 4, V, I, Lenin, "Conspectus of 1,ectures on tlze History of 13hilt>ssphy," in (JolEected Works, 45 vols. (&toscow, 19631, 38:276, 5, See Lean Trotsky, The Perrrzanef?t litevolzttic~narzd KesuEts arzd 13rtlspects (I,ondon, Z 962 f , 6 , C:ontrary to legend, however, "the dictatorial cfirnax of the French Revolution was not, and co~tldnot be, a party dictatarsflip af the Jacobins, because the jacobin Cfuh never was rile kind of disctglirred, ccntralizcd, and tdcofogicaily hamogencous party that could have played that rote. . . . But while the French Revolution never produced the. reality of a, party dictatorship, it did produce the idea. That tdca arose among the defeate~fextremists in tlne prisons of the "T11ermidor; the concept of a %revoliudonaryvanguardkras born as a dream of the defeareci rearguard of revolutionary extremism," It was precisely in order to t>vercomethe "weaknesses" osf the jacobins and of Robespierre that Buonarroti, a survivor of the Babeuf conspiracy, taunched t l ~ e""legend tliat Kobespierre and the Jacobins bad themselves set tlze exail-tpie for that attempt," h o r n B~lonarroti,the idea of an ""educational dictatorship" passed to Rlanqui over Peter Tkacfiev and finally to Ixnin. Rtchard Lowenthal, Model or Ally? The C;onzmzdtzist Powers and the Developirzg Cotrrztries (Oxford, 19771, pp, 52-54, 7.h t h u r Kosenberg, CGescl;ticl;ttedes BBocI~ewismus(Frankfurt, I966f, p, 8 1. 8. The proletariat must first ally itself with the peasantry against the autocraw in order to carry tbrougln a "democratic revolution," Only tlien, in order to accomplish the ""soc-iatist revolution," dsoufd workers atly the~l-tselveswith atker classes in such a way that " h e iinstability of the peasantry and petty bourgeoisie" wvvould be countered, V. I. l,enin, ""E'wo Tactics of Social De~l-tocracy,"in Selected Vkic~rks,l:4S9f-f. 9. Sec I, Ixntn, "Mlaxism and Rcvistonisxn," "1 Selected tVorks, I:70-78, I~lteltectuafly,this piece cannot cornpare with L~lxelnburg" s"Sciaf. Reftorm or

Revollittio~l" and Kacrtsky" b%ernstcin and the Social I>emocrattc Prograxn: An Anti-Cririy ue," The inlportant point for Lenin was "how Russia~aBernsteinist1-t has manifested itself and what particular: fruits it has borne" ((p. 131). That is what l,enin elaborates in "What Is To Be Dane?" in inelected Wc~rks,I :121-270. 1C).Ixntn, "What Is 3'0 Be I>onc?" p. 143, 11. Kaut~kyalready suggested that "socialist conscioust~essis sometl~ingintrothat arose duced to the proletarian class struggle from wirli~outand not soi~~ething within it: spontaneously." Carmen Claudin-Urondo, Lerzz'n and the Gultzcral Revulzation (Idondon,197";7,p. 70. 12. Georg I.,ukAcs, H i s t o ~ajt-td Glass Co~sciousness:Stiddies itz Marxist Dialectics, trans, Rodney Livingston (Czarnbridge, Mass., 2971 f, p. 46-83. 13. Cited by Isaac Deutscher, The Prophet Armed (New York, 1965), p, 90. 14, E-fenry Pachreq ""Communism and Class," in Socialism zrz Historyp ed, Stcpfien Ertc Rronncr (New York, 1984j, pp. 89-109; Roscnbcrg, Geschickrte Qes Bolschewismzes, pp, 66-84, 1.5. Alexander Rabinowitcl~,The Kolshevzks Come to, Pou~er:The Revolution of 191 7 Z'FZ f3etr(lgrad (New York, I978), p. xxi, 16. Georg Luk&csso~tghtto devetop it in "Tactics and Etli~ics,"wilich appears in his Political iV~it'tings,f 919-2929, cd. Rodncy I,ivingsrone jI,ondon, 19721, pp. 3-18, 17. Isuk6cs, Hzstory a d (Jl~ss(Jol.tscioustzws, pp, 2.56ff. 18. Jblilsvan Lljilas, Cofzversatz'czrzswith Stalin, trans, Alicl~aelB, 1)etrovich (New York, 1 9621, p. 116. 19. Kosenberg, t;eschzchte des B~olscheutisnzl-ts, pp, 148fi. 20, Otto Mirchheimer, "hfarxism, Dictatorsl~ip,and Proletariat," in inI'"oEztics, Law, and Sockl C:han,y-c: Selected Essays of Cltto Kzrchheimer, ed, Frecteric S. Burin and M~irt1,-Shell (New York, 1969), pp. 27ff. 2 1 . "The current, widcsprcact, popular, if oxlc may say so, conception of tfic kithering awaykof the state ~tndoui-tedlymeans obscuring, if not repudiating revolution . . . in favor of a vague nation of a slow, even, gradual change, of ahse~xcc,of teapwand storms, t>f absence sl revolutiot~," V. I, l,enin, "The State and Revolutior-r,""in Scleaed iVorks, 2:2912, 22, Turning to the left wing of his party, Lenin employed f c x his purposes a work by Nikotai Bukharin that lle had previously critici~edas "semi-anarchist" kin its views. See Nikolai Bukharin, "Tc~warda Theory of the Inlperiatist State," in Selected Writings on the State a ~ z dthe Tra~sritz'ofzt o Soczalknz, trans. and ed. Richard B, Day (Armonk, N.Y., 1982). 23. Lenin, "The State and Revol~ttion,"p. 371. 24, "The ovcrti-rrow of ti-rc bourgeoisie can bc acfiievcd only by the proletariat becoming the r ~ l i n gclass, capable of crushing the inevitable anct desperate resistance of the bourgcaisie, and of organizing alE the u~orkingand exploited people far the new ecc)nomic system. . . . By ectucating the wc>rkers"arty, Marxism educates the vanguard of the proletariat, capable of assuming power and leadl'lzg the u ~ h o l ~ people to socialism, of tlirecting and organizing the new system, of being the teacher, the guide, the leader of all the working and exploited people in organizing their social ItFe without thc bourgeoisie and against the bourgeoisie," "id,, p. 304.

Notes

207

2.5, This equation would soon permeate official party Iiteraturc, For example, in wfiat would become perhaps the most popular rendition af corniliunist pl~ilosophy~ the matter urauld already be put bluntly it1 1918: "The foundatiar-r of our urhutc policy must be the widest possible development sl productivity . . . everytl~ingelse must be subordinated t o this one task," NNtkoiat Bukliartn and Evge~lii f3rec>brazl~ensky, The ABC of Commurzkm: A I%opzrlarExplanatiotz of the Prrzgram o f t l ~ eCommz.cnistIlduty in R Z I S S(Ann Z ~ Arbor, 2967), p, 74, 26, V. I, Lenin, "Report to the EiE?lfnth13arty Congress" "ecernber 22-29, 1920) in Selected Works, 3:s 2 9. 27. tilysses Santarnaria and Akin Manviile, ""Xenir~und das Probiexn dcr ubcrgangsgesefIscl-talt," in Jahrb~ch$er Arbelterbe~~egz.1~zg~ ed. Czlaudio Pozzoli (Frankfurt am Main, 19771, 5:.57. 28. Atltotlio (iramsci, "The KevtjLuticon Against %C:rzpitat9,'$in Selectic~nsfrom Political iV~itings,f 9 f 0-2 920, ed, Qutnton Hoarc, trans. John Xlathews (New h r l i , 1977),pp. 34ff, 29. ""Under socialism much of "rimitive2emocracy will inevitably be revived, since for tlze first time in the history t>f civilized society, the mass t>f the population will rise to taking an indepetzde~ztpart, not only in voting and elections, but also in the eusryday admznistratzo~znfthe stage. Under socialism all will govern in turn and will soon become accustomed to no one governing." Lenin, ""T'he State and Revolcrtiat-r,""pp. 372-373. 30, Ibid., p, 361, 31. ""It has rlcver emerect the head of any socialist to "rorntsc9hat the t~ighcr phase of the development commut~ismwill arrive; as fcx the great socsialists"f;lrecast that it wilt arrive, it presupposes not the present productivity af tabo~irand not the preserzr; ordinary run of petjpie. . . . Until the %igher"hase t>f communism arrives, socialists dellland the strzctest control by society and by the state aver the measure of tabor and the rneasure of consumption." Ibid., p. 357-58, 32. Andre Liebicl~,From the 0$her Shore: Rzassian Social Democrats after 2923 (Cambridge, Mass., 1997), pp. 82-83, 33, Cited in Augustin Souchy, &;richMiihsaan: Sein Leben, Sein Werk, S e k Mnrtyrizsm (Karisruhe, 19841, pp, 43-44, Also see the rclevant sections in Victor 1901-1941, trans, Peter Sedgwick (I,ondot~, Serge, Memoirs {of cz Revolz~ticrrzarj~, 2963). 34, Lean Trotsky, l90.f (New York, I971 ecf,), p. 259. 35. ""X cannot be forgotten that the October ctprising of the Bolsheviks was not directed against a legal parliamentary democratic regime but rather agait~srrrtlers wfia liad anointed thel-nselves." Rasenberg, Geschichte des Kolschou~knzus,p, 135, 36. "By the summer of 1918 effective admir~istrationhad all but vanishcct frorn Russian incfustry, and the country was mc~vi~lg towards the brink of economic collapse. Thc Bolsheviks, who had encouraged workcrskcantrol in 1917 as a means of undermining the 13rovisiclnal Government, were now compelled to act lest they themselves sho~itdbe engulfed by the same eleiliental tide which liad swept away Avrich, Krurzstadt 1922 (New York, 19741, p. 28, their precfecessors," 37. Rabinowitch, The Bolshevzks Come to, Pou~er,pp. 168ff. 38, Ixntn, "The State and Revolution,"". S1 I.

39. See V* I, I,enin, "The Bolsheviks hlusr Assume Power,"" in SeEecled iVorks, 2:377-3P. 40, "The "special coercive forceVor the suppression of the proletariat by tfic bourgeoisie . . . must be replaced by a "special coercive force9for the suppres"ion of tfie bourgeoisie, . . . This is prcciscly what is meant by "bolition of the state as state.This is precisely the 'act' of taking possession of tlie means of prcjduction in the nalme of society, And it is sell-evident that such a replacement of one (bourgeois) "special fc>rce%y another (proletarian) 'special forcekcannot possibly take place in the form af kithering a w a j ~ ~ " ~ , e n"The i n , State and Revoitltion," p. 299, 41. Note the discctsslc~nin Stepficn Eris Bronner; Ideas in Action: PuEzzical Trr~ii2ionz;tz the Twentieth Ce~ztuty(Lanhail-t,hfd., 29991, pp. 28 f ff, 42- J. A, Hobson, Impericllisnz (Ann Arbor, 1971), pp, 257ff. 43, Note the fine biograpliy by F, f3eter Wagner, Rudolf Hilferdirzg: Tbeclv~~ and Poligia o f Demc_tcraticSocialzsm (Atlantic Highlands, N.J., 1996). 44, See Rudolf Hilferding, Firznrtce f:apital, trans. Morris Watnick and Sam Ciordon (London, 198f ). 45, The concept of ""unequal developmetit" "essentially suggests that tliflcretit sectors af rfie world capitalist economy develop at different rates to the point wfiere the balance of forces will nevcr acfiicvc real cquiltbriuxn, I,cnin heiievcd that this made a ""peaceful" division af the tlnderdeveloped world impossible. It indeed becomes possible t~ envision one state assttming "hegemony"" over the world systern. A criticlue sl this posiric>n is prcjvided by C;eorge Lichtheim, Imperkliswt, (New York, 19711, p. 107. 46, Nikolai Bulifiarin, Imperialism and the World Economy (New York, 19291, See atso Gohen, K~kharil'~ and the Kolshevzk Revolul.l'u~z,pp, 2SEf. 47.It has even been suggested that ""Lenin" hypothesis lias since been substanriated in as muck as students of diplomatic tlistory prior to the Great War now almost unanimously hold tfiat Gertnany was the real aggressor in the summer of 2914." Gerd Hardach, The First World Way, 29114-1918 (Berkeley, 1977), p, 8. 48. JuIi~rsRraunthal, H z s t o ~of the I:zter~zatio~al, 3 vots., trans. Henry Col lins, f3eter Forct, and Kenneth Mitchell (New "Cork, 1980],2:45. 49. Hcr~ryI'ashter, "rfkc Prob1em of Imp~lrla~istn,~ it1 Sc)cMIism i~zHistory, pp. 161ff. SO. V, I. Lenin, ""Critical Rell-tarks a n the National Question," in National Liberation, Socialism, arzd Imperialzsm: SeEected Writings (New Yorli, 1968),p. 27. 31. Ibid. 52, ""The proletariat cannot support any consecration of narionalisrn; on the contrary, it supports everytiling that hetps to obliterate national. distinctions and rell-tove national harriers; ir supports everything that makes the tie hcrwecn nartox~atitirs cfoser and closer, or tends to merge nations. To act tlifferently means siding with reactiorlary nationalist philistinism,"" El~id.,p, 28. 53. Rosa L,uxemburg, "The Russian Revolution," in IRclsa L.zaxenzhz~rg,Speaks ed. hfary-Atice Waters (New York, 19701, pp, 378ff. 54. It was Stalin's ruthlessness in tfealing with C;eorgiati desires for autonomy that led to a clash with Lenin just before the latter's death, Car1 A, Landa~ter, European Soci~lism,2 vols. (Bcrkclcy, 1959)),2:1190ff,

Notes

209

55. Hclmut Gruber, ed., Soviet R~ssldMasters the Comi~ztenz(New York, 1974), pp, 247ff. and 299ff. 56. X~owentl-taf,Model or AIEy? pp. 48ff. 57, Ibid., pp. 176ff. 58. E, H, Garr, The Bolshevik Revc>lzdtz'orz,f 93 7-1 925, S voIs. (Baltimore, 19661, 3:6Qlff;see also, Ueutscl~er,The l%rophetArmed, p. 346ff, 59. T11us, even a sta~tnclilyanti-Soviet critic can claim: "One af the reasons why the Bofsl~evikswon the civil war was that their terror, though cruel etlough, was less so than that of the Whites." I,andauer, Eztropean Socialism, 2: 1215, 611, 1,entn's scrltin~atcdectslorl to abolish the debt scriousIy undcrmirtcd his attempts to garner foreign investr-nent, and it was used to help justify the creation of an economic cordon sanitaz're around tile young Soviet rtation. See Alec Nove, An Eco~zomicHistory of the USSR (12illidtllesex, 1969), pp. 6 8-69, 61. ""lthe Bolsheviks had a real cornplaint against thc Allied governments, it was not t>nthe score of rlze direct Allied rnititary incerferetlce, which was confused, halfhearted, and pathetic, but rather on the score of the rnilitary aid, particufarly in stores and mutlitit>ns, given to the Russian Whites, E-lere it was particularly the British government whicll had the responsibility. It was officially stated in Idondon that the total contributions of this nature amounted to something close to one hundred mllfion pounds in clie money of t l ~ a day. t The C:ornmunists are right in charging that rl-tis huge expenditure was incurrcct largely with a view to ovcrtfirowing Soviet power; and they can, of course, take satisfaction from the fact that this effort F. Kennan, Rtkssia apt8 the West gnder Lenin apt8 Stalin was u n ~ u c c e s ~ f ~(;cargc f," (New York, 19611, p, 115, 62. Rosenberg, Ceschzchte des IBalscbewbnzus, pp. 151-15263. Ibid., pp. 13-1 8, 13.5-1 $6, and passim, 64, k r i c h , Xronstadt 2 923, pp. 162-166, 65. ""l is important, above all, to examine the conflicting motivcs of the insurgents and their Bolslievik adversaries., The sailors, on the ane hand, were revol~ttianary zealots, and likc zealots thraughout history they longed to recapture a past era before the purity t>f their ideals l ~ a dbeen tlefifiled by the exigetlcies of power. The RsIshcvtks, on the other hand, having exnergcd victorious frorn a bloody Civil War; were not prepareci to tolerate any new clzatIetlge to their authority, Throughout the conflict each side behaved in accordance with its awn particular goals and aspirations. To say this is not to deny the necessity t>f moral juctpetlt, Yet, Krt~nstadtpresents a sittxation in wbicfi the historian can syllipathize wit11 the rebels and stilI concede that the Kotsheviks were justified in subduing them. To recognize this, indeed, i s to grasp the full tragedy af X(ronstadt," "id,, p, 6. 66. Richard Pipes, Russia under the Bolshevik R e g h e (New York, 19941, p. 369. 67. lLichtheirn,""Safitlism," p. 283, 61J. Novc, Economic Hisroql, pp, 93ff. 69, Among the noteworthy new works see Man Bullock, Elitkr and Stalir?: Ikarczlkek IIives (Idandon, 1991); Walter Layueur, S~ale'rz:The Glasnost Reveka!aliotzs (London, I 990); and Dmitri Vofliogotlov, Stali~:Trz'zdmpC7and Tragedy (London, 199 1). 70. iSt1~1chhas been written about the disaffection of revol~ttionariesand various IAeftistsfrorn the Rsfshevik movement, XIuch less has been w r i ~ e r about l those who

were drawn to the movement as a rcpresentativc of autliiority and sovcrcignry. In this regard, it is important to consider the tectinocrats, scientists, and bureaucratic spceialists of every sort, Sec Kendatt E, Railcs, Tech~zologyatzd -Societyzatzder Lenit-r arzd Stalin: Origins of the Souict Technical Intellzgerzts& 2 9 2 7-1 94 2 jl%rincetotii, I9%8), pp. 44ff. "i". Luxernburg, The Russiacln Kevulsttiorz, p. 389ff. 72. kiax Weber, ""Potitics as a Vocation," in From M a x Weber: Essays in Soczcrlt~gai;ed. and trans, H, H, Gerth and C:, Wrigbc :Mills (New York, 1946), p. Z 19. 7 3 . Roscnbcrg, Gachichte Qes Rolschewisnzus, pp, 188-1 89,202-203, 74. Mirchheimer, ""The Socialist and Bolsl~evikT1ieory of the State," in Polz'tiw, I,aw, and Social Change, p. I 1 . 7.5.Note the classic discussion in the cetebratect collection, The God that: Failed, ed. Richard Crossman (New York, 1949). 76, See Isaac Deutscher, St~ali~a: A 1)oligicalBic~grcrphy(New York, 196'7). 77. Roy A. kiedvedyev, Let Hl's~oryJz~dge:The Clrigijzs and C;ofzsequencesof Stalinknz, trans. Colleen Tayfor (New York, 19'72). 78. Note the essay of 1913 that essentiall~suti-tmarized Lenin's arguments on nationalisrn and rnct urirti his approval, Josepfi Stalin, "Marxism and the Natiarlal Qt~estion,"in Works (Moscow, 19S3), vat. 2. 7 9 . A firlc short sketch of his mercurial pcrso~lalitywas providect by the former C:ommissar of Educatiot~under I,enin, Atiitoly V. l,unarcbarsky, Revolz~tic~nsuy Silhouettes, trans. Micliaei Glenny (New York, 1967, pp, 59-73. 80. "Trotskyism" was actually an artificial construct emglt>yedby the ZitlovievKaii-tenev-Stalin clique in its rnac-hinations against 1-rotsky fc3ilowing Lenin" death. Boris Souveraine, "Stalinism," in inarxkrn in the inodertz WcjrM, ed. Alilorad &ll, Uracfikovitch (Stanford, 196S), p. 93, 81. Stcplicn E Cohen, R~kharinajt-td the Bolshevik Revolzatio~:A Pulztical Biqraphy 1888-1938 (New York, 297.31, pp. 173ff. 82, Exon Trotsky, Terrorism and Conzmu~zism:A Repl3~to K ~ r lK~atdbky(Ann Arbor, 196l),and Ti~eirMorals arzd O ~ r (New s York, 1973). 83. Ixszek Kolak~wskt,~McainC:zirre~tsof Mnrxlsnz, trans. F! S, F a h (Ncw York, 1978) 3:11f, 84. J, Arch Cietty and OIeg V. Wa~tti-tov,The Road to Terror: Stalz~zand the SelfL>estrzactiofzof the Bolsheviks, 2932-29.39, trans, Benjamin Sher (New Haven, Z999), p. 582, 85. I,outs E'ischcr could write that urhtiie "some form of industrial revolution had to take place in the Soviet Ur-rion for a whale variety af reasons . . . 1 see no valid reason Ear assuming that it had to take pIaec at the time and in the manner urhtch Stalin tletermined, s t l ~ e than r the reason that Stalin so determined it and was a b k to put his detcrtninarion into effect."" X,~utsFiscl-rcr, The Cornmzatzist Party o f the Soviet Ilnivrz (New York, 19713, p. xii. 86. Lenin admittedly tried to give the early terror a legal b a s k Still, its ""temporary" character was taken for granted as a necessary response to the Wfiiites and the Entente. See Barrington hloore, Jr., Souiet Po~ztz'cs-dhe L)z/mma of I'ou~er (New York, 196.5 ed.), pp. 124ff.

Notes

21 1

87, RCVCTI~C as a principal motive in the ctiminartoxl of the oId Bolsheviks is stressed by Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: Staliz'nS Pzdrge o f t h e Thirties (New York, 1973). 88, ""The importance of other tl~anelective principles in t l ~ eselection t>f the top Party Icadcrshtp is disclosed by certain evcnts that took place between tlic Seventeenth Congress in 1934 and the Eighteelnth C:ongress in 1939. It has beet? computed that out of the seventy-one individuals ejected to the Central Cotl-tmittee at the Seventeenth C:ongress, nine were executed, twelve declare~tkenmies of the peopleyand prsbabjy executed), and twenty-lotlr had disappeared, accounting for forty-five out of the seventy-one.. By 1939, of the sixty-eight candidates (or alrernates for rneil-tbershipf in the 1934 Central Gornil-tittee,fourteen had been executed, twa had comxnitrcd suicicte, nine had been declared enemies of the people, and thirty-hur had disappeared." Moore, Soviet I%olitzcs,p, 248. 89, This is nicely portrayed through the characters of lvarlov and (;letkin in Arthur Koestler" snovel Ilarkness at Nc~con(New York, 1969). 90. Tliis devetopment ir charted, and assumes particularly graphic form, in the e C)zcl"arz(~Munich,1980). extraordinary trilogy by hianis Sperber, Wie eine T r d ~ zpn 91. Butlock, I-litkr an~i"StaLztz, p.958, 92*Bukhartn was a friend of many avanr-gardists, who tried to intercede on behalf of tile great poet Osip kiandelstail-t, wllile Trotsky sided with t11ell-t pubticty. Nadezlieda Xlandelsram, Hope Against Hope, trans. Max Haywood (New York, 19991, pp, I I 3 f . Leon Trotsky, Literature arzd Revolsttio~z,trans, Rose Strunsky (Ann Arbor, 1972). 93, "Marxism under Statitn cannot be defined by any cc>tiectit>nof statements, ideas or concepts: it was not a question af proposidc~nsas such but of the fact that there existed an all-powerful authority competent to declare at any given moment wfiat marxisrn was and what it was not. '&1arxism\l1eant notliiing rnore or less than tfic current pronouncexncnt of the authority in question, i.e., Stafin hiinself." Kolakowski, Main C;urretz;ds of M a r x k m , 3:4. See also Herbert hfarcuse, Sovzed M a r x k m : A Critical' A~zaIysis(New York, 1961). 94. For an analysis t>f the concept, see t l ~ eexcellent work by Abrarn "Tertz, The TrkE Regins/C)~zSCIC~~IESL ReaLism (New York, 1960). 95. "Our policy in art, during a transitional perioct, can and must be to help the various groups and scfiools af art wfiicfi have come over to the Revoltltion to grasp correctly t l ~ ehistoric meaning t>f the Revolution, and to attow tl~erncomplete freedam af self-determination in the field of art, after putting before theill the categorical standard of being for or against tfic Kevolution.'Trotsky, II,i$eratzareand Revolution, p. 14. 96. ""SraEin arbitrarily deprived the Soviet Union of almost the wtiole of its military leaderstiip-hetwem thirty and forty thousand of its abtest and mtlst experienced oilers-when it was faced wit11 the danger of war; that he refused to listen ta the evidence Irom a variety of sources that Germany was preparing to attack the Soviet Union, so allowing Hitler the great advantage af surprise; and that he created such an acmt~sphereof terrcrr that those who realized cl~eextent t>f the danger were tlnable either to represent the real situation to him or to take rneasures tbel-nselves to meet it." Bullock, FlitEer and StaLin, pp. 71 7, 787, 902.

97. Stalin probably did nor have a futIy worked out economic program before his assul-nption of power and, as the decision was initially presented, coItectivization was to be carried out wftho~ltforce. The crude response of the peasants, along with the even cruder responses of tlze party to their opposition, let ft>oset l ~ eRoodgates for the "rcvoIutlon from abovc." Nove, Ec.;corzornicHzstnry, pp. 122ff. 98. This n s t i o t ~of ""panning," wlzich served as a prcjtotype for Eastert~ European cornm~xnism,has coil-te to be identified with socialist planning as such. In fact, lzt>wever, "ti~esemtjdels, whiclz have given a bad name to socsiaiism, are not the poarl>?una~zagedsamples of a Dasfzlaliy sound strzacasre, but unofzstrosz'ties ilcz their very corzccptiorz," Henry Pachter, "Three Ecorlornic iJllodels," in SociaEzsnz in HZStorx p. 43. 99, "T17;e key characteristic of the Stalinist rnodel of econoxntc growth was its lack t>f ecorzomic self-generating, self-regulating, and adjusting features, To run at all, tet alone to perforin well, it required an enormous political edifice to provide the regulation, supervision, and coorciinaeion. In fact, the Soviet political system was tieveiaped targefy to run the economy and was shaped by running the econail-ty in line with the chosen grr~vvthstrategy," "eryn BiaIer, Stali~zSSuccesssors: L,eadersi~ip, Stability; and C:j~angeai.E the Sovkt U~ziun(Cambridge, hiass,, 19801, p, 19. 1CJO. Nove, Economic Hzstov, pp. 1 92-200, 101. The simple fact is that ""neither tile survival of the system twenty years after the revolution nor the effectiveness of the system in rnohitiztrtg resources alter virtual compf etion t>f the revot utions from above required the unleashing and persistence of terror, Ifowevcr, the estabIishment and continuation of Statin's absolute dictatorship would have been irnpossibte without it." lialer, S u l k 3 Szaccessors, p. 27. 102. Hanglab Arendt, The Origzns of E'otalitarianz'sm(New Yark, 19-58],pp. 427, 465. 1CJ3. Rohert Conquest, Stali~zland the Kirov Murder (Idondon,1989). 104, For the fascinatit~gtranscript, see Robert C. Tucker and Stephen X;, Cofien, eds., The Greag ]*urge Trkl (New York, 196.5). 10.5, Henry 13achta draws a tink between the purge of Bukharin and his suspected opposition to the Hiticr-Stalin pact in "Ruk harin: History and Idrgcnd," in Rissejt-tt (Fall 19741, 572-5"7. See also Colzet~,Ilz/khari~gatzd the BoEshevik Revolzetzorz, pp. 337ff. 106, Bullock, Hitler and Stalilz, pp. S 10ff, 107, Ibid., p, 95.3, 108. Chilling accounts are provided by scares of memoirs and novcls. Among the most important are Natalta Ginsburg, jltzto the Whirlwin~l;Anatoti Rybakov, C2hiEdren o f t h e Arbng, trans. Harold Shukman (Boston, 1988); Victor Serge, The Ckse o(f:onzrade Etlayev, trans. Wiftard R, Trask (London, 1968); and Aleksander Solzhcnitsyn, The First Grcie, trans. T1zomas !F Whitney (New York, 1968). 109. See Andrezej Walicki, 1Marxisrn and the Leap to the Ki~tgdc~m of Freedcjm: The Rise and PaEb ofthe Counnzztnz'st Utopia (Stanford, 199.5). 110, Ian Kershaw, "Wc~rkingtowarcis the Fuhrer?: Reflections t>n t l ~ eNature of the Hitler L)ictatorsl~ip," in S~~dli~zism and R"az:ism: D2'ctatorships z;tz Compar&sn, eds, Xarl Kershaw and XiIoshc 1,cwin (Cambridge, 19971, p. 95, 111. The Second XnrernationaI had passed numerous pacjfistic, antiwar resolutions before 1924, i~lcltldingthe most famous, whicfi was joltltly sponsor" in

Stuttgart by Idcnin, X*crxexnburg, and Martav it1 1907. Rut they simply assumed compliance by its mcmhers and the organizadon lacked any means to cnfarcc its decisions, For a discussion of the Stuttgart conference, see Bractnthal, Hktory of the Irzterr?caborzal,1:334-338; 36;1-363. 112, Roscnberg, Ceschichre des Rolschewismus, p, 208, 113, I>cutschrr, The Prophet Armed, pp. 458ff. 114. The best general overview i s provided by F. L, Carsten, Revolution in Cerztival Ezarope: 2 9 18-1 9 2 9 (Berkeley, 1972). For a critique of the internaticonat policy advacated by the Soviet Leadership following the Sgarracus revoIt, sce Paul Ixvi, Zwischefz .Spartaklas uzzd Soxiaidemokratie: Schrifien, Aufsatze, Rednz, ~rzd Bri.)'e,ed. Charlotte Keradt (Frankfurt, 19691, pp. 22-94, 136-147, 115. V. 1. Lenin, """eft-Wing Communism-an Iniantite llisorder," in inelected iVorks, S:34.5ff. 116. Sec the discussion ""NEP in Foreign Poiiicyy"Cars, The Bolshevik Revc~tlzctiorz, 3:272-304, 157. V. I, Lenin, ""Theses and Report t>n Bourgeois l3emscracy and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat t a thc First Congress of the Communist Xnrernadonal,""in SeEected Works, S: 1SOff. X3arty btindly 118, ""7111e present-day concept of a tightly disciplined C:amt~-t~inist following tletaited instructions from Aloscow . . . certainly does nor apply to these early attempts tu extend the Suvtcr system tu other lands. At this tixnc, the leaders of the Rcrssian Kcvolutiorl served as inspirers, and as corlrributors of occasional advice and assistance, btxt not as directors. Altbouglz they often claimed they were riding tl~ey the wave t>f the future, they were scarcely able to direct it into the cl~ant~efs chose," hkorc, Soviet Politics, p. 197. 11% Notc the outstarlding dcscriprion of parry-life in Xlargaretc RuberNeumann, Wjn Potsdam tz~klchMoskaak: Statione~zekes Zrrweges (Frankf~trtam Main, 1990). 120, Fcrnando Claudin, The Gowzmunisr ~Movenzent:Fronz (Jomintern trz (Jomz'nfc~mm,2 vols., trans. Rrlan Plcrcc (New York, 29'75),1:1 C)3ff, 121. David Fernbach, "Rosa I,t~xemburg's130titlcal Heir: An Appreciation of f3aul l,evi," New Left Review 238 (November-Decemberf 1999), pp. 3-25, 122, Note the classic essay by Ricfiard X*owenthaf, "The Boisl-tcvizarian of the Spartacus I"eague,""in I:zter~zational(Jommzanism, St. Anrl-to~ly"Papers, No, 9 ed. Uavid Footman (X,ondon, 19601, pp, 23-71. 123, Claudirz, The Gonznzzan&tMcrvenzent. 124. Henry Pachtcr, WeE~nzacbtRtdsslafzd: Ar-lsse~zpolitz"sche Strategic in Drei Jahmhzanderten (Oldcnburg, 1968). 125, Note the discussion on the popular front in Stephen Eric Bronner, Moments of Decbton: f301iticalHistory and $he Crises of Radicalism (New Yark, I992), pp. 517"ff. 126, Conquest, The Great Terror, pp. 273Ff. 127, Deutsct~er,Stalifz,pp, 4 3 3 4 5 5 and passiil-t. 128, Bullock, Elitbr and Stalilz, pp. "i7ff. 129. I>jifas, Co~versationswith S;~altl-t, p, 80-81. 130. Rraunthal, Histogl (of the Irzternatiorzal, S:144ff; Clauctin, The Gonznzuntsr Movement, 2:307ff.

131. Hetni: Timmcrmann, The Recline nf the iVorld Gonzmunist Mnveme~zt.: Moscou~,Beqing, a d C;ommzanist Parties in the W s g , trans, Juli~rsW;", Friend (Boulder, 1 987). 132, Pachter, Weltmacht Kussland, pp. 8-9. 133, Roy A, hledvedcv and Zhclrts A. h$ectvcctcv, Khrushchev: The Years itz lJower,trans, Andrew R. Durkin (New Yark, 19781, and Michef Tatu, Le lJo%voir en URSS iX3aris, 1967). 134, This becomes evidetit in a story about the Twentieth Party Congress, Apparently2 after hearing the revelat~onsof Stalin's crirnes, one af the dejfegates mumbled under his breath: "Wl~yhadn? Khrushchev said any OF this u~htlcStalin was alive?" The Soviet leader responded angrily: "Who said that?" Silence, He askcd a second time, and then a third, Firtally Khrushchcv said: "That" s h y f didn't say anything wl~ilehe was alive." Quareci in Der ,Sj~iegel,July 4, 1388, pp. 118fi. 135. WaXickt, ~Mcarxisma d the lielap to the Kz'wdom of Freedonz, pp. 514ff. 136. Bialer, Stalifz3- Successors, pp. 147ff. 137. Czl-tris Harmon, Bzrreaucracy and Revolzdtzon in E~asdenzEurope (l,ondan, 19741, pp, 49-66. 138, Walicki, Marxism and the Idcrapto the Ki~zgdcrmof Freedom, p,S22. 139, "In sorne respects, tl-te break hctwecrl mature Stalinism and its Ixnir~istpast was more clear-cut, mare prslo~tndthan between the present systell-tand its Statinist past. The Sralinist systcrn was establislled through a series of deep revolutionary convutsiotis and transformations. The present system came into being in a process of incrcmcrltal evolutionary cl~angc.Thc Stalinist system acquired its shape by crushing established institutions; the present autlioritarian system was rnslded by the process aE their adjustll-tent," Biater, Stalin LSr~ccessors,p. S9. 140, See Baruch A, Hazan, From Breshrzev to Cc1rhacC7ri.v:Infighting in the Krepnlhz (Boulder, 1387), 141. John &4i)lcr,Mikhail G~torbacheva d the E~zdof Soviet Power (New York, 1993);Angus Raxb~trgl~, The Secand Rzdssian Reval~tion(London, 199 2 1, 142. Ricf~arctPipes, C~omnzzatzism:T&e Va~zished-5"pecrer(New York, 1994.1, p. 25, 143, An expanded version of this section was writteti tfuring the events t>f August 1991 and published as a pastscript i r Mowze~zts ~ of Deckzon, C;iven its dcscriptjorl of the dismal end of commutiism and its anticipation of certain tlevelspmetits "beyond" Leninism, t~awever,this revised version seems particularly appropriate for incf usion here. 144, Note the ""letter froi1-t an Old Balshevik" in Basis Wicotaevsky, Power and cct, jams I>. the Soviet Elite: 'The I,etter nf atz Old Rolsheuik' aallzd Other Essla~~s, Zagoria (New York, Z 965).

Chapter 5 1. A broader treatment of the thell-tes in this chapter is provided in Stephen Eric Rronncr, Rcxa 1,uxenzburg: A Revolzdtl'onary for Clur Tinzes (University Park, Pa,, I997 [3rd printing]), 2. Anncties I,aschitza, lm I;cbe~zsra.ausch,trotz alledem Rosa I,gzaxemhlarg: Eine (Berlin, I996), Bic~grapC~ie

Notes

21 5

3* Note the Ietters published by Sonja I*icbknccl~t in a l i ~ volurnc k entitled Rriefe dem G e f ~ n g n k(Berlin, 1"320), as well as tltose by I,uise Mai~tskyin Bi.zefe atz K ~ r ~l r z dLuise Kat-.ttsk3!(Berlin, 192.3). In the same vein, sec I,uisc Kautsky, Rasta Ltexenzbzirg: Et% C;edenkbztch (Berfin, 1929) and the biclgraphy by EXenriette Rotand-Holst, Rosa ^I,uxenzbzarg: Ihr Lcben uzzd Wirknz (Zurich, $937). 4, See Elzhieta Ettinger, Rclsa 1,uxernburg: A Life (Cambridge, 1389). S. ltasa L-ctxetliburg, The I,ettt.rs of Rosa L z - z x ~ ~ E Seed. M Yand ~ , trans, Stephen Eric Brotmer (Atfantic Highlands, N=f,, 1993 [rev, ed.]), p. 147. 6. See Raya Dunayevskaya, Rssa Luxemburg Women's I,iberr;rtic)n and MarxS Philoso>l?hyof R e v o l ~ f i o n(New jersey, 1981). 7. Rosa I,uxelnburg, ""Stagnation and Progress of kiarxism" (1903f, in Rssa 1,gzaxenzblarg Speaks, cd, Mary-Alicc Waters (Mew York, 19701, pp, 106-1 13, 8. Laschirza, f m Leberzsrauch . . . , p. 29. 9. Rosa I*uxemburg, ""The National Question and Autonorn~r,"" it1 The National Questicl~:Selected Writin@ by Kosa Ltexenzb~rg*ed. H. B, Davis (New Yorli, Z'37=6),p. 135, 10. Rosa l,uxemburg, "Der 13artei 23rotetariatkum (;ed$ct-ttnis," in in30Etfzsche Schrzften, 3 vols., ed, Ossip M, Flechtheitli (Frankfurt, 19681, 3:23ff. 11. Gonzrade a d I,over: Rosa I,zaxernbrarg%Letters kn J,co Jogiches, cd, Flxbicta Ettinger (I,ondon, Z "3 l f , 12. Rosa Edr~xemburg,"Str6mungen in der polniscfien sozialistischen Bewegung," and "ller Sozialgatriotismus in 1301en," in C;essmnzelte Werke I ( l f ,pp. 18 and 50. 13, (iiven that I,uxemburg tielped with parts of the manuscript, especially those dealing with political economy, note the discussion by Franz LWehring, Karl Marx: The Story o(His IIiI;?,trans, Edward Fitzgeratd (Ann Arbor, t 96%),pp, 165-163. 14, Note Luxemburgk forward to the anthott>gy entitled "The 1301isb Question and the Socialist Movement," in The Nagioncl/ &ztesti:l'on, p. 8.5, 15. "By failing tu analyze Poliand and Russia as ctass societies bearing cconorntc and politicat contradictions in their bosoms, by viewing them not from the point of view of historical dcvciopmcnt but as if they were in a fixed absolute conditiorl as homc~geneous,ut~differentiatectunits, this view ran counter to the very essence t>f Xlarxism." Ibid., p. 63. 16. ltosa Luxernhurg, ""The Junius f3ampblet: The Crisis in the German Social Sp6.a ks, pp. 30"lrf. De~liocrac-y,"in in~osa1,uxell~b~trg 17. "What is especially striliing about this formuta is the fact that it tloest~krepresent anytbl~lgspeciEicaiIy connected with socialis~lior with the politics of the working class. It is at first: glanec a paraphrase of the old slogan of bourgcois nationalism put forth in all countries at all times: %theright of nations to freedot11 and p 1102, tndcpcndenec,"' I'uxcmburg, "The National Qucstiorl and A~ttonoxny~"" 18. Norman (;eras, The L.egcacj~ of Rosa Luxembzllrg (L,ondon, 1976), p. 16, 19, Grorg I,ukhcs, ""The Xlarxism of Xlosa I,uxemburg," in ixrzstol.3, and Glass Cr~nsciozas~ess:Stz.tdze.s in Marxist Dlirlectzcs, trans. Kodney l,ivingstone (Cambridge, Mass., 19711, pp, 27if. 20. Luxernburg, ""Kefc~rmor Revolution," in Kosa Luxenzbzerg Speaks, p, 39. 21. Ibid., p. 6.5, 22. Ibid., p. 41, 23. Ibid., p. 74, QUS

24. The Letters of Rosa Luxembzkrg, p. 60, 25. Luxemhurg, ""Relortl-tor Revolution," p. 883. 26, The I,etters of Rosa Luxembzkrg, p. 1C14, 27. Thus, wlzen Bernstein ""abandoned scientific socialism llie tt>stthe axis t>f intellectual crystallization around which isolated facts groups themselves in tile organic whole t>f a coheret~tconceptiot~of the world." Luxernburg, Ref;.,rz or Revolzftic~n, p. 85. 28. Ibid., pp. 88-89, 29. "What appears to characterize this revisionist practice above all" certain hosdlity to 2aficory.TThis is quite naruraI, for our 2aheor~;Vtharis, the principles of scientific socialism, impose clearly rnarked titl-titationsto practical activity-insofar as it concern$ the aims of this activity, the means used in attaining these aims, and the method ernpIc~yecfin tlliis activity. It is quite natural for people who run after immediate "practical\esctlts to warlt to free themscjves tram such limitations and to render tlzeir practice incfependent t>f our 'theory." hid., p. 87, 30. Rosa Luxernburg, "Xfilitia and hfilitarisrn," in Selected 1'"olit-I'c~l Vkirititzgs of Kosa Luxenzbzer~cqed, llick Howard (New York, 19711, pp. 13.5ff'. 31. Luxemburg, ""Relortl-tor Revolution," p. 59. 32. C)skar Negt, "Zur matcrtaltsriscfien Dialekrik vorl Sgontanett2t crnd Organisation: Rosa L,uxemb~trg,"in inez~zeDernskrratie ohrze Sazialzsmus: Ober den Ztksanzrnerzba~tgvc_tnI3olitik, Ceschzchte ~ n Moral d (Frankfurt, 1976), pp. 182ff. 33. Paul Frohlich, Rijsa Luxervrburg: Her Life arzd Work, trans, Jokanna Hoorweg (New York, 1972), pp. NI-94, 34.Kosa L.uxemburg, ""Organizational Questions of Russia11 Social L3em(1cracy" in Selected 12alz"t2'cdlVkirititzgs of Rssa f,zaxemburg, p. 294. 3.5, Ibid., p, 306. 36, Ibid., p. 289. 37. Georg I,uk&cs, ""Critical C)bscrvations on Rosa I,uxemburgk "Critique of the Russian Revolution,"3in I-liktory and Cllass Co~zsciousnws,p, 292. 38. I,uxemburg, ""Organizationat Questions of. Russian SoclaI Democracy," p. 304). 39. Iduxemburg would forxnulatc her tfzoughts on tfzcsc evcnts more than ten years later in an article concerned with the ten-day tong general strike to secure universal st~ffragein "The Belgian Experiment" (1913). Note the discussion by l,asclliifza, I m Leberzsrauch . . . , pp. 427ff. 40. Laschirza, Im Lebensrauch . . . , pp. Z74ff, 41. C)n the intellectual connections between Iduxemburpand the ttlieorists of the perlltanent revolution, see Geras, Legac3: pp. 43ff; Dunayvskaya, Rssa Lz.~xemburi~, pp. 165ff. On I'aarus, sec Z.A.K. Zeman and W. B, Scharlau, The Merchalczt of Kevulz~tio~: The Life of Alexander Israel Hfitclphand (London, 1965), pp. 20-35 and passim. 42, Kosa Luxernburg, "Mass Strike, Party, and Trade Uniclns," in Selected PolitzcaI Writa'fzgs,p, 227, 43, Isaac Deutsclzer, The f3rc>pC3etArmed: Trotsky, 1879-2 921 (New Yorli, Z96S), pp. 131, 117-144. On the R~lssiansoviets in general, see also the classic work by Oskar Anweilcr, Die Rate i ~ zRussland f 90.7-1 921 (Ideiden,1958). 44. The 1,et~t.r~ o(Rosa Luxenzburg, p, 114,

Notes

217

45. I*uxcmburp, "Mass Strike, Part5 and Trade trttions," p. 2-52. 46. ""X is coilinpletely absurd to think of the ilinass strike as an act, an isolated action. The rnass strike is rather the sign, the totality-concept of a whole period of the cfass struggle lasting for years, perhaps tlecades." Ibid., p. 237, 47. Iduxemburg was 1101: some fanatic and her faitfi in the rnass never took a ""mystical" form, A retreat into t l ~ efine shadings of her tl~eoryin order to dismiss its roilinantic ejements, however, is tendentious. It also misses the context in which her tl~esrywas formed no tess than the reasons for its impact. See F. I,, Carsten, "heedorn and Revolution," in Revisl'onkm: Essays ofz the I-jistor~jof Marxist Ideas, ed. Idcogold Xabcdz (New York, 19621, pp. 55fi; and E, H. Carr, 3937: Before ava! Aftgr (L,ondon, 1969), pp. 56ff. For the second position, see (;eras, Idegac3t,pp. 11311, 48. Laschifza, Im Leberzsrauc!~. . . ,p. 459. 49. I,uxcmburp, "The junius Pamphlcr,""in Roscll1,uxcnzburg Speaks, p. 31 5. 50. Ibid., p, 316, 51. The 1,etzt.r~of Rosa Luxenzburg, p, 172. 52. L,uxernburg, ""The junilts f3amplitet," p. 3-32. 53. Ibid., p. 3 19. 54. Ibid., p. 329, SS. 13aul X,evi, Zwische~zSparl-akzgs urzd Sozicrlliemokratie: Schriften, Azafsatze, Reden, und Rriefe, ed. Charlotte Rcradt (Frankfurt, 19691, pp. 11-138 and passim; C:harlotte Deradt, Pazd I,eui: Eirz demtlkratischer Sozzalist z ~ zder Wei~zarerRepuhlik (Frankfurt, 19691, pp. 40-62. Sce atss F'ranz Rorkenau, World (Jonzm~$tzisnzA f-lzstor~~ of the f:onznzu$zist IrztematiorzaE (Ann Arbor, I962), pp. I-Eillf; Julius Histcl~3fof the jlntenzatiottal, 3 vafs,, trans, Henry Coilins, Peter Ford, Bra~~nthat, and Kennet11 Mitcl~ell(New York., 1980), 2:224ff. 56. Lascfinitza, Pm Lebensrauch . . . , p, 571. Observations on Rosa 57, Thc best rcfutation is offercd by Lukiics, b'C:~iti~al Luxemburg% '"C:rlrique of the Russian Revolution."' 58. IAuxcmburp,"The R~~ssian KevoIution," in Rosa I,@zaxenzblargSj~eaks,p. 378. 59, Ibid., p, 380. 60, Admittcdty, white inrrncrscd in the (;erman Spartaccts uprising of 1919, l,uxernburg retracted some t>f her eartier criticisms-including her support for convening a constituent assembly Note the discussion by Peter Nettl, Rssa Luxervrburg, 2 vols. (New York, 1366), 2:;717--719, See also Clara Zetkin, "Uln Rasa I,uxemburgs Stellt~ngzur russicken Revol~ttion," iin Azasgewahlte Reden urzd Schriftczrz (RcrItn, 29571, 2:385. 61.14uxemburg, ""7111e Russian Revolution," pppp,391, 390. 62. Ibid., p, 394, 63. Ibid,, p, 389, 64, The l2etters of Rosa Luxembzkrg, p. 2-58. 65, Franz Uorkenau, Wc~rid Comnzu$zisnz: A Histovj~ of the f:ommztrzist Itzterr-zatl'u~zd(Ann Arbor, 19621, pp. 87ff. 66. Note the remarks by her secretary, itlathilde Jacob, "Von Rosa l,uxernburg tlnd il~renElreunden in Mrieg ~ t n dRevolution 1914-1 919," hrsg. Sybilie Qtlacle. und Rctdlgcr Zimmcrxnan in IrztematicrtrzaEe iVzssc~zshsaftlicbe Ksn.esponderzx xtkr Ceschichte dcr deutscheg Arbeiterbeutegurzg. Berlii~(West), Heft 4, 1988, pp. 43Sff.

67. K I ~ CGictinger, IS Eine I,eiche i m Lsandwehrkatzal: Die E r m o r d ~ n gder Rosa I,. (Mainz, 1993). 61J, Scc Perry Anderson, Corzsiderations nn Westenz Mnrxisnz (l,ondon, 1976); Maurice Merleau-130nry, Aduentwres of the 1)ialectic (Evansttln, 1973). At1 alternative perspective is provided by Russcll Jaeaby, The Dialectic nf Defeat: Corzrours of Westert? Marxism (New York, 1981); see also Brsnt~er,Rosa Luxemhurg, pp. 96ff.

Chapter 6 1, Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, 1)ialectic of Enlightennze~.zt,trans, John Cumrning (New York, t972), pp, 120ff. 2, Kudotf Uahro, The Alternative i~ Easterrz Europe, trans, l3avid Fernbach (I,ondon, 19781, pp. 17-48, 123-1 83,235-250. .3* Herbert Xlarcusc, Cllze-Dl;me~zsionalMafz: Stucalks irz the Ideologqf nfildvatzced ItzcriztstriaE Society (Beacon, 19641, pp. 1-1 20, 4. Frcderick Exlgcls, ""Ludwig Feucrbach and the End of Classical German 13hilosophy," in Kart :Wai-x and Frederick Engefs, Sekcted Wcjrks, 3 vols. (Moscow, 19691, 3:340, 339, 5 , Karf :UIarx, "Tc~warcfa Critique of Hegef's 13hilssopl~yt>f Law: 1ntroducti~)n~" in Wri~z;tzgsof the Yclutzg Marx 012 I'hil~~sopJ?~~ a~zdS o c Z e ~ed. and trans, Loyd D, Easton and Kurt H. CiucSdat (New York, 1967)),p. 2.50. C;. Stephen Eric Bronner, "Points of tleparture: Sketcfies for a Critic-at Tl-teory with Public Airns," in ('IfCritical T h e o v atzd Its Theorists (Oxford, 19941, pp. 322 f-f. 7. Benjatl-tin Barber, The Conqzaest of Politics: I,zheral Philosophy in Dernonaitl'c T[nzes (Princeton, 191382, p. 199. 8, JGrgen Habermas, Legitimatio~zGrkis (Bostt~n,1375), p. 113, 9. Stephcn Erie Rronner, "jurgen Habermas and the l*anguageof Politics,""in Of Crit-ir;rrETk~eoryand Its Theorists, pp, 293fi, 1Q. Srephen Eric Bronner, Ideas i ~ Action z (I,anharn, hfd., 19991, pp. 4 t ff. 11. lrnrnanuef Kant, "What is Enlightenment" in in~jraland 1"oliticaE Writi~gs, ed. Car! j. Friedrick (New York, 1949), p. 136. 12. The best atternpt to deal with this matter is providect by Joshua Cohcn and Joel Ragers, On Denzocrac3*:"Toward a TransjFt)mzatiuf~t OJ American Society (New York, 1983). Afso see Satnucl Rowles and Hcrbcrt Gintis, I)ernocrlacy artd Capitalism: lJropert;5.;Comnzurzzty atzd the Ccj~~tmdictit,rzs of Modern Social Ti?oz.tght (New York, 1987), pp, 64ff. 13, Niklas l,ul~mann,"Das Konzept des 130titischen," in Arci;tinaedes urzd wir: Itzter~iews,ed. Dirk Baecker and Cieorg Stanirzek (Berlin, 191;?, p. 11. 14. Note the farnc~usanaiysis of "commodity fetishism" in inarl &?iarx,Ckpital, 3 vols., trans, Samuel kioore and Edward Aveiing (Mew York, t967), t:71Ef. 15. T, W Adorno, ""Scicty,'Vn Critical The0l.y a d Socieq ed, Stephen Fric Bronner and X2ouglas XracKay ICellner (New York, 19891, p, 271. 16. Karl Marx, Crurzdrkse: f;r,tarzd~riorzsof the Clritique of Political E ~ O ~ Z O M Z Y trans, Martin Nichotaus (New Yc~rk,19731, pp. 83ff. 17, Marx, Ckpkal, 1:38ff,

Notes

219

18. Kart Xlarx, The F30verty of (Philosophy (hiItlscau; 1963), p, 63. 19. kiarx, Capital, 3:799, 20, Ibid*,3:800. 21. Note the cfassic essay by (ieorg I,ukrics, ""Reificadc~nand the Conscit>usness of the Proletariat,"" in History l a d (Jlass Consciozasness trans. Rodncy 1"ivingsrcntnc (Cambridge, Alass,, 19721, pp. 83ff. 22. Jiirgen Habermas, Tcjmmd a Rational Society: Stgdeirzt Protest, Scieuce, and L.'t~litics,trans, jeremy j. Shagiro (Bosttln, 19701, p, 112. 23. Gohen and Rogers, O r z Dernscrac;y; p. 68; Jiirgen Habermas, Kszswledge and Hz$nzatz Interests, rrans. Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston, 19721, pp. 191-3fl0. 24. Henri t,efebvre, Dialectical Materialism, trans. John Sturrock (Idandon, 19681, pp. 129-1 30. 2.5. Habermas, Legitirnatir~~z nli,N,Y,, 1978). O n the theory, see Karl Korscl~, Schrifiea zur Sozierlkzerun~;ed. Ericl-t Gerlacb (Frankfurt, 1969); Otto RGilte, RaupEQinefor ebne tzeue GeselEschaft (Hamburg, 1971); and Branko Horvat, The Political Ecsnonzy of SociaEkm: A Marxist Social Ther~ry(Armonk, N.Y,, 29821, of councils by Alex Callir~icos,The pp. 235-371. Note thc futuristic di~cussio~l Kevat?ge c~(Hktory:Marxkm and the k;ast Ezarc~peanRevolzdtic~rzs(University Park, Pa,, 199 1),pp. 95ff. Also Kcrtell C)! irnan, ed., ~WcarketSocialism: The Ilehare antong Socklr'sts ((New York, 1998). 41. Becartse councils so~igiltto coil~batb~treart~ratic alienation and the divislon t>f tabor by unifying administrative, ~udicial,and economic forms t>f decisionmaliing, it misses the point to simply recornil-tend the creation of an independent judiciary: such a suggestion rrtns counter to the purposes of the entire enrerprisc. Sec Willialn Gonnolly, Appearance and RmEity (Cambridge, 2981 f, pp. 188Ef. 42- Norc tile critique of localism offered by Jofirl Ehrenhcrp, Civil S ~ ~ c i e t)):he j~: Critir;rrE Hktory cl( an Idea (New York, I999), pp. 224-2.50. 43. Wlodzirnierz Krrts, "Coxnmoctity Fctisbistn and Sociatism," it1 The Economia arzd I'oEitzw of SoczaEism: Collected Essays (Lsndot~,1973), pp. "1;-"5. See atso Ssfetozar Srojanovic, ""Between Ideals and Reality," h S~elfiCover~zitzg Socialism, ed. Branko Horvat et al. (White f3fains, N,Y, 197.5). 44. Joshua C:otien and Joel Rogers, A S S C I G ~ ~and ~ Z Denzocraq O~S ( N e w York, 1995), 4.5. Do~tglasMeflner, (I;ritl;;al Theol35 Xbiarxk~z,and Moderrzity (Cambridge, 1989), p. 214, Also note Kelinerk Televisiorz am! the Crisis of X2emc_tcracy(Boulider, 1990). 46. "iMost prc)btems of the natural and social environmet~tsare bigger problems from the standpoint of the poor, including thc -r;lrorkir~g poor, than for thc salariat and the well-to-do, In other words, issues pertaining to production conditions are class issues, even though they are also more than class issues." James OKonnor, ""Capitalism, Nature, Socialism: A Theoretical Introduction," Capitalism, Ncrttdre, Socialkm l (Fall 19881, p, 37. 47. The situation has actually gotterl worse sir~ecthe publicadon of the jrnportant work by juliet: B. Schor, The Overzuorked American: The Ufzexpected Declisfe of I,eisz.tre (Ncw York, 1991), 48, Andre Gorz, Adieux au pr(~lt(tclriat:Aze d6la du soci~lisme(Paris, I98Q)),and Paths to Paradise: On the Liberation from \X"orK (Boston, 11385). Sec also tlic provocative set of essays by Claus Offe, Disorprtized C~ayital2"sl.n (C;ambridge, Mass., 198.5). 49, Note the essay, which builds upon the famous parnpl~letof I%ul Lafasgue, by Henry Pacl~ter""The Rigfit to Be Lazy,'?n Socialism i~ Histar3i; pp. 3-16, 50, Georgcs (iurvirch, "La soctologie du jcunc Marx," C:ahi;ers I~zternarionaux de SocioEogie 3 ( 1 9 48), pp. 4 and passim.

Notes

221

51. Arthur Rosenberg, Denzocr~cyatzd SociaEism: A Contribution to the Poli$ical Histo? of LThe Past 1 SO Years, trans. George Rosen (New York, 1939). 52. Rranner, Ideas i ~ zActiorz, pp. 206ff. 53.. Ernst Blsch, Thornas Mzztrzzer: Afs ThcroEogt: der KcvoEzftz"o~z (Frankfurt am Main, 1972). 54. Note the concern with this theme expressed in the Socklist Register 2000, ed. Leo Panitch and Czolin Leys (l,ondon, 200tl). 55, Theocior W. Adorno, "Cultural C:riticism and Sc>ciety," in inJrzsnzs, trans. Samuel and Shierry Weber (I,ondon, 296"jr),pp, 21-23. 56. C)skar Ncpr and Alexander Klcrge, CjffentEzchkcic wzd Erfahrza~zg:Zur Orga~zisationsi;f~zaE~fse von hgrgerlicher und prclletarischer c'Jffen$lichkzeit (Frankfurt, 1972), p, 87. 57, ""1 is necessary to make a distinction between the criticlue of reformism as a political practice and the critique of a political practice on the grounds that it might gtvc rise tc) reform, This tatter . . . critique is frequent in left-wing grr~ups,"Micsliet Fo~tcatllt, PouterIKszou~lcrdge:Selected ttztervitrws and Other Writings, 1972-1 977, ed. CkIin Corclczn (New York, 19777, p. 143, SR. Jean-Pactl Sartre, Saimt Cenet: Actor and Martyr ( N e w York, 2971 f, p. 344. 59, JuIi~rsRraunthaI, Hzstol.3" o f t h e I:zterrzatio~al,3 vols., trans. Henry Collins, Peter Ford, and Kennetk hfitct~ell( N e w York, 29XO), 3:510, 60. Andrk (;or&, Soci~lisma d RevoEzadon, trans. Norman I>enny (New York, 1973), pp. 135f1, 61. hfaurtce h$crleau-Ponty, AAdve~ztfdresof the Dialectic, trans, jascpfi Btcn (Evanston, 1973) p. 206, 62- See Regis Debrah Revr>lzdtio~z ai.E the Revolution? trans, Bobbye Ortiz (New York, l 967). 63. Edtvard Hallett Czarr, The Ta~entyYears Cr&& 2 92 9-1 939 (New York, 1964 ed.), pp. 60, 5.3. 64. Stephen Eric Bronner, ""The New Right in the United States and Abroad," ln Neorzatiotzalismt-ks-Neokorzserv~thnzzas: Sorzdierurzgerz ~ r z dAtzalyssrz, ed, hlichact Kessler, et al. (Tuehingen, 1997), pp, 9-21. 65. Richard Rorty, Conti~gency,l?"ol.ty,Solidarity (Cambridge, 19871, pp. ISIOFf. 66. See Fiiiiker Frobel, j6rgen Heinriclis, and Otto Kreye, llie nezae zntematio~ale Arbic;lsteilzang: StrukturelEe Arbeihlo~i~qkeit in den Indz-kstrz'el2tzderla zand die Irzdustrhlisierur2g dcr Entwicklgdr2gsf2~zder (Hamburg, 1977). 67. Henry Pachter, The Pal/ am' Rise of Europe: A Politizlal, Social, and Gzalt~ral History ofthe Tx/entie$hCentuql (Mew "u"ork, 1975),pp. 450ff.

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Index Accountability, 148-1 S5 of capitat, 152-1 53 labor movell-tent and capital, 154-1 55 of power in socialism, t 50-1 5 2 Accz~mtaln~iorz of usness, 131-1 32 lAetli~las view t>l, 82 kiarx and Enge1s"synthesizing notions of, 10-1 1 revof utionary violence stell-tming frorn rrtling, 29 structtxuaf interpretations of, 162-1 6.3 struggle and ideal t ~ f ,1Q) it1 United States, 158-1 60 See aEso class ideat Class action, 11-25, 188fn29)

Class ideal, 10, 164--167*2 2 9jn33) aligning social mclvernetlts into, 165-166 organizing competing tntercsts for attention with, 166 perfecdng sociaiiisrn and, 167' perversion of sojcialism and, 30 f socialism, 145-1 4 8, 183

Darknws cat Noo~z(Koestler), 2 12 (n89) l)arwin, Charles, 38-39

Index

L>as Kapital (~Marx),35 Debacle, The (Zolaf, 23 L>eclaration o f the Rights of &fanand Citizen, The, 1.3 Democracy, 3 -3 1 Bernstein" view an, 58, 64-65, 73, 200in15) bourgeois concepts of economic jrtsticc, 3-4 bourgeoisie and worker class after revol~ttionsaf 1848, 2-3 breaking connectiot~between property and, 23 class action, 11-1 5, 188(n29) coil~il~unism as fulfiljrnent of, 6, 21: as dcscribed ir~ (Jommzanzst Marzifes-to, 8-1 1 devclopmcnt of Parts Commune, 22-27 dcvelop~nentaf working class, 3-4 internationalism, 15-22, 30 Ma~~tsky and Bernstein" views an, 58, 200(n15) k1arx and Engels?vlews an, 5-7, 30, 193(r189) Alarxism and, 26-31 positivism of Comte, 4 scientific analysis of working class, 10 worker support for rci;pzehEiqz.te ~ie"-yl.zocrattque, 2 Democratic ccntraIism, 73-79 D e ~ ~ ~ o c r arejuvenation tic (galsnost), 115, 117 L>evelopmc-lrztof C;i.r)itclEkm in Russk, The (Imin), 80 Zlictaeorship educational, 8 1, 20S(nC;) Idetlinkintroduction of, 78 Dictatorship of proletariat defineci by I,enin as virtuous necessity, 86-87 X~uxemb-ctrpkphilosophy of, 139-140 Marx on, 1 3 13arisCommune as, 22-23, 191-192(n69)

224

as part of translrion from capita1'ism to communism, 88-89 R~lssianRevolution and, 84-89, 206-2C27(x1n 24, 2.5, 29) See also proletariat Rk rzeg4e ;SCE$, 33, 39 l3issolution t>f communist regime, 1 5 7-1 21,214(r~143) l3jitas, Alilsvan, 83-84 Dreyfus Affair, 69, 70

Eco~zoma'cDoctrine o f Karl Xbidrx, The (Kautsky), 35 Econoil~icissues Rerr~steir~" ccomrnitmcnt to workers, 63 bourgeois concepts of economic justice, 4 comproil~iseto transform party ideoft>gyinto, 65-66 during dissotution of Soviet cornmrtnist regime, 117-1 3 8 imperialisln and, 41 1-92 irnpltcations of internationalistn, 178, 180-181 I,cnin%economic dercrminisrn, 80-8 1 linking economic and political tlemocracy, 3.30, 193(n89) I,uxetl-rburg7ssccunzz~lata'o~z of C:zapz;cal, 1 26-1 28 perestraika and glasnost, Z 1.5, 126-1 17 scarcity and ultimate aims t>f organization, 173-3 72 SE3L3 and question of economic: reform, 42, 195-1 96jn26) Empiricism of Uernstein, 63-64 Empower~~~ent and domination, 167-4 A1,220(nrr41,461 Engels, Elrederick achieving urllon of prulictariat, 190(n52) attack on SPI) anti-Sexnitism, 193(n85) bullding af Marxist11 by, 28, 193 (n8.l)

cc>mmitmentto internadonafism, 16-17, 190-1 91(nS3f f:otzdztz"o~z of the Wc~rkz~tg f:Eass t ~ z England, The, 6 dictatorship of proletariat, 13, 22-23, 191-1 92(nQ9f founding of Nezde Rhei~zsche Zeitzd~zg,6 lir~kingecanornic and political democracy, 30, 1931nX9) role af ruling class to create revt>lutit>n,8 1 synthesizing nations of class, 10-1 1 views a n politic-at dcil-tocrac-y,5-7 urarking class to create new order, 9- 10 See also Co~1zmu~zist Ma.tzihto, The Erfgrt Program, 33, 43-4-85 Ethics abset~ceof in l,eninism, 83 acco~intabilityand socialist, 148-1 55 Rcrnsrctnk ideology of compramisc and, 63-66,202(n42) Fvol ution Bernstei~~ anct Kautsky % notions of, 58-59 Kautsky" attraction to 13arwinas theory, 38-39 of views o n internationalism, 177-183 Fvaludr>nrtrysocialism, 75-76 Ftrsr International, 18-21, 23-24 Prom Sect- to Part3, (Bernsrein), 58

Callifet, General (;aston de, 69 Ckneral Council, 19, 21, 19 1(n64) German C:ornmunist Party (I(l>lt)j,110, 138 Germany Kautsky" criticism of imperial, 49, 198(nn 44,45,46) pact between Stalin and Hider, 1 06-1 07, 111 Cidtlens, Anthony>74 C;lobalization. See internationalism

Habermas, JGrgcn, 11 55 Harrington, Rrichael, 160 HcgcI, G, W. F., S, 4, 9 Helpkanct, ALexandcsr, 80 Hilferding, RudolF, 90, 91 Hitler, AdoL17t.1, 106-1 07, 1 11 Hobson, John A,, 90-91 Zdeofogy of compromise, 57, 65-66, 203fn52) Imper%alism(Lenin), 90-93, 208(n47) Imperialism Hobson on ""prasttical interests" of, 90-9 1 Lenin's theory af, 90-93, 208(n47) 1,uxemburg on, 127, 128-129 ""Xnag~tralAddress" "arx), 18, 19 Independent Social Democratic Party (USPD), SO I:zdustrial I>ezrelojl;rme~zt of PoIatzL-I, T!?e (t,uxernburg), 12.5 Institutional impcrativc, 171-1 77 Internationalism cultural imptications af, 182- 183 tlernojcracy and, 15-22, 30 economic implications of, 17'8, 180-1 81 Engels c-oil-tmitmentto, 2 6- 1"l' evolving views on, 177-1 83 rnuttiple interests in, 178-1 79 politicat implications of, 181-1 82 as posture toward underdevett>ped nations, 278 InvertecS world, 152-1 54 repod~rctionof reif cation in, 1SS Jat~rks,jean, 70, 203-204(n63) Jones, Homer, 199(nl) Junius Brochure, 136, 138

227

Index

Kautsky, Karl, 28, 29, 33-48 about, 34-35 beliefs in social scientific analysis, 57-58 bringir~gconsciousness from outside working force, 82, 206fnll ) on capitalism, 35-36 commitment to parliamentary rule, 43, l96(nn 28,291 criticism t>f imperial Germany, 49, 198fnn44,4S, 46) k;cc~rztjmz'c Doctrirze of Karl iWarx, The, 35 on I:rfidrt I3mogramm, 43-45 fail from popuIariry of, 49-53 helps jailed Id~rxembrtrp,135 increasing power of SPLS, 45-50, 196-1 97(nr-r 32, 33, 34, 36) LAet~ink esteem for, 80-8 1 on mass strike, 48, 196(n27j Mateelist Concei>ti(~n of Mistor3 The, 52 notions of cvoIution, 58-,59 Oricgirzsof Chrktianit3 The, 34 pacifism of, 49 political theories of party and state, 4 0 4 3 , 195(n2E )) popularization of A2arxism by, 33-37, 194(~27j I%eczarsors to SuciaEism, 34 on R~lssianRevof utian, 52, Z 99jnn 54, 55) Social Revolz-il;b'on,The, 4.5 Kercnsk?~,Alexander, 85, 88, 95 Keynes, Jolm M a y ~ ~ a r 90 d, Khrushchev, Nikita, 1.1 3-1 14 Kierliegaard, Soren, 5 King Lo~iis-Phiilipe,I Kirov, Scrgei, 106 Koestier, Artl~ur;2 Z l (n89f Kropotkirt, Peter, 20 Labor movcrnent and capital accountability7 154-1 55 Labor pourer sold by proIetartat, 1 3 , 188-189(n31) LaEargue, Paul, 28

Lassalle, Ferdinand, 17, 22,42 Left- Wi~ggCommurzkm jI,enin), 109 Lenin, V.. I,, 77-104 on ctass struggle and class war, 82 death of, 98 Revelo>f?nzentof Capitalism in Rzassia, The, 80 esrccm for Kautsky, 80-81 foreign policy of, I 10 on imperialism, 90-94, 208(n47) introduction of dictatorship, 78 liefit- Wirzg Conzmutz&wt,Z 09 Iife and studies of, 80 I,uxetl-tb~lrg critical of Treaty af Brcst-I,itvosk, 139 Materialism and Empirio-Cktickm, 80 on minorities, 93 on national self-determination, 92-93, 208(n52) omissions of institutional checks a n parry, 83-84 possible successors to, 100-104 on proIetartat, 81, 87, 205fn8) recognizing role t>f soviets in new regirnc, 88 on revolution in Russia, 81-83 role of party in revolutionary politics, 78, 82-83 S&& and Revolgl.iu~z,The, 84, 8.5, 88-89, 2t)6(nn 21,24),207(nn 29, 31) support of Bolsheviks, 89,208(n40) on ""unequat deveft>pment," R 208(n4.5) view t>f I.uxernburg, I 3 7 WI3ac Is To Be Done?, 80 on "withering away of the state," 85,201;(1121) I~entnistn,77-104 absence of ethical standards in, 83 as guardian of revolution, 94-1 tfO imperialism and appeal of, 89-94 overview of, 77-79 possible successors to Lenin, 10tf- 104 rise of Stalinism, 104-108 91,

Russian Revolutic~nand tlictatorsl~ip of proletariat, 84-89, 206-207(nn 24, 25, 29) Stattnistl-t's break with, 103-1 04, 23 Cfjn85),21 4(111.39) ~tnderdevetopmentand revolution, 79-84 Levi, I1aul, IlO, 138 Idibcralismand private property, 13, 189-190(n39) Licfitheim, George, 30, 16 1 l,iebktlec.ht, Karl, 51 Liebknecht, Wiil-relm, 18, 20, 63 I~rk&cs, Gcorg, 36, 1 0 7 20O(nl1) Luxemhurg, Rosa, 43,424, 50, S I , 57, 61,74,99,123-144 Acczamulaborz of Capitaf, The, 126-128 on aligning social mclvements into class ideal, 16.5 on bureaucracy, 132-1 33 Cris'sis B( German Social l3emocrac~ The, 136 et-itical of Lenin's signing of Treaty of Brcst-Zdttvosk,1.39 critique of nationalism, 125-126, 215(nn 15, 17) death of, 141-142 on dictatorship af proletariat, 139-1411 on emergence of class consciousness, 131-1 32, fight against social inequalit5 125 Irzdr?tstrial Revelopme~zrof Pola~zcl, The, 125 Juxlius Brochure of, 136, 138 life and pl~ilosopl~y of, 123-12.5 linking of nationalism, militarism, imperialism, and capitalism, 127 ~McassStrikzlr, IJcarty, atzd T r ~ d e Unzo~zs,133 mass strtkc and solidarity, 133-1 38, 226(n39), 217(ntl46, 47) on hfittcrarld Affair, 70 Reform or Revolzftic~n,129, 130, 2161nn 27,291

on revisionism and reformism, 129-131 as romantic revolutionar)~,137- 138, 143-1 44 Russian Revolglinlz, The, 138-1 39, 21 7(n57) on socialism, 127, 140-141, 143 Spartacus Kcvolt of 1919, 110, 138, 142 on terrorism and a~~thoritarianism, 142 underground legacy of, 123, 142-1 44 on women" sights, 124, 125 Alatenkov, Georgei, I I 3 hfarkct initiatives (pcrcsnoika 1, 115, 126-117 kiarsl-tall, X H., 72 Alartov, Julius, 87 kiarx, Karl as antipolidcal, 190(n46) on bourgeoisie, 9, 188(1123) on burcaucraw, 186-1 87(n11) capitalism" effect on capitalists and workers, 9 Ct~jilWar ia Prance, The, 24, 25 commitment to internationalism, 16-17, 140-191(n.53) Das Kapital, 35 dictatorship of proletariat, 13 differentiation between base and supcrsrrueturc, 187(n21) founding of Mezae Rheirzische Zritung, 6 ""Inaugural Address," M, 19 Lenin's differing views on transition and proletariat, 87 linking economic and political dcmocraq, 30, 193(r~89) O n the Jewish Qztadion, Q on political democracy*5-"7 118(r ~ n 9, 10) promotion of Paris Commune by, 24-25, 192(nn 73, 77) on religion, 147 retrospective views of, 146

Index

on revolutions of 1848, 1851n3) role af ruling class to create revt>lutit>n,8 1 subordination a l itl-tperialism to capitalism, 90 synthesizing nations of dass, 10-1 1 on transiriorl to proletaria11 regime, 85 urarning to SPT3 not to present socialism as distribution, 204in70) See also Cc)mma~zistManifesto, The Marxism, 26-31 appeal of, 30 Rcrnsrctn" rrevisionism vs, ortt~odox, 59-63 devclopmcnt of, 26-27, 192(n81t) Engels%uilding of, 28 impact of Rcmstcin% rrevisionism on, 56 Ma~~tsky" attraction to Darwin's evoiutiotzary theory, 3 8-3 9 Ma~~tsky" interpretation of, 46 X~rntnismand, 77-78 Lenin's revislon of, 82 popularization of by Kacrtsky, 35-37, 194(n7) scientific etzaracter of, 10, 34-35 under Stalin, 104-188,21 I(n93) &fass association, 160-1 6 1 Mass strike, 48-49, 133-138 as creation of friction between classcs, 1.35 Ma~~tsky" view of, 196fn27) X*uxcmburp%theory of, 133-1 38, 143, 216(n39), 217(nn 46,47j as underground tradition of 1,uxemhurg, I43 Mass Strike, Party, and Tmdc Er~ic~ns (l.uxernburg), 133 Ma~erialismand Emplvio-C;riticr'swz (I4e,1in),80 Ma~erialistCu~zccrptio~z of History; The (Kautskyf, 52 Merleau-130nty, hfaurice, 182 Xlitferand, Alcxandre, 69-71 Mitterand affair, 68-71 &finisteriatism, 69

229

kiinorities as viewed by I,enin, 93 A4olscov, \riact-1eslav3I I 3 kiiihsail-t, Erick, 87-88 Nationalis~n eritiqued by I A ~ ~ ~ r e m t125-1 7 ~ r g ,26, 2S5(ntz 15, 17) historic devclopmcnr of, 17'7-1 78 internatior~alismand, 178 intpertalism, linked to i~~illtarism, and capitalism, 127 restoring nationa! atltonarny to acl~icvcunion of proletariat, 190(nS2) National self-determination, 92-93, 208(nS2) Natural science. See science Naurnantz, Friedrict-1, 134 Neorevisionistm, 72 Nezce Rheinisclje Zeitzarzg, 6 New Econail-tic Progarn (NEP), 98, 102 Nicolaevsky, Boris, 221

OE the lezuish Qutrstton (~"ularx),6 C)rtgir~alcornprornisc, 66 Origins of Chrktianity, The (Kautsky), 34 X3aci&stl-taf Second International, 49 Paine, Thomas, 15-16 X3atmer, R, R., 12 Paris C:ummune, 22-27, 85, 87 tfestruction of, 26 as dictatorship of proletariat, 22-23, 191-1 92(n69f function of, 26 Marxism promoted by, 24-25, t92(nn 73, 77) Parliamentary rule, 43, 196(nn 28, 29) X3arty Kolshcviks bciitcf in, 83 Kautsky's priority given to, 39-40 Kautsky" rtttetlrics of- state and, 4 0 4 3 , I9S(n21)) in Lenink revolutionary p~litics,78, 82-83

Stalin" rise to eminence in, 97, 98, 100-102, 203 transforming ideology into economics with comproznise, 65-66 See also Soclal Democratic Party Ptekfianov, (ieargi, 213 f301itical dernt>cracy Engel" views on, 6-7 linking economic and, 3 8 See also dei~~ocracy f301itics from beisw; 165 Positivism of Comte, 4 Precz.trs.sors tlo SocPszlism (Kacrtsky), 34 Proletariat achieving unity of, 12, ISIO(n52) as class selling tabor power, 11, 188-1 89(n.31) dems~cracyseen as prelude to coil-tmunistl-t,21: dictatorship of, 1.3, 84-89, 206-207(nn 24, 25, 29) Lenin's views on, 81, 8"7 205(n8) kiarx on transition to proletarian regime, 85 See aEso dictatorship of proletariat Proudhon, Pierre, 3, 18,29

Reform or Revolgl.tn~z(I,uxemburg), 129, 138,21(;(nn 27, 29) Reforms positive purpose of utopia, 173-1 74 required to achieve socialism, 174-1 76, 221 (n57) S1)D and question of economic, 42, 195-1 96fn26) Reificadon and alienation, 155-1 58 Reiigion as critiqued by Marx, 247 Kt"tf>zabliquc? a(6mocratiq~e~ 2 Retrospective views of hlarx, 146 Revisionism, 55-76 apparent defeat of, 62-63 Rcrnstcin" ethics and comprorntsc, 63-66,202(n42) Rcrnstctn" influcncc on past and present, 71-75, 264jnn 72, 74, 75 )

challenging privileged status of working class, 61 concept of crisis in capitalism, 59, 77-76, 205(n"7"3) imperialisgm and, 90 1,cninism and, 77 life of Ectuard Bernstein, 55-5 6 hlillerand affair, 68-71 motivations for, 66-68 origins of, 57-63 as prr)duct of working class, 67-68, 203(nn 56, 58, 59) role of state in, 72-73 Revolution, 79-434 of 1848,2-3, 185(nS) internationalism and, 1S, ISIO(n50) 1,eninism as guardian of, 94-100 1,eniil's views on, 80, 8 1 1,uxemburg as romantic, 137-138, 143-144 I,uxemburg% report of 1906, 134-135 revolutionary mission of working class, 3 8 role of party in Lenin%revolutionary politics, 78, 82-83 ruting ctass"ole to create, 81 violence dependent on action t>f ruling class, 29 Ri@l;s of Man, The (Painc), 15-1 6 Robespierre, M,, 25, 192(n7S) R~usseau,jean-jaeqrtes, 3, 4, 186(n5) Rulc of Iau; 4, 186fn4) Ruling class revol~ttionaryviolence dependent on action of, 29 rote in creating revolution, 8 1 Russia impact of World War 1 an, 95 support for Rstshcviks and Russtar1 Iievt>lutit>n,96-97 See aEso Kusstarl RevoIution Russian Revolution dictatorship of proletariat and, 84-89, 206-207(nt124, 25,29j

Index

as first revolution of modern age, 90 Kautskyk criticisms of, 52, 199(nn 54, 5.5) Lenin's views on revoIurion in Russia, 81-83 as premature, 86 speculation about in tum-of -thecentury Russia, 79-80 support for Bolshevilts and, 96-97 Russia~zRevolution,The (Luxemburg), 138-139, 21;7(nf7) Russian Social Democratic Party (RSPD), 79-80,131 Sartrc, Jcan-Paul, 175 Scandinavian socialism, 201 (n31) Scarcity, 171-172 Scl~midt,Heirnut, 65-66 Science Bernstein" beliefs in social scientific analysis, 57-58 ir~tegrityof empirical knowIedge and, 63-64 Kacrtsky" views on social scientific analysis, 38-39, 57-58 scientific ejzaracter of Xlarxism, 10, 34-35 Second International, 37,44 decline of, 108,212-213jnll l ) influence of controversies on Lenin,

82 interest in bourgeois revolutions, 40, 195(t119) LAet~ink attack on state at, 8.5 pacifism of, 49 reaction to X4iller;xncI Affair, 69, 70 Sensibiiity of individuals, 27%-2 73 Serge, Victor, 145 Sexism, 123 Stzcvardnazc, Eduarci, 118, 11 9 Smith, Adarn, 4 Social democracy Uert~stein% revisiot~ismand contemporar.); 56-57 See also cfemc~cracy Social I>emocratic La bor Party, 18

231

Social Dell-tocratic X3arty (SPll) attack on in Junius Brochure, 136, 138 Bern$tcir~% intent to reorient, 59-60, 201 (n20) breadth of, 37 impact of mass strike on, 135 increasing power of, 4.5-.!if], 196-197(nn 32, 33, 34, 36) question of econoil-ticrelorll-t, 42, 19.5-1 96(n26) reaction to first electoral setback, 48-49 theory bullding in, 196fn30) three cornpctitng theories of, 43 Socialism, 145-1 83 accountability of pourer in, 1.50-151 aim of, I 6 7 associated with transition to communism, 146-247 Bernstein" beliefs on, 64, 6.5, 68, "7-71 class ideal and, 30, 167 democrratic defcnsc of material and social equality in, 2 devetopirrg critical theory of, 14.5-148, 183 e~l-tpowermentand dal-nination, 167-1 71, 220jnn 4 1,46) ethics and accountability in inverted world, 148-155 evof utionary, 75-76 instlrltrionaf irnperativc, 171-1 77 Kautsky's cunderstatlcfing of, 34, 3940 1,uxemburgk view of, 127, 140-141, 143 new views t>f internationalism, 1"lr-IS3 ortgi~lsas ururkcrk protest movetl-tent, 18qn23) pursrzir of unity and vagaries of class, 158-264 reform required tu achievc, 174-1 "7, 221fn.57) reification and atienation, 2.55-258 Scandinavian, 201(n32 )

social movements and class ideal, 164-167, 219in33) ties to capitalist production, 6 Soc~atistethics, 148-15.5 Social movements, 164-1 67, 21 911133) aligning into class ideal, 165-166 organizing cornpcting interests for attentiot? with class ideal, 166 Social science, See sclcrlcc Soviets, 88-89, 96 Spartacus Revolt of 1919, 110, 138, 142 SPD, See Social De~nocraticIZarty Spencer, Hcrhert, 38 Sperber, ktanks, 2 2 1jn90) Stalin, Joscgh association wit11 Hitler, 106-l 07, 111 ccjllectivizing agriculture, I Q).$-l 06, 212jn09) lack t>f policy for underdeveloped world, 93 as Icadcr, 1CJ4-108, 21 1(n96), 212jnn 97, 9 8 ) Xife of, 101 mc~dificationsto l,eninism lnq; 79, 93, 208(rr54) rise to party eminence, 97, 98, 100-1 02 terror used by, 106-107, 212(nlOl) transformation af world comln~xnisrn by, 107-1 08 Trotsky and Bukt~arin"qualities compared with, 104,21 I f 92) Stalinism, 104-1 08 beginnings of, 102 break with Let~inism,103-l 04, 210(n8S), 214(n139f Communist International, 108-1 1 3 Ml-trushchev3rise to power, 113-1 14 terror uscci during, 106-1 CJ7, 212(n101) Stare Kautsky's political tl~esriesof party and, 4 0 4 3 revisionism and role of, 72-73

State a~zdR e ~ ~ l g t iThe ~ n ,(l,enin), 84, 85, 88-89,206(nn 21, 241, 207(nn 2% 3 1) Structural interprctadons of ctass, 162-1653

Tecbnott>gyand environmental Isgisladon, 170 Terrorism after defeat af Paris Commune, 26, 1"32(n80) 1,uxetl-tburgspeaks against, 141 party vieurs on use of, 103, 2 101n86) crscd by Sealin, 106-1 CJL 212fnlCl1 ) Thiers, Adoiphe, 23 Third wa).; 71, 74 Tito, Marshall, 84, 112 Trade unions, 47, 197(n40) Transition to proletarian regitl-te, 85, 87, 88-89 frorn socialism to ~ommcir~ism, 146-1 47 Treaty of Rrcst-l*ttvosk, 95, 139 Trotsky, lxon d~rrtngIdsninism, 80, 82. during rise t>f Stalin, 101-104, 106, 210(nn 79, 80),211(nn 92, 95) Twentieth Party Congress, 113, 214(n134) 21 Points, 109-1 1 0 Uttcfergrourld traditisrl of X,uxemburg, 123,142-144 Uttion of Sovict Socialist Republics and tlissolution t>f ctjmmunist regime, 117-121,214fn143) United States class and social privilege in, 158-160 transclass iss~tesin, 158- 159 Unity and ctass, 158-164 Utopia commut~ist,190(n44) positive purpose of, 173-1 74 refcjrrn required to achieve socialism, 174-1 76,22 l (nS7f

Index

Van Treitschke, Heinrich, 3.5 Van Volmar, C;eorg, 47, 60 Wagncr, Ricfiard, 35 Waldeck-Rousscau, Renk, 69 Weber, klax, 100 iVhnk irs To Re IJone? (X,cntn), 80 Wie ei.~lzeTrs~z~i" im C>sclan(Sperher), 25 1(rtf20) Wissef, Kucfolf, 198(nf0 ) Women" sights, 124, 125 Working class after revol~ttionsaf 1848, 2-3 Rcrnsrctn" soxnmitmcnt to improving worker" economy, 63 capitalism and revolutlorlary mission of, 30 chaIIcrlges by rcvtslonism to privileged status, 6 I costs of technology sfiifted to, 170 developrnet~ts>f, 3 4

* 233

e~l-tergenc-e of radicat, 191(nQO) Engel? description of existence of,

Q founding of first (icrman political party for, 17 Iack of borlds to party or union, I60 Marxk and dngel" scientific analysis of, I Q revisionism as product of, 67-68, 203(nn 56, 58,S9) scociaiism%sorigins as protest movetl-tenr, l87(n13) wvrkcr support for rkpzkbliqzde ddmtlcratique, 2 Wurm, hlathtldc, 137