Soldiers, Citizens, And The Symbols Of War: From Classical Greece To Republican Rome, 500-167 B.c. (History and Warfare.)

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Soldiers, Citizens, and the Symbols of War

HISTORY AND WARFARE Arthcr Fcrrill, Series Editor

SOL.DIERS, CITIZENS, AND THE SYMBOLS OF WAR: From Classical Greece to Republican Rome, 500-167 K.C. Allto1110 Sdntosiios\o THE ORIGINS OF WAR: From the Srone Age to Alexander the Great Artlier Fcrriil A HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN MILITARY HISTORY: From the Revolutionary War to the Present Jerry K. Sweeney, edltor THE hllLlTARY REVOLUTION DEBATE: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe Clifford j. Rogers, cdrtor SUN I"1N: MILITARY METHODS Kalph l). Sawyer, tmizslator

THE GENERAL'S GENERAL: The Life and Times of Arthur MacArthur Keln~ethRay Youi~g

T O DIE GALLANTLY: The Battle of the Atlantic Tlrnctthy J. Kurlydn arid Jdn hi. Cttpe5, etiitors GOOD NIGHT OFFICIALLY: The Pacific War Letters of a Destroyer Sailor W ~ l l ~ aM. m I\/lcBr~cle SUN-TZU: ART OF WAR lialph I). Sawyer, trarzslator FEEDING MARS: Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present Joh11 I ynn, etirtor THE SEVEN MILITARY CLASSICS O F ANCIENT CHINA Kalph 1). Sawycr, tr~?7zslator

Soldiers, Citizens, and the Symbols of War From Classical Greece to Republican Rome, 500-1 67 B.C.

Antonio Santosuosso 71he Urzittersity of Western O?ztario

I

CJXiesyiqy

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A Meil~berof the I'erseus Boolis C;roup

For Alma with love

History nizd Warfnrc.

All rights rtscrved. Printed in the United States of America. N o part of this publication may be rcproduccci or trailsnlitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, incluciing photocopy, recording, o r any information storage and rctrieval system, without pcrnlission in writing from the publishcr. Copyright O 1997 by Westview I'ress, A hlember of I'erscus Books C;roup Publi\hcd In 1997 111 the Un~tcdstates of Amer~cdby Wcstv~ewPress, 5500 (:cntrdl ilvvcnue, Boulcter, (,olorado 80301-2877, , ~ n dIn the Un~tcdK~ngdomby W \ t v ~ e w I'rcss, 12 I-Ird's Lopre Roaci, l~canliome, 500-1 6 7 l3.c . / Xntonro $antoworso. p. cm.-(H15torv and w'trfarc ser~cs) Inclucle\ b ~ b l ~ o g r a p h ~references cal and mctex. ISI3N 0-8133-3276-1 (hc).-ISBN 0-81 31-3277-X (pb) 1. *Il~litaryhistory-Anc~ent. 2. C,~vrl-n~~litary relatronsHistory. 1. Tttlc. 11. 5er1cs: H~storvand warf;tre. ULY.525 1997 155'.0092-d~LI

97-7294 C11'

The paper used In thir publrcation mcct5 the requirements of the Amcr1cd11N'1t1onal StG1~lclard for I'ermanence of I'apcr for I'rlntccl I ~ b r a r yi\iater~alsZ39.48-1984.

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Contents

l i s t of Figures Acknowledgme~zts Introduction 1

Close Array and Pointed Spears: The Ways of the Greek Phalanx War Alnong the Greeks, 7 Weapons and A r r ~ ~ of o r the lloplite, 9 The Hoplite in Battle, 12

2

First Blood on the I'lain of Marathon I'rologi~e, 24 The Eattle, 30

.?I Greeks, I'crsians, and the Syrrtbols of War

A New Invasion, 39 Thermopylae, 42 Salamis, 50 I'lataea, 58 The Persian Arm): 66 Why the Persialls I,ost, 7 2 'I'he Symhols of the Victorious, 74 4

Rich, Poor, and the Wages of War at the End of the Classical Period Sailors and Social Status, 82 Spartan Society, 84 The Mercenary Sy$tem, 88 Hoplites and Light Infantrymen, 93 Thebes's Challenge of Spartan Supremacy, 102

5

Footmen, Horsemen, and the Syinbols of Military Might The Macedonian Army, 110 The Ways of Alexander: Granicus, lssus, and Gaugamela, 120 The Keys of Alexander's Success, 136 Religion, Warfare, and Political Power, 14.3

6

A I'halanx with Joints: The Rornar~sand the Heirs of Alexander Warfare After Alexander, 148 The Roman Military System, 150

War as a Soaal Organ~srn,158 The Leg~onVersus the Phalanx, 160 Hann~balas Alexander's Hew, 168 Hannihal's I'upzl: Scip~oAfricanus, 184 The Deification of the Mllltary Le,ader, 198 Conclusion

Glossary List of Abbreviations Notes Selected Bil>liography About the Book a i d Author Index

110

Figures 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4

Ancient Greece Marathon, 490 R.C. Marathon, 490 IS.(,.: The Init~alClash t Marathon, 490 B.c.: The L ~ sStq,e

3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4

Greece, 490-479 IS.(:. Thermopylr~e,480 B.C:. Salamis, 480 R.C.. Plataea, 479 B.(:.

4.1 4.2

Sphacteria, 425 R.C.. Leuctra, 371 1S.C.

5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4

Alexander's Route Granicus, 334 IS.(:. Issus, 333 B.C. Gaugarnela, 331 B.(:.

6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.7 6.8 6.9 6.10 6.1 1 6.12 6.13 6.14 6.1.5 6.16

Cytloscephalae, 197 B.C. Pydna, 168 R.('. Second Punic War Trebi,a, 21 8 l$.ehold"'~" because the Persians did not Yee the Creek slitps. Rut they received a sure signal that their enernies were lined up for battle wherl they heard the Greek war song, the paean-"a sou~ld,shouting from the Greeks,/a joyful song, and to it makrng shrill response,/from the ~slandrocks about there carue an antiphony of echoes."" Soon after the paean, the Greek fleet appe,ared before the Persian eyes: "(2uickly all of then1 were \ l s ~ b l et o ~ i g l i t . " "The ~ Greek3 had the element of surprise on their side. The Athenian ships ruanr~edthe left and left cerlter of tlie line, and the 30 A ~ g l ~ l e t ,shlps ~ n had the extreme r ~ g h twlth 20 M e g m a n atld 16 Sp'artan sli~psnext to them. The Persian fleet had the Plioenician ships on the right, the Cypriots, I'arnpliylians, and Lycians next t o them, and tlie Ionian and other Greek s h ~ p on s the left."" At the beg~nning,the Greelc fleet started to retreat, and tlie ~nvaders rushed upon them in pursuit. At a certain point, however, as I-lerodotus Indlcates, a sltlgle A t h e l l ~ a ~s lh ~ pstopped retreating, reversed oars, and rammed an enemy ship. Others soon followed s u ~ t . ~ "Aescliylus " has a d ~ f ferent story: It was the right wing and thus by lmpllcatior~the Alginetans who were the first to attack, he says.l0I One ~nlghtargue that Herodotus and Aescliylus descr~bethe same action but from different v~ewpointsr ~ g h t from the Greek side (Aeschylus), lett from the I'ersian s ~ d e (Iderodotus) as J. S. M o r r ~ s o ns~ggests."'~ However, t h ~ swould stlll create

56

Greeks, Persians, and the Symbols of War

problems on the Issue of whlch was the first Greek ship to attack. It seerns more reasonable t o accept another tradition that Herodotus also mentions,lo7 namely, that an higinetan ship began the attack. The two prlnc~pal neth hods of f~ghtlrlgsea battles in antlqulty were boarding or rammlng. Boarding represented an attempt to re-create a land battle on the decks ot ships. Thucydides gives a s p l e r ~ d ~descrlptior~ d of- such an encounter a t the battle of S y b o t ~in 432 B.C. between the fleets of Corinth and Corcyra. "When the standards were ratsed on e~thers~de,"he wrltes, "they [the ships] joined battle, both h a v ~ n ghoplites on the decks as well as n1'111y archers i ~ n dthe javelin-meil, for they were st~llrather rudely fighting in the ancient fashton. And so the sea-fight was hotly contested, not so rnuch by reason of the skill displayed as because it was more like a battle on I~ild."The re,~sonbehlrld this system of fightrt~gwas that the contestants "trusted for victory to the hoplites on the decks who stood and fought while the s h ~ p srernained notionl less." It was a rrlatter of "brtite strength rather than . . . sk111."'~'~RC1nln1l~lg, whlch ~nvolvedusing a bro~lzeprow In the shape of a swordfish, was designed to disable enemy shtps by breaking thetr oars or to sink them by teanng a hole In t h e ~ rhulls. 01 the two methods, ralntni~lgwas Inore suitable to the Greek s h ~ p sat Salam~s.They were lower In the water and probably smaller and sturdier than their opponent^'.'^' Moreover, in the restricted waters of the narrows, the Phoetlicians' superlor se'3faring skill c a n e to naught, i ~ n dthe Pers~an fleet's nrirnerical superiority dtd not mean much when one could deploy a t best only 80 trireines in line-abreast forination in the 1,200 meters of- the c h , a ~ l n e l . ~Finally, ~ ' ~ the fresh crews of the Greek shlps were able ro null~fy the potentially faster ships of the enenly, w h ~ c hhad been a t sea for many hours by the tirue of the c o n f r ~ n t a t i o n By . ~ contrast, hoarding su~tedthe Pers~ans.If the opposlng ships were comp,lred on the l ~ s i of s t h e ~ rfight~ng gotentral, a Persian boat would have a numerical advantage of almost 2 to l over a Greelc tnrerne. T h ~ swas because the nu~nberof fighting Iner1 on Greek ships was, apart from except~on'llcircumstances, between 14 atld 18 (4 archers and 10 or 14 spearmen or javelinmen),lm wh~le,as Herodotus mentions, on each I'ersian boat, "there were tli~rtyfight~ngmen of the Pers a n s and Medes and SC3cae.""'" The Greek fleet's sudden movement forward caught the enenly by surprise. "l~nrned~ately s h ~ pstruck its brazen-plate beak/on ship." At the beglnnlng, "the Persian force withstood the shocks,"'"' but soon "the shores of S a l a ~ n and ~ s all the coast around" would be "full of corpses of men most miserably destroyed," "bodies . . . sea drenched and swlrling,/bobbing in t h e ~ rrobes.""' Plutarch also mentions that a breeze caused a swell In the water, a d d ~ n g to the confusion and dtsorder of the I'ersian fleet.Il2 I'lutarch 1s not the most r e l ~ ~ ~ of b l eancient sources, and G. Smets and A. Dorsinfa~lg-Srnets

Greeks, Persians, and the Syrnbols of War

57

clam1 that his statement 1s not ev~ciencefrom a tradit~onalearly source but a conclusion reached by h13 knowledge of the battle locatton.' Yet, espectally stnce it is a conclusion that the clinnate could support, tt seems reasonable to belleve that the swell d ~ doccur, as N.G.L. Hammond does.t14 Also, as A. R. Burn argues, there ts ev~dencetn Herodotus suggesting the presence ot wlnd durtng the battle. For instance, In his discussion ot the role of the Oor~nth~ans, Elerodotus says that they ho~stedt h e ~ rsails &he11 they departed from the Greek l ~ n e . ~ ' ~ 'I'he battle lasted a long time. It began at the break of dawn;'16 11ended ~n "the eye of black night.""' Thls 11np11esthat ~t was hard fought, not the ktnd of qulck affair that a cursory readrng of both Herodotus and Aeschylus suggests. Aeschylus remarks that, after the first sudden attack, the Per~1311sfoi~ght~allantly.'lX Later, when the first l ~ n eof ships was routed and the other l~nesvalnly trted to gush forward so that "they too might d~splay their valour,""" the situatton becarne cr~ticalfor the I'erslans: Thetr ships, disabled by rarnmlng and w ~ t ht h e ~ roars soxneti~nessheLared off by t h e ~ r own shtps once they had lost control, t~npededeach other and made Impossible the reliet of the front line.'" Meanwhile, wrttes Aeschylus, the Creek s h ~ p sattacked " w ~ r hperfect p l a ~ land ~ ~ r d e r " they ; ' ~ ~"fought orderly and In array," says H e r o d ~ t u s . " ~ 'I'he two opposlng lines had begun the battle roughly parallel to each other, stretch~ngalong a north-south ax~s.'" At the lirst contact, the Greek l ~ n eprobably had become roughly a semtc~rcle117 shape, wtth the Atginetans on the r ~ g h enlbraclng t the shores of Salarnts and closer to the enemy and the Athen~ansfarther west near the Atr~cdcoast. T ~ Iposltlon S seems to have been ina~ntainedfor most of the ftght. The breakthrough resulted from a colnbtnation of two tlitngs: Flrst the A~gtnetar~s defeated t h e ~ ropponents on the r ~ g h of t the Greek 11ne and probably pursiied them well Into the straits farther east; second, the Athen~ansmust have eventually routed their opponents on the left. When the etlemy left was also routed, the A~ginetans,who by now had dtsposed of eherr enemtes, closed the trap: "All that escaped from the Athenians fell In t h e ~ rcourse antong the Aeginetans."lN At that p o ~ n t ,the Greek 11ne p r o b ~ b l yresembled a c ~ r c l e . " It ~ was also then that the surface of the sea became covered wtth the stght of overturned sl~tps,"filled as it was with shipwrecks and the slaughter of ~nen."~""'Ihe beaches and the reefs around "were filled filth corpse^,"'^' all was 11.1 d~sarray,"~and the Greeks, says the messenger to the Perstall queen In Aeschylus's Persae, "kept striktng us, ltke tnnnics/or a catch of fish, with broken fragments ot oars, or b~ts/offlot~axnfrom the wrecks."'?" When the Pers~anships turned to flee, "tmost of them were destroyed." l0 But the last act ot the drarua had yet not been played. The Persians, stranded on Psyttalela, still rema~ned.One of the Athen~angenerals, Ans-

'

58

Greeks, Persians, and the Symbols of War

tides, gathered some of the hoplites and other infantryine~lwho had remained on the shores of Salamrs. Covering "tlie~rbodres w ~ t hweli-made arins of b r o r l ~ e , "they ~ ~ ~surrotlnded the island, pumrneled their enemies with rocks and arrows, and finally went in for the kill, si~ughteringtllein one by one-Pers~ans "at their peak of pliystcal cond~tion,/stoutestof heart and of outstanding lineage,/and always in rhe first the Lord [Xerxesl could trust." ' ;" Tlie Greeks sank inore than 200 eneniy ships, "not ~ n c l u d ~ nthose g captured together with t h e ~ crews."'33 r They lost only 40 ships thentselves, and their casualties too inust have been low bec'luse the shipwrecked Greeks could swim across to S a l a r n i ~ . Tlie ' ~ ~ Perstans whose sli~pswere stink, however, were drowned in tlie sea e ~ t h e rb e c a ~ ~ sthey e could not swiru, as Herodotus write^,"^ or becC1usethey could 11ot find safety on the southern shores that lay in the hands of the enemy. Yet the Creeks seemed to have been unaware of the extent of their victory, for they litade themselves ready for another assault. T h ~ s'~lsosuggests that Xerxes still 11~da consider,~ble number of s h ~ p that s had not been engaged.' 36 But the Greeks were wrong: Xerxes had, in tact, come to the end of his road for the litoment. 111sarmy's safety and efficiency were tied to his navy. As Barry S. Strauss and J o s ~ a h Qber wrtte, the two were "mutually supporttve and could not operate independently o f each other. The army needed the food carried b y the literchant Inarine, the merchant rrlarine needed the protection of the battle fleet, and the battle fleet needed tlie secure beachhead establ~shedby the army."' '7 Xerxes sent his fleet back to the coast of Asia Minor to avoid the peril of another c o n f r o ~ ~ t ~ ~with t i o t lthe enemy d11d t o secure supplles and grain for the troops r e ~ n a t n ~ nIng Greece. His general Mardonius witlidrew to Thessaly to sperld the winter there with a parr ot the arrny, a relatively s~rtall host that illcluded Xerxes' best troops-the I m ~ n o r t ~ ~Medes, ls, Persi,a~ls, Saca, Bactrians, and Ind~ans.The Great King litinself hurr~edback to Sard~s in A s ~ aMinor b y the land route across the I-Iellespont, probably accornpanied by one-third of the army. Hts other general, ilrtabc~zos,escorted hirn to the Hellespont, then started to retrace his steps w ~ t h60,000 men, says I-lerodotus, to join Mardonius in T h e s ~ a 1 y . lBut ~ ~ ttrne would pass before the two gener'lls combined their forces since, en route, Artabazos decided to attack a city that had left the Perstan fold.13'

Plataea Salrt~niswas without doubt the turning point of the war, but it clearly did not mean certain victory for the Greeks in their struggle agatnst the Persian Ernp~re.The Greeks had shut the Persians otf from the Peloponnese, hut the large arrny of the invaders still co~ltrollednorthern a ~ l dmost of central

Greeks, Persians, and the Syrnbols of War

S9

Greece. The Greeks had cut t h e ~ renemy's sect Ilnk, but the Persians' land supply l ~ n ethrough the Hellespont was sell1 intact and they still could rely on the cooperation, voluntary or coerced, o t some i~nportantGreeks, such as the M d c e d o i ~ i ~ ~and n s most of a11 the Thebans. The battle of Platdea, fought 111 479 R.C.., one year after Salamis, was as crucial as Marathon had been eleven years earl~er.Defeat at Plataea would have meant the end of Greek hopes for success. It would not have been just another stage In the struggle against the Perstans, as had been the case w ~ t hThermopylae. At the l'herrnopylae pass, only a relatively srnall number of Greelc forces had been present at tlie beglnnlng of battle, and a11 even srnaller group hdd been ~nvolvedIn the final confrontation. At Plataea, by contrast, more than half the Spartan state was present, with 5,000 hoplites and 35,000 helots;lJO most of the force that Athens could master In a moment of d ~ r eemergency-8,000 men'4' (compare t h ~ sto the 9,000 troops present at Marathon)-was there as well. A Persian victory could only n ~ e a annihilar~ tion for the Greek army. Moreover, there would have been no new troops to replenish the vanquished ranks, as the Romans would have after Cannae. Sparta and Athens had ruustered everything they could at the foothills of Mount C1th~tero11 and Mount Pastr,~.Thar is why the confrontation at Plataea--confused as it was and less herorc than Marathon, Thermopylae, or Salant~s-is at least as Inlportant as the Athenian victory of 490 B.al>ly30 meters or so) and launched char weapons. When the younger Sp~rt~~ns-the 20- to 30-yex-olds" '-were told to pursue them, the peltasts easily outran the heavier opponents. The moment the Spartans gave up their pursuit, Iphicrates' rneri wheeled back and attacked again. T h ~ s tune, the Spartans of 20 to 35 years of age were ordered to pursue t h e ~ torr mentors but agaln to no avail."4 Actuaily, when they t ~ ~ r n eback, d the Spartans suffered even rnore casualt~es.Some relief, however, seemed finally on the w ~ ywhen tllelr cavalry, whlch had escorted the Amycl~ansup to Stcyon, finally returned. This time, both hoplites and cavalrymen pursued the peltasts, but again they tailed to come to grips with them. Xenophon c~scr~bes t h e ~ failure r to the action of the horsemen, who ~ n s t e ~of~catching d up wtth the fleeing peltasts, kept in line with their own slow-movtng hopl i t e ~ . "But ~ A. J. Andersori r~ghtlyargues that the horsemen had little cho~cebut to stop.""f they had cont~nuedt h e ~ rchdrge w~thoutthe support of their own hopl~tes,they would have had to deal wttli the Athenran hoplites, who had assumed a battle forination. By themselves, there was really l~ttlethat they could do.

Rich, Poor, and tC~eWages of War

101

While their casudlties mounted and their enernies became increasingly bold, the Spartans retreated to a small h111, less than 7.50 meters from the sea and over 3.5 kilorneters trorn Lechaeuln. The garrison In Lechaeurn, aw'ue of the plight of the Sp'>rtG>ns,sent thein sorrle boats so t h a the besieged Spartans could finally escape from their attackers, but when the Spartans dld so, it was In a manner that dishonored their reputation. 'l'he Athenian hoplites had just decided to play a rnore active role by moving directly agallist the Spartans on the hill. It was too much for the Spartans, who broke and fled, some plunging into the sea and some escaping w ~ r h their cakalry. Of the originL1l600, about 2.50 were killed on the field."' The lesso~iof the destruction of the Spartall mora was not that the best peltasts could defeat the best hoplites on level grourld but, as Andersoil s a p , that even the best hoplites could be defeated by "a skillful cornbin,qtton of heavy and light ~nfantryunless they were themselves adequately supported by other arrns.""Vhis example and a number ot others that Anderson discusses in his book also r'lise another question."" The key issue of the debate about Iioplires versus I~glituifantry IS not that the light Infantry could ever have beaten the hoplites o n level ground but that the hoplites would have been m ~ i c hinore effective if, as Alexander would find out, they had been supported by other arms. True, there was a sound, pract~cal reason why the Greek states were reluctant t o develop light Intantry. 'l'he hoplite needed practically n o training. FIls social habit of attending the gymnasium, at least for the well-to-do hoplite, or w o r k ~ n gon the land assured that he would be In good physical condition \vithout special training. Fight~ngin line with a linlited number of maneuvers o n the battlefield, except for the Spartans, also meant that what lie needed was not formal tratning but a strong sense of soc~alduty that wotlld prevent him from abandoning the line, thereby betray~nghis comrades. Peltasts, for instance, needed much more train~ngthan the h ~ p l i t e . ' ~Well-trained O peltasts, such as Iph~crates' men near Corinth's walls, could perform br~lliantly.B L Ieven ~ Iphicrates, probably the gre'ltest general of l ~ g h ttroops of the ancient world, could not perfor~nm~racles.When In charge of a less well-drilled force (at Corcyra, for example), his carupaign rn~ghtbe successful in other ways, but he could not defedt hoplites."' But extetlstve training, of course, would have meant iteeptng men under arms and thus under gay even during periods of peace. IJI other words, badly trained light troops were ~neffcct~ve; well-trained light troops were effective but expensive. I11 the long run, hoplrtes were probably cheaper and more cost effective. As Hanson argues, hoplite warfare was "economically t r ~ ~ g a l . " ' ~ ~ Yet even this explan,ltion does not tell the whole story. There were other powerful reasons not to develop light troops. As W. H. McNeill hac argued for the military of most periods,12? there must have been a reluctance to c11~1ngein the ancient period. The introductio~~ of the peltasts on a brge scale

102

Rich, Pool; avzd the Wages of War

would have lnednt reth~nkingthe whole approach to the battlefield. It would have Implied a new etiquette for the conduct of war. It would have meant, for instance, the possibility of surprise attacks on enemy cantps, night encounters, and ;~xnl~~~shes-~all things that were extremely unusu,~l111 the Greek world, as Pr~tchetthas shown. Iphtcrates did conduct ambushes at Abydos and elsewhere, and the other famous general of I~ghttroops, Ue~nosthenes, again did conduct a nlght attack, but both cases ( ~ we f exclude the ' ~ c t ~ o nofs barbar~anThracians) remained odd~tiesIn which gelrasts, not hoplites, were involved.'" It is also indicative of- the whole attltude to war that there is no word for surprise attack in the Greek dict1011'1ry.'~' The acqulsrtlon of property belonging to other people always played an important role in arlclerlt warfare. A rrlarl fought not only because the role of w'xrrlor was a n extenston of his role as a cit~zenbut ;11so because successful war brought him economic gains. To lncltide other people, such as the poorer classes, \vould have meant sharing the booty. We do not know how i~llporrantgreed was 11.1 terms of exclud~ngothers from shar~ngthe wages of vtolence, but ~tmtlst have been a powerful incentive for lteeptng other people front waging war. F~nally,as long as the ruilitary role was an extenston of the CIVIC role, the inclus~onof other classes would have ~lecessar~ly rne,lnt a revolut~onin the soc~alarrangement-agatn, an unpalatable and unlikely shift, considering the natural reluctance t o soczal change. Lower classes could be admitted into the nlil~tarystructure only when the I'trge-scale admtsston of mercenaries and the sh~ftrngof decis~onnialcrngfrom the cttlzenry to one man or a small group of tnen had cortie to separate the rn~litarp role from the socid f u t ~ c t ~ oBut t ~ . t h ~ swas t o happen only when the Macedon~anscrushed the ~ndependenceof the Greek states and when onernan rule replaced the clties' oligarchies or democracies. It is natural, then, that the gre'lt battles that closed the c1'1ss1cal era of warfdre would again be the prtvate domain of the hopllte, not of the peltast. T l ~ e b e s ' sChallenge of S p a r t a n S u p r e m a c y When Sparta became embroiled In conflicts against 'l'hebes In the first halt of the fourth century, it seemed at first a n uneven struggle-pitting the most warlike of the Greek states against a city that, at least until 42.5 R.('., had been regularly beaten by an adversary, Athens, that the Spartans had already ~'~nyuished. Inste'ld, the etld product of these wars would shock the whole of Greece. At Leuctra 117 371 R.(:. and a t Mant~neanine years later, in 362 B.ekTopography, pt. 1 (I3erkclcy, l 965), p. 145. 68. O n this, see Chapter 5. 69. Herodotus VI. 1l 3 . 70. lbld., V1.114. 7 1. Ibid., VI. i l 7. 72. N.CT.1,. Haniinond, "'C~~sualtles and Re~nforcenientsof Cltlren Solcirers ~n (~reeccand i\/racctlon~a,"/ounzal of Hc~llelzjc-\tmtr'~cs109 ( 1989): 59-60. 73. Krcntz, "(,asualtics in FIopllte B'lttlcs," pp. 19-20. 74. Polyb~usXXXV. 1.2. 75. I'rrt~l~ctt, The Greek State mt Wrrr, pt. 4, p. 92. 76. C)n this, sec Chapter 6. 77. Xcnophon, iWcnzcirabrlra 3.1.6. 78. lh~d.,1.2.1. 79. Ibid., 3.1 .l 1. 80. lbld., 3.2.1. 8 1. Ibid., 3.2.3. 82. Ibid., 3.1.6. 83. Garlan, \Var in the Alzcreizt kBorlti, pp. 145-1 50, 84. Warry, Warfare EIZt l ~ e(:lass~cal World, p. 69. 8.5. Xenoplioii, Cyropaedrn 11.6-9. Cf. Andercon, Mrlrta~y Tl,coy and I'racti~e~ v r the Age of Xeno/>hon, p. 99. 86. kor tlic Athenian strategol, see Garlnn, War rtz the Aizrtc~iztWorld, pp. 154-155.

276

Notes

87. For an example of the situation, see Xenophon, A7zal~asis111.1.1.46. 88. Herodotus VIT.229. 89. Ibid. 90. Ibid., V11.231. 9 l . Ib~d.,VII.232. 92. Ibid., VII.229. 93. lbrd. 94. Hcrodotus seems to condemn Aristodemus bccause, in his opinion, Aristodemus should have acted as Eurytus did. He also offers a different explanation of Ar~stodemu\'sactlon; see I-lerodotus \III.2.30. 95. J. dr. Romilly, "La notion dc 'cla,ses moyennes' dans I'Athknes du Vc 5. av. J. C.," RPVUCdes 6tzides grecqtres 100 (1987): 1-1 7. 96. Ihid., pp. 7-8. 97. Ibrd., p. 15. 98. Euripides, Supplices, lines 238-24.5 (my translation). 99. C;recnhalgh, Early Greek Warfare, pp. 74-75. 100. Hanson, Tl7e Other Greeks, p. 233. 101. Llct~enne,"La phalange: Probli.nies et controversrs," pp. 123-1 24. 102. On this, see Hanson, Tht Otl7er Grceks. This intcrprctation, however, probably does not apply to the Spartan state. L0.3. T h ~ is s Arist~des'vicwpoint, exprcsscd in h ~ Panatl~enaic14s. s Sec A. Santosuosso, "Leonardo Bruni Revisited: Hans Baron's Thesis on thc Influence of the Classics In the La~datzoFloretztirrae Urbis," in J. C;. Rowe, ed., Aspects of Late Medieval Governmeizt and Society: Fssays Prese~ztedto ]. K. 1.andrr (Toronto, 1986), p. 41. 104. Aeschylus 241-242. 105. Herodotus V.49. 106. Hanson, Tiw Other Greelcs, espec~allypp. 291-.32.3. 107. I'ritchctt, T/7e Greek State at War, pt. 1, p. 28. 108. Pritchett, T l ~ Greek e .State at War, pt. S, pp. 5.3-100. 109. V. D. Hanson, "Rev~ewof W. K. Pritchett, The Greek State at War, Part I-V," Classical i'hilology 8 7 ( 1 992): 256. 110. See W. K. I'ritchett, The Creek State at War, pt. 3 (Uerkelcy, 1979),p. 8, regarding Wilaniowitz's vicwpoint. l l l. Hcrodotus VII. 140. 112. Ibid., VlI.141. 113. Ibid., VI.106-107. 114. Garlan, War in the A?zczmt World, p. 48. 1 1 S. Herodotus TX.62. 116. Xcnophon (Helle~ztcaVI.4.7-8) suggests that "a11 these things were but devices of the leaders." 117. For the trophy, we I'r~tchett, The Greek State at War, pt. 2, pp. 246-276; for the sharc of the booty given to the gods, set, pt. I , pp. 93-100. 118. In the fifth c e n t ~ ~howcvcr, v, .I numbcr of intellectual\ questioned this practlce; see M. Ciccici, "Guerre, stdsels e dsttlia nella Grecia del V secolo a.C:.," in hlarta Sord~,ed., l santnarj e la guerrn trel rnondo classrco ( M ~ l a n ,1984), pp. 132-141.

119. See C;arlan, War 112 t l z 11iicie~ztWorld, pp. 4 1-57. 120. t. Rodriguer Adrados, Il14s~mitcit131 politi~aen la Grecm ~ldszza(kladrrd, 1966), pp. 121-133, argue, that thc Greeks corlsrdered rho favor of thc gocls rsscntral to tlterr defeat of the i'crsr,lns. 121. Cf. Garlan, Wur iiz tlw Atzcl~ntIYiorld, p. 55. 122. t. bornart, The l'sychoaizillysts of War, trans. A. l'fe~fcr ( ( ~ ~ i r d rCrty, n N.Y., 1974; 1st Italian 19h6), p. 147. 12.3. l)ettenne, "1,a phalange: l'roblkrne5 et controverses," p. 128. 124. Harnmcmd, "'C'~s~~altles and Rernforcen~entsof Crtireii Soldress In Greece and hlacedoiiia," pp. 76-57. 125. " T' he l'rofession o f Arms," War, a t e l e ~ ~ i b\cries ~ ~ nwritten by GWYIIIIC1)yei-, (:anad~an Kroddcastrng (:orporation, June 1984. 126. I'rrtchett, T l ~ Greel: e State at War, pt. 1, p. 27, n. 107. 127. Thucydtdes 1.70.8.

Chapter Two 1 . l'ausanras 1.32.4. 2. I.A.S. l,van,, 'TIerodotus ancl the 13'1ttlc of hlarathon." llistorta 42 (199.3):306. 3. Herodotus V1.112. 4. Tl~ucyd~di-, 11.34.5. 5. See h ~ epitaph s in XI. I)~llonand l,. Garland, eds. and trails., Arzc~ri~t Cireece: Soc-ral all& Ffrstorrzal 1)onrnznzts from Arcl~atcTtnzes t o the Death of Socrates c. 800- 399 N.( . (l oridorl, 1994), p. 189. 6. i-lrtstc)phanc.s, f'qzlit~s78 l ff. 7. Ar~stctphanes,Achantcrzs~~s 697ff. 8. t o r an introduct~onto the I'crsran trnpire, see chap. l 3 ("The Achdemcnrcl P,nlpire c. 5 5 0 - 3 30") arid relevant brblrograpllv (pp. 756-762) rn An16lie Kulirt, I he A~lcieiztR'c~arkast c. 3000-J JO B.('., vol. 2 (l,ondon, 199.5). 9. Herodotus V.49. 10. Ihld., V.50. I I . 1. M. lialcer, " T l ~ el'ers~an Wars i-lgarn5t (;recce: i-l IZi~~lsscssment," Hlstorln 38 (1989): 127-129. 12. On the Per\lC~ii ~ 7 ' plar~, 1 ~ see ~bld.;A. K. Burn, Persin atld tile Greeks: The Defelrse of the West, L . 746-478 N.(. (I ondon, 1962). pp. 236-237; and J.A.R. Xlunro, "Somc Ohservatrons oil the l'et-s~anWars," jozirtzal o f f - f c l l ~ t ~Jturites zc l9 (1899): 196; 11. Btngtson, eci.. T j ~ eGYL'LJ~S a ~ r dthe I'ersta~zs: I rom t h Szxtl~ ~ ~ to t l ~ ekozirth Ccnt~~rtes, trans. J . Conway (Nem York, 1968; 1st C~crrnaned. 1960, pp. 37-46. I i.I(urr1, Persia and the (;reeks. pp. 238-2 19. 14. Iierodotus VI.lO1. l 5. The distance wds 23 i~iiles,according to hl.0.B. Caspar~,"Stray Notes on the l'ersiari W'irs," Iciti~.rtmlof Hclleltti {tz~dzes3 1 ( 1 9 I 1): 104; he also mentions a return r n a r ~ hFrom hlarathc)~lto Athcns of no morc r h ~ nX hours. N.(;.I . Harnrnond, " T l ~ e(:an~pa~gn'lnd the Battle of Marathon," 111 h15 Stctd~esrrz Greek l l i s t o r ~ /l~ : Comparztofz 'irolzlme t o n Htstory of C;ret>cet o 322 1j.c . (Oxford, 1971), p. 21 0, put\ the d1stancc at 26 ~rirlcs,tllat 15,a n X- or 9-hour march. 16. Hammond, "I he C alllpalgn arid the Battle of Xlarathon," pp. 202-204.

2 13

Notes

17. licrodotus VI.102. J. l. L,~~cnby, T/?r 1)efelzcc. of C ~ C C C 490-479 LT, t3.C. (Warn~~nstel; t,ngland, 2991), p. 48, argues that "the plarn rout11 of Athens itself would have been at Ica\t as suttablc for cav;tlrv." 1X. Herodoti~sV1.102, 107. 1% IIbld., VI. 107. 20. Cttrnel~usNepos, Mzltm~les4.1, 111 ( ornehu\ Nepos, 1)e vrrts 1llz~stnhz4s.Half of thc 200,000 infantr)/rncn, says, h'epos, wcrr prescnt at the battle. 21. Ilammond, "The C:an~pa~gnd ~ l t lthe Battle of blarathon," p. 203, adopt5 25,000 as a mrvrzmum figure for tlie fight~ngtroops. Accord~nj;:to Haniniond (p. 20?), the I'ers,~a~i fleet 111cludedat least 200 trlrernes, and 400 nlrrchant sh~ps,.In adclit~onto the 25,000 solchcrs, 52,000 sarlors were transported by tht fleet. 22. \V. W. WOW, "Arnis, Tact~csand Strsitegy In the Pcrs~~ln Wars," Jouri7al of Hellerrr~Studtes 4 1 ( 1 923): 12 1. See also W. K. I'r~tcliett, "'1CIaratho11,'' Unrr~erszty of (:alzfor7zza Pz~blrmtrorzs r7z C,lasszcal Arc.hacsology 4 ( 1960): 174-1 75; h'. Seltuntla, "The l'crslan5," 111 1. l. IIackett, ed., A lizstory of Wnr r l z the il?rcrefzt World (New York, 1989), pp. 82-10?. 0 1 1 the Pcrs~ansand Greeks, see I.a7enby, The J ) ~ / C W C C of Greece, pp. 17-44. c s Strategy In the I'crs~an Wars," p. 123. 23. How, "Arms, I a ~ t ~ ancl 24. On the prinlacy of the bow among the I'ers~anl, see A. l;. Wardman's rcmarkr In " Tact~csand tlie I'radtt~onof the Per\ran Wars," Hzstona 8 (1959): 53. 25. W. hlcl cod, "The liangc of the Ancient Iiow," I'hoerrts 1 9 ( 1 965): 3. 26. How, "Arms, I a c t ~ a11d ~ s Strategy In the I'crslan Wars," p. 120. Ilelbru~kargucs that the Pcrs~anprofessional troops uere superlor to the Athen~a~i\; see h ~ s Hzstory of the Art of War, vol. 1 , p. 69. 27. C t. l? Ii~iknell,"Thr (:ornrn'~nd Structtlrc and C;e~~er'~ls of the hlarathon ld., Vl. 11 3. F l . Ilxd. 52. lbld.

Notes 53. Ibid., VI.114-115. 54. I'auranlas 1.14.3. 55. lhld., 1.32.7. 56. Herodotus Vi. 117. 57. (:orrrelrus Nepos, iM11tlndcs 5.4. 58. L>clbruck, Hzstory of fhc. Art of Wcrr, vol. 1, p. 72. 59. Iiamrnond, "The C ampdrgn and the Iiattlc of ~Iaratlion,"p. 203, estnndtcs the I'crs~anarmy had a m ~ n ~ m uofm25,000 rnen for the campatgn, but he does not give an estlnlate for the battle. 60. E-lcrodotusVI.l 15. 61. Ibid., V1.116. 62. (:orrrelius h'cpos, iM11tlndcs 5.4. 6 3. But on thls, see also f.,vans's argument 111 " H e r o d o t ~ ~and s the Battle of Marathon," pp. 300-302.

Chapter Three 1. Herodot~lsV11.9. 2. Balcer, "Thc I'crsian Wars Aga~nst(;recce: h Kcassc~rn~ent," pp. 112-1 35. 3. Herodotu5 VI1.20. 4. I ~ I J .~11.12-I , X. 5. Simonidc\, fragment 172, In I yra Graeca, ccl. and trans. I. 11. tclinonds, vol. 2 (C:anibr~dgc,1958). 6. E-lerodotu\ VII. 184. 7, O n the sl/c of the Ikrs~anarmy, sce A. It. Rurn, I'crsza ami II)P C;rrek~: The DPfeusr of the West, c. F46-478 D.C. (Idondon,1962), pp. 326-330; Sir f' hlaurrcc, "Tile Sue of the Xrtnv of Xcrxes," jourrzal of Helle~ircSt~rdr~*s 50 (1 930): 21 0-235. 8. I'talcer, "The I'crsidn vfar\ hgdln'.t (rrerce: h ~ieds\rssnicnt,"p. 127. 9. Sec llcroclutus V11.184. 10. Ibld., VII.6 1-99. l l. Il71d., V11.34. 12. lhld., VII. 36. 11. Ibid., VII.22. 14. Ibld., V11.37. 1 5. Ilxd., VII.39. 16. Ibid., VII.138. g see D. C;11115, (;ollahoratzorz wrth the l'ersza~zs 17. On the b l e c l t ~ ~ n(;reeks, (W~eshaden,1979). L 8.1icrc)dorus V11.172- 1 74. 19. Ibid., V11.175. 20. Cf. P. R. Ckorges's dccount of Greek pollcy before L ~ l a ~ i i In ~ s "Sav~ng , Hcrodotu\'s I'lienomena: The Oracle\ and the kvents of 480 K.< .," (,lasstccrl Arztzqnlty 5 ( 1 986): 14-59. 21. Ilcrodotus VII. 17 5. 22. Ihrd. 23. 1 an1 followtng A. I>a\kalak~s,ProhlPmes hzstonques acttortr cic la butarllr tios Thernzopyles (l'arrs, 1962), pp. 185-187, for the ~hronologv.hly account of the

Notes

22 1

1~1ttlc15 ba\ed m,llnly on I icrodotu\'r ~ ~ c c o u(VII.198-234), nt with some added det'iils from I ) ~ i ~ d o r SicuIus l~s (X1.4-12). 24. Herodoeus V11.2 10. 25. 1. l,. Myrrs, Herodutzts, buther of History (Oxford. 19-56),p. 252. 26. Sec Dask'llak~s,Prohiernes hrstortqt~es,pp. 9-28. Hc follo\w Hcrodotu5's list (V11.202), except rn regard to tile number of Spartans. I arcnhy, The I>eferlie of Crrcece, pp. 134-135, calculates rhc overall (rrcck force at 11omore than 8,000. 27. I Icrodotus VII.202. 28. Sirnolildes of Ceos's ~nscriptrori15 In ~brd.,VII.228. 1)rodorur Sicul~~c, (X1.4.S) and I\ocrate\ (l'anegyrz~90) list 1,000 Spdrt,ln\. 29. U. Co~coli,Pruprreta foizdrarra ed eserirto rzelio stnto spartn~zo&l17cta ilassrca (Rome, 1979), pp. 92-95, thinlelbruck's 5t'111d and on the role of rel~glon,see Prrtchert, T h e Greek {tate at War, pc. 3 , especrally pp. 1-10. 6 l . I)askalakrs, Prol~l~nzes h l s t o r l c i ~ epp. ~ , 29-SO. 62. On thl\, see Dc S~nctls,"Note crltrche sulla storla mrlrtarc dellc gucrre persrane," pp. 78-79. A?. E-ltgnett, Xcrxes' lrzt~astorzof Crrce~e,pp. 118-139. 64. Herodotus VII.21 I. 65. On the sea c o l ~ f r o n t ~ ~off t ~ oArtem~\rum, n see ~ h ~ dVIII. . , 1-23. 66. Aescliylus 1 1-12. 67. C;. Smets and A. I)or\~~~fat~g-Smccs, "I a bata~llcde Salarn~nc:1 c5 ~ ~ L I ~ c,411c'~," izua~rc.de l'itzst~trrtde I'htlologle et d'fftstotre Onerztalc~set Slavcs 12 ( 19-52):4 15. 68. Hcrodotu5 (V11.144) 5avs that 200 \ h ~ p swere bu~ltwrth the money. Ar~stotlc ( P o l l t z ~ a22.7) rmentloris 100 trlremcs, but Thcnii\tocle\' decree \upport\ Hcrodotur's csttmate; sec I>lllon and Crarland, Afzcre71t G r ~ e c e p. , 201. Cf. K. I. I,enardon, T l ~ Saga e o f Thenztsto~les(Lolldo~l,l978), pp. 51-56; V. C;ahrlclsen, kv?iaiiLtizgtlie Athe~rrnitF1ec.t: I'irblrc Ezxatlorz a d SoLzol K~Iatio/zs(Baltrmore, 1994), pp. 25-37, 69. I hucyd~des1.74.1. 70. Wcrodoru5 VII. 173. The Arhenlans are not 51nglcd out In term5 of tllcrr col?tr~butlorito the 10,000 men guard~ngthe pass, bur clcarlv they were aniolig them bcc.tuse onr of tlic generals was the Athcn~anrhcrnr\toclcs. 71. The rest had becl1 left at Athein, probably to prevent 1' I'erslan lalltllng there or to protect the c ~ t vagdrlirt an attack by another Greek communlth Aeglna, with whom rliey were at war; \catL J. S. Mttrr~so~i, "The Crrt,ek ihrps at ialani~sarid rhe L)rc~kplvus," /ozrriial of ffelle?zrc Studrc~s1 I 1 (1991): 197. 72. Hcrodotu5 VII. 10. 73. Ihld., V111.97. 74. For (I-reek polrcy at this st;tge, cf. N. IZobcrt\on, "The True Xlc,lnrng o f the 'Wooden Wall,'" (:lusstcal l'hrlology 82 (1987): 1-20. l or the battle, cf. I.azcnby, T h e 1)ef~~rzce of Greece, pp. I F 1-2 16. 75. Herodotus V111.71. 76. 1he positlon war srnlllar to the one taken at Arternls~t~nl. 77. The following dl\cu\slon 1s p'lrtlally basecl on K. (,ustancc, War at Sea: Modertz 'Tljeory mrd A?icleirt I'mctlce (London, 1970; l st ecl. 19181, pp. 1 ?-30. 78. On th~s,cf. Balccr, "Thc Perslan Wars Aga~nstC;reccc," pp. 136-1 39. 79. Ho\vcvcr, the I'ers~an fleet strll outnumbered the Greek fleet at Salamls1,207 5h1ps agaln5t 310, accordrng to A e ~ h y l u s(Irnc5 339-343); also, Werodorus VI11.48 put\ the C;reel< 5trength at 380 ship. Iiut oli th~s,\cae Udrnmond, Sttrdres tiz Greek History, pp. 268-270. In T k Atl~ertzaiz Trrrenze: T h e History aizr-l Kecorzstruct~orzof arz il?rcrcvzt Greek Warship (C,ambr~clge,19861, 1. S. blorrrson ~ n J. d f; Coates accept the fig~~res of about 977 for the Perrians and 380 for the Greeks. 80. Cf. the short but cogenr suniniary of thew rea\olis In irnets and 1)orsinfangSmcts, "La hata~lledc Salamrne," p. 417.

81. I,enarcion, The Saga of Tl7enl1storles, p. 25. 82. l h u c y d ~ d e s1.1 38. 83. Heroclotu\ V111.75. 84. I-lrgnctt, Xcrxc~s'i n v n s ~ u ~ofz Greece, p. 208. 8 5. Acschylus 157-360. 86. Ibrd., 361-371. 87. 0 1 1 th15, sec, the brref ~ornr11~nt5 In Srli~tsand I)orsr~lfa~~g-Sr~~i-tr, ''1 a b~ta111e de Sal'~mine," pp. 409-411. The authors reject D ~ o d o r u sSi~ulus's statement (X1.17.2), which I accept as credtble. K. K ~ k o l a o ustrongly supports the rel~abilrty of I)~odoru\'saccount; siae I l l \ "I a t)atd~llede Salarnrne d'dpres 1)rodorc de S ~ c ~ l e , " Roi>lte&.S etudes greiqcles 95 (1982): 145-156. 88. Acschylus (382-383) seems to 111~pl.v that the Persran shrpi pdtrolled the cxrts, sweeprng haclc and forth rather than proceedlog ~ n t othe strarts. 89. I rdent~fy the rnodcrn rs1'1nd of I ~ p s o k o u t a la~i Herodotus's l'syttalcra (VI11.76; sec alro Aeschvlus 447-464). 011 t h ~ s ,see I'r~tchett, Studies 117 il~ronrt Greek Topography, pt. l , pp. 94-1 02. Wammond (Stltdies trz Greek Hzstory, pp. 253-265) thinlti that l'syttdlela 15 rnstead the modern i\land of Avlo5 Yervos, whrch IS In the mrdcile of the straits, west of the u t v of Salnmrs. 90. I'ausan~asI. 36.2. 91. Aeschylus 450-454; Herodotus Vl11.76. 92. Herodotus VI11.78-8 3. 9.3. I b ~ d .V111.83. , 94. Burr-i, C;ITCX'S atzd Persmns, p. 458. 9 5. i-lerctdotu\'5 malicrou\ g05c.1~ a h o i ~ the t Cor~nrhran\fleerng 111 panic \IioulJ be Jrsregarclcd. I l e says at the e t ~ of i the \tor)/ that "all Wcllas" accepts rhc C ctr~ntliran version, t h ~ 15, t that therr s h ~ p were s "'lmong the foremost rn the bdttle" (I Ierodotus V111.94). l l i e epitaph 117 lionor o f the Corrnth~answ11o Jled at Sal.~ni~s reniind\ the reader, " [ Ofrrend! In the wrll w,itcredl crty of C'or~nthwc onLe Irvcd. llSut riow wc lie 111 hrals' [lslalld of 5aIamrr. Here we ~ a p t u r e dI'hoeniclan ships and I'ers~an, and we saved holv Greece from thc Xledci]," 111 C. W. bornara, cd. c1~7dtrani., Archaic Tunes to the Etrd of the Pclo[~ouuasranWar ( C ' I I U ~ ~ I 198.3), C ~ ~ Cp., 25. 96. i-lcschylus 386-387. 97. Ibid., 389-190. 98. Ibrd., 198. 99. I am followrrig I Ianirnoncl'\ recon\tructron of the lines; we 1115 Stztdles rn Greek H~story,p. 283. 100. I Icrociotus VIII.84. 101. Aeschylus 199. 102. Morr~soti,"The (;reek jhrps at Salan~rsand the Z>rekplo14s,"p. 199. 103. Herodotus V111.84. 104. Thucvdidcs 1.49.1-2, 1. 1 OS. Hammctnd, itz~dles172 (;reel{ l i l s t o ~ yp. , 296. 106. Morr~sotiarid Coatcs, Tlje Athenza~zTnren~e,p. 58. 107. Ib~d.,pp. 55-60. 108. Plutarch, 'Tljemlsto~les14.1, 117 Vztac. Then~ritocles'decree 5 . ~ ~that 5 "they \llctuld also ch0oc.e [tlen rna[r]~nes[for eacjh ship from those between twenty land t h ~ j r t vvears of age and four r l r ~ h ~ r s ree " ; 1)1llo11and Crarland, Alzczcrzt G r ~ e c e ,

224

Notes

P. 201. An cwccption,ll ctrc~u~~lstance is rctlected 111 the decree of 430 13.plbatnt (sj~ec~dl hopl~tes), 40 actdtt~ortalhoplltcs, L0 archers, atltl 10 pcltasta for each bo'lt. T l ~ cair11 of thc expedrtlon was to collect trtbiite or to card the I'cloponncse (Gabrrelsen, t.~narza~tg the Atl~cnmrrFlcet, pp. 106-1 07). 109. E-lcrodotusV11.184. L 10. Ae\chylus 408-409,41. l . 111. Il-t~d..272-273,275-277. 1 12. I'ltttarch, Ti)emzstocles 14.2. 11 3. 5rnets and I>orunfarlg-1d.,XI. l l.3. 71)3. Ttgcr\tedt, T ! J 1~egmd of .Tpmrta tir C ~ U S SArztrqzttty, ~ L ~ / pp. 106, 107. 304. t-lerodotus V11.204. 305. Ibid., VII.228. Sl~nonlde\of C:co5 wa\ the author of thc inscr~pt~on. 306. H. R. Imlnerwdhr, Form and T/3(121& f f z Herodotus ((.leveland, 1966), pp. 262-263, 307. l'lutarch, l ) c Herodott malzg/zrtatr 3Y-42, and Artstrcks 19, In Vttarj. Cf. Nylc~nd,"Herodoto\' S O L I ~ Cfor C \the P1atd1~1 ( : d ~ ~ l p a ~ g ~pp. i , "82-8 3.

Chapter Four 1 . J. Talllardat, '9 a rr~iareathenlenne et la guerrr 5ur la mer auu V' et IV' 516clcs," in J.-I! Vcmant, ecl., 1'robli.mrs (ie /a grterre eiz C ; r t r ~anctetztzr (l'arlr, 1Y68), pp. 184-185.

Notes 2. IblCl., 185. 3. Ihrd.; T h u c y d ~ d eV11.12.3. ~ 4. 11. Jordan, The At/~e~zrnrz Ntrvy 171 the (.lassrcal Perzod: A S & t d y o f the Atherztnn Naual Alinzr~zrstratzorz rrz thc brfth a?zd kourth Cer~tmrr~s B.('. (lierkelcv, 197C), pp. 186-1 87. C. Tarlldrdat, "I a trrGrc~athe~lre~l~le et la guerre sur Ia nler dux V' et IVf s~l.cles," p. 20 1 . 6. 11~1~1. 7. Jordan, Tbr Atlierrrrr~rNavy r ~ the r Classr~alPerrod, pp. 91, 210. 8. V. Crabrrcl\i.~l,hzna~zcrrzgthe Atherzlan Ple~t:Pzthlz~ Taxatrort m?rd Soclal Kelutrorzs (Kaltrmorc, 1994), pp. 106-1 07. 9. T'~rllardat, " 1 , ~rr15re c~thcnicnr-ie et la guerrc \ur Id lner dux V" ct IV' s15cle5," 17. 202. 10. (;ilrlan, War zrz &beAizcre?zt \Vorld, p. 132. 11. Iorcian, The iltherzralt Nazly rtt the (:lassrcal I'errod, pp. 210-264; Rlorrtson dnd Codre$, The Athe7rin~zTrfremc, pp. 108-1 09. 12. Thucyd~tfesIlI.18.3-4. 13. lorclan, Ihe Atl7cjrzrar1N a z ~ y171 tlw Classrcal IJenod,pp. 20.5-206. 14. Ib~ct.,p. 195. Th15wa5 true not onlv of Athens but al\o of other states (p. 200). 1F. Ihrd., pp. 21 0-264. 16. For rnstancc, protige was b;lsect on lailcl owncrshrp eccn 111 a rnarltrme stare such as Kenn~ss~~ncc Vcnlcc; sec &l. Ventura, Nob~ltae popolo izrlla soacJta z,e~zeta del '400 e 'F00 (Rar~.1974). 17. F o r the follow~ngc ~ ~ i a l vo~f i Spartan s soc~ety,sec Xenophon, liesi~rrhlrcn I acedaenzorrosrr~nz:U . C o//olr, "I o staro spart,tno del V ~ c ~ o l o ,111 " Iavid, Spartrr Retweetz L~npzrea d Re~lolzjtron(404-243 I$.( .): Irrterrzul I'rohlems a7zd Tljerr Impact orr C.onten?/)orary (,reek C:orrsiroztsrrfis (New York, ] % l ) ,esprciallv chaps. 1-2; 1. T. Ilooker, 7 %Aizcze~zt ~ Spastnrzs (London, 1 980), pp. 1 16-1 19. 1X. Xenophon, Kcspz~blrcnI a~edncmonort14mVII. C-6. 19. lhld., VI1.1-2. 11.10-11. 20. On th~s,5ce ~bld.,11-111, espec~~~llv 2 l . Ibld., IV.2. 22. Ib~d.,V1.2. 23. Ib~d.,V1.3-4. 24. Ilxd., VI.3. 25. Ihrd., IX.3-6. 26. 1)lllon ancl Garla~lcl,Arrcreizl Greece, p. 52. 27. Heroclotus IX.73. 28. Xcnophon, Resprdblrci2 7.ucedacmnrronr~rnX1.3. 29. Ib~d.,11.7-9. 30. lh~d.,V11. 31. Ib~d.,11.1-2. 32. Ihrd., 1.8. 3 2. Xenopho~l,Helle7trin IV. C. 10. 34. Sec 1)111011 and Crarland's conlnlentb on Sparta's fcst~valand their translatecl pdssdge from Aclldn, Vanu N~stonrr12.50, 111 Aircre~ztGreece, pp. 179-1 80.

3.5. RI. I. l-iillcy, "Sp'~rta," in ].-I? Verilant, ed., I'rcibicfires de Ia gucrre lJiz Gri.ce a??c-teizne(I'aris, 1968), pp. 143-160. 36. Ibid., pp. 146-147. ~ c , the battle of l'lataea, the Sp,lrtari l'au5an1'1s rc~civcd"ten 37. I or i n s t ~ ~ nafter of evcrythii~g-wo~ncn, horses, wmels, G ~ ~everything itl else" (I Ierodot~rsIX.8 3 j. 38. J. IS. 13ury ,~ndKu~sellRlciggs, il lltstory of C ; ~ P B C P to the Lkath of illexavdrzder t l ~ cC;rP67t (London, 1982), p. 98. 39. I'oseidonios K k 1 87 1 4 8 ~in, L>illon and C;arland, ilizcrent C;rceie, p. 171. 40. Aristotle, Polittca 11.9, 16. ccl~ne of Atacedon," /otrrrzal of Hell~~zrc Stz4cires 106 (1986):2-3. 19. For niy st'ltrstlcal a n a l y s ~of~ the recruitment, I Ii,~vcused the fig~lresg ~ v c In ~i Ham~uond,Alexander the?C h a t , pp. 26-30, 66-47. 20. AlCxanJer dpparcritly left another 12,000 rnfdntrvmcn 111 Maccdorira: sec hid.. pp. 27, 66-67. 2 l . Ibid., pp. 26, 66-67. 22. Ibid., p. 28. 23. Ibid., p. 66. 24. Ibid., pp. 66-67. 25. Ihid. 26. l h ~ d . 27. h. I)evixic, "Alexander the Crreat," in lohn Hackett, ed., Warfare riz the Arzc~ctltIVorlii (New York, 1 989), p. 107. 28. E-laninlond,Alr~xu7zdertCw evlne, "A I'awn-Sacr~hcc at thc liattlc of the C;r,lnr~\~\," p. 3. 54. I>evlnc, "l>cn~ytholog~z~np the Battle of the (kanlcus," p. 277. SS. Arr~arlI. 12.9-10. 56. I'lutar~h, Akxartder 1 5, In Vitae. 57. h r r ~ a n1.14.4; cf. Hammond, AIcxarzcirr tl7e Great, p. 73.

58. Arr~an1.1 5.4. 59. J.F.C. Fuller, The Genernls1)rp o f Alh-nrrder he Great (I,ondon, 1958), p. 149. 60. Han~mond,Alcxnnticr the (;rent, p. 73. 61. Arna11 1.16.1. 62. Diodorus SICLIL~\ XVII. 19.6. 6 3. Arr~anI. 15.2-7. 64. lbld., 1.14.6. 65. Dcvine, "11 I'awn-Sa~r~ficc , ~ the t Eattlc of the C;r,~nlcus," pp. 10-1 3. 66. Arr1a111.1 5.3. 67.Ibid.,I.lC.3, 16.1. 68. l'iutarcli, Akexarzder 16.12; I'olyatnus IV. 3.16. 69. Plutarch, Alexarzcier i6. 70. Arr1a111.16.2.6. 7 1. I>ev~nc., "I~cmytholog~/~ng thc Rattle of the C;r,lni~us,"p. 276. 72. Ilxd., pp. 277-278. 73. Wamnlond, Aloxirn~ierthe evrnc, "Grand ract~cs the Rattle of Issus," T ~ Atzcfetzt C \YIorliI 12 ( 198 F): 45-46. 78. Arrlan 11.8.8. O n the battle, see Hammond, Alexnrrtier the xc7rtder the Cueat, p. 285. 145. O n t h ~ s see , Dev~rie'sconuuent\ In "Great Tact~csat the IL~ttleof Issus," pp. 50-53; I)rv~nc,"The ISattlr of (~augamt~la: A Tact~caland Source-C.rrtrca1 Study," pp. 106-107. 146. Arrian 1.1 3.1, 4. 147. Ibid., 111.10.1-2. 148. Ibld., 111.10.3. 149.l)elbruck, fitstory of t l ~ Art c of War, vol. 1, p. 232. 150. I'olyb~u\ X.13.1-F. l 5 1. Garlari, War 171 the Artirerrt World, p. 146. 152. Arr~an1.15.7. 153. Ibld., 11.10.3.

Notes 154. Ib~d.,111.14.3. 1 55. Piutarch, Alexatztler 6 3. I 56. Ibid.; Arr~dilVI. 10.4. 157. Arr~an11.14. l 58. P. (keen, Alcxatzdcr of Macedon, 3 76-32? &C. (Harti~ondsworth,Englar~d 1974), pp. 313-136. 1 59. See, Tor rn\tanctk,Rosworth's remarks rn C,o11qi4est aizd ).nzptre, p. I 8 1 , and In "Alexzlnclcr the C~reatand the 1)cclrnc of Rl~ecdonia,"cspeclally pp. 1-2, 12. I6O. Halnmoncf, Altwarzder the Great, p. 253. 161. Ib~d.,pp. 14-1 5. 162. Ib~d.,pp. 67-68, 281-282; hurran 1.12.1. l 63. Green, Alexarzder of Maccdorz, pp. 1 52-1 81. 164. 1.' C~oukowsky,Fssat stir les ortguzes d ~ mythe r d'Alexatztlre (3 36-270 av. 1.C'.), vol. 1 (Nancy, Erance l97X), p. 6 9 . 165. I I,~n~rnond, illexa~zdcrthp Great, pp. 278-290; E. Bad~an,The l)elficatzotz ofAlexarz~+eler the C;rent: Protocol of t l ~ efirst C;ollorlzt% The (:enter of Hermencutr~ a 5tudies l rn flellenlctre and Alodcrn Culture (Berhelej, 1976). pp. 1-1 7. Eor an argunlent that hlcvandcr had no dcsirc to be deified, sec G. 1,. (,awkwell. " I he I k ~ f i catlon of Alexander the (;reat: h Note," 111 I. \Vorth~ngton,ed., Velztz~r~s iizti) Greek History (Oxford, 1994), pp. 293- 306. 166. C~rccn,Alexaizder of Macedoll, pp. 372-373. 167. 15aldso11, " 1'11e 'l>lvlnlty' of Alcxanclcl;" pp. 371-382. 168. Ibld., pp. 371-372. 169. Badran, 'The I>c~ficatronof Alexander the Clreat," pp. 1-5. 170. Raldson, ''The 'l)tv~nity' of i-~1cxaric~cr," p. 364. 171. Ib~d.,pp. 383-388. 172. I'lutarch, Alcxatztlcr 2- 3 . 17 3. Clrecn, Alexarzcfer of Maierlorz, p. 269. 174. (2uotcd In ~bici.,p. 274. 175. Radldn, ''The 1)clficacron of Alexd~idcrthe (;rear," pp. 10-1 1. 176. Ibid., p. l l . 177. Hamrnond, Alexarztier the C;rent, p. 287. 178. C;oitkowsky, kssar szav les orzgrnc.s du mytl~ed'illexarzdre, vol. I, pp. 69-70. l 79. Radldn, "The I'lclficaeron of Alexd~idcrtile (;reat," p. 3. 180. Crouki)w5ky, t.ssar sur les ongrnes titt mythe d'AlexcrlrJre, vol. l , p. 70. 181. Ibid. 182. Ibld., p. 4. 183. Ibid. 184. licportcd I I I 1'. h'. ISor/zl, "Srgnific,~topolrtrcc), rcorioni~~o c socrdlc dell'rtnprcsn dr Alessancll-o," in K. 15ianchr Band~ncllr,ecl., Storla e crvzlta dcr C;rpil, vol. 5 (hlllcin, IC)79),13. 167.

Chapter Six 1. P. I eveque, "1 a guerre i1'6pocjue hellen~stlclue," In J.-P. Vernant, rd., I'robliomes J e la gzterre er2 Gr2t e arrLlcnrze (I'arr5, 1968), pp. 26 5-266; Kosworch, "Alexander the Great and the 1)ccllnc of hlacedonla," pp. 1-12. 2. l'olybrus V.82.6.

242

Notes

3 . Arrrarl VII.23.3-4. ru\ (XV.12.7) nlrlitton\ that oiily the (:arthag~nranthird Irne re~narncd bch~nd,hut the subscqutnt caul-se ot the bnttlc suggests thnt the Roman triaril s t ~ y c dbchlnd as ucll. 270. Ibid., XV. 13.1-2. 27 1. Ihrd., XV. 13.3. 272. Ib~d. 273. Ibrd., XV. l 3.7-8. 274. Ib~d.,XV. 17.9-10. 275. Ib~d.,XV.14.6. 276. Ib~d.,XV.14.1-2. 277. Ibid., XV.14.3-5. 278. Ihrd., XV. 14.6-8. 270. Ib~d.,XV.14.9. 280. T,1c7.inowska, "1.2 gc11es1rcpubbl~cdnadel culto ~nipcr~alc," pp. 285-295. 28 1. Seguln, "La rel~gtondr Ccrpron I'Afrlcarn," pp. 7-21. 282. Beside5 'wgiirn's artrcle, see also Gabba, ornrlto Sctpronc Afrtcano e la IcggcntL," pp. 3-17. 283. Scg~tin,"1.a relrg~onde Sclpton I'Afrrcaln," p. 7. 284. 111) XX11.53.l l . 28.5. Ib~d.,XXVIII.iX.8.

250

Notes

286. Ibid.. XXVIII.39.15. 287. Cf. I'olyb~us's verslon (X.9-l h ) with I IVY'S account (XXV1.42-48). 288. 1 I V Y XXVII. 19.4. 289. Inc~ynowska,"I a genes1 repubbllcnna del culto ~mpcr~alc," p. 287. 290. Scg~lln,"I a rellgroi~de Sclplon I'Afr~c~~ln," PP. 1 1 - 12. 291. 011th15, \lac ~ h ~ dpp. . , 17-18; Gabba, "1'. (.ornello Llptone Afrr~anoc Id legge~ld~~," p. I I; Jac/ynowska, "I J gcriclr r c p u h b l ~ c a ndel ~ ~ t ~ l ~t ~o i ~ p e r ~ ~pp. rle,'' 289-290.

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Primary Sources Acllcaa Zacticus. I)< obsatizone tolerarzda con~mciatarrus. Aeschylus. Persae. .S~~?P~~LCS. Aristophdnc\. A t hnrrzc.izses. . kqultes. . T,ysfstrr?ta. . l'ax. hulrtotlc. Athrrzatorz IJolrtc~ta. . Polrtlia. Arridli. A?~ahaszsAlexaridfr. . T~zcttta. tiscleprudotiis. l)c tacttcts. (:urtiur Ruf~15, Q u t l i t ~ ~1)e r . Gestrs Alrx~zndnMngtz~. L>~oJoru\Srculu\. liahlaothc~ahzstorz~a. Frot~t~nus. Stratcgenznla. iielle?zzca Clxyrby~rchla. HeroJot~is.Hzstonu. E-l~pjx)crate\.0 7 2 IIETS,Waters, l'lu~es. Homer. ilznd. . O~J3'~se)l. Isocrates. Pnnegyrzt . I IVV. A trrbe ~o?zdlrabhrl. Ncpo5, (,orncl~us. Dc z)zrts tlhrstnbrts. O~iiisdndecStmteglk6s. I',xu\anid\. Gruectcre d ~ s c n p t t o . Plato. Kespu6l~ca. I'lutarch. L3e llcrodotz malig~t~tute. . Mor~zlm. . Cynlposiul.?1. . vrtac,. Poly'~enu\. Stvategenzata. l'olj Ixu\. Hzstorza. Thucydidc\. l)? Dcllo I'elopoizrzesmc(,. Vcgctiu~,kpitonza de re1 mzlitarrs. Xenophon. A ~ z n l ~ s r s .

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C o l l ~ c t i o n sof Pritnary Sources l)tllon, bI., and I . (Tarland, cds. arid trans. 1994. A~zclerri.( . Aclco~k,b. 1'. 1957. Tile (;rcok a~rtlMac~dolzrarzArt of War. Rcrkcley. -. 1981 (1st ctl. 1940). The I\'onzmiz Art of War lj~zderthe 12~puhllc.Cambr~dge. an id cl as^ CXULJO, XI. G., et al. 1995. 1)r~io?zar10Jelln ~ ~ u t lfeiti{ t k ra. Rome. Aldcrwn, J. K. 1970. Mrlttary 'Tl7pory arzd IJracticeriz the Age of X ~ I Z O ~ / JUerkeley. OIZ. . i979 ( 1 s t cd. 1961). Atzcrctzt Grerk Horsrmansl~ip.Bcrltelcy. . 1984. "Hoplites and Heres~es:A Note." Jozirncrl o f Hellerrrc Stztdzcs 104: 152. Andrewcs, h. 1966. "The C;ctvcrnment of (:ia551cal Sparta." In 1,. Badtan, ed., /lito e n t Socrct)) arzzf Insttttrtiotzs: Stitdtcs Prescntezf t o Victor Fhrenherg otz hts 7 7th 12zrthtlay. Oxford. . 1981. " I h e I-lopl~teKatnlogos." In G. S. Shrimpton and 1). I. XlcC,argar, cds., (:lass~~-al C : O I Z ~ Y I ~ ?Studies L ~ ~ ~ O111~kLofror ~ S : of LW.L: McGregor. New York. Arriould, I). 1981. Gzterre et pntx h n s In poisie grecyue. Kew York. Atkrn\on, J. F, 1980. A Cor?znzelztnry 012 Q. (Lrtrus R21/11~' Wtstortae Alexnlzdrr Maguz: Hooks arzd 4. Amrterdam. Au\t~n,XI. 199.3. "Alcxandcr and the Xfaccdonran Triva\ion of A m : Aspcctr of the Htstorcography of War and P,n~prrcIn Aritrclurty." 1x1 J. lircli and G. 5hrplev, cds., War nrzd Socrety trz the Greek \V(.&, pp. 197-223. I ontlotl. Bad~an,1,. 19 58. Eorelgrz C;lterrte/ae 264-70 1i.C. Oxforcl. . 1976. T h e I)czfi~a~ro?z of Alexnndcr tlw Great: I'rotocol of thtz Fzrst Colloquy, The Centcr o f Hcrmeneuttcal Studres rn Hcllcnrstr~and Xlodern Culture. Ucrkclcy.

. 1977. "The B'lttle of . 14. Oxford. Ilucklcc J . 1980. I he Theharz Hegt~nzorzy,371-362 R.(,. Cambridge.

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. 198 5. "Epamc~nondasand the I:MUOI,ON.'' Pl~o~rzrx 19: 134-143. I%ugh,Cr. R. 1988. The fforsemetz of Atherzs. Pr~ncetori. ISiirford, A. 1960. "Hc'lvy Trailsport rn C lassrcal Ar~trqurty."iC~orronzicHrstory Kri~tew(2nd \ems) 13: 1-1 8. Burn, A. R. i9.72. "Notes or1 Alexander's (bnipargn, 112-330." J o ~ l n mof l Helletzrc Stzi Jles 72: 8 1-9 1 . . 1962. l'eirsra nrrti the Greeks: The l)cfe?zse of the West, c. 746-378 fr.(,. Idondon. . 1969. "Warnnic)nd on Xfarathon: A Few Nc)tes." [ourrznl of Hell~:71~ Studtes 89: 1 18-1 19. Bur-y, I. l%.,and K. hlcrggs. 1982. A Ntstory o f C;reec~to the Death o f Akexarzder t h f emitnt, 1.' 1995. "A propoc, dc Ia d6rnocratie atlierllenne et dc Ia err6 grecclue." Rez/rte d ~ eturfes s grecqzdrs l OX: 19 8-2 t (l. de Romillv, J. i987. "1.a notion dc 'classes nlovennes' d'uls I'i\thi.nes du Vc S. dv. J. C'." Revtie ties Ctt~desgrec ques 100: 1-1 7. I>c Sanctlr, G. 1956- I 968. Srorra dei ronzaizt. 4 vols. k iorcncc.. -- . 1966. "Note cr~tlches~tlla~ t o r l am~litaredellc gucrrc pcrs~ane."In h ~ s Scrrtti rnr~tor~. Vol. I , pp. 69-97. Iiori~c. 1>e Str. O r o ~ xC;.P,.bl. , 1972. The Orr~t?rsof the I'elopo~t~tesin~z War. I ondon. . 198l. Tl7c Class Strztggle ~ t the z Anczerzt Cirec~kWorkd. 1,ondon. Dctlcnnc, M . 1988. "1,a phalangc: 1'robli.mes et ~ontro\erscs."In J. 1.' Vernant, ctl., I'roblbnzes lie /a guervr ett Grece a ~ i ~ r e ? pp. r t ~ 1~19-142. , I'ar~s. I>ec~nc,i-l. 1980. "The I o c a t ~ o nof chc Battlcfic.ld of Issus." 1,rr)eq~ool(.lassrcal Monthly S: 3-1 0. ------. 1981. "EXfRO1,ON: A Study In C:ldss~c;ll Tcr~~i~nology.'Yhoetzix 37: 201-277. . 1985. "The Stratcg1c.5of Alcxa~idcrt h Crrcat ~ and 1)arlus 111 In the Issu, (,ampatgn ( 333 B.C,.)." TI7e ilttcieitt World 12: 25-37. -. 1985. "Great Tact~csa t the Rattle of Issus." The Attcte?rt W ) r / d 12: 38-59. . 1986. "The liattlc of C~~luganirla: A Taet~caland 5ource-C'rrt1eal Study." Ihe Atzcretlt W r l d 13: 87-ll3.

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Ci'lbba, l,. 1975. ''l? nzes dc /a terrp, pp. 149-1 60. Parir. -. 1974. Ke~herLIjeside poltorLBttq~iegre~qt4e.I'ar~s. . L975 (1st brctich cJ. 1972). War 112 the Ancie?~t\Vorld: A S o ~ l a lHrstory. Trans. J.1,loyd. London. . 1988. Slavery m A~zcrcfrtGreece. Ewp,tridcd dnd rcv1sc.d from I sr French ed. Ithaca. Gcorges, !I B. 1986. "'Saving Heroclot~~s's I'henomcna: I he Oracles and the l,vcnts of 480 U.C." C;lassrcirl il?ztrq/i/ty5: 14-$9. C;taririellr, G. 1938. lion?rr tiell'etri idcllc guerre pzi?rrthe. I5ologna. Gtllrs, 1). 1979. (;ollaboi,atioil rvrth the Persznfts. Wtesb;lclen. Goldhrll, S. 1988. "Battle Narrative and l'olstic5 In hcschvli~s'l'cvsac,." loi~nzalof Nellerzrc Strtdtcs 108: 189. Crornme, A. W. 1952. "Jlerodotus and Xlar~thon."l'boeit~x9: 77-87. Goodman, XI. I)., and A. J. l-lollada?~.1986, "ticlrgrous kruplcs rn Arictcnt Warfare." Class/ial Qaarterly 36: 1 51-1 71. C;oukousky, !I 1978. Fssar sur les ortgtfzes d z ~mythe d'Alexndre ( 3 36-270 av. l.C.). N'lncy, krdnce. . 1983. "1icche~-clicsreccntcs 5111- tilcxandre le Grand (1978-1 982)." Kevzde zfes ktudes gr~c-qzies96: 225-24 1 . C;or/~ni Gtacora, I. I992 (1st Ital~anrd. 1986). A Taste of Aitcz~trtRomp. Trans. A. lierklot/. C hrcago. Cirecn, l? 1970. Xerx(~sat Snlanzis. New York. . 1974. Alrxa~rcderof Macedoit, 3 76-37 3 B.(. Hartl~ondsuorth, Fngland. Grcenhalgh, ITA.1. 1973. hurljf Greelz Warfare: Hors~wtritarld (,hariots trz the Honzerzc arrd Archats Age. Carnhr~dgc. Cirlffith, C;. T. 1947. "r2lexandcr's (;cneralsh~pat C;augamcI,t." [ourtzal of 1lclIertzc Str~dres67: 77-89. -. 1956-1 9 57. "Makcdon~ka:Note\ on the iVacedotl~an\of I%hlp allcl Alexa~idec"I'roceedtrrgs of the Camhrrtt,qc) I'htlosoph~calScrcic>ty4: 3-10. . 1968 ( 1st cd. 19 i5). The Merc-efzarresof the Nelle?rrstzc World. Gsonrngen. . 1980. "Phllrp a\ J C ~ t ~ n eand r ~ l the &lacedon~'i,lnArmy." 111XI. Hat/opoulo\ and I . I oukopctulos, eds., I'hrl~pof Macedoii, pp. 58-77. Athctls. . 1981. "l'cltasts and the (>rig1115ot the M~3cccionianI'halanx." 111 ilit~iertt Ma~e~io?zraiz Studres lit Hoiror of Charles F. Fdsoiz. I"11essalotlrkr. Crsell, C. 1972 ( I \ t cd. 1917). I-ftstolre mizcreirize de 1'Afrtq~e~ i z 4Nord. O\nahruck, C~er-man y. Hackctt, J. H., cd. 1989. A History of WLVrn the A~zcrcfrtIYforld. 1,ondon. P -

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I'attcr\on, J.1993. "Xl~l~tary Organ~rat~on and Socl,ll emostheires a d Hls Use of Mrlrtnry Surprise. Stuttgart. Koux, C;. 1974. "Esch~lc,Wkrodote, Dlodorc, Plut'~rquc r,lcontenr Id bardillc dc Sala~nine."Rzkllett?z de Corrtzspo?t&nte Hcllpnrqtte 96: 51-94. IZuncrrn,~i~. W. C,. 1990. "l)ooi~icdto Fxt~t~ctlon: The l'olls as a11 kvolutlonary Dead-Encl." In 0 . Murr'iy and S. l'r~cc, edr., T h e Greek (:lty: I.ronz 1iomc.u t o Alexarzdcr, pp. 348-367. Oxford. 5alrrlon, 1. 1977. " I ' o l ~ t ~ ~Hitpl~te\?" al Jottrnal of Helkittc Studze~97: 87-122. Santosuu\so, A. 1986. "1 conardo 15runr Iie\ls~ted:Hans Bauon's I'hca~son the Influeilce oi the (:lasr~er111 the I,autfat~ot.lore~zrrnaeUrbrs." 111I. C;. R o w , ed., Asp e ~ t sof 7,ate Medleual Government a d lioLrety: Fssays I'resentcd to J. K. 1.a~1der, pp. 25-5 l . Torontc). Saulnlcr, C. 1980. 1,'ar~nt;eet /a gucrre dans le nzoizcie I:trrtsco-Ronzairze VIIc-IVc S . Parr\. 5c1avone, A., ed. 1988-1991). Storzcr dz Komd. Vol\. 1-2. Turcn. Scullard, Id. H. 1970. 5 ~ 1 p i Afritartus: o 5oldzer a ~ c l'olltzcran. i Ithaca. . 1974. T h e k,lepharrt tit the Grec~kaiid Kowraiz World. (:ambr~dge. Seguin, Iioger. 1974. "I a rellglon de Sclp~onI'Africa~n." 1,ntt)mus 71: 3-21. Sekunda, N. 1989. "The I'er\~an\." In J. E. I Iaekrct, ed., A Hzstory of War i n the Aizcrc~rztWorld, pp. 82-1 03. New York. P -

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Shr~mpton,C;. 1980. "The I'crsi'ln C:avalry at Rlarathon." I'hoe?tzx 34: 20-37. S~ngor,H. W. 1988. C)orsprorzg erz hctt~kt~rrrs vatz de boplretetzpl~alarrxrn I~ctarchazsci~e(~rzeke~zlarzrl. 1,cldcn. Thc Nrthcrlands. Snlcts, G., and A. 1)orstnfang-Srnets. 1952. "La bata~ilede Salamme: Idessources." Arzlrbratre zfe I'lrrstrtt(t de Pbzlologrc et ~i'Hzstozre Orterztales et Slaves 12: 409-426. Smith, Cr. L9 18. "Athc~llanC asualty I ~sts."(:lasszc.al I%ilology 14: 36 1-364. Sm~th.K. E. 1958. Senvc-e zn t l ~ cI'ost-iManarz I\'onzarz Army. ~Manchc~tel: Snodgracs, A. M. 1964. Farly Grecl: Armorrr n ~ r dWeapoizs. Ed~nb~irgh. . 1965. "The Hoplite Rc~forrnand l-I~stctry."Jozinzal of I-iellerzzc Stz~~ires 85: 110-1 22. --. i 967. Arms Q ~ Z CArmoirr ! of t l ~ rGreeks. I~~IL~c'I. Spe~dcl,M . 1984. Kommr Army Stz4d1t*s.Vol. l . Anictercia111. Spcncc, I. (F. 199.3. Tile C.'avalry of C.'luss7czrl (;recce: A \ o a d aizri Milzlary History with I'artziular Kefererzce t o ilthetzs. Oxforci. Strducs, K. S., and J. Ober. 1990. T / JAimtonzy ~ of Error: Atzczetzt illilztary 1)zsasters anti Tl7etr 1 essolts for Modeviz Strategzsts. New York. Sumncr, G. V. 1967. '"lioman Pol~cpIn Spain Bcforc the l-lannibalic Wrrc" Haruard Studrc.s rrz (:lass~calI'l~zlolo~y72: 206-246. Ta~llardat,J. 1968. ''l a trilrre dthen~enncet [a gLierre sur la iuer dux Vr et IVe stPclcs." I n ].-P. V~rilant,ed., ProI~lentesd~ la gtrerrc er2 (;recc avzcitizize, pp. 184-205. I'arls. Talhcrt, K.J.A. i 989. "The Role ot the Hclotc 111 the C:l~ccStruggle at Spdrtd." HIStorta 78: 22-40. Talbcrt, IZ.J.A., ed. 1985. Atlas of(:lasstc.al Hzstory. Idondon. T~trn,W. W. 1966 ( 1 s t ccl. 1930). IIcl/etttstrc Milttary '~mizdNaz~a/L)~z~c[opivre?rts. New York. Tigerstedt, P,. N. 1965. T h e I,t.gc.rz~fof ,';l,arta ~ r (,lnsszcml z Arttzqmzty. 5tockholm. roynhce, A. 1. 1965. Narzrzzbnl's 1,c.g~~-y: f i e Ha~znthalzc-Wars' l:fft.its o n Ronzniz 1.tfe. 2 vole. Idondon. . 1969. Somc Problems of Greek Hzsto y. Oxforci. Vandcrpool, t . 1966. "Tlic. I)cmc of Marar11c)n ancl the licraklc~on." A~?zencn~z [ourttal of Archaeology 70: 3 19-32 3. --. 1966. "A Monument of thc K;lttlc of hfarathon." Hcspei,ra 35: 93-106. Vdn der Veer, J.A.(r. 1982. "The ISattle of Xlarathoil: A Tctpograph~~dl 5ur~cy." M~zrmosyrzc3s: 290-321. Van Wee\, fIdn5. 1994. "The liomcr~cWay of War: T h e Ilrad and the I iopl~teI'halanu." Greece and Rome 41: 1-18, 131-1 55. Vernant, J-l! 1968. Myth arzd Society 112 Arzcle~zt( ; Y ~ Y C Trdiw. P. Jrlilet 1.10yd. New York. Verndnt, J-P., ed. 1968. Probli.nzrs zfe la Suerre err C;r?ce aizcrfinne.P'lris. Vidal-Naquct, l'., and l'. I cvCque. 1960. " t , p a n c ~ o d a cpythagctr~c~en et Ic probIZrnc racrlcluc dc Ia J r o ~ t eet de la gdi~chc~.'' Hzst~ria9: 294-308. Vlhlbank, F. W. 1940. I'hrlrp V of Macedolt. C,ambr~dge. . 1979. A Htstorztal Comnz~rrtar)~ o n Polybrus. 3 vols. Oxford. VIFc~llinga,E-I. T. 1990. "Thc Tr~remeancl H~\tor)."Mrzemosyne 47: 132-149.

Warcin~~in, A. 1:. 1959. " T c i ~ t i1'~11d% the T r ' ~ d ~ t ~ofo nthe I'ersian War,." lltstorm 8: 49-60. Warr!~, 1. 1980. Wclrfizre in the (,lasszcirl \Vorld. Nrw York. Wclwci, I 1 cader\ C;c~rozis~a,87 G~acosa,1. C;ornnr, 247(11178) Gllid~lrs,I 52, I h 5 C~ranrcus(334 B.c.), battle of, 117, 1 18, 1 19, 120-124, 128, i3.5, 1 36-1 37, 142-143, 1 55 battleordcr\, 120 casualt~e~, 123-124 XIL~cedor~ran plm, 122-1 2 % map, 121 I'cr\lan plan, 121- 122 C;rcat I'la~nr (203 B.( .).battle of hattleorders, 188 Illdps, 190, I 9 I Crreecc mdps, 27,4 3 war and \oc~alwucture, 4, 8-53 war and rymbol~s~n, 5-6 See rdso Hopl~tcs;War\ Crrcenhalgii, I'.A.L .,2 1 3(nlO) cJntftt1l, C;. r., 89, 90 Hall, Ecilth, h, 76 liaiiirnond, N.(;.I,., 26, 29, 34, 57, 68, 117, 124, 134,217(1115), 2 18(111121, 28), 21 9(n44), 220(n59), 222(n89), 227(n 22), L38(rl8.3) I-Iann~bal,son of II'~rn~lcar Barw, 3, 75,168-198,205 army for the journey r o Italv, 170 lrnltates Alcxandcr, 150- 184 mdp of Hannlbal's routt, 169 \trategical plan, 168, 170, 180-182, L4h(n 156) t'1ctica1 approach to battle, 170-1 72, 1 76

I1armGlntl,l., 7, 2121nl) Harrrs, W. V., 150 W'~sdrubal,so11of C~~sgo, 185, 195 Ilasclrubal, \on of tlamllcar llarca and brother of Hanl-irbal, 18 1 Hastatr, 153, 154, 155, 157, 161, 188, 189, 195. Sec) also 1 cg1011 lfe/ots,45, 59, 81, 84, 85, 88, 93, 96, 97,98,209, 231 (1146) E-leracle\, 6, 10, 21, 22, 11, 37, 80, 106, 107, 144, 145, 198,207 Hernics, 146 Herodot~is,14, 16, 18,40, 67,69, 70, 7.5, 76, 77, 78, 80, l l l , l 12, 2 k6(1194),221 (nn 50, 54), 222(11r-i 68, 70, 79), 223(1195), 226(nn 195, 217), 229(n291)

on I'lataea, 59, 62, 63, 65, 66 on Salarn15,50, 5 1 , 54, i F, 57 on I ltcrmopylae, 4 5-50 H~gnctt,C., 54, 59, 226 (n2 10) Hrf~/~els(lxodvguard o f 'ipartari k~ngs), 45, l 16,209 I Ilppla,, 26-29 Hlppocrate~,5, 39, 76, 77 I Iolladay, A. I., 96. 97, 99 Ilomcr, 9 , 80, 144 Hoti1ocrot1~1~111 eltte Llnlts and, 104 Sacred ISancI and, 1 04- 105 Sparta, 8 5-86 wdrfdrc dnd, 104-1 06 Homotor, 87, 209. See mlso Spartlatcs I-Iopl~tcr,7-2 3, 20 1-203 117 bdttle, 12-17 L ~ S U ~ ~16C 17 I~S, cornparrson wlth I'crslan army, 29-30, 40 cuIra$$, 10 debarrus Ill's arrny and, 120, 12 1, 123-124, 126,127-128.13 1, 136, 141 economic pressure and the rist, of, 90-9 1

~ d e ~of, ~ l89, \ 91-92 1111p'1ctOII c1tl/en-5oldrer,91-92 nurnhcr of, 89 orrgn of, 89 Pe~oponne\ranW