The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament (EU Election Studies)

Citation preview

The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament Edited by

Juliet Lodge

The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

This page intentionally left blank

The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament Edited by Juliet Lodge Director Jean Monnet European Centre of Excellence University of Leeds UK

Editorial Matter and Selection © Juliet Lodge 2005 Chapters © the individual authors 2005 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1T 4LP. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The authors have asserted their rights to be identified as the authors of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2005 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN-10 1–4039–3517–3 hardback ISBN-13 978–1–4039–3517–5 hardback ISBN-10 1–4039–3518–1 paperback ISBN-13 978–1–4039–3518–2 paperback This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The 2004 elections to the European Parliament / edited by Juliet Lodge. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1–4039–3517–3 –– ISBN 1–4039–3518–1 (pbk.) 1. European Parliament––Elections, 2004. I. Lodge, Juliet. JN36.A197 2005 324.94'0561––dc22 2005042518 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 14 13 12 11 10 09 08 07 06 05 Printed and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham and Eastbourne

For Europeans of the new European Union and especially Keri-Michèle, David and Chris; Tom, Hannah and Laura; Jade and Sophie.

This page intentionally left blank

Contents

List of Tables and Figure List of Abbreviations Notes on Contributors Preface

ix xi xii xvii

Part I Introduction 1 Euro-Elections 2004 – A Defining Point in European Integration? Juliet Lodge 2 European Parliament 1999–2004 Richard Corbett 3 European Parliamentary Electoral Law and the 2004 Elections: Towards Uniformity or Commonality? James D. Mather 4 The EP Party System After the 2004 Elections Tapio Raunio 5 EUphoria to Apathy: EP Turnout in the New Member States Mark D. Baimbridge

Part II

3 8

18 33 45

Country Case Studies

6 Austria Josef Melchior 7 Belgium Tom Delreux and Caroline Steensels 8 Cyprus Costas Melakopides 9 Czech Republic Lenka Rovná 10 Denmark Karina Pedersen 11 Estonia Terry Mayer 12 Finland Tapio Raunio 13 France Helen Drake 14 Germany Simon Green

57 65 73 81 88 95 101 109 122

viii

The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

15 Greece Dimitris Kavakas 16 Hungary Agnes Batory 17 Ireland Edward Moxon-Browne 18 Italy Donatella M. Viola 19 Latvia David Galbreath 20 Lithuania Terry Mayer 21 Luxembourg Philippe Poirier 22 Malta Mark Harwood 23 The Netherlands Edith Drieskens 24 Poland Aleks Szczerbiak 25 Portugal José M. Magone 26 Slovakia Lenka Rovná 27 Slovenia Irena Brinar 28 Spain Roberto Espíndola and Fabio García 29 Sweden Fredrik Langdal 30 The United Kingdom Richard Whitaker

131 138 146 155 165 173 179 187 194 201 210 218 223 230 239 248

Part III Conclusion 31 Communicating Europe: From Procedural Transparency to Grand Forum Juliet Lodge 32 The European Parliament 2004–09 – A Parliament for the People of the New EU Polity? Juliet Lodge Index

261

279

293

List of Tables and Figure

Tables 3.1 3.2 3.3 4.1 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 6.1 7.1 8.1 9.1 10.1 11.1 11.2 12.1 12.2 13.1 13.2 14.1 15.1 16.1 17.1 18.1 18.2 18.3 19.1 20.1 20.2 21.1 22.1 23.1

Modes of European election by member state, 2004 The rights to vote and stand by member state, 2004 Average number of electors per MEP by member state, 2004 Party groups in the European Parliament, 1979–2004 Summary of political and socio-economic influences on turnout Summary of EP election turnout, 1979–2004 Summary of statistics of turnout in EP elections, 1979–2004 NMS and the Eurogap Predictions of NMS EP election turnout Elections to the EP in Austria EP election results, Belgium, 2004 EP election results, Cyprus, 2004 The EP election results in the Czech Republic The Danish elections to the European Parliament, 2004 Estonia: results of the EP elections, 2004 The Riigikogu 2 March 2003 elections Results of the 2004 European Parliament elections in Finland The 14 Finnish MEPs elected to Parliament The regional constituencies and the distribution of French seats in the European Parliament, 2004–09 France: the results of the EP elections Results of the German election to the European Parliament, 13 June 2004 The Greek results of the elections to the EP The 13 June 2004 EP election results in Hungary Ireland: European Parliament election results, 2004 Italian parties and lists 2004 Euro-election results in Italy Italian MEPs’ affiliation to EP political groups and number of women MEPS 2004 Latvian EP election results Lietuvos Respublikos Seimas: 8 October 2000 EP election results, Lithuania Luxembourg: the 2004 EP election results Malta: 2004 EP election results Results of the European Parliament elections in the Netherlands ix

23 25 29 34 47 48 48 49 51 63 70 79 86 92 99 99 106 106 112 117 128 133 142 151 156 160 161 168 174 178 180 192 198

x

The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

24.1 Turnout in post-1989 Polish elections and referendums 24.2 Results of the June 2004 Polish elections to the European Parliament 25.1 European Parliament election results in Portugal, 1999 and 2004 26.1 The public’s views on the future of Czechoslovakia, 1990 and 1992 26.2 The EP election results in Slovakia, 2004 27.1 Previous Slovenian presidential, parliamentarian, local elections and referenda turnout 27.2 Results of the 2004 EP elections, Slovenia 28.1 Turnout at Euro-elections in Spain 28.2 Spain: results of the Euro-elections, 2004 29.1 Sweden: 2004 EP election results 30.1 Regional turnout at the 2004 and 1999 EP elections in the UK 30.2 EP election results in the UK, June 2004 32.1 Results of the 2004 EP elections, by political grouping 32.2 Women Members of the 2004–09 European Parliament 32.3 The European Parliament’s committees

206 207 216 218 221 224 229 231 237 245 249 255 286 287 289

Figure 18.1 EP group membership: Italy

162

List of Abbreviations

ALDE CAP CESDP CFE CFSP EC ED EEC EFA EU ELDR EMU EP EPP EPP-ED Greens-EFA EUL/NGL IND-DEM IGC JHA MEP NATO PES QMV SEA STV TEA TEU UEN WEU

Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe Common Agricultural Policy Common European Security and Defence Policy Convention on the Future of Europe Common Foreign and Security Policy European Community European Democrats European Economic Community European Free Alliance European Union European Liberal, Democrat and Reform Party Economic and Monetary Union European Parliament European People’s Party European People’s Party (Christian Democrats) and European Democrats Greens-European Free Alliance European United Left-Nordic Green Alliance Independence/Democracy Group Inter-Governmental Conference Justice and Home Affairs Member of the European Parliament North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Party of European Socialists qualified majority voting Single European Act single transferable vote Treaty of Amsterdam Treaty on European Union Union for Europe of the Nations Western European Union

xi

Notes on Contributors

Mark Baimbridge Senior Lecturer in Economics at the University of Bradford, is author/editor of several books on economic integration, including: Economic and Monetary Union in Europe (Edward Elgar, 2003 & 2005) and Fiscal Federalism and European Economic Integration (Routledge, 2004), Current Economic Issues in EU Integration (Palgrave, 2004), Britain, the euro and Beyond (Ashgate), and a three volume series analysing ‘The EU at 50’ (Palgrave). His research interests include EU central bank independence, enlargement, UK–EU relationships. Agnes Batory has a first degree in law from ELTE Budapest and a PhD in International Studies from Cambridge University. She worked on the EU accession referendum campaign at the Hungarian Prime Minister’s Office and is currently a Research Fellow of the Centre for Policy Studies at the Central European University in Budapest. Her main field of research is political party and party system development and expressions of Euroscepticism in East Central Europe. Irena Brinar is currently Head of the Office of the International Programmes at the FSS and Lecturer in European Integration. She has published on the EU in the Journal of European Public Policy (with Marjan Svetlicic, 1999); Central European Political Science Review (with Bojko Bucar, 2001); Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration (2001–2003); Back to Europe: Central and Eastern Europe and the European Union (ed. Karen Henderson, UCL Press, 1999); L’opinion européenne 2002 (with B. Bucar, Presses de Sciences Po, 2002). She is a member of the ECPR Standing Group on the EU. Richard Corbett MEP is the spokesperson for the Socialist Group in the European Parliament on the issue of the European Constitution and is the Parliament’s co-rapporteur on the matter. He represents the Yorkshire and Humber region for Labour. He has written widely on EU affairs, including The European Parliament (5th edn, John Harper Publishing, 2003) – the standard textbook on the European Parliament, co-authored with Michael Shackleton and Francis Jacobs. He also wrote The European Parliament’s Role in Closer EU Integration (Macmillan, 1995) and The Treaty of Maastricht: From Conception to Ratification (Longman, 1993), as well as a number of polemical and political pieces. Tom Delreux is a PhD student at the Institute for International and European Policy at the Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium. He holds a Masters degree in Political Sciences (Catholic University of Leuven) and is currently xii

Notes on Contributors

xiii

analysing the internal EU policy-making process regarding the European Union’s external environmental policies. Helen Drake is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Politics, International Relations and European Studies, Loughborough University. She is the author of works on Jacques Delors, the European Commission, and French relations with the EU. Edith Drieskens is an assistant at the Institute for International and European Policy at the Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium. She holds Masters degrees in Political Sciences (Catholic University of Leuven), European Studies (Catholic University of Leuven) and American Studies (Universities of Antwerp, Brussels and Ghent). Analysing the coordination mechanisms for the establishment of multilateral economic sanctions for security purposes within the framework of the United Nations Security Council from a transatlantic point of view, her PhD research focuses on the political economy of international coalition-building. Roberto Espíndola is a director of the Marie Curie Training Site on Europeanisation and Acting Director of the Centre for European Studies at the University of Bradford. A comparativist, his most recent publications relate to democratisation, participation, political parties and electoral campaigns in Europe and Latin America. David J. Galbreath is Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at the University of Aberdeen. His research centres on the domestic politics and foreign policy of the Baltic states. He has recently held a Fulbright Research Fellowship to Latvia and completed a PhD at the University of Leeds. He is the author of ‘Ethnicity and Politics’ in the Encyclopedia of Government and Politics (Routledge, 2004, with T. David Mason) and ‘The Politics of European Integration and Minority Rights in Estonia and Latvia’ in Perspectives on European Politics and Society (2003). Fabio García was Marie Curie Fellow at the Centre for European Studies, University of Bradford, and is now a student at the doctoral programme in comparative and European politics at the Centre for the Study of Political Change, University of Siena. Simon Green is Lecturer in German Politics at the University of Birmingham. His research focuses on policy-making structures in Germany and on immigration and citizenship policy in Europe. He is the author of The Politics of Exclusion: Institutions and Immigration Policy in Contemporary Germany (Manchester University Press, 2004), as well as editor (with William Paterson) of Governance in Contemporary Germany: The Semisovereign State Revisited (Cambridge University Press, 2005). In 2004, he also coordinated a project on public policy challenges and solutions in the UK and Germany.

xiv

The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

Mark Harwood is an Assistant Lecturer in European Studies at the University of Malta where he teaches European comparative politics. He is currently working on a doctoral study of Malta’s Europeanisation experience. Dimitris Kavakas is an expert on EU politics and institutions, specialising in the Common Foreign and Security Policy and member states’ policies. He is the author of Greece and Spain in European Foreign Policy (2000), and has published on the EU. Now Dean and General Director of New York College in Thessaloniki, Greece, he has worked as a political correspondent for television and radio, and Press and Public Relations Officer for Cedefop. Fredrik Langdal is a researcher at the Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies. His research interests are primarily the role of national parliaments in the European integration process and the division of powers between the European Union and the member states. Juliet Lodge is Professor of European Integration and EU Politics and Director of the Jean Monnet European Centre of Excellence, University of Leeds. She has published widely on the EU; has worked extensively with EU institutions and governments; and was European Woman of Europe 1992. Her current research is on the draft Constitutional treaty and on EU egovernance in internal and external security, eJustice, ethics and biometrics. José M. Magone is Senior Lecturer in European Politics, University of Hull. His publications include Iberian Trade Unionism: Democratization under the Impact of the European Union (Transaction, 2001); Politics of Southern Europe (Praeger, 2003); The Developing Place of Portugal in the European Union (Transaction, 2004); Contemporary Spanish Politics (Routledge, 2004); and the edited volume Regional Institutions and Governance in the European Union (Praeger, 2003). James D. Mather is a doctoral research student and tutor of European Community Law in the School of Law of the University of Leeds. The title of his thesis is ‘A Neo-Intergovernmentalist Approach to a Multi-Tiered European Construct: A Case Study of Merseyside and South Yorkshire and the Principle of Partnership under European Regional Development Policy’. Terry Mayer is a freelance researcher in Russian and East European politics and society and an associate of the Jean Monnet European Centre of Excellence, University of Leeds. Costas Melakopides is Associate Professor of International Relations, University of Cyprus, and External Associate of the Institute of European Integration and Policy, University of Athens. His latest book (in Greek) is entitled Is There an Ethics in World Politics? Introduction to Theory and Practice (Sideris, 2003). Josef Melchior is Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science, University of Vienna. He teaches and publishes on Austrian politics and

Notes on Contributors

xv

European integration. His current research focuses on the European Constitution and the democratisation of the EU. Edward Moxon-Browne is Jean Monnet Chair of European Integration, and Director of the Centre for European Studies, at the University of Limerick. Among his publications are Political Change in Spain (Routledge, 1989); A Future for Peacekeeping? (Macmillan, 1997); and Who Are the Europeans Now? (Ashgate, 2004). Karina Pedersen is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, Denmark. Philippe Poirier is Lecturer in Politics, Faculty of Humanities of the new University of Luxembourg. His PhD thesis was on the extreme right parties in Europe (2002). He has published papers on regionalist and right movements in Europe, on European citizenship and politics in Benelux. Tapio Raunio is Professor of Political Science, University of Tampere. He is co-author of Finland in the European Union (2003), and has published articles in journals such as the European Journal of Political Research, the Journal of Common Market Studies, Party Politics, and West European Politics. His current research focuses on the role of national legislatures in the EU’s political system. Lenka A. Rovná CSc is Jean Monnet Professor in Political Science, Chair of the Department of West European Studies, Charles University, Prague. In 2002–03 she served as an Alternate to the Czech Government Representative at the Convention on the Future of Europe. She teaches and publishes on European, British and Canadian Politics. In 1991–95 she was Visiting Professor at Guelph, Bishop’s and Calgary Universities, Canada. In 2004 she was made Chevaliere de l’Ordre National du Merite. Caroline Steensels is a research assistant in the Department of Political Sciences at the Catholic University of Leuven. A graduate of the Universities of KULeuven and Hull, she is currently working on a large scale empirical project on the impact of internationalisation on the legitimacy of international organisations, in casu the EU and the WTO. Aleks Szczerbiak is senior lecturer in contemporary European studies at the Sussex European Institute, University of Sussex. His research interests include Central and East European party and electoral politics and the EU’s impact on national politics. Co-covenor (with Paul Taggart) of the European Parties Elections and Referendums Network (EPERN), his work includes Poles Together? The Emergence and Development of Political Parties in Postcommunist Poland (CEU Press, 2001); Opposing Europe: The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism in Contemporary Europe, 2 volumes (co-editor with Paul Taggart, OUP, 2005); and Choosing Union: the June 2003 EU accession referendums (Taylor and Francis, 2005).

xvi

The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

Donatella M. Viola, is a former Robert Schuman Scholar at the Secretariat of the European Parliament in Luxembourg and Marie Curie Fellow at the London School of Economics, where she also obtained a PhD in International Relations. She has lectured in many British academic institutions including London, Cardiff, Bristol and Plymouth Universities. She is the author of the Monograph European Foreign Policy and the European Parliament in the 1990s (Ashgate, 2000) and other publications on the European Parliament, national parliaments, European foreign policy and EU immigration policy. Richard Whitaker is Lecturer in European politics at the University of Leicester. His research deals with the European Parliament, comparative legislatures and representation.

Preface

When the first direct elections to the European Parliament were held in June 1979, the European Parliament had negligible powers and little credibility as a putative legislature. It lacked political clout and credibility. Its members and nascent political party groups were largely unknown and its existence barely visible. Whether it could aspire to becoming a legislature analogous and having similar powers and authority to those of the national parliaments in the then Nine member states was a matter of conjecture, and a source of anxiety for some in national governments and national parliaments who feared that it might one day rival them for the attention and assumed ‘loyalty’ of the people within their territories. The European Parliament’s role in the EU was evaluated in terms of whether it could contrive to become ‘the Grand Forum’ of public debate on the crucial political issues of public policy; and whether it could ever become the guardian of the socio-economic and politico-cultural values of the peoples of the European Community. Few took it seriously as an institution worthy of public attention or as one that would one day help to transform the European Community into a European Union complete with the checks and balances taken for granted in its component member states’ polities. Its members, however, did take a view as to the proper role of parliaments in democratic polities. Their overriding concern was to discern and represent the common interests of the people who had elected them, and to hold the executive to account. With negligible treatygiven powers, MEPs skilfully exploited the European Parliament’s own Rules of Procedure over the years in an enlightened and innovative way in order to address those concerns. When the first elections to the newly enlarged European Union’s European Parliament took place 25 years later, the European Parliament had come of age as a legislature. It had won genuine legislative power. The much ridiculed idea of the European Community ever having a quasi federal bicameral legislature comprising a house of the people (the European Parliament) and a house of the states (the Council of Ministers) had been replaced by a bicameral legislative arrangement of power-sharing: co-decision. Under co-decision, the European Parliament has almost won equal status and power with the Council of Ministers. Few would have thought in 1979, that the then omnipotent Council would become accountable to the European Parliament in the way that it had by 2004. Few would have predicted the impact that the European Parliament would have on institutional reform and constitutional innovation in the European Community. Fewer still would have thought that the European Parliament would become the champion of national xvii

xviii

The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

parliaments in their quest to acquire a meaningful role in respect of European legislation. By the time of the 1990 ‘Assizes’, the European Parliament had become a recognised source of and force for constitutional change. By the time of the European Convention, some ten years later, even governments allowed it to play a recognised official role in deliberations that were to lead to an unpresaged consultation of the people by governments in the wake of the latter’s adoption of a draft constitutional treaty for the European Union. By 2004, the European Parliament had moved from being either ignored or vilified by (some) national governments to being treated with dignity, and growing respect as befits a body that is a force to be reckoned with. Is it, then perhaps, all the more paradoxical that the European Parliament, as an institution, and its members, as the elected representatives of the people, appear to have failed to capture the public imagination and inspire them to vote in far higher numbers than they did on the occasion of the 2004 elections? Turnout had fallen from 69 per cent in 1979 to 49 per cent in 2004. It is tempting to ascribe failures to mobilise the electorate to turnout voluntarily in sufficiently high numbers to structural and political weaknesses in the European Parliament and the party groups and their sister transnational parties. While organisational problems do inhibit them from realising their potential, other factors need to be taken into account. Most relevant among them are the dominance of national political classes and elites vis-à-vis MEPs. They determine the selection of candidates to contest European Parliament elections, the conduct of the campaign at the most local of levels within the member states, and the deployment of European information produced by both the European parties and by national political parties. As the interface between the voter and the European Parliament candidates, they have largely failed to perform as facilitors or mobilisers. National political elites have not matched the European Parliament’s political elite’s endeavours. If anything, some states have deliberately frustrated them by commission or omission. Since the first European Parliament elections, collectively MEPs have enabled the voters with varying degrees of success to see and gain some understanding of the key democratic challenge facing the emerging European Union (as epitomised by a series of treaty reforms designed to make the institutions more effective, democratic, accountable, open and efficient). National political elites in governments and parliaments and in national political parties have not matched this by enabling voters to understand the contribution to domestic experience that European public policies deliver, and that MEPs shape and authorise in conjunction with the domestic, national governments of the day. Various explanations for this have been offered over the years. These tended to ascribe this to governments’ fears of being usurped or eclipsed by other tiers of authoritative sources of decisionmaking and distribution of public goods. At the simplest level, this has been presented in terms of problems associated with government perceptions as to the implications of European integration and European multi-level

Preface

xix

bureaucratic interpenetration for the exercise of national sovereignty first in an age of increasing economic interdependence and then in an era of accelerating globalisation. Either way, the public policy space has escaped the territorial boundaries that traditionally define the contours of a national government’s reach. National parliaments have long been absent from effectively participating in the scrutiny and oversight of their national governments’ positions in the Council of Ministers, and MEPs and candidates in EP elections have had to rely on the very national parties who mobilise the electorate for national elections to stimulate turnout in the EP elections even though they may be ill-equipped and lacking in adequate knowledge about either the European Parliament, its authority, role and record, or its parties’ positions, aspirations and differences over the European Union. Recognising this, especially as the Convention on the Future of Europe got under way, the EU Commission took steps to try and adapt to public perceptions of the EU being too distant to be meaningful or to engage with. Technological advances were deployed to link up at least with the section of the electorate sufficiently aware of the EU and motivated to seek out further information: EU Commissioner online ‘chats’, video-cams, and direct online links to MEPs became increasingly common. A Group was set up in 2002, known as the GII group, to devise a multi-annual programme for EU ‘information activities’ in 2003–4. It comprised representatives from the European Parliament (represented by Spanish Christian Democrat MEP Alejo Vidal-Quadras Roca, German Christian Democrat MEP Elmar Brok, German Social Democrat MEP Christa Randzio-Plath and French Socialist MEP Michel Rocard), the Commission and the Council. It was due to report in 2005, after the 2004 EP elections. In the meantime, incoming Commissioner Margot Wallström was charged with communications policy and duly launched an EU blog. This indicates an acknowledgement of a public diplomacy deficit on the part of the EU institutions collectively, and recognition of the challenge that declining public participation in European Parliament elections presents in many EU states. No matter how close technology indirectly brings policymakers to the people, it is not sufficient to mobilise a high turnout: a human interface and civic interaction remains necessary. Those more exposed directly to campaigning are more likely to vote regardless of their age (a powerful predictor of voting propensity), social class, or educational level. Second-order election reasoning that suggests that EP elections are on a par with local elections in the public psyche is plausible but insufficient either to predict or explain turnout satisfactorily. The availability of, and access to, election campaign materials, presented effectively, relevantly and attractively to voters has been shown to be a more powerful indicator of likely turnout. This is one reason why the issue of communication is now an EU priority. Clearly, there are information deficits and misunderstandings to be overcome. This requires a collective effort for future EP elections and for the sustainability of good democratic governance in the EU in general. Failing that, public

xx

The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

credibility and trust in MEPs and in the EU institutions is unlikely to rise. The risk is that unless the latter are able to define and communicate effectively and credibly what they stand for, what they seek to achieve and how, why and with what resources they legitimately pursue and meet agreed goals, a negative image of the EU will be presented by those hostile to European integration and careless of its democratic vision. An official public diplomacy strategy is needed in its own right in order to increase the potential for the public to be exposed to information about the EU, especially in the run up to the series of referendums on the draft constitutional treaty. This does not exonerate national political classes and elites from taking steps to ‘close the EU communications gap’ to which they have systematically contributed. Rather it means that they must cease to view the EU as an arena of ‘foreign’ activity and present it and themselves in it as a normal part of domestic political life. In this, EU institutions, policy outcomes and crucially the ‘voice of the people’ in the people’s institution – the MEPs, must be acknowledged both by national political elites and crucially by journalists who have a duty to inform the people about the EU’s collective priorities and public policy goals, objectives and choices before them. In short, national political classes need to internalise the EU and to rethink the EU: how, what and whom they see, visualise and present to their domestic constituencies. They are part of public policymaking spaces that escape national territorial definition. The developing processes of internalisation are evident, the counterpart socio-psychological community remains inchoate. The essays in this book provide, hopefully in an accessible style, an overview of the European Parliament’s development since the 1999 elections, the electoral systems used for EP elections, an evaluation of the transnational parties, and snapshots of the elections in each of the 25 member states. The chapters on the EP elections in each member state cover the background to the campaign, the electoral system, parties, actors, issues and outcome. Finally two chapters address the proximity paradox. They illustrate the disjuncture between the aspirational goal of bringing the EU closer to the citizen and the strategy for implementing it – via the codes of greater transparency, institutional reforms from the further rebalancing of the relative legislative authority of the Council and European Parliament, almost universal codecision and IGC endorsed expansion of EU competence. One chapter outlines the way in which transparency, openness and accountability were advanced. The other, by contrast focuses on the communications deficit. Together they accentuate the very different approaches pursued. Both are valid and desirable in their own right. Both are essential for different reasons. Both, are vital to ensure enhanced legitimacy for the EU, to revitalise the never-ending quest for responsible governance, for simplicity, consistency, efficiency, accountability, responsiveness, openness and democracy. Both however, also have a role to play in helping the EU’s political leaders at all levels to make the EU dimension salient and meaningful to the people.

Preface

xxi

We thank the many people who have helped us in our research, in answering questions and providing data. We are responsible for how this has been interpreted. We also thank Ray Addicott and Tracey Day, and Alison Howson at Palgrave Macmillan for launching the European Parliament election series with this book: in the mid 1970s when the European Community and much less the European Parliament were less than a twinkle in the eye of many publishers, Macmillan published the first book on the first direct elections to the European Parliament designed for a broad audience. It is a privilege to contribute the first volume on the first elections in the newly enlarged European Union on the eve of the referendums on the adoption of the draft Constitutional Treaty for the European Union.

Juliet Lodge Brussels, October 2004

This page intentionally left blank

Part I Introduction

This page intentionally left blank

1

Euro-Elections 2004 – A Defining Point in European Integration? Juliet Lodge

The European Union remains a model of peaceful conflict resolution. It is a unique and sustainable demonstration of democratic, multinational cooperation. Far more than a multilateral permanent negotiation, it is inspired by the nation state and has the political and institutional attributes of democratic governance and a unique supranational polity thanks in no small measure to the perseverance of the European Parliament. The 2004 elections to the European Parliament mark something of a defining point in the history of European integration. The 2004 elections seemed simultaneously mundane and an accepted feature of a sui generis system, now accepted as a polity in its own right, that a quarter of a century ago had seen politicians fiercely disputing the wisdom and desirability of the people directly electing a European Parliament at all. Then sovereignty and the allegedly deleterious consequences direct elections would herald for state autonomy and sovereignty preoccupied those anxious about supranational institutions and supranational policy-making. In 2004, and compared even to 1999, these issues were settled through the Convention on the Future of Europe, the Inter-Governmental Conferences (IGCs) and the presentation of a draft constitutional treaty due for ratification by all the member states, following national procedures, including referendums in many. The 2004 elections to the European Parliament were probably the last Euroelections under the old treaties, and the first in a wider, more hetereogeneous, fragmented and disparate Europe. The 2009 elections may be the first under a new Constitution. They occur after the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome in an even wider Europe where the scope of policy sectors tackled at the supranational level will be even wider still, and where territorial political contours representing state boundaries are to be transcended both by the 3

4

The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

goals and vision of the Single Market, e-governance and democratic processes entrenched in the new Constitution. The European Parliament has to rise to the challenge of sustaining and making the new democratic polity work openly, effectively, responsively, accountably and democratically. Twenty-five years after the first ever direct elections to the European Parliament, a new European Parliament was elected by voters in the 25 countries of the newly enlarged European Union (EU). These elections were as historic as the first. The issue of democracy and the democratic credentials of the EU were once again high on the EU’s agenda. The European Parliament had transformed the face of the EU’s polity since its first direct election in 1979. Its members had worked tirelessly to give expression to parliamentary democracy at the supranational level1 – from the early Dehousse Reports in 1962 through to the Spinelli and Crocodile initiatives of 1984, the Catherwood Reports on non-Europe, those of David Martin in the 1990s and the Corbett Report in 2003.2 All showed that not only was the European Parliament a motor for constitutional change and institution-building but that it could accomplish fundamental institutional and constitutional reform by gradual yet bold steps that would challenge the pre-eminence of national governments, establish a genuine bicameral legislature, and increasingly make the EU’s institutions themselves directly responsive and accountable to the people in the member states. The European Parliament (EP) has achieved much, yet for much of the time its role in reforming the EU has gone unacknowledged. Spinelli proclaimed in 1984 that parliaments were king-makers; they had a special and particular role to play vis-à-vis executives. The EP has moved from being a weak, consultative assembly to being one of the movers and shakers of European integration. It now faces perhaps its greatest test in continuing to shape, deliver and sustain democratic practice. As this book confirms, every EP election so far has been largely hijacked by national political parties peddling a national agenda that deprives the electorate of the opportunity to consider EU issues and which all too often masks national governments’ ambivalence over declaring and effectively explaining and arguing their European policy priorities. Obviously, governments need tactically to retain a margin of manoeuvre and surprise in negotiations and bargaining with partners in the Council of Ministers. They may be disinclined to take MEPs even from government parties into their confidence: the EP’s majority in co-decision may depart from their preferred position. However, there is some chance that the new provisions regarding the role of national parliaments may lead to the development of procedures, patterns of consultation and cooperation between elected representatives which lead to a more constructive discourse and presentation of issues to the electorate. If the EP and national parliaments can develop patterns that are mutually beneficial and reinforcing, then there may be some hope that the old, archaic view of rivalry between them will give way to dialogue designed to ensure that democratic discourse and practice are developed and sustained

Euro-Elections 2004

5

at all levels in an interpenetrated web of democratic activity. Whether this might contribute to lessening the public trust deficit in politics remains to be seen, but overcoming this is a challenge common to MPs, MEPs and governments alike. Open governance is about open, tolerant, reasoned and reasonable communication both among those who represent and govern and those who are governed. The EP is the EU’s guardian of political values entrenched in the original treaties whose realisation expresses itself both in the common commitment to sustainable peace among states and consensual, peaceful problem-solving by them. The European Community’s and EU’s fluid institutional and decision-making designs may be suboptimal and imperfect. Those of the Constitution have yet to be tested. But first they have to be explained, a task MEPs have already embraced. This book is about the first direct elections in the newly enlarged EU. Part I begins with an overview of the context of these elections and reflections on the historical turning point characterised by the Convention on the Future of Europe. Short overviews of the elections in the member states are provided in Part II. Were these elections really no more than mere second-order election repeats of those in the past? Or do they reflect an instrument of the constitutional force given to the implementation of constitutional norms and values central to the practice and sustainability of liberal democratic representative government and parliamentary democracy in the EU at a time when the existential raison d’être of the EU is open to challenge not just from within its borders (in the shape of the usual Eurosceptics and ‘extremist’ parties) but from external forces endangering global peace as well as more specifically the viability and security of the EU? The democratic beast in its EU manifestation is not only relatively young but it shoulders the expectations and aspirations of a small group of states in the world committed to democratic political practice, which is both a minority form of governance in the world and one that requires constant renewal and affirmation if it is to withstand extra-EU onslaught and enable the EU to contribute to global peace as the founding fathers of European integration envisaged over 50 years ago. In Part II, the individual country studies reveal that in several member states, governments’ nervousness over the public reception to the draft Constitution may have impelled some to allow European issues to be marginalised in the EP election campaigns, and others to step outside the fray to guard against vociferous anti-European and anti-Constitution elements diverting the campaign and process. For some, the question of whether or not to hold a referendum on the Constitution had yet to be settled. In this sense, in the UK for example, a low turnout was possibly preferable to a higher one that could be represented as a deep public antipathy to the EU in general and the Constitution in particular without a proper debate having taken place. Ensuring that such a proper debate occurs is a collective responsibility. Facilitating understanding of the Constitution’s democratic intent epitomised

6

The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

in its institutional, legal and procedural designs and acting as a communicator and forum at all levels of governance falls to MEPs, and not just the members of the Convention on the Future of Europe. Struck by the low levels of turnout in most member states, the incoming Commission has indicated its intention to ensure that Europe is better communicated, and to ensure that citizens are able to participate. However, this is not really the Commission’s role. Governments, parliaments and parties especially are responsible for explaining what they do, when, why and how. Parties now are but one forum for mobilising citizens and persuading them to use their franchise. Mediated governance is the norm: political information is mediated through many public, private, state, extra-state, extra-territorial and individual voices, both legitimate and accountable, illegitimate and destructive. In an environment of multidimensional and multilevel policy-making, MEPs face the challenge of requiring collective responsibility for sustaining democracy and connecting supranational politics with the people to overcome the lazy, comfortable assumptions that democracy is everpresent and unbiquitous across the EU; that uniformity exists in its conceptualisation, realisation and practice; that it does not require an effort on the part of all citizens to make their political preferences explicit in peaceful, democratically validated and accountable ways. Governments, parliaments and parties committed to democratic institutions, procedures, problem-solving and practices need to show that democracy matters and that it cannot be sustained in the absence of democratic participation exemplified by democratic elections. Mediated governance may open myriad information sources to people interested in and able to access them. It also exacerbates inequalities, trust and democratic deficits. Political mediation offers a constitutionally embedded, accountable and responsible route to reducing them. MEPs provide the human face to democratic governance and are in a position to explain ‘Europe’ to the people. The question for the next EU elections is therefore not simply one of ensuring voters are informed about the EU and EP. Information – even a surfeit of interesting information – will not be enough to persuade people to vote. Rather, there is a need to show that democratic governance remains one of the most benign and inclusive forms of government – from local to supranational level – and that it depends on the participation of the people and the credibility of their legitimate and publicly accountable institutions to deliver good government. The plethora of other forums for participation neither make redundant nor absolve traditional institutions of parliamentary and democratic practice from the need to affirm the legitimacy and accountability of government. The vehicles of participation and communication may expedite the transmission of information but by themselves are far from adequate or sufficient vehicles of democractic governance, let alone efficient channels of ensuring accountability of policy-makers. Accountability itself is

Euro-Elections 2004

7

increasingly slippery. Democracy has to be revitalised. Generations fought to deliver it: ever-evolving European integration has contributed to sustaining it. The European Parliament was and remains its custodian and champion, and the supranational institution that through its accountability to the people needs to give them confidence in the European design.

Notes 1. J. Pinder (ed.) Foundations of Democracy in the European Union: From the Genesis of Parliamentary Democracy to the European Parliament (London: Macmillan, 1999). 2. D. Martin, An Ever Closer Union? (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1991); R. Corbett, The Treaty of Maastricht: From Conception to Ratification (London: Longman, 1994); J. Lodge (ed.) The EEC in Search of a Future (London: Macmillan, 1986).

2

European Parliament 1999–2004 Richard Corbett

The European Parliament’s role in the EU system has continued to evolve. This chapter looks at some of the key changes over the last Parliament that affected the nature of the beast to be elected in 2004.

A more powerful co-legislature The 1999–2004 Parliament began its work soon after the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, making it the first European Parliament that could genuinely claim to be a co-legislature, on an equal footing with the Council with which it formed the bicameral legislative authority of the European Union. The ‘co-decision procedure’, whereby both the EP and the Council have to adopt EU legislation in identical terms, originated in the Maastricht Treaty in the early 1990s, but only for ten articles in the treaty. The Amsterdam Treaty extended this to 23 further articles and at the same time modified the procedure to the EP’s advantage, making it clear that the two institutions were on an equal footing. In the 1999–2004 Parliament, the focus of work therefore shifted further towards legislation. In all, some 403 legislative acts were adopted under codecision (some 2.5 times more than in the previous Parliament under the Maastricht provisions), rising from 68 in the first year of this Parliament to 105 in the last. Parliament’s legislative work normally consisted of amending Commission proposals before approving them. But in some cases, the EP rejected proposals outright, causing them to fall. This could even happen post-conciliation procedure, as in the case of the Takeovers Directive which actually fell on a dead-heat vote, MEPs thereby not approving the outcome of the conciliation negotiations with the Council. More typically, contacts and negotiations between Council and the EP produced sufficient consensus to adopt modified Commission proposals as legislation. In most cases Council

8

European Parliament 1999–2004

9

and Parliament could even reach agreement at first or second reading, without needing conciliation and a third reading. None the less, a significant number of legislative procedures (86, just over a fifth) did require the convening of the conciliation committee, and these were often, of course, the more controversial ones. The conciliation committee, consisting as it does of all the members of the Council and an equal number from the EP, is too large a body to negotiate all details in full committee. It typically relies on a ‘trialogue’ of Council presidency, EP representatives (usually a Vice-President with the committee chair or rapporteur) and the responsible Commissioner to explore possible compromises. The EP and Council representatives report back to their own delegations to the committee which can approve agreements without needing to convene or reconvene the whole committee. Thus, during the five years, the full conciliation committee met on 49 occasions, whereas there were 193 ‘trialogue’ meetings. A large variety of matters have been subject to co-decision, ranging from environmental standards (such as the level of CO2 emissions and the rules for genetically modified organisms), consumer protection (ranging from food hygiene to protection of airline passengers and the warnings on cigarette packets), employee rights (working time, parental leave, consultation of workers), animal welfare, transport, student exchange schemes, the regulation of financial markets and much else besides. Co-decision provides a doublecheck on the adoption of EU legislation: two quality controls in which Council tries to reconcile national differences, as expressed by governments, and Parliament tries to reconcile political differences, as expressed through its political groups. The EP brings openness to the legislative procedure (as it meets in public) and pluralism (comprising MEPs from across the political spectrum, including members from parties in government and those in opposition in their countries). Co-decision makes the EU subject to more checks and balances than any other international structure. None the less, the more consensual style of decision making required in the Union makes it difficult for political groups or parties to highlight their differences to the electorate. The need for an absolute majority in Parliament to amend Council’s position, and the need anyway to reach agreement with a very large majority in a Council composed of diverse governments, means that the main groups in the EP usually end up supporting the same final positions. They may have bargained hard to get there, but it is difficult to profile their distinctiveness to the public. Their members’ skills at explaining, persuading and bargaining can matter more than their number of seats. This style of work has its merits, especially in a Union of diverse countries, but it does blunt the political confrontations and dramas that are the lifeblood of parliaments.

10 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

Parliament and the scrutiny of the executive Some progress was achieved during the 1999–2004 Parliament concerning the EP’s powers of scrutiny over implementing measures. The EU’s system for delegating implementing powers to the Commission required the latter to act in conjunction with committees of national officials. Except where they are purely advisory, such committees could block the Commission’s decision (by a qualified majority in the case of a ‘Management’ committee and by a blocking minority in the case of a ‘Regulatory’ committee) sending the matter to the Council. The EP had for years criticised (1) the fact that only a committee, and not the Parliament, had such a right of call-back, (2) a blocked decision was referred back to Council alone with no Parliamentary involvement, (3) in Regulatory committee systems, Council could continue to block decisions even when it could not agree on an alternative, and (4) the whole system, with hundreds of committees, was complex and lacked transparency. Post-Maastricht, with co-decision giving legislative powers jointly to Parliament and Council, Parliament took the view that they therefore jointly delegate implementing powers, and should consequently both be involved in defining the procedures for exercising them and have equal rights of callback. Council, however, argued that Article 202 of the EC Treaty remained unchanged, providing for Council alone to define the system for implementing powers. Council did, after much pressure from MEPs, eventually modify this ‘comitology’ system in June 1999, to take account of some (but not all) of the EP’s criticisms. It provided for greater transparency, with Parliament to receive all agendas, minutes and all draft measures tabled as well as to be informed of the composition of committees. It lessened the possibility for Council to block implementing measures when it cannot agree on an alternative. However, as regards Parliament’s rights to call back a measure, it recognised only that the EP could claim (within one month) that an implementing measure exceeded the scope of powers delegated, in which case the measure had to be re-examined. There was no recognised right to object to the substance. A new opportunity to press the issue arose in 2001. In the area of financial services, a large volume of highly technical co-decision legislation, that would require frequent adaptation, led to some anxiety that too much frequentlychanging small print would be subject to up to three readings each in Council and Parliament. On the proposal of a committee set up by the European Council and chaired by Baron Lamfalussy, it was proposed that Council and Parliament should agree that, once the basic principles were adopted by co-decision, substantial implementing powers should be delegated to the Commission, working under comitology procedures with specialist regulatory and advisory committees. This gave the EP the opportunity to seek further reforms. Without some concessions, it simply would not agree to delegate powers. In particular, Parliament sought to obtain a right to call decisions back if it were dissatisfied on the scope or the substance and insisted on

European Parliament 1999–2004

11

being treated in an equivalent way to the Council. This led to further interinstitutional negotiations which resulted, in February 2002, in a formal undertaking from the Commission accepting that, in this field, Parliament’s period to examine draft implementing measures be three months instead of one month, that Parliament had a formal role on the substance and not just on the scope as laid down in the 1999 decision, and that it would ‘endeavour that the Parliament benefits from equal treatment’ with the Council, implying that it would give equal weight to any Parliamentary objections to a measure. The Commission and Council also accepted that there be a ‘sunset clause’ on such delegations of power, which would automatically return to Parliament and Council unless they renewed it. More generally, the Commission stated that it now accepted that the Council and Parliament ‘should have an equal role in controlling the way the Commission carries out this executive role’. It followed this up with a proposal to Council to amend the 1999 decision. It proposed that, where the basic legislation was adopted by co-decision, implementing measures would be adopted, under the regulatory procedure, through two distinct stages. In the initial ‘executive’ phase, the Commission would discuss its drafts with committees of member state representatives. It would then finalise its drafts and send them, in the second ‘control’ phase, to the EP and the Council. Either institution could, within a set deadline, express opposition to the Commission’s draft implementing measure, in which case the Commission would either submit a legislative proposal or proceed to adopt the implementing measure, possibly amended in the light of the positions of the EP and the Council. An urgency procedure would allow implementing measures to provisionally enter into force before the legislator’s controls take place. This would fulfil the requirement that Council and Parliament be equal partners in overseeing the Commission, but remained unsatisfactory in that the Commission could still ignore any objections made. In the event, the Council did not want to revise the 1999 decision before the Convention drafting a new Constitution (see below) had finished its work. But in the Convention, the ongoing evolution of this debate had a significant influence leading to agreement on this issue that was duly incorporated into the draft Constitution providing for the EP and Council to have equal rights in scrutiny, call-back and revision of delegated legislation.

Constitutional change The EP, and its committee on Constitutional Affairs, remained highly involved in seeking further system change in the EU. During the lifetime of the 1999– 2004 Parliament, there were two rounds of treaty reform. The first culminated in the Treaty of Nice and the second in the drafting of the proposal for a new EU Constitution. The Nice IGC arose because the Amsterdam Treaty had failed

12 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

to settle three interrelated problems generally seen as central to making the EU fit for enlargement. These were: • the scope of majority decision-making in the Council, which was only increased slightly at Amsterdam; unanimity among well over 20 member states was felt to be a recipe for gridlock • the weighting of votes per member state in the Council, with a large number of small countries poised to join • the number of European Commissioners. It was agreed that the Union would need to return to these ‘Amsterdam leftovers’ before enlargement could successfully take place, and a further IGC was convened during the year 2000. The EP again pushed for participation in the IGC and for the IGC to address issues beyond the Amsterdam leftovers. On both these points, Parliament was successful. It participated with two representatives, Elmar Brok and Dimitris Tsatsos, taking part in all the meetings of the IGC negotiating group (as opposed to selected meetings in the Amsterdam IGC). On widening the agenda of the IGC, Parliament pressed for this to include the reallocation of seats per member state in the EP, the working methods of the Courts, the integration of the WEU, enhanced cooperation, the statute of European political parties, the power of the Commission President to dismiss commissioners, and the protection of rights (with the European Council having convened a body composed of MEPs, MPs and government representatives to draft a Charter of Fundamental Rights for the Union). Despite the initial reluctance of many member states to widen the agenda, all of these points were eventually dealt with. The compromise agreed in the middle of the fourth night of negotiation in the European Council of Nice in December 2000 contained elements that were strongly criticised by the EP. These included the new definition of a qualified majority (which effectively raised the threshold, thereby making decisiontaking more difficult, as well as making the definition more complicated) and the excessive number of seats in the EP (ignoring the previously agreed limit of 700 and containing anomalies such as the Czech Republic and Hungary having fewer seats than countries of equivalent size). But the Nice package also contained some improvements: • the extension of qualified majority voting (QMV) to 28 new areas, including the decision on nominating a President of the Commission and the adoption of the statute on European political parties • the extension of co-decision powers for the EP to six, later eight, new areas • a new right for the EP to challenge the legal acts of the other institutions at the Court of Justice

European Parliament 1999–2004

13

• the reorganisation of the Courts to avoid the EU’s legal system seizing up with the growing backlog of cases • the strengthening of the powers of future Presidents of the Commission, giving them the right to organise a hierarchy by nominating VicePresidents, and the right to dismiss individual Commissioners • the provisions on triggering enhanced cooperation without the need for unanimity • the strengthening of Article 7, for dealing with a member state in which fundamental rights are threatened • the establishment of EuroJust • the provisions on defence and security, with the virtual absorption of the WEU by the Union. Parliament did not specifically endorse the Nice Treaty, but nor did it call for its rejection. Instead, it took advantage of the highly critical mood about IGCs as a working method, with complex deals settled late at night by tired heads of government, and called for the next reform to be prepared by different procedures. The EP pressed for a novel way of preparing the next treaty reform. It called for a Convention, composed of European and national parliamentarians, national governments and Commission representatives, meeting in public, to examine the competencies and procedures of an enlarged EU and to reach broad agreement on a new, codified, simplified and improved Constitution for it. Although novel in terms of preparing a new treaty, the method had been used to prepare the Charter of Rights endorsed by the institutions at the time of the Nice summit, and of course tallied with Parliament’s traditional tactic of trying to build alliances, notably with national parliaments and sympathetic governments. Few governments were initially enthusiastic, but this was turned around by a year of lobbying by the EP, notably via national parliaments, in time for the European Council meeting in Laeken-Brussels in December 2001. The Belgian Presidency worked closely with the Parliament’s Constitutional Committee, and especially an informal group of its leading members (Napolitano, Mendez de Vigo, Corbett, Leinen, Duff, Frassoni and Kaufman) dubbed the ‘Friends of Laeken’, in drafting a text approved by the heads of government, which became known as the Laeken Declaration. It provided for the Convention to be composed of one representative of each government and two of each national parliament from all 28 member states and applicant states (including Turkey), 16 Members of the European Parliament, two members of the European Commission, a President (former French President Giscard d’Estaing) and two Vice-Presidents (former Belgian and Italian Prime Ministers Dehaene and Amato). Parliament identified a number of priorities for its representatives to press for:

14 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

• the treaties to be consolidated into a single document with the typically constitutional parts to be in a short first section • the Charter of Rights agreed at Nice to be incorporated into the treaty • an end to the ‘pillar’ structure of the Union, notably by incorporating the remaining part of the ‘Third pillar’ into the field of Community law • co-decision to apply to the remaining areas of legislative activity • Parliament to elect the President of the Commission • the posts of High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy and Commissioner for External Affairs to be merged • comitology to be further reformed. All of these elements were included in the draft Constitution approved by the Convention and submitted to the governments for an IGC in 2003–04. The IGC, in which Parliament again participated through two representatives (Mendez de Vigo, later replaced by Brok, and Hänsch) at ministerial level and its President (Cox) at heads of government level, left them all intact.

Internal reform In light of the forthcoming enlargement and of the Nice Treaty changes, the EP embarked on a general revision of its internal Rules of Procedure through the Corbett Report of 2002. With this reform, Parliament streamlined its committee and plenary procedures to devote more time to controversial matters, tightened up the rule on creating political groups (henceforth to require members from at least one-fifth of the member states), made provision for a secret ballot when voting on the candidate for President of the Commission (thereby lessening the possibilities for governments to lean on MEPs) and limited the possibilities to filibuster.

Election system Another issue resolved during the 1999–2004 Parliament was the question of the electoral system for electing the EP itself. The original treaties provided for Parliament to draw up proposals for a uniform procedure in all member states to be enacted by Council acting unanimously. However, the Council had never been able to agree on a uniform procedure despite the various EP proposals over the years. The Treaty of Amsterdam therefore amended these provisions of the treaty allowing for the possibility, failing a uniform procedure, of ‘common principles’ to be adopted rather than a fully identical procedure. On 25 June 2002 Council approved, with the EP’s assent, a decision enacting certain common principles. Most notable of these was the obligation on member states to use proportional representation based either on the list

European Parliament 1999–2004

15

system or the single transferable vote. It also added to the incompatibilities by stating that EP membership was incompatible with being a member of the Court of First Instance, the Board of the European Central Bank, Ombudsman and, to be phased in, membership of a national parliament. This latter provision will bring to an end the practice of a dual mandate, which had already been in decline.

The statute for European political parties Over the years a number of European-level party federations had been formed, notably the EPP (Christian democrats/centre-right), the Party of European Socialists, the ELDR (liberals), the European Free Alliance (chiefly regionalist parties) and the Greens. They were some way from having the cohesiveness and public impact of most national political parties, and their funding relied in large part on their respective groups in the European Parliament, a situation that the Court of Auditors had criticised. This criticism was a spur to set up a separate and transparent system for financing European political parties. It was also thought that a statute for them could enhance their profile. It could, in due course, counter the tendency for European elections to be fought on domestic rather than European issues. Indeed, since Maastricht, the treaty states that ‘political parties at European level are important as a factor for integration within the Union. They contribute to forming a European awareness and to expressing the political will of the citizens of the Union.’ Taking advantage of the introduction by the Nice Treaty of QMV with co-decision to adopt the statute for European political parties, Council and Parliament reached agreement on this in early 2004. The regulation on ‘political parties at European level’, which became operational in July 2004 after the European elections, lays down that, to achieve recognition and hence EU funding, a European party must be represented, in at least onequarter of member states, in the EP or in the national parliaments or regional assemblies; alternatively, it must have received, in at least one-quarter of the member states, at least 3 per cent of the votes cast at the most recent European elections. A European party must respect the principles of the EU, namely liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law. The EU budget will make available €8.4 million per year for funding European political parties. Of this, 15 per cent will be distributed in equal shares among the parties, while the rest will be distributed in proportion to the number of members elected to the EP. To receive financing from the budget a European-level political party must file an application with the EP each year. Any money thus received may only be used to cover expenditure directly linked to the objectives set out in its political programme and may not be used for the direct or indirect funding of national political parties. A European party must also publish annually its revenue and expenditure

16 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

and declare its other sources of funding by providing a list of donors and of donations exceeding €500 received from each donor. A party may not accept anonymous donations, donations from legal bodies in which the state holds more than 50 per cent of the capital, nor donations exceeding €12,000 per year from any individual or organisation.

Members’ statute Parliament continued to be dogged by the failure of the EU to adopt a common statute on the terms and conditions of MEPs and by other issues surrounding MEPs’ expenses. The failure to agree a common statute from the beginning of the elected EP had led to the establishment of what was supposed to be a provisional system whereby every MEP was paid the same as a member of his or her national parliament. The regime for expenses was left to the EP with the understanding that this would compensate members from countries where national MPs had a particularly low salary. This system had become increasingly untenable, but the political challenges involved in agreeing a common salary – which would inevitably mean cuts for some and politically difficult increases for others as well as ending the linkage with national MPs – in the end proved insurmountable. The treaty provides for a common statute to be adopted by the EP with the assent of the Council. With the entry into force of the Treaty of Nice, such assent could be given by a qualified majority instead of unanimity, with the exception of any provisions relating to taxation. After several years of discussion, an agreement seemed close in June 2003, when the EP approved a draft statute, which it thought would obtain the assent of the Council. The latter, however, announced that it objected to three points: the retirement age for MEPs, the tax arrangements for their salaries and questions to do with privileges and immunities, which it said could only be changed on the basis of an IGC. In December 2003, Parliament voted by a very large majority to accept Council’s objections. Parliament agreed that salaries, although paid from the European budget, should be subject not only to European tax but also to national tax, provided that there would be no double taxation (a point accepted by the Council). Parliament agreed that immunities and privileges should be dealt with separately. Lastly, MEPs proposed a compromise on the retirement age, which the Italian Presidency of the Council had indicated would be acceptable: former MEPs would be entitled to a pension from the age of 63 (instead of 65 as the Council wanted or 60 as proposed by Parliament in June). It seemed that, 25 years after the first direct elections, MEPs would at last be governed by the same rules. But unexpectedly and at the last minute – during the Council meeting of 26 January 2004 which was due to approve the draft statute – a number of ministers objected to the level of the proposed salaries

European Parliament 1999–2004

17

for MEPs, which had been set at half that for a judge of the European Court of Justice and which until then had been unopposed. The whole statute has therefore been left for the new Parliament to try once more. The several rounds of discussion leading up to this meant that, every six months or so, the issue of MEPs salaries and expenses was in the headlines. This led in turn to it becoming the focus of Eurosceptic attacks. Weaknesses in the expenses system included a flat rate reimbursement of travel to the EP based on a YY economy class airfare (but leaving members free to find cheaper methods of travel where they could) and controls which were, at least initially, somewhat lax in terms of checking that members utilised their staff and office allowance properly. These were significantly tightened up over the years (though some national parties, such as the UK Labour Party, took additional precautions in requiring their own MEPs to have their accounts audited annually by external auditors), but the travel reimbursement remained subject to strong criticism. Although not very different from the system in force in several national parliaments, including the UK, it was a sitting target for Eurosceptic attacks and media sensationalism. These considerably weakened the image of the European Parliament in the run-up to the 2004 elections. Overall, however, the EP has continued to have considerable influence in shaping the EU.

3

European Parliamentary Electoral Law and the 2004 Elections: Towards Uniformity or Commonality? James D. Mather

The Assembly shall draw up proposals for elections by direct universal suffrage in accordance with a uniform procedure in all Member States. The Council shall, acting unanimously, lay down the appropriate provisions, which it shall recommend to Member states for adoption in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. (Art.138 (3) EEC) When the EC Treaty was signed by the original six member states in 1957, original art.137 EEC stated that the Assembly, as the EP was originally called, consist of representatives with advisory and supervisory power. Original art.138 (3) EEC stipulated that it comprise ‘delegates … designated by the respective Parliaments from among their members in accordance with the procedure laid down by each Member State’. MEPs were therefore nominees from national parliaments. Art.138 prescribed direct universal suffrage according to a uniform procedure across the Community. As much as this would have been welcomed by many as a move to endow the evolving European construct with a degree of popular legitimacy, governments of the Six feared that this would lead to calls for the Assembly to be much less of a consultative, advisory body and much more of a fully-fledged legislative chamber, posing a significant threat to their overall power in what they saw was still very much an intergovernmental organisation. Nearly 20 years of wrangling later, they finally agreed to hold first direct elections held in line with provisions under Council Decision 76/787 EC. This instrument, inter alia, reaffirmed the initial treaty pledge that the ‘European Parliament’, now 18

European Parliamentary Electoral Law

19

so-named, be elected by a uniform electoral procedure. In the meantime, national electoral laws were to regulate them. The first eventually took place in June 1979. National governments have still to agree unanimously to a uniform electoral procedure so MEPs are now directly elected accordingly to different systems and rules on different days, albeit within the same fourday period. This chapter examines the legal dimensions of European parliamentary electoral procedure as a whole and the extent to which there is parity in the processes which take place. It is divided into four sections. The first section gives a largely historical account of the background to direct elections and the pledge until 1997 and the Treaty of Amsterdam to institute a uniform electoral system. Then it examines the post-Amsterdam art.190 (4) EC which provides that the EP draft proposals for direct elections in accordance with ‘principles common to all Member states’ if a uniform procedure is deemed undesirable or unascertainable. This is the basis for universalised forms of proportional representation (PR). The second section outlines the varying modes of PR used by the member states in the 2004 EP. The third section considers whether, in the absence of total uniformity, a degree of commonality has been achieved and whether it is sufficient for the election of a supranational legislative body at the turn of the twenty-first century. The final section suggests measures to further the possibility of what I term ‘flexible uniformity’ across the EU for future EP elections.

An electoral history The six founding member states of the Community agreed, as laid down in original art.138 EEC, that the Assembly should draft proposals for direct elections under a uniform procedure. The final decision was, however, to be taken unanimously by the Council. MEPs had to prepare the ground for the transition from an Assembly of indirectly elected delegates to one of (uniformly) elected representatives. Spurred on by their cherished power of initiative in this field (something usually reserved to the Commission), and galvanised by a desire to become a genuine democratically elected legislature, they acted quickly. In 1961, the first set of proposals was set out in the Dehousse Report, which the Council rejected. The Assembly, calling itself ‘Parliament’, adopted two further resolutions in 1963 and 1969 but the Six also rejected them, so a number of national parliaments threatened to elect their own national representatives by universal suffrage. However, they concluded that this would have contravened the strict rules of the treaty, something they were hesitant to do. In any case, if the primary reason for direct elections, with or without a uniform procedure, was to imbue the EP and the European project with a degree of social and democratic legitimacy, direct elections across the whole of the Community were needed and not some kind of representational fragmentation.

20 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

Following the accession of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom to the Community in 1973, the EP’s Political Affairs Committee put direct elections back on the political agenda. Dutch Socialist Schelto Patijn was given the task of drawing up a report and putting forward appropriate recommendations. Upon his rather minimalist and tentative proposals, the Assembly, in January 1975, formally adopted a resolution in the shape of the Draft Convention on Direct Elections.1 This laid the basis for Council Decision 76/787 EC, and the attached Act Concerning the Election of the Representatives of the Assembly by Direct Universal Suffrage, which provided, inter alia, that the EP comprise 410 representatives, elected on five-yearly terms, who could, if so chosen, hold a dual mandate. The question of a uniform procedure, as envisaged in the treaty, was, significantly, put to one side with the insertion of art.7 which reiterated the wording of art.138 (3) EEC that it was for the EP, presumably sooner rather than later, to draw up the requisite proposals. In the interim – which was in fact to last indefinitely – EP electoral procedures were to be governed by national provisions. Although originally envisaged to be in force to permit European elections in June 1978, Decision 76/787 EC finally entered into force on 1 July 1978, thereby resulting in the postponement of the first direct elections until June 1979. Despite the delay, what is notable about the adoption of the Decision is that within a mere five years the Council had in principle and practice dropped its opposition to a directly elected chamber. Immediately following the 1979 elections, Jean Seitlinger, a Christian Democrat from France, put forward recommendations for a procedure inspired by the system of election to the German Bundestag, based on a variant of proportional representation with seats distributed according to the d’Hondt method. Multilevel constituencies with between 3 and 15 representatives (as originally proposed then dropped in the UK in 1977–78) would be established and there would be no electoral threshold. In March 1982, the EP adopted his proposals by 158 votes to 77, a majority of approximately 2:1.2 However, between December 1982 and May 1983, the Council failed to achieve unanimity and missed an opportunity to augment the representative and democratic nature of the institutionally immature Parliament. Instead it set the basis for a series of more determined but ultimately (unnecessary and) unsuccessful proposals. Following the 1984 elections, German MEP Reinhold Bocklet (a member of the European People’s Party) reignited the debate within both the EP and the Council. He argued that the aim of a uniform electoral system could be attained incrementally, and that ‘uniformity’ per se did not necessarily signify the need for absolutely identical procedures across the EC but required, instead, parity in key elements of the system. He proposed universal voting by the d’Hondt method with member states free to divide their territories into either a single national constituency or smaller regional constituencies and to set their own thresholds of no more than 5 per cent. Owing to wholesale opposition of the EP’s Legal Affairs Committee and only a small majority in

European Parliamentary Electoral Law

21

favour in the Political Affairs Committee in February 1985,3 the proposals were not voted on by the EP. Despite the establishment of an intergroup working party, which worked to resolve differences by laying down a number of common fundamental principles, progress stalled before the 1989 elections. Shortly afterwards, Karel de Gucht, a Flemish liberal, was charged with the election brief. Over a three-year period, he worked tenaciously as rapporteur of an informal working group within the Committee of Institutional Affairs. Following the adoption of an interim resolution proposed by him in 1991,4 the EP adopted his substantive proposals in March 1993 by 207 votes to 79. The de Gucht proposals also argued that ‘uniformity’ did not mean ‘identical’ in every aspect across the Community but rather harmonisation of the most basic elements in a common procedure based on proportional representation. This was to take account of the votes cast throughout the territory of each member state, with each able to draw up open or closed party lists either for the whole territory or for smaller regional constituencies and minimum thresholds of between 3 and 5 per cent. With the United Kingdom (or more accurately Great Britain) in mind, the de Gucht proposals provided that if a member state had a single-member constituency system, no more than two-thirds of seats could be distributed according to that system, with the remaining third distributed to ensure overall proportionality. Despite EP approval, the Council failed even to consider de Gucht’s recommendations. Some progress was made after the 1994 elections and EC enlargement to Austria, Finland and Sweden. In 1996, when the Heads of State and Government at Amsterdam amended art.190 (4) EC (ex-art.138 (3)) to the effect that the achievement of a ‘uniform’ procedure was no longer their exclusive aim and that a system drawn up ‘in accordance with principles common to all member states’ was equally as welcome, if not more attainable. This was clearly a response to Bocklet and de Gucht’s recognition that there were manifest differences of opinion between the member states and that harmonisation and flexibility, as opposed to uniformity and rigidity, were more likely to win the support of more governments. The immediate post-Amsterdam proposals adopted by MEPs in July 1998 were devised by Giorgio Anastassopoulos, a Greek member of the European People’s Party, who, in a draft act, largely followed its line of commonality.5 He argued that all MEPs be elected by a list system of PR with optional minimum thresholds and preferential voting, and special arrangements to take account of specific regional characteristics. Controversially, member states with over 20 million inhabitants were to establish regional constituencies and 10 per cent of all seats were to be elected in a Europe-wide constituency. These recommendations reflected the Amsterdam change in emphasis to flexibility and commonality and their implementation would not have brought about too great a transformation in practice, particularly given that all the member states had in place a system of proportional representation for the 1999 elections. As predicted by many, the Council did not adopt them for the 2004 elections.

22 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

The 2004 elections Following EU enlargement on 1 May 2004, the EP elections between 10 and 13 June 2004 were the largest transnational parliamentary elections ever to be held, with a total of 25 member states participating. As can be seen in Table 3.1, although all had adopted one of two (of many other) forms of PR, either the party list or the single transferable vote (STV), a range of variants of the former were employed. Whereas Ireland and Malta (as well as Northern Ireland) alone used STV, the other 23 had party lists based on either d’Hondt (Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Hungary, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain and the UK), Hare-Niemeyer (Germany and Italy), Hagenbach-Bischoff (Greece, Luxembourg and Slovakia) and Saint-Laguë (Latvia and Sweden). Austria, the Netherlands and Poland used a combination of the d’Hondt and the Hare-Niemeyer systems, while Cyprus and Lithuania relied upon their own particular forms of party list for the calculation and distribution of seats. As well as these differences in overall electoral formulae there were asymmetries also in terms of preferential voting. Seventeen member states allowed preference voting for one or more individual candidates whilst the remaining eight limited individual choice by favouring predetermined party lists of candidates. Of the 17, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg and Malta had open lists, whereas Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Sweden drew up ordered lists. In terms of electoral districts, as is also shown in Table 3.1, 18 member states designated a single national constituency covering their entire territory. Four divided it into regional constituencies. In Italy and Poland, seat allocation was based on national votes but with administrative representation between the regions, whilst in Germany, lists could be drawn up either at the regional level within the Länder or at the national, federal level depending upon party preference. As far as minimum legal thresholds are concerned, 12 of the 25 member states imposed thresholds of between 3 and 5 per cent, whereas the remaining 13 were content for any party receiving a tangible share of the vote to be represented in the EP. A total of 19 member states staged their elections on Sunday 13 June 2004. EU citizens in the Netherlands and the UK voted on Thursday 10 June, those in Ireland on Friday 11 June, and those in Latvia and Malta on Saturday 12 June. Only the Czech Republic spread voting over two days with polling stations open on Friday 11 June between 14.00 and 22.00 and those on Saturday 12 June between 08.00 and 14.00. Postal voting, as in the UK, and electoral innovations in the Netherlands, also allowed ballots to be cast over a longer period. The vote could not be declared officially until the last polling booth anywhere in the EU had closed. With regard now to the rights to vote and stand as a candidate for EP elections following Maastricht, art.19 (2) EC (ex-art.8b (2)) provided that every citizen of the Union, defined as any national of a member state, be able to enjoy electoral

Table 3.1

Modes of European election by member state, 2004

Member state

23

Austria Belgium Cyprus Czech Republic Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Ireland Italy Latvia Lithuania Luxembourg Malta Netherlands Poland Portugal Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sweden United Kingdom

Electoral formula

Preferential voting

Ballot structure

Constituency

Electoral threshold (%)

Voting day (2004)

H–N & d’Hondt d’Hondt Form of Party List d’Hondt d’Hondt d’Hondt d’Hondt d’Hondt Hare–Niemeyer Hagenbach–Bischoff d’Hondt S.T.V. Hare– Niemeyer Sainte–Laguë Largest Remainder Hagenbach–Bischoff STV H–N & d’Hondt d’Hondt d’Hondt Hagenbach–Bischoff d’Hondt d’Hondt Modified Saint–Laguë d’Hondt & STV (NI)

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes No & Yes (NI)

Ordered Ordered Open Ordered Open Closed Open Closed Closed Closed Closed Open Open Open Ordered Open Open Ordered Ordered Closed Ordered Ordered Closed Ordered Closed

National Regional National National National National National Regional National & Regional National National Regional Regional National National National National National National & Regional National National National National National Regional

4 – – 5 5 – – 5 5 3 5 – – 5 5 – – – 5 – 5 – – 4 –

Sunday 13 June Sunday 13 June Sunday 13 June Friday 11 & Saturday 12 June Sunday 13 June Sunday 13 June Sunday 13 June Sunday 13 June Sunday 13 June Sunday 13 June Sunday 13 June Friday 11 June Sunday 13 June Saturday 12 June Sunday 13 June Sunday 13 June Saturday 12 June Thursday 10 June Sunday 13 June Sunday 13 June Sunday 13 June Sunday 13 June Sunday 13 June Sunday 13 June Thursday 10 June

Sources: ;

24 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

rights in the member state of residence, under the same conditions as nationals of that state. Detailed arrangements for the implementation of this Article were provided for in Directive 93/109 EC which, according to its preamble, had as one of its principal aims the abolition of any pre-existing nationality requirements imposed by member states to regulate such participation. Accordingly, art.3 makes clear that any Union citizen who is not a national of the member state in which he or she resides and who satisfies the same conditions with regard to the rights to vote and stand as a candidate as those imposed by the state on its own nationals, may vote and stand on equal terms. In the 2004 elections, it is notable that the Luxembourgeois Frédérique Ries, resident in Belgium, took the opportunity, stemming from the Directive, of standing on the same terms as Belgian nationals and now represents the Belgian collège électoral francophone. Despite being heralded by many as a major reform for placing Union citizens, who have exercised their fundamental right under art.18 (1) EC to freedom of movement to another member state, on the same footing as nationals of that state, the fact that member states still retain the absolute competence to formulate the substantive rules conditioning the rights to vote and stand within their jurisdiction must not be ignored. Therefore, although measures on eligibility must be applied to nationals and Union citizens without distinction, individual member states still jealously guard the authority to determine the precise nature of these rules within their territory. Inevitably, this has led to disparities. In 2004, as demonstrated by Table 3.2, although all member states stipulated 18 as the minimum voting age, eligibility to stand as a candidate varied from 18 in Denmark and Slovenia to 25 in Cyprus, Greece and Italy, 23 in France, and 21 in Lithuania. Some states permitted their own nationals in third states either to vote by post, for instance Finland, Luxembourg and Spain, or by proxy, for example France, while some, such as Ireland, Hungary and Slovakia, imposed a strict residence requirement and denied the vote to those of their nationals living abroad. Clearly the ability of Union citizens to exercise their Union-derived rights varies between the member states.

The achievement of commonality post-Amsterdam? Decision 2002/772 EC sought to amend original Decision 76/787 EC in order to fulfil the Amsterdam goal of EP, in accordance with principles common if not uniform in the member states. For the 2004 elections and thereafter, the amended act provided that MEPs would be elected on the basis of PR using either the list system or the single transferable vote method (art.1 (1)) and that preferential lists would be permitted (art.1 (2)). It further laid down that member states would have the power to establish constituencies and electoral subdivisions within their territories (art.2); they would have the power to set minimum thresholds not exceeding 5 per cent for the allocation of seats

European Parliamentary Electoral Law Table 3.2

25

The rights to vote and stand by member state, 2004

Member state Entitlement to vote

Eligibility for election

Austria

Age = 19. Every Austrian/EU citizen able to stand. EU citizens must be in full possession of right to stand in member state of origin.

Belgium

Cyprus

Czech Republic

Denmark

Estonia

Finland

France

Age = 18. Every Austrian/EU citizen able to vote. EU citizens must be in full possession of voting rights in member state of origin. Austrians abroad able to vote using polling cards. Age = 18. All Belgian & EU citizens resident in Belgium and in full possession of voting rights entitled to vote. Belgian citizens abroad able to apply to vote by post. Age = 18. All Cypriots & EU citizens who are habitually resident in Cyprus for period of at least six months immediately prior to acquiring voting rights able to vote. Age = 18. Any Czech/EU citizen entitled to vote. Must be in possession of full voting rights.

Age = 18. Any Danish/EU citizen permanently resident in Denmark able to vote. Danes resident in another EU member state may cast postal vote unless denied by legal decision. Age = 18. Every Estonian/EU citizen entitled to vote except those legally divested of right. EU citizens must permanently reside there & have right to vote in home member state. Age = 18. All Finnish citizens eligible to vote regardless of domicile. EU citizens able to vote if domiciled in Finland on 51st day before election day and if apply for right to vote no later than on 80th day before election day. If lost right to vote in member state of origin no entitlement to vote. Age = 18. All French & EU citizens who are domiciled or long-term resident able to vote. France nationals living outside France may vote by travelling to France or by proxy.

Age = 21. All Belgian & EU citizens able to vote entitled to stand. Must be entered on Belgian electoral roll, enjoy full civil rights and speak language corresponding to constituency. Age = 25. Right to stand open to those with right to vote. No right for those convicted of serious or electoral offence or those suffering from mental incapacity. Age = 21. Any Czech/EU citizen mainly resident in Czech Republic able to stand. EU citizens must be registered as resident for more than 45 days. Age = 18. Any Danish/EU citizen in full possession of right to stand as candidate entitled to stand. EU citizens must enjoy right to stand in member state of origin. Age = 21. Every Estonian & EU citizen with right to vote able to stand. Members of defence forces no right to stand. Age = 18. All Finnish & EU citizens having right to vote may stand for election.

Age = 23. All French & EU citizens who are domiciled or long-term resident able to stand. EU citizens must be fully entitled to stand in member state of origin.

26 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

Table 3.2

continued

Member state Entitlement to vote

Eligibility for election

Germany

Age = 18. Must be German for at least 1 year to stand. Must be in full possession of right to stand as candidate. EU citizens as residents of Germany entitled to stand. Must satisfy right to stand in own member state.

Greece

Hungary

Ireland

Age = 18. All Germans who are residents of Germany, EU member state, state of Council of Europe or any other state where been resident there for less than 25 years, entitled to vote. Must be on German electoral role. EU citizens in full possession of voting rights in member state of origin entitled to vote. Age = 18. All Greeks & EU citizens entitled to vote. Must be registered on electoral role of municipality or local authority. Those with irrevocable criminal conviction unable to vote. Age = 18. Every Hungarian/EU citizen having a residence in Hungary entitled to vote. EU citizens from other member states must ask for inclusion on list of voters. Age = 18. All Irish & EU citizens resident in Ireland able to vote. EU citizens must possess full voting rights in member state of origin. Irish citizens resident abroad not able to vote. Age = 18. All Italian & EU citizens registered on electoral roll for 90 days before election able to vote.

Age = 25. All who have right to vote entitled to stand as candidate.

Age = 18. Every Hungarian/EU citizen having right to vote entitled to stand for election.

Age = 21. All Irish & EU citizens must be resident in Ireland to stand. EU citizens must be in full possession of right to stand in member state of origin.

Age = 25. All Italian & EU citizens able to vote entitled to stand. EU citizens must have right to stand in member state of origin. Latvia Age = 21. Every Latvian/EU citizen, Age = 18. living in Latvia, able to stand. Lithuania Age = 21. Every Lithuanian/EU Age = 18. Every Lithuanian national/EU citizen, permanently citizen entitled to vote able to resident in Lithuania as evidenced stand. Prohibited where not served by population register, able to vote. sentence imposed by court 65 days prior to election, if in military or Must be included 65 days prior if legally incapable and subject to to election. Must not have been forced medical treatment. declared incapable by court. Luxembourg Age = 18. All Luxembourg Age = 18. All Luxembourg nationals & EU citizens resident nationals & EU citizens resident in Luxembourg able to stand. in Luxembourg able to vote. EU EU citizens must possess all civil citizens must possess all civil rights & must not have been rights and must not have been disenfranchised in member state Italy

European Parliamentary Electoral Law

Table 3.2

27

continued

of origin. Luxembourg nationals abroad able to vote by post. Malta Age = 18. Every Maltese/EU citizen on electoral register able to vote. Maltese citizens abroad may vote by post. Must not be serving sentence of above 6 months or be mentally infirm. Netherlands Age = 18. All Dutch & EU citizens able to vote. EU citizens must be in full possession of voting rights in member state of origin. Netherlands citizens abroad may vote by proxy or post. Poland Age = 18. Every Polish national/EU citizen, in permanent residence entitled, to vote. Must be registered in voter register. No postal voting allowed. Portugal Age = 18. Every Portuguese/EU citizen entitled to vote. EU citizens must be entitled to vote in member state of origin. Slovakia Age = 18. Every Slovak/EU citizen domiciled in Slovakia entitled to vote. Slovenia Age = 18. All Slovenians & EU citizens with permanent resident in Slovenia able to vote. Must not be suffering from mental disorder. Spain Age = 18. All Spanish & other EU citizens entitled to vote. EU citizens must be fully entitled to vote in member state of origin. Spanish nationals abroad able to vote by post. Sweden Age = 18. All Swedish & EU citizens registered resident in Sweden entitled to vote. Postal voting from abroad allowed. United Age = 18. All United Kingdom & Kingdom other EU citizens able to vote. Must appear on electoral roll. EU citizens must be in full possession of voting rights in member state of origin. UK nationals abroad and members of armed forces need to make declaration of eligibility to vote. Source:

disenfranchised in member state of origin. Age = 18. Every Maltese/EU citizen appearing on Electoral Register able to stand.

Age = 18. All Dutch & EU citizens able to stand. EU citizens must be in full possession of voting rights in member state of origin. Age = 21. Every Polish national/EU citizen, having remained permanently in Poland or another EU member state for 5 years, entitled to stand. Must not have been convicted of criminal offence. Age = 18. Every Portuguese/EU citizen entitled to stand. EU citizens must be entitled to stand in member state of origin. Age = 21. Every Slovak/EU citizen domiciled in Slovakia entitled to stand. Age = 18. All Slovenians & EU citizens with permanent residence in Slovenia able to stand. Must not be suffering from mental disorder. Age = 18. All Spanish & other EU citizens able to vote entitled to stand.

Age = 18. All Swedish & EU citizens entitled to vote are entitled to stand. Age = 21. All United Kingdom & other EU citizens entitled to vote are entitled to stand. EU citizens must be in full possession of civic rights in member state of origin.

28 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

(art.2A); and they would also be able to set ceilings for candidates’ election expenses (art.2B). In addition, rules governing the incompatibility of the office of MEP with membership of national parliaments (art.6 (2)); the ability of member states to determine the date and time of elections within a fixed four-day period (art.9 (1)); and the ability of member states to decide upon procedures for filling vacancies (art.12 (2)) were included. Given the manifest lack of uniformity, has commonality truly been achieved in respect of the processes for electing the EP? Universal PR is now the norm, not merely informally but formally. Whereas this is certainly a welcome step towards some kind of parity, it must be recognised, however, that at least four variants of the party list are employed as well as STV. Shortly after the 1999 elections, these various methods, coupled with differences in preferential voting, led inevitably to disproportionality and distortions in the EP’s representative nature.6 These are exacerbated by three related factors: member states being able to decide whether or not to (1) apply electoral thresholds and then, in the event, applying them variably; (2) divide their territories into constituencies or small electoral units; and (3) inequalities agreed by governments in respect of the ratio of electors to MEPs in each member state (see Table 3.3). Considerable differences persist when it comes to the precise detail of some of the most important procedural rules and practices. Art.7 of the amended act maintains, without prejudice to its other rather minimalist, pro-national stipulations, that the EP electoral procedure be governed in each member state by its own internal provisions. On the surface, it can be inferred that national rules still have greatest substance – so long as they ‘do not affect the essentially proportional nature of the voting system’ – because of the different situations and circumstances prevailing in each of the states. This may be so, but for a supranational parliament, supposedly the mouthpiece and representative body of all the peoples of Europe, there is a much stronger case for national peculiarities to be set aside and for them to be subordinated to the need for a higher degree of intra-Community harmonisation and overall procedural consistency, in order to provide it with greater independence and legitimacy. However, the real reason for ceding so little sovereignty over EP electoral procedure to the EU lies in member states’ unwillingness to see national electorates merged to form a potentially strong supranational electorate; an electorate which could, in their eyes, plausibly strengthen the EP’s quest for a co-equal or even greater role than the Council in the longer term. The actual conduct of the elections is still left largely to the member states. Although the amended act has almost universally laid down that the office of MEP is incompatible with membership of national parliaments and that elections must take place within a specified four-day period, member states still have the competence to fix the precise time and day, impose ceilings for electoral funding and, significantly, determine the conditions within their territories for those eligible to vote and stand as a candidate, subject, of

European Parliamentary Electoral Law

Table 3.3

29

Average number of electors per MEP by member state, 2004

Member state Austria Belgium Cyprus Czech Republic Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Ireland Italy Latvia Lithuania Luxembourg Malta Netherlands Poland Portugal Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sweden United Kingdom

Number of MEPs

Population

Inhabitants per MEP

18 24 6 24 14 6 14 78 99 24 24 13 78 9 13 6 5 27 54 24 14 7 54 19 78

8,067,289 10,355,844 715,137 10,203,269 5,383,507 1,356,045 5,206,295 59,630,121 82,536,680 10,554,804 10,142,362 3,963,636 57,844,017 2,331,480 3,462,553 448,300 394,641 16,192,572 28,218,531 10,407,465 5,379,161 1,995,033 40,409,330 8,940,788 59,842,820

448,183 431,494 119,186 425,136 384,536 226,008 371,878 764,489 833,704 439,784 422,598 304,895 741,590 259,053 266,350 74,717 78,928 599,725 522,565 433,644 384,226 285,005 748,321 470,658 767,472

Source:

course, to the non-discrimination clauses contained in Directive 93/109 EC. Individual member states still retain crucial electoral prerogatives, which militate against the creation of a true European electorate, empowered by the Community and against the institution of a supranationally elected and independent EP. It is difficult to say affirmatively whether or not the EP does now have an electoral procedure which accords with ‘principles common to all of the Member states’. This is so due to the largely unqualifiable nature of the legally spurious concept of commonality. Does the notion mean, for instance, near uniformity or loose coordination of the most basic elements? Whilst it inevitably falls short of uniformity and, conversely, is indicative of a degree of flexibility which takes account of individual statal circumstances, it would seem that the flexibility of the current system, even following the adoption of Decision 2002/772 EC, has left the much greater degree of control in the hands of individual member states: a series of roundly harmonised procedural rules

30 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

and practices emanating from a collective will in the Council remains elusive. On the whole, therefore, the present situation does not appear to amount to commonality. In any case, commonality was inserted into the treaty for largely political reasons to mask member states’ opposition to a truly uniform procedure, and also, cynically, to persuade the European electorate(s) of at least some progress in the attempt to boost the EP’s representativeness, legitimacy and authority. Above all, it appears more than likely that commonality was included within the text of art.190 (4) EC precisely because it is immeasurable and open to several contrasting interpretations.

Conclusions: the need for flexible uniformity For almost 50 years, direct elections under a uniform procedure have been one of the principal goals of the Community. Despite the successful introduction of direct universal suffrage in 1979, and numerous EP resolutions, the lowest common denominator option –commonality – has prevailed. This is reflected in the wording of art.190 (4) EC post-Amsterdam and the provisions of the Act contained in Decision 76/787 EC, as recently amended by Decision 2002/772 EC. Lodge is quite accurate in her assessment that the current situation ‘allows Member states to combine maximum flexibility over the way in which they wish to interpret and implement those common principles with minimum concessions to the principle of uniformity’.7 This commonality, which effectively permits an optimum flexibility whereby member states are able to have their MEPs elected in line with their own broad electoral processes and rules, denies the European elections of their European nature and reinforces the view that their conduct is ultimately controlled by the member states individually and not by a greater collective European will. Above all, it is in itself seemingly vacuous, essentially unqualifiable, and a rather feeble substitute for the continuing failure to agree a uniform procedure. Given that the European Parliament is, as its name suggests, a European Parliament, it is surely only sensible for there to be a uniform European electoral procedure. As well as going a long way to remedy the current representative distortions, it is likely that a single system instituted across the Community, with a set of well organised and mobilised European political parties, would better connect the citizen with the Union and further the attainment of a more mature European civil society. Their participatory function in EP elections is probably the most important political aspect of Union citizenship. The Europeanisation of the electoral process, making it more distinctive, visible and understandable, would serve, in the long term, to transform European elections from being second-order national elections to first-order elections for an increasingly active and relevant supranational legislative body. What kind of uniform electoral procedure is proposed however? A single system of PR with a uniform method for the distribution of seats should be employed, probably the D’Hondt formula which is the most popular

European Parliamentary Electoral Law

31

in use and favoured in many EP resolutions. This should be coupled with citizens being able to cast preferential votes for individual candidates in either national constituencies, for smaller member states, or proportionate regional constituencies, for larger member states. Furthermore, a 5 per cent threshold should be imposed across the EU with elections on the same day. These measures would significantly reduce distortions in terms of the representative nature of the EP, equalise the weight of each citizen’s vote and forge a stronger link between the citizen and the MEP. They would also eliminate the fragmentation that the representation of small, often extremist, parties bring, but there would be flexibility insofar as the delimitation of constituencies is concerned, given the varying geographic and demographic features of the 25 member states. In respect of the ability to vote and stand, this flexible uniformity would be reinforced by, controversially, lowering the voting age to 16 to promote political and European consciousness at the earliest age; enfranchising all Union citizens residing permanently and registered as such in a member state; and by enabling member states to decide whether their nationals abroad should be able to participate. Such near uniformity with a proportionate degree of flexibility would surely bring about the distinctiveness and fairness that would increase the democratisation of the Parliament and, further, raise the level of political engagement within and identification with the Community. We all await some kind of action under a new but textually unchanged art. III-232 of the (Draft) Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe!

Notes 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

[1975] OJ C32/15. [1982] OJ C87/61. [1989] Doc. PE 132.437. [1991] OJ C280/141. [1998] OJ C210/7 & C292/45. M. Baimbridge and D. Darcy, ‘European Electoral Systems and Disproportionality’ in J. Lodge (ed.), The 1999 Elections to the European Parliament (London: Palgrave, 1999), pp. 253–4. 7. J. Lodge, ‘Making the EP Elections Distinctive: A Proposal for a Uniform E-election Procedure’ in Lodge, The 1999 Elections to the European Parliament, p. 273.

Bibliography Baimbridge, M. and D. Darcy, ‘European Electoral Systems and Disproportionality’ in J. Lodge (ed.), The 1999 Elections to the European Parliament (London: Palgrave, 1999). Bowler, S. and D.M. Farrell, ‘Legislator Shirking and Voter Monitoring: Impacts of European Parliament Electoral Systems upon Legislator–Voter Relationships’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 31 (1993) 45–69.

32 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

Corbett, R. F. Jacobs and M. Shackleton, The European Parliament (London: John Harper, 2003). Farrell, D.M. and R. Scully, ‘Electoral System Effects on Parliamentary Representation: The Case of the European Parliament’. Paper delivered at the 2002 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 29 August–1 September 2002. Judge, D. and D. Earnshaw, The European Parliament (London: Palgrave, 2003). Lodge, J. ‘Making the EP Elections Distinctive: A Proposal for a Uniform E-election Procedure’ in J. Lodge (ed.), The 1999 Elections to the European Parliament (London: Palgrave, 1999). Millar, D. ‘A Uniform Electoral Procedure for European Elections’, Electoral Studies, 9 (1990) 37–44. Oliver, P. ‘Electoral Rights under Article 8B of the Treaty of Rome’, Common Market Law Review, 33 (1996) 473–98. Steunenberg, B. and Thomassen, J. (ed.), The European Parliament on the Move: Toward Parliamentary Democracy in Europe (Oxford: Rowan and Littlefield, 2002).

4

The EP Party System After the 2004 Elections Tapio Raunio

The sixth elections to the EP consolidated the position of the centre-right groups in the Parliament. The electoral triumph achieved by the European People’s Party (EPP) in 1999, ending the 20-year reign of the Party of European Socialists (PES) as the biggest party in the EP, was repeated with the EPP again emerging as the largest party in the chamber. The group of the European Liberal, Democrat and Reform Party (ELDR) managed to attract new member parties after the election, giving the group its highest seat share after the first direct elections held in 1979. However, the right-wing groups do by no means form a coherent bloc capable of cooperation across the various policy issues that are on the EP’s agenda, and hence the left-wing groups, particularly PES, will remain relevant in terms of building winning coalitions in the chamber. The progress made by Euro-sceptical lists in several countries received a lot of attention in the media, but anti-EU representatives continue to be marginalised in the chamber. This chapter analyses the role of parties in the European Parliament. The first section briefly outlines the development of the EP party system since the 1979 elections. In the second section I explain the role of the party groups in the Parliament, focusing on the dynamics guiding party group behaviour and on the interaction between groups and committees. The final section introduces the party system of the 1999–2004 legislature, and argues that the new Parliament is going to be more competitive, and hence potentially more interesting, than before.

The development of the EP party system The core of the EP party system is formed by the main European party families: conservatives and Christian democrats, social democrats/socialists, and the 33

34 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

smaller liberal, green, and radical left groups. The seating order in the chamber reflects this, with the left-wing groups such as social democrats and former communists on the left side of the hemicycle, the liberals in the middle, and Christian democrats and conservatives on the right. Table 4.1 shows the distribution of seats in the Parliament between 1979 and 2004. The PES and EPP have dominated the chamber throughout this period, controlling more than half of the seats after each election. After the 2004 election they controlled 64 per cent of the seats (468 out of 732). Table 4.1

Party groups in the European Parliament, 1979–2004

Groups PES EPP ELDR/ALDE EDG EDA COM CDI RB ER Greens/EFA EUL LU EUL-NGL EN FE ERA UEN TGI EDD IND/DEM NA Total

1979

1984

1989

1994

1999

2004

113 107 40 64 22 44 11

130 110 31 50 29 41

180 121 49 34 20

198 157 43

180 233 50

200 268 88

20 16

13 17 30 28 14

9 410

7 434

12 518

26

23

48

28 19 27 19

42

41

21 20 16

27

27 567

16 626

37 29 732

Notes: Abbreviations: PES = Party of European Socialists; EPP = European People’s Party, European People’s Party and European Democrats (EPP-ED) since the 1999 elections; ELDR = European Liberal, Democrat and Reform Party, Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) after the 2004 elections; EDG = European Democratic Group; EDA = European Democratic Alliance, European Progressive Democrats until the 1989 elections; COM = Communist and Allies Group; CDI = Technical Group of Coordination and Defence of Independent MEPs; RB = Rainbow Group; ER = European Right; Greens = The Green Group, Greens/European Free Alliance since the 1999 elections; EUL = European United Left; LU = Left Unity; EUL-NGL = Confederal Group of the European United Left, since 1995 the group has included the sub-group Nordic Green Left; EN = Europe of Nations; FE = Forza Europa; ERA = European Radical Alliance; UEN = Union for Europe of the Nations; TGI = Technical Group of Independent Members; EDD = Europe of Democracies and Diversities; IND/DEM = Independence and Democracy; NA = Non-attached. EDA and FE merged in July 1995 to form Union for Europe (55 MEPs). The UPE joined EPP in June 1998. Dates: 1979 = after the European elections (EE); 1984 = after the second EE; 1989 = after the third EE; 1994 = after the fourth EE; 1999 = after the fifth EE; 2004 = seat distribution in August 2004.

The EP Party System 35

For the first time since the introduction of direct elections, the centreright EPP became, in 1999, the largest group. The group brings together Christian democratic and conservative parties, and the entry of several powerful conservative parties to the group has caused anxieties among the Christian democrats that have traditionally been strong supporters of deeper European integration. Forza Italia is a good example. Having first been rejected by both the EPP and ELDR after the 1994 elections, it formed a group of its own (Forza Europa), then merged in 1995 with the Gaullist European Democratic Alliance (EDA) to form the Union for Europe (UPE), and finally was accepted to the EPP in 1998. The British Conservatives fit into the EPP even less comfortably, at least in terms of their voting behaviour in the Parliament,1 and the title European Democrats was added to the EPP’s group name after the 1999 elections so that the Tories could maintain their separate identity in the otherwise strongly pro-integrationist EPP group. The formation of the social democratic PES presents far fewer problems, as almost every member state has a centre-left, social democratic party. PES was the largest party in the Parliament from 1979 until 1999. Unlike its main rival EPP, the group has become more cohesive over time as the majority of European social democratic parties have adopted broadly similar views on both socio-economic matters and on the future of integration. The seat share of the Liberals remained below 10 per cent until the 2004 elections. The previous enlargement of the Union in 1995, together with the change of electoral system in the UK from single-member plurality districts to proportional representation prior to the 1999 elections, benefited the ELDR. However, as with EPP, this numerical expansion also meant that the group became ideologically more heterogeneous. In particular, the accommodation of Nordic centre parties has proven problematic, especially on integration matters in which the Danish, Finnish and Swedish parties are considerably more Eurosceptical than the group majority. The communists, or the radical left, have formed a group under various labels since 1973. The title Nordic Green Left was added to the group name, Confederal Group of the European United Left (EUL-NGL) after the 1995 enlargement. The Greens achieved an electoral breakthrough in 1989, and have since then formed a group of their own in the Parliament. They have benefited on average more than most groups from the second-order logic of Euro-elections, which favours small parties at the expense of larger mainstream parties. In the fifth Parliament (1999–2004) the Greens formed a group together with representatives from Basque, Flemish, Scottish, Spanish and Welsh regionalist parties. The conservative party family has been represented by the European Democratic Group (EDG), a group formed around the British Conservatives in 1973 as well as the EDA. The former joined the EPP in 1992 and the latter established the Union for Europe of the Nations (UEN) in 1999. The extreme right parties formed a group after the 1984 and 1989 elections. The regionalist

36 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

parties of the European Free Alliance (EFA) have never mustered enough seats to form their own group, and their MEPs have instead sat as subgroups in the Technical Group of Co-ordination and Defence of Independent MEPs (CDI) (1979–84), the Rainbow Group (1984–94), the European Radical Alliance (1994–99), and the Green group in the 1999–2004 Parliament. Finally, the anti-EU parties – who have throughout the history of the Parliament been very much in the minority in the chamber – formed the Europe of Nations (EN) group after the 1994 elections and the Europe of Democracies and Diversities (EDD) after the 1999 elections. Most non-attached MEPs have been either members of extreme right-wing parties or independents. Before examining the party system in the new Parliament, the next section analyses the functions party groups carry out in the chamber.

The role of party groups in the Parliament Party groups and committees, and the interaction between them, provide the key to understanding how the EP operates. The party groups have over the decades reformed both their internal rules and the Parliament’s rules of procedure, with the explicit goal of strengthening the role of party groups (particularly EPP and PES) in the chamber.2 Group formation is regulated in Rule 29 of the EP’s Rules of Procedure: 1. Members may form themselves into groups according to their political affinities. Parliament need not normally evaluate the political affinity of members of a group. In forming a group together under this Rule, Members concerned accept by definition that they have political affinity. Only when this is denied by the Members concerned is it necessary for Parliament to evaluate whether the group has been constituted in conformity with the Rules. 2. A political group shall comprise Members elected in at least one-fifth of the Member States.3 The minimum number of Members required to form a political group shall be nineteen. 3. A Member may not belong to more than one political group. 4. The President shall be notified in a statement when a political group is set up. This statement shall specify the name of the group, its members and its bureau. 5. The statement shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Union. The availability of considerable material and procedural benefits acts as a powerful incentive for group formation. It also explains the emergence of technical groups, like CDI in 1979–84, the Rainbow Group in 1984–94, and the short-lived Technical Group of Independent Members (TGI) after the 1999 elections. While the money from the Parliament may appear inconsequential

The EP Party System 37

in absolute terms, it has nevertheless been crucial for certain smaller regionalist and green parties that have not enjoyed access to comparable resources at the national level. Material benefits include, for example, office space, staff and money for distributing information. The sum each group receives depends on the number of MEPs and working languages in the group. In addition to the number of staff employed by the party groups (532 posts in 2000), each MEP has one to three personal assistants (financed from the EP budget) and both the committee and the EP staff assist groups and MEPs. Group staff perform a variety of duties, ranging from routine administration to drafting background memos, following developments in committees and drawing up whips in plenaries.4 Turning to procedural rights, appointments to committees and intra-parliamentary leadership positions, and the allocation of reports and plenary speaking time are based on the rule of proportionality between the groups (see below). Certain plenary actions, such as tabling amendments or oral questions, require the backing of a committee, a party group or at least 37 MEPs. Non-attached representatives are thus procedurally marginalised in the chamber. Appointment of committee seats and chairs and EP Presidency are all controlled by the groups. The President of the EP is elected for two and a half years. The two largest groups, PES and EPP, shared the Presidency from 1989 to 1999. In the 1994–99 legislature, for example, the first President was Klaus Hänsch, a German SPD representative from the PES, with José María Gil-Robles Gil-Delgado, from the Spanish Partido Popular (EPP), replacing him at mid-term in January 1997. This cosy pact was temporarily suspended after the 1999 elections, when a centre-right coalition elected Nicole Fontaine (EPP) as the new President in July 1999. Imitating the deals between EPP and PES, the EPP and ELDR struck an agreement according to which the Liberals would support Fontaine and the EPP would in turn back the candidacy of ELDR group leader Pat Cox at mid-term in January 2002. The old alliance between EPP and PES was renewed after the 2004 elections, with the Presidency first held by the Spanish socialist Josep Borrell. He will then be replaced by a member of the EPP at mid-term in January 2007. Committee assignments are decided in the first session of the newly elected EP held in July.5 The number and size of the committees are decided first, followed by the appointment of committee members and substitutes. The distribution of committee seats is based on the rule of proportionality, with membership proportional to group size. Research on committee appointments by Bowler and Farrell in the 1989–92 EP showed that ‘the share of committee places is proportional by both nationality and ideological bloc. Within these limits, set by allocations along ideological or national lines, there is scope for the kinds of specialised membership and recruitment made in the US Congress’.6 There are no restrictions on multiple memberships, but the majority of members are full members of one committee and substitutes in another one. Members may be highly active in the committee in which

38 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

they are substitutes, especially when they did not get seats in their priority committees. Substitutes usually have full speaking and voting rights (when they replace a full member), and it is not uncommon for them to receive rapporteurships. Within committees there are four positions of authority: chairs, vice-chairs, party group coordinators, and rapporteurs.7 Committee chairs are highly influential positions. According to the Rules of Procedure, committees elect their own chairs, but in practice party groups control the allocation, with the d’Hondt method used for this purpose. Chair allocation is thus roughly proportional to group size, reflecting the procedures found in most European parliaments. Party group coordinators are responsible for coordinating the work of their groups in the committees. Together with the committee chair, the coordinators negotiate the distribution of rapporteurships between the groups. Once a group has been assigned a report, the coordinator allocates it to a member of his or her group. However, the coordinator must take into account the wishes of the national parties inside the group, in addition to the wishes of the members themselves. Party groups also have working groups that, to a varying extent, mirror the committee structure.8 Committee work revolves around reports. The Parliament produces two types of reports: legislative and non-legislative. Lacking the formal right to initiate legislation or to rewrite bills, the Parliament produces own-initiative reports. The Conference of Presidents decides whether the committee is given the right to produce the report. A rapporteur is responsible for drafting a report on the issue handled in the committee. The distribution of rapporteurships is not regulated in the Rules of Procedure. Instead, party groups have developed a system based primarily on the rule of proportionality, with procedures that differ somewhat between the committees. Each group receives a quota of points out of the total point tally based on its share of seats in the committee. Party group coordinators and committee chairs decide the value of each report to be produced by the committee, and coordinators identify their groups’ priority reports and make bids on behalf of their groups in specific coordinators’ meetings. To quote Ken Collins, the former chair of the Environment Committee: ‘it is a combination of a kind of auction and a kind of elaborate game of poker because the technique of the group spokesman is to spend the minimum points for his or her group, and to get the maximum number of reports’.9 After a group has won a report, it is distributed to one of its members seated in that committee. The other party groups often nominate a shadow rapporteur to monitor the work of the rapporteur. The rapporteur system means that individual members, and not committee chairs, are the key persons in the passage of individual pieces of legislation. But, when drafting the report, the rapporteur must be prepared to compromise in order to accommodate the views of the committee. Such compromise-building is necessary in order to facilitate the smooth passage of the report in the committee and later in the

The EP Party System 39

plenary. The draft report, together with amendments, is then voted upon in the committee. Groups may debate the bill in their own meetings, but more usually the MEPs of the group seated in the committee convene to agree, if possible, on a common stand. Once adopted (by simple majority), the report is sent to the plenary. If the committee opinion is not unanimous, the losing minority can give a summary of its position. Before the plenary stage the groups decide what amendments to propose, and whether to support the report or not. National party delegations, especially the larger ones, often hold their own meetings prior to the group meetings. Finally, the report is introduced in the plenary by the rapporteur, and amendments tabled by the committee responsible, a party group or at least 37 members are voted upon. Embedded in a separation-of-powers system, and with no real EU government to hold accountable, the main function of the Parliament is to influence the EU policy process. That is why the Parliament has delegated the scrutiny of legislation to its committees. Parliament’s positions are in most cases in practice decided in the committees before the plenary stage. Both national and party group interests influence committee work. The procedures for allocating committee chairs, seats and reports can be interpreted as mechanisms for the party groups to control the committees in a situation where the former are relatively weak, at least when compared to European national parliaments.10 Delegating authority to backbenchers through committee work and reports is also a key way of rewarding group members and tying them into the formation of group positions. However, party group leaders are strongly limited in their ability to direct the actions of their committee members, with national parties possessing – through their right to control candidate selection – at least as much power as party group leaders.11 With the exception of the assignment process, party group influence within committees is therefore modest, with groups having coordinating mechanisms for overseeing committee work instead of hierarchical structures for controlling MEP behaviour in the committees. Turning next to the organisation of the party groups, at the start of the five-year legislative term they elect their leaders (chairman/president), who usually occupy the post until the next elections or even longer. The chairs represent their group in the Conference of Presidents, the body responsible for setting the Parliament’s agenda and for organisational decisions. The number of vice-chairs varies between the groups. The executive committee of the group is the Bureau, composed of the chair, vice-chairs, heads and possible additional members of national party delegations, and the treasurer. The Bureau is responsible for organisational and administrative issues, and prepares policy decisions for group meetings. Party groups also establish working groups for examining specific policy areas and for coordinating group policy on those issues.12

40 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

Lacking the kinds of rewards and sanctions that group leaders normally have at their disposal in national legislatures, the party groups place a lot of emphasis on building consensus in their meetings. Decision-making within groups is often based on protracted negotiations, with group leaders putting much effort into building positions that are acceptable to all or nearly all parties in the group. Unlike national party leaders, EP group chairs do not control or even influence candidate selection, nor can they promise lucrative ministerial portfolios or well-paid civil service jobs. Groups have whips, but they basically just remind MEPs of group positions and indicate which votes are important. The groups convene regularly in Brussels prior to the plenary week as well as during Strasbourg plenaries. The meetings in Brussels constitute a ‘Group week’, usually lasting two to three days. When MEPs feel they cannot follow the group position, they are expected to make this clear in the group meetings. National party delegations are the cornerstones upon which the groups are based. Some groups are indeed no more than loose coalitions of national parties, while even in the oldest and most organised groups – EPP and PES – one can occasionally see divisions along national lines. Most national delegations have their own staff, elect their chairpersons, and convene prior to group meetings. However, the impact of national parties is mitigated by three factors. First, national parties are seldom unitary actors themselves. National parties throughout the Union are, to a varying extent, internally divided over integration, and these divisions are reproduced in the Parliament. Second, the EP is a committee-based legislature, with emphasis on building issue-specific majorities in the committees. Third, the majority of bills and resolutions do not produce divisions along national lines. Much of the Parliament’s agenda is taken up by internal market legislation, not by constitutional matters or redistributive decisions like the allocation of structural funds. Roll call analyses indicate that the groups do indeed achieve respectable levels of cohesion, with the cohesion of the larger groups varying between 80 and 90 per cent.13 What accounts for this relatively unitary behaviour? Until the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties one could argue that as most votes in the Parliament had little if any impact, it did not really matter how MEPs voted. According to this line of reasoning the fragile foundations of group cohesion would be put to test once the Parliament acquired real legislative powers.14 But group cohesion has not declined as the Parliament has become a more powerful institution. Why do MEPs and national party delegations vote with their group most of the time? The most important reason is policy influence. Cohesive group action is essential for achieving group’s objectives, while cooperative behaviour within groups helps MEPs in pursuing their own policy goals. Considering that national parties control candidate selection, part of the answer lies in the fact that most national parties have by and large refrained from intervening in the EP’s work. Were the party leaders to begin monitoring MEP behaviour

The EP Party System 41

on a more regular basis, through increased policy coordination or even voting instructions, group cohesion could be seriously threatened.15 Third, considering the huge number of amendments and final resolutions voted upon in each plenary, the voting cues provided by group whips are an essential source of guidance for MEPs. The voting rules of the legislative procedures also impact on group behaviour and particularly on coalition formation. While the primary decision rule in the Parliament is simple majority (50 per cent plus 1 of those voting), for certain issues specified in the treaty (mainly budget amendments and second reading legislative amendments adopted under the co-decision procedure) the Parliament needs to muster absolute majorities (50 per cent plus 1 of its members, 367 out of 732 MEPs after the 2004 elections). Until the 1999 elections the formation of majorities was primarily based on cooperation between PES and EPP. In the fifth Parliament (1999–2004) this cooperation played a lesser role than before, with EPP and PES opposing each other more often regardless of the voting rule. Still, these two large groups voted together on approximately 70 per cent of all votes. Party groups thus have an incentive to achieve unity during voting periods in order to increase their influence legislation and to put pressure on the Commission and the Council on non-legislative matters. Cooperation between EPP and PES could also be regarded as a sign of ‘maturity’, as the Parliament needed to moderate its resolutions in order to get its amendments accepted by the Council and the Commission.16 After all, the overwhelming majority of national ministers represented in the Council and members of the Commission are either social democrats or Christian democrats/conservatives. To summarise, the non-hierarchical group structure, based on institutionalised interaction between the leadership, the committees and the national delegations, facilitates group cohesion. The extensive negotiations taking place both within and between groups and the need to accommodate national viewpoints has been argued to lead to lowest common denominator decisions. However, such policy compromises are a prerequisite for the Parliament to influence EU legislation. I now turn to the final section of this chapter which examines the shape of the party system in the ‘sixth’ European Parliament.

The party system after the 2004 elections The elections did not really result in any significant changes in the EP party system. The seat distribution between the two main groups (EPP, PES) remained by and large unchanged, and the balance of power between the ‘left’ and ‘right’ is approximately the same as in the 1999–2004 Parliament, with the right-wing groups controlling around 50 per cent of the seats and the leftist groups about 40 per cent. This section first outlines the groups formed after the elections and then looks at the impact of the EP party system on the EU’s policy process.

42 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

The EPP-ED continues as the largest group, with 268 MEPs (37 per cent) in the new Parliament. EPP is also the only group that has members from all 25 member states. By far the largest national party delegation is the German CDU/CSU with 49 seats. Other main parties are the British Conservatives, Partido Popular from Spain, and Forza Italia from Italy. The conservative wing of the group was strengthened during the 1990s, and now the same trend continued, with particularly the ODS from the Czech Republic displaying quite strong Eurosceptic tendencies. It is thus very likely that the group will be substantially more coherent on socio-economic matters than on broader questions relating to European integration. The second largest group is PES with 200 seats (27 per cent). Latvia and Cyprus are the only countries that do not have representation in the group. The French Parti Socialiste is the largest national party in the group with 31 MEPs. The Liberal group welcomed UDF from France and the La Margherita list from Italy, among others, to its ranks after the elections. The new group has 88 MEPs (12 per cent) from 19 member states, the largest seat share held by the liberals in the Parliament since the first elections held in 1979. The group also changed its name from ELDR to the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE). The group has a strong pro-European philosophy, and this may create problems between the group majority and the centre parties from the Nordic countries. The Greens/EFA group has 42 MEPs (6 per cent) in the new Parliament, with the German Greens being the main national party in the group. As was expected, the enlargement did not profit the Greens as no Green MEPs were elected to the Parliament from the ten new member states. The radical left EUL-NGL has 41 MEPs, among them 7 MEPs of the German PDS. As a result of the electoral victories gained by Eurosceptical lists in several countries, the former EDD expanded its membership and changed its name to Independence and Democracy group (IND/DEM). The group has 37 MEPs (5 per cent), and brings together Eurosceptics from the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy (Lega Nord), the Netherlands, Poland, Ireland, Sweden and the UK (Independence Party). The Union for a Europe of Nations (UEN), with 27 MEPs (4 per cent), is the smallest group in the Parliament. It is an alliance between various conservative and Eurosceptic forces, with Alleanza Nazionale as its leading national party delegation. Eurosceptic groups continue to be marginalised in the chamber. This brief overview of the group structure shows that the party system looks pretty much the same as it did before the elections. However, the modest strengthening of the right-wing groups may actually prove to be quite significant. This results from two factors. First, if the new Constitution enters into force before the 2009 elections, it will give the centre-right groups (and the whole Parliament) considerably more legislative powers. Second, regardless of the fate of the Constitution, the impact of the EP depends very much on whether it gets its amendments accepted by the Commission and the Council.

The EP Party System 43

Interestingly, at the start of the 2004–09 Parliament, the EU has a rare situation in that the party-political composition of the Council, the Commission and the EP is quite similar – they are all dominated by centre-right (members of EPP and ELDR/ALDE) parties. This probably lessens the need in the Parliament to negotiate compromises between EPP and PES, as the former knows that social democrats have quite weak opportunities to block decisions in the Council or the Commission. To be sure, the legislation produced by the EU will still be primarily based on extensive bargaining among the various actors, but the new party-political situation may give the centre-right forces better chances for achieving their policy goals, such as pushing through economic reforms needed to make Europe more competitive.17

Notes 1. See S. Hix, ’Parliamentary Behavior with Two Principals: Preferences, Parties, and Voting in the European Parliament’, American Journal of Political Science, 46:3 (2002), 694. 2. For an excellent analysis of the development of the party system and the party groups, see A. Kreppel, The European Parliament and Supranational Party System: A Study in Institutional Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 3. Groups comprising MEPs from only one country (such as FE in 1994–95) have not been permitted after the 1999 elections. 4. R. Corbett, F. Jacobs and M. Shackleton, The European Parliament (4th edn, London: John Harper, 2000), pp. 82–6. 5. The section on committees draws on V. Mamadouh and T. Raunio, ‘The Committee System: Powers, Appointments and Report Allocation’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 41:2 (2003), 333–51. 6. S. Bowler and D.M. Farrell, ‘The Organizing of the European Parliament: Committees, Specialization and Co-ordination’, British Journal of Political Science, 25:2 (1995), 219–43. 7. C. Neuhold, ‘The “Legislative Backbone of” keeping the Institution upright? The Role of European Parliament Committees in the EU Policy-Making Process’, European Integration online Papers, 5:10 (2001), . 8. R. Whitaker, ‘Party Control in a Committee-Based Legislature? The Case of the European Parliament’, Journal of Legislative Studies, 7:4 (2001), 63–88. 9. R. Wurzel, ‘The Role of the European Parliament: Interview with Ken Collins MEP’, Journal of Legislative Studies, 5:2 (1999), 1–23. 10. See also Bowler and Farrell, ‘The Organizing of the European Parliament’, and Whitaker, ‘Party Control in a Committee-Based Legislature?’ 11. See Kreppel, The European Parliament and Supranational Party System, pp. 202–11. 12. See T. Raunio, ‘Political Interests: The EP’s Party Groups’, in J. Peterson and M. Shackleton (eds), The Institutions of the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 257–76. 13. For more information on voting patterns in the Parliament, see S. Hix, A. Kreppel and A. Noury, ‘The Party System in the European Parliament: Collusive or Competitive?’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 41:2 (2003), 309–31.

44 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

14. L. Bardi, ‘Transnational Party Federations, European Parliamentary Party Groups, and the Building of Europarties’, in R.S. Katz and P. Mair (eds) How Parties Organize: Change and Adaptation in Party Organizations in Western Democracies (London: Sage, 1994), pp. 357–72. 15. For example, the British Labour Party has, since the latter part of the 1990s, introduced a mechanism for ‘policy coordination’ between London and the party’s MEPs. See W.B. Messmer, ‘Taming Labour’s MEPs’, Party Politics, 9:2 (2003), 201–18. 16. See Kreppel, European Parliament and Supranational Party System. 17. See S. Hix, ‘The Prospect of “United Centre-Right Government” in the EU’, EUSA Review, 17:3 (2004), 6–7.

5

EUphoria to Apathy: EP Turnout in the New Member States Mark D. Baimbridge

A story in The Economist (2004), apocryphal or not, encapsulates the attitude of the EU’s electorate towards the 2004 EP elections. A British MEP candidate approached a shopper to elicit her support, the woman stood as close as she could to the hapless would-be MEP and shouted ‘Boring!’ This was the message the recently enlarged EU’s voters sent to both national and EU leaders, with particular venom in the ten new member states (NMS).1 The question for both sets of political elite is how could the triumph of enlargement so quickly degenerate into the turnout disaster of the EP elections? Its fifth enlargement on 1 May 2004 increased the EU’s membership to 25 countries with the accession of Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. Whilst this enlargement is unprecedented in terms of the number of countries, it is less so in terms of more important features such as population and economic status. Further enlargements are planned to incorporate Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 at the earliest, and in March 2003 the Commission indicated that enlargement would follow to Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia-Montenegro after the planned accession of Bulgaria and Romania. Turkey was recognised as a candidate in December 1999, but negotiations will not be launched until it meets key political accession criteria. By the 2009 EP elections, the EU is likely to have 27 members, and 32 by 2014. By then, the EU 15 will be in the minority. Therefore the current voting profile of the ten NMS provides an insight into future developments. This chapter focuses on the ten NMS. It examines the so-called ‘Eurogap’ in terms of the difference between their most recent national elections, accession referendums and the EP elections. It analyses specific political and socio-economic factors influencing voter turnout. The predictability 45

46 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

of EP turnout is modelled with reference to both national and referendum votes. Finally, proposals are forwarded to reverse turnout trends and halt future mass disengagement. The precarious nature of turnout in EP elections was highlighted as a ‘general concern’ by the OSCE/ODIHR pre-election assessment, noting that under half of the electorate voted in the 1999 EP elections.

EP election turnout EP elections has been a centrepiece of academic attention since the first elections took place in 1979 and quinquennially thereafter. A principal assertion has been that EP elections constitute ‘second-order’ contests, with national parties divided largely on national issues. However, in relation to turnout, Mattila (2003) reviews two research directions at the theoretical level in terms of a system or individual approach. The former relates to factors influencing general participation rates and those for the EP in particular; the latter concerns both socio-demographic factors and the European electorate attitudes to the EP. A number of hypotheses concerning factors influencing turnout can be formulated from previous research, These are summarised in Table 5.1, together with their relevance to the 2004 EP elections. Table 5.2 illustrates the mean turnout over the 1979–2004 period for the EU15 and the EU as a whole both pre- and post-2004.2 The consequence of continuous compulsory voting is evident, together with its legacy post1993 in Italy. Turnout averages 50–60 per cent in a cluster of five states. The remaining six fall below the psychological 50 per cent barrier. The mean number of elections (5) is identical for both groups, suggesting that EP election fatigue is not a determining factor. Finally, the immediate impact of the ten NMS is visible in the 2.1 percentage point fall in a single EP election of the overall EU average turnout.

The Eurogap and EP elections Since their inception in 1979, EP elections have failed to grasp voters’ imagination. Initial turnout of 65.9 per cent steadily fell to the nadir of 47.8 per cent in 2004. As with any generalisation, further investigation indicates a clear distinction between subgroups of EU member states (see Table 5.3). For the founding EU6 the initial turnout was 74.9 per cent and although this has fallen, it rose to 63.2 per cent in 2004, some 15.4 percentage points above the overall average. A different picture emerges in relation to the degree of variation, as indicated by the standard deviation statistic, whereby variability has risen for the EU6, but has only marginally fluctuated over the 1979–2004 period for the EU as a whole. This overall picture of relative stability is further illustrated by the statistically significant (p < 0.01) correlation coefficients relating to turnout for consecutive EP elections (1979–84 = 0.95; 1984–89 =

EP Turnout in the New Member States Table 5.1

47

Summary of political and socio-economic influences on turnout

General determinants

Comment in relation to EP elections

Members of Parliament are elected by proportional representation, whereby once support exceeds a real or implicit threshold, then elected members more closely reflect voters’ preferences. Compulsory voting is anticipated to raise turnout relative to where it is voluntary. However, non-compliance punishment is variable in severity and enforcement. Elections are held at the weekend, not a workday. This increases the likelihood that employed voters can participate.

All EU member states since 1999 have adopted either direct proportional representation or mixed member proportional systems.

Compulsory voting is currently relevant in Belgium, Cyprus, Greece, Luxembourg and Malta.

In most EU member states, elections are held on weekends. Ireland, the Netherlands and the UK are the exceptions, with the Czech Republic voting on both Friday and Saturday. Electors are close to their representatives In most EU countries EP elections are held with when votes are cast for an individual candi- the whole country as a single constituency. date in a single-member district. Belgium, France, Ireland, Poland and the UK being exceptions. Socialisation into a democratic political The majority of EU member states have held system increases likelihood of participation free elections either before or immediately after where free elections are long established. the Second World War, with Portugal and Spain returning to democracy in the 1970s and the 8 NMS since independence in the late 1980s/early 1990s. Turnout is likely to be inversely associated The EU15 have long-established domestic election cycles; however, the 8 NMS have witnessed with frequency of elections, whereby the a rapid increase in elections following independcosts begin to outweigh the benefits and ence. voter fatigue sets in. Using strict party lists does not permit elec- This has evolved to become the standard practice in the majority of EU member states. tors to vote for a specific candidate and thus decreases satisfaction. Only Luxembourg purposely conducts national Simultaneous conduct of national and EP elections increases turnout since this lowers elections simultaneously, this occurs only randomly elsewhere. the cost of voting. If a country is net contributor (recipient) to Germany and the UK have consistently been significant net contributors, whilst Greece, Ireland, the EU budget, turnout is lower (higher). This is based on a general feeling resulting Portugal and Spain have been net recipients. from receipt (contribution) of funding from The 10 NMS are expected to be significant net recipients in the future. (to) the EU. Opinion polls and the Eurobarometer studies Turnout is higher in countries with high indicate this tends to be lower in northern support for EU membership. member states and/or net budget contributors. For the 10 NMS this can be implied from their accession referendums. Turnout is higher in a country’s first EP elec- The 2004 EP elections were unique with the tion, based on an initial surge of enthusiasm. largest number of member states (10) since 1979 undertaking their first participation. Formerly the ratio in prosperity between the Higher economic and social well-being highest and lowest EU member states was 2:1; (income per capita, education, awareness however, this has increased substantially with of parties and candidates, etc.) increases the 10 NMS who average only 30% of EU15 turnout. GDP per capita. Public expenditure as a percentage of GDP tends Importance of government for citizens’ to be higher in northern EU member states and well-being whereby the combination of higher taxes and greater benefits raises the is considerably lower in the 10 NMS. incentive to vote. Sources: Adapted from Mattila (2003) and Rose (2004).

48 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

0.84; 1989–94 = 0.88; 1994–99 = 0.88; 1999–2004 = 0.91). These indicate that turnout remains resolute irrespective of either national or EU-led initiatives to shift participation levels. Table 5.2

Summary of EP election turnout, 1979–2004

Belgiuma Luxembourga Italy Greecea European Union (1979–99) Spain European Union (1979–2004) Ireland Germany Austria France Denmark Portugal Finland Netherlands Sweden UK a

Number of elections

Average turnout (%)

6 6 6 6 79 5 89 6 6 3 6 6 5 3 6 3 6

91.13 88.48 78.08 73.28 58.78 58.30 56.66 55.57 55.50 52.97 51.45 49.62 47.56 44.27 43.38 39.20 33.38

Compulsory voting.

Table 5.3

Summary statistics of turnout in EP elections, 1979–2004

Ave EU Ave EU(6) Ave NMS(10) Ave NMS(8) Std dev EU Std dev EU(6) Std dev NMS(10) Std dev NMS(8)

1979

1984

1989

1994

1999

2004

65.9 74.9

65.0 71.4

62.9 69.6

58.1 67.1

52.9 61.9

19.7 15.1

18.4 18.7

18.3 19.5

18.0 21.6

20.5 24.9

47.8 63.2 40.2 31.0 20.3 24.4 21.7 10.7

However, perhaps the most telling information contained within Table 5.3 relates to turnout in the NMS. The overall mean turnout for the CEEC8 was 31 per cent, ranging from 16.7 per cent in Slovakia to 48.2 per cent in Lithuania. This raises concern over the degree of NMS attachment to the institution they have only recently joined. Table 5.1 shows there are a number of potential explanations such as voter fatigue and understanding of the EP’s functions. However, such turnout figures was partially predicted by a survey of national

EP Turnout in the New Member States

49

experts (Kurpas et al., 2004: ii) who concluded that turnout would be below that of the accession referenda. Table 5.4 illustrates the turnout in the most recent national election3 and the two EU-related plebiscites in which the NMS have participated, whilst the three final columns modify the Eurogap concept of Rose (2004) to highlight the difference between the percentage voting in three scenarios. The first measure of the Eurogap examines the difference in turnout between the referendums and most recent national election. In contrast to the hypothesised direction of the Eurogap, several NMS (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland) reversed its direction and recorded higher turnout in their accession referendums. The normal direction of the Eurogap is resumed in the difference between the EP election and national election turnout. Here all ten NMS registered a negative figure ranging from –10.4 percentage points for Lithuania to –53.4 percentage points for Slovakia with a mean of –28.9 percentage points. Finally, based on examination of the Eurogap between both EU-related votes, the ten NMS appear to divide into three groups. Poland, Estonia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Latvia all recording a Eurogap of over –30 percentage points; the Czech Republic and Lithuania form a middle cluster; whilst Malta and Hungary record differences of less than –10 percentage points. Finally, correlation analysis indicates that there is a statistically significant relationship between the EP election and accession referendum turnout (0.8, p < 0.05). Hence, the latter could be seen as laying the foundation for subsequent events. Table 5.4

NMS and the Eurogap

Most recent national elections (A) Cyprusa Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Maltaa Poland Slovakia Slovenia Mean Std dev a

Compulsory voting.

91.8 57.9 58.2 70.5 71.2 58.6 95.7 46.2 70.1 70.1

Turnout (%) Accession referendum (B)

EP election (C)

Eurogap (B–A)

Eurogap (C–A)

Eurogap (C–B)

na 55.2 64.1 45.6 72.8 63.3 90.9 58.9 52.2 60.3

71.2 27.9 26.9 38.5 41.2 48.2 82.4 20.4 16.7 28.3

na –2.7 5.9 –24.9 1.6 4.7 –4.8 12.7 –17.9 –9.8 –3.9 12.0

–20.6 –30.0 –31.3 –32.0 –30.0 –10.4 –13.3 –25.8 –53.4 –41.8 –28.9 12.7

na –27.3 –37.2 –7.1 –31.6 –15.1 –8.5 –38.5 –35.5 –32.0 –25.9 12.4

50 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

Several patterns emerge concerning Eurogap indicators’ interrelationship. Firstly, examination of the Eurogap (B–A) relative to (C–A), shows that all the NMS demonstrate an increased Eurogap, with the mean rising from –3.9 to –28.9 percentage points. In terms of the Eurogap (B–A) relative to (C–B), the majority of indicators are significantly higher, with the exception of modest increases in Lithuania and Malta and a reversal in Hungary. The former two instances of turnout stability are symptomatic of established social norms (Lithuania) and compulsory voting (Malta), whilst the Hungarians seem increasingly disengaged. In comparing Eurogap (C–A) with (C–B) the NMS fall into three groups: those registering a relatively small difference (the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania and Malta) and more importantly, where the latter Eurogap is significantly higher (Estonia, Poland) and significantly lower (Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia). Hence, relative to the traditional Eurogap concept the intra-EU measurement (C–B) illustrates the movement in electoral participation between the two EU-related votes. For the former group of Estonia and Poland apathy seems to be accelerating, but for the latter group of Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia a modicum of optimism exists. In seeking to ascertain a greater understanding of the determinants of the 2004 EP election turnout an empirical analysis was undertaken based on recent studies (Mattila, 2003; Rose, 2004) which found that political variables (period of free elections, PR, compulsory voting, weekend voting, electors per MEP, simultaneous domestic elections) have a statistically significant impact on turnout, whilst socio-economic factors do not. Bar a single dummy variable which identified Malta as being previously non-communist/ possessing a history of free elections/compulsory voting (r = 0.86, p < 0.01) and the previously noted link with referendum turnout (r = 0.8, p < 0.05), none of the other hypothesised explanatory variables examined (referendum ‘yes’/‘no’ vote, Sunday voting, number of districts, EP seats, GDP per capita, unemployment rate) were statistically significant. However, given the paucity of observations (n = 9) such an outcome is not unexpected. An alternative analysis is suggested by previous findings on the steadystate Eurogap illustrated in Table 5.4. Hence, the question becomes one of whether 2004 EP election turnout of the NMS was predictable given prior levels of voter participation. It is hypothesised that EP election turnout depended on turnout in the accession referendum and most recent national election, respectively. A simple regression model was estimated in each case and found to be statistically significant.4 From these equations the estimated EP turnout and its difference from the actual figure were calculated for each NMS. Table 5.5 presents these calculations for each regression model, where a positive (negative) difference indicates the actual turnout is greater (less) than that predicted. In relation to the accession referendum model the NMS divide into three groups. The estimated regression model proves relatively accurate vis-à-vis the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovakia and Latvia, and moderately so vis-à-

EP Turnout in the New Member States Table 5.5

51

Predictions of NMS EP election turnout (%) Accession referendum model Estimated EP Difference turnout (actual–est.)

Cyprus Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Malta Poland Slovakia Slovenia

na 27.8 38.4 16.3 48.9 37.5 70.6 32.2 24.1 33.9

na 0.1 –11.5 22.2 –7.7 10.7 11.8 –11.7 –7.5 –5.5

National election model Estimated EP Difference turnout (actual–est.) 66.7 27.4 27.8 42.0 42.9 28.2 71.3 13.9 41.6 41.6

4.5 0.5 –0.9 –3.6 –1.6 20.0 11.1 6.6 –24.9 –13.2

Notes: Accession referendum model: EP = –38.47 + 1.2 REFERENDUM** R2 = 0.63 National election model: EP = –39.74* + 1.16 NATIONAL** R2 = 0.67 Where** = p < 0.01; * = p < 0.1.

vis Lithuania, Estonia, Poland and Malta. However, the previously identified Hungarian participation rate is placed into context with the model suggesting an EP election turnout of a mere 16.3 per cent. Although substantially below actual Hungarian turnout, it is only 0.4 percentage points under actual participation in Slovakia. The regression analysis based on turnout achieved in the most recent national election produced similar results with a clustering of NMS into three groups. Those where the model closely or moderately predicts the actual EP election turnout (respectively, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Hungary, Cyprus and Poland; and Malta and Slovenia). This model identifies two outliers (Lithuania and Slovakia) at opposite ends of the spectrum of overand underestimation of turnout. The final and potentially most disturbing information these regression models offer is the ability to estimate the point at which turnout at EP elections could fall to zero. Substitution of this value into each estimated equation indicates that once referendum turnout and, more plausibly, national election turnout drop to 32.06 per cent and 34.26 per cent, respectively, then based on current trends EP election turnout would sink to a position which could further deteriorate.

Conclusion A former senior British politician, William Whitelaw, once accused the then Labour Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, of going around stirring up apathy. However, even less effort than stirring was required in the 2004 EP elections: voter turnout followed the mean downward 3 percentage point trend experienced since 1979. The EP elections were fought largely on national

52 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

issues and were typified by significant anti-government votes, together with a strong showing for Eurosceptic parties across the Continent. Perhaps the most striking reflection of this lack of enthusiasm for the European project, symbolised by the EP, came in the EU’s NMS who had only joined six weeks before. The two Mediterranean NMS apart, the CEECs used these elections to doubly rebuff to their new EU partners. Firstly, the minority of the electorate that bothered to vote backed anti-EU parties with a passion, and, secondly, demonstrated a substantial degree of indifference. Whilst there is no single dominant cause of voter apathy in the NMS, two reoccurring features of the post-election commentary are disillusionment with national governments and suspicion of the constraints that EU membership may bring. In relation to the issue of disenchantment with national governments, one potential way forward is to focus upon the interrelationship between national parliaments and the EP, by giving the former a greater role in EU decision- and policy-making. For example, the ability of national parliaments to use subsidiarity as a reason to object to legislative proposals made by the European Commission could be enhanced. Further, national parliaments could be given a more prominent role in, for example, scrutinising draft EU legislation. As for the suspicion in which the EU as a whole and in this case the EP in particular is held, the EU is likely to undertake a further bout of soul searching (Lodge, 2001a, 2001b). The sense that the majority of the EU populace are disengaging from the EP is debilitating for an institution that already stands accused of corruption and irrelevance. Indeed, the Dutch State Secretary for European Affairs has announced that the Dutch presidency will include a special conference on the issue of why so few voters participated in the EP elections. The end of the EP’s harder-to-justify practices, such as commuting between Brussels and Strasbourg and abused expenses systems, would be visible signs of progress, if less than profoundly fundamental. Possibly, voters would identify more with their MEPs if (1) they voted by disaggregated districts or constituencies rather than national lists; (2) closed lists were opened to permit electors to vote for a specific candidate; and (3) voting was made less onerous, perhaps by the wider adoption of postal ballots. Ironically, the new structure of the EP resulting from an all-time low turnout could yet lead it to save itself. Firstly, the rise of Eurosceptic and populist parties could eventually prove positive if initially unpalatable, placing the EP in a unique and potentially powerful position within the EU. Secondly, the inclusion of some more vibrant MEPs might excite public interest in the EP’s work – after all, there is no such thing as bad publicity. Or is there?

Notes 1. The 2004 accession countries are occasionally subdivided into eight NMS comprising of the CEECs alone given their recent historical commonality. 2. For the calculation of EP election turnout the initial ‘out of sequence’ EP elections of accession countries (Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Austria and Finland) are counted as

EP Turnout in the New Member States

53

per the immediate prior EP election. Otherwise these results would be omitted from the quinquennial calculations. Moreover, the unweighted member state turnout is used in all tables and calculations within this chapter. 3. Data source, International IDEA (2004). 4. The usual transformation of the dependent variable [ln(EP/1–EP)] to ensure the restriction to a closed interval (0–100 per cent) was also tested. However, this was ultimately rejected when the predicted EP turnout statistics were found to be nonsensical.

Bibliography Blais, A., and A. Dobrzynska (1998) ‘Turnout in Electoral Democracies’, European Journal of Political Research, 33 (2), 239–61. Blondell, J., R. Sinnott and P. Svensson(1998) People and Parliament in the European Union. Participation, Democracy and Legitimacy (Oxford: Clarendon Press). The Economist (2004) ‘Barbarians at the Gate’, 12 June. Franklin, M., C. van der Eijk and E. Oppenhuis (1996) ‘The Institutional Context: Turnout’ in C. van der Eijk and M. Franklin (eds) Choosing Europe? The European Electorate and National Politics in the Face of Union (Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press). Gabel, M.J. (2003) ‘Public Support for the European Parliament’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 41 (2), 289–308. Gros, D. (2002) ‘Health not Wealth: Enlarging the EMU’ in P. Mair and J. Zielonka (eds) The Enlarged European Union: Diversity and Adaptation, (London: Frank Cass). Hix, S., T. Raunio and R. Scully (2003) ‘Fifty Years On: Research on the European Parliament’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 41 (2), 191–202. International IDEA (2004) Visualising the Euro-gap (Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance). Jackman, R.W. (1987) ‘Political Institutions and Voter Turnout in the Industrial Democracies’, American Political Science Review, 81 (2), 405–24. Jesuit, D. (2003) ‘The Regional Dynamics of European Electoral Politics: Participation in National and European Contests in the 1990s’, European Union Politics, 4 (2), 139–64. Kurpas, S., M. Incerti and B. Crum (2004) Preview of the 2004 European Parliament Elections: Results of an EPIN Survey of National Experts (Brussels: European Policy Institutes Network (EPIN). Lodge, J. (2001a) ‘Invisible, Irrelevant but Insistent? Euro-elections and the European Parliament’ in J. Lodge (ed.) The 1999 Elections to the European Parliament (London: Palgrave Macmillan). Lodge, J. (2001b) ‘Making the EP Elections Distinctive: A Proposal for a Uniform eElectoral Procedure’ in J. Lodge (ed.) The 1999 Elections to the European Parliament (London: Palgrave Macmillan). Marsh, M. (1998) ‘Testing the Second-Order Election Model After Four European Elections’, British Journal of Political Science, 28 (4), 891–607. Mattila, M. (2003) ‘Why Bother? Determinants of Turnout in the European Elections’, Electoral Studies, 22 (3), 449–68. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) (2004) Elections to the European Parliament, 10–13 June 2004 (Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR).

54 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

Pacek, A.C., and B. Radcliff (2003) ‘Voter Participation and Party-Group Fortunes in European Parliament Elections, 1979–1999: A Cross-National Analysis’, Political Research Quarterly, 56 (1), 91–5. Reif, K., and H. Schmitt (1980) ‘Nine Second-Order National Elections – A Conceptual Framework for Analysis of European Election Results’, European Journal of Political Research, 8 (1), 3–44. Rose, R. (2004) ‘Voter Turnout in the European Union’, in Voter Turnout in Western Europe since 1945: A Regional Report (Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance). Schmitt, H., and R. Mannheimer (1991) ‘About Voting and Non-Voting in the European Elections of June 1989’, European Journal of Political Research, 19 (1), 31–54. Schmitt, H., and J. Thomassen (eds) (1999) Political Representation and Legitimacy in the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Topf, R. (1995) ‘Electoral Participation’ in H-D. Klingeman and D. Fuchs (eds) Citizens and the State (Oxford: Oxford University Press). van der Eijk, C., and M. Franklin (eds) (1996) Choosing Europe? The European Electorate and National Politics in the Face of Union (Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press).

Part II Country Case Studies

This page intentionally left blank

6

Austria Josef Melchior

Introdution Since the parliamentary elections in late 1999, which took place only four months after the last elections to the European Parliament (EP), Austria has undergone profound changes. For the first time in the Second Republic, the People’s Party (OeVP) formed a government with the populist rightwing Freedom Party (FPOe) under their (former) leader Jörg Haider in early 2000. The day after, fourteen EU member states adopted diplomatic measures against the Austrian government. These so-called ‘sanctions’ led to serious tensions between Austria and the other EU member states but also between the government parties and the opposition.1 Only two years later, a crisis concerning the political direction of the Freedom Party occurred that led to the resignation of most of its members in government. In view of this, Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel of the People’s Party called early elections in late 2002 which led to a landslide victory for his People’s Party which won more than 42 per cent (plus 15 percentage points) of the vote. The Freedom Party lost nearly two-thirds of its former voters and secured only 10 per cent of the vote. Nevertheless, the ruling parties decided to prolong their cooperation in government. The government introduced a reform agenda that tried to combine (neo)liberal goals with conservative values. It aims at rolling back the state and state bureaucracy, the privatisation of public enterprises, and an increased role for market-like mechanisms in steering society. Concerning European integration, OeVP and FPOe diverge significantly on a number of issues ranging from how to deal with atomic power plants in neighbouring countries to the question of enlargement. One uniting European topic was the (unsuccessful) fight for a new agreement with the EU partners on the sensitive issue of transit over the Alps and equal representation of smaller countries in the European 57

58 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

Commission and the Council during the IGC 2003 and 2004. The political style of the new coalition is more confrontational and less inclusive than it used to be in Austria for decades. Strikes, particularly in the public sector, have been used by the unions in recent years as an instrument to press for concessions more often than in decades before, and the institution of social partnership has lost much of its influence even in its core areas like labour law and social and economic policy.2

The European elections 2004 The elections to the European Parliament (EP) were scheduled for 13 June 2004. They marked the end of a series of elections at local, regional and presidential level. The series started in autumn 2003 with the elections to the provincial parliaments in Tyrol and Upper Austria on 28 September and ended with the presidential elections on 25 April 2004. It soon became clear that it would be difficult to mobilise the voters for the EP elections. More seriously, the EU’s image had deteriorated significantly during the previous twelve months and reached its lowest level since Austria joined the EU.3 The same is true concerning diminishing trust in the European, but also the national, political institutions and a negative attitude concerning enlargement.4 Therefore, Austria had become one of the most Euro-sceptic countries in Europe along with the UK and Sweden. Given this rather gloomy outlook several initiatives were taken to mobilise the voters. There were a number of calls to participate in the vote that were published in the print media, for instance, by the heads of the social partners or on behalf of the Austrian president; and candidates and party spokespersons regularly asked their sympathisers to participate in the upcoming elections. In TV spots prominent European figures like the Commission President Romano Prodi and the president of the EP, Pat Cox, among others, asked the Austrian voters to go to the vote. The topic of a possible low turnout surfaced regularly in the news in TV and on radio and was present in many reports about the upcoming EP elections. Six groups registered for the European parliamentary elections: OeVP, the Social Democratic Party (SPOe), the FPOe, the Greens, the ‘List Hans-Peter Martin’, and the ‘Left – opposition for a Europe acting in solidarity’.5 The last two groups were newcomers to the electoral arena. Hans-Peter Martin, a former journalist and author of several bestsellers (among them Bitter Pills and The Global Trap) had been recruited by the SPOe as its leading candidate for the 1999 EP elections but they departed in disharmony right after that. In 2000 he started his ‘European Transparency Initiative (ETI)’ that aimed to ensure access for all citizens to European documents and meetings. More provocatively, he started collating information about individual MEPs, notably concerning their presence or absence in parliamentary debates, their activities, and whether they may have abused the generous reimbursement

Austria

59

allowances for expenditure on travelling, accommodation and the support granted to MEPs. Capitalising on the attention he received in German and Austrian popular media he decided to run in the EP elections. ‘The Left’ is a platform comprising the Austrian Communist Party, independent leftist groups in Austria and the newly founded ‘Party of the European Left’. It is led by Leo Gabriel, a journalist and Third World activist. Aware that the chance of getting elected was slim, he wanted to use the EP elections to raise awareness for the matters of anti-globalisation movements and to find an organisational form that brought together leftist and independent groups in Austria and beyond.

The election campaign The EP campaign seamlessly followed that on the Austrian presidential elections that had resulted in a victory for the candidate of the opposition SPOe, Heinz Fischer. In contrast to the last EP elections, the parties did not experiment with prominent ‘outsiders’ on their candidate lists. According to the reduced size of the EP after enlargement and the Treaty of Nice, Austria could only send 18 instead of 21 MEPs – so the stakes for all parties to secure their seats were higher this time. All parties relied mainly on their established teams. A shake-up was given to the list of the Freedom Party. Two MEPs had already left the party in February 2003 and the leader of the delegation of the Freedom Party had distanced herself from developments within her party so it was clear that she would be replaced. The List H.P. Martin decided only shortly before the time to register ended to establish formally a party and to present a brief list of candidates in order to realise the generous financial benefits each successful party is entitled to under Austrian election law. His list comprised only four candidates, among them Karin Resetarits, a well-known former TV journalist. At that time she was employed by a radio station that belongs to the biggest private media enterprise that had also pushed H.P. Martin’s revelations about the EP’s financial privileges in the most widely read popular newspaper in Austria (Die Krone). The election campaigns were officially launched in the first and second week of May. The four established parties used posters and the internet and put advertisements in newspapers, radio, and cinemas to communicate their messages and all candidates were actively campaigning in the streets. More importantly, the campaigns were rather closely covered by public and private radio and TV stations. Only the frontrunners of the four established parties were invited to one-hour TV interviews that are regularly broadcast on Sunday mornings (Pressestunde) and to a final discussion on the last Sunday before the elections. Nevertheless, all these activities met with little enthusiasm among voters whose interest in the campaign remained very modest throughout.

60 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

The parties’ campaigns The OeVP focused on its traditional self-image as ‘the’ pro-European Austrian party, on the achievements resulting from EU membership, and on the continuity of the team of MEPs led by ex-journalist Ursula Stenzel since 1996.6 Particular emphasis was given to mobilising its own voters given that a good turnout would be crucial for the chances of doing well in the elections.7 The main aim of the junior partner in government, the FPOe, was to limit expected losses in the EP election. Under the chairmanship of Herbert Haupt and the influence of Jörg Haider – who had won a major victory in the provincial elections in Carinthia in March 2004 against the trend of devastating defeats in all nationwide elections since 2000 – the party nominated Hans Kronberger, a moderate ex-journalist as frontrunner to the EP elections. His candidacy was challenged by a group of right-wing party functionaries who ran a preferential vote campaign for their candidate, Andreas Mölzer, who was in third place on the party list.8 The party’s official campaign promoted the fight against the use of atomic energy in Europe, against ‘more money for Brussels’, and against Turkish EU membership. It started its campaign by announcing an initiative against European involvement in Iraq and ended it with an ‘hour of the patriots’. The challenger from within the FPOe aimed at the mobilisation of the traditional core of extreme-right voters. They wanted to seize the opportunity to gain more influence within the party, believing that the populist expansion of the party was a mistake. The SPOe started its campaign by presenting itself as the voice that would make Austria heard again in Europe, alluding to the deteriorated standing of Austria following the EU measures against the Austrian government and the participation of the FPOe in government. Building on its traditional image, the party argued in favour of a ‘social Europe’ that aims at full employment, growth and social security, and stopping privatisation of basic public services. It also tried to profit from the criticism of the government’s reform policies in Austria, asking the voters to teach the government a lesson. In an attempt to exploit the EU critical mood in Austria, the SPOe put up posters saying that Europe is for the people, not for big business. In the last phase of the campaign the party also claimed that it would prevent any attempt to privatise Austrian water resources. The Greens, promoting their frontrunner Johannes Voggenhuber, presented themselves as a serious alternative to the governing parties. It was the only party that ran on a Europe-wide coordinated platform and that permanently emphasised the need to concentrate on European issues like the European Constitution, and environmental, energy and transport policy. In two poster series – one consisting of caricatures of leading politicians of the governing parties and one focusing on the two leading candidates and their messages – they contrasted nationalism with European democracy, NATO with a European peace policy, neoliberalism with social Europe, the use of atomic

Austria

61

energy and unlimited traffic with a European environmental policy. A radio spot featured Daniel Cohn-Bendit, co-speaker of the European Green’s election campaign, following the establishment of the European Green Party in February 2004 in Rome. The campaign of the List H.P. Martin focused on the single issue of fighting against the misuse of public money by the Members of the European Parliament. Lacking financial resources, his campaign was heavily dependent on media presence. He promoted himself as the one who is able to ‘clean up Brussels’ in an attempt ‘to help democracy’. In his public appearances he argued for better control of the European institutions and direct citizen involvement, against European lobbyism, and the danger of a militarisation of the EU following the adoption of the new European Constitution, which he opposed.

Campaign dynamics and issues Two topics dominated the public debate during the campaign: MEPs’ alleged financial privileges, and the role of the SPOe and its leading candidate during the time of the ‘diplomatic measures’ of the EU-14 against the Austrian government in 2000. Already in April 2004, H.P. Martin had begun to appear on German TV shows and Austrian popular media criticising the misuse of the generous compensation schemes for MEPs. This issue regularly popped up in political discussions and led to allegations and counter-allegations, a debate about who of the contenders had done more to remedy the situation and who may be more credible in their affirmations not to have exploited the given arrangement. Jörg Haider accused the Social Democrats’ leading candidate of treason because he had written a letter at the time of the ‘EU measures’ that was interpreted by the governing parties as supportive of these actions. Jörg Haider even demanded that his right to vote and stand as a candidate should be withdrawn. When a discussion started on whether a parliamentary investigation should take a look into this matter, even the Austrian Commissioner, Franz Fischler, a member of the People’s Party, interfered by criticising his own party and the poor style of the electoral contest. It is likely that this kind of negative campaigning was deliberately chosen by the three biggest parties to mobilise their membership given the poor image of the EU among the electorate and the absence of (popular) European themes that would allow differentiation between the political parties. This became evident in the debate about several issues. First, all parties more or less rejected the possibility of EU membership of Turkey within the near future. Particularly the Social Democrats and the Greens tended to emphasise their concerns instead of their more differentiated positions in the face of outright rejection by the governing parties, by the List H.P. Martin and the negative attitude towards further enlargement within the population. In a complementary fashion the parties tried to amplify differences between themselves where

62 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

they did not exist in the way they were presented. This relates in particular to the resistance to the liberalisation of Austrian water resources, the fight against the use of atomic energy in Europe and against the financial privileges within the EP. The debate was full of (false) accusations revolving around the credibility and consistency of the argumentation of the contenders. The governing parties and the oppositional Social Democratic Party competed with one another on who is the true fighter for the Austrian interest within the EU. The Greens tried to distance themselves from this infighting, promoting a more European perspective. The strategy of the List H.P. Martin focused on the populist issue of waste of public money and the Left concentrated on the pan-European fight against neoliberal globalisation. The inward looking and nationally oriented contest was accompanied by a public discourse and growing awareness of the need to focus more on European issues and a more European perspective as well. The widespread anti-EU sentiments among the electorate, the populist temptation to exploit the given negative mood, and the overriding aim of mobilising one’s followers led to a self-reinforcing dynamics that prevailed over rational criticism and good intentions to avoid such an outcome.

The result Turnout at the EP elections fell from 49 per cent in 1999 to a record low of about 42 per cent in 2004. This is within the expected range and close to those 41 per cent of the population who had already declared their intention to participate in the vote in the Eurobarometer poll in February 2004. The main reasons for abstention were: public feeling of the elections’ irrelevance (22 per cent); lack of interest in the EU and the EP (20 per cent); and dissatisfaction with the policies of the EU (19 per cent).9 Therefore, nonvoting was understood as a political statement in contrast to 1999. The smaller coalition partner, the Freedom Party, suffered a devastating loss of more than 17 percentage points. The Social Democratic Party became the strongest party but it secured only a small margin ahead of the governing People’s Party. The Greens gained their highest score ever at national elections (nearly 13 per cent) but were overtaken by the List H.P. Martin, which came in third place winning 14 per cent of the vote (see Table 6.1). The Social Democrats won seven seats and the Greens two – as many as in 1999. The People’s Party lost one seat, winning six seats; the Freedom Party lost four of their five seats, and the List H.P. Martin won two seats. H.P. Martin was able to mobilise voters who normally would have voted for the Freedom Party, but he also attracted a large number of former voters of the Social Democrats. Among his voters were more men than women, a high proportion of bluecollar workers and the elderly, many of whom are critical of the EU and the governing coalition and who regularly read the newspaper Die Krone.10

Austria

Table 6.1

63

Elections to the EP in Austria

2004

Votes (in %) 1999

1996

2004

Seats 1999

1996

SPOe OeVP FPOe Grüne List HP Martin Liberal Forum Others Sum

33.3 32.7 6.3 12.9 14.0 – 0.8 100

31.7 30.6 23.5 9.3 – 2.6 2.2 99.9

29.2 29.6 27.5 6.8 – 4.3 2.6 100

7 6 1 2 2 – – 18

7 7 5 2 – 0 0 21

6 7 6 1 – 1 0 21

Turnout

42.4

49.4

67.7

Source: Own compilation of data published by the Ministry of the Interior ( 30 July 2004).

The election result has already had a number of consequences. First, 60 per cent of the Freedom Party’s traditional voters abstained and a further 15 per cent voted for the List H.P. Martin.11 Second, a split between the ‘traditionalists’ and the ‘populists’ within the FPOe became visible and caused tensions that could only be eased temporarily by the nomination of Jörg Haider’s sister as the new chairwoman of the party. The preferential vote campaign was successful and right-wing Andreas Mölzer was able to win the only seat of the FPOe, defeating the frontrunner of the party. Third, the weakening of the FPOe will further reduce the influence of the party within the coalition and on the government’s European policy. Fourth, contrary to what one may expect, the balance of the pro-European forces within the Austrian delegation to the EP has been strengthened because of the defeat of the FPOe that was not fully compensated by the two seats won by the Eurosceptic list of H.P. Martin. Fifth, and most disturbingly, the representative quality of Austrian MEPs has suffered severely and may exacerbate the risk of growing alienation between the MEPs and the Austrian population that they are supposed to represent. As a consequence of the election campaign, it seems likely that the following topics will figure prominently on the political agenda of Austrian MEPs: (a) settling the issue of the MEPs’ salary and compensation schemes; (b) finding a satisfactory solution for the regulation of road transport over the Alps; (c) a more cautious approach towards the privatisation and liberalisation of basic public services; and (d) special emphasis on social and ecological issues, including the containment of the use of nuclear power plants in the EU. Such efforts will only help to improve the EU’s poor image if the Austrian political class learns the lesson that the 2004 campaign teaches: stop using the EU as a scapegoat for unpopular decisions; focus on matters

64 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

that are of real concern for the people; and more and better information of what is at stake in European politics.

Notes 1. See F. Karlhofer, J. Melchior and H. Sickinger (eds) Anlassfall Österreich. Die Europäische Union auf dem Weg zu einer Wertegemeinschaft (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2001). 2. See E. Tálos and M. Fink‚ ‘Sozialpartnerschaft in Österreich: Das korporatistische Modell am Ende?’ in S. Jochem and N.A. Siegel (eds) Konzertierung, Verhandlungsdemokratie und Reformpolitik im Wohlfahrtsstaat. Das Modell Deutschland im Vergleich (Opladen: Leske and Budrich, 2003), pp. 194–231. 3. See the results of the newest Eurobarometer survey: European Opinion Research Group, Eurobarometer 61. National Report Austria (European Commission, July 2004); European Opinion Research Group, Eurobarometer 61. First Results (European Commission, May 2004). Several other Austrian polls that were published in the newspapers from January to June 2004 draw an even darker picture about the public’s opinion towards the EU and enlargement in particular. 4. See European Opinion Research Group, Eurobarometer 61. First Results. 5. Basic information about the parties and their positions on Europe can be found on their homepages: OeVP at ; SPoe at ; the Greens at ; the Freedom Party at ; list HP Martin at ; and the Left at . 6. The OeVP’s party manifesto was entitled ‘Wir sind die Europapartei. Österreich im Herzen – Europa im Blick’ (‘We are the European party. Austria in our hearts – Europe in our sight’) as of 7 May 2004. 7. The poster campaign read like this: ‘Peace. Freedom. Vote!’; ‘Security. Employment. Vote!’; ‘Future. Opportunities. Vote!’ and ‘Representing Austria Strongly’. 8. According to the election law of 1996 it is possible to cast a preferential vote for a particular candidate on the party list in addition to the vote for the particular party. If a candidate on the list gets at least 7 per cent of the votes cast for the party as a whole, he or she is directly elected irrespective of his or her position on the party list (see Europawahlordnung, BGBl. 117/1996, § 63 and 77). 9. See F. Plasser and P.A. Ulram, Analyse der Europawahl 2004. Wähler, Nichtwähler, Motive (Vienna: Fessel GFK Public Research, Ludwig Boltzmann Institut für angewandte Politikforschung, 14 June 2004). 10. Ibid. 11. Institute for Social Research and Analysis, Wählerstromanalyse. EU-Wahl 2004 (Vienna, 2004).

7

Belgium Tom Delreux and Caroline Steensels

Introduction On 13 June 2004, 6,857,986 voters elected 24 MEPs. Belgium is one of the few EU countries – beside Luxembourg and Greece – where voting is obligatory, which explains the relative high turnout of 90.8 per cent. Belgium is a federal state where regional parliaments are elected on the same day as the EP, so new representatives for the regional parliaments in Flanders, Wallonia, Brussels and the German-speaking area were elected as well. Belgium’s federal state structure also generates territorially split political parties, so different parties operate independently in each region. As a result of the Nice Treaty, Belgium had one EP seat less than in 1999. Its 24 seats are divided between three constituencies: Flanders has 14, Wallonia nine, and the German-speaking community one. This means that three separate EP elections by PR are run in Belgium: in Flanders, in Wallonia and in the German-speaking community.1

Domestic background The 1999 federal, regional and EP elections resulted in a unique governmental constellation: for the first time both green parties joined a government coalition of liberals and socialists, thus sending the Christian democrats into opposition. The 2003 federal elections were the first test of this purple–green coalition. Whereas the liberal and socialist parties were rewarded for their participation in government, both green parties were severely punished. However, early on in the 2004 election campaigns, it became clear that its outcomes would become both an evaluation and correction of the 2003 results. Since 1999 the political landscape in Flanders has changed enormously as a result of two interlinked factors. First, an internal struggle in the Flemish nationalist party, VU, led to it splitting. The more Flemish nationalist wing 65

66 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

continued as N-VA (New-Flemish Alliance), while a wing preferring a broader progressive project reformed itself as Spirit. Second, the Christian democratic and the socialist party started modernising, resulting in an updated programme, a more modern look, and a change of name. The Christian democratic CVP changed its name in CD&V (Christian Democratic and Flemish), SP became sp.a (Socialist Party Different). A few months before the 2004 elections, the green party undertook a similar operation. With a new name, Groen! (Green!), it wanted to stress its independent status. It rejected sp.a’s offer to join the ‘left-wing cartel’ that sp.a formed with Spirit since the 2003 federal elections. The two other ‘traditional parties’ (CD&V and VLD) also created cartels for the 2004 elections: CD&V took its chance with N-VA, VLD with Vivant. Moreover, this ‘reallocation’ of Flanders’ political landscape was strengthened by a relatively large number of politicians switching parties. This was also the case for some Flemish MEPs during the EP legislature 1999–2004. Consequently, the de facto distribution of Flemish EP seats in 2004 differed from the initial situation of 1999. The Christian democrats lost one seat to VLD. VLD could not increase its seats because one MEP left the party and founded its own (Liberaal Appèl). Two Flemish green MEPs also switched: one to sp.a, another to the independents. However, one green seat was recycled by Bart Staes, who was elected on a VU list, but switched to the greens. Consequently, the distribution of EP seats among the Flemish parties before the 2004 elections differed completely from the situation after the 1999 elections: the Christian democrats, the greens and the remains of the VU each lost one seat; the socialists, the independents and one little party (Liberaal Appèl) each won one. Compared to the Flemish political turmoil, the party climate in Wallonia remained relatively stable: only two parties/movements changed their political format. On the one hand, the Christian democratic party (PSC), in trying to redefine its political project, adopted a so-called ‘charter of democratic humanism’ and transformed into the CDH (Humanist Democratic Centre). On the other hand, the liberal federation of PRL-FDF-MCC (Reformist Liberal Party, Democratic Front of Francophones and Movement of Citizens for Change) merged into a new liberal movement, the MR (Reformist Movement). Unlike Flanders, these changes did not lead to a major transfer of politicians from one party to another. As for the parties operating in the German-speaking community, changes remained limited to a change of name: the German-speaking liberals, the PFF (Party for Freedom and Progress) adapted their name to PFF-MR as to indicate they were also part of the MR.

Towards the elections Since 1989, Belgium has imposed a strict law on campaign expenditure, limiting EP campaign expenditure per party to €1,000,000. If more than

Belgium

67

one election takes place on the same day, no more than €1,000,000 can be spent by each party for those different elections. Campaigning may not begin until three months before the elections, and parties and candidates are not allowed to distribute electoral messages through commercial bill boards, radio, television adverts, telephone campaigns or any kind of paraphernalia such as pencils, T-shirts, and so on.2 The Belgian parties focused mainly on national issues. There was a lot of media coverage but the regional elections got proportionally much more attention. Even if an EU issue was discussed, the debate was invariably translated into a national issue. The VLD/Vivant campaign was dominated by Guy Verhofstadt, the federal PM, who headed the European election list. As Verhofstadt had announced he would not take up his mandate if elected,3 his candidature was contested by other parties, especially by CD&V/N-VA, who called him a ‘fake candidate’. Verhofstadt, at that time seen as a possible successor to Commission President Romano Prodi, defended his place on the list saying that the electorate could judge Belgium’s EU policy. Yet, political analysts argued he wanted to use his PM status in a prestige duel with former PM Jean-Luc Dehaene (CD&V/N-VA). Dehaene headed the CD&V/N-VA list. His European realisations (for instance, his vice-presidency of the European Convention) and his appearance of European statesmanship dominated his campaign. He emphasised his European statesmanship credentials by refusing any debate (especially with Verhofstadt) on non-EU issues. This ‘battle’ with Verhofstadt personalised the EU campaigns of CD&V/N-VA and VLD/Vivant. Despite similar EU programmes and preferences, both cartels constantly attacked each other (journalists and analysts called it a ‘mud campaign’). Unlike CD&V/N-VA and VLD/Vivant, sp.a/Spirit did not place a party heavyweight at the head of its list, but surprised everyone by, after a few months of guessing, selecting the former president of the socialist trade union, Mia De Vits. It was argued that De Vits could credibly personalise the socialist claim for a more social Europe, the main issue of the sp.a/Spirit campaign. Remarkably, on the three cartel lists – VLD/Vivant, CD&V/N-VA and sp.a/ Spirit – the smallest cartel partner received an eligible place on the European list. In the run-up to the elections Vlaams Blok was sentenced by a court for racism and inciting discrimination, but was in appeal during the election campaign. Its heavyweights headed both the regional and European lists and its campaign focused on their court sentence. Vlaams Blok aimed to retain its EP seats, as did Groen!. The latter’s campaign concentrated on EP list leader Bart Staes. Groen! applied the same strategy as Vlaams Blok by placing all its heavyweights on the list. Faced with a newly imposed election threshold, it had a single slogan for both the European and the regional elections: ‘Groen! is searching for 280,000 votes’. The party was helped by various studies and press articles, which commended the excellent work records of Staes in the European Parliament.

68 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

The election campaign of the francophone parties was dominated by the ‘clash of the titans’ between party leaders Elio Di Rupo (PS) and Louis Michel (MR) and – as in Flanders – the closely related debate on so-called ‘fake candidates’. On the basis of the 2003 election results, it was clear at the beginning of the EP campaign that eight of the nine Walloon seats would return to their current ‘owners’, thus leaving just one ‘floating’ seat uncertain. The PS had placed its party leader Di Rupo in first place on its European list, followed by incumbent MEP Véronique De Keyser. The PS confidently entered the election campaign. As the party was seen as a dynamic, able policy-maker and a factor of stability in an economically uncertain time, it was expected that the PS would firmly establish its leading position in francophone politics. Minister of Foreign Affairs Michel headed the European list for MR. Although he had announced he would not take up his European mandate, his position was justified on the grounds that he in effect defined the European strategy of the MR. At the start of the election campaigns, news leaked out that MR representative Daniel Ducarme (at that time, minister-president of the Brussels Region) was accused of fiscal fraud. This issue may have had a bad effect on the overall image of the party. Furthermore, in an attempt to become the largest political federation in francophone politics, the MR tried to forge a cartel with CDH at the start of the election campaign. When this failed, the MR tried to prize away members from the CDH, but without real success. The European debates between Di Rupo and Michel were very limited and mainly focused on the regional elections and its consequences. Party president Joëlle Milquet headed the CDH list. CDH’s main concern was for the regional elections. Over time, electoral support for CDH had fallen and francophone politics had become a ‘two-party region’. If CDH wanted to return into government, it had to show it presented some real political power as an alternative to MR. Therefore the CDH campaigned to reach a self-imposed election hurdle of 15 per cent. Compared to the Flemish greens, the Ecolo campaign was less a matter of political survival and more one of consolidation after the 2003 electoral bashing. As the party strongly opposed the practice of ‘fake candidates’, it placed the relatively unknown MEP Pierre Jonckheer in charge of its European list, followed by heavyweight Isabelle Durant. By placing Durant in second place, Ecolo hoped to reclaim a second seat. Ecolo was the only francophone party that tried to incorporate transnational issues into the European campaign. Unfortunately, this did not elicit much of a response from the media or the other parties. The largest non-traditional party is FN (National Front), a francophone extremist right party. Despite a complete media boycott, FN has grown over the past decade. As a consequence of a lawsuit that FN and FNB (New Belgian Front, another francophone extremist right party) had started against each other at the beginning of the election campaign, the French electoral college temporarily suspended their European

Belgium

69

and regional lists and those of four other small parties, thus fuelling the debate that these smaller parties were being silenced by the traditional parties. National issues dominated the EP election campaigns in Flanders and Wallonia. Nevertheless, there is a broad consensus on most EU issues and Belgium’s EU policy in general. Belgium is considered as one of the most pro-European member states. This pro-EU consensus, combined with a public indifference, leads to a ‘permissive consensus’ about the nation’s EU policy. Therefore none of the Belgian parties can be labelled as fundamentally antiEuropean.4 All traditional Belgian parties support augmenting EU institutions’ powers, and expanding EU competences, especially in socio-economic areas. Over the last few years however, a sense of so-called ‘healthy Euro-criticism’ has surfaced in some Belgian parties. For example, Flemish socialists indicated in their election campaign ‘we are not Euroscepical, but we ask some critical questions’.5 These questions dealt with the negative effects of the free market and the lack of social protection measures in the EU. Sp.a/Spirit also threatened to veto the Belgian ratification of the constitutional treaty if too many social elements were deleted. Another example of this Euro-criticism was the argument put by CDH and PS in favour of a cooling-off period in the enlargement process in order to safeguard the deepening process. During the different election campaigns, three issues were stressed. First, the candidacy of Guy Verhofstadt as Commission president divided the francophone camp: MR supported him, PSC sat on the fence and both PS and Ecolo indicated that the nationality of the Commission president was not so much an issue for them and that they would prefer to support a candidate from their own (European) political group. In Flanders, all parties supported Verhofstadt’s candidacy, except for Vlaams Blok who feared that this would mean a francophone politician becoming Belgium’s next Prime Minister. Second, the constitutional treaty was an issue. For sp.a/Spirit and all the francophone parties, the European Convention presented the absolute minimum they could accept, especially in respect of a ‘social Europe’. By contrast, CD&V/N-VA and VLD/Vivant opposed this position arguing that the treaty was too big a step forward to veto it. Most discussions on the constitutional treaty were reduced to a national question of whether or not a non-binding referendum should be organised. In Flanders, VLD and Vlaams Blok advocated a referendum (Vlaams Blok even proposed linking it with a referendum on the EU accession of Turkey – their major EP campaign issue was opposition to Turkish accession), while CD&V/N-VA opposed it. Groen! and sp.a/Spirit argued for an EU-wide referendum. Third, the so-called Bolkestein directive on the liberalisation of the European service market was briefly discussed in the campaign. One week before the elections, a demonstration against the proposal – attended by sp.a/Spirit, PS, CD&V/N-VA, CDH, Groen! and Ecolo – took place in Brussels. Except for VLD/Vivant, all Flemish and Walloon parties strongly opposed the proposal, stating that the directive should include more exceptions (especially concerning health care).

70 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

Results and conclusions The EP election results (see Table 7.1) in Flanders and Wallonia were very similar to those of the regional elections. However, the outcome for the two regions pointed in different directions. In Flanders, the opposition parties (CD&V/N-VA and Vlaams Blok) won the elections at the expense of the two government parties (sp.a/Spirit and VLD). In Wallonia however, one of the government parties came out on top (PS) whereas the other party (MR) was seen as the loser of the elections. In the German-speaking Community, CSP kept its EP seat. From a theoretical point of view, it is only significant to Table 7.1

EP election results, Belgium, 2004 Seats Number Gain/loss (in 2004 comparison with 1999)

Flandersa VLD/Vivant sp.a/Spirit CD&V/N-VA Vlaams Blok Groen! VU Walloniab CDH Ecolo MR FN PS RWF German-speaking community CSP PFF MR Ecolo SP PJU-PDB

EP election 2004

Votes EP election Federal 1999 election 2003

3 3 4 3 1 –

0 +1 +1 +1 –1 –2

21.9 17.8 28.2 23.2 8.0 –

23.6 14.2 21.7 15.1 12.0 12.2

26.0 24.9 25.6 18.2 3.9 —

1 1 3 0 4 0

0 –2 0 0 +1 0

15.2 9.8 27.6 7.5 36.1 1

13.3 22.7 27.0 4.1 25.8 –

14.7 8.4 32.1 6.0 32.0 1.1

1 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0

42.5 22.8 10.5 14.9 9.3

36.5 19.6 17.0 11.4 –

–c – – – –

Notes: a Given the changes in the Flemish political landscape, direct electoral comparisons of the 2004 results with the 2003 and 1999 results are not possible. We are comparing the 2004 VLD/Vivant score with the sum of the 1999 and 2003 scores of each separate party, the 2004 sp.a/Spirit result with the 1999 SP result and with the 2003 sp.a/Spirit result, the 2004 CD&V/N-VA score with the 1999 score of CVP and with the sum of the separate 2003 scores of CD&V and N-VA, and the 2004 Groen! result with the 1999 and the 2003 Agalev result. b The 2004 results of CDH and MR are compared with the 1999 and the 2003 scores of PSC and MR respectively. c Contrary to the regional and European elections, there is no separate electoral college for the German-speaking community in the federal elections.

Belgium

71

compare these results with the results of similar elections (namely the 1999 European elections). However, given the second-order nature of European issues in Belgium (the dominance of national issues in the 2004 campaign) and the reallocation of the Flemish political landscape, these results can – to a large extent – be compared to the outcome of the 2003 federal elections, although they relate to different decision-making levels. In Flanders, the cartel CD&V/N-VA became the largest party with 28.2 per cent of the vote, winning four EP seats. Vlaams Blok boosted its share by 8.1 per cent over 1999 and won an additional seat. The two major government parties, sp.a/spirit and VLD, lost votes compared to the 2003 federal elections, but sp.a/Spirit did better than in 1999 and won a seat. VLD/Vivant kept its three seats. Groen! lost one seat, but doubled its 2003 score and achieved its aim of retaining one seat. The prestige duel between Guy Verhofstadt and Jean-Luc Dehaene resulted in an obvious victory for Dehaene, who won 651,345 preference votes versus 388,011 for Verhofstadt. The PS was the overwhelming winner of the EP elections in Wallonia. With 36.1 per cent of the vote, it secured the ‘floating’ seat, thus sending four representatives to the EP. Its share of the vote was up 10.3 per cent on the 1999 EP elections but only up 2.1 per cent on the 2003 results. MR, the second government party, kept its three seats. Compared to the 1999 results, its share was more or less as before (a small gain of 0.6 per cent), but compared to the 2003 federal election results its share was down by 4.5 per cent. CDH reached its self-imposed critical threshold of 15 per cent thus safely keeping its only EP seat. Ecolo managed to halt its decline by slightly improving its share compared to the 2003 results. Finally, despite a media embargo and a leadership problem, the extremist right party FN closed the gap with Ecolo, getting 7.5 per cent. When looking at the preference votes of the francophone politicians heading the respective candidate lists, PS leader Di Rupo ranks first (483,644 votes) followed by MR leader Michel (327,374) and CDH leader Milquet (191,900). In the German-speaking community, the results of the EP and the regional elections differ. Whereas almost all parties gained votes in the EP elections, they lost votes in the regional elections, except for the German-speaking socialists. Given the fact that there was only one EP seat at stake, the European elections were – even more than in the other regions – a popularity contest. Incumbent MEP, Christian democrat Matthieu Grosch, kept his seat with 42.6 per cent of the vote, whereas his party only won 32.8 per cent of the vote in the 2004 regional elections. The 2004 European elections in Belgium were an obvious example of ‘second-order national contests’.6 The campaign, the issues, the media coverage were dominated by ‘first-order’ national topics resulting from the simultaneity of the EP and regional elections. The results of the regional and the European elections strongly converged for Wallonia and Flanders as the winners could be found among the opposition parties (and the PS in Wallonia) and the government parties lost votes. Keeping in mind the

72 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

differences in electoral size of the different regions and the size of the different parties,7 Dehaene was Belgium’s most popular politician on the European lists, followed by Di Rupo, Verhofstadt and Michel.

Notes 1. By the term ‘Flanders’ we refer to the geographical area of Flanders plus the Dutchspeaking people living in the Brussels Region. ‘Wallonia’ refers to the geographical area of Wallonia minus the German-speaking communities but plus the francophones living in the region of Brussels capitol. 2. Belgische Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers en Senaat, Verkiezingen voor het Europees Parlement en de Raden van 13 juni 2004, Regeling van de verkiezingscampagne en beperking, controle en aangifte van de verkiezingsuitslagen, doc. 51 1046/001. 3. Under Belgian election law, a candidate who has been elected does not have the duty to effectively take up his/her mandate. If an elected candidate renounces his or her mandate, the position will be taken by the next on the list. 4. J. Beyers and B. Kerremans, ‘Diverging Images of Consensus: Belgium and its View on European Integration’, in K. Goldmann and K. Gilland (eds), Nationality versus Europeanisation: The National View of the Nation in Four EU Countries (Stockholm: Stockholm University Press, 2001), pp. 127–65. 5. Mia De Vits, quoted in De Standaard, 15 May 2004. 6. S. Hix, The Political System of the European Union (London: Macmillan Press, 2003). 7. We used the following formula: number of preference votes number of preference votes *100 ————————————— + ———————————————— 2500 number of party votes

8

Cyprus Costas Melakopides

Introduction For the Republic of Cyprus, the 13 June 2004 EP elections acquired sui generis significance. As with the other nine ‘newcomers’, the event was an experience of self-evidently historic proportions and a paradigm of mixed feelings. On 24 April 2004, Greek and Turkish Cypriots voted in referendums on the future of the divided island. A ‘Yes’ vote would have led to a ‘United Cyprus Republic’ acceding to the EU on 1 May and the Euro-election following a different (logistical) course, reflecting the new – albeit quite obscure or underarticulated – political and social realities. Although the entire Republic of Cyprus joined the EU on 1 May 2004 as the legitimate state entity recognised by the international community, 75.8 per cent of Greek Cypriots rejected Kofi Annan’s Plan so 37 per cent of Cyprus’ territory remained occupied by Turkish troops.1 Thus, Greek Cypriots essentially formed the electorate. Although the Turkish Cypriots of the occupied ‘north’ had been invited to participate in the election, only 503 responded. The Nicosia government had advertised the Euro election in all Turkish Cypriot newspapers. But, given the all-consuming preoccupation of all Cypriots with the UN-sponsored negotiations and the referenda, it is unclear whether the limited Turkish Cypriot turnout was due to indifference, confusion or other reasons. Greek Cypriots seemed mentally and emotionally exhausted by the vicissitudes over the protracted Kofi Annan Plan.2 Mixed feelings arose from: relief that the Republic of Cyprus was ‘saved’ by their ‘No’ vote; conviction that the EU should present a ‘European’ alternative to the UN Plan, despite disappointment over the EU not asserting itself in the UN-sponsored negotiations and injecting into the plan the EU’s legal and political culture’s principles, values and norms.3

73

74 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

The 2004 Euro-election in Cyprus Cyprus was a single constitutuency. PR was used and voting was compulsory but abstention did not entail penalties. All Greek Cypriots who voted in the previous presidential elections were automatically included in the electoral role for the EP. Turnout at 71.19 per cent, a correspondingly low abstention rate among the EU’s lowest, was relatively high. The 27.5 per cent abstention rate was unusual by Cypriot standards, where elections are (formally) compulsory. It can be explained by the ‘political fatigue’ caused by the 24 April referendum and by my ‘mixed-feelings hypothesis’. Unlike the elaborate polls for the April referendums, no exit polls were conducted. Without opinion data, the evidence for the above is only anecdotal and impressionistic. Out of 483,311 registered voters, 350,387 citizens voted on 13 June to elect candidates from traditional political parties and a few new formations. The former consisted of the following: the Progressive Party of Working People (Anorthotiko Komma Ergazomenou Laou) (AKEL), a socialist party; the Democratic Rally (Dimokratikos Synagermos) (DISY), right of centre; the Democratic Party (Dimokratiko Komma) (DIKO), a centrist party; the Social Democratic Movement EDEK (Kinima Social Dimokraton EDEK) (EDEK), social democrat; and the Ecological and Environmental Movement (Kinima Oikologon Perivallontiston) (KOP), a Green party. New formations also fielded candidates. Apart from eight Independents, the most interesting new political entity was a splinter group from the conservative DISY – ‘For Europe’. Created shortly before the Euro-election by two former expelled DISY MPs, its defining feature was its founders’ clear opposition to the Annan Plan. Using the slogan ‘European Cyprus’, a group formed combining the United Democrats (EDI) – of former president, George Vassiliou – with some supporters of the Annan Plan. New Horizons (Neoi Orizontes) (NEO), a centrist yet ‘nationalist’ party, attracted like-minded individuals (including two well-known academics), under the label ‘European Collaboration-New Horizons’. The ‘People’s Socialist Movement’ was an ad hoc creation for the Euro-elections.

The campaign While lip-service was paid to ‘European issues’, all candidates responded to the people’s main, if not exclusive, preoccupation: Cyprus’ post-referendum state of affairs and who could, and who would not, work for a ‘European solution’ to the Cyprus problem. Specific questions to be addressed included the election campaign modalities, any further Cypriot idiosyncrasies, the candidates’ particular campaign tools and methods, and the manner of articulating major issues. Compared to other EU members – such as Greece – the Cyprus Euro-election involved a two-step vote: selection of a party (or formation) and then up to two individual candidates from within the chosen list. Therefore, apart

Cyprus

75

from the political parties’ or formations’ own advertising, many candidates ran individual campaigns. According to the GNORA Communications Counsellors, who conducted telephone interviews with a number of hopeful candidates,4 their campaigns followed ‘traditional’ patterns, for three reasons: limited campaign funds, limited time, and limited familiarity with the singleconstituency, national (as opposed to a regional) election campaign. They noted further three categories of campaign expenses. AKEL, the Ecological and Environmental Movement, and European Collaboration-New Horizons ran ‘low budget’ campaigns. ‘EDI-European Cyprus’ and ‘For Cyprus’ had ‘medium budget’ spending, whereas DISY, DIKO and Social Democratic Movement EDEK ran ‘high budget’ campaigns. Turning to campaign tools and methods, 60 per cent of candidates chose to communicate their message by phone (either personally or by their staff or both). 56.2 per cent used individual cards – with the candidate’s name, photograph, and a biopic. 47 per cent used pamphlets which circulated in addition to those of the political parties or formations. 44 per cent ran ads in newspapers and magazines. Being a ‘medium budget’ tool, this differed substantially from the ‘high budget’ means of radio advertising (16 per cent) and of television spots (chosen and/or affordable by only 6.2 per cent). Other campaigning included cocktail parties in hotels (given by 34.4 per cent). 28 per cent chose gatherings in private homes. 25 per cent of those interviewed sent personal letters to members of their respective political party. Finally, GNORA’s conclusion about ‘traditional’ campaign methods rested also on evidence that only 22 per cent of candidates used email and mobile phone messages. However, most parties or groups promoted themselves and candidates on their websites. Major national newspapers’ websites hosted portraits or short biographies of most candidates. Again, in the absence of research by Cypriot pollsters, voters’ accessibility to these websites and degree of influence on their decisions cannot be determined. Such material, however, is revealing about the parties’ Euro-election concerns, their priorities, the balance between ‘Cypriot’ and ‘European’ content, and so forth. In most cases, this material did not elaborate on ‘European issues’, handling the Euro-election primarily in a party-centric and Cyprus-centric manner. Each party attempted to promote its image and argue that it alone had the ‘best candidates’, meaning those best-suited to representing Cyprus’ interests in the European Parliament. Neither the conservative DISY nor left-wing AKEL created particularly relevant websites. Rather, the Ecologists’ web page exhibited technical sophistication and even preoccupation with European concerns. ‘How we see Europe and what we will claim in the European Parliament’ emphasised almost exclusively the Green Agenda and the European Greens’ values and worldview, to the point that ‘the Cyprus content’ seemed suppressed. Given the party’s results, however, this Euro-focus may have contributed to their serious defeat. DISY and AKEL internet material was limited and uninspiring. AKEL especially campaigned with less than its proverbial vigour. Its website

76 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

lacked pre-election material but hosted its Secretary-General’s apologetic postelection statement; and gave a link to the website of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left, even though the Cypriot party’s platform did not seem to fit with its EP counterpart. Apart from its candidates’ biopics, DISY concentrated on summarising speeches by its president and other officials. These revealed the intense partycentric preoccupation of the Democratic Rally. DISY was experiencing a serious internal crisis, following the leadership’s decision to support passionately the ‘Yes’ campaign in the referendum even though its party members were 2:1 against. Then the associated expulsion of two leading MPs from the party in May led to the formation of the splinter group mentioned above. This group’s initial chances of success were indeterminate. However, when former DISY president, Yiannakis Matsis – a popular and respected political figure – joined them, DISY’s leadership felt seriously threatened. Thus, DISY’s effective campaign concentrated on regaining its traditional following. Two party messages published on its website two days before the election are revealing. The first, by its president, called on its followers to vote for candidates who would join the European People’s Party, ‘Europe’s strongest political force’. He called this DISY’s ‘comparative advantage’, adding that ‘this is the great power that we wish to utilize for the benefit of our country’.5 The statement ended thus: ‘We call on the proud people of the Democratic Rally to strengthen our party. The party that pioneered our accession in the United Europe. No vote is redundant. We are certain that, next Sunday, together, we will all give the fight for a united and strong Democratic Rally.’ Apart from that DISY focused on healing internal splits: ‘Let us consider who will benefit from any split in DISY. Let us consider who wants a weak political opposition. We do not forget that we have all fought together. We do not forget that together we have all succeeded. That is why it is necessary that all together we continue.’6 By only 37 votes nationwide, ‘For Europe’ managed to elect an MEP. In any event, little help could be derived from the first two organisations’ websites, because they were elliptical or weak. ‘For Europe’ did not even have one, so all that DIKO and EDEK’s websites offered were short biopics and a few general announcements.7 EDEK’s recalled its long and respectable relationship with the Party of European Socialists and provided a link to their Euro-election statements and theses. The People’s Socialist Movement ran only four candidates, to dramatise its view that two seats should have been reserved for Turkish Cypriots. Two other formations fielded six candidates: the EDI-European Cyprus and the European Collaboration-New Horizons. The latter used the internet to present pre-election arguments and statements; a couple of them with bold, Cyprus-related European content such as their call to expose the postreferendum British policy of ‘punishing’ the Greek Cypriots for their ‘No’ in the referendum.The United Democrats (EDI) had a website but, except for

Cyprus

77

biopics and a link to the European Liberal Democrats, no other pre-election material could be found. The above sketch has summarised the parties’ and candidates’ central campaign means and methods. It remains to add that some formations opted for collective posters for their candidates, while a few hopefuls booked public space (such as large posters at bus stops) for individual advertisements. Most candidates banked primarily on the exposure they enjoyed in pre-election political programmes on public and private radio stations as well as on private and public TV. Thus, they were interviewed – if quite briefly, but very tensely – by early-morning radio programmes. All television channels gave late evening slots to most parties’ and formations’ representatives. The Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation broadcast interviews with all the six candidates’ groups on successive nights.

Campaign issues Much conspired to render Cyprus’ national problem the central focus of most campaigns, including: (i) the 24 April referendum, with the profound mental and emotional exhaustion it entailed; (ii) the dramatic debate about such a cosmogonic matter so close to the Euro-election that it left Cypriots little time to immerse themselves in labyrinthine European issues; (iii) after long and passionate support for European integration, a sense of disillusionment with the EU had set in owing to the absence of support by the Commission and other EU organs for a more ‘European’, or at least a ‘more fair’, plan than that of Kofi Annan; (iv) finally, voters seemed convinced that the priority now was to focus on how the EU would address and manage Cyprus’ own problem. Voters’ expectations affected the candidates’ focus and rested on the following question: which political parties or formations and which candidates could best respond to the issue of finding a solution to the national problem in line with EU principles, values and norms? Yet the primacy of the national issue was not the electorate’s only preoccupation. Most parties could not afford to disassociate their campaigns from either their corresponding EP groups or some general ‘European’ theses, principles and values represented by their own formations. Except for a few individuals with long and/or deep familiarity with European issues,8 the majority did not expand on them. For instance, there was no substantive debate on either the emerging Constitution or Europe’s need to cope with terrorism and asymmetrical security threats, or immigration, racism and xenophobia. Only EDEK and the Ecologists made their ‘European’ credentials and commitments explicit. In contrast to the other parties’ generalities on Europe (for example, AKEL’s promise to join the EP’s Left to meet the needs of ‘the working people’). EDEK’s main campaign pamphlet outlined a nine-point ‘Vision, Theses and Commitments’. EDEK’s pamphlet title – ‘Echoume thesi stin Evropi’ (‘We have a place in Europe’) – was also its main campaign slogan.

78 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

Six had clear ‘European content’ and only three were Cyprus-centric. The list’s first points read: ‘For the New Europe, the Europe of the peoples’; ‘for a Europe of social justice, security and solidarity’; ‘for a Europe of full employment and real convergence’. Its remaining ‘European theses’ included these: ‘for a Europe of education, civilization and knowledge’; and ‘for a Europe of peace and cooperation’. The following three were its ‘Cypriot’ theses: ‘for a Cyprus with a voice, a role, and a perspective’; ‘for a Cyprus that claims and gains with consensus and national unity’; and, finally, ‘for strong Cypriots in a strong Europe, with self-confidence and hope for a better tomorrow’. Similarly, the Cypriot Greens’ pamphlet – ‘This time I support Ecologists’ – contained only one ‘Cypriot’ out of four main arguments or theses. All four started with the verb ‘Thelo’ (‘I want’) and continued thus: ‘support in the Euro-parliament for my decision for a just and viable solution of the Cyprus problem’; ‘to strengthen the Movement which works continuously for the rights of ordinary citizens in Health, Culture, Education and the Environment’; ‘to be represented in Europe by young persons with new and fresh ideas’; and finally, ‘(I want) Europe, a force for Peace, for Democracy and the protection of the Human Rights of all people in the whole world’. A group of Cypriot Greens visited their corresponding European Group in Brussels to discuss the 13 June election and, a week before the election, EDEK President, Yiannakis Omirou, went to Copenhagen to seek and secure the support of PES President, Poul Nyrup Rassmussen. Thus, DISY – who aimed at regaining their traditional support – occupied one extreme of the spectrum, while the Ecologists, who stood as genuinely concerned Europeans, the other. Given Cyprus’ current idiosyncrasies and the aforementioned exceptions, this campaign focused on who could best handle Cyprus’ problem in the EP. Polls predicted that AKEL and DISY would each win two seats, with the Democratic Party (DIKO) getting one and the Social Democratic Movement none. The first surprise was AKEL coming second to DISY (see Table 8.1). As the 2001 national election winner expecting to repeat that success, and as the party of the left – a traditional colossus in Cypriot affairs – it was shocked by its losses. Party officials reportedly acknowledged weaknesses in party organisation, adding that the abstention proved that many were hesitant to commit themselves. Independent analysts explained the losses in terms of: disappointment with AKEL’s oscillating stance on the Annan Plan;9 a consequent flow of party support to ‘pro-No’ parties or formations (such as EDEK); and displeasure with the fact that AKEL’s participation in the governing coalition (for 16 months) entailed responsibility for current economic difficulties. The second surprise was linked to DISY’s performance. Instead of being traumatised by its simmering crisis, accentuated by the emergence of the splinter movement, ‘For Europe’, it managed to regain support among those previously disgruntled by its ‘pro-Yes’ referendum stance. It must be concluded therefore that DISY’s campaign of ‘party patriotism’ worked since there is no

Cyprus

79

evidence that ‘pro-No’ followers changed their minds – the evidence from numerous reports and conversations being to the contrary. Table 8.1

EP election results, Cyprus, 2004

Political party/formation DISY AKEL DIKO ‘For Europe’ EDEK EDI–European Cyprus Eur. Coll.–N. Horizons Ecol./Environmental Mov. People’s Soc. Movement Independents

Votes

Percentage

94,355 93,212 57,121 36,112 36,075 6,534 5,501 2,872 808 1,678

28.23 27.89 17.09 10.80 10.79 1.95 1.65 0.86 0.24 0.50

Seats 2 EPP-ED 2 EUL/NGL 1 ELDR 1 EPP-ED

2001 (%) 34.0 34.7 14.8 – 6.5 2.6 3.0 2.0

The rise in support for social democratic EDEK from 6.5 per cent in 2001 to 10.8 per cent was also unexpected. It can be explained by the return of voters disappointed in the past by the social democrats’ protracted internal crisis; respect for EDEK’s principled stance on the referendum; defection by former AKEL voters; and an energetic and respectable campaign, which stressed the social democratic theses. DIKO – the party of President Tassos Papadopoulos – won 17.09 per cent of the vote compared to the 14.8 per cent share in the 2001 general election. The rise in popularity relates to: first, formerly alienated party figures returning to its fold; and second, the steady popularity of Tassos Papadopoulos. DIKO met its realistic target of electing one MEP.10 The founders of ‘For Europe’ were pleased with their successful political experiment, winning 10.8 per cent of the vote and the election of veteran Mr Matsis as MEP by a narrow margin of 37 votes over EDEK. The halving of support for New Horizons (and their associates) and for the Cyprus Greens can be explained by the ‘lost vote syndrome’. In view of the near certainty that only DISY and AKEL could win two seats apiece, DIKO one, leaving ‘For Europe’ and EDEK fighting for the sixth seat, New Horizons and the Ecologists seemed set for defeat. The group around EDI condemned themselves to failure by their extreme ‘pro-Yes’ views and sustained challenge to President Papdopoulos. The six MEPs are likely to work for both a fair and a viable – or ‘European’ – solution to the Cyprus problem and for some wider EU goals, including the protection of human rights; solidarity and peace; the Euro-Mediterranean project; and the satisfaction of the needs of citizens of smaller member states. They may push the idea of developing Cyprus from a major transportation and telecommunications hub to a Euro-Mediterranean politico-economic and cultural bridge linking the EU with the wider region.

80 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

Notes 1. Treaty of Accession (Protocol 10), signed on 16 April 2003 in Athens, provided that if Cyprus’ political problem had not been resolved by the time of accession, the acquis communautaire would not be applied to the occupied territory. Kalliope Agapiou-Josephides, ‘The First European Parliament Elections in Cyprus: The Challenge of European Integration in a Society Striving for Reunification’, South European Society and Politics (2005). 2. It is misleading to describe the Greek Cypriot ‘No’ as opposition to ‘reunification’and Turkish Cypriot ‘Yes’ as its endorsement. The latter wanted EU membership. They also want 35,000 Turkish troops to leave, socio-economic improvement, and genuine human rights and civil liberties. The Annan Plan prima facie served most of their needs and dreams. The Greek Cypriots saw it as unworkable, and were angry at protracted procedures chosen by the UN General Secretariat. Inter alia, the plan forgave Turkey’s guilt for and obligations regarding the 1974 invasion; curtailed or suspended many Greek Cypriots’ human rights; expected them to carry economic burdens of the proposed new state and to (literally) compensate themselves for Turkey’s violation of their right to enjoy their occupied properties. It permitted foreign troops on the island ad infinitum; constitutional-administrative provisions making the new state manifestly dysfunctional; and vested three non-Cypriot judges with ultimate authority in all cases of political and administrative deadlock. The Annan Plan contradicted elementary principles and rules of International Law and violated EU norms and values. The whole project was rushed to completion just before EU accession. 3. Turkish Cypriots were relieved by controversial, post-referendum ‘support’ they received from the UN, Washington and London, all of whom spoke of ‘upgrading’ the status of the still unrecognised – because unilaterally declared and condemned by the UN – ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (TRNC). Simultaneously, they were reportedly concerned over exclusion from the EP election and about whether, when, and how, new negotiations would begin. 4. Interviews with 32 of 48 candidates of the major formations, between 15 and 21 June 2004, addressed individual campaigns. See Phileleftheros (Nicosia daily) 27 June 2004. 5. Nikos Anastasiades, ‘No vote is redundant’, DISY website (), 11 June 2004. 6. ‘Message to the voters’, , 11 June 2004. 7. An exception was the link to one DIKO candidate’s own web page: Ms Antigone Papadopoulou, with her articles and speeches, some with substantial European content. 8. The exception applies mainly to: Yiannakis Kasoulides (DISY, elected); Panayiotis Demetriou (DISY, elected); Manthos Mavrommatis (DISY, unelected); Yiannakis Matsis (‘For Europe’, elected); Androula Vassiliou (EDI-European Cyprus, unelected); Marios Iliades (EDEK, unelected); Christos Stylianides (EDI-European Cyprus, unelected); and most of the unelected Green list. 9. AKEL Politburo first supported the plan but in response to the people’s opposition, its Central Committee changed its stance to a (qualified) ‘No’, before saying it would accept the Annan Plan if certain guarantees for implementation were met. Although the party leadership ended up campaigning for a ‘No vote’, prominent party officials championed a ‘Yes’ vote. 10. If a scandal involving this MEP that erupted soon after 13 June brings his downfall, Ms Antigone Papadopoulou will replace him. The DIKO MEP may join PES; DIKO and EDEK may unite domestically.

9

Czech Republic Lenka Rovná

The Czech Republic was established on 1 January 1993 after the fall of communism in Central and Eastern Europe and the division of Czechoslovakia. The newly formed state claimed itself heir to the traditions of humanity and democracy of the Czechoslovak Republic founded in 1918. The transition of the centrally planned economy ruled by a communist nomenklatura towards a market economy, multiparty parliamentary democracy and the overall democratisation and resuscitation of civil society went hand in hand with the process of accession to the EU. The dichotomy between transition and EU accession created several frictions, but the EU played an important role as an external factor accelerating the entire process of transformation. The foreign policy of the new democracy was based on the slogan ‘Back to Europe’, signifying the goal of joining Euro-Atlantic structures, especially the EU and NATO.1 In January 1996 the Czech Republic submitted its application to join the EU and was invited by the Luxembourg Summit of the European Council in December 1997 to be one of the first of six countries to start a long negotiation process.2 The country became a full member after signing the accession document on the Acropolis in Athens in the spring of 2004. The timing of the last enlargement, incorporating ten new member states, was connected to the forthcoming European elections. However, in the interim, the decision to hold referendums on accession meant that attention and political campaigning was diverted to the referendum. Czech political actors, particularly political parties, focused mainly on the referendum about the accession itself rather than the elections held a year later. The Czech internal debate about European integration can be divided into several periods: • 1989–91: mainly connected with the ‘Back to Europe’ campaign 81

82 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

• 1991–97/98: forming of the political attitudes of Czech citizens vis-à-vis the EU as such • 1997/98: forming more structural attitudes towards different aspects of European integration3 • 2002–03: preparation for the referendum • 2003–04: preparation for the European elections, with limited debate about the Draft of the Constitution.

The referendum The debate around the referendum concentrated on the overall orientation of Czech foreign policy: either to the West or to the East. A strong underlying motive was the opportunity to secure financial support from the EU. Some sceptical voices warning against the loss of Czech sovereignty with a somewhat populist voice were represented by the Czech President Václav Klaus, the only candidate country president openly to oppose EU accession. The government ran a European information campaign which was quite comprehensive. Running for several years, it tried to reach various social groups. In the event, there was a 55.21 per cent turnout for the referendum on 13 June 2003. 77.33 per cent approved EU membership for the Czech Republic.4 This decision opened the door to a European future with all its pros and cons. The Czech Republic thus officially saw itself as becoming thereby part of a democratic and more successful world. The positive referendum result was considered a success of the governing coalition, which came to power after the 2002 parliamentary elections. The main uniting point for the centre-left coalition had been EU accession. Its fragile majority of 101 MPs in the 200-seat Parliament comprised three elements: the Social Democrats, the People’s Party and the Union of Freedom. All three governing parties converged on the platform of Euro-optimism. By contrast, the opposition, represented by the Civic Democratic Party and the Communist Party, had traditionally held and expressed reservations about Czech membership of the EU.

Campaign positions Traditionally, the programme of the Czech Social Democrats (CSSD) has been always very pro-European, and their position in government in particular infused them with a feeling of responsibility for the accession of the Czech Republic to the EU. The platform of CSSD emphasised shared values with other socialist, social democratic and labour parties and their idea of Europe with a social dimension. This position was also made highly visible during their participation in the Convention on the Future of Europe. Prime Minister Vladimír Špidla personally favoured a more or less federal Europe but had to moderate this in view of the politics of the less Euro-optimistic opposition.

Czech Republic 83

Nevertheless, the Union of Freedom (US), formed after the division of the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) in 1998, presented itself as Euro-optimistic. It supported the further deepening and widening of the EU and tried to make the ‘European card’ one of the differences between itself and the ODS, rather than personal disputes. The Christian and Democratic Union–Czechoslovak Peoples’ Party (KDU– CSL), from 2002 until the European elections held the portfolio of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. It supported the European orientation of the country and saw the EU as a fulfilment and embodiment of its own Christian democratic values. Minister Cyril Svoboda supported the idea of mentioning God in the Preamble of the Constitution for Europe, hoping to thus preserve his position at the head of his party. However, he was to fail to gain either. The Civic Democratic Party (ODS), until recently led by Václav Klaus, has always officially proclaimed EU membership as an essential goal of Czech foreign policy. Under the influence of its former Chairman, the ODS has contested certain concepts, such as ‘Europe of the Regions’ or the ‘Social State’, and is opposed to further political integration. Jan Zahradil, the Shadow Minister of Foreign Affairs and a newly elected MEP, wrote: ‘European integration receives a one sided portrayal by Czech media, outlining only one possible happy future … we have to keep to the terms: advantageous, non advantageous; practical, non practical; works, does not work’.5 As a member of the Convention, Jan Zahradil collaborated closely with Jens Peter Bonde and his party faction. The current leader of the party, Mirek Topolánek, represents a more moderate stream in the party’s policy towards the EU. Although for many years the ODS was headed by Václav Klaus, many leading party figures remain cautious and ‘suspicious’ towards the EU, whereas ODS members as a whole are proEuropean.6 According to opinion polls, public trust in the EU is fairly stable where voters of the main parties are concerned: ODS (79 per cent); US (81 per cent) and KDU–CSL (83 per cent). Over half of CSSD (52 per cent) and under a third of communist KSCM (24 per cent) respondents trust the EU. The Communist Party (KSCM) has an ambivalent approach towards the EU. Its members and voters in general (primarily elderly, less educated, from smaller settlements, or the disillusioned) were not keen on EU accession. The party leadership is more open-minded and, in fact, divided.7 The orthodox leadership won support by criticising the limited social policy of the governing Social Democratic Party and the ‘capitalist’ substance of the European integration process. The more reformist element led by Miloslav Ransdorf, a new MEP, does not reject European integration as such, but seeks to influence it in a way that addresses social issues more and makes it ‘more social’.8

The EP election The elections were held on Friday afternoon and Saturday morning to encourage voting. City dwellers usually go to the polls on Friday afternoon

84 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

before leaving for the weekend, while inhabitants from smaller towns and villages vote on both days. A positive factor was that the days and dates corresponded to the traditional timing for general elections. In the case of the Czech Republic no other elections were held at the same time. Thus on 11 and 12 June 2004 citizens and permanent residents living in the country had the right to select from 32 political subjects, using PR and the preferential vote system. The whole territory was one electoral district. For major political parties the EP election campaign began even before the referendum about EU accession in June 2003. In their manifestoes and interviews, political leaders assured voters that they would protect ‘Czech interests’ in all European institutions, including the European Parliament. Many new political or civic groups were created before the European elections with the aim of winning representation in the EP. Of the 32 candidate lists, 19 had the word ‘party’ in their name, but with the exception of the parliamentary political parties and the Green Party, very few of them could really be characterised as ‘parties’. Instead, they represented associations and an element of civil society representing different social groups, such as the pensioners (The Party of Social Security), the regions (Interests of Moravia in United Europe), the aristocracy (Czech Crown, Monarchistic Party of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia), and so on. In some cases the establishment of a party or movement was a ‘one-man or one-woman show’ and concentrated on one outspoken personality, such as Viktor Kožený’s Civil federal alliance, the Conservative Party of Alena Hromadková, the Right Bloc of Petr Cibulka. In some cases the candidate expressed a Czech sense of humour and absurdity (for example, Balbin’s Poetic Party, HELAX (Ostrava is amused); the Independent Initiative, led by porn star Dolly Buster). In some cases, neither the candidates‘ motives for contesting the elections nor their manifestos were clear, such as that of ‘The Party of Common Sense’. Opinion polls predicted good results for the opposition parties (ODS and the Communists) and the representatives of the ‘independent’ groupings. The Association of Independents and European Democrats (SNK–ED) was led by Josef Zieleniec, former Minister of Foreign Affairs in the government of Václav Klaus, who left ODS before the party crisis in 1997 and is currently a Senator, and who represented the Czech Republic in the Convention. His approach towards European integration is close to federalism. The position of the second ‘Independent’ list led by a TV magnate, Vladimír Železný, stressed the role of the nation state and of the regions. No candidate openly asserted an anti-European position. The difference in their views was concentrated on the speed and extension of the integration and on the weight given to national governments vis-à-vis the EU institutions. The fact that the EP elections took place just two years after the general elections and at the midterm of a fragile coalition government played a crucial role. The parliamentary political parties did not concentrate on European matters as much as on the critique of current government politics. For

Czech Republic 85

instance, the billboard of the main opposition party ODS appealed to the voters with a picture showing scissors cutting a red rose – the symbol of the governing Social Democrats. The government, struggling with necessary social reforms, answered: ‘If you want to preserve a welfare state, vote for the Social Democrats.’ 9 The topics discussed and issues tackled were mainly domestic ones. European issues were relegated to the margins. The Constitution of Europe, EU institutional reform including the position and the number of Commissioners, Christian roots of European culture, common foreign and security policy, justice and home affairs, Turkey’s EU membership bid, EU taxes, the implementation of the euro, Qualified Majority Voting in the Council of Ministers or the referendum on the draft Constitution for Europe, were rarely centre stage but were discussed to some extent, mainly during TV confrontations between candidates on weekend debating programmes, followed by a small number of voters. The situation in respect of television advertising was similar. TV adverts were shown in the early afternoon on weekdays, when most people were still at work, and on Saturday mornings. Each political actor was given 20 minutes per week. Parliamentary political parties used their slots to try and attract attention with cartoons, or by relying on ‘known’ faces. In many cases, there was negative advertising with heavy criticism of other parties, which clouded the issues and often made it very difficult for viewers to understand what the message in the TV slot was and what policy the candidate advocated. Smaller parties and movements made promises connected to the demands of regions, domestic or social policy, such as an increase in pensions or giving a greater role to the aristocracy. In general, TV advertisements were either boring or amusing, but frequently failed to give a clear picture of the EP’s role and the views of candidates. Lack of interest on the part of the voters explains low turnout. Voters were more concerned with the football championships and voting for their favourite competitor on Super Star (the Czech version of Pop Idol). Only 28.3 per cent of voters took part in the European elections, compared with the 55.2 per cent in the accession referendum a year earlier. The government not surprisingly suffered significant losses. The leader of the party and PM, Vladimír Špidla, was, for example, in open conflict with his predecessor and former PM, Miloš Zeman. Moreover, the government’s defeat at these EP elections can be explained in terms of deep divisions in the Social Democratic Party, the campaign, the fact that the main topics were domestic and the fact that voters used the occasion as an opportunity to express dissatisfaction with the reforms of the fragile coalition government. The success of the opposition parties was to be expected (see Table 9.1). The governing coalition won only four seats in the European Parliament, while the winner of the elections was the ODS. The Civic Democrats harvested the dissatisfaction of voters with the policy of the government coalition, as well as with the Social Democratic Party. The Communist Party profited

86 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament Table 9.1

The EP election results in the Czech Republic

Party ODS KSCM CSSD KDU–CSL SNK–ED Independents Total

Share of vote (%) 30.04 20.26 8.78 9.57 11.02 8.18

No. of EP seats 9 6 2 2 3 2 24

from very disciplined voters and from the generally low turnout, as did the Christian Democratic Union. The fatigue of citizens with party politics was also reflected in the success of both independent formations. The Association of Independent Candidates and European Democrats (SNK–ED) led by J. Zieleniec, won three seats and joined the EPP–ED group together with the ODS. Vladimir Železný decided to start his ‘independent’ career in the Eurosceptic group of Independence and Democracy. Czech Communists together with the German PDS will play an important role in GUE/NGL. Two Social Democrats will not be a small addition to the PES. The fact that the government coalition party Union of Freedom (US) did not get a single seat caused the Vice PM and Chairman of the party, Petr Mareš, to step down from party leadership. The successful opposition parties, the ODS, as well as the Communists, put pressure on the government coalition, calling for a confidence vote. But the worst enemy for the Social Democrats was created by the Social Democrats themselves. The deeply divided party leadership decided not to support the party leader and his coalition government. Vladimír Špidla stepped down as party leader and as his conception of the coalition government did not get sufficient support, he decided to dissolve the government. The President of the Czech Republic, Václav Klaus, asked the newly designated Chairman of the Social Democrats, Stanislav Gross, to form a new government. In a majority of European countries the opposition was much more successful than the parties of the government in the European elections. The fact that the Czech European elections were driven by so many domestic topics was also reflected onto the Czech domestic political scene, and, together with the weakness of the coalition and the crisis in the governing Social Democratic Party, caused a political crisis which culminated in the fall of the government.

Notes 1. L. Rovná, ‘Democratisation Through Enlargement and Participation in the Convention: A Czech Perspective’, in Nanette Neuwahl, (ed.) European Union

Czech Republic 87

2.

3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

Enlargement: Law and Socio-economic Changes (Montreal), Université de Montréal, 2004, pp. 41–62. B. Lippertová, ‘Strategické otázky rozširování Evropské unie na východ po lucemburském summitu’, (The Strategic Questions of the Enlargement of European Union to East after Luxembourg Summit), Mezinárodní vztahy, 2 (1998), 17–27. M. Mareš, ‘Ceské politické strany a evropská integrace’, (Czech Political Parties and European Integration), Integrace, 1, (2000), 15. Lidové Noviny, 16 June 2003, 15. Jan Zahradil, ‘Na unii s ružovými brýlemi?’ (About Union with Rosy Glasses?), MF Dnes, 2000. Source: STEM, Trendy, February, 2000. See Mareš, ‘Ceské politické’, 15–20. Miloslav Ransdorf got the highest number of preferential votes (interview with M. Ransdorf, MF Dnes, 18 June 2004, A7). ‘Eurovolby: každá strana má o co hrát’ (Euroelections, every party has got something to play for), MF Dnes, 11 June 2004, B2.

10

Denmark Karina Pedersen

At the time of the Danish EP elections in June 2004 the Liberal-led coalition with the Conservatives had held office for some two and a half years. Mainly with the support of the Danish People’s Party, it had accomplished a large part of the programme it launched when it took over from the Social Democratic-led coalition with the Social Liberals that had been in office in 1993–2001. (Until 1994 the Christian People’s Party and until 1996 the Centre Democrats were also part of this coalition.) The Danes are well known for their Euroscepticism. This scepticism surfaces especially during referendums. Denmark has a tradition of referendums on the European issue. Five have been held since the 1972 referendum of EC membership. In 1986 the electorate supported the Single European Act. It voted twice on the Maastricht Treaty, once against it in 1992 and then for it in 1993 following the Edinburgh amendment to meet its concerns over citizenship. In 1998, the electorate accepted the Amsterdam Treaty but in 2000 it rejected the euro. The European Constitution will also be put to a referendum. In these referendums turnout has held steady in the mid 80s (the level at national elections) and never dropped below 74 per cent. EP election turnout has been much lower, varying from 47.8 per cent in 1979 to 52.4 per cent in 1984, dropping to a low of 46.2 per cent in 1989, a high of 52.9 per cent in 1994 and back to 50.4 per cent in 1999.

The setting The EP elections in Denmark were held on Sunday 13 June. No other elections were held simultaneously. The most recent elections at national, regional and local levels were held in November 2001. Local and regional elections are due in November 2005 and national elections must be held by then at the latest. The EP elections did not compete with any major events except 88

Denmark

89

the European soccer championship. However, in view of turnout in 1999, it was decided to try and boost turnout by making Sunday polling day. The reasoning for this was that by departing from normal polling days and opting for Sunday, people would have more time to vote and would, by voting on the final day of EP elections across the EU, be able to get the result shortly after going to the polls. This, coupled with the relative distance of a national election compared to 1999, was also expected to help motivate voters to turn out at the very least to give an interim verdict on the government. There was concern, however, that voters might forget or not choose to vote on Sunday and that limited media coverage of the work of the EP and elections would deter turnout. In Denmark, the party system at the European level does not correspond to the party system at the national level. There are eight parties in the Folketinget, the national parliament, compared to six parties and two movements in the EP. Seven of the Folketinget parties and both EP movements contested the elections. There are internal disputes within most parties. The most proEuropean parties are the Social Liberals, the Liberals and the Conservatives. The Social Democrats favour the EU, whereas the Christian People’s Party – which lacks an MEP and had little chance of getting one – and the Socialist People’s Party are more sceptical supporters of the EU. Only the (right-wing) Danish People’s Party opposes European integration. Both movements – already represented in the EP – contested the election. The People’s Movement against EU, created in 1972, opposes EU membership. The June Movement, created after the referendum on the Maastricht Treaty on 2 June 1992, works to halt further Danish integration into the EU. The main difference between the two movements is that whereas the People’s Movement strongly opposes integration, the June Movement accepts European cooperation and tries to limit EU integration. The only Folketinget party not to contest the EP elections was the anti-EU Red–Green Alliance, the most left-wing party in the Folketinget. Instead of standing for election as a party, several of its members were candidates on the lists of these two movements. Danish MEPs are elected by PR where Denmark forms one electoral district. The rules for nominating candidates are basically the same as for national elections, so parties (and movements) elected to the national or European parliament in the most recent elections and who are still represented may contest the election and nominate candidates. New parties not represented need to collect a number of signatures equal to 1/175 of the votes cast at the last national election in order to become eligible for election. Eight of the nine parties and movements contesting the EP election paired up in election pacts to boost their chances of an extra mandate. The two movements joined forces, as did the Socialist People’s Party and the Social Democrats; the Social Liberals and the Christian People’s Party; and the Liberals and Conservatives. These election pacts were primarily of a technical nature.

90 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

The campaign The campaign did not really take off until two to three weeks before the election. The candidates to different degrees campaigned before this but did not get media coverage as the media were preoccupied with a royal wedding on 14 May. The campaign was not only shorter than those before national elections, it was also less well covered and intense. Usually for Denmark, there were a couple of campaigns aimed specifically at getting out the vote. The EP ran one with posters, stickers, T-shirts, postcards, bags and mouse pads distributed to high schools, libraries, private individuals and other interested parties. The Democracies of Europe also ran a campaign for getting out the vote – mainly with outdoor posters. Besides that some youth organisations promoted going to the polls in a campaign (posters and a magazine). Soccer players from the Danish national team played a prominent role in both. Political TV advertising is not allowed in Denmark, but the parties do get free time on national TV. Two nationwide stations have different degrees of public service obligations. One of them, DR, has a tradition of providing free airtime to each of the parties and lists standing for election. In 2004, in the two-week run-up to the election, each party and movement got a 30minute slot at 7 pm in which to present a five-minute election video and field two representatives to be questioned by a journalist. This closed with a lengthy group discussion among the prime candidates on Thursday night. Besides that several stations ran debates with one or two candidates, and some campaigning was reported on the news. Instead of TV commercials, parties used smaller posters in light posts and ran large commercial billboard posters, newspaper and magazine ads. They handed out leaflets on the streets and at stalls, ran election web pages, events, campaign buses and election meetings. Traditional election meetings were poorly attended so some candidates tried other means to get out the vote, including workplace and street meetings, and the internet. In general, the parties did not make any use of the EP transnational party groups although some reference was made to them. EP veteran from the June Movement, Jens Peter Bonde, had recommendations by European colleagues in his advertisements. The newly elected chair of the European Social Democrats, former Prime Minister (1993–2001) and party leader of the Social Democrats (1992–2002), Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, alluded to this position, and noted meetings with party leaders from other European countries. His press releases highlighted what Social Democrats of Europe together might accomplish in the EP. Voter ignorance about the candidates and the lack of genuine campaigning were major issues throughout the campaign. Insufficient female representation was briefly noted. The parties dealt with this in various ways. A group of female Social Democrats expressed their dissatisfaction with the party’s emphasis on the two male front figures through a press advertisement promoting female candidates on the list. The leading male Social Liberal

Denmark

91

candidate graced some of his full-page newspaper ad with the photos – and thereby support – of prominent Social Liberal women. As always when there is a Danish referendum on an aspect of the EU, a major issue is the EU’s institutional set-up. Consequently, MEPs’ travelling between Brussels and Strasbourg, fraud, the attendance records of Danish MEPs and to some extent their pay were stressed. Campaigning was not only about issues not directly related to the substance of EU policies. EU financial support for the agricultural industry was put on the agenda when a national TV station broadcast a list of Danish beneficiaries some ten days before the election, thereby provoking a general debate and allowing all parties to indicate their support for changing the system. This is expected to be one of the issues that Danish MEPs will focus on along with environmental protection which was an issue in the campaign and something generally supported by Danish voters. The prospect of Turkish EU membership was also an issue in the campaign. Only the Danish People’s Party opposed Turkey’s accession. The others saw it either as only a distant possibility or as something that would increase European security. Other than that, terrorism and security were not issues in the campaign. The European Constitution featured to a limited extent only. The anti-integration movements and parties complained that the pro-integration parties did not want to discuss the European Constitution in the campaign. The latter argued that the electorate’s view on the European Constitution would be covered in a referendum. Contrary to most other elections, immigration was not an issue either.

The result The one big winner in the Danish EP elections were the Social Democrats led by former Prime Minister and former party chair Poul Nyrup Rasmussen (Table 10.1). They doubled their share of the votes and went from three to five MEPs, even though the total number of Danish MEPs had been cut from 16 to 14. It was a major personal victory for Poul Nyrup Rasmussen. The number of votes he received exceeded most expectations – he got two-thirds of the votes cast for the Social Democrats. His 400,000 personal votes exceeded the total for the Liberal Party (the second largest party) and beat the personal vote record (250,000) set by former Prime Minister, Poul Schlüter, in 1994. Support for Nyrup Rasmussen was due to many factors. First of all, he is well known among the electorate and that is of particular importance when the whole country forms a single constituency in which all voters can vote for any candidate of their choice. He tried unsuccessfully to capitalise on his record as Prime Minister, notably on the international scene, by calling an election shortly after 11 September 2001, but both he and Schlüter benefited from an element of voting gratitude for their work as Prime Ministers. Schlüter and Nyrup Rasmussen differ in that whereas Schlüter was elected to the EP as a first step towards retirement, Nyrup Rasmussen is starting an international

92 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

career. Lastly, there may be a trace of sympathy or compassion with Nyrup Rasmussen who had had to leave his party chairmanship in 2002 following the 2001 electoral defeat. Table 10.1

The Danish elections to the European Parliament, 2004 Votes 2004 Vote share MEPs 2004 Change in 2004 (%) vote share 1999–2004

Social Democrats 618,409 Social Liberals 120,473 Conservatives 214,902 Socialist People’s Party 150,518 June Movement 171,927 Christian Democrats 24,284 People’s Movement 97,986 Danish People’s Party 128,789 Liberals 366,734 Total 1,894,022 a

32.6 6.4 11.3 7.9 9.1 1.3 5.2 6.8 19.4 100

5 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 3 14

+16.1 –2.7 +2.8 +0.8 –7.0 –0.7 –2.1 +1.0 –4.0 18.6a

Change in MEPs 1999–2004 +2 0 0 0 –2 0 0 0 –2 –2

The volatility, that is, the sum of changes for each list divided by 2.

Exit polls showed that the Social Democrats managed to retain 85 per cent of the voters that would vote for them at a national election and attracted 23 per cent of Social Liberal voters, 17 per cent from the Socialist People’s Party and 10 per cent of Liberal voters. This indicates how distinct the EP elections are from national elections. The movements opposing European integration were the losers in the EP elections. Whereas the European results overall showed a rise in support for Eurosceptics, the support for Danish Eurosceptics fell. The June Movement lost almost half their support and lost two out of three MEPs. The People’s Movement lost some electoral support but kept their EP seat via their electoral pact with the June Movement. The two movements’ defeat shifts the balance between parties promoting European integration and parties and movements that do not. Whereas in the outgoing parliament they had almost a third of the Danish seats, they now have only a fifth. Moreover, the Socialist People’s Party previously had a Eurosceptic MEP but now has one more favourable to European integration. The two movements opposing integration belong, though formally not tied to any political wing, mainly to the left on the traditional left–right spectrum. Due to their losses and the moderate increase in votes for the Danish People’s Party, opposition to European integration has shifted a little to the right and become more bourgeois, showing that the opposition has changed character. Overall, the balance between pro-integrationist parties and parties/ movements against European integration shifted to the advantage of the former. The shape of the European party system more closely resembles the

Denmark

93

national party system. Whether this is a one-off or the beginning of a trend remains to be seen. Important in this respect may be the extent to which the movements opposing European political integration mobilise. Before the 1994 and 1999 EP elections, they had been mobilised at referendums shortly before the elections. In 2004 this was not the case since the last referendum was in 2000. The governing Liberals were also among the main losers, dropping from 23 to 19 per cent of the vote.They lost two of their five MEPs. This was an unsatisfactory result for the governing party, but may be partly explained by the list being dominated by candidates unfamiliar to the public – even though some of them had served in the outgoing EP, and by the electorate voting against the leading government party. An exit poll showed that of the voters who would vote for the Liberals in a national election, 12 per cent voted for the Conservatives and 10 per cent for the Social Democrats in the EP elections. The Liberals lost to both the opposition and its coalition partner. Part of this could be explained by the well known and female front candidate of the Conservatives. There were minor shifts in support for the other parties, but not in their respective number of MEPs. Whereas the Conservatives gained almost 3 per cent in electoral support, the Social Liberals lost almost 3 per cent. This gain and loss may very well at least partly be related. In 1999 the Social Liberals had a well known female former MP in front and gained sufficient votes to be represented in the EP. In 2004 the Social Liberals nominated a relatively well-known male MP. The Conservatives, on the other hand, nominated as leading candidate a well-known female MP in 2004 who won votes from the Social Liberals and from the Liberals. The electorate did not turn out to vote to the extent that was expected. Turnout was 47.85 per cent, 2.61 per cent lower than in 1999. This seems to be due to lack of interest in and information about the EP and the candidates, and the sunny weather. Great care is needed if extrapolating EP results to national politics. First, EP turnout was much lower than the usual mid 80s at national elections. A large part of the electorate abstained. Second, the campaign was modest but did focus on some European issues. If the campaigning had been mainly on domestic issues – or international ones like the situation in Iraq – one could with some strength argue that the electorate had evaluated the government and opposition. But other issues were covered and could therefore affect voting behaviour. What are the implications for national politics? First, following the trend seen in many other places in these EP elections, voters expressed dissatisfaction with the leading governing party, the Liberals. The Prime Minister assumed a leading role in the campaign and so had a stake in it. Yet the Liberals did worse than opinion polls predicted for a national election at the same time, thereby suggesting that a genuine European element was at play in the EP elections. The Liberals alone fared worse than polls predicted. When comparing the

94 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

parties’ share of the votes cast for parties (excluding the two movements) the Social Democrats and Conservatives did better than predicted by the opinion polls for a national election in June, whereas the other parties did about the same. The Social Democrats won an electoral victory. Following their national election defeat in 2001, leading to their resignation from government, this boosted their confidence and crucially those of rank-and-file campaigners as they became the leading Danish party at EU level. This may well have an indirect impact on domestic politics.

11

Estonia Terry Mayer

Background With an area of 45,000 km2 and a population of approximately 1.4 million people, Estonia is one of the smallest EU states. In the republic’s unicameral parliament, the Riigikogu, elections for the available 101 seats take place by proportional representation every four years. The president of the republic is directly elected by the parliament every five years. Numerous political parties and alliances emerged or disappeared in the first years of independence. By 1997 there were 32 officially registered parties in the republic. However, in recent years smaller parties have merged, and more lasting political alliances and parliamentary coalitions have been established. This has been aided by the institutional structure of the Estonian parliamentary system, which is heavily biased in favour of established parties. Electoral funding is only given to parties with seats in parliament, while registration procedures for new parties are complex and campaigns are costly. The fourth round of general elections to be held since Estonia regained independence in 1991 took place in March 2003; the polls were largely viewed as a reflection of the struggle between the new prosperous in Estonia and the poor. More than 900 candidates representing six parties contested the available 101 seats. The Centre Party (Keskerakond), the most left-wing of the parliamentary parties, is led by Edgar Savisaar, who helped to found the Estonian independence movement in the 1980s. The party polled fractionally more (some 4,000) votes than Res Publica (25.4 per cent and 24.6 per cent respectively) but gained the same number of seats (28). The Centre Party operates on an agenda combining liberal economics and social democracy, highlighting issues in electoral campaigns such as the need for progressive tax rates to redress the balance between rich and poor (both the corporate and personal tax rates have been set at 26 per cent since the early 1990s), 95

96 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

and enhanced welfare benefits. It also calls for greater state intervention in the economy. The party appeals to less well-off citizens, particularly the large Russian minority in the republic (approximately 29 per cent of the population), pensioners and poorer rural families. Criticism has been levelled frequently at Tallinn’s city council mayor Savisaar – whose party holds the majority in the council and where he has been involved in various political scandals, including secretly recording conversations with other party leaders in 1995. This led to his dismissal both from the government and as party leader. Within six months, however, he had been re-elected as Chairman of the Centre Party. The Social Democratic Party (SDE) is led by the very popular Toomas Ilves. Previously known as the Moderates, the SDE changed its name in February and adopted a manifesto based on social democratic alternatives for Estonia, in a bid to overcome the inequalities within the republic. The right-leaning Res Publica, led by Prime Minister Juhan Parts, was founded in 2002. Financed by wealthy business professionals, it campaigns on issues such as low tax and minimal state interference in the economy. Its leading figures, however, are not political newcomers, but experienced politicians who have broken away from the Pro Patria union. The core of the party’s electoral support, according to the British Helsinki Human Rights Group (BHHRG), consists mainly of political émigrés living in the west who – if they possess Estonian citizenship – have the right to vote in parliamentary elections.1 Also on the right, the Reform Party (Reformierakond), formerly led by Siim Kallas (now a member of the European Commission) have served in coalition governments of various leanings, and are known as the masterminds behind Estonia’s tax system and fiscal policies. Current campaigns call for faster privatisation and for the reduction of the tax rate from 26 per cent to 20 per cent. Rahvaliit (People’s Union), led by Villu Reiljan, is a left-of-centre party which enjoys a lot of support in rural areas, and virtually none in the cities. Their leader was embroiled in a scandal surrounding the use of state money to play the stock market in 1996–97. Former Prime Minister Mart Laar’s Isamaa (Pro Patria, Fatherland), adhering to the classic Christian-conservative line, is seen as the leading force behind Estonia’s tough citizenship laws: predictably, the party is despised by the Russians in the republic. While Estonia is commonly depicted as the most successful of the postSoviet states – a model of democracy and economic success – not everybody is doing so well. Tough citizenship laws ensure that ethnic Russians resident in Estonia are largely disenfranchised (although they are permitted to vote in local elections), resulting in a sizeable minority of the population being barred from taking any part in the democratic political processes in the republic. According to a particularly scathing report carried out by BHHRG during the 2003 elections, Estonia is also rife with other problems rarely receiving attention in the West: these include high unemployment levels (particularly

Estonia

97

in the Russian-dominated regions), population decline, widespread drug addiction, prostitution and child abuse. Foreign observers at the last elections, however, were apparently meant to believe the most pressing issue in the 2003 election was whether or not the country should have a progressive or flat-rate income tax. Since 1991 Estonian political parties and alliances have been united in foreign policy goals: membership of both the EU and NATO. A referendum on EU entry took place on 14 September 2003, with a turnout of 64.02 per cent of eligible voters. A majority of 66.84 per cent voted for EU accession.2

EP electoral system Candidates for the EP elections were registered by the National Electoral Committee on 2 May. Each party was allowed to put forward twelve candidates. A total of 91 were nominated by ten parties and there were four independent candidates. Estonia formed one national constituency. The election was held under a newly-adapted PR system: the electoral law had been amended in February 2004 to allow for an open party list, ensuring victory to candidates who polled the highest number of votes, irrespective of their place on the party list. The law was amended to put a stop to the previously common practice of using high-profile individuals in party electoral campaigns to boost levels of support, when those people would not actually be serving in parliament.

The European election campaign Estonian parties based their campaigns on the issues of their appropriate party alliances in the European Parliament. Local issues were also stressed with Res Publica calling for cooperation among all six Estonian MEPs in protecting the republic’s interests within the EU. The SDE aim was to change the EU’s social policy to provide for equal benefits for all. The Reform Party’s campaign revolved around lower taxes. The Centre Party stressed freedom of movement of labour in Europe, and high social welfare benefits. The People’s Union is anti-euro, while the nationalist Pro Patria Union focuses on the preservation of the Estonian language and on preventing a visa-free regime between the EU and Russia. EU issues were domesticised and focused primarily on EU funding to Estonia, and how these funds were to be used at local level. Funding earmarked for Estonia for 2002–06 under the Copenhagen Treaty totals more than €1 billion which must not be wasted in ineffective, bureaucratic institutions. However, there is a high chance that it could be and debate focused therefore on whether and how it might be effectively deployed. With 15 counties and 205 rural councils, it is obvious that centralisation and rationalisation are required in order to ensure that funds are allocated

98 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

fairly among the small population of 1.4 million people. However, Estonia’s agricultural industry has declined dramatically since the fall of the Soviet Union, particularly in the eastern regions, largely populated by Russians. The break-up of the collective system of agriculture has led to an exodus to the cities, and to those left behind in the countryside living in isolated, run-down rural communities. Centralisation may therefore prove difficult as the collapse of the collectives has brought with it the disintegration of social networks. ‘The disintegration of their previous social arrangements means that people have difficulty forming the kind of groups and associations needed to breath[e] life into the workings of a modern democracy. Inevitably, this means that politics is conducted by small cliques many of which drift from one indistinguishable party to another. Civil society lies still-born in much of Estonia.’3 One of the most common arguments put forward for the enlargement of the EU was that Western-style ideals of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights would ‘automatically’ spread eastwards, and that EU membership would in some way ‘guarantee’ stable democracy. However, opponents of EU membership in Estonia suggested that rather than EU member governments being able to influence Estonia and other new members, the real source of power would be the EU Commission which was portrayed as overly centralised and bureaucratised – the very things so familiar to ex-Soviet bloc states. They argued that therefore it was not only the legacy of soviet-style bureaucratisation that needed attention. Preoccupation with local concerns and a low level of interest in the EP elections was predicted. A poll carried out by Emor found that only 33 per cent of eligible voters definitely expected to vote in the EP elections, with around 28 per cent likely to do so. Tomis Saarts suggested that this was a combination of the parties involved failing to carry out successful ‘propaganda campaigns’, and ignorance among the population of the function and purpose of the European Parliament. He also maintained that voting would be more influenced by personalities rather than parties.4 A Gallup poll in May/June 2004 found that only 36 per cent of people believed that they had enough information to decide who to vote for in the EP elections; 20 per cent had received leaflets at home; 3 per cent had been approached in the street; 48 per cent had seen advertisements. The conclusion to be drawn here is that parties (and the government) could have done much more to encourage interest in the elections.5 Yet in Estonia there is no fixed ceiling for campaign expenses. As well as the state funding available for parties with seats in the Riigikogu, finance comes from private donations.

EP results The elections were held on Sunday 13 June. No other elections took place at the same time. The turnout of just under 27 per cent (Table 11.1) was among the lowest in the EU, and well below the 58.2 per cent turnout in the

Estonia

99

March 2003 parliamentary elections (Table 11.2). The opposition SDE won three of the six available seats. SDE success was largely due to the personal appeal of SDE leader, Toomas Ilves, former foreign minister and ambassador to Washington, who actively promoted EU membership and was able to demonstrate detailed knowledge of the EU to the people. Born in Sweden and resident for much of his life in the US, and only resident in Estonia since 1993, he nevertheless won a third of the total votes cast. Table 11.1

Estonia: results of the EP elections, 2004a

Turnout: 26.8% Party SotsiaaldemokraatlikErakond/Social Democrat (SDE/PES) EestiKeskerakond/Centre Party (K/ELDR) EestiReformierakond/Reform Party (ER/ELDR)b Isamaaliit/Fatherland Union (IL/EPP-ED) EestimaaRahvalliit(ERL/UEN)b Res Publica (RP-EPP-ED)b a b

%

EP seats

36.8 17.5 12.2 10.5 8.1 6.7

3 1 1 1 – –

Registered voters: 897,809; votes cast 234,485, of which 2,244 (0.9%) were invalid. Party in government or part of governing coalition.

Source:

Table 11.2

The Riigikogu 2 March 2003 elections

Turnout: 58.2% Party Eesti Keskerakond Ühendus Vabariigi Eest/-Res Publica Eesti Reformierakond Eestimaa Rahvaliit Erakond Isamaaliit Rahvaerakond Mõõdukad Eestimaa Ühendatud Rahvapartei Eesti Kristlik Rahvapartei

% 25.4 24.6 17.7 13.0 7.3 7.0 2.2 1.1

EP seats 28 28 19 13 7 6 – –

Source: Estonian National Electoral Committee.

The Centre Party, which forms the largest opposition group in parliament, was beset by internal problems and won just one seat. On 13 May 2004, after disputes over the practicalities of EU membership, seven members of the party left and formed their own parliamentary group, with a view to eventually establishing a new party (the Democratic Centre Party). However, the Centre

100 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

Party still managed to split the Russian vote. As a result, the joint Russian List, headed by Georgii Bystrov (who has a record of challenging Estonian language laws), failed to surmount the 5 per cent electoral threshold. One seat went to the right-wing Pro Patria Union, taken by Tunne Kelam, a leader in the 1980s independence movements. The Reform Party won one seat (for Toomas Saavi, MP since 1995 and Vice-Chairman of the Estonian Parliament). Surprisingly, despite having the resources to run the most expensive electoral campaign, and being so successful in the March 2003 elections, Res Publica failed to win any seats. Their top candidate, MP Urmas Reinsalu, acknowledged that the result was a protest against the government and that it would have to make changes before the next election. The Centrist People’s Union also failed to win a seat. Independent candidates together won a total of 6 per cent of the votes but no seats. Given the recent history of Estonia, and the overriding support among politicians and public for EU membership, the low turnout may be seen as somewhat surprising, particularly in view of both the high referendum vote and the very recent accession to the EU. But to ordinary Estonians, the EU is seen as irrelevant and having little impact on their everyday lives. Public trust in politicians and the government is especially low and entrenched. This has not been aided by the high number of parties and coalitions that have emerged – and disappeared – since independence. Party membership in the republic stands at just 4.9 per cent, and political campaigns focus on personalities rather than issues. The low turnout in the European Parliament elections may well demonstrate that ‘new’ Europeans are behaving in much the same way as the ‘old’, by using the election as an opportunity to register a protest vote against the incumbent government. A more sceptical view might be that Estonians (particularly younger ones) voted for EU membership as a means by which to escape the problems in the republic and move westwards. Accession – the key goal – has been attained.

Notes 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.



The Baltic Times, 3–9 June 2004.

12

Finland Tapio Raunio

Introduction Considering the disappointingly low turnout, 31.4 per cent, in 1999, the expectations were not running high in the run-up to the third Euro-elections to be held in Finland. Various public opinion surveys carried out in the months preceding the election indicated that turnout would again be low (albeit slightly higher), and, reflecting the consensual nature of Finnish politics, the main parties appeared to be in broad agreement about the future of European integration. However, a number of factors also gave cause for optimism. Firstly, Finland had been governed since 1995 for eight years by a ‘rainbow coalition’, a cabinet that under the strong leadership (particularly in EU issues) of Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen brought together five parties across the ideological spectrum and controlled around 70 per cent of parliamentary seats, thus leaving little room for opposition. But, after the parliamentary elections held in March 2003 a centrist coalition between the Centre Party (KESK), the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the Swedish People’s Party (RKP) took office, and this new government had a much narrower majority in the legislature. The first government formed by the three parties after the elections had been short-lived, as the Prime Minister Anneli Jäätteenmäki, Finland’s first-ever female to hold that position, was forced to resign in June 2003 after allegations concerning the use of secret foreign ministry documents during the election campaign. The primary reason for the cabinet downfall was that the main coalition partner, the SDP, demanded that Jäätteenmäki must resign. However, the same parties formed immediately thereafter a new cabinet, with Matti Vanhanen of the Centre Party appointed as the new PM. The broad parliamentary majority enjoyed by the Lipponen governments had stifled debate and reduced the impact of the opposition, but now the 101

102 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

government was attacked both from the right, by the National Coalition (KOK), and from the left, by the Left Alliance (VAS) and the Green League (VIHR). This had contributed to livening up debates on Finland’s place in Europe, with particularly the National Coalition criticising the new government for its lack of commitment to future integration, especially in defence and foreign policy issues. Since the end of the Convention there had also been more debate about national EU policy than before. Much of this is explained by the rapid progress made in developing the EU’s common foreign and security policy, including the solidarity clause in the new draft Constitution, as security policy questions are always high on the Finnish political agenda. Despite several MEPs choosing not to run again, the parties also managed to attract high-profile candidates, including two party leaders and a lot of prominent parliamentarians. Jäätteenmäki, seeking to re-establish her career after the humiliating defeat as the PM, announced in spring 2004 that she would run for a seat in the Parliament. Other most notable candidates included Ville Itälä, the chairperson of the National Coalition1 who had decided to step down as he no longer enjoyed sufficient support among his party. Bjarne Kallis, the chair of the Christian Democrats (KD), also decided to run for a seat. Moreover, the reduction in the number of seats, from 16 to 14, meant that the competition was going to be even tighter than before, with small parties (particularly the Christian Democrats and the Swedish People’s Party) in real danger of losing their seats. And, finally, Paavo Lipponen, the former prime minister (1995–2003) and current SDP leader, announced in the spring that he was interested in becoming the new Commission president.

The Euro-election 2004 The election was held on Sunday, 13 June 2004. Advance voting took place on 2–8 June and abroad on 2–5 June. In contrast to the 1999 elections, there were no major domestic events competing for media attention. Nor was the electoral calendar full, with the previous elections to the national parliament held over a year ago and the municipal elections scheduled for October.2 According to the Finnish law on EP elections,3 candidates can be nominated by registered parties and voters’ associations. Parties can form electoral alliances with one another and voters’ associations can set up joint lists. The maximum number of candidates per party or electoral alliance or a joint list is 20. The whole country forms one single constituency. Voters choose between individual candidates from non-ordered party lists. Altogether 227 candidates were nominated by 14 parties.4 The Centre Party, the Social Democrats, National Coalition, Left Alliance, the Green League, the Swedish People’s Party, the Communist Party (SKP) and Köyhien Asialla fielded the maximum number of candidates allowed by the electoral law. Other parties contesting the elections were the Liberal Party (LIB, 15 candidates), Pensioners for the People (EKA, 12), Suomi – Isänmaa (12), and Suomen Kansan Sinivalkoiset

Finland

103

(8). One electoral alliance was formed, between the Christian Democrats (15 candidates) and the True Finns (PS, 5 candidates). The average age of the candidates was 46 years; 38 per cent of the candidates were women. Of the 16 Finnish MEPs, 10 were trying to renew their seats.5 Eurosceptical parties and movements have remained marginalised in Finnish politics despite the fact that indifference towards EU is widespread and people in general are far less enthusiastic about integration than politicians and key civil servants. Public opinion concerning EU membership has proved relatively stable ever since Finland joined the EU, with Finns less supportive of further integration and membership than citizens across the Union. Hence there is a clear discrepancy between public opinion and the pro-European policies of the parties represented in the national parliament and the European Parliament.6 The only Eurosceptical party that has won seats in the Eduskunta, the national parliament, since Finland joined the Union is the True Finns.7 Of the parties contesting the 2004 Euro-elections, the True Finns, the Communist Party, the extreme-right parties Suomi – Isänmaa and Suomen Kansan Sinivalkoiset, and, with some reservations, also Köyhien Asialla, could be categorised as Eurosceptical. It was clear from the outset that these parties had no chance of coming anywhere near winning a seat in the Parliament. As a result, more important in this respect are the Eurosceptical candidates within the main parties. Most of the Finnish parties are, to a varying extent, divided over integration, and these divisions have been particularly pronounced in the Centre Party and in the Left Alliance. The opposition to further integration within these parties is in EP elections channelled primarily via two MEPs, Paavo Väyrynen (Centre), and Esko Seppänen (Left Alliance), both of whom stood for re-election in 2004.

The campaign and campaign issues With the exception of the efforts of individual candidates that had started campaigning already earlier in the spring, the actual campaign period, with parties launching their campaigns and debates in the media, was quite brief. The campaigns really got under way during the week commencing Monday 24 May, which was quite late considering that advance voting would begin on 2 June. The EP information office located in Helsinki did its best to spread information in the run-up to the elections. The election budget of the EP office was between €230,000 and €250,000. The office had a series of commercials on one of the main TV channels for two weeks, a similar two-week series of commercials in movie theatres, put up 6,150 posters in 53 cities, sent altogether around 300,000 brochures (half of them postcards), took part in fairs and other similar events, organised five panel debates and election quizzes, offered financial and material support to a variety of interest groups, and maintained its own website with information on the elections.

104 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

The provincial media, including newspapers from the more Eurosceptical provinces, cannot really be blamed either, for most of them ran a series of informative stories on the EP and the candidates. Similarly, the largest quality nationwide daily, Helsingin Sanomat, provided fairly comprehensive coverage of the elections. The four national TV channels, including the two state-owned ones, and the radio fared much worse. One of the problems was again that the media, particularly the main TV channels, focused on selected leading candidates, giving them much free nationwide exposure during the campaign. However, in the end it is the parties that are responsible for the quality of the campaigning, not the media or the EP’s information office. The campaign was definitely of higher quality than in the elections held five years earlier. With no competing political events diverting attention away from the elections, the parties had much more time, money and energy to spend on the elections. This applied particularly to the party leaders, who had in 1999 stayed home, leaving the campaigning to the individual candidates. Now the party leaders took part in television debates and toured the country in support of their candidates. Nevertheless, it is still fair to conclude that the party leaderships approached the election with a notable lack of enthusiasm. Such behaviour is facilitated by the open list electoral system, as the most efficient electoral strategy for individual candidates is to focus on their personal qualities (for example, international and national political experience, expertise on EU issues, language skills). Indeed, the electoral system leads to more competition within than between parties.8 Individual candidates from the same party list pursue personal campaigns, with party programmes almost completely in the background. Survey data show that the electoral system is reflected in citizens’ voting behaviour in EP elections. The personal qualities of candidates weigh heavily in people’s minds when making their voting decisions. In two surveys carried out before the 1996 elections, 57 per cent and 63 per cent agreed with the statement that the individual candidate is more important than the party when making the voting decision.9 In 1999, 56 per cent of the voters chose first their preferred party while 44 per cent chose their candidate irrespective of his or her party affiliation.10 In 2004 the situation was similar, with the majority of the respondents thinking that the party is more important than the candidate when making their voting decisions. However, again 44 per cent reported that the candidate is more important than the party.11 Considering the potentially divisive impact of European integration on party unity, party leaders have good cause to support the existing rules of the electoral game. Protest or dissenting opinions get channelled through individual candidates, whereas in member states with closed lists organised factions often appear to contest the official party line. Given the candidate-centred nature of the campaigning, it was fairly difficult to pinpoint any key themes of the elections. No singular issue dominated the campaign. Defending ‘national interests’ was perhaps the main issue. In

Finland

105

general, voters were far more concerned about the ability of the candidates to defend Finland’s national interests in the EU than about wider questions related to European integration. This was not surprising when considering that after enlargement Finland would only have 14 out of 732 seats in the Parliament. Therefore it was natural that voters would be concerned about the extent to which Finland’s voice is heard at the European level, with candidates in turn advertising themselves as efficient spokespersons for Finland. Under the broad umbrella of national interests, the debate focused on familiar themes in Finnish EU policy – defence (including the decision on whether Finland should apply for NATO membership), agriculture, regional policy, and protecting the welfare state. The draft Constitution did not really feature in the debates. Some of the parties, including the Green League and the Left Alliance, campaigned in favour of putting the Constitution to a referendum, but the three main parties were opposed to consulting the people. The National Coalition and the Social Democrats tried to rally the people to vote by portraying the election as a choice between a social democratic and a bourgeois Europe. Both parties also emphasised their memberships in the two largest party groups in the Parliament, thereby signalling that voting for other parties, particularly the Centre that sits in the ELDR group, would effectively mean wasting votes. As in the 1996 and 1999 elections, the transnational manifestos of the Euro-parties were almost completely absent during the campaigns. They were available via the internet at the parties’ home pages, but were not really used at all in the actual election campaigns by the candidates or the parties. The only real exception was the Green League, which used the manifesto of the European Green Party in their campaign. The Finnish parties did not really make use of any visible campaign help from abroad. Some key figures of the Europarties did visit Finland during the campaigns, for example, the ELDR group leader Graham Watson attending the party congress of the Swedish People’s Party, but such visits hardly made the headlines and went by and large unnoticed.

The result The result brought few surprises, with the main parties holding on to their seat and vote shares and the Eurosceptical parties failing to gain new ground. Table 12.1 shows the results by parties, and Table 12.2 lists the elected 14 MEPs. Turnout was in the end higher than expected: 41.1 per cent, almost ten percentage points above the dismal 31.4 per cent achieved in 1999; 16.2 per cent of the electorate cast their votes in advance. Turnout was lowest (around or below 30 per cent) in rural municipalities in eastern parts of the country, areas that have a higher share of Eurosceptical voters than the country as a whole.

106 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

Table 12.1

Results of the 2004 European Parliament elections in Finland

Party

Candidates

Votes (per cent)

Seats

Seat change

20 20 20 20 20 20 15 20 5 20 15 12 8 12

392,771 (23.7) 387,217 (23.4) 350,525 (21.2) 172,844 (10.4) 151,291 (9.1) 94,421 (5.7) 70,845 (4.3) 10,134 (0.6) 8,900 (0.5) 5,687 (0.3) 3,558 (0.2) 3,279 (0.2) 3,248 (0.2) 1,864 (0.1)

4 4 3 1 1 1 0

–1

KOK KESK SDP VIHR VAS RKP KD SKP PS Köyhien Asialla LIB EKA Suomen Kansan sinivalkoiset Suomi–Isänmaa

–1

Source: Ministry of Justice.

Table 12.2

The 14 Finnish MEPs elected to the Parliament

Candidate Anneli Jäätteenmäki Alexander Stubb Satu Hassi Esko Seppänena Ville Itälä Reino Paasilinnaa Piia-Noora Kauppia Riitta Myllera Kyösti Virrankoskia Lasse Lehtinen Paavo Väyrynena Eija-Riitta Korholaa Hannu Takkula Henrik Lax a

Party

EP Party group

Votes

KESK KOK VIHR VAS KOK SDP KOK SDP KESK SDP KESK KOK KESK SFP/RKP

ALDE EPP Greens EUL-NGL EPP PES EPP PES ALDE PES ALDE EPP ALDE ALDE

149,646 115,224 74,714 72,401 65,439 64,305 62,995 55,133 51,415 47,186 44,123 35,285 32,739 32,707

Campaign Expenditure (€) 75,000 119,000 52,000 95,000 106,000 99,000 73,000 93,000 299,000 53,000 68,000 68,000 69,000 115,000

Re-elected MEP.

Source: Ministry of Justice.

The National Coalition, the winner of the 1999 EP election with 25.3 per cent of the votes and in opposition since the 2003 national parliamentary elections, emerged again as the largest party, with 23.7 per cent of the votes and four MEPs. This was the same number of seats as the party won in 1999, but effectively it lost one seat, as MEP Eija-Riitta Korhola had defected

Finland

107

from the Christian Democrats to the National Coalition towards the end of the parliamentary term. In addition to Korhola, the MEPs of the National Coalition are Ville Itälä, the former party chair, Alexander Stubb, a high-profile civil servant that has worked for both the Finnish government and for the Commission President Romano Prodi, and Piia-Noora Kauppi. The Centre Party won 23.4 per cent of the votes and also held on to its four seats. The vote queen of the elections was the former Prime Minister Anneli Jäätteenmäki who won 149,646 votes. Her popularity was at least in part due to the fact that many Centre voters felt that she was treated unfairly by the Social Democrats and the media the previous year when she was forced to resign as the PM. The other Centre MEPs are Kyösti Virrankoski, Paavo Väyrynen, and Hannu Takkula. The Social Democrats were hoping to win also four seats, but could only manage three with 21.2 per cent of the votes. The party’s MEPs are Riitta Myller, Reino Paasilinna and Lasse Lehtinen, with the former two renewing their seats. Given the reduction in the number of seats, the smaller parties were struggling to maintain their seats. The Green League lost its second seat, and the decline in its vote share (10.4 per cent) in comparison with the 1999 elections (13.4 per cent) is partially explained by the fact that Heidi Hautala, the former co-chair of the Green group in the EP, had entered the national parliament in the 2003 elections. The new Green MEP is Satu Hassi, former party leader and minister for the environment. The Left Alliance won 9.1 per cent of the votes, exactly the same percentage as in 1999, with Esko Seppänen, the strongly Eurosceptical MEP, holding on to his seat. The Swedish People’s Party also managed to recapture its only seat with 5.7 per cent of the votes. Henrik Lax is the new MEP for the party. The Christian Democrats had won one seat in 1999 with 2.4 per cent of the votes, thanks to a productive electoral alliance with the Centre, but now failed to win any with 4.3 per cent of the votes. Each of the remaining parties won less than 1 per cent of the votes. The results indicate that the overall direction of Finnish integration policy and the European policies of the parties that gained representation in the European Parliament will not undergo any major changes. The factors that led Finland to apply for EU membership – trade dependence, security concerns, and consolidating Finland’s place in the West – remain by and large unaltered. The main Finnish parties are solidly pro-EU, and emphasise that a strong Union is in the interests of Finland (and other small member states). The media has only paid very sporadic attention to what the Parliament does, and hence it is expected that there will not really be any debate or good coverage of the items that are on the EP’s agenda. National EU debates will continue to focus on defence and foreign policy, agriculture and regional policy, and more specifically on the broader question of Finland’s role and place in the process of European integration.

108 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

Notes 1. Itälä was the party chair until the party congress held a week before the EP elections. 2. In 1999 the timing of the election could hardly have been worse. National parliamentary elections had been held three months earlier in March, and presidential elections were scheduled for January 2000, with speculation about possible candidates and their respective chances of winning office receiving wide coverage in the media. 3. Untypically for Finland, there was some debate in early spring about the electoral system used in EP elections, with some key individuals such as Paavo Lipponen arguing in favour of closed lists instead of the non-ordered open list system. The move to closed lists was argued to improve the quality of the campaigns as parties would be forced to become the key players as opposed to the individual candidates under the present system. The idea of splitting the country into regional constituencies, a proposal that was discussed in the aftermath of the 1999 elections, was no longer mentioned. 4. In the first Euro-elections of October 1996 14 parties and one voters’ association fielded a total of 207 candidates. In 1999 eleven parties put forward 140 candidates. For detailed analysis of the 1996 elections, see T. Martikainen and K. Pekonen (eds), Eurovaalit Suomessa 1996: Vaalihumusta päätöksenteon arkeen (Acta Politica No. 10, Yleisen valtio-opin laitos, Helsingin yliopisto, 1999). The 1999 elections are analysed in P. Pesonen (ed.), Suomen europarlamenttivaalit (Tampere: Tampere University Press, 2000); and T. Raunio ‘Finland’, in J. Lodge (ed.), The 1999 Elections to the European Parliament (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 100–16. 5. In addition, Ari Vatanen, the former rally world champion elected to the Parliament in 1999 from the National Coalition list, decided this time to run in France, his country of residence. 6. See K.M. Johansson and T. Raunio, ‘Partisan Responses to Europe: Comparing Finnish and Swedish Political Parties’, European Journal of Political Research, 39:2 (2001), 25–49; and T. Raunio and T. Tiilikainen, Finland in the European Union (London: Frank Cass, 2003), pp. 43–71. 7. The True Finns are for all purposes a successor to the Rural Party, albeit with somewhat less populist tendencies. The ideology of True Finns is rather nationalistic and the party wants the EU to be an association of independent nations and is against the deepening of integration. In the 2003 elections to the Eduskunta the party won 1.6 per cent of the votes. 8. The most expensive campaign was that of MEP Kyösti Virrankoski, whose campaign costs were €299,000. The campaign expenditures of the elected MEPs are shown in Table 12.2. According to the law, those elected to the Parliament and their deputies must submit a notification on their election financing to the Ministry of Justice. This notification must include the total costs of the election campaign, with the costs itemised into the candidate’s own funds and outside support. Support from outside is classified in terms of contributions from private persons, enterprises, party organisations and other corresponding important donors. The value of each contribution and the name of the donor is to be stated separately, if the value is at least €3,400. 9. P. Majonen, ‘Kauniita ja rohkeita vai aatteellisia ammattipoliitikkoja? Suomen eurovaalien vaaliteemat ja vaalikampanjointi 1996’, in Martikainen and Pekonen, Eurovaalit Suomessa 1996, p. 76. 10. S. Borg, ‘Puolueet, ehdokkaat ja äänestäjien valinnat’, in Pesonen, Suomen europarlamenttivaalit, p. 136. 11. H. Miettinen, ‘Eurovaalit mielletään puoluepoliittisemmiksi kuin viimeksi’, Helsingin Sanomat, 11 June 2004.

13

France Helen Drake1

Introduction The EP elections of Sunday June 13 20042 concluded a difficult electoral cycle for the French President Jacques Chirac and Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin. The ‘strange affair’3 of the 2002 presidential and legislative elections had strongly suggested a French electorate disaffected by the politics of the mainstream, and with a waning appetite for participation in electoral contests per se. On that occasion, the number of abstentions and spoilt or blank voting papers was the highest ever in a presidential contest in the Fifth French Republic, whilst the scattering of first-round votes between presidential candidates of the Left cost the incumbent Prime Minister Lionel Jospin his passage into the second round (by only 0.68 per cent, or 194,000 votes); on the Right, the same phenomenon afforded the President an embarrassingly scant 20 per cent of the votes.4 Two years later, in March 2004, the President’s UMP (Union pour un mouvement populaire – Union for a Popular Movement) lost, to the Left, 20 of its 22 regional councils and 10 of its départements, in an electoral contest in which over one third of the electorate abstained. Jean-Pierre Raffarin survived to lead a government reshuffled by the President, but faced the EP elections of June 2004 weakened by his and the President’s declining popularity. Moreover, the 1999 EP elections had seen an absention rate of 53 per cent, and a bad defeat for the President’s party, the then RPR (Rassemblement pour la République – Rally for the Republic).5 Mindful of all this, the government displayed cautious (and tactical) pessimism, talking publicly of a turnout no higher than 50 per cent, one that in the event was the lowest since 1989, at 43 per cent. The opposition Socialist Party, again, outperformed the UMP. The immediate impact of these EP elections was limited – again Prime Minister Raffarin survived the presidential axe – but they offer insights into France’s relations with the EU. By 2004, France had undergone at least a 109

110 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

decade of troubled introspection regarding its status in an enlarging EU.6 It had lost its intellectual and moral advantage over Germany, having had to acquiesce, with much bad grace, to the inevitability of Germany’s revised voting weight within the EU’s institutions. France thus entered the 2004 European elections with nine fewer MEPs than in 1999, and 21 fewer seats than Germany, which gained 12. It lost as many seats as the UK, Spain and Italy, but the symbolic impact was far more brutal given the history of the Franco-German relationship, predicated on equal representation but a French sense of superiority.

The campaign In this context the EP elections were muted. The President was laconic, the government cautious, and the mainstream parties distracted by power struggles. The electorate was apathetic, and the media ‘debate’ in real terms limited to those already in the know.7 Far more media-worthy on the day was the France–England football match launching Group D in the Euro 2004 football championship in Portugal. The appeal of les Bleus may not have physically deterred voting, since the match started as polling stations were closing, but it competed for airtime the following day: not only did the media lead with the French team’s last-minute victory over England on 13 June, so did the Prime Minister – who then waited three days before responding to the results of the other Euro 2004. President Chirac set the tone for the campaign in his press conference of 29 April 2004.8 This came midway between the damning results of the March regional elections, and the June EP elections which he portrayed as an opportunity for France to secure its national interest in an increasingly powerful EP. While this intervention could be seen as constructive, as it forcefully endorsed the EP elections’ significance, it has to be taken in context. Chirac’s support for the EP’s status and his message of encouragement to French MEPs were a departure for Chirac. Until then, the French President had pursued the traditional French line of talking down the EP – other than the symbolic and economic significance of its part-time seat in Strasbourg – and ignoring MEPs’ potential in formulating or negotiating French policy in the EU. His change of heart was part of his ongoing strategy to arrest France’s falling influence in an enlarged EU:9 that is, as the instrumentalisation of these elections and French MEPs for national gain, as befits his presidential role. The government Prime Minister Raffarin also talked up the national interest when, in Ireland on 24 May, he spoke of his vision of a future Europe of nation states (‘une Europe d’Etats-nations’). This mirrored more or less faithfully Chirac’s preferred ‘Fédération européenne d’États-nations’ (a European Federation of Nation states), as proclaimed at the 2002 presidential election, in the presidential 29 April

France

111

2004 press conference, and in his mid-June 2004 press conference following member states’ agreement on the EU’s new constitutional text.10 But the government’s information campaign urged people to vote on the grounds that Europe affected their daily lives. Prime Minister Raffarin said it was a choice between trusting or mistrusting Europe (la confiance ou la défiance), a cleavage typifying French attitudes to Europe since the early 1990s. Claudie Haigneré, the Minister for Europe appointed in the post-regional election reshuffle, specifically urged voters not to consider vexed matters (dividing the UMP) such as Turkey’s EU bid or the draft EU Constitution. The official campaign poster showed an envelope (representing that into which French voters would place their voting slip), out of which flowed a list of very diverse issues, portrayed as matters where the EU had power to act and change lives. The slogan was ‘Le 13 juin votons pour le Parlement européen’ – ‘Let’s Vote for the EP on 13 June’. This official campaign (see Le Monde, 31 May 2004, for details) ran from late May 2004 to polling day and aimed for breadth over depth. Its main elements were a poster campaign (over 20,000 posters in all areas of over 3,000 inhabitants, targeted in public places such as stations and shopping centres); inserts and flyers in 66 regional daily newspapers; locally-distributed information; and an internet campaign () intended for younger voters, and those most likely to abstain. The campaign, on which the Government belatedly spent €3 million (lower than the €5.5 million of 1999), was coordinated with the not insignificant efforts (over €1 million, out of a total budget for the EU25 of some €8.3 million) of the EP’s Paris information office which strove to complement the government’s campaign. Both shared the goal of raising awareness of the significance of the vote by underlining the EP’s growing role; and motivating people to vote. The EP’s office also ran citizen-friendly cinema and TV clips; more posters (a joint poster with the government had proved impossible); displays for the Paris métro, buses, and a small fleet of SMART cars in Paris and certain regional French cities; and one-off events such as handing out leaflets at a busy motorway toll on France’s Pentecôte bank holiday, and the display of the European flag at the Stade de France during key French rugby matches in February and March 2004.11

Campaign participants and issues, rules of the game, electoral reform and state backing 169 lists were declared to the French Ministry of the Interior by the deadline of 28 May 2004; in the Île-de-France alone, there were 28. The odds stacked up differently irrespective of how costly or effective the campaigns would be because the electoral system favoured larger over smaller participants, and penalised the smallest, mainly owing to the April 2003 government reform of the mechanics of PR in regional and EP elections. This aimed at reinforcing bipolarity in France’s party system to produce a Left–Right fight, by forcing mainstream and marginal parties alike into tactical alliances. In the case of

112 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

the EP elections, the reform was unconvincingly dressed up as bringing the voter closer to his or her elected representative (la proximité) by regionalising the vote.12 In previous EP elections parties had fought on the basis of national lists where France comprised a single, national constitutuency. This, inter alia, encouraged political ‘stars’ to head their respective party lists. In 2004 France was divided into eight ‘super-regions’ (the official term was ‘inter-regional’ constituencies), and all participants fought on the basis of super-regional lists (see Table 13.1). This cut the visibility of nationally-known têtes de liste, and may have depressed turnout. The majority of the ‘stars’ elected in 1999, particularly from the mainstream parties, had been conspicuous by their absence from the EP. The new system worked against parties unable to mobilise sufficient support in the regional constituencies to reach the 5 per cent threshold. One group, Jean-Pierre Chevènement’s republican supporters, declined to contest the elections, in protest, ostensibly, at the new system. Table 13.1 The regional constituencies and the distribution of French seats in the European Parliament, 2004–09 Constituencies

Number of seats

Île-de-France Sud-Est (South-East)

14 13

Nord-Ouest (North-West)

12

Ouest (West)

10

Est (East)

10

Sud-Ouest (South-West)

10

Massif central – Centre (Massif Central – Centre)

6

Outre-mer (Overseas)

3

Total

Regions within this constituency Île-de-France Corse Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur Basse-Normandie Haute-Normandie Nord Pas de Calais Picardie Bretagne Pays-de-la-Loire Poitou-Charentes Alsace Bourgogne Champagne-Ardenne Franche-Comté Lorraine Aquitaine Languedoc-Roussillon Midi-Pyrénées Auvergne Centre Limousin Saint-Pierre et Miquelon, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Guyane, Réunion, Mayotte, Nouvelle-Calédonie, Polynésie française, Wallis-et-Fortuna

78

Source:

France

113

There are state rules on media coverage in an attempt to balance fair play with the advantaging of parties already represented in Parliament (and so consolidating majorities) . Each of the parties that form groups in the National Assembly was allowed 24 minutes on each of TV and radio (two hours’ in total on each of TV and radio, divided by five): the UMP, UDF (Union pour la Démocratie française – Union for French Democracy), PS (parti socialiste – Socialist Party), PCF (parti communiste français – Communist Party), and the PRG (Parti des républicains de gauche – Party of Republicans of the Left). All others fielding candidates in at least five constituencies had to share one hour of TV and radio, with no more than five minutes for any one list. These rules effectively treated parties represented in the EP but not the French Assembly (such as the souverainiste sceptics) the same as ad hoc groups constituted solely for the purpose of gaining publicity and funding at these elections.13 Rules on the state funding of campaigns were slightly more even-handed: campaign expenses were reimbursed to lists winning at least 3 per cent of the vote.14 Even so, the government’s intention to discipline a multiparty party system into bipolar alliances and to concentrate France’s MEPs into the smallest number of EP groups possible, shaped the campaign to a degree, albeit with rather limited success. The UMP and its ‘allies’ Despite its absolute majority in the National Assembly (309 of 577 seats), the UMP (‘Avec l’Europe, Voyons la France en Grand!’ – ‘With Europe, Let’s see France writ large!’) had – contrary to the President’s intention in 2002 – failed to cohere into a single, united party on the Right by the EP elections in June 2004, which exacerbated problems within the UMP, and between it and its allies. Intra-UMP divisions focused very publicly on the rivalry between President Chirac and Prime Minister Raffarin on the one hand, and on the other, the free-spirited, highly efficient Interior (and then Economy) Minister and young-ish gun, Nicolas Sarkozy. He pushed for a vote in the UMP for a referendum on the future EU Constitution, effectively adding to the opposition pressure on a reluctant President only weeks before the poll. He made plain his desire to oust Alain Juppé (ex-Prime Minister and Chirac confidant) as the UMP’s President. Distracting as this was, there were difficulties over specific EU issues. UMP leader Juppé led the UMP to oppose outright Turkey’s bid to join the EU as part of the UMP campaign platform, in direct contradiction to President Chirac’s more ambiguous stance: he was constrained by the agreement reached between the EU Heads of State and Government to await the European Commission’s recommendations. Turkey’s relations with the EU were thus problematic for the President, particularly since this was also an issue on which traditionally pro-European voices, such as Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, opposed him. The UMP officially endorsed the EU’s draft Constitution, but at the expense of encouraging dissidents who used the internet and email to make themselves

114 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

heard. With one exception, these groups refrained from presenting their own separate electoral lists, but did serve to remind the UMP and voters of the UMP’s difficulty in silencing its so-called souverainistes – single-issue Eurosceptics arguing in Gaullist mode for the ‘return’ of French sovereignty. In particular, MP Nicolas Dupont-Aignan’s motion at the April 2004 party conference ‘Pour une autre Europe’ (‘For an alternative Europe’) won nearly one-fifth of the votes; and his ‘campaign’ at the elections, entitled ‘Debout la République – les nouveaux gaullistes au service d’une certaine idée de la France’ (‘Stand up for the Republic: the new Gaullists serving a certain idea of France’) played to the Gaullists in the UMP. The most potentially damaging souverainistes had left the UMP by 1999,15 and it was in decline.16 In 1999, the then RPR had campaigned (under Sarkozy’s leadership) in alliance with the then DL (Démocratie libérale – Liberal Democracy) on a half-hearted Eurosceptic ticket.17 Interestingly, the UMP’s problems in 2004 drove it to claim kinship with the most damaging of their former souverainiste opponents, Philippe de Villiers’ MPF (Mouvement pour la France – Movement for France), Prime Minister Raffarin claiming the group for his own majority. De Villiers was nevertheless deemed more palatable to the UMP than former RPR member, Charles Pasqua, whose RPF (Rally for France) list (‘Pasqua, la France en tête’ – ‘France Ahead, With Pasqua’) was run by well-known souverainiste MEP William Abitbol. Pasqua and de Villiers’ combined score at the 1999 EP elections beat the RPR-DL into third place (after the PS) with 13 MEPs sitting as independents (non inscrits) in the 1999–2004 EP. Pasqua had led the 30-strong UEN (Union for Europe of the Nations) group in the EP but by early June 2004 denounced his former partner’s ‘political bigamy’ and the divorce between the two souverainiste leaders was consummated by Pasqua and his group losing all their seats and failing to win one in 2004. More threatening to the UMP than the ghost of le souverainisme was François Bayrou’s UDF (UDF-Europe). Although Bayrou had lost most of his party members to the UMP, and was scarcely a credible presidential contender for 2007, he was important to the government’s majority in political, if not numerical terms. UMP and the UDF’s traditionally differ over Europe: the UDF is the pro-European, ‘foreigner’s party’ that Chirac so scathingly derided in his infamously Eurosceptic ‘Cochin’ speech of 1978. The UDF is an openly federalist party, and in this alone presents a permanent challenge to the UMP and the President himself, for both of whom the recognition of the EU’s quasi-federal regime has been belated, roubled and incomplete. Bayrou had a very high media profile in these elections, and his campaign distinguished itself from the other mainstream parties’ in its single-minded focus on European issues, and his tactical urging of voters not to get dragged into the Left–Right, government–opposition battles waged in lieu of European campaigns. Most noteworthy, alongside the UDF’s support for the draft EU Constitution and its federal aspirations for the EU, was Bayrou’s public

France

115

intention to remove UDF MEPs from the EPP, which he depicted as having been ‘invaded’ and ‘colonised’ by Eurosceptics (including the RPR/UMP, since 1999), and to create a new democratic European party. The UDF campaign had its own media stunts with, for example, the choice of Jean-Marie Cavada, former President of Radio France, to head the list in the South-West region. Other list leaders (all sitting MEPs) included General Philippe Morillon, UN Commander in Bosnia in 1992 and 1993 (described as ‘self-satisfied’ when he played a similar role in the 1999 elections).18

The opposition: the PS and its ‘partners’ Closest to the UDF in its European vision were the federalist Greens (les Verts) who supported the draft EU Constitution and democratic representation organised on an EU-wide level (such as simultaneous referendums to be held in the EU25 on the Constitution). Its campaign was run in close conjunction with the European Green Party whose spokesperson, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, had in 1999 co-led the French Greens’ list (with Dominique Voynet), and who was a star in his own right. The Greens used the European Party logo (see ), as well as the slogan from the campaign common to the Green parties throughout the member states (‘We have the Party’). The Socialist Party’s official literature was also pro the EU’s Constitution. Its manifesto was written by Pierre Moscovici, ex-European Minister in the Jospin gauche plurielle government (1997–2002) (‘Et maintenant, l’Europe sociale’ – ‘And Now, a Social Europe’). In government, he had wholeheartedly supported Europe’s semi-federalist direction and the PS campaign more or less reflected this. More obviously, it showed bitter PS opposition to the government, its main campaign being a call on supporters for a vote against the government (a vote sanction). The campaign reflected more critical Socialist camp voices towards Europe, calling, for example, for amendments to the Constitution’s social policy provisions (this was also official presidentialgovernmental policy); and a referendum among PS grassroots, on Europe, once the Constitution was settled by the EU’s leaders. But PS leader François Hollande insisted on loyalty to the party’s officially pro-Constitution, pro-EU stance, making it a condition of candidates’ places, and no minor figures in the PS headed regional lists. Unlike 1999, the Party campaigned alone, without Chevènement’s MDC, as it was no longer under pressure to cohere with its partners-in-government. The PS’s relations with the PES were good. Its chair, Poul Rasmussen, was at the PS’s campaign launch. After the June elections, intra-party recriminations over Europe intensified, and were closely linked to the intra-party battles for control of the party as the 2007 presidential contest loomed. Further to the left, the Parti communiste (PC) (‘L’Europe oui! Mais pas cellelà!’ – ‘Yes to Europe, but not to that Europe!’) also lost to the PS. It opened

116 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

its lists, as in 1999, to non-party members, including in some cases deals with former Chevènementistes; and its trajectory over the previous years, and in particular its participation in the gauche plurielle government of 1999– 2002, had already led it away from its traditionally implacable resistance to European integration, to a more realist, reformist stance. It firmly opposed the EU Constitution, sharing PS misgivings to what it saw as the Constitution’s ‘liberal’ content. Its Trotskyist LO-LCR (Lutte ouvrière-Ligue communiste révolutionnaire) comrades were stridently Eurosceptic, but, in the March 2004 regional elections, had been trounced. Others Neither the extreme scepticism of Jean-Marie le Pen’s National Front (FN – Front national),19 nor the resistance of the CPNT (Chasse, Pêche, Nature, Traditions – Hunting, Fishing, Nature and Traditions) did well. As in the 2002 presidential election, the FN insisted that ‘Brussels’ spelt the imminent end to France. Its campaign suffered more than others by the loss of the national list focus since it robbed Jean-Marie le Pen of a nationwide platform for his personalist, rally-style politics;20 and a legal ruling barred le Pen from leading the list in his chosen constituency of the South-East. The distribution of leading positions was sensitive in the FN given le Pen’s stranglehold, and his insistence on his daughter Marine le Pen leading the FN list in the Île de France. By 2004 the FN had overcome the effects of its 1998 split with Bruno Mégret (whose separate list, the then MN – Mouvement national – had undermined the FN in the 1999 EP elections). In 2004, Mégret’s renamed MNR (Mouvement national républicain – National Republican Movement) list was still trying to position itself as the palatable face of the alternative right, and ran a narrowly-focused campaign (‘Europe Oui, Turquie non! Pour une Europe indépendante et puissante’ – ‘Europe Yes, Turkey No! For an Independent and Powerful Europe’). The CPNT (‘Pour la France qu’on aime, l’Europe des différences’ – ‘For the France we Love, a Europe of Differences’) only fielded new candidates and no sitting MEPs, reflecting its claim to do politics differently from the old guard. The other alternative list winning most national media attention was the Europe-Palestine list, fielded only in the Île-de-France. It featured comedian Dieudonné M’Bala M’Bala, disgraced in late 2003 for what his critics (and the law) deemed to be anti-semitic remarks. Otherwise, the field of 169 lists saw a smattering of protest and interest groups from independent candidates, and civil society groups, whose concerns ranged from the assieged motorist, and taxpayer, to the ‘ordinary’ French (Francine Gomez’ La France d’en bas), and supporters of greater regional independence.

The results Turnout was at 43 per cent, (Table 13.2) abysmally low. In Corsica, France’s most troublesome region, 72 per cent abstained. The highest turnout was in

France

117

the Massif Central-Centre and the South-West. The record abstention rate confirmed voters’ relative indifference to typical ‘second order’ EP elections, the general abstention trend, and lacklustre campaigns. The government’s information services’ poll on the effectiveness of its poster campaign, and of the EP office’s radio campaign, was damning; 61 per cent of respondents could not recall any element of these campaigns; 71 per cent had no memory of the EP’s radio campaign; 71 per cent admitted paying no attention to the campaigns; and 83 per cent deemed them unimportant as a factor in their decision whether or not to vote. The EP office felt that while the attempt to coordinate EP and French government activity had been successful, the government’s expenditure was relatively low (compared to that of many political parties across EU25), and national specificities eclipsed European messages. Table 13.2

France: The results of the EP elections

Registered voters Abstentions Votes cast Blank and spoilt ballot papers Valid votes Party lists

Votes

% of registered voters

% of votes cast

41,518,225 23,754,576 17,763,649 594,968 17,168,681

– 57.21 42.79 1.43 41.35

– – – 3.35 96.65

Votes

% of registered voters

PS (Socialist Party) 4,960,426 UMP (Union for a Popular Movement) 2,856,218 UDF (Union for French Democracy) 2,051,453 FN (National Front) 1,684,868 Verts (Greens) 1,271,134 Various Right (of which de Villier’s 1,516,645 MPF – (Movement for France) PCF (Communist Party) 900,293 Various Left (overseas territories) 231,047 Various (divers) 592,043 LO-LCR 571,550 CPNT (Hunting, Fishing, Nature and Traditions) 297,293 Ecologists 166,397 MNR (National Republican Movement – Bruno Mégret) 53,605 Regionalists 15,709

Seats

28.89

31

16.64

17

11.95 9.81 7.40

11 7 6

8.83 (MPF: 6.7)

3

5.24 1.35 3.45 3.33

2 1 0 0

1.73 0.97

0 0

0.31 0.09

0 0

Source: French Ministry of the Interior ().

118 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

The PS capitalised on the government’s unpopularity and tactical voting (vote utile). The Greens dropped from nine to six seats; the PCF from six to two, and LO-LCR lost all its five and would not have its expenses refunded. The Left won 43 per cent of the votes, and the PS’s 29 per cent share gave it 31 of the 78 seats available (against 22 of the 87 in 1999), making it the largest national group in the PES. The UMP won 16 per cent, of the vote and 17 seats. It failed in its bid to represent all those on the mainstream right, since the UDF won nearly 12 per cent of the vote and 11 seats. In the Somme the UMP’s paltry score of 9.13 per cent was made worse by the personal victory of Gilles de Robien, the only UDF minister in Jean-Pierre Raffarin’s government; and in de Villiers’ own stronghold of la Vendée, where the UMP got 8.79 per cent. The souverainistes suffered from their split since 1999 and fell from 13 to three seats. This was a worse result than in either 1994 (12.33 per cent for de Villiers) or 1999 (13.05 per cent for de Villiers-Pasqua), and in absolute terms was proof of the sceptics’ failure to unite behind their cause. De Villiers’ personal popularity was reflected in the 12.36 per cent for his list in the West. A fatal blow was dealt to Pasqua and his supporters. The CPNT lost all its six EP seats, confirming the tactical voting trend of the electorate. The FN won 9.8 per cent of the vote, lower than its 1984, 1989 or 1994 successes, which were so instrumental in founding the party’s role in France as the ‘shadow of democracy’,21 and far below its first round score of nearly 17 per cent in the 2002 presidential elections. The FN does now have a core electorate, but with only seven seats, and despite populist list successes elsewhere in the EU, it was dubious whether FN MEPs would sit in a new, extremist group (which would require 19 MEPs from five different member states). The results suggested the continued importance of the presence of credible and recognisable leading lights: de Villiers won over 38 per cent in his stronghold in the Vendée (South-West), where the CPNT and its unknowns collapsed; and the UDF fared best (13.17 per cent) in the SouthWest where Cavada had headed the list. The PS’s victory over the UMP in this constituency, which included Alain Juppé’s city of Bordeaux, says more about Juppé’s credibility problems than anything else. In François Bayrou’s backyard of the Pyrenées Atlantiques (South-West), the UDF’s score (19.45 per cent) was higher than the UMP’s. Le Pen was elected in the South-East where the FN list won 12.18 per cent and two seats; as was his daughter in the Île-de-France, with 8.58 per cent and one seat (hers). In the 2004 EP elections the same proportion of women MEPs as in 1999 (43.6 per cent) won seats, despite the gender parity law (of 6 June 2000) governing these elections.22 Of the 78 women, 35 were sitting MEPs (44.8 per cent). The three overseas candidates were réunionnais, each of the main parties having chosen a candidate from this most populated of France’s overseas constituencies to head their list. None of the civil society lists scattered

France

119

sparsely throughout the regional constituencies won a seat. The EuropePalestine list won 50,000 votes in the Île-de-France rather than the 150,000 it had hoped for, but did better in certain urban estates (cités) in over 30 towns of over 15,000 inhabitants, winning 15 per cent in some polling stations, and nearly matching LO-LCR in Seine-Saint-Denis, just north of Paris. These results were seen as evidence of the phenonemon of the ‘ethnicisation’ of voting behaviour and a possible new electoral cleavage, given the high-profile and troubled issue of multiculturalism in France in 2004.

Conclusion The 2004 EP elections were overshadowed by domestic politics. The Raffarin government’s reform programme (especially of the funding of the health system), and incidental controversies such as that over ‘gay marriage’ dominated the national and regional media (and the French media finds it notoriously hard to sell EU news).23 By the campaign start at the end of May, EU enlargement had occurred; and agreement on the Constitution was imminent. Some of the heat had thus been drawn out of the pre-enlargement situation, leaving the party campaigns stranded. Yet it was precisely the deal on the EU’s Constitution prepared the next Euro-battleground: a referendum on the ratification of the constitutional text agreed upon on 18 June 2004 in Brussels. In his 14 July 2004 presidential address, President Chirac signalled a referendum in the second half of 2005 as all the parties and, according to opinion polls, 75 per cent of the public, wanted: he said he would ‘directly consult’ on a text that ‘concerned them directly’ in the second half of 2005. The President had, at a stroke, injected a new electoral battle into what would have been a three-year electionfree period. For him, the referendum vote was a historic opportunity (as Maastricht had been for François Mitterrand) for the French to confirm what he declared to be an uncontested truth: that contemporary France is viscerally pro-European, and has been for 50 years; its political leaders know this, and those demurring are either insincere, or guilty of ‘polluting’ the European issue for their own political gain. This was an unmistakeable challenge to both his own camp and to his opponents to cohere around the French-inspired project of European union. From this angle, the EP results were inconclusive. Overall, parties and lists most supportive of the EU’s current direction were more successful than outright sceptics, but they had revealed rifts that would be tested by the referendum. The 2004 vote sanction results, along with the high abstention rate, suggest that the referendum would not just be about the Constitution. In the Maastricht referendum of September 2002, President Chirac’s party had scarcely supported his own pinched support for the treaty. But in the Fifth Republic, all Presidents are constrained by their post and their heritage

120 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

to convert themselves into ardent supporters of European integration,24 and Chirac is no exception, and this time would be playing his presidential role to the full in appealing to the French to vote for the Constitution. France’s longterm relations with the EU are conditional on the outcome of the referendum. Meanwhile, French representation in the EP remains as fragmented as ever, indicating that the chance provided by the EP elections to enhance French influence in the EU’s institutions had been missed.

Notes 1. I gratefully acknowledge the financial support of British Academy Small Research Grant SG35607, which facilitated the research for this chapter. 2. Voters in France’s overseas constituencies cast their vote on Saturday 12 June 2004. 3. A. Cole, ‘A Strange Affair: The 2002 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in France’, Government and Opposition, 37, 3 (2002) 317–42. 4. J. Gaffney (ed.) The French Presidential and Legislative Elections of 2002 (Ashgate, 2004). 5. The abstention rate (in metropolitan France) was 53 per cent in 1999, 46.53 per cent in 1994, 51.11 per cent in 1989; 43 per cent in 1984, and 39 per cent in 1979 (Le Monde, 31 May 2004). 6. H. Drake (ed.) French Relations with the European Union (Routledge, 2005, forthcoming). 7. This for example was the case of the lengthy televised debates between candidates and other party people on France 3’s highly-regarded Europe-France-Express programmes: these were not for the faint-hearted or casual viewers. The multimedia debates organised by RTL [radio], Le Monde and LCI [TV], such as on 1 June 2004 (when representatives from eight contesting parties were invited), were more accessible, but still required high interest and good knowledge. 8. Le Monde, 29 April 2004 9. Rapport d’Information (déposé par la Délégation de l’Assemblée nationale pour l’Union européenne, présenté par M. J. Floch) sur La présence et l’influence de la France dans les institutions européennes (Assemblée nationale, no. 1594, 12 May 2004). 10. 11. Information available from the French Information office of the European Parliament’s website: . I was also kindly helped in this respect by Christian Garrigues, Directeur-adjoint for the EP’s office in Paris. 12. This reform (Law No. 2003–327 of 11 April 2003, published in Le Journal officiel, 12 April 2003) had been rejected in 1998 by the Socialist government of the day, under pressure from the Greens and Communists who feared, rightly so, the negative effects it would have on their representation. See D. Howarth, ‘France’, in J. Lodge, The 1999 Elections to the European Parliament (Palgrave, 2001), p. 137 (note 22). The shock of April 2002 spurred the Raffarin government into action, although he had to force the vote through the National Assembly using the 49/3 ‘vote of confidence’ procedure. A rationale of the reform can be found at . The French branch of the European Movement had supported the reform on the democratic grounds of bringing citizens closer to their representatives.

France

121

13. I thank Julien Navarro for drawing my attention to this point. 14. See Howarth, ‘France’, p. 122; and . All candidates winning 3 per cent or more of the votes have their ‘propaganda’ expenses reimbursed (voting slips, posters, tracts, and so on); and in addition, up to 50 per cent maximum of other campaign expenses are also reimbursed to the tête de liste of these candidates as a lump sum, up to a ceiling of €1,150,000 per list. The high number of lists (169 nationally) inevitably included some that did not qualify for this funding; anecdotal evidence from the Île-de-France and other regions (such as Lyon), suggests that some of the smaller lists had difficulty even producing and distributing their ‘propaganda’. 15. As expressed with some force in Dupont-Aignan’s book, advertised on his group’s website at the time of these elections and entitled L’Europe va dans le mur. Elle accélère. Et elle klaxonne! 16. See Christopher Flood, ‘French Euroscepticism and the Politics of Indifference’, in Drake, French Relations with the European Union. 17. See Howarth, ‘France’, pp. 118–19. 18. Ibid., p. 122. 19. The FN campaigned under the following lengthy label: ‘Pour faire respecter les droits, les intérêts et la souveraineté de la France en Europe, pour y défendre nos emplois, notre niveau de vie, notre sécurité, nos libertés, nos traditions françaises, contre l’entrée de la Turquie dans l’Union européenne’ (For the respect of the rights, interests and sovereignty of France in Europe, for the defence of our jobs, living standards, security, freedoms, and French traditions in Europe, against Turkey’s entry into the EU). 20. See C. Fieschi in Gaffney, The French Presidential and Legislative Elections, pp. 169–84, on le Pen’s political style. 21. C. Fieschi, In the Shadow of Democracy: Fascism, Populism and the French Fifth Republic (Manchester University Press, 2004). 22. The percentage of French women MEPs had risen from 22.2 per cent in 1979 (18 of out 81 seats); via a drop to 20.9 per cent in 1984 and 1989 (17 of 81 seats in both cases); to 29.9 per cent in 1994 (26 out of 87) and 43.6 per cent in 1999 (38 of 87). In 2004, the figure was 34 out of 78 seats (43.6 per cent). See . Also Le Monde, 15 June 2004, which reports that the lists in the greatest contention for winning EP seats were led by men. Of the parties which won seats: the PS will send 14 women out of 31 MEPs (45.2 per cent); the UMP 9 of 17 (52.9 per cent); the UDF 5 of 11 (45.5 per cent); the FN 3 out of 7 (42.9 per cent), the Greens 3 of 6 (50 per cent); none in the MPF or PCF delegations. 23. See Olivier Baisnée, ‘The French Press and the EU: The Challenge of Community News’, in Drake, French Relations with the European Union. 24. C. Parsons, A Certain Idea of France (Cornell University Press, 2003).

14

Germany Simon Green

Introduction: the domestic context Like in 1999, the 2004 European Parliament election in Germany was held against a background of widespread voter discontent with the incumbent federal government, consisting of a coalition between the social democrats (SPD) and the ecologist Greens under the leadership of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder.1 Whereas in 1999, much of the government parties’ poor result could be put down to their uncertain start in office the previous year, following 16 years in opposition to a conservative (CDU/CSU) and liberal (FDP) alliance under Chancellor Helmut Kohl, the voters’ ire was on this occasion directed at the government’s attempts to address Germany’s increasing structural economic problems.2 Although the origins of these problems lie in the 1970s and 1980s, it was unification in 1990 which set off the spiral of decline that the SPD-Green government has struggled to contain. Eastern Germany was economically far weaker than anyone had expected, and the persistence of high unemployment (of around 15 per cent) and low growth rates in this region of the country required transfers from the west on a truly monumental scale, totalling some €1250 billion between 1991 and 2003.3 Only a minority of this money has gone into infrastructural investments: the majority has supported current expenditure, often through payments from the social insurance funds, which in Germany operate on the principle of parity between employers’ and employees’ contributions, usually supplemented out of general taxation. The federal government sought to meet these various commitments via debt, which has doubled since unification, and by raising taxes, including taxes on labour via social insurance contributions. In turn, this raised total labour costs in Germany to among the highest in the developed world. While this created a prima facie incentive for German companies not to employ new 122

Germany

123

staff or even to relocate to cheaper production locations, the high marginal rate of taxation simultaneously meant that consumer spending has been extremely sluggish for the past several years. In consequence, real GDP growth was virtually zero between 2001 and 2003, thereby opening new gaping holes in the government’s tax revenue. In 2002 and 2003, Germany’s budget deficits far exceeded the 3 per cent limit laid down in the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact. Its consummate failure to adhere to these deficit limits was all the more ironic given that it had been the German government which had insisted on the pact prior to the introduction of the euro in 1999. Inevitably, these developments all pointed to the pressing need to reform and slim down Germany’s extensive network of social welfare. However, the political incentive to do so has been very low: not only have there been more welfare recipients than wage earners in Germany since 1997, with the result that such cuts would affect a large number of persons, but an election of some sort, either at state (Land), federal or European level, at which opposition could be vented, is normally held every few months. Following its election in 1998, the initial response of the SPD-Green government was to convene a macro-corporatist forum under the rubric of ‘Alliance for Jobs’ (Bündnis für Arbeit). However, this body failed to make any substantive progress during 2000 and 2001, during which time the economic situation and the government’s approval ratings steadily worsened. Indeed, the federal government secured re-election in 2002 only by the narrowest of margins, and largely because of Chancellor Schröder’s skilful exploitation for electoral purposes of the looming war in Iraq, as well as of widespread flooding in eastern Germany in August 2002. By March 2003, however, the Alliance for Jobs forum had broken down altogether. In response, on 14 March 2003, Chancellor Schröder announced his so-called ‘Agenda 2010’, which in essence introduced ‘workfare’ elements into labour market policy, by cutting levels of unemployment benefit while simultaneously expecting beneficiaries to take on any form of paid employment offered to them.4 These plans prompted widespread protest from within the union movement and the SPD, many of whose grassroots members felt that by targeting some of the weakest elements of society, in other words the unemployed, Chancellor Schröder was betraying traditional social-democratic values of social justice. When a clearly frustrated Schröder responded by resigning as party leader (although not as Chancellor) on 6 February 2004, a post which he had only taken over by default in 1999 and which he had never relished, it appeared only to confirm to party activists his reluctance to try and work with them to achieve the necessary reforms in a socially acceptable manner. The opposition CDU/CSU, whose consent to these reforms was also necessary by virtue of its control of the upper chamber of parliament, the Bundesrat, did not rush to agree with Schröder’s proposals, instead relishing the internal dissent these had caused.5

124 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

The 2004 European election This was the domestic context against which the 2004 EP election was held. Crucially, the election provided the first major opportunity for voters to pass judgement on Agenda 2010 since it was announced 15 months earlier, as no national or major Land elections had taken place in the interim.6 This arguably increased even further the latent potential for the EP elections in Germany, as elsewhere in the EU, to act as a focus for protest voting, given the widespread perception that this was a ‘lower order’ election whose outcome was largely irrelevant.7 In the German case, protest voting has tended to take two forms. First, normally loyal supporters of the various parties tend to stay at home, and turnout has accordingly been lower than at national or even Land elections. In addition, at EP elections, turnout has fallen since 1989 to reach its hitherto historical low of 45.2 per cent at the 1999 election. Second, the electorate as a whole is generally more willing to support smaller players in the party system in these elections, especially the Greens and the post-communist PDS, as well as fringe parties such as the extremist Republikaner, who notably scored 7.1 per cent in the 1989 election. While the Greens hoped not to be engulfed by the same anti-government protest that swept the CDU/CSU to its second-best European result in 1999, the PDS was faced with a much more existential issue: having scored its best-ever national result in the 1999 election, it had crashed out of the Bundestag in the 2002 federal election, at which it surprisingly failed to poll above the 5 per cent of votes necessary for representation. Without a strong showing at this election, its prospects of re-establishing itself as a national party, as opposed to just a defender of eastern German particular interests, would effectively be over. Three other factors must be added to this dynamic. First, the CDU/CSU has what can only be described as a structural advantage in European elections in Germany, having emerged as the largest party at each of the six previous elections since 1979. Although its results were lower during between 1984 and 1994, when it was also in power at federal level, the party has been best able to mobilise its voters when in opposition, as was the case in 1979, 1999 and 2004. When combined with its consistently strong showing in the opinion polls in the run-up to the election, it went into the election with realistic hopes of a resounding victory. Conversely, and unsurprisingly, the SPD’s campaign was engulfed by a sense of resignation over what was widely recognised would not be a strong result. Second, for historical reasons, the political issue of European integration has traditionally been subject to a remarkable and long-established consensus between all the main parties, with the arguable exception of the PDS. This has meant that no party has seriously questioned Germany’s commitment to European integration as a whole, and especially to the big projects such as monetary union or eastern enlargement. Even on the question of Turkish membership of the EU, where differences are more clearly identifiable, the

Germany

125

parties have rarely attempted to gain political capital from this. With no real differences between the main actors, this degree of consensus has helped turn EP elections over the years into rather tepid affairs, in which parties traded more-or-less standard homilies on the benefits of integration. The 2004 election was no exception, notwithstanding one or two nuances. In one sense, this well-established trend was probably reinforced by the low turnout of 1999. In 2004, many candidates, including the leading candidates for the CDU and SPD, felt obligated to try and ‘sell Europe’ to the electorate at the expense of highlighting what policy differences existed. Of course, this had little prospect of galvanising already disinterested voters, and the national party figures and their organisations, who organised the campaign, much preferred to work on mobilising their ‘core’ electorates around national issues.8 Lastly, Germany’s complex system of party financing itself influences the dynamics of a European election campaign. Although state support for parties was revised in 1994 to take into account both votes obtained and membership levels, with the effect of reducing the amount of money available per vote,9 European elections continue to constitute a profit-making opportunity for the parties, provided of course that expenditure levels are kept lower than income. When combined with the political imperative of emphasising national issues wherever possible, the result was therefore a set of low-key campaigns by the parties, in which national figures dominated and the real issues of European integration received little attention. Like all elections in Germany, the poll for the European Parliament took place on a Sunday 13 June 2004. Voters were asked to cast one vote (as opposed to the usual two at federal elections) for a party list drawn up on a national basis (as opposed to Land-based lists at federal elections), with the usual threshold for representation of 5 per cent of valid votes cast. On polling day itself, a number of other elections were held: in six out of Germany’s 16 Länder, there were local elections; in addition, a new state legislature was elected in the eastern state of Thuringia. While turnout fell again in all 16 Länder except Baden-Württemberg, the three western states holding local elections, plus Thuringia, all were among the Länder with the highest turnout. However, at the other end of the scale, with a turnout of just 26.9 per cent, the voters in the eastern state of Brandenburg once again broke the negative turnout record for any state or national election, which they themselves had set at the 1999 election. Indeed, overall, the election met with apathy. The 1999 record low turnout of 45.2 per cent fell further to just 43 per cent. The parties’ own tactics did little to generate interest in the election. None of the five main parties fielded any candidates with an instantly recognisable national profile. Both the CDU’s and SPD’s leading candidates, Hans-Gert Pöttering and Martin Schulz, respectively, were seasoned and undramatic MEPs. As well as being virtually unknown at national level, they positively embodied the cross-party consensus that has defined Germany’s European policy over decades: in the only TV debate of the election, it took the two

126 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

candidates 20 minutes to find a topic on which they disagreed.10 Only Schulz had featured briefly in the German press in 2003, when the Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi had caused a scandal in the European Parliament by comparing him to a concentration camp guard. However, the focus of attention quickly switched away from Schulz onto Chancellor Schröder’s decision, as a result of the ensuing row, to cancel his traditional Italian holiday, after which Schulz slid back into obscurity. Although much the same can be said for the three smaller parties, the Greens, the FDP and the PDS, they did take a slightly different approach. The Greens chose a dual leadership for the election consisting of the generally invisible Rebecca Harms and the somewhat better-known former FrancoGerman revolutionary Daniel Cohn-Bendit. By contrast, the FDP made a virtue of the fact that their leading candidate, the 33-year old management consultant Silvana Koch-Mehrin, was both young and a complete newcomer to politics: her image dominated virtually all the party’s election materials. Both the Greens and the PDS fielded national politicians trying to restart their careers: thus the Greens’ list included Angelika Beer, who was in fact the joint party leader but who had failed to make any impact in this position, and Cem Özdemir, a former national MP who had resigned in 2002 over a minor scandal involving parliamentary privileges. The PDS list included not only the former party leader Gabi Zimmer, but also the erstwhile enfant terrible of its orthodox communist wing, Sahra Wagenknecht-Niemeyer. The campaign was soporific. The large parties’ manifestos were short. The SPD’s document tried to draw attention away from issues surrounding Agenda 2010 onto questions such as pacifism, social rights and globalisation. The CDU’s manifesto did everything possible to highlight what it considered to be the failings of the SPD-Green government in Berlin.11 This pattern was reflected in the two parties’ poster campaigns and TV commercials. The SPD attempted to pick up on the themes which had been so successful in the two previous Bundestag elections: its TV commercials plugged social justice (soziale Gerechtigkeit) heavily, as in the 1998 election, while its poster campaign propagated Europe as a force for peace (Friedensmacht Europa).12 Against the background of ongoing violence in Iraq, it was no surprise that this poster was used particularly heavily in the eastern Länder, where the party’s anti-war campaign in the 2002 federal election had been particularly successful. The CDU’s poster campaign was constructed around the rather fuzzy slogan of ‘Germany can do more in Europe’ (‘Europa 2004: Deutschland kann mehr’), and featured the party leader, Angela Merkel, rather than Pöttering. But it was the party’s TV commercials which were the most blatant in their attempt to benefit from an anti-government vote, by focusing exclusively on the SPDGreen government’s record. The CDU’s tactics largely can be explained by the party’s overriding goal of winning the next federal election in 2006. As well as profiling Merkel, Chancellor Schröder’s likely challenger, the CDU used the campaign to try to create some momentum towards the 2006 election,

Germany

127

just like Helmut Kohl had managed to do in the 1994 election.13 To this end, it had also secured the election, shortly before the European election, of its candidate for Federal President, Horst Köhler. Both the large parties stood out for not providing any real platform, either on TV or posters, for their leading candidates. By contrast, the FDP gave exclusive coverage to Silvana Koch-Mehrin, who was widely acknowledged to be a photogenic choice of candidate.14 The FDP also made much of its desire to hold a referendum on the European constitution, an undeniably populist sleight-of-hand, given that such a referendum would require a change in Germany’s constitution, which the FDP had no means of imposing. The PDS’ campaign was the most blatantly negative, with most of its posters proclaiming ‘Enough is enough!’ (‘Es reicht!’) and calling for the poll to act as a vote against the government’s reform of the social welfare system. Only the Greens ran their campaign under the banner of the supranational European Green Party. Their joint manifesto with other ecologist parties contained more in terms of concrete policy proposals, for instance on food labelling, than did the manifestos of the other German parties.15 In parallel to the party campaigns, the European Parliament itself and the federal government ran TV commercials and poster campaigns encouraging voters to turn out. A particular innovation was an internet-based election aid (Wahl-O-Mat), which provided participants with a recommended vote based on their responses to 30 questions drawn from the parties’ manifestos.16 The Wahl-O-Mat had made its first appearance at the 2002 Bundestag election, and was run by the Federal Office for Political Education (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung) in conjunction with the second main state TV channel (ZDF). Given the overwhelming sense of frustration with national politics, combined with a much greater level of media and popular interest in the German national football team’s chances at the imminent Euro 2004 tournament, none of the party’s campaigns could really be said to have made an impact on public perceptions. Even on the question of whether Turkey should join the EU, the very real differences between the government and opposition parties barely registered with the voters; nor did other issues, such as the Constitution, immigration or terrorism, play anything more than a negligible role in the election. Although 61 per cent of voters considered the decisions of the European Parliament to affect them personally, this level was lower than for local, state or federal legislatures: the corresponding figure for the Bundestag was 86 per cent. A total of 51 per cent of voters admitted to national issues determining how (and indeed whether) they cast their vote. In this context, the deep unpopularity of the government (–1.3 on a +5 to –5 scale) was bound to be critical in deciding the outcome of election. However, the dominance of national issues in voting decisions did vary considerably by party, and was highest among PDS and CDU supporters, and lowest among Green voters.17

128 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

The result The EP results confirmed the SPD’s worst fears. It was expecting a poor result, but even it was shocked when its result came in at just 21.5 per cent of votes cast (Table 14.1). The scale of the SPD’s defeat was massive and on a national basis: only in two (moreover very small) Länder, Bremen and the Saarland, did the party manage to exceed 30 per cent. In seven Länder, it polled under 20 per cent, and with a low of just 11.9 per cent in Saxony. Compared to its 2002 federal election result, the SPD lost almost 13 million votes; it was able to attract a mere 9 per cent of the total electorate, and it now has only 23 EP seats. The SPD also suffered a humiliating defeat in the Thuringian state election, where it polled just 14.5 per cent. Table 14.1

Results of the German election to the European Parliament, 13 June 2004 2004 Vote share (per cent)

CDU/CSU SPD Greens PDS FDP Others Total Seats Turnout (per cent)

44.5 21.5 11.9 6.1 6.1 7.9 43.0

Seats 49 23 13 7 7 – 99

1999 Vote share (per cent) 48.7 30.7 6.4 5.8 3.0 3.7

Seats 53 33 7 6 – – 99

45.2

Note: Germany is one of a minority of EU member states to employ the Hare-Niemeyer procedure, which tends to favour smaller parties, in the allocation of its 99 seats by party. Source: (accessed 26 July 2004).

The CDU/CSU emerged once again as the undisputed winner of the election, with 44.5 per cent of the national vote. However, several factors took the shine off this otherwise excellent result. The party’s share of the vote dropped by over four percentage points compared to 1999. Like the SPD, the CDU/CSU also suffered from problems of mobilisation and lost 7 million votes compared to the 2002 federal election. When calculated in terms of the total electorate, its result of 18.6 per cent is also far from impressive. It also failed, albeit narrowly, to retain its absolute majority of German EP seats. Although the CDU/CSU lost votes across the board, its vote share also fluctuated considerably, from 57.4 per cent in Bavaria to 24 per cent in Brandenburg, where the party was beaten into second place by none other than the PDS. Undoubtedly, the CDU/CSU benefited from a protest vote against the government, and it picked up 830,000 former SPD votes. But significantly, its result does not represent an unqualified vote of confidence in the party’s ability to offer an alternative: while opinion polls

Germany

129

have regularly shown most voters to be deeply unhappy with the SPD-Green government’s performance, a similar proportion does not believe that a CDU/ CSU-led government will be an improvement. Given the strength of feeling against the SPD, one of the most surprising elements of the result was the extraordinary performance of the Greens, whose result, at 11.9 per cent, is far-and-away their best at a national-level election. The party did particularly well among highly educated voters, among whom it beat the SPD into second place, and among voters aged 30–44.18 Predictably, the Greens were strongest geographically in the city states of Hamburg, Berlin and Bremen, polling over 20 per cent in each, but also in large western Länder such as Hesse and Baden-Württemberg. The party was able to mobilise its supporters well, and its result arguably reflects the high degree of importance its voters accorded to European as opposed to national issues. The other two small parties had cause to celebrate, too. With 6.1 per cent, the FDP won a place in the EP for the first time since the 1989 EP elections. The PDS beat its previous best result at a national level election to take 6.1 per cent of the vote. While it once again failed to make much of an impact in the western part of the country, it scored over 20 per cent in each of the five new Länder, and 30.9 per cent in Brandenburg. Although the party clearly benefited from the fact that local elections were held simultaneously in three eastern Länder, as well as from the parallel state election in Thuringia, the result means that it is able to look forward to the main prize, a return to national representation at the 2006 Bundestag election. By contrast, none of the other 18 parties contesting the election, including the extremist Republikaner and the Animal Protection Party, scored above 2 per cent. The 2004 European Parliament election neatly confirms the pattern established in the five previous polls held in Germany. The opposition CDU/ CSU once again emerged as the clear winner, although its result was not as resounding as in 1999. The main governing party, the SPD, suffered a heavy defeat, although its partner in government, the Greens, managed not to get sucked into the SPD’s electoral quagmire. The other two smaller parties also did well. When combined with the predominance of national issues in determining voter decisions, and a historically low turnout, the election in Germany was, like in many other member states, a momentary, albeit clear, protest vote against the policies of the incumbent national government. Its relevance for predicting both the outcome of the 2006 federal election and Germany’s future European policy is therefore marginal.19

Notes 1. See W. Paterson and S. Green, ‘Germany’, in J. Lodge (ed.) The 1999 European Parliament Elections (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001). 2. For a full analysis of these problems, see S. Green and W. Paterson (eds), Governance in Contemporary Germany: The Semisovereign State Revisited (Cambridge: Cambridge

130 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

3. 4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

15. 16. 17.

18. 19.

University Press, 2005), especially the chapters by Kenneth Dyson, Wolfgang Streeck and Roland Czada. See Der Spiegel, 5 April 2004, ‘Tabuzone Ost’, XV (2004) 24–41. For a compelling account of Schröder’s chancellorship and his grappling with economic reforms, see Der Spiegel, 19 July 2004, ‘Langer Anlauf, kurzer Sprung’, XXX (2004) 20–41. Note that the CDU and its Bavarian sister-party, the CSU, are formally two separate parties who contest any national election independently of each other. However, both parties normally act together at federal level, although, unusually, they did not contest the 2004 EP election on a joint manifesto. Two Land elections were held between March 2003 and June 2004: the city states of Bremen and Hamburg went to the polls on 25 May 2003 and 29 February 2004 respectively. However, in both elections, local issues and political constellations predominated. Cf. D. Hough, ‘The European Parliament Election in Germany’, EPERN European Parliament Election Briefing Paper No. 3, via (accessed 1 July 2004). For instance, one week before polling day, the Greens’ suggested that all the main parties should share a platform to promote the importance of European issues. However, this was rejected as ‘unnecessary’ by the other parties. See Die Welt, 8 June 2004, ‘Die Europawahl wird ein Flop’. Der Spiegel, 7 June 2004, ‘Lukratives Geschäft’, XXIV (2004) 19. See also W. Paterson, C. Lees and S. Green, ‘The Federal Republic of Germany’, in J. Lodge (ed.), The 1994 Elections to the European Parliament (London: Pinter) 67–8. Frankfurter Rundschau, 8 June 2004, ‘Das unbemerkte Duell’. Hough, ‘The European Parliament Election in Germany’, 5. Die Welt, 27 April 2004, ‘Parteien postitionieren sich für Europawahl’. Paterson et al., ‘The Federal Republic of Germany’. For instance V. Neu, ‘Europawahl 2004 – Motive der Wahlentscheidung’ (Berlin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung), available at (accessed 1 July 2004). Hough, ‘The European Parliament Election in Germany’, 5. (accessed 1 June 2004). Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, Europawahl in Deutschland. 13. Juni 2004 (Mannheim: Forschungsgruppe Wahlen), at: (accessed 20 June 2004). Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, Europawahl in Deutschland. For an authoritative analysis of German European policy in the new millennium, see C. Jeffery and W. Paterson, ‘Germany and European Integration: A Shifting of Tectonic Plates’, West European Politics, XXVI (2003) 59–75.

15

Greece Dimitris Kavakas

In Greece, the EP elections took place on 13 June. They were a non-event. The recently elected conservative government wanted a reaffirmation of the popular verdict, while the socialist opposition party, knowing that three months is a very short time in which to change the political climate, wanted to hold onto their share of the vote at the national elections. The three small parties tried to capitalise on the greater electoral volatility at EP elections. However, apart from the Greek Communist Party which campaigned against EU membership and the EU Constitution, all the parties focused on domestic political issues. During the campaign everything suggested that the 76 per cent turnout of the previous 1999 elections would drop significantly because of a lack of voter interest. The timing of the 2004 EP elections was problematic. Three major factors competed for attention and significantly affected the level (or lack) of interest, the absence of any significant campaign on behalf of the political parties and the record low turnout. Firstly, national elections had taken place only three months earlier in March resulting in victory for the conservative New Democracy party. This affected the campaign for many reasons. The socialist party (PASOK) had been almost continuously in power since 1981 with only one interval between 1990 and 1993, when New Democracy had governed with a narrow majority of one seat in the Parliament. In March 2004, the conservatives came back to power with a landslide. It was expected that it would retain its leading position in the EP elections for two significant reasons: firstly, there had been an unusually long (by Greek standards) twomonth campaign leading to the March national elections; and secondly, the proximity of the conservative victory eliminated any doubt that New Democracy was going to be the leading party at these European elections. In addition, the political parties had exhausted most of their budgets and were unwilling to invest effort and funds in the June elections. 131

132 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

Secondly, the elections coincided with the beginning of the hot Greek summer. So, with the attention of Greeks on weekend escapes to the beaches, the idea of staying in the cities to vote looked less attractive, particularly after they had given their verdict three months ago and taking into consideration that the debate agenda was no different and was dominated by domestic issues. Finally, on the Saturday evening before the Sunday elections, Greece’s national football team won the opening Euro 2004 championship game against the host Portugal team. Saturday night and most of Sunday was given over to celebration and that detracted attention from the polls. Even when the results were presented on Sunday evening on television, the reports from Portugal and the interviews with football players and commentators exceeded the reports and interviews of politicians and election analysts. Politicians themselves were keener on discussing football rather than the results of the EP elections. A total of 20 groups participated in the 2004 EP, of which 15 comprised small parties, civilian groups or NGOs. Five groups were from the extreme left. These included the Revolutionary Left Front (MERA), the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Greece, the Organisation for the Reconstruction of the Communist Party of Greece (OAKKE), the Militant Socialist Party of Greece and the Anti-Capitalist Coalition, a group whose members participate in anti-globalisation, anti-EU demonstrations and protests. Two groups were environmentalist parties: the Greek Ecologists and the Ecologists-Greens (belonging to the European Green Party). Three groups came from the central political spectrum: the Democratic Socialist Movement, the Democratic Regional Union of Micheal Charalambidis, a former PASOK member, and the Centrists Union of the eccentric Vasilis Leventis. Two groups came from the extreme right, fascist political spectrum, the Hellenic Front and the Patriotic Coalition. Two groups were civilian groupings, the Vision group and the Women for another Europe, a feminist coalition. Finally, the last grouping out of the small 15 was the Rainbow Party, a member of the European Free Alliance which is the party of the Macedonian minority in Greece, a minority not recognised by the Greek state. In its campaign press releases, this group highlighted its claims of suffering discrimination. Together, these 15 groups won 5.2 per cent of the vote. The remaining 94.8 per cent of the vote went to five political parties and 77.04 per cent of this was shared between the two biggest parties (Table 15.1). The New Democracy party, after its extraordinary victory at the national elections in March, aimed at reaffirming its popular support and the absolute domination of is leader Costas Caramanlis on the political scene. New Democracy is a member of the EPP party and fully in favour of the EU Constitution and the federal orientation of the Union. The Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) entered the EP election campaign shattered by the March defeat and with significant internal problems due to attempts to restructure itself. PASOK’s main aim was to hold onto its support as registered

Greece Table 15.1

133

The Greek results of the elections to the EP

Party New Democracy PASOK KKE SYN LAOS Women for Europe D.R.U Greens Centrists Union Greek-Ecologists M-L KKE Hellenic Front DHSOK MERA Anti-capitalist Coal. ASKE Patriotic Coalition Rainbow Vision OAKKE Registered to Vote Voted

%

Votes

EP seats

43.01 34.03 9.48 4.16 4.12 0.76 0.73 0.67 0.56 0.54 0.35 0.25 0.22 0.22 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.10 0.10 0.08

2,633,574 2,083,327 580,396 254,447 252,429 46,505 44,541 40,873 34,511 32,956 21,220 15,243 13,627 13,387 11,938 11,598 10,618 6,176 5,996 5,090 9,938,863 6,283,637 (63.22%)

11 8 3 1 1

in the national election. Of the three smaller parties, the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) gave voice to a European agenda. As the main opponent to European integration, KKE called for Greece’s withdrawal from the EU, opposition to EU directives and legislation and the rejection of the proposed EU constitution. The second small party was also from the left and both the Coalition of the Left and the Ecology movements tried to make gains at the expense of falling support for PASOK. Finally, a new party from the far-right participating for the first time in the EP elections managed to get representation in the European Parliament. The Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS) was created after its leader George Karatzaferis left New Democracy to rally in favour of the Orthodox Church’s demand against the EU directive that the mentioning of religion should be eliminated from ID cards. LAOS reinforced its nationalistic rhetoric and became a member of the Europe of Nations political group in the European Parliament.

The campaign and campaign issues Getting the message across The 2004 EP election campaign was perhaps the most disappointing so far since European issues were almost totally absent from the debate. Despite

134 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

a number of radio and television programmes sponsored by the European Parliament, it seems that the message failed to get across. Public TV and a few radio stations dedicated limited time to discussing the relevance of the European Parliament and its powers in EU decision-making. The goal was to get across the message that Greek MEPs would participate in an institution that had increasing power and significance for making decisions that would impact on the daily lives of citizens in Europe, including Greece. However, such TV programmes did not manage to attract significant numbers of viewers and radio programmes failed to initiate a genuine European debate. TV advertising/advertising in general Two weeks before 13 June, Greeks could be forgiven for not knowing that an election to the European Parliament was imminent. Not until the last two weeks before the poll did billboards appear. The complete absence of TV advertising was perhaps the most significant element of this electoral campaign. The most serious explanation for this was the exhaustion of party budgets during the previous national election campaign. However, except perhaps from the Communist Party campaign, even the limited billboard advertising omitted Europe from party messages. The leaders of the four main parties represented in the Greek and European Parliament (at the time of the elections LAOS was not represented), New Democracy, PASOK, KKE and SYN (Coalition of the Left), met together on national TV in front of five journalists for a debate with timed answers. After two and a half hours of questions and answers, it was obvious that Europe was completely absent from the electoral debate. The parties’ campaigns New Democracy considers itself as the obvious European party in Greece since it was during its time in government in the 1970s that Greece negotiated its accession to the Community, signed the accession treaty and became the EC’s tenth member in 1981. During the 2004 EP election campaign, New Democracy declared its full support for the EU Constitution and federal solutions to European integration; however, its message followed the domestic debate. Its main message was that every promise made before the March election would be put into practice. The governing party wanted to establish its reliability and respect for its programme in the domestic environment. PASOK’s campaign was characterised by confusion. George Papandreou was elected as the President of the socialist party a month before the national elections in order to reverse the trends that the party had suffered under the leadership of Costas Simitis and avoid electoral defeat. However, Papandreou did not manage to escape defeat. His first priority after the national elections was to restructure PASOK and impose his personal identity on it. In this attempt, the EP election campaign was to be dominated by slogans presenting Papandreou’s priorities for the party policy, for example

Greece

135

‘We demand development and jobs for everyone, we pursue knowledge and jobs for the young, we vote for Greece in Europe.’ The European element was always there, but in the background. It was something given, not disputed. Another important personal impact of Papandreou was his decision to include young candidates, representatives of civil society, in the party list for the European Parliament. However, this created resentment in his party since many established party members and previous MEPs were left off the list. Analysts believe that this was a risk taken in order to gain the respect of the electorate, something that was not achieved. The Communist Party was perhaps the only party that focused exclusively on Europe. Its policies and priorities make it the most important anti-European political force. Perhaps this explains the doubling of its share of the vote compared to its share in the March national elections. KKE’s campaign ignored the newly elected government and domestic political aspects of debate. Its rhetoric centred on the EU Constitution and integration in general. Its main message explored the ideas of three words, ‘resistance–disobedience–revolt’, against the EU. Although extreme in focus and rhetoric, KKE managed to unite under its auspices all anti-European forces of the left. However, one of the significant elements of the Communist campaign was its anachronistic Marxist language that had been abandoned by the majority of European left forces. It left the impression that time had stopped for KKE in the 1970s and explains why it is still struggling to develop an image of itself as a modern party for the future. It seems that the Greek left faces several structural problems and this is the case with SYN, the Coalition of the left. With its main message developing on domestic issues, SYN tried to persuade the public that ‘There is another way, take it to the left!’ The main elements in the message were the fight against price rises, unemployment, poverty, privatisation, war and neoliberalism. SYN’s only reference to Europe during the campaign had been the affirmation of its support for the constitution but with certain qualifications to prevent Europe becoming a fortress, and to ensure that the EU’s so-called ‘fight against terrorism’ would not compromise or eliminate citizens’ rights and liberties. Perhaps the biggest surprise of the elections was the success of a new farright party. LAOS, a populist party based on religious orthodox support and xenophobic rhetoric, followed a campaign that was centred around its leader, George Karatzaferis, under the message ‘Vote YES for him who knows how to say NO.’ It won a seat. Public opinion For the Greek public, the 2004 EP elections inevitably seemed like a continuation of the March national elections. However, it was obvious that the public was tired of political speeches and debates. Greek interest in Europe revolved more around football and the selection of the team in Portugal than the selection and election of Greek representation for the EU in Brussels

136 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

and Strasbourg. Hardly any of the main five parties in the campaign made any use of manifestos or logos of the transnational EP party groups. The only exception was again KKE, which included several speakers from the EP Communist group in its main rally events in Athens and Thessaloniki, including, notably the leader of the Portuguese Communist Party. During the party leaders’ debate on TV four days before election day, the public opinion seen through the lens of journalists’ questions also focused exclusively on domestic issues. Issues The main issues that dominated the agenda in the 2004 EP election campaign were: the performance of the new conservative government during the three months since its election; the new elements in the actual economic situation in Greece revealed by the new government; the referendum in Cyprus, and preparations for the 2004 Olympic Games in Athens. The main debate between the two big parties, New Democracy and PASOK, was whether the new government had performed well during those three months. According to the opposition, the government had been absent. Its main criticism revolved around the fact that New Democracy did not want to take any position for or against the Annan Plan for Cyprus during the referendum. In addition to that, PASOK claimed that New Democracy deliberately wanted to suggest that preparations for the summer Olympics were behind schedule in order to be credited with their successful completion. A further element in the debate was the announcement by the Economic Minister that the Greek public debt had been deliberately misrepresented as low by PASOK when it was significantly higher, something that resulted into the immediate intervention of the European Commission. PASOK claimed that this was calculated to benefit the party’s standing but was a cynical act of treason on the part of the government that would seriously damage Greek interests. The new EU Constitution was accepted by both main parties and thus was kept in the margins of the debate. KKE openly rejected it together with any federal solutions for the EU. LAOS opposed to it from the right developing nationalistic and xenophobic rhetoric, while SYN accepted most of it demanding some changes. On the issue of immigration, again at the margins of the electoral debate and with the total absence of the big parties, LAOS and SYN formed the two opposing camps. LAOS opposed immigration, arguing that it ‘increases the unemployment of Greek citizens’, while SYN on the contrary advocated protecting immigration and preventing the emergence of a ‘Fortress Europe’. On the issue of terrorism and security there were two different positions, but without any significant debate on them. On the one side, the government and PASOK agreed on the need to ensure secure Olympic Games in Athens and supported the government’s decision to ask for NATO support for sky patrols during the Games. This decision was strongly opposed

Greece

137

by KKE and SYN. However, the public seemed totally indifferent and passively accepted the government’s decision. The significant abstention rate of 36.78 per cent, unprecedented in the history of Greek elections, is considered as inevitable given the exhausted campaign that led to the March elections and the absence of anything new in the debate. June Euro-elections in Greece seemed to be viewed as a repetition of the general elections with a predetermined result. New Democracy repeated more or less the March percentage and reaffirmed its public mandate. PASOK suffered a further defeat; this time extending the 5 per cent difference in the general elections to 9 per cent. It seemed that, firstly, the choices of its leadership were not condoned by the public, and secondly, the party itself has to adapt to a new role and new identities. After its 20 years in power, adaptation to an opposition role and rhetoric is not easily achieved. The Communist Party doubled its March percentage mainly because of PASOK losses, but also because it was the recipient of all left Eurosceptic and anti-European forces. The position of parties on the Cyprus referendum seems to have played a role in the result. PASOK and SYN were openly in favour of the Annan Plan and both of them seem to have lost significant electoral power. On the other hand, New Democracy seems to have suffered no ill-effects from its neutral position on the Cyprus referendum, while KKE and LAOS, the extreme left and right positions against the UN peace plan, seem to have gained power.

The result The absence of significant discussion about European issues resulted from the consensus of the main political parties on European integration and Greece’s role in a federal Europe. Together they can count on the support of almost 80 per cent of the electorate. That is why it is certain that Greece will support the adoption of the new EU Constitution. In addition to that, Greece will be a strong supporter of further enlargement to include Bulgaria and Romania and the enlargement prospects for the rest of the Balkan states.

16

Hungary1 Agnes Batory

Introduction The first election to the European Parliament in Hungary was held on 13 June 2004 – a truly historic event which, however, most voters seemed to see as little more than yet another round of the same old domestic political battle. Four of the eight parties presenting lists in the election are represented in the current Parliament for the legislative 2002–06 term: the Hungarian Socialist Party and the liberal Alliance of Free Democrats in government, and Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Alliance and the Christian-democratic Hungarian Democratic Forum in opposition. These parties were widely expected to win all mandates available to Hungary in the EP, although it was doubtful whether the smallest of the four, the Democratic Forum, would be able to secure the necessary minimum share of the vote (5 per cent) for electing an MEP. Since the mid 1990s, Hungarian political life has been dominated by the confrontation of the two major parties, the Socialist Party (the socialdemocratised successor of the pre-1989 state party) and Fidesz (a right-wing catch-all party), with the two together generally receiving over 80 per cent of the votes in national elections. The Free Democrats and the Democratic Forum, the dominant forces of the democratic transition and the early 1990s, had gradually become allies and default junior coalition partners for the Socialists and Fidesz, respectively. Somewhat unfortunately from the government’s perspective, the EP election took place two years after the April 2002 elections that it had narrowly won. By 2004, the midterm blues had clearly set in, with much discussion in the media focusing on the coalition’s record in the final months of the European election campaign. Prime Minister Péter Medgyessy’s approval ratings (that had reached an all-time low in March 2004) improved somewhat by May, but most remained dissatisfied with his performance. His party also tailed Fidesz 138

Hungary 139

by a large margin in the polls.2 Perhaps the most salient foreign policy issue, the continuing presence of Hungarian troops in Iraq, was also increasingly unpopular. Another significant event of the legislative term, the referendum on EU accession, was held in April 2003. The results reflected broad if shallow public support for Hungary’s EU membership, with 83.7 per cent of ballots cast in favour. However, turnout was an unexpectedly low 45.6 per cent, giving a clear warning that voters tended not to have strong feelings about the ‘European issue’ – a lesson that, judging from the campaign in 2004, Hungarian parties may have learned all too well.

The election The 13 June EP election was held on the basis of Act CXIII, adopted in December 2003. The law established a proportional electoral system, with a 5 per cent threshold and mandates distributed according to the d’Hondt formula in Hungary as a single electoral district. The system was sufficiently similar to the PR tier of national elections (used since 1990) to be familiar to voters. With a population of over ten million, Hungary was to send 24 MEPs to the EP. The eight parties that succeeded in collecting the required 20,000 recommendations from registered voters contested the election with fixed lists of candidates. In addition to the four parliamentary parties, these were: the Hungarian Justice and Life Party, an extreme right/national-populist party that had been present in Parliament between 1998 and 2002 but failed to pass the 5 per cent threshold in the last elections; the old-style communist Workers’ Party; the small Social Democratic Party; and the Hungarian National Alliance, all with negligible electoral support. The most notable of the extra-parliamentary parties, the Justice Party, has been against EU accession, and the Workers Party also had a history of perhaps more moderate Euroscepticism. The parliamentary parties had all been in favour of joining the Union at the time of the referendum and continued to support Hungary’s EU membership. Fidesz has traditionally been the most likely to voice reservations about the conditions of membership or particular EU policies whilst generally calling for a ‘Europe of nation states’. The most consistently pro-EU/pro-integration party, throughout the entire period since regime change, has been the Alliance of Free Democrats, with the Socialists taking the middle ground. Civil society organisations generally played little role in the public debate, and none had a significant impact on the election campaign.

The campaign The differences in parties’ attitudes towards European integration may have set the stage for a campaign actually dealing with policies that the newly elected MEPs could influence. However, against the background of midterm

140 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

disillusionment with the Socialist-Free Democrat government and a distinct lack of interest among voters,3 the salience of EU policy issues remained low in the campaign period. The few issues that received some attention included the EU budget (with all four parties pledging to maximise transfers to Hungary and denouncing breach of the Stability Pact by ‘some large member states’), the future President of the Commission (with parties pledging support to candidates to be nominated by their respective transnational EP party groups), and certain institutional aspects of the EU Constitution (with parties supporting the principle of ‘one country – one commissioner’, for instance). The question as to whether the Constitution should make reference to Europe’s Christian roots sparked some controversy. Fidesz and the Democratic Forum – both socially conservative parties with ties to the Church – strongly favoured this proposal, while the more secular Socialists would have preferred other member states to take the initiative. However, even these ‘European’ policy issues or questions were generally subject to little debate, with the consequence that the parties’ positions remained practically indistinguishable for the average voter. The transnational EP party groups with which the Hungarian parties are affiliated also remained largely invisible. The campaign of the Free Democrats was, to some extent, an exception to the general pattern, as it did emphasise a number of simple ‘European’ messages: more EU support for urban development rather than the countryside and agriculture; ‘no’ to restrictions by ‘old’ member states on labour mobility; a cheaper and less bureaucratic EU administration; lower taxes and continuing tax competition among member states. Apart from the second one, on which the parties were in agreement, these programme points were unique to the Free Democrats, and the call for more support for cities (could have) had relevance for the party’s predominantly urban electoral base while also being well-suited to its top candidate, the mayor of Budapest. Eventually, however, the European content of this party’s campaign was also pushed to the sidelines as domestic political concerns took centre stage. The months in the run-up to the election were dominated by various policy proposals designed to appeal to the broadest possible segment of the electorate. Some of these were distinctly populist in nature, and none had much to do with the direction European integration should take or policies that were within the EP’s competence. In February 2004, the Prime Minister took the opposition (and presumably some members of the governing parties) by surprise when, in the course of his ‘state of the nation’ address, he called for a single list of MEP candidates jointly nominated by all parties, the direct election of the President of the Republic (presently elected by Parliament), and the radical reduction of the number of deputies in the national assembly. However, both the opposition parties and the junior coalition partner Free Democrats rejected the idea of a joint list, which thus died an early death. Fidesz decided to appeal directly to the people, asking voters to sign a ‘National Petition’, prominently displayed by activists in public places as well

Hungary 141

as on the party’s website, which was eventually supported by over 1 million signatures (the precise figure has been called into question). The Petition demanded, among others, that the government freeze hospital privatisation, defend Hungarian jobs, give more support to farmers, and apply price controls in the energy and pharmaceuticals sectors – without making any provision as to where public funds would be found for putting the proposed policies into practice. Perhaps similar in nature, although faring incomparably worse, was the attempt of the Workers Party – outside mainstream politics for the past 15 years – to collect the constitutionally required number of signatures for calling a referendum against the privatisation of hospitals. However, perhaps unfortunately from the party’s perspective, the Constitutional Court vetoed the legislation in question, thereby rendering the referendum idea pointless before the end of the campaign. The two smaller parliamentary parties also focused on the most popular elements of their domestic agenda. The Free Democrats stressed a cornerstone of their 2002 election manifesto, the reduction of taxes, generally in conjunction with references to the need to roll back the boundaries of the state – what they labelled, in short, as ‘the liberal alternative’. The Democratic Forum took a stand on withdrawing Hungarian troops from Iraq, an issue overwhelmingly supported by public opinion. Another cornerstone of the party’s campaign was the claim that the Forum alone remained outside the circles of corruption and sleaze which they suggested bound the Socialist Party and Fidesz together. Absent from the campaign were the Eurosceptics, particularly the antiEU Justice and Life Party. The party never recovered fully from the electoral defeat of 2002, which left it outside Parliament and, consequently, without the state subsidies and publicity it had received in the previous term. While the party leadership continued to protest against what they felt was deliberate exclusion from the media, much of its anti-EU rhetoric went largely unnoticed in 2004. Instead of a confrontation between pro- and anti-EU political forces or competing visions about the EU’s future, the run-up to the election was thus dominated by the battle between the Socialists and Fidesz, fought largely on the government’s record in office. The two major parties relied on an impressive array of campaign tools and methods, from paid advertisements in the electronic and print media to rallies, open debates and mailing leaflets and manifestos directly to households. Billboards were also used extensively, with the parties displaying their leading MEP candidates and slogans such as ‘[Vote] Socialist again on 13 June’ (Socialist Party), ‘Liberals to the Union – Now!’ (Free Democrats) or ‘For a normal Hungary’ (Democratic Forum).

Results The undisputed winner of the election was Fidesz, with over 1,450,000 votes – 400,000 or 13 per cent more than the Socialists. The two smaller parliamentary

142 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

parties also did well, with the Free Democrats securing the highest share of vote in any national poll in the past ten years, and the Democratic Forum, against all odds, scraping past the 5 per cent threshold. As expected, none of the small extra-parliamentary parties got even near to electing an MEP from their lists. The composition of the cohort of new Hungarian MEPs was as follows: Fidesz 12, Socialist Party 9, Free Democrats 2, Democratic Forum 1. Table 16.1

The 13 June 2004 EP election results in Hungary

Party list

Number of votes

Share of vote (%)

Number of seats

Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Alliance Hungarian Socialist Party Alliance of Free Democrats Hungarian Democratic Forum Hungarian Justice and Life partya Workers Partya Hungarian National Alliancea Social Democratic Partya

1,457,750 1,054,921 237,908 164,025 72,203 56,221 20,226 12,196

47.40 34.30 7.74 5.33 2.35 1.83 0.66 0.40

12 9 2 1 – – – –

a

Failed to pass the electoral threshold of 5 per cent.

Source: National Election Committee .

At 38.5 per cent, turnout was disappointingly – but perhaps not unexpectedly – low, at least in comparison with earlier elections in Hungary, although still considerably higher than in some other new member states (for example, 20.8 per cent in Poland and just 16.9 per cent in Slovakia). The European election mobilised the voters considerably less than the last parliamentary election when, at 73.4 per cent, nearly 1.5 million more voters cast a ballot than in June 2004, or even than the last local election in 2002 when turnout was 51.15 per cent. Interestingly, the number of ballots that were cast in favour of EU membership (3,056,027) in the 2003 referendum is almost the same as the number of votes in the European election of June 2004 (3,075,450). It is tempting to conclude, rather neatly, that the same voters who were sufficiently committed to EU membership to support it in the referendum were now expressing a preference on who should represent them in the EP, but polling data are not available to substantiate this claim. The results also suggest otherwise. Fidesz voters are generally less enthusiastic about the EU than Socialist or especially Free Democrat voters and were consequently underrepresented in the ‘Yes’ camp of the referendum.4 In contrast, every second person participating in the European election backed Fidesz, considerably more than the Socialists. Part of the explanation is an electoral swing from the larger governing party to the opposition, reflecting a high proportion of protest votes rather than,

Hungary 143

necessarily, a long-term change of political allegiances. However, differential mobilisation between the government and opposition camps also played an important part. Fidesz supporters were more prone to use this opportunity to express their opinion on (or, more precisely, disapproval of) the current government than other voters – particularly the Socialists’ supporters – were. A large part of the latter group seems to have preferred to stay at home. This brings us to the question of interpreting the abstention of approximately 5 million Hungarian citizens, representing half the country’s population and nearly two-thirds of the electorate. Is the silent majority Eurosceptic, indifferent, or are there other factors at work? Eurobarometer data offers little support to the first proposition: while there certainly is a not insignificant group of people who believe that the EU is a ‘bad thing’ (16 per cent in spring 2004), indifference is far more common (32 per cent), and a convincing – albeit shrinking – majority (45 per cent) still considers membership as a ‘good thing’.5 After the similarly sparsely attended referendum, four in five Hungarians said that they were pleased about the ‘Yes’ result – a far higher proportion than that of the number of people who had actually bothered to vote. This also suggests that low turnout has relatively little to do with resistance or hostility to the EU. A commonly offered explanation for low turnout holds that the public has little understanding of how the EU works or why people should concern themselves with the EP. However, the Eurobarometer poll found that in spring 2004 21 per cent of Hungarian respondents (the highest proportion in the post-communist new member states) felt that the EP had ‘a great effect’, and a further 42 per cent that it had ‘some effect’ on their lives, which suggests that people did attach some significance to the institution, albeit considerably less than to the national parliament and government.6 The nature of the campaign therefore seems to be a more important factor. On the one hand, it gave voters the impression that the European election was a chance to express their opinion about the government, rather than the EU or the MEP candidates’ proposed European policy agendas, about which, in any case, most parties told them relatively little. On the other hand, it had no direct, practical impact on government–opposition relations as it had been clear that the electoral defeat of the governing parties would not lead to their resignation. The stakes were therefore perceived to be low for the electorate. As for the parties’ performance, the results are what one would expect on the basis of the ‘second-order election’ model (as are low turnout and the dominance of domestic politics in the campaign). Given that the election took place almost exactly halfway through the national electoral cycle, and consequently Hungary had an unpopular government in office, the dominant force of the coalition suffered a grave loss. The junior coalition partner, which could have been expected to fare likewise, avoided this fate because it was not seen to be as closely associated with the government’s unpopular policies as the Socialists. The Free Democrats reinforced this impression by a clever

144 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

campaign in which they distanced themselves from the Socialists (claiming that their influence in the coalition was insufficient to get the ‘right’ policies through) and by emphasising ideological differences between themselves and their allies. The second-order election model would also predict that small, extreme parties do well. Arguably, this may have been the case if there was any ‘room’ on the right, but Fidesz had successfully crowded out the Justice Party as well as other extreme right groupings in domestic politics and – what could have given hard Eurosceptics a competitive edge – the parties’ positions on ‘Europe’ played little role. On the other hand, small parliamentary parties performed well, owing largely to the ‘second-order logic’: the Free Democrats and the Democratic Forum secured votes from people whose support for the Socialists would not have been so easily swayed in first-order (national parliamentary) elections, when that party and Fidesz are the only serious contenders for office. The first European election in Hungary sadly repeated the pattern wellknown from long(er)-standing member states: even the active part of the electorate felt that the main purpose of the exercise was to send a signal to the Prime Minister’s office, rather than to send representatives to the EP. Public attitudes may change gradually if political parties use European elections as an opportunity to debate the future direction of European integration or EU policy issues, but in 2004 in Hungary this was not the case. The outcome of the election therefore says little about the preferences of the voters on European integration, although the almost complete absence of electoral support for radical Eurosceptics does indicate that lukewarm support for, or indifference about, ‘Europe’ are still the dominant attitudes among the public. Low turnout in Hungary and across Central and Eastern Europe is perhaps the most important message for the EU. Having waited for joining the Union for nearly a decade, citizens in the new member states fail to muster any energy for understanding, and any enthusiasm for trying to influence, what goes on inside this complex institution. The perception that decisions are made too far from ‘real people’ seems to be all too common in the post-communist entrants, where the EU-wide sense of alienation from ‘Brussels’ is aggravated by a general mistrust in the political elite. This, and parties’ failure to compete on a European agenda, are the main reasons for the anti-climax of the first European election in Hungary.

Notes 1. This chapter is based on a longer paper: A. Batory, ‘The 2004 European Parliament election in Hungary, June 13 2004’, EPERN 2004 European Parliament Election Briefing, No. 8 (2004), available at . 2. May 2004 Gallup poll, available at .

Hungary 145

3. In a February 2004 Gallup poll, EU policy issues or the activity of the EP were the least likely to be identified by Hungarian respondents as topics they felt the European election campaign should focus on. See Gallup Hungary poll, available at , and European Commission, Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2004/1 (first results, May 2004). 4. Hungarian Gallup poll, Népszabadság, 3 April 2003. 5. EC, Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2004/1. 6. Ibid.

17

Ireland Edward Moxon-Browne1

Introduction As in most EU member states, it has become customary in Ireland to regard European Parliament elections as ‘second order’ elections in the sense that their function is widely perceived to be a test of the popularity of political parties and politicians between general elections. On those rare occasions when national and EP elections coincide, the EP election often provides a valuable indication of potential threats lying behind the general election vote insofar as voters are willing to ‘take a risk’ with their EP vote and hence produce a set of results that contrasts with the national electoral vote in ways that may be instructive. This is due to an instinctive tendency on the part of any electorate to exercise more caution in a general election than in an EP election, a tendency whose nuances are obviously all the greater in the specific PR(STV) method of voting used in Ireland (and Malta). In Ireland, EP elections are taken very seriously by the political parties because they are fought on domestic issues and the results are seen as a ‘snapshot’ of public opinion, but also because ‘new faces’ can be introduced to the electorate as EP candidates without it mattering very much if they actually get elected. Parties that do badly in EP elections can in any case draw comfort from academic research that shows that EP election results are a poor indicator of subsequent general election performance. Voters for their part have taken a fairly relaxed view of EP elections with turnout generally being lower than in general elections. In the 1992 general election, for example, there was a 68 per cent turnout but it was only 44 per cent in the 1994 EP elections. Such EP voting apathy may now be less of a problem as EP election turnout has recently started to rise again (notwithstanding the continuing decline elsewhere in the EU). The practice of holding another poll on the same day as an EP election has become more the rule than the exception in Ireland. For example, in 1979 and 2004, local 146

Ireland 147

government elections were held simultaneously with the EP election; as was a constitutional referendum in 1984 and 2004. It is difficult, of course, to ascertain what effect on turnout these concurrent polls exercise, but it is clear that Irish governments have become increasingly reluctant to allow an EP poll to go ahead without it being harnessed to at least one other test of public opinion. The traditional apathy evident at EP elections in Ireland can be attributed to the apparent ‘remoteness’ of the EU institutions, the sometimes arcane policy issues involved, and a feeling that the verdict of the voters will make little impact in a Parliament that is itself still searching for a definitive role in the EU policy-making process. Moreover, the three principal political parties not only support EU membership unequivocally, but differ very little on appropriate policies to pursue in the EU context. On issues of major national interest, there is a high degree of consensus: agriculture; regional policy; fiscal harmonisation; and institutional reform. In EP election campaigns, therefore, parties try with some difficulty to distinguish themselves from each other. As a 1994 newspaper headline put it: ‘Euro-candidates struggle to bury their similarities’. Against such a background of consensus, electoral excitement can be stirred up only by intra-party bickering, local issues, and local personalities. Both in 1999 and in 2004, independents who were successfully elected owed their success to idiosyncratic factors without displaying a great knowledge of, or even making references to, the European Union in their campaigning. The function of EP elections in Ireland appears to be to provide a political stage on which both parties, policies and politicians can compete for approbation. The ‘European’ language of the manifesto is reduced to a mere alibi behind which the real issues of personality and political preference are played out. Voters and candidates collude in this rhetorical charade, knowing that speeches on beef exports, neutrality, the constitutional treaty and the Lisbon agenda are the necessary but rather distorted shadows of more familiar and entrenched policy positions in the domestic political context. In the 2004 EP election, the European ‘veneer’ on the campaign trail was very thin; and many candidates reported no interest in, nor even a mention of, European issues in a whole day of hard campaigning. In some ways, the EP election campaign becomes therefore a surrogate for its national equivalent. This argument links back to the idea that voters use EP elections to register disapproval of the government at a midway stage: in 2004, this was again the case. The EP election can provide an opportunity to ‘warn’ the government without actually changing its composition. It is certainly true that there is little connection between EP election results and general election results in Ireland. In 1979, 1984, and 1989, for example, the percentage of votes received by the government of the day was substantially lower than that received in the previous (in 1989 simultaneous) general election. Even when EP and general elections are held on the same day, as in 1989, voters behave differently in each, with nearly half voting for different parties in the two elections. In Ireland, therefore, EP election results are not a reliable indicator

148 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

of general election performance. Governments know this and therefore the ‘warning’ value of the EP election results has become somewhat muted. After the apparently disastrous election results for the government in 2004, the Transport Minister, Mr Brennan, said the government would not be ‘panicked’ into taking any precipitate actions. With the next general election over two years away, this could be loosely translated as ‘Tomorrow’s another day’. In any case, the record shows that Fianna Fail generally does worse in EP elections than in national elections, irrespective of whether it is in government or not: local government results are a more reliable indicator of the party’s popularity since these candidates are closer to the grassroots they purport to represent.

The actors in the campaign As a consequence of the Nice Treaty reducing the number of Irish MEPs, all of the constituencies except Dublin had been redrawn and renamed. The East constituency (formerly Leinster) and the South constituency (formerly Munster) were cut from four seats to three; the latter lost one county. The North-West constituency (formerly Connacht-Ulster) retained three seats. Nominations closed on 17 May, and 44 candidates had put their names forward for the 13 seats in the new EP. Seven were veterans of the previous EP. Besides 17 Independents, Fianna Fail put forward eight candidates, Fine Gael six, Labour four, Sinn Fein four, the Greens three, and the Socialist Party one. A number of factors discouraged sitting MEPs from running again in 2004: the reduced number of seats was seen as making the chances of reelection more difficult; the abolition of the dual mandate at local government level led ‘new blood’ to enter the race; and the unpopularity of the major political parties, as reflected in opinion polls, made it likely that many of their candidates would run the gauntlet of electoral disapproval on 11 June. In fact, this latter prospect was sufficiently daunting for the smaller of the two government parties (the Progressive Democrats) to decide against fielding a single candidate. Under the rules governing EP elections in Ireland, candidates have to be 21 years of age or over. Any EU citizen on the electoral register was entitled to vote making a total electorate of just over 3 million (3,084,131). Each candidate was permitted to spend up to €230,000 during the campaign and any candidate who got elected, or achieved more than one-quarter of the quota in first preference votes, would be entitled to a government refund of up to €38,092.14. A written statement of expenses was to be submitted to the Standards in Public Offices Commission within 56 days of polling day. The poll was scheduled to be held on Friday 11 June with voting taking place between 07.00 and 21.00 on that day. The count was due to be held on Sunday 13 June but the results withheld until after 21.00 when polls would have closed in all 25 member states.

Ireland 149

As often happens in Ireland, the EP election coincided with two other polls: local government elections and a referendum on citizenship. The object was clearly to maximise turnout although it was not clear which of the three polls would raise the turnout of the other two. In the event, the referendum on citizenship received a higher turnout than the EP election or the local government poll, but the referendum on citizenship contained an important ‘European dimension’ insofar as the government argued that a ‘yes’ vote would bring Ireland into line with the rest of the EU in no other part of which did the mere fact of being born in the jurisdiction entitle one automatically to citizenship. The multiplicity of new ‘faces’ in the European and local government elections did lead to some confusion: posters dangling from lamp-posts did not always distinguish between the campaigns, and the fact that party leaders accompanied candidates in both polls on the doorstep added to the voters’ perplexity.

The campaign Although the main political parties in the EP election were affiliated to European party groups which had issued manifestos clearly articulating views on most major European issues, the campaign was marked by an almost complete absence of themes connected to the EU. At one level this is understandable in the sense that all parties in Ireland are to some extent ‘Europeanised’ and the differences between them are too small to excite much heat during an electoral campaign. The high degree of consensus across the electorate that EU membership is beneficial distinguishes Ireland from many other EU countries where the principle of membership, never mind the alleged benefits, is still politically divisive. For evidence of this, one need not look much further than Poland, Britain or the Czech Republic. Nevertheless, the party manifestos in Ireland suggested more polarisation than actually emerged on the campaign trail. In fact, many candidates complained that electors were simply not interested in raising European issues and were concentrating instead on the parish pump grievances that were being given an airing elsewhere in the simultaneous local government elections. Variations between the parties on most European issues remained largely ones of emphasis. The so-called Lisbon Strategy, for example, evoked a variety of positions. While the Greens and the Labour Party drew attention to the environmental and social objectives of the Strategy, Fine Gael emphasised free enterprise, competition and free trade, but acknowledged some concern for the ‘less well off’. The governing Fianna Fail party, in keeping with its ‘catch-all’ traditions and broad cross-class appeal, attempted to bridge the gap between haves and have-nots: ‘we cannot isolate the need for social inclusion from any growth agenda, nor can we ignore the environment in which people live’. The Labour manifesto was most explicit in its advocacy of the social objectives of the Lisbon agenda. It endorsed the objectives of an overall EU

150 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

employment rate of 70 per cent, and an interim female employment rate of 60 per cent by 2010. The Green Party echoed these sentiments in declaring that ‘issues like social justice and environmental protection go hand in hand and must not take second place to the single pursuit of competitiveness’. In a similar vein, Sinn Fein deplored the increasing drift of the Lisbon process towards competitiveness, deregulation, and privatisation at the cost of improving society. On the constitutional treaty, the parties tended to differ in degree but not in principle. Fianna Fail as the government party involved in its negotiation and successful conclusion, urged its finalisation. Fine Gael supported it; as did the Labour Party ‘in principle’. The Greens hedged their bets but deplored the ‘militarisation’ of the EU. Only Sinn Fein came out unequivocally against the draft treaty. As one of the few ‘European’ issues to stir up any feeling in Ireland, the question of EU security policy was handled gingerly in the manifesto statements. With caution, and some ambivalence, Fianna Fail would work ‘positively within a framework of a common and foreign security policy, and in accordance with our constitutional duties’ but also urged more cooperation between the EU and the UN in crisis management with further development of the EU’s rapid response capability. The Fine Gael position was less ambiguous. The party supported a military role for the EU and Ireland’s participation in it. Neutrality was not always the best policy in every conflict. Unlike any other party, Fine Gael would contemplate Irish participation in peacekeeping operations without a UN mandate. Labour reiterated the need for UN approval for peacekeeping operations; and the Greens deplored the ‘militarisation’ of the EU, and the concomitant development of a rapid reaction force, EU military command structures, and the constitutional treaty that extends these trends into the future. Sinn Fein meanwhile wanted Irish neutrality explicitly recognised in the treaty, to prevent further erosion of the country’s traditional foreign policy stance.

Election results The final EP results were not known until Tuesday 15 June due to the lengthy process of counting in STV elections. At 59.7 per cent it was over 9 per cent higher than in the 1999 EP election, and 15 per cent higher than in 1994; and well above the 45.5 per cent average for the EU25. Thus Ireland recently bucked the trend of falling turnout elsewhere in Europe. This may be due largely to the ‘Celtic Tiger’ phenomenon which is strongly (although too directly, perhaps) associated with EU membership. The 2004 election took place near the end of a successful Irish presidency of the EU witnessing the historic conclusion of a text for the constitutional treaty, and the largest enlargement in the EU’s history. The forthcoming visit of President Bush to Ireland also generated considerable debate, and dissent: but the mere fact that an EU–US summit was being held in Ireland

Ireland 151

on account of its role as President of the Council, tended to sharpen public awareness of the political implications of Ireland’s membership of the EU at a key moment. Table 17. 1

Ireland: European Parliament election results, 2004

Dublin

East

North-West

South

E. Ryan (FF) G. Mitchell (FG)

L. Aylward (FF) M. McGuinness (FG) A. Doyle (FG)

S.O’Neachtain (FF) J. Higgins (FG)

B. Crowley (FF) S. Coveney (FG)

M. Harkin (Ind)

K. Sinnott (Ind)

M.L. McDonald (SF) P. de Rossa (Lab)

As often happens with EP elections, voters also took the opportunity to ‘punish’ the Government despite the relatively benign economic conditions prevailing. Anti-government sentiment appears to have centred on the idea of ‘promises not fulfilled’ (health and education), the controversial plan to disperse civil service departments to rural areas, and various law and order issues. Fianna Fail as the principal government party bore the brunt of the voters’ revenge. Recording its lowest percentage of votes in any election for 70 years, and losing two of its six EP seats, Prime Minister Ahern admitted that the party would need to study the results carefully. The other party that saw a reverse was the Greens: their vote went down by 2 per cent and they lost both of their EP seats. Fine Gael, a party whose premature obituary had already been written by the pundits sprang back in a way that surprised even some of the party stalwarts. Its votes rose by 3 per cent over the 1999 level, and it won five EP seats. Sinn Fein made history by seeing its first ever MEP elected, an achievement made all the sweeter by an identical success in Northern Ireland. This double-header lent credence to the claim of Sinn Fein as the first truly transnational ‘European’ party achieving success in two EU countries simultaneously.

Implications In many respects the implications of the EP election in Ireland contrasted with those in other member states. Although there was a strong reaction against the incumbent government in Ireland, the degree of Euroscepticism seen elsewhere was not replicated. In fact, almost all the Irish MEPs elected could be said to be in favour of Irish membership of the EU even if a critical voice will occasionally be raised at Strasbourg. Turnout was higher in Ireland than elsewhere, and ten per cent higher than in 1999, reflecting the highly positive public attitude towards EU membership which surpasses that anywhere in the EU. Moreover, the Irish presidency in the first six months of 2004 gave unprecedented publicity to the EU, most of it favourable, and the fact that

152 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

the ‘welcome’ to the ten new members took place in a semi-carnival-like atmosphere during a bank holiday weekend in Ireland all over the country added to the feel-good factor surrounding Ireland’s EU membership. The European implications of the election are, however, difficult to identify. Although it is true that the level of Euroscepticism seen in many other EU states was not replicated in Ireland, it is not evident that the voters were thinking in these terms. In cases where Eurosceptic candidates were successful (for example, Sinn Fein) it is by no means clear that this was the reason for the party’s success. Likewise, although the Fine Gael resurgence implied a strongly pro-European voice in the European Parliament, it would be difficult to prove that this was the reason for its dramatic revival. What seems more likely is that the balance between Eurosceptic and Europhile representation among Irish MEPs was a function of domestic politics: Sinn Fein was perceived as being effective in urban areas; and Fine Gael was seen as an alternative, potentially at least, to the current government. What is even more marked about this election than previous EP elections is the extent to which personalities rather than policies played a part in winning votes. One reason why the Progressive Democrats did not field a candidate was that they could find no one who had sufficient charisma to win a seat. Given the size of Ireland’s EP constituencies, successful candidates need to appeal beyond the borders of the party faithful: they need to haul in the floating vote. On the campaign trail, voters were evidently not interested in discussing or even raising European issues: these were regarded as being either too abstruse or more likely too uncontroversial to be debated. In a highly Europeanised party political system, the scope for real policy divergences are few and far between: successful candidates tend to be popular, or to gain popularity, for reasons that are not immediately connected to the EP or to the EU. How will the 13 Irish MEPs fit into the new EP? The five Fine Gael members will continue in the EPP; the four Fianna Fail MEPs will continue that party’s link with the UEN; and the one Labour MEP will return to the Socialist Group. The two Independents will join the Liberals (ALDE) and the Independence and Democracy Group, respectively, while the new Sinn Fein member joins the EUL-NGL group. Brian Crowley (FF) has been elected leader of the UEN group, the first Irishman to lead it, and the second time an Irish MEP has led a political group (Pat Cox led the Liberal Group prior to becoming EP President). Therefore, despite its small representation in the new EP (13 MEPS out of 732), Ireland looks set to remain disproportionately influential in its future development. This role is likely to be enhanced by Irish participation in the all-important Committees. Instead of spreading themselves too thinly, there is now more concentration in areas of national interest: regional development, and economic and monetary affairs have two Irish MEPs each – one from each of the two main parties; Labour and Sinn Fein will vie for the limelight in the Employment Committee; and G.Mitchell indulges his own interests and experience in the Development Committee. Most significantly, perhaps,

Ireland 153

and reflecting Ireland’s transition from the ranks of the demandeurs to a postmaterial society, is the fact that no fewer than three Irish MEPS are on the Environment and Public Health Committee (Aylward FF, Doyle FG, and Sinnott Ind). Five of the thirteen Irish MEPs are female, making it one of the most gender balanced national delegations in the history of direct elections, and the lack of a perceived need for Irish participation in the Womens Affairs Committee also reflects a maturing of Irish political culture where female participation in politics is taken for granted – the two most recent Heads of State, being women, having proved exemplary role models.

Conclusion How will the 2004 EP election in Ireland be viewed by historians? On the one hand, the fact that the turnout was higher than in 1999 will be attributed to the other polls being held on the same day. In particular, the citizenship referendum which was the only one of the three polls to see a real awareness of the European Union emerge, had provoked a fairly sharp debate in the media. Television and radio chat shows, and the correspondence columns of the press, had been dominated by an issue where feelings inevitably ran high: those who supported the government’s line that the rules for eligibility for Irish citizenship should be tightened up ran the risk of being castigated as racist. The government line that the proposed constitutional amendment brought Ireland into line with the rest of the EU won unexpectedly high support in the referendum. At a deeper level the debate was about Irish attitudes towards the outside world, about Ireland’s international role, and in particular the attitude towards non-white immigrants, many of whom were to be directly affected by the amendment. In the EP election campaign itself, there were no audible or visible signs of a debate about any EU issues. Candidates struggled in vain to arouse some interest in the more topical issues: the new draft Constitution; the Lisbon agenda, and Irish ‘neutrality’, but either the voters were not interested or they had made up their minds. The campaign posters did not mention issues either: the voter was simply asked to vote for a person, and it was not always clear whether this was for the local elections or the EP election. The waters were muddied further in the Dublin constituency where the Sinn Fein leader’s relatively photogenic face appeared on posters despite his not being a candidate in either of the elections where Sinn Fein was running. The healthy turnout in the Irish EP election (in contrast with lower turnouts in most other member states) can be attributed to the mood of euphoria that accompanied the Irish EU presidency and which had, untypically and undeservedly perhaps, caught the popular imagination. No previous Irish presidency had been so skilfully marketed or commercialised. Every kind of product or service from Ballygowan mineral water to Audi cars to Eircom had competed successfully for the coveted logo designating them as official suppliers to the Irish EU presidency. Yet, the many summit meetings

154 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

held across the country remained set-piece affairs more noticeable for their remoteness from possibilities of popular participation than for the real sense of involvement that the presidency had promised, and the EU, more broadly speaking, so desperately needs. Having survived a hardly fought campaign for a reduced number of seats, the newly elected MEPs from Ireland are likely to adopt a more activist stance in the EP. Between them, they can call on long experience in the EP itself (de Rossa), long familiarity with the interface between national and EU institutions (Mitchell, by virtue of being Chair of the Oireachtas Committee on European Affairs), youth and relevant academic training (McDonald) and the tenacity of a civil rights campaigner (Sinnott). Even more than those who preceded them in the Parliament, this Irish contingent can be expected to work vigorously for a more powerful EP, and more transparency and accountability in the EU policy-making system. In Ireland, EP elections have become embedded in the domestic political system as befits a society that is highly Europeanised. The combined effects of an exhilarating national economic performance and a high-profile EU presidency, on the one hand, and the buoyancy of popular support for EU membership, on the other, implies that the EP elections are taken seriously even if the language of those elections is subtle, indirect and coded. If Irish electors now appear less concerned with why they send their successful representatives to the European Parliament but more concerned with the quality of whom they send, this may be no bad thing.

Note 1. The author wishes to acknowledge the research assistance of Meghan Jenness, Centre for European Studies, University of Limerick.

18

Italy Donatella M. Viola

The following chapter1 provides a general overview of the elections to the European Parliament held in Italy on 12 and 13 June 2004. After a brief introduction to the Italian political situation, it looks at the EP information and political campaigns. Finally, some conclusions will be drawn on the inevitable effects as well as repercussions of this event in the Italian political life.

A glance at the Italian political outlook Italy was one of the founding members of the European Community in the 1950s and has maintained ever since a strong European vocation. This long pro-European tradition has been somehow broken by the current centreright coalition government led by the businessman Silvio Berlusconi, founder and leader of Forza Italia. His party, born under the so-called Second Italian Republic2 and which has recently celebrated its tenth year of existence, presents a more pragmatic and less Euro-enthusiastic approach. The above coalition, known as Casa delle Libertà (House of Freedoms), gathering Forza Italia, Alleanza Nazionale, Lega Nord and Unione dei Democristiani di Centro, won Italy’s general election in April 2001, managing to secure 350 of 630 seats in the Camera dei Deputati (Lower Chamber) and 175 of 315 seats in the Senate (Upper Chamber). This coalition was also represented in the 1994–99 EP by 38 members. In the EP elections, the political campaign, choice of candidates and definition of the electoral manifestos remain prerogatives of national parties. Article 55 of the Italian Act no. 18 of 24 January 1979 establishes that all expenses for the technical organisation and election of Italian MEPs are borne by the Italian state. The EP also runs an information campaign via various activities, and the EP political groups draft manifestos along with national parties. A proportional voting system with five constituencies is 155

156 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

used for Euro-elections in Italy, but a party has to reach a certain threshold of votes at national level before it can qualify for seat allocation. This occurs at constituency level, but surplus votes are redistributed at national level, helping smaller parties win seats. Citizens cast their vote simply by marking their chosen list or by also indicating their preferences for maximum three candidates within the same list, which means that choices for candidates can override the party list order.

The 2004 Euro-election On 12 and 13 June 2004, almost 50 million Italian citizens3 were called to the polls to elect their 78 MEPs: 20 for the North-Western Constituency (Piemonte, Valle d’Aosta, Liguria, Lombardia), 15 for the North-Eastern Constituency (Veneto, Trentino-Alto Adige, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Emilia-Romagna), 15 for the Central Constituency (Tuscany, Umbria, Marche, Lazio), 19 for the Table 18.1

Italian parties and lists

Abbreviation

Party/list name

AN AS AP UDEUR Ab. Scorp. Verdi All. Lomb Aut PdCI FI Tricolore MIS CODACONS IdV LN Lib-Dem No Euro PN Pens. PRI PR – Bonino PRC Soc SVP (North-Eastern Constituency only) UDC Ulivo UV (North-Western Constituency only) V

Alleanza Nazionale Alternativa Sociale – Alessandra Mussolini Alleanza Popolare Udeur Abolizione Scorporo Verdi Verdi Lega per l’Autonomia Alleanza Lombarda Partito dei Comunisti Italiani Forza Italia – Partito Popolare europeo Fiamma Tricolore Movimento Idea Sociale/Rauti Lista dei Consumatori Italia dei valori – Di Pietro/Occhetto Lega Nord Patto Segni –Scognamiglio No Euro Paese Nuovo Partito dei Pensionati Partito Repubblicano italiano- Liberal Sgarbi Partito Radicale – Lista Emma Bonino Rifondazione Comunista – Sinistra europea Socialisti Uniti per l’Europa Südtiroler Volkspartei Unione dei Democristiani di Centro Uniti nell’Ulivo per l’Europa Union Valdotaine – Fédéralisme en Europe Federazione dei Verdi

Italy 157

Southern Constituency (Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria) and 9 for the Insular Constituency (Sicily and Sardinia). Twentyfive lists, as shown in Table 18.1, ran in the 2004 EP elections, although Südtiroler Volkspartei and Union Valdotaine, representing the German and French minorities in Italy, ran only in North-Eastern and North-Western Italy respectively and were linked for seat redistribution purposes. Finally, there were some ‘disguised’ lists, commonly defined liste-civetta, such as Abolizione Scorporo Verdi Verdi and Paese Nuovo, which, by displaying names similar to those of other parties, had the clear objective of misleading citizens who wished to cast their preference to Verdi and Forza Italia.

Information campaign The Italian EU presidency ran an information campaign on the Euro-elections through the media, but also by sending 58 million SMS mobile phone messages reminding Italian citizens to vote on Saturday 12 June from 3 am to 10 pm and on Sunday 13 June from 7 am to 10 pm. Euro-elections were held along with regional elections in Sardinia as well as administrative and local elections in 63 Provinces and in 4,519 Municipalities.4 This ‘dragging’ factor helped mobilise and increase electoral turnout. The opportunity to vote on Saturday afternoon, introduced for the first time in Italy, favoured this upward trend. But turnout would have been higher had polling days not coincided with the start of the European football championship in Portugal and the Formula One Grand Prix. At 73 per cent, turnout was up by 2.2 per cent over the 1999 EP elections. This figure assumed an even greater significance given the disappointing EU average of 45.5 per cent and considering that voting in Italy is not compulsory. Under Article 48 of the Italian Constitution, ‘The vote is personal and equal, free and secret. Its exercise is a civic duty’. An important aspect of this campaign was the promotion of women’s participation by introducing the so-called ‘pink quota’: at least one-third of the candidates were to be female; a TV slogan ‘I vote woman’ was run. The EP’s Italian office5 was particularly active on public and private TV channels, radio, cinemas, football stadiums, airports, train and underground stations. EP officials gave lectures and visited schools and universities across the country and distributed printed documents. The EP undertook a series of original initiatives, completely distinct from those of the Italian political parties, in order to awaken public opinion and attract media and press attention to the EU. A series of sports and music events were run, such as the EP’s award of a Special Prize for the best young cyclist of Giro d’Italia and a concert of classical music in Genoa, European capital of culture, on 9 May. In front of the world-famous Trevi Fountain the European flag was projected, reminding citizens of the EP polling days. Manifestos were displayed in cooperation with Unione Province Italiane in 103 Provinces and 8,100 Municipalities. Finally,

158 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

RAI 2 TV News broadcast live during the elections, and a special edition of the popular talk show Porta a Porta was held in Rome at the EP’s office.

Political campaign issues The political campaign was run by national parties, when possible in cooperation with EP transnational political groups. The Socialists, FI and Verdi respectively contributed to draft the common manifesto of the Party of the European Socialists, the European People’s Party and the Greens. Forza Italia inserted Partito popolare europeo while the Italian Communists added Sinistra europea in their respective lists. One of the first issues to hit the headlines was EU Commission President Romano Prodi’s call to the Italian centre-left parties’ leaders to run united under the Ulivo6 at the forthcoming elections and to leave the door open to other potential allies. For this purpose, on 12 February 2004, he circulated a document entitled ‘Europe: the dream, the choices’ where he expressed concern that the Italian media had become instruments to achieve, exercise and influence political power. Typical examples of this phenomenon were the dismissal of two TV journalists Enzo Biagi and Michele Santoro and the resignation of Lucia Annunziata, chairwoman of RAI who denounced her board of increasingly being manipulated by the government with regard to appointments and editorial decisions. Finally, there was the resignation of Italy’s most famous newsreader, Lilli Gruber of TG1, who accused the news programme she hosted of having been twisted to reflect Berlusconi’s view.7 Prodi’s initiative was seen by centre-right politicians as an undue interference in Italian politics. For others, this move appeared to be contrary to political ethics as Prodi, in his capacity of EU Commission President, should have maintained a super partes position and should not have be involved in shaping Italian political strategies for the Euro-elections. For their part, centre-left politicians criticised government coalition leaders for putting forward their names in the lists knowing that they would have been unlikely to win EP seats given that the dual mandate is discouraged.8 A more serious political wrangle broke out over Iraq. The Italian government supported Washington and London throughout in the build-up to the war, considering it necessary to free the world from a dictator like Saddam Hussein and guarantee international peace and security. The Italian Opposition fiercely condemned this intervention, considering it illegal under international law, and viewing US diplomatic unilateralism supported by military force as likely to precipitate further hostility and terrorism. Despite Opposition protests, in spring 2003 Berlusconi authorised the dispatch of 3,000 Italian troops to serve with the international peace-keeping force in Iraq. On 12 November 2003, 19 were killed when the Italian military barracks were attacked in Nasiriyah, Southern Iraq. This tragic event shocked the Italian public. The terrorist attacks of 11 March in Madrid, and the subsequent decision of the newly

Italy 159

elected Spanish Socialist Premier Luís Rodriguez Zapatero to withdraw troops from Iraq, opened a heated debate on whether Italy should also recall its military contingent. The tension climaxed with the kidnapping of four Italian hostages on 12 April and the execution of one of them two days later. On 8 June, after a series of unsuccessful negotiations, the three Italian hostages were released as a result of a US raid operation authorised by the Italian President of the Council. After countless TV appearances of the Premier to celebrate this happy outcome, the Opposition accused Berlusconi of exploiting this question for publicity purposes and for gaining votes in the forthcoming election.9 Finally, public attention turned to the never-ending drama of illegal immigrants who defied the unusually stormy Italian spring to reach their ‘promised land’ in the hope of a better existence. As to the specific campaign appointments, the schedule of each party was displayed only on 13 May and party communication did not start until 19 May 2004. This delay cut short the time-slot for each party, reducing the two-month period foreseen by law for electoral campaigning. Overall, the parties had the chance to attend only three TV political debates, each with four guests, to broadcast six TV messages and to organise one press conference. Emma Bonino, former Commissioner and Radical MEP, wrote to RAI denouncing the imbalance in terms of participation of all political forces and topics discussed on TV. To publicise her party’s programme an information leaflet for all households was produced and circulated. As she pointed out, between 10 April and 5 May 2004 popular programmes such as Porta a Porta, Primo Piano, Ballarò, Batti & Ribatti and Unomattina devoted 30 shows to Iraq, three to Alitalia and Fiat/Malfi emergencies, three to crime, five to EU enlargement and four to TV information, while there was no mention of the referendum proposed by the Radicals to repeal the restrictive act on artificial insemination. Overall, the campaign hardly dealt with EU issues, addressing only Europe’s inability to speak with one voice over Iraq. Other key questions were neglected, such as to the European Constitution, EU institutional and judicial reforms and Turkey’s entry into the EU.

The result FI failed to achieve the 25 per cent minimum predicted by its leader and won only 21 per cent of the votes, thus securing only 16 EP seats and a loss of 6 seats, compared to its 1999 EP share of 25.2 per cent and its 2001 general election share of 29.4 per cent. (See Table 18.2) Even so, FI remained the most popular single party and the governing coalition’s vote held up well thanks to modest gains by its allies: AN, UDC and LN. Yet Berlusconi acknowledged his responsibility, accepting that his governing coalition needed to regroup and to start afresh.10 The left-wing Ulivo coalition also marginally increased its share, winning 31 per cent of the votes and 25 seats in the EP.

160 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

Table 18.2

2004 Euro-election results in Italy

National Party

%

Uniti Nell’Ulivo 31.1 FI 21 AN 15 PRC 6.1 UDC 5.9 LN 5 V 2.5 PdCI 2.4 Lista Bonino 2.2 IdV 2.1 Soc 2 AP-Udeur 1.3 Alleanza Sociale 1.2 Pensionati 1.1 Tricolore 0.7 PRI-LIB Sgarbi 0.7 Patto Segni-Scognamiglio 0.5 CODACONS 0.5 All. Lomb Aut 0.5 Abol Scorp V-V 0.5 SVP (Ulivo) 0.4 – 2.2 N-E PN 0.2 No Euro 0.2 Misi 0.1 UV 0.1

Votes

EP Seats

10,119,909 6,837,748 3,759,575 1,971,700 1,917,775 1,615,834 802,502 783,710 731,867 694,963 665,771 420,089 398,036 372,811 236,016 232,799 172,327 159,795 158,712 158,040 146,252 77,202 70,179 46,827 29,430

24 16 9 5 5 4 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0

Source: Italian Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA).

Former Prime Minister and DS leader Massimo D’Alema won the highest number of votes (832,660) in a single constituency. The most striking result was the victory of former journalist Lilli Gruber with over 236,000 votes in the capital, Rome, roughly twice as many as Belusconi, for a total of 796,666 votes in the Central Constituency.11 Gruber was foreign correspondent of RAI 1 who reported from Baghdad during the war and was the first MEP to visit Iraq after her election in June 2004. The SVP did not reach a high percentage of votes nationwide, but registered 2.2 per cent in the North-Eastern Constituency. Michl Ebner was elected MEP with 92,836 votes, by virtue of a law safeguarding the rights of minorities. The PRC gained two more seats than in the previous elections, securing five MEPs, including Vittorio Agnoletto, leader of the Italian No Global Movement. The Italian Communists as well as the Greens did better than in the previous elections, but their EP representation at two was unchanged. The New Socialists, led by former Minister Gianni De Michelis, registered 2 per cent of the votes, securing two seats in the EP. This result was extraordinary

Italy 161

if compared with 0.1 per cent of 1999 election. With the exception of the Radicals, who lost four of their six 1999 EP seats, small parties did fairly well, despite Berlusconi’s call on voters not to ‘waste’ votes. The outcome reflected either genuine party loyalty or a desire to punish the government. The higher turnout made the EP results even more disappointing for the Premier. The people’s ‘index of loyalty’ to Berlusconi’s party was 60 per cent, one of the lowest. According to a flow analysis carried out by DS, 5.8 per cent of FI votes shifted to Ulivo, 0.5 per cent to Udeur, 1.7 per cent to the Greens, 1 per cent to PdCI and 0.5 per cent to PRC. In addition, FI passed 13.5 per cent of votes to its government coalition partners, and more specifically 8.1 per cent to AN, 3.3 per cent to UDC and 2.1 per cent to LN. According to another source, IPSOS, UDC and LN gained 7 per cent and 4 per cent of the share of FI disillusioned voters. The same source reveals that 7 per cent of both FI and UDC votes were redirected to the Ulivo coalition. This meant that despite changes within the two poles, only 2 per cent of the voters swung from the right to the left. Although some voters ‘betrayed’ their parties, they remained loyal to their respective coalition.12 Table 18.3 Italian MEPs’ affiliation to EP political groups and number of women MEPs National party

FI (G) UDC (G) A.P Udeur (O) Pens (O) DS – Ulivo (O) SDI – Ulivo (O) Independent – Ulivo (O) La Margherita – Ulivo (0) MRE Movimento Repubblicani Europei – Ulivo (O) SVP (O) Ulivo Tot. Ulivo IdV (O) PR-Bonino V (O) PRC (O) PdCI (O) AN (G) LN (G) NPSI (G) US (O) Tricolore (O) AS (O) Note: G = Government; O = Opposition.

EP Total MEPs Women political group MEPs EPP-ED EPP-ED EPP-ED EPP-ED PES PES PES ALDE

16 5 1 1 12 2 2 7

1 0 0 0 3 1 1 1

ALDE EPP-ED – ALDE ALDE GREENS/EFA EUL/NGL EUL/NGL UEN IND/DEM NA NA NA NA

1 1 25 2 2 2 5 2 9 4 1 1 1 1

1 0 7 0 1 1 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 1

Women as a % of MEPs 6.25 0 0 0 25 50 50 14.29 100 0 28 0 50 50 20 0 33.3 0 0 0 0 100

162 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

At the first July plenary session of the newly elected EP, 24 MEPs – 16 from FI, five from UDC, one from AP-Udeur, along with Ebner from SVP/Ulivo and Carlo Fatuzzo from the Pensioners’ Party – joined the group of the European People’s Party. (See Table 18.3 and Figure 18.1) Massimo D’Alema and 11 DS members, two MEPs from SDI, Gruber and Santoro, the two journalists elected within the Ulivo coalition, agreed to sit with the Group of the Party of European Socialists, five MEPs from La Margherita, IdV, Lista Bonino and MRE (Movimento Repubblicani Europei) joined instead the new Group of ALDE, seven MEPs from PRC and PdCI joined the EUL. The nine members of AN, in line with their ambition to become a mainstream party, did not join with far-right parties preferring UEN membership. Unexpectedly, the four LN members, including their historical leader Bossi, decided to join the Eurosceptics of the Group for Independence and Democracy rather that sitting as non-attached members like in the previous legislature. Finally, the Socialists Gianni De Michelis and Alessandro Battilocchio as well as the right-wing MEPs Luca Romagnoli and Alessandra Mussolini chose the status of independent members. During the sitting of 20 July, two Italian MEPs, Mario Mauro from FI attached to the EPP group, and Luigi Cocilovo from La Margherita attached to the ALDE group, were nominated EP Vice-Presidents. 



   

  



  %00 %$

Figure 18.1

0%3

!,

%$'REENS %&!

EP Group membership

Source: European Parliament.

%5, .',

).$ $%-

5%.

.!

Italy 163

On 14 July 2004, the creation of the Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) was announced. ALDE, led by British Liberal MEP Graham Watson, is the third largest EP group with 88 members from 19 countries, including seven Italian MEPs from La Margherita, two Radicals and one Republican. Finally, the percentage of women MEPs rose from 11 to over 19 per cent. Of the 15 Italian female MEPs, except for the five newly-elected MEPs from Ulivo, ten were re-elected from the outgoing EP.

Conclusion Contrary to voters’ general lack of interest in EP elections throughout the EU, turnout in Italy was high due to a combination of factors: the public’s proEuropean attitudes supported by a good information campaign, coincidence of EP elections with administrative/local elections, and the chance to vote on two days including Saturday afternoon. Given this turnout, the sixth EP elections assumed a major significance for Italian politics, as a tool to test and measure the government’s popularity. The two opposing political poles, Casa delle Libertà and Uniti nell’Ulivo, maintained a certain equilibrium, but within the government coalition FI votes shifted in favour of its allies. Berlusconi’s open support for the war against Iraq and US President George W. Bush could be seen as one of reasons why his own party’s share of the vote decreased. In addition, his intransigent approach with the press ended up undermining his popularity. Many issues, large and small, came to the surface, such as: the refinancing of the Italian mission in Iraq fiercely opposed by the centre-left, the fiscal reform put forward by FI, the federal reform strongly demanded by the Northern League, the reform of voting system for the general election forwarded by UDC, as well as the appointment of a new board of RAI. A government reshuffling process started with the resignation of the Minister of Economy and LN member, Giulio Tremonti. This was followed by the refusal of AN leader Gianfranco Fini to fill this position, by the refusal of UDC leader Marco Follini to take up a ministerial role, and by the decision of LN leader Bossi to resign his position as Minister of Reforms and Italian MP and go to Strasbourg. Concern was expressed that his resignation would trigger a chain reaction among UDC and AN members, thus causing the fall of the government. Berlusconi saved temporarily the situation by nominating as the new Minister of Economy Domenico Siniscalco, professor of economy, technocrat and former Director-General at the Treasury and, as Minister of Reforms, Vice-President of the Senate and LN member Roberto Calderoli. The newly appointed Minister announced that if the Camera would not adopt promptly the bill on devolution, already approved by the Senate, he would resign. On 22 July 2004, the Camera confirmed its confidence in the Berlusconi government over the amendment on the containment of public expenses in order to comply with Maastricht parameters. Internal disputes

164 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

have caused a major government crisis and unintentionally breathed new life into a stagnating opposition coalition. As the Premier’s popularity appears to be on the wane he will have to find a formula to hold together the government coalition and to rethink his strategy for the future.

Notes 1. In memory of all men, women and children killed in Iraq. 2. The Italian political landscape underwent a seismic shift in the 1990s when the Mani pulite (Clean Hands) Operation exposed corruption at the highest levels of politics and business, causing the fall of the First Italian Republic. 3. 49,845,299 Italian citizens: 24,000,587 males and 25,844,712 females (source: Italian Ministry of Home Affairs, 29 April 2004). 4. Italian Ministry of Home Affairs, Electoral Information System Department. 5. I wish to thank Paolo Meucci, Vice-Director of the Rome Office of the European Parliament and Elisabetta Santella for kindly providing me with invaluable information on this campaign. 6. The Uniti nell’Ulivo coalition gathers Democratici di Sinistra (DS), La Margherita, Social-Democratici italiani (SDI) and Republicans (MRE). 7. It is worth pointing out that both Gruber and Santoro ran as Independent members within the Ulivo coalition at the Euro-elections and were among the candidates with the most votes. 8. ‘Europee, I segretari del centrosinistra non si candidano’, La Stampa, 22 April 2004. 9. ‘Fassino al premier: sobrietà sugli ostaggi’, Il Messaggero, 10 June 2004. 10. ‘Berluscono: Colpa mia, ora ripartiamo’, Il Messaggero, 15 July 2004. 11. Irene Peroni, ‘Anchor deals Berlusconi nasty blow’, BBC News Online, 15 June 2004. 12. ‘Elettori fedeli ai Poli, ma tradiscono i partiti’, Il Messaggero, 16 June 2004.

19

Latvia David Galbreath

In an article in The Baltic Times, the British Latvian academic Daunis Auers noted the sharp contrast between domestic parliamentary elections last held in October 2002 and the European elections on 12 June 2004.1 In Riga during the last parliamentary election, it was impossible not to know that there was an election and that the major parties were contesting the elections. For example, no one could miss the People’s Party’s bright orange tents and balloons in the Old City and the central parks, nor the army of school children handing out flyers for the Centre Party. By contrast, there was negligible attention to the EP elections. Even Latvia’s most well known Latvian Language paper, Diena, hardly mentioned the EP elections before the end of May. There is little doubt that the timing did not help as it came so recently after the 1 May enlargement. Despite the lack of attention paid to the European elections, the lead-up to as well as the result of the elections have been significant for Latvian politics. This impact is predominantly a result of the flux of Latvian domestic politics within the last year. This chapter discusses several aspects of the Latvian European elections: (i) Latvian political party preparation and participation in the elections; (ii) the EP results; and (iii) the impact on Latvian domestic politics during a time of political instability.

Contesting parties Latvian politics have been characterised by the collapse and formation of numerous parties but several parties now dominate Latvian politics. The political union of For Fatherland and Freedom (Te–vzemei un Brı–vı–bai) and the Latvian National Independence Movement (Latvijas Naciona– la Neatkarı–ba Kustiba) have had significant ups and downs since the first elections in 1993. None the less, with a core group of voters, they have continually made the percentage threshold for participation in the Saeima.2 Both groups 165

166 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

are continuations from the late Soviet period. The two merged to compete in the 1995 national elections and have remained together since. While the Fatherland Union considered NATO membership far more important to Latvia than EU membership, it has none the less consistently worked toward this goal while remaining sceptical about how far Latvia should integrate into the European project. There is a significant number of centre parties. The most recent of these is New Era (Jaunis Laiks), which was formed by former Bank of Latvia president Einars Repse to contest the October 2002 national elections. New Era is the largest party in the Saeima, but not a member of the current minority governing coalition. The People’s Party (Tautas Partija) came together for the 1999 elections but has been dogged by their former controversial leader and three-time prime minister Andris Skele. Another new party following a socially Christian Democratic line is the Latvian First Party (Latvijas Pirma– s Partija), which also came to political prominence in the 2002 elections. The First Party is one of the few parties that has been able to court both Latvian and Russian-speaking voters. Finally, the Green and Farmers’ Union (Zal¸o un Zemnieku Savienı–ba) produced Europe’s first Green Prime Minister, with the establishment of the current minority government. Following the 2002 elections, the largest party, New Era, organised a coalition involving the First Party, the Fatherland Union and the Greens. New Era leader Repse became Prime Minister and New Era held the majority of ministerial posts. The New Era-led government collapsed in February 2004 when Repse fired Deputy Prime Minister Ainars Slesers (First Party). There had been constant battles over appointments as well as between Repse and Slesers. The latter accused the former of ‘heavy-handed’ leadership. When the coalition collapsed, Repse was unable to bring together another government, as the condition was often Repse’s removal as Prime Minister. Left out of the first government, the People’s Party joined the First Party and the Greens to form a new minority government. As we shall see, while the EP election results did not help the ruling coalition, animosity between the largest political parties means that the minority government may last longer than many would have expected. Overall, the lack of cooperation in Latvian politics has not helped Latvians to remain interested in politics. Notable election lists were also put up by left-wing parties. The Latvian Socialist Party (Latvijas Socia– listiska– Partija) list included the former Soviet mayor of Riga Alfreds Rubiks. Because of his participation in pro-Soviet organisations at the end of the Soviet era, Rubiks is one of many prominent political figures who are unable to contest domestic parliamentary elections. Similarly, the Latvian Social Democratic Workers’ Party (Latvijas Socia– ldemokra– tiska– Stra– dnieku Partija) had as EP candidates former KGB official Juris Bojars and former Soviet border guard Janis Adamsons.3 Likewise, well-known leader of the For Human Rights in a United Latvia (Par Cilve–ka Tiesı–ba– m Vienota– Latvija) Tatyana Zhdanok also participated in the elections having been barred

Latvia

167

from public office for her time as leader of the pro-Soviet Interfront. Zhdanok’s contentious relationship with the Latvian state is based on an attempt to deny her Latvian citizenship despite her familial link with the pre-Soviet regime. Following the EP elections, Zhdanok won her case in the European Court of Human Rights which ruled that the Latvian state had violated Zhdanok’s rights when she was barred from assuming political office.4 The fact that she was allowed to contest the EP elections was used by the defence to support the early decision of the Latvian state. However, the Court found for Zhdanok who remains one of the most high-profile minority politicians in Latvia. The For Human Rights Union was originally a combination of the People’s Harmony Party (Tautas Saskan¸as Partija), the Latvian Socialist Party and the Equal Rights Movement (Lı–dztiesı–ba), the last also led by Zhdanok. Rubiks and Zhdanok were both against Latvian accession to the EU and NATO. At the end of 2002, the People’s Harmony Party leader, Janis Jurkans, decided that the other two parties maintained politically unrealistic goals and called for a ‘new’ union.5 In response, Rubiks and Zhdanok accused Jurkans of selling out for a future place in government, while Jurkans maintained that he was bringing the party in line with other European socialist parties in preparation for the European Socialist Conference in 2004. This division did lead to the People’s Harmony Party being allowed to negotiate with the current minority government. Although not a member of the coalition, it secured a ministerial post in return for a guarantee of support for government legislation. However, this led right-wing parties to label the minority government as fraternising with Moscow. In the end, the three parties contested the EP elections individually. As in other parts of Europe, the EP elections gave parties that were not particularly well represented at the domestic level a chance to win political recognition. Two parties in particular exemplify this in Latvia. First, Latvia’s Way (Latvijas Celš) used the EP elections as a way of re-emerging in Latvian politics. After being in governing coalitions from the first post-Soviet elections (1993), Latvia’s Way failed to win enough votes to pass the 5 per cent threshold to remain in the Saeima at the October 2002 national elections. The election list included the former Prime Minister Andris Berzins, former Culture Minister Katerine Petersone as well as many who had experience of dealing with the EU, such as former European Integration Office head Janis Vaivads and Justice Ministry Representative at the EU Inese Birzniece. With some of the biggest names in Latvian politics, the party hoped these elections would bring them back into politics at the next elections. Latvia’s Way’s inability to rise above the 5 per cent threshold in the October 2002 national elections was a bitter irony since no other party had done as much to bring about EU membership. Latvia’s Way has been particularly keen to participate in the new European project. The EP elections also allowed the relatively recent and unknown Conservative Party a chance to win attention on the Latvian political stage. Financed

168 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

by businessman Valerijs Belokons, the party began advertising heavily and early for the elections. According to Auers, the Conservative Party’s main policy platform was to use its influence in the European Parliament to adjust the Lat–euro exchange rate in order to bring about lower petrol prices. The Conservative Party’s planned spending for the EP elections was Ls 100,000.6 There was also a myriad of social democratic parties that participated in the elections, such as the United Social Democratic Welfare Party and the Social Democratic Union.7 Other parties such as the regional Latgale Light as well as the unknown Eurosceptics also participated in the elections. Unsurprisingly, the traditional larger parties were to win EP seats.

The results The Latvian European election results largely fit Reif and Schmitt’s secondorder electoral model.8 Turnout was far lower compared to the national elections in October 2002. The Latvian Election Commission predicted a 70 per cent turnout. Participation in the referendum on EU accession had been nearly 73 per cent. As should have been expected, actual turnout on 12 June was a meagre 41 per cent. The governing coalition did not do well. The right-wing Fatherland Union and the centre-right New Era Party did best: the former won nearly 30 per cent of the vote and four EP seats; the latter won nearly 20 per cent of the vote and two of Latvia’s nine seats (see Table 19.1). Other centre-right parties faired less well. The struggling Latvia’s Way and the second-largest party in the Saeima, the People’s Party, each won one seat with under 7 per cent of the vote, as did the leftist For Human Rights Union with nearly 11 per cent of the vote. The governing Greens/Farmers and Latvia’s First Party did not win any seats. Of those parties that won EP seats, only the For Human Rights Union can be considered anti-European, while there is a great deal of Euroscepticism in the Fatherland Union. Table 19.1

2004 Latvian EP election results

Parties Fatherland and Freedom Union New Era People’s Party For Human Rights Coalition Latvia’s Way

Seats 4 2 1 1 1

Source: Diena, 14 June 2004.

Finally, Reif and Schmitt expect small parties to do well at the expense of large parties in second-order elections. However, the outcome in Latvia is mixed. The smallest and largest parties in the Saeima did best in the European

Latvia

169

elections. Perhaps the small Fatherland Union should have been expected to receive many of the protest votes as well as cater to those voters apprehensive about Latvia’s membership of the EU. Yet it is too simple to say that larger parties will suffer in second-order elections as the strong support for the larger parties at the domestic level indicates. Reif and Schmitt’s assumption is related to the idea that politically dominant parties are ordinarily the larger parties in the national parliament, but this is not the case in Latvia at the moment. This is not to say that we cannot see the vote for New Era also as a protest vote against the state of Latvian politics currently, given the acrimonious collapse of the last coalition and the very possible collapse of the minority coalition. Events in Latvia suggest that the larger domestic political dimensions must be taken into account when making predictions for second-order elections. Overall, the parties who won EP seats will sit with four EP political groups. Both New Era and the People’s Party will sit with the European People’s Party. The Fatherland Union will sit with the statist Union for Europe of the Nations. Latvia’s Way is affiliated with the European Liberal and Democratic Reform Party. Finally, the For Human Rights Union has oddly decided to sit with the Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance, although their politics more closely match those of the Group of the Party of European Socialists (PES). This is despite the fact that Boriss Cilevics, who is a member of the National Harmony Party, sat with PES following the 1 May enlargement. At first glance, it is unsurprising for a post-Soviet country not to have a member sitting with one of the most dominant EP parties. However, Estonia and Lithuania have three and two PES seats respectively. The often politically contentious ethnic situation between Latvians and Russian-speakers in Latvia, in addition to the current debate over upcoming education reform, means that left-wing politics is currently more complicated than in their neighbours, although Estonia has had its own problems. Following the elections, the list of MEPs was released, showing few surprises.9 The Fatherland and Freedom Union are represented by their leader and former Prime Minister, Guntars Krasts, as well as Roberts Zile, Girts Valdis Kristovkis and Inese Vaidere, who came from the Riga City Council. Krasts will be sitting in the Industry and Energy Committee, while Zile will be working with Transportation. At the same time, Kristovkis will be dealing with Common Foreign and Security Policy, while the latecomer Vaidere is aiming for the Environment or Economic Committee. The New Era delegates are Aldis Kuskis and Valdis Dombrovskis, both aimed for the Budget Committee. The People’s Party has Rihards Piks who will be in the EP’s Foreign Committee. For Human Rights Union’s Zhdanok will be sitting in the Human Rights Committee, which will no doubt irritate the Latvian nationalists. The once dominant Latvia’s Way will be represented by Georgs Andrejevs, who will be working on the Environment and Social Health Committee.

170 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

Implications for domestic politics The victory of the core opposition parties in the EP elections casts a shadow on the viability of the current governing coalition led by the Green/Farmers and including the First Party and the People’s Party. Both the Fatherland Union and New Era were key members of the previous government, with the latter being the most dominant holding the majority of ministerial positions including that of Prime Minister. As discussed earlier, the only member of the current government to win any seats was the People’s Party with one seat. Thus, unsurprisingly, the New Era called for the resignation of the current government. New Era leader Repse even went so far as to call on President Vaira Vike-Freiberga to request a new government, which the President declined to do. Following this, New Era and the Fatherland Union called on the People’s Party to resign from the governing coalition and join them in a new coalition.10 The history between New Era and the People’s Party has been acrimonious since the campaigns for the October 2002 national parliamentary elections. These two parties that have such close political platforms refused to work together in the EP election campaign despite belonging to the same European party. While New Era was a new political face in 2002, the People’s Party goes further back, with the former leader and founder Andris Skele going back even further. In the Sixth Saeima (1995–98), an independent Skele formed a majority ruling coalition with seven members, only excluding the leftwing People’s Harmony Party and the Latvian Socialist Party. At the time of his political appointment, Skele was also chairman of the Latvian Shipping Company, although he had previously acted as Agriculture Minister in 1993. The coalition lasted only one year with Skele falling out with the now defunct ‘Saimnieks’ over the post of Finance Minister. Skele followed with another coalition that was torn apart by a corruption scandal. Skele had experienced several accusations such as misappropriating funds and having ‘undemocratic tendencies’. Furthermore, he oversaw several ‘shady’ financial deals involving the privatisation of state-owned properties. However, he was never investigated by the Prosecutor-General’s Office. Skele was eventually invited to form a government as now head of the People’s Party, which was formed to represent the interests of Riga oligarchs. His third time and final time as Prime Minister lasted only nine months when he resigned in 2003. An ongoing battle with Latvia’s Way, which represented the oligarchic interests in Ventspils, led to the collapse of the government. Thus, when it came to the 2002 election campaign, the similarly styled New Era easily painted the People’s Party with the brush of corruption. New Era and the People’s Party were unable to come to an agreement to establish a government in October 2002 and thus the latter was left out of the governing coalition.

Latvia

171

The People’s Party has refused to consider a new coalition with the People’s Party outside of the existing members. Defence Minister and People’s Party MP Atis Slakteris stated that New Era and the Fatherland Union had already been invited to join the current coalition. However, New Era leader Repse has dismissed the Greens and Farmers’ Union as well as the First Party as possible coalition partners, calling them ‘traitors’. While a spokesperson for New Era argued that ‘the European Parliament elections show that the voters are not pleased with the current government’, the election results across the EU show a defeat for the governing parties except those countries such as Spain and Greece who have recently had national elections. Rather, the Latvian election results indicate that the voters are not necessarily impressed by any of the mainstream parties but feel comfortable placing in Brussels members of the organisation that pressed for independence from Moscow. Of all the parties in the Saeima, the Fatherland Union has suffered the least from political accusations of corruption, ‘undemocratic’ leadership or becoming too close to the left-wing Russophonic parties. At the same time, there is little to indicate that EP electoral success will effect success at the national level. Politically situated centre parties have increasingly come to dominate Latvian politics and it is unlikely that the Fatherland Union could translate its EP success into more Saeima seats. It is not surprising that the EP elections did not capture the Latvian electorate’s attention when they had already made their most important decision in September 2003. The future importance of the EP elections will always be challenged by the remote nature of EU governance as well as Latvia’s small number of MEPs. However, what the EP elections do provide is encouragement to Latvian political parties to discuss the EU within their own political discourse.

Notes 1. The Baltic Times, 3–9 June 2004. 2. The Saeima is the Latvian national parliament. The post-Soviet period began with the fifth Saeima elected in 1993 continuing on from the pre-Soviet regime. 3. Article 21 of the 1992 Latvian Law on Elections states that a candidate must not have been or not be ‘a salaried or contractual employee of the USSR or LaSSR KGB, the USSR Defence Ministry, Russia’s (USSR’s legal successor) and other State Security Services, or army intelligence or counter-intelligence, as well as an agent or resident of these establishments or an owner of an apartment used for conspiracy meetings’. 4. The Baltic Times, 1–7 July 2004 5. See The Baltic Times, 16–22 January 2004; and Chas, 8 January 2003. 6. Latvia’s largest party in the Saeima, New Era, only planned to spend Ls 30,000. See Diena, 20 May 2004. 7. The United Social Democratic Welfare Party also contested the elections.

172 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

8. K. Reif and H. Schmitt, ‘Nine Second Order National Elections: A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of European Elections Results’, European Journal of Political Research VIII (1980) 3–44. See also M. Marsh, ‘Testing the Second-Order Election Model after Four European Elections’, British Journal of Political Science XXVIII (1998) 591–607. 9. Diena, 16 June 2004. For Latvian MEP Committees see Diena, 8 July 2004. 10. The Baltic Times, 17–30 June 2004.

20

Lithuania Terry Mayer

Background Covering an area of 65,300 km2, Lithuania is the largest of the three Baltic states, and the second poorest country in the EU. The population consists of some 3.5 million people, 80 per cent of whom are ethnic Lithuanians, 8.7 per cent ethnic Russians, 7 per cent Poles, 1.6 per cent Belarusians and 2.1 per cent others.1 Elections to Lithuania’s unicameral parliament (the Seimas) take place every four years, with 70 of the 141 seats available allocated from party lists and 71 in single-seat constituencies. The minimum vote threshold required to gain a seat was originally 4 per cent, but owing to fragmentation and the proliferation of small parties, it was raised to 5 per cent in 1996. This led in turn to the formation of coalitions by parties trying to surmount the new barrier. Presidential elections take place every five years. Numerous parties (often dominated by well-known personalities), parliamentary factions and coalitions have emerged or disappeared since 1991. Immediately after independence, parliament was dominated by the former Communist Party, now named the Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party (LDLP), whose leader, Algirdas Brazauskas, was elected President of the Republic in February 1993. Sajudis, on the Right, split and evolved into the Homeland Union, or Conservatives, with Vytautas Landsbergis and Gediminas Vagnorius as its leaders, and moved away from a radical nationalist agenda towards a more pragmatic, centrist political approach. The LDLP were ousted in 1996, having failed to deliver too many election promises, and with its leaders having come under increasing suspicion of corruption. Voters in Lithuania were less than impressed by the drop in living standards which they were suffering in the wake of post-Soviet reforms, and viewed the party elite as opportunists benefiting at the expense of the ordinary citizen. From 1996 to 173

174 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

2000 the government was led by a centre-right coalition, pursuing policies of gradual economic reform combined with large-scale privatisation. After the last general election in October 2000, 13 parties were represented in parliament, constituting 7 political alliances (Table 20.1). Initially, the government was controlled by the 67-seat centre-right New Policy coalition, the Liberal Union (LU) and the New Union Social Liberals (NU), led by the then prime minister, Rolandas Paksas. Following disputes within the coalition over funding of the privatisation of the monopoly power companies, the Social Democratic Party (SDP), with the largest number of parliamentary seats, stepped into government. Paksas resigned as Prime Minister in May 2001 and formed the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in 2002. The SDP and the NU put together another coalition and the former President, Brazauskas, became Prime Minister. This confusing array of parties and coalitions of varying ideological slants, have all been basically united over the necessity for economic and democratic reforms, and the goal of EU and NATO membership. The SDP and the New Union signed an agreement in February 2004 which involves cooperation over the selection of candidates in constituencies in both the European and national elections: if they maintain the current coalition beyond the next elections in October 2004, other parties might be encouraged to follow. Table 20.1

Lietuvos Respublikos Seimas: 8 October 2000

Party . A. Brazausko socialdemokratine koalicija . – Lietuvos demokratine darbo partija – Lietuvos socialdemokratu˛ partija – Naujosios demokratijos partija – Lietuvos rusu˛ Sajunga Naujoji Sajunga (socialliberalai) Lietuvos liberalu˛ Sajunga . . Tevynes Sajunga (Lietuvos konservatoriai) Krikšcioniu˛ Demokratu˛ Sajunga Lietuvos valstieciu˛ partija Lietuvos Krikšcionu˛ Demokratiaiu˛ Partija Lietuvos centro Sajunga Nuosaikiu˛ju˛ konservatoriu˛ Sajunga Lietuvos lenku˛ rinkimu˛ akcija Lietuvos liaudies Sajunga Lietuvos laisvu˛s Sajunga ‘Jaunosios Lietuvos’, nauju˛ju˛ tautininku˛ ir Politiniu˛ Kaliniu˛ Sajunga Lietuviu˛ tautininku˛ Sajunga Lietuvos partija ‘Socialdemokratija 2000’ Moderniu˛ju˛ Krikšcioniu˛ Demokratu˛ Sajunga Non-partisans Note: Turnout: 55.9 per cent. Source:

ABSK LDDP LSDP NDP LRS NS LLS TS-LK KDS LVP LKDP LCS NKS LLRA UTL LLS JL/PKS LTS SD 2000 MKDS –

Votes %

Seats

31.1

19.6 17.3 8.6 4.2 4.1 3.1 2.9 2.0 1.9 1.5 1.3

51 26 19 3 3 28 33 9 1 4 2 2 1 2 – 1

1.2 0.9 0.5 – –

1 – – 3 3

Lithuania

175

In common with the other EU accession countries, Lithuania was presented with a set of criteria to fulfil, including democratic forms of governance, a functioning market economy and adherence to European human rights standards. Unlike the other ex-Soviet Baltic republics, however, Lithuania chose to institute liberal citizenship laws: with a markedly smaller proportion of ethnic Russians resident in the republic, it was easier for them to do so. Automatic citizenship was granted to those resident in Lithuania in 1940 and their descendants, and to all those living in the territory in 1989. After 1991 language competence tests were introduced along with a residency stipulation of ten years. In practice this means that the opportunity for participation in both national European elections for state residents is much greater than in the other Baltic republics. An important outcome of these liberal citizenship laws is that relations between Lithuania and Russia have been much more settled and mutually productive than those between Russia and Estonia or Latvia, and this is of great importance to the EU. Russia has considerable economic leverage in the Baltics, which are still dependent on Russian energy supplies; in addition of course, the EU would like to tap into the vast resources available further east. The presidential election campaigns in January 2003 were portrayed as a clash between Western-style thinking and the old Cold War mentality, involving Valdas Adamkus, a 77-year-old former exile, who had spent some 50 years in the US, and was therefore seen as embodying Western values and able to command the respect and support of the West, and Rolandas Paksas who was prone to blaming all the country’s economic and social ills on the west and was, according to analyst Egdunas Racius, accused of being financed by a Russian millionaire with links to the military industry.2 In the event Paksas won narrowly. However, in November 2003, amid claims of corruption and links with the Russian mafia, which included illegally granting citizenship to Yuri Norisov in exchange for financial support, a parliamentary committee was established to investigate allegations against the president. Paksas initially dismissed the charges as an attempt by political opponents to discredit him, and refused to hand in his resignation; he was then accused of damaging Lithuania’s interests in both the EU and NATO. The committee finally concluded that Paksas had violated the Lithuanian Constitution and his oath of office, and that there was a threat to national security; parliament voted by narrow margin for impeachment and proceedings were initiated which culminated in Paksas being stripped of the presidency in April 2004. With Paksas determined to stand again and nothing in the constitution to prevent him from doing so, the Lithuanian parliament voted through a law (passed by 64 MPs) banning impeached officials from running in future presidential elections. On 25 May the constitutional court ratified the new law. The British Helsinki Human Rights Group (BHHRG) cite ‘opinion polls’ (though give no details) which suggest that had Paksas run in the latest presidential race, he could have won.3 In the wake of the Paksas scandal, parties

176 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

were quick to ally themselves on either the pro-Russia or pro-Western wing of the political spectrum: Racius describes this as ‘elevated through the media, both private and state-run, to the level of hysteria’, with Russian interests seen to be influencing all manner of things and people, and everything ‘allegedly Russian was labelled as a threat’.4

The EP campaign With the presidential elections taking place on the same day and drawing much of the media attention, and several of the parties undecided about which EP party group to join if elected, campaigns focused on domestic and local issues such as agricultural subsidies, taxes, education, health and pace of economic reforms. The new Labour Party campaigned on the basis that it would defend Lithuania’s interests in the EU. It is another example of a party dominated by a personality rather than by policies. It was founded in November 2003 by Russian millionaire businessman Viktor Uspaskich and is supported by the minority Russian population and the less-well-off Lithuanians throughout the country, who have been impressed by Uspaskich’s pledges to fight corruption and poverty. The party targets pensioners and the poor, who have benefited less from post-Soviet reforms. However, beyond promises of a brighter future, policies remain vague. While Uspaskich is commonly portrayed as the fun, brash ‘Mr Gherkin’, a good deal of hypocrisy was believed to surround much of the media coverage about him: ‘the same media that denounced Paksas (and, later Prunskiene) for cultivating contacts with “the east”, makes no comment on Uspaskich’s Russian background … Uspaskich receives jocular write-ups in the press for owning a large gherkin factory. Contrast this with Paksas’s campaign funder, Yuri Borisov, who was denounced for his Russian ethnicity and is still threatened with expulsion from Lithuania where he was born and where he has lived for most of his life.’5 The Conservatives recently proposed changes in party rules which would mean that citizens who had settled in Lithuania during the Soviet period would be barred from leading political parties: this was obviously aimed at Uspaskich. On the other hand, the Conservatives have themselves been accused of the corruption which pervades Lithuanian society, and were heavily criticised over the dubious ‘Mazeikiu Nafta’ privatisation deal with an American company. Party membership in Lithuania is very low (2 per cent), and one of the main concerns surrounding the European Parliament election was the perception that the majority of voters have a low level of political understanding or awareness. For example, in the presidential elections which took place on the same day, they voted for Prunskiene because they believed she would lower taxes and unemployment, even though only the government has the power to change such policies. The typical Lithuanian appears to have little or no understanding of what the European Union is actually about, and still less about the purposes and

Lithuania

177

functions of the European Parliament. Arunas Degutis (number two candidate in the Labour Party) maintains that ‘knowledge and interest in the European Parliament is divided along a cleavage separating those who believe they are benefiting from European integration and those indifferent to it’.6 There were also doubts over the abilities and experience of the prospective candidates, with relatively small numbers of suitably qualified people standing for election as MEPs. To further complicate matters, there was clear uncertainty among the parties themselves over which political affiliation to join within the EP. The Labour Party, Centre Party and the Homeland Union were all undecided, and announced that they would choose after the elections had taken place. In polls carried out during May and June, it was found that only 34 per cent of those questioned felt they had enough information to decide who to vote for. Only 1 per cent had been visited by prospective EP candidates at home; none had been contacted by phone; 37 per cent had received leaflets through the mail; 3 per cent had been approached in the street. However, 72 per cent had seen advertisements and 67 per cent had read about the elections in the newspapers.7

Results The elections were held on Sunday 13 June 2004. 241 candidates representing 12 parties contested 13 seats. Voter turnout, at 48.38 per cent, was higher than in many of the other member states, and inflated because presidential elections were held on the same day. Turnout certainly did not come anywhere near the 80 per cent predicted in the EU Observer on 7 April.8 Viktor Uspaskich’s Labour Party won 30.3 per cent of the vote, and five of the available 13 EP seats (Table 20.2). Even though Uspaskich was not standing as an MEP (he occupies his party’s only seat in the Seimas), his pro-EU party’s victory demonstrated again how Lithuanian elections tend to be dominated by personalities rather than party platforms. The governing Social Democratic Party came second with 14.4 per cent of the votes, and two EP seats. Aside from the elections being viewed as an opportunity to register protest votes against the incumbent government, one other reason for their poor showing was the rise in prices and VAT which came into effect on 1 May. Lithuanians complained that the Poles had managed to negotiate with the EU to stave off increases in VAT on heating for several years, and thought that their own government could have done the same. The left-of-centre Farmers’ Union/New Democracy Party, led by presidential candidate and former Prime Minister, Kazimira Prunskiene, won one seat on 7.4 per cent of the vote. The Homeland Union/Lithuanian Conservatives won two seats (12.4 per cent) and will be represented in the EP by Vytautas Landsbergis and former European Affairs Minister Laima Andrikiene. The Liberal and Centrist Union (11.2 per cent) also won two seats. One seat went to the Union of Farmers’ Party and the New Democracy Party (7.4 per cent).

178 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

The Liberal Democratic Party, tipped earlier in the year to do well in the October Seimas election, suffered badly as a result of the Paksas impeachment and won just one seat (6.8 per cent). Table 20.2

EP election results, Lithuania

Party Labour Party/Darbo Partija (DP) Lithuanian Social-Democratic Party Lietuvos Socialdemokratu Partija (LSDP) Homeland Union (TS) Tévynés Sajungos – Lietuvos Konservatoriai Liberal and Centre Union (LCS) Liberalu ir Centro Sajunga Peasants and New Democratic Party Union (VNDPS) Valstieciu ir Naujosios Demokratijos Partiju Sajunga Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Valstieciu ir Naujosios Demokratijos Partiju Sajunga Others Total Notes:

Votes

%

Seats

363,931

30.2

5

173,888

14.4

2

151,400

12.6

2

135,341

11.2

2

89,338

7.4

1

82,368 209,438

6.8 17.4

1 –

1,205,704 Registered voters: Votes cast: Invalid votes: Valid votes:

13

2,654,336 1,282,634 (48.3%) 76,930 (6.0%) 1,205,704 (94.0%)

Source:

It is evident from these results that Lithuanians are willing to experiment with new parties and political personalities and are on a sharp learning curve. This should not be seen as especially surprising in a country which has seen so many different governing alliances and political factions in its few short years as an independent democratic republic. Like all EU states, political parties have indiscriminately portrayed themselves as being the best able to defend the state’s interests in the EU, thereby implying that they have yet to internalise the reality of membership in a supranational polity.

Notes 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

The Baltic Times, 8–14 July 2004.

The Baltic Times, 8–14 July 2004.

The Baltic Times, 3–9 June 2004.

21

Luxembourg Philippe Poirier

In Luxembourg, the EP elections were held, as usual, simultaneously with the general election on Sunday 13 June. Both were a landslide victory for the party of the Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker, the Christian Social People’s Party (CSV, member of the European People’s Party), a so-called ‘party state’ (Staatstragend) in the Luxembourg political system (Table 21.1).1 In the EP election, the CSV won 37.13 per cent of the vote (31.2 per cent in 1999), its best result since the first direct EP elections in 1979. The coalition partner with the CSV, the liberal Democratic Party (DP, member of the European Liberal Democrats Party) won 14.8 per cent of the vote (down from 20.4 per cent in 1999). The Luxembourg Socialist Labour Party (LSAP, member of the European Socialist Party), the third main party of the Luxembourg political scene, lost slightly, 22.9 per cent in 2004 against 23.4 per cent in 1999. The CSV has dominated Luxembourg politics since 1945, sharing power with one of the two other main parties. However, it is worth noting that in 1974 after an unsatisfactory electoral result, though still the first party in the country, it chose to go in opposition, and an LSAP-DP coalition government, led by the former President of the European Commission, Gaston Thorn, was created. Two new parties came onto the scene in the 1980s: the Green Party and the sovereignist party Action Committee for Democracy and Interest Justice (ADR, ‘observer member’ of the Union for Europe of the Nations), sensitive to the issues of retired people. The rise of this party should be seen as an example of the so-called silent revolution well known in the majority of Western democracies.2 The Green Party did well at the 2004 EP elections with 15.2 per cent of the vote against 10.1 per cent in 1999, whereas the ADR won 8.03 per cent against 9 per cent in 1999. The last government had been characterised by five main political events that were not without influence on the last European elections results. Firstly, a bill for a new status for civil servants was voted. Civil servants represent 179

180 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

almost 40 per cent of all voters. Secondly, a reform of the pensions was introduced. It consisted of a more balanced scheme between the public and the private sector in favour of the latter. Thirdly, the outgoing government pleaded for the preservation of banking secrecy laws in Luxembourg and for the adoption by its international competitors (within and outside the EU, such as Switzerland or the Channel Islands) of similar measures so as to prevent Luxembourg losing any of its competitiveness as a financial centre. Finally, the Prime Minister in 2002 declared that he was in favour of dual nationality.3 This question is very important because almost 41 per cent of the resident population of the Grand Duchy is foreign (85 per cent of them come from a member state of the European Union). Table 21.1

Luxembourg: The 2004 EP election results

Name of party

Action Committee for Democracy and Interest Justice (ADR) Democratic Party (DP) Luxembourg Socialist Labour Party (LSAP) Green Party Christian Social People’s Party (CSV) Left Movement Luxembourg Communist Party Notes:

List votes

Preferential votes

Global votes

% of votes

Seats won

59,856 75,684

27,380 85,823

87,236 161,507

8.03 14.87

1

139,422 107,910

100,545 55,294

239,967 163,204

22.09 15.02

1 1

230,286 10,950

173,084 7,366

403,370 18,316

37.13 1.69

3

8,652

4,109

12,761

1.17

Registered voters: 229,484 Luxembourg citizens: 217,869 Other European citizens: 11,615 Turnout: 90.1 per cent.

Source: Gouvernement du Grand-Duché du Luxembourg, Elections 2004,

Voting is compulsory in Luxembourg so turnout is usually high: 90.1 per cent in June 2004. These data only concern people enrolled on the electoral register. Luxembourg citizens are automatically enrolled and citizens of other EU countries on a voluntary basis. Although the latter represent 36.04 per cent of eligible voters, only 5.04 per cent chose to vote for Luxembourg candidates (to vote for the Luxembourg candidates, citizens of other EU states must have been resident in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg for at least five years when they enrol on the electoral register). Since 1979, the EP and general election coincide and the EP election is therefore seen as second-order national election. Candidates in the EP elections compete

Luxembourg 181

also for national seats, except for candidates from small parties unlikely to win seats in both legislatures (for example, the Left party, a member of the European Left Party). Those heading the lists of the three biggest parties contest the post of Prime Minister. In a sense, the EP elections are like a retreat to restart national political careers. Election as an MEP is also seen as a prelude to retirement. EP elections are viewed as a very good test of the Prime Minister’s popularity. For EP elections, the Prime Minister runs in a single national constituency, unlike national elections where he chooses one of the country’s four constituencies. At the last EP elections, outgoing Premier Jean-Claude Juncker gained the highest number of preferential votes since 1979. Candidates not heading the EP list usually resign their EP mandate if elected to the national legislature or if they become a member of government. Generally, they retain their EP seats for a few months pending for the constitution of the governmental coalition. Consequently, actual MEPs are less appreciated and less well-known by the electors. Usually, outgoing MEPs or Luxembourg politicians specialising in European politics never head the list, so the 2004 EP election was an exception to the rule. Often Luxembourg MEPs have difficulty in being re-elected despite holding good posts in EP committees or their EP party because of the vagaries of the electoral system. Each voter has the same number of votes as the number of seats: six. Votesplitting (panachage) is permitted so voters may either vote for a single list, or for candidates from more than one list, or choose individual candidates from a particular list. When a voter votes for one single list, the list receives as many votes as the seats to be allocated (hence six votes). Where a voter votes for an entire list made up of less than six candidates, this list receives as many votes as the number of the candidates. No list may include more than twelve names (twice the number of seats). Seats are then allocated based on the total number of votes obtained by the list: that is, the number of preferential votes for candidates and the votes for the list itself.4 The first allocation of seats is done with the Hagenbasch-Bischoff method (a quota that is the number of seats plus one), and any remaining seats by the largest average method (total number of votes of the list divided by the number of seats already attributed to that list in the first round plus one). The new MEPs are: former CSV president of the Luxembourg Parliament, Jean Spautz (75), former CSV minister of Advanced Studies and Culture, Erna Hennicot Schoepges (63), outgoing CSV MEP, Astrid Lulling (75), outgoing MEP and former challenger as Prime Minister in 1999, the socialist Robert Goebbels (59), former LP minister of Foreign Affairs in the outgoing government, Lydie Polfer (52), and outgoing ecologist MEP Claudes Turmes (44). In 1994, five parties took advantage of the Maastricht Treaty provisions allowing EU citizens to stand in any member state. In 2004 only the Luxembourg Communist Party and the Left did so.

182 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

Campaign participants and political context Given the small size of Luxembourg its political system is less articulated than others. The political parties are traditionally weak and panachage reinforces this. Think tanks do not exist and the public space5 is reduced by size but also because a large part of the intelligensia, EU civil servants and the population do not speak Luxembourgish, the language used for political activities in the Grand Duchy. Simultaneous EP and national elections also mean that interest groups and NGOs focus on the lattter. Two types of social mobilisation occur for EP elections. In July 2003, the Luxembourg Parliament organised a public hearing about the projected EU Constitution with civil society. The Independent Trade Union of Luxembourg (close to the socialist party), the Luxembourg Confederation of Christian Trade (close to CSV) – the most prominent trade unions in the Grand Duchy6 – the Federation of Luxembourg Industrialists (a member of the Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe), the Federation of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises, the Confederation of Luxembourg Commerce and the Luxembourg Bankers Association expressed their attachment to the national sovereignty in an enlarged Europe. During this national forum the unions stressed the view that their Luxembourg social model was more efficient than the European social model in spite of the introduction in the EU Constitution of a Charter of Fundamental Rights.7 The employers’ associations were more critical of the ongoing process of European integration, notably fiscal harmonisation, and asked the government to avoid making the same mistake as it did at the European Summit of Feira, regarding the tax package.8 The employers’ associations, supported by the powerful Civil Servants General Confederation, focused on this issue because the government intended negotiating a new agreement on the tax policy regarding savings.9 Given civil society’s view, the government tried to portray itself as the best at both defending the national interests and promoting the communitarian method. Accordingly, it held a meeting with seven heads of state (Austria, Benelux countries, Ireland, Finland and Portugal) in order to issue a common position for the European Council in Athens. This group called for the equal treatment of all states in future EU decision-making, and for the maintenance and extension of the Community method.10 The principal requests were: equal representation in and rotation of the Commission for all states; retention of the Commission’s exclusive right of initiative in legislative matters; extending co-decision; a role for national parliaments in controlling their national representatives in the Council; a single person wearing a double hat for the post of the High Representative for the CFSP and the Commissioner for External Relations, having the status of Commission Vice-President, but operating in the fields of CFSP and CESDP under Council authority. This coalition opposed the creation of new institutions. The G7 rejected European Convention chair Valéry Giscard d’Estaing’s proposal for a powerful European Council president, with its own administration and

Luxembourg 183

power, preferring current rotation of the European Council and specialised councils. At the Athens summit consecrating EU enlargement, several new members (Cyprus, Slovenia, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Baltic republics) joined the G7’s position. However, in September 2003, after the publication of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, the Benelux countries, refused to participate to the Prague Meeting of these countries, as they considered the critics about the draft from other small Eastern and Mediterranean countries to be too ‘Eurosceptic’ and a risk for the procedure of ratification by the European Council in October 2004 in Rome.11 Public opinion was much more positive than government or civil society suggested. Eurobarometer and polls by the Luxembourg parliament showed Luxembourg residents to be most in favour of the EU Constitution and most confident in the EU’s institutions. In March 2004, 79 per cent of Grand Duchy inhabitants considered the EP elections important; 77 per cent supported the EU Constitution.12 In June 2003, for the first time since 1937, the government decided to hold a referendum to ratify the constitution.13

The campaign and campaign issues In spite of some public meetings, the EP campaign was almost invisible. In May 2004, the LSAP invited Belgian French-speaking socialist leader, Elio di Rupo, and the general secretary of the French socialist party, François Hollande, to a meeting. Daniel Cohn-Bendit, co-chairman of the European Green Party EP group, attended a Luxembourg Green Party rally. In April, Charles Pasqua, president of the Union for a Europe of the Nations, gave a speech in the presence of Luxembourg MP, Jacques-Yves Henckes, coordinator for the national and European campaign of the Action Committee for Democracy and Interest Justice. In March, the Left focused its congress on European integration with delegates from the Dutch Socialist Party, the Italian Communist Refoundation Party and the German Party of Democratic Socialism. The Luxembourg parties spent 10–15 per cent of their total budget on the EP campaign. The CSV, LP and LSAP spent around €1 million, the Greens and the Action Committee for Democracy and Interest Justice around €350,000. Luxembourg does not regulate maximum campaign spending nor does it provide generalised public financial support to political parties. However, under the electoral law, if a party presents a full list of candidates and if it obtains 5 per cent of votes cast, it qualifies for public support to the tune of a contractual amount of €12,500 and twice that for each extra 5 per cent of votes cast, and €12,500 for each MEP. The state pays for one mailing to all households if the party wins at least 5 per cent of the vote, and TV and radio slots (which parties can supplement from their own funds). All parties ran television and radio adverts and published their manifestos in French, German, English and Portuguese, the latter because 16 per cent of the population come from Portugal, a former colony. The two TV channels (RTL

184 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

Tele Lëtzebuerg and Tango TV) only had one programme on the EP elections with national leaders. Officially, the Green Party was the only party to get financial and technical support from a European party: the European Green Party. Its TV spots were similar to those of the Austrian and German Green Parties and were devised by their German advertising agency. Campaign teams were very small, numbering between three and nine people. Except for the Green Party, there was no official distinction between the EP and the national campaign. The major parties focused their EP campaign on national issues like economic growth, education14 and transport. These three topics were relevant because, for the first time after 15 years of interrupted economic growth of between 3.5 and 5 per cent, growth had slowed in 2003 to between 1.9 and 2.3 per cent, particularly in the financial industry which provides almost 25 per cent of the state’s fiscal revenue. Another EU question of national interest for Luxembourg was the funding of unemployment benefits for cross-border workers (those living in one state and working in another). The EU Commission had in June 2003 proposed that unemployment benefit be paid by the employing country, a suggestion unacceptable to Luxembourg as 38 per cent of employees are non-resident. In December 2003, it was agreed that the country of residence should cover unemployment benefits, and the country of employment contribute for at least three months. Luxembourg secured specific treatment and a delay of application in the Grand Duchy. EU transport policy also figured in the campaign because, apart from the Democratic Party, all parties opposed the EU’s privatisation of rail.15 All supported the EU’s project for interoperability of the trans-European highspeed rail system, hoping that Luxembourg would be among the priorities given the high-speed train nexus of London–Brussels–Luxembourg–Frankfurt and Paris–Luxembourg–Berlin. Given 100,000 cross-border daily commuters all supported the development of a regional16 transport plan.17 All the parties supported: the EU Constitution, (including the sovereignist party, subject to the proviso that it is only a constitutional treaty and not a Constitution); sustainable development in an enlarged EU; Turkey’s accession bid, and immigration from outside the EU. NGOs and interest groups were absent from the EP campaign, save for the association supporting immigrants’ economic and civil rights. The Link Committee of Foreigner Associations funded by the government, the high commissioner of foreigners and an association supporting immigrant workers in March 2004 asked for a cut in foreigners’ residence requirements to vote in local and EP elections. The most relevant European campaign issue was the potential appointment of JeanClaude Juncker as EU Commission President. In April 2004, the Prime Minister officially declined the offer from the EPP and majority of the European centreright governments. However, the LSAP implied duplicity arguing that he had said he would respect the will of Luxembourg citizens but had, in Brussels, led a discreet campaign to get the future post of permanent president of

Luxembourg 185

the European Council. His political future was such a major issue because it pushed the question of his successor to the fore. The two main candidates were outgoing Minister of Justice, Luc Frieden, representing the right wing of the party (liberal conservative) and François Biltgen, outgoing Minister of Labour and CSV president, embodying the left wing (trade unionist and social democrat). Overall, national and European issues merged: EU issues were nationalised and national issues tended to focus on personalities as much as domestic politics. This is perhaps inevitable given co-terminous national and EP elections.

Notes 1. With this definition I refer to those political parties that are always (or most of the time) part of the government coalition because of the influence and importance of their associative network (namely trade unions and cultural organisations), their electoral rooting and their capability to integrate and make a selection of the ruling class. It is also another way of legitimacy following the decline in importance of Christian culture. The CRISP (Centre de recherche et d’information socio-politiques) uses the definition of ‘dominating party’. CRISP, Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, systèmes et comportements électoraux: Analyse et synthèse des scrutins de 1974, 1979 et 1984 (Luxembourg: House of Parliament, Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, 1987), p. 96. 2. R. Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). 3. P. Poirier, ‘La democratizzazione della società europea passa attraverso una riaffermazione del legame tra nazionalità e cittadinanza?’, Foebus, 9, April (2004), 69–89. 4. Loi électorale du 21 février 2003, at: 5. H. Arendt, La Crise de la Culture (Paris: Collection Points essais, Seuil, 1985). 6. Gaining almost 85 per cent of all votes at the last elections in November 2003. 7. The ‘Luxembourg social model’ is a process of institutionalised consultation between the Government, employers and unions at the macro-social level of industrial relations which is the hallmark of Luxembourg’s consensual tradition. The fora in which the extensive involvement of the social partners in the formulation of economic and social policy takes place are the Chambers of Labour and Trade, the Economic and Social Council and tripartite bodies such as the National Employment Commission, the Standing Committee on Employment and the Tripartite Coordination Committee. The latter was created in 1977 as a means of dealing with the economic crisis, and the most important achievement in this tripartite context was to enable the restructuring of the steel industry during the 1990s (with massive job cuts by ARBED) to be carried through consensually. More recently, in April 1998 the Committee reached consensus on the National Plan to be submitted to the European Commission following the Luxembourg extraordinary summit on employment. See M. Hirsch, ‘Tripartism in Luxembourg: The Limits of Social Concertation’, West European Politics, 9:1, January (1986), 347–60. 8. The European Council endorsed the timetable set out, which foresees a stepby-step development towards realisation of the exchange of information

186 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

as the basis for the taxation of savings income of non-residents. Presidency Conclusions Santa Maria da Feira European Council 19 and 20 June 2000

With regard to the sensitive issue of tax policy on savings, harmonisation in the European Union, a first formal agreement was signed in June 2003 between member states and Switzerland. The aim of the Directive is to render income coming from savings, in the form of interest payments made in one member state to beneficial owners who are individual residents for tax purposes in another member state, to be taxed in accordance with the laws of this member state of residence. The automatic exchange of information between member states concerning interest payments is the means chosen to achieve effective taxation of these interest payments in the member state of residence. Gouvernement du Grand-Duché du Luxembourg, Réunion informelle de sept Etats membres de l’Union européenne qui partagent globalement la même conception de l’Europe, B. Fayot and P. Poirier, ‘Les Etats et les représentants du Benelux au sein de la Convention: analyse d’un discours et d’une stratégie’, in L’Année Sociale 2003 (Bruxelles: De Boeck-Université, 2004), pp. 358–86. P. Poirier, La participation politique au Luxembourg à l’occasion des élections législatives et européennes de juin 2004. Analyse seconde, (Luxembourg: Chambre des Députés, mars 2004). Gouvernement du Grand-Duché du Luxembourg, Le gouvernement luxembourgeois décide de soumettre la future Constitution européenne à la ratification par référendum, national, The Grand Duchy registered the worst result of European countries in 2001 at the Programme for International Student Assessment, statistical comparative study sponsored by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development in 42 countries. For more details, see With the ‘Third railway package’ presented in March 2004, the Commission proposed opening up international passenger services to competition within the EU in 2010. The Great Region consists of Luxembourg, the French-speaking Community and the Walloon region of Belgium, the Lorraine region of France, and the German Saarland and Rheinland-Pfalz. For more details, see Grande Région, Sommets de la Grande Région, 7e Sommet de la Grande Région, 30 juin 2003 – Sarrebruck (Sarre) Gouvernement du Grand-Duché du Luxembourg, Elections 2004

22

Malta Mark Harwood

Few would have blamed the Maltese electorate had they followed the majority of their European brethren and showed a marked apathy towards the 2004 EP elections. In less than a year they had been bombarded by a highly polarised and politicised referendum campaign, followed almost immediately by a highly tense general election revolving around the issue of EU membership. Most Maltese were simply relieved when it was all over. Although turnout was markedly lower than in general elections – 82 per cent compared to 96 per cent at the last general election1 – it was still the third highest in the EU,2 even though voters had to elect only five MEPs, the smallest quota for any EU state, a fact that rankled some and became a campaign issue for others.

Background Malta is a predominantly two-party political system with the consequent polarisation of policies extending to the issue of EU membership. The ruling Christian Democrats, the Nationalists, had been campaigning for EU membership since the late 1980s. Their policy was endorsed in the 2003 referendum on EU membership (with 53.65 per cent saying ‘yes’ and 46.35 per cent saying ‘no’3) and by the subsequent general election which saw them returned to power with a sizeable majority in parliament. The main opposition Socialists, the Malta Labour Party (MLP), had long campaigned against what it termed ‘full membership’. It was finally compelled to change its position after its defeat in the last general election, making a commitment to respect the wishes of the majority of the electorate. Thus, the divisive issue of EU membership was resolved before the EP elections. With both major parties in agreement on Europe, Malta’s traditional two-party, polarised system was challenged by the rising popularity of the Maltese Greens, Alternativa Demokratika, which had never won a seat in the Maltese parliament, gaining 187

188 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

on average 1 per cent of the vote in general elections. Its popularity had steadily risen at the local level with electoral success in local council elections in 2003 and 2004. Consistently pro-EU membership, the Maltese Greens represented the greatest challenge to the ruling Christian Democrats due to their popularity in affluent, middle-class areas from where the Nationalists’ normally drew their support.

The electoral system The EP elections took place on Saturday 12 June. Simultaneous local council elections were held in 22 localities in Malta and Gozo. The EP elections may have boosted turnout in these localities from the 71 per cent registered in 2001 when the same localities last held local council elections.4 However, long-term voting trends would need to confirm this. As in all elections in Malta, the EP elections were carried out using the single transferable vote system, a form of proportional representation used mainly by Malta and Ireland. The system allows voters to opt for candidates rather than parties. People give their order of preference for candidates from 1 to 10 with number one being given to their most popular candidate. Voters are not obliged to vote for the same party or to use all their preferences. Based on the size of the electoral district and votes cast, a quota is established which candidates must meet to be elected. Once they have reached that quota, any additional votes they win are then passed on to the candidate listed as the second choice on the voting papers. Once the second-choice candidate has reached the quota, votes are then passed on to the third preference, and so on, until all available seats have been filled. The system was modified slightly for EP elections. Normally, Malta and Gozo are divided into 13 electoral districts with candidates needing relatively small quotas to be elected. For the EP elections, the fact that Malta was only able to vote for five MEPs meant that the electoral districts had to be scrapped and the vote became a national one. The quota was thus exceptionally high, standing at 40,954. Only one candidate, from the Christian Democrats, was automatically elected. While his additional votes were then passed on to the second preference, most candidates were elected through the elimination of those candidates who performed worst. Eliminations, additional counts and further eliminations made the process very protracted and results were not fully known until the following Wednesday. In addition to the protracted nature of calculating such a large quota, the merging of the electoral districts into one was also expected to have a huge impact on the campaign. Traditionally, candidates target constituents in their district, making door-to-door visits, organising local events and receptions, distributing leaflets. Patronage plays a key role. Large scale canvassing is limited to mass meetings, mass media and billboards. With many of the former methods unsuited to target the whole

Malta

189

population as one electoral district, the EP elections put greater emphasis on mass media methods, thereby giving a huge competitive advantage to the Christian Democrats and Socialists, both of whom have their own television and radio stations and extensive print media. Campaign spending is officially capped at Lm 600 (roughly £1,400) per candidate but the rules on spending are generally ignored, something denounced by the Greens. The main political parties are not obliged to disclose how much they spend and no official figures are available. The 27-strong list of candidates was exceptionally long because one list had to be offered for the whole country. The two major parties each tabled eight candidates. In both cases they were a mixture of television personalities, the party faithful and one or two new faces. The Christian Democrats provided the most diverse and balanced list of potential MEPs, including a former minister, an academic, a Gozitan lawyer (the only candidate from Malta’s sister island) and a non-partisan figure from the referendum campaign, a key to the party’s attempts to win back floating voters. While none of the first three candidates was elected, the last candidate, Dr Simon Busuttil, had gained a strong reputation during the referendum for being an expert on the EU. This was reflected in his automatic election after easily jumping the quota on the first count. The list of Nationalist candidates was also notable for having two female candidates, the only women on the ballot paper. However, neither was elected. The Socialists originally planned to nominate three candidates but subsequently nominated eight. While the list bore no surprises, it included a current MP, a high-profile journalist from the Socialist media and a founding member of the Green party, who had switched from Labour to the Greens and back to Labour. While the MP was successful, the latter two were not. The Greens nominated only one candidate, Professor Arnold Cassola, a highprofile member of the party and Secretary-General of the Greens in the EP. The remaining ten candidates, either standing as minor parties or independents, were mostly marginal figures with limited exposure and limited policies. However, four candidates were of particular note. Dr Emmy Bezzina (Alpha Party) campaigned in favour of divorce and abortion, political suicide in this staunchly Catholic country. Malta’s first non-native candidate, the Nigerianborn Damian Iwueke, promised to represent everyone on the fringes of society while attacking the main parties for mismanagement of the country. The hunters’ lobby, long dominant in local politics due to its sizeable membership and persistent threat to rescind its support from parties failing to defend its interests, tabled its first, independent candidate, Carmelo Farrugia and many keenly followed his prospects to see how truly coordinated and influential this group actually was. Finally, Norman Lowell, a highly colourful public speaker, gained wide exposure under his Imperium Europa party, largely thanks to his oratory skills rather than his extreme, far-right policies.

190 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

The campaign Campaigning began some six weeks before 12 June. As the emphasis was on the mass media and billboards, the two main parties had a huge advantage with little, if any, exposure of non-party candidates on their political stations or in their papers. The Greens and other candidates had to rely on state television and the English-language press, although many independent candidates only got airtime on minor cable stations. The EP ran an exceptionally limited campaign, almost entirely restricted to the capital city, while even a highprofile visit by EP President Pat Cox near to the elections had a limited impact on the general public. An interesting blend of domestic concerns and European factors appeared to dominate the electoral campaigns. Most candidates were preoccupied with promoting their credentials as prospective effective MEPs. Few candidates actually addressed policy or suggested initiatives. Wider European issues such as the new constitution or adoption of the euro were complete non-starters. The leader of the Opposition stated that it was more a question of jobs, unemployment and the cost of living than factors like the Constitution, which would dominate the debate.5 The Christian Democrats hinged their campaign on presenting a unified team with the slogans ‘Competent, Consistent, Credible’ and ‘Yes, Let’s Grow in Europe’. Rather than pushing any specific agenda, the party tried to win votes by attacking the opposition Socialists’ credentials to stand as MEPs while promoting its status as a potential member of the largest EP group, the EPPED. The Christian Democrats argued that it was best to vote for consistent candidates who had always supported EU membership rather than for Socialist candidates who had only recently made, according to them, a superficial U-turn on Europe. They argued that members of the ruling party would sit with the largest group in the EP and so have greater ability to advance Malta’s interests. This point was reiterated constantly, with billboards showing clearly the political makeup of the EP and the predominance of blue within that institution, even though the EPP’s colour is green. EPP-ED Chairman, Hans-Gert Poettering, visited Malta in early April 2004 to stress this point. The Nationalists also made extensive use of reports that suggested that the EPP would perform best in the elections, as if hoping to score points through association.6 However, the EPP-ED manifesto was hardly mentioned, although the Christian Democrats did try and stress that the EPP-ED had been the most effective party in pushing for a sixth EP seat for Malta despite lack of support from the Greens and the Party of European Socialists (PES). The Christian Democrats were always aware that the principal threat came from the Greens. In trying to offset support for the latter, the Christian Democrats may have made their gravest miscalculation. The persistently proEU Greens could not be discredited in terms of EU membership, so the party tried to highlight the European Green’s support for abortion. This backfired

Malta

191

disastrously. The allegation emerged early in the campaign, giving the Maltese Greens the opportunity to show clearly that they were, and had always been, against abortion. Coupled with allegations of a whispering campaign against them, the Greens took legal action against six Christian Democrats, including Dr Busuttil and the party’s secretary-general. Citing the well known fact that the Greens had advised their supporters to vote blue in the last general election, to ensure a pro-EU victory and so membership, the Greens were able to argue convincingly of being betrayed and so to ride a wave of sympathy that may have significantly contributed to their winning nearly 10 per cent of the vote. The Christian Democrats tried to drop the issue but the damage had been done. The Socialists did not run such a coordinated team campaign. They emphasised individual candidates and their ability for self-promotion. The party’s main slogan, ‘Europe is all about You’, seemed to reiterate this point. Party individuals played different cards, though all seemed united in attacking the government on the state of the economy, unemployment, the environment and the proposed pension reforms. Another principal preoccupation of the Socialist candidates was defending their individual and the party’s right to change its policy on Europe. Some even claimed that by being anti-EU membership the party was the real European party because it had a realistic and unblinkered approach to the EU. Little if any emphasis was placed on the role of the PES in the EP other than its general voting pattern in favour of such issues as the environment, but the PES’ manifesto was also a non-starter in campaign terms. The Greens focused much of their attention on the personal credentials of their candidate as a long-serving member of the European Greens. With the slogan ‘For the Country, not for the Party’, the Greens hoped to capture the vote of all those dissatisfied with both major parties, repeatedly calling for a break with Malta’s traditional two-party system. In a country where floating voters are few and people are more likely to abstain from voting rather than switch party affiliation, the Greens hoped that people could and would now opt for a third choice. Contrary to the message from the Christian Democrats, the Greens advocated Maltese representation in all three major EP political groupings to protect Malta’s interests. While emphasising the European Greens’ environmental record, the Maltese Greens downplayed the European Greens’ general manifesto, their own commitment to divorce as well as contesting the Christian Democrats’ claim that the Greens had blocked the campaign for a sixth EP seat for Malta. While official results took some days to be issued, it became clear early on that there had been a large swing away from the Christian Democrats, and the Socialists had not won an absolute majority of votes (Table 22.1). Once the first preference votes were counted, it was noted that the Christian Democrats had won just under 40 per cent of the vote while the Socialists had won just over 48 per cent. The real and notable surprise of the election was the Greens’ exceptionally strong performance with just under 10 per cent of the vote.

192 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

Table 22.1

Malta: 2004 EP election results

Name of party or candidate

Number of first preference votes

The Malta Labour Party (Socialists) The Nationalist Party (Christian Democrats) Alternativa Demokratika (Greens) Carmello Farrugia (Pro-hunting) Imperum Europa (Far-right) The Alpha Party Damian Iwueke (Independent)

% of overall votes cast

Number of EP seats

118,983

48.4

3

97,688

39.7

2

22,938

9.3

–

3,119

1.3

–

1,603 756

0.6 0.3

– –

0.06

–

153

Source: Department of Information.

Because of the complicated nature of the counting and the fact that only one candidate, Dr Simon Busuttil, immediately reached the quota and was elected, it was uncertain for some time whether the fifth seat would go to the Greens or the Socialists. While the Green vote was significant, it was not enough to win a seat: two went to the Christian Democrats (Simon Busuttil, former head of the Malta-EU Information Centre; David Casa, executive secretary of the Malta-EU Steering Committee) and three to the Socialists (John Attard Montalto, MP; Louis Grech, former chairman of Air Malta; Joseph Muscat, MLP activist). The pro-hunting candidate won only 1 per cent of votes, barely one-fifth of the lobby’s 16,000 members. The far-right Imperium Europa candidate did much better than many feared, scoring the second highest vote of any candidate not coming from the three major parties. The results surprised the ruling Christian Democrats who had expected to ride out a wave of euphoria following the 1 May celebrations and the valid criticism that the Socialists’ U-turn on Europe lacked conviction. The latter had failed to convince many that the party had any policy on Europe other than its commitment to respect the wishes of the electorate. While support for the Socialists remained static, they claimed ‘victory’ in the EP elections, and the fall in support for the Christian Democrats reflected increasing criticism of government policy and EU membership. The government faced several major challenges in the first few weeks of EU membership, with a new political leader and extensive negative press in the run-up to the elections. This included stories accusing the government of knowingly returning Eritrean refuges to their country of origin where they were subsequently tortured, accusations against the Foreign Affairs Minister which the Prime Minister announced he was investigating and yet

Malta

193

declined to launch an official investigation into, as well as negative press surrounding EU membership. The latter included disgruntled farmers accusing the government of misinformation to win the 2003 referendum, an outbreak of rodent infestation in Gozo after the island’s landfill site was closed to comply with EU regulations, and Opposition claims that the fall in prices of certain commodities after membership would last only until stocks did, when prices would rocket. Several long-term factors worked against the Christian Democrats. An attempt to curb fiscal spending and increase revenue meant a substantial increase in the VAT rate on membership, a highly unpopular inheritance tax reform which hit the middle classes most, a planned reform of the pension system and general economic downturn with dwindling tourism, factory closure, troubles in Malta’s national airline and problems with privatised national companies. All in all, the Maltese Christian Democrats got off more lightly than other ruling parties across Europe. While the EP elections seem to become a confidence vote in the government, it is debatable as to how well they reflect general voting trends in Malta. The EP elections offered no scope for local patronage with little, if any, direct relevance for the daily lives of voters. People appear to have gone for candidates based on merit with all those elected having a strong knowledge of the EU. With a sixth seat now available in the 2009 EP elections, and, consequently, a lower quota, it is possible that the Maltese Greens could challenge Malta’s traditional two-party system. For Malta’s current batch of MEPs, it is imperative that they take up the suggestion of one successful candidate, Joseph Muscat, and try to coordinate regular meetings amongst themselves to make the most of Malta’s limited voice. In outlining priorities, as Mediterranean people they can make a vital and much needed contribution to push for regional initiatives in this much neglected sea. At the same time, Malta desperately needs initiatives to tackle its environmental problems to ensure that future citizens have a habitable place in which to live. In this respect, it is to be hoped that the five MEPs make a real and valid contribution to Malta and the EU.

Notes 1. Department of Information, European Parliament Election Results, 2004. W. Hirczy de Mino and J. Lane, ‘Malta: STV in a Two-Party System’, . The Maltadata website is a wealth of information on the STV system and Maltese electoral results. 2. The Times of Malta, 15 June 2004. 3. Department of Information, Referendum Results, 2003. 4. Department of Information, 2001 and 2004 Local Council Election Results. 5. The Times of Malta, 9 May 2004. 6. S. Hix and M. Marsh, ‘Predicting the Future: The Next European Parliament’,

23

The Netherlands Edith Drieskens

On 10 June 2004, together with the UK, the Netherlands set the ball rolling for the 2004 European Parliament elections. Twenty-seven seats were to be divided in a single national constituency, four fewer than in 1999. The Christian-democratic CDA (Christen Democratisch Appèl) of Prime Minister Jan-Peter Balkenende won 24.4 per cent of the vote, closely followed by the social-democratic opposition party PvdA (Partij van de Arbeid) with 23.6 per cent of the vote. As CDA lost two seats and PvdA gained one, both parties ended up at seven. The biggest winner was Europa Transparant, the party of whistleblower Paul van Buitenen, whose revelations on fraud and mismanagement within EU institutions resulted in the resignation of the Santer Commission in 1999. This party was a new contender but won 7.3 per cent of the vote and two EP seats. Another new participant in EP elections was the populist right-wing party LPF (Lijst Pim Fortuyn) which with only 2.5 per cent of the vote did not win a seat. However, this result does not reflect the party’s influence on Dutch politics in the preceding two years. In 1999, Dutch turnout was at 29.9 per cent marginally higher than the 23 per cent turnout in the UK. As the 1999 turnout would not have been the best card an incoming EU presidency could leave, the Dutch government made every effort to organise a well-funded, large-scale information campaign in the months before the elections. This time, turnout reached 39.1 per cent.

Domestic background: Balkenende I and II On 6 May 2002, nine days before the House of Representatives1 elections of 15 May, the Dutch population was astonished by the assassination of Pim Fortuyn, the founder and leader of the LPF. The leftist parties, especially PvdA, and the media were accused of having demonised Fortuyn. In the weeks before the elections, polls had shown that the party – known for its populist 194

The Netherlands

195

ideas on immigration and domestic security – was on course to win up to 20 per cent of the vote. On election day, LPF came top with 17 per cent of the vote. Occupying 26 seats out of a total of 150, LPF became the second largest party in the House of Representatives, after the CDA which gained 14 seats and was, with 43 seats the largest party. The right-liberal party VVD (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie) and PvdA lost heavily – 14 and 22 seats, respectively, arriving at 24 and 23 seats. CDA, VVD and LPF formed a government coalition under the leadership of Jan-Peter Balkenende and took office on 22 July 2002. On 16 October 2002, after 86 days of government, the Balkenende I cabinet fell as the CDA and VVD threw in the towel, considering LPF an unreliable coalition partner. Indeed, the shortest period of government in Dutch post-war parliamentary history had been characterised by quasi continuous quarrelling and scandals at all levels within LPF, culminating in an open conflict between LPF ministers Eduard Bomhoff and Herman Heinsbroek. New elections were held on 22 January 2003. As LPF lost 18 seats and PvdA won 19 seats on 22 January 2003, the winner of the 2002 parliamentary elections became the loser of the 2003 elections and vice versa. As only a quarter of those who voted LPF in 2002 did so in 2003, political analysts explained the 2002 elections in terms of once-only protest voting. Gaining only one seat but remaining the largest party in the House of Representatives, CDA had again the power of initiative as for government formation. As VVD won only 4 seats, the only possibility to form a new centre-right coalition would have been together with LPF. Given the experience of the Balkenende I cabinet, this was not a realistic option. As a result, PvdA’s raising star Wouter Bos became Balkenende’s discussion partner. On 10 April, talks between CDA and PvdA went wrong as a result of differences on the organisation of essential expenditure cuts. A new round of talks – this time between CDA, VVD and the left-liberal party D66 (Democraten 66) – succeeded after 48 days. On 27 May, after a year of political chaos, the Balkenende II cabinet finally took office. On the day of swearing in, the cabinet faced the difficult task of saving €13.1 billion on public spending, especially on social security, in the following four years. On 1 June 2004, the seriousness of the Dutch economic situation was underlined once more as EU finance ministers decided that the Dutch government should, in 2005 at the latest, cut the budget deficit to under 3 per cent of GDP, on penalty of a fine of €1 billion.

Towards the elections: Eurocriticism and Euroscepticism European issues were not prominent in the 2002 and 2003 House of Representatives election campaigns. In the past, broad political consensus on the development of the European integration process had only been questioned at the margins of the political landscape – especially by the leftist socialist party SP (Socialistische Partij). In 2002, Pim Fortuyn used his

196 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

strong Eurosceptic ideas as part of a broader anti-establishment discourse, rather than as mobilising themes as such.2 Yet, in 2002, like in 2003, the increasingly critical attitude of the Dutch public towards the European integration project started trickling into mainstream political debate.3 In recent years, the public has found it hard to accept the large annual Dutch net contribution to the European budget – approximately €5 billion against receipts of some €2.5 billion in the form of subsidies.4 Moreover, the fact that France and Germany got away with breaking the Stability and Growth Pact deficit ceiling in November 2003 exacerbated Dutch voters’ distrust of their EU partners, especially the big member states and EU institutions. In the 2004 EP election campaign, this growing malaise became visible through the participation of no fewer than eight Eurocritical and Eurosceptic political parties: Democratisch Europa (DemEur), Leefbaar Europa (LeefbEur), Partij van het Noorden (PvhN), Nieuw Rechts (NwRechts), Europa Transparant (EurTrans), LPF, Partij voor de Dieren (PvdD), and Respect.nu (RespNu). The fact that the established political parties regained their levels of public support in the 2003 House of Representatives elections should not be seen as a normalisation of Dutch politics. They were only able to do so by taking over a number of Fortuyn’s positions, especially on asylum and migration policy. The same applied to the 2004 EP elections. CDA, PvdA and especially VVD adopted a more reserved and Eurocritical attitude than in 1999. As in most EU states, national rather than European issues dominated the campaign. In contrast to countries like France and Germany, highly sensitive issues like the scope of the future constitutional treaty or the possible accession of Turkey rarely came up for discussion. Party leaders mainly discussed drugs, asylum, migration and employment policy. The European dimension was often limited to the question of whether or not ‘Brussels’ should interfere in these policy domains and subsidiarity. Significantly, most of the domains that came up for discussion during the election campaign could also be found on the policy priority list for the Dutch presidency of the second semester of 2004. Notwithstanding the participation of the Eurocritical and Eurosceptic parties, in the weeks before the elections the established parties’ discussions were flat and often slid into jokes about the need for a number of – at first sight – unusual European rules. Foreign minister Bernard Bot (CDA) was one of the few exceptions. On 2 June, in a speech at the Humboldt University in Berlin, Bot stated that a number of competences – agricultural, cultural, health and social policy – should, to a certain extent, be returned to the member states.5 According to Bot, the only way to halt growing public alienation was the introduction of a social contract between the EU and its citizens. Yet on the eve of the elections, national politics again dominated news broadcasts. The internal twists within VVD, leading to Secretary of State Annette Nijs’ resignation, and the prolongation of the Dutch military mission in Iraq were the news headlines.

The Netherlands

197

Focusing on voter turnout To stimulate voter participation, the Dutch government spent €1.2 million on a large-scale information campaign beginning in April using the slogans ‘Europese Verkiezingen. U/Jij komt toch ook’ (‘European Elections. Don’t miss your chance to vote!’) and ‘Europa. Best Belangrijk’ (‘Europe. Rather important’). In February, the EP’s Hague Office launched a similar campaign on regional radio and television. In May, the government’s information campaign reached cruising speed with the organisation of a ‘Europe week’ with festivities and celebrations throughout the country to mark EU eastern enlargement. The House of Representatives press tower in The Hague and the Beurs van Berlage in Amsterdam were decorated with banners saying ‘Geef Europa een Stem’ (‘Give Europe a voice’) and ‘Wie verder denkt, kent geen grenzen’ (‘Who thinks ahead does not know frontiers’), twice in combination with a reference to the date of the elections. Throughout the month, a small roadshow travelled the country to persuade Dutch citizens to go to the polls. The show also stopped at the Pinkpop and Dunya music festivals in an attempt to inform young people about the importance of voting in the EP elections. Throughout the information campaign, the internet was frequently used as information provider of choice by the government, political parties, the press and civic groupings, witness the numerous websites created for the elections. While there is no ceiling on election spending, the 2004 EP election was the last where parties were not allowed to use their government funding. Citizens could get advice on how to vote by an online voting test called ‘Europese StemWijzer’. Expats were offered the possibility of voting by telephone or the internet. The idea of raising voter turnout by making voting less location dependent, was also the motivation for the introduction of the Kiezerspas (‘Voter’s pass’). Voters, who had exchanged their polling card for such a pass before 4 June, were allowed to vote in the polling station of their own choice on the day of the elections. In the communities of Assen, Deventer, Heerlen and Niewegein, voters could even do so without such Kiezerspas. Finally, forgetful citizens could ask the government for a text message on their mobile telephone as a reminder the day before the elections. Although turnout increased by almost 10 per cent, it remained below the EU mean of 44.2 per cent. As for the 15 old member states, the Netherlands preceded Portugal (38.7 per cent), the United Kingdom (37.7 per cent) and Sweden (37.2 per cent). By comparison, turnout for the House of Representatives elections of 2002 and 2003 was 79.0 and 79.9 per cent. A few days after the EP vote, the Dutch government announced that it would host a conference on the downward trend in EP turnout during its presidency in the autumn of 2004.

Results: ‘returning to Brussels with a smile’ Both the low turnout and the results indicated the second-order character of the EP elections. Coming some 18 months after the 2003 House of Representatives

198 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

elections, the second-order elections logic would suggest that voters would vote differently in EP elections compared to national elections if organised at the same time. Governing parties would have been expected to lose support to small – radical, populist or protest – parties. As Table 23.1 shows, the governing centre-right coalition took losses in the 2004 EP elections: CDA and VVD both lost two seats, D66 one.6 The coalition lost about one-fifth of its vote compared to the 1999 EP elections. Opposition leader Bos (PvdA) explained the result as a vote against the Balkenende government. Yet given the low turnout and the fact that the next House of Representatives elections are due in 2007, care is needed in explaining the result in national terms.7 Moreover, by prolonging the Dutch military presence in Iraq by eight months only one day after the vote, the governing parties made clear that the EP election result would not influence national policy-making. The biggest loser was VVD with 13.2 per cent of the vote, compared to 20.7 per cent in 1999. A failed election campaign, internal twists only days before the elections, as well as a latent leadership dispute between finance minister Gerrit Zalm and parliamentary party group leader Jozias van Aartsen are said to have settled the party’s hash. Table 23.1

Results of the 2004 European Parliament elections in the Netherlands

EP 2004

CDA PvdA VVD GroenLinks EurTrans SP CU/SGP D66 PvdD LPF PvhN NwRechts LeefbEur DemEur ResNu [Others]

7 7 4 2 2 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 27

Seats Gain/loss (compared to EP 1999) –2 +1 –2 –2 +2 +1 –1 –1 – – – – – – – – –4

EP 2004

Votes EP 1999

24.4 23.6 13.2 7.4 7.3 7.0 5.9 4.2 3.2 2.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0 100

26.9 20.1 19.7 11.9 – 5.0 8.7 5.8 – – – – – – – – 100

House of Representatives 2003 28.6 27.2 17.9 5.1 – 6.3 2.1 + 1.5 4.0 0.4 5.8 – – – – – 1.1 100

Note: In the Netherlands, EP elections are proportional representation elections.8

The Netherlands

199

Europa Transparant was the surprise of the elections, polling 7.3 per cent of the vote. As the party won two seats, Paul van Buitenen had more than enough reasons to ‘return to Brussels with a smile’. He stressed that his party is ‘a-political’ but ‘pro-European’. In the EP, van Buitenen will find an ally in his fight against fraud and corruption in Austrian Hans-Peter Martin, whose party Europäische Transparenz Initiative (ETI) also won two seats. Also SP won an extra seat. Of the small and new parties, only the Partij van de Dieren (PvdD) result is worth mentioning as well. Standing for animal rights in the EU, it won 3.2 per cent of the vote. While just failing to get a seat, the result was a big improvement on its 0.4 per cent share in the 2003 House of Representatives elections. With 2.5 per cent of the vote, LPF also failed to get an EP seat. The 2004 EP elections seemed to confirm the party’s demise. Unlike CU/SPG (ChristenUnie/Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij), Europa Transparant decided not to join the new anti-Constitution ‘Independence and Democracies’ group in the EP. Instead, Paul van Buitenen and Els De Groen joined the Green/Europe Free Alliance group as independent members. Tactically this was important for van Buitenen to gain a seat in the EP’s budgetary control committee. The other Dutch MEPs are (newcomers shown in italics) Camiel Eurlings (CDA), Maria Martens (CDA), Albert Jan Maat (CDA), Ria Oomen-Ruijten (CDA), Lambert van Nistelrooij (CDA), Corien Wortmann-Kool (CDA), Bert Doorn (CDA), Max Van den Berg (PvdA), Edith Mastenbroek (PvdA), Jan Marinus Wiersma (PvdA), Emine Bozkurt (PvdA), Dorette Corbey (PvdA), Thijs Berman (PvdA), Ieke Van den Burg (PvdA), Jules Maaten (VVD), Jeanine Hennis-Plaschaert (VVD), Jan Mulder (VVD), Toine Manders (VVD), Kathalijne Buitenweg (GroenLinks), Joost Lagendijk (GroenLinks), Erik Meijer (SP), Kartika Liotard (SP), Hans Blokland (CU/SGP), Bas Belder (CU/SGP) and Sophie in ‘t Veld (D66) from 20 July 2004 onwards. With an average age of 47.3 years, the new delegation is clearly young. Yet given turnover of only 40.7 per cent, Dutch MEPs are not among the least experienced. As twelve female candidates were elected on a total number of 27, the delegation is remarkably feminine as well.

Conclusion: a difficult task for the Dutch presidency In voting Europa Transparant, PvdD or SP, 17.5 per cent of the electorate voted for a different approach to the European integration process. By voting against the way established parties have managed the EU in the past, rather than against the European integration project as such, in the Netherlands, Eurocriticism rather than Euroscepticism seems to have dominated the 2004 EP elections. Given the election results in its own country, Austria, France, Sweden, Poland, the Czech Republic and the UK, the incoming Dutch presidency not only faced the difficult task of cooperating with a newly elected

200 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

and enlarged European Parliament, but also with a European Parliament in which a motley crew of ‘Eurorealists’, ‘Eurocritics’, ‘Eurosceptics’ and ‘Europhobes’ is keen on striking a different note than the prevailing ‘ever closer union’ one.

Notes 1. Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, often referred to as: ‘Tweede Kamer’. 2. Robert Harmsen (2002) ‘Europe and the Dutch Parliamentary Election of May 2002’, RIIA/OERN Election Briefing No. 3, 3. Robert Harmsen (2003) ‘Europe and the Dutch Parliamentary Election of January 2003’, RIIA/OERN Election Briefing No. 9, 4. The Netherlands Court of Auditors, ‘EU Trend Report 2003’, 5. ‘Für einen europäischen Gesellschaftsvertrag’, speech by Foreign Minister Bernard Bot, Humboldt Universität, Walter Hallstein Institut für Europäisches Verfassungsrecht, Berlin, 2 June 2004. 6. For the 2004 European Parliament elections, electoral alliances were made between CDA and CU/SGP, between PvdA and GroenLinks, as well as between VVD and D66. Without these alliances, CDA would have obtained an extra seat, at the expense of CU/SGP. 7. When comparing the results of the left opposition parties PvdA, SP and GroenLinks with their results in the 2003 House of Representatives elections, one could say that this bloc lost as well, dropping slightly from 38.6 to 38.0 per cent. Especially PvdA would be on the losing side, dropping substantially from 27.2 to 23.6 per cent. 8. A closed list system operates limiting the impact of preference votes. To be elected by preference votes, candidates must get more than 10 per cent of the electoral threshold. Only Ria Oomen-Ruijten, Emine Bozkurt and Kartika Liotard were elected this way.

24

Poland Aleks Szczerbiak

The EP election took place at a time of enormous uncertainty in Polish domestic politics. It was almost completely overshadowed by a government formation crisis that had engulfed Poland since March when ex-communist premier Leszek Miller announced his intention to stand down the day after Polish accession to the EU. By then Mr Miller’s Democratic Left AllianceLabour Union (SLD-UP) government was the most unpopular since 1989 with approval ratings of only around 5 per cent.1 Although it lost its parliamentary majority following the departure of its Polish Peasant Party (PSL) coalition partner in March 2003, the government had been fairly secure in office and able to win key parliamentary votes. The situation changed dramatically at the end of March when 33 SLD-UP deputies led by Sejm Marshall Marek Borowski broke away to form a new party, Polish Social Democracy (SDPL), thereby depriving Miller of his de facto parliamentary majority. Following Mr Miller’s resignation, President Aleksander Kwas´niewski (another ex-communist) entrusted the task of forming a new government to Marek Belka, his one-time economic adviser and Poland’s most senior representative in the US-led civilian administration in Iraq. Mr Belka failed to secure a parliamentary vote of confidence on 14 May winning the support of only 188 deputies (mainly from the SLD-UP), well short of the 226 required. The initiative then passed to parliament but none of its parties was able or willing to collect the signatures to nominate a candidate. According to the Polish Constitution, the President then had a final attempt to form a government and Mr Kwas´niewski re-nominated Mr Belka, with an investiture vote scheduled for 24 June. If Mr Belka then failed to secure a vote of confidence, Mr Kwas´niewski was constitutionally bound to call an early parliamentary election within 45 days, which effectively meant early to mid August. The EP election also took place at a time of increasingly tense relations between Poland and the two largest EU member states, France and Germany. 201

202 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

Relations with these countries were already strained since Poland strongly backed the US invasion of Iraq and agreed to run one of the post-war reconstruction zones without consulting its EU partners. They deteriorated even further when Polish (and Spanish) opposition to new voting provisions in the draft constitutional treaty, which France and Germany strongly supported, was one of the key factors in the breakdown of negotiations at the December 2003 Brussels summit. The voting system agreed at the December 2000 Nice summit gave Poland, along with Spain, 27 votes in the Council of Ministers, only two fewer than the four largest member states. The constitutional treaty, on the other hand, proposed replacing this with a new system requiring a ‘double majority’ of member states representing 60 per cent of the EU’s population to pass legislation, which was felt to be much less favourable to Poland and created fears of Franco-German domination. The Polish government also led a group of EU countries insisting that the preamble to the constitutional treaty should include an explicit reference to Europe’s Christian roots. The Miller government was strongly backed by all the main opposition parties for its stance on the constitutional treaty. Indeed, Jan Rokita, the parliamentary leader of the generally pro-EU liberal conservative opposition party the Civic Platform (PO), coined the slogan ‘Nice or Death’. All this meant that by the time of Polish EU accession in May 2004 and the June EP election positive feelings generated at the time of the overwhelming 77.45 per cent ‘Yes vote’ in the June 2003 accession referendum2 had, to some extent, subsided. This should not be exaggerated because polls taken since last June indicated that pro-EU feeling remained at very high levels. This was in spite of the barrage of negative publicity surrounding the negotiations on the constitutional treaty and the apparent threat that it represented to Polish interests. It was less surprising in view of survey evidence that most Poles were quite realistic about short-term benefits of EU membership. The constitutional treaty was due to be resolved at an EU summit the weekend after the EP election. The Polish government already appeared to be moving towards a compromise, when it lost its main ally following an apparent softening of Spain’s stance in the wake of the Socialists’ March election victory. Fearing that any compromise would fail to secure the necessary two-thirds parliamentary majority to ratify the treaty, President Kwas´niewski signalled that the alternative route of a popular referendum should be used, to be held concurrently with the next presidential election in autumn 2005 in order to secure the 50 per cent turnout required for it to be constitutionally valid.

The Euro-election 2004 The Polish EP electoral law was passed at the end of January 2004. Poland’s 54 MEPs were to be elected from 13 electoral districts corresponding broadly

Poland

203

to 16 regional provinces, except that two Western provinces, two Southern provinces and two North-Eastern provinces were merged into single districts. In a provision designed to encourage electoral participation, no fixed number of seats was allocated to each electoral district. This would be determined after the election on the basis of turnout in that district. First, the overall allocation of seats between the electoral committees would be determined nationally using the d’Hondt counting method (which favoured larger parties). Then, seats would be divided between electoral districts according to turnout using the (more proportional) Hare-Niemayer method. However, the impact of this provision was more than outweighed by other factors, not least the fact that the election was on the Sunday after the Catholic feast of Corpus Christi, a national holiday, so many Poles may have taken a ‘long weekend’ that included polling day, 13 June. The election was contested by election committees that comprised: parties, coalitions of parties or those registered by groups of at least 1,000 voters. Much of the parliamentary debate on the election law concerned the participation of these ‘civic lists’ that at one stage seemed might play a very important role. There was much speculation that President Kwas´niewski would sponsor one as a precursor to launching his own centre-left party in the future. This did not transpire. The election was dominated by more traditional party formations. In order to register a candidates’ list in an electoral district, an election committee had to collect 10,000 signatures. If it collected 10,000 signatures in at least seven electoral districts then it was automatically registered across the whole country. To share in the division of mandates, individual parties and civic committees had to secure at least 5 per cent of the vote nationally (electoral coalitions 8 per cent). In reality the only electoral committees with a serious chance were the 15 who managed to register candidates’ lists across the whole country. Only eight of them were real contenders: the SLD-UP, Peasant Party, Civic Platform, and Polish Social Democracy, together with the Catholic-nationalist League of Polish Families (LPR), conservative Law and Justice party (PiS), the radical-populist agrarian Self-Defence (Samoobrona) party led by the controversial Andrzej Lepper and the (non-parliamentary) liberal Freedom Union (UW).

The campaign and campaign issues Although the tempo picked up a bit during the last couple of weeks, the campaign was generally extremely low key and failed to capture the public’s imagination.3 One reason for this was that the main parties did not take it very seriously. Partly, they were not really sure what kind of campaign to run or how to pitch their message, given that it was the first time that they had contested EP elections. Perhaps most importantly the EP elections coincided with a domestic political crisis and parties focused more on whether a new

204 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

government would emerge or whether there would be an early parliamentary election, for which they wanted to conserve their energies. At best they treated the polls as a ‘dry run’ and indicator of their popularity ahead of the third and final attempt to form a government. Civic Platform actually formally wound up its campaign one week before the election was due to take place! There was virtually no official government campaign informing people about what this election was about nor any thought given as to how to encourage turnout apart from the provision in the electoral law noted above, about which most voters were probably unaware. The election law allocated a total of 15 hours of guaranteed air time on national TV (20 hours on national radio) for election committees that registered in at least nine districts and ten hours on regional TV (20 hours regional radio) for all election committees. Generally, the media failed to cover the election in a way that would generate interest and excitement. The lack of coverage by state TV, from which most Poles derived their political information, was particularly important and stood in stark contrast to their approach to other national polls. In the runup to previous parliamentary and presidential elections, Polish TV’s news had traditionally run short clips on the main parties’ campaigns in the weeks before the poll. Similarly, before the 2003 EU accession referendum the Polish TV main evening news programme Wiadomos´ci had a digital clock running in the corner of the screen showing the time left before polling day. European issues were not much in evidence in the campaigns. Only three of the eight main groupings’ slogans mentioned Europe specifically: the SLD-UP (‘Europe for development – development for Poland’), Law and Justice (‘Honourable representation in Europe’) and Polish Social Democracy (‘Let’s take advantage of the European opportunity’). Attempts to introduce European elements tended to be confined to persuading voters as to who would best represent Poland’s interests, either in general or by referring to specific policy areas such as: agricultural subsidies, the EU budget, regional funding or research and development. Civic Platform, SLD-UP, Freedom Union and Polish Social Democracy generally presented the EU in a positive light as an opportunity, while the LPR and Self-Defence portrayed it as a threat. The LPR revived its old accession referendum slogan of ‘Yesterday Moscow, today Brussels’, while Self-Defence, terming their approach ‘Eurorealist’, called for a complete renegotiation of the accession terms and withdrawal from the EU if this could not be achieved. Dovetailing with their broader populist message, Self-Defence argued that only they could do this because they were not compromised by earlier participation in the accession negotiations. Although some parties did flesh out their European policies and some produced special ‘European election programmes’, with a few notable exceptions, there was little attempt to present clear choices about the EU’s future trajectory. The main exception to this was probably the Law and Justice party which produced a fairly detailed policy statement ‘A Europe of solidaristic Nations’ outlining a vision of the EU that was strongly intergovernmentalist but also based on

Poland

205

high fiscal transfers from richer to poorer states. This was published with little fanfare on its website a few days before the election, although its main ideas were set out in a shorter policy statement, the ‘Krakòw Manifesto’, that accompanied the campaign launch. Civic Platform and the Democratic Left Alliance produced reasonably substantial European policy statements but did little to publicise them. The Peasant Party produced a lengthy but fairly banal set of ‘election theses’, while the LPR and Polish Social Democracy produced a short ‘statement of aims’ and ‘election appeal’ respectively. Surprisingly, given the earlier controversy that had surrounded it, there was relatively little mention of the constitutional treaty during the campaign. The only main parties giving it any prominence were the LPR, who rejected it in principle as a step towards the construction of a European ‘super-state’, and Law and Justice, who called for an explicit reference to Christianity in the treaty and pledged to oppose any moves to ‘compromise’ on retaining the Nice voting system. Both, particularly the LPR, had a very ‘national-patriotic’ flavour to their campaigns. Even Civic Platform gave the issue relatively little prominence, save for a brief defence of Nice in their European programme as the best way to protect the EU from the emergence of a ‘hegemonic’ group of member states (implicitly France and Germany). Not surprisingly given the issue’s domestic political salience in recent months, most parties tried to present themselves as vigorous opponents of corruption and their candidates as having ‘clean hands’. Non-European and generally domestic themes dominated the campaign, particularly socio-economic issues such as unemployment, taxation and pensions. Civic Platform’s approach perhaps best exemplified this. Its election broadcasts, with extracts from party leaders’ campaign rally speeches, focused on national issues, particularly attacking the Miller government. They could easily have been rerun as one of the party’s broadcasts at the next parliamentary election! Similarly, in the weekend before the election, Civic Platform’s final campaign call was for a referendum to amend the Polish Constitution to: cut the number of MPs, abolish the second chamber and introduce single-member constituencies for parliamentary elections (seen by many as a panacea against corruption and populism). The LPR devoted one of their campaign broadcasts – ‘They wanted war’ – to Poland’s involvement in Iraq, calling for a referendum on withdrawing Polish troops, wanted by a majority of Poles but opposed by most mainstream parties. Virtually all the parties focused on individual candidates’ qualities, stressing their European experience, education, career status and knowledge of foreign languages. The Peasant Party did this implicitly by, uniquely, standing virtually all of the party’s top leadership as election candidates. In Self-Defence’s case this was a defensive strategy to counter its stereotype as a leader-dominated, parochial and badly educated party lacking experienced and competent cadres. The Freedom Union persuaded some key figures involved in the enlargement negotiations (such as ex-Foreign Minister Bronisław Geremek and Chief Negotiator Jan Kułakowski) to stand on their ticket, and ran a simple but

206 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

clever campaign juxtaposing them with images of their younger candidates, and portraying themselves as representing both ‘the future and experience’, as their campaign slogan put it. Civic Platform, Law and Justice, Self-Defence and Polish Social Democracy ran campaigns that focused heavily on their national party leaders’ qualities even though none actually stood for election. Transnational EP party manifestos, logos or speakers were almost completely absent from the campaign. The only significant exception was when Civic Platform, a member of the European People’s Party (EPP), invited German Christian Democrat leader Angela Merkel to address its campaign launch. The Democratic Left Alliance, who had always sought to use recognition by socialist international bodies to legitimate their transformation from a communist to a social democratic party, and Law and Justice, who had demonstrably resigned from the EPP over various issues including the latter’s support for the constitutional treaty, used the logos of and put statements by the Party of European Socialists and the Union for a Europe of Nations respectively on their websites but made little use of them in their campaigning. The other two parties with transnational European party links – the Peasant Party (EPP) and Freedom Union (Party of European Liberal Democrats and Reformists) – hardly mentioned this in their campaigns. In putting domestic and non-European issues to the fore, were the parties simply responding to voters’ concerns? The evidence for this is inconclusive. According to Gallup in May, 71 per cent of Polish voters said that they would be influenced by party stances on national issues when deciding how to vote. But 62 per cent also said that stances on Europe would be an essential element of their choice.4 Without more detailed polling evidence it is impossible to draw firmer conclusions on this. The result One of the most striking features of the EP election in Poland was the incredibly low turnout of only 20.87 per cent. As Table 24.1 shows, this was the lowest turnout in any Polish national election or referendum held since 1989. It was also the second lowest (after Slovakia with 16.96 per cent) of any EU state. Table 24.1

Turnout in post-1989 Polish elections and referendums (%) 90

91

93

94

95

96

97

98

00

01

02

03 04

Local Presidential

42.3 33.8 45.5 44.2 60.6(1) 64.7(1) 61.1 53.4(2) 68.2(2) Parliamentary 43.2 52.1 47.9 46.2 Referendums 32.4 42.9 58.9 European 20.87 Source: Rzeczpospolita, 14 June 2004 and Polish State Electoral Commission ().

Poland

207

Eight parties and electoral coalitions crossed the respective 5 per cent and 8 per cent thresholds (Table 24.2). Civic Platform won 24.10 per cent of the vote, a little less the 26–31 per cent pre-election poll prediction but almost double its September 2001 parliamentary election score. The biggest surprise was LPR’s strength in second place with 15.92 per cent of the votes, 8.05 per cent up on 2001 and above the 8–13 per cent opinion poll predictions.5 Law and Justice won 12.67 per cent, as projected, and 3.17 per cent up on 2001. However, the other surprise was Self-Defence with 10.78 per cent, similar to its 2001 share but well below projections of 16–23 per cent. Although the SLD-UP’s 9.35 per cent represented a massive 31.68 per cent slump in support compared with 2001, polls had shown them hovering around the 8 per cent threshold for electoral coalitions. They were also pleased to emerge as the clear victors in the battle for the ‘left vote’ with Polish Social Democracy (5.33 per cent). The Freedom Union (7.33 per cent) and Peasant Party (6.34 per cent) were relieved to have crossed the 5 per cent threshold, which had been in considerable doubt. Table 24.2

Results of the June 2004 Polish elections to the European Parliament Votes

Civic Platform League of Polish Families Law and Justice Self-Defence Democratic Left Alliance-Labour Union Freedom Union Polish Peasant Party Polish Social Democracy

%

2001

Change (%)

MEPs

1,467,775 969,689 771,858 656,782

24.10 15.92 12.67 10.78

12.68 7.87 9.50 10.20

+11.42 +8.05 +3.17 +0.58

15 10 7 6

569,311 446,549 386,340 324,707

9.35 7.33 6.34 5.33

41.03 3.10 8.98 –

–31.68 +4.23 –2.64 –

5 4 4 3

Sources: Polish State Electoral Commission (); A. Szczerbiak, ‘Poland’s Unexpected Political Earthquake: The September 2001 Parliamentary Election’, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, XVIII (2002) 41–76 (50).

Some commentators interpreted the low turnout and high vote for parties hostile to or extremely critical of the EU – particularly the LPR, Self-Defence and (although to a lesser extent) Law and Justice – as a sign that Poles were becoming disillusioned with the EU. The LPR had spearheaded the campaign against Polish EU accession during last June’s referendum and, while it did not explicitly advocate Polish withdrawal this time, its campaign materials continued to attack the EU as a threat to sovereignty and for promoting what it saw as anti-Christian values. LPR strongly opposed any EU constitutional treaty as a matter of principle. While Self-Defence did not share LPR’s axiological critique of the EU, it bitterly criticised Poland’s terms of EU accession and

208 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

threatened withdrawal if they could not be renegotiated successfully. Law and Justice had a highly critical, but more restrained, approach towards the EU. To interpret the low turnout as some kind of ‘Eurosceptic backlash’ is to oversimplify at best. Post-1989 turnouts have generally been fairly low, and under 50 per cent in three out of the last four parliamentary elections. In recent years Poles have become increasingly cynical about politicians and alienated from the political process in general, not least because of a string of highprofile political corruption scandals. The main reason for the exceptionally low turnout was the fact that most Poles simply did not understand the purpose of the election. A May 2004 Gallup poll found that among the most common reasons cited for abstention was insufficient knowledge about the EP’s role (71 per cent) or insufficient information (62 per cent). Only 20 per cent (compared to the EU average of 42 per cent) said they had enough information; 26 per cent said they would abstain because they were against the EU.6 The government ran no official information campaign explaining the EP’s functions, and the main parties and media did little either to fill the information vacuum or generate interest. Drawing conclusions about Polish attitudes towards the EU from the vote won by Eurosceptic and Eurocritical parties is also problematic, first because other issues overshadowed the campaign. Second, most parties did not present clear choices about the EU’s future trajectory and Poland’s role within it. The LPR did but also focused on other issues such as Poland’s involvement in Iraq. Third, polling evidence suggests that the European issue has a low salience in determining the voting behaviour of the Eurosceptic and Eurocritical parties’ supporters, given that many are actually pro-EU. More than a third of LPR supporters’ voted ‘Yes’ in the EU accession referendum. Self-Defence voters were almost evenly divided and more than 80 per cent of Law and Justice voters supported accession.7 Subsequent polls confirmed these patterns of support for EU membership in June. While so many LPR voters disagreed with the party on this ‘trademark’ issue suggests that opposition to the EU was not necessarily what motivated their support for the party. Fourth, it is important to bear in mind the very high vote for parties with a broadly positive message about the EU – the SLD-UP, Freedom Union, Polish Social Democracy and (earlier talk of ‘Nice or Death’ notwithstanding) the Civic Platform. The Peasant Party backed a ‘Yes’ vote in the referendum, has a strong Eurosceptic current (including its recently elected leader Janusz Wojciechowski) but was broadly neutral. Finally, Polish attitudes towards the EU have changed little since the overwhelmingly ‘Yes’ vote in the 2003 referendum. Eurosceptic and Eurocritical parties’ support was not really much more than predicted. The main surprise was that the main beneficiary was the LPR rather than Self-Defence. This was probably because the LPR’s ‘religious right’ electorate was more disciplined and motivated than Self-Defence’s, which – in the context of a very low turnout – boosted the former’s support. This probably also explains the relatively good (compared to their worst

Poland

209

expectations) vote for the SLD-UP and the Peasant Party. The SLD and the Peasant Party were easily the best organised political parties in Poland, with the highest membership levels and local organisational penetration, and, therefore, best able to mobilise their ‘core’ supporters.

Conclusion The EP election was clearly a major triumph for the centre-right opposition parties, particularly the liberal conservative Civic Platform. Parties opposed to or critical of the EU also performed well, although the main beneficiary of this was the Catholic nationalist LPR rather than the radical-populist Self-Defence party, that most pre-election polls had shown challenging Civic Platform for first place. The governing SLD-UP saw a huge slump in its support. The 20.87 per cent turnout in Poland was the second lowest in Europe and a record low for a post-1989 national poll. None of this necessarily questions Poland’s commitment to European integration through the EU. Low turnout reflected an alienated and confused, rather than anti-European, electorate. The campaign failed to generate any interest or excitement and was completely overshadowed by the government formation crisis and prospect of an early parliamentary election. The main parties did not know how to approach the campaign which they gave a low priority and the media did little to fill the information vacuum. With few notable exceptions, very little attempt was made to use the campaign to present voters with clear choices about the EU’s future trajectory. The lack of focus on European issues in party campaigns, together with the lack of hard data on what motivated voters to support particular parties, makes it difficult to draw firm conclusions about attitudes towards Europe on the basis of this election and the extremely low turnout makes it hard to extrapolate any general political trends from these results.

Notes 1. The Democratic Left Alliance was the direct successor to the former ruling Communist Party, the Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR) and the Labour Union its small social democratic electoral ally that drew supporters from both the Communist Party and democratic opposition. 2. See A. Szczerbiak, ‘History Trumps Government Unpopularity: The June 2003 Polish EU Accession Referendum’, West European Politics, XXVII (2004). 3. See M. Czaplicki, Analizy i Opinie 25: Pierwsze wybory europejskie w Polsce (Warsaw: Instytut Spraw Publicnych, June 2004). 4. See: 5. Polish polls tend to underestimate support for parties such as the LPR, whose electorate comprises what might be termed the ‘religious right’, because many of these people distrust and are reluctant to cooperate with opinion pollsters. 6. See . 7. See Szcerbiak, ‘History Trumps Government Unpopularity’.

25

Portugal José M. Magone

Introduction Since 17 March 2002, Portugal has been ruled by a right-centre coalition government, consisting of the liberal-modernist social democratic party Partido Social Democrata (PSD) led by EU Commission President designate José Manuel Durao Barroso, and the conservative-Eurosceptic Democratic Social Centre-People’s Party (Centro Democratico e Social-Partido Popular – CDS-PP) led by populist Paulo Portas. The governing coalition came to power after the resignation of the socialist prime minister Antonio Guterres following big losses in the local elections on 14 December 2001. President Jorge Sampaio, after consulting the main political forces and the state council, then called for early elections. In March 2002, Barroso’s PSD was unable to win an absolute majority and formed a coalition with the CDS-PP. The right-centre coalition campaigned with an austerity programme to cut the budget deficit, which exceeded the previous Guterres’ government limit of 3 per cent of GDP set up by the EU Growth and Stability Pact. Indeed, in July 2002 the EU Commission estimated Portugal’s budget deficit at 4.1 per cent. Finance Minister Manuela Ferreira Leite introduced public sector cuts, especially in the oversized public administration. This simply added to the already dire economic recession. Austerity persisted throughout 2003 with negative growth and accelerating unemployment by the end of the year. During 2003, Portugal was also shattered by a major paedophilia scandal in the Casa Pia, the major charity taking on orphan and abandoned children. Several prominent public figures were indicted, including Paulo Pedroso, a former minister in the previous Guterres government. The support of socialist leader Eduardo Ferro Rodrigues for Pedroso led to a major crisis inside the party. A further paedophilia scandal broke out in the island archipelago of 210

Portugal 211

Azores which added to the negative image of the country and simultaneously to a depressing atmosphere in politics. Although the European Convention was discussed thoroughly in Portugal, it remained very much an elitist undertaking and did not engage the public. Portugal’s approach to European integration so far has been dominated by public administration and characterised by mere reactive adaptation to demands from Brussels. In the 1999 election, 25 MEPs were elected in a single constituency by the d’Hondt system of proportional representation. Nevertheless, under the negotiations of the Treaty of Nice, Portugal lost one seat and therefore in 2004 only 24 MEPs were to be elected. EP elections in Portugal are second order, and in contrast to Denmark and the UK, they more or less mirror the national party system. This is reinforced by the fact that the Eurosceptic vote is small and the vast majority of the population is very pro-European, even though it is insufficiently informed about EU institutions and policies.

The 2004 Euro-election The year 2004 had a symbolic importance for two reasons. First because Portugal hosted the prestgious European football championship in June–July 2004. The so-called ‘Euro 2004’ was seen as an opportunity to overcome the previous years of recession and put the country back on the map. Euro 2004 was acclaimed as a big success by the European football federation UEFA. This was reinforced by a brilliant performance by the Portuguese team which reached the final and became European vice-champions. Second, Portugal celebrated the thirtieth anniversary of its democracy on 25 April, the day on which the former authoritarian dictatorship had been toppled by the Movement of Armed Forces (MFA) in a bloodless coup d’état in 1974. Although Portugal has still many weaknesses and problems, democracy is now strongly rooted in the country. The European elections were overshadowed by the European Football championships. Voters went to the polls on Sunday 13 June, after Portugal had played its first match against Greece and lost 2:1. Moreover, the day was quite hot and many people simply headed for the beach. It was also St Anthony’s day, the patron saint of Lisbon, so many took this opportunity to have a long weekend starting on 10 June, a national holiday, until 13 or 14 of June. These factors help explain the low turnout of 38.7 per cent, compared to the 40.29 per cent in the 1999 EP elections. European elections are normally contested by a number of smaller parties as well as the five main parties. Nineteen parties took part under the aegis of 13 official electoral groups. The list of candidates included two coalitions. The more important one was the governmental PSD and CDS-PP coalition called Forca Portugal (‘Go on Portugal’) emulating Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia and trying opportunistically to capitalise on public enthusiasm for Euro 2004 and

212 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

support for the Portuguese football team. The list was headed by former EU Commissioner Joao de Deus Pinheiro, who felt a bit misplaced in the overall strategy of the governmental parties given that he was the coalition’s second choice as list leader following former party leader Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa’s decision not to head the list. A joint effort via Forca Portugal was agreed by the two main parties on 13 April 2004. Indeed, until now the PSD members belonged to the European People’s Party (EPP) and the CDS-PP members to the Union for Europe of the Nations (UEN) (Expresso, 9 and 17 April 2004). The Democratic Unitary Coalition (Coligacao Democratica Unitária – CDU) consisted of the Communist Party (Partido Comunista Portugues – PCP) and the Greens (Partido Ecologista Os Verdes – PEV) and was headed by Ilda Figueiredo. The CDU took a critical stance on the Iraq War, demanding a more independent EU position. The CDU campaigned for a referendum on the new constitutional treaty. Internal problems also surfaced within the Communist Party which had been in the limelight over the past two years owing to dissent over its leadership. The Socialist Party (Partido Socialista – PS), ‘winner’ of the 1999 EP elections, hoped to exploit growing public discontent over the Barroso government’s austerity policies. PS nominated the prominent former president of the Audit Court and former minister in the Guterres government, Antonio Sousa Franco, as head of the list. In the 1999 elections Mario Soares had headed the list and led a campaign making the case for his election as President of the European Parliament, thwarted in the event by opposition from the European People’s Party. Antonio Sousa Franco, however, secured instant recognition owing to his general popularity. Nevertheless, in the last week of the campaign, he collapsed in the middle of campaigning in Matosinhos and died instantly. Further to the left, the elections were contested by the Left Block (Bloco da Esquerda – BE) comprising four small extreme left and new wave parties: the Trotskyite Socialist Revolutionary Party (Partido Socialista Revolucionario – PSR), the Maoist People’s Democratic Union (Uniao Democratica Popular – UDP), the new wave Politics XXI, and the Left Revolutionary Front (Frente de Esquerda Revolucionaria – FER). Their roots go back to the 1974–75 revolutionary period. The BE has been quite successful since 1999 in winning seats in the Assembly of the Republic. The left bloc list was headed by Miguel Portas, brother of CDS-PP leader Paulo Portas. Miguel Portas had to fund the campaign personally owing to a lack of campaign funds. Regarded as the main rival to the communist coalition, opinion polls predicted that BE would win one seat in the European Parliament. Apart from these main electoral lists, nine other parties contested the elections. All were too small to constitute a real challenge to the main parties. On the right, was the New Democracy Party (Partido da Nova Democracia – PND) led by Manuel Monteiro, former CDS-PP leader. He decided to found a new party in 2003, due to growing disappointment with the policies of his

Portugal 213

former party supporting deeper integration. Accordingly, PND is strongly Eurosceptic and against further integration. A highly nationalist, extreme right-wing party, the National Renewal Party (Partido Renovador Democratico – PNR) founded in 2000, also ran. It copies the positions of Jean Marie Le Pen, leader of the French Front Nationale; of Nicholas Griffin of the British National Party, and Gianfranco Fini of the National Alliance (Alleanza Nazionale). It uses slogans such as ‘Portuguese first!’ or ‘Portugal First!’ to mobilise its voters. It presents ready-made solutions to the problems of corruption, unemployment, immigration and criminality. Also on the right is the People’s Monarchic Party (Partido Popular Monárquico – PPM) founded in 1974. It was at its height between 1979 and 1983 when it was in the centre-right coalition called Democratic Alliance, led by the PSD. It has been in decline ever since. One of the main leaders of the PPM decided to found a new ecological party in 1994 and so split the vote. The Party of the Earth Movement (Partido Movimento da Terra – MPT), led by Goncalo Ribeiro Telles, has been unable so far to make any real headway. On the left, two tiny extreme left-wing parties are still active, inspite of a decline of their electoral support. By far the most important is the Maoist Communist Party of Portuguese Workers-Movement for the Reorganisation of the Party of Proletariat (Partido Comunista dos Trabalhadores PortuguesesMovimento Reorganizativo do Partido do Proletariado – PCTP-MRPP), led by Arnaldo Matos and Garcia Pereira, who presented Orlando Alves as head of list. The PCTP-MRPP follows a strong Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideology which is anti-capitalist in its rhetoric. In respect of the EU, it advocated a referendum on the constitutional treaty. The less important extreme left-wing group is the Trotskyite Workers’ Party for Socialist Unity (Partido Operario de Unidade Socialista – POUS) led by Carmelinda Pereira and Aires Rodrigues and usually winning 4,000–5,000 votes in elections. Additionally, three other tiny parties took part that are difficult to locate in a left–right spectrum.The Democratic Party of the Atlantic (Partido Democratico do Atlantico – PDA) is a regionalist party in the autonomous regions Azores and Madeira. It is a tiny party of friends mostly based in the Ponta Delgada in the Azores. It is a moderate version of previous independence movements in both islands. Another, the Humanist Party (Partido Humanista) advocates a non-violent way of life for human beings. The head of its list was lawyer Luis Guerra, who called for an ‘open Europe, a Europe of cultures and of new times’. The Movement for the Ill (Movimento do Doente) ran as a single issue party, demanding better health care.

The campaign and campaign issues All the parties emphasised the importance of boosting turnout. The EP office in Lisbon invested in a campaign of posters and rock concerts to bolster awareness of the EP elections. This was also reinforced by a campaign of

214 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

the National Electoral Commission designed to encourage the electorate to vote. In terms of advertising, each political party was entitled to free television time, allocated according to the strength of the political parties, by public and private television as well as radio. Each party was entitled to public reimbursement of electoral campaign expenditures in line with its election results. The campaign began at the end of April. The main issue overshadowing the EP elections was the government’s austerity policies which opposition parties said damaged the economy and exacerbated rising unemployment. The negative discourse of the government led to a general decline in confidence in the Portuguese economy. The coalition parties countered with the argument that they were only sorting out a budget deficit inherited from the previous Socialist government. The coalition parties targeted the head of list of the Socialist party Antonio Sousa Franco, who had been the Finance Minister of the previous government. He was called by the Forca Portugal coalition as the ‘father of the budget deficit’. Apart from this dispute between the two main parties, the communist coalition took a more Eurosceptic line making the case for a referendum on the new constitutional treaty and criticising the Growth and Stability Pact. This was reinforced by similar eurosceptic arguments by the BE on the left and Monteiro’s New Democracy on the right. European issues were far more prominent that in the 1999 elections. The political groupings tended to emphasise the growing convergence of European and national policies. The most European of candidates was Antonio Sousa Franco from the Socialist Party which fully endorsed all European policies. The Socialist Party emphasised the European legacy of the Socialist Party going back to the foundation of the party in 1973. Its slogan was ‘With Europe in all big events’ (‘Com a Europa em todos grandes momentos’). Forca Portugal’s electoral programme was a compromise between the PSD and CDS-PP. Although it emphasised the importance of the EU and its policies for the future development of the country, it also highlighted the importance of defending national interests. One of the main campaign posters included a photograph of Deus Pinheiro and the word ‘competence’ (competencia). The use of the national flag as the symbol of the coalition led to major opposition protests who lambasted this as mere opportunism due to the European football championships. This ‘footballisation’ of the campaign was unprecedented in Portuguese electoral history. According to Article 12 of the law on political parties, no party may use or abuse national symbols such as the national flag. Of the two coalition parties, the junior partner had to make major ideological concessions, and rein in their strong Eurosceptic elements. Therefore, the CDS-PP had major difficulties in dealing with the New Democracy Party of Manuel Monteiro, which was able to exploit the situation even though it was seen negatively by its junior partner in Forca Portugal. On several occasions, Deus Pinheiro was pressured by CDS-PP not to

Portugal 215

take part in debates with Manuel Monteiro and the latter claimed that he was being discriminated against by the main parties (Expresso, 15 May 2004). The Communist coalition coordinated its campaign with all other European communist parties. The common platform agreed in Nicosia stressed the view that the EU should be a counterbalance to the United States and be proactive in promoting peace. Moreover, it emphasised the need for proactive employment policies, environmental aspects and the referendum for the constitutional treaty. The left bloc also presented a pro-peace message, emphasising aspects of solidarity within the EU. It called for a ‘refoundation of the European Union’ not ruled by the ‘directorate of the rich countries’. In this sense, the BE competed for left-wing votes. The death of Antonio Sousa Franco in the last week of the campaign led to an early end of the campaign as a mark of respect for such a prominent Portuguese politician.

Election results The last opinion poll in the week before the elections predicted victory for the Socialists. The main weekly newspaper Expresso predicted that the Socialist Party would win 43.3 per cent of the vote and 11 seats, Forca Portugal 37.8 per cent and 10 seats, the communist coalition CDU 7.7 per cent of the vote and two seats, the left bloc 5.6 per cent of the vote and one seat (Expresso, 10 June 2004). The actual result exceeded expectations for the left-wing parties. Governmental parties lost heavily and the centre-right parties suffered their worst defeat since the advent of the new democratic regime. The difference between the PS and Forca Portugal was 11.2 per cent (Table 25.1). Left-wing parties captured together accounted for 60 per cent of the vote, and the right 36 per cent. The coalition parties lost 230,000 votes compared to the 1999 EP elections. Most of their voters either abstained or switched to the PS and the other smaller parties. In terms of electoral geography the coalition parties disappeared from the larger cities, from the Algarve and many northern localities, which have been in the past centre-right strongholds. The coalition parties were replaced by the Socialist Party. The coalition government lost also in the autonomous regions of Madeira and Azores, traditionally PSD strongholds. The EP elections were the first test of the coalition government. The results suggest a strong protest against the government as well as a vote for Antonio Sousa Franco. The big winner, however, was the new small left bloc, which won 4.9 per cent of the vote and one EP seat for its first MEP, Miguel Portas. This was a big achievement for this new formation consisting of different small left-wing parties which is now a force to be reckoned with nationally and at European level. The group tends to attract young voters in the larger cities. It has become a major threat to the communist coalition, which, in spite of the remarkable result of 9.1 per cent, lost 50,000 voters compared to the EP elections of 1999. Manuel Monteiro’s New Democracy won 1 per cent of the vote and may be a threat to the CDS-PP in future elections.

216 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

Table 25.1

European Parliament election results in Portugal, 1999 and 2004

Party/Coalition

2004 %

Socialist Party(PS) 44.5 Forca Portugal(PSD/CDS/PP) 33.3 Socialdemocratic Party(PSD) Democratic Social Centre/People’s Party(CDS/PP) Democratic Unitary Coalition(PCP-PEV) 9.1 Block of the Left(BE) 4.9 New Democracy(ND) 1 Communist Party of Portuguese Workers (PCTP/MRPP) 1.1 Monarchic People’s Party(PPM) 0.5 Party of the Earth Movement(MPT) 0.4 Movement for the Ill(MD) 0.4 Humanist Party(PH) 0.4 National Renewal Party(PNR) 0.2 Workers’ Party for Socialist Unity(POUS) 0.1 Democratic Party of the Atlantic(PDA) 0.2 Turnout(Abstention) in Percentage

38.7 (61.3)

1999 Seats

%

Seats

12 9

43.05

12

31.1 8.12 10.32 1.79 –

9 2 2 – –

0.88 0.44 0.39 – – – 0.16 0.15

– – – – – – – – 25

2 1 – – – – – – – – – 24

40(60)

Sources: STAPE, 2004; CNE, 2004.

The 2004 EP election was characterised by a high level of abstentionism. Although it did not reach the 64.4 per cent abstention rate in the 1994 EP elections, it still reached 61.3 per cent. Even in the UK, turnout was slightly higher than in Portugal. Only Estonia, Poland, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Slovenia and Sweden had higher levels of abstentionism. Portugal’s turnout fell below the EU average of 45.7 per cent. Among its elected MEPs are six women (corresponding to 25 per cent of the delegation to the EP), including four Socialist Party members, one from Forca Portugal and one from the communist coalition.

Conclusions: a victory for the left The European elections in Portugal were dominated by the negative impact of the austerity policies of the right-centre coalition government under Prime Minister Manuel Durao Barroso, who meanwhile was nominated as the new President of the European Commission. The opportunistic creation of the electoral coalition Forca Portugal went horribly wrong for the parties of the coalition government. All opposition parties gained at the expense of the centre-right. EU issues, notably the constitutional treaty and security, while important, were overshadowed by national concerns in respect of the EU Growth and Stability Pact and domestic management of the economy.

Portugal 217

Among the new MEPs are very able people who have either governmental or parliamentary experience, such as Antonio Costa, Capoulas Santos, Edite Ferreira and Manuel dos Santos (all from the Socialist Party), Joao de Deus Pinheiro, Vasco Graca Moura and Silva Peneda (PSD), Ilda Figueiredo (PCPPEV) and naturally Miguel Portas (BE). In sum, the EP elections in Portugal were characterised by a protest vote against the austerity policies of the government, and by the emergence of new political parties on the left and right of the spectrum which campaigned strongly on European issues.

Bibliography Bloco de Esquerda (BE) (2004) Manifesto do Bloco de Esquerda para as Eleicoes ao Parlamento Europeu 2004. Refundar a Europa.Mudar Portugal, Comissao Nacional de Eleicoes (CNE) (2004) Expresso (weekly newspaper), Forca Portugal (2004), Manifesto Forca Portugal. Mais Europa, Melhor Portugal, (accessed 28 June 2004) Lobo, M.C., ‘Legitimizing the EU? Elections to the European Parliament in Portugal,1987– 1999’, in A.C. Pinto (ed.), Contemporary Portugal. Politics, Society and Culture (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), pp. 203–26 Magone, J.M., ‘Portugal’, in J. Lodge (ed.), The 1999 Elections to the European Parliament (Basingstroke: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 171–84 Magone, J.M., ‘Portugal’, in Richard Katz (ed.), Political Data Yearbook 2002, in European Journal of Political Research, 42:7–8, December (2003), pp. 1058–66 Magone, J.M., ‘Attitudes of Southern European Citizens Towards European Integration: Before and After Accession, 1974–2000’, in Antonio Costa Pinto and Nuno Severiano Teixeira (eds), Southern Europe and the Making of the European Union (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), pp. 209–36 Magone, J.M., The Developing Place of Portugal in the European Union (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2004) Magone, J.M., ‘Portugal’, in Richard Katz and Ingrid van Biezen (eds), Political Data Yearbook 2003, in European Journal of Political Research 43:7–8, December (2004) O Publico (daily newspaper) Partido Socialista (2004) ‘Pela Europa, pelos Portugueses. Documento-base para a Convencao Nacional Europa 2004’, in (accessed 28 June 2004) Partido Comunista Portugues (2004) ‘Declaracao do Encontro Nacional do PCP sobre as Eleicoes para o Parlamento Europeu. 28 Fevereiro de 2004’, (accessed 28 June 2004) Partido Comunista Portugues (2004) ‘Plataforma eleitoral comum para o Parlamento Europeu 27 de Abril 2004’, Partido Nacional Renovador (PNR) Secretariado para o Tratamento Administrativo do Processo Eleitoral (STAPE) (2004),

STAPE, Eleicoes para o Parlamento Europeu 1999. Atlas Eleitoral (Lisboa: STAPE, 2003) Torres, F., and A. Fraga, ‘What “Europe”? Portugal’s Reactive Adaptation to European and Institutional Changes’, in Sonia Lucarelli and Claudio Radaelli (eds), Mobilizing Politics and Society? The EU Convention’s Impact on Southern Europe, a special issue of South European Society and Politics, 19:1, summer (2004) 97–120

26

Slovakia Lenka Rovná

The Slovak Republic was established after the velvet split of Czechoslovakia on 1 January 1993.1 While Prague and Czech citizens noted this day with a certain nostalgia, Slovak political elites as well as citizens celebrated the creation of a new democratic state and the finalisation of the political emancipation of the Slovak nation.2 The leadership of the chairman of the Movement for Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) and the protagonist of the split of the country, Vladimir Meciar, with his not particularly European and Atlantic politics, led to the isolation of the country, and decelerated the process of the accession to the EU. Meciar’s government submitted the application to the EU in 1995, even earlier than his Czech counterpart Václav Klaus. However, European officials strongly criticised Slovakia’s leadership and the country was slipped into the second group negotiating EU accession. The defeat of Meciar and his politics in 1998 speeded up the process of Europeanisation, and Slovakia finalised the negotiation together with the other nine candidate countries in 2002. The whole accession process was concluded by a successful referendum held on 16–17 May 2003, where almost 93 per cent of voters (on a turnout of only 52 per cent) supported EU entry. (See Table 26.1 for 1990/92 views on Czechoslovakia’s future.) Table 26.1

The public’s views on the future of Czechoslovakia, 1990 and 1992

Variants

Independent states Federation Unitarian state Bundes Republic Confederation

Elections 1990 Elections 1992 Czech Republic Slovak Republic Czech Republic Slovak Republic (%) (%) (%) (%) 12 45 37 – –

13 63 14 – –

13 28 29 21 5

Source: Oskar Krejcí, Ceský národní zájem a geopolitika (Prague: Universe, 1993), p. 148.

218

18 26 11 6 31

Slovakia

219

Political context The last elections to be held before the European Parliament elections were the parliamentary elections with turnout at 70.06 per cent in September 2002. The official winner became HZDS, still headed by Vladimir Meciar. His party managed to win 19.5 per cent of the vote, but with a zero coalition potential of forming a new government. During the period 1994–98, HZDS was criticised for its authoritarian and undemocratic politics expressed by the misuse of the Slovak Secret Service and the oppression of the opposition. Nevertheless, the election results could be interpreted as the willingness of Slovaks to maintain democracy and join the European Union. The extreme right parties, The Slovak National Party (SNS) and the Real Slovak National Party (PSNS), did not pass the 5 per cent threshold necessary to enter parliament. The elections thus were a success for the centre-right parties, which had composed the previous ruling government (1998–2002) and who started the movement towards European structures and the EU. The Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (SDKÚ) won the support of 15.09 per cent of the voters and its leader and previous Prime Minister, Mikuláš Dzurina, preserved his position. Dzurinda, managed to address a pro-reform group of voters and proved that the orientation towards the EU and NATO was right.3 A newly formed political party, Direction (SMER), which was established just in 1999, achieved the third best result with 13.46 per cent of the votes. The ambitious young leader of SMER, Robert Fico, who claimed to follow ‘the third way’ and was inspired by New Labour, had – according to opinion polls – expected an overwhelming success and aspired for the position of Prime Minister. His rather loud election campaign created the opposite effect. Another former coalition party from the years 1998–2002, the Party of Hungarian Coalition (SMK), with its charismatic and popular leader Bela Bugar, achieved more than 11 per cent of the vote. The result reflected the ethnic cleavages in Slovakia, where a decisive minority of nearly 10 per cent of Hungarians lives in the southern region of Slovakia. The Christian-Democratic Movement (KDH), led by Pavol Hrušovský, gained 8 per cent. The liberals from the Alliance of the New Citizen (ANO), who managed to get 8 per cent of votes as well, joined the centre-right coalition government, which gathered together 78 seats from the 150 MPs in the National Assembly. The Communist Party (KSS), the only real unreformed leftist party in the new parliament, was supported by those voters who had been unable to find a place in the society since the fall of Communism in 1989. Simultaneously the party obtained some protest votes like in the case of the Czech Communists.4

The EP elections The elections to the European Parliament were held in Slovakia on Sunday 13 June 2004 from 7 am till 10 pm. This was the first time an electoral event had been held on a Sunday. It was expected that turnout would be boosted

220 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

by generating the expectation that people would be expected to go and vote just after morning mass. However, by then voter fatigue had set in. There had been two rounds of presidential elections and a referendum about the general elections in 2004. This contributed to depressing turnout.5 Seventeen political parties and associations contested the EP elections; seven claiming to be political parties, the rest referring to themselves as movements. Besides the parliamentary political parties, the presence of two parties representing the Hungarian minority, one of the Roma minority, one NGO called Active Women and two nationalist parties, expressed different cleavages in Slovak society. The election campaign was considered to be rather boring, concentrating mainly on the personalities of the candidates. The mass media blamed politicians for not having come up with any European agenda before the elections and for only repeating slogans from Brussels, such as ‘We look for unity in diversity’.6 The lack of topics and their abstract content reflected the absence of discussion inside the political parties about their European politics. In the main, political parties reproduced the agenda and topics of the manifestos of their partners or political families in the EP. No political party or movement rejected the membership of Slovakia in the EU, but a more sceptical approach was noticeable in the marginal Civic Conservative Party (OKS) represented by the Vice Rector of Comenius University, Professor Osuský. OKS together with the Communists also rejected the Constitution for Europe, while the Christian Democrats made its acceptance of the draft Constitution conditional upon the inclusion of explicit recognition of God in the preamble. The parties on the right of the political spectrum emphasised the fulfilment of the Four Freedoms and, especially SDKÚ, the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union of PM Dzurinda, advocated implementation of the euro in 2006. The left-wing parties (SMER, KSS) concentrated on the social dimensions of European integration. The question of a foreign European policy based on cooperation with the US was supported by the governing SDKÚ and the conservative OKS.7 Nationalist elements were prominent in the campaign. The nationalistic formation, the Coalition of Slovak National Party, the Right Slovak National Party, as well as the LS-HZDS8 of Meciar, openly expressed their anti-Hungarian grievances. Political elites and especially the governing political parties who succeeded in overcoming the isolation of the country, landing safely in NATO and the EU, also now give more attention to national interests and sovereignty, and are more cautious vis-à-vis the deepening of European integration than is the general public. According to research done by the Institute of Political Sciences of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, 24 per cent of Slovaks support a federal EU, while 22 per cent are for a confederation.9

The result Slovakia set the record for the lowest turnout in EP elections with only 16.96 per cent of voters going to the polls. (See Table 26.2) Compared to other

Slovakia

221

European countries, the governing coalition, whose MEPs sit with the EPP-ED group, was quite successful, winning eight of Slovakia’s 14 seats. Table 26.2 Party SDKÚ LS-HZDS SMER KDH SMK Total

The EP election results in Slovakia, 2004 % share of the vote

EP seats

17.1 17.0 16.9 16.2 13.2

3 3 3 3 2 14

Source:

The coalition political parties with their eight seats considered the result as a success even though the liberal governmental party ANO did not reach the necessary 5 per cent to win a seat, and 83 per cent of voters abstained. According to the Prime Minister, the mass media were to be blamed because they mainly commented the salaries of MEPs, instead of explaining the importance of voting in the EP elections and participation in European politics.10 The fact that the government coalition parties always supported European integration translated into increased sensitivity of their voters vis-à-vis the European agenda. The opposition was not sufficiently capable of mobilising citizens unhappy with governmental policy. The strongest governing party, SDKÚ, on the contrary, capitalised not on its European policies but on the popularity of the leader of its list, Peter Štastný – a former hockey player and manager of a hockey team, the St Louis Blues, who had lived in Canada for 24 years – and who did not hide his lack of knowledge about the subtleties of the European Constitution.11 The results and participation in the EP elections in Slovakia were less a referendum on the government and more a reaction to domestic political conditions, unlike in the Czech Republic. Low participation in the new member states, including the Czech Republic, and especially Slovakia, were the result of two factors: first, an insufficiently informed public; and second, preoccupation with the referendums on EU membership itself. The latter were especially important as they represented confirmation that their countries belonged to the happier and more successful part of Europe and the world. In the case of Slovakia, it was a confirmation of the recognition of a newly formed state ‘with its own star on a blue European flag’. EU membership is still considered by many citizens as an aim in itself and not yet as an instrument for influencing European politics and their own lives. Still, domestic political topics are felt to be more manageable and understandable for voters. As emphasised by Rustow or Dahrendorf, democracy has to be ‘the way of life’

222 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

and it takes more than one generation to get used to it.12 The EP elections thus provided a new level for the new citizens of an enlarged Europe to learn how to use their democratic rights.

Notes 1. Oskar Krejcí, Ceský národní zájem a geopolitika (Prague: Universe, 1993), p. 148. 2. K. Vodicka and L. Cabada, Politický systém Ceské republiky, (Political System of the Czech Republic), (Prague: Portál, 2003), p. 131. 3. 4. The Slovak Spectator, 8:36, 23–29 September (2002). 5. ‘Na Slovensku se ztratili volici’, ‘Slovakia lost voters’, MF Dnes, 15 June 2004, A13. 6. ‘Papierové hlavy’, ‘Paper‘s Heads’, Domino fórum 23:2 (2004). 7. SME, 9 June 2004, 2; Pravda, 9 June 2004, 4. 8. LS HZDS – People’s Party Movement for Democratic Slovakia. 9. ‘Europska integrácia alebo ignorácia? Nezaujem slovenských politických strán a politikov o europskú diskúsiu’, ‘European Integration or Ignoration? Ignorance of Slovak Political Parties about the European Discussion’, 11 June 2004, Fridrich Ebert Stiftung Slovensko, 10. ‘Koalícia zvít‘azila pri úcasti 17 per cent volicov’, (‘The Coalition Won with the participation of 17 per cent of Voters’), 11. Pravda, 9 June 2004, 4. 12. D.A. Rustow, ‘Transitions to Democracy, Toward a Dynamic Model’, in Comparative Politics, Number 3, April (1970), 337–64; R. Dahrendorf, Úvahy o revoluci v Evrope (Praha: Nakladatelství evropského klubu, 1991).

27

Slovenia Irena Brinar

Introduction Among the new European democracies that joined the EU in May 2004, Slovenia is believed to be politically the most stable one. Except for the first multiparty elections in 1990 when the DEMOS coalition, the opposition to the communist regime, formed the government (but did not end its term), and a brief six-month interlude in 2000 when Liberal Democracy (LDS) for tactical reasons decided to step down before the parliamentary election, the leading political party was the LDS. As a rule, it formed grand coalitions with different partners from all parts of the political spectrum, thereby ensuring a comfortable majority for its coalition governments in the parliament. In 2000 the LDS (centre, centre-left) formed a coalition with the Slovenian People’s Party (SLS – centre-right), the United List of Social Democrats (ZLSD – centre-left, left-wing) and the Democratic Pensioners’ Party (DeSUS – centreleft). In many ways the first EP election on 13 June 2004 came as a surprise because turnout was well below that in any national elections. Even more surprising was the interpretation of the results as electoral victory for the New Slovenia (NSI – centre-right, right-wing) and a relative defeat of the ‘ruling’ LDS. However, this would not necessarily be repeated at the national elections of October 2004.

The EP election 2004 Election day – Saturday – was cold and rainy, so many people stayed home, contrary to the expectation of election pundits. No simultaneous major sports or cultural events competed for Slovene attention. All political parties and politicians called upon the voters to vote, and expected a reasonably high turnout. However, a substantial majority abstained. This cannot be blamed on 223

224 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

the ‘electoral silence’ a day before elections and on polling day or the ban on publishing public election surveys (polls) a week before the elections. The same electoral legislation had been in force for national and local elections when turnout was much higher. (See Table 27.1) A combination of factors account for the low turnout: 45 per cent of respondents said they were disappointed with politics; 12 per cent said they had insufficient information; 10 per cent saw EP elections as irrelevant; 4 per cent thought EP candidates weak; 3 per cent felt the campaign was weak; 2 per cent blamed the weather; 1 per cent blamed all these.1 Table 27.1 Previous Slovenian presidential, parliamentarian, local elections and referenda turnout (1992–2004) Event

Presidential elections

Parliamentary elections

Local elections

Referenda

Year 1997 2002 1992 1996 2000 1998 2002 1996 1999 2001 2003 2004 Turnout 68.29 72.07 85.6 73.7 70.14 58.27 67.82 37.9 27.33 35.66 31.1 60.44 27.54 31.45 (%) (EU) Source: National Electoral Commission, , 21June 2004.

The campaign Low turnout harms left-wing and centre parties and benefits right-of-centre parties whose voters more reliably go to the polls. As in the accession process, there was no relevant anti-EU campaign. The Slovene National Party (SNS), which is the only declared parliamentarian Eurosceptic party, did not run a major campaign. It only participated in general public events, especially on TV and radio. There was some, although limited, civil involvement in the campaign. The Union of Free Trade Unions of Slovenia (ZSSS), the largest trade union and only member of the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), sent a questionnaire to all political parties and lists running for the EP election that focused on seven key topics: workers’ rights, full employment and sustainable development, more and better jobs, equal opportunities, social security, public services and infrastructure (for example, water supply), and strengthening of transborder trade union rights. Each of the topics was specified with several concrete questions. For example, the topic of workers’ rights included the following questions: ‘Which measures should be applied to enact the Directive 2002/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2002 establishing a general framework for informing and consulting employees in the European Community?’ ‘Will you support the revision of the Council Directive 94/45/EC of 22 September 1994 on the establishment of a European Works Council?’; ‘Will you support the formation of European Works Councils in companies that have not established them yet?’2 Although this trade union’s attempt can be considered a positive practice

Slovenia

225

of a civil society involvement, its effectiveness and impact on decisions of voters is doubtful. Firstly, only a fraction of the electorate knew about this action presented only on the trade union’s homepage. Secondly, only seven lists or individual candidates3 (of 13 lists running for the Euro-election) responded to the questionnaire and their answers were rather formal and general.

Mobilising the electorate The campaign for the first EP elections in Slovenia in 2004 will be remembered only because this was the first time that the Slovene electorate acted as a part of the European electorate of 450 million. Nothing spectacular happened during the campaign. It looked like Euro-enthusiasm, present in political elites and in the electorate during the accession process, had been worn out. Domestic issues dominated the campaign. Some attention was paid to the new European Constitution and security issues, while immigration and terrorism were hardly mentioned. Instead, the introduction of the euro, new financial perspectives (2007–13) and free movement of labour were the most important European issues. Getting the message across The campaigns mostly used mass media, especially TV, and direct contact with partisans and voters. TV debates were anything but spectacular. Often, they were dominated by domestic issues. Candidates were polite and nice to their opponents, seldom involved in direct confrontations, which, if they arose at all, focused on domestic issues. TV debates showed that the journalists and expert panellists often knew more about European issues than the candidates who – again and again – started to discuss domestic preoccupations. The similarity of the European manifestos of all political parties, parliamentary and non-parliamentary ones, is an important explanatory factor for their behaviour. Directly or indirectly, candidates stressed the need to realise Slovene national interests in the EU. Several well-rehearsed arguments from the EU accession campaign resurfaced. Consequently voters did not pay attention to the campaign. The public quickly realized that seven Slovene MEPs would not have much say in the 732-member EP or in its political groups. Even if all seven worked together and in unison defended a specific national interest (which voters thought unlikely considering existing political divisions) they would be hardly heard. From this perspective, the issue of who would be elected to the EP seemed irrelevant. TV advertising/advertising in general Public broadcasters, national TV and radio, and commercial TV (POP TV) started with the presentations of lists and public debates immediately after the official beginning of the campaign. Mainly the parliamentary parties with sufficient funding paid for additional TV advertising. National public

226 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

broadcasters, TV and Radio Slovenia broadcast seven primetime (TV – 8pm; radio – 5 pm) public debates each. Six debates were organised on specific topics (regionalism and the protection of Slovene specific interests; jobs and the protection of minorities; human rights, justice and the introduction of the euro; agriculture, education and Slovenia’s opportunities in the EU; ecology and free movement of workers; EU foreign and security policy and Slovene national identity), while the seventh was a final confrontation between all the party lists. However, it is very difficult to compare party positions on particular issues, since the initial six debates were organised in such a way as to ensure that each party or list was invited to only two public debates. Additionally, daily at 11 am – the second programme of Radio Slovenia presented lists, manifestos and candidates. Presentations of lists were broadcast also on the first programme at 4 pm following the main news programme. The commercial POP TV broadcasted two primetime public debates at 8 pm. The first debate focused on European issues (for example, the European Constitution, Christianity in its Preamble, competences and powers of the EP, Turkey’s EU membership, free movement of labour, and so on). It ran simultaneously with a public debate on a public TV that focused more on domestic preoccupations (regionalism and the protection of Slovene specific interests). A survey showed that viewers were more interested in domestic issues and watched public TV, so commercial television opted for a new format for the second public debate: they paid more attention to domestic concerns and invited journalists from neighbouring countries as guest participants. This highlighted Slovenia’s bilateral relations with these countries. The tactic paid off. Lists and individual candidates were hosted also by local radio and TV stations. The parties’ campaigns The law on elections to the EP required the lists to present their candidates and manifestos a month before the election, thereby making for a relatively short campaign. Usually the lists picked their leading candidates from among well-known political and public personalities. It was, however, sometimes difficult to meet the requirement that 50 per cent of candidates be female. Consequently, the majority of women candidates were relatively unknown. Only three parties, among them one parliamentary party (SMS), chose a woman as their leading candidate. The parties saw the EP Euro-election as a dress rehearsal for the autumn 2004 national parliamentary election. Not all parties campaigned with the same enthusiasm. Apart from using radio and television to promote their manifestos, some parties and lists ran more elaborate campaigns with jumbo posters, and different activities. The NSI had the best organised and most elaborate campaign that, besides the popularity of their main candidate Lojze Peterle, contributed to their electoral victory. Their candidates’ ‘Euro-bus’ visited more than 150 towns and villages, where they met interested voters. For some smaller villages and towns

Slovenia

227

this was the first opportunity people had had to meet and to talk to wellknown political personalities. This in itself attracted people. They produced an electoral brochure that presented their views and policies on an efficient Slovene and European economy, transparency of the EU budget, sustainable development, regional and agricultural development, security (based on a concept of human security across all spheres of life), increasing the EU’s role in the world and Slovenia’s role in the EU. Their campaign and approach appealed to voters although their leading candidate, Lojze Peterle (who was also selected as one of the ‘Europeans of the year’) was sometimes ridiculed for his somewhat populist approach and told that playing his harmonica would not be sufficient for success as an MEP. Two German MEPs (Elmar Brok, CDU, and Bernd Posselt, CSU) participated in public events. The SLS was far less successful in directly contacting voters, which shows that just going to several places is not enough. The SLS visited 159 towns and villages. Its campaign lacked a clear focus and the electoral slogan ‘100 per cent Slovenia’ seemed too pompous and vague. They suffered especially from the fact that electoral turnout in their strongholds, rural North-Eastern Slovenia, was below average. Although their leading candidate, Franc But, former agriculture minister, was well-known as a successful negotiator with the EU in the accession process, the SLS failed to win even one EP seat. Other political parties and lists did not use the direct approach as much. The SDS, another victor of the EP election, organised 50 electoral events and meetings in different towns under the slogan ‘Slovenia my fatherland also in Europe’. The central event of their campaign was the visit of the MEP HansGert Poettering, leader of the EP political group EPP-ED. The LDS made only 30 visits to different towns. It did not produce a special electoral brochure, but announced their priorities on their homepage. Their key electoral slogan was that Slovenia should become one of the most developed EU countries. The fact that they did not pay much attention to the actual mobilisation of their electorate to ensure a higher turnout backfired and they won only two seats, although they had been confident that they would win three. The ZLSD organised only 16 electoral events in bigger towns and cities. In addition to their key slogan ‘In Europe for the good of Slovenia’, each of their candidates used his or her own personal slogan to stress a personal note. They did not produce a special electoral brochure. Although their leading candidate was Aurelio Juri, the last candidate from the list Borut Pahor, (the president of the party and then the president of the national parliament (2000–04) who obviously hoped he would not be elected) was elected directly by preference votes. Public opinion Different agencies studying public opinion from April to June 2004 came to similar conclusions regarding projected turnout (between 32 and 67 per cent) and voter preferences, and all were surprised by the actual turnout.

228 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

Polls correctly forecast two seats for the SDS and one for the ZLSD. LDS was expected to get at least two and the NSI at least one. The final seventh seat was uncertain.

The results The low turnout was especially shocking. It was much lower than in ‘old’ member states, but also lower than in any national elections in Slovenia, only comparable to those in some referenda. However, this turnout was very similar to the ones in other new EU members. A possible explanation might be that voters, who had been bombarded with the EU issues during the accession process and before referenda, were simply fed up with the EU. Additionally, among others, the following explanations seem relevant: the electorate did not consider this election very important for their everyday life and realisation of their specific interests; a short duration and relatively poor content of electoral campaigns; voters knowing that 14 per cent of votes were required for an MEP believed that candidates who did not run for parliamentary parties did not stand a chance, which meant that many who preferred alternative candidates decided not to participate in the election. Above all, the results reflect the anti-governmental sentiment of those who abstained. This explains why domestic themes – such as denationalisation, corruption, disproportionately high salaries in public services, ‘erasure’ (the former SFRY (Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia) citizens who had their temporary or permanent residency in Slovenia and did not apply for Slovenian citizenship in 1991, but also did not arrange their status as aliens with permanent residency, and consequently were ‘erased’ from the list of permanent residents), relations between Slovenia and Croatia – to a large extent dominated the campaign. Compared with the recent national elections, the Euro-election in Slovenia showed a certain shift of the electorate – from left-of-centre to right-of-centre. (See Table 27.2.) However, it is questionable to what extent inferences can be drawn for the national elections from the EP election results. Four MEPs were elected by preferential votes – three of them as the leading candidate of their lists. Lojze Peterle received 77.3 per cent of the votes of NSI, while the second candidate on the list of the NSI, Ljudmila Novak, received only 0.99 per cent. On the list of LDS and DeSUS, Jelko Kacin received 58.4 per cent and Mojca Drcar Murko 5.9 per cent, and on the list of SDS, Mihael Brejc got 59.77 per cent while Romana Jordan Cizelj (the second candidate on the list) got only 2.7 per cent. The only MEP who was not a leading candidate and was elected by preferential votes was Borut Pahor (ZLSD) with 44.4 per cent of the votes of his list. Thus, in the EP election Slovenians did not vote for the parties but for candidates with adequate education, European experience and good reputations in Slovenia.4 As to the priorities of Slovene MEPs, they are likely to reflect Slovenia’s strategic priorities in the EU, agreed by all parliamentary

Slovenia

229

political parties: enlargement, the EU Lisbon Strategy, and the future EU financial perspective. Table 27.2 List

Results of the 2004 EP elections, Slovenia No. of voters

New Slovenia, Christian People’s Party 102,753 Liberal Democracy of Slovenia 95,489 and Pensioners’ Party Slovenian Democratic Party 76,945 United List of Social Democrats 61,672 Slovenian People’s Party 36,662 Slovene National Party 21,883 Slovenia is ours 17,930 Youth Party of Slovenia and Greens of Slovenia 10,027 Voice of Slovenian women 5,249 Party of Ecological Movement of Slovenia 2,588 National Party of Labour 2,022 Party of Slovenian People 1,386 Democratic Party of Slovenia 1,263

%

No. of MEPs

23.57 21.91

2 2

17.65 14.15 8.41 5.02 4.11 2.30 1.20 0.59 0.46 0.32 0.29

2 1

Note: Total no. of voters: 1,628,918; no. of voters participating: 461,879 (28.35%) Source: National Electoral Commission, , 21June 2004.

Notes 1. CJMMK (Center za raziskovanje javnega mnenja) (Public Opinion and Mass Communication Research Center, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana), Politbarometer 6/2004, junij 2004, p. 30, , (10 July 2004). 2. (10 July 2004). 3. The questionnaire was answered by: LDS, SLS (Franc But, MA), ZLSD, Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS), Youth Party of Slovenia with Greens (SMS), SNS and Slovenia is Ours (Dr Alja Brglez). 4. Such preferences of the Slovenian electorate were also noted in a public survey. See CJMMK, Politbarometer 11/2003, November 2003, pp. 18–19, , (10 July 2004).

28

Spain Roberto Espíndola and Fabio García

Introduction The Spanish EP elections on 13 June confirmed the position of the ruling Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE – Workers’ Socialist Party of Spain) at the March 2004 parliamentary polls. The 45 per cent turnout was the lowest of any election in the history of Spanish democracy and compared badly with turnout at the 1999 EP election. In March the centre-left PSOE got back into government after eight years in opposition, outrunning the centre-right Partido Popular (PP) in elections heavily marked by the terrorist attacks that hit Madrid just three days before the poll, as well as by the PP administration’s reaction to that tragedy. Prime Minister José María Aznar’s government blamed the attacks on the Basque terrorist organisation ETA and denied evidence linking the Madrid massacre to Islamic fundamentalist terrorists. That led to street protests and boosted turnout by three million, more than eight per cent compared to elections in 2000. Coupled with the unpopularity of Aznar’s decision to send Spanish troops to Iraq, it led to the PP defeat. The March events focused the voters’ concerns and the parties’ debate largely on Aznar’s foreign policies and on his administration’s failed attempts to manipulate the Madrid attacks. The priority given by Aznar to links with the US and UK had resulted in the Spanish participation in the invasion of Iraq, as well as in pro-US positions within the EU, similar to those of the UK and Poland. This contrasted with the PSOE governments’ policies until 1996 of closeness to the Franco-German axis. Aznar, with London and Warsaw, blocked key areas of the proposed EU constitution, and supported US actions in Iraq. The PSOE, on the other hand, opposed the presence of Spanish troops in Iraq and promptly withdrew them, giving the highest priority to Spain’s role within the EU and secondarily to its relations with Latin America and the Maghreb. In a political system characterised by an absence of Euroscepticism 230

Spain

231

and practically unanimous support for European integration from all the main political groups, the debate prior to the EP elections focused on those foreign policy issues.

The Euro-election 2004 The EP campaign was marked by apathy. It was the fifth time voters had been called to the polls within a year or so given local and regional government elections in May 2003, those for the Madrid regional government in October 2003, for the Catalan Parliament in November and the general parliamentary elections of March 2004. Apathy, therefore, could easily be explained as a consequence of voter fatigue. Another important factor could have been that whilst the electorate approve and support the EU and the EP, only a minority takes an interest in them1. Turnout may also have been depressed by the coincidence of polling day with major sporting events. Besides being the second day of the 2004 football Euro Cup, that day Spain hosted the World Motorcycling Championship and major car racing and basketball events. A further disincentive to turnout was the fact that the EP elections unusually did not coincide with any local government or regional polls; the only occasion that had occurred before was in June 1989, when turnout also fell. (Table 28.1). Table 28.1

Turnout at Euro-elections in Spain

Turnout (%) Abstention (%) MEPs

1987

1989

1994

1999

2004

68.52 31.48 60

54.71 45.29 64

59.14 40.86 64

63.05 36.95 64

45.14 54.86 54

Source: Interior Ministry of Spain.

Campaign participants To understand the campaign, it is essential to appreciate the overall public and party consensus in favour of European integration. Commentators are fond of quoting Ortega y Gasset’s dictum that ‘Spain is the problem, Europe the solution’. This positive approach extended to the recent enlargement, even though this meant Spain ceased to be a significant recipient of EU funds and became a net contributor. It has led to the total absence of either Euro-sceptic or specifically pro-EU parties or groups. This may perhaps change once the effects of enlargement are felt more directly or the balance of power shifts eastwards, marginalising Southern Europe. For the time being, European integration is not contested. The campaign was also affected by the electoral system, similar to the one used for parliamentary elections in applying the d’Hondt method of proportional representation, but with the significant difference of treating

232 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

the whole of Spain as one national constituency instead of the provincial constituencies used for general polls. This seriously affects regionalist parties, forcing them to stand nationwide and preventing them from drawing the significant benefits of their region-based vote they receive in parliamentary elections.2 Consequently, the main competitors in the 2004 EP elections were the three main national parties: PSOE with a list led by Josep Borrell, PP with a list headed by Jaime Mayor Oreja, and the list of the Communist Party-led coalition Izquierda Unida (IU – United Left) headed by Willy Meyer. Regional parties and those representing different brands of regionalist nationalism had to form coalitions and coalesced into three lists. One of them was Galeusca, formed by the Catalan party Convergencia i Unió (CiU – Convergence and Union), Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV – Basque Nationalist Party), Bloque Nacionalista Gallego (BNG – Galician Nationalist Bloc) and two smaller groups, Bloc Nacionalista Valencia (BNV – Valencian Nacionalist Bloc) and Partido Socialista Mallorquín/Entesa Catalana (FSM/EN – Socialist Party of Mallorca/Catalan Left), with a list led by Ignasi Guardans (CiU). At the 1999 EP elections both CiU and BNG went it alone, but their poor showing in the March 2004 general elections – compounded in the case of CiU by a defeat at regional polls that ended their 20 years as the ruling party in Catalonia – led them to join the Galeusca coalition. Europa de los Pueblos (Peoples’ Europe) was another coalition, formed by the regional nationalist groups more clearly identified with the left, namely Ezquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC – Republican Left of Catalonia), the Basque party Eusko Alkartasuna (EA), Chunta Aragonesista (CHA – Junta of Aragon), Partido Socialista Andaluz/Asamblea de Izquierdas de Andalucía (PSA/AIZ – Socialist Party of Andalucia/Assembly of Andalucia’s Left) and several small parties such as the Andecha Astur, Conceju Nacionaliegu Cantabru, Esquerra Verda del País Valencià and Iniciativa Ciudadana de La Rioja, with a list led by Bernat Joan (ERC). At the 1999 EP elections most of these groups formed a similar coalition, but including groups closer to the Christian Democratic centre such as PNV. Both this list and Galeusca gathered regional nationalist groups seeking a greater level of autonomy for their regions. The third list, Coalición Europea (European Coalition), represented a more moderate approach, putting itself forward as an intermediate position between the regional nationalists and the main parties. It was formed by Partido Andalucista (PA), Coalición Canaria (CC), Unión Valenciana (UV), Unión Mallorquina (UM), Partido Aragonesista (PAR) and other groups such as Convergencia de Demócratas de Navarra and Extremadura Unida, with a list headed by Alejandro Rojas Marcos (PA).

The campaign The campaign was highly personalised and largely focused on domestic issues. These meant that any reference to, or participation of, EP parties was marginal

Spain

233

at best, and often non-existent. Although PSOE, PP and IU play central roles in their respective EP groups – PSE, EPP-ED and GUE – the symbols and programmes of those groups were absent from the campaign. Party leaders and some of the main candidates either visited key EU figures or attended rallies held by sister parties at other EU member states and very occasionally included guests from sister parties in their own activities, but those instances were limited and received scarce media coverage. The only presence of the EP itself was limited to some television advertising encouraging citizens to vote. Within a centralised and highly personalised campaign, marketing was focused on the heads of the two main lists, Borrell for PSOE and Jaime Mayor Oreja for PP. They appeared in every poster and the parties’ communication strategies kept the focus on them. Both parties prioritised targeting young voters and middle-age professionals and relying on massive rallies, mainly at weekends. At those events the candidates appeared surrounded by supporters with that profile, aiming for the image to be graphically conveyed by newspaper reports and television news bulletins. Party leaders made frequent references to the massive dimensions of rallies as evidence of popular support. The campaign on television Television debates also played an important part in the campaign, with Borrell and Mayor Oreja facing each other at two debates in two of the main private television networks – Tele 5 and Antena 3 – whilst representatives from each of the six lists participated in a forum at the TVE1 state-owned channel. This was a novel element as no such electoral debates had taken place since 1993, but the debates themselves were highly formal and less than dynamic, with all details – topics, timing, speaking order – being negotiated beforehand. Since electoral law does not allow parties or candidates to buy advertising on radio or television, the role of broadcasters was limited to the transmission of free spots on the publicly owned television stations, that is the two national state-owned channels – TVE1 and La2 – and on regional channels such as Telemadrid, Canal Sur in Andalucia, ETB in the Basque Country and TV3 in Catalonia. Those spots were transmitted three times a day during the campaign period, and were provided free to all the lists. Their length, however, was mainly based on the results at the previous Euro-elections, a criterion that favoured the two main parties. The parties’ campaigns A key element in all strategies were appeals to party members and supporters, as every group had good reasons to seek to overcome electoral apathy. The ruling PSOE was seeking to consolidate its March victory and thus to counter criticism from the right that challenged the legitimacy of the Socialists’ success, accusing them of having taken advantage of the Madrid tragedy. Although it has been argued that in Spain abstention knew no ideology, recent research indicates that since the 1990s it affects mainly the centre-left and that the

234 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

Socialists’ defeat in 2000 was largely due to traditional PSOE supporters who choose to stay at home.3 Hence it became crucial for the PSOE to encourage a high turnout in order to stay ahead. Although the campaign itself was largely centred on domestic topics as a reflection of the recent general elections and the change in government, the parties tried to link those concerns with Europe-related images. The Socialists campaigned under the main slogan ‘We return to Europe’ (Volvemos a Europa), seeking to identify themselves as being pro-EU and to taint the former PP administration as having distanced itself from the European integration process. Their graphic and internet publicity conveyed a Europhile image by using the symbols of Spain and the EU linked by a heart, verbally reinforced by a ‘We like Europe’ (‘Nos gusta Europa’) message. The centre-right PP, meanwhile, tried to overcome their March defeat by mobilising their party and electorate, encouraged by the boost of 10,000 new members who had joined their ranks since the March elections led to a high level of politicisation of Spanish society. Their strategy, hence, sought to combine capital-intensive with labour-intensive tactics, running a centralised media campaign whilst simultaneously mobilising party members and supporters to canvass and hold rallies. The PP’s message was condensed in the slogan ‘With you, strong in Europe’ (‘Contigo, fuertes en Europa’), implying determination to defend Spain’s interests within the European institutions as opposed to the deference to French and German interests they attributed to PSOE. In a clear reference to the spontaneous rallies that protested against their government’s management of the March terrorist attacks, the PP’s radio and television advertising ended with the message ‘Spread the word’ (‘Pásalo’). That was the message used in March to convene the protest rallies, mainly by means of mobile phones; now the PP was turning it around to convene their electorate. The left IU’s campaign sought to recover what they called the ‘loaned votes’, those of their traditional supporters who had voted Socialist in March to ensure the defeat of the PP administration. Their appeal was based on the slogan ‘Now, for the IU’ (‘Ahora IU’), seeking to persuade those voters to return, in a campaign centred around well-known artists and cultural figures. Although voting for a minority force in parliamentary elections with provincial constituencies electing a small number of deputies could be seen as a ‘lost vote’, that was not the case in the Euro-elections with one national constituency, they argued. The parties forming the other three lists – Galeusca, EdP and CE – used the campaign to emphasise regional and nationalist demands, linking them to the integration process. Thus CiU’s message was summarised as ‘Yes to Europe, yes to Catalonia’ (‘Sí a Europa, sí a Cataluña‘), ERC told voters that ‘A different Europe is possible’ (‘Otra Europa es posible‘) and PA invited them to ‘Feel your roots’ (‘Siente tus raíces‘). Although these coalitions had to stand across the single national constituency, in reality their campaigns were largely focused

Spain

235

on those regions where they had an identifiable electorate, such as Catalonia, Galicia, the Basque Country, Andalucia and the Canary Islands. Public opinion In the two months prior to the Euro-elections, several polls released the results of some nine national opinion surveys, in most cases commissioned by the main newspapers. Two conducted by Instituto Opina in early April and late May, as well as one run by Demoscopia in early June, were published by El País. One by Voxpública in late April was published by El Periódico de Catalunya, with the other main Catalonian daily La Vanguardia running a poll held by Noxa in early June, and El Mundo publishing Sigma Dos’s surveys on 26 April and 6 June. Also, Celeste-Tel conducted a survey, with results published by La Razón. However, the most comprehensive and systematic opinion survey was run on 4 June by the Centre for Sociological Research (CIS – Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas), a prestigious public sector institute. Except for Sigma Dos, all forecast a substantial PSOE victory, expecting it to win 46 per cent of the votes, and a sound PP defeat, with under 40 per cent of the vote. On election day, they were separated by just over two percentage points, and the pollsters’ main failure was not to anticipate the level of abstention. By far the most optimistic forecast was by CIS at 76 per cent, proven wrong by the 55 per cent of the electorate that abstained. Campaign issues The campaign was largely fought over domestic issues. The PP emphasised the successes achieved in their eight years in government, seeking to shake away their March electoral defeat and the negative image left by their handling of the Madrid terrorist attacks. They presented the now ruling PSOE as corrupt and spendthrift, looking for contradictions in the Socialists’ policies. Meanwhile, the PSOE told citizens that ‘your vote decides’, reminding them that the March election had meant a change in unpopular foreign policies and the return of Spanish troops from Iraq. The Socialists claimed that their government marked the beginning of a new era based upon consensus politics, interpreting the wishes of large majorities of the electorate. To their left, IU sought to recover the votes lost to PSOE at the March elections by presenting themselves as the true defenders of ‘social Europe’ and attacking the Socialists for having acquiesced in the past with neoliberal policies they were now trying to change. The three coalitions of smaller parties, for their part, tried to shift the debate towards the rights of regions and nations, with demands that went from the recognition of Catalan and Euskera as official EU languages, an EU intervention in the Gibraltar dispute, and a special statute for peripheric regions such as the Canary Island, to the self-determination of the Basque Country. Beyond domestic issues, when the debate touched upon European matters the bi-partisan consensus that had existed since Spain joined the EU in 1986

236 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

broke down. Although a consensus remained over some issues such as Turkey’s potential entry into the EU, the need for a constitution to clarify complex EU treaties, and the advantages of deeper integration, the broad EU strategies proposed by the two main parties were clearly divergent. The debate over the European Constitution found the PP defending the Nice agreements on the EU Council that gave Spain a similar status to France, Germany, Italy and the UK, whilst the PSOE supported the ‘double majority’ or qualified majority system proposed by the constitutional treaty. The Socialists accused the PP of having blocked agreement over the European Constitution whilst they were in government; the PSOE favoured a more conciliatory and federalist approach as opposed to the PP’s intergovernmental position. When the Socialists accused the PP of Euroscepticism, the head of the Popular list replied by claiming to be ‘Euro-demanding’4. Foreign policy and the internal security problems posed by terrorism are other issues where the main parties disagreed. The PSOE criticised the Atlanticism of the Aznar government, its alliance with Britain within Europe and the abandonment of traditional priorities within Spanish foreign policy, but above everything the decision to participate in the Iraq War despite the overwhelming opposition of Spanish public opinion. Closely related to that were issues of internal security and counter-terrorism, with the PSOE advocating reliance on EU policies and collaboration, whilst the PP gave a higher priority to links with the US.

The results The results broadly met the pollsters’ forecasts, with the ruling PSOE coming on top and improving its performance at the 1999 Euro elections by eight percentage points and by 0.87 with regard to the March parliamentary poll (Table 28.2). Having been returned to government just two months earlier, the Socialists did not get the punishment vote that seems to have affected other European ruling parties and confirmed their hegemony even in the face of a very low turnout. Despite their campaign efforts, the PP remained in second place, but got just one MEP less than PSOE and their performance showed an improvement of 3.5 percentage points compared with that at the March general elections. Both parties seem to have stabilised their positions, PSOE as the party getting the most votes and PP leading in most provinces, but not in the most populous ones. The main losers were IU and the smaller parties, as the two main parties now controlled 84.7 per cent of the vote as compared with 75 per cent in 1999. The Socialist victory badly hit IU, as the latter failed to recover the votes it claimed to have ‘lent’ to PSOE at the March parliamentary polls, being left with just its core voters and having its representation at the EP halved, in the worst defeat of their electoral history.

Spain

Table 28.2

Spain: results of the Euro-elections, 2004 2004

Party

PSOE PP Galeusca IU-ICV EdP CE

Others

237

1999

Votes

%

MEPs (54)

6,741,112 6,393,192 798,816 643,136 380,709 197,231

43.46 41.21 5.15 4.15 2.45 1.27

25 24 2 2 1 –

2.31

–

Party

PP PSOE IU-EUIA CIU CE CN+EP BNG EH Others

Votes

%

MEPs (64)

8,410,993 7,477,823 1,221,566 937,687 677,094 613,968 349,079 306,923

39.74 35.33 5.77 4.43 3.20 2.90 1.65 1.45 5.53

27 24 4 3 2 2 1 1 –

Source: Interior Ministry of Spain.

The regional nationalist parties also lost ground to PSOE, as the latter improved its vote by 14 percentage points in Canarias, eleven in Galicia and Andalucia, eight in Catalonia and the Basque Country, and six in Valencia. All in all, the regional parties saw their EP representation reduced from nine MEPs in 1999 to just three. One of the most affected was CiU; after losing the Catalan regional government in November 2003, at these Euro elections it lost twelve percentage points – when compared with 1999 – and went down to third place in Catalonia, after PSOE and PP. Other regional parties, such as BNG, CC and PA, lost the Euro representation they had achieved in 1999. Amongst factors that may have contributed to the smaller parties’ loses, the reduction in the number of Spanish MEPs from 64 to 54 should be mentioned, as well as the perception that the main parties – as key members of the two main blocs with the EP – are in a stronger position to defend national interests in the face of the recent enlargement. In any case, the low turnout makes it difficult to draw any conclusions based on an extrapolation of these results to national elections. An additional success scored by PSOE after these polls was the election of the head of its list, Josep Borrell, as EP President until 2007. The PP also did well, getting Alejo Vidal-Quadras elected as First VicePresident of the EP. During the upcoming legislative period, the Spanish government is likely to promote within the EU social policies similar to those it is seeking to pursue at home, particularly in terms of the eradication of gender inequalities and the support for trade union rights. Those policies would also have the effect of reducing the effects on unemployment of the lower labour costs prevalent in new EU member states. A key issue for the PSOE government will be the defence of Spanish interests in the allocation of structural funds during the next funding period, expected to be 2007–13, seeking to prevent or at least delay the loss of support resulting from the recent enlargement. The PSOE is

238 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

also likely to promote the development of CFSP, and in particular that of a common security and defence policy, seeking to differentiate themselves from the PP Atlanticist policies as well as to support links with Latin America and the Maghreb. This would be coupled with an emphasis on police cooperation and combating terrorism.

Notes 1. Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, Estudio Preelectoral: Elecciones al Parlamento Europeo, No. 2564, May 2004. 2. The electoral system favours the representation of regionalist parties, as shown at the March 2004 parliamentary polls when the Catalan regionalist party CiU obtained ten deputies (out of 350) with 3.3 per cent of the total vote, the Catalan ERC got eight deputies with 2.5 per cent and the Basque PNV seven with 1.6 per cent, whilst Izquierda Unida (IU – United Left), the third largest political force at the national level, with 5 per cent of the vote achieved only five parliamentarians. 3. Belén Barreiro, ‘Los determinantes de la participación en las elecciones españolas de marzo 2000: El problema de la abstención de la izquierda’ Estudios/Working Papers, No. 171 (Madrid: Juan March Foundation, 2001). 4. El País, 10 June 2004.

29

Sweden Fredrik Langdal1

Introduction ‘It’s like kissing your own sister’, the Swedish Prime Minister allegedly remarked at a dinner for selected Nordic journalists two weeks before the EP elections. When the comment was finally reported by the media well after the election the PM commented that the turnout had proved him right; the election had not aroused any strong feelings. Turnout had fallen from 38.8 per cent in 1999 to 37.8 per cent in 2004, despite the high political salience of European integration. This stems from a vocal Eurosceptic public; a very high degree of electoral mobilisation for the referendum on the euro, where 82.6 per cent voted; and the public debate on the draft constitutional treaty. Moreover, early spring 2004 saw an impassioned debate about the free movement of workers after EU enlargement. This arose when the government suddenly started emphasising the risks of ‘social tourism’ and changed its liberal position on transitional rules only to be defeated in the national parliament after an unusually heated debate. Thus the conditions for an interesting and lively election campaign and high turnout were in some senses benign, though other circumstances worked in the other direction. The main challenges facing the political parties were mobilisation of the electorate and what attitude to take to a rather Eurosceptic public. A Social Democratic single party minority government, in informal coalition with the Green Party (Mp) and the Left Party (V) has governed since the 1998 election and after the 2002 general election. The coalition cooperates on the budget and a wide range of domestic policy but explicitly excludes EU politics and foreign and security politics. The Social Democrats excluded EU matters because the two junior coalition parties oppose membership of both the third stage of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and of the EU. They are also particularly uneasy about the draft constitutional treaty, developments 239

240 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

in the Common Foreign and Security Policy as well as any notions about European Defence Cooperation. The coalition partners agree on retaining Sweden’s policy of non-alignment. The 2004 EP election took place against the backdrop of the referendum on the euro in September 2003, where 55.9 per cent of the voters rejected membership in the third stage of the EMU compared to 42.0 per cent in favour. This referendum saw most of the political and social elites pitted against the V, Mp, the rural Centre Party (C) and some influential economists as well as dissenters from virtually all political parties. The result illustrated a wide gap between the elected representatives and the voters they represent on EMU in particular, but also on the process and direction of European integration more generally, and election managers kept this in mind entering the election campaigns in the spring 2004.

The Euro-election 2004 Swedes voted on Sunday 13 June. Postal voting was possible from 26 May until then. The election’s timing was heavily criticised, since schools closed a week before and many families had gone to their summer houses. Moreover, good weather probably contributed to the low turnout, despite postal voting. The ballot structure is an ordered but open list, which means that if a candidate obtains a personal vote of at least 5 per cent of the party’s total votes, this candidate overrides the list order. There is one single nationwide constituency with a 4 per cent threshold for representation using a modified St Laguë electoral formula.2 The main participants in the election campaign included the seven parties represented in the national as well as the European Parliaments and a new cross-party list called Junilistan (the June list – JL). Several Swedish parties have fundamental problems with policy stances in relation to the EU as the referendum on the euro revealed. The Green and the Left Party want Sweden to leave the Union, though they played this demand down during the election campaign. The Social Democrats (SAP) have a sizeable minority highly sceptical of the EU. Several ministers more or less passively supported the ‘No’ side in the 2003 referendum. Of the four Bourgeois parties, the conservative Moderate Party (M) and the Liberal People’s Party (Fp) are traditionally seen as the most pro-EU. The Christian Democrats (Kd) are deeply split over the EU. Interestingly, in the light of the euro referendum, the Centre Party revamped its stance on Europe and began advocating a federal EU, albeit with limited powers at the European level. The new actor, the June List, comprised persons involved in the ‘No’ campaign in the euro referendum and was founded early in 2004. JL’s campaign was financed by leading Swedish business personalities and by a loan from the Danish June Movement. The list included candidates from the SAP, Kd, M, as well as independent left and liberal candidates, so widening its appeal to all opposed to further centralisation of powers and the EMU but favouring remaining in EU.

Sweden

241

Interest groups and various NGOs took part to a limited extent, for example in releasing reports on Swedish MEPs’ voting patterns during 1999–2004, such as those by the Swedish Society for Nature Conservation and the neoliberal think tank Timbro on voting records on environmental issues and free trade respectively.3 Conspicuously absent from the election campaign were many trade unions. Only the highly Eurosceptic shop employees union and the transport workers’ trade union actively campaigned for a Eurosceptic candidate placed 31 on the SAP list. Likewise, the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise remained largely uninvolved.

The campaign and campaign issues Mobilising the voters falls primarily but not exclusively on the shoulders of the participating parties. The Swedish Election Authority (SEA) is responsible for the administration of the election and it spent an estimated 15 million Swedish kronor (SEK) on raising the awareness of the elections. It produced a leaflet for all households on the election, the electoral system and different methods of casting the ballot but made confusing statements about who MEPs actually represent.4 It ran a bland TV advert on the election and postal voting, and radio advertising, but was also caught in the crossfire since it did not distribute the JL’s ballot papers due to administrative praxis. The government allocated 11 million SEK to different authorities and larger cities specifically to boost turnout among young voters. The EP Stockholm office was very active, producing an informative booklet and other widely distributed printed publications; and visiting over 100 schools, associations and universities across Sweden. Since it is not a Swedish agency, it could not run TV advertisements on Swedish television but it did advertise via the London-based privately owned TV3. The Stockholm EP office’s most important activity was interacting with journalists: it awarded 77 scholarships in autumn 2003 – spring 2004 primarily to local and regional journalists to attend EP Strasbourg sessions, and ran other events to raise journalists’ awareness of how the EU functions in general and the EP’s role in particular. The enlightenment of journalists should be top priority, not least since the mass media has become the main channel for campaigning and given the quality of media reporting on EU affairs. Political parties are not allowed to advertise on television, so this form of communication is unavailable for partisan mobilisation. Radio advertising was used by both administrative agencies and to a limited extent by the political parties. Media coverage was rightly criticised as inferior, and the two interrelated problems are that there is very little coverage between elections and that many journalists lack sufficient knowledge of EU affairs. This contributes to low awareness of the role and importance of the EP and depresses turnout. Unless the existing pattern of media reporting changes, MEPs may remain as anonymous to their domestic audiences in 2009 as they were in 2004.

242 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

The parties’ campaign The organisation of the parties’ election campaigns is a distinctly national affair, despite the obvious European dimensions. Very scant use was made of the transnational party groups’ manifestos and centrally produced information material. Even when used, it was used primarily within the parties rather than as external information. Even though the voter was not confronted directly with abbreviations like ELDR and PES, some parties like SAP and C did cooperate with their European party groups before and during the campaign. One reason why so little use was made of the transnational party groups could have been that several Swedish parties are out of sync with their European counterparts. This is obvious in the case of the Swedish and European Green Party but similar, albeit less stark, considerations seem to lie behind the general non-use of the European manifestos in combination with their rather airy content. A few, mainly Nordic, politicians from other countries (including Norway) participated in the campaign. This restraint can be explained in terms of the differing political cultures between Sweden and continental Europe, which make such visits either not worthwhile or may even have an adverse effect on the campaign. Public opinion Since acceding in 1995, Sweden remains among the most Eurosceptic of all member states. The Spring 2004 Eurobarometer reported that 37 per cent of those polled saw EU membership as a good thing (the third lowest approval rate of EU15, ahead only of Austria and the UK). Swedes head the EU15 list of those seeing EU membership as a bad thing, a belief held by 33 per cent of those polled.5 According to Eurobarometer surveys, Euroscepticism has risen over the last few years, as illustrated not least by the rejection of the Euro in the referendum. Issues Awareness of this climate of opinion and increasing hesitancy towards European integration led campaign managers of almost all parties to opt to campaign on some variation on the theme of limiting EU power to fewer policy areas, but with stronger policy-making powers in areas where the public wanted more EU cooperation, such as crime in general and trafficking in particular. In this sense, some of the parties’ campaigns were populist in supporting and reinforcing the preferences of ‘ordinary people’. From the campaign and from interviews with the campaign leaders it can be concluded that above all the campaigns of the S, M, Fp, C and Kd were designed to mobilise and appeal to the parties’ own voters since every voter who turned out would be worth two votes given expectations of high levels of abstention. This was done by emphasising domestic issues familiar to voters; for example, the emphasis on law and order in the case of the Moderate Party;

Sweden

243

and on employment and social security in the case of the Social Democrats, and so on; and by allowing for some EU criticism as a response to the euro referendum result. However, parties campaigning on an outright Eurosceptical position had a potentially larger pool of voters to tap and here the challenges were both to lure voters away from their preferred parties in domestic elections and induce them not to abstain. If we first look at the different themes that were adopted by most parties, we can see that all parties apart from S and to lesser extent Fp had some form of limiting EU power as an overarching theme, implying that the EU had too many decision-making powers in too many policy areas and that these powers should be repatriated to the member states. There was differentiation over how many fewer decisions the EU should take, ranging from V and Mp advocating EU secession, though in muted ways compared to previous campaigns. The June List built its whole campaign around the theme of curbing EU powers and repatriating as many as possible compatible with the single market. The Centre Party used the theme ‘Narrower but sharper’, and variations on this could also be found on posters of historically solidly pro-EU parties like the Moderates and on the Liberal People’s Party’s flyers. SAP was alone in not making this their central theme. Instead they tried to mobilise voters along a traditional left–right cleavage, arguing that if voters liked the SAP in domestic politics they should vote SAP in the EP elections as well. However, one SAP candidate, placed in 31st position on the ballot slip, ran a successful campaign on the same theme as the other parties, stressing dislike for integration and EU institutions. Given most parties’ emphasis on the sovereignty–Europeanism cleavage, this dimension structured the debate and the main questions became in which areas should the EU act with more restraint and in which areas should it act more forcefully. Turning to the issues that were addressed in the campaign, Mp, V and JL campaigned on the draft Constitution, calling for a referendum on whether to accept or reject it. All three parties oppose the proposed Constitution. Other parties, essentially favouring it, were not particularly keen on bringing in the issue into the EP campaign, arguing that it was a matter for decision by the national parliament. Perhaps the most prominent issue was the fight against international crime, where most parties campaigned on increased cooperation. The Liberal Party explicitly favoured the creation of a European FBI, while most others were positive but non-committal. Given near consensus on the importance of fighting crime and the absence of concrete policy proposals, there was little to structure the debate around. Terrorism and immigration were not prominent, though some parties highlighted the role of the EU in the world and peace generally. Environmental issues were discussed to some extent. Towards the end of the campaign, the question about travel allowances for alcohol became highly topical, as Swedes prefer to go to Germany, Denmark or one of the neighbouring new member states to stock up on cheap alcohol rather than buy at the retail monopoly. The battle line

244 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

was drawn between Christian Democrats demanding reinstatement of highly restrictive quotas, supported by parties critical of the EU, while Fp and M proposed domestic adaptation to counter the adverse effects. For probably the first time in Sweden’s EP campaign experience, a concrete policy proposal, over which the EP actually has power, was integral to the election campaign. The SAP sounded the attack on the Directive on Services and in particular the application of the rules of origin. They rapidly won support from the Left Party and from the blue-collar trade unions. The debate on the Directive reflected the left–right dimension in terms of benefits and drawbacks of deregulation of the service markets and the dimension of national versus European policy-making, that is to say who should have the right to regulate the labour markets. Interesting and encouraging as this may seem, the debate was not constructive, fraught with information deficiencies and ultimately confusing for voters. Moreover, as a SAP strategy of mobilisation, it seems to have failed to have motivated their target blue-collar workers. This points to some very serious pedagogical problems when communicating EU legislation in a national context. The complexity of the legislation, the uncertainties concerning a proposal at a very early stage in the policy-making process and not least the discrepancies between a uniform system of law emanating from the EU level which sits uneasily with the Swedish tradition of labour market regulations, make for a formidable communicational challenge. The strategy most parties chose to mobilise their own voters resulted, in the words of one campaign manager, in effect in eight parallel campaigns of very limited scope and incentives for party interaction to generate debate.

The result The election result was a minor sensation given opinion polls and expert predictions. Not only did the SAP get the lowest share of votes since the beginning of last century, but the newly founded June List secured three seats. (See Table 29.1.) Until the last week of the campaign, predictions were that the June List would fail to reach the 4 per cent threshold. During the last week, however, when it seemed that a vote for the June List would not be wasted after all, the swing took all the established parties by surprise. The June List attracted Eurosceptics from all other parties, exploiting Euroscepticism in the electorate at large regardless of normal party partisanship. The result for the other two Eurosceptic parties, V and Mp, were less spectacular; both lost out to the June List. While competition over Eurosceptic votes was sharpened, most parties reflected generalised Euroscepticism in their campaigns, and this too drew votes away from V and Mp compared to the 1999 EP election. The SAP’s campaign strategy failed. It was designed to mobilise SAP voters by stressing the left–right cleavage, and through extensive use of the Prime Minister and popular ministers on campaign posters. However, the SAP failed to recognise the strength of EU disillusionment among its supporters who

Sweden

245

to a large extent stayed at home or voted for other parties. The Christian Democrats’ and the Liberal People’s Party’s share of the votes fell and each lost one seat. The Liberals’ loss can partly be explained by the absence in 2004 of an exceptionally popular candidate in 1999. The Moderates were also slightly down from 1999 but recovered from their bad results in the last national election. The Centre Party held its ground despite, or thanks to, its rather bold revamping of its strategy towards European integration. Table 29.1

Sweden: 2004 EP-election results

Party

Seats

Social Democratic Party (SAP) Moderate Party (M) June List (JL) Left Party (V) Liberal Party (Fp) Centre Party (C) Green Party (Mp) Christian Democratic Party (Kd) Others Valid votes 2,512,069 Of which candidate votes Blank and invalid votes Total votes Electorate Turnout a

5 4 3 2 2 1 1 1

Gain/lossa

–1 –1 +3 –1 –1 0 –1 –1

2004 (%)

EP National election election 1999 (%) 2002 (%)

24.6 18.2 14.5 12.8 9.9 6.3 6.0 5.7 2.2

26.0 20.7 – 15.8 13.9 6.0 9.5 7.6 0.5

39.8 15.2 – 8.3 13.3 6.1 4.6 9.1 2.8

1,480,960 72,395 2,584,464 6,827,870 37.85 per cent

The number of Swedish seats was reduced at this election from 22 to 19.

Sources: Valmyndigheten ; Statistiska centralbyrån .

The ballot structure of open but ordered party lists meant that a number of candidates campaigned for a personal vote, either in broad congruence with the party line or in some instances against their own parties. All parties had over 50 per cent of their voters opting for a preferred candidate, with the Christian Democrats having the largest share of personal votes of 71 per cent. The cross-party June List had the lowest share despite the heterogeneity of their candidates. Most personal votes went to the lists’ top candidates, thereby reinforcing the ordering of candidates by the parties. However, for three parties, the candidate votes changed the order of the list. First, voters relegated two of the SAP’s top five candidates from the list and voted in a Eurosceptic, Anna Hedh, and Åsa Westlund, who campaigned broadly on the party message with support from current ministers, Ingvar Carlsson,

246 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

the ex Prime Minister, and the Social Democratic Youth League. The third candidate who rose up the list with the help of personal votes was Maria Carlshamre, Fp, a journalist and the only one of the three who can be said to have some limited claim to fame before the campaigns. Her campaign focused on trafficking and women’s rights. Finally, the Moderate Party’s first name on the list, Gunnar Hökmark, was demoted to second place by the voters, who put in first place Charlotte Cederschiöld, EP Vice-President during the 1999–2004 legislature. Of the Swedish MEPs for the period 2004–09, 14 are newcomers so only five have experience of being MEPs, though one newcomer has worked as an EP official for the Green Group. It seems unlikely that the Swedish contingent as a whole will be influential. Rather, many MEPs seem likely to be obstructionist or watchdogs; seven were elected on a more or less Eurosceptic ticket; and a few more of them are out to curb EU power and crack down on bureaucracy. Since the June List has no ideological compass apart from decentralisation and their MEPs are divided ideologically, a high degree of fractionalisation in voting patterns seems likely. Other MEPs are likely to follow their respective party group line in the vast majority of the decisions. MEPs most likely to make an impact in the coming term are those who are either experienced and/or well-attuned to the ideas of their respective party groups. From this perspective, the high turnover in MEPs may prove costly in terms of influence. To mention one example, the SAP’s Göran Färm was lined up to become the PES spokesman for budgetary issues, but lost his seat to Eurosceptic Anna Hedh. A few MEPs likely to be influential in the coming years include Charlotte Cederschiöld (M), Cecilia Malmstöm (Fp) and Jonas Sjöstedt (V), given their experience of the EU policy process and, in the case of the first two, concordance of preference with their respective party groups EPP and ELDR (ALDE). To conclude this section, two comments should be made based on exit poll data.6 First, more voters from all parties apart from S, felt their party’s stand on EU as opposed to domestic issues determined their vote: the election really was about Europe. Second, the divergence between the general party preference and the vote cast is high and increasing. This can be attributed to a large extent to JL, which managed to attract voters from all other parties, but it is still remarkable that 34 per cent of those surveyed voted differently in the EP elections compared to how they would vote if there was an election to the national parliament, and it is possible to interpret this fact as a protest among those who turned out to vote. This points to a flaw in representation or political party leadership that parties will have to tackle if they wish to avoid two separate systems for national and EU elections.

Conclusions The Swedish EP campaign was fought on European rather than domestic issues, even though the issues in the campaign were adapted to appeal to

Sweden

247

Swedish voters in general, and their own voters in particular. The overarching theme was about policy-making powers and on which level different policies should be decided. All parties called for a leaner EU, and some for more effective policy-making powers in some policy areas. This general theme was broken down into tangible issues to appeal to voters. In general, they concerned genuinely European transnational issues. Many of these related to the internal market, others to cross-border crime, trafficking of women and children, and environmental issues, though for these issues the debate tended to be conducted on a more general level. The proposed Constitution as such and the calls for a referendum were high on the agenda for those parties critical of it, while the rest either played it down or were silent. The parties and media are equally responsible for the failure of mobilisation. Parties failed to explain why voting in EP elections matters to the use of public power and why the EU’s only directly elected institution is important. The campaign did not present voters with clear-cut choices on matters they see as affecting their daily life. Instead, it became a competition between which party wanted to curb EU power the most. Campaign expenditure was limited, ranging from between one-tenth to one-third, of what is spent in national elections. Commercial advertising was sparse and limited the visibility of the campaign. Parties do not devote major resources to contest the 19 EP seats when the office of government is not at stake. The lack of transnational features should be taken seriously since if democracy is to function on an EU wide basis, with the EP representing EU citizens rather than 25 segments of voters, the salience must rise of transnational parties and party groups as well as the presence of ‘foreign’ politicians to signal that these elections are not a national affair. Finally, the size of the Eurosceptic vote should not be overestimated, nor should the impact it is likely to have on the EP. Twelve of the 19 Swedish MEPs are broadly pro-EU and 16 favour Sweden staying in the EU. However, if the pro-EU MEPs do not begin to argue the case for integration it is likely that the 2009 election will see the current trends intensified.

Notes 1. I would like to acknowledge that part of the empirical material for this chapter has been collected within a broader research project named CIVACTIVE, financed by the 6th Framework Programme of the EU, directed by Richard Sinnott. Moreover, I would like to thank Karl-Magnus Johansson and Juliet Lodge for comments on an earlier version of this chapter. 2. See the Electoral law SFS 2003:1058. 3. K. Morén and M. Blomdin-Persson, EU-valet och miljön – SNF:s kartläggning och analys inför valet till Europaparlamentet 13 juni 2004 (Stockholm: SNF, 2004) and F. Erixon and N.H. Rossbach, Hur röstar EU-parlamentarikerna i utrikeshandelsfrågor? (Stockholm: Timbro, 2004). 4. See T. Bergman and M. Blomgren, ‘Okunnigt i medierna om Europavalet’, Dagens Nyheter, 20 June, 2004. 5. Eurobarometer 61, Spring 2004, p. 8. 6. SVT EUP-VALU 2004.

30

The United Kingdom Richard Whitaker

European Parliament elections in the UK rarely spark much public or media interest, but in 2004 things were different. By British standards, turnout was high and the campaign involved much discussion of UK membership of the EU. The party system was shaken by the rise of the UK Independence Party (UKIP) and the poor results for Labour and the Conservatives. Largescale postal voting boosted turnout, which, at 38.2 per cent, was the highest ever for EP elections in the UK and well above the 23.3 per cent at the 1999 EP elections. European issues rose high up the UK’s political agenda as a result of attempts among heads of government to finalise the European Constitution during the campaign. Unlike 1999, there was little discussion of the euro in 2004. Instead UKIP raised the more fundamental question of whether Britain should continue to be part of the EU and the Conservatives put forward proposals to renegotiate the UK’s terms of membership. Yet national issues such as the war in Iraq, the government’s economic record and the problems of postal voting were still prominent in the campaign. Such were the practical problems of getting ballot papers out on time that this issue got increasing amounts of press attention as the elections drew closer.

The Euro-election 2004 Postal voting and turnout The UK’s sixth EP elections took place on Thursday 10 June. Voters could vote from around 1 June in four of the UK’s twelve regions where only postal voting was permitted – the North East, North West, East Midlands and Yorkshire and the Humber – in contrast to the usual method of attending polling stations. Postal voting became an issue in the campaign, not least because of the problems with ensuring ballot papers were printed correctly and delivered 248

The United Kingdom

249

on time to the relevant electors. Around 440,000 ballot papers went out after the government’s deadline of 1 June, an event which was not lost on the national press or the electorate as a whole.1 In making such widespread use of postal voting, the Government acted against the advice of the Electoral Commission, which had recommended that it be piloted in only two regions.2 The practical problems associated with the experiment suggested that the government would have been well advised to heed this advice. Nevertheless, this scheme gave some voters the chance to send off their ballot papers a few days before the official election date, thus altering the nature of campaigning and allowing pre-election-day polls to include among their respondents those who had already voted. Postal voting boosted turnout in the four English regions above turnout elsewhere in England, as Table 30.1 shows. Turnout was higher in every single region of Britain in 2004 compared to1999. This is most likely the result of two factors. First, local council elections were held simultaneously with EP elections in various parts of the country including Birmingham, Southampton, major cities in the north of England, and parts of Wales. Londoners went to the polls to elect their mayor and members of the London Assembly. Second, higher turnout was at least partly a result of greater interest in the elections, as is clear from cases such as Scotland where participation increased in the absence of local elections or postal voting.3 Table 30.1

Regional turnout at the 2004 and 1999 EP elections in the UK

Region North East North West Yorkshire and the Humber East Midlands West Midlands East London South East South West Scotland Wales Northern Ireland

Turnout 2004 (%) 41.0 41.1 42.3 43.7 36.3 36.5 37.3 36.6 37.7 30.6 41.1 51.2

Turnout 1999 (%) 19.6 19.4 19.6 22.6 21.0 24.5 23.0 24.7 27.6 24.7 29.0 57.8

Note: Regions in italics used postal voting only.

The European Parliament also took steps to increase turnout. These efforts were based around the EP’s election website, ‘Europe Counts’ , featuring a number of celebrities. British comedian Eddie Izzard and actress Keira Knightley, among others, could be found encouraging citizens to use their European vote and to find out more about

250 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

how the EU operates. The site also provided details of the candidates standing in each electoral region, and offered an email reminder and results service. Pro and anti-EU participants in the campaign Among the key players was the UK Independence Party, which called for British withdrawal from the EU. Building on fears among some of the electorate about the European Constitution and making heavy use of celebrities in its campaign, UKIP quickly emerged as a leading contender for votes. The British National Party (BNP) took a similarly anti-EU stance in its campaign. On the left, George Galloway’s Respect Coalition campaigned against the proposed Constitution and British membership of the euro. On the pro-European side of the fence, Britain in Europe frequently attacked UKIP during the campaign but also facilitated debate with a series of European Question Times. However, their work attracted little national media attention.

The campaign Compared to the 1999 EP elections, European issues, principally the Constitution and the question of Britain’s continued membership of the EU, had a much higher profile. But more often than not, the word ‘Euro’ appeared with reference to football rather than the single currency. As is usually the case in EP elections, national issues were central. In particular, the government’s decision to go to war in Iraq featured substantially, as did the economy and public services. Opposition parties exploited the practical problems resulting from the government’s decision to use postal voting for parts of Britain. The discussion of national issues was stimulated by the simultaneous local council and London mayoral elections. The Labour campaign The expectation of midterm losses and the extent to which voters often use EP elections to protest against governments meant that there was little optimism about Labour’s possible achievements. Overall, Labour’s campaign concentrated largely on national issues and on attacking the Conservatives. When it did discuss EU policies it focused mainly on its approach to negotiating the EU Constitution. Prime Minister Tony Blair set out so-called ‘red lines’ around policy areas in which he would not agree to give up the veto. This attracted criticism from the pro- and anti-European camps. Europhiles argued that the government gave an overly defensive view of Britain’s relationship with the EU which would only add to the anti-EU case. Eurosceptics felt that the Constitution should be rejected outright. Blair was largely absent from Labour’s campaign materials, in stark contrast to the 1999 elections.4 Although the Party of European Socialists (PES) adopted a manifesto in late April 2004, the Labour Party made very little use of this in its campaign. Instead Labour departed from its strategy at the 1999 elections by drawing up

The United Kingdom

251

its own European manifesto under the title Britain is Working. In keeping with the party’s emphasis on national issues and attacking the Tories, the opening and concluding sections of this document made substantial references to the party’s economic record since 1997, and insisted that the Conservatives’ aim of renegotiating British membership of the EU would lead either to withdrawal or a humiliating climbdown for the UK. Much of the rest of the manifesto dealt with European issues and, in particular, Labour was keen to position itself to the left of the Conservatives on workers’ rights in the EU. The manifesto set out developments in the justice and home affairs arena, such as the agreement on a European arrest warrant, a common definition of terrorism, the work of Europol and the contribution of these developments to the fight against terror and illegal immigration. Labour also underlined the advantages of the European Constitution and the government’s red lines, beyond which it would not allow a move to qualified majority voting. Once the campaign took hold, Labour concentrated on promoting the government’s national economic record and attacking the Conservatives and their new leader, Michael Howard. Labour’s slogan ‘Britain is working. Don’t let the Tories wreck it again’, encapsulated this approach, and was to feature on posters with Howard and previous Conservative leaders pictured above it. Labour election broadcasts were largely negative, discussing the Conservatives’ plans to cut public spending and defending Labour’s record in office but without picturing Blair himself. The party’s election leaflets had slightly more European content. They gave information on candidates for a particular region, details of regional-specific successes and of Labour’s achievements in the EU, but again they also drew much attention to Labour’s actions within the UK on the economy and public services. Overall Labour suffered as a result of the public’s preoccupation with problems in the aftermath of the Iraq War. A poll in the Daily Telegraph on 29 May 2004 showed that only just over a quarter of respondents agreed that the government had dealt successfully with the situation in Iraq. Given such public discontent, Labour losses were more severe than expected and the result was Labour’s worst electoral performance under Blair. The Conservative campaign Under their new leader, Michael Howard, the Conservative Party distinguished itself from Labour and the Liberal Democrats by opposing the Constitution outright and favouring a renegotiation of Britain’s EU membership. Well before the campaign, the Prime Minister’s decision to allow a referendum on the EU Constitution deprived the Conservatives of what might have been the central plank of their electoral strategy. This U-turn by Tony Blair meant that they could no longer accuse Labour of being elitist by pushing the Constitution through parliament without consulting the electorate at any point. As in past elections, the Conservatives adopted their own manifesto and were keen to keep their distance from the European People’s Party (EPP) to which

252 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

their European Democrats (ED) group is allied. The tone of the Conservative manifesto was clear from its title, Putting Britain First, and from its frequent references to ‘new threats from the EU Constitution’ in a series of policy areas. The document set out a vision of the EU as a more flexible organisation with greater possibilities for opt-outs and enhanced cooperation among groups of member states who wish to integrate further than others. Among other things, the manifesto called for a restoration of local and national control over fisheries policy and greater national government influence on overseas aid. In putting forward these proposals, the Conservatives were keen to stress their previous success at securing opt-outs from the social chapter and single currency. The previous actions of Conservative MEPs also featured in election leaflets which pointed out their attempts to fight fraud in the Commission and reduce the volume of EU regulations. Michael Howard featured heavily, appearing on party election broadcasts and in election leaflets. Several events during the campaign caused problems for the Conservatives. First, the party had to drop an incumbent MEP, Bashir Khanbai, from its list of candidates in the Eastern region following irregularities in his expenses claims.5 This hardly chimed well with the Conservatives’ emphasis on cleaning up EU finances. Second, and a more substantial problem, was the unexpected degree of momentum behind the UK Independence Party. With its bold message and high-profile campaign, UKIP appealed to many of the more Eurosceptic Conservative supporters. The problem was exacerbated when the party whip was withdrawn from four Tory peers who had signed an open letter urging voters to support UKIP. In response to this and to opinion polls suggesting that the Conservatives might lose quite heavily to UKIP, Michael Howard attacked UKIP as ‘extreme’. He attempted to position the Conservatives as reflecting the ‘mainstream majority’ of opinion on the EU, taking the middle ground between the pro-European Labour and Liberal Democrat parties, on one hand, and the anti-EU UKIP, on the other. However, this strategy, and the leaking of an internal Conservative document describing UKIP members as ‘cranks’ and ‘political gadflies’,6 led to angry reactions from UKIP’s celebrity candidate, Robert Kilroy-Silk. UKIP tried to exploit this by suggesting that UKIP represented the views of many Conservative MPs.7 The Liberal Democrat campaign Party leader Charles Kennedy kicked off the Liberal Democrat campaign by asking voters to use the EP elections to register their feelings on the war in Iraq. The decision not to concentrate primarily on putting the pro-European case was a reaction to Euroscepticism in Lib Dem constituencies and to the success of UKIP more broadly. Lib Dem election leaflets attacked Labour on Iraq, local taxation and public services, and criticised budgetary mismanagement and secrecy among EU institutions. However, the Liberal Democrat manifesto, Making Europe Work for You, dealt mainly with European issues, as its title suggests. It argued for the proposed Constitution and British membership

The United Kingdom

253

of the euro, and set out the benefits derived by Britain from the EU. It also offered criticisms and suggestions for reform. Here there were similarities with the other parties as in the call for independent impact assessments of all new legislation, improvements in tackling fraud and the need for subsidiarity to be properly enforced. The UKIP campaign Buoyed by £2 million of contributions to its funds and armed with celebrities, UKIP ran a successful campaign, stealing votes largely from the Conservatives but also from Labour and the Lib Dems. During the run-up to the election, discussions surrounding the EU Constitution helped to put Europe on the electoral agenda and thus provided fertile ground for UKIP to boost its share of EP seats from the three it won in 1999. UKIP had to defend itself against allegations of links with the far-right British National Party, but overcame any damage resulting from this to finish third overall in the election. UKIP offered a simple message to voters with its slogan ‘Say No to European Union’. Its posters were basic in design with the slogan taking centre stage and the stars of the EU flag forming the ‘o’ in ‘No’ on a fuchsia pink background. UKIP election leaflets highlighted its opposition to the Constitution, the single currency, the level of immigration into the EU and to the UK’s budgetary contributions. Candidates were portrayed as ‘real people’ rather than professional politicians and voters were assured that supporting UKIP would ‘teach [such] politicians a lesson’. A key element of UKIP’s high profile in the campaign was Robert KilroySilk who stood as the party’s leading candidate in the East Midlands region. As a well-known former daytime television presenter, Kilroy-Silk had a broad appeal and was highly experienced in front of the camera. However, he had been sacked by the BBC early in 2004 following a newspaper article in which he described Arabs as ‘suicide bombers’ and ‘limb-amputators’. Despite this, he was an effective campaigner who could employ his television experience in UKIP election broadcasts. Other celebrities were brought in to support the campaign. Actress Joan Collins held a press conference in Nottingham at which she refused to answer any political questions. Further support came from astronomer Patrick Moore, former motor racing driver Stirling Moss and actor Edward Fox. The party also benefited from the services of Dick Morris who worked on Bill Clinton’s successful presidential campaigns in the US. Morris aimed to boost UKIP’s vote by keeping the slogans simple and basing them all around the word ‘no’. This allowed the party to appeal to a disparate group of voters, many of whom had different reasons for opposing British membership of the EU. Other parties On the left was the Respect Coalition, led by MP George Galloway, dismissed from the Labour Party in October 2003 following comments he had made

254 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

about the Iraq War. Respect campaigned primarily on an anti-war ticket but also opposed the euro and the EU Constitution, and called for higher taxes and a higher minimum wage in Britain. On the right, the BNP opposed British membership of the EU. The Green Party stood out from others in the UK by fighting the election on the manifesto of its transnational party which favoured the EU Constitution and called for greater European cooperation on environmental protection and the promotion of human rights, among other things. In Scotland the Scottish National Party (SNP) campaigned under its manifesto Vote for Scotland, calling for the country’s independence within Europe. The Welsh nationalists, Plaid Cymru, called for full representation for Wales in Europe and pursued a left-wing agenda on workers’ rights. UKIP had far less impact in Scotland and Wales. The BNP similarly failed to exert a major influence in the campaign outside England. Neither stood in Northern Ireland, where the main parties are largely Eurosceptic, with the exception of the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP). The main talking point of the elections in Northern Ireland was the success of Sinn Fein whose campaign led to their first seats in the EP, one of which was among the three representing the province. Overall this was a much more lively campaign than the UK experienced in 1999. European issues were frequently debated, and UKIP did much to force other parties to discuss their European policies. National issues were nevertheless of importance and the results were in keeping with the usual midterm losses for governing parties in European elections.

The result The single most dramatic development was UKIP’s ability to build on its foundation of three MEPs and fourth place in 1999, to a total of twelve MEPs in 2004, making it the UK’s joint third largest party in the EP, only seven seats and around six and a half percentage points behind Labour. Britain’s two largest parties lost ground to their smaller rivals, not least, to UKIP (see Table 30.2). Labour was at the midpoint of a second consecutive term of office and so, on the basis of previous EP election results and the second-order election model, losses were to be expected. Labour achieved their worst result since 1997 and were down 19 per cent from their 2001 general election result and around 5.4 per cent from their score in the 1999 European elections. Labour came fourth in the South West and South East regions, where UKIP achieved some of its best results. There were some improvements in traditionally Labour areas with the party increasing its vote share in Wales and moving up to first place in the North West region, but beyond this, there was little joy for Labour. Perhaps more significant was the Conservatives’ failure to improve on or even maintain their 1999 success. Although they won the election with 27 seats, the Tories lost 9 per cent of the vote in Britain compared to 1999, the largest fall in vote share for any party. They lost almost entirely to UKIP

The United Kingdom

255

whose gain in vote share was just over 9 per cent. Conservatives came first in six regions, one fewer than in 1999, including moving ahead of Labour in London. But the party also experienced the election’s largest regional drop in vote share when it lost 13 per cent in the East Midlands to UKIP. With an increase of ten seats in the EP,8 UKIP made more gains than any other party and won 16.2 per cent of the vote. UKIP’s biggest success was in the East Midlands where they came second with 26.1 per cent share of the vote, only about 5,000 votes behind the Conservatives and where the choice of KilroySilk was vindicated. UKIP came second in three regions – East, South East and South West – in which they had been relatively strong in 1999. Table 30.2

EP election results in the UK, June 2004

Party

Results for Great Britain Conservative Labour UK Independence Party Liberal Democrat Green British National Party Respect – the Unity Coalition Scottish National Party Plaid Cymru Others Total Results for Northern Ireland Democratic Unionist Sinn Fein Ulster Unionist SDLP Others Total a

Votes

% of vote

Seats

Change in seats from 1999a

4,397,087 3,718,683 2,660,768 2,452,327 1,028,283 808,201 252,216 231,505 159,888 749,645 16,458,603

26.7 22.6 16.1 14.9 6.2 4.9 1.5 1.4 1.0 4.6 100.0

27 19 12 12 2 0 0 2 1 0 75

–8 –6 +10 +2 +2 0 0 0 0 0

175,761 144,541 91,164 87,559 50,252 549,277

32.0 26.3 16.6 15.9 9.2 100.0

1 1 1 0 0 3

0 +1 0 –1 0

These figures are adjusted for the overall reduction in seat numbers in the UK from 87 to 78.

Source: House of Commons Research Paper 04/50, European Parliament elections 2004, 23 June 2004.

The Liberal Democrats boosted their share of the vote by 2 per cent and two seats over 1999 but fell from third to fourth place overall. Their worst result was in Wales where, despite an increase of 2 per cent of the regional vote, they fell to fifth position overall. The Green Party made gains by retaining its two MEPs despite the reduction in the number of seats allocated to the UK. Neither Respect nor the BNP won a seat. Plaid Cymru did poorly, losing 12.1 per cent of the vote compared to 1999 and finishing in third place. The

256 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

Scottish Nationalists also lost support but still managed to finish second, around 2 per cent ahead of the Conservatives. In Northern Ireland, the SDLP lost much of its support to Sinn Fein which gained its first EP seat. The Ulster Unionists lost, to the benefit of the Democratic Unionist Party, and with the newfound success of Sinn Fein, the Northern Ireland delegation took on a rather different appearance to its predecessors.

Conclusions In Britain, the outcome of the EP election for Labour is worrying given the proximity of the next general election. Labour failed to get across a sufficiently clear pro-EU and pro-Constitution message in order to prepare the ground for a positive result in the referendum likely to take place in 2005. When Europe was discussed, it was often in terms of defending British interests or criticising the Conservatives, rather than putting a case in favour of the proposed Constitution. The problem of how to react to UKIP dogged the Conservatives and raised questions about how they should position themselves in future while avoiding the divisions over Europe that caused the party so much difficulty under John Major’s leadership. The potential problems became clear towards the end of the campaign when pro-European Conservatives criticised the leadership for adopting an overly defensive approach towards the EU, thereby handing votes to UKIP.9 At the same time, the Eurosceptic Conservative MEP Roger Helmer called for Britain to move to ‘associate membership’ of the EU based largely around a free trade agreement.10 Neither appeared to agree with Michael Howard’s ‘middle way’ and so the party came away from the campaign with some disagreement about how to deal with the UKIP threat in future. For the Conservatives the results are disappointing and do not bode well for the next election. Before going on to win the general election in 1997, Labour had won 62 of the UK’s 87 EP seats in 1994, albeit under a different electoral system. However, the Conservatives might take heart from an opinion poll towards the end of the campaign which suggested that few UKIP voters would support UKIP at a general election and that only around half of UKIP supporters are in favour of British withdrawal from the EU.11 Furthermore, the notoriously disproportionate first-past-the-post electoral system in use for Westminster polls will make things much more difficult for UKIP at the general election. As for the EP, the success of UKIP and of Eurosceptic parties elsewhere in the EU means that the next parliamentary term will see the largest Eurosceptic group ever formed in the EP, with 33 members under the title Independence and Democracy. Not all their MEPs favour secession, a factor which may undermine group cohesion. Regarding Britain’s relationship with its EU partners, the results suggest that the British public is unlikely to vote in favour of an EU Constitution, an outcome which would only add to the UK’s reputation as an awkward partner in Europe. However, the government will be

The United Kingdom

257

looking to influence the EU’s direction when it holds the EU Presidency in the second half of 2005. This will provide an opportunity for Labour, assuming it is still in power, to push for further progress on creating the knowledge-based economy and the opening up of labour markets associated with the Lisbon Agenda. The question of British membership of the euro also remains to be resolved via a referendum if Labour win a third consecutive term of office.

Notes 1. BBC News, ‘Postal deadline “will be missed’’’, 1 June 2004, (accessed July 2004). 2. The Electoral Commission, Electoral Pilots at the June 2004 Elections: Recommendation, December 2003 (London: The Electoral Commission, 2003). 3. House of Commons Research Paper 04/50, European Parliament Elections 2004, 23 June 2004. 4. J. Mather, ‘The United Kingdom’ in J. Lodge (ed), The 1999 Elections to the European Parliament (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001). 5. Guardian, 13 May 2004. 6. Guardian, 2 June 2004. 7. Daily Telegraph, 2 June 2004. 8. This figure is adjusted for the overall reduction in seats in the UK from 87 to 78, as are all other references to seat changes in 2004. 9. The Times, 8 June 2004. 10. R. Helmer, ‘A Seismic Change’, Guardian Unlimited, 7 June 2004, (accessed June 2004). 11. Daily Telegraph, 7 June 2004.

This page intentionally left blank

Part III Conclusion

This page intentionally left blank

31

Communicating Europe: From Procedural Transparency to Grand Forum Juliet Lodge

Transparency seen originally as an administrative practice rather than as a political practice at the core of democratic practice, slams into the debate on the nature and contours of post-parliamentary debate about a supranational system where formal and substantive democracy is contested, as much if not more so than inside the member states. Advocacy of transparency implies that communication about ‘Europe’, what the EU is ‘doing’ is essential to sustaining democratic governance. Transparency is used in the EU for different ends all associated with an overarching goal of communicating to citizens as part of a process to enhance democratic governance in an enlarging EU. The tactical use of ‘transparency’ relates most closely to the idea of making the EU accessible, visible and close to its citizens – initially to counter traditional scapegoating by member governments of the Commission. This converges with procedural aspects of public access to documents. The strategic use of transparency conflates it with constitutionalisation in the EU, and with normative values and ideals central to democratic governance.

Transparency: a challenge to EU institutional structures Advocacy of transparency implies that transparency is a remedy for some existing deficit: whether structural, procedural or socio-psychological. Potent signs of deficit are readily identifiable at the structural level where transparent inter-institutional reform is advocated to redress the deficit. Viewed through the prism of structural, procedural and socio-psychological lenses, the pursuit of transparency involves challenges to the EU’s authority 261

262 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

structures, accountability, accessibility and attentiveness. Authority structures are challenged because measures evade democratic scrutiny, control and safeguards. Accountability is challenged because of the absence of sufficient parliamentary input and justiciability before the EU courts. Accessibility is challenged because access to documents and information has been denied (sometimes for good operational reasons, sometimes for unclear reasons). Attentiveness has been challenged because ironically while the Commission has sought to communicate Europe to the EU’s residents, those responsible for making pillar III policy (whether directives, framework decisions or flanking programmes) are not required to be visible, accountable and accessible. They do not need to attend to the voice of citizens. Pillar III excludes deliberative investigative co-decision by citizens’ representatives in the European Parliament, even after the Nice Treaty reforms. Yet it covers many of the issue areas of greatest salience to individuals. Citizens remain largely uninformed about steps in these areas; uninterested in the impact of measures on democratic practice and, until it is compromised or reduced, unaware of how potentially their own personal and collective liberal democratic freedom might be constrained. Non-governmental actors – the Guardian newspaper and Statewatch – rather than citizens have challenged the EU to honour its commitment to ‘transparency’. Transparency and openness are frequently portrayed as synonymous. Neither was originally entrenched as an EU obligation in the founding treaties. That they became so resulted from political imperatives that reflected some politicians’ beliefs that the EU had to be seen to be democratic and open at a time when the way in which it was seen and/or believed to make policy was depicted as at best opaque, and at worst verging on the devious. Declining public regard for the EU – as exemplified by falling turnout in Euro-elections, low interest and knowledge about the EU, and negative votes in referendums in some countries on treaties that deepened political integration (from Maastricht onwards) – provoked sufficient concern among EU elites to lead them to advocate structural changes and procedures to reveal the EU’s openness and transparency. Somewhat disingenuously, member governments’ put the onus on the Commission to prove its transparency when the Council was the source of structural obfuscation, a lack of accountability and attentiveness to MEPs or the public. Commission documents, statements and politicians’ speeches advocated a need to make the EU visible, accessible and ‘close to citizens’. In practice, this involved enhancing the EP’s role, especially vis-à-vis the Council of Ministers, and Commission-led procedural changes to develop proactive channels of communication to EU citizens. The goal was to show the EU as open, accessible, attentive and accountable – all ideas embedded in the affective values and ideals associated with democratic EU governance. The constitutional and affective elements of openness and transparency rose up the agenda throughout for two reasons. First, because the interinstitutional change in the balance of legislative authority meant that

Communicating Europe

263

MEPs had an absolute need to get access to information (in practice draft and amended draft proposals of the Commission and the Council) if they were to become effective legislators. Second, because the Single Act reforms could only be implemented if ratified in line with member states’ national constitutional provisions. This meant that referendums had to be held in several states. A negative vote in just one could jeopardise all constitutional reform and therefore the attainment of the very objectives that those reforms were designed to facilitate. The public were therefore brought into a process which affected the constitutional design of the EU but were drawn in without being properly informed or involved.1 Constitutional and arcane documents that formed the basis of referendum did not inspire public trust, let alone a sense of affective identification with the EU. The EU was thereby depicted as lacking both by the media and by governments who were largely to blame for this state of affairs. Reforming EU institutions, and notably the balance of power between the Council and EP to prevent the Council ignoring MEPs, was sensitive and difficult so historically MEPs supplemented constitutional reform by championing imaginative supplementary procedures based on the premise that anything not forbidden by the treaties was implicitly allowed. The EP interpreted its Rules of Procedure innovatively to engage the Commission and Council progressively in dialogue and to advance the EU’s institutional reconfiguration in the expectation of later entrenchment in treaty reforms. This process culminated in the Convention on the Future of Europe. Transparency was justified to uncover ‘what was going on’. It first took shape through procedures to enhance access to information about impending legislative initiatives, proposals and ideas being contemplated in the Commission both for MEPs (famously disregarded by the Council of Ministers), elites and for the general public. The Commission’s procedural response was to show that it was open (by granting access to documents, and developing ‘green paper’ pre-decisional consultations). This relied on it (and later other EU institutions) operating in ‘response’ mode to requests from outside parties for documentation. This was presented legislatively in the shape of proposals to facilitate public access to EU documents. Originally this implied that in the course of legislative readings, MEPs should have the same access as Council members to the most up-to-date draft proposals on which decisions were to be reached, in order to ensure that their deliberations related to the actual not past draft documents (and so enhanced efficiency and effectiveness of parliamentary scrutiny and deliberations). This was seen as especially important so long as the Council, when acting in legislative mode, continued to meet in secrecy. Not until 2000 was the Council General Secretariat required to make accessible to the public the provisional agendas of all Council meetings and its preparatory bodies in respect of cases where the Council acts in a legislative capacity.2 By 2001, the Council was to publish as many of its documents as possible on its website3

264 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

(something also done by the Commission and the European Parliament). Technological advance moved this forward to e-library-type depositories of information to be sought and accessed, into a form of interactive ‘listening’ to citizens by early 2000.

Transparency: a challenge to the implicit agenda – communicating with citizens Communicating transparency to citizens was especially difficult given existing information deficits and disinterest over what the EU was for, what its institutions did, or what policies were in prospect and how they could be justified. The implicit agenda was one of apolitical persuasion, of engaging the Commission in communicating positive messages about European governance in an anodyne, non-prescriptive, non-partisan apolitical way. Ideological advocacy of political options remains the preserve of political parties engaging in political mobilisation for the purposes of direct elections. This overly simplistic view overlooks the role of national parties (at all levels) and that of social movements. Originally it reflected sensitivity surrounding the idea of the Commission having a role to play at all vis-à-vis people living within the territorial boundaries of the EEC/EU. At a time when the concept of EU citizen was political dynamite, people in the EU were expected to hierarchically order their loyalties with loyalty to the nation state at the apex as their primary political attachment. Any challenge to that was exceptionally controversial and seen as interference to Europeanise the public. A second element to this implicit agenda stemmed from the bad press that EU institutions received in many member states. They became the easy scapegoat for decisions taken by their governments’ in the Council of Ministers which were likely to be contested or unpopular domestically. Attempts were made to counter the EU Commission’s image as a marauding, antiquated, closed bureaucracy by proving that it was, on the contrary, open, transparent and accessible. Documents not readily available domestically were there for the asking at EU level, in theory if not always in practice. If the Commission was denied a right (and personnel) to communicate with the people directly, it could at least show that it was accessible and would provide paper documentation. Its porte parole (official spokesman) on the other hand would give briefings that were factual, not prescriptive, rarely defensive, and rarely rebutted disinformation. The latter function was seen and is still seen as political and sensitive and open to the charge of interference in the domestic affairs of a sovereign member state if the head (of what were until the late 1990s called Commission Press and Information Offices in the member states) of Commission offices in the member states publicly rebutted misinformation or presented an EU view. This was a particular problem in the UK until 1997, and strikingly again in the period of the ‘listening Europe’ of the Convention of the Future of Europe.

Communicating Europe

265

Council secrecy contrasts sharply with the Commission’s attempts to fulfil its obligations as guardian of the treaties and promoting an ever-closer union. The EU Commission developed plans to speak directly to citizens and then to show them that it was listening to their views. These began with Commissioner Oreja’s letters to citizens, through to the increasingly common but relatively novel e-chats with Commissioners, and the Commission’s Europe Direct and ‘Your Voice in Europe’ programmes. While communication and the creation of a common EU identity may be linked, the Commission’s approach has been based on communicating that commonality through common messages translated into EU languages and communicated on the same footing across the member states (and in practice globally), regardless of the biases incurred by self-selecting respondents anywhere in the world. This is not the place to enter the cultural theory debates about whether and how linguistic plurality might inhibit the emergence of an EU-wide public sphere, or whether a common language might hasten EU-wide communication between social and political actors. Rather it is to stress that measures to promote procedural transparency have had far-reaching structural implications that even go beyond their impact on inter-institutional communication and information sharing. That such an ‘information/ communication’ role had far more significant constitutional implications than the rather limited transparency procedures on accessing public documents suggested was either not recognised, ignored or obscured by preoccupation with the bigger problems for EU institutional capacity raised by prospective, rapid enlargement to states whose democratic credentials were contested and changing. Inter-institutional procedural changes undertaken under the guise of promoting the cause of legitimacy through the quest for openness and transparency in practice had important consequences for reconfiguring the inter-institutional balance of authority, accountability and responsibility. Accompanying the ‘public eye’ agenda for communicating Europe to the often quiescent, disinterested public and sometimes equally quiescent media was a constitutional one whose logic emanated from politicians anxious to entrench a balance of political power among the EU institutions in a constitutional document that would be recognised as such by the public.

Transparency: a challenge to accountability and democratic legitimacy Historically, transparency in the EU (and the EEC before it) was interpreted contextually in terms of flaws in the original constitutional design. ‘Transparency’ was used as a justification to change the relative interinstitutional balance of power between the unelected Council of Ministers and the European Parliament (appointed from the membership of national parliaments until the first direct elections in 1979). References to democratic legitimacy gaps and the ‘democratic deficit’ related specifically to the

266 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

negligible power and minimal influence that MEPs could exert in respect of the content of legislation initiated by the Commission and adopted eventually by the Council of Ministers acting in legislative mode. Direct elections were seen as the key to reducing the democratic deficit and enhancing the EU/ EEC’s democratic legitimacy. The phrase ‘direct elections’ was often used as shorthand to subsume several attendant ideas. These referred primarily to constitutional reform to expand the EP’s authority progressively to imbue it with legislative power. Viewed through the structural prism of the interinstitutional balance of legislative power, the EU’s imperfect democratic credentials had to be rectified to close the democratic deficit at least at the supranational level and enhance EU legitimacy.4 Traditionally in Western Europe, democratic governance has been associated with open government, checks and balances in the exercise of government, liberalism and individual freedoms. Spinelli and former Commission President Jacques Delors shared a sense that the goals of European integration had to be made explicit and visible: that the ‘governed’ had to recognise and see the ‘government’ as just and legitimate, preferably in a constitutional document recognisable as such by the public. They were not alone in thinking that interim procedural rather than constitutional steps would be needed to reconfigure authority gradually and attain that goal.

Boosting accountability through efficiency In the EU secrecy is still associated with decision-making behind closed doors by the Council of Ministers. It is structural and deliberate. Openness in the Council is associated with it working in legislative mode. Secrecy over policymaking more generally would seem incompatible with cherished notions of democratic governance in the EU. Advocacy of transparent procedures in legislative and policy-making processes has been coupled with the idea of using it instrumentally, not to advance accountability as such, but to improve policy-making and the allocation of scarce financial resources synergistically among too often compartmentalised policy areas. The EP’s 1984 Draft Treaty establishing the European Union and the Single European Act advocated institutional and procedural reform to enhance efficiency and edged the EU towards a single legislative procedure. The EP’s legislative authority was progressively augmented over an increasing number of policy areas, first under the cooperation procedure and then under co-decision. Parity between the European Parliament and the Council is imperfect, though the EP continues to exploit its right to set its own agenda and Rules of Procedure to acquire greater procedural transparency from both the Commission and the Council, inducing greater communication of policy goals and sharing of information. The contestation over EU governance, their role and that of EU institutions in it, was no longer to take place behind closed doors. The structural element of the democratic deficit had

Communicating Europe

267

been supplemented by acceptance of a role for the people in shaping the reconfiguration of authority and the content of policy. The referendums on the Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice Treaties and those pending on the draft constitutional treaty underscore the need to secure public assent, to inform the public, and communicate with the public to ensure public acceptance and the legitimacy of the outcome. While procedural transparency improved public access to information, its operation in practice as a public conduit for accessing EU information, affected values and political behaviour and helped both to promote a reconfiguration of inter-institutional relations, to advance a redistribution of political authority and to facilitate the emergence of an EU public space. This process was about more than giving the EU a ‘human face’, something consistently advocated by successive Danish Presidencies since the December 1973 Copenhagen EC summit spoke of ‘human union’; and flagged up during the next decade by the Adonnino Committee’s recommendations for a People’s Europe. The initial steps on procedural transparency have been boosted by the technical (web-based) means for shaping it and inevitably have been harnessed rather uncritically by EU institutions with a view to creating an EU civic or public sphere.

Open communication with citizens The idea of a public sphere implies that citizens are able to communicate and have equal rights vis-à-vis the state/authorities who in turn have to justify themselves to gain support and legitimacy. Participatory democratic idealism combined with an agenda to facilitate effective and informed public engagement both directly and indirectly via MEPs and other agencies. Since effective engagement depended on a degree of political mobilisation and especially access to relevant information, the question of who had a right to access information assumed importance. Member states differed among themselves over officials’ rights of access to pre-decisional papers relevant to ongoing EU prosposals as well as over what constituted an official secret and what was to be in the public domain. The idealistic view that increased public knowledge about the EU would lessen public distrust, disaffection and disinterest in the EU underlay efforts to make the EU more visible, open and accessible. Initially, at the simplest level, this involved boosting business awareness of the opportunities created by the Single Market Programme, in part through the creation of ‘relays’ of Euro information, and one-stop shops. Information about the EU was to be presented more attractively and less ‘bureaucratically’. EU ‘citizens’ were to be made aware of their ‘rights’.5 This conceived of end-users as passive receivers of information. How they might transform it for active political purposes was neglected, even though the mere act of accessing information implied activity on the part of the end-user.

268 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

EU institutions acquired a particular role and responsibility for facilitating and shaping communication across the emergent transnational sociopsychological EU public space. Making information about the EU more readily accessible was but a first step. From 1994 onwards, accessibility was defined in a way that conflated accessibility and transparency with the broader, but arguably implicit and potentially contentious, agenda of freedom of information. The implications for the public and for the nascent, supranational political culture are extensive, and nowhere more so than under pillar III. The Tampere European Council proposed establishing a ‘Scoreboard’ to record progress on pillar III proposals every six months. The first appeared under the French Presidency in November 2000 but its updating is haphazard.6 If it is assumed that transparency implies that decision-makers are accessible and open, then it is easy to infer that any denial of access to information implies that they have something (devious) to hide. Showing the EU as ‘open’ and having nothing to hide, however, was not the same thing as having an officials secrets act or a freedom of information act. EU policy areas are littered with instances of non-transparency; for instance, restrictive interpretations of transparency apply in respect of direct or indirect, wholly or partly state-owned undertakings’ obligations of financial transparency which is defined in terms of transparency to the Commission (Art 86(3) EC). Although outside the scope of this chapter on transparency as it relates to governance, these are none the less worth noting. The Dutch government eventually secured the inclusion of a ‘declaration’ on transparency in the Maastricht Treaty after acrimony greeted the Commission’s proposal in 1992 for the Council’s draft regulation on transparency. Some felt this was far more extensive in scope than member governments’ official secrets acts which related primarily to internal security, policing and defence. It defined openness in terms of restricted access. It prescribed the vetting of Commission and Council staff who were to have access to ‘sensitive information’ and classified documents.7 Member governments had a vested interest in not bringing these matters to their national parliaments’ as well as the public agenda at a time when they were preparing the ground for the 1996 IGC leading to the Treaty of Amsterdam,8 far closer and more extensive cooperation under pillar III and a partial communitisation of pillar III.9 Not until the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 was transparency to feature officially and then only after more dispute among the member states. Accessibility: the facts Directives lay out the principles and grounds governing the granting or refusal to institutions and individuals of access to documents. Each institution provides public access to a register of documents. (Whether a document goes onto the register or not is subject to public scrutiny and discrepancies can arise between the different institutions over whether or not a document should be publicly accessible.10) Moreover, each institution’s own rules of

Communicating Europe

269

procedure governing decisions on the accessibility of documents can be tactically used, or altered. The European Court of Justice ruled that, before the Treaty of Amsterdam, EU institutions were entitled to govern citizens’ right of access to documents through their internal decision-making rules rather than by constitutional legislation. Since the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, efforts to enhance EU accessibility and transparency have been intensified under the guise of bringing the EU ‘closer to the citizens’. This often controversial process goes beyond the code of conduct for public access to Council and Commission document.11 It eventually led to a regulation under Article 255 of the EC Treaty.12 This redefines the principles, conditions and limits on grounds of public or private interest governing the right of access to documents, attempts to facilitate the easier possible exercise of the right to access and promotes measures on good administrative practice distinct from the Kinnock reforms of the Commission. Of note was the decision in 2001 on the internet presentation of legislative texts free of charge under the EUR-Lex portal common to the institutions.13 In common with national governments, EU institutions proscribe access to information that may damage their interests or compromise financial competitiveness, inter alia. This is permissible under EU ‘exception’ rules. The EU courts (First Instance and the European Court of Justice) can annul an institution’s refusal to release documents but they cannot order it to release them. The institution may then refuse access to the documents on other grounds. Exceptions are permitted in the case of documents defined as ‘sensitive’, where disclosure would compromise the protection of public interest (particularly public security, defence and military matters, international relations, the financial policy of the Community or a member state), the protection of privacy, commercial interests of a natural or legal person, court proceedings, and inspections and audits, unless there is an overriding public interest in disclosure.14 Applications for access to documents have to be processed within 15 working days from the registration of the application, and an annual report is published which also provides a reasoned record of cases in which access was refused, and the number of ‘sensitive’ documents in the register. The counterpart to access to documents, however, is denial of access. A number of important cases, first brought by the Guardian newspaper, led to reforms and the establishment of basic principles that have to be honoured. Their timing was crucial. It coincided with journalist John Carvel’s challenge to Council confidentiality (the Guardian case) as highly controversial steps were being taken under pillar III to complement the realisation of the Four Freedoms (notably of persons) with measures to: control personal freedom of movement, especially of third-country migrants and nationals; measures on immigration, asylum, refugees, data collection – such as SIS and Eurodac; and within three weeks expanding the remit of the European Drugs Monitoring Unit (set up officially in June 1993) from data collation to combat crime in

270 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

conjunction with the nascent Europol project group. Whether it is supposed that there was a conspiracy to conceal in the Council or whether lack of experience deterred disclosure, it may be concluded that for political and tactical reasons, non-disclosure seemed preferable to openness. This cannot be excused by pleading that these sensitive measures in 46 documents may have constituted an electoral liability for governments concerned with issues of EU democratic governance around the time of the 1994 Euro-elections and the 1996 IGC. It is easy to portray transparency in terms of a conspiracy agenda of concealment: internal security decision-makers, it could be argued, need ‘secrecy’ and minimal public or parliamentary scrutiny to maximise the chances of operational success.15 However, some of the strategic policy decisions they make not only involve public expenditure (which should be subject to scrutiny in a democracy) but affect individual rights. For example, the creation of an EU border guard either as a military force or as a civilian force is a matter of public interest and should not evade public scrutiny. The 1999–2004 EP fought hard and successfully to gain some authority over pillar III. While the public may not know much about the intricacies of the transparency debate among the institutions, the image of a closed system is unhelpful to creating public trust and confidence. Moreover, the EP has since its inception had to battle for access to information, security-related or the day-to-day stuff of ordinary legislation. Proper scrutiny implies access to necessary information and thus greater openness than had hitherto been the norm. Openness remains imperfect: the 1993 transparency decision in respect of access to documents which entered into force on 1 March 1995 does not extend to transparency over governments’ positions on legislative proposals before the Council has taken its decision. However, the EP secured a degree of access to sensitive Council information in the sphere of security and defence policy via an inter-institutional agreement16 to implement the May 2001 agreement on public access to EP, Council and Commission documents. Additional measures were adopted in October 2002 including strict provisions for a specially designed meeting room for holding such meetings.17 Officials and MEPs have to be vetted and are subject to a ‘need-to-know’ principle under Articles 5–11. While the drivers for transparency came from different directions, they converged at the point where constitutionalising EU governance for an enlarging EU became the big game in town. Constitutionalising a commitment to transparency seems desirable in an enlarging EU where constitutional principles have to be enshrined as states with different (and totalitarian antithetical) political regimes and cultures join and have to acclimatise themselves to EU political practice and culture. This is the proximity paradox.

Transparency as accountability: communicating political values Once the principle of representative government had been realised – at least in form – through successive Euro-elections and then by a series of treaty reforms

Communicating Europe

271

that codified changes in the inter-institutional distribution of legislative authority, the old constitutional canard of what kind of organisation the EU was came to the fore again. This was exemplified by the debates over constitutional designs. However, the Convention on the Future of Europe’s first articles of the draft constitutional treaty confirm commitment to democratic values and fundamental principles derived from acceptance and tolerance of difference and diversity across the board: subsidiarity, proportionality and loyal cooperation are defined as the guiding principles governing the limits and use of Union competences (Article 8). The requirement that shared values are developed and cultural diversity respected is set out in Article 3 which states: ‘The Union’s aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples.’18 Article 2 lists fundamental European values. It stresses the democratic values which are designed to make people feel part of the same union. A breach of one of them would be sufficient to initiate the procedure for alerting and sanctioning the member states in question. These values meet two criteria: they are fundamental and lie at the heart of a peaceful society practising, tolerance, justice and solidarity; and have a clear non-controversial legal basis so that member states can discern the resultant obligations which could be subject to sanction.19 The broader requirements of rectifying the democratic deficit have an internal and external perspective. The internal relate to structural intrainstitutional relations and to inter-institutional relations. The external concern measures to communicate to the public accountability of the EU’s decision-makers. But communicating accountability to the public in this sense goes beyond providing for the election of the EP by direct, universal suffrage. It involved moving away from the idea of public passive acquiescence to an invisible hand of European integration to the idea of giving a human face to identifiable EU institutions showing their democratic accountability for their actions to the public. This concept of public accountability underlay the efforts both of MEPs and the Commission to show that the EU was ‘open’ to and accessible by the public. It also manifested itself in the idea of limiting and creating a ‘just’ balance of authority between the member states and the EU. The Luxembourg non-paper preceding the Maastricht Treaty heralded the way for references to proportionality and subsidiarity, as core elements of better law-making20 (implying perhaps disingenuously that the more visible and close to the people affected by legislation, the more likely it would be ‘good legislation’ and the less likely they would be to find it unacceptable); and for explicit recognition to be given to the idea that national parliaments might have a role to play in respect of EU policy-making, making it more transparent, bringing it closer to the people but not necessarily improving efficiency. Most critically, perhaps, the resignation of the Santer Commission and the subsequent Kinnock reforms showed that policy-makers were not above the law.21 As the supposed custodians and guardians of the treaty and good, fair and just government in the EU, the Commission’s failings had to be

272 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

publicly acknowledged, especially in liberal democracies where resignation was the expected honourable public penalty for serious political failings. However, the Santer Commission’s resignation and the ‘leftovers’ from the 1996 IGC bolstered pressure to alter the EP’s powers and influence vis-à-vis the appointment and removal from office of the Commission. Transparency as demonstrated by accountability and responsiveness suggested a very different agenda to the pressure for transparency facilitated by public access to information. Procedural and constitutional converged increasingly sharply. The administrative, civil aspect of accountability became politicised and conflated with the constitutional agenda of enlargement and reform. The display of openness coincided with the apparent belief that by making information more readily accessible to those armed with the wherewithal to seek it on the net, the EU would improve the communication of its goals and policies to the public. The implicit goal was to counter cynicism about ‘Europe’ and bolster trust and confidence in European integration without engaging in overt political persuasive communication which has traditionally been seen to be the preserve of politicians in their interaction with the media. While the media had improved access, too, to broadcasting facilities in the Commission, editorial content was subject to the usual domestic vagaries and skewing. However, investigative journalism into the demise of the Santer Commission boosted public attention and appeared to prime the public space for an open debate on future governance moderated by e-governance lines and grand constitutional forums like the Convention on the Future of Europe. While the latter had hoped to present itself as an open people’s forum through its initiation of reflection and attentiveness phases, by February 2003, its Presidium was criticised for falling short of the ideals of openness and transparency. Equally problematic is the issue of how the Commission can best safeguard citizens’ interests. It is aware of the potential erosion of individual privacy and human rights by the abuse of large-scale intelligence information and intelligence gathering activities by various groups. Commissioner Liikanen told the European Parliament in September 2001 that, as guardian of the treaty, the Commission attached ‘the utmost importance’ to respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and supported the incorporation of EU commitments into the treaties (Art 6 TEU and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights): ‘Privacy is a fundamental right. Any derogation … has to be specifically provide for by law, necessary for the objectives of general interest, proportionate, and subject to adequate checks and guarantees against any form of misuse.’22 State security interests falling under Title V elude this Commission guarantee. MEPs and the Commission agreed that data gathered by Echelon type systems could be passed to commercial bodies for purposes not related to the prevention of crime or state security and, in those instances, should be subject to EU data protection directives.23 Commission and Council rhetoric favouring privacy diverged from practice when in 2004,

Communicating Europe

273

having ignored the EP’s opinions, MEPs referred their decisions for annulment to the Court. MEPs had also taken exception to the Commission using the electoral recess and schedule to make it difficult for MEPs to block, once again, decisions which MEPs felt to be detrimental to the public. The 1998 Vienna Action Plan had already stressed the need to accelerate cooperation in criminal matters among the member states and with third countries and ‘where necessary approximation of legislation’. The broad scope of any such resulting legislation (on organised crime from trafficking, rape, murder, racism, forgery, car crime to sabotage and terrorism) has extensive implications for individual liberties. The Council insists that protecting the public interest outweighs the interests of democratic control.24 Clearly, if legislation evades parliamentary scrutiny, it adds to the claim that the EU is far from transparent.

Transparency as attentiveness: a challenge to e-governance Then Commission President Delors signalled the interpretation of transparency as attentiveness in 1992. He advocated inventiveness in the cause of simplicity, clarity, redoubling of Commission efforts ‘at explaining what we do’, and ‘greater transparency’ to improve the working of the European Community and to bring it closer to its citizens.25 The Commission began by identifying a series of initial steps to increase the transparency of its work, including the seeking of wider-ranging advice, at an early stage, on key proposals through recourse to ‘green papers’ prior to the preparation of formal proposals; swifter publication of Commission documents soon after their adoption; and improving Commission communication with and information to the public.26 The Commission’s Guide to Access to Commission documents27 states that the fundamental principle is that the public will have the widest possible access to documents held by the Commission with certain exemptions to protect public and private interests. ‘Access to documents is a key element in the Commission’s policy on openness, which aims to stimulate a debate on Community affairs based on full knowledge of the facts.’ This was mirrored in 1995 by Council assurances, spurred by Danish and Swedish government pressure, to ‘work towards greater transparency of its proceedings ... while maintaining the effectiveness of the decision-making process’. It agreed to make votes on legislative acts public; to hold more frequent debates broadcast to the public (‘open debates’) on ‘important matters affecting the interests of the Union or on major new legislative proposals’ to be held at the start of each Presidency. It instructed Coreper to consider the conditions under which public access to Council minutes could be facilitated.28 A year later, it confirmed its intention to facilitate swifter processing of requests for access to Council documents.29 The concern that the Commission, MEPs and member governments now have over the referendums on the Constitution impel efforts to make the EU

274 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

both more visible, user-friendly and attentive. The idea of a ‘listening EU’ was initiated by the deliberations leading to the Charter of Fundamental Rights and then the Convention on the Future of Europe. Both explicitly sought citizens’ views, whether mediated by political parties, voluntary sector groups or directly. Both represented an advance on earlier practices epitomised by MEPs acting in responsive mode to citizens’ dissatisfaction in petitions to the EP, complaints to the Commission, and more recently to the Ombudsman Phase One of the Convention on the Future of Europe (CFE) was dubbed, by the CFE President, the listening phase. The counterpart to listening must be reflection on what is said and ultimately some explicit acknowledgement and incorporation of citizens’ viewpoints in the final output. It is echoed in the opening articles of the draft Treaty on a Constitution for Europe: Title 1 Article 1 begins: ‘Reflecting the will of the peoples and the States of Europe to build a common future’, thereby implying that attention has been paid to what the people had to say. The opportunities opened by the internet to make the EU both more accessible in terms of the availability, visibility and accessibility of information were exploited to bring the EU closer to its citizens. Accordingly, the EU’s decision-makers were to be shown to be visible, accountable, accessible and attentive by dint of e-chats as well as real-time e-conferencing, with citizens as well as the feedback and other e-Europe mechanisms set up over the past few years.30 The Presidency websites seem increasingly popular.31 Commissioners, such as Pascal Lamy when launching the EU trade dialogue in November 2002, saw this as enhancing both the transparency and legitimacy of their actions.32 Whether or not this by itself will boost EU legitimacy is doubtful. E-political activity is notoriously self-selecting but the idea that citizens can ‘communicate’ authoritatively and directly with the ‘government’ may augment public expectations that public authorities have a duty to be attentive, accessible, visible, responsive and accountable. Recognising the tension between the openness offered by cyberspace – and the potential for abusing it for criminal purposes (ranging from racism and pornography to fraud) and the need to preserve individual freedom and collective security, the Commission launched an EU cyber-security agency in February 2003. It is to rapidly react against high-level computer threats and crimes and supplements EU legislation and measures brought in since 1998. Balancing accountability and transparency here will again prove problematic whether or not a genuine EU-wide public sphere emerges in cyberspace. However, e-governance poses particular challenges both to sustaining transparency and especially to the creation of a civic commons in cyberspace.

From transparency to communication Scepticism over the usefulness of accessing MEPs, the Ombudsman or officials (online or otherwise) cannot be overcome simply by making a website easy

Communicating Europe

275

to access and to use. Transparency of information needs a counterpart in feedback: if public and interested parties are invited to give their views, will they come to expect the accommodation of those views, not via the traditional channels of deliberative parliamentary democracy but via a more immediate online response? The chimera of closeness evinces a proximity paradox as public policymaking escapes national boundaries. The shape and form of open government is present in the constitutionalisation of the EU. Democratic idealism is evident. Internal procedural refinements to improve the efficiency of decision-making may expedite decisions even when co-decision becomes increasingly tortuous as the EU enlarges, but they may not convince the public that the EU is open or trustworthy. If anything, the more internal, invisible procedures are introduced, the more likely it is that the post-parliamentary anxiety of visible politicians becoming little more than the voice of invisible decision-makers may take hold. Even the Danish Presidency in September 2002 decided to investigate the ‘fast track’ (secret) procedure whereby Commission and Council officials and MEP rapporteurs (in a trialogue) try and expedite EP agreement at first reading stage.33 The shape and form of open government may be there, but not always the content. The Convention on the Future of Europe tried to address this in draft Article 7 of the constitutional treaty by moving the issue of the right of access to documents of the institutions (currently Article 225 of the treaty) to the Titles on ‘the democratic life of the Union’ or ‘Union Institutions’ of the constitutional treaty. Referendums on major public issues would deflect attention from these adventures into European integration but they are insufficient in themselves to ensure that transparency is real in all its dimensions. Without that reality, EU governance that sustains a lack of transparency on matters closest and most visible to citizens – the internal security agenda being a good example – smacks of escapologist adventurism. That cannot augur well for the public reception of constitutional reform in an enlarging EU. As the final report of the Convention on the Future of Europe’s Working Group IX on Simplification stated: ‘Citizens must be able to understand the system so that they can identify its problems, criticise it, and ultimately control it.’

Notes 1. EU Commission, ‘Adapting the Institutions to make a success of enlargement. Commission Opinion in accordance with Article 48 of the TEU on the calling of a Conference of Representatives of the Governments of the Member States to amend the Treaties’, Brussels, February 2000. 2. OJL 9, 31 January 2000. 3. ‘Proposal for a European Parliament and Council regulation regarding public access to Parliament’, Council and Commission documents, COM(2000)30; Bull.1/2– 2000;

276 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

4. See also Action Committee for the United States of Europe, Joint Declaration to be submitted for parliamentary approval in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands (18 January 1956); and the Draft Treaty establishing the European Union, European Parliament, February 1983. 5. This had a counterpart in employment matters, notably in respect of directly enforceable rights on equal access to employment, housing, education and social rights under Regulation 1612/68. The Court of Justice applied the principle of transparency to this in a number of judgments by asserting that individual EU nationals should also be able to ‘see’ a statement about their rights in national legislation. 6. Communication de la Commission au Conseil et au Parlement Européen, ‘Mise à jour semestrielle du tableau de bord pour l’examen des progres realisés en vue de la création d’un espace “de liberté de securité et de justice” dans l’union européenne,’ COM(2001)278 final. Brussels, 23 May 2001. 7. Accordingly, vetting was to be done by authorities in the state from which the official emanated, thereby raising the spectre of varying rights of access for different levels of officials with the attendant prospect that some would be inadvertently excluded from accessing the very information to which their colleagues had access. This could have disadvantaged one state compared to another notably in respect of pre-decisional negotiations in the Council, and in respect of ‘A’ points matters. 8. Reflection Group, ‘Reflection Group’s Report to the Intergovernmental Conference’, SN 519/95, Reflex 20, Brussels, 1995. 9. In November 1993, The Trevi group (founded 1976), the Ad Hoc Group on Immigration (1986), and the Coordinators of Free Movement (1998) were replaced by the K4 Committee (senior interior ministry officials), three Steering Groups (policing and customs; immigration and asylum, and judicial cooperation), and a plethora of Working Groups under the Steering Groups. A new Directorate-General (DG H) covering what came to be known as the ‘third pillar’ was set up. 10. Special report from the European Ombudsman to Parliament following the Ombudsman’s own-initiative inquiry into public access to documents held by institutions other than the Council and the Commission which already had rules covering this, OJ C 44, 10.2.1998. 11. OJ L 145 31 May 2001, Bull,5–2001, point 1.1.2; 340 31 December 1993, Bull.12– 1993, point 1.7.6; Council Decision 93/731/EC on public access to Council documents OJ L 340, 31.12.1993; Commission Decision 94/90/ECSC,EC,Euratom on public access to Commission documents OJ L 46, 18 February 1994. 12. Regulation(EC)No 1049/2001 adopted on 9 April 2001 OJ L 111 20 April 2001. See also Decision 93/731/EC on public access to Council documents (OJ L 340 31 December 1993) amended by Decision 2000/527/EC, OJ L 212. 23 August 2000; and Proposal for a European Parliament and Council regulation regarding public access to Parliament, Council and Commission documents, OJ C 177E, 27 June 2000; COM(2000) 30; Bull. 2–2000, point 1.9.2;. 13. See 14. S. Peers (2000) ‘The EU Court System and Freedom of Information’, Statewatch Observatory on EU Freedom of Information – Case Law: Netherlands v. Council Case 58/94 [1996] European Court Report 1-1269, March. 15. T. Bunyan states that this redefined the classifications of secret, confidential and restricted to include those marked and LIMITÉ (Limité documents are not given a ‘security classification’). He notes that no mention is made of the top-

Communicating Europe

16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

21.

22.

23.

24. 25. 26. 27.

28. 29. 30. 31.

32.

277

secret category which covers disclosure which could have ‘exceptional serious consequences.’ Statewatch Analysis 13 (2002) 3. OJ C 374 29 December 2001, p. 1; OJ L145 31 May 2001, p.43. Additional measures were adopted in October 2002 (OJC 298/4 30 November 2002). OJ L 101 11 April 2001, p.1. Draft text of the Articles of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, CONV 528/03 6 February 2003. CONV 528/03, Annex II, p. 11. EU Commission, ‘Communication of the Principle of Subsidiarity presented to the Council and the Parliament’, Bull.ec 10–1992; ‘Interinstitutional Declaration on Democracy, Transparency and Subsidiarity’, Bull.EC 10–1993; ‘Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament, Council and the Commission on Procedures for Implementing the Principle of Subsidiarity’, Bull.EC 10–1993. EU Commission, ‘Reforming the Commission: A White Paper’ (Parts I and II), Communication from Mr Kinnock in agreement with the President and Ms Schreyer, Brussels, March 2000; ‘Reforming the Commission: Consultative documents’, (February 2000). European Parliament Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy: Temporary Committee on the Echelon Interception System, A5–0264/2001. Resolution adopted by 367 votes to 159 with 39 abstentions on 5 September 2001, pp. 16–17. See draft direction on the handling of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector COM(2000) 385 final – OJ C 365 19 December 2000.

EU Commission, Target 1992, 7/8 1992, p. 1. Press Release, IP(92)995, ‘First Measures to Increase Transparency’, Brussels, 2 December 1992. See introduction by Secretary-General David Williamson and OJL 46/60 18 February 1994: Commission Decision of 8 February 1994 on public access to Commission documents. Council Conclusions on transparency approved on 29 May 1995, 7481/95 (Presse 152) pp. 4–5, SN 5015/96. Council Decision of 6 December 1996 amending Decision 93/731/EC on public access to Council documents, OJ L 325/19 12 December 1996. See, for example, the European Parliament’s special mailbox set up in summer 2002 at The Danish Presidency reported on 14 November 2002 that its website, had been visited some 800,000 times, daily averaging 6,500. During the first four months of the Danish EU Presidency, some 5,000 documents and texts were published on the website; 4,000 opted for news updates via e-mail and SMS, and during the first four months, subscribers got over 2 million emails and approximately 60,000 SMSs. Webcasts of major meetings in Denmark were seen on average by 1,000 persons, mainly watching transmitted press conferences after the event. Commissioner Lamy said: ‘It is only if we have a broad debate with all stakeholders about the issues, real or perceived, raised by trade liberalisation that we can garner the support necessary for carrying these important negotiations to a successful conclusion. This consultation is part of my commitment to transparency and

278 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

dialogue and is aimed at seeking public input into how the EC should respond in its initial offer to the request it has received from third countries. I therefore invite all interested parties to study this document and let us know their views on the issues at stake before 10 January 2003.’ (14 November 2002). 33. These talks occur outside formal committee proceedings. They originated during the adoption of the regulation on access to EU documents in 2001 and were meant only to expedite technical, politically non-controversial measures.

32

The European Parliament 2004–09 – A Parliament for the People of the New EU Polity? Juliet Lodge

Since the first Euro-elections, much attention has been paid to the level of turnout. In the past, a high turnout was deemed essential to justify the European Parliament’s claims and quest for an accretion of its originally negligible legislative powers. The mere fact of its direct election was seen as lending credence to its claim to being the only directly legitimated institution, and was key to its claims as to the legitimacy of its attempts to acquire genuine legislative authority. Its legislative and control functions and powers were boosted over the years, both via minimalist small steps that exploited its own Rules of Procedure to give expression to traditional democratic values and practices in respect of parliamentary control over the executive, and via the maximalist strategy of treaty reform and constitution-building associated with Altiero Spinelli. In 2004, there had been a little more relaxed attitude to the question of EU member states’ nationals being allowed to vote in their EU state of residence because fears voiced since 1979 that non-residents and those resident in states other than their EU state of origin would, given the chance, deliberately vote twice to skew results, had not been vindicated. In the 1999 EP elections, fewer than 100 cases of this were recorded. By January 2004, five months before the new member states joined the EU, the ‘old’ 15 member states had brought in measures to allow the ‘new’ members’ citizens to vote in the Euro-elections if resident in another EU state. Justice and Home Affairs Commissioner Vitorino justified this in terms of the importance of political participation to an individual’s sense of citizenship of the EU. The traditional utilitarian associations inferred from individuals’ personal sense of gain from 279

280 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

being in the EU and positive attitudes towards the EU, indicative of a higher probability of participation in EP elections, have to be seen against the context of the EU adding value to national identification1 and multiple loyalties. While it remains true that turnout mattered in 2004, and matters for the self-image, status, legitimacy and authority of the European Parliament as much now as it ever did, how and why it matters differs now. There has been a significant change in reactions to the EP since the 1999 elections. The EP no longer suffers from practised indifference of the part of some national parliaments, heads of government and national political leaders: the EU has become internalised by domestic political administrations who see it as a key frame of reference for policy-making, as do many – though not all – national parties and parliaments. The EP’s existence as a necessary institution in the EU’s polity is rarely contested by mainstream political parties. Its legitimacy is no longer disputed. Its right to act as legislature is no longer contested. It has acquired a degree, if grudging, of recognition and respect even in the eyes of national politicians once vocal in their antipathy to it. It has become more visible as the political institution of political control in the European setting. In many respects, it has come of age as a mature parliament and political force. This has not universally translated itself into high turnout at the polls, partly because this image of the EP is one perhaps more readily recognised by elites rather than publics. Regional governments, the Council of European Municipalities and Regions,2 industry federations, unions, the women’s lobby, the European Anti-Poverty network, and think tanks produced ‘manifestos’ and ‘open letters to candidates’ for the elections and for the 2004–09 Parliament.3 Many naturally stressed the primary interests of their constituents: ranging from the economy, sustainable growth and jobs, to securing a role for local and regional government in the new Constitution. The EP has become the focal point for lobbyists as well as governments and NGOs, regional representatives, public and private interests – in short for those who engage in the daily stuff of political bargaining and negotiating in the EU.4 It has not become so for publics at large. Worse still, in a sense it has suffered from the ubiquitous sense of parliaments and politics being of little direct relevance – within domestic as well as supranational settings – to the individual citizen. This is all the more paradoxical in view of the efforts made by the Commission, MEPs and others – especially using the internet and online citizens ‘forums’, polls and mini referendums on contemporary issues from the draft Constitution to opinions on the desirability of e-exchange of police records, and a common sports policy. Outgoing EP President Pat Cox had done a good deal to boost public recognition of the EP but this did not translate itself necessarily universally into higher turnout on the occasion of the EP elections. Where turnout rose, as in the UK, this was the result of domestic politics rather than an indicator of voter recognition of the EP’s legislative authority, importance, relevance and power. Where turnout was

The Euopean Parliament 2004–09

281

particularly disappointing (as in many of the new member states), it was also attributed to domestic circumstances and in some to voter ignorance. Since the first Euro-elections, a correlation between voter ignorance and turnout has been inferred. Similarly, it has been repeatedly argued that turnout could be boosted if national leaders and heads of government were more prominent during Euro-election campaigns. In some member states, they were – but not always for positive reasons associated with explaining the campaign and European issues themselves. In Italy, Premier Berlusconi’s appeal to voters to go to the polls and the government’s text message to all mobiles reminding voters of the dates and opening hours of the polling booths was rebuffed by the Communists as an infringement of privacy rules. Anti-government/European messages lambasted political leaders. For example, in Germany Chancellor Gerhard Schröeder took legal action against the far-right National Democratic Party which depicted him on billboards saying ‘don’t get screwed’ and which, according to his lawyer, represented an infringement of his personal rights. In the Netherlands, the EU’s whistleblower Paul van Buitenen did well while the governing centre-right coalition slipped back.

Euro-elections 2004: the re-politicisation of the Commission? Since before the first Euro-elections, the relationship between the Commission and the EP was the source of government anxiety. If the two were seen to be ‘on the same side’ in the legislative process, even when the consultation procedure was beginning to give way to the cooperation procedure, they were depicted as propelling deeper integration and opposing the Council of Ministers (and national governments). Any hint of commonality was seen as a threat to national sovereignty. When the Santer Commission was forced to resign by the EP, the political nature of the relationship was highlighted. In the succeeding period of constitutional reform and IGCs, the Commission appeared to have ceded the political initiative (but not its legal right) in respect of promoting integration to member governments. Even during the 1999–2004 EP, when the PES aimed to support the first broadly centre-left Commission in the EU’s history, intergovernmentalism seemed to be in the ascendant. This was misleading. Co-decision constrained its room for manoeuvre but encouraged earlier attention to the EP and earlier accommodation and adaptation to the bicameral legislature as MEPs exercised genuine legislative authority. Parlamentarisation of integration rose up the agenda both because the EP successfully won a role in the IGCs and in the Convention on the Future of Europe, and because national parliaments acquired a treaty-based role. Capitalising on the legacy of the 1999–2004 parliament, the EP’s activities after the elections became more visible. Political spats within it secured wider media coverage than before, beginning with the election of the EP’s new President, and the chairs of EP committees when deals were struck and

282 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

undone. The election by 388 out of 700 votes cast on 20 July to EP President of Josep Borrell (PES) who had never before been an MEP highlighted the usual manoeuvring of the main political groups. The EPP and PES agreed to share the Presidency with Borrell leading for the first half of the EP’s fiveyear term, and with the PES agreeing to support a centre-right candidate – possibly German – for the second half. This displeased some new member states who had high hopes of winning the EP Presidency. The Vice-President posts were distributed as follows: seven EPP; three PES, two ADLE, one Green and one GUE. The EP also approved in a secret ballot by 413 to 251 Jose Manuel Durao Barroso to succeed Commission President Romano Prodi. In his hearings with the EP political groups, Barroso undertook to take account of the EP’s views at all times. When hearings with individual Commissioners followed in October, Trade Commissioner designate Peter Mandelson (a British national) broke the last taboo in proclaiming himself no longer the House of Commons’ man but the European Parliament’s man. This not only laid lie to the old anxiety of Commissioners ‘going native’ but was an expression of the political importance of the EP to sustaining Commission autonomy (notably from governments). In the past, the European Parliament had needed to win the support of the Commission to secure gradual but significant procedural changes to ensure that its views were heard, accommodated and finally codified in a series of treaty amendments progressively imbuing it with genuine legislative power. After the 2004 elections, the Commission was in the position of needing the EP’s support in order to safeguard its own position. Its independence, credibility and strength rest on EP support. This inverts the traditional view of the relationship between the EP and Commission. It dispels the old idea that such a political relationship would seriously weaken the independence of the Commission. It implies recognition of the political realities of needing to build political consensus across the EU of 25 states in order to achieve EU objectives. These are likely to focus on realising the Lisbon agenda and its agenda of liberalisation, something that may benefit from the centre-right majorities in the EP, Commission and probably the Council throughout the next legislature. The EP’s internal organisation has always been subject to heavy criticism: party organisation is sometimes chaotic; working procedures are somewhat tortuous; and its size and multinational composition are a challenge to anyone seeking to make decision-making and the legislative processes open, just, democratic, accountable, efficient and effective. These are challenges that the EP’s new parties must meet. EP political groups will need to hone the diversity of their component national parties and define common objectives that can be realised in conjunction with the legislative agenda normally set out by the Commission. The system-transforming outgoing legislature left the new MEPs with new opportunities. There has already seen a transformation in the way

The Euopean Parliament 2004–09

283

in which the legislative agenda is elaborated. There is far greater Commission consultation of stake-holders, even in the formerly highly intergovernmental pillar III on justice and home affairs, now – despite continuing weaknesses – broadly accountable to and subject to EP control. The discussion on the goals for Tampere II, for example, illustrate this with stakeholders’ views being put on the Commission’s website. This makes the process both more transparent and more obviously political. Technocratic decision-making requires political legitimisation through the EP and Council.

Collective responsibility for EU democracy: communicating Europe The need for a strong EP to complement and make possible a strong, independent Commission has been recognised by the Commission and MEPs. Securing party cohesion within the EP is a precondition to the EP being able to demonstrate its effectiveness both in policy-making and in the legislative process and also vis-à-vis the creation of confidence among publics as to its ability to represent them and be a credible, trustworthy, confident and responsible parliament acting accountably and requiring accountability on the part of the other institutions. It has not quite fulfilled those ambitions yet. More than ever before, the EP needs to become the EU’s grand forum and the voice of the people. It needs to rediscover parliaments’ traditional roles. Above all, it needs to show the people who have elected its members that it is worthy of their confidence; that it can hold executives accountable; that it can influence the shape of policy inputs and outputs, the distribution of resources and the strategic vision of the EU across policy domains. It has to prove that it is not an arcane irrelevance. There is no place for corruption. Dissent must be tolerated. Liberal democratic practices, respect for the rule of law, acceptance of the political culture of the EU and of democratic values and practices need to be demonstrated. It is up to MEPs to do this consistently, visibly, coherently and in a way that is relevant to, connects with and is understandable by the people. This is not simply a question of MEPs becoming ‘closer’ to the voters whether in person or via the tools of e-democracy. It is a question of them delivering democratic accountability, demanding democratic responsiveness on the part of the other institutions, requiring deliberation and genuine consultation. The newly elected European Parliament needs to begin where the Convention on the Future of Europe left off: MEPs must listen to the voters as well as communicate with them. If they do not, turnout will fall (and erode their claim to legitimacy) as interest in participating in the core political processes that sustain democracy wither. This is a tall order but it is one that is essential if the EU is not to slip into a technocratic-executive model of decision-making where together governments and technocrats determine outcomes. Communicating Europe to a heterogeneous, dispersed electorate

284 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

speaking different languages, having different conceptions of democracy as well as different histories, understandings and socio-economic-political cultures and traditions poses numerous challenges. However, there is a common message to be communicated about the relevance of politics and the importance of participation in political processes if democracy is to be sustained.5 European democracy is a two-way game: the people – or nascent demos – empower the European Parliament by participating in its direct election and all that flows from that; the European Parliament must empower the people by helping to generate a sense of EU-wide civic competence. EU democracy is about sharing competence and responsibility among the institutions and the people. Communicating Europe, therefore, is not just about the provision of information about EU activities and policies. It demands deliberation, feedback, consultation and discussion of the stakes, the choices, the priorities and the reasons behind chosen priorities. They must be put and explained, argued and debated but not just by MEPs who have a particular responsibility to communicate with and mobilise the voters, but also with political parties, representatives, civil society, the private and public sectors. The effectiveness of their communication will depend not just on their individual energy but on how they communicate, through what medium and what they communicate. How convincing are they in presenting information about the EU not in an apologetic, pseudo-apolitical way but convincingly in a way fashioned by political engagement and debate over alternative choices, alternative visions and inspired by party-specific ideologies and orientations? It is time for the EP’s political parties to take on the mantle of maturity. If MEPs want the next EP election campaign to reflect European issues, they must consistently assert a European agenda during the period of this legislature, making a case in the national and supranational settings. In neither can they afford to be seen or misperceived as the mouthpiece or pawns of national party politics. They will have failed if in 2009 yet another ‘neutral’ information campaign has to be conducted to tell the people that the EP exists and outline to them its broad functions. For the first Euro-elections, the EP and Commission ran neutral information programmes to inform the people about a novel election – unique in living experience – the direct election by universal suffrage of the continent’s first supranational parliament.6 Similar and less high-profile information programmes accompanied successive EP elections. In 2003, the EP had a special ‘task force’ liaising with the main political groups that in 2004 was still trying to persuade them to ‘put Europe’ into the campaigns. This was a reflection of the extent to which political campaigning even about an autonomous, supranational European Parliament with genuine legislative power remains the captive of national politics. It is an ironic element of national sovereignty that has not kept pace with the time. It reveals both national parties and national governments’ inability or unwillingness to present an honest picture of their work and roles in the life and shaping of

The Euopean Parliament 2004–09

285

the political priorities of the supranational European polity. This contributes not to shoring up their own ‘power’ vis-à-vis the European Parliament and Commission but to exacerbating the growing public trust deficit in politicians in general. Few governments or parties campaigning in the EP elections gave a credible and genuine view of their European goals, vision and priorities in a way that captured public interest and attention. Anti-EU and Eurosceptic parties did so manipulating media-friendly stunts and messages that were simple, often trite and rarely meant to spur genuine public honest debate. Democracy was ill-served. The EP will have to be responsive and responsible to the people. It will have to engage politically with both the Commission and the Council even in areas where national parliaments have progressively lost authority, such as in respect of internal and external security and foreign affairs. If governments genuinely want their citizens to be responsible participants in political processes at all levels and especially at the EU level (when many have referendums on the Constitution), they must respect the EP’s authority and voice. In their guise as the European Council and the sectoral Councils, they must respect co-decision. The scurry over the adoption of provisions on the adequacy of the transfer of passenger-name data in the run-up to the election and then immediately after the elections did not show respect either for the EP or for proper democratic procedure. This is not to say that every minority issue and every expression of dissent – and worse, intent to destroy the EU’s democratic process as UKIP and others proclaim – should be allowed to paralyse and squander legislative time. It is to say that MEPs, the Council, governments and the Commission have a collective responsibility to uphold, deepen and improve the democratic process.

The threat of fragmentation From around 100 different national parties, 732 MEPs representing some 450 million people were elected. The balance of power among the three major groups remained largely unchanged with the EPP-ED winning 37 per cent of the seats, the PES 27 per cent (1 per cent down on 1999) and the ALDE 12 per cent (up 4 per cent on 1999) but the relative strength of national contingents within them was changed. (See Tables 32.1 and 32.2.) The uneasy and sometimes shaky EPP-ED alliance is more conservative and Eurosceptic and faces the possibility of the ED forming a separate, yet internally divided, party. The now more leftist PES comprises MEPs from 23 national parties compared to 15 in 1999. The southern partners have replaced Britain and Germany in terms of strength. The Alliance of Liberal and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) continues to embrace right and leftist parties and is likely to find itself dividing in favour of coalitions on policy issues with both the EPP and PES: the UK and Italian MEPs represent its left-wing tendencies, and its French, Danish and German MEPs rightist (market liberalisation) tendencies.7

286 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

Table 32.1

Country

Results of the 2004 EP elections, by political grouping No. of seats EPP-ED PES ALDE Greens/EFA EUL/NGL IND/DEM UEN NA Total

Belgium 6 Czechoslovakia 14 Denmark 1 Germany 49 Estonia 1 Greece 11 Spain 24 France 17 Ireland 5 Italy 24 Cyprus 3 Latvia 3 Lithuania 2 Luxembourg 3 Hungary 13 Malta 2 Netherlands 7 Austria 6 Poland 19 Portugal 9 Slovenia 4 Slovakia 8 Finland 4 Sweden 5 UK 28 Total 268 Notes: EPP-ED PES ALDE Greens/EFA EUL/NGL IND/DEM UEN NA

7 2 5 23 3 8 24 31 1 16 0 0 2 1 9 3 7 7 8 12 1 3 3 5 19 200

6 0 4 7 2 0 2 11 1 12 1 1 7 1 2 0 5 0 4 0 2 0 5 3 12 88

2 0 1 13 0 0 3 6 0 2 0 1 0 1 0 0 4 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 5 42

0 6 1 7 0 4 1 3 1 7 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 3 0 0 1 2 1 41

0 1 1 0 0 1 0 3 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 10 0 0 0 0 3 11 37

0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 9 0 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 27

3 1 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 6 0 0 3 0 0 2 29

24 24 14 99 6 24 54 78 13 78 6 9 13 6 24 5 27 18 54 24 7 14 14 19 78 732

European People’s Party and European Democrats Party of European Socialists Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe Greens and European Free Alliance European United Left and Nordic Green Left Independence and Democracy Group Union for Europe of the Nations Non-attached

Overall, in the EP the inherent threat of excessive fragmentation was met procedurally by the creation of fewer party groups than in the outgoing EP. The EPP-ED have 268 seats; PES 200; ALDE 88; the Greens and European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA) 42; the European United Left and Nordic Green Left (EUL/NGL) 41; the Independence and Democracy Group (IND/DEM) 37; and the Union for Europe of the Nations (UEN) 27. The remaining 29 MEPs sit as non-attached MEPs without the privileges and power that goes with official recognition as a party group. While the Alliance of Liberal and Democrats for Europe non-attached MEPs from eight member states could form an extreme

The Euopean Parliament 2004–09

Table 32.2

287

Women Members of the 2004–09 European Parliament

Country EPP-ED PES ALDE EUL/NGL GREENS/EFA UEN IND/DEM NI Total BE CZ DK DE EE EL ES FR IE IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT SI SK FI SE UK TOTAL

2 3 1 10 0 2 7 14 2 1 0

3 0 1 9 1 4 11 14 0 5

2

1 2 3 0 3 2 2 1 2 3 2 2 2 67

0 0 5 0 4 3 2 4 0 1 1 4 7 79

1 1

2

2 1 1 0 1 3 0

1 1 4 1 0 0 1 1 0

1 0

0

7 0 0 3 1

0 3

1

1

0

0

0

1

1 1

1

3 0 1

0

3 0

0 1 0

1

1 0

1

1 1 0 0

1 1 1 3 6 26

0 1 12

1 0 3 18

5

1 0 3

0 1 12

7 5 5 31 2 7 18 34 5 15 0 2 5 3 8 0 12 7 7 6 3 5 5 11 19 222

Source:

right-wing group, they are deeply divided. More so than in the past, the EP has negative elements within its ranks, including those bent on destruction and preventing the adoption of the draft Constitution. Two new groups – the federalist ALDE and the Independence and Democracies group (IND/DEM) – represent, in theory, the two polar opposites on this. ALDE was created on 14 July 2004 with 88 MEPs from 19 member states; and IND/DEM has 11 members from the UK, Poland, Italy, Greece, Sweden, Ireland, the Netherlands and Czech Republic. The two groups will bring the issue to the fore when the EP is the first to vote on the draft Constitution, although speaking time is still allocated on the basis of group size and will mean that the EPP and PES lead the debate. The aim is not only to record the EP’s view but to ensure that the EP is seen as a large-scale forum, a model for open, pluralistic and democratic debate, which, according to EP President Borrell, ‘will be complex for reasons of identity, ideology or different concepts of the Europe we want, all of them equally worthy of respect … [and which] should serve, above all,

288 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

to ensure that the citizens voting in the referendum know the reasons for and consequences of their decision and so that they can express their opinion on the text of the constitutional Treaty, rather than with reference to the political context of each individual country’. Accordingly, following signature of the draft Treaty on 29 October 2004 in Rome, the EP is set to hold several debates on key aspects of the Constitution before the first referendums to be held in many member states on its adoption starting in 2005. It is due to enter into force on 1 November 2006 following ratification in all member states. Along with the Commission (whose goal of effective communication with the people is to be stimulated through a ‘people’s university’ on Europe, and indirect means given its lack of a legal basis or budget for political campaigning as opposed to information) the EP will take the question of the EU’s future to citizens and must finally perform as the voice and grand forum of the people. Its parties therefore must cohere to be convincing proponents of a particular view of Europe. Cross-party and cross-national consensus is desirable even though unanimity even within the groups themselves is unlikely. The party groups’ ‘coordinators’ will have to do more than act as contact points for specific issues. Effective intra-group mobilisation will be essential if a party group wishes to make its views prevail both within the EP’s 20 new committees and in plenary. The political machinations surrounding the election of the chairs to these renamed committees were possibly more public than in the past, and reflected policy mergers in line with the new Commission portfolio constellations and political realities of EU enlargement. (See Table 32.3, which shows the EP’s committees.) The EP cannot afford, however, to neglect other critical issues. Some 400 items of legislation remain from the outgoing EP. The highly controversial issue of the transfer of passenger-name data to UK authorities and the adequacy of associated data protection was referred to the Court with a view to annulling the decisions reached by the Commission and Council. The Lisbon Agenda, e-governance and the EU’s world role – as a civilian power8 using military means in support of its humanitarian mission, as a trade power, and as an entity seeking a role on the UN’s Security Council – reflect a step change in how the EU’s leaders see the EU. The trappings of united endeavour are more evident. The administrative and political procedures need to keep pace with a very much changed political reality. The EP therefore has to continue to build on its Constitutional Affairs Committee’s ground-breaking work with national parliaments and prepare itself for a much enhanced role, both in mobilising informed debate on the draft Constitution and in respect of its role in the new polity.

Elections 2009 The emphasis on effective communication with citizens using all means possible has gained momentum since the initial convention called to create

The Euopean Parliament 2004–09

Table 32.3

The European Parliament’s committees

Committee No. of members ( ) Acronym Budgets (47) BUDG Budgetary Control (35) CONT Economic & Monetary Affairs (49) ECON Employment & Social affairs (50) EMPL Environment, Public Health & Food Safety (63) ENVI Industry,Research & Energy (51) ITRE Internal Market & Consumer Protection (40) IMCO Transport & Tourism (51) TRAN Regional Development (51) REGI Agriculture (42) AGRI Fisheries (35) PECH Culture & Education (35) CULT Legal Affairs (26) JURI Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (53) LIBE Constitutional Affairs (28) AFCO Women’s Rights & Gender Equality (35) FEMM Petitions (25) PETT Foreign Affairs (78) AFET AFET sub-committees on Human Rights (32) DROI Security and Defence (32) SEDE Development (34) DEVE International Trade (33) INTA a

289

Chaira

Member state

J. Lewandowski EPP/ED S. Fazakas PES P. Beres PES

Poland Hungary France

O. del Turco PES

Italy

K.-H. Florenz EPP-ED

Germany

G. Chichester EPP-ED

UK

P. Whitehead PES

UK

P. Costa ALDE

Italy

G. Galeote Quecedo EPP-ED J. Daul EPP-ED P. Morillion ALDE

Spain France France

N. Sifunakis PES G. Gargani EPP-ED

Greece Italy

J.-L. Bourlanges ALDE

France

J. Leinen PES

Germany

A. Zaborska EPP-ED M. Libicki UEN E. Brok EPP-ED

Slovakia Poland Germany

H. Flautre Green/ALE K. von Wogau EPP-ED L. Morgantini GUE/NGL E. Baron Crespo PES

France Germany Italy Spain

Chairs are distributed in line with party strength and priorities, and seats using the d’Hondt PR system. Committees prepare plenary work, draft reports on legislative proposals. The influential Chair sets the agenda of the meetings and acts as honest broker in reports. Alternates are appointed as well as Vice-Chairs.

a European charter of fundamental rights. The Convention on the Future of Europe exemplified the strengths and weaknesses of this approach. egovernance and the various portals of the EU’s institutions and parties, NGOs, citizens’ groups, and so on, add to the opportunities for exchanging

290 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

information. However, this needs to be mediated by political actors if consensus is to be built to make sound, informed decisions. The EP must become more credible between 2004 and the next elections in 2009 on all fronts. It faces a particular challenge in mobilising younger voters (67 per cent of 18–24-years-olds, compared to an average of 54 per cent of EU voters overall, abstained in 2004) and manual workers (64 per cent of whom abstained). It has to overcome citizens’ disappointment with politics in general and in their perceptions of the extent to which it reflects their concerns: just 51 per cent of those who voted on the EP elections felt that it did already accomplish this. Eurobarometer also found that feelings of attachment to ‘Europe’, and a sense of belonging as an ‘EU citizen’ were higher among those who voted. Only 46 per cent, however, indicated that they trusted the EP. Set against voting trends across the EU, voting in general is lower in the new ten than in the old 15, and while simultaneous elections (whether national, regional or local) did boost turnout in some member states (as with the local elections in Ireland +8.6 per cent, and UK +14.9 per cent) turnout was lower in others (Thuringen –2.2 per cent; Lithuania – 7.5 per cent with a simultaneous presidential election).9 Turnout is but one crude indicator of public confidence in political processes and institutions but it remains important to sustaining democratic political behaviour and institutions: hostility and/or indifference not only signal disappointment and a lack of confidence in the receptiveness of those institutions but leave a vacuum that can (and has been) occupied by those opposed both to deliberation and constructive debate, and hence to democratic practice itself. In the UK, the low-key campaigns of the main political parties and of the Labour government in particular left a campaign vacuum that was readily exploited by the vociferous Euroscepticism/antiEuropeanism of UKIP candidates who vowed to destroy the EP, disrupt its political processes and turn back the tide of history on all fronts. This meant that while Europe featured in the campaign, there was little genuine debate even in public meetings. Euro-elections have always been contentious: in their conception, their advocacy before 1979 and their impact thereafter. Turnout in 2004 was generally disappointing, and especially so in the new member states. This was not entirely unexpected, nor is it seen as implying a lack of legitimacy for the EP’s ambitions as a legislature exercising its control and legislative powers across all three EU pillars. While the above traditional explanations of disappointing turnout measured against turnout for national general elections retain some explanatory power, a further variable has to be taken into consideration: voter lack of trust and confidence in the relevance of the political process in general to their lives, living conditions and standards. Generalised disengagement and a lack of citizen connection with politics and elected representatives suggest both a lessening of public confidence in the accountability of those in authority at all levels; and a communication deficit. While the Commission and member governments recognise the latter and

The Euopean Parliament 2004–09

291

are attempting to address it in the context of ratifying the new Constitution (something unthinkable at the time of the first EP elections in 1979), and while it may be that creating some sense of constitutional patriotism may be a means of consolidating a nascent form of EU identity across the still widening EU, the question of trust in political authorities, including the elected MEPs, has still to be effectively dealt with. Accountability is central to confidence and trust. But it is not just MEPs who need to demonstrate their accountability to voters, and the accountability of the Commission and the Council to the EP. Rather, member governments and national parliaments need to demonstrate their trust and confidence in MEPs. No amount of procedures can assure this: governments and parliaments must show that they trust the EP as an autonomous body exercising legislature power in a responsible way at the supranational level, and that they no longer see it as a rival for citizens’ loyalties and attention, or as a competitor for control over policy-making that has long escaped the democratic controls of national, regional and local authorities. Europeanisation of national party politics remains an aspiration even for EP elections in most member states. The 2009 elections will take place in a European Union whose political contours and presence will be greater than before. The European Parliament’s work as constitution-builder, however, will not have ceased. It must continue to act as the custodian, guardian and transmitter of the supranational polity’s normative beliefs, practices and values, requiring and checking that they are upheld by the EU’s political classes and systems of governance. It will need to be vigilant as co-guardian (with the Commission focusing more on guarding and ensuring compliance with the treaty and EU law) of the EU’s basic values, and safeguard the EU’s democratic credentials and practices, including enhancing the legitimacy of the open method of coordination. These must be reflected in the course of its work, and as its party groups prepare for a real presence in the 2009 election campaign. So far, they have been barely visible. By working with national parliaments, the transnational federations and national parties, they need to act as voice and champion of the people, communicate and educate, inform and be informed, open and sustain a receptive democratic political culture. Together they must explore and improve the relevance of politics to citizens, build trust and confidence and show together they can work to facilitate democratic participation and accountability in a transparent, responsible, effective, accountable and democratic European Union and so realise the ideals of the European Community’s founding fathers as expressed in the constitutional treaty.

Notes 1. F.C. Mayer and J. Palmowski, ‘European Identities and the EU’, Journal of Common Market Studies 42 (2004) 573–98; J. Lodge, ‘Loyalty and the EEC: The Limitations of the Functionalist Approach’, Political Studies, 26 (1978) 232–48.

292 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

2. , June 2004; and B. Eberlein and D. Kerwer, ‘New Governance in the EU’, Journal of Common Market Studies 42 (2004) 121–42. 3. European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) ‘Open Letter to the Candidates for the European Elections’ (May 2004) ; Eurochambres, ‘Manifesto for the European Parliament 2004–2009’, ; 4. P. Bouwen, ‘The Logic of Access to the European Parliament’, Journal of Common Market Studies 42 (2004) 473–96. 5. K. Neunreither, ‘Citizens and the Exercise of Power in the European Union: Towards a New Social Contract?’ in A. Rosas and E. Antona (eds) A Citizens’ Europe: In Search of a New Order, (London: Sage, 1995); D.N. Chryssochoou, ‘Theorising about the Future of Democracy in the European Union’, European Union Review 3 (1998) 117–36. 6. V. Herman and J. Lodge, The European Parliament and the European Community (London and New York: Macmillan, 1978). 7. 8. W. Carlnaes et al., Contemporary European Foreign Policy (London: Sage, 2004); J. Lodge, ‘The EU from Civilian Power to Speaking with a Common Voice – The Transition to a CFSP’ in J. Wiener (ed.) Transatlantic Relations: The EU and International Diplomacy (London: Macmillan, 1996) pp. 67–94. 9. Flash Barometer, ‘Post European Election 2004 Survey’, EU Commission, Brussels 2004, p. 11.

Index Note Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes Aartsen, J van 198 Abolizione Scorporo Verdi Verdi 156–7 Accountability 5–6, 154, 262, 265–6, 270–2, 274, 283, 290–1 of Commission 291 of government 6 of policymakers 6 of EP 7, 291 lack of 262 Action Committee for Democracy and Interest Justice (Luxembourg) 180–3 Adamkus, Valdas 175 Adonnino Committee 267 Agriculture 226 and EP committee 289 and Latvian Agriculture Minister 170 and Slovenian Agriculture Minister 227 Agnoletto, Vittorio 160 Albania 45 Alema, Massimo D’ 160, 162 Alleanza Nazionale 42, 155, 213 Alliance of Free Democrats (Hungary) 138, 139, 142 Alliance of the New Citizen (ANO Hungary) 219, 221 Alpha Party 189, 192 Alternativa Demokratika 187, 192–3 Amato, 13 Amsterdam treaty 8, 11, 14, 88, 268–9 Anastassopoulos, Giorgio 21 Andecha Astur 232 Andrejevs, Georgs 169 Andrikiene, Laima 177 Annan plan 74, 136 Annunziata, Lucia 158 Anti-Capitalist Coalition (Greece) 132 Anti-Europeanism 290 see also Euro-scepticism, Euro-sceptics Anti-globalisation 57 Assent 14 and EP, 14 and Council 16 and public 267

Association of Independents and European Democrats (SNK-ED) 84 Asylum policy 196, 269, 276n see also immigration as an issue (in the Netherlands) 196 Austria 21, 22, 25, 29, 48, 52, 64, 182 and Austrian citizens 25 and delegation to the EP 63 and Austrian President 57 and water resources 62 Aylward, L 151 Aznar, José María 230, 236 Azores 213, 215 Balkan states 137 Balkenende, Jan-Peter 194–5 and Cabinet 194–6 and government 198 Barroso, Manuel Durao 210, 212, 216, 282 Basques 35, 233, 235, 237 and ETA 232 Basque Nationalist Party 232 Battilocchio, Alessandro 162 Bayrou, François 114, 118 BBC 253 Beer, Angelika 126 Belangrijk 197 Belarusians 173 Belder, Bas 199 Belka, Marek 201 Belokons, Valerijs 168 Benelux countries 182, 183, 286 Berg, Max Van den 199 Berlusconi, Silvio 126, 155, 158–9, 161, 163, 164n, 211, 281 Berman, Thijs 199 Berzins, Andris 167 Bezzina, Emmy 189 Biagi, Enzo 158 Bicameral legislature 281 Biltgen, F 185 Birzneice, Inese 167 Blair, Tony 250–1 293

294 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

Blokland, Hans 199 Bloque Nacionalistia Gallego BNG (Galician Nationalist Bloc, Spain) 232, 237 Bloque Nacionalista Valencia BNV (Valencian Nationalist Bloc) 232 Bocklet, Reinhold 20 Bojars, Juris 166 Bomhoff, Eduard 195 Bonde Jens Peter 83, 90 Bonino, Emma 159 Border guard of the EU 270 Borisov, Yuri 176 Borowski, Sijm Marshall Marek 201 Borrell, Josep 37, 233, 237, 282, 287 Bos, Wouter, 195, 198 Bosnia and Herzegovina 45 Bot, Bernard 106 Bozkurt, Emine 199 Brazauskas, Algirdas 173 Brejc, Mihael 228 Britain and renegotiation of EU membership 251 Britain in Europe 250 British Nationalist Party (BNP) 213, 250, 253, 254–5 Brok, Elmar 14, 227 Brown, Gordon 250 Bugar, Bela 219 Buitenen, Paul van 194, 199 see also whistleblower 281 Buitenweg, Kathalijne 199 Bulgaria 137 Bündnis für Arbeit (Alliance for Jobs) 123 Bureau, of the European Parliament 36, 38–9 Burg, Ieke van den 199 Busuttil, Simon 189, 191 Bystrov, Georgii 99 C (Centre Party: Sweden) 240, 243, 245 Calderoli, Roberto 163 Caramanlis, Costas 132 Carlshamre Maria 246 Carlsson, Ingwar 245 Cavada, Jean-Marie 115, 118 Carvel, John 269 Casa, David 192 Casa Pia (paedophilia scandal) 210

Cassola, Arnold 189 Catalan, as official language 235 Catalan Parliament 231 Catherwood Report 4 Catholic 203 Catholic–nationalist League of Polish Families (LPR) 203, 207 CDH see Humanist Democratic Centre CDU/CSU (Germany) 42, 122, 124, 128–9 Cederschiöld, Charlotte 246 Ceec 48, 52 Celtic tiger 148 Centre Democrats (Denmark) 88 Centre Party (Keskerakond, Estonia) 95–7, 99, 101 Centre Party (KESK – Finland) 101, 107 Centre Party (Latvia) 165 Centre Party (Lithuania) 177 Centre Party (Sweden) 240 Centrist Union (Greece) 132 CESDP 182 CFSP 182, 238, 292n and High Representative 182 Channel Islands 180 Charalambidis, Micheal 132 Charter of Fundamental Rights 12, 13, 14, 182, 272, 274, 289 Charter of democratic humanism 66 Chevènement, Jean-Pierre 112, 113, 116 Chirac, President 109–10, 113–14, 119–20 Christen Democratisch Appèl (CDA Netherlands) 194, 196, 198, 199, 200n Christian Social People’s Party (Luxembourg) 179, 181, 182, 183 Christen Unie 199 Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People’s Party (KDU–CSL) 83 Christian Democratic Movement (KDH Slovakia) 219 Christian Democrats 15, 20, 33, 34, 35, 41 and in Belgium 65–66, 71 Czech Republic 86 Denmark 92 Finland 102–3, 107 Germany (see also CSU) 122–4, 128–9

Index

Hungary, 138 Italy 155 Latvia 166 Malta 187–93 Netherlands 194 Poland 206 Slovakia 219, 220 Slovenia; 220 Spain 232 Sweden 240, 244–5 Christian People’s Party 89 Christian roots 85, 140, 202, 205, 220, 226 and values 83 Chunta Aragonesista 232 Cibulka, Petr 84 Citizenship (of EU) 30, 88 and sense of 279, see also Irish referendum on CiU (Convergence and Union:Spain) 232, 234, 237–8 Civic Alliance 138, 142 Civic Conservative Party (OKS Hungary) 220 Civic competence 284 Civic Democratic Party (ODS) 82 Civic Platform (PO) 202 Civilian power 288 Civil federal alliance 84 Civil Servants General Confederation 182 Cizelj, Romana Jordan 228 Clinton, Bill 253 Coalición Canaria 232 Coalición Europea 232 Coalición Nacionalista (Spain) 232 Coalition of the Left (SYN) Greece 134–5 Cochin speech 114 Cocilovo, Luigi 162 Co-decision 4, 8, 24–7, 29–30, 56, 277, 281, 290, 300 and role for national parliaments 197 constrained 296 Cohn-Bendit, Daniel 126, 183 Cold War 175 Collins, Ken 38 Comitology 10, 14 Commissioners, number of 88, 182 committee of the EP 39–41, 43n, 80n, 152–3, 172n, 181, 185n, 278n, 281 and size 37

295

number 37 chairs 38–9 reports 39 members 39 committee-based legislature 40 Common Foreign and Security policy 85, 102, 169, 240 Communist Party Austria 59 Czech Republic 82–3, 85 Finland 102–3 France 113, 115, 117n, 120 Germany) 124, 126 Greece 131–5 Hungary 204 Italy 158, 160 Lithuania 173 Luxembourg 180–1 Poland 209 Portugal 136–7, 212–13, 216 Slovakia 219 Spain 231 and in EP 34, 35, 136 Compulsory voting 46, 47, 49, 50 Conceju Nacionaliegu Cantabru 232 Conciliation 8–9 and committee 9 and negotiations 8 Confederation of Luxembourg Commerce 182 Conservative Party (Denmark) 89 Conservative Party (UK) 248, 250–1, 254–5 Constitution for EU, and ‘new’ 5, 11, 13, 31, 60–1, 82–5, 88, 91, 113, 115–16, 119, 131–3, 140, 153, 159, 182–5, 220–1, 225–6, 230, 236, 243, 247–8, 250–4, 256, 273–4, 277n, 285, 291 and Anti-Christian 208 and Charter of Fundamental Rights 182 and democratic intent 5 and federal aspirations 115, 132; solutions 134 and liberal content 116 and social policy provisions 115 see also Draft constitutional treaty Christianity in preamble 220 and EP as constitution-builder 4, 29

296 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

Constitutional Affairs Committee of the EP 11, 13, 288–9 and constitutional design 263, 265, 271 and norms 5 and principles 270 and reform 4, 182, 253, 263, 266, 275 281 Constitutionalising EU governance 270 Constitutionalisation of EU 275 Convention on the Future of Europe 3, 5, 6, 11, 13, 14, 67, 69, 82, 83, 84, 86n, 102, 182, 211, 217n, 263, 264, 271–5, 281, 283, 289 and listening phase 274 Convergencia de Demócratas de Navarra 232 Convergence and Union (CiU) 232 see also Galeusca Cooperation procedure 266, 281 Corbett, Richard 4, 13, 14, 32n, 43n Coreper 273–4 Corruption and Latvia 170 and Lithuania 173 Costa, Antonio 217 Coveney, S 151 Council of Ministers 4, 85, 202, 262, 263, 264, 265–6, 281 Counter-terrorism 236 Cox, Pat 14, 37, 58, 152, 205, 295 Crime 159 as election issue 242 fighting 243, 269 international 243 organised 273 prevention 272 Croatia 45, 228 Crocodile initiatives 4 Cross-border crime 247 Cross-border workers 184 Crowley, Brian 150 CSA (Christian Social Alliance: Austria) 57 CSU (Christian Social Union: Germany) 42, 122–4, 128–9, 227 Czech Social Democrats 82 Czech Republic 221 D66 195 Danish June Movement 230

Danish People’s Party 89 Defence cooperation 240 see also common foreign and security policy De Gucht, Karel 21 Degutis, Arunas 177 Dehaene, Jean-Luc 71 Dehousse, Jean 19 and Dehousse Report 4 D66 (Democraten 66 Netherlands) 195 Delors, Jacques 266, 273 Democratic deficit 7, 265–6, 271 Democratic Forum (Hungarian) 138, 140–1, 142, 144 Democratic legitimacy 266 and direct elections 19 and gaps 265 Democratic Party (DIKO) 74, 75 Democratic Pensioners’ Party (DeSUS Slovenia) 223 Democratic Rally (DISY, Cyprus) 74 Democratic Regional Union 132 Democratic Socialist Movement 132 Democratic Unionist Party (UK) 256 Demokratisch Appel (Netherlands) 22 Democratic Party of the Artlanti (Portugal) 213 Democratisch Europa 196 Democrats for the Olive Tree (Italy) see Ulivo DEMOS (Slovenia) 223 DIKKI (Dimokratiko/Koinoniko Kinima [Democratic Social Movement] Greece) 132 D’Hondt 20–1 Direction (SMER – Slovakia) 219 Di Rupo, Elio 68 Dombrovskis, Valdis 169 Double majority 202, 236 Doyle, A 151, 153–4 Draft Constitutional Treaty 5, 11, 14, 69, 147–50, 184, 196, 205–7, 212–16, 236, 239, 267, 271–5, 280, 283, 288, 291 see also Constitution for Europe Draft Treaty establishing the European Union 266 Ducarme, Daniel 68 Duff, A 13 Dunya music festival 197 DUP (Democratic Unionist Party: UK) 255n, 256

Index

Dupont-Aignan, Nicolas 114, 121 Durant, Isabelle 68 Dutch Presidency 52, 196, 199 Dzurina, Mikuláš 219 220 EA (Basque Solidarity: Spain) 232 Echelon 272 Ecolo Mouvement ‘ecolo’ – les verts [Greens]: Belgium) 68 Ecologists (Greece) 132 see also Greens, and EFA Economic and Monetary Union 239 ELDR (European Liberal, Democratic and Reform Party) 15, 33, 35, 37 42, 43, 79, 99, 105, 206, 242 ELDR–ALDE 33, 42, 206, 246 election manifesto of ELDR Group leader 37 Electoral Commission 249 and English regions 249 and local council elections 249–50 and postal voting 249 Electoral procedures 21–23 First past the post 256 D’Hondt 21–2, 203, 311, 220, 231 Hare–Niemayer 21–2, 203 Hagenbach–Bischoff 22 Saint Laguë 22 Uniform 14, 18–21, 30; and common principles 14, 30; and uniform procedure 4, 21–23 Employment 60, 78 and as electoral issue 60n, 276 and Employment and Social Affairs Committee of the EP 289 and Germany 123, 184 and Ireland 150 and Luxembourg 185n and the Netherlands 196 and Portugal 215 and Slovenia 224 and Sweden 243 see also unemployment EMU 53n, 239, 240 England 110, 249, 254 Enhanced cooperation 12–13, 252 Enlargement 139, 165, 205, 210, 214, 216, 229, 231, 237 Environment 76 as an issue 30, 149, 191, 241, 243, 247

297

and constitution 254 and EP Committee 38, 289 and Greens’ record 191 and parties (Greece)132 and policies 9, 215 and protection (Denmark) 91, (Ireland) 150 and standards 9 Environmental Movement (Cyprus) 74, 75, 78 EPP (see also European People’s Party) 33, 37, 40 Election manifesto EPP–ED 34, 42, 79, 86, 99, 161, 190, 221, 227, 233, 286 Equal Rights Movement (Latvia) 167 Equal rights of EP and Council in scrutiny 10–11 ERA European Radical Alliance 34n Esquerra Verda del Páis Valencià 232 Estaing, Valéry Giscard d’ 13, 113, 182 Estonia citizenship laws 96 independence movement 95 ETA (Spain) 230 EUL–NGL (Confederal Group of the European United Left) 106 Eurlings, Camiel 199 Euro 85, 123, 220, 225, 226, 239, 248, 250, 252–3, 257 see also single currency Eurobarometer 47, 52, 54, 143, 145, 183, 242, 247, 280 Eurodac 269 Europa de los Pueblos 232 Europa Transparant 194, 196, 199 Europäische Transparenz Initiative (ETI) 199 Europe of Democracies and Diversities 36 European Arrest Warrant 251 European Convention on the Future of Europe 3, 102, 182, 211 European Constitution 202, 236, 242 and ratification by member states 3 and Christianity in the preamble 226 European Council 183, 185, 186n, 285 and Laeken 13 and Nice summit 12, 13, 14, 202 and Tampere 268

298 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

European Court of Justice 269 and of First Instance 269 European Defence Cooperation 240 European Democrats 34n, 35, 84, 86, 252, 286 European Democratic Alliance 34–5 European Directive on Services 244 European Drugs Monitoring Unit 269 European elections, and disproportionality 31 European FBI 243 European Free Alliance 11, 36, 286 see also Greens European integration 182, 195–6, 199, 209, 211, 220, 230, 240, 245 European Parliament as guardian of EU values 5 custodian and champion of democracy 6–7 European Convention European People’s Party 15, 33–7, 40–3, 106, 115, 132, 152, 162, 184, 190, 206, 212, 246, 251, 282, 285, 287, 289 see also EPP, EPP–ED Group European political parties 30 and financing 30 European Radical Alliance 36 European Socialist Party see PES European Works Council 223 Europhobes 200 Europol 251 see also European FBI Europhile 152, 234, 250 Euro-scepticism 92, 103, 105, 113, 114, 116, 141, 143, 152, 162, 167, 183, 195–6, 208, 210, 214, 224, 230, 236, 239, 256 and Euro-sceptics 196, 199, 207, 211, 213, 241, 242, 244–5, 246 and Gaullists 114 European security 220, 226–7, 238–9 and defence 215, 225 European Stability and Growth Pact 123, 140, 196 see also Growth and Stability pact European Trade Union Confederation 224 Europol 270 EU and democratic credentials 4; deficits 6

flag 251, 253, see also European flag 221 Constitution 88, 91, 105, 111–20, 126, 127, 131, 137, 140, 150, 153, 159, 182–3, 184, 190, 196, 198, 205–7, 220–1, 247, 251, 254 and ratification 183 Eusko Alkartasuna 232 Euskera, as official language 232 Ever closer union 265 Exit poll (Sweden) 246 Extremadura Unida 232 Extra-parliamentary parties (Hungary) 139 Ezquerra Republicana de Catalunya 232 Fårm, Göram 246 Farrugia, Carmello (pro-hunting) 189, 192 Fatherland Union (Latvia) 166, 169, 171 FDP (Free Democratic Party:Germany) 122, 126–7, 129 Federal Europe 82, 137 Federation of Luxembourg Industrialists 182 Female representation 103, 118, 153, 161, 189, 199, 226 Ferreira, Edite 217 Fianna Fail 148 Fico, Robert 219 Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Alliance 138–9, 141–2 Figueirdo Ilda 212 Financial Perspectives 225 Fine Gael 148 Fini, Gianfranco 163, 213 Fischer, Heinz 59 Fischler, Franz 61 Flanders 65–6, 68–9, 71 FN (Front National: France)116, 118, 121n FN (Front National/front voor de Natie: Belgium) 68, 70n, 71 Folketinget 89 Follini, Marco 163 Fontaine, Nicole 37 Football 81, 89, 110, 127, 132, 135, 136, 157, 211–12, 214, 231, 250 and European football championship 85, 110, 157, 211, 214

Index

Forca Portugal 214–15 Forza Italia 35, 42, 155–8 Fortuyn, P 194–6 For Fatherland and Freedom (Latvia) 165 For Human Rights in a United Latvia 166, 167 Founding fathers 5, 291 Fp (Liberal People’s Party, Sweden) 240, 243, 244–5, 246 FPOe (Austrian Freedom Party) 57, 58, 60, 63 Franco-German domination 202, 205 and axis 230, 234 Franco, Antonio Sousa 212, 215 Frassoni, 13 Fraud 199–200, 252 Free Democrats (Hungary) 138, 140–2, 144 Freedom Union (UW) in Latvia 168, 169 in Poland 203, 204–7 Frieden, Luc 185 Friedensmacht Europa 126 G7 183 Gabriel, Leo 59 Galeusca 232 Galloway, George 249 Gasset, Ortega y 231 Gaulle, Charles de 113 Gaullist 35, 114 Geremek, Bronislaw 205 Gibraltar 235 Gil-Robles, José Maria 37 Globalisation 59, 126 and Anti- 62, 132 Goebbels, Robert 181 Gomez, Francine 116 Gozo 188, 193 GPV (Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond: Netherlands) 199 Grech, Louis 192 Green and Farmers’ Union 166, 168 Green League (Finland) 105 Green Party and UK 254–5 Greens Austria 57–60 Belgium 65; and purple–green coalition 65; Flemish 66, 68 Cyprus 74, 75–7, 85–6

299

Czech Republic 84 Denmark 89, 93 EP and ERA 15, 34, 35, 36, 37, 42, 61, 62, 75, 132, 184, 286 EFA (European Free Alliance)11, 30, 49–50, 57 Finland 102, 105, 107, 112 France 115, 118, 121n Germany 57, 122–3, 126–7, 129, 130 Greece 132, 136–7 Ireland 148–9, 150 Italy 158, 160–1 Latvia 161, 166–8 Luxembourg 183 Malta 187–9, 191 Portugal 212 Slovenia 229 Spain 212 Sweden 239, 240, 246 Green League (Finland) 102 Green Party (UK) 254–5 Groen, Els de 199 Growth and Stability Pact 214, 216 Group for Independence and Democracy 162 Gruber, Lilli 158 Guardans, Ignasi 232 Guerra, Luis 213 Guterres, Antonia 212 Guterres government 212 Haider, Jörg 57, 60, 61, 63 Hänsch, Klaus 38 Harkin, M 151 Harms, Rebecca 126 Hassi Satu 107 Hautala, Heidi 107 Hedh, Anna 245 Heinsbroek 195 Hellenic Front 132 Helsinki Human Rights Group 175 Hennis Plaschaert, Jeanine 199 Henckes, Jacques-Yves 183 Higgins, J 151 Hökmark, Gunnar 246 Hollande, François 183 Homeland Union (Lithuania) 173, 177 Howard, M 251, 256 Hromadková, Alena 84 Hrusovský, Pavol 220

300 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

Humanist Democratic Centre (CDH – Belgium) 66, 68–9, 71 Humanist Party (Portugal) 213 Human face, of EU 267, 271 Humanitarian mission 288 Human Rights Union (Latvia) 167–9 Human rights 53n, 78–9, 175, 226, 254, 272, 277n, 289n and EP committee 289 and fundamental freedoms, 272 and respect for 15, 80n, 98 in a United Latvia 166 for HR Union 167–9 and European Court of HR 167 Human union 266–7, 271 Hungarian National Alliance 139, 142 Identity cards 133 IGC 3, 4, 11, 12–14, 16, 58, 268, 270, 272, 281 see also Amsterdam, Maastricht, Nice; and Convention on the future of Europe Ilves, Toomas, 96 Immigration 77, 136, 276n as election issue 91, 127, 136, 159, 184, 195, 196, 213, 225, 241, 251, 269 from outside the EU 184, 253 illegal 251 see also racism, asylum Imperium Europa 189, 192 Independence and Democracies Group 199, 287 Independent Trade Union of Luxembourg 182 Independents (Ireland) 150 Information and communication 6 Inheritance tax reform (Malta) 193 Iniciativa Ciudadana de La Rioja 232 Institutional Reform 6, 85 Interests of Moravia in United Europe 84Intergovernmental Conference 3 Intergovernmentalism 281 Iraq 123, 126, 139, 141, 158–9, 166, 196, 198, 201–2, 205, 230, 235, 250–1, 252, 253 Ireland and referendum on citizenship 149, 153 Itälä, Ville 107

Italian Constitution 157 Italian No Global Movement 160 IU (United Left: Spain) 232, 233, 234, 236, 238n Iwueke, Damian 189 Izzard, Eddie 249 Jäätteenmäki, Anneli 101, 102, 107 Joan, Bernat 232 Jonckheer, Pierre 68 Jospin, Lionel 109, 115 Judicial cooperation 276n Juncker, Jean-Claude 181, 184 June Movement (Denmark) 89, 92 Junilistan (Sweden) 240, 243–4, 246 Juppé, Alain 113, 118 Juri, Aurelio 227 Justice and Life Party (Hungary) 139, 144 K4 committee 276n Kacin, Jelko 228 Kallas, Siim 96 Karamanlis, Costas 132 Karatzaferis, George 133, 135 Kauppi, Piia-Noora 107 Kd (Christian Democratic Party: Sweden) 240, 242 Kelam, Tunne 99 Kennedy, Charles 252 KESK (Centre Party of Finland) 101, 106 Keyser, Véronique de 68 KGB 166, 171 Kilroy-Silk, Robert 252 Kinnock, Neil 277 and reform of Commission 269, 271 KKE (Kommounistiko Komma-tis Elladas: Greece) see Communist Party Klaus, Václav 82, 83, 84, 86, 218 Knightley, Keira 249 Koch-Mehrin, Silvana 126 Kohl, Helmut 122, 127 Köhler, Horst 127 KOK (National Coalition: Finland) 102, 106 Köyhien Asialla 102 Kožený, Viktor 84 KPOe see Communist Party: Austria Krasts, Guntars 169

Index

Kristovkis, Girts Valdis 169 Krivine, Alain 110 Kronberger, Hans 60 Kułakowski, Jan 205 Kuskis, Aldis 169 Kwas´niewski, Aleksander 201, 202, 203 Laar, Mart 96 La Magherita 162–3 Labour (Ireland) 150 Labour mobility (Hungary) 140 Labour Party (UK) 248, 250, 253–5 Laeken Declaration 13 Lafontaine, Oskar 129 Lagendijk, Joost 199 Landsbergis, Vytautas 177 Länder 125 Latgale Light 168 Latvia’s Way 167 Latvian Euroskeptics 167 Latvian First Party 166, 168, 170, 176 Latvian Socialist Party 166–7 Latvian Social Democratic Union 167 Latvian Social Democratic Workers’ Party 166 Latvian United Social Democratic Welfare Party 167 Latvian Independence Movement 165 Law and Justice party (Poland) 203–4 Lax, Henrik 107 Leefbaar Europa (LeefbEur) 196 Left Alliance (Finland) 102 Left Party (Luxembourg) 181 Left Party (Sweden) 239–40, 244, 245 Left Revolutionary Front (Portugal) 212 Lega Nord 42, 155–6 Legitimacy of governments 6 and see democratic legitimacy Lehtinen, Lasse 107 Leinen, J 13, 289 Leite, Manuela Ferreira 210 Le Pen, Jean Marie 113, 213 Le Pen, Marine 116 Lepper, Andrzej 206 Leventis, Vassilis 132 Liberal Democracy (Slovenia) 223 Liberal Democratic Party (Lithuania) 174, 178 Liberal Democratic Party (Luxembourg) 179

301

Liberal Democrats (UK) 163, 252 Liberal Party (Denmark) 89, 93 Liberal Party (European) 169 see also ELDR Liberal Party (Finland) 102 Liberal Party (Sweden) 243 Liberal Union (Lithuania) 174 LIF (Liberal Forum:Austria) 63 Lijst Pim Fortuyn 194, 196, 198–9 Link Committee of Foreigner Associations 184 Liotard, Kartika 199 Lipponen, Paavo 101, 102 Lisbon Agenda 153, 257, 288 Lisbon Strategy 149, 220, 229 List H.P.Martin 61–2 Lista Bonino 159, 160, 162 Liste-civetta 157 Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party 173 and Citizenship laws 175 and language competence tests 175 and Baltics 175 and Cold war 175 and impeached officials 175 LO–LCR (Lutte ouvrière – Ligue communiste révolutionnaire) 116, 117–18, 119 London Assembly 249 London Mayoral elections 250 Lowell, Norman 189 LSAP Lëtzeberger Sozialistesch Arbecter Partei:Luxembourg) 179 see Luxembourg Socialist Labour Party Lulling, Astrid 181 Luxembourg Bankers Association 182 Luxembourg Communist Party 181 Luxembourg Confederation of Christian Trade 182 Luxembourg Socialist Labour Party 179, 180, 183, 184 M (Moderate Party: Sweden) 239 Maat, Albert Jan 199 Maaten, Jules 199 Maastricht Treaty 7–8, 10, 15, 45, 89, 163, 181, 262, 267–8 and art 19(2) 118 and referendum 119 Macedonia 45 Macedonian minority 132

302 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

Madrid attacks in 158, 230, 233, 235, 238 regional government 231 Madeira 215 Maghreb 230, 238 Malmstöm, Cecilia 246 Malta Labour Party 187, 192 Maltese Greens 187, 191, 193 Mandelson, Peter 282 Manders, Toine 199 Marcos, Alejandro Rojas 232 Marinho, Luis 211 Martens, Maria 199 Martin, David 4 Martin, Hans-Peter 58, 199 Mauro, Mario 162 Mastenbroek, Edith 199 Matos, Arnaldo 213 Matsis, Yiannakis 75, 79 McDonald, M 152 McGuinness, M 151 Meciar, Vladimir 218–19, 221 Medgyessy, Péter 138 Mediated governance 6 Mégret, Bruno 116 Meijer, Erik 199 Merkel, Angela 126, 206 Meyer, Willy 232 Michel, Louis 68 Michelis, Gianni De 160, 162 Militant Socialist Party of Greece, 132 Miller, Leszek 201, 205 Minimum wage 254 Mitchell, G 150 Mitterrand, François 119 Moderate Party (Sweden) 240, 242, 244–5, 246 Molzer, Andreas 60 Monarchistic Party of Bohemia 84 Montalto, John Attard 192 Monteiro, Manual 212 Morillion, Philippe 115 Morris, Dick 253 Moura, Vasco Graca 217 Movement for the Ill (Portugal) 213 Movimento Repubblicani Europei 162–3 Mp (Green Party: Sweden) 239–40, 243, 244 MPT (Movement of the Party of the Earth: Portugal) 213, 216

MRPP/PCTP (Revolutionary Movement for the Reconstruction of the Party of the Proletariat/Communist Party of Portuguese Workers) see Communists MS–Tricolore (Social Movement – Tricolour: Italy) 156, 160 Mulder, Jan 199 Multi-level policymaking 6 Murko, Mojca Drcar 228 Muscat, Joseph 192 Mussolini, Alessandra 162 Myllera, Riitta 107 National Democratic Party (Germany) 281 National Independence Movement (Latvia) 165 National parliaments 4 National Petition (Hungary) 140–1 National Renewal Party 213 Nationalist Party VU (Flanders) 65 and Greece, 74 and Malta 192, and Basques 232 NATO 60, 81, 97, 105, 136, 166–7, 174, 175, 219, 220 ND see New Democracy: Greece Neutrality 147, 150, 153 New Democracy and Czech Republic 85 and Greece 131–6 and Lithuania 177 and Poland 212 New Democracy Party (Portugal) 214–15 New Era 166, 168–9, 170–1 New Flemish Alliance (N–VA) 66, 69, 70, 71 New Horizons (Cyprus) 74 New Labour 219 New Policy coalition (Lithuania) 174 New Slovenia 223, 226 New Socialists (Italy) 160 New Union Social Liberals (Lithuania) 174 Nice IGC 11, 15 Nice Treaty 11, 13, 14, 16, 59, 65, 148, 202, 205, 211, 236, 267, 282 and slogan ‘Nice or Death’ 202, 208 see also European Council

Index

Nieuw Rechts 196 Nijs, Annette 196 Nistelrooij, Lambert van 199 Non-alignment, Swedish policy of 240 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 97, 105, 136, 166, 174–5, 219, 220 Northern League (Italy) 155, 163 Norway 242 Northern Ireland 254, 256 Novak, Ljudmila 228 Ombudsman 274 OeVP (People’s Party: Austria) 57–8, 60, 63, 64n Oreja, Jaime Mayor 232, 233 Oireachtas committee on European Affairs 154 Olympic Games 136 Ombudsman 15, 274, 276 and own initiative enquiry 276 Omirou, Yiannakis 78 O’Neachtain, S 151 Oomen-Ruijten, Ria 199 Open method of coordination 291 Opt-outs 252 Oreja, Jaime Mayor 232, 233 Organisation for Reconstruction of Communist Party in Greece (OAKKE) 132 Organised crime 273 Orthodox Church 133 Overseas aid 252 Own initiative reports of EP 38 Özdemir, Cem 126 Paasilinna, Reino 107 Pacs 114 Paese Nuovo 157 Pahor Borut (ZLSD) 227, 228 Paksas, Rolandas 175 and impeachment 178 Panhellenic Socialist Movement 132 see also PASOK Panachage (vote splitting) 181 Papadopoulos, Tassos 79 Papandreou, George 132 Parlamentarisation 281 Partido da Nova Democracia 212 Partido Popular (PP) 230ff

303

Partido Socialista Mallorquín/Entesa Catalana 232 Partido Socialista (Socialist Party: Portugal) 212, 217n Partij van de Arbeid 194, 196, 198 Partij voor de Dieren (PvdD) 196 Partij van het Noorden (PvhN) 195 Partito Socialista (Socialist party: Spain) 230, 232 Partito Socialista (Socialist Party: Italy) 155 Parts, Juhan 96 Party for Freedom and Progress 66 Party group formation 36 see also Rules of procedure of EP Party Groups in the EP 33, 34, 37, 40–1, 43n, 44n, 90, 105, 136, 140, 142, 149, 246–7, 286, 291 and manifesto 242 and role 36, 288 and functions 36–9 see also European political parties Party of Green Hunters 189 Party of Hungarian Coalition (SMK) 219 Party of the Earth Movement (Portugal) 213 PASOK (Panhellinio Socialistiko Kinima: Greece) 131–6 Pasqua, Charles 114, 118, 183 Passenger name data 288 Patijn, Schelto 20 Patriotic Coalition (Greece) 132 PC (Plaid Cymru: Wales) 254–5 PCF (Communist Party of France) 113, 117–18, 121 PDA (Democratic Party of the Atlantic: Portugal) 216 PDS (Party of Democratic Socialists: Germany) 42, 86, 124, 126, 127, 128–9 PDS (Democratic Party of the Left: Italy) 161 Peasant Party (Poland) 202, 203, 205, 205, 207, 209 Peneda, Silva 217 Pensionati (Pensioners’Party: Italy) 162 Pensioners for the People (EKA – Finland) 102 Pensions as an election issue (Luxembourg) 180

304 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

People’s Europe 267 People’s Party (Latvia) 165–6, 168 People’s Harmony Party 167, 170 People’s Monarchic Party 213, 216 People’s Movement against the EU (Denmark) 89 People’s Party (Tautas Partija: Latvia) 166 People’s Union (Estonia) 99 Pereira, Garcia 213 Pereira, Carmelinda 213 Peterle Lojze 226–8 Petersone, Katerine 167 PES (Party of European Socialists) 33, 35, 37, 40, 42, 78, 80, 86, 99, 106, 115, 118, 241–2, 250, 257, 259, 280–1 PEV see Green Party: Portugal Piks, Ruhards 169 Pillar structure 14, 290 and third pillar 14, 262, 268–70, 276n, 283 Pinheiro, Joao de Deus 212, 214, 217 Pinkpop 197 Plaid Cymru (Wales) 254–5 Plenary, of EP 14, 29, 162, 288 and actions, 37 speaking time 37 week 40 voting 41 PNV (Basque Nationalist Party: Spain) 232, 238 Polfer, Lydie 181 Polish Constitution 202, 205 and EU accession 202, 207, 209 and constitutional treaty 202, 207, 209 and EP electoral law 202–3 and Social Democracy 202, 203, 205, 207 Polish voting in Council of Ministers 202 Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS) 133–5 Portas, Miguel 212 Portas, Paulo 210, 212 Poland and Catholic nationalist League of Polish Families LPR 203, 204, 205 Civic Platform 202, 204–7 Polish Peasant Party PSL 204 Polish Social Democracy SDPL 204, 207 Self-Defence (Samoobrona) Democratic Left Alliance–Labour Union 202, 204, 207, 208

Presidential elections 17 and Austria 59 and Cyprus 75 and France 110, 116, 118, 173, 175–7 and Poland 202, 204 and Slovakia 220 Poland and accession referendum 201–2, 204, 207, 208 election committees 203–4 Politics XXI 212 Portas, Miguel 217 Posselt, Bernd 227 Pöttering, Hans-Gert 125 Prague meeting 183 Prodi, Romano 58, 67, 107, 158, 282 Pro Patria Union (Estonia) 96 Progress Party (Denmark) 89 Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL) 74 Proportionality 271 Prunskiene, Kazimira 176, 177 Public sphere 267 PvdA (Partij van de Arbeid:Netherlands) 190, 194, 196, 198, 200n Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) 85, 182, 202, 236, 251 see also majority voting Racism 67, 77, 273, 274 Raffarin, Jean-Pierre 109–11, 113–14, 118–20 Rahvaliit (People’s Union) 96 Rainbow Party 132 Rapporteur 38–9 and informal working group in the (EP) Committee of Intitutional Affairs 21 responsibility, 38 system 38–9 Rasmussen, Poul Nyrup 78, 89 Real Slovak National Party 218 Red–Green Alliance 89 Referendum in Cyprus 136, see also Annan plan and Hungary on accession 139, 142 and Sweden on euro 240 Reform Party (Reformierakond) 96, 99 Reformist Liberal Party 66

Index

Reformist Movement 66 Reiljan, Villu 96 Reinsalu, Urmas 99 Repse, Einars 166 Republican Left of Catalonia 232 Republikaner 124, 129 Respect Coalition 250, 253, 255 Respect.nu 196 Res Publica 95, 97, 99 Reunification (and Cyprus) 80 Revolutionary Left Front (MEKA) 132 RI–Dini (Italian Renewal – Dini List) 158 Ries, Frédérique, 24 Right Bloc (Czech republic) 84 Right Slovak National Party 220 Riigikogu 98 Robien, Gilles de 118 Rodrigues, Aires 213 Rodrigues Eduardo Ferro 210 Rokita, Jan 202 Romagnoli, Lica 162 Rome Treaty 3 Rossa, P de 151, 154 RPFIE (Rally for France/Independence from Europe) 109 RPF (Rally for France) 114 RPR (Rally for the Republic: France) 109, 145 Rubiks, Alfreds 166 Rules of Procedure, of EP 14, 36, 38, 263, 266, 279 and party group formation, 36 Russians, in Estonia 96 Russian list 99 Russian mafia 175 Ryan, E 151 Saarts, Tomis 98 Saavi, Toomas 99 Saeima 165–8, 170–1 Samoobrona 203 Sampaio, Jorge 210 Santer, Jacques, resignation of Santer Commission 194, 271–2, 281 Santoro, Michele 158 Santos, Capoulas 217 SAP (Social Democratic Party: Sweden) 240–1, 243–6 Sarkozy, Nicolas 113, 114 Savisaar, Edgar 95 Schlüter, Poul 91

305

Schoepges, Erna Hennicot 181 Schröder, Gerhard 122, 123, 126, 130n, 282 Schüssel, Wolfgang 57 Scotland 249, 254 Scoreboard 268 SDI (Social Democratic Party: Italy) 162, 164n SDLP (Social Democratic and Labour Party: UK) 254, 256 Seats in EP and distribution 22, 30, 34 Secession 243, 256 Second order elections 5, 30, 35, 46, 53n, 54n, 71, 117, 143–4, 146, 169, 172n, 180, 211 and logic 146, 197 Secrecy and Council 265–6 and EU 266 Séguin, Philippe 116 Seimas 173 Seitlinger, Jean 20 Self-Defence Party (Poland) 203–8 see also Samoobrona Seppänen, Esko 103, 106, 107 Serbia Montenegro 45 SGP (Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij: Netherlands) 198, 200n Schröder, Gerhard 122–3, 281 Schoepges, Erna Hennicot 181 Schussel, Wolfgang 57 Schulz, Martin 125 Simitis, Costas 134 Single currency 252 Single European Act 88, 263 Single Market 4 Siniscalco Domenico 163 Sinistra europea 156, 158, 164n Sinn Fein (Ireland) 254, 256 Sinnott, K 151, 153–4 SIS 269 Sjostedt, Jonas 246 Skele, Andris 166 Sky patrols 136 Slakteris, Atis 171 Slesers, Ainars 166 Slovak Democratic and Christian Union 220 Slovak nation 218

306 The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament

Slovak National Party (SNS) 219–20 and Real Slovak National Party (PSNS) 219 and Right Slovak National Party 220 Slovak Secret Service 219 Slovenia and aliens 228 and Citizenship 228 and corruption 228 and denationalisation 228 and strategic EU priorities 228 Slovenian People’s Party (SLS) 223 SNP (Scottish Nationalist Party: UK) 256 SPD (Social Democratic Party, Germany) 52, 137, 138–9, 143–4 and SPD–Green government 137–8 SPOe 59, 60–1, 63 Soares, Mário 212 Social Chapter 252 Social contract 196 Social Democratic Party (Denmark) 89 Social Democratic Party (SDE) Estonia 96 Social Democratic Party (Finland) 101 Social Democratic Party (Hungary) 139 Social Democratic Party (Lithuania) 174 Social Democratic Youth League (Sweden) 246 Social Liberals (Denmark) 89 Social Movement (EDEK) 74 Social welfare system 127, 224 Socialist Party (Hungary) 138; and Latvia 166 Socialist People’s Party 89, 92 Socialistiche Partij SP 195, 199 Souverainiste 113–14, 118 Sovereigntist Party (Luxembourg) 184 Spautz, Jean 181 SPD (Social Democratic Party: Germany) 37, 122–3, 125, 126, 128, 129 SPD–Green government (Germany) 122–3, 126, 128 Špidla, Vladimir 87 Spinelli, Altiero 4, 266, 279 SPOe (Social Democratic Party: Austria) 58, 60, 61 SPP (Social People’s Party: Denmark) 88 Stability and Growth Pact 123, 140 Staes, Bart 66 Štastný, Peter 221 Stoiber, Edmund 122 Stubb, Alexander 107

STV 22–3, 28 and Ireland 146, 150, 193n see also electoral procedures Subsidiarity 52, 196, 253, 271, 277, 277n Substitute members in EP 37–8 Südtiroler Volkspartei 157 Suomi-Isänmaa 102 Suomen Kansan Sinivalkoiset 102 Suominen, Ilkka 106 Svoboda, Cyril 83 SVP (South Tyrol People’s Party) 58 Swedish People’s Party (RKP) 101 Switzerland 180, 186 Takkula Hannu 106, 107 Tampere European Council 268 Tampere II 283 Tapei, Bernard 196, 200 Telles, Goncalo 213 Terrorism 127, 135, 158–9, 225, 230, 236, 238, 243 Topolanek, Mirek 83 Tories 250–1 see also Conservatives Trafficking 242, 246–7, 273 Transnational party federations 45 Transnational party groups 90, 242, 257 and manifestos 242 Transparency in EU 261, 269, 274 as accountability 262 as administrative practice 261 as communication 264, 265 as democratic practice 261 and Maastricht 268 Tremonti, Giulio 163 Trialogue 9, 275 Trotskite Socialist Revolutionary Party (Portugal) 212 True Finns 103 Turkey 226, 236 and accession 68, 91, 121, 127, 159, 184, 196, 236 candidature 45 EU membership 61, 85, 91, 111, 113, 116, 190–2, 226 Turmes, Claudes 181 Tyrol 58 UDC (Italy) 156, 159, 160, 163 UDF (Union for French Democracy) 42, 113, 115, 121

Index

UDP (Democratic People’s Union: Portugal) 214 UEN Union for the Europe of Nations 34, 42, 99, 114, 152, 161, 212, 286 UK and terms of membership 248, 251 UK Independence Party 248–50, 252–5, 285, 290 and UKIP campaign 253 and general election 256 Ulivo 156, 159, 160–1 Ulster Unionists 255 UMP (Union for a Popular Movement) 114–15, 117–18, 121 Unemployment, as an issue 50 in Estonia 96 in Germany 122–3 in Greece 135–6 in Lithuania 176 in Luxembourg 184 in Malta 190–1 in Poland 205 in Portugal 210, 213–14 in Slovenia 224 in Spain 237 see also employment Unification (of Germany) 122 Union for Europe of the Nations 169, 212, 286, 287, 289 Union for Fatherland and Freedom, 165–6, 168–9 Union for French Democracy 42, 113, 114, 115, 118, 121 Union of Farmers’ Party (Lithuania) 177 Union of Freedom (Czech Republic) 82 Union of Industrial and Employers Confederations of Europe 182 United Democrats (Cyprus) 74 United Left (Izquierda Unida IU) 232 United List of Social Democrats (ZLSD Slovenia) 223 Unione dei Democristiani di Centro 155 Uspaskich, Viktor 176, 177 UUP (Ulster Unionist Party: UK) 255

Velvet split of Czechoslovakia 218 Ventspils 170 Verdi 156–7, 158 Verhofstadt, Guy 67 VIHR (Green League of Finland) 106 Villiers de, Philippe 114, 118 Vidal-Quadras, Alejo 237 Vienna Action Plan 273 Vigo Mendez de 14 Vike-Freiberga, Vaira 170 Virrankoski, Kyösti 107 Vision group 132 Vits, Mia de 67 Vivant 66–7, 69–71 see also VLD Vlaams Blok 67, 69, 70, 71 VLD 66–7, 69, 71 Voggenhuber, Johannes 58 Voter’s pass (Netherlands) 197 VU (Flemish Nationalist Party) 65–6 VVD (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie SGP:Netherlands) 195–6, 198–200 Wagenknecht-Niemeyer, Sahra 126 Wales 249, 254 Wallonia 65–6, 69, 71, 72n Watson, Graham 105, 163 Welfare state 85, 105, 123 see also social welfare system, social contract, social chapter opt-out Wiersma, Jan Marinus 199 Whitelaw, William 51 Wilson, Harold 51 Women for another Europe (Greece) 132 candidates 90, 93, 157, 189, 199, 226 in EP 153, 163 Women’s Rights 246, 247 Workers’ Party (Hungary) 139, 141 Workers’ Socialist Party of Spain (PSOE) 230 Wortmann-Hool, Corien 199 Yugoslavia 228

V (left Party: Sweden) 239 Vagnorius, Gedmininas 173 Vaidere, Inese 169 Vaivads, Janis 167 Vanhanen, Matti 101 VAS (Left Alliance: Finland) 102, 106 Vassiliou, George 74 Väyrynen, Paavo 103 Veld, Sophie‘t 199

307

Zalradil, Jan 83 Zalm, Gerrit 190 Zapatero, Luís Rodriguez 159 Zeman, Miloš 85 Zhdanok, Tatyana 166 Zielemiec, Josef 84 Zile, Roberts 169 Zimmer, Gabi 126