The Crisis of Social Democratic Trade Unionism in Western Europe (Contemporary Employment Relations)

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The Crisis of S o cial Demo cra tic Tra de Unionism in Wes tern Eu rope

Contemporary E mployment R elations S eries E ditor: Gregor Gall Professor of Industrial Relations and Director of the Centre for Research in Employment Studies, University of Hertfordshire, Hat.eld, UK The aim of this series is to publish monographs and edited volumes on all aspects of contemporary employment relations including human resource management, employee branding, shared services, employment regulation, the political economy of employment, and industrial relations. Topics such as mergers, corporate governance and the E U – in the context of their effect upon employment relations – also fall within the scope of the series. A imed primarily at an academic readership this series provides a global forum for the study of employment relations. Other Titles in the Series L earning with Trade Unions Edited by Steve Shelley and Moira Calveley 978-0-7546-4974-8 L abour R elations in Central E urope Edited by Jochen Tholen IS BN 978-0-7546-7093-3 Child L abour in S outh A sia Edited by Gamini Herath and Kishor Sharma IS BN 978-0-7546-7004-9 Trade Unions and Workplace Democracy in A frica Gérard Kester IS BN 978-0-7546-4997-7 H uman R esource M anagement in R ussia Edited by Michel E. Domsch and Tatjana Lidokhover IS BN 978-0-7546-4876-5 Changing Working L ife and the A ppeal of the E xtreme R ight Edited by Jörg Flecker IS BN 978-0-7546-4915-1

The Crisis of S ocial Democratic Trade Unionism in Western E urope The S earch for A lternatives

M ar tin Up ch ur ch Middlesex University, UK Graham Ta ylor University of the West of England, UK A n dre w M a thers University of the West of England, UK

© M artin Upchurch, Graham Taylor and A ndrew M athers 2009 A ll rights reserved. N o part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. M artin Upchurch, Graham Taylor and A ndrew M athers have asserted their moral right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identi.ed as the author of this work. Published by A shgate Publishing L imited A shgate Publishing Company Wey Court E ast S uite 420 Union R oad 101 Cherry S treet F arnham Burlington S urrey, GU9 7PT VT 05401-4405 E ngland USA www.ashgate.com British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Upchurch, M artin, 1951The crisis of social democratic trade unionism in Western E urope : the search for alternatives. - (Contemporary employment relations series) 1. L abor unions - E urope, Western - Political activity Cross-cultural studies 2. S ocialism - E urope, Western Cross-cultural studies I. Title II . Taylor, Graham (Graham John) III . M athers, A ndy, 1964331.8'8'094 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Upchurch, M artin, 1951The crisis of social democratic trade unionism in Western E urope : the search for alternatives / by M artin Upchurch, Graham Taylor and A ndrew M athers. p. cm. -- (Contemporary employment relations) Includes bibliographical references and index. IS BN 978-0-7546-7053-7 (alk. paper) 1. L abor unions--E urope, Western--Case studies. 2. L abor unions and socialism--E urope, Western. I. Taylor, Graham (Graham John) II . M athers, A ndrew. III . Title. H D6657.U63 2008 331.88094--dc22 IS BN 978-0-7546-7053-7

2008031179

Contents List of Figures and Tables About the Authors Acknowledgements List of Abbreviations

ix xi xiii xv

1

Social Democracy and Trade Unions 1 Introduction 1 S ocial Democratic Trade Unionism 2 Trade Union Identity and S ocial Democracy 5 The R ise and F all of Corporatism: M odels and L imits of Incorporation 10 N eoliberalism and the Crisis of S ocial Democratic Trade Unionism 14 Trade Unions and the S tate: The L imits and Possibilities of Trade Union A ction 17 O utline of the Book 22

2

Sweden – Social Democracy after the Divorce? F rom Institutional S trength to Ideological H egemony S wedish S ocial Democracy Democratic S ocialism or Technocratic Corporatism? The R adicalization and L imits of the S wedish M odel N eoliberal R estructuring and the Crisis A fter the Divorce? Continuity and Change in Union O rientation Class Compromise or Corporatist Incorporation?

27 29 31 37 39 43 47 51

3

Germany – The Collapse of a Model? The E arly SP D and the Unions S ocial Democratic Trade Unionism and Co-Determination 1968 and the Challenge to S ocial Democracy Globalization and N eoliberal O ffensive: The S econd Challenge A lternatives?

53 54 58 63 68 74

4

State, Unions, and Labourism in Britain This Great M ovement of O urs The Creation of a Dominant Party Union N exus A L iberal M arket Tradition rather than S ocial Democratic Corporatism? A N ew Consensus? The Union R esponse to Blairism

81 81 84 88 94 99

vi

5

6

7

The Crisis of Social Democratic Trade Unionism in Western Europe

F rom O pposition to Dissent N ew S ocial Identity?  S ummary

103 108 112

The Persistence of French Exceptionalism?  Introduction Intransigent and Paternalistic E mployers  S tate H ostility to Unions  The R efusal to Participate F rom L abour Unity to ‘Polarized Pluralism’ Competitive Trade Unionism  F rom Popular F ront to L iberation: The F ormation of Communist H egemony Ideological Divisions and L abour E xclusion from the Post-War S ettlement The S ettlement is S haken E conomic Crisis, F ailing M ilitancy, and L eft Disunity  S ocial Democracy in Office: The Abandonment of Reformism  The Crisis of Trade Unionism  The ‘N ew S ocial Democracy’ Union R eorientation Conclusion

113 113 114 115 116 118 119

The ‘European Social Model’: Towards a Transnational Social Democratic Trade Unionism? E uropean Integration, Global Capital and the Crisis of the N ation S tate Industrial Developments Political Developments S ocial Developments S ocial Democratic Trade Unionism at the E uropean L evel Alternative Futures? R eformulation or R ejection? R eviewing the E vidence

Appendices  Appendix A Sweden – Major Post-War Governments, Trade Union Membership, Political Parties and Key Events Appendix B Germany – Major Post-War Governments, Trade Union Membership, Political Parties and Key Events Appendix C United Kingdom – Major Post-War Governments, Trade Union Membership, Political Parties and Key Events

120 121 124 126 126 127 129 133 139 141 142 143 147 152 157 159 160 174 181 182 183 185

Contents

Appendix D France – Major Post-War Governments, Trade Union Membership, Political Parties and Key Events Appendix E Estimated Trade Union Membership 1950-2007 References Index

vii

188 190 191 221

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L ist of F igures and Tables F igure 7.1 A lternative Trade Union F utures

160

Table 7.1 S ynthesis of S ocial M ovement Theory and R adicalized Political Unionism

170

A ppendix A S weden – M ajor Post-War Governments, Trade Union M embership, Political Parties and Key E vents A ppendix B Germany – M ajor Post-War Governments, Trade Union M embership, Political Parties and Key E vents A ppendix C United Kingdom – M ajor Post-War Governments, Trade Union M embership, Political Parties and Key E vents A ppendix D F rance – M ajor Post-War Governments, Trade Union M embership, Political Parties and Key E vents A ppendix E E stimated Trade Union M embership 1950-2007

182 283 185 188 190

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A bout the A uthors M artin Upchurch is Professor of International E mployment R elations at M iddlesex University, L ondon. H e is co-author of New Unions, New Workplaces: A Study of Union Resilience in the Restructured Workplace, R outledge (2003) and The Realities of Partnership at Work, Palgrave M acmillan (2008). Graham Taylor is R eader in S ociology at the University of the West of E ngland, Bristol. H is recent publications include Globalization, Modernity and Social Change: Hotspots of Transition (2008) Palgrave M acmillan (with Jörg Dürrschmidt).   A ndrew M athers is a S enior L ecturer in the Department of S ociology & Criminology at the University of the West of E ngland, Bristol, United Kingdom. H e is the author of Struggling for a Social Europe: Neoliberal Globalization and the Birth of a European Social Movement published by A shgate (2007).

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A cknowledgements The authors would like to thank R ichard Croucher and John Grahl of M iddlesex University and S ue M ilner of the University of Bath for their helpful and insightful comments on various chapters at draft stage. Important insights from their organizations’ perspective were also offered by M ark S erwotka, General S ecretary of the PCS union in Britain, and Klaus Dräger, Parliamentary A dviser to the Gauche Unitaire E uropeéne in Brussels.

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L ist of A bbreviations AEE U A malgamated E ngineering and E lectrical Union (UK) AFL A merican F ederation of L abor APO außerparlamentarische Opposition (E xtra-parliamentary O pposition) – Germany A TTA C Association pour la taxation des transactions pour l’aide aux citoyens (A ssociation for the Taxation of F inancial Transactions for the A id of Citizens) BE CTU Broadcasting, E ntertainment, Cinematograph and Theatre Union (UK) CBI Confederation of British Industry CDU Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (Christian Democratic Union of Germany) CERES Centre d’études, de recherche et d’éducation socialist (Centre for S ocialist S tudies, R esearch and E ducation) – F rance CF DT Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail (F rench Democratic Confederation of L abour) CF TC la Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens (F rench Confederation of Christian Workers) CGT Confédération Générale du Travail (General Workers’ Confederation) – F rance CO BAS Confederazione del Comitati di Base (Confederation of R ank-and-F ile Committees – Italy) CP Communist Party (Great Britain) CPE Contrat de première embauche (F irst job contract) – F rance CRS Compagnie Republicane de Securite (R epublican S ecurity S quad) – F rance CS D Cosmopolitan S ocial Democracy CSPE C Confederation of S ocialist Parties of the E uropean Community CS U Christlich-Soziale Union (Christian S ocial Union) – Bavaria/Germany CWU Communication Workers’ Union (UK) DGB Deutsche Gewerkschafts Bund (German Trade Union F ederation) DPUN Dominant Party Union N exus DTI Department of Trade and Industry (UK) EIF E uropean Industry F ederations EMF E uropean M etalworkers’ F ederation EM U E uropean M onetary Union EPS U E uropean F ederation of Public S ervice Unions

xvi

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ES D E uropean S ocial Dialogue ESF E uropean S ocial F orum ESM E uropean S ocial M odel E TF E uropean Transport Workers’ F ederation E TUC E uropean Trade Union Confederation E WC E uropean Works Council F BU F ire Brigades’ Union (UK) F DP Freie Demokratische Partei (F ree Democratic Party) – Germany FO F orce O uvrière (Workers F orce) – F rance FR G F ederal R epublic of Germany (FDR – West Germany) GA TS General A greement on Trade in S ervices GDR German Democratic R epublic (DDR – E ast Germany) GE W Gewerkschaft Erziehung und Wissenschaft (E ducation and S cience Union) – Germany G-10 Union syndicale-G10 (Group of Ten Unions) – F rance GM B General, M unicipal, Boilerworkers (Union) – UK GUE Gauche Unitaire Europeéne (E uropean United L eft) ICF TU International Confederation of F ree Trade Unions (renamed the ITUC after the merger with the World Confederation of L abour in 2006) IFI International F inancial Institution ILO International L abour O rganisation ILP Independent L abour Party (UK) ITUC International Trade Union Confederation KAP D Kommunistischen Arbeiter-Partei Deutschlands (Communist Workers’ Party of Germany) KPD Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (German Communist Party) L CR Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire (R evolutionary Communist L eague) F rance LO Landsorganisationen i Sverige (N ational O rganisation in S weden) – Trade Union F ederation LP L abour Party (Great Britain) ME DEF Mouvement des Entreprises de France (F rench E nterprises M ovement) MP M ember of Parliament (UK) NA TFHE N ational A ssociation of Teachers in F urther and H igher E ducation (UK) N GL N ordic Green L eft N GO N on-Governmental O rganisation NLR N eoliberal R estructuring OM C O pen M ethod of Co-ordination PCF Parti communiste français (F rench Communist Party) PCS Public and Commercial S ervices Union (UK)

List of Abbreviations

xvii

PDS Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (Party of Democratic S ocialism) – Germany PES Party of E uropean S ocialists PS Parti Socialiste (S ocialist Party) – F rance RM T N ational Union of R ail, M aritime and Transport Workers (UK) SA CO Sveriges Akademikers Centralorganisation (S wedish Confederation of Professional A ssociations) SAF Svenska Arbetsgivareföreningen (S wedish E mployers Confederation) SAP Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Arbetareparti (�������������������������������������������� S wedish S ocial Democratic and L abour Party) S DTU S ocial Democratic Trade Unionism SEI U S ervice E mployees International Union (USA /Canada) SFIO Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière (F rench S ection of the Workers’ International) – former name until 1969 of PS SM T social movement theory SM U social movement unionism SP D Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (German S ocial Democratic Party) SSP S cottish S ocialist Party S UD Solidaires, Unitaires, Démocratiques (S olidarity, Unity, Democracy) – F rance TCO Tjänstemännens Centralorganisation (Confederation of Professional E mployees) – S weden TGWU Transport and General Workers’ Union (UK) TUC Trades Union Congress (of UK) UCU University and College Union (UK) US DA W Union of S hop, Distributive and A llied Workers (UK) USP D Unabhängige Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Independent S ocial Democratic Party of Germany) WAS G Arbeit und soziale Gerechtigkeit – Die Wahlalternative (Work and S ocial Justice – the E lectoral A lternative) – Germany WF TU World F ederation of Trade Unions

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Chapter 1

S ocial Democracy and Trade Unions Introduction O ur objective in writing this book is to explore the current crisis of social democracy in Western E urope and its resultant impact on the strategic orientations of trade unions. We seek to define a model of social democratic trade unionism, to test its strengths and limitations, and to record evidence of its breakdown and replacement with alternatives. We have chosen four countries to undertake this task (S weden, Germany, Britain and F rance) each with a different formulation of party union nexus developed over time. We have supplemented our analysis with evidence from E uropean-wide initiatives such as the E uropean Trade Union Confederation (E TUC). We begin with a discussion of the crisis of social democracy and attempt to locate this crisis within state and employer strategies of capital accumulation focussed on neo-liberal restructuring. M ost studies of social democracy in the post war period agree that social democracy is not what it once used to be in its ‘Golden A ge’. The collected studies in Bornstein et al (1984) point to a very different set of state-labour-capital relationship by the end of the 1970s from their immediate post war equivalents. The changed political economy, marked by the end of the long post war boom and inflationary crises, severely affected the relationship. Both Padgett and Paterson’s A History of Social Democracy in Postwar Europe (1991) and M oschonas’ In the Name of Social Democracy: The Great transformation: 1945 to the Present (2002) confirm this view. Added to the constraining effect of economic recession was a decline in the critical mass of the manual working class within west E uropean societies. This decline in the traditional support base led S ocial Democratic parties to shift rightwards in an attempt to ‘catch’ a new layer of middle class votes. By the 1990s the debate focussed on social democracy’s alleged accommodation to neoliberal global restructuring through the lens of the Third Way (Blair 1998; Giddens, 1998; H ombach, 2000; A restis and S awyer, 2003). Within these shifts we hope to argue that the specific role of organized labour, as a sub-set of ‘social democracy’, has also changed. We begin by defining social democratic trade unionism and proceed to set out a model of union-party relationships that approximate to four case study countries. This is followed by an exploration of the ideology and practice of social democratic trade unionism. We explore the union identity that underpins social democratic trade unionism, and relate this to the development, consolidation and crisis of social democratic ideology across the case study countries. This is followed by an exploration of the practice of social democratic trade unionism which is developed in the context of the development,



The Crisis of Social Democratic Trade Unionism in Western Europe

consolidation and crisis of corporatism. We then explore a range of theoretical issues relating to the limits and possibilities of trade union action in capitalist societies and translate this to the form and function of the capitalist state. F inally, we set out the methodological approach developed in this book and present a resumé of the subsequent chapters. Social Democratic Trade Unionism We can discern different formations of social democratic unionism in industrialized E urope. In northern E urope, the pattern of labour movement development was marked by an organic relationship between a dominant socialist or social democratic party and the trade unions. A dominant party union nexus (DPUN ) was created. A harmonious and complementary relationship was established based on a division of labour in which the party pursued the politics of state and the unions conducted the politics of civil society (Pelinka, 1983: 99). The reciprocal relationship between the two ‘wings’ of the labour movement provided the basis for the emergence of a particular form of trade unionism. H ence: Drawing support from the same social strata, oriented towards common objectives, and with an overlapping leadership and membership, a strong party union axis was in the interests of both. Ideologically the unions mirrored the parties, their philosophy of class accommodation matching the social democrats’ reformist parliamentarianism. In short, they were social democratic unions (Padgett and Paterson, 1991: 177; our italics).

S ocial democratic trade unionism was premised on cohesive and politically homogeneous labour movements with strong and disciplined confederations that mediated party-union relations. The principal objective of social democratic trade unions vis á vis the party was the winning of elections in order to facilitate the development of electoral programmes that would augment the industrial power and influence of the trade unions. Such a reformist outlook was not inevitable for a workers’ party. The ideological conflict within the workers’ movements was hard fought, as socialists with a constitutional and parliamentary orientation of reform battled for workers’ allegiance on the left with revolutionary and Communist alternatives as well as anarchist and syndicalist currents. In northern E urope, social democracy established its domination over other ideologies in the first decades of the twentieth century. In doing so it presented a somewhat contradictory position on workers’ emancipation. The core tenet of social democracy has always been to attempt to merge capitalism with democracy. Contradictions between the essentially undemocratic nature of capitalism and the democratic fashion of decision-making in trade unions were always likely to emerge. S ocial democracy was progressive in that it based itself upon working class solidarity that went beyond the business or craft interest common to many early trade unions. O n the other hand the interests of

Social Democracy and Trade Unions



class solidarity were always contained by party and union leaders and suppressed by the ‘national’ interest of capital over the interests of competing states. H ence any notion of international class solidarity would be eschewed when the majority of social democrats and trade union leaders supported their own country’s war efforts. F urthermore, at the national level, social democratic politicians and their allies in the trade unions fought consistently against workers’ power over capital whenever rights of ownership and control were challenged ‘from below’. In post war southern E urope, social democratic trade unionism remained undeveloped or developed comparatively late. This was, in part, because of continuing processes of exclusion of labour by the state from the national body politik, and partly a result of politically fractured societies which embraced fascist dictatorships in both S pain and Portugal and a M ilitary Junta in Greece. In societies such as F rance and Italy, the labour movement fragmented along political and ideological lines and social democracy seemed unable to subjugate the rival ideologies of syndicalism and communism. In this context, rival confederations developed and the most important union-party relationship to develop was between communist parties and the dominant trade union confederation. The strength and form of union-party relations defined both the electoral success of social democratic parties and the extent to which a ‘social partner’ orientation developed amongst trade unions. It is possible to outline four main models of party-union relations (Padgett and Paterson, ibid: 179-85) which correspond to the substantive case studies explored in this book. It is these four models which form the focus of our book, and which enable us to give due consideration to national varieties of social democracy. The Swedish Model (‘Unparalleled Intimacy’) Until their formal divorce in 1987, the S wedish S ocial Democratic and L abour Party (SAP ) and the main blue collar train union confederation (LO ) enjoyed a relationship of unparalleled intimacy. Prior to the divorce, members of affiliated LO unions were automatically members of the SAP and the unions contributed substantially to SAP funding. There continues to be an important overlapping of LO and SAP leaderships and union branches continue to affiliate to the SAP. The S wedish M odel was marked by exceptionally high levels of union density and working class electoral support for the SAP . In this context, the SAP enjoyed unparalleled electoral success and LO was able to exert a considerable influence over the SAP a range of policy areas and deliver the discipline necessary to sustain the centralized solidaristic collective bargaining that marked the S wedish M odel of post-war development. The German Model (‘Informal Alignment’) In Germany, the trade union confederation (DGB) is supra-partisan and therefore formally independent of the German S ocial Democratic Party (SP D). The SP D



The Crisis of Social Democratic Trade Unionism in Western Europe

lacks cohesion and authority owing to the jealously guarded autonomy of its constituent unions. German unions neither contribute to the funding of the SP D nor campaign openly for the party in elections. This reflects both legal restrictions on union activity and the importance German unions attach to accommodating non-socialist members. N evertheless, there are important informal alignments between the SP D and German unions manifested in the participation of union leaders in the party hierarchy and a degree of overlap between union membership and party electorate. This relationship of formal independence with close informal ties has given the SPD a degree of flexibility in policy terms whilst nonetheless providing the party with an important base of support. This was manifested in the axis of trade union barons and SP D elites underpinning the S chmidt Government’s (1974-82) policy of crisis management. The UK Model (‘Formal Affiliation’) In the UK, trade unions are formally affiliated to the Labour Party and trade union subscriptions have been an important component of party funding. The affiliated unions are represented at every level of the Labour Party including the N ational E xecutive Committee and through the ‘block vote’ at the Party Conference. There is no formal relationship between the TUC and the L abour Party; although the TUC has been unambiguous in its support for the L abour Party and the relationship between the two is mediated by a L iaison Committee. Despite the formal affiliation of the unions to the Labour Party, the relationship lacks cohesion owing to the fragmented and politically diverse nature of the British trade union movement. Consequently, the TUC is a loose-knit confederation that is subordinate to, and weaker than, its constituent unions and is undeveloped as an independent policy forum. The weakness of the TUC and the decentralized nature of collective bargaining undermined the attempts of post-war L abour governments to use the party-union linkage to control wages and L abour governments were unable to deliver growth and employment in return. Indeed, the resulting tensions undermined both the legitimacy of the trade unions and contributed to the poor electoral performance of the L abour Party. This was the context for the institutional distancing of the unions and the L abour Party over the past two decades. The French Model (‘Fragmentation’) In F rance, the labour movement has been, and remains, highly fragmented. Despite its syndicalist roots, the dominant trade union confederation (CGT) became aligned with the Communist Party, while the main non-communist confederation (FO ) remained politically non-aligned meaning that the socialist party lacked an organic link with the trade union movement. F rom the 1970s, there was a gradual ideological convergence between the PS and the recently secularized CF DT and the latter gradually assumed a social democratic identity. This was marked by the gradual abandonment of industrial militancy, the moderation of political

Social Democracy and Trade Unions



demands and electoral support for the S ocialist Party followed by a cooperative or accommodating position with regard to the post-1981 S ocialist Government. M ore recently, the CF DT has pursued a non-partisan political orientation, while espousing a perspective close to the ‘Third Way’. Despite these developments, social democratic trade unionism has remained underdeveloped in the F rench context. The PS has established dominance on the L eft and a broad political appeal that has militated against the need for union attachments and the union movement remains highly fragmented and competitive and, moreover, low union density provides an important limit to what the CF DT or the FO could offer the PS . In short, there has been no mutual embrace between party and unions. Trade Union Identity and Social Democracy The development of divergent union-party relations reflects the path dependent articulation of divergent union identities. The historical development of trade unionism involved a triple polarization of union identity between a revolutionary or anti-capitalist orientation, an orientation focussed on social integration or social cohesion, and business unionism that involved a narrow orientation around occupational interests (Hyman, 1996a: 65). During the first half of the twentieth century there were bitter and prolonged struggles within and between unions and union confederations on the basis of these rival identities. By the mid20th century, the conflict over trade union identity in Western Europe had been transcended in practice, although the transformation was to some degree obscured by organizational separation and ideological sloganizing (H yman, 1994a). Trade unions that had articulated revolutionary or reformist political demands became increasingly focussed on a collective bargaining agenda that rendered political orientations increasingly rhetorical. S imultaneously, the terrain of collective bargaining became increasingly politicized as a result of Keynesian macroeconomic management and the legislative regulation of employment relations and in this context, business unionism also became increasing untenable. In this context, the emergent trade union identity became what H yman (1996a: 66) has termed ‘political economism’ which combined collective bargaining with employers with a concern to influence the broader political, legal and economic framework of collective bargaining. Political economism was premised on a complex process of institution building associated with ‘political exchange’ or ‘neo-corporatism’ that displayed marked national specificities (Baglioni, 1987; Therborn, 1992a, 1992; Crouch, 1993) alongside functional similarities and involved reciprocity between union restraint and labour friendly or labour neutral government policies. In this book we focus on a particular form of political economism marked by the existence of a dominant party union nexus between a social democratic labour party and trade union confederation(s). The maturation of social democracy in the post-war ‘Golden A ge’ was, however, marked by a high level of ideological diversity and fluidity between



The Crisis of Social Democratic Trade Unionism in Western Europe

national contexts and within national contexts over time (Padgett and Paterson, op cit: 11). Ideological diversity was a product of the changing social composition of party membership and electorate; particularly in the context of changing class composition. Ideological fluidity was a reflection of the rejection of doctrinal dogma and utopian vision by social democratic leaders in favour of a position defined by flexible pragmatism and electoral expediency. Importantly, social democracy’s Cold War ideological orientation against Communism was partly shaped by A merican power in the form of M arshall A id and the associated activities of the American Federation of Labor in financing and encouraging ‘social democracy’ to the exclusion of any Communist alternative (Carew, 1987). In the immediate post-war period, social democracy also took a highly programmatic form. S ocial democratic programmes typically took the form of a preamble spelling out fundamental principles followed by a series of objectives to which the formulation of policy was to be applied. In this period, it was easy for social democrats to equate state-led reconstruction with the social democratic ideal of a socially regulated economy. The ethos of liberal capitalism had been undermined by depression in the 1930s and the exigencies of wartime planning and in the defeated nations of Germany and Italy the legitimacy of capital had been besmirched by its collaboration with fascism. These factors combined to enable programmatic social democracy to emerge as the hegemonic political discourse and practice of the L eft across Western E urope. The programmes elaborated three main themes: the socialization of the means of production, state planning and the control of the economy and the security and equality associated with social citizenship (Padgett and Paterson, ibid: 13-19; L ipietz, 1987; E sping-A ndersen, 1990). N one of these programmatic elements were necessarily dependent on socialist ideology despite the ongoing articulation of socialist rhetoric. In fact, the programmes were essentially technocratic, geared towards the national modernization of capitalism through technology and efficiency. As such any notion of class difference within the workplace was suppressed as a ‘harmony of interests’ was assumed possible through technological progress. During the 1950s, the tensions and contradictions arising from the ‘electoral dilemma’ of programmatic social democracy became increasingly apparent and, in this context, the axioms of working class socialism were revised and displaced by the more diffuse ideology of managed or welfare capitalism (Przeworski, 1985: 239). These tensions and contradictions became manifest in three main ways. F irst, was the contradiction between the collectivism of labour movement politics and the individualism of liberal democratic politics. The politics of nationalization and social welfare increasingly clashed with individual property rights and the rule of law and this resulted in essentially liberal programmes of reform. S econd, was the contradiction between particular interests and general interests. S ocial democratic political parties seeking election were forced to broaden their appeal beyond the shrinking minority of the manual working class and increasingly jettisoned socialist ideology and rebranded themselves as all-embracing ‘peoples’ parties’. Third, was the contradiction between immediate reforms and ultimate goals. Initially, social

Social Democracy and Trade Unions



democratic parties retained their long-term commitment (albeit rhetorically) to the abolition of capitalist private property alongside systematic planning programmes designed to reform capitalism according to the socialist values of rationality, justice and freedom. During the 1950s, such reformism was increasingly abandoned as the ideology and practice of Keynesianism overcame the tension between immediate reforms and ultimate goals. In the process, socialist goals were replaced by the humanistic goals of individual fulfilment and personal liberty. S ocial Democracy’s love affair with Keynesianism had begun during the 1930s when socialist governments in N orway, F rance and S weden responded to the depression with anti-cyclical policies that broke with economic orthodoxy. In the work of J.M . Keynes, social democrats found a distinct policy for administering capitalist economies whereby the state could be transformed into an institution by which societies could regulate crises and maintain full employment. Keynesianism was a theory which granted a universal status to the interests of workers. In this context social democrats abandoned the project of nationalization and developed an ideology of the welfare state. Social democracy was redefined as a democratic modification of market forces: nationalization was unnecessary and socialist goals could be achieved by influencing private industry to behave in the national interest. This position was strengthened by a widespread acceptance of the ‘managerial revolution’ (Burnham, 1945), by which capitalism had allegedly been transformed by the separation of ownership and control and the creation of a new breed of technocratic manager more likely to administer capitalism in a socially responsible way. This amounted to a gradual abandonment of reformism. Keynesianism in practice appeared to bring the economy under political control and legitimize the doctrine of equality. Trade union militancy was contained through wage control by an accommodation between trade union and party leaders. It broadened the base of consumption and reconciled the competing claims of capital and labour through the pursuit of a high performance economy (Padgett and Paterson, op cit: 22-3). Welfare capitalism thus enabled the creation of relative surplus value that could (at least temporarily) be diverted into social welfare without affecting economic equilibrium (R yner 2007). In this context, working class socialism began to appear increasingly anachronistic and the process of ideological revisionism intensified through the 1950s and 1960s. Ideological revisionism developed in an uneven way in Western E urope which reflected, inter alia, the specificity of the party-union nexus. In Sweden, the shift towards Keynesianism in the 1930s followed a brief period of radicalism in the immediate post-war period. A sophisticated model of Keynesianism was developed based on solidaristic wage bargaining, active labour market policies and universal social welfare (Padgett and Paterson, ibid: 25-6). The process of ideological revision was swift and smooth owing to the pre-war success and legitimacy of Keynesian policies and the close relationship and shared objectives of the SAP and LO . In (West) Germany, the M arxist past of the SP D was rejected unequivocally at the Bad Godesberg Congress of 1959, where the Party adopted a programme premised firmly on a humanist ethos and principles and in the process transformed



The Crisis of Social Democratic Trade Unionism in Western Europe

itself from an Arbeiterpartei to a Volkspartei. The main impetus for these developments was the banning of the German Communist Party (KPD) in 1956 which eliminated electoral competition on the left and poor electoral performance which culminated in a third successive defeat in 1957 (Padgett and Paterson, ibid: 28-9). In the UK, ideological revisionism was fraught with antagonism and conflict despite the fact that the British L abour Party had no meaningful M arxist heritage to jettison. A significant faction of left-wingers and moderates in both the Party and the unions held a deep ideological and emotional attachment to Clause IV of the Party’s Constitution which committed the Party to the socialist objective of the common ownership of the means of production. During the 1950s, the block votes of the unions prevented the abandonment of Clause F our and, whilst Party policy developed in an increasingly reformist and revisionist direction, enduring conflict over the issue obstructed the ‘modernization’ of the Party’s organization and constitution and create significant tensions within and between the trade unions (Padgett and Paterson, ibid: 30-2). In F rance, the doctrinal commitment of the early F rench S ocialist Party (SFIO ) to M arxist socialism was highly resilient despite the poor electoral performance of the Party and the practical involvement of the Party in the politics and government of the F ourth R epublic. The Party remained dominated by civil servants and municipal councillors and, in the context of the ongoing competition from the Communist Party and its alignment with the CGT, was unable to generate significant support amongst the working class electorate (Padgett and Paterson, ibid: 32-3). The 1960s witnessed the consolidation of the social democratic consensus. There was an increasing ideological convergence between the parties of the L eft and R ight and electoral battles were increasingly fought over issues of competence and efficiency. The era was heralded by some commentators in the post-industrial/ F ordism tradition as the ‘end of ideology’ (Bell, 1960). S uch themes were assimilated within social democratic circles. Ideology was equated with ‘class politics’ and rejected as anachronistic and replaced by a discourse of modernity and social progress. In practice, social democratic parties and governments increasingly focused on the problem of growth and the ways in which ‘indicative planning’ mechanisms could ensure economic growth in order to overcome residual islands of social inequality in a sea of generalized affluence. It was the popularity of indicative planning which highlighted the abandonment of reformism and the adoption of technocratic and scientific managerialism. This masked the emerging ideological vacuum at the heart of social democracy that left established labour movement leaders open to ideological challenge from the radical left. By the end of the decade, this challenge was becoming manifest in the form of a political challenge by the N ew L eft soixante-huitards and an industrial challenge in the form of ‘wildcat’ strikes and workplace militancy led by the rank-and-file. The response to these challenges was an attempt to renew social democracy through a focus on the reform of capitalism from above. There was a particular focus on the extension of economic and industrial democracy as witnessed in the popularity of autogestion in the newly created F rench PS and the plans for wage-earner funds

Social Democracy and Trade Unions



developed by the LO -SAP in S weden. The renewal of social democracy ultimately floundered in the recession created by the 1973-4 oil crisis but, as Padgett and Paterson (ibid: 40) argue, even before the crisis, social democratic politics had started to show signs of disorientation, decay and stagnation. N otwithstanding this withering of social democracy in northern E urope, in the southern E uropean states of F rance and Italy social democracy was coagulating as Communism withdrew to its phase of historic compromise with capital. The decomposition of social democracy accelerated alongside the crisis and collapse of Keynesian economics in the 1970s and 1980s. Western capital responded to a decline in profit rates by seeking to enlarge markets and proletarianize workers in the under-developed world through the process of globalization. The certainties of state-capital-labour relations in relatively closed national economies in the developed world began to dissipate. The deepening accumulation crisis of western capitalism was combined with a mounting legitimation crisis of welfarism. E xisting collectivist models of social welfare undermined the central axioms of social democratic government and social democracy appeared bereft of ideas on how to confront the difficulties. The politics of consensus and class compromise disintegrated into polarization and conflict as capital and labour made demands on each other and the state that governments were unable to accommodate (Padgett and Paterson, ibid: 49). In northern E urope, the crisis deepened the divisions between left and right within labour movements. The dominant rightwing response to the crisis was to reject further ideological politics in favour of the politics of pragmatic ‘realism’ which translated into government programmes of ‘crisis management’ that amounted to little more than moderate versions of monetarism. O n the left, there was a rejection of reformist social democracy and the development of neo-M arxist frameworks for understanding the crisis and the formulation of ‘alternative’ economic strategies based on state intervention, public ownership and export controls. The ideological crisis of social democracy in Western E urope was uneven and reflected, inter alia, the form and intensity of the party union nexus. In S weden, the initial response of the SAP was to develop a socially symmetrical crisis management policy alongside radical proposals to extend economic democracy through the development of wage-earner funds. This solidaristic response to the crisis reflected the consensual political culture in S weden and the enduringly close relationship between the SAP and the LO . When the strategy collapsed in the face of a severe economic crisis in the early 1990s, the SAP began a long retreat from social democratic orthodoxy that included abandoning its commitment to full employment, support for monetary and financial deregulation and accession to the European Union. In West Germany, there were increasing strains within the SPD owing to the influx of a new generation of ideologically-motivated activists and the rise of the new social movements around the issues of peace and ecology that culminated in the formation of the Green Party. The initial response of the right in the party was to reaffirm the principles of Bad Godesberg and attempt to strengthen the labour movement orientation of the Party. While there was a degree of accommodation to the N ew

10

The Crisis of Social Democratic Trade Unionism in Western Europe

L eft in the late 1980s, the radical challenge was largely externalized into the Green Party. In the UK, the Wilson/Callaghan L abour Government (1974-9) formally abandoned Keynesianism at the 1976 Party Conference and followed this with three years of crisis management. On losing office in 1979, the Party shifted markedly to the left in response to, inter alia, party activist and trade union dissatisfaction with the 1974-9 government and the changing social composition of both the party and the unions away from the traditionally conservative blue collar activists towards more educated and radical white collar activists. These divisions, intensified by the 1984-5 mineworkers’ strike, contributed to the ideological disintegration of British social democracy and, from such a position of weakness, there was no effective resistance to the neoliberal onslaught by the Thatcher Governments against the trade unions and the last vestiges of social democratic corporatism. In F rance, the PS avoided ideological fragmentation owing to the increasing ‘presidentialism’ and republicanism within the Party and became increasingly integrated into mainstream E uropean social democracy. A s a result of the failure of the 1981 M itterrand Government’s unsuccessful foray into socialism the PS moved into the centre ground of F rench politics. The Rise and Fall of Corporatism: Models and Limits of Incorporation H aving described really existing social democracy it is now necessary to pursue some theoretical arguments on corporatism and its centrality to the social democratic model. Corporatism (or more correctly, neo-corporatism) can be defined in terms of a political structure within advanced capitalism which integrates organized socioeconomic producer groups through a system of representation and cooperative mutual interaction at the leadership level and mobilization and social control at the mass level (Panitch, 1981a: 24). This structure is based on a form of systematic political exchange between the state and trade union leaderships based on a trade off between wage moderation and state economic and labour market policies that attempts to resolve distributional conflicts and the employment-inflation dilemma (Gourevitch et al., 1984: 364-5). The influence of corporatism as a model of conflict containment has been explored in detail by authors such as Goldthorpe et al (1984), and S treeck (1984). Goldthorpe counterposes an alternative view to two strands of theory which saw the influence of corporatism as either a) a non-revolutionary mode of transition from capitalism to socialism whereby the power of organized labour reaches its apex as it is admitted into decision making within the S tate apparatus (see for example, S tephens, 1986) or, b) as the highest form of social control of labour under capitalism whereby the potential militancy of labour is totally emasculated as trade union leaders create accommodating deals with Government and employers. (see for example, Panitch, 1981b). A s an alternative Goldthorpe suggested that a study of corporatism in practice provides a contextual understanding for the process of conflict generation and containment, but that the outcomes of the process are dependent on the mobilizing capacity of the partners. Part of this mobilizing

Social Democracy and Trade Unions

11

capacity for the trade unions is dependent on resolving the tension between trade union leaders, who are willing to offer wage restraint in return for legal or social policy concessions and the rank-and-file who may be able to block wage restraint deals by organized pressure from below. Thus corporatist arrangements, or at least outcomes, are capable of being broken by the trade unions and can be a precursor to conflict (as evidenced in the collapse of the British Social Contract in 1978/79). S imilarly Governments or employers can withdraw from such understandings should circumstances change or if promises, once made, prove too hard to deliver. R egini (1979), for example, cites the example of the failure of the deal between unions and Government in Italy in the late 1970s whereby promises to inject more state cash subsidies into the Mezzogiorno were not kept and as a consequence the Italian union confederation withdrew offers of wage restraint. Corporatism also developed as part of an attempt to reconcile the political management of the economy with the autonomy of market forces. This involved a form of collaboration between government and business and government and labour through which the state attempted to harmonize the interests of each with the broader ‘national interest’ (Padgett and Paterson, op cit: 191). This involved the construction of a triangular structure of consultation and decision-making based on a sustained dialogue between ‘social partners’. There were three main factors that contributed to the development and stability of corporatism in E urope. F irst, is the existence of a state tradition of economic interventionism in social formations where liberal individualism was relatively undeveloped. S econd, the existence of a political culture based on social harmony and political consensus, made possible by the desire for national re-construction and nation building. Third, and perhaps most importantly, the election of social democratic governments alongside the existence of strong, representative and cohesive peak associations of employers and unions with close institutional linkages between trade unions and social democratic political parties (Bornstein, 1984; Padgett and Paterson, ibid: 191-2; Panitch, op cit: 31). The development of corporatism was particularly tied to levels of (un)employment and the way in which this impacted on the industrial strength of the working class (Panitch, 1981a: 30-2). Grahl (2001: 32, 39) also makes the point that national corporatism was made possible by business dependence on ‘own resource’ productivity coalitions with labour. This had involved a tradeoff between trade union support for technological change in return for training opportunities and wage growth linked to productivity. The initial impetus towards corporatism in the immediate post-war period was constrained in the 1950s by the context of a decade of market-led growth, relative class harmony and low levels of industrial conflict. In the 1960s and 1970s, declining growth rates and the re-emergence of distributional conflicts resulted in a marked increase in corporatist consensus building institutions. During the 1980s corporatism entered a terminal crisis as corporatist arrangements were unable to contain distributional conflict in a context of economic crisis and recession. Faced with intensified international competition corporations sought to expand from their domestic base and internationalize through strategic alliances and mergers.

12

The Crisis of Social Democratic Trade Unionism in Western Europe

Increasing dependence on alternative sources of international finance encouraged ‘A mericanization’ through shareholder value, which, in turn, made it increasingly difficult for social democratic governments to redistribute domestically created surplus value to welfare and planning. In this context, corporatism came under attack from business interests for the way in which it stifled flexibility and undermined competitiveness. The ‘positive sum’ bargain of the immediate post-war period was unsustainable in the changing economic circumstances. There were also important changes in E uropean labour movements associated with the shifting balance of blue-collar and white employment that created fragmentation and divisions within union confederations and thus decomposed the labour movement cohesion that was an important precondition of corporatism. Corporatism in post-war E urope did not develop in a linear way, but on the basis of how the above factors interacted with conjunctural socio-economic developments within particular nation-state societies. In S weden, the conditions outlined above were all present and the foundations of corporatism were laid before WWII on the basis of the 1937 Basic A greement: a formal class compromise through which capital and labour leaderships mutually recognized the scope and limits of each others powers. In the post-war period, organized interests were represented on the L abour M arket Board and subsequently across the whole gamut of public policy. S wedish corporatism largely withstood the challenges of the 1960s and 1970s through the orchestration of a solidaristic wages policy and an active labour market strategy that balanced wages, profits and productivity. Nevertheless there were tensions between LO and the growing white-collar unions that undermined labour movement cohesion and a growing tendency towards workplace industrial militancy and ‘wage drift’. During the 1980s, the S wedish M odel came under severe strain owing to the fragmentation of the labour movement and centralized wage bargaining. The attempt to revive S wedish corporatism through symmetrical crisis management and the development of radical wage-earner fund policies alienated S wedish capital which responded with intense political opposition and a hyper-liberal industrial strategy. The politics of consensus was dead, the intimate ties between the SAP and LO had been ruptured and, during the early 1990s, the SAP in government embarked on a flexible accumulation strategy. In the UK, the conditions outlined above were largely absent and, despite the fact that a ‘corporatist bias’ developed in post-war Britain (M iddlemas, 1979: 391), corporatism remained undeveloped in the 1950s and subject to instability and crisis when attempts were made to develop it in the 1960s and 1970s. While the trade unions were anxious to be co-opted in the context of the immediate postwar period, the weakness of the TUC and peak level employer confederations prevented the institutionalization of corporatism. This was compounded by the ideological commitment of organized labour to voluntarism and ‘free collective bargaining’. The L abour Government elected in 1964 was committed to notions of economic concertation and fostering a partnership between government and trade unions. The policy of ‘planned growth’ involved an attempt to balance the pursuit of full employment and the control of wage-push inflation. The policy failed owing

Social Democracy and Trade Unions

13

to the underlying weakness of the British economy manifested in constant balance of payments crises and the weakness of the TUC in controlling rank-and-file wage demands. The attempt to develop voluntary corporatism in the UK resulted in an explosion of trade union militancy and an increasing strain on the party union nexus. This strain was exacerbated by the L abour Party’s response which was an attempt to reform collective bargaining and incorporate the trade union leadership further in order to achieve voluntary and subsequently, statutory, pay restraint. The resulting tension between union leaders and the rank-and-file was brought to a head in the1978-79 ‘Winter of Discontent’. The subsequent L abour Party defeat and the election of the neo-liberal Thatcher Government tolled the death knell for British corporatism. In both F rance and Germany, the undeveloped nature of Keynesianism and the enduring prevalence of unemployment during the 1950s obviated the need for corporatist concertation. In both cases this changed in the early 1960s in a context of tight labour markets and industrial militancy. In West Germany, while a legal framework existed for the regulation of industrial relations and wage bargaining, formal tripartite corporatism did not develop until the 1960s. This reflected the laissez-faire orientation of Christian Democrat governments and a tension between the ‘social partner’ and ‘activist left’ wings of the German labour movement (M arkovits, 1986: 83-93). The main impetus to the development of corporatism in Germany was the entry of the SP D into government in 1966 and a shift in the balance of power within the DGB towards the ‘social partner’ unions. The resulting Konzierte Aktion framework was, however, undermined by enduring division within the labour movement; particularly the commitment of the more powerful, larger unions to Tarifautonomie (free collective bargaining) and tension between the social partners over the SP D’s co-determination legislation. Towards the end of the 1970s, formal tripartitism had given way to a more informal bargain between the ‘social partner’ unions and the SP D leadership focussed on wage restraint and positive labour market policies. The corporatist bargain in Germany was also tenuous owing to the limited capacity of the SP D to deliver labour market reform in the context of coalition governments and the important and independent role of the Bundesbank in the framing of economic policy. The close ties between the leaderships of the SP D and DGB was an increasing source of tension within the German labour movement during the 1980s with the two factions of the DGB in disagreement over developing closer ties with the Green Party or constructing a Grand Coalition with the CDU. In F rance, economic coordination and planning was well-established through bipartite relations between state and business which largely excluded labour. During the 1960s, there was an attempt to incorporate the CF DT into the planning process led by Jacques Delors. The willingness of the unions to countenance wage restraint in return for a concerted labour market policy was ultimately frustrated by the enduring lack of union influence within the planning structures. The wave of industrial militancy that swept F rance in 1968 highlighted the imbalance between the power of labour in the workplace and the political marginalization of labour

14

The Crisis of Social Democratic Trade Unionism in Western Europe

in relation to the state. In this context, there was a further attempt to construct social democratic corporatism in 1969 through the contrat de progrès which was an attempt to orchestrate public sector pay in a way that embraced wider social and economic issues. The CF DT was receptive to the plan, but it proved impossible to implement and collapsed in 1972. During the 1980s, the S ocialist Government emphatically asserted its independence from both the unions and business interests and, whilst it eventually reversed its decision to undermine the special status of business, M itterrand actively undermined rather than cultivated social democratic corporatism (H all, 1986: 221-2). We now move to an examination of the current crisis of social democracy and the impact of neoliberal restructuring on trade unions. Neoliberalism and the Crisis of Social Democratic Trade Unionism There is a growing debate concerning the impact of neoliberal restructuring and globalization on trade union organization and vitality. In the N orth A merican context, for example, the debate has focused on the extent to which these developments are shifting the strategic orientations of trade unions away from ‘business unionism’ towards ‘social movement unionism’ (Dreiling and R obinson, 1998; R obinson, 2000; F antasia and Voss, 2004) and the extent to which the resulting ‘new labour internationalism’ provides the basis for union revitalization and renewal (Goldfield, 1989; Moody, 1997; Waterman, 2001; O’ Brien 2004; Ghigliani, 2005). In Western E urope, the impact of neoliberal restructuring and globalization has produced a different form of crisis and a divergent trajectory of reorientation. This reflects the institutional specificity of the relationship between trade unions, political parties and the state that predominated in post-war Western E urope and that produced nationally specific forms of ‘social democratic trade unionism’. To rehearse the argument, social democracy is a historical phenomenon marked by the integration and interpenetration of socialism and trade unionism and the de facto integration of the labour movement into parliamentary democracy (M inock, 1998). This integration was achieved through a historic ‘settlement’ in which trade union leaderships recognized the legitimacy of private property and the market in return for ‘concessions’ based on the delivery of state welfare and state support for collective bargaining. The ability of labour movements to extract concessions was based on the close institutional connections between trade unions and a ‘dominant party of labour’ with an ideological commitment to social justice, political liberalism and the welfare state. H ence, social democratic trade unionism was the product of this ‘specific social structuration’ (Moschonas, 2002: 17) marked by a historically specific and contingent relationship between a growing industrial working class, trade unions, reformist socialist and labour parties and the nation state. The processes of neoliberal restructuring and globalization in Western E urope have produced a serious crisis in this form of trade unionism. The industrial strength and bargaining power of trade unions has been undermined by de-industrialization

Social Democracy and Trade Unions

15

and a drastic decline in trade union density. The ability of the nation state to offer concessions has become severely constrained by the dynamics of global competition. Capital has been forced by the exigencies of international product market competition to increase rates of both intensive and extensive exploitation of their workforces. R ather than challenge capital directly social democratic political parties have become increasingly attracted to neoliberal policy prescriptions geared towards national business competitiveness. Where concessions to labour remain these take the form of defensive or ‘dented shield’ forms of social pacts associated with ‘competitive corporatism’ in which trade unions attempt to mitigate the worst effects of neoliberal restructuring (R hodes, 1998). The development of new strategic orientations around ‘partnership’ and competitive corporatism reflects a weakening of the union-party nexus that has been induced by the institutiondissolving dynamics of neoliberalism. ‘Partnership’, in this context, represents a denial and/or suppression of class conflict, and a direct appeal by the state to workers’ ‘self interest’ at the enterprise level. The development and consolidation of Keynesian social democratic settlements also involved the ‘statization of society’ (Panitch, 1986: 189) or ‘statization of social life’ (Poulantzas, 1978). N eoliberal restructuring, in contrast, by its very belligerence encourages the ‘opening-up’ of civil society. This process of openingup presents trade unions with three principal avenues of strategic and ideological reorientation. F irst, unions have the option to embrace the associational politics of the ‘third way’ and adopt the strategy of social partnership (Cohen and R ogers, 1995; A ckers and Wilkinson, 2003; Prabhaker, 2003; Upchurch, 2008). A s such unions may adopt collaborationist strategies designed to appeal to business competitiveness and the employer. S econd, unions may seek to lobby the ‘party of labour’ for a return to ‘traditional social democracy’. This strategy assumes that neoliberalism is simply a variant of capitalism rather than a consolidating response to the current accumulation crisis (e.g. Garrett 1998, 2003). Third, unions can exploit this opening-up in order to liberate themselves from the institutional and ideological fetters of the Keynesian welfare state in order to re-establish themselves as autonomous ‘movements’ in civil society. There are, however, serious institutional barriers to this latter reorientation and, as R ainnie and E llem (2006) suggest ‘labour movements at whatever level have to experience near terminal crisis before the rigidities of old structures, attitudes and activities can be opened up to new and challenging ways of organizing’. The purpose of our analysis is to provide an institutional analysis of neoliberal restructuring and trade union strategic orientation in Western E urope. We focus in particular on two interrelated processes of reorientation associated with the crisis of the party union nexus. F irst, the extent to which strains within the party union nexus are producing division and fractures within, and between, unions on the basis of an accommodation to, or resistance against, neoliberalism. S econd, the extent to which a weakening of the party union nexus is resulting in the emergence of new union identities based on ‘social movement unionism’ or ‘new labour internationalism’. We suggest that there are three important variables that are likely

16

The Crisis of Social Democratic Trade Unionism in Western Europe

to determine the extent of reorientation and division. F irst, is the ability of unions to re-politicize their relationship with social democratic parties and governments. S econd, is the ability of unions to ‘open-up’ their internal procedures and modes of representation. Borrowing terminology from social movement theory, we can argue that this second strategy might represent a new cycle of contention (Tarrow 1988: 141-160), whereby the partial de-institutionalization of industrial relations means that unions might now seek to re-mobilize their forces and become actors again within wider civil society. F ollowing on from this, our third variable becomes the willingness of union members to engage in new and challenging ways of organizing. Both Crouch (1993) and H yman (2001a) have noted the formation of differences in industrial relations and labour regimes between the west E uropean liberal democracies. Crouch, utilizing an historical perspective and focusing on postwar settlements, defines the concept of alternative ‘European state traditions’. H yman, in analyzing Britain, Germany and Italy, constructs a triangulation of market, class and society and posits each country differently in terms of ‘geometry’. In essence, both authors offer an explanation of difference in terms of dependence on historical trajectory and specified in institutional forms. This would assume that industrial relations’ outcomes are a dialectical product of both structure and agency. A s N ielsen et al (1995), suggest, continuity and change in social democracy are likely in terms of both ‘path dependency’ and ‘path shapers’. In addition to national variance we can also note tensions within the explicit party union nexus. A key characteristic has always been a perceived need for trade union leaderships to maintain the ‘balance’ between sectional (or class) interest and (bourgeois) national interest. There is thus a tension between the ‘sword of justice’ and ‘vested interest’ roles of unions (F landers, 1970: 15-16). In the postwar period of ascendant social democracy this tension was contained by a political settlement whereby government concessions were granted to the union leaders in return for them exerting some discipline over rank-and-file wage militancy (F landers, 1974; Coates 1984, H assel 2003). Variable forms of neo-corporatism were de rigeur: more entrenched in the ‘strong’ social democratic states of S candinavia, and weakest in the ‘liberal market’ economies of the UK and Ireland (Bornstein, 1984; Padgett and Paterson, 1991). A second tension was located in the potential development of bureaucratic forms of representation emanating from the ‘institutionalization’ of trade unions within ‘pluralist’ industrial relations systems. The accommodation between trade union leaders, employers and Governments was often seen by rank-and-file members to be against their own economic interest. Indeed, such institutionalization and bureaucratization has the potential to erode union legitimacy and mobilizing capacity (O ffe and Wiesenthal, 1985; M üllerJentsch, 1986; Darlington, 1994).

Social Democracy and Trade Unions

17

Trade Unions and the State: The Limits and Possibilities of Trade Union Action A defining feature of social democratic trade unionism is the existence of a dominant party union nexus (DPUN ). Within this nexus there is a need to understand the precise role and function of trade unions, workers’ political parties and the state. We attempt to clarify this role through by drawing on critical theoretical approaches to trade unions and theories of the capitalist state. Trade Unions Within M arxist theory the dominant tradition has stressed the necessity of such a union party link owing to the limited potential of trade unions to achieve social and political change independently of political parties. There have been two main reasons for this pessimism. The first reason is the product of the structural position of trade unions within capitalist society (A nderson, 1967: 264-8). Trade unions express rather than challenge the unequal and contradictory relationship between capital and labour. Trade unions can bargain within the system, but are unable to transform it owing to their social position as a passive reflection of the capitalist workplace. This contradictory character of trade unions as agents of social change was recognized by both M arx and E ngels as they observed trade union development. The revolutionary potential of trade unions was claimed by M arx and E ngels in The German Ideology when commenting on the Chartist battles with the police in E ngland and Wales as the campaign for the vote saw a call for a general strike in both 1838 and 1842: ... even a minority of workers who combine and go on strike very soon find themselves compelled to act in a revolutionary way – a fact one could have learned from the 1842 uprising in E ngland and the earlier Welsh uprising of 1839, in which year the revolutionary excitement among the workers first found comprehensive expression in the sacred month which was proclaimed simultaneously with a general arming of the people (M arx and E ngels, 1932: 210-211).

S uch optimism for the role of trade unions as agents of change proved short lived as within the next two decades in E ngland the employers resumed an offensive and the balance of class forces shifted away from labour. By 1871, preparing material for the Conference of the F irst International, E ngels was forced to conclude: The trade union movement, among all the big, strong and rich trade unions has become more of an obstacle to the general movement than an instrument of its progress: and outside of the trade unions there are an immense mass of workers in L ondon who have kept quite a distance away from the political movement for several years, and as a result are very ignorant (quoted in Draper, 1978).

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The Crisis of Social Democratic Trade Unionism in Western Europe

This change in attitude, which was also reflected in Marx’s contribution to the F irst International at the time, highlighted a problem. Why was it that the newly emerging working class did not recognize its power within the workplace and organize through the collective strength of the unions to overthrow the employers and the capitalist system? If it was because they lacked the necessary class consciousness then what were the obstacles to the development of such a consciousness? Did this consciousness arise spontaneously or was it a dialectical product of the times, and what, therefore, is the precise relationship between trade unions and class conflict? The search for answers to these questions has been central to Marxist theory of trade unions and industrial conflict ever since. E xplanations have emerged which attempt to explain the development of class consciousness and its relationship with trade unionism and conflict. Most Marxist theorists recognize that consciousness is not a fixed entity, but is rather something which ebbs and flows over time. This ebb and flow may not only be capable of operating for the class as a whole over periods of time (as recorded by M arx and E ngels in the previous examples), but will vary between individual workers at the same moment in time (and in the same workplace under the same conditions). The relationship may be further obscured when it is understood that consciousness may develop as a result of strike action rather than as a cause. F urthermore some authors, such as H obsbawm (1981), have argued that the type of strike action can have either a negative or positive effect on consciousness – negative if it is purely economistic (over wage militancy) and positive only if it raises political demands. The problems of consciousness were recognized most potently by L enin when recording and theorizing on the ‘ebbs and flows’ of the Russian Revolutionary period from 1905 to 1917. It was translated directly into L enin’s writings on trade unions which, as with Marx and Engels, reflected a changed political context and reframed political tactics. A t times of revolution, L enin portrayed a much more direct link between trade unions, conflict and political action than in periods of quiescence. Thus, during the 1905 R evolution L enin wrote that the working class was instinctively, spontaneously, social democratic (i.e. revolutionary). A t other times in his writings between 1905 and 1917, in contrast, workers’ consciousness was simply limited to a ‘trade union’ or ‘economic’ level expressing a mere expectation of gaining concessions from the employers in difficult times. Workers’ Parties In contrast to the ambivalence of trade unions, the political party has the potential to rupture the natural environment of civil society owing to its position as a ‘voluntarist contractual collectivity’ which restructures social contours (A nderson, op cit: 265). The principal weapon of trades unions is the strike, which temporarily liberates workers from the power of capital and at the same time challenges capital. H owever, strikes are an abstention rather than an assault on capitalism and the use of this essentially ‘economic’ weapon on the ‘political’ terrain in the form of a general strike has always been constrained by the limitations of a simple withdrawal

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of labour. The essential limitations of trade unions, as established by L enin in What is to be Done, is that trade unions generate only a ‘corporate’, sectoral or limited consciousness owing to the fact that they represent only the working class. F urther efforts to attempt to explain the barriers to workers’ developing political class consciousness were made by Gramsci. H is experience of syndicalism in the occupation movement in Turin factories in 1919/20 led him to draw the conclusion that workers, even at the high points of struggle, may still lack the intellectual will to challenge state power. Gramsci (1978, Selections from the Prison Notebooks 192126) used M arxist methodology to locate the problem as one in which ruling class ideology held grip over workers’ minds through a variety of means. E ssentially he defined the trade unions as a part of capitalist society that operated above all within the confines of capitalist ideology: ... objectively, the trade union is nothing other than a commercial company, of a purely capitalistic type, which aims to secure, in the interests of the proletariat, the maximum price for the commodity labour, and to establish a monopoly over this commodity in the national and international fields. The trade union is distinguished from capitalist mercantilism only subjectively ...

In terms of consciousness, Gramsci saw workers identifying themselves primarily with a section of their class with whom they shared a common skill or trade. The degree and density of trade union membership would, therefore, be a simple measure of sectional consciousness. S econdly, workers may identify with the corporate interests of the class as a whole (measured by affiliation of the union to a national federation, sympathy action, or affiliation to a political party of labour) and only finally developing a hegemonic revolutionary class view. The task thus remained to help encourage hegemonic consciousness through a war of position or a battle of ideas as part of a process of revolutionary preparation. This war of position had as its chief purpose developing the challenge to ruling class ideology sustained not just by force, but also by an array of institutions which acted to justify the status quo in workers’ minds despite their explicit and verbal everyday rejection of the employers’ values. Gramsci described a Civil S ociety of institutions such as Parliament and the Church which sought to blind workers to the real nature of capitalist society. In effect the ruling class had constructed in its defence a battery of ‘fortresses and earthworks’ which served to mask itself from direct attack. The relative absence of such barriers in R ussia, explained by an absence of a liberal democratic political culture, served to explain why workers there leapt towards revolutionary ideas so quickly. In western capitalisms such a process may be more prolonged but in time, as crisis develops, even these structures of civil society would begin to collapse as a politically educated working class became progressively alienated from them. A t this point mass explosions of anger would be possible as the war of position moved into a war of manouevre when workers came out of the trenches to challenge the state directly.

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Gramsci’s conclusions were undoubtedly revolutionary. H owever, within his framework there are insights into the barriers to worker consciousness which may explain why conflict can be successfully managed and contained within capitalist society. N ot only do the legal and executive institutions hold a cosmetic appeal for the system, but the institutions of collective bargaining and the dominant role of the trade union leaders within them can also be of pivotal importance. O n the contemporary terrain, social democratic trade unions may thus act as ‘earthworks’ in the Gramscian sense. Collective bargaining becomes important to legitimize in the minds of workers the everyday exploitation of their labour-power. In Gramsci’s (1923) words: The capitalists, for industrial reasons, cannot want all forms of organisation to be destroyed. In the factory, discipline and the smooth flow of production is only possible if there exists at least a minimum degree of consent on the part of the workers.

A s trade unions were a product of capitalism they were destined to become a legitimizing institution. The task thus remained to challenge their social role ideologically by building alternative pre-revolutionary union movements (related directly to Gramsci’s factory council experience) which may both challenge the trade union leaders’ dominant role and establish rank and file based union structures outside of the fortresses and earthworks of capitalism. The problems of the development of consciousness were also tackled by George L ukacs in his series of essays written in 1923 entitled History and Class Consciousness. L ukacs was attempting to explain the relative failure of revolutionary movements outside of R ussia after 1917 and concentrated in particular on why workers so easily appeared to accept the dominant ruling class ideology, and, by implication, were drawn towards the parliamentary orientation of the rival ideology of social democratic reformism. H is conclusions have similarity with Gramsci’s in that he identified in particular the importance of institutions in legitimising the existing order. The legal and executive machinery appeared as an ‘inevitable’ series of rulings reinforced by both the power of the press and workers’ own leaders. It is from this milieu that the social democratic parliamentarians and the trade union leaders drew legitimacy. The trade union leaders acted as mediators within the institutional framework, and their social position was thus dependent on the continuation of the capitalist order. In effect, workers accumulated both an imputed consciousness, making them critical of capitalism as a result of the work experience, whilst at the same time having an actual consciousness which accepted as natural, the capitalist order. A s such, L ukacs placed increased emphasis on the role of the party in transforming worker consciousness. The party was seen as essential as it brought intellectuals into the labour movement that provided the intellectual and theoretical leadership that enabled corporate consciousness to be translated into socialist consciousness. Without such revolutionary party intervention trade union consciousness alone would bind the majority of workers to social

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democracy. By the end of the 1930s such a process of ‘social democratisation’ of worker consciousness had taken place in most of western E urope, as Communist alternatives were increasingly constrained by a combination of the deflections of S talinist ideology and the defeats of militancy in the two decades of recession in the 1920s and 1930s. A fter World War Two, and despite the aforementioned limitations, in the 1960s and 1970s the historical roles of unions and parties appeared to be reversed and across advanced capitalist societies the trade unions emerged as the standard bearers of working class political advance. The increasingly rightward orientations of social democratic political parties, and the policies of social democratic governments concerned with the efficient functioning of the capitalist economy, resulted in a political attack on trade union autonomy. In this context, the corporate consciousness of trade unions was more resilient to incorporation than the ‘artificial’ voluntarism of socialist politicians (Anderson, op cit: 272-3). The Capitalist State The form and function of the capitalist state militates against the efficacy of trade union politics. The debate within theoretical M arxism on the capitalist state articulated and reflected a series of diverse political orientations and strategies within labour movements. The L eninist model of the capitalist state presented the state as an instrument of capitalist class rule and argued that it was impossible for the working class to use parliament for its own ends. In the UK, the notion that there was an interweaving of economic and political power was developed by M iliband who linked the capitalist form of the state to the background, attitudes and interests of its leading personnel. The weaknesses associated with this approach are well known and have been elaborated at length elsewhere (Clarke, 1991; Jessop, 1982; H eld, 1983). The approach is of limited utility in the analysis of social democratic trade unionism for it assumes that there are tightly constrained limits to economic and political reform and that any reforms achieved by trade unions through the capitalist state are functional for capital and subsequently rectified by the selfregulating mechanisms of capitalism (Kelly, 1988: 230-3). The instrumentalist analysis of the capitalist state was challenged by the ‘capital logic’ approach which argued that the state has a degree of ‘relative autonomy’ from capital that is both necessary and functional for capital. The relative autonomy of the state rests on the formal separation of politics and economics and the state is functional for capital because its own long-term survival is dependent on capital accumulation. The state is thus able to introduce reforms that may work against the short-term interests of particular capitalists, around issues such as training or health and safety, in order to fulfil the interests of capital in general. The problem with this approach is that it fails to consider the extent to which state policies have often been dysfunctional for capital or the extent to which different state policies may be contradictory (Kelly, ibid: 237). This approach is also limited with regard to the analysis of social democratic trade unionism as it assumes that the

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relationship between trade unions and social democratic parties and governments is in every instance based on the incorporation and demobilization of the working class (cf. Panitch, 1981a). A s we will demonstrate in the following section, such an assumption is empirically unjustified and provides no basis for understanding the crisis and decomposition of social democratic trade unionism. In this book, we proceed on the basis that the autonomy of the state is real and this provides an opportunity for both capital and labour to influence the structure and policies of the state in their own interests (Kelly, 1988; cf. Jessop, 1982; Clegg et al., 1986; M cL ennan, 1984). In other words, the state is an object and a product of class struggle. This approach is superior as it allows an appreciation of the often contradictory nature of state polices. F or example, the promotion of trade union organization through legal provisions may result in a short-term reduction in industrial conflict whilst in the long-term augmenting the power and resources unions have to mobilize against employers (Kelly, op cit: 242). F urthermore, this approach problematizes the notion that capital has a unified set of interests that can be unproblematically articulated by the state (Kelly, ibid: 243). In the UK in the post-war period, for example, there was an ongoing division between US multinationals that favoured a reformist strategy towards industrial relations and UK engineering capitalists who favoured a repressive strategy to curb trade union power (S trinati, 1982). This approach also has the advantage that it allows a consideration of the extent to which state agents and functionaries have interests of their own and wield power for a variety of personal, group and class interests (Kelly, op cit: 243). In this context, different branches or departments of the state may pursue divergent and often contradictory policies. The focus on the contradictions of state action highlights the extent to which the state is intermeshed with the struggles of civil society (Poulantzas, 1978). In this context, the election of social democratic governments in the post-war period carried workers’ aspirations into the heart of state activity particularly in the area of social policy (Kelly, op cit: 244; Therborn, 1983). In the context of an increase in labour’s ‘power resources’ (Korpi, 1983) as measured in terms of increasing union density and the electoral success of social democratic and labour parties, capitalist states were forced to make concessions to labour even where these imposed costs on capital (Kelly, op cit: 244; Simon, 1982). The power and influence of the capitalist state is thus limited and state action can often have unanticipated effects. Outline of the Book H aving given an overview of our theoretical perspectives the remaining chapters of this book focus on the detail of developments in each of our chosen countries. In Chapter 2, we explore the development, crisis and decomposition of social democratic trade unionism in S weden. S weden represents a case of social democratic trade unionism par excellence with a relationship of ‘unparalleled intimacy’ between the S wedish S ocial Democratic Party (SAP ) and the main blue-

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collar trade union confederation (LO ). We begin by outlining the key features of S wedish social democracy as an ideology and practice. The following section explores the economic, political and social context in which the S wedish labour movement developed and the specific ways in which the development of the Swedish labour movement was connected to the specificities of the Swedish Model. In the next section, we explore the consolidation of the S wedish M odel during the 1950s and 1960s and the ways in which this institutionalized a serious of tensions and contradictions within the model that were to erupt into the serious industrial and social unrest of the 1970s. The following section explores the radicalization of the S wedish labour movement in the 1970s and the ways in which this process highlighted the limits and contradictions of the S wedish M odel. The following section explores neo-liberal restructuring in S weden and the extent to which this resulted in the crisis and decomposition of the S wedish M odel. The following section explores patterns of continuity and change in trade union orientation and strategy in the context of neo-liberal restructuring and the crisis of the S wedish M odel. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the legacy of the S wedish M odel to the orientation and strategy of contemporary S wedish trade unionism. In Chapter 3, we address the implications of the potential fracturing and/or collapse of the German model of co-determination and locate developments within the general accommodation of the SP D to neo-liberal market agendas through A genda 2010. R eference to key German authors will be made and evidence from documents of the DGB as well as a review of industrial disputes and A genda 2010 demonstrations will be recorded. The ‘Keynes Debate’ within the SP D will be reviewed and its implications for the relationship between the SP D and the trade unions assessed. The chapter will then describe the emerging alternative political movement to the left of the SP D (WASG/Linkspartei) and examine its social and political characteristics with respect to the anti-neoliberal and global justice movements within Germany grouped around such organizations as A TTA C and the various E uropean S ocial F orums. The emerging debate over anti-neo liberal versus anti-capitalist nature of the new movement will also be reviewed. Specific reference will also be made to the embedded nature of sections of the trade unions (especially Ver.di) within the new social movements and an indication of the significance of such developments will be given. In the fourth chapter we review the changing relationship between N ew L abour and the trade unions since the mid 1990s and then in the period of L abour Government since 1997. The strategy of the British Government in terms of its response to globalization and capital accumulation will be described with reference to Third Way thinking. Government and M inisterial S tatements will be given as evidence of policy. The specific historical nature of the relationship between the trade union leaders and L abour will be explored within the general framework of social democratic trade unionism (SDTU) already identified. The crisis of SDTU will then be highlighted on the industrial, political and social fronts. Government strategy on partnership at work, privatization and public service marketization will be described as well as the deliberate distancing between unions and L abour

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inspired by N ew L abour itself. The crisis of partnership as an industrial strategy will be considered with reference to moves to reject the strategy by key members of the awkward squad. In the political field a distinction will be made between those trade union leaders of the awkward squad wishing to reform the L abour Party to the left and those having rejected affiliation by choice or by expulsion. Evidence of affiliation and links between the unions and parties and campaign organizations outside of the traditional party-union nexus will be examined. F inally the chapter will explore new developments in UK unions with respect to social and community unionism and the development of internationalism. The continuing constraints on such new developments will be assessed and further likelihood of change explored. In Chapter 5, we account for the persistent under-development and weakness of social democratic trade unionism in F rance. We trace this through the emergence of the labour movement and its developing strong attachments to syndicalism and subsequently to communism which competed with social democratic tendencies within F rench labour to produce its fragmentation. We show how communist domination of the labour movement in the form of the PCF /CGT axis precluded the development of a strong social democratic orientation, but also how this situation has not been fundamentally altered in the wake of its collapse towards the end of the twentieth century. Processes of neoliberal restructuring have resulted in a polarization of F rench labour between accommodation by the main social democratic forces and resistance which is increasingly taking the form of a social movement orientation amongst sections of the trade union confederations and an organized political alternative to neoliberalism. In Chapter 6, we explore the prospects for, and barriers to, the development of social democratic trade unionism at the E uropean level. In recent years, political and economic actors in the form of the Party of E uropean S ocialists (PES ) and the E uropean Trade Union Confederation (E TUC) have developed around the vision of the E uropean S ocial M odel. In this chapter, we explore the potential of these actors and more critical and radical currents in E uropean civil society to forge a new social democratic settlement at the E uropean level. We begin by analyzing the process of E uropean integration as a way of understanding the emergence during the 1980s of the concept of the E uropean S ocial M odel (ESM ) as a social democratic alternative to the dominant neo-liberal model of E uropean integration. S econd, and in line with our depiction of the situation within nation states, we outline the developments at the E uropean level of the industrial, political and social dimensions of social democratic trade unionism and the alternative currents which have emerged to challenge it. Third, we analyze the significance of these developments and suggest that there are indications that a form of transnational hybrid trade union identity is discernible that would be an important precondition to the development of a critical social democratic trade unionism at the E uropean level. H owever, we conclude by contrasting to this the top-down and rather artificial development of the dominant extant forms of social democratic trade unionism at the E uropean level.

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In the final chapter, we explore the similarities, differences and the prospects for alternatives across the case study nation states and at the E uropean level. In doing so we develop alternative future identities for trade unions within the western E uropean context, spanning from alternative ‘reformulations’ of social democratic trade unionism to radicalized political unionism. We attempt to locate developments in our chosen countries to each of these alternative scenarios and in doing so we seek to reflect on factors which have determined the varying trade union responses. O ur conclusions are partly speculative. The collapse of the financial markets during 2008 will further complicate the chemistry of protest and dissent. Unions will struggle to oppose the disease of unemployment and calls will arise for an end to the market madness of neo-liberalism and the restoration of Keynesian prescription. These ideological and economic crises will place further strain on the old certainties of social democratic trade unionism. In that we foresee further fragmentation of the traditional party union nexus as we anticipate an ever widening political and social divide between the traditional parties of labour and their trade union wings.

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Chapter 2

S weden – S ocial Democracy after the Divorce? In the case of S weden, we have an example of social democratic trade unionism par excellence. The close organizational linkages between trade unions and a social democratic political party resulted in a distinctive ‘S wedish M odel’ of development marked by highly centralized bi-partite bargaining, a universalist welfare state and unparalleled electoral success of a social democratic or labour party. The M odel developed on the basis of an institutionalized class compromise enshrined within the 1938 Basic Agreement between organized labour and organized employers and delivered high standards of living and social welfare for S wedish workers and high levels of growth, productivity and profitability for Swedish capital. In the late 1970s, cracks and tensions started to appear within the M odel following the external shocks of the global oil crisis and growing political dissent within S weden. S ince the 1980s, the S wedish M odel has been in crisis. There has been a serious challenge to social democratic hegemony through the development of a ‘hyperliberal’ strategy by S wedish employers and the development of a neoliberal state strategy that has involved the liberalization of financial and capital markets and the accession of S weden into the E uropean Union. Despite the neoliberal backlash, many components of the S wedish M odel remain intact; including high levels of state welfare, sectoral collective bargaining and, after a period of economic crisis in the early 1990s, the S wedish economy continues to out-perform its Continental rivals and has become part of the exemplary ‘N ordic M odel’. The lynchpin of the S wedish M odel was the cohesive strength of LO  – the main trade union confederation – and the close institutional relationship between LO and the S wedish S ocial Democratic and L abour Party (SAP ). This enabled the trade unions to influence government policy and impose the centralized discipline necessary to coordinate centralized collective bargaining. This influence and discipline also rested on an exceptionally high level of union density that has consistently been one of the highest in the industrialized world. In S weden, the crisis of social democratic trade unionism has resulted from a challenge to the hegemony of LO by confederations of white collar and professional worker’ unions and the formal divorce of the main confederation and the SAP . Despite these developments, union density remains at 77%, the mechanisms of centralized collective bargaining remain intact and trade unionists retain influence within the SAP . This highlights a high degree of ‘path dependency’ with regard to the transition from Keynesianism to neo-liberalism in S weden. It also throws light on a more fundamental question regarding the limits and possibilities of socialist advance through the institutional mechanisms of centralized corporatism.

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The well-developed nature of S wedish social democracy resulted in it becoming something of a laboratory within which to explore and dissect this issue. O n the one hand, a range of commentators came to the conclusion that the ‘class compromise’ of 1938 was a reflection of labour strength and, consequently, a staging post on the road to socialist advance, while the S wedish M odel was a reflection of working class strength and unity (Esping-Andersen, 1985; Higgins and A pple, 1983; H immelstrand et al., 1981; Korpi, 1978, 1983; S tephens, 1986; Tilton, 1991). O n the other hand, the 1938 A greement was also presented as an example of corporatist incorporation that involved the demobilization of the labour movement and the transformation of the labour leadership into technocratic state managers concerned above all with the efficient regulation and functioning of the capitalist economy (Przeworski, 1985; Crouch, 1979; L ehmbruch, 1982; S chmitter, 1974; Panitch, 1980). In this chapter, we return to this debate, not simply as an exercise in archaeological curiosity, but because, in the context of the high level of path dependency highlighted above, the institutional legacy of the S wedish M odel continues to have an important impact on the orientation and strategy of trade unions in contemporary S weden. The S wedish labour movement played a central role in the development and institutionalization of the S wedish M odel and it is, therefore, possible to explore the origins, consolidation and crisis of social democratic trade unionism alongside the origins, consolidation and crisis of the S wedish M odel. It is possible to impose a crude periodization on the development of the S wedish M odel: the 1930s and 1940s marked the emergence and development of the M odel; the Model was consolidated in the 1950s; in the 1960s tensions and conflict started to develop around the model; the 1970s witnessed the erosion of the M odel and the radicalization of important sections of the labour movement; and since the 1980s the S wedish M odel has been in crisis or indeed collapsed and entered a period of terminal decline. In this chapter, we begin by outlining the key features of S wedish social democracy as an ideology and practice. The following section explores the economic, political and social context in which the S wedish labour movement developed and the specific ways in which the development of the Swedish labour movement was connected to the specificities of the Swedish Model. In the next section, we explore the consolidation of the S wedish M odel during the 1950s and 1960s and the ways in which this institutionalized a serious of tensions and contradictions within the model that were to erupt into the serious industrial and social unrest of the 1970s. The following section explores the radicalization of the S wedish labour movement in the 1970s and the ways in which this process highlighted the limits and contradictions of the S wedish M odel. The following section explores neo-liberal restructuring in S weden and the extent to which this resulted in the crisis and decomposition of the S wedish M odel. The following section explores patterns of continuity and change in trade union orientation and strategy in the context of neo-liberal restructuring and the crisis of the S wedish M odel. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the legacy of the S wedish M odel to the orientation and strategy of contemporary S wedish trade unionism.

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From Institutional Strength to Ideological Hegemony S weden is marked by highly centralized and disciplined trade union organizations with very high levels of union density. There are three trade union confederations: Landorganisationen (LO ) includes manual workers’ unions, Tjänstemännes Centralorganisation (TCO ) organizes the unions of clerical and technical employees and Sveriges Akademikers Centralorganisation (SA CO ) organizes the unions of professional workers. The unions within these confederations are mainly industrial or sectoral unions. Within the LO , for example, dominant unions include M etall (metalworkers union) and Kommunal (municipal workers union). In the system of centralized bargaining that developed as a central plank of the S wedish M odel, the main bargaining units comprised ‘cartels’ of constituent unions organized across sectors. A n important component of the S wedish M odel was the existence of close organizational linkages and shared policy commitments between the LO and the Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Arbetarparti or S wedish S ocial Democratic L abour Party (SAP ). The SAP has enjoyed electoral success unparalleled by social democratic parties or labour parties in other advanced societies and this is reflected in the key institutional features of the S wedish M odel. The S wedish trade unions have faced a centralized and internally disciplined employers’ organization in the form of the Svenska Arbetsgivareföreningen (SAF ) or the S wedish E mployers Confederation dominated by large firms in the export-oriented engineering sector. There are further employers’ organizations representing local and state government employers. These factors contributed to the development of a highly centralized system of bipartite bargaining underpinned by a historical class compromise. This compromise is enshrined in the 1938 Basic Agreement in which employers accepted the right of workers to unionize in order to improve and protect their position in the labour market and unions recognized the right of employers to manage and control the organization of the workplace. The S wedish M odel is based on a highly distinctive ideological model of social democracy. This distinctive character is based on five central themes: integrative democracy, society as the ‘peoples’ home’, the compatibility of equality and efficiency, the social control of the market economy and way in which a strong society is seen as a precondition for enhanced individual freedom (Tilton, 1992). The notion of integrative democracy is manifested in the pivotal importance that the expansion of democracy has taken within S wedish social democracy. This has been presented as a three stage process of democratic development whereby political democracy is expanded into social and economic democracy. This has involved the construction of a state in which first industrial workers and then employees in general participate on equal terms in the organization and governance of society. H ence, S wedish social democrats have eschewed L eninist or elitist models of ‘class politics’ in favour of a conception of politics as a consensual ‘rule of all’ premised on the ‘deproletarianization’ of industrial workers, the schooling and organization of workers to assume political and economic power and the development of cross-class coalitions and consensus (Tilton, ibid: 410-11). The

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notion of folkhemmet or the conceptualization of state and society as the ‘peoples’ home’ is premised on the idea that solidarity and equality of consideration characterize a good home and similarly consensus and democratic persuasion should characterize the governance of state and society (Tilton, ibid: 411-12). The compatibility, and indeed complementarity, between socio-economic equality and economic efficiency has resulted in the LO position that the benefits of equality include long-term growth and efficiency. (Tilton, ibid: 414). The priority accorded to the development of a socially controlled market economy rather than the nationalization of productive enterprises can be traced to the accommodation of the SAP with agricultural interests in the early 20th century. The SAP decided to broaden its appeal to all the ‘little people’ and workers in general and to accept small-scale and cooperative modes of production as acceptable forms of economic organization. H ence, the conceptualization of a socialized market economy in which the labour movement worked to equalize the background conditions under which markets operated through the redistribution of incomes and property in an egalitarian direction. This has resulted in the development of a form of ‘functional socialism’ that recognises the value of socially controlled markets (Tilton, ibid: 414-18). The rejection of the notion that the growth of the public sector threatens individual liberty is premised on the democratic legitimacy of government and the importance of taxation to the maintenance and expansion of public services. (Tilton, ibid: 422-25). The M odel ultimately rested on the unparalleled electoral success of the SAP . In the 70 years following the introduction of universal suffrage, the SAP led the government for 56 years. F or 40 consecutive years, S weden had a social democratic prime minister and for 38 years the SAP were the sole governing party. Between 1921 and 1985, the SAP attracted the votes of 44.8% of the electorate and in five elections the Party received over 50% of total votes (Therborn, 1992b: 1). There are a number of factors that help to explain the exceptionalism of social democratic politics in S weden (Therborn, ibid: 5-15). F irst, the classbased nature of S wedish politics as expressed in the relationship between class membership and voting behaviour. In the elections of 1948 and 1956-1968, the SAP received 70% of workers votes and when combined with the votes of the Vänsterpartiet Kommunisterna or L eft Communist Party (VPK) the two labour parties combined received 75%. S econd, the historical parallels between the formation of the S wedish working class and the development of the modern party system. S weden underwent a comparatively rapid process of industrialization and social democratic and trade union politics developed concurrently in the context of intense political agitation for the extension of the franchise. In addition, the S wedish working class was, in comparative terms, economically uniform with low differentials between skilled and unskilled workers. Third, the SAP has been less successful than other social democratic parties in attracting the votes of the whitecollar middle class despite comparatively high levels of white-collar unionization. This can be explained partly by the existence of alternative ways of expressing social democratic sensibilities through membership of non-LO unions and voting

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for bourgeois parties that have, in the main, pursed policies analogous to the SAP . F ourth, the ‘popular movement’ tradition of class politics in S weden resulted from the ways in which the labour movement developed in parallel with other popular movements such as the temperance and evangelical movements, and this has resulted in a politics that is reformatory, educational and collective in form. The combination of this popularism with the specific geo-political situation of Sweden have combined to keep non-class issues off the agenda and intensified the unifying and cohesive character of the labour movement. These exceptional characteristics of S wedish social democracy have combined with five aspects of SAP leadership and strategy to account for the outstanding electoral success of the Party (Therborn, ibid: 15-29). F irst, the practice of ‘open door politics’ that has involved the SAP developing alliances and coalitions with both left and right has both increased the democratic legitimacy of the SAP and contributed to the maintenance of electoral majorities. S econd, the class politics of the SAP have consistently been filtered or mediated through the LO such that class politics became LO politics. The founding conference of the LO established that members of constituent unions would automatically be members of the Party (Gidlund, 1992: 106) and this system of collective membership, until abolished in 1987, constituted between 75% and 80% of SAP membership. Third, it is generally acknowledged that the leadership of the SAP has exhibited both high levels of tactical skill in relation to the machinations of electoral politics and exhibited an excellent grasp of ‘technical’ economic issues that has in equal measures wrongfooted and impressed opponents and maintained legitimacy within and beyond the S wedish labour movement. F ourth, until the 1980s, the SAP was the strongest social democratic party organization in the world in terms of party membership with over 1.2 million individual and collective members in 1986. Until the forced divorce of the SAP and LO in 1987, the organizational capacity of the SAP was to some extent rooted in the workplace and the SAP benefitted from the radicalization of LO politics during the 1970s. In addition to these factors, the success of the SAP was bolstered by the non-involvement of S weden in warfare throughout the 20th century and the good fortune that the SAP were not tainted by being in power in times of major economic crises. In the following section, we explore the historical context that underpinned this unique social democratic settlement and the extent to which the S wedish labour movement was indeed the principal architect of the S wedish M odel. Swedish Social Democracy There is no clear agreement on the dynamics that were responsible for the specificity of the Swedish Model of capitalist development. There has been particular controversy concerning the extent to which the labour movement were active agents in the construction of the model or shaped by the infrastructural preconditions and institutional dynamics of the M odel. The development of social

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democracy in Sweden took place in a highly specific social context marked by late industrialization and the religious, cultural and ethnic homogeneity of S wedish society. The central issue to be explained is how and why the S wedish labour movement achieved a high degree of centralized authority and cohesion. There have been attempts to explore this issue through a focus on the economic and political specificity of Swedish development and the strategic orientations of the labour movement itself. H owever, important as these factors may be, they should not be allowed to obscure the enduring ideological divisions and sectionalism within the S wedish labour movement. In the early stages of industrialization, craft unions were dominant and industrial unionism was not consolidated until the 1930s. H ow were these problems overcome in order to secure the development of industrial unionism and the comparatively early development of a unified trade union confederation? A ccording to F ulcher (1995: 8-10), the growth of industrial unionism developed from the specificity of ‘work material’ unionism that bridged the gap between skilled and unskilled workers and resulted in the emergence of hybrid forms of craft/industrial unionism particularly in the woodworking and metalworking sectors. The socialists played in a key role in encouraging this form of ‘open unionism’. S ocialists in the SAP also played a key role in the early development of the LO , as the Party established a class-wide organization and demonstrated the need for this to the unions. In other words, national political organization preceded and generated national union organizing. In the context of the late democratization, S wedish socialists were forced to establish an industrial power base as part of the struggle for a universal political franchise. The key to understanding the early development of the S wedish labour movement is thus the prominent role of socialists in shaping union organization. In tracing the origins the S wedish model, however, it is important to place the strategic orientations of socialist organizers in the specific economic and political context of Swedish development. Concentrated and Powerful Employers: The Importance of Economic Infrastructure During the 19th century, the S wedish economy developed rapidly and became dominated by a small number of export-oriented sectors such as iron and steel and timber and pulp marked by a concentrated pattern of private ownership. A ccording to Ingham (1974), these factors laid the basis for a pattern of centralized, disciplined and offensive action by employers that set the agenda for centralized bi-partite bargaining, the concentration of trade union power and organization and the normative regulation of the capital-labour relation in a way that promoted comparatively low levels of industrial unrest. H ence, the particular infrastructure of the S wedish economy based on specialization, concentration and organization of business provided the main dynamic for the development of the S wedish M odel and the centralized and solidaristic nature of the S wedish labour movement.

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The SAF was formed in 1902 and became the dominant employers’ organization in 1907 following the defeat of the engineering employers in a bitter dispute that included a five month lockout. The SAF has always been a highly centralized organization and has attempted to promote central agreements for all the major branches of industry and has frequently used or threatened lockouts in order to achieve its demands. S ince the 1890s, the struggle between the LO and SAF has been over the collective agreement. This took the form of ‘open cartels’ that operated to limit wage competition within the union ranks (Åmark, 1992: 69). The strategy of limiting competition in the labour market built upon the established strategy of S wedish employers in limiting competition in product markets. A central prerequisite for the success of the LO was thus the extent to which the SAF accepted the LO unions as legitimate negotiating partners. Undeveloped Liberalism: The Importance of Political Context L iberal democracy developed comparatively late in S weden and liberalism has not been a dominant ideology within S wedish state and society. Until 1866, S weden was a totalitarian monarchy. F ollowing the introduction of a two-house parliament in that year, the upper house continued to be dominated by the monarchy and aristocracy for the course of the 19th century; whilst the lower house was dominated by the independent peasantry and the urban bourgeoisie. The main political issues in this period were tariffs and protectionism and the liberals were powerless to prevent wide scale protectionism in the S wedish economy. The right of association was determined as part of the constitutional settlement of 1864. N evertheless, in the late 19th century there were sporadic incidences of state repression with regard to the burgeoning labour movement. In the early 20th century, the focus of state activity shifted to the regulation of conflict as reflected in the ultimately unsuccessful attempt by the S wedish state to create a legal framework for collective bargaining after the general strike of 1909. The non-repressive nature of the pre-industrial regime and the weakness of liberalism allowed the S wedish labour movement to develop with comparatively little state repression (F ulcher, 1995: 13-14; 1991: 66-7). The non-repressive nature of the pre-industrial regime was a product of the geo-political isolation of S candinavia and the ‘political backwardness’ of S weden manifested in the dominance of a self-governing peasantry alongside a weak aristocracy and an undeveloped bourgeoisie. R epressive legislation was also prevented by the late industrialization and democratization of S weden and the weakness of liberalism. The liberals did not consider that anti-union reforms were appropriate in a political context in which universal franchise had not been achieved and, in 1905, the L iberal/SAP majority in the Riksdag prevented a raft of punitive legislation that would have resulted in imprisonment, or fines, for strikers. The weakness of liberalism also made it easier for socialists to take over the leadership of the labour movement. While the labour movement was led by liberals between the 1860s and 1880s, socialists had assumed the leadership of most unions by the 1890s.

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The Labour Movement as an Agent of its own Consolidation? The SAP was formed in 1889 by trade unionists with support from Danish socialists and constituted the first permanent national party organization. The party was led by H jalmar Brantling who, as an academic, gave a theoretical edge to a movement dominated by skilled workers and craftsmen. In 1898, the Party split into separate political (SAP ) and trade union (LO ) branches. The success of the S wedish labour movement in forging a distinctive social democratic settlement has been seen as a reflection of the strategic choices made within the labour movement that enabled it to build and develop organizational strength and subsequently translate this into political influence. In the first quarter of the 20th century, this involved rebuilding union organizational strength following the defeat of the 1909 general strike alongside the mobilization of political support for the SAP . This strategy successfully brought the majority of S wedish trade unions within the LO and enabled the SAP access to political power through involvement in a series of coalition governments. The weakness of liberalism meant that social democracy played a key role in the struggle for democratization. The Conservatives controlled parliament until 1918 when full universal franchise was achieved. There had been an expansion in the franchise in 1911 and this led to liberal and social democratic control of the lower house. This resulted in a decade of struggle between the lower and upper houses: the latter being controlled by the monarchy and the conservatives. In the context of enduring disputes over military mobilization in WWI and the threat of Bolshevism in nearby R ussia, the conservatives relented and a full franchise was achieved. This period had seen a massive increase in popular support for the SAP : by 1917 the SAP was the largest single party with 39% of the vote. The 1920s were politically unstable and were marked by a series of weak minority governments. In this context, the SAP failed to develop a coherent political programme. The party oscillated between revolution and reform and its commitment to ‘socialization’ resulted in the sustained hostility of bourgeois political parties. This, however, was to provide an important source of radical strength during the 1930s. Unlike the L abour Party in the UK, the SAP were not forced to compromise in coalitions with established bourgeois parties and the SAP was not in power when the impact of the Great R ecession created mass unemployment. The extent to which the strength of S wedish social democracy is related to the close organizational ties between the SAP and LO should not, however, be overstated. As Åmark (op cit: 68) notes, collaboration rested firmly on reformist foundations. The SAP developed a moderate line in order to maintain the support and collaboration of non-socialist trade unionists and liberals. This approach, however, created tensions within the S wedish labour movement between moderates and a range of syndicalist and communist opinion on the revolutionary left; particularly when the SAP abandoned the use of the strike as a political weapon. In the first decade of the 20th century, the influence of syndicalism was particularly marked in the Young Socialist Movement; reflecting opposition to the centralization of

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the labour movement and the development of collective agreements. The Y oung S ocialists formed the Swedish Workers’ Central Organization (SA C) which became a small but persistent rival of the LO . These tensions were heightened in 1911, when the SAP entered a coalition government with the L iberals. Between 1918 and the mid-1930s, there was serious political and industrial conflict within the S wedish labour movement. In the context of a war-time truce between the SAP and the Conservatives, the left were forced out of the Party at the 1916 Congress and in 1917 the L eft Party was formed. This was followed by the emergence of a series of communist-led organizations within the labour movement such as Union Opposition formed in 1917. The opposition built up support in sectors such as quarrying and construction and, in 1920, the SA C made up approximately oneeighth of the total LO membership. During the 1920s and 1930s, communists also emerged as active opponents of the labour movement’s moderate leadership. Communists gained brief control over the metalworkers and typographers unions in 1919 and the communist-led Committee for Union Unity made up about 10% of LO delegates at the 1926 and 1929 congresses. In the early 1930s, the intensity of communist opposition started to fade as communist-led strikes were defeated and communists were expelled from the movement following a LO counter-attack. A ccording to F ulcher (1995: 18), there were three main reasons why radicals failed to consolidate and extend their challenge within the S wedish labour movement. First, the escalation of conflict by employers, particularly the threat or practice of the lockout made unions increasingly dependent on the LO . S econd, the success of reformism in delivering electoral and constitutional reform undermined the attractiveness of radical and revolutionary alternatives to reformism. Third, the late industrialization of S weden blurred the demarcation between revolution and reform in the formative years of the labour movement and the early unity and centralization of the labour movement allowed the SAP -LO to withstand the challenge from the left. During the 1930s, social democracy moved towards a hegemonic position in S weden. In 1928, Per A lbin H ansson declared, in S orelian style, that the SAP was the ‘peoples home’: a move that accepted electoral reformism as the Party’s exclusive strategy. This strategy involved widening the electoral base of the Party and the development of a crisis strategy to reduce unemployment following pressure from the LO . In 1932, the SAP formed a minority government and attempted to draft a crisis policy and social welfare legislation. F ollowing opposition from conservatives and liberals, the Party forged an alliance with agricultural interests in parliament and formed the first farmer-worker political alliance. During the 1930s, the Party increased its share of the popular vote resulting in a general election victory in 1938. The key event of this period, however, was the Saltsjöbaden Agreement which centralized collective bargaining between the LO and the SAF in order to end chronic industrial conflict and provided a constitutional settlement in which the SAP were able to pursue economic planning and social legislation in parliament. This amounted to a historic compromise in which the SAP recognized the rights of private property in return for an acceptance of social democratic reforms. The

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SAP did not, however, abandon socialist ideology or the long-term objective of socialist transformation. The rationalization and centralization of industry was seen as a staging post en route to the socialization of production; whilst universal welfare was an important source of working class unity and power. Throughout the post-war period, however, conflict remained within the labour movement and on occasion came to the surface as cooperation and accommodation with capital by the SAP generated discontent in the LO whilst the on-going articulation of socialist ideology in both the SAP and LO alienated employers. There was, therefore, a complex interplay between labour movement agency and historical contingency that institutionalized a number of contradictions and tensions within the S wedish M odel (F ulcher, 1988, 1991, 1995). These contingencies included the ways in which labour movement unity was encouraged by entrenched employer hostility initially to unionization and later to legislative regulation in a way that encouraged employers to favour the institutionalization of self-regulating bi-partitism and the SAP to pursue a strategy of market-based economic growth. H ence, the emergence of a centralized employer’s organization was stimulated by the existence of a unified and centralized union movement and the consolidation of the SAF further encouraged the centralized unity of the LO . F ollowing the 1905 engineering industry agreement, employers accepted the inevitability of collective bargaining and this was followed in 1906 by the December Compromise between the LO and SAF in which employers recognized unions in return for union recognition of managerial prerogative over the hiring and firing of labour. The 1906 compromise was firmly on the terms of employers particularly as the unions relinquished any control over the hiring of non-union labour or strike breakers. H owever, the employer counter-attack following the 1906 agreement played a crucial role in the centralization of the LO which had little in the way of authority prior to 1906 and pushed unions to accept the demands of SAF -led employers for agreement under the threat of lockouts. In this context, unions were transformed into agents of employer power and, while this was temporarily reversed by the 1909 general strike, the basic features of the S wedish M odel had been established: the centralization of the union movement under employer pressure. E mployers forced the transition from ‘work materials’ to ‘industrial’ unionism. In 1908, metalworking employers refused to negotiate except with all the unions in the industry. R ather than suppress the unions, the employers used their centralized strength to extend collective bargaining, organize labour markets and reorganize unions into organizational units that matched those of the employers (F ulcher, 1995: 12-3). O n balance, the organizational strength and unity of the S wedish labour movement was undoubtedly central to the forging of the historical compromise of 1938, but this was nonetheless a compromise with a powerful and unified opponent in the form of S wedish industrial capital. During the 1950s and 1960s, the S wedish M odel was consolidated and, in favourable economic circumstances, the tensions and contradictions of the M odel were suppressed.

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Democratic Socialism or Technocratic Corporatism? The debate on the nature of the S wedish M odel was conducted between ‘labour movement theorists’ and ‘corporatist theorists’ (see F ulcher, 1987 for an elaboration of this debate). A dvocates of the former position (E sping-A ndersen, 1985; H iggins and A pple, 1983; H immelstrand et al., 1981; Tilton, 1991; S tephens, 1986) presented the S wedish M odel as a staging post on the journey towards democratic socialism that reflected the organizational strength and unity of the S wedish labour movement. A dvocates of the latter position (Przeworski, 1985; Crouch, 1979; L ehmbruch, 1982; S chmitter, 1974; Panitch, 1980) focussed on the way in which corporatism involved the abandonment of socialist goals in favour of cooperation with employers and the state in the technocratic management of capitalism through extra parliamentary mechanisms of interest mediation. In M arxist variants of this approach, corporatism involved the integration of the labour movement within the capitalist state as a mechanism of demobilization and control that negated the power of labour in the full employment context of the post war period. This strategy was particularly effective where strong social democratic governments were in power, as these administrations had a power base in the working class and could overcome the objection that corporatist institutions lacked parliamentary legitimacy (Panitch, 1981; Jessop, 1978). With hindsight it is easy to see the source of this divergent interpretation of the S wedish model. L abour movement theorists failed to puncture the discursive hegemony of social democratic ideology in S weden and, therefore, failed to grasp the technocratic foundations of the S wedish M odel. O n the other hand, this should not be taken to imply that Swedish workers did not benefit from the operation of the S wedish model in terms of welfare, income and security. R ather both approaches minimized the contradictions underpinning a model of technocratic corporatism legitimated through a discourse of democratic socialism. This can be traced through an exploration of the consolidation of the S wedish M odel in the 1950s and 1960s, the radicalization of the M odel in the 1970s and ultimately the crisis of the M odel in the 1980s. During the 1940s, the SAP introduced an extensive programme of welfare reform and economic expansion. This resulted in the increasingly serious problems of inflation and balance of payment crises. In 1948, in the context of these pressures and a disappointing electoral performance, the SAP attempted to impose wage ceilings to control inflation. The LO resisted and, under the leadership of Gösta R ehn, successfully persuaded the SAP to introduce an ‘active labour market strategy’ in its place. S weden thus avoided the endless stop-go cycles and political paralysis of UK governments following the introduction of incomes policies. The 1950s, however, were a period of stagnation in SAP support and the Party was once again forced to seek the support of agricultural interests in parliament. This resulted in a toned down welfare programme and a focus on educational reform. The agrarian interest was, however, declining and there was an increasingly intense struggle between the parties for the support of the white-

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collar middle class. The SAP was also coming under pressure from the LO for greater state involvement in industrial restructuring, saving and investment. The SAP successfully brought these concerns together with the introduction of the Allmän tilläggspension (A TP – S upplementary Pension S cheme) which equalized pension rights across all classes of workers and accumulated vast savings within collective control which could be used for public investment. This resulted in an increased level of ideological polarization as the bourgeois parties attacked the A TP as ‘creeping socialism’. These parties, however, offered no alternatives and the result was a steady increase in white-collar support for the SAP . In 1960, the SAP was returned to power with a de facto majority. The 1960s marked the high point of social democratic hegemony. The radicalization of the SAP was based on pressure from the LO and expanding electoral support and the main components of the ‘S wedish M odel’ were consolidated: the R ehn-M eidner Programme of economic management and a universalistic welfare state. Developed by Gøsta R ehn and R udolf M eidner, the R ehn-M eidner Programme was an attempt to reconcile full employment and low inflation and comprised three main policy approaches. First, a solidaristic wages policy that established equal pay for comparable work across industries and sectors. The level was determined regardless of profitability or productivity in particular firms and sectors at a level determined by the export sector and hence constrained by international competition. S econd, an active labour market policy designed to facilitate the re-training and mobility of those workers rendered unemployed by the solidaristic wages policy. Third, a restrictive fiscal and monetary policy to curb inflation and high profits. The underlying rationale for the programme was thus to shift resources to the most efficient areas of the economy with the minimal opposition of workers expelled from inefficient firms. The dominance of the SAP provided the S wedish labour movement with unparalleled political power resulting in both social democratic hegemony throughout S wedish society and an institutional architecture comprising large, encompassing unions and corporatist policy making (H enrekson et al., 1993: 51-2). The S wedish welfare state focussed on the delivery of high-quality services such as education, health and housing rather than fiscal transfers. The Swedish Model delivered comparatively high levels of equality across a range of indices: including per capita employment, ratio of male to female earnings, progressive taxation, generous public pensions, high quality public services, relative absence of poverty and overall income equality (Glyn, 1995: 16). The S olidarity Wages Policy developed by the LO had little impact on differentials during the 1950s and employers benefitted from a marked modernization of manufacturing industry and increasing levels of profitability. The egalitarian rhetoric associated with the solidaristic wages policy can obscure its role as an instrument of wage restraint and an important source of tension within the S wedish M odel (F ulcher, 1991: 204-6; Kjellberg, 1992: 96-7). The logic of the strategy was to facilitate the modernization of S wedish industry without the need for the direct intervention of the state. In this context, the policy became

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beset by contradictory pressures particularly when allied with the concern of the LO to improve the position of low paid workers. Consequently, the main impact of the policy during the 1960s was the compression of wage differentials. H owever, in the context of the uneven nature of the expansion and contraction of S wedish companies, and the impact of local labour market strategies and the increasing prevalence of unofficial strikes, some groups of workers were able to achieve significant levels of ‘wage drift’. This resulted in increasing levels of pay inequality between different groups of workers and an increasingly serious squeeze of company profits that undermined the international competitiveness of the Swedish economy. The policy rested on the ratio of profits to wages and, in this context, the pursuit of egalitarian goals either threatened the competitiveness of S wedish industry or imposed constraints on those workers with the most leverage thus eroding the legitimacy of the policy amongst rank-and-file union members. This erosion of legitimacy was compounded by the opposition of workers to rationalization in both contracting and expanding sectors that was manifested in increasing levels of unemployment and the fragmentation and intensification of the labour process. Ultimately, unemployment was only contained through the expansion of the public sector and the expansion of white-collar occupations and employment. H owever, this undermined the policy further through the ways in which it altered the institutional infrastructure of the S wedish collective bargaining system through the increasing involvement of the state and the increasing dominance of non-LO white-collar and professional trade unions in the bargaining process. The Radicalization and Limits of the Swedish Model In 1968, the SAP reached a high point of popular support with 50.1% of the popular vote. During the 1970s, however, the social democratic hegemony began to decline. Tensions started to develop within the labour movement as it became increasingly apparent that the M odel had failed to live up to its egalitarian ideals and that S wedish workers experienced an increasing powerlessness in the workplace (F ulcher, 1987: 244-5). There was also a reaction against the increasingly centralized authority within the labour movement. The result was the re-emergence of conflict. In 1969, there were extensive ‘wild cat’ strikes in the mining sector followed by disputes involving dockworkers in 1972 and forestry workers in 1975. The disputes focussed on employment insecurity, demands for greater industrial and labour movement democracy and the reform of labour law (Fulcher, 1991: 205-7, 270-1). The emerging conflicts radicalized the leadership of the SAP -LO , but led ultimately to a serious undermining of the S wedish M odel. The model was undermined as the system of centralized bargaining that had contained wages during the 1950s and 1960s was transformed into a system for the equalization of wages and as the system of bi-partite bargaining that underpinned the S wedish M odel was undermined by the introduction of legislative reform that

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undermined the class compromise underpinning the 1906 and 1938 agreements. The period also witnessed the emergence of the LO -inspired concept of ‘wageearner funds’. The latter reform was bitterly opposed by employers and bourgeois parties and implemented in a seriously diluted form by the SAP government in 1982. The unpopularity of the wage-earner fund proposals contributed to the defeat of the SAP in the 1976 election and ultimately to a SAF counter-attack that was to challenge the fundamentals of social democratic hegemony that had dominated S wedish state and society for almost 50 years. The controversy around these issues damaged irrevocably the institutional and cultural fabric of centralized corporatism: The 1970s showed that there was a contradiction at the heart of the social democratic model. The social democrats had worked out a modus vivendi with capital that was mutually beneficial but ultimately unstable; the idea of a socialist transformation of society persisted, while cooperation with industry generated a labour revolt that forced the government to radicalize its policies in ways that destroyed the very modus vivendi which had been established (F ulcher, 1995: 21).

The growing instability of the S wedish M odel was due to a number of developments that heightened the contradictory tensions within the centralized system of collective bargaining. These included important changes in the industrial and social structure resulting in the growth of white-collar trade unionism, the impact of the expansion of women’s employment and the more general impact of the growth of new social movements such as feminism and the green movement and the changing consciousness of S wedish workers that pushed the SAP -LO into a series of radical policies around industrial democracy, capital formation and investment and work re-design. The growing importance of the white-collar union confederations was a particularly important source of tension and instability within the S wedish model of centralized collective bargaining (Kjellberg, 1992: 102-3). The growing importance of TCO and SA CO was a result of important changes in the occupational structure and the expansion of the welfare state. Prior to the 1960s, TCO and SA CO had become increasingly important, although subordinate, participants in collective bargaining. The white-collar confederations were non-socialist organizations and were often hostile to LO -SAP policy objectives and, as a result, the S wedish labour movement became increasingly subject to sectionalism. This reflected the way in which public sector workers faced the state as employer; a situation that was exacerbated after 1965 when public sector workers gained the right to strike. During the 1960s, the tensions became more acute resulting in large-scale strikes and lockouts particularly in the public sector. The growing importance of the white-collar unions resulted in a decline in the pattern making dominance of the LO in the collective bargaining process and the increasing importance of cross federation alliances in relation to both wage bargaining and in response to state

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restructuring. This included the emergence of LO -TCO alliance in the area of ‘production politics’ during the 1970s that campaigned for legislation on workers’ rights and codetermination. The growing importance of non-LO white collar unions was linked to the increasing labour market participation of women in the post-war period, and indeed, social conflict and union mobilization around gender inequality provided another source of instability within the S wedish M odel (Jenson and M ahon, 1993). The S wedish welfare state was based on the recruitment of women to part-time service jobs and a partial transformation of reproductive relations away from the family into negotiated wage-labour mode. In this context, there was a marked increase in the labour market participation of women in the post-war period which increased from 35.1% in 1950, 59.4% in 1970 to 80.5% in 1989 (Korpi and S tern, 2003). During the same period, there was a marked equalization in the levels of pay awarded to men and women with women achieving 89.9% of male income by 1981 in comparison with 69.5% in the UK (Korpi and S tern, ibid). There is also a high level of unionization amongst women workers; including part-time women workers which stands at over 80% amongst both manual and white collar workers. There remained, however, high levels of sexual segregation generated by the concentration of women in the expanding public services in a way that reinforced sexual stereotyping and the enduring importance of traditional family values (R uggie, 1988: 182). The high level of sexual segregation in S weden has also been associated with the dominance of class-based political organizations that tended to achieve reforms for women on terms favourable to men (Widerberg, 1991). The S wedish model of post-war development was underpinned by a preference for women workers over immigrant labour as a means of overcoming labour shortages. Women, therefore, benefitted from the egalitarian reforms that were designed to benefit all workers but the specific interests of women, such as the expansion of childcare, were not pursued with any enthusiasm until this was made necessary by the labour shortages of the 1960s (R uggie, op cit: 174-76). In this context, there was an increasing difference in the forms of organization, participation and activism of women trade unionists in LO in comparison to the white-collar unions. While more women are members of TCO and SA CO than LO , it was LO with its links to the SAP that pursued more radical gender policies around the issue of equal pay (R uggie, ibid: 178) and this became an important source of tension within the non-LO unions. There were, however, important initiatives in TCO affiliated unions such as Svenska Industrijänstemannaförbundet (SIF – the Technical and Clerical E mployees Union) such as the negotiation of a proactive jämställdbet contract that created divisions in these unions and created gendered cleavages and alliances between LO and TCO unions and between the public and private sectors (Jenson and M ahon, op cit: 95-6). The emergence of new social movements also created tension within the S wedish M odel around the contentious issue of nuclear power. The development of nuclear power was a central component of the SAP -LO full employment growth strategy. The policy cost the SAP the support of an increasingly important ‘green movement’ as the

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Party was unable to reconcile demands for decentralization and environmental security with the goals of growth and efficiency (Korpi, 1978: 330-1). The S wedish model was further undermined by the experience and consciousness of ordinary S wedish workers. Throughout the 1960s and 1970 there was a growing dissatisfaction on the issues of both wage levels and work pressure particularly in the metalworking sector (Korpi, 1978: 109-41). In contrast to the UK, S wedish manual workers were more willing and able to constrain managerial prerogative in a context of low unemployment and tight labour markets (S case, 1977: 144-59). Indeed, the organizing dynamic of the labour movement resulted in a more critical view of inequality amongst S wedish workers (S case, ibid: 118-43). H owever, the radical vision of labour movement leaders was constantly undermined by the de-radicalizing impact of the S olidarity Wage Policy that maintained or even widened wage differentials. The coexistence of egalitarian values and sustained inequalities provided the context for the legislative and organizational reforms of the 1970s. O rganizational reforms included experiments in work reorganization and job redesign such as those developed at Volvo and S aab. The context for these reforms was managerial concerns over absenteeism and labour turnover and an attempt to compensate core workers for wage restraints imposed by the S olidarity Wage Policy. The experiments were implemented on the basis of consultation with unions and involved the redesign of work through the introduction of semiautonomous workgroups (Berggren, 1990; A uer and R iegler, 1990). The most important legal reform was the Medbestämmandelagen (M BL ) or Worker Codetermination A ct of 1976 which provided unions with the legal right to receive information and engage in consultation and negotiation over personnel and operational issues. The A ct, therefore, repudiated a key aspect of the 1938 Basic Agreement on managerial prerogative. The A ct was resisted by private sector employers until 1982 when the ‘Development A greement’ on codetermination (UVA ) was concluded between SAF and LO /PTK after six years of negotiation (S chiller, 1988a: 101-25). A s S chiller (ibid, 1988b) noted, this represented a victory for the SAF and a maintenance of the status quo as the agreement stressed the collective endeavour to improve efficiency, profitability and competitiveness of enterprises rather than specific rights of codetermination. The proposal to develop wage-earner funds was the most radical proposal to emerge in the 1970s and was conceived as a radical plan to democratize capital ownership. The proposals were drafted by R udolf M eidner and accepted by the LO Congress in 1976. The proposals were eventually legislated in 1982, but in a highly diluted form that reflected growing policy differences between the LO and SAP and the entrenched opposition of S wedish employers. The proposals were unpopular even amongst sections of the LO’S own rank-and-file and this unpopularity contributed to the defeat of the SAP in the 1976 election. In the end, the original focus on equality shifted to a focus on capital formation, social security finances and sustained full employment and industrial democracy became an instrument of economic policy rather than an extension of social welfare (E sping-A ndersen, 1992: 59). A s Pontusson (1984: 88-92) has argued, the wage-

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earner proposals highlighted the organizational confidence of the Swedish labour movement to consider radical solutions to the crises and tensions affecting S wedish corporatism. Ultimately, however, the S wedish labour movement remained trapped within the contradictions of corporatism and the result was restraint rather than mobilization. This episode set the scene for the S wedish labour movement’s long retreat from radicalism and from the late 1970s the focus shifted to concerns over job security and the protection of past gains (Peterson, 1987). Neoliberal Restructuring and the Crisis The crisis of the S wedish M odel developed in the context of a combination of external shocks and internal tensions and pressures. The crisis was reflected in the deteriorating performance of the S wedish economy. Between the 1970s and the mid-1990s, the S wedish economy was marked by declining investment and growth and a deteriorating level of manufacturing productivity (A uer and R iegler, 1994; Glyn, 1995). Between 1970 and 1991, S weden slipped from third to fourteenth place with a GDP per capita 6% below the OE CD average (Weiss, 1998: 89). In the past decade, the performance of the S wedish economy has improved substantially with levels of growth, productivity and F DI well above the E U average (A iginger, 2005). The extent to which S wedish social democracy has withstood the extended period of neo-liberal restructuring depends on how the crisis of the Swedish model is understood. One perspective highlights significant continuities in the importance of centralized bargaining and labour movement initiative that have gone a long way to absorb the shocks of intensified global competition (R ehn and Viklund, 1990). H owever, there is much to be said for the argument that deep and long-standing contradictions in the S wedish model failed to withstand the recessionary and increasingly competitive environment of the 1970s and 1980s, and, while there was a degree of continuity with respect to the importance of centralized bargaining, there has nonetheless been a shift towards more crisis-ridden and contradictory forms of corporatism (F ulcher, 1991: 204-22; Kjellberg, 1992: 103-7). The crisis of the S wedish model can be understood in terms of how the internal contradictions of the S wedish F ordist settlement developed synchronously with neo-liberal globalization and its contradictions (R yner, 1999: 48-9). The internal contradictions of the model emerged during the 1970s as a crisis of representation and legitimation within the particular version of the ‘politics of productivity’ (M aier, 1977) that had developed in post-war S weden. The resulting social policy reforms were a response to this crisis; but were ultimately inconsistent with changing economic conditions and this resulted in an increasingly serious crisis of accumulation and regulation. The counter-mobilization of the SAF was a response to this crisis of government and the resulting hyperliberal project combined a challenge to social democratic hegemony and an ‘exit’ from the centralized corporatist institutions of the S wedish M odel. This involved a shift in the internal

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balance of power within the SAF . S mall entrepreneurs had long-standing grievances with the S wedish M odel and their increasing activism, alongside the SAF setbacks of the 1970s, served to politicize the Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken/Wallenberg ‘sphere’ of interlocking directorships against the Handelsbank sphere that actively supported the S wedish M odel (R yner, op cit: 58). F ollowing the appointment of Curt N ikolin as executive director of the SAF in 1978, the organization has pursued an explicitly hyperliberal strategic orientation. This included total nonaccommodation to the public commission established to work out a compromise on wage-earner funds resulting in an abandonment of the proposals and a gradual withdrawal from corporatist forms of bargaining culminating in a total unilateral exit by 1992. S wedish capital thus pursued a strategy premised on a less mediated form of representation and on reducing state autonomy in relation to the structural power of capital (R yner, op cit: 59; A hrne and Clement, 1994). In addition, the SAF increasingly attempted to challenge social democratic hegemony and redirect popular discourse in a market-friendly direction. In this context, the SAF has succeeded in making neo-liberal ideas popular in middle class circles and this has resulted in the increasing electoral success of the Moderaterna (neo-conservative party) and the rightward shift of the liberal Folkpartiet. In this context, SAP policy shifted to a strategy of ‘compensatory neoliberalism’ wedded to the norms of ‘new constitutionalism’ (Gill, 1992) and applied through the S wedish Central Bank and the M inistry of F inance during the 1980s. The politics internal to the S wedish labour movement provide a clue as to why compensatory neo-liberalism developed as the dominant response of the SAP . The leaders and researchers of the LO had a long-standing concern with regard to the fragility of the institutions linking distribution with macro-economic stability and growth and had used their influence within the SAP in an attempt to encourage an increase in savings and investments in order to pre-empt the negative impact of a global economic downturn (LO , 1961, cited in M artin, 1984). H owever, as R yner (op cit: 57) notes, the measures intended to serve an integrative function between accumulation and expanded social consumption in the 1970s were never implemented as a coherent strategy for capital formation and industrial policy. The LO and SAP failed to build a hegemonic project around collective capital formation as it implied a violation of the terms of the 1938 Basic Agreement. While capital formation politics was popular in some sections of the LO , the LO failed to convince the rest of the social democratic movement that pursuing the idea of wage-earner funds was worth the electoral risk; particularly amongst the cadres in the municipal and social welfare sectors. Between 1982 and 1990, the SAP pursued a ‘third way’ policy as part of an attempt to return to traditional social democratic politics after the radicalism of the 1970s. The ‘third way’ was specific to the Swedish context and it is important for it to be differentiated from the broader political strategy of neoliberal accommodation developed in the 1990s (cf. Åmark, 1992: 88 and Giddens, 1998). The ‘third way’ was an alternative to both Keynesian expansionism and neo-liberal restraint and involved a major devaluation of the S wedish currency

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in an attempt to stimulate S wedish export industries and increase international competitiveness of the S wedish economy. In the context of the ‘R eagan boom’, the strategy succeeded initially in simultaneously achieving full employment, increasing competitiveness and profitability and macro-economic stability. The strategy ultimately failed, however, as long-term growth in GDP and productivity failed to materialize and the implicit incomes policy failed. Increasing profitability and investment failed to increase GDP and productivity owing to the increasing tendency for firms in dynamic sectors of the Swedish economy to locate high value-adding activities in continental Europe. This change in the territorial fix of S wedish productive capital undermined further the conditions presupposed by the R ehn-M eidner M odel through the disarticulation of domestic wages and profits, investment and productivity growth and an increasing territorial noncorrespondence between capital accumulation and state regulation. A longside continentalization, Swedish companies pursued a flexible, de-centralizing and dualistic approach to wage bargaining. O n the union side, these developments made the resurrection of centralized coordinated bargaining increasingly difficult and this undermined union cohesion and enabled the SAF to decentralize bargaining to an increasingly greater extent. The ability of unions to secure compensation for the collapse of centralized bargaining through successful deals at the microlevel ultimately undermined the SAP government’s incomes policy and resulted in increasing tension and conflict between LO/TCO and the SAP-led Ministry of F inance. The ‘third way’ ultimately failed as the S wedish economy entered serious economic crisis between 1990 and 1993. The failure of the ‘third way’ in S weden was also a result of important changes in ideology and agency within S wedish social democracy as manifested in the orientation and outlook of social democratic state managers (R yner, 1999: 62). In 1985, the government deregulated capital and money markets and in 1989 there was a formal deregulation of foreign exchange markets. In 1990, the government decided to apply for membership of the E uropean Union and formally abandoned its commitment to full employment. The government introduced a ‘norms-based’ monetary policy to contain inflation by exerting market discipline on collective actors such as unions and social service agencies in wage and budget bargaining. The M inistry of F inance and the Central Bank thus sought to amplify the territorial non-correspondence between global financial markets and collective and state bargaining for disciplinary purposes and thereby construct a S wedish variant of the ‘new constitutionalism’ (R yner, ibid: 62). The result was the so-called ‘War of the R oses’ between the M inistry of F inance and the unions and social service cadres. F ollowing the reforms of 1985, there was a qualitative change in the nature of the tension between the SAP government and the unions. Prior to 1985, conflict had arisen in the context of the ambiguities and tensions of the R ehn-M eidner M odel. A fter 1985, however: The conflict was no longer in regulation but of regulation. LO and TCO did not consent to their marginalization and continued to demand support for solidaristic

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The Crisis of Social Democratic Trade Unionism in Western Europe wage policy and did not heed to ‘moral suasion’ of incomes policy since there no longer was a coherent, common moral framework (R yner, 1999: 63; italics in original).

Nevertheless, the ‘third way’ continued to be presented to the rank-and-file SAP and LO members as a reformist socialist response to the crisis that stood in opposition to neo-liberalism. M oreover, the policy changes were not subject to debate or approval at either Party congress or within the electoral arena. The SAP government thus generated a legitimation crisis both within the labour movement and in broader civil society. In 1991, in the context of a wage freeze and a temporary ban on strikes, support for the SAP fell to an all time low. The Party was subjected to a humiliating electoral defeat and was replaced by a radical bourgeois government led by Carl Bildt. The election was immediately followed by an explicitly anti-social democratic agenda which included liberalization, privatization and the ending of state subsidies for trade union activities. This brief period of right-wing radicalism came to an end when the bourgeois government was forced into cooperation with the SAP in the face of an intensifying economic crisis. The crisis resulted in S weden leaving the ERM after the government unsuccessfully attempted to maintain the fixed exchange rate at tremendous cost. The SAP returned to power in 1994 and again in 1998 and 2002. Centralized sectoral bargaining was reintroduced in 1997 in a development that highlighted the enduring strength of S wedish trade unions (Bieler, 2004; R yner, 2002). The reforms of the 1980s resulted in S weden becoming increasingly integrated into the global economy through transnationalization and liberalization. O utward F DI increased from US $14136 million in 1990 to US $39481 million in 2000 (L uif, 1996: 208; UN , 2001: 191). Inward F DI increased from US $2328 million in 1990 to US $21449 million 2000 (L uif, op cit: 208; UN , op cit: 191). The S wedish economy performed well in the decade following 1995 and S weden along with Denmark and F inland achieved an average growth rate of 2.9% compared to an average of 1.6% in Germany, F rance and Italy and an average productivity increase of 2.4% compared to 0.5% in Germany, F rance and Italy. This was in a context of comparatively high levels of spending on education and a level of R & D that was double the average level in Germany, F rance and Italy (A iginger, 2005). In this context, the S wedish model has been generalized into the ‘N ordic M odel’ that combines flexible labour markets with universal welfare and income security – the concept of ‘flexicurity’ (flexibility plus security) originated in Sweden and has subsequently been extended into F inland and Denmark (Giddens, 2007: 12). F lexicurity has involved the reform of labour markets and education and training in order to prioritize employability. The unemployed are guaranteed a measure of security in return for a commitment to retrain and accept alternative employment in growing and dynamic sectors. In comparative terms, S weden remains a highly egalitarian society with low levels of economic inequality and high levels of state expenditure on education

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and health. While public expenditure has fallen since the 1980s, expenditure on welfare has changed only at the margins largely preserving the structure of existing programmes (Pierson, 1996: 171-2). O nly the taxation system has undergone fundamental change in the period of restructuring since the 1980s with a shift towards lower rates of income tax. The active labour market policy has contributed to a comparatively high ratio of spending on training and placements as opposed to spending on unemployment benefits (70:30 compared to 10:90 in USA ), although commentators stress the high reliance on placements within the programme and question the extent to which it has contributed to economic growth or employment (H enrekson et al., 1993; Weiss, op cit: 88). There is, however, evidence of a growing polarization and marginalization in S wedish society as evidenced by rising unemployment, growing income differentials and growing numbers of workers on temporary contracts (L indberg, 1999). There has also been an increase in poverty particularly amongst young people and migrants and there has been a marked increase in ethnic segregation in large urban areas such as S tockholm, Gothenburg and M almö (Bieler and L inberg, 2008). In the 2006 elections, the SAP lost to the centre right Alliance for Sweden receiving the lowest share of the vote (34.99%) since the introduction of universal suffrage. There was a significant decline in support for the Party amongst pensioners (down 10% since 2002) and members of the LO (down 5% since 2002). In essence, there was a shift in the ideological and policy orientation of the SAP leadership in which a social democratic discourse was transformed into a neo-classical-utilitarian discourse. The explanation for this change is partly to be found in the involvement of S wedish state managers in transnational elite forums such as the BIS and IMF . H owever, as R yner (op cit: 66-7) notes, the shift was also part of a diachronic logic within the S wedish M odel itself. There is an elective affinity between the Rehn-Meidner Model and monetarism based on restrictive macro-economic policy and there is, therefore, an important bridge between the two discourses. In this context, the theoretical-political orientation of SAP leaders shifted from reformist M arxism to technocratic reformism to utilitarian individualism marked by a shift from strategic to technocratic conceptions of regulation. In the context of this epistemic shift, the crisis of the 1970s came to be seen not as a crisis of capitalism but a validation of monetarism. After the Divorce? Continuity and Change in Union Orientation There is a remarkable level of continuity with regard to trade union orientation in S weden. In the political sphere, while the LO and SAP have formally separated, links between the two organizations remain and LO representatives continue to have influence SAP candidates and policy. There is little evidence of the LO attempting to forge links with other political parties such as the Greens or the L eft Party. In the industrial sphere, there are important continuities with the S wedish M odel in terms of centralized sectoral bargaining, low levels of industrial unrest

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and high levels of union density. There are, however, important divisions emerging within and between unions on the issues of E uropean integration and globalization. There is little evidence of S wedish unions reorienting around a ‘social movement’ identity and a marked level of continuity with the forms of ‘political unionism’ associated with the social democratic tradition in S weden. We will explore each of these areas in more detail. Political Orientations The SAP and LO were formally divorced in 1987 when the party conference decided to end the system of collective membership. The relationship had become increasingly fraught during the 1970s and early 1980s as a marked radicalization of LO coincided with the SAP facing the LO as a labour market protagonist in its role as employer. The growth of non-LO unions reduced the ability of the LO to deliver wage restraint and the LO wage-earner fund proposals lost the SAP the 1976 election. By the time of the divorce, leaders of both wings of the party had become convinced of the need for a looser institutional relationship (A ylott, 2003). The LO came to recognize that its exclusive relationship with a single political party, and at that time a deeply unpopular governing party, was increasingly unhelpful in the context of an increasing competitive market for union members. The SAP was becoming increasingly concerned about the ‘psychological disadvantages’ associated with an essentially passive membership and was keen to pre-empt legislation on the issue that was being sought by a coalition of the bourgeois parties and the Communist Left Party. Moreover, the SAP had become financially less reliant on trade union sponsors following the introduction of state funding for political parties in 1965. The proportion of SAP funding from trade union sources declined from around 90% in 1945 to approximately 5% in 1998 (A ylott, op cit: 373). L evels of membership fell dramatically following the abandonment of collective membership from a peak of 1.24 million in 1983 to 164,000 in 1999. It has been argued that the relationship between the two wings of the S wedish labour movement has moved from a high to a low level of integration (S undberg, 2001: 175-9); from a ‘integration model’ in which the interests and organizational priorities of the LO and SAP were almost identical to a ‘competition/rivalry model’ in which the two wings of the movement compete as vehicles of representation (Thomas, 2001: 281-4). H owever, this may overstate the degree of separation. A s A ylott (op cit: 374) notes, it is widely understood that LO objections prevented the SAP entering into a coalition with the liberals following the 1994 election. M ore striking, was the way the SAP government was forced to abandon its planned reform of labour market legislation in 1994 following the furious reaction of the LO that included the threat to withhold party funding and the organization of rival M ay Day rallies. In a survey of local SAP -LO organizational linkages, A ylott (ibid: 378-83) notes that while there has been a dramatic decline in membership levels, this is not reflected in the number of units affiliated to party branches or a decline in party

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activity measured in terms of the number of meetings and the numbers that attend them. O r to state this more directly, it is the passive members that have left. SAP -LO connections continue to exist in three main forms: the organizational affiliation of union sections, the affiliation of union clubs and the affiliation of workplace associations. H owever, these groups have declined at the local level both in absolute terms and as a proportion of the units affiliating to branches thus weakening the presence of blue collar trade unionism within the SAP . In most of S weden, the legendary ‘s-representatives’ whose function was to disseminate social democratic propaganda within the workplace have died out (Gidlund: op cit: 119). A new generation of well-educated, white-collar party members has changed the character of the SAP and undermined the system of close personal ties between the SAP and blue collar trade unionism. H owever, the LO unions continue to wield influence within the SAP principally through the enduring importance of trade union committees (facklig utskott) and their ability to submit motions to the general assembly and nominate candidates for internal elections. The SAP continues to value the funding that it continues to receive from LO sources and, to the extent that the level of funding is now allocated annually on the basis of negotiations at the national, regional and branch level, the influence of the LO unions may have actually increased. The dominant party-union nexus has thus been weakened but its terminal decline has been over-stated. Industrial Orientations There is also evidence of increasing divisions within the LO and between the LO , TCO and SA CO . A ccording to Bieler (1999, 2003, 2006) divisions between unions organizing in the domestic production sectors and transnational production sectors emerged on the issue of E U membership and then subsequently on the issue of EM U and the E uropean single currency. Throughout most of post-war period, SAP and LO were opposed to membership of the E U on the grounds that it would threaten the sovereignty and neutrality of the S wedish state and the integrity of the S wedish M odel of full employment and generous state welfare. In 1990, in the context of a severe crisis, the SAP reversed its position and initiated the process of S wedish accession. N egotiations and a ‘yes’ vote in a referendum were completed in 1994 and S weden acceded to E U membership on January 1st, 1995. While unions organizing in the domestic sector continued to adhere to the traditional SAP -LO position, unions in the transnational sector began to articulate the argument that E U membership was the only strategy through which to regain control over transnational capital and international financial markets (Bieler, 1999). The subsequent debate on EM U highlighted the deepening of this division as transnational sector unions not only continued to support deepening E uropean integration but also started to accept neo-liberal concepts and orientations (Bieler, 2003, 2006). There are also divisions between unions organizing in the domestic and transnational sectors and between unions organizing ‘core’ and marginalized workers on the issue of how trade unions should respond to the pressures and

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dynamics of globalization on the S wedish M odel (Bieler and L indberg, 2008). In this context, it is possible to discern an important division between ‘defend and restore camp’ and a ‘modernize and adapt’ camp with divergent emphases on the national and international arena respectively. In recent years, levels of Industrial action in S weden have remained low in comparison with other E U states. There were only three recorded strikes between 2000 and 2004 with an average of 34 days working days lost per 1000 workers in comparison to F rance (92), UK (31) and Germany (4) (E U25 average 41). There have been exceptions where negotiations over new pay agreements have broken down such as the dispute between Kommunal and city and municipal employers in 2003 and the dispute between the Transport Workers Union and SAS in the A viation S ector in 2004 (EIRO , 2007). Trade union density has declined but remains comparatively high with coverage of 77% in 2004 compared with 83% in 1995. This compares to levels of density in F rance (8%), Germany (18%) and UK (29%) in 2004 (E U25 average 25%). S ectoral level bargaining remains dominant with low levels of state intervention. Collective bargaining coverage also remains very high at 92% compared with Germany (65%), UK (35%) and F rance (90%) (E U25 average 66%) (Van Gyes et al., 2007). Social Movement Unionism? The extent to which social movement unionism is emerging in S weden is a complex issue owing to the tradition of horizontal institutional linkages between ‘folk movements’, unions and the SAP . This has been described as a founding movement tradition that has died in the Party but lives on in the unions (L indhagen, 1972: 185) or alternatively as ‘political unionism’ (H iggins, 1985, 1996) or ‘movement socialism’ (Dahlkvist, 1999). In general, there is evidence that the increasingly elderly ‘folk movement generation’ is more inclined to belong to parties, cooperatives and associations that individuals under 55 and far more likely than individuals under 25 (Vogel et al., 2003: 58-71). Vandenberg (2006) highlights the example of the well-publicized 1994 dispute between US retail giant Toys ‘R’ Us and the Commercial Workers Union Handels over the refusal of the company to employ workers on collective contracts at its stores in S tockholm, Gothenburg and M almö. The union launched a strike and organized a consumer boycott and sympathetic secondary action that prevented the stores receiving deliveries, advertising, financial services and even repairs. In the context of an international boycott, and a run on the companies shares on the US stock market, the company backed down and signed a collective contract with the union. Vandenberg (ibid: 184) suggests that the dispute can perhaps be described most accurately as a form of ‘political unionism’ that exploited strong vertical linkages between the relatively young and inexperienced workers at Toys ‘R’ Us with regional and national union organizers and horizontal linkages between workers and consumers. The linkages rested on a defence of social democratic values against the values of A nglo-A merican individualism. In this context, social

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movement unionism is a product of the enduring hegemony of social democratic values and the enduring legacy of the centralized decentralization of the S wedish labour movement. In the case of S weden, the development of social movement unionism has not emerged as part of a crisis of social democratic trade unionism but as an enduring legacy of its institutional and ideological development. There is little evidence that S wedish trade unions are developing alliances with other social movements (Bieler and L inberg, 2008). In general, cooperation is seen as a threat to internal unity and external effectiveness with regard to bargaining with employers and the state. In the transnational sector, cooperation with other social movement is even more problematic owing to acceptance of many aspects of neo-liberalism and the tendency to perceive globalization in a positive light. Class Compromise or Corporatist Incorporation? In S weden, social democratic trade unionism developed on the basis of strong organizational ties between SAP and LO . The S wedish labour movement attempted to construct and maintain a broad and inclusive cross-class support for social democracy through the ideological construction of the ‘people’s home’. In this way, the labour movement was able to reconcile involvement in parliamentary politics and institutional collective bargaining with a long-term commitment to socialist transformation. The S wedish M odel constructed by the SAP -LO did indeed result in important advances for S wedish workers in terms of rising living standards, solidaristic wage bargaining and exceptionally high levels of universal welfare. The enduring organizational and institutional autonomy of the labour movement in the post-war period highlights the limits of the incorporation argument; particularly given the radical policies on codetermination and wageearner funds that were developed as late as the 1970s. Y et if it were a compromise, the terms of the deal were decidedly in capital’s favour. In the context of the long post-war boom the LO could be rewarded generously for its restraint. Ultimately the Model could not endure the external shocks of intensified global competition and internal tensions premised on the increasingly obvious mismatch between social democratic ideology and technocratic and managerialist practice. The ‘path dependency’ initiated by the close institutional linkages between LO and SAP and the policy decisions of SAP and bourgeois governments have combined to initiate a new model of social democratic growth and development for the neo-liberal era in the form of the N ordic M odel. The important continuities between the ‘S wedish’ and ‘N ordic’ M odels highlights an enduring truism that social democracy may indeed be the best possible shell for liberal capitalism.

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Chapter 3

Germany – The Collapse of a M odel? Germany has been subject to ruptures of revolution, defeat in war and forty five years of divided territory. Despite these momentous events, a solid example of a dominant party union nexus within the social democratic framework established itself after 1945 in the west and was absorbed in the east after unification. However, the relationship between the unions and the party of labour is less organic and formalized than its British counterpart. The Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschland (SP D), while attached to union social and industrial concerns, has felt it increasingly necessary to appeal to the ‘middle ground’ of the electorate in a ‘catch all’ electoral strategy. F rom the 1970s onwards it has sought to distance itself from traditional working class interests. M any CDU members have also been active in the higher echelons of the unions, supportive of the sozialstaat in line with Christian interpretation of social policy. In recognition of this realpolitik, the unions and the DeutscheGewerkschaftsBund (DGB) have moderated their political orientation and refrained from overt linkage with the SP D. The link between unions and the SP D has thus been more informal, and focussed on personal rather than collective affiliation to the party. Most importantly, the creation of Modell Deutschland in the West Germany of the 1960s and 1970s was a product of consensus –based politics in which the trade union leaders and SP D came to an accommodation with representatives of capital in the (west) German national interest. F or employers, the Modell ensured peaceful co-operation with the unions through legislation, stabilized collective bargaining arrangements, and constrained union influence at the workplace by the alternative empowerment of Works Council. S o long as the German economy thrived and expanded in the 1970s and1980s the class interest of (west) German workers appeared to be adequately satisfied by the Modell’s ability to deliver rising real incomes. The de-stabilising of the Modell in the 1990s and beyond has exposed the underlying clash of the interests of German capital and the class interest of the mass of German workers. In consequence, the current crisis of German social democratic trade unionism has begun to unfold. In this chapter a brief overview is given to the historical development of social democratic trade unionism in Germany. M ore focussed attention is then given to the political and ideological origins of co-determination as a defining characteristic of the German model of social democracy in practice. F inally, we analyse the implications of the strains and tensions that have developed within the model in recent years.

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The Early SPD and the Unions The historical development of social democratic trade unionism in Germany can be characterized by sharp ideological battles focussed on both the national question and the dilemma of revolution versus reform. The failure of the 1848 bourgeois revolution created a dilemma for the emerging workers’ movement. H ow could German workers’ interests be advanced when there was no unified German state? S hould a workers’ political party ally itself with bourgeois parties in the interests of national unification? Would the process of nation unification lead to a democratic state in which universal suffrage would guarantee workers’ progress through parliamentary reforms? O r should a workers’ revolution follow the bourgeois revolution? In the period from 1850 until the creation of the German state in 1871 these ideological and practical questions were fought for by the followers of key socialist politicians such as F erdinand L assalle, Wilhelm L iebknecht and A ugust Bebel. L assalle had been a fellow member with M arx of the Communist L eague and the two had met during M arx’s return to Germany in 1848. A s Grebing (1969: 35-36) records ‘L assalle shared M arx’s grasp of the historical situation… [and] was aware of the dichotomy between man’s freedom and predetermined development’. In 1863 the ex-factory machinist L assalle founded the Allgemeiner Deutsche Arbeiterverein (German General Workers’ A ssociation) in L eipzig in order to help organize the developing workers’ fraternization movement spawned by the events of 1848. H owever, he diverged from M arx on strategy and tactics on the national question and the role of the state. L assalle viewed the state as an enabling mechanism to progress the workers’ cause, in contrast to M arx’s insistence that communism should oversee the ‘withering away’ of the state. L assalle also sought a workers’ tactical alliance with the Prussian monarchy and Bismarck against the Prussian L iberals, with the aim of convincing Bismarck of the validity of universal suffrage and state support for producers’ co-operatives (Grebing 1969: 44). A s such he offended M arx and E ngels’ position that alliances with the bourgeoisie should only occur when such bourgeois forces were acting against reaction, rather than as one variant of reaction. In 1869 a second workers’ party – the Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei (S ocial Democratic Workers’ Party) was founded in E isenach by A ugust Bebel, Wilhelm L iebknecht and others who had broken with the L assalleans. A gain, much of the political manifesto of the new party was drawn from the language of M arx and E ngels, although as with L assalle the practical emphasis was once again on parliamentary reform. The new party differed again from both M arx and L assalle on the question of the state and nation. The E isenachers opposed Prussia (in contrast to L assalle) and supported a unified Germany that would exclude Austria. Divisions on theory and practice within the embryonic German socialist movement were thus already developed before German unification in 1871. In particular, while the language of workers’ politics appeared radical and called for the creation of a socialist society, in practice the programme was coloured by an insistence on the nation state and parliament as the focus of change.

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The Franco-Prussian war of 1870-1871 solidified differences between the two workers’ organizations on the national question, but as Germany was unified in victory over N apoleon III these disagreements receded and common agreement was found on the question of workers’ emancipation. The two parties merged at Gotha in 1875 to form the Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands (German S ocialist Workers’ Party). The birth of the modern social democrats, however, took place in a Germany ruled by the Bismarckian elite in which socialists were excluded from any access to state power and repressed by employers and state whenever the excuse or opportunity arose. Paradoxically, perhaps precisely because of this exclusion, the new party placed even more emphasis on seizing state power by legal means, including universal suffrage and state-aided socialist co-operatives under control of working people. S uch a benign view of the role of the state again drew the wrath of M arx, who in his Critique of the Gotha Programme (1875) sought to expose the contradiction of being able to control ‘a police guarded military despotism’ by legal means. In 1878 the state responded to two attempts to assassinate Wilhelm I by passing the A nti S ocialist L aw. This law proscribed all socialist organizations and allowed the state to ban meetings, writings and newspapers. It was extended on a number of occasions until 1890, when the opportunity for extension was not taken up. During the period of its operation an estimated 1500 persons were imprisoned with hard labour and 900 expelled from the country (Grebing, 1969: 59). Despite the repression the social democrats insisted on working legally and after 1890 the number of votes cast for the party (now renamed as the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschland) rose to over 1.4 million, nearly 20% of the total vote. H owever, during the period of repression the ideas of M arx and E ngels had gained ground among the SP D rankand-file. The social democrats thus had a dual mentality in the development of its political ideology. O n the one hand there was an obsession with capturing state power by constitutional means, but as a countervailing tendency a large section of the membership had become acquainted with the idea of revolution and socialist transformation. This was the setting that led to the emergence of both E duard Bernstein and Karl Kautsky as leading theorists of the new party. Both utilized M arxist terminology to describe the objective conditions of German workers, but rather than urge the workers to seize power through party and revolution, Bernstein argued for an ‘evolutionary’ transformation (Bernstein, 1961), while Kautsky argued the ‘inevitability’ of transformation from capitalism to socialism without emphasising the necessity of seizure of state power. The theoretical debate thus transmuted from one of nation versus class to one of revolution versus reform. By this time industry had expanded in Germany and with that the mass of the industrial working class had grown. E arly trade unions were craft based and under the initiative of Lassalle had held a first general congress in 1869. The (Liberal) German Progressive Party, in response to the development of the L assallean unions, had established its own union movement as the H irsch-Duncker trade associations focussing on social reform ‘from above’ as opposed to workers’ struggle ‘from below’. In addition to these two strands of unionism smaller anarcho-syndicalist

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organizations existed at the level of town and workplace, as well as Christian labour associations. R epression from the A nti S ocialist L aw as well as internal differences led to the collapse of the L assallean unions a few years after the founding congress. A fter the end of the A nti S ocialist laws in 1890 the ‘free’ socialist oriented trade unions were revived under the chairmanship of Karl L egien. H owever, as Grebing (1969: 68) reports ‘the tasks which the F ree Unions set themselves were clearly demarcated from those of the Workers’ Party’. In particular the unions focussed on economic aspects of the employment relationship within capitalism, leaving the political struggle to the party. A s such the classic divide in the social democratic model between politics and economics was implanted. M embership of the free unions gradually expanded growing from 237,000 in 1892 to 2.6 million in 1912. H owever, while the separation of politics and economics continued the leaders of the unions increasingly crossed the divide to stand as parliamentary candidates for the SP D. By 1912 one third of SP D deputies in the Imperial Parliament were union leaders (ibid, 1969: 69-70). A rguments between the Bernstein revisionists and the Kautskyites spilt over from the party to the unions and were crystallized at the time of the SP D’s E rfurt Programme in 1891. In particular, a strategic debate on the road to socialist power raised the issue of the political mass strike as a weapon to advance the workers’ cause. M ass general strikes had been successful in both Belgium and S weden in obtaining universal suffrage. The 1905 R evolution in R ussia coincided with a highpoint of industrial struggle in Germany, and had consolidated the notion of mass action as an agent of revolutionary change. S uch was the context in which the left of the SP D, led by R osa L uxemburg, challenged both Bernstein and the Kautskyites in their assessment of what needed to be done in Germany. A s S chorske (1983: 28) observes the events abroad had given a ‘new concreteness’ to the debate within Germany. Within the SP D and unions support for the mass strike was cautiously approved by the leaderships so long as its purpose was purely tactical and confined to the struggle for universal suffrage. Kautsky, for example, saw such action as secondary to the political struggle for socialism through constitutional means. S uch views were grounded in the seemingly onward march of universal suffrage, which, with the ever expanding numbers of workers in the economy, would surely lead to socialism through parliament. In this context the mass strike might only be used, as Bebel argued in 1905, ‘as a purely defensive measure, designed to safeguard the exercise of power legitimately acquired through the ballot’ (Bebel cited in S chorske, 1983). E ven the ‘gradualist’ Bernstein supported this position. The mass strike would be a weapon to be called upon by the trade union leadership in bureaucratic fashion, with defined ends and time limits. Divergence between the right of the SP D and L uxemburg over the mass strike remained fundamental. The position of the leaderships of both the SP D and the unions was to maintain the separation between economic and political demands, while L uxemburg and the left argued that ‘ceaseless reciprocal action’ should take place between economic and political struggle (L uxemburg, 1986: 42). L uxemburg’s position, expressed in her pamphlet The Mass Strike, was that the strike was capable both ideologically

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and organizationally of fermenting workers’ revolution. These opposing positions crystallized the schism between reform and revolution. The build up to the F irst World War isolated the left within the emergent social democrat movement as party and union leaderships supported the war effort. A major argument utilized by the majority of social democratic leaders for the War was the fear that hard won social and political gains and their associated values may be threatened by the external enemy (Grebing 1969: 87). In turn the nationalist orientation of social democracy was re-inforced. The parallel schism between reform and revolution was to re-emerge in the 1918/1919 R evolution and the ensuing Weimar years. The schism played itself through with devastating consequences. The SP D post-revolution Government unleashed the forces of reaction against L uxemburg, Karl L iebknecht and the S partacists in 1919, and then proceeded to crush the communist inspired workers councils and embryonic Bavarian S oviet R epublic in the ‘lost’ German R evolution in 1923 (H arman 1982; Broué 2006). A s Berger (2000: 103) records ‘the longing for unity, so prevalent in N ovember 1918, had given way to mutual hatred and recrimination’. But despite the triumph of the SP D and social democracy over the forces of revolution, opposition to the SP D’s version of reform continued to come from the left. Graf (1986) comments on this period: …during the Second Reich and Weimar Republic, any significant shift to the right on the part of the SP D leadership, such as the parliamentary party’s approval of war credits in 1914, its truck under E bert with the reactionary forces, its periodic lapse into “parliamentary opportunism” or the right rump’s acceptance of H itler’s enabling law in 1933, would be countered and challenged every step by the L eft. The success of the USP D [the breakaway Independent Socialist Party – authors], the rise of the S partacus movement, and the consistent increase in the KPD’s mass following throughout the Weimar era were all concrete and determined reactions to deficiencies or revisions in Social democratic praxis.

S o in the post WWI period the labour movement was ‘far from united’ (Geary, 1984: 160). Divisions existed not just between the S ocial Democrats and Communists, but also within the radical left a split was to occur in 1919/20 between Communists with the formation of the more insurrectionary KAP D. The USP D ‘independent socialists’ also split, with one faction joining the embryonic KPD in 1920. The events of 1919 and beyond conditioned the ideological position of German social democracy and its associated model of trade unionism. M ost importantly the concept of economic democracy (as an adjunct of liberal political democracy) became enshrined in the principles of co-determination. Works Councils became the concrete social democratic alternative to the Workers’ Councils and soviets favoured by the communists. The origins of co-determination, as a model of German social democratic trade unionism, need to be explored further.

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Social Democratic Trade Unionism and Co-Determination Two strands of opinion have traditionally explained the origins of co-determination. F irst, on Mitbestimmung’s historical roots, there are some writers, such as the historian Wolfgang H irsch-Weber, who argue that the ill-fated 1848-49 R evolutionary Parliament in Frankfurt provides the first evidence of co-determination as a particularly German approach, whilst the majority view of most other commentators has been that the origins lie firmly within the First World War economic structure, and the ensuing revolutionary years of 1918-19. A second division of opinion concerns the precise nature of the social chemistry which led to the first co-determination laws, enshrined in A rticle 165 of the 1919 Weimar Constitution. Were the new labour laws a compromise between the forces of parliamentary democracy and revolutionary socialism, or were they a defeat for the forces of revolution, and, by implication, a victory for social democracy? Co-determination in the Weimar Republic: Class Compromise or Class Collaboration? Just six days after the outbreak of the R evolution on 15 N ovember 1918 H ugo S tinnes for the employers, and Karl L egien for the unions, signed the S tinnesL egien A greement aimed at securing peace in industry. The concessions made by the employers included (see Grebing, 1969): • • • • • •

recognition of independent trade unions and collective agreements disbandment of ‘yellow’ company unions cessation of discrimination against union members recognition of the 8 hour day (subject to its introduction in other industrial nations) establishment of jointly managed employment offices and arbitration bodies the recognition of committees to represent all employees in plants with more than fifty workers.

O n 4 December the A greement was complemented by the Zentralarbeitgemeinschaft (ZA G) creating a Central Joint L abour Committee composed equally of employer and union representatives to advise the government on industrial policy and demobilization. These agreements clearly cemented the collaborative relationship which had developed between the two sides during the War. They also ran parallel to the E bert-Gröner Pact designed to raise a militia against internal insurgency. In return for these concessions the trade union leadership agreed not to touch the existing property structure i.e. to oppose take-over and socialization of factories. The framework had thus been set by the SP D, trade union leaders, employers and military for the maintenance of the existing social relationships of production, albeit with the trade unions guaranteed some decision-making involvement. The

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framework represented entirely the concept of Mitbestimmung later built into the Weimar Constitution and the L aw of Works Councils in 1920. The state, employers and trade union leadership were united, with military back-up, against the revolutionaries. S ome historians have claimed that the co-determination process established in 1918 to 1920 was a compromise between state, industry and an offensive workers movement. The labour historian and lawyer O tto KahnF reund (1983) for example, argues that; ... the political and social situation in 1919 ... led to a temporary state of equilibrium in the balance of power between the bourgeoisie and the working class. This state of equilibrium was reflected both in the creation of new labour law norms and in their underlying ideology.

S imilarly, F ranz N eumann (1978), states that the Weimar L aws were a ‘codification’of the interests represented in ‘pluralistic collectivism’ whereby all sectional interests including those of the workers’ councils were represented. Richard Comfort (1966: 98) argues that the Weimar Constitution in its modified version of works’ councils represented ‘an attempt to placate the labour movement and to demonstrate their (the SP D) willingness to compromise with the left.’ But the establishment of co-determination, in both its form and content, was a compromise not with the workers’ movement in general but specifically with the (social democratic) leadership of that movement. The leadership of the trade unions and the SP D were able to preserve and reinforce their social position at the expense of the revolutionary elements based within the rank-and-file of the unions and the left wing of the political parties. The employers, for their part, preserved ownership and control of the factories against the threat of socialization from below. H aving secured a victory over the revolutionary elements the victors then proceeded to crush the opposition. Co-determination was the social form of workplace organization that was the (albeit temporary) result. The uneasy alliance and collaboration of state, industry and unions began to fracture in 1923. The period up to 1922 had seen a rapid rise in the number of workers covered by collective agreements rising from 2 million in 1913 to 6 million in 1919 and reaching over 14 million in 1922. In addition by 1922 the ‘F ree Unions’ had gained effective control over the new statutory works councils claiming over three-quarters of the councillor positions (Berghahn, 1989: 204) This, combined with the general rise in militancy throughout the period, had pushed back the employers’ prerogative in industry. But economic conditions had changed by 1923. The defeat of the German O ctober took place at a time of rising unemployment (up to 23.6%) and hyper-inflation and as a result organized labour was pushed onto the defensive by employers determined to regain authority in the workplace. This period was marked by a wave of lockouts and dismissals but, in addition, employer pressure on the Centre Party-led Coalition Government led not only to the abolition of the eight hour day but also, in 1924, to the collapse of the ZA G, the banning of the KPD (German Communist Party) and cuts in welfare

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payments and public service pay. The principles of economic democracy were still central to the SP D, but without consensus with the employers the SP D could only mount a rearguard propaganda exercise. The continuing economic crisis and the renewed employers’ offensive meant that by 1930 the SP D’s priority was the struggle over unemployment insurance rather than a defence of co-determination. The death of Weimar and the economic crisis in Germany had destroyed the SP D’s industrial project. Co­-determination had been central to the party’s view of socialism and they had dragged a sometimes reluctant trade union leadership with them into their vision of economic and social democracy. By 1933 the tragedy of German history had begun and co-determination was buried as the labour movement sank beneath the iron heel. H owever, the state of affairs that existed in the Weimar R epublic in the arena of industrial relations left a lasting impression on the leaders of the SP D and trade unions. O nce ‘normalcy’ returned to West Germany after 1945 co-­determination, for the S ocial Democrats at least, once more became representative of social harmony and progress. The (Re?) Emergence of the German ‘Model’ The re-establishment of some form of co-determination in the western zones after the S econd World War was by no means automatic. Initial proposals to reintroduce a ‘social partnership’ in industry were turned down by the A llies in 1945. M ore important priorities concerned the Allied-instigated policies of de-nazification, de-cartelization and de-concentration of industry. The need to develop a series of checks and balances within industry to help ensure the success of liberal democracy, together with pressure from the labour movement leaders helped change allied policy. Berghahn (1985), for example, refers in terms borrowed from H abermas (1973), to the perceived need of (west) Germany’s elites under US influence to search for ‘integrating devices’ such as wealth formation plans, co-determination and industrial partnership when the ‘masses’ began to use their democratic vote to become active in a ‘system-destabilising’ way. H owever, whilst the model established politically negotiated institutional arrangements it was never a fully fledged social-democratic model such as existed in Sweden. Similarly the fact that the embeddedness of the institutions was a form of political settlement between capital and labour makes it different from the nature of welfare capitalism in Japan, which is essentially employer-dominated and labour exclusive. The success of the model in bringing industrial peace and economic prosperity is also a direct function of the favourable factors reshaping West German capitalism in the immediate post-war period. To this extent it can be difficult to separate the contribution of the industrial relations system to economic prosperity from other factors exogenous to workplace relations. German capitalism was a relative success in the immediate post war period as a result of its product market-led dynamic and its ability to respond to demand in an expanding world economy. A surplus of labour supply fed the accumulation process with the entry into the west of some eight million mainly skilled ethnic

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German refugees (e.g. lens makers from the Zeiss works in the S oviet Zone or glassworkers from Czechoslovakia). In the 1960s the ready surplus of labour was no longer ethnic Germans but instead was the Gastarbeiters (guestworkers) from countries such as Turkey, Italy and Y ugoslavia. In these earlier years at least, the M odel was characterized more by inequality of income rather than equality. Wage incomes at current value rose some three and a half times between 1950 and 1967 but those of entrepreneurs and the self employed rose by five times and workers’ share of private wealth actually fell from two fifths to under one quarter (Kidron, 1970: 173). What in effect had been happening during this period was a massive increase in capital formation feeding further investment into manufacturing. Contrary to modern day conceptions of Modell Deutschland as a consistently labour-friendly system, Kidron notes when writing his 1968 survey Western Capitalism Since the War that ‘... Germany in the sixties has been one of the few countries in the world in which public expenditure on ‘social objectives’ has lagged behind the growth of output; and to this day its outlay on education is the lowest in the Common M arket relative to GNP and only half the proportion spent in Britain’ (Kidron, 1968: 173). Whilst many of the reforms and framework of social policy were established in the early 1950s in fact it was not until the mid 1970s that the share of social expenditure began to increase as the West German State prepared for some fine tuning in the balance between accumulation in human as opposed to physical capital and some of the supposedly ‘embedded’ features of the German M odel accordingly took place. The Unions S uccess was secured in re-establishing union membership, particularly in the British sector by as early as 1946. By 1947 there were 2.1 million members in the sector, allowed by the military powers on the basis that no single enterprise had more than one union. A debate ensued between the British authorities and pre-war leaders of the unions as to how the unions should be reformed. H ans Böckler, an SP D member of the R eichstag in 1928-33 and district secretary of an SP D union organization before the War, was prominent in the discussions. H e put forward four goals for the unions in the new Germany (Bark and Gress, 1989: 137). 1. a single national union organization to replace the three ideologically divided groups that had existed until 1933. 2. nationalization of large and intermediate industry. 3. workers’ co-determination in individual factories, and 4. national economic planning.

  Böckler had maintained contact with other former trade union and SPD officials after 1933 in his guise as a travelling lingerie salesman, an ideal cover to travel the country and avoid arrest by the N azis!

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These demands were not unique to Böckler and the emergent unions but received support from the SPD under S chumacher as well as Kaiser for the ‘Christian S ocialist’ wing of the formative CDU. There was disagreement with the British on the question of ‘one big union’ which was felt to be potentially too powerful. The official Allied Powers’ view was that the unions could perform a necessary function in a democratic society but that their chief purpose, at that time, should be to aid the process of de-cartelization rather than overly strengthen the hand of labour. The eventually agreed structure in 1949 (the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund – DGB) was something of a compromise drawn up by Böckler in conjunction with Will L awther, President of the British M ineworkers’ Union and Jack Tanner of the E ngineers’ Union. There was to be a total of 16 independent industrial unions with a total membership of five million, of whom 4.2 million were blue collar, 530,000 white collar and 270,000 Beamte (administrative grade civil servants). Böckler was elected Chairman of the DGB at its first Congress in Munich in 1949. The agreement extended across all three western allied zones. In the S oviet Zone a separate union organization (Freie Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund) had already been formed. Many of the rules of the affiliated union movement were also drawn up at this time, including disciplinary measures to cut off finance and membership of the DGB if any union defied. These rules effectively placed much power in the hands of the trade union bureaucracy, requiring, for example, that no local union may call a strike without the authority of its executive, and that the executive must not call a strike before all attempts at negotiations have broken down. Before a strike took place there would also have to be a ballot in which 75% of those voting supported the strike. The ideology of ‘peace and responsibility’ was also included in the terms of DGB affiliation, whereby unions should ‘take into account’ the state of business and the ‘repercussions of a strike on other sectors of the economy’ before actually bringing members out (Crawley, 1973: 198). A s H ülsberg (1988: 31) has noted of the union leaders at the time ‘What they were fundamentally opposed to was any form of extra parliamentary mobilization’. F rom the very beginning, therefore, the unions in West Germany were bureaucratically controlled and operated under moderate rules with a national reformist outlook. A ttempts to reassure the A llies of the non-revolutionary aims of the union leadership were combined with reformist caution against the perceived threat of KPD or left-wing influence from below. Power in the unions was placed very much in the hands of the union bureaucracy, backed up by a tacit agreement with the emerging S tate of the priority of industrial peace to get the economy moving again. The question of co-determination proved more difficult to resolve. It was a central platform point of both the union leaderships and the SP D but caution was expressed by the pro-Marktwirtschaft A denauer as leader of the CDU. The F DP were distinctly hostile, the A mericans too, appeared cautious as guaranteed worker rights in the form embraced with Mitbestimmung appeared on the surface at least to have an aura of socialism. The employers meanwhile had begun by 1949 to recover from the processes of de-cartelization, dismantling and de-­nazification to reassert themselves in opposition to any form of ‘social ownership’. Despite

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these difficulties a deal was struck between Adenaeur and Böckler which paved the way for co-determination in a restricted form by application in the coal and steel industries. Böckler threatened a national strike to force A denaeur’s hand and this seemed enough to win the argument. In return for agreeing to support Mitbestimmung in coal and steel A denaeur drew the line at any further socialization of industry. The Bill itself still received a rough passage. The F rench and A mericans remained hostile, whilst the British were worried that the proposed worker representatives on the S upervisory Board may become distanced from the rank-and-file and that the experiment would collapse as a result (a similar experiment in Britain with joint union-management Liaison Advisory Committees was ill-fated due to union opposition). The free market F DP were thoroughly opposed as were the KPD but for different reasons, claiming that the whole idea was class collaborationist. H owever, with the support of the SP D the Bill became law in M ay 1951 (the Betriebsfassungsgezetz  – Works Constitution L aw), and the scene was set for further battles between the unions and Government to extend Mitbestimmung to other areas of the economy. A ll enterprises in coal and steel with 1000 or more employees were to have workers’ representatives on the S upervisory Board. A Worker Director was also to sit on the Board of Directors, with an equal vote in management affairs. A parallel Wages A greement A ct secures the role and rights of unions at national/regional level to collectively bargain with employers organizations, with legally binding agreements as a result. A second Works Council law in 1952 obliged all larger firms to establish a Works Council (employees only) which was entitled to information and consultation about management plans in the area of personnel and welfare. This too, was opposed by sections of employers but in its essence it had the effect of restricting the role of unions by incorporating the workforce as a whole into a form of joint decision making at the expense of adversarial negotiations. Bergmann and M üller-Jentsch (1975: 42) in referring to the effects on unions of the 1952 A ct, claim: ‘(The A ct) ... consolidated the power of the entrepreneur and evicted the trade unions from the plant’. What they are meaning is that the unions as a result of the A ct, had no formal existence inside the plant, with rights of representation and negotiation given to the Works Council. In effect the unions had been ‘tamed’ (Pirker 1960 ch. 6). Co-determination was thus micro-corporatism in practice, whereby a productivity coalition between capital and labour was encouraged at the workplace, re-enforcing sectional interest at the expense of class solidarity. In 1972, under an SP D Government, the law was further amended and extended allowing more formal links between union and Works Council and enhanced power for the Councils themselves. 1968 and the Challenge to Social Democracy By the 1960s the first signs of strains within the West German economy emerged. A budget deficit crisis of 1965 was partly a result of the attempt by the CDU’s Erhard to ‘pump prime’ the economy out of an economic downturn by cutting income taxes

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(Gourevitch et al., 1984). The resulting crisis ushered in a CDU-SPD Coalition in 1966 which in turn attempted to deal with the national economic emergency by introducing a phase of ‘Concerted A ction’ between Government, employers and unions to dampen wage growth as a counter inflationary measure. As such both state and employers were willing to use the consensus based political system to persuade the unions of the necessity of wage restraint. The resulting strike wave of 1969 was mostly unofficial and resulted in pay increases of between 10 and 15% for workers in all industries and effectively broke the wage restraint formulated under this period of ‘Concerted Action’ (Riemer, 1983: 177). Further rank-and-file action in 1973/74 (mostly of unskilled women and foreign workers) forced the leadership of IG M etall into a defensive position against its own membership (R iemer, ibid: 193-4). F inally in 1977 the union leaderships pulled out of the ‘Concerted A ction’ altogether. E vidence of ‘institutional alienation’ during the 1970s was also produced by Körner (1974) in a study of unofficial stoppages in North Rhine Westphalia. Körner argued that many of these stoppages were a direct result of dissatisfaction with the participatory nature of Works Councils. The background to these cases in the 1970s, particularly in the metal and engineering industry, was the push by IG M etall to establish a shop stewards (Vertrauensleute) network as a countervailing force to the power of the Works Councillors. The fact that both this strategy and the generality of unofficial action declined after the 1970s was a result of both a general downturn in disputes as well as the response by the S tate to extend the scope of Works Councils by further legislation and reinforce the micro-aspects of German corporatism at the expense of the macro-aspects. A s far as societal relations were concerned the West German state had been faced not only with increased unofficial strike levels but also with a large and militant student movement and a left terrorist R ed A rmy F action campaign (M innerup, 1976; H arman, 1988: 223-235; M arkovits and Gorski, 1993: 6773). These events clearly fed ideas that West German society might be fracturing (e.g. Katzenstein, 1989). Debates on the future of co-determination in the 1980s also reflected concerns at the development of two potential groups of ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ amongst workers who were dependant/non-dependant on the system. The insiders were identified as as skilled and permanent workers in the core industrial sectors and the outsiders as a growing group of lesser skilled and less permanently employed workers with a consequent lower commitment to the philosophy and practice of Mitbestimmung. Commentators have attempted to locate this fracture in terms of a new ‘post-F ordist’ paradigm which, because of the associated decline of the mass production society of ‘organized capitalism’ allowed less space for the social democratic compromise between state, capital and labour (e.g. L ash and Urry 1987; M arkovits and Groske, 1993: 6). A s a result of these developments the SP D was thrown into a crisis of identity, and alongside that the model of social democracy which seemed to have worked well in (West Germany) was further questioned. Its exclusion from the corridors of power in the immediate post war years had led the party to adopt the ‘catch-all’ electoral strategy to gather votes of the middle class beyond its traditional worker

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base. S uch a strategy was given added impetus with the division of Germany and the loss of a critical mass of SP D support in the E ast. In order to compete electorally with the CDU/CS U the SP D had moved increasingly to the right as a strategy of Angleichung was compounded with a continuing commitment to consensus with capital and fear of Communism as the Cold War was solidified. In 1959, at its Bad Godesberg Congress, the SP D agreed to abandon its commitment to the socialization of industry. The DGB soon followed with its own policy reformation. It can be argued that the SP D in this period gradually began to change from a party wanting to reform capitalism in the workers’ interest to a party solely wishing to run capitalism in the national interest. Graf (1986: 99) describes it thus: The party’s platform thus increasingly amounted to a mere negation of the bourgeois coalition’s tangible achievements and a vague assertion that, once in office, the SPD would expand and extend (or ‘modernize’) the existing state and economy.

S uch a shift paralleled the revisionist and technologically deterministic developments in the British L abour Party, as each party sought to present itself as the saviour of national competitiveness and productivity. But the 1968 explosion of unrest challenged SPD hegemony on the left. The ensuing ‘years of rage’ saw the birth of the N ew S ocial Movements (e.g. women’s, student, peace and ecology), and the development of the N ew (extra-parliamentary) L eft. A s such the tension between parliamentary reform and extra-parliamentary radicalism framed the repertoires of action within (West) Germany (see R ucht, 2003, for an overview). Within the old E ast, the opposition movements also contained a strong peace and environmentalist content, adding to the chemistry of protest after unification in 1990 (Dale, 2005). The SPD no longer had a monopoly ideological hold over workers and their expectations. A s Markovits (1992: 177) argues ‘...it was the West German student movement and the N ew L eft that challenged virtually every convention and institution in the F ederal R epublic, including anticommunism and the postwar order’. In particular the extra parliamentary left (or APO – außerparlamentarische Opposition) provided a ‘sociocultural break with the past’ (H ülsberg, 1988: 42) in utilising direct action and demonstrations as the leitmotif of political struggle. In so doing the APO deliberately eschewed what was perceived as the bureaucratic and centralized model of the SPD’s favoured consensus politics. A s the heady days of ’68 receded the N ew L eft re-oriented itself in a number of ways in the 1970s, either by the ‘long march through the institutions’, which included entering the SPD and various research institutes, or by forming new left parties of assorted L eninist, Maoist and Trotskyist tendency. The year 1980 also gave birth to the West German Green Party. O f the two latter options the Greens appeared better placed to profit from the ideological crisis within the SPD. The new far left groups suffered with the retreat from class struggle, and the prevailing anti-communist atmosphere with its accompanying official sanctions (such as the 1972 enacted Berufsverbot banning radicals from public service employment), and

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failed to make significant gains. The Greens focussed on ‘post-materialist’ issues and identified a desire for de-centralization and democratization. (Padgett and Paterson 1991: 53). They became divided, however, between the fundamentalists (fundis) and the realists (realos) over the question of working with other parties (especially the SPD) and entering parliamentary and local council bodies. In this aspect they were guided ideologically by the industrial sociologists and leading realos H elmut Wiesenthal and Claus O ffe, who utilized systems theory to advocate a decentralized and networked form of political engagement akin to the ‘flexible specialization’ espoused by ‘post-F ordist’ academic theorists (see, for example, O ffe, 1983). Their attitudes to the trade unions and workers’ struggle appeared potentially contradictory. O n the one hand the eco-socialists utilized neo-Marxist phraseology to critique the inbuilt exploitation of workers in capitalism and indeed begun to orientate their work on the ‘core working class’ by supporting a number of strikes during the 1980s (see H ülsberg, 1988: 130). But on the other hand the ‘post-materialist’ concerns of the ecolibertarians focussed on championing the ‘underclass’ at the expense of the organized working class (Markovits and Gorski, 1993: 154) who, it was contended, were the main beneficiaries of the discredited bureaucracy of Modell Deutschland. A s such the trade unions and Greens did not manage to establish a lasting relationship, not least because their more radical approach still grated with the traditional methods of the trade union leaderships. Dissent within the unions also appeared to be contained in the 1970s without substantial threat to the SPD’s organizational and ideological dominance. Markovits (1986: 147) observes that ‘The activist unions distanced themselves from the mainstream of the SPD during the late 1970s and early 1980s without , however, renouncing the traditional ties of the German working class to social democracy’. The dominant party union nexus remained intact. Keynesianism and Modell Deutschland While the left in the SPD (and in particular its youth section – the Jusos) wanted to work with the APO , the right held its ground and was willing to distance itself from the N ew L eft and the social movements. This is despite the SPD attempting to redefine its values at its 1989 Berlin Congress to include demands arising from the N ew S ocial Movements. A s Meyer (1997: 134) suggests ‘N one of the party leaders and candidates after Vogel (the candidate for Chancellor 1983-87) wholeheartedly accepted the Berlin Programme as his own personal political position. E ach of them underlined selected issues...or emphasized his own policies’. S uch a divergence of orientation reflected deeper ideological division focussed on the nature and validity of the sozialstaat and its core value system enshrined in Keynesian welfarism. The debate over Keynes had begun during the period of ‘modernization’. The SP D under the Chancellorship of H elmut S chmidt (1974-1982) saw a debate in the party between the orthodox Keynesians, who considered insufficient demand to be caused by low profit rates, and the ‘left Keynesians’ who considered excess profits to be the root cause of a crisis of over-production (Bornost, 2005). The latter view was supported by the unions, in particular by O tto Brenner, president

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of IG M etall in the 1950s as an ‘expansionary wage strategy’, whereby high wages would increase demand in the economy. The employers, once regrouped after the war, naturally opposed such a policy leading to set piece legal confrontations with IG M etall over strike actions. This opened the door for moderate union leaders in the 1960s, such as Georg L eber of the building workers’ IG Bau to challenge the confrontational stance of IG Metall and in turn to act as a moderating influence on the strategy of ‘expansionary wages’ (Gourevitch et al. 1984: 112-13). A s H yman (2001: 123) suggests ‘The often bitter debates within German trade unionism in the 1960s had centred around two radically different conceptions of purpose and identity  – as a mechanism of social order (Ordnungfaktor) or as an oppositional force to employers – and perhaps to capitalism as such (Gegenmacht)’. The ensuing debate in party and unions was strongly influenced by Fritz Scharpf and his book Socialdemokratische Krisenpolitik in Europa (1987), which highlighted the difficulties of applying both Keynesian policies and social democratic goals within the new global economy. S charpf (1991) argued for a new version of social democracy that focussed on supply-side economics as an aid to creating corporate profitability. Under Schmidt the government had taken the orthodox view, and pursued a policy of state borrowing to finance investment and a reduction of wage costs to boost company profits. Such a policy saw an economic recovery gather pace albeit at the expense of national debt and associated inflationary pressures. The second S chmidt Government (1978-80) strengthened this policy approach and real wages actually went into decline during 1979 to 1982 as part of the process. H owever, the onset of general world economic recession during 1979/80 meant that German exporters faced difficulties finding markets for their products. This, combined with new competition from Japan, meant that the Keynesian model of state-led investment, with its consequent inflationary tendencies, was itself thrown into crisis under pressure from German business leaders. The longer term offensive against wage costs resulted in a decline of wages and salaries as a proportion of GDP in the last two decades (S chmidt and Dworschak, 2006). It is these policies which have proved central to the erosion of the German social model. The erosion has, of course, been a gradual rather than instant process, and in its course, as Grahl and Teague (2004) point out ‘neither business nor political elites in Germany have ever hesitated to put the external performance of the economy first and the social model second’. The net effect of this elongated management of retreat from the social model has left a reaction in the SP D where many of the remaining ‘left Keynesians’ felt increasingly isolated. The Dilemma Re-stated Co-determination has defined the parameters of social democratic industrial relations in Germany, while Keynesianism has been utilized ideologically and practically to construct the welfare state. N either co-determination nor Keynesianism are part of any ‘grand compromize’ between capital and labour, whereby the balance of power is equally weighted. Rather they are specific forms

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of ‘collaborative regulation’ of labour and welfare conducted between the state, employers and trade union leaders that leave the social power of capital intact. Co-determination is an expression of the national interest of German capital. By ‘evicting’ trade unions from institutional power in the workplace class interests expressed by the rank-and-file are suppressed and contained. Sectional interest, or betriebsegoismus, is correspondingly enhanced, as the Works Council acts to create productivity coalitions with the employers. H owever, under the dual system of industrial relations, trade union leaderships are permitted to represent class interest through collective bargaining. S ectionalism in the workplace is thus kept in check by trade union expression of class interest within society as a whole. But such expression and representation of worker interest is confined to the economic sphere. It is depoliticized. S uch has been the nature of social democratic trade unionism in Germany, forged as an alternative to communism in Weimar and in post war West Germany, nationalistic in orientation, and focussed on the existing (capitalist) state as a route to social change. While the economy expanded in the post war Wirtschaftswunder codetermination survived by serving the workers well. S tandards of living and real incomes for the majority of the (west) German population rose throughout the 1950s and 1960s. The first challenge came ‘from below’ in the ‘years of rage’ in 1968 and after. This challenge was contained, the system of co-determination and welfare provision was enhanced in workers’ favour, and the dominant party union nexus remained unharmed. The second challenge, however, has come ‘from above’ in terms of a state/employer offensive against labour, and is inextricably linked to the concerns of German employers as they face intensified competition in a more internationalized and neo-liberal market. The associated shift from ‘society’ to ‘market’ identified in Hyman’s (2001) triangulation threatens the ability of Modell Deutschland and social democracy to deliver to the mass of workers. Trade unions are faced with a dilemma. S hould they act to defend Modell Deutschland by collaborating with the SP D reform agenda in order to moderate it? O r should they stand in direct opposition to ‘modernization’ and reform and risk fragmenting our model of social democratic trade unionism? Globalization and Neoliberal Offensive: The Second Challenge Government and employer attempts to follow neoliberal prescriptions in Germany have indeed been inextricably linked with a national debate over ‘what is to be done’ with Modell Deutschland. In the early 1980s the prominent CDU politician L othar S päth (1985: 218), for example, began advocating both deregulation of working time and labour law in an effort to encourage innovation and ‘flexible specialization’ against what he personally saw as an ossified German regulatory culture. For the employers the attack was led by H ans-O laf H enkel, a leading spokesman for the

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Mittelstand firms who became President of the BDI (German Industry Association). Wolfgang S treeck observes of H enkel that ‘Using neo-liberal rhetoric unheard of from a German business leader, H enkel became highly visible by publicly confronting his counterpart at the BDA .’ (S treeck, 2005: 150). S uch critique of German institutional sclerosis crystallized itself in the Standortdebatte, a national debate over the ability of Germany to attract and retain investment in a globalized world economy. It was not simply labour market regulation that was under fire from neo-liberal advocates. The political system in West Germany had developed with in-built checks and balances from the federal structure, with each of the Länder exerting influence over the federal centre in the Bonn republic. Consensus appeared integral to the political system as agreement had to be reached incrementally between social partners in what Katzenstein (1987) described as the ‘semi-sovereign’ state. H owever, the consensus nature of West German politics was likely to be a hindrance to necessary change if approval to neo-liberal restructuring had to be gained from social partners and stakeholders who included the SPD and the trade unions. F or any Government wishing to enact change a strategic choice would need to be made between utilising the tried and tested (but increasingly discredited) incremental approach or breaking with the consensus and directly challenging the collective interests of organized labour. A dvocates of a radical approach pointed increasingly to the evidence of declining German competitiveness, in particular the relatively high unit labour costs attributed to non-wage benefits paid by employers (see Bell and F reeman, 1995; and Kitschelt and S treeck, 2004, for a review of the evidence). The Deutsche Bundesbank joined the fray, producing a report which showed a net outflow of investment gathering pace in the early 1990s as German firms sought to invest abroad (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1997). F rom a Marxist perspective Brenner (1998: 231) suggests that the outward flow of investment was a response to continuing declining rates of profit in the home base. The profit crisis in turn produced low investment and lower levels of capital formation, thus further fuelling the crisis of accumulation (Leaman, 1997). Unification in 1990, after an initial boom period, appeared to exacerbate the problems. To a certain extent, the massive boost to public spending after unification, both to rebuild infrastructure in the East as well as to transfer social welfare payments, acted to temporarily stave off or delay neoliberal restructuring (Marsh, 1996). Once the post Unification boom was over the whole German economy was left with a continuing budget deficit. Public spending needed to be tightened to correct the imbalance. E ntry into the E uropean M onetary S ystem in preparation for the E uro necessitated further pruning of spending to meet the convergence criteria. Difficulties also emerged in managing incremental change in the semi-sovereign state, as the new eastern Länder upset the balance

  The BDI (Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie) is an umbrella organization for industry (similar to the CBI in the UK). The BDA (Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände) is a confederation of different employers’ associations. It has no role in collective bargaining.

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and continued to demand transfer payments from west to east financed through personal taxation. The Failure of the Kohl Offensive Chancellor Kohl – the ‘unification Chancellor’ – was thus faced with the problem of attempting to reduce workers’ real wages and raise labour productivity while at the same time cutting back on social welfare spending. This was the agenda of the new ‘Berlin’ republic when Kohl famously declared that Germans were living in a ‘collective leisure park’. It was unlikely that such an attack on workers’ well-being could be sustained without a parallel attack on the key features of Modell Deutschland, and in turn on the core values of (west) Germany’s model of consensus and incremental change. To get through the strategic dilemma the Kohl Government operated on two fronts, one hostile to labour’s interests and the other seeking to engage the unions in the reform process F irst, on the legislative front, the F ederal Government in its 1993 Standort R eport introduced 147 measures for liberalization, many of which were later included in the 1994 Standortsicherungsgesetz (law to secure the productive competitiveness of Germany) (F lockton, 1996). S econd, Kohl attempted to establish open dialogue with the unions and employers by the creation in 1996 of a tri-partite Bündnis für Arbeit (E mployment A lliance) aimed at moderating wage growth in return for employment security. H owever, while the liberalization measures were secured the Bündnis collapsed due to a combination of employer hostility and union opposition in the same year. F aced with the continuing need to appease business Kohl then turned to a direct offensive against the unions by the introduction of his ‘50 point’ programme to reduce sick pay provision and work-related benefits such as the raising of the retirement age and rescindment of ‘bad weather money’ for building workers (cherished as an important concession to the unions in 1957). L ufthansa and Deutsche Telekom were to be privatized by the sale of Government stock and regulations covering shop trading hours relaxed as a concession to market liberalism. O nce again, whilst the liberalization measures went through the Government (and indeed employers) did not act strongly enough to fend off trade union led opposition to the changes in sick pay and ‘bad weather money’, including widespread strike action in both the private and public sector. A s expectations of the Kohl regime faded many workers in the E ast turned away from Kohl towards the SPD, re-creating the potential critical mass of voters necessary to secure Governmental power for the SPD. In 1997 the SPD were able to form a coalition Government with the Greens. They too, would now be faced with the same strategic problem of what to do with Modell Deutschland.

  Quoted of Kohl in the Financial Times Survey of Germany, O ctober 5th 1993.

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The SPD-Green Coalition (to the Rescue)? F or the SP D under Gerhard S chröder the dilemma was particularly acute. S hould the coalition government seek to collaborate with sections of the trade union leaders to try to introduce reform, or was it necessary to distance the Government from the unions and launch an assault? If the latter course was chosen how could this be done within the confines of the semi sovereign state and Modell Deutschland? How might the trade union and SPD rank-and-file react to such an assault, given the centrality of the national consensus model, social partnership and the sozialstaat to the historical development of German social democracy and its sibling social democratic trade unionism? F or the Greens – the minority coalition partner – another dilemma was apparent. A s Dräger et al (2000) record the Greens shifted rightwards to support the SP D right wing in the 1990s. S hould they now seek to defend the ‘bureaucratic and centralized’ Modell Deutschland against neo-liberal invasion, or should they too support reform in the interests of flexible specialization and the ‘post-industrial’ society. Ironically, while Kohl’s CDU led Government failed in its reform attempt the SP D would be likely to have a better chance of success. Its relationship with the trade unions, and its identity as the historical defender of workers’ interests, could be effectively utilized to disarm and disorientate opposition within the unions. S o long as there was no alternative to the left to which the party and trade union faithful could defect, then there would be a chance that such a strategy would succeed. In ideological terms such a course of action would involve forcing home the national business interest while suppressing the class interest of German workers, precisely as we have theorized as central to social democracy in western E urope. In the event S chröder (under pressure from L afontaine and the left in the SPD) chose at first to sweeten the unions by rescinding the sick pay changes and restoring the building workers’ ‘bad weather money’. H e then chose in 1998 to pursue a similar strategy to Kohl to ‘see consensus re-institutionalized’ through the vehicle of an E mployment A lliance (Bündnis für Arbeit) brokered by the Government between the employers’ organizations and trade unions. This new Bundnis, however, must be characterized as a neo-liberalized form of competitive corporatism designed to enhance the international competitiveness of German firms by seeking concessions from the unions. It differs from the neo-corporatism of the ‘golden age’ of West German capitalism from which German workers could make substantive gain. H owever, even this initiative quickly collapsed. The failure of this initiative was in large part due to employer intransigence and their continued insistence on labor market reform, leading to a paralysis in statecapital-labor relations within the newly unified Germany (Upchurch, 2000). The SP D-led Coalition, under continuing pressure from business, then returned to the

  Financial Times, 7th December 1998 ‘S chröder begins search for jobs consensus’

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‘reform’ agenda with the 2003 launch of Agenda 2010. The reforms have since been described as ‘the largest social reform project in the history of the FR G’ (L ohse, 2005) and the ‘abandonment by the German political elite of the social market model’ (Streeck, 2005). The programme represented an attack on the ‘first resort’ welfare philosophy of the German social democratic model and the parallel adoption of the ‘Third Way’ by the SP D and the Greens (H ombach, 2000; Dräger et al., 2000; Arestis and Sawyer, 2003). This affirmation by Chancellor Schröder of supply side economics over demand-led Keynesianism was not without casualty within the SP D. Under the party leadership of O skar L afontaine, the SP D had actually begun to resist emerging neo-liberal orthodoxies. L afontaine argued that the E uropean Central Bank and Bundesbank should adjust monetary policy to favour employment growth alongside E uropean wide corporate tax harmonization to prevent downward drift in corporate tax levels. L afontaine subsequently lost the backing of Schröder in this challenge and resigned from office under substantial business pressure (R yner, 2003: 213-219). The M arch 2003 Agenda 2010 programme became in effect the SP D-led Coalition Government’s version of Kohl’s ‘50 point programme’. In introducing it Schröder stated that ‘We will reduce state benefits, encourage personal responsibility, and ask for more personal contribution’ (S chroeder, 2003, p. 8, translation). The stated rationale for the programme was to combat Germany’s ongoing problem of high unemployment by shifting responsibility for job seeking from the state to the individual. Central to the design of the reform programme was the Personnel Director of Volkswagen, Peter H artz, who was made Chairman of the reform body which then became known as the H artz Commission. The choice of H artz and the establishment of a Commission in 2002 to oversee the programme was significant in its own right. For in establishing a commission Schröder bypassed not only the incremental constraints of the semi-sovereign state but also the consensus mode of working with the social partners. O nly two members of the 21 person Commission were from the trade unions, and only one from a business organization. S chröder followed up this move with the announcement of the closure of the F ederal M inistry of L abour and its incorporation into a new M inistry of E conomic A ffairs headed by a right wing SP D member. The L abour M inistry was as S treeck (2005: 162) says, ‘the union stronghold inside the government machinery’. S uch a snub to the unions could only be interpreted as a move to distance the Government from union interests. A s the reform programme was then rolled out each phase was labelled H artz I, II , III with the last proposals (H artz IV) introduced in January 2005. Key details of the reforms were as follows:

 A genda 2010 is so named to achieve the 2010 targets for labor market deregulation and supply side initiatives of the E uropean Union’s L isbon S trategy.   http://www.german-embassy.org.uk/agenda_2010_reform_expectatio.html  –  accessed 8th M arch 2006.

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•

•

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O n January 1, 2004 the basic rate of income tax was reduced to 16% (from an initial rate of 25.5% in 1998) and the top tax rate cut to 45% (from 53% in 1998). H ealth service patients now have to pay higher prescription charges for medicines and a ‘practice fee’ of ten euros per quarter if they visit their doctor. F rom 2005 onwards, an additional monthly premium became payable to cover the cost of dentures; it is automatically collected with medical insurance contributions. S tricter rules about acceptable employment apply for the long-term unemployed: job seekers can expect to have their benefits cut if they turn down jobs. The M odern L abour M arket S ervices A ct (H artz I), came into force on January 1, 2003. It aimed to facilitate a rapid return to work of difficult-to-place job seekers by promoting temporary employment or contract work run through privately run Personnel S ervice A gencies (PSA s) attached to local employment offices. Job seekers who set up their own business as an Ich-AG (M e plc) can receive subsidies from their local employment office for a period of three years (600 euros per month in the first year, 360 euros in the second, and 240 euros in the third). These grants are tax-free and non-repayable. A ‘minijob’ involves part-time employment with gross pay of up to 400 euros a month (as at 2003). These jobs are designed to be ‘attractive’ to employees because they are tax- and deduction-free – even as secondary employment alongside a taxable main job.

While the SP D-Green Coalition Government reworked the German sozialstaat the employers launched a parallel offensive against organized labour. Central to the offensive was a drive to redefine the boundaries of the system of collective agreements to the employer’s advantage. This was achieved by some employers leaving the sectoral agreement to establish their own ‘in-house’ agreement, most often with a less ‘militant’ union than under the old arrangements. The number of extensions of agreements to non-unionized organizations also declined (H assel, 1999; Jacobi, 2003). N ew opportunities to exploit cheaper labour were also opened up as the Wall came down. Production shifts to the countries of CEE increased as German companies expanded their assets abroad. S imilarly the ‘old E ast’ was used as a ‘test-bed’ to force the abandonment of labour-friendly regulative practices such as the provision of holiday and Christmas bonus pay, or overtime premia for S aturday working. M ore intensive working methods were also introduced within the manufacturing sector, most notably in the key auto industry (Upchurch, 1995). These changes were significant, as they meant that co-determination could now be used to suppress workers’ pay through a creeping programme of negative wage drift or even payment unter Tarif (Bispinck, 1997). This is in marked contrast to the ‘golden age’ of (West) German social democratic trade unionism of the 1960s through to the 1980s, when the system of co-determination could be utilized by the Works Councils (more often than not under union influence) to enact a

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process of positive wage drift through the application of workplace based bonuses above the collective agreement. While the unions were on the defensive against the employers the scale of the shift of the SPD in office to a programme of labour market reform was nevertheless met with considerable opposition from the trade union rank-and-file. It is the content of this opposition, both in quantitative and qualitative terms that would determine whether or not the dominant party union nexus would remain intact as its prized Modell Deutschland fell into disarray. Alternatives? Co-determination formed a core part of the particularized form of social democratic industrial relations in Germany. We have suggested that the SP D might be better placed to deliver reform of Modell Deutschland than the CDU, simply because of its ability to ‘persuade’ the union leaderships that an SP D government is preferable to one led by the CDU. S uch a ‘dented shield’ approach carries huge risks should the Parteienverdrossenheit evident in Germany alter direction towards the development of any left alternative to the SP D and their collaborators in Parliament, the Green Party. O ur analysis would suggest that the SP D’s long term retreat from socialist reform of capitalism has brought the social democratic model of trade union/ party relations to a point of severe tension. The party continues to see a decline in its supporting base. The party has lost 180, 000 members in recent years and is now in the midst of a faction fight between Right and Left. Most significantly, the proportion of workers voting for the SP D has been steadily declining since the late 1980s. S ince 2001 the share of workers’ votes for the SP D in the west has been only slightly higher than that of all voters, and since 2003 has been lower than that for all voters in the east (N achtwey and S pier, 2007). The drop in fortunes for the SP D in the 2005 federal elections heralded in the Grand Coalition under A ngela M erkel. The M erkel-led coalition has since consolidated reforms without expanding their total scope. In fact, M erkel has more recently claimed her support for the social market economy at the expense of A nglo-S axon style market liberalization. The main fall-out of the reform agenda has consequently fallen on the SPD. In this respect popular opposition to the reform agenda has not confined itself solely to electoral misfortune for the SP D. O pposition also came from the trade union rank-and-file and lower levels of the trade union apparatus. It is to these events that we now turn. The Unions and Industrial Disputes In the past Modell Deutschland has acted to protect the interests of the unions. We have argued that this neo-corporatist protection was a specific characteristic of  S ee ‘M arch to the middle: M erkel celebrates Germany’s social market model’, Financial Times, 11th June 2008.

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German social democratic trade unionism. But as Greer (2008) illustrates in his study of public services, neo-liberal restructuring has meant that German trade unions can no longer rely on the old vestiges of social partnership. The unions have been faced with rapidly deteriorating labour market conditions since unification, which have included industrial restructuring (especially in the east), rising unemployment, increased casualization and outsourcing, and increased incidence of pockets of low pay. A ll of these factors, together with the restructuring of public services, have acted to undermine their structural power (Dribbusch and S chulten, 2008). Membership of DGB affiliated unions peaked at 12 million immediately following unification in 1990, but fell to less than 7 million by 2005. Most importantly the defeat of the IG M etall in the 35 hour week dispute in eastern Germany in 2003 was a severe setback for the unions, and was followed by successful employer offensives to increasing working time. A s a result of these contextual factors and membership trends DGB affiliates have been forced to review their strategies of recruitment, organization and retention as well as their political orientation. Initial responses to the H artz Commission’s proposals from the union leaderships were cautious but certainly not hostile. M ichael S ommer, chair of the DGB described the proposals as ‘socially just modernization’ while both IG M etall and Ver.di focussed on the positive improvements contained in the proposal on childcare and collective bargaining autonomy (E ironline, 2002). H owever, a groundswell of opposition by rank-and-file and middle layer sections of the unions developed in response to the reform process. A loose coalition of activist networks from the trade unions organized the first large demonstration against Agenda 2010 in N ovember 2003, when an estimated 100,000 marched in Berlin led by the banners of Ver.di and IG M etall. Core to the protest was an ethos of anti neo-liberalism, which had begun to emerge earlier in Germany with the growth of the global justice organization ATTAC with numerous trade union affiliations. This network was subsequently consolidated in a 500 strong fringe meeting of German trade union activists at the E uropean S ocial F orum in Paris in N ovember 2003 (Bornost, 2005). In M arch 2004, Ver.di and the DGB called for a national day of action against the reforms and an estimated half million people demonstrated in Berlin, Cologne and S tuttgart alongside A TTA C, social organizations and church groups (E ironline, 2004). During 2004, further ‘M onday’ demonstrations took place against the reforms, mainly in E astern Germany. The Montagdemonstrationen in L eipzig during A ugust, 2004 were particularly notable with an estimated 60,000 protestors. It was at one of these protests that O skar L afontaine indicated a fracture in the SP D when he denounced S chröder’s plans ‘to dismantle the social welfare system’. The official position of the DGB is that the social state is a cornerstone  ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� A TTA C Germany currently has 16000 individual members and is supported by Ver. di, DGB S aar, four regions of the GE W and numerous other trade union branches (http:// www.attac.de/ueber-attac/was-ist-attac/mitglieder/) accessed 8th N ovember 2007.   ‘������������������������������������������������������������������� Germany: M onday Demonstrations continue to grow�������������������� ’������������������� by N orman Brewer, Green Left Weekly, online edition, S eptember 8th 2004.

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of social order and it vehemently opposes notions of a minimalist state. H owever, following a S ummit meeting between union leaders and S chröder in A ugust 2004 an uneasy truce was formed, after which the DGB refused to support the easternbased protests against the state reform programme. S imilarly when workers at the O pel factory in Bochum struck for a week in O ctober 2004 against redundancies they were refused support by the leadership of IG M etall. Despite the unevenness between east and west, the anti-H artz demonstrations, combined with industrial developments, have created a crisis of loyalty to both the SP D and the trade union leaders. The crisis was caused by widening disaffection with the SP D-Green Coalition and a rising tide of industrial action to express that opposition. In turn, the crisis manifested itself politically not only in a fall of votes for the SP D (and Greens) but also in the formation of new forces to the left. New Political Opposition While the structural and associational power of the unions weakened it became incumbent on some sections of the unions to turn to a more politicized approach to combat neoliberal restructuring. To a certain extent the political manifestation of the crisis was symbolized by moves by dissident trade unionists, including some regional full time officials, to participate in the creation of a new left wing group named the Arbeit und soziale Gerechtigkeit – Die Wahlalternative (WAS G) (L abour and S ocial Justice – the E lectoral A lternative). The new grouping, based in the west, adopted an explicit anti neo-liberal programme including opposition to the H artz reforms and backing for the protests. Prominent new members included Ulrich M aurer, the former head of the SP D parliamentary fraction in Baden Würtemberg, F ederal Constitutional Court justice Wolfgang N eskovic, and well-known leader of the Turkish Community in Germany H akki Keskin. Its economic programme included demands for more progressive taxation and demand management policies. In June 2005, the WAS G agreed an electoral alliance with the eastern-based Linkspartei resulting in joint lists in the S eptember 2005 F ederal E lections, and on 18 June 2005 the WAS G received a boost when it was joined by O skar L afontaine. Die Linkspartei was formed from the PDS which itself originated out of the remnants of the old E ast German ruling party, the S ocialist Unity Party. A s such the PDS still contained in its ranks many exCommunist and ageing activists, many of whom still have elected positions as local councillors within the E ast. Its leadership, under the triad of Gregor Gysi, L otha Bisky and M ichael Brie, have been anxious to break out of the party’s eastern ghetto by downgrading its S talinist inheritance and engaging in western-based politics (Thompson, 2005). Unity with the western-based WAS G offered a distinct opportunity to broaden appeal. Put to the test in the 2005 general election, the alliance received 8.7% of the national poll (25% in the E ast and 4.7 % in the West) and support in the West was twice the level compared to when the PDS stood alone in the previous election. This was a greater share of the vote than that received by the Green Party and slightly less than that of the FDP. Significantly, the new party

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took a considerable number of votes from the Green Party, which had appeared compromised by its support while in coalition for the SP D reforms and its internal confusion at the placement of German troops in A fghanistan. The new alliance now has 54 members in the national Parliament (12 of whom who are members of the WAS G), has broken through the 5% barrier in western Land elections, and has consequently fractured the dominance of the SP D in terms of labour-oriented Parliamentary representation. A two-year process of talks to explore a full merger of the Linkspartei and the WAS G was completed in June 2007 when the new party was formed with an estimated 72,000 members. The newly elected deputy leader of the party, O skar L afontaine, was at pains to place the party in a ‘social justice’ camp when he told the founding conference’s 800 delegates that ‘We are the party of the social state. We need a new force, The L eft, which says, “yes, we want to restore the social state”’.10 During the discussions leading to fusion, the fault line between anti-neoliberalism and anti-capitalism manifested itself in some tensions within the WASG/Linkspartei debates over future policy.11 M ost importantly, the prospect of the L eft Party entering coalition governments in the L änder raises the possibility of such coalitions introducing austerity policies which conflict with the party’s anti-neoliberal platform. Despite these tensions the new party felt confident enough for Dietmar Bartsch, its managing director, to offer talks in June 2007 to the SP D ‘if conditions were right’.12 This was followed up by an offer from the L eft Party to form a new coalition with the SP D and to replace A ngela M erkel with an SP D Chancellor. The offer was rejected by the SP D and in an interview in Der Spiegel Peter S truck, chair of the SP D parliamentary group called the offer ‘laughable’.13 Despite the SP D’s belligerence the party continues to see a decline in its electoral base. The left, represented by party chair Kurt Beck, wished to reverse some of the S chröder labour market reforms but is bitterly opposed by the SP D’s traditional right wing led by F ranz M üntefering, SP D vice-chancellor.14 The faction fight could lead to a break up of the current Grand Coalition if the left of the SP D holds sway. This might even open the door to talks with the L eft Party over a new coalition, at least at Land level. F or the unions such new political developments, combined with joint activity with social movement organizations, signal an ‘opening up’ of their activities in ways which we have hypothesized. But caution is still necessary. The propensity for unions to develop new strategies in the past always appeared constrained by 10  Irish Times, 18 June 2007 p.11. 11 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������� This has already manifested itself in the Berlin WAS G standing against the Linkspartei: PDS in the Berlin local elections, where the PDS have participated as a governing coalition partner in a programme of spending cuts. 12  Financial Times, 19 June 2007 p.9. 13  Guardian 25th June 2007. 14  Financial Times (World edition) ‘SP D power struggle threatens M erkel coalition’ O ctober 9th 2007. A majority of delegates subsequently supported the left’s proposals at the SP D Congress in H amburg in O ctober 2007.

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the ‘embeddedness’ of German unions in the institutions of social partnership (Behrens et al., 2003: 39), and their focus on the ‘core strategy’ of sectoral bargaining (H olst, 2008). E ven the union associations with the new L eft Party, as Jüncke (2007) suggests, may be constrained by the bureaucratic culture of the unions. There is also evidence of some unions (e.g. IG BCE , the mining, energy and chemical union) accommodating to neo-liberalism by arguing for enhanced German competitiveness (Dribbusch and Schulten, ibid), reflecting a ‘third way’ position focusing on the supply of human capital through the upgrading of skills and education. Despite such constraints Behrens et al (ibid) and Turner (2007) have recorded some limited evidence of revitalization strategies being undertaken as neo-liberal reform of the social model has gathered pace, including both widening and broadening of agendas within the ‘organising approach’ as well as mergers, coalition building and international co-operation. Bischoff and Bremme (2006) report that the US service industries union, SEI U, have conducted organizing seminars for Ver.di in H amburg, and Ver.di have conducted some basic organizing offensives in the LI DL supermarket chain (see http://lidl.verdi.de). The education union, GE W, has attempted to directly recruit students at university by offering free membership (E ironline, 2005). A nnesley (2006), in a study of Ver.di also records some innovative activity in the public sector, with the establishment of ‘blank spot’ projects to recruit in greenfield areas and city centre ‘one-stop’ shops. A ttempts at networking across traditional union boundaries have emerged among hi-tech workers in the S iemens dispute over redundancies (Croucher et al., 2007), while networking initiatives on an international basis are reported from union representatives in BASF plants in Germany, A rgentina, Brazil and Chile (Dribbusch and S chulten, ibid). Unions have also shown recent evidence of new engagement with social movements and organizations such as the Clean Clothes Campaign. A s well as union involvement with A TTA C, the DGB and individual unions have allied themselves with environmental campaigns such as Greenpeace and Deutscher Natur Ring, and some anti-fascist organizations (Behrens et al., ibid: 34-5). O n the international front both Ver.di and IG M etall have expressed a willingness to become engaged in the E uropean and World S ocial F orums, supporting calls for ‘Decent Work’ and the embedding of ILO standards in the work of the World Trade O rganization (WTO ). IG M etall organized two key workshops on union/N GO co-operation and union organizing in MN Cs at the N airobi World S ocial F orum in 2007. A gain, in contrast, IG BCE have expressed some caution to such internationalist engagement with N GO s and ‘post-S eattle’ campaign organizations, and have focused instead on arguments for corporate social and ethical responsibility (Dribbusch and S chulten, ibid). What these small initiatives nevertheless indicate, is that significant sections of the German trade unions have now opened themselves up to the possibility of working in newer, less bureaucratic and more risk prone ways. Central to this development has been a commitment to oppose neo-liberal initiatives at state and workplace level. The focus on anti-neoliberalism is inevitably intertwined with opposition of the unions to state and employer policies within Germany, and

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gives explanation to the recent upturn in industrial disputes from 2006 onward (E ironline, 16 July 2007). M any of these strikes have been in the public sector, such as the 2007 rail industry dispute and the local government pay disputes in 2008. The continuing accommodation of the SP D in coalition government with the CDU/CS U to neo-liberal agendas will mean that the current crisis of social democratic trade unionism remains unresolved. A s such, the new L eft Party, for example, has been given the opportunity to develop within the context of workers’ fears of neo-liberal restructuring, together with global justice movement concerns and general anti-war sentiment. Indeed there is evidence of trade union involvement with the new party which would confirm a more fundamental break with the dominance of the SPD. Regional officials of IG Metall and Ver.di were both active in the formation of the WAS G, even to the extent that the economic programme of the new party was drafted by staff from the economics department of Ver.di. (Bornost, 2005). M uch will also depend on the outcome of the factional in-fighting within the SPD itself. Central to this factionalism is the question of the SP D’s future role as a party representing workers’ interests, and in turn the future of social democratic trade unionism in Germany.

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Chapter 4

S tate, Unions, and L abourism in Britain The British case of social democracy can be defined by its bias towards liberalism and the dominance of ‘labourism’. These specificities flow from the separation of economics and politics between union leaders and the L abour Party (LP ). It parallels the duality of ‘class’ and nation’ which we have defined as a cornerstone of social democratic ideology. The relationship has often been strained, but ultimately the ‘political’ wing of the party-union nexus has subordinated the ‘economic’ wing and class struggle has been suppressed. A lthough the general paraphernalia of social democratic neo-corporatism has been relatively absent in Britain there has been a distinct relationship between trade unions and a mass party of labour in which the agenda of social justice and equality has been dominant. The immediate postwar period saw a consolidation of this model as the majority L abour Government adopted a Keynesian programme of demand management and gave birth to the welfare state. For this reason we can justifiably add the British case to a particularized relationship between state and unions that falls within the west E uropean social democratic camp. H owever, the British L abour Party was also at the forefront of Third Way thinking under Blair, while the unions suffered more than their west E uropean counterparts from state and employer offensive against their power. To further understand British peculiarities some additional factors need to be considered. This Great Movement of Ours The first peculiarity is sometimes defined as ‘labourism’, and is delineated by the solid and enduring organic relationship between the trade unions and the LP . L abourism began to emerge in the last quarter of the nineteenth century after the demise of the radical ‘direct action’ Chartist movement. It was exemplified by a reliance on industrial strength to fight for worker interests albeit selfconsciously contained within the prevailing system of capitalism (S aville, 1973). Political action was to be pursued firstly through the demand for the vote and then in Parliament itself. F ranchise for the working man (but not woman) was effectively won in the passage of the 1867 R eform A ct. When this reform from above was granted, it was given in response to agitation from below and also as recognition of the inevitable progress of liberal democracy in a modern industrial age. In this context the demand for the vote must be seen as a demand that directly  S uffrage for women had to wait another half century!

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challenged the power of the state, the capitalist and land-owning classes. The vote, once won, focussed the minds of the new trade union leaders. The first Trades Union Congress took place one year after the 1867 A ct, and raised the possibilities of achieving social change by lobbying sympathetic L iberal MP s and pressing petitions in constitutional fashion. The predominance of the craft based unions also gave a sectionalist flavour to the labour movement at a time when unions had difficulty in organising the mass of unskilled men and women living in the poverty of late Victorian Britain. The militant period of ‘new unionism’ from the 1880s, led by avowed socialist leaders in the rapidly expanding unions, was nevertheless contained by the trade union leaders and fledgling TUC who pursued the strategy of petitioning and lobbying parliament for reform. By the turn of the century there were two million union members in Britain, double that which existed twenty years before, and by the outbreak of the F irst World War in 1914 working class organization cemented with union membership increasing further to four million. The rapid rise of the trade unions in terms of membership and the spread of collective bargaining from the 1880s through to 1914 also saw the emergence of a layer of full time trade union leaders and a national bargaining framework which rapidly took on a bureaucratic form with an associated distancing from the rank-and-file. The model for such unionism came from the Amalgamated Society of E ngineers (ASE ), which had succeeded in forcing the employers into a system of joint regulation whilst building up its own resources and appointing a layer of centralized officialdom to co-ordinate and police member action. This new bureaucracy was described by the Webbs in their History of Trade Unionism (1894) as the ‘civil service of the trade union world’ who, by their constant association with businessmen and state officials, undergoes an ‘invidious transformation’ and ‘arranges compromises on terms distasteful to a large section of his members’. It was this bureaucratic layer of officials who formed the bedrock of the enduring alliance with the LP , utilising the union vote within the party machinery, doing deals with L abour and L iberal MP s, and often crossing the economic-political divide by standing as parliamentary candidates. Continued employer attacks on the unions spurred the desire of the unions to create their own political defence through parliament through a new labour-oriented party. S ome unions, particularly the miners’, were slow to divorce completely from the L iberals but in time, for the union leaders, the L abour Party became their Party. M embership of other socialist oriented organizations also grew in line with the trade unions. The co-operative movement, for example, grew from 600,000 in 1880 to three million in 1914, although the movement remained ‘aloof’ from the LP (H inton, 1983: 24). The emerging critical mass of working class organization allowed space for the trade unions to challenge the political status quo of Tories and L iberals, and in 1900 the TUC converted its Parliamentary Committee into the L abour R epresentation Committee (LR C). The LP , formed in 1906, in the words of E rnest Bevin, came ‘out of the bowels of the trade unions’ but from the beginning the fledgling party rejected revolution in favour of reform, with only the small S ocial Democratic F ederation (S DF ) taking an unequivocal revolutionary stance.

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It was strongly influenced by the Liberal reformers of the day, whose chief aim was to eliminate poverty by social reform rather than by the abolition of capitalism. A ny M arxist current was on the fringes of the new movement. Indeed, a greater influence than Marxism upon its founding members was that of religion. This was particularly true of the Independent L abour Party (ILP ), one of the groups central to the formation of the LP , which constructed an intellectual tradition in west Yorkshire strongly flavoured by Methodism, the Chapel and non-conformism as an alternative to the A nglicanism of the land-owning classes. O ne of the leaders of the ILP , Tom M ann, had even considered joining the priesthood while in the ILP (Cliff and Gluckstein, 1988: 15). The small radical faction, influenced by the British M arxist H .M . H yndman and the ‘utopian socialist’ William M orris, the S DF , initially participated in the LR C but then withdrew. In the absence of a clear political programme from the ILP the reformist majority orientation of the Labour Party was influenced theoretically by the Fabians, who led it to adopt a strategy focussed on parliamentary issues, leaving the industrial front to the trades unions. The F abians, led by S ydney and Beatrice Webb alongside other ‘bourgeois intellectuals’ such as H .G. Wells and George Bernard S haw, promulgated a gradualist version of socialism in direct opposition to M arxist revolution. Their ‘scientific socialism’ had its prime objective as the modernization of British industry ‘from above’ in order to compete with emerging E uropean competitors in the world market such as Germany. In such a scheme there was little space for any mass movement for societal change ‘from below’. A s M iliband observed ‘the leaders of the L abour Party have always rejected any kind of political action (such as industrial action for political purposes), which fell, or which appeared to them to fall, outside the framework and conventions of the parliamentary system. The L abour Party has not only been a parliamentary party, it has been a party deeply imbued by parliamentarianism’ (M iliband, 1972). Thus the ‘labour movement’ was defined by its labourism and constructed its two wings – the unions and LP, sometimes affectionately and other times cynically referred to as TIGMOO (This Great M ovement of O urs). A lone among the social democratic parties of Western E urope the LP has been provided with substantial funding by the trade unions. This still remains the case in 2008, with more than two thirds of funding for the LP provided by the unions, either as formal affiliation fees, as ‘top-up’ individual donations to party HQ, or as funding support for individual MP ’s campaigns in their constituencies. While only 16 of the 63 TUC’s affiliated unions are affiliated to the Labour Party among those affiliated are the largest and most important unions, especially those with substantial membership in the private sector. Most of the non-affiliated unions also have a leadership which orientates on parliamentarianism and labourism in the social democratic tradition. The affiliated unions donated £56 million to the party between 2001 and 2006 with Amicus donating more than £8 million, the Transport and General Workers’ Union (TGWU) £7 million, the shopworkers’ union USDAW nearly £6 million and the local government union UNISON more than £10 million. The domination of funding has also been accompanied with

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substantial voting power within the LP itself through the mechanism of block voting arrangements. The block vote has historically enabled a few trade union leaders, subject to varying degrees of discipline from the national executives, to wield enormous influence at party conferences. Pelling (1991: 202-204) records that at the height of the period of individual membership of the LP in 1952 there were just over one million individual members compared to a combined trade union block membership of just over 5 million. A s individual membership fell in the post-war period the dominance of the trade union block vote within the party machine increased in importance. By 1988 individual membership had fallen to 265,000, but trade union affiliated ‘membership’ was just under 5.5 million. Individual membership grew again until N ew L abour’s election in 1997, when it reached approximately 400,000. But by 2006 membership had plummeted once again to less than 180,000, and unions affiliated 2,639,284 members to the party. A t local level, at the height of its membership and activism, trade union delegates would also form the core of constituency associations of the party, and act as an essential core of foot-sloggers and door-knockers on behalf of L abour during elections. Trade union leaders have also been personally influential within the LP, often crossing the economic-political divide to become L abour MP s (although rarely, if ever, travelling in the other direction). In 1931, for example, after the split in the party more than half of L abour MP s were from the M iners’ F ederation. Trade union sponsorship of MP s continued throughout the war and post-war years with some reaching dizzy heights, such as the former dockers’ leader E rnest Bevin, who sat alongside Churchill as his ‘right-hand man’ in the war cabinet, and James Callaghan, a former official of the Inland Revenue Staff Federation who became L abour’s leader and Prime M inister in the late 1970s. A s such the subtle interplay of formal and informal influence wielded by the unions in these years was formidable. The Creation of a Dominant Party Union Nexus The TUC has remained the sole federation and peak organization of labour, and the trade union leaders have managed to pursue the ‘progressive alliance’ with the LP in its formative years, its years in opposition, and its years in power. Why is this so? It would be simple to suggest that this unity is a product of reformist consciousness of the majority of British workers. However, this would be a gross oversimplification. British labour history has exhibited a duality of radicalism alongside that of reform, and the practice of revolutionary trade unionism has bubbled beneath the surface during outbreaks of syndicalism and rank-and-filism on more than one occasion. The Chartist movement of the mid nineteenth century, the rise and agitation of new  �������������������������������������������������������������������������� A lthough the General F ederation of Trade Unions (GF TU) was established in 1899 to manage union dispute funds. It still exists for purposes of providing research and education support for smaller specialist unions.

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unionism in the 1880s, the period of the Great Unrest prior to World War O ne, the 1919 revolt and the shop stewards movement, the syndicalist movement and the formation of the Communist Party in the 1920s, the resurgence of the shop stewards movement from 1935-1945, and the rank-and file agitation of the 1970s are all testament to an alternative tradition. While these movements have been significant they have failed to sustain a lasting challenge to the dominant party union nexus. This failure to consolidate can be located in three factors. F irst, the duality of economics and politics and its associated creation of a parliamentary organization dealing exclusively with the political dimension allowed for the inclusion of trade unions in the body politik and the institutions of British society. The LP provided a national focus since the unions remained highly fragmented and in many cases localized while the TUC had little unifying function or role. While leftwing union activists may have continued to agitate for extra-parliamentary activity, the central focus remained on parliament. A ny alternative route of revolutionary action against the machinery of the state had much less contextual application, and is in contrast to developments elsewhere in E urope where workers’ exclusion from the franchise or the machineries of state was more apparent. A s H inton (1983: 24) concludes ‘the formation of the L abour Party at the turn of the century represented, not a victory for the socialists, but the effective containment of the socialist impulse within older labourist traditions’. Its cross-over with L iberalism ensured that it presented only a weak version of social democracy from the outset, formed as an alliance between various socialist parties and the unions and lying somewhere between L iberalism and M arxism in ideological outlook. Its dominant ideological influence, however, was that of the Webbs’ ‘inevitability’ of gradualism. This ensured a thoroughly reformist orientation while ideas of radical change were pushed to the margins. S econd, the challenges from the left were either too divorced from the immediate aspirations of the mass of workers or were subject to unfortunate timing and unable to construct a viable alternative. The first minor challenge to the party union nexus came from syndicalism after 1911. The syndicalists held a critique of both the trade union bureaucracy and the parliamentarianism of the LP , but were divided in strategy. O ne strand of syndicalist thought, supported by Tom M ann through the Industrial S yndicalist E ducation L eague, agitated for more direct forms of democracy within the unions and the rejection of party politics. This translated itself into an orientation on reforming the trade unions from within, rather than necessarily building alternative trade unions, combined with a general abstention from building an alternative political organization. Indeed, such was the position of the syndicalist authors of The Miners’ Next Step written in 1912. The S ocialist L abour Party (a 1903 breakaway from the S DF ), took a different position. Influenced by the American socialist Daniel de Leon they sought but failed to establish alternative unions. H owever, whatever the strategic differences  ���������������������������������������������������������������������������� A number of reviews can be found of these movements see, for example, H yman (1987); Kelly (1988); Callinicos (1995) and M cIlroy and Campbell (1999).

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within syndicalism, its fate was determined essentially by the ebb and flow of class struggle, in conditions outside its control. H ostile circumstances thus meant that any challenge to the party union nexus was peripheral and embryonic. The immediate post war years following 1918 saw a return to class struggle with more political emphasis under the impact of the Bolshevik R evolution. This was not lost on the majority of British syndicalists, who abandoned their non-party orientation and turned towards M oscow by embracing the newly formed Communist Party (CP) in 1920 (Darlington, 2008). But by this time the LP had already emerged dominant in terms of its ability to represent workers’ interests, largely because of its role in the war when it consolidated itself both at local and national levels. In response to rising working class militancy and unrest it had also tacked to the left and expressed a distinct socialist programme of public ownership by its adoption of Clause IV of its Constitution in 1918. F rom 1920 until 1923 the postwar strike wave abated as the effects of unemployment and the defeat of the 1919 Triple A lliance between miners, railway workers and transport workers was felt, leaving less fertile ground for revolutionary politics. The split in the L iberal Party created more space for electoral advance by Labour, and the first minority Labour Government was formed in 1924. The fledgling CP was left with little alternative but to orientate itself on the L abour Party, both as individual members through the trade union connection, or more formally by calling for affiliation to the LP (a move consistently rejected by the LP leadership). L enin and the M oscow-based party had argued for such a course of action, primarily as a tactic to expose the reformist nature of the LP leadership. The consequent failure of the CP, however small, to break workers’ mass allegiance from the LP in this period, including the 1926 General S trike, was crucial. Klugmann (1969: 331-332) suggests that membership of the CP probably fell from 3000 to 2000 in this difficult period. Klugmann’s ‘official’ Communist Party history is cautious in offering insights to this period. The ‘orthodox’ Trotskyist position of Woodhouse and Pearce (1975) is less reticent and claims that the CP had by 1926 become completely S talinized and that this was the cause of strategic errors. H inton and H yman (1975) present a more sober view, by recognising the individual role of CP members but also pointing out that for much of the period the policy of the CP leadership was actually to the right of S talin, and the British CP had dragged its feet in implementing the M oscow advice to build a vanguard rank-and-file cadre within the unions. During the General S trike itself, the slogan ‘All Power to the General Council [of the TUC]’ was a reflection not only of the British CP’s strategic orientation on the trade union leaders (Dewar,  ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� The influence of Moscow on the British CP is the source of considerable debate and argument. F ishman (2004: 382), for example, from a CP position, has argued that ‘for much of the time many Comintern-affiliates operated without let or hindrance from the centre’. A critique of this argument can be found in Campbell and M cIlroy (2005).  ������������������������������������������������������������������������� The N ational M inority M ovement represented such an attempt, but has been critiqued by H inton (1975: 138) as being weak in its industrial base and ‘dependent on the open or tacit support of left-wing officials for its advance’.

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1976: 61-62), but also of its tacit recognition of the hegemony of both the TUC and the LP . This is not to say, however, that CP members had an unimportant role within the unions. Individual CP members fought hard as class warriors. A reality recognized by the British state in its imprisonment in 1925 of most of the CP leadership (as the state prepared for the General S trike) and the arrest of many CP militants during the strike itself. The fact that the CP was influenced by a foreign power was undoubtedly an additional factor in the repression. But the 1930s and 1940s can be characterized, in particular, by CP members’ important influence in rebuilding shop steward organization in major sections of British industry. CP members had access to training in agitational techniques and resources that others lacked, but in addition they were also ‘prepared to go where wiser men had feared to tread’ (Croucher, 1982: 33). The third and final reason for dominance lies within the trade unions’ ability to absorb and contain dissent. M inkin (1992: 647-9) in his book The Contentious Alliance suggests that the resulting alliance, however fractious, would not be broken due to the class based character of the LP , its ‘broad tent’ nature which can accommodate radicals, and the binding glue between unions and party encapsulated in the concept of TIGMOO . The emphasis on economic issues at the expense of politics also allowed the union leaders to remain pragmatic in the face of difficulty, and to stand at the head of periods of militancy while at the same time containing the militancy within the economic rather than political framework. S uch ability to ‘walk on two legs’ is epitomized in the radical mission statements of the unions in which political demands for social justice, redistribution of income, and equality of man (sic) form part of the constitution. Within this pragmatic ambivalence the trade unions could be home to both radical socialists and working class Tories. The paradox is shown clearly at times of industrial militancy, when the trade union leaders and TUC, generally with the implicit approval of the state, are able to place themselves at the head of the rising tide of militancy, as in the Triple A lliance of 1919-20, and in the 1926 General S trike. TUC opposition to both the 1969 ‘In Place of S trife’ legislation and the 1971 Industrial R elations A ct provides a more complex interplay of state and union relationships, with the TUC both mobilising and constraining rank-and-file opposition. In addition the TUC and its affiliate unions, despite federalism, have been able to summon just enough authority to discipline dissent. Discipline has been directed mostly against the left but also against the right wing as the TUC did when suspending those unions who complied with state registration under the terms of the Conservative’s 1971 Industrial R elations A ct. The ability of the union leaderships to discipline the rank-and-file is one crucial construct of social democratic trade unionism which has been carried over into the unions’ historic role. The trade union leaders have acted to ‘hold the centre line’ in their relationship with the LP . A t times their role as representatives of class interest has led them to oppose the L abour leadership when it has strayed too far in the ‘national interest’ over such issues as the attempted abandonment of Clause IV in the 1950s or in the proposed application of restrictive labour legislation. In this respect the union leaders have acted as a class barrier to what they have perceived

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as the worse excesses of the LP establishment. O n the other hand they have been willing to use their block vote against the left in the party, against the CP, against ‘dissenters’ such as Bertrand R ussell in the 1960s, and against the post 1968 new left from the 1970s onwards. A Liberal Market Tradition rather than Social Democratic Corporatism? S ocial democracy and labour relations in Britain needs to be viewed through the lens of a liberal market political tradition. This ‘liberal collectivism’, as Crouch (1977) defines it, has involved ‘a system of indulgent pluralism, with only a few attempts at [state] involvement, and with conflicts treated as interests’. This has manifested itself in a passive role of the state and the jealous guarding by both employers and trade unions of their independence. F or example, unlike some continental counterparts British unions have neither been given nor sought any state-sponsored role in distributing social assistance. The second Victorian R oyal Commission examining trade unions reported in 1894. It endorsed reliance on ‘indulgent pluralism’. Its conclusions, taken mainly from the evidence supplied by leading employers, were that industrial relations were at their best when strongly organized trade unions met stable employers’ associations in voluntary negotiations (Phelps Brown, 1986: 29). E mployers favoured such national arrangement with union leaders as an alternative to local arrangements subject to more rank-andfile militancy. In practical terms this ‘voluntarism’ has meant the prime concern for unions has been the protection and maintenance of free collective bargaining, rather than state regulation of wages and conditions of employment. S uch liberal voluntarism flows from the specific historical development of British capitalism, whereby free trade and free markets (or rather imposed trade and imposed markets) brought benefits to the dominant trading nation. However, British trade unions have not benefited from the establishment of a set of basic rights as is the case in much of western E urope. N o written constitution has been prepared to create such rights. Rather, unions have had to fight for immunity from prosecution for damages sought by aggrieved employers. S uch was the legacy of the nineteenth century L iberals who ‘gave’ unions immunities. Ironically this may have made the trade union movement more dependent on state patronage and favour than would otherwise have been the case, and has meant that the balance of class forces at any one time has had important legislative consequences. F or example, the concessions given to unions in 1871 by the L iberal Government were framed by a rise of newly enfranchized workers in the ‘N ew M odel Unions’ of craft workers and in more militant general unions of the unskilled (M artin, 1980: 28). In contrast, the Trades Dispute A ct in 1927 was introduced following the defeat of the 1926 General Strike, and entailed unions in the public sector losing their ‘right’ to affiliate to the L abour Party while immunities from prosecution for ‘political’ strikes were removed and workers had to contract-in to the political levy.

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A no less important contextual feature in the British case is the relative stability of the UK political system. The state has avoided both revolution and defeat in war over the period of domestic development of industrial society. O ne consequence is that the phenomenon of national reconstruction and the demand for a grand compromise between capital and labour on a consensual basis has been generally absent (Crouch, 2003). The state (except in the periods of the two world wars) has had less recourse to appeal to the trade unions for help in rebuilding the nation’s economy. The formal machinery of liberal corporatism has thus been relatively muted and where corporatist mechanisms have appeared in peace time they have been much weaker than their continental counterparts, more ad hoc and pragmatic in their nature, and treated with more suspicion by both trade unions and employers. A n exceptional period of involvement of trade unions in the machinery of government was during and following the S econd World War. Incorporation of the trade unions into decision-making structures was deemed essential by the Churchill wartime Coalition Government to ward off growing rank-and-file militancy and the threat to arms production and the national war effort. F ormer union leaders such as M inister of L abour E rnest Bevin proved crucial to the government in convincing the TUC and its affiliates of the necessity of keeping the machine lines running, and indeed in enabling space for employers to intensify work effort. Bevin’s Government role in the war years was substantial in expanding reforms to working people (such as the extension of food subsidies, the abolition of means testing for unemployment benefit and the introduction of price control). A t the same time he acted to suppress union disputes with the drafting of the E mergency Powers (Defence) A ct, which outlawed strikes and restricted labour mobility in ‘essential’ industries under O rder 1305. H is style of working established a consultative approach which prefaced the period of British neo-corporatism. A s M artin (1980: 271) observes ‘H e [Bevin] emphasized consultation from the start’. By 1947, in the period of post-war reconstruction undertaken by the first majority Labour government, trade union representatives were sitting on no less than sixty separate state bodies, compared to only twelve in 1939 (Bornstein, 1984). TUC General S ecretary S ir Walter Citrine sat on 30 public bodies and at the end of the war could tell the Congress ‘We have passed from the era of propaganda to one of responsibility’ (TUC, 1946). S uch was British social democratic corporatism at its peak. H owever, the scope of corporatist arrangements remained limited by political intransigence and employer hesitance. This became evident at the time of nationalization. S tate planning and control of industry were not regarded as vehicles to challenge the power of capital and enact social change (M iliband, 1972: 272-317; Coates, 1975: 47). F or example, from the 1920s the major unions, especially the miners’ union, had lobbied to nationalize major sections of industry, but there appeared little appetite or interest among the union leaders to go beyond the concept of state ownership to raise the agenda of workers’ control. F or the TUC and other union leaders the number of trade union representatives who sat on the newly created boards of the nationalized industries seemed a more important concern (M artin, 1980: 290). The establishment of tri-

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partite Development Councils on a sectoral basis had minimal impact, with only a few sectors coming on board as business leaders refused to participate (H inton, op cit: 175-176). Despite trade union opposition to government wage restrictions in 1948 and in the 1950s the continued loyalty of the trade union leaders and their refusal to usurp the power of capital did not go unnoticed at the highest levels. A fter a long period of uninterrupted Conservative Government through the 1950s into the early 1960s it might be assumed that a more abrasive relationship would have been created between the Government and the unions. But this was a period when Conservative Governments embraced minimalist neo-corporatism with the establishment of both the tri-partite N ational E conomic Development Council and a N ational Incomes Commission. A s Crouch (1977: 206-207) suggests this was a period when ‘the Compromise was still dominant’. A t the TUC Centenary in 1968 union loyalty to the national interest was observed by no less than H er M ajesty the Queen, who, in her address to those gathered at a celebratory dinner in L ondon’s Guildhall paid tribute to the work of the TUC and asked ‘that you will continue to provide wise leadership on which the future of our country so much depends’ (cited in Taylor, 2000: 1). From Welfare State to Revisionism In 1951 British social democracy was at its zenith and it could be argued that the liberal market tradition was challenged with the creation of the British welfare state. The mood for a new Britain was undoubtedly a product of ordinary workers’ desire for change and ‘no return to the thirties’. H owever, subsequent analyses of this period would suggest that the nationalization of industry and the welfare reforms were more a product of the state’s desire (including both L iberals and Tories) to modernize British capitalism than a project to build socialism. A s Padgett and Paterson (1991: 138) argue ‘In the final analysis Beveridge and Keynes (both Liberals – authors’ emphasis) exercized more influence over the creation of the British welfare state than those L abour leaders who put it on the agenda’. Perry (1986: 158-159) also claims that L abour’s ‘reluctant collectivism… tended to absorb and neutralize the social democratic tradition’. Crisis followed. The cost of the war and its Korean overhang, and the fuel shortage sparked by the exceptionally cold winter of 1947 threw the British economy into a crisis of national debt and placed the Government at the mercy of bale-outs from the US Government. The conditionality attached to M arshall A id and debt relief in 1946/47 meant the abandonment of inflationary policies and a retreat to deflation and market liberalization. The atmosphere of the Cold War also soaked into the psyche of many trade union leaders resulting in purges of CP members in many unions and the adoption of an anti-Communist stance by the TUC in international affairs (Carew, 1987: 30; Weller, 1988). Communist Party influence in the unions had been on the increase since 1941, with the CP reaching its peak membership of 56000 in late 1942. CP militants were often at the forefront of wage militancy campaigns but, in reality, their influence remained small and was ‘badly damaged’

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by the Cold War offensive against them (Stevens, 1999). Any flirtation with ‘fullbodied’ social democracy as an agent of social change was also subdued as the TUC engaged in a period of economic crisis management in the national interest. A s such the unions had to deal with Governments of both persuasion and their key adversarial mission as ‘bargainers first and foremost’ was re-affirmed ‘seeking deals, negotiating agreements and settlements for their members at work and not simply obedient servants of a party or ideology’ (Taylor, 2000: viii). S uch deals might focus on defending the principle or key aspects of the welfare state, but went side-by-side with trade union and TUC pressure for ‘economic growth and higher productivity and efficiency’ (Taylor, 2000: 10). As such the trade union leaders consolidated their position as mediators between the state, the employers and union members, and old debates rekindled about the separation of the interests of the bureaucracy from those of the rank-and-file. Rank-and-file discontent filtered upwards to the trade union leadership, causing renewed tensions between the unions and L abour, which spilt over into a left-right battle within the party over ‘revisionism’. The revisionist ideological thrust from the right was supplied by A nthony Crosland in his 1956 book The Future of Socialism which foresaw a ‘peaceful revolution’ in terms of capitalism’s and business’ ability to present a human face. Crosland went further and postulated that capitalism only pertained to Britain from the 1830s to the 1930s. In 1956, he argued, it did not apply. S uch a revisionist denial of class society was taken further by L abour’s leader Gaitskell in 1959 in his attempt to abandon the Clause IV commitment to state ownership of the means of production. Gaitskell’s subsequent rebuff by the party was orchestrated by the unions, who still held dear to the sentiment of class interest. In riposte, H arold Wilson, the new leader of the Party and Prime M inister from 1964, published Labour and the Scientific Revolution. The publication echoed the earlier F abian visions of the Webbs in its desire to raise British industrial productivity by a process of technocratic modernization. The publication avoided the Clause IV question but promised instead a ‘new deal’ for science and education in an effort to boost Britain’s competitiveness. In common with the Crosland/Gaitskell approach the publication envisaged no difference between the interests of business and that of the common people. A new coherent revision to ideology had emerged from within the L abour leadership during this period and into the 1970s which downplayed the role of state ownership and ‘equality’ but which foresaw the concept of a L abour state focussed on the development of individual ‘liberty’ (M eredith, 2005). Problems, however, remained in industrial relations. From Boom to Bust A s the long post-war economic boom ran through the 1950s and 1960s the locus of power had once again shifted to the gathering shop stewards movement. The ensuing discord was addressed by the establishment in 1965 by the L abour Government of the R oyal (Donovan) Commission into the state of British industrial relations (which reported in 1968). The relatively weak discipline of the trade unions and

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TUC as the ‘peak’ organization of labour meant that neo-corporatist mechanisms of wage restraint proved continually difficult for the trade unions to sustain. This is in contrast to S weden, H olland, A ustria and West Germany where any rank-andfile pressure to abandon arrangements was contained institutionally (Bornstein, 1984: 60). O f most concern was the system of workplace bargaining whereby local negotiations by independent shop stewards created upward wage drift and in so doing usurped the discipline of the trade union central collective bargaining machinery. E mployers’ evidence to the Commission called for legislation to enact formal contracts of national collective agreements, but the final Report reenforced a voluntarist approach and recognised the reality of workplace bargaining by promoting local productivity agreements. Much of the Report’s findings and recommendations were influenced or written by industrial relations academics of the pluralist school (such as A llan F landers, H ugh Clegg and Bill M cCarthy) who, as R eid (2005: 300) observes, ‘had [roots] in the social-democratic opposition to the rise of dictatorship in inter-war Germany’. F landers had for a period been a member of an ethical socialist group in 1920s Weimar Germany (Kelly, 1999), while one of the leading labour lawyers involved in the R eport’s production, O tto Kahn-Freund, was a Jewish Social Democrat who had fled Germany in 1933 to come to England. The social democratic flavour of the Report was designed to consolidate bureaucratic forms of trade unionism at the expense of workplace power. The voluntarist nature of reforms to the system were thus designed to contain rank-and-file militancy and to bureaucratise local workplace bargaining by creating closer ties between workplace union representatives and the full time officials of the unions (Cliff, 1970). This was aided by the encouragement of a ‘professionalized’ personnel function policed by the Institute of Personnel M anagement, by an increase in full time plant convenors and senior stewards, and by the creation of an independent appeals system. Donovan also recommended the development of various schemes of worker participation. H owever, these longer term reforms were not enough to stem the continuing tide of unofficial strikes, which became increasingly subject to co-ordination by the rank-and-file. Within this milieu the CP had also established a L iaison Committee for the Defence of Trade Unions in 1966, with the aim of building a left oppositionist alternative in the unions. The L abour Government from 1966 chose to directly confront militant groups of workers and then attempted to restrict union immunities with the introduction of its 1969 ill-fated In Place of Strife proposals. Increased rank-and-file wage militancy also met with a response by the state in terms of a change in approach to corporatism. In the immediate postwar period the state had utilized corporatist arrangements both to draw unions and employers into planning machinery (although weak and relatively ineffective) as well as to introduce wage controls to stem inflationary pressure. In the 1970s the emphasis from both Conservative and Labour governments was confined to creating social pacts with unions to restrain wage growth, rather than utilising corporatism as a mechanism of industry planning. Conservative Governments in this period began the process of retrenching consultative mechanisms such as the N ational

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E conomic Development Councils (founded by the Conservatives in 1961) and sought to take on the trade unions by introducing legislation restricting trade union immunities from prosecution. The L abour Governments from 1974 to 1979 under H arold Wilson and James Callaghan dealt with the union problem by attempting to impose voluntary and then statutory wage restraint in return for concessions in the social wage and an increase in individual rights at work. M ost spectacularly the demise of the Keynesian Welfare S tate and the conversion to monetarist orthodoxy was premised by the imposition of cash limits to spending in the public sector. This was the L abour Government’s response to the conditions of the 1976 International M onetary F und loan deemed necessary to stem the economy’s crisis of inflation. But each time the government attempted to impose wage restraint the dam eventually broke, most spectacularly in the ‘Winter of Discontent’ of 1978/79 when the bitterness of the rank-and-file public sector workers against the Social Contract agreed with the TUC could not be contained. The legacy of the period was a revision and re-affirmation of tensions to be found between class and nation at the very core of social democratic trade unionism. The struggles over wages and jobs during the period marked a ‘quantitative and qualitative’ change for union activity (H yman, 1999a), including a successful work-in between 1971 and 1972 at the Upper Clyde shipyard against job shedding (F oster and Woolfson, 1999); two successful miners’ strikes against the Government and employers in 1972 and 1974; the emergence of a movement for workers’ control over industry; and the development of far left inspired rankand-file political organization in the unions led not just by the CP but also by ‘new left’ groups such as the International S ocialists/S ocialist Workers Party (see M cIlroy, 1999, and Darlington and L yddon, 2001, for a review of the period). A new group of left-wing trade union leaders had also emerged, such as H ugh S canlon of the engineers and Jack Jones of the transport workers, who were prepared to go further than usual in pushing the class interest of their members (Panitch and L eys, 2001). It also saw the rise and then fall of left-wing opposition within the L abour Party, coalesced in the early 1980s around Tony Benn’s bid for the deputy party leadership (which narrowly failed) and an ‘alternative economic strategy’. But by 1979 many union members of different political persuasion were in despair of the Labour Government’s policies in office, most especially for its continued attempts to restrict wages and thus the quality of life for ordinary workers. The re-emergence of mass unemployment, reaching over one and a quarter million by the end of the decade, did not help L abour’s cause. In the 1979 General E lection nearly one-third of trade union members voted Conservative, and the consequent disarray and confusion among organized workers allowed the incoming Thatcher regime to launch a new period of capital accumulation in Britain marked by a full bloodied return to the ‘normality’ of market liberalism. A ny last remnants of corporatism were swept aside as trade union leaders were pushed into the cold and corporatist bodies dismantled as the primacy of market forces was imposed. The subsequent series of Parliamentary A cts passed by the Government reversed most of the immunities gained by the unions in the immediate post war period. Protective

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legislation for the individual at work also regressed. In marked contrast to the zenith of social democratic corporatism of thirty years earlier British industrial relations became, in substance, its very antithesis with trade unions excluded from the body politik and stripped of state protection. A s Phelps Brown observed of the period, ‘What is remarkable in the reaction of the trade unionists is their passivity. The new laws were severe only if they were enforceable, and enforceable only if there was no general and spontaneous impulse to repudiate them. It was such an impulse that over-turned the 1971 A ct; ten years later none such arose’ (Phelps Brown, 1986: 16). The spirit of the 1970s, while forming a beacon of trade union militancy at the time, had been suppressed by the L abour Party and their allies in the unions and had re-confined itself to sectional and economic militancy rather than the development of sustainable political radicalism. The whirlwind of unemployment and the Thatcher offensive dissipated rank-and-file militancy and depressed left wing oppositionism in the unions. S uch was the initial crisis of social democratic trade unionism in Britain that when exposed to successive ‘salami tactic’ onslaughts of employers and the state against the steelworkers, civil servants, teachers, print workers and, most importantly, the ‘vanguard’ of the miners in 1984/85 the trade unions could not summon the necessary solidarity or political will to resist. The confidence of union activists to challenge the employers and state independently of the union leaderships was severely dented. In the aftermath the solution offered by the trade union leaders was to see a return of a L abour Government at any cost. A New Consensus? The period from the mid-1970s under L abour through to the Thatcher-M ajor years of the 1980s and early 1990s marked the beginning of a new ‘consensus’ among British Government leaders (Cohen, 1994; H ay, 1997). This consensus was marked by a commitment to monetarism and the control of inflation at the expense of Keynesianism and the maintenance of full employment; and an abandonment of any commitment to expand the welfare state. It also marked, within the L abour fold, a deepening of the Croslandite revisionism of three decades earlier. As Howell (1980: 318) observed ‘The revisionist scenario impl[ied] the final, deliberate extinction of a decaying social democratic perspective, basing this on a claim that the party should not even appear to function as an instrument of fundamental change’. The Thatcher regime added privatization to the pot pourrie of gathering neo-liberalism. The incoming N ew L abour Government in 1997 remained fully committed to continuing the consensus, but added ideological fervour to the mix with its espousal of a third way approach to living with ‘really existing globalization’. This ideological position owed much to Giddens’ appeal to redefine the concept and practice of social democracy (Giddens, 1998; Blair, 1998), most notably by suppressing class conflict and identity in the pursuit of global industrial competitiveness. While granting some early concessions on

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union recognition and a M inimum Wage the N ew L abour government refused to sanction the abandonment of restrictive trade union legislation enacted by the Conservatives. F or the trade unions this new consensus posed considerable dilemmas. H aving been cold-shouldered by L abour in the 1970s and then left out to freeze by the Thatcher Government the unions now found themselves faced with a L abour Government that was prepared not only to treat them with suspicion but also to create a distance between party and unions. Indeed, the ideological stance of N ew L abour had deepened beyond the revisionism of the last L abour Governments to such an extent that the old certainties of the social democratic party-union nexus could no longer be guaranteed. A s we have argued throughout this book the accommodation of social democracy to neo-liberalism has reshaped the relationship between workers, unions, and the traditional party of labour. The mechanisms and processes of this contemporary realignment of forces now need to be examined in more detail. New Labour The approach of N ew L abour to the unions and industrial relations must be seen in the context of the continuing productivity gap between Britain and its main competitors in the globalising economy (Upchurch, 2008). The 1997 N ew L abour government inherited a production regime described by R ubery (1994) as a ‘low wage, low skill economy, unable to compete in or effectively adjust to the demands of new international competition’. The strategy in the ThatcherM ajor years had been to focus on restructuring industry by market mechanisms, and in so doing clear market ‘rigidities’ which were allegedly caused by protective labour regulation and excessive trade union power. But despite the restructuring of the UK’s industrial base and the attacks on the collective interests of labour the productivity gap between the UK and its major competitors remained. This gave grounds for N ew L abour to contend that a different approach was needed if the productivity gap was to be closed (see Porter, 2003). A s H ay (2004) has observed N ew L abour’s chosen approach transmuted into the ‘dual objectives’ of credibility in financial markets and competitiveness in the productive economy. This approach assumes that risks in the international product market can be minimized by adopting supply side solutions to the market problem (Thompson, 1996; Green et al., 2001). This involves both a drive to increase labour market flexibility (a continuation of the Thatcher neo-liberal project) but also to upgrade human capital through education and skill training (the main area of change under N ew L abour). Labour market flexibility is pursued in a continuing attempt to reduce labour market ‘rigidities’, while human capital is constructed through ‘employability’ and ‘adaptability’ under the aegis of the Gordon Brown’s much-vaunted post neoclassical endogenous growth theory. The resulting model of social liberalism is consistently presented as progressive and necessary in a globalized economy. H owever, the experience of previous L abour Governments was always tempered by the opposition of the rank-and-file worker to any attempt to impose

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constraint by the Government in pact with the union leaders. N ew L abour attempted to deal with this ‘worker’ problem in three ways. F irst, was to clear the ground by ‘modernising’ the party with a purge of the hard left and a dilution of union power in the form of the block vote. S econd, was to maintain restrictions on the power of organized labour through the discipline of labour flexibility and legal constraint. Third, was to encourage an ideological shift in thinking away from traditional adversarialism towards a consensus- based system of industrial relations. The strategy of the new Government was summed up in Tony Blair’s introduction to the 1998 Fairness at Work White Paper. It is worthy of quotation at length: This White Paper is part of the Government’s programme to replace the notion of conflict between employers and employees with the promotion of partnership … The White Paper steers a way between the absence of minimum standards of protection at the workplace, and a return to the laws of the past. It is based on the rights of the individual, whether exercised on their own or with others, as a matter of their choice. It matches rights and responsibilities. It seeks to draw a line under the issue of industrial relations law. There will be no going back. The days of strikes without ballots, mass picketing, closed shops and secondary action are over. E ven after the changes we propose, Britain will have the most lightly regulated labour market of any leading economy in the world. M y ambition for this White Paper goes far wider than the legal changes we propose. It is nothing less than to change the culture of relations in and at work – and to reflect a new relationship between work and family life … Already modern and successful companies draw their success from the existence and development of partnership at work. Those who have learnt to cherish and foster the creativity of their whole workforce have found a resource of innovation and inventiveness that drives their companies forward as well as enriching their lives (Blair, in DTI 1998 foreword).

The then Prime M inister’s phraseology undoubtedly sent some shivers down the spines of the trade union leaders. Despite such trepidation the ‘model’ of industrial relations proposed by Blair initially appealed to the TUC. The TUC founded its own semi-independent Partnership Institute in 2001 to act as a lobby group and consultancy to business, and began to promote ‘six principles’ of ‘good’ partnership as a potential strategy of union revival. F or the employers, the Confederation of British Industry (CBI, 2003) was clearly cautious not to concede ground to trade union representation, preferring instead to emphasize the value of direct rather than indirect representation. H owever, despite its caution, the CBI endorsed the TUC’s 1999 Partners for Progress document (TUC, 1999). The TUC embrace of partnership also has a certain strategic intent, reflecting the TUC’s desire to once more be seen as a legitimate actor both within society in general and with employers in particular. In contrast to its earlier ambivalence to the E uropean E conomic Community, the TUC sought to draw upon the labourfriendly institutional implications of the ‘E uropean S ocial M odel’ as a source of

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legitimacy. The emphasis by the TUC on a supposed link between partnership and increased business performance is much in evidence in its own literature, as well as that of the TUC Partnership Institute. F or example, a TUC review of progress of partnership in the UK reported in 2002: When bosses and employees work together in partnership businesses increase productivity and profitability, they have less staff turnover and less sickness absence (TUC, 2002).

There is also an underlying assumption that it is possible to achieve its six principles if the underlying conditions for ‘good’ partnership’ are in place. Consequently the TUC’s agenda has embraced concerns about patterns of corporate governance, reflecting the general critiques of ‘short-termism’ and shareholder benefit at the expense of ‘stakeholders’ outside of the boardroom. Counter arguments for a refined form of company pluralism have been set out by the TUC’s Stakeholder Task Group, where TUC Policy Officer Janet Williamson argued for a company web of stakeholder interests ‘each of which is based on mutual dependence’ (Williamson, 1997). Good partnership practice would thus sit side-by-side with ‘good’ corporate governance. What had emerged in just five years of New Labour was a triple alliance between Government, employers and the TUC on the value of high performance work systems, responsible corporate governance and employee involvement. M ore importantly, this new ‘triple alliance’ had been founded on the ideological pursuit of the Third Way programme of consensus within a risk society be-devilled by the perils of globalization. This particular world view was supplemented with an analysis of society emanating from the Marxism Today perspectives of the ‘N ew Times’ essayists (see H all and Jacques, 1980), which claimed the fragmentation and disintegration of the traditional working class in a thesis of class de-alignment. S ubordination of notions of class struggle was integral to the project to ‘modernize’ social democracy, whereby policy was to ‘transcend’ or, alternatively, to ‘combine’ any difference between L eft and R ight (Driver and M artell, 2002: 86). S uch a thesis is somewhat tentatively explained further by Driver and M artell (ibid.: 95): Blair’s third way combines rather than transcends L eft and R ight but, in doing so, produces new configurations which in themselves may not be easily identifiable as being strongly either L eft or R ight. Combining L eft and R ight can lead to contradictions or be mutually undermining. It may lead to situations where choices have to be made between L eft or R ight over the other, but not necessarily

 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� It is claimed by Terry (1997) and H ay ( 1999: 10) that Blair was a reader of Marxism Today and a believer in the ‘N ew Times’ analysis of post-modernist class fragmentation. Unfortunately, for the (somewhat embarrassed) writers of ‘N ew Times’ such as S tuart H all and M artin Jacques, Blair’s Third Way response was to entertain neo-liberalism.

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In adopting this philosophical approach N ew L abour clear the ground for the abandonment of socialist critique of the market and the associated validity of class struggle. O r, as the then Chancellor Gordon Brown told the CBI at their 1999 Conference ‘we must never again be seen as anti-success, anti-competition, anti-profit, anti-markets’. In adopting such a stance any difference between state, market and class is absorbed and subsumed within a milieu of what Weltman and Billig (2001) describe as ‘anti-politics’. L eft behind from the era of ‘traditional’ socialism is a form of ‘ethical socialism’ that gives priority to community over class, ‘in which the S -word is retained but in its hyphenated form of social-ism’ (Callinicos, 2001: 46). The ‘transcending’ of Left and Right within New Labour’s quasi-official third way ideology was nevertheless combined with a more traditional attack on the L eft by the R ight wing of the Party. The origins of this attack lay with the earlier party leaderships of N eil Kinnock and John S mith when L abour was in its eighteen years of opposition throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s. S uch an attack was justified by the Labour leadership as a precursor to a move to catch-all voter preferences in common with west E uropean sister parties and the US Democrats. However, it also sought to redefine the relationship between Labour and resurgent class interest represented by the unions, most notably with the ‘distancing’ of L abour from the unions. En route the attack took in a successful abandonment in 1995 of Clause IV of the Constitution, the expulsion of the far left Militant faction, and then a ‘distancing’ which took the form of the ending of formal trade union sponsorship of MP s, the search for alternative business-led funding, and, most significantly, the dilution of the power of the unions through the block vote (M cIlroy, 1998; L udlam, 2004; R ussell, 2005). The dilution of the union block vote was engineered through the creation of an electoral college in 1993 and initially reduced the proportion of votes held by the unions at Party conference from 90% to 70%. A s R ussell (ibid.: 196) reports the ‘modernizers proposed that conference might be reformed to exclude the trade unions altogether’. When Blair became leader in 1994 he proposed further dilution, and the union share was reduced by rule change to 50% in 1996. F or many years the block vote had been used traditionally by the right in the union leaderships against left wing challenges from the constituencies. A s such some of the more ‘left’ trade union leaders had been co-operative in the changes. In 1988, for example Bill M orris, then Deputy General S ecretary of the Transport and General Workers’ Union (TGWU), said that the reform of the block vote was ‘an idea whose time has come’ (quoted in M inkin, 1992: 364). N evertheless such dilution of union power within the Party weakened the organic connection between L abour and the unions. A s such it reflects deeper strain in the party union nexus. Indeed the process is continuing under the new leadership of Gordon Brown, who went so far as to propose to the 2007 L abour Party Conference that conference itself can only advise M inisters of

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policy proposals by submitting views to the newly created N ational Policy F orum. In assessing the shifting terrain of the party union link L eopold (2006: 3) concludes that the ‘distancing’ between unions and L abour has had the effect of shifting the unions away from the ‘insider’ status of a ‘union-party bonding’ model to one of ‘internal lobbying’. If L eopold is correct in his analysis the binding glue of TIGMOO would no longer be guaranteed to be there. R ather than assume a ‘winwin’ relationship between trade union leaders and L abour Party we might expect, within the ‘internal lobbying’ model, the development of a ‘win-lose’ possibility. A s such we can hypothesize an increase in the number, scale and depth of policy fault lines between the unions and the L abour Party which will have the potential to alter qualitatively the party union nexus. The Union Response to Blairism A s would be expected within a ‘crisis’ situation the response of those affected by the crisis, in this case the trade unions, has been mixed. We describe the response on three separate but interlinked fronts – the industrial, the political and the social. In terms of industrial strategy we have already noted the early willingness of the TUC and many of its affiliates to engage in the partnership framework encouraged by the Government. S uch an approach was foregrounded not only by the desire of the TUC to establish new legitimacy through productivity coalitions with employers, but also the relative quiescence of the rank-and-file as evidenced by the decline in dispute activity. This relative quiescence allowed the locus of power within the unions to gravitate towards the union leaderships, who, left without rank-and-file pressure were more open to collaborative overtures from employers and government. H owever, we will return to the fate of partnership later in this section. A s has happened so often in the past sections of the trade unions, including the TUC have exhibited an ability to ‘walk on two legs’, in this instance by a parallel adoption of the organising model of unionism alongside partnership as a second strategy of renewal. This organizing model, in contrast to partnership, reflected a deepening of employer-union adversarialism, albeit with the injection of techniques of ‘organising’ to increase union membership. M any of its techniques are adopted from experience in the USA , where trade union decline has been particularly severe. The TUC launched its own Organising Academy and many affiliate unions began to channel resources into seeking and applying more innovative methods of recruiting. Unions were encouraged to examine their own democratic procedures to generate a ‘new ethos’ and develop a campaigning approach to attract non-traditional workers (H eery, 1998). The focus has thus been on attracting new trade union members such as women and ethnic minorities and has involved deepening the bargaining agenda to include issues such as training, bullying and discrimination. E xpansion of union membership into previously unorganized workplaces has been a secondary aspect of the campaign. E vidence suggests that full time union officers now regard organizing and recruitment with

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higher priority than they did in the 1980s, with ‘considerable effort in identifying and grooming activists and building workplace organization’ (H eery, 2005a). H owever, while the new unionism marks a qualitative shift in emphasis towards a more open union strategy its results still appear limited in the UK. In the first few years more than 150 new organizers were trained at the TUC Organising Academy, but in three years of the scheme the trainees had brought in just 7500 new members to participating unions and a further 18000 through associated campaigns (H eery et al., 2000). By 2005 TUC estimates put the total number of newly recruited members by trainees in the order of 20,000, against an annual ‘turnover’ of TUC affiliated membership of 2 million (N owak, 2005). The reasons for the limited effectiveness of organizing are not difficult to define. Most importantly, the relative downturn in the levels of industrial disputes militated against rebuilding union organization based on an ethos of activism and engagement. Trade union membership decline in the UK, while severe in the private sector, has not been so devastating as in the US , so the search for alternative strategies has not been so urgent. E mployers remain less hostile to trade unions in the UK than they are in the US , so again there is less need to switch to a confrontational organizing approach. In addition the cultural shift needed of full time officials has been constrained by resources (Snape, 1994), and fear of power loss if the ‘organising’ approach releases too much discretion and control to an activated rank-and-file (Carter and Fairbrother, 1998: Danford et al., 2003). F inally, the increasing managerial insistence on tightening work regimes has undoubtedly led to difficulties in establishing ‘facilities time’ for trade union organizing. A s a result of these constraints downward diffusion of a rather diluted TUC organizing model has been difficult (Carter, 2000). The difficulties of operationalising the organising model have so far been confined to cultural and structural factors, rather than political factors. However, critiques of the organising model have also highlighted the de-politicized nature of the organising approach, in that organising has been seen by the unions as separate from political challenge to the status quo (S chenk, 2003; Y ates, 2003; Upchurch, F lynn and Croucher, 2008). H owever, as we have seen from our historical overview, surges of union growth have been spurred by an increase in rank-and-file industrial militancy, often led or organized by socialist activists inspired by a political vision to change society. We cannot ignore the political dimension of unionism if we are to understand prospects for union revival. With this in mind, it is of importance to note that on the political front a fault line has begun to develop centred on the consequences of neo-liberal policies and the associated attacks on public service provision. Central to the emergence of the new opposition within trade unions to N ew L abour has been the issues of public-private partnership (such as the Private F inance Initiative and academy schools), F oundation H ospitals, continued privatization, and, at the workplace, partnership practice itself (M urray, 2003). We have already argued that the Government’s productivity alliance with the unions and employers was framed by a shift away from adversarialism towards a regime imbued with consensus.

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While the organising model was at odds with such a shift the partnership framework appeared to grip the imagination of large sections of the unions. A s time has passed the issue of partnership has since become a cutting edge of difference between those in the unions wishing to work with N ew L abour’s ‘progressive workplace consensus’ and those wishing to express opposition. This gathering opposition has been central to the debates within the unions on the value, or otherwise, of the party-union link. This is exemplified by the election of the ‘awkward squad’ of trade union leaders outside the N ew L abour ‘modernising’ project, and the renewal of a sharp dividing line in industrial disputes crystallized in the firefighters’ 2003/2004 dispute and the consequent decision of the union to disaffiliate from the Labour Party. The disjuncture between government and union policy in the public sector has created a particular focus for the retention of partnership discourse by the TUC and public sector unions over the future of public service delivery in Britain. A 2003 TUC resolution referred to a ‘spirit of partnership which needs to be adopted between government departments and agencies and the trade unions representing workers in these important and demanding public services’. H owever, the strains between unions and government on this issue are highlighted in the resolution’s caveat: ‘Congress urges those in government to enact their obligations under international law, and not seek to remove the ability of the trade unions to protect their members by the use of industrial action. The trade union movement demands of its “political arm”, the L abour Party, that all partnership agreements are enacted with the full backing of international law, and that these are partnerships of equals and do not demand trade unions to be “silent partners”’ (TUC, 2003). Indeed, there is now evidence of leaders of major unions within the TUC wishing to move from ambivalence towards partnership towards hostility. Derek S impson, since being elected as General S ecretary of the important engineering based A micus union (which has since become part of UNI TE ), has challenged the TUC concept of partnership as a precursor for reviewing all the partnership agreements signed by the union. H e claims that partnership, as presently constructed, is ‘… all smoke and mirrors’ (quoted in M urray, 2003 p.125). The mood of change was summarized in comments given in a 2002 Red Pepper forum on N ew Trade Unionism by the CWU General S ecretary Billy H ayes: I think the other important difference between us and the 1980s-1990s model is the issue of partnership. I’m not against working with the employer; it’s what used to be called collective bargaining. We’ve worked with the Post Office management to get £2.5 billion from the Government for investment in the industry. But I’ve found anything that is announced as ‘partnership’ is more like supplication than negotiation. Weakness invites aggression; that’s the reality. Anyone who’s ever been an activist knows that the first word you learn not to hear is ‘N o’. When I’ve been with people who follow the partnership agenda they say: ‘The employers said we can’t have it.’ A nd they accept it. This sort of partnership agenda is dead (H ayes, 2000).

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Indeed the three largest unions within the TUC have now cautioned against partnership. The public service union Unison submission to the TUC 2004 R eview, for example, has argued: We suspect Congress H ouse has always had its own agenda based on the social partner imperative, but….could point to the need to maintain a political equilibrium among affiliates. Now that the pendulum has swung to the left, is this being reflected adequately?

A nd in similar vein, the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU) suggested: There is a danger … in the TUC being seen as an intermediary…or in being concerned to keep in with the Government – at the expense of the forthright presentation of working people’s agendas.

This is not to say that there is outright opposition to partnership, but rather one of retreat to a position in which partnership is viewed merely as a possible tactical approach with employers who may be reluctant to deal with unions on other terms. Amicus, for example, signed a major Partnership A greement in the print industry when in 2005 it sought the services of Professor F rank Burchill through the DTI S trategic Partnership fund to review the previous partnership arrangements (Personnel Today, 2005). The CWU also continues to sign partnership agreements with small employers on the fringe of the industry. General S ecretary Billy H ayes outlines the tactic in this way ‘We actually have partnership agreements in some telecommunication firms, where we do not have full negotiating rights. We regard partnership agreements in these certain instances, as an interim measure on the way to more mature and respectful relationship between equals’ (H ayes, 2006). S uch cautious opposition to partnership has, however, been exposed as more left wing trade union leaders have emerged in recent years, and as the outcomes of previous partnership arrangements have proved disappointing to the rank-and-file. The election of a ‘broad left’ leadership of the Public and Commercial S ervices Union (PCS ) in 2003 is one such example, whereby the previous long-held support for partnership in principle has been reversed (Beale, 2005). H owever, there are deeper constraints to the development of partnership which would indicate grim prospects for the vision. M ost importantly, the ‘mutuality’ implied by partnership continues to ignore the everyday reality of workplace conflict and employee exploitation. In circumstances where Britain’s productivity gap remains employers are bound to seek further intensification of work. Further constraints focus on the inability of  ������������������������������������������� Quoted in ‘N ew Trade Unions in the M aking’ Red Pepper TUC Special, L ondon, 2002.  ��������������������������������������������� Quoted in ‘S hift to L eft Demanded by Unions’ The Guardian 10/03/04.  ��������������������������������������������� S ee Upchurch (2007) for a review of evidence.

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third way ideology to overcome the continued subjugation of industrial relations to neo-liberal market imperative and unstable corporate governance practices (Sisson, 1995, Driffield, 1999; Upchurch and Danford, 2001). This point was well recognized by no less than the TUC’s ex-General S ecretary John M onks (now General S ecretary of the E TUC) in his A neurin Bevan memorial lecture given in N ovember 2006. M onks, the erstwhile foremost advocate of partnership, states: Partnership with who? There has been a disintegration of the social nexus between worker and employer – a culture containing broad rights and obligations. The new capitalism wants none of it … I did not fully appreciate what was happening on the other side of the table … it cannot be easy running a firm … when you are up for sale every day and night of the year (M onks, 2006).

Indeed, as R obert Taylor concludes in his review of the evidence for the Government-funded E conomic and S ocial R esearch Council (ESR C): The critics of partnership at work in Britain have certainly grown more widespread and influential in recent years. Their attacks have begun to exercise a significant influence over the attitude of public policy-makers towards the concept. Partnership has never been without its opponents who see it as an inappropriate means for developing new forms of industrial relations. N ow it is finding it difficult to remain on any public policy agenda at all (Taylor, 2004: 6).

From Opposition to Dissent While the increasing distance between N ew L abour and the unions can be clearly identified, the causes and effects of this distancing on union political strategy are complex. H yman (2001: 106) locates such distancing as a product of trade unions declining membership and economic effectiveness. H ence unions are less able to influence LP policy. Charlwood (2004) downplays divisions between unions and the LP by depicting the ‘awkward squad’ in terms of traditional left-right divisions within the labour movement and differentiates between those representing ‘left’ strands in old and large union sections (e.g. Kevin Curran, who emerged from the General, M unicipal and Boilermaker’s (GM B) ‘leftist’ N orthern R egion, Derek S impson from the engineering and electricians’ AEE U’s Broad L eft and Tony Woodley from the ‘left’ Transport and General Workers’ (TGWU) tradition); and those from homogeneously discrete unions affected severely by Government policy (e.g. M ark S erwotka of the Public and Commercial S ervices Union (PCS ) and A ndy Gilchrist (and then M att Wrack) of the F ire Brigades Union (F BU)). We would argue, however that both H yman and Charlwood do not import the full significance of progressive distancing. Firstly, while Hyman’s point on union power has obvious validity it is still the case that the LP has taken more note of the trade union position in the past when membership and power have been equal

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to, or lower than today. S econd, given the traditional loyalty expressed by trade union leaders to the L abour Party establishment it has always been the case that the left-wing of the movement have been a focus of dissent in times of tension. Charlwood’s assessment of the new opposition, or awkward squad, should for this reason not be surprising. We would suggest that there is now a deeper political differentiation premised on the future form of the party-union nexus. In actuality the crisis of social democratic trade unionism has created two broad responses from union leaderships: first is an attempt to influence New Labour policy by open criticism and internal lobbying, the withholding of funding, and a challenge to the L abour Party leadership to be more sympathetic to the trade union agenda (reform); and second is a minority position reflecting a fundamental questioning of the future of the L abour-Union link (rejection). A campaign for internal party reform is evidenced by motions criticizing the Government’s position at L abour and TUC Conferences and by attempts to coordinate protest among unions on a factional basis (L udlam and Taylor, 2003). A s with any factional campaign, the logical outcome is to reconstruct L abour with a new leadership, in this case openly sympathetic to the positions held by these unions. Derek S impson, for example, argues: The biggest threat to N ew L abour is the trade union movement. If it kicks into gear it can mobilise its troops, its finances, its block votes to bring down New Labour internally, that is within the Party (author’s emphasis).10

The process of achieving internal reform has entailed unions critical of N ew L abour’s leadership and policies engaging themselves in united lobbying campaigns within the Labour Party machinery. It confirms the shift already identified to a distinct lobbying relationship between union leaderships and the L abour Party hierarchy. F or example, Derek S impson, of A micus/UNI TE , Tony Woodley (TGWU/UNI TE ), Billy H ayes (CWU) and Tony L ennon (President of the Broadcasting, E ntertainment, Cinematograph and Theatre union – BE CTU) have engaged in projects such as the Labour Campaign for Electoral Reform to ‘reclaim the L abour Party’ for the left or have played a part in an alliance between some left wing union leaders and the S ocialist Campaign Group (L udlam and Taylor 2003: 739). H owever, N ew L abour’s abandonment of formal sponsorship of MP s by the unions has left the unions with less authority over MP s than used to be the case, and it does not follow that all union members who are MP s will follow the union line. Individual MP s who have union connections are now free to be members of union groupings but their relationship with union policy is non-mandatory. A n example of MP s’ ‘indiscipline’ came with the parliamentary vote in M arch 2007 to replace the Trident nuclear submarine, whereby 43 of the 64 L abour MP s who are Unison members voted with the Government despite Unison’s official opposition to replacement. Similarly 39 of 54 TGWU MPs voted 10 ����������������������������� Quoted in M urray (2003: 126).

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for Trident replacement despite General S ecretary Tony Woodley writing them all personal letters reminding them of the TGWU’s ‘long record of supporting the removal of Britain’s nuclear weapons, stretching back to the 1950’.11 In some despair affiliated unions have resorted to withholding expected monies to the party as part of their protest at individual policies. The CWU withheld £500,000 after the 2001 General E lection, and spent the money instead on campaigns against specific government policies, while the GMB withheld £2 million for similar reasons (L udlam and Taylor, 2003). In 2004, the GM B withheld a further £750,000 from a proposed £5 million special election fund and used the money to fund the union’s campaign against creeping privatization of the N ational H ealth S ervice (L eopold, 2006). In 2008 delegates at the GM B national conference also voted to withdraw financial support from individual Labour MP’s who were members of the union but who ‘fail to back traditional labour policies’.12 S ome union leaderships, such as at the GM B, are no doubt withholding money as a simple tactic to gain policy concessions from L abour. F or the F BU, however, the tactic culminated in a complete strategic break with Labour under rank-and-file pressure. The strategy of internal confrontation and bargaining within L abour has been further pursued by the ‘big four’ Labour affiliated unions – Unison, Amicus, GM B and the TGWU – who met L abour MP s in early summer 2004 to discuss an alternative election manifesto, made necessary in the unions’ view because L abour now needed to ‘reconnect the party activists and the public’ (Tempest, 2004). The ‘accord’ struck at a weekend forum in Warwick University in July 2004 with the then industry secretary Patricia H ewitt was in the best traditions of ‘TIGMOO ’. In the forum unions were promised manifesto commitments to guaranteed leave entitlements, enhanced rights to strike without fear of dismissal, and extra rights of transferred workers in the public sector. A future ‘review’ was also promised to examine unequal pay. Tony Woodley of the TGWU described the commitments as ‘serious movement’ and that a ‘united trade union movement is now being treated again with respect and dignity’.13 While some ‘movement’ was achieved the talks failed to win extra protection against unfair dismissal or compulsory pensions contributions from employers. M any of the promised reforms (on pensions and the ‘two tier’ workforce) were also already under progress from the Government. Fear that the Government would not fulfil its promises on pensions later led to threatened strike action by public sector unions in 2005, re- emphasizing the ‘fragility’ of the A greement (H eery, 2005b: 12). The resultant deal between the unions and Government was enough, however, to prevent the union leaders calling strike action, and reinforces the point that the unions may still form a buffer to government strategy. This would support Crouch’s (2001) contention that N ew 11 11������������� R eported in Socialist Worker, issue 2043, 24 M arch 2007. 12 �������������������������������������������������������������������������������� ‘Unions cut funds to MP s it says do not support L abour values’, by David H encke in the Guardian, 10th June, 2008. 13 ������������������������������������������������������������������������ ‘L abour promises extra holiday’, by Patrick Wintour and Tania Branigan, Guardian, July 26th 2004.

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L abour are still willing to make concessions to the unions in the face of neo-liberal imperative. H owever, local authority workers were excluded from key aspects of the pensions deal, leading to further calls for a series of one-day strikes in 2006. Unison then announced after the one day national strike in M arch 2006 that it would ‘refuse to finance, canvass or pay for printing leaflets for the council elections until a deal is reached on the pensions dispute’.14 In a parallel development, and despite the public service unions’ willingness to work in partnership with the Government over the future of public services, the unions were forced to call a one-day protest under the aegis of the TUC’s NHS Together campaign over the fate of the N ational H ealth S ervice (NHS ) in M arch 2007. The day of action interplayed with the Keep Our NHS Public campaign organized by activists at grass roots level, and produced an interesting mix of officially-led union action combined with unofficial political and community initiative. A minority position among the ‘awkward squad’, however, has been held by those unions and union leaders who have been prepared to abandon the link with the L abour Party altogether, either by openly declaring support for alternative parties and being expelled from the Labour Party (the RMT) or by voting to disaffiliate (the F BU). Within this grouping can also be included leaders of two public service unions (the PCS and the former college lecturers’ union – NA TFHE ) who are not affiliated to the Labour Party. The evidence of trade union leaders’ willingness to support parties other than L abour remains slight, and where the spectre has occurred it has been met with a strong response by the L abour Party leadership. The Party E xecutive took the decision early in 2004 to expel the RM T after six of its Scottish branches had voted to affiliate and donate money to the Scottish Socialist Party (SSP ). The Wrexham branch of the RM T has since voted to support Forward Wales and nine RM T branches in E ngland supported Respect.15 O ne CWU branch in Scotland affiliated to the SSP16 and one in S outh E ast Wales to Respect. The FBU disaffiliated from Labour early in 2004 and its London Region of the FBU backed Respect in the Greater L ondon A uthority and E uropean elections, while the Eastern Region gave financial support. A majority in the FBU leadership, however, appears committed to the possibility of reforming L abour from without, and gave its backing to the campaign of left L abour MP John M cDonnell in his bid for the leadership of the L abour Party in 2007. The expulsion of the RM T from the L abour Party nevertheless marked a watershed in the newly tense relationship between the trade unions and the Party. The expulsion of the RM T, whose antecedents had been one of the founders of the LP some one hundred years earlier, took place against a background of rising rankand-file militancy, political turmoil and general disaffection within the RMT with the N ew L abour Government (Berlin, 2006; Darlington, 2007). The expulsion in 14  Guardian M arch 30th 2006 ‘UNISON curbs support for L abour’. 15 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������� S ee www.respectcoalition.org. In December 2007 R espect split into two factions. 16 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� S ee www.scottishsocialistparty.org. The SSP has since split with a breakaway group called S olidarity launched by former MSP Tommy S heridan.

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2004 followed the RM T decision to allow local branches to campaign for and affiliate to parties other than Labour. New Labour, it was argued, had ‘deserted its working class roots’ and was ‘jumping into bed with its big business friends’ (RMT News, July/A ugust 2001). The RM T have since held a one day Conference early in 2006 to review possible alternatives for political affiliation, and convened a shop stewards conference in 2007 which pledged support for the RM T inspired Trade Union F reedom Bill, designed to overturn in Parliament some of the restrictive union legislation (see Darlington, 2007 for a review of these developments). The RM T followed their initiative with a call to establish a N ational S hop S tewards Network open to all bona fide rank-and-file affiliated trade union workplace representatives with the aim of offering support to all TUC affiliated unions in their campaigns and industrial disputes.17 S ubsequent membership debates about the L abour link have taken place in the CWU, the F BU, BE CTU and the Transport S taffs’ union TSSA (L eopold, 2006).18 The CWU leadership are committed to the L abour link, but despite this the CWU representative on the L abour Party N ational Executive stood down from his position in April 2007 citing ‘a growing conflict of interests between my role in representing and defending the views of CWU members and continuing to spend time on the L abour Party NE C’.19 M ark S erwotka of the Public and Commercial S ervices union (PCS ), Paul M ackney then General S ecretary of the N ational A ssociation of Teachers in F urther and H igher E ducation (N atfhe), and Bob Crow of the RM T also publicly supported both the ‘Convention of the Trade Union L eft’ sponsored by the S ocialist A lliance in F ebruary 2004, and S erwotka, M ackney, M att Wrack (F BU) and Crow also sponsored the Respect supported F ighting Unions Conference in N ovember 2006.20 The first Convention was attended by more than 700 union activists with Crow taking the opportunity to defend affiliations to ‘another socialist organisation’.21 S uch discontent within the dominant party union nexus has material roots. The RM T have consistently rejected the privatization ethos on the railways and L ondon Underground, while the F BU were embroiled in a two year long dispute over ‘modernization’ and pay in the F ire S ervice, in which the Government played a key role in blocking the F BU’s aspirations (S eifert and S ibley, 2005: 68-126). A s such the break with L abour was founded on real concerns of union members rather than a simple left-right political disagreement of the union leadership with N ew L abour. Three years after the industrial dispute with the N ew L abour Government the 2007 F BU Conference returned to the affiliation debate, but decisively rejected re-affiliation. This vote took place against the background of the support of the majority of the 17 ��������������������� www.shopstewards.net. 18 ���������������������������������������������������������������� Both BECTU and the TSSA voted to re-affirm the link with Labour. 19 ������������������������������������������������������������������ CWU Deputy General S ecretary Dave Ward in a statement reported in Socialist Worker 5 M ay 2007. 20 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� S ome of these General S ecretaries have also spoken on platforms of the S ocialist Party created ‘Campaign for a N ew Workers Party’. 21 ������������������������������������ A uthors’ taped recordings of speech.

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F BU leadership for the John M cDonnell campaign for the L abour L eadership. The failure of the campaign to gather the necessary parliamentary support for a challenge from the Left is significant in that it highlights the decline of serious and sustained left opposition within the Parliamentary L abour Party. It is in marked contrast to the heady days of post war Labour Party history which saw significant challenges from both the Bevanite and Bennite left to leadership orthodoxy. We suggest that the rejectionist position cannot be explained simply as an aberration in policy, or as a temporary ‘tiff’ between sections of the unions and labour in power, but rather as a minority collapse of the L abour-union relationship founded on a distinct political opposition to N ew L abour’s continuing neo-liberal policy direction. S erwotka, of the PCS , framed such opposition when referring to a series of attacks on the Civil S ervice: The only honest conclusion that can be reached from a consideration of these examples is that they represent a commitment to neoliberal ideology, and are not just isolated acts of political expediency designed to keep the Tories from regaining the initiative. It is not surprising that people are rejecting the notion that New Labour is as good as politics can get. Our task is, first, to map out a strategy to defend ourselves from the immediate attacks and, secondly, to articulate something better which is politically achievable (S erwotka, 2008).

A s we have hypothesized the crisis of ‘social democratic unionism’ is a product of the accommodation of social democratic and L abour-type parties to neo-liberal imperatives. The political logic of rejection, therefore, is to develop re-orientation strategies towards societal movements which reject neo-liberalism, and which if need be go beyond the traditional party-union nexus. S uch a position was suggested at the F ighting Unions Conference by Paul M ackney, then joint General S ecretary of the newly formed University and College L ecturers’ Union (UCU). A lthough the Conference was dominated by the debate about the unions’ relationship with L abour, there was also a contribution by M ackney who argued that there might be an additional element to trade union reorientation: relating to and harnessing the ‘spirit’ of the new social movements.22 It is to this reorientation towards a social movement identity that we now turn. New Social Identity? We have argued in chapter one that the possibilities for the development of new identities for unions is a function both of external drivers of crisis (in this case neo-liberalism) and internal drivers for change (both organizational and political). In particular, as R ainnie and E llem (2006) suggest, ‘it appears that labour movements at whatever level have to experience a near terminal crisis before 22 ������������������������������������ A uthors’ taped recordings of speech.

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the rigidities of old structures, attitudes and activities can be opened up to new and challenging ways of organising’. The prospects for the development of new social identity for British unions will thus be both encouraged and tempered by these constraints. What, then, is the evidence of prospect for change? H eery et al (2003: 88) highlight the ‘significant constraints’ on the development of social movement unionism (SM U) in the UK and imply that this may be unnecessary as a renewal strategy following the election of N ew L abour in 1997. H eery and A dler (2004: 60) also suggest that while union movements are faced with state policies of ‘exclusion’ they are likely to invest in organizing activity based on the US model. There has also been a concern to highlight the ways in which the ‘opening up’ of UK unions could be difficult in the context of political factionalism between activists and social democratic leaders (Darlington, 1994). A first analysis of trade union – social movement co-operation has shown that tensions have resulted from different internal organizations, accountability structures and ways of mobilization (Bieler and M orton, 2004; H eery, 2005b: 14). The question is whether trade unions are prepared to broaden their remit beyond the workplace and carry out the necessary internal restructuring, ultimately leading to a new social identity, necessary for the successful co-operation with other social movements, and this possibly at the expense of traditionally close ties with labour-oriented parties? While the practical reorientation of trade unions around a SM U strategy is weak and patchy there is, however, some evidence that trade union leaders are beginning to articulate this approach as a key element of strategic reorientation. F or some unions such as the RM T and F BU, as we have argued above, this reorientation interplays strongly with its rejectionist approach to L abour. E vidence of new social re-orientation, and a parallel embracing of social in addition to economic interest, also comes from unions (and indeed the TUC) which remain strongly committed to the Labour link. This new focus on the ‘social’ reflects the same concern with the ravaging effects of neo-liberal policies among these union leaderships, albeit that their political orientation remains focused on changing N ew L abour’s policies from within. The ‘awkward squad’ leaders were all elected from the rank-and-file on a pledge to increase membership participation, paralleling progressive forces within the TUC, for example, that have engendered a review of unions’ internal practices under the ‘new unionism’ approach. This process may involve challenging the undemocratic elements in the union hierarchy and, more fundamentally, an engagement with marginalized groups by drawing upon the practices of social movements. E vidence has been found of the informality and personal testimony elements of the women’s movement being incorporated into the TUC’s campaigning structures (H eery, 1998). H yman (1999b) also notes that the TUC appears to have relaxed bureaucratic practices in its encouragement of anti-racist campaigns. The TUC have also actively courted alliances with labourfriendly N GO s and convened a working Conference for trade unions and N GO s early in 2007, gathering support from established N GO s such as Oxfam as well as smaller and newer ones such Labour behind the Label. The leaders of public service unions have been particularly keen to frame workers’ discontent in terms

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of under-valuation or the low esteem in public service work and to link the defence of public services to demands for universal citizenship rights. This view has been articulated clearly by M ark S erwotka: What the government don’t seem to understand is that public sector workers have a pride in being public servants. This is an issue about civil society, workers don’t want fragmentation, they believe in basic decent services.23

The PCS launched a new Coalition for Better Civil and Public Services in M arch 2006 attracting support from L ondon Citizens, the Citizens’ A dvice Bureau, and the H oward L eague for Penal R eform.24 The union followed this up with a Make Your Vote Count initiative for the M ay 2007 elections whereby council election candidates were questioned by activists on their attitudes to civil service job cuts and privatization. M uch of this campaign was co-ordinated by PCS ‘Town Committees’ set up on an ad hoc basis in some towns and cities throughout the country. In a parallel initiative Unison and A micus activists have been central to the launch of the national campaign group Keep Our NHS Public which is also supported by the N ational Pensioners’ Convention as well as numerous academics, health service professionals, artists and journalists.25 Indeed, gathering union disquiet over the Government’s modernising’ agenda for the public services has gone beyond the new opposition in the unions. The TUC offered backing for a PCS one day strike and subsequently called for all union support for a one day protest against cuts in services on M ay 1st 2007. Government attempts to restrict pay increases for public sector workers saw further demonstrations organized by the Police F ederation in early 2008 and a one day co-ordinated strike of the N ational Union of Teachers, UCU and PCS on A pril 24th 2008. In assessing such new union coalition building F rege et al (2004) identify different typologies; while unions have often utilized the ‘vanguard coalition’ in the past (such as in the 1984/85 miners’ strike) the newer coalitions would appear to be more open to nonunion authority, representing the ‘common cause’ or ‘integrative’ type. A n example of ‘common cause’ coalition has been the support given by Unison both locally and nationally to the Defend Council Housing Campaign against the handover of public housing to social landlords in areas such as Birmingham (F rege et al., 2004: 141-142). A further five unions are affiliated to the campaign. In terms of localized ‘community unionism’ the picture is more modest with Wills and S imms (2004: 69) concluding in a study that initiatives have so far been carried out in an ad hoc fashion without an ‘overarching strategy’. H owever, they also highlight the Living Wage and Justice for Cleaners campaigns supported by unions in E ast L ondon and

23 ���������������������������������� ‘N ew Trade Unions in the M aking?’ Red Pepper TUC Special. 24 ������������������������������������������������������������������������� http://www.pcs.org.uk/Templates/Internal.asp?N odeID=897125 accessed 17th M arch 2006. 25 ������������������������������������������������������������������� http://www.keepournhspublic.com/index.php accessed 17th M arch 2006.

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the work of Battersea and Wandsworth Trade Union Council’s O rganizing Centre as local success stories. Beyond the defence of public services there is emerging evidence that many campaigns and coalitions of protest against contentious Government policies have resonated deeply within trade unions. The Government position and treatment of asylum seekers, for example, has been criticized publicly by Bill M orris, a L abour loyalist and former General S ecretary of the TGWU. H e has been joined by a further eleven trade union General Secretaries and Presidents in backing five open letters to the national media organized by the national Committee to Defend Asylum Seekers. The RMT, BECTU, FBU, UCU and Unison have all affiliated directly to the Committee, which is largely funded by trade union donations. H owever, it is the question of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq that has met with most official trade union opposition. The Stop the War Coalition now has a total of 13 national union affiliations and over 300 union branch affiliations. The tendency for trade unions to re-orientate as part of a broader movement must include a commitment to an active internationalism outside of the mainstream institutional avenues. This is best exemplified by the participation of trade unionists in the World and E uropean S ocial F orums. E ight national unions supported the L ondon ESF 26 as well as the TUC and the S cottish TUC. S peaking at the E uropean A ssembly in M arch 2004, the representative from the TUC linked explicitly the themes of opposition to war on Iraq, the rise of racism and fascism, and labour exploitation in the Third World to the possibility of a different world. H e also stated that for trade unions: O ur purpose includes economic and social justice for all in the workplace and in the community, our purpose includes respect for all in the workplace and community, our purpose includes employment rights for all, in the UK, in E urope and across the globe. A nd we are for peace in a framework of international law.

He further highlighted how the donation of £50,000 by London Region Unison was seen as a benchmark for contributions by other unions and that the TUC had written to every General S ecretary encouraging participation in the ESF . Unison also sent an official delegation of 30 to the 2007 World Social Forum in Nairobi and have actively engaged in supporting trade unions through educational programmes in both the former Y ugoslavia and some developing countries. We would suggest that the developments described above mark a limited, but significant shift in strategy in Britain towards an attempt to reorient trade unions as social actors, and also highlight the changing terrain on which trade unions are operating.

26 ������������������������������������������������������������������������� Affiliated national unions are TGWU, Unison, GMB, AUT, UCU, Amicus, TSSA and the RM T.

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Summary We began by defining the peculiarities of British ‘social democracy’ and its union movement. In particular trade unions in Britain have traditionally oriented on a L abour Party that has been parliamentary focussed above all else. N ot all unions have taken the step of affiliation to the party, and some in the public sector have been barred by legislation from doing so even if they wished. Despite this the ‘labour movement’ in Britain has been characterized by the close organic link between the unions and the dominant party of labour. The other aspect of social democracy, that of neo-corporatism, has been weak and sporadic in the UK, reflecting both a liberal market tradition in the body politik and a suspicion by organized labour and employers of the state. H owever, the demise of social democratic trade unionism can be discerned within the UK both in terms of form and content. Blair and Brown’s N ew L abour project has sought to distance the L abour Party from the unions while at the same time smoothing the adoption of neo-liberal policies through the ideology of the third way. This process has exacerbated strains in the alliance between L abour and the unions such that the unions have moved from insiders to lobbyists in their relationship with the Government. E ven without mass rank-and-file militancy expressed through industrial disputes a space has emerged in which new political orientations and social identities of the unions has emerged. S uch new forces remain marginal to the mass of union organization within the UK, but are nevertheless significant in their challenge to the traditional party-union nexus.

Chapter 5

The Persistence of F rench E xceptionalism? Introduction The formation of the labour movement in F rance demonstrates clearly that it is almost a polar opposite case to S weden. A series of structural and conjunctural factors shaped its development to produce a weak form of social democratic trade unionism that until recently remained subordinate to its communist oriented counterpart. L ike S weden, F rance industrialized late, but this was a slow and protracted process that produced economic dispersion. Coupled with the religious, cultural and ethnic heterogeneity of french society, this encouraged the formation of a decentralized and federalized union movement with low and uneven levels of membership density. F rance experienced democratization early and while the struggle for universal suffrage involved the popular classes, labour organizations remained illegal and subject to widespread and persistent repression by authoritarian employers and the state. This tended to generate a class as opposed to sectionalist basis for trade unionism, but ideological division proved to be rife. This was a product of political intervention into the formation of trade unions that saw various socialist tendencies attempt to shape the unions, but without any significant success. Indeed, the early twentieth century was marked by a clear decision by trade unionists to reject the strategy of seeking political influence through electorally oriented socialist parties in favour of political independence. The link between union federations and socialist parties remained weak and the ideology of democratic socialism remained undeveloped as socialist parties, faced with the challenge of communism, retained an ideological basis in M arxism. A lthough demonstrating a willingness to participate in government, electoral success largely eluded the socialist party that remained a weak and secondary electoral force until the 1980s. S ocial democratically oriented union federations have also been faced with intransigent and authoritarian employers whose lack of centralized discipline has militated against the formation of a social partner willing and capable of engaging in concertation. M oreover, until the post-war period, the state retained a highly liberal non-interventionist perspective and this was changed only by the strong challenge led by communist organizations with widespread mobilization capacity and legitimacy due to their prominence in the liberation movement. The post-war social settlement did not take the form of an institutionalized class compromise, but rather produced an ongoing situation of labour exclusion. The communist wing of the labour movement proved to be hegemonic for nearly half a century, but this was subject to challenges and eventually to crisis and collapse amidst global

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and domestic change. The current period of neoliberal globalization has served to strengthen the social democratic wing of the labour movement that has had the clearest strategic response to it. However, significant resistance to neoliberal globalization has generated clear evidence of an alternative strategic direction based around a social movement orientation and linked to a political alternative to neoliberalism. The social democratic orientation appears to be in the ascendancy, but its capacity to become hegemonic remains limited. It has been undermined most seriously by the persistent unwillingness and incapacity of employers to develop into a reliable social partner and by a legacy of radicalism that has contributed to sustaining mass mobilization in defence of acquired social rights. In chapter two, we addressed the issue of why it was that the S wedish labour movement was able to develop in the centralized and cohesive way that encouraged the formation of social democratic trade unionism. We highlighted how within the specific economic and political contexts, socialists played a vital role in the formation of this type of trade unionism. In this chapter, we focus, in contrast, on the way that the specific contexts within which the French labour movement emerged were not propitious for the formation of social democratic trade unionism. M oreover, we show how the enduring ideological and religious divisions in the working class served to hinder attempts to shape trade unionism into a social democratic form. Intransigent and Paternalistic Employers Industrialization in F rance was a slow and uneven process producing a ‘complex mosaic’ of industry (M agraw, 1992a: ix). Industrialization was slowed by the conservatism of bankers preferring low risk foreign loans to higher risk domestic industrial investment. It was not until the state ensured the necessary infrastructure, such as the railway system, was put in place that industry began to shift from the countryside to the town and even by the late nineteenth century, the majority of workplaces employed fewer than fifty workers. Small-scale enterprise encouraged a rather disorganized capitalism in which the balance of power in workplaces was firmly with the employers. Much worker resistance took the form of a defence of traditional skills and ways of life (M agraw, 1992a). Leading industrialists also had great political influence being admitted frequently to local and national elites. However, official employer organizations were restricted by law. S uch organizations as did exist lobbied heavily for the maintenance of economic and industrial liberties such as reducing import duties and opposing legislation curbing child labour. F or employers, the proper role of the state was limited to defending private property and maintaining social order (Jefferys, 2003a, M agraw, 1992a). By 1870, organized capital still remained undeveloped. It possessed very limited organization and no resources to pursue common action. Industrial relations were characterized by ‘contestation’ with ‘fragmentary, marginal’ contact between employers and workers (Crouch, 1993:

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77). E mployers remained implacably hostile to workers’ organizations and almost universally rejected collective bargaining (M agraw, 1992b) which by 1890 had become ‘sporadic’, but industrial relations were still characterized by strike action (Crouch, op cit: 83). E mployers remained highly authoritarian and were exceptionally hostile to challenges to their power in the workplace. The counterstrike action repertoire of employers included funding company unions, importing strike-breakers, and employing armed men to threaten pickets (M agraw, 1992b). By 1914, collective bargaining was at best ‘fragmentary’ and adversarialism was still rife (Crouch, op cit). While expressing an aggressive liberalism, hostility to unions was also a product of employer paternalism which was opposed to any working class independence as well as to state intervention into its ‘family’ domain. E mployer paternalism was heavily influenced by social Catholicism and originated in the mid-nineteenth century as a way of producing a disciplined working class in a country facing concerns about industrial and national efficiency amidst severe labour shortages and high immigration. Women workers were particularly affected by the introduction of religious practices into factories and domestic lives. R oss (1982a: 2) argues that it was ‘authoritarian paternalism’ which helped to establish the working class as a ‘class apart’ (ibid: 1) and fuelled its radicalism. H owever, working class anti-clericalism was somewhat contradictory. While often taking a militant and autonomous form, it sometimes pushed workers into supporting the values and politics of the secular republican bourgeoisie thereby integrating sections of the working class into the state. N evertheless, while occasionally supporting workers against overly intransigent employers, the state was generally highly repressive of workers’ organizations. State Hostility to Unions The origins of political radicalism amidst the emergent working class can be located in its participation in the bourgeois revolutionary struggles of the early nineteenth century which resulted, in 1848, in universal male suffrage being granted seven years earlier in F rance than in Britain (M agraw, 1992b). Interestingly, the term ‘social democracy’ appeared in F rance before anywhere else, but its organizational expression as the social democratic party was quickly ‘crushed by force’ in 1849 (M oschonas, op cit: 18). O ther organizations of the working class, such as trade unions, were also subjected to repression during the S econd E mpire and this marked a continuity with earlier manifestations of state hostility to workers’ organizations. The origins of this hostility are in the liberal thought underpinning the postrevolutionary constitution. R ousseau regarded associations of interest groups as socially disruptive as they stood between the individual and the general interest (Jefferys, 2003a) and this thinking encouraged the ‘annihilation of any sense of common interest intermediation between the individual and the nation’ (S ewell,

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1980: 89). A lthough conceived as a way of stopping the rebirth of corporations, the loi Le Chapelier aimed to ensure complete freedom of contract and was utilized mainly against workers’ associations (ibid). Clandestine and quasilegal organizations persisted and organized strike action (M agraw, 1992a), but repression was rife and tended to produce localized, fleeting and activist forms of organization (Jefferys, 2003a). A lthough the law was repealed in 1864, only the moderate, anti-strike chambres syndicales were tolerated which held the first national workers’ congress in 1876 (Andolfatto and Sabot, 2004). This was during the decade of repression that followed the bloody suppression of the Paris Commune in 1871 in which socialist and ‘proto-union groups’ went underground (M agraw, 1992b: 82). The aggressively liberal state had produced worker radicalism and the threat of socialism and so the state elite in the Third R epublic adopted a new approach developing social reforms as a means of working class integration. This produced a tension within the labour movement, but the main conception remained that the state was a coercive apparatus. This thinking produced much activist opposition to the loi Waldeck-Rousseau passed in 1884 which, while legalizing unions, retained a repressive edge requiring union registration and membership declaration (Jefferys, 2003a). R ising industrial strife encouraged the state to return to its ‘iron fist’ approach resulting in the shooting of strikers that alienated workers from the R epublic (M agraw, 1992b: 49) and reinforced support for a tradition of political radicalism that rejected participation in bourgeois politics. The Refusal to Participate In Przeworksi’s terms, F rench labour adopted a strategy of refusing to participate in bourgeois politics. It developed a revolutionary syndicalist unionism which, while articulating a transformationary class project, refused its subordination to socialist political organizations. This form of political unionism expressed the centrality of skilled workers to the labour movement, but was also produced by the relative weakness and fragmentation of F rench socialism. Padgett and Patterson (op cit: 6) argue that the ‘factionalism and fragmentation’ of socialism was due to the lack of the link with organized labour leaving socialism in the hands of intellectuals. The outcome was a divided and weak socialist movement (Milner, 1992). Magraw (1992b) identified at least six groups that vied with one another in the latter part of the nineteenth century. The ‘possibilists’ saw themselves as ‘the agents of the trade unions’ (M oss, 1976: 125) and made significant electoral gains based on Paul Brousse’s idea that public services could serve working class interests. Reformism was personified by Jean Jaurès who called for class alliances to achieve electoral success and so enable the working class to permeate the state and advance ‘little by little’ towards socialism (cited in Przeworski, op cit: 46). The Guesdistes split with the ‘possibilists’ in the 1880s and argued for a clear distinction between the economic role of unions and the

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political-ideological role of the Party. The Guesdistes’ attempts to subordinate unions to political imperatives failed as their ideology and practice went against the grain of the formation of the working class that saw skilled workers remain pivotal to the labour movement (M oss, 1976). While industrialization had subjected craft workers to severe exploitation and deprivation, it had not stripped them of control over the labour process. This situation generated the ideology of ‘trade socialism’ (19) that was advanced firstly as a class alliance of ‘radical republicanism’ (70) and later in the form of a class based revolutionary syndicalism. The primacy of revolutionary syndicalism, however, should not hide uneven regional developments such as in the north where the miners union was attached strongly to Baslyism. This reformist trade unionism developed a ‘regional corporatism’ and mobilized the vote for socialist deputies who should legislate for better working conditions and even for nationalization of the mines (M agraw, 1992b: 100). M oss’s argument links the formation of union politics with the form of industrial development. The M arxist orthodoxy was that comparatively late industrialization failed to produce a sizeable industrial working class as the basis for a ‘strong, centralized labour movement’ (M ilner, 1992: 215). In other words, social democratic trade unionism was not dominant due to the lack of a social basis for it. Indeed, the main socialist party (SFIO ) possessed only a small membership and had a greater social base in the peasantry than in the industrial working class (Padgett and Patterson, op cit). R evolutionary syndicalism was expressed organizationally by the formation of the CGT in 1895 and politically it aligned anarchists and revolutionary socialists. The latter were ‘A llemanists’ (after Jean A llemane) that rejected the electoralist shift in socialist politics in favour of a revolutionary struggle waged on both the industrial and political fronts by the union and the party respectively. This perspective on union-party relations contributed to the formulation of the Charter of Amiens that codified the rejection of political control of the CGT by the ‘quasi-M arxist’ (85), but reformist electoralism of the SFIO (M agraw, 1992b). Revolutionary syndicalism found its first home in the Bourses du Travail that advocated the general strike as the main means of revolutionary transformation. The Bourses combined with the CGT in 1902 and in 1904-6 agitated for an eight hour working day as a revolutionary reform which culminated in a failed general strike on M ay Day that was followed by intense state repression (M oss, 1976). E mployers also launched an offensive based on Taylorization that provoked strikes such as that at the R enault Boulogne-Billancourt factory: a location that was to become emblematic of the state of the union movement. O n this occasion, sackings reduced union membership to about 1% of the workforce. In the lead up to world war, the union movement remained small and in a state of impasse between revolutionary syndicalism and reformist socialism.

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From Labour Unity to ‘Polarized Pluralism’ The F rench labour movement entered the World War united, but around the Union Sacrée that required party and class differences to be set aside and the triumph of reformism was expressed in the CGT/SFIO Comités d’Action whose aim was to defend workers’ sectional interests while collaborating with the defence of the nation. The effects of war production and of the war itself re-exposed divisions within both the CGT and the SFIO . The CGT leadership shifted to a neutralist position while condemning the syndicalist led, but largely isolated, anti-war strike wave in the L oire in M ay 1918. The SFIO leadership remained loyal to the defence of the Republic and only a minority supported a pacifist position (Magraw, 1992b, A mdur, 1986). F ragile labour unity was shattered by the quasi-revolutionary upheaval of the immediate post-war period. F ierce industrial strife occurred as the tripartite mechanisms developed as part of the war economy were dismantled and the state and employers rejected the reformist overtures of the CGT and SFIO . Indeed, moderate union leaders felt increasingly squeezed between the ‘two sets of savage brutes’ of syndicalists and government-employers (M agraw, 1992b: 188). Thomas, a moderate SFIO ex-minister, argued for an internationally brokered shorter working day as a bulwark against Bolshevism, but legislation passed in 1919 was undermined by the patronat. The government responded to the ensuing strikes with severe repression. The defeated general strike of M ay 1920 was followed by an employer’s offensive which reversed the rapid gains in membership made by the CGT which, reduced to its core militants, divided on ideological grounds. This division was preceded by a commensurate split in the SFIO that formed the PC. These divisions broke the pre-war impasse in the F rench labour movement as neither reformist socialism nor revolutionary syndicalism had worked. Bolshevik communism provided a way out of the impasse, but its centralizing tendency proved problematic for a hitherto federalist labour movement to assimilate (M agraw, 1992b). The Bolshevization of the Party contained in the 21 conditions for joining the Communist International provoked internal opposition as did the PC’s move against the ‘federalist, individualist and libertarian deviations’ in the CGTU (A mdur, 1986: 201). These divisions, along with the formation of the anti-Bolshevik, class collaborationist CF TC in 1919 (M ouriaux, 2004b, M agraw, 1992b) produced the apparently enduring model of ‘polarized pluralism’ (E bbinghaus, 1996: 36/37) in F rench trade unionism. In H yman’s terms, Jefferys (2003a: 64) argues that the CGT, CF TC, and CGTU occupied respectively the poles of market, society and class focused trade unionism. Politically, this division established the ‘Communist model’ (R oss, 1982a: x) in which the Party dominated the relationship with the union confederation. H owever, the social democratic relationship between union and party largely failed to be established. E lements of the CGT wished to emulate the British model, but though Jouhaux’s ‘politique de présence’ suggested closer

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union-party links (A mdur, op cit: 228), it actually produced a level of collaboration with governments that was unacceptable to the SFIO (M agraw, 1992b). The SFIO had decided from its inception not to participate in government and existed contradictorily as a formally M arxist party of opposition which adopted reformist policies. This expressed the ‘disorientation’ of social democracy in the inter-war years that maintained its socialist rhetoric but, focussed on electoral office, had no strategic alternative to managing capitalism (Padgett and Patterson, op cit). The SFIO was also a party with few working class members and a largely rural, anti-clerical and cross-class electoral constituency (Bell and Criddle, 1988, Bell and S haw, 1983). The apparent forward march of the SFIO had stalled and the development of the working class had also reached a plateau at approximately 40% of the adult population (Przeworski et al., 1980). The SFIO ’s cross-class strategy of electoral alliances with the R adicals produced a hostile relationship with the class pure PC. H owever, the existence of the PC meant that the SFIO could not become a thoroughly social democratic party of government attractive to the reformist ambitions of the CGT. A nd the CGT, along with the other confederations, had failed spectacularly to recruit the emerging new working class that could have made it an attractive partner for the SFIO . Competitive Trade Unionism F or most of the inter-war period, the main confederations competed for the allegiance of the shrinking minority of skilled workers whose central importance to F rench labour was passing with the decomposition of the ‘old’ working class. The mass worker based in the banlieue was becoming pivotal to the composition of a ‘new’ working class that was also increasingly composed of migrant workers who, like younger workers, were distanced from the legacy of labour radicalism. The response of the main confederations to the new situation of unbridled employer and state power amidst a defeated, divided and demoralized working class was very different. The PC in its ‘class against class’ period up to 1933 compelled the CGTU into a failed strategy of industrial militancy. It also sought to organize migrant workers in contrast to the CGT’s aim of regulating migration (M ilner, 1992). The CGT sought a partnership with modernizing sections of the patronat to make gains through boosting productivity resulting from new Taylorist production methods. H owever, authoritarian, A mericanized employers were dominant not least at R enault-Billancourt where the ‘patron-vampire’ ruled over the divided and insecure ‘new’ workforce whose resistance remained individualized due to draconian anti-union measures. O nce the PC line (taken from M oscow) changed, the CGTU was more successful in combining its anti-fascist politics with bread and butter factory issues. The PC had also established electoral heartlands in working class areas as the basis for ‘municipal communism’ (M agraw, 1992b: 245) which produced an ‘authentic communist counter-society’ (M oschonas, op cit: 27). The PCF was

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also influential over the radical cultural initiatives of the period (Milner, 1992). A social democratic culture was largely absent amongst the working class due to middle class domination of the SFIO , the CGT’s lack of industrial workers and its industrial and political strategies of partnership and lobbying. This meant that it was the communist rather than social democratic wing of F rench labour that was best placed to establish hegemony over the mass trade unionism produced by the wave of factory occupations accompanying the election of the Popular F ront government in 1936. From Popular Front to Liberation: The Formation of Communist Hegemony The fascist threat from within and beyond F rance regenerated labour unity. Unity was driven from below and above and took shape in 1934 when, on orders from M oscow, the PC signed a unity agreement with the SFIO and then in 1936 when the CGT was reunited. By joining the ‘Cartel’ of R adicals and S ocialists, the PC enabled an electoral majority for the Popular F ront with the SFIO as the largest party (R oss, 1982a, Danos and Gibelin, 1986). A s leader of a popular not a class based government, Blum distinguished between the ‘exercise’ and ‘conquest’ of power (Przeworski, op cit). H owever, Blum’s victory sparked a huge wave of factory occupations that forced employers into signing the first ever national collective agreements that conceded pay rises, the 40 hour week, paid holidays, and union rights. Within a year, a hundred times more collective agreements were signed than in 1933 (M agraw, 1992b). F or contemporary communists, the M atignon agreement was a tactical concession by the ruling class in the face of a potentially revolutionary upsurge that was ‘aborted’ by the leaders of the CGT/ PCF who limited the strikes to apolitical demands (Danos and Gabelin, op cit, James, [1937] 1993). The resulting social reforms, while not amounting to a lasting social settlement, were significant and were clearly the products of mass industrial mobilization rather than merely stemming from electoral success. The major employers displaced the representatives who had signed the M atignon agreement and reformed themselves into a new association with a hardened attitude (Jefferys, 2003a) and this heralded an employer’s counter-offensive. The strike wave transformed the CGT and PCF into mass organizations. CGT membership grew fivefold in a year to 5 million while the PCF tripled in size to 300,000 with particular strength and influence amongst the blue-collar workers that were to become the central figure of the labour movement for the next generation. The Popular F ront period was, therefore, a ‘giant stride’ towards PCF / CGT hegemony in the labour movement (R oss, 1982a: 11). Y et this hegemony was established under the dominance of the PCF which was by this time ‘fully S talinized’ and ‘strategically subordinate to the Comintern’ (ibid: 14). Therefore, renamed the PCF , committed to cross-class alliances, and concerned above all else with the defence of the S oviet Union, its control of the CGT forced the

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confederation increasingly into support for war production. N owhere was this more apparent than at R enault Boulogne-Billancourt where the strike wave had produced 25,000 CGT members (and 21 union football teams) of which 6000 joined the PCF . H owever, wage cuts and speed-ups generated wildcat strikes and opposition to working 60 hour weeks resulted in an occupation during the general strike of 1938. The CGT instructed the end of the occupation as the plant was surrounded by troops. The defeat of the general strike was ‘decisive’ and unions began to be crushed (M agraw, 1992b). CGT membership fell almost as quickly as it had risen and it was split over foreign policy. O nce the PCF declared ‘revolutionary defeatism’, it was declared illegal and its supporters were driven out of the CGT (R oss, 1982a). When the S oviet Union was invaded in 1941, the PCF changed its line and thereafter played a leading role in the R esistance, but around a politics of ‘patriotic unity rather than class war’ (Magraw, 1992b: 308). The CGT was reunified in 1943 and led the railway strikes that contributed significantly to the Liberation. While the R esistance Charter expressed the common demands of social and christian democracy alongside communism for national reconstruction (Padgett and Patterson, op cit), the PCF was the dominant player becoming the largest party in the post-war elections (now including female suffrage). Disbanding its militias also underlined its willingness to engage in the process of capitalist stabilization that was brokered at the Y alta conference. Unlike during the Popular F ront period, the PCF participated in government in 1944-47 emphasizing national reconstruction through increased domestic production. In return for political and industrial stability, PCF ministers assisted in delivering significant reforms. The most notable were nationalization with union representation (including at R enault), national economic planning, works councils, social security institutions under comanagement (paritarisme), and universal state education to age 18 (M ouriaux, 2004a, R oss, 1982b). O n the defensive due to collaboration under Vichy, employers were constrained to accept minority positions on the administrative committees governing welfare provision. The PCF ’s central role in the L iberation and postwar reforms confirmed it as the largest party on the Left reaching a peak in 1946 with 28.8% of the vote in comparison to 18.1% for the SFIO (Bell and Criddle, 1988). The PCF also gained control over the CGT thus consolidating itself as the principal player in the labour movement. Ideological Divisions and Labour Exclusion from the Post-War Settlement Initially supportive of industrial peace to ensure reconstruction, strikes at R enault Boulogne-Billancourt compelled the PCF to break with government economic policy rather than risk losing control over the CGT. This resulted in the PCF ’s expulsion from government, a situation reinforced by the development of Cold War politics. R econstruction through M arshall A id required the PCF ’s exclusion from the ‘Third F orce’ government and this was underlined by the Cominform’s

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criticisms of previous party policy. The CGT was now mobilized industrially to meet party objectives, but the strikes of autumn 1947 were defeated through repressive measures sparking the split in the CGT to form FO (R oss, 1982a, M ouriaux, 2004a, Birchall, 1974). This defeat marked the restoration of the ‘old (im)balance of class relations’ (H yman, 1989: 205) which resulted in the almost complete exclusion of labour from the state in the post-war social settlement. Both unions and parties had proven too weak to impose collective bargaining and corporatism on reluctant employers. H owever, labour exclusion reinforced class identities providing for the possibility of industrial and political mobilization for reforms. M oreover, it meant that those sections of the patronat favouring dialogue found it difficult to find willing union representatives (Jefferys, 2003a). So while remaining ‘under-institutionalized’, industrial relations became ‘highly politicized’ as the CGT sought to mobilize pressure for state intervention into industrial affairs. But such pressure became more difficult to mobilize due to the re-establishment of antagonism within the union movement (R oss, 1982b: 20-1). From Cold War to Gaullism The division of the CGT was driven ultimately by international not domestic politics. Backed by money channelled through the AFL , the new confederation (FO ) bore more marks of American influence than of social democratic trade unionism. Its diverse political tendencies were united by virulent anti-communism and FO supported free collective bargaining, ‘M arshallization’ of the F rench economy and NA TO . It also played a leading role in the ICF TU after the split from the WF TU (Jefferys, 2003a, A ndolfatto and S abot, 2004, Béroud and M ouriaux, 1998a). H owever, FO was born as a ‘rump organization’ (L ange and R oss, 1982: 237) strong only in the public services. It numbered about nine times fewer members than the CGT (Andolfatto and Sabot, 2004) and received five times fewer votes in works councils’ elections (A ndolfatto and M atuszewicz, 2004). Despite the privileged relationship with Guy M ollet enjoyed by FO leader R obert Bothereau (Béroud and Mouriaux, 1998a) and the ideological affinity between the FO and the SFIO (Daley, 1999), this period by no means saw the formation of social democratic trade unionism as developed in N orthern E urope. The FO was unable to provide the SFIO with any significant working class support and the mass membership and resources that would have accompanied it. This complete ‘lack of working class credentials’ (Bell and Criddle, 1988: 14), made the SFIO reliant on the rural, non-Catholic and middle class constituency of the R adicals. Deprived of the working class foundation characteristic of social democratic parties, the SFIO increasingly emphasized the other characteristic of a willingness to govern (ibid). A lthough formally maintaining the appearance that the SFIO was a working class party committed to socialist transformation through class struggle (Padgett and Patterson, op cit), M ollet asserted that participation was not a doctrinal question. Consequently, he led the SFIO into a series of ‘centrist’ coalition governments whose failure to deliver reforms disillusioned its members

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if not its voters (Bell and Criddle, op cit). The SFIO therefore remained largely immune to the ‘leftist’ version of reformism advanced by the PCF that remained politically isolated. Trade unionism from 1947-1953 was defined by the Cold War. The Cold War froze out the PCF from any possibility of entering office and the political structure of the F ourth R epublic encouraged governments of the centre. The PCF ’s line of opposing A merican domination of the F rench economy and hostility to the ‘Third F orce’ government meant it lacked any straightforward means of political influence. Consequently, it used the CGT as an ‘extreme transmission-belt’ for its political goals (R oss, 1982a: 59). The CGT possessed considerable power to disrupt key areas such as coal, transport, post and electricity (M ouriaux, 1998), but this was wielded unsuccessfully in 1948 when an 8 week strike by miners failed to be converted into a general strike. Its subsequent focus on peace campaigning at the expense of labour market issues contributed to reducing the CGT’s membership drastically (R oss, 1982a). The thawing of the Cold War in the early 1950s promised to rid F rench labour of the worst excesses of sectarianism. A lthough now in a relationship of ‘relative autonomy’ (R oss, 1982a) from the PCF , the CGT was still affected detrimentally by its political lines. The ‘pauperization’ thesis stated that F rance was an imperialist state in decline and incapable of delivering reforms thereby producing absolute immizeration for the working class. It resulted in the mid-50s in the CGT adopting a new strategy of industrial militancy to raise workers’ living standards and show the bankruptcy of ‘centrist’ reformism. While successful in the regions subjected to economic decline, the strategy failed where the economy was developing and spectacularly so at R enault where the CGT did a u-turn and signed an agreement that limited strikes in return for sustained pay rises (R oss, 1982a, 1982b). The PCF also failed to destalinize, denying the existence of the Kruschev speech and condemning the uprising in H ungary. This position was adopted by certain federations within the CGT, but not by the confederation as a whole. The PCF also voted for military measures against the liberation movement in A lgeria in 1956 and then failed subsequently to mobilize any significant opposition to the war thereby contributing to the total failure of the general strikes called by the CGT in 1958 to defend the R epublic against the supposed fascist threat at home and abroad (R oss, 1982a). O nly 1000 out of 35,000 workers at R enault BoulogneBillancourt went on strike (Birchall, 1974). The PCF characterized Gaullism as ‘personal power’ and argued that it opened the door to fascism thus calling for a ‘non’ in the referendum on the formation of the F ifth R epublic for which it received a humiliating lack of support. N ot only was the PCF increasingly out of touch with the left intelligentsia, its version of anti-A merican nationalism had also lost it significant working class backing to Gaullist nationalism shedding 1.5 million votes in 1958 (R oss, 1982a). PCF dominance, bolstered somewhat paradoxically by its political exclusion, had also been produced by the high price paid by the SFIO for its political inclusion. The SFIO had participated in 21 out of the 27 postwar governments which had failed to deliver reforms, had repressed opposition,

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and had supported colonialism. This record, later characterized as ‘Suez, CRS et centrisme’ (cited in Bell and Criddle, 1988: 146) had seen its vote fall from 25% to 16 per cent. However, internal party dissent was stifled by Monnet as the SFIO became increasingly ‘sclerotic and bankrupt’ (Criddle, 1977: 37). The SFIO therefore remained largely immune to the tide of ideological revisionism sweeping N orthern E uropean social democratic parties (Padgett and Patterson, op cit). While damaged by the machinations of PCF politics, the CGT remained as the largest confederation with the greatest support in union elections (A ndolfatto and S abot, op cit) and with the greatest mobilization capacity. But it was increasingly the biggest fish in a shrinking pool of unionized workers. The CGT had managed to keep the idea of class struggle alive at a time when it had been almost abandoned in other labour movements in E urope (R oss, 1982a). It also retained mass allegiance amongst blue-collar workers. H owever, while the working class had been maintaining, if not increasing, its share of the adult population, the relative weight of manual workers in the productive sectors had been declining until it was eventually overtaken by other wage earners (Przeworksi et al., op cit). This section included the ‘new working class’ (M allet, 1963) in administrative, professional and technical jobs who, alongside workers in lighter industry who tended to be younger, migrant, and female workers (M agraw, 1992b), were at the forefront of the radicalization process that shook the social settlement and promised to renew the social democratic challenge to communist domination. The Settlement is Shaken The social and political tensions produced by Gaullism did not result immediately in widespread social upheaval, but as the 1960s developed the post-war settlement was shaken to its foundations. Gaullist dirigiste economic strategy involved a high level of state intervention to restructure industry to produce ‘national champions’ that were competitive in the international market (R oss, 1982b, Jefferys, 2003a). This strategy produced regional disparities and generalized austerity thereby generating discontent amongst workers that Gaullism attempted to control by way of national economic planning which rendered union militancy as illegitimate. Gaullism marked a continuation of labour exclusion (R oss and Jenson, 1994) and its authoritarianism was expressed clearly in 1963 by its conscription of striking miners that provoked a united and successful movement (R oss, 1982a). This marked the beginning of the ‘offensive syndicale’ (M ouriaux, 2004a) that culminated in the events of 1968. The events of M ay-June 1968 are well known and especially so the role of ‘la grande force tranquille’ played by the CGT (R ioux and Backmann, 1968, S auvageot et al., 1968, R oss, 1982a, H arman, 1988). A s in 1936, once a national agreement had been brokered at Grenelle, the PCF /CGT did all it could to enforce a return to work. This was not achieved at R enault-Billancourt where a mass meeting rejected personal pleas by CGT leaders and continued the strike with the

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backing of the CF DT (H arman, 1988). The CGT’s decision to call off the strikes was driven by its continued subordination to the PCF ’s political strategy that was threatened by explicit support by the CF DT and FO for a renewed ‘centrist’ political solution to the crisis bolstered by the radical rhetoric of new left activists (R oss, 1982a, M ouriaux, 2004a). This rhetoric echoed the radical critiques of bureaucratic and technocratic capitalism and socialism emerging from the new class composition. F or M allet, the new working class was concerned less with seizing political power than with transforming social relations directly. This produced new demands for workers’ control and for ‘self-management of production and the economy’ that were pushing unions beyond reformism (H yman and Price, 1983: 81). The radicalism expressed in 1968 was not immediately or indeed successfully recuperated in social democracy. Indeed, F rance was rather exceptional in that the aftermath of the labour uprising did not produce the election a social democratic government (Jefferys, 2003a) and the relationship between labour and the state remained largely unaltered with unions still as ‘outcasts within the Gaullist state’ (Bornstein, 1974: 78). While the events of 1968 once again failed to produce a lasting social settlement, the labour movement made some limited gains such as four weeks of paid leave and the legal recognition of unions in the workplace, which employers had long opposed. Thus, the radicalization process continued into the 1970s and had a discernible effect on labour organizations. F ollowing the formation of the PS and its alliance with the PCF , FO moved away from socialist politics and emphasized apolitical trade unionism thereby remaining marginalized (N ugent and L owe, 1982). The PCF /CGT developed according to the new logic of the ‘state monopoly capitalism’ thesis that underpinned the politics of E urocommunism. The corollary of the PCF ’s E urocommunist strategy was for the CGT to channel discontent away from industrial militancy towards political mobilization. This produced days of action in support of demands for nationalization and economic planning adopted by the united political front of the left in 1972 as part of the Programme Commun (R oss, 1982a, 1982b). The CF DT was most affected by the radicalization process. This was expressed initially as an intensification of local militancy directed towards wage equalization in which immigrant, women, and low skilled workers were prominent (Bevort, 2004, R oss, 1982a). This strike wave for equality and dignity included action by 400 immigrant workers at R enault-Billancourt in 1973 (F ysh and Wolfreys, op cit). This was accompanied by political radicalization whereby the confederation made reference to class struggle and declared itself socialist at its 1970 congress (N ugent and L owe, 1982). H owever, this was a ‘new’ socialism that expressed the conditions of life and demands of the new working class. The CFDT identified 3 main ills of capitalist technocratic society (exploitation, alienation, domination) which were to be tackled by social ownership of the means of production and exchange, democratic planning and autogestion (self-management) (M ouriaux, 2004a, 2004b, Bevort, 2004). Autogestion also became a central plank of Changer

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la Vie: the policy and strategy document of the PS whose conference at Épinay in 1971 reunited nearly all of the non-communist left under the leadership of M itterrand. Economic Crisis, Failing Militancy, and Left Disunity The collapse of Bretton Woods and the oil crisis soon translated into domestic economic crisis as the high growth rates of 1968-73 slowed dramatically while inflation and unemployment grew amidst balance of payments problems. It was soon apparent that these problems were protracted and structural and that les trente glorieuses were over. The crisis put paid to radicalization and unions’ responses to the new situation became increasingly politicized as workplace militancy became more difficult to mobilize and failed to offer a viable solution. 1968-1974 have been characterized as the ‘années d’illusions’ (M ouriaux, 2004a: 70) for trade unionism. The early seventies had seen a series of protracting and exacting strikes involving both the CGT and CF DT the most prominent of which began in 1973 at the L ip factory where the occupation turned workers co-operative symbolized autogestion in action, but its crisis was resolved temporarily only by state intervention. A s such episodes subsided, radicals moved away from the workplace and towards the N ew S ocial M ovements and this led the CF DT into campaigns around the environment, and gender and racial equality that distinguished it from the CGT (M ouriaux, 2004a, 2004b; R oss, 1982a). With industrial militancy failing both the CGT and the CF DT shifted towards a politicized strategy, but L eft unity faltered over the concretization of the Programme Commun especially around the questions of nationalization and foreign policy. This was due to the PS ’s increasing moderation underpinned by its growing electoral support and the increasing intransigence of the PCF whose support was beginning to falter (R oss, 1982a). The failure of left party and union unity left workers demoralized politically and demobilized industrially and therefore vulnerable to the ‘onslaught’ from the state and employers (R oss, 1982b). The union’s politicized strategy had made the labour movement a ‘hostage to a friendly opposition’ (R oss, 1982b: 73), but this changed as the electoral fortunes of the PS improved dramatically. Social Democracy in Of.ce: The Abandonment of Reformism By the election of 1978, the PS polled a greater percentage of the vote than the PCF for the first time since 1936 indicating the impending triumph of Eurosocialism over E urocommunism. M itterand’s long game of working simultaneously with and against the PCF , spanning the idealist and realist currents in the PS , and of attracting cross-class support had worked. This was demonstrated most spectacularly with the electoral victories in 1981 that brought the PS into office for the first time in the

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F ifth R epublic. Bell and Criddle (op cit) argue that the programme of the PS was within the West E uropean social democratic mainstream. N ationalization was less a means of socialist transformation than of technocratic modernization. M oreover, redistribution was secondary to achieving growth through reflation. When the policy of ‘Keynesianism plus nationalizations’ (Kesselman, 1986: 242) failed amidst growing international recession, the government embraced rigueur. The government focussed increasingly on rationalizing industry and modernizing the economy so as to make F rance competitive internationally. Bell and Criddle (op cit) argue that this moment did not mark a transformation in the party away from socialism towards social democracy as this had already taken place. N evertheless, it did mark a definitive shift in social democracy away from idealist notions of reforming capitalism towards a realist approach of managing the crisis. This shift has been described as transforming the goal of socialism into ‘the quest to perfect F rance’s capitalist economy’ (Kesselman, 1986: 234). It can, therefore, be understood in Przeworksi’s terms as the final ‘abandonment of reformism’ (op cit: 53). Improving French capitalism produced a policy of ‘competitive disinflation’ comprising monetary stability and the strong franc, wage moderation, and cutting the public deficit. The eventual outcomes were improved competitiveness amidst spiralling unemployment (Clift, 2002: 328). The Crisis of Trade Unionism The A uroux laws introduced by the PS in 1982 were designed to support the kind of trade unionism practised by the CF DT that increasingly interpreted autogestion as meaning subsidiarity and therefore concertation at the workplace level. The laws actually encouraged the processes of decentralization and destatification of industrial relations (Daley, 1999) that were expressed as the expansion of local bargaining including bypassing of unions (S egrestin, 1990). Therefore, the new laws were introduced within, and contributed to, ‘la crise troublante’ of trade unionism (M ouriaux, 2004a: 75-87). R oss and Jenson (op cit: 176) concluded that by the 1980s F rench unions were ‘the weakest of any major society’. The evidence was union density at around 10 per cent, low strike levels, and an absence of militants. M oreover, unions were facing a crisis of public legitimacy. The CGT apparently adopted a ‘hedgehog position’ in the 1980s failing to recognize or respond to the looming crisis (Verberckmoes, 1996: 20). H owever, the CGT was wracked by internal disputes initially between the supporters of the ‘proposition-force’ strategy aimed at securing advantages out of industrial change and of the ‘opposition-force’ strategy of opposing such changes through industrial militancy and unremitting support for the political goals of the PCF (R oss, 1982a). The latter strategy won out resulting in the CGT leading, and losing, a number of militant disputes against industrial restructuring. It also refused all negotiations with the management at R enault over the ‘dix de Billancourt’: a group of sacked trade unionists whose plight symbolized the reassertion of management’s right to

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manage. In 1991, the CGT lost control of the works council at R enault-Billancourt for the first time since the 1940s, a development which was quickly followed by the closure of the plant (M ilner, 1992). The severity of deindustrialization contributed to the CGT losing more than half of its members within a decade (A ndolfatto and S abot, op cit) during which time its share of the vote in elections for works inspectors and particularly to works councils plummeted (A ndolfatto and M atuszewicz, op cit). M oreover, the PCF was in a ‘spiral of decline’ (author’s translation) (M ouriaux, 2003) losing its working class bases and militant cadres due to deindustrialization and political disillusionment. It quickly became ‘a beleaguered and involuted rump of a party’ with membership halved in under a decade and the remnants engaged in faction fights (Ross and Jenson, op cit: 176). By 1986, the PCF vote had fallen to under 10% confirming that it had lost its dominant position on the left to the PS . It was only at its lowest point, in 1991, that the CGT embarked on a process of strategic identity change (M ouriaux, 1998). This change revolved initially around three issues: re-establishing the mass character of the CGT by opening it up to the newly diverse workforce, re-establishing a distance from the PCF, and re-establishing a coherent strategy including unified union action around immediate demands and propositions for economic change (M ouriaux, 2004a). The collapse of communism was also a turning point for FO . The FO had remained remarkably untouched by either the period of radicalization or by social democracy in office of which it remained highly critical. It had also rejected the proposition from the CF DT to form a reformist wing of trade unionism (Daley, 1999). F ollowing the failure of left unity, about which many in the CF DT had been sceptical, the leadership engaged immediately in a process of developing a new strategic identity. The M oreau R eport triggered a process of recentrage that shifted the confederation towards a social democratic orientation (M ouriaux, 2004b). The strategy of the deradicalized CF DT was to promote contractualism and to shape industrial restructuring rather than oppose it, but this faltered due to the lack of a willing partner in either patronat or government (R oss, 1982b). Thus, when faced with social democracy in office, the CFDT was highly supportive with its 1982 congress voting in favour of rigueur and embracing the A uroux laws (M ouriaux, 2004b). F alling membership (Bevort, 2004) and governmental cohabitation produced a second recentrage (M ouriaux, 2004b) as, although having an affinity with the moderate wing of the PS in the shape of Michel Rocard, the CF DT presented itself increasingly as politically independent and willing to negotiate with governments of both left and right. This was expressed by its slogan of ‘ni neutre, ni partisan’ (neither neutral, nor partisan) (A paricio et al., 1999). Its congress in 1986 decided not to support any party in elections and in 1988 the CFDT expunged any official reference to socialism (Béroud and Mouriaux, 1998b). Trade union reorientation in the 1980s did not result in its regeneration. It also remained largely ineffective in the face of austerity and liberalization. This situation eventually produced a resurgence of grass roots organization and

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mobilization in the form of the coordinations that were prominent in strikes by railway workers, nurses and other public sector employees. F or S egrestin (1990: 114) the coordinations were an expression of how unions had lost the strategic identity of ‘collective actor’. Ceasing to exist as a social movement, unions remained only as institutions concerned with regulating, rather than changing, the economy and society (S egrestin, op cit: 114). The ‘New Social Democracy’ A nderson (1994: 4) argued that by the 1990s, the form of social democracy that had emerged in S outhern E uropean states was different to the classical model developed in N orthern E urope where mass parties had been tied to powerful unions. F rance epitomized this ‘new social democracy’. Its leadership was drawn from the professional classes, its electoral constituency was diverse, its attachment to declining unions was weak, and its policies failed to tackle mass unemployment instead being limited by the demands of the global economy to achieving moderate reforms. This situation had been brought about by the ‘modernization’ of the PS . M ichel R ocard epitomized the new ‘technocratic managerial socialism’ that aimed, above all, to restore competitiveness while looking after the weak (Bell and S haw, 1983: 51). The PS retained only ‘one grand design’ (R oss and Jenson, op cit: 185). This was to advance E uropean integration that promised to address the lack of an effective economic strategy, of political regulation, and of an ideological project (ibid, Clift, 2002). H owever, E uropean integration did not ‘provide mobilizing fervour for the left’ (R oss and Jenson, op cit: 180) as, in the form of EM U, it came to be associated increasingly with austerity policies that exacerbated rising levels of unemployment and social insecurity. The close result of the referendum on the Treaty of M aastricht and the class nature of opposition to it (M oss, 1998) heralded the abysmal performance of the PS in the 1993 election. The failure of social democracy in office in 1993 produced a process of ‘autocritique’ a central element of which was to question its hitherto acceptance of neoliberalism in an attempt to develop a credible political strategy (Clift, op cit). The PCF was in even greater disarray with its vote now firmly below 10% and, riven by factional conflicts, it could not produce a coherent strategy. Faced with this ‘desolate scene’ (Ross and Jenson, op cit: 185) on the Left, a significant number of working class voters supported the FN (M ouriaux, 2003, F ysh and Wolfreys, op cit) making it appear as the ‘party of the disaffected working class’ (M oss, 1998: 130). Unsurprisingly, faced with this political disarray on the L eft, and lacking any effective political voice for redistributive policies, the political activity of unions also appeared increasingly as incoherent with little evidence of any ‘collective political project’ either within or across confederations (Daley, 1999: 211). This demonstrated the strategic disarray amongst union confederations in the face of neoliberal globalization.

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By the early 1990s, unions faced a desperate situation in the face of a significantly restructured economy, state and society. E conomically, the government had ended all capital controls thereby stimulating further foreign investment that developed alongside the reorientation of domestic industry to transnational markets. E conomic policies had focussed increasingly on price stability and currency strength at the expense of tackling unemployment. S tate restructuring was most evident as privatization, welfare reform and the deregulation of industrial relations so as to promote flexible labour markets (Bieler, op cit, Daley, 1999). While neoliberal restructuring had produced a new class composition with divisions between private and public sector, core and peripheral, and younger and older workers, it was also generating rising discontent and growing mobilization. Jefferys (2003b: 356) identifies three phases of the ongoing ‘rebellion’ and ‘rumbling revolt’ against restructuring the national economy and society to the requirements of global capitalism. The first phase began in 1993 with the electorate punishing the PS for its failure to halt the advance of neoliberalism and culminated in 1995 with the strike wave against pension and welfare reforms. Jefferys (ibid: 358-9) detected four aspects of these strikes: unity, radicalism, democracy, and political effect. The first declaration of unity in action between the leaders of FO and the CGT for half a century only underlined the common threat that the reforms posed to the entrenched institutional position of unions within the welfare state. It was not, therefore, coincidental that both unions supported widespread strike action and demonstrations and that the radical breakaway unions from the CF DT emerged in the public sector and public services. The S UD’s championed grass roots control of the strikes that, while mobilized mainly by the unions, were not under their control being ended by the general assemblies against the will of the unions. The strikes were increasingly recognized as a social movement against neoliberal globalization and its main effect was to challenge the pensee unique. It thereby contributed to the election of the gauche plurielle in 1997 in which the dominant PS promised a renewal of social democratic policies (M oss, 1998, Jefferys, 1996, 2003b, Bourdieu, 1998, Clift, op cit). The second phase of rebellion, between 1996 and 2002 (Jefferys, 2003b) was conditioned by the performance in office of the gauche plurielle. The PS developed a new ‘réalisme de gauche’ that attempted to reconcile market and state to achieve economic competitiveness alongside social justice. This translated into maintaining macro-economic stability while delivering limited redistribution and tackling unemployment through the shorter working week and active labour market policies (Clift, op cit). The language of left realism was translated to the E U level with the adoption of the L isbon S trategy in 2000 whose central aim of restoring full employment suggested a social democratic renaissance as a E uropean Third Way. H owever, any discursive radicalism masked an underlying continuity of governmental practice. The gauche plurielle practised a ‘soft neoliberalism’ that was ambiguous regarding market regulation and accepted the budgetary limitations set by the S tability and Growth Pact (M oschonas, op cit: 199).

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While avoiding any major strikes, the gauche plurielle was faced with demands from associations representing the marginalized (les sans), and in particular of the unemployed, the homeless and the paperless migrants (sans papiers). Policies that promoted the further marketization of the economy and society also generated opposition leading to significant mobilizations amongst students, school students and small farmers and these sectors were particularly engaged with the burgeoning global justice movement. This movement took on a ‘peculiarly emblematic status’ (A ppleton, op cit: 63) and, through A TTA C, succeeded in affecting the terms of political debate by sensitizing public opinion to see social problems through the lens of neoliberal globalization (ibid, Waters, 2006). While seeking to respond to widespread concern about social questions and globalization, the PS was again punished for its record in office as its vote (15.9 per cent) placed it third in the presidential elections in 2002. Jefferys (2003b) argues that the third phase of rebellion began in 2003 with the strikes against pension reforms. H owever, the presidential election itself sparked massive protests against the FN that has been a significant element of the revolt since the early 1990s (F ysh and Wolfreys, op cit). M arginalized groups have also been engaged in revolt with the rioting of urban youth against police harassment also having roots in mass unemployment. Y outh unemployment rates have also been significantly higher than in other leading EU states and this contributed to the huge mobilizations against the CPE (contrat première embauche) (R oss, 2006) supported by the unions, but focussed on street demonstrations rather than strike action (Coupé, 2006). This success in halting the liberalization of the labour market followed on from the victorious campaign against the E uropean Constitutional Treaty that focused on its liberalizing aspects and the lack of a social dimension. The ‘non’ was particularly strong amongst the socially disadvantaged (S tartin, 2008, Grunberg, 2005) whose opposition was mobilized by local collectives that continued to meet with the goal of producing an anti-neoliberal presidential candidate, but this failed to materialize. N evertheless, this phase of revolt continues in the wake of the election of President S arkozy who has persisted with pension reforms thereby provoking further strike action (Krishnan and Thomas, 2007). In general terms, the political situation in F rance seems to be rather volatile and subject to fragmentation. Indeed, the electoral system has become less bipolar and more complex and fragmented (H aegel, 2005). F rance has not been normalized by entering a new political phase where ideological politics has been replaced by ‘efficient technocratic governance’ (Krishnan and Thomas, 2007: 297). Indeed, political radicalism on the Left and the Right has made significant advances giving the impression that ‘the centre cannot hold’ (Wolfreys, 2002). O n the L eft, the PS is still by far and away the most successful electoral force, but its vote has fluctuated widely. It has been punished, mainly by its traditional working class supporters, for its incapacity to deliver the promised break with neoliberalism. There has also been a declining attachment to the PS amongst both the blue and white collar working class that ‘no longer feels protected by the party’ (42). While

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this vote has been redistributed amongst other parties, there has been a rising group of abstainers that has also been liable to return to vote for the PS (E vans and M ayer, 2005). This situation is commensurate with the general analysis that the link between social democratic parties and the working class is weakening, but not yet broken (M oschonas, op cit). The main social basis for ‘social liberalism’ comes from the middle and not the lower strata (Bachet and Durand, 2001) and the PS has received relatively stable support from these groupings (E vans and M ayer, op cit). These factors suggest that the PS is more likely to retain a centrist than leftist strategy. This situation is reinforced by the increasing moderation of the PCF that means that the PS is punished less for its own increasing moderation (M oschonas, op cit). The PCF has reoriented ideologically around defence of ‘the vulnerable and dispossessed and the F rench nation’ (Bell, 2000: 152) and its strategy of becoming ‘a party of government … and a junior partner of the S ocialists’ has cost it dearly. The PCF vote has fallen from 8.6% in 1995, to 3.3% in 2002, and further to 1.9% in 2007. This near electoral death has left the PCF as a deracinated structure that is in strategic disarray. A strategic shift into ‘hardline opposition’ or federating the social movements is not possible due to internal party resistance and strong competition from the Green and Trotskyist parties (Bell, 2004: 31). The PCF has been left with an insufficient vote to be an effective ‘corrective on socialdemocratic politics towards the left’ (M oschonas, op cit: 258) while demonstrating its unwillingness to become an equal partner of an electoral alternative refocused on a break with capitalism. Bensaïd (2007) argues that the rightward shift in social democratic parties and the demise of the communist parties has opened up a radical but unstable ‘space’ for new social and political formations with an anti-capitalist perspective. In F rance, this space has been socially robust, but politically fragile. A s shown above, resistance to neoliberalism has been widespread, profound, and protracted. S ections of the unions have radicalized and new radical unions have developed alongside a range of militant grass roots associations across a range of issues (see Crettiez and S ommier, 2006). Initially, there was widespread concern to defend the autonomy of the social movements from political control. But with the declining influence of the PCF over the ‘alternative movements’ and the ‘less directive’ approach taken by the L CR (Bell, 2004: 27) there has been less opposition to the search for a new political alternative to the social liberalism of the PS. However, this has been thwarted as the specific social struggles against neoliberalism have remained largely disconnected from a political expression (Boulangé and Wolfreys, 2007). A lthough it is possible to identify factors such as political isolationism and opportunism, more decisive influences are the historical legacy of a distrust of political organizations and electoral politics alongside an unfavourable electoral system. S ome success in challenging the PS electorally may come with the emergence of the Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste (NPA ) grouped around O livier Besancenot and the L CR .

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F rance appears, arguably, to be further advanced in this project than elsewhere in Western E urope (Krishnan and Thomas, 2007). Union Reorientation While successfully challenging the pensee unique, the movement against neoliberal globalization has not halted restructuring. The ME DEF ’s project for a refondation sociale, alongside the election of S arkozy, have raised the stakes to the point at which the strategic identities of trade unions are now characterized clearly by the relationship of union confederations to the neoliberal project. A lthough M ouriaux (1998b) suggests correctly that the most recent period in trade union history can be characterized in terms of opposition to neoliberalism, there has actually been a divided rather than a united union response. The confederations have become increasingly polarized and Labbé and Nezosi (2004: 135) have identified the strategic choice as between ‘négociation’ and ‘contestation’. This distinction expresses the fundamental difference between confederations, like the CF DT, whose strategy of social partnership is based on a ‘realist’ acceptance of the new conditions produced by neoliberal globalization and other confederations that reject this assessment. H aving made this fundamental distinction, it is important to state that the strategies of these opponents differ markedly with the CGT in particular remaining in a state of ideological flux and confusion (Chapman et al., 1998). Industrial Reorientation The CF DT has, arguably, been the confederation that has developed the clearest and most consistent strategic response to neoliberal globalization. The CF DT has largely accepted the sociological analysis that the transition to a post-industrial society (Touraine, 1981) risks rendering the workers’ movement an anachronistic and conservative force tied to the old F ordist social settlement. The CF DT has, therefore, sought to modernize itself by adopting the identity of social partner. This identity expresses its search for a new historic alliance with progressive sections of the patronat and the state elite in order to forge a new post-F ordist social settlement that can deliver social justice whilst renewing economic competitiveness (A paricio et al., op cit, Béroud and M ouriaux, 1998b). F or example at a conference in 1999 on ‘The transformations of capitalism and the levers of union action’, it was asserted that new types of economic regulation and social rights were applicable in the new period of capitalist development (Béroud and M ouriaux, 2001). In essence, the adversarial principles and practices of class struggle have been firmly rejected in favour of consensual forms of institutional action based on the principle of social dialogue (A paricio et al., op cit, Béroud and M ouriaux, 1998b). This has translated into a strategy of shifting away from defending national and sectoral collective agreements towards developing local agreements at workplace level. Whilst setting the trend towards localized collective bargaining, the other

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confederations have largely followed the CF DT in signing collective agreements and this is especially the case at the level of the firm. This development suggests less the formation of a new consensus than a tacit acceptance that unions are seldom capable of opposing their employer successfully (L abbé and N ezosi, 2004: 121). The increasing willingness of the CGT to sign collective agreements belies the assertion that it ‘still relishes conflict’ (Daley, 1999: 190). The CGT has shifted decisively away from the kind of industrial militancy that characterized its ‘opposition-force’ stance in the 1980s. A ny contestation is now less about outright opposition (although pockets of militant opposition do remain) and more about strengthening its hand in negotiations. This new orientation towards collective bargaining was epitomized by the meeting between the leadership of the CGT and the employer’s federation in January 1995. H owever, as shown by its participation in the strike wave later in the same year, the CGT remains willing to mobilize against neoliberal inspired reforms. N evertheless, it has consistently rejected calls for a general strike in favour of limited strikes and days of action (Béroud, 2006, Jefferys, 2003b). Its call for a general strike to oppose reforms suggests that FO has reoriented as a ‘new union of struggle’ (M oss, 1998: 133). This is, however, also rather misleading in that its radical rhetoric has far outstripped its capacity for effective mobilization and it too has increasingly signed collective agreements (L abbé and N ezosi, op cit) and, at the sectoral level, has made compromises on terms accommodating to employers (Béroud, 2006). The militant and oppositional stance taken by unions in G10 S olidaires is reminiscent of the communist and revolutionary syndicalist traditions of the CGT. But, despite its perspective of translating sectional industrial militancy into a general political strike, its capacity to mobilize remains highly limited and its influence is restricted to the public sector. Political Reorientation The political dimension of trade unionism has proven to be decisive to its historical development. The state has been a target for trade union activity in that it has delivered significant employment and social protection that unions have not been able to extract directly from highly intransigent employers. It is, therefore, rather significant that neoliberal globalization has been accompanied by a trend towards the depoliticization of trade unionism. This process has been most apparent in relation to the CF DT that has adopted an anti-statist (A paracio, et al., op cit) or at least an anti-corporatist (Béroud and M ouriaux, 1998b) approach that has made it highly critical of what it regards as the over-politicization of trade unionism. This outlook developed out of the assessment that the political strategy adopted in the 1970s had failed. While rejecting socialism in favour of an apparently apolitical stance, the CF DT has more recently been associated with the renewal (sic) of social democracy as the ‘Third Way’. F or example, in N ovember 2000 it held a conference titled ‘L iberalism or S tatism: are we condemned to choose?’ While quietly supportive of the advance of this perspective in the PS , the CF DT remains

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overtly hostile to any continued attachment to statism on the part of the PS (Béroud and M ouriaux, 2001, M ouriaux, 2004b). The CF DT has largely accepted globalization as a new fact of life. H owever, it counterpoises the neoliberal celebration of globalization and nationalist rejection of it as ideological positions. Its position is to operate increasingly at the E U level regarded as a space onto which it can displace its search for a new social settlement that has not been forthcoming at the national level. It has also transposed its antistatism to this level favouring subsidiarity and the construction of a social E urope through social dialogue between social partners over legislative developments (A paricio et al., op cit). The CF DT campaigned in support of the Treaty of M aastricht (ibid), was pro-EM U (Bieler, op cit) and openly supportive of the Constitutional Treaty for which a majority of its members voted in favour (Grunberg, 2005). The CF DT has been the confederation that has reoriented itself the most to the E U level investing significant resources and participating notably in European Works Councils and other networks (Basson, 2004) as well as in the E TUC. FO was forged politically through its rejection of communism that bonded its ideologically diverse components. The collapse of communism has, therefore, posed a considerable ideological challenge that is still far from being resolved. Thus far, the dominant position, rooted in its strength in the public sector, appears to be a defence of the social republican settlement. This has translated into persistent support for Keynesian responses to economic crisis (Béroud and M ouriaux, 1998a). A lthough FO has tended to avoid an overtly political orientation (ibid), it has long maintained links to the PS . H owever, the relatively weak social republican tendency in the PS suggests that such links are unlikely to be strong. N evertheless, its members still vote mainly for the PS , but increasingly too for the right and the extreme right (Béroud, 2006). FO has become increasingly hostile to the E U that it regards as having betrayed its founding principles. The confederation opposes subsidiarity and defends national social legislation against harmonization downwards (Basson, op cit). It was also highly critical of EM U (Bieler, op cit) and 75% of its members followed its lead by opposing the Constitutional Treaty (Grunberg, op cit). While once playing a leading role in the E TUC, its opposition to its current strategy has generated the possibility of its disengagement from it (Basson, op cit). Despite opposition to change amongst its communist militants, the CGT has undergone a fundamental reorientation that has, however, left the federation rather lacking a clear political direction. In 1995, the federation jettisoned its anticapitalist discourse in favour of a new foundation in ‘valeurs humanistes et internationalistes’ (cited in Béroud, 2006: 259). A t the same congress, held amidst the upheaval of the public sector strike wave, the CGT also revoked its aim of the socialization of the means of production (M oss, 1998). This ideological reorientation has been accompanied by an organizational shift that has established the union’s complete autonomy from the PCF . Political independence has been expressed by the confederation no longer calling for a PCF vote, by leading officials no longer holding office in the party, and by no longer automatically supporting

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party initiatives. The political shift has been so decisive that CGT leader, Bernard Thibault, was well received by the PS congress and PS officials have also attended the CGT congress. Ideological reorientation has not, however, delivered a new coherent strategy or vision for the CGT. It has articulated a strategy of being close to government and to the social movement which has limited its capacity to be critical of, and mobilize against, policies emanating from governments of the left. M oreover, it has remained largely oriented around specific demands and issues that it has not translated into a new project (Béroud and M ouriaux, 1998c, Béroud, 2006). While originally fundamentally opposed to european integration, the CGT has become increasingly less suspicious of it (Daley, 1999). This gradual europeanization of the CGT included its break with the WF TU in 1995 and culminated in its adhesion to the E TUC in 1999 (Basson, op cit). The CGT has opposed the neoliberal logic of the Treaty of M aastricht and the convergence criteria for EM U (Bieler, op cit). H owever, the confederation has been rather constrained by E TUC membership in that it abstained on the vote on the Constitutional Treaty taken by the E TUC E xecutive Committee and thereafter failed to campaign against it (Béroud, 2006). N evertheless, 78% of its members voted against the Treaty (Grunberg, 2005). The CGT has responded to neoliberal globalization by a certain accommodation to it and a tendency towards depoliticization thereby opening up a political space to its left. This space has been occupied by the G10 of which the S UD unions are a vital component. The G10 has expressed a clear and consistent opposition to neoliberalism that has underpinned its defence of the public sector and public services and has provided a clearly political dimension to its platform of demands (Ubbialli, 2004). This political orientation has been translated into mobilization against liberalizing policies emanating from governments of both the right and the left, but its own political diversity also expresses the political heterogeneity on the anti-neoliberal left. The G10 has been uncompromisingly critical of the neoliberal character of european integration and of the E TUC. It has, therefore, played an important part in the development of the E uropean S ocial F orums (Giraud et al., 2005) and in the E uropean M arches N etwork against Unemployment, Job Insecurity and E xclusions that played an avant garde role in mobilising for a social E urope (Béroud, 2006, M athers, 2007). O utright opposition to the Constitutional Treaty translated into greater opposition to it amongst S UD members than amongst those of any other union (Grunberg, op cit). Social Reorientation In F rance, perhaps more than in any other E uropean state, there exists a widespread understanding that ‘neoliberalism’ and ‘globalization’ connote much more than a new set of economic policies and practices. The process of neoliberal globalization and opposition to it have increasingly been framed in terms of competing projects that encapsulate different conceptions of how society and its constituent social relations are to be organized. This contest has been waged less by

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established institutions such as unions and parties and more by associations (often oriented towards social groups suffering the social consequences of neoliberal globalization) as well as by foundations or ‘think tanks’ such as Raisons d’Agir and the Fondation Copernic. This dimension to the contest over the direction of social change can be comprehended in terms of social movements seeking to mobilize civil society around a social project. This perspective highlights the importance of the reformation of the employer’s federation in 1998 in the new form of the ME DEF that expressed its intention to operate more explicitly as a militant and campaigning body and to seek social transformation in the shape of the ‘refondation sociale’ which marked nothing less than a ‘re-founding of the F rench industrial relations and welfare systems’ (Jefferys, 2003a: 203). This shift marked its intention to demolish the remnants of the social republican settlement and to advance an explicitly neoliberal project. The existence of the aforementioned associations and foundations along with other ‘new’ social movements around issues such as immigration, the environment, sexuality, and fascism and the movement for a different globalization (altermondialisme) have come to be known as ‘le mouvement social’ (M ouriaux, 2004a: 108). It is in relation to the refondation sociale and le mouvement social that it is possible to analyse the social reorientation of trade unionism. The CF DT has presented itself as a progressive social rather than political actor whose aim is social transformation through social dialogue. It has largely welcomed the refondation sociale as an opportunity to develop a new social settlement with the patronat. S peaking favourably about the refondation sociale, ex-General S ecretary N icole N odat outlined its place within the new societal vision of the CF DT. This vision includes ‘the invention of a new political culture that places the imperative on reform at the heart of social transformation, that is the joining of collective solidarities with individual responsibility, the optimization of the market and the efficiency of the state and public services, the opening to Europe and the world and the guaranteed integration of everyone’ (author’s translation, cited in Bevort, op cit: 62). The emphasis on social integration suggests a possible affinity with the associations mobilizing around social questions. However, the CFDT’s perspective has been very much influenced by Touraine’s analysis of society in terms of included and excluded and therefore supportive of intra- and not inter-class redistribution (A paricio, et al., op cit). While developing ‘societal unionism’ in the 1970s (Daley, 1999) by 1986 the CF DT had begun its retreat from social movements. In line with Touraine’s thinking, such movements should seek a new consensus in civil society and eschew political demands and political links. Therefore, social movements producing radical criticisms and demands have been dismissed as ideological and ill fated (Béroud, 2006). In essence, the relationship of the CF DT to the social movement has been hostile (M ouriaux, 2004a). A consequence of its orientation as a social partner has been the growing distance between the apparatus of the CF DT and its grass roots. M oreover, increasing centralization has been accompanied by increasing professionalization. These processes have generated rising tensions within the confederation that have

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produced expulsions and departures (Béroud and M ouriaux, 1998b, M ouriaux, 2004b, Béroud, 2006). FO has been implacably opposed to the refondation sociale, but this is based very much around a defence of the social republican state. FO has had very few contacts with associations and did not involve itself in the mobilizations in support of the sans papiers or the unemployed. It has also proven weak on issues relating to gender equality and environmental protection (Béroud and M ouriaux, 1998a). While opposing neoliberal globalization, FO has only shown a symbolic participation in the global justice movement (Giraud et al., 2005). Its relationship with the social movement has been described in terms of ignorance (M ouriaux, 2004a). The CGT has made a significant departure from its previous militant workerist identity, but its reorientation towards social movement unionism remains limited and contradictory. Significant episodes in its reorientation include the ‘Robin H ood’ operations during the strikes in 2004 that ensured the maintenance of utility services for domestic users while disconnecting symbolic targets. These actions aimed to forge solidarity between workers and consumers whilst demonstrating that utilities are not commodities (Béroud, 2006). A mongst the main confederations, the CGT has developed most links with associations and N GO s and its 2003 congress made the development of such links a priority (M ilner, 2005). H owever, its relationship with, and approach to, associations has been uneven (Béroud and M ouriaux, 1998c). The CGT retains a tendency to promote its own initiatives in competition to coordinations and associations and to impose its own perspectives on alliances. This has been the case in relation to the unemployed movement and women’s organizations (M ilner, 2005) as well as the struggles of the intermittents du spectacle and of the précaires (insecurely employed). In the later case, the confederation was heavily involved in the strikes at M cDonalds, Pizza H ut, and Quick, but was unable to incorporate the new demands and networked forms of organization arising from them (Béroud, 2006, Perrin, 2005). This suggests a rather critical relationship with le mouvement social (M ouriaux, 2004a). This assessment is born out by moderate participation in the ESF s around worker oriented themes thereby demonstrating concern amongst CGT officials that such events were unduly focused on abstract questions at the expense of concrete social problems (Giraud, op cit). A similar assessment of A TTA C (Waters, 2006) may also explain its limited participation. The G10 has been an integral part of le mouvement social (M ouriaux, 2004a). It has occupied the political terrain that the CF DT and, in part, the CGT have vacated (A ndolfatto and Choffat, 2004) and has thereby gained adherents through defections. The main aspects of the new trade unionism such as participatory democracy and focussing on issues beyond the workplace (Giraud et al., op cit) have been strongly present in the G10 and in S UD in particular (Ubbialli, 2004). S UD has consistently offered material and political support to the movements of the ‘sans’ and has developed alliances with the Confédération Paysanne (Béroud, 2006). The G10 participated in the ESF in Paris more than any other confederation and it was engaged particularly around matters ‘extrasyndicaux’ such as immigration,

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gender equality, and ecology (Giraud et al., op cit). A vital aspect of S UD has been its militant oppositionalism and particularly in relation to the refondation sociale around which it proposed to construct an anti-neoliberal pole of trade unionism (Ubbialli, op cit). Through its close association with the Fondation Copernic and initiatives set up by the late Pierre Bourdieu, SUD has played a significant part in revealing neoliberalism as an ideological project. M oreover, this activity has also demonstrated how S UD has emphasized the development of a broad social movement that articulates an alternative societal project. A lthough developing as a social movement union par excellence, S UD remains small and rather isolated (Ubbialli, op cit) and this expresses how although a social movement orientation has penetrated trade unionism, it remains on its fringes (M ilner, 2005). Conclusion R ecent labour history seems to show a propitious set of circumstances for the development of social democratic trade unionism. PCF /CGT hegemony has collapsed, the political system favours centrist politics, and european integration has offered a new strategic identity for unions as a social partner thereby suggesting a consensual as opposed to a conflictual model of industrial relations. However, the CF DT that embodies this new identity has to overcome serious obstacles, based on historical legacies, in order to establish this new form of social democratic trade unionism. The CF DT has a low rate of density that limits its claim to be a representative social partner and its growing centralization has produced serious internal opposition and defections. It has also been faced with a prospective social partner in the form of the employer’s federation whose conception of consensus appears to be premised upon its dominance thereby restricting its capacity to grant concessions. This has resulted in the CF DT participating in the mobilizations against elements of state restructuring. The relative volatility of the political situation and the concomitant fragility of centrist politics mean that the development of political alternatives to the left and right remains a serious possibility thereby offering a credible challenge to the centrist political orientation of social democratic trade unionism. This challenge is connected to the legacy of radicalism that has contributed to an enduring capacity to mobilize significant support for the defence of acquired social rights and to the embryonic formation of an alternative strategy identity for french trade unionism as a social movement. The current situation displays certain parallels with the inter-war years in that trade unionism has been polarizing and neither camp has yet established hegemony. In contrast to the inter-war years, this polarization has not been occurring in the wake of a fundamental defeat for labour that has maintained a substantial capacity for mobilization. Unions have not, however, connected significantly with the largely unorganized new working class in the service sectors. While social democratic trade unionism exists largely in the form of an institution, the alternative to it also remains largely institutionalized in public sector trade unionism and a

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thriving counter-cultural base has been a limited development of recent years. N evertheless, this embryonic alternative in the form of social movement unionism is not encumbered by the PCF whose control over political trade unionism has been ended decisively.

Chapter 6

The ‘E uropean S ocial M odel’: Towards a Transnational S ocial Democratic Trade Unionism? The development of social democratic trade unionism at the national level involved a settlement between the ‘political’ and ‘industrial’ wings of the labour movement in the form of a dominant party-union nexus (DPUN ). The crisis of social democratic trade unionism is inseparable from the crisis of the Keynesian welfare state (KWS ) and the process of E uropean integration. In this context, it is pertinent to enquire as to the possibility for social democratic trade unionism to re-emerge at the E uropean level. This would require the development of transnational labour movement actors capable of playing the kinds of coordinating and disciplining roles carried out by social democratic political parties and trade union confederations within the nation state. In the context of deepening E uropean integration, organizations have emerged at the E uropean level that have, at least, the potential to mobilize around an emergent social democratic project at the E uropean level. The Party of E uropean S ocialists (PES ) has developed as the umbrella organization of E uropean social democratic parties and the E uropean Trade Union Confederation (E TUC) has been formed as a confederation of E uropean trade union confederations. In this chapter, we evaluate critically the potential of these organizations to coordinate their constituents in such a way as to achieve a new social democratic settlement at the European level. We do so, first, by analyzing the process of E uropean integration as a way of understanding the emergence during the 1980s of the concept of the E uropean S ocial M odel (ESM ) as a social democratic alternative to the dominant neo-liberal model of E uropean integration. S econd, and in line with our depiction of the situation within nation states, we outline the developments at the E uropean level of the industrial, political and social dimensions of social democratic trade unionism and the alternative currents which have emerged to challenge it. Third, we analyze the significance of these developments and suggest that they indicate the requirement for social democratic trade unionism at the E uropean level to develop a transnational hybrid identity. We conclude by contrasting, and accounting for, the top-down and rather artificial development of social democratic trade unionism at the European level with its more organic development within nation states.

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European Integration, Global Capital and the Crisis of the Nation State The crisis of national social democracy and the process of E uropean integration are intimately related. This has important implications with regard to the prospects for the recomposition of social democracy at the transnational or E uropean level. It is important to begin with an exploration of the main dynamics underpinning the process of E uropean integration in order to highlight the barriers and opportunities that E uropean trade unions face at the transnational level and the powerful dynamics working against recomposition or renewal at the national level. The dynamic of European integration is a product of both the increasing fluidity and mobility of global capital and the breakdown and recomposition of Keynesian forms of regulation and social democratic administration at the national level. It is, however, important not to overstate the importance or distinctiveness of the E U as a political institution. The process of E uropean integration represents a spatial realignment of the political forms taken by the ‘reorganization of the social conditions of production and relations of exploitation’ (Schonfield, 1969: 405). E uropean integration developed through the crisis of national forms of Keynesian regulation and has in turn resulted in a fundamental transformation of national political processes (H olloway and Picciotto, 1980: 143). Whilst this process is often presented in terms of globalization marginalizing the nation state, it has been articulated through and involves the restructuring of nation states according to the logic of global capital (Panitch, 1994). The development of the E U does not mark the marginalization of the nation state, but the strengthening of the liberal state and its consolidation at an increasingly transnational level. In this sense, the development of the E U does not mark a threat to the nation state, but a consolidation and extension of its powers at a transnational level. Consequently, the development of the E U is ultimately a ‘rescue’ of the liberal state (M ilward, 1994). It involves the pooling, recomposition and strengthening of sovereignty at the transnational level in a way that has allowed the state to escape nationally organized forms of political mobilization and the destabilizing impact of administrative forms of social welfare. This suggests that the process of E uropean integration has undermined the organizational strength of social democracy and the social gains associated with it. M oreover, if social democracy is to be rejuvenated beyond the nation state, it will be through an engagement with the new variable geometry of institutional power that has been produced by the process of integration. The power of E uropean institutions is ultimately premised on intergovernmental treaties as developed through Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs) and while nation states have ceded a degree of sovereignty the promotion of integration has usually been premised on the need to resolve domestic problems or promote domestically defined goals (Pierson, 1996: 197). The EU in its present form constitutes a confederation of states rather than a confederal state (H irst and Thompson, 1999: 223). While dismissing the notion of a E uropean state, it is however important to recognize that the regulatory gap that has developed between the E U and nation states has facilitated the recomposition of the liberal state at the

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national level and the recomposition of capital at an increasingly E uropean level. In this sense the E U is little more than an ‘imagined community’ premised on the defining myths of the ‘European model’ of capitalist development (Albo and Zuege, 1999) and the ESM (M oss, 2001). H owever, the model of capitalism in E urope (Bieler, 2006) and the meaning of the ESM (H ermann and H ofbauer, op cit) have become objects of struggle. In this sense, the ultimate form of E uropean institutions is as yet unclear and is ultimately dependent on the further mobilization of struggle. The mobilization of struggle is, however, difficult given the logical and spatial separation of the regulatory and administrative moments of the state that is central to the institutional form of the E U. This is expressed in the principle of ‘subsidiarity’ through which neo-liberal policies and directives are developed at the E uropean level, but applied in nationally specific ways by EU member states. The practical decision-making processes of E uropean integration have thus served as a subtle form of deregulation: undermining what is left of national corporatist arrangements while preventing the development of E uropean mechanisms of policy coordination and development. The recomposition of the liberal state form at the E uropean level has facilitated both a fundamental restructuring of E uropean capital and the increasing domination of the E uropean economy by ‘E urocompanies’ (R amsey, 1995; M arginson, 2000) and a marked reorganization of the social relations of exploitation within European states and societies as marked by the flexibilization of labour markets and the restructuring of social welfare that have been facilitated by changes in E U governance mechanisms. The ‘O pen M ethod of Co-ordination’ (OM C), for example, is a form of networked governance that has amounted to an essentially ‘neo-voluntarist approach to the development of “social E urope”’ (S treeck, 1997) in that it has encouraged changes in policy at national level through peer review at E U level and through the exchange of information and ‘best practice’. In effect, the OM C was designed to engage social actors in the ‘modernization’ of the E uropean social model. Where the restructuring associated with ‘modernization’ has proved unpopular, there have been attempts to channel discontent into these new fetished forms of ‘social partnership’. This can be seen when examining the industrial, political and social developments in trade unionism at the continental level. Industrial Developments The E TUC and its constituent E uropean Industry F ederations (EIF s) have adopted a strategic orientation of ‘social partnership’ which has been advanced mainly through processes of multi-sectoral and sectoral social dialogue. This strategy has delivered few substantive gains owing to the capacity of employers’ organizations to have a de facto veto power over the outcomes of these processes. M oreover, the idea and practice of social dialogue have been dominated by the E uropean Commission which has become increasingly less willing to encourage

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employers’ organizations to make agreements under the threat of legislation and, through the E uropean E mployment S trategy (EES ), has encouraged an increasingly managerialist approach to social dialogue (Gold et al., 2007). The severe limitations of social partnership in practice have resulted in some EIF s attempting to develop a more autonomous strategy expressed as the formulation of co-ordinated bargaining policies. H owever, the ‘soft’ issues and approach of social dialogue still dominate E uropean level industrial relations and ‘hard’ collective bargaining is almost non-existent. Indeed, E uropean collective bargaining remains largely a ‘virtual prospect’ (Marginson and Sisson, 1998). Hence, conflictual industrial orientations have been largely absent and the phenomenon of the ‘E urostrike’ has been a rare event. The European Social Dialogue (ESD) The ES D was promoted by E uropean Commissioner Jacques Delors as his favoured way of achieving collective agreements at the E uropean level (de Boer et al., 2005). In addition to providing an alternative to the harmonization of employment and working conditions through legislation, the Commission also regarded the ES D as a way of building the institutional capacity of industrial relations actors at the E uropean level. The initial discussions between the ‘social partners’ (E TUC, UNI CE , CEEP ) at Val Duchesse were followed by the inclusion of the social dialogue process in the S ocial Protocol of the Treaty of M aastricht and the S ocial Chapter of the Treaty of A msterdam. The social dialogue process can occur either under the auspices of the Commission or, as has increasingly been the case since the L aeken Declaration in 2001, autonomously between the social partners (Gold et al., op cit, de Boer et al., op cit, S chroeder and Weinert, 2004). The social dialogue occurs both at multi-sectoral level involving the peak level organizations such as the E TUC and at the sectoral level involving the EIF s. These processes have produced over 300 outcomes, but these have been overwhelmingly nonbinding joint statements aimed at influencing EU political actors. A small number of framework agreements have been concluded but their impact on employers and employees in member states has been minimal (de Boer et al., op cit). N evertheless, the E TUC has remained an enthusiastic supporter of the social dialogue process which remains ‘one of its core avenues’ of influence and it has sought consistently to encourage the engagement of employers’ organizations with the process (Bieler, 2006: 180). However, in the context of the limited power and influence of either the E TUC or indeed the Commission to enforce meaningful engagement, employers’ organizations have retained a veto power over the process and have had very few incentives to seek more than basic agreements at the E uropean level (de Boer et al., op cit). A similar power is possessed by the E uropean Central Bank in the macro-economic dialogue over which it has the power of definition of its structure and content. This results in the ‘permanent exclusion’ of E uropean trade unions from institutional influence on policies concerning monetary, fiscal and wage co-

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ordination which remains largely in the hands of the ECB, finance ministers and the Commission (S chroeder and Weinert, op cit). A similar pattern of a lack of influence and outcomes exists for the European S ectoral S ocial Dialogue (ESS D) owing to the refusal of employers’ organizations to enter into meaningful negotiations. A s a consequence, dialogue has been limited to exchanging information and developing joint statements (Bieler, 2006). Indeed, the intended aim of these joint statements has not been to formulate a common framework leading to collective bargaining around employment relations, but rather to provide an alternative means for lobbying E uropean political actors for the particular interests of an industry or service in the face of liberalization (de Boer et al., op cit). It is possible to conclude that ‘the social dialogue is in no position to effect fundamental change of the current neo-liberal drive in the E U’ (Bieler, 2006: 181). H owever, recent developments in the implementation of the EES have seen the social dialogue become an increasingly important means for driving forward the restructuring of welfare along neoliberal lines. In this context, partnership has become something of a ‘managerialist façade’ (Gold et al., op cit: 20). A lthough union engagement with the EES at the national level has been marginal, the E TUC has encouraged participation and thereby might entrap itself within the ‘iron cage of neoliberal rationality’ (M athers and Taylor, 2005). Indeed, this is indicated by the way in which the E TUC’s joint evaluation with UNI CE and CEEP focused on the role of social partners in implementing the EES and not on participating in formulating its agenda (Gold et al., op cit). European Works Councils (EWCs) This complicity in the degradation of the social dialogue suggests that the E TUC has been ideologically subordinate to the Commission in the development of a vision for a E uropean industrial relations system. This may also be indicated by its enthusiasm for the development of E WCs. E WCs are the organizational form taken by the decentralization of collective bargaining; the economic expression of the ‘subsidiarity’ principle which has governed the negative integration of E urope. Whilst E WCs have been used to generalize productivity norms (Coller, 1996; E dwards, 1998), they have seldom gone beyond the ‘virtual’ collective bargaining implied by framework agreements and joint declarations of opinion. O n the whole, the achievements of the E WCs have been mixed and rather disappointing (S treeck, 1997; Whittall, 2000). There is, however, limited evidence of E WCs becoming vehicles through which more oppositional and social movement oriented forms of trade unionism may be developing. The E WC at GM M otors, with support from the E uropean M etalworkers’ F ederation (EMF ), organized multi-plant strike action to oppose redundancies on five occasions between 2000 and 2007. Two of these strikes coincided with debates in the E uropean Parliament on industrial restructuring that resulted in GM being charged with the misuse of subsidies by failing to guarantee secure employment (Gajewska, 2008). These strikes were mobilized largely by union representatives at plant level and so did not involve contact between

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workers at different plants. N evertheless, M artinez L ucio and Weston (2000: 211) highlight how contacts between union representatives developed through the E WC process had the potential to form ‘alternative networks and relationships’ to those developed at elite level and illustrated the effectiveness of such networking to the ‘E uro-strike’ triggered by the closure of the R enault-Vilvoorde plant. Co-ordination of Bargaining Policies In the context of an increasing disenchantment with EIF s and the social dialogue process, E uropean trade unions have demonstrated a propensity to develop more autonomous industrial strategies in the form of co-ordinated bargaining policies. This has the advantages that it does not require engagement with unwilling employers’ organizations, the agreement of E U institutions within which unions are structurally disadvantaged and can encompass national differences (Bieler, 2006). H owever, practical developments have been limited. By 1999, only four of the EIF s possessed a committee charged with co-ordinating policies on collective bargaining (L eisink, 2002), but this has improved since the E TUC congress in 1999 gave EIF s the main responsibility for collective bargaining at E uropean level (L eisink, 2002). In relation to wage co-ordination, virtually every EIF has now developed co-ordination rules. H owever, while some resources have been channelled upwards to the E uropean level, there has been very little institutional development or transfer of competences. The general conclusion is that in relation to co-ordination of bargaining, unions have chosen a strategic option characterized as a ‘transnational resource model’ which, while envisaging a slow process of transferring resources to the E uropean level, does not involve the formation of common rules underpinned by sanctions and effective institutions. Therefore, both the EIF ’s and the E TUC have remained ‘under-institutionalized’; involved in administering co-ordinated bargaining policies, but leaving national unions as the main actors (S chroeder and Weinert, op cit). The EMF is, however, something of a special case in that its location in a highly internationalized sector has encouraged the development of co-ordinated bargaining which the federation has been quick to act upon. The EMF has exchanged information through the E uropean Collective Bargaining Information N etwork, has exchanged observers for rounds of collective bargaining, and has formulated shared bargaining standards and guidelines. These have included the demand for reduced working time to 1750 hours annually and a pay formula of productivity plus inflation (Bieler, 2006). The EMF has also undergone internal restructuring. In 1999, the EMF altered its statute to provide a basis for negotiation and to devolve power to policy committees. Its Collective Bargaining Committee now meets much more regularly and debates rather than reports on collective bargaining aims and a S elect Working Party now develops new collective bargaining initiatives. The EMF has also increased affiliation fees enabling it to recruit more staff. These developments suggest that the EMF has reinvented itself in order to move beyond a ‘transnational resource model’ towards a ‘transnational institution model’.

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M oreover, the EMF has also displayed a willingness to underpin its autonomous collective bargaining strategy with an orientation towards mobilizing industrial action. This shift away from social dialogue and towards autonomous collective bargaining has been limited and it has also been developed as a ‘defensive instrument against social dumping’ and thereby has not offered a fundamental challenge to the dominant conception of E uropean industrial relations emanating from the Commission (S chroder and Weinert, op cit: 200) and being advanced by the E TUC and other elite formations. Political Developments The process of E uropean integration was met initially with some scepticism and even distrust by social democrats especially given that the Treaty of R ome was authored by centre-right politicians with a free market outlook. When this view gave way to a tacit acceptance of integration it was replaced with indifference as social democrats focussed on the nation state as the key strategic political location. It was only with the crisis of national Keynesianism that social democrats began to identify further integration as a means of renewing the social democratic project (Dunphy, 2004). While highly supportive of integration, social democracy appears to be divided between a ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ reformist E uropean project. The stronger version regards the E U as a potential vehicle for an ‘interventionist social democracy’, but this requires further and deeper integration. This perspective has, therefore, been ‘critically supportive’ of treaty extensions and the single currency (ibid: 5). It is the weaker version that is, however, ascendant and this perspective is largely uncritical of such developments and articulates the E uropean project as a modernizing project for which an ‘historic compromise’ is required between the centre-left and the centre-right (ibid: 6). A s a result of the increasing popularity of these perspectives, the notion that a strengthened E U could achieve social democratic aims no longer deemed possible at the national level has become prevalent amongst E uropean social democratic parties. This belief has resulted in an increasing focus on the need to develop an institutional mechanism at the E uropean level capable of articulating support for a E uropean social democratic project. The Party of European Socialists In 1992 the Party of E uropean S ocialists (PES ) was formed in order to replace the Confederation of S ocialist Parties of the E uropean Community (CSPE C) which had presided over a deeply divided political family throughout the 1970s. The main dynamics in the development of the PES were the intensification of E uropean integration and the need to develop a social democratic perspective on, and response to, the dynamics of E uropean integration and an article of the M aastricht Treaty which provided a legal basis for the development of trans-

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E uropean political parties. The process of E uropean integration posed a double challenge to social democracy. F irst, an institutional challenge owing to the way in which E urope as an elite project bypassed national parliaments and created an increasingly serious democratic deficit. Second, a policy-making challenge as national parliaments were increasingly constrained in the domestic arena owing to the force of E uropean treaties and legislation. This process was particularly problematic for social democratic parties owing to their close linkages with public sector trade unions and the interventionist and dirigiste orientation of many parties of the centre-left (L adrech, 2003: 117-21). During the 1980s, the main architects of European integration were drawn from the centre right and this was reflected in the ways in which the E U had developed according to a logic of negative integration underpinned by a neo-liberal agenda. In this context, social democrats mainly supported the EM U agenda owing to a lack of serious alternatives and an acceptance of the post-Keynesian political environment. S ocial democrats were forced to accept prior treaty commitments and, in an E U context where partisan mobilization is extremely difficult, social democrats found themselves in a position where having accepted the broad parameters of change associated with EM U were not in a position to influence the detail or direction of policy in this area. The development of the PES coincided with a renewed academic interest in the potential of transnational parties to influence the policy of the EU. The focus was on the essential differences between national political parties that are essentially ‘office-seeking’ and transnational parties that are essentially ‘policyseeking’ (L ightfoot, 2003: 219). These loose collections of national parties (M arsh and N orris, 1997) were not yet fully-functioning parties owing to the undeveloped nature of the E uropean polity and therefore tended to be ‘policy-seeking parties’ (H ix and L ord, 1997). A ccording to H ix (1999), transnational parties in the E U tend to adopt policy positions around two left-right conflicts: an economic conflict between dirigiste and laissez-faire orientations and a socio-economic conflict between libertarian and authoritarian orientations. O n this basis, he argues that distinctive party programmes exist and the PES has been able to develop common policies for its constituent parties and influence EU policy mainly through pressure at IGC meetings. To the extent that the E U also has an independent role in the aggregation of policy preferences, transnational parties rectify the problems of ‘lock in’ and ‘control gaps’ in ways favourable to their constituent parties. The PES thus constitutes a ‘coordinating nexus’ that has attempted simultaneously to maintain the E U as an acceptable ‘frame’ of reference and set an agenda for a democratic and sustainable E urope through the coordination of policy networks. While there is an acceptance that the reconciliation of policy differences can often lead to sub-optimal policy outcomes and that the declarations and manifestos of the PES have been vague and bland there is, nonetheless, a tendency towards the generation of collectively structured goals and more specific policies. The success of the PES in getting agreement for the inclusion of an E mployment Chapter at the Treaty of A msterdam has been presented as key evidence of the policy-seeking success of the PES .

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A key dynamic to the launch of the PES was the need to develop and coordinate social democratic responses to EM U. In this context, employment emerged as the principal focus of the PES during the 1990s. A ccording to L adrech (2003: 121-2), the inclusion of the E mployment Chapter marked a partial victory for the PES . The victory was partial owing to the limited nature of the E mployment Chapter and the way in which the principal role of the PES was to facilitate agreement amongst the leaders of E uropean social democratic parties. L adrech (ibid: 112-5) argues that while the outcome of the E mployment Chapter was indeed largely symbolic, its genesis lay in the role played by the PES in coordinating an alliance of social democratic governments committed to the development of S ocial E urope. H ence, working behind the scenes the PES coordinated ideas which formed the basis of government positions and ultimately bargaining positions at the IGC. This is traced through the PES work programme of 1993-4 which was focussed on the development of a social democratic E uropean employment agenda and was developed through a working party that included representatives of national party leaders, members of the E uropean socialist group and representatives from the E TUC. H ence, PES networking facilitated the development of a coordinated and effective social democratic response to the neo-liberal logic of EM U and proved that concerted effort plus national electoral success could influence the policy agenda of the E U. H owever, L adrech (ibid: 124-5) concedes that the A msterdam Treaty also highlights the reluctance of national social democratic parties to transfer power and influence to the European level to achieve tasks and goals that are becoming difficult to control and coordinate at the national level. Essentially, while most social democrats are in favour of a new Keynesian settlement at the E uropean level, few are willing to transfer to the E uropean level the institutional and political mechanisms that would make such a settlement possible. Ultimately, the regulated capitalism approach lacks a common programme for economic regulation at the E uropean level. In the absence of this, the dominant social democratic discourse has been premised on ‘progressive governance’ and the need to develop a range of ‘third way’ politics specific to national contexts. Ladrech (ibid: 125-7) concludes that while the PES has not been able to redefine national traditions and circumstances, it has nevertheless allowed these to expand as the dynamics of E uropean integration impinge increasingly on domestic policy. In this context, he argues, the PES constitutes ‘an emerging and evolving E uropean public space’. A rather more sceptical assessment of the influence of the PES on the development of E uropean employment policy is presented by L ightfoot (2003) who questions the capacity of the PES to influence either member parties or E U policy. F ollowing the M adrid and M almö congresses in 1995 and 1997, the PES did manage to affirm support for EMU and the need for an Employment Chapter amongst its constituents. H owever, the PES was less successful in gaining agreement for the deepening of E U competence in the area of employment policy. Consequently, PES declarations on the topic were often unsubstantial and contradictory and the role of the PES somewhat less important than that stressed

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by L adrech (2000, 2003). In power, social democratic governments were able to ‘bounce’ other member parties into positions outside those that had been carefully formulated by the PES owing to the fact that national interests supersede those of transnational cooperation. L ocked into the complex, multilayered governance structure of the E U, social democratic governments were often forced to abandon established positions. In opposition, social democratic political parties had little or no influence over the PES position on employment policy. Ultimately, the PES was successful in shaping the policy preferences of some member parties and this was manifested at the Amsterdam and subsequent IGCs. This was reflected at the IGC when serious ideological and national differences re-emerged. The results of the Treaty of Amsterdam ultimately reflected the success of the social-liberal vision of E uropean integration and employment policy that had emerged at the M almö congress and which had been given impetus by the election of the N ew L abour Government in the UK during 1997. Importantly, the E mployment Chapter failed to develop a competence in the area of employment policy at the European level and the main focus was on flexibility and competitiveness rather than unemployment. Indeed, some members, most notably the Dutch and the UK, were willing to forge alliances with governments outside the PES in order to achieve on their social liberal agenda. Ultimately, the factors leading to the Employment Chapter were complex and went beyond the influence of the PES. The episode highlights the enduring importance of the nation state to social democratic politics. Groupings of nation states were as important as the PES , notably the alliance between A ustria, S weden and F inland. F inally, the centre right in E urope was not opposed to tackling unemployment as long as it was contained within a social-liberal policy framework. Developments following A msterdam also highlight the limits of PES influence on the EU policy making process. The Lisbon Process launched in 2000 strengthens intergovernmentalism and social liberalism and the Treaty of N ice also highlighted the enduring hegemony of the social liberal agenda. The PES role was modest, but not totally without influence. The weakness of the PES was ultimately demonstrated by the messy and confusing nature of the Treaty of A msterdam. S ome members of the PES found it easier to produce policy documents with ideological rivals than subscribe to a clear and coherent manifesto with fellow social democrats. Parties are only willing to compromise on issues that do not militate against their national interest. The overall impact of the PES on its constituent parties and E U policy is thus somewhat ambiguous and contradictory (M oschonas, 2002: 269-72). In contrast to the CSPE C, there is no doubt that the PES has contributed to the rejuvenation, reorganization and deepening of cooperation amongst social democratic parties in Europe. The political influence of the PES has increased, most notably through the leaders’ conference and its authority is clearly asserted at the E uropean level. The numerical inferiority of the PES in contrast to the EPP is more than compensated for by an enhanced level of homogeneity. H owever, the PES is underdeveloped in terms of organizational and logistical infrastructure leading to a weak level of institutionalization. The ‘Bureau’ of the PES is limited to administrative and

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coordinating functions and lacks a clearly defined role. There is little in the way of ‘political demand’ amongst constituent parties for its role to be expanded. In respect of the biannual congress of the PES , important decisions are taken in advance and the organization lacks a political culture of majorities and oppositions or supranational loyalty beyond national allegiances. The PES is ultimately an elite exercise which is closed in on itself with no organizational contact with E uropean societies and with barely the capacity to supervise the socialist group within the European Parliament. Conflict within the EU remains ‘national-territorial’ and there is no clearly defined road to European integration. The greatest failure of the PES is thus the absence of a clear social democratic project for E urope. The ultimate contradictions of the PES are located in the socialist summit meetings, particularly those that take place prior to inter-governmental conferences (IGCs) of the E uropean Council (E C) (M oschonas, 2002: 272-4). These meetings highlight both the ultimate strength and weakness of the PES . While these meetings date back to the 1970s, they are only recognized in the statutes of the PES after 1992. Through these meeting the PES has wielded influence on decision-making within the E U to the extent that it has become something of a ‘backdoor partner’ in the process of E uropean integration. H owever, participants in the meetings act only in their capacity as leaders of national parties and their legitimacy thus derives from their legitimacy in national-level politics. The meetings thus add a supranational gloss to what is essentially an intergovernmental phenomenon. The summit meetings thus highlight the visibility of the PES as a supranational party whilst devaluing it as a structure with supranational designs. The PES is ultimately a ‘proto-party’ which exists as part of a political network and whose influence is determined by its contacts and connections within the network. The network has enhanced the political capacity of E uropean social democracy; but this is also a product of the uneven and variable power structures within the E U which deviate markedly from the classical division of powers found within the nation state. There is, therefore, little evidence that social democratic renewal is occurring within the polity of the E U. Alternative Left Parties Parties to the left of social democracy were also opposed to E uropean integration. It was presented as a means of establishing US hegemony over Western E urope as the ‘economic arm of NA TO ’ and a project driven by right-wing elites (Dunphy, op cit: 3-4). With the collapse of communism, the communist parties (reformed or otherwise) have almost entirely come to accept the need for a degree of supranationality to tame and tackle global capital and to offer a political alternative. While all of the L eft parties, unlike the social democratic parties, are unequivocally opposed to the neoliberal project, there is significant disagreement regarding the process of E uropean integration and its manifestations such as the single currency and treaty developments. There appears now to be very little support for a position of withdrawal from the E U and slightly more support for the demand for its radical

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restructuring particularly amongst the N ordic L eft parties. M ost of the L eft parties now appear to argue for a ‘strong reformism’ (Dunphy, op cit: 4-5) and this is apparent in the developments of L eft party co-ordination at the E uropean level. O n its formation in 1989, the Gauche Unitaire Europeéne (GUE – E uropean United Left) declared that it was ‘firmly committed to European integration’ (cited in H olmes and L ightfoot, 2007). H owever, the GUE and N ordic Green L eft (N GL ) remains a confederal organization whose diversity of participating parties and individual MEP s has produced a distinct lack of internal cohesion which has militated against the production of consistent positions (Dunphy, op cit) let alone a coherent project. F ormed in 2004, the PEL consists almost entirely of Communist Parties and articulates a clear reformist position for a ‘different E U’ central to which is greater power for the E uropean Parliament. The PEL is also oriented towards the ESF process and to the social movements that comprise it, but it is much less explicit about its relationship to trade unions (PEL , 2004a, 2004b). Social Developments The dominant strategy of the E TUC has been that of ‘social partnership’ within the institutional machinery of the E U in an attempt to defend and extend the ESM . A s we demonstrated earlier, the limits of this form of transnational social democratic trade unionism have been clearly exposed. There is, however, evidence that the E TUC is beginning to combine its role as an institutionalized ‘social partner’ with the more campaigning approach associated with ‘social movement unionism’ (Taylor and M athers, 2004). This development indicates how the E TUC has become increasingly embroiled in the struggle over the meaning of the ESM which involves the formulation of a vision of the future of E uropean society and the mobilization of a E uropean civil society to achieve it. The limitations of the E TUC approach have, however, generated support for more radical visions and mobilizations emerging from the grass roots networks of trade union and social movement activists associated with the Global Justice M ovement (Taylor and M athers, 2002a, 2002b). This can be illustrated through an exploration of E uropean campaigns and mobilizations associated with fundamental human rights and the future of public services. The Campaign for Fundamental Social Rights The tentative shift in the E TUC’s orientation has occurred in the context of a wider debate on the constitutional future of the E uropean Union which has produced campaigns around the E uropean Charter of F undamental R ights and the E uropean Constitutional Treaty. Through these campaigns, the E TUC has moved slightly, but significantly, towards a social movement identity by developing alliances with other civil society actors, framing a broader and more inclusive agenda and introducing and strengthening mechanisms for consulting and mobilizing its

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constituent confederations. The E TUC case for fundamental social rights at the E uropean level is premised on the need to balance the dynamic, but potentially damaging process of neo-liberal restructuring with a range of social, political, civil, and economic rights that protect workers and promote social integration. This is justified in terms of both the indivisibility of human rights and an ‘historic compromise’ between economic progress and social protection which is at the heart of the E uropean project (F eickert, 2000). The E TUC has been campaigning for such a platform since the late 1980s and the S ocial Charter and S ocial Protocol are seen as important milestones on the road to social E urope. This strategic route has been given further impetus by a renewed debate on the constitutional and institutional reform of the E U which has been triggered by a perceived ‘democratic deficit’ between the EU and the people of Europe. The E TUC was an enthusiastic supporter of the E uropean Charter of F undamental R ights: its E xecutive Council adopted a resolution highlighting its crucial role in transforming the vision of a ‘citizens’ E urope’ into reality. This position was set out in a campaign paper published jointly by the E TUC and the E uropean Platform of S ocial N GO s: ‘A Charter which guarantees civil, social, economic, political and cultural rights will counter the apathy and scepticism which appears so prevalent. It’s time to put ideals back into E urope’ (E TUC, 2000). This fleshed out a vision of a social Europe in which citizens had substantive social rights set out as a series of ‘programmatic rights’, including rights to work, education, health, and housing, that were in effect binding political objectives that were to be elaborated in five-year ‘action plans’ and coordinated and monitored at the E uropean level. The campaign around the Charter also involved the E TUC in mobilizing large demonstrations in Porto and N ice. The E TUC was therefore able to mobilize its constituents in support of an agenda for social change and to make alliances with non- governmental organizations (N GO s) and the E uropean Parliament for the incorporation of a legally binding Charter into the Treaty. H owever, due to the opposition of UNI CE and certain member states, the Charter was transformed from a vehicle for deepening and consolidating social E urope into a vehicle for imposing a piecemeal social E urope by judicial decree. Despite this major limitation, the E TUC E xecutive was almost unanimous in its support of the final document and called for the demonstration in Nice to demand its inclusion in the Treaty. O f the 75,000 demonstrators in N ice, 10,000 demanded that the Charter not be included in the Treaty. These demonstrators were mainly from non-ETUC affiliated unions, such as the French SUD and the Italian rankand-file committees (COBAS), alongside associations active in mobilizing against the social consequences of neoliberal restructuring and supporters of left political parties. Together they formed a ‘Collective for an A lternative Charter’ which included demands for substantive social rights such as a universal guaranteed income for E uropean citizens and the reduction of the working week without loss of pay or flexible working. The campaign around the Constitutional Treaty highlighted two of the elements of the E TUC strategy already evident during the campaign on the Charter: a closer

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alignment with other E uropean N GO s in an attempt to develop a common agenda and the mobilization of E uropean trade unionists on key E uropean issues. In F ebruary 2002, a ‘civil society contact group’ was established that brought the E TUC together with environmental, social, developmental, and human rights N GO s in a structured relationship with the Praesidium of the Convention. The ETUC reported that this reflected the fact that trade unions and the NGOs have a common and complementary agenda on many issues and demonstrated that the E TUC and the social N GO s were again coalescing around a shared vision of social E urope. The E TUC submission to the Convention was entitled ‘A Constitutional Treaty for a S ocial and Citizens’ E urope’. This document proposed the incorporation of the Charter; the development of a E uropean system of industrial relations; the establishment of a system of ‘E uropean E conomic Governance’ to coordinate economic, employment, and social policy objectives; and the promotion and protection of services of general interest (Degryse, 2002). The E TUC also mobilized rank-and-file trade unionists in support of this agenda. There was a mass demonstration in Brussels to mark the L aeken Council and a E uropean day of action on 21 M arch 2003. Despite these initiatives and mobilizations, the E TUC campaign produced very limited results beyond cementing its institutional role as a social partner within the new Constitution. The networks that had developed an ‘A lternative Charter’ were also active in opposing the Constitutional Treaty. M oreover, they lent a legitimacy of internationalism to the campaigns opposing the ratification of the Treaty within F rance and the N etherlands. Unions such as S UD were prominent in opposing the Treaty on the grounds of its regressive social aspects and were a key actor in the ‘E uropean M arches N etwork against Unemployment, Job Insecurity, and E xclusions’ that welcomed the ‘no’ votes as a rejection of a neoliberal Constitution that would bring further unemployment and job insecurity. It called for a reorientation of European employment policies away from the flexicurity agenda promoted by the L isbon S trategy and towards an agenda expressing universal and unconditional social rights for E uropean citizens (M athers, 2007). The centrality of the ESM to the debate over the Treaty was highlighted by the role that the Bolkestein Directive played in making the issue of the lack of a social E urope into a key question in the F rench referendum. The Bolkestein Directive also became a further focus of social mobilization by the E TUC and its critics. The Campaign Against the Bolkestein Directive on Public Services The Directive on S ervices of General Interest (aka the Bolkestein Directive) aimed to create a single market in public services and became highly controversial due to the country of origin principle which could enable service providers to engage in wage and social dumping. The E TUC was implacably opposed to the Directive. A lthough the Directive had the potential to divide unions within Western E urope and particularly between Western and E astern E urope, the E TUC managed to align its framework of defending the ESM so as to ensure that its call for demonstrations

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was followed by unions across the Continent. H owever, the widespread support for collective action was mobilized according to the ‘logic of vertical coordination’ in that the organization of action was highly centralized stemming from the E TUC E xecutive Committee and circulated downwards through the EIF s and national confederations (Gajewska, 2008: 112). O f the EIF s, it was, unsurprisingly, the E uropean F ederation of Public S ervice Unions (EPS U) in particular that opposed the Directive and it had also been active in the campaigns around the Charter. M oreover, EPS U has been particularly advanced in developing a social discourse which has facilitated the formation of co-operative relationships with social movement organizations (SMO s). It has mobilized for demonstrations called not only by the E TUC, but also by A TTA C and the E uropean S ocial F orum (ESF ). These demonstrations have targeted the threat of GA TS to public services and EPS U has participated with other international social movement organizations in the international campaign to ‘S top the GA TS A ttack’ (Bieler, 2006). This initiative was advanced by Public S ervices International which has also worked closely with N GO s such as Greenpeace E urope and the E uropean S ocial Platform of N GO s around the issue of public procurement and in particular by providing support through its research unit. The participation of EPS U in the ESF s, along with the E uropean Transport Workers’ Federation (ETF), is significant in that these events have assembled thousands of participants who have engaged in hundreds of seminars and meetings on themes such as privatization, citizenship, the environment, immigration, work, and pensions. These occasions provided a forum for the reflexive exchange of experiences among the diversity of opponents of neo-liberal policies and resulted in shared declarations of common values that express, to a degree, a more system challenging meaning and content for the ESM than those advanced by the E TUC. Thus far, the involvement of the E TUC in this process of constructing a ‘E uropean moral economy’ has been limited with participation of high level officials varying from forum to forum and the E TUC organized its own event before the Paris ESF in, arguably, an attempt to slow down trade union participation in the ESF process. O n the whole, like other international trade union bodies, the E TUC has styled itself as a ‘mediator’ between movements and institutions rather than seeking to become part of the movement (Wahl, 2004). This expresses the general situation in which the strategy of social partnership is still dominant and the shift towards a social movement orientation remains limited and rather restricted to the radical fringes of E uropean trade unionism. Towards a Transnational Hybrid Identity? There is a consensus among commentators on the E TUC that the organization has failed to develop into an effective social actor on the E uropean stage. The main weaknesses include a focus on institution-building rather than mobilization (Goetschy, 1996), an overdependence on the E uropean Commission (M artin and R oss, 1998), and ideological and tactical divisions between, and within, its constituent

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confederations (Gobin, 1998; Groux et al., 1998). The E TUC is a complex, topdown organization: a confederation of confederations extending beyond the boundaries of the E U and encompassing organizations at sectoral and regional levels. Consequently, it lacks power and organizational capacity (Waddington et al., 1997) and is ‘heard but not widely followed’ (Portelli, 1990). The defining feature of the E TUC is the way in which the hegemonic social democratic vision underpinning its foundation and development has been moulded and redefined by the institutional dynamics of E uropean integration. This has tended to produce something of a schizoid identity as social democratic principles and ideals that developed at the nation level have been applied to the increasingly hostile terrain of ‘S ocial E urope’. The ‘social democratic vision’ (Groux et al., 1998) on which the E TUC was founded is an amalgam of national social democratic visions; their diversity has entailed tensions in the context of E uropean integration and on the increasingly hostile terrain of social E urope. The range of interests represented by the ETUC is broad and inclusive, reflecting the geopolitical imperative of overcoming the doctrinal and confessional divisions among its constituents (Goetschy, 1996; M artin and R oss, 1998), yet also narrow and fragmented in order to maintain transnational unity despite differing national responses to the pressures of neo-liberal restructuring. N ational unions and confederations have increasingly focused on consensual, qualitative issues as a way of reconciling the dual pressures of a declining and changing membership base and the competitiveness agenda of employers and nation-states. This has complemented a tension within the E TUC between ‘E uro-idealism’ and ‘E uro-pragmatism’ to produce an ambiguous agenda that combines bold statements supporting comprehensive systems of E uropean social regulation with support for limited initiatives that amount to a more piecemeal and ad hoc version of social E urope. This agenda has been articulated alongside an unquestioning support for the process of E uropean integration and a failure to consider adequately the negative consequences of specific reforms on European workers. This is a reflection of the limited democratic accountability and rationale of the E TUC: its top-down development has tended to produce a form of ‘political subsidiarity’ within European trade unionism. The resulting ‘democratic deficit’ is compounded by the financial, operational, and political dependence of the ETUC on the E uropean Commission. There is, therefore, a tension between the need for democratic accountability and legitimacy in order to coordinate the interests of diverse national confederations and the need to operate as part of the institutional machinery of the E U. These tensions circumscribe the power resources at the disposal of the E TUC: its ability to act has been constrained by the unwillingness of national confederations to cede power to a transnational organization. Consequently, the E TUC has focused on integration in the institutions of the E U as a lobbying organization and on coordinating the national policies of its constituent confederations. This has created three structural weaknesses: affiliated unions have remained embedded in their national contexts; the E TUC has found it difficult to maintain its political independence from the European Commission; and consequently, it has failed to develop a transnational worker identity or

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articulate a positive vision of social E urope (Waddington et al., 1997: 483-6). It has thus failed to become an effective and autonomous agent of regulation within the emergent institutions of the E U. The potential democratic gains associated with the shift from intergovernmentalism to multilevel governance have not been realized; and related initiatives, such as the EES , have retained an essentially neoliberal character (Goetschy, 1999; H ooghe and M arks, 2001). The social developments demonstrate how the E TUC is currently exploring the possibility of alternatives to institutionalized social partnership and is tentatively moving towards a role as a ‘social movement’. While this strategic shift is still embryonic and subordinate to the dominant strategy of social partnership, it demonstrates the potential for the E TUC to develop a distinctive identity with a positive vision of a social E urope capable of mobilizing E uropean workers around E uropean issues. The campaigns demonstrate how a ‘hybrid’ identity could be developed in the emerging transnational spaces where the variable geometry of E uropean trade unionism is meshing with the dynamics of E uropean integration to create new ‘repertoires of contention’ at the E uropean level (S ee Taylor and M athers, 2004 for an elaboration of this argument). H owever, there are serious obstacles to the further development of this identity. The main obstacle is the path dependency and institutional inertia resulting from three decades of institutionalization within the E U. The attempt by the E TUC to develop an identity as a ‘social partner’ in E urope has been largely unsuccessful and resulted in the E TUC taking the form of a detached and ineffective organization embracing a range of fragmented national identities. In this form, the E TUC has been unable to become an effective regulatory agent in E uropean civil society and thereby modify or restrain the liberalization of E uropean markets. The E TUC is developing a vision of social E urope as a ‘repertoire of contention’ or ‘transnational utopia’, but it currently lacks the organizational capacity and the democratic legitimacy that are necessary to translate this vision into a reality of improved substantive rights for E uropean workers and citizens. Social Democratic Trade Unionism at the European Level The case of the E TUC highlights an important distinction between the organic way in which social democratic trade unionism developed at the national level and the attempt to establish social democratic trade unionism by fiat at the E uropean level. In the context of national social democratic settlements, the social power of trade unions was derived from the institutionalization of conflict between capital and labour in a historic compromise underwritten by the state. The resulting social democratic ideology remains hegemonic within organized labour in E urope and underpins the dominant ideological orientation of the E TUC. H owever, the decomposition of national Keynesianism has involved an emptying out of the institutional spaces that were the bases of trade union power. It has also seen the transformation of corporatism from an ‘institutionalization of conflict’

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based on a ‘culture of compromise’ into the ‘institutionalization of partnership’ based on an ‘ideology of consensus’ (Therborn, 1992). This ‘emptying out’ of civil society is embraced and celebrated by the associational mantra of the Third Way as the only way to achieve individual autonomy and material prosperity in the context of neo-liberal globalization. What emerged as a defensive reaction to defeats and weakness at the national level has been embraced by the E TUC as a positive strategy for action at the E uropean level. The strategy and orientation of the E TUC have developed from a complex interplay of national and transnational dynamics and is a form of trade union organization that has developed through, and therefore articulates, the logic of E uropean integration. The dynamics of intergovernmentalism and subsidiarity that have created the ‘democratic deficit’ between the E U and the citizens of E urope have been replicated within the institutions of European trade unionism as a ‘democratic deficit’ between the ETUC and its constituent confederations. Consequently, the ability of the E TUC to establish itself as an autonomous agent of regulation at the E uropean level in order to realize its alternative vision of social E urope as the embodiment of an alternative set of values to neoliberalism is constrained by its own institutional form. In Western E uropean societies the origins of social democratic trade unionism were located in the mobilization of labour as a social movement. The power of organized labour was institutionalized economically and politically through intimate connections between the ‘politics of production’ and the ‘politics of politics’ (Burawoy, 1985: 122-55; Hyman, 1989: 202-23). This defined the trade union identity of political economism that dominated Western E uropean societies in the post-war period (H yman, 1996: 66). These developments undermined the power of organized labour as a social movement (O ffe and Wiesenthal, 1985) and have left E uropean unions dangerously exposed in the context of neo-liberal globalization in the form of E uropean integration. In this context, it is hardly surprising that the PES and E uropean collective bargaining are little more than empty shells that are disconnected from E uropean civil society. A s we have demonstrated in this chapter, however, there are signs that the labour movement is starting to mobilize in E uropean civil society as an autonomous social actor and this is reflected in oppositional currents in the economic and political spheres. The beast is stirring, but remains shackled by the enduring strength of nationally specific path dependencies and the institutional architecture that has developed as part of the process of E uropean integration. A s we demonstrated in our national case studies, oppositional currents have developed unevenly within E U members states and this unevenness has interacted with the variable geometry of the E uropean Union to create a complex picture whereby the dominant tendency for social democratic trade unionism to be in a state of crisis and decomposition is interrupted by hotspots where varied national protests collide to form hybrid forms of social democratic oppositionalism at the E uropean level. The challenge for E uropean trade unions is how to harness this oppositional energy into a coherent project of European regulation. In the final chapter, we explore the prospects for radicalized political unionism alongside a range of other possible futures.

Chapter 7

A lternative F utures? We have reviewed the crisis of social democratic trade unionism by examining four specific countries in Western Europe, each representing a variant of social democracy and party union nexus. In S weden we refer to ‘unparalleled intimacy’ typologized by high density of union membership, a long tradition (intermittently broken) of social democratic party in power, and centralized collective bargaining. O ur German example, of ‘informal alignment’ contains considerable, but informal overlap between party and trade union leadership, and a flexible but particularized form of juridified industrial relations. In Britain, in contrast, liberal market ideology has greatly infected trade union development, neo-corporatism has been weaker, but, in contrast to Germany the alignment between unions and party has been more ‘formalized’ and organic. In France, our example of ‘fragmentation’, we find no dominant party union nexus but a shifting terrain of trade union alignment with alternative political ideologies which has left social democratic trade unionism relatively under-developed. Despite such under-development a form of dirigiste neo-corporatism has featured within F rance both at national, sectoral and workplace level. We have argued that in each of our cases, including the sui generis case of the ETUC, the ‘specific social structuration’ of social democracy inclusive of trade union aspirations described by M oschonas (2002) is in crisis. In other words the consistencies of the traditional state-labour-capital relationship can no longer be relied upon in the west E uropean context. There is, moreover, little evidence that these relationships are being reconfigured in a meaningful way at the European level. F urthermore, as trade unions have been faced with neoliberal restructuring they have been forced in many instances to reconsider their identity, in some instances to ‘open-up’ their bureaucratic structures, and to engage with other forces in civil society. This identity reconfiguration is a product not only of the external pressures of neoliberal restructuring and state withdrawal of support for labour’s cause, but also of internal forces within sections of the union movement who wish to move unions in the direction of political oppositionist mobilization. If our argument is correct it begs two further questions. The first question is whether or not social democratic trade unionism can reformulate itself and survive or thrive in new forms. S econd, if it cannot, will new alternative party union relationships emerge, that are by necessity more combative and oppositional to state and employers alike? We suggest that future scenarios for the party union nexus may share some similarities, but might also exhibit some differences according to restraints of path dependency.

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Reformulation or Rejection? To help us answer these questions we suggest that the alternatives open to trade unions may be displayed on two dimensions (Figure 7.1). On the first dimension trade unions can opt between an integrative approach by exploring productivity coalitions with employers and social pacts with governments, and an oppositional approach by developing combative and militant mechanisms of protest and dissent. O ur second dimension varies from the continuance of a national orientation to problem-solving to an international one. The national approach continues to rely on the maintenance or (re)creation of sympathetic government support for the aims and objectives of organized labour, while the international approach supplements national solutions by the addition of multinational or supra-national support structures. S egments I, II and III represent reformulated or continuing scenarios for social democracy, while S egment IV represents a scenario based upon a rejection of the social democratic form and the development of an alternative political identity. NATIONAL I

II

Third Way

Traditional Social Democracy

INTEGRATIVE

OPPOSITIONAL III

IV

Cosmopolitan Social

Radicalised Political Unionism

Democracy

INTERNATIONAL

Figure 7.1 Alternative Trade Union Futures

O f course, any such two dimensional model runs the risk of ‘boxing-in’ alternatives too tightly. In reality there may be ebb and flow between alternatives, as well as tensions within unions as to which direction is desirable. H owever, we suggest that four alternative futures might evolve from these dimensions.

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Third Way (Integrative, National) Our first variant, the Third Way, is symbolized by a propensity of unions to adopt the policy of risk minimization in a global economy. S uch risk minimization, espoused by Third Way theorists such as Beck (1992) and Giddens (1998) manifests itself in the attenuation of class conflict and its replacement by ‘progressive workplace consensus’ between employees and employer. It is assumed that ‘there is no alternative’ to the forces of globalization as a paradigm shift has taken place in the global division of labour spurred by developments in information technology and finance-driven marketization. Risk in this new environment is supposedly minimized by building a productivity coalition (partnership) with the employer in the interest of business competitiveness. S uch risk-sharing would provide the ideological impetus for ‘mutual gains’ in the workplace, whereby employees work collaboratively with employers to protect the organization from business failure. In the advanced capitalist economies, risk to both employer and employee is minimized by a supply-side strategy which focuses on the upgrading of skills. A s such, protagonists argue, social democratic trade unionism might reformulate itself as a protector of worker interests in a globalized economy. In this vein, at the level of the national state, we can identify the phenomena of ‘competitive corporatism’ defined by Rhodes (1998), whereby trade unions continue to agree social pacts with Governments in an effort to moderate the worst effects of neoliberal restructuring. In F rance, for example, such retreat soured the M itterand years whereby progressive reforms soon gave way to ‘realism’ (Kesselman, 1986). In Germany, the transition to the Third Way was symbolized by Gerhard S chröder’s collaboration with Tony Blair in authoring Die Neue Mitte/Third Way. The publication signalled a shift in policy direction towards supply side economic management and worker flexibility: ... social democrats have to recognise that the basic requirements for economic success have changed. S ervices cannot be kept in stock: customers use them as and when they are needed – at many different times of day, outside what people think of as normal working hours. The rapid advance of the information age, especially the huge potential of electronic commerce, promises to change radically the way we shop, the way we learn, the way we communicate and the way we relax. R igidity and over-regulation hamper our success in the knowledge-based service economy of the future. They will hold back the potential of innovation to generate new growth and more jobs. We need to become more flexible, not less (S chröder and Blair, 1998).

Writing within the UK context, A ckers and Payne (1998) and Coats (2004) regard collaborative partnership between unions and employers as an extension of pluralist principles within which trade unions can achieve new societal and workplace legitimacy. This analysis suggests that trade unions are subject to the perils of global competition but can redefine their role as protectors within society

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against the subsequent anomie. F or example, unions might collaborate with employers to ensure organization-specific skills training. Coats (2004), an ex-TUC leader writing for the UK based Work Foundation, theorizes this approach further and argues that unions are a source of both bonding and bridging social capital – bonding capital in terms of developing intra-colleague solidarity, and bridging capital in terms of seeking common cause between employee and employer. ‘A ll of this contributes to the “ontological security” that Giddens deems necessary for social cohesion – workers understand their place in the world and have a sufficient sense of continuity to withstand the vicissitudes of their working lives’ (Coats 2004: 38). H owever, at workplace level critics have argued from their case studies that partnership not only denies the everyday reality of the capital –labour relationship but also ignores the debilitating effects that partnership working may have on trade unions and their members. A process of reality transcendence occurs whereby the ideology of partnership denies the core employment relationship. R ather than risk being shared it is transferred to the employee through work intensification, stress and increased precariousness (Taylor and R amsay, 1998; M artínez L ucio and S tuart, 2005; Upchurch et al., 2008). This is simply because Third Way partnership is adopted by governments and employers as a strategic approach to capital accumulation, rather than any benign desire to befriend organized labour. Union representatives become detached from their members’ interests through the partnership process and any oppositionist currents are repressed inside the workplace as the ideology of consensus is utilized to deny the existence of conflict (M arks et al., 1998; F indlay and M ckinlay, 2003). O ur characterization of social democratic trade unionism in this scenario includes a rubric whereby trade unions act to restrain class solidarity when it ‘threatens’ the national interest expressed in terms of national business competitiveness, while at the same time suppressing sectional interests sometimes expressed as ‘business unionism’. This Third Way variant of possible union identities reformulates this traditional characterization of social democratic trade unionism by releasing the fetters placed on ‘business unionism’ through the promotion of partnership-based consensus ideology. S uch a reformulation is promoted not only by the union leaderships but also by the state, as it seeks to by-pass class solidarity and appeal directly to labour to support national business interest. We have gathered evidence of such Third Way approaches within sections of the German trade unions (such as IG BCE – the mining, energy and chemical workers’ union); in Britain, with the establishment of the TUC ‘Partnership Institute’ and N ew L abour government support for ‘Union L earning R epresentatives’ and workplace partnership initiatives; and in F rance with the orientation of the CF DT since its ‘L iberalism or S tatism’ Conference in 2000. In such cases the emphasis has been on establishing national business competitiveness and re-legitimising trade unions through their support for such a project. M cIlroy (2008), for example, expresses this point in his analysis of Government and TUC backed workplace learning initiatives in the UK and concludes that rather than utilize learning funds

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for the purposes of union revitalization the TUC has ‘delivered policy determined by government with priority accorded to employer predilictions’. Traditional Social Democracy (Oppositional, National/EU) Leggett (2007) identifies a strand of thought within social democracy which he labels as critical traditionalists. This he describes as a ‘discernible model of social democracy’ from which ‘Third Wayists’ have now departed. This variant of critical thinking seeks to return to the values of ‘old social democracy’ exemplified by the Keynesian Welfare S tate and a positive relationship between party and unions. Within this scenario it is argued that the overwhelming power of globalization is overstated (H irst et al., 2008) and that it remains possible through the power of agency to reformulate the state-capital-labour relationship in favour of labour’s interest (Garrett, 1998, 2003: Wickham-Jones, 2000). In other words, it is not accepted that ‘there is no alternative’ to capitalism’s love affair with neoliberal globalization. David Clark, the former E uropean A ffairs adviser to the British exF oreign S ecretary R obin Cook describes the position in this way: The assumption that democratic socialism has fallen victim to an inexorable process of globalisation is too fatalistic. It ignores the reality that the world in which we live has been created by the actions of people and governments. There is no reason why, with sufficient will, it should not be created on a new and different basis….There is widespread support for the idea that that economic life should be structured to meet human need. What the left lacks is a credible strategy to make this vision a reality (Clark, 2004).

Indeed this scenario envisages within the E uropean context a possibility of an E U wide restraint on neoliberalism and the restoration of defence of the public realm over that of market forces (M arquand, 2004: 45). F or trade unions such a position would entail the development of projects to ‘reclaim social democracy’ and to continue to fight left-right battles within the national party machinery (e.g. Taylor, 2003). E arly indications of this tension were already apparent in the ‘divorce’ of the LO union federation from the SAP in 1987, whereby the formal connection between the two was untied but pressure continued to be exerted on the SAP from the unions at workplace or sectoral level. A strategy of ‘internal lobbying’ is now seen as the way forward for many ‘left’ trade union leaders in the UK, who wish to ‘reclaim’ the L abour Party. It is a strategy which was also pursued by a section of the leadership of the F ire Brigades Unions who, despite having disaffiliated from the British Labour Party, supported the campaign of the left MP John M cDonnell in his challenge for leadership of the Party in 2007. S uch battles have also been reflected in the SPD’s Keynesianism debate which we outlined in our chapter on Germany, as well as in the ‘militant’ turn of the FO in F rance and in the ongoing realignment of the CGT. Prospects for success of traditional social democracy depend on activating party members and challenging the leadership

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while continuing to ‘hold the line’ of trade union class solidarity against pressures to conform to the interests of national competitiveness. In the process trade unions at the national level are drawn into opposing state policy particularly as it relates to modernization and retrenchment of the public sector. E lements of such a strategy form part of the policy approach at E U level where the E uropean F ederation of Public S ervice Unions has been active in co-ordinating a federated campaign for a legal framework on public services (EPS U, 2005). The problem with such a strategy is that the prospects for E U-wide Keynesianism ‘from above’ appear to be receding further and further into the distance as E U policy is deliberately steered with social democratic complicity towards a supra-national project of supply side objectives, ‘flexicurity’, and employability. For this reason Callinicos (2001) and Cammack (2004) cast doubt on the political possibilities of a revival of E uro-Keynesianism, and argue that social democratic parties have long since abandoned the traditional social democratic ideal in the interests of enhancing national business competitiveness. The credibility of any revival of traditional social democracy is also clouded by a more complex theoretical debate on contemporary capital accumulation strategy. The ‘traditional’ social democratic position, as described above, assumes that the specificities of neoliberalism can be divorced from the generalities of capitalism. A s such it is possible to oppose neoliberalism and its associated aspects of marketization without challenging the core powers of capital. F rom this perspective it would be possible to reconstruct social democracy within the confines of capitalism, most specifically by a revival of Keynesian economic prescription. S ome neo-M arxist writers outside of traditional social democratic circles adopt a similar overview. David H arvey (2003), for example, suggests that neoliberalism is a particularized strategy of privatization, marketization and state retrenchment pursued by belligerent capital as ‘accumulation by dispossession’ in a new era of globalization. Pierre Bourdieu (1998) suggested something similar with regard to the state when writing that in withdrawing the ‘left hand of the state’ governing parties in west E urope have deliberately sought to distance themselves from class solidarity and labour interest in a drift towards ‘social liberalism’. It would be possible, in this scenario, for the ‘left hand’ to be revived in a process of mobilization and opposition by trade unions and other anti-neoliberal forces. Critics of this optimistic scenario highlight that the processes of social democracy’s subservience to international capital actually predate the death of Keynesianism and the onset of globalization (Callaghan, 2002). F rom a classical M arxist position H arman argues that neoliberalism, rather than being a variant of contemporary world capitalism, is now central to capital accumulation (see H arman, 2007), and is an overall response by western-based capital to falling rates of profit which became evident throughout the 1970s and 1980s (Brenner, 1998, 2006; Duménil and L évy, 2005). A parallel view is expressed by A lbo (2007: 35657) who argues that neoliberalism can be characterized as a ‘ruling class political programme to respond to challenges from the L eft’ within a ‘dominant pattern of finance-led extroverted growth….for the realization of new value’. In this view it

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becomes more difficult to extract marketization from other contemporary strategies of capital accumulation. A s a result social democracy’s positive relationship with capitalism makes it extremely difficult if not impossible for these parties and allied trade union leaderships to challenge neoliberalism without a direct challenge to the power of capital. The prospects for a revival of social democratic method would thus be severely constrained. Indeed, as both Bieler (2006) and M athers (2007) suggest, in these circumstances the re-invigoration of ‘S ocial E urope’ is unlikely to be state-led through ‘E uro-Keynesianism’ but instead is dependent on trade unions developing and expanding class struggle both within and across nation states, whereby key aspects of the dominant E U social democratic politik need to be challenged from below. Cosmopolitan Social Democracy (Integrative, International) O ur third scenario, cosmopolitan social democracy (CS D) would appear to span the left-right spectrum of social democratic politics. CS D can be characterized as both a meta-version of the Third Way and an ‘international’ version of traditional social democracy. In its ‘left’ guise it can also borrow neo-Gramscian concepts of civil society to propose agitation ‘from below’. H eld and M cGrew (2000: 116-117) typologize these right-left variants between ‘global transformers’ who wish to encourage ‘multi-level democratic cosmopolitan polity’, and ‘radicals’ who wish for ‘bottom up social change’ and the ‘reform of governance, from the local to global level’. Whilst the current meta-force of globalization is accepted as a new phase of international political economy it is argued that supra- and international regulation of globalization can mitigate the worst excesses of the market. S uch a position has acquired enhanced credibility after the collapse of the financial markets in 2008. CSD thus embraces prescriptions of institutional reform and corporate social responsibility in which ‘Globalization can be better and more fairly governed, regulated and shaped’ (H eld and M cGrew, 2002: 107). A gain many proponents of CS D envisage the E uropean Union as a key potential agent for such re-regulation (e.g. M cGrew, 2002). Partnership between employers and employees is often central to the project and is even conceived of as a form of ‘new governance’ typifying the ethos of the E uropean S ocial M odel (Kristensen, 2001). A t the E uropean level, the E TUC has articulated this CS D ‘Third Way’ position through its uncritical support for social dialogue, E uropean Works Councils and the E uropean E mployment S trategy. Giddens also expresses this theme when he outlines his vision for a E uropean S ocial M odel thus: Underlying the ESM is a general set of values: sharing risk widely across society; containing the inequalities that might threaten social solidarity; protecting the vulnerable through active social intervention; cultivating consultation rather than confrontation in industry; and providing a rich framework of social and economic citizenship rights for the population as a whole (Giddens, 2006: 15).

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In its ‘left’ version the routemap to achieving CS D is dependent on a distinct challenge to the neoliberal imperative, even though the solution to the problem may be constructed in terms of institutional reform. There is a cross-over here with political concepts of associative and network democracy. A ssociative democracy, with horizontal networks of individuals acting as pressure within a renewed civil society, is presented as a more democratic framework designed to increase rates of social capital formation, participation and societal efficiency. N ew forms of participative and associative democracy are deemed necessary because of a decline of societal solidarity allied with the risk society, which in turn has created a crisis of representative democracy (e.g. Cohen and R ogers, 1995). H owever, in the Third Way vision of CS D the motive for promoting new forms of participative democracy comes from a position of relative pessimism. O ld forms of representative democracy, associated with mass state provision of goods and services and ‘traditional’ social democracy, are no longer deemed appropriate to peoples’ needs. The CS D project becomes in essence Giddens’ (2000) ‘social investment state’ whereby the role of the state mutates to one which discourages welfare dependency while at the same time providing incentives for personal advancement via education and training. Translated to the restructured workplace CS D offers something similar to Third Way prescription. The process of participation is again postulated as key to economic and production efficiency, either as pluralist networks of stakeholders in the corporation (H irst, 1994, 1997; Kelly et al 1997: Kelly and Parkinson, 2001) or, as A rcher (1996) suggests, in terms of economic democracy expressed through Works Councils. F or many trade unions the promise of supra-and international re-regulation in favour of labour’s interest is an alluring one. It is in this segment of reformed trade union identity that we can locate the emphasis on initiatives such as that calling for ‘Decent Work’, international framework agreements, corporate social responsibility and core labour standards (see Dimitrova and Petkov, 2005, for an insight into the Decent Work approach). This strategy, adopted by many of the Global Union F ederations (GUF s) and the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), has as its objective the regulation of labour standards worldwide through agencies such as the International L abour O rganization (ILO ) or even the World Trade O rganization (WTO ). S uch a strategy of engagement for change with the institutions has been accompanied with a push by unions at international level to ally with N GO s and ‘social movements’ in a process of lobbying. The Decent Work initiative was a central component, for example, of the intervention of the ITUC and some unions (e.g. IG M etall) at the 2007 World S ocial F orum in N airobi. A t the F orum the General S ecretary of the ITUC, Guy R yder, outlined the strategy and cautioned ‘we must ensure that the battle for decent work at the global level is being won in the national arena’ (cited by Bieler, 2007). In his document he outlines the strategic problem: The global labour movement, together with its allies in progressive political parties and civil society, has been arguing for some time that decent work for

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all should be placed at the centre of global governance, as a universal goal throughout the UN system and other international institutions such as the WTO , the IMF and the World Bank. S urely that should be obvious: to be achieved globally, decent work must be prioritised by all international institutions and they must work coherently to ensure its realisation (R yder, 2007: 2).

This strategy internationalizes the unions’ march through the institutions, and parallels strategies of the GUF s and ITUC to engage not only with employers through international framework agreements (H ammer, 2005), but also with the international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank and IMF. Indeed, the ITUC has claimed some success in this approach in its dealings with the IFI s (ICF TU, 2006). H owever, as Bieler (2007) observes, from a comment of a participant at the 2007 World S ocial F orum such a strategy represents an attempt ‘to create a global welfare state’. A s such it may be impossible to achieve such a task without fundamentally changing the new ruling political and economic order, and such a task may be beyond the remit or willingness of the leaderships of unions at international level. Indeed, Bieler (2007) notes a potentially debilitating ‘top down’ and hierarchical approach to achieving ‘Decent Work’ which contrasts with the more radical and rank-and-file based initiatives associated with alternative campaigns at the F orum such as the ‘Proposal for a L abour N etwork’. S uch tensions are at the heart of debates about the origins and direction of ‘new labour internationalism’. In addressing this debate Hyman (2005) identifies a ‘labour diplomacy’ model which is based on co-operative relationships between international union leaderships, Governments and institutions but which might stand in contrast to workplace based international solidarity. M artinez L ucio (2007) also writes of a ‘managerialist’ mode of labour internationalism, which displays a tendency of horizontal networking at the level of union leaderships established to enact change through institutional structures. Within Western E urope, of course, such institutionally based managerial internationalism is inevitably geared towards a defence of the ESM , and exhibits traits of our ‘traditional social democracy’ model of nationally based oppositionism. A n example of this is the formation of the Trade Unionists Against the EU Constitution campaign led by three General S ecretaries of British unions (Bob Crow of the RM T, Joe M arino of the Bakers’ Union and Doug N icholls of the youth workers’ union, CY WU). In their jointly sponsored pamphlet they conclude (authors’ italics): Whatever views trade unionists may have about the E uropean project, the proposed Constitution is a step too far. A different and more democratic future is worth fighting for, one in which the nations of the world co-operate through the United Nations (TUAE UC, 2007).

In essence, while trade union strategic identity associated with CS D might represent a progressive process of internationalization and engagement with social movements, its potential to challenge neoliberalism may be constrained by

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its (potentially fanciful) focus on institutional reform and employer willingness to comply. Radicalized Political Unionism (Oppositional/International) While our first three segments represent examples of reformulating social democracy under various guises our fourth segment represents a break to the left from social democracy and its traditional party union nexus. It is tempting to identify this fourth scenario as simply that of an ‘international social movement unionism’ already identified by Peter Waterman (1991) and Kim Moody (1997). Moody signals the specific importance of union democracy, union alliances with social movements, and the role of the rank-and-file in developing SMU. Whilst accepting these features as oppositionist and internationalist tenets of trade union strategy we would wish to refine the analysis. In particular we suggest that many proponents of SM U as a union strategy are ambiguous or imprecise about the ‘social movement’ aspects of SM U and suffer from lack of clarity as to how trade unions may differ from social movements in their modus operandi. Indeed, Tattersall (2005) has already highlighted the heterogeneous terminology applied to SM U which refer to variants such as ‘social movement unionism, union-community coalitions, social unionism, community unionism, social justice unionism or citizenship movement unionism’. Within this mix of SMU definitions there is a need to clarify the links between social movement theory and trade union development. S econd, we suggest that much of the literature on SM U, particularly that emanating from the United S tates, is de-politicized and fails to address the necessary ideological aspects of oppositionist trade unionism deemed to challenge neoliberalism. Indeed, much of the US literature adopts an emphasis on spontaneity and voluntarism, which, while perhaps correctly placing emphasis on the rank-and-file, tends to omit questions of ideology or political leadership within unions. A n example might be Juravich and Bronfenbrenner’s (1999) classic tale of the steelworkers’ struggle at Ravenswood or Dan Clawson’s (2003) The Next Upsurge, in which the recent experiences of the F rench labour movement are framed with reference to A merican organising tactics and strategy. While offering a rich narrative of organising within a historical context, as Jefferys (2004) argues in a review of Clawson’s book, ‘It would have been an interesting addition to read how some existing union members develop and are developed into an experienced, politicized activist-friendly base’. It has also been suggested that ‘community unionism’ lacks a political ideology or more specifically an ‘ideology of labour’ premised on an independent and oppositional politics without which labour lacks coherence as a movement (Gapasin and Y ates, 1997: 59-61). Despite such caveats we would suggest that social movement theory (SM T) proves useful for the analysis as it can sometimes contain an appreciation of historical dynamic which is reflected in the framework we have constructed for each of our country chapters. Indeed, many concepts in SM T are developed by an examination of protest movements’ historical praxis. Our first task then, is to

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place our S egment IV (radicalized political unionism) within the framework of social movement theory (see Table 7.1). O f course, we need to apply caveats to our comparisons of social movements and trade unions. M any social movements are single issue campaigns, which can succeed or fail in their objective, and then disappear. Trade unions, in contrast, are class-centred social products of capitalism and are rooted in the everyday exploitation within the capital-labour relationship. A s such trade unions are here for the long haul, and as a consequence have developed long established bureaucratic structures and ways of working that may clash with the vision of new social movements. Part of the confusion over the applicability or not of social movement theory to trade unions may also lay in the pre-occupation of many social movement theorists with ‘post-industrial’ analyses of society which de-emphasize traditional class struggle approaches based on the antagonism between capital and labour. Such post-industrial analysis reifies information and knowledge above materialist concerns (e.g. Touraine, 1982, Castells, 2000). S ociety, in this approach, is governed by ‘disorganized capitalism’ (M unck, 2002: 15) or ‘the network’ (Waterman, 1997). H abermas (1987) has also argued that new social movements have arisen because of the anger expressed at the contemporary problems engendered by ‘post-material society, and, as such, the long term antagonism between capital and labour is at variance and ‘economistic’ (see M athers, 2007). In challenging these approaches Dunn (2007) pleads for greater consideration of the objective circumstances of labour within capitalism and argues that: S tated most strongly, such theories question the very concept of labour, providing rather dubious foundations for its strategies. It does often appear that we are being invited to resist exploitation on the basis of theories which leave considerable doubt whether exploitation exists and to organise in a world which is essentially disorganised (Dunn 2007: 134).

We suggest as others have (Tucker, 1991; E dwards, 2008), that trade unions are beginning to embrace contemporary injustices as part of the global justice agenda, and, in any case there is a rich history of unions pursuing the sword of justice. Tilly and Tilly’s edited collection Class Conflict and Collective Action (1981), for example, devotes itself to examining these relationships over time. F urthermore, as Barker and Dale (1998) have argued, there may not be anything particularly ‘new’ about the ‘new social movements’ when examined historically in terms of mass protest waves, which more often than not include organized labour as a central component.

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Table 7.1 Synthesis of Social Movement Theory and Radicalized Political Unionism Theory

Implications for Union Strategy/Identity

M obilising structures, ‘high risk’ activism (M cA dam 1986)

N etworking, education, social capital, ad-hoc mobilizing committees

Cycles of contention (Tilly 1978), shared repertoires of contention, common purpose

R eaction to neo-liberal deinstitutionalization of industrial relations, high level mobilization, dispute culture

S hared frames of reference ‘framing’ (Goffman 1974), ‘H igh R isk’ Coalitions

Defence of Public Services, affiliation activity, coalitions and alliance within civil society

Power devolvement (M oody 1997)

De-bureaucratization, internal restructuring and innovation (organising model) – democratization

Political congruence, political opportunities (Tarrow 1998), contentious politics, resource mobilization

Contentious collective action, left political leadership

Despite caution and caveat SM T may nevertheless give us insights into the dynamics of collective action and moral outrage against shared senses of injustice, as well the role and function of leadership within movements. O ur moral outrage is spawned by a sense of injustice invoked by the neoliberalism of contemporary capitalism. We argue that radical political unionism is a specific response by sections of the unions in Western E urope to the all- pervasive effects of neoliberalism. N eoliberal restructuring, pursued by Governments and employers throughout Western E urope, has de-institutionalized the social compact of industrial relations and ridiculed the public domain. This process of de- (or rather re-) institutionalization of industrial relations has been central to the decline of the social democratic model. In the old pluralist landscape ‘trust’ acted as a mediating tool between the two sides of industry in the interest of conflict containment within the administrative structures. It is this administrative based trust which has been so adversely affected by social democracy’s accommodation with neoliberalism and which, in turn, has led to sections of the unions having to ‘open themselves up’, engage beyond the workplace, and to politicize their identity. This politicized response to institutional crisis and reformation is a core feature of a new ‘cycle of contention’ identified by Tilly (1978) and others in SMT. The turn towards neoliberal restructuring could therefore be interpreted as a new fracture line identified in SMT as a major cause of renewed grievance and discontent (M elucci, 1989; Touraine, 1988). O r, as Tarrow (1998: 24) describes, ‘A lliances are formed, often across a shifting boundary between challengers and members

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of the polity. N ew forms of contention are experimented with and diffused.’ S uch experimentation and diffusion is not an accident of history but a product of distinct opportunities that arise in response to changing political environments in which societal policy is divided (or re-divided) into proponents and challengers. The diffusion of ideas and innovation as new movements arise makes networking activity a central component of the ability of social movements to thrive and grow (Passy, 2003: 41). O ften NSM theorists consider networking primarily as a ‘nonhierarchical’ phenomenon in which leadership and authority might be rejected as a matter of principle (Diani, 1990, 2003). N etworking is, of course, a central feature of trade union capacity building at the formal level through democratic structures of meetings, committees, education programmes and conferences. H owever, the architecture of networking is also subject to bureaucratic constraints within the union machine, and in particular to fears of loss of control by the trade union leaderships. A progressive networking approach would require the loosening up of bureaucratic stricture to allow active cross-fertilization of ideas within and between unions, and importantly, between unions and other agents within civil society who can help labour’s cause through coalitions and alliances. F or the union leaderships such a process may be a high risk strategy unless, we suggest, there is some left oriented political congruence throughout the union which marries the aspirations, expectations and frames of reference of both union leadership and activists. S uch left political congruence is more, rather than less likely as the crisis of social democratic trade unionism deepens. When combined with high levels of union participation strong networking encourages ‘high risk activism’ (M cA dam, 1986) which in turn acts to politicize union members as their propensity to mobilize correspondingly increases. In such a fashion shared ‘repertoires of contention’ would include strikes, campaigns, rallies, and, in contemporary circumstances, agitational internet-based activity (see H ogan, 2006). This will re-enforce oppositionism through willingness and propensity to be active rather than passive members of the union. O n this point Charles Tilly’s formulation echoes M arxist interpretations of the importance of the development of consciousness through collective action: People learn how to strike, to invade field, to burn in effigy, just as they fail to learn a great many other forms of action which they might, in theory, employ to advance their interests. What is more, each learned form of collective action acquires a sort of standing within some defined population as others learn to interpret it and react to it: the first strike is a mystery, the second an outrage, the thousandth a problem to be dealt with. We can thus speak reasonably of any coherent population as having a limited repertoire of action within which its members ordinarily make choices when they have collective claims to advance (Tilly, 1981: 19).

H igh risk activism, nurtured by networking and de-bureaucratization, is thus likely to be positively correlated with membership mobilization. We would expect

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in our radicalized political unionism model to find evidence of high mobilization measured through propensity to strike and to conduct campaigns against the pensée unique of neoliberalism. This is not to say that we would expect to see a general rise in strike activity in our chosen countries. R ather we sense a polarization of union strategies which imply those unions, or sections of unions, adopting our radicalized political oppositionist identity are more likely to combine mobilization with activist and membership revival. E xamples might be the militant orientation of the S UD and others in the G-10 in F rance over the pensions issue and public sector cuts (Gordon and M athers, 2004; Damesin and Denis, 2005); the willingness of left oriented sections of the IG M etall and Ver.di in Germany both to engage with the L eft Party and mobilize against the H artz reforms (Jüncke, 2007); and the real growth in mobilising capacity (and often membership) of the ‘rejectionist’ F ire Brigades Union (Darlington, 1998; F itzgerald, 2005); the Communications Workers Union in the R oyal M ail (Beale, 2003); the RM T (Darlington, 2007) and PCS (Upchurch et al., 2008) in their fight against public service deterioration in the UK. O ur position must be seen in contrast to more pessimistic quantitative analyses of aggregate strike statistics, which may be utilized to ‘prove’ the continuance of labour quiescence, declining worker consciousness and dormant class struggle in Western E urope. F or example, Gall and A llsop (2007), in presenting recent strike statistics across Western E urope, acknowledge the problems of purely quantitative analysis and emphasize qualitative assessment. But despite this acknowledgement they slip into pessimism when they dismiss ongoing class polarization by arguing that the gathered quantitative evidence ‘does not lend support to the perspective of extant social and political polarization leading to increasingly frequent and widespread mass mobilizations, of which strikes are a central component.’ O ur argument is that our radicalized political unionism is an emergent minority rather than majority identity within the unions, but that it nevertheless represents a qualitative shift in union strategy and political orientation. We identify this qualitative shift as a propensity of unions or sections of unions and their activists to politicize their industrial struggle. S uch politicization focuses on antineoliberalism, is formed within a framework of hostility to Government policy, and is often associated with defence of threatened public services. Politicization of the struggle also manifests itself in a willingness to engage with agents ‘beyond the workplace’, often accompanied with new ways of working for unions which in turn re-enforces the tendency for industrial struggle to become embellished with political oppositionism. The question of leadership within SM T has also proved controversial. We have already mentioned the tendency apparent in SM T to dismiss the role of leadership when it is associated with patterns of authority or bureaucracy. S imilar concerns have occurred within industrial relations analysis in debates over the role of the trade union bureaucracy versus rank-and-file (see Hyman, 1971, 1983). We have already outlined in Chapter 1 how the bureaucratic consolidation of the union leaderships separated them from the social position of the rank-andfile, both in terms of income, status and privilege, but also by way of the salaried

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officials’ social role as institutional mediators between capital and labour. This specific social role of the trade union leaders, so well outlined by the Webbs (1894), was inextricably tied to the development of the social democratic model of trade unionism. The heyday of the Keynesian ‘Golden A ge’ aided and abetted the emerging dominance of social democratic thought on the left and within the unions, and allowed the bureaucratic consolidation of the trade union leadership to flourish in times of high unemployment and economic growth. Keynesianism did not automatically favour social democratic unionism, as the exceptionalism of the USA testifies, but it created the framework within which it could thrive given the necessary political formulations. A s we have attempted to argue the crisis of social democratic trade unionism has been partly engendered by a new uncertainty in this institutional framework, leading to new experimentation with innovation and social movement type activity from sections of the unions. Debates over the organising model have acted to revive the bureaucracy/rankand-file debates albeit couched in terms of an activist/leadership dimension. Kelly (1998) draws on SM T to highlight the positive leadership role that can be played by union activists in mobilising members around collective senses of injustice and grievance (c.f. Klandermans, 1987; F antasia, 1988). In doing so he has drawn criticism from F airbrother (2005) for adopting a ‘vanguardist’ approach to union activist leadership in contrast to his own model of ‘workplace activism’ grounded in the collective strength of workplace organization. H owever, in considering this argument Darlington (2007) adopts a consciously dialectical approach and argues that ‘F airbrother’s explicit attempt to denigrate Kelly’s emphasis on the role of union activist leadership effectively blurs the distinction between activist and members, leaders and led, re-focusing on what is implied to be a more spontaneist dynamic in which conflict and mobilization originates in the more or less spontaneous action of workers rather than being led by premeditated “vanguard” leaders’. F airbrother (op. cit), in promoting the primacy of workplace organization may thus over-promote voluntarism and spontaneity and miss the importance of leadership, engendered at both activist and union leadership level. Indeed, critiques of approaches which express caution or even hostility to leadership have also come from within theorists of social movements. Barker et al (eds.) (2001), for example, devote an edited collection to the critique and conclude that: L eadership is fateful for movement development at every stage and turning point – their growth and decline, their heritages for the future and their mark on history – are all intimately tied up with their forms of leadership, the quality of ideas offered and accepted, the selections from repertoires of contention, organisation, strategy and ideology they make (Barker et al., 2001: 23).

Within our typology of radicalized political unionism we suggest that leadership will inevitably be to the left of contemporary social democracy. The rejectionist position taken by unions to neoliberal restructuring must include left political

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opposition to the accommodation of social democracy to those same forces of neo-liberalism. F urthermore, the type of ‘high risk activism’ demanded by this model implies congruence between the aims and aspirations of a politicized union leadership and the majority of activists themselves. The high risk strategies cannot afford to rely on membership passivity as high levels of union mobilization against state and employer are necessary to sustain the model both practically and ideologically. This may, of course, place limitations on the potential for radicalized political unionism simply because union members are at varying levels of consciousness, up to and including the ‘working class Tory’ portrayed in writings on British social history (see R ose, 2001, for a review). Within an increasingly polarized society there is also the danger that working people may also adopt the ideas of the extreme right. F ichter et al (2002), for example, have already cautioned about the recent growth of such extreme right wing ideas and organization within German trade unions. In other words, it is not activism or leadership in themselves that are important but the political orientation of such activism. The distinction is important to emphasise as studies of union activists have often found an array of activist ‘types’, only some of which might fit our model. Activists may fall within the spectrum of militancy and moderation, may be pro- or anti- partnership, or even be ‘cultivated’ by management towards a partnership outlook (S amuel, 2005). A ctivists may be divided among themselves across issues or in terms of modes of operation, and may also be at odds with union leaderships. S uch nuances have long been recognized in studies of union activists. Batstone et al (1977: 11), for example, in their classic study of British ‘shop stewards in action’ typologize shop stewards within a range of personal and leadership characteristics, but also make the point that stewards’ ideological position may support basic principles of trade union unity ‘at a number of levels’ ranging from a ‘demand for a socialist society and workers’ control’ to ‘fostering co-operation with management’. Values and goals of activists are likely to be ‘elastic’, and so congruence of political vision cannot be guaranteed. Reviewing the Evidence We referred in chapter one to ‘path shapers’ as initiators of new trade union identities as well as the force of ‘path dependency’ in constraining development (N ielsen et al., 1995). The subtleties of this structure/agency dynamic should be seen when we compare and contrast the experience of and trade union response to neoliberalism and the associated crisis of social democracy in our case study countries and the barriers to the development of social democratic trade unionism at the E uropean level. We place our four chosen countries within a taxonomy of different party union nexus that have been shaped throughout recent history. S weden is our case of ‘unparalleled intimacy’ between the unions and main party of labour – the SAP – even though this relationship suffered a divorce in 1987. Germany represents our example of ‘informal alignment’ where a dominant party union nexus was

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established between the SP D and unions but which remained informal due to the importance attached by the unions to maintaining good relations with parties other than the SPD. Britain, in contrast, is our example of ‘formal affiliation’ where union party links are most established, but where consensus-based neo-corporatist practices have nevertheless been much weaker than in the S wedish and German cases. F rance, represents our case of ‘fragmentation’ where no dominant party union nexus of the social democratic type has been firmly established, where union density is lowest, but where the state has encouraged forms of bi-partism and sometimes tri-partite neo-corporatism. E ach country has experienced different patterns and processes of neoliberal restructuring over recent decades which, in turn, have dictated the tempo of the individual crises of social democracy. The British state and employers were first off the mark in pushing through neoliberal practice in terms of privatization and roll-back of much public activity previously undertaken by the state. In a sense British market liberalism was ‘restored’ as union immunities were withdrawn by the state and employers went on the rampage against key sections of the British trade union movement in the 1980s. The introduction of similar neoliberal agendas of privatization and labour market reform has happened later in our comparator countries. Both S weden and Germany represent examples of consensus-based political systems and the roll back of state activity and the confrontational stance by employers was more likely to challenge key normative assumptions among trade unionists and the voting masses than in the UK case. Caution towards ‘allout’ neoliberalism has been understandably reflected in the actions of the ruling elites in these countries, particularly as business competitiveness, especially in the German case, has so long benefited from the productivity coalition between unions and employers. In F rance, the roll-out of neoliberal measures, most acutely encapsulated in state proposals to ‘modernize’ labour law and reconstruct pensions, have been met with an explosive response that has moved beyond the workplace to the streets. Ironically, both in spite of and because of the low union density, organized labour has been a core feature of the protest movements, adopting militant tactics that reflect the lack of a traditional institutional route for conflict containment. There are also some important differences between our chosen countries in terms of the strategy of the ‘party of labour’ when in power. In the UK, for example, following the devastation of the 1980s and 1990s N ew L abour has attempted to introduce a new ‘shared value’ centred on partnership and consensus against the traditional system of adverserialism. In Germany, F rance and S weden, in contrast, the new capital accumulation strategy of the state has involved a shift from consensus to confrontation. In Germany, the crisis is arguably more severe than in Britain because of the depth of division within the SP D created by the identification of the Partei with the long-term retreat from the social model. The institutional ‘thickness’ of the co-determination model means that the challenge to the model via a process of industrial restructuring and withdrawal of welfare ‘rights’ would inevitably be perceived to be a direct affront to the class interests of

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workers in general. A ny revision of the model though a process of ‘modernization’ by the unions or the SP D would thus be likely to be seen by activists as a betrayal of long-held rights. In contrast, trade unions in Britain have been less integrated into the post-war body politik than in more corporatist countries such as Germany (Crouch, 2003). The longer term societal stability in the UK has meant that the state has been less inclined to create a settlement with organized labour to ensure continuing stability and the institutions supporting the interests of organized labour are ‘thinner’ as a result. H ence, neoliberal marketization has been less of a shock in the UK than in the German co-ordinated economy and the political ramifications of this in terms of fractures within the party of labour have (so far) been less severe. In addition, the major period of restructuring in Britain took place during the Thatcher/M ajor Conservative regimes. The spectre of a ‘return’ to a Conservative regime can be more effectively used by the N ew L abour leadership to maintain its ideological and organizational grip over the unions. Trade unions affiliated to the British Labour Party may also perceive that they have more power over the Party than their equivalents in the SP D because of more formalized nature of the party-union link. This may help explain why the development of trade union dissidence through the ‘awkward squad’ in Britain continues to be divided between a majority who wish to ‘reclaim L abour’ and a minority who have either suffered expulsion from the L abour Party, or who have sought tentatively to explore alternatives outside of the DPUN . What is nevertheless common to both countries (and the F rench example) is the open hostility to neoliberalism from dissident union and political groupings. Central to the dissidence has been a rejection of the retreat of the state from its former role and functions, manifested in Germany in opposition to the H artz R eforms, in F rance to pension and labour law reform, and in the UK in opposition to continued privatization and private sector interest in public service provision. In all cases, such opposition may work to draw the union both to oppose state policy and to seek alliances with global justice organizations and public service user groups within a much wider popular movement. The more fractured nature of trade unions in F rance and their alignment with parties of the L eft has meant that the crisis of the F rench social model has been met with a more complex response whereby varying degrees of accommodation to neoliberalism by the unions has led to a decade long opposition movement ‘on the streets’. O pposition has also been crystallized around debates on the future of the European Union, reflecting a more generalized popular reaction to the pervading effects of neo-liberal market agendas. A s in Germany, central to the opposition movements has been a defence of the social model against state-driven neoliberal restructuring. Union support from the major union confederations (CF DT, CGT and FO ) to the protests has been ambivalent, sometime supporting the protests, sometime opposing, and sometime remaining in ‘neutral gear’. The process of union vacillation has also been overlain with differences between the union confederations, involving a ‘de-politicization’ of the CF DT and a turn to militancy by the FO . In the wake of the collapse of the PCF and its hegemony over organized labour, a space has opened up to the left of social democracy that

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has been filled partially by new unions such as SUD and others in the G-10 that offer a more consistent opposition to the neo-liberal reforms, but this development has not been matched on the political field where the space to the left of social democracy has remained highly competitive. A s with both Britain and Germany the protest movements have been distinctly anti-neoliberal in their orientation and worker opposition to NLR has been intertwined with that of social protest movements outside of, and more often than not opposed to, the major parties of social democracy. Such new alliances are significant not just because they express a form of activity outside of the traditional party-union procedure, but also because they inevitably entail a relaxation of bureaucratic means by the unions as they seek to operate within ‘open society’. These tendencies within unions have played a critical role in the development of a transnational or E uropean-level challenge to the neo-liberal dynamics of E uropean integration. The ideological retreat of social democracy from the post-war political settlements has indeed been a painful process in terms of the strains between its leadership and rank-and-file. In both the UK and German cases this ‘retreat’ has been presented ideologically by the parties of labour in terms of a new ‘Third Way’ approach to governance. In both countries strong organizational and ideological links have existed between a ‘single party of labour’ and the leadership of the trade unions. O ur research framework postulated that the reformulation of social democracy under the impact of neo-liberalism presents itself with three possible alternatives, ranging from Third Way ‘business’ type unionism, to attempts to restore variations of traditional social democracy at the national or international level. O ur fourth scenario, envisages a slow process of decay of the social democratic model of trade unionism and a corresponding attempt to revive unionism through radical, political and oppositional programmes and identity. H istorically, a threat to the dominant party union nexus resulted in the leaderships of the trade unions loyal to the SP D in Germany and the L abour Party in Britain imposing discipline on their own dissident rank-and-file. In West Germany during the 1970s, for example, a challenge by activists in IG M etall to the co-determination model led to expulsions and suspensions from membership within the unions (M iller, 1982). In the UK, the ‘modernization’ of the L abour Party, symbolized by the abandonment of Clause IV and the associated commitment to nationalization, consolidated a united front between union leaders and party leaders against the oppositional left within the party. In both cases, the ‘bureaucratic consolidation’ of the social democratic model was invigorated (O ffe and Wiesenthal, 1995) and as a consequence the ‘crisis’ of social democracy has manifested itself in a crisis of the DPUN itself and a challenge to the bureaucratic tradition of the unions. S uch disciplining of dissident sections is now less possible. In S weden, as we argued in our case study, we have an example of social democratic trade unionism par excellence. The distinctive ‘S wedish M odel’ of development was marked by highly centralized bi-partite bargaining, a universalist welfare state and unparalleled electoral success of a social democratic or labour party. S ince the 1980s the model has been in crisis and under attack from the

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political right wishing to follow the neo-liberal adventure. The unprecedented attacks on the model by the right in power in the early part of the new millennium, at the time of writing, look to be floundering in likely electoral defeat. Despite this crisis we can detect in S weden a strong commitment by the unions to restore traditional social democracy through a national route, and, as a result, constraining forces have been sufficient to maintain the distinctiveness of the Swedish ‘model’. In contrast, in F rance where the party-union nexus is already historically fractured the crisis has manifested itself in the formation of new unions and union sections. The G-10 and SUD, in particular, fit much of our typology of radicalized political unionism but are still limited in their potential for mobilization due to their small size and over-concentration in the public sector. The CF DT has been most consistent in adopting a ‘social partner’ orientation in Third Way style, while the FO still has aspirations to swing the Parti Socialiste back to the left in national politics and can be more appropriately placed within the realm of traditional social democracy. The CGT, having shed its affiliation to the French Communist Party, is more complicated to define and has shown the greatest propensity to vacillate between opposition to neoliberalism and accommodation with social democratic ideals. The different historical, economic and political contexts of our countries have thus shaped and tempered the search for alternative political visions and more radical union identities. The German case, encapsulated in the development and progress of the L eft Party, is clearly the most advanced. The new party has managed to secure commitment from minority but nevertheless substantial elements within the trade unions while at the same time bridging our ‘traditional social democracy’ model (in the guise of ‘left’ Keynesianism) with more left radical politics that imply a clear break with the SP D. To some extent this may be an unstable coalition of identity, which will be put to the test as electoral success intervenes and the ‘responsibility’ of government creates new strategic and tactical dilemmas. In particular, the fault line between anti-neoliberalism and anticapitalism may exacerbate ideological differences within such left oppositionist currents. In Britain we observe much less significant breaks with social democracy, but nevertheless a gathering critique and mutual distancing between N ew L abour in power and the trade union leaderships. A s in all our countries dissent is most focused in the public sector where disputes against ‘modernization’ have by necessity been imbued with a politicized flavour. In the UK too, we find more union experimentation with new organizing techniques and a greater openness to coalition and alliance building ‘beyond the workplace’, perhaps reflecting the more intensified process of NLR and capital-labour confrontation within this AngloSaxon variant of capitalism identified by Robinson (2000, 2002). In Sweden we observe a continuing thread within the unions of a unique ‘folk tradition’ that has survived outside of other experiences. ����������������������������������������� The linkages between union and community rested on a defence of social democratic values against the values of A ngloAmerican individualism. In this context, the peculiarities and specificities of S wedish social movement unionism can thus be seen as a product of the enduring

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hegemony of social democratic values and the enduring legacy of the centralized decentralization of the S wedish labour movement. F inally in F rance, despite the vacillations of the main union federations, aspects of the new trade unionism such as participatory democracy and a focus on issues beyond the workplace have been strongly present in the G-10 and in S UD. S UD has consistently offered material and political support to the movements of the ‘sans’ and has developed alliances with the Confédération Paysanne. The G-10 participated in the ESF in Paris more than any other federation and it was engaged particularly around matters such as immigration, gender equality, and ecology in contrast to the ‘Decent Work’ approach of the mainstream. SUD has also played a significant part in revealing neo-liberalism as an ideological project, demonstrating how S UD has emphasized the development of a broad social movement that articulates an alternative societal project. H owever, although developing as a social movement union par excellence, S UD remains small and on the fringe of F rench trade unionism. In summary, our review of the evidence would appear to support the contention that in all four countries the crisis of social democracy has transformed into a crisis of the social democratic model of trade unionism. This marks a qualitative change from previous crises in which challenges to social democratic trade unionism were always contained within the party-union nexus or neutralized by the institutions of industrial relations. A t the E uropean level, there are few indications of the crisis being reversed through the construction of a new transnational party-union nexus of the type that existed within nation state societies. This is not to argue that these processes of containment and institutionalization of conflict no longer exist or no longer work, but rather to suggest that the limits of the process have been breached to various degrees of significance in each of the countries under observation. We detect new formulations of union identity, engagement beyond the workplace, and newly politicized union strategy. O f course, such new formulations remain fragile and open to division, political tension, and subsequent re-formulation. They may also swing between a party-based response to a more syndicalist response. The collapse of the financial markets in 2008 heralds new fears of recession and poses fresh challenges to unions. H owever, appeals for state regulation and a revival of Keynesian demand management may not be enough to mask the long-term corrosive effects of neo-liberalism. The crisis of social democratic unions is set to continue, and alongside the crisis we foresee a parallel ‘opening-up’ of workers’ organised political dissent within wider civil society.

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A ppendices Post-War Governments and Leaders The tables below present the major post-war governments, membership of trade unions and political parties, and key events for our chosen countries. M embership figures for trade union members and political parties are sometimes best estimates taken from a number of sources. N ot all trade union membership for each country is included as most figures are taken from affiliates to union federations and may miss members of non-affiliated unions. All figures for Germany are for West Germany only up until 1989 and for all Germany from 1990. Despite the caveats, some clear trends, similarities and differences can be discerned. S weden has experienced the longest time in the post-war decades in which a social democratic government has been in power or has shared power in coalition (see shaded areas of charts below). Between 1945 and 2008, the SAP formed all or part of government for 52 out of 63 years. In Germany, the SP D has been in government or coalition for 20 of those years, in Britain the L abour Party for 28 years and in F rance a L eft government (PCF /SFIO /PS combinations) for 25 years. M embership of trade union federations in S weden is currently at its peak; in Germany membership peaked immediately after Unification in 1990 as the old East German union federation (F DGB) collapsed and membership was absorbed into western-based unions of the DGB. S ince then, membership has consistently fallen. In Britain, membership fell back from its 1979 peak as the Thatcher years took hold, but appeared to have reached a recent bottom point before staging some minor recovery. In F rance, membership has been consistently low peaking in the mid to late 1970s before falling back each year to 2007. M embership of the main social democratic party of labour peaked in the 1980s in both S weden (SAP ) and West Germany (SP D). The 1987 abandonment of the SAP ’s collective trade union membership in S weden in 1987 accounts for the substantially downwardly revised figure by 2007. Decline of L abour Party membership in Britain has been consistent since the immediate post war peak. M embership rallied about the time of the election of the N ew L abour Government in 1997 but has since plummeted further downwards. In F rance membership of the PCF was considerably higher than that of the SFIO /PS until the 1980s.

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Appendix A Sweden – Major Post-War Governments, Trade Union Membership, Political Parties and Key Events Years(s)

Government and Prime Minister

Estimated Membership of all trade unions (LO, TCO, SACO)

Estimated membership of SAP

Key Events

1945-76

SAP

1976-82

Conservative Coalition; T. F älldin

1.62m (1950) 1.85m (1960) 2.39m (1970) 3.30m (1980)

722,000 (1950) 801,000 (1960) 890,000 (1970) 1,205,000 (1980)

1982-86

SAP : O . Palme

1986-91

SAP ; I. Carlsson

2.81m (1990)

838,000 (1990)

1991-94

Conservative Coalition; C. Bildt

1994-02

SAP /L iberal Coalition

1956, LO -SAF begin central collective bargaining. 1973, L aw on board representation for local unions. 1980, lock-out/strike in public sector. 1983, industry-wide bargaining replaces central agreement. 1985, De-regulation of financial markets. 1987, SAP ends ‘collective membership’ and divorces from LO . 1992, withdrawal by SAF (S wedish employers’ organisation) from national collective bargaining framework. 1994, LO forces abandonment of labour market reforms. 1995, S weden joins E U. 1995, major reforms of social welfare benefits to reduce compensation.

2002-06

SAP ; G. Persson Conservative Coalition: F . R einfeldt

3.61m (2007)

125,000 (2007)

2006-

Source: various, including Berger and Broughton (1995), Bibes and M ouriaux (1990), Jefferys (1996b), LO , TCO , S DA CO , DGB, TUC, SP D, L abour Party, E ironline, L’Humanité online (20 M ay 2008).

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Appendix B Germany – Major Post-War Governments, Trade Union Membership, Political Parties and Key Events Year(s)

Government and Chancellor (West Germany 1949-1989, Germany 1990-)

Estimated 1 membership of all trade unions in West Germany 1945 to 1989, Germany 1990-

Estimated membership of SPD in West Germany 1945 to 1989, Germany 1990-

Key Events

1949-63

CDU/CS U/ F DP; K. A denauer

5.23m (1950) 6.38m (1960)

629,000 (1950) 650,000 (1960)

1948-49, Berlin Blockade. 1949 Basic Constitutional L aw of FR G. 1949, GDR founded. 1949, DGB union federation established in West Germany. 1951, Co-determination A ct for coal and steel industries. 1953, Uprising in E ast Germany (DDR ). 1955, S overeignty for FR G. 1956, Communist Party (KPD) proscribed. 1959, Bad Godesberg SP D Congress. 1961, Berlin Wall built.

1963-66

CDU/CS U/ F DP; L . E rhard CDU/CS U/ SP D; K. Kiesinger

820,000 (1970)

1967, Tri-partite period of Concerted A ction in FR G. 1968, attempted assassination of R udi Dutschke. 1969, unofficial strike wave in FR G. 1972, SP D largest party in West German Government for first time. 1972 legislation strengthens powers of Work Councils. 1973, FR G and GDR both enter United N ations. 1976, Co-determination A ct for companies with more than 2000 employees in FR G.

1966-69

1969-74

SP D/F DP; W. Brandt

7.71m (1970)

1974-82

SP D/ F DP; H . S chmidt

7. 88m (1980)

987,000 (1980)

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1982 -98

CDU/CS U/ F DP; H . Kohl

1998-02

SP D/ Green; G. S chröder

2002-05

SP D/Green; G. S chröder CDU/CS U/ SP D; A . M erkel

2005-

13.7m (1990)2 11.7m (1993)

775,000 (1998)

8.9m (2003) 8.5m (2005)

537, 995 (2008)

1983, Greens enter Bundestag for first time. 1987, publication of Socialdemokratische Krisenpolitik in Europa. 1989, Berlin Wall falls. 1990, German Unification. 1993, S tandort R eport. 1996, Bündnis für A rbeit (E mployment A lliance). 1998, reformed Bündnis für A rbeit. 2001, merger of five public service unions and foundation of Ver.di. 2003, launch of ������������ A genda 2010. 2005, L eft Party enters Bundestag for first time.

Source: various, including Berger and Broughton (1995), Bibes and M ouriaux (1990), Jefferys (1996b), LO , TCO , S DA CO , DGB, TUC, SP D, L abour Party, E ironline, L’Humanité online (20 M ay 2008). Notes 1 2

Totals for all Germany in 2003, for example, include affiliates to both the DGB and CGB. Includes membership in the New Länder for the first time.

Appendices

185

Appendix C United Kingdom – Major Post-War Governments, Trade Union Membership, Political Parties and Key Events Year(s)

Government and Prime Minister

Estimated TUC affiliate union membership3

Estimated individual membership of Labour Party4

Key Events

1945-51

L abour; C. A ttlee

9.29m (1950)

908,000 (1950)

1946, repeal of 1927 Trades Dispute A ct gives unions more immunities. N ationalisation of steel, Bank of E ngland, coal, power, inland transport. 1948, N ational H ealth S ervice created.

1951-55

Conservative; W.Churchill, A . E den Conservative; A .E den, H . M acmillan Conservative; H . M acmillan, A . DouglasH ome L abour; H . Wilson

1955-59

1959-64

1964-66

1966-70

L abour; H . Wilson

1970-74

Conservative; E . H eath

1974-74

L abour M inority; H . Wilson

1956, S uez Crisis. 1956, Future of Socialism published. 9.84m (1960)

11.19m (1970)

790,000 (1960)

348,000 (1970)

1964, Labour and the Scientific Revolution published. 1968, Donovan Commission reports. 1969, In Place of Strife published but successfully opposed by unions. 1971-72 ,WorkIn at Upper Clyde S hipbuilders. 1972, ‘Industrial R elations A ct’ collapses after union strikes. 1972 and 1974, M iners’ S trikes. 1973, UK joins E uropean E conomic Community.

186

The Crisis of Social Democratic Trade Unionism in Western Europe

1974-79

L abour; H . Wilson, J. Callaghan

1979-83

Conservative; M . Thatcher

12.95m (1980)

1983-87

Conservative; M . Thatcher

10.3m (1984)

1987-92

Conservative; M . Thatcher, J. M ajor Conservative; J. M ajor

9.9m (1990)

1997-01

L abour: T. Blair

6.2m (2001)

405,000 (1997)

2001-05

L abour: T. Blair

2005-

L abour: T. Blair, G. Brown

6.45m (2006)

182,000 (2006)

1992-97

311,000 (1980)

1974, H ealth and S afety at Work A ct. 1975, S ocial Contract between TUC and Government. 1976, IMF L oan. 1976, R ace R elations A ct. 1978-79, ‘Winter of Discontent’ public sector strikes and collapse of S ocial Contract. 1980-1992, E mployment and Trade Union A cts reduce trade union immunities and outlaw ‘closed shop’. 1984, ban on unions at Government Communications H Q followed by one day TUC-called S trike. 1984-85, M iners’ S trike. 1986, Wapping Printers’ Dispute. 1991, UK opts out of social chapter of E U’s M aastricht Treaty. 1995, A bandonment of ‘Clause IV’ of L abour Party Constitution. 1997, UK opts-in to E U social chapter. 1998, Blair’s Third Way published. 1998, N ational M inimum Wage introduced. 1999, E mployment R elations A ct allows concessions for union recognition. 2004, RM T union expelled from L abour Party; F ire Brigades Union disaffiliates from L abour Party. 2008, joint union strikes in public sector.

Appendices

187

Source: various, including Berger and Broughton (1995), Bibes and M ouriaux (1990), Jefferys (1996b), LO , TCO , S DA CO , DGB, TUC, SP D, L abour Party, E ironline, L’Humanité online (20 M ay 2008). Notes Some unions are not affiliated to the TUC. For example, in 2006 approximately 1.5 million people were members of unions which were not affiliated. 4 The Labour Party membership figures only include individual members and exclude affiliate members from trade unions, co-operative societies etc. 3

188

The Crisis of Social Democratic Trade Unionism in Western Europe

Appendix D France – Major Post-War Governments, Trade Union Membership, Political Parties and Key Events Year(s)

Government and President

1946-54

Three Parties (L eft) A lliance: V. A uriol

1954-59

Third F orce (Centre) Coalition: R . Coty Gaullists: C. de Gaulle

1959-69

Estimated union membership

4.00m (1960)5

Estimated individual membership of [1]SFIO/ PS and [2] PCF

Key Events

[1] 330,000 (1950) [2] 800,000(1946)

1945, L iberation Government initiates works councils in enterprises. 1947, PCF expelled from Government. 1948, FO splits from CGT. 1950, L aw on collective bargaining and national minimum wage. 1954, F rench defeated in Viet N am. E xclusion of PCF and ‘M arshallisation’. 1956, S uez Crisis.

[1] 120,000 (1960)

1962, A lgeria wins Independence. 1963, M iners’ strike. 1964 CF DT established as secular break from CF TC. 1968, General S trike and student riots. De Gaulle flees temporarily to West Germany. 1969, ‘N ormality’ resumes with General E lection. 1972, PCF and PS agree Common Programme. 1973, S trike for E quality and Dignity at R enaultBillancourt. 1977, PCF /PS Common Programme collapses. 1978, S ocialist Party vote higher than Communist Party for first time since 1936 Popular F ront.

[2] 850,000 (1967)

1969-74

Gaullists: G. Pompidou

3.90m (1970)

1974-81

R epublican/ Union of F rench Democracy: V. Giscard d’E staing

4.93m (1976)6

[1] 85,000 (1970)

[1] 160,000 (1980) [2] 700,000 (1977)

Appendices 1981-84

SP /PCF : F . M itterand

1984-86

SP : F . M itterand

1986-88

SP /Gaullist ‘Co-habitation’: F . M itterand SP : F . M itterand R ight Coalition: F . M itterand N eo-Gaullist RPR : J. Chirac SP Coalition: J. Chirac

3.62m (1986-88)

2002-07

N eo-Gaullist RPR : J. Chirac

1.90 (2003)7

2007-

Union for a Popular M ovement: N . S arkozy

1988-93 1993-95 1995-97

1997-02

4.51m (1983)

189 1982, A uroux L aws passed for subsidiarity and extension of collective agreements. R etirement A ge reduced from 65 to 60. 1984, PCF leaves coalition government.

2.00 (1990-94)

1995, widespread public sector strikes.

[1] 218,771(2007) [2]135,000 (2007)

2002/01, ME DEF launches Refondation sociale. 2002, L e Pen reaches second round of presidential election ahead of PS ’s Jospin. 2003, strike wave against pension and welfare reform. 2005, voters reject E U Constitution in R eferendum. 2005, inner city riots. 2006, strikes and street protests against the CPE . 2007, strikes against pension reforms.

Source: various, including Berger and Broughton (1995), Bibes and M ouriaux (1990), Jefferys (1996b), LO , TCO , S DA CO , DGB, TUC, SP D, L abour Party, E ironline, L’Humanité online (20 M ay 2008).

Notes CGT, CDF T, FO only. CGT, FO , CF DT, FEN , CGC, CF TC. 7 There are an estimated 400,000 unemployed and retired trade union members in addition to this total (M ythes et réalités de la syndicalisation en F rance, DARES O ctober 2004). 5 6

The Crisis of Social Democratic Trade Unionism in Western Europe

190 16

14

Membership in Millions

12

10 Sweden Britain Germany (West only to 1989) France

8

6

4

2

0 1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2007

Approximate Year

Appendix E Estimated Trade Union Membership 1950-2007

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Index adversarialism 96, 99, 100, 115 A denauer, Konrad 62-63, 183 AEE U (Britain) 103 A merican F ederation of L abor (AFL ) 6 Agenda 2010 72-73 A fghanistan 111 A lgeria 188 Amicus (Britain) 83, 101 anarcho-syndicalism 55 (see also, syndicalism) anglo-saxon capitalism 178 A nglicanism 83 A nti-S ocialist L aw 56 ASE (Britain) 82 associative democracy 166 A TTA C 23, 75, 78, 130, 138, 155 A uroux laws 198 A ustria 92, 150 autogestion 8, 125 awkward squad 176 Bad Godesberg (1959) Congress 7, 9, 183 Bakers’ Union (Britain) 167 Bartsch, Dietmar 77 Battersea and Wandsworth Trades Council 111 BDA (Germany) 69 BDI (Germany) 69 Bebel, A ugust 54, 56 Beck, Kurt 77 BE CTU (Britain) 107 Belgium 56 Bernstein, E duard 55-56 Besancenot, O livier 132 Benn, Tony 93, 108 Berufsverbot 65 Bevan, A neurin103, 108 Bevin, E rnest 82, 84, 89 Bisky, L otha 76 Bildt, Carl 46 Bismarck, O tto von 54 Blair, Tony 81, 96, 161, 186

Blairism 99 Blum, L éon 120 Böckler, H ans 61-62 BolkesteinDirective 154 Bolshevism 34, 86, 118 Bothereau, R obert 122 Brenner, O tto 66 Brie, M ichael 76 Brown, Gordon 95, 98, 186 Brousse, Paul 116 Burchill, F rank 102 business unionism 162 Callaghan, James 84, 93, 186 capital accumulation 1, 162, 164, 179 logic of 21 Catholicism 115 CBI (Britain) 98 CDU (Germany) 62, 65, 71, 79 child labour 114 CF DT (F rance) 13, 14, 74, 176, 178, 188 CF TC (F rance) 118, 188 CGT (F rance) 4, 8, 23, 117-119, 163, 176, 188 CGTU (F rance) 118-120 Chartist, Chartism 81, 84 Churchill, Winston 84, 89, 185 Citrine, Walter 89 civil society 2, 15, 19, 152, 158-159, 179 Clark, David 163 Clegg, H ugh 92 CO BAS (Italy) 153 co-determination 42, 57, 60, 62, 67, 73, 183 Cold War 90, 123 collective bargaining inBritain92 inE urope 115, 134 inF rance 8, 118, 178 inGermany 73 inS weden 39, 50

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Committee to Defend A sylum S eekers 111 Communist, communism 2, 6, 9, 21, 57, 113 Communist Party inBritain85-87, 90 inF rance 8, 118, 178 (see also PCF ) inGermany (see KAP D and KPD) inS weden 35, 48 (see also L eft Party, S weden) community unionism 110, 168 Conservatives 90, 92, 94 (see also, Tory Party) Cook, R obin163 corporatism 2, 10-12, 15, 37, 40, 64, 71, 157 cosmopolitan social democracy 165-167 Crosland, A nthony 91, 94 Crow, Bob 107, 167 Curran, Kevin103 CWU (Britain) 101, 106-107 cycle of contention 170 Czechoslovakia 61 DGB (Germany) 3, 13, 23, 57-80 decent work 166-167, 179 de Gaulle, Charles 188 de L eon, Daniel 85 Delors, Jacques 13, 144 de-nazification 58 Denmark 46 Deutsche Bundesbank 69 Deutsche Telekom 70 Deutscher N atur R ing 78 DTI (Department of Trade and Industry) 102 Donovan Commission 91-92 Dutschke, R udi 183 E bert-Gröner Pact 58 E rhard, L udwig 63, 183 E rfurt Programme 56 E ngels, F riedrich 18, 54-55 engineering industry 33 EPS U 155, 164 eurocommunism 125 euro-idealism 156 euro-pragmatism 156 E uropean Central Bank 144

E uropean Charter of F undamental R ights 152-153 E uropean Commission 155 E uropean Constitutional Treaty 131, 135, 153, 167, 189 E uropean E mployment S trategy 144, 167 E uropean Industry F ederations 143, 145146 E uropean M arches N etwork against Unemployment 136, 154 E uropean M etal F ederation 146 E uropean M onetary Union/S ystem 49, 69, 129, 148, 152, 167 E uropean Parliament 145 E uropean Trade Union Confederation (E TUC) 136, 141-158, 167 E uropean Transport Workers’ F ederation 155 E uropean Works Councils 145, 165 E uropean/World S ocial F orum 23, 75, 78, 111, 136, 155 E uropean S ocial M odel 23, 96, 141, 167 E uropean Union/EE C 27, 45, 49, 96, 130, 142-158, 176 F abians, F abian S ociety 83 fascist, fascism 3, 6, 111 F DI (foreign direct investment) 42, 46 F DP (Germany) 63, 76 financial markets (crisis of) 165 F inland 46, 150 F ire Brigades Union (Britain) 103-104, 106-107, 109, 186 firefighters’ dispute 101 F landers, A llan 92 flexible work 66, 95-96 FO (F rance) 4, 122, 163, 170 F ordism 43 F ranco-Prussian War (in1870-71) 55 G-10 (F rance) 136, 138, 172, 178-179 Gaitskell, H ugh 91 gastarbeiters 61 Gauche Unitaire E uropeéne 152 Gaullist, Gaullism 123-125, 188 General A greement on Trade inS ervices (GA TS ) 155 German R evolution

Index (during 1918-1919) 57 (in1923) 57, 59 German Unification (in1871) 54 (in1990) 53, 69 GE W (Germany) 78 Gilchrist, A ndy 103 globalization 14, 94-95, 114, 129 global justice movement 79, 152, 169 GM B (Britain) 103, 105 GM M otors 145 Greenpeace 155 Gramsci, A ntonio 19 Greece 3 Green Party (Germany) 9-10, 65, 70-71, 76 Green Party (S weden) 47 Guesdistes 116-117 Gysi, Gregor 76 H artz Commission 72-73, 176 H artz, Peter 72 H ayes, Billy 101-102 H enkel, H ans-O laf 68 H irsch-Dunker (trade unions) 55 H itler, A dolf 57 H olland 92 human rights 152 H yndman, H .M . 83 IG Bau (Germany) 67 IG-BCE (Germany) 162 IG M etall (Germany) 64, 67, 75-76, 78-79, 166, 177 International L abour O rganisation 78, 166 Independent L abour Party (Britain) 83 IMF (International M onetary F und) 47 incomes policy 37 Institute of Personnel M anagement 97 International S ocialists (Britain) 93 International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) 166-167 internet 171 Iraq 111 IRSF (Britain) 84 Italy 6, 9, 46, 61 Jaurès, Jean 116 Jones, Jack 93

223

Jospin, L ionel 189 Justice for Cleaners 110 KAP D (Germany) 57 Kautsky, Karl 55-56 Keskin, H akki 76 Keynes, Keynesianism 5, 7, 13, 15, 23, 27, 44, 66-68, 81, 93, 127, 135, 141, 147, 163, 173, 178 Kinnock, N eil 98 Kohl, H elmut 70, 184 KPD (Germany) 8, 57, 62 Kruschev, N ikita 123 Labour Behind the Label 109 Labour Campaign for Electoral Reform 106 labour internationalism 167 labourism 81, 83 L abour Party (Britain) 4, 23, 34, 65, 81112, 163, 176-177 labour process 39 L afontaine, O skar 71-72, 75-76 L asalle, F erdinand 54 L awther, Will 62 L CR (F rance) 132 leadership 172-173 L eber, George 67 L eft Party (Germany) 77-79, 178, 184 (see also, Linkspartei) L eft Party (S weden) 35, 48 L egien, Karl 56, 58 L enin, Vladimir 18-19 L eninist, L eninism 29, 65 L ennon, Tony 104 L e Pen, Jean-M arie 189 liberalism 33-34, 85, 88, 90, 134, 143 L iberal Party (Britain) 82, 88, 90 LI DL 78 L iebknecht, Karl 57 L iebknecht, Wilhelm 54 Linkspartei (Germany) 76, see also L eft Party (Germany) L isbon S trategy, L isbon Process 130, 150 Living Wage Campaign 110 L ufthansa 70 L ukács, Georg 20 L uxemburg, R osa 56

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M aastricht Treaty 135 M ackney, Paul 107-108 M ajor, John 94, 176, 186 M ann, Tom 83, 85 M ao, M aoism 65 M arino, Joe 167 M arshall A id 6, 90, 121, 188 M arxist, M arxism 9, 18-19, 47, 69, 83, 85, 113, 116, 171 M arx, Karl 18, 54-55 Marxism Today 96 M aurer, Ulrich 76 M cCarthy, Bill 92 M cDonnell, John 106, 108, 163 ME DEF (F rance) 133, 137 M erkel, A ngela 74, 77, 184 methodism 82-83 mezzogiorno 11 Militant (Britain) 98 M iners’ F ederation and miners’ unions (Britain) 82, 84, 89 M itterand, F rançois 10, 14, 126, 189 M ollet, Guy 122 M onks, John 103 M orris, Bill 98 M orris, William 83 M ünterfering, F ranz 77 NA TFHE (Britain) 106 N ational H ealth S ervice 106 N ational Pensioners’ Convention 110 N ational S hop S tewards N etwork 106 neo-corporatism 5, 10, 74, 81 neo-liberalism inBritain95, 108 inE urope 163, 170 inF rance 114, 130 inGermany 68-70, 78 inS weden 27-29, 43, 51 neo-marxism 9 N eskovic, Wolfgang 76 networking (inunions) 171-173 N ew L abour 95-97, 99, 104, 150, 181 new left 65 new model unions 88 new social movements 126, 169 new unionism 82 N GO s 109, 138, 154

N icholls, Doug 167 N ikolin, Curt 44 N ordic Green L eft 152 N ordic model 51 N UT (Britain) 110 O ffe, Claus 66 organising (unions) 78, 99-100, 109, 111, 173 O xfam 109 Paris Commune (1871) 116 participative democracy 166 partnership 15, 96, 99, 101-103, 161-162 PCF (F rance) 23, 119-121, 176, 181, 188 PCS (Britain) 102, 108, 110 PDS (Germany) 76-77 PES (inE uropean Parliament) 23, 141, 147149, 158 Pizza H ut 138 pluralist, pluralism 16, 88, 92 Police F ederation (Britain) 110 popular front (F rance, 1936) 120 Portugal 3 post-F ordism 64, 66 productivity 91 inBritain95 coalition 99, 161 and GDP 45 labour 70 inS weden 43 and unit labour costs 69 PS (F rance) 119-121, 188 Public S ervices International 155 rank-and-file workers 16, 39, 41, 85, 9193, 99, 168, 173 racism 111, 174 R eagan, R onald 45 R ed A rmy F action 64 R ehn-M eider model 45 refugees 61 reformist, reformism 2, 22, 117, 152 R ehn, Gøsta 38 R enault 117, 121, 123, 126-128, 188 repertoire of contention 171 R espect (Britain) 106-107 revisionist, revisionism 94

Index RM T (Britain) 106-107, 109, 186 R ocard, M ichel 129 R ussell, Bertrand 88 R ussia 19, 34 R ussian R evolution (1905) 18, 56 R ussian R evolution (1917) 18-20 R yder, Guy 166 S aab 42 SA C (S weden) 35 SAF (S weden) 29, 36, 44 sans papiers 138, 179 SAP (S weden) 3, 7, 9, 12, 22-23, 27-51, 174, 181 S canlon, H ugh 93 S charpf, F ritz 67 S chmidt, H elmut 4, 66-67, 183 S chröder, Gerhardt 71-75, 161, 184 S chumacher, Karl 62 S cottish S ocialist Party 106 S cottish TUC 111 S DF (Britain) 82 sectionalism 82, 94 SEI U (USA ) 78 S erwotka, M ark 103, 107-108, 110 SFIO (F rance) 118-119, 181 S haw, George Bernard 83 S heridan, Tommy 106 S iemens 78 S impson, Derek 101, 104 SLP (Britain) 85 S mith, John 98 social capital 162 social dialogue 143, 145, 147 socialism 54-56, 82-83, 98, 116 S ocialist A lliance (Britain) 107 S ocialist Workers Party (Britain) 93 social liberalism 95 social movements 132, 152 (see also, new social movements) social movement theory 16, 168-170 social movement unionism 48, 109, 168 social pacts 15 social partnership 71, 75, 78, 139, 143, 155, 157 (see also, partnership) social rights 152-153 S ommer, M ichael 75 S oviet Union 61, 20-121

225

sozialstaat 53, 66, 71, 73 SP D (Germany) 56-80, 174-175, 181 S partacists (Germany) 57 S päth, L othar 68 stakeholder (ism) 96 S talinist, S talinism 21, 76, 86, 120 state (role of) 21-22, 114, 134 S tinnes, H ugo 58 S top the War Coalition 111 strikes 18 inBritain86-88, 106, 110 inE urope 145, 172-173 inF rance 123, 129, 134 inGermany 64, 75-77 inS weden 33, 39, 50 S truck, Peter 77 S UD (F rance) 136, 138-139, 152, 172, 177-179 S wedish model 27-51, 177 syndicalism 85, 117 (see also, anarchosyndicalism) Tanner, Jack 62 Taylorization 117 TCO (S weden) 29, 49 TGWU (Britain) 83, 98, 101, 104-106 Thatcher, M argaret 10, 94, 176, 186 Thibault, Bernard 136 third way 1, 5, 15, 23, 44-45, 81, 94, 96, 134, 147, 158, 161-163, 177 Tory Party, Tories (Britain) 82, 87, 174 (see also, Conservatives) Toys R Us 50 trade unions (general) blue collar 62 bureaucracy 62, 82, 172-173 leaders 18-20, 57, 68, 86, 172 networking 171-172 public sector 110, 140 white collar 39-40, 62 Treaty of A msterdam 148-150 Treaty of N ice 150 Treaty of R ome 147 Trident 104 Trotskyite, Trotskyism 65, 86, 132 TUC (Britain) 4, 12-13, 82-112 UCU (Britain) 108, 110

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The Crisis of Social Democratic Trade Unionism in Western Europe

UNI CE 145 union learning representatives 162 Unison (Britain) 83, 102, 104, 110-111 UNI TE (Britain) 101 universal suffrage inBritain81 inF rance 113, 115 inGermany 56 inS weden 30 USA 99, 168, 173 US DA W (Britain) 83 US Democrats USP D (Germany) 57 Ver.di (Germany) 23, 75, 78-79 Volkswagen 72 voluntarism 12, 21, 88, 92 Volvo 42 VPK (S weden) 30 wage drift 39, 74 Ward, Dave 107 Warwick A greement 104 WAS G (Germany) 76-77, 79 Webb, S ydney and Beatrice 83, 85

Weimar (R epublic) 58-59, 68 welfare state 38 Wells, H .G. 83 Wiesenthal, H elmut 66 Williamson, Janet 96 Wilson, H arold 91, 93, 185 winter of discontent 93, 186 women workers 41, 64, 99, 115 workers (see also, working class) manual 41 skilled 32 unskilled 32 white collar 41 workers’ councils 57 works councils/councillors 53, 57, 59, 6364, 73, 128 working class (see also, workers) consciousness 18-20, 42, 84, 172 manual/blue collar 1, 32, 124 work intensification 73, 162 Woodley, Tony 103-104 Wrack, M att 103, 107 World Trade O rganization (WTO ) 78, 166 Y ugoslavia 61, 111