The Deleuze Dictionary

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EDITED BY At-rnnr\r HAKr( Th is is t he f ir s t d i c ti o n a ry d e d i c a te d to th e ' w ork of Gi l l es D el euze. It provides an in-depth and lucid introduction to one of the most influential figuresin coniinentalphilosophy. The dictionary defines and contextualisesmore than 150 ter-rnsthat relate to Deleuzel philosophy including concepts such as 'becoming','body without organs','decerritorializatiqn','differenre','repetition','rhizome' and 'schizoanalysis'. The clear explanationsalso-addressthe main intellectualinfluenceson Deleuze as well as tl're influence Deleuze has had on suDiects such as feminism, cinema, postcolonial theory, geographyand cultural studies.Those unfamiliar with Deleuze will find the dictionary a user-friendlytool equippingthem with definitions and interpretations both as a study and/or a teaching aid. The entries are written by some of the rnost prominent Deleuze scholars inciudingRosi Braidotti,Claire Colebrook,Tom Conley,EugeneHollarrdand Paul Patton.Thesecontributors bring their expert knowledgeand critical opinion to bear on the entries and provide an enrichingtheoretical context for anyone interestedin Deleuze. Adrian Parr is Professor of contemporary art and designat the SavannahCollege of Art and Design. She is the editor, with lan Buchanan,of Deleuze ond the Contemporory World, f orthcom i ng from Edinburgh U n iversity Press.

IS SBN 0-7 186-1899-6

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Th e D e l e u ze Dicti onarv Editedby Adrian Parr

EdinburghUniversity Press

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@ in this edition, Edinburgh University Press,2005 @ in the individual contributions is retained by the authors Edinburgh University PressLtd 22 George Squarg Edinburgh Typeset in Ehrhardt by Servis Filmsetting Ltd, Longsight, Manchester,and printed and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham, Wilts A CIP record for this book is availablefrom the British Library ISBN 0 7486 18988 (hardback) ISBN 0 7486 18996 (paperback) The right of the contributors to be identified as authors of this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and PatentsAct 1988.

Acknowledgements

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Introduction Claire Colebrooh Entries A-Z Bibliography

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Notes on Contributors

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Intr oduc ti on

A ckn o w l e d g e ments

First I would like to thank all rhe authorswho contributedto this proiect. Without you this dictionary would never have come into existence. Everyonewho hasentriesincludedhereand my editor,JackieJones,have beentremendouslycooperativeand helpful in more waysthan one.I would like also to thank Keith Ansell-Pearson,Ronald Bogue, Paul Patton and all of which havecerJamesWilliamsfor their commentsand suggesgions, tainly strengthenedthe theoreticalrigour of this dictionary; any shortcomingsareentirelymy own. I am very gratefulto MonashUniversityand SavannahCollegeof Art and Design for their continuingsupport.Lastly, the strongintellectand generosityof Ian Buchananand Claire Colebrook havebeena wonderfulsourceof inspirationfor me and I would iust like to extend my warmestthanksto you both; this project would neverhaveseen the light of day without your continuingencouragement and support. Adrian Parr

Claire Colebrook Why a Deleuzedictionary?It might seema particularly craven,disrespectful,literal-mindedand reactiveprojectto form a Deleuzedictionary. Not only did Deleuze strategicallychangehis lexicon to avoid the notion that his texts consistedof terms that might simply name extra-textual truths, he alsorejectedthe idea that art, scienceor philosophycould be understoodwithout a senseof their quite specificcreativeproblem. A philosopher's concepts produce connections and styles of thinking. Conceptsareintensive:they do not gathertogetheran alreadyexistingset of things (extension);they allow for movementsand connection.(The conceptof 'structure' in the twentieth century, for example,could not be isolatedfrom the problem of explaining the categoriesof thinking and the imageof an impersonalsocialsubjectwho is the effect of a conceptual system;similarly, the concept of the 'cogito' relatesthe mind to a movement of doubt, to a world of mathematicallymeasurablematter,and to a distinctionbetweenthought and the body.)To translatea term or to define any point in a philosopher'scorpus involvesan understandingof a more generalorientation, problem or milieu. This does not mean that one reducesa philosophyto its context- say,explainingDeleuze's'nomadism' asa reactionagainsta rigid structuralismor linguistics.On the contrary,to understanda philosophy as the creation of a plane,or as a way of creating someorientation by establishingpoints and relations,meansthat any philosophyis more than its manifestterms, more than its context. In addition to the producedtexts and terms, and in addition to the explicit historical presuppositions, thereis an unthoughtor outside- the problem,desireor life of a philosophy.For Deleuze,then, reading a philosopherrequires going beyond his or her produced lexicon to the deeper logic of production from which the relationsor senseof the text emerge.This senseitself canneverbe said;in repeatingor recreatingthe milieu of a philosopherall we can do is produce another sense,another said. Even so, it is this striving for sensethat is the creativedrive of readinga philosopher.Sq when l)eleuzereadsBergsonhe allowseachterm and moveof Bergson'sphilosophy to revolvearound a problem: the problem of intuition, of how the humanobservercan think from beyondits own constituted,habituated rrndall ttxl humanworld,

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It would seem,then, that offering definitions of terms in the form of a dictionary- as though a word could be detachedfrom its philosophicallife andproblem- would not only be at oddswith the creativerole of philosophy; it would alsosustainan illusion that the philosophicaltext is nothing more thanits 'said'andthat becoming-Deleuzian wouldbe nothingmorethanthe adoptionof a certainvocabulary. Do we,in systematising Deleuze'sthought, reducean eventand untimelyprovocationto onemore doxa? If Deleuze'swritings aredifficult and resistantthis cannotbe dismissed asstylistically unfortunate, asthough he really oughtto havejust sat down and told us in so many words what 'difference in itself' or 'immanence' really meant.Why the difficulty of style and vocabularyif there is more to Deleuzethan a way of speaking?A preliminary answerlies in the nexusof conceptsof 'life', 'immanence'and 'desire'. The one distinction that Deleuzeinsistsupon, both when he speaksin his own voicein Dffirence and,Repetitiozand when he createshis senseof the history of philosophy, is the 'imageof thought'. Philosophybeginsfrom an imageof what it is to think, whetherthat be the graspof ideal forms, the orderly receptionof senseimpressions,or the social construction of the world through language.The concepts of a philosophy both build, and build upon, that image. But if the history of philosophy is a gallery of such images of thought - from the conversing Socratesand mathematicalPlatq to the doubting Descartesand logical Russell- some philosophershave done , more than stroll through this galleryto add their own image.Somehave, in 'schizo' fashion, refused to add one more proper relation between thinker and truth, and havepulled thinking apart. One no longer makes one more step within thought - tidying up a definition, or correctinga seemingcontradiction.Only when this happensdoesphilosophyrealiseits power or potential. Philosophyis neither correct nor incorrect in relation to what currently countsas thinking; it createsnew modesor stylesof thinking. But if all philosophyis creation,rather than endorsement,of an imageof thought, somephilosophershavetried to givea senseor conceptto this creationof thinking: not one more imageof thought but 'thought without an image'. Deleuze's celebratedphilosophersof univocity confront the genesis, rupture or violenceof thinking: not man who thinks, but a life or unthought within which thinking might happen.When Spinozaimaginesone expressive substance,when Nietzsche imagines one will or desire, and when Bergsoncreatesthe conceptof life, they go someway to towardsreally askingaboutthe emergence of thinking.This is no longerthe emergence of thc thinker,or one who thinks, but the emergenceof somethinglike a minintrrlrclation,cvcntor pcrocptionof thinking,fronrwhich'thinkcrs'arc thcn cll'cctctl.'l'his nlcrulsthrrtthc rcrrlhistoryof'plrikrsophy rcquircs

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understanding the way philosophersproducesingularpoints,or the orientations within which subjects,objects,perceiversand imagesare ordered. Any assemblage such as a philosophicalvocabulary(or an artistic style, or a set of scientific functions) facesin two directions. It both givessome sort of order or consistencyto a life which bearsa much greatercomplexity and dynamism,but it alsoenables- from that order - the creationof further and more elaborateorderings.A philosophicalvocabularysuch as Deleuze'sgivessenseor orientationto our world, but it alsoallowsus to producefurther differencesand further worlds. On the one hand, then, a Deleuzianconcept such as the 'plane of immanence'or 'life' or 'desire' cstablishesa possiblerelation betweenthinker and what is to be thought, giving us somesort of logic or order. On the other hand, by coupling this conceptwith other concepts,such as taffectt'concept'and tfunctiont,or and 'imageof thought',we canthink not just about 'planeof transcendence' life or the planeof immanencebut alsoof how the brain imagines,relates to, styles,pictures,representsand ordersthat plane.This is the problemof how life differsfrom itself,in itself.The role of a dictionaryis only one side of a philosophy.It looks at the way a philosophy stratifiesor distinguishes its world, but once we haveseenhow 'a' philosophythinks and movesthis should then allow us to look to other philosophiesand other worlds. There is then a necessary fidelity and infidelity,not only in any dictionirry or any reading,but also in any experienceor any life. Life is both cffectedthrough relations,suchthat thereis no individual or text in itself; rrtthe sametime, life is not reducibleto effectedor actualrelations.There rre singularitiesor'powersto relate'thatexceedwhat is alreadygiven.This is the senseor the singularityof a text. Senseis not what is manifestlysaid rrr denoted;it is what is openedthroughdenotation.Sq we might saythat we needto understandthe meaningof Deleuze'sterminology- how 'territorialisation' is defined alongside 'deterritorialisation','assemblage', 'llody without Organs' and so on - and then how thesedenotedterms cxpresswhat Deleuzewantsto say,the intention of the Deleuziancorpus. llut this shouldultimately then leadus to the sense of Deleuze,which can only be giventhrough the productionof anothertext. 1 can say,here,that the senseof Deleuze'sworksis the problemof how thinking emergesfrom life, and how life is not a being that is given but a power to give various scnsesof itself (what Deleuzerefersto as'?being').But in sayingthis I have producedanothersense.Each definition of eachterm is a different path from a text, a different productionof sensethat itself opensfurther paths lirr definition.So, far from definitionsor dictionariesreducingthe forceof itn iruthoror a philosophy,they createfurther distinctions. 'l'his clocsr.rotmcfln, as ccrtirin popular vcrsionsof Frcnch poststructuralismmight irrclicrrtc, thilt tcxtshuvclro nrcanings rnd thrt onc ctn

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make anything mean what one wants it to mean.On the contrary, the life or problem of Deleuze's philosophy lay in the event: both the event of philosophicaltextsand the eventof worksof art. The eventis a disruption, violenceor dislocationof thinking.To readis not to recreateoneself,using the text asa mirror or medium through which one repeatsalreadyhabitual orientations.Just as life can only be lived by risking connectionswith other powers or potentials,so thinking can only occur if there is an encounterwith relations,potentialsand powersnot our own. If we take Deleuze'sdefinition of life seriously- that it is not a given whole with potentials that necessarilyunfold through time, but is t airtual power to createpotentialsthrough contingentand productiveencounters- then this will relatedirectlyto an ethicsof reading.We cannotreada thinker in order to find what he is saying'tous', asthoughtextswerevehiclesfor exchanging information from one being to another.A text is immanent to life; it createsnew connections,new stylesfor thinking and new imagesand ways of seeing.To read a text is to understandthe problem that motivated its The more faithful we are to a text - not the text's ultimate assemblage. messagebut its construction,or the way in which it producesrelations among concepts,images,affects,neologismsand alreadyexisting vocabularies - the more we will havean experienceof a style of thought not our own, an experienceof the powerto think in creativestylesassuch. One of the most consistentand productivecontributionsof Deleuze's thought is his theory and practiceof reading,both of which are grounded in a specificqonceptionof life. If there is one understandingof philosophy anddoxa,which wouldreturn andgoodreadingasgroundedin consistency logicandallowthoughtto remainthe same,Deleuze a text to an assimilable placeshimself in a counter-traditionof distinctionand paradox.Neither philosophynor thinking flowsinevitablyand continuouslyfrom life; reason is not the actualisationof what life in its potentialwasalwaysstriving to be, More than any other thinker of his time Deleuzeworksagainstvitalismor the idea that reason,thinking and conceptssomehowservea function or purposeof life, a life that is nothing more than changeor alteration for the sakeof efficiencyor self-furthering. If there is a conceptof life in Deleuze it is a life at oddswith itself, a potential or power to createdivergentpotentials.Admittedly,it is possibleto imaginethinking, with its concepts,dictionariesand organon,as shoring 'man' againstthe forcesof chaosand dissolution,but we can also- when we extendthis potential- seethinking asa confrontationwith chaos,asallowingmore of what is nrt ourselvesto transformwhat we takeourselvesto be.In this sensethought has'majoriboth a movementtowardsreducing tarian' and 'minoritarian'tendencies, and a tendcncytowards chnoticdiffcrcnccto uniformity and samencss I)clcuzc' opcninglhoscsrmcuniticsto n'stttttcring'orinconrprchcnsion,

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far from believingthat one might return thought to life and overcomethe submissionto system,recognisesthat the creation of a systemis the only way one canreally live non-systemically.One createsa minimal or dynamic order,both to avoidabsolutedeterritorialisation on the one hand and reactive repetitionof the already-ordered on the other.In this sense,Deleuzeis a child of the Enlightenment. Not only does he inhabit the performative self-contradiction, 'Live in such a way that one's life diverges from any givenprinciple,'healsodeducesthis 'principlethat is not one' from life. If one is to lioe, theremust both be a minimal connectionor exposureto the outsidealongsidea creationor perceptionof that outside,with perception being a difference. Deleuze'sontology- that relationsareexternalto terms- is a commitment to perceivinglife; life is connectionand relation,but the outcomeor eventof thoserelationsis not determinedin advanceby intrinsic properties. Life is not, therefore,the ground or foundation differentiatedby a set of ternls, such that a dictionary might provide us with one schemaof order amongothers.The productionor creationof a systemis both an exposure to thosepowersof differencenot alreadyconstitutedasproper categories of recognising'man' and a radical enlightenment.Enlightenment is, defined dutifully, freedom from imposed tutelage - the destruction of masters.Deleuze'sdestructionof masteryis an eternal,rather than perpetual, paradox. Rather than defining thought and liberation against anothersystem,with a continualcreationand subsequentdestruction,the challengeof Deleuze's thought is to createa systemthat containsits own aleatoryor paradoxicalelements,elementsthat are both inside and outside, orderingand disordering.This is just what Deleuze'sgreatconceptsserve to dol life is both that which requires some form of order and system (giving itself through differencesrhar are perceivedand synthesised)and, that which also opens the system,for life is just rhat power to d.ifferfrom which conceptsemergebut that can neverbe includedin the extensionof any concept. We canonly begin to think and live when we losefaith in the world, when weno longerexpecta world to answerto and mirror ourselvesandour already constituteddesires.Thinking is paradox,nor becauseit is simple disobedienceor negationof orthodoxy,but because if thinking hasany forceor distinction it hasto work againstinertia.If a body wereonly to connectwith whatallowedit to remainrelativelystableand self contained- in imageof the autopoieticsystemthat takesonly what it can masterand assimilate- then the very powerof life for changeand creationwould be stalledor exhausted by self-involved life formsthat livedin orderto remainthe same.Despitefirst appearances a dictionarycanbe the openingof a self-enclosed system.If we nrc faithfulto thc lifc of Dclcuzc'sthought- rccognising it as n crcation

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rather than destinedeffectof life - then we canrelive the production of this systemand this responseasan imageof production in general. (I must createa systemor be enslavedby anotherman's'- so declares Blake'sidealpoet in the highly contestedand chaoticagonisticsof his great poemJerusalem.Blake's aphorismswereindebtedto an enlightenmentlibitself in a seeminglyparadoxicalstructure. If we are erationismthat found condemnedto live in someform of systemthenwe caneitherinhabitit passivelyand reactively,or we canembraceour seemingsubmissionto a system Blake'searlyresponseproof relationsnot our own and respondcreatively. of the categoricalimperative the inescapability to vided an alternative which still hauntsus today:if I am to speakand act asa moral beingthen I can neither saynor do what is particular or contingent for me; living with othersdemandsthat I decidewhat to do from the point of view of 'humanity in general'.To speakor to live is alreadyto be other than oneself,and so recognitionof an initial submission.Such morality demandsa necessary a final consensusor intersubjectivity may neverarrive, but it hauntsall life and eternalaffirmationof nevertheless. By contrast,Deleuze'sparadoxical of a minimal system- to perceive inescapability begins from the creation or live is alreadyto be connected,to be other - but far from this requiring a striving for a systemof consensusor ideal closure,this producesan infinite opening.It might seemthat the Enlightenmentimperative- abandon all externalauthority - comesto function asyet one more authority, and it might alsoseemthat a fidelity to Deleuzeis a crime againstthe thinker of from difference.But the problemof Deleuze'sthought is iust this passage contradiction to paradox. To not be oneselfis contradictory if one must be eitherthis or that, if life must decideor stabiliseitself (form a harrative or imageof itself). 'Becoming-imperceptible',by contrast,is an enablingand productive paradox.One connectsor perceivesin order to live, in order to be,but this very tendencyis alsoat the sametime a becoming-other:not a nonbeingbut a?being.A Deleuziandictionarycomesinto beingonly in its use,only when the thoughts that it enablesopen the systemof thought to the very outsideand life that madeit possible.

ACTIVE/REACTIVE Lee Spinks The distinction between active and reactive forces was developed by Friedrich Nietzsche in his Oz the Genealogyof Morality and rhe notes posthumouslycollectedas The Will to Power.In his seminalreadingof Nietzsche,Deleuzeseizedupon this distinction (and what it madepossible) and placedit at the very heartof the Nietzscheanrevaluationof values.For Nietzsche,the distinction betweenactiveand reactiveforce enabledhim to present'being' asa processrather than 'substance'. The world of substantial being,he argued,is producedby the recombinationof multiple effectsof forceinto discreteideas,imagesand identities.There is no essential'truth' of being;nor is there an independent'reality' beforeand beyondthe flux of appearances; everyaspectof the realis alreadyconstitutedby quantitiesand combinationsof force. Within this economy of becoming,every force is relatedto otherforcesand is definedin its characterby whetherit obeysor commands.What we call a body (whether understoodas political, social, chemicalor biological)is determinedby this relationbetweendominating and dominated forces.Meanwhile Deleuze maintains that any two forces constitutea bodyassoonastheyenterinro relationship.Within this bodythe superior or dominant forcesare describedas 'active'; the inferior or dominatedforcesaredescribedas'reactive'.Thesequalitiesofactiveandreactive forceare theoriginal qualitiesthat definethe relationshipof forcewith force. If forcesare defined by the relative differencein their quality or power, the notion of quality is itself determinedby the differencein quantity betweenthe two forces that come into relationship. The characterof any relation,that is, is producedthrough forces.There are no intrinsic properties that dctcrmine how forccs will relate:a masterbecomesa master throughthe act